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The Spiral of ‘Anti-Other Rhetoric’
Discourse Approaches to Politics, Society and Culture The series includes contributions that investigate political, social and cultural processes from a linguistic/discourse-analytic point of view. The aim is to publish monographs and edited volumes which combine language-based approaches with disciplines concerned essentially with human interaction — disciplines such as political science, international relations, social psychology, social anthropology, sociology, economics, and gender studies. The book series complements the Journal of Language and Politics, edited by Ruth Wodak and Paul Chilton.
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Andreas H. Jucker
Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, Paris, France
University of Zurich
Michael Billig
George Lakoff
Loughborough University
University of California at Berkeley
Jan Blommaert
J.R. Martin
University of Ghent
University of Sydney
Paul Chilton
Luisa Martín Rojo
University of East Anglia
Universidad Autonoma de Madrid
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University of East Anglia
University of Southern Denmark
Teun A. van Dijk
Christina Schäffner
Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona
Aston University
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Volume 22 The Spiral of ‘Anti-Other Rhetoric’: Discourses of identity and the international media echo by Elisabeth Le
The Spiral of ‘Anti-Other Rhetoric’ Discourses of identity and the international media echo
Elisabeth Le University of Alberta
John Benjamins Publishing Company Amsterdam/Philadelphia
8
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The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences – Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ansi z39.48-1984.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Le, Elisabeth The spiral of ‘anti-other rhetoric’ : discourses of identity and the international media echo / Elisabeth Le. p. cm. (Discourse Approaches to Politics, Society and Culture, issn 1569-9463 ; v. 22) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Mass media and world politics. 2. Mass media and public opinion. 3. Discourse analysis. 4. Public opinion--United States. 5. Public opinion-Russia (federation). 6. Public opinion--France. 7. World politics--1989P96.W62 L4 2006 302.23--dc22 isbn 90 272 2712 8 (Hb; alk. paper)
2006048435
© 2006 – John Benjamins B.V. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the publisher. John Benjamins Publishing Co. · P.O. Box 36224 · 1020 me Amsterdam · The Netherlands John Benjamins North America · P.O. Box 27519 · Philadelphia pa 19118-0519 · usa
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In memory of the immigrant members of my family. To Edgar who is starting his adult life with a Russian, Azeri, French and American cultural background.
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Table of contents
Foreword chapter 1 Media, international relations, collective memories, and Critical Discourse Analysis 1.1 Media and international relations 1 1.1.1 Theoretical approaches 2 1.1.2 The “international media echo” 6 1.1.3 Interacting cascading networks model 7 1.2 Media and collective memories 10 1.3 Critical Discourse Analysis 12 1.4 Empirical study of the international media echo: Presentation 15 chapter 2 National and international contexts for the international media echo 2.1 Russian society 17 2.1.1 Russia in the 1990s 18 2.1.2 Russia and the West 25 2.2 French society 28 2.2.1 French foreign policy 28 2.2.2 Public opinion 31 2.2.3 Intellectuals 32 2.2.4 Human rights and “Liberté, égalité, fraternité” 34 2.3 American society 36 2.3.1 American foreign policy 36 2.3.2 Public opinion 38 2.3.3 The American concept of liberal democracy 38 2.4 Print elite media 42 2.4.1 Le Monde 42 2.4.2 The New York Times 45 2.4.3 Russian print elite media 47 2.5 General context at the end of the 1990s 51
xi
1
17
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chapter 3 Russia in Le Monde and The New York Times 3.1 Linguistic methodology 55 3.1.1 Coherence analysis 56 3.1.2 Coding at the macrostructural level 59 3.1.3 Coding at the all-sentence level 61 3.1.4 Coding complementarity 62 3.1.5 Verification of the analyses 64 3.2 Le Monde’s and The New York Times’ perspectives 65 3.2.1 Main trends 65 3.2.2 Lines of argumentation 66 3.2.3 Construction of the debate 68 3.2.4 Representation of Russia 83 3.2.5 Representation of Us 93 3.2.6 Le Monde’s and The New York Times’ positions 3.3 Different conceptual frameworks 102
53
98
chapter 4 Le Monde’s and The New York Times’ editorials in their national societies 4.1 French society 107 4.1.1 French foreign policy 107 4.1.2 Intellectuals 111 4.1.3 French public opinion 112 4.1.4 Le Monde’s editorials on Russia and French society 113 4.2 American society 115 4.2.1 American foreign policy 115 4.2.2 Elites 117 4.2.3 Public opinion 123 4.2.4 The New York Times’ editorials on Russia and American society 124 4.3 Significance of Le Monde’s and The New York Times’ editorials on Russia 126 chapter 5 Russian reactions to the West 5.1 Russian print elite media and the West in 1999–2001 129 5.1.1 Izvestija 129 5.1.2 Nezavisimaja Gazeta 132 5.1.3 Segodnja 134 5.1.4 Media coverage of Western and Russian intellectuals
107
129
138
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Table of contents
5.1.5
5.2
5.3
5.4
Representation of a turning point in the relations between Russia and France 140 5.1.6 An example of “international media echo” stricto sensu: Izvestija and Le Monde 144 Russian official position 147 5.2.1 Russian foreign policy in 1999–2002 147 5.2.2 Russian government and media 148 Russian public opinion 152 5.3.1 Relation to the West in connection to the second Chechen war 153 5.3.2 Attitude towards France and the USA 154 5.3.3 Relations to the West from the societal / economic point of view 156 5.3.4 Impact of the West 156 5.3.5 Russia’s place in the world 157 Russia and the West in 1999–2001 158
chapter 6 Crossing cultural and disciplinary boundaries 6.1 The spiral of “anti-Other rhetoric” 162 6.1.1 Its source 163 6.1.2 Its development 164 6.1.3 Its weakening 164 6.1.4 Its long-time effects 165 6.1.5 Can it be avoided? 167 6.2 Social identity theory and the international media echo 167 6.3 Realism, constructivism and public spheres 169 6.3.1 Realism 169 6.3.2 Constructivism 170 6.3.3 Realism and constructivism as complementary approaches 172 6.3.4 France, the USA and Russia in 1999–2001 173 6.4 Media identities on the international stage 176 6.5 Crossing boundaries 179
161
appendix 1 Editorials
183
appendix 2 Chronology
187
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appendix 3 Coherence analysis a3.1 Relations of coherence 197 a3.2 Definitions 200 a3.2.1 Macrostructural basis and text division 200 a3.2.2 Theme 201 a3.2.3 Macrostructure 202 a3.3 Hierarchical structure of a text 203 a3.4 Coding 203 a3.5 Example: “The Truth About a Hero’s Death” (NYT, 29 November 2000) 203 appendix 4 Content coding a4.1 Ideological square at the macrostructural level 211 a4.2 Parties appearing in the argumentation 213 a4.2.1 Writers’ voices 216 a4.2.2 Other voices 221 a4.2.3 Specific addressees 227 a4.2.4 Interactions at the macrostructural level 232 a4.3 Representation of Russia in terms of its history 234 appendix 5 Negative representation of Russia a5.1 Le Monde 237 a5.2 The New York Times 240
197
211
237
Notes
245
References
269
Index
279
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Foreword
The theoretical genesis of this book could be described as two frameworks in need of each other: a linguistic analysis in search of a context theory in the domain of Critical Discourse Analysis, and a media / international relations inquiry in search of a linguistic method of analysis. Chronologically, my personal and academic interest in media and East-West relations preceded by many years my training as a linguist, but this work started in fact as a project in applied linguistics. What it has become is an interdisciplinary amalgam that brings together elite media, Russia and the West, and national identities on the basis of the linguistic analysis of Le Monde’s and The New York Times’ editorials. The driving force behind this work has been my desire to understand and explain obstacles in intercultural relations, and to contribute, even very modestly, to a better acceptance between individuals and peoples. Indeed, most of all, this book bears on the fruitfulness of crossing boundaries, be they cultural, political, disciplinary or others. Many people of various cultural backgrounds and different specializations have helped me throughout the realization of this project. I would like to thank them all warmly, in particular: – – – – –
– –
the graduate students who participated in this project as my research assistants, especially Jean-Jacques Defert, Valerie Wust and Christina Keppie; Andrea Hayes for her editorial assistance and great help in translating French quotations; Elena Krevsky for her kindness and useful comments on Chapter 5; Vladimir Degoev and his family for their wonderful welcome in Moscow and help in contacting journalists; Mikhail Dmitriev for his fiery indignation over Le Monde’s positions on Russia and our heated yet amicable discussions on the topic, which was to give rise to this project; Paul Dubé for the friendly use of his listening skills over coffee; Kiamran Radjabli for his patient phone explanations of the intricate innerworkings of computers, for his help in understanding Russian cultural references, and for his support;
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– –
the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the University of Alberta for their research grants; two anonymous reviewers for their detailed and very thoughtful suggestions.
Some parts of this book have appeared as articles in Discourse and Society, the Journal of Pragmatics and Journalism Studies.
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chapter
Media, international relations, collective memories, and Critical Discourse Analysis
Periodically, the world of media becomes entangled in its own “wars”: TV news and reports, articles and editorials strongly denounce the Other, and the Other replies with its own accusations. When the Other is a foreign country, feelings of national pride mix in, and some nervousness appears on all concerned sides, government, media and public opinion alike. The role of media when it reports on (real) wars has lately attracted the interest of a number of specialists (Thussu & Freedman 2003). However, wars (of all types) are not the only occasions when journalists talk and write about another country. As Clausewitz famously said, war is the continuation of politics by other means. Thus, if media can be (discursively) engaged in wars, it seems fair to think that they can also engage in diplomacy, the non-war aspect of international relations. In a case study involving media in three national cultures and languages, this book examines how these media participate in international relations with the “spiral of anti-other rhetoric” they engage in and withdraw from with each other. “Spirals of anti-other rhetoric” deal with interactions at the international level, thus it is pertinent to examine different approaches followed in the study of media in international relations (1.1). Furthermore, as “spirals of anti-other rhetoric” are situated in a framework of remembered events, a review of media and collective memories follows (1.2). Then, a brief description of Critical Discourse Analysis (1.3), the framework for this study, is given; it is followed by a presentation of the case study (1.4).
. Media and international relations The role of media in foreign policy started attracting particular attention in the 1960s, and a number of empirical studies and theories have been published since. Theoretical attempts have recently tried to make globally sense of them (1.1.1), and the concept of international media echo has been defined (1.1.2); this concept is developed in the interacting cascading networks model (1.1.3).
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.. Theoretical approaches Noting the increasing importance of media’s involvement in diplomacy as a major standard instrument for communication and negotiation, Gilboa (2000) proposes a useful taxonomy of interactions between media and diplomacy that is composed of six conceptual models divided into two categories. The first category is based on the levels of media coverage, and it includes secret diplomacy, closed-door diplomacy, and open diplomacy. Secret diplomacy totally excludes the media and the public from negotiations and related policymaking: they are not even aware that anything has taken place. This most often happens in the case of negotiations with enemies on highly sensitive security and political issues. In closed-door diplomacy, the media and the public are aware that something is happening, but know nothing of the content. This type of diplomacy aims to break impasses in security issues when some groups might still see the talks as illegitimate, and the concessions / effects are expected to be significant. Open diplomacy allows for extensive and direct media coverage of international negotiations. It usually takes place after breakthroughs or when friendly parties are negotiating over congenial issues. The second category refers to political uses of the media and comprises: public diplomacy, media diplomacy, and media-broker diplomacy. Public diplomacy aims to affect foreign people’s thinking, and ultimately their government’s, through direct communication, with media being one of the channels of communication. In its basic variant, it is used to achieve long-term results by creating a positive image of oneself to counter domestic propaganda of the target society’s government. The non-state transnational variant refers to campaigns conducted by non-state actors in the fields of human rights and democracy, for example. In the domestic public relations variant, a public relations firm and, sometimes, lobbyists are hired in the target society. Media diplomacy uses mass media to communicate with state and non-state actors and aims to build confidence as well as to get the support of the public. The basic communication variant takes place when officials are unsure of how the other side would react. In the traveling diplomacy variant, correspondents accompany leaders in their diplomatic travels. The media events variant is characterized by live broadcast that is intended to attract wide audiences around the world. Finally, media-broker diplomacy is international mediation conducted and sometimes initiated by journalists. In the direct intervention variant, journalists are actively and directly involved (e.g. CBS Walter Cronkite’s role in the initial phase of Sadat’s visit to Israel in 1977). The bridging variant occurs when media invite representatives of opposing sides to discuss the issue that divide them (e.g. Ted Koppel’s ABC program, Nightline). The secret variant is used by governments when they employ the services of wellexperienced and trusted journalists to counter the rigidity and conservatism of
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Chapter 1. Media, international relations, collective memories, and CDA
Table 1.1 Taxonomy of actors and concepts (Gilboa 2002: 733) Type of actor
Activity
Context
Concept
Controlling actor
Replacing policy makers
CNN effect
Constraining actor Intervening actor
Constraining policy makers Becoming mediators
Humanitarian military intervention Decision making
Real-time policy
Instrumental actor
Promoting negotiations & agreements
International mediation Conflict resolution
International political brokerage Media diplomacy
their foreign affairs bureaucracies (e.g. ABC John Scali’s role in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis). In this case, the involved journalists are engaged in parallel reporting and secret mediation. Gilboa concludes that “media, [. . .], have transformed diplomacy more through providing leaders and officials with new tools than in functioning as independent actors” (2000: 305). In his categorization of models according to the levels of media coverage and political uses of the media, Gilboa takes a governmental perspective: how much and in which manner should media be allowed to participate in some form of diplomacy. Among the various models he presents, media appears a self-standing actor only in the direct intervention variant and the bridging variant of mediabroker diplomacy. However, from a media perspective, media report on foreign events, but they also intervene in the debate by taking position in its interpretations and evaluations of what is happening in other countries and between countries. Thus, the question of media effects is posed. In his critical evaluation of theories on the effects of global communication on foreign policy, Gilboa (2002) distinguished four categories according to type of actor, activity, context and concept (Table 1.1). First, in the controlling actor theory, media produces the CNN effect, i.e. it becomes a direct and maybe even dominant actor in the formulation of foreign policy, particularly when it comes to humanitarian military intervention (e.g. Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda). This theory finds its sources in the belief, despite evidence to the contrary (Hallin 1986), that negative media coverage of the war in Vietnam caused the defeat of the American army, and it contradicts the “manufacturing consent theory” according to which media generally support the official establishment policy (N. Chomsky & Herman 1988). The general claims of the CNN effect have been disproved by many studies (Gilboa 2005), but the controlling actor concept could still be valid in some narrower domains such as the previolence and postviolence phases of conflicts. Second, the constraining actor theory asserts that policy makers may be constrained (but not controlled) by fast-paced global news coverage, particularly in
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severe crisis situations. While traditional diplomacy has always relied on elite newspapers for information on other countries, all-news television networks, thanks to the technical ease of live reporting, have become a powerful and dramatic source of information both to decision-makers and the general public because of the speed of broadcasting. However, real-time coverage is also the cause of serious difficulties: in a competing journalistic environment, reporters are encouraged to work faster and this can lead to incomplete and even inaccurate information; furthermore, policy decisions might be taken without the extensive deliberations and complementary information they would require because the public, having received some information, expects a decision. Third, the intervening actor theory poses that journalists may cross the line between reporting and mediating. This can happen when leaders, not available through ordinary diplomatic channels for various reasons (e.g. Fidel Castro, Yasser Arafat, Saddam Hussein), are interviewed. While sometimes successful in helping bring opposing parties to the negotiation table, such an involvement in international issues can compromise journalistic standards by affecting the reports’ accuracy and objectivity. Fourth and finally, the instrumental actor theory advances that leaders engage in media diplomacy through press conferences, interviews, leaks, and other mediatized events to express interest in negotiation, build confidence and mobilize public support (Gilboa 1998: 62–63). This new type of diplomacy has trivialized the ambassadors’ role, but also helped in the creation of climates conducive to the opening of negotiations and to the sealing of agreements (Dayan & Katz 1992: 204– 205). Three questions in this regard need to be further investigated: the conditions of success for media diplomacy; the role of journalists when politicians and officials use and control the media in such a manner; and the long-term effects of media diplomacy. Gilboa ends his categorization of media theories with three remarks: media role depends on the prominence of the involved (TV) journalists and on the political leadership agenda; political leaders and diplomats need to be better trained in the use of communication technologies; journalists’ function can pass from one of observer to one of participant, thus placing a heavier responsibility on them. Another categorization of media influence in world politics is provided by Robinson’s model (2001). Based on the work of Hallin (1986) and Bennett (1990), this model is centered on the level of consensus within the elite, understood as the Executive, Legislative or other politically powerful position in society (Table 1.2). If there is consensus, Hallin predicts that media will reflect it. Thus, media will “manufacture consent” for the governmental policy. It is in cases of elite dissensus, or “legitimate controversy” (Hallin 1986), that critical journalism can take place (Bennett 1990; Hallin 1986). The influence of media depends then on the level of policy certainty within the Executive. If part of the elite contests the governmental
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Table 1.2 The policy-media interaction model and theories of media-state relations (Robinson 2001: 536) Level of elite consensus
Media-state relationship
Role of media
Elite consensus
Media operates within ‘sphere of consensus’ (Hallin) Media operates within ‘sphere of legitimate controversy’ (Hallin) Media takes side in political debate and becomes an active participant
Media ‘manufactures consent’ for official policy Media reflect elite dissensus as predicted by Hallin and Bennett Media functions to influence direction of government policy
Elite dissensus
Elite dissensus plus policy uncertainty and critically framed media coverage
policy, critical media coverage can provide them with additional support but is unlikely to change a firmly set official policy. But if disagreement results from a lack of policy, negative media coverage might lead the government to formulate its policy merely as a counterattack. If the government however still does not formulate a policy, it will keep on being the object of media attacks and eventually public opinion. Thus, the less certain government policy is, the more vulnerable it is to the media taking sides. Media is considered to “take sides” in the debates by its “framing” of events, i.e. the “specific properties of . . . [a] narrative that encourage[s] those perceiving and thinking about events to develop particular understanding of them” (Entman 1991: 7). Robinson concludes that the possibility of media influencing world politics is much greater than what is allowed by the manufacturing consent theory. In his attempt to conciliate the complexity of reality with the generality, parsimony and explanatory power that theory is supposed to represent, Page (2000) focuses on Entman’s triangle of three actors: public officials, media, and public opinion, and contends that it “schematizes a family of very simple and parsimonious theories of the media and foreign policy. Each theory in the family specifies the existence of the three actors and says something about the existence and/or the magnitude of some subset of the six possible bilateral relationships among them” (Page 2000: 88). Page underlines that no single theory can be totally adequate, and he adds that a satisfactory theory must specify the type of world system to which it applies (e.g. before or after the Cold War), the type of State it involves, and the type of issue it concerns. However, as shown by several studies, further distinctions between types of public opinion, types of actors within civil society, types of governmental officials, and types of media need to be drawn, and there disappears parsimony. While these three approaches pursue the same goal of theorizing the role of media in foreign policy on the basis of various empirical studies, they each center on a different concept. Gilboa (2002) takes as his focus the type of media influence,
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Robinson (2001) concentrates on the level of elite consensus, and Page (2000) on the types of relationships within a single State. Apart from the respective advantages and disadvantages each approach might present, the question arises as to the reason behind the choice of one perspective over the other. .. The “international media echo” Since foreign policy takes place in the realm of international relations, it seems a priori strange that none of the above approaches takes into account the type of relationship between the States involved, as if foreign policy were a goal in itself. In a world were “global communication” has become a buzzword, it appears appropriate to look at media influence not only in terms of foreign policy but of international relations. These relations take place on the State level and also between different national media. The “international media echo, when the content of one nation’s media becomes news in the media of another country” (Frederick 1993: 228), has been said to “mediat[e] international relations by allowing the construction of a symbolic dialogue between nations” (Oehlkers 2000: 32). A number of empirical studies have been conducted on media and foreign policy (Becker 1999; Hafez 2000; Malek 1997; Malek & Kavoori 2000; Nacos et al. 2000) with the analysis of different national media on a specific theme, but it seems that only one has specifically focused on media of different countries “dialoguing” with each other on the same topic. Oehlkers (2000) has examined how American and Japanese media reported on Sony’s acquisition of Columbia Pictures in 1989, when Japan and the United States were going through a general phase of mutual criticisms. In his conclusion, Oehlkers remarks that “the imagination of the national speaking subject, [. . .], is an element in the ideological construction of the ‘nation’ itself. The naturalization of national voices may work to suppress differences in perspectives within nations and reify national boundaries in terms of such perspectives” (Oehlkers 2000: 48). Three factors might have contributed to the lack of attention given to the function of media in international relations: insufficient abilities to work in several languages; the definition of the international media echo whose narrowness can make it difficult to collect a large enough corpus; and the international relations approach in which media is considered. The first factor could easily be alleviated, as a number of scholars in the field already know more than one language and others could be encouraged to develop their linguistic abilities. Regarding the second factor, a larger understanding of the concept would solve the difficulty. The international media echo has been defined as the report in one’s national media of what is said in another’s national media. It could also be understood in a less restricted manner as different national media reporting on each other’s society, especially when they react to what the Other (but not necessarily a media) says about
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oneself. These mutual reports are fed with information originating from different sources, including foreign media, particularly when journalists work in their own country. This second definition offers a larger and more appropriate stage for the study of the “symbolic dialogue between nations”, and it is thus the one adopted here. As for the third factor, it demands to reconsider the link of media studies with international relations theory. .. Interacting cascading networks model An interesting approach for the study of media in international relations is presented by Entman’s work on framing. A key concept among theories of media influence,1 framing, has been given numerous definitions in social science and the humanities.2 In 1993, Entman defined framing as select[ing] some aspects of a perceived reality and mak[ing] them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation. (1993: 52)
In Projections of Power, Entman (2004) distinguishes between substantive frames that “perform at least two of the following functions in covering political events, issues, and factors: defining effects or conditions as problematic; identifying causes; conveying a moral judgment; endorsing remedies or improvements” (2004: 5), and procedural frames that suggest “evaluations of political actors’ legitimacy, based on their technique, success, and representativeness” (2004: 6). Entman adds that “procedural framing does little to motivate or equip the public to engage in political deliberations, although it can have other important political effects” (2004: 6). The capacity of a frame to support or oppose a particular side depends on the frame’s cultural congruence, i.e. its closeness to culturally dominant “networks of linked ideas and feelings.” The more culturally congruent a frame, the more powerful it is in its abilities to stimulate reactions in accordance to it. Foreign policy issues can be either clearly culturally congruent or incongruent, or ambiguous. A clearly culturally congruent issue makes it easy to frame it as such and thus to influence reactions to it. A clear cultural incongruence leads to so much dissonance with habitual ways of thinking that the usual reaction is to go away from the “problem” and respond in manners that are more comfortable cognitively and emotionally. Contrarily to most of the clearly congruent and incongruent issues, in cases of ambiguity, the “winning frame” in which the issue is presented emerges from the interactions between motivations, power and strategy. In his cascading activation model to describe the process of news framing in the United States, Entman (2004) schematizes the links between the Administration and public opinion (Figure 1.1). Each level consists of a network of people and
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Administration White House State Defense
Other elites Congress members & staffers Ex-officials Experts [Foreign leaders]
Media Journalists News organizations
News Frames Framing words Framing images
Public Polls Other indicators
Figure 1.1 Cascading Network Activation (Entman 2004: 10)
organizations, and the ideas framed by the superior levels go to the levels below as in a cascade that starts at the Administration level and goes down to the elites, then the media and finally public opinion. In reverse, public opinion is partly reflected in media representations whose frames are taken into account by the elites and the Administration. However, despite all the interest that Entman’s cascading network activation model may present, it is still focused on the foreign policy of one national State only, the United States, and thus, it needs to be seen whether it can be applied to a different, but not radically different, State, and how it can be adapted to the study of (media) international relations. Figure 1.2 presents an adapted model under the form of interacting cascading networks. Each cascading network operates in its specific national socio-cultural context within a State that represents juridically and politically its national society on the international level in a world context. Through their news frames, national media of X not only take position on an issue in consideration of the national debate but
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Chapter 1. Media, international relations, collective memories, and CDA
World context Level 5 State X
State Y
Executive
Level 4
Executive
Other elites
Level 3
Other elites
Media
Media
News frames
Level 2
News frames
Public
Level 1
Public
National socio-cultural context of X
National socio-cultural context of Y
Figure 1.2 Interacting Cascading Networks
also of what they eventually perceive from society Y through Y’s news frames, and vice versa. Y’s news frames affect X indirectly through their effects on X’s media, but also directly through their reception by X’s elites and Executive.3 Thus, the international media echo (represented with a bold dotted arrow in Figure 1.2) operates on diverse planes and raises questions at different levels: 1. Public’s level: how sensitive, in which domain and in which circumstances, is the public to foreign media (directly and) indirectly? 2. Media level: what types of media are most engaged in the international media echo and under which circumstances? In which measure do foreign news get translated into national frames or influence national frames? 3. Other elites’ level: in their pressures on the Executive, how do the elites take into consideration the national public, the national interest, and foreign media (perceived directly and indirectly)? 4. Executive’s level: in which measure do foreign media influence the conduct of international affairs through the definition of foreign policy directly (through their news frames or contacts with journalists) and indirectly (through their
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reflections in national media, their influence on national elites and public, and through their influence on foreign public, elites and Executives)? 5. International level: which role do media play in international relations? What is their status? Considered together, these questions could constitute a framework for a study program of the international media echo. Each one of them is certainly too broad and too complex to be tackled in one study. This book focuses more particularly on the last one. Furthermore, while relying on a cognitive approach to framing, this work purports to explore the connection of the discovered frames with cultural phenomena (Gandy 2003: 357).
. Media and collective memories In their presentation of news and the necessary interpretation of facts required to make a ‘story’, journalists refer to a historical framework in order to help their readers make links between new events and events of the past that are already stored and organized in their background knowledge. While this is certainly the case for national news, it appears even more so for international ones, as journalists may not assume as much background knowledge from their readers. This integration of new facts within a framework of ’old’ knowledge that allows these new facts to become knowledge and then be remembered takes place both at the individual and collective levels. Halbwachs (1952) in his sociological theory of memory underlines the interactions between collective frameworks of memory and individual memories: each realizes and manifests itself in the other. Wertsch (2002: 20–24) distinguishes between two types of collective memories: the strong and the distributed versions. The strong versions, that have been difficult to defend, assume that some sort of a collective mind or consciousness exists above and beyond the minds of individuals in a collective, and draws parallels between individual and collective processes. The more accepted distributed versions posit that representation of the past is distributed among members of a collective, but there is no collective mind in the strong sense. In the “homogeneous” form of the distributed version, all members of the collective share the same representation of the past. This rarely happens, but it sometimes underlies sweeping statements about the Other. In the “complementary” version, members of the group have different representations that form a coordinated system. In the “contested distribution” version, different representations exist but in a system of opposition or contestation. According to Wertsch, members of a group “share a representation of the past because they share textual resources. The use of these texts may result in homogeneous, complementary, or contested collective mem-
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ory, but in all cases, it is the key to understanding how distribution is possible” (2002: 26). Among these shared textual resources, media figure in a prominent place, especially when it comes to the representation of a foreign Other. The question of collective memory is closely connected with that of national identity, a variant of social identity with an added need to transcend (Salazar 1998: 121), that provides a rationale for the group existence (Bar-Tal 1998). Bell (2003) points out that the key issue about national identities is not so much about their origins (as much of the literature indicates) but rather about how they “emerge in specific instances and are then translated over time, and about their everyday actualization and propagation” (2003: 69). Collective memories contribute to the definition of national identities as a creative and purposeful process that “allow[s] for the fabrication, rearrangement, elaboration, and omission of details about the past, often pushing aside accuracy and authenticity so as to accommodate broader issues of identity formation, power and authority, and political affiliation” (Zelizer 1998: 3). Collective memory is “an evoking of a past to frame a present but also to conform that past to the present” (Gronbeck 1998: 58). Collective memory is not history, but it is linked to it and has an effect on the future: History defines us just as we define history. As our identities and cultures evolve over time, we tacitly reconstruct our histories. By the same token, these new collectively defined historical memories help to provide identities for succeeding generations. (Pennebaker & Banasik 1997: 18)
Although numerous studies have been conducted on collective memory, few have investigated the topic specifically in connection with news media. On the grounds that knowledge of collective memory could explain either the mentality of an era or differences between generations, Lang and Lang (1989) conducted an exploratory study on the link between major news of the past and the content of collective memories. They state that events are remembered when refashioned and made meaningful in a contemporary context. Collective memory, the type of past to which most people, including journalists, recur differs from historical knowledge, the past as made known by historians. Collective memory embodies an orientation to the past, as do news agenda to the future; together, both frame the reporting of news. According to Lang and Lang (1989), journalists invoke the past with four purposes: to delimit an era, to provide yardsticks by which to evaluate the significance of an event, to draw explicit analogies, or to give short-hand explanations; and as with time personal memories of events tend to fade, the more remote an event is, the more important mediation is for it being remembered. In the most recent article on the topic, Edy (1999) develops another typology of journalists’ use of collective memory. From the work done by Zelizer (1992) and Schudson (1978), she retains the idea that the manner in which journalists represent the past impacts on the way we see its relevance (or lack thereof) to the present
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and the future. Through her exploratory study on the 1965 Watts riots in Los Angeles, she identifies three types of allusions to the past: commemorations, historical analogies, and historical contexts. Commemorations offer opportunities to re-examine the past. However, because these stories usually do not make this past appear relevant to the present, their impact is greatly diminished. Historical analogies are more germane to the present but do not encourage a critical examination of the past. As for historical contexts, they too do not invite a closer look at the past, because this past is presented as evidence. Thus, journalistic mentions of the past are used for the analysis and the dramatisation of events without much concern for the construction and maintenance of collective memory. In conclusion, Edy suggests that ‘journalism may provide a critical forum for the negotiation of shared meanings when a hegemonic understanding of the past has yet to emerge’ (Edy 1999: 83). The case study presented in this book looks at how the representation of a “new” Other is linked to its “old” representation, i.e. whether the Other, after a regime change, succeeds in changing its image on the international scene or is a “prisoner of its past”. Collective memory studies in the Humanities and Social Sciences have recently been criticised by Kansteiner (2002) for their incomplete methodology. According to him, we should conceptualise collective memory as the result of the interaction among three types of historical factors: the intellectual and cultural traditions that frame all our representations of the past, the memory makers who selectively adopt and manipulate these traditions, and the memory consumers who use, ignore, or transform such artifacts [sic] according to their own interests. (2002: 180)
In other words, the objects through which memory is transmitted, the senders, and the receivers must all be taken into consideration. Critical Discourse Analysis allows such an approach.
. Critical Discourse Analysis As the core of the international media echo is constituted by journalistic texts, written or oral, it seems appropriate to adopt tools of analysis that are specifically adapted to language for their study. Based on linguistic research, these tools give a more precise insight into the texts’ meaning than content analysis usually conducted in media studies or international relations can provide (Johnston 1995; Milliken 1999, 2001). They will also provide a firm ground for the analysis of the ideational impact through communication and persuasion (as advocated by the constructivist approach).
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The field originating in linguistics that considers language as a social phenomenon and thus analyses texts and places these texts in their context in order to determine the function of the discourse they represent in society is called Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). More than just linguistics, CDA is an interdisciplinary approach with a linguistic basis. Indeed, CDA aims to investigate social inequalities as they are constituted, expressed and transmitted by language; and the three most important concepts in CDA are power, history and ideology. CDA appears under different types (Wodak & Meyer 2001). Jäger’s approach (1999) is based on Michel Foucault’s discourse theory that focuses on knowledge, its composition, evolution, transmission, function for the constitution of subjects and shaping of society, and impact on society’s overall development. Considering that knowledge covers all aspects of human consciousness, Jäger states that Discourses exercise power as they transport knowledge on which the collective and individual consciousness feeds. This emerging knowledge is the basis of individual and collective action and the formative action that shapes reality. (Jäger 2001: 38)
Discursive practices, as the pre-requisite of “dispositives” which are “the constantly evolving context of items of knowledge which are contained in speaking/thinking – acting – materialization” (Jäger 2001: 56), are analyzed with various tools, including linguistic ones, that are selected according to their relevance to the texture of the object to be investigated. Action and materialization, the two other components of the dispositive, are also investigated for the knowledge that underlies them. Wodak’s discourse-historical approach, that follows the socio-philosophical orientation of critical theory, attempts to integrate a large quantity of available knowledge about the historical sources and the background of the social and political fields in which discursive “events” are embedded. Further, it analyses the historical dimension of discursive actions by exploring the ways in which particular genres of discourse are subject to diachronic change (. . .). Lastly, and most importantly, this is not only viewed as “information”: at this point we integrate social theories to be able to explain the so-called context. (Wodak 2001: 65)
In their interdisciplinary study of the discourse about nation and national identity in Austria, Wodak et al. (1999) found that it relied on four main types of discursive macro-strategies: constructive, preservative or justificatory, transformative, and destructive. The context determines which aspect connected with these strategies is brought into prominence. In van Dijk’s perspective, CDA is a multidisciplinary problem-oriented approach in the humanities and social sciences that is adopted to oppose and dissent against those who use text and talk to establish, confirm or legitimate their abuse
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of power (van Dijk 1991, 1993, 1998). Van Dijk defines the domain of his work by the theoretical discourse-cognition-society triangle. Socio-cognitive discourse analysis must rest on a solid linguistic (i.e. structural-functional) analysis, examine mental and memory structures, and consider local and global structures in society. However, CDA does not provide a ready-made, how-to-do approach to social analysis, but emphasizes that for each study a thorough theoretical analysis of a social issue must be made, so as to be able to select which discourse and social structures to analyse and to relate. In addition to that, concrete methods of research depend on the properties of the context of scholarly investigation: aims, participants, setting, users and their beliefs and interests. (van Dijk 2001: 98)
Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999) locate CDA within critical research on social change in contemporary society with the premise that social relations are based on the notion of domination. CDA starts from the perception of language (or any other forms of semiosis) as an element of social practices that constitutes other elements as well as being shaped by them. As such, CDA is supposed to engage transdisciplinary with other social methods and theories. Its focus on discourse, that anchors analytical claims about discourses in close linguistic and intertextual analyses of texts, allows for insights into social interaction and the construction of social identities. CDA oscillates between a focus on structure and a focus on action – between a focus on shifts in the social structuring of semiotic diversity (orders of discourse), and a focus on the productive semiotic work which goes on in particular texts and interactions. (Fairclough 2001: 124)
With his Mediated Discourse Analysis (MDA), Scollon (1998) shares the goals of CDA but departs from it in the strategies. MDA is based on the premise that power relations are not just discursive but are grounded in practice. Thus, MDA focuses on social actions through which actors produce the histories and habitus of their daily life rather than on discourses of social issues, although one of its central tasks is to explicate and understand how discourses of social life take part in social actions. As emphasized by van Dijk and as it appears clearly from the above review, CDA approaches are very diverse. Nevertheless, the great majority of them refer to the three interconnected metafunctions of language: the textual, the ideational, and the interpersonal. These metafunctions are associated with Halliday’s Functional Grammar (1994), but in this book they are not interpreted as syntactical structures as in Halliday’s. The textual corresponds to the content of the message; the ideational function expresses how the textual reflects society; and the interpersonal represents the exchanges, how the textual acts on / influences society. The study of the textual, ideational and interpersonal can be conducted at
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two levels: within the text by analyzing its linguistic structures, and within society by considering the text vis-à-vis its context. In combining these two levels, CDA firmly grounds a linguistic textual analysis and a social textual analysis on each other. However, while linguistics provides tools for the analysis of the textual, CDA must find elsewhere the theoretical framework for the study of the texts vis-à-vis their context.
. Empirical study of the international media echo: Presentation This book presents the Critical Discourse Analysis of Le Monde’s and The New York Times’ editorials on Russia from August 1999 to July 2001 as an empirical approach to the study of the international media echo and its impact on international politics. Under the form of short persuasive texts, unsigned editorials present the official position of a newspaper (or any other type of print media) on an issue that is deemed of particular importance at the time of publication. Editorials have been shown to play a role in public agenda setting (McCombs 1997), and to be generally representative of the newspaper’s specific framing of the issue (Nacos 1990: 188) although it has happened that the editorial position differed from the view expressed in the news articles.4 When these editorials appear in prestigious dailies, they acquire an even more special character: they reflect the opinion of an influential part of society, an opinion that is read and commented on by the elite. In the case of Le Monde and The New York Times, the prestigious French and American dailies, their audience comprises the national elite as well as part of the international elite (including journalists). Thus, Le Monde’s and The New York Times’ editorials figure among the sources of information the most likely to be used in an international media echo. A comprehensive study of the international media echo would require the analysis of print, audio and audiovisual media of various tendencies and types of audience. Such a broad approach, however, would not allow the detailed and very time-consuming analysis of text linguistic structures. In this study, depth of text analysis has been chosen over breadth. A further restriction of the corpus by the selection of elite dailies finds its justification in the privileged links between the elite and the structures of power in the national and international societies and the goal of this study, i.e. the impact of the international media echo on international politics. If the goal of this study had pertained to the impact of the international echo on the general population, the corpus would have had to focus on television news. The core corpus for this study is composed of all editorials on Russia published by Le Monde (33 editorials) and The New York Times (41 editorials) from August
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1999 to July 2001 (see Appendix 1). In the constructivist approach adopted here, cultural elements forming the “social identity” of States are particularly relevant in international relations. During this two-year period, each of the three State protagonists had to deal with identity and/or status issues. France, as one of the main pillars in the construction of the European Union, was particularly involved in the reform of its institutions due to the impending accession of ten new member States. From the type of reform the Union would agree on depended the political identity of the future Union, and thus the status each Member State could assume on the international stage through the Union by the definition of a common foreign policy (Thumerelle & Le Prestre 1997). In the USA, a Democrat President, William J. Clinton, was working with a Republican Congress to define a place for America in the post-Cold War world (Le Prestre 1997) until the installation of the Republican President, George W. Bush, in January 2001. As for the Russian Federation, almost a decade after the dissolution of the Soviet Union that gave rise to an important identity crisis (Chafetz 1996–1997; Thibault & Lévesque 1997), it was still without a flag, an anthem and an emblem. Its territory had been amputated by the independence of several of its former republics, and it was going through a severe social and economic crisis. In August 1999, Vladimir Putin made his debut on the international scene as Prime Minister of the Federation; in January 2000, Boris Yeltsin resigned and Putin became Acting President; and in March 2000, Putin was elected President. The structure of this study reflects the textual, ideational and interpersonal metafunctions of language, but first the national and international contexts in which these interactions between French, American and Russian media took place are described (Chapter 2). Then, the textual part, i.e. the linguistic analysis, presents the content of Le Monde’s and The New York Times’ editorials (Chapter 3). The ideational part underlines the significance of these editorials in their respective national society (Chapter 4). The interpersonal part shows how this Western media discourse on Russia was received in three Russian elite dailies (Chapter 5). The interconnection between the textual, ideational and interpersonal reveals the impact of the international media echo between France / the United States and Russia on international politics (Chapter 6). Readers will find the complete list of analysed editorials in Appendix 1, a chronology of Russian and related world events from August 1999 to July 2001 in Appendix 2, a detailed explanation of the linguistic methodology in Appendix 3 for the coherence analysis and Appendix 4 for the content coding, and the complete list of the most relevant sentences containing a negative representation of Russia in Appendix 5.
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chapter
National and international contexts for the international media echo
French, American, and Russian national contexts as well as the international context at the end of the 1990s set up the stage for the international media echo between Le Monde, The New York Times, and their Russian counterparts. As Le Monde’s and The New York Times’ editorials commented on the state of Russian society from a French and American perspective, before even analyzing the editorials’ content, it is necessary to look at the state of Russian society, independently of what the editorials might say about it (2.1). Then, French society (2.2), because it provides the framework in which Le Monde’s editorials were written, must be examined, as well as American society (2.3) from which The New York Times’ editorials originated. Finally, the French, American and Russian print elite dailies between which the international media echo is studied are presented (2.4). In its analysis, an editorial must be apprehended within a rather wide context because of the knowledge, memories and especially systems of beliefs, built over a long period of time, which its writing involves. To underline how deeply and widely are entrenched some society’s features that surrounded the editorials’ production, this chapter goes into details that are not directly connected with the situation in Russia in 1999–2001. The presentation of the Russian, French and American national contexts is guided by the interacting cascading networks model described in Chapter 1 (see Figure 1.2).
. Russian society Russian society is presented as it was during the 1990s (2.1.1) and for the nature of relationship it has entertained with the West (2.1.2). Throughout this book, the most known Russian names are given under their English spelling (or French if part of a text in French). All other words are transliterated according to the system usually followed in linguistic studies.
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.. Russia in the 1990s The 1999-2001 Western discourse on Russia was received in a society deeply marked by the difficulties of its post-soviet years. This Russia of the 1990s is depicted below with a particular emphasis on internal political events (2.1.1.1) and three domains in which the West was indirectly (by its reactions) or directly involved: Chechnya (2.1.1.2), NATO and Yugoslavia (2.1.1.3), and the economy (2.1.1.4). This is followed by a synthesis of Russia at the end of the 1990s (2.1.1.5). ... Internal political events The 1990s in Russia was a rather turbulent decade. Mikhail Gorbachev’s policy of perestrojka in the economic, political and social spheres of the late 1980s led to the complete Soviet pull-out of Afghanistan in 1989 and allowed for Boris Yeltsin to become the first elected President of the Russian Republic (part of the USSR) in June 1991. Although widely praised in the West, perestrojka was not as popular in Russia because of a lack of planning that occasioned many difficulties in the day-to-day life of Russians, and because of the shattering changes brought to the organization of society. In August 1991, a group of conservatives (Communists) tried to seize power. They were defeated not by Gorbachev (who had been arrested in his house in Crimea) but by Yeltsin who organized resistance with the people of Moscow from the parliament building. The coup leaders were arrested and Gorbachev brought back to Moscow. However, the balance of power between Gorbachev and Yeltsin had shifted, and on 24 August 1991, Gorbachev resigned as Secretary General of the Communist Party, and the Communist Party was disbanded. Gorbachev resigned from his position as President of the USSR and pronounced the dissolution of the Soviet Union on 25 December 1991. The introduction of Western economic reforms under the leadership of the Harvard-guided Egor Gaidar and Analoty Chubais (liberalization of prices in January 1992, privatization of state property in October 1992), while giving rise to a few very big fortunes (the oligarchs), greatly impoverished the general population (see below 2.1.1.4), and has been called the “failed crusade” of the USA to transform Russia into another America (Cohen 2000). In 1993, a fierce confrontation between President Yeltsin and the Parliament, headed by a conservative majority hostile to the economic reforms, ended with government forces storming the parliament building in October. On 12 December 1993, the first Federal Assembly of Russia was elected, but its competence was severely restricted by the new Russian Constitution. Having defeated his political opponents and consolidated his power, Yeltsin turned his attention to Chechnya, which had proclaimed its independence on 2 November 1991. The first Chechen war (1994–1996), generally opposed by the Russian media and, especially, population (see below), was one of the factors that brought Yeltsin’s popularity down. In December 1995, the communist party
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obtained the majority in the Duma (lower chamber of the Parliament) with 150 seats out of 450. Nonetheless, running against the communist candidate, Evgenij Zjuganov, Yeltsin won the presidential elections of 1996 with the help of the media (mostly controlled by oligarchs) who largely campaigned in his favour. In August 1998, as Russia was going through an acute economic crisis (ruble devaluation, default of foreign loan payments, market paralysis because of liquidity shortages, share price plunge), the Duma demanded Yeltsin’s voluntary resignation. Instead, Yeltsin dismissed both his Prime Minister Kirienko and 5 ˇ month-old government, and appointed Cernomyrdin as an interim Prime Minisˇ ter. While the economic crisis deepened, Cernomyrdin’s appointment was rejected twice by the Duma. In September 1998, Primakov’s appointment was approved. His government was not yet formed when the deputy Prime Minister in charge of financial affairs resigned. Primakov remained in office until May 1999. After the failure of an impeachment vote against Yeltsin, the Duma confirmed the appointment of Stepašin. On August 6, the IMF published a report confirming that the Russian Central Bank had invested part of its received IMF loans in Jersey for speculative purposes. On August 7, several hundred fighters under the command of Basaev invaded a few villages in Dagestan on the border of Chechnya. On the 9th, Stepašin was dismissed. Vladimir Putin, appointed on the 10th, was confirmed as Prime Minister by the Duma on 16 August 1999. ... Chechnya When the Chechen parliament, under control of the Chechen President, Džokhar Dudaev, proclaimed Chechnya’s full independence from Russia on 2 November 1991, Russia was in the midst of the great political turmoil that followed the dissolution of the Soviet Union. On 8 November 1991, Yeltsin reacted by declaring a state of emergency in Chechnya and, two days later, he sent in Interior Ministry troops. This attempt to re-establish order failed miserably as the troops were surrounded by Chechen gunmen at their arrival at the airport. They were later to be sent back to Russia by bus under the escort of the Chechen National Guard. By June 1992, Chechens had managed to free their territory of Russian armed forces. Chechnya had also acquired a considerable amount of arms. Under Dudaev, Chechnya’s political unrest between armed fractions increased. Hundreds of millions of dollars from refined oil export never appeared in the Chechen budget. In multiple locations, Azeri oil was siphoned off the pipelines going through Chechnya to Russia. Chechen mafia developed its business, and Grozny, the Chechen capital, became a centre for smuggling and money laundering. Criminals who were hired into the National Guard pursued their illegal activities without being disturbed. Passengers on trains traversing Chechnya were repeatedly looted. In 1994, four bus hijackings in the Russian North Caucasus took place, and the Chechen hijackers demanded millions of dollars in exchange for their hostages.
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In other words, Chechen state institutions were not functioning. Dudaev compensated for this with radical nationalist rhetoric. The Chechen population could survive only thanks to the Chechen tradition of solidarity in extended families, but the Russian population did not benefit from similar support. Many of them left. In December 1994, Yeltsin decided to send Russian troops to Chechnya. Two major reasons were officially given for sending Russian troops to Chechnya: a threat to the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, and a threat of political and economic destabilisation due to Chechen criminal activities. The question of Islamic fundamentalism was not brought up at that time. Only in late 1995 did General Lebed mention it as one of the most serious threats against (orthodox) Russia. The first Chechen war (1994–1996) saw the destruction of Grozny, and ended with the humiliating defeat of the Russian army.5 From the beginning, the war was unpopular among the Russian population, and this feeling was to be reinforced by the high number of young Russian conscripts who were wounded or killed, and by the activism of the “Soldiers’ Mothers”. In February/March 1995, a survey showed that 57% of the population evaluated Russian actions in Chechnya as ‘unacceptable, no matter the objective’, and 71% thought so in April/May of the same year (Petersson & Wagnsson 1998). Coverage of the war by Russian media was diversified, but unanimous on a major point: the use of force in Chechnya was senseless. Extensive coverage of casualties on both sides first shocked people, but then de-sensitised them. To influence their readers, journalists provided a value framework by making references to human rights. However, because of the Western connotation of the notion of human rights and because of the relative indifference with which it is received by a Russian audience, it became less invoked (Vinokurov 1995). In any case, Yeltsin’s opinion-poll ratings fell sharply throughout the war. Nonetheless, in June 1996, Yeltsin was re-elected President of the Russian Federation against the communist Zjuganov with the help of the media. In August 1996, General Lebed on the Russian side and Colonel Maskhadov on the Chechen side signed an agreement in Khasavyurt on the Russian withdrawal from Chechnya. It was also decided that the question of Chechnya’s constitutional status was not to be discussed before 2001. In January 1997, Maskhadov was elected President of Chechnya with a majority of 64.8% (Dudaev had been killed by a Russian rocket in April 1996). Both Chechens and Russians in Chechnya supported him. In May 1997, he signed a peace accord with Yeltsin, and obtained a quasi de facto independence from the Russian Federation. However, Maskhadov did not succeed in containing bomb attacks, ambushes against Russian soldiers, kidnappings, nor other criminal activities in Chechnya and Dagestan by unemployed ex-fighters and radical Islamist groups. In December 1998, four kidnapped foreign engineers were beheaded, despite Maskhadov’s attempt to have them freed. This was part of a series of acts of
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violence, officially and widely attributed to Chechens. The most gruesome of these acts, listed in a Nezavisimaja Gazeta’s dossier of 31 December 1999, “A chronicle of terror and crimes”, are the following: – – – – – –
4 September 1998: explosion in Makhaˇckala; 17 people killed; 90 people injured. 19 March 1999: explosion in the central market of Vladikavkaz; 64 people killed; more than 100 people injured. 4 September 1999: explosion of a five-floor apartment building in Bujnaksk (Dagestan); 64 people killed (23 children); 146 people injured. 8 September 1999 at night: explosion of a nine-floor apartment building in Moscow; more than 90 people killed; about 200 people injured. 13 September 1999: explosion of an eight-floor apartment building in Moscow; more than 120 people killed (13 children). 16 September 1999: explosion of a nine-floor apartment building in the oblast’ (province) of Volgodonskij Rostov; 18 people killed (2 children).
... NATO and Yugoslavia In 1989, the fall of the Berlin Wall symbolically opened the West to the East. The end of the Cold War, the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, and the change of political regime in East-European States had NATO members look at the purpose of their alliance and at the East in a different manner. In 1994, NATO offered former Warsaw Pact members limited associations in the form of the Partnership for Peace program, allowing them to participate in information sharing, joint exercises and peacekeeping operations. However, granting these States entry into NATO would have appeared as a threat to Russia, and thus negotiations between NATO and Russia were engaged. In May 1997, NATO and Russia signed the “Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and Russia” in Paris that established the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, giving Russia a consultative role in discussion of matters of mutual interest. At the NATO summit of July 1997, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic were invited to join the alliance. They did so on 12 March 1999, and thus brought the alliance’s borders 400 miles closer to the Russian frontier. On 24 March 1999, against Russia’s viewpoint, NATO launched an 11-week campaign of air strikes against Yugoslavia to push Serb forces out of Kosovo. The strikes were the largest military operation ever undertaken by NATO, and the first time it used force against a sovereign State without United Nations approval. NATO’s involvement in the former Yugoslavia had started in 1994, when it had carried out air strikes against Bosnian Serbs to protect Muslims in a Bosnia that wanted its independence from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In November 1995, the Dayton Accords brought an end to the Bosnian war, but in March
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1998, violence started between Kosovo’s Albanians and Serbs. Preceded by a number of calls for the end of violence (from the UN Security Council, the US and Russian foreign ministers, the Contact Group6 plus Canada and Japan, the USA, and NATO), sanctions, and warnings (including the plan for a potential NATO intervention), the Contact Group foreign ministers’ ultimatum to Kosovo’s Albanians and Serbs was heard. Peace negotiations started in Rambouillet (France) on 6 February 1999, although the Yugoslav President, Milosevic, refused to attend. The peace talks failed and Serb troops were massed at Kosovo’s border. The US President, Clinton, met with his foreign policy team to review NATO plans and strategy, and in a last effort to avoid air strikes, he sent Holbrooke as a special envoy to Serbia to deliver a final ultimatum. The meeting with Milosevic failed, and on 24 March 1999, the Kosovo air war began. The same day, to signal Russia’s displeasure, Prime Minister Primakov canceled his trip to Washington in mid-flight. On March 27, the Russian Duma condemned the NATO attack, and postponed the Start II treaty vote. In April, NATO and the American State Department rejected Milosevic’s call for an (Orthodox) Easter cease-fire and his willingness to guarantee a “substantial autonomy” for Kosovo, and gave their own conditions for the end of NATO bombing. The Russian President, Yeltsin, reacted by speaking out against the bombing and the possibility of a NATO ground war against Serbia, and he warned that Russia could be forced into a European or worldwide war. Howˇ ever, after he appointed Cernomyrdin as special envoy to the Balkans and fired his hard-line Prime Minister, Primakov, he phoned Clinton during NATO’s 50th anniversary celebrations on April 25 to discuss and reopen the contacts between the ˇ US Vice-President, Gore, and Cernomyrdin. On April 30, while the NATO strikes ˇ on Belgrade continued, Cernomyrdin met with Milosevic. On May 3, at a Washˇ ington meeting with Clinton, Gore and their advisers, Cernomyrdin endorsed the idea of enlisting the Finnish President, Ahtisaari, to assist with the negotiations. Three days later, Russia began a limited cooperation with the allies at a G-8 meeting in Germany. However, NATO planes bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade ˇ by mistake, and on a visit to Beijing on May 11, Cernomyrdin, along with the Chinese President, Jiang Zemin, strongly criticized the bombing. Despite this incident, ˇ negotiations between the Russian envoy, Cernomyrdin, the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, Talbott, and the Finnish President, Ahtisaari, started, and on June 3, they left for Belgrade, where after their meeting with Milosevic, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia informed Germany of its readiness to accept the G-8 principles for ending the bombing. Then, in a surprise move on June 12, about 200 Russian troops left Bosnia to enter Kosovo and take control of the Pristina airport. A week of tense negotiations ensued, and a preliminary agreement was reached over the Russian participation in the peacekeeping forces. On June 20, the Serbs completed their withdrawal from Kosovo and the NATO bombing campaign ended officially. In July, the final details concerning the Russian participation were settled.
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... Economy The World Development Indicators of the World Bank show that from 1991, year of Boris Yeltsin’s election to the presidency of the Russian Republic and then of the dissolution of the USSR, to 1999 when Yeltsin resigned from his position, the overall economic situation degraded dramatically for the major part of the population, while a very small minority gathered the country’s wealth. The GDP per capita (in constant 1995 international $) went from $9,457 in 1990 through a low of $5,753 in 1996 to $6,093 in 1999 (64% of the 1990 level). The industry added value (in constant 1995 US $) went consistently down (except for 1997) from $287.221 billion in 1990 to a record low of $121.996 billion in 1998, and then to $133.325 billion in 1999 (46% of the 1990 level). In January 1992, a few days after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, prices were freed. The annual inflation rate for consumer prices went from 875% in 1993 progressively down to 17% in 1997, but then up again to 86% in 1999. The annual inflation rate for food prices followed a similar pattern: from 1,590% in 1992 to 13% in 1997, and back up to 97% in 1999. This hyperinflation completely deprived Russians of their life savings. In 1994, 31% of the population lived below the poverty line. In a country that assured job security in the Soviet time, the unemployment rate was 13% in 1999. In 2000, 6% lived with less than $1 per day, and 24% lived with less than $2 per day; 10% of the population shared 36% of the income, and 20% shared 51%. The household final consumption expenditure (in constant 1995 US $), from a sharp decline from 1990 ($196.184 billion) to 1991 ($133.343 billion), went up and down to reach $193.370 billion in 1999. The above (grim) statistics expose some of the profound changes Russian society underwent during the 1990s. Confronted with the danger of grave political unrest in Russia because of the economic difficulties, but also with new opportunities, the West invested, and helped Russia repay its debts and restructure its economy. Net inflows of foreign investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10% or more of voting stock) that were only of (current) US $690 million in 1994 went from US $2.065 billion in 1995 to a high of US $4.864 billion in 1997 (after Yeltsin’s re-election in 1996 against the communist candidate, Zjuganov). In 1999, they went down to US $2.713 billion. In October 1997, the London Club (regrouping commercial banks) agreed to spread out the reimbursement of the $33 billion debt that Russia had inherited from the former Soviet Union. In July 1998, the IMF and the World Bank approved a loan of $22.6 billion to be given over 1998 and 1999 on the condition that Russia reduced its budgetary deficit. A few days later, a supplementary loan of $11.2 billion was approved by the IMF. In August 1998, just before Russia fell into a deep economic crisis, the World Bank gave a loan of $1.5 billion. The economic crisis (ruble devaluation, default of foreign loan payments, market paralysis because of liquidity shortages, share price
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plunge), accompanied by great political instability, saw the industry added value plunge to 42% of its 1990 level. Russia’s external debt, of (current) US $78.210 billion in 1992, rose to a peak of US $177.798 billion in 1998, and then came down to US $174.754 in 1999. On 1 August 1999, Russia and the Paris Club (regrouping States) signed an agreement for spreading out the repayment of the former Soviet Union debts due in 1999 and 2000. Five days later, the IMF published a report confirming that the Russian Central Bank had invested part of its received IMF loans in Jersey for speculative purposes. ... The situation at the end of the 1990s The above brief picture of Russia in the 1990s finds a good synthesis in a January 2000 poll question, “What did the Yeltsin years bring?”. 45% of the respondents answered “nothing good”.7 What did the Yeltsin years bring? (Levada 2000) a. Good – Nothing good – Democracy, political freedoms – End of shortages, ration cards, queues – Reintroduction of private property – Freedom of action for energetic people – Dismissal of communists from power – Collapse of the totalitarian system – Improved relations with the West – Hope for the revival of Russia – Better quality of goods and services – End of the threat of a new world war b. Bad – Economic crisis – High rate of joblessness – Deterioration of living conditions – Chechen war, 1994–1996 – Inflation, depreciation of savings – Dissolution of the USSR – Misappropriation of the country’s resources – Rise of criminality – Salary delays – Collapse of the state system of education and health care – Political instability – Uncertainty of the future – Tax evasion – Loss of the status of superpower
45 23 16 13 12 10 7 7 5 4 3 40 36 34 34 32 30 28 28 26 19 16 15 15 11
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– –
Foreign domination Nothing bad
7 2
When Boris Yeltsin resigned in December 1999, a political period that had been characterised by a number of political and economic problems and a specific style of dealing with them ended. For the general population, the most important criticisms of the Yeltsin years dealt with the economy, the war in Chechnya, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Questions of national prestige ranked low. .. Russia and the West The conditions which surrounded the reception of western discourse on Russia at the end of the 1990s were not merely political and economical. Before examining the evolution of Russian public opinion towards the West in the 1990s (2.1.2.2), it is necessary to look at the historico-cultural attitude of Russia towards the West (2.1.2.1). ... Slavophiles and Westernizers The question of Russia’s relations with the West has been crucial in Russian history and culture and is at the centre of Russian identity formation (Neumann 1996). It dates back to Peter the Great and his introduction of Western European reforms in the late 17th – early 18th centuries. These reforms were deeply rejected by some, and in the 19th century, the terms “Slavophile” and “Westernizer” were invented to represent the proponents of two opposed types of Weltanschauung. In his classical book, The Slavophile Controversy, Andrzej Walicki (1975: 445– 455) summarizes the differences between Slavophilism and Westernism under nine headings: the conception of personality, freedom, reflection, universalism, consciousness and action, historicism, state and law, nationality, and capitalism. The concept of personality can be considered as the cornerstone for all differences, which are summed up in the positions on capitalism. Walicki credits Herzen for having been the first to formulate the connection between Westernism and the concept of the independent, autonomous personality: It seemed to them [Belinski8 and his friends] that one of the most important reasons for Russia’s abject enslavement was the lack of personal independence; this was the source of the government’s complete disregard of the rights of individuals and the latter’s lack of protest; hence the authorities’ cynicism and the people’s excessive patience. Russia’s future will be fraught with great danger for Europe, and many misfortunes for herself, if the ferment of emancipation does not first enter the realm of individual rights. (Herzen, On the development of revolutionary ideas in Russia, 1850; quoted in Walicki 1975: 336–337)
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According to the Slavophiles, the autonomy of the individual, [. . .], leads to the disintegration of society and condemns human beings to isolation and loneliness; the autonomy of the separate spiritual faculties (especially of reason) destroys faith and consequently disrupts the integral personality and brings about its fragmentation. Personal wholeness can only be achieved if the individual is in complete harmony with the community and ready to resign his autonomy in favour of the supra-individual faith uniting it. (Walicki 1975: 446)
For Westernizers, freedom meant freedom of the individual, and was necessarily preceded by an “agony of reflection”. They hoped that individuals and nations would be imbued by universal reason, and they believed that reality could be transformed by reason and conscious volition. Thus the historical process corresponded to the evolution of consciousness and the rationalization of social relations. The progressive rationalization of social relations signified the replacement of emotional and traditional bonds by juridical and political norms. All of these processes would transform a people into a nation. “Before Peter the Great Russia was merely a people; she became a nation thanks to the changes initiated by the reformer” (Belinski, quoted in Walicky 1975: 401). For Slavophiles, freedom existed in the individual’s identification with the community. They considered that reflection killed spontaneity and idealized nonreflective faith. In opposition to universalism, they proposed Christian Orthodox humanity. Thus, the ideal personality could only be achieved through Christian social principles that were handed down by tradition. Rejecting the ideas of the Enlightenment and of the French Revolution, they believed that the essence of history was a divine mystery. Their ideal social solidarity bound individuals to the community without the interference of institutional norms. A “return to the people” was needed. Walicki (1975: 450) concludes that “the inner logic of the Slavophile analysis led to the outright rejection of the capitalist system, whereas Westernism as a thought structure implied the acceptance of bourgeois development”. Westernism was represented by members of the intelligentsia who were mostly of noble extraction (and thus separated from the people by their Europeanized education) and for whom capitalism was an abstract notion. Thus, Westernism could not be well defended against Slavophilism, which did not depend on ideas coming from the outside. ... Russian public opinion In their report, “Russia and the West: commonality or estrangement?”, Oksana Boˇcarova and Natal’ja Kim from the All-Russian Centre for Public Opinion Study
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(VCIOM), observed three stages in the transformation of Russian public opinion towards the West during the 1990s.9 The beginning of the decade saw the highest point of the last wave of emigration. Thousands of former Soviet citizens, tired of the economic difficulties and uncertain future, and of the atmosphere of disappointment and fear prevailing at the end of the 1980s during the dissolution of the USSR, left for Europe, the USA and Israel. In the new Russia, hopes for a rapid development towards economic prosperity were linked with a Western type of governance and economy. The West, as the source of positive cultural, political and economic models was a necessary element of national identification, albeit symbolically. During the mid-1990s, a partnership developed: political and economic cooperation with the USA, Western Europe, the IMF and NATO. Furthermore, travel to foreign countries for leisure, study or work became accessible to many. However, in parallel to Russia’s integration into the international community, the expansion of cultural and business relations, and the development of tourism, a new set of ideas came into view. These ideas, linked with questions of statehood, authority, power, specificity, cultural potential etc, became in practice the dominant ideational basis in political circles and popular representations, and they corresponded to a new phase in the formation of national identity. From the mid-1990s, the majority no longer looked to the West for models, but examined its own Russian history and culture, and mythologized it somewhat by the same token. The most popular concept became that of the “specific path” (which can be made to mean different things). In September 1999, 39% wished for a Russian State similar to Western States, down from 47% in April 1997; and 25% wished a Russian State with its specific organization and specific path to development, up from 17% in April 1997. First, the act of criticising the West was regarded as the deed of communists or of nationalist groups. However, progressively, the idea that the West needed and wanted a weak Russia gained ground in public opinion. The years 1998–1999 saw a progression of anti-Western feelings in the society. The economic crisis, the social and political instability reinforced an isolationist tendency and the search for enemies. While in April 1994, 41% (among 2965 respondents representative of the entire society) considered that Russia had enemies, this number rose to 65% in the spring of 1999. For those with a higher education and higher income, the industrial-financial circles of the West were the main enemies, and for the others, they were the USA and NATO. This could be explained partly by the economic difficulties and the bombing of the former Yugoslavia by NATO. Once the situation in the former Yugoslavia stabilised, relations with the West improved. Those who estimated that relations between Russia and the West were returning to normal were 45% in April 1999 and 52% in August 1999, and those who feared a return to the Cold War were 33% in April 1999 but only 17% in August 1999.10 Furthermore, if in September 1998, 46% thought that
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Russia ought to reinforce its links with the West, it was 35% in May 1999 and 40% in August 1999; and while in September 1998, 41% were of the opinion that Russia ought to end its dependence on the West, it was 52% in May 1999 and 43% in August 1999. Finally, in August 1999, 50% acknowledged a positive self-attitude towards the USA (33% in April 1999, 61% in September 1999), and 33% a negative self-attitude (53% in April 1999, 25% in September 1999). In conclusion, the authors of the report noted that a number of respondents who had travelled outside of Russia considered the opening of the borders one of the most important achievements of the reform years. “We started to live in a freer way; we wanted to travel and we travelled. It is very important and good. We began to relate better to openness; this before was not normal.”11
. French society Le Monde’s editorials on Russia deal with foreign policy. Thus, French society is examined for the conditions in which its foreign policy is conducted (2.2.1), the influence public opinion (2.2.2) and intellectuals (2.2.3) may have in its definition, and national values that are mentioned to guide it (2.2.4). .. French foreign policy The Constitution that founded the Fifth French Republic in 1958 proclaims in its Preamble (carrying the value of constitutional law) the French people’s attachment to human rights as they are defined in the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, and confirmed and completed in the Preamble to the 1946 Constitution. On the French Foreign Ministry website, France’s role in human rights’ promotion and protection throughout the world is emphasized, as well as its active participation in the creation of international penal courts, and in the recognition of an international humanitarian law.12 By its Constitution, the Fifth French Republic is endowed with features of parliamentary and presidential regimes, and both President and Prime Minister are empowered in the conduct of State affairs (Articles 5, 14, 15, 20, 21, 52). Traditionally in the Fifth Republic, the President has played a leading role in foreign policy. However, rather than being a “domaine réservé” for the President, foreign policy has been a “domaine partagé” between the President and the Prime Minister. Globally, the President gives French foreign policy its general orientation, and the Prime Minister implements it. Even in cases of “cohabitation” , when a President and a Prime Minister belong to different parties, this distribution of powers, whose significance had been heightened by the 1962 referendum that instituted presidential elections based on the principle of direct universal suffrage (Article
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6), was not fundamentally questioned. However, French foreign policy cannot be circumscribed to the positions of the President or Minister of Foreign Affairs because of France’s membership to the European Union. Although the principle of a common foreign and security policy was inscribed in the Maastricht treaty on the European Union (1992), very little had been done by 1999 to implement it. Thus, members of the Union took position collectively on foreign affairs issues within the European Council, the regular meeting of Heads of State or Government of the European Union’s Member States. In June 1997, the Socialist Party won 248 seats out of 549 in the Assemblée Nationale (lower house of the Parliament), and its leader, Lionel Jospin, was nominated Prime Minister by the 1995 elected President, Jacques Chirac, from the right-wing Rassemblement pour la République (RPR). Lionel Jospin remained Prime Minister until May 2002, when he was defeated in the presidential elections and retired from politics. The June 2002 parliamentary elections brought a conservative majority to the Assemblée Nationale, and Chirac, who had just been re-elected President, nominated Jean-Pierre Raffarin as Prime Minister. Thus, from June 1997 to May 2002, France lived under the “cohabitation” of a conservative President and a socialist Prime Minister, whose Minister of Foreign Affairs for this entire period was Hubert Védrine. In February 2000, during an official visit to Israel, Jospin made several declarations on the situation in the Middle-East, and in particular said that the Hezbollah had committed acts of terrorism. In Palestinian territories, this gave rise to protests, and in France to an official statement from the President reminding the Prime Minister not to call into question the constancy of French foreign policy in the Middle-East. Asked to comment on the issue during a radio interview, Védrine underlined that the President and Prime Minister discussed and reached an agreement on all important foreign policy issues, among which he included Russia.13 In another interview, Védrine answered with a brief “no” to the question of whether cohabitation had caused any difficulty for the definition of the French position on Chechnya.14 This however, as the above-mentioned incident shows, does not preclude some eventual divergence between the President and the government. Thus, positions of the French President and the French Minister of Foreign Affairs must be examined separately. In November 1999 at a conference of the Institut Français des Relations Internationales,15 French President Chirac proposed seven principles for the debate on the construction of a new world order: collective responsibility in action, equity, solidarity, diversity, cautiousness, liberty, and complementarity. He stated that a better organization of the international system in the 21st century required an evolution towards multipolarity, i.e. towards a world in which the European Union, Russia, China, Brazil, Japan, India, Mexico and, more generally, all great nations of the five continents would participate constructively. This multipolar world would need the responsible commitment of the USA, whose Congress unfortunately had
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decided to withdraw from several major issues. Multipolarity also meant a reinforced role for the international institutions, in particular the United Nations. The first domain in which Nations’ wisdom should be heard concerned the question of disarmament. The American Senate’s decision [not to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty precluded its entry into force and] jeopardized the system of nuclear arms control. Furthermore, the American Administration’s intention to revise the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty could cause a strategic unbalance and lead to a nuclear arms race;16 thus, this American position had to be opposed. Chirac also reiterated the necessity to think about the moral finality of actions, and he indicated two major concerns: the fight against exclusion and the establishment of a universal ethic. Moreover, while he recognized the centrality of the principle of State sovereignty in the international order, he underlined that human rights and humanitarian law had to be better respected. In March 2001 at the United Nations Commission on Human Rights,17 he declared that there was no question of “giving lessons” and France was certainly not in a position to do so, but a concerted action was necessary to enforce the observance of universal law. He added: “In the worst situation, when dialogue does not lead anywhere, we should not hesitate to condemn. [. . .] When a country massively violates universal values, the international community must condemn it and, in the framework of the United Nations Charter, apply targeted pressures to change the situation.”18 In his opening discourse to the same 1999 conference at the Institut Français des Relations Internationales,19 Hubert Védrine, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, circumscribed two main problems for the 21st century. The first concerns the type of relationship between Europe and the “hyperpower”,20 the USA. France’s wish for a multipolar world requires a strong European Union, i.e. it requires that a solution be found for the contradiction between the reinforcement of the Union’s role and its enlargement to new members.21 Multipolarity also means that the USA would have to set aside its traditional unilateralism in order to adopt multilateralism. The second main problem refers to the question of universality (Western values vs. universal values and Western moral rights vs. universal consensus), in other words to the relations between the West and “Others”. Among these “Others”, Russia figures in first place, but China and dozens of other countries are also included. A number of democrats in the world feel that the West makes use of universal values to impose its own system and influence. Védrine developed the topic of morality in international relations in several other speeches22 of which he presented a synthesis in Le Monde diplomatique.23 There, Védrine very clearly takes his distance from three beliefs: (1) States are heartless, impenetrable and repressive monsters and everything that makes them back away is good; (2) all Western values are universal and any discussion about this is a sacrilege; (3) any non democratic country can and must become democratic right away and follow Western norms. Put in a simple way, these beliefs imply that the purpose of Western foreign policies is to
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convert the entire world to the norms of Western democracy with the use of sanctions and various means of pressure. However, Védrine believes that diplomacy must serve democracy.24 Foreign policies must take into account that democracy supposes a certain level of economic development, mechanisms of conflict prevention and resolution, an efficient organization of the State, and a competent government. When a situation becomes intolerable, condemnations are appropriate but never sufficient. They must leave enough room for the condemned party to react and go back to the democratization process. .. Public opinion In his study, “Public opinion, domestic structure, and foreign policy in liberal democracies”, Risse-Kappen (1991) describes the French Fifth Republic as a centralized political system in which the strength of the Executive is reinforced by the power of the French administrative system. The fragmentation of French society along ideological, religious and class lines makes French public opinion the most divided on security issues among Western European societies. The policy network is strongly dominated by the state, in particular the presidency, and the parliament does not play a significant role.25 This is facilitated by the consensus shared by the elite and all political parties on the necessity for French independence in world politics and French “force de dissuasion”. Risse-Kappen concludes that in these conditions, French public opinion is likely to play only a marginal role in the foreign policy-making process. According to Hubert Védrine, French Minister for Foreign Affairs from 1997 to 2002, If the public does not have a fixed opinion on a subject, the government can convince it of the judiciousness of its action as long as the media are not opposed to it and that the government has a clear vision of its action. If the public is a priori fixed and the media share the same opinion, the government will not be able to reverse the situation without a sustained effort. If the government does not know what it wants, or does not dare say it, it will suffer from the cumulated weight of the public and of the media, with one following the other, or vice-versa. (Védrine 1996: 65)
In Védrine’s argumentation, public opinion’s influence on foreign policy depends thus partly on its positions, based on its general values, and on its degree of trust towards media that determines how it will let itself be influenced by media. As part of the European Values Study, a survey conducted in 199926 reaffirmed French people’s agreement with the major principles of liberal economy (individual responsibility for providing for oneself, positive value of competition, less State control of firms, private ownership of business and industry) but with certain limits in order to correct eventual excesses (Riffault & Tchernia 2003: 122–129). Thus,
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to the question of what a society should provide in order to be considered “just”, 69% found very important or important “eliminating big inequalities in income between citizens”, and 92%, “guaranteeing that basic needs are met for all, in terms of food, housing, clothes, education, health” (Bréchon 2003: 344–345). The degree of trust towards media was measured in a December 2001 poll.27 Participants declared that when it comes to international news, they trust television first (57%), then written media (24%), and last, radio (13%). To receive detailed explanations of international news, they turn to television (54%), written media (31%), and radio (10%). They more or less equally tend to trust (50%) or distrust (46%) newspapers (the proportion was respectively 50%–45% in December 2000, but 58%–38% in December 1999). More do not believe rather than believe that journalists are independent from political parties and the government (2001: 55% vs. 33%; 2000: 59% vs. 32%; 1999: 60% vs. 28%) or from money pressures (2001: 54% vs. 30%; 2000: 59% vs. 25%; 1999: 60% vs. 21%). If French public opinion usually does not exercise much influence on the definition of foreign policy, intellectuals have traditionally been active participants in the French public sphere. .. Intellectuals The term “intellectual” to represent a category of writers, researchers, professors, artists and others who had received a higher education was coined in 1898 during the Dreyfus affair. These intellectuals (among whom were Anatole France, Marcel Proust, Georges Sorel, Claude Monet, Jules Renard, Théodore Monod, and Émile Durkheim) had taken position behind the novelist Emile Zola to demand the revision of Dreyfus’ trial. Dreyfus, a Jewish officer in the French army, had been wrongly condemned to a life sentence in 1894 on a treason accusation.28 “Dreyfusisme”, i.e. the positions in favour of Dreyfus, were based on the principle of the universality of morality: in each person, the human being had to be respected (Winock 1999: 29–31, 77). In 1927, Julien Benda in Trahison des clercs described an ideal type of intellectual. Intellectuals were to be the bad conscience of the “lay and pragmatic” world; if intellectuals, by nature not involved in practical pursuits, were to enter the political arena, it would have to be in the name of “humanity”, “justice”, i.e. of “an abstract principle higher and directly opposed to political passions” (Winock 1999: 763). Despite its excessiveness, this definition has marked a French tradition of intellectuals’ involvement. Throughout the 20th century, French intellectuals have continued to take highly visible positions in public affairs albeit neither always with the best acuity nor celerity, and they have often been sharply criticized for their (leftist) political biases.29 However, in the 1970s, French intellectuals definitively took their distance from the Communist party and from all types of totalitarianism. On 4 July 1973, Le Monde published a manifesto signed
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by more than 300 intellectuals (mostly but not uniquely French), “Les intellectuels et le pouvoir” (Intellectuals and Power), that underlined that not a single country, not a single regime, not a single social group could pretend to be the depository of absolute justice, and that Stalinism and intellectuals who had transformed into apologists of crime and lies showed how dangerous utopist identification and seduction of power were: Aucun pays, aucun régime, aucun groupe social n’est porteur de la vérité et de la justice absolue, et sans doute aucun ne le sera jamais. La terrifiante expérience du stalinisme, la transformation d’intellectuels révolutionnaires en apologistes du crime et du mensonge, montrent jusqu’où peuvent conduire les identifications utopiques et l’attrait du pouvoir, ces tentations caractéristiques de l’intellectuel contemporain. (quoted in Winock 1999: 771)
From then on, French intellectuals were to prefer an involvement based on punctual actions (e.g. the operation “A ship for Vietnam” organized in 1979 to save the “boat-people”, Vietnamese who were fleeing the communist regime) to the advancement of a global cause. In 1979, the journalist and essayist Jean-François Revel was the first to talk about the “right to interfere” (droit d’ingérence) in cases of foreign humanitarian crises. In its editorial of September 23rd, 1999, “Nord-Sud: la fracture”, Le Monde noted the opposition of African, Asian and Middle-Eastern States to this right to interfere, but defended it and concluded that no good arguments could be presented against it (“Il n’y a pas de bons arguments pour s’y opposer”). This right to interfere became a “duty to interfere” (devoir d’ingérence) in 1987 under the pen of Bernard Kouchner, founder of “Doctors without Borders”, and the International Law Professor, Mario Bettati. Despite the estrangement of French leftist intellectuals from totalitarianism in general and communism in particular, Le Monde continued for a time to be indulgent, even rather well disposed towards the Soviet Union and China, as stated by the journalist Michel Legris in “Le Monde” tel qu’il est (1976). In a sociological essay, Debray (1986) underlined the interdependence between intellectuals and the journalistic community since the events of May 1968. In his opinion, previously, intellectuals earned recognition through the publication of their articles in prestigious reviews or books with renowned publishers, but now they depend on media for their notoriety. Indeed, the general public gets to know them when journalists invite them to talk about their work on TV programs or display their positions in the columns of newspapers and magazines; but conversely, journalists need the intellectuals’ ideas for their programs. While Debray’s thesis ought to be restricted to a certain type of intellectual, it can also be illustrated with the success of regular cultural programs on French TV that are centered on the participation of intellectuals (e.g. Apostrophes, Bouillon de culture, Campus), and with the space in Le Monde’s columns given to intellectuals. Thus, when La
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Balme (2000) reports that only four out of thirty-seven (11%) interviewed French foreign policy officials cited elites and intellectuals as a source of public opinion, the importance of media and the place occupied by intellectuals in media (called “intellectuels médiatiques” by Védrine 1996: 637) must be kept in mind. .. Human rights and “Liberté, égalité, fraternité” The preceding sections (2.2.1 to 2.2.3) have already underlined the centrality of the concept of human rights in French political life. Indeed, the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen came to acquire the value of a founding act, and the significance of human rights in French society can be said to be closely linked to the national motto, “Liberté, égalité, fraternité”. Retracing the August 1789 debates of the National Constituting Assembly that were to result in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, Marcel Gauchet (1989) in his introduction quotes Necker’s 1792 denunciation of the unrealism that made French people place the Declaration “au commencement de leur nature politique” (at the basis of their political nature).30 While the Declaration was originally supposed to preserve personal rights and individual freedoms from the King’s powers (as in the Lockean interpretation of the 1689 Bill of Rights), it rapidly acquired the role of foundation for the constitution.31 In July 1789, Mounier, known to be a cautious and moderate delegate of the Constituting Committee, declared: Pour qu’une constitution soit bonne, il faut qu’elle soit fondée sur les droits des hommes et qu’elle les protège évidemment ; il faut donc, pour préparer une constitution, connaître les droits que la justice naturelle accorde à tous les individus, il faut rappeler les principes qui doivent former la base de toute société, et que chaque article de la Constitution puisse être la conséquence d’un principe.32 [In order for a constitution to be good, it must be founded on the rights of men, as well as protect them; it is therefore necessary, when preparing a constitution, to know the rights that natural law grants all individuals, to remember the principles that form the basis of any society, and to have each constitutional article be the result of one of these principles.]
In a very Cartesian spirit,33 a hierarchy of principles and rules was thus posed. At the top lay principles of natural law that were to be the basis for any society. And just below came the constitution, each article of which was to result from one of these principles. In the faith that rationalism brings Progress, the French constitution, written after the American constitution, took it as a model with the intent to improve upon it: Puisque nous venons après les Anglo-Américains, nous devons tendre à nous donner une constitution plus parfaite que la leur ; nous devons les surpasser, comme ils ont surpassé les Anglais et comme les Anglais avaient surpassé les meilleurs modèles connus du temps de leur révolution.34
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[Since we come after the Americans, we should aim to give ourselves an even more perfect constitution; we should surpass them as they surpassed the English, and as the English surpassed the best known models at the time of their revolution.]
This meant putting human rights at the cornerstone of French society, and because they are universal, of all societies as well. Among human rights, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen posed in its first article the principles of liberty and equality, specifying in a clear reaction and opposition to oppression that social differences, i.e. limits to these principles, could only find their source in the common good: Les hommes naissent et demeurent libres et égaux en droits. Les distinctions sociales ne peuvent être fondées que sur l’utilité commune. [Men are born and live free, with equal rights. Social differences can only be based on the common good.]
In a study published in Pierre Nora’s Realms of Memory (“Les Lieux de mémoire”) that investigates French “significant entit[ies], whether material or non-material in nature, which by dint or the work of time ha[ve] become a symbolic element of the memorial heritage of [the French] community” (Nora 1996), Mona Ozouf (1996) examines the evolution of the French motto that appears on all official monuments and documents very often alongside the initials RF (for République française), thus creating a form of “national mnemotechnique”, i.e. “a form or technology of collective identity that harnesses individual and popular fantasy by creating juridically legitimate memories” (Berlant 1991). Born during the French Revolution, the French motto acquired its canonical meaning during the Third Republic on the basis of the historian Jules Michelet’s (1798–1874) interpretation of “fraternity”. According to him, fraternity is “a bond of justice, in which each person relies on himself but wants to be able to count on others through ‘fraternal solidarity”’ (Ozouf 1996: 95). This understanding of “fraternity” allows for the interpretation of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen as not “exclusively a charter for individualism but also an instrument for rooting out special interests – [. . .] – and a promise of civic unity” (Ozouf 1996: 95–97). Thus, the French Republic “combin[es] individual rights with the realities of collective existence, and pav[es] the way for a politics of the will” (Ozouf 1996: 110). It appears then that human rights, enshrined in the French Republic and national memory through the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen,35 cannot be dissociated from a principle of social solidarity. An example of this social solidarity combined with political engagement is provided by the foundation of the Ligue des droits de l’Homme (LDH) in 1898 during the Dreyfus affair not only to defend Dreyfus but also to come to the help of any citizen whose rights would be violated.36 The LDH mission statement explains that the association’s logo is composed of a Phrygian bonnet to stand for Liberty, of scales for Equality,
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and of an olive branch for Fraternity.37 In a movement of international solidarity, the LDH created in 1922 the International Federation for Human Rights with other similar European associations.
. American society In parallel to the description of French society, American society is here considered for its foreign policy (2.3.1), the role of public opinion (2.3.3), and the American concept of liberal democracy (2.3.3). .. American foreign policy According to the American Constitution (1787), the American President detains the Executive Power (Article 2 Section 1 Clause 1), and in this capacity, defines and conducts the Nation’s foreign policy although he needs the Senate’s approval for the conclusion of treaties and the appointment of Ambassadors (Article 2 Section 2 Clauses 1 and 2). The Constitution has been amended a number of time, but the probably most well known amendment is its First (1791) that guarantees the freedom of religion, of speech, of the press, of assembly, and of petition. Elected in 1993 and re-elected in 1997, the Democrat President, William J. Clinton, governed with a Republican Senate from 1995 to 2001. The Republican, George W. Bush, took office in the White House in January 2001. The Senate had then a Republican majority thanks to the deciding vote of the Republican Vice President, Richard Cheney.38 Bill Clinton’s foreign policy was described by his Assistant for National Security Affairs, Samuel R. Berger, in a 2000 lecture, “A foreign policy for the global age”,39 as resting on five main principles. (1) American “alliances with Europe and Asia are still the cornerstone of [American] national security, but they must be constantly adapted to meet emerging challenges.” (2) “Peace and security for America depends on building principled, constructive relations with [American] former great power adversaries, Russia and China.” (3) “Local conflicts can have global consequences.” (4) “Old threats have not all disappeared, new dangers, accentuated by technological advances and the permeability of borders, require new national security priorities.” And (5) “economic integration advances both [American] interests and [American] values, but also accentuates the need to alleviate economic disparity.” From 1995 to 2001, the Democrat Administration had to work with a Republican Congress, and this caused a number of difficulties in the domain of foreign policy. In October 1999, Berger described them in a speech given to the Council on Foreign Relations, “American power: hegemony, isolationism or engagement”.40
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He mentioned that the USA is seen as “unilateralist and too powerful”, and that “the perception persists among some [of our friends and allies] that the United States has become a hectoring hegemon”. Among the criticism addressed to the United States figures the manner “in which [Americans] pursue what [they] consider to be legitimate goals. For example, many countries react to [American] proclivity to pass judgment on their performance on everything from religious freedom to drug control, and about [American] imposition of sanctions on foreign companies with countries that earn [American] opprobrium.” And he added: “In these areas, there is room for debate about the proper balance between isolating bad actors in the world and isolating ourselves.” Indeed, “the internationalist consensus that has prevailed in [the United States] for more than 50 years increasingly is being challenged by a new isolationism, heard and felt particularly in the Congress.” Berger defined five planks for the isolationist right of the Congress that opposed the five principles of the Democrat Administration’s foreign policy. About the fourth plank, Berger remarked that the isolationists had been “nostalgic for the good old days when friends were friends and enemies were enemies” and that it was “seen lately how easily Russo-phobia [could] be revived”. In a January 2000 speech delivered to the National Press Club, “American leadership in the 21st century”,41 Berger exposed the Administration’s position towards Russia: helping it become a stable, prosperous and democratic partner for the United States. American engagement with Russia since the dissolution of the Soviet Union had produced concrete results in terms of disarmament, withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltics, and cooperation with NATO in Bosnia and Kosovo. Yeltsin’s recent resignation showed for the first time how power could be transmitted legally in Russia, and the “new government had promised to uphold basic liberties and Russia’s break with communism, and to hold free and fair presidential elections.” However, Russia was “still struggling with demons that have bedeviled it for years: the legacy of totalitarianism, poverty, corruption, conflict in the Caucasus.” To the acting President Putin, the question was asked “whether stability and hope will be based on strengthening or weakening the rules of law. That question applies to Chechnya as well: [The Administration has] made clear that Russia’s fight against terrorism is right, but its use of indiscriminate force is wrong. But [the USA] should not stop supporting those forces in Russia that are trying to strengthen the rule of law and build faith in democratic institutions. Russia is paying a price for its conduct in Chechnya; Russian democracy must not.” The Administration would continue to seek progress on the issues that mattered most to it, “including further reductions in strategic weapons as we work to develop a national missile defense system while preserving the ABM treaty”. In an address to the Duma in June 200042 after Putin’s election to the Presidency of the Russian Federation Clinton indicated five goals he was pursuing in relation to Russia: “build a normal economic relationship, based on trade and in-
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vestment between our countries and contact between people”; “meet threats to our security together”; “build a world that is less divided along ethnic, racial and religious lines” (he specifically mentioned Chechnya among others); “help Europe build a community that is democratic, at peace, and without divisions – one that includes Russia, and strengthen our ability to advance our common interests”; “have a sense of responsibility for the future. We are not destined to be adversaries. But it is not guaranteed that we will be allies.” Clinton also declared: “We Americans have to overcome the temptation to think that we have all the answers. We have to resist the feeling that if only you would see things our way, troubles would go away. Russia will not, and indeed should not, choose a course simply because others wish you to do so. You will choose what your interests clearly demand and what your people democratically embrace.” .. Public opinion Risse-Kappen (1991) describes the US foreign and security policy-making structures as decentralized. The importance of the Congress role is inscribed in the Constitution. American society is divided along party lines, but societal actors seem more able to organize themselves and gather public support for their causes than their French counterparts. The American policy network is of the societydominated type, in which societal actors and political elites constantly build and rebuild coalitions. The combination of these characteristics, according to RisseKappen, allows public opinion ample opportunity to affect policy outcomes. Public opinion usually bases its positions partly on the information it gets from media, and a July 2000 Gallup poll revealed that American public opinion had a balanced attitude towards news media: 50.54% trusted them a great deal or a fair amount, and 49.15% did not trust them very much or not at all.43 In December 2000,44 a majority of respondents believed that news media favored one political party over the other (51.14%), or both parties (3.36%), and 40.65% thought that news media generally favored neither political party. In May 2000,45 respondents said the coverage of news about foreign countries around the world, including U.S. relations with other countries was too much (12.87%), about the right amount (37.42%), not enough (46.28%). .. The American concept of liberal democracy American foreign policy discourse often mentions the concept of liberal democracy. Because of its centrality, the meaning given in the US to this concept must be examined. It is done in reference to the American Independence and Constitution, and also to the interpretation of those historical events.
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In the Declaration of Independence (1776), individuals’ rights and the necessity to protect individuals from the abuse of government are clearly stated: We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. That to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. That whenever any form of government becomes destructive to these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness.46
Furthermore, the importance of justice, peace, prosperity and freedom is proclaimed right at the beginning of the 1787 Constitution: We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.47
To preserve democracy, the constitution established a strict separation of powers: To what expedient, then, shall we finally resort, for maintaining in practice the necessary partition of power among the several departments, as laid down in the Constitution? The only answer that can be given is, that as all these exterior provisions are found to be inadequate, the defect must be supplied, by so contriving the interior structure of the government as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places. (Madison 1788)48
And freedoms of religion, of speech, of the press, of assembly and of petition, recognized in the first amendment, were to further protect the rights of individuals against the government: History is clear that the first ten amendments to the Constitution were adopted to secure certain common law rights of the people, against invasion by the Federal Government.49
Interpreting American political thought since the Revolution, Hartz (1955) declares in The Liberal Tradition in America that his analysis is based on: the storybook truth about American history: that America was settled by men who fled from the feudal and clerical oppressions of the Old World. If there is anything in this view, as old as the national folklore itself, then the outstanding thing about the American community in Western history ought to be the non-existence of those oppressions, or since the reaction against them was in the broadest sense liberal, that the American community is a liberal community. (1955: 3)
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Later on, he adds: There has never been a “liberal movement” or a real “liberal party” in America: we have only had the American Way of Life, a nationalist articulation of Locke which usually does not know that Locke himself is involved. (1955: 11)
According to him, “the master assumption of American political thought [is] the reality of atomistic social freedom” (1955: 62). Hartz’s thesis on American exceptionalism has been criticized by Kloppenberg (2001) as being too flat and too static to be adequate. In order to criticize this thesis, he underlines the great influence Hartz’s work has had on American scholars and politicians since the 1950’s and recognizes that Hartz’s assumptions about the central place of self-interest, individual rights and personal property in American politics are shared across the political spectrum (2001: 474). While Kloppenberg might be right in his criticism of Hartz’s historical analysis, the type of history relevant here is “a history [. . .] less interested in ‘what actually happened’ than in its perpetual reuse and misuse, its influence on successive presents” (Nora 1996: iv), and thus the significance of individualism must be investigated further. “Atomistic social freedom”, or individualism, was placed at the centre of American ideology in 1839 by John Taylor:50 The last order of civilization, which is democratic, received its first permanent existence in this country. . . The peculiar duty of this country has been to exemplify and embody a civilization in which the rights, freedom, and mental and moral growth of individual man should be made the highest end of all social restrictions and laws. (quoted in Arieli 1964: 192)
And Arieli, in Individualism and Nationalism in American Ideology (1964), links the American quest for national identity to the crystallization of this concept of individualism. Above all, individualism expressed the universalism and idealism most characteristic of the national consciousness. This concept evolved in contradistinction to socialism, the universal and messianic character of which it shared. Both claimed to create systems of social justice and to show a way toward the perfection of the human race. This twofold aspect – universalism and the capacity to describe values peculiar to American society – made individualism a term synonymous with Americanism. These developments help explain to some degree several phenomena peculiar to American history – the weakness of the socialist movement, the fixation of social ideologies through identification with national values, and, in recent years, the willingness to consider the United States the appointed leader of the West against world communism. (1964: 346)
Arieli’s last sentence is referring to McCarthyism, the strong anti-communist campaign of the 1950s that had spread to all sectors of society, including the universi-
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ties. In 1953, the Association of American Universities declared that membership in the Communist Party “extinguishes the right to a university position”, a statement that was supported by the heads of the most prestigious universities (Zinn 1997: 49). McCarthyism did not last, unlike anti-communist feelings as attested by President Ronald Reagan’s Evil Empire Speech (1983), in which he described the world in distinctly Manichaean terms: I urge you to beware the temptation of pride – the temptation of blithely declaring yourselves above it all and label both sides equally at fault, to ignore the facts of history and the aggressive impulses of an evil empire, to simply call the arms race a giant misunderstanding and thereby remove yourself from the struggle between right and wrong and good and evil.51
In 1993, two years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Anthony Lake, National Security Advisor to President Bill Clinton, declared: I have come to speak with you today because I believe our nation’s policies toward the world stand at a historic crossroads. For half a century, America’s engagement in the world revolved around containment of a hostile Soviet Union. Our efforts helped block Soviet expansionism, topple communist repression, and secure a great victory for human freedom. Clearly, the Soviet Union’s collapse enhances our security. But it also requires us to think anew because the world is new. [. . .] In such a world, our interests and ideals compel us not only to be engaged but to lead. [. . .] To the extent democracy and market economics hold sway in other nations, our own nation will be more secure, prosperous, and influential, while the broader world will be more humane and peaceful.52
As a synthesis, a definition of the American concept of liberal democracy can be attempted. Its primary goal is to protect individuals so that they can live peacefully and prosper. It is achieved through the constitution of a State (the Union) whose eventual abuse of powers against individuals needs nonetheless to be prevented. This is done first with the establishment of the Executive, Legislative and Judiciary independently of each other but also in check of each other; and second, by the recognition of human rights. In the pragmatic attempt to bridge the gap between the absolute primacy of the individual and the practical necessity for a government, a fundamental ambiguity is created. On the one hand, the basic stress is on the (American) individual, and this naturally leads to non-interventionism. On the other, the need for governmental intervention so that all can individually enjoy their rights fully is recognized. In foreign policy, this means that the establishment of liberal democracies everywhere in the world profits both the world and Americans. A combination of
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both currents results in unilateral intervention (on the causes of U.S. unilateralism, see Patrick 2002).
. Print elite media Newspapers, partly or totally, decide what types of editorials and opinion columns they publish. As the present empirical study of the international media echo examines interactions between Le Monde (2.4.1), The New York Times (2.4.2) and three Russian newspapers, Izvestija, Nezavisimaja Gazeta, and Segodnja (2.4.3), they need to be presented. .. Le Monde According to La Balme (2002: 277), French foreign policy officials are very receptive to media that they consider as sources of public opinion. Among French media, Le Monde enjoys a special status. Because of this prominent place in French media and intellectual life, the scandal that the journalists Pierre Péan and Philippe Cohen provoked in Februay 2003 with the publication of La face cachée du Monde – Du contre-pouvoir aux abus de pouvoir was particularly virulent. Indeed, Le Monde as the French reference daily, i.e. the newspaper that must be read even if one does not like it, was publicly attacked (albeit not for the first time in its history): Péan and Cohen accused Le Monde of having gone from a position of counter-power to a position where it abused its power.53 These accusations were particularly directed against the Chairman of the newspaper’s Executive Board, Jean-Marie Colombani, the Head of editorial staff, Edwy Plenel,54 and the President of the “Readers’ Society” and member of the newspaper’s Supervisory Committee,55 Alain Minc. Whatever elements of truth Péan’s and Cohen’s work contains, it is also a good example of “bad journalism”: factual errors, lack of references, very unclear use of quotations, no separation between comments and facts. It appears that the interest of Péan’s and Cohen’s book lies not so much in its detailed content but rather in the fact that it exposed a (not unknown) problem within Le Monde. Le Monde does not leave one indifferent. Patrick Éveno, who has written Le Monde’s history, Le journal Le Monde – Une histoire d’indépendance (2001),56 takes sides with Jean-Marie Colombani, Edwy Plenel and Alain Minc. A less polemical criticism than Péan’s and Cohen’s but a more distanced evaluation of the newspaper than Éveno’s is presented by journalist Bernard Poulet, in Le pouvoir du Monde – Quand un journal veut changer la France (2003), that basically reexamines each of Péan’s and Cohen’s accusations in a more convincing manner. In his conclusion, Poulet remarks that Le Monde, because of its pre-eminence, has come to exhibit a number of major de-
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fects traditionally present in French media, one of them being militancy. He adds that since the beginning of the 1980’s, militancy has been appearing under a new guise, that of a school master who uses human rights as a rule and morality as a sanction, and prefers to comment rather than report balanced facts: Depuis le début des années 1980, le journalisme militant a fait son retour sous de nouveaux habits: il ne défend plus un parti, une idéologie partisane, il a abandonné sa violence explicite. Il est devenu maître d’école, maniant la règle des droits de l’homme et le bonnet d’âne de la morale. Mais il préfère toujours le commentaire et l’engagement à la relation équilibrée des faits. (2003: 232)
Le Monde was founded in 1944 by Hubert Beuve-Méry on the instigation of General de Gaulle to replace Le Temps that had been the reference daily under the Third Republic. Le Temps had voluntarily suspended its publication on 29 November 1942, but two of its directors had been supporters of Marshall Pétain, and thus the newspaper was not allowed to re-appear after the Liberation. The goal pursued by Le Monde was to provide France with a reliable and internationally respected newspaper. Thanks to Beuve-Méry, Le Monde succeeded in keeping its distance from the government and in this differed from the officious Le Temps. The main ideas behind Le Monde’s positions could be summarized as a type of humanism that linked defense of freedom and democratic values with social justice and a suspicious attitude towards money because of its corrupting effects. Thus, Le Monde appeared fundamentally anticommunist but also in a way anti-American, and it presented itself as a defender of the oppressed. It took position in favour of decolonization (from 1957 to 1961, Le Monde was seized twenty times because of its publication of reports on torture practiced by the French army in Algeria). Audience studies starting in 1955 showed that Le Monde was read by right-wing and left-wing people, by business leaders and union members. In 1962, when General de Gaulle, President of the French Republic since 1958, called for a referendum to amend the 1958 Constitution and have the President elected on the principle of direct universal suffrage, Beuve-Méry under the pen name of “Sirius” took antiGaullist positions, and Le Monde began to lean towards the leftist opposition. By the end of the 1960s when Beuve-Méry retired, Le Monde had become the most influential French daily. In the 1980s, because of its leftist orientation, it started losing some of its audience, and was hit by successive crises that brought it close to bankruptcy in 1982, 1985, 1991 and 1994. However, Le Monde remained a reference newspaper. In 1994, because of his tense relationship with the daily’s director, President Mitterrand decided to reduce the number of subscriptions by the Élysée (the presidential palace) from 110 to 20. In spite of this, the President was reportedly still reading Le Monde, and his aides went outside to buy it (La Balme 1998: 269).
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Le Monde as it appeared from 1999 to 2001 was the product of a number of modifications, especially in its ownership structure (Le style du Monde 2002). In 1968, Le Monde was 40% owned by its editorial staff, 5% by its senior executives, 4% by its employees, 40% by its founders and associates, and 11% by its managers. Facing acute financial difficulties, the newspaper accrued its capital, and on September 1st, 2001, it became 52.61% owned by internal shareholders and 47.39% by external shareholders. Among the internal shareholders, the editorial staff represented 30.092% of all shareholders, and was by far the single most important group of owners; it held 33.3% of the voting rights. In 1999–2000,57 33% of Le Monde’s audience was less than 35 years old and 66% had a higher education (vs. 26% for the entire population); 39% lived in a household whose head was a senior executive (vs. 16% for the entire population). Le Monde was the national daily that was the most read by teachers and students. In 2000, it printed an average of 402,444 issues per day; 50% of them were sold in Paris and surrounding areas, 38.9% in the provinces, and 11.1% outside of France (Monde 2002: 29). Since 1997, Le Monde has also been available on the internet (www.lemonde.fr). In the 2002 brochure, Le style du Monde, Le Monde published its code of ethics. In its principles (pp. 6–7), it claims its independence and its pluralism, and affirms not to impose any editorial line on its journalists. Regarding its values, it puts forward the French Republic’s motto, “Liberté, égalité, fraternité”, its contributions to justice and solidarity and against racism and exclusion. It is in favour of openness and international cooperation, and against nationalism and isolationism. Le Monde considers itself to be an international newspaper, and it states that most events cannot be understood solely in a national framework: they have to be placed in their international setting. Le Monde informs but does not claim to be neutral: it takes positions in its editorials and also in the analyses and comments of its journalists. The articles must present a solid argumentation and avoid a polemical and sarcastic attitude as well as personal attacks. Furthermore, they must not be written on a peremptory tone and they must avoid “giving lessons”. A mediator, nominated by the director, is responsible for the respect of the journalistic rules as exposed in Le style du Monde. They constitute a reading contract with Le Monde’s audience. According to Le Monde’s structure, three people appear mainly responsible for the line of its editorials: the Chairman of the newspaper’s Executive Board (Jean-Marie Colombani), who chairs the daily meeting in which the choice for the editorial is made; the Head of the editorial staff (Edwy Plenel) who is in charge of editorial reflections (editorials, analyses and debates); and the chief editor for the editorials’ section (Alain Frachon). In 2001, Edwy Plenel published a book on his membership to the Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire (Trotskyite party) before he joined Le Monde in 1980.
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.. The New York Times The New York Times58 was founded in 1851. In the 1870s, in what remains a classic case of American investigative journalism, its reporters uncovered widespread corruption in the city’s administration, the Tweed ring, and published their findings despite numerous threats. Towards the end of the century, the newspaper met with financial difficulties and was put up for sale. It was bought in 1896 by Adolph S. Ochs, a very successful newspaper publisher from Chattanooga, Tennessee, and has since remained in his family. Ochs published his policies for The New York Times in the issue of 19 August 1896: To undertake the management of The New York Times, with its great history for right-doing, and to attempt to keep bright the lustre which Henry J. Raymond and George Jones have given it, is an extraordinary task. But if a sincere desire to conduct a high-standard newspaper, clean, dignified and trustworthy, requires honesty, watchfulness, earnestness, industry and practical knowledge applied with common sense, I entertain the hope that I can succeed in maintaining the high estimate that thoughtful, pure-minded people have ever had of The New York Times. It will be my earnest aim that The New York Times give the news, all the news, in concise and attractive form, in language that is parliamentary in good society, and give it as early, if not earlier, that it can be learned through any other reliable medium; to give the news impartially, without fear or favor, regardless of any party, sect or interest involved; to make the columns of The New York Times a forum for consideration of all questions of public importance, and to that end to invite intelligent discussion from all shades of opinion.59
“All the News that’s Fit to Print” became the newspaper’s motto and has been appearing steadily on the front page since February 1897. The New York Times rapidly established the standard, and received the following praise in 1897 by The Journalist: It has lived up to its motto ‘All the News that’s Fit to Print,’ and the great cultivated, well-to-do class do not want anything beyond that. As an advertising medium for good goods it is steadily growing in value. It may not be so large a number of readers as some of its less conservative contemporaries, but its readers represent more dollars, which, after all, is what the advertiser is after.60
Schudson (1978) attributes the newspaper’s success to four factors: the amount of its financial news and advertising; its conservatism both in editorials and in presentation of political news; its advertised “decency”; and its price, lowered from three cents to one penny in October 1898. The New York Times had a badge of respectability that attracted readers. Adolph S. Ochs was succeeded in 1935 by his son-in-law, Arthur Hays Sulzberger, until his retirement in 1961. According to Chomsky (1999) who an-
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alyzed the internal record of The New York Times, Arthur Hays Sulzberger had a systematic, persistent and decisive influence on the newspaper. “The formal mechanisms were largely irrelevant; it was in small, informal discussions between the publisher and his most trusted subordinates ‘that the course of the paper was really set’ ”.61 Sulzberger was fiercely anti-communist, and under his guidance, The New York Times’ editorial pages painted a very critical portrait of the Soviet Union and a benevolent one of the United States. In 1992, Arthur Sulzberger Jr., grandson of Arthur Hays Sulzberger, succeeded his father, Arthur Ochs Sulzberger, and became publisher of The New York Times; he was elected chairman of the board of The New York Times Company in 1997. The New York Times was owned solely by the Ochs/Sulzberger family until 1967, when it started offering shares to the public. It is now part of the diversified media New York Times Company that had revenues of about $3.1 billion in 1999 and is listed on the New York Stock Exchange. In 2000, the New York Times Company was ranked number one among peer companies in Fortune Magazine’s list of “World’s Most Admired Companies”.62 In 1998, The New York Times achieved $1 billion in ad revenues, the highest ever reached by any publication in a single year.63 As of 30 September 2000, The New York Times’ total net paid circulation was about 1.1 million copies on weekdays and 1.7 million copies on Sundays.64 It has been appearing on the Web since January 1996 (www.nytimes.com). The newspaper’s Code of Conduct for the News and Editorial Departments (2003) states in its introduction that it is in the interest of the Times and members of its news department and editorial page staff to cover the news as impartially as possible as the reputation of the newspaper rests on that. Thus, they should avoid conflicts of interest or the appearance of conflict. The newspaper’s entire Code of Ethics deals with such questions of conflict of interest, but no definition of impartial covering of the news is given. The New York Times’ editorials and Op-Ed pages are produced by a staff of about 30 editorial writers, columnists and editors. From 1993 to September 2001, Howell Raines was the editorial page editor, and in that capacity reported directly to Arthur Sulzberger Jr., the publisher. Raines, who had won a Pulitzer Prize in 1992, had been appointed editorial page editor because Sulzberger knew that Raines was “a kindred spirit: a contrarian whose values had taken shape during the sixties, who viewed the world as a moral battleground”,65 and that “like him, [Raines] took liberal positions on affirmative action, capital punishment, abortion rights, health insurance, welfare, the environment, and the role of an activist government”.66 During Raines’ tenure, the editorial pages reflected these views, and half of the editorial board was replaced. Members of the editorial board knew that Sulzberger not only read some of their draft editorials but also sometimes edited them.
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In 2001, The New York Times’ executive director, Lelyveld, announced that he planned to retire, and Sulzberger asked Raines what he would do if he were executive director. Raines’ answer was that “he wanted to enliven the front page with more exclusive breaking news – original stories”. Raines served as executive director until his resignation on 5 June 200367 after the journalist Jayson Blair, said to have been a favorite of Raines’, was found guilty of widespread fabrication and plagiarism. The Blair scandal, touching “the” reference newspaper, shook the media world, and also uncovered to the public the atmosphere of profound dissatisfaction in The New York Times. Raines was accused of having been “forbidding, autocratic, and inaccessible”, of having “played favorites, [. . .] ruled by fear, and [. . .] lost the trust of much of the newsroom”.68 The New York Times had to acknowledge that “some of the newspaper’s reporters and editors said they told Mr. Sulzberger that the newsroom’s disaffection with Mr. Raines was so deep as to likely be irreparable”.69 .. Russian print elite media No single Russian daily occupies the same position in Russia as Le Monde and The New York Times do in their respective national societies. Thus, the three newspapers, Izvestija, Nezavisimaja Gazeta, and Segodnja, as the national non-specialised newspapers that attract mostly an educated audience, were examined daily for their reactions to Western media discourse from August 1999 to July 2001. During this period, these newspapers made explicit mentions of the following French and American media: Le Monde, Le Figaro, Libération, Le Parisien, TF1 (French TV channel), The New York Times, The Washington Post, The New York Post, USA Today, NBC, CNN. To the question, “Which newspapers do you read more or less regularly? (not less than once a week)”, respondents to a 1997 VCIOM poll (N = 3000) put Izvestija in the fourth place (3.7%), and Segodnja and Nezavisimaja Gazeta in a tie at the ninth-tenth place (0.9%). None of the seven preceding newspapers qualifies as a national elite daily. The most read newspaper is by far the weekly Argumenty i Fakty (23.8%), followed by Komsomol’skaja Pravda with its tabloid-style crime reports and human-interest stories (11.9%), and the “workers’ newspaper” Trud (5.5%); they all address a more popular audience (Resnjanskaja & Fomiˇceva 1999: 75). Izvestija, Nezavisimaja Gazeta and Segodnja are also available in an electronic form on the internet. In 1999, Russia had 2.5 million internet users (of which 73% had a higher education), and in 2000, 9.2 million. The e-news audience in 1999 was composed mainly of office managers (43%), students (23%), and businessmen (17%) (Loukina 2001). According to Zasurskij (2001: 24–34), the history of the Russian media system can be divided into five periods. The first period starts in 1986 with Gorbachev’s
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policy of perestrojka and his use of the media to promote glasnost’. It continued until 1990 when a Soviet law put an end to the Communist Party control on the mass media. The second period, from 1990 to the beginning of 1992, has been called the “golden age” of the Russian media (McNair 1994: 121) because of their readiness to challenge political authority and their role in defeating the attempted 1991 coup. The third period saw the establishment of the new Russian media system. It took place in three stages: (a) from 1992 to 1993, when political confrontation and the first economic difficulties caused a sharp drop in printed media circulation; (b) from 1994 to the first half of 1995, with relative political stability but the continued decline of industrial production, the influx of “politically tainted” capital in media companies, the closure of a number of publications,70 and the success of commercial media; (c) from the second half of 1995 to the first half of 1996, with the use of “politically tainted” capital to organize a propaganda system for the presidential elections. During the fourth period, from the presidential elections of 1996 to the first half of 1998, Russian mass media became the channel of communication for politicians. Finally, the fifth period, starting with the economic crisis of August 1998, is marked by the reinforcement of the State role in the mass media system through its own media. Thus, while the 1990s have seen Russian media gain their freedom from the Communist Party, McNair (2000: 79) notes: ‘Freedom’, of course, is always relative, limited by the political, economic, and cultural conditions within which media organizations must operate. If Russian media workers are free from the impositions of an authoritarian political system, they now grapple with the sometimes equally inhibiting pressures and constraints of the market capitalism which replaced it, and the new media barons who have replaced the old party bosses.
Indeed, a specificity of the Russian media system at the end of the 1990s is the political weight exercised by oligarchs who control large sectors of the economy. Izvestija, Nezavisimaja Gazeta, and Segodnja are each controlled by an oligarch,71 and as such they cannot be categorised as nationalistic, conservative (in the Russian context), nor anti-Western. Indeed, oligarchs are ardent supporters of a number of aspects of Western economic models. In fact, these newspapers present, as Herzen put it, the two faces of the Russian Janus, Slavophilism and Westernism, the two philosophical currents that have permeated Russian intellectual life since the 1840s (Walicki 1975: 394). ... Izvestija Izvestija was founded in 1917. As the newspaper of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, it expressed the views of the Soviet government. More favoured among the intellectuals than the Pravda of the Communist Party, Izvestija gained prestige by supporting Gorbachev’s policy of perestrojka in 1987, and by taking position
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against the attempted coup in 1991. It declared its independence from the Supreme Soviet and appointed Igor’ Golembiovskij as chief editor. The Supreme Soviet, under the leadership of Khasbulatov, tried to regain control with a resolution that Izvestija’s change of status was illegal, but after a battle in court, Yeltsin dismissed the resolution by presidential decree in 1992. Izvestija showed its independence by opposing the first Chechen war in 1994–1996, but it actively supported Yeltsin’s reelection in 1996. After the presidential elections, Izvestija’s journalists agreed for the oil company, LukOjl, to acquire 20% of the newspaper’s actions in exchange of its financial help in establishing regional centres. In April 1997, Izvestija reproduced an article from Le Monde according to which the Prime Minister, Victor ˇ Cernomyrdin, owned a capital of about $5 billion.72 Vagit Alekperov, president of LukOjl (35% owned by the government), publicly criticised the newspaper for ˇ this information. In reaction, Izvestija’s journalists started a campaign against Cernomyrdin and LukOjl. LukOjl, which had succeeded in buying shares from other investors and now owned 41% of them, offered Igor’ Golembiovskij the position of president of the company under the condition that from now on the president of the company and the chief editor be named on the recommendation of LukOjl. To escape LukOjl’s pressures, the directing board of Izvestija turned to Oneximbank, which quickly acquired more than 50% of the shares. As LukOjl and Oneximbank joined forces to control Izvestija’s editorial policy, Igor’ Golembiovskij was fired and part of the editorial staff left with him. In October 1997, they founded Novye Izvestija (on the model of USA Today) with Boris Berezovskij’s funds. Mikhail Kožokin, former director of Oneximbank’s press services, became Izvestija’s new chief editor. (Voltmer 2000; Zasurskij 2001: 232–236). Thus, in 1997, Izvestija came under the control of the Oneximbank group, whose founder and president is Vladimir Potanin. Potanin was listed by Forbes’ Magazine in 1998 as the richest Russian with an estimated net worth of $1.6 billion. Forbes’ also selected him as one of the world’s top ten smartest businessmen. In 1998, the holding company Prof-Media was created to regroup Oneximbank’s media investments.73 According to an article published in Segodnja in December 1999, Potanin had entered into a financial agreement with the Kremlin.74 In revealing this agreement, Segodnja implied that Izvestija was subordinate to the government and followed its line. In September 2004, Izvestija’s chief editor, Raf Shakirov, resigned from his office in a dispute with his publisher – who had received a phone call from the Kremlin – over the paper’s critical coverage of the Beslan school hostage standoff, including its publication of graphic pictures of wounded and dead children and other victims.75 ... Nezavisimaja Gazeta Nezavisimaja Gazeta was founded in December 1990 (thanks to the new Soviet law on mass media) with private funds by the journalist, Vitalij Tret’jakov, on the
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model of the British Independent and the French Le Monde. After a very successful beginning as a member of the liberal avant-garde, the newspaper started to experience financial difficulties when prices were liberated after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. However, the newspaper survived and its reputation grew after it appeared with blank spaces in place of its censured passages during the parliamentary crisis of October 1993. In 1994–1995, Nezavisimaja Gazeta faced a financial crisis, and stopped appearing in May 1995. In the summer of 1995, its editorial collective (editorials and journalistic staff) agreed for Oneximbank (owned by Vladimir Potanin) to buy the newspaper (and continue its production), and rejected Tret’jakov’s proposition to sell but close it down at the same time. In August 1995, Boris Berezovskij made Tret’jakov an offer that, reportedly, could not be refused. The editorial collective’s previous decision was annulled on the basis of a legal irregularity, and Tret’jakov became the general director and chief editor of the newspaper he had founded. Since then, Berezovskij has had a controlling stake in Nezavisimaja Gazeta through Obedinionny Bank. He owned 80% of the company’s shares in 2001. Berezovski was a strong supporter of Yeltsin and Putin, and Nezavisimaja Gazeta was favourable to their respective election to the presidency of the Russian Federation in 1996 and 2000. However, six months after Putin’s election, Berezovskij turned against him.76 In June 2001, Berezovski decided to let go of Tret’jakov because of the political line of the newspaper’s coverage.77 Rustam Narzikulov was elected general director, and Tat’jana Koškareva was chosen (by Berezovsky) as the new chief editor. Several other journalists also left around the same time, including Dmitrij Gornostaev, a pro-Putin international affairs specialist. After Tret’jakov’s departure, Nezavisimaja Gazeta deeply changed. ... Segodnja Segodnja, first appearing in 1993 but founded in 1992 by journalists of who had left Nezavisimaja Gazeta, was from the beginning financed by the group Most. Most, established by Vladimir Gusinskij in 1989, had been first a consulting co-op for foreign investors in Russia. Gradually, Most turned into Media-Most, a media holding regrouping, among many others, the daily Segodnja, the magazine Itogi (jointly published with Newsweek), the radio station Ekho Moskvy, and especially the national TV channel NTV. Media-Most also holds financial interests in foreign media. Segodnja was the only member of the group that was not financially profitable. According to Zasurskij (2001: 226), the reason Gusinskij did not close down Segodnja was that he could use it for political ends in ways for which he could not risk the reputation of Itogi, Ekho Moskvy, or NTV. Segodnja was very critical of the first Chechen war, but it supported Yeltsin against the communist candidate, Zjuganov, for the presidential elections of 1996. By 1999, however, Segodnja reverted to its critical attitude towards the government. Gusin-
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skij’s difficulties with the Russian judiciary system (he was arrested a few times on financial charges) started after the presidential elections of 2000. Controlled until the end by Gusinskij, Segodnja was shut down by its publisher (officially for financial reasons) on 16 April 2001, two days after security forces seized NTV, the only non-state owned national TV station, from its protesting journalists on the order of its new managing board that was now controlled by Gazprom.78 NTV had supported the Primakov-Lužkov alliance during the 2000 presidential campaign. Gusinskij went to live in Spain.
. General context at the end of the 1990s At the end of the 1990s, Russia, France and the USA were facing difficulties of their own. Russia had just gone through a very turbulent decade: the end of a 73 yearold communist regime and the beginning of a capitalist one was accompanied by an almost constant political turmoil; dire difficulties in the economic and social spheres were affecting the immense majority of the population while a small group of oligarchs took advantage economically and politically of the situation; the end of the first Chechen war that had been strongly opposed and ended with a quasi de facto independence of Chechnya did not stop the violence. In these conditions, the Russian population felt generally so overwhelmed in its daily life that it was not concerned by questions of national prestige. France, with its long-standing mission of human rights defence and its mediaknowledgeable group of militant intellectuals, was dealing with a European Union that had not been able to implement the principle of a common foreign and security policy inscribed in the 1992 Maastricht treaty. The European Union was furthermore negotiating the admission of ten new member states, thereby making the possibility to reach a common foreign and security policy even more remote. With the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the USA lost its well-defined long-time enemy and was the only remaining superpower on the international stage. Thus, it had to renegotiate its position and manage its old enemy as a new found friend. This difficulty and the need to choose between isolationism and interventionism were accrued by the opposition between a republican Congress and a democrat Administration. The French Le Monde, the American New York Times, and the Russian Izvestija, Nezavisimaja Gazeta, and Segodnja, interacted in this context. All are elite dailies in their respective national societies. Le Monde and The New York Times are both wellestablished, and they also were both at the centre of comparable media scandals. In the same situation, any other newspaper would probably have lost its place on the market, but they did not as they could not be replaced as reference newspapers.
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Izvestija, Nezavisimaja Gazeta, and Segodnja each belong to a different oligarch in a society that had little experience with private ownership of media. Each oligarch entertained a different type of relationship with the Kremlin. Their influence on the content of their newspapers varied, but the newspapers could logically not oppose a Western-type economic model. In these conditions, how did Le Monde and The New York Times present Russia to their readers, and how did Izvestija, Nezavisimaja Gazeta, and Segodnja react to their discourse?
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chapter
Russia in Le Monde and The New York Times
From August 1999 to July 2001, Russia was covered relatively often in Le Monde and The New York Times. Le Monde (LM) contains one editorial per issue, and during this period, it published 33 editorials on Russia, 11.7% of all its editorials on foreign policy (i.e. excluding not only domestic but also European matters). The New York Times (NYT) published quantitatively more editorials on Russia, 41, but this represents only 6.5% of all its editorials on foreign policy as the newspaper contains three editorials per issue with always one on foreign policy. Table 3.1 shows which among the events that characterized Russia and the West from August 1999 to July 2001 (see Appendix 2 for a detailed chronology), Le Monde and The New York Times chose to highlight in their editorials. Two topics precede all the others in both newspapers: the war in Chechnya that started in September 1999, culminated in February 2000 with the fall of Grozny and has not ended since (LM: 36% of editorials: NYT: 22% of editorials); and Vladimir Putin who became Prime Minister in August 1999, acting President of the Russian Federation in January 2000, and elected President of the Russian Federation in March 2000 (LM: 24% of editorials; NYT: 15% of editorials). Another very important topic figuring in the American newspaper is the question of defense (5 editorials). Indeed, the American presidents in power at the time, Clinton and Bush, tried successively to impose a new defense missile system that went against the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty between the USA and Russia. Russia (and Europe) opposed the American project. In Le Monde, the two main topics (Chechnya, Putin) count for 60% of the editorials, and in The New York Times, the three main topics (Chechnya, Putin, defense) represent 49% of the editorials. It appears thus that Le Monde’s coverage is notably more focused than The New York Times’. Other topics that were present in both newspapers are: Russian money laundering through the Bank of New York and role of the IMF, media freedom (dismantling of Gusinskij’s Media-Most group), the failed rescue of the submarine Kursk, the parliamentary elections of December 1999, Yeltsin, and Russia’s general situation. Some topics are covered only in Le Monde (end of operation for the space station Mir, accrued role of the FSB, liberation of the French hostage Brice Fleutiaux), and others only in The New York Times (arrests of Edmund Pope for spying in Russia and Robert Hanssen for spying in the USA, Russian diplomacy with Cuba and China, Gorbachev, religious freedom, state of the Russian healthcare system, delay
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Table 3.1 Topics covered by Le Monde’s and The New York Times’ editorials Topics
Number of editorials in Le Monde The New York Times
Second Chechen war Putin Money laundering and IMF role Media freedom Submarine Kursk Defense (army, ABM treaty) Parliamentary elections Yeltsin General situation Space station Mir Accrued role of the FSB (ex-KGB) Liberation of the French hostage, Brice Fleutiaux Spy cases (Edmund Pope, Robert Hanssen) Diplomacy (Cuba, China) Gorbachev Religious freedom Healthcare system American loan to Russia Raoul Wallenberg
12 8 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Total
33
9 6 2 3 2 5 3 1 1
2 2 1 1 1 1 1 41
for an American loan to Russia, circumstances of Raoul Wallenberg’s death after World War II). The list of topics reveals that only a minority of them concern inter-State relations stricto sensu (money laundering and IMF, defense, French hostage, spy cases, diplomacy, American loan, Raoul Wallenberg). The topic choices and their treatment underline the importance of the individual, of freedom and of human rights (Chechnya, media, Kursk, religion, healthcare, Wallenberg, Brice Fleutiaux, Edmund Pope, Wallenberg). The type of covering given to these topics is revealed by a linguistic analysis. Its main methodological lines (3.1) are first presented, and the results follow (3.2). After a synthesis of the newspapers’ main trends (3.2.1) is given, the components are examined one by one: general lines of argumentation (3.2.2), structure of the debate reconstructed in the editorials (3.2.3), representations of Russia (3.2.4) and of Us (3.2.5), and finally, main positions (3.2.6). In conclusion, Le Monde’s and The New York Times’ different conceptual frameworks (3.3) are presented.
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. Linguistic methodology Despite the importance of their role, editorials have been the object of few studies especially in regard to their linguistic structures. Bolivar (1994) showed how British editorials are composed of three fundamental turns, the ‘lead’ (aboutness and posture), the ‘follow’ (responding to the lead), and the ‘valuate’ (evaluation). Tirkkonnen-Condit (1996) compared the argumentation structure of Finnish, British and American editorials. Regardless of the topic covered, Anglo-American writers provide a very clear thesis summary, contrarily to Finns who avoid doing so in the case of sensitive topics as a kind of politeness strategy. Hawes & Thomas (1996), working in Daneš’ Functional Sentence Perspective (1974), looked at the way various thematic progressions appeal to different audiences. Le (2004) examined how the identification of participants in the argumentation affected its persuasive effect. Other studies have been more concerned with the content of editorials than with their structure per se. Thus, Hackett & Zhao (1994) uncovered America’s ‘master narrative’ of war exemplified in the American opinion/editorial discourse during the Gulf War. Van Dijk (1996) exposed how editorials contain implicit and implied opinions. Le (2002) showed how Le Monde’s editorial discourse on Russia could be culturally misconstrued in Russia, where the events discussed in the editorials carry a very different socio-political weight. All of the above studies link in some way language form and language use for the study of a particular aspect of editorials. In this book, a more encompassing linguistic approach is needed. In Halliday’s Functional Grammar, the textual metafunction constitutes the basis from which the ideational and interpersonal metafunctions can take place. In other words, the analysis of the corpus linguistic structures establishes the ground for the entire study. The distinction between the textual, ideational and interpersonal is also carried within the text by the choice of linguistic structures to be analyzed. First, the textual is looked into with a coherence analysis that uncovers the editorials’ hierarchical structure and its macrostructures, i.e. the sentences whose content is most likely to remain in long-term memory. As the salient information in each text, these macrostructures are the key for defining the editorials’ framing. Second, the ideational is revealed by the coding of the macrostructures’ content and the representation of Russia in terms of its history at the all-sentence level. Third, the interpersonal is examined by looking at the parties taking part in exchanges at the macrostructural and all-sentence levels. For reasons of readibility, the linguistic methodology is explained below only in its main lines: coherence analysis (3.1.1), coding at the macrostructural level (3.1.2), coding at the all-sentence level (3.1.3), complementarity of the coding at the macrostructural and all-sentence levels (3.1.4), and verification of the analysis (3.1.5). Readers particularly interested in the linguistic methodology can find ad-
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ditional explanations and examples in Appendix 3 for the coherence analysis and in Appendix 4 for the coding of the content. .. Coherence analysis Coherence is what allows readers to consider a text as an entity, i.e. to assign it a global intention (Charolles 1983; Givòn 1995; Hobbs 1979; Sanders et al. 1992). In this work, a formal model of analysis (Le 1996) that integrates work done on processes of text production and interpretation by van Dijk (1980), Kintsch (1988, 1998), Hobbs (1985, 1990), and Daneš (1974) is used to reconstruct coherence. In this integrated model, coherence links between syntactic sentences are established on the basis of the type of logico-semantic relation existing between pairs of elements in the sentences. There are three basic relations: coordination (elaboration and parallelism), subordination, and superordination. These relations are Hobbs’ relations of expansion that have been completed. In simple terms, when we analyze a text to construct its coherence, we compare the meaning of lexical items, and determine how the ranges of these meanings relate to each other. Once the entire text has been analyzed in this manner, a graph representing the relations of coherence between sentences within each paragraph is drawn. For example, let us take the first two sentences of the third paragraph (sentences 8 and 9 from the beginning of the text) in the New York Times’ editorial about the Swedish diplomat, Raoul Wallenberg, “The Truth about a Hero’s Death” (November 29, 2000):79 3-8: In recent months the Russians, in conjunction with Sweden, have been trying in earnest to find out what really happened [to Wallenberg during and after World War II]. 3-9: In Budapest during World War II Wallenberg took great personal risks, issuing Swedish passports to at least 20,000 Jews who were being threatened by the Nazis with death marches and deportation to concentration camps.
Both sentences talk about “Wallenberg” (implied from the context in 3-8). In 38, one wonders about what happened to him during and after World War II (as implied by the context), and in 3-9, one reads about what he did during World War II. Thus the time reference in 3-9 in included in the time reference of 3-8. Sentence 3-9 is subordinate to sentence 3-8. The coherence graph for the third paragraph of the New York Times’ editorial is as follows: §3
3.8 3.9 Ý 3.10
3.11
3.12
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In paragraph 3, sentences 8, 11 and 12 are coordinated by elaboration (symbol: →). Sentence 9 is subordinated to sentence 8 (symbol: ↓) and ), coordinated by parallelism to sentence 10 (symbol: ⇑). Sentence 11 is superordinated to sentence 10 (symbol: ↑), and coordinated by elaboration to sentence 12. The representation of the relations of coherence between syntactical sentences within the paragraph they are a part of allows for the determination of the “macrostructural bases”. A macrostructural basis is a set of sentences within a same paragraph. It begins with the first paragraph sentence and ends with its last at the same or highest hierarchical level (including all the sentences in between and eventually the sentences subordinated to the last sentence at the highest level) (for more precision, see Appendix 3). The coherence graph above of paragraph 3 of The New York Times’ editorial shows that sentences 8, 11, and 12 are situated at the highest hierarchical level, and are coordinated by elaboration. Sentences 3.8 to 3.12 form one macrostructural basis. Macrostructural bases thus constitute suprasentential units of analysis that are formally defined.80 Within each macrostructural basis, we can distinguish the theme (Th), i.e. the sentence that indicates what the macrostructural basis is about. The theme is in principle the first sentence at the highest level of abstraction. In the example above, it is sentence 8 (underlined). We can also determine the macrostructure (Mcr), i.e. the sentence (or sentences) that represents the gist of the macrostructural basis. The macrostructures are the sentences most likely to remain in long-term memory (van Dijk 1980: 254). In principle, the macrostructure is the last sentence at the highest level of abstraction. In our example, it is sentence 12 (in bold). In other words, the theme is the point of departure of the argumentation, and the macrostructure, its point of arrival.81 The determination of the themes and macrostructures is particularly important in the verification process of the coherence analysis. First, the analysis is recursive: just as pairs of sentences within a same paragraph are analyzed, pairs of macrostructures are also analyzed. The coherence graph that results from this higher-order analysis shows higher-order suprasentential units of analysis (defined the same way as macrostructural bases), text themes (TTh) and text macrostructures (TMcr) (defined the same way respectively as themes and macrostructures). Second, the coherence analysis is verified when the themes and macrostructures generate at each level of analysis a summary of the text. Indeed, if we put one after the other in the order in which they appear the sentences representing the themes and macrostructures of each macrostructural basis, we obtain a shorter text that can be considered a summary of the original (its length varies depending on the number of macrostructural bases). In the example, sentences 1.1, 1.4, 2.5, 3.8, and 3.12 constitute a summary of the editorial.
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Raoul Wallenberg, the Swedish diplomat who saved thousands of Hungarian Jews from the Nazis, vanished mysteriously in January 1945 on his way to the Soviet Army’s headquarters outside Budapest (1.1). [The] important pronouncement [that Wallenberg was shot in the Lubyanka prison] should prompt President Vladimir Putin to issue a decree at long last acknowledging that Wallenberg was a victim of Stalin’s repression (1.4). Since Stalin’s death in 1953, Russians have been trying to reckon with the horrors of his era (2.5). In recent months the Russians, in conjunction with Sweden, have been trying in earnest to find out what really happened (3.8). It is time for Mr. Putin to set the record straight about Raoul Wallenberg’s last years (3.12).
The links between macrostructures are analyzed in terms of coordination, subordination and superordination. In the example, the macrostructures are 1.4, 2.5 and 3.12. Their analysis produces the following coherence graph for the entire text: 2.5 1.4
3.12
This representation shows that 2.5 is superordinated to 1.4, 3.12 is subordinated to 2.5, and that 1.4 is coordinated by elaboration to 3.12. The sentence 2.5 is at the highest hierarchical level; however, it is neither the text theme nor the text macrostructure, because 1.4 and 3.12 are coordinated by elaboration (see the first exception to the determination of the theme and the corresponding exception to the determination of the macrostructure – Appendix 3). Sentence 1.4 is the text theme (TTh), and sentence 3.12 is the text macrostructure (TMcr). Together, they generate an abstract for the entire editorial. [The] important pronouncement [that Wallenberg was shot in the Lubyanka prison] should prompt President Vladimir Putin to issue a decree at long last acknowledging that Wallenberg was a victim of Stalin’s repression (1.4). It is time for Mr. Putin to set the record straight about Raoul Wallenberg’s last years (3.12).
Let us notice that the content of both generated summaries corresponds closely to the editorial’s title, “The truth about a hero’s death”. Indeed, newspaper headlines are designed to “direct readers construct the optimal contextual effect for interpretation” (Dor 2003). The conformity of the editorial’s title to the content of its dual-level generated summaries provides thus a further means to verify the coherence analysis. In longer texts that are divided into sections containing several paragraphs, this type of analysis can be taken one step further thanks to the recursivity of the procedure.82 These sections are analyzed the same way as paragraphs, and the units of analysis they correspond to are called “text divisions”. In sum, the application of
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this model of analysis brings out the hierarchical structure of the text at different levels. It shows which sentences are most important within the macrostructural basis, within the text division and within the entire text. The higher type of unit (macrostructural basis, text division or entire text) of which these sentences are the macrostructures, the more likely they are to be kept in long term memory. .. Coding at the macrostructural level As the salient information that is most likely to remain in long-term, the content of the macrostructures is coded. In international relations, two aspects are particularly relevant: the representations of the parties involved (Us and Them), and their interactions. The coding of the macrostructural content depends on its interpretation. As the macrostructures represent the main points in the argumentation of the entire text, their content is interpreted in function of the entire text. ... Representations of Us and Them: Ideological square Macrostructures are coded for the positive and negative representations of Us and Them that they eventually contain (see A4.1). Indeed, according to Social Identity Theory (1981; Tajfel 1978, 1982, 1984), a group tends to emphasize the positive aspects of the in-group and the negative aspects of the out-group. This has also been called the “ideological square” (van Dijk 1998: 267). A macrostructure can have a multiple coding. For example, in (1) Le Monde draws its readers’ attention to the knowledge the IMF had of Russian money laundering. Thus, both Russia and the West are guilty (Mcr R neg, Mcr W neg). The New York Times’ example (2) underlines the positive attitude of the American and Russian governments in dealing with each other (Mcr USA pos, Mcr R pos). In (3), the statements of the Western governments do not per se contain any information that could reflect a negative opinion about the West. However, the co-text indicates that Le Monde considers them as bad evaluations of the situation by these governments because of the political context in which they were uttered. Thus, in light of the text argumentation, this macrostructure expresses a negative judgment on the West (co-text: Mcr W neg). Throughout the book, all examples are preceded by three numbers: the first one refers to the editorial (see Appendix 1), the second to the paragraph in the editorial, and the third to the rank of the sentence from the beginning of the editorial. Thus, “1-2-6” in Le Monde refers to sentence 6 of the editorial 1 in Le Monde’s list (“Le FMI et la Russie”, 6 August 1999), and this sentence is part of paragraph 2. (1) 1-2-6
Pis, on y apprend que ce détournement de fonds [par la Russie] se fait sinon avec l’accord, en tout cas en toute connaissance de cause de
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la part des grands de ce monde: les responsables du FMI et d’abord Michel Camdessus, son directeur général, mais aussi, avec lui, nos ministres des finances, les Larry Summers (États-Unis), Gordon Brown (Grande-Bretagne) et autres Dominique Strauss-Kahn, qui sont tous des administrateurs du Fonds. [Mcr R neg, Mcr W neg] [Worse, one learns that this fund embezzlement [by Russia] occurs, if not with the agreement, then certainly with the full knowledge of this world’s powerful people: the IMF leaders, primarily Michel Camdessus, its Managing Director, but also, with him, our Finance Ministers, Larry Summers (U.S.A.), Gordon Brown (Great-Britain) and Dominique Strauss-Kahn, among others, who are all administrators of the Fund.] (2) 11-1-3
There is reason for reassurance, however, in the calm response from the Clinton administration and the speedy effort by Russia’s Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, to emphasize the stability of overall relations between the United States and Russia. [Mcr USA pos, Mcr R pos]
(3) 2-3-15
En un concert presque unanime, les uns et les autres ont dit tout le bien qu’ils pensaient du nouveau premier ministre que Boris Eltsine a donné à la Russie. [co-text: Mcr W neg] [In near unanimity, everyone expressed much praise regarding the new Prime Minister whom Boris Yeltsin gave to Russia.]
... Interactions As we consider editorials in the context of international relations, it appears particularly relevant to note which types of interaction are represented in them. Thus, the macrostructures are coded for their senders and receivers: from [Us] to [Us], from [Us] to [Them], from [Them] to [Us], or from [Them] to [Them]. The parties in these interactions are represented through the use of a number of linguistic structures (for explanations of the linguistic analysis, see A4.2). For example, in (1) The New York Times is addressing the USA (Mcr NYT to USA). A number of times, a communication from [Us] to [Them] contains a positive or negative evaluation of Us or, most often, of Them. In these cases, the macrostructure is double-coded. Thus, in (2) the message from Russia to the USA (Mcr R to USA) also denotes a positive statement about Russia (Mcr R pos). (1) 33-2-6
But the United States should not turn away from encouraging Russia’s transition to a market economy and democracy and working with Mr. Putin to reduce dangers left over from the cold war. [Mcr NYT to USA]
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(2) 11-3-12 Meanwhile, Mr. Putin assured the administration that RussianUnited States relations were not as strained as Mr. Yeltsin had made them out to be, despite the two nations’ differences on Chechnya. [Mcr R to USA; and also, Mcr R pos]
... Other Not all macrostructures contain an evaluation of Us or Them, or a communication from one to the other. These macrostructures are coded “Other”. .. Coding at the all-sentence level Two aspects coded at the macrostructural level, the representation of Russia (3.1.3.1) and the interactions between various parties (3.1.3.2), are also coded at the all-sentence level because of their primary relevance to the object of this study. At the all-sentence level, the interpretation of the content relies primarily on the linguistic features of each sentence taken individually (including their anaphoric and cataphoric links). ... Representation of Russia in terms of its history Russia has had in the past a notably negative representation in the West. The question that is thus raised concerns the impact of this past on the present and the negative (1) or positive (2) image it will leave of Russia in the future. (1) 10-2-12 Il reste que dans les annales du crime d’État, la “campagne” de Tchétchénie 1999 figurera en bonne place. [Fut neg] [There is no denying that the 1999 Chechen campaign will have a prominent place in the record of State crimes.] (2) 16-5-24 History will honor him for these acts. [Fut pos]
In other words, in what measure is post-1991 Russia represented as the continuity of the Soviet Union or even of Imperial Russia to perpetuate its negative image (3), or more rarely positive? In particular, mentions of communism (4), the importance of the security agency (5), and militarism – as implied by mentions of the two Chechen wars (6) – have been coded because they have been characteristically associated with the Soviet Union. (For the codes, see Table A4–5.) (3) 22-2-6
and the government still uses criminal prosecution as a political weapon. [bef 91 neg]
(4) 12-5-17 If opinion polls prove correct, the new Duma may look very much the old one, dominated by Communists and nationalists. [Com]
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(5) 38-1-3
Even so, Mr. Putin, whose usual demeanor recalls his long years as a Soviet K.G.B. operative, visibly warmed to the personal chemistry of the occasion. [KGB]
(6) 6-2-5
Ils détruisent ce qui reste de Grozny, une ville qu’ils avaient réduite en ruine lors de leur précédente offensive (1994–1996). [Chech] [They are destroying what is left of Grozny, a city reduced to ruins during their previous attack (1994–1996).]
... Parties appearing in the argumentation Different voices take part in the argumentation reconstructed in the editorials. The identification of the participants in the interactions (senders and addressees) was conducted by searching for all instances of linguistic structures belonging to the categories of relational markers, person markers, and evidentials. (For explanations of the linguistic analysis, see A4.2). For example, the New York Times is addressing the USA in (1), and Russia in (2). In (3), Le Monde is addressing “la communauté internationale” (the international community), in this case more particularly the West. The communication does not have to be transnational: in (4), it is from the American Administration to an American company (noff: non-official, i.e. non governmental). (1) 18-2-3
Although Americans may feel relieved that Russian conventional forces are now too weak to pose a serious external threat, there is a worrisome side to Russia’s military breakdown. [NYT to USA]
(2) 18-6-26 The place to begin is by disengaging Russian troops from Chechnya at the earliest possible date. [NYT to R] (3) 6-5-24
Sinistres motivations qui justifieraient que la communauté internationale ne s’enferme pas dans un lourd silence complice. [LM to W] [Appalling motivations that would justify that the international community does not confine itself to deep, complicit silence.]
(4) 14-1-1
The Clinton Administration acted appropriately recently in ordering the Export-Import Bank to delay $500 million in loan guarantees to Tyumen Oil, a state-affiliated Russian company whose abusive business practices cheated foreign companies. [USA to USAnoff]
.. Coding complementarity The coding of the text content depends on its interpretation. Macrostructures, as main points in the entire text argumentation, are interpreted in function of their role in the entire text, i.e. at a pragmatic level, while the interpretation of the content at the all-sentence level relies primarily on the linguistic (syntactic
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and lexical) features of each sentence. Thus, the same sentence could be coded differently depending on the level at which it is interpreted. In (1), Western governments express their good feelings towards the new Russian Prime Minister, and thus communicate their support to Boris Yeltsin. As this sentence is a macrostructure, it is coded: Mcr W to R. When this sentence is considered with its co-text at the level of the editorial’s argumentation and not only in itself (as previously), it manifests Le Monde’s negative evaluation of Western governments because of the political context in which they expressed their support to Boris Yeltsin [co-text: Mcr W neg] (see above 3.1.2.1). This negative statement about the West is a point in the editorial’s general line of argumentation that leads to a negative statement of Russia (2-6-28: TMcr R Neg), and thus we have here an example of how expressions of congratulations by the West are used by Le Monde to construct a criticism of Boris Yeltsin. (1) 2-3-15
2-6-28
En un concert presque unanime, les uns et les autres [les gouvernements des pays occidentaux] ont dit tout le bien qu’ils pensaient du nouveau premier ministre que Boris Eltsine a donné à la Russie. [Mcr W to R; co-text: Mcr W neg] [In near unanimity, everyone [the Western governments] expressed much praise regarding the new Prime Minister whom Boris Yeltsin gave to Russia.] pour celui [Eltsine] qui avait suscité tant d’espoirs en prononçant l’arrêt de mort de l’URSS en 1991, et qui, à la différence de Mikhaïl Gorbachev, s’est fait élire à deux reprises par son peuple, c’est une fin de règne pitoyable. [TMcr R Neg] [For the one [Yeltsin] who raised so much hope when he pronounced the USSR’s death sentence in 1991, and who, contrarily to Mikhail Gorbachev, has been elected twice by his people, it is a pitiful end of reign.]
If a sentence is coded as a message ([voice] to [. . .]) at the all-sentence level, it will also be coded as a message at the macrostructural level, but not necessarily in the same terms. In (2), for example, the co-text (9-1-3) informs us that Jacques Chirac (9-2-4) was speaking at the OSCE meeting in Turkey, and thus was mostly addressing the Western world [9-2-4: F to W]. However, if we consider this sentence (9-2-4) within the text argumentation (TThMcr: 9-1-3), it functions as a message addressed by the French President to the Russian President [Mcr F to R]. In this editorial, the point of the text argumentation is a message from The New York Times to Mr. Yeltsin (TThMcr: 9-1-3), and the French President’s statement is used by the newspaper towards its own goals. This is made explicit with the expression “for example” in 9-2-4.
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(2) 9-1-3
9-2-4
Mr. Yeltsin and his allies in Moscow need to listen to warnings by those leaders who tried during the European security conference in Istanbul to explain that using bombs and tanks would not work, militarily or diplomatically, to oust Chechen terrorists. [TThMcr NYT to R] President Jacques Chirac of France, for example, said [at the OSCE meeting in Istanbul] this war to combat terrorism was “a tragic error” that was taking too many innocent lives in the breakaway republic. [all-sentence level: F to W; text level: Mcr F to R]
These two examples illustrate how the double-coding, at the all-sentence level and at the macrostructural level, allows the use of a linguistic structure to be linked to its function in the co-text and to the function of the entire text in its context. The micro-interpretation of the text content at the all-sentence level, and the macro-interpretation of the text content at the macrostructural level reveal the editorials from the inside and from the outside. On the one hand, editorials are a construction of a “virtual” public sphere in which a variety of participants take part. On the other, editorials are a participant in a larger “real” public sphere. In other words, editorialists construct their text by presenting a number of chosen participants in a certain perspective in order to influence their audience. In the case of Le Monde and The New York Times, this audience is national and international, and comprises members of the national and international political elite. Thus, this linguistic analysis of the editorials at the micro- and macrolevel contributes to the understanding of the influence editorialists exert in international relations through their use of language. .. Verification of the analyses The coherence analysis was verified with the generation of two types of summary for each editorial: first on the basis of the themes and macrostructures, and second on the basis of the text themes and text macrostructures. It was also checked that the content of the generated summaries corresponded closely to the editorials’ title. The author’s coding of the ideological square in the macrostructures, of Russia in terms of its history and of the parties appearing in the argumentation, was verified by independent coders. A native speaker of French coded half of Le Monde’s corpus (17 randomly selected editorials out of 33), and a native speaker of English coded half of The New York Times’ corpus (21 randomly selected editorials out of 41). In both cases, the intercoder reliability rate was over 91%. After discussion between the author and each independent coder about the differences in coding (most of them were due to simple errors and not to differences of inter-
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pretation), the total agreement rate reached over 99% for both Le Monde and The New York Times.
. Le Monde’s and The New York Times’ perspectives .. Main trends The results of the linguistic analysis, briefly described above, show that Le Monde, as the leading French elite newspaper, and The New York Times, as the leading American elite newspaper, adopt strikingly different perspectives to discuss Russia, although both newspapers basically agree on the value of human rights and liberal democracy, want them to be applied in Russia, and strongly criticize Russia for not doing so. Among the many participants in a multilateral debate, Le Monde presents itself as competent, representative, independent and committed to point to the responsibility of the West that is not capable of correcting Russia in its wrongdoings. In a bilateral setting, The New York Times adopts a pedagogical tone to instruct Russia on how to correct its wrongdoings. Tables 3.2a to 3.2d present the newspapers’ main features: lines of argumentation and construction of the debate (Table 3.2a), content of the debate with the representation of Russia (Table 3.2b) and of Us (Table 3.2c), and finally outcome of the debate with their main positions (Table 3.2d). Le Monde’s and The New York Times’ editorials differ in their line of argumentation (3.2.2), their construction of the debate (3.2.3), their representation of Russia (3.2.4) and of “Us” (3.2.5), and their positions towards Russia and “Us” (3.2.6). Each of these features is reviewed below in details. Table 3.2a Main features of LM’s and the NYT’ editorials on Russia: Lines of argumentations and construction of the debate LM NYT Line of argumentation Pointing to Western responsibility Pointing to Russian responsibility Construction of the debate 1) Participants Multilateralism 2) Newspaper as – Professional expertise figure of authority – Social representativeness – Independent and committed intellectual – An incisive style
Bilateralism – Skilful presentation of arguments and information sources – Balance between rational and emotional appeals – Contextualized evaluation of responsibilities – Self-confidence – A tone of commandment
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Table 3.2b Main features of LM’s and the NYT’ editorials on Russia: Representations of Russia LM Representation – Topics: Finance / politics, Leaders, of Russia Chechnya, Army, Media, (Western complicity) – Strongly negative (60% of Mcr; 49% of TMcr), significantly more than positive (p = 0)
– Historical mentions underline continuity of tsarist Russia, the Soviet Union and post-1991 Russia beyond changes of political regimes – Updated Cold-war framework with emphasis on the KGB/FSB – Significantly more references to the FSB/KGB than in the NYT (p = 0.027)
– Positive points mixed with negative points – References to the past point to a bleak future
NYT – Topics: Economy / finance, Leaders, Chechnya, Elections, Army, Freedoms (media, religion), Health Care – Strongly negative (62% of Mcr; 65% of TMcr), significantly more than positive (p = 0) – Significantly more negative at the TMcr level than LM (p < 0.05) – Historical mentions underline the continuation of some characteristics linked to the Soviet Union – Updated Cold-war framework with emphasis on militarism – Significantly more references to communism than in LM (p = 0.006) – Significantly more positive at the Mcr level than LM (p < 0.02) – Positive points show that changes are possible and dependent on a good relationship with the USA – References to the past open the possibility of positive changes in the future
.. Lines of argumentation A first approximation of the newspapers’ attitude towards their audience is given by the combination of the coherence analysis that brings forward the editorials’ argumentative points (Mcr and TMcr) with their semantic categorization. Tables 3.3 (LM) and 3.4 (NYT) present LM’s and the NYT’ lines of argumentation. In the conclusions of their general argumentation (TMcr), both newspapers put themselves on a par with States, the traditional actors on the international scene, by not only passing judgments on them but also telling them what to do in a considerable manner (in both cases, only 10% of the TMcr do not contain a judgment or a message). However, some significant differences appear between LM and the NYT in the construction of their role. The NYT criticizes Russia more heavily than LM (NYT: 65% of TMcr; LM: 49% of TMcr; p < 0.05), and it criticizes the USA much less than LM does to the West (NYT: 4% of TMcr; LM: 26%
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Table 3.2c Main features of LM’s and the NYT’ editorials on Russia: Representations of Us LM
NYT
Representation – Us = Western world of Us – Significantly less represented (positively and negatively) than Russia at the Mcr and TMcr levels – Significantly more negative than positive at the Mcr and TMcr levels – Significantly more negative about Us than the NYT at the Mcr and TMcr levels – Criticisms: role of the West in the embezzlement of IMF funds; lack of an appropriate response to the war in Chechnya – Positive points serve to reinforce the negative points
– Us = USA – Significantly less represented (positively and negatively) than Russia at the Mcr and TMcr levels – Balanced positive and negative representation – Positive and negative features point to the necessity of a good cooperation with Russia
Table 3.2d Main features of LM’s and the NYT’ editorials on Russia: Outcome of the debate LM Main positions – Messages directed significantly more often to the West than to Russia – Messages to the West significantly stronger than to Russia – To Us: be realistic (in premises); enforce the respect of human rights (in conclusions); – To Us and Russia: you share the same interests (in premises); stop the FSB’s hold on the country (in conclusions)
NYT – Messages directed significantly more often to Russia than to the USA – Messages to Russia significantly stronger than to the USA – To Russia: build a new society and reform the army (in premises); build a liberal democracy, protect liberties and media, reform the economy and the army, conduct diplomacy and not war (in conclusions) – To Us: address questions of defense and money laundering thoughtfully (in premises) – To Us and Russia: you have a common interest in working together for democracy (in conclusions)
of TMcr; p < 0.01); the NYT addresses Russia much more (NYT: 27% of TMcr; LM: 4% of TMcr; p < 0.01), and the West (including the USA) less (NYT: 16% of TMcr; LM: 33% of TMcr; p < 0.05). Furthermore, at the level of the main points in the general argumentation (Mcr), LM is much more critical of the West, Europe, France and the USA than the NYT (LM: 28% of Mcr; NYT: 4% of Mcr; p < 0.0001), it addresses Russia much less (LM: 3% of Mcr; NYT: 25% of Mcr; p < 0.0001), and finds fewer positive aspects about it (LM: 3% of Mcr; NYT: 11% of Mcr; p < 0.01).
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Table 3.3 Le Monde’s line of argumentation* Mcr Mcr Categories
N
LM to R LM to W (E / F) LM to USA E media to W NYT to W W to LM
6 39 1 1 1 1
R Neg R Pos W Neg W Pos F Neg F Pos USA Neg
/ Total of Mcr / 203 % 3 19
TMcr N Messages 3 23
/ Total of TMcr / 69 % 4 33
1
121 7 53 10 3 2 2
60 3 26 5
16
8
Ideological square 34 2 18 5
49 3 26 7
Other Total
263
7
10
93
* Mcr and TMcr can be coded more than once. Percentages have been rounded.
In other words, LM evaluates the situation in Russia and the Western reaction to it negatively, and concludes that the West must behave in a different manner to change the situation, while the NYT evaluates the situation in Russia negatively and concludes that Russia must behave differently. In the very negative picture they paint of Russia, LM points to the Western responsibility, while the NYT points to the Russian responsibility. LM can be seen as indirectly interventionist in Russian affairs and the NYT directly. .. Construction of the debate In their editorials, Le Monde and The New York Times reconstruct a debate between a variety of participants (3.2.1) including themselves (3.2.2). ... Participants In their representation of the debate, LM and the NYT give the floor to participants in a significantly different manner (Table 3.5). LM’s and the NYT’ positions are embodied in their editorials and it ensues that their respective voices are prevalent. They each present themselves as the major participant, but the NYT does so more prominently (LM: 46%; NYT: 55%; p = 0.016). Furthermore, the newspa-
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Table 3.4 The New York Times’ line of argumentation* Mcr
/ Total of Mcr / 285 %
Mcr Categories
N
NYT to R NYT to USA NYT to W NYT to Indeterm. USA to R USA to USAmedia F to R R to R noff R to USA R to O noff A pas to R
71 33 6 3 2 2 1 1 2 1 1
25 12 2
R Neg R Pos USA Neg USA Pos W Pos
177 32 11 9 1
62 11 4 3
32
11
TMcr N Messages 22 11 2
/ Total of TMcr / 81 % 27 14 2
2
2
1
1
Ideological square 53 9 3 4
65 11 4 5
Other Total
385
8
10
152
* Mcr and TMcr can be coded more than once. Percentages have been rounded.
pers construct different types of debate: it tends to be bilateral (NYT/USA vs. R) in the NYT, and multilateral in LM. The NYT lets Russia speak significantly more (LM: 18%; NYT: 28%, p < 0.01), while LM opens the debate to significantly more participants (LM: 37%; NYT: 18%; p < 0.01). This difference is reinforced when we look at all exchanges in which the addressee is either explicitly or implicitly mentioned. In LM (Table 3.6), the exchanges between Le Monde (or France or Europe) and Russia count for 15% of all exchanges, while 54% of exchanges in the NYT represent those between The New York Times or the USA with Russia (Table 3.7). In LM, 52% of the addressees are not Russia, France or Le Monde, and in the NYT only 11% of the addressees are not Russia or the USA. Finally, 33 different types of exchange are represented in the 173 tokens of exchange in LM, and 14 types of exchanges are represented in the 320 tokens of exchanges in the NYT, a very significant difference (p < 0.001). A special mention must be made of the society’s participation in the debate represented in LM. This participation occurs mostly under the form of rhetorical questions: those are questions whose answers LM gives immediately after. The
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Table 3.5 Representation of voices in LM and the NYT (all levels) N Voice LM Voice LMSoc Voice NYT Voice R Other voices: Voice F Voice E Voice USA Voice W Voice UN Voice Soc Voice O Voice A Total
LM %
122 16
46 (LM + LMSoc)
53
18 37
NYT N
%
229 117
54 28 18
12 23 17 31 1 13 13 1
1 1 54 3
302
421
9 7
editorial, “Le premier geste de M. Poutine” (13 May 2000), contains four such questions. In the answer to the first one, given in a text macrostructure, LM provides an explanation that implies that it has a good knowledge of Russian political language use, a type of knowledge that is not common to outsiders.83 The answer to the second question is also contained in a macrostructure, and its content, taking the opposite stand to what ‘naïve people’ could imagine, underlines LM’s experience a contrario. “Si vite ? Là encore, seuls les naïfs pouvaient imaginer que [. . . ]. Non” (21-3-16/18). The third and fourth questions present an alternative; they are answered conjointly and the answer is backed up by a Russian source mentioned in a macrostructure. Thus, the strategy of including rhetorical questions allows LM not only to involve its audience by giving a voice to society, but also to display its expertise. The NYT corpus does not contain any occurrence of rhetorical questions. ... Le Monde and The New York Times as figures of authority In their staging of the debate, LM’s and the NYT’ purpose is not only to represent the debate but also to participate in it, and they have to take care to assert their own authority. In a multilateral debate, LM could run the risk of having its voice covered over, but it uses society’s voice to make itself heard (see above, 3.2.1), and it implements several strategies in order to enhance its personality among the participants. The NYT faces a different problem as it dominates the scene with its interlocutor, Russia. It will be heard, but to be listened to, it needs to show how valid an interlocutor it is.
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Table 3.6 Representation of exchanges in LM (all levels): 33 types of exchanges LM to R to W to E to F to Soc to US to LM to O
14 41 6 3 21 3
Total %
91 52
LM Soc 6 1
F
E
US
W
R
2
5 1 6
6
7 1 2
7 3 2 3
1
1 2 1
1
2 3
13
O
NYT
2 1
2 3 1
7
Soc
10
14
17 10
12
3
12
5
1
Total
%
44 53 19 6 23 7 18 3
25 31 11 3 13 4 10 2
173
Table 3.7 Representation of exchanges in the NYT (all levels): 14 types of exchanges NYT to R to US to W to O
126 71 19
Total %
216 68
F
US
W
R
O
A
Total
%
2
24 26 4 11
2
2
1
20 9 3
176 106 27 11
55 33 8 3
65 20
2
2
320
1
32 10
.... Le Monde. Through the use of evidentials, person markers and relational markers, Le Monde constructs an active polyphonic participation within its written argumentation, and establishes its authority as a body of professional journalists, as a representative of public opinion, and as an independent and committed intellectual entity. This authority is presented with a rather incisive style. –
Le Monde’s professional authority
Following the publication of a report by Pricewaterhouse-Coopers, Le Monde, in its editorial on August 6th 1999 (Le FMI et la Russie [The IMF and Russia]), accused the IMF of complicity with the Russian government in the embezzlement of IMF funds. The report is introduced in the first two paragraphs of the editorial, and its content is presented by ‘on’ in 5 of the 6 sentences. In the first two sentences, the naivete of ‘on’ (relational marker), here referring to Le Monde and French society, appears in regard to the revealed facts (“on croyait tout savoir” [we thought we knew everything]; “on en savait sans doute moins qu’on ne le croyait ou le craignait” [we probably knew less than we thought or feared]). However, this ‘on’, Le Monde and French society, is portrayed as naive only for the purpose of bringing to light the gravity of the situation. Indeed, Le Monde considers itself
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knowledgeable, and it (person marker ‘on’) affirms its competence (“si l’on sait le décrypter” [if we know how to decipher it]) right after that, in the third sentence that functions as a text theme and macrostructure. Once this competence is thus firmly established, Le Monde and by its intermediary, French society, can disclose what they (relational marker ‘on’) know of Russia’s wrongdoings (“on y découvre” [in it we discover]), and of the IMF complicity (“on y apprend” [from it we learn]). The accusation against the IMF is accentuated by the scope of its authors, Le Monde and French society, and its mention in a text macrostructure. Such a strong accusation could not be left unanswered, and Michel Camdessus, the then Managing Director of the IMF, replied in a letter published on August 19th. This letter was followed by another editorial (Questions au FMI [Questions for the IMF]; 27 August 1999). There, Le Monde, having been personally blamed, openly confronts its adversary. In each of the seven sentences of its first paragraph, it very clearly establishes its opposition to Michel Camdessus, and proceeds to this effect in five complementary ways. First, it starts by asserting itself unequivocally (person markers: ‘Le Monde’, ‘nous’) in the thematic part of the first four sentences (“Le Monde . . . a publié” [Le Monde . . . published]; “nous affirmions” [we stated]; “nous critiquions” [we criticized]; “nous avons pu” [we may have]). Only then does it allow Camdessus (evidentials: “Camdessus”, “il”) to appear in the thematic part of the three last sentences (“Michel Camdessus . . . condamnait” [Michel Camdessus. . . condemned]; “il disait” [he said]; “et corrigeait” [and corrected]). Second, Le Monde makes sure to reveal its opposition to the IMF in each sentence (except sentence 4) through the relation between their theme and rheme. Third, while the rhemes of sentences 1 to 3 mention the IMF, the rhemes of sentences 5 to 7 concern Le Monde. Fourth, sentence 4 functions as a transition between Le Monde’s and Camdessus’ positions with Le Monde (person marker ‘nous’) recognizing the possibility of having made errors (“nous avons pu commettre des erreurs” [we may have made errors]), but it also suggests that this would be due to the difficulty of the work. However, Le Monde does not admit here to any errors. Hence, sentence 4, in fact, underlines the newspaper’s competence (i.e. despite the difficulty of its work, Le Monde did it well). Fifth and finally, the paragraph theme (sentence 1) recalls Le Monde’s writings about the relationship between Russia and the IMF (and implicitly their complicity), while the paragraph macrostructure (sentence 5, that functions also as a text theme and macrostructure), conversely, mentions Camdessus’ condemnation of Le Monde. Le Monde reinforces its authority in the paragraph theme by observing that the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal, two prestigious newspapers, also wrote about the links between Russia and the IMF. However, as Le Monde was the first to call attention to this problem, it is implicitly said to have been more vigilant in its work. In these five complementary ways, Le Monde has firmly defined its position (i.e. the argumentation premises) vis-à-vis Michel Camdessus, Managing Director of the IMF, and
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in doing so, it has presented itself in the best light. Now, the battle (i.e. the argumentation) can begin. It will take place in paragraphs 2 to 4, and conclude in paragraph 5. First, Le Monde shows off its strength in paragraph 2 by exposing its ammunitions: the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, and the Swiss justice system contribute to the seriousness of Le Monde’s accusations. Each of these three respectable institutions occupies the thematic part of one of the three paragraph sentences. Then, in paragraph 3, Le Monde engages its adversaries, ‘on’ (evidential), by letting them speak (“on dira que ces affaires. . . ” [people will say that these affairs. . . ]), but also by belittling them in leaving their identity indefinite. Le Monde (person marker ‘nous’) fights back by refuting their argument in the paragraph macrostructure (“l’argument ne nous paraît pas recevable” [this point is not acceptable in our opinion]) that is also a text theme and macrostructure. The newspaper’s position is reinforced in the following two sentences of the paragraph with the statement of some facts incriminating Russia. Then, in the macrostructure of paragraph 4 (also text theme), Le Monde (person marker ‘nous’) is able to deal the final blow and repeat its questions to the IMF (“nous les réitérons” [we reiterate them]). Furthermore, in its direct questions (person markers), it manages to appear twice as the ‘champion of the defenseless’, the Western taxpayers, with whom each reader of the newspaper can identify (“Comment expliquer aux bailleurs de fonds, les contribuables occidentaux. . . ?” [how can we explain to the financial backers, the Western tax payers. . . ?]; “comment expliquer aux mêmes bailleurs. . . ?” [how can we explain to those same backers. . . ?]). Finally, the confrontation comes to an end with Le Monde’s assertion of its victory (person marker ‘nos’) in the last and most prominent sentence (macrostructure of paragraph 5; text macrostructure): “D’où nos soupçons, et leur légitimité.” [Hence our suspicions, and their legitimacy.] The analysis of these two editorials has revealed how Le Monde establishes its professional authority. Le Monde demonstrates its competence in the accomplishment of its difficult work by acting as a responsible newspaper, one that compares favorably to the most prestigious (the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal), and is not afraid to confront the most powerful (IMF, Russia) in its defense of justice (along the Swiss justice system) and of the population (Western taxpayers). –
Le Monde’s social representativeness
On December 11th, 1999, in reaction to the second Chechen war, Le Monde published an editorial, Russie: que faire? [Russia: What to do?], in which it strongly calls for Western action. The Western governments (evidential ‘on’) are said to keep repeating pathetically that nothing can be done (“n’ont à la bouche qu’un affligeant ‘on ne peut rien faire’” [can say nothing but the pathetic ‘we can’t do anything’] – first paragraph macrostructure; text theme). The vague identity of on
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as those who cannot do anything exonerates the speakers in their perspective (as they are only a few among the on who are supposed to act), but incriminates them in Le Monde’s and its readers’ perspective (as they appear doubly irresponsible). In answer to a direct question (relational marker) that can be attributed implicitly to public opinion, Le Monde reveals the ‘real’ reasons behind Putin’s war in Chechnya. This accentuates Western guilt, especially when another on (relational marker) is the witness of the G7 and their Russian ‘ally’ (in quotation marks in the text) sitting together even after Yeltsin’s nuclear threat (“on y verra alors ce spectacle étonnant. . . ” [thus we will be the witnesses there of this astonishing sight] – last sentence of the third paragraph). This on is not only Le Monde’s readers; it is French society; more than that, it is Western society who has access to mass media reports on the G8 summit [i.e. G7 and Russia – E.L.]. Thus, the Western world is condemning (at least morally) its leaders. This Western public opinion (relational markers: ‘personne’, ‘on’) is reasonable (“Personne ne suggère qu’on fasse la guerre à la Russie” [nobody suggests that we go to war against Russia] – paragraph theme), and thus their leaders should listen to them when they (relational marker ‘on’) affirm that something can be done (“on peut ‘faire quelque chose”’ [we can ‘do something’]; “on peut faire comprendre” [we can make them understand]), and especially when they give concrete suggestions (“on peut imaginer de puiser dans une large panoplie de pressions . . . ” [we can imagine to pick from among a large array of pressure means. . . ] – paragraph macrostructure). In this way, European leaders are called upon by the entire Western society to act (“Le sommet de l’Union réuni ces jours-ci à Helsinki doit donner l’exemple.” [the Union Summit that convenes these days in Helsinki must set the example] – paragraph theme). This obligation of a Western reaction is stressed by the macrostructural content of the editorial that accuses Russia of brutal national-militarist wrongdoings in Chechnya, and recalls how Western powers intervened in comparable circumstances in Kosovo and Eastern Timor. On February 19th, 2000, some 10 days after the fall of the Chechen capital, Grozny, at the hands of the Russian army, Le Monde published another editorial, Poutine et les Occidentaux [Putin and the West], that severely questions the attitude of the Western powers towards Moscow. Western leaders (Chirac, Blair, Clinton and Schröder) are directly and personally called upon to answer for their shameful inaction by on (relational marker), i.e. Le Monde and Western society, who feel deeply humiliated by the United States’ and European Union’s connivance in the Chechen war (“c’est bien un sentiment de profonde humiliation que l’on éprouve” [it is really a feeling of deep humiliation that one experiences] – paragraph macrostructure; text theme). This Western public opinion (relational marker ‘on’) is disturbed by reports of human rights violations, and, in an effort to act responsibly, wants to look into the situation (“on a quelque raison de s’inquiéter” [we have good reasons to worry] – paragraph macrostructure and text macrostruc-
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ture; “Et de regarder la réalité en face.” [And to face reality head-on] – paragraph macrostructure). In contrast, Western leaders are portrayed ‘objectively’ (direct quotations are used for that effect) as very conciliating towards Vladimir Putin. Western society (relational marker ‘on’) is informed, and it understands the political situation (“on peut comprendre” [we can understand] – paragraph theme), but the least the West could do would be to distance itself from Russian authorities (text macrostructure). These two examples have shown how Le Monde’s editorialists assume the representation of a public opinion that can go beyond French national society. Le Monde endows this public opinion with moral values, and presents it as a witness to support its argumentation. Well informed, reasonable, responsible and realist, this public opinion questions the behavior of the ruling elite, who is described as incompetent, and worse, guilty of complicity in the war in Chechnya. –
Le Monde as an independent and committed intellectual
Le Monde manifests its autonomous existence when it speaks in its own name, and when it explicitly stages, alongside itself, the participation of others in the argumentation. But to demonstrate its independence and commitment, it has to take positions that differ from those held by others. LM’s general line of argumentation as revealed by the categorization of its macrostructures and text macrostructures (Table 3.2) suggests that the newspaper asserts its independent voice by adopting a critical attitude towards Russia (Mcr: 60%; TMcr: 49%) and the Western ruling elite (Mcr: 26%), and its commitment by proposing a line of action (TMcr LM to W/E/F: 33%). Some of these macrostructural bases (B-Mcr) and text macrostructural bases (B-TMcr) are affected by evidentials (Table 3.8). Evidentials denote information sources; their inclusion emphasizes the importance or the veracity of the facts presented. As their role is to reinforce the strength of an argument, one would expect them to be more frequent in the line of arguments that lead to conclusions, rather than in the conclusions themselves. At the macrostructural level, a lower percentage of instructions given by LM (52%) contains evidentials than assessments of the situation by LM (68%). Although significant (p < 0.05), this difference does not seem to be large enough to allow for any conclusions. However, if we look at the text macrostructural level, a considerable difference appears (p < 0.01) between the percentage of LM’s instructions affected by evidentials (38%) and its assessment of the situation (87%). As text macrostructures represent the conclusions of the general argumentation, the distribution of evidentials in LM’s line of argumentation conveys the idea that LM’s purpose in its editorials is to tell the world what to do. In doing so, LM constructs its own identity.
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Table 3.8 Evidentials in Le Monde’s argumentation structure %* of TMcr
Functions
Classes*
Mcr
Instructions
LM to R LM to W/E/F
3 19
4 33
Positive judgement
R Pos W Pos
3 5
3 7
Negative judgement
R Neg W Neg
60 26
49 7
Other
Other
8
10
% of B-Mcr affected by evidentials**
% of B-TMcr affected by evidentials**
52
38
68
87
* Only the most important categories of Mcr/TMcr are mentioned. ** B-Mcr: macrostructural basis. B-TMcr: text macrostructural basis. Percentages have been rounded up.
On February 19th, 2000, Jean-Marie Colombani, Chairman of the newspaper Executive Board, wrote that Le Monde had become an actor on the Muscovite media and political scene because of its reports on the war in Chechnya. The newspaper’s front-page displayed the title: “Chechnya: The Kremlin accuses Le Monde of ‘lies’.” Colombani’s reply was that Le Monde’s journalists were courageously trying to tell Russian people what their government was hiding. In this manner, Le Monde was acting as it had towards the French people during the war in Algeria, when it disclosed several reports on torture by the French army.84 The war in Algeria has been described by some as “the final great battle in the long tradition of France’s ‘engaged’ intellectuals” (Schalk 1997; Sorum 1977), who spoke in the name of “Truth, Justice, Reason and Universality” (Jennings 1997). The emergence of a very large ‘quasi-intellectual’ public since the war in Algeria is said to have favored the development of print media, including Le Monde, in which this public could find not only information but also ideas and opinions, in other words, different ways to think (G. Ross 1991). In this light, Le Monde appears in a position to carry on the role of a committed intellectual, as is attested to by the above analysis. An example of Le Monde’s independent commitment appeared in January 2000, after Boris Yeltsin resigned from his post as President of the Russian Federation in favor of his Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin (Les deux faces de M. Poutine [The two faces of Mr. Putin]; 2–3 January 2000). First, Le Monde appeared to applaud this peaceful and legal transition. Through the voice of on, it noted that this event could be credited to Russia’s ten years of post-communism, but it added that this period had been marked by corruption, war, etc. This on expressed the opinion of all those who had witnessed Russia’s recent history, i.e. the opinion of an informed world society, and it figured prominently in the structure of the edito-
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rial (paragraph macrostructure; text theme). In the 16 sentences that followed, Le Monde exposed in impersonal terms the crucial challenges that awaited Putin. In the last sentence (paragraph macrostructure; text macrostructure), it concluded in its own name (“à nos yeux” [in our opinion]) that Putin would have to be judged by his actions. By juxtaposing society’s position as text theme and its own as text macrostructure, Le Monde enhanced its personal voice in the debate on Russia. –
“La plume dans la plaie”: An incisive style
In Le style du Monde (2002), a booklet published by LM to make available to the public its internal (ethical, professional and writing) rules, LM notes that the editorial, through its conciseness, operates like “la plume dans la plaie” [the pen in the wound] (copied on the French idiomatic expression, “remuer le couteau dans la plaie” [literally: to stir the knife in the wound]). Indeed, LM’s style can be quite incisive, as the following example shows. In August 1999, in reaction to Boris Yeltsin’s dismissal of his Prime Minister, Sergeï Stepashin, and appointment of Vladimir Putin, LM published an editorial entitled, “Le naufrage de Boris Eltsine”. In the first two sentences, the editorial’s tone is already sharply defined. “La vieillesse est un naufrage, disait Charles de Gaulle en parlant de Pétain. Cette remarque cruelle vient spontanément à l’esprit à propos de Boris Eltsine, qui pourtant n’a pourtant que 68 ans” (LM; TThMcr: 2-1-1, Th: 21-2) [“Old age is a shipwreck,” said Charles de Gaulle when speaking of Pétain. This cruel remark comes immediately to mind regarding Boris Yeltsin, who is only 68 years old]. Marshal Pétain, despite being the hero who successfully defended Verdun against the German army in World War 1, is mostly remembered for having headed the pro-German Vichy regime during World War 2. One can forget the name of the French general who defended Verdun, but one cannot forget the Vichy regime and the “Maréchal”, as Pétain was called. Comparing old age and a shipwreck is indeed cruel, as LM notices, but those are de Gaulle’s words, not LM’s. It was de Gaulle who talked about Pétain and thus, he bears the responsibility of his words. Furthermore, the comparison with Yeltsin cannot really be incriminated to LM, as it comes automatically to (everybody’s) mind. And to make matters worse, Yeltsin is only 68 years old. In other words, Yeltsin does not even have the old age “excuse” of Pétain, who was 84 years old in 1940. Further in the editorial, Yeltsin’s “old age” is compared to that of czars and of General Secretaries of the Communist Party before 1991. “Tout cela évoque aussi bien la vieillesse des tsars de jadis que celle des secrétaires généraux du parti communiste d’avant 1991” (LM; Mcr: 2-2-9) [All of this evokes both the old age of former Czars and that of the General Secretaries of the Communist Party before 1991]. Western complicity is recalled in a paragraph theme: “Chacun feint donc de ne pas voir que le roi est nu” (LM; Th: 2-6-25) [Everyone therefore pretends not to notice that the king is naked]. And the last sentence, a text macrostructure, deals the final blow. “Pour celui qui avait suscité
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tant d’espoir en prononçant l’arrêt de mort de l’URSS en 1991, et qui, à la différence de Mikhaïl Gorbachev, s’est fait élire à deux reprises par son peuple, c’est une fin de règne pitoyable” (LM; TMcr: 2-6-28) [For the man who had created so much hope by announcing the fall of the USSR in 1991, and who, unlike Mikhail Gorbachev, was elected twice by his people, it is a pitiful end to his rule]. In 519 words, LM has condemned Yeltsin unequivocally and unconditionally. .... The New York Times. Although by essence eminently subjective, editorials in the NYT derive their authority from an apparently objective and self-assured tone. This tone is achieved by a skillful presentation of arguments and use of information sources, a balance between the rational and the emotional, a contextualized evaluation of responsibilities, and self-confidence in one’s assessment of the situation. The combination of these strategies results in a tone of commandment. –
Skillful presentation of arguments and information sources
Vladimir Putin’s rise to power was very fast: nominated Prime Minister of the Russian Federation in August 1999, he was elected President in March 2000. One of the consequences of this rapid ascension was that he was relatively unknown when he became the head of a State that, while not as powerful as the Soviet Union, still carried a considerable importance in world politics. Since 1991, Russia had been in a state of transformation and the West was expecting much from this process. But, could the man Putin, with his professional and political past, be trusted to carry such a substantial task? On the day of his election, the NYT published an editorial entitled, “The Putin Puzzle” (26 March 2000). Its text theme questions Putin’s ability not to reverse Russia’s decline, but to do it democratically. The NYT’ answer in the text macrostructures recalls Putin’s 17-year long loyal service in the KGB and issues a warning that Russia would lose much by returning to the KGB rulebook. Put in such a way, the NYT’ position appears all but impartial; however, it still manages to give the impression of an objective tone. It does this by displaying evaluative statements as facts in a very negative presentation of the overall situation. Having asked its central question (para.1, TTh: NYT to R / R Neg), the NYT proceeds by recalling Putin’s short and war-tainted political experience (Chechnya) (para.2, Mcr: R Neg), the crucial economic problems plaguing Russia (para.3, Mcr: R Neg), the need for a steady hand in the Kremlin, Putin’s positive characteristics in terms of leadership, economics and ideology (para.4, Mcr: NYT to R), his negative actions in matters of human rights (Chechnya) and media freedom (para.5, Mcr: R Neg), his past in the KGB (para.6, TMcr: R Neg), his personality and evaluation of the situation (para.7, Mcr: R Neg), and, finally, the lack of a model of “enlightened democratic leadership in Russia” for Putin to follow (para.8, TMcr: NYT to R / R neg). In four of the paragraphs (3, 4, 5, 7), macrostructures are first stated and then only sustained by a series of arguments
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suggesting that “this is the way it is”, not that “we have come to this conclusion because of x or y”. Furthermore, in the paragraph argumentations leading to the macrostructures, evaluative statements are expressed in the indicative mood very categorically: “The primary source of his popularity is the brutal assault on Chechnya” (21-2-11); “Mr. Putin is not a seasoned politician” (21-2-12); “He has not shown a decisive commitment to political and economic reform” (21-2-13; Mcr); “The economy is barely stirring” (21-3-15); “Mr. Putin is smart and articulate” (21-4-22); “Another source of concern is xenophobic campaign reporting by the state-owned television network” (21-5-31); and “Mr. Putin, who is 47, is steeped in the values and culture of the security agency, including its emphasis on order, discipline and the preservation of a strong central government” (21-6-34). When the paragraph argumentation bears on such a highly subjective matter as the evaluation of Putin’s personality (para.7), it is Putin’s voice that is put forward: “In the American translation of a series of autobiographical interviews [. . .], he says [. . .]” (21-7-38); “He admires [. . .]” (21-7-39) “and regrets [. . .]” (21-7-40) and “He has warned [. . .]” (21-7-41). If Putin says this about himself, and publishes it, who can contradict him? –
Balance between rational and emotional appeals to the audience
In August 2000, the world was shaken by the news that a Russian nuclear submarine, the Kursk, had sunk in the Barents Sea. Of concern were not only the reasons behind this event in a post-Cold War world (several hypotheses circulated), but also the plight of the crew trapped aboard. The reaction, or rather the lack of an appropriate reaction, of the Russian military and civil leaderships in face of this human tragedy was harshly criticized in Russia and in the West. In its editorial, “The Kursk and the Kremlin” (23 August 2000), the NYT gave its opinion on the matter. In the four text themes / macrostructures, the NYT states as a general principle that democracy and political strategy cannot be built on an autocratic tradition that places state interest above human life; indeed, democracy requires an open government and a free and independent press. Furthermore, other lessons have to be drawn from this disaster. The editorial’s general argumentation, pertaining to the democratic conduct of State affairs, could under the circumstances appear as a sign of indifference towards the Kursk crew and their families. This could deter readers from the NYT’ general conclusions, if it were not balanced by a number of comments about the human side of the event. In this process, the NYT manages not only to appear “human”, but also to tie in the superiority of Western democracy, thereby highlighting the “barbarism” of Russia. “Such public callousness would be unthinkable in any Western democracy. But it is a long, sad tradition in Russia, dating back to czars like Ivan the Terrible, Alexander III and Nicholas II, and Soviet-era tyrants like Stalin” (26-4-14/15). Although denying that Putin belongs to that “league”, the NYT links his attitude to this long tradition because of
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his KGB past. It does so by repeatedly mentioning his conduct in the development of its main arguments, thereby strengthening the ethos with the right amount of pathos. “[. . .] for most of this period Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, seemed aloof and distant. He declined during the most critical days, to cut short his Black Sea vacation [. . .]” (26-1-2/3). “[. . .] his performance has been disheartening for those who hoped to see a more democratic Russia shedding the habits of secrecy and indifference to human suffering that marred so many centuries of czarist and Soviet rule” (26-2-6). And the NYT’ final sentence, symbolic for its position, but in this case not a macrostructure, says: “But the most intriguing question is whether this tragedy can educate Mr. Putin in the arts of compassionate and accountable leadership” (26-6-27). –
Contextualized evaluation of responsibilities
The affair of Robert Hanssen, a FBI agent working for Russia, occupied much of American news time and space in the spring of 2001. Was not the Cold War supposed to belong to history with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991? Had the powerful USA become so naive that it was not capable of protecting its own interests? What did this mean for the future of Russian-American relations, and thus for world politics? In its editorial of March 23 2001, “Repercussion of a Spy Case”, the NYT examined the appropriate reactions to this affair. The premise contained in the text theme, “an espionage case, however serious, ought not to shape relations between Washington and Moscow” (34-1-3), gives the tone to the entire editorial. The general line of argumentation goes on by acknowledging the international ritual of diplomatic expulsions in such cases (Mcr), by noting that the damage of such practices between Russia and the USA in the past has been repaired by more positive actions (TMcr), by complimenting Bush for his apparent intention to continue seeking good relations with Russia (Mcr), by recognizing the damage done by Hanssen (TThMcr) and the inevitable Russian response to the expulsion of its diplomats (Mcr), and by pinpointing the urgent issues that Russia and the USA need to address (Mcr). The NYT thus concludes that “it would be unfortunate if the Hanssen case set the tone for Mr. Bush dealings with Mr. Putin” (TMcr: 34-7-26). In other words, the NYT recognizes the seriousness of the situation, the responsibility of each involved party and the type of actions it is entitled to take, but it also appraises the importance of this one event in the face of the long-term interests of all parties, and it calls on to them to act accordingly. –
Self-confidence
International relations are not only a matter of types of regime, military disasters, spy affairs and so on, but also of personal relationships between leaders. Indeed, as diplomats point out, one tends to make more efforts working out problems with one’s friends. In this context, the NYT published an editorial, “A Promis-
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Table 3.9 Evidentials in The New York Times’ argumentation structure Functions
Classes*
%** of all Mcr TMcr
% of B-Mcr affected by evidentials**
% of B-TMcr affected by evidentials**
Instructions
NYT to R NYT to USA
25 12
27 14
26
9
Positive judgement
R Pos USA Pos
11 3
11 5
Negative judgement
R Neg USA Neg
62 4
65 4
58
23
Other
Other
11
10
* Only the most important categories of Mcr/TMcr are mentioned. ** B-Mcr: macrostructural basis. B-TMcr: text macrostructural basis. Percentages have been rounded up.
ing Start with Russia” (18 June 2001), on the occasion of the first meeting between the American and Russian Presidents, Bush and Putin. The general argumentation theme (TTh) states that “Putin, whose usual steely demeanor recalls his long days as a Soviet KGB operative, visibly warmed to the personal chemistry of the occasion” (38-1-3). In other words, if Putin, despite his KGB background, can appear somewhat friendly, then there is good reason for hope, and the newspaper incites “[. . .] the two leaders [to] stay committed to their vision of Washington and Moscow as potential partners, [because] even the hardest problems can be constructively resolved” (38-2-6: Mcr). Then, having recalled the state of the delicate question of the ABM Treaty between the two countries (38-3-10: Mcr; 38-4-13: Mcr), the newspaper cautions the USA on its handling of NATO expansion and advises it not to appear provocative or threatening (38-5-17: Mcr). The NYT concludes with an encouraging comment towards the USA and Russia by saying that “the closer engagement signaled by Mr. Bush and Mr. Putin is a healthy development” (38-6-22: TMcr). In its comment on the situation, the newspaper adopts the attitude of a well-meaning teacher (i.e. You are doing well; keep on; you can do even better), and displays its self-assured sense of right-doing. The NYT’ self-confidence appears also through its use of evidentials, in particular through their distribution in the line of argumentation (Table 3.9). In the NYT, a significantly lower percentage (p < 0.0001) of the newspaper’s instructions at the macrostructural level is affected by evidentials (26%) than its other main argumentative points (58%), and this difference is also reflected at the text macrostructural level (9% vs. 23%). Thus while relying to a certain extent on what others say in its evaluation of the situation, the NYT relies basically on itself to give instructions. In other words, it takes responsibility for its positions and the line of action it puts forward.
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–
A tone of commandment
An attitude of self-confidence and the use of expressions of necessity or obligation in the indicative mood (see below, 3.2.6) contribute to a tone of commandment in the NYT. It is particularly well illustrated in the editorial, “Reforms Russia Needs” (7 January 2000). The title is very revealing. In only three words, it conveys the ideas that “you are doing badly”, “we know what you need” and “this is what you must do”. The text theme simply tells Russia to build a new society and how to proceed. Whether Russia should build a new society is not discussed; the fact that the present Russian society is beyond redemption is presented as a given. “His [Yeltsin’s] successors must put in place the missing but essential building blocks of a new society, including the rule of law, a financial system free of corruption and a central government able to collect taxes and provide a competent and enlightened administration throughout Russia’s vast territory” (NYT, TTh: 17-1-3). This was only the beginning of the list of things to do. “What is needed now is a government that is democratically accountable, but strong enough to collect taxes, restore basic services, control crime and create an environment conducive to democratic politics and freely competitive markets” (NYT; Mcr: 17-3-11). As this does not appear such a simple task, the first steps are described. “To make that possible, Mr. Putin and the parliament must radically simplify a tax system so complex and unfair that millions of Russians feel justified in simply ignoring it. Once the tax code is rationalized, Moscow must develop mechanisms to enforce it. As tax revenues flow in, the new government will have to use them to urgently repair a health care system and social conditions that have fallen into deep crisis” (NYT; Th: 17-4-12; 17-413; Mcr: 17-4-14). And as if this were not enough, “the Kremlin will also have to promote the creation of honest police forces and independent courts to rein in a violent new criminal class, which has exploited the breakdown of public institutions to muscle in on legitimate businesses and terrorize would-be entrepreneurs. Moscow must also carry a rational downsizing of Russia’s military forces” (NYT; ThMcr: 17-5-16; Th: 17-5-17). However, all editorials have an end. “Finally, in the run-up to the March 26 presidential elections, Mr. Putin should make clear that he expects independent and fair political coverage in the government-controlled and pro-Kremlin media” (NYT; Th: 17-6-19). The program elaborated by the NYT appears rather heavy. Thus, in the text macrostructure, the newspaper concludes: “If Mr. Putin’s goal is to build a strong Russian democracy, the assault on Chechnya is the wrong way to begin” (NYT; TMcr: 17-7-24). Indeed, the NYT has just handed him down, in 558 words, a detailed list of what he must do to build a new society.
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Chapter 3. Russia in Le Monde and The New York Times
.. Representation of Russia The representation of Russia occupies a primordial place in the editorials (Table 3.10). Russia is significantly more represented (positively and negatively) than Us in LM and the NYT at the macrostructural and text macrostructural levels, but Russia is more represented at the macrostructural and text macrostructural levels in the NYT than in LM. Furthermore, negative presentations of Russia are significantly more numerous than positive representations in LM and in the NYT at the macrostructural and text macrostructural levels. In fact, macrostructures containing a negative evaluation of Russia (R Neg) are predominant in both newspapers: 60% of all Mcr and 49% of TMcr in LM, 62% of all Mcr and 65% of TMcr in the NYT. The NYT presents significantly more negative evaluations of Russia Table 3.10 Representation of Russia in the ideological square Percentage of Mcr/TMcr that contain a statement*
LM
NYT
p
Mcr Us Pos/Neg** Mcr R Pos/Neg p
34% 63% < 0.0001
7% 76% 0
0 < 0.02
TMcr Us Pos/Neg TMcr R Pos/Neg p
33% 52% < 0.03
9% 73% 0
< 0.001 < 0.002
Mcr R Neg Mcr Us Neg p
60% 29% 0
62% 4% 0
NS*** 0
TMcr R Neg TMcr Us Neg p
49% 26% < 0.01
65% 4% 0
< 0.05 < 0.0001 0
Mcr R Pos Mcr Us Pos p
3% 6% NS
11% 4% < 0.0005
< 0.002 NS
TMcr R Pos TMcr Us Pos p
3% 7% NS
11% 5% NS
NS NS
Mcr R Neg Mcr R Pos p
60% 3% 0
62% 11% 0
NS < 0.02
TMcr R Neg TMcr R Pos p
49% 3% 0
65% 11% 0
< 0.05 NS
* A same Mcr or TMcr can contain statements that belong to different categories. ** Us: France, West, USA. *** NS: non significant (p > 0.05).
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The Spiral of “Anti-Other Rhetoric”
than LM at the text macrostructural level, i.e. in the editorials’ general conclusions. However, the NYT presents surprisingly significantly more positive evaluations of Russia than of Us at the macrostructural level, and these positive evaluations are significantly more frequent than in LM. In this context, it particularly matters to look at the current phenomena in Russia that LM and the NYT criticize (3.2.4.1); at the manner with which they link Russia’s past with the present and future (3.2.4.2); and at the few positive features they present of Russia (3.2.4.3). ... Negative evaluation linked to the current situation As conclusions of the editorial’s general argumentation, the content of text macrostructures is the most salient and most susceptible to remain in long-term memory. For this reason, they will be used to define LM’s and the NYT’ criticisms of Russia. The text macrostructures containing a negative evaluation of Russia in LM cover the aspects of finance and politics (1), the country’s leaders (2), the war in Chechnya (3), the army (4), media freedom (5), and Western responsibility (6). One example is given below for each category (for the complete list of these text macrostructures, see Appendix 5). (1) « Ce détournement de fonds [par Moscou] se fait sinon avec l’accord, en tout cas en toute connaissance de cause de la part des grands de ce monde [. . . ] qui sont tous des administrateurs du Fonds » (1-2-6). “This embezzlement of funds [by Moscow] occurs, if not with the agreement, then certainly with the full knowledge of this world’s powerful people [. . .], the IMF administrators”. (2) « [Poutine] mise sur les coups de canon de ses généraux pour étouffer le fracas des scandales financiers du régime Eltsine » (11-2-12) “[Putin] relies on the canon shots fired by his generals to muffle the noise from the financial scandals of Yeltsin’s regime”. (3) « La Russie qui entre ainsi, à coup de bombes et sur les ruines de Grozny, dans le XXIe siècle est un pays inquiétant » (10-5-22). “The Russia that enters into the 21st century by bombing the devastated city of Grozny is a worrisome country”. (4) « Couplée au manque de moyens et à l’état – matériel et psychologique – calamiteux des forces armées russes, [l’] obsession poutinienne du statut passé de superpuissance du pays explique largement le drame du Koursk » (27-318). [“Coupled with the lack of material resources and the disastrous state (material and psychological) of the Russian armed forces, Putin’s obsession with his country’s status as a former superpower largely explains the crisis of the Kursk”.
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Chapter 3. Russia in Le Monde and The New York Times
(5) « Quand un gouvernement s’attache à empêcher la presse de travailler sur place, quand il fait disparaître un de ses propres ressortissants, le reporter Andreï Babitski, parce qu’il en a trop vu, quand les informations recueillies par les organisations locales de défense des droits de l’homme, Memorial, le Fonds Glasnost, corroborent les témoignages récoltés par les courageux journalistes occidentaux encore dans la région [Tchétchénie], on a quelque raison de s’inquiéter » (18-28). “We have reason to be worried when a government focuses on stopping the press from working on location, when it makes one of its own citizens disappear (the reporter Andreï Babitski, who saw too much) and when the information collected by local human rights offices like Memorial and The Glasnost Fund corroborates the testimony gathered by the courageous Western journalists still in Chechnya”. (6) « [Il ne faut pas que le Kremlin puisse continuer à siéger tranquillement au Conseil de l’Europe, compter sans cesse sur l’aide du FMI (une prochaine tranche dans quelques semaines) tant qu’il fait aveuglément bombarder les populations civiles de Tchétchénie.] C’est une exigence minimale » (8-4-27). “[The Kremlin must not be allowed to quietly keep its seat in the Council of Europe and eternally count on the IMF’s help (another installment arriving in a few weeks) as long as it indiscriminately continues bombing civilians in Chechnya.] This is an absolute minimum requirement”.
As for the NYT text macrostructures containing a negative evaluation of Russia, they generate this much longer text that deals with the country’s economic / financial situation (7), its leaders (8), the war in Chechnya (9), the parliamentary and presidential elections (10), the army (11), the status of individual freedoms (12), and health care (13). One example for each category follows (for the complete list, see Appendix 5). (7) “Well before the Communist era, corruption was a part of the Russian fabric” (2-2-7). (8) “When [Yeltsin] who commands the largest nuclear stockpile in the world rattles that arsenal after he gives his vintage bear hug to President Jiang Zemin of China, the scene is, at best, unsettling” (11-1-2), (9) “The bombing deaths of so many innocent Russians [in Moscow and Dagestan] are a terrible tragedy that can only be made worse by an overreaction that tampers with Russia’s democratic progress” (3-5-23). (10) “[The] important [parliamentary] election, a precursor to presidential elections next June, has also aroused destructive forces that threaten to undermine Russia’s political progress” (12-1-4). (11) “[Shortness of money resulting in lack of maintenance of the nuclear submarines and little training of the crew, compounded with a disregard for safety] have also obstructed rescue efforts [for the Kursk sailors]” (25-2-9).
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The Spiral of “Anti-Other Rhetoric”
(12) “Mr. Putin needs to demonstrate that independent television stations, newspapers and magazines can still operate freely in Russia without government harassment” (37-5-19). (13) “Soviet-era conditions [in health care] were poor, with long waits, brusque bureaucracy and uneven standards of care” (32-1-2).
Among the Russian events covered by LM’s and the NYT’ editorials during the period under study (August 1999 to July 2001), several appear in both newspapers’ negative evaluations of Russia at the text macrostructural level. They are: the embezzlement of the IMF funds, the second Chechen war, the change of political leadership, the closing down of the TV channel NTV and the arrest of the oligarch and media owner, Gusinski, and the sinking of the nuclear submarine, Kursk. Despite the similarity of topics, a difference of approach is noticeable. LM links Russian events (embezzlement, Chechnya) with the Western attitude, and implies the responsibility of the West in the situation. The NYT presents Russian leaders in a more detailed, more personal manner. In its statements on Chechnya, LM emphasises the cruelty of Russia, while the NYT covers more questions of political strategy. Furthermore, the NYT’ negative evaluations of Russia at the text macrostructural level comprise issues not present in LM’s: the parliamentary and presidential elections, freedoms in the domains of religion and business, and health care. ... Influence of the past on the present and future Journalists need to integrate new facts into a framework of “old” knowledge to facilitate reading processes and allow for these new facts to be remembered. Both Le Monde (LM) and The New York Times (NYT) use history as a frame of reference, Le Monde more (82% of the editorials) than the NYT (68% of editorials), but the difference is not significant (p = 0.18). The density of historical mentions per sentence is .13 in LM and .10 in the NYT. Historical mentions are used to construct a negative image of Russia in 73% of the LM’s editorials and in 63% of the NYT’ editorials. In both newspapers, almost three quarters of all historical mentions are used to construct a negative image of Russia (LM: 72%; NYT: 71%). Thus, history plays a substantial role in the construction of Russia’s negative image in LM and the NYT. Differences between the newspapers appear in the categories of historical mentions they use most. The distribution of categories of historical mentions (Table 3.11) reveals two that clearly dominate in each newspaper: references to Russia before 1991 (R bef 91) in both LM (40%) and the NYT (33%), references to the KGB / FSB in LM (34%), and references to militarism (Chechnya) in the NYT (28%). Furthermore, the NYT mentions communism significantly more than LM (p = 0.006), and LM refers significantly more to the FSB / KGB (p = 0.027). Militarism (Chechnya) is
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Chapter 3. Russia in Le Monde and The New York Times
Table 3.11 Historical mentions (in all sentences) Le Monde
The New York Times %
N
%
N
R bef 91 Communism Chechnya KGB / FSB Future
41 3 19 35 4
40 3 19 34 4
31 16 27 19 2
33 17 28 20 2
Total
102
100
95
100
mentioned more often in the NYT (28% vs. 18% in LM), but not significantly (p = 0.096). Among the mentions of Russia before 1991 (R bef 91), more than half (LM: 56%; NYT: 55%) are expressed in such general terms that they could refer to Russia before and during the USSR. These two periods are explicitly linked in 3 mentions in the NYT and 2 in the LM. Thus, through the clear continuity between today’s Russia and pre-1991 Russia, the idea is conveyed that Russia is inherently bad. “Historically, Russian governments have used their power to stifle freedoms and carry out the orders of czars and Communist tyrants” (NYT; Mcr: 17-310). “But [Putin’s] performance has been disheartening for those who hoped to see a more democratic Russia shedding the habits of secrecy and indifference to human suffering that marred so many centuries of czarist and Soviet rule” (NYT; 26-2-6). “But [public callousness] is a long, sad tradition in Russia, dating back to czars like Ivan the Terrible, Alexander III an Nicholas II, and Soviet-era tyrants like Stalin” (NYT; 26-4-15). “[Le centre presque vacant du pouvoir est occupé par un groupe opaque de parents, d’officiers de sécurité, d’affairistes, de profiteurs, d’amis et d’obligés.] Tout cela évoque aussi bien la vieillesse des tsars de jadis que celle des secrétaires généraux du parti communiste d’avant 1991” (LM; Mcr: 2-2-9). “Il faut briser une population [les Tchétchènes] que les Russes s’efforcent de soumettre depuis plus d’un siècle. . .” (LM; 6-4-23). “[The near-vacant centre of power is occupied by an opaque group consisting of relatives, security officers, racketeers, profiteers, friends and the indebted.] This evokes both the old age of former Czars and that of the General Secretaries of the Communist Party before 1991” (LM; Mcr: 2-2-9). “It is necessary to break the Chechen people, which the Russians have been striving to do for a century. . .” (LM; 6-4-23).]
Both newspapers contain a similar proportion of mentions that refer explicitly to the Soviet times (LM: 34%; NYT: 32%), which are always in negative terms. They also contain negative mentions referring explicitly to the period before the USSR (LM: 2 mentions; NYT: 1 mention).
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The Spiral of “Anti-Other Rhetoric”
Le Monde does not present communism as a source of danger; it actually denies its relevance for explaining Putin’s conduct of affairs, but it notes in two editorials the difficulties communists can cause through their alliance with other parties in a Parliament with no clear majority. “Ce n’est pas l’idéologie qui l’ [Poutine] anime et sûrement pas l’idéologie communiste” [Putin is not driven by ideologies and certainly not by the ideology of Communism] (LM; Mcr: 20-2-11). “Mais, avec un quart des sièges dans une Douma très éclatée, les communistes étaient une source permanente d’ennuis” [But, with a quarter of the seats in this very fragmented Duma, the communists were a constant source of worry] (LM; 14-2-6).
The NYT is more ambivalent about Putin’s links with communism. Furthermore, it underlines the capacity of communists to act as an obstacle. “Continued growth depends on pushing through reforms long stymied by the Communists and their parliamentary allies” (NYT; 13-4-19). “By striking a parliamentary deal with his presumed arch foes, the Communists, Russia’s acting president, Vladimir Putin, has deepened the mystery over what he believes and how he intends to lead Russia” (NYT; 19-1-1). “If Unity had formed a coalition built around these groups, as expected, it would have marginalized the power of the Communists and ended their ability to block needed economic measures like tax rationalization, bank restructuring and stronger bankruptcy laws” (NYT: 19-2-6). “Mr. Putin has given an unfortunate boost to the Communist’s waning power” (NYT: 19-3-12). “[Putin] seems to harbor no nostalgia for the suffocating ideology of Communism, or the terrors carried out in its name” (NYT; 21-4-26).
References to militarism are made by explicitly mentioning that the war going on in Chechnya is the second one. “But the first one [war], as many Russians and Chechens know well, was one too many” (NYT; TThMcr: 4-5-17). “The central aims [of the second Chechen war] were to avenge Russia’s military defeat in 1996 and to lift the political fortunes of Vladimir Putin, the prime minister who became acting president when Boris Yeltsin resigned on Dec. 31” (NYT; TMcr: 20-3-13). “L’OSCE n’a ensuite jamais élevé la voix pour dénoncer le refus russe de mener les négociations prévues par l’accord de paix russo-tchétchène, prétexte à son désengagement d’une ‘affaire intérieure’ russe” [The OSCE never spoke up to denounce the Russian refusal to hold the negotiations set out by the RussianChechen peace agreement, a pretence for its [the OSCE’s] withdrawal from a Russian ‘internal matter’] (LM; TMcr; 5-5-13).
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Chapter 3. Russia in Le Monde and The New York Times
Although the NYT makes significantly more references to militarism by mentioning Chechnya, more editorials in LM are focused on Chechnya (39% vs. 22% in the NYT), but not significantly (p = 0.13). LM makes significantly more references to the KGB / FSB than the NYT. These references are directly linked to Putin, a former KGB officer, half of the time (51%) in LM but significantly more in the NYT (84%; p = 0.017). LM emphasizes the present role that is played by the FSB in the conduct of State affairs. “Mr. Putin, who is 47, is steeped in the values and culture of the security agency, including its emphasis on order, discipline and the preservation of a strong central government” (NYT; 21-6-34). “As a Soviet-era K.G.B. agent he [Putin] was raised in the Russian autocratic tradition, which values state interests above human life” (NYT; 26-4-17). “De son passage dans les ‘organes’, il [Poutine] semble surtout avoir retenu des méthodes, des modes de pensée et d’exercice du pouvoir, une conception du rapport avec les autres autorisant toutes les formes de brutalité, de cynisme, de mensonge et. . . de charme” (LM; ThMcr: 20-2-12). “La propagande, l’importance accordée aux organes de sécurité et aux militaires, rappellent les temps anciens” (LM; Mcr: 20-3-19). “Car dans son entreprise, le président s’appuie d’abord sur les ‘services’ – l’armée et le FSB, successeur du KGB, où M. Poutine a fait l’essentiel de sa carrière” (LM; 25-2-16). “Qu’il s’agisse de l’administration territoriale ou des grandes entreprises, la ‘réforme’ poutinienne consiste, d’abord, pour le président à placer ses hommes (anciens militaires, anciens guébistes” (LM; 25-2-18). [“From Putin’s time inside the communist institutions, he seems to have mostly held on to the methods, the thought and power patterns and an understanding of relationships that allows all sorts of brutality, cynicism, lies and . . . charm” (LM; ThMcr: 20-2-12). “The propaganda and the importance given to security institutions and the military recalls the old days” (LM; Mcr: 20-319). “Because in this business, the president initially relies on the ‘services’ – the army and the FSB, successor of the KGB, where Mr. Putin spent most of his career” (LM; 25-2-16). “Whether it concerns the administration of the country or of big business, Putin’s ‘reforms’ initially mean the positioning of his men (former military personnel and former KGB agents” (LM; 25-2-18).]
The four references to the future in LM are negative: what is bad will continue to be bad and will be remembered as such. In the NYT, on the contrary, the two references to the future are positive. One is about Gorbachev, and the other about Yeltsin. “[La culture du détournement de fonds public] a même tendance à s’accentuer” (LM; 1-3-9). “Les oligarques qui prospèrent à l’ombre du Kremlin vont pouvoir poursuivre leur vol” (LM; 1-4-20). “Il reste que dans les annales du crime d’État,
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The Spiral of “Anti-Other Rhetoric”
la ‘campagne’ de Tchétchénie 1999 figurera en bonne place” (LM; 10-2-12). “Cela annonce de nouveaux drames [en Tchétchénie]” (LM; TMcr: 24-5-26). [[The culture of public fund embezzlement] even has the tendency to increase” (LM; 1-3-9). “The oligarchs who are prospering under the Kremlin’s shadow will be able to continue with their thievery” (LM; 1-4-20). “There is no denying that the 1999 Chechen campaign will have a prominent place in the record of State crimes” (LM; 10-2-12). “This announces new crises [in Chechnya]” (LM; TMcr: 24-5-26).] “History will remember him [Gorbachev] generously for his crucial role in ending the cold war and pulling back the Iron Curtain that Stalin drew across Europe in 1945” (NYT; 8-1-4). “History will honor him [Yeltsin] for these acts [he engineered the end of Communist rule in Moscow and the collapse of the Soviet empire]” (NYT; 16-5-24).
In conclusion, it appears that Le Monde and The New York Times still use a historical framework that refers to the Cold War. They update it by adding points of reference to the period after 1991. In Le Monde, this results in the reinforcement of the framework’s negative aspects, while in The New York Times the possibility for positive changes is opened. However, this last remark needs to be qualified. Indeed, a list of word frequencies in all macrostructures containing a negative evaluation of Russia (R Neg) shows that in both newspapers, one in every five macrostructures (Table 3.12; LM: 22%; NYT: 23%) contains the word “Russia”, “Russian”, or “Russians”. These words represent a global symbol, and they have been used to represent the country at all times, if not officially, at least (and most importantly) in people’s minds. In comparison, the names of the post-1991 leaders (Yeltsin, Putin) and the designations of the Russian government (Moscow, Kremlin) appear significantly less often (p < 0.01). By associating significantly more often the name of the country with its negative image, rather than the name of its leaders or the seat of its government, LM and the NYT emphasize the durability of this negative image, and thus do not particularly open the door for a brighter future with a different leader or a different government.
Table 3.12 Symbols and negative evaluations of Russia In Mcr R Neg “Russia” / “Russian(s)” “Yeltsin” / “Putin” “Moscow” / “Kremlin”
N
Le Monde %
N
The New York Times %
45 24 14
22 12 7
66 27 18
23 9 7
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Chapter 3. Russia in Le Monde and The New York Times
... The necessary positive side In painting such a somber picture of Russia, LM and the NYT take the risk of discouraging their readers by leading them to think that nothing and no one can ever change the situation in Russia, and that it is not even worth attempting. However, the general line of argumentation in LM’s and the NYT’ editorials is exactly the opposite: Russia can change provided it (according to the NYT) or the West (according to LM) acts responsibly. And to offset the pessimistic impression that has been produced, the more negative the newspaper is about Russia, the more optimistic it would also need to be. The NYT is significantly more negative about Russia than LM at the text macrostructural level (p < 0.05), and it is also significantly more positive at the macrostructural level (p < 0.01). Furthermore, in the NYT, more text macrostructures are positive about Russia than in LM (11% vs. 3%). The difference between the newspapers is not only quantitative; it also appears in their content. At the text macrostructural level, the NYT focuses mostly on two points: the falling apart of the Soviet Union, thus marking that a victory had been won for the values defended by the USA (and ipso facto showing that things can change), and the development of a good relationship between Russia and the USA thanks to the efforts of their leaders. “In 1989 the fixtures of the Soviet empire began to crumble” (NYT; TMcr: 85-17). “With a wisdom and decency that is sadly rare in international power politics, he [Gorbachev] chose not to defend a dying system with a final, futile spasm of murderous force” (NYT; TMcr: 8-7-30). “For all his maddening weaknesses, he [Yeltsin] led his nation toward democracy after 1,000 years of tyranny” (NYT; TMcr: 16-8-37). “The era in which Moscow and Washington spent trillions of dollars vying for conventional and nuclear supremacy is mercifully over” (NYT; TMcr: 28-6-28). “But that episode was overtaken by the arms control initiatives of Mikhail Gorbachev and Mr. Reagan’s positive responses” (NYT; TMcr: 34-3-11). “He [Putin] has tried to strike a balance between challenging American policies on problems like Iran and Iraq and cooperating with Washington on other issues, like arms control and Mideast peace” (NYT; TMcr: 31-4-17). “The closer engagement signaled by Mr. Bush and Mr. Putin is a healthy development” (NYT; TMcr: 38-6-22).
The NYT also points out that the progress made by Russia needs to be strengthened. “That will likely roil the coming presidential campaign, a fitting legacy for a courageous but disappointingly erratic man who guided Russia through the first years of a turbulent, still unfinished journey from tyranny to democracy” (NYT; TThMcr: 16-1-4). “But Mr. Gorbachev [in opposition to Putin] came to understand that democratic reform in Russia required a more open and
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The Spiral of “Anti-Other Rhetoric”
candid government and a free and independent press” (NYT; TThMcr: 26-522).
The only positive statements of LM about Russia at the text macrostructural level concern the media, and the courage with which they perform their work. “[La presse a largement relayé l’amertume, la frustration, la colère des Russes à l’encontre de leurs dirigeants, civils et militaires.] Cela distingue assurément, la Russie d’aujourd’hui de l’URSS de Tchernobyl” (LM; TMcr: 27-2-11). “Journaux et télévisions du pays qui ont encore le courage d’un travail indépendant sont victimes d’une campagne d’intimidation: tabassages des reporters par des policiers déguisés en loubards; pressions économiques; poursuites judiciaires, etc.” (LM; TThMcr: 30-3-20). [[The press has largely relayed the Russians’ bitterness, frustration and anger towards their leaders, civilian and military.] This most certainly differentiates today’s Russia from the USSR of Chernobyl” (LM; TMcr: 27-2-11). “Newspapers and television stations that still have the courage to be independent are the victims of an intimidation campaign: reporters beat up by police disguised as thugs; economic pressures; trials, etc.” (LM; TThMcr: 30-3-20).]
At the macrostructural level, LM notes the “two faces“ of Russia, a feature that was also present in its positive statements at the text macrostructural level and that is moreover the topic of one of its editorials (15: “Les deux faces de M. Poutine”). “[La démission de Boris Eltsine au profit de Vladimir Poutine a eu lieu selon un scénario qui respecte la lettre de la Constitution.] C’est aussi une première que l’on peut porter au crédit démocratique de ces dix ans de postcommunisme par ailleurs marqués par la corruption, l’affairisme, la déliquescence de l’Etat et deux aventures militaires dans le Caucase” (LM; Mcr: 15-1-4). “Il [Putin] a manifesté son souci de restaurer l’Etat tout en respectant les libertés fondamentales, d’observer un ‘libéralisme modéré’ en matière économique et de poursuivre la politique étrangère de son prédécesseur en accentuant la tonalité nationaliste et anti-occidentale” (LM; Mcr: 16-3-13). [“[Boris Yeltsin’s resignation on behalf of Vladimir Putin took place according to a script that respects the letter of the Constitution.] It is also a first that can be credited to democracy during these ten post-communist years, otherwise marked by corruption, racketeering, decay of the State and two military ventures in the Caucasus” (LM; Mcr: 15-1-4). “He [Putin] showed his concern for restoring the State while still respecting fundamental liberties, for observing a ‘moderate economic liberalism’, and for pursuing his predecessor’s foreign policy while accentuating its nationalist and anti-Western tone” (LM; Mcr: 16-3-13).]
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The NYT’ presentation of Russia’s positive aspects clearly indicates that Russia can change for the better, and that this change depends on its good relationship with the USA. As for LM, while recognizing some positive aspects, it presents them along with negative ones. Nonetheless, one wonders whether LM’s and the NYT’ presentation of the situation is balanced enough for the discriminating reader to consider their argumentation seriously. The answer to this question lies in their representation of their own respective society. .. Representation of Us It has been noted earlier that the debate constructed by LM tends to be of the multilateral type, and the one constructed by the NYT of the bilateral type (cf. 3.2.3.1). Conversely, LM addresses primarily the world community, and in particular the Western world, when it refers to Us, while the USA points almost uniquely to the USA. Table 3.13 shows that both in LM and in the NYT at the macrostructural and text macrostructural levels, Us is significantly less represented than Russia. However at both levels, Us is significantly more represented in LM than in the NYT, and LM is significantly more negative about Us than the NYT. Both newspapers are similarly positive about Us at the macrostructural and text macrostructural levels. In short, at both levels, LM represents Us significantly more and in a significantly more negative manner, while the NYT gives a balanced representation of Us. Considering LM’s and the NYT’ differing orientations towards Us, it matters to look at their positions. ... The West according to Le Monde LM’s criticisms of the West, expressed in text macrostructures, revolve around two main points: the role of the West in Russia’s embezzlement of IMF funds, and especially, the Western lack of an appropriate response to the war in Chechnya. “Pis, on y apprend que ce détournement de fonds se fait sinon avec l’accord, en tout cas en toute connaissance de cause de la part des grands de ce monde: les responsables du FMI et d’abord Michel Camdessus, son directeur général, mais aussi, avec lui, nos ministres des finances, les Larry Summers (Etats-Unis), Gordon Brown (Grande-Bretagne) et autres Dominique Strauss-Kahn, qui sont tous des administrateurs du Fonds” (LM; TMcr: 1-2-6). “L’OSCE n’a ensuite jamais élevé la voix pour dénoncer le refus russe de mener les négociations prévues par l’accord de paix russo-tchétchène, prétexte à son désengagement d’une ‘affaire intérieure’ russe” (LM; TMcr: 5-5-13). “Invoqué à Moscou ou au Timor, le droit d’ingérence – ne serait-ce que de façon rhétorique – devrait l’être aussi face à l’agression russe en Tchétchénie” (LM; TMcr: 6-5-25). “Au minimum, il y aurait de quoi prendre quelques distances avec un régime que les Occidentaux, bien
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Table 3.13 Representation of Us in the ideological square Percentage of Mcr/TMcr that contain a statement*
LM
NYT
p
Mcr Us Pos/Neg** Mcr R Pos/Neg p TMcr Us Pos/Neg TMcr R Pos/Neg p
34% 63% < 0.0001 33% 52% < 0.03
7% 76% 0 9% 73% 0
0 < 0.02
Mcr Us Neg Mcr Us Pos p TMcr Us Neg TMcr Us Pos p
29% 6% 0 26% 7% < 0.005
4% 4% NS 4% 5% NS
0 NS***
Mcr R Neg Mcr Us Neg p TMcr R Neg TMcr Us Neg p
60% 29% 0 49% 26% < 0.01
62% 4% 0 65% 4% 0
NS 0
Mcr R Pos Mcr Us Pos p TMcr R Pos TMcr Us Pos p
3% 6% NS 3% 7% NS
11% 4% < 0.0005 11% 5% NS
< 0.002 NS
< 0.001 < 0.002
< 0.0001 NS
< 0.05 < 0.0001
NS NS
* A same Mcr or TMcr can contain statements that belong to different categories. ** Us: France + West + USA. *** NS: non significant (p > 0.05).
loin de ‘l’humilier’, embrassent avec un incompréhensible enthousiasme (LM; TMcr: 18-4-29). [“Worse, one learns that this fund embezzlement occurs, if not with the agreement, then certainly with the full knowledge of this world’s powerful people: the IMF leaders, primarily Michel Camdessus, its Managing Director, but also, with him, our Finance Ministers, Larry Summers (U.S.A.), Gordon Brown (Great Britain) and Dominique Strauss-Kahn among others, who are all administrators of the Fund” (LM; TMcr: 1-2-6). “Then, the OSCE never spoke up to denounce the Russian refusal to hold the negotiations set out by the Russian-Chechen peace agreement, a pretence for its [the OSCE’s] withdrawal from a Russian ‘internal matter’.” (LM; TMcr: 5-5-13). “Whether in Moscow or in East Timor, the right to interfere – even rhetorical – should also be invoked in the face of the Russian attacks on Chechnya” (LM; TMcr: 6-5-25). “At the very least, there would be reason to take a few steps back from this regime
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that the West, instead of ‘humiliating’, is embracing with incomprehensible enthusiasm” (LM; TMcr: 18-4-29).]
LM also blames those who content themselves with external signs of democracy and do not pay attention to the reality of the situation. “Les admirateurs professionnels et béats des régimes russes, quels qu’ils soient, ont déjà préparé leurs commentaires sur cette ‘étape décisive’ de la ‘démocratisation’ en Russie, les élections libres qui se tiennent conformément à la Constitution, la défaite sans doute irrémédiable des communistes, etc., sans plus se soucier des conditions de la campagne” (LM; TThMcr: 19-3-12). [“The dumbstruck professional admirers of the Russian regimes, whichever regime, have already prepared their statements on this ‘decisive step’ towards the ‘democratization’ in Russia, the free elections that are held according to the Constitution, the probable crushing defeat of the communists, etc., without worrying any more about the real conditions of the campaign” (LM; TThMcr: 19-3-12).]
France, as part of the Western world, is included in LM’s disapproval. It is also singled out. “[Sur d’autres projets, Paris se plaît pourtant à faire entendre une voix discordante.] Pourquoi pas à propos de la Tchétchénie?” (LM; Mcr: 16-5-27) [[“On other subjects, Paris is nevertheless pleased to make its opposing voice heard.] Why not also about Chechnya?” (LM; Mcr: 16-5-27).]
Far from counterbalancing LM’s criticism of the West, LM’s positive statements reinforce these criticisms by underlining how in similar circumstances in other parts of the world, the West behaved as it is supposed to, i.e. in a peace-keeping role. “Pour moins que cela, l’Indonésie, accusée à juste titre de martyriser la population du Timor-Oriental, a fait l’objet de sanctions économiques” (LM; TThMcr: 6-3-10). “Pour des faits de guerre pas très éloignés au Kosovo, les occidentaux, à raison, se sont mobilisés contre la Serbie” (LM; TThMcr: 6-3-11). “Lorsque Slobodan Milosevic a entrepris de réprimer dans le sang la révolte de la population du Kosovo, Américains et Européens ont fait barrage” (LM; TThMcr: 11-1-1). “Lorsque l’armée indonésienne a commencé à raser la capitale d’une des provinces du pays, le Timor-Oriental, l’ONU est intervenue en force” (LM; TThMcr: 11-1-2). “Pourtant, depuis 1945, l’idée que la communauté internationale se doit de tenter d’apaiser les feux de la planète est à l’ordre du jour” (LM; TTh: 24-1-2). [“For less than that, Indonesia, justly accused of torturing the population of East Timor, was subject to economic sanctions” (LM; TThMcr: 6-3-10). “For similar circumstances in Kosovo, the West, rightly, mobilized against Serbia” (LM; TThMcr: 6-3-11). “When Slobodan Milosevic began violently repress-
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ing the revolt of the population in Kosovo, the Americans and Europeans blockaded him” (LM; TThMcr: 11-1-1). “When the Indonesian army started to demolish the capital of one of the country’s provinces, East Timor, the UN intervened with force” (LM; TThMcr: 11-1-2). “Nevertheless, since 1945, the idea that the international community must devote itself to trying to cool the world’s fires is the order of the day” (LM; TTh: 24-1-2).]
As if this were not enough, LM contrasts the attitude of Western institutions with the good work of Western media. “[Cédant lâchement aux pressions de Moscou, elle [l’Assemblée parlementaire du Conseil de l’Europe] a, ce triste jeudi, décidé de revenir sur l’unique sanction prise en avril 2000 à l’encontre de la Russie pour lui signifier le caractère inadmissible de la sale guerre qu’elle poursuit en Tchétchénie.]]. . . Les récents reportages de journaux européens et américains auraient pu éclairer l’Assemblée de Strasbourg” (LM; TMcr: 30-3-18). [“[Cowardly giving in to pressure from Moscow, it [the Parliamentary Assembly of the European council] decided this sad Thursday to revoke the only sanction taken in April 2000 against Russia, that had been meant to signify the inexcusable nature of the dirty war Russia was pursuing in Chechnya.]]. . . The recent feature stories in European and American newspapers could have informed the Strasburg Assembly” (LM; TMcr: 30-3-18).]
Taking into account the similar function of LM’s positive and negative evaluations of the West, it appears that a quarter of both LM’s macrostructures (26.61%) and its text macrostructures (24.73%) purports to criticize the West in its attitude towards Russia. This still amounts to a clearly significantly lesser degree of criticism than was expressed towards Russia at the macrostructural level (p < 0.0001), but not at the text macrostructural level (p = 0.158). In other words, LM’s editorial conclusions are not more critical of Russia than of the West. ... The USA according to The New York Times The NYT’ positive and negative representations of Us, i.e. of the USA, is balanced at the macrostructural level (USA Neg: 4%; USA Pos: 3%) and text macrostructural level (USA Neg: 4%; USA Pos: 5%). Except for the positive representation at the text macrostructural level, the USA is significantly less represented than Russia (Mcr Pos: p = 0.0002; Mcr Neg: p = 0; TMcr Neg: p = 0). The NYT’ four text macrostructures containing a positive evaluation of the USA deal all with the benefits of cooperation between the USA and Russia for democracy, the economy and defense. “These serve important American interests like reducing nuclear dangers and encouraging democracy and economic reform” (NYT; TMcr: 14-3-18). The
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era in which Moscow and Washington spent trillions of dollars vying for conventional and nuclear supremacy is mercifully over” (NYT; TMcr: 28-6-28). “But that episode was overtaken by the arms control initiatives of Mikhail Gorbachev and Mr. Reagan’s positive responses” (NYT; TMcr: 34-3-11). “The closer engagement signaled by Mr. Bush and Mr. Putin is a healthy development” (NYT; TMcr: 38-6-22).
The six other macrostructures emphasize American economic responsibility, the rightness of American diplomacy, world (including Western) humanism, and concrete results of a good US-Russian partnership. “The Administration has already begun to shift gears and insist that a more clear accounting of international assistance be made before further loans can be granted” (NYT; Mcr: 2-5-20). “There is reason for reassurance, however, in the calm response from the Clinton administration and the speedy effort by Russia’s Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, to emphasize the stability of overall relations between the United States and Russia” (NYT; TTh: 11-1-3). “It was encouraging to hear President Bush declare yesterday that he still sought “good relations” with Russia” (NYT; Mcr: 34-3-12). “For a week and a half, the tragic plight of the 118 officers and sailors trapped aboard the sunken Russian nuclear submarine Kursk drew expressions of compassion and offers of assistance from around the world” (NYT; Mcr: 26-1-1). “The Times series reported on a remarkably successful partnership between the cities of La Crosse, Wis., and the Russian city of Dubna, 100 miles north of Moscow, that modernized maternity care, pediatric treatment and home care of the elderly” (NYT; Mcr: 32-6-23).
Conversely, the negative representation of the USA concerns its eventual reluctance to pursue its cooperation with Russia in the domain of defense (text macrostructural level), and economy (macrostructural level). “[Washington should] defer any thought of renouncing the [Antiballistic Missile] treaty” (NYT; TMcr: 6-4-23). “It would be a dangerously false economy to slow the dismantling of Russian weapons” (NYT; TMcr: 35-5-19). “Such a retreat [a broader disengagement from Russia in terms of loans] would make little sense after the election of a new parliament expected to be more friendly to economic reforms” (NYT; Mcr: 14-1-3).
Furthermore, Americans are also criticized for their lack of caution in economic matters and international relations. Finally, the extent of the damage caused by an American spying for Russia is noted (text macrostructural level). “Bank executives, eager to expand their oversea business, initially seemed happy to receive the deposits, even though the gusher of money should have raised suspicions” (NYT; Mcr: 1-3-9). “The suspicion is also growing that in
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a bid to speed privatization, stabilize Russian currency and encourage greater private investment, American policy makers may have looked the other way when charges of wrongdoing first surfaced” (NYT; Mcr: 2-3-13). “But Washington’s record of military intervention in Iraq and the Balkans, its promotion of NATO expansion toward Russia’s borders and its talk of building a missile shield have helped nudge Russia and China closer together” (NYT; Mcr: 416-18). “He [Mr. Hanssen] is accused of compromising some of Washington’s most sensitive operations” (NYT; TThMcr: 34-5-19).
Thus, the USA is presented as a State whose interest is to cooperate with Russia. The NYT recognizes that the USA does so to a certain extent (with some positive results), but it still must be encouraged to continue in this direction. .. Le Monde’s and The New York Times’ positions Le Monde’s and The New York Times’ positions are defined by looking at the messages they address to Us and Russia, their frequency, strength and place in the general argumentation. The analysis of Le Monde’s and The New York Times’ general lines of argumentation at the text macrostructural level (see above 3.2.2, tables 3.3 and 3.4) revealed that Le Monde addresses Us significantly more than it addresses Russia (to Us: 33%; to R: 4%; p < 0.001) and than The New York Times addresses Us (LM to Us: 33%; NYT to Us: 16%; p < 0.014). On the other hand, The New York Times addresses Russia significantly more than Us (to R: 27%; to Us: 16%; p < 0.05) and than Le Monde addresses Russia (NYT to R: 27%; LM to R: 4%; p < 0.01). When Le Monde and The New York Times in their messages (i.e. macrostructures in which LM and the NYT address another party) use expressions of necessity or obligation in the indicative mood, they are being particularly forceful towards their addressees. At the all-sentence level, 20% of Le Monde’s messages and 24% of The New York Times’ are strong. However (Table 3.14), The New York Times is significantly more forceful in its messages towards Russia than in those towards Us (to R: 17%; to Us: 6.9%; p < 0.01) and than Le Monde is in its messages towards Russia (LM to R: 5.3%; NYT to R: 17%; p = 0.015). As for Le Monde, it is significantly more forceful in its messages to Us than to Russia (to Us: 14.8%; to R: 5.3%; p = 0.03) and than The New York Times is to Us (LM to Us: 14.8%; NYT to Us: 6.9%; p < 0.01). These strong messages from Le Monde and The New York Times disclose what is most important to them, and what they expect from Us and from Russia. In short, both on the basis of their number (percentages) and weight (in terms of strength), the messages from Le Monde to Us and those from The New York Times to Russia appear to be the most central ones. At this point, it is necessary
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Table 3.14 Percentages of LM’s and the NYT’ messages to Russia and to Us %
from all TMcr
from all messages at all-sentence level
from all TMcr
from all messages at all-sentence level
of To R To Us
LM 4 33
Strong – LM 5.3 14.8
NYT 27 16
Strong – NYT 17 6.9
to turn to the content of all text themes and text macrostructures that contain a strong message from Le Monde or The New York Times to Us and Russia. As bases for its argumentation, i.e. as positions so self-evident that they do not need to be justified, Le Monde poses in text themes (TTh) that the West (Us) must be realistic in its dealings with Russia; the West must recognize how foolish its triumphant reaction was at the news of the Soviet Union’s disintegration in 1991 (1), and how essential its relations with Russia still is for international stability (2). Furthermore, the West must evaluate the soon-to-be-elected Russian President, Vladimir Putin, on his acts, i.e. not on his words (3), and both the West and Russia must realize that they need a solid Russian State (4). As conclusions to its general argumentation, i.e. in the editorials’ raison d’être (expressed in text macrostructures – TMcr), Le Monde reminds Europe of its obligation to enforce human rights in Chechnya (5, 6) and admonishes the West and Russia to have the FSB stop its hold on Russia (7). (1) Il faudra un jour se souvenir de l’enthousiasme béat et militant, de ce sentiment quasi religieux de triomphe idéologique qui régnait à Washington, et ailleurs à l’Ouest, en ces journées de fin 1991 lorsque implosa l’empire soviétique. (12-1-1: Strong TTh) [One day, it will be necessary to remember the smug, militant enthusiasm, the near religious feeling of ideological triumph that ruled in Washington and elsewhere in the West during the last days of 1991 when the Soviet Empire imploded.] (2) Même si la Russie n’est plus la grande puissance qu’elle se plaisait à être sous la forme de l’URSS, les relations avec Moscou sont essentielles à la stabilité internationale. (16-1-7: Strong TTh) [Even if Russia is no longer the great power that she enjoyed being as the USSR, relations with Moscow are essential to international stability.] (3) Certes, il faudra juger M. Poutine à ses actes. (19-3-13: Strong TTh) [Certainly, it will be necessary to judge Mr. Putin by his actions.] (4) les Russes et les Occidentaux ont besoin d’un Etat solide à Moscou. (25-1-13: Strong TTh) [Russians and the West need a solid State in Moscow.]
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(5) Mais il ne faut pas la [Assemblée du Conseil de l’Europe] laisser tromper l’opinion [sur l’attitude de la Russie en Tchétchénie]. (30-4-24: Strong TThMcr) [But we can’t let [the Assembly of the European Council] fool public opinion [about Russia’s attitude towards Chechnya].] (6) Il ne faut pas que le Kremlin puisse continuer à siéger tranquillement au Conseil de l’Europe, compter sans cesse sur l’aide du FMI (. . . ) tant qu’il fait aveuglément bombarder les populations civiles de Tchétchénie. C’est une exigence minimale. (8-4-26: Strong; 8-4-27: Strong TMcr) [The Kremlin must not be allowed to quietly keep its seat in the Council of Europe and eternally count on the IMF’s help (. . .) as long as it indiscriminately continues bombing civilians in Chechnya. This is an absolute minimum requirement.] (7) [Il faut tout au contraire dénoncer cette dérive. – la grande reprise en main du pays tout entier par le FSB.] Et le faire savoir à Moscou. (21-5-31: Strong TMcr) [[On the contrary, it is necessary to expose this trend – the large scale overtaking of the country by the FSB.] And to make Moscow aware of it.]
The New York Times’ strong positions and messages tend to be more encompassing and more detailed than Le Monde’s. As bases for its argumentation (in text themes – TTh), The New York Times asserts the need for Russia to put into place the essential components for building a new society (8) and to reform its army (9). As to the USA, it must be thoughtful in its defense negotiations with Russia and not needlessly throw out the ABM Treaty (10), and it must take care to investigate thoroughly the suspected Russian money laundering through the Bank of New York (11, 12). The New York Times’ strong messages that constitute the editorials’ main points (expressed in text macrostructures – TMcr) are all but one directed only to Russia and enjoin it to build a democracy (13), to protect newly established liberties in general (14) and in media (15), to reform the economic system (16) and the army (17), and to pursue diplomacy and not war in Chechnya (18). Finally, The New York Times reminds both Russia and the USA that they have a common interest in working for democracy and against nuclear proliferation (19). (8) His successors must put in place the missing but essential building blocks of a new society, including the rule of law, a financial system free of corruption and a central government able to collect taxes and provide competent and enlightened administration throughout Russia’s vast territory. (17-1-3: Strong TTh) (9) But more decisive action [imposing professional discipline in Russian military forces] is needed. (40-1-3: Strong TTh) (10) What Washington must not do is abandon the [ABM] treaty in frustration if such revisions prove beyond immediate reach. (6-1-5: Strong TTh)
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(11) For now, the need is to investigate [the suspected Russian money laundering through the Bank of New York] thoroughly and without fear of where the evidence may lead. (1-2-7: Strong TTh) (12) and [investigators must] reexamine policy decisions that may have aggravated the problem [of corruption and money laundering]. (2-1-6: Strong TTh) (13) But as he learns to wield the nearly dictatorial powers that the Yeltsin-era Constitution gives him, Mr. Putin will have to decide whether he intends to build a durable democracy or just rebuild the machinery of state. (24-6-27: Strong TMcr) (14) Mr. Putin must find a way to challenge the power of the tycoons that does not eviscerate the liberties Russians so recently won. (23-5-20: Strong TMcr) (15) Mr. Putin needs to demonstrate that independent television stations, newspapers and magazines can still operate freely in Russia without government harassment. (37-5-19: Strong TMcr) (16) In the end, however, the Russians must reform their [economic] system. (27-28: Strong TMcr) (17) The Kremlin needs to reconfigure Russia’s military forces to better fit the country’s post-cold-war needs and resources. (18-5-14: Strong TMcr) (18) Mr. Yeltsin and his allies in Moscow need to listen to warnings by those leaders who tried during the European security conference in Istanbul to explain that using bombs and tanks would not work, militarily or diplomatically, to oust Chechen terrorists. (9-1-3: Strong TThMcr) (19) Both countries have a strong interest in seeing continued progress on combating nuclear proliferation and safeguarding the transition to democracy represented by Russia’s parliamentary election on Dec. 19 and its presidential election next year. (11-5-20: Strong TMcr)
Thus, on the basis of the number, strength and place in the argumentation of messages addressed to Us and Russia, it appears that Le Monde’s central concern is to remind the West of its responsibility in the domain of human rights, and that The New York Times’ main goal is to have Russia build a liberal democracy. It is interesting to note that while The New York Times states both in a text theme (8) and a text macrostructure (16) the strong need for Russia to reform its economy, it is expressed in Le Monde only in regular sentences (i.e. that are not themes nor macrostructures).85
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. Different conceptual frameworks The application of the linguistic methodology to Le Monde’s and The New York Times’ corpora of editorials has given on the one hand a general quantitative picture of the editorials’ content for each newspaper, and on the other detailed qualitative descriptions of the argumentation in specific editorials. The combination of both reveals how Le Monde’s and The New York Times’ editorials derive from different conceptual frameworks. Le Monde’s and The New York Times’ positions are not completely dissimilar. The main features of their editorials on Russia have been exposed above (see Table 3.2). Basically, both newspapers promote the respect of human rights, particularly in reference to the war in Chechnya, and the introduction of economic reforms although with quite a different emphasis. Furthermore, both note that the West / the USA have some common interests with Russia. Where they strongly diverge is in their conceptual approach. Their main difference can be summarized in two words: holism vs. individualism. In its editorials on Russia, LM represents a multilateral debate (from which the non-Western world is nevertheless excluded) because the events under discussion take place in a world community, where everybody is responsible for each other: Russia is responsible for the critical situation within its borders, and the West is responsible for letting Russia act inappropriately. Le Monde, being equally a part of this community and thus also responsible for what is happening in it, has the duty to remind Russia and in particular the West (because of the LM’s Western identity) of their responsibilities. “Sinon, nous aurons la Russie que nous aurons méritée” (LM; TMcr: 13-4-25), i.e. “Otherwise, we will have the Russia that we deserve,” concludes the newspaper in the text macrostructure of one of its editorials, after having urged the West once again to manifest their official disapproval of the war in Chechnya. Thus, it is not surprising that LM be so rarely positive about Russia or the West: it is its duty to denounce their shortcomings, and to take up the role of the West’s “moral leader”. For LM to be listened to in a multilateral debate, it needs to define its own voice within the community, i.e. in relation to but also in contrast to the others. This explains why LM establishes its authority on its professional expertise, its social representativeness, and its independence. LM’s style is a double-edged sword. While giving its voice the sharpness that may be necessary for it to act, it can also cut links in a community that, by definition, is composed of relationships. Some appreciate the formidable efficiency of this rhetoric, “la plume dans la plaie”, especially if it is not directed to them; others call it “French arrogance”, stylistically elegant but cruel. One might admire it, but also hate it. In an individualistic, atomistic world, there is not need for multilateral debates. When a question needs to be discussed, a bilateral approach between the
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relevant parties usually suffices. This is the strategy followed by the NYT. The reasoning that can be inferred from its representation of Russia and the USA is, that while considering Russia’s alarming situation and despite its critical level, it is in the overall interests of the USA to pursue its cooperation with this country in order to help it improve. The mind set for this reasoning is primarily bilateral: “You are ‘bad’ and I need to help you because otherwise your situation will have negative effects on me. Thus, despite the difficulties, helping you is in the end good for me”. In this context, the positive evaluations of Russia and the USA by the NYT function as encouragements for the USA to remain engaged with Russia despite the considerable problems. The negative aspects of Russia are the foundation for the editorials’ arguments, and therefore must be emphasized. Their improvement is Russia’s responsibility; the USA’s role is only to help out in the process. Dealing mainly with one partner, a State, the NYT newspaper establishes its competence by asserting its authority. It does so with a skilful presentation of arguments and sources of information, a balance between rational and emotional appeals, a contextualized evaluation of responsibilities, and self-confidence. Furthermore, it assumes a tone of commandment. In a one-to-one relationship, this type of authority can be efficient if the hierarchy is not contested and provided the leader does not misjudge the situation; but otherwise, it tends to lead to a strong resistance. This particular tone of commandment has been called “American arrogance”. One might respect this competence, but also resent it. The difference of conceptual framework between LM and the NYT finds a particularly good illustration in the editorials they published on February 8, 2000 just after the fall of Grozny, the Chechen capital. Characteristically, LM’s title, “De Vienne à Grozny”, relates two sets of events taking place in different parts of the world, while the NYT’ editorial title, “Russia’s Empty Victory”, concerns only Russia and is distinctively negative. LM’s general line of argumentation goes as follows. When Jörg Haider’s farright party entered the Austrian government, the European Union and the USA rightfully protested. “Il s’agit de tirer une ligne rouge, de tracer une frontière, de dire, sans hypocrisie, qu’on ne peut pas ne pas manifester un minimum d’inquiétude quand prend place dans un gouvernement de l’Union un parti dont le chef a eu des mots pour le moins complaisants pour les nazis” (LM; TTh: 17-1-6). Russia “vient d’écraser sous les bombes une ville entière, Grozny, ‘dresderisée’ par quatre mois et demi de bombardements aériens, où bombes à billes et bombes à effet de souffle se sont chargées de pulvériser ce qui restait de malades, de mourants, de vieillards et d’enfants terrés dans les caves de la capitale tchétchène” (LM; TTh: 17-2-12). However, the West has not reacted. “[Tant d’inégalité de traitement, tant de différence dans l’indignation] réduisent [le discours occidental sur les droits de l’homme] à une formidable manifestation d’hypocrisie” (LM; TMcr: 17-4-25).
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[“It is a matter of drawing a red line, of tracing a boundary, of saying without hypocrisy that we cannot not show a minimum of concern when a [European] Union government has a leader whose comments were in the least sympathetic for the Nazis” (LM; TTh: 17-1-6). Russia “has just crushed an entire city with bombs, Grozny, ‘dresdenized’ by four and a half months of aerial bombings, where guava bombs and blast bombs were sent to pulverize who was left among the sick, the dying, the old and the children, hidden in the cellars of the Chechen capital” (LM; TTh: 17-2-12). However, the West has not reacted. “[So much inequality of treatment, so much difference in indignation] reduces [Western discourse on human rights] to a tremendous demonstration of hypocrisy” (LM; TMcr: 17-4-25).]
Starting its editorial with “the year may be 2000“ (NYT; TTh: 20-1-1), the NYT states that “the central aims [of the second Chechen war] were to avenge Russia’s military defeat in 1996 and to lift the political fortunes of Vladimir Putin, the prime minister who became acting president when Boris Yeltsin resigned on Dec. 31” (NYT; TMcr: 20-3-13). “Both goals have been achieved, at a heavy cost in blood and principle” (NYT; TTh: 20-3-14). “Russia’s generals have demonstrated that a scorched-earth campaign can drive guerillas into the hills, demolish a sizable city and kill thousands of civilians trapped in the combat zone” (NYT; TMcr: 204-15). “More than 200,000 Chechens who were lucky enough to survive have fled Chechnya” (NYT; TThMcr: 20-4-16). “An end of combat in Grozny should not bring an end to American criticism” (NYT; TTh: 20-5-23). “Mr. Putin does his countrymen no favor by encouraging that misguided reaction [the celebration of Grozny’s capture]” (NYT; TMcr: 20-6-27). The events at the origin of these editorials, the battle of Grozny, are the same. The NYT compares Grozny with “the smoking rubble of a European city circa 1945” (NYT; Th: 20-1-2), and LM describes it as destroyed “comme aucune ville ne l’a été en Europe depuis 1945” [as no city in Europe has been since 1945] (LM; Th: 17-3-13). The cruelty of the battle raises a deep indignation in LM and the NYT. However, the NYT explains the aims of the war (TMcr: 20-3-13); LM focuses on the Western and Russian attitudes (TTh: 17-1-6; TTh: 17-2-12). LM uses sarcasm to describe a situation where the NYT appeals to reason. “Et pour le cas où quelques blessés ou miraculeux rescapés se trouveraient encore dans les décombres de ce lieu dévasté – comme aucune ville ne l’a été en Europe depuis 1945 – les Russes interdisent tout secours médical” [And in case a few injured or miraculously escaped find themselves in the ruins of this place – devastated as no city in Europe has been since 1945 – the Russians deny them any medical attention] (LM; Th: 17-3-13). “The best that can now be hoped is that Russia will let international aid organizations provide humanitarian relief to Chechen civilians, and will make good on its 1996 promise to help rebuild the shattered ethnic enclave” (NYT; ThMcr: 20-
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Chapter 3. Russia in Le Monde and The New York Times
6-24). In LM’s general conclusion, the Western world is being called hypocritical (LM; TMcr: 17-4-25), while in the NYT’, Russia is told not to celebrate the fall of Grozny (NYT; TMcr: 20-6-27). The same events, and similarly strong reactions of protest, but two quite divergent approaches. Same genre – editorials – from daily newspapers comparable in terms of prestige, function and audience, and equally skilled rhetoricians, but two rather distinct styles. To get an insight into this paradox, Le Monde’s and The New York Times’ editorials need to be considered with other reactions in their respective national contexts to the same events.
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chapter
Le Monde’s and The New York Times’ editorials in their national societies
The linguistic analysis of Le Monde’s and The New York Times’ editorials revealed how their content proceeded from two different conceptual frameworks, but it did not explain why (see above 3.3). Entman’s cascading activation model (see above 1.1.3) enables a systematic approach for the contextualization of these editorials in their respective national cultures, and thus for the study of the editorials’ ideational function. French (4.1) and American (4.2) societies are examined below regarding the respective positions of their governments, elites and public opinion following the order of Entman’s model. The significance of Le Monde’s and The New York Times’ editorials on Russia is brought out through the synthesis of the linguistic and contextual analyses (4.3).
. French society .. French foreign policy Because of France’s membership in the European Union and because of the Fifth Republic institution (see 2.2.1), French foreign policy must be examined at three levels: the European Council’s (4.1.1.1), the President’s (4.1.1.2), and the Minister of Foreign Affairs’ (4.1.1.3). ... Positions of the European Council From August 1999 to July 2001, the European Council met seven times. The Council regularly called for a political settlement of the war in Chechnya while at the same time recognizing Russia’s right to maintain its territorial integrity and to fight against terrorism. The Council’s most severe declaration was made in Helsinki in December 199986 when it “condemn[ed] the intense bombardments of Chechen cities [. . .]”, stating that “this behaviour is in contradiction with the basic principles of humanitarian law, the commitments of Russia as made within the OSCE and its obligations as a member of the Council of Europe”. In Stockholm in March 2001, the Council adopted a much more conciliatory tone, and it emphasized the cooperation between Russia and the European Union while still mentioning
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its concerns about Chechnya.87 Finally, in Göteborg in June 2001,88 the Council added the situation of independent media to its concerns.89 The European Union’s positions on Russia were met with much criticism in France. Despite the Union’s unequivocal condemnation of the war in Chechnya, the Union’s positions were perceived as if the Union considered the violation of human rights to be merely another, albeit grave, problem, but not the fundamental one in Russia. ... Positions of the President At the Istanbul OSCE summit in November 1999, France threatened not to sign the Charter for European Security because of the obvious violations of some of its principles in Chechnya. As finally Russia agreed to the involvement of the OSCE in the search for a political settlement, the Charter was adopted. Answering a journalist at the press conference after the summit,90 French President Jacques Chirac recognized that Yeltsin might be under the pressure of Russian public opinion and army in his handling of the situation in Chechnya, but Yeltsin, as President of the Russian Federation, had to take responsibility for the management of the situation. Russian authorities had to understand that only a political settlement was possible in Chechnya. However, no economic or financial sanctions were even thought of, because they would only aggravate the severe economic difficulties that Russian people were experiencing. In May 2001, asked by Mexican journalists why France in particular and the European Union in general had such a cautious approach in regard to the war in Chechnya,91 Chirac answered that the Union’s position was not too cautious, but rather realistic. It had to take into account the different sensibilities of its Member States. During his first official visit to Russia in July 2001, Chirac gave an interview to the independent radio station, Ekho Moskvy,92 during which he reiterated the importance of freedom of speech and media freedom, the necessity for a multipolar world and the significance of Russia-NATO partnership, and the need to find a political settlement in Chechnya. Regarding four issues that had disturbed the relations between Russia and France,93 he replied that they all involved the French Judiciary that was independent from the Executive. Furthermore, three of these issues had originated from requests of a Swiss firm.94 In all of these cases, he added, France had been attempting to mediate the situation. ... Positions of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Védrine’s first public statement on the second Chechen War dates back to September 29, 1999 when in a joint statement with the German and Italian Ministers of Foreign Affairs,95 was expressed France’s, Germany’s and Italy’s deep concern about the degradation of the situation in Chechnya, about its dramatic conse-
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quences for the civilian population and the risks of destabilization in the region. Since then, in his multiple interventions, Védrine constantly repeated his firm opposition to the use of force as the only means to settle the situation, while also recalling Russia’s right to maintain its territorial integrity and to fight against terrorism.96 Regarding Western economic aid to Russia, he underlined that it was primary in the interest of the West; the Western mistake, of an ideological nature, had been to assume that neo-liberal reforms that were adapted to extremely welldeveloped economies like the USA or Western Europe could work in Russia, whose state of development was behind that of Europe in 1946–1947.97 After the collapse of the Soviet Union, one had to realize that Russia should not be treated as Germany had been at the end of the First World War (which led to the Second World War), and that helping a country to change takes a long time.98 Often asked by media and members of both houses of the French parliament why France and the West were not reacting more strongly to the events in Chechnya, Védrine answered that France had always been at the forefront of protestations from its first statement in September 1999 to the OSCE summit in Istanbul (November 1999) and the European Council in Helsinki (December 1999), and that France had been trying to convince its reluctant partners (the USA and Germany among others) to take a firmer position.99 Védrine said that France was alone in opposing so clearly the situation in Chechnya.100 Furthermore, he conveyed France’s positions directly to the acting Russian President, Vladimir Putin, to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Igor Ivanov, and to the Russian population.101 Commenting on his meeting with Putin (Védrine was the first French leader to meet with the acting Russian President), he added that their clear and frank mutual discussions about Chechnya had been useful (although Putin had commented rather harshly that France was the most severe in its statements on Chechnya102 ); they had also talked about Putin’s wish to make Russian legislation as compatible as possible with European legislation, which opened a field of cooperation between France and Russia.103 Védrine considered that European long-term cooperation with Russia to help it become a great modern and democratic country was in terrible contradiction with the manner in which Russia handled Chechnya, and he deplored that Russian public opinion – from Zjuganov, the leader of the Communist party, to Solženitcyn – did not see this contradiction and qualified the French attitude as an anti-Russian campaign.104 In his many interviews with written, audio and audiovisual media, Védrine was often asked the same questions about France’s positions on Chechnya. To the weekly Marianne,105 he explained that the role of foreign policy was to defend French freedom, decisional autonomy and interests, and to promote French values. Public opinion and the majority of media, on the other hand, expected France to impose its system on the rest of the world. While non-Westerners more and more frequently accepted Western values as universal, they also resented the way
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these values were globally imposed on them along with Western political and economic interests. Védrine added that Western societies believe they are the world masters; thus Western societies are fundamentally paternalistic. This arrogance is visible in the resurgence of the “colonization duty” prevalent in the Third Republic106 or in the modern concept of the duty to interfere (devoir d’ingérence). Asked whether he was talking about public opinion or the media, Védrine answered that media do not necessarily reflect public opinion exactly; they anticipate it. Editorialists, in particular, assert what needs to be done or not, and castigate what appears shocking to them. In doing so, they fulfill a missionary, proselytic, evangelist function, a function of “norm definers”. Today, a dramatic event becomes a major event only if it is shown visually. Public opinion then tells politicians: “do something to stop the suffering of . . . TV watchers!” As an example, Védrine talked about Somalia: the images were intolerable, and so “something” was done (and failed). However, a more murderous civil war in Sudan had been going on for longer but was not broadcast for technical reasons, and thus it had not been the subject of calls for intervention. In another interview,107 Védrine had said that the mobilization of public opinion was useful but very often not sufficient to influence France’s partners to adopt a firmer position towards Russia. Indeed, the USA had a different analysis of the situation. For them, Russian cooperation in matters of disarmament and Russian agreement about the revision of the ABM treaty were the first priority. (Economic) reforms and the fight against Islamic terrorism were second on the list. Chechnya came very far behind. Cohesion between partners is necessary for acting; this is what had made the Western intervention in Kosovo possible. As for France’s European partners, some were afraid that a strong Western reaction would start the development of dangerous phenomena in Russia.108 On a Russian TV channel,109 Védrine declared that the strength of France’s position on Chechnya was partly due to its public opinion that was very mobilized around this question. France’s strong reactions to Chechnya were said to be the cause of Putin’s late first official visit to France, although he had been invited much earlier. The visit took place right after Putin’s participation in the EU-Russia summit in Paris at the end of October 2000. The Chechen war was still going on, albeit less intensively than a few months before, and France had not changed position about Chechnya. Answering a journalist,110 Védrine said that Russia was not necessarily leaning on France to counterbalance the USA, but that Russia and France certainly shared the same strong opposition to the American desire to revise the 1972 ABM treaty, which France and Russia considered the cornerstone of nuclear balance in the world. In another interview about Putin’s visit,111 Védrine specified that the directing line of France’s policy towards Russia consisted of helping it become a great, modern, democratic and peaceful country. Chechnya was not forgotten, but it was not the only issue in the relations between the two countries. In reaction to a
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remark by André Glucksmann against Putin’s visit, he added112 that France could not let others manage its own interests, which is what would happen if France were the only State not to have any relation with Russia. It was more intelligent to meet with Putin and tell him what one thought. .. Intellectuals Starting in December 1999, shocking pictures and reports were broadcast in Western media on the offensive of the Russian army against the Chechen capital, Grozny. Members of both houses of the French Parliament and the media reacted by repeatedly asking the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hubert Védrine, what France was doing to change the situation (see 4.1.1.3). More public and general actions were also carried out. In February 2000, on the initiative of André Glucksmann, Romain Goupil and the academic Emmanuel Wallon, 200 French intellectuals signed a petition, “Crime left unpunished in Chechnya”. It called for a demonstration in Paris against the international silence about “massive war crimes and barbarian acts that will have to be called crimes against humanity”.113 This was the first Western mass demonstration in support of Chechens, as noted by a Russian journalist from Izvestija114 (see below 5.1.4). Several former Soviet dissidents115 had also signed this petition, very similar in tone and content to Le Monde’s editorials. Despite this appeal for action, a group of intellectuals and politicians meeting in the French National Assembly in March were still deploring the public’s indifference to the war.116 Two other petitions followed in the same month just before the Russian presidential elections. One was signed by a group of 130 researchers and academics, specialists on all former Soviet Republics. Its content was the same as for the February petition, although the tone was less incisive.117 The other, entitled “Horror haunts Europe”118 and written again on the initiative of Glucksmann and Goupil, bore the signature of more than 200 personalities from 16 European States. Its tone was the most virulent, and it was not ignored by Russian intellectuals and journalists (see below 5.1.4). The names of André Glucksmann and Romain Goupil are linked with the two most hostile petitions against the war in Chechnya. André Glucksmann is a philosopher, a former Maoist, who published in 1975 La Cuisinière et le Mangeur d’hommes, a book that symbolically consecrated the rupture of part of the intellectual ultra-left with Marxism-Leninism. Glucksmann was involved with Bernard Kouchner in the operation “A ship for Vietnam”. In 1981, Glucksmann criticized the newly elected socialist President, Mitterrand, for his selective invitation of writers to a ceremony in the Panthéon: although they were supposed to represent human suffering, none of them represented those in the Socialist camp who were fighting for their liberty. Romain Goupil is a film-maker, former member of the Trotskyite Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire.119
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.. French public opinion In a poll conducted in October 1999 for Courrier International on how Europeans and Russians viewed post-Communism,120 19% of the French respondents answered that the word “Russia” evoked something positive for them (18% for the word “communism”), and 72% that it evoked something negative (71% for the word “communism”). On 6 December 1999, the Russian army command issued an ultimatum to Grozny’s population: if they did not leave Grozny by the 11, they would be considered as terrorists and be killed. This ultimatum and the events preceding it were largely mediatized. A poll conducted on December 10–11th 1999121 revealed that 54% of the respondents felt concerned by the actions of the Russian army in Chechnya, and 45% did not. 36% thought that media did not cover Chechnya sufficiently, 43% that Chechnya was adequately covered, and 14% that it was over covered. 78% wished that Western powers would apply more pressure so that Russia would stop its military intervention. On the subject of measures that France and the European Union could take, a majority was in favour of: emergency help for Chechen refugees (92% v. 5%), suspension of credits to Russia (54% v. 38%), embargo on some types of products (53% v. 40%), and seizure of certain Russian properties (49% vs. 38%); but a majority was against the suspension of diplomatic relations (67% v. 27%). According to another December 1999 poll,122 41% considered that media had covered Chechnya rather well, 42% rather badly, and 17% did not answer. At the end of December,123 49% (vs. 35%) thought that the political situation in Russia was a threat to international security, and 75% took Yeltsin’s demission as good news for the future of Russia. The battle for Grozny started towards the end of November 1999 and ended on February 6th, 2000 when the city fell to the Russian army. On February 17–18th, 2000, asked to rank the major international events that had affected them most during the previous months, poll respondents124 answered: fighting in Kosovo (quoted first: 30%; total of quotations: 55%); the war in Chechnya (quoted first: 25%; total of quotations: 49%); participation of Jörg Haider’s party in the Austrian government (quoted first: 22%; total of quotations: 30%); massacres in Algeria (quoted first: 12%; total of quotations: 30%); request for judging General Pinochet (quoted first: 6%; total of quotations: 15%). The events that the European Union ought to handle in priority were: fighting in Kosovo (34%), war in Chechnya (31%), participation of Jörg Haider’s party in the Austrian government (25%), request for judging General Pinochet (5%).
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.. Le Monde’s editorials on Russia and French society The main features of Le Monde’s editorials revealed by the linguistic analysis (see Table 3.2) can be inserted into Entman’s table of functions and objects of news substantive frames (Table 4.1). This table reveals that Le Monde presents a very complete picture of the relation between Russia and the West in its editorials: each function (defining problematic effects / conditions, identifying cause / agent, endorsing remedy, conveying moral judgment) contains at least one element for each of the two main interactants. The linguistic analysis also allowed the singling out of the major function emphasized by Le Monde: what the West must do, i.e. the West must enforce the respect of human rights and it must be realistic. Placed in their national context thanks to the use of Entman’s Cascading Network Activation Model (2004), Le Monde’s editorials on Russia are revealed as a manifestation of a major facet of French national identity. Indeed, they point to the founding role given to human rights during the Revolution, reaffirmed during the Third Republic with the various developments around the Dreyfus affair, and inscribed in the constitutions of the fourth (1946) and fifth (1958) Republics (cf. 2.2). Human rights, in French “realms of memory”, are supposed to be at the basis of any society because of their universality. At the end of the 20th century, events in Russia have given rise to strong concerns in French society. French diplomacy Table 4.1 Functions and objects of news substantive frames (Entman 2004: 24) Focus of Frame Function of Frame
Issues / Events
Defining problematic – Finance (including IMF funds) effects / conditions – Politics – Leaders – Chechnya – Army – Media – IMF funds – Inappropriate response to the war in Chechnya Identifying cause / – Cold-war mentality agent – Role of KGB/FSB – Complicity Endorsing remedy – Stop the FSB’s control on the country – (Reform the economy) – Enforce the respect of human rights – Be realistic Conveying moral – Negative judgment – Does not assume its responsibility
Political Actors (Individuals, Groups, Nations) Russia
West Russia West Russia West Russia West
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expressed by the President or the Minister of Foreign Affairs in bilateral and multilateral settings, in the European Union, and in national contexts (cf. 2.2.1) has continuously underlined the necessity for Russia to respect human rights. At the non-official level, a strong tradition among intellectuals (cf. 2.2.3) and in Le Monde (cf. 2.4.1) has strengthened this position. As for public opinion (cf. 4.1.3), despite its low level of political concern125 (ARVAL 2003), it was strongly in favour of help for the Chechen refugees, moderately for sanctions against Russia, but against the rupture of diplomatic relations. The unanimous outcry of protest about the humanitarian situation in Chechnya was conveyed through different styles. The most “moderate” voice was Hubert Védrine’s, Minister of Foreign Affairs, who alongside his very strong criticisms (as outlined by Russian President, Vladimir Putin), denounced the media and public opinion arrogance in their human rights crusade. He, and to a lesser degree President Chirac, used French media channels to explain to the French public what French diplomacy was about and what France was doing in terms of defense of human rights. President Jacques Chirac adopted a firmer tone about the observance of universal law, reportedly in reaction to Védrine’s position, but he also underlined the necessity to be realistic, and in July 2001, through a Russian radio station, he tried to reassure the Russian public that the French government was doing its best to have a good relationship with Russia. French intellectuals were the most forceful in their various protests. In this respect, they benefited from a high level of “protest culture”: French people are among those in Europe who most often sign petitions and take part in demonstrations126 (ARVAL 2003: 305–306). Linked to the intellectual community by the socio-cultural background of its journalists and their mutual interests, Le Monde takes position with them as attested by its incisive style in the establishment of its authority (cf. 3.2.3.2.1). Although the newspaper’s style is less vehement than the intellectuals’, Le Monde takes advantage of its high visibility as the national elite daily and portrays itself as a representative of public opinion. Russia singled out the force of French protest, compared to others’ in the West, and qualified it as an anti-Russian campaign. What made France differ from other Western societies? The combination of the linguistic analysis and the context analysis has revealed the high degree of cultural congruence between Le Monde’s editorials on Russia and French society, most importantly in the essential question of human rights but also in the value of multilateralism and liberal economy moderated by solidarity. Le Monde’s framing of Russia is substantive (as opposed to procedural – see 1.1.3), and this quality, combined with the high degree of cultural congruence, makes these editorials, according to Entman (2004), the most powerful in their effects. Indeed, the French President, Jacques Chirac, and especially the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hubert Védrine, have had to answer numerous questions from the French public on the action of the French government; Védrine even recognized that the strength of the French position was partly due to the
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high level of mobilization of its public opinion. According to Risse-Kappen (1991), French domestic political structures make it difficult for public opinion to influence foreign policy. Thus, it seems that the crucial factor explaining the strength of French reactions was the significance of the cultural element involved. At the basis of the French reactions lie the founding role of human rights for the French society and the “fraternity” (solidarity) symbolic of the French Republic. In this perspective, letting a massive violation of human rights go unopposed amounts to denying one’s identity, one’s own existence. Such a threat was particularly felt at a time when France had to negotiate its identity within a changing environment: the impending enlargement of the European Union127 and its repercussions on the functioning of its institutions and consequently on the Union’s nature as a political entity. If the forceful position adopted by French media128 (including Le Monde) and society may thus have influenced the French government, it should nonetheless not be forgotten that this government is composed of people who belong to French society and thus partake in its identity values, but is circumscribed in its actions by the reality of international affairs. Thus, it appears that the pressure exercised by public opinion129 and media on the government contributed, at least for a while, to the idealism of national identity values taking precedence in the government’s position over the harsh facts of international politics. However, not all violations of human rights are denounced with the same force. Even in the case of the same violations (e.g. in Chechnya), the intensity of protest seems to vary inversely and proportionally with the level of public political responsibility. A partial explanation for Le Monde’s high involvement in the denunciation of the situation in Russia would appear to be on the one hand Russia’s Soviet past (as underlined by the two Russian causes among the news substantive frames – Table 4.1), and on the other the French intellectuals’ rupture from the Communist and other leftist parties. In conclusion, calling the French (including Le Monde’s) protest as anti-Russian is simplistic (but can serve other – inner-Russian – goals) and seeing it only as the noble defense of universal law is naïve.
. American society .. American foreign policy In its bilateral relations with Russia from 1999 to 2001, the USA was mostly concerned about the following matters: missile defense (4.2.1.1), Chechnya, economic and freedom issues (4.2.1.2).
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... The Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty and the National Missile Defense system The debate on missile defense started in 1986 with Republican President Ronald Reagan and his “Star Wars” proposal. This proposal was in the end abandoned because of its cost and technological difficulties. On 31 August 1998, North Korea test-fired a multi-stage rocket – early reports had described it as a ballistic missile – and the controversy about missile defense revived. A new project, a limited National Missile Defense (NMD) system to protect against “rogue” States (e.g. North Korea, Iran, Iraq), was put in place. According to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, neither the USA nor Russia could develop a missile defense that the other could not overwhelm. Thus, the Clinton Administration needed Russia to agree on a revision of this treaty. The NMD project was at the centre of debates, but negotiations did not succeed. On September 1st 2000, “President Clinton announced [. . .] that the NMD program [was] sufficiently promising and affordable to justify continued development and testing, but that there [was] not sufficient information about the technical and operational effectiveness of the entire NMD system to move forward with deployment.”130 It was added: “This announcement will provide additional time to pursue with Russia the goal of adapting the ABM treaty to permit the deployment of a limited NMD system that would not undermine strategic stability. The United States will also continue to consult with Allies and continue the dialogue with China and other states.” On May 1st 2000, the newly elected President, George W. Bush, declared:131 “We need a new framework that allows us to build missile defenses to counter the different threats of today’s world. To do so, we must move beyond the constraints of the 30 year old ABM treaty”; and on December 13th 2001, he announced:132 “Today, I have given formal notice to Russia, in accordance with the treaty, that the United States of America is withdrawing from this almost 30 year old treaty. I have concluded that the ABM treaty hinders our government’s ability to develop ways to protect our people from future terrorist or rogue state missile attacks.”133 ... Chechnya and other issues Compared to the NMD and ABM issues, the war in Chechnya did not occupy much place, but was still an important issue. On November 2nd 1999, after Clinton’s meeting with Prime Minister Putin, a senior Administration official emphasized in a press briefing134 that Clinton had stressed the high number of civilian casualties, the necessity of a political dialogue to achieve a solution and the need to address the immediate humanitarian crisis. He also pointed out that an increase in civilian casualties would affect Russia’s international reputation that it had been working very hard to restore. The Administration official added that there was not an “or else we might” because the USA had a whole series of difficult issues with Russia that were interlinked. The discussions the USA was pursuing in its own interest were arms control, economics issues and non-proliferation.
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The question of Chechnya was prominent at the OSCE summit in Istanbul in November 1999. When a journalist asked why the USA was not as strong as the Europeans in referring to the events in Chechnya, Samuel Berger, National Security Advisor, pointed to Clinton’s intervention about the importance of the international community’s concerns: he had asked Yeltsin about what would have happened if the international community had not cared when Yeltsin stood on a tank in front of the Russian Parliament in August 1991 to oppose a communist attempt to seize power.135 At the Washington US-EU summit in December 1999, Europeans and Americans had another opportunity to express together their concerns about the situation in Chechnya. They underlined that “the indiscriminate use of force against civilians is unacceptable.”136 Clinton again mentioned Chechnya at a press conference during his official visit to Russia in June 2000,137 as well as the importance the USA placed on protecting religious freedom and the rights of an independent media. To the audience of the radio station, Ekho Moskvy,138 he explained that the low percentage (40%) of American respondents to a Gallup poll having a “positive” or “mostly positive” attitude towards Russia was due to “the situation in Chechnya and the highly publicized other differences.” In his press briefing on the same visit,139 Gene Sperling, National Economic Advisor, specified that both presidents addressed the necessity to fight money laundering and crime separately and in addition to systematic structural efforts to prevent legal but damaging capital flight. The question of media freedom had come up several times; for example, in March 2000 the Vice President, Al Gore, had made a statement140 in which he “urge[d] the Russian authorities to honor an essential obligation of a democracy: to preserve the safety and protect the rights of Andrei Babitsky and others like him, who take risks to report the news so that citizens can honestly evaluate the actions of their leaders.”141 In December 2000, another important but not central issue that was discussed concerned the conviction and subsequent humanitarian release of the American spy Edmond Pope.142 .. Elites ... Lobbyists In 1999, the American Committee for Peace in Chechnya (ACPC)143 was founded as a private, non-governmental organization. Describing itself as a “bipartisan coalition of distinguished Americans dedicated to promoting a peaceful end to the war in Chechnya”, it is chaired by former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, former Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr. and former Congressman Stephen J. Solarz, and pursues three objectives: advocacy (development and promotion of policies through the U.S. government and international institutions), information for the public and diplomacy (private talks between rep-
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resentatives of the Russian government and Chechen resistance). It collaborates with an international network of more than 400 activists, journalists, scholars and non-governmental organizations, and distributes Chechnya Today,144 a daily email news service, and Chechnya Weekly,145 an online news magazine. In January 2001, the ACPC coordinated a petition to the Council of Europe “urg[ing] the Parliamentary Assembly not to reinstate Russia’s voting rights in the Council before the Russian government ceases its human rights abuse in Chechnya and takes steps to alleviate the continuing humanitarian disaster there”;146 and in July 2001, it “urge[d] the G-7 leaders to hold Russia accountable for continued human rights abuses in Chechnya and to make Russia’s membership in the G-8 contingent upon its adherence to democratic norms and genuine efforts to initiate negotiations for a cease-fire in the war-torn republic”.147 Among its many activities, the ACPC also worked with Congress staff to draft bills and resolutions concerning Chechnya and Russia.148 ... Congress From 1999 to 2001, a number of bills concerning Russia were introduced to the 106th Congress, but very few were actually passed and acquired the force of law. It is nonetheless useful to look at these diverse bills, as their content indicates the state of mind of part of Congress. These bills and other issues that came up for discussion can be sorted into three categories: economy, security, and state of rights and freedoms. The difficult economic conditions in Russia and the financial scandals that were revealed in the summer of 1999 (illegal use of IMF funds, money laundering through the Bank of New York) prompted a speech by the Republican chairman of the National Security Research Committee, “A new vision for Russia”, that introduced a bill,149 co-sponsored by 25 Democrats and 25 Republicans, to the House of Representatives. This speech150 reports the words of one of the Duma (Russian lower house of the Parliament) members in order to underline how consistent American support of Russian President Yeltsin has resulted in the distrust of Russian people towards America,151 and proposes an eight-point plan to change the American manner of dealing with Russia: establish a joint Russian-US legislative oversight commission to monitor all Western resources going into Russia; focus Western resources on programs like housing that will help develop a middle class; make Western resources available to reform-minded regional governments; deny corrupt institutions any future resources; have the IMF establish a blue ribbon task force to make recommendations on how it can reform itself; make the reforms precede and not follow the resources (this point was emphasized as being the most substantive); create a joint US-Russian business-to-business relationship program; and, bring young Russian students to America. A draft of this bill had been presented in a September 1999 speech, “Security issues facing our country”,152 that
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demanded “a national debate on who lost Russia”, on “what caused the current economic and political instability that is occurring in that nation that still possesses a vast supply of nuclear material, weapons, weapons of mass destruction, and pose a significant security threat to America.”153 Bill H.R.3422, “Making appropriations for foreign operations, export financing, and related programs for the fiscal year ending September 30th, 2000, and for other purposes”, that became Public Law 106–113 on 29 November 1999, included: (Sec. 517) Prohibits the availability of assistance for the Independent States of the former Soviet Union to a Government of such an Independent State, unless such Government is making progress in implementing comprehensive economic reforms based on market principles, private ownership, respect for commercial contracts, and equitable treatment of foreign private investment. Prohibits the availability of assistance also: (1) if such a Government applies or transfers U.S. assistance to any entity for the purpose of expropriating or seizing ownership of assets, investments, or ventures (unless the President determines such assistance is in the national interest); (2) if such a Government directs action in violation of the territorial integrity or national sovereignty of any other Independent State of the former Soviet Union; or (3) to enhance its military capability (except for demilitarization, demining, or nonproliferation programs).
In the Senate, the official and unofficial corruption in Russia and the problems it causes to American business had been underlined in July 1999 by the CoChairman of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, who asked that a Washington Post article, “Investors Fear ‘Scary Guy’ in Russia Talks”, be inserted in the Records.154 From 1999 to 2001, questions of security played a major role in the definition of American policy towards Russia. In 1998, it had been only by one vote that the debate on a bill stating “it is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack” was not brought to a close in the Senate (four Democrats voted with the Republicans to close the debate), and thus the bill was not voted on.155 Related to this Senate bill but much more extremist was a House of Representatives bill introduced by a Republican with 13 cosponsors in June 1999 “to prohibit compliance by the executive branch with the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the 1997 multilateral memorandum of understanding related to that treaty”.156 Just before the 2000 presidential election, another issue was brought up by a New York Times’ article (13 October 2000) and a Washington Times’ article (17 October 2000). Republican members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate accused Vice President Al Gore of having concluded a secret 1995 deal with Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, which would have allowed Russia to sell arms to Iran without being sanctioned for it contrarily to U.S. non-proliferation laws.157
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In fact, the Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement stipulated that Russia was not to conclude any new arms sales contracts and to have ended all of its military sales to Iran by the end of 1999 once already existing arms sales contracts had been completed.158 Concern was expressed not only about the relations of Russia with Iran, but also with China. In June 2001, the Republican Senator Jesse Helms asked for a Washington Times’ article, “China-Russia: Preventing a Military Alliance” (14 June 2001), by Dr. Constantine Menges to be printed in the record.159 This article stated that “for the first time in 40 years the U.S. faces coordinated international actions by China and Russia”, and concluded that “unless Russia excludes such a military component in the new treaty [to be concluded between Russia and China in July 2001], Mr. Bush should indicate that the U.S. will view this as a ChinaRussia military alliance and a potentially grave threat to be met by the significant reductions in U.S. economic support for Russia directly, through debt restructuring, international institutions and trade access. Further the U.S. would see the need to immediately accelerate movement toward missile defense.” An October 2000 House concurrent resolution,160 presented by a senior Democratic member of the House International Relations Committee and cosponsored by the Republican Chairman of the Helsinki Commission, the Republican Chairman of the House International Relations Committee and another senior Democratic member of the International Relations Committee sums up the position of the Congress on the state of rights and freedoms in Russia. The resolution expressed “the sense of the Congress that continued participation by the Russian Federation in the Group of Eight (8) must be conditioned on Russia’s own voluntary acceptance of and adherence to the norms and standards of democracy”, including: “the existence of a free, unfettered press [. . .]; the freedom of all religious groups freely to practice their faith [. . .]; equal treatment and respect for the human rights to own private property [. . .]; initiation for a just and peaceful resolution of the conflict in Chechnya [. . .]; respect for the rule of law and improvement of civil and legal institutions to implement and defend these rights; and reform of the judicial system to prevent the arbitrary detention of citizens and provide for a speedy trial and equal access to the judicial system.” This resolution did not pass, and in July 2001, a Senate concurrent resolution,161 drafted with the help of the American Committee for Peace in Chechnya, was introduced. It basically reiterated the content of the 2000 House concurrent resolution with a slight modification due to the upcoming G-8 summit: “the President should use the Genoa summit meeting of the G-8 to condition future G-8 meetings upon a demonstration by the Government of the Russian Federation to adhere to the norms and standards of democracy and fundamental human rights. . .” Among the specific points listed in both bills, three particularly attracted the attention of the Congress: the war in Chechnya, religious freedom, and the independence of media.
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From October 1999 to June 2000, the war in Chechnya was the object of the introduction of five resolutions condemning the conflict and calling for its peaceful settlement; three of them were adopted,162 all drafted with the cooperation of the American Committee for Peace in Chechnya. The two non-adopted Senate resolutions that were introduced in March 2000163 (one of which was also drafted with the cooperation of the American Committee for Peace in Chechnya) were very similar in their very forceful condemnation of the war, and both stated, contrarily to the adopted resolutions, the responsibility of Russian (Acting) President Vladimir Putin, and of Western governments by their indifference / lack of action, including that of the United States. In May 2000, a clause in bill S.2522 “making appropriations for foreign operations, export financing, and related programs for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2001, and for other purposes”164 stated: Prohibits the availability of certain funds to the Government of the Russian Federation until the Secretary of State certifies that it is: (1) fully cooperating with international efforts to investigate allegations of war crimes and atrocities in Chechnya; and (2) providing full access to international non-government organizations providing humanitarian relief to refugees and internally displaced persons there. Withholds 50 percent of funds appropriated to the Government of the Russian Federation until the President certifies to the Committees on Appropriations that it has terminated arrangements to provide Iran with technology to develop a nuclear program.
This bill was indefinitely postponed by the Senate by unanimous consent, but bill H.R.4811, introduced in July 2000 and “making appropriations for foreign operations, export financing, and related programs for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2001, and for other purposes”, was adopted and became Public Law No: 106429. It no longer contained the above prohibition about the war in Chechnya but one about religious freedom: Prohibits the use of funds for the Government of the Russian Federation unless the President certifies to specified congressional committees that the Federation has not enacted laws or promulgated executive orders that discriminate against religious minorities in violation of international agreements on human rights and religious freedoms to which it is a party.
Religious freedom had been the topic of bill H.R.2431, “an act to express United States foreign policy with respect to, and to strengthen United States advocacy on behalf of, individuals persecuted in foreign countries on account of religion; to authorize United States actions in response to violations of religious freedom in foreign countries; to establish an Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom within the Department of State, a Commission on International Religious Freedom, and a Special Advisor on International Religious Freedom within the National Security Council; and for other purposes”, that became Public Law
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No: 105-292 in October 1998. Under this International Religious Freedom Act, it was declared “to be U.S. policy to: (1) condemn violations of religious freedom, and to promote, and to assist other governments in the promotion of, the fundamental right to freedom of religion; and (2) seek to channel U.S. security and development assistance to governments that are found not to be engaged in gross violations of the right to freedom of religion.” This law originated from the Republican sponsored H.R.2431 bill (with 131 cosponsors), adopted in the House of Representatives by 375 Yeas (206 Republicans, 169 Democrats) vs. 41 Nays (14 Republicans, 27 Democrats), and in the Senate by 98 Yeas vs. 0 Nays (2 non-voting). The third issue that was discussed a number of times in the Congress dealt with media freedom. The arrest and detention of the Russian journalist working for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Andrei Babitsky, led to the adoption by the Senate of two resolutions, S.Res.161 on 24 February 2000 and S.Res.303 on 23 June 2000 (drafted with the cooperation of the American Committee for Peace in Chechnya). This last one called for the Russian Government to drop its charge against Babitsky and “condemn[ed] the Russian Federation’s harassment and intimidation of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and other news organizations”. The Congress had previously declared in Bill H.R.3427 (“To authorize appropriations for the Department of State for fiscal years 2000 and 2001; to provide for enhanced security at United States diplomatic facilities; to provide for certain arms control, nonproliferation, and other national security measures; to provide for reform of the United Nations, and for other purposes”), which became Public Law 106–113 on 29 November 1999, that Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (Sec. 503) [. . .] should continue to broadcast to the peoples of Central Europe, Eurasia, and the Persian Gulf until such time as a particular nation has established democratic rule, including a free and balanced media.
The arrest of Vladimir Gusinsky, owner of the conglomerate of Russian media, Media-Most (see 2.3.3.3), and numerous other incidents concerning the independence of media figured in the “whereas” of the House of Representatives Concurrent Resolution 352 adopted on 19 June 2000 and received in the Senate on 20 June 2000. This resolution (7) call[ed] on the President of the United States to express to the President of the Russian Federation his strong concern for freedom of speech and the independent media in the Russian Federation and to emphasize the concern of the United States that official pressures against the independent media and the political manipulations of the state-owned media in Russia are incompatible with democratic norms.
In the Senate, the Democrat Lieberman asked on 20 June 2000 that the editorials of the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal and the Finan-
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cial Times of 15 June 2000 be printed in the record.165 These editorials dealt with Gusinsky’s arrest. The “Russian Democracy Act of 2001”, introduced as bill H.R.212, and drafted with the help of the American Committee for Peace in Chechnya, became the “Russian Democracy Act of 2002” and was adopted during the 107th Congress.166 Among others, this Act: (Sec.4) Amend[ed] the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to include among activities eligible for U.S. assistance to the independent states of the former Soviet Union any activities for the promotion of democracy, rule of law, transparency, international exchanges and other forms of public diplomacy, human rights, economic reforms, administration of justice, and the development of a free and independent media in Russia. Authoriz[ed] the President to carry out specified related activities in providing such assistance to Russia. (Sec.5) Urge[d] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and the Voice of America to use new and innovative techniques, in cooperation with local independent media sources and using local languages as appropriate and as possible, to disseminate information throughout the Russian Federation relating to democracy, free-market economics, rule of law, and human rights.
This Act also provided that for fiscal year 2002, “not less than $50,000,000 [was] authorized to be available” for activities defined in the Act. .. Public opinion Gallup polls give diverse pieces of information on the position of American public opinion towards Russia. In April 1999,167 48.04% of respondents considered that the USA should continue to support Russian President Boris Yeltsin, and 42.04% did not think so. Vladimir Putin, who had been acting President of the Russian Federation since 1 January 2000, was elected President on 25 March 2000. In an 18–21 May 2000 poll, 18.21% of the respondents knew the name of the Russian President, and 74.04% answered that they did not know.168 In March 2000, 73.28% believed that Russia’s possession of nuclear weapons posed a serious threat to the US, and 23.05% did not.169 In May 2000, 45.65% considered what was happening in Russia vitally important to the US, 40.11% thought it was important but not vital, and 10.99% that it was not too important or not at all important.170 A poll question on respondents’ overall opinion of Russia (Table 4.2) shows a majority of (mostly / very) unfavourable opinions especially in April 1999 (59.09% vs. 32.59%) but also in May 1999, March and November 2000, (not in February 2001). However, it is important to notice that the sample size of the March 2000 and February 2001 polls was limited.
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Table 4.2 Overall opinion of Russia – Gallup polls171 %
April 1999
May 1999
March 2000
November 2000
February 2001
Very favourable Mostly favourable Mostly unfavourable Very unfavourable Don’t know / No answer
3.09 29.50 44.98 14.19 8.24
3.86 41.99 35.60 13.04 5.52
4.52 34.88 38.64 12.52 9.44
4.60 34.73 38.66 14.44 7.57
5.47 46.10 27.19 15.28 5.96
N
1070
1027
494
1028
492
Table 4.3 Do you consider Russia/Putin an ally of the United States? – Gallup polls172 %
April 1999 Russia
March 2000 Russia
May 2000 Russia
April 2001 Russia
June 2001 Putin
An ally Friendly, but not an ally Unfriendly, but not an enemy An enemy Haven’t heard enough about that yet to say Don’t know / No answer
2.29 44.00 26.92 5.29 20.01
9.51 34.31 25.65 14.19 15.66
11.85 48.21 22.33 11.33 –
10.40 45.20 25.31 13.10 –
6.39 35.98 8.68 5.34 43.25
1.50
0.68
6.27
6.00
0.36
N
1070
530
622
1015
1011
Do you consider
In several polls, the question, “Do you consider . . . an ally of the United States?” was asked. Unfortunately, the answers cannot be compared because either the questions asked or the sample sizes differed (Table 4.3). However, in each case, when respondents took position, they mostly answered that Russia / Putin was friendly but not an ally (April 1999: 44.00%; March 2000: 34.31%; May 2000: 48.21%; April 2001: 45.20%; June 2001: 35.98%). As an attempt to put together these various poll results, one could say that American public opinion is not very knowledgeable about Russia, does not have a particularly favorable opinion about it, and is not convinced that it is in the American interest to help it. .. The New York Times’ editorials on Russia and American society The insertion of the linguistic analysis results (see Table 3.2) within Entmans’ table of functions and objects of news substantive frames (Table 4.4) underlines how The New York Times’ editorials presents a complete picture of the situation in Russia (each function is covered) but mostly leaves aside the United States. The USA
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Table 4.4 Functions and objects of news substantive frames (Entman 2004: 24) Function of Frame
Issues / Events
Focus of Frame Political Actors (Individuals, Groups, Nations)
Defining – Economy / finance problematic effects / – Leaders conditions – Chechnya – Elections – Army – Freedoms (media, religion) – Health care Identifying cause / – Cold war mentality agent – Danger of communism Endorsing remedy – Build a new society (administration, economy, defense, media, Chechnya) – Cooperate with the USA – Address mutually important issues thoughtfully (in general and in questions of defense and money laundering) – Cooperate with Russia Conveying moral – Responsible for the problems judgement – Positive outcome possible
Russia
Russia Russia
USA
Russia
is involved only in what concerns the remedies, and as the linguistic analysis had shown, the American contribution in this respect is not particularly salient. The contextual analysis conducted within the framework of the interacting cascading networks model (see 1.1.3) reflects the ambiguity contained in the American concept of liberal democracy. In simplified terms, an interventionist Democrat Administration has to deal with a generally isolationist Republican Congress in its attempts to have Russia build a society with a sound market economy, a defense system that does not threaten (American) peace, and the respect of human rights. These issues, all interlinked in the Administration’s views, are also supported by the Congress. It is interesting to note that a bipartisan lobbyist group, created specifically for peace in Chechnya, participated not only in the elaboration of bills concerning the war in Chechnya but also those concerning religious freedom, independence of the press, and economic reforms. While public opinion does not appear convinced of the American interest to help Russia, the general orientation of The New York Times tends to be interventionist. The newspaper’s position, however, is revealingly ambiguous; while it explicitly and implicitly, with its emphasis on positive points in Russia (see 3.2.4.3), supports the Administration’s cooperation policy with Russia, the overall structure of its editorials’ frames clearly shows its natural reticence to get involved.
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Thus, as was the case with Le Monde’s editorials, the level of cultural congruence of The New York Times’ editorials with the American society is particularly high. However, in distinction to Le Monde’s, The New York Times’ congruence bears not only on a fundamental principle shared by all, i.e. the concept of liberal democracy (in its totality, not simply its human rights component), but also on one of its corollaries that has always been a focus for marked disagreements in American society. Indeed, it has been said that “this contradistinction of simultaneous detachment and engagement lies at the heart of American identity” (Renwick 2000: 204). Thus, even if according to Risse-Kappen’s domestic structure hypothesis (1991, 1995) and Entman’s cascading network model (2004) American public opinion could very well have had an impact on foreign policy in this case, the Administration’s reactions to Russia did not appear as strong as the French ones because of this inherent ambiguity in American identity. According to a study on U.S. press coverage of foreign policy crises from 1946 to 1999, the elite media in the post-Cold War era would tend to be more independent of the White House by taking the role of guardian of national interest against partisan interest either in the White House or in the Congress (Zaller & Chiu 2000: 79). From an insider’s perspective, The New York Times’ editorials on Russia tend to take a partisan position in favour of the Democrat Administration’s foreign policy despite the newspaper’s occasional warnings and recommendations. In this regard, it appears meaningful that members of the Republican Congress would rarely quote The New York Times in their interventions, while at several occasions some asked for the insertion of specific articles from other newspapers into the Records. From an outsider’s point of view, however, the editorials represent “America”, not a particular U.S. President and his Administration.
. Significance of Le Monde’s and The New York Times’ editorials on Russia The linguistic analysis of Le Monde’s and The New York Times’ editorials (Chapter 3) revealed their textual content and showed how they belong to two different conceptual frameworks, one that can be characterized as holistic and the other as individualist. Placing the editorials within their respective national societies at a broad level (Chapter 2) and at the time of their publication (4.1 and 4.2) uncovered their ideational content, i.e. how their respective conceptual frameworks fit within their respective national societies (4.1.4 and 4.2.4). Exploring further the link between the editorials’ conceptual frameworks and fundamental values of their respective national societies would expose the editorials’ significance vis-àvis their respective national societies. To this end, it is necessary to go back to the 18th century when the French Republic and the USA came into being.
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French and American constitutionalists of the 18th century both fought the power of a monarchy; they shared similar ideals of freedom and justice for individuals, and pursued the same goal of constructing a new and better society. However, they differed strongly in their answers to the timeless philosophical question of what comes first, the individual or society. As Kloppenberg (1998: 37) writes: In France, as Robespierre’s life and death showed, that tension was resolved in ways that threatened the survival of democratic individuals and elevated the power of public authority. In America, as Alexis de Tocqueville understood, that tension was resolved in ways that elevated the power of democratic individuals and threatened the survival of public authority.
Americans put individuals first, and limited the powers of the government with, among other means, the explicit mention of specific human rights (freedom of religion, speech, press, assembly, and petition in the First Amendment). In France, rationalism put universal law first with a list of human rights, at the top of which stood liberty and equality in opposition to oppression. One society emphasized individualism: human rights were a means to achieve a goal for each individual; and the other stressed a holistic / universalistic approach: human rights were the source of any society. In practice, both societies balanced the opposite notions of the individual and society and reached their ideals more or less successfully. In relation to others, both societies have considered themselves endowed with a messianic role: the United States to establish liberal democracies so that the rights of individuals would be guaranteed, France to enforce human rights because of their universality. These constitutional choices that were made in 18th century France and United States, and that were progressively reinforced by various historical developments, have profoundly imprinted their societies. In fact, the values, or more precisely world conceptions, that these choices represent are beliefs that have been institutionally transmitted in the society over a long period of time and that are shared by the members of that society whatever their political allegiance in the “sphere of legitimate controversy” (Hallin 1986). According to Farrands (1996: 20), Identities are always historically, socially and materially grounded, but they cannot be reduced to these elements. They retain distinctive features of which the most important, [. . .], are the links between the political, cultural and social processes and the importance of the historical specificity and particular experience of identities in particular cases and situations.
These world conceptions are not only part of French and American national identities, they are at their basis because of their role in the constitution of the French Republic and United States of America; in other words, they belong to the “moral purpose” (Reus-Smit 1999) that legitimate the existence of the French and Amer-
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ican states. At the eve of the 21st century, these world conceptions were clearly observable in the editorials the French and American elite newspapers, Le Monde and The New York Times, published on Russia. Thus, despite their sharp difference of attitude towards their respective national governments, editorials on Russia in both dailies not only reflect their respective societies at a certain time, they embody and project the core of French and American national identities to the world and to Russia in particular. Considering that Russia is the object of Le Monde’s and The New York Times’ editorials it is now important to examine how Russia, and in particular Russian journalists, received them.
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chapter
Russian reactions to the West
A complete study of the international media echo according to the interacting cascading networks model (see above 1.1.3) would require the study of the textual function (linguistic analysis) and ideational function of Russian media as it was done for Le Monde’s and The New York Times’ editorials. As a native speaker of French working in an Anglophone environment, I have to leave this very worthwhile endeavour to those who possess more than my fluent reading abilities of Russian. Therefore, this chapter does not include a linguistic analysis of Russian media; instead, it corresponds to the study of the interpersonal function of Le Monde’s and The New York Times’ editorials with the use of the interacting cascading networks model adapted to the Russian socio-political organization. This restricted approach taken to Russian media will thus enhance the insights gained on Le Monde and The New York Times, but cannot provide comparable insights on the Russian newspapers chosen for the analysis. The reactions of Izvestija, Nezavisimaja Gazeta, and Segodnja to Western media discourse on Russia from 1999 to 2001 are examined (5.1). The focus is on Western media discourse and not simply French or American, because most of the time France, the USA and other Western states are not considered individually but as globally constituting the Other. This section is followed by the reactions of the Russian Executive (5.2) and of public opinion (5.3). At the end of the 1990s, the organization of Russian civil society was rather weak, but oligarchs were quite powerful through their control of large sectors of the economy. Thus, no study of political parties’ positions is offered; oligarchs’ positions are examined but only indirectly through their newspapers. Finally, a synthesis of the evolution of Western-Russian relations from 1999 to 2001 (5.4) is presented.
. Russian print elite media and the West in 1999–2001 .. Izvestija Izvestija does not publish editorials stricto sensu but opinion columns. From 1999 to 2001, its various political columnists’ general position in the Slavophilism / Westernism debate was a nuanced pro-Western one, except in the case of Chechnya.
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In their comments on Western reactions to the war in Chechnya, they present a united opposition front that does not necessarily qualify as anti-Western. They talk about: the “civilising West” (16 September 1999 – Sokolov); the practically unconditional acceptance by the European press of the Chechen version of the facts (23 October 1999 – Jusin); “a shameless declaration of a double moral standard” (11 November 1999 – Sokolov); “a Cold War paranoiac knee-jerk reaction” (12 November 1999 – Mikheev); the “rhetoric of universal values disseminated in empty sentences to promote national interests” (12 November 1999 – Mikheev); “an anti-Russian propaganda reaching the absurd” (an example from Le Monde is given), but with a further addition that “a real Cold War is not possible for economic reasons” (20 November 1999 – Kolesnikov); and the position of superiority taken by the West (22 November 1999 – Alimov). In “Ne nervirujte bol’nykh” – Don’t bother the sick (29 June 2000), Sokolov mentions that members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe discuss at each of their sessions what to do with “barbarian Russia”. However, a responsible Assembly would at least follow the procedures of parliamentary hearings. The fact that the Strasburg Assembly does not do so is primarily Europe’s concern. The more distant Russia will be, the faster this Assembly will start bringing itself to order. In “Assassiny i demagogi” – Assassins and demagogues (6 July 2000), Sokolov states that although local influential people have declared the end of history173 and the end of their troubles with war, barbarism, and death, this cannot be a reason for Russians to bring about the end of Russia by their own hands [i.e. in not reacting militarily to Chechen acts; E.L.]. During his first official visit to France, and on the invitation of French authorities, Putin visited the Russian cemetery in Sainte-Geneviève-des-Bois where a number of White Russians are buried174 and he said: “the Russian people must unite; we have only one Russia.” Commenting on this event, Sokolov (“Belye, krasnye i peredovye” – The Whites, the Reds and the Advanced; 9 November 2000) remarks that Putin was at an impasse: whether he accepted the invitation or not (how did he dare go? how would he dare refuse going?), and whatever he would have said (how could he call for unification? how could he not call for unification?), he would have been criticized by Russians on one side or the other. By placing him in this difficult situation, French authorities were meddling in Russian internal affairs. In economic matters, the West is recognized to play an important role. Kolesnikov (18 January 2000) explains Putin’s absence from the economic forum in Davos with electoral reasons. He writes that there is no point for Putin to show his “human side” to the Western elite. First, he has enough to do at home. He has already expressed his position about Chechnya during his January 17 meeting with the representatives of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, and he has nothing new to say about Russia’s external policy. Second, there is no
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time to deal with Putin’s “export image”. His portrait by Western journalists as a “former spy with a glacial look” endows him with a soft anti-West tendency and “velvet” isolationism that might help him become an elected president. Kolesnikov adds (25 January 2000) that the Western hard-line position and the deterioration of the Russian image outside, provoked by the Chechen crisis but much more a result of the economic situation, could transform a velvet self-isolationism into a real isolationism that would not profit anybody. A few days later (1 February 2000), he concludes that only those who want to be helped are helped. However, Kolesnikov (7 March 2000) notes Putin’s pro-West stand during his first interview with Western media (“Breakfast with David Frost” – BBC), although the presidential elections are still three weeks ahead. Novoprudskij (5 April 2000) recognises the important need to fight against self-isolationism, and then states that the eternal Russian internal debate between Slavophiles and Westernisers, i.e. the question of Russia’s identity, is becoming an issue that is primarily decided outside of Russia. He concludes that the West unintentionally allows the resurgence of the worst features of the Russian State when it no longer considers Russia as the “Empire of Evil” but at the same time refrains from helping it transform into an “Empire of Goodness” for purely selfish reasons. Russia does not need to have its huge external debt erased, but it is important to secure the preferential terms of its reimbursement. Russia can be denied funds by international financial organisations, but one should not set political obstacles to its membership to the World Trade Organization and to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. It is not necessary to force Russia to become weaker. And whether Russia will learn how to get stronger is its own affair. However, political columnists in Izvestija do not necessarily speak in complete unison. Sokolov, for example, in “Vlastnyj golos žurnalistskoj obšˇcestvennosti” – The powerful voice of journalistic opinion (11 February 2000), about the journalistic appeal concerning the fate of the Radio Liberty correspondent, Babitskij,175 contends that the journalists’ pretension to explain to society the true meaning of events is in the present circumstances not very successful. These journalists proclaim that the executive power is inclined to lies and ugly intrigues, but they do not ask about the role played by Radio Liberty, financed by the American Congress, nor about the goals and interests of the circle of journalists from which the appeal originates. In another column (“Bezpartijnaja organisaˇcja i partijnaja literatura” – Non-party organization and party literature;176 20 April 2000), Sokolov states that the misfortune and danger with Russian mass-media is that they practically have the monopoly of providing feedback from society to its higher classes because of the lack of real political parties (except for the KPRF – Communist Party of the Russian Federation). The dislike for mass-media is not due to their demand for freedom of speech nor even to their foul content, but to their excessive pre-eminence that goes beyond their essence and foreshadows their inevitable
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surrender. On the other side, Arkhangel’skij (“Vystupaet artist bez ansamblja” – An artist performs without accompaniment; 21 August 2000) considers that if Putin does not understand the difference between freedom of speech and propaganda, then his position is not to be envied. One can like the press or not, and it can provoke indignation or even hatred, but the government does not have and will not have any other instrument of dialogue with society. And decidedly the most proWest is the voice of Vladimir Vojnoviˇc on another topic. In “Dorogie patrioty” – Dear patriots (20 July 2001), he states that all “patriots” (and under this appellation he includes all those who oppose reforms, i.e. communists, fascists, agrarians etc.) criticize the West but at the same time wish for Western material goods. He accuses them to be at the source of the Russian brain drain to the West. In matters connected with the West, it appears that Izvestija’s most vocal political columnist is Maxim Sokolov, whose work was recognized as the best journalistic writing in 1994 at the international mass-media festival “Gong-94”. Sokolov describes himself as a “bourgeois-liberal”, and a “quiet nationalist”, who thinks: “other peoples will manage by themselves; I only wish that we would live better.”177 When he emphasises the excessive power exercised by Russian media, Sokolov could appear to justify a governmental policy178 that Arkhangel’skij, for example, clearly opposes. However, the place occupied by Russian media in the political arena, unusual in (Western) democracies, has also been underlined by media specialists (e.g. Zasurskij 2001; McNair 2000). On Chechnya, Sokolov is quite virulent against the West (although his writing style must also be taken into account), which seems to be due to his rather high sensitivity to questions of national identity. .. Nezavisimaja Gazeta Like Izvestja, Nezavisimaja Gazeta does not publish editorials; it does not publish opinion columns either, although it presents expert opinions on various issues in long front-page articles. As these experts’ articles are published independently of the newspaper’s tendencies, Nezavisimaja Gazeta’s line is presented below through diverse journalistic articles with a particular interest for Gornostaev’s and Tret’jakov’s writings. According to Gornostaev, a journalist specialized in international affairs, Russian and Western mutual campaigns of influence about Chechnya have little effect on each other (3 November 1999), but Western propaganda has a reverse effect: that of bringing closer to Russia those States that oppose American hegemony (3 December 1999). The friendly atmosphere in which Igor Ivanov, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, met with his Italian and German colleagues, Lamberto Dini and Joschka Fischer, in Milan shows that the West is starting to recognise the uselessness of talking to Russians about Chechnya in an unpleasant tone (7
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December 1999). Although France, one of the most critical States on Russian actions in Chechnya, insisted on discussing the Chechen question at the beginning of the EU Summit in Helsinki, its head, Jacques Chirac, surprisingly started his speech by talking about the ban on British beef (11 December 1999). The West again does not understand Russia (18 December 1999). In an article reviewing the year 1999, Gornostaev notes that opposition between Russia and the West has never been stronger than in the last ten years. It started with the NATO aggression against Yugoslavia, during which the Russian media showed their honesty compared to most of their American and European colleagues, who merely followed the official line. Western propaganda was not only anti-Yugoslavian; it was also anti-Russian. The second phase of this anti-Russian campaign was the affair of Russian money laundering with the Bank of New York; and the third phase concerns the Chechens. The yearlong political information war between Russia and the West unfortunately included the participation of journalists on both sides. The position of the journalistic community is never closer to its national official position than during a war, even virtual. And this takes away objectivity (31 December 1999). Chechen blackmail is somewhat successful in Russian media where some journalists have recently replaced the term of “terrorists” by that of “separatists” when talking about Chechens. It is even more successful in France, if one considers Hubert Védrine’s179 particularly severe criticisms of Russia, and the popularity of anti-Russian meetings against the war in Chechnya (4 March 2000). However, “Clinton praised Putin” [headline] (16 February 2000) and “Blair spreads Putin’s good name” [headline] – “After his visit in Petersburg, the British Prime Minister announced that ‘law and order reign in Russia”’ [lead] (14 March 2000). A month after having denounced Védrine’s criticisms of Russian politics in Chechnya (14 April 2001), Gornostaev notes that these problems do not seem to have any major effect, and that the relations between France and Russia take place at a very high level.180 As Gornostaev remarks, journalists cannot remain uninvolved in an information war. As a member of the Russian journalistic community, he has supported the Russian official line by criticising Western reactions; but as a journalist, he has reported less often and in less acrimonious terms than his colleagues about the Western discourse on human rights, that was particularly severe on the French side. In appraising Nezavisimaja Gazeta’s reactions to the Western discourse on Russia, it is however relevant to bear in mind that Vitalij Tret’jakov, chief editor of Nezavisimaja Gazeta and supporter of Putin, speaks French and maintains contact with French journalists. It was primarily against French discourse that Radžikhovskij from Segodnja and Sokolov from Izvestija wrote in the most sarcastic terms. In December 1999, when the Russian army was fighting in Chechnya under the strong protests of Western media and governments, Tret’jakov181 wrote that if
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The Spiral of “Anti-Other Rhetoric”
the West showed concern for the peaceful innocent Chechens who were killed, it was only for those who died under Russian fire and not for those who had been killed by others during the three years of Chechen independence. Despite the Western reactions, Russia will not be isolated because the West is not the entire world, the West is not united, and the West needs Russia. However, when the West talks about economic sanctions against Russia, Russian communists receive more support from the population. The Russian front against Western reactions is necessary and useful in that it shows the independence of Russian politics from the West. On the last day of 1999, reviewing the events of the past year,182 Tret’jakov ranks as the three most important problems: 1 – the Chechen war, 2 – Chechnya, 3 – relations with the West. The first and third problems are linked and form a trap. Russia has to win in Chechnya, but the West does not want Russia to win, especially through a war, and Russia faces not a mythic isolation but the loop of its financial obligations. In December 1999, a Russian journalist183 writing from Washington D.C. explained to Nezavisimaja Gazeta’s readers who in America opposed Russian politics in Chechnya. The first group comprises the ordinary Americans whose professional interests are not linked with Russia. Their knowledge about Russia is absolutely minimal, and they are informed by media like NBC on whose radio station could be heard: “Clinton was the first American President to visit Bulgaria, one of the former soviet republics. He thanked this Baltic State for having supported the American bombing of Yugoslavia”. Completely different is the group composed of the professional Sovietologists. Their majority speaks Russian very well, and their studies of the former USSR problems are excellent. A first category among them considers that present-day Russia is still the “Empire of Evil” – Russia has not changed. The second category offers a more serious argumentation: in 1994, the West believed in the construction of democracy in Russia and was willing to close its eyes to mistakes in Chechnya; today, that is no longer the case. This is why, according to another journalist,184 Putin has to turn his attention to the external political front and correct the course of its relationship with the West in regard to Chechnya. This article is accompanied by a picture, that shows women receiving loaves of bread, with the following commentary: “The Russian army does what it can to help the inhabitants of Chechnya. However, Western media, of course, talk not about that but only about the humanitarian catastrophe [caused by the Russian military intervention – E.L.].” .. Segodnja Neither really intellectual nor truly popular, Segodnja is primarily oriented towards a business audience, and appears the most openly pro-West of the three newspapers presented here. It does not publish editorials, but political columns. Its political commentator, Leonid Radžikhovskij, takes critical positions on Russia,
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but he does not necessarily accept Western arguments. In fact, he accuses the West of not understanding Russia, of conducting a media war against it, and of wanting Russia to be like the West (“Opjat’ kak vsrednie veka” – Back to the Middle-Ages; 11 September 1999). In “Burja v stakane vody” – Storm in a teacup (20 November 1999), he notes that although the romantic relationship between Russia and the West has mutually come to an end, there is no question about a new Cold War. One should rather talk about Cold Peace. The NATO war in Yugoslavia did not seriously affect Russia’s relations with the West, and the Chechen war will not do so either. Saying the contrary belongs to “media lyricism”;185 what really matters is the investment climate. Radžikhovskij’s column, “Diktatura politkorrektnosti” – Dictatorship of Political Correctness, published at the time of Putin’s official visit in Paris (31 October 2000), could at first sight appear as one of the most critical of the West, if the strength of this impression were not a product of the rhetoric used, not unlike that of Le Monde. And it is precisely French media and intellectuals who are the main targets of this largely stylistic but nonetheless real attack. The French support of Chechens is linked to a tradition of russophobia, and their support of Palestinians to one of judeophobia. The fact that these black-bearded hooligans conduct their criminal operations “somewhere far away” facilitates a platonic love relationship. These psychological reasons for loving killers are supplemented with an ideological one particularly strong in France, social progress, which started with the French Revolution. The friendly manner in which the rather cruel words of the Marseillaise, the French national anthem, are sung gives an indication of French people’s faith in their Revolution. This ideology of “Liberty, Equality and Fraternity” is “the worst ideology in the world . . . except all those others”, and represents “political correctness”. Western intellectuals have the same sentimental attachment to Palestinians and Chechens as the Russian intelligentsia of the 19th century (also believing in social progress) had to their “little brothers”186 (“men’še brat’ja”). If it were not for principles of political correctness or for a non-return to the Cold War, the West could behave towards Russia less “delicately” than it does now. Nobody asks Russia whether it agrees with all or part of political correctness, and Radžikhovskij’s conclusion, “Dictatorship of political correctness – basta”, is a biting dismissal of the Western and in particular French ideological discourse on human rights and democracy, including Le Monde’s editorials. In an earlier column (“Kuda vlezli?” – Where have we been brought to?; 4 July 2000), Radžikhovskij had expressed his lack of sympathy and even respect for Chechen kamikaze fighters because he could not understand what they wanted. Russians do not rob Chechnya, they feed it, maybe badly but at least they do contrarily to Bassaev and his partisans. Russians do not take away the sovereignty of the Chechen State, as it never existed. Russians do not insult their religion and do not impose orthodoxy on them. Radžikhovskij adds that nothing can be done
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against kamikaze fighters because they do not fear death. Russians do not have any idea how to approach the Chechen destructive force since they have no understanding of it. They have no words to convince people they should be ready to die without fighting. How did Russians get into this? And how can they get out of it? In his comments about Western reactions, Radžikhovskij includes American criticisms to Russia, but he downplays their importance. In his opinion column entitled “Ritual” (2 June 2000), he notes that the United States has no serious economic interests of any kind in Russia, and that Russia does not present any serious threat to the USA in any way. Russia and the United States are neither allies nor rivals. Since the end of the Cold War, Americans have learned to live without russophobia, and they now ignore Russia. As for Russians, they need the United States. The new Russian “real idea” is “In dollar we trust” (in English in the original text), and this is as clear in the Kremlin as in the White House. The Russian elite has become psychologically dependent on the West, more than the elite in India or China where “real national traditions” and “a specific way” can be found. Thus the “ritual” will continue: Clinton will keep talking about “Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, Lenin, Stalin and sputnik” (in Latin letters in the original text), but on this (cultural) capital, one cannot live. Radžikhovskij (“Dukhivremeni” – Zeitgeist; 1 September 2000) remarks that “the West killed the USSR without even one shot”. Thus, instead of maintaining a powerful army, Russia must acknowledge the new Zeitgeist and find its place in the 21st century. The internet, transnational companies, and the integration of Europe are all elements of the new global world order, where new, not yet understood laws such as collective security, limited national sovereignty, and the primacy of ecology over politics operate. Radžikhovskij underlines not only the value of the American dollar, but also of the American democracy, as he notes that the USA is to democracy what the USSR is to socialism and the Third Reich to fascism (“Beˇcno detskaja demokratija” – An eternal infant democracy; 10 November 2000). Indeed, the United States, despite all the usual criticism (e.g. high level of illiteracy, unhealthy food, childish enthusiasm for arms, primitive culture, passion to teach the entire world but ignorance of the world), when faced with a tie between the two candidates for the presidential election,187 proceeds to do a recount of the ballots and does not engage into a civil war, as would happen in Russia. However, each country has its own history. According to Radžikhovskij (“Rvat’sja na Zapad” – Wanting to rush to the West; 20 February 2001), Russia must get rid of its complex and of the Western complex, and turn to the West while keeping its national cultural specificities and language. There is no alternative to the West (“Al’ternativy Zapada net” – No alternative to the West; 23 March 2001), and even if the “[Russian] students are angry with with their [Western] teachers”, they do not intend to leave school (“Uˇceniki zljatsja na uˇcitelej – No iz zapadnoj ‘školy’ Rossija ubegat’ ne sobiraetcja”; 23 January 2001).
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In the financial and political battle between the owner of Media-Most, Vladimir Gusinskij and the government, Radžikhovskij notes that Gusinski’s arrest has been “ideally calculated”: Gusinskij is an oligarch, a Jew and a Westerniser (“Staraja russkaja skazka“ – An old Russian tale; 20 June 2000). The difference between Russian and Western media (“SMI v vakkume” – Mass-media in the vacuum; 19 September 2000) is not that Western journalists write better nor in a more intelligent manner. It is not that they make fewer mistakes nor never write on order. The only difference is that Western governments cannot get rid of the newspapers they would like to. Western powers cannot ignore the mass-media because they are accountable to their civil society that operates through the means of the legislative and judiciary structures and of the regional governments. As part of their accountability to their society, Western powers have to answer to their media. And this is what is missing in Russia. Reacting to an interview given by Vladimir Putin to the French conservative newspaper, Le Figaro, Radžikhovskij (“Dubinoj po efiru” – Bludgeon stroke on the air; 27 October 2000) accuses Putin of using the mass-media as a scapegoat for his inability to establish his own authority in his first ten months of power. Radžikhovskij reports that Putin had accused the Russian mass-media of being instruments of blackmail in the hands of those who had taken (financial) advantage of the State disorganisation in the 1990s (i.e. the oligarchs), and who wanted to keep their privileges. After the closure of Segodnja (16 April 2001), Radžikhovskij published a few articles in Nezavisimaja Gazeta, with the mention that he formerly worked for Segodnja. In “Otdat’ dobyˇcy” (Give away the loot; 28 April 2001), he underlines the necessity of keeping a national general non-state television channel of opposition (i.e. NTV) as the concrete expression of freedom of speech that is necessary for the dynamics of democracy. As noted earlier, Segodnja’s audience tends to be business oriented, and the image Russia gives of itself outside of the country, particularly important for attracting foreign investors, has been the object of four articles by Avtandil Culadze.188 The first article (31 August 2000) is an interview of Jurij Kobaladze, managing director of the investment firm, Resonance Capital, and former head of the Public Relations Bureau in the Foreign Secret Services of the Russian Federation.189 According to Kobaladze, the recent burning of the Ostankino Tower in Moscow and the sinking of the submarine Kursk have shown the complete failure of the government in terms of information policy. While on one side official and semi-official declarations followed each other, on the other the president and his press service, the most authoritative sources of information, were silent. This raised feelings of anxiety and uncertainty. Paradoxically, the Soviet Union with its now extinct Public Relations network had a better reputation than does democratic Russia. Furthermore, declarations of various representatives of Russia when they are outside of the country do not help restore investors’ confidence. There are certainly some in the West who are not interested in the development of relations
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with Russia as shown by periodic mass campaigns, but the main responsibility lies with Russia itself. It must create a normal and efficient system to inform the population, as is the case everywhere else in the world. In the second article (30 November 2000), Culadze reports about a seminar on “Russia in the Information Age”. According to the participants, the bad image of Russia stems from the incomprehensible relations of the authorities with the mass media and society in general, and the tendency of public servants not to take responsibility for what happened, but not from enemies of Russia in the West. Even if one were to agree with a “conspiracy theory” against Russia, one must also keep in mind that some people in the West are strongly interested in developing business with Russia. With their commercial projects, they will help create a positive global image of Russia, and it is important to establish a favourable climate for investments. The third article (23 January 2001) presents another interview with Jurij Kobaladze. Kobaladze affirms that Russia did everything it could to destroy its reputation. Russia must turn its attention towards a few standards of the civilized world: quality of life, working conditions, health care, and education. While the choice of Glinka’s or Alexandrov’s music for the new Russian anthem was recently the main topic of discussion,190 people were dying of cold in the Far East. The fourth article (23 January 2001) gives the position of a Western specialist on Russia, Michael McFaul, associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. While earlier the West thought of Yeltsin as a liberal man who tried to destroy the old system despite the conservativeness of the population, now with Putin it is the contrary, and Russia’s reputation has declined. The West wants to have a better image of Russia, but some things cannot be done in a civilized world. One of them is the “Gusinski affair”. .. Media coverage of Western and Russian intellectuals The discourse of prominent journalists in elite dailies deserves attention in that it reflects the opinion of professional observers of public life. However, their influence tends to be limited to the restricted circle of their readers,191 mostly composed of members of the intelligentsia and of decision-makers. Part of this intelligentsia reacts to the news it receives mostly through media, and media covers their reactions. In February 2000, 200 French intellectuals signed a petition, “Crime left unpunished in Chechnya”. In March, two other petitions followed just before the Russian presidential elections. One of them was entitled “Horror is haunting Europe”192 and bore the signature of more than 200 personalities from 16 European States (see above 4.1.2). The title of this petition paralleled that of an article published earlier in the weekly Literaturnaja Gazeta (24–30 November 1999), “The
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ghost of ‘Cold War’ is haunting Europe”, which itself paralleled Marx’ first sentence in the Communist Manifesto (1848), “A spectre is haunting Europe – the spectre of communism.” The Literaturnaja Gazeta’s article, written by the newspaper’s Russian correspondents in London and Paris, had criticized English and French media coverage of Russia. It had particularly emphasized the increasingly sharp tone of French journalists towards Russia, and their repetitive remarks about the rise of an anti-western feeling in Russia. The French petition was rather virulent, and Russian journalists and intellectuals did not ignore it. In the most critical opinion column of Izvestija, “Francuzskaja bolezn’” – The French illness (24 February 2000), Sokolov underlines that the French media have reported the events in Chechnya with the most exaggeration. It is in Paris that the first massive Western demonstration in support of Chechnya took place. In his reply to the call for demonstration against Russia by French intellectuals, Sokolov quotes the beginning of the French petition, “Vladimir Putin continues Stalin’s work”, and later adds that the petition’s spiritual fathers and grandfathers are the leftist thinkers who, 50 years ago, in spite of their full knowledge, denied Stalin’s crimes. Today, by accepting any fable of Russian wrongdoing, they feel rehabilitated for the pro-Stalin psychosis in Paris at the end of the 1940s. France, who had shown the highest level of collaboration with Nazi Germany during the occupation in all of Western Europe, feels today a particular satisfaction in denouncing Hitlers everywhere. Thus, in face of France’s profound internal need to correct its wrongful past, if trustworthy information were given [about Chechnya and Jörg Haider193], it would only go against a strong self-satisfaction process. A number of Russian intellectuals and journalists (21) also replied to the French petition in a collective letter. This letter is written on a much milder tone, and its content is more balanced than that of the Western petition. The letter was made public at a press conference by one of its main signatories, the filmmaker Nikita Mikhalkov. To explain how Russian intellectuals who had signed the letter could still get together with others who had refused to do so, and despite his earlier use of old-regime rhetoric, Mikhalkov said: “It is time to end the war” (Segodnja, 4 April 2000). This Russian letter was reported in Segodnja (4 April 2000) under the headline, “Twenty-one – two hundred. The unequal battle of Russian intellectuals vs. Western intelligentsia”. In Le Monde (14 April 2000), it was presented as “Russian intellectuals support Putin’s politics in Chechnya”. The Russian newspaper underlined the letters’ limited number of signatories, while the French newspaper looked only at its intended effect regardless of its real significance. Izvestija also reported on the respective attitude of these Western and Russian intellectuals (“Pytem vzaimnykh osuždenij” – By the means of mutual accusations; Bogomolov; 17 April 2000). It pointed out that Cold War stereotypes, despite their disappearance from official discourses, were still present in people’s minds. In the West, Russia is the
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chaos of evil; and in Russia, the West is “my brother, my enemy”. Because people on either side have not learned to live without stereotypes, they exchange collective letters and repeat old clichés. Soviets or anti-Soviets are treated the same way. European intellectuals demonstrated and signed another petition in late October 2000 to protest the war in Chechnya and Putin’s official visit to France. In an “ordinary” article (i.e. not a “political column”), Izvestija simply reported that the petition had been signed by 500 European politicians and intellectuals, among whom were 80 members of the European Parliament.194 As for Nezavisimaja Gazeta, it underlined, also in an “ordinary article”, that Le Figaro, the French newspaper that had published the petition, was inundated with readers’ letters protesting the petition195 (the article appeared just after Putin’s first official visit to France – see below 5.1.5.2). In May 2001, the 67th World Congress of the International PEN-Club took place in Moscow for the first time. The Congress theme was freedom of expression, and in their opening speeches, Günther Grass, Nobel Prize winner of the previous year, and Homer Aridjis, President of the International PEN-Club, strongly condemned Russia’s politics in Chechnya. However, the journalists from Nezavisimaja Gazeta and Segodnja196 reporting on the event underlined the little attention paid to well-known Russian writers (Vassili Axionov, Victor Erofeev, Andreï Bitov), the limited place given to the Russian language (the section “Writers in exile” took place only in English), and the limited interest that participants seemed to take in the Conference. .. Representation of a turning point in the relations between Russia and France Isvestija’s and Segodnja’s political commentators, Nezavisimaja Gazeta’s chief editor and international affair specialist have adopted more or less pro-Western positions, but they have all protested, some of them quite strongly, against the Western discourse on Chechnya, i.e. the discourse of politicians, intellectuals and journalists that is relayed by media. The strong French reactions to the war in Chechnya caused a chill in the relations between Russia and France to the point that France was the last major European country on Putin’s list of official visits. This visit took place in late October 2000, after several months of abundant and severe reciprocal criticisms in French and Russian media, and both French and Russian authorities had reasons to believe that they would face a negative public opinion at home towards the foreign Other. This was less true in Russia than in France. Chirac, as President of the Council of the European Union at the time, invited Putin to the European Union Summit taking place in Paris (30 October 2000), and Putin, thus being in Paris, was also able to pay his first official visit to France just after the summit. On the
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evening of the summit, the “Committee for Chechnya” organised a demonstration in Paris during which a petition demanding the end of the war was read. The petition had been signed by 500 European politicians and intellectuals, among whom were 80 members of the European Parliament.197 In regard to the negative reactions to the French discourse on Chechnya, it is interesting to look at the coverage of Putin’s visit and the period that follows in the “ordinary” articles of Isvestija, Nezavisimaja Gazeta, and Segodnja. ... Coverage of Putin’s visit A few days before the visit, Izvestija published an interview with Raymond Forni, president of the Assemblée Nationale (lower chamber of the French parliament).198 In Forni’s eyes, relations with Russia are the most important factor in French foreign policy. The United States are behaving like the world gendarme and they must not be allowed to do so. Indeed, France has its own place in Europe, and Russia in the world. For this reason, Russia can play an important role in the peace process in Palestine. Forni, who was leaving for Moscow to meet with his colleagues of the Russian Duma, underlined the special importance of the yearly exchanges between members of the two parliaments, as France had such contacts with only three States (Canada, Germany, and Russia). Asked whether the Chechen question would be touched upon, Forni answered positively and added that he hoped his Russian friends would interpret the French position correctly. In an article specifically about Putin’s visit,199 Izvestija’s journalists mention Chirac’s and Putin’s words denying that there had been a chill in the relations between the two States, and underline that this reconciliation constitutes in itself an important achievement of the visit, alongside various economic agreements. Also mentioned is the manner in which Putin succeeded in appearing above all ideologies by his visit to the Russian cemetery of Sainte-Geneviève-des-Bois.200 Two weeks before Putin’s visit to France, Nezavisimaja Gazeta published an expert’s front-page article in which France, as originator of the idea “a united Europe from the Atlantic to the Ural” and as an opponent to American domination in Europe, was described as “objectively the main European partner for Russia”.201 When Putin’s visit was met with a petition of protest from European intellectuals (published in the French newspaper, Le Figaro), Nezavisimaja Gazeta focused its report on Le Figaro’s readers who opposed that petition.202 Putin was reported to have easily found a common ground on economic and political issues with the Europeans despite the Chechen question, and both Russia and the European Union agreed that “the anti-missile defence policy is the corner-stone for the maintenance of security”.203 Some days after the visit, on the 110th anniversary of Charles de Gaulle’s birth, a long article emphasized the long history of friendship between France and the Soviet Union, and mentioned in its conclusion the request of the Association of the Friends of France for a Moscow memorial to de Gaulle that
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would symbolize the friendship, harmony, and cooperation between Russia and France.204 In Segodnja, Putin’s visit in France is also considered a success, and to underline this, the journalist205 quotes two French newspapers. Le Parisien, a popular daily, writes: “In coming to Paris, Putin knew very well what he wanted: to have Europe forget about Chechnya, to establish good relationship with France and to put in place a strategic partnership with the EU. And Putin succeeded. Almost 100%.” As for Le Figaro, described as the “organ of the French establishment”, it says: “Having quickly talked about thorny issues, first of all the question of the settlement of the situation in Chechnya, Mr. Putin and Mr. Chirac instead discussed what brought Russia and its European partners closer.”, but it also adds that if Putin agreed several times with the necessity for a political settlement of the Caucasian conflict, this was not mentioned in the joint declaration. In another article, Segodnja had reported about the French journalist, Régis Faucon, asking Putin about Russia’s double standards in Chechnya.206 Not only Chechnya was noted in Segodnja as a source of difficulties, but also diverse security questions in Europe (Kosovo, relations with NATO), which were discussed at a symposium taking place in Berne at the same time as Putin’s visit in Paris. Although the main point of the discussions was the peaceful settlement of conflicts, it appeared that as long as the West and Russia looked at security questions in Europe from different perspectives, there would be problems.207 Thus, the three newspapers praise the success of Putin’s visit, even though, as Segodnja notices, some difficulties might still persist between France and Russia. A special mention must be made of Nezavisimaja Gazeta that prepares and follows the visit with articles to the “glory” of France in a style rather reminiscent of a not so far away time. ... Coverage of the relations with France and Europe after Putin’s visit In June 2000, a few months before Putin’s visit to France, the Russian and American Presidents disagreed on an eventual revision of the ABM Treaty that would have been necessary for Washington’s project of a National Missile Defence system. After Putin’s visit to France when the Bush Administration took office (January 2001), Russia and the USA experienced a number of difficulties in their relationship (Russia-Iran cooperation, ABM Treaty, Kosovo, arrest of Pavel Borodin in New York, spy affair, democratic freedoms, Chechnya).208 While the first meeting between Bush and Putin was initially supposed to take place in July at the G8 Summit in Genoa, in January the Bush administration had already announced its intention to develop a new national missile defense system, and thus to withdraw unilaterally from the ABM Treaty that was considered the corner-stone of international security in Russian foreign policy.209 This intention was officially made public by Bush on May 1.210 The Russian government finally succeeded in having
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the first meeting between the two leaders take place earlier, on 16 June 2001, in Ljubljana during Bush’s tour of European capitals. The meeting went better than expected, and both presidents exchanged invitations.211 At their next meeting in Genoa, they reached a compromise by which the development of a US defense missile system would be accompanied by a reduction of strategic nuclear warheads.212 However, from November 2000 (when Bush was elected) to June 2001, the level of uncertainty had been rather high213 and Russian foreign policy had appeared to take a European turn, although in March 2001 at the European Union summit in Stockholm where Russia was invited, Sergej Karaganov, president of the Council for foreign and defence policy, declared that to think of the rapprochement with Europe as anti-American was counterproductive.214 It is in this context that Izvestija’s, Nezavisimaja Gazeta’s, and Segodnja’s coverages of the relations between France and Russia have to be considered. Izvestija notes that after a period some were starting to call a “new Cold War”, France is beginning to “thaw out”,215 and the cooperation between the two countries, despite some incidents here and there,216 intensifies, particularly in military affairs.217 On the occasion of the French Defence Minister’s visit to Moscow, Sergej Ivanov, Secretary of the Security Council of Russia, declared that the two countries were “true partners by virtue of historical, political, military and geographic reasons” (as humorously noted by Izvestija’s journalist, this took place in a Kremlin’s room decorated with gravures that represented Russia’s victory over France in 1812 and the defeat of Napoleon’s army).218 Ivanov returned the visit and went to France in order to find an ally in the Russian opposition to the American intention to withdraw from the ABM Treaty.219 Already in January 2001, Nezavisimaja Gazeta had noted a French tendency to underline its common positions with Russia in its approach to international problems, and to distance itself from the USA and NATO.220 In another article, the newspaper added that France was alone in defending the right of the independent European States to have and present their own positions.221 The continuing disagreement between Russia and France on Chechnya did not have a negative impact on their relations, because both States shared a number of common positions in international affairs, especially on the anti-missile defence policy.222 The intensification of the political dialogue and economic partnership between France and Russia was again emphasized just before Chirac’s visit to Moscow, with the mention that “difficult” episodes between the two States (i.e. concerning Chechnya) were largely due to “leftist circles” who wanted to embarrass the French (conservative) president before the next presidential elections.223 The visit itself was reported on the whole as rather successful for Russia who expected much from it,224 and both parties’ common position on missile defense policy was qualified in the article’s headline as “against Bush”.225 Nezavisimaja Gazeta deemphasized the importance of France’s disagreement with Russia on Chechnya and other human
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rights questions, whereas it clearly underlined the critical attitude taken by Europe (the European Union and the Council of Europe) on the same issues.226 In March 2001, reporting the words of Sergej Markov, director of the Institute of Political Science, Segodnja underlines the specific relevance of the relations between Russia and Europe in the context of the growing difficulties between Russia and the United States: “Russia is knocking at Europe’s door.”227 Some time before, the Parliament of the Council of Europe had returned Russia’s voting rights (Russia had been deprived of them because of the situation in Chechnya).228 At the EU economic summit of March 2001, Russia and the European Union agreed to reinforce their partnership,229 and when the Russian and French Ministers for Foreign Affairs, Igor’ Ivanov and Hubert Védrine, met in Paris in April 2001, it was to harmonize their views before the approaching intensification of the European political schedule.230 For the three newspapers, France has become a strategic partner for Russia, and this is for the Russian and French States more worth than any discourse on human rights on either sides. .. An example of “international media echo” stricto sensu: Izvestija and Le Monde In November 2000, an incident opposed Izvestija and Le Monde. It seems to have started with a news report broadcast by TF1, a French TV channel. The facts at the basis of this TV report were also the object of an article in Le Monde (“Un Tchétchène sous la menace d’espions russes en plein Paris” – A Chechen under the threat of Russian spies in the centre of Paris; 11 November 2000) in which the author, Erich Inciyan, reported that the DST (Direction de la surveillance du territoire – the French counter-intelligence service) had “identified” (in quotation marks in the original text) two agents in discussion with the Chechen businessman, Ruslanbek Khusainov, in Paris and acquired the “conviction” (in quotation marks in the original text) that these agents worked for the FSB. Khusainov, who had asked for a political refugee status in France and had received a temporary permit with exceptional rapidity, complained to have been under pressure and blackmail by Russian authorities since November 1999 because of his acquaintance with Chechen independentists. Now, Khusainov and his lawyer, Jacques Miquel, who had met through the intermediary of André Glucksman working with other French intellectuals to denounce the “crimes against humanity” committed by the Russian army in Chechnya, were waiting for a reaction from the French authorities.231 Le Monde reported that the DST, trying to minimize the affair, had sent a technical note of protest to the FSB, and the journalist concluded with Khusainov’s words: “If they [the two FSB agents] leave [from France] unpunished, who will protect my family?”
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Two days later, Evgenij Krutikov, commenting exclusively on the TF1 news program in a frontpage article of Izvestija (“Zagovor na Elisejskikh” – Conspiracy on the Elysées, 13 November 2000), wrote that “Ruslanbek Khusainov had turned to the well-known French lawyer, Jean [sic] Miquel, who in his turn, led him to the activist and political scientist, André Glucksman – a fanatic supporter of Chechen independence and the main critic of Russian politics in the Caucasus. And then, Glucksman (very strangely) led Khusainov to the French counter-intelligence service.” After reporting on Khusainov’s business in Moscow and its financial links with Chechen fighters, Krutikov added that this affair had been exclusively criminal before it turned into a political case of espionage after the declarations of Khusainov to Glucksman. France was and would remain the main opponent to the operations in Chechnya. The scale of part of the French public opinion’s involvement in Russian internal affairs was becoming anecdotal: Glucksman and the French counter-intelligence service could know (or at least have in mind) that with Khusainov, they were dealing not with a political emigrant or a freedom fighter but with an openly criminal figure. This story with Khusainov was so strange that “it brings to mind the recent tragic death of the Russian General Consul in Marseille who fell from the balcony of his apartment. . .” Krutikov’s article was noticed. Sophie Shihab, journalist working for Le Monde, replied that Krutikov was again writing on the order of the FSB (“Les ‘Izvestia’, organe du FSB, l’ex-KGB” – Izvestia, an organ of the FSB, ex-KGB; 23 November 2000). He had already done so in 1996 when his information contradicted that of his Russian colleagues in Chechnya, and in February 2000 when he published a false interview with a colleague of the Russian journalist, Babickij, who had been kidnapped. Despite the unambiguity of the title of her article,232 Shihab makes a clear distinction between Krutikov, whom she clearly accuses of working for the FSB, and some of his colleagues who still manage to write what they think. However, she also mentions that the work of these journalists is used to put to advantage the front page articles ordered by the FSB.233 Furthermore, she concludes ironically on the coherence of Izvestija, who more than 20 years earlier was already accusing Glucksman and his fellow dissident defenders of working for the CIA. Shihab’s accusation, provoked by “the article of Evgenij Krutikov on the Chechen travels of the French thinker, André Glucksman, and his namesake, the American [sic] political commentator, Andrej Babickij”, was counterattacked in the Izvestija opinion column of Arkhangel’skij (“Mondraška i Žospen”,234 27 November 2000). In this column, Khusainov’s name does not appear once. Instead, a triple accusation is proffered. First, Shihab lies when she says that Izvestija is an organ of the FSB. Second and most importantly, the West, and France in particular, consider themselves the guardians of a new European ethic. Those who are not with them are either evil or naïve. The West behaves like a wise mother who admonishes her beloved but stupid children. And this is exactly how Shihab treats
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Russia. She loves Russia the way a pre-school educator loves unruly behaviour. Arkhangel’skij’s third point consists more of a defensive attitude than of an accusation, properly speaking. Why does the Chechen tragedy have to be used as grounds to blame and destroy Russia? Why do Russians have to justify themselves in front of Mrs. Shihab? This “incident” between Izvestija and Le Monde happened some days after Putin’s first official visit to France. Asked why he had delayed his visit to France several times despite the official invitation he had received and why France was one of the very last European States he was visiting, Putin answered in an interview (23 October 2000) given on French and Russian TV channels (TF1, France 3, ORT) and French radio station RFI that France had traditionally been close to Russia thanks to the cultural links between the two countries, that both heads of State had agreed that an official visit should take place at a time when it would give the best results, and that if it seemed to some that there had been a chill in the relationship between the two countries, Russia had not done anything in that regard. France was one of Russia’s most important partners, and France and Russia shared very close positions in many international affairs.235 These common interests were underlined by both presidents during their joint declaration to the press on 30 October 2000.236 Thus, this exchange between Le Monde and Izvestija happened at a time when both France and Russia were trying to repair their somewhat stormy relationship,237 and nothing further was apparently written on the topic of Khusainov. However, this affair raises a number of interesting points. The basic facts on which the incident started are simple: spies who are not uncommonly working in foreign territory; and a man, under the alleged threat of those spies, who tells a story whose accuracy or completeness cannot be entirely verified. However, this man is Chechen and a businessman; the spies are Russian; Russia is conducting a war in Chechnya; the events take place in Paris; and, an influential current of French society is resolutely against the Russian war in Chechnya. As a result, the basic facts become the object of a TV news report and of an article in Le Monde. If the basic facts were not by themselves a priori particularly noteworthy for newspapers like Izvestija and Le Monde, the atmosphere in which they took place made them the source of very general reciprocal accusations (justified or not). While the lack of a strong involvement by the French counter-intelligence services (DST) is criticized in Le Monde’s first article (which ends with an emotional appeal to its readers), Krutikov considers the DST naïve to believe Khusainov, and in its conclusion enlarges the story by bringing in the circumstances of the death of the Russian General Consul in Marseilles.238 While Krutikov’s motives in linking the two stories might have been to underline the lack of political relevance of the first one, nothing indicates this clearly to the audience; and as the death of a Russian consul in a French provincial town does not make national headlines (neither in
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France nor in Russia), the link made between the two stories might conceivably raise doubts in the mind of some readers about the real causes behind this consul’s death. Le Monde’s reply, under the pen of Sophie Shihab, brings the affair still a step further with the accusation that Izvestija is an organ of the FSB, and reminds its readers for the n-th time that the FSB is the ex-KGB.239 As for Arkhangel’skij, the last journalist to write on the topic, he concludes with the most general and common Russian remark about the West: why does the West hate us so much? While the story was taking on larger and larger proportions, a few factual discrepancies crept in among the different articles: Jacques Miquel became Jean Miquel; the order of acquaintance between Khusainov, Glucksman and the DST varied; Babickij was presented as a Russian journalist in the French newspaper, but as an American in the Russian newspaper (while a Russian citizen, as Babickij worked for the American Radio Liberty, he had the status of a foreign journalist in Russia); finally, the original facts completely disappeared in the last article. However, these facts do not seem to have really mattered. On both sides, the point appears to have been to denounce the Other. It is true that the affair did not go any further publicly; however, it contributed to entertain and perpetuate the general climate of reciprocal distrust in the newspapers’ audiences. By the same token, because it reinforced decades of mistrust, it prepared these audiences to interpret future events about each other in a negative manner despite the official declarations of friendship between the two States.
. Russian official position Main trends of Russian foreign policy from 1999 to 2002 are first examined (5.2.1), and then Russian positions towards media (5.2.2). .. Russian foreign policy in 1999–2002 On the basis of official documents, Zevelev (2002) describes Russian foreign policy in 1999–2002 by contrasting Evgenij Primakov’s positions to Putin’s (Table 5.1). Primakov had been Foreign Minister from 1996 to 1998 and Prime Minister from September 1998 to May 1999. It is important to take into account that Putin’s vision, as described by Zevelev, was partly shaped by the September 11, 2001 events, i.e. after the end of the period under study. Splidsboel-Hansen (2002) underlines the importance for Russia since 1991 to have its European identity recognized by the European Union. Thus, one can say that from August 1999 to July 2001, the main goals of Russian foreign policy were the political and economic integration and influential participation of Russia as a European state in a multipolar world.
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Table 5.1 Beliefs about the self, the world, and international politics in Russia according to official documents, 1999–2002 (Zevelev 2002: 454)240 Primakov
Putin
Projected desired image
Great power, an influential center of a multipolar world
Vision of the main trends in the world arena
Two trends: toward a multipolar world and a unipolar structure Formation of a unipolar world Multipolar
A European country, full member of the Western community of states Internationalization. Global competition for markets, investments, and influence Isolation of Russia
Major problems or threats Preferred world order Perception of the USA
The US is a country seeking a unipolar structure with economic and force-based dominance
Integrated developed world that includes Russia Main partner in building strategic stability
.. Russian government and media A measure of the importance of media discourse on politics is given by the type of reaction it gives rise to in official circles. In February 2000, in a direct reply to a criticism by Sergej Jastrzhembskij, the Kremlin’s spokesman, Le Monde published a front page article entitled, “Chechnya: The Kremlin accuses Le Monde of ‘lies”’.241 The same day, Jean-Marie Colombani, Chairman of the newspaper Executive Board, signed an editorial242 whose beginning read: “Ces dernières semaines, Le Monde est devenu un acteur de la scène politique et médiatique moscovite. Parce qu’il fait son travail, tout simplement. “[These last weeks, Le Monde has become an actor on the Muscovite media and political scene simply because it has done its work.] And Colombani underlined that Le Monde reported on Chechnya as it had done during the war in Algeria. In October 2000, a Russian diplomat reportedly said that Moscow did not make any distinction between the French official discourse and the French media discourse on Chechnya.243 Thus, it is no surprise that French and Russian journalists considered that the repeated delay of Putin’s first official visit to France, which took place end of October 2000, was due to the critical position on Chechnya taken by the French government, who partly receives its information through the media.244 The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had complained of a Western campaign of disinformation, of an information war against Russia (4 April 2000).245 In particular, the Minister had declared in the Financial Times (11 May 2000) that Western mass-media (TV and press) showed only one side of the story, and as a result, the Western public, who had “discovered” Chechnya only recently (while the problem had been deeply felt in Russia for a long time), was not sufficiently informed.246
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In September 2000, Putin signed the “Information Security Doctrine of the Russian Federation”.247 This doctrine, whose first version appeared in 1994, does not have the force of a law, but it is “the body of official views on the goals, tasks, principles and main directions of ensuring the information security of the Russian Federation.” The document lists diverse types of dangers and measures of security, of which a few are reproduced below. In the sphere of internal politics the following are the key threats to the information security of the Russian Federation: [. . .] – dissemination of disinformation on the policy of the Russian Federation, the activities of the federal bodies of state power and the events taking place in and outside the country; [. . .] The main measures in ensuring the information security of the Russian Federation in the sphere of internal politics are: [. . .] – stepping up counter-propaganda activities aimed at preventing the negative consequences of the dissemination of disinformation about the internal policy of Russia. In the sphere of external policy, the key objects of ensuring the information security of the Russian Federation in the sphere of external policy are: [. . .] – the blocking of the activities of the Russian mass media to explain to the foreign audiences the goals and main guidelines of the state policy of the Russian Federation and its opinion on socially significant events in Russian and international life. Among the foreign threats to the information security of the Russian Federation in the sphere of foreign policy the following are the most dangerous: [. . .] – dissemination abroad of disinformation on the foreign policy of the Russian Federation; [. . .] Among the internal threats to the information security of the Russian Federation in the sphere of external policy the following are the most dangerous: [. . .] – the information and propaganda activities of political forces, non-governmental associations, mass media and individuals which distort the strategy and tactics of the foreign policy activities of the Russian Federation; [. . .] The main measures ensuring the information security of the Russian Federation in the sphere of foreign policy are: [. . .]
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– the creation for Russian missions and organizations abroad of conditions for work to neutralize the disinformation being disseminated there on the foreign policy of the Russian Federation; [. . .]
This Information Security Doctrine explicitly promotes an active policy to correct what the State would consider as disinformation with counter-propaganda activities and creation of Russian missions and organizations abroad. The adoption of this Information Security Doctrine had taken place in a general climate of suspicion between the Russian government and (Russian and foreign) mass-media (i.e. the dismantling of Gusinskij’s media empire, Media-Most, had started). The debate on freedom of expression in media did not stop at that point. In a political column of Izvestija (“Ližizady i deržimordy” – Brown-nosers and goons; 26 June 2001), Novoprudskij reports that Sergeï Jastrembskij, aide to the President of Russia at the World Conference on Information Co-operation (25 June 2001), talked about the necessity of creating a positive image of the country outside of its borders.248 Novoprudskij agrees (ironically) that it is indeed important to create such an image outside of Russia, and the means are varied: from paid articles on the virtual successes of the Russian government in influential foreign publications to a real fight against corruption and the adoption of basic reforms (land, justice, pensions). However, he categorically opposes the creation of such an image of Russia inside Russia. Indeed, if it is possible to deceive the world by showing them what is good and hiding what is bad, it is also possible to deceive oneself, and the country has done so for millenniums (sic). This had resulted in the authorities believing in the realities that propaganda had made up for them, while the Russian people vegetated and dreamed about a rosy future or surreptitiously cursed the grim reality. Russians will not become greater with TV programs and newspapers full of pleasant news, and it is frightening to see the number of people who are ready to trust the authorities to take such a direction. The problems that Russia experienced with Western media at the height of the second Chechen war just before and after Putin’s election to the position of President of the Russian Federation might partly explain why a group of foreign journalists and experts on Russia were invited to the Valdai discussion club (3– 4 September 2004)249 in Velikij Novgorod, followed by a meeting with Putin at his residence in Novo Ogarevo (6 September 2004). During this meeting, Putin talked about Chechnya, the hostage-taking that had just taken place in Beslan (Northern Ossetia),250 Ukraine and NATO, Georgia, and his vision for Russia.251 According to Evgenia Albats, a journalist based in Moscow and member of the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, this conference, that was organized by the state-run news agency RIA Novosti and the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, had as its main purpose the improvement of Russia’s
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image abroad.252 Noteworthy is the fact that the well-experienced journalist Vitalij Tret’jakov, founder of Nezavisimaja Gazeta,253 participated in this conference as member of the Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, an independent association.254 The conference, as Putin’s “personal exercise in public diplomacy”255 seems to have made a good impression on some (e.g. Fiona Hill,256 Mary Dejevsky,257 Stephen Handelman258), but not on all foreign guests (e.g. Marie Mendras259). All 42 guests260 had all of their expenses paid, although it was not mentioned in some journalists’ reports (e.g. Daniel Vernet from Le Monde, Jonathan Steele from The Guardian261 ). No Russian journalist had been invited to the meeting with Putin, and thus, they had to learn about their President’s words through an English translation.262 Russia’s problems with Western media have continued after the height of the Second Chechen war, and Putin has been very criticized both within and outside of Russia for the media coverage of the Beslan hostage-taking and for the “firing” of Izvestija’s chief editor (see above 2.4.3.1). At the World Congress of News Agencies held in Moscow on 24 September 2004, Putin underlined the world power of media:263 As the workers of news agencies, you transmit real-time information, which is awaited by millions of people. Apart from the printed media and television, this information is welcome in the organizations of state power, diplomatic services, international organizations and financial institutions. In a word, everyone, who needs prompt and truthful reporting and expert analysis of developments, awaits it. Your work exerts direct influence on the globalization processes that give a boost to markets, accelerate healthy competition, and build up the coordination of international efforts in every sphere of our life.
And he mentioned the limits in which media must work. It is obvious that the struggle against terrorism must not become a reason for impairment of the freedom and independence of the press. But the information community can and should design such a model of work that would make the media an effective tool in the struggle with terrorism. That would rule out any, even unintentional, form of assistance to terrorists. And, of course, reports from the sites of events must by no means do harm, primarily to the people who become victims of a terrorist act. [. . .] There is no doubt: criticism by the press is useful for the authorities of all levels, even though it is sometimes painful and representatives of authority do not like it sometimes. It is not for nothing that our people say: ‘When you open the window, it’s noisy, when you close the window, it’s stuffy.’ We are creating in practice legal possibilities for openness and transparency of power. However, we also expect from the mass media both responsibility and hon-
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esty. I believe that only mutual fulfillment of these obligations by both bodies of power and by the mass media can be productive.
To a question from an Australian journalist about foreign media, he replied: They (foreign mass media) cover (these events) in different ways. I try to watch all major, significant channels that influence the world opinion, to watch news bulletins practically of all of your news agencies, both excerpts and in live presentation. Answering a previous question I’ve already mentioned that the world has changed. All of us know this very well, earlier in the previous system, when the Soviet Union suppressed its satellites on the one hand and, as it has turned out, posed a threat to many other countries, it faced corresponding attitudes. It was seen as an evil empire, as some wild, frightful, uncurbed animal. This is not so today, but many people still have not understood that the situation in our country has changed radically. They do not try to understand, but simply act in an old way, on inertia. Very many things are interpreted from a wrong understanding of the internal essence of the present-day Russian society. Almost no difference is made between the Soviet Union and today’s Russia. Russia is still either feared in the inner mind. Or imagine a lion that fell into a trap and jackals run around and bark maybe from fear or maybe from joy – such things happen too. But most often we certainly deal with professionalism and objective assessment. We may like it or not, but I must say in any case that it is always useful for us; even if we consider information not objective, it all the same is of a certain value for us, as it is food for analysis of events happening in the world and in our country.
The Kremlin’s attitude clearly demonstrates its attentiveness to the content of media and to its image in the West. Among the media, it singled out Le Monde, at least, for its critical coverage. A Russian journalist in the English-language Moscow Times best summarizes the Kremlin’s attitude towards the West and its media. It is described as a policy of (political) sticks and (economic) carrots both to distance media from Chechnya and to maintain constructive relations with the United States and the European Union.264
. Russian public opinion In the reviews of Russian media coverage of the Western attitude towards Russia, only three elite dailies have been examined, whereas the rising costs of printed media had led the majority of the Russian population turn to television and radio stations for information. The reasons for choosing Izvestija, Nezavisimaja Gazeta, and Segodnija were given above. A detailed review of Russian TV and radio programs on a two-year period involves too many practical difficulties to be included here. However, general public opinion, that is influenced by TV, radio, and elite
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dailies (albeit not uniformly) can be examined thanks to public opinion polls conducted by VCIOM, the All-Russian Centre for Public Opinion Study.265 These polls are conducted on samples of 1600 people representative of the all-Russian population. Below is presented a survey of the Russian population’s general attitudes towards the West from 1999 to 2001. These attitudes were in part based on information transmitted by the mass-media. In August 2001, the influence of newspapers, radio and television was rated in third position, behind the president (1st), the oligarchs, bankers and financiers (2nd), and before the government (4th), the governors (5th), and the armed forces (6th).266 .. Relation to the West in connection to the second Chechen war From October 1999 and for a few months afterwards, the relations between the West and Russia were deeply marked by what was then to be called the second Chechen war, as attested by Le Monde’s and The New York Times’ editorials, and in general the Western reactions to it. While the Russian population had not supported the first Chechen war,267 its attitude towards the second differed, partly because of a series of explosions in Russia that were attributed to Chechens and resulted in a high number of injured or killed civilians in September 1999 (see above 2.1.1.2). In January 2000, 68% were in favor of combat operations in Chechnya, and 24% wanted negotiations.268 In the case of the West applying hard economic sanctions against Russia because of its politics in Chechnya, 38% were in favor of ignoring the West and continuing with the previous internal and external policy, 22% preferred a search for a compromise and the reexamination of the armed intervention policy in Chechnya, 19% wanted to reply with hard sanctions against the West, 18% wished for an increase of the military budget to strengthen the country’s defense capabilities, 18% would reinforce the economic and military links with the Middle-East, China and India, and 11% would stop the payment of external debts.269 In February 2000, 73% of poll respondents were not satisfied with media coverage of the war in Chechnya.270 However, 70% thought that the federal forces should continue their offensive (23% wished for negotiations with Chechen leaders); 57% judged the action of the Russian army very good / good, and 35% satisfactory / not satisfactory. 13% expected a return to a new type of “cold war” (down from 32% in April 1999 and 33% in March 1999), but 62% thought that relations with the West would gradually go back to what they were before (up from 45% in April 1999 and 41% in March 1999). In April 2000, to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) discussing the question of Russia’s exclusion from the Council because of viola-
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The Spiral of “Anti-Other Rhetoric”
tions of human rights in Chechnya, 12% reacted with distress, 11% with humiliation, 10% with perplexity, 26% with indignation, 8% with annoyance, and 24% did not have any particular reaction. 14% thought that the West had a right to criticize Russia, but 69% took it as an unwarranted interference within Russian internal affairs. 7% thought that Russia ought to take into account Western criticisms and move towards a political settlement in Chechnya; 33% wanted Russia to persistently explain its position in the Chechen conflict to PACE; 29% were for a firm response to a provocative criticism on Russia and its army; 12% for the cessation of Russian participation in all organizations criticizing Russian politics and for the non-entry of PACE members and similar organizations into Chechnya; finally, 19% did not know how Russia should react. In January 2001, 44% (in one poll and 37% in another) thought rather important or very important the restoration to Russia of its voting rights in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, while 30% found it not very important or not important at all. In summary, it appears that Russian public opinion towards the West in connection to the second Chechen war is constructed along two opposed but not contradictory positions: resentment mingled with fear at what was perceived as Western interference in Russian internal affairs, and a certain desire to continue its links with the West. .. Attitude towards France and the USA Russian opinion polls contain fewer questions about Europe than about the USA, and when a Western European State is specifically named, it is most of the time Great Britain or Germany. This might have to do with the fact that only 11% (in a January 2002 poll271 ) considered France as a “great” (velikij) power, compared to 24% for China, 29% for Great Britain, 32% for Germany, 41% for Japan, 42% for Russia, and 61% for the USA. Despite its “low rank among the great”, France appears to enjoy a better reputation in Russia than the USA. In September 2000, more than 80% reported a positive attitude towards France, and less than 10% a negative attitude. This positive attitude was at its strongest among the 18–23 and the 40–49 year olds. However, answers to a number of specifically designed questions show that a large part of Russia’s positive attitude towards foreign countries is not linked to their specific characteristics but simply to the fact that they are not Russia. The bombing of the former Yugoslavia by NATO forces in March 1999, strongly opposed by Russia, explains the rather low level of positive feelings (Table 5.2), 50%, towards the USA in August 1999. With the improvement of the situation in Kosovo, Russian attitude towards the USA progressively became more positive (from 61% in September 1999 to 70% in July 2000), before dropping again in
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Chapter 5. Russian reactions to the West
Table 5.2 “How in general do you relate now to the USA? Well / rather well [positively], or rather badly / badly [negatively]?” %
Aug 99
Sept 99
Feb 00
May 00
Jul 00
Feb 01
Jun 01
Positive Negative
50 33
61 25
66 22
68 21
70 23
57 25
69 22
Table 5.3 “How in general do you relate now to the Americans as people? Well / rather well [positively], or rather badly / badly [negatively]?” %
Feb 00
Jun 01
Positive Negative
78 10
82 9
February 2001 (57%), when 34% considered that the USA represented a threat for Russia. Indeed, already in May 2000, 44% had opposed the American plan to construct a system of missile defense against international terrorism in replacement of the ABM Treaty because of the damage it could bring to Russian defense capabilities (18% agreed with it). In June 2001, 59% considered an eventual American withdrawal from the ABM Treaty as a threat (22% did not). While 44% evaluated the relations between Russia and the USA as tense, poor or hostile, 51% found them calm, good or friendly, and the percentage of positive attitude towards the USA went up to 69%. Except for August 1999, the percentage of negative attitude towards the USA has been constant (21–25%). The poll respondents made a difference between Americans and their government, and their positive attitude towards Americans is higher than towards the USA (Table 5.3). The above poll results underline a slight difference between public opinion and the opinion of elite dailies. While Izvestija, Nezavisimaja Gazeta, and Segodnja emphasized the role of France in the vague of opposition to Russia because of Chechnya, the public opinion related better towards France than the USA. Noteworthy are the facts that the lowest rates of positive attitude towards the USA are linked to the NATO intervention in Kosovo and to an eventual American withdrawal from the ABM treaty, i.e. events which could be perceived as external threats to Russia. This could mean that the public opinion considered Chechnya as relatively unimportant in the evaluation of its relations to the West, as was already discernible in a February 2000 poll on Chechnya (see above 5.5.1). The difference might also, and probably primarily, be due to a larger Russian coverage of the Kosovo and ABM Treaty affairs than of Western reactions to Chechnya.
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The Spiral of “Anti-Other Rhetoric”
Table 5.4 “What do you think Russia should do now? Reinforce its mutually beneficial relations with the West, or take its distance from the West?” %
Sep 99
Jan 00
Feb 00
May 00
Aug 00
Move closer Move further
61 22
68 19
74 13
72 13
74 14
.. Relations to the West from the societal / economic point of view From 1999 to 2001, the tendency observed from the mid-1990s became stronger, and the feeling that the Western model of development did not suit Russia grew. In September 1999, 39% wished for a Russian State similar to Western States and 25% wished a Russian State with its specific organization and specific path to development. In May 2000, 4% believed that the “Western” (i.e. Western-European and American) type of societal organization was a universal model completely adapted to Russian conditions; 15% thought that it could be adapted to Russian conditions; but 31% considered unlikely that it could be implemented in Russia and 37% that it contradicted the lifestyle of the Russian people. In November 2001, for 13% of the respondents, Russia belonged to Western civilization, while for 71%, it represented its own “Euro-Asian” or “orthodox Slavic” civilization, and the Western path was not suitable. However, this did not mean that relations to the West ought to be severed. In fact, from September 1999 to August 2000 (Table 5.4), more wanted a reinforcement of the relations with the West, and fewer to get away from it. A year later, in November 2001, the West was no longer so attractive. Indeed, having to choose between two positions, 61% thought that Russia ought first to secure the revival of its economy and then expand its relations with the West, and 30% that Russia develop its relations with the West in order to secure economic prosperity. And if Russia was not successful in obtaining some immediate advantage from its rapprochement with the West, 42% thought that Russia ought to find more beneficial partners, but for 38%, Russia needed to continue moving towards the West. .. Impact of the West The impact of the West on Russian life is not evaluated in a uniform manner. It is seen as rather important in the Gusinskij affair in June 2000, when the first three reasons given for his release from arrest were: pressure of society and mass-media, 31%; echoes in the West of Gusinskij’s arrest, 25%; Putin’s negative assessment of Gusinskij’s arrest, 15%. Less important but still non negligible was its role in January 2001, when Pavel Borodin, Secretary of the Union of Belarus and Russia, was arrested in the USA. According to 38% of poll respondents, the arrest was due to the legal pursuit of the Swiss public prosecutor office in the affair of Russian money
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Chapter 5. Russian reactions to the West
laundering; according to 17%, it was caused by the attempt of certain Western circles to compromise the present Russian government in the eyes of world society, and to complicate the relations of Russia with the new American administration; and 14% thought that it was the result of a political provocation by opponents to the Union of Belarus and Russia. Finally, the West was not considered the main guilty party in Russia’s difficulties. When asked, in August 2000, whom they held primarily responsible for the present difficulties in Russia, 35% answered Gorbachev and the other leaders of perestrojka; Yeltsin and his close circle came in second place with 19% of answers, and the West was last with 1%. .. Russia’s place in the world During the Yeltsin years (1991–1999), the most important criticisms expressed by the Russian population were either of an economic nature, linked to the war in Chechnya, or to the dissolution of the Soviet Union; and questions of national prestige ranked low (see above 2.1.1.5). From 1999 to 2001, the economic situation still preoccupied the majority, but the construction of a new identity and the restoration of a badly bruised national self-esteem (on an economic and not ideological basis) gradually acquired more importance, as evidenced by the three following poll results. In January 2001, the reinforcement of Russia’s authority on the international scene was considered by 17% as one of the major achievements of Russia in 2000, behind the salary and pension raise (44%), the election of an active and capable president (36%), the adoption of State symbols (anthem, emblem, flag) (31%), the criminal persuit against the oligarchs (23%), the upheaval of the economy (17%), but before the conduct of anti-terrorist actions in Chechnya (15%), the Russian successes in sport competitions (14%), the tax cuts (10%), etc. In February 2001, asked about the effects of Pavel Borodin’s arrest, 26% thought that Russia’s reputation in the world was so bad that the arrest could not make it worse; 22% thought that it was a deserved stain on Russia’s reputation, and 16% that it was not deserved. In June 2001, asked about what should be the basic goal for Russian foreign policy in the next 10–15 years, the return to a superpower status was cited 31%; be among the five most developed countries in the world, 23%; abandon foreign policy ambitions and concentrate on finding solutions to internal problems, 16%; be one of the 10–15 economically developed countries like Brazil, South Korea, Taiwan etc., 12%; lead the Commonwealth of Independent States, 6%; lead a large group of States opposing the global claims of the USA, 5%.
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. Russia and the West in 1999–2001 In 2001, the economic situation in Russia was still, by any means, not good, but it had improved from 1999 according to the World Development Indicators. The GDP per capita was at 73% of the 1990 level, but at 114% of the 1999 level. The industry added value was still only at 55% of the 1990 level, but at 119% of the 1999 level. The total reserves increased by 194% from (current) US $12.325 billion in 1999 to $36.302 billion in 2001, while the external debt decreased from (current) US $174.754 billion in 1999 to $152.488 billion in 2001. The consumer price inflation that was of 86% in 1999 went down to 21% in 2000 and 2001. As for the food price inflation, it went from 97% in 1999 to -99% in 2000 and 21% in 2001. The unemployment rate fell from 13% in 1999 to 9% in 2001. Furthermore, people were gradually getting used to their new life conditions in a capitalist country. In August 2001, Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, who had been elected in March 2000, enjoyed a 74% level of approval. However, the Russian sociologist, Levada, noted in his analysis of the socio-political situation that this approval was more based on hopes of what Putin would do than on real achievements.272 The Chechen war was still going on, and a majority (59%) was then in favor of negotiations (30% were for the continuation of the war – August 2001).273 The dismantling of the media empire, Media-Most, with the arrest of Gusinskij was mostly regarded as a question of finance and criminality.274 On the external side, the Kosovo crisis was now far behind; Putin and Bush had found a compromise in the controversy over the ABM Treaty and the construction of an American missile defense system; Russia had recovered its voting rights in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe; and Putin was being invited to international summits (European Union, G-8). Russia’s overall situation in 2001, that marked a general improvement from 1999, witnessed a parallel evolution along a continued involvement with the West on one side, and along a more and more pronounced inclination towards a “specific path” for Russia on the other side. On the governmental (and presidential) level, Russia was still seeking entry into the World Trade Organization, and despite continual criticism by the West for its handling of numerous affairs (e.g. Chechnya, Kursk, Gusinskij and media in general), it did not retreat into isolationism. On the contrary, the European Union and Russia greatly developed their trade.275 Putin’s official visit to France end of October 2000 showed how easily (on the State level) a mutual chill due to the war in Chechnya could be put aside when questions of strategic defense and world organization were at play. However, Russia kept on with its way of dealing with political issues without seeming to take much notice of Western concerns and advice. On the elite media level, despite the persistent and harsh comments that could be read generally on Russia in Western elite dailies, Izvestija, Nezavisimaja Gazeta and Segodnja underlined the importance of
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Chapter 5. Russian reactions to the West
the West in the economic domain unanimously and also occasionally some of its political characteristics, but unconditionally rejected the Western discourse on Chechnya, especially the French one. On the public opinion level, the Western discourse on Chechnya was not simply rejected, it was sometimes perceived as a threat. Although the French discourse on Chechnya had been more severe than the American one, France rated higher in Russian public opinion than the USA, whose military dealings (NATO in Kosovo, ABM Treaty) were negatively evaluated. An overwhelming majority (71%) in November 2001 chose a “specific path” for Russia over a Western one that they deemed not suitable. And if a good number (38%) agreed with a further move towards the West despite a lack of immediate (economic) advantages, slightly more (42%) thought that it was not worth it. Thus, whereas the West was extremely critical of Russia on matters that went much beyond Chechnya, and whereas Chechnya was not the most important issue for Russians in their daily life, Chechnya was the most crucial issue in the replies of Russian elite media to Western elite media, and one could wonder why. In 1999, considering Russia’s very deep economic and political difficulties that were partly brought about by Western reforms, the economic dependence on the West who used to be the enemy, the eight years of sharp decrease in living standards since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a national identity torn apart and not even vaguely reconstructed, a series of acts of violence related to Chechnya, and the constant sharp criticism of the West, the blow brought up by four apartment building explosions in September 1999 while Russia had already given a de facto quasi independence to Chechnya after its army’s humiliating defeat was the trigger that made the Russian intervention in Chechnya appear to many Russians as a last effort of self-assertion, a last effort of self-esteem, notwithstanding the real motives for the war and the human tragedy it brought with it. Izvestija, Nezavisimaja Gazeta and Segodnja were very clear. They considered that Chechnya was Russia’s own internal affair and the West did not have any right to meddle in it. Two types of explanation reinforce this interpretation. The first one is that a Western intervention amounted to a disruption of the ending of the Chechen affair according to the Russian “triumph-over-alien-forces” narrative template. In this template (Wertsch 2002: 93), 1. An “initial situation” (Propp 1968: 26) in which the Russian people are living in a peaceful setting where they are no threat to others is disrupted by: 2. The initiation of trouble or aggression by an alien force, or agent, which leads to: 3. A time of crisis and great suffering, which is: 4. Overcome by the triumph over the alien force by the Russian people, acting heroically and alone. [emphasis added]
On the basis of Propp’s work on Russian folk tales (1968), Bartlett’s (1995, first published in 1932) and Ross’ (1989) writings on the psychology of memory,
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Wertsch affirms that this narrative template, reflecting Russian historical events, takes a particular form in the Russian narrative tradition and represents an especially important cultural tool in Russian collective remembering. Among the different phases of the narrative template, he pinpoints the importance of the ending, around which the narrative is organized (Wertsch 2002: 58). The second explanation is provided by Morozov (2002) who contends that the main paradigm in Russian foreign policy is romantic realism. In this school of thought that claims to reveal the “real” motives for political action and looks at international politics against a romantic nationalist background, values of nationhood and internal consolidation are emphasized. Romantic nationalism warns about the danger of Westernization that blurs boundaries and thus represents a threat to Russian identity. In this perspective, human rights, as presented in the Western discourse (e.g. about Chechnya), are interpreted as an ideological tool and a Trojan horse to infiltrate and subvert Russian society. When concerns about security are particularly high, as in 1999–2000, the issue becomes binarized: people are either for or against Russians. But when the situation changes and feelings of security improve, Russia can afford to get closer to the West. Morozov’s explanation, without being sufficient for the entire situation, helps understand the sharpness of Russian reactions to Western positions on the second Chechen war. As Izvestija, Nezavisimaja Gazeta and Segodnja belong to oligarchs, their political commentators by editorial policy or by their own convictions could only support a continuous involvement with the West in economic issues. But with Chechnya, it was different. Chechnya was an entirely Russian matter. And the more the West and Western journalists would criticize, the more adamant Russian journalists would stand in their positions. A skilled writing style on both sides inflamed the issue even more. In 2001, the situation was different. Russia had a new president in which people placed hope. Russia had finally adopted, nine years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, its State symbols (an anthem, a flag, and an emblem) around which people could eventually gather and exist as a people. The economy had improved. Thus, although both the Chechen war and Western criticism persisted, the topic could be more or less dropped by Russian political commentators. For the government and the elite, a good external image of Russia was necessary to attract foreign investments, which had an impact on Russia’s chances of gaining membership in the World Trade Organization. To the general population, in light of their historical ambivalence towards the West, and in light of their still low standard of living despite the enormous sacrifices they had made, the West was not particularly attractive.
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chapter
Crossing cultural and disciplinary boundaries
Conducted in the framework of Critical Discourse Analysis, this study presented the positions that the elite French and American dailies, Le Monde and The New York Times, adopted on Russia in their editorials from August 1999 to July 2001, as well as the reactions of Russian journalists to Western media discourse. The national contexts in which these interactions between French, American and Russian media originated and the specific international context of the late 1990s in which they took place were presented in Chapter 2. The analysis of these interactions took place at three levels: textual, ideational and interactional. The first consisted in the linguistic analysis of Le Monde’s and The New York Times’ editorials, whose methodology and results were given in Chapter 3. In a first methodological step, the macrostructures (i.e. salient information whose content is most likely to remain in long-time memory) and the structure of the editorials’ argumentation were revealed through the application of logico-semantic rules of coherence, and the coding of the ideological square (i.e. representation of Us and Them) and communications between parties. The second step, based on the analysis of metadiscursive structures (relational markers, person markers and evidentials), revealed the participants in the debate reconstructed in the editorials. The combination of these steps resulted in a general quantitative picture of the editorials’ content for each newspaper and in detailed qualitative descriptions of the argumentation in specific editorials. Overall, the results of the linguistic analysis allowed a comparison of Le Monde and The New York Times. Both newspapers spoke for the respect of human rights and economic reforms, but in a quite different conceptual framework. In a multilateral context, Le Monde primarily admonished the West not to let Russia violate human rights, while in a bilateral setting, The New York Times told Russia how to build a liberal democracy. The reason for this essential difference (i.e. why experienced editorialists from comparable, prestigious dailies reacted differently to the same events) were looked for in the contextual analysis of the editorials. At the second level of analysis of the media interactions, Le Monde and The New York Times were placed in their respective national societies (Chapter 4) with the use of the “interacting cascading activation model”. Their positions, completed and eventually contrasted with those of their respective national governments, elites and public opinion, demonstrated how they respectively embody
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The Spiral of “Anti-Other Rhetoric”
and project French and American national identities. Le Monde’s editorials manifest the founding character given to human rights by French constitutionalists in 1789, and The New York Times’ editorials illustrate the instrumental aspect of human rights in the establishment of the American liberal democracy in 1787. Finally, at the third level of analysis, Russian reactions to Western media were examined (Chapter 5). Despite the broad range of very strong Western criticism proffered on a rather arrogant tone, journalists from the elite dailies, Izvestija, Nezavisimaja Gazeta and Segodnja, focused their reactions on the war in Chechnya. Indeed, given the socio-economic state of Russian society at the end of the 1990s and the very shattered state of Russian national identity at that time, criticizing Russia on Chechnya, whose territory belongs to the Russian Federation, amounted to a further fragmentation of this national identity. To this, journalists of elite dailies could only react strongly. This study has presented an empirical approach to the phenomenon of international media echo. It is doubtful whether any study can be complete, and this one is limited in at least three ways. First, the analysis deals only with elite print media, whereas TV (by the power of its images, the possibilities of real-time coverage and the size of its audience) now dominates the world news system. Second, the analysis has been primarily conducted from the perspective of Le Monde and The New York Times. The three Russian newspapers have not been subjected to the same detailed linguistic analysis and have been mostly considered for their reactions. Third, in view of the idiosyncrasies presented by any case study, it is always difficult to assess its representativity. Despite its limits, this study sheds some light on the international media echo thanks to its contextual analysis anchored on a detailed linguistic analysis, and to a change of approach in media theories from a focus on individual States to a focus on the international stage. The spiral of “anti-Other rhetoric” (6.1), the most negative manifestation of the international media echo, is first described. It is then explained with Social Identity Theory (6.2) and with theories of International Relations (6.3). The combination of both these approaches brings to the fore the question of media identities on the international stage (6.4). Finally, the fruitfulness of crossing cultural and disciplinary boundaries is underlined (6.5).
. The spiral of “anti-Other rhetoric” Anti-Russian, anti-Western: these qualifiers have often surfaced in the discourse of Russia and the West about each other, as different “anti-” have also frequently appeared in other relations. This “anti-Other rhetoric” is hazardous, particularly when it finds a place in the editorials of renowned newspapers, because it can eventually develop into a spiral of distrust, dislike and sometimes hate that exac-
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Chapter 6. Crossing cultural and disciplinary boundaries
erbates difficulties and helps them escalate into a conflict that is more than just discursive. In the case of Russia and the West in 1999–2001, this fortunately did not happen, although it is clear that Le Monde, under other circumstances, would have supported a Western armed intervention in Chechnya (as there had been one in the former Yugoslavia).276 Thus, it is important to examine the source, the development and the weakening of the spiral of anti-Other rhetoric, as well as its long-term effects. .. Its source It has been shown how Le Monde’s and The New York Times’ editorials embody a representation of their respective national identity. A priori, their content should be equally offensive to a Russian audience in that both newspapers are extremely critical and arrogant. If Le Monde’s style is more incisive, The New York Times gives lessons like a teacher to pupils by not only telling them what to do but how. Understandably, Russian politicians and journalists have reacted negatively to the discourse of the “West”, but they have focused on one issue, Chechnya, and singled out one Western State, France. Why this emphasis when the Russian population ranks France far behind the USA, Russia, Japan, Germany, Great Britain and China in terms of “great powers”, and has a better opinion of France than of the United States, and when the United States had been “the” traditional ideological enemy not so long ago and quite recently bombed (with NATO) the former Yugoslavia? Criticisms of Russia – for its lack of democratic structures and the troubles of its economy – while undoubtedly humiliating, may not have stirred very deep feelings at that time because Russia had never known such a political regime and wanted to enjoy the advantages associated with a liberal economy.277 Conversely, criticisms of Russia for the war in Chechnya hit a very sensitive spot because they were perceived as foreign intervention into an internal matter, thereby further questioning the integrity of Russian power over its own territory at a time when the Russian national identity was particularly fragile. On the French side, not reacting to grave violations of human rights in Chechnya (violations that had furthermore been recognized by some Russians) amounted to the annihilation of the foundation of French identity, at a time when France was dealing with the potential consequences of the impeding European Union’s enlargement. It is this concurrence of events, or more precisely this mutual feeling of danger for oneself brought partly by the Other and provoked by specific elements occurring at a given time, that caused an “inflammation of rhetoric” on both sides. It is crucial to note that a number of different elements, domestic, foreign or international, directly related to the primary issue or not, came into play. While national identities are undeniably part of the affair, it cannot be summarized as a clash of identities, a shock of cultures (contrarily to Huntington 1996). It would not only be erroneous but also
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The Spiral of “Anti-Other Rhetoric”
dangerously misleading, as it would amount to saying that the Russian national identity goes against human rights, and thus that “Russians are barbarians”. .. Its development This “inflammation of rhetoric” was sustained by several factors. On the French side, the high level of cultural congruence between Le Monde’s editorials (and other French media) and French society contributed to the official positions of the French government, whose firmness contrasted with that of other governments. Furthermore, a long tradition of eloquence (Starobinsky 1997), pressed on young minds and cultivated throughout the educational system, could only leave a strong impact on editorialists of the most “intellectual” daily newspaper. On the Russian side, skilled writing was not less relevant (e.g. Maxim Sokolov, one of the sharpest journalists; see 5.3.1). France’s relatively low rank of importance for Russia on the international level could also have been a factor: it was relatively safe to take France as the scapegoat for all Western criticisms, while designating the USA could have had direct economic consequences. Finally, in the world context, France and Russia did not particularly see each other as strategic partners at that time. This however, came to change. .. Its weakening The American project of National Missile Defence (NMD) required the revision of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty that Russia considered the cornerstone of its security system. Negotiations did not succeed and as the relations between Russia and the United States grew more and more tense, the relations between Russia and Europe, in particular France, got better. Indeed, European security was dependent on the ABM treaty, and Europeans also opposed the NMD system. Thus, a strategic partnership between France and Russia gradually developed. The war in Chechnya did not stop nor did Le Monde’s criticism of Russia. In editorials, Le Monde explicitly took position with Russia, Germany and France against the NMD system, but also stated that Chechnya was the key element on which to judge Russia particularly if one was inclined to believe in its European identity.278 However, President Putin finally accomplished his first official visit in France and the tone of Russian journalists about France softened. It is true that some Russian journalists had also tried earlier to de-emphasize the importance of the verbal conflict; they needed to reassure an audience who was concerned with the effects of the political situation on economic exchanges.
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.. Its long-time effects Given the political and legal situation of media in Russia, it is difficult to know the exact proportion of writing in Russian newspapers that originates from the journalists themselves or is “inspired from above”. However, wherever the source of the positions taken (in Russian as well as Western media), their effects on an unaware audience are the same. The analysis conducted in this study relies on editorials’ macrostructures, i.e. the information most likely to remain in longterm memory. Le Monde’s and The New York Times’ readers receive information that feed their respective memories, update and reinforce their negative perception of “Russia” by making the link between the tsarist Empire, the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation (see 3.2.4.2). In other words, the hegemonic representation of the “old” Russia seems to be transferred to the “new” Russia, despite the efforts of Russian authorities to control their image in Russian media and to change their perception by Western media (see 5.2.2).279 As for Russian readers of Izvestija, Nezavisimaja Gazeta and Segodnja, they received conflicting information on the West that contributed to perpetuate the debate between Slavophiles and Westernisers. Thus, despite the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the re-election of Boris Yeltsin in 1996 against the communist Evgenij Zjuganov, and Vladimir Putin’s attempts to correct the negative image Yeltsin had given the Russian presidency, Le Monde and The New York Times participated in the maintenance of the West’s negative collective memory of Russia, and of the use of Russia as a “barbaric” Other in European (i.e. Western) identity formation (Neumann 1999) in great part because of the second Chechen war. Since one of the main purposes of memories is the creation of a “usable past for the creation of coherent individual and group identities” (Wertsch 2002: 31), it seems that neither Le Monde nor The New York Times saw the necessity for a “new” perception of Russia on the international stage in 1999–2001. Because of the war in Chechnya, Le Monde denied Russia the European identity it was seeking.280 However, the American newspaper did try to show some positive aspects as a justification for economic aid. After September 11, 2001, when the world became more concerned with questions of global security, the USA and the Russian Federation grew closer until the Iraq war began in 2003. France and Russia, among other states, as well as The New York Times’ editorial desk (but not the foreign desk) and Le Monde all opposed the war. In 2004 and early 2005, when Russia was keeping generally better relations with France than with the USA, The New York Times continued to criticize Russia in both its articles and editorials, whereas Le Monde’s criticisms appeared primarily in its articles. Western media have negatively represented Vladimir Putin since the time of his entry onto the international political stage (corresponding with the begin-
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ning of the second Chechen war), and this image persists281 despite some isolated journalistic efforts in the West to correct this impression.282 Anatol Lieven, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, wrote in 2005: Criticism of Putin, often justified, should be leavened with a recognition that on a number of vital issues, he is still pushing economic reform in the face of the entrenched opposition of the powerful elites and public opinion. Putin may be an uncomfortable partner, but the West is unlikely to get a better one. In a generation, things may look more hopeful. If they do, it will be due in large part to Vladimir Putin.283
Whatever Putin’s actions, his strong negative image, reinforced by his link with Russia’s history, will make it very difficult to transform Western memories about Russia as long as he remains in power. In February 2005, Russian Foreign Minister Sergej Lavrov wrote in Izvestija that “the current anti-Russia campaign” in American and European media “could damage reciprocal understanding and trust in the relations we have built up with so much effort over the years since the Cold War ended”, but that there would be no return to the Cold War, because “that would only make it more difficult for us to achieve our domestic socio-political objectives; it would hinder our efforts to ensure stable development and integrate Russia into global politics and the global economy”.284 Much of Western media criticism bore on Putin’s authoritarianism,285 thereby focusing on Putin’s personality (and extending this evaluation to the entire country), but not on the adequacy of the measures he took considering the socio-political situation in Russia at that particular time. In other words, Western media were judging the degree of democracy in Russia as if Russia was living in the same conditions as Western democracies,286 and in this manner reinforced already existing fears of Westernization in Russia. This perceived threat to Russian national identity nurtured discourses labelled as “anti-Western” and nationalist by Western media.287 At the level of the articles, two imbricated vicious circles had been created. On the one hand, the manner in which Putin is criticized in Western media reinforces fears for Russian national identity and encourages “anti-Western” discourses that are then denounced by Western media. On the other hand, Putin’s negative image renders even more crucial Russia’s attempts to improve its external image, and partly explains the pressure exerted on Russian media to participate in the transformation of collective memory; however, this pressure on media (mostly TV), applied also to counteract the oligarchs’ power, adds to the negative coverage of Russia by Western media. Thus, on both sides, the stereotypical anti-Other discourse is kept alive and well. Furthermore, in portraying Russian, French and American identities in connection with deeply entrenched cultural values / representations (i.e. human rights, liberal democracy, “barbaric” Russia), Le Monde and The New York Times hinder the renegotiation of these identities in the inter-
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national public sphere and in their respective national public sphere, and thereby restrict opportunities for social change.288 While the conjunction of different circumstances weakened the spiral of antiOther rhetoric, just as the occurrence of others had provoked it in the first place, the original sources of the spiral remain, as well as a general climate of mutual distrust that has been built by decades of recurring spirals and other incidents. Thus, there only needs to be another conjunction of relevant circumstances (e.g. a report on the adventures of a Chechen businessman in Paris – see 5.1.6) to revive a spiral of anti-Other rhetoric. And whatever the political conditions at a given time, politicians and diplomats involved in relations between Russia and the West have also breathed the same air of distrust (on the role of emotions in world politics, see Crawford 2000). .. Can it be avoided? As seen above, a spiral of anti-Other rhetoric has deep roots in a soil that is periodically fertilized. Should one conclude to its perennial character? First, as some French and American official positions have underlined (in particular Hubert Védrine in Le Monde diplomatique and Marianne, and Samuel Berger in “American power: hegemony, isolationism or engagement”; see respectively 2.2.1 and 2.3.1), there are ways to express one’s position in the framework of one’s national identity without offending the Other. Second, as Russian journalists (by personal choice or by editorial policy) have demonstrated, one can choose to nurture a conflict or not. Third, after three devastating wars in a century, France and Germany have shown that there can be a deliberate policy to bring people together and to try to build up trust between them. This, of course, requires the avoidance of actions that run deeply against the beliefs of the Other (like the violations of human rights in Chechnya, for example). It also necessitates a state of awareness: from the journalists who decide on what to report and how, and from the public who interprets the news. Thus, while it might not be totally possible to extract the roots of anti-Other rhetoric, they can at least be gradually paralyzed and maybe sterilized, if not for ever at least for a long time. But a last question remains: how many wars does it take to start building more than a truce, i.e. a long-term positive relationship?
. Social identity theory and the international media echo A study of the international media echo, i.e. interactions between different national media, bears also on group membership; Social Identity Theory can provide fruitful insights into this type of intergroup interactions (Rivenburgh 1997, 2000). Based on Tajfel’s work (1981, 1978, 1982, 1984), Social Identity Theory poses that
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“the social part of our identity derives from the groups to which we belong. By favourably comparing attributes of our own groups with those of out-groups, [. . .] we acquire both a positive sense of who we are and a clear understanding of how we should act toward in-group and out-group members” (Tajfel 1981: 174). Going one step further, Bar-Tal (1998: 112) suggests that social identity, i.e. “selfconception as a group member” (Abrams & Hogg 1990: 2), “is not based merely on categorization process, but also on beliefs which provide the rationale for group existence”. Intergroup discrimination that arises from the comparison of the ingroup with the out-group is linked with collective self-esteem: the higher the later, the more discriminatory bias subjects show in situations that threaten their social identity (Crocker & Luhtanen 1990). Furthermore, people with high personal self-esteem tend to accrue more positive self-evaluations through intergroup comparisons (Crocker et al. 1993; Crocker & Major 1989; Luhtanen & Crocker 1992), but also appear to show the highest levels of intergroup differentiation (Long & Spears 1997). Páez et al. (1998) stress that social identity has a stronger influence in collectivistic and sociocentric cultures than in individualistic or egocentric cultures, and that subjects of dominated groups, like those from collectivistic cultures, place more emphasis on group membership and thus on intragroup homogeneity. According to Social Identity Theory, Le Monde and The New York Times act as members of their respective national groups when they deal with other groups. Indeed, when Le Monde and The New York Times talked about Russia in 1999–2001, they endorsed their respective national values. As this happened when French and American national identities / international statuses were in process of redefinition, their tones, especially the French one, were more forceful than their usual high self-esteem would warrant, because they needed to ‘reassure’ themselves. In 1999–2000, Russia’s level of self-esteem was quite lower than during the Soviet Union as the transition to a capitalist Russian Federation was not going without serious economic and social problems. Thus, when Western, especially French, discourse touched on a core issue of national identity (i.e. the extent of national territory) as it was perceived with the war in Chechnya, the response to the French discourse could only be strong. In 2001, the situation changed. Russia had a new president in which people placed hope. Russia had finally adopted, nine years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, its State symbols (an anthem, a flag, and an emblem) around which the population could eventually gather and exist as a people. The economy had improved. When the debate turned more towards another key element of identity, that of defence, it was the discourse to the USA that became more severe, especially that by that time Russia was regaining some of its collective self-esteem and could start therefore to more or less ignore the continuing French discourse on Chechnya on the one hand, France’s international status being limited, and to allow itself to stand up against the USA, the only remaining superpower, on the other hand.
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Thus, in terms of Social Identity Theory, the fluctuations in the spirals of anti-other rhetoric between Le Monde / The New York Times and Izvestija / Nezavisimaja Gazeta / Segodnja from 1999 to 2001 were caused not by clashes of national identities, but by the different configurations of power relations between national self-esteems / sense of security levels that were engendered by variations of intensity in specific French, American and Russian issues of national identities. The French, American and Russian newspapers addressed their respective national audiences, and in order to connect with them at a challenging time, needed to rally them around key national values. In these circumstances, the negative presentations of the Other served primarily as an a contrario assertion of the national Self, who was not particularly directly praised neither in Le Monde nor in The New York Times nor in Russian newspapers. In Le Monde, it was even sharply criticized, but this criticism served to better underline the significance of French national values. To complicate even more complex matters, considering that Le Monde and The New York Times as elite newspapers very probably have a high self-esteem and also count in their midst editorialists with high personal self-esteem, it may well be that these editorialists emphasized the negative Other to accrue positive selfevaluations (of national values), and particularly in the case of Le Monde, to also emphasize their own positive self-evaluations within the national group. The Other was the subject of media discourses and appeared as the addressee, but the Other was not necessarily the goal of these discourses and therefore not the real addressee. The complexity of the entire process was deemed to affect the relationship between the national Self, the real addressee, and the national Other, the apparent addressee.
. Realism, constructivism and public spheres As the international media echo affects the relationship between the national Self and the national Other, it is useful to look at theories of international relations. Among them, realism (6.3.1) and constructivism (6.3.2) are often opposed although they do not necessarily exclude each other (6.3.3). Indeed, their combination provides an explanation for the relationship between France and Russia, and the USA and Russia in 1999–2001 (6.3.4). .. Realism Considered by many as the leading approach in the field, realism appears under different versions, but each of them shares the same central tenets (Schmidt 2002: 9): the sovereign State is the most important actor in international politics; State behavior can be explained rationally; States are unitary actors; there is a sharp
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distinction between domestic and international politics; States pursue power in an anarchical self-help setting; and, the issues of war and peace are paramount. These core claims have been strongly attacked, in particular State-centrism and the importance given to military issues. .. Constructivism Constructivism takes a very different approach to international relations. It emphasizes ideational factors, and it is based on two fundamental concepts, the social construction of knowledge and the construction of social reality. By focusing on the constitutive (in contrast to causal) process, it seeks to establish how the internal composition and organization of objects and events make their existence possible. Depending on their philosophical and sociological stance, different types of constructivism have developed (Adler 2002). Modernist constructivism is based on the belief that society can be understood and explained objectively. Modernist linguistic (or ‘rules’) constructivism aims to uncover how social facts are constituted by language and rules. Radical constructivism considers that the validity of normative or epistemic claims cannot be assessed and thus that science is a type of hegemony. Finally, critical constructivism pursues knowledge with the intent of emancipating society. By its nature, the question of the role of media in international relations placed this study within constructivism, and the model of interacting cascading networks that was followed as a framework favors a priori a type of constructivism that recognizes the most important role in international politics to States. In the modernist type of constructivism, Wendt (1996: 48) poses that: 1. states are the principal actors in the system; 2. the key structures in the states system are intersubjective rather than material; 3. state identities and interests are in large part constructed by those structures, rather than being determined exogeneously to the system by human nature or domestic politics.
According to Wendt, the structure of the States system is supervenient to the properties of States as agents, i.e. properties of the States system are constituted but not reducible to the material properties (economic and military capabilities) and ideational properties (cultural structure formed by interlocking beliefs, ideas, understandings, perceptions, identities) of each individual State. While the reciprocal is also valid, it is so to a lesser extent. States have a “corporate identity”, i.e. “the intrinsic qualities that constitute actor individuality”, and a “social identity”, i.e. “sets of meanings that an actor attributes to itself while taking the perspective of others – that is, as a social object” (Wendt 1996: 50–51). In the States system structure, constructivists attach more importance to the cultural elements than to the mate-
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rial ones, because “actors act on the basis of the meanings objects have for them, and meanings are socially constructed” (Wendt 1996: 50). Wendt’s approach to international relations leaves place for media to influence the definition of foreign policy, but not necessarily of international politics. Working in a social-communicative approach that draws on Habermas’ communicative action theory and treats human intentions and actions as “embedded in social relations in which communication, shared beliefs, norms, and identity commitments are present” (Caporaso 1993: 66), Reus-Smit (1997, 1999) contends that constructivists have paid insufficient attention “to the discursive mechanisms that link intersubjective ideas of legitimate statehood and rightful State action to the constitution of fundamental institutions” (1997: 563–564). He poses that a State social identity cannot be based solely on the concept of sovereignty; it must be embedded within a complex of values, the constitutional structures: Constitutional structures are coherent ensembles of intersubjective beliefs, principles, and norms that perform two functions in ordering international societies: they define what constitutes a legitimate actor, entitled to all the rights and privileges of statehood; and they define the basic parameters of rightful state action. (1999: 30) Hegemonic beliefs about the moral purpose of the state represent the core of [the constitutional structures], providing the justificatory foundations for the principle of sovereignty [differentiating political units] and the prevailing norm of pure procedural justice [specifying the correct procedure to formulate basic rules]. The term “purpose” refers here to the reasons that historical agents hold for organizing their political life into centralized, autonomous political units. [. . .] Such purposes are “moral” because they always entail a conception of the individual or social “good” served by autonomous political organization. [. . .] Finally, the beliefs about moral purpose of the state are “hegemonic” not because they are the only conceptions of the moral purpose of the state propagated in a given historical context, but because they constitute the prevailing, socially sanctioned justification for sovereign rights. (1999: 31)
Depending on their culture and history, States have different constitutional structures, and it is the variation in the moral purposes of States (at a point in time or throughout time) that explains divergent institutional practices. In his conclusion, Reus-Smit opposes his holistic constructivism to systemic constructivism that focuses on systematic interactions between unitary actors, as in Wendt’s approach. Holistic constructivism is able to explain the transformation of international societies thanks to its study of the interactions between domestic and international social phenomena. Holistic constructivism, in taking into account domestic social phenomena, allows for a possible impact of media on international politics. Other constructivists have argued that transnational relations and non-state actors matter in world politics, and not just States. Summarizing the evidence of
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diverse empirical studies in his edited book, Risse-Kappen (1995: 310–313) concludes that variation in domestic and international structures of governance mediates the policy impact of transnational actors (TNAs), and that these structures of governance appear to give a better explanatory leverage to the policy impact of TNAs than international power structures, inter-state bargaining, domestic politics, or issue-area and actor properties. Risse-Kappen adds that the policy impact of TNAs would need to be further studied from the point of view of communication and persuasion. By including non-state actors on the international scene, this approach opens the possibility of a role for media in world politics. .. Realism and constructivism as complementary approaches According to the stage-complementarity model, political actors go through different but not mutually exclusive phases of identity formation (that influence preferences and interests) and of strategic interaction choice (on the basis of a fixed identity). Fearon and Wendt (2002) view constructivism and the rationalist approach in realism as different manners to study international relations. In both approaches, ideas matter but for their constitutive role in constructivism and as causal factors in rationalism. Constructivism provides insightful analyses of the ideational logic, while rationalism exposes the choice of means to diverse ends in multi-actor settings. Thus, actors will justify their actions by appealing to instrumental considerations according to rationalists, but to normative considerations according to constructivists. Rationalists try to explain macro-level phenomena by reference to micro-level phenomena, whereas constructivists take the opposite position by arguing that components need to be understood to explain the whole. In other words, The core of the constructivist project is to explicate variations in preferences, available strategies, and the nature of the players, across space and time. The core of the rationalist project is to explain strategies, given preferences, information, and common knowledge. Neither project can be complete without the other. (Katzenstein et al. 1998: 682)
Because constructivism and rationalism complete each other, the choice of one over the other should be pragmatically decided. Petrova (2003: 146) notes that scholars have concentrated either on rationalism or constructivism, but that little progress has been made in linking the two stages of the model. A specific attempt to integrate key insights of rationalism and constructivism around the concepts of identity and interests is Lynch’s international public sphere theory (1999) that places communication at the center of International Relations Theory. This theory takes its roots on the tension between international deliberation (where the creation and manipulation of public consensus can have an impact
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because of the lack of an international political system that acts by taking authoritative decisions) and formal anarchy (resulting in nonbinding consensus because of the lack of an international political system). Lynch identifies three necessary conditions for the initiation of communicative action on state identity and preferences: perception of crisis, the presence of a public sphere, and a will to consensus. During periods of crisis in which a public sphere offers the potential for communicative action, change in actor identity and interests becomes possible. Once underway, a dialogue involves dynamics of persuasion and strategic framing which could result either in change or in the reinforcement of the status quo. During periods of “normal politics”, or where an effective public sphere does not exist, actor identity and interests are likely to be relatively stable, and rationalist models of strategic interaction should apply. (Lynch 1999: 11)
A public sphere thematizes issues, frames and interprets their significance and identifies alternative solutions. Lynch argues that The process of formulating justifications in the public sphere, and of articulating the relationship between identity and interests, establishes the meaning and range of legitimate action (public sphere as constitutive). Rather than simply being a question of the extent to which public opinion constrains state policy, the issue is the extent to which public sphere discourse constitutes the state’s articulation of interests. (Lynch 1999: 21)
Thus, when basic identities and interests are not at stake, they can be taken as constants and realist theory can apply, although constructivist insights can help make explicit key variables. However, when basic identities and interests are thematized in a public sphere, they are subject to change, and thus constructivism comes in. In sum, depending on the type of international relations theory, media has no effect on international politics (realism), or media influence on foreign policy can eventually translate to the international level (Wendt’s systemic constructivism), or media can have a direct impact on international politics (Reus-Smit’s holistic constructivism), and even achieve the status of a non-state actor (RisseKappen). This range of possibilities is compounded by the claimed complementarity of realism and constructivism (Fearon & Wendt 2002; Katzenstein et al. 1998; Lynch 1999). .. France, the USA and Russia in 1999–2001 From the beginning of the Second Chechen war to 2001 (and even later), French (official and media) criticism of Russia for the violation of human rights in Chechnya never stopped and neither did Russian media opposition to this criticism, but Franco-Russian relations thawed in the Fall of 2000 when their shared interests in the domain of defense became more acute. Both France and Russia opposed the
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American National Missile Defense (NMD) program and the revision of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty that they viewed as the cornerstone of their security (see 4.1.1.2 and 4.1.1.3). At the time of Putin’s first official visit to France (late October 2000), Russia’s economic situation was improving slightly but the war in Chechnya was continuing, and Russia was still debating its anthem, flag and emblem (they were adopted on 8 December 2000). In France, protest against the war in Chechnya continued in intellectual circles and in the media, although it might not have made headlines as large as it had previously. The European Union had resumed its help program to Russia, but the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe had still not restored Russia’s voting rights. Thus, the question of human rights in Chechnya was still being debated in European and French public spheres, and basically the “threats” to French identity (because of the violations of human rights) and Russian identity (because of European and French protests against the war in Chechnya, and because of Russia’s own internal problems) were still present. The basic grounds for the clash between France and Russia had been due to a question of national identity values (i.e. of “moral security”). What made the difference between their “chill” and “thaw” periods was the added high level of concern about the NMD system (i.e. about their “physical security”). The NMD system, too technical a question to mobilize public opinion in the same measure as humanitarian issues, was debated in a public sphere that was not nearly as large as the one for Chechnya. However, it was considered more important in the definition of France’s interests than the question of Chechnya. Thus, “physical security” appears to take precedence over “moral security” in the definition of foreign policy interests, and Risse-Kappen’s domestic structure hypothesis, according to which French public opinion is likely to play only a marginal role in the foreign policymaking process (see 2.2.2), seems to be verified in the case of matters of “physical security” but not of “moral security”. If, according to Lynch (see 6.3.3), “during periods of crisis in which a public sphere offers the potential for communicative action, change in actor identity and interests becomes possible” (1999: 11), one should consider in this case that a “moral crisis” situation would seem not to measure up to a “physical crisis” situation, and thus one might be tempted to conclude that realist theories apply in those cases. However, things appear a bit more complicated if one considers that, in fact, this “physical crisis” is also a “moral” situation in the sense that a major longstanding idea behind France’s attitude is the necessity for a multipolar world in which France can maintain its independence and status, i.e. its identity, directly or indirectly (through the European Union). Both France and Russia defend the idea of multilateralism and a multipolar world289 in which they would play an influential role, and it is conceivable that their official rapprochement against an American defense initiative was facilitated by the fact that Slavophilism, an im-
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portant current in Russia, puts society firmly first to the extent that it appears to neglect the rights of individuals (see 2.1.2.1), while individualism has very strong roots in the USA (see 2.3.3). France, however, stands in the middle because of its dual emphasis on social solidarity and individual rights (see 2.2.4). Thus, Zevelev (2002) contends that US-Russian relations should be examined as a “meeting between two entities with strikingly different perceptions of self and the world” (2002: 449). It is a shift in the composition of the global threat France and Russia perceived to their respective conceptions of the world that would have influenced their relations. The threat as presented by human rights violations in Chechnya did not stop being understood as such (France’s official criticism continued) and Russia continued to treat Western criticism about Chechnya as an interference in Russian internal affairs,290 but on both French and Russian sides, the Chechnya question was deemed less important than the perceived unilateralism of the American attitude about the NMD system. Aided by a (slightly) different combination of internal circumstances, questions of State interactions came to carry more weight than domestic values in France (human rights) and Russia (“triumph-over-alienforces” narrative template; see 5.4) in the definition of their State role identity that shaped their relations at the time. However, a previous different combination of internal circumstances and a lesser felt opposition with the American conception of the world had resulted in the predominance of these domestic values for the definition of their national interests. It is important to keep in mind that both types of threat have continued to coexist; it is the evaluation of their respective importance that varied. In other words, fluctuations due to a number of internal and external factors in the composition of the global threat perceived by Russia, France and the United States would explain the variations in the relations between the USA and France with Russia. Furthermore, rather than stating the absence of public sphere debates for the questions of the NMD system, it seems more relevant to say that debates in the French public sphere were less numerous and vehement partly because of a general consensus in the society and a certain confidence that the government would act according to this consensus. The Chechen war did not occasion the same level of confidence probably because of a general feeling that “State affairs” neglect individuals’ interests, and thus more participation in the public sphere ensued. In this regard, it is interesting to note the difference between Le Monde and The New York Times. While the French newspaper published only one editorial on missile defense issues291 and appeared to support the French government by not expressing any critical comment towards it, the American daily published five editorials292 and enjoined the Clinton and the Bush Administrations to negotiate with Russia. The New York Times was more engaged in the public sphere for two reasons: the direct involvement of its own State and its opposition to American unilateralism.
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In both cases, the impact of the editorials could only be minimal: in Le Monde because of the very low level of participation; in The New York Times because of the opposition to the process but not to the content, the NMD system itself. Because of the shift in the composition of the perceived global threat that resulted in the preeminence of a world organization issue linked to a defense question, and because of the low impact of the public sphere that could be interpreted as an absence of public sphere, it is very tempting to conclude to the application of realist theories. However, it is a constructivist presentation that explained the change from a situation where ideas (i.e. human rights) mattered most to the situation in which defense issues appeared the key element. In sum, this case study shows how a constructivist approach can make the link between a constructivist study of a situation and a rationalist one. To make this link more explicit, one would have to determine the factors leading to the preeminence at a specific time of a particular value over another In this respect, a lead certainly worthy of interest was brought up by social identity theory: the different configurations of power relations between personal or national self-esteems / sense of security levels because of variations of intensity in specific issues of national identities. Indeed, whoever (institutions, individuals) decides that a particular value prevails over another at a specific time holds a certain social identity and enjoys a certain degree of self-esteem.
. Media identities on the international stage In the constructivist approach, the definition of collective identity can be examined in three different manners (Herrmann 2002: 130): the group’s boundaries, i.e. who belongs to it; the attributes (features, values) shared by a modal member; and the relationship the collective actor assumes vis-à-vis other collective actors. The linguistic analysis showed how Le Monde and The New York Times pose themselves as figures of authority in order to be heard (see 3.2.3.2). Le Monde presents itself not only as a body of professional journalists and a representative of public opinion, but also as an independent and committed intellectual entity that defends the values of “Liberté, égalité, fraternité”. The New York Times constructs its authority on its mission to report “All the News that’s Fit to Print”, by a skillful presentation of arguments and use of information sources, a balance between the rational and the emotional, a contextualized evaluation of responsibilities, and self-confidence in its assessment of the situation. The linguistic analysis of the editorials also revealed how Le Monde and The New York Times position themselves on the international stage (see 3.2.3.1). Le Monde sees the world as a multilateral forum, while The New York Times considers it as a place for bilateral relations. Both newspapers directly address States, i.e. the
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main, and sometimes only, recognized actors in international politics. This raises the question of the level on which they act. Both newspapers appear to be endowed with a “moral purpose” (explicitly for Le Monde: “Liberté, égalité, fraternité” and human rights; and implicitly for The New York Times: American concept of liberal democracy; see 2.2.4. and 2.3.3) that would legitimate them as international entities. However, it could be a reflection of their belonging to their respective national State only, and therefore not be sufficient as a basis for their separate “social identity” in the international arena. Thus, it is necessary to examine their self-conception more in detail. What kind of status would Le Monde need in order to fulfill its role as guardian of human rights? In Le Monde’s conception, since human rights are universal, they should be respected everywhere in the world and enforced by every State. One could argue that Le Monde would need some sort of an international status to “talk” to States about their human rights record, but one could also say that the universalism of human rights gives everybody the duty to see that they are enjoyed universally. Le Monde expressly adheres to the French Republic’s motto, “Liberté, égalité, fraternité”, and this would deny the newspaper an international identity if these values (by their strong association with human rights, in the French understanding), did not refer to a natural law that is by definition above any national value. Although Le Monde mostly addresses France, Europe and the West (i.e. its three successive circles of belonging) when pinpointing their responsibility in regard to stopping the violation of human rights, the newspaper does not necessarily act as a concerned subject of these three entities, because it refers to human rights as natural law and not as Western, European or French law. Therefore, Le Monde could be considered as constructing its separate and independent social identity on the international stage “from the top”, i.e. through its “mission” that guides its actions. While Le Monde’s superior mission (encompassing the transmission of information) is to defend universal values, The New York Times’ motto, “All the News that’s Fit to Print”, assimilates the newspaper’s role to that of a “conveyor belt”, albeit a discriminating one. In doing so, The New York Times may convey facts and ideas that are critical of the current Administration on the internal and also external levels, as long as this criticism is based on national interest. The New York Times, therefore, does not need to present itself as an actor on the international stage. Contrarily to Le Monde’s, The New York Times’ “arrogance” does not stem from its mission, but from overstepping it. Indeed, in its editorial positions, the American newspaper not only heavily criticizes Russia, it also directly tells it what to do and how, and in this manner could be considered to construct its international identity “from the bottom”, i.e. through its actions. Remarkably, Le Monde’s and The New York Times’ self-conceptions and subsequent behavior closely parallel the trajectory of their respective national States.
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The French newspaper plants its roots in (universal) values and goes from there, while the American daily aims to fulfill a very pragmatic domestic function but goes beyond. On the one hand, despite their opposite starting points, Le Monde’s and The New York Times’ practices result in a comparable and very much decried arrogance because of the newspapers’ lack of legitimacy that is not solved by Le Monde’s claim of social representativeness (see 3.2.3.2.1). However, the universalism (if accepted as such and when not excessively tinted by a French lens) on which Le Monde grounds its positions on humanitarian topics may render it more acceptable to the rest of the world than The New York Times’ positions on democracy which are based on an American conception of the world. On the other hand, as a result of their opposite starting points, only Le Monde is provided with a “moral purpose”. However, newspapers are subjects of national law and, whatever their prestige and ambition, cannot be compared to States whose existence depends on constitutive (material and ideational) factors. Transnational actors (see 6.3.2) also are not States, but their impact on international politics is partly derived from their links across national boundaries. Neither Le Monde nor The New York Times belongs to a multinational media empire, and neither of them, although they could, builds a coalition with other like-minded media on a specific issue. If Le Monde and The New York Times behave like transnational actors, it remains to see whether and how States, or other international actors, interact with them. Particularly interesting, if one considers that a “moral basis” is explicitly given to the French daily’s transnational actions but only implicitly to the American one’s, is the fact that international actors did not answer specifically to The New York Times but did to Le Monde. The remarks below concern Le Monde only. At first, it would seem that Russian authorities acknowledge Le Monde as some sort of interlocutor because of their direct attacks against its actions (see 5.2.2). For example, when the chairman of Le Monde’s Executive Board, Colombani, replied to a remark of Jastrzhembskij, the Kremlin’s spokesman, that “these last weeks, Le Monde has become an actor on the Muscovite media and political stage. Simply because it has done its work”, it sounded more like a proud statement of Le Monde’s legitimacy as a transnational actor than like a defense. If it is true that in criticizing Le Monde directly, the Kremlin is in fact addressing France indirectly, and therefore treating Le Monde as a conveyor of the French government’s positions, it is also true that the Kremlin, but not necessarily other parts of Russian society, can dissociate the positions of Le Monde from the French government’s positions when they do not coincide, as shown by the manner in which Le Monde was responded to before and after the first official visit of Russian President, Putin, to France. The IMF, through the voice of its Managing Director, Michel Camdessus, also directly replied to Le Monde’s accusations, but clearly treated the newspaper as a separate entity from the French government (see 3.2.3.2.1). In this case it could not have
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Chapter 6. Crossing cultural and disciplinary boundaries
been otherwise, since Le Monde’s criticism was directed to the IMF, including one of its member States, France. Although human rights are considered universal in many parts of the world and especially in French society, Le Monde, by its explicit adherence to the French Republic’s values of “Liberté, égalité, fraternité”, reinforces the idea that human rights are a tool to promote Westernization (e.g. in Russia – see 5.3.1) even if as a transnational actor it takes position against the French government on the international stage.293 Thus, because of its dual social identity, Le Monde endeavors to promote freedom, equality and solidarity for and with the Other while simultaneously cultivating feelings of national insecurity in the Other. In sum, Le Monde and The New York Times start from opposite ends on universal/domestic and idealistic/pragmatic function axes, and meet somewhere towards the middle. None of them is a subject of international law, but both strive to have an impact on world affairs through their editorial positions that are known for their arrogance, one because of the source of its positions (guardian of universal values), the other because of the practical effects of its positions (application of American conceptions to the rest of the world). Although both newspapers appear to reconcile their opposite starting points, it seems that, in this case, Le Monde’s transnational status is more easily recognized, perhaps due to its “moral purpose”. On the international stage, Le Monde and The New York Times have behaved like transnational actors. On their domestic stage, they have been reminders to their respective governments and national audiences of the “moral purpose” of their State.
. Crossing boundaries The purpose of this case study in Critical Discourse Analysis was to investigate media roles and status in international politics as it appears through the phenomenon of international media echo. To explore the interactions of editorials produced in different languages and cultures, disciplinary boundaries have been crossed by the means of a linguistic model of analysis based on cognitive psychology combined with a media context model informed by Social Identity Theory and International Relations theories. More precisely, a linguistic coherence analysis based on cognitive psychology revealed the information most likely to remain in long-term memory (i.e. the macrostructures), and thus the information most relevant for the editorials’ analysis. As these editorials reconstruct international public debates in which Others take part, it is important to find out who the participants are and how they are characterized. This was done with the study of appropriate metadiscursive structures and with the coding of macrostructures. This linguistic textual analysis that
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The Spiral of “Anti-Other Rhetoric”
revealed the content of the editorials was then completed by a contextual analysis following Entman’s model (2004) in political science / communication studies, thereby uncovering the reciprocal effects between editorials and society. Finally, as the purpose of the editorials’ analysis was the study of the phenomenon of international media echo that involves questions of national identities, Social Identity Theory and International Relations theories were used to explain the interactions of which the editorials were part. The multidisciplinary approach followed in this study has proved fruitful by what it has brought and what it opens. The linguistic analysis revealed the basic underlying opposition between Le Monde’s and The New York Times’ positions, despite their apparent overall agreement on Russia. The application of the interacting cascading networks model showed that media, in taking position on international affairs, can and do play a long-term role (independently of the place left to them by governments) in a way not previously recognized, and that governments not only use media for their own purposes but also must take media positions into account when conducting their policies. Furthermore, the combination of the cognitive approach to text analysis (i.e. coherence analysis) and framing (i.e. Entman’s definition) with the interacting cascading networks model brought to the fore the deep French and American cultural structures that underlie Le Monde’s and The New York Times’ frames, and showed how these frames, Le Monde’s in particular, contributed to the shaping of a specific discursive community through their participation in public deliberation. The constructivist approach followed in this study showed how a realist approach can become appropriate in a constructivist understanding of a situation, and an interesting path to explore the links between constructivism and realism was offered by the application of Social Identity Theory. In sum, this study revealed the fundamental functioning of the “spiral of anti-Other rhetoric”, also called “media wars”. From the discourse perspective, the question of media multiple identities and their choice of a specific (single or combined) identity for a particular issue would need to be further examined in connection with the force of their argumentation on the topic in question. Indeed, if in international affairs media can basically present three types of identity (national, international, professional), their choice is likely to be even larger (national, regional, political, professional) within their own domestic society. From the media studies perspective, apart from the questions arising from the interacting cascading networks model that have not been treated here, it would be fruitful to analyze and compare the parallel coverage of a particular issue in articles on the one hand and in editorials on the other, both in relation to the national or international context and the media identity(ies). For example, could a difference of coverage in articles and editorials correspond to a different type of identity chosen by the media?
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Chapter 6. Crossing cultural and disciplinary boundaries
From the international relations perspective, the links between constructivist and realist approaches can be further explored with Social Identity Theory by looking into what leads to the preeminence at a specific time of a particular value over another. From a combined discourse / media / international relations perspective, it would be interesting to have scholars with a non-Western cultural background conduct comparable enquiries relating to their respective national society, and test further the interacting cascading networks model. Such studies would give us much needed insight into the cultural intricacies of multilateral diplomacy. While undeniably stimulating and enriching, crossing boundaries can also be “hazardous”, as one is much more likely to stumble and get lost on unfamiliar territories than on one’s own. However, these unfamiliar territories are not empty and one can find assistance. As a linguist, I have ventured into the domains of media studies, Social Identity Theory and international relations, and I hope that specialists in these fields will find enough of interest in this work to bring it further.
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appendix
Editorials
Le Monde 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31.
Le FMI et la Russie, 06 August 1999. Le naufrage de Boris Eltsine, 11 August 1999. “Cauchemar” à Moscou, 19 August 1999. Questions au FMI, 27 August 1999. Silence sur la Tchétchénie, 27 September 1999. Ingérence en Tchétchénie, 07 October 1999. Grozny: silence on tue, 30 October 1999. Massacre en Tchétchénie, 05 November 1999. Tchétchénie: fermer les yeux, 26 November 1999. Inquiétante Russie, 08 December 1999. Russie: Que faire ?, 11 December 1999. Le chaos russe, 14 December 1999. Démission en Tchétchénie, 19–20 December 1999. L’ère Poutine, 21 December 1999. Les deux faces de M. Poutine, 02–03 January 2000. Parler franc à M. Poutine, 23–24 January 2000. De Vienne à Grozny, 09 February 2000. Poutine et les Occidentaux, 19 February 2000. Le sacre sanglant de M. Poutine, 26–27 March 2000. Poutine, pour quoi faire ?, 29 March 2000. Le premier geste de M. Poutine, 13 May 2000. Une nouvelle ère stratégique, 06 June 2000. Leçons d’une libération, 14 June 2000. En Tchétchénie, le pire, 06 June 2000. L’inquiétant M. Poutine, 14 July 2000. D’un naufrage à L’autre, 19 August 2000. Le “Koursk ” et le Kremlin, 24 August 2000. Parler avec M. Poutine, 29–30 October 2000. Bonapartisme russe, 07–08 January 2001. Jour de honte, 27 January 2001. L’odyssée de Mir, 24 March 2001.
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32. La presse russe sous contrôle, 17 April 2001. 33. La guerre de M. Poutine, 12 July 2001
The New York Times 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35.
The Russian Money trail, 31 August 1999. The Russian Money Trail, 12 September 1999. Russian Terrors, New and Old, 20 September 1999. Russia’s Chechen Gamble, 28 September 1999. Russia’s Ominous Moves on Chechnya, 04 October 1999. Selling Russia on Missile Defense, 21 October 1999. Bombings in Chechnya, 22 October 1999. Mr. Gorbachev’s Role, 10 November 1999. Chechnya and the West, 19 November 1999. Ending the Brutality in Chechnya, 09 December 1999. Boris Yeltsin’s Outburst, 10 December 1999. Russia’s Parliamentary Vote, 14 December 1999. Russia’s New Parliament, 21 December 1999. Delaying a Russian Loan, 27 December 1999. Russia’s Losing War, 28 December 1999. Russia’s Flawed Reformer, 02 January 2000. Reforms Russia Needed, 07 January 2000. The Debilitated Russian Military, 18 January 2000. Mr. Putin’s Risky Courtship, 23 January 2000. Russia’s Empty Victory, 08 February 2000. The Putin Puzzle, 26 March 2000. A Chilling Prosecution in Moscow, 15 June 2000. Mr. Putin and the Plutocrats, 16 June 2000. Mr. Putin’s Political Gyroscope, 06 August 2000. Russia’s Unsafe Nuclear Submarines, 18 August 2000. The Kursk and the Kremlin, 23 August 2000. Religious Freedom in Russia, 16 September 2000. The Leaner Russian Military, 15 November 2000. The Truth About a Hero’s Death, 29 November 2000. A Spy Conviction in Moscow, 08 December 2000. A Russian Return to Havana, 15 December 2000. Russia’s Health Care Emergency, 02 January 2001. Dealing with Mr. Putin, 17 March 2001. Repercussion of a Spy Case, 23 March 2001. Effective Nuclear Disarmament, 31 March 2001.
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Appendix 1. Editorials
36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41.
Autonomous Television in Russia, 07 April 2001. Russia’s Endangered Media, 18 April 2001. A Promising Start With Russia, 18 June 2001. Invitation to an Arms Race, 20 June 2001. Terrorizing Civilians in Chechnya, 13 July 2001. Triangular Democracy, 18 July 2001.
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appendix
Chronology
Entries in italics indicate events that are connected to the case study but indirectly. September 19, 1997 The Duma adopts the law, “On Freedom of Conscience and on Religious Associations.” All religious organizations registered in Russia prior to that date must re-register under the new law before 31 December 1999. The deadline is then extended to 31 December 2000 by Putin.
1999 March 12 March 29 June 10 July 23 July 28 August 1 August 4 August 6 August 7
August 9 August 10
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic join NATO. NATO launches an 11-week campaign of air strikes against Yugoslavia to push Serb forces out of Kosovo. NATO suspends its air strikes after Slobodan Milosevic agrees to withdraw Serbian forces from Kosovo. The Russian 4-month boycott on contacts with NATO ends. The IMF approves a $4.5 billion financial package to help Russia until/during elections. The Paris Club (composed of States) agrees to spread out Russia’s payments of the former USSR debt for 1999–2000. Fatherland Party merges with All Russia movement. The IMF makes public an audit report confirming that Russia invested IMF funds in Jersey for speculative purposes. 1,000–1,200 fighters coming from Chechnya seize several villages and small towns on the Chechen-Dagestani border (Botlikh region). Yeltsin fires PM Stepashin and entire cabinet; he names Vladimir Putin as acting prime minister. A government of “Independent Islamic Dagestan” is declared by forces around Shamil Basaev. Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov denies Chechnya’s involvement in Dagestan. Putin promises that rebels will be crushed in two weeks.
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August 11 August 13 August 16 August 17 August 17 August 19
August 22 August 24
August 25 August 26 August 27
August 29
August 31
September 2 September 4 September 8 September 13 September 16 September 23
Shamil Basaev claims leadership over the troops in Dagestan. Russian forces use helicopter gunships. Russia conducts 14 air strikes against rebels in the Botlikh region. Putin is confirmed as prime minister. Yevgeny Primakov agrees to head the Fatherland-All Russia Movement. The ruble is allowed to drop in value by up to 34 percent. The Bank of New York confirms that it is being investigated for its use by Russian mafia in money laundering. The total sum is estimated at $10 million and part of it came from IMF loans. Four small radical political parties join to become the Stalinist Bloc. Chechen rebels announce withdrawal from the Botlikh region. Sergei Kiriyenko, Boris Nemtsov and Irina Khakamada form the Union Right-Wing Forces Block. Yeltsin meets with Chinese president, Jiang Zemin. The Swiss attorney general in Geneva opens an inquiry into the bank accounts of 24 Russian personalities. The parliament approves $4.1 million in emergency reconstruction for Dagestan and $500 thousand for assistance for displaced persons (estimated at over 10,000). The space station, Mir, is abandoned by its crew after 13 years of use. Russian forces attack strongholds of Islamic fundamentalists in Karamakhi and Chabanmakhi villages after their population refuses calls to disarm. Bomb explodes in a video game parlor in the Manež shopping mall near the Kremlin; leaflets are left by the Union of Revolutionary Writers. Russian Defense Minister reports concentration of gunmen in Chechnya on the border of Dagestan. A TV network is forced off the air by the new media ministry after they reported on a political party led by Boris Nemtsov. Apartment building in Dagestan is bombed (64 killed, 146 injured). Apartment building in Moscow is bombed (94 killed, about 200 injured). Apartment building in Moscow is bombed (more than 120 killed). Apartment building in Volgodonskij Rostov is bombed (18 killed, more than 100 injured). Russian fighter jets bomb targets in and around Grozny.
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Appendix 2. Chronology
September 24 Thousands of civilians evacuate Grozny. September 25 The G7 confirms its policy of economic support for Russia despite the accusations of money laundering. September 29 Russia demands that Chechnya condemn terrorists responsible for the Moscow bombings. First Western statement on Chechnya – Declaration of the French, German and Italian Ministers of Foreign Affairs expressing their deep concern about the situation in Chechnya. September “Operation Whirlwind” sees the arrest of over 11,000 bombing suspects. October 1 Putin cuts ties with the elected Chechen government. October 2 US and Russia open a new video-conferencing center in Moscow. October 4 President Slobodan Milosevic leaves office after widespread demonstrations throughout Serbia and the withdrawal of Russian support. October 6 Chechen president calls for a holy war against Russia. October 13 The American Senate rejects the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, signed in 1996 by President Bill Clinton. October 26 Russia refuses an American offer of cooperation in missile defense in exchange of a revision of the ABM Treaty. November 4 Russia allows thousands of refugees to flee Chechnya; crossing at the Sleptsovskaya border reaches 500 people per hour. The European Parliament refuses credits to Russia in protest against the Russian military intervention in Chechnya. November 9 Russia strongly protests against the visit of Mr. Akhmadov, Chechen Minister of Foreign Affairs, in Paris. Michel Camdessus, Managing Director of the IMF, resigns from his position. November 15 The Russian Finance minister announces he will request the Western commercial banks to cancel $12 billion in Soviet-era debt. November 18–19 In Istanbul, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) ends a two-day summit by calling for a political settlement in Chechnya and adopting a Charter for European Security. Yeltsin reluctantly accepts the principle of the OSCE political involvement in the Caucasus. November 21 5,000 rebels barricade themselves in Grozny in preparation for the Russian offensive. December 1 Duma passes bill that vastly increases the powers of security services to deal with terrorism.
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December 6
December 9
December 10
December 19
December 25 December 31
Russian army command issues an ultimatum to Grozny’s population: if they do not leave Grozny by the 11th, they will be considered as terrorists and will be killed. During Yeltsin’s visit in Beijing, Russia and China sign three agreements that bring an end to three centuries of border litigations. The European Union at its Helsinki summit asks for the end of Russian bombings in Chechnya, and for the withdrawal of the ultimatum to the civilian population in Grozny. At the Russian parliamentary elections, the Communist party led by Gennadij Zjuganov remains the most important party (24.29%; 113 seats), but for the first time Yeltsin can count on a majority in the Parliament based on the alliance of several parties. The Russian army starts it final assault against Grozny. Yeltsin resigns, and hands power over to Putin.
2000 January 3
January 14 January 16
January 18
Acting President Vladimir V. Putin takes charge of Kremlin and dismisses staff members who had been loyal to Yeltsin, including Yeltsin’s daughter who is suspected in corruption scandals involving the Kremlin. Russia tightens its nuclear arms policy and suggests turning to nuclear power if other means of resolution fail. The association of the “Soldiers’ Mothers” declares that more than 3,000 Russians soldiers have been killed and about 6,000 have been injured since September 1999. Andrei Babitsky, Russian journalist working for the American Radio Liberty is arrested by Federal Forces outside of Grozny and held captive in a “filtration camp”. On 3 February, he is “exchanged” for several Russian soldiers and handed over to allegedly pro-Russian Chechen fighters. The fighters then hand the journalist over to an unidentified handler, who finally releases Babitsky in Dagestan. On 25 February, he is again arrested by Russian Federal Forces and accused of “possession of a fake passport”. He is finally released on 29 February, but placed under house arrest in Moscow. In October, a court of first instance orders Babitsky to pay an 8350 Ruble fine for holding a fake passport. Russian forces enter Grozny.
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Appendix 2. Chronology
January 20–21 The Austrian governmental coalition between Socialists (SPÖ) and Christian-conservatives (ÖVP) collapses. Negotiations for the conclusion of a governmental alliance start between the conservatives of the ÖVP and the populists of the Freedom Party (FPÖ) led by Jörg Haider. January 27 The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) rejects a social-democrat and socialist amendment for sanctions against Russia about Chechnya. February 6 Grozny falls. February 11 The London Club (commercial banks) and Russia agree on a restructuration of part of Russia’s $32 billion external debt that was inherited from the former Soviet Union. February 14 Russia makes Grozny off-limits as officials check for bombs. February 16 Russia reconciles with NATO and ends an 11-month estrangement. March 25 Vladimir V. Putin is elected president of the Russian Federation with 52.52% of the ballots. March 23 Horst Köhler is appointed Managing Director of the IMF. March 31 Putin wants to preserve Russia’s nuclear power; he stresses it is for efficiency and not arms race. April 2 Mary Robinson, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, calls for Moscow to inquire into human rights abuses in Chechnya. April 6 The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe votes for the suspension of Russia’s voting rights. The Assembly also asks the Committee of Ministers to start a suspension procedure immediately. April 11 In the UN Human Rights Commission, the European Union demands of Russia to inquire into massacres and human rights violations committed by its troops. April 14 The Duma (lower house of the Russian Parliament) approves the Start II treaty signed by Washington and Moscow in January 1993. April 21 Putin hints at Chechnya peace plan as he meets with Chechen president Aslan Maskhadov. April 28 The USA present to Russia their proposed revisions for the ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty signed in 1972. May 7 Putin is sworn in as president. May 10 Putin appoints Mikhail M. Kasyanov as prime minister.
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May 11
May 18
May 26 June 1
June 4
June 8
June 9
June 12
June 13
June 28
June 30 July 1 July 10
Russian police search the head office of the anti-Kremlin Media-Most group (belonging to Gusinskij), as well as the offices of two of the group companies, NTV Internet and Memonet. Authorities cite a pre-trial investigation on Media-Most’s security services as the reason for the search. On the request of the Swiss import-export firm Noga, the accounts of the Russian Embassy in Paris are frozen. This decision will be overturned on August 10 by the Paris Cour d’appel. Russian intellectuals, members of the Russian Pen-Club, take position against the war in Chechnya. The German Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, tells Clinton his worries about Washington’s project of a missile defense shield against “rogue States”. At the first US-Russian summit since Putin’s election, Clinton and Putin are unable to agree on missile defence. Putin refuses a revision of the ABM Treaty (that would be necessary for Washington’s project of a limited National Missile Defense system). Putin places the civil administration in Chechnya directly under his control. A report by Amnesty International denounces the Russian “filtration camps” in Chechnya. Chirac declares that Germany and France share the same worries about the consequences the NMD system would have on the ABM treaty. Putin appoints the Muslim cleric, Mufti Akhmed Kadyrov, to govern Chechnya. The French photograph, Brice Fleutiaux, who had been taken hostage in October 1999 in Chechnya, is liberated by Russian forces. Vladimir A. Gusinskij is jailed after weeks of government pressure on his anti-Kremlin Media-Most news group on financial charges. He is released three days later after having been charged of economic fraud. A bold plan is designed to overhaul the faltering economy. The upper house of the Parliament rejects Putin’s plan to disband it in favor of an elected senate. The Duma (lower house) gives the president the power to dismiss governors. Russia ratifies the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban treaty. France presides over the European Union until December 31. The European Union decides to resume its help programs for Russia.
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Appendix 2. Chronology
July 13
July 17 July 18
July 21–23 August 8 August 10
August 12
August 14 August 28 September 1
September 4 September 8 September 9 September 12
September 18 October 3 October 26
The Russian tall ship ”Sedov” is seized in the western French port of Brest on a French court decision in a law suit by the Swiss company Noga which accuses the Russian State of owing it US $66 million of debt. The boat is released on July 25. As a consequence of this incident, Putin cancels his planned meeting with Chirac at the G8 summit in Japan. Boris Berezovskij resigns from the Parliament to protest against Putin’s authoritarian turn. Putin and Jiang Zemin call for the international community to oppose the American project of a missile defense system that would create a strategic unbalance. This call is reiterated at the ASEAN regional forum in Bangkok on July 27. First G8 summit (in Okinawa) for Putin and last one for Clinton. Bomb explosion in the Moscow’s subway (8 killed, more than 100 injured). The Paris Cour d’appel [Court of Appeal] overturns the May 18 decision to freeze the accounts of the Russian Embassy in Paris that was made on the request of the Swiss import-export firm Noga. Russian submarine Kursk sinks in the Barents Sea. All 118 men aboard die. Russian media and public opinion are very critical of the way Russian officials mishandled the rescue operation. Nicholas II and his family are canonized. Fire in Moscow’s Ostankino television tower. Clinton decides to delay by one year the decision to construct a National Missile Defense (NMD) system. The decision will thus depend on his successor. Bomb explosion in a Riazan’s market (3 killed, 10 injured) Moscow announces its intention to downsize its army by 350,000 men from 2001 to 2003. Putin signs the Information Security Doctrine of the Russian Federation. The European Union lifts the sanctions against the Austrian coalition government, but asks to keep Jörg Haider’s party (FPÖ) under particular scrutiny. Moscow links the conclusion of a new Start III Treaty with the abandon of the American project of a missile defense shield. During Putin’s visit in New Delhi, Russia and India sign a strategic partnership agreement. A message from a Kursk sailor is recovered, showing that 23 sailors had survived a few hours after the explosion.
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October 30–31 Putin participates in the European Union summit in Paris. At the end of the summit, he starts his first official visit in France. October 31 One American and two Russian astronauts are launched into orbit, becoming the first occupants of the international base. November 7 The democrat Gore and the republican Bush are successively declared the winner of the American presidential elections. November 9 Russian military forces are cut by 600,000 men. November 12 American democrats and republicans start a court fight over the manual recount of ballots in Florida. November 13 Vladimir V. Gusinskij reluctantly agrees to give up control of publishing and broadcasting empire (Media-Most). November 28 During the monthly inter-ministerial conference of the OSCE, Russia refuses to allow OSCE observers in Chechnya. Grozny’s market is razed by Russian tanks. December 6 American Edmond Pope is convicted as spy in Russia and is sentenced to 20 years in prison. He is soon pardoned by Putin on humanitarian grounds. December 8 Russia agrees to curtail arms sales to Iran. The Duma adopts an anthem, a flag and an emblem for the Russian Federation (nine years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union). The Salvation Army’s application for registration as a religious organization is rejected in Moscow. It is judged to be an unwelcome foreign military organization, and is evicted from its offices on January 1. December 12 The American Supreme Court rules against the recount of litigious ballots. December 13 Al Gore concedes his defeat. December 31 Deadline for the registration of religious organizations according to the 1997 law, “On Freedom of Conscience and on Religious Associations.”
2001 January 5 January 6
Russia cannot pay its debt to the Paris Club (States) for the first trimester of 2001. It asks for a new spreading-out of its payments. The United States Congress, presided over by Vice President Al Gore as President of the Senate, certifies George W. Bush’s Electoral College victory. George W Bush is thus the winner of the 2000 presidential election.
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Appendix 2. Chronology
January 7 January 18
January 11 January 20 January 22 January 25 February 5
February 5 February 18
February 25 February 26
March 12 March 23 March 23
March 28 March 31
April 14 April 16
Putin pledges that Russia will pay all of its Soviet-era international debts. Pavel Borodin, secretary of the Russia-Belarus Union, is arrested at the JFK airport (New York) on the request of the Swiss Federal Office of Justice for charges of money laundering and participation in a criminal organization. After the kidnapping of a Doctors Without Borders’ volunteer, humanitarian organizations decide to leave Chechnya. The republican George W. Bush is sworn in President of the USA. Putin gradually replaces the army by FSB forces in Chechnya. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe restores Russia’s voting rights. Putin dismisses Alexander Gavrin the energy minister and Yevgeny Nazdratenko, governor of the Primorye region due to an energy crisis that left thousands without heat, Explosion in Moscow’s subway. FBI agent Robert Hanssen is arrested and charged for having spied for Russia for 15 years. About 50 Russian diplomats are expulsed [from the United States]. Russian military officials promise to investigate mass grave in Chechnya. The Treaty of Nice reforms the institutional structure of the European Union to allow for its upcoming enlargement (to Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia). Russia and Iran sign military and economic agreements in Moscow. Moscow expels 4 American diplomats. The Mir space station, symbol of the Soviet Union’ successes, ends its 13-year odyssey and lands in the Pacific. (Cf. 27 August 1999). Invited to the European Union summit in Stockholm, Putin rejects the European demand for a political settlement in Chechnya. Putin replaces his defence and interior ministers. 20,000 people gather in Pushkin Square to defend Gusinskij’s NTV network from the government’s 10-month financial and legal campaign. Gazprom security forces seize the NTV headquarters in Moscow; many correspondents quit. Gazprom closes down Segodnja, Gusinskij’s daily newspaper.
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May 1
Bush officially presents his project of National Missile Defense that completely obliterates the 1972 ABM treaty. The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom issues its second annual report on religious persecution worldwide (with the exception of the United States). It features China, India, Indonesia, Russia, Pakistan, Nigeria, Iran, Sudan, Vietnam and North Korea. June 6 The American Senate’s majority turns democrat. June 16 Bush and Putin meet for the first time (in Slovenia) and exchange invitations. June 17–24 The Russian delegation at Le Bourget aviation fair (France) is warned in advance by air show officials of the request of the Swiss company Noga to seize two military jets for unpaid debts by the Russian Federation. The jets are promptly towed to a secure area at the airport. The planes are then given permission to leave and provided an air corridor to Russia by the French aviation authorities. July 1 First French official visit in Russia since Putin’s election. July 5 Top journalists at Ekho Moskvy, Gusinskij’s radio station, resign to protest Gazprom takeover. July 16 During Jiang Zemin’s official visit in Moscow, China and Russia sign a treaty of friendship and cooperation for 20 years that underlines their common opposition to the American project of missile defense shield. July 19–22 G8 summit in Genoa. Bush and Putin meet for the second time and reach an agreement on the ABM Treaty. July 31 Russian commandos free Chechen hostages. September 11 Terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington, DC.
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appendix
Coherence analysis
In their writing, authors build coherence at micro- and macrolevels (Kintsch & van Dijk 1978; van Dijk 1997), i.e. they link the new and the old within sentences and paragraphs to give their text a global meaning. In their comprehension process, readers “make sense” of the text, i.e. they reconstruct a coherence for it. The construction of coherence is a psychological process in which inferences are drawn to link sentences on the basis of linguistic knowledge, domain knowledge and world knowledge. This results in the understanding of the text as an entity to which the readers can assign a global intention (Charolles 1983; Givòn 1995; Hobbs 1979; Sanders et al. 1992). The coherence reconstructed by readers might not be exactly the same as the authors’, but there is a limited number of readings for each text; in other words, the number of coherence reconstructions that can be done for each text is limited. Thus, the analysis leading to the reconstruction of a text coherence must be verifiable. In this work, coherence is reconstructed with a formal model of analysis (Le 1996) that integrates work done on processes of text production and interpretation by van Dijk (1980), Kintsch (1988, 1998), Hobbs (1985, 1990), and Daneš (1974). In this integrated model, coherence links between syntactic sentences294 are established on the basis of the type of logico-semantic relation existing between pairs of elements in the sentences. There are three basic relations: coordination (elaboration and parallelism), subordination, and superordination. These relations are Hobbs’ relations of expansion that have been completed (A3.1). Once these relations have been recognized between the text sentences, it is possible to determine the themes and macrostructures on which the argumentation is based (A3.2). The combination of both these steps reveals the hierarchical structure of the text (A3.3). A table summarizing the coherence coding is given (A3.4), and is followed by the complete analysis of an editorial (A3.5).
. Relations of coherence In the process of establishing the type of relation between two sentences S1 and S2, each of them is considered to contain three parts. Thus, S1 contains the elements x1, p1 and a1: x1 is taken as the commentary, the link, made on the pair of
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elements, p1 and a1. Similarly, in S2, x2 is taken as the commentary made on the pair of elements, p2 and a2. For example, let us take the first two sentences of the third paragraph (sentences 8 and 9 from the beginning of the text) in the New York Times’ editorial about the Swedish diplomat, Raoul Wallenberg, “The Truth about a Hero’s Death” (29 November 2000) (for the complete analysis, see below A3.5): 3-8: In recent months the Russians, in conjunction with Sweden, have been trying in earnest to find out what really happened [to Wallenberg]. 3-9: In Budapest during World War II Wallenberg took great personal risks, issuing Swedish passports to at least 20,000 Jews who were being threatened by the Nazis with death marches and deportation to concentration camps.
In sentence 3.8, the element p1, “Wallenberg”, is implied by the expression “what happened” [implied: during and after World War II] that represents a1. Knowledge of co-text and context allow for the implication of element p1 and a specification of element a1. In this sentence, “in recent months the Russians, in conjunction with Sweden, have been trying in earnest to find out” (x1) is what links p1 and a1. In 3.9, “Wallenberg” stands for p2, and “during World War II” for a2. 3-8 p1 = [Wallenberg] (a1 = what happened [during and after World War II]) 3-9 p2 = Wallenberg (a2 = during World War II)
Each relation of coherence, be it coordination, subordination or superordination, depends on the combination of the relations of inclusion that exist between p1 and p2, and between a1 and a2. In total, 21 such combinations that cover all possible cases can be defined. For example, when the elements p1 of S1 and p2 of S2 represent the same signifié (p1 = p2), definitions for the different types of relations between S1 and S2 are as follows. If the elements a1 and a2 represent the same signifié (a1 = a2), then the sentences S1 and S2 are said to be coordinated by elaboration. If the signifié of a1 and the signifié of a2 both belong to the same set (a1 ⊂ Σ and a2 ⊂ Σ), then the sentences S1 and S2 are said to be coordinated by parallelism. If the signifié of a1 is included in the signifié of a2 (a1 ⊂ a2), then S1 is said to be subordinated to S2. If the signifié of a2 is included in the signifié of a1 (a2 ⊂ a1), then S1 is said to be superordinated to S2. In the example given above, we find that on the one hand, p1 and p2 represent the same signifié, and on the other hand, the signifié of a2 is included in the signifié of a1; thus, 3-9 is subordinated to 3-8: 3-8 p1 = [Wallenberg] (a1 = what happened [during and after World War II]) 3-9 p2 =Wallenberg (a2 = during World War II) And p1 = p2 and a2 ⊂ a1 → Relation: subordination
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Appendix 3. Coherence analysis
The three following tables (A3-1 to A3-3) give the definitions for all coherence relations (coordination, subordination, and superordination). The relations marked with an asterisk (*) are Hobbs’ relations of expansion (1985, 1990). Thus, when we read a text and thereby construct its coherence, we are brought to compare the meaning of lexical items, and to determine how the ranges of these meanings relate to each other. Once the entire text has been analyzed in this manner, a graph representing the configuration of coherence relations between sentences within each paragraph is drawn.
Table A3-1 Relations of coordination Units of analysis Relations
Relations
1)
* Opposition p(a) non-p(a) * Contrast p(a) non-p(b) and ∃ Σ / a ⊂ Σ and b⊂Σ Contrast p(a) non-p(B) and p(A) implied and a ⊂ A and ∃ Σ / A ⊂ Σ and B⊂Σ Contrast p(A) non-p(b) and p(B) implied and b ⊂ B and ∃ Σ / A ⊂ Σ and B⊂Σ W/O
S1 S2 2) S1 S2
3) S1 S2
4) S1 S2
5) S1 S2
* Elaboration p(a) p(a) * Parallelism p(a) p(b) and ∃ Σ / a ⊂ Σ and b⊂Σ Parallelism p(a) p(B) and p(A) implied and a ⊂ A and ∃ Σ / A ⊂ Σ and B⊂Σ Parallelism p(A) p(b) and p(B) implied and b ⊂ B and ∃ Σ / A ⊂ Σ and B⊂Σ Parallelism p(a) p’(b) and ∃ R / p R a and p’ R b and ∃ Σ’ / p ⊂ Σ’ and p’ ⊂ Σ’ and ∃ Σ / a ⊂ Σ and b⊂Σ
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Table A3-2 Relations of subordination Units of analysis Relations
Relations
6)
Contrast p(A) non-p(a) and a ⊂ A Contrast P(A) non-p(a) and a ⊂ A and p ⊂ P Contrast p(A) non-p’(a) and a ⊂ A and ∃ Σ / p ⊂ Σ and p’ ⊂ Σ
S1 S2 7) S1 S2 8) S1 S2
* Subordination p(A) p(a) and a ⊂ A Subordination P(A) p(a) and a ⊂ A and p ⊂ P Subordination p(A) p’(a) and a ⊂ A and ∃ Σ / p ⊂ Σ and p’ ⊂ Σ
Table A3-3 Relations of superordination Units of analysis Relations
Relations
9)
Contrast p(a) non-p(A) and a ⊂ A Contrast p(a) non-P(A) and a ⊂ A and p ⊂ P Contrast p(a) non-p’(A) and a ⊂ A and ∃ Σ / p ⊂ Σ and p’ ⊂ Σ
S1 S2 10) S1 S2 11) S1 S2
* Superordination p(a) p(A) and a ⊂ A Superordination p(a) P(A) and a ⊂ A and p ⊂ P Superordination p(a) p’(A) and a ⊂ A and ∃ Σ / p ⊂ Σ and p’ ⊂ Σ
. Definitions On the basis of the configuration of coherence relations within a text, we can define units of analysis that are intermediary between the syntactic sentence and the entire text (A3.2.1), and for each of them, determine their theme (A3.2.2) and macrostructure (A3.2.3). .. Macrostructural basis and text division A macrostructural basis is a unit of analysis composed of syntactic sentences in the same standard textual paragraph.295 It starts with the first sentence at the highest
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level of generality or abstraction and finishes with the last sentence at the same level (including the sentences that are eventually subordinate to it), unless there is a relation of parallelism or contrast between them. In that case, it is considered that this rupture in the discursive structure constitutes a starting point for a new macrostructural basis. There will, however, be no rupture in the discursive structure if a relation of elaboration or opposition coordinates the second parallel or contrasted sentence (or a later one) with a former sentence at the same level; in other words, if the relation of parallelism or contrast is dominated by a relation of elaboration or opposition. A text division is a unit of analysis composed of the macrostructural sentences of all macrostructural bases contained in a text section.296 The limits of a text division are defined the same way as those of the macrostructural basis. The coherence graph for the third paragraph of the New York Times’ editorial, ”The Truth about a Hero’s Death” (29 November 2000) will provide an example (for the complete analysis, see below A3.5). It is as follows: §3
3.8
3.11
3.12
3.9 Ý 3.10
In this paragraph, sentences 8, 11 and 12 are coordinated by elaboration (symbol: →). Sentence 9 is subordinated to sentence 8 (symbol: ↓) and coordinated by parallelism to sentence 10 (symbol: ⇑). Sentence 11 is superordinated to sentence 10 (symbol: ↑), and coordinated by elaboration to sentence 12. Paragraph 3 constitutes a macrostructural basis as no relation of parallelism interrupts the chain of sentences at the highest level (3.8, 3.11, 3.12). .. Theme
Principle: The theme indicates the “aboutness”. It is the first unit at the highest hierarchical level in the coherence graph. In the macrostructural basis contained in paragraph 3 of the New York Times’ editorial, “The Truth about a Hero’s Death” (29 November 2000), the theme (underlined) is sentence 3.8. First exception: In the course of an argumentation, an author might make use of a general principle to link two specific elements. In the discursive structure, this general element will appear as superordinate to the two specific elements that are linked by elaboration (or opposition). In this case, the superordinate sentence is not considered in the search for the thematic sentence. However, if a sentence is superordinate to the preceding and following sentences and if these preceding and
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following sentences are not linked by elaboration or opposition, then the basic principle applies, and the superordinate sentence must be accounted for in the determination of the thematic sentence.
Second exception: An author might also choose to conclude the argument that he has been developing in a macrostructural basis at a more general level in order to situate the specific macrotheme discussed within a broader framework. Thus, although this last sentence will be superordinate to all other sentences, it cannot be considered to be the thematic sentence. Inversely, an author might choose to begin his argument in a macrostructural basis with a specific example of the more general theme that he wants to discuss. In this case, the thematic sentence will be superordinate to the first sentence that states the example. Third exception: Just as the author may conclude his argument at a more general level, he/she may decide to introduce it by a remark that is more general than the specific macrotheme treated in the macrostructural basis. This general introductory remark would then precede, and be superordinate to, the thematic sentence. In this case, a set of sentences linked by coordination, subordination and superordination is subordinate to the first sentence of the macrostructural basis, and a sentence n (that would be expected to be, but is not necessarily, the last) is coordinated by elaboration or opposition (directly or indirectly) to the second sentence. .. Macrostructure
Principle: The macrostructure is the sentence that contains the gist of the information given in the next-level unit it is part of. It is the last unit at the highest hierarchical level in the coherence graph of the next-level unit. In the macrostructural basis contained in paragraph 3 of the New York Times’ editorial, “The Truth about a Hero’s Death” (29 November 2000), the macrostructure (in bold characters) is sentence 3.12. Exception: In parallel to the first exception to the principle of determination of the theme, when an element is superordinated to its previous and next elements, and when these previous and next elements are coordinated by elaboration (or opposition), the superordinate element is not considered in the search for the macrostructural sentence.
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Appendix 3. Coherence analysis
. Hierarchical structure of a text Table A3-4 summarizes the successive steps of the coherence analysis. A text is considered as an entity composed of a hierarchy of units (in a descending order: text divisions, macrostructural bases, syntactical sentences, words). At each level, these units are linked with each other by specific relations. Although syntactical relations linking words within a sentence certainly participate in the text coherence, there are not taken into account in this analysis as we are more concerned with a higher level type of coherence. The analysis starts at the sentence level. First, the relations of coordination, subordination and superordination linking sentences within a same paragraph are defined. Once this is done, the limits of macrostructural bases are determined as well as their themes and macrostructures. These themes and macrostructures, taken together, must represent a faithful summary of the entire text. Then, if the text contains different sections delimited by their own title, the analysis continues between the macrostructural sentences of all macrostructural bases that are contained in each text section. This allows for the determination of text divisions, division themes and division macrostructures. These division themes and macrostructures must represent a faithful summary of the entire text. The analysis ends with the division macrostructures at the highest level (the number of these levels depends on the hierarchy of titles within the text), and results in the determination of the text theme(s) and text macrostruture(s) that must compose a faithful abstract of the entire text. Editorials being composed of a few paragraphs grouped under the same title, their analysis is composed of only two steps: between sentences within paragraphs, and between macrostructures of the macrostructural bases.
. Coding Once the coherence analysis has been completed, the sentences are coded to indicate the text hierarchical structure (Table A3-5). Depending on the text length and complexity (number of title levels), the number of levels of analysis varies. In editorials, paragraphs are grouped under one title. Thus, the analysis takes place first at the paragraph level between sentences, and then at the macrostructural basis level between macrostructures. In this case, there are no text division.
. Example: “The Truth About a Hero’s Death” (NYT, 29 November 2000) The above examples were taken from the analysis of the following editorial, “The Truth About a Hero’s Death”, that was published in The New York Times on 29
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Table A3-4 Text hierarchical structure
Table A3-5 Coding of the text hierarchical structure Codes
Descriptions
First level of analysis: between sentences within a same paragraph Th Sentence that is the theme of the macrostructural basis (unit of analysis comprised within a paragraph). Mcr Sentence that is the macrostructure of the macrostructural basis (unit of analysis comprised within a paragraph). ThMcr Sentence that is the theme and macrostructure of the macrostructural basis (unit of analysis comprised within a paragraph). Next level(s) of analysis: between macrostructures (Mcr) DTh Macrostructure that is also the thematic sentence of the text division. DMcr Macrostructure that is also the macrostructural sentence of the text division. DThMcr Macrostructure that is also the thematic and macrostructural sentence of the text division. Last level of analysis: between division macrostructures (DMcr) TTh Macrostructure that is also the thematic sentence of the entire text. TMcr Macrostructure that is also the macrostructural sentence of the entire text. TThMcr Macrostructure that is also the thematic and macrostructural sentence of the entire text
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Appendix 3. Coherence analysis
November 2000. Its complete text, analysis at the all-sentence level followed by the automatically generated text summary, and analysis at the macrostructural level followed by the automatically generated text abstract follow. 1-1: Raoul Wallenberg, the Swedish diplomat who saved thousands of Hungarian Jews from the Nazis, vanished mysteriously in January 1945 on his way to the Soviet Army’s headquarters outside Budapest. 1-2: Now, after decades of official Soviet denials and lies about Wallenberg’s death, a Russian official investigating the case has acknowledged that the heroic Swede was probably shot in 1947 while being held by the K.G.B. 1-3: Aleksander Yakovlev, chairman of the Kremlin commission investigating the case, reported this week that “We do not doubt that he was shot in the Lubyanka prison.” 1-4: This important pronouncement should prompt President Vladimir Putin to issue a decree at long last acknowledging that Wallenberg was a victim of Stalin’s repression. 2-5: Since Stalin’s death in 1953, Russians have been trying to reckon with the horrors of his era. 2-6: In Raoul Wallenberg’s case, Moscow spent a decade denying that he had ever made it to the Soviet territory. 2-7: Then it concocted a story that defied belief, saying that Wallenberg, at age 34, had died of a heart attack in Lubyanka, the dreaded K.G.B. prison in downtown Moscow. 3-8: In recent months the Russians, in conjunction with Sweden, have been trying in earnest to find out what really happened. 3-9: In Budapest during World War II Wallenberg took great personal risks, issuing Swedish passports to at least 20,000 Jews who were being threatened by the Nazis with death marches and deportation to concentration camps. 3-10: Once captured by the Soviets, Wallenberg was accused of being a spy for the United States and of being a Nazi agent. 3-11: The details of his case have been secret for too long. 3-12: It is time for Mr. Putin to set the record straight about Raoul Wallenberg’s last years.
Analysis at the all-sentence level In the coherence graphs, the themes are underlined and the macrostructures are indicated in bold characters.
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Paragraph 1 1.1 p1 = Wallenberg (a1 = vanished) 1.2 p2 = Wallenberg (a2 = the case [of Wallenberg’s disappearance]) And p1 = p2 and a1 = a2 → Relation 1: coordination (elaboration) 1.2 p1 = the case (a1 = shot) 1.3 p2 = the case (a2 = shot) And p1 = p2 and a1 = a2 → Relation 1: coordination (elaboration) 1.3 p1 = the case [Wallenberg’s] (a1 = reported) 1.4 p2 = Wallenberg (a2 = this pronouncement) And p1 = p2 and a1 = a2 → Relation 1: coordination (elaboration) §1
1.1 →
1.2 →
1.3 → 1.4
Paragraph 2 2.5 p1 = Russians (a1 = horrors of his era) 2.6 p2 = Moscow (a2 = Wallenberg’s case) And p1 = p2 and a2 ⊂ a1 → Relation 6: subordination 2.6 p1 = Wallenberg (a1 = Moscow) 2.7 p2 = Wallenberg (a2 = it [ = Moscow]) And p1 = p2 and a1 = a2 → Relation 1: coordination (elaboration) §2
2.5 2.6
2.7
Paragraph 3 3.8 p1 = [Wallenberg] (a1 = what happened [during and after World War II]) 3.9 p2 = Wallenberg (a2 = during World War II) And p1 = p2 and a2 ⊂ a1 → Relation 6: subordination
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Appendix 3. Coherence analysis
3.9 p1 = Wallenberg (a1 = during World War II) 3.10 p2 = Wallenberg (a2 = captured by the Soviets) And p1 = p2 and a1 ⊂ Σ and a2 ⊂ Σ, Σ = “details of the case” → Relation 3: coordination (parallelism) 3.10 p1 = Wallenberg (a1 = captured by the Soviets, accused) 3.11 p2 = his [= Wallenberg’s] (a2 = the details of the case) And p1 = p2 and a1 ⊂ a2 [the capture and accusation are some of the details of the case] → Relation 9: superordination 3.8 p1 = Wallenberg] (a1 = what happened [to Wallenberg]) 3.11 p2 = his [= Wallenberg’s] (a2 = case) And p1 = p2 and a1 = a2 → Relation 1: coordination (elaboration) 3.11 p1 = case (a1 = his [= Wallenberg’s]) 3.12 p2 = record (a2 = Wallenberg) And p1 = p2 and a1 = a2 → Relation 1: coordination (elaboration) §3
3.8
3.11
3.12
3.9 Ý 3.10
Summary generated from the analysis at the all-sentence level 1-1: Raoul Wallenberg, the Swedish diplomat who saved thousands of Hungarian Jews from the Nazis, vanished mysteriously in January 1945 on his way to the Soviet Army’s headquarters outside Budapest. 1-4: This important pronouncement [that Wallenberg was shot in the Lubyanka prison] should prompt President Vladimir Putin to issue a decree at long last acknowledging that Wallenberg was a victim of Stalin’s repression. 2-5: Since Stalin’s death in 1953, Russian have been trying to reckon with the horrors of his era. 3-8: In recent months the Russians, in conjunction with Sweden, have been trying in earnest to find out what really happened.
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3-12: It is time for Mr. Putin to set the record straight about Raoul Wallenberg’s last years.
Raoul Wallenberg, the Swedish diplomat who saved thousands of Hungarian Jews from the Nazis, vanished mysteriously in January 1945 on his way to the Soviet Army’s headquarters outside Budapest. The important pronouncement [that Wallenberg was shot in the Lubyanka prison] should prompt President Vladimir Putin to issue a decree at long last acknowledging that Wallenberg was a victim of Stalin’s repression. Since Stalin’s death in 1953, Russians have been trying to reckon with the horrors of his era. In recent months the Russians, in conjunction with Sweden, have been trying in earnest to find out what really happened. It is time for Mr. Putin to set the record straight about Raoul Wallenberg’s last years.
Analysis at the macrostructural level 1.4 p1 = Stalin (a1 = Wallenberg [his case]) 2.5 p2 = Stalin (a2 = horrors of his era) And p1 = p2 and a1 ⊂ a2 → Relation 9: superordination 2.5 p1 = Russians (a1 = horrors of his era) 3.12 p2 = Putin (a2 = Wallenberg [his case]) And p1 = p2 and a2 ⊂ a1 → Relation 6: subordination 1.4 p1 = Putin (a1 = Wallenberg) 3.12 p2 = Putin (a2 = Wallenberg) And p1 = p2 and a1 = a2 → Relation 1: coordination (elaboration) 2.5
1.4
3.12
Abstract generated from the analysis at the macrostructural level 1-4: This important pronouncement [that Wallenberg was shot in the Lubyanka prison] should prompt President Vladimir Putin to issue a decree at long last acknowledging that Wallenberg was a victim of Stalin’s repression.
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3-12: It is time for Mr. Putin to set the record straight about Raoul Wallenberg’s last years.
The important pronouncement [that Wallenberg was shot in the Lubyanka prison] should prompt President Vladimir Putin to issue a decree at long last acknowledging that Wallenberg was a victim of Stalin’s repression. It is time for Mr. Putin to set the record straight about Raoul Wallenberg’s last years.
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appendix
Content coding
Once the hierarchical structure of editorials has been coded following the coherence analysis (see Appendix 3), the macrostructures, i.e. the sentences containing the information most likely to remain in long-term memory, are coded for their representation of the ideological square (A4.1). Then, parties appearing in the argumentation (A4.2) are coded at the macrostructural and all-sentence levels (i.e. in all sentences whatever their level in the hierarchical structure), while the representation of Russia in terms of its history (A4.3) is coded at the all-sentence level only.
. Ideological square at the macrostructural level As the salient information that is most likely to remain in long-term memory, macrostructures are coded for their content and they can have a multiple coding. Their content is interpreted in function of the entire text. Macrostructures are coded for the positive or negative representations of Us and Them that they eventually contain. Indeed, according to Social Identity Theory (1981; Tajfel 1978, 1982, 1984), a group tends to emphasize the positive aspects of the in-group and the negative aspects of the out-group. This has also been called the “ideological square” (van Dijk 1998: 267). French and American editorials on Russia, expressing opinions on a very distinct Other, would seem to be a very relevant place for the transmission of ideology, especially in consideration of the fact that this Other was for decades and until not so long ago the “ideological enemy”. The main moves of ideology reproduction consist in: – – – –
Expressing / emphasizing information that is positive about Us Expressing / emphasizing information that is negative about Them Suppressing / de-emphasizing information that is positive about Them Suppressing / de-emphasizing information that is negative about Them
Table A4-1 indicates how the ideological square is coded.
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Table A4-1 Coding of the ideological square in the macrostructures Codes US
Description
Mcr F pos / neg
Macrostructure that contains a positive / negative statement about France Mcr USA pos / neg Macrostructure that contains a positive / negative statement about the USA Mcr E pos / neg Macrostructure that contains a positive / negative statement about Europe Mcr W pos / neg Macrostructure that contains a positive / negative statement about the West (including the IMF, NATO, OSCE) THEM Mcr R pos / neg Macrostructure that contains a positive / negative statement about Russia
Examples In (1) Le Monde draws its readers’ attention to the knowledge the IMF had of Russian money laundering. Thus, both Russia and the West are guilty (Mcr R neg, Mcr W neg). The New York Times’ example (2) underlines the positive attitude of the American and Russian governments in dealing with each other (Mcr USA pos, Mcr R pos). In (3), the statements of the Western governments do not per se contain any information that could reflect a negative opinion about the West. However, the co-text indicates that Le Monde considers them as bad evaluations of the situation by these governments because of the political context in which they were uttered. Thus, in light of the text argumentation, this macrostructure expresses a negative judgment on the West (co-text: Mcr W neg). (1) 1-2-6
Pis, on y apprend que ce détournement de fonds [par la Russie] se fait sinon avec l’accord, en tout cas en toute connaissance de cause de la part des grands de ce monde: les responsables du FMI et d’abord Michel Camdessus, son directeur général, mais aussi, avec lui, nos ministres des finances, les Larry Summers (États-Unis), Gordon Brown (Grande-Bretagne) et autres Dominique Strauss-Kahn, qui sont tous des administrateurs du Fonds. [Mcr R neg, Mcr W neg] [Worse, one learns that this fund embezzlement [by Russia] occurs, if not with the agreement, then certainly with the full knowledge of this world’s powerful people: the IMF leaders, primarily Michel Camdessus, its Managing Director, but also, with him, our Finance Ministers, Larry Summers (USA), Gordon Brown (Great-Britain) and Dominique Strauss-Kahn, among others, who are all administrators of the Fund.]
(2) 11-1-3
There is reason for reassurance, however, in the calm response from the Clinton administration and the speedy effort by Russia’s Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, to emphasize the stability of over-
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all relations between the United States and Russia. [Mcr USA pos, Mcr R pos] (3) 2-3-15
En un concert presque unanime, les uns et les autres ont dit tout le bien qu’ils pensaient du nouveau premier ministre que Boris Eltsine a donné à la Russie. [co-text: Mcr W neg] [In near unanimity, everyone expressed much praise regarding the new Prime Minister whom Boris Yeltsin gave to Russia.]
. Parties appearing in the argumentation In their editorials, Le Monde and The New York Times reconstruct a debate in which several participants take part. The idea that a text can display the involvement of several participants brings to mind the Bakhtinian concept of polyphonic discourse. According to Bakhtin (1986: 91), each utterance is filled with echoes and reverberations of other utterances to which it is related by the communality of the sphere of speech communication. . . [Others’ utterances] can be referred to as though the interlocutor were already well aware of them; they can be silently presupposed; or one’s responsive reaction to them can be reflected only in the expression of one’s own speech. . .
The incorporation of other voices appears through ‘double-voicing’, and is not gratuitous: an author may utilize the speech act of another in pursuit of his own aims and in such a way as to impose a new intention on the utterance, which nevertheless retains its own proper referential intentions. Under these circumstances and in keeping with the author’s purpose, such an utterance may be recognized as originating from another addresser. Thus, within a single utterance there may occur two intentions, two voices. (Bakhtin 1978: 180)
Drawing on Bakhtin’s work, Wortham & Locher (1996) analyzed TV coverage of the 1992 US presidential elections, and showed how newscasters transmitted their implicit evaluations through the use of others’ voices. In identifying voices, Wortham & Locher relied on five categories, suggested by Silverstein (1993) as textual devices that are commonly used to voice subjects: reference and predication, metapragmatic description, quotation, evaluative indexicals, and epistemic modalization. Referring to sources of information outside of the text in question, these devices are part of the category of evidentials, as defined by Hyland (1998) in his typology of metadiscourse. An essential notion in argumentative writing (Crismore & Farnsworth 1990; Hyland 1999), metadiscourse comprises linguistic devices that indicate writers’ “personality, credibility, considerateness of the reader, and relationship to the sub-
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ject matter and to readers” (Crismore et al. 1993). In his work on academic texts, Hyland (1998), following Crismore, Markkanen et al. (1993), classifies metadiscourse into two types, textual and interpersonal, but he modifies their content to better reflect the object of his study. In his typology, textual metadiscourse contains logical connectives (expressing semantic relation between main clauses), frame markers (explicitly referring to discourse acts or text stages), endophoric markers (referring to information in other parts of the text), evidentials (referring to sources of information from other texts), and code glosses (helping readers grasp meanings of ideational material). Interpersonal metadiscourse covers the categories of hedges (withholding writer’s full commitment to statements), emphatics (emphasizing force or writer’s certainty in message), attitude markers (expressing writer’s attitude to propositional content), relational markers (explicitly referring to or building relationship with reader), and person markers (explicitly referencing to author). Editorials, like academic texts, are argumentative and aim to persuade by explaining. This is achieved by relating new facts to already known ones, by appearing ‘objective’ and well-informed while presenting others’ positions (for reasons of credibility), and by positioning the author’s voice in the targeted community. Although editorials differ from academic texts (shorter length, lesser complexity, larger audience), Hyland’s categories of metadiscourse are still useful as a starting point to identify voices. Among the metadiscursive devices defined above, those that would explicitly reveal the identity of participants in the argumentation are relational markers, person markers, and evidentials. The first two have been the subject of little study in general, and their analysis has not been carried out in relation to media discourse. Relational markers refer to readers, and comprise “second person pronouns, imperatives, questions forms and asides that interrupt the ongoing discourse” (Hyland 1998: 444). They are used in academic texts to engage readers in the argument (e.g. one can see; we might say; note that; recall that) or manifest a personal style (e.g. if we consider; for very readable reviews. . . see) (Hyland 1998). Person markers (first person pronouns and possessive adjectives) explicitly refer to the author(s). Their presence in academic texts signals text frames (e.g. in this paper we show; we now explain; in Section 2 we will discuss), introduces research activities (e.g. we asked; our proposed estimation procedure trades off ; to test this we used), and indicates attitudes towards methods or findings (e.g. in our batch experiment; we were surprised that; we suppose that) (Hyland 1998). Evidentials are markers of overt intertextuality and have been the subject of more thorough investigation. In studies on oral institutional discourse, reported speech was found to allow participants to enact tensions in their thinking and deal with opposing views (Myers 1999), to generate affiliation between employees (Holt 1999), to enable the negotiation of purposes and relationships among school
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children (Maybin 1999), and to demonstrate professional competence by showing how clients are taken into account (Hall et al. 1999). In academic texts, writers use evidentials to establish themselves in their discipline by presenting the way in which they build upon existing knowledge (Baynham 1999; Hyland 1998). In TV journalistic discourse (coverage of the 1992 US presidential campaign), quotations have been found to convey implicit evaluations, thus participating in the construction of media bias (Wortham & Locher 1996). In news articles (from Le Monde), reported speech is mostly used to indicate newsworthiness and to provide evidence for claims in the text (Waugh 1995). By revealing the role of evidentials in different types of texts, these studies have shown how ‘double-voicing’ operates. They also collectively indicate that the function of evidentials is linked to the type of institutional discourse in which they occur. In this way, they confirm the “intimate relationship between the discourse frame and the linguistic resources used in that frame” (Waugh 1995: 166). Thus, the voices upon which the editorials’ argumentation is built were looked for by searching for all instances of linguistic structures belonging to the categories of relational markers, person markers, and evidentials with a particular emphasis on the structures listed by Hyland (1998) for each category. Then, these instances were analyzed within their co-text, and it was found (1) that a same structure could be used under different metadiscursive categories, and (2) that a structure listed in one category by Hyland could belong to another one in this corpus. This is particularly the case in Le Monde for ‘nous’, ‘on’, and direct questions, which appear in all three categories. In the classification of the use of ‘nous’ and ‘on’, Charaudeau (1992) describes their discursive effects as follows. “Nous” designates a “multiple speaker” who can represent one of the following combinations: (1) speaker and interlocutors; (2) speaker and third party(ies); (3) speaker and interlocutor(s) and third party(ies); (4) speaker and other speaker(s). “On” (third person singular – nominative case) can designate: (1) a single third party whose identity is not known to the speaker; (2) a multiple third party whose identity is not precisely defined; (3) a collective third party that represents a complete entity; (4) a multiple speaker, i.e. “nous”. ‘On’ does not have a single equivalent in English. It can stand for: ‘somebody’, ‘people’, ‘some people’, ‘everybody’, ‘those people’, or ‘we’. It can also be translated by a passive voice. The referents of “nous” and “on” are determined through the context of their use. The following sections present the linguistic structures used to indicate the presence of the writers’ voices (A4.2.1), external voices incorporated by the writers into their text (A4.2.2), and the writers’ addressees (A4.2.3). Instances of the three metadiscursive categories are underlined in the examples. The various English translations of on appear in italics. The coding of the participants in the interactions is conducted at all hierarchical levels of the text coherence; when it takes place at the macrostructural level, it is explicitly indicated (A4.2.4).
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Table A4-2 Coding of the writers’ voices Codes
Descriptions
Voice LM Sentence that contains the voice of Le Monde. Voice LM Soc Sentence that contains the voice of Le Monde and society (i.e. public opinion, as opposed to the political elite) Voice NYT Sentence that contains the voice of The New York Times. This code is added when appropriate to the previous ones. Strong Sentence that contains an expression of obligation or necessity with the indicative.
.. Writers’ voices Le Monde’s and The New York Times’ editorials are anonymous, and the editorialists write in the name of the newspaper. Thus, it could be said that the entire editorial represents the newspaper’s voice. However, editorialists use certain structures that emphasize their newspaper’s voice. Person markers (pronouns or possessive adjectives) (A4.2.1.1) refer directly and explicitly to the author(s), while attitude markers express the affective attitude reported by writers to themselves (A4.2.1.2) or to others (A4.2.1.3). Furthermore, writers also represent their voice when they answer questions asked by others (A4.2.1.4). Table A4-2 gives the codes for writers’ voices. ... Person markers First person markers (pronouns or possessive adjectives) refer directly and explicitly to the author(s). To indicate explicitly that they speak in their name only, Le Monde’s editorialists use either ‘nous’, ‘on’, or direct questions. Le Monde’s corpus does not contain any instance of the first person singular. No person markers were found in The New York Times’ corpus. Nous sometimes represents a collective speaker, Le Monde’s journalists. The cotext determines whether nous stands for Le Monde alone. In (1), nous represents the authors of ‘journalistic work’. (1) 2-1-4
Dans ce travail journalistique, difficile compte rendu de l’opacité du système politico-financier russe, nous avons pu commettre des erreurs. [voice LM] [In this journalistic work, made difficult by the opacity of the Russian politico-financial system, we might have made errors. ]
On represents Le Monde when there is no opposition between what on is doing and Le Monde’s positions / actions (see below 3.2.2.1). This is indicated by the co-text. In this use of the indefinite on, Le Monde disappears somewhat among all of those who perform the action. Thus, it appears less ‘aggressive’ towards its readers, as
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in (2), where Le Monde recalls one of the sources of today’s disappointment, but hides behind the anonymity of on to do so. On the other hand, this use can also be interpreted as denoting a certain condescension from Le Monde: by presenting something that others concur to / already know, it merely states the ‘obvious’ to those who, nonetheless, need to hear it. (2) 12-4-22 On rappellera que le désenchantement actuel est aussi le reflet de l’enthousiasme délirant du début des années 90. [voice LM] [We will recall that today’s disappointment also reflects the delirious enthusiasm of the early 90s.]
Le Monde may also ask direct questions to parties, defined explicitly (3; 4) or implicitly (5). When Le Monde does not answer its questions, it calls upon those who should be in a position to answer, here the ruling elite, to direct their attention to them (5). When Le Monde answers its questions, even partially, it represents others (see below 2.3.2.2), unless the co-text explicitly indicates that the question is being put forth by Le Monde (3). (3) 2-4-15
[. . . ] nos questions à l’adresse du FMI étaient et sont légitimes. [voice LM] 2-4-16 Nous les réitérons. [voice LM] [. . . our questions, addressed to the IMF, were and are legitimate. We reiterate them.] 2-4-17/19 [questions]
(4) 18-1-4
18-1-5
À l’heure où les hommes du Kremlin font écraser sous leurs bombes une partie de leur population, les Tchétchènes, on a plutôt envie de demander à MM. Chirac, Blair, Clinton et Schröder . . . [voice LM] [At a time when the leaders in the Kremlin have part of their population, the Chechens, crushed under their bombs, we rather feel like asking Mr. Chirac, Blair, Clinton and Schröder . . . ] [question]
(5) 12-4-24 Ce qui laisse entière la question suivante: quelle Russie demain? [voice LM] [This leaves the following question totally unanswered: what will Russia be tomorrow?]
First person markers (pronouns or possessive adjectives) in the plural form, or other person markers that can include the first may refer to the author(s) only, but also to the author(s) and other people. When these markers do not stand for Le Monde only as defined above, and when they do not refer to a third party alone (see below 3.2.2.1), they are considered to represent Le Monde and French society, i.e. public opinion. In (6), there is no doubt that nous represents more than Le Monde and more than the ruling elite; it represents French society. The use of nous
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here emphasizes a high level of responsibility, and thus just how serious Le Monde is in its positions. (6) 13-4-25 Nous aurons la Russie que nous aurons méritée. [voice LM Soc] [We will get the type of Russia that we deserve.]
Thus, by incorporating the voice of public opinion to its own, Le Monde gives its position more weight towards the ruling elite it addresses. This position is reinforced when its content is linked to a common cultural value. In this case, the ruling elite cannot disagree with public opinion (and Le Monde) without taking the risk of denying that it works for the common good as understood by the nation (7: 11-4-18). It is thus placed in a position where it becomes very difficult not to agree with the reasoning and the argumentative point that follows (7: 11-4-19). (7) 11-4-18 Personne ne suggère qu’on fasse la guerre à la Russie. [voice LM Soc] 11-4-19 Mais on peut faire quelque chose. [Nobody suggests going to war against Russia. But one can do something.]
... Writers’ attitude markers Writers can convey their affective attitude through a number of markers. Editorials embody the newspapers’ opinions, and in expressing their opinions, they adopt a positive, negative, or indecisive attitude about what has been done, what has happened, what can be done and what can happen. Editorials operate on two different levels. On the one hand, they comment on a specific situation, and doing so, also report on it; on the other, they act as participants in the debate on this situation by forwarding their positions. Thus, editorials are bound to contain a high number of attitude markers, especially those marking agreement and disagreement on what has been done and what has happened, which correspond to the more traditional “reporting / commenting of the debate” function. As coding all attitude markers in an undifferentiated manner would defeat the purpose of uncovering the editorials’ particularities, only the attitude markers selected along the following two criteria have been coded. The first relates to the “active participation in the debate” of editorials, i.e. the attitude markers about what can be done (advice, necessity, obligation) and what can happen (questioning, prediction, doubt, warning). These attitude markers reflect the direct influence that the newspapers want to exert on the situation, and in this way are indicative of the status of actor they claim on the international scene. The second criterion relates to the type of events on which the newspaper expresses its affective attitude. As this study concerns the relations between France, the United States and Russia, and as each newspaper has both a national and an international audience, the types of events that have been selected for the coding of attitude markers are: in-
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ternational events in which Russia appears as an agent, internal Russian events, internal French / European events relating to Russia (in Le Monde), and internal American events relating to Russia (in The New York Times). The newspapers’ affective attitudes are expressed with a varying degree of strength, and the categories of examples below are presented in an order of increasing certainty on the part of the newspaper. The strongest expressions of attitude correspond to expressions of obligation or necessity in the indicative mood (they are coded “strong”). (1) Questioning / doubt 26-6-27 But the most intriguing question is whether this tragedy can educate Mr. Putin in the arts of compassionate and accountable leadership. [voice NYT] 30-1-1 It is not clear whether he [Putin] means that state to be authoritarian or democratic. [voice NYT] (2) Prediction / warning / advice 1-5-15 It is premature to judge any of these assertions. [voice NYT] 6-4-21 The interest both sides share in countering the threat from rogue states suggests that with good-faith negotiation, agreement on carefully drawn changes in the ABM treaty may eventually come to pass. [voice NYT] 18-2-3 Although Americans may feel relieved that Russian conventional forces are now too weak to pose a serious external threat, there is a worrisome side to Russia’s military breakdown. [voice NYT] 18-6-26 The place to begin is by disengaging Russian troops from Chechnya at the earliest possible date. [voice NYT] 26-6-26 NATO and Russia both should move away from close shadowing of each other’s submarines that can lead to accidental bumpings, although an explosion and not a collision seems to have sunk the Kursk. [voice NYT] 5-5-14 Le prix à payer pour ce refus d’ingérence [par la communauté internationale] risque d’être bientôt beaucoup plus lourd, quand les civils tchétchènes ne seront plus les seuls à en faire les frais. [voice LM] [The price of the [international community’s] refusal to interfere soon risks becoming much greater, when the Chechen civilians are not alone in assuming the costs.] 6-5-24 Sinistres motivations qui justifieraient que la communauté internationale ne s’enferme pas dans un lourd silence complice. [voice LM] [Appalling motivations that would justify that the international community does not confine itself to deep, complicit silence.] 9-5-25 Mais elle [l’indifférence des Occidentaux] aura, un jour, un prix. [voice LM] [But it [the indifference of the West] will one day have a price.]
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(3) Necessity / obligation 2-1-5 With elections approaching in Russia and the United States, investigators must follow the trails of corruption and money laundering. [voice NYT, strong] 16-8-35 More information will be needed before anyone can judge whether the decision to spare Mr. Yeltsin from possible prosecution was warranted or wise. [voice NYT, strong] 11-5-23 Le sommet de l’Union réuni ces jours-ci à Helsinki doit donner l’exemple. [voice LM, strong] [The Union Summit currently convened in Helsinki must set the example.] 20-4-21 Si le retour à l’économie administrée est exclu, la remise en ordre suppose que le nouveau président s’attaque aux oligarques qui ont fait fortune en bradant les ressources nationales et en dilapidant les aides internationales. [voice LM, strong] [If returning to a governed economy is ruled out, restructuring implies that the new president takes on the oligarchs who made a fortune by selling off national resources and squandering international aid.]
... Answers given to others’ questions In using attitude markers that denote questioning/doubt, prediction/warning/advice and necessity/obligation, editorialists signal that they do not just comment on the debate from the outside, they actively take part in it. They also particularly do this by answering questions asked by others (see below, A4.2.2.2, examples (9) and (10)). ... Attribution of attitude markers to others To specify their own affective attitude, writers use markers. They can use the same markers to indicate their opinion of others’ attitude. By doing so, they sometimes “erase” the others’ voice, and express only their own. In the examples (1) and (2), Le Monde’s editorialists mention Russian reasons to attack Chechnya (1: 64-24) and Putin’s goals (2: 14-5-22) in terms that would not be officially used by Russian officials. The attitude markers (il faut, doit) are used to emphasize Le Monde’s denunciations of Russia. In (3), on (11-4-19) represents the Western governments, the addressees of personne in the preceding sentence (11-4-18). The attitude marker peut indicates that it is Le Monde’s voice that is expressed in 11-4-19.
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(1) 6-4-20 6-4-21
Il [le Kremlin] a d’autres raisons pour attaquer la Tchétchénie: Il faut venger la défaite que les tchétchènes ont infligée à l’armée russe en 1996. [voice LM] [It [the Kremlin] has other reasons for attacking Chechnya: Revenge must be sought for the Chechen defeat of the Russian army in 1996.]
(2) 14-5-21 Tout ce que beaucoup d’entre eux ont vécu au cours de ces dix dernières années comme des revers, des reculades, des humiliations appartient au passé. [Much of what many of them experienced during these past ten years, such as setbacks, retreats, and humiliations, is in the past.] 14-5-22 La Russie doit compter sur ses propres forces, organiser son économie sans référence forcée au libéralisme, faire régner l’ordre chez elle et imposer le respect à l’extérieur. [voice LM] [Russia must rely on its own strengths, organize its economy without having to refer to liberalism, enforce internal order and ensure respect abroad.] 14-5-23 À Grozny, Vladimir Poutine vient de prouver qu’il n’est pas regardant sur les moyens pour parvenir à ses fins. [In Grozny, Vladimir Putin has just proved that for him the goals justify the means.] (3) 11-4-18 Personne ne suggère qu’on fasse la guerre à la Russie. [voice LM Soc] 11-4-19 Mais on peut faire quelque chose. [voice LM] [Nobody suggests going to war against Russia. But one can do something.]
An attitude marker that is applied to others does not always erase their voice; sometimes, it only “covers” it, and thus two voices are superposed. The sentence below (4) would be such an example if all types of attitude markers had been coded in this corpus. The marker, “à raison”, indicating agreement, does not belong to the categories of attitude markers that were selected for coding in this particular work (see above A4.2.1.2). (4) 17-1-1
À raison, l’Union européenne (UE) s’indigne [voice LM (non marked in this corpus), voice E] [Rightly, the European Union (EU) is getting annoyed.]
.. Other voices In mentioning sources of information that originate from outside the text, writers incorporate the voice of others. This overt intertextuality is signaled by evidentials. They appear in a variety of forms: nous (in Le Monde), on (in Le Monde), reported
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Table A4-3 Coding of others’ voices Codes Voice A Voice F Voice E Voice USA Voice W Voice UN Voice R Voice Soc Voice O
Descriptions Sentence that mentions a type of utterance from an anonymous source. Sentence that mentions a type of utterance from a French official source. Sentence that mentions a type of utterance from an European official source. Sentence that mentions a type of utterance from an American official source. Sentence that mentions a type of utterance from a Western official source (including the IMF). Sentence that mentions a type of utterance from the United Nations. Sentence that mentions a type of utterance from a Russian official source. Sentence that mentions a type of utterance from the society (in the West). Sentence that mentions a type of utterance from a specified source other than those above.
These codes are added when appropriate to the previous ones – media The source is a media. – noff The source is non-official. – pas The source is explicitly mentioned but not through the subject of a verb in the active voice. – cov The source is “covert” (i.e. implicit).
speech, and others. These markers are coded in function of the origin of the source of information. Most of the time, these sources of information are official, i.e. they are connected in one way or the other to the executive, legislative or judiciary. When they are not, they are marked. Media sources, benefiting from the same professional status as Le Monde and The New York Times, have been especially marked also. Furthermore, a distinction has been made between the “prominent” sources that appear as subjects of verbs in the active voice, and the others, the explicit “passive” sources (i.e. that do not appear as subject of verbs in the active voice) and the “covert” (i.e. implicit) sources. Table A4-3 gives the codes for others’ voices. ... Person markers Nous represents a third party when it replaces the third plural person, ils or elles [they]. This use, which is defined by the co-text, denotes irony towards the third party. In (1), the editorial starts with a critical report of the European press release issued at the end of the Lisbon summit. Clearly, the nous represents the European governments. (1) 19-1-4 19-1-5
En langage moins diplomatique, cela se traduit ainsi: Nous espérons qu’enfin le conflit en Tchétchénie va s’arrêter et que le développement de nos relations avec la Russie ne sera plus gêné par cet obstacle déplaisant puisque Vladimir Poutine n’aura plus besoin de casser du Tchétchène pour s’asseoir au pouvoir. [co-text: voice E] [In a less diplomatic language, this can be translated as follows: We hope that the conflict in Chechnya will finally stop and that the
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development of our relationship with Russia will no longer be hampered by this unpleasant obstacle since Vladimir Putin will no longer need to go Chechen splashing to consolidate his power.]
When on represents a third party, some of its characteristics are defined, although it remains anonymous. Thus, it is given importance, positively or negatively, by its mysteriousness. In (2), on represents those who put forth an argument (2: 4-3-11) that Le Monde opposes (2: 4-3-12). (2) 4-3-11
4-3-12
On dira que ces affaires sont distinctes les unes des autres, qu’il faut se défier des amalgames et éviter, en mêlant tout, du blanchiment de l’argent par la mafia russe à la corruption des élites postsoviétiques, de jeter un opprobre général sur le travail du FMI en Russie. [voice O] L’argument ne nous paraît pas recevable. . . [voice LM] [It is said that these issues are distinct from each other, that one must be cautious of any amalgam and avoid generally covering IMF work in Russia with opprobrium by mixing everything, from money laundering by Russian mafia to the corruption of post-soviet elite. This point is not acceptable in our opinion.]
In (3), on stands for all of those who Le Monde believes portray Putin as a liberal. (3) 15-3-15 La manière dont il [Poutine] apportera une réponse politique dépassant les bravades chauvines constituera un premier test du “libéralisme” dont on le crédite un peu vite. [voice O] [The way he [Putin] will deliver a political answer that goes beyond chauvinistic acts of bravado will constitute a first test for his ‘liberalism’ with which he is too easily credited.]
On can also represent a group of people in a defined geographic setting, as in (4) and (5). In example (4), the use of on allows the newspaper to quote a source of information without disclosing his or her identity. In (5), the indefinite character of on who nonetheless must be in Chechnya to testify for any change there endows on with such a degree of generality that on could almost represent anybody in the eyes of the readers. (4) 16-5-24 La France, dit-on à Paris, aurait aimé tenir un langage plus ferme; [voice F] [It is said in Paris, that France would have liked to speak more firmly.] (5) 30-1-10 Comme si on avait enregistré quelques progrès sur cette terre de mort et de misère qu’est devenue la malheureuse petite République du Caucase. [voice O]
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[As if one had recorded some progress in the land of death and misery that has become the unfortunate little Republic of the Caucasus.]
Although on may represent an “other” who performs an action (on is a pronoun subject), it is not necessarily this other’s voice that is expressed. In (6), on (11-4-19) represents the addressee of personne (11-4-18) who stands for Le Monde and the society. On is the ruling elite, i.e. the Western governments. However, its voice disappears under Le Monde’s voice that is revealed by the use of the attitude marker, peut (see above 3.2.1.3). Through this use of on and not vous [you], Le Monde addresses the Western governments indirectly, and thus appears less commanding, less threatening. Similarly, in (7), on, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe who is defined by its geographical setting, Strasbourg (30-4-22), is the addressee of Le Monde whose voice is heard (30-4-21). (6) 11-4-18 Personne ne suggère qu’on fasse la guerre à la Russie. [voice LM Soc] 11-4-19 Mais on [W] peut faire quelque chose. [voice LM] [Nobody suggests going to war against Russia. But one can do something.] (7) 30-4-21 On [E] peut avoir un débat sur l’opportunité des sanctions économiques. [voice LM] 30-4-22 Mais il ne s’agissait à Strasbourg que de maintenir une sanction politique, de l’ordre du symbolique – et les symboles comptent! – une mesure destinée à préserver le sens des mots “démocratie” et “droits de l’homme”. [One can have a debate on the opportunities surrounding economic sanctions. But in Strasburg it was only about maintaining a political sanction of a symbolic order – and symbols do count! –, a measure intended to preserve the meaning of the words ‘democracy’ and ‘human rights’.]
... Reported speech Other types of evidentials can be broadly defined as reported speech. They usually present a “combination of reference, metapragmatic verb, and utterance to represent some instance of speaking [or writing]” (Wortham & Locher 1996: 563). In the corpus, reported speech is indirect (7), or direct (8). (7) 11-1-4
elle [la Russie] a annoncé, ouvertement, publiquement, qu’elle voulait la fuite ou la mort de tous les habitants de la capitale, Grozny. [voice R] [it [Russia] announced openly and publicly that it wants flight or death for all inhabitants of the capital city, Grozny.]
(8) 2-4-17
“Nous avions de bonnes relations avec M. Stépachine et je suis sûr que nous aurons de bonnes relations avec M. Poutine”,
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2-4-18
a sobrement indiqué un porte-parole de la Maison Blanche. [voice USA] [“We had a good relationship with Mr. Stepashin and I am sure that we will have a good relationship with Mr. Putin”, a spokesman for the White House indicated soberly.]
Reported speech occurs also under the form of questions. Most of the time, when Le Monde’s editorialists ask a direct question, they answer or try to answer it, sometimes extensively (9). If the co-text does not explicitly indicate that the question is being put forth by Le Monde, and if the question does not appear to oppose Le Monde’s position, then it can be considered that Le Monde is only relaying what it perceives to be the audience’s / the public opinion’s question in order to fulfill its journalistic function (9: 9-4-18). In doing so, Le Monde displays its understanding of its audience, and its knowledge of the subject matter (9: 9-4-19). (9) 9-4-18 9-4-19
Pourquoi? [voice Soc] L’explication pourrait tenir aux objectifs stratégiques de l’Amérique. [voice LM] [Why? The explanation could be contained in the strategic objectives of America.] [further explanations in the four subsequent sentences]
However, if the question appears to oppose Le Monde’s position, then it can be implicitly attributed to a third party. In (10) for example, the question (13-4-23) is one that some of Le Monde’s non-identified interlocutors could ask, and which the newspaper answers (13-4-24). With this strategy, Le Monde reinforces its position by trying to deflect its opponents without giving them too much prominence (i.e. they remain anonymous). (10) 13-4-23 Les démocrates ne sont pas nombreux? [voice O] 13-4-24 Raison de plus pour leur montrer qu’ils ne sont pas seuls et pour les aider. [There aren’t many democrats? All the more reason to show them that they are not alone and to help them out.]
... Other evidentials In other cases, evidentials are revealed by a metapragmatic descriptor (i.e. indication of some instance of language use) (1), reference and predication (2), or epistemic modalization (i.e. comparison of the epistemological status of the narrating and narrated events) (3). The only category of voicing devices that is not
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represented in the corpus as evidentials is that of evaluative indexicals, i.e. socially marked ways of speaking (Wortham & Locher 1996). (1) Metapragmatic descriptor (verbal form, noun) 2-1-5 Dans nos éditions du 19 août, Michel Camdessus, le directeur général du Fonds, condamnait notre démarche. [voice W] [In our August 19th issue, Michel Camdessus, the Fund’s Managing Director, condemned the steps we had taken.] 1-4-12 One theory, advanced by Mikhail Khodorkovsky, a Russian businessman under investigation in the inquiry, is that Russian officials used the bank to shield profits earned from the manipulation of Government securities before the ruble devaluation a year ago. [voice Rnoff pas] 14-1-1 The Clinton Administration acted appropriately recently in ordering the Export-Import Bank to delay $500 million in loan guarantees to Tyumen Oil, a state-affiliated Russian company whose abusive business practices cheated foreign companies. [voice USA] 24-2-10 It was encouraging to hear him [Mr. Putin] renounce a return to authoritarian rule earlier this summer, and to commit himself to the protection of political and economic freedom. [voice R] 41-8-23 They [Moscow and Beijing] fear that similar arguments could one day be invoked against Chinese policies in Tibet or Russian actions in Chechnya. [voice R; voice O] 26-3-12 and British and Norwegian help was not accepted [by Russian officials] until four days after the sinking. [voice W pas; voice R cov] 4-2-4 This [terrorist killings of civilians in Moscow and Southern Russia] has provoked demands [by the Russian population] for swift action. [voice Rnoff cov] 24-6-26 His [Putin’s] dismissal last week of six generals allied with Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev suggested he could not fire Mr. Sergeyev himself in a dispute over military policy. [voice R pas] (2) Reference and predication 1-1-4 Il [ce document] est accablant pour la Russie tout autant que pour le FMI. [voice Wnoff] [It [this document] is overwhelmingly incriminating for Russia as well as for the IMF.] (3) Epistemic modalization 6-1-1 À en croire le premier ministre Vladimir Poutine, les Russes font à nouveau la guerre à la Tchétchénie avec un seul objectif: détruire les bases de terroristes islamistes responsables, selon lui, des attentats qui ont fait trois cents morts à Moscou en septembre. [voice R] [Were we to believe the Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, the Russians
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Appendix 4. Content coding
are once again at war with Chechnya with only one goal in mind: the destruction of all Islamic terrorists’ bases that are, according to him, responsible for the deaths of three hundred people in the September attacks on Moscow.] 34-5-18 Given the damage alleged [by the US government] to have been done by Mr. Hanssen, including the betrayal of Russians who were spying for the United States, a vigorous response was justified. [voice USA cov]
.. Specific addressees In their texts, writers address their entire audience, but they can also target a category of it covertly through the use of person markers (A4.2.3.1) and attitude markers (A4.2.3.2), and overtly through the use of relational markers (A4.2.3.3). Furthermore, writers can explicitly indicate the addressees of the other voices they incorporate in their texts (A4.2.3.4). Table A4-4 gives the codes for addressees’ voices. Table A4-4 Coding of addressees’ voices Codes
Descriptions
[voice] to F
Sentence that contains a statement from [voice] addressed to the French government. Sentence that contains a statement from [voice] addressed to European institutions. Sentence that contains a statement from [voice] addressed to the American government. Sentence that contains a statement from [voice] addressed to Western governments / institutions (including IMF). Sentence that contains a statement from [voice] addressed to the Russian government. Sentence that contains a statement from [voice] addressed to society in general (i.e. the public opinion as opposed to the political elite). Sentence that contains a statement from [voice] addressed to Le Monde. Sentence that contains a statement from [voice] addressed to The New York Times. Sentence that contains a statement from [voice] to a specific addressee other than those mentioned above. Sentence that contains a statement from [voice] to an indeterminate addressee.
[voice] to E [voice] to USA [voice] to W [voice] to R [voice] to Soc [voice] to LM [voice] to NYT [voice] to O [voice] to Ind
This code is added when appropriate to the previous ones – noff Sentence that contains a statement to a non-official addressee (i.e. not linked to the executive, legislative, or judiciary).
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... Person markers The global audience of the newspaper being known, the voice analysis (i.e. the identification of the speakers) enables to define the addressees a contrario. It can be stated that when the newspaper speaks in its name only (see 2.3.2.1.1), it addresses its entire readership (1), i.e. mostly its national society including its national ruling elite (and some foreign readers), unless it mentions explicitly its targeted addressees as in (2). In (3), Le Monde addresses implicitly Western governments by asking them to answer to an explicitly defined group, the Western taxpayers. (1) 12-4-22 On rappellera que le désenchantement actuel est aussi le reflet de l’enthousiasme délirant du début des années 90. [LM to Soc] [We will recall that today’s disappointment also reflects the delirious enthusiasm of the early 90s.] (2) 18-1-4
À l’heure où les hommes du Kremlin font écraser sous leurs bombes une partie de leur population, les Tchétchènes, on a plutôt envie de demander à MM. Chirac, Blair, Clinton et Schröder . . . [LM to W] [At a time when the leaders in the Kremlin have part of their population, the Chechens, crushed under their bombs, we rather feel like asking Mr. Chirac, Blair, Clinton and Schröder . . . ]
(3) 4-4-18
Comment expliquer aux bailleurs de fonds, les contribuables occidentaux, que ce pays auquel il faut prêter, tous les six mois, des sommes astronomiques, est, année après année, exportateur net de capitaux? [LM to W] [How can it be explained to the financial backers, the Western taxpayers, that this country to which they are required to loan astronomical sums of money every six months is, year after year, a net exporter of capital?]
More interestingly, when Le Monde purports to represent public opinion (see A4.2.1.1), its primary targeted audience is the ruling elite (4, 5). By using these strategies in addressing its audience, Le Monde gives itself the means to influence the ruling elite (i.e. the only readers’ category with some power in the domain of foreign policy) by exerting the pressure of public opinion on it through the newspaper’s argumentation. (4) 13-4-25 Nous aurons la Russie que nous aurons méritée. [LM Soc to W] [We will get the type of Russia that we deserve.] (5) 11-4-18 Personne ne suggère qu’on fasse la guerre à la Russie. [LM Soc to W] 11-4-19 Mais on peut faire quelque chose. [LM Soc to W] [Nobody suggests going to war against Russia. But one can do something.]
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Appendix 4. Content coding
... Writers’ attitude markers In conveying the writer’s affective attitude to readers, attitude markers may be addressed to an indeterminate, unspecified addressee, to the entire audience without distinction, as in the following example. 1-5-15
It is premature to judge any of these assertions. [NYT to Ind]
However, sometimes, attitude markers are targeted to a specific category of people. When the identity of these addressees is not explicitly stated in the same sentence, it is revealed by the co-text. The examples below are those that were given to illustrate the use of attitude markers as signs of the newspapers’ voices (see A4.3.2.1.2). (1) Questioning / doubt 26-6-27 But the most intriguing question is whether this tragedy can educate Mr. Putin in the arts of compassionate and accountable leadership. [NYT to R] 30-1-1 It is not clear whether he [Putin] means that state to be authoritarian or democratic. [NYT to R] (2) Prediction / warning / advice 6-4-21 The interest both sides share in countering the threat from rogue states suggests that with good-faith negotiation, agreement on carefully drawn changes in the ABM treaty may eventually come to pass. [NYT to US; NYT to R] 18-2-3 Although Americans may feel relieved that Russian conventional forces are now too weak to pose a serious external threat, there is a worrisome side to Russia’s military breakdown. [NYT to USA] 18-6-26 The place to begin is by disengaging Russian troops from Chechnya at the earliest possible date. [ NYT to R] 26-6-26 NATO and Russia both should move away from close shadowing of each other’s submarines that can lead to accidental bumpings, although an explosion and not a collision seems to have sunk the Kursk. [ NYT to W; NYT to R] 5-5-14 Le prix à payer pour ce refus d’ingérence [par la communauté internationale] risque d’être bientôt beaucoup plus lourd, quand les civils tchétchènes ne seront plus les seuls à en faire les frais. [cotext: LM to W] [The price of the [international community’s] refusal to interfere soon risks becoming much greater, when the Chechen civilians are not alone in assuming the costs.] 6-5-24 Sinistres motivations qui justifieraient que la communauté internationale ne s’enferme pas dans un lourd silence complice. [LM to W]
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[Appalling motivations that would justify that the international community does not confine itself to deep, complicit silence.] (3) Necessity / obligation 2-1-5 With elections approaching in Russia and the United States, investigators must follow the trails of corruption and money laundering. [co-text: NYT to Wnoff, NYT to Rnoff] 16-8-35 More information will be needed before anyone can judge whether the decision to spare Mr. Yeltsin from possible prosecution was warranted or wise. [NYT to Soc]
... Relational markers With the use of relational markers, writers overtly address readers. These markers comprise “second person pronouns, imperatives, questions forms and asides that interrupt the ongoing discourse” (Hyland 1998: 444). In both corpora, the editorials never refer directly and exclusively to readers with second person pronouns. Editorialists ask direct and indirect questions, or use the imperative. When the addressees of questions are not explicitly stated as for example in (1), they can be inferred from the identity of the people asking the question. Thus, in (2), Le Monde states a question asked by the society and answers it for the society. In (3), the question is asked by a specific group (those appearing to oppose Le Monde’s position), and thus the answer is addressed to this specific group and not to the entire society. (1) 18-1-4
À l’heure où les hommes du Kremlin font écraser sous leurs bombes une partie de leur population, les Tchétchènes, on a plutôt envie de demander à MM. Chirac, Blair, Clinton et Schröder. . . [LM to W] [At a time when the leaders in the Kremlin have part of their population, the Chechens, crushed under their bombs, we rather feel like asking Mr. Chirac, Blair, Clinton and Schröder . . . ]
(2) 9-4-18 9-4-19
Pourquoi? [Soc to LM] L’explication pourrait tenir aux objectifs stratégiques de l’Amérique. [LM to Soc] [Why? The explanation could be contained in the strategic objectives of America.] [further explanations in the four subsequent sentences]
(3) 13-4-23 Les démocrates ne sont pas nombreux? [O to LM] 13-4-24 Raison de plus pour leur montrer qu’ils ne sont pas seuls et pour les aider. [LM to O] [There aren’t many democrats?
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Appendix 4. Content coding
All the more reason to show them that they are not alone and to help them out.]
The use of the imperative to address readers is rather rare. In the following example (4: 3-4-12), its purpose is to help in the interpretation of a previous statement (4: 3-4-11). (4) 3-4-11
3-4-12
Il a révélé le fond de sa pensée, et de ses inquiétudes, en déclarant, quelques heures après avoir été renvoyé par M. Eltsine sans un mot d’explication, que la Russie risquait fort de “perdre” le Daghestan. [He revealed the truth behind his thoughts and concerns when he stated, just hours after Mr. Yeltsin fired him without explanation, that Russia was in danger of “losing” Dagestan.] Comprenez: comme elle [la Russie] a déjà “perdu” la Tchétchénie après une guerre qui a duré deux ans et provoqué des dizaines de milliers de morts. [LM to Soc] [That is: the same way it [Russia] already “lost” Chechnya following a war that lasted two years and caused tens of thousands of deaths.]
... Addressees of others’ voices When editorialists incorporate the voice of others in their text, they can explicitly mention whom these voices are addressing. (1) 2-1-5
Dans nos éditions du 19 août, Michel Camdessus, le directeur général du Fonds, condamnait notre démarche. [W to LM] [In our August 19th issue, Michel Camdessus, the Fund’s Managing Director, condemned the steps we had taken.]
(2) 14-1-1
The Clinton Administration acted appropriately recently in ordering the Export-Import Bank to delay $500 million in loan guarantees to Tyumen Oil, a state-affiliated Russian company whose abusive business practices cheated foreign companies. [USA to USAnoff]
Sometimes, the addressees are implicit, as in (3) where Le Monde and a group that appears to oppose the newspaper’s position enter into a dialogue. (3) 4-3-11
4-3-12
On dira que ces affaires sont distinctes les unes des autres, qu’il faut se défier des amalgames et éviter, en mêlant tout, du blanchiment de l’argent par la mafia russe à la corruption des élites postsoviétiques, de jeter un opprobre général sur le travail du FMI en Russie. [O to LM] L’argument ne nous paraît pas recevable. . . [LM to O] [It is said that these issues are distinct from each other, that one must be cautious of any amalgam and avoid generally covering IMF work in Russia with opprobrium by mixing everything, from money laun-
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dering by Russian mafia to the corruption of post-soviet elite. This point is not acceptable in our opinion.]
However, the addressees of others’ voices are not always mentioned, explicitly or implicitly. Through their incorporation into the editorial, the others’ voices are cut from their original context, as in (3) and (4). (3) 1-4-12
One theory, advanced by Mikhail Khodorkovsky, a Russian businessman under investigation in the inquiry, is that Russian officials used the bank to shield profits earned from the manipulation of Government securities before the ruble devaluation a year ago. [voice Rnoff pas]
(4) 24-2-10 It was encouraging to hear him [Mr. Putin] renounce a return to authoritarian rule earlier this summer, and to commit himself to the protection of political and economic freedom. [voice R]
.. Interactions at the macrostructural level Interactions between participants in the debate reconstructed in the editorials are also coded at the macrostructural level. In (1), for example, The New York Times warns Russia of what it will have to do [Mcr NYT to R], and by the same token implies that it has not done well [Mcr R neg]. In (2), Le Monde enjoins the West not to forget how it reacted at the time of the dissolution of the Soviet Union [Mcr LM to W], implicitly criticizes these reactions [Mcr W neg], and explicitly criticizes Russia [Mcr R neg]. (1) 26-6-23 There will be other lessons to draw from the Kursk disaster. [Mcr NYT to R; and also, Mcr R neg] (2) 12-2-5
Il faudra se souvenir de tout cela quand, demain, hommes politiques, dirigeants économiques et journalistes occidentaux, constatant que la créature ne ressemble aucunement à ce qu’ils avaient espéré, réaliseront qu’ils ont affaire à une Russie qui n’est nullement l’allié rêvé, mais, au contraire, presqu’un adversaire déclaré. [Mcr LM to W; and also, Mcr W neg, Mcr R neg] [This must all be remembered in the future, when politicians, economic leaders and western journalists – noting that the creature does not at all resemble what they had hoped for – realize that they are dealing with a Russia that is not the ally they had dreamed of, but instead almost an enemy.]
The coding of the text content depends on its interpretation. Macrostructures, as main points in the entire text argumentation, are interpreted in function of
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Appendix 4. Content coding
their role in the entire text, i.e. at a pragmatic level, while the interpretation of the content at the all-sentence level relies primarily on the linguistic (syntactic and lexical) features of each sentence. Thus, the same sentence could be coded differently depending on the level at which it is interpreted. If a sentence is coded as a message ([voice] to [. . .]) at the macrostructural level, it will also be coded as a message at the all-sentence level, but not necessarily in the same terms. In (3), for example, the co-text (9-1-3) informs us that Jacques Chirac (9-2-4) was speaking at the OSCE meeting in Turkey, and thus was mostly addressing the Western world [F to W]. However, if we consider this sentence (9-2-4) within the text argumentation (TThMcr: 9-1-3), it functions as a message addressed by the French President to the Russian President [Mcr F to R]. In this editorial, the point of the text argumentation is a message from The New York Times to Mr. Yeltsin (9-1-3: TThMcr NYT to R), and the French President’s statement is used by the newspaper towards its own goals. This is made explicit with the expression “for example” in 9-2-4. (3) 9-1-3
9-2-4
Mr. Yeltsin and his allies in Moscow need to listen to warnings by those leaders who tried during the European security conference in Istanbul to explain that using bombs and tanks would not work, militarily or diplomatically, to oust Chechen terrorists. [TThMcr NYT to R] President Jacques Chirac of France, for example, said [at the OSCE meeting in Istanbul] this war to combat terrorism was “a tragic error” that was taking too many innocent lives in the breakaway republic. [co-text: F to W; co-text: Mcr F to R]
Example (3) illustrates how the double-coding, at the all-sentence level and at the macrostructural level, allows the use of a linguistic structure to be linked to its function in the co-text and to the function of the entire text in its context. The micro-interpretation of the text content at the all-sentence level, and the macro-interpretation of the text content at the macrostructural level reveal the editorials from the inside and from the outside. On the one hand, editorials are a construction of a “virtual” public sphere in which a variety of participants take part. On the other, editorials are a participant in a larger “real” public sphere. In other words, editorialists construct their text by presenting a number of chosen participants in a certain perspective in order to influence their audience. In the case of Le Monde and The New York Times, this audience is national and international, and comprises members of the national and international political elite. Thus, this linguistic analysis of the editorials at the micro- and macrolevel contributes to the understanding of the influence editorialists exert in international relations through their use of language.
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The Spiral of “Anti-Other Rhetoric”
Table A4-5 Coding of historical mentions Codes
Descriptions
bef 91 pos / neg Russia before 1991: Sentence that mentions a positive / negative characteristic of pre-1991 Russia (from the newspaper’s perspective as indicated by the cotext) and implies that it is still present in today’s Russia. This underlines the continuity of today’s Russia with the Soviet Union. Com Communism after 1991: Sentence in which communism is presented as a source of potential danger or difficulties after 1991. This underlines the continuity of today’s Russia with the Soviet Union. KGB KGB / FSB: Sentence that underlines the continuing importance of this security agency in political matters by linking a Russian leader after 1991 with the FSB (ex-KGB) or KGB, or by mentioning the role of the FSB/KGB. This underlines the continuity of today’s Russia with the Soviet Union. Chech Chechnya: Sentence that mentions the existence of two Chechen wars by referring explicitly to the first or the second. The emphasis here is on the repetition of a war in the same area against the same people, thus on militarism after 1991. In Western minds, this underlines the continuity of today’s Russia with the Soviet Union. Fut pos / neg Future: Sentence that predicts explicitly what positive / negative aspects of Russia will belong to History.
. Representation of Russia in terms of its history Russia has had in the past a notably negative representation in the predominantly non-communist West. The question that is thus raised concerns the impact of this past on the present and the negative or positive image it will leave of Russia in the future. Table A4.5 defines how historical mentions are coded.
Examples (1) Russia before 1991 26-4-26 par orgueil, par pathologie patriotarde, par nationalisme d’un autre âge, on se refuse, dans un premier temps, au moment précis où chaque seconde compte, à faire appel à l’aide étrangère. [bef 91 neg] [out of pride, pathological patriotism, and nationalism from a different time, they initially refuse to call for outside help, at the precise moment when each second counts.]
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Appendix 4. Content coding
22-2-6
and the government still uses criminal prosecution as a political weapon. [bef 91 neg]
(2) Communism after 1991 10-3-15 Déstabiliser M. Eltsine, en dénonçant l’incurie et la brutalité de son régime, c’était faire le lit des “rouges-bruns”: un mélange de communistes, d’ultranationalistes et de militaristes anti-occidentaux. [Com] [To destabilize Mr. Yeltsin, by denouncing the negligence and brutality of his regime, was to prepare for the Red-Browns’ arrival: a mixture of communists, ultranationalists and anti-Western militants.] 12-5-17 If opinion polls prove correct, the new Duma may look very much the old one, dominated by Communists and nationalists. [Com] (3) FSB / KGB 21-4-24 Cette perquisition musclée [par le FSB], dont bien des tenants et aboutissants sont encore obscurs, n’en est pas moins une grossière atteinte à la liberté de la presse. [KGB] [This forceful search [by the FSB] (for which many details are still unclear) is nothing less than a crude violation of freedom of the press.] 38-1-3 Even so, Mr. Putin, whose usual demeanor recalls his long years as a Soviet K.G.B. operative, visibly warmed to the personal chemistry of the occasion. [KGB] (4) Chechnya 6-2-5 Ils détruisent ce qui reste de Grozny, une ville qu’ils avaient réduite en ruine lors de leur précédente offensive (1994–1996). [Chech] [They are destroying what is left of Grozny, a city reduced to ruins during their previous attack (1994–1996).] 4-5-15 This new round of bombing, sadly, is far more popular. [Chech] (5) Future 10-2-12 Il reste que dans les annales du crime d’État, la “campagne” de Tchétchénie 1999 figurera en bonne place. [Fut neg] [There is no denying that the 1999 Chechen campaign will have a prominent place in the record of State crimes.] 16-5-24 History will honor him for these acts. [Fut pos]
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appendix
Negative representation of Russia
As conclusions of the editorial’s general argumentation, the content of text macrostructures is the most salient and most susceptible to remain in long-term memory. For this reason, they are given below to define LM’s (A5.1) and the NYT’ (A5.2) criticisms of Russia.
. Le Monde The text macrostructures containing a negative evaluation of Russia in LM cover questions of finance and politics (1), country’s leaders (2), the war in Chechnya (3), the army (4), media freedom (5), and Western responsibility (6). (1) Finance / Politics « [Le rapport sur l’utilisation des fonds prêtés par le FMI à Moscou, réalisé par le cabinet international Pricewaterhouse-Coopers], [. . . ], est proprement stupéfiant » (1-1-3). « Ce détournement de fonds se fait sinon avec l’accord, en tout cas en toute connaissance de cause de la part des grands de ce monde [. . . ] qui sont tous des administrateurs du Fonds » (1-2-6). « Malgré la transition annoncée, [. . . ], les mêmes hommes [. . . ] sont aux commandes à Moscou » (1-3-10) et « Les ex-réseaux soviétiques continuent à utiliser, sans complexe leurs méthodes d’antan » (1-3-13). “[The report on the use of funds Moscow borrowed from the IMF, by the international accounting and consulting firm Pricewaterhouse Coopers], [. . .], is absolutely astounding” (1-1-3). “This embezzlement of funds occurs, if not with the agreement, then certainly with the full knowledge of this world’s powerful people [. . .], the IMF administrators” (1-2-6). “Despite the announced transition [. . .], the same men [. . .] are in control in Moscow” (13-10) and “The former soviet networks continue to shamelessly use their old methods” (1-3-13).] (2) Leaders « [Poutine] mise sur les coups de canon de ses généraux pour étouffer le fracas des scandales financiers du régime Eltsine » (11-2-12) « où tout est lié, politique, finance et mafia » (4-3-12). Eltsine « qui avait suscité tant d’espoirs en
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The Spiral of “Anti-Other Rhetoric”
prononçant l’arrêt de mort de l’URSS en 1991, et qui, à la différence de Mikhaïl Gorbachev, s’est fait élire à deux reprises par son peuple, [a eu] une fin de règne pitoyable » (2-6-28). [“[Putin] relies on the canon shots fired by his generals to muffle the noise from the financial scandals of Yeltsin’s regime” (11-2-12) “where everything is linked: politics, finances and the mafia” (4-3-12). Yeltsin “who had created so much hope by announcing the fall of the USSR in 1991, and who, unlike Mikhail Gorbachev, was elected twice by his people, [had] a pitiful end to his rule” (2-6-28).] (3) Chechnya « La genèse de cette seconde guerre de Tchétchénie reste d’ailleurs obscure, entre provocations opportunes au Daghestan et attentats mystérieux à Moscou » (11-2-3) et « le Kremlin n’a jamais présenté le moindre début de preuve de l’implication d’islamistes dans les attentats de Moscou » (6-4-19). Le Kremlin refuse « de mener les négociations prévues par l’accord de paix russo-tchétchène » (5-5-13) et « refuse toute négociation avec M. Maskhadov » (23-4-20). « Les Russes se livrent [. . . ] à des bombardements massifs sans aucun rapport avec l’objectif affiché » (6-1-2), « ils lâchent leurs bombes sur les villages d’une population sans défense et détruisent les habitations par dizaines » (6-2-7), ce qui se traduit par « des pertes immenses chez les civils tchétchènes, et non négligeables parmi les Russes » (26-4-28). « A Grozny, Vladimir Poutine vient de prouver qu’il n’est pas regardant sur les moyens pour parvenir à ses fins » (14-5-23) et on espère « qu’en rencontrant M. Poutine, ses pairs se souviendront que c’est à des monceaux de cadavres que le président de Russie doit son couronnement » (19-4-20). « Sur ce chemin [de la force], la Russie s’est déjà, trop souvent fourvoyée » (25-3-36). « La Russie qui entre ainsi, à coup de bombes et sur les ruines de Grozny, dans le XXIe siècle est un pays inquiétant » (10-5-22). « Au minimum, il y aurait de quoi prendre quelques distances avec un régime que les Occidentaux, bien loin de « l’humilier », embrassent avec un incompréhensible enthousiasme » (18-4-29). [“The genesis of this second Chechen war is still obscure, somewhere between timely provocations in Dagestan and mysterious attacks in Moscow” (11-2-3). “The Kremlin has never presented even the slightest proof of Islamic involvement in the attacks in Moscow” (6-4-19). The Kremlin refuses “to hold the negotiations set out by the Russian-Chechen peace agreement” (5-5-13) and “refuses any negotiation with Mr. Maskhadov” (23-4-20). “The Russians are engaged in massive bombings that are in no way associated with their announced objective” and “they drop their bombs on villages and their defenseless inhabitants and destroy dozens of homes” (6-2-7), which translates into “massive Chechen civilian losses and not inconsiderable Russian losses” (26-4-28). “In Grozny, Vladimir Putin has just proved that his goals
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Appendix 5. Negative representation of Russia
justify his means” (14-5-23) and we hope “that when meeting Mr. Putin, his peers will remember that the Russian president owes his crown to piles of corpses” (19-4-20). “On this road [of violence], Russia has already lost its way too often” (25-3-36). “The Russia that enters into the 21st century by bombing Grozny is a worrisome country” (10-5-22). “At the very least, there would be reason to take a few steps back from this regime that Westerners, instead of ‘humiliating’, are embracing with incomprehensible enthusiasm” (18-4-29).] (4) Army « Couplée au manque de moyens et à l’état – matériel et psychologique – calamiteux des forces armées russes, [l’] obsession poutinienne du statut passé de superpuissance du pays explique largement le drame du Koursk » (27-3-18). « Comme si la leçon de Tchernobyl n’avait servi à rien » (26-3-16), « la vie des hommes du Koursk n’est pas la priorité » (26-4-27). « Le “bonapartisme rampant” », qui « est à l’origine des purges menées dans l’armée par Staline dans les années 30, comme de la mise à l’écart du maréchal Joukov après la deuxième guerre mondiale » (29-1-3), et « est en train de se mettre en place en Russie n’est pas de bon augure » (29-4-17). [“Coupled with the lack of material resources and the disastrous state (material and psychological) of the Russian armed forces, Putin’s obsession with his country’s status as a former superpower largely explains the crisis of the Kursk” (27-3-18). “As if nothing had been learned from Chernobyl” (26-316), “the lives of the men on the Kursk are not a priority” (26-4-27). “The ‘rampant bonapartism’, at “the origin of the purges in Stalin’s army in the 1930s and of Marshal Zukov’s disappearance after World War II”, (29-1-3) “is being put into place in Russia, which does not bode well” (29-4-17).] (5) Media « Quand un gouvernement s’attache à empêcher la presse de travailler sur place, quand il fait disparaître un de ses propres ressortissants, le reporter Andreï Babitski, parce qu’il en a trop vu, quand les informations recueillies par les organisations locales de défense des droits de l’homme, Memorial, le Fonds Glasnost, corroborent les témoignages récoltés par les courageux journalistes occidentaux encore dans la région [Tchétchénie], on a quelque raison de s’inquiéter » (182-8). « Journaux et télévisions du pays qui ont encore le courage d’un travail indépendant sont victimes d’une campagne d’intimidation : tabassages des reporters par des policiers déguisés en loubards; pressions économiques ; poursuites judiciaires, etc. » (30-3-20). « Le coup de force contre NTV donne raison à tous ceux qui craignent pour l’avenir de la démocratie dans la Russie de Poutine » (32-7-23). [“We have reason to be worried when a government focuses on stopping the press from working on location, when it makes one of its own citi-
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The Spiral of “Anti-Other Rhetoric”
zens disappear (the reporter Andreï Babitski, who saw too much) and when the information collected by local human rights offices like Memorial and The Glasnost Fund corroborates the testimony gathered by the courageous Western journalists still in Chechnya” (18-2-8). “Newspapers and television stations that still have the courage to be independent are the victims of an intimidation campaign: reporters beat up by police disguised as thugs; economic pressures; trials, etc.” (30-3-20). “The assault on NTV shows all who fear for the democratic future of Putin’s Russia that they are right” (32-7-23).] (6) Westerners Le « silence [des Occidentaux] » (5-4-11), le « refus d’ingérence » (5-5-14) « face à l’agression russe en Tchétchénie » (6-4-25) « annonce[nt] de nouveaux drames » (24-5-26). « [Il ne faut pas que le Kremlin puisse continuer à siéger tranquillement au Conseil de l’Europe, compter sans cesse sur l’aide du FMI (une prochaine tranche dans quelques semaines) tant qu’il fait aveuglément bombarder les populations civiles de Tchétchénie.] C’est une exigence minimale » (8-4-27). [The “silence [of the West]” (5-4-11) and its “refusal to interfere” (5-5-14) “in the face of the Russian aggression in Chechnya”, (6-4-25) “herald new crises” (24-5-26). “[The Kremlin must not be allowed to quietly keep its seat in the Council of Europe and eternally count on the IMF’s help (another installment arriving in a few weeks) as long as it indiscriminately continues bombing civilians in Chechnya.] This is an absolute minimum requirement” (8-4-27).]
. The New York Times As for the NYT’ text macrostructures containing a negative evaluation of Russia, they generate this much longer text that deals with the country’s economic / financial situation (1), its leaders (2), the war in Chechnya (3), the parliamentary and presidential elections (4), the army (5), the status of individual freedoms (6), and health care (7). (1) Economy – finance “Well before the Communist era, corruption was a part of the Russian fabric” (2-2-7). “Russian elites in the final years of the Soviet Union were reaping fortunes, a practice that helped discredit Communism in Russian eyes” (2-28). “American and Swiss banking regulators can [. . .] forc[e] Russian regulators to act and teach[. . .] them some monitoring techniques” (2-2-11), but “in the end, [. . .], the Russians must reform their [financial] system” (2-7-8).
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Appendix 5. Negative representation of Russia
(2) Leaders “[Gorbachev] vainly imagined that the demoralized, terrorized and lawless society created by Stalin and stifled by Leonid Brezhnev could be reformed in an orderly, controlled way in which the government set the pace of change” (8-2-7). “When [Yeltsin] who commands the largest nuclear stockpile in the world rattles that arsenal after he gives his vintage bear hug to President Jiang Zemin of China, the scene is, at best, unsettling” (11-1-2), but “for all his maddening weaknesses, he [Yeltsin] led his nation toward democracy after 1,000 years of tyranny” (16-8-37). “Mr. Putin’s political instincts also remain unclear” (16-4-12). “He served the [K.G.B.] loyally for 17 years, including a tour as a spy in East Germany in the late 1980’s” (21-6-36). “It would be a great loss for Russia and the world if he followed the K.G.B. rulebook and turned the Kremlin back into a fortress” (21-8-48). “As he learns to wield the nearly dictatorial powers that the Yeltsin-era Constitution gives him, Mr. Putin will have to decide whether he intends to build a durable democracy or just rebuild the machinery of state” (24-6-27). “It is time for Mr. Putin to set the record straight about Raoul Wallenberg’s last years” (29-3-12). (3) Chechnya “The bombing deaths of so many innocent Russians [in Moscow and Dagestan] are a terrible tragedy that can only be made worse by an overreaction that tampers with Russia’s democratic progress” (3-5-23). “In their ‘Operation Whirlwind,’ Russian police have moved too much like a tornado, arresting and detaining the innocent along with those legitimately suspected of these cowardly acts” (3-2-6). Partly started in reaction to these bombings, the war in Chechnya “is a risky battle plan – a pursuit of Islamic militants in the Caucasus that threatens to create political and military havoc not only in Chechnya but in Moscow as well” (4-1-2). “With parliamentary elections in December and a presidential vote set for next year, a second Chechen war may be designed to give the illusion of power to a weakened Russian Government” (4-5-16). “The first [war], as many Russians and Chechens know well, was one too many” (4-5-17). “Re-fighting a bad war and rejecting a valid election sounds dangerously like the Russia of an earlier era” (5-4-15). “The second war will not only devastate Chechnya” (7-2-3), “the greater damage could be to Russia’s international reputation” (7-6-15). “Mr. Yeltsin and his allies in Moscow need to listen to warnings by those leaders who tried during the European security conference in Istanbul to explain that using bombs and tanks would not work, militarily or diplomatically, to oust Chechen terrorists” (9-1-3). “Though the I.M.F. insists that its action is based solely on financial grounds, the delay rightly serves notice to Moscow that Western help is
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The Spiral of “Anti-Other Rhetoric”
not entirely unconditional” (10-4-16). “[Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and other Russian leaders should] quickly find a route to a political settlement” (10-5-21). “Unfortunately, given the war’s popularity among Russian leaders and voters, there seems little chance that [the negotiation of a compromise peace agreement] will happen before Grozny is destroyed and Russia is diminished” (15-5-18). But, “if Mr. Putin’s goal is to build a strong Russian democracy, the assault on Chechnya is the wrong way to begin” (17-7-24). “The central aims [of the war] were to avenge Russia’ military defeat in 1996 and to lift the political fortunes of Vladimir Putin, the prime minister who became acting president when Boris Yeltsin resigned on Dec. 31” (20-3-13). “Russia’s generals have demonstrated that a scorched-earth campaign can drive guerrillas into the hills, demolish a sizable city and kill thousands of civilians trapped in the combat zone” (20-4-15). “Mr. Putin does his countrymen no favor by encouraging [the] misguided reaction [of celebrating the capture of Grozny]” (20-6-27). “More than 200,000 Chechens who were lucky enough to survive have fled Chechnya” (20-4-16). “[Russia’s second offensive against Chechnya] ended a year ago” (40-3-10), “but Chechen guerrillas have fought on, using mines to kill and maim Russian soldiers” (40-3-11). (4) Elections “[The] important [parliamentary] election, a precursor to presidential elections next June, has also aroused destructive forces that threaten to undermine Russia’s political progress” (12-1-4). “The alliance [between the Kremlin and the Communists] seems to reflect cynical opportunism on both sides rather than ideological affinity” (19-1-2). “The Communists might prove all too willing to back additional powers for police and intelligence agencies and new restrictions on individual and press freedoms” (19-4-15). “For all its potential problems, a centrist alliance would have better served Russia’s longterm interests” (19-3-11). “[The promise of immunity from prosecution for Mr. Yeltsin for any misdeeds of his government] will likely roil the coming presidential campaign, a fitting legacy for a courageous but disappointingly erratic man who guided Russia through the first years of a turbulent, still unfinished journey from tyranny to democracy “(16-1-4). “The political terrain could shift abruptly even by March if Russians became disillusioned with the attack on Chechnya” (16-3-11). “Mr. Putin should use his new political strength to assure a fairer presidential race” (13-5-26). (5) Army “The Kremlin needs to reconfigure Russia’s military forces to better fit the country’s post-cold-war needs and resources” (18-5-14). “[Shortness of money resulting in lack of maintenance of the nuclear submarines and little
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Appendix 5. Negative representation of Russia
training of the crew, compounded with a disregard for safety] have also obstructed rescue efforts [for the Kursk sailors]” (25-2-9). “[Russia] should at least refrain from compounding the risks [of nuclear submarines]” (25-6-34). “There will be other lessons to draw from the Kursk disaster” (26-6-23). (6) Freedoms “If Mr. Putin received advance notification about the arrest [of Mr. Gusinsky] and failed to order the use of less draconian tactics, he has done a disservice to the press freedoms he says he supports“ (22-4-27). “Mr. Putin needs to demonstrate that independent television stations, newspapers and magazines can still operate freely in Russia without government harassment” (37-5-19). “Mr. Putin must find a way to challenge the power of the tycoons that does not eviscerate the liberties Russians so recently won “ (23-5-20). “[Mr. Putin] should be lobbied hard to bring discriminatory Russian and local laws into line with Russia’s constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion” (27-6-23). “Today, new groups independent of a centralized religious organization cannot register at all” (27-4-16). “Other groups must reapply with a thick package of material documenting the history of their religion and other information” (27-4-17). “According to the Keston Institute, a group based in Oxford, England, that monitors religious freedom in the former Communist world, many churches have been repeatedly rejected on technicalities” (27-5-18). (7) Health care “Soviet-era conditions [in health care] were poor, with long waits, brusque bureaucracy and uneven standards of care” (32-1-2).
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Notes
. For a survey of political communications effects, see McLeod et al. (2002). . For a review, see Reese et al. (2003: 10–11). . Because most often the general public in its great majority does not receive foreign media directly, it is not represented in this schema. However, it would have to be in some specific situations when “foreign” media are more or just as readily available than national ones at least on part of the national territory for reasons of language, geographical proximity, or economics. . This was the case in The New York Times in regard to the Iraq war in 2003. . For an excellent analysis of the first Chechen war, see Lieven (1999). . The Contact Group is composed of the US, the UK, France, Germany, Italy and Russia. . Poll conducted in January 2000 on a sample of 1600 people representative of the entire allRussian population. Multiple answers were possible. (Levada 2000: 444–446). . Vissarion Belinsky (1811–1848), recognized leader of the St.Petersburg Westernizers. . Oksana Boˇcarova, Natal’ja Kim, “Rossija i Zapad: obšˇcnost’ ili otˇcuždenie?”, Vserossijskij Centr Izyˇcenija Obšˇcestvennovo Mnenija, published 3 March 2000 on Polit.ru; URL: www.polit.ru/ documents/189172.html This report is based on opinion polls that were conducted by VCIOM from 1994 to 1999 on samples of 1600 people representative of the entire all-Russian population. Unless otherwise indicated, the poll results given in this section are taken from this report. . “Social’no-politiˇceskaja situacija v Rossi v avguste 1999 goda”. Vserossijskij Centr Izyˇcenija Obšˇcestvennovo Mnenija, published 10 September 1999 on Polit.ru; URL: www.polit.ru/ documents/111308.html . In quotation marks in the text. Comment of a poll respondent. . Website of French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. URL: www.diplomatie.gouv.fr . Entretien du Ministre des Affaires étrangères, M. Hubert Védrine, avec « Le grand jury RTL-Le Monde-LCI » (première partie); Paris, 27 février 2000. URL: www.doc.diplomatie.gouv.fr . Tchétchénie – Entretien du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, M. Hubert Védrine, avec le quotidien Le Figaro; Paris, 2 mars 2000. URL: www.doc.diplomatie.gouv.fr . Conférence de l’Institut Français des Relations Internationales (IFRI); discours du Président de la République, M. Jacques Chirac; Paris, 4 novembre 1999. URL: www. elysee.fr . France’s opposition to the revision of the ABM treaty has been long-standing. It was already mentioned in a press conference at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 25 August 1999. URL: www.doc.diplomatie.gouv.fr . Discours de M. Jacques Chirac, Président de la République, devant la Commission des Droits de l’Homme des Nations Unies; Palais des Nations, Genève, 30 mars 2001. URL: www. elysee.fr
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The Spiral of “Anti-Other Rhetoric” . It has been said that Chirac’s position was expressed in reaction to Védrine’s position at the Warsaw Conference on Democracy in June 2000 (Le Monde, 30 March 2001). Védrine had stated that the West should avoid any behaviour that gives the impression the West make use of the quest for democratic values and respect of human rights to impose its influence and domination in political, economic and cultural domains. He added that the West should not content itself with general proclamations, condemnations, denunciations nor prescriptions, but focus on the concrete reinforcement of the steps in the democratic process. (Conférence de Varsovie sur la démocratie; intervention du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, M. Hubert Védrine; Varsovie, 26 juin 2000. URL: www.doc.diplomatie.gouv.fr). Before going to the Warsaw Conference, Védrine had warned the organizers he would not sign the Final Declaration, because he opposed the fact that the American State Department had alone chosen the participants (on the basis of criteria that several NGO contested) and had given them voting instructions for the UN. (Tribune du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, M. Hubert Védrine, dans Le Monde diplomatique; Paris, décembre 2000. URL: www.doc.diplomatie.gouv.fr). . Conférence de l’Institut Français des Relations Internationales (IFRI); “L’entrée dans le XXI ième siècle”; discours d’ouverture du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, M. Hubert Védrine; Paris, 3 novembre 1999. URL: www.doc.diplomatie.gouv.fr . In French, the term “hyperpuissance” (hyperpower) does not have any pejorative connotation. It only denotes a higher level of power than “superpower” that Védrine deems inappropriate to represent the USA in the post-Cold War world. . In 1993, the Copenhagen European Council adopted the principle whereby a number of central and eastern European States could join the Union provided they were able to adhere to its political, economic and monetary aims. In December 1997, the Luxembourg European Council defined the States with which membership negotiations could begin. By the end of 2002, ten candidate States (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia) had completed this negotiation process, and on the 1st of May 2004, they entered the Union. Thus, from 1998 to 2002, the European Union was in a period of intense membership negotiations and also of intense debates about its institutions and its nature. Many within the Union were wondering whether the Union would be able to function appropriately with so many diverse members. Indeed, the European Union was supposed to integrate about 110 million inhabitants; this would represent a fifth of the Union’s population, but less than 5% of its GNP. . See, “Morale et relations internationales”; colloque de l’Institut de relations internationales et stratégiques; discours d’ouverture du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, M. Hubert Védrine; Paris, 16 mai 2000. Conférence de Varsovie sur la démocratie; intervention du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, M. Hubert Védrine; Varsovie, 26 juin 2000. URL: www.doc.diplomatie.gouv.fr See also, Hubert Védrine dialogue avec Dominique Moïsi – Les cartes de la France à l’heure de la mondialisation; Paris: Fayard; 2000. . Tribune du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, M. Hubert Védrine, dans Le Monde diplomatique; Paris, décembre 2000. URL: www.doc.diplomatie.gouv.fr . Tribune du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, M. Hubert Védrine, dans le quotidien Le Monde; Paris, 22 février 2001; “La démocratie au service de la diplomatie”. URL: www.doc.diplomatie. gouv.fr . La Balme (2000: 270) reports that only four out of thirty-seven (11%) interviewed French foreign policy officials cited elected members of the Parliament as a source of public opinion.
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Notes . 1999 poll prepared by the European Value Systems Study Group (URL: http://www. europeanvalues.nl) and conducted by Research International; quota method; N = 1615. . SOFRES poll conducted on 26–28 December 2001 for Télérama-La Croix on a sample (N = 1000) representative of the French population of 18 years of age or more. Method of quota (gender, age, profession of the main income earner) and stratification (region, area status). . Dreyfus was pardoned by the President of the Republic in 1899; his trial was revised in 1904; and he was finally rehabilitated in 1906. . See for example, Sévillia (2004). . Necker, Jacques. Du pouvoir exécutif dans les grands États (1792), in Œuvres complètes, Paris, 1821, t. VIII, p. 320. Quoted in Gauchet, M., 1989: iv. . Preamble to the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen: Les représentants du peuple français, constitués en Assemblée nationale, considérant que l’ignorance, l’oubli ou le mépris des droits de l’homme sont les seules causes des malheurs publics et de la corruption des gouvernements, ont résolu d’exposer, dans une déclaration solennelle, les droits naturels, inaliénables et sacrés de l’homme, afin que cette déclaration, constamment présente à tous les membres du corps social, leur rappelle sans cesse leurs droits et leurs devoirs; afin que les actes du pouvoir législatif et ceux du pouvoir exécutif, pouvant être à chaque instant comparés avec le but de toute institution politique, en soient plus respectés; afin que les réclamations des citoyens, fondées désormais sur des principes simples et incontestables, tournent toujours au maintien de la Constitution et au bonheur de tous. En conséquence, l’Assemblée nationale reconnaît et déclare, en présence et sous les auspices de l’Etre Suprême, les droits suivants de l’homme et du citoyen. . Archives parlementaires, t. VIII, p. 216. Quoted in Gauchet, M., 1989: 45. . The place of Descartes in French culture is described by François Azouvi (1998) in Nora’s Realms of Memory. At a competition in rhetoric held by the Académie française in 1765 on the topic of Descartes, a century after his death, all participants emphasized, among others, the philosopher’s boldness as an intellectual hero, the contrast between his “opinions” (i.e. philosophical positions) and his “spirit” (i.e. method of reasoning), and the immortality of his spirit. While Voltaire’s praise of Newton and Locke denied Descartes’ glory, Voltaire still recognized the value of the Discours de la méthode. “Descartes brought sight to the blind. People now saw Antiquity’s errors, as well as Descartes”’ (Voltaire, Lettres philosophiques, p. 76). During the Revolution, Descartes was presented by Chénier as the man who made it possible “to establish the rights of man upon the remains of all the antisocial prejudices that once formed the base of arbitrary power and anarchic license” (Chénier, Marie-Joseph, Rapport fait à la Convention nationale au nom du Comité d’instruction publique, 7 May 1796, pp. 4–5). This idea that the philosophy of human rights begins with Descartes was repeated by Guizot, Tocqueville, Michelet, Alain, Thorez, and Sartre. . Abbé Brun de la Combe, Joseph-André, Doutes sur les principes de M. l’Abbé Sieyès concernant la Constitution nationale, Paris, 1789, p. 11. Quoted in Gauchet, M., 1989: 55. . Sylvie Thénaut (in Rioux et al. 2003: 71) remarks that human rights were invoked by both proponents and opponents to the French governement’s actions in Algeria during debates in the French National Assembly in April 1955 and March 1956. On one side, human rights were used to denounce repression, torture etc., and on the other to justify repression that was supposed
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The Spiral of “Anti-Other Rhetoric”
to protect security of individuals and goods. Table-ronde: “Les engagements pendant la guerre d’Algérie”; Les droits de l’homme au XXe siècle, Actes des journées d’étude, 2–3 octobre 2002. . Ligue des droits de l’Homme. URL: www.ldh-france.org/connaitre_histoire.htm . Ligue des droits de l’Homme. URL: www.ldh-france.org/connaitre_missions.htm . 104th Congress (1995–1997): Democrat (48 seats) / Republican (52 seats). 105th Congress (1997–1999): Democrat (45 seats) / Republican (55 seats). 106th Congress (1999–2001): Democrat (45 seats) / Republican (55 seats). 107th Congress (2001–2003): Democrat (50 seats) / Republican (50 seats). From 3 January to 20 January 2001, the Democrats held the majority due to the deciding vote of outgoing Democratic Vice president Al Gore. Beginning on 20 January 2001, Republican Vice President Richard Cheney held the deciding vote, giving the majority to the Republicans. On 6 June 2001, Senator Jeffords announced that he would caucus with the Democrats, thus changing the control of the Senate from the Republicans back to the Democrats. URL: www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/ . “A foreign policy for the global age”; Remarks by Samuel M. Berger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; Intercultural Center, Georgetown University, Washington, DC; 19 October 2000. URL: clinton.archives.gov/ . “American power: hegemony, isolationism or engagement”; Samuel M. Berger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; the Council on Foreign Relations; 21 October 1999. URL: clinton.archives.gov/ . “American leadership in the 21st century”; Remarks by Samuel M. Berger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs to the National Press Club; Washington, DC; 6 January 2000. URL: clinton.archives.gov/ . Remarks by the President to the Duma. Moscow, Russia; 5 June 2000. URL: clinton.archives. gov/ . The Gallup Brain; July 2000 Wave 1; question 9; field date: 6–9 July 2000, n = 1001. URL: www.gallup.com/poll/ . The Gallup Brain; December 2000 Wave 1; question 23; field date: 2–4 December 2000, n = 1024. URL: www.gallup.com/poll/ . The Gallup Brain; Foreign Affairs; question 16; field date: 18–21 May 2000, n = 1011. URL: www.gallup.com/poll/ . Declaration of Independence, 4 July 1776. URL: www.constitution.org/usdeclar.htm . Constitution for the United States of America, 17 September 1787. URL: www.constitution. org/cons/constitu.htm . The Federalist Papers. URL: www.constitution.org/fed/federa51.htm . Bell v. Hood, 71 F. Supp., 813, 816 (1947) U.S.D.C., So. Dist. CA. URL: www.constitution. org/cons/const_quotes.htm . Taylor, John (1839). The Course of Civilization. U.S. Magazine and Democratic Review, 6: 209. . Reagan, Ronald: Speech to the National Association of Evangelicals; Orlando (Florida); 8 March 1983. URL: www.luminet.net/∼tgort/empire.htm. Retrieved 2 May 2003. . Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, “From containment to Enlargement”, Address at the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins
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University; Washington, DC; 21 September 1993. US Department of State Dispatch; volume 4, number 39; 27 September 1993. URL: dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/dispatch/1993/html/ Dispatchv4no39.html . The publication of this book had the effects of a bomb explosion in the media milieu. Mediation put an end to the judicial side of the affair in June 2004. “Une médiation judiciaire met un terme à l’affaire de ‘La face cachée du Monde”’; Le Monde, 8 June 2004. . Edwy Plenel resigned from this position on 29 November 2004. “Edwy Plenel quitte ses fonctions de directeur de la rédaction du ‘Monde’”, Le Monde, 1 December 2004. . In 1985, Le Monde established a “Society of readers” (Société des lecteurs) composed of readers-shareholders in order to augment the newspaper’s capital. As president of the Société des lecteurs, Minc is de jure a member of the Supervisory Committee, of which he became the President in 2000. The Supervisory Committee (Comité de surveillance) has the last say about any investment by the newspaper, and has the right to propose a candidate for the position of Chairman of the newspaper’s Executive Board. In 2000, the “Society of the editorial staff ” (Société des rédacteurs) lost its right to propose candidates for this position but kept its veto right on the nomination (Poulet 2003: 119). . See also by the same author: Le Monde, Histoire d’une entreprise de presse, 1944–1995. Le Monde Éditions, 1996. Unless otherwise indicated, information on the history of Le Monde is taken from Éveno’s 2001 book. . 1999–2000 EuroPQN. Sofres poll on a population sample representative of all people living in France (N = 21,472). Le style du Monde, 2002: 29. . It was then known as The New York Daily Times. . Quoted in Schudson (1978: 110–111). . The Journalist; 4 December 1897; 22: 46. Quoted in Schudson (1978: 107). . Arthur Hays Sulzberger (AHS) to Bassett, 5 June 1941, editorial board file, AHS papers, New York Times Archives. Schudson (1978: 580). . The New York Times Company; News Release, 22 September 2000. URL: www.corporateir.net/ . URL: www.nytco.com/company-milestones-1991.html . New York Times Newspaper 2001 Fact Book. URL: www.nytco.com/company-factbook.html . Susan E. Tifft and Alex S. Jones (1999): The Trust – The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity, Little Brown and Company. Quoted in Ken Auletta: “The Howell Doctrine”, The New Yorker, 10 June 2002. . Ken Auletta: “The Howell Doctrine”, The New Yorker, 10 June 2002. URL:www.newyorker. com. Unless otherwise indicated, the information on Raines is taken from this article. . The New York Times Company; News Release, 5 June 2003. In July, Bill Keller was named executive director. The New York Times Company; News Release, 14 July 2003. URL: www.corporate-ir.net/ . Hendrick Hertzberg: “L’affaire Blair”, The New Yorker, 26 May 2003. URL: www.newyorker. com. See also, Howard Kurtz: “Times Editor’s Tough Style Left Him Few Staff Allies”, The Washington Post, 6 June 2003; Howard Kurtz: “Howell Raines’s Tenure: It Left a Nasty Mark”, The Washington Post, 9 June 2003; Jack Shafer: “Howell’s End”, 5 June 2003, Slate, URL: slate.msn.com/id/2084050/
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The Spiral of “Anti-Other Rhetoric” . Jacques Steinberg: “Executive Editor of the Times and Top Deputy Step Down”, The New York Times, 5 June 2003. . According to the World Development Indicators of the World Bank, there were 502 daily newspapers available per 1,000 people in 1991, and only 105 in 1996. This is not only due to the closure of some newspapers, but also to the economic conditions. . On Berezovsky (Nezavisimaja Gazeta) mainly, but also on Potanin (Izvestija) and Gusinskij (Segodnja), see Klebnikov (2000). . Le Monde later retracted the information. It had erroneously described what had been said at an open hearing of the American Congress. Izvestija did not check the information and never ˇ proved the veracity of its accusation against Cernomyrdin (Voltmer 2000; Zasurskij 2001: 232– 236). . Komsomol’skaja Pravda is also part of Prof-Media. Sevodnja, 12 April 1999. . Segodnja; 18 December 1999. As for Izvestija, it says that the closure of Segodnja (April 2001) is due to its owner, Gusinskij, meddling into the newspaper’s affairs (“Vaše ekho – naše ukho” – Your echo is our ear; Arkhangel’skij; 4 June 2001). . Oksana Yablokova, “Izvestia Editor Resigns Over Beslan Coverage”, The Moscow Times, 7 September 2004. URL: http://www.moscowtimes.ru . In November 2000, Boris Berezovskij left for self-exile in the south of France. He was granted political asylum in Great Britain in September 2003. . “Pjat’ voprosov Vitaliju Tret’jakovu”; Nezavisimaja Gazeta, 7 June 2001. “Smena rukovodstva “Nezavisimoj Gazety’”; Nezavisimaja Gazeta, 9 June 2001. . On media freedom under Putin, see Becker (2004). . For the complete text and analysis, see Appendix 3. . For a typology of paragraphs and macrostructural bases, see Le (1999). . The exceptions to the general rules of determination of paragraph theme and macrostructure are given in Appendix 3. . Such analyses have been conducted on academic texts ranging from 5,000 to 10,000 words. See Le (1996, 1999). . LM explains the use of the expression “the children” to represent the KGB in the time of the Soviet Union by the fact that a major toy store is located on the same square as the KGB headquarters. “Pourquoi ‘les enfants’? Parce que le magasin qui proposait le meilleur approvisionnement en jouets de la capitale se trouvait sur la même place que le siège du KGB, devenu le FSB” (21-2-9/10). . The war in Chechnya has also been compared to the war in Algeria, but for military reasons, by Pavel Felgenhauer. Moskovskie Novosti, 24 April 2002. Reported in Johnson’s Russia List, 1 May 2002, # 6218, item 9; URL: http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/ .
S’il veut, comme il l’affirme, restaurer l’autorité de l’Etat, moderniser l’économie, redonner à la Russie sa dignité perdue, M. Poutine devra s’attaquer aux privilèges de ses parrains qui contrôlent le commerce des ressources naturelles, les banques, les médias et finalement le pouvoir politique. (15-4-17: Strong) [If he wants, as he says, to restore State authority, modernize the economy and recover Russia’s lost dignity, Mr. Putin will have to take on the privileges of his godfathers, who control the natural resources, the banks, the media and, when it comes down to it, political power.]
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Si le retour à l’économie administrée est exclu, la remise en ordre suppose que le nouveau président s’attaque aux oligarques qui ont fait fortune en bradant les ressources nationales et en dilapidant les aides internationales. (20-4-21: Strong) [If returning to a controlled economy is ruled out, restructuring implies that the new president is taking on the oligarchs who made a fortune by selling off national resources and squandering international aid.] Elle exige de vraies réformes en faveur du développement des petites entreprises privées, de l’appropriation de la terre par les paysans, de la transparence des investissements étrangers. (20-4-22: Strong) [It requires real reforms in favour of small, private business development, in favour of citizen/peasant land ownership and foreign investment openness.] . Helsinki European Council; Presidency Conclusions, Annex II; 10 and 11 December 1999; URL: ue.eu.int/ueDocs/ . Stockholm European Council; Presidency Conclusions; 23 and 24 March 2001; URL: ue.eu.int/ueDocs/ . Göteborg European Council; Presidency Conclusions; 15 and 16 June 2001; URL: ue.eu.int/ ueDocs/ . The Presidency of the European Union had already made public the Union’s concern about the situation of media in Russia. Situation des medias dans la Fédération de Russie; déclaration de la présidence au nom de l’Union Européenne; Bruxelles, 20 avril 2001. URL: www.doc.diplomatie.gouv.fr . Conférence de presse de M. Jacques Chirac, Président de la République, à l’issue du sommet de l’OSCE; Istanbul, Turquie, 19 novembre 1999. URL: www. elysee.fr . Interview accordée par M. Jacques Chirac, Président de la République, aux quotidiens mexicains “El Sol de Mexico” et “La Prensa”; Palais de l’Élysée, 30 mai 2001. URL: www. elysee.fr . Interview de M. Jacques Chirac, Président de la République, à la radio “L’Écho de Moscou”; Moscou, Russie, 3 juillet 2001. URL: www. elysee.fr . These issues were: the conditions of separation of the actress Sakharova from her daughter following a divorce; the freezing of the Russian Embassy accounts in Paris (18 May 2000); the seizure of the Russian tall ship Sedov in Brest (13 July 2000); and the incident involving Russian military jets in Le Bourget (17–24 June 2001). . Hubert Védrine had expressed the same position to a Russian news agency. Visite en Russie; conférence de presse du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, M. Hubert Védrine, à l’agence Interfax; Moscou, 29 septembre 2000. URL: www.doc.diplomatie.gouv.fr . Tchétchénie; déclaration des Ministres de Affaires Étrangères de France, d’Allemagne et d’Italie; Paris, 29 septembre 1999. URL: www.doc.diplomatie.gouv.fr . E.g. Point de presse conjoint du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, M. Hubert Védrine, et du Ministre russe des Affaires Étrangères, M. Igor Ivanov; Propos du Ministre français; Paris, 28 octobre 1999. URL: www.doc.diplomatie.gouv.fr . Le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, M. Hubert Védrine, invité du « Grand jury RTL-Le MondeLCI »; Paris, 10 octobre 1999. URL: www.doc.diplomatie.gouv.fr . Entretien du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, M. Hubert Védrine, avec France Inter; Paris, 21 mars 2000. URL: www.doc.diplomatie.gouv.fr
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The Spiral of “Anti-Other Rhetoric” . Réponse du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, M. Hubert Védrine, à une question d’actualité à l’Assemblée Nationale; Paris, 15 décembre 1999. Entretien du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, M. Hubert Védrine, avec LCI; extraits; Paris, 3 janvier 2000. See also, Réponse du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, M. Hubert Védrine, à une question d’actualité à l’Assemblée Nationale; Paris; 9 novembre 1999; 8 décembre 1999; 22 février 2000. Audition du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, M. Hubert Védrine, devant la Commission des affaires étrangères de l’Assemblée Nationale; Paris; 1er février 2000. Réponse du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, M. Hubert Védrine, à une question d’actualité au Sénat; Paris; 9 décembre 1999. URL: www.doc.diplomatie.gouv.fr . Entretien du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, M. Hubert Védrine, avec RTL; Paris, 16 décembre 1999. URL: www.doc.diplomatie.gouv.fr . Visite à Moscou; conférence de presse conjointe du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, M. Hubert Védrine, avec son homologue russe, M. Igor Ivanov; propos du ministre; Moscou, 4 février 2000. Visite à Moscou; entretien du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, M. Hubert Védrine, avec les radios françaises; Moscou, 4 février 2000. Visite à Moscou; entretien du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, M. Hubert Védrine, avec la chaîne de télévision russe NTV; Moscou, 4 février 2000. URL: www.doc.diplomatie.gouv.fr . Entretien du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, M. Hubert Védrine, avec RTL; Paris, 14 février 2000. URL: www.doc.diplomatie.gouv.fr . Entretien du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, M. Hubert Védrine, avec Europe 1; Paris, 5 février 2000. URL: www.doc.diplomatie.gouv.fr . Tchétchénie; entretien du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, M. Hubert Védrine, avec le quotidien Le Figaro; Paris, 2 mars 2000. URL: www.doc.diplomatie.gouv.fr . Entretien du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, M. Hubert Védrine, avec l’hebdomadaire Marianne; Paris, 20 novembre 2000. URL: www.doc.diplomatie.gouv.fr . French Third Republic (1871–1940): this period saw the establishment of most of the French colonial empire. . Entretien du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, M. Hubert Védrine, avec « Le grand jury RTL-Le Monde-LCI »; seconde partie; Paris, 27 février 2000. URL: www.doc.diplomatie.gouv.fr . Réponse du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, M. Hubert Védrine, à une question d’actualité à l’Assemblée Nationale; Paris, 15 décembre 1999. URL: www.doc.diplomatie.gouv.fr . Visite en Russie; entretien accordé par le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, M. Hubert Védrine, à la chaîne ORT; Moscou, 29 septembre 2000. URL: www.doc.diplomatie.gouv.fr . Entretien du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, M. Hubert Védrine, avec l’Association des journalistes France-Russie; extraits; Paris, 26 octobre 2000. URL: www.doc.diplomatie.gouv.fr . Entretien du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, M. Hubert Védrine, avec France Inter; Paris, 30 octobre 2000. URL: www.doc.diplomatie.gouv.fr . Entretien du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, M. Hubert Védrine, avec Canal Plus; Paris, 31 octobre 2000. URL: www.doc.diplomatie.gouv.fr . Petition title: “Crime sans châtiment en Tchétchénie”; Le Monde; 22 February 2000. . Izvestja; Maxim Sokolov; 24 February 2000.
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Notes . Among them figured Elena Bonner, Vladimir Boukovski, Viktor Fainberg, Alec Guinzbourg, Arina Guinsbourg, Natalia Gorbachevskaïa, Paul Goma, Sergueï Kovalev, and Leonid Pliouchtch. Le Monde; 24 February 2000. . Le Monde; 15 March 2000. . Le Monde; 22 March 2000. . Le Monde; 23 March 2000. . In March 2003, Glucksmann and Goupil (with Pascal Bruckner) signed an article in favour of the American war in Iraq in order to liberate Iraqi people from dictatorship. Only a minority of people followed this position. “Saddam doit partir, de gré ou de force!”, Le Monde, 4 March 2003. . La banque des sondages – Russes et Européens jugent l’après-communisme. Poll conducted on 22–23 October 1999 by CSA on a sample (N = 1002) representative of the French population of 18 years of age or more. Method of quota (gender, age, profession of the main income earner) and stratification (region, area status). URL: www.ipsos.fr/Canalipsos/poll/ . La banque des sondages – Guerre en Tchétchénie: qu’en pensent les Français ? (17 décembre 1999). Poll conducted on 10–11 December 1999 by the BVA Institute on a sample (N = 941) representative of the French population of 18 years of age or more. Method of quota. URL: www.ipsos.fr/Canalipsos/poll/ . La banque des sondages – Baromètre des médias (28 janvier 2000). Poll conducted on 27–30 December 1999 by SOFRES on a sample (N = 1000) representative of the French population of 18 years of age or more. Method of quota (gender, age, profession of the main income earner) and stratification (region, area status). URL: www.ipsos.fr/Canalipsos/poll/ . La banque des sondages – Les Français et la menace russe (8 janvier 2000). Poll conducted on 31 December 1999 by IFOP on a sample (N = 802) representative of the French population of 18 years of age or more. Method of quota. URL: www.ipsos.fr/Canalipsos/poll/ . La banque des sondages – Les évènements marquants de ces derniers mois (22 février 2000). Poll conducted on 17–18 February 2000 by IFOP on a sample (N = 1002) representative of the French population of 15 years of age or more. Method of quota. URL: www.ipsos.fr/Canalipsos/poll/ . 1999 poll prepared by the European Value Systems Study Group (URL: http://www. europeanvalues.nl) and conducted by Research International; quota method; N = 1615. The level of political concern is based on how respondents say they are interested in politics, how often they talk about politics with friends, and how important politics is. The score for France is 40% while the average score for the 14 polled European countries is 45% (The Netherlands: highest with 72%; Spain: lowest with 27%). . 1999 poll prepared by the European Value Systems Study Group (URL: http://www. europeanvalues.nl) and conducted by Research International; quota method; N = 1615. 67% of French respondents sign petitions vs. an average of 55% of respondents in the 15 polled European countries Sweden: highest with 87%; Portugal: lowest with 22%). 38% of French respondents attend lawful demonstrations vs. an average of 27% of respondents in the 15 polled European countries (Belgium: highest with 39%; Great-Britain: lowest with 13%). . On 1 May 2004, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia became members of the European Union.
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The Spiral of “Anti-Other Rhetoric” . It is true that only Le Monde’s editorials are analyzed in this work. However, the position of French media was unanimous. . The lack of appropriate poll questions and the number of factors that could affect the causeeffect relationship make it impossible to assess independently the impact of media on public opinion or the impact of public opinion on foreign policy. However, one can observe that public opinion, media and foreign policy tend to go in the same direction. In this case, the statement that public opinion had an impact on foreign policy is based on Hubert Védrine’s statement. . Fact Sheet – National Missile Defense; 1 September 2000. URL: clinton.archives.gov/ . Remarks by the President to Students and Faculty at National Defense University. The White House; Office of the Press Secretary; 1 May 2001. URL: www.whitehouse.gov/news/ releases/ . Remarks by the President on National Missile Defense. The White House; Office of the Press Secretary; 13 December 2001. URL: www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ . On 17 November 2004, President Putin said in televised remarks to a meeting of generals representing the various branches of Russia’s armed forces: “We have not only conducted tests of the latest nuclear rocket systems. I am sure that in the coming years we will acquire them. [. . .] Moreover, these will be things which do not exist and are unlikely to exist in other nuclear powers.” AFP (Moscow), 17 November 2004. In Johnson’s Russia List, #8457, 17 November 2004. . Background briefing by senior Administration official. The White House; Office of the Press Secretary; 2 November 1999. URL: clinton.archives.gov/ . Press briefing by National Security Advisor, Samuel Berger. Istanbul, Turkey; 18 November 1999. See also, Press briefing by Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright. Istanbul, Turkey, 18 November 1999. URL: clinton.archives.gov/ . US-EU Summit statement on Chechnya. Washington, D.C. 17 December 1999. URL: clinton.archives.gov/ . Press conference y President William Clinton and President Vladimir Putin. Moscow, Russia; 4 June 2000. URL: clinton.archives.gov/ . Interview of the President in live national radio program with Ekho Moskviy [sic]. Moscow, Russia; 4 June 2000. URL: clinton.archives.gov/ . Press briefing by National Economic Advisor, Gene Sperling. Moscow, Russia; 4 June 2000. URL: clinton.archives.gov/ . Statement by the Vice President. 2 March 2000. URL: clinton.archives.gov/ . Andrei Babitsky is a Russian journalist working for the American Radio Liberty. He had been arrested on 16 January 2000 by Federal forces and hold captive in Chechnya. . Press background briefing by Senior Administration Official on the President’s meeting with Russian President Putin. Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam; 15 November 2000. URL: clinton.archives.gov/ . URL: www.peaceinchechnya.org/ . URL: http://www.peaceinchechnya.org/contact.htm . Produced by the Jamestown Foundation. URL: www.jamestown.org/publications.php . ACPC Press Release; 23 January 2001. URL: www.peaceinchechnya.org/ . ACPC Press Release; 19 July 2001. URL: www.peaceinchechnya.org/
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Notes . H. Con. Res. 206; 25 October 1999: Expressing grave concern regarding armed conflict in the North Caucasus region of the Russian Federation which has resulted in civilian casualties and internally displaced persons, and urging all sides to pursue dialogue for a peaceful resolution of the conflict. H. Con. Res. 128; 8 May 2001: Expressing the sense of the Congress that the continued participation of the Russian Federation in the Group of Eight must be conditioned on the Russian Federation’s voluntary acceptance of and adherence to the norms and standards of democracy. H. R. 212; 12 June 2001: Russian Democracy Act of 2001. S. Res. 223; 8 November 1999: Condemning the violence in Chechnya. S. Res. 262; 24 February 2000: The Peaceful Resolution of the Conflict in Chechnya. S. Res. 280; 30 March 2000: Expressing the sense of the Senate with respect to United States relations with the Russian Federation in view of the situation in Chechnya. S. Con. Res 303; 4 May 2000: Expressing the sense of the Senate regarding the treatment by the Russian Federation of Andrei Babitsky, a Russian journalist working for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. S. Res. 27; 15 February 2001: Expressing the sense of the Senate regarding the 1944 deportation of the Chechen people to Central Asia. S. Con. Res. 60; 17 July 2001: Expressing the sense of Congress that the continued participation of the Russian Federation in meetings of the Group of Eight countries must be conditioned on the Russian Federation’s voluntary acceptance of and adherence to the norms and standards of democracy. S. Res. 213; 28 February 2002: Condemning human rights violations in Chechnya and urging a political solution to the conflict. . Bill H.R. 3027, “Russian Economic Restoration and Justice Act”. Introduced on 5 October 1999. Latest major action: referred to the Subcommittee on Domestic and International Monetary Policy, 25 October 1999. URL: thomas.loc.gov/ . “A new vision for Russia”; House of Representatives; 18 October 1999; pages: H1016210168. URL: thomas.loc.gov/ . “You know America, for 70 years the Soviet Communist Party spent tens of billions of dollars to convince the Russian people that America was an evil Nation and that American people were evil, and they failed. But, he said, You know, in just a few short months and a few short years your administration has done what the Soviet Communist Party could not do. It has convinced the Russian people that America’s intentions are not honorable, that in fact you have supported Yeltsin every step of the way, even when he’s been out of line, even when he has overseen the misuse of dollars, even when friends, the oligarchs who started and who run many of the Russian banks have, in fact, siphoned money away from the Russian people, put it into Swiss bank accounts and U.S. real estate investments, leaving the Russian government and the Russian people to pay those loans back even though that money was misappropriated.” In “A new vision for Russia”; House of Representatives; 18 October 1999; page: H10163. URL: thomas.loc.gov/ . “Security issues facing our country”; House of Representatives; 15 September 1999; pages: H8356-8366. URL: thomas.loc.gov/ . “Security issues facing our country”; House of Representatives; 15 September 1999; page: H8356. URL: thomas.loc.gov/ . “Business as usual in the Russian Federation”; Senate; 19 July 1999; pages: H9737-9738. URL: thomas.loc.gov/
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The Spiral of “Anti-Other Rhetoric” . Bill S. 1873; To state the policy of the United States regarding the deployment of a missile defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack. Latest major action: cloture on the motion to proceed not invoked by Senate by Yea-Nay Vote, 59-41 [a majority of 3/5 is required for the motion to pass]; 9 September 1998. URL: thomas.loc.gov/ . Bill H.R. 2022; To prohibit compliance by the executive branch with the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the 1997 multilateral memorandum of understanding related to that treaty. Latest major action: referred to the House Committee on International Relations; 7 June 1999. URL: thomas.loc.gov/ . “Russian arms sales to Iran”; House of Representatives; 23 October 2000; pages: H10476. “Gore-Chernomyrdin deal”; Senate; 26 October 2000; pages: S11113-11115. “Russia’s road to corruption”; House of Representatives; 29 October 2000; pages: H11520-11525. URL: thomas.loc.gov/ . The Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement was unilaterally abrogated by Putin in November 2000. . “The growing alliance between Russia and China”; Senate; 19 June 2001; page: S6445. URL: thomas.loc.gov/ . “Continued participation of Russia in the Group of eight (G.8) must be conditioned on Russia’s adherence to the norms and standards of democracy – H. Con. Res. 425 – Hon. Tom Lantos (Extension of Remarks – October 19, 2000).” House of Representatives; 18 October 2000; pages: E1830-1831. Resolution introduced on 12 October 2000. Latest major action: Referred to the House Committee on International Relations; 12 October 2000. URL: thomas.loc.gov/ . S. Cons. Res. 60; introduced 17 July 2001; latest major action: referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. URL: thomas.loc.gov/ . H. Con. Res. 206 (introduced 25 October 1999); S. Res. 223 (introduced 8 November 1999); S. Res. 262 (introduced 24 February 2000). URL: thomas.loc.gov/ . S. Res. 269; introduced 9 March 2000; latest major action: referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. S. Res. 280; introduced 30 March 2000; latest major action: referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. URL: thomas.loc.gov/ . S.2522: “An original bill making appropriations for foreign operations, export financing, and related programs for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2001, and for other purposes”; introduced 9 May 2000; latest major action: indefinitely postponed by Senate by Unanimous Consent. URL: thomas.loc.gov/ . “Arrest of Vladimir Gusinsky in Russia”; Senate; 20 June 2000; pages: S5452-5454. URL: thomas.loc.gov/ . H.R.2121 that became Public Law No.: 107-246. URL: thomas.loc.gov/ . The Gallup Brain; April 1999 Wave 2; question 40; field date: 13–14 April 1999, n = 1070. URL: www.gallup.com/poll/ . The Gallup Brain; Foreign Affairs; question 45A; field date: 18–21 May 2000, n = 1011. URL: www.gallup.com/poll/ . The Gallup Brain; March 2000 Wave 2; question 20C; field date: 17–19 March 2000, n = 494. URL: www.gallup.com/poll/ . The Gallup Brain; Foreign Affairs; question 35F; field date: 18–21 May 2000, n = 523. URL: www.gallup.com/poll/
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Notes . The Gallup Brain. April 1999 Wave 2; question 39; field date: 13–14 April 1999. GPNS May 1999 Special Interest Survey 1; question 23G; field date: 7–9 May 1999. March 2000 Wave 2; question 17C; field date: 17–19 March 2000. November 2000 Wave 1; question 13D; field date: 13–15 November 2000. Foreign Affairs; question 27U; field date: 2–4 February 2001. URL: www.gallup.com/poll/ . The Gallup Brain. April 1999 Wave 2; question 42; filed date: 13–14 April 1999. March 2000 Wave 2; question 18C; field date: 17–19 March 2000. Foreign Affairs; question 33U; field date: 18–21 May 2000. April 2001 Wave 1 – Bush 100 Days; question 24F; field date: 20–22 April 2001. June 1001 Wave 1; question 8; field date: 8–10 June 2001. URL: www.gallup.com/poll/ . This is a reference to Francis Fukuyama (1992) who predicted that the end of the Cold War would bring the end of history. Fukuyama’s thesis has been received very negatively in Russia (Tsygankov 2002). . In Sainte-Geneviève-des-Bois are buried soldiers and officers of the White Army, Russians who have fought in the French army during the two World Wars, and also several Russian celebrities, among whom are Ivan Bunin, Victor Nekrassov, Andreï Tarkovski, Serge Lifar, Rudolf Noureev, and a hero of the French Resistance, Viki Obolenskaja. . Andrej Babiskij had been arrested on 18 January 2000 by federal forces just outside of Grozny. . This title is a transformation of the title of Lenin’s article, “Partijnaja organizatcja i partijnaja literatura” – Party organization and party literature. . Russkij Žurnal; URL: www.russ.ru/authors/sokol.html . Sokolov’s column appeared a few days after the daily Segodnja was closed down and the NTV TV station was seized by security forces. . Hubert Védrine was at the time the French Minister for Foreign Affairs. . Dmitrij Gornostaev, “V Moskve ždut Širaka i Žospena”, Nezavisimaja Gazeta, 14 April 2001. . “O raznom – 4”; Nezavisimaja Gazeta, 9 December 1999. “O raznom – 5”; Nezavisimaja Gazeta, 10 December 1999. . “2000 god: v novy vek Rossija šagnet s novym presidentom”; Nezavisimaja Gazeta, 31 December 1999. . Igor’ Rotar’, “Rocciju rasljubili okonˇcatel’no?”; Nezavisimaja Gazeta, 18 December 1999. . Dmitrij Kosyrev, “Rossii pora perejiti v nastuplenie na vnešnepolitiˇceskom fronte”; Nezavisimaja Gazeta, 14 January 2000. . There is here a play on words, impossible to translate. It says: “SMIshnaja lirika”, an expression combining “media lyricism” and “funny lyricism”. . By opposition to the “older brother” in terms of politics, i.e. Russia stricto sensu. . This is a reference to the 2000 American presidential elections between the democrat Gore and the republican Bush. . “Imidž Rossi v opasnosti”, 31 August 2000; “Rossii trebuetcja imidžmejker”, 30 November 2000; “My sdelali vse, ˇctoby isportit’ o sebe vpetˇcatlenie”, 23 January 2001; “Vtoroe izdanie zastoja”, 23 January 2001. . Bjuro po svijazjam s obšˇcectvennost’ju Služby vnešnej razvedki RF. . The music of the Soviet anthem, adopted by Stalin, was written by Alexandrov. The same music has been kept by Putin for the Russian anthem, but with new words by Mikhalkov. Many
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have opposed the choice of Alexandrov’s music, and a petition appeared on the internet under the title: “We do not recognize this hymn as the hymn of our country” (4 December 2000). URL: http://www.polit.ru The debate around Russia’s new anthem was part of Russia’s construction of its new identity. According to Vitalij Tret’jakov, Nezavismaja Gazeta’s chief editor, the three symbols chosen by Putin reflect the three main stages in the development of the Russian State: before Peter the Great (the two-headed eagle), from Peter the Great to the October Revolution (the three-colored flag), and the soviet period (the anthem music). (“Ošibaetsja li ‘Putin s narodom’?”, Nezavismaja Gazeta, 6 December 2000). . Russian newspapers have become relatively expensive, and many cannot afford them any longer. Television has become the main purveyor of information (White & Oates 2003), and the reading of national newspapers is becoming more and more an activity of the most educated and of decision-makers, as in the West (Resnjanskaja & Fomiˇceva 1999: 109; Vartanova 2001: 38; Vartanova 2002: 28). . Le Monde; 23 March 2000. . In another column (3 February 2000), Sokolov criticized the reaction of several members of the European Union (including France) to the participation of Jörg Haider’s extreme right party in the Austrian government. . Svetlana Babaeva, El’mar Gusejnov, “Vikhri nevraždebnye”, Izvestija, 31 October 2000. . Vladimir Katin, “Francuzskie ˇcitateli vstupilis’ za Putina”, Nezavisimaja Gazeta, 3 November 2000. . Nezavisimaja Gazeta, 24 and 26 May 2000; Segodnja, 22 and 24 May 2000. . Svetlana Babaeva, El’mar Gusejnov, “Vikhri nevraždebnye”, Izvestija, 31 October 2000. . El’mar Gusejnov, “Rajmon Forni: U Rossi v mire osoboe mesto”, Izvestija, 13 October 2000. . Svetlana Babaeva, El’mar Gusejnov, “Zima otmenjaetsja”, Izvestija, 1 November 2000. . Juri Bogomolov, “Vse-Svoi”, Izvestija, 2 November 2000. . Nadežda Konstantinovna Arbatova, Centre for European Integration of IMEMO RAN, “Roccija i ee strategiˇceskie partnery v Evrope”, Nezavisimaja Gazeta, 13 October 2000. . Vladimir Katin, “Francuzskie ˇcitateli vstupilis’ za Putina”, Nezavisimaja Gazeta, 3 November 2000. . Marina Volkova, “Energetiˇceskij krisis sblizil Moskvy s Evrosojuzom”, Nezavisimaja Gazeta, 31 October 2000. . Jurij Dubinin, “Otnošenija s našej stranoj on namerevalsja stroit’ na osnove bol’šogo doverija”, Nezavisimaja Gazeta, 23 November 2000. . Kirill Privalov, “Kladbišˇce, zanesennoe v protokol”, Segodnja, 2 November 2000. . Kirill Privalov, “Ekzamen po francuzckomu”, Segodnja, 31 October 2000. . Igor’ Sedykh, “Gde konˇcaetsja Evropa?”, Segodnja, 31 October 2000. . Evgenij Baj, “‘My vse obsudili bez durakov’”, Izvestija, 16 March 2001. Georgij Bovt, Aleksandr Šumilin, “Drug vraga”, Izvestija, 28 March 2001. ˇ . Gennadij Carodeev, “Džoržd Buš ob”javliaet perestrojku”, Izvestija, 15 January 2001. Oleg Odnokolenko, “PROstit’ i ustupit’”, Segodnja, 17 January 2001.
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Notes . Remarks by the President to Students and Faculty at National Defense University. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 1 May 2001. URL: www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ In December 2001, Bush announced that he had “given formal notice to Russia, in accordance with the [ABM] treaty, that the United States of America is withdrawing from this almost 30 year old treaty. [. . .] The United States and Russia have developed a new, much more hopeful and constructive relationship. We are moving to replace mutually assured destruction with mutual cooperation. [. . .] President Putin and I have also agreed that my decision to withdraw from the treaty will not, in any way, undermine our new relationship or Russian security. [. . .] The Cold War is long gone. Today we leave behind one of its last vestiges.” Remarks by the President on National Missile Defense. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 13 December 2001. URL: www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ In November 2003, Putin said in televised remarks to a meeting of generals representing the various branches of Russia’s armed forces: “We have not only conducted tests of the latest nuclear rocket system, I am sure that in the coming years we will acquire them.” He added: “Moreover, these will be things which do not exist and are unlikely to exist in other nuclear powers.” AFP (Moscow), 17 November 2004. In Johnson’s Russia List, #8457, 17 November 2004. . Svetlana Babaeva, “Osyždenie posy”, Izvestija, 18 June 2001. . Svetlana Babaeva, “Nastupatel’naja oborona”, Izvestija, 24 July 2001. Vadim Solov’ev, “Vybor Putina: kompromiss s SŠA vmesto militarizacii ekonomiki”, Nezavisimaja Gazeta, 24 July 2001. . Izvestija, Segodnja and Nezavisimaja Gazeta published a number of articles on missile defense policy during that period. . Aleksandr Šymilin, “Ešˇce ne druz’ja, uže ne missionery”, Izvestija, 16 April 2001. . Svetlana Babaeva, “Osyždenie posy”, Izvestija, 21 March 2001. . During Le Bourget aviation fair, two Russian military jets were on the point of being seized on the demand of the Swiss firm Noga for unpaid debts (US$ 50 million) by the Russian government. The planes received the authorization to leave after an agreement was reached. “Begstvo iz plena”, Nezavisimaja Gazeta, 26 June 2001. . Elena Korop, “Inženernaja integracja”, Izvestija, 18 January 2001. . Elena Korop, “Inženernaja integracja”, Izvestija, 18 January 2001. . Svetlana Babaeva, “Osyždenie posy”; Izvestija, 21 March 2001. . Igor’ Korotˇcenko, “S Rišardom v Moskve budut govorit’ o ‘Kurske’”, Nezavisimaja Gazeta, 17 January 2001. . Vladimir Katin, “Pariž ne nameren ravnjat’cja na Vašington”, Nezavisimaja Gazeta, 20 March 2001. . Igor’ Korotˇcenko, “Rossija u Francija gotovy k stroitel’stvy evropejskoj PRO”, Nezavisimaja Gazeta, 21 March 2001; Igor’ Korotˇcenko, “Moskva stroit evropro’”, Nezavisimaja Gazeta, 30 March 2001. . Ksenja Fokina, “Žaka Širaka vstretjat s nadeždoj”, Nezavisimaja Gazeta, 30 June 2001. . Ksenja Fokina, Andrej Bondarenko, “Širak skazal ‘da’, ne skazvav ‘net’”, Nezavisimaja Gazeta, 4 July 2001. . Ksenja Fokina, “Širak i Putin podružilis’ protiv Buša”, Nezavisimaja Gazeta, 3 July 2001. . Elena Šesternina, “ES snova nedovolen situaciej v Rossii”, Nezavisimaja Gazeta, 18 May 2001. Vladimir Tikhomirov, “Zapad opjat’ obvinjaet Rossiju”, Nezavisimaja Gazeta, 14 July 2001.
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The Spiral of “Anti-Other Rhetoric” . Avtandil Culadze, “Bol’šaja ten’ malen’kogo medvedja”, Segodnja, 23 March 2001. . Svetlana Sukhova, “Leˇcenie ot nemoty”, Segodnja, 26 January 2001. . Il’ja Khrennikov, “Putin našel evrosojuznikov”, Segodnja, 24 March 2001. . Kirill Privalov, “Kontakty raznykh urovnej”, Segodnja, 13 April 2001. The 7th RussiaEuropean Union Summit took place in Moscow in May 2001. According to Nezavisimaja Gazeta, of importance on the European side were the issues of human rights in Russia, freedom of expression and Chechnya; and on the Russian side, the issues of energy, Kaliningrad, nuclearecological program, EU support to Russia’s admission to WTO, etc. Elena Šesternina, “ES snova nedovolen situaciej v Rossii”, Nezavisimaja Gazeta, 18 May 2001. . “Mis en relation par André Glucksman, qui s’est engagé avec d’autres intellectuels français contre les ‘crimes contre l’humanité’ de l’armée russe en Tchétchénie, Me Miquel et son client attendent une réaction des autorités françaises”. . The title is not necessarily written by the journalist, author of the article. . “Même si certains de ses journalistes parviennent encore à écrire ce qu’ils pensent, leur travail sert surtout de faire-valoir à des articles de commande qui s’étalent à la ‘une’ du journal”. . The first word of the title is a pejorative diminutive composed of the two words, “mandraž” (slang for “fear”) and “monde” (from Le Monde). The second word of the title stands for “Jospin”, the French Prime Minister at the time. . Interview of the Russian President V. V. Putin to the French TV channels “TF1”, “France 3”, to the radio station “RFI” and to the channel ORT; 23 October 2000; Moscow. Statement of the Press and Information Services of the President of the Russian Federation. 1 November 2000. URL: www. gov.ru . Chirac: “Vous voyez, au fond, une France au coeur de l’Union européenne et qui a sa personnalité traditionnelle, ses liens anciens avec la Russie, une Russie moderne et démocratique, une même vision de l’organisation du monde, un monde multipolaire où chacun conserve son identité et sa capacité à la fois de réflexion et de gestion de ses affaires, voilà les fondements de la relation francorusse. Et je me réjouis qu’elle ait pu être clairement affirmée à l’occasion de ces entretiens entre le Président Poutine et moi.” [. . .] Poutine: “D’une manière générale, les pourparlers ont confirmé que les relations franco-russes jouissent de bonnes perspectives et que nous avons en la personne de la France un bon partenaire pour garantir la paix dans le monde. Il n’y a pas de doute, la coopération entre la Russie et la France est conforme aux intérêts nationaux des deux États.” Point de presse conjoint de Monsieur Jacques Chirac, Président de la République, et de Monsieur Vladimir Poutine, Président de la Fédération de Russie; Palais de l’Élysée; lundi 30 octobre; URL: http://www.elysee.fr . The “chill” in the French-Russian relationship had been mentioned in questions of both French and Russian (ITAR-Tass) journalists. Interview of the Russian President V. V. Putin to the French TV channels “TF1”, “France 3”, to the radio station “RFI” and to the channel ORT; 23 October 2000; Moscow; Statement of the Press Services of the President of the Russian Federation; 1 November 2000. Answers of the President of the Russian Federation, V. V. Putin, to the questions asked at the joint press-conference during his visit to the President of France, J. Chirac on 31 October 2000 in Paris; Statement of the Press and Information Services of the President of the Russian Federation; 10 November 2000. URL: www.gov.ru . According to Journal l’Alsace, it was not the Russian General Consul in Marseille who fell down from his balcony, but the consul in charge of cultural affairs in the Russian General Consulate who jumped from his balcony, and it was believed to be a suicide. “Marseille: mort d’un consul russe – Un consul chargé des affaires culturelles au consulat général de Russie à Marseille a été
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retrouvé mort, hier matin, sur le trottoir de l’avenue du Prado. Artur Kamalidemof, 42 ans, a sauté d’un balcon du logement qu’il occupait au troisième étage. Les enquêteurs s’orientaient nettement hier soir vers la thèse du suicide.” Journal l’Alsace – 5 November 2000. Retrieved 25 September 2004 – URL: www.alsapresse.com/jdj/00/11/05/une/24h.html . This appears to be a very common strategy in Le Monde. . Sources: “Kontseptsiya natsional’noi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii” (National Security Concept of the Russian Federation); Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie (January 14, 2000); “Kontseptsiya vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii” (Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation), Rossiiskaya gazeta (July 11, 2001); Intervyu prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii V. V. Putina polskoi gazete “Gazeta vyborcha” i polskomu telekanalu “TVP” 14 yanvarya 2002 goda (Russian Federation President V. V. Putin’s interview to the Polish newspaper Gazeta Vyborcha and Polish TV channel “TVP” on January 14, 2002), http://www.president.kremlin.ru/events/433.html (last accessed April 18, 2002); Poslanie prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii V. V. Putina Federalnomu Sobraniyu Rossiiskoi Federatsii 18 aprelya 2002 goda (Russian Federation President V. V. Putin’ address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation on April 18, 2002), http://www.president.kremlin.ru/events/510.html (last accessed April 18, 2002). . “Tchétchénie: le Kremlin accuse ‘Le Monde’ de ‘mensonges’”, Le Monde, 19 February 2000. . Jean-Marie Colombani, “Comme en Algérie. . .”, Le Monde, 19 February 2000. . Le Monde, 30 October 2000. . Interview of the Russian President V. V. Putin to the French TV channels “TF1”, “France 3”, to the radio station “RFI” and to the channel ORT; 23 October 2000; Moscow; Statement of the Press and Information Services of the President of the Russian Federation; 1 November 2000; URL: www. gov.ru . Statement from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation about the meeting of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Russia, I.S. Ivanov, with the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights; 4 April 2000; URL: www.mid.ru . Statement from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Article of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Russia, I.S. Ivanov, in the Financial Times of 11 May 2000. 11 May 2000; URL: www.mid.ru . “Doktrina informacionnoj bezopasnosti Rossijskoj Federacii”, 9 September 2000. URL: http://www.scrf.gov.ru/Documents/Decree/2000/09-09.html English translation at URL: http://www.medialaw.ru/indep/en/d2-4.htm . Jastrembskij has been addressing this question in a number of different occasions. . URL: http://valdai2004.rian.ru . The conference, planned the previous spring, happened to take place during the tragic hostage taking in a Beslan school (Northern Ossetia). One of the captured militants testified on television that orders to attack the school came from the separatist leader Aslan Maskhadov and the warlord Shamil Bassayev (although Maskhadov denied any implication). The hostage taking resulted in the death of more than 300 people, half of them children, and more than 400 wounded after the intervention of the Russian Special Forces. The circumstances of the Special Forces assault were not clear, and Putin accepted a parliamentary inquiry into the matter under pressure.
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The Spiral of “Anti-Other Rhetoric” . Transcript of first part of President Putin’s meeting at Novo Ogorevo on Monday September 6, 2004 with a group of foreign academics and journalists – Jonathan Steele, The Guardian. In Johnson’s Russia List, #8368, 15 September 2004. URL: http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson . Evgenia Albats, “Paid Guests of Putin – The Kremlin actively recruits Western Experts to Improve Russia’s Image”, Yeshenedelny Zhurnal, 13–19 September 2004. In Johnson’s Russia List, #8371, 17 September 2004; URL: http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson. . Tret’jakov left Nezavisimaja Gazeta in June 2001 at the demand of the newspaper’s owner, Boris Berezowski, who had turned against Putin after having favored his election. . The Council on Foreign and Defense Policy is a non-governmental public association that was founded on 25 February 1992. Its main object is to participate in the preparation and realization of a concept of development for Russian foreign and defense policy. URL: http://www.svop.ru/ . Fiona Hill, “Stop Blaming Putin and Start Helping Him”, Op-Ed Column, The New York Times, 10 September 2004. . “We can at least give him [Putin] a little more room to maneuver.” Fiona Hill, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, “Stop Blaming Putin and Start Helping Him”, The New York Times, 10 September 2004. . “Mr. Putin came across as sincere and approachable, but also showed flashes of anger, such as when he insisted that the real intention of militants across Russia’s southern border was “nothing less than the break-up of Russia” or lambasted Western reports for not calling the hostage-takers in North Ossetia “terrorists”. Then, he would become animated and intense, clenching his fists and waving his hands. But his anger always appeared purposeful and controlled. This was not Nikita Khrushchev slamming his shoe at the UN, nor yet Boris Yeltsin after over-indulging. In person, the Russian leader seems much more human and less cold than he often appears on television. But in mind, as in physique, he gave an impression of neatness and discipline, of being comfortable in his skin and very self-contained.” Mary Dejevsky, “Evening of surprises with a hospitable president”, Belfast Telegraph, 8 September 2004. . “But even with the darkening mood, Putin is determined to reach out beyond Russia’s borders and, so far, to accept well-intentioned advice. That was the real message of the remarkable conversation at Novo Ogarevo. We would do well to listen.” Stephen Handelman, “Tea with the president”, The Toronto Star, 12 September 2004. . “Does this mean that President Putin did not know what he was talking about? Or was he lying to you? I think he knows what he is talking about; he is aware of what he wants the people to think. He will not hesitate to curtail the freedom of the Russian media to give the message that the terrible tragedy in Beslan was provoked exclusively by the actions of international terrorism. This is a method for the Russian authorities to disclaim responsibility for the escalation of tensions in Chechnya and the North Caucasus in the past decade.” Marie Mendras, Paris Centre for International Studies and Research (CERI), Interview with Radio Canada, 8 September 2004. . Evgenia Albats, “Paid Guests of Putin – The Kremlin actively recruits Western Experts to Improve Russia’s Image”, Yeshenedelny Zhurnal, 13–19 September 2004. In Johnson’s Russia List, #8371, 17 September 2004; URL: http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson. The number of guests varies according to the source. . E.g., Daniel Vernet, “M. Poutine accuse et s’explique sur sa ‘guerre totale’ au terrorisme”, Le Monde, 7 September 2004; Jonathan Steele, “Candid Putin offers praise and blame. Russian
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president backs Bush and accepts Nato but attacks role of West in Chechnya”, The Guardian, 8 September 2004. . “We, the citizens of Russia, were in effect invited to be content with an English translation of our head of state’s words. Don’t misunderstand me; I’m not at all opposed to the idea of our president meeting with foreign journalists and political analysts. But neither can I imagine that on September 15, 2001 – four days after the terrible tragedy of the Twin Towers – the president of the United States could have met at his out-of-town residence with a group of only foreign journalists and political scientists, to answer the questions that were tormenting all the American people at the time. I can’t imagine the citizens of the United States being forced to learn the views of their own president from an article published in any foreign newspaper, no matter how influential.” Olga Gerasimenko, “Does President Putin prefer to talk only to foreigners?”, Russkij Kurier, 8 September 2004. In Johnson’s Russia List, #8358, 9 September 2004. URL: http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson . Website of the President of Russia. Speech at the World Congress of News Agencies. 24 September 2004, Moscow. URL: http://president.kremlin.ru . “The Kremlin also is not tolerating criticism in the Western press of its heavy-handed policies in Chechnya. Sergei Yastrzhembsky, Putin’s envoy on European Union relations, rebuked Western journalists on Wednesday for not portraying Russia in a better light. Putin weighed in on Friday, telling a conference of international news agencies that terrorists rely on mass media to expand the psychological impact of their attacks and calling on journalists to become tools in the fight against terror. While using political sticks to attempt to distance Western policymakers and the media from guerrillas in the North Caucasus, the Kremlin has not forgotten to pull out economic carrots. Among those offered in recent weeks were promises to finally level the playing field for Gazprom shares – a move long sought by Western investors – and to ratify the Kyoto Protocol to curb greenhouse gas emissions. The EU has been pushing for Russia’s ratification, which it needs for the treaty to come into force. This combination of sticks and carrots makes it clear that Moscow remains keen on maintaining constructive relations with both the United States and the EU. It also helps to alleviate fears in some circles that the Kremlin is willing to risk a new Cold War as it tackles separatism and extremism in the North Caucasus.” Simon Saradzhyan, “Kremlin Goes on a Western Offensive”, Moscow Times, 27 September 2004. URL: http://www.moscowtimes.ru . Vserossijskij Centr Izyˇcenija Obšˇcestvennovo Mnenija. URL: www.wciom.ru ˇ cnja”; 21–24 January 2000 WCIOM poll. – “Vokrug parlamentskogo krizisa; Ceˇ ˇ – “Ceˇcnja, Rossija, Zapad. I Babickij”. Published 26 February 2000 on Polit.ru; URL: www.polit. ru/documents/186043.html – “Reakcija na reženie PASE o naˇcale procedury preostanovki ˇclenstva Roccii v assamblee (15–17 aprelja)”. Published 19 April 2000 on Polit.ru; URL: www.polit.ru/documents/223929.html – “Rossija i Zapad. Klinton v Dume”. Published 2 June 2000 on Polit.ru; URL: www.polit.ru/ documents/243378.html – “Putin v Evrope i arrest Gusinskogo”. Published 22 June 2000 on Polit.ru; URL: www.polit.ru/ documents/252318.html – “Rossija i Zapad na rubeže tysjaˇceletij”. Published 6 September 2000 on Polit.ru; URL: www.polit.ru/documents/309976.html – “Tam khorošo, gde nas net. Meždunarodnye simpatii Rossijan”. Published 30 October 2000 on Polit.ru; URL: www.polit.ru/documents/360954.html
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– “Sobytija i nastroenija. Lenin, Borodin i PASE (opros 18–20 janvarja)”. Published 22 January 2001 on Polit.ru; URL: www.polit.ru/documents/ 397253.html ˇ cnja (opros 19–22 janvarja)”. Published 26 January – “Pejtingi, pravitel’stvo, vybory, PASE i Ceˇ 2001 on Polit.ru; URL: www.polit.ru/documents/397743.html – “Rejtingi telekanalov, glavnye poslednikh dnej, Borodin i reputacija Rossii (opros 1–3 fevralja)”. Published 6 February 2001 on Polit.ru; URL: www.polit.ru/documents/399535.html – “Bol’šinstvo possijan sˇcitajut, ˇcto SŠA predstavljajut ugrozu dlja Rossii – 19.03.2001”; Opinion poll conducted by “Monitoring.ru” (15–19 February 2001) on a sample of 1600 people representative of the population. URL: www.monitoring.ru/press-center/facts/article_145.html. See also, Avtandil Culadze, “Odinakaja Roccija”, Segodnja, 15 March 2001. – “Rossija i Zapad. SŠA, PRO, grjadušˇcaja vstreˇca Buša s Putinym”. Published 5 June 2001 on Polit.ru; URL: www.polit.ru/documents/421573.html – “Rossijane o celjakh vnešej politiki i o sammite v Genue”. Published 20 July 2001 on Polit.ru; URL: www.polit.ru/documents/431193.html – “Social’no-politiˇceskaja situacija v Rossi v avguste 2001 g. po dannym oprosov obšˇcestvennogo mnenija”. Published 7 September 2001 on Polit.ru; URL: www.polit.ru/documents/438733. html – Press release no. 32, 13 November 2001. Poll conducted on 2–5 November 2001. WCIOM. URL: www.wciom.ru . In August 2001, the role of different forces in Russia was evaluated on a scale of very big (5) to null (1). The first six most important were: the president (4.01); oligarchs, bankers and financiers (3.78); newspapers, radio and television (3.51); the government (3.48); the governors (3.33); the armed forces (3.31). “Social’no-politiˇceskaja situacija v Rossi v avguste 2001 g. po dannym oprosov obšˇcestvennogo mnenija”. VCIOM. Published 7 September 2001 on Polit.ru; URL: www.polit.ru/documents/438733.html . In February/March 1995, a survey showed that 57% of the population evaluated Russian actions in Chechnya as ‘unacceptable, no matter the objective’, and 71% thought so in April/May of the same year (Petersson & Wagnsson 1998). . In August 2004, this trend had reversed. 21% were in favor of combat operations, and 68% in favor of negotiations. The numbers changed in August 2004 after the Beslan school hostage-taking (32% in favor of combat operations and 55% in favor of negotiations), but the general tendency remained the same. Levada Centre. Retrieved 11 October 2004 from URL: www.levada.ru . Several answers were possible. 16% found it to difficult to answer the question. . In an opinion poll conducted in 2000 by VCIOM, the question “how do you value the mass media coverage of the operations in Chechnya?” was answered in the following manner: (1) objective, detailed, helps understand the situation: 14% (28–31 Jan.), 18% (18–21 Feb.); (2) insufficient, superficial, does not present a clear account of what happens: 38% (28–31 Jan.), 38% (18–21 Feb.); (3) not objective, hides the problems and the real losses: 40% (28–31 Jan.), 35% (18–21 Feb.); (4) difficult to answer: 8% (28–31 Jan.), 9% (18–21 Feb.). Thus, in January 2000, 78% were unsatisfied with media coverage of Chechnya, and 73% in February 2000. Published 26 February 2000 on Polit.ru; URL: www.polit.ru/documents/186043.html . N = 1600. In the same opinion poll, respondents gave the following criteria to define “great” powers: high level of well-being (67%), highly developed industry (66%), respect of the law and of human rights (34%), high level of education (31%), nuclear power (30%), rich natural
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resources (25%), great cultural heritage (17%), large territory (9%). Levada Centre. Retrieved 11 October 2004. URL: www.levada.ru/interrelations.html . Vserossijskij Centr Izyˇcenija Obšˇcestvennovo Mnenija. URL: www.wciom.ru – “Socijal’no-politiˇceskaja situacija v Rossi v avguste 2001 g. po dannym oprosov obšˇcestvennogo mnenija”. Published 7 September 2001 on Polit.ru; URL: www.polit.ru/documents/438733. html . Levada Centre. Retrieved 11 October 2004 from URL: www.levada.ru . Vserossijskij Centr Izyˇcenija Obšˇcestvennovo Mnenija. URL: www.wciom.ru – “Putin v Evrope i arrest Gusinskogo”. Published 22 June 2000 on Polit.ru; URL: www.polit.ru/ documents/252318.html . The increase of import / export trade with Russia of its four most important European partners from 1999 to 2001 was: Germany, 31% / 72%; France, 54% / 50%; Italy, 52% / 72%; and the Netherlands, 92% / 57%. Intra-Extra-OECD Trade, 2004. . “Ingérence en Tchétchénie”, 7 October 1999. “De Vienne à Grozny”, 8 February 2000. “En Tchétchénie, le pire”, 6 July 2000. . However, Russia clearly shows that it is also getting increasingly “tired” of the Americantype discourse on democracy. In February 2005, Defense Minister Sergeï Ivanov declared: “We are prepared to calmly move further in this direction, developing democracy and integrating into the global economic system, but while doing so we prefer to be masters of our own house”. Johnson’s Russia List, #9059, 13 February 2005, “Russia tired of lectures on democracy – minister”, Mark Trevelyan. . Le Monde: “Une nouvelle ère stratégique”, 6 June 2000; “Elle [la Tchétchénie] est la pierre de touche de tout jugement sur la Russie, surtout pour qui veut croire à la vocation européenne de ce pays” [TMcr] in “Parler avec M. Poutine”, 29–30 October 2000. . In contrast, from March 1985 to July 1990 under Gorbachev, Soviet media coverage of the USA progressively lost its harshness to become positive in parallel with the policy of perestrojka (Becker 1999: 111–136). . Le Monde: “Elle [la Tchétchénie] est la pierre de touche de tout jugement sur la Russie, surtout pour qui veut croire à la vocation européenne de ce pays” [TMcr] in “Parler avec M. Poutine”, 29–30 October 2000. . For exemple, Eric Le Boucher: “Vladimir Poutine: pouvoir fort et idées faibles”, Le Monde, 13 March 2005; Jim Hoagland: “Reassessing Putin”, The Washington Post, 13 March 2005. . Jonathan Steele: “What the West condemns in Putin, it condoned in Yeltsin. Privatisation and welfare cuts are being rammed through by diktat”; The Guardian, 11 March 2005. Mary Dejevsky: “Putin’s critics would do well to revisit the past”; The Independent, 11 March 2005. Both Jonathan Steele and Mary Dejevsky were part of the group of foreign journalists who met with Putin at the Valdai discussion club in September 2004 (see 5.2.2). Moscow-based Peter Lavelle, who is senior Russia analyst for United Press International and did not take part in the Valdai discussion club, also published an article in the same sense, but in the Russian Izvestija. “Rice, Lavrov, and authoritarianism in Russia – Several popular myths about Putin’s Russia”, 10 February 2005. In Johnson’s Russia List, #9057, 10 February 2005.
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The Spiral of “Anti-Other Rhetoric” . Anatol Lieven: “The essential Vladimir Putin: A semi authoritarian present is Russia’s best hope for a liberal future”, Foreign Policy, January/February 2005. URL: http://www.foreignpolicy. com . Sergej Lavrov: “Vozvrata k ‘kholodnoj vojne’ ne budet” – No return to the Cold War, Izvestija, 11 February 2005. Johnson’s Russia List, #9058, 12 February 2005. . This is particularly true in Le Monde. For exemple, “Poutine reprend la main en Tchétchénie”, Le Monde, 12 May 2004; Natalie Nougayrède: “L’offensive du Kremlin contre le géant pétrolier Ioukos entre dans sa phase décisive”, Le Monde, 10 June 2004; Natalie Nougayrède: “M. Poutine renforce l’emprise du Kremlin sur la société russe”, Le Monde, 18 June 2004; “Une proche de Poutine nommée à la direction de la chaîne NTV”, Le Monde, 10 July 2004; Daniel Vernet: “L’autoritarisme volontariste de Vladimir Poutine”, Le Monde, 20 September 2004; “Après Beslan, Vladimir Poutine veut renforcer le pouvoir du Kremlin”, Le Monde, 14 septembre 2004; Natalie Nougayrède: “Le Kremlin donne des pouvoirs renforcés aux services de sécurité”, Le Monde, 25 September 2004; Editorial: “Nostalgie à la russe”, Le Monde, 20 November 2004; Natalie Nougayrède: “Vladimir Poutine poursuit sa politique de centralisation du pouvoir”, Le Monde, 13 December 2004; Natalie Nougayrède: “Le Kremlin multiplie les tentatives de reprise en main du pays”, Le Monde, 20 December 2004. However, a few analysts have contested this position: In sum, the claim that Putin’s system is democratic is weak and does not hold water. That said, we should be careful not to exaggerate, as many do, the depth and aggressiveness of Putin’s authoritarian system. It is still a hybrid regime to a considerable extent. Similarly, persisting in the characterization of Putin’s order as managed or some other form of democracy lets him off the hook for dismantling much of Russia’s democratic infrastructure and may encourage him to go further down that road. A precise calibration and characterization of Putin’s regime could facilitate, in tandem with a well-measured mix of policy carrots and sticks, turning him or his successor back toward democracy. (Gordon Hahn: “Debunking the case against Putin’s authoritarianism”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty; Johnson’s Russia List, #9062, 18 February 2005) Putin’s political reforms may well look like an attack on democracy. But they equally look like a change of gear, following a retreat from what the regime considers as dysfunctional regional elections. Evolution or design is all about trial-and-error, and this is what may well be happening. The idea is that an apparent loss of democracy at one level, will, in the longer run strengthen the democratic prowess of the entire system, as Russia’s integrity becomes stronger. Definitive judgment at this juncture is impossible. (Vlad Sobell: “Putin’s political reforms need not be viewed as anti-democratic”, Daiwa Institute of Research Europe Limited, 5 November 2004; Johnson’s Russia List, #8444, 8 November 2004). . In this sense, Vlad Sobell wrote: It seems that the prevailing system of judgment relies excessively on the past experience and, hence, is in need of some updating. Since democracy in the major former dictatorships such as Germany and Japan was developed in the wake of US occupation, it tends to be assumed that bona fide democracy cannot evolve, unless it is in some way linked to American (or rather Anglo-Saxon) roots. After the Second World War, the species has spread to the continental Europe and since 1989 it has colonised the former Soviet bloc (albeit also driven by the modified Europeanised version as embodied in the EU). In recent years, a similar process has been evident in the Middle East.Because large entities such as Russia or China have not been militarily occupied and must, in any case, pursue their own
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path, they continue to be implicitly viewed with suspicion, no matter what they do. Their evolution is viewed as headed anywhere but genuine democracy, simply because it has not been anointed as democratic by the West. As the dawn of the current post-totalitarian era recedes, time has come to part with the entrenched view that democracy can happen only when orchestrated by its US-centred Rome. (Vlad Sobell: “Putin’s political reforms need not be viewed as anti-democratic”, Daiwa Institute of Research Europe Limited, 5 November 2004; Johnson’s Russia List, #8444, 8 November 2004). . For example, Natalie Nougayrède: “Le Kremlin favorise la diffusion d’un discours nationaliste et anti-occidental en Russie”, Le Monde, 18 March 2005; Serge Schmemann: “The eternal suspicions of the Soviet mind-set”, The New York Times, 9 December 2004. . According to Wendt (1992: 421), in order to bring change, one needs not only to rethink one’s ideas about self and others but also the way one is perceived by others, as old identities are sustained by systems of interactions with others. . Russian Foreign Minister Sergej Lavrov reaffirmed the importance of the United Nations “for coordinating moves and practical steps of all countries for the settlement of conflicts, for combating terrorism, for combating proliferation of mass destruction weapons” in a press conference on 19 January 2005. Source: Federal News Service. URL: www.fednews.ru. In Johnson’s Russia List, #9028, 21 January 2005. . Steve Gutterman: “Russia warns against U.N. censure over Chechnya”, AP, 12 March 2005; Johnson’s Russia List, #9088, 12 March 2005. . “Une nouvelle ère stratégique”, 6 June 2000. . “Selling Russia on missile defense, 21 October 1999; “The leaner Russian military”, 15 November 2000; “Dealing with Mr. Putin”, 17 March 2001; “A promising start with Russia”, 18 June 2001; “Invitation to an arms race”, 20 June 2001. . It is not only in Russia that the rhetoric of human rights is considered as a tool used by hegemonic states. See, for example, Evans (1998). . Foltz, Kintsch and Landauer (1998: 302) also use the sentence as a unit in their Latent Semantic Analysis. While not rejecting the clause as a unit, they justify their choice by pointing out that the shortness of some clauses makes it sometimes difficult to find enough relevant semantic information in them, and that coherence breaks tend to occur more frequently between sentences than within sentences. . A standard textual paragraph is the typographic paragraph. . A text section is a set of standard textual paragraphs grouped under the same title. There can be different levels of text sections depending on the length and the complexity of the text.
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Index
A Anti-American American Committee for Peace in Chechnya –, – Anticommunist , , see also McCarthyism Anti-Russian , , , , , , see also russophobia Anti-Western , , –, , B Babitsky, Andreï , , , , Berezovskij, Boris – Berger, Samuel –, , Bilateralism –, – Bush, George W. , , –, C Camdessus, Michel Chechnya –, , , , –, –, –, , , –, –, , –, –, –, –, –, – Chirac, Jacques –, , , , – Clinton, William J. , –, , Cohabitation – Cold war , , , , , , , , (note ) Communism –, Council of Europe , Parliamentary Assembly of the – , , , –, , – D Declaration of Independence (American)
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen (French) , – Defense issues (security, ABM treaty, NMD system) , , , , , –, –, , , , – Democracy (democratic institutions, democratization, democratic values) , –, , , –, , , , E European Union , , , –, , , , , , F Fleutiaux, Brice Frame (media) , –, – Freedom (individual –, media –, religious –) –, , , , –, , –, , –, –, G G7, G8 , , Glucksman, André , – Gorbachev, Mikhail , , , Gusinskij, Vladimir (Media-Most) –, , –, , H Hanssen, Robert , , Holism Human rights , , –, , , , , –, , , ,
I Identity (national –, social –, collective –, concept of personality) , , , , , , –, –, , , –, –, –, Ideological square –, – IMF , , –, , Individualism , , –, Interactions (in the argumentation) , –, – Interfere (duty to –, right to –) , –, Interventionism , – Isolationism , , , –, , Izvestja –
K KGB, FSB , –, , – Kursk , ,
L Lake, Anthony Le Monde as a figure of authority – Liberal economy , ,
M Macrostructural basis (definition), –, – Macrostructure (Mcr) (definition), –, – Market economy (liberal economy, capitalism) , –
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F: DAP22SI.tex / p.2 (212-329)
The Spiral of “Anti-Other Rhetoric” McCarthyism – see also anticommunist Media and diplomacy –, – Militarism – Multilateralism , –, –, , Multipolarity –, , , N NATO –, , , , , Nezavisimaja Gazeta – O Oligarchs –, , , , , OSCE –, –, P Perestrojka , , Pope, Edmund , Positive representation of Russia – Potanin, Vladimir Pro-West –, , Putin, Vladimir , , , –, –, –, –, , –, , –, ,
Putin’s first official visit in France , – R Reagan, Ronald , Realms of memory [Lieux de mémoire] , , Russia and its history –, –, – Russian economy –, , –, Russian internal politics – Russophobia – see also anti-Russian S Segodnja –, – Slavophilism –, , , , Social Identity Theory , –, T Terrorism , , Text macrostructure (TMcr) (definition), –, – Text theme (TTh) (definition), –, –
The New York Times as a figure of authority – Theme (Th) (definition), –, –
U Unilateralism , , Universalism, universal values , , , –, –, –
V Valdaï discussion club –, – (notes –, ) Védrine, Hubert –, –, , ,
W Wallenberg, Raoul , – Westernism –, , ,
Y Yeltsin, Boris –, –, , –, Yugoslavia –, , ,
In the series Discourse Approaches to Politics, Society and Culture the following titles have been published thus far or are scheduled for publication: 22 Le, Elisabeth: The Spiral of ‘Anti-Other Rhetoric’. Discourses of Identity and the International Media Echo. 2006. xii, 280 pp. 21 Myhill, John: Language, Religion and National Identity in Europe and the Middle East. A historical study. 2006. ix, 300 pp. 20 Omoniyi, Tope and Joshua A. Fishman (eds.): Explorations in the Sociology of Language and Religion. 2006. viii, 347 pp. 19 Hausendorf, Heiko and Alfons Bora (eds.): Analysing Citizenship Talk. Social positioning in political and legal decision-making processes. 2006. viii, 368 pp. 18 Lassen, Inger, Jeanne Strunck and Torben Vestergaard (eds.): Mediating Ideology in Text and Image. Ten critical studies. 2006. xii, 254 pp. 17 Saussure, Louis de and Peter Schulz (eds.): Manipulation and Ideologies in the Twentieth Century. Discourse, language, mind. 2005. xvi, 312 pp. 16 Erreygers, Guido and Geert Jacobs (eds.): Language, Communication and the Economy. 2005. viii, 239 pp. 15 Blackledge, Adrian: Discourse and Power in a Multilingual World. 2005. x, 252 pp. 14 Dijk, Teun A. van: Racism and Discourse in Spain and Latin America. 2005. xii, 198 pp. 13 Wodak, Ruth and Paul Chilton (eds.): A New Agenda in (Critical) Discourse Analysis. Theory, methodology and interdisciplinarity. 2005. xiv, 322 pp. 12 Grillo, Eric (ed.): Power Without Domination. Dialogism and the empowering property of communication. 2005. xviii, 247 pp. 11 Muntigl, Peter: Narrative Counselling. Social and linguistic processes of change. 2004. x, 347 pp. 10 Bayley, Paul (ed.): Cross-Cultural Perspectives on Parliamentary Discourse. 2004. vi, 385 pp. 9 Richardson, John E.: (Mis)Representing Islam. The racism and rhetoric of British broadsheet newspapers. 2004. vi, 277 pp. 8 Martin, J.R. and Ruth Wodak (eds.): Re/reading the past. Critical and functional perspectives on time and value. 2003. vi, 277 pp. 7 Ensink, Titus and Christoph Sauer (eds.): The Art of Commemoration. Fifty years after the Warsaw Uprising. 2003. xii, 246 pp. 6 Dunne, Michele Durocher: Democracy in Contemporary Egyptian Political Discourse. 2003. xii, 179 pp. 5 Thiesmeyer, Lynn (ed.): Discourse and Silencing. Representation and the language of displacement. 2003. x, 316 pp. 4 Chilton, Paul and Christina Schäffner (eds.): Politics as Text and Talk. Analytic approaches to political discourse. 2002. x, 246 pp. 3 Chng, Huang Hoon: Separate and Unequal. Judicial rhetoric and women's rights. 2002. viii, 157 pp. 2 Litosseliti, Lia and Jane Sunderland (eds.): Gender Identity and Discourse Analysis. 2002. viii, 336 pp. 1 Gelber, Katharine: Speaking Back. The free speech versus hate speech debate. 2002. xiv, 177 pp.
