The World's Religions after September 11

The World’s Religions after September 11

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The World’s Religions after September 11 Volume 1 Religion, War, and Peace

EDITED BY ARVIND SHARMA

PRAEGER PERSPECTIVES

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The world’s religions after September 11 / edited by Arvind Sharma. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-275-99621-5 (set : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-0-275-99623-9 (vol. 1 : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-0-275-99625-3 (vol. 2 : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-0-275-99627-7 (vol. 3 : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-0-275-99629-1 (vol. 4 : alk. paper) 1. Religions. 2. War—Religious aspects. 3. Human rights—Religious aspects. 4. Religions—Relations. 5. Spirituality. I. Sharma, Arvind. BL87.W66 2009 200—dc22 2008018572 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available. Copyright © 2009 by Arvind Sharma All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 2008018572 ISBN: 978-0-275-99621-5 (set) 978-0-275-99623-9 (vol. 1) 978-0-275-99625-3 (vol. 2) 978-0-275-99627-7 (vol. 3) 978-0-275-99629-1 (vol. 4) First published in 2009 Praeger Publishers, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. www.praeger.com Printed in the United States of America

The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48-1984). 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Contents

Introduction

vii

Part I. War Chapter 1

Chapter 2

The Violent Bear It Away: Christian Reflections on Just War William R. O’Neill Turning War Inside Out: New Perspectives for the Nuclear Age Marcia Sichol

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Chapter 3

Demonic Religion and Violence Lloyd Steffen

Chapter 4

The BhagavadgXt7 and War: Some Early Anticipations of the Gandhian Interpretation of the BhagavadgXt7 Arvind Sharma

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Just-War Theory in South Asia: Indic Success, Sri Lankan Failure? Katherine K. Young

37

Chapter 5

19

Part II. Terror Chapter 6

Religion and Terror: A Post-9/11 Analysis Stephen Healey

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CONTENTS

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Chapter 7

The Approach of Muslim Turks to Religious Terror Ramazan Bicer

Chapter 8

Is It Relevant to Talk about Democracy in Lebanon in the Aftermath of the Summer 2006 Conflicts? Pamela Chrabieh

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Part III. Peace Chapter 9

9/11 and Korean American Youth: A Study of Two Opposing Forces Heerak Christian Kim

Chapter 10

Sacrificing the Paschal Lamb: A Road toward Peace Jean Donovan

Chapter 11

Seeking the Peace of the Global City of Knowledge of God after 9/11 Aaron Ricker

Chapter 12

The Golden Rule and World Peace Patricia A. Keefe

Chapter 13

World Religions and World Peace: Toward a New Partnership Brian D. Lepard

111 129

139 153

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About the Editor and Contributors

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Index

173

Introduction Arvind Sharma

E

urope has arguably not known war for the past sixty years, but the world is another matter. Those who were dreaming of a utopian peace after the implosion of the Soviet Union had their dreams shattered on September 11, 2001. Violence was back with a bang and this time not in secular livery but in sacred garb. And it was back this time not as war between armed parties, but as terror in which an armed minority conducts asymmetric warfare on an unarmed civilian population, disregarding national borders. This new cocktail of violence is not as deadly as the older one yet but its elements are more combustible. This volume addresses this situation and contains a series of chapters that deal with the themes of war, terror, and peace, in that order. Part I of the volume is devoted to war, especially to those aspects of war that have become more salient after the events of September 11, 2001. The concept of just war is now being revisited in almost all the religions, and the issue is explored here in the religious context of Christianity and the regional context of South Asia. The famous Hindu text, the BhagavadgXt7, is also reprised once again in this context, and the demonic dimension of war is also explored. Although the prospect of a nuclear Armageddon may have receded somewhat after the end of the Cold War, it is still around to haunt us, and new perspectives on it are also examined. Thus the concept of just war, the complications introduced by the potential for nuclear war, and the demonic element associated with war are some of the themes explored in this part of the book. The discussion is extended from war to terror in Part II of the book. War is typically engaged in by states, which are legal entities. Thus the violence involved in war is on a different footing from the one involved in terrorism, which often involves non-state sponsors. This difference opens up a whole new dimension of

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the issue of religion and war that is explored in this part of the book, especially in three theaters: the United States, Turkey, and Lebanon. Peace is the theme of Part III, as an antidote to both war and terror. But it is not to an innocent, but a hard-won, peace that one returns to, for peace is now more a matter of equilibrium rather than the complete absence of tension. How religion can be both sublimely and sordidly involved in maintaining or disturbing this equilibrium is analyzed in this last part.

Part I War

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CHAPTER 1

The Violent Bear It Away: Christian Reflections on Just War William R. O’Neill

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n a world riven by religious terror and casual slaughter, what shall we say of the justum bellum? Is the very notion now a contradictio in adjecto in late or postmodernity—war having finally become, in Clausewitz’s words, “theoretically limitless”?1 Or, as Michael Walzer urges, is war still a “rule-governed activity, a world of permissions and prohibitions—a moral world,” even “in the midst of hell”?2 The norms of just war, after all, remain a stubborn inheritance, an “overlapping consensus” of permissions and prohibitions enshrined in international positive law (i.e., the Geneva Conventions and Protocols).3 But just how are we to make sense of such a consensus? Several distinct yet overlapping methodological perspectives emerge. We might, following Grotius, assume that the just-war norms derive from the “manifest and clear” dictates of natural reason (e.g., the “secular religion” of human rights and duties).4 And yet one wonders. Can the AugustinianThomistic tradition so readily be trimmed of theological reference? Must an overlapping consensus of differing narrative traditions “bracket” religious belief? Or do scriptural or theological warrants rather support a “reiteratively particularist” consensus in Walzer’s words—one logically dependent upon our distinctive religious narratives?5 In this chapter, I will propose a via media between these rival schools of thought, arguing that distinctive religious attitudes and beliefs play a constitutive role in the (1) justification, (2) modality, and (3) interpretation of the justum bellum. Yet the resulting consensus, I argue, rests less on the contingent iteration of particular traditions than on the family resemblance of well-formed narratives.

JUSTIFICATION Christians, after Constantine, drew on their Greco-Roman and biblical heritage, working multiple variations on the theme of the justum bellum. Codified in the Corpus Juris Canonici, Ambrose’s and Augustine’s early speculations were later grounded in Thomistic natural law and refined by the Spanish Scholastics. Still further variations emerged in the seventeenth century, with

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the doctrine’s progressive disenchantment. In the Prolegomena of his magisterial De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1625), Grotius writes that the precepts of natural law retain their validity “etiamsi daremus non esse Deum [even were God not to exist].”6 For Grotius, to be sure, the impious gambit “cannot be conceded”; yet for his successors, the speculative hypothesis soon became “a thesis.” For Pufendorf, Burlamaqui, and Vattel “the self-evidence of natural law” left God a supernumerary in creation.7 Under the spell of modernity’s disenchantment, Grotius’s heirs regard the validity of the just-war norms as logically independent of the ethical substance of the traditions that “hand them on” (including, a fortiori, “the broad tradition of just war in Western culture”).8 Distinctive religious attitudes and beliefs, as in the “autonomy school” of Christian ethics, serve rather a paraenetic or hortatory function, inspiring us to do what morally (rationally) we are required to do. But such beliefs do not alter the logical force of the ad bellum or in bello criteria. Consensus, in Walzer’s felicitous terms, is “thin,” or narrative-independent, as in President Bush Senior’s assertion that the Gulf War was “not a Christian war, a Muslim war, or a Jewish war, but a just war.” Yet it seems modernity’s final disenchantment is of itself.9 Not only are the norms of just war dishonored in the breach, but the rationalist foundations of the justum bellum have ceased to be perspicuous. Reason is more parsimonious than Grotius believed. Indeed, it is precisely with respect to such foundations that the putative consensus breaks down. James Childress, for instance, proposes a “prima facie duty of nonmaleficence—the duty not to harm or kill others”; the U.S. bishops argue in a similar vein in their “Peace Pastoral.”10 James Turner Johnson demurs: “the concept of a just war” begins not with a “presumption against war,” but rather with “a presumption against injustice focused on the need for responsible use of force in response to wrongdoing.”11 Such internal “différance” may well support a rival interpretation of the consensus, specifically, that of a merely contingent overlap of “thick” narrative traditions.12 Intercommunal agreement, that is, rests not on the “manifest and clear” precepts of natural reason, but, in Walzer’s words, on the “reiteratively particularist” convergence of normative practices.13 Thus Christians and Muslims may agree on the in bello norm of noncombatant immunity, but their agreement is not foreordained by natural law. Curiously, Francisco Suárez argued in an analogous manner, distinguishing the merely contingent agreement of states from the jus gentium proper, the “rational basis” of which consists in the fact that the human race, into howsoever many different peoples and kingdoms it may be divided, always preserves a certain unity, not only as a species, but also a moral and political unity (as it were) enjoined by the natural precept of mutual love and mercy; a precept which applies to all, even to strangers of every nation.14

The latter, or “second kind of jus gentium,” conversely, embodies certain precepts, usages, or modes of living, which do not, in themselves and directly, relate to all mankind; neither do they have for their immediate end (so to speak) the harmonious fellowship and intercourse of all nations with respect to

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one another. On the contrary, these usages are established in each state by a process of government that is suited to the respective courts of each. Nevertheless, they are of such a nature that, in the possession of similar usages or laws, almost all nations agree with one another; or at least they resemble one another, at times in a generic manner, and at times specifically, so to speak.15

We cannot, alas, keep “our metaphysics warm” by invoking Suárez’s “natural precept of mutual love and mercy.” Yet, with a nod to Suárez, we may seek a pragmatic via media between a freestanding, “thin” rationalist interpretation and a “thick,” narrative-dependent overlap. For we may distinguish two modes of narrative-dependence: although a “reiteratively particularist” interpretation exhibits strong narrative dependence, a weaker narrative dependence permits us to affirm both (1) that the grammar of the just war is “empty” if not embodied or schematized in our particular traditions, and (2) that our traditions are themselves “blind” if not internally disciplined by such narrative grammar. (In Kant’s Second Critique, the synthetic role of a schema is played by the type of pure, practical judgments, i.e., a realm or kingdom of ends. By analogy, the ideal of a well-formed narrative schematizes the depth grammar of claim-rights, e.g., in the ad bellum and in bello norms.16) The overlapping consensus of the justum bellum rests, then, not in a freestanding (i.e., logically and epistemically autonomous) set of “secular” norms, but rather in the “family resemblance” of rhetorical practices.17 The ad bellum and in bello norms exhibit a concrete universality such that distinctive religious beliefs may provide for their ultimate justification—and, as we shall see, motive force and interpretation— even as our particular religious narratives are “well-formed” precisely inasmuch as they embody (or schematize) the norms. In short, such a weak narrative dependence allows us to identify, pragmatically, performative contradictions in denying just cause or noncombatant immunity, while grounding such norms in a theological doctrine of the natural law as, in Aquinas’s words, our “share in the divine reason itself,” our “participation in the Eternal law.”18 Consider the practical import of religious “grounding reasons” in the Augustian-Thomistic tradition of the justum bellum. War, for Augustine, was a tragic necessity, the consequence—and remedy—of fallen nature. The “love of enemies” admits “of no exceptions,” yet the “kindly harshness” of charity does not “exclude wars of mercy waged by the good.” Inspired by the “severity which compassion itself dictates,” such “wars of mercy” presumed that those inflicting punishment had “first overcome hate in their hearts.” Neither Ambrose nor Augustine permitted violent self-defense; only defense of the innocent neighbor could satisfy the stringent claims of charity.19 Thomas Aquinas recognized the normative primacy accorded caritas in forming justice, posing the quaestio in the Summa Theologiae II-II, Q. 40, “whether it is always sinful to wage war?” Harking back to their Thomistic heritage, the Renaissance Spanish schoolmen Francisco de Vitoria and Francisco Suárez fashioned the just-war tradition as we know it today in the law of nations or international law— law ordained, in Vitoria’s words, to “the common good of all,” including that of one’s enemies. In the Augustinian-Thomistic tradition, we begin, then, not with simple premises or prima facie presumptions underlying “the concept of a just war,” but rather

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with a grammar embedded in a complex web of belief consisting of nested values, ideals, tales and tropes. Thus, in modern Roman Catholic social teaching, the religiously inspired ideal of the bonum commune integrates the “prima facie” rules of nonmaleficence and justice in what we might call, following Sen, a “consequentially sensitive” redemption of basic human rights. Justice, extended beyond strategic national interest, recognizes the basic security rights of citizen and noncitizen alike (their claim to nonmaleficence). For it is precisely the grave, systemic violation of such claims, for example, in genocide or mass atrocity, that renders a just war “just.” But just so, terrestrial peace (“tranquilitas ordinis”) presumes more than mere nonmaleficence. Duties correlative to basic human rights, including social, economic, and cultural rights, generate structural imperatives of provision and protection—the set of institutional arrangements constituting, for John XXIII, the universal common good. Other religious traditions, such as Jewish or Moslem, “do likewise,” embodying the just-war norms in their distinctive narratives and casuistry, for example, in notions of divine obedience.20 Such a narrative rapprochement thus permits us to speak of their family resemblance, which as such remains fluid and open-textured. For we interpret and apply the just-war norms of the jus gentium as an overlapping consensus, not a grand meta-narrative. Family resemblance is not reified; yet neither is it infinitely malleable. Tacit prejudices distort our use, and, as Gadamer reminds us, notable among such prejudices is the “prejudice against prejudice” itself, the “foundationalist” prejudice that just-war norms function as a freestanding, impartial decision-procedure.21 Proceeding more geometrico, the use of just-war norms would be independent (logically and epistemically) of their particular narrative embodiment (or schematization). Yet, as we argued previously, the rules of just war are hermeneutically underdetermined. Grammar without narrative is empty. But such hermeneutical naïveté may blind us to misuse—distortions arising less from formal incoherence (of the ad bellum or in bello criteria per se) than interpretative inadequacy. Just as the devil quotes scripture, so we may speak of just war with a Hobbesian inflection. Hobbes, indeed, does just that. In Hobbes’s militant rhetoric, of course, the “state of nature”—no longer naturally pacific—is aptly “called war, as is of every man against every man.” And in that inglorious “tract of time” we call history, “wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known,” we have but one right, that of “self-defense”—the very right Ambrose and Augustine denied.22 Violent self-preservation, no longer a “stain upon our love for neighbor” in Ambrose’s words, is our natural right, writ large upon the “artificial person” of the state. Neither does Leviathan sacrifice this right, even if it is tempered by the rule of international law. Hobbesian “realism” legislates for general self-preservation in the form of laws of nature, the force of which depends upon general compliance. In a state of partial compliance, governed by weak international law, “reason” will abide by the laws of nature, and of the justum bellum, if, and to the degree, they promote self-preservation. There are, in this sense, theoretical limits to Hobbesian realism, underwritten by realism itself. And so, the “violent bear it away”—not merely by abjuring the norms of just war, but by incorporating (schematizing) them within the realist narrative.23

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President George W. Bush’s defense of our war in Iraq, for instance, seems less “a synthesis of idealist and realist elements,” in Johnson’s words, than a bricolage “from many contexts”—a rhetorical locus beholden more to Machiavelli’s “armed prophets” than to Augustine’s “kindly harshness.”24 Now, with the eclipse of Christian narrative’s “ontology of peace,” proportionality, and, by implication, reasonable hope of success and last resort, are ordered, not to the “common good,” including the good of enemy civilians, as a “final end,” but rather to the limited aims of strategic self-interest.25 American exceptionalism, not the universal bonum commune, legitimates “preventive war” in U.S. strategic doctrine.26 So too, we shall see, the in bello norm of discrimination is trumped by “political necessity.”

MODALITY In such a locus, the justum bellum becomes, as the rhetoricians say, a “selfconsuming artifact.” For it is not only the use of just-war norms that political realism distorts, but their form and force. In accordance with the Geneva Conventions, norms prohibiting torture are general in form, applying to all agents, and nonderogative—claims against torture oblige categorically. Signatory to the relevant Conventions, the United States holds Saddam Hussein’s human rights violations as (the remaining) casus belli. How, then, to account for George W. Bush’s brief for torture, abrogating these very accords? Hobbes, again, is instructive. Even for Hobbes, the laws of nature “dictate peace.” Yet such laws, though “immutable and eternal,” obtain only notionally prior to Leviathan. “The laws of nature oblige in foro interno only,” says Hobbes. “And whatsoever laws bind in foro interno may be broken.” Indeed, “every man, ought to endeavor peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, and advantages of war.” Even Hobbes, then, does not banish the rules of war, but so empties them of force that they become nugatory.27 Still subtler variations are worked on this theme. Thus we may recognize ordinary “permissions and prohibitions,” but only within limits and not “in the midst of hell.” Only a “supreme emergency” warrants a teleological suspension of the ethical. In extremis only do we permit torture, renditions, and the like. But with (post)modern terror, the extreme becomes quotidian, supreme emergency naturalized. Our Hobbesian logic is thus circumscribed within a “moral world,” and to preserve this world, we betray the very tenets that make it moral. Realism is, in effect, moralized, and in such “utopian” realism, the “absorption of politics by the language and imperatives of war,” says Jean Bethke Elshtain, becomes “a permanent rhetorical condition.”28

INTERPRETATION In the previous sections, I have argued that we must look to the “thick” uses of just war, attending precisely to the family resemblance—or distortions—introduced by the many (narrative) contexts at play in public, political reasoning. Yet distinctive religious beliefs never displace such reasoning in complex, pluralist polities where

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civility and reciprocity prevail. Our religious teaching, stories, and tropes do not typically dictate specific policies; rather they rein in our hybris, permitting us to imagine otherwise, for example, in seeing systematic distortions in our justwar rhetoric. The Augustinian sense of even legitimate warfare as tragic thus recalls the stringent demands of caritas, even to one’s enemies, a theme echoed in Pope John Paul II’s lament for Iraq that “War is never just another means that one can choose to employ for settling differences between nations. . . . War is not always inevitable. It is always a defeat for humanity.”29 At the heart of Christian narrative, after all, is suffering innocence, crucified love. The polemics of “focused brutality” and “self-confident relentlessness” are never warranted by claims of American exceptionalism, of lost innocence after September 11. That innocence, as H. Richard Niebuhr once wrote, was “slain from the foundations of the world.”30 And if the cross speaks of innocent suffering, it does so sans qualification: not only Americans figure in the calculus of innocence betrayed, but all those “crucified on many an obscure hill,” including the innocent Afghani civilians killed as collateral damage, the Iraqi children malnourished, the families displaced.31 Innocence, of course, is never policy, but the metaphor of crucifixion extends our gaze to every cross and every obscure hill, whether in New York, or Afghanistan, or Iraq. Re-inscribing the justum bellum in Christian narrative thus serves to remind us of the original uses (section i) and form and force (section ii) of the ad bellum and in bello norms. Indeed, religious différance casts the Christian churches (and pari passu, synagogues, mosques, et al.) in a critical role; theirs must remain a hermeneutics of suspicion in assessing the state’s use of just-war rhetoric. And it is against this backdrop, I believe, that we best interpret the “moral reality” of Christian pacifism: first with respect to public reason or deliberation, and then with respect to personal discernment. Were pacifism merely rule-governed behavior, its opposition to just war is patent: in Childress’s words, the “duty of nonmaleficence—the duty not to harm or kill others” is not prima facie, but absolute. Yet as Lisa Cahill has shown in an incisive critique, Christian pacifism is rather a “way of discipleship,” guided by radical fidelity to the Gospel. To be sure, its maxims preclude violence; yet the leitmotif of discipleship, of “loving your enemy,” is decisive.32 Where Machiavelli (whose infamy is exceeded only by his emulation) bequeaths us an armed peace in which there is no “place” for shalom, the pacifist bears witness to precisely such a place or locus. And this witness, precisely as such, plays its role in public reasoning. Christian pacifists may concede, with Augustine, that the “tranquilitas ordinis” of earthly peace falls short of the biblical ideal of shalom. But Christian narrative is never bracketed (as in modernity’s disenchantment), even if it is, at best, only partially translated into public reasons. What remains is witness. And though witness is not simply argument, it is, as Rawls himself recognized on reading Martin Luther King Jr., no less relevant to argument, that is, to public reasoning. For the regulative ideal of shalom, of “love of enemies,” remains the locus of deliberation—even if disciples, pacifist or just-war, differ as to its implications, hic et nunc. Pacifism, then, is no mere exercise of private piety. Neither can we regard the state as simply fallen or “immoral” as in Reinhold Niebuhr’s Christian realism.

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Public reason, though disciplined by pluralism—and thus the virtues of civility and reciprocity—is not, for that reason, disenchanted. We cannot bracket “mutual love and mercy,” as if the City of God and earthly cities were not only distinct (as for Augustine), but entirely separate. Still, there is a surplus of religious meaning. We remain citizens of two kingdoms, and hence of differing, but not opposed, moral rubrics (e.g., Niebuhr’s love and justice). Christian narrative, one might say, sublates natural law; grounding public reasons, yet providing, as well, for existential discernment. In an illuminating essay, Karl Rahner distinguishes “essentialist” ethics—what I have treated here as the generalizable grammar of just-war norms—from “formal, existential ethics,” wherein we discern the particular call of God for the disciple as “individuum ineffabile, whom God has called by name, a name which is and can only be unique.”33 Obedience to the “grammar” of our narrative traditions frames our existential obedience; yet the “natural precept of mutual love and mercy” does not exhaust it. Whether one should fight, as in the justum bellum, or refrain from fighting, as in the Christian pacifist tradition, would here be assimilated to discernment, that is, obedience to the concrete, particular will of God. Yet the state, as I argued previously, is not simply the individual writ large. The state is not an individuum ineffabile, and precisely so, falls under different moral rubrics: the state can never claim divine sanction for its war-making; at best, obedience to the divine will would be mediated through generalized political norms of the just war.34

CONCLUSION “Christian realism,” for Niebuhr, remains a paradox, but Niebuhr’s paradox lacks the saving subtlety of Kierkegaard’s irony. In times of terror, realism is quickly moralized in the polemics of “focused brutality” and “self-confident relentlessness.” Lance Morrow thus urges us to “relearn why human nature has equipped us all with a weapon (abhorred in decent peacetime societies) called hatred.”35 Rage has found a voice, seductive as it is potent. And yet, for the Christian, it is Calvary’s silence that enfleshes the great command, “love your enemy.” For Christians, this is the very touchstone of discipleship. Christians are summoned to seek those things that “make for peace,” to embody, personally and collectively, the “Gospel of peace.” The hermeneutics of hatred is not, after all, something we Americans must relearn. It is a weapon we have wielded often and well in the past. Perhaps we must rather relearn, in Augustine’s words, that for those called Christian, “love of enemy admits of no exceptions,” and that those inflicting punishment must “first overcome hate in their hearts.” A hard lesson, to be sure, after September 11, but enmity cannot be a fitting memorial to our grief. Nature, graced even in tragedy, has equipped us with other, better weapons. If September 11’s tragedy has taught us anything, perhaps it is to imagine otherwise: in the words of Dorothy Day, whom Machiavelli would deride as an unarmed prophet: “Yes we go on talking about love. St. Paul writes about it, and there are Father Zossima’s unforgettable words in the Brothers Karamazov, ‘Love in practice is a harsh and dreadful thing compared to love in dreams.’ What does the modern world know of love, with its light touching of the surface of love? It has

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never reached down into the depths, to the misery and pain and glory of love which endures to death and beyond it. We have not yet begun to learn about love. Now is the time to begin, to start afresh, to use this divine weapon.”36

NOTES 1. Karl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Edward M. Collins, in War, Politics, and Power (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1962), p. 65; cited by Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, 3rd ed. (New York: Basic Books, 1977), p. 23. 2. Walzer, p. 36. Walzer speaks of the “moral reality” of war as “a rule-governed activity.” 3. For the ideal of an “overlapping consensus” see John Rawls, Political Liberalism, rev. ed. (New York: Columbia University, 1996), pp. xlvii ff., 133–72; “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” in The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1999), pp. 164–80. 4. Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Prolegomena, trans. F. W. Kelsey (The Classics of International Law, Publication of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, no. 3, 1925), par. 11. For the notion of human rights as a “secular religion,” see Elie Wiesel, “A Tribute to Human Rights,” in The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Fifty Years and Beyond, ed. Y. Danieli et al. (Amityville, NY: Baywood, 1999), p. 3. 5. See Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), pp. 7, 10, 16–19. 6. Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Prolegomena, par. 39. 7. A. P. D’Entrèves, Natural Law: An Introduction to Legal Philosophy, 2d ed. (London: Hutchinson, 1970), p. 55. 8. James Turner Johnson, Morality and Contemporary Warfare (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999), p. 219. 9. Cf. Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. E. B. Ashton (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973). 10. James F. Childress, “Just-War Criteria,” in War in the Twentieth Century: Sources in Theological Ethics, ed. Richard B. Miller (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1992), pp. 352; see U.S. Bishops, “The Challenge of Peace,” par. 80 in David J. O’Brien and Thomas A. Shannon, Catholic Social Thought: The Documentary Heritage (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1992), pp. 510–11. “The moral theory of the ‘just-war’ or ‘limited-war’ doctrine begins with the presumption which binds all Christians: we should do no harm to our neighbors.” For commentary, see Todd D. Whitmore, “The Reception of Catholic Approaches to Peace and War in the United States,” in Modern Catholic Social Teaching: Commentaries and Interpretations, ed. Kenneth Himes (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004), pp. 493–521. 11. Johnson, pp. 35ff. 12. See Jacques Derrida, “Difference,” in Speech and Phenomena, trans. David B. Allison (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973), pp. 126–60. 13. I am indebted to John Kelsay for this term. 14. Francisco Suárez, De legibus ac Deo legislatore, in Selections from Three Works, vol. 2, trans. Gwladys L. Williams et al. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1944), p. 349. Cf. Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), vol. 2, pp. 174–78. 15. Suárez, pp. 348–49. 16. See Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Educational Publishing, 1956), pp. 68–71. Kant describes the schema of a concept as “a rule for the synthesis of the imagination,” i.e., a rule linking concepts (a posteriori or a priori) to perception (Critique of Pure Reason, B 180, trans. Stephan

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Körner, in Kant [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955]), p. 70. The ideal of a well-formed narrative extends the Kantian ideal of a kingdom of ends diachronically (as inscribed in a narrative tradition) and synchronically (as intersubjectively rather than monologically realized). Construed thus, the kingdom of ends is not a type for the abstract, ahistorical subject, but historicized, concretely in social narrative. Cf. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 3d ed., trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1958), pt. 1, par. 497, 664. 17. See Robert Audi, Religious Commitment and Secular Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 86–100. 18. ST. I–II, Q. 91, art. 1 and 2. 19. Cf. Epist. 189, and 209, 2; De Civitate Dei, XIX, 12–13, XXII, 6; Quest. Heat. VI, 10, SEL., XXVIII, 2, p. 428, IV, 44, CSEL, XXVIII, 2, p. 353; De Libero Arbitrio, V, 12, Migne, PL, XXXXII, 1227; Contra Faustum, XXIII, 76 and 79; Epist., 138, ii, 14. Cited in Roland Herbert Bainton, Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace: A Historical Survey and Critical Evaluation (New York: Abingdon Press, 1960), pp. 91ff. 20. Luke 10:37. 21. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, 2d revised ed., trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (New York: Crossroad, 1989), p. 270. As Louis Dupré observes, “The Enlightenment’s fight against [prejudices] stemmed itself from a prejudice and followed the Cartesian methodical rule that no position ought to be considered intellectually ‘justified’ before it was proven” (The Enlightenment and the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Culture [New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004], p.10). 22. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. C. B. Macpherson (London: Penguin Books, 1968), pp. 185–86. 23. Matthew 11:12. 24. Johnson, p. 23; following classical rhetorical usage, loci comprise the “storehouse of arguments” whereby general warrants are “topically” applied to specific cases. Such “commonplaces,” deriving from consensual (“common sense”) presumptions, schematize warrants (and backing), in part, by fixing motives. Cf. Cicero, Topics, II, 7; Partitiones Oratoriae, 5; Chaim Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation, trans. John Wilkinson and Purcell Weaver (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969), pp. 83–85. 25. Jean Bethke Elshtain, “Reflections on War and Political Discourse: Realism, Just War, and Feminism in a Nuclear Age,” in Miller, p. 400. 26. As Michael Walzer observes, “Hobbes argues that only an absolute sovereign can free [citizens] from . . . fearfulness and break the cycle of threats and ‘anticipations’ (that is, pre-emptive violence)” (Walzer, p. 77). 27. Locke argues that, “the not taking God into this hypothesis has been the great reason of Mr Hobbeses [sic] mistake that the laws of nature are not properly laws nor do oblige mankind to their observation when out of a civil state of commonwealth” (John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. P. Laslett [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963], pp. 93–94). 28. Elshtain, p. 407. 29. John Paul II, “Address of His Holiness Pope John Paul II to the Diplomatic Corps” (January 13, 2003) (http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/speeches/2003/ january/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_20). 30. H. Richard Niebuhr, “War as Crucifixion,” in Miler, p. 70. 31. Niebuhr, p. 70. 32. Lisa Sowle Cahill, Love Your Enemies: Discipleship, Pacifism, and Just War Theory (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1989), pp. 1–14. 33. Karl Rahner, “On the Question of a Formal Existential Ethics,” in Theological Investigations 2, trans. Karl H. Kruger (Baltimore: Helicon, 1963), pp. 217–34. “Essential ethics”

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refers to the set of universal, action-guiding moral norms ascertained by natural reason (e.g., respect for persons’ basic rights); we need not assume that such norms rest upon a foundationalist or essentialist metaphysics. 34. Such a mediating approach permits a limited rapprochement with Islamic emphasis upon divine obedience as the primary sanction for just war. See John Kelsay, Islam and War: A Study in Comparative Ethics (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox, 1993); John Kelsay, “Islam, Politics, and War,” Sewanee Theological Review 47, no. 1 (Christmas 2003): 11–19; John Kelsay, “Islamic Tradition and the Justice of War,” in The Ethics of War in Asian Civilizations, ed. Torkel Brekke (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 81–110. 35. Lance Morrow, “The Case for Rage and Retribution,” Time Magazine, Sept. 11, 2001. 36. Dorothy Day, “Love Is the Measure,” The Catholic Worker, June 1946, p. 2.

CHAPTER 2

Turning War Inside Out: New Perspectives for the Nuclear Age Marcia Sichol

To understand or change the war system, we need to understand the constituent elements at lower levels of analysis in a sophisticated way. The cook knows salt, the composer strings, and the gardener soil; the war scholar should know gender.1

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uring these post-9/11 days, we are witnessing something greater and of longer duration than armed conflicts. As a member of a congregation of women religious who believe that God lives and acts in our world, and as an ethicist who also believes in the power of human reason, I have felt the need to address not only the regional armed conflicts that have ensued, but also what I believe is the growing global conflict between religion and reason. Both religion and reason have a role to play during the current violence. Certainly religion should help people of all faiths to purify intention, and to rid the mind and heart of hatred and prejudice. Whereas people’s religious beliefs emerge from a variety of religious sects and cultures, reason appeals to universal ethical principles. Religion can help one to live by such principles; it ought not to be abused by appealing to sectarian beliefs that contradict them. No side in a conflict can use revelation to prove it is on God’s side; rather, I maintain that God works through human beings who do their best to reason rightly. In this chapter I assume that the role of theology and religion is and ought to be different from the role of philosophy and reason in making the case for war or for pacifism. Theology and philosophy have long been close partners in the Christian just-war tradition, with each appealing to human reason in making its arguments for and against war. In our century, the presence of nuclear weapons has given rise to new theories about war. These theories are but the latest within a tradition in the West dating back to the Greeks 4,000 years ago. In my book, The Making of a Nuclear Peace, I analyzed three contemporary just-war theorists, each of a different academic discipline and religious faith, but each male, and found

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that none of them succeeds in giving an ethical justification for the use of nuclear weapons. The fact that both religion and reason—theology and philosophy—have been dominated by men for centuries prompted me to ask, “What if I change one piece of the matrix and examine female thinkers? Does gender make a significant difference in making judgments about war? Will taking a ‘feminine turn’ in moral reasoning offer clues to the uncovering of the underlying principle governing centuries of the just-war tradition?” Will I find a new paradigm for a more adequate just-war theory for the twenty-first century? What I discovered was not what I expected and yet turned out to be more than I expected.

DOES GENDER MAKE A DIFFERENCE? YES . . . AND NO! The first step toward answering my questions followed from the realization that nuclear war is a bioethical issue on a global scale, affecting the lives of the human race as well as the planet’s entire ecosystem. Bioethics has brought casuistry back to respectability in moral philosophy, and its widespread practice signals a change in perspective, what I have called a “feminine turn.” Women customarily pull out moral principles from cases at hand, much as lawyers, physicians, and business people function. Today many men, too, are finding that this “feminine turn” in moral thought holds great promise of providing a more adequate approach to resolving today’s moral dilemmas than the deductive approaches of the past.

Not Gender, but Perspective In my research, I discovered that Hannah Arendt, a woman who did not actually write much about just war per se, nevertheless has developed concepts that illumine the moral ground on which the just-war tradition stands. A Jewish American philosopher who escaped from Nazi Germany, Hannah Arendt is a woman many feminists have abandoned as not “feminist” enough. Nevertheless, her work has invigorated feminist thought. What captured my attention was Arendt’s explication of Immanuel Kant in relation to aesthetics and the perspectives of “actors” and “spectators”—whom I call “insiders” and “outsiders.” The “best people,” Kant says, come to a situation not as actors, but as spectators, for only the spectator gets to see the whole while the actor focuses on the part he or she plays. More important, it is the spectator who serves as judge—he or she determines what is and is not acceptable. When it comes to war, this analysis aptly pertains to the role of the majority of women in the world.

THREE TWENTIETH-CENTURY WOMEN The claim that most women are outsiders, as along with many men who are excluded from war-fighting or policymaking for whatever reason, is supported by the fascinating stories and statistics in the writings of three twentieth-century

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women: Vera Brittain (1893–1970), Jean Bethke Elshtain (1940–), and Joanna Bourke (1963–).2 Of the three, Vera Brittain’s published letters reveal a woman who is closest to being an insider in that she served as a nurse on the front in World War I. After losing the four most significant men in her life and then seeing her own British soldiers treating injured Germans with dignity and respect, she moved from being an avid war supporter to becoming an active pacifist. In her book, Women and War, the American historian Jean Bethke Elshtain analyzes women’s behaviors in wartime and finds that there are no simplistic divisions between “violent men and pacific women.”3 She cites statistics to show that only 15 percent of the men engaged in combat in World War II, for example, actually fired their weapons in battle. Wartime analyses show that men are strongly opposed to killing even when society gives them permission to do so. Joanna Bourke, now professor of history at Birkbeck College, University of London, in what has been called “a masterpiece of revisionist history,” An Intimate History of Killing: Face-to-Face Killing in Twentieth Century Warfare, shows how women are an integral part of the slaughter of war and the myths surrounding it.4 Her position, which the writings of the two other women support, is that society is the chief determinant in deciding what aspects of gender should dominate in men and women. As women become insiders, such as, war-fighters and policymakers, society encourages them to shed their more “feminine” qualities. In the nuclear age, it is easy to see that the barriers against women in the military are fast disappearing. Little physical strength is needed to push a button. As a former Marine Vietnam veteran has said: [A]ll you do is move that finger so imperceptibly, just a wish flashing across your mind like a shadow, not even a full brain synapse, and poof! in a blast of sound and energy and light a truck or a house or even people disappear, everything flying and settling back into dust.5

THE DIS-COVERING OF THE DEEP VALUE IN THE JUST-WAR TRADITION Relating Arendt’s analysis to war, the three authors show that most men and women are not actors, not insiders, but spectators. As outsiders they are the majority affected by war. As judges who determine what is acceptable, they also have tremendous power—the power that, I believe, gave rise to the just-war tradition. The outsiders were the ones who needed a safe space to make homes, to care for families, to attain human flourishing. In prehistoric days, defense of one’s borders fell to the physically strong male. In our time defense of one’s borders has expanded beyond individual nations to regions and alliances. But what underlies this concern for defense of borders is the desire to preserve that kinship or bondedness that now reveals itself as global in scope. In the eighteenth century, Kant spoke of the bondedness of peoples in his Perpetual Peace (1795) when he referred to the kinship “steadily increasing between the nations of the earth [that] has now extended so enormously that a violation of right in one part of the world is felt all over it.”6 In the twenty-first century we have actually reached the point where war threatens the entire global family. This situation demands human action to save ourselves from ourselves.

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A NEW PARADIGM One can find instances of individuals’ acts to resolve conflicts without resort to war-fighting in the twentieth century in Gandhi, King, Mandela, and others. Thinkers from the East are among those “previously excluded” to whom I have referred. If the twenty-first century does turn out to be, as some have suggested, the century of India or China, the West would do well to enter into conversation with these thinkers in what Arendt calls the “public space.” Respect for such a public space offers the best chance to resolve conflict because discussion can focus on the boundaries beyond which policymakers may not go. Such public dialogue is called for by the bondedness of peoples, which provides justification for self-defense or defense of one’s neighbors against unjust aggression.7 The presence of nuclear weapons makes it impossible to conduct a just war because these weapons threaten the very value just wars are meant to preserve. In her analysis of the human condition, Arendt finds that the greatest surprises in history come about through one human being’s act. And it is through the human act that religion can assist reason. Ironically, Arendt turns to a religious figure—to Jesus of Nazareth, who, she says, links the power to forgive with the power of performing miracles. In fact, she, a scholar from a Jewish background, calls the Incarnation the “most succinct expression of hope for the world.”8 The Incarnation is God’s way of seeing humanity from the perspective of the lowly, a child born into a people among the most despised by the powerful elite in Rome. This is the very perspective we have been considering as the perspective of the outsider—the perspective of the most vulnerable of the world. Paradoxically, it is at the same time the perspective of power, for if the marginalized act in concert against policies and actions that are harmful to them, their combined power can force changes made by global insiders. In the United States, women’s movements led by such women as Sojourner Truth, a former slave; Elizabeth Cady Stanton; and others show the changes such combined power can effect. The civil rights movements in the United States and South Africa and Gandhi’s independence movement in India are but three examples of this use of power from the twentieth century. This perspective of power is available to each woman and each man, regardless of where they stand in society. Peace will only be possible if both genders make this “feminine turn”—perhaps it should be called a “more fully human turn”—and stand with the most marginalized to examine social and political realities from the perspective of those underneath. Such is the human act that is “the miracle in the making”—a peace that is more than a truce, but a peace that is forged through sustained work: not the work of war, but the struggle to enter into conversation with those from many perspectives, especially the perspective of the most vulnerable, still overwhelmingly a woman’s perspective.

NOTES 1. Joshua S. Goldstein, War and Gender (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 408. 2. Brittain was an English woman studying at Oxford who left her studies to serve as a nurse in World War I. Her wartime experience would mark her for life. Elshtain, an American, now the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Professor of Ethics at the University of

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Chicago, co-chairs the recently established Pew Forum on Religion and American Public Life. She was born just as America was entering World War II; the wartime culture seems to have marked her as a woman and an academic. Bourke, born in New Zealand to Christian missionary parents, traveled widely. Bourke is a revisionist historian, who is presently professor of history at Birkbeck College, University of London. Her work ranges from social and economic history to the history of the emotions. She says of her work, “Gender has always been a major site of investigation.” 3. Jean Bethke Elshtain, Women and War (Brighton: The Harvester Press, 1987). 4. Joanna Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing: Face-to-Face Killing in Twentieth Century Warfare (London: Granta Books, 2000). 5. Bourke, p. 14, citing William Broyles, a former Marine and editor of the Texas Monthly and Newsweek. 6. Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay, trans. with introduction and notes by M. Campbell Smith (New York: Garland Publishing, 1972), p. 142. 7. Marcia Sichol, The Making of a Nuclear Peace (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1990). This is the topic of the final chapter, in which I trace this core value throughout the just-war theories of Walzer, Ramsey, and O’Brien, as well as in the work of the classical just-war theorists. 8. Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (London: The University of Chicago Press Ltd., 1998), p. 247.

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CHAPTER 3

Demonic Religion and Violence Lloyd Steffen

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he religious extremism that played so prominent a role in the events of September 11, 2001, and in their aftermath, was bewildering to many. Questions arose then, and are with us to this day, about how and why religion seemed to inspire violence when it would seem to many religious people that “true” or “authentic” religion seeks to advance peace in the world and restrain aggression and violence. The question that has been placed at the forefront of this congress—literally on the masthead of communications from the organizers—is this: “Can religion be a force for good?” The answer to the question is suggested in the asking. Of course religion can be a force for good. But the fact is that it need not be. Religion can motivate people to act destructively, even self-destructively, and human history provides ample examples of situations where religion has been involved in motivating people to violence and destruction, which can take form as war and crusade, killing (including terrorist killing), and even suicide. I do not accept the claim some would make that true or authentic religion resists destructiveness and serves only the good. I think that view is naïve about the nature of religion—for religion as a social and cultural power can legitimate by its appeal to transcendent authority both life-affirming and destructive acts. The moral issue that faces religious people is, I believe, this: “How will people choose to be religious?” There is no single way to be religious—the options are in fact many. So when we ask whether religion can be a force for good, we can say with assurance and ample evidence that of course it can be. Religion, however, does not always align with goodness; it does not always promote the goods of life, including the preeminent good of life itself. Religion can serve ends subversive of goodness, attack the goods of life, and even advance a spiritual vision that affirms a necessary and sought-after destructiveness. Religion can be a part of what is good and beautiful in life, but the simple reality is that religion can repudiate goodness. When it does so, religious people will justify that repudiation by appeal to a transcendent context above or outside of ordinary human moral sensibilities. I want in this chapter to look into a way of being religious that is essentially involved with destructiveness. Contrary to those who affirm the religious possibility in light of a normative moral vision of goodness that then shuns destructive

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religion as perversion, I want to claim that the religious consciousness has long understood that it contains within it a destructive negativity of enormous power, because religious destructiveness appeals to transcendent sources to justify and legitimate such destructiveness. This negativity in the moral context is termed fanaticism or absolutist contradiction; in the religious context it is recognized as “the demonic.” Returning to the September 11 experience, I will cite examples of this demonic spiritual reality. I shall then expose some characteristics of the demonic, arguing that the demonic option is always before religious people. Then, given that there is no such thing as “true religion,” but only options for ways to be religious, I shall conclude by arguing that how one is religious is ultimately a moral rather than a religious matter. My constructive argument is that the decisions people make to be religious one way rather than another are essentially moral decisions even if implicitly made, and that those decisions and the actions that flow from them in the interpersonal sphere of human relations are always open to moral critique, and should be. Religion that can be shown to draw on or participate in the demonic option ought, in my view, to be rejected on moral grounds, despite the claim that could easily be made that such religion is true religion grounded in a transcendent authority superior to human moral reflection and exempt from the categories of moral assessment and evaluation.

THE DEMONIC You must remember to make supplications wherever you go, and anytime you do anything, God is with his faithful servants. He will protect them and make their tasks easier, and give them success and control, and victory. . . . Pray for yourself and all your brothers that they may be victorious and hit their targets and ask God to grant you martyrdom facing the enemy and not running away from it, and for Him to grant you patience and the feeling that anything that happens to you is for Him. . . . Before you enter [the airplane] you make a prayer and supplications. Remember this is a battle for the sake of God. . . . If God decrees that any of you are to slaughter, dedicate the slaughter to you fathers and [unclear], because you have obligations toward them. If you slaughter, do not cause the discomfort of those you are killing, because this is one of the practices of the prophet, peace be upon him. When the confrontation begins, strike like champions who do not want to go back to this world. Shout, “Allahu Akbar,” because this strikes fear in the hearts of the nonbelievers. Know that the gardens of paradise are waiting for you in all their beauty. . . . When the hour of reality approaches, the zero hour, whole-heartedly welcome death for the sake of God. Always be remembering God. Either end your life while praying, seconds before the target, or make your last words, “There is no God but God, Muhammed is His Messenger.”1

These words are just some selections from the “Final Instructions to the Hijackers” found in Mohamed Atta’s luggage in an abandoned car at Boston’s Logan Airport. The appeal to religious authority—to God, in fact—for sanction and justification of a murder-suicide mission directed at noncombatant civilians is unmistakable. I acknowledge that the motivations for these actions are complex and involve much more than religion—political, economic, historical, social, and cultural motives background the September 11 attacks. But, that said, clearly

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religion is involved. If religion always involves some appeal to transcendence, some idea of an ultimate value (it need not be absolute, only an Anselmian idea of “that than which nothing greater can be conceived”), these instructions make such an appeal. The instructions assured the hijackers on religious grounds that their impending deaths not only had meaning but divine blessing. The writers of the “Instructions” understood that religious sources of sanction, being attached as they are to an ultimate and transcendent power, are sufficiently powerful to overrule ordinary prudential reasoning and the self-regarding duty of self-protection it entails. It takes an enormous power to inspire a person to engage in an act of selfkilling and also to understand such an act as something other than what a moral point of view would term it—suicide. The instructions provided a way for the hijackers to frame what they were doing religiously so that their impending actions were not interpretable as suicide, which their religion, Islam, explicitly prohibits, and a powerful interpretive framework is required to overrule ordinary moral sensibilities and make something mean religiously what it does not and cannot mean morally. From a moral point of view, this document is inspiring murder and suicide; the religious construction around the acts renders them protected acts of faithful servants carrying out God’s will, acts that are blessed and will be rewarded. The religious interpretive scheme overrules the moral point of view and provides a divine sanction for murder and suicide. Let me offer one more, short example of a September 11–related religious reflection that I believe falls under the purview of demonic religion. Two days after the attacks, Pat Robertson, a prominent American televangelist, interviewed another prominent Christian evangelical televangelist, Rev. Jerry Falwell, on the 700 Club television program. Robertson offered the view that “We have insulted God at the highest levels of our government. And, then we say, ‘Why does this happen?’ Well, why it’s happening is that God Almighty is lifting his protection from us.”2 Falwell said in the interview that the September 11 attacks were clearly divine retribution for American’s sins: “what we saw on Tuesday, as terrible as it is, could be miniscule if, in fact, if in fact God continues to lift the curtain and allow the enemies of America to give us probably what we deserve.” With Pat Robertson concurring, Falwell reflected that the responsibility for the attacks rests with “the pagans, the abortionists, and the feminists, and the gays and lesbians . . . the ACLU, People for the American Way, all of them who have tried to secularize America. I point the finger in their face and say: ‘You helped this happen.’”3 There is more in the actual interview, but this statement gives us enough to work with. These statements suffice to show how Robertson and Falwell interpreted the September 11 attacks as divinely sanctioned just retribution for America’s egregious moral sins, which Falwell identifies as feminism, abortion rights, gay rights, and the like. This attack was in Robertson’s words “deserved.” I think it worth pointing out that the hijackers would have concurred with this opinion in the main, as they were willing to die for their belief that God sanctioned what they were doing and would reward them later. The hijackers shared with Robertson and Falwell the idea that this attack was ultimately authorized and sanctioned by God. In sum, the hijackers and the American televangelists agreed that God was

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angry at America, and that this attack was a justified act, a just desert approved by God—a deserved punishment for America’s sins. The hijackers do not specify the sins and their list would have certainly differed from that offered by Jerry Falwell, but those details are not important for my purposes. The use of religion and how religion is framing interpretation of this event is my issue. I want to say that the religious appeal here invokes a vision of a wrathful God hell-bent on destruction and punishment. The God appealed to in the “Instructions” and by the televangelists is authorizing murder, and suicide as a permissible means for committing the murder, and religion is effecting an interpretive transformation of the moral meaning of these acts. From a religious point of view, the meaning of the attack must be first referred to and conformed to divine will. For the hijackers, those to be murdered are legitimate targets of the divine wrath—those to be “slaughtered” are characterized as “allies of Satan” and “brothers of the devil”; for the televangelists, the attacks are a divine retribution against a nation turning Godless and secular and opposing the divine will. We can assume that the hijackers and the televangelists continue to think of God as good and just, and that even if the acts authorized are destructive of some, that destruction has positive meaning, because it is falling on enemies of God. For the hijackers, the killing and self-killing are justified and will yield the result of life with God in paradise; for Falwell, the attacks are a wake-up call so that America repents of its evil secularizing ways and forges a new bond with God as a nation not only under God but of God and with God in all things. From a moral point of view, the destruction of September 11 can be described and evaluated as murder and suicide, with murder being by definition unjustifiable and suicide at least presumptively so. Yet religion is providing an interpretive frame that trumps and then suppresses this moral evaluation with a sanction so powerful that individuals actually proceed motivated by religion to murder and to kill themselves in the process, or, in the case of the televangelists, to interpret the horrors of the day as “deserved.” My claim is that this is not only an example of the power of religious reframing of moral matters but, in authorizing immoral action, it exposes a particular way of being religious that can be associated with “the demonic.” What do we mean by “demonic religion”?

THE DEMONIC CHARACTERIZED The demonic is difficult to describe without falling into negatives, but saying what the demonic is by saying what it isn’t in one sense accurately conveys the most important thing about the demonic, which is its negativity. The negativity is located in the fact that demonic religion is not what many people seek and find in religion, that is, something positive, creative, constructive, and ultimately lifeaffirming. The demonic is none of these things. Paul Tillich, one of the few modern Christian theologians to give concerted attention to the demonic, once described the demonic as “the Holy (or the sacred) with a minus sign before it, the sacred anti-divine.”4 In that brief characterization is the heart of the matter. Demonic religion is not false religion or untrue religion, and it is not a negation of religion from outside religion. The demonic, rather, is religion of a certain sort, a way of being religious that negates what we might call life-affirming religion,

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which is religion conformed in its central vision to goodness and to the promotion of goodness. The demonic presents its possibility wherever ultimacy and ultimate power are at issue and likely to be divinized or made absolute, and this could include politics, economics, and art, as well as religion. But the demonic is a term religion has claimed as a way of describing a negativity internal to religion, a possibility that is alluring in its offer to satisfy the basic spiritual needs all human beings have for such things as community, identity, meaning, and a self-understanding formed around a sense of doing good and existing in relation to ultimate values and realities. The demonic allures with its involvement with ultimacy and transcendent power, and it can empower those who grasp it, that empowerment being a negativity in the realm of spiritual meaning. The demonic offers something life-affirming religion often cannot: certainty. That certainty is of a certain sort, for it arises from a belief that the transcendent is absolute and is to be known as such, that that absolute and transcendent spiritual reality communicates itself to human beings with absolute clarity, that human beings have the capacity to understand that communication in the purity of its absolute expression. The demonic offers certainty—absolute certainty— with no hesitancy or humility, questioning or interpretive freedom permitted to surround it. It offers absolutist ideas—and commands actions out of that absolutism—thus giving a permission slip to move past reasonableness into contradiction with goodness itself. If absolutism encompasses everything, it encompasses its own contradiction, and that contradiction will eventually will out—every example of absolutism will eventually express contradiction, as did the hijackers in their absolute belief that that a sure way to gain life—and thus promote the good of life—is to kill others and even oneself. There may be a way to understand that religiously and in light of transcendence, but the moral point of view, based as it is on reason and universalizable notions of goodness and other-regarding benevolence, sees only contradiction and negativity. An extraordinary clarity about moral and religious meaning attends the demonic: when viewed from the moral point of view this feature is deemed the “fanatical” as self-regarding duties like that of self-preservation or self-defense are willingly surrendered to the absolute. What are the major characteristics of the demonic? I suggest three.

Destructiveness First, the demonic expresses itself in destructiveness. Destruction in religion, as in life itself, is not always bad, or wrong, or evil. Destruction is in dialectical relation with creativity, so that while we would attribute wrongdoing to an arsonist whose actions threaten lives, we also would not want thoughtlessly to equate the fact of a forest fire with evil when the natural logic is that fire clears old growth so that new growth might begin, thus creating new life and preserving the forest. (In the Hindu trinity a god of destruction, Shiva [and his wife, the destroyer goddess, Kali], is set alongside a creator god [Brahma] and a preserver god [Vishnu].) So if we accept that destruction is not in itself evil and may be integral to the life-affirming values of creation and creativity, what does it mean that the

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demonic is destructive? The demonic emphasizes a persistent destructiveness aimed ultimately—spiritually—at absolute destruction. Demonic destruction is drawn out of dialectical relationship with creativity and purposefully seeks ultimate realization as absolute negativity. The demonic, in other words, identifies a religious negativity wherein destruction is unrelenting and unrelieved—except by a turn away from the demonic itself. When the demonic is fully engaged the destructiveness seeks to go absolutely negative with no hope for reclaiming life and goodness out of its movement. We can glimpse a picture of such absolute negativity in the demonic picture of God presented in 1 Samuel 15, in which God commands King Saul to undertake a total annihilation of the enemy, to inflict on the defeated Amalekites a slaughter of “man and woman, child and infant, ox and sheep, camel and donkey.” The picture of God in this part of the story reflects an absolute, unrelieved negativity that shocks King Saul, who disobeys parts of the order, leading to God bemoaning the day God made Saul King—the demonic picture is unrelenting in its vision of destruction. Saul’s refusal to follow the divine order in all of its details incurs God’s wrath, and ultimately the omnicide is carried out—by priests! Thus is the demonic vision kept “in-house,” with religious authorities and institutions able to sustain and even carry out the demonic vision. The demonic is pictured dramatically in stories of divinity as well as in the lives of the faithful—such as the priests who undertook to carry out what they took to be God’s instruction that all the enemies should be killed. Any form of religious life—and any religious tradition—that engages in a destructiveness aimed at a totalized vision of annihilation of life and the goods of life—even if offered in the name of goodness or God or values such as freedom or even life itself—participate in the demonic form of spiritual striving, seeking to bring about a realization of this possibility in its absolute negativity. (That realization is, I think, always beyond human grasp, for to realize the absolute possibility, whether of goodness or destruction, would be to render the individual something other than human, but totalized as spirit—the possibility that is a god. The demonic points to a spiritual direction of negativity, even as life-affirming religion points toward a vision of goodness, that, in light of human fallibility, is never—and cannot be—totally realized.)

Subversion of Freedom Life-affirming religion endorses a spirituality marked by an expansive inclusivity, where the dangerous power that human beings can claim over one another is diffused and shared, and all people are invited into the creation of forms of life that preserve and promote the goods of life. In the life-affirming spiritual option, the goods of life, including the good of life itself, are received as gifts, shared and cared for, valued, and extended to others in a vision of benevolent other-regardingness and impartial justice. And freedom is a critical condition for the enjoyment of religion or spirituality connected to such a vision of goodness. The demonic is not aimed in this direction but away from it. It neither seeks to promote and preserve the goods of life for all—it actually subverts the condition of freedom itself. The demonic aims not at freedom but

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seeks to grasp a spiritual power that is characterized by exclusivity, by authoritarianism and regimens of restrictive obedience, which is why political forms that adopt this spiritual context are often referred to as “demonic.” As detachment and ego-diffusiveness is a sign of freedom, the demonic concentrates and seeks increasing ego extension and dominion. It is a lesser characteristic of this loss of freedom, but noticeable nonetheless, that the demonic is humorless, whereas freedom shows itself in play and humor, detaching the ego from itself and opening itself in freedom to possibilities outside its control. Humor is one common way this is accomplished. As freedom is the defining condition of spirit and spirituality, those who use their freedom to renounce freedom exemplify this characteristic of the demonic turn. Tillich is of some help at this point, because he looked broadly—even past religion—to consider the affairs of spirit and freedom in human life. And in many arenas where freedom was the issue, Tillich invoked the category of the demonic to explore this spiritual negation of freedom, seeing it in art; in politics and economic systems, including fascism and capitalism; and even in science itself. In all of these arenas of life, human persons were turning away from freedom and surrendering to some notion of negative and absolute ultimacy that subverted freedom, and with that subversion, the idea of moral agency and human autonomy. Tillich looked into his own Christian tradition and identified the demonic renunciation of freedom in everything, including formulas of condemnation, inquisitions, the tyrannies of Protestant orthodoxy and the fanaticism of sects, and church doctrines. Tillich was specifically critical of the doctrine of papal infallibility.

Self-Deception The third characteristic of the demonic is that it prepares fertile ground for the cultivation of self-deception. People are motivated to action by goodness, and the demonic furnishes ideas of goodness to cover up the best, most reasonable (moral) interpretation of their acts. Self-deception is a psychological maneuver whereby individuals keep certain interpretations away from direct confrontation, the idea being that when self-deceived, individuals can act in one way yet operate out of a self-understanding that indicates that what is being done is really good, even if others cannot see it. (In this self-deceivers are not delusional and unhinged from reality, but see that what they are doing looks like something wrong or evil; in the self-deception they hold the secret information and the big picture interpretation that reveals it is not really wrong or evil but actually good—like the televangelists saying that a particular instance of mass murder, the 9/11 attacks, were deserved, an interpretation that goes against the best most reasonable moral interpretation, but which is tied to God employing a powerful and ultimately good reminder that God wants America awakened so that it will become what it ought to be in God’s own eyes, namely, a nonsecular, God-fearing country.) The self-deception hides the meaning of the destructiveness so that the destructiveness can continue its spiral toward absolute destructiveness. Demonic religion succeeds because destructiveness is not confronted as spiritually negative action: self-deception is a willed interpretive act aimed at

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reconstructing negative and destructive acts so that they conform to goodness. Once deemed good, those destructive acts can be undertaken as projects that have sanction thought to be goodness itself, as in the idea that God is good and would never issue a command to do evil. The disparity between what an action would most reasonably mean and how religion is able to cover up that meaning so that even murder and suicide might be deemed positive, life-affirming expressions of the goodness of God exemplifies how self-deception enters demonic spirituality to blunt confrontation with the best, most reasonable interpretation of these destructive acts.

INTERPRETING THE “INSTRUCTIONS” AND THE ROBERTSON-FALWELL INTERPRETATIONS AS “DEMONIC” These three characteristics of the demonic now allow us to interpret the demonic features in the examples of 9/11 justifications presented earlier. First, the “Instructions.” The “Instructions” appeal to God and the goodness of God. This good God, who as good would not (could not?) commit an evil act, authorizes and sanctions the hijackers to commit murder and suicide, bequeathing to them a divine blessing and promise of a reward in paradise. An ordinary moral point of view evaluating this justification would determine that the acts being contemplated are wrong and evil, as is any transcendent authority that would sanction them. But the moral point of view is being abrogated for a religious interpretation in which these evil acts are referred to God for transcendent justification beyond the reach of the moral point of view, so that these acts are being conformed with the divine purposes that are good although obscure to human beings who lack the ability to see their true purpose as consonant with goodness itself. The hijackers deceive themselves into thinking that something evil is really good; they kill themselves but in such a way that it is not to be thought of as suicide; they engage in a destructiveness that goes so far as to overrule a basic self-regarding duty to preserve one’s own life; and so gripped are they by the vision of destruction that they are not free to question the moral meaning of what they are doing. Rather than being concerned that they are murdering passengers and airliner crews, they turn attention to the moral requirement, a good end as stated in the “Instructions,” of dispatching their direct-kill victims in such a way that they do not cause undue suffering. They thus show compassion to the enemies of God in how they kill them, and completely avoid the idea that they are committing murder. Destruction, the subversion of freedom, and self-deception are apparent throughout the “Instructions.” The Robertson-Falwell perspective also demonstrates the presence of demonic religion. The murder and mayhem is present to them as a deserved punishment from God, who acts to destroy life to make a point about God’s nonsecular vision of American life. All those who oppose this vision oppose God—and the condemnation of abortion rights advocates, gays, and lesbians is issued without qualification, and the causal links to the destruction itself and to God as the real cause of it is absolute and clear. God has an absolute power to transform murder into a “wake-up call” having to do with America’s culture wars, and on 9/11, God exercised that power. God revealed through these acts a divine displeasure, and

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destruction is an acceptable means of delivering the divine message—if God wills it, it is by definition permissible and appropriate, even good. It is the way God has chosen in God’s freedom to get America’s attention. We see in the Falwell remarks an appeal to an absolute power, for an absolute power is punishing and delivering justice—which is ordinarily a good thing, is it not?—through these terrorist acts. These look like terrible acts, but if seen from God’s point of view—and this is what Falwell and Robertson are in a sense claiming to see—this destructiveness is in fact a good thing, a needed reminder from God that America has made bad choices, and change is needed. This destruction might lead to religious revival and an America free of gay people and abortion activists and the like—however that might be accomplished in the dark spiral of destruction. But the point is that if God is sanctioning these acts as a punishment, which is the claim, this death and destruction is really a moment of chastening, and that cannot be, coming from God, anything other than ultimately a good thing—really good, terrible as it may seem on the surface. So again, murder and suicide are transformed into meaning something other than what a moral point of view would see—murder, suicide, and mayhem. The demonic interpretation of the 9/11 attacks is reinterpreted to mean something other than an act of murder and suicide: in this we see a self-deceptive interpretation that negates the freedom to avow the evil before one, that uses the event to reaffirm an absolutist idea that all that happens is from God and because of God, and that embraces a defiance of the moral point of view. The demonic has transformed the meaning of violence so that it comes to bear an interpretive valence of real and deep goodness rather than of an apparent evil—this is what demonic religion accomplishes. People gripped by demonic religion suspend moral interpretation and transform acts of destruction and violence in such a way that they come to mean something religiously that they cannot mean morally. Demonic religion ultimately subverts, and then defies, the moral point of view.

CONCLUSION: THE PRIMACY OF THE MORAL POINT OF VIEW The moral point of view shuns association with spiritually negative absolutism and all that springs from it, including the violence of destruction and the appeals for sanction grounded in absolute certainty. The moral point of view, rather, envisions goodness and seeks to connect a universal sense of goodness through various goods of life important in the common life, goods such as life itself, practical reasonableness, speculative knowledge, friendship, relation with ultimacy, and many others. These goods are essential to human flourishing, and they express a benevolent attitude of other-regardingness. Demonic religion sets itself in opposition to such goods and seeks to subvert their value, even destroy them, accomplishing this end either by postulating an ultimacy that is destructive and evil, which is rare, or by the ruse that the destruction and violence unleashed under the sanction and at the will of the absolute is not really a negative but only apparently seems so. An absolute power can claim power sufficient to translate murder and suicide into meaningful, life-affirming acts. The moral point of view, being grounded in reason and appealing to a universal sense of good will, refuses to accept this

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absolutist translation and judges the demonic as a way of being religious that is destructive of the moral life. Demonic religion ultimately opposes the moral point of view itself, and a moral critique of violent acts committed in the name of a demonic vision of transcendence will finally, at some point, direct its focus on the religious possibility of the demonic itself, not just the acts that express it behaviorally. And a moral critique will call into question, and ultimately judge, that religious possibility—that possibility of the demonic—as unworthy of people of good will. It will be evaluated as a destructive religious possibility, one to be feared because of the power it holds to affect human action, one that not only does not lead to human flourishing but actually contributes to human destructiveness. Demonic religion can be discerned as a way of being religious in human actions and attitudes. It will be a form of religion that focuses on ultimacy and transcendence as all religious forms do, but in the demonic mode it will exclude and separate, it will confer value on insiders at the expense of outsiders, and it will render opponents enemies and sanction hatred, even violence, against those who do not conform to its directives. It will identify outsiders or even internal opponents as “enemies of God” or as heretics and require their exclusion, their punishment, and their dehumanization in the name of purity, which is a value that absolutists come to value above all others. The demonic is present when in the name of religion people are demeaned and dehumanized, are subjected to harm and terror, or, when afflicted with harm, be it from disease, natural disaster, or acts of human violence, are told they deserve such harm because of their defiance of true religion. Demonic religion becomes a way of wishing ill on others in the name of the sacred or the holy. Demonic religion is a religious possibility that is a real option for any religious person—it is seductive and meets needs, as I said, and some vigilance is in order to keep it at bay. Some of the spiritual techniques that are continually calling persons into postures of spiritual humility and fostering benevolent attitudes toward both individuals and a universal humanity of which the individual is a part, connected each to all and all to each one—such things as prayer, meditation, fasting, developing compassion and undertaking works of charity, practicing forgiveness, and so on—become life-affirming actions that help individuals resist the demonic option and keep self-deception at bay. But the demonic is always an option in the religious realm. The other option—the other direction on that continuum of ways to be religious—points toward a life-affirming religious possibility in which religion acknowledges goodness and affirms the essential goodness of the moral point of view itself: other-regardingness becomes an expression of a transcendent concern for others that arises from the heart of religion itself; attitudes expressing compassion, benevolence, and justice become hallmarks of the religious life itself; and the religious option comes to be a way to express goodness not simply in the realm of action but in the spiritual realm as well. In life-affirming religion all persons are spiritual persons and are to be regarded as such, respected as such, and honored as such. Religion that is unloosed from its moral hinges is not only prone to become destructive, but is, I think, doomed to do so. The power religion is dealing with, the power of ultimacy, is simply too unwieldy, and too easily distorted when attempts are made to manipulate it. Because religious life is so prone to involvement in demonic fixtures—these things happen on a continuum, they do not

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plunge into absolute evil all at once—the moral point of view is essential for testing and providing critique of actions undertaken in the religious realm. The moral point of view will provide an external resource to evaluate how actions and attitudes connect with ultimate values. It will in freedom question the meaning of actions and, in light of rational understanding, determine whether a religiously inspired action conforms to goodness; and the moral point of view will inquire whether religion itself, in any of its many particular and diverse expressions, is advancing life-affirming values or offending against them. We are not keen on subjecting religion to moral scrutiny this way, yet this moral scrutiny of religion is important if religion is to be included among the goods of life, an aspect of human existence that promotes life and contributes to human well-being and not its destruction. It can do either, and the decision to go one way or the other is not a religious decision but a moral decision about how one is going to be religious—a decision that can be made explicitly or implicitly, one that needs to be made more consciously than we are used to making it. Can religion be a force for good? Yes, of course it can. But the moral point of view would want to say something more, namely, “It should be, it must be—and it must itself oppose those who would attack goodness by their religions of violence and destruction.”

NOTES 1. These statements are taken from “Final Instructions to the Hijackers of September 11, Found in the Luggage of Mohamed Atta and Two Other Copies,” reprinted in Bruce Lincoln, Holy Terrors: Thinking about Religion after September 11 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003): pp. 93–98. 2. “Transcript of Pat Robertson’s Interview with Jerry Falwell Broadcast on the 700 Club, September 13, 2001,” reprinted in Lincoln, Holy Terrors, p. 104. 3. “Transcript of Pat Robertson’s Interview,” p. 106. 4. Paul Tillich, What Is Religion?, trans. and ed. James Luther Adams (New York: Harper Torchbook, 1963), p. 85.

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CHAPTER 4

The BhagavadgXt7 and War: Some Early Anticipations of the Gandhian Interpretation of the BhagavadgXt7 Arvind Sharma

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propose to tackle this topic in three parts. First, I shall narrate an actual piece of dialogue between Mahatma Gandhi and one Dr. Kagawa, who has been identified as “a student of religion.” Having presented that piece of dialogue, we shall next analyze it to identify the basic features of the Gandhian interpretation of the GXt7. Having done that, we shall finally see if the Gandhian frame of reference toward the GXt7 has any precedents within the Hindu tradition. We turn now to the first part of the chapter and recount the dialogue between Mahatma Gandhi and Dr. Kagawa that was reported on January 21, 1939, in the Harijan. It runs as follows: Dr. Kagawa: I am told you recite the BhagavadgXt7 daily? Gandhiji: Yes, we finish the entire GXt7 reading once every week. Dr. Kagawa: But at the end of the GXt7 Krisha recommends violence. Gandhiji: I do not think so. I am also fighting. I should not be fighting effectively if I were fighting violently. The message of the GXt7 is to be found in the second chapter of the GXt7 where Krishna speaks of the balanced state of mind, of mental equipoise. In 19 verses at the close of the 2nd chapter of the GXt7, Krishna explains how this state can be achieved. It can be achieved, he tells us, after killing all your passions. It is not possible to kill your brother after having killed all your passions. I should like to see that man dealing death—who has no passions, who is indifferent to pleasure and pain, who is undisturbed by the storms that trouble mortal man. The whole thing is described in language of beauty that is unsurpassed. These verses show that the fight Krishna speaks of is a spiritual fight.

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WAR Dr. Kagawa: To the common mind it sounds as though it was actual fighting. Gandhiji: You must read the whole thing dispassionately in its true context. After the first mention of fighting, there is no mention of fighting at all.1 The rest is a spiritual discourse. Dr. Kagawa: Has anybody interpreted it like you? Gandhiji: Yes. The fight is there, but the fight as it is going on within. The Pandavas and Kauravas are the forces of good and evil within. The war is the war between Jekyll and Hyde, God and Satan, going on in the human breast. The internal evidence in support of this interpretation is there in the work itself and in the Mah7bh7rata of which the GXt7 is a minute part. It is not a history of war between two families, but the history of man—the history of the spiritual struggle of man. I have sound reasons for my interpretation. Dr. Kagawa: That is why I say it is your interpretation. Gandhiji: But that is nothing. The question is whether it is a reasonable interpretation, whether it carries conviction. If it does, it does not matter whether it is mine or X.Y.Z.’s. If it does not, it has no value even if it is mine.2

BHAGAVADGáT–: THE GANDHIAN INTERPRETATION IN OUTLINE A close review of this dialogue reveals that Mahatma Gandhi changed his response during the conversation from a historical to a rational one. The key question asked by Dr. Kagawa was: has anybody interpreted the GXt7 like you? Mahatma Gandhi began by saying yes, but then instead of citing any name of such a predecessor he started to explain how and why the GXt7 should be understood allegorically. Dr. Kagawa, recognizing Mahatma Gandhi’s failure to cite a precedent to his interpretation then remarked: “That is why I say it is your interpretation.” Again failing to cite a precedent, Mahatma Gandhi appealed to the merit of the interpretation itself, rather than its author, as a worthy criterion of its value. So the question raised by Dr. Kagawa remained unanswered in a sense. Let us now try to answer it by asking the original question: has anybody interpreted the GXt7 like Mahatma Gandhi before Mahatma Gandhi? Before an answer to the question is attempted it is helpful to realize that on the basis of Mahatma Gandhi’s dialogue with Dr. Kagawa, Mahatma Gandhi’s interpretation seems to have two major components: 1. The GXt7 teaches nonviolence. 2. The GXt7 is to be taken allegorically and not historically. No one denies that the GXt7 refers to fighting—the question is whether this fight refers to a spiritual struggle in the heart of man or to actual warfare on a battlefield. Thus Dr. Kagawa’s question—has anyone interpreted the GXt7 like “you”—breaks down into two distinct though allied questions: 1. Has anyone interpreted the GXt7 as preaching nonviolence before Mahatma Gandhi? 2. Has anyone interpreted the GXt7 allegorically before Mahatma Gandhi?

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ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS The answer to the first question seems to be that no one appears to have claimed, as Mahatma Gandhi did, that the GXt7 preached nonviolence explicitly. It may be argued that the message is implicit in the GXt7 itself, and this is what Mahatma Gandhi did, but no one seems to have claimed this prior to Mahatma Gandhi. Having said this, however, it may now be pointed out that there are some hints in ancient Hindu literature that, although not reaching the point of articulation achieved in Mahatma Gandhi, seem to be headed in that direction. To see this it is important to realize that one of the reasons why Mahatma Gandhi thought that the message of the GXt7 was nonviolence was that, according to him, that was the message of the Mah7bh7rata itself, of which, as he said, “the GXt7 is a minute part.”3 Thus he wrote while remarking on the message of the GXt7: The author of the Mah7bh7rata has not established the necessity of physical warfare; on the contrary he has proved its futility. He has made the victors shed tears of sorrow and repentance and has left them nothing but a legacy of miseries.4

In this context certain passages of the Bh7gavata Pur7ha make interesting reading. Indeed, “it is usually said that the Bh7gavata Pur7ha begins where the Mah7bh7rata ends, seeking to correct a story which tells of gambling, dishonouring of women and a devastating war which ends in a pyrrhic victory.”5 In the fifth chapter of the first canto we actually find Vy7sa, the putative author of the Mah7bh7rata, being criticized by N7rada: It was a great error on your part to have enjoined terrible acts (acts involving destruction of life) in the name of religion on men who are naturally addicted to such acts. Misguided by these precepts of yours (in the Mah7bh7rata) the ordinary man of the world would believe such acts to be pious and would refuse to honour the teachings that prohibit such action.6

In other words, N7rada complained that the justification of violence involved in the Mah7bh7rata and especially in the GXt7 could have disastrous consequences in general, and urged sage Vy7sa to compose a devotional work to offset this effect, namely the Bh7gavata Pur7ha. Thus we find that even as far back as tenth century CE, the date usually assigned to the Bh7gavata Pur7ha, there was a certain uneasiness in certain Hindu minds with the violent nature of the Mah7bh7rata episode. The ancient thinker writing in the name of N7rada, to be sure, took a different tack than Mahatma Gandhi—he wanted a new work to turn people’s minds toward the worship of Lord Krsna and away from the terrible war and its justification. Mahatma Gandhi thought that the work itself implied condemnation of violence. But both the pseudonymous N7rada and the famous Mahatma were grappling with the same issue: the violent nature of the Mah7bh7ratan narrative and its reconciliation with higher spiritual ends. The Gandhian solution, though, must be regarded as unique, for N7rada explicitly recognized the violence involved in the Mah7bh7rata and condemned it, but Mahatma Gandhi commended it as a warning to others. This difference in attitude between using it as a

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warning rather than as an example allowed him to claim, as none had done, that the real message of the Mah7bh7rata and the GXt7 was nonviolence. How then do we answer the first question: did anyone interpret the GXt7 as preaching nonviolence before Mahatma Gandhi did so? The answer seems to be that no one interpreted the GXt7 the way it was interpreted by Mahatma Gandhi before him, even though it may be argued that the message of nonviolence is implied in the Mah7bh7rata itself, and even though we detect previous undercurrents of dissatisfaction with the violence involved therein. No one before Mahatma Gandhi seems to have clearly and unambiguously stated the message of the BhagavadgXt7—and indeed of the Mah7bh7rata—to have been nonviolence. Now the second question: did anyone interpret the GXt7 allegorically before Mahatma Gandhi? The answer to this second question can be given in the affirmative in view of certain facts that have come to light in the course of an examination of Abhinavagupta’s commentary on the BhagavadgXt7 known as the – graha. Before this evidence is presented, however, it seems useful to GXt7rthasam emphasize that Mahatma Gandhi’s claim that the GXt7 preached nonviolence rests heavily on the antecedent claim that the GXt7 must be interpreted allegorically. Mahatma Gandhi was himself fully conscious of this fact, as is clear from the prefatory note with which he commences his Gujarati commentary called Anasakti Yoga on the BhagavadgXt7.7 The remarks translate thus: No knowledge is to be found without seeking, no tranquility without travail, no happiness except through tribulation. Every seeker has, at one time or another, to pass through a conflict of duties, a heart-churning.8

Having thus provided a spiritual rather than a historical orientation, Mahatma Gandhi translates the first verse of the GXt7 and then follows it up with the following annotation: The human body is the battlefield where the eternal duel between Right and Wrong goes on. Therefore it is capable of being turned into the gateway to Freedom. It is born in sin and becomes the seed-bed of sin. Hence it is also called the field of Kuru. The Kauravas represent the forces of Evil, the Pandavas the forces of Good. Who is there that has not experienced the daily conflict within himself between the forces of Evil and the forces of Good?9

Thus Mahatma Gandhi equates the Kuruk}etra, the battlefield where the Mah7bh7rata war was fought, with the human body, the Kauravas with the forces of Evil in the person, and the P7hCavas with the forces of Good. Fresh evidence, as pointed out earlier, suggests that the tradition of such an allegorical interpretation of the GXt7 seems to go back at least as far as the tenth century CE. The reasons for making this claim are as follows. Abhinavagupta is a name with which many if not most students of Indian culture are familiar; he is well-known for his commentaries on such well-known works of Hindu prosody and dramatics as –nandavardhana’s Dhvany7loka and Bharata’s N7£ya}7tra.10 He is also a well-known exponent of the system of K7{mXra »aivism known as Trika.11 His dates are not known with complete certainty but he is believed to have been born between 950 and 960 CE. and is thus assigned to the tenth century CE.12 He also

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wrote a commentary on the BhagavadgXt7, hitherto untranslated.13 In this commentary, in his gloss on the first verse of the BhagavadgXt7, after making his own remarks, Abhinavagupta refers to a tradition of interpreting the GXt7 in which the Kuruk}etra is equated with the human body, very much in the way Mahatma Gandhi did.14 The relevant passage runs as follows: Herein some speak of an alternative interpretation. [They explain the word kuruk}etra as] the field of the Kurus: Kuru¯ h7m ⫽ karah7n7m—organs of sense; k}etra (field) ⫽ that which favours, that is, the field of the senses is the favourer of all the properties of transmigration as being that which helps to bring them about (i.e. the human body). Whereas dharmak}etra (the field of dharma) is to be understood from the sentence, “This is the highest dharma; to see the soul by means of Yoga,” namely, as being the body of the [aspirant for whom the GXt7 is] intended, a body which offers salvation by its attainment of apavarga through the abandonment of everything opposed to dharma. [So that the question asked by king Dhxtar7}£ra may be paraphrased thus:] Standing in that [battle] where passion and detachment, anger and forbearance, etc., have come together in mutual conflict, for the senses, etc., always aim at the injury of the body—what have my ignorant volitions, comparable to ignorant men, accomplished, and what have (my) wise (volitions), the P7hCavas, comparable to men of knowledge, accomplished? That is to say, who has defeated whom?15

CONCLUSION The parallels between these remarks on the first verse of the BhagavadgXt7 recorded in the tenth century CE. and the remarks made by Mahatma Gandhi in the twentieth century CE. are quite obvious. This enables us to offer the conclusion that whereas Mahatma Gandhi was certainly original in regarding the message of the BhagavadgXt7 to be that of ahias7, he was certainly not the first to think up the allegorical interpretation on which he based his opinion.16 To conclude: although the claim by Mahatma Gandhi that the GXt7 preaches nonviolence seems to be unprecedented, the allegorical interpretation of the GXt7 on which it is based is not unprecedented in ancient Hindu exegetical tradition that grew up around the BhagavadgXt7.17

NOTES 1. This statement, though substantially true, is not entirely accurate, as later chapters do contain references to fighting (e.g., IX.34). However “in thirteen out of eighteen chapters of the GXt7 (viz. Chap. IV–X and Chap. XII–XVIII) we do not meet with a single reference to the scene of the battlefield of Kuruk}etra, nor to the Epic story or incidents of any kind, which might remind us of the fact that Kx}ha and Arjuna had anything to do with the Bh7rata war or that the object of the teaching of the GXt7 was to induce Arjuna to fight, so preoccupied and deeply absorbed are both the speakers of the dialogue in topics relating to modes of spiritual culture, the ethical ideal and subtle metaphysical concepts” (S. C. Roy, The Bhagavad-gXt7 and Modern Scholarship [London: Luzac & Co., 1941], pp. 146–47). 2. M. K. Gandhi, Hindu Dharma (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Press, 1958), pp. 178–79. 3. Gandhi, p.159.

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4. Gandhi, p.140. 5. T. S. Rukmani, A Critical Study of the Bh7gavata Pur7ha (Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, 1970), p. 6. 6. Rukmani, p. 6; Bh7gavata Pur7ha 1.5.15. 7. Mahatma Gandhi, Anasakti Yoga (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Prakasana, 1970). 8. Mahadev Desai, The GXt7 According to Gandhi (Ahmedabad: Navajivan, 1946), p. 135. 9. Desai, The GXt7 According to Gandhi, p. 135. 10. See Benjamin Walker, Hindu World, vol. II (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1968), p. 221; Kanti Chandra Pandey, Abhinavagupta: An Historical and Philosophical Study (Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1935), p. 9. 11. See A. L. Basham, The Wonder That Was India (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1956), p. 335. 12. Pandey, p. 8; Basham, p. 335. 13. See Pandey, pp. 52–55. 14. K. S. Ramaswamy Sastrigal seems to attribute this view to Abhinavagupta himself when he remarks: “Abhinava Guptacarya says that k}etra means the body and that the war referred to is between the righteous and the unrighteous tendencies in man” (The BhagavadgXt7, vol. I, with translation and notes [Srirangam: Sri Vani Vilas Press, 1927], p. 47). But Abhinavagupta introduces this discussion with the remark: “In this respect some offer the following alternative explanation,” and hence seems to be citing an alternative interpretation rather than developing his own (see Wasudev Laksman Shastri Pansikar, ed., »rXmadbhagavadgXt7 [Bombay: Niranayasagar Press, 1912], p. 8). 15. Translation by the author. 16. The allegorical interpretation of the GXt7 became quite current around the turn of the century (see W. Douglas Hill, The BhagavadgXt7 [London: Oxford University Press, 1928], p.99) and continues to be popular (see A. L. Herman, The Bhagavad GXt7: A Translation and Critical Commentary [Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, 1973], pp. 107–8). It is important to realize, however, that Mahatma Gandhi seems to come by the allegorical interpretation on his own, for he says quite clearly that “Even in 1888–89, when I first became acquainted with the GXt7, I felt that it was not a historical work, but that, under the guise of physical warfare, it described the duel that perpetually went on in the hearts of mankind and that physical warfare was brought in merely to make the description of the internal duel more alluring” (Mahadev Desai, p. 127). It should be further noted that according to Mahatma Gandhi his “first acquaintance with the GXt7 began in 1888–89 with the verse translation by Sir Edwin Arnold known as the Song Celestial” (Mahadev Desai, p. 126). This translation does not project the GXt7 as an allegory (see Edwin Arnold, The Song Celestial or Bhagavad-GXt7 [Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1888], p. 9), unlike the translations or studies by Annie Besant (The Bhagavad GXt7 or The Lord’s Song [London: Theosophical Publishing Society, 1904], preface; Hints on the Study of the Bhagavad-GXt7 [London: Theosophical Publishing Society, 1906], pp. 6ff). Hence it is potentially misleading to state, as some have done, that Mahatma Gandhi was first introduced to the GXt7 through Annie Besant’s translation (see Agehananda Bharati, “The Hindu Renaissance and Its Apologetic Patterns,” The Journal of Asian Studies, 29, no. 2 [1970]: 274–75). Similarly, Mahatma Gandhi refers to his attempts to read Bal Gangadhar Tilak’s commentary on the GXt7 (Mahadev Desai, p. 125.), which again does not espouse an allegorical interpretation of the GXt7. It seems that the similarity in the exposition of the GXt7 referred to by Abhinavagupta and its exposition by Mahatma Gandhi provides a case of exegetical convergence that spans several centuries. 17. This paper was delivered at the first conference of the Australian Association for the Study of Religions held at Adelaide in 1976.

CHAPTER 5

Just-War Theory in South Asia: Indic Success, Sri Lankan Failure? Katherine K. Young

I

n this chapter, I will compare the views of Indian Buddhism, Jainism, and Hinduism on just war and ask the following question regarding each: did these religious traditions have any effect on wars in South Asia? I find that Buddhism did not move successfully beyond monastic withdrawal as its initial reaction to warfare, even though it struggled to develop the two-wheel doctrine (which acknowledges the distinct roles of both the Buddha and the King). In its early period, Jainism, too, did not find a way to reconcile its central doctrine of nonviolence with the duty of kings to regulate and protect society. By contrast, Hinduism engaged the problem directly and eventually emerged with a just-war theory.1 Along with the nature of the state and strategies to prevent religious conflict, this made a big difference in practical terms. In fact, even Buddhist and Jain kings came to rely on it, making it an Indic approach.2 A few exceptions notwithstanding, this approach eliminated religious wars. In that case, what went wrong in Sri Lanka, where the Indic theory had taken root? To answer that question, I will examine other variables in what follows.

THE VEDIC AGE AND ITS WARFARE (1500–900 BCE) In the Vedic age, warfare was constant.3 According to the texts (there is little archaeological evidence), tribes adopted heroic views of fierce manhood. They celebrated raw power and experienced it as sacred, because of its dramatic relation to life and death. They harnessed and directed this power, their goals being to protect lands and herds. Conflict, violence, and perpetual crisis were central to this worldview. Consider the many characteristic struggles: gods (devas) versus anti-gods (asuras); sages

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versus deities; sages versus ordinary people; sage versus sage; group versus group.4 Mock ritual attacks and ritualized verbal contests reflected the reality of constant warfare between nomadic tribes.5 Indra was the warrior god par excellence and chief god of the Vedic pantheon. Brahmin priests composed “power songs” to make their king victorious. Warfare itself was sacralized as a religious ritual (yajña). The reward for death in battle was heaven. This constant violence appears in maxims: “big fish eat little fish,” for instance, and “relative or no relative, crush the foes: conquer those who attack, conquer others by attacking.”6 Within this ethos, however, warriors gradually developed a code of morality.7 “Family honor or disgrace, protection of life or murder, possession of wives or adultery, possession of goods or stealing, truth swearing or false witnessing—all are the ken of the warrior class.”8 Violence continued during the transition from tribal societies (described in the R,g-Veda) to early chiefdoms and kingdoms.9 This transition accompanied a second phase of urbanization, which began in the Gangetic plain between 1000 and 800 BCE. Late Vedic texts acknowledge both defensive and offensive wars. The ideal ruler is a cakravartin. From the words cakra (wheel) and vartin (one who turns), this compound word means “one whose wheels are moving” and by extension “one whose chariot rolls everywhere without obstruction, an emperor or sovereign of the world.”10 Because early chiefdoms and kingdoms competed for resources and territories, these early states were usually unstable. On the margins, moreover, warfare continued. By the end of the Vedic age, warrior ethics had brought some order to tribal and then royal rivalries. That order made it possible to establish norms. And those, in turn, made it possible to establish ethical principles for the everyday (pravxtti) world. But for many people, warrior codes were not enough.

POLARIZATION IN THE AXIAL AGE (900–200 BCE) Because of constant warfare, some people withdrew from society as ascetics (P7li samahas; Sanskrit {ramahas) and established nonviolence (ahibs7) as a central religious virtue.11 Stress produces a “fight or flight” response, so we could classify asceticism and nonviolence with “flight.” This gave rise to Buddhist, Jain, and Upani}adic worldviews. The idea of a legitimate war is comparatively undeveloped in Indian Buddhism. This is because Buddhism began partly as a reaction to constant warfare during the Vedic Age. Although the P7li Canon was redacted only in the third century BCE, some parts went back to the period of the Buddha himself (who is now increasingly placed in the fourth century BCE). The eightfold path to enlightenment for monastics includes not killing under “right action.” (Conviction for murder, one of early Buddhism’s four monastic prohibitions, leads to expulsion.12) This path also includes refusing to trade in lethal weapons under “right livelihood.” The Buddha forbade his followers to witness military parades, discuss war, or go “to see an army fighting, to stay with an army, or watch sham fights or army reviews” even though he used militaristic language such as “all-conquerer” (sabb7bhibhu¯) as a metaphorical description of himself.13 In fact, men who fought in wars would be reborn in hell or as an animal.14 Nonviolence is first among the five precepts, moreover, for lay people.15

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But the Buddha was from the warrior (khattiya) caste, as were many of his followers. This made him take a more pragmatic attitude toward rulers (such as Pasendi, a fellow Kosalan, and Bimbis7ra and Aj7tasattu, who ruled Magadha, where the Buddha spent much of his time teaching), than his teachings against violence suggest.16 The political realities of his age—expansionist oligarchies and kingdoms, though not yet empires—meant that warfare still prevailed.17 An early Buddhist myth about the origin of the state involves a contract between an outstanding person (mah7sammata), who ends anarchy in exchange for a share of the produce.18 The Buddha admitted that it was hard to rule without force in some circumstances.19 He avoided conflicts with rulers, moreover, by not allowing soldiers to become monks. According to Steven Collins, the “king’s use of force and violence in putting down lawlessness is seldom questioned, much less criticized, the only advice given is that he should act with justice in giving punishments.”20 The five powers of a warrior (khattiyab7la) include strength of arms.21 The Buddha praised warriors as the highest caste (theoretically displacing Brahmins). Praising them became politically useful, once monks began to live in monasteries, endowed by kings, instead of wandering around the countryside. Moreover, kings built thu¯pas (S. stu ¯ pas), which became pilgrimage centers after the Buddha’s “final enlightenment.”22 Several prominent scholars think that P7li texts advocate a two-wheel doctrine.23 Both the Buddha and the king turn the wheel (cakka) of Dhamma, a word often used for Buddhist teachings.24 Collins argues that this doctrine is not about a simple parallel. It is about two modes of the Dhamma, which involve two views of kingship and war. The first mode involves the good king in the real world, which requires him to be flexible and therefore willing to negotiate so that “the punishment fits the crime.” This is an “ethics of reciprocity,” a lex talionis (“an eye for an eye”). It requires care, not haste, and avoids anger. According to Collins, the texts present this point of view as “a law of human nature if not a policy.”25 The second mode, he says, involves bad kings in a bad world.26 All kings must participate in violence, after all, which is always wrong according to the “context-independent and non-negotiable” first precept: “do not kill.” In other words, this is an ethics of the absolute. To eliminate violence means renouncing the world to become a monk and therefore abandoning the world to its karma. This does not mean the triumph of ahibs7 in daily life. Most people will not choose monasticism, even though that is the ideal way of life. Monasticism is a transcendental vision, really, that is theoretically accessible to everyone in one rebirth or another. What people do not do now, they might do in the future.27 To reconcile the opposition between accepting kings who are good and rejecting all kings as bad, Buddhism has proposed the nonviolent king. This utopian paradox had roots in a work from the early P7li canon (probably from before 250 BCE).28 The Cakkavatti-sXhan7da-sutta is the twenty-sixth sutta of the DXghanik7ya. In this sutta, the Buddha tells his monks about “a king called Da^hanemi (Strong-tire), a Wheel-turner, righteous, a king of righteousness (dhammiko dhammar7ja), a conqueror of the whole world, who had achieved stability in his country and possessed the Seven Jewels . . . he had more than a thousand sons, who were valiant, of heroic (physical) form, crushing enemy armies. He conquered this earth, surrounded by the ocean, and lived from it, without violence, without a sword, according to what is right [dhammena].”29 When it was time to

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pass power on to his son, so the story goes, the king became a renunciate. The celestial wheel-jewel, which symbolized his nonviolent and just rule, slipped from its place in the sky. When the new king asked about this event, his father taught him how to rule justly for the army, for your noble warrior client(-kings)s, for Brahmin householders, . . . for ascetics and Brahmin (-renouncers). . . . The ascetics and Brahmins in your territory, my dear, who abstain from drunkenness and negligence, who practice forbearance and gentleness, each one conquering himself, calming himself, quenching himself . . . you should go to them from time to time and ask: “What, sir, is good (‘wholesome,’ kusala)? What is not good? What is blameworthy, what blameless? What is to be practiced, what not? Doing what would lead to suffering and harm for me in the long run? Doing what would lead to happiness and benefit for me in the long run?” You should listen to them, and avoid what is bad (unwholesome, akusala); you should take up what is good and do that. That is the noble turning of a Wheel-turning king.30

The new king leads his army, following the wheel-jewel, in all directions. But he does not need to fight rival kings, because they immediately say, “Come, great king, welcome, great king, it’s yours [i.e., take possession of this territory], great king, give us your orders [or: instruction, anus7sa].”31 The wheel-turning king says, “‘No living being is to be killed. What is not given is not to be taken. Misconduct in sexual matters is not to be indulged in. Lies are not to be told. No intoxicant is to be drunk. (Now) kings in the east became clients of the wheelturning king.”32 The rival kings voluntarily become his vassals, in other words, and the king establishes righteous rule by instituting the five precepts for lay people. In this way, his kingdom prospers. This advice and expansion, with the miraculous help of the Cakka, continues with power passing from one king to another. Eventually, though, a king chooses to ignore the Dhamma. His kingdom does not prosper. Along with lies and violence, not giving to the poor causes trouble for his kingdom. And that, in turn, causes even more violence. Over the generations, things go from bad to worse. Included in the myth’s list of woes is lack of respect for ascetics and Brahmins. Finally, people realize that they should start doing good deeds instead of bad ones and abstain from killing. A list of predictions of what will happen follows. By doing good deeds, the good society will slowly make a comeback. Moreover, the future Buddha (Metteyya) will emerge.33 Then King Sankha will reign. After living in the palace, he will give it away “as alms (for the use of) ascetics, Brahmins, indigents, tramps, and beggars. In the presence of the Blessed One Metteyya he will cut off his hair and beard, put on yellow robes, and go forth from home to homelessness. He will be a renouncer” as are other “sons from good families.”34 The story ends with a general statement about the Dhamma as a refuge and about overcoming evil (M7ra) by acquiring merit through wholesome states of mind. I do not see how we can know whether the cakkavatti originally got his empire by nonviolence (although the second sequence of restoring righteous rule definitely says so) or by violence in view of the passage that refers to his thousand sons “who crush enemy armies.” The sutta as a whole is equivocal, in short, even

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though its support for defensive violence is unequivocal. In any case, Collins points out that the imperial myth of the cakkavatti, with its “cosmo-geography” appears in early Buddhist texts as a thought experiment—that is, before the advent of empires in ancient India.35 Still, he thinks that it inspired later kings who wanted empires and legitimated those who managed to win them. If so, they would have ignored the Cakkavatti-sXhan7da-sutta or recognized its ambiguity. By contrast, Balkrishna Gokhale thinks that the nonviolent king is an ideal. “In spite of these seeming compromises in practice,” he says, “early Buddhists hoped to minimize the violence inherent in the power of the State by ordaining that this power be, at all times, restrained by morality.”36 But he provides no clues on how the ideal offers any practical advice on restraint, aside from the extreme view that violence is categorically wrong. ✽ ✽ ✽ Jainism, a religion that developed in the Axial age alongside Buddhism, if not a bit before, too holds ahibs7 as the supreme value, categorically for monastics (who scrupulously avoid taking the lives of sentient creatures) and provisionally for lay people who avoid doing so by minimizing the violence of some occupations (such as hunting, agriculture, or the military), avoiding some foods (such as meat, fish, and even some vegetables), and making intention more important than act. Like the early Buddhist view, the Jain one focuses on the personal quest for salvation, not the welfare of humanity in general.37 Jains attribute the following story about war from the BhagavatXs¯utra, belonging to the Jain canon (which was redacted in the fifth century CE from fragments and oral traditions) to Mah7vXra, the last tXrthagkara. He describes a war between Kohika (the emperor of Magadha, where Mah7vXra lived) and a federation of eighteen kings, which resulted in 840,000 dead warriors. Unlike the Brahmanical texts, which promise heaven to warriors who die in battle, this one says that only two gained heaven in this war.38 One of these, Varuha, had taken lay vows— including the vow never to strike anyone first—before being drafted into the army. On the battlefield, he asks his adversary to shoot first. Although Varuha manages to kill this adversary, even so, his own wound is mortal. Sitting on the ground and vowing to renounce all forms of violence, he pulls out the arrow, dies peacefully, and attains heaven. The other warrior supports Varuha in his final moments. But his wound, too, is mortal. He dies and is reborn again as a human. This Jain story acknowledges the reality of war and being drafted by the king. If drafted, a Jain who has taken his lay vows may act only defensively—even on the battlefield. He attains heaven because of his final vow, renouncing all violence, and his peaceful death. But what if he nonetheless kills an enemy warrior? He might satisfy the religious principle at stake, I would argue, but hardly the military one. Waiting for an offensive move by the enemy, after all, would generally result in defeat. ✽ ✽ ✽ This period witnessed two extreme positions in Brahmanical circles: flight and fight. Regarding flight, not only Buddhists and Jains withdrew from society, but some Brahmins as well. The Upani}ads share ideas with the samahas (S. ´sramahas)

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such as individualism, asceticism, withdrawal to the forest, detachment from the material and social world, and theories of karma, rebirth, meditation, knowledge over action, and liberation. Scholars still debate whether these Upani}adic ideas are borrowings (especially striking is the fact that teachers are often K}atriyas and the Upani}adic language is a vernacular as in Buddhism and Jainism) or internal developments. The latter would be via the R, g-vedic long-haired ascetics (ke´sins) and silent ones (munis), ideas of ritual heat or power (tapas), the internalization of Vedic rituals, and so forth. These details aside, the Upani}ads offer a distinctive view on the nature of liberation: that the absolute (brahman) is the true self (7tman). The word ahibs7 occurs first in the Ch7ndogya-upani}ad.39 Withdrawal for spiritual development became known in brahmanical circles as nivxtti (escape, abandon, cessation) in contrast to pravxtti (action within the world). But doctrines of war were hardening as well. This was the fight response to stress. So important was warfare that passages on it (scattered through genres such as the Dharma-´s7stras) became the Dhanur-Veda, the Veda of Warfare (Veda being the category of scripture par excellence). In his Artha-´s7stra (ca. 300 BCE), Kau£ilya elaborates on the imperial ideal of the cakravartin, saying that the king should rule from the Him7layas to the ocean. Kau£ilya had some personal experience with imperialism, after all, as chief minister for King Chandragupta (ruled 321–297 BCE), whose Mauryan empire stretched throughout northern and central India. Scholars have characterized Kau£ilya as a rugged political realist at best and paternal despot at worse.40 He gave the first comprehensive view of the state in terms of a king, minister, country, fort, treasury, army, ally, and enemy. His premise was that the purpose of a king is to establish order, thereby preventing chaos, which also exists because every ruler acts to maximize his own self-interest and power for expansion of the kingdom.41 According to R. P. Kangle, Kau£ilya did acknowledge some rules for just warfare; for example, the following should not be attacked: those who have fallen, turned their backs, surrendered, whose hair is loose as a sign of submission, who have abandoned their weapons, who are visibly afraid, and who are not taking part in the fight.42 The king is ultimately accountable, however, not to justice but to his own power to ensure the existence and order of the state, which might necessitate force and stratagems such as spying, arresting people on mere suspicion, torture, and even assassination. When he conquers another king, he treats him according to his strength; if he is more powerful, he may offer terms of peace and win him over; if he is equal in power, he may enter into alliance with him, But if he is weaker, he may “be completely destroyed, unless he becomes desperate and fights for his life, when peace may be made with him.”43 Because of his political realism, Kau£ilya wanted the king to have total control over religion and to build shrines and control their wealth to achieve that. Religion is helpful only to the degree that the king can harness it to achieve his own goal.44 If promise of heaven helps warriors to fight more valiantly, so be it.45 ✽ ✽ ✽ To conclude, Buddhism, Jainism, and Upani}adic religion in the axial age never got beyond attempts to reconcile their initial response to war (withdrawal from society) and their observation that every society had to maintain not only order

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but also security (which might involve war). This is especially striking given the fact that Buddhism and Jainism developed in warrior circles and targeted local rulers for proselytism. Despite some pragmatism, the best that Buddhists could do was to recognize the paradox of a nonviolent king. Buddhism remained equivocal over the idea of the cakkavatti (world-conquerer) praising nonviolence on the one hand, but occasionally admitting the need for defensive war on the other. Because hell was the Jain penalty for participating in even a defensive war, not many Jains wanted to discuss ethical conduct on the battlefield. Jainism initially rejected the idea of the cakravartin. As theirs was a flight response, the Upani}adic ascetics too failed to address the realities of war. This created a moral vacuum that allowed a soft despotism to develop in the form of Kau£ilXya Artha-´s7stra.

OVERCOMING THE EXTREMES OF FLIGHT OR FIGHT: JUST WAR IN THE CLASSICAL AGE (300 BCE TO 400 CE) Perhaps in reaction to Kau£ilXya Artha-´s7stra, Brahmins began to shift power from warriors to themselves. Especially as priests or advisors (purohitas) to kings, Brahmins tried to tame tyrannical royal power with discussions of the just king, one who brings peace and harmony to his realm and upholds dharma through righteousness and concern for the welfare of the people (lokasabgraha). Now, ethics (dharma) would constrain power and politics (artha). In the process, Brahmins transformed royal imagery. This implied a stable and peaceful kingdom. Nonetheless, it acknowledged the inevitability of offensive wars and therefore the need for defensive ones. In addition, it acknowledged that warriors would have to fight in these wars according to a new code of ethics and that civilians deserved protection. As both intellectuals and priests, Brahmins did not participate in warfare, which was the prerogative by birth of warriors. Even so, they had to make sure not only that their own kingdom’s warriors refrained from attacking them but also that these warriors protected them from the attacks of enemy rulers. This new concern with ethics can be seen in the integration of the concept of nivxtti into pravxtti. Brahmins expanded nivxtti during the classical period. The ethical corollary of nivxtti is a list of virtues, which appeared first in the Upani}ads and then in the Yoga-su ¯ tra, such as “non-violence, truthfulness, non-stealing, celibacy, renunciation of possessions, and self-control.”46 Although these lists originally defined the ethical behavior only of renunciates and ascetics (sanny7sins and tapasvins), classical authorities reclassified them as common (s7m7nya) and therefore for everyone. M7nava-dharma-´s7stra, for instance, refers to nonviolence, truthfulness, non-stealing, purity, and restraining the sense organs.47 Making ahibs7 applicable to all people helped Brahmins to compete with Buddhists and Jains. The latter had attacked the Brahmanical tradition for its legitimation of violence in both animal sacrifice and warfare. But making ahibs7 a virtue for everyone created, in turn, a conflict between common (s7m7nya) dharma and particular (vi´se}a) dharma. Particular dharma, which includes the duties that pertain to both caste and stage of life, makes killing (hibs7) a duty for K}atriyas under specific conditions.48 So how could they fulfill the obligation of ahibs7? The supreme evaluation of ahibs7 created problems for Brahmins, too.

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Whether they became ascetics proper (and some did) or merely non-warriors who lived nonviolently, they now faced a dilemma: should they continue to uphold the warrior culture or encourage a shift to a nonviolent one for both society in general and Brahmins in particular? The general consensus favored nonviolence. How to attain that ideal, however, was another matter. Conflict over that led to the exploration, through stories, of possible solutions. Some stories displace the command for violence from mortals to the gods or God.49 Some argue that war can be legitimate but add that everyone should develop a spiritual state of detachment in action. Others argue for silence in the face of conflict. And still others argue that war is never legitimate.50 The epic R7m7yaha (composed sometime from the fourth century to the second century BCE) introduces the king’s social responsibility in connection with R7ma. Kingship and warrior dharma are now about selflessness and compassion, not selfishness and power.51 Although the epic still refers primarily to extended families or tribes, it replaces the tribal code of warrior ethics with a righteousness one that has transcendental authority and relies on personal conscience.52 It encourages kings to develop the yogin’s equanimity in the midst of conflict. One passage implies that R7ma cannot be righteous without giving up violence, which originates in greed and tyranny.53 From this, you would think that warrior circles have embraced nonviolence. From the R7m7yaha as a whole, though, you realize that R7ma has renounced only the old warrior ethic. According to the new one, he remains ready to defend justice through violence.54 Obviously, this epic reflects conflict over violence and nonviolence. The old views about warfare prevail, however, in the Mah7bh7rata (the oldest strata of which dates from the beginning of the classical period). This epic is about a great war between the Kauravas and the P7hCavas, two sides of a family. It contains the famous text, the BhagavadgXt7.55 The latter was probably composed in the first century BCE. The Mah7bh7rata often compares the bloody battle of Kuruk}etra with a sacrifice. For one thing, it killed a whole generation of warrior chieftains.56 Moreover, the “idea that by sacrificing one can compete over chieftainship is of course the essence of the agonistic legacy.”57 Even Brahmins developed a taste for big-time power. In their redactions of the epics, they try to convince others that their magical power is superior to conventional military power. Stories show them competing with warriors by using a power with fiery qualities (tejas) and divine weapons (brahma-astra) that they create from it.58 Rivalry between the two elites, Brahmins and K}atriyas, had been common before caste rigidified and Brahmins, who composed the scriptural texts, made themselves superior to K}atriyas (just as Buddhists and Jains were making themselves superior to Brahmins). The BhagavadgXt7 explores violence and nonviolence ostensibly from the perspective of K}atriyas (Brahmins were the authors of the texts). On the eve of a great battle, Arjuna does not want to fight. This battle would cause the destruction of his whole family, after all, even though it is about justice (the P7hCavas’ rightful succession to the throne) according to the prevailing rules of just warfare. He must choose between protecting his family and protecting the state: loyalty to kin versus loyalty to polity (both of which are closely connected in a royal family, which must preserve its own lineage but also its kingdom).

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Like a modern conscientious objector, Arjuna argues that war originates in greed and is therefore inherently wrong. The suffering that war creates is absurd, he adds, and leads to hell. Far better to renounce this world altogether by becoming an ascetic. But Lord Kx}ha, his charioteer, disapproves. He calls Arjuna’s action ignoble (an7rya), womanly (klXba), useless (aju}£am), and generally dishonorable (akXrtikara). Arjuna denies that he wants anything—victory, kingship, pleasure, enjoyment, or sovereignty over the three worlds—if it requires him to kill members of his extended family, violate ancient family laws (kula-dharmaU san7tanaU), or foster unrighteousness (adharma). Better to die than do any of those things.59 Once again, Kx}ha disagrees. He argues, now at a more philosophical level, that life involves both death and birth; there will always be another birth.60 But this cycle belongs to the ordinary level of existence. The ultimate level transcends this opposition altogether, involving neither killing nor being killed.61 The GXt7’s solution for this conflict between ahibs7 and hibs7 is to insist that warriors do their military duty but adopt a new yogic perspective: renunciation in action (ni}k7ma-karma-yoga). This allowed them to act in the world (the requirement of pravxtti) but also to move beyond the oppositions that characterize everyday life with a spiritual centeredness that negated the effects of karma (the requirement of nivxtti). This point of view also allowed them to gain the benefits of both nivxtti and pravxtti, thereby overcoming the deep polarization between violence and nonviolence. With this new way of understanding dharma, K}atriyas could not withdraw and become sages. Doing so would erode their distinctive function: protecting society. But they had access to the spiritual domain by cultivating not only dharma but also yogic equanimity. God himself (that is, Kx}ha) manifests both violence (hibs7) and nonviolence (ahibs7) in the cosmic cycles but also transcends both.62 He tells Arjuna to seek equilibrium in the midst of action and to act without wanting any of its results. Only by developing spiritually beyond illusion and greed can he work for the ideal society (R7mar7jya).63 A just war (dharma-yuddha), in other words, requires both just reasons and just means. More specifically, it requires (1) legitimate reasons for war (expanding a kingdom or defending it after failing to secure peace in any other way); (2) clarity (announcing both the war and every battle); (3) discrimination (restricting warfare to particular places, times, and people—the K}atriyas—so that Brahmins, the aged, women, children, peaceful citizens, the mentally ill, and the military support staff would be protected); (4) fairness and equality (including only combatants of the same size, who have adequate weapons, and who fight according to a military code that allows the surrender of those who are afraid, tired, disabled, or without adequate weapons); (5) containment (restricting war to duels between two K}atriyas of equal status and ability); and (6) reconciliation after victory (welcoming defeated kings and allowing them to keep their kingdoms and customs in exchange for tribute).64 Although the Mah7bh7rata refuses to absolutize nonviolence by calling nonviolence a general principle and violence an exception, it does encourage warriors to avoid cruelty and promotes the principles of a just war (some of which are like those developed in the West).65 But it recognizes one important exception. If an enemy does not play by the rules of righteous warfare, no regulations apply; the war is obviously unrighteous (ku¯£ayuddha).66 In other words, anything

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goes (a point that Kau£ilya makes). Ethics is promoted but not at the expense of foolishness.67 In short, Brahmins thought a great deal about violence and nonviolence. I see the following pattern: thesis (constant warfare without much regulation in the Vedic period); antithesis (polarization between flight and fight in the Axial Age); and, after a millennium of trying to move beyond these problematic extremes, synthesis (nonviolence as the Hindu norm; violence as just war the exception). The opposition between flight and fight had been theoretically overcome. Gradually, this view spread to new regions through contact with local rulers, their ritual legitimation, and syncretism.68 Because of fluctuating tribute systems and gradual integration of local chiefdoms, the state had porous boundaries. This prevented demarcation of strict in-groups and out-groups based on language, territory, and ethnicity. Although borders enlarged beyond the northern river valleys because of southward migrations, the “land” remained somewhat unified despite various names.69 This was not an empire as such but a civilizational ethos. Consider the case of Tamilnadu. The earliest Tamil literature (from the first century to the third), called cagkam, is about love and war. Some poems describe conflicts ranging from minor cattle raids to major wars. So important is war, poets discuss it in connection with five characteristic types of landscapes (tihai) that are found in Tamilnadu. The Tolk7ppiyam associates cattle raiding with mountains; preparing for war and invading with pastoral lands; besieging towns with plains; attacking and displaying royal power with seashore; and achieving victory with desert. Other poems celebrate the tyranny of chiefs who plunder and then burn towns and agricultural fields. But still other poems, no doubt under northern influence, celebrate kings for their justice and impartiality.70 With that in mind, one cagkam poem chides a king for his ruthless looting of other kingdoms: “[Y]our bards are wearing lotuses of gold and the poets are getting ready to ride fancy chariots drawn by elephants with florid bow-shields: is this right, O Lord rich in victories, this ruthless taking of other men’s lands while being very sweet to protégés?” But usually, poems demand justice within kingdoms. [O]ne might measure the depth of the dark sea, the width of the earth, the regions of the winds, the empty, eternal sky, but he could never measure you, your wisdom, kindness, compassion. Those who live in your shade know no other flames than the blazing of the red sun and the fire that cooks their rice. They know no warrior’s bow, only the rainbow. They know no weapon, only the bow. O Lord who devours the lands of others, destroying your foes with warriors who are skilled in the art of war, no enemies eat the soil of your land, only women compelled by the longings of pregnancy. Arrows are stored in your guarded fortress, justice lives in your scepter. Even if new birds come or old birds go, nothing threatens the benevolence of your rule. That is why all breathing creatures in your kingdom live in fear that you might come to harm.71

In Tamilnadu, too, we find the idea of just warfare. “Your valour in battle adheres to the principle of declaring the procedures of just warfare as you say: ‘Oh cows and cow-like gentle Brahman folk, women, sick persons . . . we will shoot our arrows fast! Go to your places of safety.’”72 ✽ ✽ ✽

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All this had an influence on Buddhism and Jainism, but they remained conflicted. In the classical period, the description of the good king appears in the Buddhist J7taka tales. He has ten virtues: almsgiving, morality, keeping the precepts, liberality, honesty, mildness, religious practice, non-anger, nonviolence, patience, and non-offensiveness.73 Mah7y7na Buddhism takes the idea of the good king one step further by identifying him as a bodhisattva in disguise.74 The bodhisattva’s aim is to transform all sentient beings into enlightened ones, which would mean eliminating violence from the cosmos. This is another example of “the utopian paradox of the nonviolent king,” who “transcends violence by conquering nonviolently.”75 The approach culminates in the “king as the future Buddha,” Metteyya.76 As such, it is very similar to the Cakkavatti-sXhan7da-sutta. According to the VimalakXrti Nirde´sa S¯utra, “When enemies line up for battle, he [the bodhisattva] gives equal strength to both. With his authority and power, he forces them to be reconciled and live in harmony.”77 This alludes to the just-war theory developed in the Mah7bh7rata. The –rya-satyaka-parivarta-s¯utra “teaches that the righteous ruler should seek to avoid war by negotiation, placation or having strong alliances. If he has to fight to defend his country, he should seek to attain victory over the enemy only with the aim of protecting his people, also bearing in mind the need to protect all life, and having no concern for himself and his property. In this way, he may avoid the usual bad karmic results of killing.”78 During this period, Mah7y7na Buddhism also developed the idea of skillful means (up7ya-kau´salya), which legitimated actions that were ostensibly against the precepts if they were for the welfare of the world. If the motive is virtuous or the lesser of two evils, taking life is not reprehensible.79 This opened the hermeneutical door to warfare for offence or defense as occasionally occurred in East Asia.80 But other Mah7y7na works such as the Brahmaj7la S¯utra argue that bodhisattvas should not participate in war, watch battles, kill, praise killing, and so forth.81 Jain works promise a harsh destiny for anyone involved in warfare. In the Jain version of the Hindu epic R7m7yaha, R7ma’s brother Lak}maha, who fights the demon R7vaha in a just war, ends up in hell with R7vaha. If going to hell was the result of kingship or being a warrior, no matter how just the reasons and means, would not Jains avoid even defensive wars or alternatively ignore Jain teachings about nonviolence? And if the latter, would this not create a vacuum of ethics on the topic of war? ✽ ✽ ✽ To conclude, in the classical period, Mah7y7na Buddhism had developed the concepts of the bodhisattva and of skill-in-means (up7ya-kau´salya). These led to consideration of the Mah7bh7rata’s just-war thinking, although Mah7y7na Buddhism seemed conflicted on this topic. Jainism, too, made some half-hearted concessions to the need for defensive wars. But Brahmins—who were on the defensive because of the demand for nonviolence yet still recognized the importance of alliances with kings—began to experiment with ways of overcoming polarization between violence and nonviolence, eventually finding a conceptual solution and embedding it in the great Mah7bh7rata epic, especially in its BhagavadgXt7 section.

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THE MEDIEVAL PERIOD (400–1300 CE) In this period, Buddhist and Jain rulers began to subscribe to the Brahmanical view of just war, making it into a general civilizational or Indic view. Between the fifth and ninth centuries, the Indic view of kingship spread to Southeast Asia. Just as in India, tributary polities and lack of administrative integration created a patchwork of political units, the lesser ones maintaining much internal autonomy after acknowledging the spiritual authority of the region’s main ruler, a cakravartin. 82 This patchwork focused on “human loyalties rather than territorial acquisitions, which admittedly was often more ideal than real.”83 “Moreover, spheres of influence could shift from one centre to another, so that any sense of statehood was fluid and contingent.”84 The cosmological orientation of the major center was replicated by lesser ones, creating multiple centers.85 But the Indic view of just war was not always present. “In war, Buddhist temples might be destroyed and famous Buddha images or relics taken booty. . . . This was because they were seen as the source of auspicious magical power that would benefit whoever possessed them. . . . When one reads of this devastation, one might wonder whether it is the case that, having overridden the prime Buddhist precept against killing, Buddhist soldiers may sometimes lose all inhibitions in war and become very violent.”86 By medieval times, Jain thinkers, too, were integrating the Brahmanical theory of just war. In Tamilnadu, the post-cagkam text Tirukkuwa^ (fourth or fifth century) has sections on righteousness (Tamil awam; Sanskrit dharma), statecraft (T. poru^; S. artha), and pleasure (T. k7mam; S. k7ma) following the classical Brahmanical view of the three mundane goals of life. Tiruva^^uvar, its Jain author, says that a king should be virtuous, wise, energetic, generous, gracious, and protecting but also impartial and just.87 Justice requires him to punish injustice, of course, in order to prevent tyranny and cruelty.88 Agricultural fertility and social harmony are the results of justice.89 This became a major theme of the Tamil epics, the Buddhist MahimKkalai and the Jain Cilappatik7ram.90 In the latter, a bent royal scepter represents injustice, a straight one justice. The Tirukkuwa^ makes similar points but adds that a good kingdom is one that “accommodates immigrants.”91 This text also alludes to the cakravartin. One passage says that the “whole world is his who chooses the right time and place” and that a “world-conqueror bides his time unperturbed.”92 Note the Indic pattern here: the cakravartin who may legitimately expand his kingdom but also must be just. John Cort analyzes four narratives of Jain kingship in medieval Western India.93 The fourth one is about King Kum7rap7la. “[T]he life of Kum7rap7la provided the narrators with the opportunity to describe a king who is fully involved both personally and politically in a Jain moral universe, and therefore in a Jain theory of kingship.”94 This latter image drew from the cakravartin model: The Jain king was a leader of the congregation of Jain devotees (sanghapati) rather than a divine emanation. The Jains saw a king such as Kum7rap7la as a special householder, and therefore as lesser than an 7c7rya in terms of the spiritual hierarchy of the fourteen stages towards liberation (guhasth7nas). . . . When the Jain cakravartin was on his tour of world conquest, the individual victories were possible only by the cakravartin taking off his royal regalia and assuming the state of a temporary mendicant. . . . Kum7rap7la is depicted as a quasi-mendicant. In the narratives of the twelve

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cakravartins in the Jain universal history, ten of them renounce their kingship at the end of their lives to become mendicants and eventually either attain liberation or rebirth in a heavenly realm, just as the Jinas themselves renounced the possibility of universal kingship for the greater victory over ignorance and karmic bondage.95

Jain borrowings of Brahmanical just-war theory are especially clear in Jinasena’s –dipur7ha (from approximately the ninth century CE). This tells the story—with hints of the Mah7bh7rata and the GXt7—about a conflict at the heart of a royal family.96 In this case, though, the conflict is between two brothers. And its view of justice relies on the Jain doctrine of acknowledging many perspectives (anek7ntav7da), because it takes into account justice not only for one aggrieved party but for all of them (king Bharata, his brother B7hubali, and the king’s ministers). The story takes place at the beginning of the current temporal cycle (the advent of civilization). The first holy man (tXrthagkara), King R,}abha, introduces “both the secular laws legislating the conduct of society as well as the monastic laws governing the pursuit of salvation.”97 (This part of the story is very similar to the Buddhist two-wheel doctrine.) When he renounces the world, his eldest son, Bharata, takes over. But his younger son, B7hubali, refuses to acknowledge Bharata as king and threatens war. Like the Mah7bh7rata, this story shows how Bharata’s advisors contain a war that would devastate the land. They do so by requiring a wrestling match between the two brothers alone. The story concludes in a characteristically Jain way by having B7hubali win, not Bharata (who would have been the rightful king). This version allows B7hubali to feel remorse for humiliating Bharata and for wanting possessions rather than salvation. As a result, he renounces the world and becomes a monk.98 Despite some pragmatic discussions on the role of kings to protect Jainism but also on the fact that kings will want to expand their kingdom and extend the religion, there are no specific rules regarding just war, only the advice of monks. Kings behave much like monks and, like the Buddhist cakkavatti, rule and even punish without violence. Even so, a ruler is still inferior to the monk.99 In the century after the –dipur7ha, which contains that Bharata-B7hubali tale, Somadeva (a Jain lawgiver who drew from the Mah7bh7rata’s just-war theory), promoted its principle of discrimination. He argued that kings could fight other kings and their warriors but not the weak or downtrodden.100 By this time, we see that Jainism subscribed to the general Indic view but also developed a more specific Jaina one—the legitimacy of defensive war to protect the Jain community and its teachings, although it keeps nonviolence as its ideal by suggesting that kings should punish wrongdoers without violence.101 By the twelfth century, in Amritchandra’s Puru}7rthasiddhi-up7ya, killing in self-defense is called a kind of virodhi-hibs7 ([legitimate] injury generated by standing in opposition), which legitimated defense of person and property.102 All this comes very close to the idea of a state religion in which the king protects the Jaina community.

WHY ALMOST NO RELIGIOUS WARS IN INDIC INDIA? Ancient India certainly had plenty of opportunity to become a land of religious wars. According to one Buddhist passage, “truth is one without a second” (ekam hi saccam na dutiyam atthi).103 According to another, Buddhism is different from

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the four religions that are false and the four that are unsatisfactory (this implies a dichotomy between truth and falsehood). Any religion is true only to the extent that it contains aspects of the noble eightfold path.104 These passages suggest that Buddhists consider themselves superior to the followers of other religions. In fact, several Buddhist Nik7yas—the Brahmaj7la-sutta, Tevijja-sutta, and Sandakasutta—often criticize Brahmins, especially their animal sacrifices and their theology. In the Tevijja-sutta, for instance, the Buddha attacks Brahmins for believing that there are many paths to fellowship with Lord Brahm7, because no one has actually seen Brahm7.105 Early Jainism was also hostile toward Brahmins. But Vedic religion, too, set the stage for the superiority of its worldview with the statement that “truth is one” (ekaa sat).106 By classical times, this rivalry could have led to religious wars because Buddhists, Jains, and Brahmins alike cultivated royal support and wanted to advise kings. Religious wars did not happen because the just king supported, or at least did not harm, the religions within his realm. Indic rulers realized that it was advantageous for a prosperous kingdom that had multiple religious and ethnic identities to keep peace among them by a rhetoric of honor, by substantial material support, and by never allowing hierarchy based on royal preference to disintegrate into religious wars. This created a fragile religio-political balance albeit within a nominal hierarchy. But there are other reasons, too, why South Asia had almost no religious wars before the Muslims arrived. This region’s culture relied on both pluralism (beginning with the Vedic pantheon) and henotheism (each deity superior in turn to the others). Later on, this spawned new deities, cults, philosophical schools, and guru lineages. Although Buddhism and Jainism ostensibly rejected the Vedic pantheon, this cultural penchant for pluralism entered through the backdoor, as it were, with the recognition of seven previous Buddhas, twentyfour previous (Jain) tXrthagkaras, popular tree spirits (yak}Xs), and so forth. Even when Hindus referred to supreme deities (»iva, say, or Vi}hu) or the absolute (Brahman), they acknowledged their many names and forms that had integrated lesser gods such as local ones or those of the old Vedic pantheon. Each of these three religions gradually acknowledged pluralism, moreover, by avoiding exclusive definitions of truth. Jainism produced a doctrine called anek7ntav7da, which accepts many perspectives. Mah7y7na Buddhism developed its concept of skill-in-means (up7ya-kau´s alya), which acknowledges that seekers find truth to the extent of their intellectual capacities. Hinduism produced its own version, called adhik7ra-bheda. In addition, it produced the notion of six dar´sahas (or schools of thought). All of these religions, moreover, borrowed from each other. The result was porous boundaries. People could have their own religious affiliations. So could families. Because there was no concept of conversion but only religious preferences, hierarchy inherent in views of supreme truth was muted by pluralism and the rhetoric of respect. People ranked ideas, arguments, customs, and even groups but rarely castigated or condemned any of them as evil. Akin to the concept of henotheism in the pantheon—each supreme in turn—this had a calming effect on interreligious relations in the best of times. As I have argued elsewhere, these religions also used specific strategies to prevent just wars from becoming religious wars.

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One technique is to remain silent regarding other religions. A second is to state philosophically or mythically what may be offensive to other religions. An argument based on logic, for instance, creates distance from the immediate context: through logic something can be said to be true yet not be interpreted personally. Similarly, stories of the gods and demons can allude to truth and illusion without directly incriminating particular religious groups. Thus, silence, logic, and mythos are distancing mechanisms that operate as a form of etiquette to avoid overt clashes. Unlike etiquette, though, there is an attempt to redirect the orientation of one of the participants, albeit as graciously as possible. Then, too, the clarity of logic or the opaqueness of myth or even the wall of silence can still be interpreted by a religious group as strategy, aggression or proselytism. There are, in fact, two official arenas that allow for overt interfaith competition in classical India: the philosophical debate and the religious poetry contest. Each has its decorum, its umpire (madhyastha), and its judge. Such court or public competitions operate much like the duel in other societies. Potential conflict is siphoned out of society by a prearranged battle of wits fought according to formal procedure; by extension, this becomes a struggle for ascendancy between two contending persons, groups, or ideas. It is noteworthy, however, that this Indian “duel” is intellectual and nonviolent.107

These strategies were usually effective in preventing religious wars, despite political expansion from the Gangetic plain and intense proselytizing. Each religion offered support for the state in ways that looked more and more like those of its counterparts.108 Historically, the Indic (Jain, Buddhist, and Hindu) pattern was that religious leaders as represented by monastics/ascetics (´sramahas) or Brahmins (br7hmahas) wanted special status with the ruler. They could tolerate, at least for short periods, secondary status as long as there was no abrogation of customary rights and no interference in the internal affairs of the religion such as to reform them. Should either of these two conditions not be fulfilled, however, they would react to regain preferential treatment by the ruler. The creation of a state religion was the most problematic of all. ✽ ✽ ✽ There were several contexts in which this religious peace was disturbed: during the rule of the »uggas (second century BCE); during the rule of the Bengali Hindu king Sa´s anka (seventh century CE); and during the rule of some Tamil kings (fifth to ninth century CE).109 To understand why the »ugga (Brahmin) dynasty’s battle to end Buddhist rule over the Mauryan empire was a marker event in the history of interfaith relations in India, we need to know why A´s oka upset the balance of religious power and interfaith relations despite his many generous policies.110 A´s oka led a massive war against the Kalingas. After the slaughter, he was moved by deep remorse to study and inculcate Buddhist teachings. He said that conquest by the Dhamma “is the only true conquest.”111 He did not give up his army, however, and even warned rebellious tribes to reform or be killed.112 A´s oka placed fifty-foot stone pillars, inscribed with edicts, at thirty places along trade and pilgrimage routes. One edict calls for expansion by teaching the Dhamma in places such as Syria, Egypt, Macedonia, and Sri Lanka. But A´s okan

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edicts also want members of all religions to live everywhere in the kingdom. They argue that religious concord (samavaya) “alone is commendable” and that people should “both hear and honor each other’s Dharma.”113 (The edicts sound very much like the Cakkavatti-sXhan7da-sutta.) In this way, A´s oka succeeded in making Buddhism a state religion, albeit one that would support other religions once he established Buddhist power. Despite his ostensible respect for other religions, though, A´s oka banned the Vedic rituals of Brahmins in the capital (because they involved animal sacrifice) and ridiculed their rites of passage.114 Brahmins obviously did not appreciate this Buddhist attack in the name of religious propaganda and reform and by what amounted to a Buddhist state religion, especially because foreign invaders, the Ku´s ahas, were converting to Buddhism.115 A Brahmin general killed a Mauryan king in 185 BCE and thus established the brahmanically oriented »ugga dynasty to reverse the power of Buddhism.116 Although evidence for a »ugga massacre of Buddhists and banishment of other Buddhists comes only from a Buddhist story about the supernatural, I think that these events probably occurred. As I mentioned, strategies for maintaining peaceful relations among religious communities included the following: diffusing tension by using only coded language for critiques and projecting critiques onto the gods. In any case, the »ugga dynasty (185–173 BCE) reasserted the preeminent role of Brahmins as royal ritualists and advisors. Of interest here, though, is that the »uggas, once they gained power, tried to diffuse religious tension by enlarging the famous Buddhist sites of Sanchi and Bharut. Avoiding state religions—with the power to intervene in religious affairs and use government offices for proselytizing—would become a cornerstone of the Indic just-war policy. Besides the »uggas, another religious conflict occurred during the rule of the seventh century CE ruler in Bengal, »a´s7gka. We know little about him except that he was a »aiva, vehemently anti-Buddhist, and supposedly destroyed the bodhi tree. Perhaps a provincial governor under the Guptas, his animosity was likely sparked because the area of Samata£a to the east had become a major Buddhist power, which threatened his rule. He killed the Buddhist ruler R7jyavardhana, possibly fought with Har}avardhana, and ruled until about 637. In Tamilnadu, cagkam poems have little to say about religion in general, although they sometimes do refer to the Tamil god Murukan_. Buddhism had played a major role just north of Tamilnadu in Andhra, especially under the S7tav7hana kings (from 230 BCE to 199 CE), and in Sri Lanka. But it did not in Tamilnadu, no doubt because the Mauryans had tried to invade Tamilnadu. Because this might have occurred under the reign of A´s oka, Tamils might have associated invasion with Buddhism and might have henceforth tried to keep Buddhists out of Tamilnadu. It is also possible that continual fighting between Tamils and Sri Lankans created a discouraging environment for monks. Be that as it may, after the third century CE, Buddhists began to arrive in Tamilnadu. Two famous Buddhist authors hailed from K7ñcX (but also had stayed in Buddhist establishments in Sri Lanka): Buddhadatta and Buddhagho}a. In his Manorathap¯ urahX, Buddhagho}a says that P7li Buddhism flourished in K7ñcX.117 When Xuanzang (Yuan Chwang/Hsuan-tsang) visited South India in about 637, he said that there “were more than 100 Buddhist monasteries with about 10,000 monks all of the Sthavira School.”118

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Jains, too, began migrating into Tamilnadu in the third century (although some monks were established in the area of Maturai early in the cagkam period) and established themselves there by the fifth. They lived mainly around K7ñcX and Tiruchir7ppa^^i but also in the deep south, mainly Kal_ukumalai in TirunelvKli district and some places in Maturai district. These places included rocky hills, which were appropriate for Jain caves (pa^^i), where monks lived. But all was not well in Tamilnadu from the fourth century to the fifth. Clues to this appear in the story of the Kalabhra Interregnum.119 Some scholars, based on clues in the VK^vikti grant of the P7h£iya kingdom, hypothesize devastation in the P7h£iya and Col-a regions and the abrogation of Brahmin rights. For further substantiation, they refer to the Buddhist author Buddhadatta (who describes the Kalabhras as “the hub of the Col-a country’s chariot”), to legends about a ruler named Accutavikkanta who locked up the P7h£ya, CKra, and Col-a kings, and to later »aiva legends.120 The so-called Kalabhras remain unidentified, although some scholars think that they were either Buddhists from Sri Lanka or Jains.121 Others dismiss the Kalabhra Interregnum as but a myth. But even in that case, it likely symbolizes rising tension among the three Indic religions. In the seventh century, Vai}hava and »aiva Tamil poet-saints called the –l-v7rs and N7yan _m7rs criticized Buddhists and Jains. They helped extend a popular temple-based religion, moreover, from the Deccan into Tamilnadu. Of great interest to them was the need to overcome a time of darkness, the kaliyuga, a myth that likely went back to »ugga times and was popularized by the Pur7has. In the TKv7ram, for example, the N7yan _m7r Campantar refers to “kings who had been seduced by the false doctrines of the heretic Jain and Buddhist monks.”122 Mahendravarman I, a Pallava king, was probably a Jain. So was Ku¯ n _-P7hCya (Ne£um7ran _), a P7hCya king. According to »aiva hagiographies, the N7yan_m7rs converted them to »aivism.123 The N7yan_m7r Appar describes how he had followed the “base, ignorant Jains” before converting to »aivism. These Tamil poetsaints reacted negatively to Jain or Buddhist newcomers, probably because of the longstanding fact that they were rivals in the religious marketplace or because they were recent newcomers (Digambaras from Karnataka or Buddhists from Andhra) who spoke only northern languages and had little interest in Tamil literature.124 A caricature of Jains in the Mattavil7sa-prahasana and antagonistic rhetoric in the bhakti hymns were responses, no doubt, to the growing strength of Jainism in Tamilnadu. Interreligious conflicts, especially between the fifth century and the seventh, were probably more common by this time than ever before despite the Indic justwar theory found in Tamil Buddhist, Jain, and Hindu texts. These might have been due to stress. Migration had always been a way to decrease tension between groups. But migrants were already reaching the subcontinent’s geographical limits. This might have increased interreligious tension.125 It might also have increased the desire for a state religion. Jainism had come close to that idea with the legitimation of war to protect the religion and the Jain community (kula). The idea of protection of the religion became a more explicit rationale for war in the Sri Lankan Buddhist chronicle, the Mah7vaasa, as we will see in the next section. I leave the story of the Indic history of just-war theory here except to point out that while it had been relatively successful on the subcontinent and in Southeast Asia, it proved disastrous to counter the military advance in the late medieval

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period first of the Muslims and then of the Western colonial powers. Was this because members of the Indic religions had forgotten the idea that some wars were really unjust (ku ¯ £a-yuddha) and necessitated different tactics? And was it because they had not experienced the alignment of religion and military power, thanks to the Indic model? ✽ ✽ ✽ To conclude, by the medieval period, the merits of the Indic just-war theory were recognized by Buddhists and Jains and became common practice both in the subcontinent and beyond. Although part of the success of the just-war theory was related to the prevailing view of the tributary state with porous boundaries and the monitoring of interreligious and religion-state relations, the latter created only a fragile balance of powers and on occasion broke down—the cases of »a´s 7gka and some Tamil rulers (but also A´s oka in the classical period). In all of these, the problem was alignment or fear of alignment of one religion and the state in times of great stress, which then provoked a political reaction by another religion to gain the same advantage. As tensions increased, the use of state power to defend the religion was entertained by Buddhists, Jains, and possibly Hindus in Tamilnadu too, although that was not always made explicit and patronage of all religions once power had been established was used to smooth over differences.

THE SRI LANKAN FAILURE? Given this background, what is the connection, if any, between the Indic justwar theory and what is happening today in Sri Lanka? First, we need to understand how this confrontation occurred. By the fifth century BCE, some Prakrit-speaking people had migrated from northern India to Sri Lanka (then called Tambapahhi), which was inhabited by an indigenous people. Tamils too were settling on the island. Buddhism was probably introduced during the reign of A´s oka. After that, Anuradhapuram became a prominent Buddhist-dominated city-state. The island sustained invasions from Tamilnadu during the cagkam period (first century BCE to third century CE). In the fifth century, six Tamil conquerors ruled in the island for three decades. Peter Schalk thinks that they were from Tamilnadu or at least had strong connections with “the other shore,” but the conflict was only a territorial one between regional powers.126 Nevertheless, these invasions inspired the vabsa literature, which refer to them as threats to Buddhism. The Mah7vabsa (the Great Chronicle), written in P7li in the fifth century CE, provides some clues by which to reconstruct the early history of Sri Lanka, although much of it is myth, beginning with three visits of the Buddha himself. Of interest here is its description of the coronation of kings with parasol and holy water following the Brahmanical model (in this Buddhist context, however, the ritual was performed by the ruler and family members127). We are told how kings opened up the land for settlements, established town-planning, and brought the whole island under their rule. PahCikabh7ya, for instance, unified the entire island and in good Indic style was a patron not only of Buddhists but also Jains,

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–jivikas, and Brahmins, even though he especially supported Buddhist missionaries.128 The chronicle mentions many wars, some of them between branches of ruling families or petty chiefs. Some chapters mention wars with Tamils (P. Dami^a) in Sri Lanka. Du££hag7mahi, for instance, “conquered in one day seven mighty Dami^a kings. He of mighty power established peace and gave over the booty to his army. Du££hag7mani said ‘This effort of mine is not for the joy of sovereignty; it is for the establishment of the Faith of the Buddha forever.’”129 On another occasion, he fought thirty-two Dami^as and finally killed their leader E^7r7 and “brought the kingdom of Lanka under one parasol.”130 But then he felt great remorse. Eight enlightened saints (arahants) comforted him saying By this act of yours, there is no hindrance in the way to heaven. Ruler of men, only one and a half men were killed here. One was established in the refuges [the Buddha, the Dhamma, and the Sangha] and the other only in the five precepts. The heretical and evil others who died were like animals. You will make the Buddha’s Faith shine in many ways. Therefore, Lord of men, cast away your mental confusion.131

This text reminds me of A´s oka, except that no one (aside from Du££hag7mahi) has compassion for the slaughtered. It legitimates genocide, in fact, because it affirms the slaughter of non-Buddhists—that is, non-humans! Sri Lankan kings used religion to rally their people, thereby contravening the Indic pattern of avoiding state religions. Even in Tamilnadu, an effort was made to have a king of one’s own religion, although that did not result in a state religion as was being attempted in Sri Lanka. But it is possible that Du££hag7mahi felt enormous stress because the Tamils were mobilizing against him. One Tamil ruler of the fifth century was a Buddhist—either a local Tamil Buddhist or a Tamil from the mainland who became a Buddhist to facilitate his rule of Sri Lanka. Both Buddhist and non-Buddhist Tamil invaders followed the Indic model of supporting all religions. Inscriptions mention royal gifts to the Buddhist sangha, for instance.132 From the eighth century to the tenth, more Tamils invaded Sri Lanka. This state of affairs fostered the consolidation of two rival linguistic identities: Sinhala versus Tamil. Schalk thinks that about this time the distinction between Sinhalas and Tamils as ethnics also occurred: “these aggressive Tamils were generalized to represent anti-Buddhist Tamils in general. Anti-Buddhists were always aliens. SXhala/siahala did no longer refer to any islander, but to the defenders of Buddhism.”133 Some tenth-century inscriptions say that Sinhala royal decrees segregated and marginalized Tamils even in villages. A Tamil could no longer hold the office of district headman. Sinhalas could no longer marry Tamils. Whether because of political mobilization to make Buddhism a state religion or real persecution or both, Sinhalas came to believe that the Tamil invaders were anti-Buddhist and therefore threats to Buddhist society. They demonized even local Tamils as antiBuddhists. This was a major turning point, although invasions from Tamilnadu continued into the twelfth century. The colonial period exacerbated this Sinhala sense of persecution. This led to pro-Buddhist, anti-Tamil mobilization. Sinhalas perceived Western invaders as

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the equivalent of Tamil invaders. They worried that Christians were converting Buddhists, taking over Buddhist schools, and making administrative jobs dependent on the use of English. Exacerbating their resentment were Tamils who learned English, gaining upward mobility through the colonial administration. The Sinhalas reacted to this epistemic rupture by linking territory, ethnicity, and language even more closely. After independence in 1948, they tried to consolidate their control over the island by colonizing Tamil-dominated districts. They made Sinhala the language of education and administration. They used quotas for Tamil speakers to counter what they considered the over-representation of Tamils in the civil service. These changes led to anti-Tamil riots in 1956, 1958, and 1977. The constitution of 1978 gave “Buddhism the foremost place.” More riots followed in 1981 and 1983. The result, as we know, was a civil war. I will not discuss the details of this escalating conflict. But I do want to point out that today both Sinhalas and Tamils lack a just-war theory. In the past, realizing that Hindu kings could threaten them, Sri Lankan Buddhists gradually rejected the Indic view of just war that Buddhists had periodically used on the mainland and in Southeast Asia. Rather, they have looked only to their own Buddhist sources for guidance on war. They have found little except the paradox of the nonviolent king and the Mah7vabsa’s call to defend the faith and dehumanize Tamils. As for Sri Lankan Tamils, they have lacked the political experience of ruling a state. They have either not known about or could not take advantage of the Indic model, which had existed in Tamilnadu, because that had been displaced with the advent of colonial rule in India. As a result, Sri Lankan Tamils have no political experience in advising leaders about justice and interreligious relations. Neither side, in short, plays by any rules for just warfare. Distinctive variables in Sri Lanka have made its history different from that of the mainland and led to a different approach to war. First is the longstanding fact of Buddhist dominance, which began even before state formation encompassed the whole island but increased after that. Second is the fact that Sri Lanka is an island. This means that since political unification, its boundaries have been both visible and firm. Third is the fact that Sinhalas perceive the Tamil invasions as catastrophic ruptures, not merely ad hoc rotations of rule by kings of each religion. Fourth is the mythic legitimation of Buddhist exclusivity in the island’s major sacred chronicle, the Mah7vabsa, and its indirect legitimation of genocide. This tradition departed, at least rhetorically, from the Indic one of tolerance and avoidance of religious wars. Fifth is the rupture caused by Western colonialism in Sri Lanka, which challenged Buddhist dominance in unprecedented ways and upset majority/minority power relations. Because Sri Lankan Tamils had not exercised political power over Buddhists for many centuries, they had no practical experience with the Indic principles of just war and resorted to their own devices. The result has been recent civil war on ethnic, linguistic, territorial, and religious grounds.134 All these factors undermined the Indic just-war theory, which Buddhists have used in Southeast Asia and elsewhere. Tessa Bartholomeusz tests modern Sri Lankan writings on war against just-war theory.135 She finds that those who support war against the Tamils today argue that it is a just war (dharma yuddhaya). They often look to the CakkavattisXhan7da-sutta (because it says that a king should have a strong, fourfold army!) and to the Mah7vaasa as precedent. The current war has a just cause, authorized

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by the ruler, and a right intention. “King Du££hag7mahi was righteous in his killing because his pure intention was to honor the dead and save the dharma. He temporarily suspended his vow of ahias7 to accomplish this.”136 Despite the fact that the Sri Lankan Constitution today gives Buddhism the foremost place while protecting all other religions on the island and guarantees freedom of religion, many Buddhists argue that the Tamils need to be defeated in order to protect Buddhism, just as King Du££hag7mahi did. As S. J. Tambiah says, “The Buddhist scheme by contrast in stating that the universal cosmic law (dhamma) is the root and fountainhead of kingship, raised up the magnificent cakkavatti world ruler as the sovereign regulator and the ground of society. By virtue of this grand imperial conception the way was made hitherto unknown in India or, in face of an inability to found them for logistical reasons, at least to stake imperial claims. The rhetoric of kingship reached a high point in the Buddhist kingdoms. But the paradox is that it is within the brahmanical regime of thought that a school of artha emerged and attempted to investigate and systematize the foundations of political economy and statecraft and to prescribe for the achievement of their objectives. The Buddhist writers did not produce this kind of differentiated ‘science’ of administration. Thus the curious asymmetry forces upon us the reflection whether the grandly conceived virtueendowed rulers may not, for lack of pragmatic rules and constraints relating to the conduct of artha, either turn themselves into ‘absolute’ monarchs practicing a degree of both liberality and tyranny unknown in India or suffer from the shifting sands of instability and disorder in their domestic and external relations.”137

CONCLUSION Are there lessons to be learned from the Indic view of just war and its history? I think so. First, every just-war theory is a moral argument. The Indic one offers an opportunity to analyze theory both in the making and in practice, thanks to its long history. Its development can be traced from constant tribal warfare at the dawn of history to state formation throughout the subcontinent and reflects fight/flight responses to stress, experiments with political theory, and religionstate relations. It took a lengthy struggle to develop this just-war theory, make it a civilizing virtue, and contain violence. The fact that this theory relies on religious pluralism and cultural heterogeneity might provide insights for pluralistic societies in the West. Especially relevant is its state with porous boundaries, allowing freedom of movement and crosscutting loyalties, which has its contemporary analogue in the European Union. This is a time of transition in the West because of migration, worldview affiliations (both religious and secular), and demographic change. Consequently, we should expect high stress and monitor developments carefully. Learning from the Indic experience, we could prevent polarization not only between religions but also between religions and states by recognizing religious pluralism (avoiding state religions and giving equal treatment to all, or at least to the major ones) and acknowledging the ways in which religions have fostered prosperity and harmony. The Indic experience—I am thinking here of A´soka—provides a warning that state interference in religious affairs for the sake of reform, even on

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justifiable grounds, can have long-term repercussions. (As a reaction, Brahmins became especially tough competitors in the religious marketplace, for instance, which contributed gradually to the disappearance of Buddhism in the land of its birth, and to the diminishment of Jainism.) If we must reform religion, we can do so more effectively by promoting public education and debate than by wielding state power. The Indic experience shows that religions can be extremely powerful cultural forces, especially when politicized. We need to respect them but also to monitor them, because religious people sometimes try to implement totalizing worldviews. The state should work with them, in other words, not against them—but maintain a system of checks and balances. Religions can inform both the state and its citizens. In this sense, they belong to civil society. But the delicate balance that governs relations not only among religions but also between them and the state can easily collapse if the state becomes too closely aligned with one religion, one ruler, or one territory. Additional factors—ethnicity, language, and political aggression—can complicate all this and lead to major conflicts. The Indic theory is pragmatic. As I say, it relies on the premise that everyone must understand and agree to the rules of just warfare; otherwise, this or that war is unjust and requires other measures. It is striking, therefore, that Muslim invaders during the medieval period did not meet a more effective resistance. The lesson here, then, is that the Indic policy worked effectively when both sides held similar values but not when one side held different ones. The Islamic/Indic encounter was indeed a clash of civilizations; the Islamic theory of just war favored a state religion (and only then tolerated other religions as under Akbar); the Indic one did not. More importantly, the Indic theory of just war and its general religious tolerance had made Indians forget about the possibility of ku¯£ayuddha: all-out war with the aim of political and religious dominance. Another lesson could be the most important of all. An idealized and romanticized approach to nonviolence can actually create extreme violence. Either absolutizing nonviolence or failing to see the occasional need for violence undermines political realism. This creates an ethical vacuum that unscrupulous political and religious leaders can easily exploit. Just-war theory might be a step in the direction of pacifism, because it requires good reasons for war (thereby preventing some wars) and constrains the violence of wars that do break out. And it can do more than that. Rulers who treat all beings as members of their families and believe that their duty is to foster the welfare of everyone (lokasabgraha) might well avoid war whenever possible. There is more hope, I think, in gradually institutionalizing more and more ways of containing violence than there is in any categorical withdrawal from violence. Containing violence, in short, leads to the dharma of nonviolence. It allows progressively fewer episodes of violence, even just violence, and so is an exercise in prudential wisdom.

NOTES 1. My discussion of just war in Hinduism is taken from Katherine K. Young, “Hinduism and the Ethics of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” in Ethics and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Religious and Secular Perspectives, ed. Sohail H. Hashmi and Steven P. Less (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 287–88.

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2. I use the word Indic here to refer to the religions that originated in the subcontinent and shared a civilizational ethos. After the coming of Islam and then colonial powers, that ethos substantially changed. 3. We know nothing about the existence or nonexistence of violence in the preceding Indus Valley civilization, because the Indus language has not been deciphered and because there is little indication of violence in the archaeological remains. 4. David Gitomer, “King Duryodhana: The Mah7bh7rata Discourse of Sinning and Virtue in Epic and Drama,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 112, no. 2 (1992): 222. 5. Tamar C. Reich, “Sacrificial Violence and Textual Battles: Inner Textual Interpretation in the Sanskrit Mah7bh7rata,” History of Religions 41, no. 2 (2001): 145. 6. Kau´sXtaki-br7hmaha XX.8.6. 7. Note that this is not a theory from primitive immorality to civilized morality. Rather, it seems that in the transition from small-scale societies to large-scale ones, the moral code of the former broke down, and it took some time for a new one to develop. 8. Mary Carroll Smith, “Warriors: The Originators of the Moral code in Ancient India,” in Reprinted Papers for the Section on Asia Religions—History of Religions, American Academy of Religion Annual Meeting (Tallahassee: Florida State University, 1974), p. 60. 9. For general discussions of state formation, see Ronald Cohen, “State Origins: A Reappraisal” and “Evolution, Fission, and the Early State,” in The Early State, ed. Henri J. M. Claessen and Peter Skalnik (The Hague: Mouton Publishers, 1978), pp. 31–75, 87–115. For discussion of kingship and state formation in India, see Carl Gustav Diehl, “Political Authority and Structural Change in Early South Indian History,” Indian Economic and Social History Review 13, no. 2 (1976): 125–57; “The Structure and Meaning of Political Relations in a South Indian Little Kingdom,” CIS, n.s. 13 (1979): 169–206; Nicholas B. Dirks, “Political Authority and Structural Change in Early South Indian History,” Indian Economic and Social History Review 13, no. 2 (1976): 125–57; The Hollow Crown: Ethnohistory of an Indian Kingdom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Ancient Indian Kingship from the Religious Point of View (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1969); Kenneth R. Hall, “Peasant State and Society in Chola Times: A View from the Tiruvidaimarudur Urban Complex,” Indian Economic and Social History Review 18 (1981): 393–410; Trade and Statecraft in the Age of the Colas (New Delhi: Abhinav, 1980). See also J. C. Heesterman, “The Conundrum of the King’s Authority,” in Kingship and Authority in South Asia, South Asian Publications Series, no. 3, ed. J. F. Richards (Madison: University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1978), pp. 1–27; The Inner Conflict of Tradition: Essays in Indian Ritual, Kingship, and Society (Chicago and London: University of Chicago, 1985). See also Hermann Kulke, “Early State Formation and Royal Legitimation in Late Ancient Orissa,” in Sidelights on the History of Orissa, ed. Manmath Nath Das (Vidyapuri, Cuttack: Pitamber Misra, 1977), pp. 104–14; “Fragmentation and Segmentation Versus Integration? Reflections on the Concepts of Indian Feudalism and the Segmentary State in Indian History,” Studies in History 4, no. 2 (1982): 237–63. See also Burton Stein, “The Segmentary State in South India History,” in Realm and Region in Traditional India, ed. Richard G. Fox (New Delhi: Vikas, 1977), pp. 415–32; Peasant State and Society in Medieval South India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1980). See also Y. Subbarayalu, Political Geography of the Chola Country (Madras: State Department of Archaeology, Government of Tamilnadu, 1973). See also Romila Thapar, Ancient Indian Social History: Some Interpretations (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1978); “State Formation in Early India,” International Social Science Journal 32 (1980): 655–69; “The State as Empire,” in The Study of the State, ed. Henri J. M. Claessen and Peter Skalnik (The Hague: Mouton Publishers, 1981), pp. 409–26; Kamil V. Zvelebil, “The Nature of Sacred Power in Old Tamil Texts,” Acta Orientalia 40 (1979): 157–92; “Power and Authority in Indian Tradition” in Tradition and Politics in South Asia, ed. R. J. Moore (New Delhi: Vikas, 1979), pp. 60–85.

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10. The word cakravartin first appears in MaitrX-Upani}ad 1.4 in the context of kings who had renounced kingship to become ascetics, which suggests that the concept was already in existence. 11. References to terms for Therav7da Buddhism are in the P7li language (P.). Sanskrit language (S.) terms begin in the section on King A´s oka. Later in the article, references to Tamil language appear denoted with a T. 12. P7r7jika is “one who merits expulsion” for committing one of four actions: (1) sexual intercourse, (2) theft, (3) murder, or (4) falsely claiming spiritual attainments (T. W. Rhys Davids and William Stede, eds., The Pali Text Society’s Pali-English Dictionary [Chipstead, Surrey: P7li Text Society, 1921–25], p. 454; hereafter referred to as PTS Dictionary). 13. D.I.7, cited by Peter Harvey, An Introduction to Buddhist Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 254; Harvey, p. 254, citing Vin. IV.104–7. 14. Harvey, p. 254, citing S.IV.308–9. 15. These include (1) p7h7tip7t7 veramahX, abstinence from taking life; (2) adinn7d7n7, (from) taking what is not given to one; (3) abrahmacariy7, (from) adultery (otherwise k7mesu micch7c7r7); (4) mus7v7d7, (from) telling lies; and (5) sur7merayamajjapam7da££h7n7 veramahX, abstaining from any state of indolence arising from (the use of) intoxicants (PTS Dictionary, p. 712–13). 16. “The early Buddhists regard the institution of war as strictly within the jurisdiction of attha and 7h7 and take a somewhat neutral attitude toward it. The Buddhist works are full of injunctions against violence but these are, more often than not, related to the level of individual and inter-group relations. The horrors of war are duly recognized but no decisive or overt effort seems to be made to insist on outlawing war itself. Perhaps in this the Buddhists reconciled themselves to their inability to influence the conduct of the state beyond giving it ethical advice. They did envision an ideal state which would eschew the use of force or violence. . . . But for all practical purposes the Samgha largely withdrew itself from considerations of war” (Balkrishna Govind Gohkale, “The Early Buddhist View of the State,” Journal of the American Oriental Society, 89, no. 4 [1969]: 734). ´ captured in the maxim “big 17. This is similar to the context of Kau£ilXya Arthas7stra fish eat little fish” (m7tsyany7ya). See the discussion of Kau£ilya later in this article. 18. For the myth of the origin of kingship, see Steven Collins, Nirvana and Other Buddhist Felicities: Utopias of the Pali Imaginaire, Cambridge Studies in Religious Traditions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 448; Agañña-sutta of the DXgha-nik7ya summarized by Balakrishna Govind Gokhale, “The Early Buddhist View of the State,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 89, no. 4 (1969): 733. 19. Gokhale cites Samyutta-nik7ya I.116: “Nor is it known that the Buddha advised total disarmament by a state. One measure that the Buddha took in expressing his disapproval of the institution of war was to forbid the monks from witnessing army parades and reviews. In spite of these seeming compromises in practice, early Buddhist political thought insists on the principle of nonviolence and non-injury as the ideal basis of statecraft and hopes to minimize the violence inherent in the power of the state by ordaining that this power be, at all times, restrained by morality” (Balakrishna G. Gokhale, “Early Buddhist Kingship” The Journal of Asian Studies, 26, no.1 [1966]: 21). 20. Collins, p. 735. 21. Gokhale, “Early Buddhist Kingship,” p. 17, citing the Tesakuna Jataka. 22. According to the early Buddhist texts, the king should be khattiya, the highest caste (SN I.69; AN, V, p. 327, cited by Gokhale, p. 17 note 21). 23. The two realms were the temporal (di££(h)adhamma) and the spiritual (sampar7ya), also called attha and dhamma or 7h7cakka (wheel of command) and dhammacakka (wheel of the law) (Gokhale, citing SN a I.81). Gokhale argues that Buddhists contributed “the theory of two ‘wheels,’” two distinct realms of action by positing two separate but equally important ideals of a cakkavatti, the leader of the temporal realm, and the

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bodhisattva, preeminent in the spiritual domain. The theory of the two domains is well expressed by a putative statement of Aj7tasattu (circa 493–462 BCE) at the commencement of the First Buddhist Council held in R7jagaha when he said to the assembled monks, “Yours is the authority of the spirit as mine is of power (dhammacakka and 7h7cakka)” (Gokhale, “Early Buddhist Kingship,” p. 22, citing N. K. Jayawicrama, Vinaya Nid7na [London: Luzac & Co., 1962], p. 8). The two wheels were to be complementary, the saggha being the conscience of the state (Gokhale says that in brahmanical political thought we have practically no such theory of separation of powers, and for obvious reasons). See also Frank Reynolds, “The Two Wheels of Dhamma: A Study of Early Buddhism,” in Gananath Obeyesekere, Frank Reynolds and Bardwell L. Smith, The Two Wheels of Dhamma (Chambersburg, PA: American Academy of Religion, 1972), pp. 6–30; Trevor Ling, The Buddha, Buddhist Civilization in India and Ceylon (London: Temple Smith, 1973); S. J. Tambiah, World Conqueror and World Renouncer: A Study of Buddhism and Polity in Thailand against a Historical Background (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976). 24. The cakkavatti (universal monarch) is the dhammiko dhammar7ja or great person (mah7purisa) endowed with the thirty-two marks (mah7purisalakkanani), and has special powers (iddhis) (Gokhale, “The Early Buddhist View of the State,” p. 737, citing MN, III, pp. 65ff). Similarly, in the Mah7v7gga, Buddha says “I am a king, an incomparable, religious king (dharmar7ja); with justice (dhammena) I turn the wheel, a wheel that is irresistible.” (Pandurang Vaman Kane, History of Dharma{7stra: Ancient and Mediaeval Religious and Civil Law [Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1973], vol. 3, p. 66). Tambiah (p. 43) traces the early Buddhist sources for the cakkavatti to the Mahapad7na Suttanta and the Maha-Parinibbana Sutta. 25. Collins, p. 420. ¯ gapakkha (TemXya) J7taka, Jataka Pali No. 538; cf. Temiyachariya, 26. See the Mu Cariyapitaka iii.6; Buddhavamsa Atthakatha 51. Some popular J7taka stories are illustrated in sculptures and inscriptions by the third century BCE. The collection of J7taka tales is usually dated before the first century BCE; commentary on them occurs before the fifth CE (Uma Chakravartim, “Women, Men, and Beasts: The Jataka as Popular Tradition,” Studies in History 9, no. 1 [1993]: 44). 27. Collins, p. 35. 28. Oskar von Hinüber. A Handbook of P7li Literature (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter [Indian Philology and South Asian Studies], 1996), pp. 19–20. 29. Collins, pp. 602–3. Some of these jewels or insignia of Buddhist kingship belong to the larger Indic tradition—wheel, conch, white umbrella, white elephant, and white horse. 30. Collins, p. 604. 31. Collins, p. 605. 32. Collins, p. 605. 33. Joseph M. Kitagawa, “The Career of Maitreya, with Special Reference to Japan,” History of Religions, 21, no.2 (1981): 107–25. 34. Collins, p. 613. 35. Collins, pp. 66–67. 36. Gokhale, “Early Buddhist Kingship,” p. 21. 37. Padmanabh S. Jaini, “Ahibs7 and ‘Just War’ in Jainism” in Ahibs7, Anek7nta and Jainism, ed. Tara Sethia (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2004), pp. 47–61. 38. Jaini, pp. 58–59 citing the BhagavatX-su¯tra (Viy7hapahhatti), VII, 9 (#302ff). 39. Ch7ndogya-upani}ad III.17. 40. Roger Boesche, The First Great Political Realist: Kautilya and his Arthshastra (Boulder, CO: Lexington Books, 2002), pp. 14–17. 41. Boesche, p. 82. 42. R. P. Kangle, ed., The Kau£ilXya Arthas7stra ´ (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1988), Part 3, p. 260.

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43. Kangle, part 3, p. 260, citing 10.3.54–57. 44. Boesche, pp. 56–57. 45. See Artha´s7stra 10.3.43; Kangle, part 2, p. 441. 46. Yoga-su¯tra 2.20–31. 47. M7nava-dharma-´s7stra 10:63; these values must have been in existence for some time. Already, Kau£ilXya Arthas7stra, ´ that masterpiece of pragmatic military strategy, had listed nonviolence, truthfulness, purity, absence of envy, and forbearance as virtues that apply to all people (Kau£ilXya Arthas7stra ´ 1:3:13), although these did not apply to the military, which was to have absolute power over the populace. Otherwise, Kau£ilya upholds s7m7nya dharmas such as ahias7. He “regards them as obligatory on individuals with as much sincerity as does A´s oka [the Buddhist emperor (273–232 BCE) who renounced all violence]. The only thing is that he does not agree that the conduct of public life should be guided by rules of individual morality . . . the preservation of the state at all costs is the foremost duty of the ruler and in the interests of the state have to take precedence over all other considerations” (Kangle, part 3, pp. 281–282). 48. One of the four Hindu castes is the ksatriya. It formed the military core, although the Artha´s7stra says that vai´syas and su ´ ¯dras may form fighting units (Kau£ilXya Arthas7stra ´ 9.2.21–24). 49. Mary Carroll Smith, p. 60; Gitomer, p. 224. 50. Reich, p. 168. 51. R7m7yaha II.101.30. 52. R7m7yaha II.101.19; II.16.53. 53. R7m7yaha II.18.36 and II.101.20. 54. “[T]his epic pits good (the god-king R7ma) versus evil (the demon R7vaha) in a kind of dharma-yuddha [just war]. In this head-on struggle, there is little moral ambiguity involved, no need for discussions of subtle rules. The battle is over the fact that R7vaha has abducted SXt7, R7ma’s wife, which is an obvious moral wrong. It is assumed that R7ma, the embodiment of dharma, must answer such an obvious affront. . . . [But], the scale of violence in this epic is limited. The battle is mainly between R7ma and R7vaha, and it is fought in the terrestrial realm, although extraordinarily powerful weapons are at times used, as in the Mah7bh7rata” (Young, “Hinduism and the Ethics of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” pp. 277–307). 55. The GXt7 is found in Mah7bh7rata, BhX}maparvan 23–40. 56. Reich, p. 146. 57. Reich, p. 160. 58. Jarrod L. Whitaker, “Divine Weapons and Tejas in the Two Indian Epics,” IndoIranian Journal 43 (2000): 89–90. 59. GXt7 1.46. 60. GXt7 2.27. 61. GXt7 2:19. 62. Hindu art, for instance, reveals a deep (yogic) passivity (the contemplative visage) yet expresses action, even violent action, within the world (represented in some forms by many arms with hands holding weapons). 63. M. M. Agarawal, “Arjuna’s Moral Predicament,” in Moral Dilemmas in the Mah7bh7rata, ed. Bimal Krishna Matilal (New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1989), pp. 136–37. 64. Megasthenes, the Greek ambassador in the fourth century BCE, testifies to the fact that war was contained so that citizens—peaceful citizens, the mentally ill, and military support staff—were not harmed (Young, “Hinduism and the Ethics of Weapons of Mass Destruction”). See also Mah7bh7rata 8.49.22; 8.66.62–63 and 7.118.7–8; 7.131.3; and the discussion in V. R. Ramachandra Dikshitar, War in Ancient India, 2d ed. (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1948). A problem for the Hindu theory of just war is whether the epics

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themselves were models of behavior. One study of the Mah7bh7rata has analyzed it from the perspective of a war-crimes tribunal. Were there legitimate reasons for the war? Was it fought according to the rules? (M. A. Mehendale, Reflections on the Mah7bh7rata War [Shimla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1995]). After careful scrutiny of all the battles, M. A. Mehendale concludes that it was not a just war, because it did not always maintain the principle of equality, especially in large battles (Mehendale, p. 23). In this context, it is important to remember that everything in the epic is more extreme than it would be in real life, because there is another level of the Mah7bh7rata narrative. This war initiates the change from the dv7para-yuga to the kali-yuga, that is, one cosmic period of time to another (curiously, the epic presents this like the change of the kalpas at an even more cosmic scale when the universe is destroyed), and this occurs at the level of daiva or fate, not puru}ak7ra or human effort. By contrast, there are fewer rules mentioned in the epic R7m7yaha and no instances of unjust stratagems or a change of the yugas (Mehendale, p. 65). This epic is often lauded as the embodiment of dharma. 65. Alf Hiltebeitel, Rethinking the Mah7bh7rata: A Reader’s Guide to the Education of the Dharma King (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), pp. 177–214. 66. Dikshitar, p. 61. 67. Torkel Brekke, “Between Prudence and Heroism,” in The Ethics of War in Asian Civilizations: A Comparative Perspective, ed. Torkel Brekke (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 113–44. Brekke sees two basic approaches in the Hindu tradition to the ethics of war, although sometimes they were mingled. One, exemplified by Kau£ilya, emphasizes the means and as such is consequentialist and pragmatic. It recognizes that the end (protection of order) justifies the means and that “acts are good or bad only in respect of their result” (p. 122, 126). The other, exemplified by the GXt7, embodies the heroic idea of chivalry and the duel, a common form of fighting, as a sacrifice or religious game. Out of that developed a deontological ethic that made duty (dharma) more important than outcome and right acts as goals in themselves apart from their results, as long as they are carried out with right intention. This led to an extensive code of ethics for fights, a jus in bello, which emphasized proportionality so that the means corresponded to that of the opponent. Brekke thinks, however, that this view did not get abstracted to create a more generalized ethic of war as occurred in Europe (p. 137). (I disagree, as will be apparent in my argument for an Indic view.) Finally, Brekke claims that the consequentialist tradition ignores jus in bello, but the deontological tradition ignores jus ad bellum (pp. 137–38). Whereas Brekke’s ideal types furnish some insight to two major paradigms, like all ideal types they distort complexity even in the examples given. Brekke claims that divine kingship, for example, lines up with the deontological position. The example, however, is the Mah7bh7rata, which is characterized as deontological but has a contractual form of kingship. Or the deontological position ignores the causes for war but its key example, the Mah7bh7rata, is all about the breaking of a contract (Duroyodhana’s refusal to return the kingdom to Yudhi}£ira as agreed) as the very reason for war. 68. Already in the P7li Canon, most of the insignia of Buddhist kingship belong to the larger Indic tradition (conch, white umbrella, white elephant, white horse), but in the Buddhist context, kingship is not obtained through Vedic sacrifices (particularly those involving animal sacrifice). Rather, devotion to Buddhist teachings (dhamma), justice, morality, purity, and piety, make the king a dhammiko dhammar7j7 (Gokhale, “Early Buddhist Kingship,” pp. 19–20). Ritual coronation by monks was important in P7li Buddhist texts (See PTS Dictionary, p. 274 for the chattamaggala “umbrella ceremony” of coronation). Collins lists the coronations from the Mah7vabsa (p. 269); Bernard S. Cohen and McKim Marriott, “Networks and Centres in the Integration of Indian Civilization,” Journal of Social Research 1, no. 1 (1958): 1–8. 69. Bharatavar´sa, Maturbhu¯ mi, Puhyabhu¯ mi, Dharmabhu¯ mi, Devabhu¯ mi, Karmabhu¯mi, JambudvXpa, BharatakhahCa, and Bh7rata M7t7.

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70. The scholiasts called this theme arac7vakai (eulogizing the impartiality of a chief or king, as in Puwan7n _u¯ wu 17, 19–23, 25, 26, etc.). 71. George L. Hart, Poets of the Tamil Anthologies: Ancient Poems of Love and War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 140, translating Puwan7n_u¯wu 20. 72. Puwan7n _u¯ wu 9 in Ettuttokai: The Eight Anthologies, vol. 1 of Tamil Poetry Through the Ages, trans. S. M. Ponniah (Chennai: Institute of Asian Studies, 1997), p. 357. 73. This list of the dasa r7jadhamm7 is found in the J7taka tales (Collins, pp. 460–61, refers to J7taka I 260, 399, II 400, V 510, Ja V 377–78, etc. Collins links this sutta with mode 1, but it better fits mode 2, I think, because of the inclusion of nonviolence in the list of virtues). 74. Scholars date the development of Mah7y7na sometime between the second and fifth centuries CE. According to Gokhale, “The Cakkavatti (Universal Monarch) has almost all the characteristics of a Bodhisattva like the marks of great men (mah7purisalakkhah7ni), and on death his funeral is conducted in the same fashion as that of a Buddha” (SN, Sela Sutta; MN, II, p. 134; DN, II, pp.141–42, cited by Gokhale 1966, p. 18, note 33). “As in the case of a Buddha there cannot be more than one Cakkavatti in a world-system at a time. The charisma of a dead Cakkavatti resides in his stu¯pa and a visit to the stu¯pa of a Cakkavatti is described as an act of merit which may lead a person to heaven after death (DN, II, p. 143 in Gokhale, “Early Buddhist Kingship,” p. 19, n. 35; MN, III, 65ff. in Gokhale, “The Early Buddhist View of the State,” p. 737, n. 38). 75. Collins, p. 420. Gokhale does not see modes 1 and 2 as a paradox but rather that mode 2 serves as an ideal for mode 1. 76. Collins, p. 24. For the origin of this trope, see Collins chapter 5.2.d and 6.5.b on Therav7da kings claiming to be Metteyya. But he also notes that the commentaries specify that the Buddha’s role is much greater than that of the great king. They are by no means equal figures. Collins says that the cakkavatti’s Dhamma is the ten paths of Good Action. According to Nyanatiloka, in the “tenfold wholesome course of action” (kusala-kammapatha) of a king, three are bodily (non-killing, non-lying, no unlawful sex); four are verbal (avoidance of lying, slandering, rude, foolish speech); and three are mental (unselfishness, good-will, right views). By contrast, a Buddha’s path is the nine Transcendental Attainments” (Nyanatiloka, Buddhist Dictionary: Manual of Buddhist Terms and Doctrines, 4th rev. ed. [Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1980], p. 146). According to Collins, “The range of a CV’s [Cakkavatti’s] power, even those who conquer all four islands, is limited, but a Buddha’s power reaches from the highest heaven to the AvXci hell. . . . The Buddha’s ‘power’ can refer either, as in the references just given, to the area over which his teaching extends (the same verb, anus7sati, and the related noun s7sana, are used for both a king’s orders and a Buddha’s teach), or to the area over which the protection verses (paritta) he teaches are effective: this is his Field of Command” (Collins, p. 472). Texts “also say that the Buddha has two wheels of Dhamma: his 7h7cakka, Wheel of Command, refers to his injunctions to religious practice (using verbal imperatives); his dhamma-cakka is the first sermon . . . the Noble Truth concerning suffering” (Collins, pp. 473–74; Collins concludes that the wheel idea is complex and has an underlying tension [p. 474]). 77. Harvey, p. 242, citing Luk 1972: 89. 78. Harvey, p. 253, citing ASP. 206–8. 79. Harvey, p. 135 citing the Up7ya-Kau´salya Su¯tra. 80. According to Joseph M. Kitagawa, “After the reunification of northern and southern China by the Sui dynasty in 581, the first Sui emperor Wen-ti, made this revealing statement: ‘With the armed might of a Cakravartin king, We spread the ideals of the ultimately enlightened one. With a hundred victories in a hundred battles, We promotes the practice of the ten Buddhist virtues. Therefore We regards the weapons of war as having become like the offerings of incense and flowers presented to Buddha, and the fields of this world as becoming forever identical with the Buddha-land’ (quoted in Wright, 1959, p. 67). The

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Dowager Empress Wu (r. 684–705) of the T’ang dynasty claimed equally pretentious honors by allowing herself to be styled Maitreya or Kuan-yin (Eliot 1954, p. 261)” (Joseph M. Kitagawa, “Paradigm Change in Japanese Buddhism,” Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 11, no. 2–3 (1984): 122. 81. Harvey, p. 254. 82. Rosita Dellios, “Mandala: From Sacred Origins to Sovereign Affairs in Traditional Southeast Asia,” The Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies Research Paper No. 10, 2003, http://www.international-relations.com/rp/WBrp10.html. According to Collins, “In Southeast Asia in the first millennium AD polities in which Buddhism existed were on the Indic model—that is rulers supported various schools of Buddhism . . . along with Hindu deities” (Collins, p. 70). Collins then says, “In the Indic model, the use of Sanskrit as the language of trans-localism (as witnessed in the epigraphic record from central Asia to Java) implied nothing about the content of the dominant ideologies—kings would normally support »aivites, Vai}havites, Jains, Buddhists and others, with or without one being a favored group. When there is in this part of the premodern world an isomorphism between a single language and a unitary ideology (at least in the case of forms of Indo-Arian) . . . it is P7li and Therav7da Buddhism, in Sri Lanka from the beginning of the first millennium AD, and in the mainland Southeast Asia from the beginning of the second” (Collins, p. 72). 83. Dellios, p. 10. 84. Dellios, p. 1. 85. Dellios argues that although the cakravartin existed as an ideal in Southeast Asia, there were few empires aside from Angkor (which lasted six centuries) and Vietnam (which had to counter Chinese imperialism). Leaders were chosen by merit as a sign of spiritual power rather than by birth. Dellios calls this “a spiritually sourced meritocracy.” Political alliance with such a ruler was viewed useful by lesser rulers. “The centre may thus be said to consist of power that is personal and devotional rather than institutional. This is not the power of conquest that is being described (though military power was viewed as a consequence), but the ability of the leader to tap into ‘cosmic power,’ be it as a Hindu ‘devaraja’ (king of gods) or a Buddhist ‘dharmaraja’ through virtuous behaviour. This concept had entered Southeast Asia by the seventh century CE” (Dellios, p. 10). 86. Harvey, p. 262. 87. V. R. Ramachandra, trans., Tirukkural of Tiruva^^uvar (Madras: The Adyar Library, 1949), ch. 39. 88. Tirukkuwal, ch. 55–57. 89. Kane, vol. 2, pp. 39, 965. 90. Paula Richman, Women, Branch Stories, and Religious Rhetoric in a Tamil Buddhist Text, Foreign and Comparative Studies/South Asian Series, 12 (Syracuse, NY: Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, 1988), pp. 114–17, 120–21. Richman points out that the umbrella is a symbol of shelter and protection, the scepter is a symbol of justice, and the discus represents the extent of the kingdom and royal jurisdiction. Justice, for the author of MahimKkalai, is preeminently the protection of the monastic community, a tradition established by A´s oka; see R. Parthasarathy, trans., The Cilappatik7ram of Ilagko A£ika^: An Epic of South India (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). The narrative of this epic, in fact, turns on the issue of injustice. The P7h£iya king wrongly condemns the hero Kovalan _ to death, an event that makes his scepter bend (16.230–233) and his parasol, which usually gives cool shade, radiate heat (19.20–26). It also causes Kahhaki, the wronged wife of Kovalan _, to condemn the king for this enormous injustice (after which he dies) and burn the city of Maturai. 91. Tirukkuwa^, 734, 151. 92. Tirukkuwal, 49, 485. 93. Here are the first three: “In the story of Mu¯lar7ja they portray a »aiva king who, while not renouncing his personal attraction to »aivism, nonetheless is an active builder of

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Jain temples as a matter of royal policy. In the story of Jayasimha Siddhar7ja, we see this support of temples extended to the honoring and patronizing of Jain mendicants. Further, the narrators avail themselves of Jayasimha’s personal relationship with Hemacandra to put into the Jain mendicant’s mouth a moral metaphysical agnosticism that could provide a theological underpinning to a political policy of impartiality. In the story of Vanar7ja C7vaC7, the narrators move beyond a portrayal of the best the Jains might hope for in the potentially dangerous political universe of »aiva and Br7hmahical kings to present a king who is ritually infused into his kingship through a distinctively Jain rite, thereby advancing a distinctive Jain ontology of kingship” (John Cort, “Who is a King?” in Open Boundaries: Jain Communities and Cultures in Indian History, ed. John Cort [Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998], pp. 102–3). 94. Cort, p. 103. 95. Cort, p. 102. 96. See Jaini, pp. 53–54 for a synopsis of the stories of B7habali and Bharata, including the one in the Tri}a}£i´sa^7k7puru}acaritra. 97. Jaini, pp. 53–54. 98. Jaini, p. 54. 99. Paul Dundas, “The Digambara Jain Warrior,” in The Assembly of Listeners: Jains in Society, ed. Michael Carrithers and Caroline Humphrey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 169–86, 178–80. 100. Ambivalence over the just-war context is apparent in Jaini’s discussion. On the one hand, he does not want to acknowledge the Hindu origin of the just-war principles when he says, “The Jaina lawgivers of medieval times accorded with customary Hindu law in these matters” (emphasis added), as if the Jains originated the idea, and, on the other, he continues to praise the Jain dislike of dealing with war, bemoaning the fact that “the Jainas were showing great insight into the possibility of building a society that practiced minimal hibs7. It must still be said, however, that the Jainas lacked either the vision or the organization to translate this precept into a general social philosophy” (Jaini, p. 56). He holds to the moral superiority of Jainism by suggesting that “what distinguishes the Jaina conception of nonviolence from that found in other world religions is that it is truly a personal way of religious discipline. It forbids the taking of all life, however, that might be justified or excused in other religions and warns that nothing short of hell or animal rebirth awaits those who kill or who die while entertaining thoughts of violence” (Jaini, p. 60). 101. Dundas, p. 179. 102. I thank my student Thomas Pokinko for drawing this text to my attention and for many helpful discussions about just war in Jainism. 103. Sutta Nip7ta: 883 cited in Arvind Sharma, “Truth and Tolerance: Christian, Buddhist and Hindu Perspectives,” in Truth and Tolerance, ed. E. Furcha (Montreal: McGill, Faculty of Religious Studies, ARC Supplement, 1990), p. 113. 104. Sandaka-sutta, cited in Sharma, p. 116. 105. Brahm7sakkhidi£ho, D.I.238, cited in Sharma, p. 116. 106. R, g-Veda I.164.46. 107. Katherine K. Young, “The Classical Indian View of Tolerance with Special Reference to the Tamil Epic Cilappatik7ram,” in Furcha, pp. 83–112. 108. From the fifth century BCE on, the cultural heartland was expanding. In his A}£7dhy7yX, P7hihi speaks of Gandhara and Kashmir as well as Andhra and the kingdoms of Tamilnadu: the Co_la, CKra, and P7h£iya. 109. The »uggas acted against foreign incursions of the Yavanas, some of whom became Buddhists; »ugga evidence is ambiguous: there is a story in a Buddhist text about the price on the head of a Buddhist. But the story is supernatural; Sanci and Bharut were enlarged under the »uggas. For details, see Lalmani Joshi, Studies in the Buddhist Culture of

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India (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1967), p. 416. Lalmani Joshi is pro-Buddhist and has collected a lot of evidence of the persecution of Buddhists. 110. “The new paradigm of Buddhism which emerged may be characterized as blending two levels and structures of meaning, the classical formula of the Three Jewels (Buddha, Dharma, saagha) and a second triple schema of the kingship, the state, and Buddhist-inspired morality. According to the new paradigm, the king is not only the political head; he is endowed with religious authority, a claim not made by any previous Buddhist monarch. In A´s oka’s own words, ‘Whatever the Lord Buddha has said, Reverend Sirs, is of course well said. But it is proper for me to enumerate the texts which express the true Dharma and which make it everlasting’ (Nikam and McKeon 1959, p. 66). Not only did A´s oka thus assume as king the prerogative to evaluate doctrines; he also exercised his authority to require monks and nuns to observe the discipline. As Rahula points out . . . ‘He was the first king to adopt Buddhism as a state religion, and to start a great spiritual conquest which was called Dharma-vijaya. . . . Like a conqueror and a ruler who would establish governments in countries politically conquered by him, so A´s oka probably thought of establishing the »7sana in countries spiritually conquered . . . by him’ (Rahula 1956, pp. 54–55)” (Kitagawa, p. 115). 111. “13th Rock Edict,” in N. A. Nikam and Richard McKeon, eds. and trans., The Edicts of A´soka (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), pp. 27, 30. 112. Gokhale, “The Early Buddhist View of the State,” p. 734; “13th Rock Edict,” Nikam and McKeon, pp. 28–29. 113. “6th Pillar Edict,” “7th Rock Edict,” “12th Rock Edict,” in Nikam and McKeon, pp. 36, 51, 52, respectively. Kane also cites examples from inscriptions from the second century CE that attest to this tolerant attitude on the part of Buddhists, Jainas, and those sympathetic to Brahmans (Kane, vol. 5, pt. 2, pp. 1012–1014). 114. “9th Rock Edict,” in Nikam and McKeon, p. 46; the myriad ceremonies compare unfavorably with the moral practices he names “ceremonies of the Dharma” (dharmamaggala)—particularly, the “diverse, trivial, and meaningless ceremonies” of women (“12th Rock Edict,” Nikam and McKeon, p. 46). This style of unfavorable comparison was related to the Buddha’s virulent attacks on the br7hmahas and Vedic rituals in the religion’s early days. 115. See Hemchandra Raychaudhuri, Political History of Ancient India with a Commentary by B.N. Mukherjee, 7th rev. ed. (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, [1923] 1996), part 2, pp. 301, 304, 309, 325. Raychaudhuri notes the state reform and propaganda dimensions of A´s oka’s rule but does not see them as a watershed as I do. 116. Brahmins were allowed to take nontraditional occupations in times of crisis. There is some debate over the brahmanical origins of the »uggas. See also Raychaudhuri, part 2, pp. 327, 329. 117. Shu Hikosaka, Buddhism in Tamilnadu: A New Perspective (Madras: Institute of Asian Studies, 1989), p. 25. 118. Cited by Hikosaka, p. 37. 119. See, for example, Paul Younger, The Home of Dancing Civan_: The Traditions of the Hindu Temple in Citamparam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 127ff; Hikosaka, pp. 21–22. 120. Younger, p. 127. 121. Whatever its early history in Tamilnadu, Jainism received considerable support from the Kadamba kings—such as K7kusthavarman (430–450 CE), Mxges´avarman (475–490 CE), Ravivarman (497–537 CE), and Harivarman (537–547 CE)—of Banav7si (Karnataka). In the latter part of the sixth century a number of Ch7^ukya kings were patrons of Jainism (Jayasiaha I; Pulake´sX I, and KXrtivarman I), a tradition that continued into the seventh century. And it remained strong, albeit with varying fortunes, under the Gagg7s, R7}£raku¯£as, Ch7^ukyas, and then Hoysa^as of the Deccan in the following

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centuries. Yuan Chwang declared that Jains were very numerous, the majority belonging to the Digaabara sect (and that Buddhism and Brahmanism were about equal). Sthalapur7has about the temples in K7ñcX indicate that Buddhism was well-established when Jainism gained ascendancy (Ramachandran, pp. 4–5). At least one Pallava king of K7ñcX, Mahendravarman I (600–630) was a Jain. Jainism flourished after the seventh century as well (perhaps because of new groups of Jain monks arriving from Karnataka and Andhra). 122. TKv7ram I.75.10. 123. Indira Viswanathan Peterson, “»ramahas against the Tamil Way: Jains as Others in Tamil »aiva Literature” in Cort, pp. 163–86; Indira Peterson, Poems to »iva: The Hymns of the Tamil Saints (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 12, 296. See also Kamil V. Zvelebil, The Smile of Murukan (Leiden: Brill, 1973), pp. 194–97. 124. R. Champakalaksmi, “Religious Conflict in the Tamil Country: A Reappraisal of Epigraphic Evidence,” Journal of the Epigraphical Society of India 5 (1978): 69–81. 125. Even so, Jainism remained strong in Tamilnadu between the seventh century and the thirteenth according to inscriptions, archaeological evidence, and texts such the Cilappatik7ram and CXvakacint7mahi. By the thirteenth century, the Jain settlement in K7ñcX— called Tiruparuttikun_wam after the region’s cotton industry, which had welcomed Jain merchants—was so well-established that it had its own district called Jina-K7ñcX. 126. Peter Schalk, X^am<sXhala? An Assessment of an Argument (Uppsala [Sweden]: Uppsala University, 2004), p. 72. 127. Ananda W. P. Guruge, trans., Mahanama: the Mah7vabsa (Pondicherry: The M. P. Birla Foundation, 1990), p. 71. 128. Guruge, pp. 73, 79: the monk Thera Moggaliputta sent Buddhist missionaries to many places, as far away as North India. 129. Guruge, p. 158. 130. Guruge, p. 161. 131. Guruge, p. 163. 132. See Schalk, p. 72. See also David Carment, Force and Statecraft in Medieval South India and Sri Lanka: Synthesis and Syncretism (Ottawa: Carleton University, 2003), pp. 148–58. 133. Schalk, p. 196. 134. In this context, I should point out that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam defines itself as secular movement because it wants to unite Tamil Hindus, Christians, and Muslims. Nevertheless, it has many quasi religious rituals. See Peter Schalk, “Beyond Hindu Festivals: The Celebration of Great Heroes’ Day by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Europe” in Tempel und Tamilen in zweiter Heimat: Hindus aus Sri Lanka im deutschsprachigen und skandinavischen Raum, ed. Martin Baumann, Brigitte Luchesi, and Annette Wilke (Würzburg: Ergon Verlag, 2003). 135. Tessa J. Bartholomeusz, In Defense of Dharma; Just-war Ideology in Buddhist Sri Lanka (London: Routledge Curzon, 2002). 136. Bartholomeusz, pp. 57–58. 137. Tambiah, pp. 52–53. Although Tambiah’s Tamil sympathies sometimes prevent him from appreciating the enormous stress for Buddhists caused by Tamil ascendancy under colonial rule, this is an important insight.

Part II Terror

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CHAPTER 6

Religion and Terror: A Post-9/11 Analysis Stephen Healey

I

n the nineteenth century, Horace Bushnell wrote that [M]en undertake to be spiritual, and they become ascetic; or, endeavoring to hold a liberal view of the comforts and pleasures of society, they are soon buried in the world, and slaves to its fashions; or, holding a scrupulous watch to keep out every particular sin, they become legal, and fall out of liberty; or, charmed with the noble and heavenly liberty, they run to negligence and irresponsible living; so the earnest become violent, the fervent fanatical and censorious, the gentle waver, the firm turn bigots, the liberal grow lax, the benevolent ostentatious. Poor human infirmity can hold nothing steady.1

Bushnell’s Christian account has much to commend it. Since the terrifying acts of September 11, 2001, the relationship of religion and politics—especially purported failures and dangers of Islam—has dominated scholarly and popular discussions. From the ashes of this catastrophe, Islamophobia, an irrational fear of things Muslim, has taken on new urgency. In the last few years, scores of books have been written either denouncing or defending Islam.2 Authors have insisted that the West and Islam are at war. In the same broad strokes, Islam has been heralded as a religion of peace. When authored by Westerners these claims are often couched in, but not sufficiently critical of, the prevalent Western view that all religions should honor the separation of church and state. When authored by non-Western Muslims, these claims generally reject church-state separation as a secular system devoid of theology, instead of viewing it as an ecclesiology.3 Beguiled by assumptions entailed within this ecclesiology, Islam’s detractors have more often misunderstood than understood the religion, and Islam’s defenders

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have more often misrepresented than represented it. The ecclesiological-theological, and not merely secular, dimension of church-state separation has often gone unrecognized. In the post-9/11 era, renewed conversation and critical theological thinking about religion, politics, violence, and peace is mandated for everyone who wishes to see a peaceful world. In work of this sort, comparative analyses of the major religions that treat social, political, economic, and cultural contexts will be most fruitful. Since the post-9/11 era is fraught with violence, ethical concern to understand and uproot violent tendencies is also a crucial starting point. Two recently published books—Sam Harris’s The End of Faith and an edited volume titled World Religions and Democracy by Larry Diamond, Marc Plattner, and Philip Costopoulos—are especially worth considering in this respect.4 Harris reflects ethically on the capacity of religious faith to precipitate acts of madness, and Diamond, Plattner, and Costopoulos examine the capacity of world religions to support development of large-scale social systems, especially democratic politics. On the face of it, the conclusions the authors draw are diametrically opposed. Harris argues that faith is poisonous to the prospect of civility, decency, and peace. Faith, he argues, is identical to irrationalism.5 In his view, even religious tolerance and liberalism are dangerous, because they conceal the fanaticism lurking in all kinds of religious faith.6 On the other hand, Diamond, Plattner, and Costopoulos argue that the world religions have multivalent resources that can be marshaled to nondemocratic and dangerous or to democratic and constructive ends.7 Understanding conditions in which particular religions support democracy and yearn for peace, and those in which they might legitimate oppressiveness and hostility, is more complex than Harris’s account acknowledges. Key differences in the approaches of Harris and Diamond, Plattner, and Costopoulos, however, make synthesizing these works profitable. The two works together suggest important views for thinking about religion and terror in the post-9/11 age. The social-historical and empirical work of Diamond, Plattner, and Costopoulos can be used to broaden Harris’s ethical-analytical treatment of religions, and the moral dimensions of Harris’s analysis can be used to enrich that of Diamond, Plattner, and Costopoulos. Troubling aspects of Harris’s moral analysis (Harris, for example, defends the use of torture as morally equivalent to collateral damage in war) can be addressed by democratic safeguards suggested in the other work.8 Both Harris and Diamond, Plattner, and Costopoulos raise issues about religiously associated violence and peace, interreligious dialogue, and current politics that are worth pondering in the post-9/11 era.

THE END OF FAITH? Harris’s main contention in The End of Faith is that religious belief is generally malicious, and that religions insulate themselves from critical scrutiny by advancing claims that disallow rational analysis. Faith, defined by Harris as irrational assent, provides this insulation. Is there a God? God only knows! Harris denies that reason can answer this question. Instead of rational warrant, religions introduce the ministry of unfeasible certitude. Harris portrays this certitude as a cartoon he believes predominates in the minds of most believers. There is a God; this God revealed a book; he used especially good men as absolute examples; he

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gives reasons to kill neighbors when they harbor false notions of God (i.e., views that differ from this or that book, or this or that prophet). Harris suggests that religious faith exploits people’s gullibility, overrides their basic capacity for sympathy, and leads them to believe incredible (even murderous) assertions. This is downright dangerous, he contends. Our beliefs, no matter how crazy, control our choices.9 If a group believes that its neighbors are infidels whom God will punish in an eternal lake of fire, that group is likely to see violence toward these neighbors as justified. If a group believes its neighbors are worthy of love, it will love them. The religions, however, admix low and high views of neighbors and provide numerous examples of righteous warriors killing infidels. Human credulousness is easily provoked to a low view of the neighbor; thus, religions breed intolerance and foster violence. Harris points to history to show that this is more or less how it works. His catalog of evidence supporting this idea should give pause to believers and nonbelievers alike. According to Harris, liberalism seeks to correct this penchant for religious violence. But it develops a view of religious belief, a meta-belief, that Harris argues leads toward the abyss of religiously motivated global-scale destruction. Liberal tolerance, on Harris’s reading, insists that religiously motivated choices should always be honored.10 This essentially leads to winking at insanity. To make this point, Harris describes bizarre belief-based practices. For example, Harris grieves, The rioting in Nigeria over the 2002 Miss World Pageant claimed over two hundred lives: innocent men and women were butchered with machetes or burned alive simply to keep that troubled place free of women in bikinis.11

But Muslims, Harris shows, are not alone in holding silly ideas. We should be humbled, perhaps to the point of spontaneous genuflection, by the knowledge that the ancient Greeks began to lay their Olympian myths to rest several hundred years before the birth of Christ, whereas we have the likes of Bill Moyers convening earnest gatherings of scholars for the high purpose of determining just how the book of Genesis can be reconciled with life in the modern world.12

Jesus wept, Harris sighs. Come now, he argues, if something is clearly erroneous, whether it is a religious creed that motivates people to harm their neighbors or one that espouses pure nonsense, it should be judged rather than tolerated. It is unethical not to judge crazy or harmful ideas, because such ideas lead people to dangerous and harmful actions. However sharply Harris makes his points, they are often leavened with humor and wit, and he is motivated by desire to see the world at peace. Without irony, he claims to have written the book “very much in the spirit of a prayer.”13 His prayer, put simply, is that people will start thinking and as a result will stop killing in the name of incredible beliefs. Harris’s criticism of religious faith is more or less ecumenical. All religions that inspire unreasonable thinking, those that make a virtue of irrational faith, come under fire. Especially prominent in his analysis, however, are Islam and Christianity. He gives special attention to the failings (witch burnings, torture ordeals for heretics, anti-Semitism, jihad, to name a few) of these two religions.14 The evidence, though well-known, is arranged with dark humor to prosecute the case that faith

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itself is to blame for insane actions of Christians and Muslims. However dangerous these faith orientations are, Harris thinks they nonetheless address real human spiritual needs that science cannot satisfy.15 The problem is not that religions address needs, but how religions conceive irrational faith as an answer to them. Instead of faith, the current moment requires ethics and spirituality that are aligned to truths about the world and self known through science. Harris presents this mixture of resources as a rational means to address spiritual needs. Harris’s analysis leads him to be certain that many religious believers are wrong about important matters. Against the faithful certitude of believers, Harris does not introduce hand-wringing liberal doubt or relativism. Instead, he introduces certitude of his own by combining the convictions that science tells us what reality is like, that we should not harm sentient creatures (unless dictated by very compelling ethical reasons, such as self-defense), and that we can learn about the nature of our own consciousness through spirituality and meditation. Harris is receptive to Buddhism as a source of genuinely rational spiritual insight. Indeed, the final chapter in Harris’s book, entitled “Experiments in Consciousness,” is the most constructive one. In this chapter, he holds that meditation helps the practitioner distinguish between thinking and consciousness. That, he says, is a key assumption of mysticism, which is rational, in contrast to irrational faith. Though the issues Harris raises are essential, the constructive point of view he offers will not support development of institutions that will bear pressures in the post-9/11 era. To discover these, Harris’s narrow view of religious faith must be complemented by socially informed study of the world religions.

WORLD RELIGIONS AND DEMOCRACY? Whereas Harris sees the destructive potential of faith, others look to the world religions for their civilization-building potential. The essays collected in World Religions and Democracy, many first published from 1995 to 2004 in the Journal of Democracy sponsored by the International Forum for Democratic Studies of the National Endowment for Democracy, examine whether the world religions are congenial to the development of democracy. Alongside articles by academic heavyweights such as Peter Berger, Bernard Lewis, Francis Fukuyama, and other significant academics, the volume contains essays by the spiritual leader His Holiness the Dalai Lama and Burma’s human rights activist Aung San Suu Kyi. Though authored by a diverse group, the articles are fairly well integrated. Those interested in the plight of democracy in our hyperreligious world will find that these articles challenge and complement the findings of Harris. Whereas Harris focuses on religious beliefs and their implications for action, the authors in World Religions and Democracy give more attention to religious institutions and socialhistorical context. Diamond, Plattner, and Costopoulos have grouped nineteen chapters into sections on the Eastern Religions, Judaism and Christianity, and Islam. A conceptual framework for the book is set forth in the introduction by Philip Costopoulos and within the first article by Alfred Stepan. The essays are dense with sheer detail and thoughtful analysis. The discussion that follows will illuminate areas in which

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Harris’s criticism of faith can profitably be engaged from broader social and historical perspectives. In World Religions and Democracy, the conceptual framework raises the concept of “twin tolerations,” which presumes the differentiation of “religious and political authority.”16 In short, the idea of twin tolerations (one for each fallen tower?) means that religions should not have the constitutional right to set public policy for democratically elected governments, and that individuals and groups should have the unrestricted right to express their values publicly, so long as they do not “impinge on the liberties of other citizens or violate democracy and the law.”17 However, the authors reject the idea that twin tolerations can be honored only through one model of church-state relations. As such, they critically examine assumptions about this relationship. Stepan explores how religions have actually interacted with political systems along these lines. He convincingly shows that the idealized separation of church and state so often heralded by Americans is at variance with the historical reality in Western Europe. Five members of the European Union, for example, have established churches, and those that do not nonetheless often divert significant public funds to church agencies. Germans, for example, generally elect to pay Kirchensteuer (Church tax), because significant social benefits (the right to be baptized, married, or buried in a church, and to be afforded access to churchbased hospitals, for example) accrue primarily to those who pay it. In the EU, only Portugal prohibits political parties from using religious affiliations and symbols. Additionally, an idealized language of church-state separation inhibits understanding of Eastern Orthodoxy, Confucianism, or Islam. In sum, “From the viewpoint of empirical democratic practice . . . the concept of secularism must be radically rethought.”18 Based upon this study of European democracies, Stepan refutes three commonly held positions. All of the essays in the volume accept these basic premises. First, religions are not reducible to single essences that can be judged, thumbs up or thumbs down. The same religion might well support diverse, even antithetical, objectives, including some that are laudatory (democracy and love, for example) and others that are horrific (antidemocracy or mindless violence, for example). Second, Stepan questions whether the social and religious conditions that prevailed at democracy’s origin are necessary to export it to another society. He pointedly questions the idea (propounded by noted political scientist Samuel Huntington, and accepted by many) that societies informed by Eastern Orthodoxy, Confucianism, and Islam will remain uncongenial to democracy. Third, eliminating religion from public and political discussions is shown to be pointless, since religiously based practice is a common part of the world’s most established democracies. These perspectives provide a valuable foundation to examine the implications of the world religions in the post-9/11 era. Harris recognizes the pluralistic nature of religions, and he knows that religions have inspired great people to do great things and base people to do base things. He claims that the latter predominate by a wide margin. Whereas Diamond, Plattner, and Costopoulos work with the assumption that religions are multivalent, Harris focuses on faith and views it univocally. He holds that faith always requires suspension of reason and entails certitude about ridiculous creeds. He is aware of significant theologians (Paul Tillich, for example) who see

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matters with significantly greater nuance, but he does not engage their work because, in his view, the common believer gives shape to history. The common believer, Harris is convinced, is most likely a fanatic duped by unreason. Against a theological orientation, Harris’s turn of mind is sociological; but his argument is a series of theological judgments. Thus, he develops an admixture of sociologically and theologically inclined perspectives. In short, Harris’s theology is judgmental, too quickly dismissive, and thus unlikely to support the aims he has in mind. The substantial notes to The End of Faith do not engage significant findings of religious studies scholarship. Too bad, because the devil, as they say, is in the details. For example, Abdou Filali-Ansary, who contributed three articles to World Religions and Democracy, points out that the influential work of Jamal-Eddin Al-Afghani (1838–97) has led many Arab and non-Arab Muslims to treat the word “secular” as more or less equivalent to “atheism” and “godlessness.”19 This explanation illuminates Muslim resistance to secular democracy, but Harris’s analysis does not ponder the issues deeply or broadly enough to get to this level. In his view, which he shares with Samuel Huntington, the West and Islam are at war.20 Instead of broad-based analysis, Harris relies heavily upon his analytical schema (faith is ruinous; meditative reason is emancipatory), even when the data he presents suggests otherwise. For example, in a lengthy footnote, he states, Attentive readers will have noticed that I have been very hard on religions of faith— Judaism, Christianity, Islam, and even Hinduism—and have not said much that is derogatory of Buddhism. This is not an accident. While Buddhism has also been a source of ignorance and occasional violence, it is not a religion of faith, or a religion at all, in the Western sense. There are millions of Buddhists who do not seem to know this, and they can be found in temples throughout Southeast Asia, and even the West, praying to Buddha as though he were a numinous incarnation of Santa Claus.21

Harris’s preconceived (and essentialist) understanding of Buddhism leads him to obscure it.22 More thorough acknowledgement of the social history of Buddhism would suggest that the simple lens used against the so-called faith-based religions and then used to praise Buddhism distorts the historical realities both of what Harris affirms and of what he denies. Harris lauds an idealized, nonexistent version of Buddhism, which is at variance with most Buddhist practice in the world. The essays by the Dalai Lama and Aung San Suu Kyi in World Religions provide examples of how to think about Buddhism as a living reality that is embedded in time, space, and culture. In contrast, Harris’s focus on one particular definition of faith distorts the historical realities of the religions he surveys. Harris believes that religious liberalism leads to suspension of judgment about foolish and dangerous creeds, when we should be willing, ultimately, to judge grotesque foolishness, even if it is dressed up in the pontifical vestment and florid calligraphy honored by a billion believers. Serious theology, in his view, is a mind game that ignores the predominant (and crude) dimensions of faith-based religions. This aspect of Harris’s thought is not convincing, because serious theology and religious liberalism have more power to challenge foolishness than nonreligious naturalism does, even if the latter is augmented by spirituality and meditation. Harris’s hope for peace is profoundly limited by the tenor and substance

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of his analysis. Diamond and coauthors show more ably how to engage in analysis of religious propensity to justify harmful practices while remaining open to their contributions. Harris has noted that Western religions tend to be historically focused and action-oriented. In the histories of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, it is undeniable that this orientation has been expressed in militant fashion. It is also true, therefore, that the basic texts of these religions contain theological justifications for war and violence.23 Should a fanatic wish to justify his choices by citing chapter and verse, each of these traditions provides an ample store of references. Harris documents without attempting to understand these tendencies. As a result, he is curiously blind to the fact that his justification of war and torture is essentially analogous to what he condemns in Christianity and Islam. Harris gives no significant attention to wider histories and broader social possibilities entailed by these religions. Were he to do so, the question of ecclesiology would be a profitable beginning place. In this context, Peter Berger’s brief article entitled “Christianity: The Global Picture” draws attention to the importance of social differentiation afforded by the Church as an institution.24 The article by Hahm Chaibong entitled “The Ironies of Confucianism” provides a fascinating discussion of Confucian values, statecraft, and economics. In short, Hahm argues that Confucian values show strong correlation to economic development and growth, but these same values have not provided significant resistance to absolutist governments. Confucianism’s main loci are family and state, and thus it lacks “a realm of awareness or action over against the realm controlled by the state.”25 Harris’s proposal may eliminate the capacity to build civil society and thus undermines a source of dissent against governments and a resource to challenge fanaticism. This is not to suggest that Harris should engage in detailed analysis of Confucianism, but rather that his critical approach to the Western religions could be augmented by a richer understanding of their social potential. None of the authors of World Religions and Democracy is an apologist for any religious tradition. Further, they are fully aware of the horrors catalogued by Harris. Yet the authors also rightly hold that the potential benefits of religious ideas, communities, and institutions must be weighed against their risks in a context in which religions inevitably exist. Religious communities are here to stay, and they will continue to represent promise and peril because they will guide the choices of billions of people. The best strategy is to work with urgency tempered by patience to encourage their long-term transformation. That process, almost surely, will entail religions engaging in self-criticism. Diamond, Plattner, and Costopoulos set forth examples of religious communities doing just that. Nothing Harris offers will encourage self-critique by religious groups. Religious traditions need not speak in the idiom of liberalism, but they will need to cultivate their own deepest capacity to inspire tolerance and denounce fanaticism. In one of Harris’s more heartfelt criticisms of religious faith, he points out that human beings did not require a prophet to teach them to be sympathetic to one another.26 Harris believes that when human beings see someone suffer, they suffer along with them unless a religious tradition blunts this capacity. He believes that sympathy is rooted in human nature, which innately understands the golden rule. However true this is in intimate settings (small communities, for example), or in ad hoc settings that spontaneously partake in the intimacy of these conditions

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(seeing a family in the hospital worry about a sick child, for example), most societal experiences are constituted by impersonal relationships. Globalization is increasing the scope of these impersonal relationships. By their very nature, these impersonal relationships are not and cannot be founded upon sympathy; instead they need to be grounded in principle and abstraction. Prophets did not teach principle and abstraction of this sort, but they did expound religious visions that fueled later societal developments of universalistic significance. Taken together, Harris and the authors of World Religions and Democracy raise questions that religious communities will need to address in the post-9/11 era. Harris’s suggestion that religious fanaticism could lead to massive destruction is correct. The terror of 9/11 is a wake-up call to renew the task of theology as a public mode of inquiry. The broad-based analyses in World Religions and Democracy support this suggestion as well. In particular, the following recommendations for the post-9/11 era can be derived from synthesizing the works of Harris and Diamond et al. and processing implications of the post-9/11 era.

CONCLUSIONS FOR THE POST-9/11 ERA In the post-9/11 era, religious traditions must be engaged as multivalent moral institutions capable of inspiring good and evil. To use the term “religion” as an analogue for “good” or “evil” is irresponsible. In addition to being positive resources within civilizations, religions have been sources of profound malice. Nor should there be doubt that religions continue to harbor these potentials. The pressure of teleological pursuit (the need for decisiveness and urgent action) has led members of every religion to challenge, alter, and engage in ad hoc reinterpretation of basic principles that they deem to be absolute. The appearance of doctrinal permanence is usually preserved through theological sleight of hand even as the principles are being fundamentally altered.27 Some of these compromises have reduced religious malignancy, but others have led to its development.28 It is an essential task to identify, then reduce or eliminate these tendencies. Harris’s work contains examples of compromise that a theological-ethical analysis might well question. He supports the nonviolent tendencies of Jainism and Buddhism, yet he denies that pacifism is a viable political strategy.29 Further, he criticizes Christians for persecuting witches (with the strappado, for example), but on the other hand suggests it would be justifiable under certain circumstance to use the strappado against a terrorist.30 Religious ethical analysis in the post-9/11 era will require examining how religious principles interact with particular social and historical settings to justify some courses of action and discredit others. Such an examination will require making judgments for some religious points of view and against others.31 This is not the task of one person, but a conversation for communities to inform policies of institutions. This conversation cannot rely upon Harris’s judgmental idiom, since no participant will possess enough truth to justify the arrogant assertion of his or her point of view or the callous dismissal of other points of view.32 In the post-9/11 era, the capacity to engage in interreligious dialogue must be developed among believers of every religion. At this time, few believers are adequately equipped to engage in interreligious dialogue. Most religious communities

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have expended enormous energy instilling the basics of their own perspectives, but they have expended almost none teaching about other points of view.33 Harris is correct to suggest that religious claims are not exempt from the canons of reason, argument, and debate.34 Some positions of faith, at least the most dangerous extremes, can be shown to be unreasonable through dialogue. Conversations of this sort are important. Harris’s criticism is flawed where it renders dialogue impossible, but his view that religious positions require defense is correct.35 Interreligious dialogue and theology will not bring religiously associated violence to an end, but both are indispensable pursuits in our time. Because they will shape the choices people make, both dialogue and theology have political import. The article by the Dalai Lama in World Religions and Democracy demonstrates that a religious leader can benefit from fresh perspectives.36 However, to engage in fruitful interreligious dialogue, everyday believers will need to learn how to recognize, challenge, and modify malignant tendencies in their own religions, and to engage with others in discussion about this. All religions possess resources to recognize enduring principles, accommodate change, and engage in self-correction, but too few of these resources have been made broadly available. In our time these potencies will need to be fully utilized. In short, rethinking religions in this manner will require theological analysis combined with broad awareness of the social histories of religions. Communities will do well to train specialists and to equip everyday believers in the area of interreligious dialogue. In the post-9/11 era, renewed attention must be given to the relationship between Islam and the West. A good starting point is to view the post-9/11 era as analogous to the post-Cold War era. A dimension of the analysis ought to question this us/them rhetorical construction. In the new post-Cold War era, “Islam” often is used as a dyadic other that replaces “Communism.” If aggregate concepts are used, careful historical analysis is necessary to understand the influence of these entities.37 All religions have at times inspired terror and violence; Harris’s declaration that Islam is especially bloodthirsty is unwarranted.38 It is true that terror attacks currently waged by Muslim terrorists capture news headlines, but this should be understood in a historical perspective. Most Muslims quietly (some vocally) find terrorist acts un-Islamic, but many Muslims also share the anger that motivates them.39 Huntington correctly identifies the need to develop a post-Cold War conflict paradigm, even though the paradigm he suggests is significantly flawed.40 The collapse of Soviet Communism and the turn of China to a marketstyle economy have raised questions in the minds of many Muslims about political economies that have prevailed in the Islamic countries of the Middle East and North Africa, most of which have been Islamic socialisms, dictatorships, monarchies, or an unhappy mixture of these. Leaders in these regimes have emulated Machiavelli more than Muhammad to exploit the construction of faith, world, and identity particular to Islam in order to solidify political power.41 In the post-Cold War world, the deepest assumptions that prevailed in these regimes and in the minds of their citizens are undergoing rapid change. Whether democracy will prevail in the Middle East and North Africa—the U.S. presence in Iraq is not auspicious—is unclear.42 But current acts of Muslim terrorists ought to be viewed as the surface-level reaction to an immense ethos shift of which the actors are only dimly aware.43 The intellectual maps of “the world” that have guided these actors are being dramatically altered, and what the world will become—to put it in other

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terms, whether Allah will emerge as the victor—is unclear. This ethos shift contributes to deep anxiety, which couples with the youthful demographic of the Arab world and the Islamic notion of divine sovereignty that seems thwarted by recent events, to promote conditions conducive to profound resentment and, for the fanatically inclined, terrorism.44 In the post-9/11 era, the role of theology originally promoted by sectarian ecclesiological practices and then later accorded to it by political liberalism must be rethought.45 In the post-9/11 era, which is the post-Cold War era, the intellectual basis of political liberalism is also changing. The words of and actions sponsored by U.S. politicians show that anxiety about these profound changes is not limited to Muslims. Political liberalism renders politically (and as a normative ecclesiology) the sectarian Protestant account of the relationship of church and state. In this view, the epistemologies of faith on the one side and of politics on the other are viewed as completely separate matters.46 Faith is viewed as a matter of speculation and opinion or unassailable heartfelt conviction. Harris is correct to criticize the notion that faith is merely private: as he says, “it is time that we recognized that belief is not a private matter.”47 When faith is held strictly separate from other cultural spheres, over time it becomes irrelevant and idiosyncratic. Further, when politics is viewed as a matter of self-evidence, the many normative, religious, and doctrinal dimensions of politics become opaque. To examine the separation of church and state, theological analysis will be necessary, because the separation itself entails many issues that are essentially theological in character. Theology must be renewed as a matter of public, and not simply ecclesial, reflection. This renewal will in turn mean that political science as a discipline will need to be intellectually reconceived, as the strictly secular object of political science is a fiction of political liberalism. In the post-9/11 era, an important task of theological and comparative religious reflection, then, is to develop principles for dealing with religiously inspired terror. Terror is not simply a concern of political science. Religious communities can and should propose solutions to states that are dealing with terror. Further, they ought to denounce terrorist acts committed in their name; the practice of excommunication may seem a quaint residue of the past, but now is the time to renew it. The post-9/11 era has altered the moral landscape, and standard ethical and legal replies to moral questions are not sufficient. Harris’s justification of torture lacks moral basis, but he is correct to encourage articulation of new principles and strategies. The acts of 9/11 contribute urgency to the suggestion that globalization is altering the significance and power of nationstates.48 The acts of 9/11 were committed by individuals whose creed justifies, even sanctifies, acts of violence against perceived oppressors and idolaters.49 Nation-states and international agencies will continue to supply police who find and bring terrorists to justice. The nature of justice remains somewhat open, however, since rogue individuals can affect the plight of millions of people. Also open is the question of strategies to employ against terrorists in various religious, political, and legal contexts. Without open, public reflection on these questions, the prevailing spirit of anxiety will foster extremist replies, even by those who mean well. In the post-9/11 era, Max Weber’s empirically based insight that religious strategies often lead to unintended results is worth recalling in the context of

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religion, terror, and dialogue. Efforts that aim to reduce religiously associated violence may actually increase it, similar to how Protestant attitudes of thisworldly asceticism had the unintended effect of stimulating wealth production. In the case noted by Weber, dualism was at work: the early Protestants feared the temptations of luxury, since they viewed luxuriousness as a tool of the Devil. In seeking to avoid luxury, they created conditions that favored promoting it. In considerations of religion and violence, it seems wise to formulate less dualistic accounts, understanding that a certain level of violence and conflict are inevitable. Instead of seeking to rid the world of religious violence and conflict, it is better to seek ways to manage it and minimize its destructive potentials. This notion of conflict is a key assumption of democratic theory that has distal roots in Protestant theology. Formulating institutions that recognize the inevitability of struggle is prefigured in Protestant ecclesiologies. The post-9/11 era apparently will be highly religious, and neither secularism nor scientism is likely to replace religious communities in the near or distant future. Thus, in the post-9/11 world, the role of religious institutions and democratic safeguards for them, and against them, are invaluable societal resources. It has become commonplace to observe that religion has not dwindled in significance as predicted by the so-called secularization thesis of early twentiethcentury social theorists. According to that theory, the advance of modernity would lead to the decline of religion. In a vein similar to that of the great Enlightenment philosophe Voltaire, whose witty dictum was that humanity would not be free until the last king was strangled with the entrails of the last priest, these theorists foresaw a day in which religionless modernity (democracy, urbanity, capitalism, and science) would prevail. In the fully modern, hyperreligious world of today, however, religions show remarkable vitality. In addition to their power to heal, religions possess shocking destructive potential. If anything, to take a phrase from philosopher Jürgen Habermas, it is the “philosophical discourse of modernity” that has declined.50 An implication of this is that Niebuhrian realism should prevail.51 The world’s religions are aspects of the power struggle that dominates all of life, and this power struggle is an ineradicable part of historical existence. Christianity, Islam, and the other world religions provide adherents something to live for, something to die for, and, under certain conditions, something to kill for. This way of putting it raises the issue of peace and violence in religions and begs for careful analysis. In that respect, the post-9/11 era—an era that began in 1989—will require renewed attention to theology, which itself will need to be transformed. In a theological idiom, willingness to criticize and be criticized must be cultivated. Whether the future ushers in a new dark age, an age of global renaissance, or a combination of these depends upon how well religious communities and individuals accomplish these acts of self-critique and conversation.

Acknowledgment Originally published in International Journal on World Peace by Stephen Healey as “Religion and Terror: A Post-9/11 Analysis,” 2005, vol. 24, no. 3 (September 2005), pp. 3–22; reprinted with permission of the International Journal of World Peace.

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NOTES 1. Cited by Harry Emerson Fosdick in The Manhood of the Master (New York: Association Press, 1917), p. 167. The original reference is Horace Bushnell’s The Character of Jesus (1860). 2. For two shrill denunciations that obscure historical Islam, see R. L. Hymers and John S. Waldrip, Demons in the Smoke of the World Trade Center: The Invasion of Evil Spirits and the Blight of Islam (Oklahoma City: Hearthstone Publishing, 2002) and Robert Spencer, Islam Unveiled: Disturbing Questions about the World’s Fastest Growing Faith (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2003). For a defense of Islam, see Feisal Abdul Rauf, What’s Right with Islam: A New Vision for Muslims and the West (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 2004). In addition, see Tariq Ramadan, Western Muslims and the Future of Islam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Omid Safi, Progressive Muslims: On Justice, Gender, and Pluralism (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2003); Khaled Abou El Fadl, The Place of Tolerance in Islam (Boston: Beacon Press, 2002). Sam Harris, treated below (see note 5 and passim), holds the view that Islam is more reprobate than other religions. 3. For some of the historical reasons behind this, see the articles by Abdou FilaliAnsary in Larry Diamond, Marc Plattner, and Phillip Costopoulos, World Religions and Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005). 4. Sam Harris, The End of Faith: Religion, Terror, and the Future of Reason (New York: Norton, 2004); Diamond, Plattner, and Costopoulos. 5. Harris makes many claims about this. A representative one is that “while religious people are not generally mad, their core beliefs absolutely are” (p. 72). 6. Harris, pp. 16–23, passim. 7. In chapter 1, which sets the framework for those that follow, Alfred Stepan criticizes the “assumption of univocality” and suggests that religions are multivocal. See “Religion, Democracy, and ‘Twin Tolerations,’” in Diamond, Plattner, and Costopoulos, pp. 9–10. I use the concept of valence (multivalent) to render Stepan’s concept of “vocality” (multivocal, univocal). 8. Harris, pp. 192–97. 9. “A belief is a lever that, once pulled, moves almost everything else in a person’s life” (Harris, p. 12). See also, Harris, pp. 44–46 and 50–79. 10. Harris, pp. 14–15, passim. 11. Harris, p. 46. 12. Harris, p. 47. 13. Harris, pp. 48–49. 14. Harris, ch. 4–6. 15. Harris, p. 16. 16. Philip Costopoulos, “Introduction,” in Diamond, Plattner, and Costopoulos, p. xi. 17. Stepan, p. 5. 18. Stepan, p. 9. 19. See Costopoulos, “Introduction,” and Abdou Filali-Ansary, ch. 12, 15–16, in Diamond, Plattner, and Costopoulos. For the reference to enduring significance of AlAfghani, see pp. 154–56 (in ch. 12). 20. “We are at war with Islam” (Harris, p. 109). See Harris, ch. 4. 21. Harris, p. 283, emphasis added. 22. Harris’s view that “Buddhism is not a religion at all” squares with the historical and non-essentialist way of thinking about “religion” that derives from the work of comparativist Wilfred Cantwell Smith. See Wilfred Cantwell Smith, The Meaning and End of Religion (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress Publishers, 1991). However, Harris does not benefit from this theoretical perspective, because he treats meditation as the essence of Buddhism. Harris also does not apply the insight to other religions. Abdou Filali-Ansary shows the importance of this insight for interpreting Islam (see Abdou Filali-Ansary,“Muslims

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and Democracy,” in Diamond, Plattner, and Costopoulos, pp. 153–67; Bernard Lewis, “A Historical Overview,” in Diamond, Plattner, and Costopoulos, pp. 168–79). 23. Readers who share Harris’s general approval of Buddhism will benefit from reading the Mah7vabsa of Sri Lankan Buddhism, Stanley Tambiah, Buddhism Betrayed? Religion, Politics, and Violence in Sri Lanka (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), and Tessa J. Bartholomeusz, In Defense of Dharma: Just-War Ideology in Buddhist Sri Lanka (London: Routledge Curzon, 2002). 24. Peter Berger, “Christianity: The Global Picture,” in Diamond, Plattner, and Costopoulos, pp. 146–50. 25. Hahm Chaibong, “The Ironies of Confucianism,” in Diamond, Plattner, and Costopoulos, p. 34. 26. Harris, p. 172. 27. A classic source for this with respect to Christianity is Ernst Troeltsch, The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches and Sects (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox, 1992 [reprint]). 28. This notion of “ethics of compromise” comes from Ernst Troeltsch, Christian Thought: Its History and Application, ed. Baron von Hugel (London: University of London Press, 1923). 29. Harris, pp. 199–203. 30. See Harris, p. 81, for a description of this outrageous device; Harris, p. 193. 31. This is a key task of religious ethics. Readers interested in pursuing this can start with the works of Max Stackhouse, David Hollenbach, Mark Heim, Lisa Cahill, Robert Benne, Ronald Thiemann, and James Gustafson. Readers will find in these authors a type of theological analysis (publicly inclined, fair-minded conversation, argument, and debate) that Harris believes impossible. 32. Harris focuses on extremes (burning heretics, for example). It is true that some such extremes will not be overcome through conversation and will require physical resistance. The cause of civilization in the post-9/11 era, however, is not furthered by imputing religious extremism to entire communities. See Max Stackhouse’s discussion of religiousethical judgment in Creeds, Society, and Human Rights: A Study in Three Cultures (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1984), ch. 10, for an example of how judgments can be made in a more ecumenical tone. Also see Reinhold Niebuhr, Human Destiny, vol. 2 of The Nature and Destiny of Man (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1946). 33. In the post-9/11 era, the ideas of religious communitarians and anti-apologists, such as Stanley Hauerwas and John Milbank, will increase this sort of ignorance of the other, should these ideas prevail. Hauerwas and Milbank both publish voluminously, and readers would do well to critically digest their views. But in spite of the erudition of Hauerwas and Milbank, Harris’s criticism of the unintelligibility of faith applies to them. Milbank, for example, goes to great lengths to show that Christian doctrines are “baseless” and thus not open to intellectual defense or apologia. See Milbank’s Theology and Social Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990) and “On Baseless Suspicion: Christianity and the Crisis of Socialism,” New Blackfriars 69 (Jan. 1988). 34. Harris, pp. 45–46. 35. Harris holds, for example, that the “spirit of mutual inquiry is the very antithesis of religious faith” (p. 48). 36. “Buddhism, Asian Values, and Democracy,” in Diamond, Plattner, and Costopoulos, pp. 70–74. 37. Samuel Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998) presents the valuable insight that the post–Cold War era is not a dyadic contest but a multi-civilizational one. 38. Harris believes that Jainism might be exempt from this claim. On the whole, that is correct. However, the Jain tradition differentiates between monastics and lay believers and recognizes that the latter may need to use violence in self-defense. Consult the Jaina

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Shrävakächär Code. Harris also sanctions violence in such cases; chapter 4 in Harris is titled “The Problem with Islam.” 39. Bernard Lewis’s controversial book What Went Wrong? The Clash between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East (San Francisco: Harper Perennial, 2003) discusses reasons behind current Islamic anger toward the West. A very different analysis is presented by Mahmood Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror (New York: Doubleday, 2004). 40. For a more convincing analysis, see Bruce Lincoln’s Holy Terrors: Thinking about Religion after September 11 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003). 41. Criticism of the penchant of Islamic states to adopt secular socialism goes back to Qutb, Mawdudi, and Khomeini. None of these figures were able to see the nonsecular dimensions of democracy. Reasons for that blindness are explored in Abdou Filali-Ansary, “Muslims and Democracy.” Also see Lewis for a very different interpretation. 42. See chapters 12–20 in Diamond, Plattner, and Costopoulos. 43. This provision applies to all actors, not only Muslims. It is true, however, that Islam’s place in the newly emerging world is especially problematic, especially given the wager the Islamic world made on the socialistic aspects of modernity, which seem to have been refuted. 44. Most Muslims live outside of the Arab world, but Muslim terrorism is largely the product of Arab Muslims or their non-Arab Muslim converts; it goes without saying that this analysis does not suggest that terrorism is caused by these factors. The issue is considerably more complex. 45. Among theologians working on this, in my view the most important are those who champion so-called public theology. (See the authors listed in note 31.) 46. This portrait of liberalism is, of course, drawn from John Locke’s Letter Concerning Toleration. Few contemporary liberals engage in the kind of religious disputation supported by Locke. He encouraged vigorous (but nonpolitical) interreligious argument. The primary contribution of World Religions and Democracy is the questions it raises about this view. 47. Harris, p. 44. 48. For a thoughtful treatment of this issue, see David Held, Anthony McGrew, et al., Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999). 49. The acts of 9/11 were not by Islam, but by certain fanatical Muslims. Harris profoundly errs when he suggests the West and Islam are at war. “The West” and “Islam” are categories, not actors. It is also important to focus on how global forces allow individuals to have dramatic results. An important treatment of this issue is Thomas Friedman’s The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 2005); this point is made by Bruce Lincoln in Holy Terrors (see note 40). 50. Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1990). 51. For the question of democracy, a good resource is Reinhold Niebuhr’s The Children of Light and the Child of Darkness (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1960).

CHAPTER 7

The Approach of Muslim Turks to Religious Terror Ramazan Bicer

DEFINITION OF TERROR

T

errorism is an expression of conflict. It operates within a political construct in which one or both parties refuse to recognize the other’s legitimacy. In fact, one goal of a legitimate political entity, when it is fighting a political movement seeking legitimacy, is to disallow negotiation. “Terrorism” and “terrorist” are thus significant legal constructs. Successfully labeling a group, a movement, or even a state as terrorist denies its political legitimacy. It can then be dealt with as a merely criminal organization. One doesn’t negotiate with criminals; one simply brings them to justice. We know from history that the attempt to criminalize authentic political movements has often failed. Terrorist conflicts end up being just as much about negotiation as any legal war is. Many terrorist entities have been awarded political legitimacy, often after a long conflict, and often by the very parties that sought to destroy them.1 Terror is a kind of dissension; in Islamic terminology it is called fitnah. Dictionaries give various meanings for fitnah: temptation, misguidance, commotion, sedition, confusion, affliction, torture, and strife.2 Among the juridical meanings, of immediate concern, are seditious speeches that attack a government’s legitimacy and that deny believers the right to practice their faith.3 Simultaneously, the correct meaning of fitnah here is aggression that seeks to eliminate freedom of belief.4 Freedom of expression should not be used to justify corrupt views and influences that violate Islamic principles. Such offensive speech and conduct may be penalized, although the precedents of the Prophet’s four immediate political successors suggest that punishment should be severe only if the conduct in question amounts to blatant disbelief. Although Islam forbids the use of coercion by

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those seeking to spread the faith, it also takes measures to protect Muslims against aggression that would deny them their own freedom. Terrorism is a complex phenomenon. Therefore, it is not easy to describe clearly. Terrorism, which possesses a global dimension today, does not possess a single definition. There is no prevailing consensus on what terrorism includes and excludes. The meaning of terror depends on the time and place, such that a so-called terrorist act could be regarded at one place and time as a struggle for freedom, yet proclaimed a terrorist act at another.5 Acts considered terrorist in nature in some countries may be considered only political crimes in others. Was not Gandhi hastily labeled a terrorist by the United Kingdom, and Mandela imprisoned for years? Even UNESCO has awarded some of its peace prizes to those who were once called terrorists.6

REASONS FOR TERRORISM In fact, terror does not exist and survive without external support. Major factors that shed light on and nurture the phenomenon of terrorism in a given country can be broadly placed in four categories. They can be listed as follows:

• • • •

Economic reasons Sociocultural reasons Educational reasons Religious reasons 7

Socioeconomic and Cultural Reasons Emile Durkheim’s dictum that “social events/phenomena can only be explained by social events/phenomena”8 helps us to solve the problem here. Terrorism as a social phenomenon has many dimensions and aspects to it. Social change involves every kind of change in society, and in its institutions and organizations. Social division involves the departure of society from its national culture to the maximum extent. Societies are constantly changing. If social change makes the institutions in society unable to perform their activities and causes defects in the system, then change results in division. A major reason for social change is urbanization. Urbanization involves a rapid change of lifestyles and cultures in society as a whole, but city life is not the only source of violence. Nonetheless, uneven opportunities, unequal levels of income, and different life patterns in urban and rural areas, and likewise differences within city areas caused by insufficient urbanization planning, have fed tendencies toward violence in society in the case of Turkey.9 According to research on reasons behind the rise of terror in Turkey, economic conditions and matters of education appear as primary factors. Research clearly indicates that most members of what may be perceived as Turkish terror organizations come from layers of society with low income and education. A noticeable observation is that individuals, and groups of individuals, with higher education and income are infrequently participants in such organizations.10

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Financial problems affect people not only materially but also psychologically. That is why terror organizations exploit disparities in income and social equity in a society. It is used as material for propaganda and as a tool of exploitation. Consequently, uneducated and ignorant people are easily subject to manipulation.11 According to research on terrorism, militant actions in terror operations are mostly performed by people of low income and education. The main item of propaganda for communism is poverty. Communist ideologists exploit the economic conditions of the people. For instance, a militant gave his personal reason for being impressed by the leftist organizations as follows: “I could not own anything I wanted in my childhood and youth because of having a very poor family. While the young people of my age were having fun in summer holidays, my family and I were obliged to go to Cukurova to work under the scorching heat in cotton fields for the summer. I had to work while studying. The condition I was in caused me to get interested in the approach to those organizations.”12 Another member, who joined a terrorist group because of hard living conditions, and not due to ideological beliefs, proclaims: “I went to somewhere far from home because of economical difficulties. I did not have any occupation. That’s why I started to work as a building constructions worker. It was impossible to make a living with the amount of money I earned.” Despite many positive consequences, rapid development in economic and social life can produce inharmonious and destabilizing effects on a group of young people in their most sensitive period of development. A lack or insufficiency of basic institutions for dealing with such problems among young people is unfortunately aggravating the situation. A system cannot work properly if economic development and growth are not supplemented by social integration.

Educational Reasons These terrorists are people who grew up in Muslim families before our eyes. We thought they were Muslims. What kind of process have they undergone, such that they turned out to be terrorists? Aren’t we all guilty? Our guilt is the guilt of a nation. It is the guilt of an inadequate educational system. A real Muslim, who understood Islam in every aspect, cannot be a terrorist. It is hard for a man to remain a Muslim if he gets involved in terror. Religion disapproves of using manslaughter to reach a goal. Education begins within the family and continues in school, at the workplace, and so on. Political parties, civil associations, nonprofit organizations, mass media, and other social organizations are part of this educational process. If one neglects the role played by non-school educational processes, one cannot penetrate into the reasons why some join a terrorist group or participate in terrorist acts. As a matter of fact, leaders of terrorist groups in Turkey generally either never had or discontinued their higher education. They are not uneducated.13 If the number of higher-educated people who are involved in terrorist acts is relatively high, then this is a warning that the education system should be examined. Therefore, one might argue that student movements should be taken seriously into account, in order to understand the possible relationship between them and the violence occurring in Turkish society.14

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Education has the power to thoroughly change the thoughts and minds of individuals and society. Education gives opportunity to shape people according to a set of goals, even if all of the goals cannot be attained. Philosophers such as Herbert Spencer believe that education makes people become more reasonable, more decent, and less greedy. The psychologist Gustave Le Bone asserts that education is an act of constructing and understanding relations of reason and result and not a matter of only memorizing and being able to repeat material. It is unfortunately true that education in Turkey brings people up as civil servant individuals, bound to desks at which the students are expected to sit rather than act, create, and produce. As a result, a person henceforward rising to a leading position at a high rank in, for example, government services, will be incapable of comprehending necessary democratic aspects of social management and, further, real-life problems in his or her society.15 Peace in society depends on thoroughly tested and positive education being imparted to its members. Briefly, the better and the more sufficient and affirmative the education is, the more useful the educated individuals are to the society, or vice versa. The role and duty of families, schools, institutions, and media are to cultivate character, leading people to serve society. The role of a society’s government is to make this education possible, at the same time supervising and controlling it. A basic feature of education today is mere parroting, making students memorize without directing them to think. A leading member of the MLAPA (Marxist-Leninist Armed Propaganda Association), having participated in 184 operations involving 117 murders, states the following about his life: “I joined leftist groups at the age of 17, when at high school. Because the people around me were in different political groups, I felt obliged to take part in one of these. At the time, I believed that the method for correcting defects in the social structure was the revolution of proletarians, aiming directly at dominant government control as in the Marxist-Leninist doctrines.” The former general secretary of a terrorist group also says the following: “We were interested in social issues, as we were youngest leaving the childhood behind. We were not satisfied with what we learned from our families or people we lived with in our environment. The communists made use of this period of our youth, manipulating our inexperience and excitements, weakening religious and national senses into annihilation through time. They tried to substitute nationalism and national morality with internationalism and proletarian morality.”16 Clearly, relative weakness of a country’s inner structure provides an opportunity for interests prone to make use of terrorism. The problem of terrorism will be solved once economic and educational problems are solved; these are, as pointed out earlier, the main reasons behind terrorist acts in Turkey. It should be kept in mind that counterviolence is not a historically proven solution to stop terrorism, because violence always gives birth to violence. In addition, the continuation of the possibility of violence is also violence.17

Religious Reasons First of all, we may mention the existence of various religious opinions, and lack of tolerance is one among them. Thus, many think that they can deliver religious

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judgments on the basis of God’s will. However, almost all of those who use this religious message miss the main point, namely, that no one has the ability to know the exact will of God. We also cannot disregard the fact that some religious leaders lead their followers astray. Clearly, ordinary people consider these men as religious leaders; people tend to think that the views of their leaders reflect the judgment of God. Consequently, the worldly opinions of these leaders come to be taken as constituting the essence of religion. Another important reason for intolerance is fanaticism existing in the subconscious of many people. This fanaticism cannot bear to endure the existence of other opinions. Thus it produces people who stand against God and also produces people who behave harshly and violently against their fellow men. It should be explained that Muslims couldn’t possibly be terrorists. The Qur’an says, “Killing one is the same as killing all” (V:32). Ibn Abbas, a companion of the Prophet, says, “a killer of a man will stay in hell for eternity.”18 This judgment is also true for unbelievers. This means that any man in Islam is subject to the same worldly judgment as an unbeliever. That is, the killer of a human being is equivalent to an atheist and thus someone who does not accept Allah and the Prophet. Now, if this is fundamental to religion, then it should be taught through education. This is not done. After September 11, we saw that Muslims tended to indulge in convolutions. Does it always have to be the “others” who are guilty? Does it always have to be that they want us to be the bagman? Why is there no culture of self-criticism in Islam? Now, it is necessary to correct the statement that “Islam does not have a culture of self-criticism.” There is self-criticism in Islam. Muslims question everything, except for the holy messages. To my knowledge, such self-criticism does not appear to exist in other religions: “If you are not right, we will do this to you.” Scholars and ethnologists have discussed and debated Islamic issues so many times that these discussions fill countless volumes. Anybody may criticize another in Islam. These criticisms have been met with sensible tolerance. For example, Ghazali wrote a tahafut (a critique on a philosopher’s incoherence of teaching). Subsequently, another scholar was free to reply to this. Had there been an Islamic state at the time, these people would have been severely punished. However, no offense was involved and the respondent did not come to grief: “There are many different thoughts.”19

The Sources of Religious Terror Nevertheless a most arresting and unexpected development has taken place during recent years, namely, the emergence of the theological justification of terrorism, a phenomenon that makes it possible to label terror “holy” or “sacred.” Put another way it is jihad. Some radical religious groups use the term of jihad to describe a sacred and holy war. Jihad in Arabic is both a verb and a noun. Its singular past tense verb is jahada or jahadat. The singular active participle of jihad is mujahid or mujahida. The verb juhd means exertion. Another related word is ijtihad, which means to struggle hard or assiduously. Jihad is simply the process of exerting one’s best in some form of struggle and resistance to realize a particular goal. In other words, jihad is the struggle against,

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or resistance to, something with the goal in mind. The meaning of the word is independent of the nature of the effort or the intended goal. As a term, jihad is used by the Qur’an to indicate striving against something, as, for instance, in the following passage: “And We have enjoined on man goodness to parents, but if they jahadaka (do jihad against you) to make you associate [a god] with Me, of which you have no knowledge [being a god], do not obey them. To Me is your return [O people!], so I shall inform you of your past deeds” (XXIX:8). Additionally, the Qur’an defines jihad as a system of checks and balances, as a way that Allah set up for one group of people to act as a check on another. When one person or group oversteps the limits and violates the rights of others, Muslims have the right and the duty to intervene and bring them back in line. There are several verses of the Qur’an that describe jihad in this manner, such as “And did not Allah check one set of people by means of another, the earth would indeed be full of mischief; but Allah is full of Bounty to all the worlds” (II:251). The term jihad has acquired a number of meanings, which include the effort to lead a good life, to make society more moral and just, and to spread Islam through preaching, teaching, or armed struggle. Such a definition has virtually no validity in Islam and is derived almost entirely from the apologetic works of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Muslim modernists. To maintain that jihad means “the effort to lead a good life” is bathetic and laughable. In all the literature concerning jihad—whether militant or internal jihad—the fundamental idea is to disconnect oneself from the world, to die to the world, whether bodily (as in battle) or spiritually (as in internal jihad). The semantic priorities of jihad in Islam are here exactly reversed from the point of view of historical and religious realities: the armed struggle—aggressive conquest—came first, and then additional meanings became attached to the term.20 Historically speaking, Kharijites, a well-known Islamic sect, gave primary importance to this idea when they spread pernicious views and doctrines against Islam. They were not exercising legitimate freedom of expression in pursuit of either truth or knowledge, but were bent on destruction and abuse. Their activities threatened to disintegrate their community. The Kharijites acted in concert and had enough power to jeopardize the security of the nascent Islamic state. Thus ancient authority on jihad has modern force. For example, the thirteenthcentury Mamluk scholar Ibn Taymiyyah reached out through the centuries to mold today’s radical Islamist thinking about jihad. Hillenbrand explains why Ibn Taymiyyah’s ideas have been embraced enthusiastically by modern Islamic reform movements: To him jihad, both spiritually and physically, is a force within Islam that can create a society dedicated to God’s service. But although stressing the prototypical religious importance of the Prophet’s career for those who wish to wage jihad, Ibn Taymiyyah is sufficiently a man of his own age to draw parallels between Mohammed’s time and contemporary events. Ibn Taymiyyah sees the Muslim world assailed by external enemies of all kinds and the only solution is to fight jihad so that “the whole of religion may belong to God.”21 There are several important insights here. First, the mid-thirteenth century was a time of danger and crisis for Islam. The danger was not simply from external enemies—in the Dar al’Harb—but from enemies within—in the Dar al’Islam itself.22 Second, jihad is the path to renewal in Islam, but that renewal requires both armed struggle and

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spiritual struggle. Third, no one is exempt from the struggle, when Islam is threatened at its very heart. Finally, this collective jihad is in itself a form of celebration, creating a current of collective piety that in effect moves history forward. A detailed exposition of jihad is given by the Ottoman Hanafite legist Ebu’s Su’ud (d. 1574). His views reveal the conservative nature of the Islamic legal tradition and how little the theory of jihad changed over the centuries. Indeed, there is very little difference in content and structure between Islamic law books composed in the tenth century and those composed in the nineteenth. According to Ebu’s Su’ud, jihad is not incumbent on every individual, but on the Muslim community as a whole.23 Fighting should be continual and should last until the end of time. It follows, therefore, that peace with the infidel is impossible, although a Muslim ruler or commander may make a temporary truce, if it is to the benefit of the Muslim community to do so. Such a truce is not, however, legally binding. Hillenbrand is saying many things here. First, the implication is that Islamic law, especially in terms of jihad, has not really evolved over the centuries. Second, centrality is accorded to perpetual struggle: it is a condition of the religious life. Third, its existential rules for living—the heart of Islam’s ethos—do not apply to relations with the infidel. This is not the radical ideology of Islamists. Such is the very nature of Islam.24 Many of the books and ideas of the classical period involve jihad and importance of jihad. All of the books are especially interested in their times. The authors mean to take care of their people, and consequently these books define the term jihad strategically in accordance with their times, their adversaries, and associates. So jihad is, more often than not, defined politically. It is clear that, at the same time, the definition and understanding of classical Muslim scholars do not transcend their historical contexts and events. It is clear that, according to the views regarding jihad found in classical books, the normal state of affairs, and peaceful relations between the Islamic and nonIslamic states, are contingent on the acceptance of Islam by the non-Islamic states, and on their payment of annual tributes to the Islamic state.

Contemporary Understanding of Jihad Radical movements striving for the purification of Islam and the establishment of a purely Islamic society have proclaimed jihad against their opponents, both Muslim and non-Muslim, throughout the history of Islam, although this is a particularly marked feature of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In order to justify the struggle against their Muslim adversaries, they brand them as unbelievers for their neglect in enforcing the strict rules of Islam. In the case of some intellectuals, the colonial experience affected their outlook on jihad. Some would argue, in view of the military superiority of the colonizer, that jihad was not obligatory anymore, on the strength of Qur’an (II:195). Others, however, elaborated new interpretations of the doctrine of jihad.25 Contemporary jihad theory begins from the time when overt military resistance to Western incursions ceased and the need arose to radically redefine the meaning of jihad, either for apologetic reasons or because the definition was no

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longer relevant to new circumstances. By the early twentieth century, most of the Muslims world was ruled over by Europeans, who imposed their laws and norms upon Muslim societies. In some cases the Europeans ruled directly (as in India and Algeria); in others they ruled through proxies (as in Morocco, Tunisia, and Iran) or through local elites that were clearly subservient to their dictates.26 Historical reasons required a redefinition of jihad. Most Muslim scholars now exhibit new thinking about jihad. Besides these powerful writings themselves, a major factor in the success of the movement may be attributed to the very method Said Nursi (1878–1960) chose, which may be summarized in two phrases: “manevi jihad” (that is, “jihad of the word” or “non-physical jihad”) and “positive action.” Nursi considered the true enemies in this age of science, reason, and civilization to be materialism and atheism, and their source, materialist philosophy. He combatted and “utterly defeated” these with the reasoned proofs offered in Risale-i Nur. He also strengthened the belief of Muslims and raised it to a new level of sophistication. Risale-i Nur thus served as a most effective barrier against the corruption of society initiated by these enemies. Nursi insisted that his students avoid any use of force and disruptive action in order to be able to pursue this jihad of the word. Through positive action, and the maintenance of public order and security, the damage caused by the forces of unbelief could be repaired by the healing truths of the Qur’an. And this is the way they have followed.27 Moreover, in Nursi’s view, the essential enemy of the Muslims in this age was not the outside enemy but the enemy within, in the form of ignorance, poverty, and conflict—the antithesis of Islam. These pitiless enemies and their consequences had brought about the Islamic world’s decline, and prevented Muslims from performing the duty of upholding the Word of God.28 As far as the jihad against poverty is concerned, he first defined poverty as the material and technical backwardness of Muslim communities. He also included need, hunger, and want in his examination of poverty. Nursi always stressed hard work and thrift. The third enemy was conflict. Nursi asked Muslims to cooperate with all other religious groups to avoid conflict. He identified ignorance as one of the key sources of conflict and suggests education and constant exchange with all groups as a way of overcoming suspicion in society. Nursi regarded such words as dissension, disorder, and enmity as synonyms of conflict and offered a general solution by translating religious ideas into everyday life practices to build a more just society. According to Nursi, it was ignorance that brought about the decline of the Muslim world. He called upon all Muslims to withdraw from the darkness of ignorance, poverty, and conflict through selfcontemplation. Jihad, for Nursi, means to kill the inner enemy and to do good work to please God.29 Another contemporary Islamic scholar, Mawdudi, advised Muslims “not to establish secret organizations in order to spread Islam, and not to appeal for the use of force or violence in order to change the conditions. Such methods are detrimental to both religion and society. Call people to Islam openly. Be broad-minded and try to change the hearts and minds of people. Make people approve of you by your morality and virtue.”30 According to those who share the thinking of Bruno Etienne, the term jihad, heavily referred to in Western media, is reduced to a single meaning. However, the

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term Guerre Sainte has other meanings in theological and hermeneutic senses; for example: 1. The war made to spread Islam. 2. The war waged against Muslims who deviated from Islam later on, as atheists or mushriks (idol worshippers). 3. Defensive wars.31 According to Etienne, jihad in general means to struggle to attain religious and moral excellence. In addition, lately Muslim scholars have warned people not to engage in activities that may be defined as “terrorist.”32 Some radical Islamist approaches, like those of Al Qaeda and Taliban ideology, might seem archaic or even unacceptable to most Muslims. Ibn Taymiyyah here has done a disservice to today’s Islamist cause. Again, as Hillenbrand explains: his implacable diatribes against all kinds of innovations in Islam—against mystical practices, philosophy, theology, and veneration of tombs—are all motivated by his desire that the true religion should not resemble in any way the practices of non-Muslims.33 Ibn Taymiyyah’s interpretation of jihad in effect has created a historical precedent for approaching non-Muslim innovation solely in terms of its potential theological impact on Islam. Thus, some radical Islamists today judge Western technology on theological grounds as potentially corrupting, as exemplified by the Taliban’s rejection of TV. Mohammed and original Islam, in contrast, welcomed innovations of all kinds, whole-heartedly adopting such as were useful.

MUSLIM TURKS AND RELIGIOUS TERROR There is today a prevailing view that the world is witnessing a resurgence of Islam. It is therefore important to determine whether this view is justified or wellfounded. In order to do so, an understanding of what Islamic resurgence means is needed. Is it a revival of Islamic teachings, or is it a radical religious movement that aims at making Islam the basis of temporal power through the establishment of a theocracy? Or is it both at the same time?34 If this is a reasonable and plausible characterization of the causes and motives of Islamic resurgence today, then it suggests that the problem it reflects is not so much one that concerns the rest of the world, but Islamic society itself. Nor is it a new problem. Before going in detail, it is better to give some historical information about the role of religious people in Turkish society. The Ottoman religious elite could offer no effective response either to European intervention or to the determination of the state elite to create a secular national state. The religious elite in effect consisted of subordinate functionaries of the state, committed to the authority of a regime, which for centuries had been a warrior state, and protector of Muslim peoples. Throughout the nineteenth century, Ottoman sultans continued to stress their credentials as caliphs and defenders of Islam. With their base of power crushed by the liquidation of the Janissaries in 1826, and ambivalent about reform because of their desire to see a revitalization of Muslim life, the ulama were unable to resist the program of the state intelligentsia. Whatever the opinion of the ulama, and whatever the shock to the feelings of masses of Turkish Muslims, the voice of

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the Westernized political establishment was the only one heard at the foundation of the Turkish modernization. Thus, from its inception, the Turkish republic was aggressively committed to a cultural revolution and to state-sponsored economic development. The heritage of strong state control as well as nineteenth-century circumstances induced the country’s political elite to implement Western-type reforms and to subordinate the religious establishment, allowing the state elite to pursue policies of economic and cultural development. These processes seem to have broken inherited institutional patterns and created a more differentiated and pluralistic society.35 Another consideration in assessing the credibility and prospects of the current movements of militant Islam is the effectiveness of Islam as a political ideology. In the recent past (since the nineteenth century), Islam as a political ideology was tried briefly as a defense against the onslaught of the West and was quickly abandoned in favor of borrowed secular ideals of nationalism, progress, and modernity.36 Religion is a fact of life. Thus, even when the first human being came into being, he always felt the need to worship a superior power. The fact is that religions change according to people’s cultures, traditions, and understandings. In this manner, in such a state as ours, in which Islam is the common belief, there are bound to be some misinterpretations and misunderstandings about religion. However, when we search the roots of radical ideas, we may find the Middle East countries to be their source. Radical thoughts are easily adopted by the people of underdeveloped countries, who are economically weak. The people of such countries could easily rebel against the existing administration, as they have lost their confidence in the government institutions, but they find themselves demoralized because of political and economic pressures. Although radical Islamic thoughts are opposed to the Turkish culture, they have been adopted by some marginal Turkish groups through Iran’s influence. Geographical closeness could be considered the reason for the diffusion of Iranoriginated religious thoughts in Turkey. Islamic policies became a topic of discussion for the first time after the revolution in Iran, and unfortunately Iran became a role model for reactionary Muslims in many countries. However, Iranian Shiite Islam and Turkish Sunnite Islam differ in many ways. Essentially, Islamic scholars are convinced that Turkey is a country in which Islam is lived freely. On the other hand, Iran always sees Shiism as its most important government institution. Thus, Muslims in Iran are in many ways stricter in following their religion than Muslims in Turkey are. Generally speaking, Islam is not a religion of wars and bloodshed, but a religion of tolerance, eternal love, and peace. The translations of the works that identify Islam with revolution, blood, and wars have affected some groups in Turkey. The Qur’an says, “The one who killed another is as guilty as if he killed all, the one who saved another’s life is as precious as he gave life to all” (V:32). The vast majority of the Turkish people are opposed to terrorism. According to research carried out in Turkey, the Turkish people are against terrorism and violence.37 It is known that most Turkish people are Muslim. In any case, according to Islamic thought, “nobody can be killed unjustly” (V:32).

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For this reason Muslims, Christians, and Jewish people have been all living together in the same region without conflict. In other words, in Turkey they have lived together peacefully for ages in the same neighborhoods and still do so. As a matter of fact mosques, churches, and synagogues have existed side by side through centuries in Istanbul and in other Anatolian cities. The people in Turkey have lived in this way through history, although they believe in different religions. No one is accused or denounced for his or her belief. The fact is that terrorism has no religion; it means that all terrorists are criminals, regardless of who they are, or what cause they claim to serve. For this reason, all moderate Muslims in Turkey condemned the terrorist attacks in November 2003 on the British embassy, HSBC, and on synagogues in Istanbul. Among the people who died in these unfortunate events were Muslims; actually, a greater portion of the lives lost were Muslim, which further shows to the world and the Turkish public that the terrorists, who carried out these attacks, were not trying to serve the cause of Islam or the Muslims. Consequently, the shopkeepers and businessmen in the districts of Istanbul, who were attacked by terrorists, reopened their shops and offices the next day, as a reaction to the terrorist attack. By doing so, they declared and proved that they are not afraid of terrorists and that they are actively opposing terrorism. Turkey and Turkish people suffered a lot for a very long time from terrorism, especially in the eastern part of Turkey. More than thirty thousand people and military personnel have been killed by terrorists. This is one of the reasons why the Turkish public is so sensitive toward the subject of terrorism. Turkish people, who have experienced terrorism in this bitter way, condemn and reject terrorism of all sorts, including the fatal attacks on the synagogues, the British embassy, and HSBC headquarters. Generally, Muslims, and in particular religious people from Turkey, have been associated with various terrorist attacks and organizations in the world media, and as a result of this, Western societies misunderstand Muslim people and sometimes incorrectly identify Muslims with terrorists. These misunderstandings and incorrect views about Muslims in the Western public arise because of the way in which the media represents Muslims to the world. The media is reluctant to investigate the issues and the events, and their reluctance to pursue the truth of news stories results in incorrect, if not fictitious, news coverage and reports. This creates grave misunderstandings and misrepresentations, which further create prejudices about Muslim people in the West, as a result of which various discriminative behavior patterns emerge in Western societies with regard to Muslims. It is a fact that some terrorists present themselves as Muslims, but what they have done is incompatible with the principles of Islam. Islam, just like other major religions of the world, has many different branches and sects. Some heretical branches or sects might preach terrorism to their followers, but orthodox Islam opposes “the killing of a person unjustly,” and hence opposes terrorism. Terrorists who present themselves as Muslims live isolated from everybody; their thoughts and mentality do not coincide with reality. At the same time, according to those terrorists, “dissimulation” (taqiya) is the most important belief.38 Radical thoughts like these may be found in any religion or movement. Although this is definitely incorrect according to Islam, people with such radical tendencies might be found among the followers of any religion.

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We should think very deeply about the Muslim terrorists. Is religious anxiety its source? Terrorism as a phenomenon is a complex entity. Like other forms of violence, there is no single reason why people engage in acts of terrorism, and no simple solution to the problems this poses. But if we wish to move beyond vengeance and seek a solution, we must try to understand and effectively address the conditions that give rise to terrorism and help it grow. In our search for a solution, there is no doubt that economic and political development play a critical role. They do not constitute the whole answer, but they are an important part of it.39 Finally, one of the leading Muslim organizations, along with several other Muslim outfits owing allegiance to different sects and ideologies in India, issued a “fatwa” against terrorism at the Anti-Terrorism Global Peace Conference. But Islam is a religion of peace and security. In its eyes, rioting, breach of peace, bloodshed, killing of innocent persons, and plundering are the most inhuman crimes irrespective of where they are practiced. At this event, delegates from various Islamic sects, numbering around 10,000, were administered an Islamic pledge to stay away from terror.40 We can be sure that the Turkish people are opposed to terrorism like the fatwa. It would be unjust to claim that any existing terrorist group originated in Turkey.

NOTES 1. The Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed., s.v. “terrorism”; Michael E. Vlahos, Terror’s Mask: Insurgency within Islam (Laurel, MD: Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory 2002), p. 2. 2. Macma al-luga al-arabiya: Mustalahat al-ilmiya wal-fanniya (Kahire: Mecmaü’lLugati’l-Arabi, 1967), s.v. “fitnah.” 3. Thomas P. Hughes, A Dictionary of Islam (London: W. H. Allen & Co., 1895), p. 129, s.v. “fitan.” 4. M. H. Kamali, “Freedom of Expression in Islam: An Analysis of Fitnah,” American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 10, no. 2 (1993): 178–201. 5. Y. Tacar Pulat, Teror ve Demokrasi (Ankara: Bilgi Yayinevi, 1999), p. 30. 6. Hannah Arendt, On Violence (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1970), pp. 46–56; Antony Arblaster, “Terrorism: Myths, Meaning and Morals,” Political Studies 25, no. 3 (1977): 414–21. 7. M. S. Denker, Uluslararası Teror ve Turkiye (Istanbul: BoOaziçi Yayınları, 1997), pp. 9–15. 8. Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, ed. Mark S. Cladis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 308. 9. Orhan Turkdogan, Sosyal Siddet ve Tirkiye Gerçegi (Ankara: Mayas Yayinlari, 1985), p. 122; Necati Alkan, Genclik ve Terorizm (Ankara: TEMUH Dairesi Baskanligi, 2002), p. 46. 10. Cihat Ozunder, “Terorun Sosyo-Kulturel Yonleri”, Dogu Anadolu Guvenlik ve Huzur Sempozyumu, Elazig 1998, p. 292; Abdülkadir Aygan, “Bir Itirafcinin Kaleminden PKK ve Terorun Sosyal Temelleri”, Cilginliktan Sagduyuya, Itirafcilar Anlatiyor, Ankara 1987, pp. 101–2. . 11. Aydin Yalcin, Demokrasi, Sosyalizm ve Genclik (Istanbul: Ak Yayinlari, 1969), pp. 238–42; Denker, pp. 10–12. 12. www.teror.gen.tr (May 23, 2006). 13. Alkan, pp. 50–51.

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14. Pulat, p. 49; Olivier Mongin, “Les Engrenages de la Terreur: Une Renonciation Politique,” Esprit, 1994–1995, p. 48; Lawrence Hamilton, “Ecology of Terrorism: A Historical and Statistical Study” (Ph.D. diss., University of Colorado, 1978), pp. 91–92. 15. Yalcin, pp. 246–48. 16. www.teror.gen.tr (May 12, 2006). 17. Leslie Macfarlane, Violence and the State (London: Thomas Nelson & Sons Ltd., 1974) p. 46. 18. Nasai, “Qas7ma,” 48; “Tahrim,” 2; Ibn Maca, “Diyat,” 2; Ahmad b. Hanbal, al-Musnad, I, 222. 19. Nuriye Akman, “A Real Muslim Cannot Be a Terrorist,” http://www.fgulen.org/ index.php?id=1727&option=content&task=view (June 11, 2008). 20. David Cook, Understanding Jihad, (University of California Press. 2005), p. 42 21. Carole Hillenbrand, The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives (New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 243. 22. See Halil Inalcik, “The Question of the Emergence of the Ottoman State,” International Journal of Turkish Studies 2 (1980): 71–79. 23. See Bernard Lewis, “The Significance of Heresy in Islam,” in Islam in History (Chicago: Open Court, 2001), pp. 293, 351, 361. 24. Hillenbrand, p. 99. 25. Rudolph Peters, Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam, (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publication, 1996), p. 324. 26. Cook, p. 93. 27. Sukran Vahide, “Jihad in the Modern Age: Bediuzzaman Said Nursi’s Interpretation of Jihad,” http://www.nur.org/en/nurcenter/nurlibrary/Bediuzzaman_Said_ Nursi_s_ Interpretation_of_Jihad_168 (April 12, 2008). 28. Said Nursi, Hutbe-i Samiye, (Istanbul: Sinan Matbaasi, 1960), p. 86. 29. M. Hakan Yavuz, “The Sufi Conception of Jihad: The Case of Said Nursi,” at International Conference on “Jihad, War and Peace in the Islamic Authoritative Texts,” Georgetown University, November 2–4, 2002, http://forum.talktopics.com/2983/sufi-conception-jihadcase-said-nursi (May 16, 2008). . 30. Cevdet Said, Islami Mücadelede Siddet Sorunu, trans. H. I. Kaçar (Istanbul: Pinar Yayinlari, 1995), p. 98. 31. Bruno Etienne, L’Islamisme Radical (Paris: Hachette, 1987), pp. 21–22. 32. Etienne, p. 177. 33. Hillenbrand, p. 243. . 34. M. Sami Denker, Uluslararası Terör ve Türkiye (Istanbul, 1997), pp. 5–7; P. J. Vatikiotis, “Islamic Resurgence: A Critical View,” in Islam and Power, ed. A. Cudsi, H. Dessuki, and E. Ali (London: Croom Helm, 1981), p. 169. 35. Ira Marvin Lapius, Contemporary Islamic Movements in Historical Perspective (Berkeley: University of California, 1983), p. 54. 36. Vatikiotis, p. 170. 37. Ozer Ozankaya, “Türkiye’de Terorun Etkenleri ve Cozum Yollari,” SBF Dergisi, XXXIV/I–IV (1979): 51–61; Denker, p. 5; Mustafa Gunduz, Basin ve Teror (Izmir: Saray Medikal Yayıncılık, 1996), pp. 54–57; Suat Ilham, Teror: Neden Turkiye (Ankara: Nu-Do Yayın DaOıtım, 1998); DoOu Ergil, Turkiye’de Teror ve Siddet (Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 1980), pp. 26–48; Pulat, pp. 47–48. 38. Mehmet Dalkilic, “Critiques of Dissimulation in Islamic Sects,” Review of the Faculty of Divinity of Istanbul University, 5 (2003): 113–39. 39. J. Lloyd Dumas, “Is Development an Effective Way to Fight Terrorism,” in War after September 11, ed. Verna V. Gehring (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing, 2003), pp. 74–75. 40. http://www.twocircles.net/2008jun01/indias_islamic_scholars_issue_fatwa_against_ terrorism.html (02/07/2008).

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CHAPTER 8

Is It Relevant to Talk about Democracy in Lebanon in the Aftermath of the Summer 2006 Conflicts? Pamela Chrabieh

I

was in Lebanon during the summer 2006 conflicts and came back to Montreal to attend the World Religions Conference. My main tasks consisted of organizing the panel session on Religion, Democracy and Human Rights in the Arab World (September 12, 2006), and introducing the results of the work I have conducted so far for my postdoctoral research entitled Voices—Paths of Reconstruction in Lebanon: Contributions of the 25–35 Lebanese Age Group.1 This chapter is a point of departure that could contribute to the debate on the religion-politics-society relations in Lebanon; but the answers proposed here are far from complete. To be more precise, Lebanon has continuously been driven by intermingling conflicts and status quo for several decades, and the analysis of its social-political situation has always been an arduous task to undertake. However, the staggering blow of the last conflict with Israel and its aftermath reveals a reality that appears to be far more complex to grasp, adding new wounds, war memories, and intricacies to old ones, weakening an already fragile Lebanon that found itself in the arena of proxy wars. In this context marked by disastrous damages in housing and public infrastructure and by terrible toll on civilian life leading to suffering and survival quest, one may ask the following: Is it relevant to talk about democracy? In other terms, is democracy a priority in the process of national reconstruction?

IS IT RELEVANT TO TALK ABOUT DEMOCRACY IN LEBANON? The assassination of the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri on February 14, 2005, unleashed a series of fundamental political changes: a big part of the Lebanese population united in an unprecedented outpouring in favor of independence in March 2005, and the Syrian army and intelligence services left

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after thirty years of occupation. Several car bombings led to the killing of elites and political leaders such as Samir Kassir and Gebran Tuéni, and activists within the Lebanese civil society and diaspora tried to capitalize on these changes and overcome the diverse challenges in order to construct-reconstruct a sustained democracy and a pluralistic society. These activists were backed up by analysts who focused on democratic prospects, religious reforms, and human rights promotion, and who saw Lebanon as a “promising Arab democratic project in the making,” a view shared by international media reports that praised Lebanon as a “positive” regional example that has been given a great opportunity by regaining its sovereignty, by the U.S. and French governments, and by U.S. institutions such as the Foundation for Defense of Democracies—which promotes democracy in the Middle East as a long-term weapon in the war against “Islamic terrorism”—and the Freedom House in New York.2 According to the findings of this institution presented in “Freedom in the World 2006”—an annually issued index of global political rights and civil liberties—Lebanon experienced the most significant improvement in both political rights and civil liberties among the countries of the Arab Middle East in 2005. Its status changed from “Not Free” to “Partly Free.” Consequently, it seemed to have the potential to build a “truly” democratic and prosperous society. Nevertheless, the parliamentary elections of May 2005 did not lead to a renewal of the Lebanese leadership or to reforms in the political system. According to Ghassan Rubeiz: The parliamentary elections going on now are not likely to bring significant reforms or ensure stability for long. For better or worse, Lebanon has become a typical Arab regime, in which political wisdom is suppressed, reform is inhibited, triumphal rhetoric is encouraged, religious authority is supreme, and minorities are marginalized. The first three rounds of the four-part elections have failed to produce important new leaders with practical ideas for building a modern and unified state. Politically, the same old wine is packaged in new electoral bottles.3

The Cedar Revolution did not result in a long-lasting democratic change in Lebanon. Despite the promises of the government, the country suffers from an inability to institute deeply needed social-political reforms. “Lebanon has not embarked on new political adventure or experiment, but rather a process of reinforcing existing institutions and behavior patterns.”4 Furthermore, the summer 2006 conflicts and their impacts seem to have turned the attention of many analysts, politicians, and members of the Lebanese civil society from important internal issues to focus on the Arab-Israeli conflict. In other terms, these conflicts demonstrated that the Arab-Israeli conflict remains an inescapable reality in the region. The horror of a regional war resurfaced, along with a polarizing dichotomy of resistance (i.e., survival, self-defense, and even revenge) versus surrender. According to Amr Hamzawy, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington: Arabs [and Lebanese in particular] feel they have to choose between resisting American and Israeli hegemony in the Middle East or giving up the right of the Arab and Muslim Umma, or community, to exist. More troubling is that the positions of

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putatively democratic Arab opposition movements on the war in Lebanon have exposed their totalitarian and populist tendencies. There is a great difference between adopting a rational discourse that rightly condemns the Israeli military for its crimes against civilians and criticizes unconditional American acceptance of the war, and cheering the death of Israeli civilians as a step toward the destruction of the “Zionist entity.” The regional shadows of the war in Lebanon will persist for many years. They may well be a long and painful reminder that the hope for any near-term democratic transformation of the Arab world was perhaps the greatest loser in a war that produced tremendous damage on all sides.5

At first sight, one may agree with Amr Hamzawy. Nevertheless, based on my personal experience and research while in Lebanon during this gruesome summer, I cannot endorse either his generalization or his pessimism. Being present in the field helped me realize that despite an obvious shift of issues in the official political and media arenas, democracy is still a matter of deep concern that is closely linked to the process of the national reconstruction, especially among the young Lebanese generations in Lebanon and abroad.

THE CULTURE OF RESISTANCE: CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE 25–35 LEBANESE AGE GROUP My statement is based on participatory observation in Beirut and Montreal since September 2005, the collection and analysis of published data (press releases, scientific articles, and electronic and multimedia material), and on contacts and interviews with twenty Lebanese aged between 25 and 35: journalists, poets, novelists, artists, bloggers, psychologists, and movie and documentary producers, in addition to activists in NGOs (nongovernmental organizations) (e.g., Nahwa al-Muwatiniya [Towards Citizenship] and Tadamon [Solidarity]), transnational organizations (e.g., Art of Living Foundation and Helem [Dream]), and groups for interreligious dialogue.6 Since September 2005, I have been asking young Lebanese numerous questions summarized as follows: How do they define the wars in Lebanon? How do they remember and memorialize these wars (or how do they construct personal war memories)? How do they use their personal war memories to define their identity? Do they find it significant to construct or reconstruct a national war memory as part of a national reconstruction process?7 How do they link their personal memories to the construction-reconstruction of this national memory? How do they link the construction-reconstruction of a national war memory to other pending issues such as the religion-politics-society relations, and especially the issues of confessionalism—a system of managing diversities or structures of governments, modes of political governorship, and social strategies adopted to ensure socialpolitical cohesion between different confessions—and democracy? What are the strategies, discourses, or actions addressing these issues that they develop and promote on the individual and collective levels in Lebanon and Canada? The data collected from the first stage of this fieldwork allowed me to identify many characteristics of this 25–35 age group.8 Individuals within this age group who are part of the “lost” Lebanese generation of war—“la génération des perdus de la guerre,” in the words of Wadih al-Asmar from SOLIDA Movement9—survived,

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while having been deeply marked by, the 1975–1990 period of conflict. Most of them use informal, alternative, or even underground strategies of testifying, rather than traditional demand-making actions: publishing articles and independent media reports on the Internet; launching alternative websites and blogs; producing alternative radio programs, short movies, documentaries, trauma plays, or dramas of survival; organizing home movie screening events, artistic exhibitions, round tables, and debates using new media resources (video, interactive installation, Internet, and virtual reality); and mixing literary and artistic genres.10 The testimonies of the individuals I interviewed during the first three weeks of the Israeli invasion focused on its horrific impacts, and many let go of their anger and fear without restraint. “Bomb Tel Aviv” was a common reaction out of despair among some young individuals, whether Muslims, Christians, or atheists. Once the shock effect was absorbed, many began analyzing the causes and impacts of previous conflicts and linking them to the most recent ones. A very interesting example lies in the Lebanese blogosphere, of which I am part. A blogosphere is the collective term encompassing all blogs (a type of website that often functions as a personal online diary) as a community or social network. Many blogs are densely interconnected; bloggers read others’ blogs, link to them, and reference them in their own writing, and many post comments on each other’s blogs. Because of this, the interconnected blogs have grown their own culture.11 The recent conflict with Israel has sent the Lebanese blogosphere into hyperdrive, with a litany of personal experiences, explanations, and exhortations crisscrossing the Internet along with disturbing pictures of the violence. Since July 2006, I have identified more than eighty blogs for young Lebanese in their twenties and thirties living in Lebanon and abroad, battling against war through the Internet. Most of these bloggers illustrate old invasions and massacres through their personal souvenirs. They also comment on recent conflicts using anecdotes, photographs, video footage, and drawings, while showing that the constructionreconstruction of a national war memory begins with the representation of wartime events lived by ordinary people and the promotion of social conditions that are conducive to creativity and innovation. The Lebanese blogosphere culture is part of a “culture of resistance” that is not ephemeral and that has been evolving since the mid-nineties within the vibrant Lebanese civil society, a mix of traditional, communally based associations and more advanced civic groups “that helped bring the country through all the years of war without the dramatic collapse that we have seen in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere.”12 According to Paul Salem, these associations and institutions provide “strength” and “durability” to the society, “even at times when the state is in great flux or has all but disappeared.”13 The resistance in that case does not only focus on survival, and is not driven by hatred or by revenge. It is a multilevel process that deals with the regional conflicts and the national problems.

PRIORITIES ON THE NATIONAL LEVEL On the national level, the culture of resistance aims not only at ending the conflicts, but also at breaking the internal status quo. Breaking this status quo requires a first priority: to deconstruct the “invisible” or nonphysical war, a gigantic

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symbolic and psychic conflict that involves the whole population; it is the war of fantasies and representations run by “passive fighters” who fail to understand the nature of their complex memories and identities. This war is the usual counterpart of the visible or physical war—conflicts, negotiations, and treaties run by “active fighters.”14 According to many young activists and bloggers (e.g., caricaturist Wassim Mouawad, blogs: “Shlon” and “Les niouzes: des infos du Liban”; movie and documentary producer Nada Raphael) I interviewed, the deconstruction of the invisible or nonphysical war begins with the treating of the trauma, by expressing, creating, and transmitting a national war memory that could be nourished by the diverse personal and collective memories. The main objective is to move from ancient and recent wounds to the most important duties as citizens: mutual respect, conviviality, and the exploration and understanding of similarities and differences. This first priority calls for a second one: constructing-reconstructing a longterm conviviality between the diversity of memories and identities; a conviviality that is not only interreligious or interconfessional as the mainstream media tended to portray the relief campaigns and social solidarity in July and August 2006, but also between generations, nationalities, social classes, and genders—an inter-human conviviality in all its dimensions. For example, in the blogs that I have reviewed so far, we find many testimonies of solidarity and conviviality between Lebanese notwithstanding their religious or nonreligious affiliations.15 It is also the case of new NGOs and social movements/networks run by young activists such as Nahwa al-Muwatiniya, Amam 05, Haya Bina, Kafa, Sawa Group, Samidoun, and Tadamon. This inter-human conviviality can be generated through these individuals and collectivities, but it would be insufficient. That is why the idea of a national dialogue is being promoted, a dialogue that is not reduced to political and religious leaders, and that allows individuals to think about the complex spaces in which democracy extends beyond the realm of electing rulers. This dialogue should integrate private-sector leaders, academics, technocrats, and young activists, whose expertise would help balance the needs of all Lebanese citizens and that would allow Lebanon to tackle the significant challenges it faces in fields such as confessionalism or sectarianism, also called consociate democracy.16 Indeed, for most of my interviewees, the conflicts of summer 2006 forced them, more than before, to ask what kind of nation and what kind of society they want to live in. For some interviewees, Lebanon is the most democratic Arab state.17 Its confessional system has spared Lebanese the twentieth-century totalitarian regimes of most Arab countries. It allows basic human rights to be promoted and offers a model of confessional coexistence between Christians and Muslims, Sunnis and Shiites; this is a model that has problems in its application but cannot be replaced because it strengthens the balance between multiple confessional components and constitutes a barrier against the emergence of dictatorship. However, many activists, artists, and bloggers believe that confessionalism is one of the main reasons why Lebanon’s central government never constructed a coherent long-term national policy that focuses on the public good. Whatever its merits, this social-political system is inherently discriminatory because it does not take into account the various components of the Lebanese society. Citizens have no opportunity for representation outside the boundaries of their sect; thus, there

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is no institutionalized citizen-state relationship. Also, this form of power sharing (half the parliamentary seats for Christians and half for Muslims) is not likely to work forever, given the country’s changing population profiles. Furthermore, it is a constrained democracy that is imbued with potential instability because it always requires external involvement to stabilize it. For some interviewees, the ideal system has to be secular as in Western countries and has to promote human rights as stipulated in international conventions. For others—even the most secular and liberal activists—advocating a secular Lebanon at this time is unrealistic.18 Furthermore, the ideal system should not be based on imported visions and values of democracy, human rights, and management of diversities—including the religious diversities. Democracy in Lebanon must be tailor-made in order to respond to the various religious, cultural, and social backgrounds of the populace. Therefore, in the view of most of the interviewees, Lebanese should make a greater effort to manage or readjust their confessional system or consociate democracy in the short run, so that in the long run it safeguards the rights of all citizens equally without sacrificing public interests for private interests—whether religious, ethnic, cultural, or economic. Such a system would also allow the blooming of a society in which the public has the means to participate in a meaningful way in the management of its own affairs and the means of a more open and free information and knowledge transmission. Still, any changes will be greatly affected by regional and international dynamics. Even the “proper exercise” of constitutional democracy in Lebanon will have to wait for a balance of power between “the conflicting parties competing for regional hegemony.”19 No lasting cure for Lebanon will be effective outside a comprehensive solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the resolution of the U.S.European-Iranian crisis over the issue of nuclear enrichment. Also, this cure requires the delineation of borders, thus regularizing the diplomatic exchanges with an eye to preserving Lebanese sovereignty. That does not prevent most of my interviewees from taking “baby steps” in the internal process of the national reconstruction, since the Cedar Revolution remains half-finished, “un projet en gestation.”20 Certainly, weapons have to be silenced, independence has to be accomplished, and the “truth” about the Hariri assassination has to be revealed, but a serious and comprehensive dialogue on the country’s past and future is a must. This dialogue, a pillar in the construction of a better-quality democracy, is a permanent day-to-day conquest. It is a dynamic order that is perfectible through citizen action. It will never be independent from a lively public sphere because “the latter nurtures the former and provides the setting in which Democracy can expand and enrich itself.”21

NOTES 1. The importance of this panel sponsored by the Canada Research Chair of Islam, Pluralism and Globalization consists of rethinking the widespread belief in Western media and public opinion that the Arab world is incapable of implementing democracy and promoting human rights because of religious totalitarianism and oppressive systems of governance; see Sheri Berman, “Islamism, Revolution, and Civil Society,” Perspectives in

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Politics 1, no. 2 (2003): 257–73, reprinted in Bernard Brown and Roy Marcridis, eds., Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 2005); Barry Rubin, The Tragedy of the Middle East (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Fatima Mernissi, Islam and Democracy: Fear of the Modern World (New York: Perseus Books Group, 2002); Eva Bellin, “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East,” Comparative Politics 36, no. 2 (2004): 139–57. In fact, this belief confines the discussion to the narrow limits of the political regimes; see Laith Kubba, “The Awakening of Civil Society,” Journal of Democracy 11, no. 3 (2000): 84–90; United Nations Development Programme, Arab Human Development Report 2003 (New York: UNDP, 2003), pp. 31, 171; Urdan Al-Jadid, “Civil Society and Governance: Case Study of Jordan,” Country Report (Sussex: Institute for Development Studies, Civil Society and Governance Programme, 1999), p. 78; Lebanese Center for Policy Studies, “Civil Society and Governance: Mapping Society and Its Connection with Governance,” Country Report (Sussex: Institute for Development Studies, Civil Society and Governance Programme, 1999), pp. 4–8. Furthermore, it conceals the complex realities of the Arab World societies. The first phase of my research took place in Montreal and in Beirut from September 2005 to May 2006. It was financed by the Canada Research Chair of Islam, Pluralism and Globalization (University of Montreal) and consisted of literature analysis, participation in many encounters and events organized by Lebanese and transnational NGOs, and encounters with young activists, artists, and journalists in Lebanon and Canada. The second phase of my research is currently being pursued at the same Chair and at the Institute of IslamicChristian Studies (Université Saint-Joseph, Lebanon), from June 2006 to May 2008. This phase is financed by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (Government of Canada). Given the lack of data, this second phase is based on qualitative analysis of field interviews—individual, collective, group focus, field notes, and different materials collected during fieldwork (press reviews and articles, multimedia reports and documentaries, electronic material, educational material, reports of meetings and workshops, statements and reports designed for fundraising, and unpublished documentation). See Denise Jodelet, “Aperçus sur les méthodologies qualitatives,” in Les méthodes des sciences humaines, ed. Serge Moscovici and Fabrice Buschini (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2003), pp. 139–62; Jorge Vargas Cullell, “Democracy and the Quality of Democracy: Empirical Findings and Methodological and Theoretical Issues Drawn from the Citizen Audit of the Quality of Democracy in Costa Rica,” in The Quality of Democracy: Theory and Applications, ed. Guillermo O’Donnell, Jorge Vargas Cullell, and Osvaldo M. Iazzetta (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2004), pp. 93–162; Patrice Brodeur, “Pour faire place à l’étude critique appliquée de la religion,” Religiologiques, 29 (2004): 61–78; Patrice Brodeur, “From Postmodernism to ‘Glocalism’: Towards a Theoretical Understanding of Contemporary Arab Muslim Constructions of Religious Others,” in Globalization and the Muslim World, ed. Birgit Schaebler and Leif Stenberg (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2004), pp. 188–205; Patrice Brodeur, Building the Interfaith Youth Movement, with co-editor Dr. Eboo Patel (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 2005). 2. Democratization in the Arab World has received much attention in the wake of the Gulf War of 1991. See John O. Voll and John L. Esposito, “Islam’s Democratic Essence,” Middle East Quarterly, September 1994, pp. 3–11; David Garnham and Mark Tessler, eds., Democracy, War and Peace in the Middle East (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1995); Augustus Richard Norton, ed., Civil Society in the Middle East, 2 vols. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995–96). However, according to Habib C. Malik, “Western analysts and leaders then realized that greater freedom and real elections could destabilize some of the oil-rich authoritarian regimes in the region, and interest waned. Lebanon, the only Arab state with an enduring democratic experience and an impressive track of record on freedom, was somehow neglected during this discussion” (“Is There Still a Lebanon?” Middle East Quarterly, December 1997, http://www.meforum.org/pf.php?id=371).

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3. Ghassan Rubeiz, “Shaping Lebanon’s Future,” The Christian Science Monitor, June 16, 2005, http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0616/p25s02-cogn.html. 4. Paul Salem, “Lebanon at the Crossroads: Rebuilding an Arab Democracy,” Saban Center Middle East Memo, no. 7, May 31, 2005, http://www.brook.edu/fp/saban/salem memo20050531.htm. 5. Amr Hamzawy, “The Big Loser after Lebanon: Democracy,” The Daily Star, August 22, 2006. 6. Other Lebanese NGOs, groups, and movements dealing with the issues of war, conflict resolution, peace building, and dialogue will be contacted through this year: Permanent Peace Movement, Amam 05, Haya Bina, Kafa, Sawa Group, Solida. 7. I describe the war memory in Lebanon as “an ongoing process of interactions between individual and collective readings of the diverse pasts and presents; a plural and dynamic process to which the constructions-representations-expressions of all actors of the Lebanese Civil Society and Diaspora contribute” (“processus en devenir d’échangesinteractions entre des relectures individuelles et collectives des divers passés et présents; un processus pluriel et dynamique auquel contribuent les constructions-représentationsexpressions de tous les acteurs de la société civile et de la diaspora libanaises” [Pamela Chrabieh, Pour une gestion médiatrice des diversités au Liban. Une théorie du plurilogue, audelà du confessionnalisme (Thèse doctorale, Bibliothèque des Lettres et des Sciences Humaines, Université de Montréal, Montréal, Juin 2005), pp. 12–13]). 8. The second stage, which began in 2007 and continues in 2008, aims at expanding the research in order to identify these contributions as the work of important socialpolitical actors in the national reconstruction. It also aims at showing changes in issues of religion, identity, and citizenship in the topography of the Lebanese social-political context. 9. Interview with Wadih al-Asmar, Beirut, 2006. 10. Asef Bayat, Social Movements, Activism and Social Development in the Middle East, Civil Society and Social Movements, Programme Paper Number 3, United Nations Institute for Social Development, November 2000, http://www.unrisd.org/80256b3c005bccf9/ (httpauxpages)/9c2befd0ee1c73b380256b5e004ce4c3/$file/bayat.pdf; Karam Karam, “Associations civiles, mouvements sociaux et participation politique au Liban dans les années 90” (draft paper presented at conference “ONG et Gouvernance dans les Pays Arabes,” March 29–31, 2000, Cairo, http://www.unesco.org/most/karam.doc). 11. See http://www.wikipedia.org. 12. Karam, p. 1. 13. Salem, p. 1. 14. This terminology was identified by the Lebanese Psychiatric Adnan Houballah in Le virus de la violence (Paris: Albin Michel, 1996). The two wars mingle and nourish each other, thus creating a vicious cycle that drags along all individuals within a society. 15. See http://pchrabieh.blogspot.com for the list of Lebanese blogs against war. 16. Antoine Messara, Le modèle libanais et sa survie. Essai sur la classification et l’aménagement d’un système consociatif, Publications de l’Université Libanaise, Section des études juridiques, politiques et administratives, no. 7, Beirut, 1983. 17. According to Michel Touma, “among Arab states, Lebanon is the only that combines a history of extensive political pluralism with a culture that is hospitable to personal and communal freedoms. The fact that different minorities—including a strong indigenous Christian community—were not reduced to a subjugated status under Muslim rule was an important element in this process” (p. 3). 18. “The usual option called for in Lebanon—deconfessionalizing political life—is unworkable because it ignores the socio-communal indicator realities on the ground. For better or worse, religion remains a strong, indeed the leading indicator of identity on the sub-state level in Lebanon and throughout the Middle East” (Malik, p. 1). According to Ghassan Rubeiz, “if Lebanon is to gain long-term stability, power sharing must be secularized.

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A more realistic alternative, in the short term, would be to rotate leadership positions among the different communities. Currently, Muslims are not allowed to hold the position of president or head of the army; nor can a Christian become a prime minister. An additional reform would be to allow Lebanese emigrants to vote in Lebanese parliamentary elections” (Rubeiz, p. 1). 19. Ghassan Tuéni, “Democracy in Lebanon: Anatomy of a Crisis,” The Beirut Review, no. 6, Fall 1993, http://www.lcps-lebanon.org/pub/breview/br6/tuenibr6.html. 20. Michel Hajji Georgiou, “Entretenir la flamme du 14 mars,” L’Orient-le-Jour (Beirut), March 17, 2006. 21. Guillermo O’Donnell, Jorge Vargas Cullell, and Osvaldo M. Iazzetta, eds., The Quality of Democracy: Theory and Applications (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2004), p. 6.

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Part III Peace

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CHAPTER 9

9/11 and Korean American Youth: A Study of Two Opposing Forces Heerak Christian Kim

T

he Korean American community has been deeply impacted by 9/11 and its aftermath. For many Koreans, these terrorist attacks brought to the fore questions about communal safety in the American context because the previously held assumption as to the safety of America was broken and the concept of North Korea as an axis-of-evil power became more relevant and real. Many began to question how this would impact South Korean immigrants in the United States. The question regarding the safety of Koreans in America as an immigrant community came to be externalized in two completely opposing tendencies. One trend was an aggressively conservatizing trend among the churchgoers, pushing even historically left-leaning Korean churches closer toward the evangelical/fundamentalist direction. The other trend went the other direction, with many individual Korean Christians leaving the church and abandoning institutional Christianity altogether, thereby leaving many Korean local congregations empty. This latter post-9/11 trend is most noticeable among those in the late teens and in college. In this chapter, I will describe the sociological phenomena of the two opposite forces that have impacted Korean American Christianity after 9/11, particularly focusing on late-teen and college-age Koreans. Specific examples will be provided from Korean American youth movements (parachurch) and Korean American youth group studies. The starting point of any discussion on Korean Americans must be with their perception of themselves or their understanding of their group identity. It is difficult to generalize about Korean American identity because there is a wide spectrum of who belongs to this group. On the one hand, you have the FOBs, which stands for “fresh off the boat.” They are Korean immigrants who recently came from Korea and retain all traits that are distinctively Korean in nature. They generally speak in Korean. They subscribe to Korean fashion in clothing. Their

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mannerisms and way of behaving is traditional Korean and not what would normally be described as American or Western. On the other far end of the spectrum are what Koreans refer to as Bananas. Bananas are Korean Americans who have lived in America for a long time and consciously work toward integrating into the American way of life. Put another way, Bananas are those who consciously work toward divesting themselves of what they perceive as Korean culture or Korean ways. Not all Bananas are American-born. In fact, some Bananas are quite recent immigrants; some may even have immigrated to the United States three or four years ago, or even less. Whereas FOBs are identified by their perpetual use of the Korean language and resorting to visible Korean customs and dress, Bananas are identified primarily by the company that they keep. Because the term Banana in colloquial discourse stands for those who are “yellow on the outside but white on the inside,” it would not be surprising to find that the label of Banana applied to Koreans who have mostly white friends. Evidence of a person’s Banana status continues to be having a white spouse or significant other, such as a white girlfriend. Of course in both cases—that of the FOB and the Banana—identity markers are more complex than that. But certainly, on a popular Korean American discourse level, these are the simplistic ways to identify FOBs and Bananas—by the language they speak, the clothing they wear, and the friends they keep. Most Korean Americans do not neatly fall into the group of the FOBs or the Bananas. The majority of Korean Americans fall somewhere in between. Of course, depending on where on the spectrum a Korean American falls, he or she will identify other Koreans as FOBs or Bananas slightly differently. However, the general rule still applies. A Korean American who speaks mostly in Korean and has mostly Korean American friends tends to be considered a FOB, and a Korean American who has predominantly white friends and speaks only in English is considered a Banana. The fact that most Korean Americans fall between these two antipodal ends is recognized by most Korean Americans, although they may not verbalize it in such terms. In a sense, we can describe this understanding as culturally innate or a sublimated part of the Korean American consciousness. The reality is assumed to be fact, and this reality is rarely questioned. The fact of Korean American assumptions regarding the linear spectrum between the FOB and the Banana is visible in the way Korean Americans describe themselves. Korean Americans have developed a decimal point system to describe themselves. For instance, a Korean who just emigrated from Korea is first-generation Korean American. A Korean who came from Korea at the age of about thirteen years old is a 1.5-generation Korean American.1 And a Korean who came from Korea at the age of seven years old is a 1.75. A Korean who emigrated from Korea at the age of seventeen is a 1.2. Although the decimal point has not been systematized per se, there is a popular understanding of what a 1.5 is, what a 1.75 is, and what a 1.2 is. The guideline is set by unspoken communal consent that assumes the spectrum between the FOB and Banana. What is a second-generation Korean American? A second-generation Korean American in the Korean American cultural context is a Korean who was born in the United States to parents who immigrated to the United States. Interestingly enough, children born to first-generation Korean Americans and children born to 1.5-generation Korean Americans are both said to be second-generation. The

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reason that the distinction is not made between the two can be attributed to the relative newness of the majority of Korean Americans in the United States. Most households have parents who are first-generation. Rarely will one find thirdgeneration Korean Americans—Korean Americans born in America to parents who were born in America. The Korean American immigrant experience is about one generation (calculated at thirty-five years) old or less.2 The 1970 census found about 70,000 Koreans residing in the United States. But the number has increased rapidly since then by about 30,000 Koreans every year. In 1976, about 290,000 Koreans were resident in the United States. And the 1980 U.S. census numbered Koreans at 354,529.3 Furthermore, a demographic study of Los Angeles in 1979 revealed that almost 81 percent of Koreans living in the Los Angeles area had been living there for 7 years or less. And the mean was 6.5 years.4 Tae-Hwan Kwak and Seong Hyong Lee note that in 1990, the Korean American population was estimated to be 1.3 million. The majority of them immigrated to the United States since 1965, when the U.S. government lifted its prohibition of immigration from Asia. Kwak and Lee state in the introduction to their edited book, The KoreanAmerican Community: Present and Future, that most of the 1.3 million Koreans in 1990 represent the wave of immigration in 1970s and 1980s.5 And Won Moo Hurh in his 1998 book states: “More than two-thirds of the current Korean population in the United States are foreign-born, and the majority of them arrived after 1970.”6 It is clear how recent Korean immigration in the United States is. The majority of Korean Americans living in the United States were born in Korea or had parents born in Korea. This is the current reality. Because of the relative newness of Korean immigration, the language is limited in terms of the decimal point system applied between the second generation and the third generation. One will find many Korean Americans who are 1.5 or 1.7 or 1.2, but one will never find Koreans who are 2.5.7 This is not a part of the Korean American discourse on a popular or academic level. There is only the second generation and the third generation; there is no decimal point between these two spectrums. Korean Americans have developed this system instinctively without any academic dictating of the point system. No one knows who started the discourse. It just became completely adopted by Korean Americans all over the United States. It can be seen as an integral part of Korean American culture. It became normative spontaneously. Won Moo Hurh writes regarding the term “the 1.5 generation”: “The term was coined in the Korean community around 1980. Although the Japanese terms for first-, second-, and third-generation immigrants—issei, nisei, and sansei—are found in Webster’s Dictionary, a term such as “1.5 generation” has not been used with reference to other immigrant groups.”8 I would argue that the reason for this is the spectrum between the FOB and the Banana that operates distinctively in the Korean American context. In a way, the reality of the FOB and the Banana explains the innate tensions within the Korean American community, wavering between the mother country that they left behind and the new land they now live in. The Korean American decimal point system is innately Korean American. Most ethnographers do not even know of the point system. Generally, anthropologists and sociologists refer to first American-born immigrants as first-generation Americans, with whichever ethnic title attached. Thus, if a couple emigrated from Ireland, their baby born in America would be first-generation Irish American. The

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parents would be immigrants and would not really have a generation attached to them. This assumption is based on the fact that sociologists and anthropologists attribute the identity of the parents to the country they emigrated from. So, the Irish immigrant couple is Irish and not really Irish American per se. They are Irish immigrants in America. Even American laws seem to support this presupposition. As powerful as Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger is, he is treated by a different set of laws than are his children, who were born in the United States. Governor Schwarzenegger is not American per se by the standards of anthropologists and sociologists. He is an Austrian immigrant in America who has been naturalized and became an American citizen. Thus, if Governor Schwarzenegger breaks a law, he can be extradited to Austria. He is not really American the way his children are. They cannot be extradited to Austria because they are not seen as Austrian in any legal sense of the term or sociological sense of the term. They are first-generation Americans. In contrast, Governor Schwarzenegger is not really American and that is why he cannot become U.S. president by law. Not only can he be extradited to Austria, the American law fundamentally assumes that he is not loyal to the United States by the virtue of his immigration. American custom, academia, and laws perceive first-generation Americans as those who are born in America to immigrants from another country. Only the Korean Americans in the United States view things differently and utilize their own system of attaching generation designators within the community. What are we to make of this? I would argue that this reality points to the way Korean Americans view themselves in the American context. First of all, they rebel— whether they are aware of it or not—against the cultural, academic, and legal mores of America in the way they perceive themselves. This can be approached from various angles. I would like to emphasize that the reason for this approach is that they were concerned more with the spectrum between the FOB and the Banana. Why were Koreans so concerned about this spectrum? It goes to the history of the Korean people. Korea is called the Hermit Kingdom for a reason. It has remained radically isolationist. Although China called white people “white devils,” they gave white people access to China relatively early. This was the case with Japan as well. Despite the highly anti-Western and anti-white sentiment floating around in Japan, Japan welcomed white individuals into Japan relatively early in its history. In contrast, Koreans intentionally held off welcoming in Westerners. Korea was the last nation in East Asia to establish normalized relations with the United States. This was done in 1882 through the signing of the Korean-American Treaty in 1882.9 The fear of the Banana factor is a part of the conscious fear of the Westerner in the Korean community. Every Korean American will tell you that their parents wanted one thing from them—that was to marry a Korean.10 Most Korean-American parents have historically threatened to disown their children if they married a white person.11 This cultural standard is operating still in many Korean families. Chon S. Edwards, a Korean who married a white American, states that even reputable Koreans with high social status living in the United States would be ashamed if their children married white. Often, the wedding will be done in secret and their close Korean friends will not be invited to the wedding.12 Perhaps Ji-Yeon Yuh’s comments about Korean women who married white American soldiers best explain the

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situation. Yuh writes regarding these Korean women who intermarried: “For second-generation Korean Americans, they were the women sitting alone, without husbands, during church service and fellowship, the ones they’d ignored because everyone else did.”13 It is this anti-white sentiment that has developed the Banana system, or the 1.5 system of identification. The sentiment of the Korean immigrant parents has been internalized in their children. It is not surprising, therefore, that even second-generation Korean Americans in California refuse to marry non-Koreans and often ostracize Koreans in their midst who marry nonKorean. The Banana fear is an integral part of the Korean-American experience that is connected to Korean historical experience. A part of the reason for the phenomenon is due to what Won Moo Hurh and Kwang Chung Kim call “adhesive” adaptation of Korean Americans to the American context.14 What that means is that Korean Americans tend to keep the Korean core—such as Korean traditional culture and Korean social-networks—while being Americanized culturally and socially. The Americanization is surface and for public consumption in the American context. However, on a fundamental level Korean Americans tend to value their Korean identity and culture. What is quite relevant in this regard is the conscious sentiment in the Korean American community that Korean Americans should be closely tied to things Korean regardless of how long they have been in the United States. Sang-O Rhee expresses this sentiment: “What we desire most is that the second generation should identify with the Korean society in America and Korea and develop positive attitudes towards them. If this can be successfully accomplished through the Korean education system, we can develop responsible citizens of a pluralistic society of multi-language and culture. This type of adaptation is called ‘harmonious selfidentity of love America and love Korea.’”15 Sang-O Rhee is voicing a normative desire in the Korean American community, desiring preservation of Korean culture among Korean Americans born in the United States. This is quite visible in the Korean American church context. It is not surprising, therefore, to find Korean American churches that have thousands of members in Los Angeles, Anaheim, Baltimore, New York, and other cities who speak only Korean and preserve Korean ways. No other ethnic group in the United States has had this phenomenon. German Americans are Christians. But there are no churches with thousands of German Americans. The same goes for Chinese Americans. There are many Chinese-American Christians but it is hard to find a Chinese church in any city that numbers over a thousand. The Korean-American church functions as a cultural center of the Korean American people as well as its religious center. This was the case from the beginning of Korean immigration, which was in 1903 in Hawaii.16 Early Korean settlers made Christian worship their first major social event after immigrating to the United States. For instance, early Koreans (some 300 Christians and 30 preachers who followed the immigrants everywhere) set up a Christian church on July 5, 1903, in Mokolia, Oahu, and another Christian church on River Street, in Honolulu, on November 10, 1903.17 This trend of setting up Korean churches as both a Korean cultural center and a place of religious worship for Koreans still characterizes the Korean American community. Hurh and Kim write: “The Korean immigrants appear, therefore, to crave both types of fellowship—spiritual (Christian) fellowship and ethnic fellowship. . . . The Korean ethnic church

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provides best both fellowships for the immigrant.”18 Thus, it would not be surprising that if any Korean American clergy adopts a Banana stance, he will lose his church membership like dust in the wind.19 For instance, if a Korean American church of 3,000 members hires a senior pastor who prefers Banana ways and encourages marrying white people, Korean-American members will leave that church and find a Korean American church that is more dedicated to Korean ways.20 The Korean-American church is a cultural center for the Korean-American people, and the central thrust of the Korean-American culture tends to be antiBanana.21 Thus, even third-generation Korean Americans are ashamed if they cannot speak Korean.22 And those who speak even a few sentences boast and lie and say that they can speak good Korean.23 In the Korean American cultural matrix of the Korean American church, the Banana factor is feared, shunned, and hated. It is not surprising, therefore, to see that many Korean Americans actually see teaching of the Korean language and culture as an integral mission of the Korean American church. Yong Choon Kim writes: “The education of the second generation of Koreans is one of the most important tasks of the Korean church for the healthy progress of the Korean American community. For this task Korean churches in America should make a special effort to continue teaching the Korean language along with Christian education.”24 One of the reasons why Korean American churches have been so successful in America in contrast to other Asian ethnic churches is simply because of the fact that Korean American churches have been aggressively pro-Korean and anti-white.25 The anti-white sentiment persisting in the Korean community was enhanced by the L.A. riots in 1992 when white American leaders (who controlled most of Los Angeles, including the police, government agencies, and the media) ignored pleas for help by Koreans. Koreans had given a lot of donations to police charities, election campaigns funds, and other types of support for white leaders of Los Angeles.26 Most Koreans felt betrayed, and pro-white factions in Korean communities were silenced for the foreseeable future. This fueled greater anti-white sentiment in Korean American churches. As a corollary, more Korean American churches embraced things Korean, more aggressively. It would be difficult to find a Korean American church that does not sing the Korean national anthem on Korean Independence Day. In contrast, one will almost never find a Korean American church singing the American national anthem, ever. One of the reasons why Korean Christianity combined with Korean nationalism is that those who attacked Koreans attacked Korean Christianity. This was the case during the Japanese Occupation, when Korean nationalism became identified with Korean Christian martyrs. And this was the case during the Korean War when anticommunism became identified with Korean Christianity. It was a fact that Korean Christians were sought out by communists and killed for their Christian faith. For many Koreans, their religion became an integral part of their national identity as Koreans in the Japanese Occupation period and South Korean identity in the Korean War. It does not really matter how accurate the perception is. The fact is that the communal memory hinges on this perceived reality. It may in fact not be completely the case in true Korean history. But this perception has been perpetuated within Korean Christianity and in Korean Christian pulpits. And thus, it is an

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integral part of the Korean collective memory and communal consciousness. If one does not understand this reality of the Korean Christian experience, which cannot be separated from Korean historical experience for Korean Americans, then one will not understand the Korean American experience. Unfortunately, not much study has been done on this aspect of Korean American identity. I hope to rectify this error in academia through a more in-depth study in the future. The extent to which this reality is fact for Korean Americans is attested by the fact that almost 100 percent of Korean American college students will say that they have been to a Christian church in their youth.27 Even parents who are non-Christians often sent their children to Korean churches for Korean cultural experience. It is only a very recent phenomenon that some Koreans have started to rally around the Buddhist temple. This reality is evident when we look at the case of Chicago. In 1997, there were estimated to be 100,000 Koreans in the Chicago area. There were 196 Korean American churches, primarily conducting their programs in the Korean language. In contrast, there were only five Buddhist temples.28 Chicago actually has one of the largest Korean Buddhist communities, in terms of percentage, but still only about 4.2 percent of Korean Americans in Chicago are Buddhist. In Los Angeles, only about 1.5 percent of the Korean Americans are Buddhist.29 For Korean Americans, Buddhism was a non-factor for much of their immigration history. The beginning of Korean Buddhism in the United States is dated to 1964, when Soh Kyongbo, a Korean Buddhist monk, arrived in Philadelphia to pursue his Ph.D. studies at Temple University. Soh Kyongbo led a small Buddhist meditation group while he was a Ph.D. student at Temple University. Much of the Buddhist movements were scattered away from major Korean population centers, including Los Angeles, Chicago, and New York. For instance, Kim Samu, a Korean Buddhist monk, set up Zen Lotus Societies in Toronto, Canada, and Ann Arbor, Michigan, in the 1970s. There were hardly any Koreans in these cities at the time. Another Korean Buddhist leader, Sungsan, set up a Son Center in Providence, Rhode Island, in 1972.30 There were hardly any Koreans there at the time. Eventually, Buddhist movements spread to population centers of Korean immigration, such as Los Angeles and New York. But it is significant that Buddhism started in the fringes of the Korean American community.31 In this sense, Korean historical experience in America is vastly different from other immigrants from Buddhist lands, such as China and Japan, which had a visible Buddhist population in the United States from the very beginning. Korean Americans were completely different. Many Koreans abandoned Buddhism when they immigrated to the United States. They saw their immigration as immigrating to Christianity. Although parents may not have actively converted to Christianity, those who left Korea and Korean Buddhism behind were willing to attend the church and subscribe to the Christianity of America. The fact that Korean American churches functioned as Korean American cultural centers32 made the transition easy, and many Korean Americans readily converted to Christianity in the context of the Korean American church. Current high-school students and college students who are Korean Americans must be understood in light of this historical experience of Korean Americans. The majority of them have been to a Christian church in America and many of them have been active participants. For many Korean American youths, their

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Korean American identity is closely tied to their experience in a Korean American church. In this light, it is understandable why the Korean American church experienced a great shock to the system with 9/11. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 shocked Korean Americans, and the shock manifested itself in the setting of the Korean American church. What happened? In terms of the Korean-American experience, Korean American immigrants were shocked in religious terms. Most Korean Americans not only changed countries but also religions when they immigrated to the United States. Most Korean Buddhists abandoned Buddhism and many actively converted to Christianity. It is not surprising to find some churches with something like 80 percent of its members being converts to Christianity. They converted after they came to the United States as immigrants. This seems to be in line with Korean immigration to the United States since the first immigration of 1903. Regarding the first wave of Korean immigrants, Bong-Youn Choy writes that 40 percent were Christians but most Korean immigrants—including nonChristians—eventually became Christian churchgoers.33 For many of these Korean American immigrants, they identified America with a Christian land. They identified the blessings of America in the areas of economy and military in terms of its Christian identity. For Korean immigrants, the United States was a great country because it was Christian. They immigrated to America, the great nation, and they adopted Christianity, the great religion. The Korean American church with its focus on Korean cultural identity made the transition in religious identity that much more smooth. They could be Koreans and be Christians and live in the Christian land as Korean Christians. In fact, it would not be wrong to say that Koreans did not really see themselves as becoming naturalized as American citizens—rather, they perceived themselves as being Koreans in America who became Christians. For many of them, Christianity was their identity that they shared with Americans. If one were to ask a Korean today what nationality he has, a typical Korean would say “Korean” even though he holds a U.S. passport and had to give up his Korean passport and Korean citizenship. One would be hard pressed to find a Korean, even a second-generation Korean, who will refer to himself as an American. Within the Korean American experience, American identity meant being Christian. This allowed Koreans to maintain their Korean heritage and continue the Hermit Kingdom ways while being fiercely loyal to the United States. This is a reason why Korean Americans comprise the greatest percentage of Asian Americans at West Point and other U.S. military academies. Every Korean American clergy member will pray for America as a Christian nation that God should protect. Korean Americans are patriotic to America not because they see value in their American citizenship but because their Korean American identity became a Korean American Christian identity and so they found solidarity with America the Christian nation on a religious level.34 There was never confusion among Korean Americans regarding their loyalty to America the nation. Korean Americans were and remain loyal to Korea as their nation despite their U.S. citizenship. They do not see the contraction of being loyal to Korea “their nation” and being loyal to American “the Christian nation.”35 In fact, given the persecution that Korean Christianity suffered in the last 100 years, if push comes to shove, they would be more loyal to the Christian nation over Korea. This was the case in

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the Korean War. Communists were killing Korean Christians, so Koreans in the South chose to die as Christians at the hands of their relatives from North Korea. 9/11 changed a lot of things. First of all, for many Korean Americans, it proved that God no longer protected America. How could God allow a small band of unsophisticated terrorists to highjack American planes right under the noses of American security and the most highly safeguarded place in American public life—the airport system—and use the American planes against American buildings? Surely, God took away his protection of the country for such a thing to happen. 9/11 imbued Korean Americans with doubt about America as a nation blessed by God. Because the identity of America as a Christian nation was firmly fixed in the Korean American consciousness, doubting America’s divine protection encouraged doubting the veracity of Christianity itself.36 Unlike white evangelical Christians who have questioned the Christian identity of America since the 1920s and even chose to separate themselves from American politics in pursuit of Christian holiness and Christian identity, Korea-American Christians identified America with Christianity. Korean American clergy encouraged this identity. Korean Americans frequently pray for the United States, and every time, they would pray that God protect the Christian nation of America. Korean American pastors frequently preach about American missionaries bringing Christianity to Korea. When Korean American clergy chastise Korea, they will not use any other nation on earth except for America to chastise Korea with, because America was a Christian nation, “founded by the Puritans.” Thus, Korean American church teachings along with individual understanding of what America is—a Christian nation— encouraged the doubt that was created among Korean Americans after 9/11. For many, it was as conclusive evidence that Christianity was not true and that the God of the Americans was false. Of course, evangelical Christians who are white in America have been clamoring for decades that America is a secular nation with a secular agenda and not a Christian goal. But they are a part of the American society, experience, and discourse. Korean Americans choose to be outside of that. Not everyone would say that Koreans had a choice in the matter. Sang Hyun Lee writes that by being nonwhite, Koreans in America are permanent outsiders even if they are more westernized than many of the white immigrants.37 This applies to Korean Americans born in the United States and their descendants as well. Whether Korean Americans are outside of the American mainstream by choice or not, the effect is the same. Korean Americans view America through the lens of Korean American identity and society. In other words, most Korean Americans know only the America that the Korean American church painted in rosy colors, through the lens of Korean Christianity.38 Thus, 9/11 encouraged a mass exodus of Korean Americans from Christianity. Korean American churches became empty as Korean Americans chose to abandon Christianity, which 9/11 proved to be a false religion in their minds. Many of them in fact went back to their old religion of Buddhism.39 And throughout Los Angeles and elsewhere, there was a revival of Buddhism among Koreans. This trend also manifested itself among the Korean American youth. Korean American high-school students and college students started to leave the Christian church in

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massive numbers. In some Korean American churches, the college group became nonexistent as high-school students who went to college refused to go to church. However, for the younger generation, the departure from Christian churches created a different reality than for their parents. Their parents were originally Buddhists, so they traded in their Christian identity card for a familiar Buddhist one. Thus, they participated in the revival of Korean Buddhism in America. Unlike their parents, Korean teenagers and college students, many of them having been born in the United States, had no experience with Buddhism. They did not know what it was. They had never practiced a single Buddhist ritual in their lives. Thus, when they left Christianity, they did not see Buddhism as an alternative. Many Korean American teenagers and college students did not know what the alternative to Christianity was. Many of them blended into general secular culture without knowing what it is or what it meant for them. What 9/11 did for many Korean teenagers and college students was to push them away from Christianity without any clear direction. So, they left Christianity. Most of them did not adopt another religion. Since 9/11 is relatively recent, we can describe the point where they currently are as a state of flight. They just wanted to abandon Christianity. It was not too difficult for Korean American youth to abandon Christianity, which they saw as a part of the oppressive white culture. The majority of Asian Americans believe that they are marginalized in the United States. And AsianAmerican youth in the United States do not fit in with cultural institutions tied to the Old Country, either. Thus, it is not difficult to see how an event such as 9/11 can easily unglue Korean American teens from Korean American churches and the Christianity they were taught in these churches. Since 9/11, many Korean American youths have been drifting away from the Korean American church without any clear direction. Interestingly enough, many Korean American churches are abandoning the pro-American position they held before 9/11. Since 9/11 was relatively recent, it is hard to assess completely the nature of the Korean American exodus from Korean American churches and the new direction of Korean American churches. Some churches are reporting over 90 percent of their youth leaving their church, currently. What this has done is create a very destabilizing reality for the Korean American community. The mass exodus away from Christianity without any clear direction has created a communal vacuum. The Korean American church still is the only real Korean cultural center. Sang Hyun Lee emphasizes the importance of Korean American churches: “Without them, for example, a communication with our second generation will not be possible.”40 Korean American churches tend to be conservative, evangelical churches. But their religious Christian conservatism is matched by their conservatism about Korean culture. When Korean Americans leave the Korean American church, they are not only leaving Christianity. They are in fact leaving the only real connection to Korean culture and the Korean American community available to them as an institution in America. It is still too early to tell what kind of impact this will have on individuals, the Korean American community, and the larger American society as a whole. The separation from Christianity was not the only reaction caused by 9/11. 9/11 created another extremist reaction among Koreans. Whereas some Koreans chose to abandon Christianity altogether and the only Korean communal center available to them, some Koreans became more aggressively conservative as

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Christians and held more firmly to the Korean cultural center of the Korean American church. Thus, it became more and more possible to hear Korean pastors preach from the pulpit against alcohol consumption and dancing. Korean clergy who had been moderate in their preaching tended to become more fundamentalist. And churchgoers followed this trend. Thus, in the past, they may have been willing to overlook certain things such as drinking among their churchgoing friends, but now Korean American laity has taken on almost a witch-hunting stance toward those who engage in drinking, gambling, or dancing. For many Korean American churches in Los Angeles, for instance, drinking came to be equated with being a non-Christian. If you drank alcohol, you could not be a Christian. Such a fundamentalist position came to dominate the popular Korean Christian discourse since 9/11. Such a fundamentalist trend is not present only among older generations of Korean Americans. Many Korean American teenagers and college students came to adopt aggressively fundamentalist positions. Formerly evangelical Christian groups became fundamentalist. Thus, it would not be surprising for Berkeley Korean Christians to say that a person who was not willing to take the bus 40 minutes to go to a conservative church was not a Christian at all. A person who drinks cannot be a Christian. This kind of fundamentalist Christian discourse came to dominate formerly moderate settings such as UC Berkeley and UCLA among parachurch and church groups. Some have complained that there was a legalistic dualism developing among some of these fundamentalist Christians. Korean Americans who emphasized that a person who did not take a bus 40 minutes to go to a Bible-believing church was not a Christian were often caught not being able to live up to the fundamentalist Christian standards they set for their communities. Thus, the bars were set aggressively high and the communities that established those rules often were seen as not observing those rules. This worked to create a greater dichotomy within the Korean American community. Korean Americans who left the church used this discrepancy to justify their departure from Christianity. Those in the fundamentalist Christian communities emphasized fundamentalist Christian rules even more to ensure that the violators come into line with the rules set for the Christian community. Before 9/11, Korean American Christians tended to exist in a broadly evangelical setting, but those days ended with 9/11. Many Korean teenagers left the Korean American church and Christianity altogether. Those who remained in the church did not know what to do and reacted by going in the opposite direction of fundamentalist Christianity. The dichotomized trend is continuing in the Korean American community. It seems that the trend will not stop in the foreseeable future. In terms of loyalty to America, this has had two divergent results. Those who tended toward fundamentalist Christianity tended to be loyal to the United States as a country. It is not surprising to find those who remained in Christianity joining the FBI and CIA, applying to West Point and the Naval Academy, and enlisting in ROTC programs. Christianity has been identified with the United States in Korean American churches for a long time, so this Korean American perception is the reason for these aggressive acts of loyalty to the United States. Of course, white evangelical Christians will be the first ones to tell them that

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America is not a Christian nation. As John MacArthur says, America is not the kingdom of Christ; the kingdom of Christ is in heaven. For Korean American Christians, this is an oxymoron. America is a Christian nation, so to be a Christian means to be loyal to the United States of America. Whereas Korean American Christians who were becoming more and more fundamentalist Christian became more and more loyal to the United States, those Korean Americans who left the church went the opposite direction. Typically, Korean Americans who left the church also silently renounced their allegiance to the United States. Thus, many Korean Americans who left the Korean American church ally themselves with China politically as well as philosophically. Whereas Korean American Christians tend to be anti-China and pro-America, Korean Americans who left the Christian church tend to be aggressively pro-China and tacitly anti-America. In an unprecedented way, many Korean Americans are drifting into socialist and communist ideologies right now, whereas such a phenomenon was practically nonexistent before 9/11. Thus, we have a situation where some Korean Americans will not think twice about betraying the United States to a foreign power because they do not identify with America. They have left Christianity and with it their fundamental loyalty to the United States of America, which they believe were founded on Christian principles, which they left behind. Thus, whereas it would have been impossible to see a Korean American abet China or North Korea in attacking the United States before 9/11, now there is a young generation of Korean Americans who despise Christianity and all that is related to it who may find themselves allying themselves with China or North Korea, lands they have never even visited. Of course, the trend is relatively new—less than five years old—so it is difficult to say with certainty. But the trend away from pro-America and toward pro-China is continuing among this group of Korean American youth, and the real significance will be felt in the next five to ten years.

NOTES 1. Won Moo Hurh defines the 1.5-generation Korean American in this way: “At this point of discussion, however, the 1.5 generation can ideally-typically be defined as bilingual and bicultural Korean American who immigrated to the United States in early or middle adolescence (generally between the ages of 11 and 16). Simply put, the adolescent immigration, bilingualism, and biculturalism constitute a unique sociocultural and existential context of Korean Americans whose life course appears to be quite different from that of the first and second generation immigrants” (Won Moo Hurh, “The 1.5 Generation: A Cornerstone of the Korean-American Ethnic Community,” in The Emerging Generation of Korean-Americans, ed. Ho-Youn Kwon and Shin Kim [Seoul: Kyung Hee University Press, 1993], p. 50). 2. The greatest wave of Korean immigration started in the late 1960s and in the 1970s because of two factors: (1) Korean President Park Chung-Hee’s positive emigration policy, and (2) the 1965 revision of United States immigration laws (P.L. 89-236) (Ji-Yeon Yuh, Beyond the Shadow of Camptown: Korean Military Brides in America [New York: New York University Press, 2002], p. 66). 3. Won Moo Hurh and Kwang Chung Kim, Korean Immigrants in America: A Structural Analysis of Ethnic Confinement and Adhesive Adaptation (Rutherford, NJ: Associated University Presses, 1984), p. 21.

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4. Hurh and Kim, p. 57. 5. Tae-Hwan Kwak and Seong Hyong Lee, The Korean-American Community: Present and Future (Seoul: Kyungnam University Press, 1991), p. 1. 6. Won Moo Hurh, The Korean Americans (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998), p. xv. 7. June Ha, “1.5 and 2.0 Generation of Korean Women,” in Kwon and Kim, p. 229. 8. Hurh, p. 164. 9. Hurh and Kim, p. 39. The Korean-American Treaty of 1882 is also known as The Chemulpo Treaty or The Treaty of Amity and Commerce. 10. Sunok Chon Pai, “The Changing Role of Korean-Americans,” in Kwon and Kim, pp. 218–19. 11. It would not be wrong to describe anti-white sentiment as historical for Korean Americans. Of the Korean males in the United States during 1912–24, those who could not find Koreans remained single until their death—some 3,000 males. Only 104 Korean males married non-Koreans during this period, and they married Asian-looking women (Romanzo Adams, Interracial Marriage in Hawaii [Montclair: Patterson Smith, 1937], pp. 336–37). 12. Chon S. Edwards, I Am Also a Daughter of Korea (Seoul: Mi-Rae-Mun-Wha-Sa, 1988), p. 111 [in Korean]. 13. Yuh, p. 3. 14. Hurh and Kim, p. 27. 15. Sang-O Rhee, “The Leaders of 21st Century Korean Communities in America: The Role of Second Generation Education,” in Kwak and Lee, p. 172. 16. Hurh and Kim, p. 47. 17. Warren Y. Kim, Koreans in America (Seoul: Po Chin Chai Printing Co. Ltd., 1971), p. 28. 18. Hurh and Kim, p. 134. 19. A study of Korean American Christians in Chicago revealed that 97 percent, regardless of Christian denomination, preferred an ethnically Korean church. Only 3 percent attended an American church that was not specifically ethnic Korean (Hurh, p. 107). 20. A 1979 survey shows that Koreans value their Korean identity. 94.7 percent of males and 94.4 percent of females were proud to be born ethnically Korean. Furthermore, 90.4 percent of the males and 89.2 percent of the females state that Korean language should be taught. Furthermore, over 60 percent were against intermarriage. And the majority of those who approved of intermarriage approved of it only on the basis of true love and understanding (Huhr and Kim, p. 79). 21. In this regard, the statement of Hurh and Kim is significant: “In sharp contrast to the findings on acculturation, most of the dimensions of ethnic attachment are not related to the length of residence in the United States. . . . [R]egardless of the length of residence, a high proportion of our respondents subscribe to Korean newspapers, prefer to associate with Koreans, and prefer to attend the Korean ethnic church. Almost all of them also indicate their strong sense of family priority, ethnic pride, and preference for teaching Korean language to their children. . . . The educational statuses also have no bearing on the degree of ethnic attachment. . . . Generally, most of the respondents show strong feelings of ethnic attachment regardless of the levels of their education.” (Hurh and Kim, p. 84). Anyone who visits a Korean church today can attest to the lasting impact of this reality as an integral Korean American experience. Furthermore, a visit to UCLA and UC Berkeley will prove most of this to be true for the youngest generation of Korean Americans, today. 22. A part of the reason for the emphasis in speaking Korean relates to Korean history during the Japanese period when Koreans were forbidden to speak Korean. Regarding this period, Sunny Che writes: “As one of the first colonial acts, Japan took the five-year-old crown prince of Korea to Japan to be reared in the Japanese imperial household and

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eventually married to a Japanese princess. She banned the Korean language and national symbols—flag, flower, and anthem—and instituted the Japanese laws and Japanese as the official language. The government bureaucracy, commerce, and schools were conducted all in Japanese” (Forever Alien: A Korean Memoir, 1930–1951 [Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company, 2000], p. 7). 23. Speaking Korean is very important to the Korean American community. According to the 1970 Census, 91 percent of the foreign-born Koreans stated that Korean was their primary language. And in the 1973 Asian-American Field Study of Koreatown, Los Angeles, 98 percent of Korean Americans said that they used Korean as their primary language (Eui-Young Yu, “Koreans in America: Social and Economic Adjustments,” in The Korean Immigrant in America, ed. Byong-Suh Kim and Sang Hyun Lee [Montclair: The Association of Christian Scholars in North America, Inc., 1980], p. 88). 24. Yong Choon Kim, “The Protestant Church and the Korean-American Community,” in Kwak and Lee, p. 198. 25. This comment by Hurh and Kim is very important to understanding the experience of second- and third-generation Korean Americans: “Simply put, the more closely Korean immigrants identify themselves with their WASP peers, the more they will experience heightened feelings of relative deprivation, social alienation, and identity ambivalence. At this point, the degree of the immigrant’s life satisfaction (psychological adaptation) and their desire for assimilation (sociocultural adaptation) may start to decline. To mitigate the problematic situation, some immigrants may shift their reference group back to their own ethnic group (Koreans) or some may seek their identity and reference group elsewhere . . . the relationship between the length of sojourn and the degree of adaptation (life satisfaction) may not be linear but rather quasicurvilinear.” (Hurh and Kim, p. 140). 26. Hurh, p. 121. 27. A recent survey shows 70 percent of all Los Angeles Koreans and 77 percent of all Chicago Koreans are active Christians (Hurh, p. 107). 28. Hurh, p. 106. 29. Hurh, p. 114. 30. Grant S. Lee, “The Future of Korean-American Buddhism,” in Kwak and Lee, p. 233. 31. In fact, Kim Samu and Sungsan worked primarily with white Americans and not Korean Americans (Lee, “The Future of Korean-American Buddhism,” p. 233). 32. In contrast, Korean Buddhist centers were not Korean cultural centers in America. Almost all major Korean Buddhist centers not only targeted white Americans, but Korean Buddhist monks trained white Americans to be their successors. In some Buddhist centers, 90 percent of the followers were white and 10 percent Asians (Lee, “The Future of KoreanAmerican Buddhism,” p. 245). 33. Bong-Youn Choy, Koreans in America (Chicago: Nelson Hall, 1979), p. 77. 34. The fact that Korean American identity became integrally intertwined with Christian identity is highlighted by Korea Week of February 1978. Only 12 percent of the total population in South Korea was affiliated with a Christian church. In contrast, 70 percent of Korean Americans at the comparable time were affiliated with a Christian church in the United States (Hurh and Kim, pp. 129–30). Many of the Korean Americans who were affiliated with a Christian church were recent converts to Christianity after their immigration. 35. This contrasts with the generic anti-American sentiment that has dominated South Korea for decades, especially as South Korea views the United States as its economic rival (Chongho Kim, “Temptation to Conform and Call to Transform,” in Kwon and Kim, p. 257). 36. From the earliest period of Korean immigration to the United States, there was the perception that the United States is a Christian country. This perception became ingrained in the Korean American consciousness. Hyung-Chan Kim criticizes this perception and

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even blames it as having had a negative impact on the Korean people. Kim writes: “It is tragic, particularly in view of the fact that so much of the energy and resources of the church were diverted to an unrealistic and naïve notion that the leaders and followers of ‘Christian America,’ when sufficiently supplicated by their fellow Korean Christians, would assist the Koreans in their fight against Imperial Japan” (Huyung-Chan Kim, “The History and Role of the Church in the Korean American Community,” in The Korean Diaspora: Historical and Sociological Studies of Korean Immigration and Assimilation in North America, ed. Hyung-Chan Kim [Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio, Inc., 1977], p. 60). 37. Sang Hyun Lee, “Called to Be Pilgrims: Toward a Theology within the Korean Immigrant Context,” in Kim and Lee, p. 40. 38. Sang Hyun Lee describes the nature of Korean Christianity: “Under the influence of the westernized Christianity, Korean cultural past has been thought of as something that we must leave behind us. We were brought up perhaps with a greater familiarity with such names as Moses, Joseph, Noah, and Santa Claus than with such names as Won Hyo, Lee Toi Ge, and even Tan Gun. I remember the shocking experience I had a few years ago when I realized that I do not know enough Korean religious and philosophical personages even to count on my fingers! Now here in America, our four thousand year old history is almost totally invisible” (Sang Hyun Lee, “Called to Be Pilgrims,” p. 53). Lee’s comments highlight the pro-Christian and pro-American (by extension) influence on Korean Christianity, which is even willing to abandon some of its cultural past and historical heritage in support of Christianity or what is perceived as a Christian culture by Korean Christians. 39. Although the Yi Dynasty of the Choson period (1392–1910) pushed Confucianism and persecuted Buddhists, Buddhism actually grew among the people more so than it did in times of peace. Even now, Buddhism claims the largest number of the Korean population (Yong-Joon Choi, Dialogue and Antithesis: A Philosophical Study on the Significance of Herman Dooyeweerd’s Transcendental Critique [Cheltenham: The Hermit Kingdom Press, 2006], pp. 276–78). 40. Lee, “Called to Be Pilgrims,” p. 65.

SUGGESTED READINGS Abelmann, Nancy, and John Lie. Blue Dreams: Korean Americans and the Los Angeles Riots. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995. Alexander, Jeffrey C., and Steven Seidman, eds. Culture and Society: Contemporary Debates. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. Baldassare, Mark, ed. The Los Angeles Riots: Lessons for the Urban Future. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993. Barringer, Herbert, Robert W. Gardner, and Michael J. Levin. Asians and Pacific Islanders in the United States. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1982. Berger, P., and T. Luckman. The Social Construction of Reality. New York: Doubleday, 1966. Bernal, M., and G. Knight, eds. Ethnic Identity: Formation and Transmission among Hispanics and Other Minorities. Albany: SUNY Press, 1993. Blalock, Hubert M. Power and Conflict: Toward a General Theory. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1989. ———. Toward a Theory of Minority Relations. New York: Wiley, 1967. Bonacich, Edna, and Lucie Cheng, eds. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994. Cohen, Nathan. The Los Angeles Riots: A Sociological Study. New York: Praeger, 1970. Douglas, Jack D. American Social Order. New York: Free Press, 1971. Eriksen, Thomas. Ethnicity and Nationalism. London: Pluto Press, 1993. Feagin, Joe R., and Clairece Booth Feagin. Discrimination American Style. Malabar: Robert E. Krieger Publishing, 1986.

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Franklin, John H., ed. Color and Race. Boston: Beacon, 1969. Gamson, William A. The Strategy of Social Protest. Belmont, NY: Wadsworth, 1990. George, Lynelle. No Crystal Stair: African-Americans in the City of Angels. London: Verso, 1992. Goffman, Erving. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. New York: Doubleday, 1965. Goldberg, David Theo. Racist Culture: Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning. Oxford: Blackwell, 1993. Gooding-Williams, Robert, ed. Reading Rodney King/Reading Urban Uprising. New York: Routledge, 1993. Gordon, Milton M. Assimilation in American Life: The Role of Race, Religion and National Origins. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964. Green, Charles. The Struggle for Black Empowerment in New York City: Beyond the Politics of Pigmentation. New York: Praeger, 1989. Hing, Bill Ong. Making and Remaking Asian America through Immigration Policy, 1850–1990. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993. Hodges, Harold M., Jr. Conflict and Consensus: An Introduction to Sociology. New York: Harper and Row, 1974. Kasinitz, Philip. Caribbean New York: Black Immigrants and the Politics of Race. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992. Kim, Illsoo. New Urban Immigrants: The Korean Community in New York. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981. Kinloch, Graham C. The Dynamics of Race Relations: A Sociological Analysis. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974. Kitano, Harry L. Race Relations. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1974. Kurokawa, Minako, ed. Minority Responses. New York: Random House, 1970. Kwon, Ho-Youn, ed. Korean Americans: Conflict and Harmony. Chicago: North Park College and Theological Seminary, 1994. Lee, Dae Kil, ed. The Current Status and Future Prospects of Overseas Koreans. New York: Research Institute on World Affairs, 1986. Lee, Shinyoung. Impact of Ethnic Identity on Psychological Well-Being among Korean Americans in the United States. Ph.D. dissertation, School of Social Welfare, State University of New York at Albany, 2001. Lewy, Thomas, and In Chul Choi. The Korean American Entrepreneur’s Guide to Franchising. Chicago: Columbia College, Chicago, and Korean American Community Services, 1994. Light, Ivan, and Edna Bonacich. Immigrant Entrepreneurs: Koreans in Los Angeles, 1965–1982. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988. Madhubuti, Haki R., ed. Why L.A. Happened. Chicago: Third World Press, 1993. Mangiafico, Luciano. Contemporary Asian Immigrants: Patterns of Filipino, Korean, and Chinese Settlement in the United States. New York: Praeger, 1988. Marger, Martin N. Race and Ethnic Relations: American and Global Perspectives. Belmont, NY: Wadsworth, 1991. Massey, Douglas, and Nancy A. Denten. American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993. McCarthy, Cameron, and Warren Crichlow, eds. Race, Identity, and Representation in Education. New York: Routledge, 1993. Min, Pyong Gap. Caught in the Middle. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996. ———. Ethnic Business Enterprise: Korean Small Business in Atlanta. Staten Island, NY: Center for Migration Studies, 1988. Muhlmann, Wilhelm E. Rassen, Ethnien, Kulturen: Moderne Ethnologie. Berlin: Luchterhand, 1964. Myrdal, Gunnar. An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy. New York: Harper and Row, 1944.

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Omi, Michael, and Howard Winant. Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1980s. New York: Routledge, 1986. Park, Andrew Sung. Racial Conflict and Healing: An Asian-American Theological Perspective. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1996. Park, Robert E. Race and Culture. Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1950. Petersen, William. Japanese Americans. New York: Random House, 1971. Roedinger, David R. The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class. London: Verso, 1991. Roosens, Eugeen E. Creating Ethnicity: The Process of Ethnogenesis. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1989. Rosald, Renato. Culture and Truth. Boston: Beacon Press, 1993. Rothschild, Joseph. Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework. New York: Columbia University Press, 1981. Schermerhorn, R. A. Comparative Ethnic Relations: A Framework for Theory and Research. New York: Random House, 1970. Scott, A. J., and E. R. Brown, eds. South Central Los Angeles: Anatomy of an Urban Crisis. Los Angeles: The Lewis Center for Regional Policy Studies, University of California, Los Angeles, 1993. Shaw, Marvin E., and Jack M. Wright. Scales for the Measurement of Attitudes. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967. Shibutani, Tomatsu, and K. M. Kwan. Ethnic Stratification. New York: Macmillan, 1965. Simpson, George E., and J. Milton Yinger. Racial and Cultural Minorities. New York: Harper, 1972. Sleeper, Jim. The Closest Strangers: Liberalism and the Politics of Race in New York. New York: Norton, 1990. Smith, Anna Deavere. Twilight: Los Angeles, 1992. New York: Anchor, 1994. Sonenshein, Raphael J. Politics in Black and White: Race and Power in Los Angeles. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993. Stone, John. Racial Conflict in Contemporary Society. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1985. Terkel, Studs. Race: How Blacks and Whites Think and Feel about the American Obsession. New York: Anchor Books, 1993. Totten, George O., III, and H. Eric Schockman, eds. Community in Crisis: The Korean Community after the Los Angeles Civil Unrest of April 1992. Los Angeles: Center for Multiethnic and Transnational Studies, University of Southern California, 1994. Turner, Victor. The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure. Chicago: Aldine, 1969. West, Cornel. Race Matters. Boston: Beacon Press, 1993. Wilson, William Julius. The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987. Wolf, Eric. Europe and the People without History. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982. Yu, Eui-Young, ed. Black-Korean Encounter: Toward Understanding and Alliance. Los Angeles: Institute for Asian American and Pacific Asian Studies, California State University, 1994. Yu, Eui-Young, and Edward Chang, eds. Multiethnic Coalition Building in Los Angeles. Los Angeles: Institute for Asian American and Pacific American Studies, California State University, 1995. Yu, Eui-Young, Earl H. Phillips, and Eun Sik Yang. Koreans in Los Angeles. Los Angeles: Koryo Research Institute and Center for Korean-American and Korean Studies, California State University, 1977.

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CHAPTER 10

Sacrificing the Paschal Lamb: A Road toward Peace Jean Donovan

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his chapter will address one of the ways in which the Catholic Church and its membership can help achieve the goals of the World Congress on World’s Religions after September 11, namely, to build bridges among the world’s religions so as to create a safer, more peaceful community on this earth. It will address questions raised by Professor Leo Lefebure, of Georgetown University in Washington, D.C., concerning the relationship between Christian worship and the ongoing violence prevalent in society. Dr. Lefebure presented a paper recently in which he noted that the theological arguments by Melito of Sardis in the second century, portraying Jesus as the paschal lamb, became the rationale used over the centuries to justify the violent Good Friday rituals directed toward the Jewish community.1 This chapter will explore the implications of the Catholic Church’s incorporation of the rituals of Passover as a foundation for our theology of worship, in particular the use of imagery of sacrificing the innocent lamb, Jesus, for the sins of many. Embedded in the rituals of Passover is the killing of innocent children.2 Where are we at this point in Christian history, that we must find our salvation by exacting the suffering of the innocent? And by permitting this violent symbolism to remain as a central expression of Catholic self-understanding, to what extent are we perpetuating the religious hatred and violence that exists in the world today? We need to refocus our imagination on the union of the divine and human in Jesus, and the promise that holds for the entire human race. It seems to me that we have to consciously and willingly sacrifice the paschal lamb imagery and symbolism, and redefine Christian worship in ways that are more life-giving, on behalf of global peace.

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THE CHALLENGE: RECONSIDER OUR ACCEPTANCE OF VIOLENCE IN RELIGIOUS RITUAL In his plenary address to the North American Academy of Liturgy in January 2004, Professor Leo Lefebure raised the issue of the relationship between religious rituals and violence. He presented a series of examples of the way in which Christianity, Islam, and Judaism incorporate rituals that both remember the victims of violence and provoke new acts of vengeance and reprisal. He stated: . . . rituals are mimetic in a two-fold sense; first, they often re-present acts of violence, making them present in symbolic form and thereby vivid in the consciousness of participants. But second, they often call forth more violence in imitation of the original injury. Ritual responses to violence are tragically ambiguous. They have proclaimed paths of peace and visions of social and cosmic harmony, but in practice rituals have repeatedly offered justifications for attacks on other groups deemed to be enemies. In the present global context of continuing conflict inspired at least in part by religions, I think it is worthwhile to explore the more problematic aspects of violence.3

When he gave this address, I would describe the response of the people around me as stunned. Professional liturgists, musicians, pastors, priests, and theologians who spend their lives facilitating prayer and communion with God in worship are inclined to see the positive value in the experience. And yet, the buzz in the room was that Professor Lefebure was saying something important, and the participants were listening. I, too, was stunned by what he was saying. In June of that same year, Professor Lefebure continued to pursue this line of thought with a paper he gave at the meeting of the Catholic Theological Society of America. He asked me to respond to his paper at that conference. This personal invitation to engage the issues with him eventually led to a paper I wrote for a theological conference at the University of Leuven, in Belgium, in November 2005.4 The immediate impetus for that paper came from an email from my seventeen-year-old daughter Kate. She and her high-school friends were studying the story of the Passover in their religion class and were having some problems. I have a question for you. We are discussing the story of Moses in Religion class right now. One of my friends, Meg, is struggling with the 10th plague. God killing children is an upsetting thought for her. We were talking about it on our free [period] today, but no one could come up with a good answer. I figured you would be a good person to ask (since after all, you know just a little about theology). What are your thoughts?5

It became clear to me that it was time to reconsider the way in which we have tolerated violence, especially violence against the innocent, as an acceptable, even laudable dimension of our religious ritual. And I came to see that the use of the image of Jesus as the paschal lamb and our ready acceptance of the Passover rituals as expressive of Christian self-understanding were embedded in the

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religious practices that Dr. Lefebure criticized. I would invite the reader to consider Dr. Lefebure’s challenge in his or her own religious practices.6

TO SACRIFICE ONE’S LIFE ON BEHALF OF THE OTHER To begin, a story. It was the first weekend of summer. The weather was warm, the river inviting. Grieving over the loss of their mother and wife, this small family, fishing poles and lunch in hand, heads out to play and laugh, live and enjoy the day with their friends. A father, two six-year-old twin boys, and Helen, a family friend, stand in the muddy riverbank, fishing poles in hand. It is the last weekend of May, the water still cold, the underwater currents running fast and strong. One of the twin boys, Eddie, slips and falls into the river. Almost in an instant, he’s pulled under the water and bobs downstream. Screaming, scrambling, people run back and forth along the bank. Bill, his father, jumps into the water. Helen follows him. Both are pulled along in the strong currents. Bill grabs Eddie, and lifts him over his head. Pushed down river, they float toward a pier. Quick hands grab Eddie. Bill has lost consciousness and slips under the water. John Hanson dives into the water, and brings him back to the surface. With the help of others on the pier, Bill and Helen are pulled from the water. Bill is not breathing. Mr. Hanson begins CPR. The paramedics arrive, but it’s too late; they can’t revive him. Bill is dead. Helen is taken to the hospital, in critical condition. Not with idle curiosity, but sincere sympathy, news of these events spread throughout the community. The local newspaper reported the story, and interviewed family and neighbors. One friend of Bill’s said, “What parent wouldn’t risk their own life for the life of their child? There’s no thought behind that action. He cared for them very much, and he did what he could to provide them a good life. Like any parent, he did what he had to do.”7 He did what he had to do. This heroic act of self-sacrifice seemed self-evident to many: what parent would not risk, even give up, their own life to save their child? This powerful image of self-sacrifice as a virtue, an ideal, is deeply embedded in Christian sensibilities and spirituality. Jesus preaches about not just loving one’s child, but loving one’s enemies.8 And in the powerful moments when he was gathered with his disciples at table shortly before his arrest and death, he inaugurated the rituals of the Eucharist, the bread and wine that became his body and blood. He proclaimed his death as salvific, effectively transforming evil and sinfulness into blessing and healing.9 For Catholics, the celebration of the ritual of the Eucharist has been a central aspect of worship throughout the centuries. But the true birth of Christianity did not come with Jesus’s death, for his followers scattered; rather it came with the glory of the resurrection, when Jesus overcame the very power of death itself. And the command to do as Jesus did was clear, “I give you a new commandment: love one another. As I have loved you, so you should also love one another.”10 Because we can readily understand the holiness of self-gift, when one human being loves another beyond self-interest, even to the point of accepting death for the other, and we can see how powerful an image the self-sacrifice of Jesus was to the early church, we need now to examine the nature of the Passover imagery to see what problems lie within it.

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IMAGE IN QUESTION: JESUS AS THE PASCHAL LAMB Why has the Christian community incorporated the story of the Passover as integral to the Christian message? And at what cost have we come to use the image of Jesus as the paschal lamb? How often do we think seriously and consider the actual content of the narrative that we have embraced? The experience recorded in the book of Exodus is centered on the conflict between Moses and the Pharaoh. God unleashes ten plagues on the people of Egypt, on behalf of Moses and the Israelites. The plagues begin when the rivers and waterways are turned to blood, polluting them and killing the fish. Then frogs emerge from the river and swarm their homes, then gnats, then flies. A pestilence kills the Egyptians’ livestock, and then boils cover their bodies. Hail rains down, beating down plants and splitting trees. Locusts eat whatever vegetation was not destroyed by the hail. The whole land is covered in darkness for three days and then, finally, the firstborn child of every family in Egypt is killed. The righteous Israelites are protected from these plagues, and through the ritual of Passover, as the blood of a lamb is shed, then poured onto the doorposts and lintel, their children are saved. Repeated throughout is the relentless “hardening” of Pharaoh’s heart purportedly inflicted by God as part of this Passover event (“The Lord hardened Pharaoh’s heart”11). How did this ritual of Passover become incorporated into Christian selfunderstanding, and celebrated within the Christian liturgy? Why has Jesus been named the paschal lamb? Biblical scholars can point to its inclusion in the New Testament.12 Lefebure notes the influence of On Pascha by Melito of Sardis (late second century).13 As part of the Office of Readings for Holy Thursday, a portion of the text reads: There was much proclaimed by the prophets about the mystery of Passover: that mystery is Christ, and to him be glory for ever and ever. Amen. . . . He was led forth like a lamb; he was slaughtered like a sheep. He ransomed us from our servitude to the world, as he had ransomed Israel from the hand of Egypt: he freed us from our slavery to the devil, as he had freed Israel from the hand of Pharaoh. He sealed our souls with his own Spirit, and the members of our body with his own blood. He is the One who covered death with shame and cast the devil into mourning, as Moses cast Pharaoh into mourning. He is the One who smote sin and robbed iniquity of offspring, as Moses robbed the Egyptians of their offspring. He is the One who brought us out of slavery into freedom, out of darkness into light, out of death into life, out of tyranny into an eternal kingdom; who made us a new priesthood, a people chosen to be his own for ever. He is the Passover of our salvation.14

What does it mean to say that the mystery of Passover is the mystery of Christ? Does he argue for the necessary suffering of Jesus to redeem sinful humanity? Or does it mean the necessary suffering of the other, the nonbeliever, whose death brings about new life? Or both? If we revisit the story of Bill, and the way in which he saved the life of his son, the impact of what I am saying may be clearer. In order to save Eddie, Bill is not going to jump into the water. Rather, forces will be unleashed to punish the river for its coldness, the people on the banks for enjoying themselves. Fish will choke as the waters become polluted, and all of the children playing there must die. All

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this must happen, for Eddie to survive. And Bill, his father, will readily agree to the spread of this evil, for what matters only is saving his own son. What an outrageous, absurd claim. Right? And yet, are we not proclaiming the death of the innocent and the destruction of the earth’s inhabitants, when we embrace the story of the ten plagues of Egypt? As Catholics, when we proclaim the centrality of the Paschal Mystery, are we not accepting this narrative as revelatory of our beliefs? And the question for us today is, considering the times we live in, can we in good conscience allow this violent ritual remembering of Passover to define our Catholic understanding of the sacrifice of the mass, in the emphasis on the innocent suffering of Jesus as salvific, and in the structure of the Sunday liturgy? Especially if we recall Professor Lefebure’s line of thought, that ritually revisiting this violence actually engenders new violence. I would argue that this Passover narrative is dangerous to the people who live today. To understand how dangerous this narrative, and others, can be, it would be worthwhile to take time to consider the power of stories to affect identity, opinion, and emotional commitments, and to instigate trouble.

THE POWER OF DESTRUCTIVE NARRATIVES Embedded in the ritual of Passover lies a story. When retold, that story takes on new life, new importance, to the people present at the retelling. Stories tell us about things that have happened, and what they should mean to us today. What are the possible messages that could be learned from the retelling of the Passover stories? It seems to me that they are destructive narratives permitting wholesale violence against those deemed to be “the enemy.” I would turn your attention to Robert Schreiter’s text, Reconciliation.15 He is a professor of doctrinal theology at Catholic Theological Union in Chicago. In his work in Latin America and South Africa, Bob Schreiter began to build a theology of reconciliation that would help heal communities torn apart by violence. As he explores the way in which narratives undergird the power of oppression, he identifies “narratives of the lie.” Violence tries to destroy the narratives that sustain peoples’ identities and substitute narratives of its own. These might be called narratives of the lie, precisely because they are intended to negate the truth of a people’s own narratives. . . . The assumption is that the lie will come to be accepted as the truth if the original narrative can be suppressed or at least co-opted. Any attempt on the part of a population to return to its older, favored narratives is met with violence or the threat of violence. Random violence also may be used to punctuate the fragility of a population’s safety. . . . How do we actually overcome the suffering caused by such violence and move to reconciliation and forgiveness? . . . overcoming the narrative of the lie, a narrative that insinuates its way into our individual and collective psyches by coiling itself around our most basic senses of security and self. It is only when we embrace a redeeming narrative that we can be liberated from the lie’s seductive and cunning power.16

The narrative of the people of Egypt, their culture, history, religious beliefs, their place in God’s world, in God’s loving embrace, in God’s plan for the human race, is eradicated by this narrative of the lie. God so hated the people of Egypt that

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God would reign down terror and destruction and heart-wrenching sorrow on them to punish them. And Moses and the Jewish people must accept and believe this Passover narrative as good, in order to secure their place in God’s eyes, their place in the Promised Land. How can the Passover stories be anything but destructive of human life, love, and community? And once again, why would the Christian community allow this narrative to define the way in which Christ becomes united with the human race, and with the people he chose to serve? This question is particularly poignant since biblical scholars point out that the events recorded in Exodus of the Passover may very well have no basis in historical fact.17 It would be best to let this narrative die. The responsible thing to do is to move away from this destructive narrative, and move toward those that will heal the wounds of religious hatred, racism, and violence. Christine Smith, Associate Professor of Preaching at Union Theological Seminary, writes in an article entitled “Sin and Evil in Feminist Thought,” “in my own work, resistance has become the guiding word. Part of our resistance to evil must be our work that is theological in nature and content. To provide critiques of theologies of the cross that justify and condone human suffering of every description is an act of resistance.”18 On behalf of my daughter, her friends, and her generation, I choose to resist the narratives of Passover as in any way expressive of my Christian faith. I will not support the destruction of a people, their homes, crops, animals, and children as the path to salvation. And in our worship, rather than to focus on Jesus as a lamb to be slaughtered, I would argue that the theological foundation of the liturgy needs a different focus: that of the incarnation.

LITURGICAL REFOCUSING: THE WORD MADE FLESH The challenge for Catholics seems clear: sacrifice the imagery and symbolism of the paschal lamb, on behalf of global peace, on behalf of the children born today who need a better world than the one we are giving them. I would not say that this is an impossible task. In fact, just this past week I presented this challenge to a group of Catholic priests, all of whom are engaged in full-time ministry, leading parishes filled with ordinary and extraordinary people, all struggling to find meaning, purpose, and happiness in their lives. These priests, given some time to assimilate the depth of the problems and the faith and imagination needed for solutions, seemed willing and able to take up the charge. Find a life-giving way to celebrate the gift of God’s own self in Jesus to the world. None of them seemed angry with me for challenging ancient and well-known symbols. Last year when I wrote the paper for the Leuven conference, I suggested that perhaps the Western tradition needs to be inspired by the spirituality of the liturgy of the East, and the centrality of the incarnation in worship. The gift of the incarnation is the redeeming gift of God, uniting humanity with the divine. St. Athanasius, a fourth-century bishop, considered the question of the meaning of Jesus’s life on earth in On the Incarnation. In many ways, Melito and Athanasius faced the same hostile world, wrote apologetically about their faith in Christ with the same fervor, and focused on Jesus’s suffering as instrumental, but Athanasius declared the salvific importance of the incarnation.

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We have seen that to change the corruptible to incorruption was proper to none other than the Savior himself, Who in the beginning made all things out of nothing; that only the Image of the Father could re-create the likeness of the Image in men, that none save our Lord Jesus Christ could give to mortals immortality.19

The gift of God is immortality. Modern-day Orthodox theologian Father George Dion Dragas, drawing inspiration from St. Athanasius’ statement, that Jesus “became human so that we may become divine,” argues that “the Son’s inhomination is an eschatological (i.e., final and irreversible) but also saving event.”20 Father Dion emphasizes the holistic nature of the celebration of the life, ministry, death, and resurrection of Jesus within the Orthodox liturgy. In the Divine Liturgy, the central act of Orthodox worship, we celebrate the whole saving economy of the Incarnate son of God. His descent from heaven and his birth at Bethlehem is represented liturgically by the Prothesis. His public ministry is represented by the Liturgy of the Catechumens. His entry into Jerusalem, followed by his Last or Mystical Supper, his death, burial, resurrection and ascension, are represented by the Liturgy of the Faithful. These three parts constitute the context of the mystery and glorification of the Triune God. Here we have the celebration or representation of the twin mystery of the faith, which rests on the two realities of the Trinity and the Incarnation.21

Father Dion argues for the embodiment of incarnational theology in the liturgy. What if the celebration of the incarnation would take on a more prominent role in Roman Catholic worship? If the incarnation became central to the worship, it would be reflected throughout the liturgy. In the opening prayers as the liturgy begins, not only would voices be raised in praise of God, and in expressions of humility in face of one’s failings, but words of gratitude should and would be spoken. The community should celebrate, truly celebrate, the gift of life, family, friends, work, and leisure. The ability to think, and breathe, and smile, to laugh and talk—the gift of life itself would be recalled with fervor. And not only laments for our failings, but our words would ring out with what we actually did right this week. We are silent about the good in our lives. This should change. To celebrate the incarnation we would have to remember that the homily is a reflection on the good news of salvation, not a critique of our sinfulness, or a plea for the financial needs of the parish. The prayers of the faithful should include all of humanity, not only in its suffering, but in its joy. Most churches pray for the church leadership, the incidents of the week that caused harm, for vocations, the sick, and the dead. During holy week, we mention non-Catholics, and pray for them. Let’s pray for the whole human race every week. And why not add a thought or two of celebration, for the ecumenical movement, for social movements that build ties and help neighborhoods? And after the consecration and consumption of the body and blood that Jesus has given to us, why not reflect on the union and communion that have been achieved through this act of faith? God becomes united with us in Jesus. And that work of divinizing the human being is taking place. Since the Catholic Church celebrates the Eucharist each and every week, the possibility of reflecting on the transformative power of the incarnation within the

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Eucharist is readily available. Seeing the good in ourselves and others, seeing us as part of the human race, seeing what we share in common, what binds and holds us together as a community no matter the diversity, these would be words and actions that bring healing. And maybe help to end the culture of violence that surrounds us.

CONCLUSION It seems to me that in today’s world, we need to refocus our imagination on the union of the divine and human in Jesus, and the promise that holds for the entire human race. We have so emphasized the suffering of the cross in our liturgical expressions that we may very well be falling into the trap of encouraging the imitation and reenactment of violence in real life. To take Leo Lefebure’s challenge seriously calls us to reconsider our narratives, especially our association with the Passover narratives of Exodus.

NOTES 1. Leo Lefebure, “Memory, Mimesis, Healing: Ritual Responses to Violence in the Abrahamic Traditions,” Proceedings of the North American Academy of Liturgy (2004), pp. 41–63. 2. Exodus 12:29–36. 3. Lefebure, p. 42. In his address, Professor Lefebure focuses on the Christian use of the Passover imagery to blame Jews for the death of Jesus, leading to violence during Holy Week against Jews, to the violence between Moslem sects during the day of remembering the martyrdom of Husayn, the grandson of Mohammed, and the hatred of the other evoked in the Jewish feast of Purim. 4. “The Incarnation in Hiding: Must Our Worship Be Built on the Suffering of the Innocent?” (paper presented at the Leuven Encounters in Systematic Theology Conference V, November, 2005) 5. January 13, 2005. 6. It is not my place to in any way comment on the way the Jewish community interprets and incorporates the violence against the Egyptians within their celebration of Passover. A simple survey of some current articles shows, though, that it is an issue that is being addressed. For example, Thomas Mann points to a Haggadah, “Our triumph is diminished by the slaughter of the foe,” from A Passover Haggadah, 2d rev. ed., Central Conference of American Rabbis, ed. Herbert Bronstein (New York: Penguin, 1982), pp. 48–49, in his article “Passover: The Time of Our Lives,” Interpretation 50, no. 3 (July 1996). 7. Nate Guidry, “Father drowns trying to save son,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, May 30, 2006, A-1, A-6; and Jonathan D. Silver, “Boater missing in 3rd incident,” Pittsburgh PostGazette, May 31, 2006, A-1, A-8. 8. Luke 6:27. 9. Matthew 26:26–30. 10. John 13:34. 11. Exodus 11:10. 12. Norman Theiss points to 1 Peter 1:17–21 in “The Passover Feast of the New Covenant,” Interpretation 48, no. 1 (January 1994). 13. Lefebure, p. 43.

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14. “The Lamb That Was Slain—Melito of Sardis,” from the website of Dr. Marcellino’s The Crossroads Initiative, www.dritaly.com. Dr. Marcellino refers to this excerpt as a “wonderful homily,” apparently immune to the significance of Melito’s praise for the killing of Egyptian children. 15. Robert Schreiter, Reconciliation (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1992). 16. Schreiter, pp. 34–36. 17. Carroll Stuhlmueller, C.P. wrote in his chapter “The Foundations for Mission in the Old Testament”: “If a pivotal or key position of Israel’s religion, such as the exodus out of Egypt or the acquisition of the Promised Land, left no trace in the archives of Egyptian or Canaanite nations, can we honestly characterize these events as ‘historical?’” (Senior and Stuhlmueller, p. 11). 18. Christine Smith, “Sin and Evil in Feminist Thought,” Theology Today 50, no. 2 (1993): 208–19. 19. St. Athanasius, On the Incarnation, 20, http://www.spurgeon.org/~phil/ history/ath-inc.htm. 20. Father George Dion Dragas, “The Incarnation and the Holy Trinity,” Greek Orthodox Theological Review 43, no. 1–4 (1998): 257. St. Athanasius, De Incarnatione, 54, in Dragas, p. 257. 21. Dragas, p. 272.

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CHAPTER 11

Seeking the Peace of the Global City of Knowledge of God after 9/11 Aaron Ricker

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he confluence in 2006 of a Conference on World’s Religions after September 11, a (CSSR/CTS) Conference on The City: A Festival of Knowledge, and a (CETA) Conference on Seeking the Peace of the City set me thinking.1 These efforts to relate theological/religious knowledge to urban life on the one hand, and national disaster on the other, made my thoughts turn toward Augustine’s Civitate Dei. What might a post-9/11 North American city of God look like? How might the peace be kept in that city? The more I thought about it, the less quixotic the question seemed, because (as I will suggest below) Augustine’s situation was, in many ways, not so very different from our own.

SEEKING PEACE IN AUGUSTINE’S POLEMICAL CITY Augustine’s City of God is like a long-burning match. It owes the lasting heat and light of its inspiration to kindling contradiction—the right question “striking” the right mind, and “rubbing it the wrong way,” at the right time. The question, famously, was this: as a Christian and a Roman citizen, how could Augustine explain the fact that dignified, civilized Roma had been exposed by her new divine patron, Israel’s “Mighty King, Lover of Justice,” and Jesus Christ his “Prince of Peace,” to the humiliating rape of barbarian conquest? Augustine’s answer—his City—was therefore conceived in controversy and contradiction. This fact is partly responsible for, and not a little exacerbated by, his decision to address the question of Christian theodicy and the sack of Christian Rome in the form of a contradiction—a polemic “Against the Pagans,” in the words of his subtitle. P. R. L. Brown writes that “[a]bove all, De

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Civitate Dei is a book of controversy,” and concludes that this simple fact has complex consequences when it comes to describing and discussing the book’s political arguments: It should never be treated as though it were a static, complete photograph of Augustine’s thought. It reads like a film of a professional boxing championship. . . . Augustine is a really stylish professional: he rarely relies on the knock-out; he is out to win the fight on points. It is a fight carried on in twenty-two books [over more than] ten years. . . . To try to extract from this infinitely flexible book a rigidly coherent system of political ideas is like trying to square the circle: it is a problem that has fascinated many great minds, and baffled all of them.2

As if to perfect the dynamism—not to say confusion—of this picture, Augustine’s City was published serially, which most likely exacerbated its tendency to digression, and it was written with widely varying audiences in mind.3 At this point a scholarly excuse presents itself, and I accept it gladly: I have no particular reason to try to cultivate a great medievalist mind for myself and then baffle it. I will not, therefore, attempt to make Augustine systematic where he has chosen to be occasional—I will not try to square Augustine’s circular boxing ring. I will instead take advantage of the para-scholarly context of this volume, and simply point out general currents of thought in the City of God that look particularly relevant to any discussion of religion and peace in a post-9/11 world. The most obvious point of contact has just been touched upon: Augustine wrote his City because Christian Rome had been seriously wounded by the Visigoths, a visibly similar (i.e., Christian) but equally visibly alien (i.e., Arian) and hostile group. The great city’s entire colonial satellite system had been destabilized, and its devotees disillusioned. Augustine wrote at the time that some of his contemporaries “began to blaspheme . . . more ferociously and bitterly than before.”4 The political event of Rome’s humiliation involved, in short, a serious “psychological impact,” and some serious theological distress.5 “Rome [was] suffering, it was thought, because she ha[d] forsaken the gods of her fathers in favour of a God Who counsel[led] meekness and submission.”6 To religion scholars, this story of a time long, long ago in a land far, far away has a surprisingly familiar ring. The imperial Rome of our time, the United States, has been wounded by a splinter religious group that, like the U.S. majority, lays some claim to the heritage of Abraham—a monotheistic “people of the book” like themselves, but that is nevertheless identifiably “other.” The U.S. umbrella of control and confidence has been visibly shaken by this cruel and humiliating attack, and part of this destabilization is, as with ancient Rome, to be found in the religious/theological sphere. “How could God let this happen?” many people asked, and some concluded, like their ancient Roman counterparts before them, that corrupt and/or meek religion was to blame. They blamed anti-religious secularism, or sinful complacency in the name of tolerance, or both. Faced with ideas like these, I am found, like Augustine, in the position of a latter-day Deuteronomist, trying to defuse and counter claims that disaster has come because “that old-time religion” has been wrongly neglected. Just as Jeremiah had to defend against the idea that abandoning Ishtar had opened Israel to harm and want, and Augustine had to defend against the idea that abandoning Mars

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had exposed Rome to attack, anyone writing a City of God for today would, in my opinion, need to defend against the idea that the slow death of state-sanctioned prayer and creationist teachings in schools, the banning of religious texts such as the ten commandments from secular courthouse walls, and the decline of “one Christian nation over all” thinking in general is to blame for the tragedy of September 11. Undertaking such a project would thus inevitably, in my opinion, force its writer into arguing that the many and various religious and so-called irreligious groups of our world can and should coexist peacefully. That is, at least, what I would do. At this point, many discriminating readers will begin to suspect that I am comparing myself to Augustine, and that I am suggesting that we can all just get along. Please let me clear away those doubts: I am comparing myself to Augustine, and I am saying that we can all get along. There are, obviously, crucial distinctions to be made: in comparing myself to Augustine, for example, I do not pretend to have his abilities or his authority. I do, though, find myself, like him, in the position of a religion scholar and religious thinker, intimately connected in political and cultural terms to the wounded imperial power in question and yet a foreigner with various loyalties of my own. Perhaps more to the point, I find myself, like him, writing about the disaster years later in retrospect, and find myself answering questions about the ups and downs of so-called real and earthly cities with questions about ideal and spiritual cities. As for suggesting that we in North America (and by extension the world) can all get along, it must be understood that I am not (and this is crucial) asserting that we can do so because we are all really saying the same thing. I will explain what I am saying soon enough, but for the moment it is enough to understand that my belief that we can all get along even though we are not all saying the same thing would make my City of God somewhat different from Augustine’s.

A DIFFERENT APPROACH TO DIALOGUE WITH “THE PAGANS” Although my City of God would, like Augustine’s, naturally find it necessary to address the question of how Christianity related to other forms of religious wisdom and practice, it would not treat them as hostile systems opposed to, or well-meaning but inferior substitutes for, Christianity as I understood that faith.7 Augustine’s idea of Christian identity led him to spend a great deal of time and energy opposing heretics, and to build his City as a bulwark “against the pagans,” in the words of his famous subtitle.8 He was careful, for example, to mock the wisdom of the Egyptians as well as that of the Greeks.9 Might it not have been possible, though, for him to build a city of God for the pagans instead? I consider myself to be as Christian as Augustine, but I wonder: even if Christians must continue to imagine “pagans” in the etymological sense of anyone who through some inexplicable backwardness manages to be happy outside our city, can we not imagine cities of God that are built in such a way as to help us go out to meet them, or at the very least invite them in? I wonder if we might even have a special in, or an edge, as we consider ourselves to be living in a global village, in imagining/building cities of God for the “pagans.” Of course, any such modern attempt would seek and find ample ancient resources. It would perhaps find justification in traditional material such as Isaiah

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19:25: “Blessed be Egypt my people, and Assyria the work of my hands.” A post9/11 City of God might well ask its audience to imagine a prophet presenting such an oracle today. Imagine a priest delivering a message to the White House, wherein Jesus blesses Iran and Iraq, and calls them “my people.” Imagine an imam delivering a message to the Saudi court or to some little al-Qaeda cell, in which Allah coos over “America the work of my hands.” At best, such prophets would be dismissed as unrealistic bleeding hearts. At worst, they would (like Isaiah) be violently attacked themselves, as traitors. My post-9/11 City of God, on the other hand, would seek to understand and apply the scandalous optimism (dare I say the pluralist hope?) of Isaiah 19:25. What, for instance, are we to make of the offerings “the nations” bring to the God of Israel in the new holy cities of Isaiah’s vision?10 Could not some of these offerings be thought of as philosophical or theological offerings? The Jewish and Christian Bibles are emphatic about the need for, indeed primacy of, such offerings. The gospels tell us, for example, that Jesus quoted Israel’s shema when asked to name the most crucial requirement of God, and that when he did, he specifically added/underlined the need for a loving offering of “all one’s mind.”11 Could not a vision that expected the “other” of the “pagan” nation—including even the often-demonic figure of Egypt and Assyria—to be accepted by God along with their offerings allow respect or at least openness when considering the offerings of its “pagan” and “other” mind? It is true that Isaiah’s vision has a pronounced tendency toward theology that we would call eschatological, but I do not consider that a reason to exclude its picture of Zion from theological imagination and analysis directed toward my own time. I am, in this way, not straying far from Augustine. He viewed his city of God as being one of two spiritual cities that transcended time and space, and found themselves “intermingled” in this life.12 Now, for me at least, this image of human life as a choice between the citizenships of two timeless cities is reminiscent of the “two cities” Barbara Rossing has identified in the theo-ethical exhortation of another eschatological work, that is, the book of Revelation.13 I admit that the decision to bring Revelation into my discussion of Augustine and the City of God has its ironies, given that in Revelation Rome is the pagan and the destroyer. I know, too, that every generation thinks Revelation is talking about them. I wonder, though: what if that is Revelation’s aim? Many of the book’s most remarkable strategies, such as its insistently vague symbolism, its constant toggling between future realities and liturgies in the present tense, and so on, certainly seem to allow such a reading. What if Revelation actually does want its audiences to think that it is somehow all about their own time? What if Revelation is right? How might Revelation be about us today? One interesting point for our purposes might be the fact that in Revelation’s city of God, there is no sea. Once the evil city (“Babylon”) is gone, and the vision of the new heavens and earth has come with the divine city of New Jerusalem, “there [is] no more sea.” This odd detail has been explained by some as symbolizing the end of the foreign oppressors and forces of chaos symbolized elsewhere by seas and sea monsters.14 The book of Revelation’s insistent negative water and sea imagery has been interpreted as a condemnation of Roman-style colonial militarism; Rome’s armies traveled by sea.15 It has also been interpreted in economic terms, as the end of the Roman empire’s unfair trade, which depended upon sea traffic.16

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Such explanations make a lot of sense. What if, though, we add the possibility that the disappearance of the sea could also be related to theological colonialism and foreignness, and to economies of ideas? It is a truism of our time and place that there are no oceans for Internet users. Knowledge of God can find its way from Korea to Canada in seconds, and all lands are indeed, in theory at least, now capable of bearing all theological fruits in our contemporary approximation of the timelessly present apocalypse. It seems to me, therefore, that some of the Information Age hype is true, and that the economy of ideas really has been utterly transformed for many of us, allowing us to participate (however imperfectly) in a city of God in which “the knowledge of God” can, in the prophet’s words, “cover the earth like water covers the sea.” The approach of my North American City of God for the present day to other religions would therefore turn out to be very different from Augustine’s. At this point, though, one might reasonably wonder: is it realistic to expect that we can gain knowledge of God from our neighbors, including potentially in this case our fellow global villagers? Is it realistically possible, to be more specific, for people who identify as Christians to see that they have things to learn from nonChristians, as well as things to share? For my part, I wonder why not. One Christian approach that could make it work is the one I have elsewhere called “Conversatianity.” A Conversatian Christianity would take Jesus’s claim in John’s gospel to be the truth very seriously, and thus approach intrareligious and interreligious dialogue accordingly. A Conversatian understanding of dialogue within the global village could, in my view, quite easily support the writing of a Christian City of God for the Pagans.

A CONVERSATIAN APPROACH TO DIALOGUE When it comes to truth, “Jesus Christ says something rather remarkable,” as John C. Medaille recently pointed out. “He claims to be ‘the Way, the Truth, and the Life.’ This means that the truth is, ultimately, not some object, such as a pure and distinct idea, but a subject, an acting, self-aware person.”17 Now, a personal truth would, like any person, naturally always seem different to different observers, and yet always be the same. This Johannine view of truth could thus explain the shocking universalism of that gospel’s opening assertion that the “light” that is Christ the Logos somehow “enlightens every human being.”18 From this point of view, we can also better see and better understand the fact that John’s famous Logos prologue exhibits a strong Conversatian character. In John’s two simple lines, the God of the book of Genesis who creates with a word is related to the Word (Logos) seen by Greek philosophy behind creation, then to the Lady Wisdom (Hokmah) whom Jewish Wisdom literature sees behind creation, and finally to the Cosmic Christ incarnated in Jesus.19 What I call Conversatianity, then, seems—far from being new—to be an established implicit Christian approach to truth. It is well-known, for example, that perfectly orthodox Christians worship a trinity who is, in words attributed to St. Gregory, “at the same time both unified and differentiated . . . a strange and paradoxical diversity-in-unity and unity-indiversity.”20 Orthodox Christology further asserts that this paradoxical God

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became “both fully divine and fully human” in Jesus of Nazareth, making Christian dogma Conversatian at the core. The Christian Bibles are also highly Conversatian texts, and include many assertions and stories that differ sharply.21 All Christian Bibles, for example, include the four gospel writers’ highly contradictory accounts of who came to the resurrected Jesus’s tomb and when, how many angels they saw there, and what happened next. Such contradictory accounts—like all other famous scriptural inconsistencies, both real and apparent—could have been edited and harmonized, but apparently the Christians who collected and assembled them were far more comfortable with “scriptural contradictions” than Christians are today. Examples could, of course, be multiplied at great length. Paul’s letters tell us that Christians “were saved,” and “are being saved,” and “will be saved.”22 In the gospels, Jesus teaches that the kingdom of God is both here already unnoticed and “coming soon in a way that will be impossible to ignore,” and so on.23 These early editors shared—or at least respected—the Conversatian approach of Christianity’s sacred texts. Finally, it seems highly significant from a Conversatian point of view that all Christian Bibles include material from texts and systems commonly called nonbiblical and non-Christian. The Hebrew Bible cites many scriptures that are lost completely. One reads of the book of the Wars of Yahweh, the book of Jashar, the Acts of Solomon, Visions of Iddo the Seer, and so on.24 The New Testament, for its part, quotes “pagan” and extracanonical sources quite freely. Acts 17.28, for example, paraphrases Aratus’ Phaenomena 5. 1 Corinthians 15.33 quotes Menander’s Thais, Frg. 218. Titus 1.12 quotes Epimenides’ De Oraculis/Peri Chresmon. Jude 14–15 quotes 1 Enoch 1.9 as an authority, and 2 Peter 2.4–5 also cites Enochic material. Not only, then, do the Christian Bibles model intrareligious dialogue (i.e., conversation between different Christian systems of thought); they model interreligious dialogue as well (i.e., conversation with non-Christian systems of thought). For many Christians, this is a difficult lead to follow. They are willing to accept the Gospel of John’s use of the pagan Greek Logos concept, but they do not want to think about the implications of such Christocentric syncretism when it comes to engaging their own pluralistic societies. They are willing to accept that Christian life is, as Edward Moore argues, living in and according to the Logos of John’s gospel, but they are not willing to engage that Logos in any other extra-Christian guise, even though John’s gospel also says that the Logos of Christ “enlightens every human being.”25 Many Christians would be unwilling, for example, to think that if John’s gospel were written today it might begin with, “In the beginning was the Dao.” Such language would make them very uncomfortable, even though it is a perfectly logical way to follow John 1’s lead, and even though this is, in fact, exactly the way in which some Chinese Bibles render John 1.1, due to Daoism’s emphasis on kenosis and humility, its concept of a preexistent and pervasive creative power, and other attributes. These translations go on to quote Jesus as saying, “I am the Dao.”26

CONVERSATIANITY AND ISLAM In the aftermath of 9/11, though, most North Americans are more likely to ask if my Conversatian approach could possibly work with Islam rather than Daoism. As far as I can see, the answer is a clear yes, even on the most literal

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creedal level, and at the points usually considered most deadly to dialogue between Christianity and Islam. The most obvious example is probably the famous Qur’anic denials of Jesus’s divinity. These passages in the Qur’an, though, always take the form of warnings against polytheism, against any Messiahs too proud to be earthly creatures or to be called God’s apostle, and against mythological ideas of literal (sexual) divine impregnation.27 A careful Conversatian approach to dialogue with Islam might very well note that orthodox Christians oppose all of these ideas too, thus opening the door for a discussion of a range of ideas about what the Qur’an might mean when it says that Jesus was a “Spirit from God . . . the Messiah . . . His Word cast into Mary.”28 If one is open to the common Muslim view that the Qur’an is capable of bearing many interpretations (one scholar proposed “308,800 potential interpretations” for every single verse!), the door between Christian and Islamic thought may prove easy to open quite wide.29 Some people may even find that they can become comfortable walking freely back and forth through it, or simply standing with a foot on each side. Once again, please understand that we do not point all of this out in order to suggest that only Christians and/or their friends truly understand Islam. I am only trying to identify examples of potential common ground being wasted by the non-Conversatian Christian majority’s present approach to Islam. A truly Conversatian Christianity would not, after all, take the form of a colonial religious tourism that sought to absorb other traditions. It would not seek to identify good ideas as confused Christian ideas. It would not even confine its energy and focus to identifying and building areas of agreement. As an approach that offered Christian truth to—and sought Christian truth in—the non-Christian “other,” a Christian Conversatianity would also welcome constructive disagreements, as well as useful concepts that only non-Christian systems have formulated; concepts that are not readily Christianized and yet seem to Christians to hold truth and beauty. Such an approach would, in my view, allow Christians to share and to learn about the personal truth they love, and to be true to their roots by growing. In fact, I think it is important to note in concluding this section that although a Conversatian City of God would differ from Augustine’s in being written for instead of against “the pagans,” I would argue that it would thus be extending— not opposing—Augustine’s project. After all, even his exclusivist city found room to admit non-Jews such as Job into the “supernal fatherland” of Israel, and even claims the pagan Erythraean Sybil as a citizen in good standing, through a creative bit of textual criticism.30

A DIFFERENT VIEW OF VIOLENCE Another area wherein a post-9/11 city of God would need, in my view, to oppose or extend Augustine’s work is in its thinking about violence. It is wellknown, for example, that although Augustine considered wars (even just wars) to be a great evil, he did not oppose war per se, preferring instead to Christianize Cicero’s idea of the just war.31 In my opinion, though, 9/11 and its aftermath work against such justifications, however ancient and venerable.

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The bare fact that both Bush and bin Laden were undoubtedly, in their own minds, following Augustine’s just-war requirements, and the bare fact that many people (including myself) manage to disagree with both of them categorically and simultaneously, seem to me to throw the real-world value of Augustine’s system into hopeless doubt. Augustine’s own passing notice of the sad reality that only a just state really deserves allegiance, but states as we know them are never just, suffices to hamstring his just-war theory from the start, as it not only raises the question of when a war has ever been really just according to the principles he lays out, it also makes one of those principles impossible to satisfy, specifically the necessity of a demonstrably just motive for the war in question, determined by a just and legitimate government.32 When I further note that Augustine’s City equates membership in the divine city with past renunciation of, and future freedom from, war, I cannot help but wonder if a post-9/11 city of God that opposed war itself, instead of simply bemoaning it, might not be said to take Augustine’s insights more seriously than he did.33 I also think it might be possible to correct Augustine by taking him more seriously than he did when thinking about the possible meaning of political violence.

A DIFFERENT APPROACH TO THE MEANING OF VIOLENCE I should probably pause to defend the idea that violence is meaningful. One often hears the phrase “senseless violence,” especially in reference to violence perpetuated by an official enemy. This phrase is useful because it effectively excuses both the speaker and the audience from thinking about their own responsibilities when discussing violence, including the basic responsibility of trying to understand violence. Strictly speaking, though, there is of course no such thing as purely senseless violence, in either the personal or the political sphere. When people from Saudi Arabia fly planes into the administrative and symbolic hearts of American big business and American big guns, it means something. When killing machines decorated with little American flags are later rained down in carpetbombing campaigns over Afghanistan, by fighter planes decorated with little American flags, it means something. When Iraqis execute and record an attack on Americans in Iraq, and the video they send to the television networks includes pictures of torture in American bases in Iraq running along the bottom of the screen, it means something. These violent acts, with their violent symbolism, are all callous and sick and in my view inexcusable, but they are not senseless. A responsible City of God for the present day would stress the intelligibility (and thus question the randomness and inevitability) of violence. It would not limit its treatment of war and violence, as Augustine did, to merely looking down on it all from above somewhere, even while providing excuses for the violence of the powerful. By denying that violence and war are fundamentally unintelligible and inevitable, and denying that war and violence are normal and legitimate in the hands of the powerful, it could correct Augustine’s instinct to justify human violence while honoring his instinct to find or make meaning in the aftermath of human violence.

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Augustine’s City of God proposed, for example, that the destruction by war of Jerusalem and later Rome were in a sense “fortunate falls,” because those political disasters created new opportunities for the spread of the knowledge of God.34 He would probably have seen the Greek colonial wars as similarly providential, as he gives the Greeks credit for further encouraging the spread of Christianity in commissioning and authorizing the Greek Septuagint.35 He also manages to disapprove of the wars that brought easy communication and interpreters and a common language to the known world, while holding to the hope that such things could be used to build peace.36 I would like to see Christians follow Augustine’s lead, and extend his insight, by daring to oppose the evils of war and terrorism categorically, and daring to take the responsibility for our own complicity in such evils seriously, even while daring to embrace without reserve any good things that grow in their wake. Ahmad F. Yousif ’s 2005 article for the journal Studies in Religion, for example, acknowledged that the 9/11 attack and its aftermath were a disaster for everyone, including Muslims, but pointed out that Canada had also seen a dramatic increase in awareness and understanding of Islam, and a corresponding “increase in inter-religious dialogue.”37 Is this not clear evidence that it is possible to locate and take control of the meaning of violence for good? Similarly, North America’s developing global city, with its apocalyptic confusion of cross-cultural and cross-national loyalties, can be conflicted and volatile, as many Montrealers will tell you they witnessed at Concordia in 2002. It can also, though, be made to work against conflict. Montrealers could also tell you about seeing the biggest peace march in Canadian history the following year, in 2003, as record numbers of people began to protest the war on Iraq even before it had begun. How did this happen? The same way the well-intentioned but unwelcome and unfortunately degenerated Concordia demonstration happened: People with multiple and cross-national loyalties, armed with cross-national information on violence overseas, and encouraged by cross-national associations formed in opposition to it, decided to insist upon the importance of cross-national awareness, cross-national peace, and cross-national justice. The global village experience of extended loyalties and multiple loyalties can, therefore, be a force for peace as much as for war, and I see no reason to believe that this fact is less applicable to religious identities and loyalties than to political identities and loyalties. The extent, therefore, to which communities of knowledge in present-day North America are able to participate in a global city, in which knowledge covers the earth “as water covers the sea,” and into which the countless nations bring their best offerings, they are able to incarnate the dynamic Conversatian peace of a City of God.

CONCLUSION I know that I will seem, to some, to have strayed a good way from Augustine’s City of God in imagining my own. I do think, though, that Augustine’s City contains the right kind of seeds for growing Cities like mine, regardless of whether he would have recognized them as legitimate fruits or as unwelcome weeds.

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Augustine’s City of God and Conversatianity First of all, the garden of Augustine’s City of God is not entirely hostile to Conversatian modes of thinking. It is true that he mocks the Greeks for their philosophical discord, but he also feels free to draw quite heavily (as we have seen already with Cicero) upon their work in doing his own, and even seems to respect them: “He speaks with consistent respect for Plato, Varro, Plotinus and Porphyry . . . [I]t is clear that he cannot entirely shake off his respect for the accomplishments, insofar as he understands them, even of those whom he wishes to oppose.”38 A Conversatian City of God would build on Augustine’s sense of respect for “pagan” wisdom, and try to relate it to his idea of a divine mind that is “infinite” and “capable of comprehending all things,” a mind that reveals itself and “enlightens every human being” as a personal truth.39 I repeat, though: this idea of human thought and action incarnating an infinite and multifaceted divine wisdom in different ways would not simply assert that we are all really saying the same thing. It would build instead on the kind of religious logic and instinct that led Augustine to believe that the Hebrew prophets and their Greek translators were, insofar as they were equally divinely inspired, equally authoritative.40 This was, furthermore, true not only of passages that “express the same meaning, but in a different way,” but also of “passages which give . . . another meaning” entirely (so long as the two meanings are not “at odds”).41 To me, this idea of real, valid unity in real, valid diversity looks like it could be extended to see different modes and schools of theological thinking as truly different in their messages and yet all somehow related in the infinitely comprehensive mind of God, especially in light of Augustine’s idea that theological difference itself may be divinely ordained.42 It also seems to me that Augustine’s own book illustrates these Conversatian principles. Peter Brown writes: “Above all, De Civitate Dei is a book of controversy,” which “should never be treated as though it were a static, complete photograph of Augustine’s thought.”43 It’s also true that Augustine’s own translators would, like the Septuagint translators, often decide later to “improve” on his original in ways that seem to make a lot of sense.44 Finally, it seems clear to me that when Augustine posits a perfect “concord of the Scriptures regarded as canonical by the Church,” and sets it in proud contradistinction to the “discord” of the pagan philosophers, he is basing his case either upon ignorance and illusion, or upon unacknowledged Conversatianity in action, because (as is clearly visible even in the few random examples given above), the dynamic unity Christian Bible as we know it is Conversatian to the core.

Augustine’s City of God and Theological Justifications for Political Violence I have said that I believe a responsible post-9/11 North American City of God would work to remove all pretense of divine excuses for human bloodshed. Augustine’s City, on the other hand, tends to apologize for the state and its violence. He writes, for example, that governments are instituted by God, and that

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the shaky peace created by governments and their wars is a relative good, even from the Christian point of view, “for, while the two cities are intermingled, we also make use of the peace of Babylon.”45 As is plainly hinted, though, in this defense of governments and their wars, Augustine admits that Babylon’s relatively good peace is created by war’s evil means and for the state’s evil reasons.46 He also notes that the murderer Cain founds the first human city, and that neither reason nor revelation point to any human government operating before the fall of the first City of God.47 People are, in Augustine’s view, “naturally sociable,” but “not naturally political.”48 Human government and its violence come from the libido dominandi, he says, and the libido dominandi comes from “pride which refuses to accept that all men are by nature equal.”49 Thus, he follows Cicero in suggesting that the state as we know it actually developed from federated banditry, and he quite deliberately “deconstructs the ideology of Rome as the eternal city, whose peace and justice are the peace and justice of the world.”50 It is not inconceivable from my point of view, then, to take these points in Augustine’s City of God seriously—perhaps even more seriously than Augustine did—and end up with a City of God that accepts, as Augustine did, any good that the wars of the powerful might do, without in any way excusing them as he does. In this way, one might also escape the temptation (familiar to North Americans in the present day) to mix religious authority with governmental authority, or even to justify using the violence of the state to persecute heretics—evils to which Augustine himself unfortunately succumbed.51

NOTES 1. CSSR: Canadian Society for the Study of Religion; CTS: Canadian Theological Society; CETA: Canadian Evangelical Theological Association. 2. P. R. L. Brown, “Saint Augustine,” in Trends in Medieval Political Thought, ed. Beryl Smalley (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1965), p. 1. 3. N. H. Baynes, “The Political Ideas of St. Augustine’s De Civitate Dei,” in Byzantine Studies and Other Essays (London: Athlone Press, 1955), pp. 288–89. 4. Augustine xi. (I will use CD to indicate general De Civitate Dei references, and “Augustine” to refer to the Cambridge edition of The City of God against the Pagans, trans. and ed. R. W. Dyson [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998]). 5. Augustine xi. 6. Augustine xii. 7. Augustine xii, xiii. 8. Augustine xi. 9. CD 18.40, 41. 10. Isaiah 19:18–21. 11. Matthew 22:39; Mark 12:30–31; Luke 10:27; Agapêseis kurion ton theon sou en holê tê kardia sou kai en holê tê psuchê sou kai en holê tê dianoia sou. 12. Augustine xiii, xix, xx–xxi, xxv. 13. See her The Choice between Two Cities: Whore, Bride and Empire in the Apocalypse (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press, 1999). 14. Rossing, p. 145. 15. Rossing, pp. 145–47; J. Ellul, Anarchy and Christianity, trans. G. W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1988), p. 72.

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16. “Even Virgil’s Fourth Eclogue envisions an eschatological time when ‘the shipper shall quit the sea, nor shall the ship of pine exchange wares; every land shall bear all fruits.’ In prophesying an end to the sea, these texts share a longing for an alternate economic vision in which sea trade in luxury goods will be supplanted by an economy that provides the essentials of life ‘without payment’ (Revelation 21:6; 22:17). In God’s New Jerusalem there will be no ships, no maritime commerce or traffic in cargo, for ‘the sea is no more’” (Rossing, p. 147; see also pp. 151–53). 17. J. C. Médaille, “Absurd Wisdom: An Apology for Euthyphro,” Theandros 1, no. 2 (Winter 2003–2004), http://www.theandros.com/euthyphro.html. 18. John 1:9a; phôtizei panta anthrôpon - John 1.9b. 19. John 1.1, 1.3; John 1.1’s En arkhê is an obvious reference to Genesis 1.1’s b’reshith (“in the beginning”), which suggests a further parallel between the creating “Word” (ên ho logos, kai . . . panta di autou egeneto) of John 1 and the God of Genesis 1 who creates by speaking (wayomer elohim y’hi) being into being; according to Heraclitus, for example, the Logos is “the unity of all things, the measure and the harmony. . . . With reservations, it is Zeus. . . . However, not only is it the universal substance, the source from which all things come but it is the principle that directs the universe.” (M. C. Nahm, ed., Selections from Early Greek Philosophy (New York: F. S. Crofts and Co, 1934), p. 88; in Proverbs 8.22, Lady Wisdom says God begot (or “possessed” or “created”—qanani) her “at the beginning” (or “as the beginning”) of his “way” (reshith darko), like an architect. Some versions read, “like a little child,” but verses such as Proverbs 3.19, Jeremiah 51.15, 10.12, etc., tell us that God created the cosmos “through (W)isdom,” supporting a reading of “head worker” or “architect” here. The Wisdom of Solomon calls her the vehicle of all creation (pantôn tekhnitis—7.22, 7.21 in Greek), and the image (eikôn) of God, who holds creation together (diêkê de kai khôrei dia pantôn—7.24). The striking and consistent verbal and theological parallels with Christ as described in passages such as Colossians 1.15f are obvious, and obviously not simply accidental; kai ho logos sarx egeneto - John 1.14. 20. Letters of St. Basil, number 38. 21. I mean here the various Protestant, Catholic, and Orthodox canons. 22. Romans 8.24; 1 Corinthians 15.2; Romans 5.9. 23. Luke 17.20f; Luke 21.25–32. 24. Numbers 21.14; Joshua 10.12–13, 2 Samuel 1.19–27, and 1 Kings 8.12–13 [in the LXX]; 1 Kings 11.41; 2 Chronicles 9.29. 25. E. Moore, “Some Notes on Orthodox Ethics and Existential Authenticity,” Theandros 1, no. 3 (Spring 2004), http://www.theandros.com/existential.html. 26. The material in this section is abstracted from my article, “Conversatianity in the Gospel of John,” Theandros 2, no. 4 (Fall 2004), http://www.theandros.com/convers.html. 27. Qur’an 4.172, 5.72f, 5.75, 19.35f. 28. Qur’an 4.171. 29. B. B. Levy, Fixing God’s Torah: The Accuracy of the Hebrew Bible Text in Jewish Law (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 180. 30. CD 18.23. 31. CD 19.5, 7, 8, 12, 28; 22.4, 22; 2.17; 4.15; 15.4; 19.7, 15. See also ad Bonif. 189; ad Marcel 138, etc. 32. CD 2.21; 4.4; 19.21, 24; 19.7 (see also Contra Faust. 22.74, etc.); Contra Faust. 22.70, 75. 33. CD 22.6, 22.23. 34. CD 18.46. 35. CD 18.42. 36. CD 19.7. 37. A. F. Yousif, “The Impact of 9/11 on Muslim Identity in the Canadian National Capital Region: Institutional Response and Future Prospects,” Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses 34, no. 1 (2005): 56.

SEEKING THE PEACE OF THE GLOBAL CITY OF KNOWLEDGE OF GOD AFTER 9/11 38. CD 18.41; Augustine xxvi. 39. CD 12.18. 40. CD 18.43. 41. CD 18.43. 42. CD 18.43. 43. Augustine xiv. 44. Augustine xiv. 45. CD 5.21; 19.26 (see also 5.13, 16). 46. Augustine xxiv–xxv. 47. CD 15.1, 5; 19.15, etc. 48. Augustine xvii (see also Brown, p. 9). 49. CD 19.12 (see also Augustine xvii). 50. Augustine xxiii; CD 4.4; Augustine xxix. 51. CD 2.19, 26; 5.24, 26.

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CHAPTER 12

The Golden Rule and World Peace Patricia A. Keefe

OVERVIEW OF THE GOLDEN RULE IN HUMAN HISTORY

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he golden rule, though phrased in various ways in the major religions of the world, is an aspect of each and expresses a commonality of relationship: “‘Do to others as you want others to do to you’ and its expression in all of the world’s religions is part of our planet’s common language, shared by persons with differing but overlapping conceptions of morality. Only a principle so flexible can serve as a moral ladder for all humankind.”1 There is a well-known poster that contains the golden rule as stated in the major religions of the world. The core meaning has to do with what some call “the ethic of reciprocity.” How do these basic ethical formulations relate to a peaceable kingdom on our earth? How does the failure of world religions and their members to abide by the golden rule result in violent conflict and war? Whatever else can be said, the golden rule is not so much an answer to the world’s needs as it is an ethical question often not addressed in contexts in which it would be useful for resolving conflict. In this section, the formulations found in Confucian, Jewish, Christian, and Hindu expressions will be explored in some detail.

CONFUCIAN GOLDEN RULE Confucius (551–479 BCE) is said to have provided the first recorded statement of the golden rule.2 During a time of political corruption, war, disintegrating society, and declining personal standards, Confucius synthesized and added to traditional Chinese teachings in an effort to reestablish social and political order on a firm foundation. The cornerstone of his edifice was excellence of character,

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expressed especially in the basic relationships of society, family, political relationships, and friends. Mencius (371–289 BCE) and Chu Hsi (1130–1200 CE) were the major Chinese philosophers who developed the Confucian golden rule. Practice of the golden rule sometimes involves an explicit imaginative role reversal, putting oneself in the other person’s situation. Elements of the Confucian understanding of the golden rule are the following: 1. In comparing self and other, the agent imagines him- or herself in the situation of the recipient. One assumes that others also get hungry and thirsty, desire to succeed, and so on. 2. Though our empathetic understanding of another is not perfect, we do have an intuitive grasp of others. 3. The agent sees the recipient in terms of a relational pattern: father/son, and so on. 4. Comparing is a matter of heart and mind. Separation of these two is un-Chinese. Comparing is a creative, artistic activity. Understanding another is as much an art as a science. 5. In order to elicit the appropriate feeling for a challenging situation, the agent may need to construct an analogy between the immediate situation and one that spontaneously elicits the appropriate feeling. In order to adequately identify with a stranger’s situation, the agent may need to take a preliminary step, to bring to mind his or her sympathy for some person closer to the agent. 6. The agent identifies with concrete aspects of the recipient’s situation. The agent may need to be able to empathize with the patriotism of the agent if another country is involved. 7. There is a scientific dimension to understanding others. Scientific component of understanding is prominent in Chinese tradition. 8. We can see the recipient in terms of the Way (tao) without explicit comparison. One can find the Way in oneself and in the other person. Mencius: “A noble man steeps himself in the Way (tao) because he wishes to find it in himself. When he finds it in himself, he will be at ease in it; when he is at ease in it, he can draw deeply upon it; when he can draw deeply upon it, he finds its source wherever he turns.”3 For Chang Tsai (1020–1077 CE), “Heaven is my father and Earth is my mother. . . . All people are my brothers and sisters.”4

JEWISH GOLDEN RULE Rabbi Hillel (active 30 BCE–10 CE) was key in the formulation of the Golden Rule. Upon being asked for a summary of the Torah, he replied: “What is hateful to you, do not do to your neighbor, this is the whole Torah, while the rest is commentary thereon. Go and learn it.” The story of Nathan to King David, to illustrate what David had done to take to himself the wife of Uriah, illustrates the golden rule. David acknowledged that the judgment he had made on the rich man, who in Nathan’s story had taken the most precious lamb of the poor man for himself, applied by implication to his own action.5

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Rabbi Arthur Waskow in a recent book, The Tent of Abraham, builds on the story of Abraham and his two sons, Isaac and Ishmael. These two brothers were at enmity due to the story of Abraham, Sarah, and the mother of Ishmael, Hagar. At the funeral of Abraham, these two longstanding enemies came together. Waskow notes that the Palestinians and Israelis continue to look past each other as did Isaac and Ishmael until the death of their father. Waskow suggests that only by recognizing that the land over which they are fighting is the land of Abraham for both will they ever stop warring. They are not yet able to stand in the other’s shoes, as required by the golden rule. “Both peoples sit unwilling to imagine that there might be a land of Abraham in which his two descendant peoples are entitled to be present, side by side, not dissolved into one but each with its own identity and self . . . each with its own self-determination, each complementary to the other.”6 Waskow is really talking about the golden rule and applying it to this most horrendous of conflicts. Imagination to look differently is what the Confucians understood.

CHRISTIANITY AND THE GOLDEN RULE The expression of the golden rule in Christianity follows upon the insights of the Jewish religion; Jesus’s expression of the golden rule is a strong statement. The flexibility of a rule that remains widely accessible and reasonable while conveying a high standard can be understood as engaging the hearer/reader in a movement through several levels of interpretation. 1. The Golden Rule of Prudence: do to others as you want others to do to you . . . with realistic attention to the consequences of your choices for the longterm welfare of your recipient. This rule must be distinguished from a pseudogolden rule of self-interest: do to others as you want others to do to you . . . with an eye to avoiding punishment and gaining rewards for yourself. 2. The Golden Rule of Neighborly Love: do to others as you want others to do to you. . . . as an expression of consideration and fairness among neighbors, where the scope of the term “neighbor” extends to all without regard to ethnic or religious differences. Because the neighbor can be the enemy, however, fulfilling a “conventional ethic of fairness” can require extraordinary love, which involves the next level. 3. The Golden Rule of Fatherly Love: Do to others as you want others to do to you . . . imitating the divine paradigm.7 When the interior was uncovered the golden rule takes on a deeper interiority: Look into your own heart. Discover what causes pain. Refuse to inflict this pain on anyone else. Are we as focused on the interior as our culture is on exploring the universe? Don’t deny the truth of others. Dogmatism can be a kind of idolatry.8

GOLDEN RULE IN HINDUISM “Let no man do to another that which would be repugnant to himself.”9 “Knowing how painful it is to himself, a person should never do to others which he dislikes when done to him by others.”10 “A person should not himself do that

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act which, if done by another, would call down his censure.”11 “One should never do that to another which one regards as injurious to one’s own self.”12 More advanced according to Erik Erikson is: “No one is a believer until he loves for his brother what he loves for himself,” which is usually attributed to Islam.13 In the Upanishads, Erikson finds the most unconditional commitment: “He who sees all beings in his own self and his own self in all beings.”14 “The Hindu identification of the spiritual self of the agent with the spiritual self of the recipient of the agent’s action provides a basis for golden rule thinking.”15

IS THE GOLDEN RULE BASED SOLELY ON INDIVIDUAL ACTIONS WITH NO IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS? The golden rule is first and foremost a principle in the philosophy of living, expressing a personal standard for the conduct of one-to-one relationships. If there is righteousness in the heart, there will be harmony in the home. If there is harmony in the home, the nation will be well governed. If the nation is well governed there will be peace in the world.16

Political reforms do not necessarily work for a regeneration of righteousness in the hearts of individuals, but “primary leverage occurs at the level of the individual and unless individuals cooperate ideas for reform won’t happen.”17 If the limitation of a radical ethics of relationship lies in its inability to cope with systems, its strength is in honoring the way relationships transcend social systems. Sensitive application of the rule takes into account those indirectly affected by one’s actions. If the golden rule is to be a truly universal principle, then there must be threads of consistency linking moral judgments about personal problems with ethical judgments about social, economic, and political affairs. What the rule does for systems is to prompt questions that imply norms for systems, for example, “Does a national government go beyond intelligent patriotism to assert sovereignty without regard for planetary responsibilities?” I am primarily interested in the life of the rule, how the rule moves, how its various meanings weave into one another, and how working with it promotes growth. Presenting the golden rule as a principle with emotional, intellectual, and spiritual significance has become, in part, a way to recover a more adequate conception of what it means to be human and a way to move beyond theories of morality that undervalues any one of these dimensions. “[S]o long as the development of religious consciousness functions to deepen, not discard, the concept of the universal family of God, the golden rule with its universal applicability will continue to symbolize the moral expression of religious consciousness.”18

THE GOLDEN RULE EXEMPLIFIED IN THE PRACTICE OF THE NONVIOLENT PEACEFORCE An idea that came together at the Hague Appeal for Peace in May 1999, was for the formulation of a nonviolent peace army, or Shanti Sena, in Gandhi’s terms. After this meeting, research was conducted on the feasibility of third-

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party nonviolent intervention and structural development was undertaken. In November and December 2002, representatives of forty-five member organizations from around the world, committed to nonviolence, came together in New Delhi, India, to launch the Nonviolent Peaceforce. These representatives chose the international governing council for the Peaceforce and selected, from among proposals from groups in three different conflict areas, the proposal from Sri Lanka. Thereafter, recruitment of the field team and training took place in collaboration with partner organizations in Sri Lanka. Training involved practice of nonviolent strategies that have been developed through the centuries. These practices include the following: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Accompaniment Monitoring International presence Interpositioning

Recruits learn about nonviolence from leaders in movements in every part of the world, including Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Thich Nhat Hanh, and others. Teachings of these and other nonviolent leaders reflect the golden rule. Martin Luther King explained how we can love our enemy, a key aspect of nonviolence: “We must not seek to defeat or humiliate the enemy but to win his friendship and understanding. . . . Every word and deed must contribute to an understanding with the enemy and release those vast reservoirs of goodwill which have been blocked by impenetrable walls of hate. . . . Returning hate for hate multiplies hate, adding deeper darkness to a night already devoid of stars. Darkness cannot drive out darkness; only light can do that . . . Hate multiplies hate, violence multiplies violence, and toughness multiplies toughness in a descending spiral of destruction.”19 King’s words reflect the golden rule in that loving one’s enemies requires that one stand in that person’s shoes. King recognizes that there is “some good in the worst of us and some evil in the best of us.”20 Gandhi wrote: “Passive resistance is an all-sided sword: it can be used anyhow; it blesses him who uses it and him against whom it is used. Without drawing a drop of blood it produces far-reaching results. It never rusts and cannot be stolen.”21 Further: “It is the acid test of non-violent conflict that in the end there is no rancour left behind, and in the end the enemies are converted into friends. That was my experience in South Africa with General Smuts. He started with being my bitterest opponent and critic. Today he is my warmest friend.”22 Gandhi’s statements reflect the basic premises of the golden rule. His grasp of nonviolence was based on deep inner awareness that all of us have the same humanity. Thich Nhat Hahn, a Buddhist monk, writes of mindfulness as the way of nonviolent living: “Nonviolence can be born only from the insight of non-duality, of interbeing. This is the insight that everything is interconnected and nothing can exist by itself alone. Doing violence to others is doing violence to yourself. If you do not have the insight of non-duality, you will still be violent. You will still want to punish, to suppress, and to destroy, but once you have penetrated the reality of non-duality, you will smile at both the flower and garbage in you, you will

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embrace both. This insight is the ground for your non-violent action.”23 These articulations of nonviolence reflect the deeper meanings of the golden rule. These are understandings of nonviolence that form the basis of training for the Nonviolent Peaceforce field teams. In 2005, reporter Chris Richards visited Sri Lanka, where Nonviolent Peaceforce field teams were working. His description of one incident: What would you do? There is a gang of young men surrounding your car—banging on your doors, your windows and your roof. You do not know how many there are, but when you saw them as you drove by before, there looked to be 20 or 30. Some were drunk. All looked angry—and they were angry with you. This is the time for self-preservation. There’s nothing stopping you from driving off to leave it all behind. Except that you’re a peace keeper; a peace builder. It’s something you believe in to your core. So you wind down the window and talk with them. They say that you have undermined them—stopped a project close to their hearts. They think you are spying on them. They are not prepared to listen . . . except you think that if you stay and engage with them you can transform the situation and defuse their violence. . . . This is the assessment that Peters Nywanda and Atif Hameed make when they get out of their car to talk with the group.24

Five days later as Richards drives with Atif past the area, four of the young men who attacked the car earlier wave and smile. Richards concluded: “What is happening in this city could never have been achieved through violence.”25 In 2006, Atif Hameed of Pakistan and Sreeram Cahulia of India, both veteran field team members in Sri Lanka, joined in an assignment to the Philippines to assess the violent situation in Mindanao. They, whose countries are at loggerheads, show the power of nonviolence, reaching the common humanity of each other and those in the area of conflict.

CONCLUSION The golden rule has not died. In fact it has developed beyond its original conception and now has a deeper foundation through the work of nonviolent leaders and practitioners. In the Nonviolent Peaceforce, a global organization with now ninety-five member organizations from all over the globe, the wisdom of nonviolence in the world’s religions comes to bear on concrete problems and specific conflicts. The golden rule is not just an abstraction. It is as real as the anger of the gang in Sri Lanka and the nonviolent action of the Nonviolent Peaceforce team based on the common humanity of all involved. It is as real as the nonviolent actors in the U.S. Civil Rights Movement who faced angry crowds, water hoses, and death with the strength of nonviolence.

NOTES 1. Jeffrey Wattles, The Golden Rule (London: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 189. 2. Interview of Karen Armstrong by Krista Tippett on National Public Radio, June 17, 2006. Also see Carpenter’s piece on Minnesota Public Radio on June 15, 2006.

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3. Wattles, pp. 19–22. 4. Wattles, p. 22. 5. Wattles, p. 42. 6. Joan Chittister, Murshid Saadi Shakur Chishti, and Arthur Waskow, The Tent of Abraham: Stories of Hope and Peace for Jews, Christians, and Muslims (Boston: Beacon Press, 2006), p. 65. 7. Wattles, p. 67. 8. Karen Armstrong interview. 9. Mah7bh7rata, book 5, ch. 49, v. 57. 10. Mah7bh7rata, book 12, ch. 252, v. 251. 11. Mah7bh7rata, book 12, ch. 279, v. 23. 12. Mah7bh7rata, book 13, ch. 113;also in The Mah7bh7rata of Krishna-Dwaipayana Vyasa, 3rd ed., trans. Pratap Chandra Roy, (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1972), vol. 11, p. 240. 13. Wattles, p. 112 and fn. 27. 14. Wattles, p. 113. 15. Wattles, p. 112. 16. Wattles. P. 172, adapted from The Great Learning, in A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, trans. and comp. Wing-Tsit Chan (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 88. 17. Wattles, p. 172 18. Analysis in this section is from Wattles, pp. 171–74. 19. Martin Luther King Jr., Strength to Love (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977), pp. 51–53. 20. King, p. 51. 21. Mahatma Gandhi, All Men Are Brothers, Life and Thoughts of Mahatma Gandhi as Told in His Own Words, comp. Krishna Kripalani (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1960), p. 128. 22. Gandhi, p. 128. 23. Thich Nhat Hanh, Anger, Wisdom for Cooling the Flames (New York: Riverhead Trade, 2002), pp. 65–70. 24. Chris Richards, “The Challenge to Violence,” New Internationalist 381 (2005): 9–12. 25. Richards, pp. 9–12.

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CHAPTER 13

World Religions and World Peace: Toward a New Partnership Brian D. Lepard

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n this chapter I will explore how world religions can become a force for peace in the world rather than a cause of division and war. I will first review the history of religion-based violence and conflict. I will then examine the contribution that world religions can make, based on their peace-inducing teachings, to the mitigation and resolution of conflict. I will suggest that world religions and world peace need to form a new partnership, in which peacemaking efforts can benefit from certain unique perspectives on peace gleaned from the scriptures of the major world religions.

RELIGION AND CONFLICT IN THE WORLD TODAY First of all, there is no need to recount the tragic and disgraceful history of wars and conflicts instigated, pursued, and escalated under the banner of religion and religious ideologies—a history that regrettably persists in the twenty-first century. We need look no further than the Middle East, not to mention many other regions of the world, to perceive the destructive effects of religious prejudices and hatreds. Moreover, even where entreaties by religious leaders and adherents to fight rival religions or secular ideologies do not result in outright war, they create in too many regions today a tense and electrified atmosphere of what we might call preconflict, in which at any moment a misguided act of terrorism or an isolated attack on an individual could spark a new religion-inspired conflagration. In centuries past, religion was such a volatile instigator of war that religious wars led to the first calls for the creation of a secular international law based on respect for sovereignty and the freedom of countries, if not individuals, to follow the religion of their choice. This was, for example, the outcome of the Thirty

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Years’ War, which resulted in the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, regarded by many scholars as the inauguration of the modern-day state system and of contemporary international law. As a result of this pathetic history, many secular observers believe that peace, and respect for international law, can only be achieved by keeping the world religions at bay.

HOW CAN WORLD RELIGIONS BECOME A FORCE FOR WORLD PEACE? In this chapter I suggest by contrast that the world religions can and must become wholehearted supporters of world peace, and in fact that a durable and profound world peace cannot be achieved without respect for and adherence to fundamental moral teachings shared by all religions. Religion-inspired conflict is based on religious prejudice and fanaticism, which defy the essential teachings of the world religions themselves as articulated in their most revered scriptures. If we look at these teachings, we see many commonalities that offer moral hope in a divided and traumatized world. I review some of these commonalities in my recent book, Hope for a Global Ethic: Shared Principles in Religious Scriptures.1 In particular, we find in the world’s great scriptures a unique and multilayered conception of peace that can make a positive contribution to resolving all conflicts peacefully, whether or not they are religious in origin.

COMMON MORAL PRINCIPLES IN WORLD SCRIPTURES RELATING TO PEACE What are some of these common principles that can serve as the foundation for a new conception of peace?

The Spiritual Nature of Human Beings A first is the common religious teaching that all human beings have a spiritual nature and have the capacity to acquire spiritual qualities. For example, according to the Hebrew scriptures, we are all created in the image of God. Buddhist scriptures counsel us, “Even as a mother watches over and protects her child, her only child, so with a boundless mind should one cherish all living beings, radiating friendliness over the entire world, above, below, and all around without limit.”2 Jesus teaches us, “be perfect, therefore, even as your heavenly Father is perfect.”3 According to the Qur’an, the reason God has created us is so that we can cultivate good relations with one another, especially those different from us: “O mankind, We have created you male and female, and appointed you races and tribes, that you may know one another. Surely the noblest among you in the sight of God is the most godfearing of you.”4 And Bahá’u’lláh counsels humanity, “O friends! Be not careless of the virtues with which ye have been endowed, neither be neglectful of your high destiny.”5 By virtue of this spiritual nature not only do we have an obligation to respect others as spiritual beings, but we ourselves have the capacity to rise above

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animalistic urges, including the desire for blood or revenge, and treat others with compassion, kindness, and justice. Unlike materialistic theories that view humans as just another form of animal, inebriated with the desire for power and with lust and greed—a view that sees war as inevitable and unavoidable—this spiritual conception of humanity’s purpose sees war as a product of humanity’s failure to rise to the spiritual heights of which it is fully capable, which, indeed, is the divine will for humanity. This teaching thus makes it a moral imperative that we pursue peace and the eradication of unjust wars. It can give us the resolve to keep trying because of a recognition of humanity’s divine potentialities and a shared belief that we are not mere animals, consigned to a life of competition and combat either for limited resources or for power, glory, or other materialistic values.

The Unity of the Human Family A second unique spiritual teaching of the world’s religions is that all human beings are, first and foremost, members of one human family, a family that morally ought to strive day and night to become ever more united, both materially and spiritually. Thus, for example, the BhagavadgXt7 of Hinduism asserts that the “whole world” is “united” and affirms that if we achieve true enlightenment we will be one with all beings.6 The Hebrew scriptures ask, “Have we not all one Father? Did not one God create us?”7 Buddhist scriptures affirm that we should love all other beings in the entire world, free from ill will or hatred.8 The Analects of Confucius teaches that we are all brothers and sisters.9 Through the story of the Good Samaritan, Jesus asserts that we are all spiritual neighbors who should love one another. The Qur’an announces that all humanity was created of a “single soul.”10 The Bahá’í writings declare, too, that “all peoples and nations are of one family, the children of one Father, and should be to one another as brothers and sisters!”11 In short, according to the scriptures, we are neither mere individualistic automatons intended to pursue our self-interests nor simple appendages of our communities, whether religious, local, or national. Rather, we are fundamentally members of a single world-embracing family. At the same time, the scriptures elevate to a moral value the diversity of thoughts, opinions, beliefs, and aspirations that characterize the human family. They see this diversity as an evidence of the divine good pleasure and a value we ought to cherish rather than lament or oppose in the interest of creating an artificial homogeneity of thought and belief. For example, the Qur’an declares that the variety of our “tongues and hues” is a sign of God.12 This teaching of the unity of the human family has a number of implications for peacemaking. For example, it counsels us to make peace with others because they are fellow family members. No one is an enemy. Furthermore, the goal is not mere toleration of others we view as fundamentally different from ourselves; it is to achieve a profound level of mutual understanding. Belief in the unity of the human family, coupled with recognition of humanity’s spiritual character, implies, too, that we ought to be simultaneously optimistic and pragmatic about peace-building efforts. We ought to reject the pessimism that can infect purely

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secular approaches. The teaching of the unity of the human family furthermore can fortify our resolve to keep trying to settle seemingly intractable conflicts rather than to give up.

PEACE AS A MORAL IMPERATIVE Third, all the world’s revered scriptures uphold peace as a moral imperative. It is not some vague social good, to be aimed at where possible. Rather, the promotion of peace, at both the interpersonal and international levels, is the raison d’être of our social lives on this earthly plane of existence. For example, the BhagavadgXt7 instructs us to practice nonviolence and harmlessness (ahimsa). The Hebrew scriptures teach us to “seek amity and pursue it.”13 Buddhist scriptures counsel us to purify ourselves from anger and to promote peace. Confucian writings condemn cruelty, arrogance, and vengeance while praising social peace. In the New Testament Jesus announces, “Blessed are the peacemakers, for they will be called children of God.”14 Thus, we are all called upon to be engaged as peacemakers. The Qur’an declares that it is “a Book Manifest whereby God guides whosoever follows His good pleasure in the ways of peace.”15 And the Bahá’í writings teach, “When a thought of war comes, oppose it by a stronger thought of peace. A thought of hatred must be destroyed by a more powerful thought of love.”16

A DYNAMIC CONCEPTION OF PEACE Fourth, however, the religious scriptures articulate a dynamic conception of peace rather than a static notion of peace as the mere absence of overt conflict. This includes seeing peace as intimately intertwined with justice, with the elimination of extremes of wealth and poverty, and with the practice of open-minded consultation. This dynamic vision of peace is sorely needed today, because we are often tempted to see war and peace in black-and-white terms—like a light switch that simply is turned on or off. We are tempted to define peace simply as the absence of war and to be willing to trade off virtually any other values to achieve it. I will elaborate on each of these points in more detail.

Peace and Justice With respect to justice, all the scriptures affirm that peace and justice go hand in hand, and that true peace must encompass a just ordering of society, including the punishment of wrongdoers. For example, the BhagavadgXt7 extols both “harmlessness” and “uprightness.” The Hebrew scriptures affirm that the “work of righteousness shall be peace, And the effect of righteousness, calm and confidence forever.”17 Buddhist scriptures recognize that sometimes the use of force may be necessary to achieve justice and prevent unjust wars. Confucian writings also endorse “uprightness” along with peace, and indicate that we should respond to wrongdoing with justice rather than kindness.18 The New Testament also repeatedly emphasizes the imperative of justice alongside peace, as does the

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Qur’an. And the Bahá’í writings assert that peace must be “based on righteousness and justice.”19 Regrettably, today, as in times past, such as the events leading up to World War II, we witness attempts to appease gross human rights violators in the name of achieving peace. But the scriptures indicate that long-lasting peace includes justice and respect for human rights, which are an integral element of peace— that, indeed, peace without justice and human rights is an illusionary peace, morally as well as practically.

Peace and the Elimination of Poverty Further, recent events make clear that attempts to impose or create peace without economic justice in particular are doomed to end in disaster. A failure to address the injustice of millions living in abject poverty while others benefit from enormous riches inevitably leads to chronic frustration and anger that can easily bubble to the surface and result in war or terrorism. Religious scriptures categorically reject the materialism that is insinuating itself into global culture, led by the West, which is only destined to create more dissatisfaction. They call upon us not only to pursue spiritual values rather than material goods in our own lives, but to take effective action to help the less fortunate. For example, Hindu scriptures extol the virtues of generosity and detachment from material things. The Hebrew scriptures, the Buddhist scriptures, and Confucian writings all require that we give to the needy as a strong moral obligation. In the New Testament, Jesus advises us to “give to everyone who begs from you, and do not refuse anyone who wants to borrow from you.”20 The Qur’an teaches us to provide sustenance to the “needy, the orphan, the captive” because of love for God and not expectation of appreciation or any personal benefit.”21 And Bahá’u’lláh advises us to “be a treasure to the poor, an admonisher to the rich, an answerer to the cry of the needy.”22 Of course, this compelling principle in the scriptures calling upon us to assist the needy does not imply that the mere existence of poverty excuses conflict or terrorism. But there is no doubt that it creates justified grievances that must be remedied in order for a lasting peace to be built. The right to economic justice and development is another facet, then, of peace with justice.

Peace and Open-Minded Consultation According to the world’s religious scriptures, open-minded consultation is also an essential element of peace. Open-minded consultation is a process by which we solve problems through freely expressing our own views with an attitude of courtesy and respect while inviting and seeking to learn from the views of others, ultimately with the goal of reaching a unified consensus. All the scriptures endorse open-minded consultation instead of conflict. For example, the Hebrew scriptures teach that magistrates should “not be partial in judgment,” but instead “hear out low and high alike.”23 Buddhist scriptures recount the parable of the blind men and the elephant, teaching that we can only apprehend truth in

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all its fullness through open-minded consultation as opposed to engaging in useless argumentation. Confucian writings indicate that everyone else can be a teacher for us, and that we must seek out the opinions of others with a humble attitude. The New Testament likewise praises consultation and a process of mutual learning and encouragement.24 The Qur’an also exhorts us to practice open-minded consultation, affirming, “Take counsel with them in the affair; and when thou art resolved, put thy trust in God.”25 The Bahá’í writings affirm, “Take ye counsel together in all matters, inasmuch as consultation is the lamp of guidance which leadeth the way, and is the bestower of understanding.”26 Again, too often today we strive for the illusion of a peace based on a fragile truce, a peace that is false because the parties involved are not able or willing to talk with one another. This kind of peace through mutual bare toleration inevitably breeds renewed tensions, and ultimately new conflicts. If individuals, nations, or peoples experiencing tension with one another can begin to engage in open-minded dialogue, inspired by recognition of their common humanity, they can better avoid conflict. And in the aftermath of conflict they can pursue through consultation a long-lasting peace. Moreover, we have learned that consultation must involve all elements of society, including historically marginalized groups and individuals such as women. A peace among leaders alone that does not nurture the full participation of ordinary citizens is likely to be transient and ephemeral.

THE LIMITED USE OF FORCE Finally, as intimated by the title of this section, the world’s great scriptures also teach us that sometimes the use of force may be justified, and even necessary, to promote justice and peace. This view of the use of force is consistent with the scriptures’ recognition that peace and justice are two sides of the same coin; true peace cannot exist without justice, and justice may require the use of some kind of force. In this connection, the concept of just war appears in all the scriptures. Obviously, when abused, just-war theory has served as ideological fuel for the kinds of atrocious interreligious conflicts I described at the outset of this chapter. But the scriptures themselves indicate the primacy of peaceful methods of dispute resolution and impose strict limitations on the use of force, limitations that render it more in the nature of a police operation than what we traditionally have called war. Indeed, these limitations correspond closely with emerging standards of just war under international law, including those that appear in the Charter of the United Nations. It is critical to emphasize, too, that the scriptures, as a general rule, emphatically declare that religious prejudice is morally inexcusable and can never justify war between members of different religions. Let me give here just a few examples of these scriptural warrants for the limited, and pure-minded, use of force to achieve peace, justice, and the protection of others. The Hebrew scriptures authorize certain limited wars, but also provide some of the world’s first protections for innocent combatants, and indicate that war must be used as a last resort. Buddhist scriptures likewise authorize wars to promote justice after all peaceful attempts at resolution have failed.

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According to Buddhist scriptures, the Buddha affirmed, “All warfare in which man tries to slay his brother is lamentable, but [the Buddha] does not teach that those who go to war in a righteous cause after having exhausted all means to preserve the peace are blameworthy. He must be blamed who is the cause of war.”27 Confucian texts authorize wars to liberate people oppressed by tyrants, and arguably only such wars. As we are aware, Christian doctrine has evolved a concept of just war grounded in biblical teachings involving love and justice. The Qur’an prohibits aggressive war but allows wars in self-defense and wars to protect the innocent from oppression. Finally, the Bahá’í writings, while outlawing “holy war” based on religion, imply that in some cases war may be necessary as a last resort to inhibit an aggressor or protect human rights victims, and that the world needs to establish a system of collective security for these purposes.28 As noted earlier, in our praiseworthy quest for peace today we often are tempted to insist on peace at any price, and regard the use of force as inherently morally reprehensible or forbidden. The scriptures can serve as a correction to these myopic well-intentioned views. The scriptures teach us that, regrettably, in a world in which tyrants and human rights violations are ubiquitous, the use of force may be the only way to forestall conflict, stop it once it has occurred, or rescue imperiled human rights victims. This is an important teaching of the scriptures. But the scriptures also emphasize that the use of force, which importantly can take forms far short of what we think of as war, must be carefully regulated and calibrated. Some scriptures imply that ideally, where possible, legitimate uses of force should be supervised by global institutions that operate under a principle of open-minded consultation. These checks and balances help ensure that the use of force is morally justified and appropriately limited. These shared ethical principles in the scriptures point to the imperative of adhering to, but also where necessary reforming, similar rules and limitations that have found their way into contemporary international law. These include rules in the U.N. Charter, which allows military action only in self-defense or where it has been authorized by the U.N. Security Council.29

CONCLUSION To conclude, despite the sordid record of religious instigation of war, any successful effort to achieve durable peace in the world must take into account and draw inspiration from the shared teachings concerning peace and the just use of force in the scriptures of the world religions. We thus need a new partnership between world religions and world peace. If members of religious communities around the globe can work together to perceive and act on these common principles, the world may yet avoid the resurgence of hatred and violence that seems to be on the immediate horizon.

NOTES 1. Brian D. Lepard, Hope for a Global Ethic: Shared Principles in Religious Scriptures (Wilmette, IL: Bahá’í Publishing, 2005). 2. Edward Conze, trans., Buddhist Scriptures (London: Penguin Books, 1959), p. 186.

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3. Matthew 5:48. All quotations from the New Testament are from The Holy Bible Containing the Old and New Testaments: New Revised Standard Version (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977). 4. 49:13. All quotations from the Qur’an are from A. J. Arberry, trans., The Koran Interpreted (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1955). 5. Bahá’u’lláh, Gleanings from the Writings of Bahá’u’lláh, 2d rev. ed., trans. Shoghi Effendi (Wilmette, IL: Bahá’í Publishing Trust, 1976), p. 196. 6. See, for example, 5:7, 11:7. All quotations from the BhagavadgXt7 are from Franklin Edgerton, trans., The Bhagavad GXt7 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972). 7. Malachi 2:10. All quotations from the Hebrew scriptures are from Tanakh: A New Translation of the Holy Scriptures according to the Traditional Hebrew Text (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society, 1985). 8. See Conze, p. 186. 9. See Analects 12:5, as translated in E. Bruce Brooks and A. Taeko Brooks, trans., The Original Analects: Sayings of Confucius and His Successors (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998). 10. 4:1. 11. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Paris Talks: Addresses Given by ‘Abdu’l-Bahá in Paris in 1911–1912, 12th ed. (London: Bahá’í Publishing Trust, 1995), no. 42.11. 12. See 30:21. 13. Psalms 34:15. 14. Matthew 5:9. 15. 5:18. 16. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, no. 6.7. 17. Isaiah 32:17. 18. See, for example, Analects 14:34. 19. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, The Compilation of Compilations Prepared by the Universal House of Justice, 1963–1990 (Maryborough, Victoria: Bahá’í Publications Australia, 1991), vol. 2, p. 165. 20. Matthew 5:42. 21. 76:8–9. 22. Bahá’u’lláh, Epistle to the Son of the Wolf, rev. ed., trans. Shoghi Effendi (Wilmette, IL: Bahá’í Publishing Trust, 1979), p. 93. 23. Deuteronomy 1:17. 24. See, for example, 1 Corinthians 14:26, 14:29–31. 25. 3:153. 26. Bahá’u’lláh, Tablets of Bahá’u’lláh Revealed after the Kitáb-i-Aqdas, trans. Habib Taherzadeh (Haifa: Bahá’í World Centre, 1978), p. 168. 27. Paul Carus, comp., The Gospel of Buddha (Chicago: Open Court, 1915), p. 148. 28. See, for example, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, The Secret of Divine Civilization, 2d ed., trans. Marzieh Gail (Wilmette, IL: Bahá’í Publishing Trust, 1970), pp. 70–71; Bahá’u’lláh, Tablets of Bahá’u’lláh, p. 165. 29. See, for example, U.N. Charter articles 2(4), 39–51.

About the Editor and Contributors

ARVIND SHARMA is Birks Professor of Comparative Religion in the Faculty of Religious Studies at McGill University in Montreal, Canada, and has published extensively in the fields of Indian religions and comparative religion. He was the president of the steering committee for the global congress on World’s Religions after September 11, which met in Montreal from September 11 to 15, 2006, and is currently engaged in promoting the adoption of A Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the World’s Religions. RAMAZAN BICER graduated from Erciyes University in Islamic and religious studies. Following this, he received an M.A. at Marmara University in Istanbul. He was awarded a Ph.D. in 1999 for a religious studies thesis on Islamic Theology. Bicer has written or translated some fifty articles and books on a variety of topics. He has several articles in Turkish, Arabic, French and English. His research interests include religious studies, theology, philosophy of religion, philosophy of ethics, New Age religious movement, and Turkish-Islamic culture. Bicer is currently an Associate Professor as head of the department of Islamic theology on Ilahiyat Faculty, Sakarya University. PAMELA CHRABIEH holds a Ph.D. in sciences of religions from the University of Montreal. She is finalizing postdoctoral research at the Canada Research Chair in Islam, Pluralism and Globalization (University of Montreal) and at the Institute of Islamic-Christian Studies (St-Josef University of Beirut). She has published several scientific articles in Canada and Lebanon on interreligious dialogue, the politics-religions-society relations in the Near Eastern area, as well as the role of Lebanese civil society and diaspora in constructing peace. She has also published Icônes du Liban, au carrefour du dialogue des cultures (2003) and À la rencontre de l’Islam, itinéraire d’une spiritualité composite et engagée (2006).

170

ABOUT THE EDITOR AND CONTRIBUTORS

JEAN DONOVAN is an assistant professor of theology at Duquesne University, teaching systematic theology, sacraments, and liturgy. She graduated from the University of Notre Dame with a B.A. in Philosophy in the first class of women. Following missionary work with the Holy Cross Fathers in Nairobi, Kenya, she pursued an M.A. in theology and an M.Div. at Catholic Theological Union, and a Ph.D. at Fordham University. She has worked as both professor and full-time minister since then. Her work in ministry has included campus ministry, parish ministry, hospital ministry, crisis counseling with women survivors of domestic violence, and hospice chaplaincy. STEPHEN HEALEY holds degrees in Religion and Society from Eastern Nazarene College (B.A.), Andover Newton Theological School (M.A.), and Boston College (Ph.D.). He was the director of the Program in World Religions at the University of Bridgeport in 1998, where he is also an associate professor. His research and publications have focused on religion and human rights, globalization in religion, and public theology. His primary teaching and research methods are the comparative analysis of religions and enquiry into the public dimensions of religious belief and practice. PATRICIA A. KEEFE is Outreach Coordinator for the Nonviolent Peaceforce. She has been on the Nonviolent Peaceforce staff since 2000 helping to establish this global organization and raising funds to develop it. Patricia has an M.A. in Theology and a J.D. She was a legal services attorney for eight years in Minnesota. She worked in the Legal Office of Amnesty International’s Secretariat in London for a year. As Director for Justice and Human Development for the Archdiocese of Oklahoma City, Patricia helped found the Oklahoma Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty and received awards from the Oklahoma Chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union and the Oklahoma Human Rights Commission. HEERAK CHRISTIAN KIM is visiting professor of biblical studies at Asia Evangelical College and Seminary in India. Professor Kim has held many prestigious academic fellowships, such as the Lady Davis Fellowship at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in Israel during the 1996–97 academic year. Professor Kim has coined a literary device, called “key signifier,” which identifies words and phrases which trigger collective memory and compel the audience to action. Besides working in literary criticism, Professor Kim has published widely on Jewish studies and biblical studies, such as Hebrew, Jewish, and Early Christian Studies. Professor Kim is very active in the Korean community and has worked as the official court Korean Interpreter for Palisades Park (NJ) Municipal Court. BRIAN D. LEPARD is professor of law at the University of Nebraska and a specialist in international law. A graduate of Princeton University and the Yale Law School, he is the author of a number of books and articles relating to international law, human rights, peacemaking, world religions, and global ethics. His most recent book is Hope for a Global Ethic: Shared Principles in Religious Scriptures, published in 2005. He also wrote Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention: A Fresh Legal Approach Based on Fundamental Ethical Principles in International Law and World Religions, which was published in 2002. He is a member of the International Board of Consultants of the Global Ethics and Religion Forum. Prior to entering law school, he served for three years at the United Nations Office of the Bahá’í International Community, where he worked on human rights issues.

ABOUT THE EDITOR AND CONTRIBUTORS

171

WILLIAM R. O’NEILL, S.J., is a professor of social ethics at the Jesuit School of Theology at Berkeley and a visiting professor of ethics at the Jesuit School of Theology in Nairobi. His writings address questions of human rights, ethics and hermeneutical theory, social reconciliation, and refugee policy. He received a Newcombe Fellowship, a Lilly Theological Research Grant, and held the Jesuit Chair, Georgetown University (2003–2004). He has served on the Editorial Board of the Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics and serves on the Board of the Society of Christian Ethics and of the journal Theological Studies. AARON RICKER is presently at McGill University in Montreal writing an M.A. thesis on the politico-rhetorical context of Mark 10:42 and its Synoptic parallels, focusing particularly on teasing out the marks and the implications of the rhetoric’s oddly Roman and imperial character. Aaron is interested in the underexploited dialogical and anarcho-pacific potential of Christian traditions and their critical study. MARCIA SICHOL investigates the need for new perspectives in just war theory for the twenty-first century, addressing the significance of taking a woman’s perspective in discovering the incarnational principle underlying the just war tradition. Marcia has a doctorate in philosophy from Georgetown University and is the treasurer and director of communications for the Sisters of the Holy Child. LLOYD STEFFEN is Professor of Religion Studies and University Chaplain at Lehigh University in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. An NGO representative to the United Nations, Steffen is the author of six books in philosophy of religion and ethics, including the award-winning Executing Justice: The Moral Meaning of the Death Penalty, and, most recently, Holy War, Just War: Exploring the Meaning of Religious Violence, published in 2007. KATHERINE K. YOUNG, James McGill Professor, teaches in the Faculty of Religious Studies and is a member of the Centre for Medicine, Ethics, and Law at McGill University. She publishes in three fields: Hinduism, ethics, and gender and religion. She has coauthored Hindu Ethics (1989) and has coedited Religion and Law in the Global Village (2000). She is currently writing a book on the peaceable ideal of manhood in the cultures of Indian Brahmans, orthodox Jews, Mennonites, and Swedes. On the topic of gender, she has collaborated with Arvind Sharma on twelve books on women in world religions and has co-authored with Paul Nathanson Spreading Misandry: The Teaching of Contempt for Men in Popular Culture (2001) and Legalizing Misandry: from Public Shame to Systemic Discrimination against Men (2006).

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Index

Abbas, Ibn, 89 Abhinavagupta, 34–35, 36n14 Abraham, 155 Absolutism Buddhism and, 39 demonic, 21, 23, 24, 26, 27–28 pluralism and, 50–51 Sri Lanka and, 57 Abstractions, 78 Accutavikkanta, 53 Active fighters, 103, 106n14 Ad bellum norms, 5 Afghani, Jamal-Eddin Al-, 76 Ahibs7 (nonviolence), 43–44, 45, 57, 62n47 Aj7tasattu, 61n23 Al Qaeda, 93 Amam 05, 103 Ambrose, 3, 5 Anasakti Yoga (Gandhi), 34 Anti-white sentiments, 116, 123n11 Aquinas, Thomas, 5–6 Arab Middle East, 100 Arendt, Hannah, 14, 15, 16 Asceticism, 38, 40, 42, 43, 48–49 A{oka, 51–52, 65n90, 67n110, 67n115 Assimilation, 124n25 A}£7dhy7yX (P7hihi), 66n108 Athanasius (saint), 134–35

Atheists, 102 Atta, Mohamed, 20 Augustine (saint), 3, 5–6, 139, 141 Bahá’í faith, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167 Bahá’u’lláh, 162–63 Balance, 31, 45 Bananas (Korean Americans), 112, 113, 114, 115, 116 Bartholomeusz, Tessa, 56, 83n23 Benne, Robert, 83n31 Berger, Peter, 74, 77 BhagavadgXt7, 31–35, 41, 44–45, 47, 63n67, 164–65 Bina, Haya, 103 bin Laden, Osama, 146 Bioethics, 14 Blogs, Lebanon and, 102, 103, 106n15 Bodhisattva, 47, 61n23 Body, human, 34–35, 36n14 Bondedness, 16 Boundaries , 56, 57 Bourke, Joanna, 15, 17n2 Brahmins A{oka and, 52 Buddhism and, 54, 58, 67n116 criticisms of, 50 nonviolence and, 47

174 Brahmins (continued) state and, 51, 58 Tamilnadu and, 68n121 war and, 41–42, 43–46, 49 Brekke, Torkel, 63n67 Brittain, Vera, 15, 16n2 Brothers Karamazov (Dostoyevsky), 9 Brown, Peter, 148 Brown, P.R.L., 139–40 Buddha, 38–39, 60n19, 61n24, 64n76 Buddhadatta, 52–53 Buddhagho}a, 52 Buddhism, 37–, 42–43, 47 American-Korean, 119 Brahmins and, 58 dialogue on, 165–66 Harris on, 74, 76, 78, 82n22, 83n23 human nature, 162–63 just wars and, 166–67 kingship and, 65n85, 67n110 Korean Americans and, 117, 118, 124n32 Koreans and, 125n39 medieval period, 48 nonviolence and, 38 pluralism of, 50 poverty, on, 165 Sri Lanka and, 54–57 state power and, 52 Tamilnadu and, 52, 53, 68n121 Tamils and, 68n137 »ugga dynasty and, 66n109 war and, 60n16 Bush, George W., 7, 146 Bushnell, Horace, 71 Cahill, Lisa, 8, 83n31 Cahulia, Sreeram, 158 Cakkavatti, 39–41, 43, 49, 56, 57, 60n23, 61n24, 64n74, 64n76 Cakravartin, 43, 48–49, 60n10, 65n85 Canada, 101, 104n1, 117, 147. See also North America Canada Research Chair of Islam, Pluralism and Globalization, 104n1 Capitalism, 81 Casuistry, 14 Catholicism, 129–36 Cedar Revolution, 100, 104 Ceremonies, 67n114 Certainty, 23, 27 Chaibong, Hahm, 77

INDEX Change, 10, 41, 43, 45, 53, 86, 87, 90–91, 102–3 Che, Sunny, 123n22 Checks and balances, 90, 167 Children of Light and the Child of Darkness (Niebuhr), 84n51 Childress, James, 4 China, 122. See also Confucianism Choy, Bong-Youn, 118 Christianity. See also Catholicism; Conversatianity; Jesus of Nazareth Conversatian, 143–44 dialogue, on, 166 future of, 81 Golden Rule and, 155 Harris on, 73, 78 Judaism and, 142 just wars and, 167 Koreans and, 111, 115–22, 123n19, 124n27, 125n38 Lebanon and, 103–4, 106n17, 107n18 Turkey and, 95 violence and, 77 “Christianity: The Global Picture” (Berger), 77 Christians, 56, 102 Chwang, Yuan, 68n121 Cicero, 145, 148, 149 Cilappatik7ram of Ilagko A£ika^: An Epic of South India, 65n90 City of God (Augustine), 139–40 Civil rights, 16, 100 Civitate Dei (Augustine), 139–40 Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order (Huntington), 83n37 Classical period, Asian, 43–47 Collins, Steven, 39, 41, 65n82 Colonialism, 54, 68n137, 91–92 Commerce, 150n16 Communism, 87, 119, 122 Community, 102 Compromises, religious, 78, 83n28 Conferences, 139 Confessionalism, 101, 103, 106n18 Conflict, 92 Conflict paradigms, 79, 81, 84n40, 85 Confucianism dialogue on, 166 golden rule and, 153–54 governments and, 77 just wars and, 167 Koreans and, 125n39

175

INDEX peace and, 164 poverty and, 165 shared principles of, 163 Consensus, 4 Conservatism, 120–21 Conversatianity, 143, 144–45 Conversation. See dialogue Conviviality, 103 Corpus Juris Canonici, 3 Cort, John, 48 Costopoulos, Philip, 72, 74–75, 77 Creativity, 23–24 Creeds, Society, and Human Rights: A Study in Three Cultures (Stackhouse), 83n32 Dalai Lama, 74, 76, 79 Daoism, 144 Dassir, Samir, 100 David, King, 154 Day, Dorothy, 9 De Jure Belli ac Pacis (Grotius), 4 Dellios, Rosita, 65n85 Democracy Arab World and, 105n2 export of, 75 future of, 79 Lebanon and, 99–101, 103–4, 104n1, 105n2 Niebuhr on, 84n51 participants, 103 religions and, 72, 74–78, 81 Demonic, the, 28, 142 Demonic religion, 20–27 Demons in the Smoke of the World Trade Center: The Invasion of Evil Spirits and the Blight of Islam (Hymers and Waldrip), 82n2 Destructiveness, 19–, 23–24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 33. See also violence Dialogue. See also Conversatianity Conversatian, Christian, 143 Diamond, et al. on, 72 faith and, 79 interreligious, 51, 79 Lebanon and, 103, 104 Locke on, 84n46 “pagans” with, 141–43 religion and, 75 role of, 81 September 11 attacks, post, 78–79, 147 shared principles of, 165–66

Diamond, Larry, 72, 74, 77, 78 Discrimination, 95 Dissent, 77 Diversity, 136. See also Pluralism Dragas, George Dion, 135 Dualisms, 81, 83n37, 157–58 Du££hag7mahi, 55 Dupré, Louis, 11n21 Durkheim, Emile, 86 Duties, 4, 43 Eastern Orthodoxy, 75 Ecclesiologies, 71–72, 77, 81 Economic factors, 94, 165 Economic reasons for terror, 86–87 Education, 58, 86–88, 89, 92, 116, 123n21 Edwards, Chon S., 114 Ego, 25 Eightfold path, 38 Elections, 100, 107n18 Elshtain, Jean Bethke, 7, 15, 16n2 Empowerment, 23 End of Faith (Harris), 72–78 Erikson, Erik, 156 Essential ethics, 9, 11n33 Ethical principles, 38, 43 Etienne, Bruno, 92–93 European Union, 75 Evangelicals, 119, 121–22 Evil, 40 Extremism, 19, 83n32. See also Fanaticism; Radicalism Fadl, Khaled Abou El, 82n2 Faith Harris on, 73–74, 75–76, 82n5, 83n33, 83n35 private, 80 reason and, 79 terror and, 85 Falwell, Jerry, 21–22, 26–27 Fanaticism, 23, 72, 78, 89. See also Extremism; Radicalism Female thinkers, 14 Fighting, 31–32, 35n1, 51, 63n67 Filali-Ansary, Abdou, 76, 82n22 “Final Instructions to the Hijackers,” 20, 26–27 Fitnah, 85 Five precepts, 38, 60n15 FOBs (fresh off the boat), 111–12, 113 Force, 166–67

176 Forgiveness, 133 Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 100 Freedom, 24–25, 26, 27, 34, 42, 85–86, 161–62 Freedom House, 100 “Freedom in the World 2006,” 100 Freedom of religion, 57 Fresh off the boat (FOBs), 111–12, 113 Fukuyama, Francis, 74 Fundamentalism, 121 Gadamer, Hans-Georg, 6 Gandhi, Mahatma, 16, 31–35, 86, 156, 157 Gender, 14 Genocide, 55 Germany, 75 Ghazali, 89 Globalization, 78, 80, 147. See also International influences God, 4 Gokhale, Balkrishna, 39–41, 60n19, 61n23, 64n74, 64n75 Golden Rule, 77, 153–58 Good and evil, 34, 62n54, 78 Gospels, 143–44 Government, education and, 88 Greeks, Augustine and, 148 Gregory (Saint), 143 – graha, 34 GXt7rthasam Guerre Sainte, 93 Gustafson, James, 83n31 Habermas, Jürgen, 81 Hameed, Atif, 158 Hamzawy, Amr, 100–101 Hanh, Thich Nhat, 157–58 Hariri (Rafiq) assassination, 99, 104 Harris, Sam, 72–74, 77, 84n38 Hatred, 9 Hauerwas, Stanley, 83n33 Healing, 136 Heim, Mark, 83n31 Henotheism, 50 Hillel, Rabbi, 154 Hillenbrand, 90, 93 Hibs7 (violence), 45, 66n100 Hinduism. See also BhagavadgXt7 destructiveness and, 23 Golden Rule and, 155–56 just war and, 37

INDEX kingship and, 65n85 military castes, 43, 62n48 pluralism of, 50 poverty, on, 165 shared principles of, 163 violence and, 62n62 “Hinduism and the Ethics of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 58n1 Historical context, 91 History, 125n38 Hobbes, Thomas, 6, 7, 11n26, 11n27 Hollenbach, David, 83n31 Holy Terrors: Thinking about Religion after September 11 (Lincoln), 84n40 Hope for a Global Ethic: Shared Principles in Religious Scriptures (Lepard), 162 Houballah, Adnan, 106n14 Hsi, Chu, 154 Human nature, 24, 39, 71, 162–63 Human rights, 10n4, 103, 104, 104n1, 165, 167 Huntington, Samuel, 75, 76, 79, 83n37 Hurh, Won Moo, 113, 115, 122n1, 122n3, 123n21, 124n25 Hymers, R.L., 82 Hyun, Sand, 125n38 Identity globalization and, 147 Korean-American, 124n25, 124n34 Korean religion and, 116, 118, 123n20 Lebanese youth and, 101 Middle Eastern, 106n18 narratives and, 133 war and, 103 Ignorance, 92 Impartiality, 46, 64n70, 66n93 In bellum norms, 5 Incarnation, 131–36 In Defense of Dharma: Just-War Ideology in Buddhist Sri Lanka (Bartholomeusz), 83n23 India, 16, 37, 48, 49–54, 56 Indic religions, 59n2, 65n82 Individual actors, 84n49 Individualism, 41, 42 Infallibility, papal, 25 Injustice, 4 Innocence, 8, 62n64, 99, 129, 133 Innovation, 93 Insanity, 73–74 Insiders, 15, 28

INDEX Intermarriage, 114–15, 123n11, 123n20, 124n22 International influences, 104, 156–57, 162, 166, 167. See also Globalization Internet, 143 Interpretation and reason, 32 Intimate History of Killing: Face-to-Face Killing in Twentieth Century Warfare (Bourke), 15 Intolerance, 73, 88–89. See also Tolerance Iran, 94 Iraq war, 7, 8 Irrationality, 72–73 Israel, 99 Isaac, 155 Isaiah, 141–42 Ishmael, 155 Islam. See also Muslims Conversatianity and, 144–45 critiques of, 82, 89 Filali-Ansary on, 82n22 future of, 81, 84n43 Golden Rule and, 156 Harris on, 73, 82n2 resurgence of, 93 separation of church and state and, 75 Shiism/Sunnism, 94, 103 terrorism and, 71–72, 79–80, 95, 96 violence and, 77, 130 war and, 6, 12n34 West and, 84n39, 84n49 Islam Unveiled: Disturbing Questions about the World’s Fastest Growing Faith (R. Spencer), 82n2 Israel, 100, 155 Jaini, Padmanabh S., 66n100 Jainism Brahmins and, 58 Harris on, 78 just-war, theories of, 66n100 kingship and, 48, 65n93 medieval period, in, 48 nonviolence and, 38 pluralism of, 50, 54 Tamilnadu and, 53, 67n121, 68n125 violence and, 83n38 war and, 37, 41, 42–43, 47 Japan, 123n22, 125n36 Jeremiah, 140 Jesus of Nazareth, 16, 144, 162–63, 164–65. See also Christianity

177 Jewish traditions, 6, 14, 16 Jihad, 89–92 John, Book of, 143, 150n19 John Paul II, 8 Johnson, James Turner, 4, 11n24 John XXIII, 6 J7taka stories, 61n26 Judaism dialogue and, 165–66 golden rule and, 154–55 interreligious dialogue and, 144 just wars and, 166 Passover and, 136n3, 136n6 peace and, 164–65 shared principles of, 163 Turkey and, 95 violence and, 77, 130 Jus ad bellum, 63n67 Jus gentium, 4 Jus in bello, 63n67 Justice, 9, 164–65, 166–67 Just war (justum bellum) Buddhism and, 166–67 Christianity and, 3–7, 10n10, 145–46, 167 Confucianism and, 167 Hinduism and, 37, 62n64, 63n67 human rights and, 167 Indic theories, 43–54, 52, 56, 57–58 Jainism and, 66n100 Judaism and, 166 kings and, 63n67 pacificism vs., 9 shared principles of, 166–67 Sri Lanka and, 56–57 states and, 9 Tamilnadu and, 46 Kadamba kings, 67n121 Kafa, 103 Kalabhras, 53 Kane, P.V., 67n113 Kangle, R.P., 42 Kant, Immanuel, 5, 10n116, 14, 15 Kau£ilya, 42, 62n47, 63n67 Kesay, John, 10n13 Kharijites, 90 Khomeini, 84n41 Kim, Hyung-Chan, 124n36 Kim, Kwang Chung, 115, 123n21, 124n25 Kim, Yong Choon, 116 King, Martin Luther, Jr., 8, 16, 157

178 Kings. See also States Buddhism and, 37, 39, 67n110 insignia of, 61n28, 63n68, 65n90 Jainism and, 65n93 just war and, 63n67 nonviolence and, 44 states and, 59n9 Tamilnadu and, 46 Veda of Warfare on, 42 Kinship, 15, 44–45 Kitagawa, Joseph M., 64n80 Koran. See Qur’an Korean-American Community: Present and Future (Kwak and Lee), 113 Korean-American Treaty, 114 Korean-American Youth identity and, 111–15, 118, 123n20, 124n23, 124n25, 124n34 religion and, 115–22, 124n27 Kum7rap7la, King, 48–49 Kwak, Tae-Hwan, 113 Kyi, Aung San Suu, 74, 76 Kyongbo, Soh, 117 Language, 65n82 Laws, Americans, 114, 122n2 Laws of Islam, 91 Laws of nature, 6, 7 Lebanon, 99–104 Le Bone, Gustave, 88 Lee, Sang Hyun, 119, 120 Lee, Seong, Hyong, 113 Lefebure, Leo, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 136, 136n3 Legitimacy, 85 Lepard, Brian D., 162 Letter Concerning Human Understanding (Locke), 84n46 Lewis, Bernard, 74 Liberalism, 72, 73, 76, 80, 84n46 Liberation/salvation/self-realization, 42 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, 68n134 Life-affirming religion, 23, 24, 27, 28 Lincoln, Bruce, 84n40 Locke, John, 11n27 Logos, 144, 150n19 Los Angeles riots, 116 Love, 8, 9–10, 131, 155 Low-income populations, 86–87 MacArthur, John, 122 Machiavelli, 8

INDEX Madness, 73–74 Mah7vabsa, 83n23 Mah7bh7rata (Vy7sa), 33, 34, 44, 45, 63n64 Mah7vabsa, 53, 56, 63n68 Mah7y7na Buddhism, 47, 50, 64n74 Making of a Nuclear Peace (Sichol), 13–14 Male thinkers, 13–14 Malik, Habib C., 105n2 Mamdani, Mahmood, 84n39 Mandela, Nelson, 16, 86 Manipulation, 87 Mann, Thomas, 136n6 Maouawad, Wassim, 103 Marcellino, Dr., 137n14 Marginalized, the, 16, 166 Marxist-Leninist Armed Propaganda Association (MLAPA), 88 Materialism, 92, 163 Mawdudi, 84n41, 92 Meaning and End of Religion (W.C. Smith), 82n22 Medaille, John C., 143 Media, 95, 104n1 Medieval period, Asian, 47–49 Meditation, 74, 82n22 Megasthenes, 62n64 Mehendale, M.A., 63n64 Melito of Sardis, 129, 132, 134 Memories, 102–3, 106n7, 116–17, 123n22 Mencius, 154 Middle East, 79, 94. See also specific countries; specific religions Milbank, John, 83n33 Military castes, 43, 62n48 Mindfulness, 157 Modality, 7 Modernity, 4, 93–94 Mohammed, 93 Moore, Edward, 144 Morality Buddhism on, 41 demonic religion and, 22, 23, 27–28 development of, 38, 59n7 religion and, 20 shared principles of, 162–66 Morrow, Lance, 9 Moslem traditions. See Islam Motivations, 25 Moyers, Bill, 73 Multivalence of religions, 75, 82n7 Murder, 22, 26

INDEX Muslims. See also Islam just war theories and, 4, 54, 58, 167 Lebanon and, 100, 102, 103–4, 107n18 terrorists and, 89, 147 Turkish, 94 Muwatiniya, Nahwa al-, 103 Mysticism, 74 N7rada, 33 Narratives, 133–34 Natural law, 3, 9 Negativity, 22–23, 25–26, 27 Negotiations, 85 Niebuhr, H. Richard, 8, 9, 81, 84n51 9/11. See September 11 attacks Nonmaleficence, 4, 6, 8 Nonviolence. See also Ahibs7 (nonviolence); Pacifism absolute, 58 BhagavadgXt7 and, 45 Brahmins and, 44 Buddhism and, 39–41, 43–44, 47, 57, 64n75 development of, 38 Gandhi and, 31–35 Islamic, 92 Jainism and, 66n100 state and, 62n47 strategies for, 157 Nonviolent Peaceforce, 157, 158 Norms, 38 North Africa, 79 North America, 147. See also Canada; United States North Korea, 122 Nuclear war, 13, 16 Nursi, Said, 92 Nyanatiloka, 64n76 O’Brien, William Vincent, 17n7 Oil, 105n2 On Pascha (Melito of Sardis), 132 On the Incarnation (Athanasius), 134–35 Open-minded consultation, 165–66. See also Dialogue Ottomans, 93 Outsiders, 15, 16, 28 Pacifism, 8, 78. See also Nonviolence Pagans, 145, 148 “Pagans,” 141–42 Palestinians, 155 P7li Buddhism, 38, 39, 52, 54, 63n68

179 PahCikabh7ya, 54 P7hihi, 66n108 P7r7jika, 60n12 Park, Chung-Hee, 122n2 Paschal lambs, 129, 130–31, 132–33 Passions, 31 Passive fighters, 103, 106n14 Passover, 130–33, 132, 136, 136n3, 136n6 Paul (saint), 144 Peace army, 156 Catholicism and, 129 Islamic conceptions of, 91 justice and, 164–65 shared principles of, 164–66 “Peace Pastoral” (U.S. Bishops), 4 Perspectives, 49, 79 Pessimism, 163–64 Philippines, 158 Philosophy, 13 Place of Tolerance in Islam (Fadl), 82n2 Plattner, Marc, 72, 74–75 Pluralism. See also Volume 3 Part I: Plural Visions Biblical, 142–43 Christian, 148 Indic, 57–58 Islamic, 89 Korean-Americans and, 115 language and, 65n82 Lebanon and, 100, 103–4, 106n7, 106n17 shared principles of, 163 South Asian, 50–51 Sri Lanka and, 55, 68n134 Turkish, 94, 95 Pokinko. Thomas, 66n102 Political science, 80 Politics , 72, 91. See also Democracy; Separation of church and state Portugal, 75 Poverty, 87, 92, 165 Power absolute, 23, 27, 28 Buddhism on, 40 cakkavatti and, 61n24 faith and, 79 Islam and, 93 Kau£ilya on, 42 marginalized and, 16 religion and, 58, 81 secularization and, 106n18 Vedic age and, 37–38 virtues and, 65n85

180 Principles, 78 Progressive Muslims: On Justice, Gender, and Pluralism (Safi), 82n2 Public dialogue, 6, 7, 8, 16 Qur’an Christianity and, 145 dialogue, on, 166 human nature, on, 162–63 just wars and, 167 killing and, 94 peace and, 164, 165 shared principles of, 163 terrorism and, 89–91 Qutb, Maududi, 84n41 Radicalism, 95. See also Extremism; Fanaticism Rahner, Karl, 9 Ramadan, Tariq, 82n2 R7m7yaha, 44, 47, 62n54, 63n64 Ramsey, Paul, 17n7 Raphael, Nada, 103 Rationalism, 4, 74 Rauf, Feisal Abdul, 82n2 Rawls, John, 8 Raychaudhuri, Hemchandra, 67n115 Realism, 8, 9 Reason, 13, 27, 79, 83n33, 88 Reconciliation (Schreiter), 133 Relationships, 78 Religion-inspired conflict, 162 Religions. See also Rituals; specific religions analyses of, 76–77 development of, 78 future of, 81 golden rule and, 153–58 Korean Americans and, 115–22, 124n34 morality and, 28 power and, 42 role of, 13 shared moral principles of, 162–66 states and, 67n110 terrorism and, 88–91 Religious belief, 3 Religious ethics , 83n31 Religious wars , 53 Resistance, 102, 134, 157 Revelation, 13 Revelation, Book of, 142 Rhee, Sang-O, 115 Richards, Chris, 158

INDEX Richman, Paula, 65n90 Riots, 116 Risale-i Nur (Nursi), 92 Rituals , 67n114, 68n134, 129–36 Robertson, Pat, 21–22, 26–27 Rome, 139, 140, 142, 149 Rossing, Barbara, 142 Rubeiz, Ghassan, 100, 106n18 Rulers. See Kings; States Rules of war, 45–46, 49, 58, 63n64 Safi, Omid, 82n2 »aiva, 53 Salem, Paul, 102 Samidoun, 103 Samu, Kim, 117, 124n31 »a{7gka, 52 Sastrigal, K.S. Ramaswamy, 36n14 Saul, King, 24 Sawa Group, 103 Schalk, Peter, 54 Scholiasts, 64n70 Schreiter, Robert, 133 Schwarzenegger, Arnold, 114 Science, 74, 81, 154 Sea imagery, 142–43, 150n16 Sectarianism, 103–4 “Secular,” 76 Secularization Falwell on, 21, 22 Islamic views, 84n41 Korean Americans and, 120 Lebanon and, 104 pessimism and, 163–64 power and, 106n18 religion and, 81 Turkey and, 94 Self-criticism, 89 Self-deception, 25–26, 27 Self-defense, 16, 41, 49 Self-preservation, 6, 21, 23, 26 Self-sacrifice, 131 Sen, Amartya, 6 Senseless violence, 146 Separation of church and state, 75, 80 September 11 attacks, 20–21, 25, 27, 71–72, 78, 118, 119–21 Shalom, 8 Shanti Sena, 156 Shiism, 94, 103 Sichol, Marcia, 13–14, 17n7 “Sin and Evil in Feminist Thought” (C. Smith), 134

181

INDEX Sinhalas, 55–56 Smith, Christine, 133 Smith, Wilfred Cantwell, 82n22 Smuts, General, 157 Social change, 10, 86 SOLIDA, 101 South Africa, 16, 157 South Asian wars, 37 Southeast Asia, 48 South Korea, 124n35 Spanish Scholastics, 3 Spectators, 14, 15 Spencer, Herbert, 88 Spencer, Robert, 82n2 Spirituality, 24–25, 74, 162–63 Spiritual needs, 23 Sri Lanka, 37, 54–57, 83n23, 158 Stackhouse, Max, 83n31, 83n32 Stanton, Elizabeth Cady, 16 State religions, 67n110 States. See also Kings Augustine on, 149 Buddhism and, 38 formation of, 59n9 just war and, 9 religion and, 49, 52, 53, 58, 67n110 Southeast Asian medieval, 48 Vedic age, of, 38 virtues and, 62n47 Stepan, Alfred, 74, 82n7 Student movements, 87 Stuhlmueller, Carroll, 137n14 Suárez, Francisco, 4–5 Suicide, 21, 22, 26 »ugga dynasty, 51, 66n109, 67n116 Sungsan, 117, 124n31 Sunnism, 94, 103 Su’ud, Ebu, 91 Sympathy, 77–78 Syrian army, 99–100 Tadamon, 103 Taliban, 93 Tambiah, S.J., 57, 68n137, 83n23 Tamilnadu, 46, 48, 52–53, 54, 66n108 Tamils, 55–56, 60n11 Taymiyyah, Ibn, 90, 93 Technology, 93 Teleevangelists, 21–22 Tent of Abraham (Waskow), 155 Terrorism. See also Turks and terror attacks in Turkey, 95 causes of, 84n44

defined, 85–86 dialogue and, 80 Islam and, 79–80, 93, 96 reasons for, 86–93 reducing, 81 religion and, 95 Terrorists, 87, 88 Theocracy , 93 Theology, 13, 80, 81, 83n31, 84n45, 143, 148 Therav7da Buddhism, 60n11 Thick narratives, 4 Thiemann, Ronald, 83n31 Thin consensus, 4 Thirty Years’ War, 161–62 Thomistic natural law, 3 Tillich, Paul, 22, 25, 75–76 Tiruva^^uvar, 48 Tolerance, 67n113, 72, 73, 95. See also Intolerance; Pluralism Toleration, 166 Torah, the, 154 Torture, 7, 72, 77, 78, 80 Totalitarianism, 104n1 Touma, Michel, 106n17 “True” religion, 20 Truth, 50, 143 Truth, Sojourner, 16 Tsai, Chang, 154 Tuéni, Gebran, 100 Turks and terror definitions, 85–86 history, 93–96 reasons for terror, 86–93 “Twin tolerations,” 75 Two-wheel doctrine, 37, 39–40, 60n23, 64n76 UNESCO, 86 United Nations, 167 United States, 100, 114, 124n36, 140–41. See also Korean-American Youth; North America Unity, human, 163–64 Upani}ads, 38, 41–42, 42–43, 156 Urbanity, 81 Urbanization, 86 U.S. Bishops, 4 Vai}hava, 53 Varuha, 41 Veda of Warfare, 42 Vedic age, 37–38, 67n114 VimalakXrti Nirde{a Su-tra, 47

182 Violence. See also Hibs7; Nonviolence; Terrorism; Torture; Wars beliefs and, 73 Christianity and, 129–36 demonic religion and, 27, 28 fighting and, 31 managing, 81 narratives and, 133–34 pre-Indus Valley civilization, 59n3 religion and, 28 Vedic age and, 37–38 Virgil, 150n16 Virtues Buddhist, 47, 64n70, 64n73, 64n76, 64n80 power and, 65n85 Upani}adic, 43, 62n47 Le virus de la violance (Houballah), 106n14 Vitoria, Francisco de, 5 Voltaire, 81 Waldrip, John S., 82 Walzer, Michael, 4, 10n2, 11n26, 17n7 Warrior codes, 38 Wars. See also Just war (justum bellum); specific wars Augustine on, 149 Brahmins and, 41–42, 43–46, 49 Buddhism and, 60n16 experiences of, 102 identity and, 103

INDEX Islam and, 6, 12n34 Jainism and, 37, 41, 42–43, 47, 66n100 memories of, 102–3, 106n7 religious, 53 rules of, 45–46, 49, 58, 63n64 South Asian, 37 Waskow, Arthur, 155 Weber, Max, 80–81 West, the, 165 Western Muslims and The Future of Islam (Ramadan), 82n2 What’s Right with Islam: A New Vision for Muslims and the West (Rauf), 82n2 What Went Wrong? The Clash between Islam and Modernitiy in the Middle East (Lewis), 84n39 Wisdom, 150n19 Witness, 8 World Congress on World’s Religions, 129 World Religions and Democracy (Diamond, Plattner and Costopoulos), 72, 74– World War I, 15 World War II, 15 Xuanzang (Yuan Chwag/Hsuan-tsang), 52 Young, Katherine K., 58 Yousif, Ahmad F., 147 Youth, 101–2 Yuh, Ji-Yeon, 114–15

The World’s Religions after September 11

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The World’s Religions after September 11 Volume 2 Religion and Human Rights

EDITED BY ARVIND SHARMA

PRAEGER PERSPECTIVES

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The world’s religions after September 11 / edited by Arvind Sharma. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-275-99621-5 (set : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-0-275-99623-9 (vol. 1 : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-0-275-99625-3 (vol. 2 : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-0-275-99627-7 (vol. 3 : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-0-275-99629-1 (vol. 4 : alk. paper) 1. Religions. 2. War—Religious aspects. 3. Human rights—Religious aspects. 4. Religions—Relations. 5. Spirituality. I. Sharma, Arvind. BL87.W66 2009 200—dc22 2008018572 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available. Copyright © 2009 by Arvind Sharma All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 2008018572 ISBN: 978-0-275-99621-5 (set) 978-0-275-99623-9 (vol. 1) 978-0-275-99625-3 (vol. 2) 978-0-275-99627-7 (vol. 3) 978-0-275-99629-1 (vol. 4) First published in 2009 Praeger Publishers, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. www.praeger.com Printed in the United States of America

The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48-1984). 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Every reasonable effort has been made to trace the owners of copyrighted materials in this book, but in some instances this has proven impossible. The editor and publisher will be glad to receive information leading to more complete acknowledgments in subsequent printings of the book and in the meantime extend their apologies for any omissions.

Contents Introduction

ix

Part I. Religions and Human Rights Chapter 1

Chapter 2

The Current State of the Individual: A Meditation on “The Falling Man” Maurice Boutin Locke’s Inheritors: The Dilemma of Religious “Toleration” Matt Sheedy

Chapter 3

Religion and an Implicit Fundamental Human Right James Kellenberger

Chapter 4

Religion and Human Rights: A Historical and Contemporary Assessment Krishna Kanth Tigiripalli and Lalitha Kumari Kadarla

3

13 19

27

Chapter 5

Achieving Religious Harmony Rhoda Asikia Ige

Chapter 6

The Grammar of Dissent: Religion, Rights, and Public Reason William R. O’Neill

49

Divine Rights: Toward a New Synthesis of Human Rights and World Religions Brian D. Lepard

61

Chapter 7

37

CONTENTS

VI

Chapter 8

Universality of Moral Norms: A Human Rights Perspective Kusumita P. Pedersen

69

Chapter 9

Is the Notion of Human Rights a Western Concept? Raimundo Panikkar

79

Part II. Individual Religions and Human Rights Chapter 10

What Gives a Person Worth? A Zoroastrian View Nikan H. Khatibi

Chapter 11

Women and Human Rights: The Status of Women in the Smxti Texts of Hinduism Abha Singh

101

103

Chapter 12

Catholicism and the AIDS Pandemic Xavier Gravend-Tirole

Chapter 13

Religion, Violence, and Human Rights: A Hindu Perspective Arvind Sharma

145

Confucian Contributions to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Historical and Philosophical Perspective Sumner B. Twiss

153

Religious Freedom, the Right to Proselytize, and the Right “To Be Let Alone” Kusumita P. Pedersen

175

Chapter 14

Chapter 15

115

Part III. A Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the World’s Religions? Chapter 16

Chapter 17

The Rationale for a Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the World’s Religions: Before and after September 11, 2001 Arvind Sharma A Bahá’í Perspective on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the World’s Religions After September 11, 2001 Brian D. Lepard

187

191

Appendices Appendix 1

United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights

199

Appendix 2

Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the World’s Religions

205

Appendix 3

A Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the Hindus

211

Appendix 4

Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights

219

CONTENTS

VII

Appendix 5

The Dhaka Declaration on Human Rights in Islam

233

Appendix 6

The Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam

235

Appendix 7

Arab Charter on Human Rights

241

Appendix 8

Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities

255

Appendix 9

A Global Ethic: The Universal Declaration of the Parliament of the World’s Religions

259

About the Editor and Contributors

269

Index

273

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Introduction Arvind Sharma

T

his volume explores the relationship of religion to human rights. Most of the chapters included in it were delivered at the global congress on World’s Religions After September 11, 2001, when it met in Montreal, September 11–15, 2006. These explorations can be divided broadly into four vectors. One set of chapters deals with the issue of religion and human rights in general. The first chapter explores the frailness of humanity through the metaphor of “the falling man” and may be taken as a secular version of the fall of Adam. Human rights discourse is an attempt to address this frailty, just as Christian soteriological discourse focuses on the expulsion of Adam. Human rights discourse constitutes a particular way of addressing the issues that human beings face as members of a polity or society. Religion also constitutes an element in this situation and is therefore relevant to the discussion of these issues. The fact, however, that its ultimate point of reference is the ultimate reality, which is often trans-human in some sense, makes it both a difficult and a fascinating element in the situation. Its role turns out to be Janus faced in relation to human rights discourse, as is evident from the various presentations in this section. Religion sometimes helps human rights discourse, and it sometimes needs the help of that discourse. The various chapters in this section address the many faces and facets of the dialogue of religion and human rights in general. In the next part, one moves from the general to the particular: from religion in general to religions in particular, as individual religious traditions are taken into account in the context of human rights. Thus this section contains chapters that deal with Zoroastrian conceptions of such a crucial human rights value as that of human worth, which constitutes the bedrock of human rights discourse; an investigation of the rights of women in Hinduism; and the issue of reproductive rights in relation to Catholicism. The question of war, violence, and human rights in

X

INTRODUCTION

Hinduism is explored next, followed by an assessment of the Confucian contribution to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The last chapter in the section explores the issue of proselytization, usually associated with a Western concept of religion. The third section brings the previous discussions to a conclusion in the form of a proposal. While Part I deals with human rights in general, and Part II examines human rights in relation to individual religious traditions, Part III pulls all these threads together in discussing the prospect of moving toward a Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the World’s Religions. The fourth and final section consists of appendices. Readers may wish to pay special attention to the appendices, as material has been brought together under this heading that may not otherwise be readily accessible. The first appendix is none other than the UN Declaration of Human Rights, so central to much of the discussion in the book. It is followed by the draft of the proposed Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the World’s Religions in its present state, the subject of discussion in Part III. Available human rights declarations by some of the individual religions are then presented, followed by a universal declaration of human responsibilities. It is a response to the charge that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ignores the issue of responsibilities because of its preoccupation with rights. Finally, the declaration pertaining to a Global Ethic is presented. This proposed ethic may be said to bear the same relationship to the proposed Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the World’s Religions that the UN Charter bears to the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Part I Religions and Human Rights

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CHAPTER 1

The Current State of the Individual: A Meditation on “The Falling Man” Maurice Boutin

T

here was a photo taken by Richard Drew and published in the New York Times and other newspapers on September 12, 2001, of a man who had jumped from a window of the restaurant Windows on the World.1 The man is pictured in free fall alongside one of the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center. Because the picture was deemed too violent by a good number of readers of the newspapers, it quickly disappeared from the material used in reports on the disastrous event in New York City on September 11. And yet the photo titled simply The Falling Man offers the opportunity to restart both anamnesis and critical distanciation, instead of needless contemplation of building debris. Today’s individual is enrolled in a host of self-help programs with “the gospel of personal blooming in one hand, and the cult of performance in the other” so as to ensure the preeminence of the spirit over the body.2 According to Peter Sloterdijk, the individual is the element of an “acutely relational secret” analyzed by him in Bubbles: Microspherology, the first of three books on Spheres.3 Such a secret provides a means to do away with the “negativity with no use”—or “unemployed negativity”—that so fascinated Georges Bataille that he readily acknowledged he “would not be able to define [himself] more precisely” as someone in a situation “between animality and humanity.”4 Such a “between” is the dividing and at the same time the articulation of the dividuation in vegetative and relational lives as both the place for, and the result of, ceaseless divisions. In this vein, Sloterdijk quotes Augustine’s poignant maxim: in experimentis volvimur—“life pours us like water from one hardship into another.”5 If one can still treat the human subject as a “middle term,” it is no longer “a mean between nothing and everything,” but a “middle term between local hero and local loser” because “the subject has to assume oneself, and in doing so, has to demonstrate a steadfastness that—given all knowledge about the human—is not there; the subject is condemned to hold on, although the supplies are used up.”6 The subject is torn apart between a pride of self-sufficiency in the universe and a

4

RELIGIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS

fear of failure in human relations. The kingdom of serenity is thwarted—a serenity based on the essentialized alternative of either optimism or pessimism frozen in attitudes that quickly become caricatures. “The speculative intellect of the Aristotelians, the pure reason of the rationalists, the automatic progress anticipated by the liberals, all provided shelter for academic serenity. But since the failure of the absolute idealists to encompass human history within the embrace of speculative reason, the issue of praxis has repeatedly come to the fore.” Bernard Lonergan called this the end of “the age of innocence” in 1977.7 In the meantime, the development of neuroscience has brought about a transformation in the framework of knowledge that has not yet established itself within the paradigmatic habits of thought that characterize today’s sociocultural life and established institutions. This remaining task is that of overcoming monocausality (i.e., a onedimensional, cause-effect relation). As Pierre Legendre suggests, “One cannot at once produce a techno-scientific society and reject the myth, i.e. the system of representations, that makes it work.”8 Such a task involves the description of a problem and the proposal of a project. The description pertains to anthropocentrism and the misunderstandings it generates, first in terms of a felt urge to debunk anthropocentrism by using a destabilizing maneuver aimed at destroying something that does not exist, and then—precisely because of that debunking—a radicalizing of the problem. The proposal focuses on the “between” that calls for a sophisticated relation to the environment (Umwelt), itself a reaction to what is usually viewed simply as opportunities for exploitation and eventual destruction. The “between” has to do with “coming to world” as world-in (Inwelt) and world-with (Mitwelt) (i.e., with a “Zwischenwelt” of development and transformation preventing the so-called quality of life from becoming an addiction).

ANTHROPOCENTRISM—THE PROBLEM? In a public lecture at the congress on Medicine Goes Electronic in Nuremberg in September 1995, Sloterdijk talked about Frustration through Machines: On the Significance of Late Medical Technology.9 In this lecture, he referred to nine major stages in the growing development of such a frustration. The first three frustrations were identified by Freud in the conclusion of the eighteenth of his twenty-eight introductory lectures on psychoanalysis in 1916–1917. First, the cosmological revolution based on Copernicus’ heliocentric cosmology banned human beings and their homeland, the earth, from the center of the universe. Second, Darwin ended the long-held human arrogance toward the animal kingdom, considering humans merely a developed species of the animal order. Finally, psychoanalysis caused a third frustration by showing that so-called spiritual processes are developing in such an unconscious way that the Ego can no longer think of itself as in control of these processes: the Ego “is not even master in its own home, but must content itself with scanty information of what is going on unconsciously in its mind.”10 In 1992 Gerhard Vollmer, a cognition biologist, added four other frustrations related to the brain, evolution, and the image of the human being. The fourth frustration is caused by ethology that includes not only the human physical

THE CURRENT STATE OF THE INDIVIDUAL

5

dimension, but also human behavioral development within the animal sequence. A fifth frustration takes place in the theory of knowledge under the influence of evolutionism: human cognition might still be successful in exploring mesocosmic reality, but it fails when exploring micro- and macrocosmic levels. Of course, the human species still remains an exceptional logical animal. However, human beings are collectively a kind of mole of the universe that bores a narrow cognitive tunnel in order to move forward and survive. Needless to say, this undercuts the pride based on the intellectual trust in the potentialities of human cognition. Following that fifth frustration, one must get prepared to face another one coming from the much-debated sociobiology and its pretense to tear apart the illusion that human behavior could express holistic, altruistic, and disinterested motives. Sociobiology discovers, as it were, a kind of so-called egoism of the genes at the basis of behavior: genes are totally indifferent to the interests of the individual and of the human species. No individual or species occupies the center of the world stage; rather, each is a mask and a means for a pre-human central power one could characterize as “the will to power” of the genes. Finally, the seventh frustration mentioned by Vollmer is caused by computer technique and has two sides: the anthropological side that views human beings as a kind of duplex imitated by machines whose “functional equivalent” shames them, and the mass media side that further downgrades them to cultural animals that can still talk, write, or perceive, and yet are forced to be aware of how outdated and inadequate their place and role in the universe has become.11 According to Sloterdijk, the list of frustrations does not end there. He registers two more frustrations, first from ecology that purports to prove that in the long run, so-called highly developed cultures can but misinterpret and destroy the highly complex systems of their environment and can neither adequately understand nor spare them. Finally, the neurobiological frustration produced by the combining of genetics, bionics, and biochemistry will make the most autonomous manifestations of human existence—for instance creativity, love, and free will— disappear in a swamp of reflective technologies and power games studded by willo’-the-wisps. To sum up, the progress of knowledge is sketched—first by Freud—after the model of a growing frustration. It consists in decentralizing human beings and divesting them of all kinds of illusory paradises; it is a procedure generated by a growing cognitive interiorization through analysis, which is called “introspection” by Freud.12 In this way, an individual who is curious and open to truth actually earns from this only a growing disadvantage resulting from severe damage to the “immune cognitive shield” after the debunking of anthropocentrism in various ways—cosmological (Copernicus), biological (Darwin), psychological (Freud), ethological (Lorenz), cognitive, genetic, computerizing, ecological, and last but not least, neurobiological.13 Such a list of frustrations might well seem pessimistic. Given such a diagnosis, it might be preferable to preserve the privileged position granted by so-called anthropocentrism. But “here as ever, one must be wary of flat statements about trends.”14 One should not forget that Copernicus’s revolution brought about—contrary to what Freud and his followers still may think—not the beginning of an end to the narcissistic blow, but liberation from a “closed world” (Koyré) and from a cosmological intimacy that had become increasingly meaningless.15

6

RELIGIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS

According to Sloterdijk, the thesis of the growing loss of centrality for humankind and the gradual and inexorable debunking of anthropocentrism is at best a misunderstanding, ultimately even an intentional abuse.16 He suggests that we view anthropocentrism as a product of cultured nineteenth-century bourgeoisie for whom the Ptolemaic and the Aristotelian geocentrism secured for the earth an outmost privilege. In fact, the physical-cosmological middle point of the universe was for Aristotle and his successors the wicked dregs of the universe, a kind of cosmic cesspool, a place for corruption, limited movements, and death, a place for great sublunar cemeteries. As such, it is the exact contrary to that which provided the basis for the alleged anthropocentrism: it rather provides the humiliation of all human beings, compared to a supraterrestrial space practically out of reach for them. In the traditional world scheme, the earth as the physical center of the universe was the worst spot possible. Erasmus, who had interiorized the cosmic “miserabilism” of the Christian community, shook his head in disapproval of the Copernicus fans, wondering whether they seriously wanted to make out of the earth17 a star instead of the infamous “vale of tears”—the English translation of lacrimarum valle, an expression used around the year 1000 in the hymn Salve Regina: Hail, holy Queen, mother of mercy, our life, our sweetness and our hope. To you do we cry, poor banished children of Eve. To you do we send up our sighs, mourning and weeping in this vale of tears. Turn then, most gracious advocate, your eyes of mercy toward us, and after this exile show us the blessed fruit of your womb, Jesus. O clement, o loving, O sweet Virgin Mary.18

As a matter of fact, the ancient geocentrism brought about human devaluation and humiliation.19 The medieval vale-of-tears rhetoric—still present and effective among Christians today—is the consequence of the idealization of the encompassing peripheral ether in Aristotelian cosmography. Planet earth is “the dark spot on the clear jacket of the sky.”20 This is certainly no reason for anthropocentric celebration. And yet frustration is too serious an issue to appeal to false examples. Freud’s fairy tale about the frustrations caused by Copernicus, Darwin, and psychoanalysis—to mention only a few examples—needs rectification that pertains to the other frustrations as well.21 For example, compared to the frustration caused by machines, the so-called frustrations following the discovery of the unconscious could be viewed as “blandishments,” since Freud’s theory did encourage a kind of “private property on fascinating mysteries.”22 The so-called anthropocentric frustration has been embellished by the revival of ancient panpsychism and panorganicism polemically blended with mechanistic production processes. The more technique develops, the more its vitalistic and

THE CURRENT STATE OF THE INDIVIDUAL

7

panorganic counterparts crop up. Both co-exist in “mutual teasing” and “permanent antagonistic interweavings,” which perpetuate an obsession for separation as the only way to really make the distinction between what endures and what is ephemeral, between organism and function.23 In the future, how should we cultivate a way of thinking that warrants for what remains of the communication and coherence previously coded by metaphysics?24

THE “BETWEEN”—A PROJECT Human beings in the twentieth century made themselves out to be as they promoted themselves to “managers of the nuclear fire” and “writers of the genetic scripture.”25 Marshall McLuhan’s “the medium is the message” is replaced by “the production of world is the message.” Homo sapiens is a transient production of Nature, humanity is a product open to further transformation; one does not know who or what the producer is. The latter is said against the attempt to hide the issue behind “the two classical pseudo-solutions”: against what is called God or what humanity is supposed to be, namely the producer. Both answers are based on “the same grammatical delusion” caused by the application of the linguistic play: “X generates Y,” which presupposes that the producer precedes the product. Thus, what is to be explained is reduced to the explaining element. The outcome of the whole operation is not only anticipated, it is also presupposed, either indirectly or explicitly. Such logical shortcomings might be eventually meaningful—albeit to some limited extent—with regard to so-called autopoietic systems. However, as far as the human predicament is concerned, this approach obstructs any further research. Human beings do not come out of a magician’s hat, nor are they like apes that come down from trees and experience themselves as humans, to use Karl Rahner’s ironical remark. Human beings do not come from the hand of a creator either—whether called God or human being—whose foreknowledge is blind to process and cancels out actual process in the first place. The one-dimensional cause-effect relation gives not only ontological precedence, but also accords primarily temporal precedence to cause over effect in terms of before and after. This is inadequate with regard to higher complexity, particularly where life process is at stake. At least with reference to the brain-mind relationship, the one-dimensional cause-effect relation is trapped within the alternative of making either the mind hostage to the brain, with the result of negating the former, or the brain hostage to the all-embracing realm of the mind, with the result that the brain can be readily ignored, if not even rejected for lack of relevance. This dilemma cannot be avoided through recourse to a “bistable fluctuation,” and it is not enough to bring into play, as Sloterdijk probably would, a sort of “bizarre circular causalities.”26 One should instead hold to the following: the mind is not the brain; the mind is not without the brain. The equiprimordiality of the not/not without expresses the fact that the mind and the brain are closely related through and within their difference. A way to harmonize “continuity and discontinuity,”27 equiprimordiality additionally provides the possibility of articulating a complex that takes into account Sloterdijk’s preoccupation with the “between.”

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Equiprimordiality eradicates the need to appeal to a unique and absolute center; it emphasizes poles radiating toward one another, for instance the worldin and the world-with, a radiation that replaces the identification/confusion between the world-in and the world-around, commonly called nature and environment. It also signals a preference for “homeotechnical” thinking and world over “allotechnical” thinking and world: the latter is geared toward domination and conflict, whereas the former—a nondominating form of agency—comes to the fore initially as ecology and as a science of complexity, potentially fostering relations based on co-contingency rather than reduction.28 Crucial for the humanizing situation, the “between” is a space made out of the co-operation of four mechanisms Sloterdijk calls “insulating mechanism” or natural space of (1) protection against nature; (2) “distanciation from nature through use of tools”; (3) “survival of the happiest in terms of the better use of opportunities offered”; and (4) “transmission mechanism.”29 These mechanisms do reveal a permanent structure at work in the hominization/humanization process throughout its historical development, even under highly varying conditions. We still lack “a way of thinking that could provide orientation in the world of complexity.”30 Participation in such a world is most simple, but also the most complicated task: it is the basic situation of being-in-the-middle-of, of “immersion,” as the very modality of human existence; and it is best exemplified today with reference to the growing advance of biotechnologies.31 According to Sloterdijk, this calls for the following:

• • • • •

Pointing out of “damaging univocity,” of inadequate “one-dimensional ontology,” and of the devastating effects caused by “hypo-complexity”32 Departure from binary logic in favor of a more “convivial” tertium datur, that is, a plurivalent logic33 “Critique of participative reason” in view of that which can (re)generate integrative logic34 Link between identity and self-distanciation35 Release from “the pathos of repetition”36

“There is no ethic possible as long as logic remains ignored and ontology unclear.”37 Theoretical activity—no matter whether it develops under scientific or philosophical agendas—is an activity by which one gives testimony to a certain contemporaneity. Today, it means working out concepts of life, soul, and mind in such a way that within the proposal itself even the difficulties generated by today’s world are also accounted for. “In modernity, a global existential experimentation constantly piques the human being who suddenly faces the dramatic absence of any heritage of convenient convictions, opinions, or doctrines. Analysis makes out of discomfort a kind of principle; from now on, one must head towards permanent innovation.”38 And yet, “extremism will not endure. Revisions and compromises soon come to the fore.”39 According to Alain Ehrenberg, we are in need of “a grammar of interior life for the people.”40 Sloterdijk calls for “a grammar of shared situation,” such as an ecology of frustrations also concerned with sociopsychological collateral casualties caused

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by theoretical discoveries and technical inventions. Each innovation produces losers whom one must talk to and with.41 The falling man whose photo was taken by Richard Drew at 9:41:15 a.m. on September 11 has been finally identified as Jonathan Briley, a sound engineer who was working in the Windows on the World restaurant at the top of the North Tower. The fact that Jonathan Briley jumped out of his window at work and was captured on film in free fall is not merely newsworthy and shocking. It is a metaphor of a grander and no less sober reality that plagues contemporary society. He jumped into his destiny, thus bearing exceptional witness of the human condition in this present age that relates—more than any previous age— the daring realizations of design, the glorious deeds of technique, and the spreading of terror, an age that moves into new dimensions of knowledge and fear. “Although we have—despite all our obsession with discourse—virtually no means of articulating the essential frames of reference for our life,” we should keep in mind that if “the dynamics of a problem engage the intellect, the dynamics of a project invite human involvement.”42

NOTES 1. New York Times, September 12, 2001, p. 7. The photo also appeared in the New York Times Book Review (May 27, 2007, p. 1). 2. “l’évangile de l’épanouissement personnel dans une main, le culte de la performance dans l’autre” (Alain Ehrenberg, La fatigue d’être soi: Dépression et société, series “Poches Odile Jacob” 27 [Paris: Odile Jacob, 2000], p. 261). I wish to thank Jim D. Kanaris for his insightful suggestions. 3. “Ce qui m’importe, en contradiction avec les conceptions topographiques et extériorisées sur les contenants et les cartes, c’est de décrire les hommes comme des éléments d’un secret relationnel aigu” (Peter Sloterdijk, Ni le soleil ni la mort [Paris: Pauvert, 2003], p. 165/German original: Die Sonne und der Tod: Dialogische Untersuchungen [FrankfurtMain: Suhrkamp, 2001]). Sloterdijk, Sphären I: Mikrosphärologie—Blasen, 5th ed. (FrankfurtMain: Suhrkamp, 2000)/French: Bulles—Sphères I: Microsphérologie (Paris: Pauvert, 2002). Although he never mentions it, Sloterdijk’s Sphere-trilogy has probably found its basic, perhaps even prior, inspiration in the American essayist, philosopher, and poet from Concord, MA, Ralph Waldo Emerson, quite particularly in Emerson’s epigraph to Essay X: Circles from his Essays: First Series, March 1841 (reprinted in Emerson, Essays & Lectures, 5th ed. [New York: Library of America, 1983], p. 401). The epigraph reads as follows: Nature centres into balls, And her proud ephemerals, Fast to surface and outside, Scan the profile of the sphere; Knew they what that signified, A new genesis were here.

In a conference on the centennial of Nietzsche’s death held in Weimar on August 25, 2000, with the title Über die Verbesserung der guten Nachricht: Nietzsches fünftes “Evangelium” (Frankfurt-Main: Suhrkamp, 2001)/French: La Compétition des Bonnes Nouvelles: Nietzsche évangéliste, (Paris: Mille et une nuits/Fayard, 2002), Sloterdijk contrasts Nietzsche with Emerson (see pp. 92–96 of the French edition), and he quotes various passages from Emerson’s Essay II: Self-Reliance (from Emerson’s Essays: First Series, rept. 1983, pp. 257–82), which he calls “the

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declaration of independence of the American essay” (p. 92 of the French edition). According to Sloterdijk,“Our average reflections and feelings are all made in USA, not made in Sils Maria” (p. 96 of the French edition; italics in the original). His Sphere-trilogy shows how right this statement is—at least for him. Sloterdijk quotes from the penultimate paragraph of Emerson’s Essay III: Compensation (Essays and Lectures, rept. 1983, pp. 283–302) in the epigraph to the lively debated chapter 5 of Sphären I (pp. 347–417; see pp. 347 and 393). 4. Giorgio Agamben, The Open: Man and Animal (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), pp. 7, 11–12/Italian original, 2002. 5. Sloterdijk, Ni le soleil ni la mort, p. 405. 6. Blaise Pascal, Pensée #72, from Pensées—The Provincial Letters, trans. W. F. Trotter (New York: Random House, 1941); Sloterdijk, Nicht gerettet: Versuche nach Heidegger (Frankfurt-Main: Suhrkamp, 2001), p. 127. 7. Bernard Lonergan, “The Ongoing Genesis of Methods,” Sciences Religieuses/Studies in Religion 6.4 (Spring 1976/1977), p. 351. 8. “On ne peut prétendre à la fois produire une société technico-scientifique et rejeter le mythe, c’est-à-dire le système de représentations qui la fait marcher.” Pierre Legendre, Leçons IV—L’inestimable objet de la transmission: Étude sur le principe généalogique en Occident (Paris: Fayard, 1985), p. 139. See also Sloterdijk, Écumes—Sphères III: Sphérologie plurielle (Paris: Maren Sell, 2005), p. 218, and Nicht gerettet, p. 186. 9. Sloterdijk, Nicht gerettet, pp. 338–366/French: Essai d’intoxication volontaire, series “Pluriel” 1016 (Paris: Hachette Littératures, 2001), pp. 235–272. 10. Sigmund Freud, “Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (Part III),” in Freud, Works—Standard Edition, 7th ed., vol. 16, (London: Hogarth Press & The Institute of Psycho-Analysis, [1963] 1978), pp. 284–85. 11. Stanislas Breton, “La philosophie face aux sciences cognitives,” in Paul Ricoeur, ed. Myriam Revault d’Allonnes and François Azouvi, Cahiers de l’Herne, 81 (Paris: Ed. de l’Herne, 2004), p. 81. 12. Freud, Works—Standard Edition, 7th ed., vol. 16, p. 285. 13. Sloterdijk, Essai d’intoxication volontaire, pp. 239–40. 14. Sloterdijk, Écumes, p. 217. 15. Sloterdijk, Sphären II: Makrosphärologie—Globen (Frankfurt-Main: Suhrkamp, 1999), p. 418. 16. Sloterdijk, Globen, p. 421. 17. Sloterdijk, Globen, 419; Ni le soleil ni la mort, 226. For Melanchton, see Sloterdijk, Globen, 418. 18. Salve, Regina, mater misericordiae, vita, dulcedo et spes nostra, salve. At te clamamus, exsules filii Evae. At te suspiramus, gementes et flentes in hac lacrimarum valle. Eia ergo, advocata nostra, illos tuos misericordes oculos ad nos converte. Et Jesum, benedictum fructum ventris tui, nobis post hoc exsilium ostende. O Clemens, o pia, o dulcis Virgo Maria.

Salve Regina is a hymn to Mary written either by the Benedictine monk Hermann the Paralytic (July 18, 1013—September 24, 1054) or by Bishop Peter of Compostela, who died in 1052. In 1020 Hermann was admitted in the school of the Reichenau monastery (Reichenau is an island on the Lake of Constance (German: Bodensee) about 5 kilometers north of the

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city of Constance). In 1043 Hermann entered the monastery. Particularly from the ninth century until the middle of the eleventh century, the Reichenau monastery was a very important religious, political, and artistic center in the southwestern part of Germany, today the state of Baden-Würtemberg. Hermann is known as historian, mathematician, astronomer, poet, and music composer. Bishop Peter lived in the first half of the eleventh century. He was the bishop of Santiago de Compostela, a city of Galicia in the province of La Corugna (northwestern part of Spain). Since the Middle Ages, Santiago de Compostela has been famous for the pilgrimage to the grave of the apostle James the Greater, whose day of celebration is July 25. The great reformer Martin Luther was a bit critical of the hymn Salve Regina, since in his view, it overemphasizes the religious significance of Mary. 19. Sloterdijk, Globen, pp. 419, 558. 20. Sloterdijk, Globen, p. 420. 21. See Sloterdijk, Essai d’intoxication volontaire, pp. 252–66. 22. “La théorie de Freud était séduisante pour ses clients parce qu’elle leur attribuait une propriété privée sur des mystères fascinants. La piste psychanalytique ne nous fait pas avancer dans la compréhension de la production d’images du monde” (Sloterdijk, Ni le soleil ni la mort, p. 227). 23. “Les cultures de la croyance en l’âme du monde et de la vision mécaniste progressiste coexistent dans une irritation mutuelle et dans une imbrication antagoniste permanentes” (Sloterdijk, Écumes, p. 217). 24. Sloterdijk, Écumes, 221. 25. Sloterdijk, Nicht gerettet, p. 167 (also for the rest of the quotations in this paragraph). 26. Sloterdijk, Nicht gerettet, p. 115; Nicht gerettet, p. 175. 27. Breton, “La philosophie face aux sciences cognitives,” 80, 82. 28. Sloterdijk, Nicht gerettet, pp. 212–234; Nicht gerettet, pp. 230–231. 29. Sloterdijk, Nicht gerettet, pp. 176–211. 30. “Ce qui manque, c’est un art de penser qui serve à nous orienter dans le monde de la complexité. Ce qui manque, c’est une logique qui serait assez puissante et mobile pour prendre à bras le corps la complexité, l’indétermination et l’immersion. Quand on cherche cette logique, il faut changer sa liste de lectures” (Sloterdijk, Ni le soleil ni la mort, p. 411). 31. Sloterdijk, Nicht gerettet, pp. 130–132; see for instance Yves Michaud, Humain, inhumain, trop humain: Réflexions philosophiques sur les biotechnologies, la vie et la conservation de soi à partir de l’oeuvre de Peter Sloterdijk, series “Micro-Climats” 64 (Castelnau Le Lez [France]: Ed. Climats, 2002). 32. Sloterdijk, Nicht gerettet, pp. 138, 186, and also Breton, “La philosophie face aux sciences cognitives,” p. 83; Sloterdijk, Nicht gerettet, pp. 216, 218; Sloterdijk, Nicht gerettet, p. 139, and also Ni le soleil ni la mort, p. 412. 33. See Sloterdijk, Nicht gerettet, pp. 129, 211, 222; also Sloterdijk, Ni le soleil ni la mort, pp. 411–412, and Ehrenberg, La fatigue d’être soi, p. 268; Sloterdijk, Nicht gerettet, p. 130, and also Globen, pp. 555–557; Sloterdijk, Nicht gerettet, pp. 129, 131, 133, 218; also Sloterdijk, Ni le soleil ni la mort, p. 411, and Jean Ladrière, “Expliquer et comprendre,” in Paul Ricoeur, ed. Revault d’Allonnes and Azouvi, p. 75; see Sloterdijk, Nicht gerettet, pp. 139, 218, and also Ni le soleil ni la mort, p. 177. 34. Sloterdijk, Ni le soleil ni la mort, p. 408, and also Nicht gerettet, 130; see Sloterdijk, Ni le soleil ni la mort, pp. 408–9. 35. See Sloterdijk, Nicht gerettet, p. 137. 36. Sloterdijk, Nicht gerettet, p. 139, and also Ni le soleil ni la mort, p. 409. 37. Sloterdijk, Nicht gerettet, p. 234, and also Ni le soleil ni la mort, p. 411. 38. “Se met en marche une expérimentation existentielle totale qui égratigne toujours les hommes des temps modernes, parce que l’on se retrouve d’un seul coup face à la

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dramatique absence de tout patrimoine de convictions utilisables, d’opinions, de dogmes. L’analyse fait de l’inconfort un principe; désormais, il faut mettre le cap sur l’innovation permanente” (Sloterdijk, Essai d’intoxicaiton volontaire, pp. 20–21). 39. “Mais l’extrémisme n’a qu’un temps. Ensuite, ce sont les révisions et les compromis” (Sloterdijk, Essai d’intoxication volontaire, p. 26). 40. Ehrenberg, La fatigue d’être soi, pp. 23, 145, 149. 41. Sloterdijk, Ni le soleil ni la mort, p. 408; see for instance Sloterdijk, Nicht gerettet, pp. 237–240. 42. “Malgré toute notre rage du discours, nous n’avons pratiquement aucun moyen d’expression pour les contenus essentiels de notre vie” (Sloterdijk, Ni le soleil ni la mort, p. 165). “Dans les problèmes, les choses s’adresent à l’intelligence; dans les projets, elles s’ouvrent à la participation humaine” (Sloterdijk, Écumes, p. 194).

CHAPTER 2

Locke’s Inheritors: The Dilemma of Religious “Toleration” Matt Sheedy

T

he philosophy of John Locke has had a significant impact on both the thinking and development of Western democracy. Considered one of the founding fathers of the Enlightenment, Locke’s theories on property, the separation of church and state, and religious toleration were radical departures from the medieval concepts of revealed theology and the divine right of kings that had ruled over Europe for centuries. Locke challenged these timeworn notions while exploring the limits of human understanding, and how it is that political authority requires the consent of law-abiding citizens. A century later, Voltaire would hold up Locke’s essay A Letter Concerning Toleration as the very essence of his politics, claiming it to have universal significance. Locke’s philosophy also inspired the works of Rousseau, Hume, Bentham, Burke, and Mill, along with Thomas Jefferson’s political concept of religious freedom and the principles of “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” Locke’s inheritors not only took up his challenge for a rational theology, but they also pushed his theories beyond the culture he wished to fashion, eventually weakening the philosophical bonds of religious conviction. It is in this sense that John Dunn writes that Locke’s legacy was both his “triumph and his tragedy.”1 While it is true that some would use Locke’s rational criteria to denigrate the very religion he sought to uphold, we might also observe that Locke’s theories aided a painful but necessary transition in human development. In what follows, I will be discussing Locke’s theory of toleration from a historical and a modern perspective, while emphasizing how the former has both shaped and limited our conception of the latter. And finally, I will suggest how a progressive reading of Locke offers a renewed significance for our current understanding of the dilemma of toleration. The development of religious toleration in the late seventeenth century was largely the result of social and political upheavals that took place both in England and in France. The Catholic rule of James II had forced Locke to flee to Holland in 1685, while the absolutist pretensions of the Sun King, Louis XIV, made it evident that the principle of persecution for religion would continue until a clear

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strategy was devised against it. It was during this period that Locke penned his famous tract, A Letter Concerning Toleration, where he stated: I esteem it above all things necessary to distinguish exactly the business of civil government from that of religion, and to settle the just bounds that lie between the one and the other.2

In the forty-odd pages that followed, Locke devised his strategy along theological lines, that is, arguments that appeal to scripture for their authority, as well as what we might call secular or pragmatic lines, arguments that appeal to history and to reason. In order to overturn the prevailing intolerance of seventeenthcentury Europe, Locke needed to show that persecution for religion was not only ineffective in a practical sense, but was also morally wrong and contrary to the laws of nature. In his First Treatise of Government, Locke challenged the belief that God’s grant to Adam in the book of Genesis was a paradigm for unlimited political rule. According to this claim, “original sin” had left humans incapable of self-direction, and so God had granted “absolute power and absolute right” to the king or ruler, which extended over all of humanity. Although Locke would come to reject original sin, he did maintain a belief in the “sinful” nature of human beings, which included the leaders of both church and state. Since all humans were sinful, it necessarily followed that the state could not act in a “disinterested” manner, and could not, as a consequence, be trusted with absolute power. “How easily the pretense of religion,” he writes, “and of the care of souls, serves for a cloak to covetousness, rapine, and ambition.”3 Locke’s radical departure from the divine right of kings assumed that all humans had been created with the ability to know God’s wishes. In his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke writes that God has given [man] a mind that can reason . . . it has a native faculty to perceive the coherence or incoherence of its ideas, and can range them right, without any such perplexing repetitions.”4

In theory, this “native faculty” could be accessed by anyone with the capacity to reason, thus negating the magistrate’s claim to divine authority. By reversing the demand for an implicit faith in rulers, Locke was not only challenging the principle of divine right, but also redefining Christian faith along the lines of its original message. Accordingly, the church was no longer to be seen as a state institution that required a bishop or a presbyter at its helm, but rather as “a voluntary society of men committed to worship as they see fit for salvation.” In the absence of an intrinsically authoritative model, Locke could proclaim toleration to be “the chief characteristic mark of the true church.” To those who would object, Locke reminds his readers that Christ “prescribed unto his followers no new and peculiar form of government,” but had simply “taught men how, by faith and good works, they may attain eternal life.” What is more, he points out “that the true disciples of Christ must suffer persecution” and not “force others by fire and sword to embrace her faith and doctrine.” Consequently, the only way to win converts to

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the faith was to follow the example of Jesus, whom Locke calls the “Prince of peace,” urging others through “admonitions and exhortations.” Such a command was not limited to Christians, however, but extended to those of other faiths, whatever they may be. In A Letter Concerning Toleration, Locke writes: Not even American (Indians), subjected unto a Christian prince, are to be punished either in body or goods, for not embracing our faith and worship. If they are persuaded that they please God in observing the rites of their own country, and that they shall obtain salvation by that means, they are to be left unto God and themselves.5

Although the Letter would extend toleration beyond the confines of Christianity, stressing justice for Muslims, pagans, and Jews alike, the assumption of a Christian nation underscores the core of Locke’s theory. His departure from medieval theology would help alter the state’s purpose by redefining its role as the protector of civil concern. “For the political society is instituted for no other end,” Locke writes, “but only to secure every man’s possessions of the things of this life.” The “triumph” of the Letter was reflected in the Glorious Revolution of 1688, which gave birth to a parliamentary democracy and a de facto tolerance for a variety of religious communities. Nearly a century later, American revolutionaries would uphold Locke’s theory of natural law, granting certain “inalienable rights” to all citizens as endowments of the Creator. Where they were to differ from Locke however, was in their belief that once these rights had been granted, God could disappear, and society would be ordered along rational lines. The separation of the church in the late seventeenth century did not foresee the state as acting in the modern sense of a neutral arbiter between competing religious viewpoints. Locke’s goal, more simply, was to convince the magistrate to permit the existence of different religious communities. In this sense, Locke’s theories effected a necessary transition in human development, aiding the shift from divine right and intolerant orthodoxy to representative government and a formal toleration of difference. While Locke was aware of the conflicts between faith and reason, and treated them at some length in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, he nonetheless clung to an empirical rigor on matters of revelation. Where reason was not enough, Locke believed that one must use probability and “degrees of assent” to determine the authenticity of a particular revelation. Although he affirmed such notions as the Trinity and the afterlife were beyond the bounds of natural reason, on other matters he was not so clear. In A Discourse of Miracles, for example, Locke writes,“The number, variety and greatness of the miracles” that we find in the Bible are marks of the divine power, and “that the truth of his mission will stand firm and unquestionable, till any one rising up in opposition to him shall do greater miracles than he and his apostles did.”6 Thus the quantity, diversity, and grandness of a miracle became probable measurements to determine its authenticity. Locke’s empirical strictness in such matters would open the door for critics such as John Toland and Matthew Tindal to use his own rational criteria against him. Known for their adherence to Deism, a belief that held reason as the benchmark for religion, Toland and Tindal would claim to be upholding Locke’s principles while attempting to erase all mystery from the Christian tradition. Whereas Locke maintained that faith was an adequate substitute for reason in the case of a clear revelation, the

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Deists would come to reject anything that was not accessible to the five senses. In this context, one can better understand why Edward Stillingfleet, the Anglican bishop of Worchester, railed against Locke’s theories, stating that they would have dangerous consequences for Christian faith. The critical distance that Locke sought to uphold between faith and reason thus became easy to knock down once its tenents were understood. Toland and Tindal’s Deism would later pave the way for the likes of Hume and Diderot to take religion out of the picture completely. The Lockean model of toleration could not have foreseen such developments as capitalism, multiculturalism, or the emergence of the secular state. Over a century ago, D. G. Ritche observed that any attempt to resurrect Locke’s theory of toleration must recognize a number of crucial changes: It must recognize a change in what constitutes a church, and what is essential in religious belief. It must acknowledge the impossibility of a correct intellectual conception of the nature of God. Finally, as Timothy Stanton points out, it must recognize a change in its view of human capacities.7 Accordingly, a contemporary Lockean model of toleration would have to accommodate to the secular, multi-ethnic, and multireligious dimensions of the modern world. Likewise, it would have to deal with the problems of intellectualizing the nature of God, and the proper uses of reason. Karen Armstrong calls this dilemma the confusion between mythos and logos, noting how scientific rationalism must be separated from the inner realm of the psyche. The failure to do so, as we are all aware, lends itself to a hostile atheism on the one hand, and to the resurgence in fundamentalism on the other. In a similar fashion, Rudolf Otto observed how the Enlightenment concept of “natural religion” was an abstract principle that removed the living center from religious experience, and ignored, as Schleiermacher attests, that “the spirit of religion can only be understood through itself.”8 A changed view of human capacities would also recognize this experiential element to religion and how the immediacy of absolute claims is not something that can be measured in concrete terms. While Locke could only advocate for a formal tolerance in seventeenth-century England, the modern implications of his theory carry well beyond their historical limitations. When Locke wrote in A Letter Concerning Toleration that the persecution for heresy would cease only “if all churches were obliged to lay down toleration as the foundation of their own liberty,” we find a fitting statement for our post-9/11 world.9 Locke’s commitment to challenging the illusions, contradictions, and hypocrisies of his day, risking not only his position in society but also his very life, reminds us that the role of the intellectual is often to go against one’s own interests and to point out unpleasant truths, whatever the consequences may be. Locke’s insistence on a dynamic reading of scripture, separating original intentions from later applications, is a crucial lesson for all religious communities to consider. Although Locke’s attempts to balance faith and reason could not stand the test of time, his belief that toleration was both a practical and moral imperative is a ground we need recover if toleration is to be anything more than an abstract liberal value based on preference and pragmatic necessity. The dilemma of religious toleration in Locke’s time was not unlike the question of homosexuality in our own. While the requirement of formal tolerance is a necessary step in preventing open forms of persecution, a further transition must be made toward positive or intrinsic tolerance if the plague of indifferentism is to be avoided. The “toleration model” for the modern Western state as a neutral and

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agnostic body has had a severe polarizing effect, where people are unable to find clear moral examples in their chosen leaders. Modern theories of toleration must reject the continued predominance of primary group identification, and strongly advocate for a more inclusive program of primary group diversity, where the traditions and beliefs of others are valued as a point of principle and are consciously integrated as an authentic global identity. I will leave you with a quote from Locke that is interesting for two reasons. First is its astuteness and originality in characterizing the climate of his day, and second, is its endurance in characterizing our own: It is not the diversity of opinions, which cannot be avoided; but the refusal of toleration to those that are of different opinions, which might have been granted, that has produced all the bustles and wars, that have been in the Christian world on account of religion.10

NOTES 1. John Dunn, Locke: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 26. 2. John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, in The Selected Political Writings of John Locke, ed. Paul Sigmund (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005), p. 126. 3. Locke, Letter Concerning Toleration, p. 127. 4. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Maurice Cranston (New York: Collier Books, 1965), p. 418. 5. Locke, Letter Concerning Toleration, p. 149. 6. Locke, The Reasonableness of Christianity, with a Discourse of Miracles, ed. Ian T. Ramsey (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1967), p. 83. 7. Timothy Stanton, “Locke and the Politics and Theology of Toleration,” Political Studies, vol. 54 (2006), p. 85. 8. Gustav Mensching, Tolerance and Truth in Religion (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1971), p. xi. 9. Locke, Letter Concerning Toleration, p. 163. 10. Locke, Letter Concerning Toleration, p. 163.

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CHAPTER 3

Religion and an Implicit Fundamental Human Right James Kellenberger

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t is a platitude that horrendous things have been done in the name of religion. Individuals belonging to one religion are forced to convert to another. Torture is done in the name of religion. Nations go to war with each side calling upon God’s help in defeating the other. Examples could be multiplied, but the point is not in contention. The terrible events of September 11, 2001, did not create the perception, held by many, that religion is a home for aggression and violence, although those events may have awakened it in some and strengthened it in many more. On the other side, religion can also be a force for good. The presence of the different major religions in the world, their social influence, and their presence in individual lives have often been a force for good. This observation, too, is platitudinous. In addition to personal spiritual development, religions provide support for stable families, they support relief organizations, and so on. In what follows I intend to focus on a particular way that the religions of the world can be a force for good. They can be a force for good by affirming human rights and vivifying our sense of general human rights. My exact thesis is that a fundamental human right is implicit in the world religions. It has been observed that talk of rights emerged only comparatively recently in human history, much more recently than the advent of religions such as Hinduism or Buddhism, or even Judaism, Christianity, or Islam.1 This may not be quite right. In the Standard Revised Version, Deuteronomy 21:17, the “right of the first born” to a double portion is spoken of. In the Tanakh the point is phrased as “the birthright is his due.” One might say here that what is spoken of is not a general right, a right that a human being has as a human, or a natural right. Consider, however, the reflections of St. Thomas Aquinas on what would come to be called the Dominion Theory. This is the idea, considered by some to be biblical, that God has given human beings dominion over all the other creatures of the earth. Aquinas says in the Summa that “it matters not how man behaves to animals because God has subjected all things to man’s power.”2 Aquinas does not use an expression that can be translated as “a right,” but he is using the concept of a right, and here it is a general or human right that human beings have by virtue of being human beings. I cite Aquinas here not to affirm the right of human beings to treat animals as they please,

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but to show that the idea of a general human right was deployed by Aquinas in the thirteenth century, and that, if Aquinas is right, such a right is affirmed in the Bible. Similarly, Khaled Abou El Fadl argues that the idea of rights and the idea of duties are both well established in the premodern Islamic juristic tradition: he cites a jurist who, in the century before Aquinas, discussed the “rights of human beings” and maintained they could not be “dismissed” except by the person concerned.3 However, while these reflections might soften whatever resistance we feel to the idea that human rights are to be found in early religious traditions, my argument does not depend on references to rights in passages of scripture or on there being a religious or theological affirmation of rights in any of the religious traditions. The argument that I am going to develop allows (1) that we will search long for an explicit scriptural affirmation of general human rights in the world religions; (2) that many or all the religions do not do much to uphold such rights as those relating to the status of women and religious freedom; (3) that an affirmation of human rights, as in the Declaration of Human Rights by the World’s Religions, if it is going to have any authority, must be endorsed by as many people as possible; and (4) that even if the world’s religions came to agree that there are human rights, there still would be disagreement on just how they should be understood.4 What I want to show is that a fundamental human right is implicit in the world religions. In order to see that this is so, we should start with a consideration of an ethical principle that is found in the various religious traditions. In a Christian expression, it is “as you wish that men would do to you, do so to them” (Luke 6:31). In a general expression that John Hick gives it, it is “that it is good to benefit others and evil to harm them.” Hick finds an expression of this principle in the various religious traditions of the world. In the Hindu tradition, in the Mah7bh7rata, we find this: “One should never do that to another which one regards as injurious to one’s own self. This, in brief, is the Rule of Righteousness.” In the Buddhist tradition, we find it in the teaching of Gautama Buddha in the Sutta Nipata: “As a mother cares for her son, all her days, so towards all living beings a man’s mind should be all-embracing” In the Analects of Confucianism, we have this statement: “Do not do to others what you would not like yourself.” In the hadith of Islam, we find these words of Muhammad: “No man is a true believer unless he desires for his brother what he desires for himself.” In Judaism, in the Babylonian Talmud, we find this: “What is hateful to yourself do not do to your fellow man.” Hick finds similar expressions in Jainism and Zoroastrianism.5 For Hick these are various expressions of the Golden Rule, which he finds is universal among the religions of the world, in a positive or negative statement. While we might debate the extent to which the different religious traditions agree on how we should treat our fellow human beings as ourselves, and on whether every follower in each of the various religions understands “brother” and “fellow human being” to be inclusive of those beyond one’s own religion, still I think that we can allow that Hick is right that the Golden Rule in some expression is to be found in all the religious traditions. Second, we should acknowledge that embodied in this ethical principle is the perception or the avowal that we human beings are in a relationship to one another. We see this most clearly in several of the formulations. In the Buddhist expression, we are told that our minds should embrace others, all living beings, as a mother cares for her son. We should see our relationship to others as like a

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mother-child relationship, in which we should care for others as a mother cares for her child. In the expression from the hadith, we should desire for our brothers what we desire for ourselves. The idea that the others are our brothers affirms a relationship between each of us and the others in which concern is appropriate. Another example that Hick goes on to cite is the second commandment of Christianity: “You shall love your neighbor as yourself ” (Matthew 22:39). Here, too, a relationship between one and each is being affirmed, that of neighbor to neighbor. The third step is to recognize that relationships can be respected and lived up to, or they can be violated. In this way, relationships have a moral aspect. Take the relationship in the Buddhist expression, the relationship of a mother to her child. When a mother nurtures, cares for, and instructs her child, she fulfills her relationship to her child. When she fails to do these things, she does not act as a mother should; she thereby morally fails her child, and she does so because she violates her relationship to her child. Underlying these various expressions of the ethical principle of the Golden Rule is the postulation of a morally demanding relationship that each has to each, as morally demanding as the relationship of a mother to her child, or of a brother to a brother. The next step is to acknowledge that if we violate this posited relationship that each has to each, we do not give what we owe to others, what is appropriate to and due to them as the persons they are, what they have a right to as persons to whom we are related in this posited relationship. And this right, as one that flows from nothing more than their humanity as persons, is a genuine human right. The analogy between the relationship of each to each that underlies the Golden Rule in its various expressions and the relationship between a mother and her child, or between a brother and a brother, remains close. But it is only an analogy. When a mother withholds from her child the nurturing and care required by her relationship to her child, she withholds what her child has a right to. She violates the right her child has to a mother’s care and support. This right, however, is not a human right. It does not flow from the child’s basic humanity. It flows from the relationship the child has to his or her mother. If the mother does not give to children not her own the care and support she gives to her own child, she does not violate her mother-child relationship to them or violate their right to her parental attention, for they have no such right. The relationship posited by the Golden Rule, by contrast, is a relationship between each and each, and when we violate it, we violate a right that others have that does flow from their simply being human beings, for it is their being human beings that makes them our brothers or neighbors. The Buddha says, “As a mother cares for her son, all her days, so towards all living beings a man’s mind should be all-embracing.” Affirmed here, on my reading, is an analogy, a close analogy, but not an identity. In violating the relationship of each to each that is posited by the Golden Rule, we do not treat others as they deserve to be treated as brothers or neighbors. We violate the worth they have as brothers or neighbors, by virtue of which they are in this relationship. This construction, then, requires that human beings have a kind of inherent worth, which makes them worthy of compassion or of being treated as neighbors, and which makes compassion or being treated as neighbors their due or their right. Different religions may bring forward different glosses on the inherent worth of human persons: for Christianity, we are in the image of

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God; for Buddhism, we are potential Buddhas. These different glosses, however, do not deny that the inherent worth of our neighbors or brothers that informs and creates this relationship attaches to their humanity. It is not something that they have come to merit through virtuous action, for if it were, then only some would qualify as our brothers or neighbors. The Buddhist formulation is instructive on this point. A mother cares for her child because her child is her child, not because her child has earned her love and care by being good. A mother cares for her child, and ought to, irrespective of the child’s moral character. Analogously, the Buddhist formulation tells us we should be compassionate toward all living beings, irrespective of their earned merit. The idea here is opposed to the notion that human beings are not themselves worthy of compassion or love, but we should nevertheless endeavor to emulate God’s love for God’s wretched and unworthy creatures, and to the notion that we should endeavor to show compassion or love precisely and only because we are commanded to do so or only because it helps us on the path to Buddhahood. On this reasoning, then, the religions of the world, in affirming the ethical principle of the Golden Rule, couched in the language of universal brotherhood or the language of all being neighbors or some cognate language, implicitly affirms the basic human right of each person to be treated as a human person with inherent worth, as a brother or a neighbor. What, though, does this fundamental right entail? Does it carry in its train the other human rights, such as the right to life and liberty, the right to freedom of movement, the right to freedom of expression, the right to work, and the right to education, all of which are named in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in A Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the World’s Religions? Perhaps so. The test is whether we deny the right of persons to be treated as fellow human beings with inherent worth, as brothers or neighbors, when we deny them freedom of expression, or work, or education, and so on. Abstractly, the test is easy to state. Seeing whether a proposed specific right concretely passes the test may be a more difficult matter. Do only immunities, such as the right not to be tortured, pass the test, or do entitlements, such as the right to work, also pass the test? And in which cultural understanding will, say, the right to work pass the test? Allowing that the right to work passes the test, what kind of work do human beings have a right to? What labor-place conditions do human beings have a right to work in? For what level of compensation? Do I have the right to expect others to provide me with work or only the right not to be prevented from working? Do I have the right to move to any country I please? James Fredericks, in the context of reflection on Buddhist understanding of human rights, asks, “Do Han Chinese people have a right to residence in Tibet?” Tibetan Buddhists, he observes, deny any such right.6 If this test is passed, however, the answer to another question is clear, I think. That question is, Who has the obligation to see that the rights just considered are met? The answer is, We all do. Just here there may arise the question, What is the relationship between rights and obligations? For some, if there is an obligation there is a right, and if there is a right there is an obligation. So if I have an obligation to help you, then you have a right to my help; and if you have a right to my help, then I have an obligation to help you. Damien Keown is among those who accept this symmetry.7 Others, however, deny this symmetry. Perhaps all rights entail obligations, but not all obligations entail rights, they hold. John Stuart Mill thought this. He held that when

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we have an “imperfect obligation,” that is, an obligation such that, although “the act is obligatory, the particular occasions of performing it are left to our choice,” as he thought was the case with “charity or beneficence,” then there is no right that correlates with the obligation.8 Joel Feinberg and Craig Ihara agree with Mill. In fact, they both cite the example of charity.9 As they see it, we have an obligation to practice charity, but no particular person has a right to our charity. The same would hold for whatever obligation we have to provide education or work for others. I suggest, however, that Mill and company may have too narrow a view of rights. Many human rights are understood to be “in rem rights,” such as the right to an education and the right to work. An in rem right is one that all who are able are called upon to fulfill.10 The right to charity, like the right to an education and the right to work, may also be such an in rem right. If our neighbor or our brother, or our fellow being, has an in rem right to education or to work, or to various other things we can help to provide, then we all ought to help provide it. The reasoning I have presented, citing the Golden Rule and its posited relationship of each to each, in effect establishes the in rem right of each person to be treated as a neighbor or brother, and allows that at least many of the human rights in its train are in rem rights. However, this is not to say how each of us is equally required to meet that obligation, for, as far as this point carries, what individuals are called upon to do to meet their obligation may vary from person to person. Furthermore, our universal obligation to help meet the rights of others could, in many cases, conflict with obligations that are more pressing morally, and such obligations would then be superior. Thus, for those in severe straits, the obligation to care for one’s own family may override their obligation to help provide education for those in need of education worldwide. This of course does not mean that they or others with conflicting obligations have no obligation to meet the rights of persons worldwide to be provided with an education, and so too for other human rights. An overridden obligation does not cease to be an obligation. Allow me to enter three caveats at this point. (1) While Christianity speaks of our neighbors, whom we should love as ourselves, and Islam speaks of our brothers, for whom we should desire what we desire for ourselves, Buddhism speaks of our minds being all-embracing toward all beings, all sentient beings, not just human beings. (2) Allowing that there is this test for human rights, we do not ipso facto rule it out that there could be other tests and sufficient grounds for human rights, such as an essential contribution to welfare or the demands of cooperative living, or even the demands of a social contract, although aspects of social contract thinking may be in tension with religious sensibilities. (3) In arguing that this fundamental human right is implicit in religious traditions, I am not arguing that the individualistic culture of human rights is implicit in religious traditions. I am not arguing that within each religion are the seeds of a culture in which individuals are encouraged to assert their individual rights against others in an adversarial fashion. Some have expressed the concern that positing or recognizing rights will give rise to such an adversarial mentality. As they see it, rights do not fit with the requirements of a religious morality. Craig Ihara has argued that rights cannot be introduced into “classical Buddhism” with its focus on Dharma and duty, without radically transforming it.11 It must be allowed that “rights” thinking opens the

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potential for individuals to assert their rights against others in an adversarial manner. But the same potential is there for a moral system of duties. One who recognizes the general moral duty to help other persons can emphasize the duty that others have to help him as against the duty that he has to help others. This adverse potential exists whether the duty is “the duty to help others” or “the duty to others to help them.” As Ihara sees it, it is a duty to other persons that will correlate with rights (so that if the duty is not fulfilled, an injury is done to those persons, which a violation of a right requires).12 By contrast, the duties that exist in classical Buddhism, he argues, can be understood as the first sort, duties that are not to other persons. If I am right, however, it does not matter which kind of duty informs Buddhist morality. Both kinds present the same adverse potential that Ihara and others find accompanying rights. Ihara is not alone in observing that an adversarial mentality runs counter to Buddhist ethics.13 The same could be said for Christian ethics, and the ethics of every major religion that keeps central the ethics of the Golden Rule. But we should be clear that recognizing the fundamental right of persons to be treated as brothers or neighbors, and whatever further human rights are in its train, does not require us to assert our right to what is our due against our neighbors’ rights. In fact, it forbids it to the extent that doing so is not treating others as brothers or neighbors. Beyond what we have seen so far, there is a dimension of the fundamental right of persons to be treated as brothers or neighbors that owes much to the religious understanding that surrounds it. This right extends to our interior action. Our minds should embrace others as a mother cares for her child. We should desire for our brothers what we desire for ourselves. We should love our neighbors as ourselves. A part of what we owe to our brothers or neighbors is caring, right desire, love. Most often human rights are understood in terms of exterior action, as requiring us to do something, or to refrain from doing something in the realm of overt action. The fundamental human right that the thesis of this paper argues is implicit in religion is the right of persons to be treated as brothers or neighbors, including their right to our care or compassion or love. When Jesus is asked,“Who is my neighbor?” he replies with the story of the Good Samaritan. The story not only answers the question posed to Jesus but also brings to light what one must do to be a neighbor. The Samaritan helps the man who has fallen among robbers by binding up his wounds, taking him to an inn, and paying others to take care of him in his absence. But, moreover, Jesus says that when the Samaritan saw the man stripped and half-dead by the roadside, he had compassion. And in the story, the Samaritan is the passerby who showed mercy for the man in need. Compassion and mercy are the interior side of the Samaritan’s action. Abou El Fadl says in his article on the human rights commitment in modern Islam that, if he is right, “dignity and justice need compassion and mercy.”14 For some, this implication for interior action may seem to be grounds for saying that there is no such human right implicit in religion, for, they would say, morality and moral rights do not extend to our affective attitudes toward others. Their argument might go this way: “We may be required to help others, and they may even have a right to our help; but we do not have to like them, let alone love them. Perhaps religion can require this of us, but morality cannot, and hence, since human rights are in the moral domain, there is no such human right.”15 This

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argument is very far from conclusive, however. For one thing, it is less than clear that morality never makes demands on our interior actions. Wrong motives can affect the morality of our actions, a point Kant understood very well. We at times recognize insensitivity to the feelings of others as a moral fault. A husband’s or wife’s lack of affection can be a moral failure. Anger is counted a vice. Second, allowing that there is a widespread tendency to regard the demands of morality as limited to our overt actions, this is not to say that this is the most profound understanding of morality. It may be that religion can help to expand such a moral understanding, and in this way be a further force for good in our world.

NOTES 1. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, 2d ed. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), p. 69. 2. ST I–II, q. 102, a. 6., in Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas, ed. Anton C. Pegis, vol. 2 (New York: Random House, 1944), p. 905. 3. Khaled Abou El Fadl,“The Human Rights Commitment in Modern Islam,” in Human Rights and Responsibilities in the World Religions, ed. Joseph Runzo, Nancy M. Martin, and Arvind Sharma (Oxford: Oneworld, 2003), pp. 338, 335. The jurist is Ibn al-’Arabi. 4. Amir Hussain makes this point in “‘This Tremor of Western Wisdom’: A Muslim Response to Human Rights and the Declaration,” in Human Rights and Responsibilities in the World Religions, pp. 175–76. 5. John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1989), pp. 313, 316. 6. James Fredericks, “Buddhism and Human Rights: The Recent Buddhist Discussion and Its Implications for Christianity,” in Human Rights and Responsibilities in the World Religions, p. 259. 7. Damien Keown, “Are There Human Rights in Buddhism?” in Buddhism and Human Rights, ed. Damien V. Keown, Charles S. Prebish, and Wayne R. Husted (Surrey: Curzon, 1998), p. 21. 8. John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1979), pp. 48–49. 9. Craig Ihara, “Why There Are No Rights in Buddhism: A Reply to Damien Keown,” in Buddhism and Human Rights, p. 45. Ihara quotes with approval Feinberg’s claim that “duties of charity, for example, require us to contribute to one or another of a large number of eligible recipients, no one of whom can claim our contribution from us as his due.” Ihara cites Feinberg’s “The Nature and Value of Rights” in The Philosophy of Human Rights, ed. Morton E. Winston (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1989), pp. 61–74. 10. Or at least our noninterference. I will assume that most if not all the specific human rights examples I have been citing are “positive-claim” in rem rights, which require the positive assistance of others. 11. Ihara, “Why There are no Rights in Buddhism: A Reply to Damien Keown,” p. 44. 12. Ihara, “Why There are no Rights in Buddhism: A Reply to Damien Keown,” pp. 45–47. 13. Fredericks also makes this observation. See “Buddhism and Human Rights: The Recent Buddhist Discussion and Its Implications for Christianity,” p. 259. He cites Ihara as another with this concern. On page 255 Fredericks, drawing upon Sallie King’s work on rights in Buddhism, says that “Buddhist human rights, in contrast to rights as understood by Western Liberalism, are non-adversarial.” See Sallie B. King, “Human Rights in Contemporary Engaged Buddhism,” in Buddhist Theology: Critical Reflections by Contemporary Buddhist Scholars, ed. Roger R. Jackson, and John J. Makransky (Surrey: Curzon, 2000), pp. 295, 296.

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14. Abou El Fadl, “The Human Rights Commitment in Modern Islam,” p. 339. 15. Basil Mitchell regarded “morality” and “sin” as being very different in their demands. Although when human beings do what is morally wrong they sin, sin is much more demanding. For him, a lack of sensitivity could be a sin, but it was not an instance of moral wrongdoing. Mitchell does not, however, address the status of human rights. Basil Mitchell, “How Is the Concept of Sin Related to the Concept of Moral Wrongdoing?” Religious Studies 29 (1984), pp. 165–73.

CHAPTER 4

Religion and Human Rights: A Historical and Contemporary Assessment Krishna Kanth Tigiripalli and Lalitha Kumari Kadarla

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he nature of the debate on a topic such as “Religion and Human Rights” is polemical and paradoxical. Both theses concepts are important for society. And both are complementary and contradictory in nature. Religion is very important for the individual and society. Human societies will crumble like castles made of cards without religion. Religion has been a binding force in society, and it helps build up the ethos and values of society. Without religion and religious-based values, societies will lose sight of direction, and ethics and rationality might even cease to exist. It has been proven since time immemorial that religion helps to inculcate values based on ethics and morality, as well as rational thinking and behavior.1 Both Plato and Karl Marx spoke about the importance of religion in society. Marx famously described religion as the opium of the masses. By saying so, Marx underscored the importance of religion in the society. But extreme and divergent religious beliefs brought internecine conflict in the world. It is paradoxical that religion, identified as a cohesive and unifying force, was also seen as a divisive and destructive force that divided societies. Religious fanatics and dogmatists have vitiated the atmosphere and are responsible for the present schism and morass in the world.2 For a rational thinker, both religious and human rights are intertwined and inseparable. Without religion there would be no civility and rationality, and the religious outlook, enmeshed with ethics, helps us to formulate certain values and makes us more helpful to others and more humane toward the beliefs of others. Rousseau observed a long time ago that man in nature has certain inalienable rights, and these rights cannot be denied to man by anyone. Men and women of faith are asserting human rights, because human rights are not simply a matter of law. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was passed without dissenting vote by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948 and which constitutes the foundation of international human rights law, affirms the faith of the people in

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fundamental human rights. Human rights cannot simply be derived from legal precedents of the past, nor from empirical evidence or logic, but require a “leap of faith.” This is true whether one is “religious” or not. Although there is widespread acceptance of the importance of human rights in international governance, there is considerable confusion as to their precise nature and role in international law. There are writers who regard the high incidence of noncompliance with human rights norms as evidence of state practice that argues against the existence of a structure of human rights principles in international law. The concept of human rights is closely allied with ethics and morality. Those rights that reflect the values of a community will be those with the most chance of successful implementation. Of course, there may be no necessary connection in particular instances, for not all community values will be enshrined in law, nor do all legal rights reflect moral concerns, since many operate on a technical level as entitlements under specific conditions. Rights may be seen as emanating from various sources, whether from religion, the nature of humankind, or the nature of society. The Natural Law view, as expressed in the traditional formulations of that approach or by virtue of the natural rights movement, maintains that certain rights exist as a result of a higher law above positive or man-made law. Such a higher law constitutes a universal and absolute set of principles, governing all human beings in time and space. The natural rights approach of the seventeenth century, associated primarily with John Locke, identified the existence of such inalienable rights as the rights to life, liberty, and property, through a social contract marking the end of the conditions governed by the state of nature. This theory enabled recourse to be had to a superior type of law, and was thus able to provide a powerful instrument for restraining arbitrary power.

THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM—HUMAN RIGHTS There are a number of human rights provisions in the United Nations Charter. Article I covers the organization, promotion, and encouragement of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. Article 13 (1) notes that the General Assembly shall initiate studies and make recommendations regarding the realization of human rights for all, while Article 55 provides that the UN shall promote universal respect for and observance of human rights. In a significant provision, Article 56 states that all members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in article.3

PROHIBITION OF DISCRIMINATION Apart from the overwhelming requirement of protection from physical attack upon their very existence as a group, groups need protection against discriminatory treatment as such. The norm of nondiscrimination thus constitutes a principle relevant both to groups, and to individual members of groups.

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The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination was signed in 1965 and entered into force in 1969. It builds on the nondiscrimination provision in the UN Charter. Racial discrimination is defined as any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.4

Under its jurisdiction, states parties undertake to prohibit racial discrimination and guarantee equality for all in the enjoyment of a series of rights, and to assure to all within their jurisdiction effective protection and remedies regarding such human rights.

THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION AS A HUMAN RIGHT The right to self-determination has often been examined insofar as it relates to the context of decolonization.5 The question arises whether this right, which has been widely proclaimed, has an application beyond the colonial context. The first article of both international covenants on human rights provides that all peoples have the right to self-determination. The Helsinki Final Act of 1975 refers to the principle of equal rights and self-determination. People shall be free to determine their political status and to pursue their economic and social development according to the policy they have chosen. However, the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations referred to the prior period of colonial rule. International law was simply the law of nations prior to World War II, and thus the rights of a human person were the rights granted by his or her government. No person, therefore, had any rights in a country other than his or her own, unless the person’s own country had secured rights for its citizens in that foreign country through a treaty. Persons might claim “natural rights” in the first half of this century, such as those affirmed in the American Declaration of Independence, but these were only recognized and enforceable by the laws of individual countries. Until the middle of this century, legal rights were “citizen rights” rather than human rights. This understanding of rights was supported by accepted theories of jurisprudence in the West, which defined laws as the decisions of governments and recognized no source of “higher law.” The Nuremberg trials after World War II asserted a higher standard of law than that of the sovereign state, and the United Nations codified this as international human rights law. Since 1948, these human rights laws have grown to include numerous covenants (treaties) and international regulatory mechanisms, such as the Commission on Human Rights of the United Nations. At the same time, the number of nations in the UN has expanded rapidly, primarily as a result of the liberation of peoples in Africa and Asia from colonial rule. The UN has become more prominent, if no less controversial, and assertions of human rights have continued to capture international attention.6

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In the last fifty years, the understanding of human rights has also expanded conceptually. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was dominated by notions of civil and political rights familiar to Westerners. But economic and social rights concerning employment, food, shelter, education, and health care also have been affirmed. More recently, accompanying the growing strength of formerly colonized peoples in the UN, cultural and people’s rights have been asserted. We see here a shift (at least in emphasis) from the individual to the group, and from protection of the dignity of the individual from state intervention to providing for communities, through state intervention, the elements of life deemed necessary for human dignity. When we reflect on the historical development of human rights, we see immediately that, for most of human history, religious leaders resisted what we today describe as fundamental human rights. Traditionally, religious leaders were primarily concerned with enforcing their authority and with the welfare of their own community, rather than with the rights of their followers, especially if recognizing these rights meant permitting dissent. Religious people who today support human rights need to acknowledge humbly that their traditions and teachings have long been used to deny many contemporary civil and political rights and that, until recently, support for human rights has come more consistently from secular political and cultural movements than from religious constituencies. This is less true for Protestants than for Catholics, as Protestants are quick to claim their right of conscience in opposition to the religious hierarchy from which they were dissenting. Nonetheless, it is common knowledge that Protestant reformers often suppressed dissent within their own jurisdictions. Religious freedom, as a fundamental right of all individuals, was not effectively institutionalized among Protestants until Roger Williams established Rhode Island as an independent colony. The Virginia Bill of Rights of 1776 laid the foundation for modern notions of civil and political rights, and in the United States, the Bill of Rights in the Constitution guaranteed these rights for all those who were permitted to vote. In the latter part of the eighteenth century, many of the individuals who embraced the idea of “natural rights” were members of churches, yet it would be misleading to say that religious organizations were active in lobbying for the protection of rights. The protection of civil and political rights was the result of a successful rebellion and the experience of freedom that inspired and sustained it.7 American religious leaders were prominent in the nineteenth century in promoting the rights of black Americans, women, prisoners, and children. And in the middle of the twentieth century, Christian and Jewish leaders from the United States were among the first to urge that the United Nations promulgate a Declaration of Human Rights. The newly formed World Council of Churches provided leadership among Protestant Christian groups and, since Vatican II, members of the Roman Catholic Church have been in the forefront of the human rights struggles all over the world. Jewish participants in the human rights movement are far more numerous than their small numbers in the world would lead one to expect. And more recently, a number of leading Muslim intellectuals have asserted that the Islamic tradition supports fundamental human rights. Among Christians there is considerable debate about whether human rights are adequately supported by the scriptures of the Old Testament or can only be

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affirmed on the basis of the saving event of Jesus Christ. Christian evangelicals have expressed concern, as have Muslims, that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights does not acknowledge God as the ultimate source of human rights, and have accused Christian liberals of making “Freedom” their God, rather than Jesus Christ. Since Vatican II, Catholics have embraced human rights as the social conditions for human dignity, and many priests, nuns, and lay leaders have been martyred in human rights struggles in Africa, Asia and Latin America.8 Religious support for human rights among Jews, Christians, and Muslims tends to take the form of arguing that modern notions of rights are implicit in the duties that we owe to God and our neighbors, which are revealed in the ancient scriptures of each community of faith. If I have, for instance, the duty to love you as my neighbor, then you have the right to expect and hold me to the standard of conduct that is consistent with my duty. Hindus derive rights from social, cultural, and religious duties. Buddhists find rights implied in the obligation to be aware of the interconnectedness of all reality, and thus affirm animal as well as human rights. This is very different from the view of those who drafted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and promoted the development of human rights law in the first part of the second half of the twentieth century. From this other point of view, which is at the core of recent Western political thought, rights are inherent in the nature of the individuals who join together to form communities. Thus rights are brought into society by individuals who, in theory, form a “social contract” with one another in order to live together. In this perspective, the community is like a voluntary association, which the individual can leave or join as he or she chooses. When Asians or Africans practicing Hindu, Buddhist, Islamic, or indigenous traditions assert their cultural rights today and complain that international human rights law is dominated by Western individualism, they are challenging the universality of the idea that communities are formed by individuals who enter into a social contract. In historical terms, of course, they are correct. Until very recently, all societies were formed more around kinship and ethnic identities than by the voluntary decisions of their individual members. Prior to modern democratic forms of government, individuals had little to say about the laws that governed their societies. Any assertion of the universality of human rights, therefore, must be acknowledged as a contemporary claim that such rights are universally the necessary social conditions for human dignity.9 In the case of culture, which is an offshoot of religion and ethnicity, individuals have faced racial discrimination in the West, which has denied or denies equal status and opportunities to individuals who happened to be blacks, Latinos, or Asians in their own societies. In this regard, the Dalits (also known as untouchables) of India were the product of religious belief, and the Hindu religion did not permit rights to these unfortunate people. The Dalit population in India is as large as the population of the United States, and numbers about 250 million. The Durban Conference against Racial Discrimination took note of the plight of the large number of the Dalits. Untouchables are denied basic human rights, although India is a signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Similar discrimination, however, is very much prevalent in different forms in the West, varying in degrees from place to place and time to time.

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The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination signed in 1965, and entered into force in 1969, builds on the nondiscrimination provisions in the UN Charter.10 Under its provisions, states parties undertake to prohibit racial discrimination and guarantee equality for all in the enjoyment of a series of rights, and to assure to all within their jurisdiction effective protection and remedies regarding such human rights. It is also fair to conclude that in addition to the existence of this convention, the prohibition of discrimination on racial grounds is part of customary international law. This may be understood on the basis inter alia of articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter, and articles 2 and 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Discrimination on other grounds of religion and gender may also be contrary to customary international law.11 Freedom of religion or belief is defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as primarily an individual right. In the words of the Universal Declaration, “freedom of thought, conscience and religion” is protected, and this includes the freedom to change one’s religion or belief, as well as the freedom to join with others in teaching, practicing, worshipping, and observing the religious disciplines of one’s faith community. Religious freedom may be asserted by a group of individuals, but it is fundamentally the right of the individual person. This understanding of the right to religious freedom implies that religion is a voluntary activity on the part of individuals, who join together to practice what their individual consciences tell them is right. As this is largely a modern, Western notion of religion, it is not surprising that more traditional religious communities are less than enthusiastic about this emphasis on the rights of the individual believer. In their view, if rights are given by God to the community of the faithful, then individual rights are secondary rather than primary. The rights of the community take precedence. Here the role of civil society is a predominant one, and the theoretical labors of Antonio Gramsci have informed us that a hegemonized civil society can become a handmaiden of the state in its project of social practices.12 Civil societies are defined by the practices of their inhabitants. These practices may lead to the sphere becoming a captive of the state; however, it could equally realize its potential for mounting a powerful challenge to state-oriented practices. The presence of civil society is a crucial, but not an adequate precondition for ensuring state accountability. Whether the state can be made accountable depends upon the selfconsciousness, vibrancy, and political vision of civil society. An inactive civil society leads to unresponsive states; a potential, self-conscious civil society imposes limits upon state power. In this context, a self-conscious and a vigilant civil society will visualize what kind of civil society one wants to build up. Hence, the role of civil society is very important in inculcating the values and ethos for itself and for the future generations. Gramsci understands civil society as the realm existing not just between the state and the family, but also occupying the space outside the market, state, and family—in other words, as the realm of culture, ideology, and political debate. It was Gramsci who drew the distinction between hegemony, based on consent, and domination, based on coercion. The changing definitions of civil society expressed the different ways in which consent was generated in different periods,

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and the different issues that were important at different times. In a way, the civil society in general terms is defined or construed as a process through which individuals negotiate, argue, struggle against, or agree with each other and with the centers of political and economic authority. Through voluntary associations, movements, parties, and unions, the individual is able to act publicly. Thus, in the early modern period, the main concern of civil rights was fear. Hence, civil society was a society where laws replaced physical coercion, arbitrary arrest, and the like. Civil society, armed with values of rights and mutual tolerance, has thus to constantly mediate between social forces seeking to assert themselves in the public space, and between them and the state. And constant vigilance has to be its creed and dogma. The battles against chauvinistic movements that attempt to hegemonize civil society have to be fought in civil society itself. There is no alternative since the state, in which at one time great hopes had been reposed, has shown itself to be vulnerable to these chauvinistic passions. It has simply opted out of engagement with these forces and their pernicious ideologies. Only a civil society, armed with a democratic spirit, can provide an alternative. In order to do so, civil society has to function as a sphere of pedagogy and communication. The values of freedom, equality, and justice have to be extended through communicative action, debate, and publicity. Civil society has to act as an intermediary filter between the particularistic loyalties of society, the individual, and the state. A civil society that is unable to mediate because it suffers from weak communication is both impotent and vulnerable. It can become strong when its members exhibit a commitment to freedom and equality, and to democracy, participation, and the mutual recognition of rights. The need is even greater in those societies where civil society is fragile. Kothari and Sethi, while speaking of modern India, put it this way: It is in . . . situations where a well-defined civil society does not exist, where the culture, history and experiences of different communities are not only different but at variance with each other, and where the state does not enjoy an overriding moral authority in many spheres of social life, if not itself being the major perpetrator of violations, that a relevant politics of human rights needs to be defined.13

But whether the voices of reason and sanity will have an impact on particularistic loyalties or on the state, or whether they will be able to modify these projects, depends on the politics and the political vision of civil society. And this means that the inhabitants of civil society have to be deeply committed to the values of democratic life. For citizens of the United States, religious freedom means separation of church and state. Religious establishment and religious freedom are seen as contradictory. International law, however, does not require “dis-establishment.” We need only think of England to see why, because there the Church of England is established by law, and the sovereign is the head of the Church. The Church of England enjoys a status not afforded to other religious communities and, in the religious education classes required in every public school in England, the Church of England generally has a predominant place in the curriculum. Nonetheless, few would seriously argue that there is religious oppression or a lack of religious freedom in

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England today. Similarly, in many other Western European societies (Sweden, Germany, Switzerland, Greece, to name a few), state churches exist, and such established churches receive favored treatment in some way. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights would never have been passed in 1948 if it had defined freedom of religion (as the United States does in the first amendment of its Constitution) as requiring the separation of church and state.14 We may now turn to Eastern Europe to look at societies under the monopolistic control of a secular worldview. Not all the countries concerned can be examined in any detail, but a comparison could be made between the East and West (Poland and Russia) and it could be, perhaps, the best approach for a number of reasons. The material available on these two societies is much greater in volume and quality than found elsewhere. Furthermore, the two countries offer the maximum opportunity for bringing out important contrasts between a dominating and a dominated society, between the Orthodox and the Catholic Church, between total state power and elements of constitutional opposition, between total disruption of the countryside and limited disruption. Nevertheless, other countries warrant a query or an explanation insofar as special developments have occurred in them from time to time. For example, there is some interest in the current situation with regard to church-state relations in Hungary and Serbia (Yugoslavia). International human rights law may well favor a “secular” state, as some religious critics claim, but it does not require it. Instead, international human rights law requires states to “prevent and eliminate discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief ” and to “combat intolerance on the grounds of religion or other beliefs.” International law names the evil as “discrimination” and “intolerance” rather than “establishment,” allowing that some sort of “fair and tolerant establishment” of religion is possible. Put more precisely, it leaves open the question of special relationships between the state and one or more religious traditions and the evaluation of the effects of such relationships on religious freedom, rather than asserting in principle that any support for religion by a government will necessarily be discriminatory. Religious communities continue to play a significant role in the enforcement of human rights because of the unique nature of international law in our time. Unlike the laws of a state, international human rights law has no coercive authority to back it up. The United Nations does not have enforcement powers, except as granted by its member nations, and then only for very limited purposes. For many, this fact suggests that human rights law is merely a legal fiction, a romantic idea, until a world government with enforcement powers is created. Others argue, however, that the enforcement of international human rights law is an experiment in nonviolent community building. Nonviolent methods for enforcing human rights laws include encouraging more responsible conduct through interfaith cooperation, exposing human rights violations to public scrutiny and shame, and economic and political sanctions. Religious ideals and discipline may help keep the human rights struggle nonviolent, may encourage political leaders to live up to the higher aspirations of their religious and cultural traditions, and may help build trust between minority and majority communities in a society. We see examples of this in the movement led by Gandhi in India, in the role of Christians and Jewish leaders during the civil rights movement in the United States during the 1960s, in the leadership of

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Christians and Muslims in fighting apartheid in South Africa, and in the martyrdom of religious leaders all around the world in the struggle for human rights.15 It is worth noting that the type, source, and volume of material in the different societies are indicative of the conditions therein. In Russia, the clearly stated aim of most research is to bring out the optimal conditions and apply the best techniques for eliminating vestiges of the “idealist” worldview. Support in religious traditions not only provides a foundation for human rights, which may otherwise appear to be merely the consensus of a particular culture or a particular time, but also translates the imperatives of human rights into the moral and spiritual language of different religious and cultural traditions. This allows more people to claim these rights as their own heritage and strengthens the contemporary affirmation that fundamental human rights are universal.

NOTES 1. John Rawls, Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 7–15. 2. World Christian Encyclopedia: A Comparative Study of Churches and Religions in the Modern World, ed. David B. Barrett, George Thomas Kurian, and Todd M. Johnson (London: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 65. 3. Carrie Gustafson, and Peter H. Juviler, eds., Religion and Human Rights: Competing Claims (New York: Macmillan, 2002), pp. 32–45. 4. James Petras, Culture and the Challenges of Contemporary World (New York: Macmillan, 2004), p. 15. 5. James Petras, “Globalisation: A Socialist Perspective,” Economic and Political Weekly (Feb. 20, 2005), pp. 459–69. 6. Adam Hochschild,“Globalisation and Culture,” Economic and Political Weekly (May 23, 2005), pp. 1235–38. 7. Manouchehr Ganji, The International Protection of Human Rights (London: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 56. 8. J. Humphrey, “The United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” in The International Protection of Human Rights, ed. Evan Luard (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 62–69. 9. Natan Lerner, The UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 2nd ed. (Alphen aan den Rijn, the Netherlands: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1980). See also Theodor Meron, Human Rights Law-Making in the United Nations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 46–54. 10. Lerner, The UN Convention., passim; also Matthew C. Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 45–62. 11. Neera Chandoke, State and Civil Society: Explorations in Political Theory (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1995), pp. 15–25. 12. Roger Simon, Gramsci’s Political Thought: An Introduction (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1982), pp. 37–42. 13. Smitu Kothari and Harsh Sethi, eds., Rethinking Human Rights: Challenges For Theory And Action (New York: New Horizons Press, 1989), pp. 66–71. 14. Quentin Skinner, “On Justice, the Common Good and the Priority of Liberty,” in Dimensions of Radical Democracy Pluralism, Citizenship Community, ed. Chantel Mouffe (London: Verso, 1992), pp. 32–42. 15. Leo Strauss, Natural Rights and History (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1953), pp. 45–52.

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CHAPTER 5

Achieving Religious Harmony Rhoda Asikia Ige

U

ntil the early 1990s, there was a clear disparity between the growing significance of religion on the world stage and the literature one could read on this score in either scholarly or popular publications. Historian Scott Appleby candidly states that, “Western myopia on the subject of religious power has been astounding.” For a long time scholars predicted that as religions were assumed to be carriers of “tradition,” they would enter into decline because of secularization and privatization. Because of the use of these blinders, scholars and observers missed the religious roots of the Civil Rights Movement in the United States and misread the surge of the Iranian revolution.1 This chapter seeks to contribute to the debate by arguing that implementation of human rights principles at the international, national, and individual levels will help tackle the warfare carried out in the name of religion. Furthermore, the key to peaceful coexistence in the world rests on religious tolerance at all levels of human interaction. In setting out this vision, the first section of this chapter, examines the “Idea of Religion.” The section called “The Human Rights Discourse” states a brief history of the rights discourse. “Religion versus Rights” discusses the concept of religion vis-à-vis rights. “Religion and the Challenge of Freedom” examines religion and the challenge of freedom. The last section, “Achieving Religious Harmony in the Twenty-first Century,” offers solutions on how to achieve religious harmony in the current century.

THE IDEA OF RELIGION The concept of “religion” connotes a belief in a supreme being and worship of that supreme being through a specified ritual. Religion is based on a moralistic outlook or way of life. In its doctrinal perspective, religion may be defined as a system of general truths that has the effect of transforming character when the truths are sincerely held and vividly apprehended. There are more earthy explanations of religion: Karl Max described it as the opium of the masses, the implication being that it makes people insensitive to the

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pressing problems of survival. Another view is that religion is “merely an instrument to contain man’s primordial fears—fear of the present, fear of the future, fear of life and death.”2 The connection between religion and human rights arises as a global problem because of human diversity. Religion is often viewed today as having a negative role in world politics, particularly in cases where a religious revival is perceived to be taking place. After decades during which religion seemed to be largely and effectively relegated to the private realm, religious activists are staking out new claims for religion as a central feature of public life. The wish to restore religion to what is considered its rightful place at the heart of society is the most notable common denominator of today’s religious fundamentalist movements. In order to achieve their aim, members of such movements may employ several tactics, including violent ones. They justify their use of violence by reason, often referring to a perception that we are not living in normal times, and that exceptional circumstances call for exceptional measures. As a result, an unusual alliance has been forged in many cases between religion and politics. The emergence of certain interest groups that do not shun violence and seem to be inspired by a particular religious ideology has tempted many observers, notably in the West, to assume an intrinsic connection between religion and violence. Hence, it is common today to consider religion as a source of conflict rather than a resource for peace. The logical conclusion, then, is to try to reduce the influence of the religious factor in the political arena. Typically in such a view, religion is deemed to be a private affair, something between individual believers and their gods, a relation that should not spill over into the public domain. Whereas religion is expected to limit itself exclusively to regulating human relations between the visible and invisible words, it is politics, on the other hand, which is deemed solely responsible for regulating people’s relations with the state in which they live. The formal separation between the fields of religion and politics has been the hallmark of many Western democracies for centuries, and has been introduced to other parts of the world, notably those that were colonized by Europe, and by extension, countries that were long under the influence of Western Europe and North America. The worldwide resurgence of religion is increasingly seen as challenging this basis of secular state. Many commentators, at least in the West, have lamented the fact that religion is reassuming a public role, bringing together again two fields of operation that in the Western tradition of the Enlightenment have long been kept apart. Because of recent conflicts in which religion also played a role, and notably after the events of September 11, 2001, religion is often associated in the West with violence. The question is, however, are we simply dealing here with religious conflict, as is so often suggested, or has religion become a suitable instrument for political mobilization, providing a resource that—like any other—can be effectively exploited for rather mundane purposes? To answer that question, it is of vital importance to analyze the role of religion in society, and to do so from a historical perspective. This is important, first to be able to understand today’s world better, and second, to be able to analyze the specific properties, and therefore the potential, of religion.3

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THE HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE The atrocities and depravities of World War II underlined the need to take international action to protect and promote human rights. These rights were no longer to be consigned to the domestic jurisdiction of states. The UN Charter appropriately contained references to human rights in its preamble and in a few substantive provisions. The few references were so terse that the first assignment given to the UN Commission on Human Rights when it was constituted in 1946 was to elaborate on those provisions. This process encouraged studies on different aspects of human rights, and the issue of cultural relativism reared its head. Could these be common standards for all, or are standards related only to the culture, traditions, and circumstance of each people? The universality approach won the day, and human rights standards are now for all people despite their cultural backgrounds. The inevitable differences among people, though, compel the admission of peculiarities and specificities in human rights even in the context of universality.4 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights prepared by the UN Commission on Human Rights became an embodiment of the standards of human rights, an achievement for some, but an aspiration for others. It became the bottom line for elaborating different aspects of human rights. Human rights are said to be inherent in man, arising from the very nature of man as a social animal.5 Dowric viewed human rights “as those claims made by men, for themselves or on behalf of other men, supported by some theory which concentrates on the humanity of man, or man as a human being, member of human kind. These include claims, demands or aspirations of human being to attain a better life irrespective of their colour, race, religion and status.”6 Obaseki J. S. C. (Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria), as he then was known, described human rights as “rights of men which should be legally recognized and protected to secure for each individual the fullest and freest development of personality and spiritual, moral, unobstructed independent life.”7 According to Kofi Annan, former UN secretary general, “Human rights are what make us human. They are the principles by which we create the sacred home for human dignity.”8 Man has successfully struggled for and has gotten human rights on the understanding of them being entrenched into their constitutions and the political traditions of their respective societies. The development of human rights at both national and international levels has resulted in a modern concept of human rights, quite different from the philosophy of Natural Law of the sixteenth and seventeenth century. The conceptual forerunners to what are now described as human rights were referred to as natural rights. The concept of natural rights was first developed by the Stoics (Roman philosophers) and were regarded as having universal application (although it needs to be pointed out that this was only for the free born, as Roman laws did not regard slaves as human beings). Natural rights were regarded as superior to any possible law and were embodied in the fundamental principles of justice, which were apparent to reason. The first documents that enshrined some kind of bill of rights were the English Magna Carta of 1215 and the English Bill of Rights (1688). These documents,

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however, had a severely restricted scope in terms of the objectives covered and subjects protected. The French Declaration on the Rights of Man (1789) is describable as the first real bill of rights, in which individual rights were generally and clearly postulated. The declaration reflected the nature of human rights as an inherent part of man, and so inalienable. Many modern states acknowledge a wide variety of civil rights on the part of their citizens. These rights are usually secured in a sovereign document, which is the constitution or basic law of that polity. One of humankind’s most cherished rights is the freedom of the individual to practice a religion of his or her choice.9

RELIGION VERSUS RIGHTS Religious belief and practice by an individual most often take place within a community of fellow believers. Religious practices posses a strong communitarian nature. As expressed by Professor Robert Wilken of the University of Virginia, religion, like culture, does not float free of institutions. Without the discipline of law and the structure of institutional life, our energies are dissipated and our lives impoverished . . . nor are institutions simply instrumental. They tutor our affections and life us beyond ourselves. As Cardinal Newman once remarked, we need objects on which our “holier and more generous feelings may rest. . . . Human nature is not republican.”10

Freedom of conscience is the basis of freedom of religion, and no person can be penalized or discriminated against because of his or her religious views. However, this does not prevent governments from either requiring the doing of some act or forbidding the doing of some act merely because religious beliefs underlie the conduct in question. In this case, the government would not be interfering with religious belief, but with conduct.11 Peace and security constitute the primary limit to religious freedom. For instance, the majority in R v. Gruenke (1991) refused to recognize a priest penitent privilege in Canadian common law because they maintained the state’s right to search for truth in the judicial process. While all the justices rejected the appellant’s claim that her communications were confessional in nature (even according to her own religion), the majority also found one basis for such a privilege in common law: The existence of a limited statutory religious privilege in some jurisdictions does not indicate that a common law privilege exists; rather, it indicates that the common law did not protect religious communications and that the statutory protection was accordingly necessary.12

In Ross v. New Brunswick School District No. 15 (1996)1 S.C.A 825, religious freedom was found to be limited by values such as tolerance. This case involved a teacher who made anti-Semitic statements, which prompted a Jewish man, David Attis, to sue a school board in New Brunswick’s Miramichi region. The

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court ruled in Ross that religious freedoms under S.2 (a) could be limited by an S.1 test. It argued that the demeaning statements actually undermined religious freedom by making it difficult for others to enjoy religious freedom and individual autonomy. It is commonplace for scholars and judges to regard Canada and modern society in general, as secular. For example, in addition to former Canadian Chief Justice Lamer, one federal court judge argued that “Canada is a secular state and although many of its laws reflect religious tradition, culture and values, they are nonetheless secular or positivistic in nature.”13 A commentator now on the Canadian Human Rights Commission argued that secularization requires that religion be defined as individual conscience: “This emphasis on individual autonomy may require further elaboration in other contents, but it is a convincing way to justify the expansion of freedom of religion in a relatively secular change.”14 The Canadian courts, while recognizing religious practices in a communal nature, did not fail to address the issue of individual rights. The Canadian Supreme Court defined religious freedom under S. 2(a) of the Charter in two cases: R. v. Big M Drugmart and R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd. In them, the court explicitly upheld individual rights where freedom of religion is protected against state intrusion. These two cases show that the court understood itself as a secularizing force in society, while mutedly recognizing, then neglecting, the importance of religion. In Nigeria, section 10 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria states: The government of the federation or of a state shall not adopt any religion as state religion.

Section 38 provides the following: “Every person shall be entitled to freedom of thought, conscience and religion including changing his religion or belief, and freedom to manifest and propagate his religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice and observance.” The same section provides for religious education and for places of worship. The right to freedom of religion is not an absolute right. It is a right curtailed by the general public interest, as well as by the individual rights and freedoms of other persons. Thus, in Agbai v. Okagbue (1991) one of the issues for determination was whether the respondent, who objected to membership of an age-grade association on religious grounds, could be compelled to do so or could be deemed to be a member willy-nilly. The appellants, who were members of the Umuskalu age grade of Amankalu Alayi, had seized the respondent’s sewing machine for his refusal to pay age-grade levies for the purposes of building a health center in the village. The respondent sued for return of his sewing machine and damages. The appellants contended that as a native of Amankalu Alayi, the respondent was obliged by custom to belong to the age grade and to pay all levies. The respondent maintained that he was not a member of the age grade, and that as a Jehovah’s Witness, his religion forbade him to join. At the Chief Magistrate’s Court, judgment was entered in favor of the respondent. The High Court on appeal reversed the judgment. The respondent’s appeal to the Court of Appeal restored the judgment of the chief magistrate. The appellants then appealed to the Supreme Court.

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Dismissing the appeal, the Supreme Court per Wali J.S.C. held the following (note that the case was decided before the commencement of 1999 Constitution): The 1963 Constitution, Section 24(1) guaranteed all Nigerian citizens freedom of conscience, thought and religion. The respondent is entitled to hold to the tenets of his religion, thought and conscience which prohibit him from joining the age grade. Any custom that holds otherwise is contrary to the Constitution and therefore null and void to that extent.15

However, in the recent cases of Safiya Tungar and Amina Lawal, in which two women were sentenced to death by stoning because of adultery, the two sentences were quashed on appeal based on the grounds that the sentences violated their right to life, right to human dignity, and right to a fair hearing. In coming to that decision, the appeals court apparently paid attention to public interest: after the pronouncements of the original verdicts by the Sharia court, Nigerian people from all walks of life as well as the international community had condemned the judgments. Nigeria may lay claim to secularity, but is the country secular? Consider the interest taken by the federal and state governments in the organization, implementation, and even sponsorship of religious activities and events such as pilgrimages and Qur’anic recitations; the building of churches and mosques; and the unofficial bills, the deliberate appointment of government offices on the basis of faith, and most recently, the inclusion of Sharia in the constitution. What comes to the fore in the Canadian and Nigerian cases examined is the balance of religious practices with rights (whether communal or individual). It is ironic to think that religion can be divorced completely from society. What we need is a re-understanding and redefinition of the word “secular,” and a broader understanding of faith so that both religion and conscience can be adequately protected, nurtured, and encouraged in society.

RELIGION AND THE CHALLENGE OF FREEDOM Religion and the challenge of Freedom: Believers with different opinions and convictions are necessary to each other . . . we cannot afford to waiver in our determination that the whole humanity shall remain a united people, where Muslims and Christians, Buddhist and Hindu shall stand together, bound by a common devotion not to something behind but to something ahead, not to a radical past or a geographical unit but to a great dream of a work society with a universal religion of which the historical faiths are but branches.16

The issue germane to this section is whether a religious claimant has a sincere belief that behavior conflicting with state regulation is required of him by his religion, not whether the religious belief in question is somehow within acceptable boundaries. Zaheeruddin v. State is a decision of the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The case involved a challenge to an ordinance forbidding Ahmadis from using the symbols of Islam and claiming to be Muslim. The Ahmadis are an offshoot of Islam, but they are regarded by most Muslims as heretical because of their belief that a

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certain person after the time of the Prophet Muhammad was also a prophet. As a result, they have been the target of considerable persecution in Pakistan. In this case, the court upheld the ordinance. The court acknowledged that religious freedom is not confined to religious beliefs, but rather extends to “essential” and “integral” religious practices. It claimed, however, that the appellants (the Ahmadis who had challenged the ordinance) had not explained how the prohibited epithets and public rituals were an essential part of their religion.17

By limiting religious guarantees of freedom to essential and integral religious practices, the Pakistan Supreme Court opened a door to the substantial limitation of religious freedom. Any rule leaving it open to the courts to determine what types of religious practice qualify to be protected could have a similar effect. The German constitutional court used similar language in the Tobacco Atheist case, which indicated that it might reserve to itself the power to restrict freedom of religion to those religious ideas and practices it deemed acceptable. In rejecting a free exercise claim by a prisoner, to whom parole was denied because he tried to persuade fellow inmates to give up their Christian faith by offering them tobacco, the court stated that “one who violates limitations erected by the basic law’s general order of values cannot claim freedom of belief.”18 The basic law does not protect every manifestation of belief but only those historically developed among civilized people on the basis of certain fundamental moral opinions. However, the court backed away from that statement in subsequent cases, and in the Religious Oath Case (1976) upheld an evangelical pastor’s right not to take the oath required of witnesses in court. The court noted that the dissident pastor’s refusal to take the oath found some support in the Bible and “is espoused by a school of newer theology,” but it also stated that “the state may not evaluate its citizen’s religious convictions or characterize these beliefs as right or wrong.”19 Of course, the courts must be convinced of the sincerity of the religious liberty claimant, but the test of sincerity must not be deformed into a test of what religious beliefs and practices are acceptable. The United States Supreme Court took its earliest approach on this issue in the case of Reynolds v. United States 98 U.S. 145 (1879), a case that took place against the backdrop of rather savage persecution of the Mormons in the nineteenth century and their sometimes violent response. In Reynolds, the court upheld the bigamy conviction of a leading Mormon. Under the Reynolds approach, the state could not tell a person what their religious beliefs should be, but the state could regulate actions, even actions thought to be required by one’s religion, as the Mormons then regarded polygamy to be. By the middle of the twentieth century, the Reynolds approach had been soundly repudiated in favor of the strict scrutiny standard. Thus, in Employment Division v. Smith 494 U.S. 872 (1990), two members of the Native American Church, which incorporates certain Native American religious practices, were fired from their jobs with a private organization providing drug rehabilitation service in the state of Oregon because they had ingested peyote in religious services within the church. Especially since they were in the business of helping rehabilitate drug users, their use of a proscribed drug was regarded as “work related

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misconduct,” and they were therefore denied unemployment compensation by the state of Oregon. Peyote is a hallucinogenic drug, and its use is generally proscribed by both U.S. federal and state law.20 Adherents of the Native American Church believe that the peyote plant embodies their deity, and so eating it is an act of worship and communion. Federal drug law and the drug laws of twenty-three other states at that time made an exception for the sacramental use of peyote, but the Oregon statute did not, and the Oregon Supreme Court had ruled that it would not read such an exception to the statute. In these circumstances, is the state’s denial of unemployment compensation an impermissible restriction on the free exercise of religion? The courts in the states have always adopted two modes of reasoning: 1. “Minimum scrutiny,” which means no further review under the principles of freedom of religion. Once the statute in question is determined to be nondiscriminatory, statutory distinctions are also subject to general regulation by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2. We also find as another level of religious freedom called “strict scrutiny,” which adds to the review for nondiscrimination the requirement that the reviewing court invalidate the challenged law unless it is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest. Strict scrutiny applies to equal protection cases, and to the review of laws that involve fundamental constitutional rights or “suspect classifications,” such as race, religion, or national origin, which have historically been used for invidious discriminatory purposes. In between Reynolds and Smith, the U.S. Supreme Court had seemed to settle on the “compelling state interest” test as the appropriate standard for judging statutes whose general applicability was being challenged by free exercise of religion claims. The 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom (ECHR) uses a standard similar to strict scrutiny. Article 9 states: Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

This article was applied in Kokkinakis v. Greece (1993), which involved a Jehovah’s Witness who had been imprisoned several times for violating Greek law that criminalized “proselytism.” By a six-to-three decision, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that by his conviction, Greece had violated Mr. Kokkinakis’s religious freedom. The court had no trouble finding that the criminal sanctions interfered with his freedom “to manifest his religion or belief.” The court stated that “bearing witness in words and deeds is bound up with the existence of religious convictions.”21

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The foregoing discussion has revealed a surprising degree of consensus among the legal regimes surveyed with respect to issues of religious freedom.22

ACHIEVING RELIGIOUS HARMONY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY No one living in the twenty-first century can feign ignorance of the diversity of the human race. The telecommunications industry has made the world a global village and opened vistas never dreamt of by earlier generations. Beyond the diversity of the human race also lie the conflicts ranging in many regions especially as a result of religion. It will be foolhardy to pretend that religion has not been a source of major conflicts in centuries past; however, religious intolerance has raised its head in the early part of the twenty-first century. Ever since the events of September 11, 2001, a new chapter has opened in the religious debate. The reality of the human rights situation in the world today is one of stark contrast: on the one hand, undeniable progress; on the other, the painful reality of widespread violations. Over the last few years, amazing changes have taken place in many parts of the world.23 We must be quick to add that the said changes that have taken place in the world have affected human relations. “Difference” is perceived as inferiority and inequality, and as an avenue to perpetuate actions detrimental to race relations and human relations. The theory of race relations has always pointed out that there is no scientific proof and backing for some of the assumptions peddled by the dominant group. The question is, How do we achieve religious harmony in the twenty-first century? To this we now turn. Achieving religious harmony in the twenty-first century is the job of all: the state, institutions, and individuals.

The Role of the State in Achieving Religious Harmony The state is the political system of a body of people who are politically organized.24 From this definition of a state, we construe a state to be that organ of government that is responsible to people locally and internationally. Many modern states have signed and ratified human rights instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). What is important is the implementation of all these instruments. Religious harmony cannot be devoid of human rights; it is the respect for human rights that will curb religious disharmony. State must ensure that these principles are included in national laws, and their citizens must be educated on the importance of adhering to rights principles in human relations.

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The Role of Institutions in Achieving Religious Harmony The United Nations, through its various arms such as United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, is responsible for seeing to the implementation of human rights in various regions of the world. The United Nations must maintain and reinforce existing international machinery for the protection of human rights. The UN must ensure that all states, irrespective of their economic and social systems, work for a humane order based on freedom, justice, and peace. Correcting inequalities, redressing injustices, and accelerating economic and social development would help eliminate wrong notions and ideas and expectations about society. It should be noted that “in today’s world many situations involving gross violations of human rights are marked by emotions and expressions of deep ethnic, national, racial and religious conflict.”25 Under international law, there is clearly a duty on the part of states to prevent violations of human rights. The most forceful legal declaration to this effect can be found in the judgment of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the Velasquez Rodriguez Case, July 29, 1988, which concerned the disappearance of Angel Manfredo Velasquez Rodriguez in Honduras. The court was requested to determine whether Honduras had violated articles 4 (right to life), 5 (right to humane treatment), and 7 (right to personal liberty) of the American Convention on Human Rights, and to rule that “the consequences of the situation that constituted the breach of such right or freedom be remedied and that fair compensation be paid to the inured party or parties.” The court went further to state the following: An illegal act which violates human rights and which is initially not directly imputable to a state (for example, because it is the act of a private person or because the person responsible has not been identified) can lead to international responsibility of the state not because of the act itself, but because of the lack of due diligence to prevent the violation or to respond to it as required by the convention.

While the United Nations needs to hold states accountable for the acts of private persons especially when these acts relate to religious intolerance, it is pertinent that the UN and its various agencies must develop the capacity to identify human rights violations at an early stage and act swiftly and effectively to bring them to an end.

The Role of Individuals in Achieving Religious Harmony The society and the state are made up of individuals, and it is the individual who gives effect to laws and polices. Every individual mirrors his or her society. In tackling religious intolerance, a concerted effort must be geared toward individual enlightenment on the imperative of religious harmony. A violation of human rights often starts with the individual before it becomes a collective phenomenon. When individuals accept the norms of both democratic and human

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rights principles and strive to live them, then the state and human rights agencies will have less work to do. It is trite at this juncture to stress a social disease that has exacerbated religious crises in recent times: racism. Racism is the theory or idea that there is a causal link between inherited physical traits and certain traits of personality, intellect, or culture, and combined with it, the notion that some races are inherently superior to others.26 It is accepted that in nearly all the world’s societies, people have apparently developed pride in the cultural accomplishments of their own groups and a corresponding derogation of those of their neighbors; however, the idea that certain groups of people are superior to others because of their genetic makeup does not appear to have been widespread. The menace of racism and religious fundamentalism is a backlash against colonial expansion and slavery. Although many states have gained independence, and are no longer subjects of other nations, what provokes people now is a reaction to perceived earlier grievances, which has now metamorphosed into terrorism. Solving the scourge of racism, religious fundamentalism, and terrorism is the work of all. The whole world must unite in condemning acts inimical to human rights, but we also must be part of the healing process. No one thinks this fight will be easy, but it is our belief that religious harmony can be achieved in the twenty-first century and beyond.

CONCLUSION Religion occupies a special place in the life of humankind, and so also human rights have become as accepted way of living. Our problem has been balancing religious freedom with human rights principles. In this chapter, we examined the idea of religion, the evolution of the rights discourse, religion and rights in the light of notable cases from two countries (Canada and Nigeria), and the limits of religious freedom in several jurisdictions, and suggested means of achieving religious harmony. It is our submission that religion and human rights can coexist if all will believe, accept, and practice human rights principles and ideas alongside the tenets of their religion.

NOTES 1. Rosalind I. J. Hackett, “Rethinking the Role of Religion in the Public Sphere: Local and Global Perspective,” in Comparative Perspectives on Shariah in Nigeria, ed. Philip Ostien, Jamila M. Nasir, and Franz Kogelmann (Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited, 2005), p. 76. 2. Akin Ibidapo-Obe, “The Right to Freedom of Religion in Nigeria,” in Essays on Human Rights Law in Nigeria, ed. Ibidapo-Obe (Lagos: Concept Publications Limited, 2005), p. 143. 3. Gerrieter Haar, “Religion: Source of Conflict or Resource for Peace,” in Comparative Perspective on Shariah in Nigeria, pp. 303–306. 4. U. O. Umozurike, “Teaching Human Rights in Law Faculties” (paper presented at the Workshop for Law Faculties in Nigeria, February 6–7, 2001), p. 1.

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5. M. A. Ajomo, Individual Rights and the 1989 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, ed. M. A. Ajomo, and Bolaji Owasanoye (Lagos: Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, 1989), p. 1. 6. Auwal Ibrahim, “Linking Democracy and Good Governance with Human Rights” (paper presented at 39th Annual Law Teachers Conference of the Nigerian Association of Law Teachers, University of Maiduguri, Borno State, Nigeria, October 13–17, 2003), pp. 11–12. 7. Ibrahim, “Linking Democracy and Good Governance with Human Rights,” pp. 11–12. 8. A quote from Atsenuwa Ayodele et al., Human Rights Made Simple, 3d ed. (Lagos, Nigeria: Legal Research and Resource Development Centre). 9. Akin Ibidapo-Obe, “The Right to Freedom of Religion in Nigeria,” p. 145. 10. David Brown, “Freedom From or Freedom For?: Religion as a Case Study in Defining the Content of Charter Rights,” University of British Columbia Law Review 33 (Special Edition, 2000), p. 575. 11. Jadesola Akande, Introduction to the Nigerian Constitution (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1982), p. 35. 12. R v. Gruenke (1991) 3 S.C.R 263. 13. Roach v. Canada (Minister of State for Multiculturalism) (1992) 88 D.L.R (4th) 229. 14. W. W. Black, “Religion and the Right to Equality,” in Equality Rights and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ed. A. F. Bayefsky and M. Eberts (Toronto: Carswell, 1985), p. 178. 15. Agbai v. Okagbue (1991) 7 NWLR (Pt. 204) 391. 16. Quoted in John C. Reitz, “Freedom of Religion and Its Limitations: Judicial Standards for Deciding Particular Cases to Maintain the State’s Secular Role in Protecting Society’s Religious Commitments,” in Comparative Perspectives on Shariah in Nigeria, pp. 196, 198. 17. Zaheeruddin v. State 26 S.C.M.R. (s. CT) 1718 (1993) Pakistan. 18. Tobacco Atheist case 12, BVerf GE, 4–5 (1960). 19. Religious Oath Case, 33 BVerf GE 23 (1976). 20. Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 21. Kokkinakis v. Greece 17 E.H.R.R. 387 (1993). 22. John C. Reitz, “Freedom of Religion and Its Limitations: Judicial Standards for Deciding Particular Cases to Maintain the State’s Secular Role in Protecting Society’s Religious Commitments,” pp. 196, 198. 23. Jan Martenson, “The United Nations and the Human Rights Today and Tomorrow,” in Human Rights in the Twenty-first Century: A Global Challenge, ed. Kathleen E. Mahoney and Paul Mahoney (Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1993), p. 927. 24. Bryan A. Garner, ed., Black’s Law Dictionary Abridged, 7th ed. (St. Paul, MN: West Group, 2000), p. 1137. 25. Theo Van Boven, “Prevention of Human Rights Violations,” in Human Rights in the Twenty-first Century: A Global Challenge, p. 1944. 26. Encyclopedia Britannica Micro-in-Depth Volume 14 (1980), p. 360.

CHAPTER 6

The Grammar of Dissent: Religion, Rights, and Public Reason William R. O’Neill

“W

e have killed him–you and I. All of us are his murderers. But how did we do this? How could we drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon?” Thus spoke Nietzsche’s Madman in the third book of The Gay Science. But it is not the death, the incredibility of God that “reaches our ears” in the new millennium.1 For modernity’s final disenchantment is of itself. The “ultimate and most sublime values” have not, as Weber believed, retreated from public life.2 Religion remains a stubborn inheritance; its political resurgence in late or postmodernity awakes us from our undogmatic slumbers. Still the horizon is blurred. Religious terror, uncivil strife—not God, but we ourselves “bleed to death under our knives.” And what shall we say of “this tremendous event”?3 Can we recur to the credulity of the Western Aufklarung, to the “secular religion” of natural or human rights? Or does postmodern fragmentation bequeath us only differing “local” narratives, incommensurable “petits récits”? In this chapter, I will sketch a rhetorical via media, arguing in the section “Neither Grands nor Petits Récits” that human rights are best conceived as neither a comprehensive metanarrative, nor as a petit récit of the Western bourgeoisie. Rights, I shall argue, rather configure or refigure our narrative traditions as a “grammar of dissent” against what the Universal Declaration of Human Rights calls “barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind.”4 In the section “Religious Narratives,” I will explore the implications of such a rhetorical turn for religious narratives. Finally, in the last section, “Lessons,” I conclude with a brief assessment of religiously inspired violence in light of the scheme elaborated in “Neither Grands nor Petits Récits” and “Religious Narratives.”

NEITHER GRANDS NOR PETITS RÉCITS For Weber, the retreat of the “ultimate and most sublime” notions of the good left in its wake the fragmented values of a demystified polytheism: our differing, even irreconcilable ends. “The intrusion of reflection into life histories and cultural

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traditions,” writes Jürgen Habermas, “has fostered individualism in personal life projects and a pluralism of collective forms of life.”5 Far from being historically adventitious, the radical pluralism of our religious, philosophical, or moral doctrines is, in Rawls’s words, “a permanent feature” of our democratic, political culture.6 For such neo-Kantian theorists, the plurality of narrative traditions implies that political reason will be common (i.e., shared and public) only if we abstract from any comprehensive doctrine of the good.7 Our conception of justice, writes Rawls, “should be, as far as possible, independent of the opposing and conflicting philosophical and religious doctrines that citizens affirm.”8 Under the veil of ignorance, Rawls’s Kantian constructivism confines “nonpublic,” religious belief to the vestibule of such an inquiry, while Habermas’s more comprehensive liberalism denies “higher or deeper” doctrines “any logical force on their own.”9 For Habermas, the “secular sublation (Aufhebung) of ontotheology by the philosophy of history” demystifies the public sphere.10 And so too, for Robert Audi, only a purely “secular rationale” suffices for citizens’ motivation in advocating or supporting public policy.11 Still, what Weber once called the “grandiose fever” of religious ethics is far from spent.12 Abjuring every “trace of divinity,” either “in the form of a divinized world or a divinized self,” Rorty’s thoroughly disenchanted “postmodernist bourgeois liberalism” remains, on its own terms, “local and ethnocentric.”13 Indeed, for critics of a communitarian stripe such as MacIntyre or Walzer, our very conception of justice derives from the fragmented substance of our differing sittliche traditions, for example, our “higher” or “deeper” religious doctrines. For MacIntyre, the thinness of liberal tolerance is finally vacuous; our universal rights’ talk, in Bentham’s words, mere “rhetorical nonsense.”14 Inspired by MacIntyre’s retrieval of Aristotelian virtue (through peregrinations from Benedict to Aquinas), Stanley Hauerwas’s ecclesial ethics denies any “universal ethic grounded in human nature per se.”15 And still other, less-sectarian critics seek a distinctively religious interpretation of rights. For Michael Perry, the very idea of human rights is “ineliminably religious,” while, in a similar vein, Max Stackhouse grounds human rights in “transcendent moral laws.”16 The issue is thus joined. Is the most reasonable doctrine a thin public morality, for example, a “moral Esperanto” of rights? Or as Walzer urges, must we concede that “morality is thick from the beginning, culturally integrated” in particular narrative traditions?17 For under the spell of modernity’s disenchantment, we must, it seems, plump down for the thin, “politics of [universal] rights” (variations upon Kantian Moralität) or the thick, tradition-dependent “politics of the common good” (Hegelian Sittlichkeit, albeit deprived of Reason’s cunning).18 Or may we discern yet a third possibility, a via media neither thick nor thin? Such, I will argue, is the heritage of modern Roman Catholic social teaching, echoed, I believe, in the rhetoric of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the American Civil Rights Movement. (Roman Catholic social teaching commends itself in such a reconstructive inquiry since it offers one of the most systematically developed theological interpretations of human rights.)

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A RHETORICAL RIPOSTE The genealogy of natural or human rights, for many a critic and partisan alike, betrays what Hans-Georg Gadamer called the Enlightenment’s “prejudice against prejudice”—the Kantian belief that moral validity claims are independent of the ethical substance of tradition, including, a fortiori, religious traditions.19 For Grotius’s modern heirs look not to the divine finality of natural law (the jus naturale), but to the “natural, inalienable and sacred Rights of Man.”20 With the eclipse of the religiously inspired bonum commune of the medievals, these “liberties of the moderns,” it seems, reign supreme.21 And yet, the uses of rights belie such a simple antinomy. The “idea of natural rights,” Brian Tierney reminds us in his magisterial treatise, was not originally “dependent on any particular version of Western philosophy”; rather, “it coexisted with a variety of philosophies, including the religiously oriented systems of the medieval era and the secularized doctrines of the Enlightenment.”22 Neither did such secular doctrines inspire the modern resurgence of “rights talk”: enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, our “faith in human rights” brackets questions of ultimate foundation. Indeed, the “overlapping consensus” precipitating in the Universal Declaration rests less in Kantian “prejudice” than in outrage at modern barbarity. In the wake of the Shoah, rights “speak” where language halts, of mass atrocity, ethnic cleansing, genocide. Let me elaborate. As I have argued elsewhere, pace Bentham (who famously dismissed “natural rights” as “rhetorical nonsense”), the “sense” of rights rests precisely in their suasive, rhetorical force. 23 Victims’ rights against torture warrant their claim that others respect their basic security, so that we may distinguish such practical, rational rhetoric from merely strategic or coercive uses. Human rights, in turn, show forth our respect for what the Universal Declaration calls the “dignity and worth of the human person,” while basic human rights preserve the conditions (or capabilities) of practically rational, discursive agency.24 For in ascribing worth, rather than mere price to persons as agents, we implicitly valorize the prerequisites of their exercising agency, that is, not only our negative, civil liberties, but basic security and subsistence upheld by the Catholic encyclical tradition.25 Indeed, as the recent Parliament of Religions attests, religiously oriented systems of the modern era have succeeded their medieval forbears in “culturally integrating” the grammar of human rights.26 Construed thus, rights are neither grands nor petits récits, but rather a “grammar” of dissent against what the Universal Declaration calls “barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind.” 27 For it is precisely as grammar, that is, rules warranting practical validity claims, that basic rights configure victims’ testimony in tribunals and truth commissions. In the words of Archbishop Desmond Tutu, victims appearing before the Human Rights Committee of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), were “empowered to tell their stories, allowed to remember and in this public recounting their individuality and inalienable humanity [was] acknowledged.”28 In TRC’s hearings, telling the story was, at once, part of a “greater story,” a new “civic narrative” embodying, or in Kantian terms, schematizing the grammar of basic rights.29 (In Kant’s Second Critique, the synthetic role of a schema is played

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by the type of pure, practical judgments, that is, a realm or kingdom of ends. By analogy, the ideal of a well-formed narrative schematizes the depth grammar of claim-rights.30) For only as embodied in our narratives is the complex interplay of rights and correlative duties exhibited as coherent (integral and comprehensive) rhetorical practice.31 As grammar vanishes into speech, so the logic of rights is expressed in what is concrete and particular, for example, the religiously inspired practice of the TRC. Still, as in any natural language, the relation of grammar and narrative remains vital—our sense of civil rights is not fixed in abstracto, but forged in the narrative history of their application, for instance, in TRC’s hearings or in the American Civil Rights Movement.

RELIGIOUS NARRATIVES Rights, we might say, thus exhibit the banality of goodness rather than “the ultimate and most sublime values” of our comprehensive (religious) doctrines. As the “deep grammar” of public reasoning—rather than a free-standing “metanarrative” or “metavocabulary”—claim-rights configure (or critically, re-figure) such doctrines, establishing their limited family resemblance.32 And, as in the Universal Declaration, this family resemblance underwrites an “overlapping consensus” regarding citizens’ “faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person.”33 Citizens thus recognize the justificatory, rhetorical force of general claim-rights, even if they differ as to the ultimate justification of such rights themselves, for example, the belief in the imago dei. It suffices for deliberative consensus that citizens’ best judgments overlap; consensus need not “go all the way down.”34 Indeed, consensus is “reasonable” only if it respects (a) the identity of general claim-rights (public reasons) and (b) the difference of citizens’ (ultimate) reasons for redeeming them. In Andrey Sahkarov’s words, rights rhetoric is probably the only one which can be combined with such diverse ideologies as communism, social democracy, religion, technocracy and those ideologies which may be described as national and indigenous. It can also serve as a foothold for those . . . who have tired of the abundance of ideologies, none of which have brought . . . simple human happiness. The defense of human rights is a clear path toward the unification of people in our turbulent world, and a path toward the relief of suffering.35

The discourse of human rights, then, does not displace our native tongues— rights inscribe neither the Kantian prejudice against prejudice, that is, in “logocentric” disenchantment of the public sphere, nor the Rortian prejudice of the “postmodern, western bourgeoisie.” There are multiple, “well-formed narratives,” sacred and secular, fulfilling the promise of the Universal Declaration. As Mary Ann Glendon observes, the Declaration’s architects expected that its fertile principles could be brought to life in a legitimate variety of ways. Their idea was that each local tradition would be enriched as it put the Declaration’s principles into practice and that all countries would benefit from the resulting accumulation of experiences. That is evident from

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leeways they afforded in the text for different modes of imagining, weighting, and implementing various rights (except for the tightly drawn rights not to be tortured, enslaved, or otherwise subjected to aggression). As Jacques Maritain put it, “many different kinds of music could be played on the document’s thirty strings.”36

Grammar without narrative, we may say, is empty. But neither is family resemblance, though not rigidly limited, infinitely malleable. Narrative without (rights) grammar is blind. In victims’ testimony, as before the TRC, human rights rhetoric is a pedagogy of the imagination, letting us identify moral solecisms, or systematic distortions of our practices. For our narrative traditions are not, as Rorty avers, hermetically (hermeneutically) closed.37 Under the regulative ideal of a “wellformed narrative,” religious traditions, as narrative traditions generally, remain subject to internal, “grammatical” critique, for instance, of religiously sanctioned apartheid under the Dutch Reformed Church.38 Indeed, the critical role of rights persists, even in narrative traditions that incorporate “the Declaration’s principles.” For no tradition, itself vital and complex, perfectly instantiates the grammar of rights. The Catholic Church’s belated recognition of a human right to religious liberty is instructive. Inaugurated with Leo XIII’s epochal encyclical, Rerum novarum in 1891, modern Roman Catholic social teaching integrated the rhetoric of human rights—Maritain, of course, would later work his own Thomistic variations on the theme. But only with the pontificate of John XXIII would the solecism of denying religious liberty be redressed. What occurred, to pursue the metaphor, was not so much the striking of a discordant note, but a resolution of prevailing disharmony. The web of beliefs comprising Catholic doctrine was woven anew in a critical rapprochement with the “signs of the times” as certain doctrinal strands, once “taken as dispositive,” were revised in light of other beliefs “already part of Christian teaching.”39 Might a doctrinal rapprochement with the Declaration’s principles support a revised interpretation of jihad in Moslem polities? Yet, if religious narrative is subject to grammatical critique, it is no less the case that religious tradition plays a critical role in justifying, explaining (motivating), and interpreting human rights rhetoric. We need not, pace Habermas, trim Tutu’s rhetoric of religious reference.40 For Habermas, we saw, the justification of public reasons must be entirely immanent; for, inasmuch as “the critique of reason is its own work,” there is “neither a higher nor a deeper reality to which we could appeal.”41 The “rational sublation of theology and its essential contents” renders distinctively religious grounding reasons, if not religion itself, otiose.42 For Rorty, conversely, grounding reasons are themselves illusory. In Rorty’s postmodernist bourgeois liberalism, “no trace of divinity” remains, either in the form of a divinized world or a divinized self,” whose subjective claim-rights are objectively vindicated.43 Curiously, Habermas and Rorty alike betray the Enlightenment prejudice that a universal morality of rights must (a) admit of rational justification, “independent of (b) religious conceptions of transcendent powers or states and their relation to human beings.”44 In the spirit of Kantian Moralität, Habermas affirms (a) as grounds for “methodological atheism” with respect to (b), while Rorty denies that (a) can be satisfied, so that religious conceptions (b) are but “local and ethnocentric” mores.45 Our rhetorical gambit, however, permits us to affirm (a), while recognizing

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the logical force of “higher or deeper” doctrines (b) comprising our overlapping consensus. For the grammar of rights need not, as Kant believed, be transcendentally justified, independently of all experience. Neopragmatic appeal to performative contradictions, for example, those entailed by denying my interlocutor’s implicit claim to equality of respect and recognition, suffice. In later writings, Habermas himself recurs to just such pragmatic argumentation.46 Yet precisely in forsaking Apel’s Letztbegründung, Habermas implicitly recovers the theological “bedrock” upon which, says Wittgenstein, our “spade is turned.”47 Religious beliefs, that is, may play an ultimate justificatory role for our “faith in human dignity.” We may with Wittgenstein, say “this is simply what I do,” when “I have exhausted the [rational] justifications” for human rights practice.48 Conscience need not make Kantians of us all! But we may still speak of a theological “bedrock,” that is, distinctively religious grounding reasons exhibiting “what I do” (my phronetic self-knowledge) in honoring the proper political virtues of civility, tolerance, reasonableness, and so on. Habermas turns his spade on the very religious grounding reasons he would deny.49 And such grounding reasons may differ. As the drafters of the Universal Declaration foresaw, Christians, Jews, Moslems, and Buddhists may root their “faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person” in their respective narrative traditions, that is, the theological sublation of rights. Far, then, from being inimical to religion, the immanent critique of religious narrative, for example, of apartheid, may itself rest upon what Tutu calls “theological and religious insights and perspectives.”50 In December 1992, Mandela himself acknowledged the role the “confessing” churches played in opposing apartheid and urged them to act “as a midwife to the birth of our democracy.”51 Now, the maieutic role of the churches appears not only in the religiously integrated critique of apartheid, but (re)constructively, in the “narrative project” of the TRC. “From the beginning,” says Antjie Krog, Tutu “unambiguously mantled the commission in Christian language.”52 The TRC was supported by major religious groups, and religious symbolism (tropes, ritual, etc.), permeated the hearings. The Commission, said Tutu, “accepted my call for prayer at the beginning and end of our meetings, and at midday when I asked for a pause for recollection and prayer.” Religious motifs of reconciliation and forgiveness were sounded in the Human Rights Violations Committee, when we agreed that when victims and survivors came to our victim-oriented hearing to testify about their often heart-rending experiences, we would have a solemn atmosphere with prayers, hymns and ritual candle lighting to commemorate those who had died in the struggle.53

Not only does Tutu’s ubuntu theology ground his rhetoric of rights and critique of apartheid as “heresy,” but the TRC itself also becomes a rite of public reasoning—the locus/topos of rights “on holy ground.” Rights rhetoric is framed or schematized in Christian narrative. At the very first meeting of the Human Rights Violations Committee on December 16, 1995, Tutu announced: “We will be engaging in what should be a corporate nationwide process of healing through contrition, confession and forgiveness.”54 Of such “nonpublic” religious reasons, Tutu

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writes: “Very few people objected to the heavy spiritual, and indeed Christian, emphasis on the Commission.55 Still, as André Du Toit, executive secretary of the TRC remarked, there is no simple fit between “the influence of religious style and symbolism” and “political and human rights concerns.”56 How are we to reconcile rights (“the morality of the depths”) with the “higher” telei of Christian narrative—“contrition, confession and forgiveness”—for example, what Albie Sachs calls a victim’s “right to forgive,” and hence, to withhold forgiveness, with a Christian duty to forgive? Reconciliation remains a complex, tensive symbol, inasmuch as a “Christian duty to forgive” is morally supererogatory.57 And yet, as Tutu urges, even legal coexistence may finally depend upon it: “No future without forgiveness.”

LESSONS No simple algorithm decides, ab ovo, the fitting “influence of religious style and symbolism.” Questions regarding the precise scope and limits of religious reason persist. Even so, several lessons may be drawn: 1. We need not disenchant the public sphere. Nor need we assume with Audi that only secular reasons suffice for citizens’ motivation, for like Habermas’s methodological atheism, Audi’s principle of secular motivation betrays an ignoratio elenchi: what is “proved” is not required by public reasoning, and may even violate the Rawlsian caveats of civility by tacitly enshrining the Enlightenment’s prejudice against (religious) prejudice.58 2. Neither is such prejudice ethically inconsequential. Invoking religious wisdom, precisely as religious, as in, for example, Murray’s distinction of religious telei and public order, guards against investing the State with quasi-idolatrous ultimacy—surreptitiously sacralizing civic discourse. Rorty’s disenchantment not only imperils the practice of human rights, but it tacitly abets the extremes of religious quietism and fanaticism—the former, as in King’s or Tutu’s critique, by absolving religion of its public role, and the latter by divesting its public role of logical force. 3. Neither religion nor public reasoning are fixed ab ovo, as if they were rival axiomatic systems. Mutual learning can occur; we know this because it has occurred as exemplified in the Catholic Church’s recognition of religious liberty or the religious critique of apartheid. As we have seen, the grammar of rights permits an immanent critique of religious narrative, while religious narrative schematizes or embodies rights grammar. And as the authors of the Universal Declaration realized, tolerance and civility are no less religious ideals. Indeed, if the family resemblance of our great religious traditions makes dialogue possible, the prospect of religious terror borne by fanaticism, resentment, and misunderstanding makes it necessary. Whether Nietzsche’s madman is proven true is not a matter of speculative philosophy but of “doing the truth” (what the liberation theologians call orthopraxis). The question of God, Tutu teaches us, is finally solvitur ambulando.

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NOTES 1. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1974), bk. 3, #125, pp. 181ff. 2. Max Weber, “Science as a Vocation,” in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, trans. and ed. H. H. Gerth, and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University, 1946), pp. 148–55. See Peter Berger, “Secularism in Retreat,” in Islam and Secularism in the Middle East, ed. John L. Esposito, and Assam Tamini (New York: New York University Press, 2000), pp. 38–51. 3. Nietzsche, bk. 3, #125, pp. 181f. 4. Preamble, “Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” in Mary Ann Glendon, A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (New York: Random House, 2001), p. 310. 5. Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, trans. William Rehg (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1996), p. 97. Cf. Rehg’s splendid commentary, Insight and Solidarity: A Study in the Discourse Ethics of Jürgen Habermas (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994). 6. John Rawls, Political Liberalism, rev. ed. (New York: Columbia University, 1996), p. 136. 7. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. ed. (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1999), pp. 485–86. Poor Ignatius of Loyola does not fare well here, being taken with Nietzsche as exemplifying moral fanaticism. 8. Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 9–10. “In formulating such a conception,” concludes Rawls, “political liberalism applies the principle of toleration to philosophy itself.” 9. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 118–23. In later writings, as we shall see, Rawls departs from such an “exclusive” conception in favor of an “inclusive,” and finally “wide” view of public reason; Rawls, “Reply to Habermas,” in Political Liberalism, p. 378. 10. Jürgen Habermas, “To Seek to Salvage an Unconditional Meaning without God Is a Futile Undertaking: Reflections on a Remark of Max Horkheimer,” in Jürgen Habermas, Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics, trans. Ciaran Cronin (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1993), p. 136. In Habermas’s words, “from religious truths, after the religious world views have collapsed, nothing more and nothing other than the secular principles of a universalist ethics of responsibility can be salvaged . . . ” (Die neue Unübersichlichkeit [Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1985], p. 52). Habermas subsequently qualifies this subscription of religion to the pastness of the past; see “Transcendence from Within, Transcendence in this World,” in Habermas, Religion and Rationality: Essays on Reason, God, and Modernity (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002), pp. 67–94. 11. Robert Audi, Religious Commitment and Secular Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 86–100. In Audi’s words, “one has a (prima facie) obligation to abstain from advocacy or support of a law or public policy that restricts human conduct, unless in advocating or supporting it one is sufficiently motivated by (normatively) adequate secular reason” (p. 96). 12. Weber, “Science as a Vocation,” 148ff. 13. Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 45. 14. Jeremy Bentham, Anarchical Fallacies, in Works, vol. 2 (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1843), p. 523. See Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), p. 69. 15. Stanley Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), pp. 60–61. 16. Michael J. Perry, The Idea of Human Rights: Four Inquiries (New York: Oxford, 1998), pp. 11–41; Max Stackhouse, “Human Rights and Public Theology,” in Religion and Human Rights: Competing Claims? ed. Carrie Gustafson and Peter Juviler (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe), p. 13.

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17. Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), pp. 7, 4. 18. See Michael Sandel, “Introduction,” in Liberalism and Its Critics, ed. Michael Sandel (New York: New York University Press, 1984), pp. 4, 6, 10. 19. See Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer, and Donald Marshall, 2d rev. ed., (New York: Crossroad, 1991), p. 270. As Louis Dupré observes, “The Enlightenment’s fight against [prejudices] stemmed itself from a prejudice and followed the Cartesian methodical rule that no position ought to be considered intellectually ‘justified’ before it was proven” (The Enlightenment and the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Culture [New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004], p. 10). 20. Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen. 21. Benjamin Constant, “ Liberty of the Ancients Compared with That of the Moderns,” in Benjamin Constant, Political Writings, trans. Biancamaria Fontana (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 308–28. 22. Brian Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights: Studies on Natural Rights, Natural Law and Church Law 1150–1625, Emory University Studies in Law and Religion (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press), p. 347. 23. See Bentham, p. 523; see my “The Children of Babel: Reconstructing the Common Good,” in the Annual of the Society of Christian Ethics (1998), pp. 161–76. Cf. Chaim Perelman, The Realm of Rhetoric, trans. William Kluback (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982), pp. 1–8. Cf. Chaim Perelman, and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation, trans. John Wilkinson, and Purcell Weaver (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969), pp. 13–62. 24. “Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” in Glendon, p. 310. 25. Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), pp. 5–87; Alan Gewirth, Human Rights (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 41–78. Cf. Alan Gewirth, The Community of Rights (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), pp. 31–70. 26. See Hans Küng, ed., Yes to a Global Ethic (New York: Continuum, 1996). Cf. David Little and Sumner B. Twiss, Comparative Religious Ethics: A New Method (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1978); Sumner B. Twiss, “Comparative Ethics and Intercultural HumanRights Dialogues: A Programmatic Inquiry,” in Christian Ethics: Problems and Prospects, ed. Lisa Sowle Cahill, and James F. Childress (Cleveland: Pilgrim Press, 1996), pp. 357–78. See Robert Traer, Faith in Human Rights: Support in Religious Traditions for a Global Struggle (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1991) in support of an ecumenical and interreligious consensus on the rhetoric of dignity and human rights. 27. MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), pp. 88–145, 326–403; Preamble, “Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” in Glendon, p. 310. 28. Desmond Mpilo Tutu, No Future without Forgiveness (London: Rider, 1999), pp. 32–33. 29. The interplay of “saying” and “said” reveals the mutually implicative character of basic human rights: just as security and welfare claims presume the practice of uncoerced claim making, so the making of such claims presumes agential security and welfare. 30. See, Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Educational Publishing, 1956), pp. 68–71. Kant describes the schema of a concept as “a rule for the synthesis of the imagination,” that is, a rule linking concepts (a posteriori or a priori) to perception (Critique of Pure Reason, B 180, trans. Stephan Körner [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955], p. 70). The ideal of a well-formed narrative extends the Kantian ideal of a kingdom of ends diachronically (as inscribed in a narrative tradition) and synchronically (as intersubjectively rather than monologically realized). Construed thus, the kingdom of ends is not a type for the abstract, ahistorical subject, but historicized, concretely in social narrative. Cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein,

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Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, 3d ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1958), pt. 1, pars. 497, 664. 31. The schematization of a rights regime, we may say, will be integral if it reflects the relative priority or weight of rights claims in relation both to other rights and non-rights claims, and comprehensive if it honors all pertinent claim-rights (negative and positive). 32. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 88–129; Cf. Paul Ricoeur’s threefold mimesis, Time and Narrative, vol. 1, trans. Kathleen McLaughlin, and David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), pp. 52–87; such a reading of rights offers a via media between a “thick” grounding of rights in comprehensive liberalism and a “thin,” purely political interpretation. Cf. Wittgenstein, pt. 1, pars. 68, 179. 33. “Standing on holy ground,” the bedrock of my faith, I may thus offer distinctive reasons for my faith in dignity, even if the sense or meaning of dignity itself is not “ineliminably religious.” 34. Cf. Donald Davidson, “Actions, Reasons, and Causes,” and “Intending” in Essays on Actions and Events by Donald Davidson (Oxford: Clarendon, 1980), pp. 3–19, 83–102 respectively. 35. Andrey Sakharov, as quoted in Burns H. Weston, “Human Rights,” in Human Rights in the World Community: Issues and Action, ed. Richard Pierre Claude, and Burns H. Weston, 2d ed. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992), p. 30. 36. Glendon, p. 230. See Jacques Maritain, “Introduction,” in Human Rights: Comments and Interpretations, ed. UNESCO (New York: Wingate, 1949), p. 16. 37. See Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong, and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), pp. 54–67. 38. The influential Dutch Reformed pastor, C. F. Beyers Naudé, introduced a status confessionis condemning apartheid in 1965; at the behest of the Alliance of Black Reformed Christians in South Africa, the World Alliance of Reformed Churches (WARC) followed suit. The ecumenical Karios Document of 1985, and the Belhar Confession of the Dutch Reformed Mission Church (DRMC) formally adopted a year later, denounced the “state theology” of apartheid. See Susan Van Zanten Gallagher, Truth and Reconciliation: The Confessional Mode in South African Literature (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2002), pp. 42–45. Without such national and international ecumenical solidarity, writes John de Gruchy, “it is highly unlikely that the resilience and hope of those who suffered so greatly in prison, under house arrest, and in many other ways, could have been sustained” (John W. de Gruchy, “The Dialectic of Reconciliation,” in The Reconciliation of Peoples: Challenge to the Churches, ed. Gregory Baum, and Harold Wells [Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1997], p. 20). 39. John T. Noonan, “Development in Moral Doctrine,” in Theological Studies 54 (1993), p. 669. Cf. Noonan, A Church That Can and Cannot Change (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), pp. 154–58. 40. As Rawls observes, public reasons are thin, yet neither simply sacred nor secular. See J. Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” in The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 143–44. 41. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, p. xli. 42. Habermas, “Reflections on a Remark of Max Horkheimer,” p. 137. 43. Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, p. 45. 44. Gene Outka, and John P. Reeder, “Introduction,” in Prospects for a Common Morality, ed. Gene Outka, and John P. Reeder (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 5. 45. See Habermas, “Transcendence from Within, Transcendence in this World,” pp. 74–78; Habermas, “A Conversation about God and the World,” in Religion and Rationality: Essays on Reason, God, and Modernity, p. 160. 46. See Habermas, “Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical Justification,” in Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, trans. Christian Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicolsen (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), pp. 43–115; cf. also, Between Facts and Norms, pp. 82–131.

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47. Wittgenstein, pt. 1, par. 217. 48. Wittgenstein, pt. 1, par. 217. 49. For Habermas too, the unschematized, or in his words “unsaturated” character of modern moral rights requires positive, interpretative specification, but there seems no compelling reason to restrict our ethical (sittliche) inheritance to the dogmatically secular. A formal-pragmatic vindication of rights—one, that is, that renounces a transcendental foundation—cannot deny, a priori, the “logical force” of religion. See Between Facts and Norms, pp. 82–131. 50. Tutu, No Future without Forgiveness, p. 72. 51. Nelson Mandela, speech delivered to the Free Ethiopian Church of Southern Africa, Potchefstroom, December 14, 1992, as cited in de Gruchy, “The Dialectic of Reconciliation,” p. 23. 52. Antjie Krog, Country of My Skull (Johannesburg: Random House, 1998), p. 153. 53. Tutu, No Future without Forgiveness, p. 72. 54. Tutu, as quoted in Gallagher, Truth and Reconciliation, p. 118. 55. Tutu, No Future without Forgiveness, p. 72. 56. André Du Toit, in “Human Rights Program,” Truth Commissions: A Comparative Assessment, Harvard Law School and World Peace Foundation, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Law School Human Rights Program and World Peace Foundation, 1997), p. 20, as quoted in Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after Genocide and Mass Violence (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998), p. 55. 57. For the polysemic signification of tensive symbols, see Norman Perrin, Jesus and the Language of the Kingdom: Symbol and Metaphor in New Testament Interpretation (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976), p. 30; cf. Philip Wheelwright, Metaphor and Reality (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972), p. 130. 58. It would be more in keeping with the tenor of Audi’s argument to say the grounding of dignity is not “specifically religious or theological” rather than to insist upon it being secular. So too, the political virtues and not merely policy are overdetermined. See Religious Commitment and Secular Reason, p. 43.

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CHAPTER 7

Divine Rights: Toward a New Synthesis of Human Rights and World Religions Brian D. Lepard

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n this chapter I will argue for a new synthesis between human rights and world religions. In the first part of the chapter, I will explore the need for such a synthesis. I will review the uneasy historical relationship between religion and human rights. I will then look at weaknesses of the existing international human rights system. In the second part of the chapter, I will lay the foundation for a new synthesis of human rights and world religions. I will examine the potential contributions of world religions to human rights, based most importantly on their foundational common beliefs in the spiritual dignity of all human beings and in the unity of the human family. Then I will touch upon the potential contributions of modernday human rights norms to the practices of world religions.

THE NEED FOR A SYNTHESIS OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD RELIGIONS Turning first to the need for a synthesis of human rights and world religions, as we survey the depressing world scene today, a skeptic could easily conclude that religious bigotry has become one of the primary engines of human rights violations. On virtually every continent, the lives of innocent civilians are shattered by cruel bombs exploded by terrorist groups, missiles or other armaments are launched against members of a rival nation or people, women and children are raped or abused, and individuals are systematically discriminated against and tortured—often under the banner of upholding the sacred teachings and principles of this or that religion or philosophy. Indeed, historically, religion and human rights have had a very troubled, if not antagonistic, relationship. Adherents of the world religions have frequently asserted

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access to an exclusive truth, thereby purporting to justify the denial of human rights to members of other religions. And leaders of particular religions have sought to stifle the independent search for truth of their own followers, insisting that they blindly accept specific dogmas and creeds, many of which have long outlived their social usefulness. The more extreme forms of this suppression have taken the form of inquisitions and punishments, even by death, for so-called apostasy. Finally, we cannot forget that the evolution of international law, and international human rights standards in particular, was in large part a response to wars, human rights violations, and genocide fueled by religious prejudice. For example, the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 ended thirty years of brutal wars between Catholics and Protestants on the European Continent. Three hundred years later, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 was motivated by the fresh and searing memories of the Nazi hatred of the Jews and the ruthless Holocaust that was the calculated manifestation of that hatred. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the many human rights treaties and declarations that followed in its wake have all attempted to guarantee respect for human rights on a broad, secular foundation. These documents appeal to humanity’s capacity for reason to recognize that we are all one species and are all entitled to certain human rights, which are universal and inalienable, simply by virtue of being human. These documents also implicitly treat human rights as claims primarily against governments. In general, the adoption of these instruments in the last sixty years marks a laudable milestone in humanity’s efforts over the last few centuries to erase the scourge of human rights violations, including those committed in the name of religion, from human society. Yet the contemporary human rights system, and human rights discourse, that have emerged from these seminal and revolutionary documents of the twentieth century have exhibited a number of weaknesses. I will suggest in this chapter that when viewed from a particular perspective, the teachings of the scriptures of the world religions can actually help ameliorate these weaknesses rather than serve, as they have too often in the past, as an impetus to human rights violations themselves.

WEAKNESSES OF CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND DISCOURSE What are some of these weaknesses of the system of human rights inaugurated by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights? First, this system, by design, rests exclusively on secular principles. The framers of the Declaration, while recognizing the important role played by religion in establishing moral values compatible with human rights, sought to base human rights on a foundation that could be acceptable to all states, including those that are atheistic or secular in orientation. But this wholesale exclusion of religion as an inspiration for the Declaration can make it appear “foreign” to devout religionists. Indeed, it is partly on this ground that members of many religions accuse the Declaration and the UN human rights system of not truly being universal and of reflecting only “Western” values. A second potential weakness of the existing system is that the rational basis for human rights implied in the Universal Declaration can appear rather weak and

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fragile. This is especially so considering that the twentieth century witnessed the appearance of allegedly “rational” and pseudoscientific ideologies such as Nazism, fascism, and racial segregation that denied the existence of universal human rights. These ideologies found many adherents among well-educated intellectuals. Third, the Universal Declaration emphasizes rights rather than duties. It makes only a passing mention of duties in Article 29, stating that, “Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible.”1 But philosophers have long recognized that for every right there are correlative duties. Who bears these? Under contemporary international human rights instruments, normally only the state is assumed to have duties to protect human rights. But recent events demonstrate that the full implementation of human rights requires the fulfillment of duties by non-state actors as well, such as militia, private organizations, and individual perpetrators. Around the world we see an upsurge in human rights violations by these nongovernmental actors. One example is the Sudan, where the Janjaweed militia is apparently engaging in what may amount to genocide. And even the precise duties of governments are not often specified in contemporary international human rights law. A fourth weakness of the contemporary human rights system is that it artificially divides rights into “civil and political” rights on the one hand and “economic, social, and cultural” rights on the other, as reflected in the creation of two separate covenants on human rights by the United Nations, one on each of these respective categories of rights. It is true that the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action adopted at the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights declares that all human rights are “universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated.”2 However, there continues to be a great deal of debate today about the relative priority of these different kinds of rights. The current legal framework cannot adequately resolve this debate. Fifth, although the Universal Declaration and its progeny have clearly asserted that rights are universal, many governments and groups are today lodging claims that rights are relative to one’s culture, including one’s religious culture. These assertions of relativism cannot convincingly be answered only by appeals to reason, for persuasive arguments for relativism can be, and have been, made on a purportedly rational foundation. Finally, current international human rights documents, while proclaiming the right to freedom of religion, give inadequate attention to specifying particular elements of this right. They also leave states with a great deal of latitude to impose limitations on the exercise of religious freedom. Thus, the protection of religious freedom today rests on a tenuous and wobbly foundation—a situation that should be of concern to followers of all religions.

POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF WORLD RELIGIONS TO CONTEMPORARY HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE Let me suggest now that if we analyze the teachings of the world religions from a particular perspective, they all share common ethical principles that can help remedy these weaknesses of the existing system. What is this perspective to which I refer? As Hope for a Global Ethic: Shared Principles in Religious Scriptures analyzes,3

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if we examine the great scriptures of the world religions with an open mind, we find certain shared concepts. The most important is the idea that all people are spiritual beings or are created by one God and together constitute one human family that ought to be united. Indeed, the scriptures assert that the very purpose of religion is to unify human beings based on principles of justice. At the same time, religious scriptures value diversity, including religious diversity and concord among religions, even if they, of course, urge humanity to follow a particular spiritual path. They thus may be said to endorse a principle of “unity in diversity.” The scriptures contain many moral principles closely linked with these foundational principles. Regrettably, many religious doctrines developed through the ages and promulgated today by religious leaders are at sharp variance with these most fundamental moral principles in their own scriptures. What contributions can a perspective based on the shared principles springing from a primary principle of the unity of humanity make to discourse on human rights? Here I outline just a few from my perspective. These can help remedy some of the weaknesses in contemporary international human rights law and human rights discourse that I have described. First, all the religions agree that human rights are a divine endowment—thus, the reference in the title of my chapter to “divine rights.” Every human being’s spiritual capacity, his or her potential to acquire virtues, and the reality that he or she is the creation of an all-loving, omnipotent God or similar force are reasons for respecting his or her rights as well as the rights of others. Each human being can possess, ideally, the attributes of the divine. This gives to each human being a profound dignity. Human beings, unique among creation, can see the divinity in others and respect them not merely as living beings but as spiritual beings. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the World’s Religions commendably reflects this idea. What relevance does this view of human rights have for contemporary human rights discourse? How can it improve the enjoyment of human rights? Most importantly, it elevates respect for human rights to a spiritual and moral obligation through emphasizing that respect for human rights is not merely a requirement of rational thought. And it transfers the idea of promoting the human rights of others from a mere intellectually apprehended duty to an emotional plane, in which each human heart burns with the desire to help others and see their human rights vindicated. This spiritual and emotional motivation is far more powerful in influencing human actions than appeals to reason alone. A second and related positive contribution of a perspective based on shared religious principles is that recognition of the unity of the human family provides a spiritual and emotional impetus to respect human rights. This is true because we are speaking of spiritual brothers and sisters, and not mere members of the same species. It is far too easy to rationalize human rights violations if we are motivated by weak notions of “tolerance” or “respect” rather than love for our fellow human beings, which is what religious scriptures seek to activate in our hearts. Third, the same vision of unity means we all have duties to uphold the rights of others. Governments are not the sole bearers of duties to protect human rights. Each human being is a trustee for the welfare of every other human being. This is

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in distinction to a popular secular model in which individuals are semiautonomous claimants of rights for themselves as individuals, or even divisive religious models that see individuals only as members of a particular religious community rather than members of the human family. In fact, all the scriptures prescribe strong duties of compassion and rescue for human rights victims. Hindu scriptures are replete with admonitions to show compassion for others and to come to their aid. The Book of Proverbs in the Hebrew Scriptures affirms, “If you refrained from rescuing those taken off to death,/Those condemned to slaughter—If you say, ‘We knew nothing of it,’/Surely He who fathoms hearts will discern [the truth],/He who watches over your life will know it,/And He will pay each man as he deserves.”4 Buddhist scriptures teach compassion, love for others, and selflessness, all of which imply strong duties to assist those whose safety is at risk. Revered Confucian texts, such as those of Mencius, recount stories of intervention to rescue citizens from a voracious tyrant. In the New Testament, the story of the Good Samaritan teaches us that every other human being is our “neighbor” for purposes of the love commandment, and we must therefore, as neighbors, rush to their rescue when their lives are imperiled by wrongdoers. The Qur’an prescribes strong duties of rescue, for example, asserting, “How is it with you, that you do not fight in the way of God, and for the men, women, and children who, being abased, say, ‘Our Lord, bring us forth from this city whose people are evildoers, and appoint to us a protector from Thee, and appoint to us from Thee a helper’?”5 And the prophet-founder of the Bahá’í Faith, Bahá’u’lláh, admonishes all of us to be an “an upholder and defender of the victim of oppression.”6 This is a unique contribution of religious scriptures. Duties to help one’s fellow human beings formulated in rationalist terms are vague at best and often minimal. According to religious scriptures, however, there is a maximalist duty to come to the aid of others in peril. Fourth, because human beings are fundamentally spiritual, all religions view their material welfare as serving their spiritual well-being, and thus as entitled to respect in its own right. The divine origin of human beings means that human welfare must be defined holistically, and without arbitrary compartmentalization of rights that flows from an overemphasis either on freedom from the state as the essence of rights or, by contrast, on economic well-being to the exclusion of freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and expression. This kind of rigid polarization is unacceptable according to the principles of the divine potential of humanity and the unity of the human family. All rights— including rights to freedom of thought; to political participation through democratic elections; to freedom from torture, arbitrary arrest, and other forms of physical restraint and abuse; to food, adequate clothing, and shelter; to participation in the communal life of an ethnic group, religion, or nation—all are essential components of human dignity, and all are entitled to protection without reservation. This does not mean that there cannot be tensions between certain kinds of rights, but it does mean that any resolution of this tension must be accomplished by granting recognition and importance to all rights. Fifth, the fundamental principles of the unity of the human family and the divine origin of all humanity require the rejection of strong claims of relativism, including claims made by religious groups themselves. Every human being reflects

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the light of God; every human being is an equal member of the human family. There can be no moral excuse, according to these teachings, for giving some groups of human beings more rights than others, even based on religious dogma. Obviously, the principle of unity in diversity allows for some flexibility and variation in social practices, but not in the entitlement to or enjoyment of universal human rights. One example is the treatment of women. All religions teach that women and men have equal spiritual dignity or are equal in the sight of God. Therefore there is no moral reason to give some women, in certain cultures, more rights than others, or likewise to give women in some cultures fewer rights than men. If women are to accept subservient roles, this must be their free choice, not a disability forced upon them. And they must always be free to change their choice. Finally, the religious scriptures emphasize freedom of religion as an essential human right. For example, in the BhagavadgXt7, the central book of Hinduism, there are many counsels to pursue learning and truth for oneself, for “darkness is born of ignorance.”7 The Hebrew scriptures counsel everyone to seek freely moral truth, wisdom, and understanding. Buddhist scriptures likewise counsel independent investigation of religious truth. According to these scriptures, for example, the Buddha counseled, “Hold fast to the truth as a lamp. Seek salvation alone in the truth. Look not for assistance to any one besides yourselves.”8 Confucian teachings praise the individual will of the common man and indicate that we all should be eager to learn, and should “question incisively.”9 In the New Testament, Jesus counseled the people to evaluate based on their own consciences and resolve to do the will of God, whether his teaching was from God or from man.10 Further, Jesus demonstrated respect for those of other religions, such as Samaritans, who were regarded as heretics by the Jews, as exemplified by his elevation of the Good Samaritan to that of a role model for all Jesus’s followers. The Qur’an unreservedly upholds freedom of religion, declaring, as the Word of God, “No compulsion is there in religion.”11 And it affirms, “The truth is from your Lord; so let whosoever will believe, and let whosoever will disbelieve.”12 The Bahá’í writings assert that “just as in the world of politics there is need for free thought, likewise in the world of religion there should be right of unrestricted individual belief. . . . When freedom of conscience, liberty of thought and right of speech prevail—that is to say, when every man according to his own idealization may give expression to his beliefs—development and growth are inevitable.”13 The right to freedom of religion has too often been neglected by governments and, as highlighted earlier, by religious adherents themselves, who many times vehemently defend their own religious freedom while seeking to deny the same liberty to others. This is reprehensible and an affront to God or the divine and the teachings of their own scriptures. There is no excuse for such dogmatism.

POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW TO CONTEMPORARY RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVES Thus far I have suggested ways in which a religious perspective anchored in the common religious teachings of the divine nature of man and the unity of the human family can strengthen both international human rights law and contemporary

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human rights discourse. But of course, international human rights law can also supplement and remedy some of the potential weaknesses in religious approaches, thus leading to a new, and sorely needed, synthesis of human rights and world religions. For example, we have seen that too many religious leaders have promoted the idea of relativism. International human rights law appropriately insists that rights are universal—and this, we have seen, is a teaching that is completely consistent with and indeed required by the religious principle of the unity of the human family. Furthermore, international human rights law more generally asserts that religious prejudice or doctrine can never be an excuse justifying human rights violations. Human rights belong to all human beings, whether or not they have a religion and regardless of their religious identity.

CONCLUSION I have suggested that the teachings of the world religions have a unique contribution to make in cultivating a new synthesis of human rights and world religions—a synthesis that not only can help erase historic tensions between human rights and religious practices, but also can enrich and fortify the enjoyment of universal human rights for all. However, this new synthesis cannot be based on exclusivist and prejudiced religious dogmas. Rather, it must be founded on the fundamental teachings of equal human spiritual dignity and the unity of the human family at the central core of all the world’s great religious scriptures. Thus, the prospects for achieving such a fresh partnership will depend on the degree to which members of religions can perceive these shared teachings and reject divisive dogmas.

NOTES 1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III) (1948), art. 29, par. 1. 2. Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, UN Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (1993), § I, par. 5. 3. Brian D. Lepard, Hope for a Global Ethic: Shared Principles in Religious Scriptures (Wilmette, IL: Bahá’í Publishing, 2005). 4. Proverbs 24:11–12. 5. Qur’an 4:77. 6. Bahá’u’lláh, Gleanings from the Writings of Bahá’u’lláh, trans. Shoghi Effendi, 2d rev. ed. (Wilmette, IL: Bahá’í Publishing Trust, 1976), p. 285. 7. Qur’an 14:8. 8. “Buddha’s Farewell Address,” Mahaparinibbana Suttanta, in Teachings of the Compassionate Buddha, ed. E. A. Burtt (New York: Penguin Putnam, 1982), p. 49. 9. Analects 9:26, 19:6, in The Original Analects: Sayings of Confucius and His Successors, trans. E. Bruce Brooks and A. Taeko Brooks (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998). 10. See John 7:17. 11. Qur’an 2:257, in The Koran Interpreted, trans. A. J. Arberry (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1955). 12. Qur’an 18:28. 13. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, The Promulgation of Universal Peace: Talks Delivered by ‘Abdu’l-Bahá during His Visit to the United States and Canada in 1912, comp. Howard MacNutt (Wilmette, IL: Bahá’í Publishing Trust, 1982), p. 197.

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CHAPTER 8

Universality of Moral Norms: A Human Rights Perspective Kusumita P. Pedersen

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would like to begin with some preliminary considerations that may help to clarify what is meant in the following reflections by “human rights.” It is useful to bear in mind that human rights is not merely an ethical theme, such as “justice,” and is also not simply a style of moral discourse, such as “rights language.” Human rights is now a system of international law. Its foundation document is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948. The Universal Declaration marks the beginning of what is often called the modern human rights movement. For the purposes of this discussion, human rights are understood as those rights that are defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, its related international treaties, and other human rights documents. While concepts of human rights have a long history, it is not my purpose here to look into the antecedents of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but to take the Declaration as the point of reference for an inquiry into “universality” of moral norms as embodied in human rights. To begin, let me briefly give a historical context for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT The twentieth century was the bloodiest in human history. In those one hundred years, 42 million people died in civil and international wars. The horrendous fact, however, is that at least 170 million people were killed by their own governments— more than four times the number killed in armed conflict.1 The grotesque brutality and vast scale of crimes committed by fascist governments during World War II led to the realization that the power of the state, if unchecked, could lead to monstrous atrocities. As the Universal Declaration says: Disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind.”2

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It became apparent that protection of human rights could not be left up to the governments of individual countries, and that a nation could not say that how it treated its own citizens was its own concern and no one else’s—as Hermann Goering had said at the Nuremburg Trials: “But that was our right! We were a sovereign State and that was strictly our business.”3 Limitation of national sovereignty was then and continues to be today a hotly contested issue. International instruments were nonetheless held by many to be needed to codify and guarantee human rights, indeed to protect people from their own governments, as they had until then no legal recourse if abused. The war, after all, had been fought against tyranny and barbarism and to protect freedom and human rights, as stated in the Atlantic Charter signed by Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill in 1941.4 The Charter of the United Nations, after a complex political process and in spite of resistance, had ultimately included wording on “friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and the self-determination of peoples” and “respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all.”5 The Commission on Human Rights was set up in June 1946 as part of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to create a detailed document on human rights following on the United Nations Charter. Eleanor Roosevelt, a member of the United States’ delegation to the United Nations, was unanimously elected chairman. Work on the drafting process began in January 1947. A strategic decision was made not to attempt the creation of a legally binding document on which it would be politically impossible to reach agreement in a short time, but rather to draft a statement of principles similar to a constitution. Some members of the commission were broadly erudite, such as the Confucian Pen-chun Chang of China; Charles Malik of Lebanon, a scholar of Whitehead and Heidegger, well versed in the Bible and deeply influenced by Thomas Aquinas; Canadian legal scholar John Humphrey; and René Cassin of France, a Jew and an authority on international law. All four played leading roles in addition to Eleanor Roosevelt. The commission included members from India and Iran as well as from Latin American and Western countries. Meanwhile, UNESCO solicited input from experts on philosophy, with deliberate intent to give a full account of philosophical traditions of different civilizations, not only that of the West. Among the 150 contributors were Jacques Maritain, Benedetto Croce, and F. S. C. Northrop, and also Humayun Kabir, S. V. Putambekar, and Le Zhongshu, writing on the Islamic, Hindu, and Confucian traditions, respectively. The Committee on the Philosophical Principles of the Rights of Man was convened in Paris in early summer of 1947. After much discussion, it issued a statement saying, “Human rights have become, and must remain, universal. All the rights which we have come slowly and laboriously to recognize belong to men everywhere without discrimination of race, sex, language, or religion. They are universal.”6 The statement goes on, “Varied in cultures and built upon different institutions, the members of the United Nations have, nevertheless, certain great principles in common.”7 Research by John Humphrey of Canada, who prepared the first draft, included thorough comparative study of the world’s legal traditions as well as existing human rights documents.8 In the fall of 1948, the final draft of the Universal Declaration was submitted to the General Assembly for approval. The intense preliminary debate in the Third Committee (for social, humanitarian and cultural affairs) ranged over “spiritual

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values and religious belief, cultural relativism, whether there should be a reference to the divine origin of the human being, the ideal relationship between the individual and the larger society, the connection between rights and responsibilities, whether concepts of ‘natural law’ could have universal validity, the nature of men and women, the purpose of the state, when life began and whether children have rights, justice and morality, definitions of ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy,’ and the meaning of the ‘public good’ and ‘the dignity and worth of the human person.’”9 Thus the Universal Declaration was based on strenuous and well-informed efforts to discern what moral norms the diverse cultures of humanity actually share. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations with forty-eight votes for, eight abstentions, and no votes against, on December 10, 1948. It was followed in 1966 by two legally binding treaties, the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Together, the three documents are known as the International Bill of Rights. Dozens of other human rights documents— international, regional, and national—have been created since 1948. Throughout the world, the Universal Declaration serves as a point of reference for human rights law and advocacy, as well as a rallying banner for activist movements.

THE ETHICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS Several points regarding the ethics of human rights need to be made before engaging directly the question of universality. First, a criticism sometimes leveled against human rights is that it is inadequate as a moral discourse. Human rights documents themselves, however, comprise a system of law as just explained, and are not intended to serve as a substitute for a religion or philosophy that aspires to give full treatment of all essential questions. To give a detailed account of human rights as an ethical system is a task in addition to naming basic principles and defining specific rights. The drafters of the Universal Declaration were keenly aware of this. Second, an allied criticism is that in human rights discourse, there is an overemphasis on rights and an inadequate weight given to duties and responsibilities. It is well established, however, that for rights there are correlative duties, and the Universal Declaration itself, when read as a whole (as it should be), makes clear the importance of duties and responsibilities. Article 29 concerns duties and the limitations of rights. Although some felt during the drafting, and some still feel, that this should have been one of the first articles, it is in any case an integral part of the Universal Declaration. Third, there is the criticism that human rights deals in terms of the individual and does not foster community. To this it can be said that the principle of nondiscrimination logically requires the individual to be the bearer of rights, and the nature of collective rights versus those of the individual is a complex issue. It is also very important to note that the Universal Declaration does not actually speak of “the individual” but, in the Preamble of “all human beings,”“all members of the human family” and “the dignity and worth of the human person,” and in the list of rights, of “everyone,” which does not have the same sense as “the individual.” Through its references to the family, the community, the nation, and the need to

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provide for human welfare, the Universal Declaration communicates a vision of the person as embedded in the human community and in a network of reciprocal relationships. As Michael Novak has put it: [T]he very term person implies a vision of a universal society, which for reasons of practicality and local autonomy, and by the workings of culture and history, is organized through countless local associations of varying sizes and horizons.10

The ideal of human rights here offers a powerful vision of human solidarity.11 Fourth, it is argued by some that human rights is Western in origin and character, is imposed by the West, and is not suitable for other cultures. The narrative of its drafting and adoption given above surely calls this into question; I will attempt to refute this claim further below. Finally, all the above points need to be seen in light of a large, overarching reality, which is that human rights is an evolving system of law and thought, a work in progress, in which some principles and rights are widely accepted and others are contested. The ongoing process of debate and negotiation resolves some issues, finds others intractable, and continues to produce new documents. Turning to the main topic, universality of moral norms and human rights, first it should be said that human rights norms in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are moral norms. They are authoritative principles and values concerned with good and evil, the right and wrong conduct of human beings toward one another, and the establishment of peace and justice. Human rights and laws are not identical: the Universal Declaration says that it is necessary that “human rights should be protected by the rule of law.”12 Taking human rights norms as moral, what then is the nature of their universality? “Universal” means true everywhere, hence justified and applicable everywhere. How should we understand this? Universality can be construed in a number of ways. I now attempt to outline different senses of “universality.” These senses are interrelated and may overlap. They are significant, separately and in sum, for grasping what may be meant by universality of moral norms, taking human rights as the point of departure.

UNIVERSALITY AS PEREMPTORY The Universal Declaration of Human Rights in its Preamble refers to “the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family” and “the dignity and worth of the human person,” and notes that “a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the greatest importance.” It then states, “Now, therefore, the General Assembly proclaims this Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and nations.” Displayed here is universality of intent, expressed by the proclamation of a common standard. This may be called “peremptory” universality in the sense of admitting no denial and expressing urgency. Simply put, it means (among its other meanings) that this is the common standard for all peoples and nations because we proclaim it as such. This peremptory universality by proclamation is claimed to be warranted by “human dignity” and the equal and inalienable nature of freedom and rights.

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Article 1 reads, “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.” Therefore, the proclamation of a common standard is legitimate because dignity and rights inhere in each human being by virtue of his or her humanness alone, without regard to “race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status” (Article 2). There is something objective in the human condition that is morally valuable and is universal or common to all, and it is this that justifies a common moral standard to be spelled out in a set of practical requirements. All through the two and a half years of the drafting process of the Universal Declaration, debates and reflections continued on these fundamental points. In the end, the words “by nature” were omitted as were any references to God or the idea that humans are created in the image of God. The final wording in itself yields a doctrine of “simple inherence.”13 This doctrine affirms that the human being, by virtue of being human, has “dignity” or is worthy of respect. It is through “reason and conscience” that we are able to know this.14 The human being, as such, has the rights demanded by human dignity. Beyond this, the statement of inherent rights is not explicit or determined. The drafters, however, intended that it be philosophically open, allowing for reading between the lines and interpretation, rather than minimalistic or impoverished.

UNIVERSALITY AS CONSENSUS Universality by proclamation can be supported by agreement as to what is proclaimed. As mentioned, when the Universal Declaration was adopted, there were no opposing votes although eight of fifty-six countries abstained. When it is objected today that human rights are “Western,” it is often said that a great many of the nations that now exist were not represented at the time of the drafting or adoption. The argument appears to be that since the origin of the Universal Declaration was not inclusive, therefore its content cannot be universal. Mary Ann Glendon and others respond that this is not a valid argument as content is what must be scrutinized; in any case, the world’s regions and their cultures were very widely represented in the drafting, if not all the states that now exist.15 Moreover, in the last fifty-three years, most of the countries of the world have been involved in international and regional processes that have created a whole series of human rights instruments. More generally, human rights has become the currency of world politics, and as David Little says, “a common vocabulary in which claims from very different cultures are similarly articulated.”16 While some human rights do not find global acceptance, others are not officially contested by any country, for example, rights against slavery or torture.17 These are universally endorsed, if not universally complied with. A counterargument could be that consensus, even if it is found on some points, is a shallow form of justification. What people or governments agree on today for whatever reason (not necessarily moral conviction), they may disagree on tomorrow. A moral norm that is supported by consensus still does not deserve to be called a universal moral norm. Consensus, to be even a partial basis for claims of “universality” must be not only broad, but also deep and abiding.

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EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FOR COMMON MORAL NORMS What then, might be the reason for consensus, if it exists? If people agree, why and how strongly do they agree? I have heard that Quakers believe that consensus in their community shows the action of the Holy Spirit among them. Agreement on moral norms may be of great importance even if in practice it only means that the norms are or can be understood, and not that human beings live up to them. In his book Human Universals, anthropologist Donald E. Brown finds in his survey of social scientific evidence that all cultures distinguish between right and wrong, all recognize the norm of reciprocity, all have proscriptions against rape and murder, and all have a concept of the “person.”18 If a human society lacks these norms, it is suffering from pathology as a society. Social scientists and ethicists recognize that certain acts and attitudes affecting human welfare are intrinsic to the human condition and call for moral reflection in all cultures, giving rise to common moral norms, while in the interfaith movement the project of a “Global Ethic” seeks to demonstrate that religious traditions agree on a set of common “core values.”19 If the Universal Declaration of Human Rights finds global acceptance, that is because it corresponds with already known cross-cultural moral norms. This correspondence is not an accident, but is there because of the extensive study, great care, historical depth, and insight with which it was drafted.

UNIVERSALITY AND MORAL INTUITIONS If it can be empirically demonstrated that common moral norms are present in many cultures, and states do officially agree, let us say, on slavery or torture, what account can be given of this? What is it in human moral consciousness that makes it possible for us to agree? Here I follow David Little’s account of universality in his article “The Nature and Basis of Human Rights.”20 Little argues that some acts are “transparently wrong”—for example, that the torture of a child is wrong needs no proof or argument. “When authors of Nunca Mas write,” Little says, “‘each time that a child suffered torture directly or witnessed the torture of his parents, he entered a realm of horror [in some cases leading to suicide],’ can there be any reasonable doubt that acts of this sort are simply and transparently wrong in themselves, whoever may perform them and in whatever culture?” and that they have acted “contrary to what it means to be a human being?”21 If a moral principle or doctrine leads to such acts or acceptance of them, it may be judged morally defective just on that basis. He quotes a 1957 article by William Gass, ‘The Case of the Obliging Stranger’ (about baking a stranger in one’s oven): “[the] act is not inexplicable; it is transparent. . . . [Thus, the] explanatory factor is always more inscrutable than the event it explains.”22 Little adds, “As in other similar examples of moral revulsion— for instance, in response to extrajudicial execution for purposes of terrorizing and intimidating—our reactions to the torture of children and the like conform precisely to Gass’s account. First, moral theories, insofar as they pretend to ‘explain’ and ‘justify’ why these acts are wrong, are little more than pompous distractions.”23 Little calls his position a form of “rational intuitionism” and says that “wrongness is, accordingly, ‘cognizable’ in that the notion has certain cognitive

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features, as already specified [as the arbitrary infliction of extreme suffering]. Human beings may be expected to know enough to be able to recognize these features.”24 This is, of course, not only consistent but powerfully resonant with the reference in the Universal Declaration to “barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind” as well as to “reason and conscience.”25

UNIVERSALITY AS INTELLIGIBILITY This leads me to the final sense of universality I wish to discuss. The idea of universal human rights is currently challenged or rejected as unreal or unavailable by certain leading ethicists, as essentialist by postmodernists, as “Western” and hegemonic by postcolonialists, and now as in the past, as infringing on national sovereignty by a number of governments. I suggest in reply that those who claim to oppose “human rights” as a defective ideology will still in practice be swift to claim their own rights if their human rights are violated. They will not feel it is justifiable or moral for them or their children to be seized, detained, tortured, enslaved, or killed by their governments or others because of their race, color, sex, language, religion, political opinion, or national origin. Whether or not they will use the language of “rights” or not in such situations is possibly a trivial point (though it will not be surprising if they do). At least some rights, I argue, are in fact accepted universally in a pragmatic manner. Even those governments that engage in human rights violations do not want to be accused of these same violations—no one wants to be called a butcher, a torturer, or a perpetrator of genocide. A kind of global consensus, then, is growing in which human rights is emerging as a common moral language. In no way does this mean that people or governments comply with human rights standards, nor that all agree on all specific rights, let alone that all or most people can exercise their rights. It does mean that human rights norms are intelligible to all. I contend that to argue against universality of human rights effectively, one would have to demonstrate not that no one ever disagrees on human rights, or that rights are never violated, but that significant numbers of people or cultures do not even understand what a right is or what a human rights violation is. This does not mean that diverse languages all have words for “rights,” or that rights must be seen to predominate over duties and responsibilities (which is clearly not what human rights discourse means to say in any case). Rather, it means that functional equivalents in the ethics and moral norms of the world’s religious traditions and cultures can be found.26 I conclude that human rights can be affirmed as universal moral norms not in the sense that they are universally agreed on or realized, but that they are virtually universal in being understood—by virtue of their universal intelligibility. Although Little places his position within the tradition of philosophical intuitionism, I believe that in the context of human rights, it can also be seen as an extension of a kind of consensus argument—but here it is a deep and powerful kind of consensus on wrongness and rightness. It is the kind of agreement that was documented and defined by the philosophers and legal scholars who drafted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (although not perfectly, as they often said themselves), by all those consulted and involved in the debate, by the hundreds of

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millions who have since embraced human rights, by social scientists studying human societies everywhere in the world, and by scholars and activists in the interfaith movement seeking formal and informal agreements on moral norms. Here, philosophical and legal analysis, political processes, social science, and intercultural dialogue seem to converge on the perception that an understanding of what human dignity is and of what human rights are does indeed arise from the very nature of the human. Ethical inquiry and empirical study do uphold the universality of human rights. The deep structure of the affirmation of universality lies in the “outrage of conscience” and the fundamental sense of “the dignity and worth of the human person” to which we may come to through “reason and conscience.”

Acknowledgment Thanks to Alan Race, editor-in-chief of Interreligious Insight, who graciously gives permission to publish this chapter, previously published as “Universality of Moral Norms: A Human Rights Perspective,” Interreligious Insight, 5/1 (January 2007).

NOTES 1. Gerald W. Scully, “Word for Word/‘Murder by the State,’” New York Times, Week in Review (December 14, 1997), p. 7. 2. Preamble: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is widely available. I cite The International Bill of Human Rights (New York: United Nations, 1993). 3. Paul Gordon Lauren, The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998), p. 210. 4. Lauren, The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen, pp. 142–45. 5. Mary Ann Glendon, A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (New York: Random House, 2001), Ch. 1; Lauren, The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen, Ch. 6. 6. Lauren, The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen, p. 224. 7. Lauren, The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen, p. 224. 8. Glendon, A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, p. 257. 9. Lauren, The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen, p. 234. 10. Michael Novak, “Human Dignity, Human Rights”, First Things 97 (Nov 1999): 41. 11. See also Glendon, A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, p. 257. 12. United Nations, Preamble: The International Bill of Human Rights (New York: United Nations, 1993). 13. Johannes Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting, and Intent (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), pp. 294–95. 14. Johannes Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting, and Intent, p. 296. 15. Glendon, A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, p. 226. 16. David Little, “The Nature and Basis of Human Rights” in Prospects for a Common Morality, ed. Gene Outka and John P. Reeder (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 76.

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17. John Kelsay and Sumner B. Twiss, eds., Religion and Human Rights (New York: Project on Religion and Human Rights, 1994), p. 43. 18. Donald Brown, Human Universals (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1991), Ch. 6. 19. See David Little and Sumner B. Twiss, Comparative Religious Ethics (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), Ch. 2; Hans Küng and Karl-Josef Kuschel, eds., A Global Ethic: The Declaration of the Parliament of the World’s Religions (New York: Continuum, 1993). William P. George gives a very useful analysis of the relation of the “Global Ethic” undertaking to international law, with reference to the implicit religious dimensions of international law, the “common heritage” concept, and “international law as a carrier of transcendental meaning” (William George, “Looking for a Global Ethic? Try International Law,” Journal of Religion [1996], pp. 359–82). 20. Little, “The Nature and Basis of Human Rights” in Prospects for a Common Morality. 21. Little, “The Nature and Basis of Human Rights” in Prospects for a Common Morality, p. 80. 22. Little, “The Nature and Basis of Human Rights” in Prospects for a Common Morality, p. 79. 23. Little, “The Nature and Basis of Human Rights” in Prospects for a Common Morality, p. 80. 24. Little, “The Nature and Basis of Human Rights” in Prospects for a Common Morality, p. 84. 25. United Nations, The International Bill of Human Rights (New York: United Nations, 1993), Preamble, Ch. 1. 26. Scholarship on human rights and the world’s religions has been expanding rapidly in the last decade. For relatively earlier contributions see Leroy S. Rouner, Human Rights and the World’s Religions, Boston University Studies in Philosophy and Religion, vol. 9 (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. 1988), and Robert Traer, Faith in Human Rights. (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1991).

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CHAPTER 9

Is the Notion of Human Rights a Western Concept? Raimundo Panikkar

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e should approach this topic with great fear and respect. It is not merely an “academic” issue. Human rights are trampled upon in the East as in the West, in the North as in the South of our planet. Granting the part played by human greed and sheer evil in this universal transgression, could it not also be that human rights are not observed because in their present form they do not represent a universal symbol powerful enough to elicit understanding and agreement? No culture, tradition, or religion can speak today for the whole of humankind, let alone solve its problems. Dialogue and intercourse leading to a mutual fecundation are necessary. But sometimes the very conditions for dialogue are not given because there are unspoken conditions that most partners cannot meet. It is a fact that the present-day formulation of human rights is the fruit of a very partial dialogue among the cultures of the world. It is only recently that this question has been felt acutely.1 I shall not enter into the details of the history of human rights, nor into an analysis of their nature. I shall confine myself to the interrogation implied in the title: are Human Rights a universal invariant?

THE METHOD OF INQUIRY Diatopical Hermeneutics It is claimed that human rights are universal. This alone entails a major philosophical query. Does it make sense to ask about conditions of universality when the very question about conditions of universality is far from universal? Philosophy can no longer ignore this intercultural problematic. Can we extrapolate the concept of Human Rights, from the context of the culture and history in which it was conceived, into a globally valid notion? Could it at least become a universal symbol? Or is it only one particular way of expressing—and saving—the humanum? Although the question posed in the title is a legitimate one, there is something disturbing in this formulation as it was given to me. At least at first glance, it

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would seem to offer only one alternative: either the notion of universal human rights is a Western notion, or it is not. If it is, besides being a tacit indictment against those who do not possess such a valuable concept, its introduction into other cultures, even if necessary, would appear as a plain imposition from outside. It would appear, once again, as a continuation of the colonial syndrome, namely the belief that the constructs of one particular culture (God, Church, Empire, Western civilization, science, modern technology, etc.) have, if not the monopoly, at least the privilege of possessing a universal value that entitles them to be spread over the earth. If not, that is, if the concept of Universal Human Rights is not exclusively a Western concept, it would be difficult to deny that many a culture has let it slumber, thus again giving rise to an impression of the indisputable superiority of Western culture. There is nothing wrong in admitting a hierarchy of cultures, but this hierarchical order cannot be assumed as the starting point, nor can one side alone lay down the criteria necessary for establishing such a hierarchy. There is, then, a prior question implied by asking whether the notion of Human Rights is a Western concept. It is the question regarding the very nature of Human Rights, and it directly submits this notion to cross-cultural scrutiny. Our question is a case in point of diatopical hermeneutics: the problem is how, from the topos of one culture, to understand the constructs of another.2 It is wrong-headed methodology to begin by asking, Does another culture also have the notion of Human Rights?—assuming that such a notion is absolutely indispensable to guarantee human dignity. No question is neutral, for every question conditions its possible answers.

The Homeomorphic Equivalent I was once asked to give the Sanskrit equivalents of the twenty-five key Latin words supposed to be emblematic of Western culture. I declined, on these grounds: that which is the foundation of one culture need not be the foundation for another. Meanings are not transferable here. Translations are more delicate than heart transplants. So what must we do? We must dig down to where a homogenous soil or a similar problematic appears: we must search out the homeomorphic equivalent—to the concept of Human Rights in this case. “Homeomorphism is not the same as analogy; it represents a peculiar functional equivalence discovered through a topological transformation.” It is “a kind if existential functional analogy.”3 Thus we are not seeking merely to transliterate Human Rights into other cultural languages, nor should we be looking for mere analogies; we try instead to find the homeomorphic equivalent. If, for instance, Human Rights are considered to be the basis for the exercise of and respect for human dignity, we should investigate how another culture satisfies the equivalent need—and this can be done only once a common ground (a mutually understandable language) has been worked out between the two cultures. Or perhaps we should ask how the idea of a just social and political order could be formulated within a certain culture, and investigate whether the concept of Human Rights is a particularly appropriate way of expressing this order. A traditional Confucian might see this problem of order and rights as a question of “good manners” or in terms of a profoundly ceremonial

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or ritual conception of human intercourse, in terms of li. A Hindu might see it another way, and so on. ✽ ✽ ✽ In order to clarify the question of our title, I shall indicate some of the assumptions on which the notion of Human Rights is based and immediately insert some cross-cultural reflections that will lead us to the locus—the context—of the question and the justification for my answer, which I would like to anticipate by means of a simile: Human Rights are one window through which one particular culture envisages a just human order for its individuals. But those who live in that culture do not see the window. For this they need the help of another culture that sees through another window. Now I assume that the human landscape as seen through the one window is both similar to and different from the vision of the other. If this is the case, should we smash the windows and make of the many portals a single gaping aperture—with the consequent danger of structural collapse—or should we enlarge the viewpoints as much as possible and, most of all, make people aware that there are—and have to be—a plurality of windows? This latter option would be the one in favor of a healthy pluralism. This is much more than a merely academic question. There can be no serious talk about cultural pluralism without a genuine socioeconomic-political pluralism. This is, for example, what has led intellectual groups in India to ask whether “civil rights” are not incompatible with “economic rights.” At any rate, to speak of cultural pluralism within what could be called a paneconomic ideology makes little sense and amounts to treating the other cultures of the world as mere folklore. The example of the notion of dharma from the Indian tradition will offer us a point of reference from which to formulate our conclusion.

ASSUMPTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE WESTERN CONCEPT I take the expression “Human Rights” in the sense of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948.4 The Western, mainly liberal Protestant roots of the Universal Declaration are well known.5 The Western world has known of the struggle for citizen’s rights since the Middle Ages.6 This struggle for concrete rights, rooted in the practices and value systems of a particular nation or country, was felt with greater urgency after the French Revolution.7 Western Man passed from a corporate belonging within a community of blood, work, and historical destiny, based on practically accepted custom and theoretically acknowledged authority, to a society based on impersonal law and ideally free contract, to the modern State, for which explicitly rational norms and duties are required. The problem becomes increasingly acute with the growth of individualism. This chapter assumes knowledge of the history of Human Rights, as well as of the fact that this transition from one form of collective life to another, more modern form is said today to have acquired a worldwide character. We would like to concentrate on the more strictly philosophical assumptions that seem to be at the basis of the Declaration.

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1. At the basis of the discourse on Human Rights there is the assumption of a universal human nature common to all peoples. Otherwise, a Universal Declaration could not legally have been proclaimed. This idea in its turn is connected with the old notion of a Natural Law. But the contemporary Universal Declaration of Human Rights further implies a) that this human nature must be knowable. For it is one thing to accept human nature uncritically or mythically, and another to know it. Otherwise, the Declaration could not speak and legislate about Rights that are universal; b) that this human nature is known by means of an equally universal organ of knowledge, generally called reason. Otherwise, if its knowledge should depend on a special intuition, revelation faith, decree of a prophet, or the like, Human Rights could not be taken as natural rights—inherent in Man. This must be a commonly held knowledge, otherwise, Human Rights could not be declared universal by an Assembly that does not claim to have a privileged epistemological status. This is made plain by the use of the word “Declaration,” which stresses the fact that it is not an imposition from above but a public explication, a making clear what is inherent in the very nature of Man;8 c) that this human nature is essentially different from the rest of reality. Other living beings inferior to Man obviously have no Human Rights, and creatures superior to Man are likely not to exist. Man is the master of himself, and of the universe. He is the supreme legislator on earth—the question of whether a Supreme Being exists or not remains open, but ineffective.9 2. The second assumption is that of the dignity of the individual. Each individual is, in a certain sense, absolute, irreducible to another. This is probably the major thrust of the modern question of Human Rights. Human Rights defend the dignity of the individual vis-à-vis Society at large, and the State in particular. But this in turn implies a) not only the distinction but also the separation between the individual and society. In this view, the human being is fundamentally the individual. Society is a kind of superstructure, which can easily become a menace and also an alienating factor for the individual. Human Rights are there primarily to protect the individual. b) an anatomy of humankind vis-à-vis and often versus the Cosmos. This is clearly shown in the ironic ambivalence of the English expression, which means at the same time “Menschenrechte,” “droits de l’Homme,” and also “menschliche Recht,” “droits humains” (humane rights). The Cosmos is a kind of understructure. The individual stands in between Society and World. Human Rights defend the autonomy of the human individual; c) resonances of the idea of Man as microcosmos and reverberations of the conviction that Man is imago dei; at the same time, it implies the relative independence of this conviction from ontological and theological formulations. The individual has an inalienable dignity because the individual is an end in himself or herself, and a kind of absolute. You can cut off a finger for the sake of an entire body, but can you kill one person to save another?10

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3. The third assumption is that of a democratic social order. Society is assumed to be not a hierarchical order founded on a divine will or law or mythical origin, but a sum of “free” individuals organized to achieve otherwise unreachable goals. Human Rights, once again, serve mainly to protect the individual. Society here is not seen as a family or a protection, but as something unavailable that can easily abuse the power conferred on it (precisely by the assent of the sum of its individuals). This society crystallizes in the State, which theoretically expresses the will of the people, or at least of the majority. The idea of an Empire or a People or a Nation with a transcendent destiny—whose duty it is to carry through the entrusted mission independent of the will of the members of that society—still exists today in some theocratic states, but even most of these try to palliate their messianic vocation by democratic endorsements. This implies a) that each individual is seen as equally important and thus equally responsible for the welfare of society. Hence, the individual has the right to stand by his or her convictions and propagate them, or to resist impositions against his or her inherent freedom; b) that Society is nothing but the sum total of the individuals whose wills are sovereign and ultimately decisive.11 There is no instance superior to Society. Even if there were to exist a God or a superhuman Reality, this, too, would be filtered through human consciousness and human institutions; c) that the rights and freedoms of the individual can be limited only when they impinge upon the rights and freedoms of other individuals, and in this way, majority rule is rationally justified.12 And when the rights of an individual are curtailed by “reasons of State,” this is allegedly justified by the fact that the State is supposed to embody the will and the interests of the majority. It is interesting to note that the “Universal Declaration” speaks of “freedoms” in the plural and, even more intriguing, of “fundamental freedoms.” The individualization does not stop at the individual, but divides this segregated entity even further into separated freedoms. In enumerating these assumptions and implications, I do not mean to say that they were actually in the minds of the framers of the Declaration. In fact, there is evidence to suggest that no unanimity could be found regarding the basis of the rights that were being declared. But the Declaration clearly was articulated along the lines of the historical trends of the Western world during the last three centuries, and in tune with a certain philosophical anthropology or individualistic humanism that helped justify them.

CROSS-CULTURAL REFLECTIONS Is the Concept of Human Rights a Universal Concept? The answer is a plain no. Three reasons vouch for it. No concept as such is universal. Each concept is valid primarily where it was conceived. If we want to extend its validity beyond its own context, we shall have

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to justify the extrapolation. Even mathematical concepts imply the previous acknowledgement of a limited field defined by the axioms we postulate. Furthermore, every concept tends to be univocal. To accept the possibility of universal concepts would imply a strictly rationalistic conception of reality. But even if this were the theoretical truth, it would not be the actual case, because de facto humankind presents a plurality of universes of discourse. To accept this fact that the concept of Human Rights is not universal does not yet mean it should not become so. Now, in order for a concept to become universally valid, it should fulfill at least two conditions. It should, on the one hand, eliminate all other contradictory concepts. This may seem improbable, but there is a logical necessity here, and theoretically, it would all be for the best. On the other hand, it should be the universal point of reference for any problematic regarding human dignity. In other words, it should displace all other homeomorphic equivalents and be the pivotal center of a just social order. To put it another way, the culture that has given birth to the concept of Human Rights should also be called upon to become a universal culture. This may well be one of the causes of a certain uneasiness one senses in non-Western thinkers who study the question of Human Rights. They fear for the identity of their own cultures. Within the vast field of Western culture itself, the very assumptions that serve to situate our problematic are not universally recognized. The particular origin of the formation of Human Rights is sufficiently well known. Probably the most important sources of dissent are three.13

Theology Human rights need to be grounded, says the theological view, in a superior, transcendent, and therefore unmanipulable value, whose traditional symbol is God as origin and guarantor of both human rights and duties. Otherwise, human rights are only a political device in the hands of the powerful. According to this view, the Declaration suffers from a naïve optimism regarding the goodness and autonomy of human nature. Moreover, it implies a deficient anthropology, inasmuch as it seems to view the human person as merely a bundle of needs, material and psychological, of which it then proceeds to make an inventory.14 And finally, in case of doubt or conflict, who is going to decide? Majority rule is only a euphemism for the law of the jungle: the power of the strongest.

Marxism For the Marxist, so-called Human Rights are merely “Klassenrechte,” class rights.15 “There are no rights without duties and no duties without rights.” They reflect the interests of a certain class, and in many cases only its aspirations. There is no mention of the economic conditions for the effective realization of what are said to be universal human claims. Furthermore, there is something abstract and too general about most of these rights: they are not sufficiently grounded in the material and cultural reality of particular groups. Finally, their individualism is evident. The individual is conceived as being in confrontation with (rather than

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included in) society, although the latter is said to be the result of freely contracting individuals. Society is not merely the sum total of individuals, and it has the rights which the individual may not violate. History has transcendent power.

History “Human Rights” appear to some students of recent history as another example of the more or less conscious domination exerted by the powerful nations to maintain their privileges and defend the status quo. Human rights continue to be a political weapon. Human rights were known long ago but only for the nobleman, or the free citizen, or for whites, or for Christians, or for males, and so on. When they were hastily applied to “human beings,” it was often defined just which groups belonging to the race could properly be styled “human.” If not all humans had human rights, the claim of human rights on behalf of animals, plants, and things would seem and still does seem bizarre, not to say ridiculous, in spite of occasional remonstrances delivered by societies for the protection of animals. Animals and such might very well have rights, but not human ones. And, as we have seen, this particular notion of the “human” has not always been very humane. And who is to speak for the whole? History discloses that only the victors declare and promulgate “rights,” which are simply what the powerful consider right at any given time. From a cross-cultural stance, the problem appears exclusively Western, that is, the question itself is at stake. Most of the assumptions and implications enumerated earlier are simply not given in other cultures. Furthermore, from a non-Western point of view, the problem itself is not seen as such, so that it is not merely a question of agreeing or disagreeing with the answer. If anything, the problem is that the issue is experienced in a radically different way. A diatopical hermeneutic does not deal with just another point of view on the same problem. At issue here is not simply the answer, but the problem itself. Now, is it possible to have access to other topoi so that we may be able to understand other cultures from within, that is, as they understand themselves? We may not be able to jump over our own categories of understanding, but it may not be impossible to have one foot in one culture and another in a second. Generally, we have only one culture as we have only one mother tongue—but we may also have a father tongue. We cannot deny a priori this possibility. I recall that, in certain parts of the East, to be illiterate means to know only a single language. It is in dialogue with others that we can encompass our common ground. We may not integrate more than one culture in ourselves, but we may open the possibility of a wider and deeper integration by opening ourselves to others in dialogue. The following parallelism may be instructive. To assume that without the explicit recognition of Human Rights life would be chaotic and have no meaning belongs to the same order of ideas as to think that without the belief in one God as understood in the Abrahamic tradition, human life would dissolve itself in total anarchy. This line of thinking leads to the belief that atheists, Buddhists, or animists, for instance, should be considered as human aberrations. In the same vein: either Human Rights or chaos. This attitude does not belong exclusively to Western culture. To call the stranger a barbarian is all too common an attitude

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among the peoples of the world. And, as we shall mention later, there is a legitimate and inbuilt claim to universality in any affirmation of truth. The problem is that we tend to identify the limits of our own vision with the human horizon.

Cross-Cultural Critique There are no trans-cultural values, for the simple reason that a value exists as such only in a given cultural context.16 But there may be cross-cultural values, and a cross-cultural critique is indeed possible. The latter does not consist in evaluating one cultural construct with the categories of another, but in trying to understand and critique one particular human problem with the tools of understanding of the different cultures concerned—and at the same time thematically taking into consideration that the very awareness of and, much more, the formulation of the problem are already culturally bound. Our question is then to examine the possible cross-cultural value of the issue of Human Rights, an effort which begins by delimiting the cultural boundaries of the concept. The dangers of cultural Westo-centrism are only too patent today. We have already mentioned the particular historical origins of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. To claim universal validity of Human Rights in the formulated sense implies the belief that most of the peoples of the world today are engaged in much the same way as the Western nations in a process of transition from more or less mythical Gemeinschaften (feudal principalities, self-governing cities, guilds, local communities, or tribal institutions, among others) to a “rationally” and “contractually” organized “modernity” as known to the Western industrialized world. This is a questionable assumption. No one can predict the evolution (or eventual disintegration) of those traditional societies that have started from different material and cultural bases, and whose reaction to modern Western civilization may therefore follow hitherto unknown lines. Further, the very powerful Universal Declaration of Human Rights also shows its weakness from another point of view. Something has been lost when it has to be explicitly declared. As the Chinese say, it is when yi (justice) declines that li (ritual) arises.17 Or as the British and Spaniards repeat, there are things that you take for granted and about which you do not speak. And in some traditional societies, you cannot boast of being noble or a friend of the royal family because the very moment you do so, you lose your nobility and your friendship with the reigning house.18 When Human Rights are declared, this is a sign that the very foundation on which they rest has already been weakened. The Declaration only postpones the collapse. In traditional words, when the taboo of the sacred disappears, sacredness fades away. If you have to teach a mother to love her child, something is amiss with motherhood. Or, as some theoreticians of Human Rights have also recognized, the legislation on Human Rights is introduced in order to find a justification for contravening somebody else’s freedom. Putting it positively, you need some justification to encroach on somebody’s field of activity. I am not saying this in order to revert to utopian dreams of an earthly paradise, but just to sound another voice. You may promulgate laws, but you do not declare what is the case—unless it has ceased to be evident; you do not proclaim an “ought” if there are no transgressions at all.

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We may now briefly reconsider the three assumptions mentioned above. They may pass muster, insofar as they express an authentically valid human issue from one particular context. But the very context may be susceptible to a legitimate critique from the perspective of other cultures. To do this systemically would require that we choose one culture after another and examine the assumptions of the Declaration in the light of each culture chosen. We shall limit ourselves here to token reflections under the very broad umbrella of a pre-Modern, non-Western state of mind. There is certainly a universal human nature but, first of all, this nature does not need to be segregated and fundamentally distinct from the nature of all living beings and/or the entire reality. Thus, exclusively Human Rights would be seen as a violation of “Cosmic Rights” and an example of self-defeating anthropocentrism, a novel kind of apartheid. To retort that “Cosmic Rights” is a meaningless expression would only betray the underlying cosmology of the objection, for which the phrase makes no sense. But the existence of a different cosmology is precisely what is at stake here. We speak of the laws of nature; why not also of her rights? Second, the interpretation of this “universal human nature,” that is, Man’s selfunderstanding, belongs equally to his human nature. Thus, to single out one particular interpretation of it may be valid, but it is not universal and may not apply to the entirety of human nature. Third, to proclaim the undoubtedly positive concept of Human Rights may turn out to be a Trojan horse, surreptitiously introduced into other civilizations that will then all but be obliged to accept those ways of living, thinking, and feeling for which Human Rights is the proper solution in cases of conflict. It is a little like the way technology is often introduced in many parts of the world: it is imported to solve the problems that it has itself created. We have already made reference to this when critiquing the universalization of the concept of indigenous Human Rights. Nothing could be more important than to underscore and defend the dignity of the human person. But the person should be distinguished from the individual. The individual is just an abstraction, that is, a selection of a few aspects of the other person for practical purposes. My person, on the other hand, is also in “my” parents, children, friends, foes, ancestors, and successors. “My” person is also in “my” ideas and feelings and in “my” belongings. If you hurt “me,” you are equally damaging my whole clan, and possibly yourself as well. Rights cannot be individualized in this way. Is it the right of the mother, or the child?—in the case of abortion. Or perhaps of the father and relatives as well? Rights cannot be abstracted from duties; the two are correlated. The dignity of the human person may equally be violated by your language, or by your desecrating a place I consider holy, even though it does not “belong” to me in the sense of individualized private property. You may have “bought” it for a sum of money, while it belongs to me by virtue of another order altogether. An individual is an isolated knot; a person is the entire fabric around the knot, woven from the total fabric of the real. The limits to a person are not fixed; rather, they depend utterly on his or her personality. Certainly, without the knots the net would collapse; but without the net, the knots would not even exist. To aggressively defend my individual rights, for instance, may have negative, that is, unjust, repercussions on others and perhaps even on myself. The need for

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consensus in many traditions—instead of majority opinion—is based precisely on the corporate nature of human rights. A paragraph on language is required here. Each language has its own genius and its own particular way to see the world and even to be it and be in it. But from a cross-cultural perspective, each language has to show the flexibility necessary to incorporate other human experiences. I know that in current English, “individual” is synonymous with “person,” but this should not prevent me from using these two words in the sense I have suggested, or from recognizing a particular human trend that tends to identify the human being with the most salient features of a gross, “individualized” body, or at least to inscribe it within that framework. In drawing the distinction between individual and person, I would put much more content in it than a French moral philosophy would do nowadays, for instance. I would like to adduce this case as a particular instance of two radically different anthropologies. Democracy is also a great value and infinitely better than any dictatorship. But it amounts to tyranny to put the peoples of the world under the alternative of choosing either democracy or dictatorship. Human Rights are tied to democracy. Individuals need to be protected when the structure that is above them (Society, the State, or the Dictator—by whatever name) is not qualitatively superior to them, that is, when it does not belong to a higher order. Human rights is a legal device for the protection of smaller numbers of people (the minority or the individual) faced with the power of greater numbers. This implies a quantitative reductionism: the person is reduced to the individual, and the individual to the basis of society. I may put it more positively by saying that it is the way by which the individual as cornerstone of society is protected, and his or her dignity recognized. In a hierarchical concept of reality, the particular human being cannot defend his or her rights by demanding or exacting them independently of the whole. The wounded order has to be set straight again, or it has to change altogether. Other traditional societies have different means to more or less successfully restore the order. The raja may fail in his duty to protect the people, but will a Universal Declaration of Human Rights be a corrective unless it also has the power to constrain the raja? Can a democracy be imposed and remain democratic?19 The policy of nonalignment subscribed to by many countries of Africa and Asia here strikes a much deeper chord than possible political opportunism, or just another way of being relevant in the contemporary political scene. It represents precisely this refusal to admit the vision of the world as a function of the justmentioned set of dilemmas represented by the so-called superpowers. In short, the cross-cultural critique does not invalidate the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but offers new perspectives for an internal criticism and sets the limits of validity of Human Rights, offering at the same time both possibilities for enlarging its realm, if the context changes, and of a mutual fecundation with other conceptions of Man and Reality.

Should the Symbol of Human Rights Be a Universal Symbol? It should be noted that I speak here of Human Rights as a symbol that, unlike a concept, is by its nature polyvalent and polysemic.

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The answer is yes, and no. Yes. When a culture as a whole discovers certain values as ultimate, these values must have a certain universal meaning. Only collective and culturally expressed universal values may be said to be human values. A mere private value cannot be called a human value. It is a humane value, but not necessarily a value for every human—as Human Rights claims to be. As a matter of fact, Human Rights comes as a corrective to the former exclusive rights of the whites, the Believers, the Rich, the Brahmans, and others—without meaning to touch legitimate privileges in the traditional sense of the word. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights must be considered, at least in its intention, as a declaration with universal validity. To say that Human Rights are not universal would amount to saying that they are not human; they would cease to be Human Rights. The whole novelty of the Declaration lies precisely here, in the assertion that every human being, by the mere fact of being human, is endowed with inalienable rights that everybody should respect. In that sense we may have here something rather unique and revolutionary in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Here, indeed, we have the positive side of the individual vis-à-vis the person. Every single human being in its individuality, by the very fact of being born, has a dignity and rights equal to any other. It is not one’s place in society, or degree of civilization, or intellectual, mores, or religious endowment that counts. Certainly, limits will immediately appear: you may be subnormal or abnormal, and not only physically, but also morally—or, others would also add, intellectually or religiously. But the naked fact of being born is the universal symbol on which Human Rights is based. From this point of view, the claim to universality of Human Rights has found a solid basis. Paradoxically enough, the Christian origin of this belief has been the cause of some of its degradation, that is, when it became an ideology, a doctrine to serve the interests of one particular group. Everybody is born free and equal; all human beings are equal in the sight of God; every human person has the same rights as any other. Nonetheless, in order to justify the fact that the unbaptized, or the Negro or slave or female or whoever, did not have the same rights, one was compelled to claim that they were not fully human beings, as history has cruelly witnessed. No. Because each culture expresses its experience of reality and of the humanum in concepts and symbols that are proper to that tradition and are as such not universal, and most likely not universalizable. This relationship between truth and the expression of truth in concepts and symbols is one of the most central philosophical problems. Truth has the inbuilt claim to be universally valid, here and there, yesterday and tomorrow, for you and for me. Yet my grasping and formulating it cannot sustain the same claim without charging all the others who do not agree with me with stupidity or wickedness. Hence the necessary via media between agnostic relativism and dogmatic absolutism. This is what can be called relativity. Our particular case is a typical example of the pars pro toto: from the optic of the inside, it looks like the whole; from the outside, it looks like a part, a fragment. Similarly, Human Rights are universal from the vantage point of modern Western culture, and not universal from the outside looking in. Now, if we take from the

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inside pars pro toto, are we able to take from the outside the totum in parte? Can another culture see in the Human Rights issue a universal language? Or should we say that it is only one way of looking at things, one way of speaking? The answer that claims to discover the totum in parte is appealing, but not convincing. This is the temptation of the intellectual who senses that any affirmation has the inbuilt tendency to be universally valid—or of the politician who, having neither the time nor the inclination to engage in such reflections, would like to see the totum in the parte of his party. But then we tend to become the selfappointed judges of all humankind. Now philosophy, being a situated reflection, makes us aware that nobody has direct access to the universal range of human experience. We can only indirectly and through a limited perspective come to know the totality. Even were we to know all the existing human opinions, ours would amount to just another opinion. One cannot view the totum except in and through one’s own window. This is the case not only because the whole is more than the sum of its parts, but also because the totum does not exist independently from the parte through which it is seen. It is only seen in and through the respective parte, and there is no stance from which one could proceed to the integration of all the parts. Coexistence is only possible on a common ground, a co-esse recognized by the different parties. Here lies the crux. We cannot but aim at the totum, and yet we often forget that all we see is the pars, which we then take pro toto. If a Christian, to put another example, were to say that Christ is not the universal savior, according to accepted custom, he or she would cease to be a Christian. But a non-Christian should not and cannot agree with this. It is only in mutual dialogue that their respective views will change or evolve. Christ will be for the Christian the symbol of totality; for the non-Christian, only the symbol of the Christians. Myriad examples from the past, especially regarding the West, are all too striking for one not to be wary of the danger of repeating what was done in the name of the one God, the one Empire, the one Religion, and what is nowadays being done under the aegis of the one Science and the one Technology. In brief, we need a new hermeneutic: the diatopical hermeneutic that can only be developed in a dialogical dialogue. This would show us that we must take neither the pars pro toto, nor believe that we see the totum pro parte, when we are aware of the pars pro toto—which is obviously what we will retort right back. This is the human condition, and I would not consider it to be an imperfection. This, again, is the topic of the pluralism. Let us consider now an example of a different perspective without attempting to present any homeomorphic equivalent.

AN INDIAN REFLECTION The word “Indian” here has no political connotations. It does not refer to the “nation” with the third largest Islamic population in the world, but to the traditional Hindu, Jain, and Buddhist conceptions of reality. Dharma (dhamma) is perhaps the most fundamental word on the Indian tradition that could lead us to the discovery of a possible homeomorphic symbol corresponding to the Western notion of “Human Rights.” I am not advancing the

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idea that dharma is the homeomorphic equivalent of Human Rights. I am only indicating that a reflection at the level of dharma may help us find our footing on a common ground, so that we may know what we are looking for when we set out on our search for “Human Rights” in the classical Indian context. As is well known, the meaning of the word dharma is multivocal: besides element, data, quality, and origination, it means law, norm of conduct, character of things, right, truth, ritual, morality, justice, righteousness, religion, destiny, and many other things. It will not lead us anywhere to try to find an English common denominator for all these names, but perhaps etymology can show us the root metaphor underlying the many meanings of the word.20 Dharma is that which maintains, gives cohesion and thus strength to any given thing, to reality, and ultimately to the three worlds (triloka). Justice keeps human relations together; morality keeps oneself in harmony; law is the binding principle for human relations; religion is what maintains the universe in existence; destiny is that which links us with our future; truth is the internal cohesion of a thing; a quality is what pervades a thing with a homogeneous character; an element is the minimum consistent particle, spiritual or material; and the like. Now, a world in which the notion of dharma is central and nearly all pervasive is not concerned with finding the “right” of one individual against another or of the individual vis-à-vis society, but rather with assaying the dharmic (right, true, consistent, . . .) or adharmic character of a thing or an action within the entire theanthropocosmic complex of reality. Dharma is primordial. We cannot hope to understand it if we approach it with moral categories (cf. the case of the GXt7) or even epistemological ones. It embraces both the conflict and the resolution, both the ought and the ought not. There is no universal dharma above and independent of the svadharma, the dharma that is inherent in every being. And this svadharma is at the same time a result of and a reaction to the dharma of everyone else. The starting point here is not the individual, but the whole complex concatenation of the Real. In order to protect the world, for the sake of the protection of this universe, says Manu, He, Svayambhu, the Self-existent, arranged the castes and their duties.21 Dharma is the order of the entire reality, that which keeps the world together.22 The individual’s duty is to maintain his “rights”; it is to find one’s place in relation to Society, to the Cosmos, and to the transcendent world. It is obvious from these brief paragraphs that here the discourse on “Human Rights” would take on an altogether different character. It would distract us from the purpose of this article to look now for the homeomorphic equivalent of Human Rights in a culture pervaded with the conception of dharma. We adduce this Indian example only to be able to elaborate in a fuller way the question of our title. Only one submission and one observation may be allowed here so as not to leave this thought incomplete. I submit that the homeomorphic equivalent is svadharma, and I make the observation that the homeomorphic equivalent does not mean the corresponding counterpart, as if all that is conveyed by Human Rights is also borne by svadharma or vice versa. Cultures are wholes, and do not fit into one-to-one correspondences. In order to have a just society, the modern West stresses the notion of Human Rights. In order to have a dharmic order, classical India stresses the notion of svadharma.

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We shall now attempt to formulate without further development some reactions to the Western discourses on Human Rights from this Indian perspective. We should add immediately that this Indian critique does not imply that the Indian model is better, or that Indian culture has been faithful to its fundamental intuition—as the existence of the outcastes and the degeneration of the caste system sufficiently prove. In confrontation and dialogue with the Western model, the Indian critique would stress fundamentally that Human Rights should not be absolutized. It would contest that one can speak of Human Rights as “objective” entities standing on their own in isolation from the rest of the Real. This is what seems to be implied in the very first article of the Declaration: “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.” Particular rights, privileges resulting from a special position in society (i.e., a relativization of rights) do not seem to be compatible with this article. Developing this point, the Indian vision would insist on the following points among others: 1. Human Rights are not individual Human Rights only. The humanum is not incarnated in the individual only. The individual as such is an abstraction, and an abstraction as such cannot be an ultimate subject of rights. As we have already indicated, the individual is only the knot in and of the net of relationships that form the fabric of the Real. The knots may individually be all the same (either jXva, 7tman, or an7tman), but it is mainly their position in the net that determines the set of “rights” an individual may have. Individuality is not a substantial category, but a functional one. The structure of the universe is hierarchical, but this does not imply that the higher echelons have the right to trample upon the rights of the lower ones—in spite of the dangers of this happening the moment the harmony of the whole is disturbed. I am not entering into the merits or demerits of this world view. We should however bear in mind that this conception is intimately linked with the conception of karma, and thus should not be evaluated outside its proper context. 2. Human Rights are not Human only. They concern equally the entire cosmic display of the universe, from which even the gods are not absent. The animals, all the sentient beings, and the supposedly inanimate creatures are also involved in the interaction concerning “human” rights. Man is a peculiar being, to be sure, but neither alone nor so essentially distinct. One could even ask whether there are specific human rights, or if this specificity is again only an abstraction for pragmatic reasons that defeats its own purpose the moment we forget its merely practical character. Here again, another cosmology and another theology provide the justification for this conception. Whether modern India, accepting and adopting modern science as it is, will be able to maintain this conception for very long is another matter altogether. But we know also about the persistence of mythical patterns. 3. Human rights are not rights only. They are also duties, and both are interdependent. Humankind has the “right” to survive only insofar as it performs the duty of maintaining the world (lokasamgraha). We have the “right” to eat only inasmuch as we fulfill the duty of allowing ourselves to be eaten by a

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hierarchically higher agency. Our right is only a participation in the entire metabolic function of the universe. We should have, if anything, a declaration of universal rights and duties in which the whole of Reality would be encompassed. Obviously, this demands not only a different anthropology but also a different cosmology and an altogether different theology—beginning with its name. That only human beings and not animals could make this declaration would invalidate it only to the same extent that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights could be contested because the Nagas and the Masai did not take part in the discussion and framing of the Declaration. 4. Human Rights are not mutually isolatable. They are related not only to the whole cosmos and all their corresponding duties; they form, among themselves as well, a harmonious whole. It is for this reason that a material list of definitive Human Rights is not theoretically feasible. It is the universal harmony that ultimately counts. This is not invalidated by the fact that India, as so many other countries, knows the codification of laws. India suffers, perhaps more than most countries, from legalistic minutiae, precisely because no juridical legislation will ever suffice.23 5. Human rights are not absolute. They are intrinsically relative, they are relationships among entities. Moreover, these entities are determined by the relationship themselves. To say that my human value depends on my position in the universe would be a caricature of what has been said if we start by thinking of an individual in itself, whose dignity is then made to depend on whether he or she is rich or poor, of one caste or another. The classical Indian vision would not subscribe to this—in spite of the failures of the system in the praxis and even the degeneration in time—but it would start from a holistic conception and then define a portion of Reality by function of its situation in the totality. In a certain sense, the knot is nothing—because it is the whole net. 6. Both systems (the Western and the Hindu) make sense from and within a given and accepted myth. Both systems imply a certain kind of consensus. When that consensus is challenged, a new myth must be found. The broken myth is the situation in India today, as it is in the world at large. That the rights of individuals are conditioned only by their position in the net of Reality can no longer be admitted by the contemporary mentality. Nor does it seem to be admissible that the rights of individuals are so absolute as not to depend at all on the particular situation of the individual. In short, there is at present no endogenous theory capable of unifying contemporary societies, and no imposed or imported ideology can be simply substituted for it. A mutual fecundation of cultures is a human imperative of our times. The Declaration defends the individual from the abuses of the State or Society. The Indian view would say that we are part of a harmonious whole on pilgrimage toward a nonhistorical goal. Interactions are the very warp and woof of the universe. Cultural and religious traditions offer a whole that cannot easily be dismembered without doing violence to their insights. Hindu karma outside its context may become fatalistic. Christian charity outside its system may turn oppressive. The universalization of Human Rights is a very delicate question indeed.

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CONCLUSION Is the concept of Human Rights a Western conception? Yes. Should the world then renounce declaring or enforcing Human Rights? No. Three qualifications, however, are necessary. 1. For an authentic human life to be possible within the megamachine of the modern technological world, Human Rights are imperative. This is because the development of the notion of Human Rights is bound up with and given its meaning by the slow development of that megamachine. How far individuals or groups or nations should collaborate with this present-day system is another question altogether. But in the contemporary political arena as defined by current socioeconomic and ideological trends, the defense of Human Rights is a sacred duty. Yet it should be remembered that to introduce Human Rights (in the definite Western sense, of course) into other cultures before the introduction of techniculture would amount not only to putting the cart before the horse, but also to preparing the way for the technological invasion—as if by a Trojan horse, as we have already said. And yet a technological civilization without Human Rights amounts to the most inhuman situation imaginable. The dilemma is excruciating. This makes the two following points all the more important and urgent. 2. Room should be made for other traditions to develop and formulate their homeomorphic views corresponding to or opposing Western “rights.” Or rather, these other world traditions should make room for themselves, since no one else is likely to make it for them. This is an urgent task: otherwise, it will be impossible for non-Western cultures to survive, let alone offer viable alternatives or even a sensible complement. Here the role of a cross-cultural philosophical approach is paramount. The need for human pluralism is often recognized in principle, but not often practiced, not only because of the dynamism that drives the paneconomic ideology, linked with the megamachine, to expand all over the world, but also because viable alternatives are not yet theoretically worked out. 3. An intermediary space should be found for mutual critique that strives for mutual fecundation and enrichment. Perhaps such an interchange may help bring forth a new myth and eventually a more humane civilization. The dialogical dialogue appears as the unavoidable method. Perhaps a suggestion here may prove helpful. Playing on the metaphor of the knots (individuality) and the net (personhood), we could probably affirm that traditional cultures have stressed the net (kinship, hierarchical structure of society, the function to be performed, the role of each part in relation to the whole), so that often the knot has been suffocated and not allowed sufficient free space for its own self-identity. On the other hand, modernity stresses the knot (individual free will to choose any option, the idiosyncrasies of everyone, the atomization of society) so that often the knot has been lost in loneliness, alienated by its own social mobility, and wounded (or killed) in competition with other more powerful knots. Perhaps the notion of personhood as the interplay between the knots and the net, as well as the realization that freedom is not just the capacity

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to choose between given options but also the power to create options, could provide a starting point for the proposed mutual fecundation. If many traditional cultures are centered on God, and some other cultures are basically cosmocentric, the culture that has come up with the notion of Human Rights is decisively anthropocentric. Perhaps we may now be prepared for a cosmotheandric vision of reality in which the Divine, the Human, and the Cosmic are integrated into a whole, more or less harmonious according to the performance of our truly human rights.

Acknowledgment This article appeared originally in Diogenes, no. 120 (Winter 1982), pp. 75–102. Reprinted with permission. This paper is an expanded and revised version of the presentation at the “Entretiens de Dakar,” Senegal, to the annual session of the Institut International de Philosophie on Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights, a summary of which will appear in the Proceedings.

NOTES 1. Cf. probably the first symposium of its kind convened by UNESCO at Bangkok in December 1979, Meeting of Experts on the Place of Human Rights in Cultural and Religious Traditions, where nine major schools of religious thought discussed the issue and recognized “that many of them have not paid sufficient attention to human rights . . . (And that) it is a task for the different religions of the world to deepen and eventually to enlarge and/or reformulate the urgent and important issue of human rights” (S 116 g of the Final Report SS79/CONF. 607/10 of February, 6, 1980). The entire report is worth reading. 2. By diatopical hermeneutics I understand a thematic reflection on the fact that the loci (topoi) of historically unrelated cultures make it problematic to understand one tradition with the tools of another, and the hermeneutical attempt to bridge such gulfs. Cf. R. Panikkar, Myth, Faith and Hermeneutics (New York: Paulist Press, 1979), pp. 8 sq. 3. Cf. R. Panikkar, The Intrarelgious Dialogue (New York: Paulist Press, 1978), p. xxii. The two words Harham and God, for instance, are neither analogous nor merely equivocal (nor univocal, of course). They are not exactly equivalent either. They are homeomorphic. They perform a certain type of respectively corresponding function in the two different traditions where these words are alive. 4. I shall capitalize Human Rights when these words have the particular meaning derived from this “Universal Declaration.” 5. The dates to recall are December 10, 1948—Proclamation in Paris of the Universal Declaration November 4, 1950—Adoption in Rome of the Convention safeguarding Human Rights and fundamental freedoms, known as “The European Convention on Human Rights” March 20, 1952— Adoption in Paris of the first additional Protocol to this Convention December 16, 1966—International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Optional Protocol (to the latter—not passed unanimously) 6. For the astounding documents of the first nine Christian centuries, cf. the collection and translation with insightful introduction by H. Rainer, Kirche und Staat (Munich: Kosel, 1961). The first edition in 1943 during World War II, with the title Abenlandische Kirchenfeihiet, is in itself a document for Human rights.

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Because it is less well known than the Magna Carta of King John of England in 1215, let us mention King Alfonso IX of Leon in 1188 with his rights to life, honor, home, and property. Interesting also is the statement and justification of Francisco de Victoria in 1538: “Cuando los subditos tengan conciencia de la injusticia de la guerra, no les es licito ir a ella, sea que se equivoquen o no” (emphasis mine) (De los indios o del derech de la guerra, II, 23, ed. BAC [Madrid, 1960], p. 831). (“When its subjects are aware of the injustice of a war, it is not lawful for them to go to it, whether they are in error or not.”) And the reason he gives is to quote Romans 14:23: “omne quod non est ex fide peccatum est,” which he translates as “todo lo que no es segun conciencia es peccado” (De los indios o del derech de la guerra, II, 23, ed. BAC [Madrid, 1960], p. 831, emphasis added). The Pauline passage is usually rendered as “Whatever does not come from faith is sin.” Victoria’s variation reads: “Whatever is not in accordance with one’s conscience is a sin.” Cf. the Thomistic principle that the rational being that is Man has to follow his or her personal conscience in order to act morally. 7. Just as a memorandum, we may recall these dates: 1689—Bill of Rights (England) 1776—Virginia Bill of Rights 1789—(August 26)—Déclaration des droits de l’homme at du citoyen 1798—American Bill of Rights 8. The Paris document is a declaration, a manifest statement making clear what is already there, an explication (declarare, to make clear – from dK-cl7r7re. Cf. cl7rus, clear, but also loud [clamor]). It is not a law, a superimposition, a human creation, but rather the recognition or discovery of something intrinsic to the nature of the thing; in this case, it is “the inherent dignity and equal and inalienable rights of all the members of the human family,” as the Preamble to the 1948 Declaration says. 9. This practical a-theism and even practical ignorance of any ulterior philosophical issue or religious factor became patent in the presentation and discussion of the Bangkok Conference mentioned above, let alone in the more official meetings where Philosophy and Religion have hardly a voice. 10. Cf. R. Panikkar, “Singularity and Individuality: The Double Principle of Individuation,” Revue international de philosophie XIX, 1–2.111–12 (1975), pp. 141–66, where it is argued that the ontic status of human individuals is basically different from that of all other individual entities; in short, that we cannot treat human individuals as we could peanuts or cattle, by a merely numerical individuality. 11. “The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government” (Art. 21, 3 of the Declaration). 12. “In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society” (Art. 29, 2 of the Declaration; emphasis of the problematic words added). 13. We do not include here a fourth source of dissent, namely the political, because the argument in such cases bears mainly on different interpretations of facts, emphases, and factors other than those related to the nature of Human Rights. Cf. as a single example: Colloques de Riyad, de Paris, du Vatican, de Genève et de Strasbourg sur le dogme musulman et les droits de l’homme en Islam, Riyad, Ministere de la Justice (Beirut, Dar Al Kitab Allubhani, 1974), and David Sidorsky, ed., Essays on Human Contemporary Issues and Jewish Perspectives (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1979). 14. “Human rights, in short, are statements of basic needs and interests” (Stanley I. Benn, The Encyclopedia of Philosophy [New York: Macmillan, 1967], s.v. “Rights,” speaking about the UN Declaration).

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15. Cf. K. Marx, Zur Judenfrage I, p. 352. 16. “Keine Rechte ohne Pflichten, keine Pflichten ohne rechte,” Marx-Engels, Werke XVI, 521 apud , in G. Klaus, and M. Buhr, Philosophisches Wörterbuch (Leipzig: VEB, 1976), s.v. “Menschenrecthe.” 17. Cf. R. Panikkar, “Aporias in the Comparative Philosophy of Religion,” Man in World, XIII.3–4 (1980), pp. 357–83. 18. Tao Te Ching, 2:22. 19. The M7navadharma{7stra (2–4) puts the same idea in a more sophisticated way: To act from a desire for reward is reprehensible. Yet without that desire, no action is possible. Laws are needed to put order into those human actions. 20. A recent example: A Catholic missionary, after over a year of really living together with an Asian tribe and sharing with the people their respective beliefs, thinks that the moment has come for some formal conversions, since they are already practically Christians. He talks matters over with the enthusiasts about Christianity: “Would you like to become officially and publicly Christians? You are already convinced . . .” and so on. Answer: “No, because some other people in the tribe are not ready.” “But it is your right!” says the missionary. “You have the right to decide by yourselves—all the more since you neither harm nor despise the others.” The answer is cutting: “We only have the right to take this step if the whole tribe does it.” 21. From the root dhr, to hold, to maintain, keep together. Cf. Latin tenere and English tenet. 22. Manu, I, 31 and I, 87. 23. Cf. the famous lokasamgraha of the GXt7, and the well known definition of the Mah7bh7rata: “that which maintains and sustains the peoples” (Karnaparvam, LXIX, 59). A recent example may illuminate the issue: In July 1981, the Indian nation was in an uproar because some 352 outcastes of the small village of Minashipuram in Tamilnadu had converted to Islam, probably in protest and reaction against their ostracism (to say the least) from the Hindu caste-communities. For our point, it is interesting to remark that HH, Sri Vishveshva Tirtha Swamiji of Pejavar Mutt along with many other Hindu religious leaders could for obviously political and opportunistic reasons—raise their voices against untouchability and discrimination without paying attention to the M7navadharma{7stra (III, 92, 150, 157; IV, 79, 213; IX, 238–39; etc.) and other sacred laws sanctioning the system. Cf. the Indian press from May to August 1981 (e.g., The Hindu from Madras, May 26; July 15, 16, 18, 28, 29, 30; August 2; etc.).

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Part II Individual Religions and Human Rights

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CHAPTER 10

What Gives a Person Worth? A Zoroastrian View Nikan H. Khatibi

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hat gives a person worth? Many use their religious viewpoints to determine their answer to this question. My belief is that each person has equal worth because each person was created equally by God. If my religious principles do not express this belief adequately or if there is some other framework others use in their determination of a person’s worth, be it a national or personal viewpoint, then people in this world are in danger of being seen as less than human or as good-doers (or bad-doers) who must earn their worth in the world. This good to be achieved is often national or religious, and so creating religious and national borders to distance people comes from a wrong view of people to begin with. From a Zoroastrian perspective, our responsibility as a community is to put the individual’s value first and foremost, and then proceed with dialogue across borders in the hopes of sustaining peace within the human brotherhood. The similarities and differences between individual and societal preferences are based on our subjective judgments. In many societies, for example, many would judge men as more capable in many areas of work than women. This is because of the fact that a society places more value on certain kinds of products and services that men traditionally have been placed in charge of providing. These extrinsic, social viewpoints tend to foster social judgments about the intrinsic values of individual human beings. So if such judgments of worth can be made in such ways within one’s own religion or society, and the more dissimilar those outside our religion or society are to ourselves, the more likely we are to make black-andwhite judgments about the outsiders’ intrinsic value as human beings. This can be seen practically applied in many religions today. Many use extrinsic differences they see in other religions as a barometer for that religion’s spiritual worth. As a result, one religion may believe or even declare itself superior to another group. This can also be seen in everyday life. A homeless person on the street may be judged by some to be less religious than a wealthy banker simply because of external attributes. In such an example, we would be judging a person’s spirituality by his or her apparent success or appearance, and by so doing, we would be acting as superior judges, a position reserved for God alone. Furthermore, throughout the world, people of all different religions believe that the only way to reach God is through their religion and thus often see the

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nonbelievers as subhuman. Institutionalized religions have consistently succumbed to believing that their ordained path is the only true path, as founded on their exclusive belief system. This can be seen in certain strands of Christianity and Islam. Christians believe that the only way to heaven is through Jesus Christ; Muslims believe Mohammad is their path. People from both sides use this as a way of putting themselves “higher” than others, when in fact, differences in religious viewpoints should be respected, celebrated, and allowed to coexist harmoniously. So what can we do to stop the belief in religious superiority? The Zoroastrian religion, with its unique history, illustrates the fundamental connectedness of the world’s religious traditions to support the view that religions are different paths to the same Reality. Prophet Zoroaster was the first to propound the freedom of choice for human beings and to affirm that human beings are entitled to the beliefs of their choice so long as they pursue the path of peaceful existence. Let us use Zoroaster’s example of promoting freedom of choice to formulate a solution for a peaceful society. Let us go to our respective communities and share with one another the importance of respecting, and more importantly, celebrating each other’s diversity and equality. Let us learn to coexist harmoniously. Only once we accept each other’s equality, each other’s value in life, can we say we are at peace with one another. Only then can we say, “Yes, we are all of equal worth.”

CHAPTER 11

Women and Human Rights: The Status of Women in the Smxti Texts of Hinduism Abha Singh

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iterally, the word smxti means recollection. It signifies “a record of tradition that was based on Vedas (´sruti).” As a compilation of approved rules and customs, promulgated at different times by or under the sanction of eminent sages, these texts enjoy the status of authority among the Hindus. In a way, these texts serve as a guide to the Hindu society with regard to religious and mundane matters. Hindu society was basically hierarchical. As a result, the thrust of smxti texts appears to help one fulfill the goal of one’s birth.1 So these texts provide a comprehensive code of conduct for each and every person in society. This chapter is an attempt to examine the status of Hindu women against the backdrop of the smxti texts.2 Smxti texts were compiled, broadly, in the period ranging between the Vedic era and Buddhist era. Scores of the texts are available. However, three of these— Manusmxti, Y7jñavalkyasmxti, and Par7{arasmxti—were quite prominent. Among the three, Manusmxti, in particular, has held a position of preeminence since its dicta have influenced the lives and ideals of Hindus down the ages. Manusmxti has been compared in its extent and thoroughness to that of Confucius in China. The paramount position of Manusmxti among Indian literature is based on the fact that this ethical work deals more with civil matters than any other work. Since Manusmxti has had the utmost influence on the social order of Hindus, we shall concentrate on it.

CONTEXT The main context of description of any smxti text is social morality. In congruence with {ruti (Vedas), smxtis present their picture of social morality blended with ritualism. Although ritualism pervades the entire outlook of Hindu religious texts, the basic thrust appears to be the stability of the social organization and the advocacy of a social morality that would be conducive to it. To be clearer, Hindu

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seers presupposed the world as meaningful. Therefore, by the performance of rituals and through the fulfillment of social obligations, one can achieve one’s ultimate goal. It would not be out of place to mention here that morality comprises the legitimacy of the pursuit of one’s self-interest, as it concedes that there is no conflict between the good of the individual and that of the society. Nevertheless, Hindu seers did not discuss morality as a separate discipline. Still, their concern for the sociomoral life of the individual and of society undeniably put them on the high pedestal of law givers (smxtik7ras). The basic precept of morality is that it is relative to time and space. Hindu social morality is also relative, but in a wider spectrum. In addition to time (yuga) and space (de{a), the Hindu concept of morality is also relative to one’s varha (class), stage of life (7{rama), and sex (ligga). This is for the reason that women of all the four varhas of Hinduism (br7hmaha, k}atriya, vai{ya, and {udra) are treated as a class apart. Hence, their duties and virtues have been depicted quite differently from those of men. Since smxtis aim at presenting guidelines for the entire life of human beings, including religion, morality, culture, and sociolegal aspects, it would not be an exaggeration to state that the morality rendered by smxti (dharma{7stra) is essentially social in character. One should remember the fact that the status of morality in a society can be determined by dissecting the treatment it imparts to its weaker class and sex. In this case, as mentioned earlier, the weaker sex (i.e., women) is under the scanner. Against this backdrop, an attempt has been made to document, in detail, the account of the status of women in smxti texts in a society that was on the threshold of Vedic and Buddhist India. It seems extremely difficult to construct a picture of women in the age of smxtis because initially these texts were passed over verbally, and they were documented much later. Lest we forget, no tall claims can be made, and in this regard, one needs to be cautious and careful. However, the influence of smxti texts on Hindu society makes one depend on that influence to a large extent, and it gives a fairly authentic picture of women in that age. Still, one of the more important features of the Vedic texts—of which smxtis comprise a synthesis—is the large number of female deities such as U}7, R7tri, PrithvX, SarasvatX, Kuhu, R7k7, SinXv7li, and many others. The religion of people reflects their mental framework. If so, then a religion that respects and worships so many female deities provides a clear image of people who respect and honor women. But at the same time, we find that smxtis have an ambivalent attitude toward women. As regards worldly pleasures, women are seen as obstacles in the path of spiritual quest. But in the view of dharma (comprehending both religion and morality), women are seen as wives and mothers, and are well respected.

NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD WOMEN The entire gamut of the existence of women in smxti texts is based on the theory of bXja-k}etra-ny7ya.3 Man-woman relationships have been explained through this analogy. Indian literature takes recourse to various analogies in order to explain complex concepts. This literary model, which was used for the purpose of easing the day-to-day functioning of life, was in due course believed

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to be a scientific truth. Thereupon, the metaphor became a tool to justify the supremacy of men over women. The dichotomy of man and woman where the two were presumed to be unequal was manifested through the bXja-k}etrany7ya. Nevertheless, it was used by smxtik7ras to underline the significance of woman’s contribution to biological reproduction. In a way, these smxtik7ras helped proclaim a morality based on hierarchy. For women, there is a code of conduct in terms of strX dharma (i.e., duty of women) that gave women a subordinate status in personal and social life. Hence, all activity, be it concerning literature, art, lawmaking, rituals, or the practice of medicine or politics, echoes the basic prejudice that women are lesser beings. Smxtik7ras adopted various ways of glorifying the prescribed and condemning the unwanted and unexpected. These glorifications and condemnations were, in fact, subtle ways of control and exploitation. In bXja-k}etra-ny7ya, the word bXja means “seeds” or “semen,” whereas k}etra means “field” or “land.” In the said metaphor, k}etra depicts woman. It is held that woman acts as a nourishing agent for the growth of a seed. On the other hand, man is called a seed that has the power to reproduce its own kind.4 Analyzing the concept of bXja-k}etra-ny7ya, Manu, the author of Manusmxti, comprehends three possibilities. First, one may give importance to bXja, some others may regard k}etra as prominent, and still others may hold both bXja and k}etra to be equally important.5 Manu holds that normally a seed sown in a defective field gets destroyed without giving any result. A field without the seed being sown into it is simply barren land. Still, the seed is given greater importance because it is only because of the influence of good seed that even a person born in tiryagyoni (i.e., animal species) could also become a seer simply by being an offspring of a worthy seed.6 The above view, which projects man at the helm of affairs, implies that in Manusmxti the relation between man and woman is never taken to be a relation between two equals. A woman has no identity, and she also is not supposed to have one. The identity she is supposed to have is conferred on her by males with whom she is associated. This particular articulation of bXja-k}etra-ny7ya influenced the social life of Hindus in such a way that even after hundreds of years, it is projected in the treatment meted out to the women even in contemporary India. BXja-k}etra-ny7ya trivialized the status of women to such an extent that women were forced to spend their lives giving birth to children. A woman was expected to take care of her children until they were grown up. She was sandwiched between training children for their roles and doing household work. Like barren land, a woman who was unable to bear children was thought to be useless. It was thought natural for the husband of such a woman to go to another woman. Consequently, a sharp boundary line and division of labor between domestic and public life was drawn. Obviously, domestic life (held as secondary in importance) was part and parcel of woman’s world. Disparities arose right at birth: a son was seen as a rescuing boat, and a daughter as a sorrow. Almost all rituals, especially the funeral rites, were essentially supposed to be performed by the son. Rites and rituals, to a large extent, contributed to the devaluation of woman in Hindu society. “The importance of the sons grew with the importance of obsequial rites which were supposedly essential to ensure man’s eschatological destiny, and which could be performed only by sons.”7 Shakuntala Rao Shastry observes that the growing importance of

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sons in funeral rites resulted in a proportional devaluation of women in Vedic and post-Vedic society: The imperative necessity of a son who could offer oblations dominated the whole sphere of thought. . . . Women who hitherto had a share in the intellectual and religious field, came to be considered as having no purpose in life except that of being the mothers of sons.8

Manu contends that men of three upper classes—br7hmahas, k}atriyas, and vai{yas—are twice born.9 Their second birth is attributed to the initiation ceremony. The detailed exposition of the said ceremony enlightens the reader regarding the importance of these ceremonies for the male child.10 But there is no such provision for the girl child. As so, the female child is called “once born.” Manu, showing his magnanimity toward women, permits a few ceremonies for them.11 Still, he contends that these ceremonies should be performed without the recitation of Vedic mantras.12 Manu strongly holds that since women cannot recite Vedic mantras, they are essentially impure and sinful. It seems that the idea of ritualistic impurity, from which women were supposed to suffer for certain periods of their lives, was used to emphasize the impurity and inferior status of women. Hence, women were degraded to the status of the once born, or {udras (fourth and the lowest class of the society). The lumping together of women and {udras implicitly presupposes the prejudice that a woman has no mind and hence no capacity to think. She is like a slave, and a male is like a master. Just as a slave does not have an independent wish, a woman also cannot act according to her wish. Apropos of the master-slave relationship, the man-woman relationship was shaped so thoroughly that it was natural for man to rule his wife—exactly the way a despot ruled or dominated his subjects. It appears that to enslave others and to become a slave was the way of life in those early years. The following expression is a classic example of such morality: “It is not the horse, not the elephant, not the tiger that should be sacrificed but the goat because even fate does not favour those that are weak.”13 A woman has to follow the duties that are prescribed by the man. The moral code of conduct, which is supposed to be followed religiously apropos of the ancient Indian law, looks upon a woman as the property of a man. Manusmxti, as well as other smxtis, state that it is the woman’s duty to give sexual satisfaction to the male and procreate. Laziness, fickleness, and lying are described as the natural, inborn characteristics of women in the Manusmxti.14 Speaking further, of course derogatively, Manu describes women as naturally lustful and ever ready to seduce men. For him, women have an insatiable passion for men, so much so that they are not even bothered by who their partner is. Women are frivolous, heartless, and full of untruth and malice.15 Hence, Manu contends that a husband must carefully guard his wife. Various lawmakers and authors of epics and Pur7has, toeing the line with Manu’s views, unanimously hold that a woman must never be left independent. It is emphasized that she always has to be under the control and protective guardianship of her father, husband, or son.16 All this suggests a thoroughly dependent and slavelike existence for women. The plight of woman continued in marriage. Early Aryans were apparently not very particular about sexual mores. Later on, in the Vedic period itself, Aryans

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seemingly became unyielding regarding the virginity of women, which led to the establishment of the marriage institution. Thenceforth, marriage received the status of a religious sacrament. The primal male-female relationship was transformed into a social tie and emotional bond. In this way, Vedic seers thus saved women from being reduced to nothing more than sex machines. The Vedas offered respect and honor to women through marriage. Women reciprocated by becoming extra careful in performing various roles assigned to them. As a result, the puritanical Hindu society in the period of dharma{7stra became more rigid toward the said institution. In the smxti texts, we find descriptions of eight kinds of marriages.17 Several kinds of progenies also are discussed, albeit many of them are offspring of extramarital unions. The importance of marriage is further emphasized by the fact that the concerned parties must scrutinize the lineage (kula), conduct, and additional qualities of each other. In other words, ancestry, health, and family history must be thoroughly examined. Mating should be made only between those parties who have no physical defects, no trace of heritable disease, and no health problems. It was also emphasized that the bride must be younger than the groom. For Manu, a bride belonging to even a wealthy family must be rejected if the family is one in which religious rites have been neglected, and the Veda is not recited. If in a marriage a male child is not born, the husband can remarry. Since the object of marriage is to carry on the male line, Manu recommends the rejection of a girl who has no brother; for Manu, there is a risk of her being made a putrik7 or of her son being taken by her father (the son’s grandfather) as his son, or whose father is not known.18 Apparently smxtik7ras legitimized such issues through these classifications.19 There is a serious discussion as to whom such children belong: to the biological father or the husband of the mother?20 It appears that in the smxti period, Hindu society was not very rigid or particular about sexual mores, and a considerable amount of promiscuity in sex relations was tolerated in the society. Niyoga (levirate, or compulsory marriage) was allowed not only in the case of childless widows, but women also practiced it with an impotent husband as well.21 Although, on the one hand, almost all smxtik7ras had accepted such relations, at the same time most of them disapproved of them, which appears to be a mockery of rational thinking. While clearly admitting the custom of niyoga, Manu goes to the extent of condemning it as immoral and against the duty (dharma) of the wife to remain loyal to her husband throughout her life and even in death.22 The Hindu ideal of extreme loyalty to one’s husband (pativrata dharma) is probably the most important factor responsible for the total suppression and subjugation of women. Smxtik7ras never tired of listing the duties of wives toward their husbands. Hindu thinkers of that age unanimously declared that service to husband is the only duty of a wife. To emphasize the importance of such service, they vehemently asserted that only by scrupulously performing that “supreme duty” would she be able to achieve heaven.23 A woman’s life is insignificant; she should sacrifice her life for the good of her husband.24 While remaining totally obedient and loyal to her husband, she should worship him as a god, even if he is full of blemishes.25 Even after widowhood she was to remain loyal to him, as there was no question of widow remarriage or the marriage of a deserted wife. In the absence or after the death of the husband, a woman was forced to live in total deprivation and strictest self-discipline.26

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As stated in the beginning, the act of procreation was heralded as a sacrifice. Since procreation was not possible without women, Hindu thinkers were forced to view them as partners in life. But the so-called mature brains condemned pleasure seeking since it appreciated the value of the idea of detachment, which entailed the condemnation of women as well. Women were perceived as the source of all temptations and as an obstruction in men’s quest for liberation. Men, seeking to overcome the sufferings of worldly life, preferred to control their women instead of controlling their minds. It was the shortcut and the easiest way to exonerate oneself of one’s pitfalls and shortcomings. Hence, the upper hand of man was manifested in the condemnation and despisement of woman.27 As a result, emphasis was placed on the chastity of women, which implied more restraint on their freedom and other rights. The marriage age of girls was constantly lowered to such an extent that a rather ridiculous norm came to prevail: that a girl should be married while she was still an infant (nagnik7). In addition, participation of women in social functions was prohibited, and they were, on the whole, reduced to the level of second-class citizens. The fact of the matter is that the condition of women deteriorated considerably over time, that is between the {ruti and smxti period and on. A bird’s eye view of {ruti texts reveals that, in the early days, Hindu women enjoyed considerable freedom and a respectable position in society. It appears that in the beginning women could perform at least some Vedic sacrifices and recite Vedic mantras. Gradually, these rights were denied to them, including the initiation ceremony. Additionally, the widespread practice of polygamy also seems to be responsible, to a considerable extent, for the devaluation of the position of women in society. We also find indications of the deplorable practice of giving several maids as gifts to an honored guest, or as dowry to a bridegroom.28 On the basis of above discussion, one may infer that in the smxti texts, by denying women’s independence, women were denied the basic value as a human being. They were deprived of personhood itself. This is a glaring example of transgression of social justice.

POSITIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD WOMEN The above discussion, which posits a grim picture of the status of women in smxti texts, is only one side of the coin. We come across several verses in these texts exhibiting the brighter side of women’s treatment. In other words, a positive approach toward women is found in almost all the texts from the Vedas to the dharma{7stras. Of course, in all these texts, the main field of work for woman was recognized to be the home and hearth, and in those affairs, she undoubtedly enjoyed maximum freedom and power. While blessing the bride, for example, one Vedic hymn says that she may rule over her husband’s household, including the parents-in-law and servants.29 As the central Hindu ethos, to a great extent, has continued to be Vedic, such positive sentiments are found in almost all later religious texts. Smxti texts, in general, declared women (of all the four classes) as worthy of protection. Manu regards the murder of woman on par with the murder of a br7hmaha or that of a child. It has been declared to be the greatest crime from which no redemption is possible.30

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Another positive note is that the male partner was held responsible for any adulterous relation, whereas the guilt of the female was minimized. Therefore, smxti texts prescribe very harsh punishment for men in the case of adultery. All men, except br7hmahas, were liable for capital punishment in cases of adultery with an unwilling partner.31 It was the duty of the king to protect the victim and return her to her family after she had performed the prescribed, so-called mild penance.32 Thereupon, even an adulterous woman was declared fit to be accepted by her family and society.33 The fallen woman must be given food and shelter.34 Manu and Y7jñavalkya, the author of Y7jñavalkyasmxti, appear to be more generous on this point since they clearly declare that a woman does not need any purificatory rite. She is always pure.35 Again, all the smxtis unanimously recognize the rights of women over their personal property.36 In this regard, the concept of strX-dhana (personal property of women) is already recognized. Of course, for smxtik7ras, the two sexes are complementary to each other, and their attraction is deeply rooted in their respective natures. Manu never intended to look down on k7ma (the domain of desire). He was only eager to voice safeguards against improper yearning for its urges. For him, unchecked sexual unions might lead to the lowering of a human being, and an unrestrained person might become a slave of desires. It is for this simple reason that celibacy was prescribed for a male student. Both men and women are expected to be united in wedlock without premarital sexual experience. In fact, the passages in the Manusmxti, which seem to condemn the nature of women, are in reality warnings against improper sex.37 Smrtik7ras never hesitated in admitting that it is a man’s world. Therefore, woman must live under the protection of men. Still, we come across passages of repeated admonitions for husbands, fathers, and sons to look after their female relations properly and keep them well satisfied.38 In a way, the emphasis on the duties of woman has been counterbalanced by the emphasis on the duties of man. Smrtik7ras point out that women are like the goddess Lakshmi, for they bring prosperity to the household. Manu says that women are essential for the welfare of the family. They give birth to children, bring them up, serve the elders of the family, and look after the entire household, as well as all the socioreligious customs. Moreover, a wife is a must for the proper fulfillment of a man’s religious duties.39 Polygamy was permitted and practiced by ancient Hindus, but it was always under compulsion. Certain conditions were stipulated under which a man was permitted to remarry. Hence, smxti texts were conscientious enough to safeguard the interests of the wife. Deserting a wife was declared a serious crime.40 The tears of dependent women blight a family. The grateful smiles of women make the fortune of the family blossom, while their curse withers the home. Moreover, the concept of mother symbolizes unselfish love, tender care, and willingness to sacrifice to the utmost. Hence, mothers are the most respected and loved persons in Hindu homes. A mother deserved greatest respect and was raised to the rank of divinity along with the teacher and the father. But the latter were placed immeasurably below her in the right to be loved and venerated.41 A mother was served properly, even if she had become a fallen woman.42 Regarding the denial of the initiation ceremony (upanayana, which symbolized the beginning of student life), these thinkers hold that the denial of it does

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not mean denial of a right to education for women. Women were supposed to obtain education without undergoing the rite.43 For Manu, marriage is the rite of initiation for women, and the contingent duties of living with the teacher and of tending the household fire, which a Brahmac7rX does, are fulfilled by the woman while serving her husband and attending to the domestic duties.44 Even some positive trend is evidenced in regard to the widows. Smxitikaras have never denied the existence of widows in the society. While discussing the ideal mode of conduct for a widow, rules were also formulated for a widow’s inheritance of family property in the absence of any male issue. Widows were even allowed to have a son through niyoga with a man appointed by the elders for the purpose. In a nutshell, there is no evidence of the ghastly custom of self-immolation of the widow (satX) in smxti texts. Apropos to the above explanation of the recognition of the worth of a woman in the family and, thereupon, in society, Hindu women developed immense moral strength and self-respect. History speaks of various legendary ladies who showed ready intelligence and a strong moral character in the hour of crises. Their character was an amalgamation of the conventional ideal of loyalty to one’s husband and a progressive outlook on life. They asserted themselves in all fields of society, be it a matter of right or duty, and above all in free choice in marriage.

OBSERVATIONS The attempt to understand the status of women requires the understanding of the social structure of that time that was pyramidal in nature, wherein women and {udras formed the base; that is, they were on the lowest level. The inequality and injustice in the society were inherent in the basic social structure itself. Women were considered lower among the lowest, as they were not supposed to have any specific varha. The woman’s varha, or class, used to be determined either by that of her father or her husband (a practice which is still prevalent). She was not considered to be able to pursue mok}a (liberation) since she was not eligible for sanny7s7{rama. Besides, she was not allotted any share in the wealth of her father or that of her husband. Smxtis enslaved the brains of women in such a way that they presumed that their nature is and should be according to such descriptions. Because of such hammering and brainwashing, either by the social structure or through literature, women became unaware and ignorant of their true selves. Smxtis have described the behavior of ideal woman with ample illustrations drawn from various sources. P7rvatX and S7vitrX symbolize total devotion to the husband, a virtue essential for an ideal woman. Framing woman as a weak creature and then advocating protection for her is showing her nothing but disrespect. The image of woman, in terms of an ideal housewife, brings out the enormous difficulties in concretizing the entirety of womanhood as such. It appears to be the greatest hindrance to the free development of women as human beings. A woman doesn’t find herself capable of anything except being a daughter, wife, or mother. In other words, her whole existence is for the man. This belief in her supposed unstable and irrational nature is prevalent in Hindu society to this day. Women with a refined self-awareness and stable state of mind have been and are still being

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oppressed by the institutions of family and society to such an extent that they even are compelled to destroy themselves. The psychology of man and woman has all along been dominated by the firm belief that the man is superior and, therefore, he must rule over the woman. As a mother, a woman was respected and is still respected, but as a wife, she is bashed even today. Various rituals and customs express this attitude. Even now, giving away one’s own daughter (kany7d7na) is considered to be a holy act that achieves great virtue (puhya) for her father. On the other hand, in certain tribal societies, the father actually sells his daughter, and the bridegroom has to pay the price for the girl. Both the options are based on the same proposition that woman has an instrumental value, be it the case of glorification or as a clear-cut exchange, such as in a barter system. Apropos to smxti texts, the son remains with his parents throughout life, while a girl is treated as an outsider since she is supposed to leave the house after the marriage. Such is the way life is lived in Hindu society. Such practice is clearly based upon the belief that a male child is the giver of seed, bXja-d7t7, and a creator of culture, while a girl is looked at as the field and a carrier of culture. Today, even after the passage of thousands of years, Hindu society is not free from the prejudice in which it became engulfed through the smxti texts that man is superior to woman. Although the democratic legal system puts every human being on the same platform and makes them equal, irrespective of sex, religion, or race, in actual practice this is rarely followed. Society is still male dominated, and people are afraid of losing their patriarchal status and modifying rights that are based on the superiority of the male. On the other hand, vast, illiterate populations of women are not ready to lose their so-called secure life and face the world. Neither of the two parties is ready to overcome the myth, realize reality, and evolve a new system that would transcend the ghost of {ruti and smxti culture. Hindu seers tried to overcome the prejudices regarding woman in the postsmxti era. They have suggested that, even within the male-dominated discourse, there is a possibility of progress in terms of a better attitude toward woman. In this regard, the temperament of two independent substances, Puru}a and Prakxti, in the S7gkhya system is suggestive. These two substances exhibit a form of manwoman relationship. Both Puru}a (man) and Prakxti (woman) have their own identities with distinctive qualities. Puru}a has consciousness and, therefore, knowledge, but Prakxti is devoid of it. Capacity to act is the distinctive quality of Prakxti. These two come together with the purpose of compensating the imperfections of each other. Puru}a is pure and free, and thereby does not undertake any activity. But because of his contact with Prakxti, he is dragged into the cycle of the phenomenal world. Puru}a does not act in spite of being conscious. Similarly, a man, by nature, is supposed to be superior. A woman is not supposed to possess intelligence. She is on par with unconscious inanimate objects, and her existence itself is of a lower level. The concept of Prakxti expresses the view that a woman lures and hypnotizes. Yet their coming together is governed by pragmatic considerations. Still, the recognition of Prakxti as an embodiment of existence shows the utility of considering the S7gkhya system. The relationship between Puru}a and Prakxti appears to be like that of the relationship between two equal beings. However, the qualities attributed to woman show that she has no identity of her

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own and lacks the power of decision making. Hence, in the S7gkhya philosophy, the independent status of women has not been fully asserted. The status of women achieved its pinnacle in the »7kta philosophy. According to the »7kta philosophy, the reality on which the existence of the world depends is both the formal and efficient cause of the world. The belief that there is a feminine element at the root of every creation is central to the »7kta philosophy. Lord »iva is also considered as the form of »akti. His mother is considered to be the mother of everything. By way of contrast with earlier Hindu thinking, in the »7kta philosophy, woman is neither inert nor like an animal, but is a living and intelligent agent. She is not the object of enjoyment, but, like man, she is an enjoyer. She helps in liberating the self and does not act as an obstruction to liberation. In fact, for the »7kta philosophers, realization of self is the result of the awakening of a power (»akti), which is called KundalinX. Therefore, in the »7kta philosophy, man and woman are on par with one another. Neither of them (although each has distinctive qualities) is either superior or inferior. This theory, which realizes the coexistence of man and woman, ultimately presents an epitome of human relationship. It explicitly expresses equality and, therefore, advocates peace. It is suggestive of a new way of life wherein women are granted equal footing with men and therefore respected.

CONCLUSION In the background of this detailed account of the positive and negative aspects of the status of women apropos of smxti texts, one can safely say that throughout the texts, women have been viewed as lesser beings. Hindu seers promulgated their code of conduct for woman with the basic presumption that man, by nature, is better informed, can counter violence, can provide a shield safety and can ensure security. Woman acquiesced in this, thinking that the difference in nature based on sex has ordained them for only the secondary, subservient roles, which are based on the expectations of men. Since secondary roles do not have a direct economic value, those who perform these roles are not counted as productive members of society. Hence, a woman’s value in her own eyes is much less than that of man. We can, therefore, understand why the life of woman was never valued highly in Hindu religion. Its worth depended on the convenience or contribution she could make to the man in the form of helping him realize his roles and satisfy his desires. Ever since the smxti age, women have always been deprived of power. Possession of power by a person implies that the person has the authority to discriminate. Not being vested with any power directly, women then do not possess the means of changing the situation and emancipating themselves physically, mentally, and emotionally since they never had access to resources that could support their efforts. Through a system of rewards and punishments, this power structure has been perpetuated down the ages. The second half of the last century witnessed great liberation movements on all fronts. The women’s liberation movement is one of them. But when seen from the point of view of Hindu women, it is clear they were offered certain concessions and privileges within the age-old, traditional structure that is itself on the verge of stagnation. Discussion of the rights and roles of women is often misconstrued as a

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threat to man’s position in society. Similarly, concern for the plight of woman and repulsion against injustices done to them are sometimes mistaken as Westernization. Even after independence, the Constitution provided special considerations to the {udras (lower-caste people) because of past injustices to them, but no such consideration was shown to women. Although the lifestyle of women has gone through many reforms and phases, economically and academically women today are more independent than their predecessors. Women are more and more emerging as working women. In spite of all this, however, there is little change in women’s social status. One could claim that in order to understand the specific nature of the problem of Hindu women, men as well as women have to be freed from the hold of traditional values and ideas. But I totally disagree with this type of solution of the problem. To my thinking, the strength of Hindu women lies in the Hindu tradition itself. As stated in the beginning, morality is relative to time and space. Since the smxti and post-smxti eras, lots of changes are in evidence in the outlook of people. Accordingly, their attitudes toward women also have seen several changes. Therefore, the solution to the problem lies in the thorough and unbiased study of traditional Hindu philosophy. I have discussed earlier that women received their due in the »7kta philosophy, in which women are granted equal footing with men and therefore respected as a person. Hence, the proper perception of Hindu texts would bring women closer to her proper place in society. As a chain reaction, people would be ready to accept women as individuals and recognize their worth as rational and moral agents.

NOTES 1. Smxtis are the products of different and widely separated ages. In consequence, we come across several such texts, some of which are entirely in prose or in mixed prose and verse, while the large majority are in verse. Nevertheless, most of the smxtis are, indeed, obscure and rarely cited even by ancient commentators. To my mind, apart from the epics (R7m7yaha and Mah7bh7rata), three smxtis, Manusmxti, Y7jñavalkayasmxti, and Par7{arasmxti, have had lasting effects on Hindu religion. These smxtis belong to a different class of composition that was not meant for oral exposition in a narrow Vedic school. These texts were written for grownup householders and learned br7hmahas as well. Since br7hmahas were supposed to be spiritual guides of the society, they were competent in determining doubtful points of dharma (righteousness). Hence, smxti texts were intended to be studied by themselves and not as part of wider curriculum. As so, the best minds among the Hindus, educated along traditional lines, have made these texts the subject of study since these texts are still supposed to illuminate the lives of future generations. Amongst these, Manusmxti held a position of preeminence, and its dicta still govern society. 2. “Status” needs to be distinguished from the concepts of “position” and “role.” Position is accorded to a person by the society. It is a passive concept, and one has to receive it, whether one likes it or not. Role, on the other hand, is something that the person actively takes up and plays on his or her own, and is responsible for that. Hence, the position of a person is, or at least should be, directly dependent on and proportional to the role one plays. Whenever there is a perfect balance between position and role, one may infer that the people have a strong sense of social justice. 3. Manusmxti, trans. Ramchandra Verma Shastri (New Delhi: Vidya Vihar, 1982), Adhy7ya IX, »lokas 32–52; Adhy7ya X, »lokas 68–70.

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4. Manusmxti, Adhy7ya IX, »loka 32. 5. Manusmxti, Adhy7ya IX, »lokas 33–69. 6. Manusmxti, Adhy7ya X, »lokas 69–71. 7. Saral Jhingran, Aspects of Hindu Morality (Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass, 1999), p. 92. 8. Shakuntala Rao Shastry, Women in the Vedic Age, (Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1952), p. 69. 9. Manusmxti, Adhy7ya I, »loka 109; Adhy7ya II, »lokas 36–68. 10. Manusmxti, Adhy7ya II, »lokas 36–68. 11. Manusmxti, Adhy7ya II, »loka 69. 12. Manusmxti, Adhy7ya IX, »loka 18. 13. S7hkhya K7rik7, ed. and trans. Ramashankar Tripathi (Varanasi: Chawkhamba Vidya Bhawan, 1970), »loka 19. 14. Manusmxti, Adhy7ya IX, »lokas 13, 14, 16, 17. 15. Manusmxti, Adhy7ya IX, »lokas 13–18. 16. Manusmxti, Adhy7ya V, »lokas 147–49; Adhy7ya IX, »lokas 2–3; Y7jñavalkyasmxti, trans. Umesh Chandra Pandey (Varanasi: Chawkhamba Sanskrit Sansthan, 2003), Adhy7ya I, »loka 85. 17. Manusmxti, Adhy7ya III, »lokas 20–33. 18. Manusmxti, Adhy7ya III, »loka 5. 19. Manusmxti, Adhy7ya III, »lokas 37–40; Adhy7ya IX, »lokas 120–25, 138 ff. 20. Manusmxti, Adhy7ya IX, »lokas 32–44. 21. Manusmxti, Adhy7ya IX, »lokas 59–61. 22. Manusmxti, Adhy7ya IX, »lokas 64–65. 23. Manusmxti, Adhy7ya IV, »loka 155; Adhy7ya IX, »loka 29; Mah7bh7rata, vol. VI, Anu{7sana Parva, trans. Pandit Ramnarain Shastri Pandey ‘Ram,’ (Gorakhpur: Geeta Press), XLVI. Also see Saral Jhingran, p. 95. 24. R7m7yaha, trans. Makhan Lal Sen (Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1978). Uttara K7hCa, chapter XVI, p. 592. 25. Manusmxti, Adhy7ya V, »lokas 153, 166. 26. Manusmxti, Adhy7ya IV, »lokas 156–58; Adhy7ya IX, »loka 75. 27. Yoga-Vashi}£ha, trans. Viharilal Mitra (Delhi: Bharatiya Publishing House, 1976). Vair7gya K7hCa, vol. I, ch. XII and XXII, pp. 45ff, 77ff. 28. Mah7bh7rata, »antiparva, Adh7yaya XXIX, »lokas 58–59. 29. R.gVeda, Adhy7ya X, »loka 85, as cited in Saral Jhingran, p. 96. 30. Manusmxti, Adhy7ya VIII, »loka 359; Adhy7ya XI, »loka 191. 31. Manusmxti, Adhy7ya VIII, »lokas 359, 364–66. 32. –pastamba Dharma Sutra, Adh7yaya II, 10.21–24, as cited in Saral Jhingran, p. 96. 33. –pastamba Dharma Sutra, Adhy7ya IV, »loka 10.271.1; Y7jñavalkyasmxti, »loka 1.72. 34. Manusmxti, Adhy7ya XI, »loka 189. 35. Manusmxti, Adhy7ya V, »loka 130; Y7jñavalkyasmxti, »loka, 71–72. 36. Manusmxti, Adhy7ya III, »loka 52; Adhy7ya IX, »lokas 192–96. 37. Manusmxti, Adhy7ya II, »lokas 213–15. 38. Manusmxti, Adhy7ya III, »lokas 55–61; Adhy7ya IX, »loka 95. 39. Manusmxti, Adhy7ya IX, »lokas 27–28. 40. Manusmxti, Adhy7ya IX, »lokas 72–79 ; Apastamba Dharma Sutra, Adh7yaya I: 10.28.19. 41. Manusmxti, Adhy7ya II, »loka 145. 42. –pastamba Dharma Sutra, Adh7yaya I:10.28.9. 43. Manusmxti, Adhy7ya II, »loka 66. 44. Manusmxti, Adhy7ya II, »loka 67.

CHAPTER 12

Catholicism and the AIDS Pandemic Xavier Gravend-Tirole

HIV-AIDS is the biggest threat to Africa since the slave trade. —Michael F. Czerny, S.J.1

T

he May 15, 2006, edition of Newsweek looked back at the history of AIDS, at that time twenty-five years old, observing, “The plague years: It brought out the worst in us at first, but ultimately it brought out the best, and transformed the nation. The story of a disease that left an indelible mark on our history, our culture and our souls.”2 “How AIDS changed America?” the magazine inquires. How AIDS changed (or not!) the Catholics? I would echo. And how did Pope John Paul II (1978–2005) react to that disease? How did the Catholic Church proceed during the pandemic: did it foster or hinder public policies fighting AIDS? Although the Church’s commitment to HIV-infected people has been immense, certain stances on the possible ways to prevent the pandemic continue to be exceedingly problematic—especially when it comes to the use of prophylactics.3 Even if “Pope Benedict XVI had requested a report on whether it might be acceptable for Catholics to use condoms in one narrow circumstance: to protect life inside a marriage when one partner is infected with HIV or is sick with AIDS,” there is nevertheless no question of admitting the use of prophylactics outside of wedlock.4 Contraception stays at the crux of the matter. As the New York Times Magazine recently showed in an extensive article about the war on contraception, the issue of birth control remains extremely complex.5 Paul VI’s Humanae Vitae (1968), in refusing the use of contraceptive devices in any areas of one’s sexual life, has in effect excluded the use of prophylactics as a means to prevent HIV/AIDS pandemics. And worse: after Paul VI, John Paul II forcefully upheld this moral teaching, drawing the church onto a very narrow path and one almost impossible to follow in the context of AIDS. Is the Catholic Church committing a crime of nonassistance to a person in danger, as many believe, by forbidding the use of prophylactics? How has the

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message of the Church helped or hindered the growth of the pandemic? And how has the Church, as a political body with great international influence, been shaping the issue on a global scale? I shall not investigate the question of why the Church forbids the use of contraception but rather examine how its rationale has developed over time. Since the debate over the reasons why the use of contraception is forbidden is entirely a question of theology rather than of public policy, I shall take this principle as (unfortunately) an unquestioned premise—even though the nub of the problem has much to do with that premise. In other words, the aim of this chapter is to investigate how Roman Catholic policy dealt with the HIV issue given this crux. More precisely, I want to evaluate where the strengths and weaknesses are within the official Catholic teaching and offer some views for making the Church’s action, given its constraints, hopefully more effective yet. In order to examine these questions, my methodology is qualitative as well as chronological. Indeed, I do not hold quantitative information to measure the “material” influence of the Church. Rather, by being qualitative and chronological, I investigate the historical developments in how John Paul II responded to the HIV pandemic and assess the echoes in the Church and outside. Because the Church can hardly be examined as merely a homogenous social body, I want to open doors for other voices, such as those of the bishops’ conferences, discourses of theologians, and religious/lay organizations. Even though I cannot be systematic in examining these co-extensive Catholic bodies, I want to bring them in as illustrations of assent or dissent to the authoritative official voice, and show how the Catholic Church has had an impact much greater than what Pope John Paul II may have desired. There are two major ways in which the Holy See, in general, and the pope, in particular, dealt with AIDS. On the one hand, we will see that the pope affirmed and called for total support and care without discrimination for those infected with HIV beginning with his first public declaration in September 1987. On the other hand, when it comes to prevention in a “material way,” that is, what kind of education one may provide in order to abate the pandemic and how condoms can be an effective tool in this, the question remains much more controversial. Different arguments are exploited. While considering the crucial points John Paul II raised in the fight against HIV/AIDS, I deliberately spend more energy on the latter issue because it is here that the Church clashes with the public health domain.

BACKGROUND: CONSERVATIVES AGAINST PRESERVATIVES We first need to go back in history in order to understand why the church pontiff forbade any use of contraceptive methods even for the case of HIV. Several references to birth control have been made throughout time.6 The first official pronouncement about modern contraception was stated in Pius XI’s Casti Connubii (1930). But no reason, however grave, may be put forward by which anything intrinsically against nature may become conformable to nature and morally good. Since, therefore, the conjugal act is destined primarily by nature for the begetting of children, those who in exercising it deliberately frustrate its natural power and purpose sin against nature and commit a deed which is shameful and intrinsically vicious.7

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This affirmation has to be contextualized as a way to fight against falling natality rather than against a means of birth control. It behooved Paul VI, after the Second Vatican Council (Vatican II), to think “through all the implications of birth control for a possible change in church teaching . . .” since the appearance of the birth control pill in the 1950s.8 A papal commission on birth control had already been set up by Pope John XXIII as early as March 1963 in order to think through the question. Robert McClory provides a magnificent report on this commission, which grew from six persons in March 1963 to thirteen and then, under Paul VI, to fifty-eight members. In 1965 the members of this commission agreed by fifty-two voices to four that the pope should not reiterate past condemnations but should write a document on different points where the position of the Church could be softened.9 Then, even if the pope changed the status of lay members to “experts” and gave official voices to fifteen cardinals and bishops, a significant majority had agreed on the fact that Casti Connubii’s position was reformable, and that contraception was not an intrinsically bad violation of natural law. In June 1966 the commission heard three reports by the “experts,” and over the month, bishops and cardinals became aware that contraception was not necessarily bad in itself—but could be read in continuity with the Magisterium’s position.10 Pope Paul was apparently quite uncomfortable with the conclusions of the commission and dissolved it. He of course knew that the issue was utterly crucial, for the Church was already deeply divided on the subject. In Fox’s words, “Pope Paul had to make the final decision and either free Catholics from the heavy weight of church teaching or to continue to uphold traditional teachings. Either way, it would be the most important moral decision of any pontificate in modern times.”11 For two more years, Pope Paul consulted other members of the Holy See. Among them was Cardinal Karol Wojtyla of Cracovia, who had not been able to come sit at the commission where he had been assigned. After the results of the commission in 1966, the Polish cardinal gathered priests, lay people, and physicians in his diocese to discuss the matter and sent their conclusions to the pope four months later.12 When the encyclical letter was published in July 1968, Karol Wojtyla rejoiced: “We helped the pope!” he apparently exclaimed.13 Yet, “many in the church were deeply disappointed by the encyclical.”14 And when it came, the pronouncement against contraceptive devices was straightforward: “Similarly excluded is any action which either before, at the moment of, or after sexual intercourse, is specifically intended to prevent procreation—whether as an end or as a means.”15 The justification is simple, in Paul VI’s view, and will be repeated later on again and again: “This particular doctrine, often expounded by the Magisterium of the Church, is based on the inseparable connection, established by God, which man on his own initiative may not break, between the unitive significance and the procreative significance which are both inherent to the marriage act.”16 In the mind of the theologian Karol Wojtyla, contrary to Paul VI, there was never any uncertainty on the matter. Already in his book Love and Responsibility (1960), he pronounced himself against the “propaganda in favor of artificial contraceptives.”17 Contrary to the dignity of the conjugal act, “the only solution of the problem of birth control at a level worthy of human persons” is “to control

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oneself.”18 Categorically, the theologian always held onto traditional Catholic teaching in this matter. Later, in 1976, when Cardinal Wojtyla was asked to preach the famous five-day Lenten retreat in the Mathilde Chapel, the future pope openly “gave comfort to Paul VI, embroiled in the controversy over contraception in Humanae Vitae . . .”19 Comparing Paul VI to Jeremiah—“I am a laughing stock”—as Cornwell relates, “the Cardinal observed that the prophet is often rejected by his own. He then made explicit reference to those who defended contraception, describing them as “humanistic circles linked with certain Christian traditions” and “campaigners in favor of abortion.” He finally consoled the Pope with the observation that “we are in the front line in a lively battle of the dignity of man.”20 Thus, until his pontificate, the mind of the future pope did not change much but was already aware of this subject’s sensitivity. At the beginning of his pontificate, John Paul II reiterated the straight trajectory of his position in Familiaris Consortio (1981)—his second apostolic exhortation, of lesser papal authority than an encyclical. The use of contraceptive devices must stay explicitly illicit: Thus the Church condemns as a grave offense against human dignity and justice all those activities of governments or other public authorities which attempt to limit in any way the freedom of couples in deciding about children. Consequently, any violence applied by such authorities in favor of contraception or, still worse, of sterilization and procured abortion, must be altogether condemned and forcefully rejected. Likewise to be denounced as gravely unjust are cases where, in international relations, economic help given for the advancement of peoples is made conditional on programs of contraception, sterilization and procured abortion.21

When that letter was published, however, the pope had not yet heard of the ravages AIDS would have on the planet. He might barely have heard of the bizarre illness diagnosed among American gay men.

THE BEGINNINGS As the apparition of HIV in the public sphere received gradual attention, so it was for the Catholic Church. I was not able to find anything official from the Holy See regarding what was later termed “a pandemic.” For Vatican observers, AIDS did not get “Roman ecclesiastical recognition” until 1987. Yet, there were, on the ground, different Catholic associations that rapidly took care of gay men dying of AIDS-associated diseases in the early 1980s. The first major article in the National Catholic Reporter was published in July 1984 under the title “AIDS: Its Victims Are This Century’s Lepers.”22 The author, Bill Kenkelen, a gay Catholic, would die from AIDS-related causes on October 14, 1991. For Fox, the reason why it lacked publicity can be explained by the fact that “in the early 1980s, the disease was still in its infancy and largely confined to the gay communities of San Francisco and New York as well as a few other pockets. Few in the Church were examining it seriously.”23 Willey’s tone, however, was much more severe toward the Church: “The Vatican’s reaction to the developing moral and social debate on how to deal with the new

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disease was at first silence, then, when bishops from the most seriously affected regions, North America and Africa, began asking advice, the suggestion was made that it might be divine retribution for sexual immorality.”24 Although this explanation was never used by Pope John Paul II, some ecclesiastical authorities have made a few statements in the same vein. The pope, on the other hand, would fight against any prejudices toward people infected by HIV, and would become a strong advocate for compassion. The last instance where we can gauge the importance of AIDS for the Holy See is through the lens of the address given each year in January to the foreign diplomatic corps. Only as late as January 12, 1991, did the pope finally mention AIDS as “undoubtedly the most deadly” illness in Africa.25 The pope would remain silent again for three years, and then, on January 15, 1994—the year of the Cairo Conference—the Pope declared: “It is clear, in particular, that they [countries in Africa] need support in the face of the plague constituted by the AIDS epidemic.”26 Although the first lead article on AIDS in the L’Osservatore Romano did not appear until March 1988, AIDS would get its first official acknowledgement by the Holy See when the Pope traveled to the United States in 1987.

TRAVEL TO THE UNITED STATES: THE VATICAN GOES PUBLIC! Before recounting the pope’s visit to the United States, it is important to provide some background as to where the tensions lay. Indeed, relations within the Catholic Church of America were quite edgy on two distinct issues. The first was the question of birth control and the use of contraceptive devices. Not surprisingly, the pope maintained his position toward contraception and directly told the bishops in 1983 that they had to insist on respect for procreation, and that contraception was thus unacceptable.27 Yet, some theologians, such as Reverend Charles Curran, did not abide by that injunction in their teaching and were more flexible than the Vatican would have preferred. The Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith issued a letter stating that Reverend Curran was unsuitable to teach moral theology.28 The next year, an Instruction issued by the same congregation repeated the interdiction to use any contraceptive device, without making any difference between HIV-infected and noninfected people.29 Second was the question of homosexuality. The Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith again made a statement, in a Letter to the Bishops of the Catholic Church on the Pastoral Care of Homosexual Persons (1986), in order to clear up “an overly benign interpretation . . . given to the homosexual condition itself, some going so far as to call it neutral, or even good.” On the contrary, the congregation stated quite straightforwardly that “although the particular inclination of the homosexual person is not a sin, it is a more or less strong tendency ordered toward an intrinsic moral evil; and thus the inclination itself must be seen as an objective disorder.”30 For Americans who were trying to grapple with how to take care of people infected with HIV—mostly gays at that time—the three documents from the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith were a deep disappointment. Even though the letter then finished with the encouragement to support homosexuals—and by extension, those infected with HIV—the overall tone had devastating repercussions

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on American soil: “The Vatican statement had remained a source of festering resentment among gay activists and of embarrassment to many bishops who regarded it as a setback.”31 And last, the concealed stigmatization of priests infected with HIV was also at stake. Not only was the institutional Church incapable of acknowledging the disease, but authorities seemed to conceal the priests who were infected with it. The most poignant example was certainly Fr. Michael Peterson. In a public letter written in April 1987, just before his death, he declared: “I hope that in my own struggle with this disease, in finally acknowledging that I have this lethal syndrome, there might be some measure of compassion, understanding and healing for me and for others with it— specially those who face this disease alone and in fear.”32 Pope John Paul’s official visit lasted ten days, September 10–20, 1987. Conscious of the various demonstrations organized against the presence of the pope that would draw important media coverage, the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) planners “recommended that the church highlight its role as compassionate caregiver rather than moral legalist.”33 Because the worst was happening in San Francisco, the planners decided to “set up the show” there.34 The result was convincing. As Margaret Melady narrates it, At the Pope’s first scheduled event in San Francisco, one hundred AIDS victims and their families were invited to be among the thousand participants, mainly sick and elderly. AIDS victims, including a priest who had contracted the disease, were invited to be close to the Pope who, by touching them, could confirm his words, “God loves you all, without distinction, without limit.” The image of John Paul II hugging AIDS victims provided a powerful antidote to attempts on the part of gay activists to portray a discriminatory church.35

Briggs, Willey, and Vitillo give enthusiastic accounts of the pope’s “first public gesture” to hug Brendan O’Rourke, a four-year-old AIDS patient.36 The pictures were on the front pages of newspapers around the world. For Vitillo, “He revealed his fatherly care by embracing a child living with AIDS and countered the mistaken reasoning the HIV pandemic might represent God’s displeasure with sinners.”37 For Briggs, the pope’s success “was a masterpiece of compassion and diplomacy”: His message was about loving the sick and dying, but it was couched in terms of sin and forgiveness. . . . The proof of God’s love, [the Pope] said, was that “he loves us in our human condition, with our weakness and our needs.” . . . Tellingly, he recalled the story of the prodigal son. . . . The message was bold and bracing and doctrinally correct. It had conveyed the Pope’s enormous personal warmth and caring along with pastoral encouragement informed by the Scriptures without diluting the church’s teachings on the sinfulness of homosexual sex.38

“THE MANY FACES OF AIDS”—THE CONTROVERSY At the end of 1987, a Catholic ecclesiastical body directly addressed the AIDS issue for the first time. The U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops drafted a document titled “The Many Faces of AIDS: A Gospel Response.” In it, the document

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was open to the idea that information about condoms—not distribution—could be considered as a means to help Catholics abate the AIDS pandemic.39 The following year, L’Osservatore Romano finally produced a lead article on AIDS in its March 10, 1988, edition, where Cardinal Ratzinger, Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith’s Prefect, put in plain words the Vatican’s view on the matter. Again, in another letter dated May 29, 1988, the cardinal made it clear that chastity before marriage and fidelity within wedlock are the exclusive means the Catholic Church will advocate for AIDS prevention: In a society which seems increasingly to downgrade the value of chastity, conjugal fidelity and temperance, and to be preoccupied sometimes almost exclusively with physical health and temporal well-being, the Church’s responsibility is to give that kind of witness which is proper to her, namely an unequivocal witness of effective and unreserved solidarity with those who are suffering and, at the same time, a witness of defense of the dignity of human sexuality which can only be realized within the context of moral law. It is likewise crucial to note, as the board statement does, that the only medically safe means of preventing AIDS are those very types of behavior which conform to God’s law and to the truth about man which the church has always taught and today is still called courageously to teach.40

In an article entitled “Prophylactics, Toleration and Cooperation: Contemporary Problems and Traditional Principles,” James F. Keenan, S. J., examined the question again. In his view, the American bishops’ position remained legitimate, although not based on the principle of toleration, but on the principle of cooperation.41 Yet, even if there is dissension within the Catholic theologians here, the locus of the controversy is neither about the distribution nor the use of prophylactics, but merely about providing information—which is, morally, of a different degree than actively participating in the distribution. Still, in the official version issued in November 1989, the title would change to “Called to Compassion and Responsibility: A Response to the HIV/AIDS Crisis,” and any mention of prophylactic information would disappear.42 As Keenan would conclude later, “While not negating The Many Faces of AIDS, the bishops resisted addressing infected persons who do not abstain from sexual activity.”43 In France, however, the (conservative) Cardinal Lustiger said on television on December 1, 1988, “You, who are affected by this disease, you who cannot then live a chaste life, take the means that people offer you out of respect for yourself and for others. You should not give death.”44 On January 9, 1989, the Permanent Council of the French Bishops issued “AIDS: Solidarity and Personal Responsibility.” In terms of prevention, they stated diplomatically: “Prophylactic means exist. It would be contestable to reduce prevention to their sole use.”45 Yet, these words had apparently not found their way to Rome.

AIDS AND THE MORAL THEOLOGICAL AGENDA In November 1988, “about four hundred theologians took part in the Second International Congress on Moral Theology which was held at the Pontifical Lateran University to mark the twentieth anniversary of Paul VI’s Encyclical Humanae Vitae.”46 On Saturday, November 12, the pope himself made clear what the

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Church’s position toward contraception had to be, and dismissed all possible exceptions, even in the case of AIDS: “By describing the contraceptive act as intrinsically illicit, Paul VI meant to teach that the moral norm is such that it does not admit exceptions. No personal or social circumstances could ever, can now, or will ever, render such an act as lawful in itself.”47 Furthermore, the pontiff then set out his ideas regarding the relationship between freedom and truth, quoting St. Augustine: “Our freedom consists in our subjection to the truth.”48 And the truth, as stated before, is protected and taught through the Church’s Magisterium, according to Roman Catholic theology.49 While John Paul II remained at the level of “moral teaching” and did not make the contraceptive act an issue of faith, a few analysts such as Sacco and Willey put his stance one step forward. For Sacco, “some remarkable differences can be observed between the approaches of the two popes. Paul VI seems to confine himself mostly to the purposes of marriage and to view the virtue of chastity as the most directly violated by the use of contraceptives. John Paul II prefers a wider point of view, considering contraception as the violation of a principle of faith, and therefore as an act which opposes God as source of any life and Church as interpreter of truth.”50 For Willey, “for John Paul the very word ‘contraception’ involves blasphemy, and the use of a condom becomes the equivalent of murder.”51 If two serious intellectuals do not understand John Paul II’s stand after having studied the primary sources, one can see how the pope’s message got even more distorted in the media. Even if the pope makes the connection with the holiness of God, he does not enter the fundamentals of faith. He recognizes them as extensions of the mystery of God, but the mystery of God itself is not in jeopardy. The confusion between the two is not surprising after all: there is a difficult dialectic between faith and ethics that produces a grey zone identified in traditional theology as the dialectic between “fides et mores.”

FIRST AIDS CONFERENCE Progressively, AIDS became an acute issue in the Vatican. While traveling in Denmark, for instance, on June 7, 1989, the pope made a remark about the epidemic.52 The remark must have been influenced by the upcoming International Conference on AIDS organized by the Pontifical Council for Pastoral Assistance to Health Care Workers—a sign that the disease was now taken seriously by the Holy See. Thus, in November, “the Vatican sponsored its own international AIDS conference . . . hoping to deflect attention from medical and scientific aspects towards the ethical problems that this new world health threat poses.”53 This strategy was not necessarily political, to be precise about the issue here, but stemmed from earnest theological reflections. Any concrete situation, in the Catholic eye, has to be considered from “God’s” point of view—in which, then, ethics will play a part. Willey notes: “Professors Robert Gallo of the United States and Luc Montagnier from France, politely but firmly told the Vatican gathering that they did not agree with prominent Church leaders such as Cardinal John O’Connor of New York, who had stated bluntly, ‘The truth does not lie in condoms and clean needles.’”54 Further, underlines Willey, “The voice of AIDS sufferers was not heard. Cardinal

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Angelini explained with great sophistication that the conference was ‘for AIDS sufferers, not of them.’”55 Once again, in his speech to conference participants, John Paul II explained his position and the Church’s—but did not offer any policy change. After having expressed his concern that “AIDS has by far many more profound repercussions of a moral, social, economic, juridical and structural nature, not only on individual families and on neighborhood communities, but also on nations and on the entire community of peoples,” the pontiff emphasized the “double-edged challenge which the Church also wants to meet by playing her part . . . [for] prevention of the disease and the health care offered to those who suffer from it.”56 In terms of prevention, John Paul II identified two objectives: “to inform adequately and to educate for responsible maturity.” In this regard, declared the pope, “only with information and education which leads to a transparent and joyous rediscovery of the spiritual value of self-giving love as the fundamental meaning of existence will adolescents and youth be able to find sufficient strength to surmount risk-prone behavior.”57 The pope then made a declaration, which is worth quoting at length since it is the first time for him to speak so meticulously on the topic: Prevention methods which, on the contrary, promote egoistic interests deriving from considerations that are incompatible with the fundamental values of life and love, can only end up being contradictory as well as illicit, merely circling the problem without resolving it at its roots. For this reason, the Church, secure interpreter of the Law of God and “expert in humanity,” is concerned not only with stating a series of “no’s” to particular behavior patterns, but above all with proposing a completely meaningful lifestyle for the person. She marks out with vigor and joy a positive ideal in whose perspective moral behavior codes are understood and lived. In the light of such an ideal, it is extremely harmful to the dignity of the person, and therefore it is morally illicit, to support as AIDS prevention any method which violates the authentically human sense of sexuality, and is a palliative for those deep needs which involve the responsibility of the individual and of society.58

The reason why John Paul II remained so stern in terms of prevention is that “parallel to the spread of AIDS, there is a kind of immunodeficiency in existential values that cannot but be identified as a real pathology of the spirit.”59 For him, prevention needed to address both deficiencies together in order to abate the epidemic. Otherwise, as he said, we “circle the problem without resolving it at its root.” In terms of health care, at last, the pontiff reiterated that the Church “feels that she is called upon as protagonist in this new area of human suffering, aware as she is that the suffering person is a ‘special way’ of her teaching and ministry.”60 While her compassion for victims of HIV must be absolutely boundless, the means for prevention continue to be bluntly restricted.

TRAVELS TO AFRICA One could imagine that by traveling in Africa, the pope could have witnessed the ravages caused by HIV/AIDS and thus changed his mind. Or that his first trip would significantly impact the second. But none of this happened. On the first day

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of his September 1990 trip to East Africa, in Dar es Salaam, where there was one of the worst rates of AIDS in Africa, the pope asked the Tanzanian diplomatic corps to work on behalf of HIV victims, who, very often, suffer tremendously from stigmatization: “I appeal to you to use whatever influence you have to direct the world’s efforts and resources to promoting the true well-being of the human family.”61 While the pontiff condemned the “indifference on the part of public authorities, condemnatory or discriminatory practices” as “collaboration in this terrible evil,”62 the pope did not consider the Church as lacking any element nor as a contributor to the evil spread of HIV. On the contrary, the pontiff repeated that the lack of moral education was the source of the expansion: The members of the Church will continue to play their part in caring for those who are suffering, as Jesus taught his followers to do (cf. Mt. 25:36), and in promoting prevention that is respectful of the dignity of the human person and his transcendent destiny. The church is convinced that without a resurgence of moral responsibility and a reaffirmation of fundamental moral values any program of prevention based on information alone will be ineffective and even counterproductive. More harmful still are campaigns which implicitly promote—through their lack of moral content and the false security which they offer—the very patterns of behavior which have greatly contributed to the expansion of the disease.63

The pope would have the occasion to reaffirm his stance in Burundi while talking to the bishops on September 5: “I want to recall that the gravity of the disease does not only depend on the suffering and deaths which are its inexorable toll, but also on its implications of an anthropological and moral nature. This epidemic differs from so many others that humanity has experienced in that deliberate human behavior plays a role in spreading the disease.”64 Thus, thoroughly and consciously the pope advocated a chaste and new lifestyle that rejected any recognition of the potential benefit of prophylactic use. For him, the problem was not only biomedical and social, but ethical and spiritual.65 Three years later in Uganda, a country “considered the epicenter of the African continent’s AIDS crisis,” the pope asserted to young people: “Do not let yourselves be led astray by those who ridicule your chastity or your power to control yourselves. The strength of your future married love depends on the strength of your present effort to learn about true love. Chastity is the only safe and virtuous means to put an end to the tragic plague of AIDS.”66 And then, to HIV victims: “You who suffer from AIDS have an important role to play in this vital struggle for the well-being of your country! Offer your sufferings in union with Christ for your brothers and sisters who are especially at risk! Your suffering can be a grace-filled opportunity to bring about the moral rebirth of Ugandan society.”67 Once again, the pope made clear how the “dangerous crisis of values” was at the root of the problem for the eradication of the epidemic: “Many people grow crippled in spirit, indifferent to the virtues and spiritual values which alone can guarantee true happiness and the authentic progress of society.”68 While the pope insisted on the connection between the two levels— biomedical and moral—there seems to be no room for a sane distinction that would allow the other biomedical discourse a better “autonomy.” Some months later, on August 6, 1993, the encyclical Veritatis Splendor was published. In it, the pope reestablished his argument that freedom must proceed

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from truth, and that reason alone could lead to the death of “real freedom”.69 Thus, goes his argument, morality is oriented toward truth, and truth can be accessed through God’s revelation as well as through natural law. On this ground, John Paul II justified (again) his interdiction to use contraceptive devices in any circumstances. Also worth mentioning is a book published after his fifteenth papal anniversary in 1993. Although John Paul II was supposed to give a number of interviews to Vittorio Messori—but did not for other, technical reasons—the Pope still answered in a simple, handwritten way Messori’s questions. Regarding the question whether the Church was backward or not, the pope wrote: “Can we say that the world is only growing toward a greater freedom of behavior? Don’t these words perhaps hide that relativism which is so detrimental to man? Not only abortion, but also contraception, is ultimately bound up with the truth about man. Moving away from this truth does not represent a step forward, and cannot be considered a measure of ‘ethical progress.’”70

DIFFERENT UNDERSTANDING OF FAMILY LIFE In anticipation of the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development, to be held in Cairo in September, the United Nations declared 1994 as the Year of the Family. Along with it, the Catholic Church also inaugurated a Year of the Family, and on February 2, the pope took that opportunity to write a long letter dedicated to the families. In the letter, he not only acknowledged the multiple crises families face, but he also offered, as opposed to the “secular Western model,” a different understanding of family. The pope was thoroughly aware that his thoughts about human sexuality did not reflect unanimity, but he once more reiterated his position—and by extension, the Church’s.71 He praised those who “swim against the tide”72 and repeated his theological conviction calling for responsibility.73 This responsibility has always been the positive form of his argument, which states that “the Church both teaches the moral truth about responsible fatherhood and motherhood and protects it from the erroneous views and tendencies which are widespread today.”74 Another element of his argument is framed around the theme of love, and with this theme, he once again condemned “safe sex” methods. Everything contrary to the civilization of love is contrary to the whole truth about man and becomes a threat to him: it does not allow him to find himself and to feel secure, as spouse, parent, or child. So-called “safe sex,” which is touted by the “civilization of technology,” is actually, in view of the overall requirements of the person, radically not safe, indeed it is extremely dangerous. It endangers both the person and the family. And what is this danger? It is the loss of the truth about one’s own self and about the family, together with the risk of a loss of freedom and consequently of a loss of love itself.75

The Cairo Conference would, in fact, have important repercussions in Rome and on John Paul II’s personal reflection. Indeed, as he would write in a public

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message addressed to the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) director on March 18, 1994, “the draft final document of the Cairo Conference, which is already being circulated, is a cause of grave concern to me.”76 The letter was given to Mrs. Nafis Sadik, the Pakistani director of the UNFPA and one of the main organizers of the Cairo Conference. It would be difficult to measure the impact the preparation of the conference had on the pope’s relationship to the “Western secular world,” but the least one can say is that more and more, the pope would frame the issue in the life/death dialectic: “In the face of the so-called culture of death, the family is the heart of the culture of life.”77 It is noteworthy to remark that the theme of life would then be used for his encyclical Evangelium Vitae (1995), a year later. As many of his predecessors, Pope John Paul was stubbornly acting as the (conservative) moral conscience of the Western world. In his letter he declared: “Fundamental questions like the transmission of life, the family, and the material and moral development of society, need very serious considerations.”78 More precisely, regarding population growth, the pope was worried by the way human populations are considered: “To formulate population issues in terms of individual ‘sexual and reproductive rights,’ or even in terms of ‘women’s rights,’ is to change the focus which should be the proper concern of governments and international agencies.”79 For John Paul II, “self-control is needed in order to face the many demands of life.”80 When the pontiff received Mrs. Sadik in his office for a private audience, it was a “deaf dialogue.” Accounts of the meeting differ according to Mrs. Sadik and the pope. According to Lecomte, “The confrontation lasted forty minutes. Nafis Sadik is astounded by the Pope’s passionate and ‘dogmatic’ stubbornness; and the latter, who did not expect such a difficult dialogue, realizes that the match that will be played in Cairo is almost lost.”81 It is worth quoting at length Cornwell’s account of the meeting, as it illustrates how the sociopolitical necessities advocated by the United Nations clashed with the pope’s insistence on an ethical-spiritual treatment of the problem. [John Paul II] handed her a lengthy memorandum on the Church’s objections to the Cairo draft document and attempted to explain to her the Church’s teaching. “She didn’t want to discuss it,” John Paul told the papal biographer George Weigel several years later in an interview. Sadik, however, later wrote an extensive description of the meeting from her own perspective in a memorandum she gave to Politi and Bernstein, authors of the 1996 biography of John Paul His Holiness. At one point, according to her, John Paul said, “Family planning can be practiced only in accordance with moral, spiritual and natural laws.” She interposed: “But natural laws make for unreliable methods of family planning.” The discussion then turned to individual choice in family planning. “In this area,” John Paul said, “there can be no individual rights and needs. There can only be the couple’s rights and needs.” According to her memory, she responded: “But couples implies an equal relationship. In many societies and not just in the developing world, women don’t have equal status with men. There’s a lot of sexual violence within the family. Women are quite willing to practice natural methods and abstain, because they’re the ones who get pregnant and don’t want to be. But they can’t abstain without the cooperation of their partners.”

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As Sadik recalled, “John Paul burst out angrily, ‘Don’t you think that the irresponsible behavior of men is caused by women?’”82

Lecomte confirms the fact that Mrs. Sadik’s argument about women’s distress was systematically dismissed, but the fact that the pope “burst out angrily” remains open to question.83 Yet, on the whole, this deaf dialogue admirably illustrates how on some sexual-moral issues the Vatican became quite estranged from the sociopolitical contingencies. One cannot say that the pope was not aware of the widening gap, but the arguments seem to remain unbridgeable. “Defend the sacredness of family life!” was L’Osservatore Romano’s title for the pope’s signed letter to all heads of states. Written the next day after the meeting with Nafis Sadik,it expressed the pope’s “disturbing surprise.”84 He insisted on the fact that “the family unit continued to be the ‘school of life,’” and regarding our topic, was concerned that “the idea of sexuality underlying this text is totally individualistic to such an extent that marriage now appears as something outmoded.”85 Calling upon a good education for the young, the pope was afraid that we merely offer them “a society of ‘things’ and not of ‘persons.’ The right to do as they will from their earliest years, without any constraint, provided it is ‘safe.’ The unreserved gift of self, mastery of one’s instincts, the sense of responsibility— these are notions considered as belonging to another age.”86 I must say that when researching the 1994 editions of L’Osservatore Romano, I was startled to come across so many articles about the well-being of family—by John Paul II and others who commented on his Letter to Families. Among the page titles over the pope’s discourses—many more articles have been written by other clerics—one can read “Save the Family and You Save Society” (February 15); “Year of the Family Must Support Life” (April 13); “Parents are God’s Co-workers” (July 17); “Family planning is couple’s decision” (July 27); “Children have right to be born from an act of true love” (August 3); “State must ensure right to life” (August 10/17); “Alarming signs indicate moral crisis” (August 31) . . . and so on. The titles worthily demonstrate how crucial Rome felt the issue was. Sometimes threatened, sometimes engaging people to view families differently, Rome tried to shape the reigning discourse on family. On September 7, Archbishop Renato Raffaele Martino, permanent observer of the Holy See at the United Nations and head of the Holy See’s delegation, intervened at the Cairo Conference. After briefly commenting on policies regarding development and women’s issues, the archbishop took two thirds of his text to explain once again the Holy See’s critique against an individualistic conception of sexuality: “Lack of responsibility in sexual behavior is also due to the fostering today of attitudes of sexual permissiveness, which focus above all on personal pleasure and gratification. . . . The Holy See cannot endorse methods of family planning which fundamentally separate those two essential dimensions of human sexuality, and will express its position on such methods through an appropriate reservation.”87 Ultimately, because the document was significantly modified, Archbishop Renato Martino expressed a “partial consensus” about the final document on behalf of the Holy See. Yet, in regard to contraceptives, the Holy See’s statement remained crystal clear and is emphasized at the very last paragraph of the address: “Nothing that the Holy See has done in this consensus process should be understood or interpreted as an endorsement of concepts it cannot

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support for moral reasons. Especially nothing is to be understood to imply that the Holy See endorses abortion or has in any way changed its moral position concerning abortion or on contraceptives or sterilization nor on the use of condoms in HIV/AIDS prevention programmes.”88

THE GOSPEL OF LIFE Against what is seen from Rome as “a culture of death,” John Paul wrote a very personal and polemical encyclical, Evangelium Vitae, published March 25, 1995: “A warning to the world that the value of human life is under threat,” Cornwell writes, “it was a powerful and timely reminder that the Catholic Church stood against every form of abuse of life.”89 The pope made an almost explicit reference to the Cairo Conference when he stated: Aside from intentions, which can be varied and perhaps can seem convincing at times, especially if presented in the name of solidarity, we are in fact faced by an objective “conspiracy against life,” involving even international institutions, engaged in encouraging and carrying out actual campaigns to make contraception, sterilization and abortion widely available. Nor can it be denied that the mass media are often implicated in this conspiracy, by lending credit to that culture which presents recourse to contraception, sterilization, abortion and even euthanasia as a mark of progress and a victory of freedom, while depicting as enemies of freedom and progress those positions which are unreservedly pro-life. (§17)90

Some want to excuse the pope’s understanding of public policy by claiming that “the Pope is at the level of principles, not of techniques.”91 Lecomte, for instance, who nonetheless wrote an excellent book on John Paul II, claims that the pope “never evocated the object [the contraceptive], he never pronounced the word.”92 The argument seems fallacious: as we have seen so far, the pope mentions it indirectly (the “contraception”) and via his official representative, does indeed directly refer to the eminently problematic subject. Even if the pope always insisted on a deep and profound compassion for victims of HIV and encouraged the Church to find means to assist victims, be they homosexual or not, his views on AIDS prevention remained inexorable. His language of principle—which could easily be qualified as “ideological” because it insists first on abstract ideas rather than taking into account concrete issues— remained somewhat sticky since all issues threatening life are all commonly identified as deathly. This polarization between life and death has been one of the most problematic arguments of the Church. Indeed, how one can define what is life and what is death? Arguments are not as self-evident as the pope would have it. Besides, the confusion between contraception for birth control and contraception for protecting one’s life does not allow many nuances. Nor is the confusion that remains between what is considered contraceptive—abortion, in my view, should not be put in the same bag as chemical pills and condoms—and what is not helpful for solving the problem at stake here. Not only did the pope recognize an essential similitude between the two methods—“Despite their differences of nature and moral gravity, contraception and abortion are often closely connected,

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as fruits of the same tree”93—he also assumed that the connection exists in current states of mind: “The close connection which exists, in mentality, between the practice of contraception and that of abortion is becoming increasingly obvious.”94 Thus, concludes Sacco, contraceptives are hardly distinguished from abortion: “For Karol Wojtyla, any definition of birth control that affirms an absolute right to abortion, without regulations or conditions, is therefore inadmissible.”95

DIVERGENT PATHS After the African Synod held in Rome, the pope issued an apostolic exhortation to the Church in Africa. Happy that “it noted the role played in the spread of this disease by irresponsible sexual behavior,” the pope celebrated “this strong recommendation”: “The companionship, joy, happiness and peace which Christian marriage and fidelity provide, and the safeguard which chastity gives, must be continuously presented to the faithful, particularly the young.”96 Slowly, however, some bishops around the world seemed to acknowledge the necessity of “the lesser evil theory.” The French Catholic bishops, for example, published a book titled Sida, la société en question (1996), in which they stated that when one cannot do otherwise, it is better to use contraceptives, although knowing that ethics condemns it. A few conservative cardinals in Rome were shocked by the book. But when interviewed by Le Monde, Father Georges Cottier, personal theologian of the pope, declared: “We cannot say in any way that the French Bishops’ text is against the Pope’s thoughts . . . It does not behoove the Pope to be the advocate of ‘the lesser evil.’ The Pope fixes the ideals to reach.”97 Yet, opposition from Rome seems to have been more serious. As the political scientist Formicola put it, the bishops’ conferences had to be restrained in their power. The way this has been accomplished has been quite political rather than theological. Maybe because the church hierarchy was dealing seriously with questions of public policy, thus trying to find ways to accommodate needs with principles, John Paul put out an apostolic letter entitled Apostolos Suos, On the Theological and Juridical Nature of Episcopal Conferences (May 21, 1998). In this letter, the pope wanted “to set out the basic theological and juridical principles regarding Episcopal Conferences, and to offer the juridical synthesis indispensable for helping to establish a theologically well-grounded and juridically sound praxis for the Conferences.”98 In so doing, the pope imposed a rule of unanimity on contentious social issues, so that a common (progressive) position from an episcopal conference would be more difficult to achieve: the conservative opinion gained more voice with the status of a veto, if needed.99 “Thus,” estimates Formicola, “John Paul ensured little deviation from papal policies, particularly on contentious moral issues as they relate to birth control, the use of condoms to prevent the spread of AIDS, and fetal tissue research.”100 While the pope succeeded in protecting the traditional Roman position on sexual issues, it did not improve his popularity. As Cornwell recalls it in his chapter on John Paul and AIDS, “It had been confidently expected that John Paul would win the Nobel Peace Prize in the year 2000—and if not then, perhaps by the end of the second year of the new millennium.”101 When Lutheran bishop Gunnar Stallseth, a member of the Nobel Peace Prize committee, was asked why

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the pope did not receive the prize, he answered: “I challenge the Vatican to redefine its attitude to condoms. . . . The current Roman Catholic theology is one that favors death rather than life.”102 If it is true that the Magisterium held this conservative position, not all in the Roman Catholic Church agreed. In his 2000 book Catholic Ethicists on HIV/AIDS Prevention, for instance, Keenan shows in his introduction that significant progress has been made in terms of moral theology, even if the clerical authorities had not yet been able to integrate the conclusions into all dioceses: Catholic moralists around the world have established two extraordinarily strong consensuses regarding condom distribution and needle exchange. They achieved these agreements by invoking the long-standing Roman Catholic tradition, and by trying to educate both local Roman Catholic communities and their leaders that the tradition has many resources for addressing the AIDS pandemic. In fact, Roman Catholic moralists throughout the world have been at pains to inform their Episcopal leadership that in a variety of ways Catholics can respond to the AIDS pandemic, not only by serving those who are HIV infected, but also by working to prevent the spread of the disease.103

The Church’s policy thus may change. To the ecclesiastical authorities who argued that condoms did not really (medically) prevent HIV, as Cardinal Trujillo’s stance on prophylactics mentioned further, moral theologians “offered substantial empirical data to address the . . . objection.”104 But overall, theologians and activists primarily recognized with Rome that prevention with condoms does not represent the whole solution. Prophylactics are part of the answer, but not the sole one. A deeper education and a change in lifestyle have to take place. And social justice issues have to be acknowledged and fought for. As Lisa Sowle Cahill puts it, “The primary cause of the spread of this horrendous disease is poverty. Related barriers to AIDS prevention are racism; the low status of women; and an exploitive global economic system, which influences marketing of medical resources.”105 Similarly, Professors Farmer and Walton emphasize the fact that “the promotion of social and economic rights for the poor . . . is the key missing ingredient in the struggle against a pathogen that makes its own preferential option for the poor.”106 For Kevin Kelly, who concludes Keenan’s book, the Church must fight for two crucial issues: the dignity and status of women, and poverty.107 The book had some potent repercussions in Rome. By 2001 the pope’s relationship to the disease seemed to have changed a little. In a message to Kofi Annan for the United Nations Special Session on HIV/AIDS held in New York June 25–27, the pontiff first expressed his concern for “undoubtedly one of the major catastrophes of our time, especially in Africa.” He underlined that the disease was “not only a health problem, since the disease has tragic consequences for the social, economic and political life of peoples.”108 Softer in the evocation of contraception, the core of his message did not focus on sexuality anymore.109 Rather, the two problems he raised were “the transmission of HIV/AIDS from mother to child” and the “access of AIDS patients to medical care, and, as far as possible, to anti-retroviral treatment.”110 Nonetheless, at the end of the session on June 27, the Holy See representative read a short statement where, twice, Catholic prevention was mentioned in clear traditional terms: “The Holy See wishes to

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emphasize that, with regard to the use of condoms as a means of preventing HIV infection, it has in no way changed its moral position. . . . Finally, the Holy See continues to call attention to the undeniable fact that the only safe and completely reliable method of preventing the sexual transmission of HIV is abstinence before marriage and respect and mutual fidelity within marriage.”111 The issue among Catholics became more and more worthy of consideration. Catholics for Choice, for instance, was launched in 1999 and has directed important campaigns since 2000 in order to counter the Church’s noncooperation with certain preventive practices.112 Others, such as Clifford Longley, “an abrasive and independent-minded leading writer for The Tablet, declared himself ‘ashamed to be a Catholic’ in an article he wrote in 2001, because of the Pope’s intransigence on condoms and AIDS.”113 But when Caritas Internationalis organized a Meeting of Catholic Organizations Engaged in the Global Response to HIV and AIDS in January 2006, the condom issue was almost silenced: no real discussions were held on the topic. Cornwell sees “papal oppression” in the whole affair. Even if Gordon Nary, founding director of International Association of Physicians in AIDS Care who praised the book Catholic Ethicists on HIV/AIDS Prevention and sent “four dozen copies . . . to Catholic bishops in Latin America,” Church authorities remained faithful to the pope’s pronouncement.114 According to Cornwell’s account, archbishops in Uganda and Brazil put forward the Church’s policy: “The same month Archbishop Pierre made his bizarre pronouncements on the sinfulness of condoms in Uganda, a priest in Brazil who had been making condoms available for infected parishioners in his region received a ‘letter of condemnation’ from his archbishop, Laudio Hummes of Sao Paulo.”115 Could the archbishop, now cardinal, have acted differently? Two years later, at the plenary session of the United Nations on the “Implementation of the Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS,” Cardinal Hummes intervened on behalf of the Holy See. Yet, his address there was again much softer with regard to prevention—and overall, politically very astute. After assessing the fact that “HIV/AIDS has been and remains one of the major tragedies of our time” and recognizing that “more than 70 million people are expected to die of AIDS over the next 20 years,” the cardinal attacked the problem of the “cost of medical treatment.”116 Not only did he criticize pharmaceutical companies, he also called for “political will and moral courage.” He then congratulated the Holy See, which, “thanks to its institution worldwide, provides 25% of the total care given to HIV/AIDS victims, placing itself among the leading advocates in the field, in particular among the most ubiquitous and best providers of care for the victims.”117 At the end of his address, when he came to prevention, the cardinal announced that “the Holy See has established an Ad Hoc Committee on the fight against HIV/AIDS” that will, among other tasks, “pay special attention to the problems of stigma and discrimination accompanying the disease, to access to treatment and care, to education on responsible sexual behavior—including abstinence and marital fidelity—and to the care of HIV/AIDS orphans.”118 The fact that “abstinence and marital fidelity” are not extracted and put up front, but rather “included” among many other goals, is telling. The Church position did not change, but the promotion of it significantly did. Besides, like other bishops before him, Colombian cardinal Trujillo, president of the Pontifical Council for the Family and thus a Vatican spokesman for “life”

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issues, questioned the efficacy of the condoms in October 2003. As Cornwell recounts, “When he was interviewed by the BBC in October 2003, Trujillo stoutly stood his ground on the scientific and medical issue: Condoms don’t work.”119 The cardinal then issued a letter titled “Family Values Versus Safe Sex” (December 1, 2003) where he stated, for example, “that condoms may be defective is not mere theory, but a fact confirmed by real-life experiences in the real world. . . . For instance, some permeability and electric tests indicate that latex may allow passage of particles bigger than the HIV.”120 The BBC then investigated and proved him wrong: “The experts lined up to contradict the cardinal, as well they might: The Vatican statement threatened to undo years of investment in teaching safe sex to combat the disease.”121 The Church has indeed a tremendous credibility among Latino-American populations, still. So when a cardinal affirms something, even though it is not in the realm of its competences, he will be listened to with great caution. Cornwell then quotes different experts and actors against the pandemic who are concerned about the Church’s influence on prevention matters. As Morten Rostrup, president of the international council for Médecins Sans Frontières, put it, “The Catholic Church is now part of the problem.”122 With Benedict XVI, now, things do not appear to be different. In an address given to the bishops of South Africa, Botswana, Swaziland, Namibia, and Lesotho on their “Ad Limina Apostolorum” visit on June 10, 2005, the new pope declared: Brother Bishops, I share your deep concern over the devastation caused by AIDS and related diseases. ( . . . ) The Catholic Church has always been at the forefront both in prevention and in treatment of this illness. The traditional teaching of the Church has proven to be the only failsafe way to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS. For this reason, “the companionship, joy, happiness and peace which Christian marriage and fidelity provide, and the safeguard which chastity gives, must be continuously presented to the faithful, particularly the young”.123

CONCLUSIVE REMARKS Was John Paul II, by not encouraging preventive policies that advocate the use of prophylactics—and worse, by condemning them—guilty of a crime for nonassistance to persons in danger, as many people would suggest? Has the Church become a “promoter of death”? As I have warned from the beginning, it is very difficult to numerically measure the impact of the Roman Catholic Church policy. For Sr. Maria Martinelli of the Unions of Superiors General based in Rome, it is necessary to map HIV services sponsored by the superiors general of religious orders of both men and women religious: There is no documentation of the work that has been done over the years, nor is there an evaluation of our initiatives that are scientific and reliable. The world lacks visibility. . . . The lack of visibility and an inadequate management of images have provided an opportunity for simplification and distortion by the media, greatly devaluing the engagement of the Church in this field and focusing the debate more or less on the promotion of condoms or contraceptives.124

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Arguments that make the Church guilty of the AIDS hecatomb in Africa forget to include many other variables crucial to the growth of the epidemic: poverty, education, access to health services, cultural perception of the condom, impact of the Church’s indictment on the life of people, and many more. Nevertheless, although we cannot measure such an impact, we may assess strengths and weaknesses of the official Catholic teaching led by John Paul II in order for Catholic organizations to work adequately in that field as well. Let me first give a brief summary of what history has shown us before evaluating the Church official position.

Historical Review Had Paul VI listened to the papal commission on birth control that declared it was possible to make the Church rules regarding contraception more supple in 1966, Humanae Vitae would not have damaged this theological question so much. The results for public policy would then have been more in tune with what public health policies demanded. But history cannot be rewritten. We have seen that the trajectory of the official Church discourses has barely changed over time and has remained founded on the same principles that Paul VI and Karol Wojtyla spelled out: the “unitive” dimension of sexual intercourse cannot be separated from its procreative one, and a Catholic cannot prevent natural procreation by artificial means. As a perpetual believer in a personalist sexuality based on natural law, the new Polish pope took a strong stance against any deviation. In 1987, when progressive people realized that the disease was not restricted to one type of sexuality but touched everybody, even within the Church, the pope had no choice but to tackle the issue at the time of his visit to San Francisco. He succeeded in showing how the Church cares for everybody and how compassion was at the core of Catholic teaching. Yet, with the publication of the American bishops’ first draft of “The Many Faces of AIDS,” Rome, through the voice of Cardinal Ratzinger, made it clear that preventive prophylactics could not become an exception to her stance on contraception. From then on, the pope would strengthen the discourse: the twentieth anniversary of Humanae Vitae gave him the first occasion. A year later, in 1989, at the closing of the International Conference on AIDS organized by the Holy See, the pope reiterated his critique of the biomedical reduction of the issue, and reminded Catholics that AIDS prevention involving prophylactics could not be supported by the Church. His travels to Africa illustrated altogether his awareness of the Church’s uncomfortable position toward prevention, the degree of distress that AIDS put upon Africans, and the compassion the Church must show toward HIV victims. For John Paul II, the root of the problem was not social nor political, but moral, existential, spiritual. For him, the crisis in modern Western societies could only be alleviated through education and programs that would put people back on the path of truth. From the Cairo Conference to his encyclical Evangelium Vitae, the pope intensely tried to put societies “back on track”—on his terms, though. During this paramount attempt, the pope passionately battled at denouncing the so-called culture of death and its multiple tentacles that threatened the Church while proclaiming for himself a culture of life.

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Over time, however, the pope did not battle as much with respect to the condom issue. Some bishops’ conferences have commented differently on the issue. With the publication of Catholic Ethicists on HIV/AIDS Prevention, the disease was contextualized into broader social justice considerations. With the illness spreading and the reflection deepening, more important issues had to be dealt with, such as access to medication and global health care policies. Thus, underlines Keenan, “Worldwide moral theologians have argued convincingly and positively that the promotion of [condom distribution] is morally licit.”125 By the end of his pontificate, however, John Paul II had not changed his mind toward prophylactics, even though the official discourse was softened. Today, the Church continues to point to the broader problems that HIV/AIDS reveal, no longer in terms of ethics, but encompassing different social justice issues related to the pandemic.126

Strengths It is always easier to critique an institution negatively rather than assess the good points made. So let me first show how positive the Church has been in terms of the fight against HIV. By the early years of this century, the Holy See had started to boast—with reason—of the fact that “a total of 26.7 percent of centers for the provision of care in relation to HIV/AIDS in the world are Catholic based.”127 In that sense, the Church has always cared for HIV victims and moreover, has worked in order to destigmatize HIV-positive people. Their human dignity can often be jeopardized by traditional societies that are tempted to reject those with this disease. From 1987 on, John Paul II always insisted on the fact that HIV victims were children of God and of the same value as anybody else. In that sense, the pope severely censured theologies that would make God responsible for AIDS as a punishment against bad behaviors. For John Paul II, dealing with the AIDS pandemic had to be broadened: there is spiritual AIDS that put modern lifestyle at stake. Hence, to prevent and fight against AIDS must mean more than public health policies. For Henri Tincq, journalist in charge of religious affairs for Le Monde, the pope wanted to deal with the crises of the state, the nation, and the current culture. In reflecting on the purpose of freedom so recently regained in Eastern Europe, for example, the pope asked, How good is freedom if its usage is, to this point, tarnished?128 The same red line runs through the three encyclicals following the end of communism: Centesimus annus (1991), Splendor Veritatis (1993), and Evangelium Vitae (1995). His position on birth control, contraception, and by extension, prevention against AIDS, has to be contextualized in this broader triangle of “Life–Truth–Freedom.” Freedom does not give the right to slash truth or life. Following the traditional idea that “freedom is the daughter of truth,” John Paul II “places himself like a ‘legislator’ of the world as well as a conscience awakener” and reminds the world that “the legality of an act does not inevitably make it moral.”129 Tincq adds: “These pronouncements had sense only when they were reported to his program of universal ethics, to his absolute defense for ‘culture of life’ that will remain, no matter what happens, the apex of his pontificate.”130 In this way did the Holy See try to contextualize the debate about prevention within a larger debate about

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human rights. As other theologians have shown—such as Keenan et al.—the Church has been at the front when she questioned problematic shortcomings such as access to medication, the fight against poverty, and the need for education. And last, many moral theologians will still point to the fact that actually, abstention is not bad—the pope’s proposal is good! But it is not enough. A lot of Christians may not control their sexual lives the way clerics do (or want to do). The ideal might thus be valuable in itself, but not necessarily available—nor desirable—for everybody.

Weaknesses For those who are HIV infected and who will not refrain from having sexual relations, the Church needs to say something. In this (not so small) case, John Paul II remained deaf to contingencies. Moreover, when public policies and Catholic organizations have to deal with people who are not necessarily Christians and may be sexually active when HIV infected, a proactive response has to be established. This is one of the strongest critiques one may address to the Church. In the condom controversy, two discourses conflict with each other as two axes functioning on different planes. Often, John Paul II’s views would start from a broad and ideological perspective, while contesting views would stem from historical situations that demanded the incorporation of other material considerations than the theoretical principles. The difficulty arose from the fact that the pope would never start with a specific historical issue but would always come from the large abstract value of life. In that sense, his method was much more deductive than inductive.131 Without suggesting an ethical system only dependent on contingencies, the Church often has difficulty incorporating in its analysis those social, political, cultural, or historical elements that would determine another course of action. Material elements remain descriptive but have no normative influence. As Sacco points out, The fact that Karol Wojtyla avoids the analysis of any contingent situations and any conclusions of pastoral character has bewildered some commentators, who have judged the current papal teaching as a step back from John XXIII and Paul VI. However, it must be remembered that the choice of a theological and anthropological level is to be understood as the reflection of his will to incorporate his message into the most varied sociopolitical contexts of the world.132

The problem in trying to set out a message applicable in the most varied situations is that it may not be rightly applicable to any situations at last. When the moral conduct becomes fixed and theoretical, one has more difficulty adapting it to a peculiar situation. Another problematic position touches the way John Paul II led the Roman Catholic Church. If the pope wanted to remain at an abstract moral level, he should not have infringed on the bishops’ conferences as in his apostolic letter Apostolos Suos, On the Theological and Juridical Nature of Episcopal Conferences in 1998. Indeed, modern ecclesiology since Vatican II demands allowing local Churches the freedom to decide for their own situation what needs to be emphasized from

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the official teaching and what does not (cf. the bishops in France and in the United States who are willing to provide information on prophylactics). This critique has been made in many other forms against John Paul II. Coming from a Soviet country where the Church had to show a common and united front against the communist regime, the Polish pope may have reproduced this logic within the Catholic Church against the “culture of death” emanating from Western countries. Dissents such as Curran’s in 1986 had to be silenced. Since the publication of Humanae Vitae in 1968, although many bishops, theologians, and lay people disagree with the pope’s position on prophylactics, regarding contraception in general and HIV in particular, there is no strong disagreement against such positions. Even though some Catholic lay movements such as Catholics for Choice have campaigned under the banner “We believe in God. We believe that sex is sacred. We believe in caring for each other. We believe in using condoms, ”133 and even though bishops such as Cardinal Martini in 2006 and theologians such as Keenan, Grémion, and Touzard have also been involved, public dissension is regrettably not allowed within the Church. In the same line of thought, as I personally witnessed in Colombia when I researched the issue in 2005–06,134 if a Catholic organization decides to do something other than what the Magisterium demands (such as providing information about condoms, or giving such devices to people who will need them, such as sex workers) the organization will have to hide this fact in order not to be rebuked. The Catholic ranks have thus become very tightly fastened together, but not in better service to the world. At last, declarations like Cardinal Trujillo’s on the inefficacy of condoms have been disastrous in countries such as Colombia, according to its UNAIDS national coordinator, Ricardo García Bernal.135 If the Church has been successful at destigmatizing people living with HIV/AIDS, “it is the moral duty for religious leaders to destigmatize condoms!”136 said Zackie Achmat, an important AIDS activist in South Africa. By contributing to its shame, the Church’s message does not help to restrict the spread of that scourge: on the contrary, it often worsens the situation severely.

Points to Develop The status of prophylactics depends on the way that sexuality, ethics, birth control issues, human dignity, and health policies are viewed. As Tad Szulc reports, the theologian Charles Curran remarked pointedly: “The only reason why contraception is an important issue today is because it has become symbolic. Because if you change on contraception, you’re going to have to recognize that you’re going to have to change on other things as well.”137 Indeed, there is still a lot to think through in terms of sexuality and contraception, as Grémion and Touzard show in their book L’Église et la contraception: l’urgence d’un changement. Science has demonstrated that arguments made through ancient visions of the human body are obsolete now—yet rules remain based on such implicit visions. Some theologians argue that sexuality should be seen as a (body) language rather than a natural tool for reproductive ends. Expression of oneself goes beyond one’s genitals. A thorough modification of discourses about sexuality is necessary here.

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This first argument relies on the assumption that the Magisterium could recognize itself as limited and in evolution—but this way of conceiving the Magisterium, I suspect, is not likely to come soon. Distinctions can be drawn without changing it. The conflation between contraception and abortion in John Paul II’s writings, for example, is problematic. Certainly too tight, this association prevented the pope from regarding contraception in a different way than abortion: both were similar components of a threatening “death culture” and were not approached with sufficient distinction. Also, in order to promote natality, the Church may often assume that birth control means should be discarded. But in the same way natural methods are recognized by the Magisterium, artificial contraception should gain more favor, as the birth control commission argued in 1966. At last, as Enda McDonagh, consultant to the AIDS Funding Network Group, explained: “We failed to make the sharp distinction, the real distinction, between contraception and the prevention of death.”138 Even if the Church would not change her discourse about sex, ethical discourses have tried to make these distinctions operable in order to integrate prophylactics as a way to prevent HIV/AIDS. Keenan, followed by other theologians, proposes the principle of cooperation rather than the principle of toleration as a way to reduce the evil of a situation. Casuistry of accommodation can also be found through the “lesser evil” principle expressed by the French bishops. In many cases, the idea is straightforward: if we cannot follow the rule, let us not aggravate the situation, but diminish it—hence cooperate in order to lessen the evil. At last, the idea of the Ghana Episcopal Conference is interesting: they stated their position as representatives of the Catholic Church, but referred people to other sources of information, such as the government, which are more specialized than them in public health issues, for example. Even though the current pope has been concerned about many of HIV’s broader issues, he has remained too silent regarding the impact of the virus on women. If Benedict XVI has announced that he would tackle the issue, nothing has officially been done to my knowledge. When an HIV-infected husband decides to have sexual intercourse with his wife, not only might she not have the right to say no, but then, she will not even be protected. Patriarchal and ideological at times, John Paul II had difficulty taking into account the fact that a woman’s fate could be better protected with effective contraceptive devices. To conclude, a personalist ethic must advocate education of minds rather than insistence on norms. Catholics are often using that discourse, but norms decreed by Rome differ significantly. Yet, often can we hear “We too preach the gospel, but we try above all to form consciences . . . .” as Vitillo reports, quoting Archbishop Theodore Adrien Sarr, president of the Bishops’ Conference of Senegal said in the International Conference on AIDS and Religion, held in Dakar, Senegal, in 1996.139 To promote responsibility is at the end of the day what the Church has to do. Fortunately, chances are that the Church will evolve, when even conservatives like Fr. Martin Rohnheimer, a priest of Opus Dei and professor of ethics and political philosophy at the Pontifical University of the Holy Cross in Rome, was able to write in an article “The Truth about Condoms” in The Tablet, October 7, 2004: “What do I, as a Catholic priest, tell AIDS-infected promiscuous people or homosexuals who are using condoms? I will try to help them to live an upright and well-ordered sexual life. But I will not tell them not to use condoms. I simply

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will talk to them about this and assume that if they choose to have sex they will at least keep a sense of responsibility.”140 Now the question remains: with this sense of responsibility, will the official teaching of the Church be able to change so as to allow Catholic organizations to distribute condoms as a means among others to combat the AIDS pandemic? Many are awaiting this change, because it would not only help to fight the scourge, but more importantly, give these organizations crucial credibility in doing so— and thus function more in productive synergy with other lay organizations.

NOTES 1. Quotation inspired by Czerny’s article, available at http://www.jesuitaids.net/pdf/ 2006_Czerny_AIDS_Civilta_ENG.pdf. 2. Newsweek, May 15, 2006. 3. I shall use the term “the Church” in its “intra-Catholic theological” sense: thus when I refer to the whole body, I capitalize the “C” and feminize the word, as some American theologians do as well. 4. Ian Fisher, “Ideals Collide as Vatican Rethinks Condom Ban,” New York Times (May 2, 2006). 5. Rusell Shorto, “Contra-Contraception,” New York Times Magazine (May 7, 2006). 6. See for example the Roman Catechism of the Council of Trent, Part II, ch. 8. 7. Casti Connubii (http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius_xi/encyclicals/documents/ hf_p-xi_enc_31121930_casti-connubii_en.html), §54. 8. Thomas Fox, Sexuality and Catholicism (New York: George Braziller, 1995), p. 67. 9. Robert McClory, Turning Point: The Inside Story of the Papal Birth Control Commission, and How Humanae Vitae Changed the Life of Patty Crowley and the Future of the Church (New York: Crossroad, 1995), pp. 90–91. 10. Catherine Grémion and Hubert Touzard, L’église et la contraception: l’urgence d’un changement (Paris: Bayard, 2006), p. 56. 11. Fox, p. 67. 12. Grémion and Touzard, p. 58. 13. Bernard Lecomte, Jean-Paul II (Paris: Gallimard, 2003), pp. 229–30. 14. Fox, p. 70. This disappointment should be significantly emphasized as it will never diminish throughout time. I know a few priests who were astounded by that decision. In Rome, a woman “high in the administrative hierarchy” told me that the day after Humanae Vitae’s publication, Paul VI was at a convent where he used to go. He had tears in his eyes while saying that he feared the world’s reaction, but that he did not see how he could have treated the question of contraception differently. Another instance is given by Fox: “The Italian Cardinal Achille Silvestrini was one of many who saw Pope Paul as a kind of Hamlet figure. Silvestrini remarked once that Montini, the intellectual, saw all too clearly ‘the infinite complexity of situations.’ Adding to the pope’s problems were the already vastly raised expectations of the world’s Catholics.” (Fox, p. 67). 15. Humanae Vitae (http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/paul_vi/encyclicals/documents/ hf_p-vi_enc_25071968_humanae-vitae_en.html), §14. 16. The argument continues: “The reason is that the fundamental nature of the marriage act, while uniting husband and wife in the closest intimacy, also renders them capable of generating new life—and this as a result of laws written into the actual nature of man and of woman. And if each of these essential qualities, the unitive and the procreative, is preserved, the use of marriage fully retains its sense of true mutual love and its ordination to the supreme responsibility of parenthood to which man is called. We believe that our

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contemporaries are particularly capable of seeing that this teaching is in harmony with human reason” (http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/paul_vi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-vi _enc_25071968_humanae-vitae_en.html, §12). 17. First published in Poland in 1960 (the part on contraception and the conjugal act can be found in the English version published in 1981, pp. 232–44); John Paul II, Love and Responsibility (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1981), p. 232. 18. John Paul II, Love and Responsibility, p. 232. 19. John Cornwell, The Pontiff in Winter: Triumph and Conflict in the Reign of John Paul II (New York: Doubleday, 2004), p. 59. 20. Cornwell, p. 59. 21. Familiaris Consortio (http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/apost_ exhortations/documents/hf_jp-ii_exh_19811122_familiaris-consortio_en.html), §31. 22. Bill Kenkelen, “AIDS: Its Victims Are This Century’s Lepers,” National Catholic Reporter (July 6, 1984). 23. Fox, p. 158. 24. David Willey, God’s Politician: John Paul at the Vatican (London: Faber & Faber, 1992), p. 178. 25. Bernard O’Connor, Papal Diplomacy—John Paul II and the Culture of Peace (South Bend, IN: St Augustine’s Press, 2005), p. 107. 26. O’Connor, p. 133. 27. In his sixth ad limina address to the bishops of the United States, September 24, 1983, the pope said: “Couples must be urged to avoid any action that threatens a life already conceived, that denies or frustrates their procreative power, or violates the integrity of the marriage act.” (§4, John Paul II, The Pope Speaks to the American Church—John Paul II’s Homilies, Speeches and Letters to Catholics in the United States [New York: Harper Collins, 1992], p. 401). 28. Joseph Ratzinger,“Letter of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith to Father Charles Curran,” L’Osservatore Romano, Weekly Edition in English 951.3 (Aug 25, 1986). 29. After restating Humanae Vitae’s argument, the text concludes: “Contraception deliberately deprives the conjugal act of its openness to procreation and in this way brings about a voluntary dissociation of the ends of marriage. (Instruction on Respect for Human Life in Its Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation: Replies to Certain Questions of the Day, § II.B.4.a). 30. Letter to the Bishops of the Catholic Church on the Pastoral Care of Homosexual Persons (http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_ 19861001_homosexual-persons_en.html), §3. 31. “In a particular way, we would ask the Bishops to support, with the means at their disposal, the development of appropriate forms of pastoral care for homosexual persons. These would include the assistance of the psychological, sociological and medical sciences, in full accord with the teaching of the Church.” (§17); Kenneth Briggs, Holy Siege: The Year that Shook Catholic America (San Francisco, CA: HarperSanFrancisco, 1992), p. 202. 32. Fox, p. 159. See also Briggs, pp. 281–83. 33. Margaret Melady, The Rhetoric of Pope John Paul II—The Pastoral Visit as a New Vocabulary of the Sacred (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999), p. 84. 34. “Archbishop John R. Quinn found himself in perhaps the most sensitive situation among his Episcopal colleagues. As archbishop of San Francisco, he had been confronted with the appeals and demands of a large and resourceful gay community. All about his downtown chancery office, the AIDS scourge raged with a fury unparalleled in the nation” (Briggs, pp. 202–3). 35. Melady, p. 84. See also Briggs, pp. 547–49. 36. Willey, p. 180; Robert Vitillo, “Reaching Out to Those with HIV/AIDS” in John Thavis, John Paul II: A Light for the World: Essays and Reflections on the Papacy of John Paul II (Lanham, MD: Sheed & Ward, 2003), p. 142.

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37. Vitillo, “Reaching Out to Those with HIV/AIDS,” p. 142. 38. Briggs, p. 548. 39. “Because we live in a pluralistic society, we acknowledge that some will not agree with our understanding of human sexuality. We recognize that public educational programs addressed to a wide audience will reflect the fact that some people will not act as they can and should; that they will not refrain from the type of sexual or drug abuse behavior that can transmit AIDS. In such situations, educational efforts, if grounded in the broader moral vision outlined above, could include accurate information about prophylactic devices or other practices proposed by some medical experts as potential means of preventing AIDS. We are not promoting the use of prophylactics, but merely providing information that is part of the factual picture. Such a factual presentation should indicate that abstinence outside of marriage and fidelity within marriage as well as the avoidance of intravenous drug abuse are the only morally correct and medically sure ways to prevent the spread of AIDS. So called safe sex practices are at best only partially effective.” From the USCCB website: http://www.usccb.org/sdwp/international/mfa87.htm#4. 40. It is also interesting to note that from the unsigned article published in the L’Osservatore Romano, March 10, 1989, edition, Cardinal Ratzinger first quoted the following: “To seek a solution to the problem of infection by promoting the use of prophylactics would be to embark on a way not only insufficiently reliable from the technical point of view, but also and above all, unacceptable from the moral aspect. Such a proposal for ‘safe’ or at least ‘safer’ sex—as they say—ignores the real cause of the problem, namely, the permissiveness which, in the area of sex as in that related to other abuses, corrodes the moral fiber of the people” (Joseph Ratzinger, “On ‘The Many Faces of AIDS’—Letter to Archbishop Pio Laghi,” L’Osservatore Romano [May 29, 1989]; subsequently republished by Zenit, the Catholic Web Media: http://www.zenit.org/english/visualizza.phtml?sid=72217). 41. James Keenan, “Prophylactics, Toleration and Cooperation: Contemporary Problems and Traditional Principles,” International Philosophical Quarterly, vol. XXIX, no. 2, issue no. 114 (June 1989), p. 217. 42. U.S. Catholic Conference Administrative Board, “The Many Faces of AIDS: A Gospel Response,” Origins (December 24, 1987); John Paul II “Compassion and Responsibility: A Response to the HIV/AIDS Crisis,” Origins (November 30, 1989). 43. James Keenan (assisted by Jon D. Fuller, Lisa Sowle Cahill, and Kevin Kelly), Catholic Ethicists on HIV/AIDS Prevention (New York: Continuum, 2000), p. 24. 44. It is hard to find a reliable source for this quote: although Lecomte (p. 483) and others mention it, the only serious account of such intervention was found in Bernard Joinet, M. Afr, “La Pandémie du sida. Une catastrophe si discrète. Que pouvons-nous faire? Quelques suggestions” in Petit Écho no. 925, 2001/9. See also http://www.sedos.org/french/joinet.htm. 45. http://www.cef.fr/catho/endit/sante/19890109sida_conseilpermanent.php. 46. John Paul II, “The diligent search for truth requires the teaching of the Magisterium,” L’Osservatore Romano, Weekly Edition in English no. 51–52 (December 19–26, 1988). 47. John Paul II, “The diligent search for truth requires the teaching of the Magisterium,” p. 7. 48. John Paul II, “The diligent search for truth requires the teaching of the Magisterium,” p. 7. 49. “The Church’s Magisterium is among the means which Christ’s redeeming love has provided to avoid this danger of error. In his name it has a real teaching authority. Therefore, it cannot be said that the faithful have embarked on a diligent search for truth if they do not take into account what the Magisterium teaches, or if, by putting it on the same level as any other source of knowledge, one makes oneself judge, or if in doubt, one follows one’s own opinion or that of theologians, preferring it to the sure teaching of the Magisterium” (John Paul II, “The diligent search for truth requires the teaching of the Magisterium,” p. 7).

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50. Ugo Sacco, John Paul II and World Politics: Twenty Years of a Search for a New Approach, 1978–1998 (Leuven, Belgium: Peeters, 1999), p. 39. 51. Willey, p. 165. 52. “Our own century has experienced such terrible wars and political tensions, such offenses against life and freedom, such seemingly intractable sources of suffering—including the present-day tragedies of the international drug trade and the increasing spread of AIDS— that some people may hesitate to express too much hope or to be over optimistic about the future” (O’Connor, p. 322). 53. Willey, p. 181. 54. Willey, p. 182. 55. Willey, p. 182. 56. John Paul II, “The Church faced with the challenge of AIDS: prevention worthy of the human person and assistance in complete solidarity,” L’Osservatore Romano, Weekly Edition in English no. 49 (December 4, 1989), p. 3. 57. John Paul II, “The Church faced with the challenge of AIDS: prevention worthy of the human person and assistance in complete solidarity,” L’Osservatore Romano, Weekly Edition in English no. 49 (December 4, 1989), p. 3. 58. John Paul II, “The Church faced with the challenge of AIDS: prevention worthy of the human person and assistance in complete solidarity,” p. 3 (italics in the text). 59. John Paul II, “The Church faced with the challenge of AIDS: prevention worthy of the human person and assistance in complete solidarity,” p. 3. 60. John Paul II, “The Church faced with the challenge of AIDS: prevention worthy of the human person and assistance in complete solidarity,” p. 3. 61. John Paul II, “The AIDS epidemic,” Origins 20.15 (September 20, 1990), p. 243. 62. John Paul II, “The AIDS epidemic,” p. 243. 63. John Paul II, “The AIDS epidemic,” p. 243. 64. John Paul II, “A Church Responding to the Sick and the Poor,” Origins 20.15 (September 20, 1990), p. 244. 65. See also Michael Walsh, John Paul II (London: Harper Collins, 1994), pp. 227–28. 66. Vitillo, “Reaching Out to Those with HIV/AIDS,” p. 142. 67. John Paul II, “Africa’s AIDS crisis,” Origins 22.36 (February 18, 1993), p. 614. 68. John Paul II, “Africa’s AIDS crisis,” p. 614. 69. Veritatis Splendor (http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/ documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_06081993_veritatis-splendor_en.html), §40. 70. John Paul II, edited by Vittorio Messori [translated from the Italian by Jenny McPhee and Martha McPhee]. Crossing the Threshold of Hope (New York : Knopf, 1994), pp. 166–67; italics from John Paul II. 71. “While certainly showing maternal understanding for the many complex crisis situations in which families are involved, as well as for the moral frailty of every human being, the Church is convinced that she must remain absolutely faithful to the truth about human love. Otherwise she would betray herself. To move away from this saving truth would be to close ‘the eyes of our hearts’ (cf. Eph 1:18), which instead should always stay open to the light which the Gospel sheds on human affairs (cf. 2 Tim 1:10). An awareness of that sincere gift of self whereby man ‘finds himself ’ must be constantly renewed and safeguarded in the face of the serious opposition which the Church meets on the part of those who advocate a false civilization of progress” (http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/letters/documents/ hf_jp-ii_let_02021994_families_en.html, §11. 72. Letter to Families (http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/letters/documents/ hf_jp-ii_let_02021994_families_en.html), §12. 73. “In the conjugal act, husband and wife are called to confirm in a responsible way the mutual gift of self which they have made to each other in the marriage covenant” (Letter to Families, §12).

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74. Letter to Families, §12. 75. Letter to Families, §13. 76. John Paul II, “Message to UN population fund director—Basic issues of family and transmission of human life require serious ethical reflection,” L’Osservatore Romano, Weekly Edition in English no. 12 (1333) (March 23, 1994), p. 2. 77. John Paul II, “Message to UN population fund director—Basic issues of family and transmission of human life require serious ethical reflection,” p. 2. 78. John Paul II, “Message to UN population fund director—Basic issues of family and transmission of human life require serious ethical reflection,” p. 2. 79. This is why the pope stated, “In accordance with its specific competence and mission, the Holy See is concerned that proper attention should be given to the ethical principles determining actions taken in response to the demographic, sociological and public policy analyses of the data on population trends” (John Paul II, “Message to UN population fund director—Basic issues of family and transmission of human life require serious ethical reflection,” pp. 1–2). 80. John Paul II, “Message to UN population fund director—Basic issues of family and transmission of human life require serious ethical reflection,” p. 2. 81. Lecomte, p. 478. 82. Cornwell, p. 131. 83. Lecomte, p. 477. 84. John Paul II, “Defend the sacredness of family life!” L’Osservatore Romano, Weekly Edition in English no. 16 (1337) (April 20, 1994), p. 1. 85. John Paul II, “Defend the sacredness of family life!” p. 1. 86. John Paul II, “Defend the sacredness of family life!” p. 1. 87. Archbishop Martino, “All must be ensured life and dignity,” L’Osservatore Romano, Weekly Edition in English no. 37 (September 14, 1994), p. 6. 88. Archbishop Martino: “The Holy See expresses partial consensus and reservations without prejudicing its position as regards some sections of Final Document.” L’Osservatore Romano, Weekly Edition in English no. 38 (September 21, 1994), p. 7. 89. Cornwell, pp. 142–43. 90. More positively, the pope would rather suggest as a solution the following: “The ways of solving the population problem are quite different. Governments and the various international agencies must above all strive to create economic, social, public health and cultural conditions which will enable married couples to make their choices about procreation in full freedom and with genuine responsibility. They must then make efforts to ensure ‘greater opportunities and a fairer distribution of wealth so that everyone can share equitably in the goods of creation. Solutions must be sought on the global level by establishing a true economy of communion and sharing of goods, in both the national and international order.’ This is the only way to respect the dignity of persons and families, as well as the authentic cultural patrimony of peoples.” (§91) 91. Lecomte, p. 482. 92. Lecomte, p. 482. 93. Evangelium Vitae (http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/ documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_25031995_evangelium-vitae_en.html), §13. 94. Evangelium Vitae, §13. 95. Sacco, p. 39. 96. http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/apost_exhortations/documents/ hf_jp-ii_exh_14091995_ecclesia-in-africa_en.html, §116. 97. Lecomte, p. 484. 98. Apostolos Suos (http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/motu_proprio/ documents/hf_jp-ii_motu-proprio_22071998_apostolos-suos_en.html), §7. 99. “In dealing with new questions and in acting so that the message of Christ enlightens and guides people’s consciences in resolving new problems arising from changes in society, the

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Bishops assembled in the Episcopal Conference and jointly exercising their teaching office are well aware of the limits of their pronouncements. While being official and authentic and in communion with the Apostolic See, these pronouncements do not have the characteristics of a universal magisterium. For this reason the Bishops are to be careful to avoid interfering with the doctrinal work of the Bishops of other territories, bearing in mind the wider, even worldwide, resonance which the means of social communication give to the events of a particular region. Taking into account that the authentic magisterium of the Bishops, namely what they teach insofar as they are invested with the authority of Christ, must always be in communion with the Head of the College and its members, when the doctrinal declarations of Episcopal Conferences are approved unanimously, they may certainly be issued in the name of the Conferences themselves, and the faithful are obliged to adhere with a sense of religious respect to that authentic magisterium of their own Bishops. However, if this unanimity is lacking, a majority alone of the Bishops of a Conference cannot issue a declaration as authentic teaching of the Conference to which all the faithful of the territory would have to adhere, unless it obtains the recognitio of the Apostolic See, which will not give it if the majority requesting it is not substantial” (Apostolos Suos, §22). 100. Jo Renee Formicola, Pope John Paul II: Prophetic Politician (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2002), p. 216. 101. Cornwell, p. 239. 102. Cornwell, p. 239. 103. Keenan, Catholic Ethicists on HIV/AIDS Prevention, p. 21. 104. Keenan, Catholic Ethicists on HIV/AIDS Prevention, p. 25. 105. Sowle Cahill in Keenan, Catholic Ethicists on HIV/AIDS Prevention, p. 282. 106. Farmer and Walton in Keenan, Catholic Ethicists on HIV/AIDS Prevention, p. 109. 107. Kelly, in Keenan (2000), pp. 324–32. 108. John Paul II, “Message to U.N. Session on HIV/AIDS,” Origins 31.10 (August 2, 2001), p. 187. 109. “The Catholic Church through her magisterium and her commitment to the victims of HIV/AIDS, continues to affirm the sacred values of life. Her efforts with regard to prevention and assistance to those affected, often in cooperation with the institutions of the United Nations, are in keeping with her mission of love and service to the lives of all, from conception to natural death” (John Paul II, “Message to U.N. Session on HIV/AIDS,” p. 187). 110. John Paul II, “Message to U.N. Session on HIV/AIDS,” p. 187. 111. http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/secretariat_state/documents/rc_seg-st_doc_ 20010627_declaration-aids_en.html. 112. “Young people all around the world, both Catholic and non-Catholic, are facing the HIV/AIDS pandemic. The Vatican’s ban on condoms is a both a social justice issue and a matter of consequence for anyone at risk of HIV/AIDS, regardless of religion, sex and ethnicity. Using condoms saves lives—and using a condom to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS promotes the culture of life that the Vatican calls for. In an effort to raise public awareness about the devastating effect of the bishops’ ban on condoms, Catholics for a Free Choice launched the “Condoms4Life Campaign” on World AIDS Day 2001.” From http://www.catholicsforchoice.org/topics/hivaids/default.asp. 113. Cornwell, p. 244. 114. Keenan, Catholic Ethicists on HIV/AIDS Prevention, p. i. 115. Cornwell, p. 241. 116. http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/secretariat_state/2003/documents/rc_ seg-st_20030922_commitment-hiv-aids_en.html. 117. http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/secretariat_state/2003/documents/rc_ seg-st_20030922_commitment-hiv-aids_en.html. 118. http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/secretariat_state/2003/documents/rc_ seg-st_20030922_commitment-hiv-aids_en.html.

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119. Cornwell, p. 245. 120. “Family Values Versus Safe Sex” (§ 10). This letter can be found on the Vatican website: http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/family/documents/rc_pc_ family_doc_20031201_family-values-safe-sex-trujillo_en.html#Latex. 121. Cornwell, p. 245. 122. Cornwell, p. 246. 123. http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speeches/2005/june/documents/ hf_ben-xvi_spe_20050610_ad-limina-south-africa_en.html, §116. 124. Caritas Internationalis. Report of Meeting of Catholic Organizations Engaged in the Global Response to HIV and AIDS. Meeting held in Geneva, Switzerland (January 23–26, 2006), pp. 27–28. 125. Keenan, Catholic Ethicists on HIV/AIDS Prevention, p. 14. 126. See also James Keenan, “Developments in Bioethics from the Perspective of HIV/AIDS,” Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics no. 14 (2005), p. 419. 127. http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/hlthwork/documents/ rc_pc_hlthwork_doc_20051201_giornata-aids_en.html. 128. Henri Tincq, Défis au Pape du troisième millénaire: le pontificat de Jean Paul II, les dossiers du successeur (Paris: Lattès, 1997), p. 309. 129. Tincq, p. 253. 130. Tincq, p. 256. 131. “For the Vatican to concede that in some circumstances, however rare, the use of condoms constitutes a lesser evil is, in effect, to set aside centuries of traditional deductive theology, an approach that moves from principle to reality. Reform-minded moral theologians have been arguing for an inductive approach, starting with situation and moving to teaching” (Fox, p. 160). 132. Sacco, p. 38. 133. www.condoms4life.org. 134. The research consisted in exploring how a Catholic organization, Fundación Eudes, working with HIV positive persons and in prevention, could be as effective as possible while remaining “catholic.” A documentary is in the process of being made, thanks to a fellowship by CASE (Council of Alumni for Social Enterprise), Harvard University. For more information, see http://www.casefellowships.org/abstract_region.php?school= Harvard%20Divinity%20School. 135. Private interview for a documentary that was to come. 136. Zackie Achmat, Fulfilling the Development Promise: Transforming Ideas into Action (conference given at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, April 7, 2006). 137. Tad Szulc, Pope John Paul II: The Biography (New York: Scribner, 1995), p. 330. 138. Caritas Internationalis, Report of Meeting of Catholic Organizations Engaged in the Global Response to HIV and AIDS, p. 71. 139. Robert Vitillo, “Pastoral and Theological Challenges of HIV and AIDS” (paper presented at the National Seminar organized for priests in Ghana by the Centre for Human Development, Accra, June 16–17, 2004, unpublished), p. 11. 140. http://www.thetablet.co.uk/articles/2284/.

CHAPTER 13

Religion, Violence, and Human Rights: A Hindu Perspective Arvind Sharma

HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMAN DIGNITY

T

hroughout this chapter I shall assume that it is analytically advantageous to carry out our discussion in terms of the twin concepts of human rights and human dignity. Sometimes these two terms are used almost synonymously; when a distinction is drawn between the two, there is a tendency to view human dignity as the more comprehensive of the two. I shall use both the terms and in both ways—sometimes as interchangeable and sometimes as distinct, sometimes as dual but undivided and yet at other times as two separate concepts, but united, even in tension. The second introductory remark is not unrelated to the first. In the main body of the chapter, I shall approach my topic through a series of successively broadening circles of orientation. I shall thus begin by examining the question of the dignity of the dead or those about to be killed, that is to say, human dignity in the face of violence, or in the case of a violent end. The next concentric circle will examine the possibility of defending human dignity not against but through violence. A third circle shall encompass the question of maintaining the dignity of combatants and noncombatants in the course of war—that often secularly ritualized enactment of violence. Finally, I shall draw the largest circle around some concepts of Hindu and Indic civilization that seem to dignify violence itself, and examine their implications. In brief, then, dignity in violence, dignity through violence, dignity while engaged in violence, and finally, dignifying violence are the four themes I shall be touching upon. Before I embark on this exercise, however, I would like to offer a few comments on the timeliness of the topic of the chapter as it was brought home to me even as I was writing it. I use the word timeliness advisedly. It is one of the virtues whose cultivation is recommended in Confucianism through the term chung-yung. The word is often translated as “the middle way” but possesses a strong connotation of “timeliness,” as in being neither too early nor too late, in a Confucian setting. I would like to share two indications of this, one in terms of human rights and the other in terms of human dignity. An op-ed piece by Michael Ignatieff appeared in

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the New York Times on February 5, 2002, under the title “Is the Human Rights Era Ending?” It proposed that the time had come to challenge the regnant mood in the wake of the events of September 11, 2001, that “national security trumps human rights.”1 On the other hand, when the »agkar7c7rya of Kanchi, a leading pontiff of India, was asked, with tension building up in Ayodhy7 for commencing work on the construction of the R7ma Temple on March 15, 2002, “What is the real meaning of ahias7 or non-violence in today’s world?” he replied, “We need both pacifism and just wars for the good of the land,” when such good presumably included maintaining human dignity at least in the good land of India and perhaps the world.2

HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE DEAD I would now like to proceed by referring to one of the earliest episodes I know involving violence and dignity. It is provided by the Greek playwright Sophocles (496–406 BCE). “Human rights theorists refer to [his] Antigone, as the classic example from Greek literature. According to Sophocles, King Creon reproaches Antigone for having given her brother a burial, contrary to the law of the city (because her brother had fought against the Polis). She responded that she is obliged to follow a higher, unwritten law which supersedes positive (man-made) law.”3 One is tempted to ask, Do the dead have human rights—such as the right to a decent burial even at the hands of the enemy? Should a shared humanity not transcend enmity? One is reminded here of an incident in the Hindu epic R7m7yaha, in which the demon R7vaha abducts the wife of R7ma. R7vaha is ultimately killed by R7ma, as R7ma proceeds to rescue his wife, SXt7, from him. With R7vaha lying dead, R7ma is asked what is to be done with his dead body. Thereupon R7ma famously replies to the brother of the dead R7vaha: Enmities end at death. Our purpose is served. Perform the proper rites. He is as much [a brother] to me as he is to you.4

So much for human rights and human dignity of the dead.

VIOLENCE AS PROTECTOR OF HUMAN RIGHTS Violence comprises both human rights and human dignity. The matter seems fairly straightforward when stated in this way. But when it is put under an analytical lens, it gets more convoluted. It gets more convoluted in terms of human rights in view of the fact that sometimes it may be necessary to resort to violence in order to protect human rights—as in the face of terrorism. This is considered acceptable from a Hindu or even an Indic perspective, since this presents a case when violence recoils on violence, in the memorable phrase of the Manusmxti (VIII. 349–51), a well-known Hindu text usually assigned in its present form to the second century AD. Bühler translates the relevant verses as follows: 349. In their own defence, in a strife for the fees of officiating priests, and in order to protect women and Br7hmahas; he who (under such circumstances) kills in the cause of right, commits no sin.

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350. One may slay without hesitation an assassin who approaches (with murderous intent), whether (he be one’s) teacher, a child or an aged man, or a Br7hmaha deeply versed in the Vedas. 351. By killing an assassin the slayer incurs no guilt, whether (he does it) publicly or secretly; in that case fury recoils upon fury.5

These verses contain an important Sanskrit word 7tat7yin, literally one who has stretched the bow to the extreme, thereby graphically representing an oppressor. The word is also sometimes used in a technical sense to include the following: (1) an arsonist, (2) a murderer, (3) a terrorist, (4) a rapist, (5) a robber, and (6) a felon.6

MAINTAINING HUMAN DIGNITY IN VIOLENCE We turn next to the question of human rights and human dignity in violence, namely in the conduct of violence or, briefly, in war. The Manusmxti just alluded to also provides surprisingly relevant material on this point. The famous scholar of Indic civilization, Professor A. L. Basham, remarks on the provisions relating to war found therein (VII. 90–93) that the “chivalrous rules of warfare, probably based on a very old tradition, and codified in their present form among the martial peoples of western India in pre-Mauryan times, must have had some effect in mitigating the harshness of war for combatant and non-combatant alike.”7 He goes on to add, “It is doubtful if any other ancient civilization set such humane ideals of warfare.”8 Ideals mind you—which means that they were perhaps not always observed in practice, but Basham was sufficiently impressed with them to write elsewhere in his classic study of Indic civilization, “No other ancient law giver proclaimed such noble ideals of fair play in battle as Manu did.”9 Before we turn to the consideration of the ideals set for the combatants, let us pause for a moment to consider the fate of the noncombatants, who, according to the general code of war, were to be spared. Striking evidence that such was the case at least during some periods of ancient Indian history is provided by the extant fragments of the work of Megasthenes, the Seleucid ambassador at the court of the Mauryan emperor of India in the fourth century BCE. Megasthenes famously (though erroneously) observed that famine was unknown in India, meaning thereby perhaps that is was unknown in India as he knew it. This observation is remarkable in itself, but one of the explanations he provides for it is perhaps even more remarkable, for he goes on to say, But, further, there are usages observed by the Indians which contribute to prevent the occurrence of famine among them; for whereas among other nations it is usual, in the contests of war, to ravage the soil, and thus to reduce it to an uncultivated waste, among the Indians, on the contrary, by whom husbandmen are regarded as a class that is sacred and inviolable, the tillers of the soil, even when battle is raging in their neighbourhood, are undisturbed by any sense of danger, for the combatants on either side in waging the conflict make carnage of each other, but allow those engaged in husbandry to remain quite unmolested. Besides, they neither ravage an enemy’s land with fire, nor cut down its trees.10

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Hartmut Scharfe notes that “Alexander’s historians observed with amazement how Indian peasants went about their work in the fields unharmed in full view of two fighting armies.” He also notes that the Mah7bh7rata (XII. 104.39) “recommends against the destruction of crops in war, at least under certain conditions, and tribal allies are instructed in the proper conduct of war [as follows]: don’t destroy crops or fields.”11 We turn next to the preservation of the dignity of the combatants themselves, or even of their human rights in some ways, speaking anachronistically of course. I now cite from the Manusmxti: 90. When he fights with his foes in battle, let him not strike with weapons concealed (in wood), not with (such as are) barbed, poisoned, or the points of which are blazing with fire. 91. Let him not strike one who (in flight) has climbed on an eminence, nor a eunuch, nor one who joins the palms of his hands (in supplication), nor one who (flees) with flying hair, nor one who sits down, nor one who says “I am thine”; 92. Nor one who sleeps, nor one who has lost his coat of mail, nor one who is naked, nor one who is disarmed, nor one who looks on without taking part in the fight, nor one who is fighting with another (foe); 93. Nor one whose weapons are broken, nor one afflicted (with sorrow), nor one who has been grievously wounded, nor one who is in fear, nor one who has turned to flight; (but in all these cases let him) remember the duty (of honourable warriors).12

Similar rules are also laid down in the epic Mah7bh7rata and elsewhere that, according to P. V. Kane, bear “comparison with the conventions of the Geneva and Hague Conferences.”13 It should be added however that the epic also provides instances of their violation.14

HUMAN DIGNITY AND VICTORIOUS CONQUEST Battles end in either victory or defeat—no matter how they are fought. Sometimes the defeated king dies—but what if he survives? And what of his kingdom? Hindu political theory provides a broad framework that helps answer such questions. It distinguishes between three types of conquests: “The first is conquest in which the defeated king is forced to render homage and tribute, after which he or a member of the family is reinstated as a vassal. The second is victory in which enormous booty is demanded and large portions of enemy territory annexed. The third involves the political annihilation of the conquered kingdom and its incorporation into that of the victor.”15 The terms used to designate these three types of conquest are not without interest. The first, the least malevolent type, is called dharma-vijaya, or righteous conquest; the second is called lobha-vijaya, or larcenous or acquisitive conquest in which booty is demanded; the third, in which the ruler is ousted, is called asuravijaya, or demonic conquest, reminiscent of the ruthlessness of the Assyrians. The idea of dharma-vijaya, or righteous conquest, is interesting. It was developed in certain circles to denote conquest only through righteousness as by the Mauryan Buddhist emperor A{oka; in other circles it may have led to development

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of the perspective that came to view war as a ritual, as in the analogy of the sacrifice of animals in Vedic ritual.16

VIOLENCE AND RIGHTEOUSNESS Another term found in the Hindu tradition—analogous to that of dharmavijaya, or righteous conquest—is that of dharma-yuddha, or righteous battle. An analysis of the word dharma-yuddha might help advance our discussion of violence and human dignity further. The word is a compound in which the first word, dharma, means righteousness, along with a host of other meanings. The word yuddha means battle or war. As a compound expression, it can be analyzed and made meaningful in more than one way. At the most obvious level, it could mean a righteous war, as well as a war fought righteously. That is to say, violence could be “dignified” either in terms of what it is being engaged in for, or in terms of how it is being carried out. Thus “fighting may be noble or ignoble according to its purpose or object, so also it can be good or bad according to the manner in which it is carried out.”17 In other words, it could mean a just war or a war fought justly, and ideally both. Such a connotation imparts human dignity to an otherwise violent exercise, because justice rubs off on violence, as it were, in terms of both the means and end of violence, thereby dignifying both. There is also a more specifically Hindu way of dignifying violence by placing it in the context of the so-called caste system. It is not often realized that one of the things performing one’s inherited duty in life generated in Indian society was a sense of dignity. There was also a dignified way of discharging one’s duty. In this sense, then, it was an honorable thing to be a warrior in itself. Then, there was an honorable way of fighting. In this particular context, it meant not running away from battle or, as graphically stated in the tradition, “not showing one’s back to the enemy.” This fact of not running away from the field of battle is specifically mentioned in the BhagavadgXt7 among the qualities of a k}atriya, and also surfaces in the Manusmxti (VII. 89) in the following verse: Those kings who, seeking to slay each other in battle, fight with the utmost exertion and do not turn back, go to heaven.18

This manner of fighting was also dignified soteriologically, to the extent that what one fought for became secondary to how one fought, that is, bravely. In the Mah7bh7rata, King Yudhi}£hira is one of the P7hCava brothers. These P7hCava brothers are the good guys, who win the war against the Kauravas, the evil cousins, who were the bad guys. When Yudhi}£hira died and was led into heaven, he was shocked to find the bad guys in heaven as well, and it was explained to him that this was so because they had performed their duty as k}atriyas, or warriors, fittingly. One feels a certain uneasiness perhaps with such an extension of the concept of dignity in relation to violence, and with good reason. For such an extension may explain a phenomenon that has puzzled cultural historians of India for a long time, namely, that despite its commitment to ahias7, or nonviolence, “positive condemnations of war are rare in Indian literature.”19 The same holds true of the

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death penalty. It is perhaps worth adding, just to emphasize this point, that this holds true even in the case of Jainism, whose commitment to ahias7, or nonviolence, is generally believed to exceed that of both Hinduism and Buddhism. The famous historian V. A. Smith found this point of sufficient consequence to include an explanation of it from a Jaina point of view in his history of India, which will not fail to interest us: A true Jaina will do nothing to hurt the feelings of another person, man, woman, or child; nor will he violate the principles of Jainism. Jaina ethics are meant for men of all positions—for kings, warriors, traders, artisans, agriculturists, and indeed for men and women in every walk of life. . . . “Do your duty. Do it as humanely as you can.” This, in brief, is the primary principle of Jainism. Non-killing cannot interfere with one’s duties. The king, or the judge, has to hang a murderer. The murderer’s act is the negation of a right of the murdered. The king’s or the judge’s, order is the negation of this negation, and is enjoined by Jainism as a duty. Similarly, the soldier’s killing on the battle-field.20

I would like to propose that one reason why in such cases violence may have lost its moral sting—its capacity to shock—may well be because it had been imbued with dignity in the ways we have discussed.

CONCLUSION Normally we think of human rights and human dignity as morally synonymous concepts in human rights discourse. This graded discussion of violence in Hinduism in the context of such discourse generates the possibility that sometimes tension might arise between the two. A dignitarian approach to violence, for instance, might tend to justify it in contexts in which a rights alone approach might consider it unjustified.

NOTES 1. Michael Ignatieff, “Is the Human Rights Era Ending?” New York Times (February 5, 2002), p. A 29. 2. Rajeev Srinivasan, “Sri Jayendra Sarasvati,” India Abroad (March 8, 2002), p. 20. 3. Alison Dundes Renteln, International Human Rights: Universalism versus Relativism (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1990), p. 17. 4. R7m7yaha VI. 109.25 (vulgate); VI. 99.39 (critical text). 5. G. Bühler, trans., The Laws of Manu (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1967 [1886]), p. 315. 6. Vaman Shrivram Apte, The Practical Sanskrit-English Dictionary (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1965), p. 208. 7. A. L. Basham, The Wonder That Was India (New Delhi: Rupa & Co. 1999 [1954]), p. 126. 8. Basham, p. 126. 9. Basham, p. 9. 10. J. W. McCrindle, Ancient India as Described by Megasthenes and Arrian (Calcutta: Chuckervertty, Chatterjee & Co., 1960 [1876–77]), pp. 21–32.

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11. Hartmut Scharfe, The State in Indian Tradition (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1989), p. 185. 12. Bühler, pp. 230–31. 13. P. V. Kane, History of Dharma{7stra, vol. 3, 2d ed. (Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1973), p. 209. 14. Basham, p. 126. 15. Basham, p. 124. 16. Basham, p. 54, 126. 17. K. B. Panda, San7tan Dharma and Law (Cuttack: Goswami Press, n.d.), p. 69. 18. Bühler, p. 230 (italics/emphasis added). 19. Basham, p. 123. 20. Percival Spear, ed., The Oxford History of India by the Late Vincent A. Smith, C. J. E. (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 79.

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CHAPTER 14

Confucian Contributions to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Historical and Philosophical Perspective Sumner B. Twiss

I

t is often claimed that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is a preeminently Western document that promulgates a distinctively Western moral and political ideology of individual human rights incompatible with many of the world’s cultural-moral traditions. Given the fact, however, that the UDHR was formulated through a year-and-a-half-long process of drafting and negotiation among representatives of no fewer than fifty-eight nations and cultural traditions, the claim seems prima facie suspect. Since the traditions of East Asia are often regarded (wrongly, I believe) as most in tension with the aspirations and content of the UDHR, it may be especially instructive to trace the Chinese contribution to its formulation: doing so may help correct those myopic perceptions that (1) the UDHR is predominantly or exclusively Western, and (2) individual human rights are necessarily irreconcilable with East Asian traditions.1 After researching the official United Nations records of 1947–48, as well as consulting the recently published diaries of John Humphrey, the principal coordinator of the drafting process, I have determined that the Chinese delegate P. C. Chang introduced a number of Confucian ideas, strategies, and arguments into the deliberative process leading up to the final formulation of the UDHR, adopted December 10, 1948, by the UN General Assembly. This Confucian contribution is considerably more extensive and influential than has ever been reported previously. Chang was described by Humphrey as the towering intellect of the Third Committee (which debated and approved the final UDHR draft sent to the General Assembly) who more than anyone else was responsible for imparting a universal rather than a purely Western character to the UDHR. Humphrey noted in his diary entry for December 4, 1948, that “in intellectual stature he [Chang] towers over any other member of the committee. I also like his philosophy.” And for October 7, 1948, he noted: “The debate in the Third Committee was passionately interesting this morning. P. C. Chang made a

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particularly brilliant speech in which he pleaded for two-man mindedness. As only he can he drew the attention of those countries that are trying to impose special philosophical concepts such as the law of nature, to the fact that the declaration is meant for all men everywhere.” In a footnote to the entry for October 11, 1948, the editor John Hobbins reports that at a four-person meeting of the officers of the Commission on Human Rights held in February 1947, “[Charles] Malik [Lebanese philosopher and diplomat] believed that the question of rights should be approached through Christian precepts, especially the teachings of St. Thomas Aquinas. Chang argued the necessity of a more universal approach. Humphrey was asked to prepare a draft and Chang suggested, tongue in cheek, that Humphrey go to China for six months to study Confucius before attempting the task.”2

BIOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUND The P. C. Chang of the United Nations official records was Chang Peng-chun (1882–1957), who was born and raised in Tientsin, China.3 He graduated from Nankai Middle School (founded by his older brother, Poling) in 1906, and from Bao-Ding Deng School (high school) in 1910. Supported by the U.S. Boxer Rebellion Indemnity Fund, Chang attended Clark University (Worcester, MA), 1910–13, graduating with a BA in 1913. He then pursued graduate studies at Columbia University, 1913–15, taking two master’s degrees in 1915, one from the graduate school and the other from the college of education (Teachers College). In 1919, after working for a few years in China, Chang returned to Columbia and completed PhD requirements in 1922, although the doctorial degree was not formally awarded until 1924, after publication of his dissertation in 1923. During 1916–19, prior to his doctoral studies, Chang taught at Nankai Middle School, serving as acting president in 1917–19, and helped his brother organize and establish Nankai University in 1919. After completing his doctoral work, Chang returned to China and upgraded Tsingshua School (Beijing) to a college in 1923, serving as its dean, 1923–26. In 1926 he returned to Nankai, becoming the principal of Nankai Middle School, while also serving as professor of philosophy at Nankai University, 1926–37. In 1928–29 Chang was acting president of Nankai University. While on the faculty of Nankai University, Chang also held visiting appointments at the University of Chicago (Chinese philosophy and art) and the Chicago Art Institute in 1931; University of Hawaii (Chinese art and literature) in 1933 and 1934; and Cambridge University (as Ministry of Education Exchange Professor) in 1936. For a brief period at the conclusion of World War II in 1945, Chang also held a visiting appointment at Columbia University. During his career, Chang authored three books, one on Chinese education (his published dissertation, Education for Modernization in China [1923]) and two on Chinese history and culture (China: Whence and Whither? [1934]; China at the Crossroads [1936]), and edited yet another (There Is Another China [1948]). He also wrote a number of original plays, two of which were staged in New York City (including at the Cort Theatre, Broadway), with the others were staged in China. Throughout his career, Chang translated many Western plays into Chinese, directed numerous play productions in China, and directed Chinese Classical

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Theatre tours in the United States (1930) and Soviet Russia (1935). In 1938 he received a doctor of humane letters from his alma mater, Clark University. Chang’s governmental and diplomatic career developed as his academic career was concluding. In 1937, possibly because of the anti-Japanese influence of his plays, Chang was appointed by the Chinese government to pursue anti-Japanese propaganda activities in Europe and America, which included giving public lectures in a number of European cities, including London, as well as lobbying the U.S. Congress for passage of an economic sanctions bill against Japan (1939). Chang was a member of the People’s Political Council, 1938–40, and served successively as minister plenipotentiary and envoy extraordinary to Turkey (a neutral country), 1940–42, and ambassador to Chile (another neutral country), 1942–45. In 1942 he negotiated and signed a Treaty of Amity between China and Iraq. At the conclusion of World War II, Chang served as China’s chief delegate (ambassador rank) at the initial organization meetings of the United Nations in London and New York, assuming the role of resident chief delegate to the United Nations Social and Economic Council, 1946–52. In 1947–48 he was a member and vice chairman of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights (including membership on the drafting committee for the UDHR), and in 1948 he headed the Chinese delegation to the Geneva Conference on Freedom of Information. Chang was well placed to make a significant contribution to the UDHR, but before examining the specifics of that contribution, we need also to be aware of certain intellectual influences on Chang, as well as the tenor of his thinking immediately preceding the formulation of the UDHR.

INTELLECTUAL INFLUENCES There were two broad intellectual influences on Chang—John Dewey’s philosophy of education and classical Chinese culture—both of which are well represented in his published work. Neither of these influences should be particularly surprising, given Chang’s dual passions for education and Chinese culture, and given the social context in China at the time he was teaching. Let us, just for the record, begin with the social context before considering Chang’s writings.

Dewey’s Influence It is well known that Dewey’s philosophy of pragmatism—particularly in its methodological approach of combining critical reflection (logic, scientific method) with a practical emphasis (social problem solving)—influenced Chinese thought in the 1920s.4 In particular it provided the New Culture Movement with a method of critique, evaluation, and adaptation of new Western ideas to the Chinese social situation. That movement was very critical of traditional Chinese cultural values and emphasized supplanting them with Western cultural values (e.g., science and technology; political ideas and structures). Although Dewey himself proposed the critical evaluation of both Chinese traditional culture and Western culture, with the aim of developing a new culture with the best elements of both, the New Culture Movement was less cautious in its rejection of traditional

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Chinese culture in favor of Western adaptations.5 As we shall see shortly, Chang’s approach was more similar to Dewey’s than that of the New Culture movement. It is also well known that Dewey’s philosophy of education in particular had an extraordinary impact on Chinese educational institutions and programming during the same period, and even lasting to the foundation of the People’s Republic in 1949. Many of China’s educational leaders at the time had trained at Columbia under Dewey and William Heard Kilpatrick (an educator who put many of Dewey’s ideas into practice in the United States). Indeed, Chang’s own brother (president of Nankai University) had studied with Dewey and strongly advocated the implementation of his educational theory. Nankai University was known for its Deweyian orientation and influence, along with Peking National University, Peking Teachers College, and Nanking Teachers College. Through the influence of these educational leaders and institutions, Dewey’s ideas on experiencecentered learning, adapting education to the needs of social evolution, cultivating the individual, and developing democratic spirit in cooperative learning projects were applied to schools and curricula throughout China. Chang himself in his dissertation and first published book, Education for Modernization in China, manifests clear indebtedness to Dewey’s educational philosophy. At the outset of this work, Chang argues forcefully for the importance of educating a leadership able to cope with economic problems so as to transform China into a modern industrialized nation with a “wide-awake outlook,”“enlightened individuality,” and “democratic processes.” He does so in a Deweyian way by emphasizing the attainment of an equilibrium between the best of the old (traditional Chinese culture) and the best of the new (Western culture) through a process of critical readjustment from old to new (as contrasted with blind appropriation of Western culture): In order to be effective in the present-day world, even as conservatives, each one needs to be equipped with the wide-awake outlook and the strong enlightened individuality which only the modernized social and moral institutions can produce. . . . China must change and change very rapidly until a state of more or less adjusted equilibrium is reached. But by modernization we do not imply that China must, even if she could, go through all the stages of change that the modern nations have gone through. For China the process is readjustment and not mere appropriation or reproduction. The products of modernism already formed can serve very well as hypotheses, but should not be too blindly or too closely followed as infallible models. . . . Modernization is a process. It will call for certain indispensable modern products in the development of the process. But it does not commit itself to uphold any crystallized formulations of the modern West to the entire detriment of the norms and formulations of the old culture. It emphasizes the process rather than the products. The old culture furnishes the basic experiences to be modernized . . . 6

Chang goes on to use Dewey’s thought in proposing that the immediate aim of education is modernization in the sense of developing in students an appreciation for the scientific method, the rights and liberties of individuals, and democratic decision-making and problem-solving processes. In order to achieve this result, Chang argues that there must be educational analogues for those circumstances that historically produced such characteristics of modernization. In particular, he focuses on the circumstances of expansion, exploration, and frontier community

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in the U.S. West, and then cites Dewey on providing the educational analogues of these circumstances—an expanding and challenging social environment that “encourages the wholesome unification of thinking and doing” in individual exertion and development, conceiving the ideal school as a frontier-like household and community in which are developed discipline, character, order and industry, and responsibility for solving problems that meet communal needs: At the end of the nineteenth century when industrial transformations were taking place in American life, Professor Dewey saw that the essential powers in men and women who could succeed in adapting themselves to the new environment were the natural products of the mode of living which we may characterize as frontier community-building that had been going on for three hundred years previously in America. He also saw that the most efficient means to adapt the younger generation successfully to cope with the vast problems around them would be the provision in the schools of the substitutes for the environmental forces which in previous generations of frontier life shaped and made possible the characteristics of initiative, keen thinking ability and cooperative endeavor.7

As the centerpiece of his argument, Chang then goes on to propose, develop, and apply five “criteria for curriculum construction.” Although it is not possible here to report his argument in any detail, the five criteria are clearly Deweyian, ranging across (1) encouraging hypothesis formulation and verification, (2) adapting methods to needs-oriented goals, (3) developing executive, organizing, and vocational capacities, (4) promoting, on the basis of equal opportunity, democratic social conduct and qualities of independent judgment, and (5) humanizing the aims and processes of modern life. The fifth criterion in particular seems to develop Dewey’s social vision of creating a new culture with the best elements of both traditional Chinese culture and Western culture, for Chang explicitly adumbrates it as follows: “Does the school activity preserve and readapt the ideals and habits of humanism in the old culture? Does the school activity allow and encourage the searching for ‘human’ values in the products and processes of modern culture?”8 I think it would be fair to infer from Chang’s discussion of these criteria that he gained from Dewey a set of social, moral, and political values that are recognizably Western in their orientations.9 At the same time, however, reflecting on the fifth criterion, Chang also clearly gained from Dewey an affirmation of the value of his own traditional culture, aspects of which might have to be preserved, even if readapted, in order to achieve the goal of a competent leadership for an equilibrated culture that is truly human or humanized. Indeed, one might plausibly discern in Chang’s emphasis on “human” and “humanized” a Confucian-influenced concern that the traits of modernization developed in China and its future leadership be humane in a traditional sense to which we now turn.

Chinese Culture, Especially Confucianism Although the influence of Dewey’s thought on Chang seems obvious and profound, one should not overlook Chang’s deep knowledge and appreciation of Chinese culture and its contribution to world history and culture. In his second

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and third books, China: Whence and Whither? and China at the Crossroads, Chang displays extraordinary erudition about China’s cultural achievements (both material and nonmaterial) prior to the nineteenth century and their impact on the rest of the world.10 Particularly important for our purposes are Chang’s discussions of Confucian and neo-Confucian philosophical and political thought as well as his views on Chinese education. Also important are his views of how traditional Chinese philosophy and related cultural forms were received by and influenced Western thinkers. Let us begin with the latter. Chang is utterly clear in his belief that Chinese philosophical thought and culture, as transmitted by returning Jesuit missionaries in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, positively impressed eighteenth-century European thinkers such as Diderot and Voltaire. For example, he quotes extensively from The Works of Voltaire that, in the latter’s view, “the life, honour, and fortune of the subject [citizen] was under the protection of the laws . . . [in] China,” its “people were not burdened with taxes,”“the fundamental law in China being to consider the empire as one family is the reason why the welfare of the community is attend to as the first principal duty,” and Confucius was a philosopher par excellence (“I have read his books with attention; I have made extracts from them; I have found in them nothing but the purest morality, without the slightest tinge of charlatanism”). Although Chang himself is not overly credulous about the historical accuracy of such claims—“it was . . . the glamour of a better organized . . . controlled, and more cultured civilization, attracting the attention of eighteenth century thinkers . . . dissatisfied with the order of things in Europe”—his point is that “descriptions of China and Chinese philosophical thought” were known to eighteenth-century Europe in “a period of rather free speculation concerning political and religious ideas” and “caught the imagination of some thinkers of the period.”11 Chang goes on to display a rather wide acquaintance with classical Chinese thinkers such as Confucius, Mencius, and Chuang-Tzu, and later neo-Confucian figures such as Ku Yen-wu, Yen Yuan, Huang Chung-his, and Tai Chen. With regard to the classical period, particularly important to Chang are Confucius’s ideas on jen and its extension to others, the inclusiveness of human responsibility for improving life, an ideal government founded on “ideals of personal conduct” (rather than on formally enacted laws), and the “cultivation of the completely humanized man,” as well as Mencius’s notions of “the essential goodness of the nature of man,” the “fundamental respect for what is ‘human’ in all men,” and the priority of the people in humane governance, emphasizing “the rights of the people as well as the obligation of the ruler to provide for the good of the people.”12 With respect to the neo-Confucians, Chang is particularly taken with Huang Chung-hsi (“a radical political thinker”), from whose treatise, Waiting for the Dawn, he quotes the famous opening paragraph criticizing the selfishness of (later) rulers to the detriment of the people being able to consider their own interests, and Yen Yuan, whom he characterizes as “an original educational thinker” and “early formulator of some principles of education . . . familiar to modern educational thinking,” for example, “the fact that real learning and doing must go together.”13 Beyond these discussions of particular Confucian philosophers, Chang also identifies a number of what he regards as general or systematic Confucian contributions

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to political thought in world history. He cites in particular the competitive civil service examination system (which he regards as “democratizing government structure to a certain extent,” well before the time of European and American democracies), the right of the people to rebellion against an unworthy ruler (“early formulated in China”), and the emphasis given to education by the state (about which he quotes Quesnay from the eighteenth century—“with the exception of China, the necessity of this institution, which is the foundation of government, has been ignored by all kingdoms”—and then cites Adolf Reichwein’s claim that “national systems of education . . . in the European world . . . owed much to the system of education in China”).14 All of this extensive and pointed discussion by Chang of Chinese (Confucian) cultural contributions culminates in his concluding claim that “China must strive to achieve a new culture that is creatively modern—yes, but it is also to be hoped that it will contain elements distinctively Chinese.”15 And some pages earlier he had written, A more liberal attitude has happily superseded the somewhat superstitious belief in the conflict of East and West. Culturally, there are many “Easts” and many “Wests”; and they are by no means all necessarily irreconcilable. To take just one instance, it is generally agreed that the humanistic attitude and emphasis in the Chinese tradition appear more “modern” than the outlook toward life that prevailed in medieval Europe. . . . Valuable suggestions for the modern world will naturally be sought after, but they can also be found in the earlier Western experiences and in Chinese history as well.16

My point in citing these claims, and Chang’s discussions of Confucian thought, can be simply put. While it is certainly the case that Dewey’s thought—as methodological approach—lies behind Chang’s thinking, it is also the case that he is clearly influenced by, and appreciative of, Chinese philosophy and political thought (independent of Dewey), so much so that he hopes to find a reconciliation or bridge between East and West precisely in commonalities that they share at various points in their intersecting histories—for example, Chinese influence on eighteenth century European thought; articulation of the right of the people to rebellion against injustice; democratization based on universal education; and open opportunity based on merit. In this manner, Chang appears positioned to do comparative philosophy, East and West, steeped as he was in both Chinese and Western intellectual traditions.

Propensity to Use Confucian Thought Chang delivered a number of lectures and addresses in the years immediately preceding his work with the Commission on Human Rights. Two sets of talks are particularly revealing of the way that he interlaces Chinese thought and Western sources. The first set of addresses was delivered in Baghdad, March 6 and 11, 1942, at King Faisal II Hall, while he was minister to Turkey. The second are pointed statements made at the initial meetings of the first session of the UN Economic and Social Council, January 23 and February 7, 1946 (London), and June 4, 1946

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(New York).17 Both sets of speeches indicate Chang’s propensity for using Chinese sources (in addition to Western ideas) to argue his case for modernization and humanization in the world. In addition, we can see certain precursors to the content of his contributions to the UDHR. The lectures in Baghdad were untitled addresses that appear to have been designed to characterize Chinese history and culture for a Muslim audience unacquainted with China and to lay the groundwork for comprehending how to go about the process of cultural change, combining elements of tradition with the realities of the modern world in a self-critical manner that advances the human good (presumably a process faced by both Chinese and Muslims in their respective contexts). Without going into the detailed substance of these lectures, suffice it to say that Chang argues strenuously for the importance of the “sound basis” of knowing the contemporary “concrete needs” of the community and then engaging in a process of “comparative study” of other societies and cultures in their environments (their ways of solving problems and meeting needs), followed by making “daring hypotheses” (about what to do) and “verification in application” (of a given hypothesis)—all as a continuous process of refinement, adjustment, and adaptation of both old and new cultural forms, social structures, institutions, and policies.18 Here we can discern Dewey’s influence. Intriguingly, in these lectures Chang makes constant use of the thought of Confucius (quoting from the Analects) in reiterating the importance of maintaining humanism and humane values in cultural change. He repeats more forcefully (without qualification) than in his earlier book that “Chinese thought influenced the so-called Philosophy of the Enlightenment in 18th century Europe” in its battle against authoritarianism.19 He also asserts (again, without qualification) that “the civil service system . . . [with] open competitive examination . . . was the foundation of democratic development in China.”20 He has an extended discussion of Confucius’s ideas regarding resistance to “class distinction in education” and “emphasis on Humanism . . . mutual understanding and respect.”21 In the latter regard, Chang explicitly discusses Confucius’s attitude toward spiritual things and, “concerning the attitude to worship,” cites Analects 6:22 (“Respect the Spirit as if the Spirit were there”), which Chang interprets as follows: “In other words it is again that humanistic attitude. It is to respect the Spirit as if it were there—emphasizing the influence of that respect on humanity, and not so much the nature of the Spirit itself which we human beings should be humble enough to acknowledge we do not know.”22 And concluding the lectures, Chang returns to “the possible influence of Chinese humanism on modern thinkers,” boldly citing the following passage from The Great Learning as “a formula . . . to relate ethics and politics and politics to education,” as the “way of creative reorientation . . . for all peoples in the present day world”: In order to bring peace to the world, there must be order in the different countries. In order to bring order in the different countries, the family (social relations) must be regulated. In order to regulate the family (social relations) individuals must be cultivated. In order to cultivate individuals, their hearts must be rectified. In order to rectify their hearts, their thoughts must be made sincere. In order to make their thoughts sincere, they must extend their knowledge. In order to extend their knowledge, they must go to things as they are.23

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Clearly, for Chang, Dewey’s thought and Confucian thought are deeply interpenetrated. In his three 1946 addresses to the UN Economic and Social Council, Chang is equally bold (and arguably Confucian) in his conception of the council’s role and practical work. In his first address, Chang contends that the council is “designed for human welfare” and that “cooperative effort in the solution of common problems” requires “a new loyalty on the part of the peoples of the world” to the work of the council. In discussing how to cultivate this new loyalty, Chang cites (first in Chinese, then in English) a passage from Mencius IV.B.16—“Subdue people with goodness, people can never be subdued. Nourish people with goodness, the whole world will be subdued.” In other words, the important thing is to nourish and stimulate the people, not to try to subdue them (even by the force of virtue). Chang adds: “Nourish people with goodness—that is the function of this Council and the whole world is waiting to be thus subdued.”24 In his second address, Chang proposes a resolution for calling an international health conference under the auspices of the council. He frames this call in the language of declaring war against microbes “causing and conditioning disease and pestilence in the world.” Although he does not here cite any Confucian sources or texts, Chang does call for a “spirit of cooperation” that does not give “too much attention to national differentiation” or “indulge over much in national pride and prejudice,” since, after all, microbes “go from place to place without passports, visas, and custom barriers” and “have no sense of national pride or distinction.” Suggests Chang, let us learn from these microbial enemies something that is “not undesirable but may even be considered supremely beneficial”—namely, that we are united in our humanity and that the “spirit of cooperation” contributes to “the true blessing of man.”25 No Confucian language here obviously, but certainly a concept of brotherhood and cooperation that is compatible with the Confucian idea of an everexpanding sympathy or benevolence for the welfare of all humankind. In his third and longest address, Chang argues vigorously for the Economic and Social Council’s giving much-needed assistance to “the economically ‘low pressure’ areas of the world,” citing specifically the less-developed areas in the Middle East, Latin America, and the Far East. In making his case, Chang argues that economic assistance for the industrialization of comparatively underindustrialized countries and peoples will enhance their self-determination and selfreliance; that such industrial development will “spur onward the progress in all [countries]”; that it would be desirable to promulgate “a suggested code of international investments, setting down conditions in lending and borrowing countries . . . conducive to such investments”; and that the council needs to give special attention to the way that the economic changes result in “political, social, and intellectual” changes as well.26 None of these betray any specifically Confucian ideas—other than the general Confucian concern for the material and social welfare of the people—but it seems significant that Chang concludes his address with an extensive passage attributed to Confucius (from Li Chi, Book VII, Li Yun), which he [Chang] characterizes as a “statement of the ideal of economic and social adjustment in the world” and which he interpolates for his audience: When the Ta Tao or Grand Way prevails, the world is for the welfare of all. Officers are selected because of their virtue and competence. Mutual confidence is promoted

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and peaceful relations are maintained. People regard not only their own parents as parents, nor only their own children as children. Provisions are made for the aged, employment is provided for the able-bodied, and education is afforded to the young. Widows and widowers, orphans and the childless, the deformed and the diseased, are all cared for. Men have their occupations and women have their homes. Surplus goods are not to be wasted: they need not be kept as one’s own. Labor is not to be idle: work is not necessarily for self only. [Please allow me to repeat these phrases—they seem so modern. “Surplus goods are not to be wasted: they need not to be kept as one’s own. Labor is not to be idle: work is not necessarily for self only.”] Scheming and intrigues are repressed and banditry and rebellion do not arise. As a result, there is no need of shutting the house-gate at night. Such is the Age of Grand Harmony.27

In retrospect, and in light of this passage, I suggest that Chang’s development proposals are very much a modern articulation of a central Confucian ideal for a harmonious world that serves the welfare of people everywhere. Considering all of the above, I believe that we can find the following traits in Chang, the last three of which are particularly carried into his work on the UDHR: (1) An abiding commitment to modernization in Chinese education, society, and culture, construed along the lines of Dewey’s thought, self-critically combining aspects of old and new. (2) A passionate commitment to the humanistic elements and vision of Confucian thought. (3) A deep interest in constructive comparative thought that attempts to reconcile the humanistic values of the Confucian tradition with those of Western traditions. (4) A propensity to use Confucian ideas to advance his case for self-critical and humanized modernization in the world.

UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS Strategic Contributions The historical record shows that Chang argued vigorously and successfully for the position that the UDHR should (1) be conceived as the basis and program for the humanization of mankind (here Chang appealed to the Confucian idea of man’s moral nature or capacity to become truly human in the sense of moral growth and achievement); (2) incorporate a large measure of pragmatic agreement on norms of conduct despite persisting differences of philosophy and ideology among peoples of the world (here Chang appealed to the Confucian emphasis on the art of living—as contrasted with metaphysics—together with making the argument that no representatives should insist on including controverted metaphysical or theological concepts in the declaration); and (3) be written in a manner readily comprehensible to all people (here Chang implicitly used the Confucian emphasis on the priority of the people to support his view that the UDHR was to be a people’s document, not a scholar’s or a lawyer’s).

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Before examining these three points in a bit more detail, it should be remarked that unlike many of the other more politically motivated representatives to the Third Committee, Chang’s contributions to its deliberations on the UDHR were almost uniformly philosophical and ethical in character. Indeed, the historical record reports at one point that “the Chinese representative felt that ethical considerations should play a greater part in the discussion. The question was not purely political.”28 That is to say, Chang attempted to argue for positions based on his understanding of Confucian philosophy and ethics and what they could contribute to constructive debate about, and resolution of, philosophical differences between representatives. With regard to the humanistic aims of the UDHR, Chang had earlier expressed his view before the UN Economic and Social Council (February 1947) that any declaration developed should be based on “the aspiration for a new humanism.”29 In September 1948, during the Third Committee deliberations, he elaborated on this view considerably by claiming, first, that “in the eighteenth century . . . in Europe, translations of Chinese philosophers had been known to and had inspired such thinkers as Voltaire, Quesnay and Diderot in their humanistic revolt against feudalistic conceptions,” to such an extent that “Chinese ideas had been intermingled with European thought and sentiment on human rights at the time when that subject had been first speculated upon in modern Europe.” This claim was immediately followed by another that, “stress should be laid upon the human aspect of human rights. A human being had to be constantly conscious of other men, in whose society he lived,” resulting in Chang’s concluding and ringing statement that “the declaration should be approved as soon as possible, to serve as a basis and a programme for the humanization of man.”30 The point here is not to raise for scrutiny the accuracy or inaccuracy of Chang’s first historical claim, but rather to show that he quite self-consciously tried to link the Confucian idea of man’s moral capacity to the notion of human rights as a development of that very capacity, both in the past and for the future.31 This linkage of human rights and humanization was an important theme in many of Chang’s subsequent interventions, and it went unchallenged. On the matter of pragmatic agreement on norms despite differences in philosophy and ideology, Chang, again, had introduced this idea earlier before the Economic and Social Council in 1947: “The fact that rights of man were included in thirty-five or forty of the world’s constitutions indicated that a large measure of agreement was possible in spite of differences of philosophy or ideology.”32 He also effectively developed this idea further in the Third Committee by stoutly resisting the incorporation of any language that would raise “metaphysical problems” in “a declaration designed to be universally applicable.”33 Here Chang argued that “in the field of human rights popular majority should not be forgotten,” adumbrating as follows: “The Chinese representative recalled that the population of his country comprised a large segment of humanity . . . [with] . . . ideals and traditions different from those of the Christian West . . . [e.g.] good manners, decorum, propriety, and consideration for others.”34 Yet, despite the importance of the latter to the Chinese, he “would refrain from proposing that mention of them should be made in the declaration,” with the hope “that his colleagues would show equal consideration and withdraw some of the amendments . . . raising metaphysical problems.”35 A subsequent intervention against those wishing to import

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a theological foundation to the UDHR put the point eloquently and subtly: “without these words [e.g., “God,” “natural law,” “by nature”] . . . those who believed in God could still find the idea of God [if they wished to so interpret], and at the same time others with different concepts would be able to accept the text [since theology was not its basis].”36 Chang’s point was clearly that pragmatic agreement was possible despite persisting differences of philosophy, theology, and metaphysics.37 His point and argument carried through the remainder of the Third Committee’s deliberations. Finally, it should be observed that Chang was a great and consistent advocate of having a brief declaration readily understandable by all, which he reported was the rationale for the Chinese delegation’s original submission of a ten-article declaration for consideration by the Commission on Human Rights. Although the final draft declaration before the Third Committee was more than twice this length, Chang was nonetheless able to claim that the Chinese “document had aided in making the present draft declaration clear and relatively brief.”38 Time and time again, during the deliberations of the Third Committee, Chang returned to this point of comprehensibility to all people, for example, “it should be a document for all men everywhere, not merely for lawyers and scholars”; “as the declaration was destined for the vast mass of the world’s population, it should never be criticized for being too explicit”; not to mention his innumerable interventions stressing the need for “concrete” language, paragraphing of articles that avoided “expressing two sets of ideas in a single paragraph,” and “careful consideration of amendments” in the spirit of the Chinese proverb, “Matters allowed to mature slowly are free from sharp corners.”39 All of these interventions, I interpolate, expressed Chang’s great respect for the Confucian emphasis on the importance of the people, whom the UDHR was being designed to serve.

Specific Articles The historical record also shows that Chang used specifically Confucian ideas to support, and indeed reformulate, various articles of the UDHR.40 For example, he appealed to Confucian concepts of human moral capacity and jen (two-menmindedness, benevolence) to forward and formulate the claims of Article 1 about the dignity of human beings and acting in the spirit of brotherhood. He used the Confucian orientation toward moral pragmatism to support what he called “pluralistic tolerance” of thought, conscience, and religious belief protected by Article 18. He implicitly used the Confucian emphasis on the importance of the people and explicitly appealed to the tradition’s experience with competitive civil service to support, respectively, governance based on the will of the people and equal access to public service forwarded by Article 21. And, for a final example, he appealed to the Confucian emphasis on duties to community to support the balancing of rights with duties in Article 29. Let us now consider Chang’s contributions to these illustrative articles in greater detail. With regard to Article 1, it is reported in some secondary literature that within the drafting committee’s deliberations, which preceded those of the full Third Committee, Chang had argued for the inclusion of jen (humaneness) in addition to the ideas of human dignity, rights, and reason.41 In the fuller, more public, and

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more completely reported deliberations of the Third Committee, the reasoning behind Chang’s earlier contributions was much more developed. First, it became clear that for Chang the idea of jen was encapsulated in the phrase “the spirit of brotherhood,” which, he claimed, “was perfectly consistent with the Chinese attitude towards manners [li] and the importance of kindly and considerate treatment of others [jen], wherein both li and jen were related by him to man’s capacity to become truly human—“It was only when man’s social behavior rose to that level that he was truly human.”42 Second, it also became clear that for Chang the language of “the spirit of brotherhood” counterbalanced the statement of rights in this article. Chang explicitly claimed, “A happy balance was struck by the broad statement of rights in the first sentence and the implication of duties in the second,” accomplishing the article’s important function that “the various rights [of the full declaration] would appear more selfish if they were not preceded by the reference to ‘a spirit of brotherhood.’”43 That is to say, for Chang, “spirit of brotherhood” connoted duties to others in such a manner that human rights and duties were importantly and appropriately interdependent. Finally, in the Third Committee’s debate about whether Article 1 should incorporate metaphysical or theological concepts, Chang made the crucial mediating intervention that it would be acceptable to understand the article on the basis of eighteenth-century European philosophy’s claim about man’s innate goodness, implying that “although man was largely animal, there was a part of him which distinguished him from the animals. That part was the real man and was good, and that part should therefore be given greater importance” (compare Mencius VI.A.14).44 Why would this be acceptable to Chang? Because this idea was consistent also with the Confucian idea that “human beings” refers to the “non-animal part of man,” wherein man has the capacity to “increase his moral stature,” “reach a high moral standard,” and rise to “that level where he was truly human.”45 By proposing this link between European and Chinese philosophy, Chang effectively quelled further effort to build into the declaration any stronger metaphysical or theological concepts. Collectively considered, the foregoing three points appear to present a genuine Confucian contribution to the formulation and adoption of Article 1. With respect to Article 18, Chang made another distinctive Confucian contribution to the Third Committee’s deliberations, one that may be somewhat surprising, given the often-cited, though myopic, view that Confucianism is hostile to religious tolerance.46 Amid the heated debate over protecting the freedom of religious belief, most pointedly the freedom to change one’s religious adherence— a point of grave contention between the Saudi and Pakistani delegates representing conflicting Islamic views on the question—Chang introduced his view of another important link between East and West. First, he affirmed that this article dealt with “one of the most important principles in the declaration,” stemming “from the eighteenth century, when the idea of human rights was born in Western Europe.”47 Second, in the interest of “studying the problem of religious expression in its true perspective,” he wished to explain “how the Chinese approached the religious problem.”48 What followed was a Confucian-informed argument in five steps:49 (1) “Chinese philosophy was based essentially on a firm belief in a unitarian cause” [a reference

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to intra-worldly, organic cosmology]. (2) “That philosophy considered man’s actions [also called by Chang “the art of living”] to be more important than metaphysics” [also called by him “knowledge of the causes of life”]. (3) “The best way to testify to the greatness of the Divinity [used by Chang in an all-encompassing way to refer to both theistic and non-theistic beliefs] was to give proof of an exemplary attitude in this world.” (4) “In the eyes of Chinese philosophers, it was pluralistic tolerance in every sphere of thought, conscience, and religion, which should inspire men if they wished to base their relations on benevolence and justice” [the exemplary attitude or art of living]. (5) QED: against “the objection of the representative from Saudi Arabia,” freedom of religious belief was to be protected. To which Chang added the pragmatically compelling point: not “to ensure the inviolability of that profound part of thought and conscience . . . was apt to lead mankind into unreasoned conflict.” Shortly after this intervention, Article 18 was adopted by the Third Committee. Chang’s Confucian background also played a large role in his support for Article 21, sometimes explicitly, but often implicitly.50 It was certainly the case that on numerous occasions at the Economic and Social Council Chang invoked the Chinese experience with “the institution of public civil service,” which he claimed had “not yet been realized in the Western world,” to support “the right of free and equal access to public service” in one’s country.51 I take the Confucian inspired influence here to be reasonably noncontroversial. By the same token, although he strongly supported the principle that “the will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government,” to the extent of proposing that “the will of the people” should be “the subject of the first clause” of subparagraph 3, Chang did not explicitly mention or discuss the Confucian idea of the priority of the people over the ruler or government (as so strongly asserted in Confucian and neo-Confucian texts).52 Perhaps the closest he came to invoking this idea was when, in his 1947 contribution to the Economic and Social Council, he tied together the ideas of public civil service, representative government, and freedom and equality forming “the basis of social democracy,” when referring to the then new 1946 Chinese constitution.53 This, of course, is hardly convincing evidence, if indeed it is evidence at all, of a Confucian influence. However, I must say that throughout all of his interventions in the Third Committee, including those discussed above, Chang made it utterly clear that the people were his priority. This principle may have been so deeply formative in his thinking—and acceptable to so many other representatives—that he did not feel the need to invoke its Confucian background. Finally, with respect to Article 29, we return to one of Chang’s contributions to Article 1—the notion of balancing rights and duties in the UDHR.54 In supporting that “happy balance” of explicit human rights and implicit duties (in “the spirit of brotherhood”) in Article 1, Chang claimed that “similar reasoning applied to Article [29], which contained a statement of duties.”55 Inasmuch as the “duties to community” mentioned in Article 29 were thereby related to Chang’s fuller claim that “the aims of the U.N. were not to ensure the selfish gains of the individual but to try and increase man’s moral stature,” for “consciousness of duties enable man to reach a high moral standard,” I believe that we have here reasonably clear evidence of a Confucian idea in support of this article. 56

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Comparative Philosophy Beyond this discussion of Chang’s interventions in the Third Committee’s deliberations, there are certain philosophical points that may be of particular interest to comparative philosophers. For example, although he referred time and again to the concept of li (rites, customs, manners) as central to Confucian ethics, Chang nevertheless clearly accepted the conceptuality of individual rights, so long as these were balanced with duties to the community in a way that would function to increase man’s moral stature. For a second example, reiterating a point discussed earlier, although at one time in the deliberations tempted to take no position on the nature of man (“for the purposes of the declaration it was better to start with a clean state”), Chang finally supported the text of Article 1 (referring to human dignity, brotherhood, and rights) understood on the basis of eighteenthcentury European philosophy incorporating the idea of man’s innate goodness, which he regarded as similar to the Confucian idea that the part of man distinguishing him from the animals is his moral nature, his innate capacity for moral achievement.57 This similarity was apparently regarded by Chang as an important normative link between Western and Eastern philosophy that could be safely affirmed by both, so long as it was kept clear of any other metaphysical and theological ideas. What is particularly interesting and important about Chang’s Confucian contributions to the debates of the Third Committee is the fact that he often appeared to be engaging in constructive comparative ethics. That is to say, he selfconsciously tried to find normative and conceptual bridges between Confucian moral thought and Western European philosophy in a way that forged new angles of vision on both traditions and how they might learn from each other.58 Cases in point included, for example, (1) linking human rights to humanization (thus producing an understanding of human rights as contributory to mankind’s moral growth and maturation, an advance over some Western conceptions of rights as no more than protective fences around individuals); (2) emphasizing the interdependence of rights and duties (thus opening the Confucian tradition to a new, moral-conceptual category [rights] while also reminding Western traditions that rights alone were not conducive to genuine community); (3) highlighting the significance of “the spirit of brotherhood” as a moral concept shared by both East and West (prompting both to take the concept more seriously); (4) identifying mankind’s moral capacity as another philosophical bridge or similarity between East and West (which both could profitably explore further in the common project of human rights’ humanization of the world); (5) demonstrating how freedom of religion could be soundly protected by both Eastern and Western traditions (in a manner that did not require adopting any specific set of religious premises or beliefs—a model for future cooperation and interaction); and (6) demonstrating how Eastern and Western traditions could agree on certain fundamentals of humane governance (e.g., priority of the will of the people, equal access to public service, implying that neither tradition had a special premium on how to understand humane governance). Equally important, perhaps, as these constructive achievements, were those lines of argument that Chang did not pursue—whether by choice or inadvertence is difficult to determine. He did not, for example, attempt to substitute li (rites,

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customs) for the category of rights or to argue for li’s moral superiority, as I believe some Western scholars of Confucianism have attempted to do. He did not argue for the priority of socioeconomic human rights over civil-political rights, as, again, some Western scholars of Confucianism are tempted to do. He did not claim that as a communitarian tradition, Confucianism was somehow conceptually incompatible with human rights thinking and advocacy, as, once again, some Western scholars are tempted to claim.59 Why did Chang not pursue such lines of argument when they seem so obvious to others familiar with the tradition? Was he, for example, so steeped in his Western education that he was blinded to these moves? I personally doubt that this is the right sort of answer, given the extent and subtlety of Chang’s Confucian interventions. A better answer perhaps is this: Chang saw both Confucianism and the West as evolving traditions, originally formed by different historical, political, and social circumstances, and yet sharing the same world, equally vulnerable to cruelty, bestiality, inhumanity of man to man, and linked in that bond of vulnerability. Furthermore, in confronting the issues before the Third Committee, Chang came increasingly to appreciate certain similarities of moral thought and action, East and West, which together formed a bridge for intercultural exchange and pragmatic agreement on the really important issues of the postwar world. And he wagered that strengthening and widening that bridge—or at least keeping it open—would allow both traditions to learn from each other, to change and evolve at least to the extent that they could actively cooperate in the grand project of the world’s humanization. If Chang so wagered, and I believe he did, then his position is one I share, and one we all can at least appreciate.

NOTES 1. An earlier and much briefer version of this paper was presented and discussed at the Academic Seminar on Perceptions of Being Human in Confucian Thought, sponsored by the International Confucian Association, Beijing 1998. A much longer version was published in Chinese in International Confucian Research, vol. 6 (1999) (journal of the International Confucian Association), and was presented and discussed at the Fairbank Center for East Asian Research, Harvard University, April 1999. Parts of the longer version formed the basis for sections of some other papers that have been published, namely, “Confucian Values and Human Rights,” in Joseph Runzo, Nancy M. Martin, and Arvind Sharma, eds., Human Rights and Responsibilities in the World Religions (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2003), pp. 283–99 (specifically the section on P. C. Chang, pp. 292–96), and “Confucian Ethics, Concept-Clusters, and Human Rights,” in Polishing the Chinese Mirror: Essays in Honor of Henry Rosemont, Jr., ed. Marthe Chandler and Ronnie Littlejohn, a volume in the ACPA Series of Chinese and Comparative Philosophy (New York: Global Scholarly Publications, 2008), pp. 49–66 (again, specifically the section on P. C. Chang, pp. 60–63). I am indebted to Wm. Theodore de Bary (Columbia University) for his critical comments on the longer version, and I also wish to acknowledge the research and secretarial assistance, respectively, of Caroline Johnson and Kathleen Pappas in the preparation of this chapter. 2. A. J. Hobbins, ed., On the Edge of Greatness: The Diaries of John Humphrey, First Director of the United Nations Division of Human Rights, vol. 1 (1948–49) and vol. 2 (1950–51) (Montreal: McGill University Libraries, 1994 and 1996, respectively). The quotations in this paragraph are from vol. 1, pp. 55–56, 58, and 88.

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3. This information on the biography and career of Chang is drawn from the following sources: “Peng Chun Chang, Diplomat, 65, Dies” (obituary), New York Times (July 21, 1957); Yearbook of the United Nations, 1947–48 (Lake Success, NY: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1948), p. 1055; “Dr. Peng-chun Chang,” online biography produced by the National Coordinating Committee for UDHR50, Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt Institute, revised April 12, 1998, and available at http://www.udhr50.org/ history/Biographies/biopcc.htm; and Ruth H. C. Cheng, and Sze-Chuh Cheng, eds., Peng Chun Chang 1892–1957: Biography and Collected Works (privately published, 1995), p. 8 (Chang’s own resume) and pp. 20–36 (“A Chronological Biography” by the editors, Chang’s daughter and her husband). The last-mentioned source is the most comprehensive and useful. 4. The information in this paragraph and the next is drawn from John Dewey, Lectures in China, 1919–1921, trans. and ed. Robert W. Clopton, and Tsuin-chen Ou (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1973), the Editors’ Introduction, pp. 1–39 (esp. pp. 4–7, 10–26). See also George Dykhuizen, The Life and Mind of John Dewey (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1973), ch. 10 (“The Far East, 1919–1921”). 5. See, for example, John Dewey, “New Culture in China” and “Transforming the Mind of China,” reprinted in his Characters and Events: Popular Essays in Social and Political Philosophy, vol. 1, ed. Joseph Ratner (New York: Henry Holt, 1929), pp. 270–95. 6. The quotations are from Chang Peng-chun, Education for Modernization in China: A Search for Criteria of Curriculum Construction in View of the Transition in National Life, with Special Reference to Secondary Education, Contributions to Education, No. 137 (New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1923), pp. 14–15. 7. The quotations are from Chang, Education for Modernization in China, pp. 28–29. The volumes by Dewey cited by Chang in his own book include Democracy and Education (Macmillan, 1916), School and Society (Chicago, 1899), My Pedagogic Creed (Kellogg, 1987), How We Think (Heath, 1910), Creative Intelligence (Holt, 1917), Influence of Darwin on Philosophy (Holt, 1910), and (with J. H. Tufts), Ethics (Holt, 1908). In addition, Chang discusses briefly Dewey’s 1921 article, “Old China and New,” reprinted under the title, “Young China and Old,” in Dewey, Characters and Events, vol. I, pp. 255–69. 8. The five criteria are listed and discussed in Chang, Education for Modernization in China, pp. 34–55; the quotation is from p. 35. 9. Beyond this general influence of Dewey’s thought on Chang, it might be asked whether Dewey’s lectures in China 1919–21—and specifically the lectures on political liberalism and the rights of individuals—influenced Chang in any direct way. So far as I can ascertain, they did not. First, it is highly probable that Chang was studying at Columbia University during the entire period that Dewey was in China. This lack of contact may account in part for why Chang acknowledges in the preface to Education for Modernization in China his particular debt to Kilpatrick, rather than Dewey. Second, in none of his published writings does Chang ever refer to these lectures or even to Dewey’s more focused works on social and political philosophy. Third, when in his third book, China at the Crossroads, Chang draws comparisons between Chinese and European thought, he nowhere cites the standard philosophers associated with the development of political liberalism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries—for example, Locke, Rousseau, and the English utilitarians—figures with whom Dewey was well acquainted and himself discussed in his China lectures (Lectures in China, pp. 141–46). None of this is to say that Dewey’s political philosophy had no influence on Chang’s thought, but rather to suggest that such influence was likely mediated only through Dewey’s educational writings. It is also not to say that Dewey’s approach to individual rights (in his China lectures) and Chang’s approach to human rights (in the UDHR context) are vastly different. There is, for example, a broad parallel between Dewey’s pragmatic, historicist position on individual rights (as the product of a historical process and

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struggle by particular societies, with no appeal to philosophical argumentation) and Chang’s pragmatic, antimetaphysical stance on human rights (see below). And Dewey did himself invoke Mencius’s name in suggesting that China’s “traditional concept of the state’s obligation to protect its people” could “be readily modified into the concept of the protection of its citizens by a democratic government” (Lectures in China, p. 154). These few, rough parallels, however, are not sufficient to demonstrate a direct impact of Dewey’s China lectures on Chang. Again, influence mediated by Dewey’s educational writings is more plausible and defensible. 10. These two books are related (as preliminary and final versions), with the first being more fully titled China: Whence and Whither? An Outline of a High School Unit of Study, A Preliminary Draft for Experimental Use in the Senior High Schools of the Territory of Hawaii (Honolulu: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1934), and the second and more polished version, China at the Crossroads: The Chinese Situation in Perspective (London: Evans Brothers, 1936). Although I have read and compared both versions, I quote only from the second one. 11. Chang, China at the Crossroads, quotations from pp. 30–32. Chang himself is quoting Voltaire from The Works of Voltaire, trans. William F. Fleming (London: Craftsmen of St. Hubert Guild, 1901), vols. iv and xv. 12. Chang, China at the Crossroads, pp. 44–50; quotations from pp. 47, 49, and 50. Chang’s discussion includes extensive quotations from the Analects and Mencius. 13. Chang, China at the Crossroads, pp. 94–97; quotations from pp. 95, 96. Although Chang does not note the source for the Huang quotation, it is from the Ming-i-tai-fang lit, recently translated and analyzed by Wm. Theodore de Bary, Waiting for the Dawn: A Plan for the Prince (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). 14. Chang, China at the Crossroads, pp. 64–68, 150–55; quotations from pp. 66, 68, 150–51. The quotation concerning Reichwein’s claim are Chang’s words, not Reichwein’s, reflecting on the latter’s book, China and Europe (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1925), pp. 86, 107–8. 15. Chang, China at the Crossroads, p. 171. 16. Chang, China at the Crossroads, pp. 124–25. Interestingly, John Dewey is nowhere named in this book, although Chang does cite Bertrand Russell’s book, The Problem of China (London: George Alien and Unwin, 1922 from the same period that both Dewey and Russell lectured in China. 17. The texts of both sets of addresses are reproduced (in their original published form as pamphlets) in Cheng, and Cheng, Peng Chun Chang, pp. 143–53, but no original publication information is supplied by the editors. The pamphlets, with their own integrally numbered pages, are titled, respectively, “Text of Two Lectures Delivered by H. E. Dr. P. C. Chang, Chinese Minister to Turkey, in King Faisal II Hall, Baghdad, on March 11, 1942, with an Introductory Speech by H. E. General Nuri As-said, Prime Minister of Iraq” (28 pages) and “A New Loyalty, War Against Microbes, and World Significance of Economically ‘Low-Pressure’ Areas: Three Speeches by Dr. P. C. Chang, Chinese Representative to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations” (8 pages). I will refer to first set of lectures as “Two Lectures,” and I will refer to the second set as “Three Speeches.” In referencing quotations from these two sets of lectures, I will cite the pamphlet page number followed in brackets with the pagination of Cheng, and Cheng’s Peng Chun Chang. 18. Chang, “Two Lectures,” pp. 18–25 [147–49]; quotations from pp. 19 [147], 20 [148], 24 [149]. 19. Chang, “Two Lectures,” pp. 8–9 [145]. 20. Chang, “Two Lectures,” p. 10 [145]. 21. Chang, “Two Lectures,” pp. 14–15 [146]. 22. Chang, “Two Lectures,” p. 16 [147]. Chang does not explicitly cite the source from the Analects other than to attribute the quotation to Confucius. D. C. Lau in his translation

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of the Analects (London: Penguin Books, 1979) renders the passage as follows: “To work for the things the common people have a right to and to keep one’s distance from the gods and spirits while showing them reverence can be called wisdom” (p. 84). 23. Chang, “Two Lectures,” pp. 27–28 [149]. Again, Chang does not explicitly cite the source from The Great Learning other than to attribute the quotation to “a certain philosopher in China.” For identification purposes, I used the following translation of The Great Learning: Wing-tsit Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 84–94. 24. Chang, “Three Speeches,” p. 2 [150]. Although Chang cites “a saying from the Chinese thinker, Mencius,” no precise source is provided in the text. D. C. Lau in his translation of Mencius (London: Penguin Books, 1970) renders the passage as follows: “You can never succeed in winning the allegiance of men by trying to dominate them through goodness. You can only succeed by using this goodness for their welfare. You can never gain the Empire without the heart-felt admiration of the people in it” (p. 130). Compare the translation of James Legge from his The Works of Mencius (New York: Dover, 1970; originally published, 1885, by Clarendon Press, Oxford): “Never has he who would by his excellence subdue men been able to subdue them. Let a prince seek by his excellence to nourish men, and he will be able to subdue the whole kingdom” (p. 323). 25. Chang, “Three Speeches,” p. 3 [151]; all quotations from this page. 26. Chang, “Three Speeches,” pp. 5–7 [152–53]; quotations from pp. 6–7. 27. Chang, “Three Speeches,” p. 8 [153]. Chang does not cite the specific source for this quotation, but it is clearly from the Li Chi. The edition I used was Li Chi, Book of Rites, trans. James Legge (New York: University Books 1967; originally published, 1885, by Clarendon Press, Oxford), vol. I, pp. 364–66. 28. Official Records of the Third Session of the General Assembly, Part I, Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Questions, Third Committee, Summary Records of Meetings 21 September-8 December, 1948, with Annexes, printed in both English and French (Lake Success, NY: United Nations, 1948), p. 87. It should be noted that these records represent a historical summary of proceedings, not necessarily a precise word-for-word transcription of quotations from speakers. Hereinafter I will cite this work as Third Committee, followed by page references. 29. Economic and Social Council Official Records, Second Year: Fourth Session 28 February 1947–29 March 1947, with Supplements 1–10, printed in both English and French (Lake Success, NY: United Nations, 1947), p. 111. Again, it should be noted that these records represent a historical summary of proceedings, not necessarily a precise word-for-word transcription. Hereinafter I will cite this work as Economic and Social Council, followed by page references. 30. Chang’s earlier claims about the influence of Chinese (Confucian) philosophy on eighteenth-century European thought are now being extended by him to the foundations of human rights thinking in the West. 31. Although Chang does not here explicitly identify the idea of man’s moral capacity, it is implicit in his emphasis on “the human aspect of human rights,” which is further developed by him in connection with his support of Article 1 (see below). 32. Economic and Social Council, p. 111. 33. Third Committee, p. 98. 34. Third Committee, p. 98. 35. Third Committee, p. 98. 36. Third Committee, p. 98. 37. Chang’s notion of pragmatic agreement, despite philosophical and ideological differences, parallels Jacques Maritain’s claim that “the goal of UNESCO is a practical goal, agreement between minds can be reached spontaneously, not on the basis of common speculative ideas, but on common practical ideas, not on the affirmation of one and the

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same conception of the world, of man and of knowledge, but upon the affirmation of a single body of beliefs for guidance in action.” Neither Chang nor Maritain cited the other, but the parallelism is remarkable. (The French representative to the Third Committee does refer to the position of Maritain as partial support for Chang’s position on Article 1; see Third Committee, p. 117.) For Maritain’s fuller reasoning, see UNESCO’s 1948 typescript volume, Human Rights: Comments and Interpretations, A Symposium edited by UNESCO, With an Introduction by Jacques Maritain (Paris: UNESCO, July 25, 1948), pp. I–IX; preceding quotation from page II. 38. Third Committee, p. 48. 39. Third Committee, p. 48, 397, 177. 40. I have changed the numbering of these articles—which was in flux during the Third Committee debate—to conform with the numbering order finally adopted. I used the edition of UDHR published in The International Bill of Human Rights (New York: United Nations, 1993), pp. 4–9. 41. Article 1 reads as follows: “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.” I reported on Chang’s earlier contribution to the drafting committee in my “A Constructive Framework for Discussing Confucianism and Human Rights,” in Confucianism and Human Rights, ed. Wm. Theodore de Bary, and Tu Weiming (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), pp. 27–53: Pier Cesare Bori, referring to records of the debates surrounding the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, reports that the Confucian tradition, as represented by the Chinese delegate P. Chang, influenced the formulation of Article 1. As reported by Bori, the first version of this article stated: “All men are brothers. As human beings with the gift of reason and members of a single family, they are free and equal in dignity and rights.” With respect to this article, Chang argued for the inclusion of “two-men-mindedness” (the basic Confucian idea of jen) in addition to the mention of “reason.” At the forefront of Chang’s mind, suggests Bori, was the idea of a fundamental sympathy, benevolence, or compassion (as represented by Mencius) as constitutive of human beings generally. The wording finally adopted included “conscience” in addition to “reason,” with the understanding that “conscience” was not the voice of an internal moral court but rather the emotional and sympathetic basis of morality, “a ‘germ’ objectively present” in all persons, “which reason must cultivate.”

Bori reconstructs Chang’s contributions from his reading of A. Verdoodt, Naissance et signification de le déclaration universelle des droits de l’homme, preface by Rene Cassin (Louvain-Paris: Naunelaerts, 1964), pp. 47ff. After consulting that volume, I believe that Bori’s reconstruction is a fair inference from the text. See Pier Bori, From Hermeneutics to Ethical Consensus among Cultures (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1994), ch. 7. 42. Third Committee, p. 99. 43. Third Committee, p. 98. 44. Third Committee, pp. 113-114. This passage appears to capture the basic thrust of Book VI.A of The Mencius. Mencius VI.A.14 reads, in part, The parts of the person differ in value and importance. Never harm the parts of greater importance for the sake of those of smaller importance, or the more valuable for the sake of the less valuable. He who nurtures the parts of smaller importance is a small man; he who nurtures the parts of greater importance is a great man. . . . A man who cares only about food and drink is despised by others because he takes care of the parts of smaller importance to the detriment of the parts of greater importance.

45. Third Committee, pp. 87, 98, 114, respectively. 46. Article 18 reads as follows: “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom,

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either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.” 47. Third Committee, p. 397. 48. Third Committee, p. 397. 49. Chang’s reasoning here appears to reaffirm and build upon his earlier position in “Two Lectures” about humanistic respect for spiritual matters, based on Analects 6:22. 50. Article 21 reads as follows: “1. Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives. 2. Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country. 3. The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.” 51. The first quotation is from Economic and Social Council, p. 110, and the other two from Third Committee, p. 462. We have seen from his earlier writings that this is a favored theme of Chang. 52. Third Committee, p. 462. 53. Economic and Social Council, p. 111. 54. Article 29 reads as follows: “1. Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible. 2. In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society. 3. These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.” 55. Third Committee, p. 98. 56. Third Committee, p. 98. 57. Third Committee, p. 98. 58. This is similar to Chang’s earlier effort to point to such bridges in China at the Crossroads. 59. I have in mind here the work of such scholars as Roger Ames and Henry Rosemont. See, for example, Henry Rosemont, “Why Take Rights Seriously? A Confucian Critique,” and Roger T. Ames, “Rites as Rights: The Confucian Alternative,” in Human Rights and the World’s Religions, ed. Leroy Rouner (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), pp. 167–82, 199–216, respectively.

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CHAPTER 15

Religious Freedom, the Right to Proselytize, and the Right “To Be Let Alone” Kusumita P. Pedersen

A

t the Millennium World Peace Summit of Religious and Spiritual Leaders held at the United Nations and the Waldorf Astoria Hotel on August 28–31, 2000, Wande Abimbola, as a “preeminent spiritual leader,” addressed the first plenary of the historic gathering in the General Assembly hall. Dr. Abimbola, a Nigerian, is a scholar of Ifa, the religion of the Yoruba people, and also a babalawo, or priest of that religion. Pointedly addressing both Christians and Muslims on the question of proselytization he said, “Leave us alone to worship the gods of our ancestors.”1 He affirmed that he was speaking not only for the Yoruba, but for all Indigenous Peoples and their religions. He referred not only to the African history of colonization and enslavement, but to continuing attacks on African Traditional Religions, with the use of mass media and the expenditure of millions of dollars. Invaders from outside have twisted the words of the holy books, the Bible and the Qur’an, he indicated, and Africa has become a battleground where religious conflicts have increased, and families and communities are torn apart by interreligious bigotry and intrareligious rivalry between denominations. He added, “The world must learn a lesson from the non-proselytizing beliefs and practices of the indigenous religions of Africa, the non-violent practices of Buddhism, Hinduism, Taoism, Confucianism and other faiths of the East.”2 On the same day, other preeminent spiritual leaders also brought up proselytization. Although it had not appeared on the official agenda of the Peace Summit, clearly it was seen by many as closely connected with the official topics of conflict transformation, poverty, the environment, and reconciliation. Although some speakers sounded the theme of the oneness of religions and called in general terms for mutual respect, the Hindu monk Swami Dayananda Saraswati asked the assembled leaders of the world’s religions to consider whether any of their theologies are disturbing to the minds of others, and whether they lead to the destruction of cultures. “If I want to be free, you should let me be free,” he said. “You are not only to love your religion, you are also not to destroy any other religion.” Chief Oren Lyons of the Onondaga Nation, speaking for Indigenous

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Peoples of the Americas, began his address by saying, “We are the Indigenous people who got away,” and continued with the story of a Native American who, although he was being burned at the stake, refused to convert because he would then meet his tormentors in heaven. In contrast, Ann Graham Lotz, the daughter of Christian evangelist Billy Graham, spoke in unmoderated terms of Jesus as the destined ruler of the world. Without any concession to religious pluralism, she declared that the global problems under discussion will be solved “when the government is on his shoulders.”3 On the following morning, Cardinal Francis Arinze, president of the Pontifical Council on Interreligious Dialogue, responded without mentioning his fellow Nigerian Wande Abimbola by name. All religions, Cardinal Arinze said, teach us to serve the poor. Conversion from one religion to another must always be free, voluntary, and uncoerced. One should neither be forced to convert nor prevented from converting. It is obvious that we cannot prohibit all conversion, and we shall not stop giving aid to the poor “because they might like our religion.” The Rev. Dr. Joan Brown Campbell, former general secretary of the National Council of Churches of Christ in the United States, subsequently stated that “all proselytization must stop.” Immediately following this, the conference went into working groups, and as soon as the session on poverty had begun, Hindu participants challenged Christians saying that efforts in India to mitigate poverty are linked to proselytization. An exchange took place between Cardinal Arinze and Swami Dayananda. Tensions increased. At this point, a small group of Christians and Hindus and one rabbi, all key individuals in leading institutions, went into a closed-door dialogue moderated by the co-director of a major interfaith organization. They worked for several hours to draft a concordat that was presented the next day.4 In the closing session of the conference, a group of Hindus and Buddhists presented a very brief statement stating that Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights should not be interpreted as allowing proselytization.5 These are only some of the occasions when proselytization was mentioned in speeches or made the subject of discussion in working groups. Indeed, the subject emerged as one of the main issues at the Peace Summit, which was the first meeting of religious leaders ever to be held at the United Nations itself. The centrality of proselytization as an issue was, in my view, one of the major achievements of the Peace Summit. It was an achievement because of the clarity and frequency with which the issue was identified, and because it was not dismissed, but was discussed for the most part civilly, responsibly, and substantively. This was the first interreligious forum on this scale where the issue had come right to center stage. This may have been for two reasons: First, many of those in attendance had never attended an interfaith meeting before and did not know, or perhaps did not care, that some others thought they were supposed to remain harmoniously “dialogical” and not bring up this uncomfortable, sensitive, and even explosive topic, which had been largely taboo in such meetings until then. They went ahead and brought it up because it was a major concern for them. Second, the interfaith movement of the last century, partly by focusing on lesscontentious topics, has at last matured to the point where even long-time participants are now ready or at least willing to hear about the problem of proselytization and to admit that it can no longer be avoided.

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The issue of proselytization is likely to continue to come increasingly to the fore in interfaith dialogues and in human rights discussions of religious freedom. The targets of proselytization, as just illustrated, have found their voice in a new way. Their religious leaders and institutions are beginning to monitor, research, and comment upon proselytization—its methods, effects, and the theologies that give it religious warrant. Religious leaders and scholars from proselytized communities are making their views known to their counterparts in the proselytizing communities. Interpretation and polemic are explicitly connecting the colonial history and present impact of proselytization to critical global issues of conflict, poverty, the environment, and reconciliation in areas torn by violence. The growing scholarly literature on religion and human rights, and increased political awareness of issues of religious freedom more generally, are making important contributions to forging a new understanding of the whole question. It might be useful at this point to clarify relevant terms in the discussion. Those opposing proselytization are now beginning to speak of the “proselytizing religions” and the “nonproselytizing religions.” What exactly is “proselytization”? It can be characterized as an intentional and organized effort to cause an individual or group to change from the religion already espoused to the proselytizers’ religion.6 Its aim is “conversion” or adoption of the new religion; for the Abrahamic religions at least, this will mean rejecting the previously held religion. Proselytization may or may not be successful, so proselytization is not the same thing as “conversion,” but conversion is its goal.7 “Evangelization,” a Christian word, is not quite the same thing as proselytization. A more general term, it means to proclaim the “good news” of the Gospel, or to “witness.” It is well recognized in theologies of mission in various Christian churches that to share the good news of the Christian faith or to witness to its message does not necessarily mean an organized, let alone aggressive, program to convert non-Christians to Christianity.8 The idea of “mission” and its concretization can be understood in many ways: as service, as witness for Gospel values of peace and justice, or as working deliberately toward conversion, “saving souls,” “planting churches” and so on. Proselytization normally presupposes some kind of an evangelical attitude, but not necessarily the other way around. How can we define and protect the human rights, and specifically the religious freedom, of those on both sides of the controversy? In attempting an analysis, one is immediately brought up short by a contradiction. It is a familiar one. Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights reads as follows: Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.9

Freedom of religion thus means freedom not only to believe in but also to practice and “manifest” one’s religion. For some religious groups, because of the nature of their beliefs, in order to be faithful to one’s religion, one must engage in attempts to win over others to that religion. For them, religious freedom is construed as permission to proselytize. It should be emphasized that this is a matter of religious conviction, of a particular kind of belief and theology. On the other

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hand, those who are the objects of proselytization state that these attempts to get them to change their religion are in fact violations of their religious freedom, since these are actions directed toward, and at times having the effect of, preventing them from having and manifesting their own religion. One religious community’s “freedom of religion” is, in fact, another religious community’s “violation of freedom of religion.” This is the dilemma: how can we protect the rights of some to retain and protect their religions without unduly limiting the rights of others to practice theirs through proselytizing activity? The evangelical interpretation of freedom of religion seems a strong one. Evangelicals forcefully use the following argument: “Freedom of religion means precisely that I can proclaim my religion; if not, then what does it mean to have freedom to manifest it? Besides, the one whom I am trying to win over is equally free to accept or reject my attempt to convince him or her that my religion is better.” In response, the opponents of proselytization say, “The targets of proselytization are often not actually free.” This is a pragmatic argument. Peoples who have been and still are the targets of proselytization repeatedly point out (as they did at the Peace Summit) that proselytization and colonial domination have not merely gone hand in hand but have been two aspects of the same enterprise. Missionaries have used and still use inducements such as health care, education, travel, and access to jobs and career advancement. There is never a “level playing field,” it is said, when religionists of a colonizing power seek to convert the colonized. The exercise of control may intend, among its other aims, to weaken or destroy the native culture and value system of the colonized. The theology behind proselytization gives the colonial enterprise a religious validation. As religion and culture are often coterminous, changing one’s religion can mean a break from one’s cultural heritage for the individual, and immense cultural change and disruption for a whole society. This, too, has been given religious validation, as the historical record shows. The end result of proselytization is, then, a violation, not only of religious freedom but also of cultural rights. Moreover, the response continues, the claim that one’s religion is superior and the assertion that some are “saved” and others are “not saved” is not merely offensive: it is in itself psychologically coercive, culturally destructive, and a denial of the humanity of the other.10 In sum, such claims are an affront to “human dignity.” The suggestion has also been made that speaking of others as “not saved,” “damned,” “pagan,” “heathen,” “unbelievers” and so on is a form of “hate speech” and as such should be restricted.11 This imports statements about the validity of any given religion into debates on the regulation of “hate speech” and its relation to the exercise of freedom of expression. The question has a long and complex history, often centering on whether speech devaluing a given racial, ethnic, or religious group in society is “incitement” to discrimination or disturbs public order.12 From this standpoint, a case would have to be made that speech leading to proselytization has this character, a possibility which in some contexts cannot be ruled out. How, then, can we protect the rights of the proselytized while safeguarding religious freedom for all? Howard Berman, an expert on Indigenous Peoples, remarked in 1994 that even if, per impossibile, all the rights included in presently existing human rights instruments were to be fully exercised by Indigenous

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Peoples, this still would not be enough to ensure their survival as peoples.13 Collective rights are an evolving issue in human rights law, as is the related and overlapping issue of rights of minorities.14 There is at this time not a “right to be let alone” or a “right not to be proselytized” fully defined in human rights documents. When one tries to formulate this right, because one faces the serious obstacles inherent in limiting the already recognized freedom of religion of those who proselytize, it is difficult to suggest guidelines for legal limitations on proselytization (such as restrictions on inducements or offensive propaganda) as opposed to prohibition of clear abuses (such as the use of violence). Natan Lerner has suggested that elements of a right not to be proselytized or indoctrinated—a right to be let alone—might be found in the right to privacy (Article 12 of the Universal Declaration and Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR]), citing Fernando Volio’s statement that privacy is a zone of security and freedom protecting other rights.15 He mentions as well Article 19 of the ICCPR: “Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference”; also important are Articles 20 and 27 of the ICCPR, prohibiting advocacy of religious hatred and protecting the right of minorities “to profess and practice their own religion,” respectively.16 The 1981 Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion and Belief further says that “no one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have a religion or belief of his choice” and even mentions “the elimination of ideologies or practices of colonialism and racial discrimination.”17 It further says, “All States shall take effective measure to prevent and eliminate discrimination on the grounds of religion and belief,” and notes that children shall be brought up “in a spirit of understanding, tolerance, friendship among peoples, peace and universal brotherhood, respect for freedom of religion or belief of others.”18 There is as yet, however, little international consensus beyond this wording itself on implications or ways of practical implementation.19 At this point, reference should be made to the proposal of Arvind Sharma that we undertake a redefinition of religious freedom, which he as a Hindu scholar of human rights considers to be biased toward Western conceptions of religion. In recent testimony to the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, Sharma stated that “the concept of religious freedom articulated in Article 18 presupposes a certain concept of religion itself, a concept associated with Western religion and culture . . . that an individual can only belong to or profess one religion at a time.”20 He gives examples from Asia of “multiple religious participation,” and the sense found in different regions of Asia that it is not necessary to leave one religion if one accepts another. Much more could be said on the important topic of “double belonging” in religion as distinct from ideas of mutual exclusion and supersessionism.21 Although Article 18 reads, “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief,” Sharma holds that this is weighted toward Western ideas of conversion, and that to be unbiased, it should be read or interpreted in this way: “This right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom not to change his religion or belief.”22 Sharma has suggested elsewhere, giving examples from different traditions, that when “freedom to change one’s religion” is “unpacked,” it will be found to contain not one but several rights:

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the right to choose one’s religion; the right to retain one’s religion; the right to ask someone to change his or her religion; the right not to be asked to change one’s religion; the right to appropriate the particulars of another’s religion, such as symbols or scriptures; and the right not to have the particulars of one’s own religion appropriated by another.23 Arvind Sharma’s analysis is useful in that it demonstrates how the formulation of human rights norms may be directly influenced by religious concepts and practices. Sharma, like Abimbola and others, makes a distinction between “proselytizing religions” and “nonproselytizing religions”; this is a distinction not just between practices but between theologies that mandate the practices. Inquiry must be continued into the question of how particular religious beliefs, and also overarching ideas about what religion is, influence the formation of different views of religious freedom, human rights, human dignity, and the universality of human rights. For some, human dignity means every human being is worthy of respect; that no one should be treated as, spoken of, or even looked upon as inferior by others; and that religious freedom means no one should be subject to any coercion or pressure, material or psychological, to change his or her religion or even to regard it as defective. Universality of human rights may imply not only the need for tolerance (minimally understood as noninterference) but also for positive respect. It may go even further, and be understood to link with a kind of universality of religion consistent with human rights norms, themselves understood as a transreligious morality. To take only one example, the Global Ethic adopted at the 1993 Parliament of the World’s Religions affirms that “there is already a consensus among the religions” on “a common set of core values.”24 Universality of religion here means the assumption that at least some aspects or elements of the world’s religions are common to all or most of them, or are compatible, and that therefore diverse religions may be accepted at least in terms of their morality, and possibly (this lies in the background) even in their truth-claims about a sacred reality.25 For others, human dignity means to be able to embrace confidently what one believes is the supreme truth, in contradistinction to the truths embraced by others. Religious freedom then means the freedom to proclaim a particular religion as true and to do as much as possible to convince others that this is indeed the best, and that accordingly other religions are not as true or as good. If in spite of efforts to be respectful or loving in manner, this proclamation is offensive to others, this may be regrettable but cannot be avoided. The truth must be served whether or not it is offensive or painful to some. If the long-range consequence is change, displacement, and even destruction of others’ religions or cultures, this can be justified in terms of a certain religious belief. Since religions cannot all be equally good or true, the best and most true should prevail. Universality of religion is an incoherent idea; strangely, it is actually a form of religious relativism. Universality of human rights, in this interpretation, supports religious particularism along with the freedom to proselytize and to change. One view of freedom of religion calls for harmony, the other for competition—the “nonproselytizing” and “proselytizing” approaches. Those whose communities are still being proselytized are speaking out more loudly and lucidly, are resisting (sometimes with violence), and are also challenging

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the ideologies and language of proselytization. They are scrutinizing the religious beliefs and rhetoric of others even if these are not shared directly or openly with them. They are asking, “We want to know why you are saying this, and doing this. What is your motive? Can you justify it? We want to know exactly what your religion says about us, and if your view of us is unwelcome to us, we will want you to know that we are opposed to it.” If the proselytizers object, the proselytized will keep on saying what they are saying now into the indefinite future. The pressure is bound to have some effect. At present, some agreements to end blatant inducements by missionaries and other offensive practices are being reached, and in some areas liberal theologies of mission are already firmly in place.26 In interreligious relations, a new phase of dialogue about proselytization is under way. In the absence of legal solutions so far, in disputes over proselytization, interreligious dialogue and negotiation must make sustained, organized efforts to achieve voluntary restraints and foster better relations between religious groups. It is often observed that religion is a factor in the majority of situations of tension or open conflict in different parts of the world. If proselytization is possibly exacerbating tensions and contributing to instability and conflict in some of these situations, it would seem that finding the means to mitigate such effects is critical. The clarification of a right to retain one’s religion and to be free from improper or excessive proselytization could perhaps play a role in efforts to reduce conflict. As Natan Lerner observes, however, “The problem of proselytism is a clash between rights. Which right should prevail in concrete situations cannot be decided in the abstract. A just solution may require striking an elusive balance. A free society must find ways of accommodating equally valid human rights.”27 If one acknowledges a right not to be proselytized, one must also acknowledge that attempts to limit proselytization can and do threaten religious freedom today in some countries. The balance between the right to preserve religious identity and heritage and the right to choose and manifest a religion is difficult to attain, but no matter how elusive, this balance must be pursued both theoretically and practically if harmony between religious communities is to be established.

Acknowledgment Thanks to Alan Race, editor-in-chief of Interreligious Insight, who graciously gives permission to publish this chapter, previously published as “University of Moral Norms: A Human Rights Perspective,” Interreligious Insight, 5/1 (January 2007).

NOTES 1. Wande Abimbola, “Religion and Peace in Africa: Recolonization and Enslavement of Africans in the Name of Religion” (address at the Millennium World Peace Summit of Religious and Spiritual Leaders, August 29, 2000, unpublished manuscript), p. 4. 2. Abimbola, p. 3. 3. This account is based on detailed notes taken by the author throughout the Millennium World Peace Summit of Religious and Spiritual Leaders. 4. Delegation of Christians and Hindus during the Peace Summit, An Informal Working Understanding: Freedom from Coercion in Religion (available from the Council for a Parliament of the World’s Religions, Chicago).

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5. Hindu, Sikh, Jain, and Buddhist delegation, Peace Summit, Resolution on Freedom of Religion and for Peace Among Religions (document circulated at the Millennium World Peace Summit, August 28–31, 2001). 6. For the purposes of this chapter, I will not consider missions to the “unchurched” or nonreligious as proselytization, as these are rarer, and more often may be termed a kind of “renewal.” 7. Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, “Introduction: Competing Claims to Religious Freedom and Communal Self-Determination in Africa” in Proselytization and Communal Self-Determination in Africa, ed. Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1999), p. 1. 8. J. Paul Martin, and Harry Winter, O.M.I., “Religious Proselytization: Historical and Theological Perspectives at the End of the Twentieth Century,” in An-Na’im, Proselytization and Communal Self-Determination in Africa, pp. 29–50. 9. The text of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948, is widely available, as are the 1966 international covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and on Civil and Political Rights. I cite United Nations, 1993. 10. Makau Mutua, “Returning to My Roots: African ‘Religions’ and the State,” in AnNa’im, Proselytization and Communal Self-Determination in Africa, p. 170. 11. Rajiv Malhotra, “The Ethics of Proselytizing” (paper given at the Conference on Human Rights and Religion, Cornell University, November 8, 2000), p. 1. 12. See David Little, “Tolerance, Equal Freedom and Peace: A Human Rights Approach,” in The Essence of Living in a Free Society (The Andrew W. Cecil Lectures on Moral Values in a Free Society), vol. XVII, ed. W. Lawson Taitte (Dallas: University of Texas Press, 1997), pp. 171–75. 13. Conference on Religion and Human Rights, May 22–24, 1994, New York. For an account of the conference, see John Kelsay, and Sumner B. Twiss, eds., Religion and Human Rights (New York: Project on Religion and Human Rights, 1994), pp. 81–112. 14. See for example Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), especially ch. 3. 15. Natan Lerner, “Proselytism, Change of Religion, and International Human Rights,” Emory International Law Review 12.1 (Winter 1998), pp. 484–85. The Volio article is “Legal Personality, Privacy and the Family,” in The International Bill of Rights: The Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, ed. Louis Henkin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), pp. 185–208. 16. Lerner, p. 515. 17. United Nations, Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion and Belief (G. A. res. 36/55, 36 GAPOR supp. [no. 51] at 171, U.N. 1981 Doc. A/36/684 1981. Posted at www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b.d_intole.htm), 1.2 and Preamble. 18. Article 4.1; Article 5.3. Abdullahi An-Na’im calls for a greater role by states (AnNa’im, “Introduction: Competing Claims to Religious Freedom and Communal SelfDetermination in Africa,” pp. 1–28). 19. Martin, and Winter, p. 31. 20. Arvind Sharma, “Religious Freedom: A Hindu Perspective” (testimony before the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, September 18, 2000), p. 2. 21. John H. Berthrong, The Divine Deli: Religious Identity in the North American Cultural Mosaic (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1999); Katherine Kurs, ed., Searching for Your Soul: Writers of Many Faiths Share Their Personal Stories of Spiritual Discovery (New York: Schocken Books, 1999). 22. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights changes the wording to read, “This right shall include freedom to have or adopt a religion or belief of his choice”

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(Article 18) precisely because of this problematic nature of the wording on “change,” especially for Islam. See Lerner, pp. 521–27. 23. Arvind Sharma, “Measuring the Reach of a Universal Right,” Religion & Values in Public Life. 8.4 (Winter 2000–1), p. 11. 24. Parliament of the World’s Religions, Towards a Global Ethic (An Initial Declaration) (Chicago: Council for a Parliament of the World’s Religions, 1993), pp. 1, 3. A significant fact, however, is that this Global Ethic (like other similar statements) draws heavily on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which precedes it by forty-five years. 25. This is one position among several on normative issues in religious pluralism or theology of religions. Space does not permit a discussion of the critiques or qualifications of this position or a summary of alternate positions beyond that given in the paragraph that follows. Some sort of universalism, although sometimes unexamined, does tend to be a working assumption or implicit attitude in interreligious programs. 26. Lawrence A. Uzzell, “Guidelines for American Missionaries in Russia,” in Proselytism and Orthodoxy in Russia: The New War for Souls, ed. John Witte Jr. and Michael Bourdeaux (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1999), pp. 323–30. 27. Lerner, p. 487.

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Part III A Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the World’s Religions?

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CHAPTER 16

The Rationale for a Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the World’s Religions: Before and after September 11, 2001 Arvind Sharma

I

t seems that at least three reasons could be advanced in favor of producing a Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the World’s Religions. I shall begin with the most general and conclude with the most proximate reason. The most general reason for adopting a Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the World’s Religions arises from the rather obvious but fundamental point that it would be in the interest of everyone if the various religions of the world acted in concert instead of working against each other. Thus, for instance, if two religions were trying to convert people from the other religion to their own, then they would be acting at odds with each other and setting up a situation of potential conflict. If these same two religions, however, came together on the same platform to draft a declaration on human rights, then they would be acting in concert. They may have to iron out differences between themselves in the course of preparing such a draft, but these would be differences in the pursuit of the same goal, which could arguably be threshed out, as opposed to the two religions trying to steal each other’s flock, as it were. One is, of course, assuming that it is better for religions to cooperate with each other than to be in a state of conflict with each other. The Buddhist emperor A{oka in India had this message carved on rocks in the third century BCE: when it comes to relations among religions, concord is preferable to conflict. The famous theologian Hans Küng expressed the same sentiment in our own times in a more contemporaneous idiom when he declared that there can be no peace among nations without peace among religions.1 Mahatma Gandhi even said that the phrase “warring creeds” is itself blasphemous,2 as creeds or religions are meant to promote peace and not war, least of all among themselves. So one rationale for a Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the World’s Religions would lie in the fact that it would bring the various religions of the

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world to the same table to share, compare, and consolidate their visions of human flourishing, collectively and creatively. A second reason would go a step further and argue that there are two main sources of value formation in the world today: the moralities embedded in the various religious traditions of the world and the liberal humanistic secular traditions of the Enlightenment to which the West and through it the world is now heir. There are these two parallel tracks available to us, as it were. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 10, 1948, is arguably the product—and some would even say the finest product—of this latter secular tradition. But why run on monorail when two tracks are available? Why not also harness the moral resources of the religious traditions of humanity, when they also share many elements of the vision articulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Martin Luther King Jr. once famously observed that the problem in human affairs is not one of a deficit in human resources; rather, the problem is one of a deficit in human will.3 If we amend the last expression from “human will” to “moral human will,” then it does not require a major exercise in imagination to realize how much this “moral human will” can be reinforced by the infusion of moral inspiration from the religious traditions of the world. His Holiness, the Dalai Lama, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Bishop Belo of Timor Leste, and Madame Shirin Ebadi of Iran are living illustrations of this promise. Early in this chapter, I offered one rationale for the adoption of a Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the World’s Religions by stating that it is better if the religions of the world cooperated than if they did not—and that crafting such a declaration would provide an occasion for such cooperation. I have now also offered a second reason for it by arguing that if, as is generally held, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as adopted by the United Nations is primarily secular in its inspiration, then there might be good reason for all the religions of the world to come together and harness their moral resources to provide another source of inspiration to realize its ideals of human dignity and well-being, and where necessary, to broaden these ideals themselves. These are the two reasons I would have adduced in justification of a Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the World’s Religions prior to September 11, 2001. After the diabolically spectacular events of September 11, 2001, it now becomes possible to adduce another and more urgent reason for the adoption of such a document. I have already referred to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was adopted by the United Nations in 1948. The United Nations itself was constituted in 1945 in the aftermath of World War II. This war was the outcome of developments such as fascism, communism, and totalitarianism that, when examined closely, turn out to be really forms of secular extremism. If this suggestion is even remotely plausible, then one might consider the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations as an antidote to secular extremism—but one rather fatally delayed in being administered only after these forces had run their terrible course. If you agree with me in the observation that religious extremism is on the rise in the early years of this century, just as secular extremism was in the early years of the last century, then perhaps there is a lesson to be learned here. That lesson is

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that perhaps a Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the World’s Religions should be adopted right now, when religious extremism is in the early stages of its growth, so that the earlier error is not repeated. I am under no illusion that the adoption of a Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the World’s Religions will by itself stem the tide of religious extremism. On the other hand, we should also not despair whether it will have any effect at all. If some of the best voices in the various religions of the world came together and produced a document embodying their collective wisdom and moderation in the face of such ongoing extremism, then it might at least serve to mitigate some of extremism’s excesses, and at the very least induce some introspection among those who should know better—and with such a document in their hands, will know better. There is, after all, something to be said for taking a step in the right direction even if that step does not take us all the way toward the goal. Even a journey of many miles commences with the proverbial first step.

NOTES 1. Hans Küng, “Global Ethic for a New Global Order,” in Arvind Sharma, ed., Religion in a Secular City: Essays in Honor of Harvey Cox (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 2001), p. 121. 2. M. K. Gandhi, Hindu Dharma (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1958), p. 232. 3. This expression was used by Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. during his Nobel Peace Prize lecture, delivered at the University of Oslo on December 10, 1964.

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CHAPTER 17

A Bahá’í Perspective on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the World’s Religions after September 11, 2001 Brian D. Lepard

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would like to comment on the various insightful points raised by Arvind Sharma in the previous chapter, and to do so from a Bahá’í perspective. These represent my own personal reflections as a Bahá’í and as a scholar of international human rights law. First, I wish to thank Arvind Sharma and all those religion scholars and believers who have contributed to crafting such a thoughtful and important document—a document that seeks to achieve the type of integration of the best that international law and religion can mutually offer to the critical problem of making human rights a reality for all human beings. Turning to the first of the three reasons that Sharma (Chapter 16, this volume) has advanced for producing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the World’s Religions, he emphasizes that “it would be in the interest of everyone if the various religions of the world acted in concert instead of working against each other.” The Bahá’í teachings similarly endorse religious amity. Bahá’u’lláh, the prophet-founder of the Bahá’í Faith, counseled: “Consort with the followers of all religions in a spirit of friendliness and fellowship.”1 Bahá’ís believe that interreligious fellowship is not only a prudent means of ensuring peaceful coexistence among members of different faiths, but a divine command. This command originates from the fact that, in the Bahá’í view, all the world’s great religions represent guidance from one Divine Source. All their founders have been inspired educators sent by that Source, often referred to as God, to provide unerring moral guidance to humanity. In the words of ’Abdu’lBahá, the son of Bahá’u’lláh and the authorized interpreter of his teachings, “Blessed souls—whether Moses, Jesus, Zoroaster, Krishna, Buddha, Confucius, or Muhammad—were the cause of the illumination of the world of humanity. . . . All of them have sacrificed life, endured ordeals and tribulations in order that They might educate us.”2 And he further stated: “All the holy Manifestations of God have proclaimed and promulgated the same reality. They have summoned

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mankind to reality itself, and reality is one.”3 For these reasons, Bahá’ís have vigorously supported interfaith activities aimed at promoting the discovery and reaffirmation of this common reality proclaimed by all the world religions. Indeed, the basis for this interfaith discourse must be a common conviction that “God is one and that, beyond all diversity of cultural expression and human interpretation, religion is likewise one.” These are words from a recent statement by the international governing body of the Bahá’í Faith, the Universal House of Justice, to the world’s religious leaders, issued in April 2002.4 Nevertheless, there are clearly also reasons of expediency for promoting interreligious cooperation, particularly on a common affirmation of human rights. Not the least of these is that religious prejudice, sometimes taking the form of fanaticism but more often the form of a claim to exclusive access to truth, is on the ascension. And it is one of the last forms of prejudice still to enjoy general credibility. This fact is highlighted by the April 2002 statement of the Universal House of Justice, which notes that for a brief period of time after the first Parliament of Religions held in 1893 at the Columbian Exposition in Chicago, which the statement praises, it seemed that the world would be emancipated from religious bigotry. But in recent years, those hopes have dimmed. The statement affirms: “The greater part of organized religion stands paralyzed at the threshold of the future, gripped in those very dogmas and claims of privileged access to truth that have been responsible for creating some of the most bitter conflicts dividing the earth’s inhabitants.”5 For all these reasons, it might be fruitful, as Sharma has recognized, to encourage further interreligious collaboration on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the World’s Religions. In particular, it might be helpful for representatives of different faiths to identify scriptural passages that support the principles elaborated in each article, and to work together to prepare an anthology of these passages. Such an endeavor would provide an opportunity for members of various faiths better to perceive the common moral principles in their sacred texts. The second reason Sharma proposes for supporting the religious Universal Declaration is that the “two main sources of value formation in the world today” are the moral values “embedded in the various religious traditions of the world” and the “liberal humanistic secular traditions” prevalent in the West. He views the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights as primarily a product of the latter secular tradition and astutely asks: “Why not also harness the moral resources of the religious traditions of humanity when they also share many elements of the vision articulated in” the UN’s Universal Declaration? This would provide, he argues, another source of inspiration to realize the Universal Declaration’s ideals of human dignity and even to broaden these ideals (see Sharma, Chapter 16, this volume). Bahá’ís would emphatically agree with Sharma’s arguments, and might even extend his argument. For Bahá’ís believe that religiously inspired values must support any beneficial concept of human rights. Further, as a matter of history, the so-called secular views of human rights that evolved out of the Enlightenment can be traced to moral principles articulated by the world religions, including Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, as many scholars have demonstrated.

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And every major world religion has taught, explicitly or implicitly, the concept of human rights, as I have pointed out in my book Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention.6 The promulgation of the teachings of every world religion has led to great advances in respect for human rights in those cultures in which their seeds were planted, even if followers have also perverted those teachings for their own petty and sometimes malicious ends. To take one example, the teachings of Islam spread abroad the principle of religious tolerance, and for well over a millennium granted women far more rights than they enjoyed in the Western Christian world. For these reasons, it is imperative that the world religions lend their voice and their unique moral perspective to efforts to implement the UN’s Universal Declaration. Indeed, the world’s leaders must turn to religious inspiration if human rights ideals are to be made reality. Regarding the role of religion in society, Bahá’u’lláh affirmed: “Religion is verily the chief instrument for the establishment of order in the world and of tranquility amongst its peoples.”7 The Universal House of Justice stated in its letter to the world’s religious leaders that religion “reaches to the roots of motivation. When it has been faithful to the spirit and example of the transcendent Figures who gave the world its great belief systems, it has awakened in whole populations capacities to love, to forgive, to create, to dare greatly, to overcome prejudice, to sacrifice for the common good and to discipline the impulses of animal instinct.”8 Bahá’ís are convinced that it is inconceivable that we can fashion a world free of human rights violations in a spiritual vacuum and through ideologies of human invention, including a purely secular theory of human rights. As Sharma has suggested, a religious perspective on human rights can offer important and very unique contributions to the principles already laid down in contemporary international human rights law. It can do so in a number of ways. First, the scriptures of the world religions articulate as a cardinal moral principle the unity of the human family, as I explore at greater length in Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention.9 This principle of unity provides a secure foundation not only for the recognition of the inherent rights of every human being, but also for the existence of individual duties to promote and protect the human rights of others. In the words of the Universal House of Justice, the “scriptures of all religions have always taught the believer to see in service to others not only a moral duty, but an avenue for the soul’s own approach to God.”10 By contrast, international legal documents, such as the UN’s Universal Declaration, primarily stress (and recognize) only the duties of governments to promote human rights. In this connection, an innovative and commendable feature of the religious Universal Declaration is that it places great emphasis on the duties of each individual to take concrete steps to implement the rights it asserts. The third justification offered by Sharma for promulgating a Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the World’s Religions is that religious extremism is on the rise, as horrifyingly demonstrated by the attacks of September 11, 2001, in the United States as well as the attacks of March 11, 2004, in Spain, and that the adoption of the religious Universal Declaration might help stem the tide of religious fanaticism. This is also a laudable objective from a Bahá’í perspective.

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The Bahá’í writings unequivocally condemn religious hatred and zealotry. The Universal House of Justice has referred to “the horrors being visited upon hapless populations today by outbursts of fanaticism that shame the name of religion.”11 It is essential for the leaders of the world’s religions to step forward, roundly condemn acts of extremism committed in the names of their religions, and foster among their followers a spirit of camaraderie with members of other faiths, in keeping with the unadulterated verities and teachings of their own scriptures. Otherwise, as the Universal House of Justice warned in 2002, “With every day that passes, danger grows that the rising fires of religious prejudice will ignite a worldwide conflagration the consequences of which are unthinkable.”12 In keeping with these broad principles, it might be possible to refine certain specific draft articles of the religious Universal Declaration. For example, in view of the essential role of religiously inspired moral principles in bringing about respect for human rights, the third preambular paragraph might be reworded to convey a more positive emphasis, such as, “Whereas the world religions are positive resources for human rights and ought to be turned to as sources of guidance and inspiration in the conceptualization and implementation of human rights.” Second, it might be possible to add a preambular paragraph affirming the unity of the human family as a basis for recognizing fundamental human rights. Third, with respect to Article 26, it might be helpful to include a paragraph promoting interreligious understanding through education, and in particular education in the common moral values shared by the world religions. Lastly, with respect to Article 29, dealing with duties, it might be possible to add a new paragraph clearly stating that everyone has a duty to promote and help protect the human rights of others. As I have emphasized, this is a unique aspect of a religiously based moral approach to human rights. In closing, let me underscore the tremendous value of the process of formulating and disseminating the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the World’s Religions, especially after the events of September 11, and wholeheartedly congratulate all those who have participated in its drafting, including Arvind Sharma.13

NOTES 1. Bahá’u’lláh, Tablets of Bahá’u’lláh Revealed after the Kitáb-i-Aqdas (Haifa: Bahá’í World Centre, 1978), p. 22. 2. ’Abdu’l-Bahá, The Promulgation of Universal Peace: Talks Delivered by ‘Abdu’l-Bahá during His Visit to the United States and Canada in 1912, comp. Howard MacNutt, 2d ed. (Wilmette, IL: Bahá’í Publishing Trust, 1982), p. 346. 3. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, The Promulgation of Universal Peace, p. 96. 4. The Universal House of Justice, “To the World’s Religious Leaders,” April 2002, p. 6 (available at http://info.bahai.org/pdf/letter_april2002_english.pdf). 5. The Universal House of Justice, “To the World’s Religious Leaders,” p. 3. 6. See Brian D. Lepard, Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention: A Fresh Legal Approach Based on Fundamental Ethical Principles in International Law and World Religions (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002), pp. 53–75. 7. Bahá’u’lláh, Tablets of Bahá’u’lláh, pp. 63–64. 8. The Universal House of Justice, “To the World’s Religious Leaders,” p. 3.

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9. See Lepard, Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention, pp. 45–47. 10. The Universal House of Justice, “To the World’s Religious Leaders,” p. 5. 11. The Universal House of Justice, “To the World’s Religious Leaders,” p. 3. 12. The Universal House of Justice, “To the World’s Religious Leaders,” p. 6. 13. For the perspective of religions other than the Bahá’í Faith on this document, see Joseph Runzo, Nancy M. Martin, and Arvind Sharma, eds., Human Rights and Responsibilities in the World Religions (Oxford: Oneworld, 2003), pt. III.

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Appendices

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APPENDIX 1

United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights PREAMBLE Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world, Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people, Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law, Whereas it is essential to promote the development of friendly relations between nations, Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women and have determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom, Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in co-operation with the United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, Whereas a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the greatest importance for the full realization of this pledge, Now, Therefore THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY proclaims THIS UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.

ARTICLE 1 All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.

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ARTICLE 2 Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.

ARTICLE 3 Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.

ARTICLE 4 No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.

ARTICLE 5 No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

ARTICLE 6 Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.

ARTICLE 7 All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.

ARTICLE 8 Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.

ARTICLE 9 No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.

ARTICLE 10 Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.

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ARTICLE 11 (1) Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence. (2) No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the penal offence was committed.

ARTICLE 12 No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.

ARTICLE 13 (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state. (2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.

ARTICLE 14 (1) Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution. (2) This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

ARTICLE 15 (1) Everyone has the right to a nationality. (2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.

ARTICLE 16 (1) Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution. (2) Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses. (3) The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.

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ARTICLE 17 (1) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others. (2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.

ARTICLE 18 Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.

ARTICLE 19 Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.

ARTICLE 20 (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association. (2) No one may be compelled to belong to an association.

ARTICLE 21 (1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives. (2) Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country. (3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.

ARTICLE 22 Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality.

ARTICLE 23 (1) Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment. (2) Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work.

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(3) Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection. (4) Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.

ARTICLE 24 Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay.

ARTICLE 25 (1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and wellbeing of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control. (2) Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.

ARTICLE 26 (1) Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit. (2) Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace. (3) Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children.

ARTICLE 27 (1) Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits. (2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.

ARTICLE 28 Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.

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ARTICLE 29 (1) Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible. (2) In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society. (3) These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

ARTICLE 30 Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein.

APPENDIX 2

Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the World’s Religions Whereas human beings are led to affirm that there is more to life than life itself by inspiration human and divine; Whereas the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 10, 1948 bases itself on the former; Whereas any exclusion of the world’s religions as positive resources for human rights is obnoxious to the evidence of daily life; Whereas the various communities constituting the peoples of the world must exchange not only ideas but also ideals; Whereas religions ideally urge human beings to live in a just society and not just in any society; Whereas one must not idealize the actual but strive to realize the ideal; Whereas not to compensate victims of imperialism, racism, casteism and sexism is itself imperialist, racist, casteist and sexist; Whereas rights are independent of duties in their protection but integrally related to them in conception and execution; Whereas human rights are intended to secure peace, freedom, equality and justice—and to mitigate departures therefrom—when these come in conflict or the rights themselves; Now, therefore, on the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the Faculty of Religious Studies, at McGill University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada. The signatories to this Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the World’s Religions, as legatees of the religious heritage of humanity do hereby propose the following as the common standard of achievement for the followers of all religions or none, on the 10th day of December, 1998, as all people are brothers and sisters on the face of the earth.

ARTICLE 1 All human beings have the right to be treated as human beings and have the duty to treat everyone as a human being.

ARTICLE 2 Everyone has the right to freedom from violence, in any of its forms, individual or collective; whether based on race, religion, gender, caste or class, or arising from any other cause.

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ARTICLE 3 (1) Everyone has the right to food. (2) Everyone has the right to life, longevity and liveability and the right to food, clothing and shelter to sustain them. (3) Everyone has the duty to support and sustain life, longevity and liveability of all.

ARTICLE 4 (1) No one shall be subjected to slavery or servitude, forced labour, bonded labour or child labour. Slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all its forms. (2) No one shall subject anyone to slavery or servitude in any of its forms.

ARTICLE 5 (1) No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, inflicted either physically or mentally, whether on secular or religious grounds, inside the home or outside it. (2) No one shall subject anybody to such treatment.

ARTICLE 6 (1) Everyone has a right to recognition everywhere as a person before law; and by everyone everywhere as a human being deserving humane treatment, even when law and order has broken down. (2) Everyone has the duty to treat everyone else as a human being both in the eyes of law and one’s own.

ARTICLE 7 All are equal before law and entitled to equal protection before law without any discrimination on grounds of race, religion, caste, class, sex and sexual orientation. It is the right of everyone to be so treated and the duty of everyone to so treat others.

ARTICLE 8 Everybody has the duty to prevent the perpetuation of historical, social, economic, cultural and other wrongs.

ARTICLE 9 (1) No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile by the state or by anyone else. The attempt to proselytize against the will of the person shall amount to arbitrary detention, so also the detention, against their will, of teenage children by the parents, and among spouses. (2) It is the duty of everyone to secure everyone’s liberty.

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ARTICLE 10 Everybody has the right to public trial in the face of criminal charges and it is the duty of the state to ensure it. Everyone who cannot afford a lawyer must be provided one by the state.

ARTICLE 11 Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be considered innocent until proven guilty.

ARTICLE 12 (1) Everyone has the right to privacy. This right includes the right not to be subjected to arbitrary interference with one’s privacy; of one’s own, or of one’s family, home or correspondence. (2) Everyone has the right to one’s good name. (3) It is the duty of everyone to protect the privacy and reputation of everyone else. (4) Everyone has the right not to have one’s religion denigrated in the media or the academia. (5) It is the duty of the follower of every religion to ensure that no religion is denigrated in the media or the academia.

ARTICLE 13 (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence anywhere in the world. (2) Everyone has the duty to abide by the laws and regulations applicable in that part of the world.

ARTICLE 14 Everyone has the right to seek and secure asylum in any country from any form of persecution, religious or otherwise, and the right not to be deported. It is the duty of every country to provide such asylum.

ARTICLE 15 (1) Everyone has the right to a nationality; (2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of one’s nationality nor denied the right to change one’s nationality. (3) Everyone has the duty to promote the emergence of a global constitutional order.

ARTICLE 16 (1) Everyone has the right to marriage. (2) Members of a family have the right to retain and practice their own religion or beliefs.

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(3) Everyone has the right to raise a family. (4) Everybody has the right to renounce the world and join a monastery, provided that one shall do so after making adequate arrangement for one’s dependents. (5) Marriage and monasticism are two of the most successful institutional innovations of humanity and are entitled to protection by the society and the state. (6) Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. It is the duty of everyone to extend special consideration to mothers and children. (7) Everyone shall promote the outlook that the entire world constitutes an extended family.

ARTICLE 17 (1) Everybody has the right to own property, alone as well as in association with others. An association also has a similar right to own property. (2) Everyone has a right not to be deprived of property arbitrarily. It is the duty of everyone not to deprive others of their property arbitrarily. Property shall be understood to mean material as well as intellectual, aesthetic and spiritual property. (3) Everyone has the duty not to deprive anyone of their property or appropriate it in an unauthorized manner.

ARTICLE 18 (1) There shall be no compulsion in religion. It is a matter of choice. (2) Everyone has the right to retain one’s religion and to change one’s religion. (3) Everyone has the duty to promote peace and tolerance among different religions and ideologies.

ARTICLE 19 (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression, where the term expression includes the language one speaks, the food one eats; the clothes one wears; the religion one practices and professes, provided that one conforms generally to the accustomed rules of decorum recognized in the neighbourhood. (2) It is the duty of everyone to ensure that everyone enjoys such freedom. (3) Children have the right to express themselves freely in all matters affecting the child, to which it is the duty of their caretakers to give due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child.

ARTICLE 20 (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of assembly and association, and the duty to do so peacefully. (2) No one may be compelled to belong to an association, or to leave one without due process.

ARTICLE 21 (1) Everybody over the age of eighteen has the right to vote, to elect or be elected and thus to take part in the government or governance of the country, directly or indirectly.

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(2) Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in one’s country and the duty to provide such access. (3) It is the duty of everyone to participate in the political process.

ARTICLE 22 Everyone, as a member of society, has a right to social security and a duty to contribute to it.

ARTICLE 23 (1) Everyone has the right to same pay for same work and a duty to offer same pay for same work. (2) Everyone has the right for just remuneration for one’s work and the duty to justly recompense for work done. (3) Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of one’s interests. (4) Everyone has the right not to join a trade union.

ARTICLE 24 (1) Everyone has the right to work and to rest, including the right to support while seeking work and the right to periodic holidays with pay. (2) The right to rest extends to the earth.

ARTICLE 25 (1) Everyone has the right to health and to universal medical insurance. It is the duty of the state or society to provide it. (2) Every child has the right to a childhood free from violence and it is the duty of the parents to provide it.

ARTICLE 26 Everyone has the right to free education and the right to equality of opportunity for any form of education involving restricted enrollment.

ARTICLE 27 (1) Everyone has the right to freely participate in the cultural life of the community and the right to freely contribute to it. (2) Everyone has the right to share scientific advances and its benefits and the duty to disseminate them, and wherever possible to contribute to such advances. (3) Everyone has the right to the protection of their cultural heritage. It is the duty of everyone to protect and enrich everyone’s heritage, including one’s own.

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ARTICLE 28 Everyone has the right to socio-economic and political order at a global, national, regional and local level which enables the realization of social, political, economic, racial and gender justice and the duty to give precedence to universal, national, regional and local interests in that order.

ARTICLE 29 (1) One is duty-bound, when asserting one’s rights, to take the rights of other human beings; of past, present and future generations, the rights of humanity, and the rights of nature and the earth into account. (2) One is duty-bound, when asserting one’s rights, to prefer non-violence over violence.

ARTICLE 30 (1) Everyone has the right to require the formation of a supervisory committee within one’s community, defined religiously or otherwise, to monitor the implementation of the articles of this Declaration; and to serve on it and present one’s case before such a committee. (2) It is everyone’s duty to ensure that such a committee satisfactorily supervises the implementation of these articles.

APPENDIX 3

A Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the Hindus Whereas the secular and the sacred are the two main avenues whereby human beings are led to affirm that there is more to life than life itself; Whereas the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 10, 1948 draws mainly upon only one of them as a resource; Whereas at the time of the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights religion had retreated from the public square but has since reappeared in a major way; Whereas religions are meant to serve humanity and not humanity to serve religion; Whereas one must not idealize the actual but strive to realize the ideal; Whereas the various communities constituting the peoples of the world must exchange not only ideas but also ideals; Whereas not to compensate victims of imperialism, racism, casteism and sexism is itself imperialist, racist, casteist and sexist; Whereas any further exclusion of world’s religions as positive resources for human rights is obnoxious to the evidence of daily life; Whereas rights are independent of duties in their protection but integrally related to them in conception and execution; Whereas in the case of human beings in general, rights and duties are correlative; sub-human creatures may have rights without corresponding duties and in exceptional cases, persons, like mothers in relation to infants, duties without corresponding rights; Whereas rights can serve both as ends in themselves (upeya) and as means (up7ya) to ends and to each other; Whereas a Hindu is like any other human being, only more so; Whereas to be a Hindu is to possess the natural right to pursue the good (dharma); goods (artha); the good life (k7ma); and the highest good (mok}a), like all other human beings, as children of the same earth and descended from the same Manu; Whereas Hindus subscribe to universal norms such as non-violence (ahia}a); truth (satya); non-appropriation (asteya); purity ({auca) and self-restraint (indriyanigrahaU) which find their expression in rights and duties in relation to oneself, to others and the State; and that, in relation to the State, non-violence denotes the right of protection against arbitrary conduct; truth denotes presumption of innocence until proven guilty; non-appropriation denotes right to property; purity denotes freedom from pollution and self-restraint denotes the right that the organs of the state do not compromise the privacy and dignity of the individual. Now, therefore, Sunday the 27th of June, 1999 the Hindu community, as assembled at the Hindu Mission of Canada (Quebec), at 955 Bellechasse, Montreal, adopts this declaration, as heaven and earth are our father and mother and all people brothers and sisters.

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ARTICLE 1 All human beings have the right to be treated as human beings and have the duty to treat everyone as a human being.

ARTICLE 2 Everyone has the right to freedom from violence, in any of its forms, individual or collective; whether based on race, religion, gender, caste or class or nation, or arising from any other cause.

ARTICLE 3 (1) Everyone has the right to food. (2) Everyone has the right to life, longevity and liveability and the right to food, clothing and shelter required to sustain them. (3) Everyone has the duty to support and sustain the life, longevity and liveability of all.

ARTICLE 4 (1) No one shall be subjected to slavery or servitude, forced labour, bonded labour or child labour. Slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all its forms. (2) No one shall subject anyone to slavery or servitude in any of its forms.

ARTICLE 5 (1) No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, inflicted either physically or mentally, whether on secular or religious grounds, inside the home or outside it. (2) No one shall subject anybody to such treatment.

ARTICLE 6 (1) Everyone has a right to recognition everywhere as a person before law; and by everyone everywhere as a human being deserving humane treatment, even when law and order has broken down. (2) Everyone has the duty to treat everyone else as a human being both in the eyes of law and one’s own.

ARTICLE 7 All are equal before law and entitled to equal protection before law without any discrimination on grounds of race, religion, caste, class, nationality, sex and sexual orientation. It is the right of everyone to be so treated and the duty of everyone to so treat others.

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ARTICLE 8 (1) Everybody has the right to demand restitution for historical, social, economic, cultural and other wrongs in the present and compensation for such wrongs committed in the past, provided that the victims shall always have the right to forgive the victimizers. (2) Everybody has the duty to prevent the perpetuation of historical, social, economic, cultural and other wrongs.

ARTICLE 9 (1) No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile by the state or by anyone else. The attempt to proselytize against the will of the person shall amount to arbitrary detention, so also the detention, against their will, of teenage children by the parents, and among spouses. (2) It is the duty of everyone to secure everyone’s liberty.

ARTICLE 10 Everybody has the right to public trial when facing criminal charges and it is the duty of the State to ensure it. Everyone who cannot afford a lawyer must be provided one by the State.

ARTICLE 11 Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be considered innocent until proven guilty.

ARTICLE 12 (1) Everyone has the right to privacy. This right includes the right not to be subjected to arbitrary interference with one’s privacy; or of one’s family, home or correspondence. (2) Everyone has the right to one’s good name. (3) It is the duty of everyone to protect the privacy and reputation of everyone else. (4) Everyone has the right not to have one’s religion misrepresented in the media or the academia. (5) It is the duty of the follower of every religion to ensure that no religion is misrepresented in the media or the academia.

ARTICLE 13 (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence anywhere in the world. (2) Everyone has the duty to abide by the laws and regulations applicable in that part of the world.

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ARTICLE 14 Everyone has the right to seek and secure asylum in any country from any form of persecution, religious or otherwise, and the right not to be deported. It is the duty of every country to provide such asylum.

ARTICLE 15 (1) Everyone has the right to a nationality; (2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of one’s nationality nor denied the right to change one’s nationality. (3) Everyone has the duty to promote the emergence of a federal but single global government—the Parliament of Humanity.

ARTICLE 16 (1) Everyone has the right to marriage. (2) Parties to a marriage have the right to retain and practice their own religion or ideology within a marriage. (3) Everyone has the right to raise a family. (4) Everybody has the right to renounce the world and join a monastery, provided that one shall do so after making adequate arrangement for one’s dependents. (5) Marriage and monasticism are two of the most successful institutional innovations of humanity and are entitled to protection by the society and the state. (6) Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. It is the duty of everyone to extend special consideration to mothers and children. (7) Everyone shall promote the outlook that the entire world constitutes a single family.

ARTICLE 17 (1) Everybody has the right to own property, alone as well as in association with others. An association also has a similar right to own property. (2) Everyone has a right not to be deprived of property arbitrarily. It is the duty of everyone not to deprive others of their property arbitrarily, or appropriate it in an unauthorized manner. Property shall be understood to mean material as well as intellectual, aesthetic and spiritual property.

ARTICLE 18 (1) There shall be no compulsion in religion. It is a matter of choice. (2) Everyone has the right to retain one’s religion and to change one’s religion. (3) All human beings are entitled to participate in all the religions of the world as much as their own, for all are legatees of the religious heritage of humanity. (4) Everyone has the duty to promote peace and tolerance among religions and ideologies.

ARTICLE 19 (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression, where the term expression includes the language one speaks; the food one eats; the clothes one wears;

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the religion one practices and professes, provided that one conforms generally to the accustomed rules of decorum recognized in the neighbourhood. (2) It is the duty of everyone to ensure that everyone enjoys such freedom.

ARTICLE 20 (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of assembly and association, and the duty to do so peacefully. (2) No one may be compelled to belong to an association, or to leave one without due process.

ARTICLE 21 (1) Everybody over the age of eighteen has the right to vote, to elect or be elected and thus to take part in the government or governance of the country, directly or indirectly. (2) Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in and the duty to provide such access. (3) It is the duty of everyone to participate in the political process.

ARTICLE 22 Everyone, as a member of society, has a right to social security and a duty to contribute to it.

ARTICLE 23 (1) Everyone has the right to work and seek gainful employment. (2) It is the duty of the State and society to ensure that everyone is gainfully employed. (3) Everyone has the right to equal pay for equal work and a duty to offer equal pay for equal work. (4) Everyone has the right for just remuneration for one’s work and the duty to offer just recompense for work done. (5) Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of one’s interests.

ARTICLE 24 (1) Everyone has the right to work and to rest, including the right to support while seeking work and the right to periodic holidays with pay. (2) The right to rest extends to the earth itself.

ARTICLE 25 (1) Everyone has the right to health and to universal medical insurance. It is the duty of the State or society to provide it.

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(2) Every child has the right to an unencumbered childhood and it is the duty of the parents, society and state to provide it.

ARTICLE 26 Everyone has the right to free education and the right to equality of opportunity for any form of education involving restricted enrollment.

ARTICLE 27 (1) Everyone has the right to freely participate in the cultural life of the community and the right to freely contribute to it. (2) Everyone has the right to share in scientific advances and their benefits, the duty to disseminate them, and wherever possible, contribute to such advance. (3) Everyone has the right to the protection of their cultural heritage. It is the duty of everyone to protect and enrich everyone’s heritage, including one’s own.

ARTICLE 28 Everyone has the right to socio-economic and political order at a global, national, regional and local level which enables the realization of social, political, economic, racial and gender justice and the duty to give precedence to universal, national, regional and local interests in that order.

ARTICLE 29 (1) One is duty-bound, when asserting one’s rights, to take the rights of other human beings; of past, present and future generations; the rights of humanity; and the rights of nature and the earth into account. (2) One is duty-bound, when asserting one’s rights, to prefer non-violence over violence.

ARTICLE 30 As the entire earth constitutes one extended family, all human beings possess unrestricted right of freedom of movement across all countries, nations and states all over the world.

ARTICLE 31 All human beings possess the right to due compensation should aforesaid rights be violated, irrespective of whether the violation occurs in the past, present or future.

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ARTICLE 32 (1) Everyone has the right over his or her body and mind to use it in any manner one wishes. (2) Everyone has the duty to use his or her body and mind to further the well-being of all. (3) One’s body and mind possess the right not to be abused by oneself, as the right of the part against the whole. (4) It is one’s duty to cultivate one’s body and mind.

ARTICLE 33 (1) Everyone has the right to require the formation of a supervisory committee within one’s community, defined religiously or otherwise, to monitor the implementation of the articles of this Declaration; and to serve on it and present one’s case before such a committee. (2) It is everyone’s duty to ensure that such a committee satisfactorily supervises the implementation of these articles.

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Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights Contents

I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII XIII XIV XV XVI XVII XVIII XIX XX XXI XXII XXIII

Foreword Preamble Right to Life Right to Freedom Right to Equality and Prohibition Against Impermissible Discrimination Right to Justice Right to Fair Trial Right to Protection Against Abuse of Power Right to Protection Against Torture Right to Protection of Honour and Reputation Right to Asylum Rights of Minorities Right and Obligation to Participate in the Conduct and Management of Public Affairs Right to Freedom of Belief, Thought and Speech Right to Freedom of Religion Right to Free Association The Economic Order and the Rights Evolving Therefrom Right to Protection of Property Status and Dignity of Workers Right to Social Security Right to Found a Family and Related Matters Rights of Married Women Right to Education Right of Privacy Right to Freedom of Movement and Residence Explanatory Notes Glossary of Arabic Terms References

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This is a declaration for mankind, a guidance and instruction to those who fear God. (Al Qur’an, Al-Imran 3:138)

FOREWORD Islam gave to mankind an ideal code of human rights fourteen centuries ago. These rights aim at conferring honour and dignity on mankind and eliminating exploitation, oppression and injustice. Human rights in Islam are firmly rooted in the belief that God, and God alone, is the Law Giver and the Source of all human rights. Due to their Divine origin, no ruler, government, assembly or authority can curtail or violate in any way the human rights conferred by God, nor can they be surrendered. Human rights in Islam are an integral part of the overall Islamic order and it is obligatory on all Muslim governments and organs of society to implement them in letter and in spirit within the framework of that order. It is unfortunate that human rights are being trampled upon with impunity in many countries of the world, including some Muslim countries. Such violations are a matter of serious concern and are arousing the conscience of more and more people throughout the world. I sincerely hope that this Declaration of Human Rights will give a powerful impetus to the Muslim peoples to stand firm and defend resolutely and courageously the rights conferred on them by God. This Declaration of Human Rights is the second fundamental document proclaimed by the Islamic Council to mark the beginning of the 15th Century of the Islamic era, the first being the Universal Islamic Declaration announced at the International Conference on The Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings be upon him) and his Message, held in London from 12 to 15 April 1980. The Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights is based on the Qur’an and the Sunnah and has been compiled by eminent Muslim scholars, jurists and representatives of Islamic movements and thought. May God reward them all for their efforts and guide us along the right path. Paris 21 Dhul Qaidah 1401 19th September 1981

Salem Azzam Secretary General

O men! Behold, We have created you all out of a male and a female, and have made you into nations and tribes, so that you might come to know one another. Verily, the noblest of you in the sight of God is the one who is most deeply conscious of Him. Behold, God is all-knowing, all aware. (Al Qur’an, Al-Hujurat 49:13)

PREAMBLE WHEREAS the age-old human aspiration for a just world order wherein people could live, develop and prosper in an environment free from fear, oppression, exploitation and deprivation, remains largely unfulfilled; WHEREAS the Divine Mercy unto mankind reflected in its having been endowed with super-abundant economic sustenance is being wasted, or unfairly or unjustly withheld from the inhabitants of the earth;

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WHEREAS Allah (God) has given mankind through His revelations in the Holy Qur’an and the Sunnah of His Blessed Prophet Muhammad an abiding legal and moral framework within which to establish and regulate human institutions and relationships; WHEREAS the human rights decreed by the Divine Law aim at conferring dignity and honour on mankind and are designed to eliminate oppression and injustice; WHEREAS by virtue of their Divine source and sanction these rights can neither be curtailed, abrogated or disregarded by authorities, assemblies or other institutions, nor can they be surrendered or alienated; Therefore we, as Muslims, who believe a) in God, the Beneficent and Merciful, the Creator, the Sustainer, the Sovereign, the sole Guide of mankind and the Source of all Law; b) in the Vicegerency (Khilafah) of man who has been created to fulfill the Will of God on earth; c) in the wisdom of Divine guidance brought by the Prophets, whose mission found its culmination in the final Divine message that was conveyed by the Prophet Muhammad (Peace be upon him) to all mankind; d) that rationality by itself without the light of revelation from God can neither be a sure guide in the affairs of mankind nor provide spiritual nourishment to the human soul, and, knowing that the teachings of Islam represent the quintessence of Divine guidance in its final and perfect form, feel duty-bound to remind man of the high status and dignity bestowed on him by God; e) in inviting all mankind to the message of Islam; f) that by the terms of our primeval covenant with God our duties and obligations have priority over our rights, and that each one of us is under a bounden duty to spread the teachings of Islam by word, deed, and indeed in all gentle ways, and to make them effective not only in our individual lives but also in the society around us; g) in our obligation to establish an Islamic order: i) wherein all human beings shall be equal and none shall enjoy a privilege or suffer a disadvantage or discrimination by reason of race, colour, sex, origin or language; ii) wherein all human beings are born free; iii) wherein slavery and forced labour are abhorred; iv) wherein conditions shall be established such that the institution of family shall be preserved, protected and honoured as the basis of all social life; v) wherein the rulers and the ruled alike are subject to, and equal before, the Law; vi) wherein obedience shall be rendered only to those commands that are in consonance with the Law; vii) wherein all worldly power shall be considered as a sacred trust, to be exercised within the limits prescribed by the Law and in a manner approved by it, and with due regard for the priorities fixed by it; viii) wherein all economic resources shall be treated as Divine blessings bestowed upon mankind, to be enjoyed by all in accordance with the rules and the values set out in the Qur’an and the Sunnah; ix) wherein all public affairs shall be determined and conducted, and the authority to administer them shall be exercised after mutual consultation (Shura) between the believers qualified to contribute to a decision which would accord well with the Law and the public good;

x) wherein everyone shall undertake obligations proportionate to his capacity and shall be held responsible pro rata for his deeds; xi) wherein everyone shall, in case of an infringement of his rights, be assured of appropriate remedial measures in accordance with the Law; xii) wherein no one shall be deprived of the rights assured to him by the Law except by its authority and to the extent permitted by it;

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xiii) wherein every individual shall have the right to bring legal action against anyone who commits a crime against society as a whole or against any of its members; xiv) wherein every effort shall be made to (a) secure unto mankind deliverance from every type of exploitation, injustice and oppression, (b) ensure to everyone security, dignity and liberty in terms set out and by methods approved and within the limits set by the Law; Do hereby, as servants of Allah and as members of the Universal Brotherhood of Islam, at the beginning of the Fifteenth Century of the Islamic Era, affirm our commitment to uphold the following inviolable and inalienable human rights that we consider are enjoined by Islam.

I RIGHT TO LIFE a) Human life is sacred and inviolable and every effort shall be made to protect it. In particular no one shall be exposed to injury or death, except under the authority of the Law. b) Just as in life, so also after death, the sanctity of a person’s body shall be inviolable. It is the obligation of believers to see that a deceased person’s body is handled with due solemnity.

II RIGHT TO FREEDOM a) Man is born free. No inroads shall be made on his right to liberty except under the authority and in due process of the Law. b) Every individual and every people has the inalienable right to freedom in all its forms—physical, cultural, economic and political—and shall be entitled to struggle by all available means against any infringement or abrogation of this right; and every oppressed individual or people has a legitimate claim to the support of other individuals and/or peoples in such a struggle.

III RIGHT TO EQUALITY AND PROHIBITION AGAINST IMPERMISSIBLE DISCRIMINATION a) All persons are equal before the Law and are entitled to equal opportunities and protection of the Law. b) All persons shall be entitled to equal wage for equal work. c) No person shall be denied the opportunity to work or be discriminated against in any manner or exposed to greater physical risk by reason of religious belief, colour, race, origin, sex or language.

IV RIGHT TO JUSTICE a) Every person has the right to be treated in accordance with the Law, and only in accordance with the Law. b) Every person has not only the right but also the obligation to protest against injustice; to recourse to remedies provided by the Law in respect of any unwarranted personal injury or loss; to self-defence against any charges that are preferred

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against him and to obtain fair adjudication before an independent judicial tribunal in any dispute with public authorities or any other person. c) It is the right and duty of every person to defend the rights of any other person and the community in general (Hisbah). d) No person shall be discriminated against while seeking to defend private and public rights. e) It is the right and duty of every Muslim to refuse to obey any command which is contrary to the Law, no matter by whom it may be issued.

V RIGHT TO FAIR TRIAL a) No person shall be adjudged guilty of an offence and made liable to punishment except after proof of his guilt before an independent judicial tribunal. b) No person shall be adjudged guilty except after a fair trial and after reasonable opportunity for defence has been provided to him. c) Punishment shall be awarded in accordance with the Law, in proportion to the seriousness of the offence and with due consideration of the circumstances under which it was committed. d) No act shall be considered a crime unless it is stipulated as such in the clear wording of the Law. e) Every individual is responsible for his actions. Responsibility for a crime cannot be vicariously extended to other members of his family or group, who are not otherwise directly or indirectly involved in the commission of the crime in question.

VI RIGHT TO PROTECTION AGAINST ABUSE OF POWER Every person has the right to protection against harassment by official agencies. He is not liable to account for himself except for making a defence to the charges made against him or where he is found in a situation wherein a question regarding suspicion of his involvement in a crime could be reasonably raised.

VII RIGHT TO PROTECTION AGAINST TORTURE No person shall be subjected to torture in mind or body, or degraded, or threatened with injury either to himself or to anyone related to or held dear by him, or forcibly made to confess to the commission of a crime, or forced to consent to an act which is injurious to his interests.

VIII RIGHT TO PROTECTION OF HONOUR AND REPUTATION Every person has the right to protect his honour and reputation against calumnies, groundless charges or deliberate attempts at defamation and blackmail.

IX RIGHT TO ASYLUM a) Every persecuted or oppressed person has the right to seek refuge and asylum. This right is guaranteed to every human being irrespective of race, religion, colour and sex. b) Al Masjid Al Haram (the sacred house of Allah) in Mecca is a sanctuary for all Muslims.

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X RIGHTS OF MINORITIES a) The Qur’anic principle “There is no compulsion in religion” shall govern the religious rights of non-Muslim minorities. b) In a Muslim country religious minorities shall have the choice to be governed in respect of their civil and personal matters by Islamic Law, or by their own laws.

XI RIGHT AND OBLIGATION TO PARTICIPATE IN THE CONDUCT AND MANAGEMENT OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS a) Subject to the Law, every individual in the community (Ummah) is entitled to assume public office. b) Process of free consultation (Shura) is the basis of the administrative relationship between the government and the people. People also have the right to choose and remove their rulers in accordance with this principle.

XII RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF BELIEF, THOUGHT AND SPEECH a) Every person has the right to express his thoughts and beliefs so long as he remains within the limits prescribed by the Law. No one, however, is entitled to disseminate falsehood or to circulate reports which may outrage public decency, or to indulge in slander, innuendo or to cast defamatory aspersions on other persons. b) Pursuit of knowledge and search after truth is not only a right but a duty of every Muslim. c) It is the right and duty of every Muslim to protest and strive (within the limits set out by the Law) against oppression even if it involves challenging the highest authority in the state. d) There shall be no bar on the dissemination of information provided it does not endanger the security of the society or the state and is confined within the limits imposed by the Law. e) No one shall hold in contempt or ridicule the religious beliefs of others or incite public hostility against them; respect for the religious feelings of others is obligatory on all Muslims.

XIII RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF RELIGION Every person has the right to freedom of conscience and worship in accordance with his religious beliefs.

XIV RIGHT TO FREE ASSOCIATION a) Every person is entitled to participate individually and collectively in the religious, social, cultural and political life of his community and to establish institutions and agencies meant to enjoin what is right (ma’roof) and to prevent what is wrong (munkar). b) Every person is entitled to strive for the establishment of institutions whereunder an enjoyment of these rights would be made possible. Collectively, the community is obliged to establish conditions so as to allow its members full development of their personalities.

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XV THE ECONOMIC ORDER AND THE RIGHTS EVOLVING THEREFROM a) In their economic pursuits, all persons are entitled to the full benefits of nature and all its resources. These are blessings bestowed by God for the benefit of mankind as a whole. b) All human beings are entitled to earn their living according to the Law. c) Every person is entitled to own property individually or in association with others. State ownership of certain economic resources in the public interest is legitimate. d) The poor have the right to a prescribed share in the wealth of the rich, as fixed by Zakah, levied and collected in accordance with the Law. e) All means of production shall be utilised in the interest of the community (Ummah) as a whole, and may not be neglected or misused. f) In order to promote the development of a balanced economy and to protect society from exploitation, Islamic Law forbids monopolies, unreasonable restrictive trade practices, usury, the use of coercion in the making of contracts and the publication of misleading advertisements. g) All economic activities are permitted provided they are not detrimental to the interests of the community (Ummah) and do not violate Islamic laws and values.

XVI RIGHT TO PROTECTION OF PROPERTY No property may be expropriated except in the public interest and on payment of fair and adequate compensation.

XVII STATUS AND DIGNITY OF WORKERS Islam honours work and the worker and enjoins Muslims not only to treat the worker justly but also generously. He is not only to be paid his earned wages promptly, but is also entitled to adequate rest and leisure.

XVIII RIGHT TO SOCIAL SECURITY Every person has the right to food, shelter, clothing, education and medical care consistent with the resources of the community. This obligation of the community extends in particular to all individuals who cannot take care of themselves due to some temporary or permanent disability.

XIX RIGHT TO FOUND A FAMILY AND RELATED MATTERS a) Every person is entitled to marry, to found a family and to bring up children in conformity with his religion, traditions and culture. Every spouse is entitled to such rights and privileges and carries such obligations as are stipulated by the Law. b) Each of the partners in a marriage is entitled to respect and consideration from the other. c) Every husband is obligated to maintain his wife and children according to his means.

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d) Every child has the right to be maintained and properly brought up by its parents, it being forbidden that children are made to work at an early age or that any burden is put on them which would arrest or harm their natural development. e) If parents are for some reason unable to discharge their obligations towards a child it becomes the responsibility of the community to fulfill these obligations at public expense. f) Every person is entitled to material support, as well as care and protection, from his family during his childhood, old age or incapacity. Parents are entitled to material support as well as care and protection from their children. g) Motherhood is entitled to special respect, care and assistance on the part of the family and the public organs of the community (Ummah). h) Within the family, men and women are to share in their obligations and responsibilities according to their sex, their natural endowments, talents and inclinations, bearing in mind their common responsibilities toward their progeny and their relatives. i) No person may be married against his or her will, or lose or suffer dimunition of legal personality on account of marriage.

XX RIGHTS OF MARRIED WOMEN Every married woman is entitled to: a) live in the house in which her husband lives; b) receive the means necessary for maintaining a standard of living which is not inferior to that of her spouse, and, in the event of divorce, receive during the statutory period of waiting (iddah) means of maintenance commensurate with her husband’s resources, for herself as well as for the children she nurses or keeps, irrespective of her own financial status, earnings, or property that she may hold in her own rights; c) seek and obtain dissolution of marriage (Khul’a) in accordance with the terms of the Law. This right is in addition to her right to seek divorce through the courts. d) inherit from her husband, her parents, her children and other relatives according to the Law; e) strict confidentiality from her spouse, or ex-spouse if divorced, with regard to any information that he may have obtained about her, the disclosure of which could prove detrimental to her interests. A similar responsibility rests upon her in respect of her spouse or ex-spouse.

XXI RIGHT TO EDUCATION a) Every person is entitled to receive education in accordance with his natural capabilities. b) Every person is entitled to a free choice of profession and career and to the opportunity for the full development of his natural endowments.

XXII RIGHT OF PRIVACY Every person is entitled to the protection of his privacy.

XXIII RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND RESIDENCE a) In view of the fact that the World of Islam is veritably Ummah Islamia, every Muslim shall have the right to freely move in and out of any Muslim country.

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b) No one shall be forced to leave the country of his residence, or be arbitrarily deported therefrom without recourse to due process of Law.

EXPLANATORY NOTES 1. In the above formulation of Human Rights, unless the context provides otherwise: a) the term ‘person’ refers to both the male and female sexes. b) the term ‘Law’ denotes the Shari’ah, i.e. the totality of ordinances derived from the Qur’an and the Sunnah and any other laws that are deduced from these two sources by methods considered valid in Islamic jurisprudence. 2. Each one of the Human Rights enunciated in this declaration carries a corresponding duty. 3. In the exercise and enjoyment of the rights referred to above every person shall be subject only to such limitations as are enjoined by the Law for the purpose of securing the due recognition of, and respect for, the rights and the freedom of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare of the Community (Ummah). 4. The Arabic text of this Declaration is the original.

GLOSSARY OF ARABIC TERMS SUNNAH The example or way of life of the Prophet (peace be upon him), embracing what he said, did or agreed to. KHALIFAH The vicegerency of man on earth or succession to the Prophet, transliterated into English as the Caliphate. HISBAH Public vigilance, an institution of the Islamic State enjoined to observe and facilitate the fulfillment of right norms of public behaviour. The “Hisbah” consists in public vigilance as well as an opportunity to private individuals to seek redress through it. MA’ROOF Good act. MUNKAR Reprehensible deed. ZAKAH The ‘purifying’ tax on wealth, one of the five pillars of Islam obligatory on Muslims. ‘IDDAH The waiting period of a widowed or divorced woman during which she is not to re-marry. KHUL’A Divorce a woman obtains at her own request. UMMAH ISLAMIA World Muslim community. SHARI’AH Islamic law.

REFERENCES Note: The Roman numerals refer to the topics in the text. The Arabic numerals refer to the Chapter and the Verse of the Qur’an; i.e. 5:32 means Chapter 5, Verse 32.

I 1. Qur’an Al-Maidah 5:32 2. Hadith narrated by Muslim, Abu Daud, Tirmidhi, Nasai 3. Hadith narrated by Bukhari

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II 4. 5. 6. 7.

Hadith narrated by Bukhari, Muslim Sayings of Caliph Umar Qur’an As-Shura 42:41 Qur’an Al-Hajj 22:41

III 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

From the Prophet’s address Hadith narrated by Bukhari, Muslim, Abu Daud, Tirmidhi, Nasai From the address of Caliph Abu Bakr From the Prophet’s farewell address Qur’an Al-Ahqaf 46:19 Hadith narrated by Ahmad Qur’an Al-Mulk 67:15 Qur’an Al-Zalzalah 99:7-8

IV 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25.

Qur’an An-Nisa 4:59 Qur’an Al-Maidah 5:49 Qur’an An-Nisa 4:148 Hadith narrated by Bukhari, Muslim, Tirmidhi Hadith narrated by Bukhari, Muslim Hadith narrated by Muslim, Abu Daud, Tirmidhi, Nasai Hadith narrated by Bukhari, Muslim, Abu Daud, Tirmidhi, Nasai Hadith narrated by Abu Daud, Tirmidhi Hadith narrated by Bukhari, Muslim, Abu Daud, Tirmidhi, Nasai Hadith narrated by Bukhari

V 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35.

Hadith narrated by Bukhari, Muslim Qur’an Al-Isra 17:15 Qur’an Al-Ahzab 33:5 Qur’an Al-Hujurat 49:6 Qur’an An-Najm 53:28 Qur’an Al Baqarah 2:229 Hadith narrated by Al Baihaki, Hakim Qur’an Al-Isra 17:15 Qur’an At-Tur 52:21 Qur’an Yusuf 12:79

VI 36. Qur’an Al Ahzab 33:58

VII 37. Hadith narrated by Bukhari, Muslim, Abu Daud, Tirmidhi, Nasai 38. Hadith narrated by Ibn Majah

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VIII 39. From the Prophet’s farewell address 40. Qur’an Al-Hujurat 49:12 41. Qur’an Al-Hujurat 49:11

IX 42. 43. 44. 45.

Qur’an At-Tawba 9:6 Qur’an Al-Imran 3:97 Qur’an Al-Baqarah 2:125 Qur’an Al-Hajj 22:25

X 46. 47. 48. 49.

Qur’an Al Baqarah 2:256 Qur’an Al-Maidah 5:42 Qur’an Al-Maidah 5:43 Qur’an Al-Maidah 5:47

XI 50. Qur’an As-Shura 42:38 51. Hadith narrated by Ahmad 52. From the address of Caliph Abu Bakr

XII 53. 54. 55. 56. 57.

Qur’an Al-Ahzab 33:60-61 Qur’an Saba 34:46 Hadith narrated by Tirmidhi, Nasai Qur’an An-Nisa 4:83 Qur’an Al-Anam 6:108

XIII 58. Qur’an Al Kafirun 109:6

XIV 59. 60. 61. 62.

Qur’an Yusuf 12:108 Qur’an Al-Imran 3:104 Qur’an Al-Maidah 5:2 Hadith narrated by Abu Daud, Tirmidhi, Nasai, Ibn Majah

XV 63. Qur’an Al-Maidah 5:120 64. Qur’an Al-Jathiyah 45:13 65. Qur’an Ash-Shuara 26:183

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66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80.

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Qur’an Al-Isra 17:20 Qur’an Hud 11:6 Qur’an Al-Mulk 67:15 Qur’an An-Najm 53:48 Qur’an Al-Hashr 59:9 Qur’an Al-Maarij 70:24-25 Sayings of Caliph Abu Bakr Hadith narrated by Bukhari, Muslim Hadith narrated by Muslim Hadith narrated by Muslim, Abu Daud, Tirmidhi, Nasai Hadith narrated by Bukhari, Muslim, Abu Daud, Tirmidhi, Nasai Qur’an Al-Mutaffifin 83:1-3 Hadith narrated by Muslim Qur’an Al-Baqarah 2:275 Hadith narrated by Bukhari, Muslim, Abu Daud, Tirmidhi, Nasai

XVI 81. 82. 83. 84.

Qur’an Al Baqarah 2:188 Hadith narrated by Bukhari Hadith narrated by Muslim Hadith narrated by Muslim, Tirmidhi

XVII 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91.

Qur’an At-Tawbah 9:105 Hadith narrated by Abu Yala—Majma Al Zawaid Hadith narrated by Ibn Majah Qur’an Al-Ahqaf 46:19 Qur’an At-Tawbah 9:105 Hadith narrated by Tabarani—Majma Al Zawaid Hadith narrated by Bukhari

XVIII 92. Qur’an Al-Ahzab 33:6

XIX 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101.

Qur’an An-Nisa 4:1 Qur’an Al-Baqarah 2:228 Hadith narrated by Bukhari, Muslim, Abu Daud, Tirmidhi, Nasai Qur’an Ar-Rum 30:21 Qur’an At-Talaq 65:7 Qur’an Al-Isra 17:24 Hadith narrated by Bukhari, Muslim, Abu Daud, Tirmidhi Hadith narrated by Abu Daud Hadith narrated by Bukhari, Muslim

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102. Hadith narrated by Abu Daud, Tirmidhi 103. Hadith narrated by Ahmad, Abu Daud

XX 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110.

Qur’an At-Talaq 65:6 Qur’an An-Nisa 4:34 Qur’an At-Talaq 65:6 Qur’an At-Talaq 65:6 Qur’an Al-Baqarah 2:229 Qur’an An-Nisa 4:12 Qur’an Al-Baqarah 2:237

XXI 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116.

Qur’an Al-Isra 17:23-24 Hadith narrated by Ibn Majah Qur’an Al-Imran 3:187 From the Prophet’s farewell address Hadith narrated by Bukhari, Muslim Hadith narrated by Bukhari, Muslim, Abu Daud, Tirmidhi

XXII 117. Hadith narrated by Muslim 118. Qur’an Al-Hujurat 49:12 119. Hadith narrated by Abu Daud, Tirmidhi

XXIII 120. 121. 122. 123. 124.

Qur’an Al-Mulk 67:15 Qur’an Al-Anam 6:11 Qur’an An-Nisa 4:97 Qur’an Al-Baqarah 2:217 Qur’an Al-Hashr 59:9

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The Dhaka Declaration on Human Rights in Islam The member-States of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference: Affirm their belief in Allah, Lord of All the Worlds, Creator of all things, Source of all bounties, who has created man in the Best of moulds, elevated him to a position of honour, made him His viceregent on earth to develop it end to improve it, entrusted him with duties and placed at his disposal all that is on earth and in the skies; Affirm also their Belief in the Message of the Prophet Muhammad SALLALLAHU ALAYHI WA SALLAM who was sent by Allah with true guidance and religion, as a mercy for all the worlds, to emancipate the oppressed who proclaimed equality among all mankind with no superiority for one over another, except on the basis of piety, and who abolished distinctions and hatred among people whom Allah has created from one end the same soul; And proceed from the faith of absolute oneness of God which is the basis of Islam and which calls UPON all mankind to worship no one but Allah and not to associate any other being with Him and which lays down the true basis of human freedom and dignity and proclaims the emancipation of man from enslavement by man; And believe in fulfilling the injunctions of the unchanging Islamic SHARIAH which calls for the safeguarding of man’s religion, soul, mind, honour, wealth and progeny, and which is universal in its applicability and is characterised by moderation in all its principles and rulings, which combines spirit with matter, and which balances individual rights and obligations and collective privileges, harmonises reason and emotion, idealism and reality, which guarantees justice to opponents in a manner that does not result in oppression or frustration; And reaffirm the cultural and historical role of the Islamic Ummah which Allah made as the beat of Ummah and which gave humanity a universal and well-balanced civilization, representing A synthesis of the timeless and the temporal, in which knowledge is combined with faith, and to fulfill the expectations from this Ummah to guide all humanity which is confused because of different and conflicting beliefs end ideologies, and to provide solutions for all chronic problems of this materialistic civilization, and to contribute to the effort of mankind to assert human right to protect man from exploitation and persecution, and to affirm his freedom and right to a dignified life in accordance with the Islamic Shariah; And believe that Fundamental rights and freedom according to Islam are an integral part of the Islamic faith and that no one shall have the right to abolish them either in whose or in part or to violate or ignore them in as much as whole they are binding divine commands, which are contained in His Revealed Books, and which were sent through the last of His Prophets, and which completed His relations, and in as much as obedience to these commands is an act of worship and neglect or violation thereof a sin, and since everyone and the Ummah are responsible individually end collectively;

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And believe that all human beings from one family whose members are united by their subordination to Allah and, being the descendants of Adam, all men are equal in dignity and basic duties and responsibilities without any discrimination on account of race, colour, language, religion, sex, political opinion, social status or other considerations; And that all human beings are Allah’s subjects, and the most loved by Him are these who serve His subjects, and no one has superiority over another except on the basis of piety. These principles shall, henceforth, be known as the Dhaka Declaration on Human Rights in Islam.

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The Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam The Nineteenth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (Session of Peace, Interdependence and Development), held in Cairo, Arab Republic of Egypt, from 9–14 Muharram 1411H (31 July to 5 August 1990). Keenly aware of the place of mankind in Islam as vicegerent of Allah on Earth; Recognizing the importance of issuing a Document on Human Rights in Islam that will serve as a guide for member States in all aspects of life; Having examined the stages through which the preparation of this draft Document has, so far, passed and the relevant report of the Secretary General; Having examined the Report of the Meeting of the committee of Legal Experts held in Tehran from 26 to 28 December, 1989; Agrees to issue the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam which will serve as a general guidance for member states in the field of human rights.

THE CAIRO DECLARATION ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN ISLAM The Member States of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, Reaffirming the civilizing and historical role of the Islamic Ummah which God made the best nation that has given mankind a universal and well-balanced civilization in which harmony is established between this life and the hereafter and knowledge is combined with faith; and the role that this Ummah should play to guide a humanity confused by competing trends and ideologies and to provide solutions to the chronic problems of this materialistic civilization;. Wishing to contribute to the efforts of mankind to assert human rights, to protect man from exploitation and persecution, and to affirm his freedom and right to a dignified life in accordance with the Islamic Shari’ah; Convinced that mankind which has reached an advanced stage in materialistic science is still, and shall remain, in dire need of faith to support its civilization and of a self-motivating force to guard its rights; Believing that fundamental rights and universal freedoms in Islam are an integral part of the Islamic religion and that no one as a matter of principle has the right to suspend them in whole or in part or violate or ignore them in as much as they are binding divine commandments, which are contained in the Revealed Books of God and were sent through the last of His Prophets to complete the preceding divine messages thereby making their observance an act of worship and their neglect or violation an abominable sin, and accordingly every person is individually responsible—and the Ummah collectively responsible—for their safeguard. Proceeding from the above-mentioned principles,

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Declare the following:

ARTICLE 1 (a) All human beings form one family whose members are united by submission to God and descent from Adam. All men are equal in terms of basic human dignity and basic obligations and responsibilities, without any discrimination on the grounds of race, colour, language, sex, religious belief, political affiliation, social status or other considerations. True faith is the guarantee for enhancing such dignity along the path to human perfection. (b) All human beings are God’s subjects, and the most loved by him are those who are most useful to the rest of His subjects, and no one has superiority over another except on the basis of piety and good deeds.

ARTICLE 2 (a) Life is a God-given gift and the right to life is guaranteed to every human being. It is the duty of individuals, societies and states to protect this right from any violation, and it is prohibited to take away life except for a Shari’ah-prescribed reason. (b) It is forbidden to resort to such means as may result in the genocidal annihilation of mankind. (c) The preservation of human life throughout the term of time willed by God is a duty prescribed by Shari’ah. (d) Safety from bodily harm is a guaranteed right. It is the duty of the state to safeguard it, and it is prohibited to breach it without a Shari’ah-prescribed reason.

ARTICLE 3 (a) In the event of the use of force and in case of armed conflict, it is not permissible to kill non-belligerents such as old men, women and children. The wounded and the sick shall have the right to medical treatment; and prisoners of war shall have the right to be fed, sheltered and clothed. It is prohibited to mutilate dead bodies. It is a duty to exchange prisoners of war and to arrange visits or reunions of the families separated by the circumstances of war. (b) It is prohibited to fell trees, to damage crops or livestock, and to destroy the enemy’s civilian buildings and installations by shelling, blasting or any other means.

ARTICLE 4 Every human being is entitled to inviolability and the protection of his good name and honour during his life and after his death. The state and society shall protect his remains and burial place.

ARTICLE 5 (a) The family is the foundation of society, and marriage is the basis of its formation. Men and women have the right to marriage, and no restrictions stemming from race, colour or nationality shall prevent them from enjoying this right. (b) Society and the State shall remove all obstacles to marriage and shall facilitate marital procedure. They shall ensure family protection and welfare.

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ARTICLE 6 (a) Woman is equal to man in human dignity, and has rights to enjoy as well as duties to perform; she has her own civil entity and financial independence, and the right to retain her name and lineage. (b) The husband is responsible for the support and welfare of the family.

ARTICLE 7 (a) As of the moment of birth, every child has rights due from the parents, society and the state to be accorded proper nursing, education and material, hygienic and moral care. Both the fetus and the mother must be protected and accorded special care. (b) Parents and those in such like capacity have the right to choose the type of education they desire for their children, provided they take into consideration the interest and future of the children in accordance with ethical values and the principles of the Shari’ah. (c) Both parents are entitled to certain rights from their children, and relatives are entitled to rights from their kin, in accordance with the tenets of the Shari’ah.

ARTICLE 8 Every human being has the right to enjoy his legal capacity in terms of both obligation and commitment. Should this capacity be lost or impaired, he shall be represented by his guardian.

ARTICLE 9 (a) The quest for knowledge is an obligation, and the provision of education is a duty for society and the State. The State shall ensure the availability of ways and means to acquire education and shall guarantee educational diversity in the interest of society so as to enable man to be acquainted with the religion of Islam and the facts of the Universe for the benefit of mankind. (b) Every human being has the right to receive both religious and worldly education from the various institutions of education and guidance, including the family, the school, the university, the media, etc., and in such an integrated and balanced manner as to develop his personality, strengthen his faith in God and promote his respect for and defence of both rights and obligations.

ARTICLE 10 Islam is the religion of unspoiled nature. It is prohibited to exercise any form of compulsion on man or to exploit his poverty or ignorance in order to convert him to another religion or to atheism.

ARTICLE 11 (a) Human beings are born free, and no one has the right to enslave, humiliate, oppress or exploit them, and there can be no subjugation but to God the Most-High. (b) Colonialism of all types being one of the most evil forms of enslavement is totally prohibited. Peoples suffering from colonialism have the full right to freedom

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and self-determination. It is the duty of all States and peoples to support the struggle of colonized peoples for the liquidation of all forms of colonialism and occupation, and all States and peoples have the right to preserve their independent identity and exercise control over their wealth and natural resources.

ARTICLE 12 Every man shall have the right, within the framework of Shari’ah, to free movement and to select his place of residence whether inside or outside his country and, if persecuted, is entitled to seek asylum in another country. The country of refuge shall ensure his protection until he reaches safety, unless asylum is motivated by an act which Shari’ah regards as a crime.

ARTICLE 13 Work is a right guaranteed by the State and Society for each person able to work. Everyone shall be free to choose the work that suits him best and which serves his interests and those of society. The employee shall have the right to safety and security as well as to all other social guarantees. He may neither be assigned work beyond his capacity nor be subjected to compulsion or exploited or harmed in any way. He shall be entitled—without any discrimination between males and females—to fair wages for his work without delay, as well as to the holidays, allowances and promotions which he deserves. For his part, he shall be required to be dedicated and meticulous in his work. Should workers and employers disagree on any matter, the State shall intervene to settle the dispute and have the grievances redressed, the rights confirmed and justice enforced without bias.

ARTICLE 14 Everyone shall have the right to legitimate gains without monopolization, deceit or harm to oneself or to others. Usury (riba) is absolutely prohibited.

ARTICLE 15 (a) Everyone shall have the right to own property acquired in a legitimate way, and shall be entitled to the rights of ownership, without prejudice to oneself, others or to society in general. Expropriation is not permissible except for the requirements of public interest and upon payment of immediate and fair compensation. (b) Confiscation and seizure of property is prohibited except for a necessity dictated by law.

ARTICLE 16 Everyone shall have the right to enjoy the fruits of his scientific, literary, artistic or technical production and the right to protect the moral and material interests stemming therefrom, provided that such production is not contrary to the principles of Shari’ah.

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ARTICLE 17 (a) Everyone shall have the right to live in a clean environment, away from vice and moral corruption, an environment that would foster his self-development; and it is incumbent upon the State and society in general to afford that right. (b) Everyone shall have the right to medical and social care, and to all public amenities provided by society and the State within the limits of their available resources. (c) The State shall ensure the right of the individual to a decent living which will enable him to meet all his requirements and those of his dependents, including food, clothing, housing, education, medical care and all other basic needs.

ARTICLE 18 (a) Everyone shall have the right to live in security for himself, his religion, his dependents, his honour and his property. (b) Everyone shall have the right to privacy in the conduct of his private affairs, in his home, among his family, with regard to his property and his relationships. It is not permitted to spy on him, to place him under surveillance or to besmirch his good name. The State shall protect him from arbitrary interference. (c) A private residence is inviolable in all cases. It will not be entered without permission from its inhabitants or in any unlawful manner, nor shall it be demolished or confiscated and its dwellers evicted.

ARTICLE 19 (a) All individuals are equal before the law, without distinction between the ruler and the ruled. (b) The right to resort to justice is guaranteed to everyone. (c) Liability is in essence personal. (d) There shall be no crime or punishment except as provided for in the Shari’ah. (e) A defendant is innocent until his guilt is proven in a fair trial in which he shall be given all the guarantees of defence.

ARTICLE 20 It is not permitted without legitimate reason to arrest an individual, or restrict his freedom, to exile or to punish him. It is not permitted to subject him to physical or psychological torture or to any form of humiliation, cruelty or indignity. Nor is it permitted to subject an individual to medical or scientific experimentation without his consent or at the risk of his health or of his life. Nor is it permitted to promulgate emergency laws that would provide executive authority for such actions.

ARTICLE 21 Taking hostages under any form or for any purpose is expressly forbidden.

ARTICLE 22 (a) Everyone shall have the right to express his opinion freely in such manner as would not be contrary to the principles of the Shari’ah.

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(b) Everyone shall have the right to advocate what is right, and propagate what is good, and warn against what is wrong and evil according to the norms of Islamic Shari’ah. (c) Information is a vital necessity to society. It may not be exploited or misused in such a way as may violate sanctities and the dignity of Prophets, undermine moral and ethical values or disintegrate, corrupt or harm society or weaken its faith. (d) It is not permitted to arouse nationalistic or doctrinal hatred or to do anything that may be an incitement to any form of racial discrimination.

ARTICLE 23 (a) Authority is a trust; and abuse or malicious exploitation thereof is absolutely prohibited, so that fundamental human rights may be guaranteed. (b) Everyone shall have the right to participate, directly or indirectly in the administration of his country’s public affairs. He shall also have the right to assume public office in accordance with the provisions of Shari’ah.

ARTICLE 24 All the rights and freedoms stipulated in this Declaration are subject to the Islamic Shari’ah.

ARTICLE 25 The Islamic Shari’ah is the only source of reference for the explanation or clarification to any of the articles of this Declaration. Cairo, 14 Muharram 1411H 5 August 1990

APPENDIX 7

Arab Charter on Human Rights Based on the faith of the Arab nation in the dignity of the human person whom God has exalted ever since the beginning of creation and in the fact that the Arab homeland is the cradle of religions and civilizations whose lofty human values affirm the human right to a decent life based on freedom, justice and equality, In furtherance of the eternal principles of fraternity, equality and tolerance among human beings consecrated by the noble Islamic religion and the other divinelyrevealed religions, Being proud of the humanitarian values and principles that the Arab nation has established throughout its long history, which have played a major role in spreading knowledge between East and West, so making the region a point of reference for the whole world and a destination for seekers of knowledge and wisdom, Believing in the unity of the Arab nation, which struggles for its freedom and defends the right of nations to self-determination, to the preservation of their wealth and to development; believing in the sovereignty of the law and its contribution to the protection of universal and interrelated human rights and convinced that the human person’s enjoyment of freedom, justice and equality of opportunity is a fundamental measure of the value of any society, Rejecting all forms of racism and Zionism, which constitute a violation of human rights and a threat to international peace and security, recognizing the close link that exists between human rights and international peace and security, reaffirming the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and having regard to the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, The States parties to the Charter have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1 The present Charter seeks, within the context of the national identity of the Arab States and their sense of belonging to a common civilization, to achieve the following aims: 1. To place human rights at the centre of the key national concerns of Arab States, making them lofty and fundamental ideals that shape the will of the individual in Arab States and enable him to improve his life in accordance with noble human values. 2. To teach the human person in the Arab States pride in his identity, loyalty to his country, attachment to his land, history and common interests and to instill in him a culture of human brotherhood, tolerance and openness towards others, in accordance with universal principles and values and with those proclaimed in international human rights instruments.

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3. To prepare the new generations in Arab States for a free and responsible life in a civil society that is characterized by solidarity, founded on a balance between awareness of rights and respect for obligations, and governed by the values of equality, tolerance and moderation. 4. To entrench the principle that all human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated.

ARTICLE 2 1. All peoples have the right of self-determination and to control over their natural wealth and resources, and the right to freely choose their political system and to freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. 2. All peoples have the right to national sovereignty and territorial integrity. 3. All forms of racism, Zionism and foreign occupation and domination constitute an impediment to human dignity and a major barrier to the exercise of the fundamental rights of peoples; all such practices must be condemned and efforts must be deployed for their elimination. 4. All peoples have the right to resist foreign occupation.

ARTICLE 3 1. Each State party to the present Charter undertakes to ensure to all individuals subject to its jurisdiction the right to enjoy the rights and freedoms set forth herein, without distinction on grounds of race, colour, sex, language, religious belief, opinion, thought, national or social origin, wealth, birth or physical or mental disability. 2. The States parties to the present Charter shall take the requisite measures to guarantee effective equality in the enjoyment of all the rights and freedoms enshrined in the present Charter in order to ensure protection against all forms of discrimination based on any of the grounds mentioned in the preceding paragraph. 3. Men and women are equal in respect of human dignity, rights and obligations within the framework of the positive discrimination established in favour of women by the Islamic Shariah, other divine laws and by applicable laws and legal instruments. Accordingly, each State party pledges to take all the requisite measures to guarantee equal opportunities and effective equality between men and women in the enjoyment of all the rights set out in this Charter.

ARTICLE 4 1. In exceptional situations of emergency which threaten the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States parties to the present Charter may take measures derogating from their obligations under the present Charter, to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the grounds of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin. 2. In exceptional situations of emergency, no derogation shall be made from the following articles: article 5, article 8, article 9, article 10, article 13, article 14, paragraph 6, article 15, article 18, article 19, article 20, article 22, article 27, article 28,

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article 29 and article 30. In addition, the judicial guarantees required for the protection of the aforementioned rights may not be suspended. 3. Any State party to the present Charter availing itself of the right of derogation shall immediately inform the other States parties, through the intermediary of the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, of the provisions from which it has derogated and of the reasons by which it was actuated. A further communication shall be made, through the same intermediary, on the date on which it terminates such derogation.

ARTICLE 5 1. Every human being has the inherent right to life. 2. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.

ARTICLE 6 Sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the laws in force at the time of commission of the crime and pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent court. Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek pardon or commutation of the sentence.

ARTICLE 7 1. Sentence of death shall not be imposed on persons under 18 years of age, unless otherwise stipulated in the laws in force at the time of the commission of the crime. 2. The death penalty shall not be inflicted on a pregnant woman prior to her delivery or on a nursing mother within two years from the date of her delivery; in all cases, the best interests of the infant shall be the primary consideration.

ARTICLE 8 1. No one shall be subjected to physical or psychological torture or to cruel, degrading, humiliating or inhuman treatment. 2. Each State party shall protect every individual subject to its jurisdiction from such practices and shall take effective measures to prevent them. The commission of, or participation in, such acts shall be regarded as crimes that are punishable by law and not subject to any statute of limitations. Each State party shall guarantee in its legal system redress for any victim of torture and the right to rehabilitation and compensation.

ARTICLE 9 No one shall be subjected to medical or scientific experimentation or to the use of his organs without his free consent and full awareness of the consequences and provided that ethical, humanitarian and professional rules are followed and medical procedures are observed to ensure his personal safety pursuant to the relevant domestic

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laws in force in each State party. Trafficking in human organs is prohibited in all circumstances.

ARTICLE 10 1. All forms of slavery and trafficking in human beings are prohibited and are punishable by law. No one shall be held in slavery and servitude under any circumstances. 2. Forced labor, trafficking in human beings for the purposes of prostitution or sexual exploitation, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or any other form of exploitation or the exploitation of children in armed conflict are prohibited.

ARTICLE 11 All persons are equal before the law and have the right to enjoy its protection without discrimination.

ARTICLE 12 All persons are equal before the courts and tribunals. The States parties shall guarantee the independence of the judiciary and protect magistrates against any interference, pressure or threats. They shall also guarantee every person subject to their jurisdiction the right to seek a legal remedy before courts of all levels.

ARTICLE 13 1. Everyone has the right to a fair trial that affords adequate guarantees before a competent, independent and impartial court that has been constituted by law to hear any criminal charge against him or to decide on his rights or his obligations. Each State party shall guarantee to those without the requisite financial resources legal aid to enable them to defend their rights. 2. Trials shall be public, except in exceptional cases that may be warranted by the interests of justice in a society that respects human freedoms and rights.

ARTICLE 14 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, search or detention without a legal warrant. 2. No one shall be deprived of-his liberty except on such grounds and in such circumstances as are determined by law and in accordance with such procedure as is established thereby. 3. Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, in a language that he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and shall be promptly informed of any charges against him. He shall be entitled to contact his family members. 4. Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall have the right to request a medical examination and must be informed of that right. 5. Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and

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shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release. His release may be subject to guarantees to appear for trial. Pre-trial detention shall in no case be the general rule. 6. Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to petition a competent court in order that it may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his arrest or detention and order his release if the arrest or detention is unlawful. 7. Anyone who has been the victim of arbitrary or unlawful arrest or detention shall be entitled to compensation.

ARTICLE 15 No crime and no penalty can be established without a prior provision of the law. In all circumstances, the law most favorable to the defendant shall be applied.

ARTICLE 16 Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty by a final judgment rendered according to law and, in the course of the investigation and trial, he shall enjoy the following minimum guarantees: 1. The right to be informed promptly, in detail and in a language which he understands, of the charges against him. 2. The right to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defense and to be allowed to communicate with his family. 3. The right to be tried in his presence before an ordinary court and to defend himself in person or through a lawyer of his own choosing with whom he can communicate freely and confidentially. 4. The right to the free assistance of a lawyer who will defend him if he cannot defend himself or if the interests of justice so require, and the right to the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or does not speak the language used in court. 5. The right to examine or have his lawyer examine the prosecution witnesses and to on defense according to the conditions applied to the prosecution witnesses. 6. The right not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt. 7. The right, if convicted of the crime, to file an appeal in accordance with the law before a higher tribunal. 8. The right to respect for his security of person and his privacy in all circumstances.

ARTICLE 17 Each State party shall ensure in particular to any child at risk or any delinquent charged with an offence the right to a special legal system for minors in all stages of investigation, trial and enforcement of sentence, as well as to special treatment that takes account of his age, protects his dignity, facilitates his rehabilitation and reintegration and enables him to play a constructive role in society.

ARTICLE 18 No one who is shown by a court to be unable to pay a debt arising from a contractual obligation shall be imprisoned.

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ARTICLE 19 1. No one may be tried twice for the same offence. Anyone against whom such proceedings are brought shall have the right to challenge their legality and to demand his release. 2. Anyone whose innocence is established by a final judgment shall be entitled to compensation for the damage suffered.

ARTICLE 20 1. All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person. 2. Persons in pre-trial detention shall be separated from convicted persons and shall be treated in a manner consistent with their status as unconvicted persons. 3. The aim of the penitentiary system shall be to reform prisoners and effect their social rehabilitation.

ARTICLE 21 1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with regard to his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour or his reputation. 2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.

ARTICLE 22 Everyone shall have the right to recognition as a person before the law.

ARTICLE 23 Each State party to the present Charter undertakes to ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.

ARTICLE 24 Every citizen has the right: 1. To freely pursue a political activity. 2. To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives. 3. To stand for election or choose his representatives in free and impartial elections, in conditions of equality among all citizens that guarantee the free expression of his will. 4. To the opportunity to gain access, on an equal footing with others, to public office in his country in accordance with the principle of equality of opportunity.

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5. To freely form and join associations with others. 6. To freedom of association and peaceful assembly. 7. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of these rights other than those which are prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

ARTICLE 25 Persons belonging to minorities shall not be denied the right to enjoy their own culture, to use their own language and to practice their own religion. The exercise of these rights shall be governed by law.

ARTICLE 26 1. Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State party shall, within that territory, have the right to freedom of movement and to freely choose his residence in any part of that territory in conformity with the laws in force. 2. No State party may expel a person who does not hold its nationality but is lawfully in its territory, other than in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law and after that person has been allowed to submit a petition to the competent authority, unless compelling reasons of national security preclude it. Collective expulsion is prohibited under all circumstances.

ARTICLE 27 1. No one may be arbitrarily or unlawfully prevented from leaving any country, including his own, nor prohibited from residing, or compelled to reside, in any part of that country. 2. No one may be exiled from his country or prohibited from returning thereto.

ARTICLE 28 Everyone has the right to seek political asylum in another country in order to escape persecution. This right may not be invoked by persons facing prosecution for an offence under ordinary law. Political refugees may not be extradited.

ARTICLE 29 1. Everyone has the right to nationality. No one shall be arbitrarily or unlawfully deprived of his nationality. 2. States parties shall take such measures as they deem appropriate, in accordance with their domestic laws on nationality, to allow a child to acquire the mother’s nationality, having due regard, in all cases, to the best interests of the child. 3. Non one shall be denied the right to acquire another nationality, having due regard for the domestic legal procedures in his country.

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ARTICLE 30 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion and no restrictions may be imposed on the exercise of such freedoms except as provided for by law. 2. The freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs or to perform religious observances, either alone or in community with others, shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a tolerant society that respects human rights and freedoms for the protection of public safety, public order, public health or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. 3. Parents or guardians have the freedom to provide for the religious and moral education of their children.

ARTICLE 31 Everyone has a guaranteed right to own private property, and shall not under any circumstances be arbitrarily or unlawfully divested of all or any part of his property.

ARTICLE 32 1. The present Charter guarantees the right to information and to freedom of opinion and expression, as well as the right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any medium, regardless of geographical boundaries. 2. Such rights and freedoms shall be exercised in conformity with the fundamental values of society and shall be subject only to such limitations as are required to ensure respect for the rights or reputation of others or the protection of national security, public order and public health or morals.

ARTICLE 33 1. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society; it is based on marriage between a man and a woman. Men and women of marrying age have the right to marry and to found a family according to the rules and conditions of marriage. No marriage can take place without the full and free consent of both parties. The laws in force regulate the rights and duties of the man and woman as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution. 2. The State and society shall ensure the protection of the family, the strengthening of family ties, the protection of its members and the prohibition of all forms of violence or abuse in the relations among its members, and particularly against women and children. They shall also ensure the necessary protection and care for mothers, children, older persons and persons with special needs and shall provide adolescents and young persons with the best opportunities for physical and mental development. 3. The States parties shall take all necessary legislative, administrative and judicial measures to guarantee the protection, survival, development and well-being of the child in an atmosphere of freedom and dignity and shall ensure, in all cases, that the child’s best interests are the basic criterion for all measures taken in his regard, whether the child is at risk of delinquency or is a juvenile offender. 4. The States parties shall take all the necessary measures to guarantee, particularly to young persons, the right to pursue a sporting activity.

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ARTICLE 34 1. The right to work is a natural right of every citizen. The State shall endeavor to provide, to the extent possible, a job for the largest number of those willing to work, while ensuring production, the freedom to choose one’s work and equality of opportunity without discrimination of any kind on grounds of race, colour, sex, religion, language, political opinion, membership in a union, national origin, social origin, disability or any other situation. 2. Every worker has the right to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work which ensure appropriate remuneration to meet his essential needs and those of his family and regulate working hours, rest and holidays with pay, as well as the rules for the preservation of occupational health and safety and the protection of women, children and disabled persons in the place of work. 3. The States parties recognize the right of the child to be protected from economic exploitation and from being forced to perform any work that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere with the child’s education or to be harmful to the child’s health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social development. To this end, and having regard to the relevant provisions of other international instruments, States parties shall in particular: (a) Define a minimum age for admission to employment; (b) Establish appropriate regulation of working hours and conditions; (c) Establish appropriate penalties or other sanctions to ensure the effective endorsement of these provisions. 4. There shall be no discrimination between men and women in their enjoyment of the right to effectively benefit from training, employment and job protection and the right to receive equal remuneration for equal work. 5. Each State party shall ensure to workers who migrate to its territory the requisite protection in accordance with the laws in force.

ARTICLE 35 1. Every individual has the right to freely form trade unions or to join trade unions and to freely pursue trade union activity for the protection of his interests. 2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights and freedoms except such as are prescribed by the laws in force and that are necessary for the maintenance of national security, public safety or order or for the protection of public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others. 3. Every State party to the present Charter guarantees the right to strike within the limits laid down by the laws in force.

ARTICLE 36 The States parties shall ensure the right of every citizen to social security, including social insurance.

ARTICLE 37 The right to development is a fundamental human right and all States are required to establish the development policies and to take the measures needed to guarantee this right. They have a duty to give effect to the values of solidarity and cooperation

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among them and at the international level with a view to eradicating poverty and achieving economic, social, cultural and political development. By virtue of this right, every citizen has the right to participate in the realization of development and to enjoy the benefits and fruits thereof.

ARTICLE 38 Every person has the right to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, which ensures their well-being and a decent life, including food, clothing, housing, services and the right to a healthy environment. The States parties shall take the necessary measures commensurate with their resources to guarantee these rights.

ARTICLE 39 1. The States parties recognize the right of every member of society to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health and the right of the citizen to free basic health-care services and to have access to medical facilities without discrimination of any kind. 2. The measures taken by States parties shall include the following: (a) Development of basic health-care services and the guaranteeing of free and easy access to the centres that provide these services, regardless of geographical location or economic status. (b) Efforts to control disease by means of prevention and cure in order to reduce the morality rate. (c) Promotion of health awareness and health education. (d) Suppression of traditional practices which are harmful to the health of the individual. (e) Provision of the basic nutrition and safe drinking water for all. (f) Combating environmental pollution and providing proper sanitation systems; (g) Combating drugs, psychotropic substances, smoking and substances that are damaging to health.

ARTICLE 40 1. The States parties undertake to ensure to persons with mental or physical disabilities a decent life that guarantees their dignity, and to enhance their self-reliance and facilitate their active participation in society. 2. The States parties shall provide social services free of charge for all persons with disabilities, shall provide the material support needed by those persons, their families or the families caring for them, and shall also do whatever is needed to avoid placing those persons in institutions. They shall in all cases take account of the best interests of the disabled person. 3. The States parties shall take all necessary measures to curtail the incidence of disabilities by all possible means, including preventive health programmes, awareness raising and education. 4. The States parties shall provide full educational services suited to persons with disabilities, taking into account the importance of integrating these persons in the educational system and the importance of vocational training and apprenticeship and the creation of suitable job opportunities in the public or private sectors.

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5. The States parties shall provide all health services appropriate for persons with disabilities, including the rehabilitation of these persons with a view to integrating them into society. 6. The States parties shall enable persons with disabilities to make use of all public and private services.

ARTICLE 41 1. The eradication of illiteracy is a binding obligation upon the State and everyone has the right to education. 2. The States parties shall guarantee their citizens free education at least throughout the primary and basic levels. All forms and levels of primary education shall be compulsory and accessible to all without discrimination of any kind. 3. The States parties shall take appropriate measures in all domains to ensure partnership between men and women with a view to achieving national development goals. 4. The States parties shall guarantee to provide education directed to the full development of the human person and to strengthening respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. 5. The States parties shall endeavour to incorporate the principles of human rights and fundamental freedoms into formal and informal education curricula and educational and training programmes. 6. The States parties shall guarantee the establishment of the mechanisms necessary to provide ongoing education for every citizen and shall develop national plans for adult education.

ARTICLE 42 1. Every person has the right to take part in cultural life and to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its application. 2. The States parties undertake to respect the freedom of scientific research and creative activity and to ensure the protection of moral and material interests resulting form scientific, literary and artistic production. 3. The state parties shall work together and enhance cooperation among them at all levels, with the full participation of intellectuals and inventors and their organizations, in order to develop and implement recreational, cultural, artistic and scientific programmes.

ARTICLE 43 Nothing in this Charter may be construed or interpreted as impairing the rights and freedoms protected by the domestic laws of the States parties or those set forth in the international and regional human rights instruments which the states parties have adopted or ratified, including the rights of women, the rights of the child and the rights of persons belonging to minorities.

ARTICLE 44 The states parties undertake to adopt, in conformity with their constitutional procedures and with the provisions of the present Charter, whatever legislative or

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non-legislative measures that may be necessary to give effect to the rights set forth herein.

ARTICLE 45 1. Pursuant to this Charter, an “Arab Human Rights Committee,” hereinafter referred to as “the Committee” shall be established. This Committee shall consist of seven members who shall be elected by secret ballot by the states parties to this Charter. 2. The Committee shall consist of nationals of the states parties to the present Charter, who must be highly experienced and competent in the Committee’s field of work. The members of the Committee shall serve in their personal capacity and shall be fully independent and impartial. 3. The Committee shall include among its members not more than one national of a State party; such member may be re-elected only once. Due regard shall be given to the rotation principle. 4. The members of the Committee shall be elected for a four-year term, although the mandate of three of the members elected during the first election shall be for two years and shall be renewed by lot. 5. Six months prior to the date of the election, the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States shall invite the States parties to submit their nominations within the following three months. He shall transmit the list of candidates to the States parties two months prior to the date the election. The candidates who obtain the largest number of votes cast shall be elected to membership of the Committee. If, because two or more candidates have an equal number of votes, the number of candidates with the largest number of votes exceeds the number required, a second ballot will be held between the persons with equal numbers of votes. If the votes are again equal, the member or members shall be selected by lottery. The first election for membership of the Committee shall be held at least six months after the Charter enters into force. 6. The Secretary-General shall invite the States parties to a meeting at the headquarters the League of Arab States in order to elect the member of the Committee. The presence of the majority of the States parties shall constitute a quorum. If there is no quorum, the secretary-General shall call another meeting at which at least two thirds of the States parties must be present. If there is still no quorum, the SecretaryGeneral shall call a third meeting, which will be held regardless of the number of States parties present. 7. The Secretary-General shall convene the first meeting of the Committee, during the course of which the Committee shall elect its Chairman from among its members, for a two-year period in which may be renewed only once and for an identical period. The Committee shall establish its own rules of procedure and methods of work and shall determine how often it shall meet. The Committee shall hold its meetings at the headquarters of the League of Arab States. It may also meet in any other State party to the present Charter at that party’s invitation.

ARTICLE 46 1. The Secretary-General shall declare a seat vacant after being notified by the Chairman of a member’s: (a) Death; (b) Resignation; or (c) If, in the unanimous, opinion of the other members, a member of the Committee has ceased to perform his functions without offering an acceptable justification or for any reason other than a temporary absence.

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2. If a member’s seat is declared vacant pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 1 and the term of office of the member to be replaced does not expire within six months from the date on which the vacancy was declared, the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States shall refer the matter to the States parties to the present Charter, which may, within two months, submit nominations, pursuant to article 45, in order to fill the vacant seat. 3. The Secretary-General of the League of Arab States shall draw up an alphabetical list of all the duly nominated candidates, which he shall transmit to the States parties to the present Charter. The elections to fill the vacant seat shall be held in accordance with the relevant provisions. 4. Any member of the Committee elected to fill a seat declared vacant in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 shall remain a member of the Committee until the expiry of the remainder of the term of the member whose seat was declared vacant pursuant to the provisions of that paragraph. 5. The Secretary-General of the League of Arab States shall make provision within the budget of the League of Arab States for all the necessary financial and human resources and facilities that the Committee needs to discharge its functions effectively. The Committee’s experts shall be afforded the same treatment with respect to remuneration and reimbursement of expenses as experts of the secretariat of the League of Arab States.

ARTICLE 47 The States parties undertake to ensure that members of the Committee shall enjoy the immunities necessary for their protection against any form of harassment or moral or material pressure or prosecution on account of the positions they take or statements they make while carrying out their functions as members of the Committee.

ARTICLE 48 1. The States parties undertake to submit reports to the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States on the measures they have taken to give effect to the rights and freedoms recognized in this Charter and on the progress made towards the enjoyment thereof. The Secretary-General shall transmit these reports to the Committee for its consideration. 2. Each State party shall submit an initial report to the Committee within one year from the date on which the Charter enters into force and a periodic report every three years thereafter. The Committee may request the States parties to supply it with additional information relating to the implementation of the Charter. 3. The Committee shall consider the reports submitted by the States parties under paragraph 2 of this article in the presence of the representative of the State party whose report is being considered. 4. The Committee shall discuss the report, comment thereon and make the necessary recommendations in accordance with the aims of the Charter. 5. The Committee shall submit an annual report containing its comments and recommendations to the Council of the League, through the intermediary of the Secretary-General. 6. The Committee’s reports, concluding observations and recommendations shall be public documents which the Committee shall disseminate widely.

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ARTICLE 49 1. The Secretary-General of the League of Arab States shall submit the present Charter, once it has been approved by the Council of the League, to the States members for signature, ratification or accession. 2. The present Charter shall enter into effect two months from the date on which the seventh instrument of ratification is deposited with the secretariat of the League of Arab States. 3. After its entry into force, the present Charter shall become effective for each State two months after the State in question has deposited its instrument of ratification or accession with the secretariat. 4. The Secretary-General shall notify the States members of the deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession.

ARTICLE 50 Any State party may submit written proposals, through the Secretary-General, for the amendment of the present Charter. After these amendments have been circulated among the States members, the Secretary-General shall invite the States parties to consider the proposed amendments before submitting them to the Council of the League for adoption.

ARTICLE 51 The amendments shall take effect, with regard to the States parties that have approved them, once they have been approved by two thirds of the States parties.

ARTICLE 52 Any State party may propose additional optional protocols to the present Charter and they shall be adopted in accordance with the procedures used for the adoption of amendments to the Charter.

ARTICLE 53 1. Any State party, when signing this Charter, depositing the instruments of ratification or acceding hereto, may make a reservation to any article of the Charter, provided that such reservation does not conflict with the aims and fundamental purposes of the Charter. 2. Any State party that has made a reservation pursuant to paragraph 1 of this article may withdraw it at any time by addressing a notification to the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States. 3. The Secretary-General shall notify the States parties of reservations and of requests for their withdrawal.

APPENDIX 8

Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities Proposed by the InterAction Council

PREAMBLE Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice, and peace in the world and implies obligations or responsibilities, whereas the exclusive insistence on rights can result in conflict, division, and endless dispute, and the neglect of human responsibilities can lead to lawlessness and chaos, whereas the rule of law and the promotion of human rights depend on the readiness of men and women to act justly, whereas global problems demand global solutions which can only be achieved through ideas, values, and norms respected by all cultures and societies, whereas all people, to the best of their knowledge and ability, have a responsibility to foster a better social order, both at home and globally, a goal which cannot be achieved by laws, prescriptions, and conventions alone, whereas human aspirations for progress and improvement can only be realized by agreed values and standards applying to all people and institutions at all times, Now, therefore, The General Assembly proclaims this Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities as a common standard for all people and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall contribute to the advancement of communities and to the enlightenment of all their members. We, the peoples of the world, thus renew and reinforce commitments already proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: namely, the full acceptance of the dignity of all people; their inalienable freedom and equality, and their solidarity with one another. Awareness and acceptance of these responsibilities should be taught and promoted throughout the world.

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES FOR HUMANITY Article 1 Every person, regardless of gender, ethnic origin, social status, political opinion, language, age, nationality, or religion, has a responsibility to treat all people in a humane way.

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Article 2 No person should lend support to any form of inhumane behaviour, but all people have a responsibility to strive for the dignity and self-esteem of all others.

Article 3 No person, no group or organization, no state, no army or police stands above good and evil; all are subject to ethical standards. Everyone had a responsibility to promote good and to avoid evil in all things.

Article 4 All people, endowed with reason and conscience, must accept a responsibility to each and all, to families and communities, to races, nations, and religions in a spirit of solidarity: What you do not wish to be done to yourself, do not do to others.

NON-VIOLENCE AND RESPECT FOR LIFE Article 5 Every person has a responsibility to respect life. No one has the right to injure, to torture, or to kill another human person. This does not exclude the right of justified self-defense of individuals or communities.

Article 6 Disputes between states, groups, or individuals should be resolved without violence. No government should tolerate or participate in acts of genocide or terrorism, nor should it abuse women, children, or any other civilians as instruments of war. Every citizen and public official has a responsibility to act in a peaceful, non-violent way.

Article 7 Every person is infinitely precious and must be protected unconditionally. The animals and the natural environment also demand protection. All people have a responsibility to protect the air, water. and soil of the earth for the sake of present inhabitants and future generations.

JUSTICE AND SOLIDARITY Article 8 Every person has a responsibility to behave with integrity, honesty, and fairness. No persons or group should rob or arbitrarily deprive any other person or group of their property.

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Article 9 All people, given the necessary tools, have a responsibility to make serious efforts to overcome poverty, malnutrition, ignorance, and inequality. They should promote sustainable development all over the world in order to assure dignity, freedom, security, and justice for all people.

Article 10 All people have a responsibility to develop their talents through diligent endeavour; they should have equal access to education and to meaningful work. Everyone should lend support to the needy, the disadvantaged, the disabled, and to the victims of discrimination.

Article 11 All property and wealth must be used responsibly in accordance with justice and for the advancement of the human race. Economics and political power must not be handled as an instrument of domination, but in the service of economic justice and of the social order.

TRUTHFULNESS AND TOLERANCE Article 12 Every person has a responsibility to speak and act truthfully. No one, however high or mighty, should speak lies. The right to privacy and to personal and professional confidentiality is to be respected. No one is obliged to tell all the truth to everyone all the time.

Article 13 No politicians, public servants, business leaders, scientists, writers, or artists are exempt from general ethical standards, nor are physicians, lawyers and other professionals who have special duties to clients. Professional and other codes of ethics should reflect the priority of general standards such as those of truthfulness and fairness.

Article 14 The freedom of the media to inform the public and to criticize institutions of society and governmental actions, which is essential for a just society, must be used with responsibility and discretion. Freedom of the media carries a special responsibility for accurate and truthful reporting. Sensational reporting that degrades the human person or dignity must at all times be avoided.

Article 15 While religious freedom must be guaranteed, the representatives of religions have a special responsibility to avoid expressions of prejudice and acts of discrimination

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toward those different beliefs. They should not incite or legitimize, fanaticism, and religious wars, but should foster tolerance and mutual respect between all people.

MUTUAL RESPECT AND PARTNERSHIP Article 16 All men and women have a responsibility to show respect to one another and understanding in their partnership. No one should subject another person to sexual exploitation or dependence. Rather, sexual partners should accept the responsibility of caring for each other’s well being.

Article 17 In all its cultural and religious varieties, marriage requires love, loyalty, and forgiveness and should aim at guaranteeing security and mutual support.

Article 18 Sensible family planning is the responsibility if every couple. The relationship between parents and children should reflect mutual love, respect, appreciation, and concern. No parents or other adults should exploit, abuse, or maltreat children.

CONCLUSION Article 19 Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any state, group, or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the responsibilities, rights, and freedom set forth in this Declaration and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948.

APPENDIX 9

A Global Ethic: The Universal Declaration of the Parliament of the World’s Religions INTRODUCTIONi The world is in agony. The agony is so pervasive and urgent that we are compelled to name its manifestations so that the depth of this pain may be made clear. Peace eludes us . . . the planet is being destroyed . . . neighbours live in fear . . . women and men are estranged from each other . . . children die! This is abhorrent! We condemn the abuses of Earth’s ecosystems. We condemn the poverty that stifles life’s potential; the hunger that weakens the human body; the economic disparities that threaten so many families with ruin. We condemn the social disarray of the nations; the disregard for justice which pushes citizens to the margin; the anarchy overtaking our communities; and the insane death of children from violence. In particular we condemn aggression and hatred in the name of religion. But this agony need not be. It need not be because the basis for an ethic already exists. This ethic offers the possibility of a better individual and global order, and leads individuals away from despair and societies away from chaos. We are women and men who have embraced the precepts and practices of the world’s religions. We affirm that a common set of core values is found in the teachings of the religions, and that these form the basis of a global ethic. We affirm that this truth is already known, but yet to be lived in heart and action. We affirm that there is an irrevocable, unconditional norm for all areas of life, for families and communities, for races, nations and religions. There already exist ancient guidelines for human behaviour which are found in the teachings of the religions of the world and which are the conditions for a sustainable world order. We declare: We are interdependent. Each of us depends on the well-being of the whole, and so we have respect for the community of living beings, for people, animals, and plants, and for the preservation of Earth, the air, water and soil. We take individual responsibility for all we do. All our decisions, actions, and failures to act have consequences. We must treat others as we wish others to treat us. We make a commitment to respect life and dignity, individuality and diversity, so that every person is treated humanly, without exception. We must have patience and acceptance. We must be able to forgive, learning from the past but never allowing ourselves to be enslaved by memories of hate.

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Opening our hearts to one another, we must sink our narrow differences for the cause of world community, practicing a culture of solidarity and relatedness. We consider humankind our family. We must strive to be kind and generous. We must not live for ourselves alone, but should also serve others, never forgetting the children, the aged, the poor, the suffering, the disabled, the refugees, and the lonely. No person should ever be considered or treated as a second-class citizen, or be exploited in any way whatsoever. There should be equal partnership between men and women. We must not commit any kind of sexual immorality. We must put behind us all forms of domination or abuse. We commit ourselves to a culture of non-violence, respect, justice and peace. We shall not oppress, injure, torture, or kill other human beings, forsaking violence as a means of settling differences. We must strive for a just social and economic order, in which everyone has an equal chance to reach full potential as a human being. We must speak and act truthfully and with compassion, dealing fairly with all, and avoiding prejudice and hatred. We must not steal. We must move beyond the dominance of greed for power, prestige, money, and consumption to make a just and peaceful world. Earth cannot be changed for the better unless the consciousness of individuals is changed first. We pledge to increase our awareness by disciplining our minds, by meditation, by prayer, or by positive thinking. Without risk and a readiness to sacrifice there can be no fundamental change in our situation. Therefore we commit ourselves to this global ethic, to understanding one another, and to sociallybeneficial, peace-fostering, and nature-friendly ways of life. We invite all people, whether religious or not, to do the same.

THE PRINCIPLES OF A GLOBAL ETHIC Our world is experiencing a fundamental crisis: a crisis in global economy, global ecology, and global politics. The lack of a grand vision, the tangle of unresolved problems, political paralysis, mediocre political leadership with little insight or foresight, and in general too little sense for the commonweal are seen everywhere. Too many old answers to new challenges. Hundred of millions of human beings on our planet increasingly suffer from unemployment, poverty, hunger, and the destruction of their families. Hope for a lasting peace among nations slips away from us. There are tensions between the sexes and generations. Children die, kill, and are killed. More and more countries are shaken by corruption in politics and business. It is increasingly difficult to live together peacefully in our cities because of social, racial, and ethnic conflicts, the abuse of drugs, organized crime, and even anarchy. Even neighbours often live in fear of one another. Our planet continues to be ruthlessly plundered. A collapse of the ecosystem threatens us. Time and again we see leaders and members of religions incite aggression, fanaticism, hate, and xenophobia—even inspire and legitimate violent and bloody conflicts. Religion often is misused for purely power-political goals, including war. We are filled with disgust. We condemn these blights and declare that they need not be. An ethic already exists within the religious teachings of the world which can counter the global distress. Of course this ethic provides no direct solution for all the immense problems of the world, but it does supply the moral foundation for a better individual and global order: a vision which can lead women and men away from despair, and society away from chaos. We are persons who have committed ourselves to the precepts and practices of the world’s religions. We confirm that there is already a consensus among the religions which can be the basis for a global ethic—a minimal fundamental consensus concerning biding values, irrevocable standards, and fundamental moral attitudes.

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I. NO NEW GLOBAL ORDER WITHOUT A NEW GLOBAL ETHIC We women and men of various religions and regions of Earth therefore address all people, religious and non-religious. We wish to express the following convictions which we hold in common.

• We all have a responsibility for a better global order. • Our involvement for the sake of human rights, freedom, justice, peace, and the preservation of Earth is absolutely necessary.

• Our different religious and cultural traditions must not prevent our common involvement in opposing all forms of inhumanity and working for greater humaneness.

• The principles expressed in this global ethic can be affirmed by all persons with ethical convictions, whether religiously grounded or not. As religious and spiritual persons we base our lives on an Ultimate Reality, and draw spiritual power and hope therefrom, in trust, in prayer or mediation, in word or silence. We have a special responsibility for the welfare of all humanity and care for the planet Earth. We do not consider ourselves better than other women and men, but we trust that the ancient wisdom of our religions can point the way for the future. After two world wars and the end of the cold war, the collapse of fascism and Nazism, the shaking to the foundations of communism and colonialism, humanity has entered a new phase of its history. Today we possess sufficient economic, cultural, and spiritual resources to introduce a better global order, but old and new ethnic, national, social, economic, and religious tensions threaten the peaceful building of a better world. We have experienced greater technological progress than never before, yet we see that world-wide poverty, hunger, death of children, unemployment, misery, and the destruction of nature have not diminished but rather have increased. Many peoples are threatened with economic ruin, social disarray, political marginalization, ecological catastrophe, and moral collapse. In such a dramatic global situation humanity needs a vision of peoples living peacefully together, of ethnic and ethical groupings and of religions sharing responsibility for the care of Earth. A vision rests on hopes, goals, ideals, standards. But all over the world these have slipped from our hands. Yet we are convinced that, despite their frequent abuses and failures, it is the communities of faith who bear a responsibility to demonstrate that such hopes, ideals, and standards can be guarded, ground and lived. This is especially true in the modern state. Guarantees of freedom of conscience and religion are necessary, but they do not substitute for binding values, convictions, and norms which are valid for all humans regardless of their social origin, sex, skin, colour, language, or religion. We are convinced of the fundamental unity of the human family on Earth. We recall the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations. What it formally proclaimed on the level of rights we wish to confirm and deepen here from the perspective of an ethic: the full realization of the intrinsic dignity of the human persons, the inalienable freedom and equality in principle of all humans, and the necessary solidarity and interdependence of all humans with each other. On the basis of personal experiences and the burdensome history of our planet we have learned

• that a better global order cannot be created or enforced by laws, prescriptions, and conventions alone;

• that the realization of peace, justice, and the protection of earth depends on the insight and readiness of men and women to act justly;

• that action in favour of rights and freedoms presumes a consciousness of responsibility and duty, and that therefore both the minds and hearts of women and men must be addressed;

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• that rights without morality cannot long endure, and that there will be no better global order without a global ethic. By a global ethic we do not mean a global ideology or a single unified religion beyond all existing religions, and certainly not the domination of one religion over all others. By a global ethic we mean a fundamental consensus on binding values, irrevocable standards, and personal attitudes. Without such a fundamental consensus on an ethic, sooner or later every community will be threatened by chaos or dictatorship, and individuals will despair.

II. A FUNDAMENTAL DEMAND: EVERY HUMAN BEING MUST BE TREATED HUMANELY We are all fallible, imperfect men and women with limitations and defects. We know the reality of evil. Precisely because of this, we feel compelled for the sake of global welfare to express what the fundamental elements of a global ethic should be— for individuals as well as for communities and organizations, for states as well as for the religions themselves. We trust that our often millennia-old religious and ethical traditions provide an ethic which is convincing and practicable for all women and men of good will, religious and non-religious. At the same time we know that our various religious and ethical traditions often offer very different bases for what is helpful and what is unhelpful for men and women, what is right and what is wrong, what is good and what is evil. We do not wish to gloss over or ignore the serious differences among the individual religions. However, they should not hinder us from proclaiming publicly those things which we already hold in common and which we jointly affirm, each on the basis of our own religious or ethical grounds. We know that religions cannot solve the environmental, economic, political, and social problems of Earth. However they can provide what obviously cannot be attained by economic plans, political programs, or legal regulations alone: A change in the inner orientation, the whole mentality, the “hearts” of people, and a conversion from a false path to a new orientation for life. Humankind urgently needs social and ecological reforms, but it needs spiritual renewal just as urgently. As religious or spiritual persons we commit ourselves to this task. The spiritual powers of the religions can offer a fundamental sense of trust, a ground of meaning, ultimate standards, and a spiritual home. Of course religions are credible only when they eliminate those conflicts which spring from the religions themselves, dismantling mutual arrogance, mistrust, prejudice, and even hostile images, and thus demonstrate respect for the traditions, holy places, feasts, and rituals of people who believe differently. Now as before, women and men are treated inhumanely all over the world. They are robbed of their opportunities and their freedom; their human rights are trampled underfoot; their dignity is disregarded. But might does not make right! In the face of all inhumanity our religious and ethical convictions demand that every human being must be treated humanely! This means that every human being without distinction of age, sex, race, skin color, physical or mental ability, language, religion, political view, or national or social origin possesses an inalienable and untouchable dignity, and everyone, the individual as well as the state, is therefore obliged to honor this dignity and protect it. Humans must always be the subjects of rights, must be ends, never mere means, never objects of commercialization and industrialization in economics, politics and media, in research institutes, and industrial corporations. No one stands “above good and evil”—no human being, no social class, no influential interest group, no cartel, no police apparatus, no army, and no state. On the contrary: Possessed of reason and conscience,

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every human is obliged to behave in a genuinely human fashion, to do good and avoid evil! It is the intention of this Global Ethic to clarify what this means. In it we wish to recall irrevocable, unconditional ethical norms. These should not be bonds and chains, but helps and supports for people to find and realize once again their lives’ direction, values, orientations, and meaning. There is a principle which is found and has persisted in many religious and ethical traditions of humankind for thousands of years: What you do not wish done to yourself, do not do to others! Or in positive terms: What you wish done to yourself, do to others! This should be the irrevocable, unconditional norm for all areas of life, for families and communities, for races, nations, and religions. Every form of egoism should be rejected: All selfishness, whether individual or collective, whether in the form of class thinking, racism, nationalism, or sexism. We condemn these because they prevent humans from being authentically human. Selfdetermination and self-realization are thoroughly legitimate so long as they are not separated from human self-responsibility and global responsibility, that is, from responsibility for fellow humans and for the planet Earth. This principle implies very concrete standards to which we humans should hold firm. From it arise four broad, ancient guidelines for human behavior which are found in most of the religions of the world.

III. FOUR IRREVOCABLE DIRECTIVES 1. Commitment to a culture of non-violence and respect for life Numberless women and men of all regions and religions strive to lead lives not determined by egoism but by commitment to their fellow humans and to the world around them. Nevertheless, all over the world we find endless hatred, envy, jealousy, and violence, not only between individuals but also between social and ethnic groups, between classes, races, nations, and religions. The use of violence, drug trafficking and organized crime, often equipped with new technical possibilities, has reached global proportions. Many places still are ruled by terror “from above;” dictators oppress their own people, and institutional violence is widespread. Even in some countries where laws exist to protect individual freedoms, prisoners are tortured, men and women are mutilated, hostages are killed. (a) In the great ancient religious and ethical traditions of humankind we find the directive: You shall not kill! Or in positive terms: Have respect for life! Let us reflect anew on the consequences of this ancient directive: All people have a right to life, safety, and the free development of personality insofar as they do not injure the rights of others. No one has the right physically or psychically to torture, injure, much less kill, any other human being. And no people, no state, no race, no religion has the right to hate, to discriminate against, to “cleanse,” to exile, much less to liquidate a “foreign” minority which is different in behavior or holds different beliefs. (b) Of course, wherever there are humans there will be conflicts. Such conflicts, however, should be resolved without violence within a framework of justice. This is true for states as well as for individuals. Persons who hold political power must work within the framework of a just order and commit themselves to the most non-violent, peaceful solutions possible. And they should work for this within an international order of peace which itself has need of protection and defense against perpetrators of violence. Armament is a mistaken path; disarmament is the commandment of the times. Let no one be deceived: There is no survival for humanity without global peace! (c) Young people must learn at home and in school that violence may not be a means of settling differences with others. Only thus can a culture of non-violence be created.

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(d) A human person is infinitely precious and must be unconditionally protected. But likewise the lives of animals and plants which inhabit this planet with us deserve protection, preservation, and care. Limitless exploitation of the natural foundations of life, ruthless destruction of the biosphere, and militarization of the cosmos are all outrages. As human beings we have a special responsibility—especially with a view to future generations—for Earth and the cosmos, for the air, water, and soil. We are all intertwined together in this cosmos and we are all dependent on each other. Each one of us depends on the welfare of all. Therefore the dominance of humanity over nature and the cosmos must not be encouraged. Instead we must cultivate living in harmony with nature and the cosmos. (e) To be authentically human in the spirit of our great religious and ethical traditions means that in public as well as in private life we must be concerned for others and ready to help. We must never be ruthless and brutal. Every people, every race, every religion must show tolerance and respect—indeed high appreciation—for every other. Minorities need protection and support, whether they be racial, ethnic, or religious.

2. Commitment to a culture of solidarity and a just economic order Numberless men and women of all regions and religions strive to live their lives in solidarity with one another and to work for authentic fulfillment of their vocations. Nevertheless, all over the world we find endless hunger, deficiency, and need. Not only individuals, but especially unjust institutions and structures are responsible for these tragedies. Millions of people are without work; millions are exploited by poor wages, forced to the edges of society, with their possibilities for the future destroyed. In many lands the gap between the poor and the rich, between the powerful and the powerless is immense. We live in a world in which totalitarian state socialism as well as unbridled capitalism have hollowed out and destroyed many ethical and spiritual values. A materialistic mentality breeds greed for unlimited profit and a grasping for endless plunder. These demands claim more and more of the community’s resources without obliging the individual to contribute more. The cancerous social evil of corruption thrives in the developing countries and in the developed countries alike. (a) In the great ancient religious and ethical traditions of humankind we find the directive: You shall not steal! Or in positive terms: Deal honestly and fairly! Let us reflect anew on the consequences of this ancient directive: No one has the right to rob or dispossess in any way whatsoever any other person or the commonweal. Further, no one has the right to use her or his possessions without concern for the needs of society and Earth. (b) Where extreme poverty reigns, helplessness and despair spread, and theft occurs again and again for the sake of survival. Where power and wealth are accumulated ruthlessly, feelings of envy, resentment, and deadly hatred and rebellion inevitably well up in the disadvantaged and marginalized. This leads to a vicious circle of violence and counter-violence. Let no one be deceived: There is no global peace without global justice! (c) Young people must learn at home and in school that property, limited though it may be, carries with it an obligation, and that its uses should at the same time serve the common good. Only thus can a just economic order be built up. (d) If the plight of the poorest billions of humans on this planet, particularly women and children, is to be improved, the world economy must be structured more justly. Individual good deeds, and assistance projects, indispensable though they be, are insufficient. The participation of all states and the authority of international organizations are needed to build just economic institutions. A solution which can be supported by all sides must be sought for the debt crisis and the poverty of the dissolving second world, and even more the third world. Of

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course conflicts of interest are unavoidable. In the developed countries, a distinction must be made between necessary and limitless consumption, between socially beneficial and non-beneficial uses of property, between justified and unjustified uses of natural resources, and between a profit-only and a socially beneficial and ecologically oriented market economy. Even the developing nations must search their national consciences. Wherever those ruling threaten to repress those ruled, wherever institutions threaten persons, and wherever might oppresses right, we are obligated to resist— whenever possible non-violently. (e) To be authentically human in the spirit of our great religious and ethical traditions means the following: We must utilize economic and political power for service to humanity instead of misusing it in ruthless battles for domination. We must develop a spirit of compassion with those who suffer, with special care for the children, the aged, the poor, the disabled, the refugees, and the lonely. We must cultivate mutual respect and consideration, so as to reach a reasonable balance of interests, instead of thinking only of unlimited power and unavoidable competitive struggles. We must value a sense of moderation and modesty instead of an unquenchable greed for money, prestige, and consumption. In greed humans lose their “souls,” their freedom, their composure, their inner peace, and thus that which makes them human.

3. Commitment to a culture of tolerance and a life of truthfulness Numberless women and men of all regions and religions strive to lead lives of honesty and truthfulness. Nevertheless, all over the world we find endless lies, and deceit, swindling and hypocrisy, ideology and demagoguery:

• Politicians and business people who use lies as a means to success; • Mass media which spread ideological propaganda instead of accurate reporting, misinformation instead of information, cynical commercial interest instead of loyalty to the truth; • Scientists and researchers who give themselves over to morally questionable ideological or political programs or to economic interest groups, or who justify research which violates fundamental ethical values; • Representatives of religions who dismiss other religions as of little value and who preach fanaticism and intolerance instead of respect and understanding. (a) In the great ancient religious and ethical traditions of humankind we find the directive: You shall not lie! Or in positive terms: Speak and act truthfully! Let us reflect anew on the consequences of this ancient directive: No woman or man, no institution, no state or church or religious community has the right to speak lies to other humans. (b) This is especially true:

• For those who work in the mass media, to whom we entrust the freedom to report for the sake of truth and to whom we thus grant the office of guardian. They do not stand above morality but have the obligation to respect human dignity, human rights, and fundamental values. They are duty-bound to objectivity, fairness, and the preservation of human dignity. They have no right to intrude into individuals’ private spheres, to manipulate public opinion, or to distort reality; • For artists, writers, and scientists, to whom we entrust artistic and academic freedom. They are not exempt from general ethical standards and must serve the truth;

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• For the leaders of countries, politicians, and political parties, to whom we entrust our own freedoms. When they lie in the faces of their people, when they manipulate the truth, or when they are guilty of venality or ruthlessness in domestic or foreign affairs, they forsake their credibility and deserve to lose their offices and their voters. Conversely, public opinion should support those politicians who dare to speak the truth to the people at all times; • Finally, for representatives of religion. When they stir up prejudice, hatred, and enmity towards those of different belief, or even incite or legitimize religious wars, they deserve the condemnation of humankind and the loss of their adherents. Let no one be deceived: There is no global justice without truthfulness and humaneness! (c) Young people must learn at home and in school to think, speak, and act truthfully. They have a right to information and education to be able to make the decisions that will form their lives. Without an ethical formation they will hardly be able to distinguish the important from the unimportant. In the daily flood of information, ethical standards will help them discern when opinions are portrayed as facts, interests veiled, tendencies exaggerated, and facts twisted. (d) To be authentically human in the spirit of our great religious and ethical traditions means the following:

• We must not confuse freedom with arbitrariness or pluralism with indifference to truth.

• We must cultivate truthfulness in all our relationships instead of dishonesty, dissembling, and opportunism.

• We must constantly seek truth and incorruptible sincerity instead of spreading ideological or partisan half-truths.

• We must courageously serve the truth and we must remain constant and trustworthy, instead of yielding to opportunistic accommodation to life.

4. Commitment to a culture of equal rights and partnership between men and women Numberless men and women of all regions and religions strive to live their lives in a spirit of partnership and responsible action in the areas of love, sexuality, and family. Nevertheless, all over the world there are condemnable forms of patriarchy, domination of one sex over the other, exploitation of women, sexual misuse of children, and forced prostitution. Too frequently, social inequities force women and even children into prostitution as a means of survival—particularly in less developed countries. (a) In the great ancient religious and ethical traditions of humankind we find the directive: You shall not commit sexual immorality! Or in positive terms: Respect and love one another! Let us reflect anew on the consequences of this ancient directive: No one has the right to degrade others to mere sex objects, to lead them into or hold them in sexual dependency. (b) We condemn sexual exploitation and sexual discrimination as one of the worst forms of human degradation. We have the duty to resist wherever the domination of one sex over the other is preached—even in the name of religious conviction; wherever sexual exploitation is tolerated, wherever prostitution is fostered or children are misused. Let no one be deceived: There is no authentic humaneness without a living together in partnership! (c) Young people must learn at home and in school that sexuality is not a negative, destructive, or exploitative force, but creative and affirmative. Sexuality as a lifeaffirming shaper of community can only be effective when partners accept the responsibilities of caring for one another’s happiness.

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(d) The relationship between women and men should be characterized not by patronizing behavior or exploitation, but by love, partnership, and trustworthiness. Human fulfillment is not identical with sexual pleasure. Sexuality should express and reinforce a loving relationship lived by equal partners. Some religious traditions know the ideal of a voluntary renunciation of the full use of sexuality. Voluntary renunciation also can be an expression of identity and meaningful fulfillment. (e) The social institution of marriage, despite all its cultural and religious variety, is characterized by love, loyalty, and permanence. It aims at and should guarantee security and mutual support to husband, wife, and child. It should secure the rights of all family members. All lands and cultures should develop economic and social relationships which will enable marriage and family life worthy of human beings, especially for older people. Children have a right of access to education. Parents should not exploit children, nor children parents. Their relationships should reflect mutual respect, appreciation, and concern. (f) To be authentically human in the spirit of our great religious and ethical traditions means the following: We need mutual respect, partnership, and understanding, instead of patriarchal domination and degradation, which are expressions of violence and engender counter-violence. We need mutual concern, tolerance, readiness for reconciliation, and love, instead of any form of possessive lust or sexual misuse. Only what has already been experienced in personal and familial relationships can be practiced on the level of nations and religions.

IV. A TRANSFORMATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS Historical experience demonstrates the following: Earth cannot be changed for the better unless we achieve a transformation in the consciousness of individuals and in public life. The possibilities for transformation have already been glimpsed in areas such as war and peace, economy, and ecology, where in recent decades fundamental changes have taken place. This transformation must also be achieved in the area of ethics and values! Every individual has intrinsic dignity and inalienable rights, and each also has an inescapable responsibility for what she or he does and does not do. All our decisions and deeds, even our omissions and failures, have consequences. Keeping this sense of responsibility alive, deepening it and passing it on to future generations, is the special task of religions. We are realistic about what we have achieved in this consensus, and so we urge that the following be observed: 1. A universal consensus on many disputed ethical questions (from bio- and sexual ethics through mass media and scientific ethics to economic and political ethics) will be difficult to attain. Nevertheless, even for many controversial questions, suitable solutions should be attainable in the spirit of the fundamental principles we have jointly developed here. 2. In many areas of life a new consciousness of ethical responsibility has already arisen. Therefore we would be pleased if as many professions as possible, such as those of physicians, scientists, business people, journalists, and politicians, would develop up-to-date codes of ethics which would provide specific guidelines for the vexing questions of these particular professions. 3. Above all, we urge the various communities of faith to formulate their very specific ethics: What does each faith tradition have to say for example, about the meaning of life and death, the enduring of suffering and the forgiveness of guilt, about selfless sacrifice and the necessity of renunciation, about compassion and

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joy? These will deepen, and make more specific, the already discernible global ethic. In conclusion, we appeal to all the inhabitants of this planet. Earth cannot be changed for the better unless the consciousness of individuals is changed. We pledge to work for such transformation in individual and collective consciousness, for the awakening of our spiritual powers through reflection, meditation, prayer, or positive thinking, for a conversion of the heart. Together we can move mountains! Without a willingness to take risks and a readiness to sacrifice there can be no fundamental change in our situation! Therefore we commit ourselves to a common global ethic, to better mutual understanding, as well as to socially beneficial, peace-fostering, and Earth-friendly ways of life. We invite all men and women, whether religious or not, to do the same!

NOTE i The text entitled “Introduction” was produced by an Editorial Committee of the “council” of the Parliament of the World’s Religions in Chicago on the basis of the Declaration composed in Tübingen (here headed “principles”). It was meant to serve as a brief summary of the Declaration for publicity purposes. At the same time it was intended to be read aloud in public. So this text was read out publicly at the solemn concluding plenary on September 4, 1993, in Grant Park, Chicago: a number of passages were greeted with spontaneous applause by the audience of thousands.

About the Editor and Contributors

ARVIND SHARMA is Birks Professor of Comparative Religion in the Faculty of Religious Studies at McGill University in Montreal, Canada, and has published extensively in the fields of Indian religions and comparative religion. He was the president of the steering committee for the global congress on World’s Religions after September 11, which met in Montreal from September 11 to 15, 2006, and is currently engaged in promoting the adoption of A Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the World’s Religions. MAURICE BOUTIN is John W. McConnell Professor of Philosophical Theology and Philosophy of Religion at McGill University, Montreal. He received his Ph.D. from the State University of Munich, Germany, with a dissertation published in 1974 in the series “Beiträge zur evangelischen Theologie” with the title Relationalität als Verstehensprinzip bei Rudolf Bultmann (“Relationality as Understanding Principle in R. Bultmann’s Thought”). Since 1975, he has been a member of the International Colloquiums on Hermeneutics (Rome, Italy) founded by Enrico Castelli. He served as president of the Canadian Corporation for Studies in Religion from 1981 to 1987 and has published articles in German, French, Swiss, American, and Canadian journals, and chapters in books published in Germany, Italy, France, Canada, and the United States. XAVIER GRAVEND-TIROLE, after obtaining Joint Honours in religious studies and philosophy at McGill University, a B.Th. at the Institut Catholique de Paris, and an M.T.S. at Harvard Divinity School, is now working on his Ph.D. in a joint program between the University of Montreal and the University of Lausanne. His work revolves around issues touching the relationships between religions, spiritualities, cultures, and societies. More specifically, his thesis looks at how religious intermingling and mixing can be viewed positively. RHODA ASIKIA IGE is postgraduate researcher at Keele University, Staffordshire, UK. Prior to this, she was lecturer in the Department of Jurisprudence and International

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Law at the University of Lagos, Nigeria (2003–7) and research fellow with the Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies in Lagos, Nigeria. She earned her LL.M. from the University of Lagos, an M.A. in African Studies specializing in African Law from the University of Ibadan, and an LL.B. with honors from the University of Ibadan, all in Nigeria. Her teaching and research interests are African studies/African law, feminist legal studies, human rights with particular focus on women and other vulnerable groups, and public international law. She is also a trained nurse. LALITHA KUMARI KADARLA has an M.Phil. in empowerment of women relating to feminism. She is presently engaged in the completion of her doctoral work along similar lines. She is also currently teaching as senior lecturer in the University Post Graduate College, Kakatiya University, Warangal, India. She has published a number of articles and attended numerous national and international seminars. JAMES KELLENBERGER is professor of philosophy at California State University–Northridge. NIKAN H. KHATIBI graduated from the University of California–Irvine, with a B.S. in 2004 and then spent a year earning his M.B.A. He is currently in medical school pursuing a career as a physician. In the future, he envisions himself practicing medicine for some years before running for office as a member of the U.S. Senate. He is chair of Zoroastrian Youth of North America (ZYNA) and chief editor of FEZANA Journal’s Youthfully Speaking section. BRIAN D. LEPARD is professor of law at the University of Nebraska and a specialist in international law. A graduate of Princeton University and the Yale Law School, he is the author of a number of books and articles relating to international law, human rights, peacemaking, world religions, and global ethics. His most recent book is Hope for a Global Ethic: Shared Principles in Religious Scriptures (2005). He is also the author of Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention: A Fresh Legal Approach Based on Fundamental Ethical Principles in International Law and World Religions (2002). He is a member of the International Board of Consultants of the Global Ethics and Religion Forum. Prior to entering law school, he served for three years at the United Nations Office of the Bahá’í International Community, where he worked on human rights issues. WILLIAM R. O’NEILL, S. J., is professor of social ethics at the Jesuit School of Theology at Berkeley and a visiting professor of ethics at the Jesuit School of Theology in Nairobi. His writings address questions of human rights, ethics and hermeneutical theory, social reconciliation, and refugee policy. He is the recipient of a Newcombe Fellowship and a Lilly Theological Research Grant, and held the Jesuit Chair at Georgetown University (2003–2004). He has served on the editorial board of the Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics and serves on the board of the Society of Christian Ethics and of the journal Theological Studies. RAIMUNDO PANIKKAR, who holds three doctorates, has been a prominent advocate of interreligious dialogue throughout his distinguished career, in the course of which he taught at the universities of Madrid and Rome in Europe and then at Harvard University (1967–71) and the University of California–Santa Barbara (1971–78). He has published more than forty books and 900 articles. KUSUMITA P. PEDERSEN is chair of the Department of Religious Studies at St. Francis College in Brooklyn, New York. She is a member of the board of trustees of the Council for a Parliament of the World’s Religions (CPWR) and the Interfaith Center of New York.

ABOUT THE EDITOR AND CONTRIBUTORS

271

MATT SHEEDY was born and raised in Toronto, Ontario, and is currently pursuing his Ph.D. in religious studies at the University of Manitoba. His master’s thesis, which was completed in 2007 at Memorial University of Newfoundland, was on John Locke’s theory of religious toleration. He is currently focusing on more contemporary issues of religious toleration, using such tools as critical theory and psychoanalysis to examine the individual as well as the social and political impact of religious extremism in North America and around the world. In the future, he would like to teach religious studies at the university level, with the aim of promoting religious studies as a tool for critical thinking and progressive social change. ABHA SINGH is a National Merit scholarship holder in intermediate arts and at the graduate level (philosophy honors), as well as a gold medalist in postgraduate philosophy. She was awarded a Ph.D. in 1986 and a Litt.D. in 2003. She has been lecturing and tutoring postgraduate and undergraduate classes for the last twenty-five years. Dr. Singh has participated in thirty-two seminars and conferences. She has completed two research projects sponsored by the University Grants Commission and has published one book and twenty-four research papers. She was seminar director at The Indian Council of Philosophical Research’s national seminar on “Morality and Social Justice” in January 2008. KRISHNA KANTH TIGIRIPALLI was educated at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He spent 1987–89 in Mexico and the United States under an Indo-Mexican cultural exchange program. Presently he teaches International Relations at Kakatiya University, Warangal, Andhra Pradesh, India. He visited Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and El Salvador during 1987–89 in connection with research on the “Central American Crisis.” SUMNER B. TWISS is Distinguished Professor of Human Rights, Ethics, and Religion at Florida State University, where he holds a joint appointment between the university’s Department of Religion and its Center for the Advancement of Human Rights. He is also professor emeritus of religious studies at Brown University. He is currently coeditor of the Journal of Religious Ethics (Blackwell-Wiley) and senior editor of the book series Advancing Human Rights. He has published numerous books and articles in such areas as comparative religious ethics, religion and human rights, philosophy and theory of religion, and biomedical ethics. The recent focus of his work has been on moral evil and human rights atrocities.

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Index

’Abdu’l-Bahá, 191 Abimbola, Wande, 175 Abortion, 118, 128–29, 137 Abrahamic religions, 177. See also specific Abrahamic religions Absolutes, 82, 93 Abstention, 135 Abstractions, 135 Achmat, Zacki, 136 Adultery, 109 Adversarial mentalities, 23–24, 25n13 Afr, M., 140n44 Africa, 31, 123–24, 129, 132, 133, 136, 175 Agbai v. Okagbue, 41–42 Ahias7 (nonviolence), 146, 150 Ahmadis, 42–43 AIDS. See also John Paul II and AIDS Africa and, 129 bishops and, 120–21, 129–32 Catholic policy overview, 132–38, 143n109 family life and, 125–28 gospel of life and, 128–29 history of controversy, 118–25 “AIDS: Its Victims Are This Century’s Lepers” (Kenkelen), 118 “AIDS: Solidarity and Personal Responsibility” (Permanent Council of French Bishops), 121

Alfonso IX of Leon, 96n6 Alliance of Black Reformed Christians, 58n38 Allotechnical thinking, 8 American Convention on Human Rights, 46 Ames, Roger, 173n59 Amina Lawal, 42 Analects (Confucius), 171n22, 173n49 Angelini, Cardinal, 123 Animals, 85, 87, 92, 93 An-Na’im, Abdullahi, 182n18 Annan, Kofi, 39, 130 Anthropocentrism, 4–7, 87 Antigone (Sophocles), 146 Apartheid, 53, 54, 55, 58n38 Apostolos Suos, On the Theological and Juridical Nature of Episcopal Conferences (John Paul II), 129, 135 Applesby, Scott, 37 Aquinas, Thomas, 19–20 Arab Charter on Human Rights, 241–54 Arinze, Francis, 176 Aristotle, 4, 6 Armstrong, Karen, 16 Asia, 31 Asian religions, 179. See also specific Asian religions A{oka, 148, 187 –tat7yin, 147

274 Atheism, 16 Atlantic Charter, 70 Attis, David, 40–41 Audi, Robert, 50, 55, 56n11, 59n58 Augustine (saint), 3, 122 Authenticity, 94 Authority, 14, 30 Autonomy, 82 Ayodhy7, 146 Bahá’í faith, 65 freedom of religion and, 66 Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the World’s Religions and, 191–97 Bahá’l’lláh, 65, 193 Bary, Wm. Theodore de, 168n1, 170n13 Basham, A.L., 147–48 Bataille, George, 3 Belhar Confession, 58n38 Belo, Bishop, 188 Benedict XVI (Ratzinger), 115, 121, 132, 133, 137, 140n40 Bentham, Jeremy, 13 Berman, Howard, 178 Bernal, Ricardo García, 136 Bernstein, 126 “Between,” the, 7–9 BhagavadgXt7, 66, 97n23, 149 Bible, 14, 30–31 Bigamy, 43 BXja, 105, 111 BXja-k}etra-ny7ya, 104–5 Bill of Rights, English, 39 Bill of Rights, U.S., 30 Binary logics, 8 Biotechnologies, 8 Birth control. See Condoms; Contraception Bishops’ Conference of Senegal, 137 Bori, Pier Cesare, 172n41 Br7hmahas, 113n1 Brain, the, 7 Brazil, 131 Briggs, Kenneth, 120 Briley, Jonathan, 9 Brotherhood, 161, 164, 165, 166, 167 Brown, Donald E., 74 Bubbles: Microspherology (Sloterdijk), 3 Buddhism compassion and, 65 freedom of religion and, 66 Golden Rule and, 20–21

INDEX human worth, on, 22 rights and, 23–24, 25n13, 31 Bühler, G., 146 Burke , 13 Burudi, 124 Cahill, Lisa Sowle, 130 Cairo Conference, 125–26, 127, 128 Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, 235–40 “Called to Compassion and Responsibility: A Response to the HIV/AIDS Crisis” (Keenan), 121 Campbell, Joan Brown, 176 Canada religious freedom in, 40–41, 42 Carital Internationalis, 131 CASE (Council of Alumni for Social Enterprise), 144n134 “The Case of the Obliging Stranger” (Gass), 74 Cassin, René, 70 Caste systems, 97n23, 149 Casti Connubi (Pius XI), 116 Catholic Ethicists on HIV/AIDS Prevention (Keenan), 130, 131 Catholicism, 30, 31, 50, 53, 55, 142n90. See also AIDS Catholics for a Free Choice, 143n112 Catholics for Choice, 131, 136 Causality, 7 Centesimus annus (John Paul II), 134 Ceremonies. See rituals Chang, P.C. (Chang Peng-chun) biography of, 154–55, 169n3 intellectual influences on, 155–62 UDHR and, 153–54, 162–68, 172n41 Change , 160 Chaos, 85 Chastity, 109, 121, 124, 129 Children, 107, 179 China. See also specific religions of China influence on West, 157–59, 171n30 Muslims and, 160 Western influences on, 155–57 China: Whence and Whither? (Chang), 154, 158 China at the Crossroads (Chang), 154, 158, 169n9, 170n10 Christianity. See also specific subreligions freedom of religion and, 66 history of, 95n6

INDEX human devaluation by, 6 human worth, on, 21–22 Locke on, 14–16 proselytization and, 176 rescue and, 65 rights and, 19–20, 24, 30, 31, 34 superiority and, 102 UDHR and, 54–55 Churchill, Winston, 70 Civil and political rights, 63, 71, 168 Civil Rights Movement, 37, 50, 52 Civil society, 32–33 Cognition. See reason Colombia, 131, 136, 144n134 Colonialism, 47 Africa and, 175 freedom of religion and, 178 ICCPR and, 179 rights and, 30 self-determination and, 29 universal values and, 80 Commission on Human Rights, 70 Committee on the Philosophical Principles of the Rights of Man, 70 Common ground, 80, 90 Communication, 33. See also Dialogue Community democracy and, 157 rights of, 32 UDHR and, 71–72 Zoroastrians on, 101 Complexity, 8 Computers, 5 Concepts, 83–84 Condoms. See also Contraception; Prophylactics Catholicism and, 128, 130, 137–38, 143n112, 144n131 efficacy of, 132, 136 Confucianism Analects (Confucius), 171n22, 173n49 Chang and, 157–59, 160–62, 170n22 freedom of religion and, 66 Golden Rule and, 20 language of, 80 rescue and, 65 timeliness and, 145 UDHR and, 153–68, 164–66 Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith, 119 Conscience, 73, 74–74, 96n6, 172n41

275 Consensus , 52, 73, 88, 93 Constitution, U.S., 30 “A Constructive Framework for Discussion Confucianism and Human Rights” (Twiss), 172n41 Contingencies, 135 Contraception, 115–18, 121, 122, 127–29, 134, 136, 137, 139n29. See also Condoms; Prophylactics Conventions, 45 Conversion, 176, 177 Cooperation, religious, 187–89, 191 Copernicus, 4, 5 Core values. See Shared values Cornwell, John, 118, 126, 128, 129, 131, 132 Cottier, Georges, 129 Council of Alumni for Social Enterprise (CASE), 144n134 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 32, 71 Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 71 Creativity, 5 Croce, Benedetto, 70 Cross-cultural questions, 86, 95n2. See also Universality Culture, 178 Curran, Charles, 119, 136 Dalits, 31 Dar es Salaam, 124 Darwin, Charles, 4, 5 Death, 146 Declaration, 96n8 Declaration of Human Rights, U.N., 20, 22 Declaration of the Rights of Man, French, 40 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations of 1970, 29 Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion and Belief, 179 Deism, 16 Democracy China and, 156–57, 159, 160 churches and, 54 Confucianism and, 166 cross-cultural perceptions of, 88

276 Democracy (continued) Hinduism and, 111 religion and, 38 UDHR and, 83, 164, 167, 173n54 Western, 13, 16–17 Descartes, René, 57n19 Destiny, 91 Dewey, John, 155–57, 160, 161, 169n9, 170n16 Dhaka Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, 233–34 Dharma (dhamma), 90–91, 104 Dharma{7tras, 108 Dharma-vijaya (righteous conquest), 148–49 Dharma-yuddha (righteous battle), 149 Dialogue, 33, 72, 80, 85, 94. See also public reasoning Diatopical hermeneutics, 79–80, 85, 95n2 Diderot, Denis, 16, 158, 163 Dignity basis of, 59n58 Catholicism and, 142n90 proselytization and, 178 religious freedom and, 180 rights and, 64, 65 UDHR and, 73, 82, 164 universality and, 76 violence and, 145–50 Discourse of Miracles (Locke), 15 Discourses, religious, 136. See also Narratives, religious Discrimination, 28–29, 31, 34 Diversity, 17, 64, 66. See also Pluralism Divine nature of humans, 64 “Divine” rights, 64 Domination, 32 Dominion Theory, 19 Dowric, 39 Drew, Richard, 3, 9 DRMC (Dutch Reformed Mission Church), 58n38 Drugs, 43–44 Dunn, John, 13 Dupré, Louis, 57n19 Durban Conference against Racial Discrimination, 31 Dutch Reformed Church, 53 Dutch Reformed Mission Church (DRMC), 58n38

INDEX Duties Hindu women and, 105, 110 human unity and, 193 individual, 64–65 rights and, 22–24, 31, 92–93 states, of, 46 UDHR and, 63, 71, 164, 165, 166, 167 Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the World’s Religions and, 194 violence and, 149–50 Du Toit, André, 55 East Asia, 153. See also specific religions of East Asia Eastern Europe, 34 Eastern religions, 175. See also specific religions Ebadi, Shirin, 188 ECHR (European Convention for Protection of Human Rights), 44 Ecology/environment, 4, 5, 8 Economic, social, and cultural rights, 63, 71. See also social justice Economic and Social Council Official Records, 171n28 Economic factors, 65, 112, 130, 142n90. See also Industrialization; Poverty Education, 33, 110, 156, 157, 158, 159, 194 Education for modernization in China (Chang), 154, 156, 169n9 L’Église et la contraception: l’urgence d’un changement (Grémion and Touzard), 136 Ego, 4 Egoism, 5 Ehrenberg, Alain, 8 Emerson, Ralph Waldo, 9n3, 10n3 Employment Division v. Smith, 43 England, 13, 33 Enlightenment Chinese influences on, 158, 160, 163 democracy and, 13 prejudice of , 55, 57n19 religion and, 16, 51, 53, 192–93 UDHR and, 167 values and, 188 Environment/ecology, 4, 5, 8 Episcopal Conference of Bishops, 143n99 Equiprimordiality, 7–8

277

INDEX Erasmus, 6 Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Locke), 14, 15 Essay III: Compensation (Emerson), 10n3 Essay to X: Circles (Emerson), 9n3 Ethology, 4–5 European Convention for Protection of Human Rights (ECHR), 44 Evangelicals, Christian, 31, 177 Evangelium Vitae (John Paul II), 126, 128, 134 Evolution, 4–5 Experience, 16 Extremism, 8, 55, 188–89, 193–94. See also Fanaticism Fadl, Khaled Abou El, 20, 24 Faith, 16, 58n33 Falling Man (photo), 3, 9 Families, 125–27 Famliaris Consortio (John Paul II), 118 Fanaticism, 192. See also Extremism Far East, 161 Farmer, 130 Farmers, 147–48 Feinberg, Joel, 23 Female deities, 104, 109 First Treatise of Government (Locke), 14 Forgiveness, 55 Formicola, Jo Renee, 129 Fox, Thomas, 118, 138n14 France, toleration and, 13 Fredericks, James, 22, 25n13 Freedom Catholicism and, 122, 124–25, 128 characterized, 94–95 choice in marriage, of, 110 Christianity and, 31 expression, of, 178 individual, 83 John Paul II and, 134 UDHR and, 172n46 Freedom of religion proselytizing and, 175–81 religious, 13, 30, 32, 40, 63, 66, 165–66, 167 Free will, 5 French Catholic bishops, 121, 129, 137 Freud, Sigmund, 4, 5, 6 Frontier, U.S., 157 Frustration , 6

Frustration through Machines (Sloterdijk), 4 Fundamentalism causes of, 16, 47 politics and, 38 Gadamer, Hans-Georg, 51 Gallagher, Susan Van Zantan, 58n38 Gallo, Robert, 122 Gandhi, Mahatma, 34, 187 Gass, William, 74 Gays, 119–20, 139n34 Gay Science (Nietzsche), 49 Gender, Hinduism and, 104, 112. See also marriage Geocentrism, 6 George, William P., 77n19 Germany, 34, 43 Ghana Episcopal Conference, 137 Glendon, Mary Ann, 52, 73 Global Ethic, 74, 77n19, 180, 183n24, 259–68 God, and UDHR, 82, 83 Goering, Hermann, 70 Golden Rule, 20–21 Good Samaritan, 24, 66 Grammar, 51–52, 53 Gramsci, Antonio, 32–33 The Great Learning (Wing-tsit Chan), 160, 171n23 Greece, 34 Grémion, 136 Gruchy, John de, 58n38 Habermas, Jürgen, 50, 53, 54, 56n10, 59n49 Harmony, 45, 93 Confucian, 162 religious freedom and, 180 Hate speech, 178 Hauerwas, Stanley, 50 Health, Chang on, 161 Hegemony, 32 Helsinki Final Act of 1975, 29 Hermann the Paralytic, 10n18 Hermeneutics, 79–80, 85, 95n2 Hick, John, 20, 21 Hinduism code of conduct, 103 compassion and, 65 conquests and, 148–49

278 Hinduism (continued) freedom of religion and, 66 Golden Rule and, 20 laws and, 97n23 proselytization and, 176 rights and, 31 terrorism and, 146 UDHR and, 90–93 Universal Declaration of Human Rights of, 211–17 His Holiness (Politi and Bernstein), 126 HIV. See AIDS Hobbins, John, 154 Holism, 93 Homeomorphism, 80–81, 90, 91, 94, 95n3 Homeotechnical thinking, 8 Homosexuality, 16, 119, 139n31 Honduras, 46 Hope for a Global Ethic: Shared Principles in Religious Scriptures, 63–64 Huang Chung-hsi, 158, 170n13 Humanae Vitae (Paul VI), 115, 118, 133, 138n14 Humanism, 160, 163, 165, 173n49 Human nature disparate conceptions of, 87 historically, 85 Mencius on, 158 sexuality and, 136 shared conceptions of, 64 subjectivity, 3–4 theology and, 84 twentieth century writers on, 7 UDHR and, 73, 82, 84, 165, 167, 172n41 Western concepts of, 14, 89 Human persons, worth of, 21–22, 51, 101–2 Human rights, 19–25, 27–35, 39–40 Human Rights and Responsibilities in the World Religions (Runzo, Martin and Sharma), 195n13 Human Rights Violation Committee, 54 Human Universals (D.E. Brown), 74 Hume, David, 13, 16 Hummes, Laudio, 131 Humphrey, John, 70, 153–54 Hungary, 34 ICCPR (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights), 179 Idealism, 4 Identity, 8, 17, 84, 105, 111–12

INDEX Ifa, 175 Ignatieff, Michael, 145–46 Ihara, Craig, 23–24, 25n9 “Implementation of the Declaration of commitment on HIV/AIDS,” 131 India, 31, 33, 34, 97n23 Indic perspective, 146 Indifferentism, 16 Indigenous peoples, 175–76, 178–79. See also specific indigenous peoples Individualism, 156, 167 Individuals abstractions, as, 92 concepts of, 96n10 dharma and, 91 duties and, 63, 64–65 Hinduism and, 104 Marxism on, 84–85 persons vs., 87 rights of, 32 role of, 46–47, 94 society and, 97n20 states and, 30 UDHR and, 71–72, 82, 89 Zoroastrians on, 101 Industrialization, 161 Information , 137 Innocents, 147, 162, 194 Innovation, 8–9 In rem rights, 23, 25n10 Institutions, 40, 46, 102 Integral schematization, 58n31 Intelligibility, 75–76 InterAction Council, 255–58 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 46 Interfaith movement, 176 International Association of Physicians in AIDS Care, 131 International Conference on Aids, 133 International Conference on Population and Development, 125–26, 127, 128 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 29, 32 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 179, 182n22 International influences, 27, 29, 32, 33, 34, 46, 128 International law duties and, 63 religion and, 67

279

INDEX religious dimensions of, 77n19 roots of, 62 “Introduction: Competing Claims to Religious Freedom and Communal SelfDetermination in Africa,” 182n18 Introspection, 5 Intuition, 74 Iran, 37 Islam. See also Qur’an Ahmadis and, 42–43 Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, 235–40 Dhaka Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, 233–34 Golden Rule and, 20 rights and, 20, 24 superiority of, 102 UDHR and, 53 Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights, 219–31 “Is the Human Rights Era Ending?” (Ignatieff), 146

Kabir, Humayun, 70 Kane, P.V., 148 Kant, Immanuel, 25, 51–52, 57n30 Karios Document, 58n38 Keenan, James F., 121, 130, 134, 135, 136, 137 Kenkelen, Bill, 118 Keown, Damien, 22 Kilpatrick, William Heard, 156, 169n9 King, Martin Luther, Jr., 188, 189n3 Kokkinakis v. Greece, 44 Koran. See Qur’an Krog, Antjie, 54 K}etra, 105 KuhCalinX, 112 Küng, Hans, 187

Jainism, 20, 150 James II, 13 Jefferson, Thomas, 13 Jehovah’s Witnesses, 44 Jen, 164–65, 172n41 Jesus of Nazareth, 31 Jihad, 53 John Paul II and AIDS Africa and, 123–25, 129 bishops and, 129–32 early reactions of, 118–20 family life position of, 125–28 overviews of, 133–38, 141n52, 143n109 women and, 126–27, 137 Johnson, Caroline, 168n1 John XXIII, 53, 117 Joinet, Bernard, 140n44 Judaism Christians and, 15 compassion and, 65 freedom of religion and, 66 Golden Rule and, 21 proselytization and, 176 rights and, 19, 30, 31, 34 Judgmentalism, 101 Jus naturale, 51 Justice. See also Economic factors AIDS and, 130, 134

Lakshmi, 109 Lama, Dalai, 188 Language, 35, 75, 80, 88. See also Homeomorphism; Narratives, religious Latin America, 31, 161 Lau, D.C., 170n22, 171n24 Lawal, Amina, 42 Laws, 72, 91, 93, 97n19, 97n23 Lecomte, Bernard, 126, 127, 128, 140n44 Legendre, Pierre, 4 Legge, James, 171n24 Leo XIII, 53 Lepard, Brian D., 193 Lerner, Natan, 179 Letter Concerning Toleration (Locke), 13, 14, 15, 16 Letter to Families (John Paul II), 125, 127, 141n73 Le Zhongshu, 70 Li, 165, 167–68 Liberalism, 50, 53, 56n8, 58n32, 169n9 Liberation/salvation/self-realization, 112–13 Life and death, 128, 134, 143n112, 146 Little, David, 73, 74, 75–76 Locke, John, 13–17 Logos, 16 Lonergan, Bernard, 4 Longley, Clifford, 131

Catholicism and, 142n90 Confucian, 166 dharma and, 91 social, 113n2, 130 war and, 149

280 Lorenz, Konrad, 5 Lotz, Ann Graham, 176 Louis XIV, 13 Love, 5, 64, 125, 141n71 Love and Responsibility (Wojtyla), 117–18 Lustiger, Cardinal, 121, 140n44 Luther, Martin, 11n18 Lyons, Oren, 175–76 MacIntyre , 50 Magisterium, 117, 122, 136, 137, 140n49, 143n99, 143n109 Magna Carta, 39 Mah7bh7rata, 20, 97n23, 148, 149 Majority rule, 83, 84 Malik, Charles, 70, 154 M7navadharma{7stra, 97n19 Mandela, Nelson, 54 Manu, 91, 106, 107, 108, 109 Manusmxti, 103, 105, 106, 113n1, 146–49 “The Many Faces of AIDS: A Gospel Response” (USCCB), 120–21, 133 Maritain, Jacques, 53, 70, 171n37 Marriage, 107, 111, 124, 129, 138n16, 139n27 Martin, Nancy M., 195n13 Martinelli, Maria, 132 Martini, Cardinal, 136 Martino, Renato Raffaele, 127 Marxism, 27, 84–85 McClory, Robert, 117 McDonagh, Enda, 137 McLuhan, Marshall, 7 Mechanisation, 6–7 Médecins Sans Frontières, 132 Media, 128 Medicine Goes Electronic (Sloterdijk), 4 Meeting of Catholic Organizations Engaged in the Global Response to HIV and AIDS, 131 Meeting of Experts on the Place of Human Rights in Cultural and Religious Traditions, 95n1, 96n9 Megasthenes, 147 Melady, Margaret, 120 Men, 101. See also marriage Mencius, 65, 157–59, 161, 170n9, 170n22, 171n24, 172n41, 172n44 Messori, Vittorio, 125 Metaphysics, 7, 162, 163, 165, 167, 170 Middle East, 161. See also specific religions Mill, John Stuart, 13, 22–23

INDEX Millenium World Peace Conference of Religious and Spiritual Leaders, 175–76 Mind, 7, 24, 106, 110, 111 Minority rights, 179 Miracles, 15 Mitchell, Basil, 26n15 Modernity, 8, 16 Modernization, 156–57, 160. See also Progress Mok}a, 110 Montagnier, Luc, 122 Montini, 138n14 Morality Catholic faith and, 122 dharma and, 91 Hinduism and, 104 human nature and , 167, 171n31 inspiration, as, 188 mind and, 24–25 relationships and, 21 rights and, 28 shared values and, 180 sin vs., 26n15 toleration and, 14, 16 UDHR and, 72 Mormons, 43 Motherhood and Hinduism, 106, 109 Murder, 74 Muslims China and, 160 Christians and, 15 rights and, 30, 31, 34 Mythos, 16 Myths and human rights, 93 techno-scientific society and, 4 Naissance et signification de le déclaration universelle des droits de l’homme (Verdoodt), 172n41 Nankai University, 154, 156 Narratives, religious, 52–55. See also discourses, religious Nary, Gordon, 131 National Catholic Reporter (periodical), 118 National security, 146 Native American Church, 43–44 Native Americans, 175–76 Natural law modern outlooks on, 51 UDHR and, 82, 154

INDEX Natural Law , 28 Natural rights, 39 Nature, Sloterdijk on, 8 “The Nature and Basis of Human Rights” (Little), 74 Naudé, C.F. Beyers, 58n38 Negativity, 3 Neighbors and the Golden Rule, 21 Neuroscience, 4, 5 New Culture Movement, 155–56 “A New Loyalty, War Against Microbes, and World Significance of Economically ‘Low Pressure’ Areas” (Chang), 170n17, 171n24 Newman, Cardinal, 40 Nietzsche, Friedrich, 9n3, 49 Nigeria, 41–42 Nobel Peace Prizes, 129–30 Nonassistance, crime of, 132 Nonviolence (Ahias7), 34, 150 Non-Western minds, 87–88 Northrop, F.S.C., 70 Novak, Michael, 72 Nuremberg trials, 29 Obaseki , 39 Obligations, 22–24 O’Connor, John, 122, 141n52 Official Records of the Third Session of the General Assembly, 171n28 Ontology, 8 O’Rourke, Brendan, 120 L’Osservatore Romano, 119, 121, 127 Otto, Rudolf, 16 Pagans and Christians, 15 Pakistan, religious freedom in, 42–43 “La Pandémie du sida. Une castastrophe si discrète. Que pouvons-nous faire? Quelques suggestions,” 140n44 Panorganicism, 6–7 Panpsychism, 6–7 Pappas, Kathleen, 168n1 Par7{arasmxti, 103, 113n1 Parliament of the World’s Religions, 180 P7rvatX, 110 Paul VI, 115, 117–18, 122, 133, 138n14 Peace and religion, 40 Peace Summit, 175–76 Peasants, 148 Pen-chun Chang, 70 People, the. See Democracy

281 People’s Republic of China, 156 Permanent Council of French Bishops, 121 Perry, Michael, 50 Person concept of, 74, 87 role of, 94 Peter of Compostela, 10n18, 11n18 Peterson, Michael, 120 Philosophy, 96n9 Chinese, 165–66 UDHR and, 163, 167–68 Pierre, Archbishop, 131 Pius XI, 116 Plato, 27 Pluralism. See also Volume 3 Part I: Plural Visions Catholic, 116, 129, 135, 140n39, 140n49, 143n99 Chang and, 159 characterized, 90 Chinese, 166 Commission on Human Rights and, 70 concepts, of, 84 need for, 94 public reasoning and, 52 rights and, 45 UDHR and, 71, 164 Universal Declaration and Human Rights and, 54, 153 universalism and, 183n25 universality and, 81 Zoroastrians on, 102 Poland, 34 Polarization, 17, 65 Politi, 126 Politics. See also States fundamentalism and, 38 pluralism and, 50 rights and, 33, 58n32 UDHR and, 94, 96n13 Polygamy, 108, 109 Population trends, 142n79, 142n90 Postmodernism, 49, 50, 53 Poverty AIDS and, 130 Chang on, 161 proselytization and, 176 Pragmatism, 163, 164, 168, 169n9, 171n37 Chinese influence on Dewey’s philosophy, 155–157 UDHR and, 162 Prakxti, 111

282 Privacy, 179 The Problem of China (Russell), 170n16 Production, 7 Progress, 141n71, 142n99. See also modernization Property rights, 109, 110 Prophylactics, 121, 124, 134, 136, 140n39, 140n40. See also condoms; contraception “Prophylactics, Toleration and Cooperation: Contemporary Problems and Traditional Practices” (Keenan), 121 Proselytization, 175–81 Protestantism, 30 Psychoanalysis, 4 Ptolemy, 6 Public reasoning, 52, 54, 55, 56n9, 58n40 Public service, 166, 167 Public sphere , 50 Pur7has, 106 Puru}a, 111 Putambekar, S.V., 70 Quesnay, 159, 163 Quinn, John R., 139n34 Qur’an, 65, 66 R. v. Big M Drugmart, 41 R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., 41 R. v. Gruenke, 40 Race, 29, 45, 47, 130, 179 Rahner, Karl, 7 R7ma temple, 146 R7m7yaha, 146 Rape, 74 Rationalism, 4, 5, 13, 16, 65, 74. See also Reason Ratzinger, Joseph (Benedict XVI), 115, 121, 132, 133, 137, 140n40 Rawls, John, 50 Reality, 91, 93, 112, 191–92 Reason. See also Rationalism authority and, 14 Catholicism and, 125 failure of, 4 faith and, 15, 16 marriage and, 139n16 participative, 8 public, 52, 54, 55, 56n9, 58n40 toleration and, 16 UDHR and, 73, 82, 172n41 weakness of, 63

INDEX Reciprocity, 74 Reconciliation, 55 Reichwein, Adolf, 159, 170n14 Relationships, 20–22, 45, 104–5 Relativism, 39, 63, 65–66, 67, 125, 180 Relativity, 89–90, 93 Religions. See also specific religions characterized, 37–38 dharma and, 91 human rights and, 19–25 rights and, 30 roles of, 38–47, 96n9 war and, 17 Religious Oath Case, 43 Repetition, 8 Rerum novarum (Leo XIII), 53 Respect, 64 Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention (Lepard), 193 Revelation, 15 Reynolds v. United States, 43 Rhode Island, 30 Right and wrong, 74 Rights, 29, 30, 96n14. See also Human rights Right to be let alone, 179 Ritche, D.G., 16 Rituals concepts and, 81 gender status and, 105–6, 108, 109–10 Hinduism and, 103–4 rights and, 173n59 war as, 149 Rodriguez, Angel Manfredo Velasquez, 46 Rohnheimer, Martin, 137 Roles, 113n2 Romans, 39 Roosevelt, Eleanor, 70 Roosevelt, Franklin, 70 Rorty, Richard, 50, 53, 55 Rosemont, Henry, 173n59 Ross v. New Brunswick School District No. 15, 40–41 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 13 Rules of war, 147–48 Russell, Bertrand, 170n16 Sacco, Ugo, 122, 129 Sachs, Albie, 55 Sadik, Nafis, 126–27 Safiya Tungar, 42 Sahkarov, Andrey, 52

INDEX »7kta philosophy, 112 Salve Regina, 6, 10n18 »agkar7c7rya of Kanchi, 146 S7gkhya philosophy, 112 Sanny7s7{rama, 110 Saraswati, Dayananda, 175, 176 Sarr, Theodore Adrien, 137 S7vitrX, 110 Scharfe, Hartmut, 148 Schleiermacher, Friedrich, 16 Science, 4, 136, 155, 157 Second International Congress on Moral Theology, 121 Secularization Catholicism and, 125 duties and, 65 human rights and, 193 international influences and, 34 Nigeria, of, 42 politics and, 50 public reasoning and, 59n49 religion and, 41 toleration and, 16 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and, 188 Security, 40, 57n29 Self-determination, 29–35, 112 Senegal, 137 Sentient beings, 23 Separation of church and state, 15, 33, 38 September 11 attacks, 146, 188–89 Serbia, 34 Sexuality, 107, 109, 126, 136. See also AIDS Shame, 136 Shared values China and West, 159–60, 163, 165, 167, 173n58 human rights and, 64 religious freedom and, 180 scriptures and, 192 studies of, 74 Sharma, Arvind, 179–80, 191, 192, 193, 195n13 Shastry, Shakuntala Rao, 105–6 Sida, la société en question (French Catholic bishops), 129 Silvestrini, Achille, 138n14 Sin, 14, 26n15 Slavery, 47 Sloterdijk, Peter, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8–9, 9n3 Smith, V.A., 150 Smxtik7ras, 104, 105, 107, 109

283 Smxtis, 103–9, 113n1 Social contract, 31 Social justice, 113n2, 130, 134. See also Economic, social, and cultural rights Society. See also States Hinduism and, 103–4 UDHR and, 82 Sociobiology, 5 Sophocles, 146 South Africa, 34, 58n38 South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), 50, 51 Space, 104 Sphere triology (Sloterdijk), 3, 9n3 Spirituality Chang and, 160, 173n49 human rights and, 193 rights and, 64 women and, 104, 105 Zoroastrians on, 101 »ruti (Vedas), 103, 108 Stackhouse, Max, 50 Stallseth, Gunnar, 129 Stanton, Timothy, 16 States. See also Politics accountability of, 32, 33 brutality of, 69 churches and, 34 duties and, 63 rights of, 70 role of, 45 UDHR and, 82, 83 Status, 113n2 Sterilization, 128 Stillingfleet, Edward, 16 Stoics, 39 Stoning, 42 Strict scrutiny standard, 43–44 Subjectivity, 3–4 »u-dras, 110 Sutta Nipata, 20 Sweden, 34 Switzerland, 34 Symbols, 59n57, 88–90 Szulc, Tad, 136 Tao, 161 Technology, 94, 155 Terrorism, 47, 147 “Texts of Two Lectures Delivered by H.E. Dr. P.C. Chang, Chinese Minister to Turkey” (Chang), 170n17, 171n23

284 Theology, 84, 164, 165 Thirty Years’ War, 62 Tierney, Brian, 51 Time, 104 Tincq, Henri, 134 Tindal, Matthew, 15, 16 Tobacco Atheist case, 43 Toland, John, 15, 16 Tolerance Confucianism and, 165–66 international influences, 34 Islam and, 193 Locke on, 13–17 philosophy and, 56n8 religious freedom and, 40–41 role of, 37 Totality, 93 Touzard, 136 TRC (South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission), 50, 51, 52 Trujillo, Cardinal, 130, 131–32, 136 Truth Catholicism and, 122, 125, 141n71 dharma and, 91 fanaticism and, 192 frustration and, 5 John Paul II and, 134 miracles and, 15 religions and, 62 religious freedom and, 180 universality and, 86, 89 Truth and Reconciliation: The Confessional Mode in South African Literature (Gallagher), 58n38 Tutu, Desmond, 51, 54–55, 188 Twiss, Sumner B., 172n41 UDHR. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (United Nations) Uganda, 124, 131 Unconscious, the, 6 UN Economic and Social Council, 161 UNESCO, 70, 95n1, 171n37 UNFPA (UN Population Fund), 126 United Nations. See also Commission on Human Rights; Universal Declaration of Human Rights human rights and, 28–35, 39 John Paul II and, 126 organization of, 155 role of, 46

INDEX United States discrimination and, 31 John Paul II and, 119–20, 139n27 Locke and, 15 religious freedom and, 33 rights and, 30 Unity, human, 61, 64, 65–66, 193, 194 Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities, 255–58 Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the Hindus, 211–17 Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the World’s Religions, 22, 64, 187–89, 191–94, 205–10 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (United Nations). See also Chang, P.C. (Chang Peng-chun) articles, 172n41, 173n54, 177 assumptions of, 82–83 bases of, 188 Chang and, 172n41 criticism of, 71–72 history of, 69–71, 95n5, 96n8 individuals and, 32, 89 pluralism and, 52–53 reasons for, 51 religions and, 22, 27, 30, 31, 54–55, 162–68, 192–93 religious freedom and, 34 text of, 199–204 universality of, 72–76 weaknesses of, 62–63, 86, 92, 96n12 Universal Declaration of the Parliament of the World’s Religions, 259–68 Universal House of Justice, 192, 193, 194 Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights, 219–31 Universality, 63, 67, 69–76, 79–88, 88–90, 135, 163, 180 UN Population Fund (UNFPA), 126 Untouchables, 31, 97n23 U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB), 120–21 USCCB (U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops), 120–21, 140n39 Values, 89 Varha, 110 Vatican II, 30, 31 Vedas, 103 Vedic ethos, 108 Vedic period, 106–7

285

INDEX Vedic texts, 104 Velasquez Rodriguez Cases, 46 Verdoodt, A., 172n41 Veritas Splendor (John Paul II), 124–25, 134 Victoria, Francisco de, 96n6 ‘Victorious conquest,’ 148–49 Violence, 14, 38, 146–47. See also Terrorism; War Virginia Bill of Rights, 30 Vitalism, 6–7 Vitillo, Robert, 120, 137 Volio, Fernando, 179 Vollmer, Gerhard, 4–5 Voltaire, 158, 163 Voting, 30 Waiting for the Dawn (Huang), 158 Wali J.S.C., 42 Walton, 130 Walzer , 50 War, 147–48 WARC (World Alliance of Reformed Churches), 58n38 Weber, Max, 49, 50 Weigel, George, 126 Welfare, 57n29, 65 West, the history of, 96n7 Indian critique of, 92–93 religious freedom and, 179 rights and, 31

UDHR and, 62, 72, 73, 153 validity of concepts of, 79–83 Westernization, 113, 156 Westo-centrism, 86 Wholes, 91, 95 Widows, 110 Wilken, Robert, 40 Willey, David, 118–19, 120, 122–23 Williams, Roger, 30 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 54 Wojtyla, Karol, 117–18, 129, 133, 135 Women, 66, 101, 103–13, 126–27, 130, 137, 193. See also marriage The Works of Mencius (Legge), 171n24 World Alliance of Reformed Churches (WARC), 58n38 World Council of Churches, 30 World religions , 61–67, 195n13, 259–68. See also Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the World’s Religions Y7jñavalkyasmxti, 103, 109, 113n1 Year of the Family, 125 Yen Yuan, 158 Yoruba, 175 Yugoslavia, 34 Zaheeruddin v. State, 42–43 Zhongshu, Le, 70 Zoroastrianism, 20, 101–2

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The World’s Religions after September 11

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The World’s Religions after September 11 Volume 3 The Interfaith Dimension

EDITED BY ARVIND SHARMA

PRAEGER PERSPECTIVES

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The world’s religions after September 11 / edited by Arvind Sharma. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-275-99621-5 (set : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-0-275-99623-9 (vol. 1 : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-0-275-99625-3 (vol. 2 : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-0-275-99627-7 (vol. 3 : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-0-275-99629-1 (vol. 4 : alk. paper) 1. Religions. 2. War—Religious aspects. 3. Human rights—Religious aspects. 4. Religions—Relations. 5. Spirituality. I. Sharma, Arvind. BL87.W66 2009 200—dc22 2008018572 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available. Copyright © 2009 by Arvind Sharma All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 2008018572 ISBN: 978-0-275-99621-5 (set) 978-0-275-99623-9 (vol. 1) 978-0-275-99625-3 (vol. 2) 978-0-275-99627-7 (vol. 3) 978-0-275-99629-1 (vol. 4) First published in 2009 Praeger Publishers, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. www.praeger.com Printed in the United States of America

The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48-1984). 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Contents Introduction

ix

Part I. Plural Visions Chapter 1

Chapter 2

Chapter 3

Master Hsin Tao’s Vision: The Museum of World Religions Maria Reis Habito

3

Movement and Institution: Necessary Elements of Sustaining the Interfaith Vision David A. Leslie

13

Pluralism as a Way of Dealing with Religious Diversity Caitlin Crowley

19

Chapter 4

Promotion of Interreligious Dialogue Mihai Valentin Vladimirescu

23

Chapter 5

Redefining Humanity and Civilization Nadine Sultana d’Osman Han

31

Chapter 6

Along a Path Less Traveled: A Plurality of Religious Ultimates? Arvind Sharma

43

The Great Chain of Pluralism: Religious Diversity According to John Hick and the Perennial Philosophy Andrew Noel Blakeslee

49

Chapter 7

CONTENTS

VI

Chapter 8

Religious M7y7 Patricia Reynaud

71

Part II. The Broader Context of Interfaith Dialogue Chapter 9

The Concept of Peace and Security in Islam Muhammad Hammad Lakhvi

Chapter 10

Interreligious Dialogue Attentive to Western Enlightenment Gregory Baum

Chapter 11

Lessons from Hinduism for the World after 9/11 Ashok Vohra

Chapter 12

Orientalist Feminism and Islamophobia/Iranophobia Roksana Bahramitash

Chapter 13

Women’s Interfaith Initiatives in the United States Post-9/11 Kathryn Lohre

83

87 97 107

113

Chapter 14

John Paul II and Benedict XVI on the Jewish Tradition Harold Kasimow

123

Chapter 15

Peace Education: Building on Zarathushtrian Principles Farishta Murzban Dinshaw

133

Chapter 16

Protestantism and Candomblé in Bahia: From Intolerance to Dialogue (and Beyond) Raimundo C. Barreto Jr. and Devaka Premawardhana

137

An Analytical Inquiry into Islamic and Western Methodologies of Studying World Religions Ahmad F. Yousif

153

Buddhism Meets Hinduism: Interaction and Influence in India Arvind Sharma

167

P. C. Chang, Freedom of Conscience and Religion, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights Sumner B. Twiss

175

Chapter 17

Chapter 18

Chapter 19

Part III. Reports from the Field Chapter 20

Chapter 21

Oil and Water: Being Muslim and Teaching Theology in a Jesuit University in Post-9/11 America Amir Hussain Religious Diversity Journeys for Seventh Graders Gail Katz

187 195

CONTENTS

Chapter 22

Chapter 23

VII

Interfaith Encounters in the Pews: Bringing Interfaith Dialogue Home C. Denise Yarbrough

199

Religious Intolerance in Contemporary China, Including the Curious Case of Falun Gong Sumner B. Twiss

227

About the Editor and Contributors

241

Index

245

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Introduction Arvind Sharma

T

his volume consists of papers presented at the global Congress on the World’s Religions after September 11, when it met in Montreal September 11–15, 2006. The congress dealt with the dimension of religious life characterized by the interaction of various faiths that constitute the variegated tapestry of the world’s religions. Interfaith activity, although present in some form from the earliest period of recorded history, is a particularly pronounced feature of religious life in modern times. The various faiths now rub shoulders in today’s shrunken world, in a way that was just not possible earlier. Scholars have used the words exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism to frame the relations that could conceivably exist among the various faiths. As the terms themselves suggest, exclusivism describes a pattern of relations that tends to exclude the followers of other religions from the ambit of one’s own, whether socially, soteriologically, or in other unspecified ways. Inclusivism, by contrast, allows room for other religions, but on one’s own terms. Pluralism, however, tends to accept all religions on their own terms as far as possible. While the actual relations among religions as they exist in the world display all three patterns, there is an increasing tendency to consider pluralism as the preferred pattern, because it tries to treat all religions on an equal basis. Part I of the volume consists of chapters that advocate, enhance, and embroider such a plural perspective. Chapters that deal with such a plural vision in specific context, in which the role of an individual intellectual or religious tradition stands out, are brought together in Part II. They provide a feel for the richness and complexity of the plural vision as it acquires specific contours in a given situation. Some chapters also allude to or imply the problems that might arise in such an interfaith context.

X

INTRODUCTION

Finally, interfaith activity is above all an activity that involves human beings in the flesh like you and me. It may have a “theory” underlying it, or various aspects of it may be susceptible to theoretical discussion, but one needs to be reminded that it is something that happens in real life, or in the field, as it were. Four such “field reports” constitute Part III of this volume.

Part I Plural Visions

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CHAPTER 1

Master Hsin Tao’s Vision: The Museum of World Religions Maria Reis Habito

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museum dedicated to exploring the world’s great religious traditions opened in Taipei on November 9, 2001. In spite of heightened fears about international travel after the events of September 11, the opening was attended by more than a hundred religious leaders and representatives from the museum world from many different countries. The professed mission of the museum is to teach about religions and religious life in the world, and to provide a transformative experience as a basis for mutual understanding, peace, and love among peoples of the world. The vision for the museum as a place that will foster religious learning, interreligious dialogue, and cooperation was developed by its founder, the Ven. Dharma Master Hsin Tao. He conceived the museum as an educational institution that will explore the fundamental values that are at the roots of all religions. The mission of the museum to encourage respect, tolerance, and love by fostering dialogue among people of all faiths and backgrounds has attracted widespread support among his disciples in Taiwan and overseas, whose contributions have made the museum project possible. This chapter is divided into four parts: The first will introduce the background of Dharma Master Hsin Tao and the museum project; the second will explain the Buddhist vision on which it is founded, the third and main part will describe the content of the museum, and the fourth part will consider the contributions of the project to interreligious dialogue and cooperation.

DHARMA MASTER HSIN TAO AND THE MUSEUM PROJECT Dharma Master Hsin Tao was born in a small village in Myanmar (Burma) in 1948, to parents of Chinese descent. At age four, he was separated from his family in this war-torn country, and he later became a child soldier in the Kuomintang army at age eight. In 1961, he immigrated to Taiwan, where he attended middle school and searched for religious answers to his childhood experiences of war, separation from family, suffering, and death. At age fifteen, he experienced a deep religious conversion when hearing the name of Bodhisattva Kuan-yin. He was ordained at age twenty-five and started to pursue solitary ascetic meditation practice.

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At age thirty-three, he continued his regime of fasting and meditation in a cave on Ling-chiou Mountain (Mountain of the Sacred Vulture) in Fu-long on the northeast coast for two years. Disciples followed him there, and in 1983, the Wu-sheng (No-Birth) monastery was established. Some time later, Master Hsin Tao surprised his then only a handful of ordained disciples by announcing his intention to build a museum of world religions that would help people learn more about their own religious traditions and let them be exposed to other religious faiths as well. Overcoming their initial reluctance, he encouraged the disciples to start the museum project by enlisting the support of the many lay disciples and by starting project planning and fundraising activities. Thus, the World Religions Museum Development Foundation was established in 1991 and an information center on the museum was inaugurated in Taipei in the same year. One cannot help but ask the question, what factors could have led a small group of hermit nuns and monks to go out into the world and start a project of such a vast scope? The first point to mention in this regard is the general revival of Buddhism that occurred in Taiwan in the eighties with the surge of the Engaged Buddhism movement, which took nuns and monks out into the streets by involving them in charitable and educational activities. Master Hsin Tao’s own experiences in counseling people who flocked to him for advice are also crucial for understanding the genesis of the museum project. For him, most of the problems people experience in life stem from “religious blindness,” which means a lack of religious perspective or distorted religious views and beliefs. This blindness affects not only the understanding of one’s own religion, but especially also the attitude toward the religious Other. As Master Hsin Tao thought about ways to provide a cure for this situation, the vision of a museum that would provide much-needed religious information in an accessible and engaging way started taking shape. In 1991, the museum foundation started hosting interreligious dialogue conferences, and Master Hsin Tao and a group of his disciples began to travel extensively in order to establish contacts with representatives of the various religions, and to visit universities, museums, and religious sites to gather information and religious objects for the museum and to make the project internationally known. In March 1998, Ralph Applebaum Associates, a New York–based exhibition design company, was entrusted with the planning and design of the museum, and in fall of the same year, Professor Lawrence Sullivan, director of the Center for the Study of World Religions at Harvard Divinity School joined with a team of scholars from the center to develop the content of the exhibits.

MASTER HSIN TAO’S VISION: THE AVATAMSAKA (CHIN. HUA-YEN) WORLD The religious vision informing the museum concept is taken from the Avatamsaka (Flower Garland) Sutra, which was translated into Chinese starting from the fifth century C.E. The text gave rise to the Chinese Hua-yen school of Buddhism, which did not seek to establish itself as a rival sect, but sought to integrate the religious ideas of other Buddhist schools, which also flourished between the sixth and

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ninth centuries in China. The main part of the Sutra is the story of the young pilgrim Sudhana’s visit to fifty-three teachers during his search for enlightenment. The last stage of Sudhana’s journey is the entry into the tower of the future Buddha Maitreya, where he sees the universe from the point of view of enlightenment. In this grandiose vision, every single thing and event in the universe is seen as deeply interconnected, also beautifully described in the Sutra by the image of “Indra’s net.” This net extends limitlessly in the four directions. At each knob of the net there is a shining diamond that endlessly reflects the reflection of all the other diamonds. In Master Hsin Tao’s vision, religions relate to each other like these shining diamonds. While they retain their distinct identity, they are at the same time deeply interconnected, interpenetrating and reflecting each other. In this view, no religion is an island, but, on the contrary, all religions depend on each other in their co-existence. Religious pluralism is not a threat, but an opportunity to cultivate the shared core values of love and understanding, as well as an invitation to work together for the realization of one global family. The individual religious believer does not have to feel lost in religious diversity, but is invited to develop a sense of belonging and integration by realizing interconnectedness. It is obvious that in this unifying view of religions, the conflict potential of religions, as well as all forms of religious extremism, is ultimately attributed to “religious blindness,” and therefore is not highlighted in the museum. The true core of each religion is seen as insight, love, and compassion, not as discrimination, aggression, or conflict. The task of religions is precisely to address the challenges created by conflicts, and to transform them together through wisdom and understanding. This message is most clearly conveyed in the Avatamsaka Theater at the center of the museum visit. With this short introduction of the vision that underlies the museum concept, I will now turn to the way in which the vision has been concretely translated into the museum content.

THE CONTENT OF THE MUSEUM OF WORLD RELIGIONS The goal in the content development and design of the museum has been twofold: (1) to create an institution of learning in which the visitor will find well structured information about important aspects of the world’s religions, and (2) to create an interactive space that, in the words of Ralph Applebaum, “immerses the visitors in an experience, which lets them view religion from many different perspectives to gain a better understanding of their own faith and the faith of others.”1 To this, Professor Sullivan added, “visitors will be invited to explore all religions as expressions of a universal search for purpose, meaning and enlightenment. The museum will be a living monument to the human spirit and a sanctuary honoring the world’s myriad faith traditions.”2 To engage the visitor in this exploration, the visit to the museum has been designed as a journey that, even though not a ritual per se, has a structure analogous to the three-part structure of religious rituals. First, the visitors experience a moment of separation from everyday life and entry into a very different quality of space and time. Second, during this kind of “time out,” suspended between the normal moments of everyday activity, the visitors undergo a special and intense experience, during which they receive knowledge

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that transforms their understanding and alters their self-perception. Such transformation occurs in the face of powerful sacred objects, symbols, or events that are displayed and experienced in relatively dramatic presentations in the museum. They invite the visitor to participation and interaction. Thirdly, steps are undertaken to reinsert the visitor back into the life of daily activity. I would now like to invite the reader to follow me on an imaginary tour through the museum. You arrive at the Sogo department store at the Yung-he section of Taipei, which houses the museum on the sixth and seventh floors. Your attention is immediately drawn away from everyday life activity by the facade banners that extend over the top floors of the building and announce the museum’s name, special exhibits, and upcoming events. You step out of your everyday street behavior by entering into the open and light-filled ground-floor lobby of the museum, where you read Master Hsin Tao’s mission statement about the importance of mutual respect, understanding, and love. As you lift your eyes toward the ceiling, you see Indra’s net extended over a dark blue sky, with luminous pearls representing the stars. Next to the stars are twenty-four words, including blessing, faith, and love, expressing core religious and human values. The ascent in the elevator brings you to the seventh floor. During the twominute elevator ride the light becomes lighter, creating the feeling of ascending into an altogether different, sacred realm. Master Hsin-Tao’s voice is heard speaking words of welcome, which are translated into English. Coming out of the elevator, you step into the entry processional, the Pilgrim’s Way, where you are directly swept into the stream of religious history. To the side, there is an entry into a children’s exhibit, which was not originally part of the museum concept. The Pilgrim’s Way is a long corridor where you experience the time of religious history, conceived as a long, flowing lifeline. You are welcomed by the words “The doors to goodness and compassion are opened by the keys of the heart.” This expresses the intention of the museum: love as the key to understanding others. You purify your hands as pilgrims do by putting them into a clear flowing stream of water, the Water-Wall. A panel explains the sacred meaning of water in different religions. Then you head upstream, toward the very font of life, in the company of other pilgrims whose more-than-life-size images are reflected on the walls. The images of the other pilgrims gradually become smaller to reach your own size, so that you feel you are one of them. The Entry Processional gives you the chance to cleanse your memories by replacing mundane thoughts and conceptions with the abiding religious questions and messages that have long directed human beings toward the foundation of love, tolerance, and understanding. The ten or eleven columns that stand in the path confront you with key questions, such as “Who am I?” “Where do I come from?” “Where do I go to?” The questions, which can also be heard spoken by different voices in Chinese, invite self-reflection. When you finally reach the end of the procession, you are invited to leave a handprint on a heat-sensitive wall. At this point, the separation from mundane life and the insertion into the museum world is complete. Now you enter into the Golden Lobby, which is the central point of orientation and therefore the place to make a central statement: “Love is our common truth,”

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and “Peace is our eternal hope.” The museum makes a new beginning, displaying hopes for a new kind of world, a world based on love and peace fostered by deeper understanding of the religions. The interconnectedness of the religions is visually expressed by a big and colorful labyrinth on the floor containing the symbols of the major religions of the world. The ceiling is a dark blue hemisphere with tiny stars that is arching over the two golden pillars that seem to hold it up. The Golden Lobby thus not only attempts to visually depict the interconnectedness between religions, people, and their deepest aspirations, but also the interaction between heaven and earth. From the Golden Lobby you step down into the Creations Theater. The panel on the eastern wall of the lobby slides aside and you enter into the darkened theater as into a cave. You are implanted there in the mysterious and primeval space to relive the experience of the seed of love and peace, planted in the fertile grounds of origins. In a fifteen-minute film you view the primordial times described in religious myths, and relive the drama and emotion of how life came to be as it is. A powerful weave of narration, imagery, and music retells the stories and poses fundamental questions about the nature of reality, such as “How did the universe come into being?” and about the place and purpose of human beings in fostering love and peace within it, such as “Where does human life fit in and what is its meaning?” The Creations Theater is designed to offer us a broad reach and universal scope in which to consider questions concerning the religious value of the cosmos and human life. Next, you enter a strikingly different frame of time, the lifetime of the human body. The Hall of Life’s Journey tells the story of the body’s transformation through the lifetime of an individual, from birth to death and afterlife. Of course, bodily life is being examined under a religious lens, which highlights the importance given to each stage of life by the various religious traditions. The hall is divided into five main stations. Each of these stations contains the same elements: a concave film screen, a round showcase displaying different religious artifacts, a touch screen containing information and a short interactive comic, a rounded wooden bench, and a sculpture depicting the particular stage of life. The five stages are the following: 1. Birth. Here, the short film shows birth rituals and celebrations from different traditions. The showcase contains items such as baptismal gowns and children’s clothing. The comic depicts a baptismal scene. 2. Coming of Age. This stage emphasizes growth and transformation. The role of religion is expressed in the statement, “Religions guides and encourages young people as they grow in their ability to love and explore life’s meaning.” The film shows young people receiving religious instructions, as well as initiatory rites. The showcase contains such items as a first communion dress, a Shinto garb, and Teffilin. In the comic, a Japanese girl takes us through her daily life. 3. Midlife. In this stage, adulthood is displayed through religious evaluations of marriage, parenthood, work, responsibility toward family and society, and spiritual growth. All these are elements of the film. Great importance is given to responsible parenting: “When you teach your son, you teach your son’s son” (Talmud).3 The showcase contains marital dresses and items from different traditions; the interactive comic illustrates a Hindu wedding.

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4. Old Age. Special attention is given to groups that assume a leading, responsible, and directing role in the journey of life traversed by others: such as teachers, shamans, religious healers, and consecrated community leaders. The wisdom gained in life is the central aspect of this station. The film shows elderly people in their function as teachers; but scenes depicting Buddhist nuns and monks, a rabbi, and an old man engrossed in reading remind us of the fact that religion is commonly of increasing importance in an elderly person’s life. The artifacts include a Tibetan prayer-wheel, an Indian head-garb, and Taiwanese rice cakes symbolizing long life. The comic shows the Japanese custom of donning a red garb on a person’s sixtieth birthday, which means the beginning of a new cycle, returning to childhood. 5. Death and Afterlife. The journey of life ends here. This station introduces the religious beliefs concerning the afterlife: heaven and hell, reward and judgment, theories of reincarnation, and the treatment of the dead body in different traditions. Death is not seen as the final point, but interpreted as a new beginning, the start of a new journey. This is expressed by “He who is able to stay master of himself will live on and will not be wiped out by death. He will have eternal life.”4 The artifacts in the showcase include an Egyptian book of the dead and Taiwanese paper money, which is commonly burnt to supply the needs of loved ones in the nether world. The comic, different from the previous ones, is not colorful, but solemnly presents a Greek Orthodox funeral in shades of grey and brown.

Walking through the Hall of Life’s Journey, you lurch between what is familiar and what is strange, and gain a personal sense of the recombinant process of life and growth in time. At each step you are encouraged to especially think about enhancing peace and love in your world. Each of the five steps or stages lets you see time in a different frame. These stages are shared by all human beings. Therefore the walk through the Hall of Life’s Journey will bring about a deepened sense of the interconnectedness of all humankind. No matter how different details and rituals of life may be, you are always referred back to one common basic experience—the experience of going through life in this world together with others. To the midpoint of the Journey of Life Theater two adjoining galleries open on either side: the Testimony Theater on the left and the Meditation Gallery on the right. In the Testimony Theater you can watch films of religious persons sharing in their journey or attend a life event. You are also invited to record your own testimony. The Meditation Gallery focuses on the role of contemplative techniques in each religion, but is also a space where you can actually quietly sit and rest on a broad wooden platform in the center. This gallery seeks to provide an instructive experience of what different religions have in common: the peaceful, individual, or collective search for transcendence through prayer, meditation, and contemplation, shown and explained in the film. The message is that the experience of transcendence flows into compassionate action in the world. The Avatamsaka World at the end of the Hall of Life’s Journey is the center point of the museum. As explained earlier, it is based on the story of the pilgrim Sudhana’s visits to fifty-three teachers, culminating in his enlightened vision of

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the universe. The Avatamsaka World is architecturally designed as a golden globe, which seems to be freely suspended between the sixth and seventh floors of the museum. To reenact the vision of Sudhana, you ascend a stairway into the interior space of the globe and then sit down together with other visitors on the round bench along the interior walls. You recline and lift your gaze up to the ceiling to watch a twelve-minute film seeking to convey the Avatamsaka view of the world. The film is clearly structured. Following the instructions, you see yourself in a newborn child that is greeted by a joyfully diverse world of smiling faces from different nations. Then the scene shifts to the dome of a church, a mosque, a Buddhist temple, and so on. The prayers, chants, and music resounding from these houses of worship are accompanied by spherical sounds. A short sentence of explanation is given for each scene. Now the atmosphere changes: the sacred sounds and images give way to dramatic music and scenes of war. A voice explains that these disturbances and difficulties are “a common challenge” for humanity. The film ends with images of ordinary people, and of religious leaders, such as Mahatma Gandhi and Mother Theresa. We hear that “love,” “peace,” “wisdom,” and “compassion” are the way to change the world for the better. Both structure and content of the Avatamsaka World reinforce the concept of community and togetherness: Visitors share the same bench together, recline in the same position to watch the film, and are invited to work together for peace in the world. In the face of the isolation and loneliness, the by-product of modern structures of society, the message the museum seeks to convey in so many different ways is that we are never alone, but on pilgrimage together in an interconnected universe, guided by the wisdom and love that is to be found at the root of the religions. Exiting the Avatmasaka World you step into the Great Hall of World Religions on the seventh floor. The hall is slightly oval-shaped, with a wider area at the center that now houses the exhibit on the greatest sacred buildings. To create a dignified and solemn atmosphere, this hall also efficiently works with light effects. The dark marble floor and dimmed lights of the hall contrast with the highlighted showcases that present sacred objects of ten religions, namely Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Shinto, Sikhism, Taoism, and special exhibits on Egyptian religions and Maya. Explaining that these ten traditions “typify the rest,” the introductory panel reminds us of the intention of the museum, namely to show the fundamental communality of the world’s religions through the plurality of forms. In addition to the showcases, each space includes a screen showing ritual scenes, a touch screen containing information, and a round, specific symbol of the religion inlaid into the marble floor. The hall is geared toward creating a harmonizing experience of religions, expressed by its founder as follows: “The Museum of World Religions gives us the chance of getting to know religions, and puts before us the task of choosing our own faith that will energize our life. The museum gives each religion the chance of a free dialogue, in order to avoid religious inspired conflicts and fights. This is a museum for the heart and the soul, a home where we can relax and find peace.”5 Thus, the museum is intended as an institution that counterbalances the negative image of religions, the facet of religion that, based on their potential to incite violence, is most often portrayed in the media. The exhibit on the greatest sacred buildings features miniature models of buildings such as the Dome of the Rock, Old-New Synagogue, Golden Temple, Chartres Cathedral, Borobodur Temple, and Ise Shrine. The models are fully

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fashioned on the inside as well, and flexible cameras on the outside permit access to the inside view. This exhibit is especially popular with schoolchildren. After exiting the Great Hall of World Religions, you are gradually reinserted into daily life. You have the choice between having a drink at the coffee shop, buying a gift at the museum store, or taking a meal in the vegetarian restaurant. All of these options signify gradual departure from the museum world and reentry into the ordinary frame of life, the final step of the three-fold ritual. The hope is that the museum experience will leave you with a transformed awareness of self and other, and with a deeper understanding of the mission of the museum’s founder, Master Hsin Tao, which is to foster true tolerance based on understanding, and to develop each person’s potential to spread love and peace in the world.

THE MUSEUM’S CONTRIBUTION TO INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUE AND COOPERATION After more than a decade of preparatory development and five years of existence, the museum has not only made a difference in the Taiwanese religious landscape, but has also transformed all those who were drawn into its radius in their own respective ways. The first persons to be mentioned in this regard are the numerous, mainly Chinese, lay volunteers who have selflessly offered their time, efforts, and financial support to help realize this $66 million project that is entirely financed by donations. Their engagement has to be understood in the light of the Buddhist precept of dana (giving), which they hereby strive to fulfill. The project has forged their cooperation and cohesion very effectively. The support of the lay disciples has also enabled the Ling-jiu shan community to forge ahead in their efforts to build a culture of interreligious dialogue both in Taiwan and abroad. The consultants who work on the project in Taiwan represent all the religious traditions of the island. Their opinions are listened to in order to ensure that the displays of the museum will not in any way offend the religious sensitivities of their adherents. The museum project has thus stimulated cooperation among various religious groups in Taiwan and contributed to a climate of dialogue, mutual respect, and friendship. The museum is an educational institution with programs for schoolchildren, students, and the general public in Taiwan. Many young people volunteer at the museum, and many of them are also involved in an interreligious youth group of the museum, the International Youth Interfaith Union. Schoolchildren who visit the museum undergo the popular Life Education program, which highlights the uniqueness and contribution of each individual life, as well as the values of respect, tolerance, and love. To carry out the educational and interfaith work of the museum, the UNassociated nongovernmental organization Global Family for Love and Peace was founded in 2002. GFLP started organizing and sponsoring a series of BuddhistMuslim dialogues in response to the Taliban’s destruction of the Buddha statues in Bamiyan. The series of these continuing dialogues is based on the premise that a better understanding of each other will overcome prejudices or indifference and lead to friendship and collaboration. Dialogues were held at Columbia

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University, in Malaysia and Indonesia, the UNESCO headquarters in Paris, and in Tehran, Barcelona, Marrakesh, Beijing, and Taipei. All of the Buddhist-Muslim dialogues have involved both renowned scholars and religious leaders of these two religions. Also, a new partnership has also emerged with the Jerusalem-based Elijah Interfaith Institute. The Museum of World’s Religions helped co-organize and cosponsor the first meeting of the Elijah Board of Religious Leaders in December 2003 in Seville, and hosted the second meeting at the Wu-sheng monastery in December 2005. At that meeting, a recent project associated with the museum, namely, the creation of the University of World Religions, was introduced to the religious leaders. The university is envisioned as an international institution equipped to prepare students for the task of becoming responsible human beings who are creatively engaged in the challenges facing the multi-religious global society of the twenty-first century. Its faculty members and graduate students will pursue ongoing research into the foundations of world religions traditions as basis for further dialogue and cooperation. In recent developments, the president of Mongolia has expressed interest in the university project, and Mongolia has become the most likely location for it.

CONCLUSION During the planning and design process of the museum, one frequently voiced opinion was that a museum displaying the religious traditions of the world in a completely non-hierarchical way could only be established in a country like Taiwan, where many different religions coexist peacefully together in a very small space. It was also further noted that only a Buddhist group could sustain such a project, not only because of the strong commitment of the devotees, but mainly because of the vision that makes such a project appealing and convincing. The all-encompassing vision of the museum is that of the Avatamsaka World, which sees everything from the standpoint of perfect enlightenment. This vision upholds the interconnectedness and mutual interpenetration of all things, without negating the complexity of the makeup of the universe. The world of enlightenment is not different from this world of contradiction, suffering, and strife. The only difference is the ignorance or “blindness,” which leads human beings to harm one another for all kinds of reasons, including religious ones. In the Avatamasaka Sutra, the enlightened vision is not the starting point of the pilgrim’s path, but its culmination. Sudhana’s visit to the fifty-three different teachers, described in this Sutra, affirms the plurality of the spiritual paths as the way to enlightenment and unity. The obvious question to be asked here is whether this vision can be fully transplanted into a non-Buddhist cultural context. Put differently, which changes would have to be made to the museum concept to make it work in a Western, intellectually secularized context? How do we address religious bigotry, fundamentalism, intolerance, and violence in a way that fully engages those critical minds that, in the tradition of the Western enlightenment, see these as reasons why humankind would be better off without any kind of organized religion that can be used for less-than-noble ends? These and other challenges will have to be

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addressed again, now that the museum is considered by organizations in both Germany and Great Britain as an educational model to emulate.

NOTES 1. All quotes are taken from interviews held in 1999 with Ralph Appelbaum, Professor Lawrence Sullivan, and Dharma Master Hsin Tao. The interviews are shown in the introductory film to the museum, “Museum of World Religions” by Global Vision, available in CD form from the museum. 2. From interview with Professor Sullivan. 3. Talmud, Kiddushin 36a. 4. Tao Te Ching, Ch. 16. 5. From interview with Dharma Master Hsin Tao.

SUGGESTED READINGS Guggenmos, Esther Maria. “Eine Welt der Liebe und des Friedens. Reflexionen über das Museum of World Religions in Taipei (Taiwan) ein Jahr nach seiner Eröffnung.” in Peter J. Bräunlein, ed. Religion und Museum, Bielefeld: Transcipt Verlag, 2004, pp. 159–94. Habito, Maria Reis. “The Taipei, Taiwan, Museum of World Religions.” Buddhist Christian Studies 22:203–6. Habito, Maria Reis, and Bhikkhuni Liao Yi, eds. Listening. Buddhist-Muslim Dialogues 2002–04. Taipei: Museum of World Religions Foundation, 2005. Heartney, Eleanor. “Divine Intervention. Ralph Applebaum’s compelling exhibition design for the recently opened Museum of World Religions in Taipei offers a highly pragmatic account of “universal” spiritual values.” Art in America 202:89–93. Hung Shu-yen. Museum of World Religions Guidebook. Taipei: Museum of World Religions Foundation, 2004. Lin Ming-mei and Chi Ya-lan, eds. Sowing Seeds of Love. Ven Dharma Master Hsin Tao and the Museum of World Religions. Taipei: Museum of World Religions Foundation Publication, 1999. Taylor, Deirdre. “In Taipei, Up Jacob’s Elevator. The Museum of World Religions Shines a New Vision of Hope,” in Spirituality and Health, The Soul/Body Connection, Spring 2002, pp. 23–29. Wilke, Annette, and Guggenmos, Esther Maria, eds. Im “Netz des Indra”: Das Museum of World Religions in Taipeih (Taiwan) und sein interreligiöses Museumskonzept, Veröffentlichungen des Centrums für Religiöse Studien Münster, Band 7, Vienna: Lit Verlag, 2008.

WEBSITES OF INTEREST Museum of World Religions: mwr.org.tw. Global Family for Love and Peace: gflp.org.

CHAPTER 2

Movement and Institution: Necessary Elements of Sustaining the Interfaith Vision David A. Leslie

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ovements are born out of deeply held convictions that the status quo needs to change. The movements of the day are many: environmental, gay rights, women’s rights, nuclear freeze, Jubilee, disability rights, farmworkers’ rights, and many others. At times, broad societal movements emerge out of the religious community. Other times, religious community support gives these movements new adherents, strength, and direction. In each case, people and collectives of people are called, sometimes driven, to improve the world as they and others experience it. Out of the mantra “something needs to change,” movements are born. The goal of such movements is to change both perspectives on specific issues and worldviews and individual and corporate practices. This is especially so for those movements that have strong interfaith characteristics. During the last decade, for example, Jubilee committees were formed to educate faith communities about the debilitating consequences of immense debt in developing nations and to raise the collective voice for debt retirement for developing nations. Likewise, environmental concerns, in particular global warming, have been the impetus for faith communities revisiting Holy Scriptures and developing faith and environmental sustainability study and action initiatives. The mission of these efforts is to change religious thinking about the environment and to change individual and corporate practices such as how electric power is purchased and how buildings are built, and to enhance religious communities’ voices in support of policies such as the Kyoto Protocol. In the Pacific Northwest, where environmental consciousness is quite strong, the Catholic bishops in the dioceses along the Columbia River released the pastoral letter “The Columbia River Watershed: Caring for Creation and the Common Good.” This letter added an important faith-based perspective to the environmental movement in our region of the United States and Canada. Coalitions of denominational and interreligious organizations regularly convene forums on a wide range of environmental issues including dam breeching on the lower Snake River as proposed by tribal governments in an effort to restore

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salmon runs, as promised in treaties with the U.S. government signed in the 1850s. Dialogue on land usage, water rights, and small-farm sustainability are also interfaith action priorities. In addition, interreligious advocacy efforts to support the Endangered Species Act and to oppose drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge are also part of the faith community’s active participation in the broader environmental movement. There are numerous other issues on which people of differing faiths converge. There are interfaith groups that study scriptural texts, and interreligious marriages are increasingly the order of the day. Pastoral care in hospitals and chaplaincy programs in correctional institutions have clearly identifiable interfaith dimensions. There is probably no issue today—either inside or outside of one’s faith community—that does not have some aspect of interreligiousness. We live in an increasingly pluralistic society, and even our most sacred and parochial convictions, such as the concept of salvation, are often processed through an interfaith lens. As such, being engaged in and knowledgeable of interfaith relations and affairs is not optional. As I have found in my vocational endeavors and suggested earlier, there is hardly an issue or societal concern that does not have (or should not have) interfaith dimensions. If part of our collective mission is to work for the improvement of the world, to positively change the status quo for all of God’s people, then the building of respectful, constructive, and issue-oriented interfaith relationships is a must. Peacemaking, human rights, and environmental sustainability are best done cooperatively, and pose the opportunity for the faith community to collectively model a different type of temporal behavior, namely, suspending partisan parochialism and engaging cooperatively in a mutually agreed-upon actionoriented manner. Today’s interfaith movement—and the movements within the movement— have many reflections, and its proponents have many goals and objectives. If there is any doubt, just review closely this congress’s program. Although seeming at times quite diffuse and disjointed, there is an important keystone or hinge point that brings in focus a central purpose for all interfaith work. This purpose, I believe, is found in the answer to the question that is posed poignantly in the subtheme of the Congress, “Can religion be a force for good?” Clearly, this question can be answered both in the affirmative and the negative. Religion can be a force for good and religion can be a force for evil. Yet most of us, I would suspect, are driven to see most fully the force of religion as a force for good and to work ethically and morally to mitigate the not-so-good aspects of religion. As the world continues to have its share of sectarian violence, some of which is clearly religion-inspired, the need for religion as a force for the good becomes more critical. And, as more and more people of faith and others outside of the religious community develop this conviction, there is a growing sense of the urgency for new reflections and commitment to interfaith relations, dialogue, and action. Central to this growing awareness is the corresponding awareness that together we can make more positive differences, and conversely, apart, the potential for destruction is enhanced. To further this point, “Can religion be a force for good?” is answered most fully when numerous people of faith from numerous religious traditions and convictions come together in joint efforts. Interfaith efforts within South Africa played

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a critical role in sustaining the movement that eventually ended the apartheid regime and brought about a new political reality. Likewise, interfaith efforts in the United States helped end our own apartheid, Jim Crow, segregationist practices. The picture of the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., Greek Orthodox Archbishop Iakovos, and Rabbi Abraham Heschel walking together in Selma, Alabama, during the civil rights struggles in the United States visually confirms this point. In Iraq there are efforts to build an interfaith alliance developed through the Iraqi Institute of Peace, which helped develop the Baghdad Religious Accord that states publicly the need for interfaith cooperation and the end of bloodshed. In urban and rural communities throughout much of the world, interfaith cooperation is seen as a necessary aspect of creating respectful and healthy communities spawning courageous efforts to address the needs of the poor and disenfranchised through health and human services. Yet, in spite of all this positive energy and movement, there are detractors. Several millennia ago, King Solomon of ancient Israel developed the political and religious alliances that allowed the kingdom to experience peace, prosperity, and power as never before. However, as biblical writers warned, “If you turn aside from following me . . . serve other gods and worship them, then I will cut Israel off from the land that I have given them; and the house that I have consecrated for my name I will cast out of my sight.”1 According to these observers, Solomon’s tolerance and interest in the “other” opened the way to apostasy—a type of religious treason—and the ultimate downfall of the kingdom. More recently, this story has repeated itself in different forms. Remember, one person’s openness is another person’s apostasy. When Pastor David Benke, president of the Atlantic District of the Lutheran Church Missouri Synod, joined in a community commemoration for the victims of September 11 at Yankee Stadium, he was suspended from the clergy roster for promoting religious “syncretism (mixing religions), defending false doctrines and unionism (worshipping with non-LCMS clergy).”2 In other places in the world, interfaith interest and cooperation—even intra-religious cooperation—can result in ostracism and, sadly, even death. Like most movements, those engaged in interfaith efforts are confronted daily with critics, people who are apathetic and those who would deny the value of and the opportunity to engage in interfaith work. Yet, the interfaith movement is critical to the well-being of the world and must be nurtured, sustained, and grown. So how is this to happen? How is the movement to keep its focus, and develop its passion and the new leadership necessary to keep the interfaith movement creatively alive? It is in these questions that we find the convergence of movement and institution. For twenty years, I have worked within interfaith organizations and for Christian-based organizations like my current employer Ecumenical Ministries of Oregon that have a strong commitment to engaging with other faith traditions. From my experience, I know firsthand the wonderful opportunities and the soulnumbing challenges in these efforts. I have learned that healthy interfaith organizations are movement-infused and committed to working on tangible issues of our time and developing the consciousness and leadership important to today’s and tomorrow’s societal crises and transformational opportunities. They are not stagnating and diffuse but focused and flexible, able to change with the times.

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So how then do healthy interfaith organizations develop and grow in depth of purpose and program? Let me share with you several things I have learned and work on daily to ensure that our part in the interfaith movement is alive, relevant, rich in passion, and sustainable: 1. Interfaith work is holy and sacred. Clearly, this for many is the root of the passion that allows the interfaith movement to flourish; yet it is also at the root of much of the resistance to the movement. What personally is sacred and from God, may be seen as anathema to the faith of another. Ultimately, interfaith organizing is an enterprise that should not be taken for granted or lightly, and the religious principles that undergird the interfaith institution and the movement as a whole should be clearly developed. 2. Interfaith work must therefore be based on the respect of faith traditions. It is important to create a learning environment where those participating can share not only their own faith commitments but learn about others. A healthy interfaith institution is grounded in intellectual and spiritual curiosity and openness where learning and seeking are honored and individual faith traditions, commitments, and beliefs are acknowledged and respected. 3. With that said, however, vibrant interfaith organizations seek to find the “we”—that is, the point of convergence of common or shared goals, dreams, aspirations, and inspirations. Creative interfaith work cannot be a forum for unilateral dominance of one faith tradition—a series of monologues—rather it is a dialogical, mutual, and reciprocal process. 4. The organization that flourishes is one that has clarity of purpose and a mission that is developed by all stakeholders. Additionally, it is one where the mission is regularly revisited and adjusted as needed over time. Taking time in retreats and planning sessions to deliberate and discuss how the mission is being carried out, who is “at the table” as well as who is not, and issues that need to be addressed and those that may no longer need attention is critical to health and sustainability. 5. Creative interfaith organizations are characterized by a public aspect of the work of the organization; they offer opportunities for the public—religious and secular—to engage one another. Publicly available prayer and worship events, lectures, dialogue circles, social service programs, and social action initiatives offer the opportunity for people to put their faith into action and discover others previously unknown who share common interests, beliefs, and commitments from differing faith traditions. This is a powerful witness that is much needed in our broken, fractured world. 6. Movement-filled institutions have the ability to risk and stretch in developing programs but also know their limits. In other words, it is important to be driven by big visions (for example, the end of war) yet understand that the single institution cannot do everything alone and accomplish everything immediately. There has to be a sense of “urgent patience” and a congruence of initiatives with resources available including financial, human, spiritual, and in-kind. Too many movements and corresponding organizations burn out or do not reach their full potential because of taking on too much with little planning and inadequate resources. There is also a tendency to be unwilling to share the opportunities of service with other organizations in common cause.

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It is important to avoid institutional arrogance that excludes rather than includes potential allies and friends. 7. Sustainability is related to the rhythms and ebbs and flows of the people in a community and the historical circumstances of life. The interfaith movement is very relational-oriented, and organizational sustainability can often rest on the passions of a few committed individuals. As people come and go, organizations may fluctuate depending on movement leadership (or lack thereof). Likewise, historical circumstances can radically impact interfaith relationships. The situation in the Middle East, for example, is both the impetus for critical and extraordinary interfaith relationships and, at the same time, creates great stress for the interfaith movement. Understanding this means that there is an unending commitment to develop new leaders and practitioners, as well as to not despair when all is not perfect. 8. Finally, as we all know, the interfaith movement is not always an easy place to put one’s energies and commitments. The interfaith movement is about change, about new ways to think about one’s faith and to practice and live in community. At its root, the interfaith movement challenges extreme parochialism and a religious orthodoxy that holds all others outside of a particular faith as doomed to hell. Those engaged must realize that the road traveled will not be easy. Fortunately, however, the movement’s strength is found in those through the millennia, as well as those here today and those yet to be discovered whose interfaith commitments sustain the joint efforts to build healthy and respectful societies and address society’s inequities and selfdestructive tendencies. Knowing that we are not alone ensures the future of the movement. As I have discovered, the interfaith movement in its many reflections is critical to the well-being of the world in which we live. My hope is that you will find your place within this sacred and mighty endeavor and build bridges and empower hope in the days to come.

NOTES 1. 1 Kings 9:6–7a (New Revised Standard Version). 2. Todd Hertz, “Benke Case Closed, but Tensions Remain,” Christianity Today, Vol. 47, May 21, 2003 (www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2003/mayweb-only/31.0.html).

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CHAPTER 3

Pluralism as a Way of Dealing with Religious Diversity Caitlin Crowley

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nteractions between religions take place along a continuum. At one end of the spectrum is pluralism. At the other end is intolerance. Intolerant relationships consist of hatred and prejudice. One group may believe that another group should be exterminated. Intolerance can also be nonviolent, but lead a group to believe that the rights and privileges of the other should be less than one’s own. At the pluralistic end of the spectrum, interactions are marked by the effort to create peaceful coexistence based on acknowledgement and respect for religious, cultural, and ideological differences. It is not to be confused with diversity. Diversity is already a social reality in North America. On account of diversity, there are many ideas and opinions that are forced into coexistence. Sometimes coexistence works and sometimes it causes friction. The uneven response to diversity begs the question: what is the best way to deal with diversity? The answers to this question span this long, varied continuum from intolerance to pluralism. There is an area on the tolerance continuum that could be called non-accepting tolerance. In this case, a person maintains that their religious truth is greater or more true than others. Although all those not participating in that person’s tradition are excluded from salvation, those in the darkness are allowed to be in darkness. This is because, “it is preferable to allow others the freedom of error than for believers to lose their integrity.”1 There is no effort to forcibly convert or eliminate those of another faith; their existence is tolerated. However, their beliefs are not acceptable for salvation. That is why it is called non-accepting tolerance. A little farther along the continuum is acceptance of those who are similar to you and rejection of those that are too different. Vaishnavites and Shaivites are not the same, but are close. Jews and Christians share a similar history. Ideas and beliefs that are shared make it easier to understand and accept someone of another faith tradition. People may identify those close to them as being on somewhat of the right path. There are people in another place on the spectrum who believe that although their religion has the ultimate truth, those who live good lives will be rewarded in the next life or the afterlife, despite their rejection or ignorance of the truth. This

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seems like tolerance because those of other faiths will be given some reward for good behavior. However, these people still consider other faith traditions to be in some way inferior in their religious beliefs. Universalism is a concept that spans the spectrum. It is the idea that all human beings are able to access the religious truths of particular traditions and achieve salvation through that religion. However, the concept of universalism does not guarantee that those who practice other traditions will achieve salvation. Some people who are universalists believe that humans can achieve salvation no matter what their traditions. There are also universalists who believe that anyone can join their religious tradition, but that joining their tradition is essential for salvation. At the far end of the spectrum is pluralism. Diana Eck, Harvard professor of comparative religions and Indian studies, defines pluralism in her book A New Religious America: “Pluralism is not an ideology, not a leftist scheme, and not a free-form relativism. Rather, pluralism is the dynamic process through which we engage with one another in and through our very deepest differences.”2 Professor Robert Wuthnow agrees that this engagement is both broad and deep. He writes, “Religious differences are instantiated in dress, food, holidays, and family rituals; they also reflect historic teachings and deeply held patterns of belief and practice. These beliefs and practices may be personal and private, but they cannot easily be divorced from questions about truth and morality.”3 In active pluralism, these beliefs, practices, and commitments cannot be checked at the door. They are a necessary part of debate and dialogue. The first thing required for active pluralism is the renunciation of the supremacy of one’s own religion. Pastor Scott Gustafson explains that, “religion might be understood in such a way that the variety of religious expressions are assumed to be diverse expressions of a more ultimate reality. In this case religious toleration seems logically to follow. However, the toleration of any particular expression that claims ultimate status for itself is quite problematic because such claims undermine the assumption that individual religious expressions are indicative of some other, more fundamental reality.”4 Pluralism also requires some level of relativism. There are elements common between different religions and among all religions. However, there are also incompatible differences—for instance, reincarnation and the belief that a soul gets one life to live are theologically irreconcilable. There is more than one way to approach these differences. A religious person could view the difference as unimportant—as a culturally specific detail that is important for the practice of that religion but exists outside of the realm of truths that are common to all religions. A person could also refuse to decide which belief is more true—only their Higher Power really knows. They do not know whether what they do or what someone else does is more right, and agree not to choose. This person would recognize a difference but move on to focus on the common truths between religions. Pluralism, then, requires interest in and sincere study of other religions— how they began, their history, their theology, their rituals, and so forth. It is important to realize that although there is a huge difference in the outer aspects of religions from the names, history, rituals, and organizations, the essence of religions is almost identical as to guide humanity in their physical life observing love, the unintentional love, and justice, and in the ultimate goal of unification

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with the Supreme Being. It is important to realize that studying a text or ritual by itself does not approximate the lived experience of that text or ritual. The process of encountering both a text and the lived experience of a text can be challenging in many ways. As Professor Louis Hammann of Gettysburg College puts it, “practicing [religious tolerance] may strain one’s own commitments, unless tolerance is itself required by the logic of those commitments.”5 Interest and study may be seen as a part of one’s own religious experience. This can be highly successful and fulfilling personally, and can facilitate achieving real pluralism. In the beginning of the twentieth century, CaoDai faith was founded in Vietnam, stating that all religions are of one same divine origin (which is God called by different names), have the same teachings based on love and justice, and are just diverse manifestations of the same truth. With its universal teaching, CaoDai paves a way for more tolerance in pluralism. One way to focus pluralism is around concern for our common interests— peace and the well-being of humanity. Sister Joan Kirby writes in an essay: “We will meet outside the walls; we will meet on our way up the mountain; we will meet in the search for our deepest roots in God. This does not imply a religious consensus as a negotiation of our faith convictions. Rather, it acknowledges that we all draw from the deepest and most life-giving sources and that we share everyone’s concern for the future of humanity.”6 Professor Diana Eck illustrates this complicated process best: “Pluralism is not simply relativism. It does not replace or eliminate deep religious commitments or secular commitments for that matter. It is, rather, the encounter of commitments. While the encounter with other faiths in a pluralist society may lead one to a less myopic view of one’s own faith, pluralism is premised not on a reductive relativism but on the significance of and engagement with real differences.”7 Pluralism is a feasible paradox. And even if it was found that particular faiths tended more toward exclusivism, the fact that there are scholars in every tradition who believe that real pluralism is possible demonstrates the potential in all religions for activating pluralism. Respecting deep religious differences while maintaining one’s own commitments is intense but possible. Argument and dissension will happen. The key will be to create truly pluralistic environments, make them the norm, and prepare the next generations to inherit and preserve it. CaoDai, recognizing the merit of all religions, propounding that all religions have one same origin and teach the same principles, always encourages people to open their heart to have interest and study of other religions as part of their own religious practice in order to fulfill pluralism and thus create harmony for humanity.

NOTES 1. Charles Teague, “Freedom of Religion: The Freedom to Draw Circles,” in Religious Traditions and the Limits of Tolerance, ed. Louis J. Hammann and Harry M. Buck (Chambersburg, PA: Anima Books, 1988), p. 18. 2. Diana L. Eck, A New Religious America (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 2001), p. 70. 3. Robert Wuthnow, America and the Challenges of Religious Diversity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), p. 3.

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4. Scott W. Gustafson, “The Scandal of Particularity and the Universality of Grace,” in Hammann and Buck, pp. 24–25. 5. Louis J. Hammann, “Defining the Boundaries of a Community,” in Hammann and Buck, p. 44. 6. Sister Joan Kirby, “Walls, Fences, and Homes for the Homeless,” in Hammann and Buck, p. 149. 7. Eck, p. 71.

CHAPTER 4

Promotion of Interreligious Dialogue Mihai Valentin Vladimirescu

I cannot persuade myself that without love to others, and without, as far as rests with me, peaceableness towards all, I can be called a worthy servant of Jesus Christ. St. Basil the Great (329–79 CE), Letter 203, 2

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t is obvious that dialogue between cultures and religions has become one of the main pillars of modern cultures, and one of the ways we judge the maturity of today’s religious traditions. Having recourse to dialogue only as an emergency measure, when conflicts and dramatic events have made both cohabitation and understanding much more tense, only adds to the difficulties inherent in already very complex situations. For this reason, more and more of these types of meetings are held every day, giving people an opportunity to share thoughts and exchange ideas, opening up new channels of understanding and collaboration. The organization of the conference on the world’s religions after September 11 is a display of confidence in the power of communicative reason. It aims to bring together different lines of thought and action, and sit experts and stakeholders down at the same table, with a full awareness of the magnitude of the work to be carried out. One of the basic aims of this meeting should be to raise awareness among as much of the population as possible regarding the challenges that need to be faced in order to create, strengthen, and maintain a culture of peace, with positive contribution of peaceful religions creatively committed to peace-seeking initiatives. Our meeting is targeted at all those who have dedicated, or are willing to dedicate their lives to intellectual, social, political, and religious commitment, aimed at exploring human cohabitation in all its complexity. It is also aimed at those who want to be stimulated by programs of action that will enable them to overcome the obstacles that have long deadlocked collective situations paralyzed by ancestral prejudices, banal interests, and sterile attitudes.

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Underlining the importance of promoting understanding, tolerance, and friendship among human beings in all their diversity of religion, belief, culture, and language, and affirming that interreligious dialogue is an integral part of efforts to translate shared values into actions, in particular efforts to promote a culture of peace and dialogue among civilizations, we should acknowledge that respect for the diversity of religions and cultures, tolerance, dialogue, and cooperation can contribute to combating ideologies and practices based on discrimination, intolerance, and hatred and help reinforce world peace, social justice, and friendship among peoples. Based on these considerations, the leaders of religions should encourage and urge governments and states to take a number of measures aimed at, inter alia, promoting, including through education, understanding, tolerance, and friendship among human beings in their diversity of religion, belief, culture, and language; protecting religious sites and preventing acts or threats of damage to and destruction of these sites; preventing and eliminating discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief, in the recognition, exercise, and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms in all fields of civil, economic, political, social, and cultural life; and ensuring that, in the course of their official duties, members of law enforcement bodies and the military, civil servants, educators, and other public officials respect different religions and beliefs and do not discriminate against persons professing them. We are living in a very exciting moment in history. Something profound and wonderful is happening, which can be seen only if we stand back and observe the spectrum of cultures and religions that have been evolving over the centuries. If we can do this and enter into alternative religious and cultural worlds, something amazing begins to show itself, a deep pattern that has been centuries in the making. It appears that the different religions and cultural consciousnesses shaped a new humanity. We see as we look across religious worlds that they are all deeply concerned with a stage of being human that needs to be overcome. The Bible does not directly address interreligious dialogue as it is understood and practiced today. The Greek word dialegomai, which appears in such verses as Acts 17:17 and Jude 9, means to “discuss, conduct a discussion.”1 The New Testament writers were thus using dialegomai to describe a period of questions and answers following the proclamation of the gospel. Nonetheless, the Bible gives several examples of sustained interreligious conversation. Jesus spent several days in the temple as a young man, discussing religious issues with the teachers. Jesus questioned the teachers on various points, amazing them in turn with his responses to their questions. Although an example of interfaith rather than interreligious dialogue, this discussion almost certainly involved insights from Jesus that would have been understood by the teachers as transcending the common boundaries of contemporary Judaism. The method of education through questioning was common among both Jews and Greeks: the rabbinical method of teaching involved mutual questioning and discussion, and even earlier the Greek philosopher Socrates utilized this method in what is now called Socratic dialogue. Such mutual discussion is at the heart of interreligious dialogue. Paul’s discourse on the Hill in Athens exhibits a similar willingness to engage in interreligious dialogue. Rather than avoiding any contact with the idolatrous practices of the Athenians, Paul closely observed them and

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then used these practices as the springboard for presenting his beliefs. Note that Paul did not initially engage in evangelism or debate: he debated with the Jews and the “devout” (i.e., God-fearing gentiles), but he merely “beheld” the practices of the people outside his religious community. Paul was fulfilling the first purpose listed in the first section of this chapter: Paul examined the religions of the Athenians to determine their spiritual state and to present the gospel in a way that would be most comprehensible to them. The knowledge used by Paul could be obtained only through direct interaction with the practitioners of the Athenian philosophies and religions. Paul also shows that Christians can acknowledge truth in other religions without accepting the entirety of the religion as true. His affirmative quotation from the Cretan poet Epimenides (whom he again quotes in Titus 1:12) is an example of approvingly noting a truth in the beliefs of the Athenians. The fact that he was nonetheless presenting the gospel, however, also shows that acknowledging the limited truth to which the Athenians held does not mean one should compromise advocating the supremacy of God’s full revelation in Christ. The episode on the Hill is an example of Paul becoming all things to all people in order to win some. Through the clarified understanding of other religions that results from interreligious dialogue, evangelists are able to express their beliefs so that they will be correctly understood by people in other religions and cultures. This can only result from, to use the old cliché, walking in the shoes of others. Dialogue is a way for understanding how non-Christians perceive Christianity. Interest in a Christian approach to people of other faiths can already be seen in the New Testament. In the book of Acts, Peter, responding to the realities of a multifaith context, says to the gentile Cornelius, “I truly understand that God shows no partiality, but in every nation anyone who fears him and does what is right is acceptable to him.”2 This basic understanding of God’s direct access to all people echoes what is asserted in the Hebrew scriptures by the prophet Malachi when he says, “For from the rising of the sun to its setting my name is great among the nations, and in every place incense is offered to my name, and a pure offering for my name is great among the nations says the Lord of hosts.”3 In Jesus’s words and action, in his proclamation, in his ministry of healing and service, God was establishing his reign on earth, a sovereign rule whose presence and power cannot be limited to any one community or culture. The attitudes of Jesus as he reached out to those beyond the house of Israel testify to this universal reign. He spoke with the woman of Samaria, affirming all who would worship God in Spirit and truth.4 He marveled at the faith of a centurion, acknowledging that he had not found such faith in all Israel.5 For the sake of a Syro-Phoenician woman, and in response to her faith, he performed a miracle of healing.6 But while it appears that the saving power of the reign of God made present in Jesus during his earthly ministry was in some sense limited, through the event of his death and resurrection, the paschal mystery itself, these limits were transcended.7 The cross and the resurrection disclose for us the universal dimension of the saving mystery of God. This saving mystery is mediated and expressed in many and various ways as God’s plan unfolds toward its fulfillment. It may be available to those outside the fold of Christ in ways we cannot understand, as they live faithful and truthful lives

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in their concrete circumstances and in the framework of the religious traditions that guide and inspire them.8 The Christ event is for us the clearest expression of the salvific will of God in all human history.9 It is our Christian faith in God that challenges us to take seriously the whole realm of religious plurality. We see this not so much as an obstacle to be overcome, but rather as an opportunity for deepening our encounter with God and with our neighbors as we await the fulfillment when “God will be all in all.”10 If we look at the teachings of Jesus, the deepest concern and command to love one another, to awaken spiritually, and to go through a profound rebirth calls for a renovation of our being and the move to a dialogical consciousness. Thus, in the Judeo-Christian roots we find this call for the awakening of a new awareness that centers upon God and the presence of God as the primary concern for human beings, which in turn calls for the deepest change in our lives. A model of interdependence of individuals within the family and larger communities is much more realistic and healthy for both the person and the community. If autonomy implies anonymity in the city or neighborhood and absence of intimate bonds that are rooted in mutual commitments, then the person is fleeing from the association of life and love with duty and responsibility. If a large number of people are motivated solely or in the majority of cases by self-interest alone, society at large will suffer. All decisions that involve collaboration with others must be based on a prudent trust that the people will be true to their word. In time of peace, societies in the ancient Middle East defined their relations on the international level in terms of treaties and the responsibilities that flowed from such commitments. Such an agreement was usually imposed by an emperor upon the petty states that came under his control. His self-description at the beginning of a treaty portrayed him as a benefactor whose gracious attitude would continue, but the treaty itself obliged only the vassal. Transgression of the stipulations laid upon the subordinate party was the reason for war or for a court case and corrective punishment. In every modern society people should have a perspective or viewpoint whereby the intricacies of daily life can be evaluated from the outside. This can be achieved in the context of dialogue, because each partner is listening to the other express a vision of life and community. It can be discovered also when we enter the literature of an ancient civilization, stepping back into a world quite different from our own. Both Jews and Christians share the Hebrew Bible and accept it as God’s word; even though methods of interpretation differ, we can continue to learn from the way the other community experiences and lives this word. The dialogical human somehow awakens to the realization that to be human is a profoundly interrelational, interconnected, interactive way of living and being. This means that everything in human life requires the living through of this interactive principle of reality itself. At this deepest level, we see a contrast and tension playing out through history between the ego-centered culture and the dialogical way of life. This brings us to the question of the importance of interreligious dialogue. Religions are deeply established patterns of life that have been distilled over centuries and millennia of ongoing cultural evolution and experimentation. Religious worldviews attempt to get to what is most fundamental in human culture and human reality. They are alternative, narrative, corporate expressions of what is profoundly first, the vital core of our cultural life. As we look across the spectrum

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of religions we find profoundly alternative ways of recognizing something primordial that is the common source of our diverse worldviews. We need to respect their religious convictions, different as these may be from our own, and to admire the things that God has accomplished and continues to accomplish in them through the Holy Spirit. Interreligious dialogue is therefore a “two-way street.” Christians must enter into it in a spirit of openness, prepared to receive from others, while on their part, they give witness of their own faith. Authentic dialogue opens both partners to a deeper conversion to the God who speaks to each through the other. Through the witness of others, we Christians can truly discover facets of the divine mystery that we have not yet seen or responded to. The practice of dialogue will then result in the deepening of our own life of faith. We believe that walking together with people of other living faiths will bring us to a fuller understanding and experience of truth. The different religious teachings agree that the egocentric life is the source of diverse human problems. The great world teachers through the ages have attempted to show that the essence of being human is in overcoming the egocentered way. This can be seen, for example, deep in the Judaic tradition with the ultimate command to love God with all our heart and all our being. This primal reality is so profound and deep that there is no one name that can approach it or exhaust it and no name has emerged in the evolution of global cultures to presume to name it. And yet it is important to have a word that may function to help us focus our thoughts and attention on this deep common ground that emerges out of interreligious dialogue. A religion is a way of life that shapes a culture, so if we understand the interactions and interplay between and among religions, we see that there is a profound common reality emerging from this creative encounter, found right at the core of the diverse religions. One of the greatest lessons of the centuries of interreligious dialogue and interaction is that logos is so deep in its unity that multiplicity and plurality and diversity are of its essence. Here we see the deepest roots of the origin of dialogue and the evolution of dialogical consciousness. In this historic drama of logos we see that human evolution inexorably moves beyond the egocentric culture to the awakening of global consciousness through dialogue. This deeper story of human evolution could not be seen clearly until we advanced to the global perspective that comes from creative dialogue between worlds. Perhaps the deepest lesson that we might learn from the evolution of cultures is that human beings are essentially beings in dialogue. We do not stand alone. The vision of human as an ego-centered, independently existing entity has simply been shown to be unacceptable and disastrous in the evolution of cultures. This brings us to the condition in which we are living, an exciting moment in this evolution over centuries. The birthing of this dialogical consciousness is accelerating and peaking in contemporary times. The religions can encounter one another only by delving more deeply into the truth, not by giving up. What is required, however, is reverence for others’ belief, along with the willingness to seek truth in what I find alien, a truth that concerns me and that can correct me and lead me further. What is required is the willingness to look behind what may appear strange in order to find the deeper reality it conceals. The promotion of dialogue among different communities and civilizations is, at present, a priority for the international community. It is only in dialogue that

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communities can truly meet and understand one another. Choosing the route of dialogue however, involves facing a number of difficulties and challenges. First of all, throughout history there have been clashes between groups of people bearing different truths or worldviews. This difficulty is ingrained in the centuries-long history of every group and its own self-understanding and, therefore, can be eliminated neither quickly nor through pure will. Interreligious dialogue also helps Christians to better understand their own faith. Because the focus of interreligious dialogue is on the differences between religions, Christians are forced to examine their own beliefs in order to support these positions. This examination will increase the self-understanding of Christians, helping them to differentiate between the pure gospel and the cultural lenses through which people too frequently interpret the gospel. Interreligious dialogue enhances apologetics and discernment. By better understanding the beliefs and practices of other religions, Christians are able to understand how true Christianity is different. This enables Christians to both identify and contextualize the teachings of other religions, and to present a reason why Christians believe differently. Finally, interreligious dialogue increases the ability of Christians to love their neighbors. Dialogue will enhance our ability to see that each person is their moral equal—the only difference is that Christians are sinners who have been saved through God’s grace. The knowledge that Christians had nothing to do with their salvation should inspire them to reach out and share the undeserved love of God with their neighbors. Relational evangelism will improve as clarified understanding of the faith and lives of neighbors erases misconceptions about other religions. Interreligious dialogue is a very elastic concept. Sharing experiences and sharing lives, working on common projects for a better world, wrestling together with questions of religious truth—these are some of the approaches to interreligious dialogue. Interreligious dialogue changes our normative understanding of religious meaning. It represents a shift from self-sufficiency in religious understandings of identity and truth to an appreciation of potentially multiple sources of identity and truth. And the shift is not simply a matter of observation in the face of the facts—there just happens to be many religions. It is a shift toward appreciating that one cannot now think theologically or intellectually about one’s own faith outside of the relationship of this dialogue. In this sense, dialogue changes our perception of reality itself. Dialogue is a transaction between people and not systems. This point is often made but seldom taken fully to heart. Through friendship we learn to value the religious experience of the other in ways that overcome stereotypes and move beyond text book definitions. But friendships also thrive on the cut and thrust of human inquiry. Not everything that a friend says need be taken at face value. There is a critical edge to our conversations, and this is what keeps friendship alive. Once we take one another for granted the relationship declines. Friendship reaches across differences between people and critical friendship commits the integrity of friends to both honesty and shared life. Religions are deep wells of social value, that is, they provide ethical frameworks, binding beliefs, and a sense of human solidarity in community. They harbor values such as justice, peace, compassion for the suffering, friendship with the stranger, and connectedness to the earth. Historically, these values have been mostly directed toward shaping self-sufficient communities, in spite of the universalist thrust at the

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heart of the post-axial religious consciousness. In a plural world this is no longer tenable. The question arises how to transcend self-sufficiency and thereby crosspollinate the spiritual and ethical resourcefulness of each. In his Homily on the Beatitudes, the holy Hierarch Gregory of Nyssa extols peace and concord among people: Of everything that people seek to enjoy in life, is there anything sweeter than a peaceful life? Everything that you would call pleasant in life, is pleasant only when it is united with peace. Let there be everything that is valued in life: wealth, health, a wife, children, a home, relatives, friends; let there be beautiful gardens, places for merry banquets and all contrivances for amusement . . . let all this be, but if there not be peace, what use is it? . . . And so, peace is not only pleasant in itself for those who enjoy peace, but it makes all the good things of life enjoyable. If there should occur with us, as often happens with people, some kind of misfortune in a time of peace, it too becomes more tolerable, because in such a case evil is pacified by good . . . Judge for thyself: What sort of life do those who are at enmity with each another and are suspicious of one other have? They meet sullenly and one abhors everything in the other; their lips are mute, their glance is averted and the hearing of one is closed to the words of the other. Everything that is pleasing to one of them is hateful to the other; and, on the contrary, that which is hateful and hostile to one, is pleasing to the other. Therefore, the Lord wants that thou wouldst multiply in thyself the grace of peace with such abundance, so that not only wouldst thou enjoy it, but that thy life would serve as a medicine against the illness of others . . . Whoever turns others away from this shameful vice, such a one renders the greatest benefit and may justly be called blessed; such a one performs a work of God’s power, by destroying evil in human nature, and by introducing in place of it fellowship with good things. That is why the Lord also calls the peacemaker a son of God, because he who procures such tranquility for human society becomes an imitator of the true God. The Bestower and Lord of good things completely exterminates and destroys all that is unnatural and alien to good. A similar activity does He command also of thee; and thou must extinguish hatred, cut off enmity and vengeance, destroy quarrels, expel hypocrisy, extinguish the remembrance of wrongs which corrupts the heart, and in place of it introduce everything contrary . . . love, joy, peace, goodness, magnanimity, in a word the whole assemblage of good things. And so, is not he blessed who distributes the divine gifts, who imitates God in his gifts, whose benefactions are similar to God’s great gifts?11

We feel called to allow the practice of interreligious dialogue to transform the way in which we do theology. We need to move toward a dialogical theology in which the praxis of dialogue, together with that of human liberation, will constitute a true locus theologicus, that is, both a source of and basis for theological work. The challenge of religious plurality and the praxis of dialogue are part of the context in which we must search for fresh understandings, new questions, and better expressions of our Christian faith and commitment. In their encounters with neighbors of other religious traditions, many Christians have come to experience the meaning of a “common humanity” before God. This experience is rooted in the biblical affirmation that God is the creator and sustainer of all creation. “The earth is the Lord’s and all that is in it, the world, and those who live in it.”12 God called the people of Israel to be witnesses among the nations while, at the same time, affirming that God is the God of all nations.13

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The eschatological visions in the Bible anticipate all nations coming together and the creation being restored to the fullness that God intends for all. This conviction is reflected in the affirmation that God is not without witness among any people or at any time.14 A particularly important dimension of the dialogue among civilizations is interreligious dialogue, which implies dialogue both among religions and within a single religion. Indeed, the key issue raised by the dialogue among civilizations is the place of ethics in the relationship between societies, peoples, and individuals. Hence, interreligious dialogue constitutes an essential dimension of the dialogue among civilizations. Many interreligious conflicts are fuelled largely by a search for identity expressed by a retreat into a particular religion or spiritual tradition to the exclusion of all others. Beyond the political factors at work, these antagonistic manifestations or retreats are rooted in ignorance of the intrinsic ideals and objectives shared by all faiths. Interreligious dialogue could be an important factor in highlighting the dynamic interplay between spiritual traditions and their specific cultures, by focusing on their mutual contributions and exchanges. It is therefore even more imperative in this age of globalization for all faiths to work together through joint action to reinvent forms of coexistence for the peoples of the world whose experience of conflict or coexistence constitutes the building blocks of the collective memory of humanity.

NOTES 1. William F. Arnt and F. Wilbur Gingrich, eds., A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature, 2d ed. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1979), p. 185. 2. Acts 10.34–35 (New Revised Standard Version). 3. Malachi 1.11. 4. John 4.7–24. 5. Matthew 8.5–11. 6. Matthew 15.21–28. 7. Cf. Matthew 10.23. 8. John 10.16. 9. I Timothy 2.4. 10. I Corinthians 15–18. 11. Stuart Hall, trans., Gregory of Nyssa: Homilies on the Beatitudes (Leiden: Brill, 2000), p. 77. 12. Psalms 24.1. 13. Exodus 19.5–6. 14. Acts 14.17.

CHAPTER 5

Redefining Humanity and Civilization Nadine Sultana d’Osman Han

Human beings are like parts of a body, created from the same essence, When one part is hurt and in pain, the others cannot remain in peace and be quiet. Sa’adi1

H

umanity can be defined by looking into another’s eyes and see one’s own reflection. Civilization is a living orchestra in which mankind’s diversity must be harmonized like a symphony of various instruments. Soren Aakye Kierkegaard said that “life can only be understood backwards; but it must be lived forwards.”2 What does this mean? It means that we must look to the past for guidance, because the past is our stable point of reference, and thus avoid repeating past errors. Humanity is spirituality with a form. It bridges the outer and inner life. From divine origin, spirituality is the essence of compassion, unbiased justice, tolerance, morality, honesty, integrity, and humility. Without spirituality there can be no humanity or civilization. Spirituality is the direct communication between our conscience and the divine. There can be no compromise or shield of justification for our bad deeds. It is assumable that originally all humans were not aware of this divine revelation and that it had to be taught to us in a framework that could be understood. Thus, holy prophets were chosen among us to enlighten us. These teachings gave rise to religion. For Moslems the Ummah is made comprehensible by the teachings transmitted by the Prophet Muhammad. With the passing of time, religion split into various branches to accommodate various cultures in the same manner as languages. Thus, it is ridiculous to declare that only one religion represents the only truth, in the same context that only one language cannot be accepted as the sole means of communication.

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Only spirituality is indivisible. Religion itself must be diversified to meet the needs of a multicultural humanity and geographical differences.

WHAT IS THE BASIC DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ISLAM AND CHRISTIANITY? Islam is oriented toward the heart and follows the emotional process reflected in the Sufi music with its flight into the ecstasy of the imaginary, an aspect of spiritualism. Christianity is oriented toward the intellectual process of its followers and is rigidly controlled much like Western classical music. Thus, wisdom would require that instead of fighting one another, we harmonize both for a balance between the head and the heart. Both language and religion are modified over time by human interpretation. In the first instance, on the positive side, it accommodates new discoveries or understanding. On the negative side, ambiguous wordings mislead the unwary. In the second case, it is more complex. The interpretation or misinterpretation of religion gives rise to the temptation of manipulation in order to justify and legitimize objectionable actions or behavior, including cruelty and all sorts of abuses. It is a sad fact that humans are handicapped by genes inherited from nature’s law of survival, which is the fate of animals on this planet. In fact, due to the very faulty and aggressive nature of mankind, several prophets had to periodically redirect us to the right path away from barbarism. Humans were blessed at some point in time by the revelation of spirituality, enabling them to escape the cruel law of the jungle affecting the animal kingdom. But most of us could not or would not relinquish the thrill of power over the weak. Civilization for most people translated into the gratification of insatiable greed. It is a defect that has survived in spite of the example set by prophets and that shall ultimately destroy humanity. Although religion proclaims to mirror spirituality, in practice it is a tool of control for the power and ambitions of a few. Today, more than ever, religions are exploited to justify the injustices and imbalance carried out in their name in all areas of our lives: political, racial, between genders, between the poor and rich, economic, health, environment, and so forth. The list goes on and on. Spirituality that is the internal journey of one’s soul cannot be confused with religion, nor with so-called righteous humane secular democracies that are the imperfect laws of men in which self-interests are the ultimate goal. Spirituality cannot be applied to the self-appointed judges of conscience and behavior, governed by the law of the strongest over the voiceless and defenseless multitude who cannot challenge them. Spirituality is the uncorrupted word from the divine found in the consciences of those untainted by sins of cruelty, oppression, injustice, and self-serving motives in contempt of other’s rights. No one can interfere between an individual conscience and the divine. The divine (Allah or God) is the only judge of the soul and the dispenser of punishment. No one has the right to anticipate what the divine’s punishment shall be for an individual. The only person one may be allowed to judge is oneself, in order to improve oneself. In the same way, a true democracy cannot be a banner of justification in

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the oppression and exploitation of the weak in the name of so-called humanitarian goodness without substance. In the same context, the ideology of democracy has become a slogan without meaning. It has become a propaganda of deceits and inequalities that are carried out with impunity. Unless we urgently attend to justice for all in a global framework, with respect to individual rights, to dignity and well-being, to tolerance— indulgent with our human brothers and sisters worldwide, and severe with our own shortcomings—we shall drive ourselves to extinction. Although we are still hoping for a miracle to save ourselves from our destructive selves, it is my humble opinion that the long-awaited final prophet shall not save us this time from our follies, but shall come as a stern judge. This time, humans shall have to account for their evils. Mankind has taken too much for granted for its rescue by exceptional prophets. We have disregarded too often the warnings to amend our ways. From the beginning of time we have indulged in wars to appropriate what belongs to others, to justify falsely our oppression of the weak, and generally to live by the dictate of the law of the jungle. This century shall see the accountability that we deserve. Perhaps we should prepare for it, for there is no more escape. In this, we shall be all equals, just as death does not spare any human. The past is the compass of time. It guides our steps in the present toward the future. Without a past we are lost, blindly seeking our reason for being. It may be that life on earth is a glitch in an otherwise perfect cosmos. However, it is a point I shall not debate because its knowledge is outside the scope of human intelligence. On the other hand, we know that life on earth is one of cruelty in which both animals and humans killed (and kill) each other for basic survival. At some point in time, only humans were blessed with the potential to distance themselves from this vicious circle and to progress toward what we call humanity and civilization. Yet, as of this century we have been unable to achieve either. We have only achieved degrees of humanity and civilization, but at the same time, we have also achieved greater ability to inflict greater destruction and barbarism upon ourselves, the animal kingdom, and the planet itself. Primitive man’s aggressiveness was limited in scope and without a clear understanding of consequences, which were relatively minor. Today aggressiveness cannot be discounted in the same light manner, for the very survival of the planet as a whole is at stake. A civilized humanity and wars are incompatible, and unless we can resolve disputes without violence, there can be no civilization and in fact we may be considered more barbaric than animals: a form of destructive virus. Why wars? We have heard countless justifications for it over the centuries and particularly today, in which the aggressors are trying to convince their victims that the sufferings inflicted upon them are for their own good and thus not only morally acceptable, but something to celebrate! We are back to the gladiator mentality. Do not be deceived by slogans of self-justification in the name of righteous humanity. Wars are nothing less than legalized organized crimes. Regardless of the many shields to justify such aggressive behavior, the truth of the matter remains that wars are being waged to appropriate what belongs to others.

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In theory, it is all very well to assume that prosperity comes from steady hard work and honesty, but realities show otherwise. The most expedient means to acquire wealth is by the exploitation of others. Most drug dealers clearly understand this reality; most governments use the same tactics to appropriate the coveted commodities such as petroleum from the Middle East, diamonds from Africa, gold from Latin America, and a cheap labor force from poverty-stricken countries and immigrants. The list goes on and on. Wars are thus to control the right to exploit with impunity another country, for self-interest. The slogan of “human-rights” seems overused and quite irrelevant in regard to wars when one analyzes the laissez-faire martyrdom of children worldwide, or the plight of the Palestinians who were ruthlessly uprooted from their country and way of life to make room for the Israelites, victims of World War II, a conflict that had nothing to do with the Palestinians. Today, millions are persecuted, tortured, displaced, and made homeless by government policies and wars, and although some murmurs of disapproval may be heard, no actions are taken for these unfortunate people are deemed expendable by our uncivilized mentality in which the law of the jungle prevails—for it has never left us. It is obvious that humans do not learn from past lessons of barbarism. History repeats itself, only with different victims. The twentieth century should have been a century of peace and growth as the logical outcome of technological advances. We should have expected a better quality of life—physically, emotionally, and intellectually—as progress eliminated arduous manual work. Yet, this has clearly not happened. On the contrary, the twentieth century claims, to its shame, two world wars, and the new century is heading toward a bloodier third one, not by necessity but by choice. We would do well to urgently examine our motives. A superpower does not look kindly on self-reliant nations. Any nation that does not need charity or protection is viewed as a threat. Yet, this attitude is selfdefeating. Warfare is big business. No other business could claim such exchange of billions of dollars, yet ironically, it benefits no one. The consumer’s needs are just a speck in the economic scale in comparison to military needs. Thus, as such, warfare has to be promoted and expanded, to permit military trade. Such a giant investment must produce dividends, to avoid the bankruptcy of its nation, hence the wars. The uncontrollable addiction to greed of big businesses could only lead to the present innovation of “preventive wars.” We are deceiving ourselves if we believe that peace can be achieved by warfare. History has shown time after time that wars can only lead to retaliation and thus more bloodshed and misery for mankind. It is also nonsense to declare that nuclear weapons should be the privilege of a few nations, under the belief that they will use “mature restraint” in the use of such weapons. The use of the atomic bomb by the United States in Japan belies such an assumption, as do repeated threats to use nuclear weapons, to intimidate nations that are not viewed favorably. Again, any stockpile of weapons has to be eventually used, for the titanic investment made to its production cannot be left to rust. Hence, propaganda justifies “preventive wars.” Only banishment of all nuclear weapons worldwide could be a step toward peace.

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Double-standard policies have never worked. It is undeniable that quality of life cannot be achieved by warfare and injustice. The new world order was presented as a gift of happy promises for the future of mankind in the twenty-first century. But as soon as the door opened, it transformed itself into a new world labeled “ethnic cleansing” and “profiling as potential criminals” mostly the followers of Islam. Yesterday, other groups were the victims, and tomorrow we may see a totally different group victimized. If we look at the state of affairs in our society, we would recognize the truths of our behavior reflected in our contempt of human lives resulting in child neglect, abuse, birth defects, famine, homelessness, discarded elders for whom the golden years have turned into the pauper years, and the addiction to drugs, sex, and violence so prized as entertainment. But our greatest modern crime today is war—mass murder of civilians, and the random imprisonment and torture of prisoners, most of them held without charges, but based on a system of discrimination toward the least favored ethnicity of the moment. The second most unspeakable evil is committed by enlisting children-soldiers. Even animals protect their young! Where are the promises of our scientists and politicians? Their discoveries have not resulted in the betterment of mankind, but its destruction. Farmers were removed to be replaced by scientists that thought they were better qualified than nature itself. The result is the pollution of the food chain, both vegetal and animal, leading to numerous new viruses and the destruction of the human immune system. As to the new abundance of genetically modified food, besides being of doubtful nutritional value, it has brought its own problem of an overfed, dependent society, and along with it sickness and obesity in one corner of the planet and famine in another. In addition, drug discoveries do not fare better, and most experiments bring untold catastrophes that we are only perceiving now in our environment, health, and so forth. We have even gone as far as to deny the basic right to die with dignity. Science without wisdom is very dangerous indeed. Even the computers have become powerful devices to spy on and control individuals and groups, curtailing the precious right to privacy and political ethics. It is time that the public demand maturity and decency toward human lives from their leaders.

THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY IS THE BLOOMING OF OUR PAST EXCESSES Most politicians and futurists like to remind us that the burden of our bad deeds shall not mature before the next generations, but I tend to disagree, for our ancestors made the same reasoning—thus in the twenty-first century, we are that next generation. We are their future, and the burden is ours to solve. The twenty-first century shall see either our salvation or our extinction. The choice is ours, and it can no longer be delayed and hidden under veils of illusions. It is my humble opinion that unless we come to realize that wars must be banned worldwide, along with weapons, we cannot save this planet nor achieve true civilization.

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Globalization must be defined not in terms of imposing one culture over another but to safeguard the security, economy, well-being, and justice for all nations without discrimination. Corporations must be regulated on the same standards worldwide. In addition, profits and salaries for both employers and employees must provide a fair maximum for employers and fair minimum for employees. A global currency should be introduced so as to end currency inequality. When an employer receives several millions in salary and his employee at the bottom of the ladder receives an estimated ten dollars an hour, it is not a fair division of profits, but the impunity of organized corporate Mafia-style organization. Societies cannot function along this kind of inequity and thievery. Corporate profits must determine the fair equity of salary for both employer and employee. We cannot return to a slavery mentality in a civilized world. It would be useful if an international language were taught to small children along with a native language. All humans should be bilingual. Religions are the threads that unify a community or nations, thus they interweave deeply with governmental affairs. As such, religions have been used time and again by political leaders to divide rather than unify human beings. This must change without delay. Religious conflicts deny the purpose of religion as an expression of spirituality and humane decency. It becomes like today’s democracies, just a superficial platform of talk without substance. It is imperative that religions be unified in a commitment for the betterment of mankind without any discrimination against diversity of creed, belief, or culture. Religions must speak with one voice against governmental abuses of power. Religion must be a forceful preemptive tool against the evil of declaration of war. Religions are powerful entities and if they have the goodwill to do so, they have the power to strengthen the United Nations by implementing the following: 1. An independent truly international court (much expanded and more effective than the model of today), in which all nations are represented fairly, must enforce that any declaration of war be considered a crime against humanity, and the court must have the authority to demand the immediate resignation of the government in violation, and a new one voted in office, regardless of the size or power of the nation. 2. An independent international court must oversee the protection of children and bring to justice without delay any perpetrator of child abuse (individual or organized). Trafficking and exploitation of children must never be tolerated, and officials who do not enforce protection of children within their borders must be made accountable. Any act of violence should be severely punished, and torture of any kind should never be tolerated under any circumstance. We must look at the planet’s resources in global terms for a fair distribution to all mankind. We must all contribute to the healing of the earth and rediscover a healthier lifestyle. 3. Laws must be reviewed to protect the well-being of the family, the vulnerable, and the sick (both physical and mental). Leisure time and proper education in morality (without oppression) must be reintroduced for a happy earthly journey. Entertainment must be joyful, without vices or violence. It must be a tool of civilized relaxation, a model of inspiration of the finer qualities possible within human abilities.

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Suffering must never be inflicted upon others in reality or in imaginary entertainment. The young look upon their elders for their future adulthood, thus it is important to show excellence in all our behavior if we can hope to attain the goal of civilization as intended by the divine. Other laws governing marriage, sickness, death, and so forth must be for the happiness of mankind. Marriage and motherhood are not for children. Marriage under the age of eighteen (and possibly twenty-one) years old should be banned worldwide. Maturity is essential for a healthy society. Children must not be rushed into adult responsibilities that overwhelm them.

SOCIETIES ARE ALWAYS REFLECTED IN THE TREATMENT AND THE EDUCATION RECEIVED BY CHILDREN The children are always the adults of tomorrow; thus they must be our priority. There is no doubt that criminals shall always exist even under the best of circumstances. So how to deal with this problem? Prisons are not the answer in most cases. Petty crimes such as theft or disorderly conduct should be fined to compensate victims, or community services performed. For heinous murders, if not due to mental disorder or uncontrollable emotional disturbance, perhaps the death penalty could be considered, but never in a physically painful manner. For other crimes all efforts toward rehabilitation should be considered. Children should never be judged as adults. These recommendations may seem too idealistic, yet if profound reforms are not implemented urgently, this century shall see the extinction of mankind in the worst kind of nightmare. Possibly, it is already too late, for the earth itself has its rhythm as well as its own immune system defense. Although most futurist politicians believe that the answer lies by preparing remote survival quarters while annihilating most of mankind, that is an unrealistic vision. Their agony may be even more painful than the ones that they intend to inflict on the masses. Do not believe for a moment that our present induced hysteria toward socalled national security, the Patriot Act against terrorist threats, terror from Islam, and all similar propaganda slogans are sprouting from a sudden momentum of aggression by so-called fundamentalist crazy states or nations. First, let me say that the present turmoil has nothing to do with religious spirituality. The basic message of all religions, as taught by every prophet, was one of compassion, tolerance, and justice. Islam is a peace-oriented religion. This is supported by the facts that warriors of Islam have shown time and again mercifulness in time of wars, respecting Islamic teachings that conquered populations should be spared. The generosity of hospitality to strangers is also a direct influence from Islam. At no time did the Moslems commit atrocities as was done in Europe at the time of the Inquisition, or the Crusaders, or such cruelty as to nail a prophet on a cross. Islam has always promoted tolerance and justice, as amply demonstrated by the Ottoman Sultans during their very long reign for nearly 700 years. This said, to this century, mankind has not reached the goal of idyllic societies, and the future looks gloomier. Not because this is inevitable, but because the leaders of today, controlled by the all-powerful corporate world of our times, have no

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intention whatsoever to work toward the betterment of human beings, but rather toward their alienation in order that a chosen few can capitalize and benefit from the diminishing resources of the planet. In addition, we have reached that level in our development where the people who decide our fate have progressed toward the fantasy that they can match their creator and create themselves a humanity that suits their needs and desire for total control of life surrounding them. In the role model that they have been taught, this small group wants to be the ultimate master with engineered slaves or servants who would worship them. Hence, the creation after World War II (and before that under different names) of such future global planners as the think tank RAND and so forth. The present turmoil has nothing to do with the sudden appearance of so-called terrorists but is a well-thought-out plan to rid the planet of those “they” consider undesirable, and the realization that their previous encouragement for a population explosion to meet the expansion of a consumerism market has served its purpose both in term of profits and resources, and is no longer needed. It may have even become a liability to the survival of these manipulators who created dependent artificial societies. We should not be so surprised, for from the beginning of time, the fate of mankind has always been shaped by an “elite” class. Perhaps what has changed is the commitment or goals toward the betterment of mankind. Kings were committed to safeguard the well-being of their subjects, and those who erred were promptly removed by an intolerant public. Kings had their privileges, but they knew their limits. Also, they were very conscious of their obedience to a divine force. This is not so today. Although numerous so-called religious sects of all sorts have sprung up to mislead and capitalize on a naive people who have lost touch with true spirituality and search desperately for the right path to their inner being, the masterminds of today, futurists, consider themselves the new creator, or in other words, the equal of the divine. The divine is not a presence that we can categorize or understand easily with our limited human intelligence. Yet some have the mere breeziest of intuition that we may have been created as perhaps a sort of experiment. If we prove ourselves to be a defective experiment we might be destroyed, very much like humans do in their own laboratories with both animals and bacteria, once they are through with their own “live” experiment. We are well aware that the animals we use as “guinea pigs” feel the pain of their suffering, but are not conscious of the source of their pain and are powerless against the scientists who decide their fate. Our fate may have been already decided. However, it is our moral duty to help ease the suffering of our fellow-beings as long as the divine allows us a breath. Evil might triumph over truth, but we must stand strong at the side of justice and tolerance and not falter in our determination to remain true to spirituality within our inner self. We must not waste in vain the precious gift of life, in the here and thereafter, that the divine has bestowed on us. The incomprehensible shall be made comprehensible in due course to the deserving souls. Futurists are nothing new, only the wording has changed. In addition, all futurists do not have the same agendas. The greatest futurist of his time was Nostradamus. Nostradamus was not some sort of magician nor a medium with the meaning that we usually associate

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with those who perceive what is obscure to the majority. Nostradamus was an exceptionally perceptive psychologist of human nature and very much conscious of the interrelation between the cosmos, the earth, and life itself. He could read the map of mankind’s journey on earth as revealed to him by his exceptional awareness of the world around him and the presence of the divine in all things. Nostradamus tried to transmit his knowledge to us, and his message is not as nebulous as it may first appear. However, Nostradamus did not conform to the knowledge and mentality of his own time, thus he had to take care to reveal truths in layers of veils so as not to antagonize the authorities of his time. Thanks to his wisdom, his words were not lost to those who would eventually comprehend his message. In the same way, the “experts” during his time did not accept the concept of earth as a sphere. This kind of mentality is still with us today, for the “experts” in each era do not look kindly on those whose insight or intuition look further into the future than the accepted scientists of the time. Thus, the visionary of this world must always take care not to make tooobvious waves in a sea of ignorance or they may risk becoming the victim of persecution or slander.

CONCLUSION The twenty-first century is going to be the century of truth, in which we shall all be accountable for our actions to a higher court than the corrupt courts of mankind. The twenty-first century is not going to bring back to us a messiah to redeem us from our sins. Humans were unable or unwilling to recognize messiahs when they came in the past. The Prophet Jesus Christ (peace and blessings be upon him) was crucified, and later his teachings were distorted to the extreme extent as applied by the Christians’ inquisition. Another Prophet, Muhammad (peace and blessings be upon him), was sent to us to bring us back to the path of compassionate justice and behavior. The passing of time brought its forgetfulness, and with it brought forth struggles for power with the consequences of division within Islam. Allah the Merciful sent again a messenger as revealed by the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) for preparing his recognition by the faithful. This messenger was the Ottoman Sultan, Fatih Mehmet, who reestablished the spiritual path leading to the Ottoman Caliphate for the preservation of Allah’s will. Under its protective umbrella, Islam flourished in peace, justice, and prosperity, benefiting the Christians as well. Again, with the passing of time, corruption led to self-serving disloyalties and misinterpretations of his teachings. This brought forth in the twentieth century the vengeful sword of evil—leading to unprecedented mass deportation or massacre called justified “ethnic cleansing” for the good of humanity and democratic ideals, just as the Taliban (and other oppressive regimes) believed that prayers would absolve them from their daily crime of cruelty and injustice. Needless to say, these politicians and religious leaders do not abide by the rules and teachings that they impose on others by force.

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As the twentieth century of sorrows was approaching its end, a last merciful reprieve was granted to us, so as not to carry forth the destructive path of doom to the new millennium. But again, promises of instant material and power gratification clouded our judgment. Thus, divine signs went unrecognized by many, and were ignored or exploited by a few. Henceforth, this modest messenger came to us with the softness of the mist, and left us with the quietness of humility. Alas! This is so. Our mentality of presumptuousness to unlimited forgiveness for our sins looks toward a glorified messiah to absolve us of wrongdoing. This is not going to happen. The time has come for the accountability of our actions toward others. Unless the spiritual truth can triumph over the evils of the law of the jungle, it is my observation that we are reaching the end of our journey on earth. For we have reached the future. We are the children upon which the sins of the fathers have been visited. The planet Earth is a circular sphere, Every point of departure is every point of arrival. Life has a circular rhythm, Everything returns to its starting point. The seeds of nature grow from the Earth, Give their leaves and fruits, Then return to the Earth. The animal’s earthly envelope Composed of nutrients of the Earth, Returns to the latter, to nourish the Earth itself. The spiritual soul comes from the realm of purity of Allah, And must return pure to the realm of Allah. The Qur’an is the book of Heavens, The first chapter, Opens with the first Prophet, Adam. The last chapter, Will end with the return of Adam’s posterity. The circle of Khalifat is reaching its end. Its last mission: The unity of mankind In universal beneficence. The 21st century will be the point of arrival of the Universal Soul, At its point of departure from the realm of Allah. The Earth itself must return to its cosmic origin. A new voyage is being drafted in the infinity of time.3

NOTE 1. This quote is from the motto of the Tehran School of Social Work (1958–79), as quoted in Sattareh Farman Farmaian (with Dona Munken), Daughter of Persia: A Woman’s Journey from Her Father’s Harem through the Islamic Revolution (New York: Crown, 1992). However, the original source for this motto is the “Book of Gulistan,” a work of prose, poems, and maxims by Sa’adi, a thirteenth-century Persian poet. 2. Soren Kierkegaard, The Journals of Soren Kierkegaard, ed. & trans. by Alexander Dru (London, New York: Oxford University Press, 1938). Soren Aakye Kierkegaard (1813–55) was a Danish philosopher and theologian.

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3. This poem appears in Nadine Sultana d’Osman Han, “The Ummah” (unpublished paper, 1993).

SUGGESTED READINGS Cornish, Edward, and World Future Society. The Study of the Future: An Introduction to the Art and Science of Understanding and Shaping Tomorrow’s World (Washington, DC: The Society, 1977). d’Osman Han, Nadine Sultana. “Angry Times” (unpublished paper, 1990). ———. “Invitation to Reunification within Islam” (unpublished paper, 1992, available at http://www.nadinevalidesultan.org/re-unificationwithinislam.html). ———. “Spiritual Earth Journey” (unpublished paper, 2003, available at http://www. nadinevalidesultan.org/spiritualearthjourney.html).

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CHAPTER 6

Along a Path Less Traveled: A Plurality of Religious Ultimates? Arvind Sharma

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t would be well to begin by recalling the task one has set out for oneself. The task is to persuade the reader to think in terms of the possibility of a plurality of religious ultimates. I have no illusions regarding the magnitude of my venture. Indeed the very consideration of this possibility might have occasioned a measure of surprise that I hope to mitigate as we proceed. In fact, if the eyebrows raised in disbelief at the beginning of this chapter are reduced at its end to furrowed eyebrows contemplating, howsoever reluctantly, the possibility indicated in the title, I would consider myself adequately recompensed for my labors. And a labor it has been. For although religious plurality is a dominant feature of the religious life of our century both inside and outside academia, there is, in the technical sense of the word, a “rational” reluctance to concede it in the context of religious ultimacy. We are familiar with a plurality of religious traditions as well as a plurality of methods of studying them—both when such methods are sympathetic to religion, or neutral or antagonistic toward it. There is even a plurality of paths admitted within a religious tradition. There is also a growing if somewhat problematic realization that there could be plurality of revelations of or from the same reality, compared to which the acceptance of a plurality of expressions of the experience of the same reality is perhaps considered somewhat less of a problem. Such magnanimity of disposition, however, seems to desert us when the question of the plurality of religious ultimates is raised. This is perhaps in part because the idea appears like a philosophical version of a religious position that is not even a rejected option in the Abrahamic religions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, namely, polytheism. The word tends to sink out of sight under the weight of its own negative associations. Perhaps the rejection is too quick, as the Sikh scholar noted at an ecumenical conference. After hearing a Jewish, a Christian, and a Muslim scholar vehemently assert by turns that they believed in “one God” he is said to have exclaimed: “Will someone tell me how many one Gods there are?” But

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surely there is more to it. Even an apparently polytheistic religion such as Hinduism, for instance, upon investigation, it turns out, believes in one God. Klaus K. Klostermaier writes: Many Hindu homes are lavishly decorated with color prints of a great many Hindu gods and goddesses, often joined by the gods and goddesses of other religions and the pictures of contemporary heroes. Thus, side by side with »iva, Vi}hu, and DevX one can see Jesus and Zoroaster, Gautama Buddha and Jina Mah7vXra, Mah7tm7 G7ndhX and Jawaharlal Nehru, and many others. But, if questioned about the many gods, even illiterate villages will answer: bhagv7n ek hai, the Lord is One. They may not be able to figure out in theological terms how the many gods and the One God hang together and they may not be sure about the hierarchy among the many manifestations, but they know that ultimately there is only One and that the many somehow merge into the one.1

THE PROBLEM OF MONOLATRY How deeply entrenched this monolatrous tendency is in religion and philosophy becomes evident even from a cursory inspection of the philosophies and religions of East and West. Contrary to the Kiplingesque formulation, the East and the West do meet at least in this respect. Both mind and matter are equally given in common experience. I see a table. The perception is mental; the object perceived is material. Yet Western idealism in one way or another, from Plato to Hegel, manages to either explain it or explain it away in terms of mind or spirit or some such entity. Western materialism—from its most ancient forms to its modern incarnation as scientific materialism and Marxism—manages to perform the diametrically opposite feat of accounting for mind in terms of matter. In either case the many have been reduced to two and two to one. Indian philosophy does not like being left behind. Various forms of Indian idealism and Indian materialism perform similar maneuvers to achieve similar results. It is perhaps a matter of further interest, however, that sometimes, although one is reduced to the other, the reduction is not to one but several material or spiritual principles. And now the plot begins to thicken.

, RELIGIOUS ULTIMATES IN NY–YA-VAI»E…IKA AND S–NKHYA One Hindu system of thought is known as Ny7ya-Vai{e}ika. According to it an entity, in order to be ultimate, must be eternal. It argues that as only composite objects can dissolve, only a partless entity can be eternal and therefore ultimate. In order to be devoid of parts, an entity must be either infinitesimal or all-pervasive. This principle allows it to posit nine fundamental substances: earth, water, fire, and air (all atoms); ether; space; time, souls, and mind. Thus the system is plural but it is not pluralistic in the sense that all of them do not enjoy the same status. The soul enjoys a higher status and among the souls is the supreme soul—God.2 Another Hindu system, the S7gkhya, subsumes all matter under a single entity and is also atheistic so that in the end one is left with a plurality of souls. However, in their state of salvation they are all qualitatively (though not numerically) the same: spiritual clones, as it were.3 It would be tedious to multiply the examples all of which point

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in the same direction—that even the apparently pluralistic systems possess a monistic bias if probed far enough or deep enough.

RELIGIOUS ULTIMATES AND SOTERIOLOGY Thus are we led to the crux of the matter. Religious or philosophical systems can be pluralistic, but such pluralism tends to become attenuated and even vanish when it comes to soteriology. In the guise of oneness masquerading as sameness, or as the one goal to which all paths lead, or the one emptiness that characterizes everything including itself as empty, or as the one Buddha or the one Buddha-nature in all— in one way or another—monistically or henotheistically—somehow salvation comes to hinge on the one. In this deck of cards even drawing an ace will not help— salvation is the joker. But why must this be so? In the Hibbert Lectures that he delivered at Manchester College and published under the title A Pluralistic Universe, William James raised a similar issue. It would be convenient to pursue our investigation further in the light of what he has to say. In the present context the manner in which he contrasts monism and pluralism is particularly helpful. According to him monism “insists that when you come down to reality as such, to the reality of realities, everything is present to everything else in one vast instantaneous co-implicated completeness,” whereas for “pluralism, all that we are required to admit as the constitution of reality is what we ourselves find empirically realized in every minimum of finite life.”4 Elsewhere he distinguishes between them as follows: “Pluralism lets things really exist in the each-form or distributively. Monism thinks that the all-form or collective-unit form is the only form that is rational.”5 The way William James contrasts rationalism and empiricism helps turn the key further in the lock: “Empiricism means the habit of explaining wholes by parts, and rationalism means the habit of explaining parts by wholes.”6 It is apparent now why empiricism would invite the charge of incoherence,7 for it is open-ended. Towards the end of his lectures William James offers some concluding remarks with great economy and courtesy. He says: Whatever I may say, each of you will be sure to take pluralism or leave it, just as your own sense of rationality moves and inclines. The only thing I emphatically insist upon is that it is a fully co-ordinate hypothesis with monism. This world may, in the last resort, be a block-universe; but on the other hand it may be a universe only strung-along, not rounded in and closed. Reality may exist distributively just as it sensibly seems to, after all. On that possibility I do insist.8

It seems that James’s views have suffered from benign neglect because the possibility he insisted on has not been fully explored. One may explore it further with the famous Indian metaphor of the elephant and the blind men. Thereby hangs a tale.

THE PARABLE OF THE BLIND MEN AND THE ELEPHANT Buddha, the Blessed One, gives the parable of the blind men and the elephant to illustrate that partial knowledge always breeds bigotry and fanaticism. Once a group of disciples entered the city of »r7vasti to beg alms. They found there a number of

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PLURAL VISIONS sectarians holding disputations with one another and maintaining “This is the truth, that is not the truth. That is not the truth, this is the truth.” After listening to these conflicting views, the brethren came back to the Exalted one and described to him what they had seen and heard at »r7vasti. Then said the Exalted One: “These sectarians, brethren, are blind and unseeing. They know not the real, they know not the unreal; they know not the truth, they know not the untruth. In such a state of ignorance do they dispute and quarrel as ye describe. Now in former times, brethren, there was a R7j7 (king) in this same »r7vasti. Then, brethren, the R7j7 called to a certain man, saying: “Come thou, good fellow! Go, gather together all the blind men that are in »r7vasti!” “‘Very good, Your Majesty,’ replied that man, and in obedience to the R7j7, gathered together all the blind men, took them with him to the R7j7, and said: ‘Your Majesty, all the blind men of »r7vasti are now assembled.’ “‘Then, my good man, show the blind men an elephant.’ “‘Very good, Your Majesty,’ said the man and did as he was told, saying: ‘O ye blind men, such as this is an elephant.’ “And to one he presented the head of the elephant, to another, the ear, to another a tusk, the trunk, the foot, black, tail and tuft of the tail, saying to each one that that was the elephant. “Now, brethren, that man, having presented the elephant to the blind men, came to the R7j7 and said: ‘Your Majesty, the elephant has been presented to the blind men. Do what is your will.’ “Thereupon, brethren, the R7j7 went up to the blind men and said to each: ‘Have you studied the elephant?’ “‘Yes, Your Majesty.’ “‘Then tell me your conclusions about him.’ “Thereupon those who had been presented with the head answered ‘Your Majesty, an elephant is just like a pot.’ And those who had only observed the ear replied: ‘An elephant is just like a winnowing basket.’ Those who had been presented with the tusk said it was a ploughshare. Those who knew only the trunk said it was a plough. ‘They body,’ said they, ‘is a granary; the foot, a pillar; the back, a mortar; the tail, a pestle; the tuft of the tail, just a besom.’ “Then they began to quarrel, shouting, ‘Yes, it is!’ ‘No, it isn’t!’ ‘An elephant is not that!’ ‘Yes it is like that!’ and so on, till they came to fisticuffs about the matter. “Then, brethren, that R7j7 was delighted with the scene.”’9

The moral the Buddha draws from the tale is “those who think truth is in their exclusive keeping and their religion is the only approach to reality ‘see only one side of a thing,’ like the blind men in the parable.”10 Such an interpretation of the parable is helpful if one is contrasting religious exclusivism with religious pluralism.11 However, it does pose a problem. The person who is not blind knows the elephant as the whole, as an object that possesses the various parts grabbed hold of by the blind men. Hence this situation corresponds to that of rationalism (and not empiricism) as defined by William James: the habit of explaining the parts by the whole. Let us however take another look at the situation. Even a person who is not blind never sees the elephant simultaneously as a whole. He can see only one part or side of the elephant. Moreover, one cannot quite say that the blind men did not know the elephant as such according to their mode of knowing. They utilized the sense of touch; the person with vision uses sight. Is a wooden bat the same object

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in the hands of a player who can see it and a blind person who can only feel it? Moreover, does the person with eyes really see the object called elephant as it is? If the person possessed x-ray vision, would the person still see the same elephant? Moreover, in a less dramatic vein, let us only imagine that we as human beings possessed a sixth sense—as different from all our senses as sound is from sight. What creature would we “see” them? The point then is this: all knowledge is partial in its own way. How are we to know that in another way of knowing the elephant would not appear in a very different way—even as two distinct objects? We are out-Jamesing William James in our pursuit of radical empiricism to be sure, but the implications of empiricism in this light are truly radical. And this is when we haven’t even introduced the notion of a universe that is changing all the time!

PLURALISM AND POLYTHEISM We must plunge now into the forest a little deeper. In the parable the blind men are groping for the elephant; is it possible that at some level of experience they may construct one by their groping for it, in some psychedelic way? Let us discard this possibility as rather far-fetched but consider another. In the parable the elephant represented reality; the blind men grasped one part of it. The reality of the elephant itself, however, was taken for granted, as known or knowable. But our situation in life is different. We are holding onto different parts and do not know whether they are all connected. They may be or they may not be. Are all the religions connected? Is the ultimate of all the religions the same? It is the rationalism that leads us to this assumption, and this becomes clear in the discussions of the point in Indian and Western philosophy where Occam’s razor is deliberately invoked to establish the case for one God or reality.12 But are we then not begging the question? It is rationalism itself that is being called into question. Indian discussions of the issue are helpful here. The Ny7ya-Va{e}ika school was referred to earlier. In this pair, it is the Ny7ya school that emphasizes rationalism and sure enough argues for monotheism on the basis that “wherever there is scope for the consideration whether we should admit a single principle or a multiplicity of principles, all logicians are unanimous that the former course should be followed.”13 It should be added however that critics of the highest caliber such as Appayya DXk}ita, the seventeenth-century South Indian polymath, “are of the view that the argument does not prove that there is only one maker of the world, and they do not admit ‘parsimony’ as a consideration which can clinch the issue. To this [a logician] replies: ‘Is parsimony to be rejected here only, or everywhere?’ Surely, in view of the fact that almost all modern developments in scientific theory are based on a recognition of ‘parsimony,’ it is hard to reject parsimony in this case. But (as Appayya DXk}ita says) since we are proceeding on the basis of observed facts, it is not simpler to suppose that the world is the co-operative endeavour of many intelligent beings?”14 William James’s statement that “a philosophy of pure experience must tend to pluralism in its ontology”15 sounds like a grand and radical restatement of the point just made.

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CONCLUSION One might conclude by trying to push this point of view a little further with some passion, aroused not by my partiality to it but by indignation at its neglect. One may advert to the parable of the elephant for this purpose. Let us suppose that not one but two elephants were placed in the midst of the blind men. Now their descriptions might still be the same, but they could apply to either of the two elephants. If the metaphor is thus extended, two similar statements need not necessarily relate to one reality; two realities could be involved. Or to press a different metaphor into service to make the same point: identical symptoms, such as a headache, can be generated by different diseases. In the study of religious pluralism much attention has been devoted to the point that the self-same identical reality is perhaps experienced differently. One may conclude this chapter with the plea that at least more attention, if not the same measure of attention, be accorded to the possibility that it is possible to experience different ultimate realities identically.

NOTES 1. Klaus K. Klostermaier, A Survey of Hinduism (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), p. 144. 2. See M. Hiriyanna, The Essentials of Indian Philosophy (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1948), pp. 86, 90. 3. Hiriyanna, pp. 107, 115. 4. William James, A Pluralistic Universe (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1916), p. 322. 5. James, p. 324. 6. James, pp. 7, 8. 7. James, p. 325. 8. James, p. 328. 9. As narrated by T. M. P. Mahadevan, Outlines of Hinduism (Bombay: Chetana, 1960), pp. 18–19. 10. Mahadevan, p. 20, the word God replaced by reality. 11. See John Hick, “Religious Pluralism,” in The Encyclopedia of Religion, Mircea Eliade, ed., vol. 12 (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1987), pp. 331–33. However, whereas the pluralism position in these contexts is understood as questioning the “sole possession of reality,” this paper questions the assumption that we possess a “sole reality.” 12. See Satchidananda Murty, Revelation and Reason in Advaita Ved7nta (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1974 reprint), pp. 119–203. 13. Murty, p. 202. 14. Murty, p. 208, emphasis added. 15. James, p. 361.

CHAPTER 7

The Great Chain of Pluralism: Religious Diversity According to John Hick and the Perennial Philosophy Andrew Noel Blakeslee

Everything has already been said, and even well said; but it is always necessary to recall it anew, and in so doing, do what has always been done: to actualize in thought the certitudes contained, not in the thinking ego, but in the transpersonal substance of the human intelligence. —Frithjof Schuon, In the Face of the Absolute, 19891 Everything has been said before, but usually by people who did not know that they were saying it.” —John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, 19892

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ow are we to understand the reality of religious diversity? The sheer sociological fact of the world’s multiple faith traditions is itself fairly unproblematic, particularly if some variant of a naturalistic explanation is assumed: religions are products (albeit complex) of the projective human mind, with its attendant hopes and fears, interacting with distinct cultural and environmental circumstances. If, however, one wishes to offer a nonreductionistic interpretation of religion and religious diversity, that is, an account that accepts as veridical the assertions of divinity or transcendence—in other words, a religious interpretation of religion—then one quickly arrives at the problem of conflicting truth claims of various categories between religious traditions. Given the reality of truth-claim conflict, many agree with Bertrand Russell, when he states, “It is evident as a matter of logic that, since [the great religions of the world] disagree, not more than one of them can be true.”3 Some theologians and philosophers of religion

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maintain this position, as one part of a rationale that has come to be known, not without some discomfort over terminology, as exclusivism or particularism, which usually entails the all-too-human but not very cogent assertion that the true religion just happens to be one’s own.4 Conversely, the recognition of conflicting truth-claims can engender, as with Russell, the conviction that all cognitive assertions of some transcendent reality by the religious traditions are mistaken. However, between these two positions—the veracity of one religious tradition, or none—lies the pluralist perspective: all of the world’s great religious traditions are different but equally veridical manifestations of or responses to a transcendental ultimate or ultimates. Each tradition contains truth and is endowed with an equal salvific/transformational capacity. As with other stances on the reality of religious diversity, the pluralist position is itself plural: there are a number of held differences regarding the nature of ultimate reality, the nature of human being, and their relationship, among other issues. Yet all the pluralist positions on religious diversity share the same theoretical task, namely that of offering a nonreductionistic, global religious account of religion. The problem is conceivably compounded: it can be difficult enough to offer a rational justification for belief in and adherence to one religious tradition, let alone for multiple and often very different traditions with seemingly conflicting truth-claims. But fortunately for apologetic and explanatory purposes, the pluralist position maintains that the primary truth-claims of all the great traditions will stand, or fall, together, in relation to the fundamentally different and exclusively naturalistic interpretation of the same global phenomena. The problem under consideration had been well-stated by Harry Oldmeadow as follows: “For many scholars concerned with the inter-relationship of the religions the central dilemma has been this: any ‘theoretical’ solution to the problem of conflicting truth claims demands a conceptual platform which both encompasses and transcends any specific theological position; it must go beyond the premises of any particular theological outlook but at the same time not compromise the theological position to which one might adhere.”5 This study will compare two positions in the pluralist stream of religious diversity theory that answer to the problem articulated above: the much-discussed pluralistic hypothesis of philosopher of religion John Hick, and the teachings contained in the philosophia perennis, or perennial philosophy, as championed in recent times by thinkers such as Frithjof Schuon, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Huston Smith, and others. Prima facie, these two positions appear to be cut from the same cloth; but as we shall see, there are marked differences between them, indicating a difference in worldview orientation, perhaps leading one to eventually question the accuracy of their common pluralist categorization. Part one will introduce the perennial philosophy, particularly as understood by its current key exponents, and offer its perspective on religious diversity. Part two will elucidate John Hick’s position, and address a representative sample of the voluminous criticism directed against his theory. Part three will bring the two together in comparison and contrast. It is hoped that this examination will prove helpful for achieving a greater discernment of both the contentious issues and points of harmony between these two powerful perspectives on the reality of religious diversity.

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THE PERENNIAL PHILOSOPHY The philosophia perennis, or perennial philosophy, is the name given to the philosophical-religious orientation that holds Truth to be unitary and universal, “everywhere and always the same.”6 That is, all of the world’s great religious traditions embody a part of the one Truth, or in other language used, the Principle. Here a wellknown phrase by Rumi is apt: “The lamps are different, but the Light is the same.”7 As a self-conscious, religious-philosophical movement within modern times, the perennial philosophy, also known as traditionalism or the primordial tradition, has been spearheaded by the scholars René Guénon (1886–1951), Ananda Coomaraswamy (1877–1947), and Frithjof Schuon (1907–98). It is currently advocated by thinkers such as Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Martin Lings, Huston Smith, James Cutsinger, and Harry Oldmeadow, among others. According to Oldmeadow, the contemporary perennial philosophy program can be characterized as follows: “the traditionalists are committed to the explication of the timeless wisdom which lies at the heart of the diverse religions and behind their manifold forms . . . they are also dedicated to the preservation and illumination of the divinely-appointed forms which give each religious heritage its raison d’être, providing its formal integrity and ensuring its spiritual efficacy.”8 Furthermore, and as a result of this commitment, “[t]he tradtionalist stands implacably opposed to the prevailing modern worldview (secular, humanistic, and scientific) which originated in the Renaissance and which has been strengthening its tyrannical grip on the modern mentality ever since.”9 The perennial philosophy, then, asserts the traditional values of divine revelation and orthodox practice, along with an entailed antipathy or resistance to philosophical movements that subvert these values. This latter aspect will be discussed when we compare this philosophy with the thought of John Hick. But closer to the issue of religious pluralism, James Cutsinger states that “[w]hat distinguishes the perennial philosopher . . . is the conviction that Heaven has provided mankind with more than one way to be saved, that there exist several authentic Revelations and traditions.”10 Or referring to Huston Smith, M. Darrol Bryant states: “The insight that gradually emerges in Smith’s work is that the variety of religions does not contradict a singular Transcendence. Instead, it witnesses the richness of Transcendence—its plenitude that allows for an endless number of complementary finite expressions.”11 Contrary to common misperception, the perennial philosophy does not claim that all religions are the same. Nor does it advocate any kind of syncretistic amalgamation of the various traditions. On the contrary, as distinct yanas or vehicles of spiritual transformation linked to Truth or the Principle, they are otherwise self-contained and self-sufficient, echoing the Buddha’s parting words, “be ye lamps unto yourselves.” Before elucidating further the perennialist or traditionalist understanding of religious diversity, it will be helpful to outline the basic components of this perspective or Weltanschauung.

CONTOURS OF THE PERENNIAL WORLDVIEW The skeletal concept of the perennial position is the metaphysical assertion of the hierarchy of being: existence is tiered and graded or composed of a range. From the Absolute or Principle or Godhead, all the way down to subatomic nature, with each

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level containing the subsequent lower level. This perspective has been the majority report in most times and places; it has commonly come to be known as “The Great Chain of Being.” According to Arthur Lovejoy, author of the book by the same title, “[t]he conception of the universe as . . . ranging in hierarchical order from the meagerest kind of existents . . . through ‘every possible’ grade up to the ens perfectissimum . . . has, in one form or another, been the dominant official philosophy of the larger part of civilized mankind through most of its history.”12 And another common traditionalist description of this structure is given by Cutsinger: “We may thus distinguish in the total universe four degrees: Beyond-Being, God-Being, Heaven, and Earth. Beyond-Being and Being taken together—if one may so express it— constitute the Divine Principle; while Heaven and Earth constitute universal manifestation.”13 We can speak then of two broad categories in this structure: The Principle, and Manifestation. And the higher up in the hierarchy one goes, the greater the complexity (to the perfect end of divine simplicity) and actuality or increased being one encounters. Following Smith, the components of being can be enumerated as: power, duration, locale, unity, importance, and worth, with their combined maximization equaling perfection as the Divine Principle. The hierarchic structure of nature also corresponds to or informs the individual human being; “as above, so below,” goes the ancient insight. Man as microcosm mirrors the macrocosm: the body is equal to the material, with the soul paralleling the heavenly realm, and beyond with the spirit, as distinct from the soul, aligned to the Principle or Godhead. In Hindu parlance, the core of the human is Atman, which ultimately is Brahman—or so many of the mystics from all the traditions exclaim, each in their own languages. But this information must be existentially realized; the goal of human being is increased spiritual maturation, to the point of self-transcendence or ekstasis and Self-abidingness. As John Hick says, it is a moving from self-centeredness to Reality-centeredness. Or according to the current leading representative of perennialism, S. H. Nasr,“The miracle of human existence is that man can undo the existentiating and cosmogonic process inwardly so as to cease to exist; man can experience that ‘annihilation’ (the fana of the Sufis) which enables him to experience union in the ultimate sense.”14 The way of the perennial philosophy is decidedly the way of the jnana yogi or the way of gnosis. It is the embodiment of the Socratic exhortation to “know thyself,” where identity and understanding fuse: the means of gnosis meets the end of realization. In a passage that itself reads like a mystic invocation, Smith states: Unconsciously dwelling at our inmost center; beneath the surface shuttlings of our sensations, precepts, and thoughts; wrapped in the envelope of soul (which too is finally porous) is the eternal and the divine, the final Reality: not soul, not personality, but All-Self beyond all selfishness; spirit enwombed in matter and wrapped round with psychic traces. Within every phantom-self dwells this divine; within all creatures incarnate sleeps the Infinite Sentience—unevolved, hidden, unfelt, unknown, yet destined from all eternity to waken at last and, tearing away the ghostly web of sensuous mind, break forever its chrysalis of flesh and pass beyond all space-time.15

And Nasr on this point: “knowledge remains potentially the supreme way to gain access to the Sacred, and intelligence a ray which . . . is none other than the Divine Light itself as it reflects in man.”16

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In the perennial philosophy a crucial epistemological distinction is made between ratiocination and intellection. Whereas ratiocination is a mental, discursive/analytic operation, intellection involves insight, and immediate or direct apprehension of unitive knowledge, and is traditionally positioned within the heart. The intellect is Plato’s “eye of the soul,” or the “eye of the heart” in Islamic mysticism, or the Hindu sraddha: “knowledge of the heart.” And as the Christian mystic Meister Eckhart says, “There is something in the soul that is uncreated and uncreatable . . . this something is the Intellect.”17 Eckhart’s assertion echoes Aristotle’s agent intellect, which is, according to James Duerlinger, “the divine activity of pure self-knowledge present in our own souls,” as well as the Plotinian view that the essence of a thing is not that thing—it is rather the Intellect, situated “within” and “above”—both immanent and transcendent.18 Emphasizing the integration of who we are with how we know, Smith writes that not only is the Intellect “the sine qua non of our knowing; it is the ground of our being—that which gives us our existence. Philosophers now separate epistemology and ontology and give them different referents, with the result that truth is regarded as a function of propositions, not things. Traditionally, the two were more or less joined. In Latin, verus means ‘true’; it also means ‘real,’ ‘genuine,’ and ‘authentic’— properties that are not restricted to statements. . . . In Sanskrit sat doubles for both ‘truth’ and ‘reality.’”19 Examples from other traditions can be cited indicating the convergence of knowing and being. And the great mystical realization of this connection, affirmed by the perennialists, leads to the exclamation of tat tvam asi, “That thou art:” our essence is the divine. This ontology assures epistemological efficacy. That is, as the Ultimate or God is absolute and infinite, manifesting all possibilities, the relative and finite is necessarily contained therein. We exist in this latter maya realm, yet fortunately we possess (or are possessed by) the Intellect—that facet of the Absolute that makes us “theomorphic” beings, capable of knowing Truth with a capital “T,” or the Real. This knowing is primarily an act of recollection (Plato), or in Sufi parlance, dhikr—“remembering” to combat our chronic gaflah or “forgetting.” We recollect or return to that which always was within. Intellection is direct, a priori apprehension of truth. Put another way, it is understanding, as in the German verstehen— “standing under.” It is immediate intuition, as opposed to discursive ratiocination—which can only manage insights once attained, not arrive at them. Reason is conceived traditionally, as handmaiden to theology, which is itself just a gateway to intellective experience. And yet even the existence of the intellect is often not sufficient for liberation/ salvation. Even though, according to Nasr, “the Intellect shines within the being of man, man is too far removed from his primordial nature to be able to make full use of this divine gift by himself. He needs revelation which alone can actualize the intellect in man, and allow it to function properly.”20 The perennialist emphasis on revelation as an essential component in our knowing the Real, and thus achieving deliverance, assures the continuing relevance of the world’s great religious traditions. The spiritual insights sourced in the Intellect take shape as revelation, and solidity in the context of a tradition. Revelation is complex. Or rather its interpretation is multileveled—from the literal to anagogical/metaphorical, to the mystical, all hierarchically ordered as well. The perennialist holds that tradition is essential for proper elucidation and understanding of revelation.

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But tradition too is complex. This brings us to the last key component of the perennialist worldview, namely, the distinction between the exoteric and esoteric aspects of religion. Broadly speaking, all of the great religious traditions are composed of these two dimensions. The exoteric involves ritual, rites, customs, law, and theological formulations/dogma. It is all the outward facets of a tradition, imbuing the tradition with distinction. The exoteric aspect is responsible for the genuine differences between traditions. The esoteric, on the other hand, involves the spirit rather than the letter—it is the inner, intellectual, and experiential dimension of a tradition, shorn of visible or tangible accoutrement. The esoteric is concerned with the deepest meaning or rite, ritual, symbol, law, and dogma, for the end of awakening, realization, or gnosis. In Judaism for instance, the exoteric/esoteric contrast can be seen in the difference between Talmudic and Kabbalistic interpretation. Or in Islam, it is the difference between the Shariah and the Tariqah. Here too, hierarchy is the structure: the esoteric is the “higher” aspect, the core or heart of a tradition. And it is accessed and understood only by an elite minority of spiritual savants, those who perceive an inner dimension in all religious forms. The perennialists would remind us of the ancient epistemological principle of adequatio: the thing known requires the appropriately developed instrument in the knower. Plotinus: “Knowing demands the organ fitted to the object.”21 If the organ or instrument is not up to par, certain levels of reality will not be perceived. The achievement of gnosis or spiritual knowledge is usually a long, arduous task, requiring strict preliminary moral development and observance. Only then, and with necessary grace, can the aspirant hope to be adequate to the divine sophia. The esoteric is thus necessarily the minority orientation in every tradition. Both the exoteric and esoteric orientations are essential for the full development and efficacy of a religious tradition. But the relation between the two is one of creative tension. The esoteric can occasionally appear dismissive of religious law and observance, whereas the exoteric often looks skeptically upon seemingly amoral mystical experiences and insight. This tension hints at the reasons behind the perennialist’s pluralistic view of religious diversity. According to Smith: The attitude of each spiritual type toward the other must in the nature of things be, at best, ambivalent. The esoteric will honor the exoteric’s faith, for he will see it as invested in scripture and/or incarnation that truly are God’s revelations. He will not, however, be able to share the exoteric’s conviction that the text or life which he encounters his revelation is the only, or in any event supreme, mode in which God has spoken. The exoteric’s assessment of the esoteric is likely to be less charitable, not because exoterics are less endowed with that virtue, but because, a portion of the esoteric position being obscured from him, he cannot honor it without betraying the truth he does see. If, as the esoteric maintains, Revelation has multiple and equal instances, no single instance can be absolute. But single instance—be it Christ, the Koran, or whatever—is what the exoteric’s faith is anchored in, so esoterism looms as exoterism’s subverter.22

From this dyadic perspective, the perennial philosophy is sourced in the esoteric, while yet fully honoring the outward dimensions of and real differences

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between the world’s religious traditions. Thus the point of tension lies, not between each of the great traditions, but between esoteric and exoteric understandings of the religious phenomenon. The esoteric emphasis on the hierarchic structure of religious knowledge leads to the espousal of the principle of formal diversity and inner unity.23 That espousal, along with the macrocosmic-microcosmic correlation, is captured in the rather arresting statement by Schuon: “In esoterism there are two principles . . . the first is that fundamentally, there is only one religion with various forms, for humanity is one and the spirit is one; the second principle is that man bears everything within himself, potentially at least, by reason of the immanence of the one Truth.”24 Assertions such as “there is only one religion with various forms” has often led to a misunderstanding of the perennialist perspective, as was mentioned. Formal diversity is and must be emphasized as much as inner unity. Both the exoteric or orthodox structure and esoteric are necessary complements in a well-functioning tradition, with no single tradition being sufficient for all of humanity. Schuon emphasizes that “the unity of the different religions is not only unrealizable on the external level, that of the forms themselves, but ought not to be realized at that level, even were this possible, for in that case the revealed forms would be deprived of their sufficient reason. The very fact that they are revealed shows that they are willed by the Divine Word.”25 The key signature of the perennial philosophy, and the point that is most pertinent to this discussion, is the affirmation of genuine pluralism, or put negatively, the rejection of any one tradition’s exclusive possession of the Truth. Aside from the soteriological reasons for this, its basis is sheer metaphysical impossibility. Schuon states the argument in the following way: every religion, as a specific form, “by definition cannot be unique and exclusive, that is to say, it cannot be the only possible expression of what it expresses. Form implies specification or distinction, and the specific is only conceivable as a modality of a ‘species.’ . . . To claim that a limitation, for example, a form considered as such, is unique and incomparable of its kind, and that it excludes the existence of other analogous modalities, is to attribute to it the unicity of Existence itself.”26 Putting it another way, “a form is always a modality of a category of formal, and therefore distinctive or multiple, manifestations, and is consequently but one modality among others that are equally possible, their supraformal cause alone being unique.”27 No structure, religious or otherwise, can be all-inclusive, hence the necessity of diversity. But the necessity of diversity is only possible given supraformal unity. And this unity is only fully realized on the esoteric level of each of the great diverse traditions. To summarize, the basic components of the perennial philosophy, along with its entailed perspective on religious diversity, include the following: (1) the pervasive hierarchic structure of existence; (2) the primacy of the intellect and revelation in psychology and spiritual achievement; (3) the exoteric/esoteric distinction within each religious tradition; (4) the formal integrity (orthodoxy), necessary diversity, and equality of each of the great religious traditions; and (5) the ultimate transcendent unity of religions, both surpassing and validating each respective tradition. Based on its worldview, we can thus see how the perennial philosophy underpins a pluralistic position on religious diversity. But there are of course other views on the matter. We shall now turn to John Hick’s theory of religious diversity.

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JOHN HICK’S PLURALISTIC HYPOTHESIS When examining Hick’s position on religious pluralism, it is important to stay cognizant of the organizing problem or question that he is attempting to solve or answer: How do we account, from a nonreductionistic perspective, for the reality of multiple faith traditions? Put another way: from a global religious perspective, how do we account for the reality of religious diversity? Hick’s thesis or hypothesis is that all the great religious traditions are different but equally veridical responses to a transcategorial ultimate, or what he calls the “Real,” echoing a designation of the divine in a number of traditions. In other words, every great tradition is responding to the same ultimate reality that goes beyond our comprehension, but in very different guises according to our diverse cultural contexts. And these different responses to the Real are on the whole legitimate and accurate, based upon a pragmatic criterion, which will be discussed presently. But first, how did Hick arrive at this conclusion? Hick begins his case for the pluralistic hypothesis by arguing that the universe is religiously ambiguous. That is, the universe can be understood and experienced both religiously and naturalistically. There is no way, for instance, to accurately quantify arguments and evidence for and against the existence of God or a transcendent reality. There is no agreed-upon value assignation to arguments, evidence, or experience. Of course, these can and do sway people to conclude one way or the other (or both ways at different times), but there is no objective criterion that can ever properly settle the matter. Hick thus concludes that “the universe maintains its inscrutable ambiguity. In some aspects it invites whilst in others it repels a religious response. It permits both a religious and a naturalistic faith, but haunted in each case by a contrary possibility that can never be exorcised. Any realistic analysis of religious belief and experience, and any realistic defense of the rationality of religious conviction, must therefore start from this situation of systematic ambiguity.”28 And given this ambiguity, it is nonetheless “entirely rational for those who experience religiously to trust their religious experience and to base their living and believing on it. The principle on which this argument rests has recently been aptly called the ‘critical trust approach.’”29 The important qualification indicated by “critical” is that it is rational to trust our experience except when we have some reason to doubt it. For instance, we normally trust our sensory perception of the outside world, except when we have some reason to doubt, such as during the experience of a hallucination or optical illusion. But those are exceptions that prove the rule of our fairly accurate grasp of our environment. At issue then is whether we can apply this principle to our religious experience. Here we encounter Hick’s concept of “epistemic distance.” He argues that if the universe were not religiously ambiguous—if the divine were ever consciously present and self-evident—there would be no genuine creaturely freedom in response. We would be compelled to follow in the direction of the divine. In contrast, according to Hick, if God preserves an epistemic distance from us, so that we are free to be aware or unaware of the divine presence, then it can reasonably be expected that at any given time not everyone will have freely opened themselves to an awareness of that presence. And if, as the pluralistic hypothesis holds, religious experience is always

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culturally conditioned, it is not surprising that it takes different forms within the different traditions. In view of this I believe that it is reasonable to apply the critical trust principle (with its proviso) to religious experience.30

Hick then extends this legitimacy principle to all traditions; it is an example of what he calls the “epistemological golden rule”—if we believe our tradition is legitimate (based upon the critical trust argument), then we must extend that view to all the other great traditions, who likewise apply the same principle in ascribing veracity to their own experience. If this principle is sound, then, as Hick states, “it must apply to the other traditions as well, and it thereby validates a plurality of incompatible religious belief systems.”31 We can compare this view with the perennialist perspective, as stated by Schuon: “he who sets out to prove the truth of one religion either has no proofs, since such proofs do not exist, or else he has the proofs that affirm all religious truths without exception, whatever the form in which it may have clothed itself.”32 Comparisons will be discussed further in the next section. Getting back to Hick’s position: the basic epistemological principle in operation here is critical realism; all of our experiencing is always “experiencing-as”—it always involves an element of interpretation. We never see an object as it purely, truly is, but only as it is through our cognitive processing. This is of course not a new idea. As a variant of the teaching of adequatio, Thomas Aquinas for instance states that “the thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower.”33 Hick applies this principle to understanding diverse religious systems. He states his position thus: “The hypothesis is that there is an ultimate reality . . . which is in itself transcategorial (ineffable), beyond the range of our human conceptual systems, but whose universal presence is humanly experienced in the various forms made possible by our conceptual-linguistic systems and spiritual practices.”34 As an aspect of this critical realist position, Hick incorporates Immanuel Kant’s distinction between phenomena and noumena, or the way in which things appear, and the way they are in themselves. The Real appears to us in a variety of ways, but the way the Real is in itself we cannot say. This distinction commonly raises the following question: if we cannot know the Real as it is in itself, why suppose that it exists at all? One might respond by asking whether there exists such a thing as an interior, consciousness aspect to the human person, which is not directly/immediately accessible by those outside. Hick would reply that the Real is that which must exist if our religious experience and knowledge is to be legitimate, or more than just an illusory projection. It must be remembered that this is an attempt at a religious explanation of religion, starting from within “the circle of faith,” as Paul Tillich and others have formulated the matter. Another response that typically gets raised at this point in examining Hick’s argument is the following: perhaps this legitimates some religious experience, but why assume all religious traditions are equally true? In response, we see the other key component of Hick’s position: soteriological parity. Hick maintains that when we look around us at all the great traditions, we see that they are all more or less equal in producing people who have achieved extraordinary spiritual consciousness and being in the world. Every great tradition is capable of offering salvation or liberation, and producing mahatmas or saints. This involves a shift in orientation from what Hick calls, as mentioned previously, self-centeredness to Reality-centeredness.

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The proof of trans-faith legitimacy therefore lies in a pragmatic criterion. If we accept this, then we are naturally led to conclude that all traditions are oriented toward the same ineffable absolute. Hick thus offers a global or comprehensive, nonreductionistic or non-naturalistic interpretation of religion that is grounded in critical realism and pragmatic criteria. A number of philosophers of religion agree with Sumner B. Twiss when he states that “Hick’s theory of religious pluralism constitutes one coherent and not implausible account of the diversity of the world’s religious traditions.”35 But of course, not everyone agrees. One striking facet of Hick’s hypothesis is the resultant extraordinary amount of attention and criticism it has received by theologians and philosophers of religion. There are a few reasons for this. One of which is that it is a powerful contender for “best explanation of the facts” of religious diversity, hence the attention to the theory. But another reason is that it controversially requires an apparent reconceptualization of certain dogmas and self-understandings within each of the traditions. This will be discussed further as we briefly examine, following Hick’s approach, the statements of numerous critics of his theory by grouping them under the most significant commonly recurring themes.

CRITICISMS OF THE PLURALISTIC HYPOTHESIS First, Hick’s theory has been accused by one of his prominent critics Gavin D’Costa of really just being a form of agnosticism, vitiating intended explanation, given the asserted ineffability of the Real. Hick responds that this is not accurate. He is not asserting that we cannot know the nature of the Real, but rather that all positive terms “are part of our human conceptual field . . . and according to the pluralistic hypothesis the Real is beyond, or outside, this conceptual field.”36 This is maintained in part as a response to the chronic and irresolvable metaphysical debates between the traditions. Divine transcategoriality is essential to this hypothesis if it is going to be effective in explaining the global religious situation. Further, as Hick notes, transcategoriality is in fact taught by virtually all the great thinkers of the different traditions . . . but monotheistic theologians then regularly undermine this basic insight by making a wealth of positive claims about the nature of the supposedly ineffable reality. Christian theologians, for example, having declared that “God transcends even the mind” (Augustine) or that “by its immensity the divine substance surpasses every form that our intellect reaches” (Aquinas), nevertheless profess to know that this ineffable reality is in its ultimate nature a Trinity of Father, Son and Holy Spirit, the second person of whom became incarnate as Jesus Christ. But we ought to be consistent at this crucial point, despite the far-reaching implications of doing so. We cannot rationally hold both that the ineffable, or transcategorial ultimate reality is indescribable in human terms and also that it is correctly describable in the terms provided by one’s own religious tradition.37

With the assertion of the phenomena/noumena distinction, Hick’s position is thus arguably best termed a quasi-agnosticism, since it advocates greater realism regarding our actual and potential religious knowledge.

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One might then ask: what about directly experiencing the Real—is this possible, as all of the great traditions assert? Hick’s answer goes back to the epistemological stance of critical realism. We only ever experience the other through our conceptual repertoire. We experience the Real not as it is in itself, but as it presents itself to us, mediately, through our cognitive structure (“experiencing-as”). Hick mentions an apt line from the Hindu text the Yogavasistha: “Thou art formless. Thy only form is our knowledge of thee.”38 Moving to another line of criticism, it has often been claimed by thinkers such as Kenneth Surin, Adnan Aslan, and Harold Netland, among others, that Hick’s argument is a form of Western intellectual imperialism, particularly a form of modern, Enlightenment-based rationalism. It is claimed that this hypothesis distorts traditional non-Western belief systems by trying to fit them in occidental categories. In reply, Hick argues that with a little study of world religious history, it becomes clear that this is just not true. As example, he cites the aforementioned words of medieval Muslim mystic Jalal ul-din Rumi: “the lamps are different, but the Light is the same.” Or the ancient Indian Vedas, where it is claimed, “the Real is one, but sages name it variously.”39 Hick argues that we can see similar statements from the Buddhist emperor Ashoka, Guru Nanak, al-Arabi, Ramakrishna, the Dalai Lama, and others. Nor is it an entirely Asian position, however. Similar utterances can be seen in the more mystical strands of Christianity for instance, such as in the writings of Nicolas of Cusa and William Penn. With this perspective, then, it is difficult to argue that Hick’s hypothesis is a form of cultural imperialism. Its basic stance has been expressed in virtually all times and places. Still, many critics insist that his position does not do justice to the distinct and often apparently conflicting cherished beliefs of all the great traditions. Hick does in fact advocate reinterpreting some of these conflicting particularities as absolutely true, but only from within each respective tradition. But as he emphasizes, let’s remember the basic problem we’re trying to solve. Not more than one of these rival belief systems could be finally and universally true, and yet the traditions within which they function seem, when judged by their fruits, to be more or less equally valid responses to the Real. Now the distinction between the Real in itself and the Real as variously humanly thought and experienced enables us to understand how this can be: namely, the differing belief-systems are beliefs about different manifestations of the Real. They’re not mutually conflicting beliefs, because they’re beliefs about different phenomenal realities. It is in this sense that they are reduced or downgraded in their scope.40

It’s a radical reinterpretation, but as Hick says, “we really do have to make a choice between a one-tradition absolutism and a genuinely pluralistic interpretation of the global religious situation.”41 Put another way, Hick’s position is radical precisely because it aspires to comprehensiveness—a virtue that, in our postmodern climate of “incredulity toward metanarratives,” typically receives short shrift in the academy.42 Alfred North Whitehead reminds us that comprehensiveness is “an excellency of which we have nearly forgotten the existence.”43 Referring to his own faith tradition—Christianity—Hick also emphasizes, that “right from the beginning the Christian belief-system has been changing all the time, sometimes slowly and sometimes rapidly, in response to developments

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in human knowledge and experience.”44 With the awareness of the evolution of tradition we realize that it is not so simple as a metatheory imposing itself on the various religions, distorting them all to conform to an overarching belief. Hick reminds his readers that his theory has emerged from within a particular religious tradition itself, just as other pluralistic conceptions have emerged from other traditions. The justification of this view, as he says, “is simply that this is a more realistic view because it takes account of a wider range of data than any one of the traditional absolutisms.”45 This view admittedly departs from the mainstream or exoteric side of most of the traditions, but Hick responds that “yes it does and it must. This has to be recognized by anyone who is trying to develop an understanding of religious diversity.”46 This is indeed recognized by at least some philosophers of religion, such as Sumner B. Twiss. In response to critics such as Harold Netland and Roger Corliss, who claim that Hick’s position is distortive or inappropriate to the various tradition’s self-understandings, Twiss states that this critique results in the overly parochial and protective view that an explanatory account of a belief or practice must be restricted to the perspective and terms of the subject or culture. But this is precisely to confuse different levels or senses of interpretation [internal-descriptive and higher-order explanatory] (and interpretive adequacy) in such a way as to block genuine inquiry and attempts at explanation and theory from a perspective different from that of a subject or culture. This seems at best myopic and at worst a confused antiintellectualism . . . why should we suppose that an explanatory-theoretical account must at that level simply replicate or be bound by traditional understandings and concepts? . . . of course, the account is reductive, invoking non-traditional theoretical factors to explain in a systematic and comprehensive way what doctrines-as-they-are-understood-internally-to-tradition may really be all about. Is not this what a theory is supposed to do?47

(Here “reductive” pertains to “explanatory,” not “naturalistic.”) This passage by Twiss reminds us that Hick’s attempt at theoretical explanation is legitimate, as long as we recognize the value of higher-order explanation; that is,“philosophy-of.” A variation of the criticism that Hick’s position is a distortion of the traditions is the assertion that his theory is a form of homogenization: it makes all the religions basically the same, with the same questions and goals. Critics such as Mark Heim emphasize the sometimes seemingly vast differences in orientation among the religions. In response Hick argues that they are all specifically different, but generically the same. “They all presuppose a profound present lack, and the possibility of a radically better future; and they are all answers to the question, how to get from one to the other.”48 Hick emphasizes that the religions are not all the same, and they do not all say the same things. “On the contrary, religious pluralism sees them as different, often very different totalities consisting of distinctive ways of conceiving and experiencing the Real. And the practical outcome is not that there should be a new global religion, the same for everyone, but that the adherents of each of the existing world faiths should respond as fully as possible to the Real, the Ultimate, in their own way by devoutly living out their own tradition. So in this respect religious pluralism leaves the different traditions just as they are. They are recognized, respected,

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affirmed as authentic contexts of salvation/liberation, each with its own unique character and historical particularities.”49 One last point in this survey of criticisms, by way of reiteration: As Alvin Plantinga has asked, why posit the Real at all? Why believe that there is an absolute behind the many faces of God, as it were? The response, again, is that “[t]he Real itself is . . . that which there must be if our human religious experience, in its variety of forms, is not purely imaginative projection but is at the same time a mediated awareness of the ultimate transcendent reality.”50 Hick offers a more concise version of his pluralistic hypothesis by a compelling analogy or metaphor: just as the rainbow, as the sun’s light, clear and without color itself, is refracted by the earth’s atmosphere, or a prism, into the spectrum of colors, so is the divine light, lucid in itself, refracted by human cultures into the spectrum of religions. Still, there remains much resistance to Hick’s hypothesis. It has been accused by the process philosopher David Ray Griffin of attempting to equalize all traditions by making them all equally wrong. But this is inaccurate. They are equalized, more or less, because of taking seriously the principles of critical realism, divine ineffability, and soteriological parity. Outside of pluralist-oriented circles, it can be said that the primary impetus for resistance to Hick’s hypothesis lies in the inability to cede supposed superiority of one’s own tradition, however nuanced or politely stated. If one wishes to maintain the spiritual superiority of one’s own tradition, in the process violating the epistemological golden rule, one must clearly accept the onus of proof that their specific fruits are more nourishing than those of all the other traditions. Not to mention the spirit-destroying arrogance that this position entails. There are of course other ways of conceiving religious pluralism, as well as other criticisms of Hick’s position. Some of these criticisms are voiced by the perennial philosophers themselves. We shall now bring these two positions together in comparison and contrast in the following section.

THE PERENNIAL PHILOSOPHY AND JOHN HICK’S PLURALISTIC HYPOTHESIS IN RELATION Between John Hick’s position and the perennial philosophy there are areas of strong commonality, as well as considerable areas of divergence. We shall examine each in turn. First, both are explicitly pluralist in orientation toward religious diversity (methodological or terminological issues notwithstanding). James Cutsinger states that the perennial philosophy is “the affirmation of the spiritual equivalence of the great revelations.”51 With the emphasis on equivalence, Hick would concur. Second, both argue for the unicity of the Ultimate or Real, with its status as the source of our genuine religious experience and response. This religious experience/response is genuine or legitimate in that it is not merely human projection onto purely natural phenomena, and it is potentially spiritually efficacious or transformative. Both have been identified as a species of “identist” pluralism, to use David Ray Griffin’s terminology: “According to identist pluralism, all religions are oriented toward the same religious object . . . and promote essentially the same end (the same type of ‘salvation’). Identist pluralism is, in other words, identist both ontologically and soteriologically.”52 Yet although both

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positions affirm the unity of the Ultimate, and the same broad kind of transformational response, they also emphasize the considerable differences between the religions, a point that is often misunderstood or ignored by critics. Again, there is inner unity, but equally there is formal diversity. How those acknowledged genuine differences are understood is a separate issue. Third, both Hick and the perennial philosophy affirm the diversity and multivalency of religious language in each tradition. Both affirm genuinely cognitive/realist/correspondent religious language, as well as metaphorical and mythological religious discourse. Fourth, implied in the affirmation of equivalence between the traditions is the assertion that only the Absolute is absolute. That is, the great traditions are sufficient but finite and less-than-perfect emanations of or responses to the Real or Absolute. To claim otherwise would result in, as Wilfred Cantwell Smith and others remind us, being guilty of idolatry. In contrast, the pluralist perspective entails the attitude of humility as each tradition faces the other in acknowledged limitation. Emphasizing limitation and difference in a continuing analysis of identity and form, Schuon states: “A religion is a form, and so also a limit, which ‘contains’ the Limitless, to speak in paradox; every form is fragmentary because of its necessary exclusion of other formal possibilities; the fact that these forms—when they are complete, that is to say, when they are perfectly themselves—each in their own way represent totality does not prevent them from being fragmentary in respect of their particularization and their reciprocal exclusion.”53 Lastly, both Hick and the perennialists agree that religions stand or fall together in relation to competing alternative Weltanschauungen, such as atheistic scientism, or postmodern skepticism. Both hold that an argument for broad religious truth-claims contained in a particular tradition only legitimates or lends credence to all other forms of genuine religious expression. With an awareness of these commonalities, one might be tempted to conclude that Hick’s position is a part of the “great chain” of perennialism, as it were. Indeed, a case could be made for such a conclusion, depending upon the interpretation of certain elements in each system. But upon closer inspection, the real differences between the two would make such an argument difficult to sustain. The points of difference, primarily, revolve around the nature of knowing (epistemology), and the nature of traditions. We shall examine each, with their attendant related issues, in turn. As discussed, a key feature of the perennial philosophy is its emphasis upon the distinction between reason and the intellect (also termed “intelligence”), or the knowing modes of ratiocination, and intellection. And Nasr states that only the intellect or intelligence “can know the Absolute and in fact only the Absolute is completely intelligible. Below that level, the activity of maya enters into play and brings about an element of ambiguity and uncertainty.”54 Here we begin to see a contrast between perennialism and Hick’s position—it is a difference between mysticism and gnosis on the one hand, and rationalism/philosophy and quasiagnosticism on the other. Hick would agree that we live in an epistemological world of ambiguity and uncertainty, but he would deny that the Absolute or Real is capable of complete intelligibility. In place of an apparent capacity for immediate intuitive knowledge of the Real, he would claim that our only capacity or legitimate orientation is faith, understood as critical trust. All knowledge acquisition is mediated and limited, and ultimately critical trust has to fill in the gap, as it

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were, with the only exception being Hick’s allowance of a possible future or eschatological verification (one of the reasons for the qualifier “quasi” on his position as “agnostic.” The other reason being the positing of unknowable noumena). The perennial philosophy is decidedly gnostic and mystical in orientation, as is evidenced in the fundamental connection between epistemology and ontology or identity. That is, from the perennialist perspective, we are assured of the veracity of our spiritual knowledge because the core of our being is identical to the Real— tat tvam asi—“that thou art.” Nasr writes that “discrimination between the Real and the unreal terminates in the awareness of the nondual nature of the Real, the awareness of which is the heart of gnosis and which represents not human knowledge but God’s knowledge of Himself.”55 This mystical perspective of essential unity with the divine is a basic esoteric teaching that is in tension with the exoteric or official teachings of a number of the great traditions. The exoteric position typically emphasizes the radical transcendence of divinity, rather than its immanence. But aside from religious or theological stance, there are according to Hick philosophical problems with the assertion of identity: If the mystic, having returned from the unitive state, is able to remember and describe the experience, must there not have been a continuity of individual consciousness and memory formation during that experience? Must there not have been a continuous thread of individual memory-bearing consciousness throughout? To become totally dissolved in the infinite reality of Brahman, like a drop falling into the ocean—which is a familiar analogy in the advaitic literature—would be a state from which there could be no return to the same finite individuality.56

There are, then, conceptual problems with this common report of literal unitive experience and identity in the mystical worldview. As Hick notes, the unitive mystical experience seems to stand outside of the critical realist model of the exceptionless mediation of experience by cultural-human conceptual constructs. If there were only one kind of mystical report, Hick’s hypothesis would need to be amended. However, as he states, “does not the fact that there are a number of different traditions of unitive mysticism, offering their characteristically different reports of the nature of the Real, make it seem more likely that the otherwise universal structure of human consciousness hold here also, and that that which is being directly experienced is not that Real an sich but the Real manifested respectively as Sunyata, as Brahman, as God?”57 The typical perennialist response to this kind of problem is that it cannot be resolved through rational analysis; rather, these kinds of quandaries can only be resolved through direct experience of higher levels of being. But the gnostic or jnanic way of intellection is not the only means to the ultimate in the perennial philosophy. As we have seen, there is also revelation. Adherence to revealed truths is sufficient for salvation for the “common man,” and it is also often necessary for the activation of the intellect, for that esoteric minority pursuing higher states of mystical experience. Here the perennialists don the other cap and affirm the exoteric or orthodox value of received truths. Revelation can be understood as the necessary structure or edifice of a spiritual tradition. Its veracity simply needs to be accepted if the individual’s spiritual progress is to occur. From Hick’s perspective however, even revelation is mediated

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or conceptually/culturally filtered. We thus must refrain, at the least, from claiming inerrancy when asserting descriptions of the Absolute. And of course, the issue of revelation opens-up a Pandora’s box when it comes to scriptural interpretation and criterion of judgment for veracity, with its attendant disagreements, wars, and splintering into “heterodoxies,” as the history or religions attest. The perennialist answer to this problem is: spiritual authority. Nasr claims that “[a]s long as one remains within a single tradition, there is always, within that religion, an inerrant authority which is guaranteed by Heaven for those who accept that religion. . . . The believers of a particular religious tradition live with the certitude that there is an authority which guarantees its authenticity and voice which can speak the truth.”58 This position has arguably only become increasingly untenable, beginning, in the modern era at least, with the intellectual revolutions of the Enlightenment, principles of which included the reversal or overturning of the traditional hierarchy of Revelation, and elitist spiritual authority, down to democratic process, Reason as arbiter, and individual conscience and conviction. In contrast, regarding metaphysical beliefs, Hick claims that “we should be very cautious in making knowledge-claims in these areas . . . we have to accept that our opinions in these areas are only opinions, and that it is not necessary for salvation that our present opinions turn out to be true.”59 Commenting on this kind of (neo)modern view, Nasr replies: “Such a perspective finally replaces divine authority by human understanding and cannot but fall into a kind of humanism which only dilutes what remains of religion.”60 And Schuon refers to this trend as an aspect of a slide into “suicidal liberalism.”61 Hick would likely reply that it is always “human understanding” in operation— for better or for worse we have no choice in the matter. Furthermore, the perennialists seem to ignore forms of humanism that fit squarely in the domain of religion, and arguably take an ironically myopic view of the forms that Spirit can assume—from the sacredness of doubt and uncertainty, to the positive life and spirit-affirming achievements of secular liberalism, not least of which i