Traditional and Analytical Philosophy: Lectures on the Philosophy of Language

Traditional and analytical philosophy L EC T UR E S ON THE P H I L O S O P H Y OF L A N G U A G E

ERNST T U G E N D H A T

Traditional and analytical philosophy L ECT URE S ON THE P H I L O S O P H Y OF L A N G U A G E T R A N S L A T E D BY P. A. G O R N E R

C A M B R I D G E U N I V E R S I T Y PRESS CAMBRIDGE LONDON

NEW YORK

MELBOURNE

SYDNEY

NEW ROCHELLE

Published by the Press Syndicate o f th e U niversity o f C am bridge T h e Pitt B uilding, T ru rh p in g to n S treet, C am bridge CB2 1RP 32 East 5 7 th Street, New Y ork, NY 10022, USA 296 B eaconsfield P arade, M iddle Park, M elbourne 3206, A ustralia. © S u h rk a m p 1976 E nglish tran sla tio n © C a m b rid g e U niversity press 1982 F irst pub lish ed 1982 P rin ted in T h e U n ited States o f A m erica by Vail-Ballou Press, Inc., B in g h am to n , N.Y. T h is book was originally pub lish ed in G e rm an in 1976 by S u h rk a m p u n d e r the title Vorlesungen zur E inführung in die sprachanalytische Philosophie. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data T u g e n d h a t, E rn st T ra d itio n a l a n d analytical philosophy. 1. L an g u ag es— Philosophy I. T itle II. V o rle su n g en z u r E in fü h ru n g in die sprachanalytische Philosophie. English 401 P I 06 ISB N 0 521 22236 2

T O T H E M E M O R Y OF MARTIN HEIDEGGER

Contents

P reface T ra n s la to r’s p refac e P art I

ix xi

Introduction: confrontation of analytical philosophy with traditional conceptions of philosophy 1 A q u estio n o f m e th o d 3 2 A p h ilo so p h e r in search o f a con cep tio n o f p h ilo so p h y 12 3 O ntology an d sem antics 21 4 H as fo rm a l sem antics a fu n d a m e n ta l questio n ? 35 5 C onsciousness an d speech 50 6 T h e a rg u m e n t w ith th e p h ilo so p h y o f consciousness co n tin u ed 65 7 A practical co n cep tio n o f p h ilo so p h y 76

P art II 8 9 10 11

12 13 14 15

A first step: analysis of the predicative sentence P re lim in ary reflections on m e th o d an d preview o f th e co u rse o f th e investigation 93 H u sse rl’s th e o ry o f m e a n in g 107 C ollapse o f th e tra d itio n a l th e o ry o f m e a n in g 121 P redicates: th e first step in th e d e v e lo p m e n t o f an analytical con cep tio n o f th e m e an in g o f sentences. T h e d isp u te be­ tw een nom inalists a n d conceptualists 133 T h e basic p rin cip le o f analytical p hiloso p h y . T h e d isp u te co n tin u ed . P red icates a n d q u asi-p red icates 150 T h e m e a n in g o f a n expressio n a n d th e circu m stan ces o f its use. D isp u te with a behaviouristic co n cep tio n 163 T h e e m p lo y m e n t-ru le o f an asserto ric sen ten ce. A rg u m e n t with G rice a n d S earle 177 Positive acco u n t o f th e e m p lo y m e n t-ru le o f asserto ric sen­ tences in term s o f th e tru th -re la tio n 192

Contents

16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

27

28

V lll

S u p p lem en ts 207 ‘A n d ’ an d ‘o r ’ 227 G en eral sentences. R esum ption of th e p ro b lem o f p redicates 243 T h e m o d e of em ploym ent o f predicates. T ra n sitio n to sin­ gular term s 257 W hat is it fo r a sign to stand fo r an object? T h e trad itio n al account 270 T h e function o f singular term s 284 Russell and Straw son 297 W hat i s ‘identification’? 310 Specification an d identification. Specification an d tru th 323 S patio -tem p o ral identification and the constitution o f the object-relation 337 S u p p lem en ts 348 I T h e connection betw een object-relation, situationin d e p e n d e n c e a n d the truth-capacity o f assertoric speech 348 II R eciprocal d e p e n d en c e of the identification o f spatiote m p o ral objects and th e identification o f spatio-tem poral positions 357 Results 372 I T h e analytical concept o f an object 375 II T h e m ode o f em ploym ent of predicative sentences an d th e explan atio n o f the w ord ‘tru e ’ 381 T h e n e x t steps 391 N otes B ibliography In d ex o f nam es In d e x o f subjects

411 429 434 436

Preface

In so-called analytical o r language-analytical philosophy th e re is little reflection on its own foun d atio n s, a n d today less th an b efo re. For the m ost part the problem s treated are inherited problem s w hich are not questioned. Partly this is d u e to a lack o f historical consciousness. A way o f philosophizing can only becom e a fu n d am e n tal philosophical posi­ tion by c o n fro n tin g it with earlier conceptions o f philosophy. T his reflection on fo undations is not ju s t an additional act o f self-clarification. It is a condition o f a philosophy’s ability to perceive the task that has always b een the genuinely philosophical task: the ex am in atio n o f existing questions, m ethods and basic concepts, an d the d ev elo p m en t o f new ones. T h ese lectures aim to provide an im petus in this direction. T hey th e re fo re have the ch aracter o f an in tro d u ctio n . By m eans o f a con­ fro n ta tio n with trad itio n al p hilosophy’s fu n d am e n tal o rien tatio n to the subject-object schem a they attem p t to bring questions w hich already exist in analytical philosophy into the context o f a specifically languageanalytical fu n d am e n tal question. As reg a rd s co n ten t they move in a field o f investigation th at is by no m eans new; an d even in this field they take only a first step. T h e book is directed at th ree d iffe re n t groups o f read ers. T h e rea d er w hom it addresses directly in the fo rm o f lectures is the philosophical b eg in n er, fo r w hom it could serve as an in tro d u ctio n to th e p h ilo so p h ­ ical way of thinking. At the sam e tim e it is directed , if only in an oblique way, at the re a d e r who is already well-versed in linguistic analysis. A bove all, how ever, it is directed at those who, b ein g m ore o r less fam il­ iar with trad itio n al philosophical m odes o f conception, miss in analyti­ cal philosophy a fu n d am e n tal q uestion which can be co m p ared with the g reat trad itio n al approaches. T his book seeks to bu ild a b rid g e fo r such rea d ers, by try in g to show th a t analytical philosophy contains a fu n d a ­

Preface

x

m ental question w hich can1 not only com pare w ith the trad itio n al ap p ro ach es b u t actually proves to be su p e rio r to th em . T his aim is a reflection o f my own d ev e lo p m e n t, which sta rted out fro m H eid e g g er an d led to language-analytical philosophy. I becam e convinced th a t H e id e g g e r’s question ab o u t th e u n d e rsta n d in g o f ‘B e in g ’ can only acquire a concrete an d realizable m ean in g w ithin the fram ew ork o f a language-analytical philosophy. A lth o u g h th e re is h ardly any m en tio n o f H eid e g g er in these lectures I owe to him the specific m ode o f access with w hich I ap p ro a ch the p roblem s o f analyti­ cal philosophy. For this reason th e book is ded icated to him . It has its o rigin in lectures I gave in H eid e lb e rg in the S u m m er sem ester o f 1970. A lthough I have re-w ritten an d e x p a n d e d th e tex t it seem ed to m e sensible to reta in the lecture-form . Starnberg, March 1976.

E.T.

Translator’s Preface

My aim th ro u g h o u t this tran slatio n has been to co m bine accuracy with readability, b u t at tim es the latter q uality has h ad to take seco n d place. W h en ev er possible long sentences have b een b ro k e n dow n in to several s h o rte r ones, b u t in som e cases to have d o n e this w ould have significantly a lte re d the sense o f w hat is being said. As fo r my tran slatio n o f individual w ords th e follow ing re q u ire som e co m m ent. For Vorstellung I have used ‘re p re s e n ta tio n ’ r a th e r th a n ‘id e a’, for to have ch osen the la tte r w ould have m ade it im possible to tran slate th e verbal fo rm s vorstellen, vorgestellt etc. I co n sid ered th e m o re literal ‘p re se n ta tio n ’, b u t in the e n d settled fo r ‘re p re se n ta tio n ’ b ecau se o f the c u rren c y it has acq u ired th ro u g h K em p S m ith ’s tran slatio n o f the Critique o f Pure Reason. F o r both Bezugnahme, bezugnehmen an d Ver­ weisung, verweisen I have h a d to use ‘re fe re n c e ’, ‘r e f e r ’. For th e m ost p a rt it is clear fro m the co n tex t w hich sense is in te n d e d , b u t w h ere th e re is th e possibility o f co n fu sio n I have p u t th e G erm a n term in brackets. F or gegenständlich I have used the artificial ‘o b jectu al’ because ‘objective’ w ould have been positively m isleading. Gegenständlich m eans so m eth in g like ‘having th e ch a racter o f an object’. It has n o th in g to do w ith ‘objec­ tive5 in the sense in w hich, fo r exam p le, a ju d g m e n t may be objective (ra th e r th an subjective). In tran slatin g q u o tatio n s fro m H u sse rl’s Logische Untersuchungen I have in the m ain follow ed J. N. F in d lay ’s tran slatio n . In th e case o f W ittgenstein I have sim ply r e p ro d u c e d the s ta n d a rd E nglish tran sla­ tions w ithout m ak in g any changes. I w ould like to th a n k P rofessor T u g e n d h a t fo r the th o ro u g h n e ss o f his com m ents at every o f th e tran slatio n , my frie n d s Eric M atthew s an d G uy Stock for som e very help fu l discussions o f points re la tin g to th e tran slation, an d th e G e rm a n A cadem ic E x ch an g e Service (DAAD) fo r en a b lin g m e to have two p erio d s o f study in G erm an y with c o n seq u e n t

Translator's preface

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benefit to my know ledge o f G erm a n philosophy an d th e G erm an la n ­ guage. Finally, I wish to th a n k P rofessor H ans W e rn e r A rn d t o f th e U niversity o f M an n h eim for having first d raw n my a tte n tio n to P ro fe s­ sor T u g e n d h a t’s book. P. A. G O R N E R

University o f Aberdeen

P art O ne Introduction: confrontation of analytical philosophy with traditional conceptions of philosophy

LECTURE 1

A question of m ethod

‘In tro d u c tio n to language-analytical p h ilo so p h y ’ - th a t is am b ig u o u s. F ro m a le ctu re-c o u rse with this title o n e m ig h t ex p e ct a survey o f a philosophical m o v em en t, an historical o r system atic g u id e to th e p h ilo ­ sophical lite ra tu re com m only called language-analytical. T h is is n o t w hat I shall be d o in g , p articu la rly as such in tro d u c tio n s to lan g u ag eanalytical ph ilo so p h y already e x ist.1 T h e title can also be in te rp re te d in a n o th e r sense, by u n d e rs ta n d in g ‘p h ilo so p h y ’ in th e sense o f p h ilo so p h ­ ical activity. T h e title w ould th e n d e n o te an in tro d u c tio n to la n g u ag eanalytical philosophizing. O n e in tro d u c e s so m eo n e to a p a rtic u la r activity by d e m o n stra tin g it to him by m eans o f an exam p le, so th a t h e can im itate it. So I w ould have to d e m o n stra te to you a ch aracteristic language-analytical line o f th o u g h t in a way th a t w ould enab le you to follow it a n d stim u late you to ca rry o u t sim ilar p a tte rn s o f a rg u m e n t yourself. A n d in d e e d this is so m e th in g I in te n d to do. B u t such a d e m o n stra tio n by m eans o f an e x a m p le can n o t, ta k en by itself, suffice fo r an in tro d u c tio n if th e activity in q u estio n is a way o f d o in g philosophy. A way o f d o in g philo so p h y is n o t re la te d to o th e r ways o f d o in g p h i­ losophy in th e way th a t o n e fo rm o f d a n c e is re la te d to o th e r form s. F o rm s o f d an c e a re n o t m u tu ally exclusive o r inclusive. O n th e sam e e v e n in g one can, w ith equal en th u sia sm , d an c e a ta n g o , a b oogie a n d a ro ck ’n ’ roll - a n d sim ply n o t b o th e r w ith th e waltz. B u t o n e ca n n o t p h ilo so p h ize in o n e way w ith o u t having rejected o r in c o rp o ra te d the o th ers. A d an c e can be o u t o f date; b u t it is n o t o n th a t ac co u n t in c o r­ rect. In p h ilo so p h y , on th e o th e r h an d , as in every science, th e co n c ern is w ith tru th . F o r this reaso n , alth o u g h ways o f d o in g p h ilo so p h y can be m o d e rn o r o ld -fa sh io n e d , w o rry in g ab o u t this is th e business n o t o f th e p h ilo so p h e r b u t o f th e h isto rian . I f I am asked w hy I d o p h ilo so p h y in this way r a th e r th a n th a t I c a n n o t answ er: ‘B ecause it is u p to d a te ’, b u t

Introduction

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only: ‘Because it is th e correct way.’ B ut this im plies an obligation to ju stify the claim to be correct. T o in tro d u c e som eone to a way o f do in g philosophy, th e re fo re , involves rela tin g it to o th e r ways o f d o in g p h i­ losophy and, by m eans o f such a co n fro n tatio n , d e m o n stratin g its cor­ rectness. B ut this m eans th at o n e m ust d eb a te the idea o f philosophy as such. I f o n e ’s aim is to in tro d u c e som eone to a p articu la r way o f do in g p h i­ losophy one ca n n o t sim ply p resu p p o se the concep t o f philosophy. T o in tro d u c e so m eone to a p articu lar way o f philosophizing is, hence, always also to in tro d u c e som eone to philosophizing as such. If it is tru e th a t o n e can only in tro d u c e som eone to languageanalytical philosophy, o r any o th e r so rt o f philosophy, by co n trastin g it with o th e r ways o f d o in g philosophy, th e n this affects the question o f w hich line o f th o u g h t is to be chosen to illustrate it. We ca n n o t be co n ­ te n t with ju s t any exam ple. In co n fro n tin g language-analytical philos­ o p hy with o th e r ways o f philosophizing we are n o t ju s t co n fro n tin g m ethods. T h e im p o rta n t philosophical positions o f the past always took as th e ir sta rtin g -p o in t certain fu n d a m e n ta l substantive questions a ro u n d which th e w hole field o f possible philosophical questions was o rg anized. In th e case o f language-analytical philosophy it may be less clear w hat its cen tral substantive question is, in d e ed w h eth er it has one. B u t th en we m ay expect th a t it m ig h t be precisely in the co n fro n tatio n with earlier philosophical positions th a t language-analytical philosophy will find its ow n central question. A n d this m eans th a t it is only in this c o n fro n tatio n th a t it will find itself. I f this is co rrec t we c a n n o t assum e th a t language-analytical philoso­ phy is already a fixed q u an tity w hich we can first in tro d u c e an d th en co n tra st with e a rlier positions in an ap p en d ix . N o w h ere is it laid dow n w hat language-analytical philosophy is. I f we so u g h t to arriv e at a defi­ n ition o f ‘language-analytical p h ilo so p h y ’ by a process o f in d u ctio n an d ab straction fro m the existing philosophical lite ra tu re which is d escribed as language-analytical, th e n at best we w ould achieve an em pty ch arac­ terization; it could n o t serve as the basis fo r a con crete way o f philoso­ phizing. So do I w ant to in tro d u c e you to som eth in g w hich does n o t yet exist? In th e case o f philosophy this is not as ab su rd as it sounds. A philosophy is only con stitu ted in philosophizing. I t follows fro m this th a t philoso­ p h izing, an d a way o f philosophizing, is an activity which only becom es w hat it is in th e process o f being in tro d u c ed . B u t in th a t case we m u st ab an d o n yet an o th e r preju d ice: if w hat is b ein g in tro d u c e d does n o t exist p rio r to its in tro d u c tio n th e n clearly

A question of method

5

the p erson w ho wishes to in tro d u ce o th ers to this activity can n o t him self have it at his disposal. H e can only in tro d u c e o th e rs by at th e sam e time in tro d u c in g him self. P erh ap s these reflections strike you as incredible an d as a p o o r p ed a­ gogical trick. Does not the p reten sio n o f seeking to in tro d u ce som eone to som ething which does no t yet exist, and is first co n stitu ted in the in tro d u c tio n , rem in d one o f M ü n c h h au se n ’s atte m p t to pull him self up by his own bootstraps? C an I seriously wish to assert th a t I w ant to in tro d u c e you to som ething with w hich I am m yself n ot yet acquainted? O bviously on e can n o t look fo r som ething o f which o n e does n o t already have a vague prelim inary conception (Vorbegriff). A nd obviously I do have a vague p relim inary conception o f linguistic analysis. B u t th en no d o u b t so do you. O n the o th e r h an d , it is u n clear to us, an d in general, in w hat linguistic analysis, as a philosophical position, really consists. We can n o t expect to rem ove this unclarity by g ettin g an answ er from som ew here, b u t only by d ee p en in g th e existing prelim in ary conception. A nd it may n o t be im plausible to expect th a t precisely fro m a co n fro n ­ tation of linguistic analysis - initially on th e basis o f th e vague prelim i­ n ary conception we have o f it - with im p o rta n t earlier philosophical positions th e re will em erge its own substantive fu n d am e n tal question. T o arrive at this fu n d am e n tal question is th e aim o f th e in tro d u cto ry p a rt o f these lectures (Lectures 1-7). In th e m ain p a rt which follows we shall, by analysing th e predicative sta tem en t-fo rm , take a first step in an sw ering this question. L et us begin, th e n , with th a t vague prelim in ary u n d e rsta n d in g (Vor­ verständnis) w hich everyone can be assum ed to have, inasm uch as it is sim ply an explication o f its designation. Clearly ‘language-analytical ph ilo so p h y ’ refers to a way o f d oing philosophy which involves the belief th a t the problem s o f philosophy can be solved, o r m ust be solved, by m eans of an analysis o f language. Im m ediately th e question arises: by m eans o f w hat sort o f an analysis o f language? T h e analysis o f language w ould seem to be th e task o f linguistics. Does this m ean, th en , th a t philosophy, if it is u n d e rsto o d as linguistic analysis, becom es linguistics o r a p a rt o f linguistics? O r is the analysis o f la nguage carried o u t in philosophy d iffe re n t fro m th a t car­ ried o u t in linguistics? A nd, if so, how is th e d iffe ren ce to be ch a racter­ ized? N otice how , from the very b eginning, o u r e n terp rise becom es m o re com plicated. L anguage-analytical philosophy finds itself con­ fro n te d , not only with a d em an d to legitim ate itself vis-a-vis o th e r con­ ceptions o f philosophy, b u t also with th e d em an d to define its relatio n ­ ship to a closely-connected em pirical science.

Introduction

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We have h e re a specific instance o f a difficulty philosophy has always, faced when trying to define itself: how is it to define its relationship to th e sciences? It is characteristic of m o d e rn philosophy th at this question arises not ju s t in general in relation to all sciences, b u t in a special way in relation to o n e p articu la r science. F or classical m o d ern philosophy, particularly since K ant, this science was psychology. Now it is linguistics. P erhaps th e re is an o th e r way of d o in g philosophy for w hich sociology occupies a c o rresp o n d in g position. In m o d ern philosophy this peculiar collision with a specific em pirical science results from w hat is called its reflective character. It conceives o f its enquiries as consisting n o t in the d irect them atization o f such an d such objects b u t in sim ultaneous reflection on how these objects can be given to us, how they becom e accessible to us. In classical m o d e rn philosophy th e field o f givenness reflected u p o n was conceived as consciousness, a dim ension o f rep resen tatio n s o r ideas; w hereas in the new conception o f philosophy it is conceived as th e sp h ere o f th e u n d e rsta n d in g o f o u r linguistic expressions. In every instance philosophy finds its sp h ere o f reflection already occupied by a p articu lar em pirical science. A nd so each tim e th e question arises: how is this sphere, if, from th e point o f view o f philosophy, it is n o t ju st one sp h e re am ong others, accessible to a specifically philosophical m ode o f study? I know o f no satisfactory answ er to the questio n o f how languageanalytical philosophy is to be distinguished fro m the em pirical science o f linguistics. Such an answ er can certainly n o t be given with the aid o f traditional distinctions betw een philosophy an d science, since this answ er w ould have to d e p e n d essentially on th e new conception o f p h i­ losophy. Anyway at the p rese n t stage o f this in tro d u ctio n we clearly lack all the presuppositions fo r m eaningfully tackling this question. All one can really say at p rese n t is: language-analytical philosophy differs from th e em pirical science o f linguistics in that it has to justify itself as p h i­ losophy, an d , hence, finds itself co n fro n ted by o th e r philosophical positions. I re tu rn to th e nom inal definition of ‘language-analytical philosophy’ as a philosophy which seeks to solve the problem s o f philosophy by m eans o f an analysis o f language. How can we get f u rth e r if we start from this first prelim inary u n d ersta n d in g ? We can tu rn to the p erso n who hears this definition for the first tim e a n d see w hat his initial rea c­ tion is. I f he is a thinking p erson he will im m ediately raise th e following objection (it is th e sta n d ard objection th a t is always b ro u g h t against th e

A question of method

7

language-analytical conception of philosophy). ‘It is clear,’ h e will say, ‘th a t verbal explan atio n s b elong to philosophy. T h e y have always done so. B ut they re p re se n t only a prelim inary stage an d serve m erely to rem ove the unclarity an d am biguity in th e use o f philosophical term s. T h is can only be a transitional stage on th e way to th e things with which we a re concern ed . A fter all, language is only a m ed iu m , an d if a philos­ op h y reg a rd s th e analysis o f linguistic usage as n o t ju s t a p relim in ary task, bu t as its real task, th e n it has clearly lost contact with th e su b stan ­ tial questions, th e things them selves.’ W e begin th e n with th e negative in which th e idea o f a languageanalytical philosophy first ap p ears to an outsider. H ow ever, th e objec­ tion ju s t raised only rem ains on th e p erip h e ry . It speaks o f things in c o n tra st to w ords w ithout saying w hat sort o f things it m eans, an d w h ere they a re to be fo u n d . Only w hen we get o u r th in k in g p erso n to ex plain w hat he m eans will we have tak en a first step into th e real field o f dispute. In which extra-linguistic sphere, we will ask him , are th e th in g s th e m ­ selves to which h e refers to be sought? If he is n o t a p h ilo so p h er, b u t sim ply a th in k in g person, then he will m ost likely reply: ‘T h e things them selves? C learly they are given to us by ex perien ce. A n d th e appeal n o t to rem ain with m ere w ords had this m eaning: to reach know ledge on e m ust have reco u rse to ex p e rien ce.’ W ith refe re n c e to em pirical know ledge th e objection, th u s in te r­ p re te d , seem s plausible, in d e ed conclusive. Precisely w hat it says is tru e o f an em pirical science: explanations o f w ords a re necessary, b u t they co nstitute only a transitional stage in research. H e re the things th e m ­ selves are th e facts o f a s p h e re o f scientific experien ce. B u t if th e objec­ tion is p u t fo rw ard as an objection to a conceptio n o f philosophy, th e n this can only'm ean eith er (a) th at on e denies th a t philosophy is a specific d im ension o f enquiry which is n o t reducible to th e em pirical sciences (in which case it is not an objection specifically to language-analytical philosophy, b u t to philosophy as such) o r (b) th a t o n e su pposes th a t philosophy has its own, an d hence non-em pirical, m ode o f ex perience. I f th e objection is not sim ply from a th in k in g p erso n , b u t fro m a p h i­ lo sopher, th e n th e second o f these alternatives m u st be th e on e he has in m ind. T h e justification o f th e above objection can n o t, th e re fo re , be ra tio n ­ ally discussed w ithout going into th e question o f th e specific subjectm a tte r o f philosophy, a n d w hat it is ab o u t this su b ject-m atter which distinguishes philosophy from th e em pirical sciences. A d o m in an t, th o u g h no t u n d isp u te d , view of philosophy in th e history o f philosophy

Introduction

8

is th a t it has to do, n o t with em pirical know ledge, b u t with a p rio n know ledge, th a t its propositio n s a re valid a p r io n , i.e. they can n o t be verified, or falsified, by (sensory) experience. O f course, this description applies equally to logic an d m athem atics; so it can n o t be used to define philosophy. M oreover, such an ex tern al d escriptio n rem ains unsatisfac­ tory so long as o n e does n o t ask on w hat essential fe a tu re o f philosophy it is g ro u n d e d . T h o se who have described the subject-m atter o f philosophy as a priori (Plato was th e first) have d o n e so because they believed th at all u n d e r ­ sta n d in g contains p resu p p o sitio n s we norm ally do not atten d to, b u t w hich w hen a tte n d e d to a p p e a r as som ething we know, fo r we can n o t conceive th at it could be d iffe ren t. B u t w hen we w ant to express this know ledge we becom e p e rp le x ed . A classical ex am ple o f this (used again by W ittg en stein 2) is St A u g u stin e’s rem ark ab o u t tim e. ‘W hat th en is tim e? I f no o n e asks m e, I know w hat it is. I f I wish to explain it to him w ho asks m e, I do n o t know .’3 H e re then we seem to have a sp h ere o f know ledge w here o u r ig n o ran ce rests not on in ad eq u ate ex p erien ce b u t on the fact th a t we a re dealin g with aspects o f o u r u n d e rsta n d in g which are too close to us a n d too obvious. W hat we are h ere striving fo r is n o t th e ex p lan atio n o f so m e th in g th a t is not yet u n d ersto o d , b u t the clarification o f w hat is alread y u n d ersto o d . A n d this clarification can only be achieved by reflection on o u r u n d e rsta n d in g itself, n o t by ex p e­ rience. T h is explication o f the subject-m atter o f philosophy (th o u g h still, o f course, wholly abstract an d thesis-like) also enables one to see how p h i­ losophy differs fro m o th e r a p rio n form s o f know ledge. Logic an d m athem atics are also a p rio ri , b u t they do not seek to articu late som e­ th in g we already know; ra th e r they ask about w hat is im plied by things which we already know, o r which we can hypothetically assum e. St A u g u stin e’s re m a rk about tim e is n o t applicable to th e sentences o f logic an d m athem atics. Since K ant th e analytic an d the synthetic a priori have b een d istin ­ gu ished. S entences are called analytic a priori if th e ir tru th o r falsity rests solely on th e m ean in g o f the linguistic expressions co n tain ed in th em . T h u s we arriv e at analytic a p rio ri sentences by linguistic analysis or, m o re precisely, by th e analysis o f th e m ean in g of o u r linguistic expressions. By contrast, sentences w ould be synthetic a p rio n if, tho u g h not em pirical, th e ir tru th did not rest sim ply on the m ean in g o f the expressions co n tain ed in them . So it now becom es clear b oth which conception o f philosophy u n d e r­ lies th e language-analytical position a n d which altern ativ e th e objection

A question of method

9

raised to it boils dow n to. L anguage-analytical philosophy co rresp o n d s to th e traditional conception o f philosophy as an a priori fo rm o f knowl­ ed ge an d in te rp re ts the a priori as an analytic a priori. W ith referen c e to the explanation o f the subject-m atter o f philosophy ju s t given this m eans th at th e know ledge p resu p p o se d in all u n d e rsta n d in g is to be u n d ersto o d as know ledge o f th e m eaning o f the linguistic expressions in which u n d e rsta n d in g is articulated. A nd the objection to th e lan­ guage-analytical positon, as now becom es a p p a re n t, comes dow n to the alternative: e ith e r deny th a t th e re is an a priori subject-m atter o r claim th at th e re is a synthetic a priori. In th e objection as it was first abstractly fo rm u lated w ere com bined (th o u g h at first this was n o t noticed) two diam etrically o p p o sed posi­ tions, one em pirical and th e o th e r m etaphysical. T h e only p ro p e r way o f dealin g with th e objection is to discuss each o f th em separately. A gainst the em piricist th e linguistic analyst can arg u e th a t in language we actually have a sp h ere o f th e a priori as this was ju s t described: we know w hat o u r linguistic expressions m ean w ithout always being able to articulate w hat we thus know ; w here we succeed th e re resu lt analytic statem ents. B ut on w hat should a synthetic a priori rest? It seems th a t o n e m ust conceive, in the sp h e re o f th e a priori, an analogue o f sense-experience. In this way th e re arises the idea of a non-em pirical ex p erien ce, a sp ir­ itual seeing, an intellectual intuition. Plato and A ristotle called this intellectual intuition nous; an d in L atin this was tran slated as intuitus. M ore or less explicitly this idea o f an intellectual in tu itio n plays an im p o rta n t role in large parts o f th e philosophical trad itio n . In o u r tim e it has been taken u p and theoretically developed by p h enom enology. T h e language-analytical thesis th a t th e re is only an analytic, only a lin­ guistic a priori can th e re fo re be seen as a counter-thesis to th e idea o f an intellectual intuition. T h e re is o f course an o th e r conception o f a synthetic a priori which does no t involve an appeal to intellectual intuition. T h is is th e K antian conception. K ant rejected th e idea o f a non-em pirical ex p erien ce, an intellectual intuition. H e also related all non-analytic know ledge to em pirical experience. H ow ever, he believed th a t o ne can know syn­ thetic propositions a priori relatin g to experience. T h e ir validity is n o t a p p re h e n d e d in an intellectual intuition b u t rests on th e fact th a t they fo rm u late the conditions of th e possibility o f experience. H ow ever, it is d o u b tfu l w h eth er K an t’s a tte m p t to find an alternative to th e analytical an d intuitive conceptions o f philosophy is successful. T h e p ro p o sitio n s which K ant rep rese n ts as conditions o f th e possibility o f ex p erien ce can

Introduction

10

also be in te rp re te d as analytic. T o th e ‘conditions o f th e possibility’ o f ex p erien ce belongs precisely w hat is analytically co n tain ed in th e m e a n ­ ing o f ‘e x p e rie n c e ’. T h u s o ne can say th a t w hat K ant has d o n e is to analyse a ce rtain co n c ep t o f experience. S um m arizing we can say: su p p o sin g (a) th a t th e critique o f th e K a n t­ ian conception o f a synthetic a priori (which I have h e re m erely h in te d at) h ad b ee n ca rrie d th ro u g h a n d (b) th at th e id ea o f an intellectual in tu itio n h a d been re fu te d , th en th e language-analytical co n cep tio n o f d o in g philosophy w ould have b ee n show n to be the co rrect, because only possible, way o f d o in g philosophy. A ssum ing, th a t is, th a t th e a priori is characteristic o f philosophy. In o n e ’s first co n fro n tatio n w ith th e specifically philosophical, a priori subject-m atter o n e is easily m isled in to tra n sfe rrin g to it th e stru ctu res w hich a re fam iliar fro m scientific o r even pre-scientific know ledge. T h is is why one points away fro m w ords to th in g s w ith o u t co n sid erin g th a t p hilosophy does n o t relate to things in th e way th e sciences do. A nd even w hen this is ad m itte d th e re is a tem p ta tio n to distinguish th e things o f philosophy a n d th e ir m ode o f availability fro m em pirical things b u t n o netheless to conceive o f th e m by analogy with em pirical things. T h e philosophical su b ject-m atter is n ot s u r re n ­ d e re d in th e language-analytical conception; it is m erely fre e d fro m a naive m isu n d ersta n d in g . F or philosophy th e d em an d th a t we sh o u ld tu rn o u r atten tio n to th e things can only m ean : th a t we should conceive o f th e a priori su b ­ je c t-m a tte r in connection with experience. T h e d a n g e r o f losing c o n ­ tact with th e things (an d th a t m eans: with experien ce) arises precisely w hen a philosophy constructs in th e a priori sp h e re its ow n fictitious w orld o f things with its ow n non-em p irical m o d e o f access. Precisely if ex p erien ce is th e only subject-m atter fo r p h ilosop h y th e n w hat is sp e­ cifically philosophical can only be linguistic analysis. T h e last reflection serves to draw o u r atte n tio n to a questio n ab le assum ption which th e line o f th o u g h t p u rsu e d so fa r sh ares with th e trad itio n al conception o f philosophy. Even if th e existence o f an a priori a n d its distinction fro m th e em pirical seem s u n d en iab le , it does n ot follow th a t it is m e an in g fu l to set th e sp h e re o f th e a priori o ver against th e sp h e re o f th e em pirical as a self-contained sp h e re o f know ledge. N o r does it follow th a t it is m e an in g fu l to distinguish fro m th e em pirical sciences an exclusively a priori en q u iry an d subjectm a tte r called philosophy. T h is how ever is to touch o n a question which po in ts ah ead an d which o n e is unlikely to m ake p ro g ress with in th e co n fro n tatio n with

A question of method

11,

e a rlie r philosophical positions. A nd at th e p re se n t stage o f o u r a rg u ­ m e n t it ca n n o t be tackled at all, fo r we do n o t yet possess a u n ita ry co n c ep tio n o f philosophy. O nly o n th e basis o f such a co n cep tio n co u ld it be d ec id e d in w h at way a priori an d em p irical e n q u iry are to be com bined. W e m u st n o t d isre g a rd this q u estio n , th o u g h it m u st b e b o rn e in m in d as a q u estio n th a t has yet to be decid ed . T h e p rim a ry aim o f th e line o f th o u g h t p u rsu e d so fa r has b een to m a k e us realize th a t we h av e n o t yet arriv ed at a definite co n cep tio n o f ph ilo so p h y (even if we d o n o t q u estio n th e p re su p p o sitio n o f a p u re ly a priori co n cep tio n o f p h ilosophy). F or even if we exclude, in th e way previously in d icated , th e sp h e re o f logic a n d m athem atics, th e re m a in in g s p h e re o f th e a priori does n o t a m o u n t to a unified su b ject-m atter. We clearly do n o t w an t to re g a rd all analytic statem ents which re st o n som e d efin itio n o r o th e r (e.g. ‘A b ach elo r is u n m a rrie d ’) as b e lo n g in g to p h ilo so p h y . So a p rio rity is at best a g eneric fe a tu re o f ph ilo so p h y ; it does n o t suffice fo r its specific definition. N o r did e a rlie r co n cep tio n s o f p h ilo s­ o p h y consist sim ply o f th e idea th a t p hilosophical k n o w led g e is a prion. Sim ilarly, th e notions o f m eaning-analysis a n d analyticity d o n o t su f­ fice to p ro v id e th e language-analytical co n c ep tio n with a u n ita ry co n ­ cep t o f philosophy. I f o n e looks at th e lan g uage-an aly tical lite ra tu re o n e notices th a t it is n o t ju s t any w ords w hose m e an in g is in v estig ated . B u t fro m w h e re does language-analytical p h ilo so p h y get its criteria fo r d ec id in g w hich w ords, types o f w o rd , an d linguistic stru c tu re s a re to be analysed? O bviously to a large e x te n t fro m its o rie n ta tio n to w ard s tra d itio n a l philosophical disciplines an d prob lem s. In so fa r as this is so th e objection th a t th e language-analytical p ositio n is only a m e th o d a n d does n o t possess a unified ce n tral q u estio n o f its ow n a p p e a rs ju stified . H ow ever, th e objection only applies to th e ex istin g lan g u ag eanalytical lite ra tu re . W e have yet to see w h e th e r in th e very idea o f a language-analytical p hilosophy th e re m ay n o t be co n tain e d a u n ita ry fu n d a m e n ta l question.

LECTURE 2

A philosopher in search of a conception of philosophy

T h e co n fro n ta tio n with ea rlier conceptions of philosophy with which I am b eg in n in g th e in tro d u c tio n to language-analytical philosophy not only has th e aim o f justify in g this way o f doing philosophy; it is also in te n d e d as a way o f finding its own central question. T h e first th ru st re m a in e d on th e p erip h e ry . We m erely in fe rre d w hat lan g u ag e-an aly t­ ical philosophy is from th e definition o f the nam e. A nd th e idea th at philosophy is a p n o n was sim ply taken over fro m th e trad itio n . N o n e­ theless we did succeed in taking a first step tow ards justification: the ap p a re n tly superficial idea th a t the m e th o d o f philosophy consists in an analysis o f o u r linguistic u n d e rsta n d in g was show n to be the defensible core o f the trad itio n al conception of th e a priori ch aracter o f philoso­ phy. W ith this first step we have rea ch ed th e c u rre n t self-u n d e rstan d in g o f language-analytical philosophers. H ow ever, this self-u n d e rstan d in g is n o t ad e q u ate, for, as we have seen, it provides no criterio n fo r d istin­ g u ish in g the philosophically relevant w ords, o r w hat is philosophically rele v an t in language, fro m w hat is philosophically irrelevant. F o r this we clearly n ee d a definition o f the su b ject-m atter o f philosophy, som e­ th in g which is n o t given sim ply by saying th a t th e su b ject-m atter of ph ilosophy is a priori. H ow should o n e proceed? O ne could try to m ake distinctions within the sp h e re o f th e a priori, to distinguish d iffe re n t species o f th e analytic. O n e could, fo r exam ple, exclude em pirical expressions which can be d efin e d in term s o f a com bination o f p ro p erties. F or exam ple, th e sen­ tence ‘B achelors are u n m a rrie d ’ is analytic because ‘b ach elo r’ is defined as ‘u n m a rrie d m a n ’. O ne could try to delim it a class o f expressions which one feels a re n o t em pirical in this sense an d which may be th o u g h t to be som ehow (I am deliberately expressin g m yself in this v ague way) philosophically relevant: w ords such as ‘g o o d ’, ‘tru e ’, ‘actio n ’, ‘b e lie f’, ‘e x p e rie n c e ’, ‘tim e’, ‘object’, ‘m e an in g ’.

In search of a conception of philosophy

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I shall no t take this path, th o u g h it seem s to m e prom ising an d has yet to be developed. Even if by follow ing this p ath one succeeded in arriving at useful distinctions o ne w ould still lack o rien tatio n with respect to the q uestion of which linguistic sph ere is philosophically rel­ evant. For to be able to decide this one m ust start fro m a conception of the subject-m atter o f philosophy. W e m u st th e re fo re en q u ire directly as to th e them e, o r fu n d am e n tal question, o f philosophy; an d , specifically, about th e them e, o r fu n d a ­ m ental question, o f language-analytical philosophy. T o this en d I shall again choose the m eth o d o f co n fro n tatio n with th e philosophical tra ­ dition. T h is tim e we cannot sta rt out fro m a prelim in ary conception of language-analytical philosophy, fo r as far as th e substantive fu n d a m e n ­ tal question is co n c ern ed we do no t have such a conception at o u r disr posal. W e m ust, th e re fo re , take as o u r sta rtin g -p o in t one o r m o re fu n ­ d am en tal questions o f the philosophical trad itio n an d see w h eth er, w hen in te rp re te d language-analytically, they yield a fu n d am e n tal q u es­ tion o f language-analytical philosophy. I shall consider in tu rn th re e concepts th a t are ce n tral to traditional philosophy, an d in this way we shall gradually in tro d u c e ourselves into th e fu n d am e n tal qu estio n o f language-analysis. T h e se are (1) the concept o f being which was c h a r­ acteristic o f the ancient conception o f philosophy (2) the concepts o f consciousness and experience tow ards which m o d e rn philosophy has been o rien tate d an d (3) th e concept o f reason w hich - in th e Socratic question - stands at the b eg in n in g of o u r philosophical trad itio n . O f course we cannot with these th re e points o f o rien tatio n exhau st w hat trad itio n can teach us about the fu n d am e n tal philosophical question. T h e o rien tatio n tow ards o th e r perspectives o f philosophical th o u g h t could also have o th e r consequences fo r the sketch of a language-analytical position. So to this e x te n t the follow ing a tte m p t rem ains consciously incom plete an d one-sided. You m ig h t also ask: can one in the en d really be satisfied with a his­ torical o rien tatio n tow ards existing conceptions of philosophy? Even if it can be show n th a t these traditional conceptions a re only genuinely realized in linguistic analysis this w ould only justify th e lan g u ag e-an a­ lytical m ode of en q u iry relative to these positions. B u t how are these positions them selves to be justified? T his leads to th e question: how does o ne justify a certain conception o f philosophy in an d fo r itself ra th e r th a n sim ply relative to o th e r conceptions? T h is question we should keep in m in d in the discussion o f th e particu lar conceptions. A lready the discussion o f th e first conception will lead to im p o rta n t hints how to answ er this question.

Introduction

14

It was P arm enid es who first posed the question ab o u t being as th e fu n d a m e n ta l question o f philosophy. B ut it is in A ristotle, at th e b eg in ­ ning o f his Metaphysics, that we first find an a tte m p t at an in tro d u c tio n to this question as th e fu n d am e n tal question o f philosophy. T h e r e is m uch th a t is im p o rta n t fo r o u r u n d e rta k in g (in d ep e n d en tly o f th e o ri­ en tation tow ards being) to be le arn ed from it; I shall th e re fo re p re se n t it in r a th e r m ore detail. A ristotle first develops a prelim inary idea o f philosophy, i.e. a fo rm al indication o f w hat is to be u n d ersto o d by philosophy. O nly a f u rth e r reflection on how this idea can be concretely realized will lead to a d e f­ inite conception o f philosophy. T his prelim in ary idea is th a t o f know ledge o f th e h ig h est an d m ost g en eral gro u n d s. T h is prelim inary conception o f p hilosophy as a m ost g eneral a n d ultim ately justifying form of know ledge rem a in ed , d esp ite variations in in te rp re ta tio n , largely d o m in a n t in the trad itio n th a t fol­ lowed. H usserl, fo r exam ple, still characterizes his p relim in ary co n c ep ­ tion o f philosophy as th e ‘idea o f a science a n d ultim ately a universal science with an absolute fo u n d a tio n .’1 A ristotle arrives a t this prelim inary conception o f philosophy in tw o ways. O n e 2 consists in an investigation o f w hat in g en eral is u n d e rsto o d by th e w ord ‘p hilosophy’ - in A ristotle it is th e w ord ‘w isdom ’, sophia. T h e o th e r starts fro m the fact th a t we m ean by ‘p h ilo so p h y ’ a p re-em i­ n en t, highest m ode o f know ledge o r enquiry. It w ould th u s seem r e a ­ sonable to call th a t know ledge ‘philosophy’ w hich possesses those p r o p ­ erties constitutive o f know ledge to th e h ig h est d eg ree. Now it is constitutive o f know ledge th at it is general a n d th a t o n e can give r e a ­ sons fo r w hat is know n. It follows from this th a t th e h ig h est know ledge is know ledge based on ultim ate an d the m ost general g ro u n d s. In this line of a rg u m e n t the assertion th a t know ledge is g en eral m ay, in p articu la r, seem im plausible. Usually know ledge is d istin g u ish ed fro m belief o r opinion: we say o f som eone th a t he know s so m eth in g , an d does n o t m erely believe it, if his belief is tru e an d if h e can ju stify it.3 T h e aspect o f justification figures in this definition b u t n ot th a t o f generality. A nd we w ould certainly say th at th e re can also be know ledge o f sin g u lar item s.4 T o u n d e rsta n d A ristotle’s account one m u st bear in m in d th a t h e is n o t speaking o f know ledge in co n tra st to belief o r o pinion. In term s o f th e distinction A ristotle h e re has in m ind, believing, know ing an d q u es­ tio ning all belong to th e sam e level and are as a w hole co n trasted with a low er cognitive capacity h e calls ‘e x p e rien c e’ (empeiria). In his in tro ­ d u ction A ristotle n o t only contrasts philosophy with ‘lo w er’ m odes o f

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know ledge; h e re g a rd s it as the h ig h e st possibility o f cognitive b eh av ­ iour. In a q u ite m o d e rn -so u n d in g discussion he distinguishes th re e levels o f cognitive b e h a v io u r5 (or of th e cognitive c o m p o n e n t o f b ehaviour). T h e lowest level is th a t o f p erc ep tio n . By m eans o f p ercep tio n a h u m a n b ein g o r anim al resp o n d s to en v iro n m en ta l stim uli in acco rd an ce with a given b eh a v io u ral schem a. A h ig h e r cognitive level is th a t which A ris­ totle calls ex perience-capacity a n d which m o d e rn psychology calls learning-capacity: th ro u g h association one learns from ex p erien ce. T h e re p e a te d p e rc e p tio n o f a p h e n o m e n o n A to g e th e r with a p h e n o m e n o n B has th e re su lt th a t w hen A h a p p e n s we ex p ect B; o r we learn th a t if we d o B we achieve A a n d in this way fo rm a new b eh av io u ral schem a. W e have th e th ird cognitive level, acco rd in g to A ristotle, w hen th e re is fo rm e d betw een A a n d B n o t a m erely u n a rtic u la te d association w hich m anifests itself m erely in b eh av io u r, b u t w hen this co nnection is m ad e explicit in th e belief (or know ledge) th a t ‘w h e n e v e r ^ , th e n B ’ o r th a t ‘all A are B \ W e do n o t find this capacity in th e o th e r anim als, says A ristotle, only in m an; a n d we can su p p le m e n t this by saying th at only m an possesses a system o f signs in w hich it is possible to fo rm u n iv ersal ‘if - th e n ’ sentences o r ‘all’ sentences. W e can also fo rm u late this m o re precisely as follows. O nly m an possesses a la n g u ag e in w hich th e re are sin g u lar (‘this . . .’) an d hen ce also p a rtic u la r (‘som e . . .’) a n d universal (‘all . . .’) sentences; a n d only w hen an org an ism possesses such a system o f signs can it distinguish betw een singular, p articu la r a n d universal states o f affairs. T h e associative state o f affairs - th e co n n ectio n betw een A a n d B - is already g en e ral; b u t this is a quasi-g en erality w hich does n o t yet sta n d in any d efin ite relatio n to singularity an d in w hich, th e re fo re , th e re is as yet no distinction betw een ‘all . . .’ a n d ‘m any . . .’ C o n n ected w ith this is th e fact th a t th e g en eral in ‘e x p e ri­ en c e ’ is n o t yet an object. T h e o rg an ism m erely behaves in th e a p p r o ­ p ria te way a n d w hat it has in m ind is th e indiv id u al th in g given in p e r ­ ception. F or this reason it is only th e cognitive level o f k n ow ledge w hich A ristotle characterizes as general. O nly w hen th e g en eral becom es an object an d stan d s in a d e te rm in a te rela tio n sh ip to th e in dividual is th e re a rela tio n sh ip to th e g en eral. A f u rth e r characteristic o f know ledge in co n trast to ex p erien ce, acco rd in g to A ristotle, is justification. T h e universality o f an ‘all’-senten ce clearly belongs to a justification-context. W h o ev er asserts ‘all . . .’ can be asked fo r a justification o r hav e his a tte n tio n d raw n to c o u n te r­ reasons. T h e relation to justificatio n is in fact a fe a tu re n o t ju s t o f ‘all’sentences b u t o f all asserto ric sentences, all assertions in so fa r as they

Introduction

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m ake a truth-claim . I shall exam ine this connection later. W hat A ris­ totle calls ‘e x p e rie n c e ’, on th e o th e r h a n d , the cognitive faculty w hich is not articu la ted in sentences, does not involve reasons an d co u n ter-reasons. So w hen A ristotle refers to justification as a characteristic o f know l­ ed g e h e re too th e co n tra st is n o t with b elief b u t with ex p erien ce. K now l­ edge, it is tru e, is distin g u ish ed fro m belief by th e fact th at som eo n e w ho know s so m e th in g can ju stify w hat h e knows. B u t the p erso n who only believes or d o u b ts ab o u t w hat th e o th e r person knows also stands in a possible justification-context, som ething which is n ot tru e o f the p erso n who disposes o f a co rresp o n d in g state of affairs in the m a n n e r o f association on th e basis o f ‘ex p e rien c e’. T h e distinction o f the th re e levels o f cognitive capacity th at A ristotle m akes at th e b e g in n in g of his Metaphysics is still not obsolete. N e v e rth e ­ less we may not find com pelling th e construction o f th e idea o f a h ig h est science o n the basis o f th e two characteristics which resu lt fro m this distinction. O ne can, how ever, reach th e sam e resu lt m o re directly, sim ­ ply by conceding th a t by a h ig h est science one can at any ra te n o t u n d e rs ta n d a restric ted science. It follows fro m this th a t no science can be re g a rd e d as th e h ighest science which is restricted in its scope an d in its justification. We shall now p au se a m o m e n t an d con sid er w hat we can learn fro m this in tro d u c tio n o f a p relim in ary conception re g a rd in g the q u estio n o f how it is possible to in tro d u c e a conception of philosophy. A ristotle arriv ed at his p relim in ary conception o f philosophy by reflecting on (a) w hat o n e u n d e rsta n d s by th e w ord ‘p h ilo so p h y ’ (or ‘w isdom ’) an d (b) a p a rtic u la r aspect o f this u n d e rsta n d in g , nam ely, th a t by ‘p h ilo so p h y ’, in co n trast to the p a rtic u la r sciences, is m e an t a highest science, a p r e ­ e m in en t fo rm o f know ledge. My appeal to traditio n is simply a v arian t (b ro a d e n e d by th e historical dim ension) o f such an ap p e al to a p re lim ­ inary u n d e rsta n d in g . B ut is such an ap p e al to th e p relim in ary u n d e r ­ sta n d in g o f th e w ord com pelling? Can we n o t free ourselves from it an d sketch a n o th e r, p e rh a p s m o re ad eq u ate, conception o f philosophy? C ertainly we can sketch o th e r conceptions o f ‘p h ilo so p h y ’. B u t w hat does it m ean to say th a t they could be m o re ad eq u ate? M ore a d e q u ate to w hat? We see th a t it w ould only be a m a tte r o f a d isp u te ab o u t w ords. T h e re is no such th in g as the co rrec t m ean in g o f a w ord. It is n a tu ra l w hen talking ab o u t ‘philo so p h y ’ to m ean w hat co rresp o n d s to th e o rd i­ n ary p relim in ary u n d e rsta n d in g o f this w ord. B ut th e re is n o th in g sacred ab o u t this. A nyone is at liberty to in tro d u c e a n o th e r m ean in g , p ro v id ed h e can d istinguish it clearly fro m th e usual m eaning.

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Now this may a p p e a r unsatisfactory. In this question o f w hat is to be u n d ersto o d by philosophy, thus at the crucial startin g -p o in t o f o u r enquiry, a re we to rem a in subject to arbitrarin ess and a boundless re l­ ativism? Does not this a p p e a r wholly incredible? In philosophy if o ne gets into a situation like the p re se n t one, one should ask oneself w h eth e r one does no t in reality m ean som ething d iffe re n t fro m w hat o n e thinks o n e m eans. W e thin k we know th a t the m eaning o f ‘philo so p h y ’ cannot be anything arbitrary . B ut on the o th e r h a n d it is plainly ab su rd to arg u e ab o u t the correct m ean in g o f a w ord. I f th e re fo re th e re is som ething co rrect about o u r feeling th a t the m e a n ­ ing of ‘p hilosophy’ ca n n o t be an y th in g arb itrary , th en we m u st in reality m ean som ething else. It is possible th a t som eone will now say: ‘Precisely. T h e e rro r lies in yo u r language-analytical p ro ce d u re . T h e m ean in g o f th e word ‘philosophy’ may be arb itra ry ; b u t n o t w hat philosophy is.3 W hoever talks like this does n o t know w hat he is saying. For so long as th e m eaning o f th e w ord is n o t settled th e question: w hat is philoso­ phy? can only m ean: w hat does th e w ord m ean? Probably th en we m ean so m ething else w hen we assum e th at th e m eaning o f ‘philo so p h y ’ cannot be arbitrary. Let us co n sid er w hat it w ould be like to ask a sim ilar q uestion o f a n o th e r science, botany fo r exam ple. We would say: o f course it is a verbal question w h eth er a p a r ­ ticular scientific subject-m atter is so called; b u t this subject-m atter - th e study o f plants - exists, irrespective o f which te rm we use to describe it. H e re we are dealing with som eth in g th at is th e re , a specific sp h ere o f objects. B u t one could h ardly say th a t philosophy deals with a specific sp h e re o f objects. H ow ever, ju st as in th e case o f th e p articu la r sciences we say ‘th e re exists a sp h e re of objects M ’ in th e case o f philosophy we can say ‘th e re exists such-and-such a specific m ode o f know ledge’, e.g. ‘th e re exists - in idea at least - a h ig h est form o f know ledge, reg ard less o f w h eth e r we call it philosophy, o r so m ething else’. A nd we could th e n p erh a p s go on to say: ‘th e re exists —in idea at least - a m ost g eneral a n d ultim ately justify in g fo rm o f know ledge, reg ardless o f w h eth e r we call it philosophy o r som ething else’. H ow ever, this way o f avoiding m eaning-relativism clearly leads to a fo rm o f dogm atism an d h en ce basically back to relativism . If we concede th e w ord ‘philoso p h y ’ to an o p p o n e n t w ho declares th a t he w ould like to m ean som ethin g d iffe re n t by ‘p h i­ losophy’ an d rem ain co n ten t m erely to say ‘b u t th e re exists th e m ode o f enquiry X ’, th e n oth ers a re free to say: ‘th e re is also th e m ode o f en q u iry Y .’ B ut in th a t case w hich m ode o f enquiry o ne engages in w ould be a m a tte r o f arb itra ry choice. T h e re thus em erges a difficulty w hich has no parallel in th e o th e r

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sciences: fo r th e re we are n o t co n c ern ed to show th a t it is n o t arb itra ry to en g a g e in th e m o d e o f enquiry in question. W h at is given in the case o f a science is sim ply th e sp h e re o f objects. In th e case o f philosophy, on th e o th e r h a n d , we a re no t th in k in g o f a p a rtic u la r sp h e re o f objects b u t o f a m o d e o f know ledge or en q u iry , thus a p articu la r activity. T h e n o n -a rb itra rin e ss (and th a t m eans: legitim acy) o f an activity, how ever, can only resid e in th e n o n -arb itrarin e ss o f th e motivation fo r engag in g in this activity. I f we are relu c tan t to accept th a t th e w ord ‘p h ilo so p h y ’ stan d s fo r so m e th in g a rb itra ry th e n it w ould a p p e a r th at w h at we m ean is th a t it ca n n o t stand fo r so m eth in g fo r w hich th e re is an arb itra ry m otivation. In this case w hat ‘exists’ is no t a s p h e re o f objects. N o r is it a n activity. It is a m otivation. A co nception o f philo so p h y is to be re g a rd e d as a suggestion to which o th e r suggestions can be o pposed. T h e se suggestions a re to be u n d e rsto o d , firstly (and incidentally), as suggestions as to how th e w ord ‘p h ilo so p h y ’ is to be u n d e rsto o d , an d , secondly (and essentially), as suggestions re g a rd in g th e en g ag in g in a p a rtic u la r fo rm o f enquiry. T h is provides us with an an sw er to th e q u estion: w hat is it to legitim ate a conception o f philosophy, not ju s t historically, relative to a given p relim in ary u n d e rsta n d in g , b ut abso­ lutely? T o in tro d u c e som eone to philosophy, an d to a p a rtic u la r co n ­ ception o f philosophy, is to show th e m otivation to en g ag e in this activ­ ity to be p re -e m in e n t vis-a-vis o th e r motives. A ristotle already saw it like this in his in tro d u c tio n . F ro m th e outset his co nceptual in tro d u c tio n goes h a n d in h a n d with an in tro d u c tio n o f m otivation. W e delight, h e says, in th e cognitive as such, alread y in p e r ­ ception a n d especially in seeing; a n d the h ig h e r th e cognitive level th e m o re estim able it is.6 T o show th a t it is th e cognitive as such to w hich we are m otivated A ristotle believes h e has to isolate th e cognitive fro m th e co n tex t o f b e h a v io u r.7 T h e re fo re th e h ig h e st m otivation w ithin th e cognitive sp h e re belongs to know ledge w ithout practical p u rp o se , p u re th e o ry .8 In this text A ristotle is co n ten t to r e f e r to ex istin g opinions; besides h e m erely show s th a t th e re is a m otivation to th e cognitive a n d th a t w ithin th e cognitive sp h e re th e highest m otivation belongs to th e ­ oretical science and, ultim ately, to philosophy. B u t A ristotle th o u g h t he could show th a t p u re th eo ry is th e activity m ost w orth striving afte r, th e h ig hest possibility o f h ap p in ess.9 T h is thesis is based o n th e follow ing two prem ises: (1) th a t activity is th e o n e m ost w orth striving afte r w hich is self-sufficient an d im m utable (2) th eo ry is th e activity w hich possesses th ese p ro p ertie s. N e ith e r o f th ese prem ises can seem ev id en t to us today. N o r do I know o f any o th e r a rg u m e n t th a t can ju stify th e m o ti­

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vation to p u r e th eo ry as a way o f life w orth striving a fte r fo r its ow n sake, let alo n e th e o n e m ost w orth striving a fte r, as valid fo r everybody. L et m e sum m arise. (1) T h e u ltim ately decisive in tro d u c tio n o f a c o n ­ ception o f philo so p h y w hich p ro v id es m o re th a n a historical leg itim a­ tion and w hich is n o t relative to a given p relim in ary u n d e rs ta n d in g is an in tro d u c tio n in te rm s o f m otivation. (2) T h e A ristotelian in tro d u c ­ tion in term s o f m otivation is n o t convincing. W h e th e r this invalidates th e A ristotelian p relim in ary co n cep tio n , o r w h e th e r it is still possible to p ro v id e a convincing in tro d u c tio n o f this p relim in ary co n cep tio n in term s o f m otivation, a re questions to which I shall be r e tu r n in g in co n ­ n ection w ith th e th ird tra d itio n a l g u id in g n o tio n , th a t o f reaso n (Lec­ tu re 7). W e m u st now ex a m in e how A risto tle gets fro m the p relim in ary co n ­ cep tion o f philo so p h y as a science which (1) is univ ersal a n d (2) ra d ic a l­ izes th e asp ect o f ju stificatio n , to his p a rtic u la r co n cep tio n o f p h ilo so p h y as e n q u irin g into b ein g o r ‘b ein g as b ein g ’. In Metaphysics 1 , 2 , w here A ristotle in tro d u c es th e p relim in ary co n ­ cep tion, he indicates a specific co n crete e la b o ra tio n 10 o f it w hich is clearly P lato n ic:11 every p a rtic u la r science is being conceived - on th e m odel o f geom etry - as a d ed u c tiv e th eo ry w hich justifies th e p ro p o si­ tions possible in this sp h e re by d ed u c in g th e m fro m th e h ig h est an d most general prem ises in this sp h e re : th e axiom s o f this science. B oth th e ju stificatio n an d th e gen erality possible w ithin th e p a rtic u la r science are lim ited. T h e ju stificatio n is lim ited because th e axiom s a re assu m ed as h y p otheses; they a re n o t them selves ju stified . T h e g en erality is lim ited to th e p a rtic u la r sp h e re . T h is p ersp ectiv e leads to th e id ea o f a h ig h e st science th e task o f w hich w ould be to d eriv e th e p rem ises o f th e p a rtic ­ u la r sciences fro m o n e o r m o re s u p re m e princip les, fro m w hich th e p rem ises o f all o th e r p a rtic u la r sciences a re to be d eriv ed . T h is w ould p ro v id e a co n crete co n cep tio n o f philo so p h y an d its tasks vis-a-vis th e p a rtic u la r sciences th a t co rre sp o n d s exactly to th e p relim in ary co n c ep ­ tion d ev e lo p e d by A ristotle: th e aspects o f h ig h est g en erality a n d u lti­ m ate ju stificatio n coincide in th e idea o f a science w hich d eriv es all know ledge fro m su p re m e prin cip les (= m ost g en e ral g ro u n d s). T h e P latonic idea o f philo so p h y as a d ed u c tiv e system based o n a su p re m e p rin cip le, o r s u p re m e p rinciples, reta in ed a stro n g attra c tio n in th e su b se q u e n t h istory o f philo so p h y rig h t u p to G erm a n Id ealism with its dialectical system s. H ow ever, this id ea o f a su b stan tiv e un iv ersal science was rejected as u n rea liza b le by A ristotle, on th e g ro u n d s th a t it p resu p p o se s a m istak en th e o ry o f science. T h e u ltim ate su b stan tiv e

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prem ises o f the p articu la r sciences, according to A ristotle, are ir re d u ­ cible, not fu rth e r d eriv ab le.12 T h is criticism can be m ad e even m o re strin g en t from a m o d e rn perspective. A ristotle still accepted th e Pla­ tonic conception o f th e p articu lar science as a deductive theory on the m odel o f g eo m etry .13 T h is contradicts the concep t o f an em pirical sci­ ence which g ro u n d s its propositions so to speak fro m below, by ex p e­ rience, a n d not fro m above by referen c e to given prem ises. If already w ithin th e p articu la r science th e m ovem ent o f justification is fro m below upw ard s r a th e r than fro m above dow nw ards th e n th e idea o f a radicalization o f substantive justification by derivation from even h ig h e r u p is ru led o u t in advance. F or A ristode the Platonic conception o f philosophy was th e m ost n a t­ u ral possibility o f giving a concrete sense to his prelim in ary conception. I f he nevertheless cam e to recognize that this conception is incapable o f realization an d yet w ished to hold fast to his p relim in ary conception, th e n a new ap p ro ach was req u ired which w ould d eterm in e , within the fram ew ork o f this prelim inary conception, th e relation o f philosophy to th e sciences in a fu n d am en tally d iffe re n t way. T his new conception is th a t o f ontology.

LECTURE 3

Ontology and semantics

It is at the b eginning o f B ook IV o f his Metaphysics that A ristotle first in troduces his new conception of philosophy. ‘T h e r e is a science which studies being as being.’ In d e e d the special ch aracter of this science visa-vis the o th e r sciences is supposed to consist in the fact th a t w hereas th e latter investigate a p articu lar sp h e re o f being philosophy investi­ gates being as b eing.1 W hat distinguishes the concept o f being, fo r A ristotle, is th a t it is th e m ost general concept.2 F o r o f everything an d an ything one can say th a t it is. E verything and anything, th e re fo re , can be called being. Clearly A ristotle arrives at his new conception o f philosophy by d ro p ­ p in g the aspect o f justification from the prelim inary conception devel­ o p ed at the beginn ing an d settling exclusively fo r th e aspect o f highest generality. T h e highest, p re-em in en t science, called philosophy, is u n i­ versal, but does not have a justificatory role in relatio n to th e particu lar sciences. T his conception, since it is orien tated tow ards the concept o f being {on), leads to the conception o f philosophy as ontology. T o enable us to u n d e rsta n d the specific ch aracter o f this conception o f philosophy as ontology (and this m eans: a conception th a t is based on th e concept o f being) we can think o f an analogous reflection using a concept o f m o d e rn philosophy, th a t o f an object. Each science has to do with a specific sph ere o f objects, objects o f a specific k ind, an d with a specific m ode o f accessibility. Can one say that it is also th e task o f the p articu la r science to them atize this object-sphere as such and th e pecul­ iar m ode o f givenness which distinguishes it from o th e r object-spheres? O n e could a rg u e about this. Since th e concepts which characterize an object-sphere as such are n o t o f m erely gradually h ig h er generality th a n the concepts within the object-sphere, one can say th at th e objectsp h e re as such, e.g. th at o f physics, th e arts, m athem atics, is th e subjectm a tte r o f the philosophy o f physics, philosophy o f art, philosophy o f

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m athem atics. H usserl called such a them atization o f an o b ject-sp h ere a ‘reg io n al ontology’.3 W hat is discussed in such an ontology is w hat it is to be an object o f th e relev an t sphere. B ut one can go fu rth e r a n d ask: w hat is m eant by an object as such, in abstraction fro m a p articu la r s p h e re o f objects? In this way one arrives at the q u estion ab o u t objects as objects, ju s t as previously o n e arrived at the questio n ab o u t beings as beings. A re we h ere d ealin g with two analogous questions o r do b oth ques­ tions have th e sam e m eaning? Obviously this d e p e n d s on w h e th e r or n o t th e two expressions ‘b e in g ’ and ‘object’ have rou g h ly th e sam e m eaning. W hereas fo r us th e expression ‘bein g ’ (‘Seiendes1) is a p h ilo ­ sophical term o f art, th e G reek p hilosophers w ere able to take the ex pression ‘on fro m o rd in a ry lan g u ag e.4 As ‘b ein g ’ (on) is th e participle o f th e verb ‘to b e ’ (einai), a n d th e w ord ‘is’ is notoriously am biguous, difficulties arise h e re , ab o u t which I shall speak later. At p rese n t, how ­ ever, we can confin e ourselves to the characterizatio n ju s t given: every­ th in g a n d a n y th in g is a being, because o f everythin g it is significant to say th a t it is. O n e could d o u b t this, p o in tin g o u t th a t th e re exist objects th a t a re not, e.g., objects o f phantasy. B ut to this o n e could rep ly th at by saying ‘they ex ist’ one says o f them th a t they are. T h u s it seem s th at even those objects which in a certain sense are n o t in a n o th e r sense som ehow are. N ow w hat is m e a n t by th e w ord ‘object’? T his w o rd too, in th e com ­ p reh e n siv e sense in which it is used in philosophy, is a term o f art. In o rd in a ry la n g u ag e we are inclined to call only m aterial objects - an d th e n only those which are n o t persons - objects, a n d n o t e.g. events or n u m b e rs and o th e r abstract objects; alth o u g h th e n again o n e does speak o f the object o f a discussion. W hat is m eant by ‘objects’ in philos­ ophy has its basis n o t in w hat we call objects in o rd in ary lan g u ag e b ut in w hat we m ean by the w ord ‘so m e th in g ’ in o rd in ary language. O ne could say: by ‘object’ is m e a n t everything th a t is som ething. H ow ever, this form ulation is linguistically faulty, because th e w ord ‘so m e th in g ’ is n o t a predicate, b u t an indefinite p ro n o u n . T h e e r r o r o f sp eak in g in such a way w ould becom e even m ore strikingly evid en t w ere o n e to say: an object is a som ething. N onetheless philo so p h ers have freq u en tly talked like this in th e trad itio n . T h u s A ristotle, e.g., coined th e e x p re s­ sion ‘a this’ (tode ti) fo r ‘object’. W e m u st try to avoid such u n g ra m m a ti­ cal expressions, an d to this en d th e re is no altern ativ e b u t to go back even fu rth e r to th e linguistic b ack g ro u n d . T h e re is a class o f linguistic expressions w hich are used to stand fo r an object; a n d h ere we can also say: to stand fo r som ething. T h e se are th e expressions which can fu n c­

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tion as th e sentence-subject in so-called sin g u lar pred icativ e statem en ts a n d w hich in logic have also b een called singular terms. T h e elu cid atio n o f th e concept o f an object by rec o u rse to sin g u lar term s is certainly also to be fo u n d p rio r to lan g uage-analytical philo so p h y . T h u s H usserl d eterm in e s th e b re a d th in w hich he w ishes th e co n c ep t ‘object’ to be u n d e rsto o d by defin in g it as follows: ‘any subject o f possible tru e p red ic atio n s’.5 A nd A ristotle too d efin e d his co n c ep t of an object by m eans o f the co n cep t of the hypokeimenon, th e subject o f p red ic atio n s.6 B u t w hat is m e a n t by this rem a in s u n c le a r so long as it is n ot specified w hat is to be u n d e rsto o d by a sin g u lar p red icativ e sta te m en t a n d by its subject. Now it w ould seem n a tu ra l to d istinguish sin g u lar p redicative statem en ts fro m o th e r pred icativ e sta te m en ts by saying th at they are those w hich have a sin g u lar te rm as th e ir subject. W e are thus m oving in a circle and re q u ire an in d e p e n d e n t c riterio n fo r recognizing sin g u ­ lar term s. T h e follow ing c rite rio n suggests itself: an expression X is a sin g u lar term if, w hen it is s u p p le m e n te d by a n o th e r ex p ressio n to fo rm a w hole assertoric sentence, o n e can d e d u c e fro m this sentence a n o th e r sen tence in w hich X is rep laced by ‘so m e th in g ’ (or ‘so m eb o d y ’).7 By this criterio n ‘the n u m b e r 3’, e.g., is a sin g u lar term , fo r fro m the sen ten ce ‘T h e n u m b e r 3 is sm aller th a n th e n u m b e r 4 ’ th e re follows th e sentence ‘S o m eth in g is sm aller th an th e n u m b e r 4 ’; a n d we can now ad d by way o f elucidation: som eth in g , nam ely th a t fo r which th e ex p ressio n ‘th e n u m b e r 3’ stands. O bviously th e m ode o f e m p lo y m e n t o f sin g u lar term s is co n n ected with a system o f p ro n o m in a l ex pressio n s which can take th e ir place (pro-nom ina!): ‘so m e th in g ’, ‘w hich?’, V h ic h ’, ‘th e sam e’. A nd each o f these p ro n o u n s we can, trivially, su p p le m e n t by th e w ord ‘object’, by saying, instead o f ‘w hich’, ‘w hich ob ject’, instead o f ‘the sam e’, ‘th e sam e object’, an d , instead o f ‘so m e th in g ’, ‘som e o b ject’. If the w ord ‘object’ is used so bro ad ly , th u s if its m e an in g is yielded by th e use o f these p ro n o u n s, or th e sin g u lar te rm s w hich replace th e m , th e n it has th e b ro ad sense in te n d e d in philosophy. O nly la ter will I ex am in e th e in tim ate connection betw een th e w ords ‘so m e th in g ’ an d ‘th e sam e’. B ut even now I can p o in t o u t that, in stea d o f th e criterio n ju s t m e n ­ tio ned, o n e could also use th e id entity-sign as a criterio n o f sin g u lar term s: an expression is a sin g u lar te rm if it can stan d on e ith e r side o f ‘is the sam e as’ (or ‘= ’).8 T h e notion o f ‘objects’, as th u s d e te rm in e d , is clearly directly co n ­ nected with th at o f ‘b ein g ’. T h e thesis th a t o f ev e ry th in g a n d a n y th in g we can say ‘it is’ m e an s-so m e th in g like: w hatever so m eth in g m ay be at any rate it is. H ence, alread y ac co rd in g to A ristotle th e con cep t o f being was intim ately co n n ected n o t only with th a t o f unity b u t also w ith th a t

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o f so m eth in g (ti)\ a n d this connection - th a t every b eing is also som e­ th ing an d o ne and vice versa - was also reta in ed in Scholasticism u n d e r th e titles ens, unum, aliquid. B ut how can o ne th em atize such a th in g as being as being, objects as objects? W here an d in w hat way do we find such a thing? Clearly n o t in ex perience, fo r alth o u g h we find objects in experien ce we do n o t find the object as object, objecthood, being as being, Being (Sein). B ut n o r do we reach it by abstraction. W e can see this if we reflect on th e p e c u ­ liar certainty o f th e statem en t ‘E v erything is a bein g ’ o r ‘E verything is an object.’ Clearly th e certainty o f this statem en t is no m ere inductive o r hypothetical certainty; we have no t arrived at it by co m p arin g m any objects an d progressive abstraction. For if th at w ere so, th e n it w ould be conceivable th a t th e re m ight still be som ething which we h ad not so far co nsidered th a t could no t be te rm e d an object. B ut this possibility is excluded a priori, because if it is som ething th e n it is eo ipso an object. So we do not arrive at w hat we m ean by ‘an object’, o r by the e x p re s­ sion ‘so m e th in g ’, by abstraction. H usserl drew atten tio n , in this co n n ec­ tion, to th e distinction betw een ‘g en eralizatio n ’ an d ‘fo rm alizatio n ’9 an d called th e them atizatio n of th e object as object, in co n trast to th e ‘regional ontologies’, ‘form al o n to lo g y ’. T h u s with th e conception o f philosophy as ontology th e rela tio n o f the highest science to the p a rtic ­ u la r sciences is d e te rm in e d in a new way vis-a-vis the Platonic co n cep ­ tion: philosophy no lo n g e r em braces the p articu la r sciences as reg a rd s th e ir co n ten t, but form ally; as ontology it them atizes th a t which all sci­ ences form ally p resu p p o se , ra th e r than principles fro m which th e ir p ropositions could be derived. W ith this A ristotle explicitly m ark ed o u t fo r the first tim e a them atic field which was already in Plato, th o u g h only im plicitly. Clearly this field o f th e form al is a field o f a priori, a n a ­ lytic know ledge (we have ju st seen th a t we can n o t arrive at the concepts in question inductively, em pirically). A nd equally it is clear th a t h e re th e d em arcatio n o f a narrower field w ithin th e analytic, w hich we m issed w hen discussing th e analytic c h a ra c te r of philosophy, begins to take shape. B ut now w hat is m e a n t by ‘fo rm alizatio n ’ in co n trast to ‘g en eraliza­ tio n ’? H usserl did not elab o rate this an d A ristotle did n o t even explicitly m ake th e distinction. O n e could provisionally describe it by saying th a t it p resu p p o se s a m ove o f reflection. W hereas th e p articu la r sciences are co ncerned with the objects o f a dom ain an d th e ir p ro p erties, the su bject-m atter o f ontology is not to be sought in a tra n sc e n d e n t dom ain (for w here should this be?). B ut th e n the only altern ativ e is th at on e arrives at this subject-m atter by reflecting on th e m a n n e r o f o u r r e f e r ­

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ence to objects. Such a m ode of en q u iry was only developed in th e m od­ e rn period an d that explains why it was not possible fo r A ristotle to use a concept such as that o f form alization. T h e question now arises: in w hat way do we re fe r, or can we refer, to objects? W e becam e acquainted with one possibility in th e attem p t to fix the philosophical co ncept o f an object, viz. referen c e to objects by m eans o f linguistic expressions. T h e re is a specific class o f linguistic expressions - singular term s - w hose m ode o f em ploym ent is such th a t by m eans o f th em we are able to re fe r to som ething, to an object. A nd if we can only specify w hat is m e an t by the philosophical concept o f an object by recourse to sin gular term s, the w ord ‘so m eth in g ’ and o th e r p ro n o u n s, th en to the question ‘how can one them atize som ething like th e objecthood o f objects (or being qua being)?’ it w ould seem plausible to answ er: only by reflecting on the use o f th e co rresp o n d in g linguistic expressions. F rom th e linguistic perspective we can at any rate give a definite m eaning to th e distinction betw een generalization an d form alization. W hat I have called, in explaining generalization, progressive abstrac­ tion clearly rests on the fact th at we can subsum e concepts u n d e r o th er, m o re general, concepts. C oncepts a re principles o f classification an d to th e m th e re co rresp o n d , in language, the so-called general terms o r pred­ icates, which, accordingly, can be called classification-expressions.10 An ex am ple o f a progressive abstraction would be th e series o f predicates: ‘native o f th e P alatinate’, ‘G e rm a n ’, ‘h u m a n ’, ‘living th in g ’, ‘spatiotem p o ral object’. H ere th e next p red icate is m o re g eneral th a n the p re ­ ceding one, because it is applicable to all objects to which th e p reced in g o n e is applicable, w hereas the converse is not th e case. Now one can say o f each of these predicates, or the c o rresp o n d in g concepts, th a t it is a classification-expression, or classification-principle. T his is clearly to say so m ething com pletely general, fo r it applies to all predicates, o r co n ­ cepts. B ut it is clearly n o t simply gradually m ore general th a n any o f th e predicates o r concepts them selves, an d , th e re fo re , does n o t belong to a series o f th e kind I have ju st p rese n ted . F o r it is the concepts o r predicates them selves a n d n o t the objects which fall u n d e r th e concepts, o r to which th e predicates are applicable, which fall u n d e r th e descrip­ tion ‘classification-principle’ or ‘classification-expression’. In contrast to the previously n am ed predicates, which a re applicable to objects, we arrive at the pred icate ‘classification-expression’, o r th e p red icate ‘p re d ic a te ’, by reflecting on th e m ode o f em p lo y m en t o f those o r o f any predicates; a n d th at m eans: by reflecting on th e m ode o f em ploym ent o f a species o f linguistic expression. B ut now this is a p ro ­ c e d u re o f basically the sam e kind as th a t by which we a rriv ed at th e

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p red ic ate ‘singular te rm ’ o r ‘expression which stands fo r an object’. Now the specifically language-analytical position w ould be th a t o n e can only explain w hat is m e an t by ‘concepts’ by referen c e to the use o f p re d ­ icates, and th at o n e can only explain w hat is m e an t by ‘objects’ by re f­ e re n ce to th e use of singular term s. B u t in w hat sense is this reflection on the m od e o f em plo y m en t o f expressions to be u n d e rsto o d as form alization? A b rie f indication o f linguistic distinctions is h e re req u ired . T h e concept o f fo rm is clearly closely connected with th a t o f stru ctu re. O u r linguistic expressions are structurally com posite at two levels: (a) that o f the com bination of p h o n em es to fo rm the sm allest m ean in g -b earin g units, i.e. w ords or m o rp h em es an d (b) th a t o f th e com bination o f m o rp h em es to form sentences. ‘S tru c tu ral com position’ m eans that th e com position is ruleg overned: the sm aller units cannot be com bined with others arbitrarily b u t only in so fa r as they are elem ents o f certain classes. Now at th e level o f the com bination o f m eaning-bearing units to fo rm sentences th e re are two possible m odes of analysis: on th e o n e h an d , th e syntac­ tical which investigates th e ex tern al o r ‘su rface’ com position o f sen­ tences and has re g a rd n e ith e r to the m ean in g o f the sentences n o r to th a t o f the sentence-com ponents. T h e classes o f sen ten ce-co m p o n en t a re n o t defined sem antically; ra th e r they are d eterm in e d exclusively by th e so-called principle o f ‘d istrib u tio n ’, i.e. th e substitutability o f their elem ents for o n e an o th er, th e only condition bein g th at th e resu lt m ust also be a sentence. By con trast o ne calls ‘sem antic’ any m ode o f analysis w hich concerns the meaning o f linguistic expressions. H ere it can be a m a tte r eith er o f the m ean in g o f th e individual w ords o r o f how th e m eaning o f sentences d e p e n d s on th e m eanings o f th eir p arts. In lin­ guistics it was only a few years ago th a t atten tio n began to be paid to this second m o d e o f enquiry, w hereas w ithin philosophical sem antics it has been, since Frege, th e d o m in a n t one. T h e classes o f sentence-parts to which one m u st re fe r in this m ode o f enquiry are not th e classes o f syntactic sentence-parts, fo r th e fo rm e r can n o t be defined in d e p e n ­ d ently o f m eaning; ra th e r they a re sem antic classes which a re defined in term s o f th e sort o f co n trib u tio n the m e an in g o f th e ir elem ents m akes to the m eaning o f a la rg e r u n it, ultim ately a sentence; o r in term s o f th e elem ents o f o th e r sem antic classes with w hich they can be com ­ b ined. As exam ples o f such sem antic classes on e can m ention both sin­ g u la r and general term s. T h e reason why th e definition o f singular term s is so involved is because o n e is dealing n o t with a syntactically definable class b u t with a sem antic class which is defined by th e m ode o f em ploym ent o f the expressions, o r by the so rt o f co n trib u tio n they

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m ake to th e m e an in g o f a sentence. T h e se two sem antic classes also p ro v id e a sim ple exam ple o f th e com bination o f th e elem en ts o f two sem antic classes; fo r the com bination o f an expressio n which stan d s fo r an object with a classification-expression yields a (singular) p redicative assertoric sentence. H ow precisely this is to be u n d e rsto o d will occupy us at length later on. Now o ne can call any stru ctu ra l them atizatio n o f lan g u ag e - th e p h o ­ netic, th e syntactic and th e sem antic - form al. It seem s n a tu ra l, th e re ­ fore, to distinguish betw een m aterial {inhaltlich) a n d fo rm al sem antics. F orm al sem antics arrives at its subject-m atter th ro u g h a process o f fo r­ m alization which is linguistically sym bolized by rep la cin g th e m aterial exp ressions by variables, with th e u n d e rsta n d in g th a t these stan d fo r an a rb itra ry expression o f a sem antic class. In this way th e sem antic form o f a com posite expression can be exhibited, e.g. o n e can use th e letters ‘a , ‘b’, V for sin g u lar term s, F \ £G’ fo r g en e ral term s an d can then ex h ibit th e form o f a predicative senten ce with o n e sin g u lar te rm (e.g. ‘P ete r is crying’) by ‘F a, an d that o f a p redicativ e sentence with two sin g u lar term s (e.g. ‘P eter hits P aul’) by ‘Fab’. T h u s if it sh o u ld be tru e th a t we can only arriv e at, a n d can only th em atize, th e category o f object by reflecting on th e c o rre sp o n d in g linguistic expressions, th e n it w ould be clear w hat is m ean t by ‘fo rm ali­ zatio n ’. F or th e th em atization in question w ould n o t be ju s t any th e ­ m atization o f linguistic expressions; it w ould be a th em atizatio n o f th eir sem antic form . You could point o u t th a t I have now only d escrib ed w hat is m ean t by ‘fo rm al’ a n d ‘fo rm alizatio n ’ w ithin sem antics in term s o f th e contrast with m aterial sem antic questions, a n d th at it is n o t clear w h e th e r this distinction co rresp o n d s to th e distinction betw een fo rm a l­ ization and generalization, thus betw een a fo rm a l an d a m aterial ap p ro a ch to objects. T h ese two things m ust in d e e d be d istin g u ish ed ; they are, how ever, connected. O n e can show this by m eans o f th e sym ­ bolization I have ju s t illustrated. T h e scientist w ho is d ea lin g w ith objects o f a certain sph ere, an d th e ir p ro p e rtie s, uses, am o n g o th e r sen ­ tences, sentences o f th e fo rm ‘F a. W ith th e sin g u lar term s w hich h e uses in place o f ‘a h e re fe rs to certain objects, e.g. with th e expression ‘th e m o o n ’ he refers to th e m oon. T h e m aterial sem anticist can en q u ire ab o u t th e meaning o f this a n d o th e r expressions. B u t w hen o n e fo rm a l­ izes w hat th e scientist (or any o th e r la n g u ag e-u ser) is d o in g w hen h e re fers with this singular te rm to this object, th u s if one asks w hat in g en e ral it m eans to re fe r to an object a n d w hat in g en eral it m eans to speak o f an object (‘w hat an object qua object “is” ’), th en o n e does so precisely by form alizing th e m aterial su b ject-m atter o f th e sem anticist

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an d asking ab o u t th e form al m ean in g o f singular term s. O bjectual fo r­ m alization finds its sense in sem antic form alization. I f this should be th e only possible way o f u n d e rsta n d in g th e form alization-step by w hich ontology is constituted, th e n o n e w ould have already show n th a t ontology is only realizable in a language-analytical p h ilosophy u n d e rsto o d as form al sem antics.11 A t this stage o f o u r reflections I can n o t yet assert so m uch. In discussing th e m o d ern , socalled tra n sc e n d e n ta l concept of philosophy we shall b ecom e ac q u ain ted with a n o th e r kind o f reflection in which re fe re n c e to objects is not u n d e rsto o d linguistically; an d only m uch later will I really attack this trad itio n al m o d e rn conception (Lectures 20 an d 27). So fa r only this m uch has b een said: (I) fo r A ristotle, an d with h im th e w hole p r e ­ m o d e rn ontology, th e re was no possibility o f exp lain in g w hat d istin ­ guishes th e form al concepts investigated in ontology fro m o th e r co n ­ cepts. (2) T h e rec o u rse to form al sem antics offers at least one possibility o f ex p lain in g this distinction. You will have felt it to be problem atic th a t fo r the A ristotelian co n ­ cept o f being I su b stitu ted th e concept o f an object, an d th a t I o rie n ta te d m yself exclusively tow ards th e latter. My reason for p ro ce ed in g in this way is th a t th e con cep t o f an object is less am biguous an d that, conse­ quently, certain aspects o f w hat is m ean t by ‘b ein g ’ can be b ro u g h t o u t by it m o re clearly. B u t w hen o n e p roceeds in this way essential p e rsp e c ­ tives o f th e trad itio n al ontology rem ain u n h e e d e d . W h at m akes th e ex pression ‘b ein g ’ so difficult is its connection with th e am biguous v e r­ bal ex p ressio n ‘is’. F o r th e tim e being it will suffice to a tte n d to two o f this w o rd ’s various m odes o f em ploym ent. W e som etim es use th e w ord ‘is’, th o u g h ad m itte d ly ra th e r seldom , with a sing u lar te rm o r a p ro ­ n o u n a n d w ithout a su p p le m e n tin g p red ic ate ex p ressio n (e.g. in th e sen tence ‘G od is’). H e re it m eans ‘exists’. A second m o d e o f em p lo y ­ m ent, an d th e on e w hich is m ost fre q u e n t in o u r lan g u ag e, is as th e socalled cop u la in a predicative sentence (e.g. ‘T h e sky is b lu e’). N ow it w ould seem th a t w hen o ne speaks o f ‘a b ein g ’ only th e use o f ‘is’ in th e sense o f ‘exists’ is involved, fo r ‘a b ein g ’ m eans ‘so m eth in g which is’, th u s th e w ord ‘is’ is h e re used w ithout a su p p le m e n tin g p redicateex pression. So w hereas th e ex pression ‘is’ is used am biguously, th e su b ­ stantival expression ‘b ein g ’ seem s to be univocal an d have th e sense ‘ex iste n t’. W e m ust be all the m o re su rp rised th e n w hen we find th a t in his ontology A ristotle is p rim arily o rien tate d tow ards th e copulative ‘is’. A nd it m u st seem even m o re su rp risin g th a t h e u n d e rsta n d s this ‘is’ as th e ‘is’ o f a ‘b ein g ’12 a n d th at he takes the ‘b ein g ’ to b e th a t for which

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the predicate stands, hence the being-thus-and-so {das So-seiend-Sein) o f th e object. O ne could try to in te rp re t this in a harm less way: why sh o u ld not th e predicate in a sentence like ‘T h e sky is blue’ also stand fo r som ething, in this case th e blueness o f the sky? T his conception w ould be co m p ar­ atively harm less because som ething like blueness is in d e ed an object (som ething) an d thus could also be designated as a being. O u r criterion o f objects fits: th e expression ‘th e blueness’ is a singular term . B u t in m oving from ‘T h e sky is b lue’ to ‘th e blueness o f the sky’ we have to ch ange th e fo rm o f th e expression; the p red icate ‘is b lu e ’ has b een ch an g ed by a so-called nom inalization into th e singular te rm ‘the b lu e­ ness’. A nd since singular term s an d predicates are sem antic classes, we m u st also u n d e rsta n d this gram m atical change as on e o f sem antic form . L ater I will show th a t th e nom inalized form is sem antically secondary relative to th e predicative form . I ca n n o t assum e this h ere. B u t th en I do no t need to, for A ristotle him self, in his d eb ate with Plato, does n o t m erely re g a rd objects like blueness, hence abstract objects, as sec­ on dary; he rejects th em altogether. W hatever o n e ’s attitu d e may be to th e Platonic p roblem o f th e relation o f th e blueness o f an individual object to th e blueness as such, A ristotle rejects no t only th e latter b u t also the fo rm e r.13 For him such abstract objects do not exist, only co n ­ crete objects with th e ir predicative determ in atio n s. A ristotle was ce r­ tainly too casual in his ap p ro ach to th e com plicated pro b lem o f abstract objects. H e was, how ever, u n d o u b te d ly right to reject the red u c tio n o f p redicative d eterm in a tio n s to abstract objects. Even if o n e accepts ab stract objects, they in th e ir tu rn have predicative d eterm in atio n s. B ut how should on e positively u n d e rsta n d predicative d e te rm in a ­ tions if they are no t objects? If one appro ach es th e problem im partially th e n I th in k one has to say: if we divide a singular predicative sentence into its sem antic com ponents both o f them - th e singular te rm an d th e pred icate - have a m eaning, i.e. we u n d e rsta n d both o f th em ; b u t only o n e of them - th e singular term - stands for an object. If only singular term s stand fo r objects th e n it seems to follow th a t form alization o f th e linguistic expressions reaches fu rth e r th a n th e form alization o f objects. A n explicitly sem antic enquiry was, how ever, u nknow n to A ristotle. T h is is why h e called predicative d eterm in atio n s both onta (beings) an d legomena (som ething said ).14 In th e M iddle Ages this u n d ecid ed n ess becam e the sta rtin g -p o in t o f th e nom inalism controversy. A ristotle re fu se d to follow Plato in trea tin g th e m eaning o f predicates as an in d e ­ p e n d e n t object. H ow ever, because h e failed to perceive th e sem antic

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dim ension he inevitably objectified th e ir m eaning. T h e result is a pecu­ liar extension o f th e concept o f being (on). It is — to g e th er with the concepts o f th e o n e an d o f som ething - m ore com p reh en siv e th an th at o f an object (tode ti). T h e title ‘o ntology’ now begins to iridesce. It would have an unequivocal sense if one w ere to define it, as I initially did, an d as is usual in analytical philosophy, in term s o f the con cep t o f an object, or, which am ounts to th e sam e thing, in term s o f th e concept o f being in th e sense o f existence; ‘ontology’ would then m ean ‘theory o f objects’. In contrast to this the introduction o f ontology by A ristotle, which becam e sta n d ard in the tradition, contains a tension which was not resolved in th e tradition. T his tension is a consequence o f A ristotle’s d u al orien tatio n : on the one h and, to th e - objectual - fo rm u la ‘being as b ein g ’; on th e o th e r h an d , to the verbal form ‘is’. H e lets him self be g u id ed by this verbal form even w here it does n o t co nnote bein g in the sense o f existence, i.e. w here th e ‘is’ is not the ‘is’ o f a being; an d since the fo rm u la ‘bein g as being’ nonetheless rem ains th e gu id in g principle, th e form alizing ap p ro ach , which in itself would have led away from the restriction to th e problem o f objects, is again being cast into an objectual term inology. A ristotelian ontology transcends th e form al th eo ry of objects in th e d irection o f a form al sem antics, b u t in such a way that w hat em erges is m isin te rp rete d in term s o f an object-o rien ted p ersp ec­ tive, ow ing to th e lack o f aw areness o f the sem antic dim ension. T h u s if one views the traditional elaboration, essentially d eterm in e d by A ristotle, o f th e idea o f a philosophical fu n d am e n tal discipline as ontology fro m a language-analytical perspective (one o f reflection on th e m eaning o f words) it tu rn s out to be unsatisfactory in re g a rd to both o f th e aspects in A ristotle’s p relim inary conception o f philosophy. Firstly, in re g a rd to its justification: the object-orientated A ristotelian fo r­ m al discipline lacks a fo u n d atio n in a m ethod o f reflection; such a fo u n ­ d atio n w ould be p rovided by a form al sem antics (though w h eth e r this is th e only possible fo u n d atio n we do n o t yet know). Secondly, in reg ard to its scope: its claim to universality could only seem convincing so long as o n e rem a in ed o rien tate d to objects. B ut the o rien tatio n to everything (and that m eans: to all objects) ap p e ars itself restricted as soon as on e focusses on th e realm o f th e form al itself. T h e perspective on objects th e n co rresp o n d s to ju s t one sem antic form am o n g others. T h e r e are two aspects o f this critique o f ontology from a languageanalytical p o in t o f view w hich I m ust particularly em phasize. Firstly, th e critique is not an external one. Both defects re p re s e n t im m an e n t diffi­ culties. T h e language-analytical perspective was n o t necessary to show

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th em u p , b u t only to rem ove them . Secondly, this critique has positive consequences fo r th e question o f linguistic analysis as reg a rd s its own co n ception o f philosophy. W e d id n o t u n d e rta k e th e c o n fro n tatio n with th e trad itio n al basic conceptions m erely in o rd e r to be able to co n trast the language-analytical conception o f philosophy with them . R a th e r we did so in o rd e r to arriv e at such a conception in th e first place, a fte r it e m erg ed th a t th e o rien tatio n tow ards m eaning-analysis does n o t suffice fo r this p u rp o se. In this re g a rd the follow ing possibility seem s so far to em erge. We can follow A ristotle in his sketch o f a p relim in ary co n cep ­ tion o f philosophy (with th e reserv atio n s about m otivation m e n tio n e d in th e last lecture). W e can also follow him in th e d ev e lo p m e n t o f his p relim in ary co nception into th e conception of a philosophical fu n d a ­ m ental discipline which does n o t deductively g ro u n d th e know ledge o f the o th e r sciences b u t ra th e r them atizes w hat they all form ally p re s u p ­ pose. A nd now we only n eed to follow u p th e two weak points o f his co nception o f ontology with an a ttitu d e th a t is p re p a re d to reflect on th e m ean in g o f linguistic expressions a n d we find th a t th e trad itio n al ontology itself points beyond itself to a new conception o f th e form al science, which, in th e shape o f a form al sem antics, u n d erlies all sciences. F orm al sem antics is, on th e o n e h a n d , a language-analytical u n d e rta k ­ ing: it is sem antics, it analyses th e m e an in g o f linguistic expressions. O n th e o th e r h a n d , it is form al, in th e sam e sense th a t ontology was form al; an d because it rem oves w eaknesses o f ontology, which are in capable o f im m an e n t reso lu tio n , it can lay claim to being onto lo g y ’s legitim ate suc­ cessor. T h e r e is also a n o th e r way in which we can com e to see th e su p erio rity which form al sem antics possesses over form al ontology fro m th e p e r­ spective of A risto tle’s own idea o f philosophy. T h is is by sta rtin g o u t no t fro m th e unclarities o f ontology b u t fro m th e step which A ristotle took fro m th e reg io n al sciences to fo rm al science. I f one co n stru es p h i­ losophy qua h ig h e st science as th e tran sitio n fro m th e p a rtic u la r sci­ ences to th e fo rm a l elem en t com m on to th em all, th e n it is by n o m eans obvious th a t th e only such elem ent is objecthood. In science, as also elsew here, we n e v e r sim ply re fe r to objects, b u t always in such a way th at we m ake p redicative statem ents a b o u t them . B u t m ost o f th e state­ m ents o f science, e.g. those in which laws are fo rm u late d , do n o t co n ­ tain singular te rm s an d only re fe r indirectly to objects. It is surely co n ­ sistent th e n n o t to restrict th e form alization to sin g u lar term s, b u t to ex ten d it to w hole sentences and all sentence-form s. N ote m o reo v er th a t ontology is com pletely p rese rv e d w ithin form al sem antics. T h is is tru e n o t only o f th e parts o f trad itio n al ontology in

Introduction

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which so m ething was illegitim ately objectified - th e predicative d e te r­ m inations - bu t also o f th e th eo ry o f objects which now proves to be a p a rt o f form al sem antics. W hat still rem ains u nclear, how ever, is w hether this new conception o f a fo rm al fu n d a m e n ta l discipline has a unitary fu n d a m e n ta l question as ontology did in th e question co n cern in g ‘being as b ein g ’. So fo r the tim e being we have simply an ex ten d e d subject-m atter; w h eth er this can be org an ized a ro u n d a ce n tral question is still u n clear. I shall take u p this difficulty in th e nex t lecture. T o d ay I w ould sim ply like to lighten the shock you may have felt w hen I stated th a t ontology is p reserv ed w ithin sem antics. Even if you ag ree with m e th a t th e o rien tatio n tow ards the fo rm o f linguistic expressions opens u p a subject-m atter th a t is b ro a d e r th a n ontology, you will probably w ant to qualify this to th e effect th a t th e new subjectm a tte r is a linguistic one and thus no lon g er belongs to th e dim ension of ontology, th e d im ension o f ‘reality’. T h e r e is re p e a te d h ere the sam e resistance to the language-analytical position th a t has already show n itself, in a n o th e r connection, in th e first lecture. L anguage, o n e thinks, is som eth in g m erely subjective. If o n e co nverts ontology, w hich has to d o w ith reality, into linguistic analysis, th e n th e m ost im p o rta n t thing is lost, even if som eth in g else is ad d ed . Now it seems to m e th a t in objections o f this kind, even w hen raised by philosophers, a pre-philosophical m otive is p rese n t, a reserv atio n sim ilar to th a t w hich is en te rta in e d against philosophy in g en eral by th ose w ho are n o t fam iliar with philosophy. In w hat way, I would reto rt, does ontology have to do with reality? C ertainly n o t in th e way th e sci­ ences do. It does n o t have to do with objects. O b jecthood is n o t itself so m eth in g real like an object. B ut is n o t - you could now ask - objecthood, even if n o t itself som e­ th in g real, th e reality o f th e real? A nd is n o t this lost in the reflection on th e m erely linguistic? It is only in th e f u rth e r course o f these lectures th a t we will gradually w ork o u t th e categories which m ake it possible ad eq u ately to discuss such questions. So fa r I have barely tou ch ed on th e essence o f th e lin­ guistic. W e are, th e re fo re , no t yet in a position to see th a t it is a m istake to speak o f th e ‘m erely linguistic’, of la nguage as a m ere m ed iu m betw een us and reality. At th e p re se n t stage of o u r en q u iry it m ust suffice to say th a t th e opinion ju s t expressed, th a t th e reality o f th e real can n o t be a p p re h e n d e d in reflection on th e use o f language, arises fro m a m e re feeling; fo r if it w ere to be m o re th an this o n e w ould have to be able to say how som eth in g like ‘reality’ can be given to us, if n o t in

Ontology and semantics

33

linguistic usage. We will soon have an opportunity critically to examine such a positive alternative (p. 61 ff). But it would in any event be false to think that the distinction between object and m eaning is levelled out by the semantic turn. T h e opposite is the case. It was the old ontology in which this distinction was levelled out; for want of other categories the m eaning of a linguistic expression was interpreted as an object. By contrast, there is no reason, from the semantic perspective, for neglecting the object for which an expression stands in favour of its meaning. All linguistic expressions which we understand have, in so far as we understand them , a m eaning. Some of these expressions, singular terms, stand for objects. An expression can presumably only have this function of standing for an object in virtue of how we understand it, thus in virtue of its meaning. If this is correct - and it is only later that we will precisely investigate these connections - then the objecthood of objects cannot be thematized independently of the meaning of singular terms. However, that does not mean that the object for which the expression stands and its m eaning coincide. T he dimension of objects does not lose anything as a result of the semantic approach; rath er som ething is added to it and only thus does it become intelligible. If we now proceed from singular terms to whole sentences (or to other component-expressions) then, although they have a meaning, it is not clear that we can say that they stand for objects. H ere then the dimension o f objects does indeed fall away; and the impression th ere ­ fore arises that we are dealing with the ‘merely linguistic’. But the lin­ guistic is not the m ere sign; it is that which one understands and which many can understand in the same way. It is, therefore, nothing subjec­ tive. At present I am only concerned that you should dwell on this understanding in its puzzling familiarity and resist the tem ptation to force it into traditional categories. A nother reason why I have exam ined objections I assume you to have towards a formal semantics as extended ontology is that they seem to me to be the same objections that have hindered traditional ontology itself from developing into formal semantics. All the decisive steps o f Greek ontology resulted from semantic reflection. However, every step led to an objectifying reinterpretation which concealed the linguistic dimension of the reflection. Thus the problem of being (Sein) and notbeing (Nichtsein) was twisted by Parmenides into a problem o f what is and what is not (von Seiendem und Nichtseiendem ), with the grotesque but con­ sistent result that there is ju st a single unm oved being (Seiendes), because with what is not (dem Nichtseienden) not-being (das Nichtsein) was also

Introduction

34

excluded.15 Plato discovered for the first time, in reflection on questions of definition, the meanings of predicates - and immediately objectified them, in his doctrine of ideas, into supersensible entities. Finally, Aris­ totle started out from the form of the singular predicative sentence and nonetheless developed on this basis an objectual ontology. But what is it then that hindered traditional ontology from dealing with the semantic dimension as such, and which also makes it so diffi­ cult for us? Why is it that we too unconsciously interpret the nonobjectual understanding of linguistic expressions in an objectual way? Clearly it is due to the fact that when we speak o f something this is, by definition, an object. We can thus thematically direct ourselves only to objects; u n d e r­ standing is essentially unthem atic. So if we wish to investigate the m ean­ ing o f o u r expressions we find ourselves faced with peculiar difficulties. T he m eaning is not what we are naturally directed towards; we must, therefore, carry out a reflection which inhibits our natural directedness. And then we m ust also be careful not to objectify that with which we are dealing in this reflection. My saying ‘with which . . . we are dealing’ already contains, in the pronom inal ‘with which’, an objectification. And is there not an objectification already contained in speaking of ‘the m eaning’ of an expression? Indeed, and we shall see later that, and to what extent, this is an im proper way of speaking.

LECTURE 4

Has formal semantics a fundamental question?

Because Aristotle orientated him self not only towards the expression ‘being’ (Seiendes) but also towards the expression ‘is/to be’, traditional ontology reaches beyond a m ere theory of objects or theory of sub­ stance. This surplus really already belongs to the broader field of a formal semantics. If one asks why Aristotle included predicative d eter­ minations as well as objects in his form al them atic the answer m ust be: because predicative determ inations, although not objects, are at least determ inations of objects. So the orientation towards the category of an object, which is definitive of the whole o f traditional philosophy, also determ ined which non-objectual semantic form Aristotle dealt with. If we now envisage a form al semantics as the form al universal science in place o f ontology we m ust consider w hether the form al thematic, as thus extended, still has some sort of unified structure and a centre, so that h ere too a unitary fundam ental question can be form ulated. T h e fundam ental question o f ontology is: what is being as being? It is obvious that this form ulation of the question is a makeshift solution, for it is fram ed as though one were asking about the what-being (WasSein) of an object. I have therefore reform ulated it so that what is being asked is what it m eans to speak of an object (or being). This is already to give the question a semantic form ulation. But its real semantic coun­ terp art is the question: ‘How can one refer to objects with linguistic expressions?’ and this question, it would seem (cf. p. 33), leads back to the question: ‘In what does the m eaning of a singular term consist?’ And if we wish to avoid speaking of a m eaning as an object, this ques­ tion can be form ulated as follows: ‘W hat is it to understand a singular term ?’ Analogously, if we extend the sphere of the formal thematic beyond that of singular term s, we can ask with respect to any semantic class: ‘W hat is it to u n derstand an expression of this form ?’ T h e for­ mulation ‘W hat is it to u n derstand . . . ?’ is not completely clear. But at

Introduction

36

the present stage of our deliberations it is appropriate to content o u r­ selves with a question-form ula which contains only a vague indication of what we are looking for. As yet we do not know with what categorial means we can adequately thematize som ething like the understanding of linguistic expressions. T o explain how such questions about the understanding o f expressions of a certain form, or about the u n d e r­ standing of this form, are adequately to be form ulated is, therefore, a task which already belongs to the elaboration of formal semantics. We can call the question: what is it to u nderstand an expression of a certain semantic form , or the form o f this expression? the formalized question o f m eaning. Its relation to questions about the m eaning or understanding of a particular expression of this form is analogous to the relation o f the study of being as being to the reference to an indi­ vidual being. T hus it seems that we can call this question the fundam en­ tal semantic question which corresponds to the fundam ental ontological question. M oreover, with this question concerning the structure of our linguistic u nderstanding we have an answer to the question concerning a narrow er and m ore fundam ental reflection on our understanding, som ething we still lacked when attem pting, in the first lecture, to char­ acterize a language-analytical conception of philosophy. In contrast with the broad sphere of the a priori, o f the clarification of meaning, we have here a narrow er sphere of reflection in which the understandingstructures already presupposed and understood in all understanding of particular linguistic expressions are to be analysed. If we define the subject-m atter of philosophy in term s o f this formal-semantic sphere of reflection, this implies the thesis that all specifically philosophical con­ cepts are concepts connected with the analysis of the semantic struc­ tures. But if we construe the enquiry into semantic form as reflection on the presuppositions of all linguistic understanding, then we cannot be con­ tent to see this question break down into as many questions as there are sem antic forms. In this respect then the question about semantic form, as hitherto form ulated, does not yet correspond to the fundam ental question of ontology; for to speak of the question about semantic form obscures the fact that one is really dealing with several questions. How are they connected? A first step suggests itself immediately: the form of the expressions of a semantic class is determ ined by which expressions of other classes they can be com bined with and by the way in which the m eaning of the expressions contributes to the m eaning of the composite expressions which thereby arise (p. 26). T he semantic form o f a class o f com po­

H as form al semantics a fundam ental question?

37

nent-expressions is thus always an abstract m om ent of the structure of the corresponding complex expressions. Now it belongs to the essence of a structural composition that it m ust term inate in units which are no longer essentially parts o f wholes, but essentially wholes of parts. In the linguistic sphere these independent units are sentences - or, to put it better, we can define sentences as follows (though this is not unproble­ matic): they are those linguistic expressions which can still enter as parts into larger linguistic units, but no longer in such a way that they are essentially components of a m ore com prehensive syntactic or semantic structure (which does not rule out that some com ponents of sentences, e.g. personal pronouns may involve a reference to com ponents of other sentences).1 T h e sentence thus seems to be the primary unit of m ean­ ing. T ru e, one can also understand parts of sentences, but one then understands them as parts of sentences; and one can only say some­ thing (etwas zu verstehen geben) with a sentence, not with a word or other sentence-part (save where these function as elliptical sentences). It follows from this that the question concerning the semantic form of a class of non-independent expressions (such as, e.g., singular terms) is always to be understood as a com ponent-question of the question concerning the semantic form o f the corresponding sentence (in this case of the predicative sentence). T h e questions concerning the seman­ tic forms of the various classes of com ponent-expressions thus enter as parts into the questions concerning the semantic forms of sentences. B ut now, because there are different sentences, the problem again arises, at the present level, o f w hether there are not just many similar questions in form al semantics, but a unitary question. Does o u r u n d er­ standing of linguistic expressions break down into the understanding of different sentence-forms or are these sentence-forms internally con­ nected? Is there such a thing as a general form o f all sentences, of which all particular sentence-form s can in some way be regarded as specifica­ tions? It would seem clear that this question cannot be decided in advance, but only in the actual elaboration of the formal-semantic anal­ yses. But it seems equally clear that the analyses must be directed towards this question if one does not wish to have different forms of understanding merely juxtaposed to one another. Accordingly, formal semantics has at least a hypothetical fundam ental question, viz. the question concerning the form of all sentences, or the connection of all sentence-form s, a question we can also form ulate thus: ‘W hat is it to understand a sentence?’ It is this question which corresponds to the question about being as being in ontology.2 All we can do at the present stage of our deliberations by way of

Introduction

38

preparation for answering this fundam ental question is to ask whether traditional ontology does not already contain a perspective on some­ thing which is common to all sentences. You may feel that it is a mistake even to surmise the presence of such a perspective, given that sentences did not even belong to the thematic of ontology. However, we have seen that ontology is an ambivalent discipline, one of whose tendencies points towards a formal semantics (though this tendency is blocked by an object-orientated counter-tendency). We may then surmise that ontology already contains a perspective on the form of sentences, par­ ticularly when one considers that Aristotle, in his ontology, was orien­ tated towards the concept o f logos - m ore precisely the logos apophantikos, the assertoric sentence. This orientation towards the assertoric sentence was connected with the thematization of the copulative ‘is’. Aristotle’s interpretation of all (singular) predicative sentences with a verbal predicate (e.g. ‘Peter swims’) as sentences with a copula and a participle (e.g. ‘Peter is swimming’)3 implies that the copula had for him the significance of the indicative verbal form as such, or the form of the composition of predicative sentences. However, this perspective on the sentence-form came to nothing, because the interest was immediately directed towards ‘beings’, the predicative contents. But most im portant o f all, because of the orientation towards ‘beings’, the singular predica­ tive sentence-form rem ained the only one considered in ontology. And this sentence itself, partly on account o f the orientation towards ‘is’ and partly on account of the interpretation of the predicates as standing for determ inations o f objects, was interpreted one-sidedly as a com pound of singular term and predicate. T h e possibility, which became so crucial for the m odern logic of relations, that sentences like ‘Peter hits Paul’ can just as well be interpreted as the combination of a so-called twoplace predicate (= classification-expression) (‘. . . hits . . .’) with an ordered pair of singular terms (‘P eter’, ‘Paul’), was not seen. T he rem aining forms of assertoric sentence were partly not perceived by Aristotle at all (such as those of complex sentences) and partly (as in the case of general sentences) regarded as ontologically irrelevant because they do not express statem ents about an object. T hus one cannot derive a perspective for the question concerning something common to all forms o f sentence from these beginnings of a theory of the predicative sentence-form; for they only deal with a single sentence-form. In certain places, however, Aristotle encountered aspects of form which, though presented by him as formal aspects of the predicative sentence, can immediately be seen to apply also to other sentences. O ne such place is his treatm ent of the Principle of Contra­

Has form al semantics a fundam ental question?

39

diction and the Law of Excluded Middle. In the context of our discus­ sion there are two respects in which Aristotle’s mode of treatm ent of these ‘most general principles’ is worthy of attention. Firstly, Aristotle finds it difficult to bring the discussion of these prin­ ciples into a systematic connection with the them atic of ontology - the doctrine of substance. T h e discussion of these principles does indeed not belong to a theory of objects. Aristotle, however, justifies his inten­ tion to deal with them in ontology on the grounds that they underlie all sciences.4 H ere then Aristotle him self encountered formal foundations of the sciences which cannot be understood objectually. N owhere does the tension between theory of objects and form al semantics, which p er­ vades the Aristotelian ontology, becom e m ore evident than here. On the one hand, Aristotle was undogm atic enough to place treatm ent of these principles, on account of their form al-universal character, in the context of the question concerning being as being. On the other hand, the discussion o f them, in Book 4, does not stand in any systematic connection with the rest of the problem atic of the Metaphysics. Secondly, it is worth noting that Aristotle presents both principles only with reference to the form of singular predicative statements. T hu s the Principle of C ontradiction takes the form : ‘the same attribute cannot at the same time and in the same respect belong and not belong to the same object’.5 In o th er places, however, Aristotle also formulates it thus: ‘it is impossible that (something) at the same time is and is not’.6 If the ‘is’ of this form ulation is understood as the copula, then this fo r­ mulation is identical with the previous one. However, this ‘is’ can also be interpreted as having the sense of th at ‘is’ which can be placed before any assertoric sentence. Instead of saying, e.g., ‘It is raining’ one can say ‘It is the case that it is raining’, and instead of saying ‘It is not rain ­ ing’ one can say ‘It is not the case th at it is raining.’ If we orientate ourselves towards this use of ‘is’, the form ulation of the Principle of Contradiction ju st m entioned would have the m eaning: ‘It is impossible for som ething at the same time to be the case and not be the case.’ We can perhaps say, provisionally, that this prefixed ‘is’ expresses the affirmative form of an assertoric sentence and the ‘is not’ expresses the negative form . T he following re-form ulation o f the last-mentioned fo r­ mulation o f the Principle o f C ontradiction would correspond to this explanation: ‘It is impossible at the same time to affirm and deny some­ thing.’ Why is it impossible? T o this we also find an answer in Aristotle. It is clearly not impossible to u tter such a sentence; it is only impossible for one to say som ething thereby, to signify som ething (etwas zu verstehen

Introduction

40

geben).1 I can elucidate this as follows: if one affirms and denies some­

thing, this is like making a move in chess and then withdrawing it, or giving som ething away and then taking it back.8 In the relevant actionrespect one has not done anything. Aristotle points out that one can only justify the Principle of C ontradiction indirectly, namely by show­ ing that whoever denies it makes speech senseless. Since this justifica­ tion no longer rests on the special form of the predicative statement, but on the m ore universal aspect of affirm ation and negation, inter­ preting the Principle of Contradiction in this m ore general way is sug­ gested by Aristotle himself. But how general is it? If the m ore general interpretation holds for all sentences whose affirmative or negative form is expressed by that prefixed ‘is’ or ‘is not’, then clearly it holds for all assertoric sentences. We find a criterion for distinguishing so-called assertoric sentences or statements from other sentences in Aristotle (though not in th e Metaphysics)', and this criterion has been accepted ever since. It is: w hether one can call what is said with the sentence true or false.9 By means of this criterion assertoric sentences are distinguished from sentences in other so-called modes, such as im perative sentences, optative sentences, interrogative sen­ tences. In contrast to this semantic criterion it m ight seem plausible to characterize assertoric sentences by reference to the syntactic criterion of the indicative verbal form . But the two criteria do not correspond. T h ere are various types, or modes of em ploym ent, of indicative sen­ tences in which one does not say som ething which can be called true or false and which, therefore, cannot be called assertoric sentences, e.g. many sentences in the 1st Person F u tu re Indicative - such as ‘1 will come’ - express not a prediction, which can turn out to be true or false, but an intention. If it makes sense to speak o f the general form of assertoric sentences, then we m ust also be able to symbolize these sentences in a general way. And if the Principle of Contradiction holds for all assertoric sentences, then it m ust be capable of being form ulated by means of this form ali­ zation. From now on I shall use, as is usual in logic, the letters ‘p \ ‘q\ Y as symbols for arbitrary assertoric sentences. In this way we arrive at the standard m odern form ulation of the Principle of Contradiction: a statem ent of the form ‘p and not^?’ is impossible (necessarily false). If we characterize what is said with a sentence (e.g ‘It is raining’) as true or false, we express this by means o f the form ulation ‘that/?’, e.g. ‘T h at it is raining is tru e’. B ut this ‘th at’ already occurred in the for­ m ulation with the prefixed ‘is’ and one can now easily see that, in the case of any sentence which one can equivalently transform into ‘It is

Has form al semantics a fundam ental question?

41

the case that/?’, one can equally well say ‘It is true that/?’. Consequently, the use of that prefixed ‘is’ extends ju st as far as, and no fu rth e r than, the use of assertoric sentences. If it is correct that the prefixed ‘is’ and ‘is not’ express the affirmative or negative form of assertoric sentences, then we can now say that the Principle of Contradiction is grounded in this general form of assertoric sentences. T he real result for our ques­ tion concerning a unitary sentence-form would of course be that here a general form, if not of all sentences then at least of all assertoric sen­ tences, seems to emerge. But does not the distinction between affirma­ tion and negation extend beyond the use of that prefixed ‘is’ and ‘is not’? Does it not apply to imperative sentences and optative sentences as well as to assertoric sentences? And would we not then have to expect a m ore general form of the Principle of Contradiction, which extends beyond the sphere of assertoric sentences? O f course m ore im portant for us than this question would be the question w hether perhaps there emerges here a general form of all sentences. Before I investigate this question (and I will not do so until the next lecture) we m ust consolidate what has so far been achieved. I wanted to pursue the question concerning a general sentence-form today only to the extent that clues to it can be derived from traditional ontology. If the reflections so far can only be supported by reference to Aristotle’s treatm ent of the Principle of Contradiction, then they have a rather slender basis in his ontology. Since ontology is orientated towards the word ‘is’, a clearer basis would be given if that prefixed ‘is’, on which I based the reflections, occurs in Aristotle himself. Now this is in fact the case. In his discussion of the various meanings of the word ‘is’ Aristotle distinguished this prefixed ‘is.’10 H e p u t forward the thesis, which a m om ent ago I merely hinted at, that with this ‘is’ it is said that some­ thing is true and with the corresponding ‘is not’ that something is false. This thesis he justifies by referring to the equivalence of ‘It is the case that/?’ to ‘It is tru e th a t/?’. Aristotle calls this meaning of being einai hos to alethes.11 We can accordingly speak of veritative being. T h e situation with regard to Aristotle’s treatm ent of veritative being resembles that with regard to his treatm ent of the Principle of C ontra­ diction. H ere too Aristotle considers only predicative sentences, although again it is clear that what he says can be applied to all asser­ toric sentences. And here too Aristotle is unsure about the systematic place of this subject in ontology. At first he states that it does not belong to metaphysics at all,12 but later on there is a short discussion of this m eaning of being.13 This discussion is directed so strongly towards the predicative sentence form that it yields little for our problematic. Only

Introduction

42

one thing is of interest: Aristotle arrives here at a differentiation within veritative being which relates to the so-called modalities of being (pos­ sibility, actuality, necessity). In his detailed discussion of possibility and actuality in th e Metaphysics, on the other hand, Aristotle treats them as modalities of copulative being; and this means: in an objectual m anner. T he word ‘possible’, e.g., is not understood in such a way that, like the veritative ‘is’, it is prefixed to the assertoric sentence (and we must add: to an arbitrary assertoric sentence) (‘It is possible that/?’), but in such a way that one must say a is possibly F \ thus in such a way that it is the objects that are possibly or actually such-and-such. In the ontological tradition possibility, actuality and necessity have been called ‘modalities of being’; but because of the orientation towards objects one could not see that the being of which they are modalities is veritative being. But what, you will ask, is this veritative being? From Aristotle we get no fu rth er inform ation on this question. However, we must not over­ look the fact that in this connection too Aristotle speaks not only of ‘to be’, but also o f ‘being’. Is the veritative ‘is’ the ‘is’ of an object? This con­ ception may not seem mistaken, inasmuch as the grammatical trans­ form ation o f (p ’ into ‘that /?’ m ust be conceived as nominalization. Although the expression ‘that it is raining’ still seems to have the same content as the assertoric sentence ‘It is raining’, ‘that it is raining’ is not a sentence; it is a singular term . We can tell this from the fact that ‘that/?’ requires supplem entation by a (higher-level) predicate in order to become once m ore a whole sentence, e.g. ‘T h at it is raining/is tru e ’, ‘T h at it is raining/is pleasant.’ We must also include here such rela­ tional supplem entations as ‘he /hopes/that p ’, ‘he/believes/that/?’. Now if ‘that/?’ is a singular term , then we will have to say that every such expression stands for an object. Clearly, from any sentence ‘that p/F y we can infer ‘som ething/F’. Now what sort of objects are they for which the nominalized form of an assertoric sentence stands? Instead of saying ‘It is the case that/?’ we can also say ‘It is a fact that/?.’ This circumstance might suggest the view that the objects in question are facts. However, this would be a mistake. For in the negative case we say ‘It is not a fact that/?.’ H ere we still have to do with the object in ques­ tion, but deny that it is a fact. T h a t it snowed yesterday is a fact only if it is true that yesterday it snowed. We obviously use the predicate ‘is a fact’ as equivalent in m eaning to the predicate ‘is true’. We must, th ere­ fore, ask: what are these objects that are designated by an expression of the form ‘that/?’ (and which are only facts if they are true) in and for themselves? T h at which can be true or false and which, if it is true, is a fact, is what is asserted when we u tter an assertoric sentence. So it seems

H as form al semantics a fundam erital question ?

43

that we can characterize the objects in question as what is said or asserted. This also seems to correspond to our ordinary use of lan­ guage. We ask, e.g., ‘Is what he asserted (said) true? Is it a fact?’ In English philosophy the term of art ‘proposition’ has been adopted for what I here designate as what is said (das Gesagte). Frege called these objects ‘thoughts’. As this word is used by Frege ‘thought’ is not to be understood in the sense of thinking, but ra th e r in the sense of what is thought. Perhaps this designation ‘what is th o u g h t’ or ‘the thought’ is m ore attractive to you than my linguistic talk of ‘what is said’. But p e r­ haps you will also be unhappy with Frege’s designation and say: ‘All these designations of the object in question, w hether as “what is said” or “what is thou g h t”, characterize it merely subjectively as “what is m eant by us”; but we would like to know what it is in itself.’ Although I doubt w hether this dem and is justified, I shall for the present accede to it. As a m atter of fact, there is also a term inology for the objects in question which is free of all subjective connotations: they are referred to by Husserl, and in W ittgenstein’s Tractatus, as ‘states of affairs’ (Sach­ verhalte). Thus, according to this conception, every nominalized asser­ toric sentence ‘that /?’ stands for a state of affairs. W ittgenstein then proceeded to define a fact as the ‘obtaining’ (Bestehen) of a state of affairs.14 With this we would have reached a conception which suggests that the veritative ‘is’ is to be construed as the being (Sein) of an object, as a mode of existence (Existenz), namely as the obtaining (Bestehen) of a state of affairs. O f course this obtaining would be a strange kind of existence. For one will have to say even of states of affairs which we do not obtain, hence states of affairs that are not facts, that, as states of affairs, they somehow exist; for otherwise we could not talk about them . One could try (and it has been tried) to dispose of this difficulty by attributing to states of affairs ano th er sort of being which they have in themselves whether or not they also obtain. B ut the real difficulty sets in earlier, namely, in the question: what then is a state of affairs? O ne can see nicely from this exam ple how the allegedly thing-orientated thinking and language-analytical thinking com pare. T h e re are people who breathe a sigh of relief when offered the term ‘state of affairs’ for the objects for which expressions of the form ‘th at/?’ stand. But the alleg­ edly language-independent object is then som ething merely suggested by the word. It is the linguistic analyst who first establishes the relation to the thing (Sachbezug) by not being content with the word and asking what is m eant by it. W hat then is m eant by it? Just try to answer this question w ithout referrin g to sentences and their meanings! I cannot

Introduction

44

yet deal with this question adequately. As yet we lack the categorial means for tackling a question concerning a kind of objects. Also I shall only later (Lecture 10) show in what way the attem pts by Husserl and W ittgenstein to construe the object-character of states o f affairs without reference to language must be regarded as having failed. In these pre­ liminary reflections we are not yet trying to solve the problems, but simply to arrive at a correct way of posing the problems. At certain points then I will have to be satisfied if an idea seems sufficiently plau­ sible for you to be p rep ared to follow me further. In the case of the present4question it m ust suffice if I say: the concep­ tion of veritative being as the obtaining o f states of affairs at any rate does not correspond to our ordinary ways of talking, and seems merely to arise from a traditional tendency to assimilate this being to the exis­ tence o f perceptible objects. O ne can, if one insists, speak of the obtain­ ing of a state o f affairs. But if one asks for the criterion for deciding whether a state o f affairs obtains or not, one will have to say: the state of affairs that (e.g.) it snowed yesterday obtains if and only if it is true that it snowed yesterday. And it is true that it snowed yesterday if and only if it snowed yesterday. T h u s talk of the obtaining of a state of affairs points back to the u n derstanding of the unm odified, not yet nom inalized, sentence. We had the following series o f equivalences: (1) the state of affairs that/? obtains = (2) that/? is a fact = (3) it is the case that/? = (4) that/? is true = (5) /?. Now if the m eaning of (2) is not explicated by (1), but the m eaning of (2), and hence that of (1), by (4) and (5), then clearly we also cannot explicate the m eaning of (3), hence the m eaning of verita­ tive being, in term s o f its equivalence with (2) and (1), but only in terms of its equivalence with (4) and (5). Let us begin with (4) and (5). However unclear the m eaning of ‘that /?’ still is to us, this m uch seems clear: that the nominalized sentence ‘that/?’ contains not m ore than the original sentence *p\ but less. W hat was rem oved from the sentence ‘/?’ in the transform ation into the sin­ gular term ‘that/?’ is what we can call its assertion-m om ent. If instead of saying ‘Yesterday it snowed’ one simply says ‘that it snowed yester­ day’, one refers to what was asserted in the preceding utterance; but in such a way that one no longer asserts it. If one only says ‘that it snowed yesterday’ then, in contrast to when one says ‘It snowed yesterday’ one does not yet signify (zu verstehen geben) anything; rather, by rem oving the assertion-m om ent, one creates, so to speak, an empty-place for other supplem entations, in which other position-takings vis-a-vis the same state of affairs, which was previously asserted, can be expressed,

Has formal semantics a fundam ental question ?

45

e.g. ‘that p - is doubtful’, ‘that/? - I regard as im probable’, etc. Now there is one such predicative supplem entation the significance of which appears to be that it gives back to the expression precisely what was taken away by its nominalization. This is the supplem entation by the predicate ‘is tru e’. For if one supplem ents ‘that/?’ with ‘- is tru e’, one says again precisely the same as one said with ‘/?’. From this it seems to follow that the predicate ‘is tru e ’ expresses the assertion-moment. In the original expression ‘/?’ there is no sign for expressing the assertionm om ent. But because the equivalence ‘/? = that/? is tru e ’ holds, we can now say that the m eaning of ‘/?’ is composed of a propositional content and the assertion-m om ent, and that the propositional content corre­ sponds to what is expressed in the nominalized form by ‘that/?’. You will ask: how is this assertion-m om ent to be understood? I can­ not yet answer this question here; the answer again belongs to the elab­ oration rath er than to the exposition of the problematic (cf. Lectures 15 and 28). Provisionally, I think I can assume that you have a vague understanding of what is m eant by the assertion of something, as opposed to o ther position-takings, such as supposition, doubt, etc. of the same state of affairs. But one thing it would seem can be inferred from the reflections ju st carried out, and this is that the assertionmom ent, because it can be expressed in the predicate ‘is tru e’, contains a truth-claim . W hoever utters an assertoric sentence asserts something (e.g. that it is raining) and always also thereby asserts that what he asserts (e.g. that it is raining) is true. Now if the veritative ‘is’ is used as equivalent to the predicate ‘is tru e ’, then it follows that this ‘is’ also expresses the assertion-m om ent of the statem ent, and that this assertion-m om ent is to be understood as a truth-claim. This result can now be directly linked with the explication of this ‘is’ I gave in the discussion of the Principle of Contradiction, viz. that it expresses the affirmative form of the statement. T h e difficulty which arose there: that this description is too general, because it also applies to non-assertoric sentences, would now be removed. For we can now say: the affirmative form of the sentence, in the special case of the assertoric sentence, has the significance of an assertion; and this is a definition of the class of assertoric sentences by a characterization of their form . This definition, of course, is very closely connected with the criterion that we have previously found, viz. that a sentence is an asser­ toric sentence if one can call what is said with it true or false. T he p re ­ sent definition, on the other hand, says that a sentence is an assertoric sentence if it is used in such a way that a truth-claim is thereby m ade. We can of course easily bring out the connection between the two cri­

Introduction

46

teria by saying: only in so far as the use of a sentence already contains a truth-claim can what is said with it be called true or false. But now the following difficulty suggests itself. I had previously dis­ tinguished the affirmative sentence-form from the negative. But the truth-claim , or the assertion-character, is supposed to belong to all assertoric sentences and hence also to negative assertoric sentences. Does this not show that the subordination of the assertion-form to the affirmative form is mistaken? W here does the mistake lie? Have I, p er­ haps, in the introduction of the truth-claim , based myself one-sidedly on the affirmative assertoric sentences and lost sight of veritative notbeing? But what would this mean? Should we say that negative sen­ tences, or sentences o f the form ‘It is not the case that/?’, make a falsityclaim? ‘It is not the case that/?’ is clearly equivalent to ‘T h a t p is false’; so one can indeed say that with a sentence of this form it is asserted that what is said with *p* is false. But ‘It is not the case that/?’ is, of course, equivalent, not to ‘p \ but to ‘not-/?’. With ‘It is not the case that/?’, th ere­ fore, the falsity of the opposite statem ent is asserted; and this is only possible because here too the statem ent asserts its own truth. T hus the use of any assertoric sentence, w hether or not a ‘not’ occurs in it, involves a truth-claim . And that in the use o f any assertoric sentence something is asserted is clear anyway. A lthough one can assert the opposite, one cannot do som ething that is the opposite of asserting. We thus find ourselves forced to look for the e rro r on the o ther side. T he assumption that there is an affirmative and a negative sentence-form, or that affirm ation and negation are on a level, cannot be correct. Firstly, it is not possible to divide sentences into affirmative and neg­ ative. T ru e, for every assertoric sentence there is an opposite sentence. But there is no general criterion by which we could tell which of the two is the negative one; for the criterion that that sentence is negative in which a negation-sign occurs is of only limited application. Frege gives as an example the sentence ‘Christ is im m ortal.’15 It is, of course, the negation of the sentence ‘Christ is m ortal’; but it appears not to be meaningful to say that it is intrinsically negative, or, as I incautiously said, that it has a ‘negative form ’. T h e predicate ‘is im m ortal’ is as ‘pos­ itive’ as the predicate ‘is.m ortal’. It may seem negative because it is equivalent to ‘is not m ortal’; but the predicate ‘is m ortal’ can equally well seem negative because it is equivalent to ‘does not live forever’.16 Thus we cannot regard negation as a property which belongs to a sentence; rather we m ust construe it as an operation which, when applied to a sentence, generates the opposite sentence. But what is it that is negated, or to what is the operation o f negation applied? As both

Has formal semantics a fundam ental question?

47

assertoric sentences - e.g. ‘It is rain in g ’ and ‘It is'n o t raining’ - are assertoric, one cannot construe the second sentence as though what is negated is the assertion o f the first; rath er w hat is negated is what the first asserts, its propositional content. If we symbolize the assertionm om ent o f ‘p ’ with Frege’s assertion-sign V , and the non-nom inalized propositional content of with */?*, then our two sentences have the form V*/?*’ and V *not-/?*’ rather than the form V */?*’ and ‘not h *p*\ T h at the negation-sign pertains only to the propositional content can also be reinforced, following Frege, by considering the role of negation in com ponent-sentences of complex sentences.17 W hen sentences enter as com ponent-sentences into a com plex sentence then, even if they are not nom inalized, they lose their assertion-m om ent; only the whole sen­ tence is asserted. Let us take e.g. the sentence-form ‘p or q\ It is obvious that here only the complex sentence as a whole is asserted, and that it would contradict the sense of such an ‘o r’-sentence if the two com po­ nent-sentences were also asserted. T hus the two com ponent-sentences lack the assertion-m om ent when they occur in this form of sentence, though th ere is no symbol for this lack in natural language. But this is only possible if (since the assertion-m om ent is absent) the ‘not’ belongs to the propositional content. This arg u m en t can only be evaded by the outlandish thesis that the word ‘n o t’ has a different m eaning when it occurs in an in d ep en d en t sentence and when the same sentence func­ tions as a com ponent-sentence. But is it not then misleading, you will ask, to continue to refer to assertion as affirmation? T he notion of an affirm ation seems essentially related to a denial. However, one can acknowledge such a correlation without contradicting the results ju st achieved. We simply have to rem ove an ambiguity in speaking of denial and negation. For every propositional content *p* there is always one opposed to it (*not-/?*), which we get by negating the first. T o avoid ambiguities we can reserve the word ‘negation’ for this. If one asserts (assertorically affirms) this second propositional content (*not-/?*) one can call this the denial of the affirm ation of the first propositional content (*/?*) and, again to avoid ambiguity, one can reserve the word ‘denial’ for this. Denial, as thus understood, is, therefore, the assertoric affirm ation of a negated propositional content; and this m eans: of a propositional content which is negative relative to another. T h u s the denial, which is itself an affir­ mation, is opposed to another affirm ation. It is in this way that we must also u n d erstan d the words ‘yes’ and ‘no’ (for the time being I shall disregard their non-assertoric use). We use these words in conversation when the propositional content which is

Introduction

48

affirm ed or denied has already been expressed by a preceding assertion or question, so that the reply does not need to repeat the propositional content and can restrict itself to the mere affirm ation or denial. Again it is easily overlooked that with the ‘no’ too som ething is affirm ed, viz. the opposite propositional content. If we use the symbol ’ to indicate that the propositional content which is at issue is the one that had been m entioned in the conversation, then the assertoric ‘yes’ has the form ’ and the assertoric ‘no’ the form V not Now if every denial is an affirm ation which is opposed to another affirm ation, then it also follows that every affirmation is opposed to another affirm ation - namely, its denial, the affirm ation of the opposite propositional content. Every ‘n o ’ expresses a position-taking against a ‘yes’. Does every ‘yes’ also express a position-taking against a ‘no’? If it is correct that one cannot divide sentences into intrinsically positive and intrinsically negative then this is clearly how we must view it. Thus, understanding the assertion-m om ent as affirm ation turns out to be cor­ rect. Every assertion is a position-taking against the one opposed to it; only this position-taking is not m ade explicit as it is in denial. Later I shall try to show that without consideration of this property - being a position-taking against - one cannot understand the m ode of employ­ m ent o f assertoric sentences and their various forms (Lectures 15, 17, 27). T hus from the fact that what is negated is always only the proposi­ tional content and not the assertion, it in no way follows that the assertion-m om ent is untouched by the negation. On the contrary. T hat the utterance o f an assertoric sentence has the character of an assertion, and hence o f an affirm ative position-taking, would be meaningless if the propositional content were not opposed to one that negated it. Now w here do we stand with respect to our question concerning a unitary form of all sentences? We have arrived at a form which is common to at least all assertoric sentences: (1) they have the structure ‘t- */?*’ and con­ nected with this structure is the fact that (2) for every *p* there is a *not-/?*. W hereas the first part of this symbolization represents som e­ thing that rem ains the same for every assertoric sentence, behind the second part, the symbol */?*, is concealed the entire multiplicity of struc­ tures of the propositional content. A unitary understanding of the form of assertoric sentences would only be achieved if a connection of the various structures of the propositional content were also to become vis­ ible. But so far it is n o t even clear how one is to enquire into the p ro p ­ ositional structures. I do not intend to pursue this aspect of the problem

Has form al semantics a fundam ental question?

49

any fu rth er in the introductory reflections; it will be our central concern in the main part of the lectures. But I would also not wish to give the impression that with the re fer­ ence to the assertion-m om ent and the negateability o f propositional content this structure that is comm on to all forms of assertoric sen­ tences is already explained. T he aim of this lecture was not to find an answer to the question concerning the form of assertoric sentences (and perhaps of all sentences), but simply to investigate w hether there is a unitary form at all which would be amenable to such a question. At present we only know that the question: what is it to understand an assertoric sentence? aims at three structural m oments and their inner connection: (1) what is it to understand an assertoric affirmation? (2) what is it to understand a propositional content? (3) what is it to u n d e r­ stand the word ‘not’?

LECTURE 5

Consciousness and speech

If Aristotle or the tradition which followed him had taken veritative being as the guiding thread of their investigation, then there would have developed, within the fram ew ork of ontology, a semantics of the assertoric sentence-form . Instead o f this, however, the problematic, which Aristotle had at least touched upon, becam e unrecognizable in the shape of the inadequate doctrine of th everum as another ‘transcen­ dental’ determ ination o f ens, together with unum and aliquid, a doctrine in which the veritative m eaning of ‘is’ was assimilated to the others and thereby finally objectified. M oreover for mediaeval ontology the start­ ing-point for the dem onstration of the universality of being was no longer the usage of ‘is’ but the thesis that the determ ination ens is the first determ ination that is given to the m ind.1 How this proposition, which, to the im partial observer, must appear far from evident, indeed unintelligible, could be regarded as suprem ely evident by an entire tra ­ dition, can be explained only by reference to the concept of represen­ tation (Vorstellen) which I shall exam ine at the end of this lecture. W here the Aristotelian ontology, and indeed the entire traditional ontology from Parm enides to Hegel, came closest to veritative being was in the assum ption th at the question of being is always connected with the question of not-being. How far from obvious this is can be seen immediately one considers that a theory which started out from objects or from that mediaeval conception of ens would have no occasion to them atize the ‘not’. T h e opposition o f being and not-being is (as we could already see in connection with the Principle of Contradiction) an opposition that belongs to veritative being ju st as much as the so-called modalities of being; and other meanings of ‘is’ (such as that of the cop­ ula or existence) only participate in this opposition because they are species of veritative being.2 O n the oth er hand, our traditional orien­ tation towards the opposition being - not-being contributes to our ten­

Consciousness and speech

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dency to place denial on a level with affirm ation and to overlook the peculiar status3 of the ‘n o t’ m the sentence-form . W hat we were able to achieve in the previous lecture in connection with veritative being was a form al characterization of all assertoric sen­ tences. T his provided us with a fundam ental question for the semantics of assertoric sentence-form s. If in the question concerning a form al universal science we orientate ourselves tow ards the Aristotelian startingpoint, nam ely towards the question concerning the form al p resu p p o ­ sitions o f all sciences, then with the form al semantics of assertoric sen­ tences we have already achieved our aim, for in the sciences only assertoric sentences occur (at m ost-one would have to add in terro g a­ tive sentences). On the oth er hand, once one has en tered the sphere of form al semantics it would be artificial to restrict the thematic field to asserto­ ric sentences, since such a restriction would be incompatible with this form al science’s claim to universality. It thus seems plausible no longer to sketch the form al them atic o f the sought-for universal science by reference to the sciences but by taking as o n e ’s point of dep artu re, as I did in the previous lecture (p. 36), o u r u n d erstan d in g o f linguistic expressions in general. But then we are faced with the question: how can we extend the unified perspective we have achieved for the inves­ tigation o f assertoric sentences in such a way that it can be understood as the unified perspective for the investigation of all forms of sen­ tences? Assertoric sentences are contrasted with im peratives, optative sen­ tences and interrogative sentences. I leave undecided w hether this list of other sentence-form s is com plete and systematically significant. And I shall not now give a semantic criterion for these classifications.4 It is usual to rely on gram m atical criteria such as m ode o f verb, word-position and intonation. T his is an indication o f how little attention has hitherto been given in philosophical semantics to non-assertoric sen­ tences. O ne can see in this an effect o f the traditional ontology. W hereas Aristotle had with veritative being ju st en tered the dim ension of assertoric semantics, non-assertoric semantics seem to lie completely outside the scope o f an ontology - unless one understands the o rien ­ tation towards ‘is’ as an orientation not ju s t towards the indicative form of this verb, but towards all its modes. Such an orientation has never been developed in the traditional elaboration o f the question of being; b u t it would be conceivable.5 Ju st as we can transform an asser­ toric sentence into a prefixed ‘it is the case’ followed by the nominalization of the sentence, so we can clearly also transform an im perative

Introduction

52

sentence (e.g. ‘Let him come!’) into a prefixed ‘let it be the case’ fol­ lowed by the nom inalized form ‘that he comes!’, or, e.g., the interro­ gative sentence ‘Is he coming?’ into ‘Is it the case that he is coming?’ This gives us a fundam ental insight into the structure of non-asser­ toric sentences: ju st like assertoric sentences they can be divided into an affirm ation-m om ent and a propositional content; and in their case too the propositional content without the affirm ation-m om ent can be expressed by m eans o f the nominalized locution ‘that p ’. But not only do non-assertoric sentences also have a propositional content; one can also see immediately that one and the same propositional content can occur in an assertoric sentence and in the various non-assertoric modes o f sentence; e.g. ‘He is com ing’, ‘Let him come!’ ‘If only he would com e’, ‘Is he coming?’ all clearly have the same propositional content and only differ with respect to mode. T h ere is thus confirmed what initially did not seem to follow necessarily, namely, that we must regard the sem antic form o f non-nom inalized assertoric sentences as also com posed o f an affirm ation-m om ent and a propositional content; although the propositional content is not grammatically isolable. Only this structure makes intelligible the connection between ‘He is com ing’, ‘Let him come!’ etc. It thus em erges that the sentence-forms of the various sentence-m odes only differ with respect to their mode, whereas the other element, the propositional content (thus that ele­ m ent which is the bearer of all fu rth er formal-semantic sub-struc­ tures), is com mon to all sentence-form s (with of course certain quali­ fications, such as, th at im peratives can only refer to something in the fu tu re).6 In this way then one arrives at a unitary structure of all sentences, which one can symbolize by ‘M */?*’, where ‘M ’ is a variable which is to be replaced by the symbols for the various modes e.g. by V for the assertion-m om ent, which gives us the already familiar Similarly one can e.g. write ‘!*p*’ for the im perative and for the inter­ rogative sentence. B ringing in non-assertoric sentences also provides additional confir­ mation for the view that the ‘n o t’ belongs to the propositional content. T he im perative ‘Do not come!’ dem ands the realization of the same state of affairs whose truth is asserted by the assertoric sentence ‘You will not com e.’ T h e im perative denial also has the form ‘!*not -/>*’ and is thus the im perative affirm ation of a negated propositional content. Only in passing shall I m ention the problem of so-called ‘external’ negation, i.e. negation in such sentences as ‘I do not order that p .’1 Such so-called ‘perform ative’ sentence-form s, though they have the

Consciousness and speech

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grammatical form of assertoric sentences, are not assertoric sentences. For in u ttering them one is not only asserting something; one is at the same time doing what they assert (e.g. when I say ‘I o rder . . .’ I am not (only) asserting that I am ordering; I am ordering).8 Now if one could assimilate ‘I assert th at/?’ and ‘I o rd er th at/?’ to ‘p y and ‘!*/?*’ then ‘I do not assert that /?’ and ‘I do not o rd e r that /?’ would clearly have the form ‘not h */?*’and ‘not ! */?*’. O ne may doubt w hether this assimilation is correct and w hether the semantics of performatives is not ultimately to be understood in term s of the semantics of assertoric sentences, so that one would again arrive at a unitary conception of negation. In any case external negation does not occur in the case of the non-nominalized sentences ‘/?’, *!*/?*’, etc. However, by reference to perform atives one can see what meaning a sentence of the form ‘not-M*/?*’ would have and in this way convince oneself again that negative assertoric sentences, imperatives, etc., do not have this form. Must we also regard the non-assertoric modes as a form of affir­ mation? Do they too have the character of a position-taking against an opposing affirmation? For this view speaks the fact that the Principle of Contradiction clearly also holds for non-assertoric sentences and that one can justify it h ere in exactly the same way as in the case of assertoric sentences. If one says ‘Come here and do not come h ere’ one has said nothing. With the second step one has cancelled the first. A nd of course there is also an im perative use of ‘yes’ and ‘no’. How­ ever, even in the case of the explicitly negative sentence (‘Do not come!’) it seems less clear that it is to be construed as position-takingagainst; for such an utterance seems directed not against another utterance but against an action. Only if it could be shown that the negative im perative is really directed against an opposite imperative by which the action is being directed would it be clear that it is to be construed as the denial of an affirm ation. And then of course it would be plausible also to construe the im perative which does not contain a ‘not’, precisely as in the case of the assertoric sentence, as affirmation; and that means as position-taking against the imperatival affirmation of the opposite propositional content. T he question of w hether the various non-assertoric modes can be construed as modes of affirma­ tion can, therefore, ju st as in the case of the assertoric mode, in the end only be decided by actually carrying out the semantics of these form s of sentence. Only in the case of interrogative sentences can one see in advance that they do not conform to this schema. A lthough they too have a negatable propositional content, it seems not to be m eaningful to

Introduction

54

describe the two interrogative sentences which have an opposed prop­ ositional content as being themselves opposed. It would be m ore cor­ rect to say that in both questions ‘Is he coming?’, ‘Is he not coming?’ one and the same thing is being asked. But it is also easy to see why interrogative sentences occupy this special position. A question is a dem and that a sentence be uttered, within a range specified by the interrogative sentence,9 normally an assertoric sentence or, if there are specifically practical questions (cf. Lecture 7), an imperative. Thus the only reason why interrogative sentences are not affirmative is that they contain the dem and for an affirm ation, a position-taking. Con­ sequently these non-affirm ative sentences do not constitute a counter­ example, to the result that is now em erging, viz. that yes/no positiontaking is fundam ental to the use of all sentences with a propositional content. Do all our sentences have this form? Clearly there are also independent units of com m unication which have no propositional content, e.g. ‘ow’, ‘h u rra h ’, ‘thanks’, ‘hello’. But such expressions do not exhibit any semantic structures (or only very rudim entary ones). We shall see later that the analysis of the m eaning of such situationrelated expressions presents far fewer difficulties than the analysis of propositional sentences. O ne can therefore say that the question con­ cerning the understan d in g of our linguistic expressions, though not completely reducible, is in essence reducible to the question of the understanding of sign-form ations of the form 'M *p*\ And so the fun­ dam ental question of form al semantics as a whole can be directly join ed to the fundam ental question o f the semantics of assertoric sen­ tences presented at the end of the previous lecture; only in place of the question about the u n derstanding of V’ one has the question about the u nderstanding of the various modes and their interconnection. T he fundam ental question is: how is it that our entire linguistic understanding has the structure of yes/no-position-takings of various modes vis-a-vis propositional contents? O f course, w hether one can speak of a unitary structure and not simply of common structural mom ents is still an open question. B ut at least we now know in what answering it positively would consist: firstly, in the dem onstration o f a systematic connection o f the structures o f the propositional content (p. 48) and, secondly, in the dem onstration o f a systematic connection between the different modes. With this I can conclude this prelim inary sketch of a form al sem an­ tics as the language-analytical successor-discipline to ontology in its capacity as form al universal science. We do not yet know anything

Consciousness and speech

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about the conceptuality and m ethods with which such an enquiry can be tackled; in the m ain part of these lectures I shall likewise attem pt to p u rsu e this enquiry by way of a step-by-step destruction of the con­ ceptuality available from the tradition. At present I am only trying to m ark out a them atic field that can be claimed as the field of a science which is somehow pre-em inent and for this reason merits the title ‘philosophy’. In o rd e r to restore the connection with this o ur principal question and to p rep are the next step I can now sum m arize the criticism that can be brought against the Aristotelian conception of a pre-em inent science as ontology in the following way. Firstly, one can call this con­ ception in question absolutely, i.e. with respect to m otivation (p. 18). It will be in the context of the guiding idea of ‘reason’ that I shall first attem pt to introduce a conception of philosophy absolutely, that is to say by reference to a pre-em inent m otivation and not on the basis of a prelim inary u n d erstan d in g o f the w ord ‘philosophy’ (Lecture 7). Secondly, one can criticize the conception of philosophy as ontology relative to the prelim inary u n d erstan d in g which Aristotle takes as his starting-point. O ne could then question the idea of form alization. If this is to be m easured against A ristotle’s own prelim inary conception, then the question arises: with what right is one of the two aspects of the prelim inary conception, viz. the radicalization o f the justificatory character of science, left out? I shall likewise be taking up this aspect u n d e r the heading ‘reason’. T hirdly, one can also criticize the ontolog­ ical conception from the point o f view of the o th er aspect of A ristotle’s prelim inary conception, viz. th at of universality. It was this third aspect which led us to envisage the b ro ader disci­ pline of a form al semantics in place of ontology. So far then the only thing to recom m end the idea of a form al semantics as a pre-em inent science is essentially the fact th at it is m ore com prehensive than ontol­ ogy. If we continue to orientate ourselves prim arily towards this aspect of universality one could ask: if it has now been shown that ontology is surpassed in its universality-claim by form al semantics, what gu ar­ antee have we that form al semantics will not in tu rn be surpassed in its universality-claim by an o th er discipline? O ne could argue that the sense of form alization which em erged from the analysis o f the concept of an object is only significant with reference to sentences and that, consequently, the idea of an extension of the form al discipline beyond the sphere of sentences does not make sense. I adm it that I am inclined to this view. However, we m ust be on our guard against dogm atism here. In the linguistic interpretation of

Introduction

56

A ristotle’s form al reflection-step I stressed that I must initially leave open the question of w hether this is the only possible way of u n d er­ standing this step. M oreover, it seems undeniable that linguistic understanding is not reducible to the understanding of isolated sen­ tences. Sentences are the smallest units of communication; but these belong - both in science and elsewhere - to larger contexts of com­ m unication and understanding. T hese contexts rem ain unexam ined if we confine ourselves to the form of sentences. A thematic orientated towards sentences, ju st like one orientated towards objects, favours an atomistic approach. It is for this reason that there has recently arisen, un d er the title ‘pragm atics’, a discipline which seeks to transcend this lim itation.10 Also, the question arises of w hether we should leave out of account all modes of consciousness and experience which are not expressed in sentences. This question opens up a new perspective. It subsumes the u nderstanding of linguistic expressions under the con­ cept of consciousness and thus holds out the prospect of a broadening of the field of form alization, although off-hand it is not clear w hether a formalization of non-linguistic experience makes sense, or what should take the place of formalization. In consciousness we encounter the second traditional guiding-idea with which I wanted to confront the language-analytical conception of philosophy (p. 13). T he orientation towards consciousness character­ istic o f classical m odern philosophy has - like the language-analytical conception - been understood as a critical extension of ontology. T he relationship to ontology of philosophy of consciousness and linguistic analysis is in a certain way analogous. In both cases, and in contrast to the theory of objects, the new philosophical approach arises out of reflection. In the philosophy of consciousness this is represented as. reflection on the experience or consciousness of objects; in semantics as reflection on the sentences in which objects are spoken about. Phi­ losophy of consciousness and language-analytical philosophy thus app ear as com peting undertakings, each of which can claim to out­ reach the other. All consciousness of an object is always a com ponent of the u nderstanding of a sentence. On the other hand, the philoso­ phy of consciousness can argue that all sentence-understanding is merely one m ode of consciousness am ong others. An introduction to language-analytical philosophy will therefore have to include a confrontation with the philosophy of consciousness. As in the debate with ontology the concern is just as much with addi­ tional insights into the n atu re of language-analytical philosophy as with the justification of the language-analytical conception of philoso­

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phy. T h e link between the debate with ontology and the debate with the philosophy of consciousness is this: reflection on consciousness opens up a perspective which appears to outbid the universality-claim of the language-analytical conception. In o rd er to be able to carry through this debate with the philosophy of consciousness we m ust first get an idea - obviously a very simplified and schematic one - of the positions of the philosophy of conscious­ ness relevant to our problematic. This we shall do by examining how ontology was m ade into a problem, and its point of departure extended, by reflection on consciousness. I shall present this develop­ ment of the philosophy of consciousness, in contrast to ontology, in the form of three successive and increasingly radical steps. Having done this we shall then have to ask what the consequences are of each of these three steps for the language-analytical conception, or what the consequences are of a language-analytical conception for these three steps. T he first step is that which we can call the Cartesian step. Historically it was with this step that the turn from ontology to consciousness began. It resulted from a re tu rn to that aspect of the Aristotelian preliminary conception of philosophy which Aristotle him self had neglected in his ontological interpretation of this prelim inary conception, viz. the aspect of grounding and justification. T h e question o f justification in the sci­ ences concerns their assertions in so far as they make a claim to knowl­ edge. B ut knowledge is ultimately always knowledge of an individual. It always concerns som ething which someone believes. We say that he not only believes it, but knows it, if he can justify it. We also say then that he is certain of what he believes, that it is indubitable for him. Justification consists in an explicit elimination of possible doubts. In the question of doubt and certainty everyone finds himself thrown back upon him self: one can have one’s attention draw n to possible doubts by others, but the doubting itself and the corresponding certainty is a state of the individual. Now Descartes pointed out that this state of doubt or certainty itself cannot be doubted by the person whose state it is at the time he is in that state. It then tu rn ed out that there is a whole class of states - believing, wishing, intending, feeling, etc. - which are indubit­ able for the person who is in them . If one asks by what this class is defined perhaps the only criterion is precisely this: that the person whose states they are has, at the time in which he is in them , an in d u ­ bitable knowledge that he is in them . This criterion gives us a first broad concept of consciousness (we shall later become acquainted with a sec­ ond, m ore narrow concept). It now seemed plausible to interpret this

Introduction

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sphere of consciousness as som ething inner which is somehow im m e­ diately given to the individual, thus to ‘m e’ (to the ‘ego’, as was now said). A nd fu rth er it seemed plausible to assume that I know everything outer and dubitable somehow by means of what is inwardly given and indubitable. T he radicalization of the question of justification thus leads to (1) the conception of the inner as som ething indubitable and (2) the question of how som ething outer is given to me, how it can be known by me. This question was called the epistemological question. This first step in the philosophy of consciousness - the Cartesian, epistemological one - does not yet imply any extension of ontology. It signifies vis-a-vis ontology only a new centre of gravity of enquiry: before the question concerning being as such there is placed the ques­ tion concerning its accessibility. T he ontological structures can rem ain untouched. However, the question of accessibility can affect the ontological ques­ tions themselves. W here this happens there results the second step, the so-called transcendental-philosophical turn. This step consists in this: the question of the mode of givenness of objects is no longer regarded merely as a question about certainty but as constitutive for the object­ hood of objects. We can clarify this thesis o f transcendental philosophy most easily by reference to H usserl’s conception of regional ontologies, a conception I have already touched on in the introduction of the ontological posi­ tion. At the time I pointed out that the fundam ental concepts which characterize a sphere of objects as such - concepts such as ‘material thing’, ‘state of consciousness’, ‘num ber’ - are not merely of gradually higher generality than the concepts which belong to the object-sphere; they are fundam entally different from them. If there are fundam en­ tally distinct object-spheres which are not simply sub-divisions of one universal realm o f being, this m ust be because there are not only objects of different kinds in the distinct object-spheres, but objects whose mode of objecthood is different. Now for a philosophy which does not yet reflect on language there is only one possible interpretation of this state of affairs. T he distinctions in question are not distinctions of the objects and their contents; they can therefore only concern the m ode of giv­ enness of objects. For Husserl the form o f objecthood is constituted in the form of m ode of givenness of these objects (Ideen hi §7). C orre­ spondingly one can also, according to H usserl, only clarify the sense of objecthood as such in a transcendental study of givenness. We find a basically similar position in Kant, only with the difference that Kant does not thematize objecthood as such. N or does he distin­

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guish different spheres of object; he is concerned only with the object­ hood of the objects of experience in space and time. As with Husserl the possibility of experience is, for Kant, constitutive of the objecthood of objects. T h a t is the sense of the celebrated statement: ‘T h e conditions o f the possibility of experience as such are at the same time conditions of the possibility of the objects o f experience.’11 With this second step, then, the reflection on consciousness has an effect on ontology itself. Ontological analysis is now conceived as the analysis o f the possibility of experience or of what makes it possible that objects as such and the objects o f the various regions can be given. But as I have presented the transcendental-philosophical position so far it still rem ains d ep endent on ontology in that it allows the latter to furnish it with its fundam ental concept, that of an object. T h e transcendental turn merely brings it about th at what was already the theme, object­ hood, is now analysed in a new way; but the them atic field is not thereby extended. This extension of the them atic field by reflection on consciousness is the third step. T h e latter consists in this, that by reflecting on conscious­ ness the orientation towards objects is transcended, for it emerges that there are modes o f consciousness which cannot be understood as con­ sciousness of an object. Historically this step is only hinted at in the m odern philosophies of consciousness, in particular in Kant. Reflection on the experience o f objects m ade Kant aware that objects are given to us in space and time. Space and time, however, are not themselves objects. But how we should positively in terpret the con­ sciousness of space and time, which is not itself an objectual conscious­ ness, rem ains unclear. On the basis of form al analogies (Critique o f Pure Reason, B39, B47) K ant calls it an ‘intuition’ (Anschauung) but that is clearly a m akeshift solution. Intim ately connected with the conscious­ ness of space and time (cf. B 39 f.) is the consciousness o f the world, the (definite or indefinite) totality of experienceable things (B 446 f.). This totality o f objects is clearly not itself an object. Unlike Husserl, K ant arrived at the necessity of a transcendental enquiry precisely through the recognition th at all experience of objects is essentially always spatial and tem poral and contains a world-relation (Weltbezug). T he subjective tu rn was m ade necessary by som ething which does not becom e accessible in an objectual approach. On the other hand, Kant only them atized that non-objectual consciousness which belongs to the context of objectual experience. Kant recognized th at concepts like totality and infinity can only be understood on the basis of the concept of a repeated (‘successive’) act . 12

Introduction

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M oreover, the concept o f a synthetic act - the synthesis of the manifold according to rules - was, for Kant, fundam ental to the understanding of consciousness as such, or at any rate of that consciousness which Kant called experience: the knowledge o f objects (B103, 195 f.). Now the consciousness that som eone has o f his action (and that means: of the rule which he follows in his action) is again not the consciousness of an object. So not only did K ant also take account of modes of consciousness that are non-objectual; he thought that a certain non-objectual con­ sciousness - an act-consciousness - was essential to the consciousness o f objects.13 T his, o f course, shows that Kant nonetheless rem ained orien­ tated towards the consciousness of objects: for this reason he consid­ ered only that act-consciousness which, in his view, is essential to the consciousness o f objects and their connection in space and time. He did not develop a general theory of the consciousness of acts; hence the question of what it is to be conscious o f one’s action and what it is to be conscious o f an action-rule rem ained unclarified. It is in H eidegger’s Sein und Zeit that we first find an attem pt explicitly to carry thro u g h the third step an d free the understanding of con­ sciousness from the orientation towards objects. In doing so Heidegger abandoned the term ‘consciousness’. This was because this term had, on account o f its descent from ontology, been so tied to the concept of an object that it seemed that consciousness means eo ipso consciousness of objects. For the term ‘consciousness’ H eidegger substituted a term of art ‘disclosedness’ (Erschlossenheit),14 In particular H eidegger tried to show that the disclosedness which the person has of himself, of his own being (thus speaking traditionally: his self-consciousness) is not to be u n d e r­ stood objectually. This problem atic was, for him, connected with the non-objectual ‘disclosedness’ o f ‘w orld’, where ‘w orld’ stands not for the totality of objects but for the totality o f significance in which a person understands him self (Sein und Zeit §§ 18, 32). A fter this crude survey of the relationship o f the philosophy of con­ sciousness to ontology we m ust ask: what implications does this have for the language-analytical conception? For the presen t I shall pass over the problem which we encountered in the first, Cartesian, step, for this problem had to do not with an extension of ontology, b u t with a completely different conception of philosophy which results from a radicalization of the aspect of justifi­ cation. We shall retu rn to this problem later u n d e r the heading ‘reason’. T h e second, transcendental step is an expression of the insight that one can only them atize that which constitutes an object as object and

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the objecthood of the various spheres of object by at the same time reflecting on our relationship to objects. In the discussion of the Aris­ totelian formalization-step I pointed out that one can only thematize the objecthood of objects by reflecting on our relationship to them (p. 24). We then saw how one can achieve and thematize the concept of an object if one understands our relationship to objects in such a way that it rests on the use o f certain linguistic expressions. At the time I left open the question of w hether one can also conceive of this relation­ ship, and the reflection on it, in non-linguistic terms. It is this concep­ tion which we now find ourselves confronted with in the transcenden­ tal-philosophical position. In so far as our present guiding question is the universality of the m ode o f enquiry this much at least is clear: so long as it restricts itself to objects the transcendental mode of enquiry is not m ore comprehensive than the language-analytical, for the relationship to objects which tran­ scendental philosophy of course regards as primarily non-linguistic, is, even from its perspective, not linguistically inaccessible. On the other hand, however, the language-analytical reflection on our relationship to objects places this in the m ore com prehensive context of predication and veritative being. W hat is to be understood by the ‘givenness’ of objects in this context is som ething we shall have to consider later. But it will perhaps already make sense if I say, by way of anticipation, that from the point of view of linguistic analysis the problem of the ‘acces­ sibility’ of objects becomes a part of the problem of the verifiability of the predicative statements which can be m ade about objects. T h e prob­ lem o f regional ontologies thereby acquires a new and more com pre­ hensive sense than it has in Husserl. If the difference between different spheres of object concerns the objecthood of objects, this means that it concerns the form of the corresponding predicative statements. T hat two objects differ not only with respect to certain predicates but with respect to their objecthood means, as H usserl says, that they are acces­ sible in essentially different ways. But that would now also have to mean: that the applying of predicates to them is verified in fundam entally different ways. A nd that means: the difference in m ode of givenness is grounded in the difference of veritative being. B ut the transcendental-philosophical reflection on our relationship to objects is not ju st m ore narrowly conceived than the language-analyti­ cal. T h e question arises: is not the idea o f a pre-linguistic relationship to objects which one can reflect on an illusion? I can today merely indi­ cate this language-analytical criticism of the transcendental-philosophical approach in o rd er to provide at least a preliminary orientation;

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only later (Lectures 21 and 27) will we be in a position to elaborate this criticism. T h e idea of a pre-linguistic relationship to objects implies that one thinks of this relationship as a having before oneself (ein Vorsichhaben). T h e fundam ental m odern concept for this having before oneself is the concept of ‘representation’ (Vorstellung). Consciousness has a rela­ tionship to objects by ‘representing’ them. This term is the principal point o f attack for a language-analytical critique of the transcendental-philosophical position. It is not the fact that transcendental philosophy orientates itself towards objects that lin­ guistic philosophy objects to. R ather it is that transcendental philosophy conceives o f the consciousness of objects in too simple a fashion; it fails to take account of the fact that we refer linguistically to objects by means o f expressions which - as singular term s - belong to a certain logical (formal-semantic) sentence-structure. How then is one to conceive of a pre-linguistic relationship to objects? As representation. W hat is m eant by this? H ere I m ust become somewhat m ore precise. In ordinary linguistic usage the expression ‘sich etwas vorstellen’ (lit. to represent som ething to oneself) is used in two different senses. In one sense ‘er stellt sich vor . . .’ is com pleted by a noun clause, e.g. ‘Er stellt sich vor, dass es jetzt in Berlin regnen könnte’ (‘He imagines that it could now be raining in B erlin’). This is representing som ething to oneself in the sense of im ag­ ining that som ething is so and so. In the second sense ‘er stellt sich vor . . .’ is com pleted by an expression which stands for an object, e.g. ‘Er stellt sich den Kölner Dom vor’ (‘H e pictures Cologne C athedral to him ­ self’), ‘Ich kann mir m einen Grossvater nicht m ehr vorstellen’ (‘I can no longer picture my g ran d fath er’). Used in this way ‘sich etwas vor­ stellen’ means som ething like ‘make som ething present to oneself’ (‘sich etwas vergegenw ärtigen’) in the sense o f : form an inner picture, a phantasy-im age of, bring it before one sensuously (anschaulich). It is this second m ode of em ploym ent from which the philosophical terminology derives. It came to be used in early m odern philosophy in the context of an epistemological ‘theory o f representation’ (Repräsentation ): inner representations (Vorstellungen) as representatives (Vertreter) [repraesentationes] of outer objects. However, transcendental philosophy still retained the term ‘representation’ (Vorstellung) even when it rejected this theory o f representation (Repräsentation) and m ade it clear that con­ sciousness relates to objects directly and not via inner representatives. This is true, as indeed Husserl him self show ed,15 even of phantasyrepresentations (when I imagine Cologne C athedral I mean it itself directly; I do not see a picture which ‘stands fo r’ it). But it is also true of

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all o th er form s of being conscious o f an object. H ence the rep resen ta­ tion (Repräsentation) aspect in the concept o f rep resen tin g (Vorstellen) drop s out. A nd as this concept is also not restricted to m aking present sensuously (anschauliches Vergegenwärtigen) it becomes so refined that it stands for any, even non-sensuous, conscious having before oneself. A nd thus ‘rep resen tatio n ’ became the general concept for o u r conscious relationship to objects. B ut in reality this concept is vacuous. With it som ething which belongs to a sensuous relationship (Anschauungsbezie­ hung) is transferred to a relationship th at is logical. T h e consciousness of an object is like the sensuous having before o neself of a picture, only this having before oneself is not sensuous. From the beginnings of G reek philosophy up to Husserl philosophers, through the neglect o f language-analytical reflection, have o perated with a sensuous and even optical m odel. T h e philosopher sits at his desk and thinks about the world and nothing is m ore natural than to look at the objects he has before him: things on the desk an d , outside the window, trees and houses. O f all these things he has a sensuous im age. A nd it is ju st so, he thinks, only not sensuously, when one refers to objects. B ut what does ‘j u st so - only not sensuously’ mean? We can now also u n d erstan d the mediaeval idea that being is the prim ary object of the intellect (ens primum objectum intellectus nostri).16 A lthough the term ‘rep resen tatio n ’ is not yet used here the conception of an intellect which has som ething before it (objectum) is basically the same. It was then thought: if from this content which the intellect has before it, as im agination its image, one rem oves all determ inateness, w hat results is the concept o f b ein g .17 And it was this conception o f ‘being’, which no longer has anything to do with the actual use of ‘is’, which Hegel took as his point of d e p a rtu re in his Logic . 18 We shall later have to see w hether this conclusion, that transcenden­ tal philosophy in its attem p t to construe the relationship to objects1nonlinguistically falls back on an em pty concept, can also w ithstand a m ore precise exam ination. You could think: even w hen we refer to an object linguistically we m ust still also rep resen t it to ourselves. But if someone uses a singular term , e.g. ‘P eter’, we do not ask him: ‘Who do you re p ­ resent to yourself with “P eter”?’ but ‘W ho do you m ean with “Peter”?’ We do not represent objects to ourselves, we mean objects. B ut what, you will ask, is it to m ean an object? Now that is precisely the question th at will have to be investigated. It is a question which can be investigated - the language-analytically purified question of tra n ­ scendental philosophy - whereas the question o f what it is to represent an object is a pseudo-question. Even the o rd in ary language ‘V orstellen’

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which of course, unlike the philosophical term , is m eaningful (making som ething present in the imagination) is only possible in the context of m eaning som ething: if someone, e.g., tries to sensuously represent to him self an object, this means that he tries sensuously to represent to him self the object which he means. But has the whole of transcendental philosophy been so exclusively orientated towards representation? You will point out that I myself have draw n attention to the fact that Kant conceives of the conscious­ ness of objects as a synthetic act. However, if we ask what it is that this act synthesizes the answer is: representations. It is of secondary im por­ tance that Kant actually uses this term .19 W hat is decisive is that the manifold which consciousness synthesizes consists of simple data (‘sense-data’). And ju st as little as the consciousness of objects can be thought o f as representation can it be thought of as a combination of representations. In general one can say: so long as one failed to con­ sider logical structure it was not possible to think of the relationship of consciousness to objects in any oth er way than by analogy with a sen­ suous having before oneself, arid that means - w hether this expression is used or not - as ‘representation’. T hough other perspectives were always being added to it, it was the orientation towards ‘representation’ that rem ained decisive. Particularly questionable is the developm ent of this conception in G erm an Idealism (though this would require a criti­ cal in terpretation on its own). H ere representation was fu rth er form al­ ized into a ‘subject-object relation’ and this one sought to grasp with general logical-ontological concepts such as those of identity and oppo­ sition. T hese concepts, for their part, were taken over naively without considering the way they function in sentences. And then, since con­ sciousness allegedly cannot be grasped with the understanding, by means of logic, these concepts were combined in paradoxical fashion in a so-called dialectical logic. Once one has started with a problem in a wrong way, and there are prejudices which prevent things from being put right, then all that seems to rem ain is the escape into the apparent profundity of the paradoxical.

LECTURE 6

The argument with the philosophy of consciousness continued

T h e debate with the second step of the philosophy of consciousness the transcendental approach - went in favour of the language-analyti­ cal position. How is it with the third step, in which the transcendental question concerning the conditions of the possibility of the experience o f objects led to modes o f consciousness which are no longer objectual? In this extension of the enquiry beyond objects transcendental phi­ losophy failed to take account of sentences. It thereby passed over a whole dim ension of non-objectual consciousness without which there is also no objectual consciousness. T h u s in extending the thematic it started out from an unclear basis.1 On the other hand, with the worldproblem there is opened up, in both the Kantian and the H eideggerian version (connection of objects in space and time; connection of signifi­ cance), a dimension of consciousness which goes beyond the u n d er­ standing of sentences ju st as much as beyond the relationship to objects. Also the other non-objectual modes o f consciousness, such as the con­ sciousness of action-rules (the same is true of the experience of a sen­ sible manifold such as the view of a landscape or the hearing of a mel­ ody) are not ‘logical’ modes of consciousness, are not articulated in sentences. H ere then we encounter a limitation of the language-analyt­ ical approach, if this is understood as formal semantics. But if we recognize such a limitation from whence do we get ou r criterion of universality? Clearly we orientate ourselves towards a broad concept of consciousness in the sense of what H eidegger m eant by ‘dis­ closedness’. But what is to be understood by consciousness in general? Plainly we have no clear concept of this. N or do we have a clear concept of the various non-logical modes of consciousness; what is actually m eant by a consciousness of spatial and tem poral connections, by an action-consciousness and so on? Until we can see more clearly here we

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can have no idea how we should concretely conceive an extension of the universal approach beyond the sphere of sentences. In particular it must rem ain unclear whether, and if so how, a formal analysis of a nonlinguistically articulated consciousness is possible, what formalization would mean here, or what would have to take the place of formaliza­ tion. O ne can clearly only make progress here by clarifying our u n d e r­ standing of the various modes of consciousness and of the notion of consciousness in general. How can modes of consciousness be analysed? One m ight think: by introspection, by inner perception. But is con­ sciousness something we can inwardly look at? Is there such a thing as inner perception, inner observation? I ask you to seriously try to p er­ ceive what is inside you. Is it not immediately evident that this is a non­ sensical idea? We can observe with our senses, and if we speak of observing something inwardly this can mean: attending to one’s bodily sensations. But this is not what one means when one speaks of what is inner. What is inner - that is consciousness, and here there can be no question of anything like observation or perception. Perhaps you will say: ‘But I know indubitably that I am conscious of this and that; this consciousness m ust therefore be somehow inwardly given to m e.’ Must it? It would be over hasty to argue: what we do not know by means of outer observation we know by means of inner observation. Perhaps the so-called inner differs much m ore fundam entally from the so-called outer.2 Instead of philosophizing in this way by postulation we would do bet­ ter to look at how things actually stand. But where should we look if not by inner perception? What is to be done if we do not even know where and how we have to look, if we do not know how something about which we speak is to be m ade evident? If all that is given to us of something is our speaking about it then we can only elucidate it by examining how we can speak about it. It seems then we can only clarify even that the­ matic which extends beyond the understanding of sentence-forms by means of linguistic analysis. T o be sure, I am speaking now o f ‘linguistic analysis’ in the broad sense of an analysis of m eaning, not in the narrow sense of an analysis of sentence-forms. Linguistic analysis in this broad sense takes the place of descriptive phenom enology, if one rejects as fictions the peculiar forms of intuition - inner intuition and intuition of essences - presupposed in phenomenology. I would like to try to dem onstrate to you the methodological superi­ ority of linguistic analysis to phenom enology by reference to that way o f speaking of consciousness which has become decisive for phenom e­ nology itself (in Husserl).

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Husserl distinguishes two concepts of consciousness.3 T he one derives from our speaking of som eone having a consciousness of some­ thing or a conscious relation to something. Husserl calls this conscious­ ness of som ething ‘intentionality’ or ‘intentional experience’ (intention­ ales Erlebnis). It is for Husserl the decisive concept of consciousness. However, ‘intentional experiences’, according to Husserl, fall un d er the more com prehensive genus of experiences in general. In each person experiences belong to the unity of a ‘stream of experiences’. We also call this ‘stream of experiences’ ‘consciousness’. In this sense we say, e.g., this and that is contained in my consciousness - that is, it is a part of the whole of my consciousness in the sense of my stream of experi­ ences. Consciousness in this sense - H usserl’s second concept of con­ sciousness - is clearly founded upon the concept of ‘experience’ (Erleb­ nis). T h e two term s which are fundam ental to H usserl’s concept of consciousness, and which stand in need of clarification, are, therefore, ‘experience’ and ‘intentionality’. Husserl seemingly carries out the explication and clarification of both concepts phenomenologically, using the m ethod of inner intuition. I would like to show that in neither case is there really any question of an inner intuition and that the deci­ sive criteria are exclusively linguistic. By ‘experiences’ Husserl understands anything which can be inwardly perceived by the person whose experiences they are. Husserl claims that the possibility of such an inn er perception is evident. How can Husserl claim som ething to be evident which we have just seen can­ not even be found? From H usserl’s reference to the Cartesian sphere of inner certainty we can immediately see what he has in mind. I have already draw n attention, in the previous lecture, to the fact that one can define a first concept of consciousness in such a way that it embraces all states in which the person whose states they are has, at the time at which he has them , an indubitable knowledge th at he has them . These states are what Descartes called cogitationes and what Husserl calls experi­ ences. W hen I say: I am in such-and-such.a mood, have such and such phantasies, feelings, intend, believe, wish this or that, it is clearly inap­ propriate to ask: ‘How do you know that, are you sure of that?’ (one can only ask: ‘A re you telling the truth?’) - as opposed to when, e.g., I say: ‘I weigh 70 kg’ or ‘My u p p e r right wisdom-tooth is hurting.’ This is the fact to which Descartes drew attention and which Husserl too starts out from . Husserl, however, immediately placed the following in terp re­ tation on it: if I cannot doubt a state of myself then it is directly given to me, I directly perceive it. Husserl believed that he had an evident perception of this perception. However, m ust one not say: this allegedly

Introduction

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evident perception is as fictitious as w hat it is supposed to be a percep­ tion of? W ittgenstein, in his Philosophical Investigations,4 has pointed out that an approach such as H usserl’s illegitimately assimilates statements about what is in n er to statem ents about what is outer. If we make a statem ent in which an ‘experience’ is expressed it is clearly not based on an external observation. From this philosophers like Husserl conclude that it is based on internal observation. But must a statem ent always be based on something? I have ju st pointed out that in the case of a state­ m ent about an experience it does not make sense to ask: ‘How do you know that?’ H usserl presupposes that such a question always makes sense and that one can reply: ‘I know it by inner perception.’ T hat a statem ent is not based on anything appears strange to us. But this is only because we automatically assimilate all statements to one another and construe them on the model o f observation-statements. If we exam ine how things actually stand we see that in this case the statem ent itself is som ething ultimate. T h e characteristic feature o f experience-words, for Wittgenstein, is ‘that the third person present is to be verified by observation, the first person not’ (Zettel §472). T h e statem ent ‘I am w orried’ is not based on the worry in the sense that it rests on the observation that I am worried but in the sense that in it the being w orried is expressed, as in a cry (Phil. Inv. §244). On the oth er h an d - and this distinguishes it from the cry - the statem ent is uttered by me as one which can be repeated as this same statem ent by others and can then be verified by observation. Both these things - that the word in the 1st Person Present is not to be veri­ fied and that in the 3rd Person it is to be verified by observation belong essentially to the m ode of em ploym ent o f such a word. ‘I do not say it on the basis o f the observation of my behaviour. But it only makes sense because I so behave’ (§357). (And that means: because another can say it on the basis of the observation of my behaviour and my utter­ ances.) If it were not so then we could not learn and understand such a word. By dem onstrating this two-sidedness in the use of experience-words W ittgenstein m ade possible an understanding of the so-called inner which is distinct from both behaviourism and introspectionism. In the context of our discussion we need not pursue this problem any further. O ur sole concern here is to show that, contrary to H usserl’s view, the certainty-criterion which Descartes used to define cogitationes does not rest on an inner perception. T h e certainty is not som ething positive, but simply the negative fact th at here ‘the expression of uncertainty is

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senseless’ (Phil. Inv. §247) because the request for a justification is sim­ ply not applicable and a ‘doubt is logically excluded’ (Phil. Inv. p. 221). T he criterion of an experience-sentence in the 1st Person Present such as ‘I am in pain’ is, therefore, that it can be automatically converted into ‘I know that I am in pain.’ Because this conversion, though always possible, contains no addi­ tional inform ation it hardly occurs in ordinary language. W here, how­ ever, philosophy orientated itself towards this sentence ‘I know that I am in pain’ without noticing that its m eaning is precisely that of the sentence ‘I am in pain’, the illusion arose that the person who utters such a sentence observes him self and perceives the experience-state with absolute certainty. T he orientation towards this form of sentence in which the word ‘I’ occurs twice resulted in self-consciousness being characterized as a relation o f ‘the self’ to itself (so-called reflection). T he real peculiarity of sentences in which som eone says som ething about his experience-states is not the double occurrence of the word T , but rather that they - and indeed precisely in the simple form - are not statements about the state, but its expression, and hence exclude doubt. And it is precisely this last-m entioned fact which is expressed by the sentence with the double ‘I ’ (‘I know that I . . .’). With this the language-analytical basis for H eidegger’s analysis o f the disclosedness of o n e’s own being is reached. H eidegger rejected the theory o f reflection ju st as much as W ittgenstein;5 his m istrust of sen­ tences, however, h indered a clear destruction of the theory of reflec­ tion. But H eidegger started precisely where W ittgenstein finished. T he obsession with reflection had prevented philosophers from seeing what one is actually conscious o f in self-consciousness. This can only be appreh en d ed by attending to the simple sentences (without a double ‘I ’) in which someone says som ething about himself by saying e.g.: I am in such-and-such a mood, I intend to do this and this. I am not directed towards myself in the utterance of such sentences, but express my being-thus-and-so (being-in-a-mood, being-bent-on). It is the analysis of this being which, according to Heidegger, is the task of a properly understood theory of self-consciousness.6 I come now to the other, and for Husserl decisive, concept of con­ sciousness: that o f ‘intentional experience’. This is intended to desig­ nate that class of experiences the peculiar character o f which is to be directed towards an object. Consciousness in this sense, then, is essen­ tially consciousness of something. Now we must ask ourselves: how does H usserl establish the existence of this object-relation, and in what does it consist? What is m eant ‘strikes

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us unmistakably in any illustration we choose. In perception something is perceived, in im agination som ething imagined, in a statem ent some­ thing stated, in love som ething loved, in hate something hated, in desire som ething desired, etc. It is the common feature that can be ap p re­ hended in such examples that B rentano has in mind when he says: “Every m ental phenom enon is characterized by what the scholastics of the m iddle ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object and what we . . . would call the direction to an object.” ’7 How does Husserl establish the directedness to an object by means of these examples? H ere too Husserl appealed to the evidence of the intu­ ition of essences (Wesensanschauung ). However, the examples show that again the criterion is simply a linguistic one. He notices that verbs such as ‘perceive’ ‘state’ ‘h ate’, etc., are transitive, that they have a gram m at­ ical object. Intentionality is thus a relation. Since intentionality is sup­ posed to constitute what is to be understood by ‘consciousness in the strict sense’,8 everything depends on making clear what it is that distin­ guishes these transitive verbs from non-intentional transitive verbs. Husserl gives no fu rth er explanation. I will now try to work out what is specific to the intentional relation by asking: of what kind are the objects referred to by the grammatical object of these verbs? We find that the majority of these verbs are not completed by singular terms which stand for concrete (perceptual, spatio-temporal) objects but by nominalized sentences, thus by linguistic expressions of the form ‘that p ’ which stand for ‘states of affairs’. W hen Husserl, in his series of examples, says that in a statem ent som ething is stated, the word ‘some­ thing’ clearly stands not for a concrete object, but for a state of affairs. T he same is true of most intentional verbs or modes of consciousness e.g. knowing, believing, doubting, wishing, questioning. T he sentence ‘I know . . .’ can only be completed by an expression of the form ‘that p’. Som ething corresponding is true of asking a question and intending, except that the completing sentence has a different grammatical struc­ ture. We can therefore say that the characteristic feature of these inten­ tional verbs is that they stand for a relation which holds not between two concrete objects but between a concrete object (a person) and a state of affairs. In English philosophy, in which the term ‘proposition’ has been adopted for ‘Sachverhalt’, these modes of consciousness are called propositional attitudes. We can speak of propositional modes of conscious­ ness. Now clearly not all the examples Husserl gives of intentional experi­ ences belong to the class of propositional modes of consciousness. In the case of some of them , e.g. loving, pitying, adm iring, only a singular

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term which stands for a concrete object can ap p ear as transitive object. Moreover, th ere is a group of intentional verbs which can be used in both ways. T o this mixed group belong perceiving, seeing, rem em ber­ ing, desiring. O ne can say ‘I see that the sun is rising’, but also ‘I see the sun’, ‘I desire to eat a piece of b re a d ’ but also ‘I desire a piece of bread.’ We can distribute this mixed g roup according to their two modes of em ploym ent am ong the two other groups, and we would then have two fundam ental classes of intentional modes of consciousness: propositional and non-propositional, those which relate to states of affairs and those which relate to concrete objects. Now the question is: what do these two classes have in common that distinguishes them from all o th er relations? We cannot appeal to the fact that both are modes of consciousness o f som ething; for what this means is supposed to be explained by the characterization of intention­ ality. H usserl says that common to all modes o f consciousness is a directedness to something. But what does this m ean? ‘D irectedness’ is clearly a m etaphor. Sign posts and guns are directed towards something; how­ ever they are not intentional. Again the appeal to inner evidence may appear tem pting. But if someone were to say to me: ‘You see when you are conscious of an object, perceive it, rem em ber it, fear it, that you are directed towards it; and you see how this relation differs from other relations’, then I would say: I see nothing at all. I sense a difference of course, but here it is a question of m aking clear what is unclearly sensed; and for this I have no intuition at my disposal - only linguistic usage. If there was only the one class o f intentional modes of consciousness, viz. the propositional, then we would have a clear distinguishing crite­ rion. For we do not find relations between a concrete object and p ro p ­ ositions outside intentionality. O pposed to this criterion, however, stands the o th er class of experiences designated as intentional. W hat is to be done in such a case? T h ree possibilities are conceivable, (a) the modes of consciousness of the two classes have nothing in common, in which case the concept of intentionality tu rn s out to be a pseudo­ concept o r (b) we succeed in finding a completely different common characteristic; the supposition that the orientation towards the p ro p o ­ sitional could be a way of achieving a general criterion of intentionality would then be shown to be m istaken, or (c) it would have to be shown that the non-propositional modes o f consciousness are only apparently non-propositional, that in reality they imply propositional conscious­ ness. It is this last possibility which, in my opinion, can be realized. I assert then: all non-propositional intentional modes of conscious­

Introduction

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ness imply propositional modes of consciousness. We can take as our point of d e p a rtu re a thesis of B rentano according to which what distin­ guishes intentional relations from o ther relations is the fact that the second term of such a relation need not exist.9 We shall see in a m om ent that this characterization does not apply to all non-propositional inten­ tional relations. It is, however, clearly correct for most cases. X can fear, love, desire, etc.,7V, even though TV does not exist. Non-intentional rela­ tions, by contrast, are not possible unless both terms of the relation exist. If N does not exist, then I cannot hit N , eat him, or sit on him. But how is this peculiarity of intentional relations to be explained? Shall we say that in the case of an intentional relation the object is, so to speak, in the m ind of the person concerned and, hence, that the rela­ tion is also possible when the object does not exist in reality? But this way of speaking is again clearly metaphorical. How can we give it a clear m eaning? Probably by saying that X m ust at least believe that N exists. I can fear the devil w ithout him existing but not without believing that he exists. T o believe that N exists - or, to put it m ore precisely, that there is exactly one object to which the properties implied in ‘AT belong - is a propositional m ode of consciousness. W hat B rentano drew attention to, viz. that the object o f an intentional mode of consciousness need not exist, is th erefo re simply a consequence of the fact that one can only relate intentionally (consciously) to an object in such a way that one believes it to exist. T h a t it is really this th at is characteristic of the non-propositional intentional relation is shown by those cases to which B rentano’s thesis does not apply. If I say ‘X sees, hears, recognizes N ’, then that N does not exist is ruled out. T h a t would only be possible if I had said: ‘X believes that he sees, hears N .’ However, even here the consciousness that there exists an object that = N is implied. W hen we say of X that he sees N this m eans: he knows on the basis of his optical perception (1) that there is som ething which = N (2) that here (in his optical su rro u n d ­ ings) there is som ething, (3) that this = N. T h at the apparently simple sentence ‘He sees N ’ contains such a complex assertion can be seen from the fact that if som eone says ‘I see N ’ one can dispute this assertion in three ways: (1) there is nothing which = N (N does not exist) (2) there is nothing here or (3) this (what you see) is not = N . Thus seeing, etc., also implies a propositional consciousness that N exists. At the same time the account ju st given makes it clear why B rentano’s thesis does not apply to these cases. If one says of som eone that he sees, hears, recog­ nizes N, this means that he does not ju st believe the implied state of affairs; he knows it.10 Now if one says of som eone ‘He knows that/?’

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(and not: ‘He believes he knows th a tp ’), then one asserts (among other things) that it is true that p. Thus, whoever says ‘X sees N ’ (and not just ‘X believes he sees AT) at the same time endorses the truth of the state­ ments implied by X’s statem ent ‘I s e e N ’, hence the truth of the implied existential statements; and fo r this reason it is implied in these cases that N exists. T o reinforce my thesis that all non-propositional intentional con­ sciousness implies a propositional consciousness —or, more precisely, a belief that that to which it refers exists - I would like to deal with another apparent counter-exam ple. How is it when we represent some­ thing to ourselves in the imagination? T he specific character of this m ode of consciousness seems to be precisely that that to which it refers is m eant as non-existent. But how is this non-existence to be under­ stood? For example, one is telling a story, a joke or the like and one begins ‘A man . . .’ Im plied is: ‘Im agine that there existed a man . . T he man is thus m eant as non-existent. But that can only be done by thinking of him as existing. It would be incorrect to think that when we m ean something in the imagination the existence is taken away and the m ere object is left over. T h e phantasy-modification has the character ‘it is not so, but I imagine that it were so’. T h e phantasy-modification is a modification of veritative being. It therefore concerns not ju st objects but, e.g., a whole story. Everything which is told there or thought up is not m eant as really being so, but only thought of as being so. It is, however, thought of as being so. And for the objects this means that they are not m eant as really existing, but are merely thought of as exist­ ing. They are, however, thought of as existing. T hus phantasy-consciousness too is implicitly propositional. In the previous lecture I drew attention to the fact that to have a consciousness of an object is not to have a representation of it but to m ean it, and to mean an object by means of a singular term is a nonindependent com ponent in the understanding of predicative sentences. T he reflections which have now been carried through take us a step further: to mean an object is not only a non-independent com ponent of a propositional consciousness; it in turn rests on a propositional con­ sciousness, which consists in holding to be true an existential sentence.11 And thus the general proposition would be proved that all so-called intentional consciousness is explicitly or implicitly propositional con­ sciousness. T h e essence of the intentional relation consists in this: it is a relation between a concrete object and a state of affairs. And that means: that it is grounded in the understanding of a sentence. Thus the attem pt to recover in a language-analytical way H usserl’s ‘strict’ con­

Introduction

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cept of consciousness has led us to an unexpected discovery: we find that a consciousness of som ething that is not founded in a holding-tobe-true of an existential sentence does not exist. T h e peculiar ‘quality’ of consciousness which Husserl called ‘intentionality’ and which in sup­ posedly intuitive description he characterized as a directedness to an object turns out to be sentence-understanding. Let me rem ark, incidentally, that the description of consciousness as a subject-object relation, of which the transcendental philosopher is so fond, is also thereby ren d ered untenable. T h ere is no such relation. W here a subject has a conscious relationship to an object this is never a simple relation but is always founded in the understanding of a sen­ tence. A particularly u n fortunate consequence o f the idea o f the ‘sub­ ject-object relation’ was that the attem pt was also made, in German Idealism, to interp ret self-consciousness in accordance with this schema. In the case of self-consciousness the subject is conscious of him ­ self. This consciousness was, therefore, interpreted as a subject-object relation in which subject and object are identical; thus as a relation of som ething to itself. This idea, which was simply a result of the underinterpretation of the actual facts as m anifested in the sentences in which someone speaks about himself led the already inadequate conception of self-conscious­ ness as reflection into absurdity. Instead of simply orientating oneself towards sentences with the double T (‘I know that I . . .’) one took these two occurrences of T out of their sentence-context and constructed an abstract self-relation of ‘the’ self to itself. Insoluble problems were obviously bound to result from such an ap p ro ach.12 T h e dem onstration th at all intentional consciousness is propositional gives an additional historical significance to the language-analytical pro ­ gram m e of a theory of sentences: the question about consciousness, like the ontological question about being as being, turns out to be a question about the understanding o f sentences. O f course this only applies to consciousness in the sense of intentionality, not to the non-objectual modes of consciousness. A language-analytical clarification o f the non-objectual modes of con­ sciousness, unlike that o f experiences and intentionality, would not be able to base itself on work that has already been done. M ore extensive preparation would therefore be necessary here. I thus leave open the question of w hether, and, if so, how, the question concerning the understanding of sentences can be surpassed by invoking either a m ore com prehensive concept o f understanding such as that aimed at by ‘pragm atics’, or a more com prehensive concept o f consciousness of the

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kind to which the transcendental-philosophical attem pts point. A nd so the question also rem ains open as to how the'universality-claim of the language-analytical conception of philosophy I have developed is to be ju d g e d and w hether, and if so how, this conception could be extended. B ut does this m ean then that the decisive question rem ains u n an ­ swered? T h e decisive questions never find an answer in philosophy. This is not to say that they are unansw erable, but only that, w hen the questions left open by a philosophy (e.g. ontology) are answ ered by a new philosophical approach, this new approach, so long as it is philo­ sophically alive, itself reaches into the dark, inasm uch as it encounters questions which, for the tim e being at least, it cannot answer. In the case o f such questions, which concern the limits of a philosophical posi­ tion, it is already a gain if one at least perceives these limits. You could ask: if I see the limits of a sentence-orientated theory of understanding why do I not go beyond them? My answer is: because I do not know how the concept of form alization can be extended beyond these limits or w hat would th ere take the place of form alization. Perhaps you will draw my attention to the fact that I m yself expressed doubts, in Lecture 1, about an a priori conception o f philosophy. Should one not be even m ore dubious about a purely formalistic conception? Certainly. From such doubts, however, there would not im m ediately result a new posi­ tive conception o f philosophical m ethod, but only a syncretism. You will see th at it will not be at all easy for us even to find an adequate concep­ tuality for the new semantic thematic. For in the main the categorial means available to us still stem from an object-orientated tradition; and it seems to me d oubtful w hether it is possible to develop a new concep­ tuality other than by debating with the inadequacies of previous ones (cf. Lecture 8). Only somebody who does not see these specifically philosophical difficulties of conceptual clarification and the form ation of categorial m eans adequate to a m ode of enquiry can wish to take two or m ore steps at a time.

LECTURE 7

A practical conception of philosophy

Today I come to a new and final attem pt at an introduction of the language-analytical conception of philosophy. It is orientated towards the idea of reason. T h e word ‘reason’ (Vernunft ) is not used univocally. In the G erm an Enlightenm ent vernünfteln was used to translate the Latin ratiocinari, just as today raisonner in French and to reason in English are still in use. T he faculty of reason would accordingly consist in the capacity to argue. It is this that K ant has in m ind when he defines rea­ son in its logical sense as the faculty of making inferences (Critique of Pure Reason, B355). But from this there follows a second ‘transcenden­ tal’ definition, according to which reason is designated as ‘the faculty of principles’ (B356). ‘Principles’ are the first and, hence, unconditional propositions of a deductive system. From this there resulted for Kant a concept of reason according to which reason stands for the conscious­ ness of unconditioned totality (B378 ff.). On this basis G erm an Idealism then came to oppose reason, wholeness, dialectic, to the ‘m ere’ u n d er­ standing, and there began that disdain for the logical that is character­ istic of the G erm an developm ent of the last century and a half. Despite this peculiar developm ent of G erm an philosophy the words Vernunft and vernünftig retained, in ordinary language, their original Enlight­ enm ent sense, whereas vernünfteln and räsonnieren are now only used in a pejorative sense. In ordinary language vernünftig means something like ‘well g ro u n d ed ’. A nd the dem and to use one’s reason means: one should not take over opinions unexam ined, but enquire as to their grounds and counter-grounds. T h e capacity to argue is not only a capacity to make deductive inferences but, m ore generally, the capacity to justify statements. Ratio, raison, reason can mean both ‘gro u n d ’ (Grund) and ‘reason’ (Vernunft). T h e faculty of reason is the capacity of being able to answer for one’s beliefs and actions (Latin: rationem reddere. Greek: logon didonai).

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A conception of philosophy which is orientated towards the idea of reason thus takes up that aspect of the Aristotelian preliminary concep­ tion of philosophy which had been neglected in its ontological realiza­ tion. T h ere have been many attem pts in the history of philosophy to develop a conception of philosophy as the science which radicalizes the aspect of justification which is present in all sciences; for example, in Plato, in Descartes, in Germ an Idealism, in Husserl. However, I shall not undertake the introduction of a language-analytical conception of philosophy which is orientated towards the idea of reason in connection with these historical positions. For now, at the end of the introductory reflections, I would like to make an attem pt to justify the languageanalytical conception of philosophy - and with it an idea of philosophy as such - absolutely, rath er than relatively to given historical concep­ tions or a given understanding o f ‘philosophy’. With this I link up with the reflections of Lecture 2: to justify a par­ ticular conception of philosophy can mean: to show that it corresponds to our prelim inary understanding of philosophy or that in it the inten­ tions of earlier conceptions of philosophy can be realised or better real­ ised. T he previous p art of my introduction moved within this fram e­ work. One can, secondly, try to justify a particular conception of philosophy directly. But, as I tried to show in the second lecture, this can only mean: to justify the motivation for this activity. By this I mean: to dem onstrate that it is advisable (ratsam) to engage in this activity. A justification of a conception of philosophy which is not merely relative to a presupposed prelim inary understanding of the word ‘philosophy’ can, therefore, only have the sense of a practical justification. If such a practical introduction is not itself to presuppose a particular understanding of a word then we cannot start from a particular concep­ tion of philosophy and only subsequently attem pt to justify it practi­ cally. Rather we must ask: is there a theoretical activity - for we can assume that this is what is at issue - which it can be shown to be advis­ able to engage in? A nd whatever the answer will be, it will be this theo­ retical activity which - being practically pre-em inent - we shall call phi­ losophy. O r we can drop the assumption ju st m ade and simply ask: is there any activity which it is advisable to engage in? O r better: what is it advisable to do? This is clearly the most comprehensive practical question that it is possible to ask, and we can now say: if it motivates or requires a particular theoretical activity then we will call this theoretical activity ‘philosophy’. Let us first try to get clear in a prelim inary way about the meaning of such practical questions in general and about the meaning of the most

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comprehensive practical question. What are practical questions and to what context do they belong? There is a class o f actions which are characterized by being inten­ tional.1 Some authors even define ‘action’ in terms of intentionality, for of an unintentional movement and its consequences one does not say ‘He did it* but ‘It happened to him.’ What criterion do we have for recognizing an intentional action? The distinguishing criterion o f intentional action seems to be that the action can be characterized by reference to its intention. Someone is making movements at a window. What is he doing? He is letting fresh air in. That is his intention. But the opening of the window - as means to an end - is also intended. So to the question ‘What is he doing?’ we can also reply: ‘He is opening the window.’ How do we tell that the action is really intentional and has precisely this intention? Ultimately only from the fact that the person concerned is himself prepared to express his intention. If one accepts this criterion, then one can only speak of intentional acting, and hence o f doing or acting in a narrow sense, with respect to beings who can speak. In our context we can ignore the problem of unconscious inten­ tions,2 for what concerns us is that our entire conscious life, that which can express itself linguistically, is always characterized by intentions and intentional activity. We can always ask someone who can speak and who is not asleep or unconscious: ‘What are you doing?’ We achieve an additional understanding o f the relation o f intention and action if we consider that we can also intend future actions. If someone has the intention o f doing something in the future he can also simply say: ‘I will do this*, e.g. ‘I will come.* It is to be noted that such sentences in the 1st Person Future which look like assertoric sentences are not assertoric sentences (cf. above p. 49). The sentence ‘I will come’ is not a prediction but a sentence in which an intention is expressed. I shall call such sentences intention-sentences. If the person said ‘I will come* and he does not come we do not say ‘He made a mistake’, but ‘He did not stick to his declaration.’ When I say to someone ‘I will certainly come* this ‘certainly’ expresses, not the theoretical certainty of a predic­ tion, but the resolution to stick to my word. Just as the denial o f the negation, considered as a possibility, under­ lies theoretical certainty (I am sure that p when I am convinced that it is excluded that not-p) so too the practical certainty of resolution is grounded in a denial o f the negation, considered as a possibility, o f the intention (the intention-sentence): ‘I will certainly come’, that is: for me there is no question of my not coming. Now we encounter here a pecu-

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liar feature of intentional activity that is conscious (capable of linguistic articulation): because the act is determined by an intention and this is articulable in a sentence, but the sentence is negateable, with the con­ sciousness of the act there is always given the consciousness of the pos­ sibility of refraining from the act. Conscious intentional action is there­ fore always situated in a range (Spielraum) o f possibilities against which one can of course close oneself but for which one can also open oneself in deliberation. With this we have reached the phenomenon of so-called human free­ dom.3 It is better if we speak of a free action than of a free will. All conscious intentional action is free. However, the mere consciousness o f alternative possibilities does not amount to freedom; freedom requires that the consciousness o f alternative possibilities can be actiondetermining. Where this is not the case we speak of compulsive acts; and we do not say of compulsive acts that they are intentional. The compulsive act happens to the person concerned. How can one estab­ lish whether the consciousness of alternative possibilities is action-deter­ mining? By connecting with the act which someone claims not to be able to avoid a disproportionate punishment. If he still cannot refrain from the action then he is acting unfreely. You will now perhaps ask: how can one know that action, in which the consciousness of alternative possibilities can be action-determining, is really free, that it is not itself determined? This question is, however, no longer permissible if a free act is defined as one in which the con­ sciousness o f alternative possibilities is action-determining. The ques­ tion just posed presupposes a concept of ‘real* freedom which would be opposed to determinism. I hold this metaphysical concept of freedom to be fictitious; I would therefore say that in this sense of freedom intentional action is not free. By contrast, freedom as I have just defined it is a phenomenon, for which there are empirical criteria. And it seems to me that it fulfils what we mean when we, e.g., say ‘I am free to do it’ or ‘It depends on me whether I will do it/ Now just as there is deliberation with reference to the range of free­ dom, so too there is questioning, for all deliberation is guided by a ques­ tion. This question must be understood as the question-counterpart of the intention-sentence, just as the theoretical question is the questioncounterpart of the statement. When we deliberate and ask what is to be done we take counsel with ourselves. We can therefore say that the question-counterpart of the intention-sentence is the question: what is it advisable to do? - thus what I have called a practical question.4

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H ow ever, it is stili u n clear w hat is really being asked ab o u t w hen one asks: w hat is advisable? Is th e re a typical q uestion-fo rm u la fo r this q u es­ tion which brings o u t the logical character o f this question? If the practical question is the q u estio n -co u n te rp a rt o f th e intentional-sentence, th e n its g eneral form w ould have to be th a t which results fro m “the question-m odification o f such a sentence, thus, e.g., ‘Will I com e?’ an d , as the com prehensive question, ‘W hat will I do?’ Now if in an intention-sentence an in ten tio n is expressed an d ‘I will com e’ m eans som ething like ‘I in ten d to com e’, th en th e question m ust also be able to take th e form ‘Do I in ten d to com e?’ an d , as co m p re h e n ­ sive question: ‘W hat do I in te n d to do?’ T h is question, how ever, unless fu rth e r qualified is at least am biguous, in th a t it gives th e im pression o f being a theoretical question (‘which intentions, motives are p re se n t in m e?’). O nly at a pinch can it be u n d ersto o d as a practical question, i.e. as a question w hich initiates a deliberation an d is d irected to a decision, n o t a statem ent. T h e previously m entioned form ‘W hat will I do ?’, on the o th e r han d , is am biguous in a n o th e r way: it can have the sense o f a request for a theoretical prognosis. N onetheless a deliberation can be expressed in this question an d also in th e question ‘W hat do 1 in te n d to do?’ You see, it is not th e g ram ­ m atical form which is decisive, b u t th e m ode of em ploym ent. T h e r e is, how ever, still a n o th e r gram m atical fo rm for th e practical question in which th e possibility o f m isin te rp retin g it as a theoretical q uestion seems to be excluded. W hen we deliberate on w hat is to be d o n e we are m ost likely to say ‘W hat ought I to do?’ A nd yet this form too is am biguous, for such a question can equally well be u sed as a req u e st for an o rd e r: it is at th e sam e tim e th e q u estio n -co u n te rp a rt of th e im perative. T his is connected with the fact th a t sem antically intention-sentences a n d im peratives are closely related; intention-sentences are th e equivalent in the 1st Person o f im peratives in the 2n d (or 3rd) P erson. In th e case of a statem ent (‘H e will com e') the relationship betw een sentence and event is such th a t the sentence is su p p o sed to co rresp o n d to th e event, to be correct (or incorrect) relative to it. In the case o f th e im perative an d th e intention-sentence, o n th e o th e r h an d , th e relationship is such th a t th e event - nam ely th e action - is supposed to co rresp o n d to th e sentence, to be correct (or incorrect) relative to it. (C om pare: ‘H e presents th e m atter as it is’; ‘H e acts as h e was o rd e re d to do/as he h ad resolved to d o ’.) C onnected with this affinity betw een im perative and in ten tion-sentence is th e fact th a t ‘O u g h t I to com e?’ is used both as a q u estio n -co u n te rp a rt o f ‘C om e!’ an d as a q u estio n -co u n ­ te rp a rt o f ‘I will com e.’ T h e question ‘W h at o u g h t I to do?’ is, th e re fo re,

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also am biguous; it can be used as a re q u e st fo r an o rd e r as well as fo r advice. T h u s to reach an u n d e rsta n d in g o f practical qu estio n s we ca n n o t confine o u r atten tio n to any o ne o f th e gram m atical fo rm s ‘W hat will I do?, ‘W hat d o I in te n d to do?’, ‘W hat o u g h t I to d o ?’ In th e case o f each o f the form s we m ust add: i f it is u n d e rsto o d as a req u e st fo r advice. A nd so we find ourselves again h aving to fall back on th e fo rm u latio n we started o u t from : ‘W hat is it advisable to d o ?’ We m u st th e re fo re ask ourselves: w hat are we asking fo r w hen we ask fo r advice, w hat d o we expect fro m advice? S uppose we ask som eone: ‘W hat o u g h t I to d o (in this situation)?’ an d suppose h e u n d e rsta n d s th a t we a re no t asking fo r an o rd e r b u t fo r advice, an d sup p o se h e replies: ‘D o w hat is best (in this situ atio n ).’ Surely we w ould say: ‘W hat is best, clearly, b u t what is th e best (in this situation)?’ W hat seem s ridiculous in th e co n tex t o f a co n crete question, because it is trivial, can be philosophically significant. T h e trivial answ er to a practical question is ‘T h e b est’. T h is gives us a sim ple linguistic criterion fo r telling w h eth e r th e question ‘O u g h t I . . .?’ is m e an t as a practical question, as a req u est fo r advice, a n d n o t fo r an o rd er: nam ely, w h enever it occurs in explicit o r im plicit connectio n w ith the e x p re s­ sions ‘th e best’ or ‘g o o d ’. W hat d o we m ean by th e w ord ‘g o o d ’? W hen d o we call so m eth in g ‘b e tte r’ th a n so m eth in g else?5 T o this th e follow ing g en e ral answ er can, I believe, be given: w hen the o ne is to he preferred to th e o th e rfo r objective reasons. T h e definition I am suggesting th u s has two co m p o n en ts: (1) the w ord ‘b e tte r’ is used to exp ress a p re fe re n c e , a n d ‘to p re fe r’ m eans: with re fe re n c e to a plurality o f possibilities, to decid e fo r one, to choose it. T h e w ord ‘g o o d ’ th u s belongs, as a p re fe re n c e -w o rd , to th e co n tex t o f choice an d freed o m . O nly a bein g w hich is free in th e sense p rev i­ ously described can u n d e rsta n d th e w ord ‘g o o d ’. (2) In co n trast to o th e r p referen ce-w o rd s like ‘m o re p le a sa n t’ o r ‘like m o re ’, w hich express th a t som ething is m erely subjectively p re fe rre d by som eo n e, th e w ord ‘b e t­ te r’ expresses th a t th e p re fe re n c e is an objectively ju stified one. T h e p re fe re n c e —both th e subjective o n e an d th e objective o n e —can relate to things, states o f affairs o r actions. F o r ex am p le, we say o f a th ing o f a certain k in d , a car fo r instance, th a t it is good o r is b etter th a n an o th er. T h is m eans: if o ne need s a th in g o f this k in d , this is to be p re fe rre d to the o th e r fo r objective reaso n s (which does n o t ru le o ut th a t som eone m ig h t consciously choose th e w orse because he n e v e rth e ­ less likes it m ore. A lth o u g h he ought to p re fe r the o n e, he chooses th e other).

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T alk o f good things is d e p e n d e n t on talk o f good actions. A th in g is good if one can p e rfo rm well with it the action fo r which it is servicea­ ble. H ow ever, this is n o t to say th a t ‘goo d ’ m u st ultim ately re fe r to actions. For, th a t an action is to be p re fe rre d to an o th e r fo r objective reaso n s may in tu rn be g ro u n d e d in this, th a t th e condition - th e state o f affairs - th a t is b ro u g h t ab o u t by it is to be p re fe rre d , fo r objective reasons, to th a t w hich w ould be b ro u g h t about by th e o th e r action. T h e an sw er ‘W hat is best’ is th u s the trivial answ er to th e q uestion ‘W hat o u g h t I to d o ?’; b u t n o t only to this question. T h e question ‘W hat o u g h t I to d o?’ is itself a special fo rm o f th e com pletely g en eral question ‘W hat o u g h t I to choose?’ ‘W hat is to be p re fe rre d for objective reasons?’ T h e scope o f th e trivial answ er ‘th e best’ extends as fa r as this question. It is n o t only in q u estions co n c ern in g o u r own actions th a t we find ourselves faced with a choice. ‘G o o d ’ m eans com pletely generally som ething like ‘w orthy o f b ein g d esire d ’. W hat we re g a rd as w orthy o f being desired, i.e. w h at we believe is to be d esire d (p referred ) fo r objective reasons, d e term in e s w hat we believe we o u g h t to do. We can leave o p en the q u estio n o f w h eth e r w hat is ultim ately (i.e. n o t relative to so m eth in g else) w orthy o f being d esire d can itself only be th o u g h t o f as activity. Practical q uestions th e n a re questions concernin g the good, the b et­ te r, th e best. In th e practical question the q u estio n er is n o t asking ab o u t w hat is (veritative being) b u t ab o u t w hat it is good (better, best) fo r him to do. Now w hat does it m e an to say th a t som eth in g is to be p re fe rre d fo r objective reasons? T o g ro u n d so m eth in g objectively m eans to ju stify it. T h is c o rre­ sp onds to the con cep t o f reaso n which I in tro d u c ed at the b eg in n in g o f to d a y ’s lecture. So instead o f saying o f th at which is good th a t it is th at which is to be p re fe rre d fo r objective reasons we can equally well say th a t it is th a t w hich is rationally to be p re fe rre d . A n d now we can also say: w hen we ask som eo n e fo r advice, o r take counsel with ourselves re g a rd in g w hat we o u g h t to do, we a re asking w hat it is ratio n al to do, i.e. which course o f action we can g ro u n d , justify. B u t w hat does th a t m ean? Justification (Ausweisen) is a species o f leg­ itim ation (Rechtfertigung). W hen we legitim ate an action we are saying th a t it is correct; an d by this we m ean th at it conform s to a rule. All conscious action is ru le -g u id e d an d th e re fo re th e w o rd -p air ‘c o rre c tin c o rre c t’ belongs essentially to all conscious actions. An action can, e.g., be co rrec t relative to a ru le o f w riting, a rule o f a gam e, a social conven­ tion, a technical ru le, a legal norm . O ne can speak o f a relative legiti­ m ation here. O n e legitim ates o n e ’s action, re n d e rs an account o f it, rel­ ative to a certain n o rm ; a n d this th en also m eans: vis-ä-vis th e p articu la r

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p artn e rs who ad h e re to this rule. T h is relative legitim ation can already be called a gro u n d in g : one g ro u n d s o n e ’s action, ren d e rs an account of it by referen c e to th e ru le which it follows. Justification differs fro m this relative legitim ation in b eing an absolute legitim ation, absolute in the sense th a t (a) it is n o t accom plished relative to a given ru le and hence also (b) n o t vis-a-vis p articu lar p artn e rs but vis-a-vis arb itrary p a rtn e rs (and is in this sense ‘objective’). It is precisely th e capacity fo r this absolute legitim ation th a t we call ‘reaso n ’. W hat one is dealin g with h e re th e n is a possibility o f answ ering for, re n d e rin g an account of, an action in a way th a t is n o t relative to a given rule. Such an absolute legitim ation exists, in a p rim ary sense, only in re la ­ tion to linguistic acts, statem ents. T h e correctness o f statem ents does n o t hold relative to a rule, b u t absolutely; this correctness one calls tru th . I f we can also ask (in a secondary sense) o f o th e r actions w h eth er they can be legitim ated (in th e absolute sense), this is because in te n ­ tional acts im ply intention-sentences which can be g ro u n d e d by state­ m ents o f th e form ‘It is good (better) th at . . (including th e form ‘It is good to do x.’) Such statem ents, which are possible replies to practical questions, we can call practical statem ents. T o every in ten tio n -sen ten ce ‘I will do x*, bu t also to every action-sentence ‘I am d o in g x \ th e re can be attached a w hy-question ab o u t th e reason fo r the action, o r fo r the in tention. H ere reason m eans som eth in g like m otive. If I am asked why I am d oing som ething I can reply by giving eith er a subjective o r an objective reason. In th e fo rm e r case I say ‘B ecause I like d o in g it’, in th e latter ‘B ecause it is good (better) to d o this.’ N ow w hen I d o x because I believe th at th e best th in g (in this situation) is to d o x , th e n the ju stifi­ cation o f this practical statem en t carries over to th e action which im plies this statem ent. O n e can th e re fo re also legitim ate non-linguistic acts in an absolute sense, show them to be rational, by justify in g th e statem ents ab o u t what is good th a t are im plicit in them (and th a t o f course m eans: ju stifying th em as true). T h e good is thus a species o f the tru e , which is sim ply to say th at practical statem ents are a k ind o f statem ent. A nd th e tru e in tu rn is a species o f th e correct, th at species, nam ely, in reg a rd to which we can speak o f absolute legitim ation, justification. O n e can also oppose the tru e to the good; it th e n stands fo r those statem ents in which the w ord ‘g o o d ’, o r a c o rresp o n d in g w ord like ‘advisable’ or ‘o u g h t’, does not occur. It th e n stands only fo r those statem ents which, in co n ­ trast to practical statem ents, one can call theoretical statem ents. B ut now how are statem ents o f th e form ‘It is good th a t/? ’, ‘T h a t p is b e tte r th a n th a t q to be justified? O nly w hen th at is exp lain ed w ould the com plicated path we have follow ed in to d ay ’s lecture - a path which

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sta rted with practical questions and led, via th e p h e n o m e n a o f fre ed o m , choice, d elib eratio n , advice, th e good as w hat is objectively to be p r e ­ fe rre d , to reaso n as the faculty o f justification - lead beyond an appeal to ev er new w ords to a g e n u in e result. L et us first m ake clear to ourselves th a t sentences o f this fo rm are used in such a way th a t they at any ra te make a claim to objectivity an d justifiability. T h e characteristic fe a tu re o f the justification-claim of statem en ts is th e possibility o f b rack etin g it by th e use o f expressions like ‘it seem s (to m e, to us) th a t’, ‘I believe t h a t . . T h e m ean in g o f th e ju stification-w ord ‘is tr u e ’ (ju st like th a t o f any sim ple use o f an asserto ric sentence) lies in this co n tra st with ‘it seem s th a t . . Now this co n ­ trast is also p re s e n t in sentences in w hich th e w ord ‘g o o d ’ is u sed. We can say: ‘It seems to th em to be good, they believe th a t it is good. B ut is it g o o d ?’ T h is does n o t apply to subjective p referen ce-w o rd s: we can n o t (except u n d e r special circum stances) say ‘I believe th a t I like it’ 'That p seem s to m e to be m o re p le san t th a n that q.’ T h e w hole co n tex t o f qu es­ tio ning, d o u b tin g , disp u tin g , ju stify in g is absent h ere ; b u t n o t in th e case o f those sentences in w hich it is asserted th a t so m eth in g is good. T h e se sentences th e re fo re also have no subjectivity-indicator; th eir validity claim is objective, fo r all ratio n al beings (e.g. fo r all w ho can ask ab o u t th e justification o f sentences). T h is seem s to be co n trad icted by th e fact th a t we can say ‘T h a t is good fo r him , fo r m e.’ B u t th e re is an am biguity in th e w ord ‘fo r’. ‘It is good fo r h im ’ m eans: it is conducive to his well-being; if his w ell-being is to be p ro m o te d th e re are objective reasons fo r p re fe rrin g this. B u t these reasons fo r this being b e tte r fo r him are valid n o t ju s t fo r him b u t fo r an y o n e an d , h ence, so m eo n e else can advise him with re fe re n c e to his well-being. T h u s it is clear th a t practical questions are actually ratio n al questions, ju stification-questions. B u t now how is a justificatio n o f practical state­ m ents conceivable? T his q u estio n can easily be answ ered fo r all cases in w hich we ask w hat we o u g h t to do (w hat it is good to do) in order to achieve a certain end. T h e q uestion o f w hat a re th e best m eans to p r e ­ su p p o sed ends can be answ ered by rec o u rse to th eo retical reaso n in g , p articularly a b o u t th e rele v an t causal connections. B ut w hat ab o u t w hen we do n o t ask ‘W hat o u g h t I to do in o r d e r to achieve A V b u t sim ply ‘W hat o u g h t I to do (in this situation), w h at is th e best to wish an d to do (in it)?’, e.g. ‘Is a capitalistic o r a socialistic econom ic system b e tte r? ’ Also in th e answ ering o f such a q uestion th eo retical co n sid era­ tions take u p th e g reatest space; we c a n n o t significantly an sw er such a q u estion w ithout know ing th e situation an d theoretically p e n e tra tin g

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th e altern ativ es envisaged in th e questio n . B u t m e re k n o w led g e is n o t ad e q u a te fo r an sw e rin g th e questio n : w hat is it best to do? T h e leg iti­ m ation o f o u r u ltim a te aims is n o t a m a tte r o f th e o re tic al reaso n . K n ow ledge o f w hat o u g h t to be c a n n o t be re d u c e d to k n o w led g e o f w hat is. So th e re arises th e q u estio n c o n c e rn in g th e possibility o f th e ju stificatio n o f th e irred u cib ly practical c o m p o n e n ts o f practical ju s tifi­ cation. It is th e q u estio n c o n c ern in g th e possibility o f p ractical reaso n . So w hen we ask practical q u estio n s w hich a re n o t m erely relativ e to p re su p p o se d ends, w h en we u ltim ately call in q u estio n o u r actions a n d desires, we a re re f e r re d back to th e p rio r q u estio n o f th e possibility o f practical reason. B u t m u st we ultim ately call in q u estio n o u r action? W h at in d u c es us to d o so? W e have previously seen th a t practical q u estio n s arise fo r us to th e e x te n t th a t we are conscious o f ourselves as faced w ith a ra n g e o f p o s­ sibilities. M ostly we a re n o t conscious o f a r a n g e o f possibilities fo r o u r action; a n d w hen we are , this usually only co n c ern s th e q u estio n o f th e co rrect choice o f m eans. S eldom d o we also call in q u estio n o u r aim s an d o u r way o f life as a w hole. B u t o n w hat th e n does th e e x te n t o f o u r consciousness o f o u r r a n g e o f possibilities d e p e n d ? T h e qu estio n : w hat induces us to ask p ractical q u estio n s? th u s re fe rs us back to th e q uestion: w hat in d u ces us to b eco m e conscious o f a ra n g e o f possibilities? W e can now say th a t it is th e in te re s t o f rea so n in ju s ti­ fication. F o r th e rea d in ess to ju stify th e th e o re tic a l a n d practical beliefs im plicit in o n e ’s ow n action p re su p p o se s th a t o n e co n sid ers altern ativ e possibilities. R eason p resu p p o se s fre e d o m a n d ex te n d s only as f a r as freed o m . If, th e re fo re , o n e w ants to act rationally , o n e has an in te re st in beco m in g conscious o f o n e ’s ra n g e o f possibilities a n d in e x te n d in g it. A im ing a t rea so n in o n e ’s actions c a n n o t sim ple m ean : ask in g w h eth e r w h at o n e is actually d o in g is good. R a th e r it m ean s asking w hat it w ould be best to do. It is th e re fo re n o t as th o u g h o u r actio n m oved in a fixed r a n g e o f possibilities w hich is th e re in d e p e n d e n tly o f o u r co n ­ sciousness a n d to w hich we only have to a tte n d . H ow f a r th e ra n g e o f possibilities ex ten d s d e p e n d s on o u r in te re st in actin g reflectively, a n d th a t m eans: rationally. T h is ratio n al in te re st can be re stric te d to th e m eans to given ends, b u t it can also rela te to th e en d s them selves an d , ultim ately, to o u r life as a w hole. T h e q u estio n : w h at is w o rth y o f b ein g d esired in g e n e ra l (an d n o t ju s t fo r me)? a n d th e q u estio n c o n n e cted with it: w h at o u g h t I to do? (u n d e rsto o d as a q u estio n re la tin g to my w hole life), I w ould like to call th e fu n d a m e n ta l practical q u estio n . W hat in d u c es us to ask this q u estio n is th u s th e in te re st in reaso n , a n d

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th a t m eans: the in te rest in existing responsibly in an absolute sense, i.e. in such a way th a t we can be answ erable for o u r actions n o t only with re fe re n c e to given n o rm s and n o t only with referen c e to given aims. O ne could go a step fu rth e r an d ask: but why should on e w ant to be rational? T h is w hy-question is am biguous. It can eith er be u n d e rsto o d as being itself a q u estion o f rea so n , in which case it has th e sense: is it rational to w ant to be rational? O r it can be u n d ersto o d as a question o f m otivation: w hat as a m a tte r of fact induces us to be rational? Is it ratio n al to w ant to be rational? We cannot, so it seem s, legitim ate reaso n th ro u g h itself; this w ould be to p resu p p o se the very th in g we wish to justify. M ust we n o t th en say that the rational in te rest is itself irratio n al, c a n n o t itself be rationally justified? In o rd e r to be able correctly to assess the logical situation in which we h e re find ourselves it will be best if we think o f it in th e form o f a dialogue. T h e r e are th e n two possibilities; e ith e r the p erso n who re p ­ resents the in te re st o f reaso n (A) is challenged by an o th e r p erso n (B) to ju stify it; o r A tries to c o n v in c e d o f his standpoin t. In th e first case A can reply th a t in asking him for a justification B is already p resu p p o sin g th e in terest o f reason; an d in this sense - as th e p resu p p o sitio n o f all ratio n al questions - th e in terest o f reason is itself rational. T his legiti­ m ation o f th e in te rest o f reason co rresp o n d s to the way in which, since A ristotle, o ne justifies th e Principle o f C ontradiction. T h e Principle o f C o n trad ictio n can also n o t be ju stified directly, because it m ust itself be p re su p p o se d in any justification. B u t for this very reason it can n o t be called in question; if o ne speaks at all - in sentences - th e n one has p re su p p o se d th e P rinciple o f C ontradiction. A ristotle th e re fo re says th a t, to be consistent, th e o p p o n e n t (of the principle) w ould have to give u p sp e ak in g .6 In th e case of th e in terest o f reason we are n ot in so fav ourable a position: h e re we can only say th a t to be consistent th e o p p o n e n t m ay n o t ask fo r a legitim ation. (O ne could still allow him to ask relative ratio n al questions concern in g m eans to ends; b u t the ques­ tio n asked by B, nam ely, how the in te rest o f reaso n is to be legitim ated, was n o t in te n d e d in this relative sense.) But, conversely, if he does n ot ask a ratio n al question B also ca n n o t be convinced by A o f the sta n d ­ p o in t o f reason, fo r som eone who does not e n te r in to ratio n al arg u m e n t can clearly also no t be rationally convinced. T h u s we arriv e at th e follow ing result. T h e in terest o f reaso n is itself ratio n al in th e special sense th a t it is the presu p p o sitio n o f all rational questions. B u t th e re is no absolute sta n d p o in t outside reaso n from w hich one could p e rsu a d e an in te rlo cu to r - p erh a p s the one in o n e ’s

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own soul - who lives according to the principle o f im m ediacy (n o n ­ deliberation) to accept the in te rest of reason. O ne can only aw aken an d stren g th en the in te rest o f reason th ro u g h p ro p er education. T his also answ ers the second question, which co n cern ed not th e leg­ itim ation o f the in terest o f reason but its factual genesis. B ut does this m ean th a t everything is relativized again by the question: in w hat does the p ro p e r education consist? No, for th e correct ed ucation is defined by this line o f th o u g h t as th a t which cultivates the in terest o f reason. A nd alth o u g h such an education is only one of m any conceivable e d u ­ cations, it follows from w hat has previously been said th a t it is th e only one th a t is correct in the absolute sense, th e only o n e which can be legitim ated as rational. I can now re tu rn to my real p urpose, a practical in tro d u ctio n o f a conception of philosophy. T his was supposed to arise fro m th e context o f practical questions and for this reason we h ad first to get clear ab o u t the n a tu re o f practical questions. My suggestion at th e b eg inning o f th e lecture was: if th e practical question ‘W hat is it advisable to do?’ d em ands a certain theoretical activity then we can call this activity - as a practically p re-em in en t activity - ‘philosophy’. Now th e question ju st re fe rre d to is th e question w hich in the m eantim e I have called th e fu n d am e n tal practical question and which has em erg ed as th e m ost com prehensive ratio n al question. A nd the fu n d am en tal practical q u es­ tion, we saw, points in tu rn to th e p rio r question co n cern in g th e possi­ bility o f practical reason. Now one could designate as philosophy both the co ncrete process of answ ering the fu n d am e n tal practical question with all its th e o re tic a lveritative and p ractical-veritative im plications and also th e p rio r q u es­ tion co ncerning th e possibility o f practical reason. T h e two belo n g to gether; and from w hat has gone before it is clear th a t th e re is fo r b o th o f them not ju st som e m otivation b u t the highest rational m otivation. If we com pare this in tro d u ctio n of philosophy with th a t of A ristotle then it already differs from it in th e prelim inary stage which in A ristotle was characterized by the concept of science. T o this p relim in ary stage th e re co rresp o n d s in the p rese n t intro d u ctio n the co n cep t o f reaso n so far as this is not yet specifically related to th e fu n d am e n tal practical question. It co m p reh en d s both practical an d theoretical reason an d is thus m o re com prehensive th an the concept of (theoretical) science. In the concept o f reason there is taken up the aspect o f justification w hich was em phasized by A ristotle h im self but neglected in th e second stage of his intro d u ctio n . But, secondly, th e p rese n t in tro d u ctio n is prim arily distin g u ish ed

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from th e A ristotelian by th a t aspect by w hich p h ilo so p h y is d istin ­ g uished as a p re -e m in e n t science, or rational question, fro m th e o th ers. F or in th e p re se n t in tro d u c tio n this p re-em in en ce is a practical p r e ­ em inence. T h e re is a practically p re -e m in e n t rational q u estio n . I f we call it philosophy th e n co m ponents in th e usual p relim in ary u n d e r ­ stan d in g o f th e w ord sophia becom e im p o rta n t which A ristotle neglected: ‘p h ilo so p h y ’ an d ‘w isdom ’ as th e question ab o u t th e h ig h est good, as th e question ab o u t th e m eaning o f life an d as a g en eral p ra c ­ tic al-th eo retical w o rld-orientation. We call him a wise m an who can advise us well with resp ect to ultim ate aims an d life as a whole. In th e fu n d a m e n ta l practical question we also find again th e aspect o f universality w hich A ristotle em phasized; only now th e universality is n o t u n d e rsto o d in term s o f spheres o f objects b u t in term s o f th e p ra c ­ tical q u estion which ideally d ep e n d s on a theoretical p e n e tra tio n o f th e total co n c rete w orld-situation. Em pirical sciences w ould have to e n te r into ‘p h ilo so p h y ’ as th u s u n d ersto o d ; the o rd e r in which they w ould do so w ould be d e te rm in e d by th e practical aim . I am b eg in n in g to speak in th e subjunctive because as yet a m ethodologically clarified co nception o f such a ‘p h ilo so p h y ’ does n o t exist, n o r am I in a position to p rese n t such a conception. My practical in tro d u c tio n th e re fo re break s o ff at th e crucial p o in t w here th e p relim in ary conception o f philosophy o b tain ed fro m th e practical fu n d a m e n ta l question sh o u ld acq u ire definite m e th ­ odological contours. O nly at th e h ig h est point o f th e fu n d am e n tal practical q u estion, in the p relim in ary q u estion co n c ern in g the possibility o f practical reaso n , do we reach m ethodologically fam iliar g ro u n d . W ith th e question a b o u t th e possibility of-practical an d theoretical reason, i.e. with the questio n o f how statem ents can be ju stified , the th eo ry o f veritative being, o r the assertoric senten ce-fo rm , is taken u p again with p articu la r re fe re n c e to the aspect o f justification. T h e aspect o f justification which was neglected by A ristotle in th e form alization-step is in tu rn accessible to a form al th em atization a n d th e resu ltin g them atic coincides with th e th e ­ m atic o f ontology ex ten d e d to veritative being in th e w idest sense (which also em braces statem ents in which w ords like ‘g o o d ’ occur). We shall see later th a t o n e u n d e rsta n d s an assertoric sen ten ce if an d only if one know s its tru th -co n d itio n s; a n d th at m eans: know s how it is to be justified. A nticipating this later result I can say th a t th e ex p lan atio n o f th e m e an in g o f a sta te m en t-fo rm is identical with th e ex p lan atio n o f how statem ents o f this form are to be justified . T h u s th e question co n ­ cerning the possibility o f reason finds its answ er in a sem antics o f a sser­ toric sentences. T o be sure, th e question co n c ern in g th e possibility o f

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reaso n does n o t directly lead beyond veritative bein g to a g e n e ra l fo r­ mal sem antics. N o n -asserto ric sentences have no relatio n to reason. H ow ever, th e ju stificatio n a n d necessity o f such an ex ten sio n does n o t sim ply follow fro m th e fact th a t o n e can only elu cid ate so m e th in g by th em atizin g th e w hole g en u s to w hich it belongs an d by co n tra stin g it with o th e r species o f th e sam e genus. R a th e r it has alread y b ecom e clear th a t we c a n n o t h o p e to analyse p ractical sta te m en ts w ith o u t analysing in te n tio n -se n ten c es, im peratives a n d optative sentences. T h e w ord ‘g o o d ’ can only be e x p lain e d in this way; th u s th e u n d e rs ta n d in g o f th o se assertoric sentences in which th e w ord ‘g o o d ’ occurs is g ro u n d e d on th e u n d e rs ta n d in g o f th ese n o n -asserto ric se n ten ce-fo rm s. T h u s my practical in tro d u c tio n o f p h ilosophy leads, at least at its h ig h e st point, back to th e language-analytical co n c ep tio n o f p h ilo so p h y as this em e rg e d in co n n ectio n w ith th e ontological realizatio n o f th e A risto te­ lian p relim in ary co n cep tio n o f philosophy. By analo g y with th e A risto ­ telian fo rm u latio n ‘th e re is a science w hich stu d ies b ein g as b ein g ’ (above p. 21) we can now say: th e re is a fo rm a l q u estio n w h ich we have a p re -e m in e n t ratio n al m otivation fo r asking: th e qu estio n c o n c ern in g th e possibility o f practical reason. T h is questio n belongs to th e m o re gen eral q u estio n c o n c e rn in g th e possibility o f rea so n as such, a q u e s­ tion which is identical w ith th e q u estio n c o n c e rn in g th e u n d e rs ta n d in g o f assertoric sentences. T h is la tte r q u estio n is po sed w ithin th e fra m e ­ w ork o f a g e n e ra l fo rm a l sem antics, w hose fu n d a m e n ta l q u estio n is: w h at is it to u n d e rs ta n d a sentence? A n d this q u estio n (cf. above p. 36) coincides with th e elu cid atio n o f th e questio n o f w h at it is to u n d e rs ta n d th e m e an in g o f a linguistic exp ressio n . T h e p re -e m in e n t m otivation we h av e fo r th e q u estio n co n c ern in g th e possibility o f practical re a so n thus leads us in to th e sam e sem antic th e ­ m atic th a t resu lted w hen we took ontology as o u r sta rtin g -p o in t. H ow ­ ever, it leads in to it via a p a rtic u la r sem antic s tru c tu re - th a t o f practical statem ents - w hich fo r a g en e ral analysis o f th e sem an tic sp h e re ca n n o t sta n d at th e b eg in n in g . T h e practical h ie ra rc h y based on th e p r e ­ e m in e n t m otivation does n o t c o rre sp o n d to th e th e o re tic al sequ en ce which results fro m th e in n e r co nnections o f th e th em atic field. T h is is also th e rea so n why it is so difficult to w ork o u t in m ethodologically clarified fo rm th a t co n c ep tio n o f ph ilo so p h y w hich re p re s e n ts th e co n ­ crete ca rry in g th ro u g h o f th e fu n d a m e n ta l practical q u estio n . A n d yet fro m th e p o in t o f view o f this p ractical in tro d u c tio n th a t w ould be th e m ost im p o rta n t philosophical task.

P art Two A first step: analysis of the predicative sentence

LECTURE

8

Prelim inary reflections on m ethod and preview of the course of the investigation

My aim in th e in tro d u c to ry p a rt o f th e se lectures was to w o rk o u t a q u estio n w hich can be r e g a rd e d as a fu n d a m e n ta l q u estio n o f lan g u ag eanalytical philosophy. At th e sam e tim e th e languag e-an aly tical co n cep ­ tion o f p h ilo so p h y was to be c o n fro n te d with o th e r p h ilo so p h ical posi­ tions an d we w ere to ex a m in e w h eth e r, a n d if so how , it can be ju stified vis-ä-vis these o th e r positions. A nd this involved also discussing th e idea o f p hilo so p h y in general. T h e fact th a t this has n o t yielded a u n ita ry co n c ep tio n o f p h ilo so p h y is no disad v an tag e. T h e object o f such reflections is to g et clear about th e d iffe re n t possibilities o f u n d e rs ta n d in g so m e th in g (in o u r case th e idea o f a ‘p re -e m in e n t science’) a n d a b o u t how th e se d iffe re n t possibil­ ities are re la te d to o n e a n o th e r. W hich o f these o n e th en calls ‘p hiloso­ p h y ’ is a se co n d a ry m a tte r. Essentially we have b eco m e ac q u ain ted with th re e ways in w hich ‘p h ilo so p h y ’ co u ld be u n d e rsto o d . Firstly, o n th e basis o f th e discussions o f th e first lectu re, o n e could d e sig n a te ‘p h i­ lo so p h y ’ all elu cid a tio n o f p rio r u n d e rs ta n d in g , all clarification o f co n ­ cepts o r m eanings. Such en q u iry w ould be a ‘p re -e m in e n t’ en q u iry in asm uch as it con cern s th e u n d e rsta n d in g -p re su p p o sitio n s o f d irect, non-reflective k n o w ledge a n d en q u iry . Secondly, fro m o u r e x a m in a tio n o f th e A risto telian in tro d u c tio n th e re em erg ed a co n c ep tio n o f ph ilo so p h y as a u n iv ersal fo rm a l science, w hich is to be u n d e rs to o d as form al sem antics. T h e first o f th ese two co nceptions o f p h ilo so p h y re p re se n ts a vague, b u t indispensable, m etho d o lo g ical co n c ep tio n o f lan g u ag e-an aly tical philosophy. By co n tra st th e second co n c ep tio n has clear th e m atic co n ­ to u rs an d a d efin ite fu n d a m e n ta l q uestion. It re p re se n ts, if o n e holds on to the first, b ro a d co n cep tio n o f language-analy tical p h ilo so p h y , th e g ro u n d -d iscip lin e o f language-analytical p hilosoph y . It co n tain s a q u es­ tion w hich, vis-ä-vis questio n s in ac co rd an ce with th e first co n cep tio n , is

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‘p re -e m in e n t’; fo r it concerns th e universal presu p p o sitio n s o f all u n d e rsta n d in g . T h e co nceptions o f p hilosophy as ontology an d as tran sc en d e n ta l p h ilosophy have show n them selves to be in a d eq u a te ap p ro x im atio n s to th e second con cep tio n o f philosophy. In so far as tran scen d en tal p h i­ losophy contains elem ents which p o in t beyond this co n cep tio n these elem ents can them selves only be clarified by linguistic analysis (L ecture 6), thus by m eans o f a p ro c e d u re in accordance with th e first conception o f philosophy. Finally, a third con cep tio n o f philosophy re p rese n ts th e question I have called th e fu n d a m e n ta l practical question. H istorically, since Soc­ rates an d Plato, this questio n c o n c ern in g the good - W hat is to be done? H ow should we live? - has in flu en ced th e conceptio n o f philosophy. It is possible to see th e w hole history o f E u ro p e a n philosophy as a d eb ate betw een this practical con cep tio n o f philosophy an d th e A ristotelian th e o re tic a l-fo rm a l conception. T h is practical fu n d a m e n ta l question is also a ‘p re -e m in e n t’ question. B u t it is p re -e m in e n t in a n o th e r sense, nam ely, in th e sense th a t it is th e only question fo r w hich th e re is an im m ed ia te a n d absolute ratio n al m otivation. N ow which sense o f ‘p r e ­ e m in e n t’ sh o u ld we settle for: th a t w hich leads to th e second conception o f philo so p h y o r th a t w hich leads to the th ird conception? If by this q u estio n o n e m eans: w hich so rt o f enq u iry sh o u ld be called ‘philoso­ p h y ’? th e n it is u n d ec id a b le an d also u n im p o rta n t. It is a m atter o f in d iffe re n c e to which so rt o f e n q u iry one attaches the label ‘philoso­ p h y ’. B u t if th e questio n m eans: fo r w hat so rt o f en q u iry should on e rationally decid e, which q uestion o u g h t one to ask? th en it follows a n a ­ lytically th a t it can only be th e th ird conception o f philosophy. I was n o t in a position to give clear co n to u rs to this kind o f philoso­ phy. O f course, it does n o t re q u ire m uch reflection to see th a t the q u es­ tion: w hat o u g h t to be d one? is n o t a sem antic question. T h e h ig h est co n cep tio n o f p hilosophy, hig h est in th e sense th a t it is th e only o n e th a t is p re -e m in e n t in te rm s o f its m otivation, is th u s n o t a languageanalytical co n cep tio n o f philosophy. N ow we have seen th a t this th ird conception o f philo so p h y also refers back to o u r second concep tio n , in as m uch as o ne can only clarify th e p relim in ary q uestion c o n c ern in g th e possibility o f practical reason - th e possibility o f th e justificatio n o f p ractical statem en ts - by m eans o f an analysis o f th e fo rm o f these sentences (p. 8 8 - 9 ).1 H ow ever, it w ould be sophistical - th o u g h very attractive as a way o f easing th e theoretical p h ilo s o p h e r’s conscience - to in fe r fro m this connectio n th a t the u n c o n ­ d itio n al ratio n al m otivation th e re is fo r th e th ird co n cep tio n o f philos­

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o p h y carries over to the second conception. It is tru e th at th e question o f th e possibility o f asking th e practical question is m ethodologically p rio r to the practical question; bu t it does not follow from this th at it sh o u ld p reced e it practically. F or th e fu n d a m e n ta l practical question does n o t ad m it o f p o stp o n em en t. O n e w ould be simply ev ad in g the practical question w ere one to try to p e rsu a d e o n eself th at o n e cannot ask it w ithout having first clarified th e m ethodologically necessary p re ­ lim inary questions. M oreover, w hat g u a ra n te e is th e re th at o n e will not rem a in stuck in th e form al prelim in ary questions? In these lectures at any ra te I will n o t even get as far as a sem antics o f practical statem ents; I will thus rem ain stuck in a question w hich is prelim in ary to th e p relim ­ inary question. A fte r this w arn in g I can begin th e m ain p a rt o f th e lectures. In the first lecture I a n n o u n c e d th a t I w ould n o t be p rov id in g any results or surveys. In stea d 1 would like to p u rsu e with you a fu n d a m e n ta l ques­ tion o f linguistic analysis. W e now have a ro u g h id ea o f th e outlines o f the fu n d a m e n ta l discipline o f linguistic analysis. H ow can we begin to w ork this them atic field? T h e follow ing p ro c e d u re m ight suggest itself. Since it has becom e clear th a t w hat is unsatisfactory about ontology is th e restrictio n to one or at best two sem antic form s - sin g u lar term s a n d predicates - a g en ­ u in e reflection on th e sentence-form s w ould have to m ake su re th a t the totality o f the rele v an t fo rm al distinctions w ere inclu d ed . It w ould th en be possible to carry o u t th e enq u iry into th e u n d e rsta n d in g o f sentences at th e re q u ire d level o f system atic generality. Such a system atic p ro c e d u re is how ever not possible if o n e does n o t yet possess the categorial m eans o f analysis. W e d o n o t yet know how o n e can en q u ire into the m e an in g o f a linguistic expression, let alone into w hat it is to u n d e rsta n d a sem antic class o f ex pressions, or the co m bination o f expressions o f d iffe re n t classes. As yet we d o n o t even have a clear conception o f sem antic fo rm , hence we do n o t yet have a p ro c e d u re for sem antically classifying sentences, a n d thus fo r arriv in g at th e totality o f form al distinctions ju s t d em an d e d . T h e few distinc­ tions I have m a d e in th e in tro d u c to ry reflections w ere p u rely provi­ sional ones which could sim ply claim a certain plausibility; they m erely served to give us a view o f th e field o f investigation. I only d istin g u ish ed the sem antic class o f sin g u lar term s, w hich was m a rk e d out by th e tr a ­ ditional concept o f an object, an d the co m p lem en tary class o f pred icates (g eneral term s). A nd even in th e p rese n tatio n o f these classes I h ad to an ticip ate unclarified notions such as th a t o f a m o d e o f em p lo y m en t. Equally tentative w ere th e distinctions betw een p ro p o sitio n al co n ten t

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a n d m ode a n d , in p articu la r, th e distinction o f d iffe re n t m odes. T h e d e m a n d to e x te n d th e analysis fro m objects to th e u n d e rsta n d in g o f sentences can th e re fo re n o t be taken to m ean th a t in sentences we have a field o f investigation w hich we sim ply have to e n te r. If we wish to r e g a rd form al sem antics as th e successor discipline to ontology th e n we m u st first w ork o u t a conceptuality, as fu n d a m e n ta l as th e ontological, w ith which this field o f investigation can be m a d e accessible. O f course a co nceptuality which is ad e q u a te to a su b ject-m atter can only be achieved in th e analysis o f this su b ject-m atter itself. H ow ever, th e re results a com pletely d iffe re n t kin d o f p ro c e d u re , d e p e n d in g on w h e th e r (as in a p a rtic u la r science, in o u r case linguistic science) o n e em b ark s directly on th e theo retical w orking o f a field, usin g an existing con ceptuality a n d leaving th e d ev e lo p m e n t o f a m o re a d e q u a te co n cep ­ tuality to scientific p ro g re ss, o r (as in philosophical research into fo u n ­ d ations) o n e a p p ro a c h e s th e field o f investigation with th e p rim a ry in te n tio n o f w o rk in g o u t an ad e q u ate conceptuality. In th e first case th e investigations o f th e co n c rete m aterial a re ca rrie d o u t in such a way th a t th e available trad itio n al conceptuality (which is know n to be in a d e ­ q u ate), an d h en c e any conceptuality, is as little in evidence as possible. In th e second case we m u st carry o u t such analyses as a re aim ed at p u ttin g th e adequacy o f th e trad itio n al conceptuality to th e test an d , if it proves to be in a d eq u a te, dev elo p in g a new conceptuality. In co n crete term s th a t m eans: th e fu n d a m e n ta l co n cep t o f previous philosophy is th a t o f beings o r objects. T h e fu n d a m e n ta l co n cep t o f m o d e rn p h ilo so p h y - th a t o f consciousness - is also u n d e rsto o d in th e sense o f a consciousness o f objects. T h is leads to every new p h ilo so p h i­ cal o r scientific them atic bein g c o n stru e d in term s o f this concept. T h e co n seq u en ce fo r sem antics is th a t th e answ er given to th e q u estio n : w h at is it to u n d e rs ta n d a linguistic ex pression? is th a t w hat o n e u n d e r ­ stan d s w hen o n e u n d e rsta n d s an ex p ressio n is th e meaning o f th e ex p ressio n , this bein g conceived as follows: th e exp ressio n stands fo r th e m e an in g w hich th e p e rso n w ho u n d e rsta n d s th e ex p ressio n represents to him self, an d w hat on e re p re se n ts to o n eself is an object. T h u s alth o u g h sta n d in g fo r objects is p ec u lia r to o n e specific class o f ex p ressio n s (sin­ g u la r term s), an d alth o u g h even in th e ir case m e an in g an d object sh o u ld be d istin g u ish ed , th e fact th a t th e re is no o th e r concep tu ality available in th e trad itio n leads o n e to co n stru e even th e m e an in g o f th ese ex pressions an d th a t o f every ex p ressio n as an object. W h e re th e in a p p ro p ria te n e ss o f this m o d e o f conception is felt in linguistic rese arch , b u t a fu n d am e n tally new o n e is not available, such an objec­ tionable co n c ep t as th a t o f an ‘object’ is avoided by u sing a m o re n e u tra l

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term in o lo g y : o n e speaks, fo r ex am p le, o f ‘c o n te n ts’, o r on e sim ply co n ­ fines o n e s e lf to saying th a t every e x p re ssio n stands fo r so m eth in g , leav­ ing it com pletely o p e n how this ‘so m e th in g ’ is to be u n d e rsto o d . W e shall have to a d o p t precisely th e o p p o site p ro c e d u re . W e m u st avoid concepts w hose only a d v a n ta g e is in d e te rm in a te n e ss. I f in stead o f saying th a t th e ex p re ssio n stan d s fo r an object o n e says th a t it stan d s fo r a co n te n t, o r sim ply fo r so m e th in g , th e n o n e has m erely lost clarity an d g ain ed n o th in g . C rucial fo r us m u st be th e q u estio n o f w h e th e r o n e can say th a t th e ex p re ssio n stands jo r so m e th in g a t all. I f this tu rn s o u t to be false th e n we m u st try to w ork o u t a new c o n c ep tio n w hich is as fu n d a m e n ta l as th e objectual co n c ep tio n . T h e first, critical—d estru c tiv e step - th e te stin g o f th e ad eq u acy o f th e tra d itio n a l o b je ct-o rien ted a p p ro a c h in its ap p lica tio n to th e u n d e r ­ sta n d in g o f linguistic ex p ressio n s - seem s relatively easy to u n d e rs ta n d . It is p erfectly intelligible th a t a co n c ep tu ality th a t was d ev e lo p e d fo r a specific an d m o re n a rro w th e m atic sh o u ld pro v e in a d e q u a te w hen a p p lied to a n o th e r a n d b ro a d e r them atic. B u t how sh o u ld o n e conceive th e se co n d , co n stru ctiv e step? I f we p u t th e tra d itio n a l p ersp ectiv e o u t o f action an d e n te r o u r th e m atic field as it w ere w ith o u t any p e rsp e c ­ tive, th e n far fro m a p p e a rin g in a new lig h t it will a p p e a r in n o lig h t at all. A new co n cep tu ality can n ev e r be a tta in e d d irectly fro m an u n c o n ­ cep tu alized th e m atic field, b u t only in reflection o n th e w eaknesses o r limits o f a prev io u s conceptuality. T h u s th e critiq u e o f th e objecto rie n ta te d position in its ap p licatio n to th e q u estio n o f m e a n in g is by no m eans in te n d e d to have th e m erely neg ativ e significance o f clearin g away an in a d e q u a te conceptuality; r a th e r it co n stitu tes th e in d isp e n s­ able first step in th e positive task o f w o rk in g o u t a m o re a d e q u a te co n ­ ceptuality. O f c o u rse n o t every kind o f critiq u e o f a given co n cep tu ality is co n structive; h o w ever, th e re is no p ro g re ss in th e field o f fo u n d a ­ tional rese arch w hich does n o t arise fro m a c ritiq u e o f th e p rev io u s co nceptuality. T h is co n n e ctio n b etw een d estru c tiv e an d co n stru ctiv e c o n c ep tu al w ork is exem p lified by a s tru c tu re w hich in th e co u rse o f these lectu res will re p e a te d ly p ro v e to be fu n d a m e n ta l to a new step: if an ex istin g co n cep tu ality tu rn s o u t to be in a d e q u a te w hen a p p lie d to a w ider th em atic field, o n e is obliged to reflect on p re su p p o sitio n s o f this co n ceptuality w hich did n o t have to be reflected u p o n w ithin th e p r e ­ vious co n cep tio n . O n e th u s arriv es at a m o re g e n e ra l co n c ep tu ality , on e w hich u n d e rlie s th e p rev io u s co n c ep tu ality b u t w hich also p e rm its other c o n cep tu al in te rp re ta tio n s. Such new co n c ep tu al in te rp re ta tio n s o f co u rse n ev e r arise in a m erely ab stra ct reflectio n on fo u n d a tio n s, b u t only u n d e r th e p re s s u re o f new d a ta o f th e th e m atic field w hich ca n n o t

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be ex p lain e d in te rm s o f th e previous conceptuality. W e shall see th at this critica l-co n stru ctiv e s tru c tu re is n o t only im p o rta n t fo r th e w orking o u t o f a specifically language-analytical conceptuality, as o p p o sed to the trad itio n al o b je ct-o rien tate d conceptuality, b u t th at it also rep eats itself w ithin th e language-analytical position. T h e d e b a te with trad itio n al philosophical conceptions o f trad itio n al ph ilosophy was th u s by no m eans m erely a m a tte r o f in tro d u c in g you to th e th em atic o f lan guage-analytical philosophy. In so fa r as languageanalytical p hilosophy, like all previous form s o f fu n d a m e n ta l p h ilo so ­ phy, is co n cep tu al rese arch in to fo u n d atio n s an d is n o t m erely co n ­ ce rn ed with p a rtic u la r problem s (m any analytical p h ilo so p h ers o f co urse a re only co n c e rn e d with p articu la r problem s; fo r us how ever this is irre lev an t), it is ca rrie d o u t by m eans o f a critiq u e o f trad itio n al philosophy. In th e in tro d u c to ry p a rt o f these lectures the d eb ate with trad itio n al con cep tio n s co n c ern ed only the d em arca tio n o f th e th em atic field. Now , how ever, th e d eb a te will concern th e conceptuality. T h e aim s o f this m ain p a rt o f th e lectures are, (1) to d e m o n stra te th a t th e m e an in g o f sentences ca n n o t be co n stru e d objectually (L ectures 9 10), (2) to w ork o u t a new conceptuality, in term s o f w hich we can ex­ plain, if n o t th e u n d e rs ta n d in g o f all sentences, th e n at least th e u n d e r ­ sta n d in g o f all asserto ric sen ten ces (L ectures 11-19, 27) an d (3) to show th a t th e tra d itio n a l fu n d a m e n ta l concept o f an object can itself only be u n d e rsto o d on th e basis o f this new conceptuality (L ectures 2 0 -2 7 ). I f it is co rrec t th a t we can only achieve a new conceptuality with which th e u n d e rs ta n d in g o f linguistic expressions can be ex p lain e d by ex plic­ itly taking leave o f th e o b je c t-o rie n ta te d conceptio n , th e n as re g a rd s th e m e th o d o f o u r en q u iry it w ould be advisable, firstly, initially to restrict th e in v estigation to those sem antic stru ctu re s which fall w ithin th e purview o f tra d itio n a l p h ilo so p h y an d , secondly, to sta rt w ith th e criticism o f a th eo ry o f m e an in g w hich th o u g h m o d e rn is still tra d itio n ­ ally o rie n ta te d a n d w hich a ttem p ts to m ake as m uch as possible o f the o b je ct-o rien tate d concep tu ality in sem antics. R e g ard in g th e first p oint, it w ould seem reaso n ab le to ig n o re co m ­ pletely fo r th e tim e b ein g n o n -asse rto ric sentences; fo r these sentences d o n o t fall w ithin the scope o f th e trad itio n al conceptuality at all. M o re­ o ver it w ould a p p e a r sensible to co n c en tra te above all on th e pred icativ e sen ten c e-fo rm . A lth o u g h th e tra d itio n was also fam iliar with o th e r fo rm s o f assertoric sen ten ce, th e trad itio n al sem antic co n cep tio n m akes sense, if at all, only in co n n ectio n with predicative sentences (for o th e r fo rm s cf. L ectures 17 a n d 18); a n d th e stru c tu re o f th e predicative se n ­

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ten ce was widely re g a rd e d as the universal stru c tu re o f th e assertoric sentence, o r ju d g m e n t, as such.2 It is n o accident th at in th e d eb ate with ontology th e two sem antic classes o f singular an d general term s, thus th e two constituen ts o f th e predicative sentence, e m erg ed relatively easily. I f o n e ’s o rien tatio n is tow ards objects th e n th e predicative sen­ tence seems th e one m ost easy to u n d e rsta n d , fo r besides an objectd esignation it contains only one o th e r com p o n en t. M oreover it also seem s reaso n ab le to assum e th at th e predicative statem en t in which an individual is classified is th e m ost elem en tary fo rm o f assertoric speech a n d the o ne which u n d erlies all o th e r sem antic stru ctu res. H usserl is a good rep rese n tativ e o f a trad itio n al position with which to begin. O n th e one h a n d , H usserl was already aw are o f th e p roblem o f th e m e an in g o f linguistic expressions an d , u n d e r th e influence o f Frege, trie d to avoid co n stru in g th e m ean in g o f an ex p ressio n as its object. O n th e o th e r h a n d , he, u nlike Frege, ap p ro a c h e d th e p ro b lem fro m a philosophical position w hich did no t exclude th e subjective (psychological-epistem ological) aspect; an d it was a d ecidedly objecto rien tate d position. F u rth e rm o re , in his th e o ry o f categ o rial synthesis H u sserl m a d e an effo rt, u n iq u e in th e pre-analytical trad itio n , to solve by m eans o f th e trad itio n al conceptuality th e p ro b lem o f how th e m e a n ­ ing o f a com plex expression (in p articu la r th a t o f a sentence) arises o u t o f th e m ean in g o f its com ponents. H ence, in ex am in in g th e possibility o f explaining th e u n d e rsta n d in g o f linguistic expressions an d , in p artic­ u lar, th eir com bination, in term s o f an o b ject-orien tated conceptuality, th e difficulties an d blind alleys o f H u sserl’s sem antics can be re g a rd e d as exem plary. T h e collapse o f the trad itio n al conception, acco rd in g to which lin ­ guistic expressions a re always used to stand fo r so m eth in g , will lead us to them atize th e p h e n o m e n o n , p re su p p o se d b u t n o t reflected u p o n in th e trad itio n al conception, o f mode o f employment, an d to look o u t for a new conception. In analytical philosophy th e re are two ap p ro ach es to th e ex p lan atio n of th e u n d e rs ta n d in g of linguistic expressions an d , in p articu lar, th a t o f assertoric sentences. T h e o ne ap p ro a ch , which stem s fro m the later W ittgenstein, says: to u n d e rsta n d a sen ten ce is to know how it is to be used. T h e o th e r ap p ro a ch , which ex ten d s fro m F rege via th e early W ittgenstein, C a rn a p an d T arsk i to D avidson an d o th ers, says: to u n d e rsta n d an assertoric sentence is to know u n d e r w hat conditions it is tru e o r false. We shall see th a t a satisfactory analysis o f th e m ean in g o f assertoric an d , in p articu la r, o f predicative sentences a n d th e ir com ­ p o n en ts, can only be achieved by com bining these ap p ro a ch es in a c e r­

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tain way. Even now it may a p p e a r plausible th a t th e con cep t o f tru th occupies a place in th e conceptuality o f a th eo ry o f th e u n d e rsta n d in g o f assertoric sentences which is com parably fu n d a m e n ta l to th a t occu­ pied by th e co n cep t o f an object in th e conceptuality o f ontology an d tran sc en d e n ta l philosophy. O f course th e concept o f tru th also occurs in trad itio n al philosophy. M oreover th e concept o f an object is also reta in ed in analytical philosophy. H ow ever, w hereas in th e trad itio n th e tru th -re la tio n was u n d e rsto o d in term s o f refe re n c e to objects, I shall try to show th a t refe re n c e to objects is essentially an elem en t in the tru th -re la tio n , ju s t as th e fu n ctio n o f sin g u lar term s is only to be u n d e r ­ stood in term s o f th e ir role in a sentence. B ut we ca n n o t be c o n te n t to trea t th e concept o f tru th as som eth in g sim ply given. O f co u rse th e w ord ‘tr u e ’ is n o t definable. It will be o n e o f o u r first tasks a fte r the d em o n stratio n o f th e collapse o f th e o b je ct-o rien tated ap p ro a ch to ex p lain how th e m ean in g o f expressions a n d sem antic classes o f e x p re s­ sions can be investigated philosophically. It will th e n em erg e th a t the ex p lan a tio n o f th e w ord ‘tr u e ’ coincides with th e ex p lan a tio n o f the assertoric, an d , ultim ately, th e predicative se n ten ce-fo rm (L ectures 18, 27). In these lectures I shall n o t get beyond this first step in th e w orking o u t o f a basic analytical conceptuality. W ith the d e m o n stra tio n th a t the refe re n c e to objects is an elem e n t in th e u n d e rs ta n d in g o f a species o f sentences th e step in th e co n cep tu al research into fo u n d atio n s to w hich th e d eb a te with th e pre-analytical, object-orientated trad itio n is essen ­ tial is concluded. T h e n ex t fu n d a m e n ta l step, w hich co n cern s the ex ten sio n o f th e problem atic fro m assertoric to n o n -asserto ric sen ­ tences, I shall m erely indicate in th e last lecture. T h is step is re g a rd e d by m any analytical p h ilo so p h ers today as th e n ex t to be tak en , th eir a tte n tio n having h ith e rto b een largely confined to assertoric sentences. It seem s clear th a t o n e ca n n o t tra n sfe r th e notion o f tru th -co n d itio n s o r at least n o t autom atically - to sentences which do n o t ch aracteristi­ cally contain a truth-claim . So again we a re faced with an in a d e q u a te concept, this tim e th a t o f th e tru th -re la tio n . A nd o n e can ask w h eth er, by reflecting on its fo u n d atio n s, o n e can so ex ten d this co n cep t as to yield a concept w hich achieves fo r all sentences w hat th e co n cep t o f tru th achieved fo r assertoric sentences. So again th e n ext step in the q u estion o f fo u n d atio n s w ould not consist sim ply in a tte n d in g to h ith ­ e rto neglected sem antic form s. It w ould also involve a sim u ltan eo u s d eb ate with th e previously available fu n d a m e n ta l conceptuality; except th a t this w ould n o lo n g e r be a trad itio n al conceptuality, b u t alread y an analytical one.

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O n e m u st o f co u rse leave o p e n th e q u estio n o f w h e th e r th e co n cep t o f tru th (always assu m in g th a t it does p ro v e to be fu n d a m e n ta l to the analysis o f asserto ric sentences) is really su ite d to serve as th e basis fo r th e so u g h t-a fte r b ro a d e r conceptuality. B u t if this a p p ro a c h fails th e n th e q u estio n arises: fro m w hat o th e r co n c ep tu ality can o n e start? T h e idea th a t th e re is no n e e d to start fro m a p rev io u s, m o re restric ted co n ­ cep tuality, an d th a t a new co n cep tu ality will auto m atically arise fro m th e c o n fro n ta tio n w ith th e new d a ta , is naive. T h is is th e reaso n why, if we a re seeking n o t so m e kind o f in v e n to ry b u t ra th e r co n c ep tu al clari­ fication, we c a n n o t begin im m ediately a c o m p le te fo rm a l sem antics, b u t m u st p e n e tra te th e th e m atic field step by step. T h e seq u en ce o f steps h e re is p re sc rib e d n o t by factors o f th e th e m a tic field b u t by th e avail­ able conceptuality. T h e s tru c tu re o f all sentences w hich I b r o u g h t o u t in th e in tro d u c tio n - M * p * - could o f co u rse give rise to d o u b ts a b o u t this p ro c e d u re . I h ad p o in te d o u t th a t all f u rth e r fo rm a l su b s tru c tu rin g belo n g s to th e p r o p ­ ositional co n ten t. W e m u st th e re fo re ex p e ct th a t th e re is also a p r e d i­ cative fo rm , etc., in th e case o f n o n -a sse rto ric sentences. W ould it n o t th e n be m uch m o re satisfactory fro m a system atic p o in t o f view if in stead o f first restric tin g ourselves to asserto ric sen ten ces we w ere to p ro ce ed like J o h n S earle in his book Speech Acts, i.e. m a first section investigate th e sem antics o f th e d iffe re n t m o d e s a n d , in a second sec­ tion, th e sem antics o f p ro p o sitio n a l stru c tu re s in ab stractio n fro m th e m odes? T h is w ould in d e e d be m o re satisfactory fro m a system atic p o in t o f view, b u t I do n o t see th e co n c ep tu al m e an s with w hich we can carry o u t such a n u n d e rta k in g . In p a rtic u la r I m u st p o in t to two difficulties: firstly, b o th m o d e a n d p ro p o sitio n a l c o n te n t a re ab stra ct elem en ts o f sen tences th e significance o f w hich we c a n n o t h o p e to clearly g rasp rig h t at th e b eg in n in g o f o u r u n d e rta k in g ; a n d co n n e c te d with this is th e fact th a t in d ev e lo p in g th e co n c ep tu ality necessary fo r th e analysis o f th ese co m p o n en ts th e re is, in n e ith e r case, a tra d itio n a l co n cep tu ality w hich we can sta rt o u t fro m . S econdly, as o ne is d ea lin g with two m o m en ts, n o t with tw o c o n stitu e n ts, o n e c a n n o t so conceive th e stru c ­ tu re M*^>* th a t th e con cep tu ality re q u ire d fo r th e analysis o f th e on e elem e n t could be in d e p e n d e n t o f th e co n cep tu ality re q u ire d fo r th e analysis o f th e o th e r elem ent. B u t in th a t case it w ould seem m ost unlikely th a t an analysis first o f th e m odes a n d th e n o f th e p ro p o sitio n a l co n te n t could lead to a satisfactory resu lt. Since o n e c a n n o t d o ev ery ­ th in g at o n ce th e re is no a ltern ativ e b u t to p r e p a re th e g en e ral se m an ­ tics o f th e form s o f p ro p o sitio n a l c o n te n t by first an alysing som e o f th ese fo rm s in co n n e ctio n with one m o d e. A n d th e m o d e m ost suitable

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fo r this p u rp o se is clearly th e traditionally m ost fam iliar one, viz. the assertoric m ode. O nly th a t su b se q u en t ab straction -step to which I have already re fe rre d w hich w ould have to lead beyond th e conceptuality th a t p ro v ed successful fo r th e analysis o f assertoric sentences w ould m ake possible both an u n d e rs ta n d in g o f th e o th e r m odes an d a co n cep ­ tuality in which we can u n d e rs ta n d th e form s o f p ro p o sitio n al co n ten t in d e p e n d e n tly o f th e individual m odes. W e thus find ourselves once m o re r e fe rre d to a step-by-step p ro c e d u re . H ow ever convincing S earle’s p ro g ra m m e may be it is a p ro g ra m m e fo r th e fu tu re - as can be seen fro m the co n c ep tu al u n fru itfu ln e ss o f S earle’s own carry in g o u t o f this p ro g ra m m e (w hich I will only be ex am in in g later. See p. 398). O n e m u st recognize th at, as in any rese arch , so too in philosophical research into fo u n d a tio n s, th e seq u en ce o f steps in the analysis does n ot c o rre sp o n d to th e sequence in th e su b se q u en t system atic exposition. B efo re we begin o u r u n d e rta k in g with th e ex am in atio n o f H u sse rl’s analysis o f the predicative sen ten c e-fo rm I would like to specify the q u estions w hich m u st g u id e us. W e will be dealing fo r th e first tim e with q u estions o f m e an in g an d we sho u ld fra m e such questions in a way w hich involves th e few est possible assum ptions. I f one asks: ‘W hat is the m e an in g o f th e ex p re ssio n “r e d ”?’ o ne clearly m eans the sam e as w hen on e asks: ‘H ow is th e expression “r e d ” to be u n d e rsto o d ? ’ We ca n n o t speak o f th e m e a n in g o f an ex p re ssio n w ith o u t re fe rrin g to an u n d e r ­ stan d in g ; b u t we can p erfectly well speak o f th e u n d e rsta n d in g o f an ex p ression w ithout re fe rrin g to a m eaning. It w ould th e re fo re seem to involve few er p resu p p o sitio n s if one w ere to fo rm u late a m eaningq u estion as follows: ‘H ow is th e expression “A ” to be u n d e rsto o d ? ’ r a th e r th a n as follows: ‘W hat is th e m e an in g o f th e ex p ressio n “A ”?’ A n o b je ct-o rien tated th e o ry o f m e a n in g will o f course p re fe r th e second version because it is analogously fo rm u la te d to th e q u estio n : ‘W h at is th e object fo r w hich th e n am e ‘W ” stan d s?’ B u t th e o b ject-o rien tated p h ilo so p h er can also have no objection to th e first version. In fo rm u la t­ ing the q u estio n we sh o u ld n o t already p re d e te rm in e a p articu la r answ er. So alth o u g h we should n o t puristically avoid sp eak in g o f the m e an in g o f an ex p re ssio n (which is a perfectly n a tu ra l way o f speaking), we sho u ld n o t be m isled into asking questions w hich a re only suggested by this m o d e o f speech. H ow ever we are n o t dealin g with so sim ple a sem antic q u estion as th a t co n c ern in g th e m e an in g o f th e w ord ‘r e d ’. T h e q u estio n c o n c e rn ­ ing the u n d e rs ta n d in g o f th e pred icativ e sen ten c e-fo rm d iffers fro m such a q u estio n in two respects. Firstly, it co ncern s th e m ean in g o f an ex p ressio n (such as ‘T h e ball is r e d ’) which is com posed o f two elem ents

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each of w hich already has a m ean in g b u t w hich w hen co m b in ed yield a u n ita ry m eaning. As we are in te reste d in th e q uestion o f how the u n d e rsta n d in g o f the sentence-w hole d e p e n d s on the u n d e rsta n d in g o f th e two sen ten ce-p arts we m ust now, secondly, abstract fro m the p artic­ u la r m e an in g o f this sentence o r its com ponents an d ask ab o u t th e u n d e rs ta n d in g o f th e sentence-form ‘Fa o r ‘Fab’ (cf. p. 26). I f one asks how a w hole is m ade u p of p arts, th e re is clearly a relatio n o f in te rd e p e n d e n c e betw een a co rrect u n d e rsta n d in g o f th e p arts (as p arts o f this whole) o f the w hole a n d o f th e com bination. We m ust th e re fo re exp ect an analysis o f th e predicative sen ten ce-fo rm to p ro ­ vide an answ er to the follow ing fo u r questions: (1) how is a singular te rm u n d ersto o d ? (2) how is a p red ic ate u n d ersto o d ? (3) how is th e com bination of a singular te rm with a p red ic ate u n d e r ­ stood? (4) how is a (predicative) assertoric sentence u n d ersto o d ? It is n o t so easy to fo rm u late these fo rm a l-sem an tic questions in term s o f th e w ord ‘m e a n in g ’. It may seem plausible to use th e ‘as’ fo r­ m u la o f ontology and ask, e.g., ‘In w hat does th e m ean in g o f a p red icate as such consist?’ B ut th e question ‘In w hat does th e m e an in g consist?’ has no clear m eaning; it could tu rn o u t to be a p seu d o -q u estio n . In question (3), finally, th e referen c e to a m eaning no lo n g er seem s a p p ro ­ p riate, unless th a t is o n e assum es th a t to th e co m bination too th e re som ehow c o rresp o n d s ‘a m e an in g ’. B ecause o f these difficulties I have im m ediately fo rm u la te d th e fo u r questions w ithout using a w ord like ‘m e an in g ’ o r ‘sense’ (like H usserl I re g a rd these two expressions as synonym s). B u t even if we confine o u r ­ selves to th e w ord ‘u n d e rs ta n d in g ’ it is far fro m clear how such fo rm a lsem antic questions a re to be fo rm u late d . O n an ea rlier occasion I u sed th e fo rm u latio n ‘W hat is it to u n d e rsta n d a p red ic ate ?’ B u t already at th e tim e I re m a rk e d th a t this fo rm u latio n can only be re g a rd e d as p r o ­ visional (p. 35 f). W e co u ld only arrive at a clear fo rm u latio n o f o u r questions if we w ere clear ab o u t th e type o f answ er we expect. We th u s find ourselves in the aw kw ard, b u t in philosophy n o t u n u su a l, position o f n o t know ing clearly w hat it is we a re really asking ab o u t. It is im p o r­ ta n t in such cases th a t o n e at least knows th a t o n e does n o t know. W e will th u s have to b e a r in m in d th a t th e questions them selves also becom e c lea re r in the co u rse o f bein g answ ered. In p articu la r we m u st see to it th a t th e fo rm al sem antic questions (e.g. co n c ern in g th e u n d e r ­ sta n d in g o f predicates) reta in th e necessary connections w ith th e c o n ­ cre te sem antic questions (e.g. ab o u t th e m e an in g o f ‘r e d ’) fro m w hich

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they re su lt th ro u g h form alization. We m u st th e re fo re find a fo rm fo r co n crete sem antic q uestions w hich can be tra n s fe rre d to the fo rm alized questions. O n e such possibility (which I m e n tio n by way o f anticip atio n ) is th e follow ing. O n e can also d e-substantify the q u estio n co n c ern in g ‘the u n d e rs ta n d in g ’ of, e.g., th e expression ‘r e d ’ an d ask: ‘U n d e r w hat co nditions d o we say o f som eo n e th at h e u n d e rsta n d s th e ex p ressio n “r e d ”?’ B u t to speak o f conditions (or th e ‘conditions o f th e possibility’) also involves substantivization. Clearly we ca n n o t ex p ress w hat is m e an t by m eans o f a substantive, b u t only by m eans o f a sen ten ce, nam ely, by saying: th e answ er we are aim ing at to th e questio n co n c ern in g th e u n d e rs ta n d in g o f th e expression ‘r e d ’ m u st have th e form : ‘so m eo n e u n d e rsta n d s the expression “r e d ” if an d only if . . .’ T h is fo rm u latio n can now easily be tra n s fe rre d to th e form alized sem antic q u estio n . W hen we ask ab o u t th e u n d e rsta n d in g o f p redicates we are looking fo r an answ er o f th e form : ‘S om eone u n d e rsta n d s a p red ic ate “F” if an d only if . . .’ Now it seem s plausible to conceive th e co m p letio n o f this ifsen tence in such a way th a t both in th e co ncrete q u estio n an d in the fo rm alized sem antic question th e m ode o f em p lo y m e n t o f the e x p re s­ sion is bein g r e fe rre d to. As this seem s to involve a distinct p reju d ice against th e o b ject-o rien tated position I w anted at p rese n t sim ply to m en tio n this perspective, n o t to ad o p t it. I shall com e back to this q u es­ tion o f th e fo rm in w hich fo rm a l-se m a n tic questions a re to be p o sed at th e b eg in n in g o f th e positive analytical reflections, in conn ectio n with a p rin cip le o f W ittgenstein (L ectures 11 a n d 12). L et us now r e tu r n to th e fo u r questions re fe rre d to above. C learly q u estion (3) (how is th e com bination o f th e sin g u lar te rm with th e p r e d ­ icate u n d ersto o d ? ) is th e key-question. F rom its clarification th e re w ould im m ediately have to follow th e answ er to th e fo u rth q u estio n : how is th e predicative sentence u n d e rsto o d ? We can also expect th a t an ad e q u a te answ er to th e first two questions is only possible if th e th ird q u estion is alread y included; fo r only if it can be show n th a t in the u n d e rsta n d in g o f each o f th e two se n ten ce-co m p o n en ts the u n d e r ­ sta n d in g o f its com bination with th e o th e r c o m p o n e n t is alread y in clu d ed can o n e expect a u n ita ry m e an in g o f the w hole sen ten ce an d n o t a m e re ag g lo m erate o f two m eanings to result. It w ould seem th e re fo re th a t we sho u ld begin with questio n (3), o r at least include it fro m th e very b eginning. H ow ever, if we w ant to tak e as o u r sta rtin g -p o in t the object-o rien tated , a n d specifically th e H u sserlian , th eory th e n we m u st first observe th e sequen ce which th e basic ap p ro a ch o f this th e o ry dictates. It is characteristic o f th e o b ject-o rien ­

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ta te d ap p ro a c h th a t it does n o t tak e as its sta rtin g -p o in t th e com p o sitio n o f th e se n ten ce, b u t is prim arily o rie n ta te d tow ard s th a t sen ten cec o m p o n e n t w hich stan d s fo r an object, viz. th e sin g u lar term . It th e n c o n stru e s th e w hole se n ten c e as also sta n d in g fo r an object. In th e in te r ­ p re ta tio n o f H usserl we will th e re fo re have to sta rt w ith qu estio n (1), a n d fro m th e re m ove tow ards a p re lim in a ry decision a b o u t q u estio n (4). O nly a fte r this will we be able to deal w ith q u estio n s (2) an d (3) to g e th e r. H u sse rl’s a p p ro a c h , a n d th e o b je ct-o rien tate d ap p ro a ch in g en e ral, fo u n d e rs on th e q u estio n o f how p red ic ate s a re u n d e rsto o d . In p red ic ate s th e re fo re we will find a sta rtin g -p o in t fo r th e d ev e lo p ­ m e n t o f a new , specifically lan guage-analytical, co n cep tio n . T h u s in w o rking o u t th e language-analytical co n c ep tio n I will p ro ce ed in rev e rse o rd e r. I shall begin with q u estio n (2) - p red ic ate s - (L ectures 11 and 12) a n d th e n p ro ce ed to a p re lim in a ry inv estig atio n o f q u estio n (4) - th e u n d e rs ta n d in g o f asserto ric sentences as such - (L ectu res 1 3 16). O nly at the en d (L ectures 2 0 -2 7 ) will I d ev elo p th e lan g u ag eanalytical con cep tio n o f sin g u lar term s. It will em e rg e th a t sin g u lar term s in fact p re se n t sem antic analysis with m uch g re a te r difficulties th a n do p red icates, a n d th a t th e o b je ct-o rien tate d analysis ex p lain s th e sem antic categ o ry o f sin g u lar term s, fo r w hose e x p la n a tio n it was se em ­ ingly p re d e stin e d , in a wholly in a d e q u a te way. In th e lan g u ag eanalytical analysis sin g u la r te rm a n d p re d ic a te are essentially u n d e r ­ stood as se n ten c e-p arts; th e an sw er to q u estio n s (3) a n d (4) will th e r e ­ fo re follow autom atically fro m th e clarification o f th e first two q u e s­ tions. In conclusion I w ant to deal w ith an objection th a t has p ro b ab ly o c c u rre d to som e o f you d u rin g th ese last reflections. I am b eg in n in g with th e q u estio n o f th e m e an in g o f a com posite ex p ressio n . B u t w ould it n o t be m o re a p p ro p ria te fro m a system atic p o in t o f view to first ex p lain how a n o n -co m p o site ex p re ssio n is to be u n d e rs to o d ? F or only th en w ould we have a basis fo r th e q u estio n o f how a co m p o site e x p re s ­ sion arises o u t o f th e m eanings o f its c o m p o n e n t ex p ressio n s. H ow ever, if it is co rrec t th a t th e p rim a ry sem an tic u n its a re sen ten ces (an d h en c e com posite expressions) th e n th e q u estio n c o n c e rn in g the sem antics o f elem e n ta ry com posite ex p ressio n s is th e fu n d a m e n ta l sem antic q uestion. B u t in th a t case o n e c a n n o t h o p e to be able to clarify th e essence o f th e m e a n in g o f ex p ressio n s in g en e ral in d e p e n d e n tly of an sw erin g this q uestion. We m ust th e re fo re also ex p e ct th a t all n o n ­ co m posite ex p ressio n s a re essentially c o m p o n e n t-e x p re ssio n s a n d th a t th e ir m e a n in g can only be u n d e rsto o d in te rm s o f th e sentence-w hole.

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If this is co rrec t th e n any sem antic theory is m istaken which believes it can first say so m e th in g ab o u t th e m eaning o f sim ple expressions an d only th e n m ove on to th e q u estio n o f how th e m e an in g o f a com posite ex p ressio n arises o u t o f the m e a n in g of its c o m p o n e n t expressions.

LECTURE

9

Husserl’s theory of m eaning1

H u sserl develops the fo u n d atio n s o f his theory o f m ean in g in his Logical Investigations, p articularly in Investigation I, w hich is en title d ‘E x p res­ sion and M e an in g ’. T h e in tro d u c to ry p a ra g ra p h s are d ev o ted to d istin ­ g u ishing ‘m e a n in g fu l’ signs - linguistic expressions - fro m indicative signs. T h e concepts essential to his th eo ry o f th e m ean in g o f linguistic exp ressions a re in tro d u c e d by H u sserl in §§9-14. T h e first, fu n d a m e n ­ tal step is ta k en in §9: if an expression is n o t ju s t ‘a m e re w o rd -so u n d ’ b u t a sign an d , m oreo v er, a sign o f a specific kin d , th e n th is is d u e to th e fact th a t it can be ‘in te rp re te d ’ as so m ething w hich has a m eaning. T h e m ere p a tte rn o f so u n d s or m ark s o n p a p e r d o es n o t have a m e a n ­ ing in its e lf; r a th e r the m ean in g is ‘c o n fe rre d ’ u p o n it by its b ein g in te r­ p re te d in a p a rtic u la r way. T h is first step in H u sse rl’s investigation seem s to m e to be u n o b jec­ tionable, th o u g h no t obvious. By taking it H u sserl placed his analyses o n a d e e p e r th o u g h m o re h azard o u s basis th a n Frege: a satisfactory th e o ry o f m e an in g ca n n o t confine itself to talking abstractly a b o u t m eanings; it m u st also take into account the psychological o r a n th ro ­ pological fac to r o f the sign-user. M eanings do n o t exist in a Platonic h eaven; they a re m eanings o f signs. A nd they a re m ean in g s o f signs only in virtue o f the fact th a t certain sensible fo rm s are u sed (‘in te r­ p r e te d ’) as signs. I f this is so, th e n it is fu n d a m e n ta l to a satisfactory th eo ry o f m e an in g th a t one correctly characterize the m ode o f b ehav io u r, o r conscious­ ness, in w hich an expression is in te rp re te d as m ean in g fu l. In th e p r e ­ vious lecture I drew atte n tio n to th e fact th at o ne only speaks o f m e a n ­ ings o f expressions in connection with an u n d e rsta n d in g o f these expressions. O n e w ould th e re fo re have expected H u sserl to re fe r to th a t which ‘c o n fe rs’ m e an in g on th e expression as understanding, so th a t

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the further question would then have to be: What is it to understand an ex p ression? F rom th e ou tset, how ever, H usserl speaks, as th o u g h this w ere obvious, o f m e a n in g -c o n fe rrin g acts. A nd in H usserl ‘act’ is a technical te rm fo r ‘in te n tio n a l e x p e rie n c e ’. As in d icated in L ec tu re 6, by an in te n ­ tional ex p e rien c e H usserl m eans a m ode o f consciousness o f an object. T h e co n c ep t o f intentionality, which is n o t explicitly d ev elo p ed u n til In v estigation V - in an analysis w hich, significantly, is no lo n g e r o rie n ta te d tow ards th e m eanings o f linguistic exp ressio n s - is alread y p re su p p o se d as th e only possible basic concept o f th e th e o ry o f co n ­ sciousness in th e sem antic Investig atio n I. ‘In virtu e o f these acts [the m e a n in g -c o n fe rrin g acts] th e expression is m o re th a n m erely a w ordso u n d . It m eans som eth in g , a n d by m e an in g it it re fe rs to an o b ject’

(§9). Y ou will notice how , in an alm ost p ara d ig m atic m a n n e r, th e p ro b lem o f m e a n in g is h e re overlain w ith a trad itio n al, o b ject-o rien tated co n cep ­ tuality. W h at it m ean s to u n d e rs ta n d a linguistic exp ressio n is a q u estio n w hich is n o t asked. It is ta k en fo r g ra n te d th a t it is a m a tte r o f in te n ­ tional consciousness, consciousness d ire c te d to an object. F rom th e o u t­ set H u sserl ap p ro a c h e s th e p ro b lem o f m e an in g w ith this co n c ep t o f consciousness. O n e m ight have ex p ected , as th e logical co n seq u en ce o f this a p p ro a c h , th a t th e m e an in g o f an expression w ould be sim ply id e n ­ tified w ith th e object to w hich th e m e a n in g -c o n fe rrin g act is d irected . H ow ever, H usserl does n o t m ake such an identification. H u sse rl is so re w a rd in g as a critical p o in t o f d e p a r tu re because, on th e o n e h a n d , his a p p ro a c h is, explicitly a n d as a resu lt o f philosophical reflectio n , an o b je ct-o rien tate d one, a n d because, on th e o th e r h a n d , he n o n eth eless reco g n ized th a t th e m ean in g s o f expressions ca n n o t sim ply be co n ­ s tru e d as objects. So by ex a m in in g H u sse rl’s theory o f m e an in g o n e can investigate th e questio n o f how far a consistently o b ject-o rien tated a p p ro a c h can as it w ere be stretch e d bey o n d itse lf; th u s how far, if on e starts o u t fro m th e assu m p tio n th a t linguistic expressions a re u sed to re p re s e n t objects, o ne can n o netheless take accoun t o f th e fact th a t the u n d e rs ta n d in g o f expressions is n o t identical with th e re p re se n ta tio n o f objects. H u sse rl took account o f this fact in two respects, a n d in so doing in d ic ated d iffe re n t possible ways in w hich th e m ean in g s o f linguistic expressions can be in c o rp o ra te d into a consciousness o f objects w ith o u t them selves having to be re g a rd e d as objects. Firstly, he acknow ledged th a t th e re a re expressio n s w hich, th o u g h they have a m e an in g , d o n o t in any way stand fo r an object: th e so-

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called sy n ca te g o rem a tic expressions. T h is c o n c ep t ste m s fr o m th e sem antics o f tra d itio n a l logic.2 C a te g o re m a tic ex p re ssio n s w ere th o se w hich can o ccu r as terms, i.e. in th e position o f su b ject o r p re d ic a te in th e p ro p o sitio n s o f a syllogism. T h e n o tio n o f sin g u la r an d g e n e ra l te rm s is o f th e sam e o rig in . E xp ressio n s w hich c a n n o t fu n c tio n as te rm s w ere re g a rd e d as m e re aux iliary w ords. T h e o b je c t-o rie n ta te d a p p ro a c h also lies b e h in d this division o f ex p re ssio n s in to cate g o re m atic a n d syncateg o rem atic. In th e A risto telian o n tolo g y , ev ery ex p re ssio n w hich falls u n d e r o n e o f th e ‘ca te g o rie s’ (every kategorema), i.e. every ex p re ssio n w hich can fu n ctio n as a sin g u la r o r g e n e ra l te rm , stan d s fo r so m eth in g . T h e se ex pressions w hich stan d fo r so m e th in g have an in d e ­ p e n d e n t m e an in g . In c lu d e d a m o n g th e m w ere also w hole asserto ric sen tences. A cc o rd in g to this co n c ep tio n , o th e r e x p re ssio n s h ave a m e a n in g only in co n n e ctio n w ith ca te g o re m a tic ex p re ssio n s a n d w ere, fo r this re a so n , called ‘sy n c ate g o re m a tic’. H u sse rl takes over th e division in to c a te g o re m atic a n d sy n c a te g o re ­ m atic ex p ressio n s (In v estig atio n IV §4 ff.). W e will see la te r how h e fits sy n c ateg o rem atic ex p ressio n s into his o b je c t-o rie n ta te d a p p ro a c h . I n i­ tially, in In v estig atio n I, th e d istin ctio n is ig n o re d . H e re H u sserl seem s, w hen sp e a k in g o f ex p ressio n s in a com pletely g en e ral way, to be th in k ­ in g only o f c a te g o re m atic expressions. B u t even in th e case o f c a te g o ­ rem atic ex p ressio n s, in o th e r w ords, ex p re ssio n s w hich sta n d fo r so m e­ th in g , H u sse rl does n o t th in k th a t th e object fo r w hich an ex p ressio n stan ds is th e m e an in g o f th a t ex p re ssio n : ‘E very [!] e x p re ssio n . . . has n o t only its m e an in g , b u t also re fe rs to c e rta in objects . . . B u t th e object n ev e r coincides with th e m e a n in g ’ (In v estig atio n I §12). In th e n o tio n th a t, in th e case o f all (categorem atic) ex p ressio n s, o n e m u st d istin g u ish betw een th e object a n d th e m e a n in g o f th e ex p ressio n , H u sserl is in v o k in g a distinction m a d e som e years e a rlie r by F re g e, in his essay ‘O n Sense a n d R e fe re n c e ’.3 In this essay F re g e sta rte d o u t fro m th o se ex p ressio n s he called p r o p e r n a m e s a n d w hich m o re o r less c o rre sp o n d to th e sin g u la r term s o f th e o ld e r tra d itio n . A n d H u sse rl too states: ‘N am es o ffe r th e clea re st ex a m p le s o f th e s e p a ra tio n o f m e an in g a n d re fe re n c e to an o b je ct’ (In v e stig a tio n I 12). A lth o u g h H u sse rl’s te rm in o lo g y is n o t w holly u n a m b ig u o u s, h e m e an s by n am es p rin cipally ex p ressio n s w hich ‘can p e rfo rm th e sim ple su b je ct-fu n ctio n in a sta te m e n t’ (Investig atio n V §34). W hat we have h e r e th e n is H u s ­ se rl’s sem antics o f sin g u la r term s. W e a re th e re fo r e fac ed with th e first o f th e fo u r questio n s w hich I sin g led o u t a t th e e n d o f th e p rev io u s lectu re as b ein g im p o rta n t fo r th e clarification o f th e p red ic ativ e se n ­ tence.

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H ow does H u sserl answ er th e questio n ab o u t the m ean in g o f sin g u lar term s? Every such ex p ressio n , he says, designates an object. A n d if one defines ‘object’ as I suggested in L ec tu re 3 an d as it is also d efin ed by H u sse rl,4 th e n o n e will take no excep tio n to this sta te m en t (th o u g h one may p e rh a p s fo rm u la te it m o re carefully as: ‘Every sin g u lar te rm claims to d e sig n ate an o b ject’5 in o r d e r to allow fo r th e fact th a t w hat is d esig­ n ated m ay n o t exist). B ut, h e con tin u es, every such ex p ressio n also has a m e a n in g , an d this is to be d istin g u ish ed fro m th e object. In s u p p o rt o f this claim , H u sserl, like F rege, points to th e fact th a t two sin g u lar term s can d esig n ate th e sam e object a n d yet n o t have the sam e m e a n ­ ing, e.g. ‘th e victor o f J e n a ’ an d ‘the v anquished o f W aterlo o ’, or, to q u o te F re g e ’s c e le b ra ted ex am p le, ‘th e E vening S tar’ an d ‘the M o rn in g S ta r’. O n e can u n d e rs ta n d both expressions, a n d thus know w hat m e a n ­ ing they have, a n d yet n o t know th a t they stand fo r th e sam e object. F re g e an d H u sse rl a re h e re re fe rrin g in p articu la r to a specific class o f sin g u lar term s know n as ‘d efin ite d escrip tio n s’. So as to be able so m e­ how to classify th e se ex pressions we should first get clear ab o u t the various sem antic types o f tho se sin g u lar term s with which co n crete (p erceptible) objects can be d esig n ated . I will r e tu rn to these d istin c­ tions w hen, follow ing th e discussion o f predicates, I give my ow n an a l­ ysis o f sin g u lar term s. A first possible way in w hich expressions can d esig n ate co n crete objects is th e deictic, by m eans o f d em o n strativ e p ro n o u n s such as ‘th is’ o r ‘th a t’ a n d p e rso n a l p ro n o u n s such as ‘I ’, ‘you’, ‘it’. It is characteristic o f this m o d e o f d esig n atio n th a t it d e p e n d s on th e co n tex t o f speech w hich object th e ex p ressio n stan d s for. In th e case o f such a w ord, one ca n n o t ask fo r w hich object does it stand, only for w hich object does it stan d in this o r th a t context. T h e ob ject-referen ce d e p e n d s on th e p a r ­ ticu lar use. I f o n e takes this p ro p e rty as th e criterio n o f an ex p re ssio n ’s m e m b e rsh ip o f this class, th e n we will also have to in clu d e in th e class o f deictic subject-expressions tho se expressions which consist in th e co m b in atio n o f a d e m o n stra tiv e p ro n o u n o r a possessive adjective with a su bstantive, e.g. ‘this h o rse ’, ‘o u r h o rse ’, likewise th e com b in atio n with th e d efin ite article (‘th e h o rse ’) w h ere the expressio n is n o t used to d es­ ig n ate a species (‘th e h o rse is a dom estic an im al’) b u t in such a way th a t an in d iv id u al object o f this k in d is m ean t, w here it is again given by the co n text w hich object it is. A second class is co n stitu ted by definite descriptions: expressions such as ‘th e victor o f J e n a ’, ‘th e E vening S ta r’. E xpressions o f this kind d esig n ate an object by specifying a certain characteristic (e.g. th a t o f b eing th e victor o f J e n a ) w hich, it is su p p o sed , belongs only to a single

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object, this being expressed by th e definite article. Russell th e re fo re aptly called these expressions ‘defin ite d escrip tio n s’.6 A th ird class consists o f p ro p e r nam es, such as ‘N ap o le o n ’, ‘V en u s’, ‘B o n n ’. It is characteristic o f these expressions that, alth o u g h they des­ ignate an object, they do no t do so by m eans o f a co n te x t-d e p e n d e n t or c o n te x t-in d e p e n d e n t description. It th e re fo re seems co rrect to say o f th ese w ords th a t they have no m eaning. For it m akes no sense to ask for th e m ean in g o f such a w ord o r to ask how it is to be u n d e rsto o d : one can only ask which object does it designate. In th e trad itio n d e term in e d by ontology the fact th a t these w ords d esignate objects b u t th at one can n o t in ad d itio n ask fo r th eir m e an in g m ade th em seem th e linguistic expressions par excellence. From a naive p o in t o f view p r o p e r nam es seem also to be the sin g u lar term s w hich it is m ost easy to u n d e rsta n d . In contrast to a definite d escription a p ro p e r n am e seem s to desig n ate th e object as such, im m ediately an d d irectly.7 W e will see later th a t this is a m istake an d th a t th e m ode o f em p lo y m en t o f p ro p e r nam es belongs to a h ig h e r level th a n th a t o f th e o th e r two classes o f referrin g ex pression an d indeed presu p p o ses them . At p re se n t all th a t needs to be m a d e clear is that the thesis o f F reg e an d H usserl, th a t every ‘n am e’ bo th designates an object an d has a m eaning, is valid for only one class o f co ncrete sin g u lar term s: definite descriptions. Deictic sin g u lar term s do no t in them selves stan d for an object; and p ro p e r nam es have no m eaning. F or us th e im p o rta n t q u es­ tion is w h eth er, an d if so how, o n e can m ake sense o f th e n o tio n o f a m ean in g o f an expression which is distinct fro m th e object fro m an ob ject-o rien tated p oint o f view. W h at is to be u n d e rsto o d by th e m e a n ­ ing o f a ‘n a m e ’? F rege h ad alread y given a plausible answ er to this question. O f course o n e m ust take note o f his d iffe re n t term inology. F rege, u n lik e H usserl, does no t use ‘sense’ (Sinn) and ‘m e a n in g ’ (Bedeutung) as synonym s; ra th e r for th a t which H usserl p rim arily calls ‘m e an in g ’ F reg e exclu­ sively uses th e w ord ‘sen se’ an d , d e p a rtin g fro m o rd in a ry linguistic usage, calls th e object th e m eaning (Bedeutung) o f the expression. T h is term inological d iffe ren ce does n o t involve any ad d itio n al substantive problem s; it is ju s t th a t w hen speaking ab o u t F re g e ’s views o n e m ust be clear w h eth e r o ne is using th e w ord ‘m e an in g ’ in his o r th e u su al sense. N ow acco rd in g to F rege th e sense o f th e ex pressio n contains th e ‘m o d e o f p re se n ta tio n ’ o f the object.8 It is clearly constitutive o f m aterial objects th a t they can a p p e a r in an u n lim ite d n u m b e r o f perspectives o r m odes o f p rese n tatio n . F re g e ’s thesis is th a t every definite d escription designates an object as th e object w hich is given in such-and-such a way.

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T h e expression ‘th e Evening S ta r’, fo r exam ple, stands for th e object which a p p e ars at a p articu la r tim e in a p a rtic u la r p a rt o f th e sky. T h e sam e object a p p e a rs at a n o th e r tim e in a n o th e r p a rt o f the sky an d if on e designates it as th e object w hich a p p e a rs thus o n e calls it ‘th e M o rn ­ ing S ta r’. Now th a t is an account w hich H usserl was well able to ad o p t. In In v estigation I th o u g h he gives yet a n o th e r account. H e starts fro m the assu m p tio n th a t expressions w hich d esig n ate th e sam e object b u t have d iffe re n t m eanings a re distin g u ish ed fro m o ne a n o th e r by ‘th e specific m a n n e r in which th e object is m e a n t’ (Investigation I §13). It th e re fo re seem ed plausible to co n stru e th e m ean in g as a ch aracteristic o f th e act. H ow ever, an expression has o n e identical m eaning , w hereas any n u m ­ b er o f acts can in te rp re t it in th e sam e way. H usserl th e re fo re cam e to th e view th a t th e m ean in g consists in th e essence (th e ‘ideal species’) of th e rele v an t act (‘o f m ean in g th e p a rtic u la r object’). ‘T h e m e an in g (.Bedeutung), th e re fo re stands to th e various acts o f m ean in g (Meinen) . . . as red n ess in specie stands to th e strips o f p a p e r lying h e re w hich all “h av e” this sam e re d n e ss’ (Investigation I §31). T h is at any ra te is a possible way in w hich H usserl can acco m m o d ate m eanings w ithin th e fram ew o rk o f his o b ject-o rien tated ap p ro a ch . B ut it is by no m eans obvious th a t w hen we m ean an object with a d efin ite d escrip tio n w hat we u n d e rsta n d is th e essence o f this (act of) m eaning. T h is acco u n t is also u n ab le to answ er the question o f how it is th a t th e re are d iffe re n t m odes in which o n e an d th e sam e object can be m eant. Does n o t a p articu la r m ode o f p re se n ta tio n o f th e object co rre sp o n d to each such act-essence? L ater, in his Ideas. (§94), H u sserl m odified his co n ception in this direction, which h ad already b een an ticip ated by F re g e’s account: th e ‘sense’ is th e ‘object in its specific m ode o f p re se n ­ ta tio n ’ (§131). T h is is a second possible way o f in te g ra tin g m ean in g s which a re dis­ tinct fro m th e object into th e object-o rien tated ap p ro a ch : th e m ean in g is n o t th e object b u t th e m o d e o f p rese n tatio n o f th e object. A n d it is, m o reover, quite a plausible view. R eflection on th e m ode o f p re se n ta tio n of objects is characteristic o f th e so-called tra n sc e n d e n ta l tu rn in ontology. In its tran sc en d e n ta l fo rm th e theory o f objects th u s h ad a perspective in which it could m ake intelligible th e m eanings o f at least those expressions which also desig­ n ate objects. In th e th eo ry th a t the m e an in g of an ex p ressio n is th e m ode o f p rese n tatio n o f th e object, th e concept o f m e an in g rem ains d e p e n d e n t on th e concept o f an object. In d e e d fro m th e o u tset we m ust expect th a t it is sim ply n o t possible fo r th e object-o rien tated ap p ro a ch

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to develop a co n c ep t o f m e an in g w hich w ould be in d e p e n d e n t o f th e co n c ep t o f an object. H u sse rl’s first ex p la n a tio n o f th e m e an in g of a ‘n a m e ’ - th e m e an in g is th e essence o f th e act o f m e an in g - is an e x p la ­ n a tio n in w hich th e m e a n in g is u n d e rs to o d in term s o f th e object-reference; fo r it rests on th e assu m p tio n th a t th e re is an act, a n d an act is th e consciousness o f an object. T h e co n c ep t o f m e a n in g which is d e p e n d e n t on re fe re n c e to objects is o f course u n p ro b le m a tic so long as we a re d ealin g with sin g u lar te rm s, in o th e r w ords, w ith expressio n s w hich d esig n ate objects. B u t now w hat is th e position as re g a rd s th e m e an in g o f th e re m a in in g ca te­ go rem atic ex p ressio n s, viz. (a) g en e ral term s a n d (b) w hole assertoric sentences? T h e s e q u estio n s c o rre sp o n d to th e second a n d th e fo u rth o f th e fo u r questio n s to w hich I r e f e r re d at th e e n d o f th e p rev io u s lec­ tu re. L et us first co n sid er q u estio n 4, th a t o f th e m e an in g o f th e w hole assertoric senten ce. H u sse rl gives an answ er to this q u estio n in In v esti­ g ation I, b e fo re an sw e rin g th e th ird q uestion - th e q u estio n ab o u t p r e ­ dicative s tru c tu re - in In v estig ato n V I. T ac k lin g th in g s in this o r d e r also m akes sense in te rm s o f th e su b je ct-m a tte r. F or o n e can certainly say so m e th in g ab o u t how in g e n e ra l o ne sh o u ld in te r p re t th e m e a n in g o f w hole asserto ric se n ten ces - w h e th e r they be p red icativ e o r n o t even b e fo re o n e has investigated th e ir stru c tu re . We shall see th a t th e a cco u n t w hich H usserl gives o f th e m e an in g o f th e w hole asserto ric se n ten ce p re d e te rm in e s a p a rtic u la r answ er to th e th ird a n d crucial q u estio n a b o u t p red ic ativ e stru c tu re . H usserl does n o t wish to restric t his thesis th a t every ex p ressio n b o th re fe rs to an object a n d has a m e a n in g to sin g u la r term s. It holds fo r all (categorem atic) ex p ressio n s an d , in p a rtic u la r, fo r w hole asserto ric se n ­ tences (§12). B u t now w h at a re we to u n d e rs ta n d by th e m e an in g an d th e object o f a w hole asserto ric sentence? H u sse rl p ro v id es n o u n e q u iv ­ ocal answ er to this questio n . O n th e o n e h a n d , h e says, o n e can re g a rd th e object o f th e su b ject-term o f th e sen ten ce, in o th e r w ords, th a t ‘ “ab o u t” w hich th e sta te m e n t is m a d e ’, as th e object o f th e sentence. O n this view, th e object o f th e sta te m e n t ‘a is la rg e r th an b’ w ould be a o r p e rh a p s a a n d b. ‘B u t th e re is also possible,’ h e th e n says, ‘a n o th e r c o n ­ cep tion w hich views th e w hole state o f affairs c o rre sp o n d in g to th e sta te m e n t as th e a n a lo g u e o f th e object n a m e d by a n a m e an d w hich d istinguishes it fro m th e m e an in g o f th e asserto ric sen ten ce. If o n e does this th e n o n e will give as exam ples sen ten c e-p airs such as “a is la rg e r th a n b” a n d is sm aller th a n a ”. T h e two sentences clearly assert so m e­ th in g d if fe r e n t . . . B u t they ex p ress th e sam e state o f affairs . . . N ow

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w h e th e r we d efin e the object o f th e sta te m en t in this o r the o th e r sense . . . statem en ts a re always possible w hich d iffe r in m ean in g b u t which rela te to the sam e “object” ’ (§12). T h is gives th e im pressio n th a t it is m o re im p o rta n t to distinguish object an d m e a n in g at any price th a n to specify w h at is to be u n d e rsto o d by th e m e an in g a n d th e object o f a statem en t. H u sserl’s w avering b etw een two possible ways o f c o n stru in g th e m e an in g -o b je ct distinction as ap p lie d to w hole asserto ric sentences reveals a fu n d a m e n ta l u n c e r­ tain ty as to how talk o f objects in re g a rd to linguistic expressions is to be d efin e d . O n th e o n e h a n d , H usserl too d efin e d an ‘o b ject’ as th at w hich is the subject o f possible p red ic atio n s.9 O n the o th e r h a n d , his o b je ct-o rien tate d ap p ro a ch - th e assu m p tio n th a t all ‘m e an in g -co n fe r­ rin g consciousness’ is consciousness o f an object - obliged h im to hold th a t every linguistic ex p ressio n , o r at least every categ o rem atic ex p re s­ sion, stands fo r an object. It follows fro m th e first co n cep tio n th a t the only th in g th a t can be re g a rd e d as th e object o f an assertoric sentence is th e object (or objects) fo r w hich th e su bject-term (or subject-term s) o f th e se n ten ce stan d s (and o n e can only speak o f an object o f th e sentence in th e case o f sin g u lar p red icativ e sentences). In this way m e a n in g an d object o f th e se n ten c e are in d e e d sh arp ly d istin g u ish ed , fo r th e re is now n o object c o rre sp o n d in g to th e m e an in g o f the w hole sentence. H ow ­ ever, fo r the o b je ct-o rien tate d ap p ro a c h this is an u n accep tab le result, fo r fro m such a p o in t o f view a m e an in g not s u p p o rte d by conscious­ ness o f an object hangs as it w ere in a void and is sim ply inconceivable. So H usserl fo u n d h im self com pelled by his ob ject-o rien tated a p p ro a c h to d raw the distinction betw een object a n d m e an in g in reg a rd to w hole sentences in a d iffe re n t way. T h e o b je ct-o rien tated ap p ro a ch d e m a n d e d a co n cep tio n w hich assigns to th e sen ten ce an object c o rre ­ s p o n d in g to th e w hole m e an in g . A n d as we have already seen we can in d e e d speak o f an object fo r which a w hole senten ce ‘p ’ stan d s, viz. the state o f affairs that p. M o reo v er such a conception is com patible with the d efin itio n o f an object as the subject o f possible p red icatio n s, fo r, even if th e assertoric senten ce itself is n o t a subject-expression (a sin g u lar te rm ), its nom inalized fo rm ‘th a t p ’ certainly is. B u t now if th e object o f an assertoric sentence is u n d e rsto o d in this way can we in ad d itio n distinguish a m ean in g o f th e sentence? T h is is w hat H usserl tries to do in th e discussion to which I have ju s t re fe rre d . T h e two sentences ‘a is big g er th a n b ’ an d lb is sm aller th an a ’ re p re se n t th e sam e state o f affairs b u t have d iffe re n t m eanings. H u sserl clearly w ants to assim ilate the m e a n in g -o b je c t distinction as ap p lied to state­ m ents as closely as possible to th e distinction as ap p lied to sin g u lar

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term s: th e m eanings o f th e two sentences are so to speak two m odes o f p rese n tatio n o f o n e an d the sam e state o f affairs. B ut h ere talk o f d iffe re n t m odes o f p rese n tatio n o f o n e a n d the sam e th in g has only a m etap h o rical sense. W hat lies beh in d it? W h at are the criteria fo r d eciding (a) w hen two sentences have th e sam e o r d iffe re n t m eanings a n d (b) w hen they stan d fo r the sam e o r d iffe re n t states o f affairs? As reg a rd s (a) n o th in g specific can be in fe rre d fro m H u sse rl’s exam ple. It may be d o u b te d w h e th e r he had definite criteria, an d h en c e a d efinite concept of m eaning, in m ind. As fo r (b) H u sserl probably u sed the sta n d a rd criterio n , viz. tw o sentences stand fo r th e sam e state o f affairs if they have th e sam e tru th -co n d itio n s, i.e. if we can assert a priori (analytically), sim ply on the basis o f o u r u n d e rsta n d in g o f th e se n ­ tences, th a t if the o n e (e.g. ‘a is b ig g er th an b’) is tru e th e n th e o th e r (e.g. (b is sm aller th a n a ’) is also tru e , and if th e one is false th e n th e o th e r is also false. T h e c o rre sp o n d in g criterio n in th e case o f descrip tio n s w ould be: two d escriptions stan d fo r th e sam e object if we can assert a priori (analyti­ cally), sim ply on the basis o f o u r u n d e rsta n d in g o f th e expressions, th a t they d esignate th e sam e object. H ow ever this is not the criterio n w hich h olds fo r all d escriptions which desig n ate th e sam e object, fo r norm ally we can n o t establish w h eth e r they d esignate th e sam e object sim ply on th e basis o f o u r u n d e rsta n d in g o f th e expressions. We ca n n o t in fer th a t ‘th e victor o f J e n a ’ stands fo r th e sam e object as ‘th e v an q u ish ed o f W aterlo o ’ m erely fro m o u r u n d e rsta n d in g o f these expressions; we can only establish this by ex perience. A n exam ple o f d escrip tio n s analogous to ‘a is big g er th a n b’ a n d ‘b is sm aller th an a in this resp e ct w ould be, p erh a p s, ‘th e victor o f J e n a ’ an d ‘th e c o m m a n d e r o f th e victorious arm y at J e n a ’. T h u s we see th a t the criterio n by re fe re n c e to w hich H u sserl d eterm in e s w hich statem en ts stan d fo r th e sam e state o f affairs is in fact d iffe re n t fro m , an d n a rro w e r th a n , th e criterio n fo r d escrip tio n s’ h a v ­ ing the sam e object. In th e case o f statem ents a classification-criterion as wide as th a t which connects all descriptions which d esig n ate the sam e object w ould have to be: statem ents have th e sam e object if they h av e n o t only th e sam e tru th -co n d itio n s, b u t th e sam e tru th -v a lu e .10 B ut o n e w ould th e n have to say th a t all tru e statem ents designate o n e an d th e sam e object; an d likewise all false statem ents. T h is intuitively u n n a tu ra l b u t form ally consistent thesis was p r o ­ p o u n d e d by F re g e .11 H e too th o u g h t th a t o n e m ust also d istin g u ish b etw een ‘sen se’ (Sinn) a n d ‘object’ (Bedeutung) in th e case o f statem en ts. H ow ever h e in te rp re te d th e object o f the assertoric sen ten ce n o t as th e state o f affairs fo r w hich it stands b u t as its truth-v alu e, i.e. as ‘the cir­

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cu m stance th a t it is tru e o r th a t it is false’. T his co n cep tio n , in co n trast to H u sse rl’s, at least allow ed a clear distinction to be d raw n betw een m e an in g an d object. T h e two sentences ‘B e rn e is th e capital o f Switz­ e rla n d ’ and ‘B o n n is situated on th e R h in e ’ have d iffe re n t m eanings, b u t they stand fo r th e sam e ‘object’, nam ely, th e sam e tru th -v alu e , fo r they a re both tru e . O n e can reach a b e tte r intuitiv e u n d e rs ta n d in g o f this id ea by th in k in g o f th e ‘object’ fo r w hich all tr u e statem en ts stand as ‘reality ’ o r th e ‘w orld’; th e m eanings (senses) o f tru e statem en ts w ould th e n be th e d iffe re n t m odes o f p re se n ta tio n in w hich reality m anifests itself (false statem en ts w ould th e n n o t have th e ir ow n object; r a th e r th e ir m e an in g s w ould re p re se n t th e aspects in w hich reality does n o t m anifest its e lf).12 B ut this idea o f reality as an object as sug g ested by th e substantival expression m ust itself a p p e a r su sp ect to us. T h e real sub stance o f th e analogy w hich F rege exhibited b etw een th e m e an in g a n d object o f descrip tio n s an d th e m e an in g an d tru th -v a lu e o f state­ m ents lies in a n o th e r d irectio n an d alread y points b ey o n d th e objecto rie n ta te d a p p ro a c h . I ca n n o t go in to this h e r e 13 b u t w ould m erely p o in t o u t th a t F re g e was clearly using the w ord ‘o b ject’ in a n o n -sta n ­ d a rd se n se.14 I f it is taken in its usual sense - as ‘subject o f possible p red ic atio n s’ - th e n F re g e’s theo ry , w hatever its positive co n te n t may be, p rovides no possible answ er to th e q uestion co n c ern in g th e object o f assertoric sentences. H u sserl on th e o th e r h a n d probably d id not u n d e rs ta n d th e fo rm al co nnections F reg e h ad in m in d , an d in any case h e was b o u n d to be p u t o ff by th e intuitive u n n a tu ra ln e ss o f F re g e ’s result; h e thus m a d e his ow n suggestion in which th e analogy with the c o rre sp o n d in g distinction in re g a rd to descriptio n s is no lo n g e r p re ­ sent. A n d he d id n o t develop it fu rth e r. H ow ever we sh o u ld n o t over-estim ate this negative result. It sim ply consists in this: th a t th e distinction betw een m e an in g an d object which is m a d e in re g a rd to descrip tio n s can scarcely be tra n s fe rre d to asser­ toric sentences in th e m a n n e r suggested by H usserl. B u t H u sserl was able to d ispense w ith th e very vague idea o f th e m e an in g o f asserto ric sentences w hich h e in tro d u c e d on this occasion; h e was nev erth eless able to ho ld on to th e view th a t every assertoric sen ten ce ‘p ’ stan d s for an object, viz. th e state o f affairs that p. O nly th e co n cep t o f m e an in g h ad to be newly d efin ed a n d its rela tio n sh ip to th e object newly d e te r­ m ined. It now o c c u rre d to H usserl to com bine th e two possible ways, co n sid ered as alternatives in §12, o f d istin g u ish in g betw een th e object an d th e m e an in g o f a statem en t. You will recall th a t, acco rd in g to th e first o f these, th e object o f a predicative sentence is th e object o f its su bject-term ; th e w hole sen ten ce as such only has a m e an in g a n d not,

Hass er Vs theory of meaning

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in a d d itio n , an object. T h e r e was no real a r g u m e n t w hich told ag ain st this co n c ep tio n , only th e o b je c t-o rie n ta te d a p p ro a c h , ac co rd in g to w hich th e re also h ad to be an object c o r re s p o n d in g to th e w hole e x p re s­ sion. B ut now this re q u ire m e n t is fulfilled by sim ply in c o rp o ra tin g in to th e first possibility th e o n e u n p ro b le m a tic idea o f th e seco n d possibility, viz. th e idea th a t every n o m in a liz ed asserto ric se n ten ce ‘th a t p' sta n d s fo r a state o f affairs. T h u s in §34 o f In v estig atio n I th e re e m e rg e s th e follow ing c o n c e p ­ tion (the o n e which is finally a c ce p te d by H usserl). T h e object o f th e se n ten c e ‘J u liu s is w e e p in g ’ is th a t o f w hich it asserts so m eth in g , viz. Ju liu s. B u t o n e can also speak a b o u t th e m e a n in g o f th e sen ten ce. In this case th e m e an in g o f th e se n te n c e becom es itself th e ob ject-ab o u tw hich o f a f u r th e r sta te m en t. T h is new object w hich is d esig n ated by th e nom in alized ex p re ssio n ‘th a t J u liu s is w e e p in g ’ is th e state o f affairs. C o rre sp o n d in g to th e g ram m atical m odificatio n o f n o m in alizatio n is th e sem antic m odification o f th e o bjectification o f m e an in g . T h e q u estio n c o n c e rn in g th e re la tio n sh ip b etw een th e m e an in g a n d object o f th e asserto ric se n ten c e is th u s m a d e m o re co m p licated by th e fact th a t now two objects are involved. T h e object-ab o u t-w h ich o f th e sta te m en t is th e object o f th e su b je ct-te rm o f th e se n ten ce; it is d istin ­ g u ish ed fro m th e m e a n in g in th e way d e sc rib e d by H u sse rl in th e first altern ativ e o f § 12. T h e state o f affairs, on th e o th e r h a n d , th e object fo r w hich th e ex p ressio n ‘th a t/? ’ sta n d s, is th e —objectified - m ean in g . T h e q u estio n I left o p e n w hen I in tro d u c e d objects o f th e ty p e that p in L ec tu re 3, viz. how th e se objects - states o f affairs o r p ro p o sitio n s sh o u ld be conceived, w ould th u s b e an sw e re d in a specific way: th e object that p is th e m e a n in g o f th e se n te n c e ‘p ’. T h is id e a could a p p e a r p lausible, fo r it is n a tu ra l to say th a t tw o states o f affairs that p a n d that q a re iden tical if th e tw o sentences a n d ‘q h av e th e sam e m e a n in g (it is o f co u rse assu m ed th a t th e se n ten c es a n d ‘q c o n tain no deictic expressions). B u t even if we d isre g a rd deictic ex p re ssio n s th e id en tificatio n o f th e state o f affairs that p w ith th e m e a n in g o f ‘p ’ is n o t ten ab le. W e can alread y see this fro m linguistic usage: we c a n n o t tra n s la te sta te m en ts a b o u t states o f affairs w ith sta te m en ts a b o u t m ean in g s. F o r ex am p le, o n e ca n n o t say instead o f ‘th e state o f aff airs th a t it was snow ing y ester­ d ay is p le asin g ’ ‘th e m e a n in g o f th e se n ten c e “it was sn o w in g y esterd ay ” is p leasin g ’. T h is fact w hich is o fte n re m a rk e d u p o n 15 does n o t itself p ro v e an y th in g . W hat o n e m u st go o n to ask is w hat th e g r o u n d o f this d iscrep an cy in linguistic usage is. It is usefu l to look ag a in a t th e c o rre s p o n d in g th e o ry o f F rege. T o

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th e superficial r e a d e r F re g e seems to hold th e sam e view as H usserl. I w ould re m in d you th a t F re g e ’s te rm for w hat H usserl calls a ‘state o f a ffa irs’ is ‘th o u g h t’. N ow F rege also says that th e sense o f an assertoric sen tence is a th o u g h t.16 Also acco rd in g to F reg e th e object o f the n o m ­ inalized e x p re ssio n ‘th a t p ’ is the sense o f ‘p ’. 17 H ow ever, it is easy to o verlook th e fact th a t w h at F rege calls ‘sense’ is a technical term an d does not c o rre sp o n d at all to w hat o n e ordinarily u n d e rsta n d s an d w hat H u sserl u n d e rs ta n d s by ‘m e a n in g ’ (or ‘sense’). In p articu lar the c o rre ­ lation betw een sense a n d u n d e rsta n d in g fro m which I sta rted in th e p revious le ctu re does n o t hold fo r Frege. T h e r e seems to be no com ­ p reh e n siv e te rm in F reg e fo r w hat we u n d e rsta n d w hen we u n d e rsta n d a linguistic exp ressio n . I f we co n tin u e to call th a t which we u n d e rsta n d ‘m e a n in g ’ (B edeutung) - an d thus use the w ord quite d ifferen tly fro m F re g e - we will have to say that fo r F rege th e sense o f an assertoric sen ten ce constitu tes only a p a rt o f its m eaning. B ecause, fo r F rege, th e sense is th e th o u g h t a n d th e th o u g h t is th at which can be tru e o r false,18 only w hat is re le v a n t to th e question o f tru th o r falsity belongs to th e se n se .19 H e re , as D u m m e tt has show n, F rege anticip ated th e m o d ern view th a t th e m e a n in g o f a sentence consists in its tru th -co n d itio n s. It is only later th a t I shall r e tu r n to this really crucial aspect o f F re g e’s th e ­ ory. I shall also at p re s e n t d isre g a rd those o th e r con stitu en ts o f m e a n ­ in g 20 in w hich acco rd in g to F rege a feeling is ex p ressed o r a ‘h in t’ is given to th e h e a r e r .21 W h a t is im p o rta n t from the p oint o f view o f o u r discussion is th a t, fo r F rege, an assertoric sentence an d th e c o rre sp o n d ­ ing in te rro g a tiv e sen ten ce have th e sam e sense; this m ean s th a t th e assertio n -m o d e o r q u estio n -m o d e (F rege speaks of ‘assertoric fo rce’) do es n o t b elo n g to th e sense b u t is an additional elem en t o f m e an in g .22 Now this view co rre sp o n d s in th e m ost precise fashion to actual linguis­ tic usage, w hen we co n sid er th a t th e sense is th a t for which th e e x p re s­ sion ‘t h a t// stands. ‘T h a t/? ’ d iffers fro m (p ’ in th a t it lacks th e assertionm o m e n t (cf. above p. 64). W e can now r e tu r n to H u sse rl’s thesis th a t th e state o f affairs that p is th e (‘objectified’) m e an in g o f ‘p \ It is now clear why this thesis is false. T h e m e an in g o f ep ’ always contains m ore th a n th a t fo r w hich the ex p ressio n ‘th a t/? ’ stands. H ow ever justified a n d how ever n atu ra l it is to say th a t an ex p re ssio n ‘th a t p* stan d s for so m eth in g - w h eth e r o ne calls it a state o f affairs, a p ro p o sitio n o r a th o u g h t - it is false to say this o f th e u n m o d ifie d ex p re ssio n ‘p ’. Som eone w ho says ‘p ’ is n o t simply d esig n atin g a state o f affairs, b u t at the same tim e asserting th a t it is tru e o r ‘o b ta in s’; a n d this ad d itio n a l factor w hich is in c lu d ed in the m e an in g o f ‘p ’ can no lo n g e r be c o n stru e d objectually.

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H usserl did n o t overlook this factor o f the sentence-m ode; o n the co ntrary he held th a t a ‘positional q uality’ belongs to th e essence o f in ten tio n al acts as such, including all ‘nom in al’ acts.23 H e th u s trie d to neutralize the th re a t to his fu n d a m e n ta l position, w hich is o rien tate d tow ards nam es a n d re p rese n tatio n , posed by the n a tu re o f sentences by sim ply in c o rp o ratin g this aspect o f sentences into th e object-reference. Now this w ould m ean: every singular term not only stands for an object; with such a term so m ething is implicitly asserted. B u t w h at is it th a t is im plicitly asserted w ith a sin g u lar term ? A ccording to H usserl it is the existence o f the object.24 A pplied to singular term s th a t stan d for (m ate­ rial) objects this thesis is no t im plausible an d I shall be re tu rn in g to it later (Lect. 26). B u t even now we can anticipate th a t if this thesis tu rn s o u t to be co rrect the conclusion it suggests is th e o p p o site o f th a t d raw n by H usserl: it w ould follow th a t these nam es re fe r back to statem en ts (those w hich they implicitly assert) (cf. above p. 73). H ow ever, ap p lied to the nom in al expressions with w hich we are now co n cern ed , e x p re s­ sions o f the form ‘th a t/? ’, th e thesis w ould seem to be false. T h e idea th a t w hen we say ‘th a t p ’ the obtaining o f th e state o f affairs (or the tru th o f the th o u g h t) is im plicitly asserted contrad icts th e fact th a t we can ju s t as well com plete ‘that/? . . with ‘is false’, ‘is d o u b tfu l’, etc., as with ‘is tr u e ’. S om eone who is ju s t begin n in g to say ‘th a t p . . .’ has n o t yet im plicitly p re ju d g e d how he will com plete it. So we have no alternative b u t to reject H u sse rl’s identification o f the state o f affairs thatp with the m eaning of ‘p ’. H ow ever, H u sserl’s objecto rien tate d ap p ro a ch gives rise to a n o th e r a n d even m o re serious p ro b ­ lem. W h e th e r one identifies th e state o f affairs that p with th e m ean in g o f *p’ or in te rp re ts th e ir relationship in a d iffe re n t way th e re still arises th e f u rth e r and crucial question o f w h eth e r o u r u n d e rsta n d in g o f the m ean in g o f ‘/?’ is g ro u n d e d in o u r know ing for w hich object ‘th a t p ’ stands o r w h eth e r it is the o th e r way ro u n d . H usserl him self, in Investigation I, characterizes th e connection betw een m e an in g an d state o f affairs thus: th e state o f affairs is the objectified m eaning. T h is w ould seem to im ply that th e identification o f th e state o f affairs that p already p resu p p o ses th e u n d e rsta n d in g o f th e m eaning o f ‘p \ B ut th e n this w ould m ean th a t the m e an in g w ould fo r its p a rt have to be in te rp re te d non-objectually. But, as we have alread y seen, fo r H u sse rl’s object-orientated ap p ro a ch a m e an in g which is n o t p ro p p e d u p by an object-consciousness is impossible. So H usserl draw s th e conclusion which, given his sta rtin g -p o in t, is the only possible one: as the state o f affairs thatp is in any case su p p o sed to be identical with th e m eaning o f *p’ it is easy to pro ject th e conscious­

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ness o f th e state o f affairs back in to th e u n d e rs ta n d in g o f m ean in g . C onsistently with this H u sserl no lo n g e r speaks, in Inv estig atio n s V a n d V I, o f th e m ean in g , b u t only o f th e state o f affairs. T h e u n d e rs ta n d in g o f th e n o t yet nom in alized sta te m e n t is also in te rp re te d as ‘conscious­ ness o f th e state o f a ffa irs’; only in this case th e state o f affairs is n o t yet ‘objectual in th e strict sen se’ (Investigation V §§36, 38). W e m u st th e re fo re re g a rd H u sse rl’s a tte m p t to apply th e m e a n in g object d istinction to statem en ts as well as to n am es as a failu re. In itself this w ould be no d isaster, n o r is this resu lt th e essential one. W h at is essential is th a t H u sserl co n stru es th e m e a n in g o f th e se n ten c e as an object. H ow can th e so u n d n e ss o f this co n cep tio n be tested? By asking: if th e state o f affairs is n o t fo u n d e d in th e m e a n in g th e n how , acco rd in g to this co n cep tio n , is it positively u n d e rsto o d ? I f o n e ca n n o t have rec o u rse to th e m e a n in g o f the sta te m e n t th e only way o f ex p lain in g th e ontological status o f th e state o f affairs is to re g a rd it as a composite object. T h e idea th a t th e m ean in g o f an asserto ric sen ten ce is an object inevitably results in th e view th a t th e m a n n e r in which th e m e an in g o f th e w hole sta te m e n t arises o u t o f th e m eanings o f its p a rts can only be th o u g h t o f as com position. O n e can leave o p e n th e q u estio n o f w h e th e r o n e speaks o f m ean in g s o r objects in re g a rd to th e sen ten ce-p arts. W h a t is crucial is th a t it is a m a tte r o f com position. C om p o sitio n im plies objects both as its elem en ts an d as its results. E ven if o n e avoids sp e ak ­ in g o f objects a n d thin k s o f th e meaning o f th e com posite ex p ressio n as com posed o f th e meanings o f th e c o m p o n e n t ex pressio n s, in th e co n cep t o f com position o n e is m ak in g u se o f an objectual categ o ry a n d h en c e co n stru in g m eanings as objects. W e are thus faced w ith the crucial th ird q u estio n o f th e fo u r q u e s­ tions em p h asized by m e at th e e n d o f th e last lectu re viz. how is th e co m bination o f th e two sen ten c e-p arts, th e sin g u lar te rm a n d th e p r e d ­ icate, to be u n d e rsto o d ? H u sse rl’s answ er to th e fo u rth q u estio n (how is th e w hole assertoric se n ten c e u n d ersto o d ? ), viz. its m e an in g is an object (a state o f affairs), largely p re d e te rm in e s th e answ er to th e th ird q u e s­ tion: to th e com position o f th e expression th e re m u st co rre sp o n d a co m position in th e object, o r m ean in g . T h is m ay at first a p p e a r harm less, an d p e rh a p s you will even ask in asto n ish m e n t: how else is th e m e an in g o f th e w hole ex p ressio n to be u n d e rsto o d , if n o t as com posed o f th e m e an in g s o f its co m p o n en texpressions? In th e n e x t le ctu re we shall h av e to ex a m in e how fa r th e objectual co n ception o f th e m e a n in g o f a pred icativ e sen ten ce can be p rese rv e d by m eans o f an acceptable co n c ep t o f com position.

LECTURE

10

Collapse of the traditional theory of m eaning

T h e g u id in g q u e stio n o f o u r in v estigation is: W h a t is it to u n d e r s ta n d a se n ten c e? T h is q u estio n I re g a rd as th e fu n d a m e n ta l q u estio n o f p h i­ lo sophy, w hich sh o u ld ta k e th e place o f th e tra d itio n a l fu n d a m e n ta l q u estio n - w h at is b ein g as being? o r w h at is it to r e p r e s e n t a n object? W e a re th u s n o t asking this q u estio n fo r th e sake o f ask in g it b u t r a th e r with th e aim o f re a c h in g a new philo so p h ical a p p ro a c h . T h e conviction ex p re sse d in th e first p a r t o f these le c tu re s th a t th e q u estio n - W h at is it to u n d e r s ta n d a sentence? - has th e fo rm a l un iv ersality o f th e q u es­ tio n c o n c e rn in g objects as objects a n d in fact is m o re c o m p re h e n siv e th a n th e la tte r, d oes n o t a m o u n t to a new a p p ro a c h vis-ä-vis th e objecto rie n ta te d a p p ro a c h ; it m e re ly points in th e d ire c tio n o f su ch a new a p p ro a c h . O n e can only d ev e lo p it by w o rk in g o u t a new basic co n c ep ­ tu ality a p p r o p r ia te to th e new su b je ct-m a tte r. T o achieve this we shall first look at w h at h a p p e n s w hen th e tra d itio n a l basic co n c ep tu ality is a p p lie d to th e u n d e r s ta n d in g o f a se n ten c e, in th e e x p e c ta tio n th a t th e re su ltin g te n sio n will yield a basis fo r th e d e v e lo p m e n t o f a new h o rizo n o f e x p la n a tio n . I n th e last le c tu re we w ere able to see how th e o b je ct-o rien tate d a p p ro a c h d id n o t p re v e n t H u sse rl fro m giving a p lau sib le a c co u n t o f th e d istin ctio n betw een th e m e a n in g a n d th e ob ject o f n am es b u t th a t in th e case o f th e m e a n in g o f w hole sen ten ces it lan d s h im in grav e difficulties. T h e state o f affairs that p, w hich H u sse rl h im s e lf initially in te r p re ts as a su b se q u e n t m odification, m u st, given th e o b je c t-o rie n ­ ta te d a p p ro a c h , be p ro je c te d back in to th e o rig in a l con scio u sn ess o f th e m e a n in g o f A ccordingly, if th e co n sciousness o f a sta te o f affairs c a n n o t be e lu c id a te d by re fe re n c e to th e u n d e r s ta n d in g o f a se n ten ce, b u t th e u n d e r s ta n d in g o f th e e x p re ssio n co m p o sed o f sin g u la r te rm a n d p re d ic a te is an originally objectual consciousn ess, th e n th e m a n n e r in w hich th e m e a n in g o f th e p red ic ativ e se n ten c e d e p e n d s o n th e m e a n ­

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in g o f its te rm s can only be ex p lain ed by m eans o f th e only o b ject-o rien ­ ta te d conceptuality available fo r this p u rp o se, i.e. it m ust be co n stru e d as composition, as synthesis. So we are faced with th e fu n d a m e n ta l q uestion o f sem antics, h ere in co n n e ctio n w ith th e special case o f th e predicative sentence: how does th e m e an in g o f a com posite ex p ressio n result fro m th e m ean in g s o f its c o m p o n e n t expressions? P roving itself a d e q u ate in this fu n d a m e n ta l sem an tic q u estio n is th e decisive criterio n for th e applicability o f a p h il­ o sophical concep tu ality to the q uestions of sem antics. I t was clear to H usserl th a t the com position constitutive o f a state o f affairs c a n n o t be w hat o n e o rd in arily u n d e rsta n d s w hen o n e speaks o f co m posite objects. O rd in arily w hen one com bines objects to form a co m posite object - e.g. w h en on e com bines pearls to fo rm a pearl-necklace o r build in g -sto n es to fo rm a b u ild in g - th e com posite object is ju s t as m u ch a c o n c re te sp a tio -tem p o ra l object as its parts. A state o f affairs o r fact, on th e o th e r h a n d , is n o t a concrete sp atio -tem p o ral object. W h e n we sp eak o f th e fact th a t C aesar was m u rd e re d in R om e in 44 B.C. C aesar is a co n crete sp atio -tem p o ral object. Equally th e event o f his m u r d e r is sp atio -tem p o rally locatable. It h a p p e n e d in th a t place an d at th a t tim e. T h e fact th a t C aesar was m u rd e re d in th a t place at th a t tim e, on th e o th e r h a n d , is n o t locatable and datable. T h u s th e object fo r w hich a nom in alized sentence stands, like th a t for w hich a n o m i­ n alized p re d ic a te stands, is no t a co n c rete spatio -tem p o ral object: states o f affairs are , like a ttrib u te s, so-called ‘ab stract’ objects. H u sserl calls co n c rete objects ‘re a l’ objects an d ab stra ct objects ‘ideal’ objects. For him th e c riterio n o f a ‘re a l’ object is th a t it can be sensibly perceiv ed (Inves­ tig atio n VI §46). T h u s a lth o u g h his o b je ct-o rien tate d ap p ro a ch obliged H u sserl to c o n s tru e states o f affairs as com posite objects they are non eth eless objects o f a n o th e r o rd e r th a n the objects of w hich they a re com posed. B u t now this m ean s th a t th e com position in questio n m ust be o f a sp e­ cial kind. H u sse rl a tte m p te d to o vercom e this difficulty by m eans o f his th e o ry o f categ o rial synthesis. T h is re p re se n ts th e m ost far-rea ch in g a tte m p t so f a r m a d e to ex p lain states o f affairs an d th e m ean in g o f sen tences fro m an o b je ct-o rien tate d position. B e fo re e x p o u n d in g th e basic fe a tu re s o f this th eo ry I w ould like briefly to d raw y o u r a tte n tio n to a n o th e r object-o rien tated position in w hich th e n o tio n o f com position is ap p lied naively to states o f affairs, viz. th e position re p re s e n te d by W ittg e n stein ’s Tractatus. In asm u ch as W ittg en stein in th e Tractatus is, u n lik e H usserl, o rien tate d prim arily to w ard s sentences r a th e r th a n nam es his position is alread y a decidedly

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language-analytical one: ‘O nly propositions have sense; only in the n exus o f a p ro p o sitio n does a nam e have m e an in g ’ (3.3). H ow ever this idea is still in te rp re te d ontologically. T h e Tractatus g ro u n d s th e sem an ­ tic prim acy o f se n ten ce over n am e in an ontological prim acy o f facts o v er things: ‘T h e w orld is th e totality o f facts, n o t o f th in g s’ (1.1). Now th e question arises: w hat are we to u n d e rsta n d by a ‘fact’? W ittgenstein answ ers: ‘W hat is th e case - a fact - is th e o btainin g o f states o f affairs’ (2.). A nd w hat is a state o f affairs? T o this W ittgenstein answ ers: ‘A state o f affairs is a com bination o f objects’ (2.01). T h is view is o p e n to th e criticism at w hich I have already h in te d , viz. th at it depicts th e state of affairs as a com posite co n crete object. T h e Tractatus invites this criticism by explicitly stating: ‘In a state o f affairs objects fit into o n e a n o th e r like th e links o f a ch ain ’ (2.03). W ittgenstein rejected this view h im self w hen h e ab a n d o n ed the ob ject-orientated position o f th e Tractatus. F rom this p erio d stem som e notes w hich, u n d e r th e title ‘C om plex a n d F act’ have been p u b lish ed as an a p p e n d ix to Philosophical Remarks. 1 H e re W ittgenstein writes: ‘C om ­ plex is n o t like fact. F or I can e.g. say o f a com plex th a t it moves fro m one place to a n o th e r, b u t n o t o f a fact . . . A nd a com plex is a spatial object, com posed o f spatial objects . . . B u t that this com plex is now situated h e re is a fact . . . T o say th a t a re d circle is composed o f red n ess an d circularity, o r is a com plex with these c o m p o n en t p arts is a m isuse o f these w ords an d is m isleading (Frege was aw are o f this an d told me). It is ju s t as m isleading to say th e fact th a t this circle is re d (that I am tired) is a com plex w hose c o m p o n en t p arts are a circle an d red n ess (m yself an d tiredness) . . . O f course we also say: “to p o in t o u t a fact”; bu t th a t always m eans; “to p o in t o u t th e fact th a t T o p o in t o u t a fact m eans to assert som ething, to state som ething. “T o p o in t o u t a flow er” d o esn ’t m ean this . . . T h e ro o t o f this m u d d le is th e co n fu sin g use o f th e w ord “object”.’ W hat W ittgenstein h e re calls a com plex is a com posite co n crete object. In now g oing so far as to say th a t th e fact does not consist o f so m eth in g he is rejecting th e object-orientated ap p ro a ch alto g eth er. H usserl, how ever, has show n th a t on th e basis o f an ob ject-o rien tated a p p ro a ch one can still perfectly well distinguish betw een a com plex an d a fact. T h is brings m e to his theory o f categorial synthesis. T h e task H u sse rl set h im self was to distinguish fro m th e real com position o f an object a special n o n -re al com position w hich is constitutive o f a fact. L et m e try to m ake th e distinction clear by m eans o f an exam ple. A h a m m e r is a real object which is com posed o f two p arts: a shaft an d a head. I f we

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ascertain this a n d say ‘this h a m m e r is com posed o f a sh aft a n d a h e a d ’ th e re c o rre sp o n d s to this sta te m en t th e state o f affairs th a t th is h a m m e r is co m posed o f a sh aft a n d a head. T h e state o f affairs, it is assu m ed , is itself an (ideal) com posite object. Now w hat a re its co n stitu en ts? S h o u ld we say: th e (real) com position is (ideally) co m b in ed , o n th e o n e h a n d , w ith th e h a m m e r, on th e o th e r h a n d , with th e sh a ft a n d th e head? T h e state o f affairs in questio n w ould th e n be co m p o sed o f tw o co n stitu en ts: (1) th e real com position a n d (2) th e o rd e re d object-trio [h am m er, sh aft, h ead]. H u sse rl p r e fe rre d a n o th e r way o f looking at it (In v estig atio n VI §48) ac co rd in g to w hich only th e real objects, th u s h a m m e r, sh aft a n d h e a d , fu n ctio n as co n stitu e n ts o f th e state o f affairs a n d th e real co m ­ po sition (the p a rt-w h o le relation) re p re se n ts th e way in w hich th ese objects a re (ideally) co m b in ed in th e state o f affairs. N ow w hichever way th e m o d e o f com position o f th e state o f affairs is to be u n d e rsto o d (I shall com e back to this) it is clearly fu n d a m e n ta lly d iffe re n t fro m th e m o d e o f co m position o f th e h am m er. T h e h a m m e r itself e n te rs into th e state o f affairs as a p a rt, an d , alth o u g h a real co m p o site object can always be itself a real p a r t o f a la rg e r w hole, it can n ev er be so in such a way th a t its ow n p arts can be th e c o m p le m e n ta ry co n stitu e n ts o f th e new whole. T h e state o f affairs th a t th e h a m m e r consists o f h ea d a n d sh aft, is, in co n tra st to th e h a m m e r, n o t a p erc ep tib le object. A n d equally we c a n n o t p erceiv e its com position as we can p erceiv e th e co m ­ p osition o f th e h a m m e r o u t o f h e a d an d shaft. It is th e re fo re te m p tin g to say: ideal com position is n o t ascertain ab le by p e rc e p tio n b u t only in thought. H u sserl can h e re a p p e a l to a lo n g tra d itio n ac co rd in g to w hich th in k ­ in g , th e ‘u n d e rs ta n d in g ’, is a faculty o f synthesis an d a synthesis w hich is n o t a species o f real co m p o sitio n .2 L et m e illu strate this by m ean s o f a n o th e r ex am p le. W h e n we a p p r e h e n d th e fact th a t A is se p a ra te fro m B th e n A a n d B a re certainly n o t really co m b in ed , they a re sep arate . A n d yet in th e state o f affairs th a t they are se p a ra te , they a r e co n n ected . T h ey a re b ro u g h t in to this co nnection, w hich is n o t a real co n n ectio n , by th o u g h t. T h is does n o t m e an th a t th e co n n e ctio n do es n o t actually (wirklich) exist (A a n d B a re actually separate). T h a t facts are n o t real objects (con crete objects in space an d tim e), th a t they a re only co n sti­ tu te d in th o u g h t, does n o t m ean th a t they a re n o t actual. T h in k in g too, like all consciousness, is u n d e rsto o d by H u sserl as objectual consciousness an d h en c e as an ‘act’.3 Acts o f th in k in g h e calls ‘categ o rial’ acts in co n tra st to ‘sensory’ acts in w hich c o n c rete objects a re re p re se n te d . It is ch aracteristic o f a categ o rial act th a t it re p re se n ts an object w hich is co m p o sed in such a n d such a way as co m p o sed in such

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a n d such a way - w hich it can only d o by sim u ltan eo u sly r e p re s e n tin g its c o m p o n e n t objects. N ow th e r e p re s e n tin g o f each co m p o n e n t-o b je c t is (by d efinition) itself an act. A ca te g o ria l act is th e re fo re a sy n th etic act w hich is fo u n d e d o n o th e r acts, ultim ately o n sen so ry acts w hich r e p ­ re se n t th e real objects w hich e n te r in to th e synthetic object. T h e sy n th e ­ sis o f th e objects o f th e f o u n d in g acts is ac co m p lish e d by th e fo u n d e d categ o rial act; a n d in this synthesis th e new synth etic object is consti­ tu te d . T h u s th e la tte r c a n n o t, even in p rin cip le, be re p re s e n te d in a sim ple (sensory) act. So H u sserl tries to ex p lain th e d istin ctio n b etw e en ideal a n d real objects a n d th e p e c u lia r co m p o sitio n o f ideal objects by d istin g u ish in g b etw een th e c o rre s p o n d in g acts, th u s by d istin g u ish in g th e ways in w hich th e re le v a n t objects a re given (th u s by giving a ‘tra n s c e n d e n ta l’ ex p lan a tio n ). T h e o r d e r o f types o f object is g r o u n d e d in th e o r d e r o f acts. T h e e x p la n a tio n h e gives is s u p p o se d to h o ld fo r all ideal objects, also fo r species (w hich a re c o n stitu te d in acts o f ‘id eativ e ab stra c tio n ’), a ttrib u te s a n d equally fo r sets. H o w ev er, I shall co n fin e m yself to states o f affairs. T h e co m p o sitio n o f a state o f affairs, w hich is fu n d a m e n ta lly d if fe r e n t fro m all real co m p o sitio n , is ex p la in e d by saying th a t this syn­ thesis is th e synthesis ac co m p lish e d by a categorial act. It th u s becom es clear ‘th a t categ o rial fu n ctio n s, in “fo rm in g ” sensible objects, leave th e ir real essence u n to u c h e d . . . C a te g o ria l fo rm s d o n o t glue, tie o r p u t p a rts to g e th e r so th a t a real, sensibly p e rc e p tib le w hole resu lts. T h e y d o n o t fo rm in th e sense in w hich th e p o tte r fo rm s. F o r th e n th a t w hich was originally given to se n se -p e rc e p tio n w ould be m o d ified in its ow n o b jecth o o d : re la tin g a n d c o n n e c tin g th o u g h t a n d k n o w led g e w ould n o t be th o u g h t a n d k n o w led g e o f w hat is, b u t r a th e r falsifying tra n s fo r­ m a tio n into so m e th in g else’ (In v e stig a tio n V I §61). P e rh a p s you will ask: to w h at e x te n t th e n can o n e say th a t p a rtic u la r states o f affairs actually {wirklich) o b ta in (and th a t th e c o rre sp o n d in g sta te m en ts a re tru e ), if th e se objects a re n o t ‘re a l’ (real) a n d a re only c o n stitu te d in th e sy n th etic acts o f th in k in g ? T o th is H u sse rl can reply: a state o f affa irs is o n e th a t actually obtains (an d th e c o rre sp o n d in g sta te m e n t is tru e ) if th e re le v a n t ca te g o ria l synthesis o n th e fo u n d a tio n o f th e real objects th a t e n te r into it can be p e rfo rm e d (is possible) (e.g. th e state o f affa irs th a t sh a ft a n d h e a d a re co m b in ed , actually o btains if th e c o rre s p o n d in g synthesis o f th e se rea l p a rts can be p e rfo rm e d ).4 N ow b e fo re I com e to th e a p p lica tio n o f this th e o ry o f c ateg o rial sy n ­ thesis to o u r c o n c re te q u estio n c o n c e rn in g th e sem an tic stru c tu re o f p red ic ativ e sta te m e n ts I w ould like to d raw y o u r a tte n tio n to a p a rtic u ­ lar sem an tic p ro b le m w hich H u sse rl th o u g h t this th eo ry co uld solve:

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th e p ro b lem o f th e sem antics o f syncategorem atic expressions. As I re m a rk e d in the last lectu re (p. 109) such expressio n s co n stitu te, even fo r H u sserl, a class o f ex pressions w hich have m ean in g b u t do n o t stan d fo r an object. T h is co nception can be in te g ra te d with th e o b ject-o rien ­ ta ted co n cep tio n , with which p rim a facie it seem s in co m p atib le (In v es­ tigation V §§4 ff.), by m eans o f th e th e o ry o f categorial synthesis. A ccording to H usserl, syncategorem atic expressions a re com binationw ords; they have no ‘in d e p e n d e n t’ m eaning. O nly exp ressio n s w hich stand fo r an object (categorem atic expressions) have an ‘in d e p e n d e n t’ m ean in g . N ow categ o rem atic ex pressions can only be co m b in ed w ith o th e r categ o rem atic ex pressions to form a com plex ex p ressio n w ith a new u n ita ry m e an in g if this com bination is m ed iated by one o r m o re sy n categ o rem atic expressions. T h is sem antic-syntactic con cep tio n c o r­ resp o n d s directly to th e o n to lo g ic a l-tra n sc e n d e n ta l co n cep tio n o f cate­ gorial synthesis. T h e synthesis o f a categorial act is ex p re ssed in th e n o n -in d e p e n d e n t m ean in g s o f th e syncategorem atic te rm s (e.g. ‘a n d ’, th e p red icativ e ‘is’, ‘= ’). T h ey a re objectually in te rp re te d by these acts n o t in th e sense th a t th ey them selves stand fo r objects, b u t ra th e r in th e sense th a t they re p re s e n t the fo rm o f unity in which th e synthetic object is c o n stitu ted on th e basis o f th e fo u n d in g objects. Since it is again an act w hich con fers m e a n in g on th e syncategorem atic ex p ressio n , an d since th e to ta l-m ea n in g o f this synthetic act is again an object, th e o b je ct-o rien tate d ap p ro a c h can be u p h e ld in im pressive fashion even fo r th e u n d e rs ta n d in g o f these expressions. B u t in th e e n d we have to ask w h e th e r th e theo ry o f categorial acts is really cap ab le o f m a k in g th e consciousness o f states o f affairs, o r the u n d e rs ta n d in g o f th e m e an in g o f com posite expressions, intelligible. In p a rtic u la r, how do th in g s sta n d as re g a rd s th e m e an in g o f th e p re d ic a ­ tive sentence? I have d elib erately p rese n ted H u sse rl’s th eo ry o f nonreal com position as abstractly as H u sserl h im self p rese n ts it, because th e su b su m p tio n u n d e r this th e o ry o f th e predicativ e sen ten ce gives rise to an ad d itio n a l difficulty. I f we tak e a sim ple p red icativ e sentence, e.g. ‘H e id e lb e rg C astle is r e d ’, th e n if th e th eo ry o f categ o rial synthesis is to be a p p lie d we m u st assum e th a t n o t only th e sin g u lar te rm ‘H e id e l­ b e rg C astle’ b u t also th e p red ic ate -ex p ressio n ‘r e d ’ stands fo r an object; fo r if we d o n o t have at least tw o objects th e n we ca n n o t speak o f a co m position, a synthesis. We th u s com e up again st th e second o f my fo u r q u estions, viz. th a t co n c ern in g th e m e a n in g o f th e predicate. A n objectifying co n cep tio n o f p red icates o f th e kind o n e could have in fe rre d fro m th e g e n e ra l s tru c tu re o f the th e o ry o f categorial acts is in fact to be fo u n d in H u sserl. T h e analysis o f th e p red icativ e sentence-

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fo rm in Investigation VI §48 is ca rrie d out to g e th e r with an analysis o f sentences in w hich it is said o f som eth in g th at it contains so m e th in g else as a p art. As a un itary schem a fo r both predicative sen ten ces and w h o le -p a rt sentences H usserl suggests: A is (has) a A is a ’ is th e fo r­ m alization o f a predicative sentence w ith a copula such as: ‘T h e castle is re d .’ H usserl attaches g re a t im p o rta n ce to se p aratin g the co p u la, as a sy n categorem atic com bination-w ord which is sup p o sed to re p re se n t (repräsentieren) th e synthesis, from th e predicate. A has a , o n th e o th e r h a n d , is a (not very happy) attem p t to form alize a w h o le -p a rt sentence, e.g. ‘T h e castle has the b an q u e t-h all.’ T h e converse fo rm w hich H usserl gives both fo r A is a’ an d fo r A has a , viz. ‘a is in A ’ (e.g. ‘T h e b an q u ethall is in the castle’) is clearer. If we also apply this converse fo rm to th e predicative sen ten ce we get: ‘(the) red n e ss is in th e castle’. O bviously we can now convert this fo rm itself into th e converse fo rm ‘T h e castle has re d n e ss’, w hich, in co n tra st to ‘T h e castle is re d ’, H u sserl re g a rd s as th e fo rm o f expression in w hich the synthetic s tru c tu re becom es explicit. W e also find this assim ilation o f th e su b je ct-p red ic ate sen ten ce to th e w h o le -p a rt sen ten ce elsew here in H usserl. In Investigation I II , which is h e a d e d ‘O n th e theory o f wholes an d p a rts’, h e says th a t p red icates sta n d fo r ‘n o n -in d e p e n d e n t p a rts’. ‘W e in te rp re t th e con cep t part in th e widest sense w hich allows o n e to call an y th in g a “p a r t” th a t can be d istin ­ g u ish ed “in ” an object or, speaking objectively, th a t is “p re s e n t” in it . . . T h u s every non-relative “rea l” p red ic ate points to a p a r t o f th e object o f th e subject-term . T h u s e.g. “r e d ” an d “r o u n d ” . . .’ (§2) O n e m ight question w h eth e r th e w h o le -p a rt relatio n is th e m ost su it­ able relation to which to assim ilate th e su b je ct-p red ic ate stru ctu re . In ste a d o f ‘th e red n ess is in th e castle’ one could suggest ‘th e red n ess is o n th e castle’, a n d instead o f ‘th e castle has red n e ss’, ‘th e castle is com ­ b in e d with re d n e ss’. T h e real question, how ever, is n o t which relatio n is to be p re fe rre d b u t whether a predicative sentence can be in te rp re te d as a relatio n al sta te m en t at all. T h a t it m u st be thus in te rp re te d how ever follows necessarily from th e idea th a t th e p red ic ate stands fo r so m e­ th in g ; an d this idea is itself inevitable if o ne starts fro m th e assu m p tio n th a t th e state o f affairs is co n stitu ted in a categorial synthesis. In d e e d th e idea th a t th e p red icate stands fo r som ething does n o t even d e p e n d o n th e peculiarities o f H u sse rl’s th e o ry o f categorial synthesis; ra th e r it rests on th e fu n d a m e n ta l p resu p p o sitio n , which we also fo u n d in th e Tractatus, th a t th e state o f affairs is som ething com posite; fo r this p r e ­ su p poses th a t it is com posed o f at least two constituents. So you see, th e specific way in w hich H usserl has answ ered th e fo u rth q u estio n (the m e an in g of th e w hole sentence is th e state o f affairs) p r e ­

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d eterm in e s a specific answ er to th e th ird question, how the m e an in g of th e w hole senten ce arises o u t o f th e m e an in g of th e co m p o n en t-ex p ressions (nam ely, as a resu lt o f com position, o r m ore precisely: as a resu lt o f categorial synthesis). A nd this answ er to th e th ird question in tu rn p resu p p o se s a specific answ er to th e second question, th a t co n c ern in g th e m ean in g o f th e pred icate, nam ely, th a t the m e an in g o f th e p re d i­ cate (e.g. ‘r e d ’) is th e object fo r w hich its nom inalized m odification (‘re d n e ss’) stands. It is to be noted th a t every step in this th o u g h tseq uence (if o n e d isreg ard s th e peculiarities o f th e th eo ry o f categorial synthesis) is a necessary consequence o f th e o bject-o rien tated ap p ro a ch as such an d n o t som eth in g p eculiar to H u sse rl’s philosophy. In H usserl th e in te rp re ta tio n o f predicates as objects does n o t only arise in this way as a necessary consequence from th e system atic con­ text, b u t also sim ply from th e conception o f a p red ic ate as a ca te g o re­ m atic expression, or, m o re fu n d am en tally , because an altern ativ e con­ cep tio n o f m e an in g which d id no t re q u ire to be p ro p p e d u p by objects was sim ply n o t available w ithin the fra m ew o rk o f th e o b ject-o rien tated ap p ro a ch . It is tr u e that in Investigation I. §12, with w hich I began, H u sserl also claim ed th a t th e distinction betw een object a n d m ean in g w hich h ad been show n to obtain in re g a rd to nam es m ust also be m ade with re g a rd to predicates; in d e ed he even assum ed th e re th a t a p re d i­ cate does not d esig n ate an object at all an d that, th e re fo re , o n e can n o t speak o f th e object o f a p re d ic a te b u t sim ply of a ‘relatio n to objects’, th ese being th e objects to w hich a p red ic ate can be applied. T h u s he can explain th e distinction betw een object and m e an in g as ap p lied to p red icates in a way fam iliar to us fro m m o d e rn sem antics: two p re d i­ cates - e.g. ‘an equ ilateral tria n g le’ an d ‘an eq u ia n g u la r tria n g le ’- can h ave ‘th e sam e relatio n to objects, th e sam e ra n g e o f possible applica­ tio n ’ an d yet n o t have th e sam e m eaning. B ut if we ask how this m ean ­ ing w hich is d istinct fro m th e relation to objects is itself to be u n d e r ­ sto od th e answ er is exactly analogous to th a t in th e case o f th e m ean in g o f th e w hole sentence: (a) in speaking o f ‘red n e ss’ o n e is sp eak in g objectually o f the m e an in g o f th e p red ic ate ‘r e d ’ (b) in th e absence o f any o th e r conception o f m e an in g th e objectual consciousness (of redness) is p ro jected back in to th e o rig in al m eaning-consciousness o f th e p red icate ‘r e d ’. A lthough in u n d e rsta n d in g th e p red ic ate o f a sentence th e act of consciousness is n o t objectually d irected to th e m ean in g o f th e p re d i­ cate, b u t only to th e object o f th e subject-term o f th e sen ten ce, th e m e an in g o f th e p red ic ate is n o netheless an object, nam ely, th e c o rre ­ sp o n d in g attrib u te. T h u s th e objectual conception o f predicates ca n n o t be sh ak en by sim ­

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ply p o in tin g to th e fact th a t H u sse rl h im self defin ed an ‘o b ject’ as th e subject o f possible p red ic atio n s (cf. p. 418 n. 4). T h is d efin itio n do es n o t c o n tra d ic t th e idea th a t p red ic ate s too sta n d fo r objects. F o r every p r e d ­ icate can be nom in alized an d o n e ca n th e n say: ju s t as, th o u g h th e state o f affairs that p is n o t the o b ject-about-w hich o f the sen ten ce ‘p ’ th e sen ten ce neverth eless stan d s fo r this state o f affairs, so, in th e sam e way, a lth o u g h in using the p red ic ate ‘r e d ’ o n e is n o t d ire c te d to the a ttrib u te o f red n e ss as an object, n ev erth eless th e p re d ic a te stan d s fo r this object, an d this object is its m ean in g . A re we b e tte r e q u ip p e d in th e case o f p red ic ate s th a n we w ere in th e case o f assertoric sentences to show th a t this p ro c e d u re o f H u sse rl’s involves a hysteron-proteron? I believe we are . F or in th e m e an tim e we have in c o rp o ra te d in to o u r en q u iry th e q u e stio n o f th e c o n stru c tio n o f th e w hole ex p ressio n fro m th e m e an in g s o f th e co m p o n en t-ex p re ssions; a n d it is in rela tio n to this p ro b lem , th e p ro b lem u p o n w hich ev ery th in g else h in g e s, th a t we can show th a t th e o b je ct-o rien tated ap p ro a ch fo u n d e rs. T h e o b je ct-o rien tate d a p p ro a c h re q u ire d th a t th e way in w hich th e m e an in g o f th e w hole ex p re ssio n arises o u t o f th e m ean in g s o f its co m ­ p o n e n t expressions be in te rp re te d as composition. T h a t this co n cep tio n is u n te n a b le if com position is th o u g h t o f in th e usual sense as real co m ­ position we saw by re fe re n c e to W ittg e n ste in ’s Tractatus. T h e p u rp o se o f th e th e o ry o f categorial synthesis was to o vercom e this difficulty. Was it successful? Yes, to th e e x te n t th a t th e co m po sitio n o f th e state o f affairs ca n n o t be in te rp re te d as-real com position. B u t this only tells us how th e com position may not be in te rp re te d . W hat is still lacking is a positive ch aracteriza tio n o f this com position. In th e case o f real com ­ position we have d efin ite c riteria fo r d e c id in g w h e th e r o r n o t an object A is co m b in ed with an object B (e.g. th e sh a ft a n d h e a d o f th e h am m er); an d this is equally so in th e case o f a real p a rt-w h o le rela tio n sh ip . Now if th e talk o f com position is n o t to be com pletely em p ty we m u st also have a criterio n fo r d ec id in g w h e th e r o r n o t an ideal com position obtains. We ca n n o t establish, e.g., w h e th e r red n e ss is in th e castle o r co m bined with th e castle in th e way th a t we can establish th a t th e d ra w e r is in th e table o r is co m b in ed with it. R edn ess fo r its p a r t is n ot a real object, b u t an a ttrib u te a n d this c a n n o t be a tta c h e d in a real way to th e castle o r o ccu r in it as a real, se p a ra te p a rt. In d e e d this was stressed by H usserl him self. B ut th e n w hat sort o f positive criteria do we have? It seem s to m e we only h av e one: th a t red n e ss is in (o r on) th e castle is th e case if an d only if th e castle is re d . In o th e r w ords, if we a re asked

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which relatio n we m e an w hen we speak o f th e relatio n betw een th e a ttrib u te a n d th e object we can only reply: th a t relatio n which o btains w hen th e c o rre sp o n d in g p re d ic a te applies to th e object. I f this is c o rrec t - an d so lo n g as no a ltern ativ e way o f u n d e rs ta n d in g this rela tio n is o ffe re d we m u st accep t it - th e n th e hysteron-proteron o f th e o b ject-o rien ­ tated co n c ep tio n o f p red ic ate s is established. W hat a sen ten ce such as ‘R edness is in th e castle’ o r ‘R ed n ess is com bined with th e castle’ m eans can only be ex p la in e d by re c o u rse to the sentence ‘T h e castle is r e d ’ an d n o t th e o th e r way ro u n d . It is im m aterial w hich p rep o sitio n we use in th e objectual r e n d e rin g - w h e th e r we say th e red n ess is in o r o n o r u p o n th e castle o r co m b in ed w ith it; fo r w hat we m ean by all such aw k­ w ard fo rm u la tio n s (aw kw ard because they are p arasitic on d iffe re n t real relations) can be m a d e precise (and can only be m a d e precise) by re fe re n c e to th e stra ig h tfo rw a rd pred icativ e senten ce in which n o re la ­ tion is ex p re ssed . We a re th u s at th e tu rn in g p o in t o f th e w hole discussion. For if it is tru e th a t we can only d efin e th e rela tio n betw een a ttrib u te an d object by m eans o f th e o rig in a l p red ic ativ e sen ten ce th e n we can n o t seek to ex p lain th e u n d e rs ta n d in g o f th e predicative sen ten ce itself by m eans o f th a t rela tio n . B u t th e n this m ean s th a t we re q u ire a com pletely new ex p lan a tio n o f th e u n d e rs ta n d in g o f a pred icate, an ex p lan a tio n w hich does n o t have re c o u rse to th e n o m inalized fo rm o f th e p red ic ate an d w hich d oes n o t take th e fo rm o f saying th a t th e p red ic ate stands fo r so m eth in g . F or any such e x p la n a tio n w ould again have to speak o f a co m b in atio n o f th e object o f th e subject-term with th e object (or m e a n ­ ing) o f th e p red ic ate , a n d w hen asked fo r th e criterio n o f th e ex istence o f this co m b in atio n w ould ag a in have to have rec o u rse to an u n d e r ­ sta n d in g o f th e p red ic ativ e se n te n c e which o n e alread y possesses. W e m u st th e re fo re com pletely a b a n d o n the o b je ct-o rien tated ex p lan a to ry m odel o f a com po sitio n o r synthesis. T his m odel w hich consisted in th e assim ilation o f a logical stru c tu re to a real relatio n (an d com p o sitio n unless specially d efin ed is a real re la ­ tion) o ffers only tw o altern ativ es: either o ne does n o t d istinguish th e co m position o f a state o f affairs fro m th a t o f a real th in g a t all (Tracta­ tus), or o n e does d istin g u ish th e m b u t is th e n unab le positively to c h a r­ acterize th e m (H usserl). I f we now look back at th e th e o ry o f categ o rial synthesis it becom es clear th a t w hat gave it plausibility was m erely th e negative a d v a n ta g e o f avoiding th e absu rd ities o f a real com position. T h e vagueness o f th e co n c ep t o f ideal com position by w hich this a d v a n ta g e is p u rc h a se d is n o t rem o v e d by p ro p p in g it u p with categorial acts, fo r such acts can them selves n o t be directly exhibited . O u r only evid en ce

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th a t a categorial act o f a p articu la r type is involved is th e fact th a t an ex p ression o f a p articu la r sem antic fo rm is bein g used. So far o f cou rse I have only d e m o n stra te d th e failu re o f th e theory o f categorial synthesis in re g a rd to one-place predicative sentences. T h e in adequacy o f th e th e o ry is particularly obvious in th e ir case because such a sentence has only o n e object-about-w hich an d it was necessary th e re fo re first to tra n sfo rm them b efo re one could speak o f a synthesis o f tw o objects at all. O n e m ight th in k th at th e th eo ry can at least be su stained in th e case o f relational statem ents, th u s in th e case o f manyplace predicative sentences. W hen I first in tro d u c e d th e th eo ry in a g en e ral way 1 also gave relational sentences as exam ples. H ow ever let us now look at th e m a tte r m ore closely. L et us take th e exam ple 1 have alread y used, th e sentence ‘T h is h am ­ m e r is com posed o f sh a ft a n d h e a d .’ In my discussion o f this exam ple I p o in ted o u t th a t the com position o f this state of affairs can be th o u g h t o f in two d iffe re n t ways. T h e one th a t seem s to m e to be logically co r­ rect is as follows: in th e state o f affairs th e relatio n o f real com position is ideally com bined with, on the o n e h an d , th e h a m m e r a n d , on th e o th e r h an d , with th e object-pair sh a ft an d h ea d . In this co n cep tio n a relational sta te m en t is tre a te d as a m any-place pred icativ e statem en t. T h e relation (in this case th e real com position) is th e object fo r which th e nom inalization o f th e m any-place p red ic ate (‘com posed o f ’) stands a n d thus co rresp o n d s to th e a ttrib u te in th e case o f a o n e-p lace p re d i­ cative sentence. T h e ideal com bination of th e relatio n with th e real objects (the h a m m e r on th e one h a n d , th e object-p air sh a ft an d h ead o n th e o th e r h an d ) thus co rresp o n d s exactly to th e co m b in atio n o f th e a ttrib u te with th e one real object in th e case o f a o n e-place p redicative sentence. B u t th e n this conception is o p en to precisely th e sam e objec­ tion as the previous one: asked to give a criterio n fo r th e p resen ce o f this ideal com position o ne can only reply th a t it obtains betw een th e real com position and th e objects if th e original sentence is tru e , in o u r ex am ple: if th e h a m m e r is com posed o f sh aft an d head. As I have alread y p o in te d out, H u sserl p re fe rre d a n o th e r co n cep ­ tion, according to which in a relational sta te m en t it is only th e real objects which are synthesized in th e categorial act; th e real relatio n on th e o th e r h a n d is so to speak in c o rp o ra te d into th e categorial synthesis. T h u s th e categorial act will be a d iffe re n t one d e p e n d in g o n th e type o f rela tio n co n c ern ed . T h is view seem s to m e to be u n te n ab le . T h e r e is no rea so n to re g a rd any relatio n betw een two real objects as n o t a real relation. H usserl how ever th o u g h t th a t to the d iffe re n t real relations th e re co rre sp o n d d iffe re n t ideal relations. C onsistently ap p lie d this

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idea w ould re su lt in a d u p licatio n o f all types o f relatio n . ‘In th e fo r­ m ation o f ex te rn a l relations a sensuous fo rm m ay serve as th e fo u n d a ­ tion fo r th e constitution o f a c o rre sp o n d in g [!] categorial form ; as w hen we a p p re h e n d , a n d p e rh a p s express, th e sensible ad jo in in g o f con ten ts A a n d B given in th e p e rc e p tio n o f a co m p re h en siv e w hole G in the synthetic form s “A adjoins B ” o r “B adjoins v4” W ith th e co n stitu tio n o f th e la tte r form s, how ever, th e re arise new objects b elo n g in g to th e class “states o f affairs” ’ (Investigation VI § 48). F rom th e fact th a t th e state o f affairs th a t A adjoins B is an ideal object H u sserl m istakenly infers th a t th e relation o f ad jo in in g ex p ressed in th e two sentences is itself an ideal relation. T h e only ideal relation involved is th e relatio n betw een th e real relation o f ad jo in in g an d th e object pair {A, B }; we w ould thus be back with my original conception w hich leads to th e sam e difficulty as aro se in th e case o f o ne-place p redicative sentences. L ater on I will ex am in e a n o th e r aspect o f H u sse rl’s th eo ry o f cate­ gorial synthesis which co ncerns th e m e a n in g o f th e w ords ‘a n d ’ a n d ‘o r ’. B u t o u r first task m u st be to w ork o u t a new con cep tio n o f p red icates which does n o t tre a t th em as sta n d in g fo r objects.

LECTURE

11

Predicates: the first step in the development of an analytical conception of the m eaning of sentences. T h e dispute between nominalists and conceptualists

T h e o b je c t-o rie n ta te d con cep tio n o f th e m e a n in g o f p red icativ e se n ­ tences f o u n d e r e d on th e questio n o f how th e m e a n in g o f th e w hole se n ten c e results fro m th e m ean in g s o f th e sen ten c e-co m p o n en ts. T h e only an sw er th e o b je ct-o rien tate d position co u ld give was: th e m e a n in g o f th e w hole se n ten c e is co m p o sed o f th a t fo r w hich th e sin g u lar te rm sta n d s a n d th a t fo r w hich the p red ic ate stan d s. T h is an sw e r led to th e dilem m a: e ith e r th e com position m u st be c o n s tru e d as th e real c o m p o ­ sition o f a co m p lex object o r o n e c a n n o t say w hat is to be u n d e rsto o d by com po sitio n h e re w ith o u t p re su p p o sin g precisely th a t u n d e r s ta n d ­ in g o f th e se n ten ce w hich was to be ex p lain e d . T h is re su lt is n o t p u re ly negative, inasm uch as it p rescrib es a specific d irec tio n o f e n q u iry fo r a new , n o lo n g e r o b je c t-o rie n ta te d a tte m p t at an ex p la n a tio n . Firstly, u n d e rs ta n d in g o f th e p re d ic a te has e m e rg e d as th e - fro m an o b je ct-o rien tate d p o in t o f view - critical e le m e n t in th e u n d e rs ta n d in g o f a p red icativ e sentence. W e will th u s first h ave to try to achieve a new a n d no lo n g e r o b je ct-o rien tate d c o n c ep tio n o f th e u n d e rs ta n d in g o f a p red icate. S econdly, it has a t th e sam e tim e b eco m e clear th a t th e p ro b lem o f th e u n d e rs ta n d in g o f a p re d ic a te - th e seco n d o f my f o u r qu estio n s (see p. 103) - is directly c o n n e c te d w ith o u r th ird q u estio n , viz. how we u n d e rs ta n d th e co m b in atio n o f th e sin g u lar te rm with th e p red ic ate . It w ould th e re fo re seem plausible th a t th ese two q u estio n s sh o u ld now be co m bined. T h is gives a c o n c re te clue to th e en q u iry in to th e u n d e rs ta n d in g o f a p red ic ate . W ere we sim ply to f o r ­ m u late th e questio n c o n c ern in g th e u n d e rs ta n d in g o f th e p re d ic a te th u s: w h at is it to u n d e rs ta n d a p re d ic a te if this u n d e rs ta n d in g c a n n o t consist in th e consciousness o f an object? we w ould h av e n o positive clue as to how we sh o u ld p ro ce ed . If, on th e o th e r h a n d , we co m b in e th e second q u estio n with th e th ird a n d h o ld fast to th e id ea th a t at any ra te th e sin g u lar te rm sta n d s fo r an object, we can ask: if th e su p p le m e n ta ­

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tion o f th e sin g u la r te rm by a p red ic ate does n o t have th e fu n ctio n o f co m b in in g th e object o f th e sin g u lar te rm with a n o th e r object (th at o f th e p red icate) how th e n is it to be u n d e rsto o d ? C learly we ca n n o t now look fo r so m e th in g o th e r th a n an object with w hich th e object o f the sin g u la r te rm w ould be co m b in ed , fo r w hatever is com b in ed with som e­ th in g is so m e th in g an d , h en c e, an object. W hat we have to a b a n d o n is precisely this id e a o f a co m b in atio n o r synthesis. So we have to ask: if th e su p p le m e n ta tio n o f a sin g u lar te rm by a p re d ic a te does n o t have th e fu n c tio n o f com b in in g th e object fo r w hich th e sin g u lar te rm stands with so m e th in g else th en w hat is its function? W e can h e re link o u r discussion to a co n cep t which was already p re s e n t in th e tra d itio n a l th e o ry o f th e p red ic ate . T h e only aspect o f th e tra d itio n a l th e o ry I have so far co n sid ered is th e id ea th a t th e p r e d ­ icate sta n d s fo r an object. I have n o t g o n e into th e q u estio n o f w hat th at o bject was conceived to be. It is only in passing th a t I have called these objects d e sig n a te d by nom in alized p red ic ate s ‘a ttrib u te s’: we find in th e tra d itio n , in a d d itio n to ‘a ttrib u te ’, a series o f o th e r d esig n atio n s such as ‘sp ecies’, ‘u n iv e rsa ls’, ‘co n c ep ts’, ‘p ro p e rtie s ’. T h e d esig n atio n ‘universals’ expresses th e idea o f ‘g en e ral objects’ w hich can b elo n g to any n u m b e r o f in d iv id u al objects. It is this ‘b elo n g in g ’ w hich is ex p ressed in th e d esig n atio n ‘a ttrib u te ’. ‘S pecies’, th e desig n atio n p re fe rre d by H u s­ serl, is th e L atin tra n sla tio n o f th e G reek eidos (‘loo k ’, ‘a p p e a ra n c e ’); this w o rd c o n trib u te s little to th e ch aracteriza tio n o f th e objects in questio n e x c ep t p e rh a p s this: th a t they a re objects o f an intellectual in tu itio n . T h e w ord ‘c o n c e p t’ occupies a special position, fo r one hesitates to r e g a rd concepts as objects. So already in trad itio n al p h ilo so p h y th e re seem s to exist, in th e id e a th a t p red icates sta n d fo r co ncepts, an a p p ro a c h w hich leads aw ay fro m th e o b je ct-o rien tate d co n cep tio n ; th e te rm ‘c o n c e p t’ sh o u ld th e re fo r e be specially in v e stig a ted .1 Finally, th e d esig n atio n o f universals as ‘p ro p e rtie s ’ can be u n d e rsto o d as a fu rth e r specification o f th e ir d e sig n atio n as attrib u tes: it is ch aracteristic o f u n i­ versals th a t w h en they a re ascribed (‘a ttrib u te d ’) to a real object it a p p e a rs as c h a racterize d by th ese attrib u tes; th e a ttrib u te is its ‘q uality’ o r ‘p r o p e r ty ’. H ow ever, this d esig n atio n is insufficiently c o m p re h e n ­ sive. A n a ttrib u te such as redness is a p ro p e rty o f th e castle b u t we w ould n o t call th e a ttrib u te o f b ein g a castle a quality o f this b u ilding. ‘T h is is a castle’ answ ers th e q u estio n ‘W hat is this?’ w hereas o n e only calls q u al­ ities th o se characteristics o f objects w hich r e p re s e n t answ ers to th e q u estio n : ‘H ow is this q u alified ?’ W hat is m e an t th e n by calling u n iv e r­ sals ‘p ro p e rtie s ’ is sim ply th a t th e object is som ehow ch a racterize d by

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th em , in w hatever resp e ct this m ay be. F o r this reaso n it w ould seem b e tte r to call an a ttrib u te a ‘ch a racteristic’ r a th e r th a n a ‘p ro p e rty ’. I f th e object fo r w hich a p re d ic a te stands is conceived as a c h a ra c te r­ istic th e n th e o b ject-o rien tated con cep tio n com es closest to th e p re se n ­ tatio n o f th e pro b lem I have ju s t elaborated. F or as a ch aracteristic th a t fo r w hich th e p re d ic a te stands is viewed in its relation to th e object o f th e sin g u lar term . I h a d asked: w hat fu n ctio n has th e su p p le m e n ta tio n o f th e sin g u lar te rm by a pred icate? U sing th e concept o f a c h a ra c te r­ istic it is possible to give an answ er to this q uestion th a t still co n fo rm s to th e object-o rien tated ap p ro a ch . Such an an sw er w ould be: th e s u p p le ­ m e n tatio n o f th e sin g u lar te rm by th e p red ic ate has th e fu n ctio n o f ch aracterizin g the object o f th e sin g u lar te rm an d it does this by co m ­ bin in g this object with a characteristic. Now we w ere su p p o se d to d ro p th e idea o f a com bination with som ething. It was fo r this reaso n th a t I fo rm u la te d th e q u estio n thus: if th e su p p le m e n tatio n o f th e sin g u lar te rm by a p red ic ate does not have th e fun ctio n o f co m b in in g th e object o f th e sin g u lar te rm w ith so m e th in g th en w hat fu n ctio n does it have? W e can d eriv e an answ er to this q u estio n directly fro m th e o b ject-o rien ­ tated ac co u n t ju s t given by d r o p p in g the specifically o b je ct-o rien tate d ad d itio n . In ste a d o f saying: th e su p p le m e n ta tio n o f th e sin g u lar te rm by a p re d ic a te has th e fu n ctio n o f co m bining th e object w ith so m eth in g a n d th e re b y ch aracterizin g it we can say: th e su p p le m e n tatio n by th e p re d ic a te does not have th e fu n ctio n o f co m binin g th e object o f th e sin g u lar te rm with som eth in g , but instead th a t o f ch aracterizin g it. W ith this we e n c o u n te r a new a n d no lo n g e r ob ject-o rien tated thesis ab o u t w hat it is to u n d e rs ta n d a pred icate. A ccording to this new c o n ­ cep tion th e fu n ctio n o f th e p re d ic a te is n o t to stand fo r so m eth in g , b u t r a th e r to characterize so m e th in g (th e object o f th e sin g u lar term ) a n d h en c e to u n d e rs ta n d th e p red ic ate is to u n d e rsta n d its ch aracterizatio n fu n ction. A sen ten ce such as ‘T h e castle is r e d ’ is n o lo n g er to be ex p lain e d by saying th a t th e p re d ic a te stands fo r a ch aracteristic (re d ­ ness) w hich is synthesized with th e object, b u t ra th e r by saying th a t th e object - th e castle - is ch a racterize d in a specific m a n n e r by th e p r e d i­ cate ‘is r e d ’. I can see th a t you will raise a w hole series o f fu n d a m e n ta l objections an d q ueries. Firstly, you m ight ask, with w hat rig h t do I su d d en ly sta rt sp eak in g o f a fu n ctio n o f a linguistic expression. Secondly, you will w ant to know w hat precisely is m e a n t by a ‘ch a racteriza tio n -fu n ctio n ’. T h ird ly , you w ould be ju stified in asking how far my suggestion is an altern ativ e to th e o b je ct-o rien tate d acco u n t at all. T h a t th e object o f th e

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sin g u lar te rm is ch a racterized by th e p re d ic a te is, you will say, obvious a n d alm ost trivial. B u t d o esn ’t this sim ply say less th a n th e object-orienta ted conception? T h e la tte r also allows o n e to speak o f a c h a racteriza­ tion o f th e object o f th e sin g u lar te rm by th e p red ic ate , b u t in stead o f sim ply leaving it a t th a t it also provides an ex p lan a tio n o f how this c h a r­ acterization is achieved, viz. by th e com bination with a ch aracteristic fo r w hich th e p red ic ate stands. O nly if it becam e clear how th e new e x p la ­ n atio n com pen sates fo r this a p p a re n t lack could it really claim to be re g a rd e d as an altern ativ e to th e object-o rien tated ex p lan atio n . In this le ctu re I w ant to deal in tu rn with these th re e question-com plexes. So, firstly, with w h at rig h t d o I ask fo r th e fu n ctio n o f a linguistic expression? In so d o in g I seem to be sm u g g lin g in a new id ea w hich has n o t arisen fro m my critical in te rp re ta tio n o f th e o b je ct-o rien tate d a p p ro a c h . H ow ever, I w ould ask you to co n sid er th a t o u r task m u st now be th a t o f fin d in g an alternative, in th e specific case o f p red icates, to th e o b je ct-o rien tate d in te rp re ta tio n o f linguistic exp ressio n s. W e th u s find ourselves throw n back to th e sta rtin g -p o in t o f H u sse rl’s sem antics an d m u st so to speak take a n o th e r step b e h in d this startin g p o in t so th a t th e a ltern ativ e possibilities can reveal them selves. H u sse rl’s sta rtin g -p o in t was th e ‘c o n fe rrin g o f m e a n in g ’ by th e u se o f signs (above p. 107). W e saw how H usserl im m ediately in te rp re ts this ‘c o n fe rrin g o f m e a n in g ’ as an ‘act’ a n d thus as consciousness o f an object. I f we go b eh in d this first m ove o f H u sse rl we arriv e at th e m o re g en eral p e r ­ spective o f th e use o f signs. B ecause fro m th e o u tset H u sserl so co n ­ ceived th e use o f a sign th a t a sign can only be used to stan d fo r an object, th e u n d e rly in g con cep t o f th e use o f a sign could n ot as such becom e salient fo r him . Now this concept o f sig n -em p lo y m en t has, as a basic concept, th e a d v a n ta g e th a t it still encom passes th e o b ject-o rien ­ tated a p p ro a c h b u t a t th e sam e tim e o p en s u p altern ativ es to it. It p e r ­ mits th e view th a t all o r som e signs a re u se d to stan d fo r an object. O n th e o th e r h a n d , how ever, we can now ask: fo r w hat o th e r p u rp o ses a re signs used? A nd o n e possible answ er w ould be: to ch aracterize. Now th a t fo r w hich so m e th in g is used is w hat we call its fu n ctio n . N otice th a t in this new way o f looking at thin g s signs assum e an im p o rta n c e w hich th ey did n o t have in th e o b ject-o rien tated c o n c ep ­ tion. F o r th e la tte r th e sign is a m e re in te rm e d ia ry b etw een conscious­ ness a n d object. It has th e fu n ctio n o f m ak in g p re se n t to consciousness th e object fo r w hich it stands. B u t consciousness can also be conscious o f th e sam e object th a t is m ad e p re se n t to it by th e sign w ith o u t th e sign. T h u s th e w hole th e o ry o f categorial acts can be c a rrie d th ro u g h p u rely as a th e o ry o f th in k in g w ith o u t having to r e f e r to signs. T h e situ atio n is

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co m pletely d if fe r e n t as so o n as o n e co n sid ers o th e r fu n ctio n s o f signs. For exam ple, if th e fu n c tio n o f a sign consists in ch aracterizin g , th e n this fu n ctio n o f ch a ra c te riz in g is d e p e n d e n t o n a sign. H e re th e sign d oes n o t serve as a m e re in s tru m e n t fo r so m e th in g w hich co u ld also be ach ieved w ith o u t it. N ow if th e fu n c tio n o f a th in g is w h at th a t th in g is used fo r th e n th e n o tio n o f th e fu n ctio n o f a sign is closely co n n e cted with th a t o f th e employment o r use o f a sign. W h en we ask w hat th e fu n ctio n o f so m e th in g is we p re s u p p o s e th a t it belo n g s to a c o n te x t o f p u rp o siv e actio n . I f we e n q u ire as to th e fu n ctio n o f so m e th in g , e.g. a h a m m e r, we a re asking: fo r w hat p u r p o s e is it n o rm ally used ? A n d this q u estio n re fe rs to a p a rtic u la r h u m a n activity (e.g. th e k n o ck in g in o f nails). So th e q u e s­ tion: w hat is th e fu n c tio n o f a sign? is directly co n n e cted w ith th e q u e s­ tion: w hat is th e n o rm a l u se o f this sign? an d th e la tte r q u e stio n re fe rs to th e q uestion: w hat is th e action o f w hich this u se o f a sign is th e (or a possible) co n d itio n ? F o r ex am p le, if a p a rtic u la r class o f signs has th e fu n ctio n o f c h a ra c te riz in g so m e th in g this m e an s th a t th e se signs a re n o rm ally u se d to c h a ra c te riz e so m e th in g a n d th a t th e action w hich so m e o n e p e rfo rm s w h en h e uses a p re d ic a te is th a t o f ch a ra c te riz in g so m e th in g as th u s o r th u s. All o f this is clearly also tr u e in th e p a rtic u la r case w hich th e o b je c t-o rie n ta te d c o n c ep tio n re g a rd s as th e o nly case. A sign with th e fu n c tio n o f sta n d in g fo r so m e th in g is u sed to in d icate w hich object o n e m eans. A n d th e a n sw e r to th e q u estio n : w h at is a p e r ­ son d o in g w ho uses a sign in this way? is th a t h e is in d ic atin g w hich ob ject h e m eans. W h en I discussed H u s s e rl’s ta k in g th e ‘c o n fe rrin g o f m e a n in g ’ as his s ta rtin g -p o in t I p o in te d o u t th a t th e in te rp re ta tio n (Auffassung) o f a sign w hich co n fers m e a n in g o n it sh o u ld really be called ‘u n d e r s ta n d in g ’ fo r we h a d e a rlie r seen th a t to ask fo r th e m e a n in g o f a sign is to ask how th a t sign is to be u n d e rs to o d . W e saw th a t H u sse rl im m ed iately by­ p assed u n d e rs ta n d in g in fav o u r o f th e in te n tio n a l act. C o n sid eratio n o f an u n d e rs ta n d in g o f th e sign was fo r him as su p e rflu o u s as c o n sid e ra ­ tion o f th e u se o f th e sign, alth o u g h th e o b je c t-o rie n ta te d co n c ep tio n can equally well be b ased on u n d e rs ta n d in g as on use: to u n d e rs ta n d a sign is to know fo r w hich object it stands. N ow how is th e u n d e r s ta n d in g o f a sign c o n n e c te d w ith its use? C learly in this way: to u n d e rs ta n d a sign is to know w h at fu n c tio n it has o r how it is u sed . N ow if we know o f so m e th in g how it is u se d th e n this m ean s th a t we know its em p lo y m e n t-ru le s. If this is so th e n u n d e r s ta n d ­ in g th e fu n c tio n o f a sign m u st consist in k n o w in g th e ru les o f its em p lo y m e n t.

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It thus em erg es th a t by going back to th e fu nction o f linguistic ex p ressions we arrive at a new co m prehensive ex p lan a to ry perspective o f which th e follow ing concepts a re characteristic: fu n ctio n , use o f so m eth in g , ru le o f this use, ac tio n -ru le and an u n d e rsta n d in g th a t is an u n d e rs ta n d in g o f a rule. A fte r th e discussion o f pred icates we will have to a tte m p t to apply the sam e set o f concepts to sin g u lar term s. O n the basis o f the th u s re -fo rm u la te d questions ab o u t singular term s an d p red icates we will be able to re tu r n , with m o re pro sp ect o f success (th o u g h only a t the en d o f th e w hole lecture-series [L ecture 27]), to o u r th ird q uestion - viz. w hat is it to u n d e rs ta n d th e co m bination o f a sin­ g u la r te rm w ith a pred icate? F or we no longer feel com pelled to en q u ire in to a com bination o f w hat th e sin g u lar term stands fo r with w hat th e p re d ic a te stands for. R a th e r th e q uestion now acquires th e sense: how is th e em p lo y m e n t-ru le o f th e o n e so rt o f expressio n co n n ected with th e e m p lo y m e n t-ru le o f th e o th e r so rt o f expression? T h e aim o f th e w hole investigation is an answ er to th e question: w hat is it to u n d e r ­ sta n d a w hole predicative sentence? It should now be possible to p u t this question th u s: w hat is th e fu n ctio n o f such a sentence? o r w hat are we d o in g w hen we em ploy a p redicative sentence? H u sse rl’s answ er was: w hat we a re d o in g w h en we u se a predicativ e sentence is r e p r e ­ sen tin g , by m ean s o f it, a state of affairs. O f course on th e p re se n t basis it is to be ex p ected th a t we will arriv e at quite a d iffe re n t so rt o f answ er. B u t now let us re tu r n to p redicates. T h e second question 1 exp ected fro m you was: w hat does it m ean to speak o f ‘ch aracteriza tio n ’? As I th in k this is a basic d a tu m o f o u r u n d e rsta n d in g in so far as we u n d e r­ sta n d how to use p red icates, I ca n n o t d efine this w ord, m erely elucidate it. A p red ic ate fulfils its ch a racteriza tio n -fu n ctio n by acting as a crite­ rion. A criterio n (from th e G reek krinein, to separate) is so m eth in g w hich serves to d istinguish. In ap p ly in g a p red ic ate to som e objects b u t n o t to o th ers we classify all those objects to which we apply it an d at th e sam e tim e distinguish th e m fro m th o se to which we do n o t apply it. W h en we apply a p red ic ate to an object we declare it to be an object w hich is like th e o th e r objects to w hich we app ly th e p red ic ate an d u n lik e those to w hich we d o n o t apply it; and th a t m eans: we c h a ra c te r­ ize it as such an object. T h e ch aracteriza tio n -fu n ctio n consists in this classifying-and-distinguishing. T h e th ird q u estio n I ex p e cted fro m you can be directly linked to this elu cidation. F or you could now a rg u e against m e as follows. I f ch arac­ te rizin g is a fo rm o f classifying th en fo r precisely this reason th e objects ch a racterize d by a p re d ic a te m ust h av e som ething in com m on. A nd do we n o t th en h av e to say th a t it is really this com m o n so m eth in g th a t

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characterizes th e object and are we not th u s led back to th e objectual characteristic? T h e p redicate, you will say, can n o t itself fu n ctio n as a criterion, fo r the application o f th e p red ic ate to ju s t th ese objects an d n o t o th ers requires a fo u n d atio n in the objects, o r ‘m a rk o f d istin ctio n ’; a n d in d e ed th e characteristic was also so called in trad itio n al philosophy. S hould this a rg u m e n t prove com pelling, th e n the o b ject-o rien tated co nception w ould be resto red . I t w ould th e n have been show n th a t the fu n ctional conception does not o ffe r a g en u in e alternative, fo r it is itself obliged to have reco u rse to th e object-o rien tated co nception: th e p r e d ­ icate only characterizes th e object by sta n d in g fo r a characteristic which itself characterizes th e object in a prim ary sense. It is only now th a t th e real w eight o f th e object-o rien tated conception shows itself. It does n o t sim ply arise from th e philosophical p reju d ice th a t every linguistic expression stands fo r som ething; ra th e r it seem s to be th e only in telli­ gible epistem ological explan atio n o f th e use o f predicates. Vis-ä-vis my earlier re fe re n c e to th e priority o f th e predicative fo rm (‘r e d ’) over its nom inalized m odification (‘re d n e ss’), th e object-orien tated p h ilo so p h er could now a rg u e th a t this priority tu rn s o u t to be a m erely g ram m atical one; epistem ologically th e u n d e rsta n d in g o f th e p red ic ate is fo u n d e d in the re p re se n ta tio n o f the c o rre sp o n d in g characteristic. My accusa­ tion of a hysteron-proteron w ould th u s re b o u n d against m y own e x p la n a ­ tion. So if this fu nctional ex p lan atio n is to re p re se n t a g e n u in e altern ativ e to the object-o rien tated one th e n its real co n ten t m ust be d e e p e r th a n an y th in g suggested by my account so far; a n d it m ust be in term s o f this d e e p e r c o n te n t th a t th e fu nctional ex p lan atio n is able to answ er th e ob ject-orientated counter-criticism ju s t p re se n te d . F ro m th e p o in t o f view o f m e th o d it w ould seem reasonable to start th e p rese n tatio n o f th e new ap p ro a ch by arg u in g with this criticism , fo r such a c o n fro n ta ­ tion should disclose th e real substance o f th e fu nctio n al ex p lan atio n . I will co n d u ct this c o n fro n tatio n in th e fo rm o f a dialo g u e betw een th e two positions. Such a dialogue sh o u ld b rin g us step by step to th e rea l kernel o f th e problem . T h e functional ex p lan atio n fits into th e so-called n o m in alist trad itio n acco rd in g to which th e re are no gen eral essences fo r w hich p red icates stand; an d th e only objects given to us in u n d e rsta n d in g these signs a re th e signs them selves, th e nomina. T h e co n tra ry position has som etim es been called realism , som etim es conceptualism ; the fo rm e r w hen th e th e o ry has been u n d e rsto o d in a m o re ontological sense (p red icates stand fo r real objects), th e latter w hen it has b een u n d e rsto o d in a m o re

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psychological o r epistem ological sense. T h e traditional ontological cri­ tiq u e o f realism by nom inalism is n o t th e o n e I p re se n te d in my last lecture, w hich c o n c e rn e d the p ro b le m o f how th e object o f the p r e d i­ cate is co n n e cted w ith th a t o f th e subject; r a th e r it re la te d to th e o th e r p ro blem o f how o n e a n d th e sam e g en e ral object can sim u ltan eo u sly be in m any co n crete objects. T h e d e b a te into w hich we m u st e n te r (in view o f th e counter-criticism ju s t raised), on th e o th e r h an d , is n o t p rim arily an ontological d eb a te b u t a psychological-epistem ological one. A ccording to th e con cep tu alist thesis o n e can only u n d e rsta n d th e ch aracteriza tio n -fu n ctio n o f a p re d ic a te if th e em p lo y m e n t o f th e p r e d ­ icate is co n n e cted w ith th e re p re se n ta tio n o f so m eth in g fo r w hich th e p red icate stands. F or if this w ere n o t so th e p red ic ate w ould h ave no objective fo u n d a tio n ; it w ould be arb itrary . L et us first allow th e nom inalist to m o u n t his co u n ter-attack . H e will d en y th a t we in fact always r e p re s e n t so m e th in g w hen we significantly em ploy a p red icate. T a k e , e.g., th e sentence ‘H eid e lb e rg Castle is r e d .’ I f we m ake this sta te m e n t in th e p e rc e p tu a l situatio n , th u s in a situ atio n in w hich we perceive th e castle a n d perceive th a t it is re d , th e n clearly we do so on th e basis o f a p articu la r co lo u r-rep rese n tatio n . B u t su p p o se we u tte r such a sen ten ce h e re in th e lectu re-ro o m , fo r ex am p le, w h ere we ca n n o t see th e castle; we can have a c o rre sp o n d in g c o lo u r-re p re s e n ­ tation in o u r im ag in atio n , b u t clearly we can also u n d e rs ta n d th e sen ­ tence w ith o u t h aving any such re p re se n ta tio n co rre sp o n d in g to th e w ord ‘r e d ’. T his first attack by th e nom inalist can easily be b e a te n o ff by his o p p o n e n t. It tu rn s o u t to be a m is u n d e rsta n d in g , fo r it th o u g h t o f th e re p re se n ta tio n o f so m e th in g fo r which th e p red ic ate is su p p o se d to stan d as a sensuous re p re se n ta tio n . T h a t we can use a p red ic ate with u n d e rs ta n d in g w ith o u t having sensuous im ages is so m e th in g th e c o n ­ ceptualist will im m ediately concede. H u sserl h im self show ed this in im pressive fashion, in C h a p te r 2 o f Investigation I. B u t it is n o t a q u es­ tion o f sensuous re p re se n ta tio n s, th e conceptualist will say; th e c h a ra c ­ teristic o f red n e ss is so m e th in g w hich is co m m o n to m an y things, it is red ness in general. So this was a m is u n d e rsta n d in g . H ow ever, it was n o t an u n p ro d u c tiv e m isu n d ersta n d in g . F o r it is now clear th a t th e only k in d o f re p re s e n ta ­ tions in question a re non-sen su o u s re p re se n ta tio n s. Previously th e n om inalist h a d asserte d th at u n d e rs ta n d in g a p re d ic a te is not always acco m p an ied by a sensuous re p re se n ta tio n ; h e will now claim th a t th e re sim ply a re no re p re se n ta tio n s o f th e kind claim ed by th e conceptualist. T h e suspicion arises th a t, a lth o u g h th e co m m o n ch aracteristic is n o t an

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o b ject o f se n se-p erc ep tio n , this re p re se n ta tio n is still b e in g th o u g h t o f on th e m odel o f sen se-p erce p tio n . T h e com m on characteristic, because it is so m e th in g g en e ral, ca n n o t be se n su o u sly re p re s e n te d ; b u t it can n o n eth ele ss be re p re s e n te d . B ut how ? T h a t se n se-p erce p tio n h e re serves as th e m o d el seem s p articu la rly clear in H u sse rl’s case, fo r h e says: th e g en e ral object is given to us in an in tu itio n o f essence (Wesen­ sanschauung). A c o rre sp o n d in g tra d itio n , a c c o rd in g to w hich we r e p r e ­ se n t th e se g e n e ra l essences in an intellectu al in tu itio n (nous), has existed since Plato. T h e no m in alist can leave u n d e c id e d how far his o p p o n e n t th in k s o f th e g en e ral ch aracteristic o n th e m o d el o f se n se-p erce p tio n (th o u g h one m ay well th in k th a t u ltim ately h e has to th in k o f it in this way). His a rg u m e n t will now be th a t in any e v e n t we do n o t e n c o u n te r such a re p re se n ta tio n o f so m e th in g g en e ral th a t we reco g n ize in an object. L et us assum e, w hen we say o f th e castle th a t it is r e d , th e m ost fav o u rab le case, viz. th a t o f p e rc e p tio n ; we h av e a p a rtic u la r sen su o u s c o lo u r-re p re se n ta tio n , b u t d o we h av e , in a d d itio n to this r e p r e s e n ta ­ tio n (or fo u n d e d in it), a f u r th e r n o n -se n su o u s re p re s e n ta tio n th ro u g h w hich we a p p r e h e n d th a t co m m o n c h a racteristic - th e re d n e s s - in th e object? T h is q u estio n is m e a n t to hit th e o p p o n e n t a t precisely th a t p o in t w hich h e h im se lf em p h asized as th e decisive one. W e ca n n o t, h e h a d claim ed , reco g n ize an object as o ne c h a ra c te riz e d by a p re d ic a te unless we can d iscern in it a ch a racteristic fo r w hich th e p re d ic a te stan d s. A n d now it is objected to him th a t we sim ply c a n n o t fin d such a re p re s e n ta ­ tio n o f a ch aracteristic. T h is b rin g s o u t a p ec u lia rity o f his a rg u m e n t w hich sh o u ld be n o ted : his insistence on th e a p p re h e n s io n o f a c h a rac­ teristic w hich m u st u n d e rlie th e c h a ra c te riz a tio n -fu n c tio n o f th e p r e d i­ cate was n o t a discovery b u t a p o stu late . It was n o t show n th a t it is so; r a th e r it was a rg u e d th a t it m u st be so. T h is aro u se s th e suspicion th a t ag ain it is only th e o b je ct-o rien tate d p re ju d ic e th a t is at w o rk h e re , n o t, ad m itte d ly , in th e sim ple fo rm o f sta tin g in ad v a n ce th a t every sign m u st stan d fo r so m e th in g , b u t r a th e r in th e fo rm o f an inability to th in k o f th e c h a ra c te riz a tio n -fu n c tio n o f p re d ic a te s in any o th e r way. O n e c a n n o t th in k o f it d iffe ren tly ; th e re fo r e it m u st be so. B u t if o n e ca n n o t ascertain th a t it is so th e n th e re w ould seem to be so m e th in g w ro n g wich o n e ’s p re su p p o sitio n s. B u t at th e stage th e d e b a te has now re a c h e d , th e stre n g th o f th e co n ­ ce p tu a list vis-ä-vis th e n o m in alist consists in th e fact th a t a lth o u g h th e co n c ep tu alist ca n n o t ex h ib it th e n o n -se n su o u s re p re s e n ta tio n h e p o s­ tu lates, th e no m in alist f o r his p a rt h as n o t yet given a positive ac co u n t o f how th e c h a ra c te riz a tio n -fu n c tio n o f p re d ic a te s is to be u n d e rsto o d .

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So long as n o altern ativ e acco u n t is available th e co n cep tu alist account, h o w ev er hy p o th etical it m ay be, reta in s the advan tag e. T h e n o m in alist m ust th e re fo re now be pressed into giving his ow n positive account. T h e w eakness o f trad itio n al nom inalism was th a t its stre n g th lay only in its critiq u e o f th e o p posing position. O nly since W ittg e n stein ’s Philosophical Investigations has th e re been a positive ex p la­ n a tio n o f how o n e can u n d e rs ta n d th e ch a racterizatio n -fu n ctio n o f p red icates th a t does n o t involve p r o p p in g up this fu n ctio n with objects.2 1 shall take as my p o in t o f d e p a r tu re a g e n e ra l re m a rk ab o u t th e m e a n in g o f linguistic expressions w hich is fo u n d in §560 o f th e Investi­ gations: ‘-“T h e m e an in g o f a w ord is w hat is ex p lain e d by th e e x p lan a­ tio n o f th e m e a n in g ” i.e. if you w ant to u n d e rsta n d th e use o f th e w ord “m e a n in g ”, look fo r w hat a re called “explan atio n s o f m e a n in g ” ’. A t th e b e g in n in g o f th e Blue Book, w here a sim ilar re m a rk occurs, W ittgenstein explains its significance by saying th a t it is in te n d e d to b rin g th e q u estio n ‘W h at is m e an in g ?’ ‘dow n to e a r th ’. It is in te n d e d to fre e us fro m th e com pulsive idea th a t m ean in g m u st be an object. T h e sense o f this re m a rk is th e re fo re o n a level w ith m y ea rlier suggestion th a t in stead o f asking fo r th e m e a n in g o f an expressio n we sh o u ld ask how we u n d e rs ta n d it. H ow is th e understanding o f m e a n in g of w hich I h ad sp o k en co n ­ n ec te d with th e explanation o f m e a n in g re fe rre d to in th e q u o tatio n fro m W ittgenstein? U n d e rsta n d in g a n d explain in g a re fre q u en tly used as o p p o sin g concepts, as fo r ex am p le in the fam iliar co n tra st betw een in te rp re ta tiv e (verstehend) a n d e x p la n a to ry psychology. H ow ever, th e w o rd ‘e x p la in ’ is used in tw o d iffe re n t senses. O n e can say ‘E xplain to m e why th at is th u s a n d so’: ex p la n a tio n in th e sense o f th e giving o f reasons. It is only this k in d o f ex p lan a tio n th a t can be o p p o sed to u n d e rs ta n d in g o r describing. E xplaining-w hat o r -how differs fro m this ex p laining-w hy: ‘E xplain to m e how th a t w orks’, ‘explain to m e w hat th a t m e an s’, ‘ex p lain to m e th e m e a n in g o f th e ex p re ssio n ’. It is ex p la­ n a tio n in this second sense th a t W ittgenstein is re fe rrin g to. T h e re la ­ tio n sh ip o f this kind o f ex p la n a tio n to u n d e rsta n d in g is as follows: so m e o n e w ho explains so m e th in g show s w hat h e u n d e rsta n d s o r how h e u n d e rs ta n d s so m e th in g . I f I ask som eone to ex p lain to m e how a m a ch in e w orks I assum e th a t he u n d e rsta n d s how it works a n d how o ne o p e ra te s it; a n d th e e x p la n a tio n is successful if it results in my u n d e r ­ sta n d in g how it is o p e ra te d . C o rresp o n d in g ly , if I ask so m eo n e to ex p lain th e m e a n in g o f a linguistic expression to m e I assum e th a t h e u n d e rsta n d s th e ex p ressio n ; a n d th e ex p lan a tio n is successful if it

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results in my u n d e rsta n d in g th e expression. T h u s we can say: to explain (in this sense) m eans to show w hat o ne u n d e rsta n d s, to com m unicate an u n d e rsta n d in g , to m ake so m eth in g u n d e rsto o d . If now we apply W ittg en stein ’s rem a rk to predicates we m ust say: the m ean in g o f a p re d ic a te is w hat we explain w hen we ex p lain its m eaning. A nd how do we ex p lain th e m e an in g o f a predicate? If to u n d e rsta n d a p red ic ate is to know how it is u sed to characterize, i.e. to classify an d d istinguish, th e n th e ex p lan atio n o f th e m ean in g o f a p red icate m ust consist in explainin g how it is u sed to classify an d distinguish. H ow can this be d o n e, e.g. in th e case o f th e p red ic ate ‘re d ’? C learly n o t by p o in t­ ing to th e g en eral characteristic o f red n ess, for, as th e conceptualist rightly em phasized, this is su p p o sed to be a g en eral essence an d h ence n o th in g which can be sim ply p o in te d to. T h is g en e ral essence sim ply plays no p a rt in th e ex p lan atio n o f the m e an in g of a p redicate. In real­ ity we explain th e m ean in g o f a p red ic ate - if we ca n n o t explain it by m eans o f o th e r w ords, by a definition - by m eans o f exam ples. We p rese n t th e p erso n to w hom we wish to explain th e m ean in g o f the w ord ‘r e d ’ with objects which we characterize as re d (‘th a t is r e d ’) an d o th ers o f which we den y the p red ic ate (‘th a t is n o t r e d ’). T h e positive exam ples show how th e p red ic ate classifies an d the n egative ones show fro m w hat it distinguishes th a t which it classifies. W h at we show in this way is how th e p re d ic a te is used. W e can th e n ascertain w h eth e r th e p erso n to w hom we have ex p lain ed th e use o f th e p re d ic a te has u n d e r ­ stood th e ex p lan a tio n by g etting him to use th e p red ic ate him self. A n d if h e th e n uses it d iffe ren tly fro m w hat we in te n d e d we co rrect him by m eans o f such expressions as ‘c o rre c t’ a n d ‘n o t c o rre c t’ until h e has u n d e rsto o d us. W h at we explain to him by m eans o f th e exam ples is th u s th e employment-rule o f th e p redicate. F o r an activity which in all its stages is re g u la te d by ‘co rrec t’ a n d ‘in c o rrec t’ is an activity which follows a rule, even if th e ru le ca n n o t be fo rm u late d in w ords. T h e ru le shows itself only in its c o rre c t use, an d in o u r case this m eans: in th e co rrec t ap plication o f th e p red ic ate to exam ples. We th u s arrive at th e follow ing result: if th e m ean in g o f a p red ic ate is sim ply w hat we explain w hen we explain th e m ean in g o f th e p r e d i­ cate, th e n th e m e a n in g o f th e p red ic ate ca n n o t be id en tified with th e com m on featu re; r a th e r the la tte r does n o t figure in th e ex p lan atio n of m ean in g at all. T h e factor w hich conceptualism held to be essential p roves to be su p e rflu o u s in th e ex p lan atio n o f m eaning. T h e rejection o f th e re p re se n ta tio n o f a g en e ral essence is now no lo n g e r m erely n eg ­ ative. R a th e r a new positive conception has tak en its place. I f h e is

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asked: how can a m ode o f em p lo y m en t o f a p re d ic a te avoid b ein g a rb i­ tra ry if it is w ithout a fo u n d a tio n in objects? th e nom inalist can now p o in t to th e ru le obtain ed by applying the p re d ic a te to exam ples. T h e conceptualist could try to relativize this re su lt by calling in q u es­ tion th e p resu p p o sitio n , tak en over fro m W ittgenstein, th a t th e m e a n ­ in g o f a linguistic expression is sim ply w hat we ex p lain w hen we explain its m eaning. E xplanation, he could say, is sim ply an in tersubjective co m m u n icatio n o f u n d e rsta n d in g . It does n o t follow fro m this th a t w hat we u n d e rs ta n d can be identified with w hat we can explain. A n d in d e ed this does n o t necessarily follow. H ow ever, th e nom inalist will now give th e conceptualist the follow ing points to consider: (1) L in ­ guistic signs do as a m a tte r o f fact belong to intersu b jectiv e co m m u n i­ cation. As a m a tte r o f fact the in dividual only acquires a lan g u ag e in this way. Is it n o t th en superfluous to posit, in ad d itio n to this u n d e r ­ sta n d in g th a t o n e can explain, make understood, a n o th e r special in n ersubjective u n d e rsta n d in g ? (2) T h e p o in t previously rea ch ed in th e d eb a te was th a t th e conceptualist was n o t able to d e m o n stra te th e exis­ te n ce o f his postu lated re p re se n ta tio n o f a g en eral essence an d d e m a n d e d fro m the nom inalist an alternative positive ex p lan atio n . T h is has now b een p ro v id ed , at least fo r that m e an in g which is in tersu b jectively com m u n icated . T h is ex p lan a tio n w hich is actually valid fo r intersubjectively com m unicable m e an in g is, th e n , a possible ex p lan atio n o f th e u n d e rsta n d in g o f m ean in g in general. A nd as th e co n cep tu alist h a d no d em o n strab le alternative to o ffe r fo r inner-subjective u n d e r ­ sta n d in g he o u g h t now to accept this explanation-possibility exhibited in intersubjective ex p lan atio n as hold in g also for in ner-subjective u n d e rsta n d in g . A nd this, the nom inalist w ould say, seem s all th e m o re plausible if we consider th a t each individual, if h e wishes to becom e clear ab o u t his u n d e rsta n d in g o f a predicate, m u st em ploy the sam e m e th o d h e uses w hen exp lain in g th e em p lo y m en t-ru le o f th e p red icate to som eone else. I f o n e wishes to get clear a b o u t th e m e an in g with w hich one is using th e w ord ‘re d ’, even if th e re w ere such a th in g as th a t gen eral re p re se n ta tio n o f red n ess, it w ould be useless to ap p eal to it: even to o n eself o n e can only ex p lain (m ake clear) o n e ’s own u n d e r ­ sta n d in g o f a p red ic ate by elucidating to o n eself by m eans o f exam ples how one uses it. We c a n n o t say th a t we only u n d e rsta n d w hat we are able to explain; we can, how ever, say th at we only u n d e rsta n d clearly w hat we a re able to explain, an d th a t we can only becom e clear ab o u t w h at we u n d e rsta n d by exp lain in g it. W e will n o t be able to leave th e d eb a te betw een nom inalism an d co n ­ ceptualism in this state. T h e conceptualist can still get r o u n d this last

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a rg u m e n t o f th e n om inalist. B u t b efo re p assing final ju d g m e n t in the co n tro v ersy we will first have to get cle a re r a b o u t th e m eth o d o lo g ical significance o f th e new perspectives in tro d u c e d by th e n om inalist.

Appendix on speaking of concepts W h en listing th e v a rio u s tra d itio n a l d e sig n atio n s o f w hat p re d ic a te s sta n d fo r p. 134) I also m en tio n ed a term inology which o n e m ight th in k could p o in t b e yond th e o b je c t-o rie n ta te d fram e w o rk : th e term in o lo g y a cc o rd in g to w hich p re d ic ate s sta n d f o r concepts. T h is way o f sp e a k in g seem s to avoid two difficulties to which H u sse rl’s c o n ce p tio n gave rise. Firstly, it is n o t c le ar th a t a c o n c e p t is a n object. Secondly, if o n e speaks o f c o n cep ts this n o lo n g e r suggests th e idea o f a c o m p o ­ sition. W e d o n o t say th a t th e ob ject fo r w hich th e sin g u la r te rm sta n d s is com­ bined w ith a c o n cep t; r a th e r we say th a t it is subsumed u n d e r it, th a t th e object falb under th e concept. So it m ig h t seem th a t H u sse rl’s c o n ce p tio n o f p re d ic a te s is n o t a t all re p re s e n ­ tative o f th e tra d itio n , in d e e d th a t in c h o o sin g H u sse rl I h a d picked a p a rtic u ­ larly w eak re p re se n ta tiv e o f th e tra d itio n . A n d o f c o u rse if this w ere so th e n m erely d e m o n s tra tin g th a t H u s se rl’s c o n ce p tio n c a n n o t w ith sta n d critical analy­ sis w ould be no cause fo r a b a n d o n in g th e e n tire tra d itio n a l position a n d a d o p t­ ing a specifically lan g u ag e-an aly tical co n cep tio n . W h at th e n is th e significance o f sp e a k in g o f concepts? K a n t’s c o n ce p tio n can p e rh a p s be re g a rd e d as e x em p lify in g th e tra d itio n a l u n d e r s ta n d in g o f concepts. In his Lectures on Logic § 1 K a n t d e fin e s ‘c o n c e p t’ as ‘g e n e ra l re p re s e n ta tio n ’ a n d in b ra ck e ts adds: repraesentatio per notas communes. C o rre sp o n d in g ly , in th e Cri­ tique of Pure Reason, h e says a c o n ce p t is a ‘re p re s e n ta tio n ’ w hich in c o n tra st to in tu itio n rela te s to a n object n o t im m ediately b u t ‘m e d ia te ly ’ ‘by m ean s o f a fea­ tu re w hich several th in g s m ay hav e in c o m m o n ’ (B377 cf. also B93 f.). T h u s a co n ce p t is u n d e rs to o d by K a n t a n d in early m o d e m p h ilo so p h y g e n era lly as a species o f re p re s e n ta tio n (G e rm a n : Vorstellung. L atin: repraesentatio. English: ‘id ea ’). In early m o d e m p h ilo so p h y th e re is a d d e d to th e fu n d a m e n ta l d ifficul­ ties involved in sp e a k in g o f ‘re p re s e n ta tio n s ’ th e a m b ig u ity o f th e te rm as b etw een re p re s e n tin g a n d r e p re s e n te d , i.e. b etw een th e sta te o f consciousness and th e object a p p re h e n d e d by it, its objective c o rre la te . T h is a m b ig u ity also m akes it u n c le a r w h a t is m e a n t by sp e a k in g o f a ‘c o n c e p t’ (conceptus). T h e d efi­ nitions o f K a n t w hich have ju s t b e en given, ho w ev er, a re relatively u n a m b ig u ­ ous. T h e y d e cid e th e am biguity in fa v o u r o f th e subjective m e a n in g (concipere, conceive) fo r, in th e d e fin itio n th e objective m e a n in g is a g ain expressly e m p h a ­ sized as so m e th in g to w hich th e co n cep t relates: nota communis. B u t now this objective c o rre la te o f th e subjectively in te r p re te d c o n c e p t - th e c o m m o n m ark - is sim ply H u s se rl’s ‘species’, th e ‘a ttrib u te ’ o f th e o b je c t-o rie n ta te d co n cep tio n . Now th e subjective c o rre la te o f th e a ttrib u te - th e re p re s e n tin g o r m e a n in g (Mei­ nen) o f th e a ttrib u te —is clearly n o t a possible th eo re tic al su b stitu te fo r th e a ttri­ bute. I t w ould a p p e a r to m ak e n o p a rtic u la r sen se to say th a t th e p re d ic a te stands

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fo r th e re p re s e n tin g o f th e a ttrib u te ; a n d even if it d id m ake sense one w ould still be left with the u n c la rifie d n o tio n o f an a ttrib u te . In te r p r e te d in this way th e n th e c o n ce p t-te rm in o lo g y does n o t re p re se n t an a lte rn a tiv e to th e o b jec t-o rie n ta ted co nception; th e im pression o f a non-objectual c o n ce p tio n results sim ply fro m th e am biguity o f this term inology. In F reg e, how ever, we find, in c o n tra st to this e a rlie r m o d e rn trad itio n , a th eo ry o f p re d ic ate s a cc o rd in g to w hich (1) p re d ic ate s stand fo r concepts (2) con cep ts a re explicitly u n d e rsto o d objectively (objektiv) a n d (3) concepts a re n o n e th e less sh arp ly d istin g u ish e d fro m objects (Gegenstände). A b rie f d escrip tio n o f th e essential fe atu res o f his th eo ry will have to suffice h e re .3 F o r F re g e th e re are - a p a r t fro m syn categ o rem atic expressions - two kinds o f linguistic ex p ressio n : ‘c o m p le te ’ a n d ‘in co m p lete ’. C o m p lete expressions a re (1) n am es (sin g u lar term s) a n d (2) w hole (assertoric) sentences. O f b o th we can say th a t they sta n d fo r an object. I can h e re ig n o re the peculiarity in F re g e ’s co n ce p ­ tion th a t a w hole se n ten c e .also stands fo r an object (a tru th -v a lu e ).4 In c o m p lete ex p ressio n s a re e x p ressio n s with o n e o r m o re gaps; they a re th u s ‘in n e e d o f su p p le m e n ta tio n ’. E xam ples are: ‘T h e b ro th e r o f . . . is a h o rse ’. I f an in co m p lete e x p ressio n is su p p le m e n te d by a co m p lete ex p ressio n (by a nam e) th e re resu lts a n o th e r c o m p le te e x p ressio n , w h e th er it be a n a m e o r a sentence, e.g. ‘the b r o th e r o f C h a rle s’, ‘C atalina is a h o rse ’. All exp ressio n s which n e ed su p p le m e n tin g in this way F reg e calls ‘fun ctio n al e x p ressio n s’. P redicates - e.g. ‘. . . is a h o rs e ’ - thus c o n stitu te a species o f fu n c tio n al expression; they are those ex p ressio n s w hose su p p le m e n ta tio n results n o t in a nam e b u t in a sentence. A c co rd in g to F reg e fu n c tio n a l e x p ressio n s also d e sig n ate som ething; how ever this is n o t a n object, fo r ‘o bject’ is d e fin e d as w hat is d e sig n ated by a com plete e x p ressio n . F re g e calls w hat is d e sig n ated by a fu n ctio n al e xpression a ‘fu n c tio n ’; a n d if the fu n c tio n a l e x p ressio n is a p re d ic a te he calls the fu n c tio n a ‘c o n cep t’. F u n ctio n s in th e w id er sense I can h e re d isre g a rd . T h e im p o rta n t aspect o f F re g e ’s th e o ry in this c o n te x t is th e id ea th a t a p re d ic a te too stands fo r so m e­ th in g , b u t th a t this is n o t an object b u t a concept. F reg e em phasizes that this h olds fo r th e p re d ic ate precisely in its c h ara cte r as predicate. T h e con cep t is ‘essentially p re d ic ativ e ’.5 If, o n the o th e r h a n d , o n e w ants to say som ething about a co n cep t th e n one m u st d e sig n ate th e concept by m eans o f a ‘n a m e ’ which resu lts fro m th e n o m in a liz atio n o f th e p red icate. B u t now a n a m e can only d e s­ ig n a te a n object. If, th e re fo re , o n e speaks of a co n cep t, if on e says so m eth in g about it, it m u st ‘first be tra n s fo rm e d in to an object’.6 T h is object into which th a t which th e p re d ic ate stan d s fo r is tra n s fo rm e d is ro u g h ly th e sam e as H u s s e rl’s ‘species’, th e tra d itio n a l a ttrib u te . F rege th ereb y gets h im self in to th e follow ing aw kw ard position: w hen sp eak in g o f such an object in dividually he calls it a ‘c o n ce p t’ even th o u g h b eing a n object it c an n o t be a concept. T h is leads to th e p a ra d o x ‘th a t in my term in o lo g y expressions such as “th e c o n ce p t F” d o n o t d e sig n ate con cep ts b u t o bjects’; ‘the c o n ce p t horse is not a c o n c e p t’.7 In assessing F re g e ’s th e o ry o f p re d ic ate s we can distin g u ish two co m p o n en ts,

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a syntactical on e a n d a sem antic one. T h e syntactical fo u n d a tio n o f F re g e ’s th e ­ ory is his id ea th a t a p re d ic ate is an essentially incom plete expression, th a t it is to be u n d e rsto o d as essentially a se n ten c e-p a rt, a sta te m en t-frag m en t. W ith this p io n e e rin g step F re g e p re p a re d th e way fo r th e language-analytical conception. H e b re ak s with th e trad itio n a l idea, w hich H u sserl took over, th a t a sin g u lar pred icativ e sen ten ce is com posed o f subject, copula a n d p red icate, th a t b oth p re d ic a te a n d subject a re in d e p e n d e n t un its, th a t each stan d s fo r an object a n d th a t b etw een the two objects fo r w hich they sta n d th e re m u st be a com binationelem ent, the sem antic c o u n te rp a rt o f the c opula, a synthesis betw een th e two objects. F o r F reg e th e cop u la n o longer exists; w hat was called th e c o p u la is a p a rt o f th e pred icate. T h is c onception o f th e syntax o f predicative sentences also enables F re g e to b re ak with th e trad itio n a l idea th a t the p re d ic ate stands fo r a n object. T h e p ecu ­ liarity o f F re g e ’s c onception finds expression in th e fact th a t h e applies to w hat the p re d ic ate stan d s fo r a n d w hat h e calls a concept, th e sam e term s as h e applies to th e predicate: ‘n e e d in g su p p le m e n ta tio n ’, ‘u n s a tu ra te d ’. T h a t th e co n ce p t is ‘essentially p re d ic ativ e ’ m eans th a t it is so m e th in g in com plete, u n sa tu ra te d a n d fo r precisely this re aso n c an n o t be an object. F rege th u s rem ain s tie d to th e tra d itio n in so fa r as h e holds fast to th e idea th a t th e p re d ic ate too stan d s for som ething; w hat it stan d s for, how ever, is n o t an object. T h e q uestion is w h e th er this re p re se n ts a g e n u in e th ird possibility b etw een th e o b jec t-o rie n ta ted concep­ tion a n d th e language-analytical conception. I f the p re d ic ate does n o t sta n d fo r an object th e n o n e w ould be rid o f th e difficulties o f th e o b jec t-o rie n ta ted con­ ception a n d yet w ould n o t sim ply be left with th e view th a t it is all a m a tte r o f the sign a n d its em p lo y m en t-ru le . Does such a th ird possibility really exist? T h e r e is, to b egin with, th e basic difficulty th a t a sign is su p p o sed to stand fo r so m e th in g th a t is n ev erth eless n o t an object. T h e c o n tra d ic tio n w hich seem s to be involved h e re is show n by the fact th a t F reg e finds h im self h a ving to m ake such statem en ts as ‘T h e concept horse is n o t a co n ce p t.’ H ow ever I d o not wish to p u rsu e this p ro b lem fu rth e r; I re fe r you instead to th e instructive in te rp re ta tio n a n d criticism in S e a rle .8 F reg e him self says: ‘L an g u ag e h e re is in an aw kw ard situ atio n w hich justifies d e p a rtin g fro m w hat is u su al.’9 A ssum ing o n e is p re p a re d to accept this, it still rem ain s to ask (1) w h at positive in te rp re ta tio n a re we to give to this so m e th in g which is n o t an object? a n d (2) how a re we to u n d e rs ta n d th e relation in a p re ­ dicative sentence betw een this so m eth in g a n d w hat th e subject o f th e sen ten ce stands for? T h ese two questions a re directly connected. F re g e calls th a t w hich a p re d ic ate stands fo r, like th a t w hich a sin g u lar term stan d s fo r, its ‘re fe re n c e ’ (Bedeutung).10 It is n o t necessary fo r m e h e re to go fu r th e r in to th e p ro b lem s co n n ec te d with this term in o lo g y .11 Suffice it to say th at w ith re g a rd to b o th p red icates a n d nam es F rege distinguishes th e ir re fe r­ ence fro m th e ir sense, a n d th a t in each case th e re fe re n c e is w hat th e exp ressio n desig n ates, stands f o r .12 F reg e is th e re fo re able to call the c o n cep t the re fe re n c e o f a p re d ic ate . T h e question: w hat is o n e to u n d e rs ta n d by a concept? can th e re ­

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fore also be construed thus: what is it for a predicate to have a reference? Frege’s answer to this question can be inferred from his account of what it is for a pred­ icate (concept-word) to have no reference: ‘Concept-words . . . which have no reference . . . are not such as combine contradictory elements - for a concept can very well be empty - rather they are such as have vague boundaries. In regard to every object it must be determinate whether it falls under the concept or not; a concept-word that does not satisfy this requirem ent in its reference has no reference.’13 This definition shows that for Frege a concept is a criterion by which objects are distinguished into those which fall u nder it and those which do not. T hat the question of what a concept is is so closely connected with the ques­ tion of how we are to understand its relation to what a name stands for is the consequence of Frege’s idea that the concept is something essentially in need of supplementation. The relation o f ‘an object’s falling under a concept’ Frege calls ‘the fundamental logical relation’.14 O f course these answers to the two questions just referred to which can be inferred from Frege immediately give rise to counter-questions: (1) to speak of an object falling under a concept is to speak metaphorically. How are we to conceive this falling of something under a concept? (2) Even though we may understand in general what it means to speak of a criterion there still remains the question of how in a given case one can recognize a concept or how one can decide whether an object falls under a particular concept. One can find no answer to these questions in Frege. For him they are epistemological questions and as such no concern of logic. In the context of a funda­ mental philosophical enquiry, however, we cannot rest content with this. State­ ments about what is to be understood by the sense or the reference of an expression which do not tell us how we can know what sense or reference an individual expression has remain empty. In contrast to Frege, both Husserl and linguistic analysis give an answer to this question. According to Husserl one rec­ ognizes the attribute in an act of intuition of essence; and against this the language-analytical position argued that one explains the application-rule of a predicate by means of examples. Frege’s theory of concepts does not offer a third possibility; it provides no answer at all. One can, however, try to get clear about what Frege calls the ‘fundamental logical relation’. What does it mean to say that an object ‘falls u nder’ a concept? What does the corresponding notion of ‘subsumption’ mean? T he metaphor of ‘falling under’ goes back to the terminology Aristotle used for the subject-predicate relation. The term for ‘to predicate’ - kategorein - means something like ‘say down upon’; correspondingly the correlative term ‘subject’ (,hypokeimenon) means ‘that which lies under’. There is a peculiar ambiguity in the way Aristotle uses this terminology: it is not clear whether he is referring to the linguistic expression or to something for which the expression stands. It was this ambigu­ ity which concealed from Aristotle the later alternatives of nominalism and con­ ceptualism. However, the expression being said down upon’ stems from the orientation towards the use of the expression. Just as in Greek one could use the

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e x p re ssio n ‘saying d o w n u p o n ’ we speak o f th e application - o f th e p re d ic ate ! - to (.Anwenden auf). T h a t th e n o tio n o f ‘s u b s u m p tio n ’ a n d th e falling o f objects ‘u n d e r ’ concepts seem s m o re plau sib le th a n th e o b jec t-o rie n ta ted n o tio n o f a combination o f th e object w ith a n a ttrib u te is d u e sim ply to th e fact th a t th e fo rm e r re fe rs back directly to th e lan g u ag e-an aly tical e x p la n atio n . W e can now try to fo rm a m o re precise id e a o f how th e n o tio n o f an object falling u n d e r a c o n c e p t re fe rs back to th a t o f th e applicability o f a p re d ic a te to th e object. In this I follow P. L o r e n z e n .15 O n e can first m ak e clear to o n e se lf that in stea d o f a p a rtic u la r p re d ic a te -e x p re ssio n w hich o n e u ses in a c c o rd an c e with a ru le (w hich o n e h as e x p la in e d by m ea n s o f a d e fin itio n o r by sam ples) o n e can always use o th e r e x p ressio n s in a c c o rd an c e with th e sam e rule. Sem antically w hat m a tte rs is n o t th e e x p ressio n b u t th e e m p lo y m e n t-ru le , th e c h a ra c te riz a ­ tio n -fu n c tio n . N ow o n e can a b strac t fro m all p e cu liaritie s o f th e sign a n d re fe r to tw o d iffe re n t predicate-expressions - e.g. ‘r e d ’ a n d ‘r o u g e ’ - as the sa m e predicate if th ey a re a p p lie d in acc o rd an c e with th e sam e ru le. H o w ev er, to avoid a m b i­ guities o n e can as b e fo re re serv e th e w o rd ‘p re d ic a te ’ f o r th e p re d ic ate -ex p re ssion a n d use th e w o rd ‘c o n c e p t’ fo r th e a b stra c tio n ju s t in tro d u c e d . T h is w ord w ould th e n be so d e fin e d th a t all p re d ic a te s th a t a re u se d in a cc o rd an c e with th e sam e ru le re p re s e n t th e sam e co n cep t. A n d F re g e ’s fu n d a m e n ta l logical relatio n o f ‘fa llin g u n d e r ’ w ould th e n be d e fin e d th u s: a n object falls u n d e r a c o n ce p t if a p re d ic a te w hich re p re se n ts this co n ce p t a p p lies to it (auf ihn zutrifft). T h u s th e q u e stio n s to w hich n o a n sw er c o u ld be fo u n d in F reg e w o u ld now be a n sw e re d by g ro u n d in g th e talk o f co n ce p ts o n th a t o f p re d ic ate s. T h e r e is o f co u rse a d iffe re n c e b etw een this d e fin itio n o f ‘c o n ce p t’ a n d F re g e ’s co n ce p tio n . T h e d e fin itio n ju s t given is a so-called ‘in te n sio n a l’ defin itio n : a c c o rd in g to it tw o p re d ic ate s r e p re s e n t th e sam e c o n c e p t if a n d only if they have th e sam e m e a n in g , a re u se d in a c c o rd a n c e with th e sam e a p p lic atio n -ru le . F reg e o n the o th e r h a n d has a so-called ‘e x te n sio n a l’ c o n c e p tio n o f ‘c o n c e p t’. F or him tw o co n ce p t-w o rd s sta n d fo r th e sam e c o n ce p t if a n d only if ‘th e c o rre ­ s p o n d in g c o n ce p t-e x ten sio n s co in cid e’. 16 T h u s fo r in sta n c e th e tw o p re d ic ate s ‘an im al with a h e a r t ’ a n d ‘a n im al with k id n e y s’ re p re se n t, a cc o rd in g to th e defi­ n itio n we have ju s t given, two d if fe r e n t c o n ce p ts, w h ereas, o n the basis o f F re g e ’s d e fin itio n , they sta n d fo r o n e a n d th e sam e c o n cep t. T h is d iffe re n c e h o w e v er is n o t a fu n d a m e n ta l o n e; o n e can o p e ra te w ith a n e x te n sio n al d e fin itio n o f ‘c o n ­ c e p t’ in m uch th e sam e way as o n e does w ith th e in te n sio n a l d e fin itio n . T h e id en tity -c rite ria o f th e c o n ce p t w ould still re la te to th e a p p lic atio n o f p re d ic ate s; only o n e w ould now have to say: two p re d ic a te s r e p re s e n t th e sam e c o n ce p t if they a p p ly to th e sam e object.

LECTURE

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T he basic principle of analytical philosophy. T he dispute continued. Predicates and quasi-predicates

B e fo re I b rin g to an e n d th e in te r ru p te d d eb a te betw een th e nom inalist a n d th e co n c ep tu alist we should try to get a c le a re r g rasp o f the m e th ­ odological significance a n d scope o f th e two decisive p erspectives on w hich th e n o m in a list’s a rg u m e n t rested . T h e se perspectives co n stitu te o u r first steps in th e d irec tio n o f a new , no lo n g e r ontologically-orienta te d sem an tic con ceptuality. T h e first o f th e se perspectives was co n ­ ta in e d in th e q u estio n co n c e rn in g th e fu n ctio n o f a lingustic expression th a t was in tro d u c e d at th e b e g in n in g o f the prev io u s lectu re, th e second in W ittg e n stein ’s d ic tu m , which was only b ro u g h t in in th e co u rse o f th e d isp u te b u t is in fact fu n d a m e n ta l: T h e m e an in g o f a w o rd is w hat th e ex p lan a tio n o f its m e a n in g ex p lain s.’ In both cases it is a m a tte r o f p e r ­ spectives w hich I h a d a p p lie d specifically to o u r q u estion co n cern in g th e m e an in g o f p red ic ate s b u t w hich are in fact o f u n iv ersal scope; fo r th ey co n c ern th e q u estio n o f th e m e a n in g o f all linguistic ex p ressio n s a n d th u s rea ch b ey o n d th e special controversy betw een nom in alism an d co n ceptualism . H ow fa r am I en title d to claim th a t these perspectives h av e so m eth in g intrinsically co m p ellin g a b o u t th e m an d are n o t a rb itra ry altern ativ es to th e o b je ct-o rien tate d co nception? O n e can n o t d e m a n d o f a new way o f loo king at th in g s th a t it be intrinsically com pelling, m erely th a t it be m o re fu n d a m e n ta l th a n th e p rev io u s o n e an d h en ce can at least n o t be called in q u estio n by th e latter. I have a lre ad y show n in th e last le ctu re th a t this is th e case with th e fu n ctio n al co n c ep tio n vis-ä-vis th e o b je ct-o rien tate d co nception. T h a t signs are used an d u sed to p e rfo rm a p a rtic u la r fu n ctio n is n o t d e n ie d by th e o b je ct-o rien tate d co n cep tio n , b u t p re su p p o se d as obvious; an d th e only re a so n why this fe a tu re is n o t m a d e them atic is because th e o b je ct-o rien tate d p h ilo s o p h e r sim ply takes it fo r g ra n te d th a t the fu n c ­ tio n o f th e sign is to sta n d fo r an object. B ut as soon as o n e explicitly

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retrac es th a t step th e p a rtic u la r fu n ctio n o f sta n d in g fo r an object tu rn s o u t to be m erely one possibility a m o n g others. O f course th e objecto rie n ta te d p h ilo so p h e r m ay say th a t we can n o t conceive o f any o th e r fu n ctio n fo r a sign th a n th a t o f sta n d in g fo r an object. B u t we have alread y seen th a t, in th e special case o f p redicates at least, it is n o t d if­ ficult to get him to ad m it th a t a p re d ic a te has th e fu n ctio n o f c h a racter­ izing the object fo r w hich a singular te rm stands. O f co u rse h e h ad to qualify this adm ission by saying th a t this is m erely a fu n ctio n th a t the p red ic ate also has a n d th a t it can only fulfil it by p e rfo rm in g its alleged basic fun ctio n o f sta n d in g fo r an object: it characterizes th e object o f th e subject-term o f th e sen ten ce by sta n d in g fo r an object - th e attrib u te - w hich itself ch aracterizes th e object in a p rim a ry sense. W ith w hat w o n d erfu l capacities th e trad itio n al p h ilo so p h er finds it necessary to en d ow his objects! A re we n o t in d u lg in g in m ythology if we say o f objects th a t they characterize o th e r objects? A n d this th ey are su p p o sed to accom plish by a d h e rin g to th e o th e r objects, by b eing co m b in ed with th em . It alread y em erg ed in th e H usserl-critique th a t the co n cep tio n o f th e m ean in g o f a pred icativ e sentence as com posite o r - this always so u nds b e tte r - as a ‘synthesis’ o f two objects - ca n n o t be carried th ro u g h . It now em erges th a t even if it could, it could n o t m ake th e fu n ctio n o f ch a racterizin g intelligible. In reality th e o b ject-o rien tated co nception has h e re p ro jec ted a fu n ctio n w hich is only intelligible as a fu n ctio n o f signs back in to th a t s tru c tu re which was th e only o n e avail­ able to it. T h e m ethodological significance o f th e second persp ectiv e which is co n tain ed in W ittg e n stein ’s re m a rk - ‘T h e m e an in g o f a w ord is w hat th e ex p lan atio n o f its m e a n in g ex p lain s’ - rem a in ed less clear in th e last lecture. W hat is m e an t by this re m a rk is sim ply this: w hen p h ilo so p h i­ cally we ask ab o u t th e m e an in g o f linguistic expressio n s we a re asking w hat th a t is in gen eral (‘as su ch ’) ab o u t which we ask w hen pre-p h ilo sophically we ask ab o u t th e m e an in g o f an in divid u al expression. T h u s W ittg en stein ’s re m a rk has fo r analytical philosoph y a significance co r­ re sp o n d in g to th a t w hich th e q uestion ab o u t ‘b ein g as b ein g ’ has fo r ontology. J u s t as ontology did not m e an by ‘b ein g ’ a m etaphysical co n ­ stru ctio n b u t was asking w hat th e beings with w hich we h ave to d o p rephilosophically a re as beings, so too fo r analytical philo so p h y w hat is m e a n t by ‘m e a n in g ’ ca n n o t be a m etaphysical o r scientific co n stru ct: w hen philosophically we ask how we use linguistic exp ressio n s we a re asking ab o u t th e sam e th in g we ask a b o u t w hen pre-p h ilo so p h ically we ask how an in dividual ex p ressio n is used; only now it is a qu estio n o f m o d e o f em p lo y m e n t as such, in fo rm a l generality. O n e co uld th e re ­

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fo re call W ittgenstein’s d ic tu m the fu n d a m e n ta l p rin cip le o f analytical philosophy, i.e. th e fu n d a m e n ta l p rin cip le o f th a t philosophy w hich conceives itself as a question ab o u t th e u n d e rsta n d in g o f o u r linguistic ex p ressions an d w hich seeks to win th e conceptuality in w hich it poses this questio n fro m this q u estio n itself. N ow how is this second p erspective co nnected w ith th e first, viz. th at o f th e function o f linguistic expressions? T h e first p ersp ectiv e yielded th e m axim : if you w ant to clarify th e m e an in g o f a fo rm o f linguistic expressions th e n ask: w hat a re expressions o f this fo rm used f o r ? T h e second perspective yields th e m axim : if you w ant to clarify th e m e an in g o f a fo rm o f linguistic expressions th e n ask: how a re exp ressio n s o f this fo rm used? T h u s both perspectives em phasize th e m o d e o f e m p lo y m en t o f an expression, b u t th e second proves to be m o re fu n d a m e n ta l an d g en eral; as o p p o se d to the first p erspective it does n o t p re su p p o se th a t th e u n d e rsta n d in g o f a linguistic exp ressio n belongs to a teleological co n tex t, th e co n tex t o f an in ten tio n al action. I do n o t know w hat a rg u m e n t o ne could use to cast d o u b t on W itt­ g en stein ’s p rin cip le so long as it is u n d e rsto o d in this fu n d a m e n ta l g e n ­ erality; fo r o n e w ould th e n have to d etach the m e an in g which th e w ords ‘m e a n in g ’, ‘u n d e rs ta n d in g ’, etc., have in linguistic th eo ry fro m the m e an in g they have in th e ir p re-th eo retica l em ploym en t. T h e re are con­ ceptions of linguistic th eo ry fo r which this is a possibility. A p h ilo so p h ­ ical sem antics how ever w ould lose its p u rp o se if this h a p p e n e d , fo r p h i­ losophy only seeks to m ake explicit w hat we alread y u n d e rsta n d prephilosophically. W ittg en stein ’s p rin cip le th e re fo re also lays dow n th e limits o f a possible philosophical sem antics; and this also co n tain s a first clue to th e answ er to th e question I left o p en , viz. how philosophical sem antics could be d istinguished fro m linguistic sem antics. So th e ob ject-o rien tated p h ilo so p h er could n o t evade W ittg en stein ’s p rin cip le eith er. H ow ever, h e w ould im m ediately - an d rightly ex p lain th a t w hen h e says th a t every expression (or at least every ‘categ o rem a tic’ expression) stands fo r an object he also m eans th a t in each ind ividual case w hen o n e is asked a b o u t th e m e an in g or th e use or the ex p lan atio n o f an expression o ne is to indicate th e object fo r w hich th e ex p ressio n stands. So fro m th e p o in t o f view o f m e th o d we have th e sam e situation as we h ad in th e case o f th e first perspective: a question is posed which h a d no t b ee n m ad e explicit in th e o b ject-o rien tated tr a ­ d itio n but which th e object-o rien tated p h ilo so p h e r im m ediately accepts an d m o reo v er im m ediately answ ers in an o b je ct-o rien tated way, as th o u g h this w ere th e only possible answ er. W e h o w ev er can ask: are th e re no t o th e r possible ways o f ex p lain in g an e x p re ssio n ’s m ode o f

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em plo y m en t? In th e p a rtic u la r case o f p red ic ate s it seem s obvious th a t we c a n n o t ex p lain th e use o f a n ex p re ssio n in th e way th e objectth e o rist claim s we can (cf. p. 143). N ow o n e could object th at in to d a y ’s elu cid atio n s I have unjustifiably sim plified W ittg e n stein ’s p rin cip le. D id we n o t alre ad y see in th e p r e ­ vious le c tu re th a t this p rin cip le by no m ean s m erely ties th e p h ilo s o p h ­ ical analysis o f m e a n in g to th e an sw e rin g o f in d iv id u al qu estio n s o f m e an in g but, in its stress on th e explanation o f m e an in g , red u ces m e a n ­ ing to th e intersubjectively available m o d e o f em p lo y m e n t o f th e ex p ression? A nd if th e p rin cip le is u n d e rs to o d in this way it clearly c a n n o t be ac know ledged by th e o b je c t-o rie n ta te d p h ilo so p h e r as being m erely trivial. W ittgenstein did in fact u n d e rs ta n d his p rin cip le in this n a rro w e r sense a n d d isp u te d th e possibility o f an in tro sp ectiv e fixing o f m eanings. H ow ever W ittg e n stein ’s d en ial o f th e possibility o f a so-called p riv ate la n g u a g e 1 rests on a rg u m e n ts th a t a re d isp u te d in analytical p h ilo so p h y .2 I f we a re to re g a rd W ittg e n ste in ’s p rin c ip le as th e fu n d a ­ m ental p rin cip le o f analytical p h ilo so p h y th e n a t th e p re se n t stage o f o u r reflections w h ere we a re only g ettin g a fo o tin g in analytical p h ilo s­ op h y we sho u ld n o t b u rd e n it with this n a rro w in te rp re ta tio n . W e m ust take it in a fo rm in w hich it is ad m itte d by everyon e. W e o b tain such an u n d o g m a tic in te rp re ta tio n o f th e p rin cip le if we allow n o t only th e p o s­ sibility o f som eone e x p lain in g an e x p re ssio n ’s m o d e o f em p lo y m e n t to h im self in th e sam e way th a t h e w ould ex p lain it to so m eo n e else b ut also, as a lim iting case, th e possibility o f th e re b ein g m ean in g s o r m eanin g -co m p o n en ts o f ex pressions th a t so m e o n e can only ex p lain to h im ­ self. T h e la tte r w ould clearly be th e case if so m e th in g th a t is only inw ardly accessible, a sensation o r re p re se n ta tio n , co n stitu tes o r partly co n stitutes th e m e a n in g o f an ex p ressio n . W e can now take u p ag ain th e co n tro v ersy betw een th e no m in alist an d th e conceptualist. In re sp o n se to th e challeng e to p ro d u c e his own positive con cep tio n o f the m e a n in g o f a p re d ic a te th e n om inalist, invok­ ing W ittg e n stein ’s p rin cip le, h ad r e f e r re d us to th e e m p lo y m e n t-ru le w hich is ex p lain e d a n d can only be ex p la in e d by m ean s o f positive an d n eg ative exam ples. T a k in g acco u n t o f th e distinctions I hav e ju s t m a d e th e co n cep tu alist co uld now reply th a t h e has n o objection to W ittg e n stein ’s p rin cip le, b u t th a t one m u st d istinguish b etw een th e g e n u in e ex p lan a tio n an d g ra sp in g o f m e a n in g an d th e in te rsu b jec tiv e e x p lan a tio n . ‘It is p erfectly tr u e ’, h e w ould say, ‘th a t a p re d ic a te can only be e x p lain e d in te rsu b jec­ tively in th e way d escrib ed by th e n om inalist. H o w ev er all this p roves is th a t th e intersu b jectiv e e x p la n a tio n is n e v e r a d e q u a te to th e g rasp in g

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o f a m eaning; it can only m e d iate it. For such an ex p lan atio n o f the em p lo y m e n t-ru le by exam ples still leaves o p en w hat it really is th at d e term in e s the ru le. T h e ind iv id u al exam ples do n o t suffice for this for we only say o f so m e o n e th a t h e has u n d e rsto o d th e ex p lan atio n if he is able to apply th e p red ic ate correctly to new exam ples. B ut this can only m ean th a t th e p e rso n to w hom we explain th e p red ic ate by m eans o f ex am ples form s a m ental co rrela tio n betw een the p red ic ate an d som e­ th in g th a t is com m on to th e positive exam ples b u t ab sen t fro m th e n eg ­ ative ones; an d it is only because he can also p erceive this com m on fe a tu re in new objects th a t h e can apply th e p red icate correctly beyond th e exam ples given to new cases. T h u s th e positive ex p lan atio n given by th e nom inalist c a n n o t p re se n t itself as a g en u in e altern ativ e to the o b je ct-o rien tated e x p lan a tio n b u t m ust itself ultim ately fall back on the la tte r.’ T h e r e a re analytical p h ilo so p h ers w ho are sim ply closed to this a rg u ­ m ent. T h u s it fre q u e n tly looks as th o u g h in th e en d th e re is again ju s t o n e view co n fro n tin g a n o th e r. W e ca n n o t leave it like this. W e m ust settle th e co ntroversy in a convincing m a n n e r. T h e re are two do g m atic a rg u m e n ts with w hich th e conceptualistic line o f a rg u m e n t ju s t p re ­ sen ted is som etim es p a rrie d . Firstly, o n e occasionally h ea rs it said th a t such an a rg u m e n t refers to psychological co n d itio n s with w hich sem antics has n o th in g to do. As we shall see th e re is an elem e n t o f tru th in this statem en t. In this vague fo rm , how ever, it is unaccep tab le; fo r it is not clear in advance w hat the b o u n d arie s betw een sem antics a n d psychology are. O n e m ust first take seriously th e co n c ep tu alist’s a rg u m e n t in o rd e r to establish precisely w hich aspect no lo n g e r belongs to sem antics an d why it does not d o so. Secondly, it is som etim es stated th a t it is only th ro u g h lan g u ag e - an d m o re precisely p red ic ate s - th a t o u r e x p e rien c e is stru c tu re d into types. T h e co n c ep tu alist’s rep ly thus violates th e prin cip le o f th e ‘impossibility o f going b e h in d la n g u a g e ’ (‘U nhint ergehbarkeit. der Sprache’)* H ow ever, this is an im plausible thesis w hich can be show n to be ab su rd by th e fact th a t we perceive linguistic signs them selves (w h eth er acoustically or optically) as typical. I f fo r ex a m p le we h e a r th e so u n d ‘r e d ’ we resp o n d to it in so fa r as it exhibits a p a rtic u la r stru c tu re ; we react to th e in d iv id ­ ual sou n d in so fa r as it is a re p re se n ta tiv e o f a type o f so u n d . B u t now th e sam e is tru e o f all p e rc e p tio n , n o t ju s t h u m a n p erc ep tio n . Every stim u lu s-re sp o n se schem a, w h e th e r co n d itio n e d o r u n co n d itio n e d is such th a t th e sam e so rt o f re sp o n se follows th e sam e so rt o f stim ulus, o r a d e te rm in a te r a n g e o f sim ilar stim uli. A nd to th e ex ten t th a t p e r ­

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ceptual p h e n o m e n a a re introspectively accessible we can likewise ascer­ tain th a t o u r sensation- an d rep rese n tatio n -co n te n ts are, w ith o u t ex cep ­ tion, typical. A co lo u r-p ercep tio n , fo r exam ple, is as reg a rd s its con ten ts n ev er u n iq u e; ra th e r a specific sh a d e o f red is perceived as o ne th at can be perceived as the sam e on any n u m b e r o f occasions. O ne m ust h e re note a rem a rk a b le confusion which th ro u g h o u t th e centuries has b u rd e n e d th e en tire discussion o f nom inalism . T ra d i­ tional philosophy, since A ristotle,4 carried with it a d o g m a acco rd in g to which p erc ep tio n - ‘sensibility’ - relates to individuals. T h is p rem ise was p re su p p o se d by both sides in th e nom inalism controversy. T h a t th e re a re rep rese n tatio n s o f individuals a p p e a re d u n p ro b lem atic to both sides in th e dispute; th u s if th e re a re also re p rese n tatio n s o f universals o r types this m ust be a n o n -sensuous m ode o f cognition. In reality how ­ ever p e rc ep tio n relates n e ith e r to individuals n o r to universals; r a th e r it is typical. T h u s th e con trast is n o t betw een th e in dividual and th e universal an d typical b u t betw een th e typical on th e o n e h a n d an d th e individual an d the universal on th e o th er. W hat distinguishes the u n i­ versal fro m th e typical is th a t we only call universal w hat is com m on to m any individuals (an attrib u te) o r can be ap p lied to m any individuals (a predicate). T h e con cep t o f a universal is correlative to th a t o f an in dividual, ju s t as p redicates are essentially expressions w hich su p p le ­ m e n t sin g u lar term s. F ro m the p o in t o f view o f linguistic analysis th e consciousness o f w hat is individual is no m ore a sensuous p h e n o m e n o n th a n consciousness o f a universal; it is a logical p h e n o m e n o n . A n d as we shall see th e logical - o r linguistic - co nstitu tio n o f re fe re n c e to individuals poses m uch g re a te r p roblem s o f analysis th an does th e co n ­ sciousness o f universals which in consciousness o f types h as a sensuous p rec u rso ry fo rm . A nd on th e o th e r h a n d we can now u n d e rsta n d how trad itio n al philosophy could fail to notice th e evident fact, n ev e r d o u b te d in psychology, th a t p erc ep tio n relates to th e typical.5 It h ad to acco m m o d ate th e category o f the individual som ew here an d as it d id n o t reflect on th e fo rm o f sentences all th a t rem a in ed was to assign th e in d ividual to sensibility. W hat follows from all this re g a rd in g the evaluation o f th e a rg u m e n t b ro u g h t by th e conceptualist against the nom inalist? T h e co rrec t a p p li­ cation o f th e p red ic ate to exam ples according to th e co n cep tu alist’s th e ­ sis is only possible on th e basis o f a m ental-correlatio n o f th e p red icate w ith so m eth in g th a t is com m on to all exam ples. Does this n o t m ean: with so m eth in g typical given in consciousness? A n d w ould n o t th e co n ­ cep tu alist’s view be vindicated by th e typicality o f p ercep tio n s ju s t described? B u t in th a t case the p u rp o se fo r w hich th e co n cep tu alist

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fo u n d it necessary to po stu late an ab stract object w ould alread y be achieved by sensuous re p rese n tatio n s them selves. In o r d e r to attain clarity h e re we m ust d istinguish b etw een th e behaviouristic an d introspective conceptions o f th e psychological p h e n o m e ­ no n o f th e typicality o f perceptions. T h e typical sensation o r th e typical m ental im age th a t we en c o u n te r in in tro sp ectio n (a specific sh a d e o f red , a specific triangle-shape) does n o t c o rre sp o n d to th e em p lo y m en tra n g e o f o u r o rd in a ry p redicates (‘r e d ’, ‘tria n g le ’). F o r precisely this reason th e conceptualist fo u n d it necessary to p ostu late a n o n -sen su o u s re p re se n ta tio n o f so m eth in g th a t is com m on to all sh ad es o f re d , every­ th in g th a t is called ‘r e d ’, o r all form s o f triangle. T h e situation is d iffe r­ e n t fo r th e behaviouristic conception. T h a t an org an ism perceives ty p ­ ically is d e te rm in e d by its re sp o n d in g to stim uli o f a certain kind in th e sam e way. T h e ra n g e o f sim ilarity o f th e stim uli to w hich the o rg an ism re sp o n d s in th e sam e way can be w idened o r n arro w e d . For ex am p le th e o rg an ism can le arn to re sp o n d in th e sam e way to all colo u r-sh ad es o n e calls ‘r e d ’. W hereas in th e introspective concep tio n th e re is no sen ­ suous re p re se n ta tio n co rresp o n d in g to all colour-sh ad es th a t a re n o t m erely th e sam e b u t sim ilar, in th e behaviouristic co nception this dis­ tinction no lo n g er applies. W h e th e r we call th e various stim uli, fro m an in trospective sta n d p o in t, th e sam e o r m erely sim ilar - if th e .o rg an ism is a p p ro p ria te ly co n d itio n ed th e n it re sp o n d s to th em in th e sam e way. In this sam eness o f reaction to sim ilar stim uli behaviouristic psychology o f p e rc e p tio n has a p rese n tab le d atu m with which th e in tro sp ectio n ist co n ception has n o th in g com parable. T h e pro b lem o f sim ilarity played a larg e role in th e trad itio n al, introspectively c o n d u c te d discussion o f nom inalism . For nom inalism , H u m e a rg u e d th a t one does n o t need th e re p re se n ta tio n o f so m e th in g identical th a t is com m on to all sensuous re p re se n ta tio n s w hich c o rre ­ sp o n d to th e em p lo y m e n t o f a p redicate; it suffices th a t th e re p re s e n ­ tations g ro u p them selves in to circles o f sim ilarity.6 B u t in th a t case, it was a rg u e d ag ainst H u m e ,7 th e re m ust be a re p re se n ta tio n o f th e sim i­ larity o f th e sensuous rep rese n tatio n s, fo r w hat m a tte rs from an in tro ­ spectionist sta n d p o in t is th a t consciousness recognizes th a t th e sim ilar rep rese n tatio n s are sim ilar; th e nom inalist th ereb y finds h im self com ­ pelled to again ad m it at least the re p re se n ta tio n o f one ab stract object. B u t if o n e adm its th e re p re se n ta tio n o f sim ilarity th e n why n o t r e p r e ­ sentations o f any relations a n d attributes? T his difficulty does n o t arise in th e behaviouristic conception which is n o t co n c ern ed with re p re s e n ­ tations an d is able to p o in t to th e physical p h e n o m e n o n o f th e sam e

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resp o n se w h ereas th e in tro sp ectiv e co n cep tio n is u n ab le to p o in t to any c o rre sp o n d in g psychic p h e n o m e n o n . B u t w hat follows fro m this? A t p re s e n t only this: o n e can only a p p e al to th e typicality o f p e rc e p tio n as th e psychological fo u n d a tio n o f th e u n ifo rm ity in th e em p lo y m e n t o f a p re d ic a te if o n e takes as o n e ’s basis th e behav io u ristic co n c ep t o f p e rc e p tio n . T h e co n c ep tu alist may a g re e w ith this; fo r a fte r all h e is claim ing th a t th e psychological fo u n d a tio n o f th e u n ifo rm ity in th e em p lo y m e n t o f a p re d ic a te is n o t a p e rc e p tio n , is n o t a m erely sen su o u s re p re se n ta tio n . B u t if th e b ehaviouristicallyin te rp re te d p e rc e p tu a l m echanism can even be c o n s id e re d as th e psy­ chological fo u n d a tio n o f th e u n ifo rm em p lo y m e n t o f p red ic ate s, th e n m u st n o t th e re c o u rse to ab stract objects, w hich only b eco m es necessary fro m th e in tro sp ectiv e perspective, a p p e a r su sp ect (especially w hen we recall th a t th ese re p re se n ta tio n s a re no t fo u n d in in tro sp e c tio n b u t m erely postu lated )? T h e co n c ep tu alist m ay rep ly th a t n o th in g is ex p lain e d by th e re fe re n c e to th e s tim u lu s-re sp o n s e sch em a a n d its co n ditionability; th at, o n th e c o n tra ry , th e le arn in g -ca p acity o f in telli­ g e n t org an ism s is itself ju s t as p u zz lin g a n d in n ee d o f e x p la n a tio n as th e special capacity fo r le arn in g p red icates. T h is is co rrec t. B ut, firstly, this is to sh ift th e p ro b le m to a n o th e r level, th a t o f causal e x p lan a tio n ; a n d , secondly, o n e m u st p o in t o u t to th e co n c ep tu alist th a t if th e le a r n ­ in g o f p red ic ate s is only o n e case o f such a u n iv ersal b eh a v io u ral p h e ­ n o m e n o n as th e learnin g -cap acity o f in te llig en t o rg an ism s th e n th e re q u ire d e x p la n a tio n can only be conceived as a physiological o ne; u nless o n e also w ants to a ttrib u te th e capacity fo r re p re s e n tin g ab stra ct objects to m ice an d fish (always assu m in g th a t th e re p re s e n tin g o f ab stract objects could in any way explain th e capacity fo r a u n ifo rm resp o n se to sim ilar stim uli).8 W e arriv e at a definitive clarification o f th e situ atio n if we now re tu r n to W ittg e n stein ’s p rin cip le, w hich I assu m ed w ould be accep ted , in its m o st g e n e ra l in te rp re ta tio n , by th e o b je ct-o rien tate d p h ilo so p h e r. I h ad co n c ed e d to th e la tte r th e possibility th a t a linguistic ex p re ssio n is u sed (and h en c e also ex p lain ed ) in such a way th a t it is assig n ed to a r e p r e ­ sen tatio n o r stands fo r so m e th in g th a t is only inw ard ly accessible. W e can now use W ittg e n stein ’s p rin c ip le as a c rite rio n fo r d e c id in g w h e th e r th e co n c ep tu alist was r e fe rrin g to th e m e a n in g o f an ex p ressio n a t all w h en he asserte d th a t ex p lan a tio n by ex am p les is n o t e n o u g h , th a t th e ex p re ssio n m u st sta n d fo r so m e th in g id entical th a t we in w ard ly r e p r e ­ sent. C learly he was n o t if th e m e a n in g is w h at we ex p lain w hen we ex p lain th e m e an in g o f th e ex p ressio n . F o r even if we d isre g a rd in te r-

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subjective e x p la n a tio n an d assu m e th a t a p erso n exp lain s th e w o rd ‘r e d ’ to h im self in trospectively he can clearly only do so by placing b e fo re his in n er-ey e, n o t th a t a ttrib u te o f which th e re is no sensuous re p re s e n ta ­ tion, b u t exam ples. So it now becom es clear th a t w hat th e co n cep tu alist m issed in e x p la n a tio n by exam ples was n o t so m eth in g th a t b elo n g s to th e q u estio n o f m e a n in g b u t so m e th in g th a t co ncern s th e causal ex p la­ natio n o f u n d e rs ta n d in g . I f o n e accepts W ittg en stein ’s p rin cip le (in its w idest in te rp re ta tio n ) th e n h y p o th eses co n c ern in g th e causal e x p la n a ­ tion o f u n d e rs ta n d in g no m o re b elo n g to th e philosophical ex p lan atio n o f u n d e rs ta n d in g th a n they b elo n g in th e individual case to ex p lain in g how a p a rtic u la r ex p re ssio n is used. By o rie n ta tin g ourselves tow ards W ittg e n stein ’s p rin c ip le we can also see th a t o ne does n o t over-step the limits o f a specifically sem antic en q u iry sim ply by b rin g in g in psycho­ logical p h e n o m e n a ; o n e only does so if th e en q u iry assum es th e c h a r­ acter o f an e x p la n a tio n why. O f co u rse th e re is no law th a t o n e m u st accept W ittg en stein ’s p rin ci­ ple. B u t if o n e does n o t accept it one m u st be clear w hat it is o n e is really asking ab o u t. A n d we have ju s t seen th a t if w hat interests us is causal e x p la n a tio n th e n physiological hypo th eses a re p referab le to th e in tro sp e ctio n ist hypothesis. I f th e con cep tu alist n o n eth eless holds on to the in tro sp e c tio n ist s ta n d p o in t this is because he was originally m oving w ithin th e limits o f W ittg e n stein ’s d ictu m an d was n o t th in k in g o f a causal e x p la n a tio n at all. H e h a d sta rte d o u t from th e assu m p tio n th a t o n e exp lain s an in d iv id u al p re d ic ate -ex p ressio n to o n eself by assigning it to th e c o rre sp o n d in g a ttrib u te . B u t this thesis h a d to be ab a n d o n e d rig h t at th e b eg in n in g o f th e d e b a te with th e nom inalist, fo r in tro sp e c ­ tion fails to reveal such an object. O nly w hen th e co n cep tu alist asserted , in his critiq u e o f th e n o m inalist, th a t th e re must be such an object did he slip u n n o tic e d in to tre a tin g th e q u estio n as o n e o f hy p o th etical causal e x p lan a tio n . So we can now finally re g a rd th e o b je ct-o rien tated co n cep tio n o f p red ic ate s as h av in g b een disp o sed of. B u t have we alread y achieved a new co n c ep tio n o f th e m e a n in g o f pred icates th a t is fu n d a m e n ta l e n o u g h a n d precise en o u g h to replace th e object-o rien tated co n c ep ­ tion? W h a t we have so fa r re a c h e d are two definitions: (1) to ex p lain (or u n d e rsta n d ) a p re d ic a te is to ex p lain (or u n d e rsta n d ) w hat ch aracteriza tio n -fu n ctio n it has, (2) we ex p lain a p red ic ate o r th e m e an in g o f a p re d ic a te w hen we show (or know ) th e use o f th e p re d ic a te by m ean s of positive a n d n egative exam ples. I t is easy to see how th ese two d efin i­ tions a re co n n e cted : we ex p lain w hich ch aracterizatio n - (distinction-, classification-) fu n c tio n a p re d ic a te has by d e m o n stra tin g , by m ean s o f

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positive a n d negative exam ples, its m ode o f em p lo y m en t, o r we u n d e r ­ stand w h at ch a racteriza tio n -fu n ctio n the p red ic ate has i f we can u se it correctly, positively a n d negatively. F or this concep tio n o f th e m e an in g o f predicates th e use o f th e linguistic sign fo r characterizatio n is essen ­ tial an d does not m erely m ed iate this characterizatio n ; o n e can th e re ­ fo re call it a specifically language-analytical conception. T h a t th e p r e d ­ icate stands fo r an a ttrib u te is n o t d isp u ted by the new co nception; it m erely asserts th a t th e existence, o r know ledge, o f the attrib u te c a n n o t g ro u n d th e u n d e rsta n d in g o f th e p red icate, b u t is itself g ro u n d e d on this u n d e rsta n d in g . As re g a rd s fu n d am e n tality this ex p lan atio n o f th e m e an in g o f p r e d ­ icates can co m p are w ith th e o b ject-o rien tated ex p lan atio n , b u t n o t yet as reg a rd s clarity a n d distinctness. F or it is n o t yet clear w h at precisely is m ean t by ‘m ode o f em p lo y m e n t’, o r ‘co rrec t app licatio n to ex am p les’, notions th a t a re fu n d a m e n ta l to th e new ex p lan atio n . T h is can be show n by th e follow ing consid eratio n . T h e ex p lan a tio n o f a p red ic ate is su p p o sed to consist in th e d em o n stratio n by m eans o f exam ples o f its co rrect a n d in co rrect em p lo y m en t. T h a t th e p erso n to w hom a p r e d i­ cate has been ex p lain ed has u n d e rsto o d th e ex p lan atio n is show n by th e fact th a t h e uses it a n d only uses it as it was ex p lain ed to him . W ere h e to use it d iffe ren tly a n d w ere we still to say th a t he is u sin g it correctly this w ould m ean th a t th e ex p lan a tio n was incom p lete; we could n o lo n g er claim th a t w h at was being exp lain ed was th e m e an in g o f th e expression. B ut th e n it w ould seem th a t a m o d e o f em p lo y m e n t o f p redicates w ould resu lt th a t does n o t at all co rre sp o n d to th e ir actual m o de o f em ploym ent. T h e p red ic ate ‘re d ’, fo r exam ple, is ex p lain ed by ap p lying it to a p p ro p ria te objects given in p erc ep tio n . W ould it n o t th e n follow th a t he a n d only he has correctly u n d e rsto o d th e w ord ‘r e d ’ w ho uses it if an d only if so m e th in g red is p re se n t in th e p erc ep tu a l situation; a n d th a t h e a n d only h e correctly u n d e rsta n d s th e w ord ‘ra in ’ w ho uses it if an d only if it is rain in g ? W e can o f course imagine a p rim itive la n g u ag e in w hich expressions a re used in this way. I shall call expressions u se d in this way quasi-pred­ icates. O n e can p robably say th a t th e characterizatio n -ex p ressio n s chil­ d re n learn in th e first stage o f lan guage-acquisition are u sed in this way. A child learn s to say ‘bow-w ow ’ w hen it sees a dog, ‘m a m a ’ w hen th e p e rc e p tu a l p a tte rn o f th e m o th e r shows itself. W e a re n o t now co n ­ c e rn e d w ith w h eth e r it is a c o rre c t hypothesis o f d ev elo p m en tal psy­ chology to say th a t th e ch aracterizatio n -ex p ressio n s w hich ch ild ren first le arn are q u asi-predicates. I am u sin g th e q u asi-p red icate m erely as a th o u g h t-m o d e l o f an expressio n co m p arab le to a p red ic ate b u t se m an ­

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tically very m uch sim pler an d re fe r to child-langu ag e sim ply by way o f illustration. T h e characteristic fe a tu re o f q u asi-predicates is th a t in th e ir case em ploym ent-situation a n d ex p lan atio n -situ atio n are o f th e sam e kind. T h e ex p lan a tio n shows in w hat situation th e expressio n is to be used. In th e case o f predicates, by co n trast, it is clearly ch aracteristic th at th e ir n o rm al em p lo y m en t-situ atio n is n o t o f th e sam e kind as th e ir e x p la n a ­ tion-situation. I f th e n we wish to hold on to th e view th at w hat is ex plained w hen an expression is ex p lain ed is its m o d e o f em p lo y m en t (and we m u st hold on to it fo r this connection is analytically co n tain ed in th e m e an in g o f th e w ord ‘ex p lan a tio n ’) th e n it follows th a t the ex p la­ n ation o f a p red ic ate , a n d hence too its m o d e o f em p lo y m en t, is m o re com plicated th a n could have been g a th e re d fro m th e acco u n t given so far. As I have so fa r described th e m e an in g o f p red icates it rem ain s in d e te rm in a te w h e th e r we a re speaking o f predicates o r q u asi-p re d i­ cates, o r m o re correctly: so far w hat has b een exp lain ed has n o t b ee n th e m e an in g o f p redicates, b u t th a t o f quasi-predicates. T h e difficulty we h e re com e u p against is no m ere q u estio n o f detail. It can n o t be dealt w ith by m erely su p p le m e n tin g w hat has been said so far, for it concerns th e fo u n d a tio n o f th e sem antic th e o ry th at is to be w orked out. It concerns the questio n o f how th e m o d e o f em p lo y m en t o f p redicates, an d h en c e th a t o f th e o th e r expressio n s o f o u r lan g u ag e, is to be u n d e rsto o d . T h e n otion o f th e use (or em ploym ent) an d o f th e rules o f use is, as we have seen, still extrem ely vague. It still also fits th e objectual conception. T h e questio n which now arises is: if the use o f linguistic expressions is no t re g u la te d by re fe re n c e to objects th e n by re fe re n c e to w hat is it reg u lated ? T h e answ er th a t m ost readily suggests itself is: by refe re n c e to th e circum stances o f use. It looks as th o u g h if o n e does n o t assign linguistic expressions to re p re se n ta tio n s o f objects - fro m th e in n e r-p ersp e ctiv e so to speak - th e n th e only altern ativ e is to assign th e m to the circum stances o f use - in the o u te r-p ersp e ctiv e so to speak. T h u s we re a d in W ittgenstein th a t w hen o n e asks fo r th e m ean in g o f a linguistic expressio n one sho u ld ask o n eself in w hat so rt o f circum stances it is u se d .9 N ow it is precisely this con cep tio n w hich breaks dow n w hen ap p lied to predicates, fo r it results in th e ir b eing ex plained as quasi-predicates. O f q u asi-predicates we can in d e ed say th a t to ex p lain th e m is to explain in w hat circum stan ces - in w hat situ ­ ation - they are to be used; a n d th at a sp e ak e r o f th e q u asi-p red icate lan g u ag e u n d e rsta n d s such an expression is show n by his using it in th e co rrect circum stances. I f predicates ca n n o t be u n d e rsto o d in this way an d if it sho u ld e m erg e th a t th e o th e r expressio n s ca n n o t be u n d e r ­

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sto o d in this way e ith e r th e n th e q u estio n arises: w hat o th e r possible way is th e re o f u n d e rs ta n d in g th e ir m o d e o f e m p lo y m e n t if it is to be n e ith e r by re fe re n c e to re p re se n ta tio n s o f objects n o r by re fe re n c e to circu m stan ces o f use? O u r f u r th e r analyses o f th e sem antics o f p red ic ativ e sentences m u st b e o rie n ta te d tow ards this question. W h at is at issue is th e fo rm a tio n o f a co n c ep tu ality a d e q u a te to th e u n d e rs ta n d in g o f o u r lin g u istic e x p re s ­ sions, initially in th e p a rtia l are a o f th e p red ic ativ e asserto ric sentence. A new concep tu ality d o es no t sim ply fall fro m h eav en . W e can only w ork it o u t ste p by step, taking as o u r sta rtin g -p o in t p rev io u s c o n c ep ­ tualities an d th e ir d efects revealed in th e a tte m p t to ap p ly them . By way o f p re p a ra tio n fo r the n e x t steps I w ould to d ay ju s t like to d ra w y o u r a tte n tio n to a f u rth e r d istinction betw een p red ic ate s a n d q u asi-p red icates. T h e q u asi-p re d ica te ‘r e d ’ also d iffe rs fro m th e p r e d i­ cate ‘r e d ’ in th a t it is used as an in d e p e n d e n t linguistic ex p ressio n ; it is a o n e-w o rd se n te n c e ,10 w hereas th e p re d ic a te req u ires s u p p le m e n ta ­ tio n , in the sim plest case su p p le m e n ta tio n by a sin g u lar te rm . T h is d if ­ fe re n c e b etw een p re d ic a te an d q u a si-p re d ic a te is so ch aracteristic th a t w e can ex p e ct th a t w h e re v e r a w o rd fu n ctio n s an alo g o u sly to a p r e d i­ cate (nam ely as a ch a racteriza tio n -ex p ressio n ) b u t is u se d in d e p e n ­ d en tly it is a q u asi-p re d ica te, i.e. a ch a racteriza tio n -ex p ressio n w hose e m p lo y m e n t is situ atio n -rela te d . W h a t follows fro m this fo r th e m e a n ­ in g o f p red icates? T h a t it will only be possible to u n d e rs ta n d th e m in th e co n tex t o f th e su p p le m e n tab ility by sin g u la r term s, certainly. B ut h e r e two o p p o sin g h y p o th e ses a re conceivable. Firstly o n e could s u p ­ p o se th a t it is only becau se p red ic ate s ca n n o t be em p lo y ed in d e p e n ­ d en tly th a t they ca n n o t b e u n d e rs to o d by re fe re n c e to th e situ atio n o f th e ir em p lo y m e n t; to this su p p o sitio n w ould c o rre s p o n d th e h y p o th esis th a t th e m e a n in g o f whole sen ten ces, p red ic ativ e sen ten ces, an d th e n o th e rs, can be u n d e rs to o d com pletely by re fe re n c e to th e circu m stan ces o f th e ir em p lo y m e n t. T h e second possibility w ould be th a t it is precisely th e su p p le m e n ta tio n o f p red ic ate s by sin g u lar term s w hich m akes th e e m p lo y m e n t o f p red ic ate s, a n d h e n c e th a t o f w hole p red ic ativ e se n ­ tences, situation-independent. If th a t is so th e n only if we ap p ro a c h th e q u estio n co n c e rn in g th e u n d e rs ta n d in g o f sin g u la r te rm s in th e sam e specifically language-analytical m a n n e r in w hich, in th e last two lec­ tu res, we h av e a p p ro a c h e d th e q u estio n co n c e rn in g th e u n d e rs ta n d in g o f p red ic ate s can we a rriv e at a new u n d e rs ta n d in g o f th e m e an in g o f p red ic ate s w hich relates n e ith e r in trospectively to th e re p re s e n ta tio n o f objects n o r b eh aviouristically to th e circum stances o f em p lo y m en t. Y ou will alre ad y h av e g a th e re d fro m th e way in w hich I have c h a r ­

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acterized these two h y p o th e ses th a t I h o ld th e second to be th e co rrect on e. I in te n d , how ever, to ex a m in e th e first hypoth esis first a n d will n ot ex a m in e th e second till m uch later. F o r it will e m e rg e th a t fo r a p ro m ­ ising clarification o f th e em p lo y m e n t-ru le s o f th e two co m p o n en ts o f a p red ic ativ e se n ten c e we re q u ire a te n ab le p relim in ary co n cep tio n o f the e m p lo y m e n t-ru le o f the w hole sentence. Such a co n cep tio n ca n n o t be ach ieved at a stroke.

LECTURE

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T he meaning of an expression and the circumstances of its use. Dispute with a behaviouristic conception

I f th e m e an in g o f a linguistic sign can n o t be u n d e rsto o d in term s o f th e sign’s sta n d in g fo r an object th e n th e view w hich m ost readily suggests itself is th a t to u n d e rs ta n d a sign is to know in which circum stances it is to be used. A t th e e n d o f th e last lectu re I trie d to show th a t as re g a rd s th e use o f p red icates at any ra te this con cep tio n will n o t do; how ever I also raised th e question o f w h e th e r this conceptio n m ig h t nev erth eless be c o rre c t in the case o f all in d e p e n d e n t u tte ran ce s a n d h en ce in th e case o f w hole assertoric sentences. B efore we reject th e thesis th a t th e m ean in g o f an ex p ressio n consists in th e circum stances o f its u se we m ust subject it to a m o re fu n d a m e n ta l ex am inatio n . In §117 o f his Philosophical Investigations W ittgenstein writes: ‘If, fo r ex am ple, som eone says th a t th e sentence . . . has m e an in g fo r him , th e n he should ask h im self in w hat p articu la r circum stances this sen ten ce is actually u se d .’ A n d as W ittgenstein says in a n o th e r place the use is th ereby co n n e cted with o u r o th e r activities. By way o f ex p lan atio n h e presen ts, at th e b e g in n in g o f th e Investigations, som e exam ples o f ‘la n ­ guages m o re p rim itive th a n o u r ow n’ (§2). A n exam ple, w hich is f u r th e r elab o rate d in th e follow ing p a ra g ra p h s, is d escribed in §2: ‘Let us im a g ­ in e a la n g u ag e . . . w hich is m e a n t to serve fo r com m u n icatio n b etw een a b u i l d e r a n d an a s sista n t# . A is building with b u ilding-stones: th e re a re blocks, pillars, slabs an d beam s. B has to pass h im th e stones, a n d th a t in th e o rd e r in w hich A n ee d s them . F o r this p u rp o se they u se a lan g u ag e consisting o f the w ords “block”, “pillar”, “slab”, “b e a m ”. A calls th e m out; - B b rin g s th e sto n e which h e has le a rn t to b rin g at suchan d -such a call.’ W ittgenstein adds: ‘conceive this as a co m p lete p rim i­ tive la n g u a g e ’. S om ew hat later we read : ‘W e can also th in k o f th e w hole process o f using w ords in §2 as o n e o f tho se gam es by m ean s o f w hich ch ild ren le arn th e ir native language. I will call these gam es “lan g u ag e-

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g am es” . . . I shall also call the w hole, consisting o f la n g u ag e an d th e actions into w hich it is w oven, th e “lan g u ag e -g a m e” ’ (§7). T h e lan g u ag e o f §2 is a m ore realistic m odel o f a situ atio n -rela te d lan guage th a n th e quasi-p red icate lan g u ag e I p rese n ted in th e last lec­ tu re , m ore realistic because this lan g u ag e-g am e fulfils an intelligible com m unicative p u rp o se. I f the e m p lo y m e n t-ru le o f ex p ressio n s sim ply consisted in all m em bers o f th e linguistic com m unity u tte rin g such-andsuch an expressio n in such-and-such circum stances this w ould have no obvious com m unicative significance a n d o ne could n o t explain how such a la n g u ag e dev elo p ed in a biological species, unless it rep rese n ts (as we can assum e in th e case o f child-language) a ru d im e n ta ry stage o f a h igher-level language. O f course this in no way affects th e usefulness o f th e q u asi-p red icate lan g u ag e as a th o u g h t-m o d e l. H ow ever, even fo r th e child -lan g u ag e it is m o re realistic to conceive o f its sem antics as b ein g en ric h e d in th e follow ing way: the child does n o t only u tte r a p a rtic u la r so u n d w hen a p articu la r p erc ep tu a l situation is given b u t also w hen it w ishes it to be given; it le arn s to say ‘m a m a’ n o t only w hen its m o th e r is th e re b u t also w hen it w ould like h e r to com e. T h u s th e q u asi­ p red ic ate is used both quasi-indicatively a n d q u asi-im p erativ ely -o p tatively; an d th e im p e rativ e -o p tativ e m ode o f em p lo y m en t is clearly p u r ­ poseful. T h e p a tte rn o f ex p lan atio n o f such expressions rem ains in p rin cip le th e sam e a n d we can th e re fo re also speak o f q u asi-p red icates th a t are u se d both indicatively a n d im peratively. In b o th cases th e ex p lan atio n has th e fo rm : ‘if such-and-such circum stances o btain, suchand -such an ex pression is u se d ’; th e only d iffe ren ce w ould be th a t in o n e case th e circum stances consist o f th e p erc ep tu a l situ atio n an d in th e o th e r case o f th e need-situ atio n ; in th e one case they are ex tern al stim ­ uli in th e o th e r in te rn a l stim uli which, how ever, are d irec ted to th e p ro d u c tio n o f ex tern al stim uli. H ow ever, as W ittgenstein him self em phasized o n e can h ard ly speak o f ‘ex p la n a tio n ’ in th e case o f child-language in the first stage o f its d ev elo p m en t; it is m o re a p p ro p ria te to speak o f ‘tra in in g ’ (§5). T o speak o f ‘ex p lain in g ’ p resu p p o se s th a t th e o n e to w hom an ex p ressio n is ex p lain ed already u n d e rsta n d s th e w ords ‘co rrec t’ a n d ‘in c o rre c t’. T h u s h e learn s a ru le to which h e conforms; h e learns th e m o d e o f em p lo y m e n t th a t is co rrec t relative to an actio n -n o rm . (For th e exis­ ten ce o f an actio n -n o rm it is n o t necessary th a t it be cap ab le o f bein g fo rm u late d . Its existence am o u n ts sim ply to this: th a t certain actions can be called ‘co rrec t’ a n d o th e rs ‘in c o rrec t’.) I f th e m o d e o f em p lo y ­ m e n t is n o t being explained th e n we are d ea lin g sim ply with a causal co nnection th e m echanism o f w hich can be u n d e rsto o d p u rely in term s

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o f th e b ehaviouristic th e o ry o f le a rn in g . T h e child learns, th ro u g h socalled ‘in stru m e n ta l co n d itio n in g ’, th a t in su c h -an d -su ch ex te rn a l o r in te rn a l circum stances (in th e e n v iro n m e n t o r th e o rg an ism ) it can th ro u g h such-an d -su ch an activity - th e u tte rin g o f a p a rtic u la r so u n d - p ro d u c e a positive stim u lu s o r p re v e n t a n eg a tiv e one. T h e positive stim u lu s fu n ctio n s as a so-called ‘re w a rd ’ o r ‘re in fo rc e m e n t’ which causally m otivates the co n d itio n e d resp o n se . In th e case o f th e im p e ra ­ tively em plo y ed q u asi-p re d ica te th e re w a rd consists in th e p ro d u c tio n o f th e stim ulus associated w ith th e ex p re ssio n ; in th e case o f its in d ica­ tive em p lo y m e n t it consists in th e p leased re a c tio n o f th e adults. F or o u r p u rp o ses, how ever, we can d isre g a rd th e q u estio n o f w hat m oti­ vates th e association betw een circum stances (in te rn a l o r ex tern al) an d th e use o f th e sign; in d e e d we can ig n o re a lto g e th e r th e q u estio n o f w h e th e r this association is explained o r causally p ro d u c e d by co n d itio n ­ ing. We can th e re fo re also ig n o re th e q u estio n o f w h e th e r o n e can sp e ak o f th e meaning o f a sign an d understanding a t all w h e re th e use o f th e sign is le a rn e d by c o n d itio n in g (clearly n o t if o n e can only speak o f ‘m e a n in g ’ a n d ‘u n d e r s ta n d in g ’ w h ere o n e can also speak o f ‘e x p lan a­ tio n ’; on th e o th e r h a n d o n e sh o u ld n ev e r g et b o g g ed d o w n in such v erbal questions: r a th e r o n e sh o u ld leave o p e n th e possibility o f th e re b ein g , e.g., a w id er a n d a n a rro w e r c o n c ep t o f m ean in g ). W e can d is­ re g a rd this distinction - which in o th e r co n tex ts is fu n d a m e n ta l b ecause th e im p o rta n t p o in t in o u r co n te x t is u n a ffe c te d by it. W h e th e r th e ru le in q u estio n is a normative ru le , i.e. a ru le w hich th e sign-user follows, o r a causal ru le , i.e. a m e re objective re g u la rity w hich can be n o te d by an o b serv er - th u s w h e th e r th e ru le is o f th e fo rm ‘if such an d such conditions obtain this ex p re ssio n is to be u s e d ’ o r ‘if such an d such co n d itio n s o b ta in this ex p re ssio n is u s e d ’ - m b o th cases it is a m atter o f th e association o f th e use o f a sign w ith a p a rtic u la r p e rc e p tu a l situation, w ith p a rtic u la r perceived circu m stan ces o r conditio n s. In so far as such a ru le , w h e th e r it be c o n stru e d as a causal ru le o r a n o rm ativ e ru le, assigns th e use o f th e sign to c e rta in circum stances (conditions) I shall call it a ‘co n d itio n al r u le ’. T h e q u e stio n o f w h e th e r th e m e a n in g o f o u r linguistic expressio n s consists in th e circu m stan ces o f th e ir use can th e re fo re also be fo rm u la te d th u s: a re th e em p lo y m e n t-ru le s o f o u r linguistic expressio n s to be c o n s tru e d as in this sense co n d itio n al rules? T h e lan g u ag e -g a m e w hich W ittg e n stein p re se n ts in §2 is also d istin ­ g u ish e d fro m th e q u asi-p re d ica te la n g u ag e e n ric h e d by th e q u asi­ im p e rativ e e m p lo y m e n t-fo rm in th a t it takes a c co u n t o f th e communica­ tive aspect o f all n a tu ra l - w h e th e r h u m a n o r an im al - languages. A sign is n o t only used by som eone; it is also d irec ted to so m eo n e (or

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several persons). W e m u st th e re fo re distinguish betw een sp e ak e r a n d h e a r e r or, m o re g enerally, betw een th e em itte r an d th e receiver(s) o f th e sign. In W ittg e n ste in ’s ex a m p le it is only in resp ect to th e sp e ak e r th a t o n e can say th a t th e sign is associated with th e circum stances o f its use. In re g a rd to th e h e a r e r - in th e exam p le th e assistant - on th e o th e r h a n d , w h e th e r o r n o t h e u n d e rsta n d s th e sign is show n by w h e th e r w hen h e perceives th e sign h e p e rfo rm s a p a rtic u la r act. H o w ­ ever, th e h e a re r-ru le is also a co n d itio n a l rule; th e only d iffe ren ce is th a t now th e co n d itio n is th e sig n -ev e n t its e lf: if th e sign is h e a rd such a n d such an activity is c a rrie d out. T h is ru le can also be c o n s tru e d b oth no rm ativ ely a n d causally. I t is only in this m o d el th a t we h av e a realistic m odel o f a prim itive la n g u ag e, fo r it is only in this m o d e l th a t an in tersu b jectiv e p u rp o se o f sig n -em p lo y m e n t becom es evident. In fact o n e can say th a t all actual p rim itiv e la n g u ag e s w hich in c o n tra st to child-lang u ag e are n o t p re lim ­ in a ry stages b u t alre ad y fu n c tio n purp o siv ely in th e ir ow n rig h t, h en ce all an im al-la n g u ag e s, c o n fo rm to this schem a. H en ce th e e n tire b eh av ­ io u ristic th e o ry o f la n g u a g e takes its d e p a r tu re fro m th is schem a. A cco rd in g to this c o n c e p tio n th e fu n ctio n o f th e sign is to m ed iate b etw een stim u lu s a n d re sp o n se a n d in this way to m ake it possible th a t th e one c o m m u n ic a tio n -p a rtn e r has o r receives th e stim u lu s an d th e other exhibits th e a p p r o p r ia te re s p o n s e .1 T h u s in W ittg en stein ’s ex a m ­ ple A n eeds a p a rtic u la r b u ild in g -sto n e an d in stead o f p e rfo rm in g th e a p p ro p ria te actio n h im se lf h e p e rfo rm s a substitute-action w hich fo r its p a rt ex erts a stim ulus o n B w hich b rin g s it a b o u t t h a t # p e rfo rm s th e action. T h u s th e sign m akes it possible fo r th e o n e to act fo r th e o th e r, b u t also fo r th e o n e to p erc eiv e fo r th e o th e r. T h e latter is th e case, fo r ex a m p le , w ith w arn in g o r feeding-signals: o n e p a rtn e r perceives th e situ atio n a n d does n o t h im se lf re s p o n d (or is n o t th e only o n e to re sp o n d ) b u t r a th e r p e rfo rm s an actio n w hich serves as a su b stitu te stim ulus fo r th e o th e r p a r tn e rs such th a t they can re sp o n d a p p r o p r i­ ately to th e situ atio n w ith o u t p erc eiv in g it them selves. W e can call signs w ith this so rt o f com m unicativ e fu n ctio n ‘signals’. T h is te rm in o lo g y is n o t u n d is p u te d . T h e r e are a u th o rs 2 w ho only call signs o f this k in d ‘signals’ if th e ir e m p lo y m e n t bo th by th e em itte r a n d th e receiver is n o t le a rn e d b u t in n a te , as in the la n g u ag e o f bees. H o w ­ ev er, in th e c o n te x t o f o u r in v estig atio n the distinction betw een th e le a rn e d a n d in n a te e m p lo y m e n t o f such signs is n o t im p o rta n t, p a rtic ­ u larly as I shall also be ig n o rin g th e (m uch m o re fu n d a m e n ta l) d istin c­ tio n b etw een th o se signs o f this k in d w hose ru les a re causal an d those w hose ru les a re n o rm a tiv e a n d w hich we m ust u n d e rs ta n d as co n v en ­

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tio n al signals. A lth o u g h W ittgenstein says th a t th e la n g u ag e-g am e that h e describes is le a rn t th ro u g h ‘tra in in g ’ it em erges clearly fro m later p arts o f th e Investigations th a t he u n d e rs ta n d s th e rules as n o rm ativ e a n d th e signs as conventional. A m o re serious u n ce rtain ty co n cern in g th e in te rp re ta tio n o f W ittgenstein’s lan g u ag e-g am es has to d o with the qu estio n o f w h e th e r he in te n d s to c o n tra st th em as ‘prim itive lan g u ag es’ with th e lan g u ag e we actually speak o r w h eth e r h e in ten d s th e m to be u n d e rsto o d as a sim ple m o d el o f how even o u r la n g u ag e fu nctions. T h e thesis th a t o u r lan g u ag e is a signal-language a n d th at it is to be u n d e r ­ stood o n the m o d e l o f co n d itio n e d responses (only in a m o re com pli­ cated way) is p ro p o u n d e d by th e b eh a v io u rist th e o ry o f lan g u ag e; w h e th e r W ittgenstein h eld a c o rre sp o n d in g view, th o u g h with a n o r­ m ative ra th e r th a n a causal in te rp re ta tio n o f rules, is a q u estio n we can leave o pen. A nyw ay it is this thesis - th a t o u r linguistic ex p ressio n s fu n c tio n as signals o r th a t th e ir rules a re conditio n al rules - th a t we have to exam ine. It is th e m o re g en e ral a n d m o re fu n d a m e n ta l fo rm o f th e thesis th a t th e m e an in g o f an ex p re ssio n consists in th e circu m ­ stances o f its em ploym ent. I w ould first like to p o in t o u t tw o fu n d a m e n ta l difficulties which im m ediately becom e a p p a r e n t if on e a ttem p ts to co n stru e th e sentences o f o u r la n g u ag e as signal-signs. T h e first is th a t the m e an in g o f a signalsign is not th e sam e fo r sp e ak e r an d h e a re r. T h u s th e b eh av io u rist lang u ag e -th eo rist L eo n a rd B loom field w rites th a t th e ‘m e a n in g ’ o f an ex p re ssio n is ‘th e situation in w hich th e sp eak er u tte rs it and th e reac­ tion w hich it calls fo rth in th e h e a r e r ’.3 A ttem pts have b een m a d e to gloss o ver this fact, p o in tin g o u t th a t every m e m b er o f a linguistic com ­ m u n ity can, d e p e n d in g on th e situation, assum e b o th th e ro le o f th e sp e a k e r an d th a t o f th e h e a re r an d o n e can th e re fo re say th a t so m eo n e only u n d e rsta n d s th e ex p ressio n if he know s both co n d itio n al rules. B u t even so this co nception does n o t fit th e sentences o f o u r lan g u ag e. O r p u ttin g it m o re cautiously: it at least does not c o rre sp o n d w ith o u r o rd in a ry u n d e rs ta n d in g to say th a t a sen ten ce does n o t have o n e an d th e sam e m e an in g fo r sp e ak e r an d h e a re r. T h e r e is h e re revealed a pecu liar co n tra st betw een th e two th eo ries o f m e an in g th a t I have so fa r discussed. T h e o b ject-o rien tated th e o ry o f m e an in g h ad sim ply ig n o re d th e com m unicativ e fu n ctio n o f la n ­ g u age; as it did n o t expressly reflect on the fact th a t an ex p ressio n is used it was also able to overlook the s p e a k e r- h e a re r relatio n . F ro m this p o sition th e fact th at an ex p ressio n has only one m ean in g fo r sp e ak e r a n d h e a re r a p p e a rs entirely u n p ro b lem atic . T h e b eh av io u rist co n c ep ­ tio n on th e o th e r h a n d rig h tly took th e com m unicativ e situ atio n as its

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startin g -p o in t. H ow ever, its o rien tatio n tow ards sig n al-lan g u ag es led to sp e ak e r-m ea n in g a n d h e a re r-m e a n in g bein g se p a ra te d . A satisfactory analysis o f th e m e an in g o f o u r linguistic ex pression s can ig n o re n e ith e r th e com m unicative aspect o f la nguage n o r th e id e n tity o f m e an in g fo r sp e a k e r an d h e a re r; an d we will th e re fo re have to ask how this identity o f m e an in g is co n stitu ted fro m w ithin th e s p e a k e r- h e a re r situation. T h is is a way o f fo rm u la tin g th e q u estio n which is sim ilar to th e way in w hich it h ad alre ad y been fo rm u la te d in the first th ird o f this ce n tu ry by th e A m erican social-psychologist G eo rg e H . M e ad .4 In stea d o f sim ­ ply taking th e iden tity o f m e an in g fo r g ra n te d as in th e o b ject-o rien ­ ta ted conception one sh o u ld , ac co rd in g to M ead, tak e as o n e ’s startin g p o in t th e biologically m o re prim itive an d th eoretically u n p ro b le m a tic signal-languages an d ask w hat in th e way o f b e h a v io u r m u st be ad d e d fo r sp e ak e r a n d h e a re r to be able to re fe r to so m eth in g identical. A ccording to M ead this is only possible if th e sp e ak e r im plicitly cop e rfo rm s th e resp o n se o f th e p a rtn e r a n d likewise th e h e a re r th e action o f th e speaker. I f th a t is correct, th e n an identical m e an in g which is in d e p e n d e n t o f th e specific com m unicatio n -ro les o f sp e ak e r a n d h e a re r w ould only be co n stitu ted by th e division o f th e co m m u n icatio n -ev en t in to speaker- a n d h e a re r-ro le s beco m in g explicit fo r sp e ak e r an d h e a re r them selves, in th a t each o n e in th e p e rfo rm a n c e o f his role cop e rfo rm s th a t o f th e o th e r. T h is th e o ry , th a t each o f th e p a rtn e rs in te r­ nalizes th e ro le o f th e o th e r, also explains, acco rd in g to M ead, how it is th a t som eone can talk to him self. H ow ever, M e ad ’s th eo ry rem a in ed p ro g ra m m a tic . H e did n o t show how th e im plicit co -p e rfo rm an ce o f th e p a r tn e r ’s resp o n se in o n e ’s ow n action is concretely to be conceived. B u t we can re ta in his co n cep tio n as a h y pothetical p ersp ectiv e fo r o u r f u r th e r analysis. I f d espite this obvious d iffe ren ce betw een senten ces an d signals viz. th a t sentences have only one m e an in g , we ex a m in e th e thesis o f th e sig n al-ch aracter o f o u r la n g u ag e in relatio n to th o se sen ten ces which a re o u r im m ed ia te co n cern - pred icativ e assertoric sentences - th en we find ourselves im m ediately facing a second difficulty. F o r a signallan g u ag e clearly o ffers n o ro o m fo r assertoric sentences. I f o n e seeks to ap p ly th e distinction b etw een indicative a n d im p erativ e sentences, w hich is essential to o u r lan g u ag e, to a signal-sign o n e can in te rp re t th e signal b oth as a sta te m en t th a t so m e th in g is th e case an d as an im p e ra ­ tive th a t so m eth in g is to be do n e; b u t precisely because b o th in te r p re ­ tations are possible both a re o u t o f place. Is a b ee-d an ce to be co n stru e d as in fo rm in g th a t th e re is h o n ey in a p a rtic u la r place o r as a co m m an d to fly there? Is a w arning-cry to be co n stru e d as in fo rm a tio n th a t th e re

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is d a n g e r o r as a c o m m an d to ru n away? Such a d istin ctio n w ould clearly only be m e a n in g fu l if it b e lo n g ed to th e ru le s o f th e lan g u ag e g am e th a t th e re c ip ie n t does n o t m erely re sp o n d w ith th e resp o n se a p p r o p r ia te to th e e m itte r’s stim ulus b u t also has th e possibility o f re s p o n d in g to th e e m itte r’s giving o f a sign as su ch . A lth o u g h we are n o t yet able to say w hat th e em p lo y m e n t-ru le s a r e w hich d e te rm in e w h e th e r a se n ten c e is asserto ric o r im p e rativ e this m u c h at least is clear: a sign can only be u se d assertorically o r im p e rativ e ly if th e re c ip ie n t has th e possibility o f re sp o n d in g to th e giving o f th e sign as an a sserto ric o r im p e ra tiv e giving o f a sign. T h e possibility o f re sp o n s e to th e giving o f th e sign itself is in o u r se n ten c e-la n g u ag e co n ta in e d in th e p h e n o m e n o n o f p o sitio n -tak in g (Stellungnahme). T a k e a situ atio n in w hich a signal co u ld also be given (e.g. th e alarm -cry ‘fire ’). T h e re c ip ie n t can re sp o n d to th e se n ten c e in th e sam e way th a t h e can re s p o n d to th e signal. B u t it is also possible fo r him , instead o f re sp o n d in g , to re p ly to th e sen ten ce, to ta k e u p a p o sitio n to w ard s it. T h e sim plest fo rm o f p o sitio n -tak in g is d en ial a n d d e p e n d in g on how th e w o rd ‘n o ’ is used a n d w h at it is to w ard s w hich a positio n is ta k en th e se n ten c e is rev e ale d as an im p e r­ ative o r an indicative. It m ay be su rm ise d th a t th e two fe a tu re s w hich alre a d y a t first glance seem to d istin g u ish th e sen ten ces o f o u r la n g u a g e fro m signals b elo n g to g e th e r. It w ould now seem plausible to look u p o n th e position-taking o f th e re c ip ie n t as th a t re sp o n se o f th e p a r tn e r w hich, ac co rd in g to M ead, is im plicitly co -p e rfo rm e d by th e em itte r. F o r th e n eg ativ e o r affirm ativ e p o sitio n -tak in g o f th e re c ip ie n t is a re sp o n se o f th e kind b ein g looked fo r; o n e w hich is a lre ad y a n tic ip a te d in th e e m itte r ’s u se o f th e sign. W h e n we u tte r a sentence w h e th e r asserto rically o r im p e r­ atively, we m e an it as o n e th a t can be d e n ie d . T h e a p p r o p r ia te re sp o n se o f th e p a r tn e r to a sen ten ce, in c o n tra st to th a t to a signal, is n o t th e p e rfo rm a n c e o f a n action b u t th e a ffirm atio n o r d en ial o f th e sen ten ce. In th e case o f th e im p e rativ e th e p e rfo rm a n c e o f th e actio n is also a possible resp o n se . B u t this p e rfo rm a n c e o f th e actio n is to b e u n d e r ­ sto o d as a ffirm a tio n , so m e th in g essentially d if fe r e n t fro m th e m e re r e s p o n s e ;5 fo r in stea d o f p e rfo rm in g th e action o n e can re p ly w ith a ‘n o ’. In yes/no p o sitio n -tak in g , as in th e o th e r p o sitio n -tak in g s such as q u estio n in g , d o u b tin g a n d so on w hich a re g ro u n d e d in th e possibility o f yes/no p o sitio n -tak in g , th e re c ip ie n t is clearly re f e r rin g to the same thing as th e e m itte r, albeit in a d iffe re n t way. A n d if th e ru le s fo r th e e m p lo y m e n t o f th e se n ten c e by th e e m itte r can be show n to be such as re la te its e m p lo y m e n t to th e possible p o sitio n -tak in g s o f th e recip ien t, th e n th e e m itte r is alread y re fe rrin g to th e sam e th in g as th e possible

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recipients. In this way M e a d ’s p ro g ra m m a tic hypoth esis w ould be given d efin ite c o n ten t. O f co u rse these reflections a re them selves still p r o ­ g ram m atic, fo r o n e w ould first have to show th a t an d how yes/no p o si­ tio n -ta k in g belongs to th e em p lo y m e n t-ru le o f sentences. Initially we a re only co n c ern ed w ith assertoric sentences an d in p a r ­ tic u la r with pred icativ e assertoric sentences. A fte r th ese very g en e ral a n d an ticip ato ry reflections I com e now to th e p ro m ised ex am in atio n o f th e thesis th a t th e em p lo y m e n t-ru le s o f pred icativ e sentences can be u n d e rs to o d as co n d itio n al rules a n d , specifically, in acco rd an ce with th e sch em a o f a signal-language. T h e g en e ral difficulties ju s t re fe rre d to d o n o t r e n d e r a d etailed ex a m in a tio n su p erflu o u s. F o r it is only by m eans o f th e p recise critical e x a m in a tio n o f existing theo ries th a t we can h o p e to m ake new positive ap p ro a ch es. I w ant to co n d u c t th e discussion w ith re fe re n c e to an ex am ple. I shall choose an ex a m p le w hich because it is a p p ro p ria te to a co n tex t o f action is as acco m m o d atin g as possible to th e theory to be criticized: th e se n ­ te n ce ‘T h e tow n-hall is on fire.’ O n e can easily im ag in e situations in w hich it w ould be ju s t as a p p ro p ria te to use this sen ten ce as th e signalex p re ssio n ‘F ire !’ N ow ac co rd in g to th e th e o ry to be ex am in ed th e m e a n in g o f th e se n ten c e consists o f two conditio n al ru les: the co rrec t u n d e r s ta n d in g o f th e h e a re r is show n by th e fact th at h e resp o n d s to th e se n ten c e in a specific way; a n d th e co rrec t use by th e sp e ak e r is sh o w n by th e fact th a t h e uses th e sen ten ce in specific circum stances. So if th e th eo ry is c o rrec t it m u st be possible to specify th e p articu la r re a c ­ tion o f th e h e a r e r an d th e p a rtic u la r situation o f th e sp e ak e r w hich to g e th e r a re su p p o se d to co n stitu te th e m e an in g o f this sentence. I shall b eg in with th e h e a re r. S u p p o se so m eo n e com es h e re into th e le c tu re -ro o m a n d u tte rs th e se n ten c e ‘T h e tow n-hall is on fire.’ H ow w ould we react? P robably m any o f us w ould n o t react at all, o th e rs w o uld ask th e m an to leave us in peace, o th e rs w ould ask him how h e know s this, o th e rs w ould p e rh a p s lau g h a n d o th e rs m ig h t ru n o u t with v arious aim s; in sh o rt th e re is no q u estio n o f a ru le-g o v ern ed co n n ex io n b etw een th e h e a rin g o f th e sen ten ce an d p a rtic u la r actions. T o avoid this m anifest n o n se n se to which th e theo ry seem s to lead b eh av io u rist th e o rists in tro d u c e d th e concept o f an actio n -d isp o sitio n .6 A sen ten ce ca n only have a practical m e an in g , o ne m ig h t say, in c e rta in situations. F o r ex am p le, th e se n ten c e ‘T h e tow n-hall is on fire’ does n o t have a p ractical m e a n in g if so m e o n e u tte rs it h e re in th e le ctu re-ro o m b u t it d o es if so m e o n e is rin g in g th e fire-b rig ad e. T o escape th e objection th a t we n ev e rth ele ss u n d e rs ta n d th e se n ten c e w hen it is u tte re d h e re in th e le c tu re -ro o m a n d we do n o t b elo n g to th e fire -b rig a d e it is ex p lain ed

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th a t th e m e an in g consists n o t in an action b u t in an action-disposition; th a t we h e re a n d now u n d e rsta n d th e sentence ‘T h e tow n-hall is on fire’ m eans th at it aw akens a disposition in us such th a t if we w ere th e fireb rig a d e we w ould rush o u t to extinguish the fire. B u t o n e could ju s t as well say th e m e an in g consists in th e disposition to ru n o u t in to th e street if o n e w ere an o cc u p an t o f th e tow n-hall. T h e r e are any n u m b e r o f d iffe re n t situations in w hich this se n ten ce can be practically relevant. A m o n g arsonists, fo r exam ple, it can be used as an a n n o u n c e m e n t o f success. T h e a tte m p t to co n stru e an assertoric sen ten ce as a signal th u s leads to th e re su lt th a t n o t ju s t two m eanings m u st be a ttrib u te d to it b u t in n u m e ra b le m eanings. T h is disqualifies th e th e o ry at least as re g a rd s th e h earer-sid e; fo r if th e re are indefinitely m any m eanings o f a linguistic ex p ressio n th en th e m e an in g o f th e expressio n cannot be som eth in g th a t o n e can learn acco rd in g to a ru le (or several rules). I w ould also like to p o in t o u t once ag ain th a t 1 have chosen an exam ple w hich is specially fav o u rab le to th e th eory. In th e case o f m ost assertoric sentences it is difficult to th in k o f any kind o f a p p ro p ria te reactions. W hat, fo r exam ple, w ould be th e a p p ro p ria te reactions to th e senten ce ‘T h e tow n-hall is r e d ’ o r ‘T h e tow n-hall dates fro m th e eig h tee n th c e n tu ry ? W e will th e re fo re have to su p p o se th a t th a t with w hich the h e a r e r connects th e sen ten ce acco rd ­ ing to a ru le is so m eth in g o th e r th a n an action, action-disposition o r b u n d le o f action-dispositions, an d re tu r n to th e m uch m o re n a tu ra l co nception th a t th e action o r action-disposition w hich th e h e a rin g o f an ex pression effects is a re su lt re q u irin g th e com bin ed o p e ra tio n o f th e u n d e rs ta n d in g o f th e expression and o f th e action-m otivations o f th e p erso n co n c ern ed . B u t in w hat th e n does th e m e an in g fo r th e h e a re r consist? O n e could p e rh a p s th in k th a t the ru le w hich in signal-languages is th e h e a re r-ru le fits im peratives ra th e r th a n assertoric sentences, a n d th at th e ru le we have to follow in using assertoric sentences is th e ru le w hich in th e sig nal-language is th e sp e ak e r-ru le. T h is is certainly an attractiv e su g ­ gestion, p articu larly w hen o n e considers th a t in this w eaker fo rm th e behaviouristic th e o ry w ould also be able to cope with both o f th e diffi­ culties to w hich I r e fe rre d a t th e b eg in n in g . In co n trast to signals, sen ­ tences w ould be e ith e r indicative o r im perative. T h e m e an in g o f th e indicative se n ten c e w ould be d e te rm in e d even fo r th e h e a r e r by th e sp e ak e r-ru le a n d th e m e an in g o f th e im perative sen ten ce w ould be d e te rm in e d even fo r th e sp e a k e r by th e h e a re r-ru le . In both cases th e n th e m ean in g fo r sp e ak e r a n d h e a re r w ould be th e sam e. So in th e case o f th e sentences w ith which we a re at p re se n t con­

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c e rn ed (i.e. asserto ric sentences) ev e ry th in g d e p e n d s on w h e th e r at least th e sp eak er-sid e o f th e signal-schem a fits. C an o n e say th a t th e m e an in g o f an asserto ric se n ten ce consists in th e circu m stan ces in w hich it is used? T h is thesis fo r its p a rt allows o f two in te rp re ta tio n s. Firstly o n e could try to co n stru e th e circum stances practically. T h e m e an in g o f th e se n ­ ten ce ‘T h e tow n-hall is on fire ’ w ould th e n be d efin e d by th e circ u m ­ stances which give p o in t to th e u tte ra n c e o f th e sen ten ce, e.g. th a t h elp is n e e d e d to p u t o u t th e fire. T h is ex p lan a tio n how ever am o u n ts to a rep e titio n o f th e ex p lan a tio n th a t was previously given fo r th e h e a re r a n d it w ould be subject to th e sam e w eaknesses. B esides we w an ted to assim ilate th e h e a re r-ru le to th e sp e ak e r-ru le an d n o t vice versa. T h is in te rp re ta tio n is th e re fo re elim inated. T h e second a n d m o re plausible in te rp re ta tio n o f th e re fe re n c e to circum stances o r em p lo y m en t-situ atio n is th a t w hich c o rre sp o n d s to th e re fe re n c e to th e stim ulus in th e b eh av io u rist m odel: th e circum stances to w hich the m e a n in g -ru le ties th e use o f th e se n ten c e a re d efin e d by th e p e rc e p tu a l situ atio n o f th e speaker. T h is view can be h eld in a sim ­ ple a n d a revised version. A pp lied to o u r exam ple th e sim ple version w ould be: always (or in m ost cases) w hen it is p erceiv ed th a t th e tow nhall is on fire o n e says ‘T h e tow n-hall is on fire’, o r in its n o rm ativ e fo rm u latio n : w h en ev er it is p erceived th a t th e tow n-hall is on fire o n e is to say ‘T h e tow n-hall is on fire.’ O n e could also re g a rd this ru le fo r th e use o f th e p redicative sen ten ce as a specification o f a ru le fo r th e use o f th e predicate, w hich w ould th e n be: w h en ev er it is p erceiv ed th a t so m e th in g is o n fire o ne is to say th a t it is on fire. T h is ex p lan a tio n w ould be an e x p lan a tio n o f th e p re d ic a te as a q u asi-p red icate. It is obvious th a t this ex p lan a tio n is in a d eq u a te, fo r n o rm ally we use n e ith e r p red ic ate s n o r pred icativ e sentences in th e c o rre s p o n d in g p e rc e p tu a l situ ation. O f course, signals too a re som etim es sto red a n d tra n sm itte d n o t in th e p e rc e p tu a l situation, b u t only w hen they can be rele v an t to a p a r t­ n e r. Bees, fo r ex am ple, p e rfo rm th e ir la n g u ag e -d a n ce n o t in th e p re se n c e b u t in th e im m ed ia te a fte rm a th o f certain p ercep tu ally receiv ed factors; it is th e in fo rm a tio n -re q u irin g p a rtn e rs th a t first trig ­ g e r o ff th e la n g u ag e -d a n ce . T h is com plication can be easily in c o rp o ­ ra te d in to th e b eh a v io u rist th e o ry by m eans o f th e follow ing ad d itio n s: (1) th e no tio n o f p e rc e p tu a l circum stances can be e x te n d e d to in clu d e p erc ep tio n s w hich co n tin u e to exercise an influ en ce th ro u g h m em ory. (2) H e re too o n e can in tro d u c e th e co n c ep t o f a d isposition an d say: fro m th e m o m e n t o f th e rele v an t p e rc e p tio n th e sp e ak e r is in a c o rre ­

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sp o n d in g d isp o sitio n w hich is only ac tu a liz ed if he en c o u n te rs a p a r tn e r n e e d in g in fo rm a tio n ; th e p a r tn e r is th e n h im se lf a fa c to r th a t b elongs to th e circum stances. T h e co n d itio n a l ru le is now an e x te n d e d situ atio n ru le a n d can be fo rm u la te d so m e th in g like this: if xy was p erceiv ed an d a p a r tn e r P is p erc eiv e d , S is (or in th e n o rm a tiv e fo rm u la tio n : ‘is to b e ’) u tte re d . T h is revised v ersion o f th e b e h a v io u ristic ex p la n a to ry sch em a can easily lead o n e to su p p o se th a t th e lack o f situ a tio n -re la te d n e ss w hich is c h a racteristic o f th e use o f a p red ic ativ e se n te n c e is in p rin cip le n o th in g b u t th e e x te n d e d situ a tio n -re la tio n th a t a lre a d y h o ld s fo r b ee -lan g u a g e, only m u ch m o re com p licated . T h e sp e a k e r n e e d n o t have p erceiv ed th a t th e tow n-hall is on fire; h e m ay h av e in fe rre d it o r le a rn t it fro m so m eo n e else. All th e se possibilities w ould have to be in c o rp o ra te d in th e e x te n d e d situ a tio n -ru le . As in th e case o f th e h e a re r-ru le th e e m p lo y m e n t-ru le th re a te n s to b eco m e so co m p licated th a t it ceases to be d e te rm in a te - a n d this in th e case o f so sim ple a sen ten ce as ‘T h e to w n-hall is on fire ’! B ut, you m ay ask, why s h o u ld n ’t a se n ten ce w hich is easy fo r us to u n d e r s ta n d re st u p o n a co m p licated m ech an ism ? H o w ­ ever, we a re n o t e n q u irin g a b o u t a m e ch a n ism u n d e rly in g th e u se o f th e se n ten c e b u t a b o u t th e ru le s o f its u se w hich o n e m u st be able to ex p lain to som eo n e; o th e rw ise we a re n o t e n q u irin g a b o u t m e an in g . B u t we d o n o t n e e d to dw ell on this in d e te rm in a c y a rg u m e n t. T h e thesis th a t th e m e a n in g o f a p re d ic a tiv e se n ten c e can be d efin e d in te rm s o f th e situ atio n o f its use, h o w ev er e x te n d e d , fo u n d e rs fo r r e a ­ sons o f p rin cip le. In o r d e r to show this I w ould like to d raw a tte n tio n to two aspects o f th e use o f p red ic ativ e se n ten ces w hich co n tra d ict th e ac co u n t w hich rela tes use to circu m stan ces. I can b rin g th e se two aspects in to re lie f by se ttin g th e m a g a in st th e tw o ad d itio n s in th e revised v ersion o f th e b eh a v io u ristic th e o ry . T h e se w ere (a) to th e p r e ­ sen t circu m stan ces w ere a d d e d th e p ast circ u m sta n ce s w hich co n tin u e to e x e rt an in flu e n ce th ro u g h th e m e d iu m o f m e m o ry (b) th e p re s e n t circ u m sta n ce w hich calls fo rth th e actu al use o f th e se n ten c e is th e p re s ­ ence o f a p a r tn e r n e e d in g in fo rm a tio n . _ 1. I shall begin w ith th e seco n d o f th e se tw o p o in ts. I t is essen tial to th e view th a t use is d e te rm in e d by circu m stan ces fo r if th e re is no p r e ­ sen t fa c to r w hich calls fo rth th e actual use, th e actu al u se at a p a rtic u la r tim e a n d a p a rtic u la r place w o u ld n o t be g o v e rn e d by th e circu m stan ces at all. B u t now an asserto ric se n te n c e is n o t g o v e rn e d by a ru le w hich ties its use to a specified p a rtn e r-s itu a tio n . E ven if o n e ig n o res th e fact th a t o n e can also significantly u tte r a se n te n c e w ith o u t an a d d re sse e b ein g p re s e n t it is n o n e th e le ss tr u e th a t o n e can u tte r it to any p a r tn e r j

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at any tim e in any place w ith o u t its m e a n in g chan g in g . (T his o f co u rse does n o t apply to sentences w ith deictic ex pression s; it is only la te r th a t 1 shall sp eak a b o u t th ese ex p re ssio n s, w hich in th e co n tex t o f o u r dis­ cussion possess a special significance.) B u t this m eans th e n th a t th e use o f th e se n ten c e is n o t ju s t less situ a tio n -re la te d th a n a signal b u t p o si­ tively situ a tio n -in d e p e n d e n t. It can be re p o r te d on th e rad io , fo r ex a m ­ ple, th a t H e id e lb e rg tow n-hall is on fire, an d som eb o d y so m ew h ere in A laska o r in A fg h a n ista n can tell som e p eo p le, who m ay o r m ay n o t be in te re ste d to h e a r it, ‘H e id e lb e rg tow n-hall is on fire .’ O f co u rse if th e m an in A laska d oes u se this se n te n c e th e re will be ce rtain circum stances in his situ atio n w hich occasion his re p e a tin g of-this sen ten ce; b u t th ese circum stances a re c e rta in m otives a n d in te rests a n d h av e n o th in g to do with th e m e a n in g o f th e se n ten ce. So th e em p lo y m e n t-ru le w hich d e te r ­ m ines th e m e a n in g o f a p red ic ativ e se n ten c e ca n n o t be a co n d itio n al ru le o f w h atev er co n te n t; it c a n n o t be a ru le o f th e fo rm ‘if . . . use se n ten c e “p ” H o w ev er to rec o g n ize th e situ a tio n -in d e p e n d e n c e o f a p red ic ativ e se n ten c e is n o t yet to u n d e rs ta n d it. T h e elu cid atio n o f this p ecu liarity o f p red ic ativ e se n ten c es is in my o p in io n o f decisive im p o r­ tan ce fo r th e u n d e rs ta n d in g o f th e u se o f predicativ e sentences an d o f asserto ric la n g u a g e generally; I will la te r go into this p ro b lem th o r ­ oughly. F o r th e tim e b ein g h o w ev e r I can at m ost claim plausibility for th e thesis th a t it is th e sin g u la r te rm s in pred icativ e sentences w hich m ake possible this situ a tio n -in d e p e n d e n c e . W hat d istin g u ish es th e sen ­ ten ce ‘H e id e lb e rg tow n-hall is o n fire’ fro m th e q u asi-p re d ica te ‘fire’ is th e fact th a t th e sin g u la r te rm h o ld s on to th e p e rc e p tu a l situ atio n , or so m e th in g in it, as iden tical a n d in this way m akes it possible to r e f e r to th e p e rc e p tu a l situ atio n fro m any o th e r situation. T h is re fe re n c e to th e situ atio n fro m a n o th e r situ atio n is so m e th in g fu n d a m e n ta lly d iffe re n t fro m a n e x te n d e d situ a tio n -re la tio n in th e sense o f situ atio n -d e p en d ence. 2. In th e case o f th e e m p lo y m e n t o f a p red icativ e sen ten ce th e re a re n o t only n o p re s e n t circu m stan ces w hich b elong to its m ean in g , th e re a re no past circu m stan ces e ith e r. It m ig h t at first seem th a t alth o u g h th e significant use o f th e se n te n c e ‘H e id e lb e rg tow n-hall is on fire ’ by th e m a n in A laska d id n o t re q u ir e a ca llin g -fo rth fa c to r th a t b elongs to th e m e a n in g it d id re q u ire th e circ u m sta n ce th a t h e h e a rd this se n ten c e on th e rad io . S om e e x p e rie n tia l fo u n d a tio n , even if n o t a p e rc e p tu a l one, seem s to be re q u ire d fo r th e significant use o f th e sentence. H o w ­ ever it is easy to see th a t this assu m p tio n is m istaken. T h e m a n may fro m w h ate v er m o tiv e have g o t it in to his h e a d to sta rt a false ru m o u r. T h is ex a m p le m ay at first a p p e a r so m ew h at artificial. Y ou m ig h t even

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be inclined to say th a t if som eone uses the sen ten ce in this way th e n he is using it in a way th a t is co n tra ry to th e ru le an d th a t uses w hich are co n tra ry to th e ru le do n o t n ee d to be, in d e e d may n o t be, in c lu d ed in th e em p lo y m e n t-ru le . B u t th in k once m o re o f the m an w ho com es in h e re an d cries: ‘T h e tow n-hall is o n fire.’ W e u n d e rs ta n d this sta te m en t im m ediately alth o u g h we do n o t know w hat ex p e rien tial basis th e m an has fo r it; in d e e d we d o n o t know w h e th e r h e has any ex p e rien tial basis at all. N atu rally we will only take his sta te m e n t seriously to the e x te n t th a t we su p p o se it to be w ell-founded. B u t o u r u n d e rs ta n d in g o f th e sta te m e n t is in d e p e n d e n t o f w h e th e r we take it seriously o r not. I f we ask ourselves o r ask him w hat a re th e circum stances w hich have occa­ sio ned his u tte ra n c e o f this se n ten ce o r w h at g ro u n d s h e has fo r it we a re p re su p p o sin g th a t fo r him a n d fo r us in d e p e n d e n tly o f these c ir­ cum stances o r g ro u n d s th e m e an in g o f th e sen ten ce is alread y fixed. T h e conclusion is th u s un av o id ab le th a t n o t only th e p re se n t circ u m ­ stances b u t also th e p ast circum stances o f a se n ten c e’s em p lo y m e n t a re com pletely irre le v a n t to th e m e an in g o f th e sentence. In re g a rd to th e first point, th e situ a tio n -in d e p e n d e n c e o f th e em p lo y m e n t o f a p r e ­ dicative sentence, o n e could still su p p o se th a t a co n d itio n al ru le w hich fixes its m e an in g is m erely not sufficient fo r th e actual use o f a p re d ic a ­ tive sentence. It was still conceivable th a t th e re sho u ld be a co n d itio n al ru le w hich fixes th e m e an in g w hich concerns th e sp e a k e r’s p ast circu m ­ stances a n d re p re se n ts at least a necessary co n d itio n o f th e use o f th e p redicative sentence. It has now b ee n show n th a t the m e an in g c a n n o t ' be c o n tain e d in a conditional ru le at all. T h is n egative resu lt raises once m o re th e questio n : w h at sh o u ld be th e d irectio n o f o u r en q u iry into th e m e an in g o f a p red icativ e sentence? I f we ca n n o t c o n stru e th e m e an in g as an object a n d if it does n o t consist in th e circum stances o f use w hat th e n rem ains? In p a rtic u la r you m ay ask: if th e circum stances o f use a re irre le v an t to th e m e an in g th e n m u st we n o t also a b a n d o n th e p resu p p o sitio n th a t to u n d e rsta n d a linguistic ex p ressio n is to know its em p lo y m en t-ru le? B u t to arg u e th u s w ould be to assum e th a t it is only to th e circum stances o f its em p lo y m e n t th a t so m e th in g can be re la te d by its em p lo y m e n t-ru le ; an d th is w ould be a m istake. W h e n I first in tro d u c e d th e question a b o u t use it e m e rg e d th a t w hen we sp eak o f th e use o f so m eth in g it is norm ally so m e th in g th a t has a fu n ctio n (p. 136f). A nd w h en we ask fo r th e em p lo y m e n t-ru le o f so m e th in g th a t has a fu n ctio n we a re n o t asking u n d e r w h at circ u m ­ stances it is to be u sed b u t how it is to be u se d if o n e wishes to achieve th e p u rp o se fo r w hich it exists. P redicates, it b ecam e clear, have a fu n c ­ tio n , th e fu n c tio n o f characterizin g ; so it is plausible to su p p o se th a t

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on e can also speak o f a fu n ctio n in th e case o f th e w hole sentence. B u t in w hat sh o u ld th e fu n ctio n o f a sentence consist? D oes th e use o f a sen tence have a p u rp o se ? Do we use a se n ten c e with th e in te n tio n o f b rin g in g so m e th in g about? T h is w ould be th e sim plest way o f in te r ­ p re tin g th e idea th a t th e use o f a sentence has a fu n ctio n . T h e em ploym e n t-ru le s o f th e se n ten c e w ould on this view be ru les co n c ern in g how th e sentence is to be used to achieve th e in te n d e d effect; on e can call ru les o f this kind instrumental rules. W e shall th e re fo re have to ex a m in e th e h y pothesis th a t th e em p lo y m e n t-ru le s o f asserto ric sentences a re n o t to be co n stru ed as conditional rules b u t r a th e r as in stru m en tal rules.

LE CTURE

14

T he employment-rule of an assertoric sentence. A rgum ent with Grice and Searle

‘T h e m e a n in g o f a w o rd is w h at th e e x p la n a tio n o f th e m e a n in g e x p lain s.’ I hav e called this d ic tu m o f W ittg e n ste in ’s th e fu n d a m e n ta l p rin cip le o f analytical philo so p h y ; a n d we h av e so fa r seen n o re a so n fo r n o t c o n tin u in g to a d h e r e to it. (In th e last le c tu re it re c e d e d in to th e b a c k g ro u n d inasm u ch as it could n o t fo rm th e basis o f th e b e h a v io u r­ istic version o f th e thesis th a t th e m e a n in g o f an e x p re ssio n is d e te r ­ m in e d by a co n d itio n a l rule. F o r precisely this re a so n how ever I stressed th a t o n e can u n d e r s ta n d th e c o n d itio n a l ru le n o t only as a causal ru le b u t also as a ru le w hich th e p e rso n w ho uses th e sign follow s a n d w hich o n e can th e re fo r e ex p lain . My c ritiq u e o f th e co n d itio n alru le th e o ry was n o t specially d ire c te d a g a in st its causal v ersio n a n d can th e re fo re also be u n d e rs to o d as a c ritiq u e o f a th e o ry w hich takes W itt­ g e n ste in ’s p rin c ip le as its basis.) F u rth e rm o re it still seem s trivial to say th a t to ex p lain th e m e a n in g of an e x p re ssio n can only b e to ex p lain th e r u le o f its em p lo y m e n t. I b eg an th e analysis ö f th e m e an in g o f p re d ic a tiv e se n ten c es with th e e n q u iry in to th e m e a n in g o f p red ic ate s. T h e se q u en c e was as follows: in analysing th e p red ic ativ e se n te n c e it se e m e d n a tu ra l to sta rt w ith p red ic ate s b ecause it was this p a r t o f th e p re d ic a tiv e se n te n c e on w hich th e o b je c t-o rie n ta te d co n cep tio n o f th e m e a n in g o f p red ic ativ e se n ­ tences fo u n d e re d . In th e m e a n tim e a se co n d rea so n fo r this o r d e r o f p ro c e e d in g , a n d on e m o re closely re la te d to th e m a tte r in h a n d , has beco m e a p p a re n t. I f u n lik e the o b je c t-o rie n ta te d p h ilo s o p h e r o n e starts n o t with re p re s e n ta tio n s b u t w ith m o d es o f b e h a v io u r a n d if f u r th e r ­ m o re o n e takes into ac co u n t la n g u ag e s m o re p rim itiv e th a n sen ten cela n g u ag e , th e n it becom es clear th a t c h a ra c te riz a tio n -e x p re ssio n s a re th e linguistic ex p ressio n s which a r e th e easiest to u n d e rs ta n d . P re d i­ cates have a p re -fo rm w hich I h av e called q u a si-p re d ic a te s an d w hich a lre ad y fu n c tio n as in d e p e n d e n t e x p re ssio n s, h en c e d o n o t re q u ire to

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be s u p p le m e n te d by sin g u la r term s. T h e ir ex p lan a tio n is u n p r o b ­ lem atic fo r it is achieved by m eans o f exam ples by sim ple assig n m en t to p a rtic u la r circu m stan ces (perceived by the sign-u ser o r to be b ro u g h t a b o u t by th e recipient). In the last lecture I d id n ot d irectly re fe r to signals as q u asi-p re d ica tes, fo r I w ished to avoid con fu sio n in th e ex a m ­ in a tio n o f th e q u estio n o f w h eth e r predicative sentences can be co n ­ s tru e d as signals. B u t su b seq u en tly th e re is no reaso n fo r n o t also calling signals qu asi-p red icates. O n e can th u s th in k o f p red ic ativ e sentences as arising o u t o f quasi­ p red ic ate s th r o u g h th e a d d itio n o f sin g u lar term s. T h e analysis o f sin ­ g u la r term s w hich to th e o b je ct-o rien tated p h ilo so p h e r a p p e a re d so u n p ro b le m a tic co n stitu tes fo r th e b e h a v io u r-o rie n ta te d a p p ro a c h th e ; rea l cru x in th e analysis o f th e sem antics o f pred icativ e sentences. It is th e sin g u lar te rm s by m ean s o f w hich - as I have so far only b ee n able to su ggest - th e use o f pred icativ e sentences becom es situ atio n -in d e­ p e n d e n t. N ow it is becau se p red ic ate s, th o u g h close to quasi-p red icates, are n o t q u asi-p re d ica tes (for th ey a re essentially incom p lete ex p ressio n s an d this is so m e th in g th a t w ould also have to be em b o d ied in th e ir em p lo y ­ m e n t-ru le ) th a t my first account« o f th e way in which p red icates a re e x p la in e d f o u n d e re d (p. 160). T h is account p ro ce ed ed in accordance w ith th e m o d el a p p r o p r ia te to quasi-predicates: to ex p lain an ex p re s­ sion is to show in w hich circu m stan ces it is to be used. T h is m odel, h o w ever, h a d to be fu n d a m e n ta lly criticized. It h a d to be show n th a t it is useless n o t only fo r th e ex p la n a tio n o f predicates b u t also fo r th a t o f w hole sentences. Since this has b een d o n e in th e last le ctu re we could r e tu r n to th e discussion o f p red icates. A nd ac co rd in g to w h at has ju s t b e e n said a satisfactory ac co u n t o f th e ex p lan a tio n o f p red icates w ould now at th e sam e tim e have to in clu d e th e ex p lan a tio n o f sin g u lar term s. N ow th e c o m b in ed analysis o f th e em p lo y m e n t-ru le o f p red icates an d sin g u la r te rm s is sim ply th e analysis o f th e pred icativ e sen ten ce in its p red ic ativ e s tru c tu re . I f p red icates a n d singular term s a re expressions w hich essentially co m p lete each o th e r th e n th e ir m e an in g can only co n ­ sist in th e c o n trib u tio n w hich each o f these types o f ex p ressio n m akes to th e m e a n in g o f th e w hole sentence. B u t if this is so th e n it w ould be advisable b e fo re sta rtin g th e discussion o f the tw o se n ten ce-co m p o n en ts to achieve a t least a p r e lim in a ry ‘co n cep tio n (Vorbegriff) o f th e em p lo y ­ m e n t-ru le o f th e w hole sentence. Since th e objectual a p p ro a c h (which a ro se fro m a o n e-sid e d co n c ern with sin g u lar term s) an d now th e thesis th a t m e a n in g consists in th e circu m stan ces o f em p lo y m e n t (which arose fro m a o n e-sid e d co n c ern w ith signal-signs fu n ctio n in g like p red icates

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m ade in d e p e n d e n t) a re to be re g a rd e d as having fo u n d e re d we at p re ­ sen t lack a positive perspective th a t could guide an analysis o f p re d i­ cates a n d sin g u lar term s. A n d since o u r aim in th e co u n ter-m o v e to those one-sided ap p ro a ch es is to u n d e rs ta n d both p red icates a n d sin­ g u la r term s in th e ir m utually su p p le m e n tin g fu n ctio n we can only ex p ect to find such a g u id in g -p e rsp e ctiv e in th e e m p lo y m e n t-ru le of th e w hole sentence. O f cou rse if we sh o u ld be able to discover som e­ th in g a b o u t its use as a senten ce before th e elucidatio n o f th e sentenceco m p o n en ts a n d hen ce o f th e stru c tu re o f th e p red icativ e sentence, th e n obviously this can only co n cern th e sentence as an asserto ric sen­ tence in gen eral, n o t as a predicative sentence. A n d if th e pred icativ e se n ten ce-fo rm is th e m ost elem en tary se n ten c e-fo rm , to w hich all o th e r form s, as h igher-level form s, re fe r back, th e n w hat we can find o u t ab o u t th e use o f th e assertoric sentence in gen eral b efo re th e analysis o f th e p redicative stru c tu re can only be re g a rd e d as a provisional account which can itself only becom e fully intelligible later th ro u g h the analysis o f th e p red icative stru c tu re . In an investigation such as th e p re ­ sent o n e an are a has first to be o p en e d u p ; o n e is n o t sim ply d escrib in g o n e th a t is already know n. C onsequently such going to a n d fro is h ard ly to be avoided. T h e question o f how th e em p lo y m e n t-ru le o f an assertoric sen ten ce is positively to be u n d e rsto o d was raised at the e n d o f th e last lectu re, a fte r we h a d a rriv e d at th e negative resu lt th a t it ca n n o t be u n d e rsto o d as a conditional rule. O u r only reliable g u id e in this q u est is th e p rin ci­ ple th a t we can only c o u n t as th e m e an in g o f a sen ten ce th at o f w hich o ne can significantly say th a t we explain it w hen we ex p lain to so m eo n e how th e sentence is to be used. T h e ex p lan atio n , we saw, is n o t achieved by giving exam ples o f th e em p lo y m e n t o f th e sen ten ce in p a rtic u la r circum stances. N ow if th e p re se n t circum stances h av e n o th in g to do with th e m e an in g o f th e asserto ric senten ce th en th e ad d re ssee o f th e in fo rm a tio n is th e only elem e n t p re se n t in th e situ atio n th a t could have so m eth in g to do with the m e an in g o f th e sentence. C o u ld it be th a t th e em p lo y m en t-ru les we are seeking are ru les which som ehow rela te th e em p lo y m en t o f th e sentence to th e ad d ressee? I f so th e n this clearly ca n n o t be in such a way th a t th e ad d re ssee is u n d e rsto o d sim ply as a trig g e rin g -fac to r, for, as we have seen, if this w ere hisTuncti'on, th e n he w ould m erely be a n o th e r item in the circum stances. B ut how else is th e rela tio n o f th e use o f th e senten ce to th e ad d re ssee to be u n d e rsto o d ? I f th e em p lo y m e n t-ru le in which th e m e an in g is su p ­ posed to reside does no t rela te th e em p lo y m en t o f an asserto ric sen ­ tence to so m eth in g given (the p re se n t a n d past circum stances) a n d if

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m o reo v er we wish to avoid relatin g it to so m eth in g in w ard ly r e p r e ­ sen ted , th e n th e only th in g left is to relate it to certain consequences o f th e se n ten c e’s em ploym ent. A nd th e sim plest way to co n stru e this w ould be as follows: th e em p lo y m en t-ru le o f th e sen ten ce relates to a purpose, to an intended effect. T h e relatio n betw een th e em p lo y m e n t-ru le an d th e p a r tn e r w ould th e n be this: w hen we say so m e th in g to so m eo n e we th ereby in te n d to b rin g so m eth in g about in him . I am th u s taking u p the suggestion m a d e at th e en d o f the last lectu re th a t o n e sh o u ld tak e as o n e ’s sta rtin g -p o in t th e fact th a t linguistic expressions have a fu n ctio n an d en q u ire w h eth e r th e em p lo y m e n t-ru le w hich we explain w h en we ex p lain th e m e an in g co u ld be co n stru e d as an instrumental rule. B ut first we m ust dispose o f a m isu n d ersta n d in g . T h e qu estio n o f w h eth e r th e em p lo y m e n t-ru le o f an assertoric senten ce relates to a p u r ­ pose sho u ld n o t be co n fu se d with th e trivial q u estio n o f w h e th e r we use sentences to achieve p u rp o ses. T h a t by u tte rin g a sen ten ce we n o rm ally in te n d to b rin g so m e th in g ab o u t is trivially tr u e - b u t we can in te n d to b rin g a b o u t all sorts o f things so it ca n n o t be this which d e te rm in e s th e m eaning o f th e sentence. As well as using a h a m m e r fo r th e p u rp o se fo r w hich it exists we can also use it for various o th e r p u rp o ses; an d even w hen we use it f o r t h e p u rp o se fo r w hich it ex ists,,in its ow n p r o p e r fu n ctio n , we d o so in o rd e r to achieve various o th e r p u rp o ses. A n d we can also use a sto n e for all sorts o f p u rp o ses, a lth o u g h in itself it has no function. So w hen we ask w h eth e r th e em p lo y m e n t-ru le o f sentences relates to a p u rp o se we a re not asking w h eth er we use th e m fo r p u rposes: R ather we a re asking w h eth e r a sen ten ce has a s ta n d a rd p u rp o se, in th e way th a t a h a m m e r has an d a sto n e has n o t an d w h eth e r this sta n d a rd p u rp o se is w hat we explain w hen we ex p lain its m eaning. O ne possible way o f rela tin g th e m eaning o f a sen ten ce to an effect in the ad d re ssee w hich th e sen ten ce-u ser in te n d s w ould be this: th e sentence is used to b rin g ab o u t a p articu la r action o r action-disposition o f th e p a rtn e r. T his conception w ould be very close to th e con cep tio n , re fu te d in th e last le ctu re, th a t th e h e a re r u n d e rsta n d s th e sen ten ce if h e resp o n d s to it by acting in a p articu la r way. T h e p re se n t suggestion is - at least as re g a rd s assertoric sentences - like th e p rev io u s o n e a n d , fo r th e sam e reasons, u n ten ab le. T h e actions we; can in te n d to p ro d u c e in a p a rtn e r with an assertoric sentence a re so m u ltifario u s th a t they can n o t d e te rm in e its m eaning. So this possibility is excluded. I f th e re is any q u estio n at all o f an in te n d e d effect on th e p a rtn e r d e te rm in in g th e m e an in g th e n it can only be a disposition w hich co rresp o n d s to th e indicative sense o f th e

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asserto ric se n ten ce. O n e could say: th e use o f an asserto ric se n ten ce th a t is to say th e sta te m e n t - has th e fun ctio n o f in fo rm in g th a t so m e­ th in g is th e case. A n d o n e could r e n d e r this m o re precisely by saying: if so m eo n e, vis-ä-vis a p a r tn e r, uses an asserto ric sen ten ce *p’, h e in te n d s to b rin g it a b o u t th a t th e p a r tn e r hold s ‘p ’ to be tru e , o r, in a n o th e r fo rm u la tio n , th a t h e believes th a t p. B u ild in g o n this thesis, a n d a c o r­ re s p o n d in g o n e fo r im peratives, H . P. G rice, in an in flu en tial p a p e r ,1 d ev e lo p e d a th e o ry a b o u t w hat it is to mean so m e th in g w ith a sign. W e m u st sharp ly d istin g u ish th e two m e an in g s o f th e G erm a n w o rd 'meinen’ w hich play a ro le in G rice’s th eo ry a n d fo r w hich in E nglish th e re are tw o d iffe re n t w ord s: (1) to m ean so m e th in g w ith a sign: E nglish: ‘m e a n ’, F re n ch : ‘vouloir dire’ (in G e rm a n too in stead o f £was meinst du ' damit?’ we can equally well ask ‘was willst du damit sagen?’) (2) to believe th a t so m e th in g is th e case, hold so m e th in g to be tru e . T h e fu n d a m e n ta l im p o rta n c e fo r sem antics o f ‘m e a n in g ’ in th e sense o f vouloir dire becom es clear w hen o n e realizes th a t th e action w hich so m e o n e p e r ­ fo rm s w hen he uses a se n ten c e consists in m e a n in g som ething-w ith th e sen ten ce; a n d o n e can now also u n d e rs ta n d th e ‘u n d e r s ta n d in g ’ o f th e h e a r e r as a c o n c ep t co rrelativ e to this m e a n in g (Meinen): th e h e a re r u n d e rs ta n d s w h at th e sp e a k e r m eans. A ccordingly w hat is u n d e rsto o d is n o t th e sign b u t th e actio n o f th e sp e a k e r or, b e tte r, w hat is d o n e w ith th e sign. G rice’s p ro g ra m m e consists in a tte m p tin g to c o n stru c t th e co n ­ c e p t o f th e m e a n in g (sense) or u n d e rs ta n d in g o f linguistic ex p ressio n s o n th e basis o f th e c o n c e p t o f m e a n in g (vouloir dire). P reviously I said th a t th e fu n ctio n o f th e asserto ric se n ten c e can be u n d e rs to o d as in fo rm in g (Mitteilen). O n e could now b u ild th e co n c ep t o f in fo rm in g in to th e G ricean co n cep tu ality by saying: in fo rm in g is a special case o f m e a n in g (Meinen) nam ely th a t w hich consists in th e e m p lo y m e n t o f an asserto ric senten ce. N ow G rice shows t h a t w hen o n e d o es so m e th in g with th e in te n tio n o f b rin g in g it ab o u t th a t o n e ’s p a r t­ n e r believes so m e th in g this ca n n o t always be u n d e rs to o d as in fo rm in g o r as m e a n in g (in th e sense o f vouloir dire). F o r ex am p le, in o r d e r to b rin g it a b o u t th a t a p e rso n believes so m e th in g o n e can g et th e p e rso n in to th e a p p ro p ria te p e rc e p tu a l situ atio n o r o n e can see to it th a t h e perceives a sy m p to m (Anzeichen) o f its being th e case. A sym p to m is a so-called n a tu ra l sign, a state o f affairs w hose existence enables o n e to in fe r th e existen ce o f a n o th e r state o f affairs. W h e n I p o in t o u t to so m e ­ o n e th e p a w -p rin t o f a b e a r this can have th e significance th a t I in te n d to b rin g it a b o u t th a t h e believes th a t a b e a r is in th e vicinity; b u t such an act is n o t in fo rm in g . G rice show s th a t we can only sp eak o f in fo rm ­ in g or, m o re generally, o f m e a n in g (vouloir dire) if o n e in te n d s, in a

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particular way, to b rin g it a b o u t th a t o n e ’s p a rtn e r believes that/?, nam ely in such a way th a t th e p a r tn e r (1) recognizes th e in te n tio n an d (2) th e recognizing o f th e in te n tio n is fo r him th e g ro u n d fo r th e fo rm atio n o f th e belief. F o r o u r p u rp o se s how ever we can ig n o re th ese refin em en ts, fo r w hat has first got to be d ec id e d is w h eth e r it is at all co rrect to say th a t so m eo n e who, vis-a-vis a p a rtn e r, uses an assertoric sen ten ce ‘p ’ always th e re b y in ten d s - in w hatever m o re precisely d efinable way - to b rin g it a b o u t th a t th e p a rtn e r believes that/?. A lth o u g h this is certainly m ost o fte n th e case, it is n o t always th e case. A pupil, fo r exam ple, w ho answ ers th e te a c h e r’s q u estio n does n o t in te n d to in fo rm th e teach er. O r if A u tte rs, vis-ä-vis B, an assertoric sen ten ce ‘p \ know ing th a t # is convinced o f th e opposite, h e clearly does n o t d o so in o r d e r to b rin g it a b o u t t h a t # believes that/?. G rice him self, in a later p a p e r ,2 a b a n d o n e d his th e o ry fo r ju s t such reasons; how ever h e c o n tin u e d to h old th a t th e e m p lo y m e n t-ru le o f an assertoric se n ­ te n ce consists in its b ein g used to b rin g it a b o u t th a t a p a r tn e r believes so m ething. A ccording to th e new theo ry : w hen A uses, vis-ä-vis B, an assertoric se n ten c e *p\ th e n he in te n d s (in th e m o re precisely d efin ed way) to b rin g it ab o u t t h a t # believes th a t A believes th a t/? .3 T h is sta te m e n t seem s to m e to be correct. W h en I u tte r, vis-ä-vis so m eone, an assertoric sentence ‘p ’ I d o n o t necessarily in te n d to b rin g it a b o u t th a t he believes th a t p; b u t I d o necessarily in te n d to b rin g it ab o u t th a t he believes th a t I believe th a t p (even if I’m lying I in te n d to b rin g it a b o u t th a t he believes th a t I believe that/?). H ow ever, it does n o t follow fro m th e correctn ess o f this statem en t th a t th e in te n tio n to w hich it refers is th e p rim a ry in te n tio n co n n ected w ith th e use o f an assertoric sentence, o r th a t this is th e fu n ctio n o f th e sentence. It is conceivable th a t this in te n tio n is m erely a conseq u en ce o f th e p rim a ry in te n tio n w ith which an assertoric sentence is used an d by re fe re n c e to w hich its fu n c tio n is to be u n d e rsto o d . B ut above all it does n o t follow fro m th e co rrectn ess o f th a t sta te m en t th a t th e m ean in g o f th e sen ten ce is co n tain e d in th e fu n ctio n o f an assertoric sen ten ce as this is h e re d efin ed . I shall deal only with this last p o in t w hich fo r us is th e m ain one. I f we ap p ly W ittg e n stein ’s p rin cip le to G rice’s suggestion th en we w ould explain to so m eo n e th e m e a n in g o f an asserto ric sen ten ce ‘/?’ by telling him th a t it is used to b rin g it ab o u t th a t a h e a re r believes th at th e sp e a k e r believes th a t p. O n e w ould th u s explain th e m e an in g o f th e se n ten c e ‘p ’ by m eans o f a lo n g e r se n ten c e ‘q’ w hich contains th e e x p re s­ sion ‘th a t/? ’ as a p art. T o this it can be objected, firstly, th a t *q’ is clearly n o t synonym ous with ’/?’; an d , secondly, th a t o n e c a n n o t u n d e rsta n d

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such an ex p lan a tio n unless one already u n d e rsta n d s th e m ean in g o f ‘th a t p ’ an d h en ce the m e an in g o f B ut even if we w ould o r could explain, in a p articu la r case, th e m ean ­ ing o f a sen ten ce in this way this w ould not be a possible basis for a th e o ry o f m ean in g , at least not if th e latter re g a rd s itself as fu n d a m e n ­ tal, thus in explaining th e m ean in g o f sentences is n o t co n te n t to p re ­ su p p o se th e u n d e rsta n d in g o f c o rresp o n d in g sentences in an o th e r lan­ gu age, a so-called m eta-language. T h e re a re various types o f such circu lar m eta-linguistic theories o f m eaning. W h at distinguishes the G ricean th eo ry fro m th e o thers is th a t it n o t only p resu p p o ses th a t th e m e an in g -th e o rist u n d e rsta n d s m eta-linguistic sentences b u t also th at he alread y know s w hat it is to believe that p. B ut this is to p re su p p o se every­ th in g th a t is to be explained. G rice’s th e o ry does n o t o ffe r an alternative to th e a p p ro a c h which has reco u rse to ideas a n d the behaviouristic ap p ro a ch ; it sim ply leaves th e p ro b lem open. I do not wish to suggest th a t G rice’s p roposal is w orthless. H ow ever, th e im p o rta n ce o f his co n trib u tio n lies elsew here. G rice attem p ts p r e ­ cisely to defin e a com prehensive con cep t o f m e an in g (in th e sense o f vouloir dire) w hich goes b eyond m e an in g in sentences an d also em braces signals, those nam ely w hich are n o t to be u n d e rsto o d causally, b u t o f w hich o ne can say th a t so m eth in g is signified by them . I believe th a t such a use o f signals only occurs w h ere the basic lan g u ag e o f those who u se th e signals is already a sentence-language. In th e case o f signals o f this kind it is in d e e d tru e th a t they a re ex plained in th e way envisaged by Grice. T o ap p eal to a sentence ‘q’ which p resu p p o ses th e u n d e r ­ sta n d in g o f a sentence in exp lain in g a signal x is n o t circular. B u t precisely because G rice’s concept o f m ean in g {vouloir dire) is so co m p re­ hensive, h e can n o t, as we shall see, c a p tu re w hat is specific to assertoric speech. Finally, 1 w ould like to m ention o n e m o re difficulty. Even if we re g a rd th e intersubjective em p lo y m en t o f sentences as basic, n o th eo ry o f m e an in g can be satisfactory which does n o t allow fo r th e fact th at we can also use assertoric sentences, an d with no chan g e o f m e an in g , w hen talking to oneself. So if my suggestion th a t the em p lo y m e n t-ru le is to be u n d e rsto o d as som ehow related to th e ad d re ssee is to w ork th en this can only be if th e role o f th e ad d re ssee can also be in tern alized . B u t in G rice’s th eo ry this is no t so. It w ould be ab su rd to suppose th a t w hen I say som eth in g to m yself I in te n d to b rin g it ab o u t th a t I believe th a t I believe th at so m eth in g is th e case. W h en one speaks to o n eself one is clearly no t try in g to b rin g som ething about. N onetheless it does seem th a t one uses th e linguistic sign to som e end, th a t it has a fu nction.

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T h is w ould su ggest th a t we should c o n tin u e to be g u id e d by th e id ea th a t th e se n ten c e has a sta n d a rd p u rp o se , i.e. a fu n ctio n , b u t th a t th e fu n ctio n does n o t relate to th e p ro d u c tio n o f an effect. Is this conceiv­ able? In any ev e n t ev e ry th in g seem s to fav o u r a b a n d o n in g th e sugges­ tion th a t we sh o u ld rela te th e m e a n in g o f asserto ric sen ten ces to an in te n d e d effect a n d in te r p re t th e ir em p lo y m e n t-ru le s as in stru m e n ta l ru les. P e rh a p s th e re is a n o th e r way o f u n d e rs ta n d in g th e fu n ctio n o f a sen tence; an d p e rh a p s th e re is a way o f rela tin g th e em p lo y m en t-ru les to th e ad d re sse e which does n o t involve re g a rd in g th e la tte r as th e object o f an in te n d e d effect. A bove all we m u st sta rt at a m uch low er level a n d n o t o p e ra te fro m th e o u tse t with such high-level w ords as ‘believe’ a n d suchlike. T h a t th e p rim a ry effect o f an asserto ric sen ten ce o n an a d d re sse e is n o t an action b u t a belief is so m e th in g w hich, if correct, itself re q u ire s to be ex p lain e d . I f in seeking to u n d e rs ta n d th e w ord ‘believe’ we d o n o t wish to re s o rt once m o re to in te rn a l re p re se n ta tio n s th e n we m u st be clear th a t outsid e th e use o f sentences th e re a re no actions o r action-dispositions th a t o ne can sim ply d escribe as th e ex p ressio n o f a belief. I t is tru e th a t we speak o f th e actions o f in tellig en t anim als as being d e te rm in e d by beliefs a n d in te n tio n s. F o r exam ple, th e cat ru n s tow ards th e sp o t b ecause it believes th a t th e re is so m e th in g th e re th a t has th e p ro p e rtie s x y w hich it can perceive and because it desires th in g s which h av e these p ro p e rtie s. T h e in te n tio n a l action is th e exp ressio n o f a b elief and a d esire; b u t th e re a re no actions o u tsid e th e use o f asserto ric sentences in w hich a belief-disposition could m an ifest itself in d e p e n d e n tly a n d n o t as a m e re co m p o n en t. T h a t th e cognitive a n d th e v o lu n tativ e factors are co n tra ste d w ith one a n o th e r at all in behaviour seem s th u s to be a co n sequence o f th e use of, on th e o n e h an d , assertoric, an d , on th e o th e r h a n d , im p e rativ e a n d in te n tio n a l sentences; b u t, if this is so, th e n we c a n n o t m ak e use o f th e con cep t o f belief in ex p lain in g th e m o d e o f em p lo y m e n t o f an asserto ric sentence. In ste a d o f p re su p p o sin g th a t only a belief can c o rre sp o n d - in w h at­ ev er m o re precisely d efin ab le way - to an assertoric sentence, we sh o u ld sta rt with th e actual m odes o f b e h a v io u r with w hich an ad d re ssee re sp o n d s to th e u tte ra n c e o f an assertoric sentence. W hat d istin g u ish es th e p a r tn e r ’s re sp o n se to an assertoric sentence fro m th e resp o n se to a signal is not th a t th e p a r tn e r does n o t re sp o n d - b u t only believes so m e­ th in g - b u t r a th e r th a t th e only actions o f th e h e a r e r w hich a re rela ted in a ru le -g o v e rn e d way to th e sta te m e n t o f th e sp e a k e r a re them selves speech-acts a n d consist in th e use o f a linguistic ex p ressio n . T w o lin ­ guistic resp o n ses to a sta te m e n t th a t a re always possible a re th e u tte r ­

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ances ‘yes’ an d ‘n o ’. E q u iv a len t to th e se a re th e re p e titio n o r d en ial o f th e sta te m e n t, likew ise th e u tte ra n c e s ‘t h a t p is t r u e ’ a n d ‘t h a t p is false’. C learly ‘n o ’ a n d ‘yes’ a re n o t ju s t two possible resp o n se s, r a th e r they b elo n g to g e th e r: th e h e a r e r can an sw e r w ith ‘yes’ or ‘n o ’. In this ‘ca n ’ is g r o u n d e d every o th e r linguistic re sp o n se to th e u tte ra n c e o f th e sp e a k e r (a) in th e sense th a t th e re a re o th e r p o sitio n -tak in g s a n d equally th e possibility o f ab stain in g fro m ta k in g a p o sitio n a n d th ese possible re sp o n se s a re all g r o u n d e d in th e u n d e r s ta n d in g o f th e yes/no a lte rn a ­ tive (b) in th e sen se th a t every o th e r linguistic re sp o n se w hich can be r e g a rd e d as a re p ly to th e s p e a k e r’s u tte ra n c e p re su p p o se s explicitly o r im plicitly o n e o f th e p osition-takings. B u t if you th in k th a t in saying this I am alread y a sse rtin g to o m u ch it d o e s n ’t m a tte r; it is e n o u g h if you a d m it th a t th e h e a r e r can always rep ly w ith ‘n o ’ o r ‘yes’. H ow can a th e o ry such as th a t o f G rice a c co m m o d ate such facts? T h e ‘yes’ reactio n co u ld be a c c o m m o d a te d relatively easily: th e h e a re r th e re b y m akes it know n, o n e m ig h t say, th a t h e accep ts th e b elief o f th e sp e ak e r. B u t w h at ab o u t ‘n o ’? C learly o n e c a n n o t say th a t th e h e a r e r is th e re b y m ak in g it know n th a t h e d o es n o t a c ce p t th e b elief o f th e sp e ak e r. I f h e says ‘n o ’ this d oes n o t m e a n th a t h e do es n o t believe th a t so m e th in g is th e case b u t th a t h e positively believes th a t so m e th in g is n o t th e case. S hall we th e n say th a t so m e o n e w ho rep lies with ‘n o ’ th e re b y m akes it know n th a t h e believes th e o p p o site o f w h at th e sp e a k e r believes? B u t th e n h e a r e r a n d sp e a k e r w ould n o t be c o n tra ­ d ic tin g o n e a n o th e r. T h e tw o se n ten c es ‘A believes th a t p ’ a n d ‘B believes th a t n o t-p’ d o n o t c o n tra d ic t each o th e r; a n d o f c o u rse this is eq u ally tr u e o f th e sen ten ces A in te n d s to b rin g it a b o u t t h a t # believes th a t A believes that/> ’ an d *B in te n d s to b rin g it a b o u t th a t A believes th a t B believes th a t not-^>.’ W e have now a first im p o rta n t clue to th e e m p lo y m e n t-ru le o f an a sserto ric se n ten ce. W e m u st first clarify w h at it is th a t so m e o n e is d o in g w ho uses an asserto ric se n te n c e if th e p e rso n to w hom he speaks can re s p o n d to it w ith ‘n o ’ a n d this u tte ra n c e is to be u n d e rs to o d in such a way th a t th e h e a r e r is c o n tra d ic tin g th e sp e ak e r. I f w hat th e sp e a k e r is d o in g is to be in te r p re te d as try in g to b rin g so m e th in g a b o u t th e n it re m a in s u n in te llig ib le w hat it is th a t th e h e a r e r is co n tra d ic tin g o r w hat it is th a t is d e n ie d o r affirm e d by th e h e a re r. I f we ask ourselves w ith o u t p re c o n c e p tio n s w h at is it th a t is d e n ie d by th e h e a r e r th e an sw e r is th a t clearly it is th a t w hich th e sp e a k e r a sserte d . W e w ould now have a new h y p o th e sis as to w h at th e actio n o f th e sp e a k e r a n d th e fu n ctio n o f th e se n te n c e consist in; w h at th e sp e a k e r is d o in g w hen h e uses an asserto ric se n te n c e is asserting so m e th in g an d

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th e fu n c tio n o f th e sen ten ce consists in its being u sed to assert so m e­ th in g o r to m ake an assertion. B ut o f course this im m ediately raises th e question: w hat does it m ean to assert so m ething? W e have alread y seen in th e provisional c h a ra c te r­ ization o f assertoric sentences in th e in tro d u c tio n th a t th e assertio n of a sen ten ce ‘p ’ contains a tru th -claim ; th a t it is asserted th a t it is tr u e th a t p. B ut we ca n n o t be co n te n t with such explanations. T h e q u estion is: if th e fu n ctio n of th e se n ten c e is so d efin ed th e n how a re the em p lo y ­ m e n t-ru le s o f th e se n ten c e to be u n d ersto o d ? N egatively we can say: w hen^f asserts th a t p this is an act, so m eth in g he does, b u t co n tra ry to G rice’s way o f d efin in g th e speech-act - th e em p lo y m en t o f th e sign this is n o t an act th a t can be d efin e d as b ringing , o r try in g to b rin g , so m eth in g about. A ccordingly we can also say o f th e sign, the assertoric sen tence, th a t th e p u rp o se fo r w hich it is used is sim ply th e act itself, th e assertion. In th e case o f an action th a t is d irec ted tow ards an effect on e first d eterm in e s th e in te n d e d effect; a n d th e n by m eans o f this one defines th e action. O n e can th e n ask fo r th e ru le which th e action - o r th e em p lo y m e n t o f m ean s - m u st follow in o rd e r to achieve th e p u rp o se. In th e case o f an action w hich contains its p u rp o se in itself this division in to two stages does n o t apply. As th e assertion-act is n o t d efin ed by re fe re n c e to an in te n d e d effect it can only be defined by th e actio n -ru le itself (which o f co u rse is always to be u n d e rsto o d as th e em ploym entru le o f th e sign) a n d again this m eans th a t th e em p lo y m en t-ru les are n o t to be co n stru e d as in stru m e n ta l rules. As Searle has show n,4 th e rules m u st b e rules th a t are co nstitutive o f an action. B u t now w hat so rt o f rules a re they? T h e thesis th a t th e g e n u in e speech-act, th e act w hich Grice called m e an in g (in th e sense o f vouloir dire), is n o t to be defin ed in term s o f th e in te n tio n o f p ro d u c in g an effect o rig in ates fro m J. L. A ustin. A ustin d istinguishes th re e acts w hich a re p e rfo rm e d in u sing a se n ten ce.5 T o speak o f d iffe re n t acts w hich a re fo u n d e d in o n e a n o th e r is sta n d a rd in ac tio n -th eo ry an d co rre sp o n d s to o u r o rd in a ry way o f speaking. It derives fro m th e fact th a t an act is d efin ed by th e in te n tio n which gov­ ern s it, by its p u rp o se , a n d th a t bodily acts are p e rfo rm e d in o r d e r to achieve so m eth in g , in o r d e r to achieve so m e th in g f u rth e r , etc. T h u s en d s a re p u rs u e d w hich in tu rn a re in te n d e d as m eans to f u rth e r ends. F o r ex am p le I p e rfo rm a ce rtain h a n d -m o v e m e n t on th e w indow catch in o r d e r to o p en th e w indow , in o rd e r to let fresh air in. A nd this m eans: I let fresh air in (act C) by o p e n in g th e window (a c t# ) an d I do this by m oving my h a n d in a p a rtic u la r way (act A). O f co u rse w h eth e r

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it is correct to speak h e re o f several acts ra th e r th an several ways of d escribing o ne an d th e sam e act is d isp u ted in actio n -th eo ry :6 b u t we do n o t n ee d to b o th e r ab o u t this here. Back now to speech-acts. A ccording to A ustin we are to distinguish (1) th elocutionary act, th e u tte ra n c e o f certain stru c tu re d sounds (2) th e illocutionary act, th e m e an in g (in th e sense o f vouloir dire), th u s in o u r case the asserting; th e relation betw een these two acts is such th at on e can say: h e u tte rs th e sentence ‘p y in o rd e r to assert th a t p o r a lte rn a ­ tively: he asserts that/? by u tte rin g o r em ploying th e sen ten ce ‘p ’ an d (3) th e perlocutionary act, th a t act o r those acts which in te n d effects an d w hich one seeks to achieve by m eans o f th e illocutionary act e.g. ‘he asserts th a t p in o rd e r to convince th e p a r tn e r ’ (in o rd e r to b rin g it a b o u t th a t th e p a rtn e r believes th a t p)\ o r p u ttin g it th e o th e r way ro u n d : ‘he seeks to convince the p a rtn e r by assertin g th a t p ’.7 A ustin ’s co n trib u tio n consists in having h ig h lig h ted th e illocutionary act as a distinct act o r act-description, an d th e sem antically relev an t o n e, as against th e perlocutionary act tow ards which G rice’s th e o ry is o rie n ­ tated. A u stin ’s line o f th o u g h t, th e central concern o f w hich lay else­ w h ere (tho u g h I n ee d n o t go into this here), has subsequently b ee n d eveloped as a th eo ry o f m eaning by A lston an d S earle;8 b u t in n e ith e r o f these a u th o rs do we find a satisfactory characterizatio n o f th e em ploym ent-rules o f this act.9 S earle, it is tru e , has co n stru cted a w hole system o f rules in g ra n d style an d in th e process has p ro d u c e d a n u m ­ b er o f ideas which can serve as guidelines; these how ever have rem a in ed u n d ev e lo p e d . T h u s h e gives the follow ing rules fo r th e illo­ cu tionary act o f assertion, and h en c e for th e em p lo y m en t o f an asser­ to ric sentence: (1) th a t an assertoric sentence fp* is only to be used w hen th e sp eaker believes th a tp an d (2) th a t th e em p lo y m en t o f this sentence ‘counts as an u n d e rta k in g to the effect that/? rep rese n ts an actual state o f affairs’.10 H ow ever, it is n o t clear, n o r does S earle ex p lain , w hat h e m eans by ‘u n d e rta k in g to th e effect th a t’. F u rth e rm o re it is n o w h ere show n w hat th e connection is betw een these two rules - w hich S earle calls the ‘sincerity ru le ’ an d th e ‘essential ru le ’.11 So it rem ain s u n clea r w h eth e r these a re two in d e p e n d e n t conditions which m u st b o th be fu l­ filled or w h e th e r th e o n e is th e consequence o f th e o th er. I shall re tu r n to this difficulty later (p. 214ff) a n d fo r th e p re se n t confine my a tte n ­ tio n to the ru le w hich S earle obviously reg ard s as th e fu n d a m e n ta l o n e: th e ‘essential r u le ’. I shall deal w ith th e first p a r t o f S earle’s fo rm u latio n o f this rule - ‘an u n d e rta k in g to th e effect th a t . . .’ - la ter (p. 199); it m u st som ehow co n cern th e ac t-ch aracter o f assertion. It is th e second p a rt o f th e fo rm u latio n (‘th a t p rep rese n ts an actual

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state o f a ffairs’) th a t is crucial. T h is ex p lan a tio n , you will perceive, rem ains com pletely em pty, fo r in it ev e ry th in g th a t sh o u ld be ex p lain ed is sim ply p re su p p o se d ; m o reo v e r with its re fe re n c e to actual a n d n o n ­ actual states o f affairs it w ould lead stra ig h t back to th e o b ject-o rien ­ tated a p p ro a c h . It is obvious th a t o ne ca n n o t explain th e use o f a se n ­ ten ce to som eo n e by saying th a t som eone w ho uses p ’ wishes th e re b y to say th a t ‘p ’ re p re se n ts an actual state o f affairs. T h e inevitable c o u n te r­ q uestion is: w hat a re states o f affairs a n d how does o n e tell w h e th e r they a re ‘actu al’? N ow because S earle uses *p' to re fe r n o t to th e asser­ toric se n ten c e b u t to th e p ro p o sitio n al c o n te n t - th u s as I have used ‘*p*’ _ We m u st re fo rm u la te S earle’s ex p lan a tio n in th e follow ing way: so m eone w ho uses ‘p ’ wishes th e re b y to say th a t th e state o f affairs th a t p actually obtains. B u t th e state o f affairs that/? actually obtains w h en it is tru e th at/? (above p. 44). A n d as we also*have to o m it th e ex p ressio n ‘wishes to say’ (‘m e a n s’) in exp lain in g th e use we can say even m o re sim ply: w hen a sp e a k e r uses an assertoric senten ce ‘/?’ h e asserts th at/? an d w h en h e asserts th at/? h e asserts th a t it is tru e that/?. You will p e rh a p s find this a tte m p t to sim plify S earle’s ‘essential ru le ’ rid iculous a n d say th a t all it achieves is th a t this ru le loses all e x p la n a ­ tory force. W hat is th e use, you may ask, o f know ing th a t so m eo n e w ho asserts th a t/? asserts th a t it is tr u e th at/?? In th e first place, th e w ord ‘asserts’ occurs again in th e ex p lan atio n . In th e second place, I can now be accused o f w h at I always accused th e o th e rs o f d o in g : n am ely o f sm uggling into th e ex p lan a tio n a w ord w hich itself has first to be ex p lain ed : th e w ord ‘tr u e ’. T o this I sho u ld reply: (1) S earle’s sta te m en t do es in d e ed lose its a p p a re n t e x p lan a to ry value as a resu lt o f this sim plification; how ever we m u st dem olish p se u d o -e x p lan a tio n s to clear th e way fo r real ex p la ­ nations; (2) th a t th e w ord ‘a ssert’ occurs ag ain in th e ex p lan a tio n shows th a t this sta te m en t can at m ost re p re se n t a first step tow ards an ex p la ­ n ation; (3) - an d this is th e crucial p o in t - I have n o t sm u g g led in th e w ord ‘tr u e ’; r a th e r this w ord belongs to assertoric speech itself. N e ith e r S earle’s com plicated sta te m en t n o r its sim plified fo rm have any v alue in them selves; its sim plified fo rm how ever is in te re stin g fo r us b ecause it b elongs directly to th e co n tex t o f m odes o f b eh a v io u r reflection on w hich has led us to conclude th a t th e use o f an asserto ric sen ten ce is to be co n stru e d as assertion. It is these m odes o f b eh a v io u r them selves to w hich we m ust tu r n if we w an t to know w hat an assertio n is, fo r th e q u estio n o f w hat an assertion is can be n o th in g b u t th e q u estio n : in ac cordance with w h at rules is this act p erfo rm e d ? L et m e recall: th a t th e use o f an assertoric sen ten ce is to be c o n s tru e d

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as assertio n re su lte d fro m th e fact th a t th e h e a r e r can rep ly to th e sp e a k e r’s u tte ra n c e w ith ‘yes’ (or ‘th a t is tr u e ’) o r ‘n o ’ (o r ‘th a t is false’) a n d th a t th e u tte ra n c e ‘n o ’ is to be u n d e rs to o d as m e a n in g th a t th e h e a r e r is co n tra d ic tin g th e sp e ak er. In th e m o st im p o rta n t tra d itio n o f m o d e rn ph ilo so p h ical sem antics (a tra d itio n w hich ex te n d s fro m F re g e th ro u g h W ittg e n ste in ’s Tractatus to T arsk i, C a rn a p a n d D avidson a n d to w hich I shall be re f e r rin g again) th e w o rd ‘tr u e ’ o ccupies a c e n tra l place, b u t only as a w ord w hich th e sem an tic th e o rist uses; a n d in sem an tic th e o ry th e w o rd ‘tr u e ’ can also be u se fu l w h e re a la n g u a g e is th e m a tiz e d in w hich th e w ord ‘tr u e ’ does n o t o cc u r (e.g. a signalla n g u a g e ).12 O n th e o th e r h a n d th e fact th a t asserto ric sp eech is a fo rm o f speech in w hich th e u se o f th e w o rd ‘tr u e ’ itself has a co n stitu tiv e ro le has so fa r b e e n m o re o r less ig n o re d w ith th e re m a rk a b le ex c ep tio n o f M ichael D u m m e tt’s re c e n t book o n F rege. H ow th e fact th a t th e use o f th e w ord ‘tr u e ’ belo n g s to asserto ric sp eech is to be in te r p re te d is so m e th in g th a t will c o n tin u e to occupy us fo r a lo n g tim e; in d e e d we shall see th a t th e analysis o f th e use o f th e w o rd ‘tr u e ’ coincides w ith th e analysis o f th e u se o f asserto ric sentences. W h a t can b e said h e r e a n d now is: (1) th e rep lies by m e an s o f (a) ‘n o ’, (b) th e d en ial o f w h at is asserte d , (c) ‘th a t is false’, a re clearly eq u iv ale n t in m e an in g . Likew ise th e rep lies by m eans o f (a) ‘yes’ (b) th e re p e titio n o f th e assertio n (c) ‘th a t is tr u e ’. O n e can th e re fo r e say th a t a lth o u g h th e yes/no reply has a w id er field o f ap p lica tio n th a n asserto ric se n ten ces th e analysis o f ‘yes’ an d ‘n o ’ as u sed in th e co n tex t o f assertoric speech is id e n tic al w ith th e analysis o f th e w ords ‘tr u e ’ a n d ‘false’. (2) It is n o t only th e h e a r e r w ho can say ‘th a t is tr u e ’; th e sp e a k e r too in stea d o f sim ply a sse rtin g th at/? can assert th a t it is tr u e th at/? (it was precisely this th a t m y sim plified v ersion o f S e a rle ’s sta te m e n t b ro u g h t out). B u t in so d o in g h e h im self is d e n y in g th e possible n eg ativ e rep ly o f th e h e a re r. A n d as ‘it is tr u e th a t/? ’ is eq u iv ale n t in m e a n in g to the o rig in a l sta te m e n t ‘p ’ th e sp e a k e r’s s ta te m e n t alre ad y im plicitly co n tain s a d en ial o f th e possible d en ial o f th e h e a re r (cf. p. 4 7 f). N ow this does n o t yet enab le us to give an analysis o f th e em p lo y ­ m e n t-ru le s o f an assertio n ; it d o es, h o w ever, enab le us to take a first step to w ard s such a n analysis. F o r now we can at least say: (1) N o t only a re th e speech-acts w ith w hich th e h e a r e r re sp o n d s to th e sp e a k e r a n d , above all o th e r speech-acts, th e yes- o r n o -re sp o n se - re la te d in a ru le -g o v e rn e d way to th e s p e a k e r’s u tte ra n c e ; th e o rig in a l use o f th e asserto ric se n ten c e by th e sp e a k e r is also re la te d in a ru le -g o v e rn e d way to th e y es/n o -reactio n o f th e h e a re r. B u t this m ean s th a t since th e

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e m p lo y m e n t-ru le s o f th e asserto ric sen ten ce re la te n e ith e r to th e cir­ cu m stances o f u se n o r to an in te n d e d effect it can now be ex p ected th a t th e em p lo y m e n t rules w hich we a re seeking a re som ehow m ed iated th ro u g h th e possible co n tra d ic tio n o f th e h e a re r. (2) T h e h e a r e r ’s re sp o n se , at any ra te in its basic fo rm s o f ‘yes’ a n d ‘n o ’, is itself an asser­ tion. B u t th e re is an essential d iffe re n c e betw een this k ind o f h e a r e r ’s re sp o n se a n d th e o th e r th in g s o n e w ould describe as responses. It is n o t ju s t th a t th e h e a re r, as re g a rd s th e ru le -g o v e rn e d relatio n to th e u tte r ­ an ce o f th e sp e a k e r, can equally well re sp o n d w ith ‘yes’ o r ‘n o ’ o r an a b ste n tio n a n d th a t h en c e th e re is a specific a re a o f fre e d o m h ere; r a th e r th e ch a racteristic f e a tu re at an y rate o f d en ial is th a t it refers back to th e u tte ra n c e o f th e speak er. A n d in d e ed this co u n te r-u tte ra n c e o f th e h e a re r is re la te d to th e sp e a k e r’s u tte ra n c e in precisely th e sam e way th a t th e s p e a k e r’s u tte ra n c e is re la te d to th e h e a r e r ’s u tte ra n c e ; this is b ecause, as w e saw e a rlie r, (p. 46 f) th e re is n o absolute distinction b etw een affirm ativ e a n d n egative statem ents. W e can only say th a t th e la tte r is th e d e n ia l o f th e fo rm e r. B u t th e n th e fo rm e r is equally th e d en ial o f th e la tte r. T h is resu lts in a fa r-re a c h in g relativization o f th e d istin ctio n b etw e en sp e a k e r a n d h e a re r. If th e h e a r e r resp o n d s with ‘n o ’ th e d istin ctio n red u c es to this: th a t th e o riginal sp e ak e r m akes so to sp eak th e first ‘m o v e’. T h u s in so fa r as th e rela tio n betw een sp eak er a n d a d d re sse e is n o t a one-w ay stree t it c o rre sp o n d s n e ith e r to th e stimu lu s -re s p o n s e sch em a n o r to th e G ricean co n cep tio n o f a p u rp o sere la te d act. It is n o t ju s t th a t th e act o f th e h e a r e r reacts u p o n th e sp e a k e r o r his act; r a th e r b o th acts clearly relate - th o u g h o f co u rse in a way th a t has yet to be e x p la in e d - to th e sam e th in g : th e o n e denies what th e o th e r affirm s. M o reo v er, th e affirm ing, a n d likewise th e q u es­ tio n in g , d o u b tin g , etc., resp o n se s o f th e h e a r e r re fe r back to th e s p e a k e r’s u tte ra n c e in fu n d a m e n ta lly th e sam e way as denial, nam ely as d iffe re n t position-takings to th e sam e th in g w hose n eg atio n is asserte d in th e d en ial. F o r all these resp o n se s tak e place ag a in st th e b a c k g ro u n d o f th e possibility o f d en ial, h e n c e p re s u p p o s e d en ial as a possibility. A nd becau se all o th e r possible resp o n ses by m eans o f speech-acts also p re ­ su p p o se one o f th e se p o sitio n -tak in g s they too a re n o t m e re resp o n ses to th e sp e a k e r’s u tte ra n c e . O n e can call all th e se speech -resp o n ses w hich p re s u p p o s e th e possibility o f denial, in c lu d in g d en ial itself, answers in stead o f resp o n ses. W h a t have we th e re b y achieved? Still very little. I f we co n fin e o u r ­ selves to th e possibility o f an sw e rin g ‘yes’ or ‘n o ’ as th e basic possibility th e n th e only ch a racteristic o f th e use o f an asserto ric sen ten ce so fa r to e m e rg e is th a t it - as an a ssertio n - anticipates a d en ial o r is itself th e

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denial o f an o th e r assertion. I have already p o in te d th a t o u t in th e in tro ­ d u ctio n (p. 47); a n d this o f course does n o t a m o u n t to an em p lo y m en trule. I t is conceivable how ever th a t this c o n fro n ta tio n o f two o p p o sed assertions p rovides an initial basis on w hich to co n d u c t o u r search for th e ru les which d e te rm in e th e em p lo y m e n t o f an assertio n . As th e two assertions are re la te d to o ne a n o th e r in such a way th a t the o n e calls ‘false’ w hat th e o th e r designates ‘tr u e ’ th e c o n fro n ta tio n clearly con­ cerns th e tru th o f th e statem ent. B ut w hat is ‘tr u th ’ an d how can the relatio n to it be reflected in em ploym ent-rules?

LECTURE

15

Positive account of the employment-rule of assertoric sentences in terms of the truth-relation

In th e last le ctu re I s ta rte d o u t fro m th e assu m p tio n th a t b efo re we can d eterm in e th e em ploym ent-rules o f predicates, an d o f the singular term s w hich s u p p le m e n t p red ic ate s so as to fo rm elem e n ta ry asserto ric se n ­ tences, we m u st first possess a p relim in ary con cep tio n o f th e em p lo y ­ m e n t-ru le s, a n d th a t m ean s o f th e m eaning, o f w hole asserto ric se n ­ tences. W e n e e d a reasonably solid conceptual basis fo r th e en q u iry in to th e u n d e rs ta n d in g o f th e co m p o n en ts o f an elem en tary assertoric s e n ­ ten ce, even if this basis can itself only be subsequen tly con so lid ated by th e analysis o f th e u n d e rs ta n d in g o f th e co m p o n en ts o f th e p red icativ e sentence. Even this q uestion o f a m erely provisional u n d e rs ta n d in g o f th e em p lo y m e n t-ru le s o f assertoric sentences tu rn s o u t to be exceedingly difficult. I will su m m arize th e results achieved so far: (1) A lready in th e le ctu re b e fo re last we w ere able to exclu d e th e behaviouristic o r quasi-behaviouristic conception according to which th e em p lo y m e n t-ru le rela tes to circum stances, th e em p lo y m en t-situ atio n . (2) Likewise excluded is the object-orientated conception which relates th e em p lo y m e n t o f th e sentence to a re p re se n ta tio n o r idea (how ever this is to be in te rp re te d ) o f a state o f affairs o r actual state o f affairs; such an ex p lan a tio n w ould be a hysteron-proteron because th e state of affairs can itself only be identified by m eans o f sentences. (3) It n e x t seem ed plausible to in te rp re t th e em p lo y m en t-ru les as fu n ctio n al ru les a n d to rela te th em , on th e o n e h a n d , to th e a d d re ssee a n d , on the o th e r h a n d , to th e consequences o f th e speech-act. B u t th e q u estion was: How? T h e m ost n a tu ra l th in g seem ed to be to view th e act as b ein g d efin e d by an in te n d e d effect an d th e rules as in stru m e n ta l rules; this con cep tio n led to th e speech-act b ein g d efin ed as an act o f in fo rm in g . H ow ever, th e co rrect sta te m en t th a t so m eo n e who, vis-ä-vis a p a rtn e r, u tte rs an assertoric se n ten c e *py th e re b y in fo rm s him th a t h e

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believes th at/?, a n d th a t this m eans th a t in a specific way h e in te n d s to b rin g it ab o u t th a t th e p a r tn e r believes th a t he believes that/?, also p roved to b e an u n su ita b le basis fo r a rriv in g at th e e m p lo y m e n t-ru le o f th e sen tence. (4) I th e n su g g ested , ap p e a lin g to th e illocutio n ary -act th e o ry , th a t we sh o u ld u n d e r s ta n d th e sem antically re le v a n t act o f em p lo y in g an asserto ric se n te n c e n o t as an act o f c o m m u n ic atio n b u t as an act o f assertion. H o w ev er, we co u ld find n o satisfactory answ er in S earle to th e q u estio n co n c e rn in g th e em p lo y m e n t-ru le s o f an assertio n . (5) I f th e e m p lo y m e n t-ru le s can only be re la te d to th e p a r tn e r an d to th e consequences o f th e act then th e only a d e q u a te p ro c e d u re seem ed to b e to ask: w h at a re th e possible resp o n se s o f th e a d d re sse e th a t a re re la te d by a ru le to th e sp e a k e r’s u tte ra n c e ? It e m e rg e d th a t th ese resp o n se s a r e them selves speech-acts a n d th a t u n d e rly in g th e m all a re th e answ ers by m ean s o f ‘n o ’ o r ‘yes’ o r an in te rm e d ia te p o sitio n -tak in g , o r an ab sten tio n fro m ta k in g a p o sitio n , a n d th a t th e possibility o f ‘n o ’ possesses a fu n d a m e n ta l significance fo r all o th e r p o sitio n -tak in g s, a ‘n o ’ w hich is clearly u se d as e q u iv ale n t in m e a n in g to th e ex p ressio n ‘th a t is false’. It is only this circ u m sta n ce w hich p erm its o n e to call th e u se o f an asserto ric se n te n c e ‘a sse rtio n ’. A n d it also b ecam e clear th a t th e ‘n o ’ itself expresses an assertion. It belongs to th e sense o f an assertion th a t it con tain s a re fe re n c e to an assertio n co n tra d ic tin g it. T h is is how f a r we h a d got. T h e q u estio n we m u st now ask is w h e th e r this is a possible basis fo r fin d in g th e em p lo y m e n t-ru le s o f asserto ric sen ten ces th e e x p la n a tio n o f w hich co u ld claim to be th e ex p lan a tio n o f th e ir m e an in g . It is only th e sense o f th ese em p lo y m e n t-ru le s th a t co u ld d e te rm in e ju s t w hat is m e a n t by calling a speech -act ‘a sse rtio n ’ - a d e s­ ig n a tio n w hich so far I have m erely taken as a fact fro m o rd in a ry usage. B u t first I w ould like to deal w ith two d o u b ts th a t m ig h t be raised a b o u t my p ro c e d u re at th e en d o f th e last le c tu re , a p ro c e d u re w hich co n c e n tra te d en tirely on one reply, viz. th a t w ith th e w o rd ‘n o ’. (1) Since I have m yself em p h asized th e im p o rta n c e o f th e fact th a t in asserto ric speech th e w o rd ‘tr u e ’ occurs, it w ould seem necessary th a t th e f u r th e r analysis sh o u ld n o t only be o rie n ta te d to w ard s th e ‘n o ’ b u t sh o u ld also ta k e ac co u n t o f th e fact th a t th e ‘n o ’ o f asserto ric speech has th e specific sen se o f ‘th a t is false’. A n d do we n o t th e re fo re have to p ro v id e a t least a provisional e x p la n a tio n o f th e w ords ‘tr u e ’ an d ‘false’? (2) H ow fa r is o n e ju stifie d in a c c o rd in g such a special p o sitio n to th e n eg ativ e reply? Even if it is clear th a t all o th e r p o sitio n -tak in g s tak e p lace ag ain st th e b a c k g ro u n d o f th e possibility o f d en ial it co u ld n o n e ­

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theless be argued that, for the addressee, prior to any position-taking, prior also to the withholding from any position-taking, is the under­ standing o f the speech-act. We must o f course accept that this under­ standing o f the assertion already belongs to the context o f possible position-takings towards the assertion; however it is not identical with any position-taking, though it does seem to be the primary hearer-correlate o f the speech-act. If we free the notion, introduced by Grice, o f m eaning in the sense o f vouloir dire from Grice’s own interpretation o f it as communication and apply it to the present view that it is an assertion, then we can now also say: the hearer understands what the speaker means, he understands what he wishes to say, he understands the asser­ tion. And this understanding is not just a theoretical assumption that we can make in order to explain the transition from the hearing o f an assertion to the hearer’s taking up his own position; rather there are also responses belonging to the hearer’s behaviour in which the pure understanding o f the assertion is expressed. T h e hearer says, for exam ­ ple: ‘(I understand what he is saying:) He is asserting that/?.’ T h e analysis o f the em ployment-rules o f an assertoric sentence will have to pay par­ ticular attention to this understanding on the part o f the hearer, for when we ask about the m eaning o f a linguistic expression we are asking what it is to understand it; and indeed we can now say: what the hearer understands when he understands the speaker’s assertion is, precisely, the employment-rules o f the assertoric sentence. True, one must distin­ guish between the understanding o f the linguistic expression and the understanding o f the speech-act, but if what is understood when the linguistic expression is understood is its function, then the two things belong together: to understand an assertoric sentence is to understand what assertion it can be used to make; and one can then say o f this assertion itself that it is understood. However, the reference to the pos­ sible denial o f the hearer is not relativized by this inclusion o f the hearer’s understanding; it is merely supplem ented. Som eone who understands an assertion understands it precisely as one to which an assertion denying it can be opposed. A nd as we have seen this means: the assertion is so understood that another assertion can say that what it asserts is false or that it is true. But this means: whoever understands the assertion understands it as one which can be true or false. But what do we mean by these words ‘true’ and ‘false’? I thus com e to the other point. Before attempting, on the basis o f what has now been achieved, to look for the employment-rule o f an assertoric sentence must we not first explain the use o f the words ‘true’ and ‘false’? Now one could say that this has already been done, for I pointed out that

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‘that p is false* is used equivalently with the denial o f the sentence and ‘that/? is true’ equivalently with the denial o f this denial, hence with the original sentence. T h e m eaning o f the word ‘true’ would then be given by the equivalence: that p is true = p. It is customary to refer to the theory that the meaning o f the word ‘true’ is defined by this equivalence as the Redundancy Theory,* for it appears to make the word ‘true’ superfluous: instead o f saying ‘that/? is true’ we can always simply use the original statement 7?’ itself. Almost everyone who is confronted with this theory for the first time has the feeling that it suppresses som ething essential, som ething one could perhaps call the statement’s relation to reality. We must try to form a clearer idea o f what underlies this feeling. T o this end the best thing to do would be to start with the way in which this relation to reality was dealt with in the truth-definition o f the philosophical tradition. T h e traditional definition o f truth goes back to a definition o f Aristotle: ‘For to say that what is the case is not the case or that what is not the case is the case is false; but to say that what is the case is the case and that what is not the case is not the case is true.’2 Since Aristotle thought that there are negative and positive statements, in an absolute sense, he defined their truth and falsity separately. I f we ignore this peculiarity o f his definition it turns out to be identical with the Redundancy Theory: a statement that som ething is the case is true if it is the case. However, Aristotle also explained his definition by saying that truth consists in a correspondence between statement and thing3 and this in turn led to the traditional formula o f the adequatio intellectus et rei,4 the agreem ent (Übereinstimmung) o f the thought with the thing. T h e inde­ terminateness o f the expressions em ployed in this formula led in the philosophical tradition (which for the most part simply took this formula, rather than the actual use o f the word ‘true’, as its point o f departure), to the most phantastic theories such as, e.g., that truth is the coincidence (Zusammentreffen) o f thinking and reality, the unity o f subject and object;5 and that things becom e true by being thought; and it would then also seem plausible to suppose that a statement only becomes true by being verified, for only then would thinking com e into contact with the thing itself. Unbridled speculations o f this kind, which merely spin out an uncom prehended traditional formula and have lost contact with the matter itself (die Sache selbst) - the actual understanding o f words - are clearly not worth debating with. I f the traditional formula permits a m eaningful interpretation at all then it can only be this: since that with which the thought is supposed to agree is construed as an object (as ‘thing’) ‘the thought’ too is to be

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co n stru ed as an object an d n o t in the sense o f ‘th in k in g ’. T h e only version o f th e fo rm u la w orth discussing is th a t which con stru es th e ag re em e n t as o n e betw een w hat is believed (or w hat is asserted) an d w hat is real, such that w hat is believed is th e objective correlate o f the actual statem ent a n d w hat is real is the objective co rre la te o f th e tru e statem en t. Since th e objective co rrela te o f a sta te m e n t is a state o f affairs th e re w ould re su lt the follow ing d efinition: (1) the asserted state of affairs, that p, is true if and only if it agrees with the corresponding real state of affairs, the corresponding fact. T h is con cep tio n o f two states o f affairs, a believed o r asserted state o f affairs on th e o n e h a n d , a real state o f affairs on th e o th e r h a n d , which in any event som ehow ‘c o rre s p o n d ’ (entsprechen) a n d in th e case o f tru th also ‘a g re e ’ (übereinstimmen) fo u n d e rs on the im possibility o f cashing th e im ages o f c o rre sp o n d e n c e an d ag re em e n t. In p articu la r it can n o t be specified w hat th e real state o f affairs ‘c o rre sp o n d in g ’ to th e asserted state o f affairs is su p p o se d to be w hen th e assertion in qu estio n is false, n o r w herein th e relatio n o f a g re e m e n t is su p p o sed to consist. W e can h o w ever re -fo rm u la te (1) in such a way that th e referen c e to a co rre ­ sp o n d e n c e o r an a g re e m e n t is d ro p p e d b u t w hat was in te n d e d by th e fo rm u la tio n is p rese rv e d : (2) the asserted state of affairs, that p, is true if and only if it is a real state of affairs (a fact). T h e r e is now no lo n g e r any talk o f tw o states o f affairs; it is th e sam e state o f affairs th a t is b ein g asserted th a t in th e case o f tru th is real an d w hich we th e n call a fact. O n e can still call (2) a fo rm u latio n o f th e a g re e m e n t-th e o ry o f tr u th alth o u g h th e w ord ‘a g re e m e n t’ n o lo n g er o ccurs in th e d efinition. H ow ever, th e question now arises w h eth e r we sh o u ld so to sp eak rea d this equivalence from left to rig h t o r fro m rig h t to left. W hat is d efin ed by w hat? T h e claim o f th e object-o rien tated a g re e m e n t-th e o ry is th a t th e w ord ‘tr u e ’ is ex p lain e d by re fe re n c e to th e reality o f th e state o f affairs. B ut this presupposes (1) th at we already u n d e rs ta n d w hat is m e an t by a state o f affairs th at/? b efo re we u n d e r ­ sta n d th e se n ten c e an d (2) th a t th e re is a p ro p erty o f states o f affairs W th a t e ith e r is reality or is th e criterio n o f reality, a n d th at we have to e x a m in e states o f affairs w ith resp ect to this p ro p e rty in o rd e r to decide w h e th e r th e assertio n th a t/? is tru e. H ow ever, thin g s are obviously the o th e r way ro u n d : if we a re to explain to som eone w hat th e p ro p e rty in q u estio n is all we can say is: th e state o f affairs asserted by m eans o f a se n ten c e ‘/?’ is real (a fact) if an d only if it is tru e th a t p. I f we now d ro p the object-orientated com ponents o f (2) we can attem p t to c o n s tru e th e rela tio n to reality to w hich the w ord ‘tr u e ’ is su p p o sed

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to re fe r not as the p ro p e rty o f an object b u t adverbially an d in this way arrive at th e form ulation: (3) that p is true = really p, fo r exam ple: ‘(the assertion) th a t it is rain in g is tru e if an d only if it really is ra in in g ’. B u t now it is obvious th a t we can say ‘it really is rain in g ’ if and only if we can also simply say ‘it is ra in in g ’. T his how ever red u ces th e last-m entioned fo rm u latio n o f the ag reem ent-theory to th e form ula o f the R edundancy T h eo ry . T h e w ord ‘really’ m erely u n d erlin es a co n tra st which clearly alread y belongs to the use o f th e assertoric sentence itself. W hat is this contrast? T h e o th e r fe a tu re which I b ro u g h t in today by way o f su p p le m e n ta­ tion, viz. th e u n d e rsta n d in g o f th e h e a re r which preced es any positiontaking tow ards the assertion o f th e speaker, is o f help h ere too. W hen S says ‘th e tow n-hall is on fire’ th e resp o n se o f the h e a re r in which his u n d e rsta n d in g w hich p recedes his own position-taking is ex p ressed is th e sentence ‘it is asserted th a t th e tow n-hall is on fire’. A n d he can add: ‘is it really on fire?’ o r ‘is it tru e th a t it is on fire?’ T h u s in an assertoric co m m unication-situation we always have th ese two things: th e sp e a k e r’s sentence ‘p ’ an d the h e a re r’s sentence (which does not have to be u tte red b u t always could be u ttered ): ‘it is asserted th a t /?’. In asm u ch as w hat th e sp e ak e r is doing, viz. asserting som eth in g by m eans o f th e assertoric expression p \ is u n d e rsto o d a n d possibly stated by th e h e a re r (‘it is asserted . . .’) th e now m odified expression ‘th a t /?’ loses its assertionm o m e n t an d can th u s serve th e h e a re r as th e basis fo r a position-taking o f his own; fo r ‘that/? . . .’ can now be su p p le m e n ted by ‘is tr u e ’, ‘is false’, ‘is d oubted by m e’, etc. T h e w ord ‘tru e ’, like th e word ‘rea l’, is a contrastword. L ea rn in g to u n d e rsta n d it is le arn in g to u n d e rsta n d the co n trast betw een '/?’ and ‘it is asserted th a t /?’ o r m o re generally: the co n trast betw een ‘p ’ an d ‘th at/?’. C o m p ared with th e incom plete expression ‘th a t p ’ the expression ‘p ’ contains a plus and it is this plus th a t is ex p ressed in th e su p p le m e n tatio n by ‘is tr u e ’: th e expression ‘is tr u e ’ is th a t ex pression by m eans o f which we are able to so su p p le m e n t th e re d u c e d ex pression ‘that/?’ as to obtain an expression which is again equivalent to the original assertoric expression ‘/?\ It is precisely this th a t the fo rm u la o f the red u n d a n cy -th eo ry states. It only ap p e a rs trivial if o n e overlooks how essential th e d iffe ren ce betw een '/?’ a n d ‘that/* ’ is. T o explain th e m ean in g o f the w ord ‘tr u e ’ is to explain th e differen ce in the m e an in g o f ‘/?’ an d ‘th at /?’ which is essential to th e use o f assertoric sentences. W hoever moves fro m ‘(it is asserted) th at /?’ to (p ’ m oves from m erely u n d e rsta n d in g ‘p ’ to asserting that/?. H ence th e ex p lan atio n o f th e w ord ‘tr u e ’ is identical with th e ex p lan atio n o f th e act o f asserting. For this reason th e u n d e rsta n d in g of th e w ord ‘tr u e ’ as this is specified in th e

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fo rm u la o f th e re d u n d a n c y theory is only trivial if o n e assum es th a t o n e already u n d e rsta n d s th e em p lo y m e n t o f asserto ric sentences. W hat have we achieved with all this? We h a d alread y seen earlier th a t th e ‘tru e ’/‘false’-response c o rresp o n d s to the ‘yes7‘n o ’-resp o n se, o r a ffir­ m ation a n d denial. In ad d itio n it has now e m e rg e d th a t to th e sense o f ‘tru e T fa lse ’ th e re belongs no t only th e o p p o sitio n betw een these w ords them selves w hich can be re p ro d u c e d in th e affirm atio n an d denial o f th e relev an t senten ce b u t also w hat distinguishes th e se n ten c e ‘p ’ fro m th e red u ced expression ‘th at p ’. T his co ntrast-m om en t which is expressly m an ifested in th e w o rd -p air ‘tr u e ’/Talse’ th e re fo re also alread y belongs to th e assertorically used Y es/No a n d m ust be ta k en into acco u n t in th e analysis o f th e act o f assertion. L et us now r e tu rn to th e p o in t rea ch ed at th e e n d o f th e last lecture. I f assertion essentially anticipates th e possibility o f a d en ial - a c o u n te r­ assertion - th e n it can be u n d e rsto o d as a challenge, in th e sense in w hich o n e challenges som eo n e to take u p th e co u n ter-p o sitio n in a gam e, e.g. in a bet. T h a t th e em p lo y m en t-ru les of assertoric sen ten ces can be u n d e rsto o d as rules o f a game is an idea w hich stem s fro m W ittgenstein, w hich S earle too has ta k en up b u t n o t really explo ited , a n d which has b een d ev elo p ed above all by D u m m e tt.6 F ro m D u m m e tt com es th e f u r ­ th e r suggestion th a t assertoric speech can be c o m p ared w ith th e type o f g am e in w hich two p a rtn e rs play against each o th e r a n d th e rules a re such th a t follow ing th e m leads to a final-position which consists in th e o n e having won and th e o th e r h av in g lost. L et us first be clear th a t the m oves in a g am e a re acts o f th e kind we a re looking for, nam ely, acts th e rules o f w hich relate n o t to th e circ u m ­ stances in w hich they a re p e rfo rm e d b u t to th e ir consequences. B ut now th ese a re consequences n o t in th e sense o f in te n d e d effects, b u t in th e sense o f consequen ces re g a rd in g th e outco m e o f th e g am e which re su lt fro m follow ing th e ru les o f th e gam e. T h e ru les also re la te th e acts to a p a rtn e r; b u t they do so in such a way th a t th e p a rtn e r is n o t th e object o f an in te n d e d effect, b u t th e o p p o n e n t w ho is essential to th e gam e. T h e gam e is defined by th e way in which th e moves o f th e two p a rtn e rs a re rela ted by th e ru les o f th e g am e to th e o u tco m e o f th e gam e. Now w h at is th e g am e o f asserto ric speech like? T h e assertio n -act th a t consists in th e em p lo y m e n t o f an assertoric sen ten ce ‘p ’ is th e o p e n in g move. T h e rules o f th e gam e a re such th a t th e p a r tn e r ’s co u n ter-m o v e is already fixed by th e open in g -m o v e; it consists in th e u tte ra n c e o f ‘n o t p .’ By way o f analogy th in k o f bets (th o u g h in fact it is m isleading to speak o f ‘analogy’ h e re fo r a b et can itself only be u n d e rsto o d as a m o d ­ ification o f th e assertoric gam e; how ever, th e re fe re n c e to a b et m ay

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serve to illustrate what I have in m ind). Now how is the opening move to be understood? I can now com e back to th at p art o f Searle’s rule whose discussion I had postponed. As the essential rule for the em ploym ent of an assertoric sentence he o ffered: its em ploym ent ‘counts as an u n d ertak in g to the effect that/? rep resen ts an actual state o f affairs’ (above p. 187). I have already shown th at the second p a rt o f this form ulation presupposes w hat has first to be explained and is th erefo re useless. B ut how is the first p art to be in terp reted ? W hat does ‘counts as an u n d ertaking to the effect that . . mean? T his rem ained unclear. H owever, it becomes sig­ nificant if we in te rp re t it as: ‘stands fo r a g u aran tee t h a t . . .’ T h at some­ one who uses an assertoric sentence ‘p ’asserts som ething m eans, we m ight say, th at he offers a g u aran tee th at it is tru e that p. His o p p o n en t on the other hand guarantees that it is tru e that not -p. W hat does this mean? Well, whoever guarantees som ething guarantees th at certain conditions specified by him are fulfilled. W hat would these conditions be in the case o f the em ploym ent o f an assertoric sentence? Can we say: whoever uses an assertoric sentence guarantees th at the truth-conditions o f his assertion are fulfilled? B ut what, you will ask, is m eant by this talk of truth-conditions? A condition is expressed in an if-sentence. So if that which som eone asserts is to have a truth -co n d itio n we would have to envisage a form ulation of the following kind: ‘that/? is true, if . . .’ And th e thesis ju st m entioned would th erefo re m ean: if som eone uses an assertoric sentence ‘p ’ (if he guarantees th at it is tru e that p) th en he guarantees that th e condition re fe rre d to in th e protasis o f the above form ula is fulfilled. T o be able properly to u n d erstan d th e significance o f this suggestion one should com pare it with the idea - which was rejected - th at the em ploym entrule relates the em ploym ent to the circumstances of employment. T here we were dealing with a conditional rule. It had the form : ‘if . . . the em ploym ent o f the expression* is co rrect’. Now th e ‘if . . .’ appears on the o th er side: ‘the em ploym ent o f th e exp ressio n* is correct (true), if . . T h e re it was said u n d e r what conditions it is correct to use the expression. Now one is saying: if (for w hatever reasons) the expression is used what th en are the conditions u n d e r which it is correct. This reversed relation to conditions presupposes ( 1 ) th at those conditions in which the expression is used (the em ploym ent-situation) are irrelevant to th e correctness o f its use - this is the situation-independence of em ploym ent th at I m entioned earlier (but which will only be explained later) - and (2 ) th at those conditions on which the correctness of the use o f the expression depends are those whose fulfilm ent is g u aranteed by

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the use of the expression itself. W hat the expression guarantees is that the conditions o f its correctness (truth) are fulfilled. It is this, then, that is m eant by speaking o f truth-conditions. T h e speech-act of assertion consists in g u aran teein g its own truth-conditions. We can now also begin to u n d erstan d how it is that som eone who uses an assertoric sentence ‘/?’ can equally well say ‘that/? is tru e ’. T he equivalence ‘p = that/? is tru e ’ is g ro u n d ed in the fact that someone who asserts som ething is always asserting the correctness (truth) of his asser­ tion; that this is so is g ro u n d ed in the essence o f assertion as an act of guaranteeing. In the preceding prelim inary discussion of the word ‘tru e ’ I pointed out that this w ord expresses the contrast between '/?’ and ‘it is asserted that/?’ and th at it is in the h e a re r’s u n d erstan d in g that this contrast first becomes prom inent. We can now see why this is so. Someone who gives a guarantee m ust always do two things: ( 1 ) he specifies the conditions whose fulfilm ent he is guaranteeing; (2 ) he guarantees their fulfilment. W hoever gives a g u aran tee does both these things; but th ere would be no act o f g u aranteeing if he did not do both things at once. Now the person to whom the g u aran tee is given can only be said to understand the g uarantee if he also u n d erstan d s both these things. But he would not u n d erstan d the g u aran tee as a g uarantee if these two things - what is gu aranteed and that it is g u aran teed - were not kept apart in his understan d in g . A pplied to the u n d erstan d in g o f an assertion this means: someone understan d s the assertion m ade by m eans of an assertoric sentence if, firstly, he knows the truth-conditions of the assertion and, secondly, if he knows th at the speaker is g u aranteeing th at these conditions are fulfilled. W hat he does not know, w hat is open for him, is w hether the conditions are actually fulfilled, in o th e r words, w hether the assertion is true. Its being open for the p erson who understands the assertion w hether it is tru e is as essential to his u n d erstan d ing as his knowing that the person who makes the assertion asserts that it is true. T h e insight that one u n d erstan d s an assertoric sentence if and only if one knows its truth-conditions was first form ulated in W ittgenstein’s Tractatus: ‘T o u n d e rsta n d a proposition (Satz) m eans to know what is the case if it is tru e ’ (4.024). This definition is, however, incomplete, for the u n d erstan d in g of an assertion is also characterized by the second of the above-m entioned features: it is also understood that the person em ploying the sentence is g u aran teein g that it is tru e . 7 B ut now this second feature rem ains the same for every assertoric sentence. So if it is simply a m atter of explaining to som eone the m eaning of a particular

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sentence and it can be assum ed that he knows that it is an assertoric sentence, one can also simply say: the m eaning of the sentence is explained by giving its truth-conditions. T h e result so far achieved seems unsatisfactory, for two reasons: firstly, nothing has so far been said about how one can explain what the truthconditions of an assertion or sentence are. One possibility would be (as the reference to an if-sentence suggests) that the truth-condition of a sentence is itself given by means of a sentence. T he tradition of semantic theories that was inaugurated by T arski 8 is grounded in this possibility. It presupposes, o f course, th at in explaining a sentence one always has at o n e’s disposal another sentence which is already understood or, if it is a question of the m eaning of a whole system of sentences, another language, a so-called m eta-language. I pointed out in the debate with Grice th at such a meta-linguistic theory is not sufficient for our fu n d a­ m ental question of how linguistic expressions are understood. I would also rem ind you that so far we have seen no reason to abandon the idea that to explain a linguistic expression is to explain its em ploym ent-rule, and that means: its m ode o f em ploym ent. If we specify the truth-con­ dition of a sentence by m eans of another sentence, this can only mean that the first sentence is used in the same way as the second; it does not mean that the m ode of em ploym ent itself is shown. Besides, by the thesis that the m eaning is given in a conditional rule we did not m ean that the conditional rule is form ulated in words, but, rather, that it is shown under what conditions the sentence is used. A nd clearly we must now hold on to the same theoretical claim. Secondly, the purpose of speaking of a ‘guarantee’ and a ‘bet’ can only be to point in the right direction; such term s must now be put aside, for the following two reasons. Firstly, every act of guaranteeing som ething itself presupposes the use of an assertoric sentence. T h e explanation by m eans of the term ‘g u arantee’ would thus be a pseudo­ explanation. We would again be committing a hysteron-proteron. Secondly, the notion of a guarantee involves something more than the anticipation contained in an assertion, for it is essential to the concept of guaranteeing that in the event o f the anticipated condition not being fulfilled the g uaran to r must reckon with certain negative consequences from the side o f the partners. T h e same is true of the notion of a bet. Even some­ one who bets ‘m erely for the h o n o u r’ loses the honour that would be due to him were he to win the bet. T hese two defects belong together. I used the word ‘g u arantee’ in order to describe the act of assertion as the opening-m ove in a game. But if we want not merely to nam e the opening-m ove of a gam e but to

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define it, this can clearly only be done by specifying the consequences it has in the gam e, and th at means: how it is related by the rule of the gam e to the outcom e of the game. A nd only by defining an assertion in term s of the rules of the game-moves that follow it can we expect to be able to explain the truth-conditions guaranteed by the assertion by ref­ erence to em ploym ent-rules. It is only now that the crucial defect of Searle’s system of rules becomes clear. This system of rules ended precisely where it should have begun, namely with the m ere nam ing of the opening-m ove of the game. This is no merely external criticism, for in his general prelim inary reflections Searle him self com pared speech-acts with game-acts and pointed out that a game-act is regulated by its consequences in the gam e . 9 By what rules then is the game of assertoric speech defined? Although I want to d ro p the notion o f a guarantee we can still be guided by it. It is essential to a guarantee that there are decision-criteria for its fulfilment. Som eone who understands a guarantee knows the criteria by reference to which it is decided w hether it is fulfilled o r not. Likewise som eone who u nderstands an assertion, though he does not know w hether it is tru e does know how it can be established w hether it, or the opposite assertion, is true; in o th e r words he knows how it would be decided w hether the asserted truth-conditions are fulfilled or not. T h e estab­ lishing of w hether an assertion is tru e is called its justification or verifi­ cation. T hus from a completely differen t starting-point we arrive at a thesis m ade fam ous by Logical Positivism, viz. th at one understands an assertion if and only if one knows how it is to be verified, and that means: if one knows its verification-rule. Now if the person who u n d er­ stands the assertion knows how one establishes whether it is true, then the assertion m ust consist in the g u arantee that, if it is tested as to its tru th , it will be established that it is tru e, and that means: that following its verification-rule will lead to success. This state of affairs could be expressed in the com plicated form ulation: the person who asserts that p in guaranteeing that its truth-conditions are fulfilled guarantees that the fulfilm ent of the truth-conditions, and hence the tru th of the asser­ tion, is verifiable. But the interm ediate clause now becomes superfluous and there is no reason fo r not regard in g the verifiability itself as the tru th condition of the assertion. This step is crucial for it removes the unclarity that has so far su rro u n d ed the question of what one is to und erstan d by the truth-conditions of an assertion and how one can explain them to som eone. If the truth-condition consists in the fact that following the verification-rule will lead to success, then giving the truth-

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condition o f an assertion will consist in d em o n stratin g its verificationrule or, to p u t it m ore simply, in show ing how it is verified. So instead of speaking o f a ‘g u a ra n te e ’ we can now specify the rules of the gam e whose opening-m ove is the use of an assertoric sentence. T h e gam e is like this: a speaker utters an assertoric sentence ‘p \ T h e h e are r is free to re g a rd him self as a m ere spectator o r as a p a rtn e r in the gam e. In the latter case he assumes th e role of o p p o n en t by u ttering the negation of ‘p*. However, it is also en o u g h if speaker and h earer know th at the h e a re r (or som eone o r other) could assum e the role of oppo n en t. T h e rule of the game consists in th e verification-rule. T h e verification-rule is such th at following it leads to a positive result either for the speak er o r fo r his oppo n en t. T h e gam e-outcom e is defined by the consequence that an agreem en t is reached betw een speaker and opp o ­ nent such that eith er the speaker assents to the o p p o n e n t’s original assertion or vice versa. T h e act o f assertion can now be defined. R em em ber I only appealed to the notion o f assertion for the p u rp o se o f defining anew the use of an assertoric sentence, after it h ad becom e clear th at the use of such a sentence can be defined n eith er by the circum stances of its use n o r by an in ten d ed effect. From th e outset o u r p u rp ose was to find the em ploym ent-rules which we explain (or u n d erstan d ) w hen we explain (or u n d erstan d ) th e m eaning o f an assertoric sentence. A nd now we can say: one u n d erstan d s an assertoric sentence if one knows what function it has, viz. the function of being used to p e rfo rm a particular assertion-act. T his act or the use o f the sentence is defined as the open­ ing-m ove of the gam e ju st described. A nd that means: following a certain rule - the verification-rule - leads to a resu lt the consequence o f which is that th e o p p o n en t agrees with the speak er or vice versa. T h e specifi­ cation o f the com plex of rules and actions (the ‘g am e’) to which the use of an assertoric sentence belongs spells o u t what was m erely h inted at by describing som eone who uses an assertoric sentence as guaranteeing that its truth-conditions are fulfilled an d , subsequently, as guaranteeing that his assertion is verifiable, o r that th e application of the verificationrule will have a positive outcom e for him . W hat it m eans to guarantee a positive outcom e shows itself in the way in which the consequence of the gam e-outcom e is connected with the opening-m ove by the verification-rule. T h e consequence o f the gam e-outcom e does not have the character o f an effect. R ather it is a consequence which is draw n by the players in accordance with th e rule of th e gam e, such that if som eone refused to draw the consequence which results from following the ver­

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ification-rule we would say that he did not u n d erstand what an assertion is, or th a t it showed that although he u ttered a sentence he did not u n d e rsta n d its m eaning. It could be objected to my analysis that I have defined an assertion as the opening-m ove o f a gam e at the end o f which there are again asser­ tions, nam ely the agreeing statem ents of the two opponents. Isn’t this circular? We m ust first try to get a clearer picture than so far achieved o f the connection betw een the result of following the verification-rule and the gam e-outcom e. Following the verification-rule obviously leads to a situation in which no one who understands the assertion is any longer free to affirm it or to deny it. I say obviously it leads to such a situation, for th ere is no o th er way o f interpreting the fact that even the person who denied it m ust now affirm it. T h a t there actually are such rules the following o f which has a result that one can characterize by saying th at the assertion turns out to be true (or false) could o f course only be show n by the actual explanation of these rules and so far I have not done this. So far all we can say is: that following the verificationrule leads to such a situation is shown by the fact that playing through the verification-rule has the consequence that one of the two opponents sees him self compelled to accept the assertion of the other. T h e assertion at the en d o f the gam e thus has a pre-em inent character: one cannot contradict it in this situation - at th e end o f the game - without laying oneself open to the charge o f n o t u n d erstan d in g it. But is it possible to treat the use of an assertoric sentence which occurs at the end o f the gam e as itself an assertion if I define assertion as an act o f guaranteeing, or as the opening-m ove in the game? I think it is. We m ust allow the limiting-case of a trivial act o f guaranteeing, o r the trivial case in which opening-m ove and concluding-m ove coincide. T o fu rth e r characterize the gam e-outcom e by saying that the speaker has won if the o p p o n e n t has to agree with him and otherwise has lost seems at p resen t to be superfluous; it is only in a later connection that we will see how far this description is necessary. For the present we can say that th e rules o f this gam e are not such as lead to an outcom e which consists in a player having won o r lost but ra th e r in an assertion proving to be true o r false. T h is is exactly how the outcom e of the game is described by the opp o n en ts in the gam e itself. T h e assent of the o p p o ­ n en t forced u p o n him by the rules of the gam e is expressed in the sentence ‘Y our assertion has tu rn e d out to be true, m ine false.’ V erification-rules are distinguished from o th e r gam e-rules - and this constitutes th eir u n iq u e character - by being rules of justification, i.e. rules the following o f which decides w hether the assertion of the speaker

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or th at of his opponent is correct - where the word ‘correct’ has the sense of ‘tru e ’. In contrast to all the rules so far re ferred to - conditional rules, instrum ental rules and o ther kinds of gam e-rules - the character­ istic feature of justification-rules is th at the correctness of an act does not simply consist in its following the rule; ra th e r it is only the correct following of the rules that decides w hether the original act is correct in the absolute, no longer rule-relative, sense of ‘tru e ’. W hen I provisionally characterized the em ploym ent of an assertoric sentence as guaranteeing that its own truth-conditions are fulfilled (a characterization which of course continues to be valid; it was merely insufficient) I pointed out that when it is simply a m atter of explaining the m eaning of a particular sentence to som eone and it can be assumed that he knows that it is an assertoric sentence one can also simply say: the m eaning of the sentence is explained by giving its truth-conditions. Similarly I can now say: as all other features o f the verification-game are the same for all assertoric sentences then, w hen it is only a m atter of explaining the m eaning o f a particular sentence and one can assume that it is known that it is an assertoric sentence, one can simply say: the m eaning of the sentence is explained by showing how it is verified; to und erstan d an assertoric sentence is to know its verification-rule. B ut precisely this aspect o f the p resent theory, which is clearly central and of decisive im portance for particular explanations, has so far rem ained undeveloped. I have not yet shown how a verification-rule is explained. But nothing can be said about this in general. How an asser­ toric sentence is verified is som ething th at must be shown separately for each form of assertoric sentence. O ne cannot get fu rth er than the result so far achieved so long as one speaks about assertoric sentences in gen­ eral. My im m ediate aim was simply to arrive at a - necessarily hypo­ thetical - prelim inary conception of the em ploym ent-rules of assertoric sentences as a foundation for the enquiry into the em ploym ent-rules of the com ponents of a predicative sentence, the most elem entary form of assertoric sentence (p. 179). So the next step would seem to be to set about the task of clarifying the employment-rules of predicates and singular terms. If the conception now arrived at is correct then the em ploym ent-rule of the singular term and the em ploym ent-rule of the predicate together constitute the veri­ fication-rule of the predicative sentence. From this fact alone, viz. that the verification-rule of the predicative sentence is founded in two other rules, it is clear that the elucidation o f the verification-rule of the p re­ dicative sentence-form will present peculiar difficulties. Consider also the following point. In the refutation o f the thesis that the employment-

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rule of assertoric sentences relates to the circum stances of em ploym ent we encountered the peculiar situation-independence of the employmentrule of assertoric sentences. It is this situation-independence of em ploy­ m ent which makes it possible for the em ploym ent to be determ ined by rules o f an o th er kind (with which we have now becom e acquainted). In particular this situation-independence is clearly essential to the fact that one can use not only the w ord ‘correct’ b u t the w ord ‘tru e ’: an assertion is once and for all true or false. So far I have p resupposed this aspect of the em ploym ent of the word ‘tru e ’, not explained it. How this situa­ tion-independence is constituted is som ething that the analysis o f the most elem entary sentence-form would have to show. I have already hinted that it is the function o f singular term s to make possible this situation-independence (p. 161). T h e analysis o f the verification-rule o f predicative sentences is thus m ade even m ore difficult. I will therefore postpone once again the treatm en t o f predicates and singular term s in o rd e r first to show by reference to simple cases how the m eaning of a sentence can be explained by giving its truth-conditions and how these can be explained by dem onstrating the sentence’s m ode of verification. T hese simple cases are those in which th e truth or falsity of an assertion depends simply on the tru th or falsity o f o th er assertions. Sentences em ployed in this way are the com plex sentences form ed by means of ‘a n d ’ and ‘o r’, and so-called general sentences. T h e discussion of these sentence-form s will also provide an o p portunity to dem onstrate, from an o th er angle, the inadequacies of object-orientated semantics.

L E C T U R E 16

Supplements

T h e m ultiplicity of sem antic theories I have touched on in the last two lectures in the process o f trying to achieve w hat seems to me to be a tenable prelim inary concept o f th e m eaning o f an assertoric sentence may have left b ehind a certain confusion. So before taking up the p ro b ­ lem to which the line o f th o u g h t o f the last lecture led it seems to m e to be necessary to in se rt a lecture devoted to surveying what has been achieved. T his will enable me to say som ething about the connections betw een the various positions an d to add a su pplem ent th at will be im p o rtan t fo r w hat will follow.

/.

T h e various theses ab o u t the m eaning of assertoric sentences (a.s.) are as follows. (1) O ne u n d e rsta n d s an a.s. if one knows fo r which state of affairs it stands. (2) O ne u n d e rsta n d s an a.s. if one knows in which circum stances it is to be used. (3) O ne u n d e rsta n d s an a.s. if one knows w hat its truth-conditions are. (4) O ne u n d e rsta n d s an a.s. if one knows w hat its verification-rules are. (5) O ne u n d e rsta n d s an a.s. if one knows w hat belief the person who uses it com m unicates to a hearer. (6 ) O ne u n d e rsta n d s an a.s. if one knows which assertion-act a speaker can p e rfo rm with it (illocutionary act theory). (7) O ne u n d e rsta n d s an a.s. if o ne knows the verification-gam e whose opening-m ove is p e rfo rm e d with it. T h e m ost striking thing both about the line o f thought as it has turned out and abo u t virtually all im p o rtan t m o d ern theories is the central position which the concept o f tru th suddenly acquires. You could say:

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that statem ents can be tru e or false is som ething one has always known. Before Frege, however, no one had hit upon the idea o f defining the m eaning - the sense - of a sentence by means of its truth-conditions. T h e ‘reality-relation’ of statem ents was also understood as tru th in the philosophical tradition, but this relation always rem ained pre-defined as a relation to things (res), to beings. It is only when one is prim arily orientated towards sentences ra th e r than towards nam es that it seems natural to start with the possible tru th of a sentence and by reference to this u n d erstan d even its m eaning. B ut how is this tru th that is no longer gro u n d ed in an orientation tow ards objects to be understood? T h e re is a great tem ptation simply to presuppose the concept of tru th as an unanalysed basic concept, as was done with the concept of an object in traditional philosophy. And in fact this is precisely what most analytical philosophers do, both those who have regarded the form ula of the Redundancy T heory as an answ er to the question of the m eaning of ‘tru e ’ ra th e r than m erely a starting-point, and also those who, in the question o f the m eaning o f an assertoric sentence, have been content with thesis (3). T hese two views, which are often held simultaneously, contradict one anoth er. For th e idea that the word ‘tru e ’ is eliminable, as the R edundancy T h eo ry claims, is incom patible with the idea that it is indispensable to the determ ination o f the m eaning o f a sentence. If one is w ondering w hether th ere is an alternative to the objectorientated approach - thesis ( 1 ) - and the orientation towards the con­ cept o f tru th , th en it is clear th at this is not provided by the actiontheoretical account given in (5) or (6 ), for this m ust either itself have recourse to the concept o f tru th or revert to the object-orientated approach. T h e only alternative seems to be the conception represented by (2 ) which relates the sentence to the circumstances of its employment. T h e th ree great conceptual alternatives for understanding the realityrelation o f a sign thus seem to be ( 1 ) the relation to an object (2 ) the relation to circum stances of use (3) the relation to truth. It is of course a cru d e simplification to speak o f alternatives here. We shall see that ju st as the object-orientated approach took some account o f the truthrelation, so too the tru th -o rien tated approach includes the relation to objects as a necessary com ponent. Thesis (2), we have seen, is hopelessly inadequate. Now that we have arrived at the tru th -o rien tated conception we can also see why it is. Despite a ra th e r dangerous ambiguity which the w ord ‘circum stances’ thereby acquires we can contrast theses (2) and (3) by saying that according to (2 ) to understand a sentence is to know in which circumstances it is to be used, whereas, according to (3), to u n d erstan d a sentence is to

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know in which circumstances it is true. T h e p ro p o n ent of thesis (2) found it necessary to re-in terp ret what we can now recognize as the grounds o f the truth o f a statem ent as the conditions u n d er which the statem ent is used. Why this was hopeless can now easily be seen. Employmentgrounds and tru th -g ro u n d s are two entirely different things. T h e con­ dition of o ur significantly using a statem ent is not that we have grounds for its truth but only that we know what they are; and this is precisely what is m eant by saying that we know what its truth-conditions are. From a methodological point of view, however, thesis (2), which is false, has an advantage over (3), which is correct. It meets the require­ m ent, which thesis (3) does not meet, that the m eaning of an expression m ust be explained by explaining how it is used. Admittedly Wittgenstein’s principle, which I called the fundam ental principle of analytical philos­ ophy, does not go quite as far as this. It says only that the m eaning is what the explanation of the m eaning explains. A nd one can say that we explain the m eaning of a sentence by giving its truth-conditions. But such an explanation is bound to be circular so long as one is unable to explain the truth-conditions themselves. A nd this can only be done by showing what one has to do to justify the statem ent or, putting it another way, by showing how one verifies the statem ent. T herein lies the supe­ riority of thesis (4) over thesis (3), a superiority one can also describe by saying that to speak o f tru th , both in general and in reference to a particular statem ent, rem ains empty so long as one does not explain the word ‘true’ itself; and this one can only do by showing how one recognizes that a statem ent is true. Thesis (4) is superior to (3) inasm uch as it explains truth-conditions by reference to a rule o f action, but it does not show in what sense this rule o f action is the em ploym ent-rule of the sentence itself. Besides, the explanation it gives would apply ju st as much to the reduced expression ‘th a t// as to th e assertoric sentence itself, *p\ T h e same truth-conditions, or the same verification-rule, hold for both expressions. B ut whereas if one only says ‘that p ’ one leaves it open w hether the truth-conditions are fulfilled, w hether following the verification-rule will lead to success, if one uses the sentence ‘p ’ one asserts that the truth-conditions are fulfilled or that following the verification-rule will lead to success. It is only thesis (7) which does justice to this aspect of the m eaning of a sentence. In this thesis I have given a precise m eaning to thesis (6 ) which as it stands is vague - that an assertoric sentence is used to make an assertion, by combining it with (4) and hence also with (3). It is only on the basis o f (7) that it becomes intelligible how by explain­ ing the verification-rule one explains the em ploym ent-rule o f the sen­

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tence. T h e em ploym ent-rule is not identical with the verification-rule the em ploym ent-rule is the rule which relates the em ploym ent via the verification-rule to the game-outcome - the verification-rule is, however, that com ponent o f the em ploym ent-rule o f an assertoric sentence that distinguishes it from the em ploym ent-rule of another assertoric sentence. Perhaps it still strikes you as strange th at the rule which concerns the verification o f a sentence should be its em ploym ent-rule. It is not the verification-rule, you m ight say, which determines the use of a sentence. C ertainly not. B ut the em ploym ent-rule o f som ething which has a func­ tion is not w hat ‘determ ines’ its use, if this means: what motivates or somehow causes its use, o r what determ ines in which circumstances it is used. W hat we are looking fo r u n d e r the heading ‘em ploym ent-rule’ is what we explain to som eone when we explain to him the use o f a lin­ guistic expression. A nd w hen we explain to som eone the use of an assertoric sentence we are not explaining what the occasions, circum ­ stances or motives o f its use are. R ather we are showing him w hat som e­ one who uses it is guaranteeing and how he does this. Sum m arizing we can say: thesis (1) commits a hysteron-proteron. (2) is false but contains an im p o rtan t methodological principle. (3) and (4) are correct b ut insufficient. (6 ) is correct but indeterm inate and all three are in corporated in my thesis (7). T h e re rem ains (5), the thesis which agrees with (7) inasm uch as it too starts out from the assum ption that the em ploym ent-rule of an assertoric sentence relates to its function but which interprets this function as com m unication. II We have already seen th at thesis (5) is incorrect because it founders on W ittgenstein’s fundam ental principle (p. 182). O n the o ther hand, the statem ent th a t / 2 when, vis-ä-visB, he u tters *p\ intends to bring it about that B believes th at A believes that/?, is correct. Accordingly if (7) is a correct analysis o f the em ploym ent-rule o f ‘p ’ th en this statem ent must follow from (7). I m ust th erefo re supplem ent the critique o f (5) from the standpoint o f my own conception by placing the two conceptions into a positive relationship to one another. B ut first a rem ark about term inology. C oncerning Grice’s ‘m eaning’ (vouloir dire) th e re are two possibilities: Either the notion of m eaning is understood as being correlative to that o f un d erstan d in g (such that one can say: the h e a re r u n derstands, or does not u n d erstand, w hat the speaker ‘m eans’) - and this appears to be the m eaning which ‘m ean’ or vouloir dire (and the G erm an meinen) actually has in ordinary linguistic

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usage. B ut in that case it is false th a t w hat a sp eaker m eans by ‘p ’ is that he wants to bring it about, etc.; r a th e r this is w hat he would m ean if, he said ‘I want to bring it about, etc.’ W hat he m eans by u tterin g ‘p ’ is to assert that p. It is this th at the o th e r perso n un derstands. Or I g ra n t Grice his terminology. I then have to say that th e function o f an assertoric sentence, o r the intention with which such a sentence is used, is not that o f m eaning som ething with it b u t ra th e r th a t o f asserting som ething with it. A nd now to business. Both in Grice and in my in terp retatio n the use o f a sentence is u n d e rsto o d intersubjectively. A ccording to Grice, how ­ ever, the addressee is th e object o f an in te n d e d effect; whereas in my account he is a p a rtn e r in a game. T his m eans (1) that in G rice’s account the com m unication-act is one-sided, w hereas in my account it is in trin ­ sically reciprocal: the speaker addresses th e h e a re r as som eone who can take up a position tow ards what h e says. T his anticipation of positiontaking belongs to the m eaning o f an assertoric sentence (cf. p. 189f). From this, however, it follows th at (2) in my in te rp re ta tio n the speaker can assum e the role o f the addressee in the capacity o f ‘N o ’-utterer. T h e ph en o m en o n o f speaking to o n eself presents no difficulty for this co n ­ ception; even if we are speaking to ourselves the use o f an assertoric sentence consists in an assertion in the sense described. It is only this conception which m akes it possible, on the o n e hand, to take account o f the intersubjective ch aracter o f speech and, o n the o th e r hand, to avoid the absurd consequence th at a sentence does n o t have the same m ean ­ ing in soliloquy as it has in conversation with a n o th e r . 1 O n the o th e r h an d I m ust now ad m it th at in my account an essential function o f intersubjective assertoric speech, viz. its com m unicationfunction, has so far been om itted. W hen I u tte r a sentence ‘p ’ I do not norm ally do so with the in tention o f challenging the h e a re r to a verification-gam e, but ra th e r with the inten tio n o f informing him (bringing it about in a specific way th at he believes), by m eans o f my assertion, that p or at least that I believe that p. Even if my thesis th at the com m unication-function does not belong to the m eaning of the sentence is correct I m ust still be able to explain this function. As the notion of believing th a tp is clearly essential in the form u latio n o f the com m unication-function we m ust first ask: w hat is m ean t by belief, an d in w hat relation does it stand to assertion? I am n o t in a position to give a definition o f ‘belief’; n o r do I know w hether th e re is a satisfactory explanation o f this word. O ne of the chief difficulties is this: we also speak o f belief in reg ard to beings which do not speak and in re g a rd to ourselves in contexts in which we do not

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speak and hence do not use an expression such as ‘p ’ or ‘that p \ ‘B elief’ - as Peirce was the first to em phasize 2 - refers to an act-disposition. We say o f a being that it believes that p if in its actions it takes account of the fact that p. A lternatively one can say that it relies on o r banks on that p, that in its actions it presupposes that p. Belief is the cognitive disposition which, to g eth er with th e voluntative or instinctual disposi­ tions, d eterm ines intentional action; and, as I have already pointed out (p. 184), p rio r to the use o f sentences there is no action in which this disposition is m anifested by itself (so it can only be an external description w hen we speak o f a belief o f an anim al by means o f the expression ‘that p ’ which refers to a sentence). In contrast to this b ro ad concept o f belief (Glauben) we can define a n arro w er concept, using for purposes of term inological contrast the term opine (Meinen):3 A opines that p = def. if A is presented with the question ‘p o r n o t-p?’, an d if he has no intentions which go beyond the gam e-outcom e, he will assert that p. This concept thus refers to the tendency or readiness o f a person to guarantee the truth of the assertion that/? in so fa r as he has no intentions which go beyond the outcom e o f the game. T his qualifying clause can also be expressed thus: ‘in so far as the p erso n ’s speech-act is d eterm in ed only by the intention that the gam e should have a positive outcom e for him ’. So here we do find it necessary to speak o f losing and w inning the game, for the reason that h e re it is a question o f th e m otivation for taking one side or the other o r for abstaining. In describing the verification-game in the last lecture I ignored this question. I was able to do so because one can explain the gam e to som eone w ithout reference to the question of the m otivation for playing on one side o r the other. I said in the last lecture that the outcom e o f the gam e does not consist in a player winning or losing but rather in an assertion p roving to be tru e or false (p. 204). But this means that if we now consider the game from the point o f view of the intentions o f the players, o r th eir readiness to take one side or the other, the inten­ tion o f w inning the gam e can equally well be described as a truth-intention: the speaker intends to assent to an assertion that is tru e . 4 One can call this in tention in the em ploym ent o f an assertoric sentence, which is concerned only with the positive outcom e of the verification-game, a purely theoretical intention. It is this purely theoretical intention which enters into the definition o f ‘opining’ through the qualifying clause ‘if he has no intentions going beyond th e gam e-outcom e’. O pining, like belief, is defined as a specific act-disposition. B ut here the act consists only in the em ploym ent o f an assertoric sentence with the purely theo­ retical intention ju st described. O ne can therefo re call this act a purely

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theoretical act. O f course it is n o t these labels which m atter; what m at­ ters is that in opining, as thus defined, we have a belief-disposition which represents an isolable cognitive disposition. W hereas the broad concept o f belief refers to a cognitive disposition which can only be extrapolated as an item co-existing with voluntative dispositions to explain in ten ­ tional acts, in the case of the disposition o f opining one can speak o f a purely cognitive disposition, inasm uch as the acts in which it is m ani­ fested are determ ined solely by the intention o f truth. However, opining as thus defined - in oth er words assertoric belief can now be subsum ed u n d er the broad concept of b elie f: som eone who without reg ard to fu rth e r intentions has a tendency to assert that/? will also take account o f thatp in his actions. O n the other hand one cannot say that, whenever A believes that/?, he also opines that/?. T he contra­ position o f the previous sentence, however, clearly does hold: if he does not believe that p then neither does he opine that p; hence one can convict som eone on the basis of his actions of the untruthfulness o f his assertorically expressed opinions. It would, however, be a mistake not to differentiate actions and lin­ guistic utterances, but simply regard them as manifestations of one beliefdisposition. T h e purely cognitive disposition o f opining outlined by the definition ju st attem pted is an in d ep en d en t disposition whose definition contains the concept o f assertion; through the connection thereby given with the verification-game it acquires certain differentiating and con­ trastive features which do not belong to non-assertoric belief. (1) W hereas in the case of any belief one can speak o f its causes, opinions also have grounds. O ne m ight even be tem pted to substitute the following defi­ nition fo r the one I have given: A opines that/? = def. A expects that the assertion that/? can be shown to be true. T h e definition I have given would then be the consequence o f the definiens that has now been given. However, as a definition this suggestion would be circular, for ‘expects’ is simply an o th er w ord for ‘opines’. (2) T h e readiness to assert that/? is grou n d ed in an explicit or implicit decision between the assertion that p and the assertion th at not-p; thus to opinion, unlike non-assertoric belief, th e re belongs the contrast with the possibility of undecidedness, or of d o u b t w hether the assertion that p is tru e or false. Doubt too concerns the justifiability of the assertion. (3) At the other end o f the scale, if the opinion is com bined with consciousness of the indubitability (and that means: the com plete verification) of what is believed then the person concerned says not only th at he opines that/?, but that he knows that p. We also make a distinction between belief and knowledge in the case of non-assertoric belief (e.g. o f animals). But that is another concept

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of knowledge according to which knowledge is correct belief; the classical definition of knowledge as a belief that is not ju st true but also adequately g ro u n d e d 5 clearly fits only assertoric belief. I f we now retu rn to the question o f the relation between assertion, belief, com m unication and the m eaning of an assertoric sentence, th en clearly as regards belief we can restrict ourselves to the n arrow er concept o f assertoric belief, i.e. to opining. I shall begin with the connection between opining and assertion. T h e definition o f opining I have given defines this connection in a specific way. We can now test the adequacy of this definition by reference to the way in which assertoric speech itself expresses itself. Clearly, the h ea rer can receive the sp eaker’s assertion in such a way that he says: ‘H e asserts th a tp; but he does n o t opine th at/?.’ T h e speaker himself, on the o ther hand, cannot say ‘p; b u t I do not opine that /?’. Searle has attem pted to in terp ret this featu re - that it is not possible to assert that p and at the same time openly adm it that one does not opine that/? - as one of the rules o f assertion, or o f the em ploym ent of an assertoric sentence. H ow ­ ever, the connection o f this rule —which he calls the ‘sincerity ru le’ with the in any case inadequately developed main rule (‘essential ru le ’), in place o f which I have p u t thesis (7), rem ains unclear. A nd, of course, this connection is bound to rem ain unclear so long as one has not decided w hether opining is to be defined by reference to assertion or vice versa. T he syncretism o f Searle’s theory here reaches its high-point. O n the one hand, the speech-act which consists in th e em ploym ent of an asser­ toric sentence is characterized as assertion and determ ined by the ‘essential ru le’. O n the other han d , the em ploym ent o f a sentence ‘p ’ is supposed to consist in the speaker’s taking the ‘responsibility’ for opining that p; b u t we are not told anything about th e m eaning of ‘opine’. In fact th ere is a clear alternative here. Either one defines assertion the em ploym ent o f an assertoric sentence - by reference to opinion, thus for instance: ‘a sentence “p ” is used to express the opinion that /?’ - a definition that would be unobjectionable if only it were possible to give an explanation o f the w ord ‘opine’ and o f the m eaning of the expression ‘that/?’ which did not have to appeal to the em ploym ent-rule o f the sentence ‘/?’ defined by the verification-game. Or one assumes that this is not possible and defines opinion as I have done, by reference to assertion. T h en the fact that when one uses the sentence ‘/?’ one expresses that one opines that p - or in o th e r words: cannot openly adm it that one does not believe that/? - cannot be a com ponent of the employmentrule of *p\ R ather it would have to follow from the m eaning of ‘opine’

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as I have ju st defined this word. T h a t it does in d eed follow from this definition is easy to see. F or if som eone asserts th a t p, and hence gu ar­ antees th at it is tru e th at p, then he cannot at the same tim e openly adm it that it is not his intention to assert som ething that is true. Someone who asserts th a t p w ithout opining th a t p p erfo rm s the opening-m ove o f th e verification-gam e w ithout the intention o f w inning the game; his opening-m ove is the opening-m ove o f one who w ould have chosen this opening-m ove with the intention of w inning the gam e. O n the basis o f the definition o f opinion we can also fo rm u late this as follows: he expresses by his assertion an opinion which is not his but that of a person who asserts the same with the inten tio n o f asserting som ething true, and this m eans: he deceives his p a rtn e r about his gam e-intention, and th at m eans: ab o u t his opinion. B u t now w hat does this m ean for the act o f assertion? L et us look at the m atter fro m the perspective of th e hearer. If th e latter notices that the speaker does not opine what he asserts th e n for the h ea rer this m eans th at th e player has m ade his m ove w ithout the intention of win­ ning. N onetheless he has m ade a m ove which has its significance with referen ce to the gam e-outcom e in d ep en d en tly o f the player’s intention o f winning. O therw ise expressed, it m eans fo r the h e a re r that the speaker does n o t stand beh in d his assertion, nonetheless h e has m ade the assertion. T h e h e a re r will not now take th e speaker seriously; he can, how ever, take the assertion seriously. W h eth er or not th e speaker stands behind his assertion is im p o rtan t to the h e a re r as regards the question of w hat weight he gives to th e sp eak er’s utterance. But this circum stance does not belong to the sentence’s em ploym ent-rule, which is defined by referen ce to the gam e-outcom e. T h e re is m anifested h e re a peculiar in d ep en d en ce o f the gam e from the players, which in the previous lecture I described by saying that the outcom e of th e gam e does not consist in a play er’s having won or lost, b ut ra th e r in an assertion’s proving to be tru e o r false. T h e sam e is tru e of th e opening-m ove. In this gam e o n e and th e sam e move can be p er­ fo rm ed by several persons, one an d th e same g u aran tee can be given by several persons. If o n e of you says to m e ‘T h e re ’s a m an waiting outside for you’, and im m ediately afterw ards a n o th e r p erson uses the sam e sentence, I will say ‘I ’ve already h eard . W hy do you say it again?’ O n th e o th er h a n d , they would clearly not both be com m unicating the sam e thing to me if one w ere to say ‘I believe th at a m an is waiting o u tsid e’ and th e oth er w ere to add ‘I believe so too.’ T h e one assertion w ould thereby acquire g re a te r w eight for me. W hat is cancelled out if

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som eone openly adm its that he does not opine what he asserts is not the assertion, the guarantee, but the dispositional participation of this individual in the guarantee. Now th at the connection between assertion and opinion has been explained an d it has been m ade clear that the recourse to opinion is not necessary to explain the m eaning of an assertoric sentence, but that ra th e r the dependence is the o th er way ro u n d , we must ask: given that this is so, how are we to u n d erstan d the com m unication-function em phasized by Grice? W hat I have so far said about the connection between assertion and opinion also applies to speaking to oneself, though o f course in this case - trivially - th e possibility of asserting som ething one does not opine no longer applies. In every monological employment o f an assertoric sentence there is expressed an opinion of the person; an d in the fact that all opinion is always also a belief, in the broad sense of this word, is g rounded the practical significance of assertoric speaking to oneself. It may seem strange th at although it started o u t from the intersubjec­ tive em ploym ent-situation, my description of the em ploym ent-rules of sentences does not so far contain the aspect of communication. It is im p o rtan t to be clear what the reason for this is. W hen one explains to som eone how an assertoric sentence is used it is presupposed that the p artn er is an arbitrary person, so long as he knows the same employmentrules. In the same way, when the rules of chess are explained to someone it is assum ed th at o n e’s p artn er is an arbitrary person who knows the sam e gam e-rules. This arbitrariness of p artn er is a reason (though not the only one) why one can also play the verification-game with oneself (one cannot play chess with oneself). T o u n d erstand how a sentence is used to com m unicate involves m ore than knowledge of the employmentrules, inasm uch as th e com m unication is always a com m unication to specific persons, not arbitrary persons. If I wish to be understood by a particular person, th en , in addition to intending to assert that/?, I m ust also in ten d to bring it about that this person notices that I am asserting that/?. In precisely the same way, if I am playing chess with someone and make a certain move, then, in addition to having the intention which governs th e move and is related to the outcom e of the game, I m ust also intend to bring it about that my p artn er notices that I have m ade this particular move. This ancillary intention is realized - in the assertoric gam e as in chess - by the player (a) seeing to it that his p artn er perceives which sign he is using and (b) - on the assum ption that th ere are several signs or sign-systems for the same game-act - choosing a sign or signsystem (a language) which (i.e. the rules of which) is fam iliar to his part-

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ner. However, these presuppositions of communication (viz. that the partners reciprocally know o f one an o th er that they are using the same signs in accordance with the same rules, and that they use the signs in such a way that each notices which sign the other is using), no more belong to the em ploym ent-rules of linguistic signs than they do to the em ploym ent-rules of other game-signs. If, in som eone’s perceptual range, I use an assertoric sentence *p' the rules o f which he knows, then he knows that I am asserting that/?. Now, if I have occasion to intend that the o th er knows that I am asserting that p, then I also have occasion to intend that he opines that I am seriously asserting that/?, and this means that I opine that/?. O f course I cannot bring it about that he knows that I opine that/?. But, since, for the most part, som eone who asserts that/? also opines that/?, my partner, if he knows that I am asserting that p, also has a reason (even if not a sufficient reason) to opine that I opine that/?. And since, for the most part, when som eone opines th at /?, his opinion is m ore or less wellfounded, my p artn er, if he knows that I am asserting that/?, also has reason him self to opine that/?. T hus by seeing to it that someone notices that one is asserting that/? one can inform (mitteilen) him that/?. For what is here called communication (Mitteilung), however, it is not only essential that one intends to bring it about, by means of conventional rules, that the h earer believes som ething (which is what Grice’s theory essentially comes down to), but that one intends to bring it about, by means of an assertion, that he opines som ething. This m eans that the communication is essentially exposed to the possibility of denial, and hence doubt, and belongs, therefore, to a potential dialogue; the effect is only achieved to the extent that the p artn er regards the o th e r’s assertion as justified. Ill With this I conclude the debate with thesis (5) and would now like to indicate a difficulty which has probably been troubling you for some time and which will give me the opportunity to make a few supplem en­ tary rem arks. W hen I drew attention to the Yes/No response of the hearer there seem ed no way o f avoiding having to say: there is something that is affirm ed or denied. A nd this was even clearer when the same response was expressed in the utterance ‘that is true/false’. It is to this same thing that the other position-takings relate and it was this too of whose truth-conditions I afterw ards spoke. Is there not revealed here, you will have asked yourselves, an objectual com ponent in my own conception? No doubt this is so. W hat we have to ask ourselves is (1)

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how should we in terp ret this objectual element? (2 ) how far can I none­ theless claim that the recourse to it does not rep resent a reversion to the object-orientated approach? Following ordinary linguistic usage I have called that which is true or false ‘the assertion’. O ne m ight th erefore be inclined to think that the objectual elem ent that we have h ere encountered - that which is true or false - is the speech-act, the use o f an assertoric sentence. For it was this that I have called assertion. However, it is easy to see that the expression ‘the assertion’ is am biguous and th at I have also in fact used it am biguously : 6 ( 1 ) we can call an individual assertion-act one assertion (2 ) in ordinary speech we say that som eone repeated one assertion or that several people m ade the same assertion. In both (1) and (2) it is t h e a ^ r tion-act that is referred to, but obviously we m ust distinguish between the act-event and the act-type. To this distinction there corresponds an analogous distinction on the part of the sign. W hen an assertoric sign ‘p ’ - or any o th er sign - occurs m ore than once, or is used m ore than once, we can say that th ere are several signs (sentences), that is, several physical occurrences o f the same structure. B ut we can also say (and this is the m ore usual way of speaking) that it is o n e sign that occurs or is used several times. Following Peirce, the sign-event is referred to as the sign-token, and the one sign that occurs several times as the sign-type. It is clear that when we enquire about the rule o f the em ploym ent of a sign we m ean the sign in the sense o f the sign-type. T h e ambiguity in speaking o f the assertion-act corresponds m ore o r less exactly to this ambiguity in speaking o f a sign. B ut we m ust distinguish a fu rth e r am biguity in the expression ‘the assertion’. We have seen that one can automatically supplem ent the sen­ tence ‘This assertion is tru e ’ as follows: ‘This assertion that/? is tru e .’ Can we still say that what ‘the assertion that/?’ refers to is the assertionact (in the sense of the act-type)? Clearly we have to distinguish the assertion in the sense o f the asserting (the assertion-act w hether as acttype or act-event) and the assertion in the sense of what is asserted. It is only the assertion in this third sense - in the sense of what is asserted which is th at which we call true or false. T h e distinction ju st indicated corresponds not only to linguistic usage (we do not say of the speechact that it is tru e or false) but also to a distinction we encountered in describing assertion as an act of guaranteeing: someone who uses a sen­ tence ‘p ’ (1) indicates what he is guaranteeing and (2) guarantees it. This distinction is a necessary one, for it is possible to take up a position towards that which the sign-user asserts - thus towards th at which he guarantees - which is o th er than that of guaranteeing. O ne can assert

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that it - the same thing that had been asserted - is false or doubtful, etc. T h e assertion-act which som eone p erform s when he employs the sentence thus consists in this: it asserts something; and that means: takes u p a position towards the same thing towards which a differen t position can also be taken u p , but to which, equally, the same position can be taken. This implies that, because th e Yes/No relates to tru th , there belongs to assertoric speech a basic relation to som ething identifiable, and this means: a relation to an object. If one considers assertoric speech, in contrast to a m ore prim itive, circum stances-related language, its char­ acteristic feature is th at it relates to tru th and by virtue of this to objects. O ne m ust th erefo re say that the prim ary objects o f assertoric speech those to which it relates qua assertoric speech - are those of which it can be predicated th at they are tru e or false. T h e objects which we h ere enco u n ter u n d e r the title ‘that which is asserted’ are of course the same as those we m et earlier u n d e r the description ‘states o f affairs’ or ‘th o u g h ts’ o r ‘propositions’ (p. 43). T he problem o f these objects which can be tru e or false is usually treated by contrasting them with spatio-tem poral objects, which are taken for gran ted and reg a rd e d as unproblem atic. W ithin a limited enquiry such a pro ced u re is justified, inasm uch as spatio-tem poral objects are iden­ tifiable in space and time, w hereas a state o f affairs that/? can only be identified by saying: it is th at which is asserted w hen one uses the sen­ tence . So although talk o f objects th at can be tru e or false is as fu n ­ dam ental as the use o f assertoric sentences (as became clear in the analysis o f the em ploym ent-rule of assertoric sentences in the last lecture) the identification o f such an object that p presupposes the understanding of the em ploym ent-rule of th e co rresponding sentence ‘p ’. H erein lies the difference from the object-orientated position (the explanation of the em ploym ent-rule of the sentence does not have to refer to the object that p. cf. above p. 2 0 2 ). T h e explanation o f the ontological status of a state o f affairs we have ju st given - that an object th at p is identified as th at which is asserted when the sentence *p* is used - is, of course, not satisfactory as it stands; it can merely serve to indicate the direction in which we have to enquire. For the explanation as it stands is peculiarly elusive and invites the fu r­ ther question: w hat is that which is asserted when the sentence *p* is used? With this I take up a question which I left open in the introductory reflections on form al sem antics (p. 44). T h e simplest answ er to this question would be: it is the sentence itself, clearly in the sense o f sentence-type. In that case, that which is called

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true or false, and to which position-takings relate, would be the sentence. This view would n o t only be sim ple, but seems also to be presupposed by a widely-held thesis to which I too have appealed. I am referring to thesis (3) (above p. 207). I f we can only explain the m eaning o f a sentence by giving its truth-conditions, th en this m eans that it is sentences that have truth-conditions, hence th at it is sentences which can be tru e or false. T his idea, th at the so-called tru th -b earer is the sentence, would, of course, be subject to at least the following qualification: it is the sen­ tence-type in so fa r as it is em ployed in a particular way. If the same sentence were em ployed differently (e.g. as a sentence o f another lan­ guage) then it would have d ifferent truth-conditions. T h e state of affairs would thus be the sentence-in-a-particular-m ode-of-employment. Hence, what I ju st asserted in general would also hold for this conception: the identification o f the state of affairs presupposes the u n d erstanding of the em ploym ent-rule an d is thus g ro u n d ed in the u n d erstanding of m eaning. However, even with this qualification the view that the state of affairs is the sentence is not tenable. O n the surface even linguistic usage speaks against this identification o f sentence and state of affairs. It is tru e that in G erm an, in contrast to o th e r languages, the word ‘Satz is used in both m eanings - both for the sentence-type and for what is asserted by means o f a sentence-type. T h a t th ere are two m eanings here is shown by the fact th at the term is com pleted differently. O n the one h and, we speak o f the Satz ‘p \ on the o th e r hand o f the Satz that p. W hat lies behind this surface difference? In the first place it is easy to see that (as I have previously pointed out) not only can the sam e sentence stand for different states of affairs when, nam ely, it is used according to d ifferen t rules, but also that dif­ feren t sentences stand for the same state o f affairs if they are used according to the sam e rule, thus have the same m eaning. If we say ‘C opernicus asserted th at the earth revolves aro u n d the sun’, we do not m ean th a t he used th e English sentence ‘T h e earth revolves around the sun’, b u t ra th e r som e sentence o r o th er th at has the same m eaning as this sentence. T h u s the identity-criteria for the state of affairs that p and for the sentence *p* overlap. H ow ever, if that were all, one could still hold that the state of affairs that/? - like the sentence-type ‘/ / - is som ething by reference to which we identify many sentence-events as one Satz. In the case of the sentencetype the unifying-principle is th e form of th e sound- o r script-structure; in the case of the proposition th at p it is th e em ploym ent-rule. So this conception am ounts to equating the identity-criteria for states of affairs

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with those for em ploym ent-rules, and this m eans, for the m eanings of sentences. A nd this means that the state of affairs that/? would be the m eaning o f ‘p \ Now we have already seen (p. 118f) that this conception cannot be correct, for the state o f affairs that/? lacks the assertion-m ode that belongs to the m eaning of'/?’ and which, in the case o f the expres­ sion ‘th a tp ’, is only added by the supplem entation ‘is tru e ’. Besides, the view that the state of affairs that/? is the m eaning of the sentence ‘/?’ collapses when applied to those sentences that contain deictic expressions. H ere we can no longer say that all sentence-occurrences with the same m eaning stand for a proposition that p. For sentenceoccurrences with one and the same m eaning can have different truthconditions, d ep en d in g on the situation in which they are used (by which speaker, at what time); and sentence-occurrences with d ifferen t m ean­ ings can have the same truth-conditions, depending on the employmentsituation. T h e two sentence-occurrences ‘I am h ungry now’ and ‘You were hungry yesterday’ do not have the same m eaning; but they do have the same truth-conditions, or stand for the same state o f affairs that I am hun g ry now, if the first sentence is used by me now and the second by you tom orrow . T h e consideration of deictic expressions calls in question not only the attem p t to construe the tru th -b earer as in some way the sentence or as a classification-principle of sentence-occurrences. I f one cannot speak of the truth-conditions of a sentence at all, then, clearly, the definition of the m eaning o f a sentence as given by me in the last lecture by spec­ ification of truth-conditions or the dem onstration o f its verification-rule is also untenable. However, both difficulties can be rem oved by an app ro p riate supple­ m entation. It is not the sentence-occurrence, but the speech-event, that we m ust regard as the elem entary unit which provides the basis for the truth -b earer. In this way we retu rn to the beginning of the present reflection where I started from the idea that the object th at p is the assertion - in a particular sense of this word - and represents an abstract elem ent of the assertion in the sense o f the speech-act. A nd the speechact, we can now say, is not identified simply by the m eaning of the sen­ tence which it uses, but by the m eaning of the sentence together with the situation in which it uses it. If a sentence contains deictic expressions, then it is only th ro u g h the com bination o f a sentence used according to a certain rule with a certain em ploym ent-situation that th ere arises som ething that can be tru e or false. T h e consequence of this for the m eaning of the sentence is that to understand a sentence ‘/?’ that contains deictic expressions cannot be to know its truth-conditions, but rather

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what the truth-conditions o f the speech-act are which uses it in situation x, where ‘x’ is a variable. This can also be expressed in somewhat technical language as follows: the m eaning o f the sentence is a function whose argum ents are the em ploym ent-situations of the sentence and whose values are assertions, i.e. objects which have determ inate truth-values (or have determ inate truth-conditions for the person who has identified them on the basis of the m eaning o f the sentence employed and the em ploym ent-situation). However, we m ust go a step furth er. N ot only does the em ploym ent of a sentence with one and the same m eaning have different truthconditions, d ep ending on the em ploym ent-situation. It is also true, con­ versely (as was shown by the exam ples ‘I am h u n g ry ’ and ‘You were h u n g ry ’), that sentences with different m eanings, employed in different situations, stand for one and the same assertion with the same truthconditions. Consequently what I ju st said, viz. that it is only through the combination o f a sentence em ployed according to a particular rule with a particular em ploym ent-situation that th ere results som ething that can be tru e or false, m ust be correspondingly supplem ented. T h e combi­ nation just described would characterize only an individual speech-event, and such a fleeting event is not the identifiable situation-independent som ething that can be tru e or false. The assertion —both in the sense of the speech-act-type and in the sense o f what is asserted (the state of affairs that/?) - is rath er the identical som ething whereby all speechevents which, th ro u g h the use of differen t sentences in different situa­ tions, have the same truth-conditions are united into one class. T h e one assertion is thus the unifying principle relative to the many speech-events determ ined by the m eanings of the employed sentences and the situa­ tions, in the same way that the sentence-type and the proposition that/? were, in their different ways, the unifying principles relative to the many sentence-occurrences. W hat is m eant by ‘unifying principle’ is that we count the many occurrences or events as one sentence-type, or as one Satz that/?, if they fulfil a certain condition. In the case of the sentencetype this condition was the form o f the sound- o r script-structure; in the case of the Satz that/? it was the em ploym ent-rule. In the case of the assertion, on the oth er han d , it is not im m ediately clear what it is in virtue o f which the many speech-events, which have neither the meaning of the em ployed sentence n o r the situation in com m on, are counted as one assertion. T o say that they have the same truth-conditions would be correct. But this would be to invoke as the g round of explanation the very thing that has to be explained. For the question is precisely: how

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is it that we can a p p re h e n d differenr. speech-events as having the same truth-conditions? T h e following conjecture, which we m ust later examine, suggests itself: if the m eanings of sentences are functions whose argum ents are the em ploym ent-situations, and whose values are truth-conditions, this can only m ean th at the em ploym ent-rules o f the various sentences which, in their respective situations, rep resen t the sam e truth-conditions recip­ rocally re fe r to one another; this system atic relation between the expressions m ust belong to th eir em ploym ent-rule. T his systematic reciprocal relation, whereby the identical elem ent required for assertoric speech is constituted, m ust be the specific achievem ent of the em ploy­ m ent-rule o f those sentence-com ponents which relate the use of sen­ tences to the situation: the deictic expressions. You may perhaps find strange this conjecture th at it is o f all things the function of situationrelated expressions to m ake the use o f linguistic expressions situationin d ep en d en t. But it can really only a p p e a r strange if one takes for gran ted th e situation-independence of assertoric speech, as som ething obvious. I f we view assertoric speech against the background of m ore prim itive, situation-dependent languages th en we m ust ask: what are the linguistic means w hereby the em ploym ent o f expressions is m ade in d e p e n d e n t o f situation in the m an n er p resu p posed in speaking of ‘tru e ’ and ‘false’. A nd what is th en m ore n atu ral than to suppose that this situation-independence is m ade possible by those expressions which expressly relate to the situation? T h a t this positive function o f deictic expressions in the constitution o f identifiability has h ith erto not been seen is connected with the fact that, in the context o f the usual m eta-linguistic sem antic theories, one did not have to worry about how the expressions which refer to situa­ tions, and which, as everyone adm its, m ust figure in the specification of the truth-conditions o f sentences with deictic expressions, are themselves explained. In the m eta-language the em ploym ent-situation can be re fe rred to by m eans o f expressions which locate the situation in an already p resupposed objective system o f objects in space and time. T h e n atu re o f o u r enquiry clearly rules out p resu p p o sing the un d erstan d in g o f any meta-linguistic expressions. We shall have to ask how the use of expressions which locate the situation in an objective system of objects is itself to be explained. It will em erge - this too I can now merely anticipate as a thesis - that far from it being the case th at the use of situation-related deictic expressions can be explained by means of such objective expressions, the use o f these objective expressions, and with it

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the use of all singular term s which refer to spatio-temporal objects, can only be explained by recourse to the deictic expressions. This suggests a whole new perspective for the problem of propositional objects and spatio-tem poral objects. H itherto in analytical philosophy this problem has been regarded simply as one of identifiability and the two kinds of object have been discussed only in contrast to one another. In the course of a fundam ental discussion of the m eaning of assertoric sentences, however, the basic question is: to what extent is som ething like a relation to objects essential to assertoric speech (in contrast to m ore prim itive, situation-dependent languages)? A nd the prim ary object-relation, w ithout which there could not be assertoric speech, con­ cerns those objects which can be true or false. Now if the identifiability of these objects is g rounded in the use o f deictic expressions, and if the deictic expressions make possible the situation-independence essential to this identifiability by producing through their reciprocal relation a prim ary level o f identifiability in space and time, then one must conclude that a reference to objects in space and time is the condition of the possibility of the use o f the expressions ‘tru e’ and ‘false’. So you see, my opposition to the object-orientated tradition should not be in terp reted as implying that a relation to objects is no longer essential. On the contrary, it emerges that a relation to objects is as basic as the u n d erstan d in g o f assertoric sentences. T h e difference between my position and what I call the object-orientated position consists simply in this: the latter presupposes the object-relation as som ething self-evi­ dent, o r it views objects as correlates o f the pseudo-concept of represen­ tation (Vorstellen) and then puts them in place of the meanings of lin­ guistic expressions; whereas what we really have to do is to show how som ething like an object-relation is only constituted in the rule-governed use of linguistic expressions, and this means: in the understanding of their m eaning. If the hypothesis regarding the positive function of deictic expressions for th e identifiability of states of affairs, and hence for the possibility of using the words ‘tru e ’ and ‘false’, is correct, then clearly we can no longer regard sentences with deictic expressions, as is usual in metalinguistic semantics, as a special case or as an unavoidable complication of socalled natural languages. In the case of sentences which contain no deictic expressions one can speak o f the truth-conditions of the sentence and say th at to u n d erstan d the m eaning of the sentence is to know its truthconditions or its verification-rule. And correspondingly, in the case of these sentences, we can also regard the state of affairs th a tp as a classification-principle of sentence-occurrences (as the ‘Satz that/?’).

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B ut, firstly, it now seems desirable to regard this case as the special case and view the state of affairs that/? in all cases as a classificationprinciple of speech-events. In the special case in which there are no situation-com ponents of the truth-condition the speech events can be identified by the rule of the sentence that is used, and the truth-condi­ tions of the speech-events are therefore, trivially, reducible to the truthconditions of the sentence-occurrences. Secondly, if the thesis referred to is correct, we can clearly no longer assume that the two cases, deictic sentences and other sentences, are of equivalent status. If it is only through deictic expressions that the identity required for the use o f the word ‘tru e ’ is constituted, then the use of an assertoric sentence - a sentence with a truth-claim - that does not refer back in one way or the o ther to deictic sentences is simply inconceivable. If we disregard more complicated sentences - those for instance which refer to abstract objects - then we must envisage two form s of such a reference-back: If it is correct that the use of all singular term s refers back to deictic expressions, then this means that in the case o f all elem entary sentences - all predicative sentences in which concrete (perceptible) objects are referred to - the truth-condition, and hence the verification-rule of the sentence, can itself not be explained without the use of deictic expres­ sions. In other words, the use of an elem entary sentence is a speech-act which, even if it employs a sentence without deictic expressions, only stands for a particular assertion that p if it belongs to a class of speechacts which all have the same truth-conditions, and of which some use sentences with deictic expressions. T hus in the case of such sentences it is a m ere illusion that one, can specify their truth-conditions without deictic expressions, an illusion that can persist only as long as one spec­ ifies the truth-conditions by means of a m eta-language, and which, as we shall see, disappears as soon as one attem pts to explain the employ­ ment-rule. It is much simpler in the case of a second form of reference-back. T h ere are sentences which are such that the tru th or falsity of the asser­ tion depends simply on the truth o r falsity of o th er assertions. Thus no situation-com ponents enter into the truth-conditions of these so-called truth-functional sentences or assertions. But this is only because they already have a situation-independent stratum of assertions that can be true or false as their foundation. So because it is essentially simpler to explain the verification-rules of these higher-level, truth-functional sentences I will begin the concrete presentation of the employmentrules of assertoric sentences with this most simple case and only then

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come back to predicative sentences. At the sam e time it has now become clearer why, prior to the discussion of predicative sentences, we could only achieve a prelim inary concept of the general essence of assertoric sentences (cf. p. 179). T h e situation-independence and identity fu n d a ­ m ental to the use o f all assertoric sentences, and thus an essential aspect o f the m eaning of the words ‘tru e ’ and ‘false’, is constituted at the level of elem entary sentences.

LECTURE 17

A nd’ and ‘o r’

In the lecture b efore last we arrived at a first, prelim inary result in the enquiry into th e m eaning o f assertoric sentences. In the last lecture I related this result to o th er possible conceptions and then supplem ented it in an essential respect. I had started from the assum ption that to understan d a linguistic expression is to u n d erstan d its em ploym ent-rule. It becam e clear th at the u n d erstan d in g of its em ploym ent-rule consists not in know ing in what circum stances it is used, but ra th e r in know ing what its function is; and th at this function consists in asserting something. So far we have only been able to d eterm in e in a general way what this m eans. T o assert som ething is to p erfo rm the opening-m ove in a veri­ fication-game. Such a gam e has the following defining features. T h e re are two m utually negating opening-positions. T h e rules of the gam e are verification-rules. T h e outcom e o f th e gam e is characterized thus: on the basis o f following th e verification-rule the one assertion turns out to be tru e the o th e r false o r one assertion m ust be w ithdraw n in favour of the other. It followed from this general characterization of the em ploym ent-rules o f assertoric sentences that the explanation of the use o f such a sentence m ust consist in the explanation of its verificationrule. It was this question th at rem ained open an d to which we m ust now tu rn . It had to rem ain open, because in g eneral nothing can be said abou t the verification-rules o f assertoric sentences. T hey m ust be shown separately fo r th e d ifferent sentence-form s or, better: different sentenceform s are distinguished precisely by having different sorts o f verificationrule. (Should th at prove to be correct then we would have a basis for re n d e rin g precise the concept o f sem antic form that has h itherto rem ain ed vague.) T h e account given so fa r is thus not only abstract; it is also incom plete so long as it has not been shown how the verification-rules of specific sentence-form s can be explained. O nly by doing this will we be able to

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see how far this conception really provides a basis for the explanation o f the m eaning of individual sentences and sentence-parts. Now we saw at the end of the last lecture that the view that the em ploym ent-rule (m eaning) o f a sentence is its verification-rule must be corrected. T h a t which can be said to have truth-conditions or a ver­ ification-rule is in general not the sentence but what is asserted. T he sentence as such has in general no specific truth-condition or verificationrule. T o know its em ploym ent-rule is not to know its verification-rule, but ra th e r the verification-rule of the assertion which uses the sentence in situation*. At this point, however, we can disregard this complication, for I w anted to begin with sim pler, though higher-level, forms of sen­ tences which do not necessarily contain deictic expressions, thus sen­ tences whose em ploym ent-rule does not contain a situation-reference. In the case of these sentences, th erefore, one can say that the truthcondition, or verification-rule, of the assertion is also the truth-condition or verification-rule of the sentence. H ence, the explanation of the m eaning o f the sentence is reducible to the explanation of this verifi­ cation-rule. T h e simplest type o f such sentence-form s are the so-called truthfunctional sentences, i.e. sentences whose tru th or falsity depends on the tru th or falsity o f oth er sentences. Sentences of this kind are (a) certain form s of com plex sentences, in particular sentences of the form ‘p or q an d (b) the sentences, traditionally known as general sentences, in which words like ‘all’ and ‘som e’ occur. In both cases one has to do with expressions or sentence-form s which had also been taken account of in the tradition, though of course they were interpreted there in an object-oriented way. T hese form s, together with that o f the simple pre­ dicative statem ent, played an essential role not only in m odern logic but also in traditional logic (the en tire A ristotelian syllogistic is exclusively concerned with general sentences), and, as a result, the traditional idea of thinking included these forms as well as the predicative form. It would th erefo re seem to me worthwhile not to begin immediately with the truth -o rien ted analysis of these sentence-form s, but again take as our starting-point the traditional object-orientated conception. In this way we can give the confrontation o f the language-analytical approach with the traditional position a b ro ad er basis. How could the m eaning of the word ‘an d ’ be explained from an objectorientated position? It would clearly be absurd to claim that this word stands for an object. B ut it is not necessary for traditional semantics to do so. F or it had at its disposal the concept of a syncategorematic expression (p. 109). R ather it is characteristic of the traditional view

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to regard the ‘an d ’ as standing for an ‘aggregate’ (Zusammen) of objects. However, this can hardly be a m atter of real composition (Zusammenset­ zung). W hen we say ‘Peter and Paul and Sim on’ we do not mean that the three are joined together or in some way really (real) connected. But what then do we mean? If it is a m atter of composition at all it can only be a composition in ‘th o u g h t’ of the kind contained in H usserl’s concept of categorial synthesis. So if there is any possibility at all of interpreting the meaning o f the word ‘and’ in an object-orientated way, then Husserl’s theory of categorial synthesis seems tailor-m ade for this purpose; and in fact in constructing his theory of categorial synthesis Husserl from the outset had also this case in mind. T h e them atic discussion o f ‘a n d ’ and ‘o r’ takes place in §51 of Inves­ tigation VI of Logical Investigations u n d er the heading ‘Collectiva and Disjunctiva’. However, the analysis is only carried out for ‘an d ’. This is probably no accident, for it is difficult to im agine what an object-orien­ tated in terpretation o f ‘o r’ could look like. Now in the case of ‘a n d ’ Husserl speaks o f the ‘conjunctive combination of names or statem ents’. In other words, he treats the case in which the word ‘and’ occurs between names and that in which it occurs between statem ents as analogous. This is a logical consequence of his view that assertoric sentences also stand for objects, namely, states o f affairs (above p. 119). From this it follows that the ‘and’ that occurs between assertoric sentences represents a combination of states o f affairs in the same way that the ‘a n d ’ between names represents a com bination o f objects. This led to Husserl only explaining ‘conjunctive com bination’ with reference to names, for on his view the transference of this explanation to the other case follows automatically. H e gives the following explanation: ‘T h at which corresponds to the words “a n d ” and “o r” . . . cannot be grasped with one’s hands or a p p re ­ hended with some sense; just as it cannot be represented pictorially, e.g. in a painting . . . T h e re is h ere only the one possibility which is always open to us: that we perform a new act o f conjunction (collection) on the basis of the two individual acts o f perception and thereby mean the aggregate o f the objects^ and B .’ In the first sentence H usserl rejects a conception o f ‘an d ’ as the representative of a real combination. In the second he gives his positive explanation which grounds the synthesis in a ‘new’ (categorial) act o f a special kind, an act of conjunction. To this act there corresponds ‘a unitary object which can only be constituted in this act-com bination’. H usserl calls this object a ‘collectivum’ or a lter­ natively an ‘aggregate’ (Inbegriff); by this he would appear to mean the same abstract object which in logic is usually called a ‘set’.

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Is it an intelligible explanation of the word ‘and’, at least as far as it occurs between nam es, to say that the objects that are designated by the names connected by the word ‘a n d ’ together constitute a set? We should not let ourselves be im pressed by the scientific respectability of the word ‘set’. T he explanation that thro u g h the w ord ‘an d’ several objects are combined to form a set explains nothing so long as we do not know what a set is. Now H usserl by no means m erely presupposes this. On the contrary, he tries to explain w hat a set - au aggregate - is by re fe r­ ring to the synthetic act in which, as he thinks, the word ‘a n d ’ is expressed. Now how is this act described? As one which ‘m eans’ ‘the aggregate o f the objects’. This description is H usserl’s explanation of the m eaning o f the w ord ‘a n d ’. Now the question is: is this description intelligible? Do we understand what it really means to mean the ‘aggregate’ of several objects? W hat is m eant by this ‘aggregate’? T h e first thing we think of when we hear this word is some kind o f spatial proximity. B ut H usserl has rightly ruled this out in rejecting the idea of a ‘real’ combination. W hen we say ‘Peter and Paul’ no spatial proxim ity is implied. T h e one may be in Australia, the other in Costa Rica or no longer be alive. B ut what then is positively m eant by the ‘aggregate’? H usserl would no doubt reply: we are here dealing with something entirely sui generis which can only be understood by p erform ing the relevant act. ‘If we want to make clear to ourselves the m eaning of the word “an d ” then we m ust actually perform an act of collection and in the thus genuinely presented aggregate bring to fulfilm ent a m eaning of the form “a and b” ’ (Investigation IV §9 (b)). But now the question once m ore arises: how is an act o f collection char­ acterized? How do I tell that I am perform ing such an act and not some other synthetic act? H usserl is clearly moving round in circles: an act of collection is one which means the aggregate of objects and this aggregate is precisely what is constituted in such an act. Perhaps you will say: what enables one to tell that one is dealing with an act of collection is the fact that it is expressed in the word ‘an d ’. But th at would m ean that what we are to u n d erstan d by ‘aggregate’ is explained by means of ‘a n d ’; whereas H usserl wanted to explain the m eaning of ‘a n d ’ by reference to the ‘aggregate’. B ut if we can only explain the ‘aggregate’ by means of ‘an d ’ we must be able somehow to understan d the latter. But how do we u n d erstan d it? Since the object-orientated in te rp re­ tation has turn ed out to be a gam e with em pty words, we shall have to try to find the step back which we took in the case o f predicates. We must in terp ret the question about the m eaning of the word ‘an d ’ as a question about the explanation o f its use. B ut then the prior question

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immediately arises of w hether the use of the word ‘and’ can be explained at all in the way proposed by the object-orientated conception, namely by having it simply stand between nam es - ‘Peter and Paul’ —w ithout this w ord-sequence being supplem ented by a predicate. I believe it can be shown th at such an explanation o f the w ord ‘an d ’ is simply incon­ ceivable. For how could we explain the use o f such a part-expression ‘a and b and c’ by means o f examples? Suppose we try to do so by somehow placing the objects together, or by draw ing a circle and placing them in it. W hat we would then have explained would already include a certain predicate, e.g. ‘a and b an d c are in this circle’. And we would thereby have included a real relation, som ething which H usserl has already rightly ruled out. P erhaps you th in k one could keep rearran g in g the three objects until it is understood th at one is to abstract from the specific m an n er in which they are placed together. B ut it is an illusion to think th at we could in this way bring som eone to u n d ersta n d that we m ean ‘a n d ’; we will rather be understood to m ean that the objects are somehow together. B ut there is no reference to such a being together or spatial proxim ity in ‘a and b\ T h u s the expectation th at one could explain the use o f the word ‘a n d ’ purely in connection with names turns out to be an illusion. A nd it would be a corresp o n d in g illusion to suppose that one could explain what is to be u nderstood by a set w ithout m aking use of predicates. Sets can only be determ in ed with the aid of predicates; we say of all objects to which a predicate is applicable th a t they are elem ents of a set. I f we introduce the concept o f a set in this way th en it should also be noted that, contrary to H usserl’s opinion, an expression of th e form ‘a and V does not rep resen t a set at all. So long as we only use the expression ‘a and b\ then although we can say th at a and b are elem ents of a set, we cannot say th at together they constitute a set; for the expression ‘a and b’ leaves open the possibility that the set also contains o th er elements. You m ight ask: why sh o u ld n ’t one also be able to form a set consisting only of the elem ents a an d b? Clearly one can do this - b u t not by m eans o f the m ere expression ‘a and b\ I f we wish to speak o f the set consisting only of a an d b then o u r form ulation m ust express the exclusion from this set of all oth er objects. So we would have to say: the elem ents of this set are a and b an d no object that is not identical with a or b; and this can be expressed by means o f a m ore com plex predicate by saying: all objects to which th e predicate ‘identical with a or W is applicable constitute the intended set. Notice th at to introduce a set consisting only o f a and b one has to use, not the word ‘and\ but the word ‘or\ You could m ake th e following objection: from the fact that ‘a and b’

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does not stand for a set in the sense of set-theory it does not follow that H usserl’s idea o f an ‘aggregate’, for which the expression ‘a and b* is supposed to stand, is not m eaningful. T h a t is correct. However, perhaps it is precisely on the basis o f this excursus into set-theory th at we can now have a better idea of w hat possible m eaning can be connected with this ‘aggregate’. We have seen that one cannot understand the expression (a and b’ to m ean that a an d b constitute a set, but merely that they are elem ents of a set. B ut elem ents of which set? For this set is not already defined by these two elem ents. Obviously, precisely that set that is defined by the predicate that follows the sentence-part a and b\ I believe this to be the only rem aining sense for H usserl’s idea of an ‘aggregate’. What ‘connects’ a and b is that they are both elem ents of a set which has been left open and has yet to be specified. B ut if this is correct then we can spare ourselves the whole d e to u r into set-theory and say m uch more simply: the sense o f that ‘ag g reg ate’ consists in this, that a predicate that has yet to be specified applies to both a and b. T h e expression ‘Peter and Paul’ should be understood as merely a sentence-fragment. It points forw ard to a predicate F and the thus com pleted sentence - ‘Peter and Paul are F ’ - clearly has the same m eaning as the complex sentence ‘Peter isF and Paul is F.’ With this we would have reached an im portant interm ediate result: not only do expressions of the form ‘a and b’ involve a reference Verweisen) to sentences, in the sense that they are to be understood as sentence-fragm ents; th eir completion to form a whole sentence shows th at ‘an d ’ as it occurs between nam es refers back to ‘a n d ’ as it occurs betw een whole sentences. T his sheds new light on the pos­ sibility o f explaining the use o f the expression ‘a n d ’ by means of exam ­ ples. However, this result requires qualification. Not every sentence of the form ‘a and b are F ’ has the same m eaning as ‘a is F and b is F\ We cannot convert a sentence such as ‘Peter and Paul are standing next to each o th e r’ into ‘Peter is standing next to each other and Paul is standing next to each o th e r.’ We m ust reg ard this sentence-form as a special case. In such a case one is dealing with symmetrical relations. A relation is term ed ‘sym m etrical’ if w henever it holds between a and b it also holds between b and a. If the sentence ‘P eter is next to Paul’ is true, then the sentence ‘Paul is next to P e te r’ is also true. Only in the case of nonsymmetrical relations (e.g. ‘P eter hits Paul’) is it necessary for there to be a syntactical indication which shows the o rd er of the two term s of the relation. N atural languages do this in two ways: by inflection and by w ord-order. In the case o f symmetrical relations this requirem ent no longer applies. H ence in English we have the sentence-form in which

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the o rd e r of the nam es of the two terms of the relation before the pred­ icate is optional. T h a t the word ‘an d ’ also occurs between the two names has no additional semantic significance. ‘Peter Paul stand next to each o th e r’ would have the same m eaning. T h e m ode of em ploym ent of this ‘and’ therefore requires no special explanation. We can thus ignore this special case and tu rn our attention to the em ploym ent of the word ‘an d ’ as it occurs between sentences. We can now also include the word ‘o r’ in the discussion. It is in any case obvious that when ‘o r’ occurs between names (e.g. ‘Peter or Paul’) the expression requires to be supplem ented by a predicate and that the sense of the ‘or that occurs between names is reducible to the ‘o r’ that occurs between sentences. I do not know how Husserl may have conceived, in the case o f ‘o r’, the relation between objects analogous to the ‘aggregate’ o f ‘and’. A disjunction between objects? W hat could that be? Suppose H usserl had followed me up to this point and would adm it that the words ‘a n d ’ and ‘o r’ m ust be understood prim arily in their role of com bining sentences to form complex sentences. From his objectorientated position he would have to say that the ‘an d ’ and the ‘o r’ stand for certain syntheses between states o f affairs. But this would be simply to tran sfer the interpretation-schem a which Husserl applied to the ‘an d ’ of names to the new level; and this would result in the same difficulties as before. If it were really a m atter of a synthesis between states of affairs then we should expect, not the expression ‘p and q\ but rather ‘th a tp and th at^’. Such expressions do actually occur and they are indeed analogous to ‘a and b\ for they too require to be supplem ented by a predicate, e.g. ‘T h a t it is raining and that it is warm is pleasant.’ But with regard to this expression we would now have to say that it is equiv­ alent to the higher-level complex sentence ‘T h a t it is raining is pleasant and that it is warm is pleasant.’ We would thus find ourselves in an infinite regress. So H usserl could not even have accepted the interm ediate result reached so far. T o accept it is to have already given up the object-orien­ tated interpretation of ‘an d ’ and ‘o r’. W hat o th er interpretation is conceivable? Someone coming from the object-orientated tradition will now be inclined to pose the question like this: if the word ‘a n d ’ combines neither objects nor states of affairs what then does it combine? However, as we saw in our treatm ent of predicates, what is mistaken in the object-orientated conception is not its view of what is connected by the predicate with the object of the subject-term of the sentence. T h e erro r was m ore deep-seated. It consisted in the assum ption that som ething is com bined with som ething at all. T h e same

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holds for ‘a n d ’ and ‘o r’. We m ust free ourselves completely from the presupposition that the m eaning o f these w ords consists in their com ­ bining in some way som ething with som ething. T h e e rro r in the objectorientated conception of ‘an d ’ is not that it speaks of states of affairs (clearly th ere corresponds to the complex sentence ‘p and q a state of affairs that p and q, likewise to the constituent sentences *p' and ‘q the states of affairs that p and that q)\ ra th e r its e rro r consists in thinking th at the state o f affairs that p and, q is somehow composed of the other two states o f affairs similar to the way in which the sentence ‘p and q is com posed o f the sentence ‘p \ the w ord ‘a n d ’ and the sentence ‘q. As in the case of predicates we again req u ire a m ore general concept which, though em bracing the possibility of composition, also leaves open oth er possibilities. W hen dealing with predicates I introduced the con­ cept of function and then that of m ode of em ploym ent: if the predicate does not have the function of com bining, if that is not its m ode of em ploym ent, then w hat function does it have, how then is it used? Sim­ ilarly we could now ask: what o th er function or m ode of em ploym ent does the w ord ‘an d ’ have? However, we will m ake m ore progress from a theoretical point o f view if we ask this question not of the sentencep art but of th e sentence-whole or the corresponding state of affairs. In th at case the question would have to be: if the state of affairs that p and q does not d ep en d on the states of affairs that p and that q in the sense th at it is com posed of them , in what sense does it depend on them? T h e move from the concept o f composition to the m ore general one of depen­ dence, like th at to the m ore general concepts of function and mode of employment, is still entirely uncontroversial and the object-orientated philosopher would have no reason to resist it. It is uncontroversial that what som eone asserts when he employs the sentence ‘p and q m ust somehow d ep en d on w hat he asserts when he uses the sentence ‘p ’ and on what he asserts when he uses the sentence ‘<7 ’. Now if this dependence does not consist in the one state of affairs being com posed of the others then the m ost natural thing would be to assum e that the state of affairs that p and q has some p roperty which depends on some properties of the states of.affairs that p and that q. Now let us recall that som eone who uses an assertoric sentence Y not only som ehow refers to a state of affairs but also asserts th at it has the p roperty o f truth. Som eone who uses the sentence ‘p and q’ says the same as som eone who uses the sen­ tence ‘It is tru e that p and q.’ It is therefo re at least very plausible to suppose th at the pro p erty of the state of affairs that p and q which depends on certain properties of the states of affairs that p and that q is its truth. T h e question: on what does the tru th of an assertion depend?

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is clearly ju st a n o th e r form ulation o f th e question: what are its truthconditions? T h a t the pro p erties o f th e states o f affairs that p an d that q on which the tru th o f that p and q d ep en d s are likewise th e ir tru th or falsity is not self-evident; b u t it would at any rate be the sim plest hypothesis. B efore exam ining this hypothesis I would like, on the assum ption that it is correct, to take a step fu rth e r. T h e w ords ‘an d ’ an d ‘o r’ are obviously not deictic expressions. Now in the last lecture we saw that if a sentence contains no deictic expressions we can ju st as well speak of the tru th and truth-conditions of the sentence as o f the tru th and truthconditions o f th e assertion chat can be m ade with it; and that in this case to u n d e rsta n d th e m eaning of the sentence is to know its truth-conditions. Let us fo r the p resen t assum e th a t the constituent sentences ‘p ’ and ‘q’ also contain no deictic expressions. In th at case the truth-value of th e assertions th at can be m ade by m eans o f ‘p ’ and ‘q\ hence the truth -v alu e o f that p and o f that q is also the tru th-value o f ‘p* and ‘q ; and since th e re fo re the truth-value o f the state o f affairs that p and q is also the truth-value o f th e sentence ‘p and q’, th e re follows from the hypothetically assum ed d ep en d en ce o f the truth -value of the state o f affairs or assertion that p and q on the truth-values of that p an d that q a co rresp o n d in g d ep en d en ce o f the truth -v alu e o f the sentence ‘p and q on the truth-values of the sentences ‘p* an d ‘q\ A nd we can now say: we u n d e rsta n d the m eaning of the sentence ‘p and q if we u n d e rsta n d the m eaning of ‘p ’ an d u n d e rsta n d the m eaning of ‘q’ and if we know that the truth-value o f ‘p and q depends in a specific way on the truth-values of ‘p ’ and ‘q\ O r if we u n d e rsta n d ‘p ’ an d ‘q as m ere variables, thus if we in te rp re t ‘p an d q as ‘ . . . a n d ---- ’ (where \ . .’ and ‘----- ’ a re em pty places for arb itrary assertoric sentences) then we can now simply say: to u n d e rsta n d th e m eaning of ‘p and q - an d hence the m eaning of the w ord ‘a n d ’ - is to know how the tru th -v alu e o f ‘p an d q depends on the truth-values o f ‘p* and ‘q\ I said b efore th at this all holds provided ‘p* an d ‘q’ contain no deictic expressions. B ut th e m eaning o f ‘ . . . a n d ---- ’ is clearly the sam e w h eth er the sentences we substitute for ‘ ’ and ‘ ---- ’ contain deictic expressions o r not. We can th erefo re say: to u n d e rsta n d the m eaning o f ‘ . . . a n d ---- ’ is to know in a com pletely general way how the truth-value of an assertion that p and q depends on the truth-values o f the assertions that p and that q: and in the specific case in which *p’ and ‘q’ do not contain any deictic expressions this depen d en ce on the truth-values o f assertions is equally a d ep endence on th e truth-values o f sentences. In logic one abstracts from sentences with deictic expressions. For

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this reason the words ‘a n d ’ and ‘o r’ are defined in m odern logic in term s of a d ep en d en ce of the truth-value of the com plex sentence on the truth-values o f the constituent sentences. M eta-linguistic semantics has taken over this definition as a general definition of the words ‘an d ’ and ‘o r’. This substitution o f th e special case for the general case is harmless, precisely because the m eaning of ‘a n d ’ and ‘o r’ is itself situation-inde­ p end en t, an d the form of tru th -d ep en d en ce rem ains the same w hether one regards the assertion o r the sentence as the truth-bearer. By referen ce to the concrete definitions of the words ‘a n d ’ and ‘o r’ th a t are given in logic o r m eta-linguistic semantics we can now exam ine the hypothesis th at the d ep en d en ce o f the state o f affairs thatp and q on the states o f affairs thatp and that q is one o f truth-value on truth-values. T h e definition is: the sentence ‘p an d q is tru e if and only if ‘p ’ is tru e and ‘q is tru e and it is false in the o th e r three cases, thus if ‘p* or ‘q or both are false. In reg ard to ‘o f one distinguishes w hether the word is u n d ersto o d in the exclusive sense o f the Latin aut or in the sense of ‘a n d /o r’ (Latin vel). In the form er case, ‘p or q is true if only ‘p ’ is tru e or only ‘q is true; it is false if both are false o r both are true. In the latter case, ‘p o r q’ is tru e if one o f them is tru e or both are true and false only if both are false. So the thesis now is th at the m eaning o f ‘a n d ’ and ‘o r’ is explained by giving, in this way, the truth-conditions of com ­ plex sentences form ed by m eans o f ‘a n d ’ and ‘o r’. D oesn’t this explanation in fact correspond to our und erstan d in g of these words? If som eone says ‘It is raining an d it is w arm ’ the person who u n d erstan d s this assertion does not rep resen t to him self some ‘aggregate’ o f the two states o f affairs; rather he knows that the assertion is tru e if it is both tru e th a t it is rain in g and th a t it is warm. If you now ask how I can prove th at it is so, hence that th e object-orientated con­ ception is false and the tru th -o rien tated conception correct, then I m ust re fe r back to the foundation of th e entire discussion, to W ittgenstein’s dictum : ‘T h e m eaning o f a word is what is explained by the explanation o f its m eaning.’ We have seen th at we cannot explain that supposed aggregate; on the o th er h an d it is clear that we can explain the m eaning o f these w ords in the way ju st described. You will object to this (1) that it has not yet been shown that this explanation explains th e actual m ode of em ploym ent of these words, and (2) th at the explanation I have given is circular. Both objections are justified; an d they belong together. I shall start with the second objection. T he circularity-objection points out that in specifying u n d e r what conditions ‘p and q is tru e one again makes use o f the w ord ‘a n d ’, and in specifying u n d e r w hat conditions

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‘p and q is false the word ‘o r’ is used: ‘p and q is tru e if and only if (p ’ is tru e and ‘q is true; *p and q is false if and only if ‘p ’ is false or (and/or) ‘q is false. And in specifying the truth-conditions o f ‘o r’ the situation is analogous. T his circularity is not so evident when the truth-conditions o f complex statem ents are given in so-called ‘truth-tables’, as is the prac­ tice since W ittgenstein’s Tractatus.1 B ut this is clearly only an illusion. T h o u g h the words ‘an d ’ and ‘o r’ do not appear the tables are so con­ structed that they m ust be supplem ented by these words when we read them . However, the fact that the word to be explained occurs in the expla­ nation does not ren d er the explanation worthless. T h e explanation shows that and how the tru th o f a complex sentence, or what is asserted with it, depends on the truth and falsity o f its constituent sentences, or of what is asserted with them . A nd the thesis that to u n d erstan d this dependence of the truth-value on the truth-values of the constituent sentences is to u n d erstan d the m eaning of the word ‘an d ’ does not lose its content because of the reapp earan ce of the word ‘a n d ’ in the speci­ fication of the truth-conditions. For if you now ask: ‘W hat does this “and” m ean?’ the answ er is: obviously the same. It also holds for the sentence ‘T h a t p is tru e and that q is tru e ’ that it is true if and only if it is true that it is true th at p and tru e that it is tru e that q. Certainly there is a regress here. B ut this regress does nothing to alter the content of the original statem ent that we u n d erstan d the word ‘a n d ’ if and only if we know in what way the truth-value o f the complex sentence form ed with it (or o f what is asserted by means o f this sentence) depends on the truth-values o f its constituent sentences (or of what is asserted by means of them ). You could point out that th e explanation that has been given can also be achieved by m ere substitution, by recourse to the equivalence ‘T h at p is tru e = p ’ (W), and thus proves itself to be tautological. T h e expla­ nation says: that p and q is tru e = thatp is tru e and that q is true. Now on the basis of W we can substitute ‘p and q for the left side of this equiv­ alence and, within this expression, again on the basis of W, we can sub­ stitute ‘T h a tp is tru e ’ for ‘p ’ and ‘T h a t q is tru e’ for ‘q’, with the result that the left side o f the equivalence is now exactly the same as the right side. B ut that the explanation reveals itself to be tautological is precisely what we would expect. T h e verbal explanation of the m eaning of a word m ust be analytic, for otherwise it would be false. A nd when, as in the case of the word ‘a n d ’, it is a basic word, i.e. a word th at is not definable by m eans of o th er words, a verbal explanation of this word can only be effected by m eans of this word; and this means: tautologi­

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cally. (T here is it is tru e a possibility o f defining the word ‘a n d ’ by means o f ‘o r’ and ‘not’; but then we are still left with one o f the two expressions.) T h a t the above definition o f ‘p and q is tautological does not m ean that nothing is gained by it. O ne m ust distinguish between illum inating and em pty tautologies. T h e tautology ‘ “p and q” is tru e if and only if “p and q” is tru e ’ is em pty. T he tautology ‘ **p and q ’ is tru e if and only if “p ” is true and “q” is tru e ’ explains the m eaning of ‘. . . a n d ---- because it gives the truth-condition of sentences o f this form and thus says what it is to u n d erstan d this word. I would thus like to emphasize that although a semantics that confines itself to giving truth-conditions and does not go beyond this and ask about the employment-rules of sentences does not achieve much, it does achieve something. A theory according to which it is the task of semantics (or at any rate that of the semantics of assertoric sentences) to give for all sentence-forms ‘Tarskian truth-definitions’ of the kind whose simplest case we have now become fam iliar with - truth-definitions which can be form ulated not in an o th er language but in the same language whose semantics is being explained - has recently been developed by Donald Davidson . 2 Davidson starts from the now generally acknowledged requirem ent that a satisfactory semantic theory m ust be capable of showing how the m eaning o f sentences depends on the m eaning of the sentence-parts. It is this requirem ent on which, as we saw, the objectorientated conception foundered. T h a t the dependence of the m eaning of a sentence on that of its parts is to be construed as a dependence of its truth-value, and can thus be presented for the relevant sentenceform in the shape of a truth-definition, is a plausible hypothesis, once it is recognized that to understand a sentence is (if for the sake of sim­ plicity we think only of sentences w ithout deictic expressions) to know its truth-conditions. This at any rate is Davidson’s thesis. H e regards it as the special virtue of this truth-definition m ethod that it enables one to analyse the semantic structure of sentences without using words not themselves contained in these sentences . 3 W hen Davidson says that it cannot be the task o f a semantic theory to explain our linguistic expres­ sions with m eans which are not themselves contained in the latter this corresponds to W ittgenstein’s statem ent that the m eaning is what we explain when we explain the m eaning o f the sentence. His conception is directed against attem pts to explain the m eaning of words and the way in which they are com bined to form m ore complex expressions thus the form s - by oth er verbal m eans, attem pts which lead one to say, e.g., that the w ord ‘an d ’ stands for an aggregate, or an act of collection, or a conjunction, or that predicates stand for attributes. W hat is special

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about the truth-definition is th at although it explains such a form -w ord as ‘a n d ’ in the only possible verbal way, namely, by m eans of this word itself, the definition nonetheless has a cognitive value in that it clarifies the sem antic form designated by this word. Nevertheless, the charge o f circularity is clearly justified; for only som eone who already u n d erstan d s the w ord ‘a n d ’ can u n d erstand the analysis of its m eaning given in term s of the truth-definition of the word ‘a n d ’. A nd when we ask how we can explain the m eaning of a word, clearly we want to know how we can explain it to som eone who does not yet know this word (or a corresponding one in an o th er language). Only it is now clear that such an explanation can no longer be accom plished by words. It can only be an explanation in which we dem onstrate the w ord’s m ode of em ploym ent by m eans o f exam ples, ju s t as the m ode of em ploym ent of predicates, we saw earlier, is only explained by examples (though it subsequently tu rn e d out that w hat was explained in this way was not predicates at all, but quasi-predicates). In the m eantim e we have seen th at the explanation of th e em ploym ent of an assertoric sentence can only consist in the explanation of its being used to m ake an assertion, and that m eans of its being used to make th e opening move in a verifi­ cation-gam e; hence th at the em ploym ent-rule that is explained is to be construed as a verification-rule. Notice th at we are now applying to the exam ple o f ‘a n d ’ - and ‘o r’ sentences the various theories which in previous lectures I discussed in abstracto. T h e truth-definition of ‘a n d ’ an d ‘o r’ has enabled us to see what a semantics which, in explaining the m eaning o f (non-deictic) sen­ tences, confines itself to giving th eir truth-conditions, can achieve; but also w hat it does n o t achieve. W hat it is n o t able to do is to explain an expression w ithout using the expression itself (or a corresponding one in a m eta-language). A nd what it equally cannot do is to give an expla­ nation o f the expression’s m ode of em ploym ent. T h e two objections raised against explaining the w ord ‘a n d ’ by m eans o f truth-conditions thus belong together; for if an expression cannot be explained by means of a n o th e r expression it can only be explained by dem onstrating its m ode o f em ploym ent. But I do not w ant merely to apply those abstract theses about the m eaning o f assertoric sentences to the case of ‘a n d ’ and ‘o r’; on the contrary, this case should serve to confirm them . T h e re fo re I will not proceed as though it had already been settled th at the em ploym entrules o f these sentences can only be verification-rules. Could they not also be conditional-rules which relate th eir em ploym ent to circum ­ stances? In the case o f ‘a n d ’ at least, such a suggestion seems extrem ely

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plausible. Could one not say th at one explains the use o f the word ‘a n d ’ to som eone by teaching him always to use the sentence ‘p and q if p and if q and always to deny it if n o t-p or n o t-q? T h e objection of circularity does not apply here, because although I can only describe the expla­ nation o f the w ord’s em ploym ent by again using the words ‘a n d ’ and ‘o r’, in the explanation itself they would not be used. T hink, e.g., o f a person A who wants to explain the word ‘an d ’ to a person B who does not yet know it. Let us suppose that it is warm and it is raining. It is I who am now giving this description of the situation, not A. A only says ‘It is w arm and it is rain in g ’ in the ap p ro p riate situation. In so doing he can assum e that B already u n d erstan d s the constituent-sentences ‘It is w arm ’ an d ‘It is rain in g .’ In an o th er situation in which it is warm, but not raining, A denies the sentence ‘It is warm and it is raining.’ In this way h e goes th ro u g h the fo u r possibilities by means of this and o ther exam ples. Eventually B will be able to im itate him in regard to o ther exam ples; and this m eans: he has u n derstood the em ploym ent-rule that was explained to him . B ut does the em ploym ent-rule which was explained to him in this way co rrespond to the m ode o f em ploym ent of o u r word ‘a n d ’? I described what is explained by saying that/4 teachesB always to use the sentence ‘p and q if p an d if q. B ut if the em ploym ent is to relate to the circum stances then this ‘i f p and if q can only mean: ‘if B perceives that p and he perceives th at q. this was also presupposed in the exam ple I gave. B ut in that case it is clear that the m ode of em ploym ent of the word ‘a n d ’ explained th ere does not correspond to the actual m ode of em ploym ent of this word. We n eith er only use the sentence ‘p and q if we perceive th a tp an d that q n o r always use it if we perceive th a tp and that q. It would seem plausible to widen the suggested explanation in the following way. A teaches B always to use the sentence ‘p and q not only when he perceives, b u t w henever he believes that p and believes that <7. This explanation already seems m ore closely connected to the expla­ nation by m eans o f truth-conditions; for ‘believe’ (meinen) means the same as ‘hold to be tru e ’. But, firstly, this would not correspond to the actual use o f the w ord ‘a n d ’ either, for we do not always say ‘p and q when we believe th a tp and believe that <7; and besides it is not clear how the explanation by m eans of exam ples that corresponds to this concep­ tion should look. We at least get closer to the actual use if instead o f saying ‘always if we believe’ we say ‘only if we believe’. T his step corresponds to the decisive step we took in the general discussion of the em ploym ent-rules

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of assertoric sentences, when it became clear that the em ploym ent-rules are not conditional rules. T h e rules are not such as determ ine u n d er what conditions - situational or cognitive - the em ploym ent of the expression occurs; ra th e r they are such as determ ine what the use of an expression implies if the expression (for whatever reasons or from whatever causes) is used. B ut now it is also plainly false th at som eone who asserts that/? and q implies that he believes th at q and believes that/?. He implies only that he is p rep ared both to assert that /? and to assert that q. However, it is not immediately clear what the corresponding explanation would be for the assertion that/? or q. Som eone who asserts this at any rate does not imply that he is prepared to assert th a tp or to assert that q. H e is precisely not p rep ared to assert one or the o th er by itself, but only that one or the oth er is true. So far in the discussion I have neglected the ‘o r’. With this word it could never have occurred to us th at its em ploym ent-rule could relate to circumstances. In the case of ‘an d ’ one could at least give this sort of explanation of the m ode o f em ploym ent of a word that by analogy with quasi-predicates we could call a quasi-‘a n d ’. But how should a corre­ sponding m ode of em ploym ent of the word ‘o r’ have looked? Something like this perhaps: one can always say ‘p or q if one perceives that/? or perceives th at q? But th ere is always less said with the sentence ‘p or q’ than with one o f the two sentences ‘/?’ or ‘q’; so on this account there would never be any occasion to use the word ‘o r’. T h e em ploym ent of ‘o r’ is clearly prospective, not retrospective. But prospective towards what? Is there any alternative but to adm it that it is verification? In that case we would have the following explanation: whoever says ‘p and q’ asserts that both assertions - that p and that q - are true, and th at means: verifiable; whoever says ‘/? or q’ asserts that one of the two assertions is true, and that means: verifiable. W hat this m eans can be explained by means of examples by showing, not in which circumstances the sentences are used, b u t in which circum stances the assertions m ade with them can be upheld against the assertions negating them , or m ust be withdrawn. T h e use o f the sentence-form and that of its denial are explained at the same time. T h e explanation takes the form of showing what attitude each of the two speakers - the one who affirms and the one who denies - takes to his assertion and that of the other when, on the basis of the verification of the two constituent sentences, they have reached agree­ m ent on their tru th and falsity. Let us take as an exam ple the sentence ‘A hippopotam us is sitting at the fron.t-door or a lion is lying in the

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yard.’ M r and M rsX want, by m eans of this exam ple, to explain the use of the word ‘o r’ to their little boy who, let us assume, understands the two constituent sentences but does not yet u n d erstan d ‘o r’. Mr X affirms the sentence, Mrs X denies it. T o g eth er they go outside with the boy and look around. Now as far as the verification and falsification of the constituent sentences is concerned there are four possibilities - clearly the same as those already distinguished in giving the truth-conditions. It will not be difficult for father, m other and son to reach agreem ent about the truth or falsity of the two constituent sentences. In doing this neither the word ‘o r’ nor the word ‘and’ is used. But the boy will perceive that, d ep ending on the result o f the verification of the constituent sen­ tences, either the father or the m other will withdraw the assertion they previously made in favour of the o th er’s assertion. Once he has u n d e r­ stood on what the withdrawal o f the assertion depends, thus once he has understood on which verification-rules the outcom e of the game depends, he has u nderstood the em ploym ent-rule o f ‘---- or . . .’ (or ‘- - and . . .’). However, this understanding is not expressed in some meta­ language - for what should this be? - but simply by the boy him self now using ‘a n d ’- and ‘o r’-sentences in the same way. T hus the conception that was developed abstractly in the lecture before last has been confirm ed in a simple concrete case. We were able to give the truth-conditions for a specific form o f sentence, and these truthconditions were then explained in term s o f the dependence of the with­ drawal (or upholding) of the affirmative (or negative) assertion on the tru th (or falsity) o f the constituent assertions. T o explain the truth-conditions in this way is to explain how the truth-value of sentences or assertions of this form is established, and this means: how they are ver­ ified. A nd this explanation also explains the m ode o f em ploym ent of sentences of this form w ithout making renew ed use o f the words that determ ine this form . If we com pare the conception of the words a n d ’ and ‘or’ that has em erged with the object-orientated conception, then, as in the case of predicates (p. 158), we can say that it is a specifically ‘language-analytical’ conception in the sense that the sign no longer appears as a m ere in ter­ m ediary by means of which som ething in ‘th o u g h t’ is represented which could also be achieved without language. T o understand the words ‘and’ and ‘o r’ is to be m aster of a particular kind of sign-em ploym ent; the idea that these words stand for som ething else is revealed as absurd as soon as one has become clear about how the m eaning of these words is explained.

L E C T U R E 18

General sentences. Resumption of the problem of predicates

T h e two form s of com plex sentence I dealt with in the previous lecture belong to a particularly sim ple an d sem antically tra n sp a re n t species of com plex sentence, those namely whose truth-value is determ ined by the truth-values o f their constituent sentences, thus sentences - or the assertions m ade with th em - which are truth-fu n ctions of their constit­ u e n t sentences (or of the assertions m ade with them). T h e re are o th er form s of com plex sentence whose truth-value (or that of the co rre­ sponding assertions) does not d ep en d , or does not only depend, on the truth-value o f their constituent sentences (or constituent assertions). T hus, for exam ple, the form s ‘q because/?’ and ‘i f p then q. e.g. ‘T h e bus crashed because the driver was d ru n k .’ Clearly such a sentence can only be tru e if both its constituent sentences are true. B ut this is not sufficient. It can be tru e that the bus crashed and that the driver was d ru n k , b u t false that the bus crashed because the driver was drunk. T h u s the tru th of such an assertion does not only d ep en d on the truth-value o f its constituent assertions. In this case th e re is clearly in addition a certain g rounding-relationship betw een the two constituent assertions. T h e situation is similar in the case o f the form s ‘If the d river had been d ru n k , the bus would have crash ed ’ and ‘If the driver is d ru n k , the bus will crash.’ A connection of g ro u n d and consequence is also asserted in statem ents o f the ‘if - th e n ’ form , only now it is presupposed - in the case of the counter-factual conditional - th at the constituent sentences are false or - in the o th e r case - th at the truth-value is left open. T h e distinction betw een truth-fu n ctio n al (so-called extensional) and non-truth-functional (so-called intensional) com plex statem ents stems from Frege. T h e discussion of the d ifferent form s of intensional complex statem ents in Frege’s p ap er ‘O n Sense and R eference’ is probably still the most com prehensive. T h e sem antics of intensional com plex statem ent-form s is still today a m atter o f controversy. I shall n o t go into it

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here. At the m om ent I am only concerned that you do not draw too far-reaching conclusions from the fact that intensional complex state­ m ents are not truth-functional. It does not follow from the fact that the truth-value of these form s of sentence does not depend, or does not only depend, on the truth-value of the constituent sentences that it is not tru e of these forms o f sentence th at to u n d erstand them is to know what the truth-conditions are o f the assertions m ade with them. We have no reason to think th at this extrem ely general characterization of the m eaning o f assertoric sentences should not hold for intensional com plex sentences. O f course, not m uch is thereby achieved, for the question im mediately arises: on what then does the truth-value of these complex sentences depend, if it is not the truth-value of their constituent sentences? Is it the m eaning of the constituent sentences? Is it their m eaning together with th eir truth-value? Is it the truth-value of other assertions which are not expressed in the constituent sentences of the com plex sentence but are im plied by it? So the hypothesis that it is also true of intensional complex sentences that, to u nderstand them is to know what their truth-conditions are, does not am ount to an answer. However, it does indicate the only direction in which the enquiry can proceed. H ere too the alternative would be an object-orientated con­ ception, according to which the m eaning o f ‘because’, ‘if . . . th en ’, etc., would have to be conceived as a certain combination of the states of affairs for which the constituent sentences stand. W hether th ere exists a concrete attem p t at carrying out an object-orientated explanation of intensional com plex statem ents, I do not know; however, it should be possible to recognize in advance the senselessness of such an attem pt now th at we have shown by reference to the exam ple of extensional com plex sentences the absurdity o f the idea of the composedness (Zusammengesetztsein) of a state of affairs. I also w anted to exam ine the statem ents which in the traditional logic were called general statem ents, in contrast to singular predicative state­ ments. Two kinds of general statem ent were distinguished, the universal (e.g. ‘All ants are poisonous’) and the particular (e.g. ‘Some ants are violet’). T h e distinction is problem atic, because the denial of a universal statem ent is a particular statem ent (‘it is not the case that all’ = ‘some are n o t’) and vice versa (‘it is not the case that some’ = ‘none a re ’ = ‘all are not'), and because the so-called quantifiers (‘all’, ‘some’) can occur m ore than once in a statem ent (e.g. ‘All ants have some ancestors’). Nonetheless one can say th at the positive universal statem ent and the positive particular statem ent are the two simplest forms of general statem ent.

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How should we conceive the semantics o f such statements? W hat is it to understan d a sentence of this form? T h e traditional view was that they are a species of predicative sentence; that is: the expressions ‘some ants’ and ‘all ants’ were construed as subject-expressions. So long as one has a purely grammatical, syntactical concept o f ‘sentence-subject’ there is nothing wrong with this. In traditional logic however the notion of the sentence-subject was an undifferentiated syntactical-semantic one. Thus not only in gram m ar but also in logic expressions of the form ‘so m e/7’, ‘a lii7’, were construed as subjects, and that means: as com po­ nents o f predicative judgm ents. In the traditional logic books 1 it was customary first to introduce ‘th e’ predicative judgm ent in general as consisting of subject, copula and predicate. T h e singular, the universal and the particular ju d g m en t were then distinguished as three species. Occasionally the singular ju d g m en t was subsum ed u n d er the universal because in both cases, and in contrast to the particular judgm ent, the predicate is valid for the ‘whole extension’ of the subject-term . 2 T hus, the general ju d g m en t was conceived on the model of the singular ju d g ­ ment; the relation between predicate or concept and that for which a singular term stands became the model for the relation between p red i­ cate and th at for which the expression ‘all F ’ or ‘some i7’ stands. T he traditional conception thus presupposes that the expressions ‘all F’, ‘some F’ stand for som ething, for an object . 3 But what sort of an object can this be? In the case of ‘all ants’ one might say it is the class of ants. But when we say ‘All ants are poisonous’ we do not mean that the class of ants is poisonous - a class cannot be poisonous - but that ants all ants - are poisonous. It becomes even m ore difficult in the case of ‘some ants’. It used to be said that this expression stands for a sub-set of the class of ants. But does this m ean a determ inate sub-set? If, for example, the statem ent ‘Some ants are violet’ is false, does this m ean that there is a determ inate sub-set of ants which are not violet? Clearly not. T h e sentence is false, if, am ong all sub-sets of ants, there are none whose elem ents are violet. ‘T h e re is a certain sub-set . . however, is simply an elaborate form ulation of ‘there are some ants . . .’ T h e expression ‘an (indeterm inate) sub-set of F’ does not stand for a (deter­ minate) sub-set of F, and hence does not stand for som ething at all. What then do we m ean by the expression ‘some ants’? If we free ourselves from the idea that such an expression must be understood as somehow analogous to a singular term (‘this an t’), then there is no longer any necessity to articulate the sentence semantically on the model of a singular predicative sentence: ‘Some ants/(are) violet.’ ‘Some ants are violet’ clearly means the same as ‘T h ere are violet ants.’ This equivalence

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suggests that we should articulate the sentence as follows: ‘Some//ants/violet.’ C orrespondingly, we would have to articulate the universal sentence thus: ‘All//ants/poisonous.’ Does this get us any fu r­ ther? If we isolate the words ‘som e’ and ‘all’, then their m eaning seems to become even m ore unintelligible. This is so as long as we ask what the expressions stand for. But because the question, as thus posed given the suggested articulation - makes no sense, we are forced to pose the question differently. Instead of ‘all’ we can also say ‘every’. If we write ‘every//ant/poisonous’ we are rem inded that there is also a sentence with the corresponding grammatical structure: ‘Everything that is an an t is poisonous.’ This clearly m eans som ething like: ‘Everything : if it is an ant then it is poi­ sonous.’ T h e word ‘everything’ does not stand for som ething, rath er it refers to other sentences, namely, all singular predicative sentences ‘T his is an ant.’ T his opens u p the possibility o f conceiving the understanding o f the word ‘every’, and hence that o f a universal sentence, as an u n d e r­ standing o f the truth-conditions o f this sentence, such that the sentence ‘Every ant is poisonous’ is true if and only if in every case in which one can say o f som ething th at it is an an t one can also say that it is poisonous. T h e word ‘every’ does not stand for som ething. Rather it contains a directive:-‘T ake everything in tu rn ’; and to this directive is connected the assertion: ‘If it is F, then it is G. ’ We can in terp ret the particular statem ent in exactly the same way: ‘(take in turn) everything: (then you will find) one or some of them that are F and G\ H ere too the assertion refers one to singular predicative assertions, but in this case in such a way that the assertion is true if any singular sentence ‘T his is F and it is G’ is true. It may surprise you that the reference to all (‘take everything in tu rn ’) is now also taken up with the paraphrase of the particular statem ent; however one can easily see that a reference to all is indeed contained in o u r understanding o f ‘some’. ‘Some’ m eans ‘some o f all’. T o make clear the contrast, and the parallel, between universal and particular statem ents we could paraphrase thus: ‘of all every: . . .’, ‘o f all some (a): . . .’ This interpretation o f general statem ents stems from Frege . 4 With it Frege succeeded in breaking out o f the narrow confines of traditional predicate-logic - the Aristotelian syllogistic - and developing the general predicate-calculus o f m odern logic. T h e syntax o f this calculus only seems artificial because looked at from the standpoint of the syntax of natural language it is unusual. But this is only because its structure makes explicit precisely th e semantic structure o f the general statem ents o f natural lan-

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guage which does not become visible in their own syntactic structure. It is only in one detail th at the sem antic conception of m odern logic seems not to correspond to the semantics of n atu ral language . 5 T h e universal statem ent is w ritten thus in m odern logic: \x){Fx-*Gx)' or in words: ‘for all x: if x is F th en it is G\ T his is ju s t an o th er form ulation o f the sentence I ju st proposed: ‘everything: if it is F then it is G\ Now it seems m uch m ore natural to in te rp re t a statem ent like ‘All ants are poisonous’ not, as I have ju s t done, as equivalent to ‘Everything that is an an t is poisonous’, but thus: ‘every ant: it is poisonous 5 and, corre­ spondingly, the particular statem ent thus: ‘some one o f all F: it is G\ T h e difference is that the singular term s o f the predicative statem ents to which the general statem ent, in F rege’s in terp retation, refers stand for all objects o f a presupposed dom ain o f objects, w hereas, according to the o th e r conception, they stand only for the objects th at are F. A ccording to the first conception the verification o f the statem ent ‘All ants are poisonous’ would consist in the exam ination of all real objects with respect to w hether, i f they are ants, they are also poisonous; according to the second conception the directive is restricted to the totality o f ants. It is a consequence o f th e first conception that, if there are no ants, the universal statem ent is still true; whereas it w ould cor­ respond to the semantics o f natural languages to say that if there are no ants the question o f w h eth er or n o t all ants are poisonous cannot be m eaningfully raised and th at a co rresponding statem ent is n eith er true n o r false. T h u s Frege has at this point been p re p a re d to d e p art from the semantics of natural language in the interests o f logical system. However, I have only m entioned this difference in o rd e r to m ake clear that what is decisive in the context o f o u r enquiry is com m on to both conceptions, nam ely, that the u n d erstan d in g o f these sentence-form s consists in know ing how th eir truth-value depends on the truth-value of other sen­ tences. T hus in reg ard to general sentences we reach a result analogous to th at reached in the case o f truth-functional com plex sentences. T h e only difference is that the assertions on whose truth-value the truthvalue o f a general sentence depends are not expressed in the components o f this sentence. A nd a fu rth e r differen ce is connected with this: the assertions on whose truth-value the truth-value o f a general sentence depen d s can be o f an unlim ited nu m b er, and in that case we cannot finally verify the all-sentence. In those cases w here we are dealing with a finite nu m b er o f objects we can convert the universal statem ent into an and-statem ent and the particular statem ent into an or-statem ent.

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T h e sentence ‘All ants in this box are poisonous’ is, if the num ber of ants in the box = n, equivalent to the sentence ‘A nt 1 is poisonous and ant 2 is poisonous . . . and ant n is poisonous.’ I have already spoken m any times o f the ‘equivalence’ o f statem ents without having defined this expression. We can now say: two sentences are to be term ed equiv­ alent when they have the same m eaning, and that means: the same truthconditions. In o u r case one can see immediately that the truth-value of the two sentences d ep en d s in the sam e way on the truth-value of the sam e sentences ‘A nt 1 is poisonous’, etc. Clearly the explanation by means o f truth-conditions that I have given of the form s o f general sentences is circular in the same way as the corresponding explanation of ‘an d ’ - and ‘or’ - sentences. T he universal statem ent is tru e if every insertion of a singular term yields a true p re ­ dicative statem ent; the particular statem ent is tru e if one such insertion yields a true predicative statement. As the quantifiers refer not to objects but to the insertions o r the sentences which result from such insertions th ere is again no m ere circle. T h e truth-definition shows how the truthvalue of the sentence depends on the truth-value of oth er sentences. A nd h ere too we can take the fu rth e r step and avoid the circle by explaining th e em ploym ent of such sentence-form s by means of exam ­ ples. In his Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics W ittgenstein writes: ‘O ne learns the m eaning o f “all” by learning that from “(x)Fx” ‘F a ” follows. (A nd this m eans that if any statem ent “This is F ” is false then the universal statem ent is also false.) T h e exercises which train one in the use o f this word, teach one its m eaning, always aim at showing that an exception may not be m ade’ (§10). How can we explain this - ‘that an exception may not be m ade’ - to som eone who does not yet u n d e r­ stand it? F or exam ple, we have beans in a sack and assert that all are black and d ep en d in g on what em erges we will uphold the statem ent or w ithdraw it o r say it has been shown to be tru e or false. With this I conclude the discussion o f the semantics of truth-functional sentence-form s and can now move on to the tw ice-postponed treatm ent o f the form o f elem entary sentences - the predicative sentence-form . I postponed th e discussion o f the predicative sentence-form for the first time when it had becom e clear th at neither the m eaning o f predicates n o r that o f whole predicative sentences can be understood by relating them thro u g h their em ploym ent-rule to the circumstances of their use. A fter it becam e clear th at the isolated discussion of predicates leads ju st as m uch into a blind-alley as the orientation towards names it seemed natural to look for the m eaning o f the two components of the predicative sentence-form in their contribution to the m eaning of the whole pre-

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dicative sentence. But this required that before resum ing the discussion of predicates and the treatm ent of singular terms we should arrive at a prelim inary conception of the m eaning of assertoric sentences. Such a conception was reached in the explanation that to use an assertoric sen­ tence is to assert that its truth-conditions are fulfilled, or that following its verification-rule will lead to confirm ation of the assertion. With this a basis was achieved for the analysis of the semantics of the predicative sentence-form . T o u n d erstan d a sentence of this form must be to know its truth-conditions, or its verification-rule. At this point I again postponed the discussion of the predicative sentence-form in order to illustrate the abstract notion of truth-conditions or verification-rules by reference to the simpler case of truth-functional sentence-forms. What makes this case so simple is not only the fact that in dealing with it we can disregard deictic expressions, and hence the distinction between sentence and assertion and hence the whole problem of the identifiability of what is asserted which is basic to o u r speaking of ‘tru e’ and ‘false’. T h e peculiar simplicity of the explanation of truth-functional sentenceform s is g rounded in the fact that it makes the tru th of these assertions dep en d en t simply on the tru th and falsity of other assertions. In the truth-definition this was expressed by the reappearance of the word ‘tru e ’ in the definiens - in the specification of the truth-conditions and, in the explanation o f the mode o f em ploym ent, by the fact that the withdrawal, or upholding, of the assertion depended on the with­ drawal, or upholding, of o th er assertions. T h e tru th and verifiability of truth-functional sentences refers (verweist) to the tru th , or verifiability, of other sentences and hence ultimately to the truth, or verifiability, of the assertions m ade by m eans of elem entary predicative sentences. T he explanation of the em ploym ent of truth-functional sentences presup­ poses that the word ‘tru e ’ o r the em ploym ent of o th er sentences is already understood. But then this m eans that my exemplification of the abstract explanation of the employm ent-rule of assertoric sentences and of the notion of truth-conditions and verification-rules by means of the truth-functional sentence-form s does not stand on its own feet. In the end this abstract explanation can only be m ade concrete by being applied to the em ploym ent o f elem entary predicative sentences. So one can now understand my earlier claim (p. 179) that what can be said about the m eaning of assertoric sentences in general prior to the analysis of the semantics of the predicative form of sentence can only be regarded as provisional. This can be m ade particularly clear by reference to the word ‘tru e ’. I have already m ade ample use of this word. However, it has not yet been

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explained. If som eone wishes to object th at it is explained by the redundancy-form ula I would rem ind you that the redundancy-form ula itself presupposes that one already understands the difference between ‘(it is asserted) that p ’ and ‘p and this difference is only understood if the verification-game whose rules are verification-rules is understood. Thus one can only reg ard the word ‘tru e’ as having been explained by the redundancy-form ula if one presupposes that one already understands how assertions can be verified, and that means: how their tru th can be recognized; the word ‘true’ does not have to be used here but it is natural to use it (together with the expression ‘that p'). T hus one could only dispense with an explanation of the word ‘tru e ’ that goes beyond the redundancy form ula if one were to omit the first step in the explanation, viz. to u n derstand an assertion is to know its truth-conditions, and pro ­ ceed immediately to the next, viz. to u n d erstan d an assertion is to know how it is verified. If we again begin at the level of the first explanation-step - as in the case of truth-functional statem ents - we see im mediately how far we still are from an u n d erstan d in g of the word ‘tru e’. For whereas in the explanation of what it is for a truth-functional assertion to be tru e the word ‘tru e ’ ap p eared again it cannot figure in the explanation of what it is for a predicative assertion to be true; so it is here that we must expect the explanation o f the word ‘tru e ’ that has so far been lacking. However, this cannot be taken to m ean that a general m eaning o f the word ‘tru e’ would be arrived at which could then be transferred to the tru th o f truth-functional assertions. W hat it means for truth-functional assertions to be tru e is already fixed by their truth-definitions. T hese truth-definitions can only be com pleted by explaining the word ‘tru e’ that occurs in their definiens by means o f a truth-definition of predicative assertions. W hat results in this way is a so-called recursive truth-definition o f the kind first developed by Tarski. T h e predicate ‘tru e ’ is defined in such a way that it is first defined for the class o f elem entary assertions and is then defined for the others - at any rate those we have so far become acquainted with - as a function o f its application to the elem en­ tary assertions. How should we approach the question of the truth-condition of a predicative assertion? A re we not once again at one of those dangerous places on our path at which no definite direction is prescribed for our enquiry, and at which I can only make some suggestion or o th er which would be bound to app ear m ore or less arbitrary? I think not. If the entire previous p ro ced u re has not been a blind-alley then the next step m ust follow automatically once we bring together the various lines of

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thought - in p art carried th ro u g h , in p art b roken-off - that are relevant to the p resen t enquiry. From th e outset th e question concerning the semantics of predicative sentences could only be u n d ersto o d as the question concerning the p re ­ dicative form , and th at means: as the question o f how the m eaning of the whole sentence results from the m eaning of its two com ponents. O f course the object-orientated position also u n d erstood the question in this way. H ow ever, its attem p t to construe the m a n n er in which the m eaning o f the sentence-w hole arises out o f the sentence-parts as com ­ position fo u n d ered . As this conception was conditioned by the objectual in terp retatio n o f predicates I tried to w ork out a new conception of predicates. B ut because predicates were treated in isolation the attem pt failed to overcom e the am biguity between predicates and quasi-predicates. It thereby becam e clear th at the m eaning of the predicate can only be u n d ersto o d by reference to the m eaning of the sentence-whole. A nd since in the m eantim e it has em erged th at to u n d e rsta n d an asser­ toric sentence (if we disregard deictic expressions) is to know its truthconditions we are now in a position to u n d erstan d th e alternative to the object-orientated conception o f the predicative sentence in term s o f the sentence-whole. If we attem pt a form ulation o f this alternative analogous to the one for truth -fu n ctio n al sentences (and for the sake of simplicity let us continue fo r the time being to d isregard deictic expressions) we can again say: the e rro r of the object-orientated conception is not that it speaks o f objects that can be tru e or false - states of affairs, or assertions - but that it thinks of a predicative state o f affairs, that a is F, as composed of a an d that for which the expression ‘F ’ stands; and fu rth e r we can now again say: the d ep en d en ce of the assertion is to be construed not as com position but as a depen d en ce o f truth-value. B ut when we a ttem p t to say what it is on which the truth-value is d e p e n d e n t we get into difficulties. If we were to say th at the truth-value of the predicative assertion is d e p e n d e n t on the object for which the singular term ‘a stands and on the attrib u te o r the class for which the predicate ‘F ’ stands, this, unlike the untenable synthesis-theory, would be correct but (a) following o u r discussion of the nom inalism -problem we know that such an explanation can at most have a secondary justifi­ cation an d that th e prim ary explanation by recourse to the attribute or class would re p re se n t a hysteron-proteron and (b) it is clearly not suffi­ cient to say that the truth-value o f the predicative assertion depends on this and that; ra th e r we req u ire a com plete form ulation of the form: ‘the assertion th at a is F is tru e if and only if . . .’ T h e truth-value of truth-functional assertions did not d ep e n d simply on assertions but on

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a p ro p erty of these assertions. T his p roperty was that of truth. T h e re is no question of this in the p resen t case, but we m ust still expect the tru th of the predicative assertion to dep en d on certain properties of the objects concerned or on a relation between them ; and it will probably have to be a relation if the if-sentence which has ju st been left open thus the truth-condition - is to yield a coherent formulation. If, however, the above-m entioned hysteron-proteron is to be avoided then at any rate in the case o f the predicate the object concerned can only be the sign itself. So it would now seem plausible to ask: is th ere a relation between the predicate ‘F* and the object for which ‘a stands which is such that one can say: the assertion that a is F is true if and only if this relation obtains? We can h e re refer back to the result of o u r earlier investigation into the function and m ode o f em ploym ent of predicates (p. 135 f), and since we are now re tu rn in g to it from the perspective of the question of the truth-condition of the assertion the result achieved at that time loses the am biguity which led us into the blind-alley of quasi-predicates. T h e purpose for which a predicate is used was shown to be characterization (p. 135). In introducing this characterization-function it seemed wholly natural to say: that which is characterized by m eans of the predicate or, p u ttin g it m ore abstractly, to which the predicate is applied - in the em ploym ent of a predicative sentence is the object for which the singular term which supplem ents the predicate to form a sentence stands. It was then the question o f the explanation of the use of the predicate which as it were led to the relation of the predicate to the employment-situation taking the place o f the relation to the object and so gave rise to the am biguity with quasi-predicates. Initially I shall leave open the question of how the problem o f the explanation of em ploym ent is to be conceived from the p resen t perspective, for I want to keep to the same sequence which em erged in the abstract description of the m eaning of assertoric sentences and which I also followed in the explanation of the m eaning o f truth-functional sentences. Only after this shall I move on to the crucial question of the explanation o f em ploym ent-rules. So ignoring for the tim e being this wider question we can tackle the question of how the characterization-relation is to be u nderstood relative to the object if it is to be u n d ersto o d as a truth-condition. It is not enough merely to speak in an unqualified way o f a characterization of the object by the predicate o r an application of the predicate to the object. An assertion that a is F is tru e not when the predicate *F' is merely applied or is applicable b u t when the predicate can legitimately be applied to it. T his relation of th e legitim ate applicability of a predicate to an object is what

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is denoted by the word ‘applies’ (‘Zutreffen ). T h u s we arrive at the fol­ lowing truth-definition for predicative assertions: the assertion that a is F is true if and only if the predicate F ’ applies (zutnfft) to the objectfo r which the singular term ‘a’ stands. Perhaps you will find this result ridiculous, for it appears so trivial. However, it is the sort of triviality we m ust expect from any truth-defi­ nition of a sentence-form . W hat we now have to do is to see exactly what is achieved with this definition, but also what it is about it that leaves us unsatisfied. This is a significant result in the following two respects: (1) T h e truth-definition of the predicative sentence enables one to give a first, no longer object-orientated answer to the question of what it is to u n d erstan d a predicative sentence. C ontinuing for the time being to ignore deictic expressions, we can say: to understand a predicative sentence is not, as was thought in the object-orientated tradition, to represen t a synthesis between two objects which correspond to the two sentence-com ponents and for which these stand; rather it is to know th at the sentence (or the assertion m ade with it) is true if and only if the predicate applies to the object for which the subject-term of the sentence stands. This is a far from negligible result at that level of semantic theory which corresponds to Davidson’s conception. (2) It is a significant result to have succeeded in giving a definition of the word ‘tru e ’ for the form of elem entary sentences in whose definiens the word ‘tru e ’ no longer occurs. You will point out to me that I have only been able to do this by bringing in the unexplained w ord ‘applies’ (‘zutrijft’). O f course I adm it this; even worse I do not believe it is possible to give a verbal definition o f the w ord ‘applies’ o th er than by means o f the word ‘tru e ’, namely by reading the truth-definition ju st given in the opposite direction, from right to left. W hat is m eant by the word ‘applies’ can only be defined by saying: a predicate F ’ applies to an object a if and only if the assertion that a is F is true. At the level o f predicative assertions then we move in a circle between the two words ‘tru e’ and ‘applies’. Nonetheless this represents a first step towards an analysis o f the condition o f the possibility of the truth of elem entary statem ents. T h e truth-definition suggests that w hat is asserted by an elem entary sentence can only be tru e or false because the elem entary sentence is not only structured {gegliedert) but so structured that the two components have different and m utually supplem enting functions of a kind which make possible such a thing as a truth-condition: an assertion is true if the predicate applies to an objectfo r which the subject-expression 5 to
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tences being true or false is grounded in their predicative stru c tu re . 6 For Plato, however, the problem was simply that of explaining the pos­ sibility o f falsity (how it is possible to assert and believe som ething that is not) and he could solve this problem by exhibiting the complex struc­ ture o f the (predicative) statem ent. In reg ard to this question the fact that the two com ponents have different functions could be ignored. And in the tradition this fact was not seen because it was taken for granted that both sentence-com ponents have the function of standing for objects. In this levelled-down form - the condition of the possibility of being tru e or false is the synthetic form of the statem ent - Plato’s insight became, via A ristotle , 7 a perm an en t item in the philosophical tradition. (Statements other than predicative were not considered.) T he foil against which Plato and Aristotle posed the problem of falsity was the idea of a representation (Vorstellen) of objects th at could only be tru e . 8 Both the truth-relation and the object-relation were thus taken for granted and treated as unproblem atic. T h e m ore radical question of the conditions o f the possibility of a relationship to truth - or in a language o f the use o f the word ‘tru e’ - could not be posed at all. Of course until now this question has not been recognized in analytical philosophy either, fo r the simple reason that, through lack of reflection on the relation of their own position to the philosophical tradition, analytical philosophers confined themselves to the traditional problems. Like Plato’s question this question too is posed against the foil of a m ore primitive language which lacks the specifically predicative struc­ ture. B ut whereas for Plato this was the fiction of a language consisting only of names, in the present enquiry it is a language consisting of more primitive characterization-expressions (quasi-predicates) of the kind we actually encounter in signal-languages and in the first language-acquisition o f children. For the characterization-expression to be able to apply to som ething such expressions must first be supplem ented by singular terms which have the function of standingfor objects to form predicatively structured expressions. T hus what makes possible a relation to truth in a language is the addition of expressions which make possible a relation to objects. This again shows why the question o f the condition of the possibility of a relation to truth lies outside the horizon of traditional philosophy: the traditional phi­ losopher took the relation to objects for granted and, given his orien­ tation, was unable to see it as a problem . It has also become clear that the one-place sem antic predicate ‘tru e’ in the truth-definition of predic­ ative sentences involves a reference (verweist), not only to the two-place semantic predicate ‘applies’, but also to the two-place semantic predicate

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‘stands fo r’. It is true that one can om it the latter expression from the truth-definition by simply saying . . if the predicate “F ” applies to a*. B ut that a predicate applies to an object means that the assertion m ade by means of a sentence form ed by the supplem entation o f the predicate by an expression th at stands for the object is true. We can now also say what rem ains unsatisfactory about the explanation of the m eaning of predicative sentences by m eans c f the truth-definition. Let me rem in d you again that I have so far d isregarded deictic expres­ sions. We were thus able to speak o f the tru th-condition of the sentence and to say that to u n d erstan d a predicative sentence is to know the truth-condition which is given in the truth-definition. If we now recall W ittgenstein’s principle: ‘T h e m eaning is w hat the explanation o f the meaning explains’, then it is clear that if we w anted to explain to someone the m eaning of a predicative sentence by m eans of this truth-definition we would have to assum e that he already u n d erstan d s the expressions ‘applies’ and ‘stand fo r’. But since a verbal definition o f the w ord ‘applies’ is only possible by m eans of th e truth-definition read in the reverse direction, this means th at the explanation eith er rem ains circular or is dependent on a non-verbal explanation of what is m eant by a predicate’s ‘applying’. A nd since, as we have ju st seen, one cannot u n d erstan d what is m eant by a p redicate’s ‘applying’ w ithout at the sam e time u n d e r­ standing w hat is m eant by saying that an expression - which for this reason is called a singular term - ‘stands fo r’ an object, the truth-definition is, if it is to be an explanation of m eaning, equally depen d en t on a non-verbal explanation o f w hat is m eant by an expression’s standing for an object. It would be a m istake to suppose that I would now suddenly transfer the d em and for the explanation o f m eaning from the prim ary level of expressions o f natu ral language to a meta-level o f expressions of semantic theory. In the present line of th o u g h t such a separation which is m ade in the usual meta-linguistic sem antic theories is not possible. Rem em ber that I started out fro m the question of how one explains a predicate. In this (philosophical) question one is only asking about what in general happens w hen the m eaning of a particular predicate is (prephilosophically) explained (p. 150). From th e question o f how a predicate is explained, how ever, we were re fe rred to the question of how a p re ­ dicative sentence is explained. A nd if the answ er to this question is: ‘by giving its tru th -co n d itio n ’ and if doing that involves using the words ‘applies’ and ‘stands fo r’, then, if the explanation is not to rem ain in the air, we have no alternative b u t to explain these words themselves. H ere, ju st as in the case of tru th -fu n ctio n al sentences, we find that if

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the explanation is not to rem ain circular we must move from the level of the specification of truth-conditions to that of the explanation of m ode of em ploym ent. Now we have already seen in the case of the sem antic predicate ‘tru e ’, in th at p art o f its recursive definition that has so far been given, that one cannot explain such a word in abstracto; what is explained is how one establishes w hether an assertion is true; and this can only be done by explaining the m ode of em ploym ent of the corre­ sponding form o f sentence. Likewise we must expect that one can only explain the word ‘applies’ by explaining how one establishes that a predicate applies; and this can only be done by explaining the employm ent-rule of predicates. A nd in precisely the same way we m ust expect that the expression ‘stands fo r’ can only be explained by explaining how one determ ines fo r which object an expression stands, and this can only be done by explaining the em ploym ent-rule of singular-term s. But now if it is correct th at singular term s and predicates are com plem entary expressions such th at a p red icate’s applying to the object for which a singular term stands constitutes the truth-condition of an elem entary statem ent, then we m ust also expect ( 1 ) that the explanation of the em ploym ent-rule o f predicates presupposes an understanding of the em ploym ent-rule o f singular term s and vice versa, and (2 ) that by explaining the em ploym ent-rule of predicates, together with that of singular term s, one explains the em ploym ent of predicative sentences. O r to p u t it an o th er way: by explaining what it is for predicates to apply and what it is for singular term s to stand fo r objects one explains what it is for an elem entary statem ent to be true.

LECTURE 19

T he mode of employment of predicates. Transition to singular term s

‘T he assertion that a is F is tru e if and only if the predicate “F” applies to the object for which the singular term “a” stands.’ With this truthdefinition a start is m ade in the analysis o f the m eaning of predicative sentences. But it is only a start. T h e transition from this first level of semantic analysis to the crucial second level, which consists in the expla­ nation o f use, will prove much m ore difficult in the case of predicative sentences than in the case of truth-functional sentences. You will th e re ­ fore not be p rep ared to und ertak e the lengthy analyses that are now required unless I am able to convince you that this first level of expla­ nation o f m eaning does not suffice for the fundam ental analysis o f the m eaning o f predicative sentences we are h ere aiming at. In the last lecture I explained the inadequacy of this explanation by saying that it presupposes that we already und erstand what it is for a predicate to apply to an object and what it is for an expression to stand for an object. But we can also see the inadequacy of this explanation from an o th er angle. T h e truth-definition with variables F ' and ‘a ’ is of course m eant to provide a fram ew ork for the specification of the truthcondition of any actual assertion by the substitution of a particular predicate and a particular singular term . But this means that it would also have to provide the fram ew ork both for the explanation of the m eaning of predicates and for the explanation of the m eaning of sin­ gular term s; and it would have to do this both in general and for the explanation of particular predicates and particular singular terms. But that the truth-definition, as it now stands, allows for an explanation of the sentence-com ponents could at best be claimed for the singular term . O f the latter one could say that one understands it if one knows for which object it stands. But what would it be, in term s of this tru th definition, to u n d erstan d the predicate? T h e best I can think of is: to und erstan d a predicate ‘F ’ is to know what it is for it to apply to an

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object. But this of course is to say nothing so long as one does not explain what it is. T h e inadequacy of such an explanation becomes immediately clear w hen one considers how one would explain the m eaning of particular predicates within the fram ew ork o f the general explanation. Now th ere is a possibility of modifying the truth-definition in a way that removes this difficulty. In the usual meta-linguistic semantic theo­ ries the truth-definition for a predicative assertion goes roughly as fol­ lows: ‘the assertion that a is F is tru e if and only if the singular term “a ” stands for an object which is an elem ent of the class for which the p re d ­ icate “F ” stands’. This definition can then be supplem ented by a speci­ fication in a m eta-language o f the object to which the expression ‘a* is assigned and a specification of the class to which the predicate F” is assigned. This truth-definition enables one, if one has a list on which all singular term s and predicates of a language are assigned to specific objects and classes, to determ ine the truth-conditions of all the sen­ tences which can be form ed by all com binations of the singular term s and predicates on the list. But this also makes it clear what the limited theoretical interests are within which such a truth-definition has a value. It is im portant that we realize the extent to which this truth-definition is even less satisfactory than the previous one. Firstly, the explanation of predicates which was lacking in the p re ­ vious truth-definition is achieved in the p resent one at the cost of a relapse into the object-orientated position; in place of a predicate’s applying to som ething one has the inclusion of an object in a class. A variant of this would have been to say that the assertion is true if the attribute for which the predicate stands belongs to the object. Since, however, two predicates which stand for d ifferen t attributes, or have different m eanings, determ ine the same class if they apply to the same objects, the truth-value of the assertion, if it depends on the predicate’s applying to the object, depends only on which class the predicate d e te r­ mines. H ence if one is introducing som ething objectual for the p re d i­ cate at all then the situation is m ade clearer if one speaks of the class than if one speaks o f the attribute. Secondly, ju st as the previous definition presupposed that one already understands the term ‘applies’, the present definition p resu p ­ poses that one already understands what it is for an object to be an elem ent of a class. O n this score th en neither of the definitions has any advantage over the o th er except that, as we have seen on an earlier occasion (p. 231), the inclusion o f an object in a class can be defined in terms o f the predicate’s applying to the object (an advantage which of

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course will only become effective if we can find an explanation of a p red icate’s applying which is in d ep en d en t o f the truth-definition). T hirdly, w hat makes the new truth-definition totally unacceptable within o u r line o f th o u g h t is that it assigns the singular term to an object and the predicate to a class by m eans o f a m eta-linguistic expression. T h e assignm ent is really only an assignm ent o f the object-language expression to th e meta-linguistic expression. H ence it is presupposed that the one to whom a singular term or predicate is explained in this way already u n d erstan d s the corresponding expression in the o th er lan­ guage. Fourthly, I would also point out th at predicates and singular term s, as they are explained in this second truth-d efin ition, are not explained as com plem entary expressions, and are not explained as essentially com ponents o f the predicative sentence. This p o int is, o f course, a m ere consequence o f the first, the relapse into the object-orientated position. Sum m arizing, we can say that the first tru th-definition was only unsatisfactory in the sense that it did n o t go far enough; it left open the explanation both of the sem antic expressions in th e definiens and, what is directly connected with this, of the sentence-com ponents themselves. T h e second truth-definition, on the o th er han d , is unsatisfactory in the wholly d iffe re n t sense that, what the first truth-definition left open, it answ ers with a pseudo-explanation given in a m eta-language and in this way merely covers up the problem facing us. T h e advantage o f the first truth-definition is that although it does not give an answ er it does put the question concerning the m ode o f em ploym ent of predicates and th at concerning the m ode of em ploym ent of singular term s on the right track. For from the outset it reciprocally relates predicates an d singular term s to one an o th er and both of them to the tru th of the assertions m ade with them . So we can expect th at the explanation of the m ode of em ploym ent o f predicates, and that o f singular term s, will at the same tim e be an explanation o f the m ode o f em ploym ent of whole predica­ tive sentences, and, hence, of the m eaning of th e word ‘tru e ’ in its ele­ m entary m ode o f em ploym ent. We already know in a general way that the transition from the first level of sem antic explanation of the form o f an assertion by means of a truth-definition to the second level, in which the m ode o f em ploym ent o f such sentences is explained, m ust take the fo rm of presenting the verification-gam e betw een an assertion o f this form and its denial; and in essence this means: showing how the assertion is verified. In the case of predicative assertions this can only m ean th at the verification-rule of the sentence is fo u n d ed in the em ploym ent-rules of the two sentence-

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com ponents. For the em ploym ent-rules of the two sentence-components this m eans that they m ust be so constituted that, if one knows the em ploym ent-rule of a particular singular term and that of a particular predicate, then one knows the verfication-rule of the sentence com­ posed o f this singular term and this predicate. A nd this means that the em ploym ent-rules of the two com ponents must consist in their contri­ bution to the sentence’s verification-rule. T hus o u r understanding of each o f the two sentence-com ponents is not ind ependent of its being the com ponent o f a predicative sentence, though ou r understanding is in d e p e n d e n t of its being com bined in a sentence with precisely this p ar­ ticular expression of the com plem entary semantic class. Now since knowing a sentence’s verification-rule consists in knowing how its truth is established - this is simply a verbal definition - it follows from the truth-definition that the verification-rule of the assertion m ade by m eans of a predicative sentence ‘Fa is grounded (a) in the knowledge o f how it is established fo r which object of arbitrary predications the singular term \ . . a stands and (b) in the knowledge of how it is estab­ lished that the predicate ‘F — ’ applies to an arbitrary object. W ith this we have now achieved at the level o f the explanation of m ode o f em ploym ent what was lacking in the truth-definition (at any rate in its first form which fo r us is the only relevant one), viz. a question about the explanation of the two sentence-com ponents that is inte­ grated into the question about the explanation of the predicative sen­ tence. You could object th at I could have already reached this result in connection with the truth-definition. I said there that in the fram ework of the truth-definition one cannot und erstan d in what the explanation or u n d erstan d in g of the predicate consists; at best one can say that to u n d e rsta n d a predicate is to know what it is for it to apply to an object. W ould it not have been easy to supplem ent this as follows: to u n d e r­ stand a predicate is to know how it is established that it applies to an object? How ever the question is not w hether such a supplem entation would have been easy but ra th e r what its methodological significance is. Talk o f establishing that a predicate applies already belongs to the con­ text o f establishing the truth, and that means: to the context of verifica­ tion. We shall see that in the case of the singular term too by asking how one establishes for which object the expression stands a perspective is opened up which was not yet contained in the truth-definition in its first form , and which in the second form is covered up by speaking of an assignm ent. H ow ever, in term s of m ethod it would seem correct to begin the analysis with the explanation of the em ploym ent-rule of

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predicates. This is not only because it presents fewer difficulties, but, above all, because in such an analysis we can appeal to the description of the explanation of the m ode of em ploym ent of predicates that I have already presented but have broken o ff on account of the resulting ambiguity with quasi-predicates. O ur task will now be to see whether this ambiguity is avoided by taking into account the fact that predicates are classification-expressions which essentially require to be supple­ m ented by singular terms; and that means: classification-expressions which characteristically apply or do not apply to objects. We would also expect from an explanation of how one establishes w hether a predicate applies that it should explain the word ‘applies’ which verbally is only definable by m eans of the word ‘tru e’, and that in this way a first step would be taken towards the analysis of the m eaning of the word ‘true’. And, finally, since, in describing the em ploym ent-rule of predicates, we cannot avoid taking account of the fact that a predicate is an expression that requires to be supplem ented by a singular term , the explanation of the m ode of em ploym ent of predicates should also give us a perspective for tackling the question of the mode of em ploym ent of singular terms. T h e procedure of establishing w hether an assertion is true is called the verification of this assertion. T h ere is no corresponding term for the procedure of establishing w hether a predicate applies to an object or not; but there would seem to be no harm in also using the term ‘verification’ for this purpose. T ran sferrin g the term in this way seems natural because the procedure of establishing w hether a predicative assertion that a is F is true is, according to the truth-definition, identical with that of establishing w hether the predicate *F' applies to the object a. N othing is prejudiced by this transference beyond what is asserted in the truth-definition. W hat is achieved with the transferred terminology is m erely a handy term for speaking about a rule for establishing w hether a predicate applies. This rule we can now call the ‘verificationrule’ o f the predicate. Accordingly, to u n derstand a predicate is to know its verification-rule, i.e. to know how it is established w hether it applies to an (arbitrary) object or not. And, correspondingly, to explain a p re d ­ icate would be: to explain its verification-rule. How can this be done? I can here refer back to the description which I gave o f the explanation of the mode of em ploym ent of a classificationexpression. (The concept o f a ‘classification-expression’ provides a generic concept for predicates and quasi-predicates.) A classificationexpression, we saw, if it is not explained by means of other words, is explained by explaining its m ode of classification by means of positive and negative exam ples in perception, or, putting it ^another way: by

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em ploying it positively and negatively in app ro p riate perceptual situa­ tions. We saw at the time (p. 159) that if what is explained in this way is the expression’s m ode of em ploym ent, in oth er words, if the classifica­ tion-expression is em ployed in the same way in which it is explained, then it is a quasi-predicate and not a predicate (or this is precisely what defines a quasi-predicate). O n the o th er hand, w hat is explained by the exem plary positive and negative em ploym ent in the perceptual situa­ tion when what is being explained is a predicate, we can now see, is not the expression’s em ploym ent-rule but its verification-rule. I shall eluci­ date this by m eans of an example. If the explanation of the word ‘re d ’ by its exem plary em ploym ent in ap p ro p riate perceptual-situations is understood in such a way that the person to whom it was explained employs it in the same perceptual situations and only in them (thus if and only if he perceives som ething red) then he has in terpreted the word as a quasi-predicate. By contrast he has in terpreted the same explanation o f the word as an explanation of the predicate ‘re d ’ if he also employs it outside the perceptual situation in a way that indicates that he has understood that what was explained to him is not the em ploym ent-rule of the predicate but its verification-rule. O f course, this description of the difference between predicate and quasi-predicate is still unsatisfactory. Two questions arise: (1) How is a predicate em ployed outside the perceptual situation if its verificationrule has been u nderstood, and in what relation does this em ploym ent stand to the em ploym ent in the perceptual situation? (2) Can one really say that the same expression - e.g. the word ‘re d ’ - is understood now as a quasi-predicate and now as a predicate depen d ing on how the expla­ nation is understood? Is it not rath er characteristic of the explanation o f the predicate that it can only be accomplished by means of a sen­ tence, so that, for exam ple, we can only explain the word ‘re d ’ as a predicate by m eans of sentences of the form ‘T his is red/not re d ’? I shall start with question (2). It correctly points out that a predicate can only be explained as an expression that supplem ents a singular term . Clearly the singular term that is of particular relevance here is ‘this’, a term which is characteristically used to stand for an object which is present in the perceptual situation. However, it would be a mistake to regard the supplem entation of the classification-expression by ‘this is .. in the explanation-situation, as a sure sign that the expression is understood as a predicate. On the contrary, a m ode of em ploym ent of the expression ‘this is re d ’ can be conceived in which ‘re d ’ still functions as a quasi-predicate. So what is essential cannot be the m ere fact of supplem entation by ‘this is . . .’; ra th e r it m ust be the special m ode of

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em ploym ent of ‘this’. By investigating this question we shall achieve a prelim inary insight into the essence o f th e expressions which supple­ m ent predicates to form sentences, viz. singular term s. T o clarify the distinction with which we are h ere concerned I shall start from the sim pler expression ‘red h e re ’. A nd, as in the introduction of the notion o f quasi-predicates (p. 159f), I can again appeal to how children speak in an early stage of acquiring a language (though again it is only by way o f illustration; it is for o u r purposes irrelevant w hether it be em pirically correct or not). If a child says, not simply ‘bow-wow’, but ‘bow-wow h e re ’, sim ultaneously pointing with his finger to a partic­ ular place or in a particular direction, then, by the criterion given, the expression ‘bow-wow’ is functioning as a quasi-predicate, not as a p re d ­ icate. For the em ploym ent o f such an expression is explained like this: if som ething bow-wow-like appears at a particular place in the percep­ tual situation, one points at this place and says ‘bow-wow h e re ’. T he child has correctly u n d ersto o d the explanation if it uses the expression in th e same way in which it was used in the explanation-situation. This was the criterion for the classification-expression being a quasi-predi­ cate. T h e em ploym ent-rule o f the whole expression ‘F h e re’ (combined with the co rresp o n d in g gesture) is a conditional rule. T o u n d erstan d it is to know in which circum stances it is to be used. T h e expression ‘this is F \ like F h e re ’, is also used by simultaneously pointing to a p articu lar place in the perceptual situation. A nd we can easily im agine a language-gam e in which ‘this is F ’ is used in accordance with the same em ploym ent-rule as ‘F h e re ’. It w ould thus be conceivable that we explain th e word ‘re d ’ to a child by exem plary use of the expres­ sion ‘this is re d ’. I f o u r criterion for the child’s having understood the explanation is th a t it uses ‘this is re d ’ in co rresponding situations, then the w ord ‘re d ’ is functioning as a quasi-predicate. As we use th e expression ‘this is F' in o u r language, however, ‘F ’ is not a quasi-predicate, for although we also use the classification-expres­ sion ‘F ’ in com bination with the w ord ‘this’ we do not only do so. W hat decides that it is a predicate, and not a quasi-predicate, is th at we also use it in com bination with o th er su pplem entary expressions, in combi­ nation with which it was n o t explained to us. T his means that when it is com bined with these o th er su pplem entary expressions it is being used in a way which does not co rrespond to the explanation-situation. But how, you may ask, can the possibility o f also using ‘F ’ with o th e r supplem entary-expressions have the consequence th at already in ‘this is F ’ it is not fu nctioning as a quasi-predicate? T h e answ er is that we can not only com bine th e classification-expression ‘F ’ with other supplem entary

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expressions to say som ething different from what we say with ‘this is F \ but also to say the same thing from an o th er situation. W hat we express in the perceptual situation with ‘this (to which I am now pointing) is F’ we can take up again as the same, outside the perceptual situation, with ‘that (to which I then pointed) is F \ With this we touch u p o n the decisive point that I anticipated in an earlier lecture (p. 223f ): it is the substitutability o f (situation-related) sin­ gular term s for each o th er such that we can say that in the different situations we mean som ething identical, the same concrete object, that makes it possible to say som ething identical by means of the sentences uttered in the different situations; and it is only in this way that the use of the sentence becomes an assertion. T h e criterion for the word ‘this’ in ‘this is F ’ being a singular term is that it is combinable with another expression by means of the two-place predicate ‘is the same as’ (* = ’). (cf. p. 23) It is only in this second m ode o f em ploym ent o f the word ‘this’ that, in contrast to the first (where it is analogous to ‘here’), the situation-item pointed at is m eant as som ething identifiable; and this means: as som ething, as an object. A nd if predicates are expressions which are supplem ented by singular term s to form elem entary sen­ tences then ‘F’ is not a predicate merely by virtue of being supple­ m ented in the explanation-situation by ‘this is . . .’; rath er it must be supplem ented by ‘this is . . .’ in such a way that other expressions can be substituted for ‘this’ by use of the identity-sign. This provides us with a basis for the inquiry into the m ode of em ploy­ m ent of singular term s on which we can later build. For the time being our investigation of singular term s is limited to what is necessary for un d erstan d in g the m ode of em ploym ent of predicates. T h a t a classifi­ cation-expression which we explain in the perceptual situation by means of exam ples only functions as a predicate if it is supplem ented by an expression which can be replaced by o th er expressions by means of the use o f the identity-sign also follows from the truth-definition. For only if we employ the word ‘this’ in such a way that it stands for an object, for som ething identifiable, can one say that the predicate applies, or does not apply, to an object - the object for which the word ‘this’ stands. We are now also equipped to answ er the first of the questions ju st raised, viz. in what relation does th e ordinary use of a predicate stand to its use in the explanation-situation in which one shows how it is ver­ ified? How the predicate is verified is explained by using the sentence ‘this is F (or not F)’ in d ifferen t ap p ro p riate situations, thus where the word ‘this’ stands for a d ifferen t object on each occasion, but always for

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one that is given in perception. In this way one shows how it can be established in regard to an arbitrary object w hether the predicate applies; and this is what it means to explain its verification-rule. T he ordinary use of the predicate, on the other hand, is that in which it is not combined with the word ‘this’, b u t with a singular term V where ‘a stands for an object that need not be given in the perceptual situation. B ut what then is the em ploym ent-rule of this general em ploym ent of ‘F ’ in ‘Fa, if the em ploym ent that was explained was the particular employ­ m ent of ‘F’ in sentences of the form ‘this is F I This question would be unansw erable if the em ploym ent-rule were determ ined by the employment-situation. T h e answer follows automatically, however, if to u n d e r­ stand the predicate is to know its verification-rule. For we can now apply the general characterizations arrived at in the abstract analysis of the use of assertoric sentences: to employ a predicate F ’ in combination with a singular term ‘a’ is to assert that it can be established, in accor­ dance with the verification-rule th at was explained by means of sen­ tences of the form ‘this is F \ that the predicate applies to the object referred to by V ; but this means: it is to assert that a certain sentence ‘this is F \ namely that which we can use in the situation in which we perceive a, thus when we can at the same time say ‘this = a , can be correctly used in accordance with the verification-rule of ‘F \ With this we have achieved two things: (1) it is now clear that the m ode of em ploym ent of ‘F' that is explained by the particular employ­ m ent of F ’ in sentences o f the form ‘this isF ’ is already the general m ode o f em ploym ent of ‘F ’ in sentences of the form F a . For what is explained when the verification-rule is explained by means of sentences of the form ‘this is F ’ is what is asserted when the predicate is employed in any predicative sentence. (2) with the description I have given of how the em ploym ent of predicates is explained I have also explained the word ‘applies’; I was able to dispense with the word in the explanation I finally gave. This means that we now have a specification of the truthcondition o f a predicative assertion that a is F in which the word ‘applies’ no longer occurs: the assertion that a is F is tru e if, in the situation in which one can substitute the word ‘this’ for la (can say ‘a is this’), one can correctly use the sentence ‘this is F \ in accordance with the presupposed explanation of the verification-rule of ‘F \ T h ere is no circle here between the word ‘tru e ’ in the definiendum and the word ‘correct’ in the definiens. For ‘correct’ here does not yet have the m eaning of ‘tru e ’; it m eans no m ore than ‘corresponding to the rule’. T h e correct em ploym ent o f the predicate F ’ in the verification-situation is explained in exactly the same way as the correct

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em ploym ent of the quasi-predicate ‘F \ T h a t this correct em ploym ent has now the sense o f establishing that the predicate applies to an object, and hence o f establishing that an assertion is true, is due to the fact that the supplem entary expression ‘this’ is understood in such a way that it is replaceable by o th er expressions by m eans of the identity-sign. T h at the explanation of the classification-expression is understood as the explanation of a predicate (and this means: as the explanation of how one establishes that this expression applies to something) rests on the fact that in the explanation it is presupposed that the word ‘this’ is understood as a singular term . A nd this much has already become clear: the fact that ‘this’ is understo o d as a singular term cannot be disposed of simply by saying that this expression ‘stands fo r’ an object. R ather we shall now have to ask what it m eans to say that an expression ‘stands fo r’ an object. A nd if the criterion for an expression’s being a singular term is that oth er expressions can be substituted for it by means o f the identity-sign (which expressions are then likewise singular terms) then we shall have to ask what the rules are which govern such substitutions; and to ask this question is to ask about the em ploym entrule of singular-term s, or to ask how they are explained. Only when this is clarified will we be able to u n d erstan d what it is to establish that a predicate applies and hence what it is for a predicative assertion to be true. We have now progressed far enough to begin the enquiry into the semantics of singular terms. With this we bring the language-analytical critique of the object-orientated position to bear on the latter’s own point of d ep artu re. So far the critique o f the object-orientated position concerned only the tendency of the latter to transfer the only formal category at its disposal, that o f an object, to the other linguistic expres­ sions. As regards this category itself, however, and as regards singular terms, th ere seems, at first sight, nothing to find fault with in the tra­ ditional conception. So in what way, one m ight ask, is the traditional idea that singular term s - and in particular proper-nam es - stand for objects incorrect? Isn ’t a singular term by definition an expression that stands for an object? Indeed it is. So one certainly cannot say that the traditional view, as far as it goes, is not correct. However, the suspicion arises that it does not go far enough. By this I m ean that the objectorientated position is probably not in a position - this is som ething we will have to exam ine - to explain what it is for an expression to stand for an object. In th at case it may also be surm ised that the object-orien­ tated position cannot explain its own basic concept: that of an object. It might seem paradoxical that a philosophical position should be inca­

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pable o f explaining its own basic concept; b u t not if you consider that if it starts out from a p articular concept a philosophical position has no dim ension into which it can step back and from which it could explain that concept. By contrast, the language-analytical ap p ro ach has at its disposal an explanatory dim ension which co m p reh en d s the relation to objects. In very general term s this counter-position is expressed in the idea that singular term s are n o n -in d ep en d en t expressions and that the prim ary sem antic u n it is not th e nam e b u t the sentence. I f singular term s are essentially expressions needing supplem en tatio n this means that an object is essentially som ething classifiable an d th at the relation to objects m ust be understo o d , in a way still to be clarified, in term s of the relation of assertions to tru th . In the truth-definition o f predicative assertions: ‘T h e assertion th at a is F is tru e if and only if the predicate “F ” applies to the object for which the singular term “a ” stands’ (which I also took as my starting-point in the explanation o f th e semantics o f predicates) we already have a fo r­ mula for expressing the idea th at the function o f singular term s - that o f standing for objects - is em b ed d ed in th e function of predicates that of classifying objects - and hence in th e context o f the tru th and falsity o f predicative assertions. H ow ever this form ula cannot do m ore than suggest an essential connection betw een the ‘standing fo r’ o f sin­ gular term s and the applying (Zutreffen) o f predicates and the tru th of assertions. It does n o t by itself show that o ne cannot explain w hat it is for a singular term to stand for an object in d ep en d en tly of this form ula. In d eed you could even argue th at this form ula appears to suggest the opposite: w hereas the questions o f w h eth er the assertion is tru e and w hether the predicate applies are m utually d e p en d e n t (cf. p. 253) nothing co rresp o n d in g holds for the question of which object the sin­ gular term stands for. In the case of the predicate we could reverse the truth-definition and say: the p redicate tF >applies to the object for which the singular term ‘a stands if and only if the assertion ‘Fa is true. Clearly we cannot say analogously: the singular term ‘a stands for that object which, if the predicate ‘F' applies to it, makes the assertion ‘Fa* true. For then the object a would not be distinct fro m all o th er objects to which the predicate ‘F’ applies. T h u s we here en co u n ter an asym m etry reg ard in g the roles o f the predicate and the singular term in the predicative sentence.1 O ne can, it is tru e, say that th e tru th o f the assertion d ep en d s both on which object th e singular term stands for an d on w hether the predicate applies to this object. B ut then one m ust be clear that, w hereas the first

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of these conditions can be form ulated independently of the second, the second cannot be form ulated independently of the first: the question of w hether the predicate applies to the object presupposes that we know to which object, thus which object it is for which the singular term stands. T h o u g h one does not have to, one can describe this state of affairs as follows (this is Straw son’s view):2 the tru th of the assertion does n o t d ep en d o n which object the singular term stands for and on w hether the predicate applies to it; ra th e r the question of the tru th or falsity o f the assertion presupposes that we know for which object the singular term stands. T h e tru th o f the assertion depends (then only) on w hether the predicate applies to this object. W hether the state of affairs should be thus described is disputed. I f one describes it thus this has the consequence th at if th ere is no object, o r m ore than one, for which the singular term stands, the assertion does not count as false. We m ust then say either th at it is n eith er tru e n o r false or th a t the person who uttered such a sentence did n o t assert anything. A lthough Strawson and others have m ade m uch of this question of w hether one should in ter­ pret it in this way o r that it is o f only limited im portance. W hether the assertion is called false or n eith er true n o r false in such cases is a m atter o f convention an d may vary from language to language. I shall be re tu rn in g to this question (Lecture 22). T h e asymmetry between p re d ­ icate an d singular term , how ever, from which this question starts out, represents a non-conventional, substantive difference. W hereas the question o f w heth er the predicate ‘F' applies to the object a depends on o u r knowing for which object the singular term ‘a’ stands, the reverse is not the case: the question of which object the singular term ‘a’ stands for m ust be settled independently of, and is the condition of, being able to establish w hether the predicate ‘F’ applies to it. H ow ever, we should not read too m uch into this result. All th at fol­ lows from it is th at in the question of the tru th of a particular assertion Fa the question o f which object the singular term ‘a’ stands for must already be decided independently of the question of the tru th of this assertion (or of w hether this predicate applies to this object). O n the other h an d it does not follow from this th at what in general it means for a singular term to ‘stand fo r’ an object can be explained in d ep en ­ dently o f the fact th at it is som ething to which predicates can apply, or not apply. T h u s from the tru th-definition of predicative assertions we can arrive at n eith er a positive n o r a negative decision regarding the question of w hether what it is for a singular term to stand for an object can be u n d ersto o d in dependently of the context of predication. Q ur line o f th o u g h t so far suggests th at the object-relation cannot be u n d e r­

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stood independently of the truth-relation. O n the other hand the asym­ metry th at has ju st been described should m ake us cautious. We cannot expect that what has been shown for predicates can simply be trans­ ferred to singular terms. T h e question can only be decided by applying to singular terms the same basic question which guided us in the case of predicates, viz. the question regarding the mode of em ploym ent of these expressions, and this means: the question of how we can explain the em ploym ent of expressions of this type.

L E C T U R E 20

W h a t is it for a sign to stand for an object? T h e traditional account

In the enquiry into the semantics o f singular term s there is no reason why we should not follow the traditional philosopher in describing the relation betw een the singular term and the object by saying that the singular term stands fo r the object. B ut at p resent we should regard this expression ‘stands for’ as a cipher, as an expression whose sense has yet to be specified. I earlier (p. 15If) called W ittgenstein’s dictum ‘T he m eaning o f a word is w hat the explanation of its m eaning explains’ the fundam ental principle o f analytical philosophy, because it instructs one to fram e the philosophical question about the m eaning of linguistic expressions in a way that exactly corresponds to the pre-philosophical question and in fact merely formalizes the latter. According to this principle the philo­ sophical question concerning the understan d in g o f a form o f expres­ sion should be construed as the question o f how pre-philosophically we explain expressions o f this form. In the case o f singular term s we have to do with expressions which not only have a m eaning but also stand for an object. In whatever way these two aspects may be connected, if the expression stands for an object at all then the question about the expression’s m ode o f em ploym ent m ust em brace, together with the question o f how its m eaning is explained, that o f how one explains for which object it stands. A nd we can only answer the philosophical ques­ tion of what it is for an expression to stand for an object by explaining how pre-philosophically one explains in a particular case which object an expression stands for. T o explain what it is for a predicate to apply to an object we asked how we would explain how we establish that a predicate applies to an arbitrary object. Likewise we can only explain what it is for a singular term to stand fo r an object by asking how we establish for which object a singular term stands. T h e question ‘How do we establish it?’ is quite indispensable. W ithout

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it any explanation of an expression would rem ain in the air. W ithin semantics this recourse to establishing corresponds to the move we m ade in th e enquiry into the semantics o f whole assertoric sentences from truth-conditions to verification-rules. In precisely the same way we were able to see in the case o f predicates th at the m eaning of ‘applies’ can only be explained by asking how it is established th at a predicate applies to an object. W ithin ontology this move corresponds to the epistemological (‘tran scen d en tal’) tu rn which ontology took in m odern times; so if the question concerning the m eaning of ‘stands fo r’ assumes this form th ere is n o th in g to p rev en t even the traditional m odern philosopher from going along with us. W hoever refuses to pose the question in this form thereby refuses to enquire into the m eaning of the relation betw een nam e and object at all, how ever this relation is designated. Such an attitu d e is not characteristic of the traditional position but of certain m o d ern sem antic theories, those, nam ely, which in the specifi­ cation of the m eaning o f assertoric sentences rem ain at the level of truth-conditions and specify the latter in a m eta-language. In these the­ ories the n am e-object relation is so construed th at each singular term is ‘assigned’ to an object. This expression ‘assignm ent’ is ju st another w ord for ‘standing fo r’; and like the latter it rem ains vacuous so long as one does not show how it can be established to which object a singular term is assigned. W hat actually h ap p en s in theories of this kind is th at the singular term is simply assigned to an o th er name, a nam e in the m eta-language. T hese theories are m erely logical or linguistic tech­ niques and do not am o u n t to a philosophical position at all. By merely presupposing, ra th e r th an explaining, how we are able to assign a sin­ gular term to an object these techniques m erely presuppose, ra th e r than explain, how we are able to re fe r to objects and what it means to speak of an ‘object’. By contrast it is characteristic of both the epistemologically based m o d ern theory o f objects - transcendental philoso­ phy - and the language-analytical theory of objects that they seek to clarify the object-relation and w hat it means to speak o f ‘objects by recourse to the question o f how objects can be given to us. T h e d iffer­ ence is that w hereas the traditional theory posed this question in d ep e n ­ dently of the question o f the function of the corresponding signs, the language-analytical theory u n d erstan d s the object-relation as a re fe r­ ence (Bezugnahme) which can essentially only be achieved by means of a sign. B u t if we do not wish to com m it a petitio principii vis-a-vis the trad i­ tional p hilosopher we cannot ju st assum e th at we can only refer to objects by m eans of linguistic expressions. O nce again w hat m atters is

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that we should so fram e the question that the traditional philosopher has no difficulty in accepting it. A nd h e can and m ust agree to clarify the question o f what it is fo r a sign to ‘stand fo r’ an object by asking how we would explain, o r establish, in an individual case, for which object a singular term stands. H e must agree to it for one cannot see in what o th er way the m eaning of ‘standing fo r’ could be explained. He can agree to it because th at th ere are signs which stand for objects is not a m atter of controversy. W hat the traditional philosopher wishes to stress is simply th at referrin g by m eans of linguistic expressions is not our only and n o t our prim ary way of referrin g to objects. T h e tradi­ tional philosopher would thus not app ro ach the question of the objectrelation as such from the sign-relation. Nevertheless he too must be capable of explaining this sign-relation. A nd we can expect that it will be precisely in th e question of how we can establish for which object a sign stands that he will find it natural to have recourse to his pre-linguistic way of referring. A nd I im agine that you too, when confronted with this question for the first time, will find it natural to think that we m ust be able to re fe r to an object in a non-linguistic way. For how, one m ight ask, can one explain for which object the sign stands unless one is som ehow able to refer directly to th e object? B ut how is this pre-linguistic object-reference to be understood? We shall obtain the answer to this question from traditional philosophy itself by taking as o u r point o f d e p a rtu re a traditional theory of singular term s which can be reg ard ed as representative. We find such a theory in Jo h n Stuart Mill. By exam ining his theory we will be able to get a clear picture o f what a pre-analytical object-theory m ust presuppose in asking how we can explain, or establish, for which object a singular term stands. As before if we do not wish to proceed dogmatically we must allow the way forw ard to be determ ined only by the difficulties in which the traditional way of posing the problem itself becomes entangled. A n o th er reason for choosing Mill’s theory to debate with is that after having long been reg ard ed by analytical philosophers as disposed of it has recently been finding su p p o rte rs.1 B efore I begin the systematic enquiry into the em ploym ent of singu­ lar term s we should recall the hints for the u n d erstanding of singular term s yielded by the analysis o f the m ode o f em ploym ent of predicates. T hese hints cannot have a justificatory function in the investigation of singular term s th a t is now to be u n d ertak en . However, though com­ pletely hypothetical and vague, they can indicate a direction in which we m ust expect the explanation of singular term s to proceed if our explanation of th e m ode of em ploym ent o f predicates is to be retained.

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T h e distinction between predicates and what I have called quasi-pred­ icates involved no em pirico-genetic hypothesis; and it served only inci­ dentally to contrast predicate-language with m ore primitive languages. T h e indispensable significance of this distinction arose internally from the requirem ents of an explanation o f the mode of em ploym ent of predicates. As was shown in the last lecture this is relatively complex. T h e explanation o f quasi-predicates enabled us to isolate a first level at which we explain a classification-expression without using words like ‘tru e ’ and ‘applies’, but simply the word ‘correct’ in the sense of ‘con­ form ing to a ru le ’. If we could ignore the fact that a predicate is em ployed outside its verification-situation it would be a quasi-predicate. Because an expression which would otherwise be a quasi-predicate becomes a predicate by virtue of its need to be supplem ented by a sin­ gular term it seem ed plausible to suppose that the function of the sin­ gular term must be (a) to m ake the classification-expressions - now sup­ plem ented to form sentences - situation-independent and (b) to refer (verweisen) from the em ploym ent-situation to the verification-situation. T h a t which is classified no longer results of itself from the employmentsituation as in the case o f the quasi-predicate but is taken up into the linguistic expression by being represented by the singular term ; T h ere is thus constituted a speech-act which belongs to a class of speech-acts in o th er situations which all ‘say the sam e’. T he correctness of these speech-acts is in d ep en d en t o f the em ploym ent-situation and points for­ ward to a special situation in which this correctness is established, a correctness which we call ‘tru th ’. I then also indicated that it seems plau­ sible to suppose that in the constitution of situation-independence a special role is played by the situation-relative singular term s, the deictic expressions. A nd in addition we saw in the last lecture that deictic expressions also have a special role inasm uch as the reference (Verwei­ sung) o f the singular term to the verification-situation is to be u n d e r­ stood as the reference to a deictic expression to be used in this situation. T hese connections suggested by the explanation of the m ode of em ploym ent of predicates do not correspond to the usual, not even the usual language-analytical, conception o f singular term s which starts out from the relation of singular term s to objects as som ething obvious and requiring no fu rth e r explanation. But since, on the other hand, it can­ not be doubted th at singular term s stand for objects, then, if these per­ spectives for the u nderstanding of singular term s should tu rn out to be correct, one would have to be able to show, firstly, that such a thing as an object-relation is only m ade possible by the situation-independence of speech accomplished by means o f deictic expressions, a situation-

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independence which at the same tim e makes possible a truth-relation. Secondly, we would have to expect th at the m ost basic (ursprünglich) objects by reference to which all oth er objects in th eir objecthood are to be understood are the speech-situations themselves. T h e perspectives for the semantics o f singular term s arising from the discussion of predicates to which I have so far referred are relatively vague. However, the connection between the semantics o f singular term s and th at of predicates acquired a m ore determ inate form through the truth-definition. I said that the aim o f the investigation is a non-verbal explanation o f the em ploym ent o f the word ‘tru e ’ in p re­ dicative assertions (and th at could only mean: an explanation of how one establishes that assertions of this kind are true) by means of a non­ verbal explanation of (1) how one establishes th at a predicate applies to an object (i.e. the em ploym ent-rule o f predicates) and (2) how one establishes for which object a singular term stands (i.e. the employmentrule o f singular terms). T h u s what we are looking for is an explanation of the em ploym ent of (elem entary) predicative sentences in which not only the word ‘tru e ’ but also the words ‘applies’ and ‘stands for’ no longer occur (and in this way all th ree words - or the em ploym ent of the corresponding sem antic classes o f expressions - would be explained). Now in the last lecture I gave an explanation o f what it is to establish th at a predicate applies which no longer depends on an understanding of the word ‘tru e ’ but (a) rests only on an u n derstanding of the word ‘correct’ (in the sense of ‘conform ing to a ru le’) (b) presupposes an und erstan d in g of the em ploym ent o f singular terms. In this explana­ tion I used neither the expression ‘stands fo r’ nor the expression ‘object’, both of which themselves require explanation; I merely m ade use o f the u n d erstan d in g of the two-place predicate ‘is identical with’ (' = ’).

T h e following additional perspectives for our enquiry into the em ploym ent-rule of singular terms result from this. (1) In the last lec­ tu re the close connection between objecthood and identity - that objects are essentially som ething identifiable - was simply presupposed as plau­ sible. This was an anticipation which can only be justified in the context o f the systematic discussion of singular terms. (2) W hat is m eant by predicates applying to som ething cannot be understood w ithout at the same time u n d erstan d in g what is m eant by objects, or what it is for a singular term to stand fo r an object. Now that it has proved possible to explain this object-relation that is implicit in the notion of applying by, instead of speaking of a singular te rm ’s standing for an object, merely appealing to an u nderstanding o f the identity-sign in connection with

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singular term s and in p articu lar deictic singular term s, it would seem natural to expect th a t the standing-for o f singular term s, even when it is explained by itself, can be reduced to a corresp onding understanding of the identity-sign. Identity would th en not m erely be essential to objecthood (as is generally acknow ledged); the m eaning o f object­ hood could be u n d ersto o d w ithout re m a in d e r in term s of identifiability. T h e consequences of this for the concept of tru th would be as follows. Since th e u n d erstan d in g o f the word ‘tru e ’ in its application to predic­ ative assertions rests on the u n d erstan d in g of ‘applies’ and ‘stands for’ the elem entary use o f the w ord (which recursively underlies the other uses) could be explained purely on the basis of an u n d erstanding of ‘correct’ and the identity-sign. H aving looked at these hypothetical perspectives for a possible language-analytical explanation o f ‘standing fo r’ suggested by the discus­ sion o f predicates I shall now begin th e systematic discussion of the question o f how one can re fe r to objects by m eans of singular term s with a critical assessm ent o f the traditional conception. I shall for the most p art ignore singular term s which stand for abstract objects - such as properties, or states o f affairs - and concentrate on those which stand for concrete (and th at m eans perceptible) objects. In connection with the interpretation o f H usserl’s theory o f m eaning (p. 150) I pointed out that o ne can take as one’s starting-point a crude distinction of concrete singular term s into deictic expressions, p ro p e r nam es and descriptions. In the traditional theory, a p a rt from p ro p er-n am es only descriptions have played a role. It was prim arily orien tated tow ards p ro p e r names because these seem ed to exhibit the standing of a linguistic expression for an object in the most sim ple and direct way. A lready influenced by Frege, H usserl h ere d e p arted from th e usual conception. Like Frege he o rientated him self prim arily tow ards descriptions, for in th eir case one m ust distinguish the object and the m eaning o f the expression. As the classical traditional conception was incapable of dealing with a m eaning that could not be construed as an object it took the p roper nam e to be the prototype of all linguistic expressions. Even for Russell the m eaning of an expression was the sam e as its object.2 A definite description - ‘the so-and-so’ - seems somehow to refer indirectly to an object. It does not stand simply and directly for the object, but - w h eth er or not one wants to speak o f a m eaning h e re - by m eans o f an attribute, which, as the use of the definite article ‘the’ implies, belongs to only one object. As soon as one considers descrip­ tions and p ro p e r nam es the question o f th e ir m utual relationship arises. In H usserl th ere is no explicit theory o f p ro p e r nam es. Frege, on the

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other h and, took the revolutionary and, for the tradition which fol­ lowed him , decisive step of treating p ro p er names, not as the m ore elem entary, but as the higher-level expressions: to establish for which object a p ro p e r nam e stands we have to have recourse to descriptions.3 For exam ple, if we use the p ro p e r nam e ‘Aristotle’ and are asked for which object, for which person, this nam e stands, we can only give descriptions: A ristotle, that is the person who was born in such-andsuch a place at such-and-such a time, the pupil of Plato, the teacher of A lexander the G reat, the philosopher who wrote most of the texts that have come down to us u n d e r his nam e, and who died in Chalkis in 322 B.C. All these descriptions stand for the same object, and their d ifferent m eanings correspond to its d ifferen t ‘modes of presentation’. T hus underlying the prim acy of descriptions over p ro p er names urged by Frege is the ontological-epistem ological idea that there is no such thing as an ‘object as such’ behind its m odes o f presentation, which could be somehow directly re fe rre d to by means of a p ro p er name. T hough im portant, this insight, which was also taken over by Husserl, does not, as such, explain w hat it is fo r a singular term - and for Frege this means: a description - to ‘stand fo r’ an object. Let us now leave this conception and retu rn to a conception which also distinguishes betw een p ro p e r names and descriptions but which regards the object-relation of p ro p e r names as the m ore elem entary. We find such a view in Mill.4 Mill calls all categorem atic expressions, thus all so-called ‘term s’ o f traditional logic, ‘nam es’ and distinguishes general names and individual names. T h e for us im portant distinction between connotative and non-connotative names he also applies to gen­ eral term s; for us how ever it is only im portant in regard to individual names, singular term s. All individual names according to Mill are ‘de­ notative’, i.e. they stand for an object. But only descriptions are in addition ‘connotative’, i.e. they stand for their object by means of an attribute which they ‘connote’. P ro p er names, by contrast, are non-connotative. T hey do n o t refer to their objects as to the sole bearers of an attribute but are ‘attached to the objects themselves’. O f course, one im m ediately asks: what is one to understand by such a direct assignm ent? Unlike the meta-linguistic semantic theorists Mill does not evade this question. T h e rob b er in the tale of Alibaba m arks a house with a chalk-sign so as to be able to recognize it again as the same, and distinguish it from others; this is how one should think of the func­ tion of p ro p e r nam es. But the use of a nam e, one will object, does not consist in its being affixed to the object fo r which it stands. (For certain purposes, of course, this can hap p en , e.g. in the case of localities, ships,

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participants at a congress. But one would hardly seek to understand the general nam e-relation by reference to these special cases. O n the con­ trary, one will only be able to explain those special cases on the basis of an understanding of the general nam e-relation.) Mill him self raises this objection and answers it thus: what we ‘m ark’ with a nam e is not the object itself but the idea of the object. I do not think this view can be dismissed as a peculiar lapse on Mill’s part. I have already pointed out in the introductory discussions (p. 62 f) that it is characteristic of the object-orientated tradition that it conceives of the object-relation as representation (Vorstellung). At the same time I distinguished between a narrow er version of the representation-theory which is characteristic of the early m odern period and according to which that to which we directly relate is not the object but the represen­ tation as its representative (Repräsentant), and a broader version to which even the critics of this theory continued to subscribe and which even if not u n d e r this nam e - is also characteristic of the ancient and mediaeval conception. According to this bro ad er version, the relation now understood as direct - to the object is understood as a relation of representation: the object is represented; an object is essentially some­ thing representable. If one asks what is m eant by ‘representation’ here, one can find no answer to this question in traditional philosophy, because the concept of ‘representation’ is a basic concept for m odern traditional philoso­ phy.5 And of ancient philosophy one can say, retrospectively, that the concept of representation implicitly underlay its distinction between aisthesis and naus, for which there was no com prehensive generic concept.6 O ne cannot get a clear grasp of this concept from the outside either for it rests on an uncashable m etaphor. T h e only thing we can do is to m ake it clear to ourselves w hat this m etaphor is. T h e point of d ep arture of the m etaphor is a representation in the sense of a perceptual (anschau­ lich) or imaginative (optical) image, or image consciousness. Taking this as the basic model for the consciousness-relation in general, the relation to objects was conceived as a having-before-oneself (Vorsichhaben) of an optical image; only this having-before-oneself is no longer to be u n d e r­ stood as sensuous perception (Anschauung). How it is positively to be understood was bou n d to rem ain undecided, for the m etaphor becomes vacuous. A non-sensuous representation, a quasi-representa­ tion is a p u re fiction. For the concept of the object itself the conse­ quence was that it had to be essentially tho u g h t of as the correlate of such a non-sensuous quasi-representation. Every representative of tra ­ ditional philosophy will resist this apparently malicious interpretation.

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But then ask how he positively understands the relation between con­ sciousness and object. You can read the history of pre-analytical philosophy from Parm enides on from beginning to end and back again and you will find no answer, unless it be one in which one adds to the confusion by saying, as in G erm an Idealism , that the relation is to be u nderstood as a relation between subject and object. W hen we ask what this is we are told: the identity o f the d ifferen t (or: the identity of iden­ tity and non-identity) and suchlike. It is, o f course, simply nonsensical to say that a = b and ai=b. And even if this were not nonsensical it is impossible to see how this form al ontological relation, simply by being twisted in upon itself can be m ade to yield som ething like a consciousness-relation, regardless of how often this twisting is ‘reflected’ and repeated (as in H egel’s Logic). O f course the advocate of such theories will claim that he is h ere being criticized merely from the standpoint of the ‘u n d erstan d in g ’. But in th at case one should ask him how he can explain his special (‘reason’) concept o f identity, n o n ­ identity, etc., without presupposing it. A nd for our p art we can see his belief th at he has to appeal to such a special insight or structure inacces­ sible to ordinary h um an understan d in g as a desperate attem pt to escape from the dilem m a o f object-orientated philosophy w ithout su rre n d e r­ ing its basic presupposition which consists in not recognizing that we relate to objects by m eans o f linguistic signs which for this purpose must be em ployed in a specific way. It was not an avoidable accident but in­ evitable that traditional philosophy should take the m etaphorical con­ cept o f representation as its starting point; fo r if one ignores the logical, the linguistic, nothing is given to us in consciousness but the sensible. T h erefo re the only alternative to a language-oriented explanation of the relation to objects is an explanation in term s of a m etaphor based on perceptual images. Mill’s conception of the object-relation of names, according to which what is directly designated is not the object but the idea, belongs to the narrow er version o f the representation-theory. We can ignore this peculiarity; only when we view Mill’s conception as representative of the b ro ad er version of the representation-theory will its fundam ental significance for the whole tradition become evident. His theory can easily be detached from the narrow version of the representation-theory if instead of saying that the nam e does not stand directly for the object, but for its representation (idea), we say that it stands for the represented object, thus for an object as object of an act of representing. Mill’s specific conception is m erely a variant of this conception, which we can regard as the traditional conception p u re and simple.

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W hat follows from this general orientation towards the concept of representation for the nam e-object relation? R epresentations in the nonm etaphorical sense, that is p erceptual images, are sim ple data which can be taken in at a glance. It is this aspect that is carried over in the m etaphorical extension of the concept of rep resen tatio n to the objectrelation, or at any rate can be carried over. T h u s because objects are u n d ersto o d as what can be rep resen ted it becom es possible to in terp re t them as sim ple data like p erceptual images an d it thereby becomes pos­ sible to conceive of the object-relation o f a nam e as m ere association or assignm ent. A nd it is only if the object is conceived as a simple datum that it is possible to assume a direct relation o f a ‘non-connotative’ name, a p ro p e r nam e, to ‘th e ’ object, a relation which does not involve - as on Frege’s view it m ust - a reference to descriptions. F reg e’s conception, by contrast, presupposes that an object is n o t som ething representable, a simple d atum , but som ething which essentially manifests itself in m anifold m odes o f presentation. T h e idea th at the object-relation o f p ro p e r nam es is somehow m ore basic than, or at least in d e p e n d e n t of, th at o f descriptions implies th at there can be a relation between sign and object which can be understood as simple assignm ent. A nd this idea can only be either the pro d u ct of a m ere failure to th in k - and we m ust suppose this to be the case with m odern m eta-linguistic assignm ent-theories - o r if it is to be philosoph­ ically justified it implies that objects can be simply given, as simply as the signs to which they are assigned; and this m eans th a t it is based on a rep resen tatio n -th eo ry o f objects. At any rate I do not know o f any other possible way o f conceiving of objects as som ething simply given as this is req u ired by the assignm ent-theory. 1 should h ere m ention a possible objection. You could ask: by p re ­ senting. things in this way, do I not p resu p p o se that at least the signs them selves are representable, an d are n o t the signs also objects? T h e question is to be answ ered in th e affirm ative. T h e sign-types are indeed represen tab le and m oreover —this is crucial - in a non-m etaphorical sense. A nd clearly we m ust also reg ard th em as objects. How ever, as sign-types they are abstract objects, w hereas the objects ‘fo r’ which those signs th at are (concrete) singular term s stand are concrete objects. My opposition to the traditional idea th at referen ce to objects is essentially to be u n d ersto o d as representation, w here ‘rep resen tatio n ’ has an uncashable m etaphorical m eaning, does n o t rule out th at am ong other objects th ere are also objects which are actually - and in a harm less, non-m etaphorical sense - representable. Let m e again point out that Mill’s theory, w hether in his own narrow

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version or in my generalized version, is a theory o f the object-relation of nam es which implies that o u r relation to objects is as such not a lin­ guistic one. H ere too it seems to me th at the representation-theory is the only possible alternative to u n d erstan d in g the object-relation and what is m eant by objects in term s of the em ploym ent of a species of sign (at any rate the only one with which we are familiar). Although in another place (in the same §5 of C hap ter 2 of his Logic) Mill says it is the function of nam es to distinguish objects, in the place w here he speaks of the relation of nam es to representations (‘ideas’) he restricts the function of names, consistently, to that of arousing in the mind those representations of objects with which they are associated. And this clearly, is what it m eans, for the traditional position, for a nam e to ‘stand for’ an object. It m eans that it ‘stands fo r’ a representation of an object in the sense of being associated with it. It is now also clear why for the traditional con­ ception the sem antics o f singular term s is independent, does not involve reference to a sentence-context. For a representation in the non-m eta­ phorical sense does not belong to such a context; thus representation in the m etaphorical sense an d accordingly what is to be understood by an object does not belong to such a context either. You could object that so far all I have really shown is, at most, that the assignm ent-theory of nam e and object and the idea of the primacy of p ro p e r nam es are g ro u n d ed in the representation-theory. On the other hand it has not been m ade clear on precisely what my hostility to this theory itself rests. W hat are the criteria for deciding that it is incor­ rect or even impossible? We m ust here distinguish between the doubtful character of the extended representation-concept as such and that of the idea that w hat we m ean by objects is to be construed as rep resen ta­ tions, or som ething representable. As far as the extended, m etaphorical representation-concept as such is concerned I cannot add anything essential to what I have already said. My thesis is th at the m etap h o r cannot be cashed; that it does not make sense to speak of a non-sensuous or somehow intellectual re p re­ sentation. This first step in my critique is not conclusive, for an assertion that a w ord is m eaningless, that a m etap h o r cannot be cashed, cannot be explained, may simply reflect the narrowness of the person who makes it. In principle th en I m ust leave open the possibility that som eone will succeed in m aking good sense o f this ex tended use o f the term ‘re p re ­ sentation’. Secondly, ju st supposing th at it does make good sense to speak of representations, can we u n d erstan d w hat is m eant by objects, and ref­ erence to objects, in term s o f this notion? Let me begin by showing that

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this thesis of the representation-relation to objects is by no means merely som ething we find in the philosophical tradition; it also seems natural to us. I shall leave it open w hether this is because we belong to this tradition. It will be best if I rem ain subjective and merely relate to you how it was in my own case when I becam e aware of this problem ; I assume it could be similar with many of you. O rdinarily one does not reflect on what one means when one speaks of objects. W hen I reflected on this I noticed how strong my tendency was to think of an object as som ething over against me (ein Gegenüber). Indeed this seems to be already implied by the words ‘G egenstand’, ‘ob-ject’. I reflected further that w hat can most indubitably be term ed an over-against is the optical, pictorial view in which things manifest themselves to us (particularly when we are sitting still). A nd then I noticed that I was thinking of the relation to objects on this model. O f course I then immediately said to m yself: it is clearly not this optical view of the object, e.g. of this desk, that I mean when I m ean the object. I can walk ro u n d the desk, I can also perceive it with other senses. I can also talk about it - or, if you do not want to hear anything about talking, think about it - when I am not in the room. A nd without doubt when I do so I m ean the same object, namely this desk. So I clearly cannot stick to the naive idea of an optical over-against. However the idea of an over-against seems even then so natural that I say: the object is an over-against, only not a pictorial one. T hese reflections show that the thesis th at we relate to objects by means of representations in the m etaphorically extended sense can arise quite naturally. T h e doubt w hether this metaphorical sense still has any content should not now disturb us. We leave this question open, act as if there were such a m eaning and ask: could this really be what we mean when we speak o f an object? How can we approach such a question? Clearly only by already having some prelim inary conception of what we m ean by ‘object’. And how do we arrive at such? Surely not by m ere analysis of the use o f the word ‘object’. I shall come back to this question (cf. also p. 22). We do not need to answer it now for it suffices for o u r present purpose to fall back on one thing which is not a m atter of controversy between the traditional philosopher and his analytical critic, viz. the fact that th e re are certain linguistic expressions - singular terms - which somehow ‘stand fo r’ objects. O f course we cannot now understand what in general it is to relate to objects in terms of the use of these expressions; that would be a petitio principii in favour of the language-analytical posi­ tion. B ut we can assum e this much: that one m ust be able to explain how these expressions stand for objects, even if this should not be

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essential to the sense of the object-relation. A nd we can now apply to our problem that basic principle of analytical philosophy, which, as we have seen, m ust also be accepted by the traditional philosopher: that we m ust be able to explain how we use a linguistic expression. It is this principle on which the representation-theory appears to founder, even if there were such things as representations in the extended m etaphorical sense. For it would follow from the represen­ tation-theory th at when we are asked to explain for which object a name stands the question concerns what we represent when using this name. A nd that the question cannot be thus understood seems clear, at least as regards intersubjective speech. In the case of representations in the non-m etaphorical sense - images - one can u n d erstand what it m ight m ean intersubjectively to exhibit them . R epresentations in the m eta­ phorical sense, on the o th er hand, have not been understood intersub­ jectively by traditional philosophy and it is not clear how they could be understood intersubjectively. Again this result is not conclusive. If we ask how a singular term is used, thus if we ask for its explanation, we are not asking what (which object) the person who uses it represents to himself, but rather what (which object) he means, that we too can m ean (cf. above p. 63f). T h e linguistic object-relation is to be understood as m eaning (Meinen) w here this word is understood not in the sense in which it is supplem ented by a nominal sentence (‘I believe (meinen) that/?’) but in the sense in which it is sup­ plem ented by a singular term (‘I m ean N ’). How this m eaning is to be understood has of course still to be explained. This word does not am ount to an answer to o u r question; all we know is what we must ask if we are enquiring about the explanation of singular terms. Now the traditional philosopher could also try to bend this question to fit his conception. H e would say: one can only explain which object one means with a singular term by recourse to the corresponding representation. T hus it would seem that we cannot conclusively refute the traditional answer until we have given a new positive explanation of what it is to explain which object one means with a singular term. But this question m ust be orientated towards how one actually answers, in a particular case, the question ‘W ho or what do you m ean by that?’ A nd in fact nobody answers this question by pointing to representations. W eshall see that the question thus posed leads us to a completely new conception of how we refer to objects and o f what is m eant by ‘objects’. O f course the following m anoeuvre is still open to the traditional p h i­ losopher. Regarding the explanation that is now to be given of how it is established what or who we mean with an expression he could say that

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this is precisely w hat he m eant by his m etaphorically extended talk o f the rep resen tatio n of an object. H ow ever, this m anoeuvre would re p ­ resen t an abandoning o f the traditional position. For it would imply the admission that we cannot explain what it is to mean an object by recourse to rep resen tatio n but that, on the contrary, we can only explain what is m eant by ‘rep resen tatio n ’ by explaining what it is to m ean an object. T h e word ‘re p resen tatio n ’, if it is newly defined, is, of course, harmless - like any word.

LECTURE 2 1

T h e function of singular term s

At the end o f the last lecture it again became clear how limited the possibilities of internally refuting a philosophical basic conception are. O ne cannot show - assum ing one is p repared to accept the uncashed m etaphor of the representation-concept - that a representation-theory is impossible. Sponge-like thoughts have the advantage that they cannot be smashed. B ut to d em and an internal refutation would also involve an unrealistic view of the extent to which obsolete philosophical ideas can be put out of action. It is enough to show that the object-relation which we encounter w hen we exam ine how we actually establish for which object a sign stands is not a representation-relation and that the m eaning of objecthood which em erges from this exam ination cannot be understood in term s of representation. T h e genuine refutation of the traditional conception cannot be accomplished internally but only by means o f the positive construction of a new conception which right from the start can claim the advantage that it takes its d ep artu re from an actual form o f reference to objects, namely that by means of linguis­ tic expressions (for the present I leave it open w hether it is the only one). T he traditional conception is thus not shown to be impossible but disregarding the unclarity of its basic concept - only false. B efore I begin the positive construction of the new conception I wish to add som ething to what I said about the representation-theory. I have shown that th e doctrine of the prim acy of p ro p er names over descrip­ tions, which implies th at ‘standing fo r’ is to be understood as simple assignm ent or association, is gro u n d ed , if it has any philosophical fo u n ­ dation, on the representation-theory. However, it would be false to sup­ pose that the converse holds, viz. th at the representation-theory neces­ sarily leads to this conception of the nam e-relation and such a simplistic object-concept. T h at it need not do so is particularly well illustrated by the case of H usserl. H usserl’s object-theory is, on the one hand, a re p ­

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resentation-theory: what he calls intentionality is the not linguistically but representationally construed object-relation of consciousness. On the other hand, we have already seen that H usserl follows Frege in thinking that descriptions are semantically m ore fundam ental than proper-nam es. In Husserl this is connected with the ontological-epistemological idea that objects - spatial ones at any rate - are only acces­ sible to us in a manifold of modes of presentation, and that it is only in such modes of presentation that they are constituted as objects. If a presentation o f the object in a multiplicity of som ething like modes of presentation turns out to be also characteristic of the language-analyti­ cal theory of objects, then the language-analytical conception must be distinguished from the traditional conception (in so far as the latter is already able to see the object as a unity of modes of presentation) by what it understands by ‘modes of presentation’. We shall see that the modes of presentation to which the enquiry into the em ploym ent of singular terms leads us are to be understood as rules for identifying an object. In H usserl, on the o ther hand, the modes of presentation of the object are understood as ‘adum brations’ (Abschattungen), as the mani­ fold perceptual perspectives in which an object presents itself to an observer, depending on his standpoint and the surrounding circum­ stances. T hese adum brations are thus themselves representations, and, moreover, representations in the non-m etaphorical sense. For Husserl all spatial objects present themselves in a rule-governed synthesis of simple data - perceptual representations - and this synthetic objectconsciousness, as intentional consciousness, is itself understood as re p ­ resentation (though now in the metaphorically extended sense).1 Husserl is h ere clearly following in the tradition of Kant, who was the first to develop a theory of this kind. According to Kant the represen­ tation of an object depends on a ‘rule’ which makes a ‘synthesis’ of m an­ ifold ‘representations’ necessary.2 However K ant’s talk of the ‘object’ is misleading. He would have characterized his problem m ore clearly if, instead of speaking of ‘objects’, he had spoken of ‘objective connec­ tions’. His question is not: how is it possible for us to refer to things, to som ething (an object)? R ather it is: how far are the connections of our representations not merely subjective but objective? This can be seen clearly from the fact that the text from which I have just quoted is concerned with the justification of the law of causality, the question of why it is that we m ust regard the sequence of events as not merely subjective but objective. H ere then the problem is in fact a completely different one. T o imagine that the problem of what makes possible a relation to objects is approxim ately the same as the problem of what

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justifies what we refer to to have a claim to objectivity would be to let ourselves be deceived by an accident of language. W hereas the contrast with ‘subjective’ is essential to ‘objective’, no such contrast belongs to the m eaning of ‘object’. T he two problem s are, it is true, not completely indep en d en t of each other. B ut it is safer if we first separate them oversharply and say that they overlap: thus it makes perfect sense to speak of merely subjective objects - e.g. objects o f which we dream . On the other hand it is not merely the existence of objects that is objective (or subjective) but also properties of objects (predications) and connections of objects (e.g. sequences o f events). T h e lack of linguistic-logical reflection in the tradition also explains the failure - despite certain beginnings in K ant3 - to see that ‘objective’ is an adverb which qualifies veritative being and whose opposite is expressed by, for instance, such a term as ‘seem ing’. Even when we speak o f objects as ‘objective’ we m ean their existence; and this means that in this case too the term ‘objective’ refers, not to the object, but to the proposition, the state of affairs. T h u s when K ant says that a relation to objects becomes possible throu g h the synthesis o f representations that is subject to a necessary rule, what he really means is not objects but som ething objective. His problem is not the one which concerns us here, viz. how we can refer to som ething (where this means: to som ething for which a singular term can stand). In H usserl’s case, on the o th er hand, the situation is more complicated. In so far as he defines ‘object’ as the ‘subject of possible true predications’,4 what he means by ‘object’ corresponds exactly to what we are here concerned with, i.e. som ething for which certain lin­ guistic expressions (which can be supplem ented by predicates) can stand. But H usserl does not base this definition, which appeals to the function of singular term s, on a language-analytical conception of the object-relation. For he holds the view that the relation to objects, for which his definition serves merely to provide a m ark of identification, is grounded in intentionality; and this I have in terp reted as represen­ tation in the m etaphorically extended sense. If I can call H usserl a rep ­ resentative of the traditional conception of w hat is m eant by ‘objects’, then I must be able to assume that when he speaks of ‘objects’ he actually means objects and not, like Kant, som ething else; and the above definition is a clear indication of this. Now when H usserl speaks of a synthesis of m odes of presentation he does not m ean objects in general but specifically spatial objects. However, if one looks m ore closely, one sees that the problem which he deals with u n d er the heading ‘synthesis of m odes of p resentation’ is one which concerns not the spatial object

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as such (as the subject of possible tru e predications) but the various predicative determ inations o f this object: every property of such an object - its form , its colour, its o th er sensible qualities - is constituted in a rule-governed synthesis of adum brations. If, for exam ple, we describe this desk as brow n, this description does not stand for a simple sensation-quality, b u t for a m anifold of such qualities, which vary according to a rule, d ep en d in g on the illum ination and the position of the percipient. Now this problem is on a level with the Kantian problem which concerns not the object qua object b u t the objectivity of properties o f objects: the specifically objective colour-quality, for exam ple, is con­ trasted with its m anifold subjective appearance-m odes. However, H us­ serl starts the problem at a m ore basic level than Kant: the properties of im agined, or d ream t of, spatial objects, for exam ple, are also objec­ tive unities which are distinct from subjective m odes of presentation and are constituted in the rule-governed sequence of the latter. For H usserl the objective in K ant’s n arro w er sense o f the word is simply a rule o f the same kind though on a higher-level.5 T h a t the m odes of presentation dealt with by H usserl are not m odes o f presentation of the object as such b u t only o f its predicative determ inations is obscured by the fact that he speaks indiscrim inately o f things and properties of things. T h at he does so we can again explain by reference to his fu n ­ dam ental, traditionalist position: by construing the object-relation as represen tatio n h e reduces the object as it is given in perception to that in the object which is given representationally in the non-m etaphorical sense. A nd although H usserl occasionally distinguishes between the object as such and its predicative determ inations, the object as such he merely calls ‘the p u re X in abstraction from all predicates’.6 In other words, all that H usserl can say about w hat the singular term as such stands for is that it is a p u re X which underlies the predicative d ete r­ m inations. T h e m anifold m odes o f presentation which H usserl has in m ind are thus not such as concern the relation o f the singular term to the object. O r p u ttin g it an o th e r way: they are not modes of p resenta­ tion to which a plurality o f singular term s (descriptions) which some­ how all designate the same object correspond. It is not surprising that in the enquiry into the constitution o f the object-relation H usserl was not o rientated tow ards these m odes o f presentation. For although he defined objects as the subjects o f possible predications, thus as what a singular term stands for, he did not look to an analysis of the em ploy­ m ent o f singular term s for the explanation of the object-relation. Only in Investigation I of his Logical Investigations w here, following Frege, H usserl explicitly goes into the distinction betw een the m eaning and

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the object of ‘nam es’ (by which like Frege he understands descriptions as well as p ro p e r names), does he en counter those different modes of presentation of an object to which d ifferen t singular term s correspond. By contrast w here h e investigates the object-relation as such, and the constitution of spatial objects, he is not orientated towards the em ploy­ m ent of linguistic expressions at all. Frege, on the other hand, left open the question of how the differen t modes of presentation of the object which correspond to its descriptions are to be understood. Even less did he attem pt to investigate the question o f what it is for a linguistic expression to ‘stand fo r’ an object, how we refer to objects by means of such expressions and what follows from this for the notion of objects as such.7 T h ro u g h his enquiry into the m eaning of singular term s Frege p re ­ pared a new way of posing the problem . B ut he was not interested in the philosophical question of how such a thing as an object-relation is constituted in the em ploym ent o f such expressions; he dismissed it as psychological and epistemological. Mill and Husserl, by contrast, had a philosophical concept for the object-relation, namely, the concept of representation, a concept which Frege rejected w ithout being able to p u t an o th er in its place. O f course Mill, like Frege, and also the majority of analytical philosophers, simply took for granted the notion of objects. H usserl, on the other hand, m ade an attem pt analytically to elucidate the object-relation and with it the m eaning of the term ‘object’. However, he did so on a pre-linguistic basis, in terms of the concept o f representation. T h u s'alth o u g h Husserl does not have a sim­ ple object-concept like Mill, and although he did not simply presuppose the existence of an object-relation and a universe of objects, his approach is ju st as traditional as that of Mill. As we now tu rn to the question of the actual mode o f em ploym ent of singular term s I w ould like once m ore (cf. p. 271 f) to rem ind you that this question does not, as such, imply any prejudice in favour of a language-analytical conception of the object-relation. T h a t these expres­ sions stand for objects is not a m atter of controversy. An explanation of how one establishes for which object such an expression stands is nec­ essary in any case, regardless o f what position one holds. It is u n d e r­ standable that in explaining the object-relation the traditional philoso­ p h er did not take the function o f the sign as his starting-point. But he can have no objection to such a p recedure for however the object-rela­ tion is finally in terp reted it m ust be possible to explain what it is for signs to stand for objects in term s of this in terpretation. It may still turn out that the explanation of singular term s requires a non-linguistic

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object-relation. Only if it should tu rn out that the object-relation which the explanation of singular term s presupposes cannot be understood independently of a specific use of signs would we have achieved a spe­ cifically language-analytical object-theory. If we u nderstand the question of which object an expression stands for in term s of the use of that expression (and this means: its use by someone) then it becomes the question of which object someone means with the expression (above p. 282). It is of course possible for someone in a given case not to m ean with a singular term the object for which it stands, e.g. if he mistakenly believes that the expression stands for an object other than th at for which it in fact stands. But since there can be no sign-object relation independently of the use of signs by persons this discrepancy can only mean that in a particular case someone means with the expression a different object from that which is (or was) nor­ mally (or originally) meant with it. This is all that can be m eant by saying that an expression really stands for a particular object. So the question of which object a singular term stands for can only be understood as the question of which object is m eant with it, if not by an individual then by a linguistic community. Now this question - ‘who or what is m eant with “a”?’ —clearly belongs to the context of whole sentences. We can see this if, in addition to the question about m ode of em ploym ent, I also apply to singular terms the other question I applied to predicates, viz. the question concerning their function. T he question of function arises as soon as the sign-rela­ tion is brou g h t into connection with an em ploym ent of the sign by p e r­ sons; and that means: with an action of persons. Every action is d e ter­ mined by an intention and if the use of a thing - in this case the use of a sign - belongs to an action then the act-intention determ ines what we call the function of the thing (what it is used for). W hen I distinguished the function of predicates from that of singular terms I characterized the function of singular terms in the same way as it is characterized by the traditional theory: it is the function of a singular term to stand for an object. But it is precisely when we reflect on the aspect of function that we see how much in need of explanation this characterization itself is. For it rem ains unclear what is achieved by using som ething to stand for an object, what the standard intention is that determ ines an action which consists in the em ploym ent of som ething with this function. T h e traditional theory gives no answer at all to this question. But we should also be clear that the answer given by a pragm atist—behaviourist tradition, viz. that the function of the sign consists in its representing (vertreten) the object for which it stands in the sense that it evokes in

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the h earer the same (or a similar) response as that which the object itself would evoke8 is incorrect. A sign-theory of this kind is orientated towards so-called natural signs, i.e. symptoms (cf. p. 181) which are defined in the following way: a state of affairs functions as a symptom of another state of affairs if the belief that the first obtains (e.g. that it is now lightning) leads one to believe that the second obtains or is about to obtain (e.g. that it will thunder). One responds then to the perception of the first as one would respond to the second. One can describe this sym ptom -relation by saying that one state of affairs represents the other in a specific fashion; and one can in terp ret this relation pragm at­ ically in the sense described. We saw earlier (Lecture 13) that we can perhaps u n derstand quasi-predicates in this way (which would then be functioning as signals) but not whole sentences. T hat one could u n d e r­ stand singular terms in this way is ruled out in advance by the fact that the objects to which symptoms refer are not concrete objects but states of affairs. Also from the point o f view of the pragm atist-behaviourist interpretation it is clear that the only objects in question are states of affairs. O ne cannot respond to a concrete object. What one responds to is the presence of this object; and the presence of an object (that it is now here) is a state of aff airs. Those theorists who in terpreted a sign’s stand­ ing for an object as representation (Vertretung), and sought to interp ret the latter pragmatically, overlooked the sharp distinction between con­ crete objects and states of affairs. Only when we simultaneously keep in m ind these two things, viz. that the traditional description o f the sign-object relation as ‘standing fo r’ tells us nothing, and that the behaviourist-pragm atist representationtheory (Stellvertretertheorie) is inapplicable to it, will we become aware of just how little we u n derstand this seemingly so obvious sign-relation. Just as the traditional psychological representation-theory, according to which the sign represents (vertreten) a representation (Vorstellung), so the behaviourist-pragm atist representation-theory presupposes that what the sign merely represents could also be given to us independently of the signs. This applies both to representations (Vorstellungen) and to states of affairs. But what about objects? How can we refer to them at all? It thus begins to em erge that we will only u nderstand what is m eant by ‘objects’, and what it is to refer to objects, by analysing the corre­ sponding sign-relation. But how, you will ask, is the relation of the sign to the object to be understood if it can in no way be construed as rep ­ resentation (,Stellvertretung)? Doesn’t som ething like a representationrelation belong to the essence of any sign-relation? Certainly not. For

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we have already seen in the case of predicates that their function - that of characterizing - has nothing to do with a representation-relation. T h e singular term is supposed to have the function of standing for a certain object. But if we view the singular term in isolation the signifi­ cance of this function rem ains unintelligible. T h e singular term ’s func­ tion of standing for som ething thus seems to be an essentially non-inde­ pen d en t function. T his would m ean: one needs signs with this function so that o th er signs can fulfil their function. T h e act which consists in the em ploym ent of such an expression seems to have no independent intention and hence not to be an in d ep en d en t act. This is shown by the fact that som eone who utters a singular term - a nam e for instance by itself, has not done anything at the level of significant speech. He has of course done som ething at the level of utterance: he has uttered this sign. B ut with what intention? If som eone begins ‘T h e so-and-so’ and does not continue we will ask: ‘Well, what abo u t it? W hat do you want to say about it?’ Som eone who has merely u tte re d a nam e, then, has not yet said anything. H e has only said som ething if he supplem ents the nam e so as to form a com plete sentence. A nd at the level of assertoric sentences (to which for the time being the whole discussion is confined) this means: if he supplem ents the nam e with a predicate. (The use of names in the vocative constitutes an a p p a re n t counter-exam ple. How­ ever this use is always m ore than a m ere nam ing. W hen we use a nam e in the vocative by itself it does not ju st stand for the object; it does not function as a singular term but contains a dem an d to the person nam ed to answer or to come.) T h at the function of the singular term essentially needs supplem en­ tation becomes clear if we characterize the function of standing for an object as th at of indicating which object is m eant. If an action consists in indicating which object is m eant then it essentially refers {verweisen) to a com plem entary action which says som ething about a particular object and which th erefo re requires an indication o f which object this is. At the most elem entary level such an act which says som ething about a particular object is the characteriz.ation-act p erform ed by means of a predicate. A predicate is as we have seen a classification-expression the use of which is such that one cannot tell simply from the situation in which it is used what the expression relates to. It th erefo re needs a supplem entary expression by m eans of which one indicates what it is (which object) - and that means: which o f all - that is being classified by the predicate. In these reflections as well as using the form ulation ‘which object is m eant’ I have also said simply ‘what (which) is m eant’; and finally have

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also used the locution ‘which o f all’. W hat do these differences imply? As reg ard s the transition from ‘which object' to ‘which’ this step is clearly unproblem atic. T h e interrogative or relative pronouns ‘w hat’ or ‘which’ are an even better guide for our enquiry than the word ‘object’, for only they en su re that the enquiry is carried out at the requisite level of form al generality. T h e expression ‘w hat’ or ‘which’ can always be replaced by ‘which object’. B u t by using only the expression ‘w hat’ or ‘which’ we m ake sure that the purely form al notion of something is not given an extra m aterial connotation by the addition of the substantive ‘object’. We thus link up again with my original introduction of the term ‘object’ in Lecture 3. T h e re I started out from the statem ent: everything and anything is an object. T his implies th a t we cannot achieve the full extension which the term ‘object’ is in ten d ed to have by saying: an object is everything which . . . and then supplem enting this by a p red i­ cate. F or by so doing we would exclude o th er things which . . . , thus other things that are also som ething, fro m the extension of the term ‘object’. T h e expression ‘w hat’, u n d ersto o d as a relative pronoun, already implies th at one is speaking o f objects. Since, therefore, the term ‘object’ is not delim itable by a predicate, we m ust conclude that the w ord ‘object’ itself, in so far as it functions grammatically as a p red ­ icate is a pseudo-predicate, precisely because it does not serve to d e m ar­ cate a class of objects from o thers (and it was this function by reference to which predicates were semantically defined). But this means that for that which is h ere in question the expression ‘object’ is as such in ap p ro ­ priate. It is m erely th at p redicate that comes closest to what is m eant by words which are never predicates because they are essentially words that su p p lem en t predicates, viz. singular term s and the corresponding pron o u n s: ‘which’ (‘w hat’), ‘som ething’, ‘this’. This is the reason why I said in the last lecture that we cannot clarify o u r prelim inary conception of w hat we m ean by ‘objects’ by investigating the use of the word ‘object’. T h e w ords o f n atu ral language towards which we have to ori­ entate ourselves are ra th e r the p ro n o u n s ju st referred to and singular term s. You may think that this is to sm uggle in a language-analytical assum ption. B ut this is not so. T h e philosophical tradition was orien­ tated tow ards the equation ens —unum —res =aliquid, an equation which is not u n problem atic b u t which we may take seriously at least in connection with the word aliquid (‘som ething’). Equally we could start, as we did at the en d of the last lecture, from the traditional admission that every singular term stands for an object, i.e. for something. T h ese considerations m ake it ap p ear probable th at the explanation of w hat it is for a singular term to stand for an object - for som ething

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- will essentially involve an explanation of how the use of singular terms is connected with the use of the corresponding (definite and indefinite) pronouns. T h e fu rth e r characterization o f the function of singular term s that I have given, viz. that by means of a singular term one indi­ cates which of all is m eant, leads directly to this connection. B ut was I justified in supplem enting the characterization of the func­ tion of the singular term in this way, i.e. by saying not ju st ‘which’ but ‘which o f all’? It seems to me that this supplem entation is already implicitly contained in the question ‘which is m eant?’, and that it is only when we make this supplem entation explicit that the m eaning of this question, and hence that of the function of the singular term , becomes clear. For the need to indicate which object is m eant, thus which object it is that is classified by a classification-expression, only arises when a plurality of objects is presupposed. T h e function of the singular term is to indicate which of all objects that could come into question is meant. T hu s it is the function of the singular term to pick out one thing from a plurality as what is m eant - and this means: as that to which the p red ­ icate is supposed to apply. I shall call this function of picking out one thing from the presupposed plurality specification.9 We can now describe what happens in a predicative assertion as follows: by means of the predicate that which is specified by the singular term is characterized. O f course, this is not yet an answer. W hat this definition provides is merely a description of the function of singular term s, which, in con­ trast to the not incorrect, but em pty, notion of ‘standing for’, says what these expressions really achieve. And now the question to answer will be: how do they achieve it? Establishing the function o f these signs has given a definite direction to the enquiry into their m ode o f em ploy­ ment: the explanation of th eir m ode of em ploym ent m ust show what the em ploym ent-rules of these signs are which make it possible for them to specify an object (pick out which of a presupposed plurality is meant). T h e broadening of horizon which the question has thereby acquired vis-ä-vis merely speaking o f ‘standing for’ may not be im m e­ diately clear. It consists in this: whereas it seemed plausible to construe ‘standing for’ as a relation which holds m erely between the sign and its object, once the function of the singular term is understood as specifi­ cation a relation of the singular term to all objects (of a dom ain) is p re ­ supposed. This is im plied in the form ulation ‘indicate (pick out) which of all’. T h e relation of the singular term to the object for which it stands is thus m ediated by a relation to all objects o f the presupposed plurality; and this shows th at in fact it is not a relation at all. A sign has this ‘relation’ to an object in so far as som eone who uses it can refer by

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means o f it to this object. A nd this reference - as specification - presu p ­ poses that the person who uses such an expression, like the person who u nderstands it, has the presupposed plurality somehow p resent in his consciousness. If this were not so th en there would be no need to indi­ cate which o f all is meant. T h e d em and for such an indication p resu p ­ poses that it is initially open which o f all is m eant; and that means: that it could be any one of all. T h u s if to m ean an object with a sign is to m ean an individual object, and if this means: to indicate which of all it is, then an object-relation implies a sim ultaneous relation to a multiplic­ ity o f objects. T h u s we will not be able to explain the function of sin­ gular term s w ithout at the same tim e explaining this multiplicity-consciousness; and the question will arise w hether this too is not constituted in a certain em ploym ent o f linguistic expressions. If then the function o f a singular term consists in indicating which of all is m eant, then the understan d in g o f the w ord ‘all’ is as basic as the em ploym ent of singular term s. B ut at the present level o f reflection (where we merely have an abstract description of the function o f singular term s and are not yet clear how they are able to perfo rm this function) there is still m ore that m ust be adm itted to be essentially connected with the use o f singular term s. We have a plurality; and from this one thing is to be singled out as w hat is m eant. H ow ever this is concretely achieved, the idea of such a specification presupposes that we are able to distinguish one thing from others, and not ju st in so far as other predicates belong to it - if th at were all we could never be sure th at there is not also an o th er thing to which exactly the same predicates belong and exactly the same p re d ­ icates do not belong - b u t in so far as it is an o th er object. It is presu p ­ posed that every thing can be distinguished from every o th er thing as an individual. T o distinguish one thing from others, however, means to establish that th e one is d ifferen t from the others; and this means - I am thereby m erely saying the same thing in d iffe re n t words - that it is not the same as the others. T hus the use of singular term s also presu p ­ poses an u n d erstan d in g o f the expression ‘is th e same as’ o r ‘is identical with’ (‘ = ’). I f it is essential to what we m ean by an object th at it is an individual (or putting it in term s of the function of singular terms: if the specification of which is m eant implies th a t it is specified which individual is m eant), then essential to the u n d erstan d in g of what is m eant by ‘objects’, or to the u n d erstan d in g o f singular term s, is an und erstan d in g o f identity and non-identity and the possession of crite­ ria of identity. T h e possibility of being able to distinguish objects from one another

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is th e condition of the possibility o f o u r being able to count them . Objects are essentially countable. T h e u n d erstan d in g o f ‘all’ and ‘som e’, the u n d e rsta n d in g of ‘is identical w ith’ and ‘is not identical with’ an d the ability to co u n t are on all fours with each o th e r and with the possi­ bility of using singular term s. T h ese connections are com pletely general and hold for all singular term s w hether they re fe r to concrete o r to abstract objects. For all that has so far been explained followed com pletely generally from the func­ tion which sin g u lar term s have as expressions th a t supplem ent p red i­ cates; it was n o t yet assum ed that the objects th at are specified by means o f singular term s are perceptible objects. T h u s even speaking of individ­ uals does not as.such imply that one is dealing with concrete perceptible objects any m ore than does speaking o f countability. T h e term ‘individ­ ual’ is to be u n d ersto o d relative to the term ‘universal’ju st as singular term s are com plem entary to predicates. T h e re a re classification-expres­ sions whose use does not involve th e com plem entary use o f singular term s. T hese a re quasi-predicates an d as their use is situation-relative those singular term s which su p p lem en t classification-expressions which are analogous as reg ard s content to quasi-predicates (and this means: which are explained analogously to quasi-predicates, as we saw in the lecture before last) designate only objects that are specified by reference to situations an d are thus spatio-tem poral objects. T hus quasi-predicates only have analogues am ong predicates which classify concrete objects; they have no analogues am o n g h ig h e r-o rd er predicates, i.e. those which classify abstract objects. B ut clearly th ere are such highero rd e r predicates; and this m eans th at th ere are also h ig h er-o rd e r sin­ gular terms. N o d o u b t one will be able to say th at reference to abstract objects presupposes referen ce to concrete objects; but at p rese n t we are only concerned with the latter. O n th e o th er h a n d there have already been indications th at referen ce to at least one species of abstract object - states o f affairs - is as basic as referen ce to concrete objects (p. 224). H ow ever this may be, we can and m ust from the outset distinguish those aspects o f the use o f singular term s which distinguish them as singular term s as such - as expressions which have the function of spec­ ifying wThich o f all is m ean t - from those aspects which specially distin­ guish those singular term s which specify concrete objects. Now if (a) the distinction betw een concrete and abstract objects is one which concerns them as objects, and if (b) specificatory reference to objects by means of singular term s is essential to speaking o f objects, then we m ust also expect that w hat distinguishes that species o f singular term that speci­ fies concrete objects w ithin the genus of singular term s is precisely the

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particular form which the general function of specifying takes in their case; and in that case concrete objects themselves would be distin­ guished from abstract objects by the m an n er in which they are speci­ fied. H aving established the general function of those expressions which by supplem enting predicates distinguish them from quasi-pred­ icates we can now pursue our enquiry into their m ode of em ploym ent by asking how these expressions specify the objects for which they stand.

L E C T U R E 22

Russell and Strawson

T o tackle the question of what it means to speak of ‘objects’ and how a reference to objects is possible by asking how we can refer to objects by means of signs is already to adopt a language-analytical approach. However we have seen (p. 288) that such an approach still leaves it open w hether the answer to this question itself results in a specifically lan­ guage-analytical position. This would consist in holding that the re fe r­ ence to objects to which the explanation of such signs points cannot be understood independently of the use of ju st such signs. As with all signs the question of the m ode of em ploym ent of these signs can only be tackled by asking how they can be explained. A nd in this case that means: how it can be explained, or established, for which object the expression stands (p. 270). To prep are for this question I enquired in the last lecture into the function of these expressions. W hat em erged th ere regarding the purpose for which singular terms are used and what it means to speak o f ‘objects’ holds generally for all sin­ gular terms and all objects. We now know what in general is being asked when it is asked how it can be established for which object a singular term stands: one is asking which object is specified by the singular term , w here ‘specify’ means: to pick out what is m eant from a presupposed plurality. If we now ask, not about the function, but about the explanation, or m ode of em ploym ent o f these expressions then precisely because of what we have seen regarding the function of these expressions the question can no longer be posed in a formal, general way. Rather a specific type o f object, a specific plurality (that of perceptible objects or states of affairs or attributes, etc.) is presupposed and one asks how it is possible to pick out one object as the one m eant from am ong all objects o f this type. T h u s the question left open in the last lecture, viz. how a singular term can specify an object, m ust be p u t separately for each type

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of object (and this is because the d ifferen t types of object - though I have not shown this - are distinguished precisely by the m anner in which they are specified). A nd this question is identical with the ques­ tion about the m ode of em ploym ent, o r the explanation, of the type of singular term concerned. T h u s by appealing to the function of expressions a new and specifi­ cally language-analytical approach is achieved, both for the explanation of w hat it means to speak of ‘objects’ and for the distinction of objects into what H usserl called ‘regions of objects’. In essence this approach derives from P. F. Strawson who first introduced it in his p a p er ‘On R eferrin g ’ (1950) in a confrontation with Russell’s T heory of Descrip­ tions and subsequently developed it in his book Individuals (1958). Sin­ gular term s, according to Strawson, have the following function: some­ one who uses them can by m eans of them refer to an object. A nd this refe rrin g consists in the singular term ‘identifying’ the object with which the rem aining part of the sentence has to d o .1 This notion of ‘identifying’ roughly corresponds to w hat I have called ‘specifying’; though, as we shall see, certain additional distinctions will need to be draw n. T ho u g h his views have not rem ained undisputed Strawson is the stan d ard a u th o r for this problem . It will th erefore be ap p ro p riate in enquiring into the m ode of em ploym ent o f concrete singular terms to take his view o f how objects can be identified by means of such expressions as o u r starting-point. A nd because Strawson arrived at his view via a critique o f Russell’s T heory of Descriptions and because the latter theory is p resupposed positively o r negatively by the entire liter­ ature on our them e I shall begin with a brief exposition of Russell’s theory.2 It is called the ‘theory o f definite descriptions’, and by ‘definite descriptions’ Russell u n derstands expressions which have the form ‘the so-and-so’. Russell started out from the traditional view, that every sin­ gular term stands for an object, as a prem ise that is not fu rth e r ques­ tioned; he did not ask how this relation is to be understood. However, if it is a relation then it seem ed impossible for the object for which an expression stands not to exist. B ut now singular term s, and in particular definite descriptions, are used which have no object. For exam ple some­ one using the sentence ‘T h e King of F rance is bald’ in 1905, when Rus­ sell wrote his p ap er, makes the claim th at the singular term ‘the King of F rance’ stands for an object. In fact, however, this object does not exist. A nd if som eone corrects him by saying ‘T h e King of France doesn’t exist’ th en his use o f the singular term does not even involve the claim that it stands for an object. M einong, from whom Russell had

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taken his d e p a rtu re , had tried to overcom e this difficulty by saying that the expression stands for an object b u t th at an object, need not exist. Russell gave no conclusive a rg u m e n t to show th at M einong’s view is impossible (this is som ething we will have to clarify). In any event he foun d M einong’s view unsatisfactory, a n d thus the question arose o f how singular term s which it is possible do not stand for an object are to be understood. Russell held fast to the traditional view th at a p ro p e r nam e stands for an object in a m ore genuine sense than a description in that it desig­ nates th e object ‘directly’3 and not, as a description does, as that to which a certain attrib u te uniquely belongs, e.g. the attribute o f being the p resen t King o f France. Russell concluded from this that in the case of expressions which can correctly be called p ro p e r nam es it is not pos­ sible for them not to have an object. W hat follows from this in regard to sentences such as ‘H om er did not exist’ we shall see in a m om ent. Anyway this view led Russell to think th at the problem of how expres­ sions which possibly do not stand for an object are to be understood reduces to the problem o f how definite descriptions are to be u n d e r­ stood. Russell’s answ er to this question is: definite descriptions are not really singular term s at all. A sentence of the type ‘T h e so-and-so is F ’ only seems to be like a singular predicative sentence because of its gram m at­ ical form . I f we logically analyse it it becom es clear th at it is a general sentence and has the logical form ‘th e re is one, an d only one, object which is so-and-so an d this is F ’. W hat Russell m eans by ‘logical form ’ corresponds to w hat I call ‘sem antic fo rm ’; and his phrase ‘if we logi­ cally analyse the sentence’ we can replace, in the context of o u r enquiry, by ‘if we ask how the sentence is u sed ’. A ccording to this view, th en , the sem antic stru ctu re of a sentence like ‘T h e King o f France is bald’ only becom es visible in the sentence ‘T h e re is one, an d only one, object which is King o f France and this is bald.5In this form ulation th e re no longer ap pears a definite description. It no longer contains the definite article ‘th e ’; th e re only rem ains the predic­ ative com ponent o f the definite description (‘King o f France’). T h e case in which the object does not exist no longer presents any difficulties. We no longer have an expression th at stands for an object, and the case where th e object does not exist now reduces to th e case w here th ere is not one, o r only one, object o f th at kind. Since in the sentence itself, as now form ulated, it is asserted th at th e re is one, an d only one, such object, if th ere is not one o r only one such object th en the sentence is simply false. T h u s the sentence is not only false w hen the one so-and-

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so is n o t/ 7, b u t equally when th e re is no object, or m ore than one, that is so-and-so. A nd one can now easily und erstand the sentence ‘T h e King o f France does not exist.’ It is simply the negation of the sentence ‘T h e re is one, and only one, object that is King of F rance.’ T hus Russell’s solution to the problem consists in in terp retin g the singular predicative statem ent as an existential statem ent, and the latter as a general statem ent. A nd this general statem ent he interprets in term s o f the sem antic stru ctu re which was b rought to light by Frege and which we have already en co u n tered (p. 247). A presupposition of Russell’s T h eo ry o f D escriptions is thus the m odern theory of general existential statem ents (i.e. such sentences as ‘U nicorns exist’), which was first developed by Frege, but h ad already been anticipated by K ant.4 ‘Existence’ is not only not a real predicate in such a sentence, as K ant taught; th e word ‘exist’ does n o t have the sem antic function of a p re d ­ icate (classification-expression) h e re at all. R ather the sentence is to be un d ersto o d in precisely the sam e way as the sentence ‘T h e re are uni­ corns.’ A nd this, as we have seen (p. 246), has the sense o f a particular sentence. It says: ‘Som e o f all objects are unicorns.’ This view seems com pelling, for it enables one to relate the u n d erstanding of the sen­ tence to a truth-co n d itio n which corresponds to the way in which we verify such sentences. A ccording to the traditional view, in a sentence such as ‘U nicorns exist’ one w ould be saying of unicorns, thought of as possible, th at they exist. B ut to establish w hether unicorns exist we do not exam ine the possible unicorns with reg ard to w hether the predicate of ‘existence’ applies to them ; ra th e r we exam ine the objects of the spa­ tio-tem poral world with reg ard to w hether the predicate ‘u n icorn’ applies to some o f them . This result can be tra n sfe rre d directly from general existential sen­ tences to so-called singular existential sentences, to sentences of the form ‘T h e so-and-so exists’, b u t with the following difference: such a sentence not only says th at at least one object (‘som e’) is so-and-so but also that at most o n e object is so-and-so, in other words that one and only one (a single) object is so-and-so. T his conception also seems com ­ pelling in the case o f the singular existential sentence, for only this con­ ception explains the sentence’s sem antic stru ctu re in a way that co rre­ sponds to how we verify such a sentence. Now this o f course has the consequence that, contrary to appearances, so-called singular existen­ tial statem ents are also not statem ents about individuals but are always general statem ents. T his also provides us with the, in my view, decisive arg u m en t against M einong’s view. T his view that we can refer to objects which are merely objects and may or may not exist and of which we can

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predicate existence or non-existence is refu ted by the fact that it co n tra­ dicts the way in which we establish the existence or non-existence of something. Thus one does not have to accept Russell’s basic prem ise, viz. that it is impossible for the object for which a singular term stands not to exist, in order to find his T heory of Descriptions plausible. R ather its plausi­ bility rests on the following considerations: (a) with sentences of the form ‘the so-and-so is F* it is always possible th at there does not exist a single such object, and that, th erefore, (b) the existence of this object m ust be im plied by such a sentence, and (c) the existential statem ent in which this implication would be articulated m ust be in terp reted as a general statem ent. In d eed one could even say that the result of Russell’s theory contradicts the prem ise from which he started out. For it has now become clear th at speaking of existence always presupposes that one is speaking of all objects and that, consequently, one cannot say of an individual object th at it exists.5 But how then according to Russell are p ro p er nam es, which it is claimed cannot possibly not stand for an object, to be understood? R us­ sell’s answer is that what we call p ro p er nam es in natural language are not p ro p e r names at all. For it is perfectly possible in the case of such expressions - e.g. ‘H o m e r’ - to discover that there is no object for which it stands. T o explain this Russell applies to the proper nam es of n atural language F rege’s theory o f pro p er names. T h e proper nam es of natural language do not have the direct relation they appear to have to the object. R ather they d ep en d on descriptions; they are ‘really abbrevia­ tions for descriptions’.6 For exam ple, Rom ulus is the person ‘who did such-and-such things, who killed Remus, and founded Rome, and so o n ’.7 This Fregean view of p ro p e r nam es,8 albeit in various form s,9 went unchallenged in analytical philosophy for a long time. It has only recently been called in question, by K ripke and D onnellan.10 If the p ro p e r nam es o f natural language do not refer to objects in the direct way that Russell’s view and the traditional view would have led one to expect, m ust one not conclude that the idea of such a direct relation is simply a fiction? But fo r Russell taking such a step was out of the question, for his T h eo ry of Descriptions led to the conclusion that what looks like a singular predicative statem ent is, if its subject-expression is a description, really a general statem ent. A nd if the p ro p e r nam es of natural language are reducible to descriptions, then the state­ ments whose subject-expression is such a p ro p e r nam e are also really general statem ents. So the result would be th at there are no singular statem ents. But if we can always only say of all objects th at one of them

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is such-and-such then it would seem that we cannot directly refer to an individual object at all. Q uine, who has radicalized Russell’s theory, has accepted this conclusion: the basic statem ents are general statem ents and there are no singular statem ents.11 Such a conclusion appeared unacceptable to Russell, however, for the sam e reason that Strawson later rejected Q u in e:12 general statem ents themselves - as we have already seen (p. 246) - refer (verweisen) via th e specification o f their truth-conditions to singular statem ents. T h o u g h Russell did not p u t it like this, one cannot explain to som eone the m ode of em ploym ent of a general sentence w ithout presupposing that he already knows the m ode of em ploym ent of singular sentences. So on Russell’s view there m ust be some genuine singular sentences. And for him this could only m ean: sentences whose subject-expression stands for an object in the way th at the philosophical tradition assum ed that p ro p e r names stand for objects. Now the required direct sign-rela­ tion appears to presuppose a direct epistemological relation. For us to be able directly to assign a sign to an individual object, this object m ust be directly given to us - in perception. W here this is the case we can obviously use the deictic expression ‘this’. Now it is characteristic of ordinary objects that can be given to us in perception that they continue to exist outside the perceptual situation; if we still refer to them when they are outside the perceptual situation, we can no longer do so with the word ‘this’. It would seem plausible to say that if the object is given to us in perception, then not only can we re fe r to it with ‘this’, we can also assign to it an ord in ary p ro p e r name; and that when it is no longer perceived, though we can no longer refer to it by means o f the expres­ sion ‘this’, we can still do so by m eans of the p ro p e r nam e. No doubt this is in a sense what actually happens. B ut is is not at all clear how it is possible. For if we have only introduced the p ro p er nam e in the p e r­ ceptual situation, and hence as an equivalent of the expression ‘this’, then how do we know that we can still re fe r to it, the same object, by means o f the p ro p e r nam e when the object is no longer present to us? As which object do we m ean the object with the p ro p er nam e if it is no longer this now p resen t object? T o answer this question must we not have recourse to some descriptions o r other? B ut in that case the p ro p e r nam e would again presuppose descriptions and is thus ruled out for Russell. All that rem ains then is a p ro p e r nam e whose referential func­ tion ceases as soon as the object is no longer present, thus a p ro p e r nam e whose referential function reaches no fu rth er th an that o f the deictic expression. In this way Russell arrives at the view that ‘this’ is the

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only logically p ro p e r n a m e ,13 i.e. th e only one which in contrast to the m erely a p p a re n t p ro p e r nam es o f ord in ary language functions sem an­ tically in the way in which on Russell’s view p ro p e r nam es m ust fu n c­ tion; it is an am biguous p ro p e r nam e. O f course understood as a deictic expression th e word ‘this’ would not be am biguous. B ut if it is u n d e r­ stood as a proper name th en it m ust be term ed am biguous (though this am biguity could be rem oved by subscripts). Russell com bined this view with an epistem ological thesis according to which the only objects which can be directly given to us are sense-data. As these are ephem eral objects this m eans th at th e logically p ro p e r nam e not only designates an object in so far as it is p resen t b u t designates this object as such. It is im p o rta n t that with Russell’s theory o f logically p ro p e r nam es in addition to descriptions and p ro p e r nam es the third class of singular term s, viz. deictic pro n o u n s, is included in th e question of how an expression can stand for an object and in d eed takes precedence over the other two classes. Russell, it is tru e, does not construe the word ‘this’ as a deictic expression b u t as an am biguous p ro p e r nam e; the function of ‘this’ as a deictic expression rem ains unclarified. H owever, an im p o r­ tant feature o f deictic expressions, namely, th at they re fe r to an object th at is p resen t in the perceptual situation, is retained. As we shall see, Straw son in his positive conception latches onto this deictic com p o n en t o f Russell’s conception, th o u gh of course with the difference th at he recognizes the deictic expressions as such and does not in te rp re t them as p ro p e r names. H ow ever, Strawson has not em phasized this positive link with Russell. As he does not discuss R us­ sell’s theory o f logically p ro p e r nam es, but only his T h eo ry of D escrip­ tions, we should ask ourselves, b efore I move on to Straw son’s critique, how we should ju d g e Russell’s theory of logically p ro p e r names. T his question provides us with an o p p o rtu n ity to test the fruitfulness of what was achieved in the previous lecture reg ard in g the function o f singular term s (though at this stage of course only from the point o f view of criticism). Can Russell’s logically p ro p e r nam es do what they are su p ­ posed to do, namely, function as singular term s, if a singular term essentially specifies an object? We can im m ediately answ er this question in the negative if we recall that ‘specify’ means ‘indicate which of all’. In the object-relation o f a logically p ro p e r nam e th ere is no relation, not even an im plicit one, to a plurality o f o th er objects. Consciousness is only related to the p resen t sense-datum and th ere is no possibility, if these objects are not present, o f holding on to them by using a sign, not even in the sense of being able to re fe r back to them as past sense-data.

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A nd this has the consequence that the expression ‘this’ because it does not distinguish som ething from others fulfils no function at all and could ju st as well be om itted. It is instructive to com pare this language of logically p ro p e r names with th at variant o f the quasi-predicate language in which the word ‘this’ was used b u t in such a way that it was not replaceable by other expressions (above p. 263). In the case o f that language too I said that the w ord ‘this’ is not yet functioning as a singular term . Now, after the clarification of the function of singular term s, we can see m ore clearly why this m ust be so. T h e predicative sentences which can be form ed with Russell’s logically p ro p e r names represen t a language that is an exact co u n terp art, based on an introspectionist conception, to the exten d ed quasi-predicate language based on a behaviouristic concep­ tion. In both cases the speaker is tied to his perceptual situation, and the perspective of his speech does not extend beyond this situation. T he word ‘this’ is idling, because it is not u ndersto o d as a word that contrasts with o th er words which could take its place. (It has perhaps - as we saw in the case of quasi-predicate language - the minimal function of point­ ing to a p articular place in the situation; and som ething similar could be m aintained for Russell’s theory with respect to a place in perceptual space.) Russell believed that in the direct relation of the logically proper nam e to a perceptual datum he had fou n d that relation to an individual that is characteristic of singular terms. B ut singular term s do not simply have a relation to an individual - every object has this to every other object to which it stands in some relation. R ather it is characteristic of singular terms th at by m eans of them we refer to an individual as an individual by indicating which it is; and this they can only do by at the same tim e relating to all. T h e re is thus confirm ed from an o th er per­ spective what I h ad already anticipated in connection with the distinc­ tion betw een predicates an d quasi-predicates: that it must be the func­ tion o f singular term s to make the em ploym ent of predicates in d ep en d en t o f the perceptual situation. Even the deictic expression ‘this’ only functions as a singular term if it refers to what is present in such a way that the latter appears as what is m eant in contrast to all others. How it can do this is a question we have still to investigate. We can now see the peculiar dilem m a to which Russell’s theory of singular term s leads. Because Russell started out from the traditional view th at a singular term relates directly to an object he denied those expressions that are reg ard ed as singular term s - definite descriptions and the p ro p e r nam es of o rdinary language - the status o f singular term s; fo r he correctly perceived that they imply a relation to every­

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thing. As such they cannot, in his opinion, relate to an individual. But those expressions from which Russell rem oved all relation to a plurality, precisely so that they can relate to individuals, can for this very reason not refer to individuals. It is true that the use of general sentences can only be explained if familiarity with the mode of em ploym ent of sin­ gular sentences can be presupposed. O n the other hand, however, a peculiar generality seems already to characterize the singular term and, hence, the singular sentence. This is, as we shall see, a dilemma which Strawson too failed to see through and which has rem ained unresolved to this day. W hat form does Strawson’s critique of Russell’s Theory of Descrip­ tions take? His article ‘On R eferring’ is divided into five parts. T h e first three are devoted to criticism of Russell. In the last two parts Strawson indicates his own positive conception. P art I of the article is supposed to describe the premises and the question from which Russell started. Strawson points out that Russell did not distinguish between the m eaning of an expression and the object for which it stands. It would follow from this, Strawson claims, that a singular term which has no object also has no meaning; Russell developed his T heo ry of Descriptions in o rd er to avoid this absurd con­ sequence. Now it is true that Russell did not distinguish between m eaning and object.14 But it is u n fruitful to reduce the basis of Russell’s problem to this easily refutable premise. Q uine for example, although he accepted Russell’s theory and fu rth e r developed it, emphatically rejected this prem ise.15 Russell’s real problem was that of non-existent objects; and this problem rem ains even if one does not confuse the m eaning of a singular term with its object. By presenting a weakness of Russell’s view that is not essential to his theory as though it were its foundation Straw­ son has m ade criticism of it far too easy. T o refute Russell’s theory Strawson produces two argum ents in the second and third parts of his article which are presented as if they con­ cerned the same problem but are in fact independent. T h e first argum ent is as follows. O ne m ight distinguish with regard to an expression such as ‘the King of France’ between the expression and the use of the expression. T h e expression as such has a m eaning, but does not stand for a specific object. T h e expression only stands for a specific object if it is used in a specific situation - in this case, if it is used at a specific time. And it stands for a different object (whoever is King o f France at the time) or for none, depending on the time at which it is used. A corresponding distinction is to be m ade in regard to the

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whole sentence. T h e sentence ‘T h e King of France is bald’ has a m ean­ ing, but in itself no truth-value. Only when it is used at a particular time can it have a truth-value. Once one distinguishes between the expres­ sion and its use the confusion between m eaning and object which underlies Russell’s theory can, Strawson thinks, no longer arise. Against this argum ent Russell has him self pointed out (in his reply ‘Mr. Strawson on R eferrin g ’) that the distinction that Strawson makes, which specifically concerns deictic expressions, and which he, Russell, in no way denies, has nothing to do with the real problem . One can replace the situation-reference implicit in the expression ‘the (present) King of F rance’ by an objective specification by saying for instance ‘the King of France in 1905’ and see im mediately that the real problem , which concerns not a confusion o f m eaning and object but the talk of non-existent objects, is in d ep en d en t o f the special problem of deictic expressions. It is tru e th at with deictic expressions Russell’s problem only arises at the level o f the use o f the sentence but it arises at this level in ju st the sam e way as before. O r perhaps not? T his Strawson tries to show in the third section of his article. T h e thesis o f this section is that w hen som eone uses a sen­ tence like ‘T h e so-and-so is F' he presupposes th at one, and only one, object exists that is so-and-so but does not assert this. W hat is the d iffer­ ence? Strawson replies th at if som eone thinks that the existential p re ­ supposition a person m akes in em ploying such a sentence is m istaken he will not say that the latter’s statem ent is false but ra th e r that ‘the question of w hether his statem ent is true or false’ simply does not arise.16 T h e criticism o f Russell then simply boils down to this: that when such an object does not exist the statem ent is not false but neither tru e n o r false. Russell reacted sharply to this criticism too - and rightly so. Firstly, what is at issue, he claims, cannot be w hether one says one thing or the o th e r in ordinary language; besides one can give examples which show th at even in ordinary language one says in such a case that the state­ m en t is false, ra th e r than that the question of its truth or falsity does not arise. This criticism m ust be m ade even sharper. Firstly, Strawson writes as though this second point in his criticism were connected with the first, whereas in fact it is in d ep en d en t of it. Secondly, the second point is as irrelevant to the real problem as the first point. Strawson seems not to notice that the alternative which he presents to Russell’s view already involves acceptance of the essentials o f Russell’s theory. T h e existential statem ent, w hether m erely presupposed or implicitly asserted, is con­

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ceived by Straw son in exactly the sam e way as by Russell:17 consequently if the expression has no object the non-existence of the object cannot be understo o d by Straw son differently than by Russell. W hether the consequence o f this for the original statem ent is that the existence is asserted or m erely p resupposed, is a nuance th e relevance of which is not obvious. Straw son’s appeal to actual usage in o rdinary language, an d Russell’s reply that this cannot be w hat is at issue, has led people to think that the controversy betw een Russell and Strawson can be characterized as follows: the fo rm e r is concerned with the construction of an ideal logi­ cal language, the latter with the peculiarities o f o u r actual ordinary lan­ guage. This contrast, which in expositions of analytical philosophy is used virtually as a criterion for distinguishing the ‘ordinary language philosophy’ o f W ittgenstein and the O xfo rd School from those sem aildeists, such as Russell, Q u in e and C arnap, who are orientated m ore tow ards logic an d belong to the trad itio n of Frege, is absurd when understo o d in this sense. T h e appeal o f W ittgenstein and others, including Strawson, to o rd in ary language was not aim ed at bringing out the wealth o f sem antic n u an ce of o rd in ary language - an u n d ertak in g which, it could p roperly be objected, could be b e tter carried out by the em pirical science o f linguistics.18 Philosophy, even philosophy of ordi­ nary language, cannot be concerned with purely factual nuances o f ord in ary language; the m erely factual was never the object of philoso­ phy, only the possible. T h e appeal to natural language in W ittgenstein and those who have u n d ersto o d him has had a m ore fundam ental sig­ nificance. T h e appeal to natural language does not involve opposition to the idea of an ideal language as such, but only to the idea o f an ideal language built in a vacuum . W hat m ade necessary the recourse to nat­ ural language was the realization th at th e ideal language rem ains itself unexplained, o r is only explained by m eans o f an ordinary language m eta-language. It is m otivated, not by an in terest in factual nuances, b ut by m ethodological ideas, about the m eaning o f an ultim ate semantic explanation (ideas of the kind we have becom e acquainted with in con­ nection with the fu n d am en tal principle o f analytical philosophy). From o u r p o in t o f view it is a m atter o f indifference w hether the view th a t the existential statem ent is only p resu p p o sed in the use of the singular term is better attested for th e n atu ral languages with which we are fam iliar th an the view th at the existential statem ent is asserted. If both are possible, but the existential statem ent m ust at least be p resup­ posed, then Russell’s theory is vindicated. O n e m ust th erefo re conclude th at Straw son’s Russell-critique in ‘On

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R eferring’ fails in every respect. Even Russell’s starting point is p re ­ sented in a way which fails to m ake clear what is really at stake in decid­ ing the correctness or uncorrectness of Russell’s theory. And the two objections which Straw son then brings tu rn out to be both irrelevant. It is only in the concluding section o f Straw son’s article, in which he sketches his own view, th at it becom es clear what the real issue is. H ere he speaks o f the function (task) of singular terms. If one is speaking about individuals o ne needs expressions by means of which one can uniquely re fe r to individuals. Expressions can only fulfil this function if they function in such a way th at th ro u g h them a speaker enables a h earer to ‘identify w hat is being talked about’. But this can only be achieved by a specific referen ce to the speech-situation (the context of utterance); to identify the object re fe rred to, the object m ust ‘be in a certain relation to the speaker and to the context of utteran ce’.19 We shall have to see in the n ex t lecture how Strawson elaborates this view in his book. B ut what we m ust now ask is w hether by reference to Straw son’s positive view we can explain what the real difference is between him and Russell. Strawson rightly regards Russell’s logically p ro per names as fictions. However, he only criticizes this aspect o f Russell’s view in passing. H e thinks he can dispose o f it by p ointing out that the conception of ‘this’ as an am biguous p ro p e r nam e again rests on the confusion of m eaning and object. Strawson is, o f course, right in thinking that the word ‘this’, as it is actually used in natural language, is not an ambiguous p ro p er nam e but, as a deictic expression, has a unitary m eaning and designates d ifferen t objects d e p en d in g on the situation in which it is used. But Russell did not claim to be using this word as it is used in natural lan­ guage; n o r can one oblige him to do so. T h e test of his theory is not w hether it co rresponds to the ordinary-language use of words, but w hether it can explain how we can re fe r to individuals. T h e reason why it fo u n d ers on this is not because Russell fails to see that despite the fact that a deictic expression stands fo r d ifferen t objects (depending on the situation in which it is used) it has a unitary m eaning. Rather it is because he fails to take into account ano th er peculiarity of deictic expressions, viz. th at the same object for which a deictic expression is used in the p erceptual situation can be re fe rred to outside the percep­ tual situation by m eans o f a n o th e r deictic expression and then also by means o f o th er singular term s. It is this substitutability of deictic expressions which m akes it possible to re fe r to the same object when it is no longer perceived. Strawson also failed to go into this aspect of the use of deictic expressions which is crucial to the specification of objects, although he deserves credit for having raised the question of the func­

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tion of singular terms and, in particular, deictic expressions. It is, how­ ever, philosophically irrelevant to reproach Russell for having failed to take account o f certain aspects o f the use o f deictic expressions. This cannot touch him, for he does n o t regard ‘this’ as a deictic expression at all. It can only touch him, and only become philosophically relevant, if the aspect o f the use o f deictic expressions in question can be shown to be a necessary condition o f the possibility o f referring to individual objects. Strawson wanted to conduct his critique of logically p ro p er names in a m ore indirect fashion. He wanted to dem onstrate that it is not neces­ sary to postulate such expressions by rehabilitating the singular term s of natural language which, in Russell’s T heory of Descriptions, are in terp reted away. This was to be achieved firstly (and negatively) by the critique of Russell’s theory and secondly (and positively) by the appeal to the function of singular terms. O ne must, he says, recognize the use of these term s, whose purpose it is to refer to individuals, as the ‘h arm ­ less necessary thing’20 th at it is. B ut is it really so harmless? And has Strawson really succeeded in rehabilitating singular term s as such, if, as he believed, this requires a refutation of Russell’s theory? Does the neg­ ative critical p art of the article provide that critique which the positive part presupposes? Strawson holds fast to the same presupposition which Russell took as his starting-point, viz. that if one is to be able to refer to an individual with an expression that expression cannot imply a general statem ent. A refutation of Russell’s theory would have required Strawson to destroy its foundations rath er than simply offer an alternative version in the shape of the thesis that the general state­ m ent is not asserted but merely presupposed. If one only criticizes Rus­ sell in the way Strawson does then precisely that aspect o f Russell’s th e ­ ory to which Strawson took exception is preserved. Strawson him self adm its even in regard to the deictic expression ‘this’ that its use presu p ­ poses a general statem ent: if som eone points som ewhere and says ‘T his so-and so . . .’ then it is either asserted or presupposed that in that place th ere is one, and only one, so-and-so.21 T h e function of singular term s particularly of deictic expressions em phasized by Strawson thus in no way contradicts Russell’s theory; ra th e r it would even seem to p resu p ­ pose it. But in that case this function is harm less neither in the sense intended by Strawson - th at it makes Russell’s theory dispensable - n o r in the sense th at it requires no explanation. We shall have to ask: how can singular statem ents be understood if they already presuppose a re f­ erence to a totality and an existential statem ent that is a general state­ ment?

L E C T U R E 23

W h a t is ‘identification’?

At the end of the lecture before last we arrived at the result that the function of singular term s is to be u n derstood as that of specifying. By ‘specifying’ was m eant: indicating which o f all objects it is that is classified by the o th er sentence-com ponent. It has not yet been decided w hether the m eaning of o u r reference to objects is exhausted by the thus ch ar­ acterized object-relation that is m ade possible by the em ploym ent o f a species o f linguistic sign, n o r w hether we are to und erstan d what is m eant by ‘objects’ in term s o f it. And in particular it rem ained still unexplained how these linguistic expressions - singular terms - m ust be em ployed if they are to be able to fulfil the function of specifying as thus described. In o rd e r to p re p a re ourselves for this enquiry into the concrete form which the specificatory function of singular term s takes we shall begin by orientating ourselves towards the conception o f Strawson (who was the first to tackle this problem ). We saw in the last lecture that one cannot be satisfied with the way in which Strawson, in his early paper ‘On R eferring’, tries critically to distinguish him self from Russell. H ow ­ ever, his own positive conception (viz. th at singular term s have a socalled identificatory function) is merely sketched in th at paper. It is only worked out in his book Individuals (1958) and in his paper ‘Singular T erm s and Predication’ (1961) in which he argues with Q uine. So it is these writings towards which we m ust orientate ourselves in the hope of reaching, via Strawson’s talk o f identification, a concrete understanding of what I have term ed the function o f specification. In the 1961 p ap er Strawson states th at it belongs to the essence of a singular term th at it is ‘used for the p u rp o se of identifying the object’. A nd this identificatory function is said to consist in ‘bringing it about that the h earer knows which object it is, o f all the objects within the h e are r’s scope of knowledge or presum ption, that the other term ’ - the

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p redicate - ‘is being applied to ’.1 T his definition of w hat is m eant by ‘identification’ comes very close to the definition which I have given of ‘specification’; one m ight th erefo re think th at they stand for the sam e concept. H ow ever, as we shall see, the m atter is m ore com plicated. B ut it is worth noting that Strawson also takes account here o f the fact (which 1 have stressed b u t which he has otherw ise neglected), th at referen ce to an object implies a referen ce to all objects o f a dom ain. T h e only respect in which Straw son’s account differs from the one I gave is in the explicit m ention o f a hearer. In Individuals the problem o f identification is, from the start, treated as one th at concerns com ­ m unication betw een a speaker an d a h earer. T h u s it is th a t for Strawson the person who prim arily identifies an object is the hearer; he does so when he knows which object th e speaker m eans. In the case o f the speaker Strawson speaks only in a derivative sense of identification: that the speaker identifies an object m eans that the h earer identifies the object which he, the speaker, m eans.2 From this we can see why Strawson chose the term ‘identify’ for the function o f the singular terms in question: the hearer knows which object is m ean t by the speaker if he knows that the object which the speaker means is identical with an object so-and-so th a t is accessible to him , the h e a re r.3 It m ight at first sight seem a p articu lar virtue of Straw son’s conception th at from the outset he tries to u n d e rstan d referen ce to objects in term s o f the com m unication-situation. O n th e o th er h a n d we saw in the semantics o f whole assertoric sentences (in the debate with Grice) that, although linguistic expressions m ust be explained as they are used in in ter subjective com m unication, no explanation is acceptable that essentially presupposes that there are two separate speech-partners. For then the use o f the expression in soliloquy could not follow the same rules. In my description of th e function o f singular term s, viz. that they serve to pick out, or indicate, which object is m eant, the use of these expressions is u n d ersto o d in term s o f the function they have in discourse; b u t this can ju st as well be soliloquy. T h e exaggerated ten ­ dency th at is to be observed today in some q u arters tow ards a com m u­ nication-orientated sem antics at any price can only lead to a semantics that construes language as simply an instrum ent of com m unication. Such a sem antics would, like traditional philosophy, again p resuppose as prelinguistic the very epistemological structures which require explanation; such structures are then not understood in term s of the speech-situation. T h e apparently m ore radical com m unication-orientated approach (more radical because for such an approach the separation o f speaker and h earer is essential) is in reality less radical, fo r it inevitably rem ains on

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the surface. T h u s we saw th at a purely com m unication-orientated con­ ception of the use of assertoric sentences, such as that of Grice, has to presuppose ju d g m e n t or belief, and hence all the logical structures of semantics, an d th a t it th erefo re cannot explain them in term s of dis­ course. In the same way a theory o f singular term s according to which their function consists in this: that by their m eans one speech-partner com m unicates to an o th er which object he is re fe rrin g to, m ust p resup­ pose reference to objects as such as som ething th at does not first need to be explained in term s o f language and discourse. Such a theory of singular term s could th erefo re contribute nothing to the fundam ental enquiry into the object-relation and the concept of an object. You m ight say: ‘So what. O ne does not refu te a theory by pointing out th at a particu lar end cannot be achieved by it; for it could be that this end is o verdraw n.’ T h a t is correct. It can, however, be shown that Straw son’s explanation presupposes the very thing it is supposed to explain. T h e h e a re r identifies the object referred to by the speaker if he knows that th e object re fe rred to by the speaker is identical with the so-and-so. T h e second com ponent of this identity-statement is a singular term which, it is assum ed in this explanation, the hearer understands. So th e concept o f identification, as thus understood, can contribute nothing to the explanation of singular terms. This weakness in Strawson’s conception has been draw n attention to particularly by B. A. O. Williams in a review o f Straw son’s book.4 Consequently, the authors who have continued to w ork in the field of enquiry opened u p by Strawson have no longer used the term ‘identification’ in the com m unication-orientated sense in which Strawson first introduced it.5 A nd Strawson too finds him self com pelled to speak o f ‘identifying’ in a sense other than that initially intro d u ced . T h e hearer, he says, m ust be able to identify the in ten d ed object ‘for h im self’.6 And, one m ight well add, the speaker m ust also be able to identify the in ten d ed object ‘for him self’. In a later place in his book Strawson writes: ‘F or each of us can think identifyingly abou t particulars w ithout talking about them .’7 It is clear th at the term ‘identify’ is h e re being used in a completely d ifferen t sense from that in which it was in tro d u ced at the beginning of the book. For w hether the ‘thin k in g identifyingly’ o f which Strawson here speaks is understood as soliloquy or as som ething pre-linguistic, it can on no account be conceived as an internal c o u n te rp a rt o f the identification introduced by Strawson at th e beginning o f the book. For th at identification, when articulated, had the form o f an identity-statem ent the first com ponent of which was: ‘the object which the speaker m eans’. Trivially, such a reference has no place in soliloquy. So if one also speaks o f identifying in soliloquy then

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it would seem no longer to be a reference that is articulated in an identitystatem ent. In an identity-statem ent two singular term s are used. If the reference to an object which both speaker and hearer perform by means of one singular term is called ‘identification’, then ‘identification’ cannot m ean ‘holding som ething to be identical with som ething’. But what then does it mean? We find no real answ er to the question in Strawson. In this lecture and the next I shall have to put your patience to a severe test as, building on the m eagre beginnings we find in Strawson and others, I attem p t to reach a clear concept o f identification which will tu rn out to be a pre-em inent special case of the specification which, in the lecture before last, I showed to be the general function of singular term s. I f you w ant to know, before letting yourself in for this u n d ertak ­ ing, why you should be so patient, my reply would be that I believe that it is only by m eans of this narrow er concept of identification (which Strawson has not explained but hinted at) that the general function of specifying, and hence the m eaning o f reference to objects, can be understood. Strawson does not explain what he means by ‘identify’ in the non-com m unication-orientated sense. H e simply paraphrases the word, mainly by the expression ‘to pick o u t’; and Searle and others have followed him in this.8 W hat is m eant by the English ‘to pick o u t’? It is not only used for the physical act of picking out an individual object from a collection, e.g. a berry from a basket o f berries, but also for the merely designatory pick­ ing out of an individual as the one intended, e.g. an officer standing before his com pany picks out an individual as the one who is to perform a certain task, by pointing to him. And it is this picking out in the sense of singling out th at Strawson has in m ind when he uses ‘to pick o u t’ as a p arap h rase for ‘to identify’. T his is also shown by the fact that on one occasion he paraphrases ‘to pick out’ itself with the expression ‘to single out’.9 It means roughly: ‘to bring som ething into prom inence as the individual that is m eant’. So it now seems clear (1) th at Strawson uses the word ‘identify’ in two completely d ifferen t senses (2) th at in its first sense - ‘sp eak erhearer identification’10 - it presupposes in the case of both speaker and hearer identification in the second sense, and that, therefore, this is the basic sense, (3) that what is m eant by ‘identify’ in this second sense, paraphrased by ‘pick out’ and ‘single out’, appears roughly to correspond to what I have called ‘specification’: the act of indicating which of all it is that is classified by the supplem enting predicative expression. Strawson him self considered using the expression ‘specify’ (which has also been used by Q uine), b u t rejected it as too vague.11 It seems that

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he wished to exclude the following ambiguity. O ne could specify12 what is m eant simply by saying: it is that object to which such and such p ro p ­ erties belong. Clearly th ere are singular terms which specify the object for which they stand in this way, viz. definite descriptions. At any rate one can say this of all those definite descriptions which do not contain a deictic expression or a spatio-tem poral specification. A deictic expres­ sion serves subjectively to locate som ething, a spatio-tem poral specifi­ cation objectively to locate som ething. We shall have to deal with this in detail later on. Descriptions which do not locate in either of these ways we can call ‘purely descriptive definite descriptions’ (rein deskriptive Kennzeichnungen). O ne may doubt w hether one can distinguish an individual object from all others by the m ere accum ulation of merely descriptive expressions, i.e. predicates. However this possibility is rela­ tively clear in the case o f ‘ordinal’ properties, i.e. properties with respect to which objects can be o rd ered in a series.13 Examples o f this sort o f singular term would be ‘the highest m ountain’, ‘the second highest m ountain’. An object can fail to be distinguished from all others, and hence specified, by such descriptions, because there are two or m ore objects to which the p ro p erty in question belongs to the same degree, e.g. if there are two m ountains of exactly the same height. But the fact that the specification fails does not m ean that an expression is not used in this way (with this intention). Even the use of a dem onstrative expres­ sion - ‘this so-and-so’ - which is regard ed by m any authors, and also by Strawson, as the most unam biguous form o f identification can fail if it tu rn s out th at th ere is no so-and-so, or m ore than one so-and-so, at the place which is pointed to. So it cannot be because it can sometimes fail that Strawson does not recognize this form o f specification as identification; he m ust have o th e r reasons. If th erefo re Strawson paraphrases his second use of the word ‘identification’ so that it appears to correspond to what I have term ed ‘specification’ and if nevertheless he does not count as identification cases which clearly fulfil the function of specification then we m ust assum e that this talk o f ‘identification’ contains yet an o th er hidden ambiguity. W hat Strawson intends by ‘identify’ in the sense of ‘pick o u t’ m ust be a special, a pre-em inent case of the general function of indicating-which-of-all. T h e problem is clearly connected with Strawson’s opposition to Russell’s T heory of Descriptions which I discussed in the last lecture. For it is obviously the possibility ju s t m entioned, of purely descriptive specification, which Russell’s T heo ry of Descriptions fits. W hereas in ‘O n R eferring’ Strawson completely rejected this theory he now seems to accept it at least for one type of description; so now the

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objection would only be th at Russell has im properly generalized what is tru e o f this type and in so doing has overlooked that use of singular term s in particular by m eans of which an object is ‘identified’. We should now be in a position to, on the one hand, und erstan d better what it was in Russell that Straw son took exception to and, on the o th e r han d , obtain an indication from this o f what he means by ‘identification’. A lthough Russell of course does not him self speak of ‘specification’ an d although Strawson too does not call it ‘specification’, one can nevertheless say: th ere is a kind o f specification by m eans of a singular term in which it is said: ‘th ere is an object that is so-and-so’ or (if we re n d e r im plicit the explicit assertion o f existence which Strawson m ade m uch of, but which is in itself indifferent) ‘the one which is soand-so’. We can now easily see w hat it is th at Strawson still misses in such an expression and why he will still not g ran t it the function of identification. If we supp lem en t such an expression with a predicate to form a whole sentence and say: ‘the one which is so-and-so is F ’, then we have not indicated, one m ight say, o f which object it is asserted that it is F; we have only said th a t the only thing th at is so-and-so, whichever this may be, is F. O f course, this explanation is still unclear, for to som eone who were to argue in this way one could reply: ‘B ut we have specified which it is, precisely by saying “th e only one th a t is so-and so”.’ H owever, the o th er person could reply th at in this way the object is only indirectly designated as the sole b e a re r o f a p roperty; an object is only identified if it is itself directly designated. This contrasting of an indirect and a direct reference to an object is o f course still unclear. O ne can, however, clarify this contrast by m eans o f an exam ple. I f som eone says som ething about the highest m ountain on earth it is n o t yet clear of which object, of which m ountain, he is speaking. O ne can ask ‘and which m ountain is the highest th en ?’ Only w hen this question h ad been answ ered would we have ‘identified’ a specific m ountain. It is still unclear how this further specification of which it is is to be achieved; but we can now say that how ever it is achieved it is only this specification that should be called ‘identification’. Such a definition o f th e word ‘identify’ occurs in Searle. H e says: ‘By “identify” h e re I m ean th a t there should no longer be any do u b t o r am biguity about w hat exactly is being talked about. At the lowest level, questions like “who?”, “w hat?”, or “which one?” are answ ered.’14 You will still find this u nclear and ask: ‘what is this distinction of levels in re g a rd to the question “which o f all is m eant?” and w hat is it that distinguishes th e lowest level?’ So far as I can see the literature has up till now provided no m eans for systematically dealing with this question.

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Now in the fundam ental principle of analytical philosophy we have a natural clue to guide us in the enquiry into the semantics of singular term s. B ut though I re fe rred to this at the beginning we have not so far p u t it to use. T h e question o f what it is for a singular term to stand for an object, we saw then (p. 270), can only be answered by asking how it is established for which object a singular term stands. In the meantim e we have seen that the function o f the singular term is to specify an object, hence that ‘standing fo r’ is to be understood as specifying. T hus the question we have to ask is obviously: how is it established which object a singular term specifies? A nd if there are different kinds of singular term and d ifferen t levels of specification then we can expect that these can be distinguished by reference to the different ways in which it is established which object the expression specifies. M oreover, this should also explain how that narrow er concept of specification, which Strawson calls ‘identification’, an d whose m eaning he did not explain but merely hinted at by m eans o f paraphrases, is to be understood. H ow ever, in p rep aratio n for such a systematic analysis we should first make clear how far o ne can get with Strawson. So far I have only dis­ cussed the question o f what in general Strawson means by ‘identification’. We m ust now try to fo rm a clearer picture of the possibilities of identi­ fication o f perceptible objects by singular term s which he envisages. In this way we can p re p a re the g ro u n d for the systematic clarification of what distinguishes the narrow er concept of identification from the m ore com prehensive concept o f specification. Strawson distinguishes two sorts o f identification: direct (dem onstra­ tive) and indirect (non-dem onstrative). As one would expect he sees identification by m eans o f the deictic expression ‘this’ as the simplest case of identification. T h e question ‘which is the highest m ountain?’ can, so it would seem, be definitively answ ered by taking the questioner to a p articular m ountain and saying: ‘it is this o ne’. This ‘dem onstrative identification’ consists in this, th at ‘the h earer can sensibly discrim inate the individual object re fe rred to ’ and thus ‘pick it o u t’. H e is thereby able ‘directly to locate’ the object re fe rre d to.15 But an object can also be identified indirectly, in a non-dem onstrative way. T his can only be done by relating it to the situation o f dem onstrative identification, thus to the perceptual situation o f speaker and h earer. Such an identification is achieved th erefo re by means o f ‘a description which relates the p a r­ ticular in question uniquely to a n o th e r particular which can be dem o n ­ stratively identified’.16 Now there is a com prehensive system of unique relations to which all spatio-tem poral objects belong, namely the system o f spatio-tem poral relations. Every perceptible object has a place within

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this system and thus stands in a unique spatio-temporal relation to every o th er perceptible object. As the system of spatio-tem poral relations is unique, and com prehensive, every perceptible object can be identified, if not by an o th er unique relation at any rate by its spatio-tem poral rela­ tion to a directly identifiable object.17 If we m easure these two possible ways of identifying concrete objects which Strawson envisages against the idea - an idea which of course is not form ulated by Strawson him self - that a specification by means of a singular term V shall only count as identification if it no longer gives rise to the fu rth e r question ‘and which object isx?’, then one must raise the following objections: 1. If we take som eone who wants to know what the highest m ountain is blindfold to Mt Everest, rem ove the blindfold and say to him ‘It is this’, it is quite likely th at he will reply: ‘But which m ountain is it that I see here?’ Normally one would reply to such a question by giving the nam e of the m ountain. But that the answer ‘the highest m ountain (or: the m ountain which you see here) is Mt Everest’ is usually accepted as definitive is d ue simply to the fact th at it is presupposed th at one is clear which m ountain it is that is so nam ed. By the question ‘which is it?’ we m ean here ‘w here is it? in what spatial relations does it stand to other objects, to o th er geographical data?’ It is only after a reply to a question o f this kind that the fu rth e r question ‘and which is the m ountain that is at such-and-such a place?’ is meaningless. T hus one can only agree with Strawson that dem onstrative specification is a specification at the lowest level, an ‘identification’, to the extent that norm ally w hen we use the dem onstrative pronoun ‘this’ or the corresponding spatio-tem poral expressions ‘h e re ’ and ‘now’ we presuppose th at we can replace these expressions by other expressions which designate the objective spatiotem poral position in which the object is situated, thus the position which belongs to the object not ju st subjectively, from the standpoint of the speaker, but the position which belongs to it relative to all o th er possible standpoints. But then it is not possible to conceive of the identification o f perceptible objects in th at way in two steps as Strawson does. D em on­ strative identification if it is to be genuine identification itself presupposes spatio-tem poral, non-dem onstrative identification. What Strawson calls ‘direct location’ (above p. 316) presupposes the possibility o f an objective location. Strawson’s failure to see this results from his taking over the traditional assum ption, which is also implicit in Russell’s theory of logi­ cally p ro p er names, th at an expression’s standing for an object is to be understood as a direct relation. Like Russell, Strawson conceived this relation as a dem onstrative relation in which som ething present in p e r­

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ception is simply pointed at. H e failed to notice that to specify an indi­ vidual means: to indicate which of all. T his does not m ean that one must be able to give the relations o f the object referred to to all other objects (this is not the case with, e.g., most types of abstract objects). It does however m ean th at through the ‘indication which’ the object re fe rred to m ust be distinguishable from everything that is not identical with it. And in the specific case o f the specification of perceptible objects this has the consequence that the indication of which object is m eant by means of a m ere dem onstrative does not suffice for specification. One must also be able to distinguish the object m eant from all others. Why this can only be done by indicating in which spatio-tem poral relation it stands to all others is som ething we have still to investigate. 2. We have seen that Strawson distinguishes two sorts of non­ dem onstrative identification. In both cases the object m eant is identified by m eans of a unique relation to som ething dem onstratively identified, in the first sort by m eans o f its spatio-tem poral relation, in the second by m eans of an o th er relation. We have now seen that dem onstrative identification itself presupposes the first kind of non-dem onstrative identification. T h e presupposition is o f course a reciprocal one. All locating of som ething by indicating its spatio-tem poral relations to other objects is only an identification if the spatio-tem poral relations of these other objects to the perceptual situation are known. I shall come back to this point. But how is it with the o th e r kind o f non-dem onstrative identification - th at by m eans of other th an spatio-tem poral relations? O ne cannot reg ard this kind of identification as restricted to those cases in which som ething stands directly in a unique relation to som ething perceived. All specification by means o f a unique relation to som ething already identified clearly belongs to the sam e class; hence the relation to the perceptual situation can be as indirect as you please. Examples are: ‘the m u rd e re r o f this m an ’, ‘the wife of Mr M aier’, ‘the President of France’, ‘the first m an to climb Everest’. Now it is easy to see that the specification of an object by means of such a unique relation to something already identified in no way differs from specification by m eans of a merely descriptive expression, to which Strawson has denied the status of ‘identification’. A specification of the form ‘the only one that stands in the relation R to this h e re ’ does not differ qua specification from a specification of the form ‘the only one th at isF .’ In both cases som ething is only singled out as an individual by saying that it is the only thing which has a certain property or is related in a certain way to som ething identified. And in both cases the question rem ains open what it is that has this property or relation, e.g. ‘the m u rd e re r of M r X—’. A nd then

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the question arises: ‘who is that, who m u rd e re d M r X?’ T his question, like the question ‘which is the highest m ountain?’ can initially be answ ered by giving a p ro p e r nam e. B ut again this is a reply th at can only count as identification if it is assum ed th a t one knows which person it is th at is so nam ed. A nd h ere too this can only m ean: if one can spatiotem porally identify the person. It is difficult to see why Straw son believed th at specification by m eans of a uniq u e relation differs essentially from specification by m eans o f a unique property. Probably he th o u g h t that only a unique relation ensures that w hat is specified is really only one. B u t if this were so one could not adm it all relation-descriptions which in virtue o f th eir m eaning p re ­ suppose th at only one object stands in this relation (e.g. ‘the m u rd e re r o f . . .’) b u t only those w here not m ore th a n one object can have the relation concerned to a particu lar object (e.g. ‘the m o th er of . . .’). Spec­ ifications by m eans o f such relations, unlike those by m eans of a unique p rop erty , cannot fail in the sense th at it could tu rn out that the descrip­ tion applies to m ore than one object. B ut w ithout fu rth e r explanation it is n o t clear why a specification should n o t be an identification merely because it can fail. A nd, besides, all the kinds o f identification distin­ guished by Strawson can fail in the o th e r sense, i.e. in the sense o f it tu rn in g o u t that th e re is no such object. T h u s in the case o f dem o n stra­ tive identification it can tu rn o u t that w hen one says ‘this beetle’ there is no beetle in the place at which one points; and the sam e clearly holds for identification by m eans o f th e objective identification by m eans of the spatio-tem poral position at which the object is situated. Strawson has not sharply defined his concept o f identification, for he has not distinguished, as I have done, a n arro w er concept of identifi­ cation from a w ider one o f specification. It is th erefo re also n o t clear what his criterion is for distinguishing a specification in the narrow er sense from one in the w ider sense. C onsequently, my assertion that specification by m eans o f a u n iq u e relation does n o t differ, in th e sense relevant to identification, from specification by m eans of a unique p ro p ­ erty, does not tell decisively against him. O ne cannot arg u e definitively against an im precise position. T his assertion o f m ine is how ever conclu­ sive if, as I assum ed in connection with th e quotation from Searle, the relevant criterion for distinguishing identification from m ere specifica­ tion is th a t in the fo rm er case the question ‘which o f all is m eant?’ is answ ered at the lowest level, in o th er w ords, th at this question can no longer be repeated. If we now look at th e objections I have b ro u g h t against the two forms o f identification distinguished by Strawson tog eth er, they seem to point

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from two d iffe re n t sides to o ne and the same thing: namely that Straw­ son, who deserves the credit for draw ing attention to the special signif­ icance o f the system of spatio-tem poral relations for the identification of perceptible objects, has yet u n d erestim ated this significance. For Strawson this significance consists simply in this, that the spatio-temporal relations between objects constitute a com prehensive and unitary system of relations and thereby m ake it possible to identify an object, in so far as it is not dem onstratively identifiable, if not by m eans of o th er unique relations, then at least by m eans o f its spatio-tem poral relations. B ut it has now been shown, (a) th a t dem onstrative identification is only an identification if it is presu p p o sed that it can be replaced by spatio-tem ­ poral relations by which th e objective spatio-tem poral position which the object occupies is designated and (b) that specification by means of o th e r unique relations is not identification at all. It em erges then, not ju st th at the system of spatio-tem poral relations is specially significant for th e identification of perceptible objects, but th at there is only one sort o f identification o f perceptible objects: if an individual perceptible object is to be spoken of in such a way that the question ‘A nd which is that?’ is no longer possible, then it m ust be located in space and time. W here have we got to? T h e result at which we have now arrived has its foundation in an in tern al critical in terp retatio n o f Strawson and, at the sam e time, in the attem p t to p u rsu e the question ‘which is m eant?’ th ro u g h its various levels to the final one at which it can no longer be repeated. In this way I have situated my own enquiry and its fu rth er systematic elaboration in th e context o f the state o f the problem in con­ tem porary analytical philosophy, which, as far as I can see, has not essentially advanced beyond Strawson. T h e correction of Strawson’s view that it is m ost im p o rtan t to hold on to is the refutation of his conception of an isolated dem onstrative identification. This conception is a residue of the traditional theory o f the object-relation as a simple relation to som ething im m ediately given and contradicts the insight that reference to an object is to be u n d ersto o d as specification, as the indication of which o f all is m eant. W hat rem ains as the positive result o f the internal interpretation of Strawson how ever will scarcely strike you as transparent. T h a t all spec­ ification of perceptible objects at the lowest level is location by means of th eir spatio-tem poral relations is a result that m ust first be m ade intel­ ligible, in several respects. 1. So far it has not becom e clear why it is that th ere are several and essentially two levels o f specification o f perceptible objects and what it is, in principle, th at distinguishes the final level. We could get no answer

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to this question from Strawson, because his use of the term ‘identification’ is too unclear. So I confined my attention to the m ere fact that such levels are shown in the m an n er in which we specify an object. B ut if reference to an object is essentially to be understood as specification, and specification exhibits such differences, then the analysis o f these differences is clearly essential for understanding our reference to objects. 2. A lthough th e specification of perceptible objects at the lowest level has tu rn e d out to be spatio-tem poral location it has so far rem ained unexplained how this specification actually functions in the interplay of dem onstrative and objectively locating expressions. 3. Should we accept it simply as a fact that the specification of p er­ ceptible objects at this lowest level turns out to be spatio-tem poral loca­ tion? For Strawson this question did not need to arise because spatiotem poral location appeared to him to be merely one kind of identification am ong others. B ut if this fact is somehow to become intelligible then it must be possible to explain it by recourse to the concept of identification - specification at the lowest level - and we do not yet have such a concept. In o rd e r to answ er this question and in this way advance our enquiry into the m ode of em ploym ent of singular term s and reference to objects we will now have to bring to bear the conceptual means which we derive from o u r systematic approach: 1. I have already pointed out that from the standpoint of W ittgen­ stein’s principle it would have been obvious from the start to pose the question of the m ode of em ploym ent o f the various kinds of singular term (and that means: the question of the particular form which the specificatory function assumes) by asking how it is established for which object the expression stands (p. 316). M oreover we will now have also to bring in the question o f meaning; and we already know that the philosophical question concerning the m eaning of a form o f expression is the question concerning how individual expressions of this form are explained - and this means: how their m eaning is established. 2. In the introduction to the problem of singular term s I left open the question of w hether the ‘standing’ of a singular term ‘fo r’ an object can only be u nderstood in relation to the context of predication, for this question could not be decided on the basis of the truth-definition of the predicative sentence-form (p. 2 6 8 f). B ut as it then em erged that ‘standing fo r’ m ust be understood as specification it also became clear that singular term s are, as regards their object-relation, essentially incomplete expressions - they require to be supplem ented by something that is said about the object m eant, i.e. by a predicate (p. 291). T h e explanation of the m ode of em ploym ent o f singular term s can thus be

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reinforced by ap proaching the m atter from the o ther side and asking how perceptible objects m ust be specified if they are to be capable of being characterized by corresponding predicates, i.e. by predicates which are explained in perceptual situations. 3. T here is a third methodological perspective directly connected with this second one. If the specificatory function of singular term s is to be understood in connection with the need to be supplem ented by p re d i­ cates this m eans that the establishing of which object the singular term stands for m ust be u nderstood in connection with the establishing o f w hether the predicative statem ents into which the singular term enters as a d e p en d en t com ponent are tru e or false.

L E C T U R E 24

Specification and identification. Specification and tru th

T h e attem p t to clarify Straw son’s vague talk o f ‘identification’, which at first seem ed to correspond to what I had called the specificatory function of singular term s, led to the following result. W hat is thereby intended is not the general concept o f specification, but a p re-em in en t special case o f this function by m eans o f which is indicated at a lowest level which object is m eant, th at is, in such a way th at the question ‘A nd which object is th e one thus specified?’ can no longer be rep eated. A nd it em erged th at in the case o f perceptible objects this special case of specification is only given w hen the object is spatio-tem porally located by th e singular term . H ow ever, we have-so far not succeeded in describ­ ing this special case of specification in a way th at would justify speaking of a clear concept of identification. It th e re fo re also rem ained unclear what relevance this special case has for specification in general and hence for the possibility o f re fe rrin g to objects. A nd equally it rem ained unclear how this identification - specification by spatio-tem poral location actually functions and in w hat way spatio-tem poral location has such a pre-em inence fo r the ultim ate specification o f a perceptible object. A t the end o f the last lecture I re fe rre d to th re e m ethodological p e r­ spectives which can guide us in answ ering these questions which still rem ain open: 1. the orientation towards the actual m ode o f em ploym ent of singular term s and, in p articular, tow ards the question o f how it is to be estab­ lished for which object the expression stands. 2. consideration o f the fact that singular term s are expressions which su p p lem en t predicates. 3. consideration of the function which establishing which object the expression stands for has in establishing the tru th or falsity o f the sen­ tences th at can be form ed with it. O f these th re e perspectives the first is th e m ost concrete; and it is also

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decisive, for we clearly cannot attribute to singular terms through the expressions which they supplem ent or through those which arise from such supplem entation, an object-relation which they do not themselves yield. O n the o th e r hand, if the specificatory function of singular terms is essentially a partial function (Teilfunktion) which supplem ents the function of characterization-expressions in such a way that expressions with an assertoric function result, then from the other perspectives one should at least be able to shed light on those questions which concern not so much the descriptive phenom ena themselves as their intelligibility. T he th ird perspective is of particular im portance to us, for after all we are only u n d ertak in g the investigation of singular term s so as ultimately to arrive at an explanation of the use of the predicative sentence-form , or of the word ‘tru e ’ at this lowest level o f its recursive definition. T he best th in g th erefo re is for us to start from a global consideration of the th ird perspective as the most com prehensive. T he resulting orientation for the u n d erstan d in g o f singular term s will automatically lead us to the detailed investigation of singular term s from the point of view of how one establishes which object is specified by a singular term . Since we shall only be able to answ er a p art o f the open questions in this way, I shall revert, in the next lecture, to the second m ethodological p e r­ spective, to consideration of the fact that singular term s are expressions which supplem ent predicates - predicates which if they were not thus supplem ented would be quasi-predicates - and this perspective will lead to a deepening o f o u r understanding of the use of singular terms which, finally, should lead to a full u n d erstan d in g of singular terms from the third perspective, with the result that it is no longer necessary to use the locution ‘standing fo r’ in the truth-definition of predicative state­ ments and that the predicative sentence-form becomes intelligible. It would also seem ap p ro p riate to begin with the third perspective because, o f the th ree, it is the only one to have so far been considered in analytical philosophy by some authors. T h e reason for the unsatis­ factory state of the semantics o f singular term s, despite the vast literature, is that the discussion of such term s was only placed in the m ore general context o f the semantics o f assertoric sentences w here the latter was p u rsu ed at the level o f m eta-theory, thus w ithout enquiring about the mode o f em ploym ent of the expressions. W here the mode of employ­ m ent o f singular term s was enquired about this happened without an orientation tow ards m ore general sem antic principles and, most im por­ tantly, w ithout consideration o f the function o f singular term s in the sentence-whole. T his holds for Strawson and it also holds for other im p o rtan t m o d ern investigations of particular types of singular terms

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which represent views opposed to Strawson, in particular those of Kripke and Donnellan. Only in Dummett do we find a clear orientation towards the third perspective, inasmuch as, in his book on Frege, he maintains that the m eaning of a singular term , which is understood by him as a directive for establishing which object the expression stands for, is to be understood as the contribution it makes to the m eaning of the assertoric sentences into which it enters as a constituent. And to understand the m eaning of an assertoric sentence is also, for Dum m ett, to know how its truth or falsity is to be established. However, D um m ett has not devel­ oped the semantics of singular term s in detail. A similar conception is also to be found in Wiggins. However this conception has no conse­ quences for the details of his analysis in which Wiggins sticks to the fram ew ork m arked out by Straw son.1 T h e form ulation in Wiggins is so concise that we can take it as our starting point, especially as it presents itself as an attem pt (albeit a ‘rough and unsatisfactory’ one) to define the term ‘identify’. ‘I identify a if, for any

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explanation remains abstract inasmuch as it fails to reveal the difference of the roles which the singular term and the predicate play in establishing the truth o f the predicative sentence. Besides, Wiggins does not intend his definition to explain what it is to u n d erstan d a singular term , but what it is for a singular term to identify an object. Now one can easily build a bridge here and say: to und erstan d a singular term is to know how one establishes which object it identifies. This would make the con­ nection between the m eaning of the singular term and its identificatory or specificatory function. And you m ight think that this provided an answer to the question ju st raised concerning the special role of the singular term in the establishing o f the tru th o f the sentence. But this is not so, for, in the first place, although speaking o f specification or identification brings out a peculiarity o f the singular term , it rem ains unclear how far this describes its role in the establishing o f the tru th of the predicative sentence form ed with it. A nd, secondly, the word ‘iden­ tify’ is the word th at Wiggins defines in his definition; w hat the role of the singular term is in the establishing o f the tru th o f the predicative sentences that are form ed with it can therefo re not be presupposed by reference to a previous u n derstanding o f the word ‘identify’, but would have to result from th e definition (the definiens). However, the most im portant problem is as follows. It emerges clearly from the context that Wiggins does not intend his definition to be understood as a general definition of the function o f singular term s. R ather the criterion o f identification, as he defines it, is supposed to dem arcate a special sub-class of singular term s. W hat Wiggins has in m ind is the narrow concept of identification, which Strawson aim ed at but left unclear, and not the broad concept o f specification. At the end of the previous lecture we fou n d a possible external criterion for this narrow concept o f identification in the non-repeatability of the question ‘and which is that?’ B ut one of the questions left open was how this distinction o f levels is to be understood, and why it is that it comes to an end in the locating descriptions. T hus we are so far lacking a concept of identification. Could it be contained in W iggins’ definition? Certainly Wiggins intended this with his definition. But that this d ef­ inition actually achieves this, that it really only applies to the specificatory function of a special class of singular term s, is bound to seem doubtful as soon as we consider how then the m eaning and specificatory function of the o th e r singular term s is to be understood. It ju st seemed to us perfectly natural to say that one u n derstands a singular term - any singular term - if one knows how the tru th of the predicative sentences into which it enters as a constituent is to be established (assuming that

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one also u n d erstan d s the predicates o f these sentences). I f this is not so, then how could the m eaning of those predicative sentences that contain singular term s which are not identificatory in the narrow sense be understood? So it would seem th at W iggins’ definition fits the general concept of specification ra th e r than the narrow concept of identification. T h u s, although W iggins’ approach is m ore fu n d am ental than that of Strawson, his attem p t to dem arcate the in ten d ed narrow concept of identification would also seem to fail. For like Strawson he too has failed to consider the broad concept o f specification and hence has m ade no provision for the necessary dem arcation against it. N evertheless, W iggins’ definition contains a n o th e r restrictive qualifi­ cation which could p erh ap s lead us o u t of the p resen t impasse. He says that a is identified if one knows ‘w ithout p relim inaries’ how one estab­ lishes that ‘(pa* is true. Is this any help? We could now say: one understands a singular term ‘a \ or an object is specified by ‘a , if one knows how one establishes w heth er ‘(pa’ is true; b u t an object is identified by ‘a if we know without preliminaries how one establishes w heth er ‘<pa’ is tru e (in both cases it is assum ed th at we know how the p redicate is to be verified). B ut of course you will ask: w hat does it m ean to know such a thing with or w ithout ‘prelim inaries’? W iggins says nothing about this and I do not believe we will get any fu rth e r by m erely trying to speculate what could be m eant by ‘prelim inaries’ in this context. T h e qualification which rem ains u n clear in W iggins could, however, p oint a way out of the im passe if we simply re g a rd it as an indication that th ere could be dif­ fe re n t ways o f know ing how one establishes (given th at one already knows the verification-rule o f V ’) w hether ‘<pa’ is true; and this w ould give us a perspective for explaining not only the concept o f identification but also its relation to the general concept o f specification, and the reason for th at sequence o f levels in the question ‘W hich is it?’; for it could tu rn out that, d ep en d in g on the kind o f singular term ‘a , th ere are differen t ways o f establishing th at the predicative sentences ‘<pa form ed with it are true. B ut what basis do we have, after so many blind alleys, for adopting this perspective, which has resulted from an obscure qualifying clause in W iggins’ definition, and for seeing in it the possibility of an answ er to o u r question? Well, th e various considerations I have raised in con­ nection with W iggins’ definition were not simply random , but were guided by the aim of connecting Wiggins’ specific intention - a definition o f identification - with th e basic thesis which em erged from our third methodological perspective, viz. that to und erstan d a singular term m ust be to know its co ntribution to the establishm ent of the tru th of predic­

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ative sentences. T he perspective for the clarification of the differentiation of level in the specification-question which has now em erged is simply th at which we get by focussing on a differentiation yielded by the third m ethodological perspective. A ssum ing you accept this, you will now ask: but how should we now proceed? How can we tackle the question of the different ways in which one can establish - assum ing one already knows the predicate’s verifi­ cation-rule - w hether a predicative statem ent is true? As we are dealing with that aspect o f the establishm ent o f the tru th of the statem ent which does not concern the pred icate’s verification-rule but that with respect to which the p redicate’s verification-rule is to be applied, the question at issue is how one establishes what it is with respect to which the p re d ­ icate’s verification-rule is to be applied. But this means: the question at issue is how one establishes for which object the singular term stands and this is nothing o th e r than th e first of o u r three m ethodological perspectives. T h u s as soon as we try to carry through the third perspective con­ cretely we are forced to m ake the transition to the first perspective. B ut the question presented by the first perspective has now received from the third perspective a direction th at was not obvious from the start. T h e question ‘How does one establish which?’ when it is incorporated into the question o f how one establishes w hether the corresponding predicative statem ents are tru e has not only the sense of ‘How does one establish which object it is that is classified?’ but also ‘How does one establish with respect to which object the verification-rule of the classification-expression is to be applied?’ In oth er words, the question ‘How does one establish for which object the singular term stands = Which object is specified by it?’ not only belongs essentially to the context of som ething being classifiable by predicates, but it belongs to this context in such a way th at it concerns the verifiability o f this classifiability. Is this a hypothesis, you will ask, or is it compelling? It is compelling if two things are adm itted: (1) th at we u n d erstan d an assertoric sentence if and only if we know how its tru th is to be established and (2) that the m eaning of the com ponent-expressions of predicative sentences consists in their contribution to the m eaning o f the sentences. But as we did not w ant to im pose on the m eaning o f singular term s anything that does not follow from their own explanation it is advisable in applying the first m ethodological perspective initially to disregard the third perspec­ tive and only bring it in later. I f we confine ourselves to those singular term s which also have a m eaning - a n d this m eans: disregard p ro p e r nam es - then in the p re ­

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vious lecture we had to do with four ways in which a perceptible object can be specified by a singular term : (1) by a dem onstrative expression (‘this m ountain’, ‘this beetle’), (2) by a description by means o f spatiotem poral relations (‘the m ountain that is situated at the intersection of such and such a parallel of latitude an d such and such a circle of lon­ gitu d e’), (3) by other unique relations to som ething already identified (‘the m u rd e re r of Mr M aier), (4) by a unique property (‘the highest m ountain’). We have seen that Strawson sees no structural difference between (2) and (3), but that he sharply distinguishes between (3) and (4) and regards (1) as in d ep en d en t o f (2). However, reflection on the possibility o f repeating the question ‘A nd which is that?’ showed that there is no difference between (3) and (4), that (1) and (2) are closely connected and that between (3) and (4) on the one hand and (1) and (2) on the other th ere is a sharp distinction. Applying the question ‘How does one establish which is m eant?’ should reveal the correctness of this initially tentative reclassification; and if at the same tim e we bring the third m ethodological perspective to bear, the ground of the distinction o f levels in the question ‘Which is it?’ should becom e intelligible. W hat distinguishes the first case, the use of a dem onstrative singular term , is clearly that establishing which is m eant can be achieved directly through perception. It is decided by perception w hether the specification succeeds or fails; one establishes w hether there really is one and only one object o f the relevant kind at the place to which the dem onstrative expression points. In the second case, that of a locating description, it is clearly the per­ ceptual situation in which the existence o f the object referred to would be established th at is designated; and h ere too perception would decide w hether one (and only one) object was specified. If the reflections o f the previous lecture on the dependence of dem onstrative specification on locating specification were correct then clearly one will have to supplem ent what has now been said about the first case by reference to the second case. In the first case it is not enough to say that which object is m eant is established by perception. It is true that in a perceptual situation the presence of one and only one object of a certain kind is established; but which it is (and that means: which of all) is established by specifying what the perceptual situation is relative to all other perceptual situations. We can now begin to u n derstand why locating descriptions have the role o f a final answer in the question ‘Which is it?’ (in the previous lecture we could merely point to this as a fact). W hat is special about

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spatio-tem poral relations for the problem o f specification resides not only in their universality, as Strawson thought, b u t in this: they are not ju st relations between objects; every spatio-tem poral position is a p e r­ ceptual situation. Strawson, like Russell, had assum ed that all reference to perceptible objects m ust be dem onstratively-perceptually grounded. W hereas for Russell the object-relation did not reach beyond the p ar­ ticular demonstrative act, Strawson conceived of a. system of identification; however, he presented it as though it consisted merely of relations betw een objects and was dem onstratively anchored at only one place. In reality, however, a system of specification could never arise in this way. W hat Strawson failed to see is that the system o f spatio-tem poral relations is not ju st anchored in dem onstration and perception; rath e r it is a system of possible perceptual positions - and th at means: a system of demonstrative specifications. W hat is special about spatio-tem poral descriptions, therefore, is that they specify perceptible objects as perceptible objects, that they specify them as objects o f possible perceptions. But this does not yet capture w hat is essential about this state of affairs. I am speaking as though it were self-evident that th ere are perceptible objects, whereas it is the presen t analysis of the use o f singular term s that is supposed to explain what it is for us to be able to refer to objects in perception. It is at this poin t that it becomes necessary to explain the significance of what was worked out by adopting the first methodological perspective by reference to the third perspective. For what is a perceptible object? W hatever else it may be it is an object to which indeed other predicates apply, but to which first and forem ost perceptual predicates apply (i.e. predicates whose use can be explained in perception by means o f examples); it is thereby constituted as a perceptible object. In a predicative sentence whose predicate is a perceptual predicate the distinguishing character of dem onstrative an d locating singular term s consists in this, that they specify the perceptual object in such a way that one can establish of it as thus specified w hether the predicate applies to it. O ne can, it is true, say: singular term s of this kind are such as specify the perceptual situ­ ation in which it can be established by perception which the object is that they specify. But what this means is that they specify the verificationsituation in which one can establish w hether the perceptual predicates asserted o f the object apply to it. This then would be, at least as regards singular term s o f the first two types, the special role they have in estab­ lishing the tru th o f predicative sentences: they indicate the verificationsituation to which the predicate’s verification-rule is to be applied. It is thus tru e to say that by means o f the spatio-tem poral descriptions

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a perceptible object is specified qua perceptible object. T h e significance of this statem ent, how ever, can easily be u n d erestim ated , for it can be mis­ in te rp re te d as m eaning that by m eans o f this specification an object that is already the object it is in d ep en d en tly o f this specification is specified in a certain respect - as perceptible - ju s t as it can also be specified in oth er respects, e.g. as regards its causes o r effects o r ordinal properties. But an object th a t is essentially a perceptible object cannot already be the object it is in d ep en d en tly o f its specification as perceptible. T hus the state of affairs is m ore appropriately expressed if in the first instance we fo rm u late it w ithout using the w ord ‘object’: with the specification of an object by spatio-tem poral descriptions a verification-situation for the application o f p erceptual predicates is specified. T o re fe r to a p er­ ceptible object is to specify a verification-situation fo r perceptual p re d ­ icates; an d since o ne can only specify such a p erceptual Situationen such by spatio-tem porally locating it, the perceptible object as such is only specified if it is spatio-tem porally located. With this definition o f the specification of th e object as such we have arrived at the narrow concept of identification fo r which we have been looking. With this we now have a basis for re n d e rin g W iggins’ definition p re ­ cise, so that it can really be u n d ersto o d as a definition of the intended narrow concept o f identification. H ow ever, to obtain the p ro p e r back­ g ro u n d for this I would first like to deal with the still outstanding ques­ tion o f how one establishes in the case of the o th e r two types o f singular term s which object is specified. Singular term s o f the third an d fourth kinds like those o f th e first two kinds contain a directive as to how it is to be established which object is m eant. In this case, however, the direc­ tive does not take the form o f specifying the p erceptual situation in which th e object would be perceived; ra th e r it takes the form o f speci­ fying a criterion — in the th ird case a relative one, in the fo u rth an absolute one - by which the object m ean t can be recognized. T h u s the singular term contains the directive to investigate all objects of a certain kind to establish which uniquely possesses the p ro p erty in question. T h e ways in which all objects are investigated to establish which has the characteristic can be very d iffe re n t d e p e n d in g on the p ro p erty con­ cerned. T h e pro ced u res req u ired for establishing who the m u rd e re r is are d iffe re n t from those for establishing which is the highest m ountain. In no case is th e establishing of th e sim ple type we have become acquainted with in the case o f p ercep tu al predicates, w here it could be established by sim ple perception w h eth er a given object has th e char­ acteristic. O rdinal pro p erties are also implicitly relational. H e re estab­ lishing which object it is is preced ed by an investigation which com pares

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the objects of the kind specified (e.g. mountains) with respect to the relevant ordinal p ro p erty (e.g. height). With the relational properties it is mostly a m atter o f causal properties (e.g., ‘the m other of . . ‘the m u rd e re r o f . . .’) o r institutional properties (‘the wife of . . ‘the pres­ ident o f . . .’) and, d ep en d in g on which it is, there are different, some­ times complicated, decision-procedures for establishing whether a given object has this relation to another. For o u r purposes, however, all that m atters is that in all cases of both these types o f specification all objects of a certain kind m ust be individually investigated - directly or indirectly - to establish which one it is that stands in this relation. B ut this means th at to establish which object it is that is specified by means o f a singular term o f type (3) or (4) is to establish which of the perceptible objects, which are specifiable by means of locating descrip­ tions, it is that uniquely fulfils the relevant criterion (being the so-andso). In oth er words, specification of types (3) and (4) presupposes locating specification of types (1) and (2), not ju s t as a m atter of fact, but in virtue o f its m eaning. T h e m eaning o f an expression of the form ‘the so-and-so’ is u n d ersto o d if (a) its form is understood (and that means: if one knows how in general statem ents of the form ‘T h ere is am ong all things one and only one that is so-and-so’ are verified) and (b) the p re­ dicative, or relational, expression ‘so-and-so’ is understood (and that means: if one knows how it is established w hether this predicate applies to an object). We can now u n d erstan d why Strawson (1) could not see where the relevant dividing line is betw een the types of singular term , (2) why he failed to give ap p ro p riate expression to the uneasiness he rightly felt about Russell’s T h eo ry of Descriptions. Both these things result from his not asking how the m eaning of singular term s is explained, or how one establishes which object a singular term specifies. Only when this question is asked does it become clear that although locating descriptions and descriptions by m eans of other unique relations have the same gram m atical form - ‘the so-and-so’ - they have completely different sem antic functions. T h e ordinary relational description specifies a rela­ tional characteristic and contains the directive to investigate all objects to establish which uniquely has the property. Locating descriptions, on the o th er hand, specify the situation in which one and only one object of a certain kind can be perceived. A lthough the locating description also has the form ‘am ong all objects there is one that is at such and such a time in such and such a place’ this does not contain a directive to run through (durchlaufen) all objects individually and exam ine them to establish which has the characteristic of being in such and such a place

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at such and such a time. This is because the running through of indi­ vidual objects is itself perform ed by running through the different spa­ tio-temporal positions (perceptual situations), thus because the individual perceptible objects are constituted as individuals precisely by the spatiotem poral positions they occupy. T h e last explanation does not clearly follow from what has gone before. I shall be returning to this aspect. On the o th er hand, it is already clear that, although both kinds of description imply a universal statem ent, only in the one case can that which is m eant only be established by a ru n ning-through o f all; in the o ther case no such d eto u r is required. This is because, (a) that which is referred to is a perceptual situation, but also because (b) the specification o f an individual spatio-temporal position implies a reference to all spatiotem poral positions in a way which differs from that in which the speci­ fication of an individual object implies a reference to all objects. B ut I will also be coming back to this (p. 369). We are now in a position to give a clear sense to W iggins’ definition. Indeed it can now claim to be both a definition of specification in general, o f what it is for a singular term , of whatever kind, to specify an object, and, when suitably qualified, of the narrow concept of identification (which is what Wiggins intended). We can easily see that the definition also completely fits singular terms of types (3) and (4), at least if we ignore the qualification ‘without p re ­ lim inaries’ which, due to its unclarity, is ultimately empty. If one speaks of ‘the m u rd e re r of H ans’ one is clearly not directly in a position to verify w hether a predicate, in particular a perceptual predicate, e.g. ‘having blue eyes’, applies to him. But one is also not directly in a position to verify such a thing about a person who is specified by a locating description. T hus if one were to in terp ret W iggins’ ‘w ithout prelim inar­ ies’ qualification very narrowly then his definition would only apply to dem onstrative specification, which, as we have seen, is, if taken in iso­ lation, not specification at all. O n the other h and, of course, the person who understands the expression ‘the m u rd e re r of H ans’ understands perfectly well what he has to do to establish w hether the person so described has blue eyes; only what he has to do to establish this is som e­ thing differen t from what he has to do to establish w hether the person who was b orn at such and such a tim e in such and such a place has blue eyes. It is not a question of which is easier or m ore complicated; that depends am ong o ther things on who it is who wants to establish it. Someone who was present when H ans was m urdered can probably establish m ore easily and with g reater certainty w hether the m u rd erer has blue eyes than if the person is specified for him by his date of birth

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and he does not belong to his im m ediate family. R ather it is a question of a fundam ental difference in the m ethod o f verification of a perceptual predicate. A locating description specifies an object directly, that is by specifying the situation in which it can be established w hether a percep­ tual predicate asserted of this object applies to it. In the case of objects that e n d u re and change their place and to which different perceptual predicates apply at differen t times the locating, if it does not specify the com plete life-path o f the object but only, for exam ple, its birth, does not designate the perceptual situation in which it can be decided whether a predicate that belongs to it at some time applies; however the lifepath of the object can be followed from perceptual situation to perceptual situation to that tim e at which the predicate is supposed to apply to it. This problem of the duratio n o f objects, to which we shall also have to retu rn , introduces a complication into the connection between locating specification and the verification of perceptual predicates, but no dif­ ference o f principle. By contrast we have a fundam entally different situation if the object is not specified as a perceptual object by being spatio-tem porally located but by means o f a characteristic; for in this case before one can know w hat the perceptual situation would be in which one can establish w heth er a perceptual predicate applies to this object, it must first be established which o f all perceptual objects uniquely has the property concerned. It is this interm ediate procedure which is absent in the case o f locating descriptions; so in this sense one can say with Wiggins that in their case one knows ‘w ithout prelim inaries’ how one establishes w hether the relevant sentence is true. W hat is missing from W iggins’ definition, in so far as it is supposed to define that narrow concept o f ‘identification’, is thus (a) the elucidation (which I have ju st given) of his qualification ‘without prelim inaries’ and (b) the restriction to perceptual predicates. T h e reason why W iggins’ definition, if intended as a definition o f ‘identification’, must be restricted to perceptual predicates is this: if the special pre-em inence of locating expressions for establishing the tru th of predicative statem ents rests on their designating perceptual situations then this special role only obtains in the case o f predicates which are such that it can be verified by p e r­ ception w hether they apply. Let me clarify this by means of an exam ple.3 T o establish w hether the statem ent that the author o f the Divine Comedy was a great poet is true it would clearly rep resen t a d eto u r w ere we first to establish which o f all spatio-tem porally locatable persons it was th a t wrote the Divine Comedy. For in o rd e r to establish w hether it is tru e that the au th o r was a great poet all th at is relevant is that he was the au th o r of this and

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possibly other poems, not anything to be established by perception about a locatable person. A nd even if we w ant to know w hether D ante - the person who was born in such-and-such a place and had such-and-such a life-path - was a great poet, the perception of this person is only relevant to the decision w hether this predicate applies to him in so far as we can only decide by perception, or ap p ro p ria te inferences to p e r­ ceptible actions, w heth er this person is the a u th o r o f the Divine Comedy and o th er poem s. T h u s if we want to know in a final sense who this g reat poet was we m ust clearly have recourse to locating singular term s and p erceptual predicates; ‘if we w ant to know who in a final sense’: we now know what this m eans. It m eans: if we w ant to specify the object <25 a perceptible object - and this means: identify it. B ut as we have seen we can also specify an object in an o th er way. A nd we can clearly also verify with respect to the object thus specified that it has such-and-such p ro p ­ erties (if they are not perceptual properties); only we th en m ean: the so-and-so, w hichever that may be, is so-and-so.4 We now know what is m eant by the clause ‘w hichever th a t may b e’. It means ‘which o f all objects th at a re locatable and distinguishable as individual objects of perception by m eans o f th eir spatio-tem poral relations’. W e have thus answ ered one o f the questions which rem ained open at the end of the previous lecture, namely, why it is that there are two levels o f specification of perceptible objects and what it is th at distinguishes the narrow concept of specification - which we can call ‘identification’ - from the general concept of specification. T h a t a distinguishing o f individual perceptible objects is possible at all depends on th ere being a multiplicity of em ploy­ m ent -sit 11 ations o f elem entary (perceptual) predicates. T h a t th ere are perceptible individual objects - i.e. things that are perceptible and clas­ sifiable, such that from all of them one can be singled out —is connected, in a way th at has still to be explained, with th e fact that th ere is a m ul­ tiplicity of perceptual situations, such that from any perceptual situation one can re fe r to any o th e r and thus can indicate of each one which of all it is. In this way it becomes possible to specify individual perceptible objects as perceptible; and that m eans: to identify them . B ut it is also possible to m ake general uniqueness-statem ents, that is, specify som e­ thing as som ething th at uniquely possesses a relative or absolute p ro p ­ erty. A nd if som ething is specified in this way then one can always also ask (though one need not), how it is to be identified. You may ask: is not this conception o f two levels of reference to indi­ vidual perceptible objects very similar to Russell’s conception? Certainly. B ut it is distinguished from Russell’s conception in so far as the two levels now belong closer together; an d this implies a new concept of the

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referen ce to objects. Even at the fundam ental level at which one refers directly to individual perceptible objects one refers to the object - con­ trary to Russell’s opinion and the traditional opinion in general - in such a way that one singles it out as one of all; and this seems to be essential to u n d erstan d in g what it is to mean an object. And because one also singles out one from all at the other level it appears necessary to establish a unitary concept of the specificatory function of which the identificatory function can be shown to be a particular form (though of course a fundam ental one). T h e second question which rem ained open at the end of the last lec­ tu re was: how should one in terp ret the fact that the specification of perceptible objects at the lowest level is by m eans of spatio-tem poral location? T his question which can also be put thus: how should one in terp ret the fact that the objects of o u r perception are essentially spatiotem poral objects? seems also to have now been answered, though only in a prelim inary way. T h e em ploym ent-situations of elem entary classification-expressions, i.e. perceptual predicates, are distinguished from one another by their spatio-tem poral relations. From this it would seem to follow that if we can hold apart, distinguish and identify the m ulti­ plicity which these classificatory expressions classify, thus if we can refer to what is classified by them as objects, then the elem entary objects resulting in this way m ust be perceptual situations; and that means: spatio-tem poral positions. O f course, this answer cannot be regarded as satisfactory for it goes fu rth e r than the question and at the same time contradicts the facts inasm uch as instead of explaining why o u r elem en­ tary objects are identified by spatio-tem poral relations it would lead to the view that our elem entary objects simply are spatio-temporal positions. So we now find ourselves confronted with the question: how are the identification o f spatio-tem poral objects and the identification of spatiotem poral positions connected? A nd this question is in tu rn obviously closely connected with the third of the questions that rem ained open at the end of th e last lecture, viz. how does spatio-tem poral identification operate?

L E C T U R E 25

Spatio-tem poral identification and the constitution of the object-relation

What we achieved in the last lecture was a prelim inary clarification of the concept of identification which sufficed to explain the division into levels in the specification-question and to confirm the sharp distinction between locating and non-locating descriptions. We can now disregard non-locating descriptions and confine ourselves to the problem of iden­ tification, since it has become apparent that the question of what is meant by ‘perceptual objects’ and how we are able to refer to such objects centres on this problem . T o this end we m ust again take up the question of how singular terms are used and how one establishes for which object they stand. W hereas in the previous lecture we were concerned to distinguish the use of dem onstrative and locating singular term s from non-locating singular terms, our concern will now be to explain, from the same methodological perspective, the interdependence of dem onstrative singular term s and objectively locating singular term s as regards their function in the iden­ tification of perceptible objects. We shall have to so approach this prob­ lem that we simultaneously aim at a clarification of the difficulty we encountered at the end of the last lecture when the hypothesis arose that perhaps spatial and tem poral positions rath er than objects th at are in space and at times are to be regarded as the most elem entary objects. We must therefore put the question about spatio-temporal identification in such a way that initially we leave open the question of w hether the identification of spatial (extended) objects and tem poral objects (events) depends on the identification of places and times or w hether the reverse is true or w hether there is an interdependence between them. O f course, one can only speak of places and times as objects if there are corresponding singular terms. But clearly there are such term s. In particular the dem onstratives ‘h ere’ and ‘now’ are such. Despite their syntactic difference from the other singular terms they fulfil all the

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semantic conditions for singular term s with which we have become acquainted. By means of the words ‘h ere’ and ‘now’, if they are used in a specific situation, som ething is specified and even identified. An indi­ vidual spatio-tem poral position is singled out from all spatio-tem poral positions as that which can be classified by a predicate (for exam ple if we say ‘H ere and now it is hot’). A nd this specification is an identification, since what is referred to is specified in such a way that, if the predicate is a perceptual predicate, then with the specification of place and time the perceptual situation for the verification o f this predicate is specified. B ut what applies to ‘h e re ’ and ‘now ’ applies equally to all expressions which specify a place o r a time by its relations to other places and times, or to spatial and tem poral objects. A nd ju st as in the case of other types of object, we can also apply the so-called quantifiers to places and times; we can say som ething about all or about some places and times. Again it was Frege who first recognized that ‘places, instants, stretches of time are, logically considered, objects’ and hence th at ‘the linguistic desig­ nation of a definite place, a definite instant, or a stretch of tim e’ is to be regarded as a singular term (‘p ro p e r nam e’).1 Thus w hether places and times are to be regarded as objects in the form al sense, which is the only relevant one fo r us, is not in doubt. W hat is in question is w hether these objects, because they cannot as such be perceived, are not such that they can only be identified by means of objects which m ark places and times by their spatio-tem poral relations. W hat the relations o f dependence are here can only be decided after we have clarified the actual mechanism of spatio-temporal identification. T h e singular term s tow ards which we have to orientate ourselves in this question are thus no longer only those dem onstrative and locating expressions which locate extended objects and events, but also those which locate places and times. I introduced the considerations of the previous lecture by combining the question of how one establishes for which object a singular term stands with a fu rth e r question, that concerning the contribution of the singular term to the establishing of the truth of the predicative sentences into which it enters as a com ponent. Now before we em barked on these analyses I m entioned a third m ethodological perspective towards which we can orientate ourselves: the question of how singular term s m ust function if they are to be able to supplem ent predicates, especially p e r­ ceptual predicates. T hese two approaches - the discussion of singular term s from the perspective of the predicative sentences into which they en te r as parts and the discussion of them from the perspective of the predicates which they supplem ent - are clearly not independent of one

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another; and they are all the less so if, as we have seen in distinguishing d ifferen t types o f singular term s on the basis o f their function in the verification of predicative statem ents, one has to consider what sort of predicates are involved. So this o th er m ethodological perspective was al­ ready presen t in the reflections o f the previous lecture. However, it re ­ m ained on the p erip h ery an d I p ostponed discussion o f the fu rth e r ques­ tions to which it gave rise. Now, w hen th e analysis is to concentrate on those singular term s whose distinctive ch aracter as identifying expres­ sions is g ro u n d ed in the fact th at they re fe r to the verification-situations o f perceptual predicates, it would seem n atu ral expressly to bring in this m ethodological perspective, all the m ore so as it is this perspective which has given rise to the additional problem o f w hether places and times should not p erhaps them selves be re g a rd e d as the prim ary objects. In o rd e r pro p erly to u n d e rsta n d how the various threads of the problem hang to g eth er you m ust also see th at in adopting this perspec­ tive —asking how singular term s m ust function if they are to supplem ent perceptual predicates - all we are doing is connecting up the discussion of singular term s with o u r earlier discussion o f predicates. In term s of that earlier perspective th e problem is: how m ust expressions function if they are to su p p lem en t classification-expressions which, if they were used in dependently, would function as quasi-predicates, in such a way that the classification-expressions acquire the character of predicates, in other words, in such a way as to yield expressions which can be true or false (or can be used to m ake tru e or false assertions)? So you see, we can approach the veritative function o f singular term s - or the truth context to which o u r speaking of ‘objects’ belongs - from two sides: O n the one h an d , we can start, as in the previous lecture, from the fact th at the statem ents to which the recursive definition of the word ‘tru e’ leads are statem ents in which som ething is asserted of an individual object. And by proceeding in this way we were able to see how the rela­ tion to objects is functionally included in the relation to tru th ; for it became ap p aren t that we know for which object the singular term stands if and only if we know - assum ing we already know the verification-rule of the predicate - how the tru th o f th e statem ent is to be established. On the o th e r han d , instead of startin g from this fact we can start from a hypothetical problem by asking how th at p a rt of the predicative sentence which already has a possible isolated m ode of em ploym ent would have to be su p p lem en ted if som ething capable of tru th is to result. T h e advantage o f this second approach is that it does not presuppose the object-relation as a fact and, hence, can contribute som ething to und erstan d in g it. O n the o th e r hand, this ap proach has, for ju st this

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reason, a constructive character and can therefore only provide a hypothesis that can only be decided by reference to the actual use of linguistic expressions. Now the ‘on the one h and - on the o th er h an d ’ does not just concern the m ethod of proceeding. O ne m ust see that the two modes of analysis approach the unitary p h en o m en o n from the two opposite ends and would th erefo re have to meet. T h e level at which they meet is that of the verification-situation. If one starts so to speak ‘from above’, from predicative sentences, or singular term s, then, as we have seen, in the question of verification the other singular terms refer (verweisen) to those which specify objects as perceptible, thus to those which specify them by reference to the perceptual situations in which one can verify (a) w hether they exist and (b) w heth er the perceptual predicates asserted of them apply to them . If, on the oth er hand, one starts so to speak ‘from below’, from the use o f a predicate in a perceptual situation, the question arises: w hat else is n eed ed if a perceptual situation is to be not merely a perceptual situation b u t a verification-situation? A nd this is identical with the question: w hat m ust be added to the use of a classification-expression in a perceptual situation for the classification-expression to be related to an object? T h u s the analysis ‘from below’ enables one to explain, by m eans of the contrast with a m ore primitive language that does not yet contain reference to objects and, hence, no truth-relation, how a referen ce to objects is constituted linguistically. (I still say: how they are linguistically constituted. At the end of the discussion we shall have to ask w hether a non-linguistic reference to objects is still conceivable.) T h e level at which the two m odes of analysis, which, somewhat clum ­ sily, I have called th e analysis ‘fro m above’ and the analysis ‘from below’, meet, is m arked by the dem onstrative singular terms ‘this’, ‘h e re ’, ‘now’. On th eir correct u n d erstan d in g there ultimately depends the u n d e r­ standing o f what it is to refer to a perceptible object. Viewed from ‘above’, dem onstrative expressions are those to whose use the use of all other singular term s refers (verweist). T o u n d erstan d the o th er singular terms is to u nderstand this reference. O n the other hand, viewed from ‘below’, if the dem onstrative expressions are used to designate the verificationsituation o f a predicate, then this use in turn refers back to other singular term s which refer to them. This reciprocal reference is not an in terp re­ tation b u t can be dem o n strated in the use o f these expressions: they are used in such a way th at they can be connected with oth er expressions by m eans of the identity-sign, a p rocedure which gives expression to the fact th at they can be substituted for one another in such a way that,

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depending on the situation in which they are used, the one speechevent is described as correct if and only if the other is described as correct; when the word ‘correct’ is used in this way it has the meaning of ‘tru e’. This substitutability which is expressed in the use of the identitysign and in which reference to objects is constituted is thus the condition of the possibility of expressions being employed in such a way that they - in contrast to the expressions of a quasi-predicate language - can be described in the language itself as true and false. Now this dependence of a reference to objects on singular term s and th eir substitutability can be m ore easily explained in terms o f the approach from ‘below’, because the approach from ‘above’ already presupposes th at one is dealing with assertoric sentences, with expressions capable of being true and referring to objects, whereas from the perspective of the approach from ‘below’ we can explain the constitution of the object-relation by means of the contrast with a language that is still pre-objectual, viz. the quasi-predicate language. I shall begin therefore by answering the question m entioned at the beginning of the lecture about how the m echanism of the identification of perceptible objects functions - and this means: how those singular term s are used by means of which we not only specify but identify p e r­ ceptible objects. Notice that this question is a purely descriptive question about the m ode o f em ploym ent o f certain types o f singular term . T he constructive aspect to which I just referred will en ter into the analysis only in so far as, in answering this question, I start with the singular term s closest to the quasi-predicate language, the dem onstrative terms, and only after this pass on to the objectively locating expressions. Only in the next lecture will I tackle the constructive enquiry ‘from below’. Now that we have seen that the words ‘here’ and ‘now’ are also singular term s and that, together with the w ord ‘this’, they constitute, as far as the dem onstrative character is concerned, a unitary class, o u r concern is with this entire class o f singular term s; and one can also include here the word T . I pointed out in the previous lecture that one can say of singular term s in general, in so far as they have a meaning at all, that to und erstan d them is to know how one establishes which object they identify. We call ‘deictic expressions’ (and all simple deictic expressions are singular terms) those which are such that establishing which object they identify is d ep en d en t on the situation in which they are used. T o und erstan d the m eaning of such an expression is to know how an object is identified by the use of the expression in relation to the em ploym entsituation. Borrow ing from the language of mathematics one can for­ m ulate this as follows: the m eaning of such an expression is a function

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whose argum ents are the speech-situations and whose values are objects. By means of the expression’s em ploym ent-rule a particular object is assigned to the speech-situation or, as one also says, the m eaning ‘m aps’ the speech-situations onto the objects. T his holds for all deictic singular term s. It is characteristic o f dem on­ strative deictic singular term s that they identify an object not just in relation to a speech-situation but as one which is directly connected with the speech-situation. O ne u n derstands the word ‘h e re ’ if one knows that it is used in accordance with a rule according to which it identifies the place at which the person using it is situated, or to which he is pointing. Som ething similar holds for the other dem onstrative expressions: with T the person speaking identifies himself, with ‘now’ the point of time at which he is speaking, and with ‘this’ an object to which he can point at the place at which he is speaking, or which (in the case of events) can be perceived at the point o f time at which he is speaking. T h e m eaning o f deictic expressions in general and of dem onstrative expressions in particular is usually presented in roughly this way. How­ ever, this explanation is still a characteristically meta-linguistic one. It presupposes th at the explanation already has at its disposal an objectual vocabulary in which one can speak about persons, places, times and objects generally. But one cannot yet u n d erstan d the expression ‘a place that . . .’ at all if one does not yet u n d erstan d the word ‘h ere’; and the same holds for the other expressions. You will perhaps suggest that we could attem pt to describe how one can demonstrate (vorführen) the use of dem onstrative expressions in a way which corresponds to the m eta-linguistic explanation. And certainly it is such an explanation by dem onstration, similar to that which I gave for predicates and truth-functional expressions, th at we need. B ut if we try to dem onstrate the use o f words like ‘h e re ’ and ‘this’ simply in accor­ dance with the rule which was contained in the meta-linguistic expla­ nation the result would be th at variant of the quasi-predicate language which I dem onstrated with expressions o f the form ‘this isi7’, when they are used in such a way that ‘this’ is not yet replaceable by o th e r expres­ sions (p. 263). I f we wanted to explain to a child the m ode of em ploym ent of, for example, the word ‘now ’ by simply saying ‘now hot’ w henever it is hot, and likewise with other predicates, such an explanation would correspond to th e meta-linguistic explanation ju st given. But the child would not have learnt that m eaning which the word ‘now’ has in our language. T h e words ‘h e re ’, ‘this’, if used simply in this way, would not yet be singular term s; they would not be being used to ‘specify’ a point of time, a m aterial object, etc., but would be functionless appendages in

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a situation-relative use of predicates. If they are to be m ore than that then, although relating to the situation, they m ust already refer beyond (hinausweisen) the situation. Even within the situation one can only specify this situation - and th a t means (you recall): single it out vis-ä-vis o th er situations as the one re fe rred to - if one already refers (bezugnimmt) to oth er situations and designates the present situation as one which can also be designated as the same from the perspective o f other situations. But to achieve this, to designate the p resent situation in such a way that it can also be designated from the perspective of o th e r situations, we have at o u r disposal no names, no free-floating signs which could be assigned to the situation as such. R ather it is the dem onstrative expres­ sion itself which refers beyond the situation in the requisite m an n er by being used in such a way that one knows th at it can be replaced by other deictic expressions if the same thing is referred to from another situation. It is in ju s t this way th at the present situation is first constituted as som e­ thing identifiable; and this m eans: only in this way is it referred to as an object. It is im p o rtan t to see that this rule - that in the event o f a co rresp o n d ­ ing change of situation the dem onstrative expressions are to be replaced by o th er deictic expressions - belongs to the meaning o f dem onstrative expressions. If som eone were to use dem onstrative expressions as they would be used in the extended quasi-predicate language to which I have ju st re fe rre d , thus, if, in the event o f a change in situation, he w^ere simply to d ro p them , instead o f replacing them by an o th er deictic expression, we would say that he has not u n d ersto o d th eir m eaning in o u r language. T h e meta-linguistic explanatory schem a th at has ju st been presented is th erefo re not only circular, inasm uch as it already p re su p ­ poses a referen ce to objects; as an explanation o f the m eaning of these expressions it is also incom plete. So one can only explain the m eaning o f dem onstrative expressions, only d em onstrate th eir m ode o f em ploym ent, by also taking into account the g ro u p o f o th er deictic expressions th a t belong to them . T o every dem onstrative expression that designates an object by its immediate rela­ tion to the situation o f speech th ere belong o th er deictic expressions that likewise designate an object in relation to the situation of speech, but in such a way th at - with ‘th e re ’, ‘th e n ’, ‘later’ - a n o th er perceptual situation is designated, or - with ‘you’, ‘h e ’/‘she’ - a person o th er than the speaker. T h e m eaning - and th at means: the identificatory function of deictic expressions - is thus characterized by two peculiarities: (1) it depends on the em ploym ent-situation which object is identified by the use of

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such an expression (2) the same object that in the perceptual situation is identified by a dem onstrative expression can, in another situation, no longer be identified by this expression; it can, however, be identified by an o th e r expression of the same deictic group. T h e first of these pecu­ liarities is the one which Strawson appealed to in his criticism of Russell; the second he failed to notice and it is precisely this one that should have been invoked against Russell (p. 308f). It is this second peculiarity of deictic expressions which is fundam ental for u n d erstan d in g how a reference to objects is possible, because only it explains how it is possible to refer to a perceptual situation in which one no longer finds oneself. Only because the use of the dem onstrative expression in the perceptual situation already anticipates the specification of the same situation, or the same object that is perceived in the situation, by m eans of a non-dem onstrative deictic expression from outside the situation can one say that the use of the dem onstrative expression itself specifies som ething, refers to an object. W hat is crucial about this peculiarity of deictic expressions is that here at a lowest level the use of the identity-sign comes into play; and it is in precisely this way that the object-relation is constituted. We had previously seen that a reference to objects - a specification of which of all is m eant - implies that the object m eant can be distinguished from all others. B ut it is only from the circum stance that we are beings whose perceptual situations change that it follows that, if we are to be able to refe r to objects of perception, we m ust be able, amid the changes of perceptual situation, to refer to the perceptual situations as identical; and because this reference to a situation takes place from the perspective of a situation th at is always different, any situation can only be held on to as identical by an o th er deictic sign being used in the new situation. Far from it being the case that an object can be distinguished from the others by a certain sign being simply assigned to it as a name, it can only be held on to as identical by differen t signs being substituted for one an o th e r according to a rule. B ut what is this rule like? Obviously the m ere substitution of a non­ dem onstrative deictic expression for a dem onstrative one is not enough, for, in contrast to dem onstrative expressions, non-dem onstrative deictic expressions are indeterm inate. With ‘h e re ’ a specific place is meant. With ‘th e re ’, on the o th e r hand, a place is not yet specified; it is only said that a place other th an the one h ere is m eant. Merely to use the word ‘there’ invites the question ‘there w here?’ In the case o f ‘th a t’ one asks ‘which?’, in th e case o f ‘th e n ’ ‘w hen?’ A nd even in the case o f ‘you’, if several are present, one can ask ‘Which of us do you m ean?’ Making clear which

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person is m eant by ‘you’, which object by ‘that’, can clearly only be achieved by spatio-temporal specification. T h e problem therefore centres on the questions ‘w here?’ and ‘when?’ T h e most natural answer to these questions takes the form ‘then when such-and-such h ap p en ed ’, ‘there - where such-and-such is situ­ ated’. B ut these replies rem ain in the air if the tem poral and spatial objects referred to in them cannot themselves be identified by their spatio-temporal relations. This, however, can only be done by specifying the distance and (in the case o f spatial objects) the direction from a certain reference-point; the latter serves as the coordinate zero-point. D epending on w hether this is objective or subjective one can speak of objective or subjective localization. It is subjective, localization which connects up directly with the last considerations. For through subjective localization non-dem onstrative deictic expressions acquire the determ inateness they initially lack. In subjective localization the here-and-now is the coordinate zero-point and all other perceptual situations are specified by giving their distance and direction from the present perceptual situation. Only in this way can we identify ano th er perceptual situation from the perspective of the present perceptual situation, by replacing the indeterm inate expression ‘then ’ by, for exam ple, ‘an h o u r ago’. However, one should bear in m ind, firstly, that the units of m easure­ m ent in such subjective localizations - hours, metres, points of the com­ pass - already belong to a system o f objective localization and, secondly, that localization by reference to the subjective coordinate zero-point yields no identification if it is not underpinned by an objective coordinate zero-point. This is clearly so in the case of com m unication between sev­ eral persons. If each person could only locate something by reference to his own here and now there would be no possibility of the different com m unication-partners identifying som ething for one another. But even an individual speaker could bring no spatio-tem poral relations capable of being held on to as identical into the manifold of his percep­ tion if his only reference-point were his changing situation. A stable spatio-tem poral system o f reference for the identification of perceptual situations can only arise relative to a spatio-tem poral coor­ dinate zero-point whose position in the time series and in space is objec­ tively determ ined. Now there is no absolute time and no absolute space. W hat makes possible a stable coordinate zero-point in space, in contrast to the changing subjective coordinate zero-point, is the contingent fact that a sufficient num ber of the spatial objects around us remain invariant in their spatial relations to one another and hence constitute a fixed

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spatial fram e of reference from which we can then single out an arbitrary object - e.g. the place Greenwich - and agree upon it as coordinate zero-point.2 Likewise a stable zero-point for tem poral location is m ade possible by the contingent fact that there is a regularity of events in n atu re which provide a fixed unit of tem poral distance, such that a unique series of events form a stable fram e o f reference that makes it possible to pick out one such event (e.g. the birth of Christ) as zeropoint. Both in the case of space and in that o f time the zero-point is conventional, moreover its objective position is uncertain; but both these things are unproblem atic, because what is really fixed is not the point but the set o f spatial or tem poral objects whose relations to one an o th er are invariant. You could now ask: if one can only identify som ething relative to an objective spatio-tem poral system o f reference, could I not have spared myself the trouble of entering into the problem o f specification by means of deictic expressions which is relative to the subjective coordinate zeropoint? However, the subjective coordinate zero-point is as indispensable to identification as the objective one. I f a speaker does not know his own position in the objective spatio-tem poral system of relations, then he does not know how he can, or could, establish what is meant. T h e identification o f a perceptual object by specification o f its spatio-tem poral relations prescribes a path which leads to the spatio-tem poral position or positions at which the object could be perceived; and to be cognizable as a path it m ust be capable of being connected with on e’s present posi­ tion. In o th e r words, to be able to orientate oneself one must know where one is. T o know where the subjective coordinate zero-point is relative to the objective zero-point is, of course, the same as to know where the objective zero-point is relative to the subjective. W hen we locate an event or a material object we norm ally only give objective specifications, but these specifications only have a m eaning for us because we assume th at we know where we ourselves are in the objective system and hence can in te rp re t the objective specifications subjectively. T hus although objective localization contains no deictic expressions it can only become effective for us as identification if it can be deictically interpreted. Conversely one can say that (a) the objective spatial and tem poral units of m easurem ent and (b) the fixed objective spatial and tem poral relations are the extra factors that m ust be added to the transition from the dem onstrative to the non-dem onstrative reference to situations if past perceptual situations are to be capable of being held on to as identical (or identifiable) and if, fu rth erm o re, all o th er possible perceptual situ­ ations are to become identifiable.

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With this the question raised at the begin n in g o f this lecture concern­ ing the m echanism o f the identification o f perceptible objects is answered in outline. It has becom e clear how this identification is achieved by an interplay of dem onstrative singular term s and objectively, spatio-tem ­ porally locating singular term s, an interplay that depends on the use of the identity-sign. T h e use o f the identity-sign has shown itself to be the decisive factor in the transition from the quasi-predicate language to the predicate language; and that m eans: the decisive factor in the use of expressions as singular term s. U ntil now this factor has rem ained on the p erip h ery o f o u r discussion, and its precise significance has still to be explained. W ith the clarification o f this aspect we shall be able to bring the discussion o f singular term s to its conclusion, for it carries one over into th at context fo r the sake o f whose clarification we have und ertak en the whole discussion of singular term s: the explanation of the truth-d efin itio n o f predicative sentences. Even then (Lecture 19) the hypothesis was suggested that the notions of a singular term ‘standing for’ an object, and o f a predicate ‘ap plying’ to an object, which figure in this definition, becom e dispensable if we only presuppose an u n d e r­ standing o f the identity-sign. H ow ever, it m ust first be decided w h eth er th e questions which at the beginning o f today’s lecture I connected with the question about the mechanism of identification can be answ ered on the basis of o u r analysis o f this m echanism . T hese w ere (1) th e question o f w hether the identi­ fication of spatio-tem poral positions is p rio r to the identification of objects in space a n d time, (2) the question of w hether we can su p p o rt the analysis o f th e actual use of singular term s, and m ake its results m ore intelligible, by asking, hypothetically, how expressions would have to be used which su p p lem en t classification-expressions, which if they were used indep en d en tly would be quasi-predicates, in such a way as to yield expressions capable o f being tru e. It will em erge that these two questions are closely connected.

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I would like to divide this lecture into two parts and in each part discuss one of the two questions m entioned at the end of the previous lecture. I The connection between object-relation, situation-independence and the truthcapacity of assertoric speech T h e enquiry into the m ode of em ploym ent of singular terms has shown that, if one disregards names, there are two ways in which singular terms can specify a perceptual object: (a) by means of an - absolute or relative —property and (b) by spatio-tem porally locating the object. We were also able to show that and how the first kind o f specification presupposes the second. A lthough I only considered the use of names in passing, in their case too it becam e ap p aren t that the way in which they specify an object rests on specification by spatio-temporal localization. T he analysis of the m ode of em ploym ent of singular term s thus led to the conclusion that the only way to directly specify a perceptible object - and following Strawson I have called this ‘identification’ - is by specifying it by means o f spatio-tem poral localization. T h a t the fundam ental singular term s are the spatio-temporally locat­ ing ones - by which we now m ean not ju st the objectively locating ones but the whole system, presented in the last lecture, of dem onstrative, deictically locating and objectively locating expressions - is a descriptive fact. It is, therefore, astonishing that hitherto it has not been clearly recognized. For the older tradition names were the fundam ental singular terms - a view which could only be maintained so long as the specificatory function o f singular term s had not been recognized and the mode of em ploym ent of the expressions h ad not been enquired about. A nd if recently K ripke th o u g h t he could reverse th e conception, which has been characteristic o f the m odern tradition since Frege, of the primacy

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of descriptions over names, this could only achieve a semblance of plau­ sibility because of his failure to take account of the distinction between locating and o th er descriptions.1 Strawson and those who m ore or less followed him have, it is true, attached great weight to locating expres­ sions; but they have not recognized their fundam ental significance, for, although they treated dem onstrative singular terms as basic, they regarded them as independent in their identificatory role. T h e basic erro r common to all previous conceptions was the assumption that there is, or even could be, a distinctive class o f singular term s which can stand for objects in isolation without presupposing in their mode of employ­ m ent their replaceability by singular term s of o th er types. O ne may simply accept the descriptive fact that the spatio-temporally locating singular terms are the fundam ental ones. But one can also seek to make this fact intelligible by starting out from the expressions which supplem ent singular term s to form sentences (i.e. classification-expres­ sions) and asking: what function and mode of em ploym ent must we expect those expressions to have which are able to supplem ent classifi­ cation-expressions to yield expressions capable of being true? This question ‘from below’ was only incidentally considered in the two pre­ vious lectures, and it is one of the two questions which I m entioned as still being open at the end of the last lecture. It is im portant to see that one could not ask the converse question. T h a t is to say, one cannot start from singular term s and ask how those expressions which supplem ent them to yield expressions capable of being true m ust function. For an isolated use of a singular term would have no m eaning and hence there is no language or part-language that con­ sists only of singular term s or a pre-form (Vorform) of singular terms corresponding to the quasi-predicates as a pre-form o f predicates. Such a language cannot even be conceived. By contrast, a language consisting only of classification-expressions (‘quasi-predicates’) is not only conceiv­ able; such languages actually exist in the form of signal-languages and not only in the case of animals, where their rules are to be construed as causal rules, but also in the case of hum an beings, where their rules are conventional and their use is explained by means of the word ‘correct’. B ut now how are we to pose the question if we start in this way ‘from below’? In any event we m ust expect a form ulation of the following kind: how m ust the classification-expressions be supplem ented if suchand-such is to be achieved? But how is this condition to be form ulated? A weak form ulation that I have already employed (p. 3 2 If) would be: how m ust they be supplem ented if they are to be capable of applying to objects? O r puttin g it the other way round: how must singular terms

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be used if they are to be expressions that supplem ent those classificationexpressions that are explained in perceptual situations? Inasm uch as it already presupposes as self-evident th at the supplem enting expressions specify objects such a form ulation does not involve much risk. A nd som ething can be achieved with it, though not m uch: it can be used to explain the n a tu re of our elem entary objects or th eir specification - that it m ust be spatio-tem porally locating specification - but not how refer­ ence to objects is possible. So how can one form ulate the question w ithout already m entioning objects in the condition th at is to be fulfilled? Since the distinctive char­ acter of quasi-predicates, in contrast to predicates or the expressions form ed by the supplem entation o f predicates, is that their mode of em ploym ent is essentially situation-relative, the question can be fo r­ m ulated thus: how must the classification-expressions that are used in a situation-relative way be supplem ented for that which they achieve - a classification - to become situation-independent? Reference to percep­ tible objects would then be made intelligible by showing that only if the classification-expressions are supplem ented by expressions which specify the perceptual situations by spatio-tem porally locating them and thus objectifying them , and by means of these situations also specify other spatio-tem porally locateable objects, does the classification-act become situation-independent. O f course I believe this to be the case. B ut even so it seems to me that the question has not yet been given a broad enough form ulation, for one can ask: w hat is achieved by our speech becom ing situation-inde­ pendent? T o this it can be replied: only in this way is assertoric speech constituted; only in this way does it becom e possible to assert som ething which involves a claim to truth and to which o th er partners in other situations can take a position of affirm ation or denial. For this reason I form ulated the question at the beginning of today’s lecture and also in the previous lecture, thus: how m ust classification-expressions be sup­ plem ented if they are to yield expressions with which som ething can be said th at can be true or false? Only if we form ulate our question ‘from below’ in this way does it also correspond to the m ethodological p e r­ spective from which I carried out the enquiry ‘from above’ in the lecture before last, the enquiry into the actual m ode of em ploym ent o f singular term s. Ju st as th ere the question of the actual m ode of em ploym ent of singular term s was placed in the context of establishing the tru th of the sentences into which they enter as com ponents, so now the question: how does the use of singular term s arise at all? would be placed in the

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context o f the question o f what m akes it possible to speak of ‘tru e ’ and ‘false’. Now so far I have n o t adequately discussed this connection betw een the situation-independence of speech and its truth-relation. You could express d o u b t as to w heth er it has really b een established th at the w ord ‘tru e ’ cannot occur in a quasi-predicate language. It seems to me to be necessary to take issue with this doubt. I earlier drew attention to the fact that if som ething is true or false it is so once and for all, an d that it is essential to w hat can be called ‘tru e ’ o r ‘false’ - to som ething asserted - that a position, o f affirm ation or denial, can be taken towards it by anybody and hence from any situation. It th erefo re seem ed clear that th e re could be no question of ‘tru e ’ and ‘false’ in a situation-relative language. B ut now one could adm it that this holds for ‘tru e’ and ‘false’ as applied to assertions, but doubt w hether it only m akes sense to speak of ‘tru e ’ and ‘false’ in this context. If one asks w hether one cannot also speak o f ‘tru e ’ an d ‘false’ in a quasi-pred­ icate language, my reply that assertions have a situation-independent sense could look like a petitio principii. T h e o p p o n e n t could say that ju st as I speak o f quasi-predicates, so he m ust be allowed to speak of quasi-truth. W hat would he have in mind? I believe th e following: in the quasi­ predicate language th e classification-expressions are also used with re f­ erence to som ething - the actual situation. A lthough it is characteristic o f the quasi-predicate language that th at with reference to which the classification-expression is used is not re fe rred to in the expression itself, one seems nonetheless able to say: d ep en d in g on w hether the situation is actually correspondingly qualified or not th e expression is used truly or falsely. Clearly we need an informal u n d erstan d in g of what is m eant by ‘tru e’, or an analogous expression exten d ed beyond statem ent-truth, if we are to be able to decide w hether such a w ord can already have a m eaning in a quasi-predicate language. U nderlying th e argum ent of the opponent of my thesis is the, in my opinion, correct idea that the use of a classifi­ cation-expression with reference to som ething - and this may simply be the situation - is tru e o f th at with reference to which the classificationexpression is used is actually th u s qualified. Now two questions will have to be distinguished here: (a) the question o f w heth er it is possible for an observer w ho possesses a language of his own in which the w ord ‘tru e ’ an d singular term s occur to in te rp re t the sign-acts o f beings who use a quasi-predicate language as tru e an d false and (b) the question of w hether these beings them selves, who have no

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singular term s, could already use the words ‘tru e ’ and ‘false’, thus w hether they themselves could u n d erstan d their sign-acts as true and false. If the user o f a quasi-predicate language uses a classification-expres­ sion in conform ity with the situation - as I shall say for the sake of brevity - th en doubtless this use can be described as true by an observer. B ut in this sense even th e reading o f an instrum ent of m easurem ent, or a natural sign, can be called tru e or false. O ur problem obviously concerns not this question b u t the second question, viz. w hether the user of a quasi-predicate language can himself use a word like ‘tru e ’. In the reflections which we m ust u ndertake to clarify this question I assum e that we have to do with a quasi-predicate language whose rules are already conventional and whose classification-expressions can be ‘explain ed ’ in the sense described earlier. And this means that I assume th at the w ord ‘correct’ already exists in this language in the sense in which it is used to affirm the rule-conform ity of an act. So we can refo r­ m ulate our question m ore pointedly by asking: is it possible, within the fram ew ork of a quasi-predicate language, for the word ‘correct’ to be used both to affirm the rule-conform ity of a speech-act and to affirm its situation-conform ity? In this second mode o f em ploym ent the word ‘co rrect’ would have the m eaning of ‘tru e ’; and to avoid ambiguity, for this second m eaning o f ‘co rrect’ I shall only use the word ‘tru e ’. Both in the case o f ‘co rrect’ and in th at of ‘tru e ’ it will be better if we orien tate ourselves tow ards the negations. We have occasion to use the w ord ‘correct’ because we have occasion to use the word ‘incorrect’ to register an act’s non-conform ity to a rule, to correct an act relative to a rule. A nd we have occasion to use the word ‘tru e’ only if we have occasion to use the word ‘u n tru e ’ or ‘false’, i.e. to correct a speech-act with respect to its not conform ing to a situation or its not conform ing (in a language with singular term s) to an object. O u r question can therefore also be form u lated thus: can th ere be occasion in a quasi-predicate language to correct the use o f a classification-expression with respect to its situationconform ity? A nd it seems th at this question comes down to this: is there the possibility within a quasi-predicate language o f correcting an error; and that means: is there the possibility in such a language of experiencing som ething as erro r? Let us consider how things stand with regard to e rro r in the case of predicative assertions. In the case of predicative statem ents relating to perceptible objects th ere seem to be essentially two possibilities of error: (a) th e statem ent concerns an object which is not present. O ne errs because the object is not perceptible; and the e rro r is corrected by

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recourse to the verification-situation. T h e re can clearly be nothing cor­ responding to this in the case o f quasi-predicates, for these by definition relate to what is present, (b) the verification-rule of the predicate is so complicated that, even if the object to which the predicate is supposed to apply is present, one cannot establish by a simple act of perception w hether the predicate applies to the object, but only by a certain o p er­ ation. It is difficult to think of an analogue of this in the case of quasi­ predicates, because one can only speak of an error, or the correction of an erro r, if it is assum ed that that to which the operations are applied remains the same d u rin g their application; and such a consciousness of identity is again excluded by definition in the case of quasi-predicates. T h e same holds for that possibility of e rro r which also obtains in the case of simple perceptual predicates, in so far as their verification depends on certain perceptual conditions, such as proximity, illum ina­ tion, etc. W hen a user of quasi-predicate language says in the dark first ‘m an’ and then ‘b u sh ’, this cannot be construed as the correction o f an error; rath er he has applied a word correctly to two perceptual situations. This is a conceptual consideration that cannot be empirically falsified, but could itself be used for correctly in terpreting empirical findings. T hus, if one were to discover that children who one had supposed pos­ sessed only a quasi-predicate language u n derstand the correction of illusion and error, one would have to conclude that they already possess the rudim ents o f singular terms. T hus, any use of the words ‘tru e ’ and ‘u n tru e ’ which is grounded on the verifiability, or falsifiability, o f classificatory utterances or - which is the same thing - on the experience of e rro r and the correction of erro r in regard to such utterances, presupposes that that which is classified can be held on to as the same. A nd if there is no possibility of holding on to th'e em ploym ent-situation as the same without the use of co rre­ sponding signs then the use of classification-expressions can only become erroneous, and in this sense u n tru e, if it takes up the situation-relation, which it has in the quasi-predicate language, into the utterance, by means of a sign representative - or, as we saw in the last lecture, by m eans of a series of such representatives which, depending on the speaker’s change of situation, m ust be substituted for one another. It em erges then that my thesis, that a speech act, if it is to be capable of being designated true or false in the same language, must be situation-inde­ pendent, was not simply a petitio principii (in so far as it is precisely asser­ tions th at can be called true and false). R ather what is characteristic o f assertion, that a position of affirm ation or denial can be taken vis-a-vis one and the same thing, is the condition o f the possibility of correcting

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an error, hence of experiencing erro r, and hence of being able to use the word ‘u n tru e ’ in this sense. Now you could object that the word ‘u n tru e ’ is not restricted in the predicate language to the context of error. We also use it to designate a speech-act as a lie; and although any speech-act that can be erroneous can also be a lie, th ere are also speech-acts in which a lie, but not an erro r, is possible. This is in particular fam iliar from the discussion that originated with W ittgenstein concerning the expression of inner states, e.g. the statem ent ‘I have toothache’ or the cry ‘ow!’ can be u n tru e in the sense o f ‘deceitful’, ‘insincere’, but there is no room here for error. Could not som ething corresponding to this hold also for the quasi­ predicate language? Can we not, fo r example, suppose that a child that speaks a quasi-predicate language, though it cannot err, can lie? W hat is w rong with this supposition can be seen immediately if we consider that a lie is an act defined by the intention of deceiving others; and that means: of producing in them m istaken beliefs. T o be able to have such an intention the person who lies m ust already have at his disposal a language in which an e rro r is possible. A lthough the person who says ‘I have toothache’ cannot him self be mistaken, this can only be a lie if the utterance belongs to an intersubjective context in which others can be mistaken about this state o f affairs. T he same is even tru e o f the act o f p reten d in g in which one aims to deceive others, not by the use o f symbols, but by the production o f natural signs. Even pretending which is not at all a linguistic act is only possible in beings who have at their disposal a language in which one can be mistaken. Thus, if a speechact which can be called u n tru e because it is u n tru th fu l is only possible in a language in which an utterance can be called untrue in so far as it is mistaken, then a lie is no more possible in a quasi-predicate language than an erro r. T h ere is, finally, a m ore general argum ent to show that the word ‘un tru e’ has no possible employm ent in a quasi-predicate language. T h at a classification-expression is used untruly (not in conform ity with the situation, or object) - w hether out o f e rro r or as a lie —presupposes that it is used correctly (in conform ity with the rule). But what is it for a classification-expression to be used correctly? O ne can clearly only explain how such an expression, e.g. ‘re d ’, is used correctly, in the sense o f ‘in conform ity with the rule’, by using it in conform ity with the situ­ ation in m any situations. W hat we m ean by ‘tru e ’ in the sense of ‘in conform ity with the situation’ is contained in the way in which the w ord ‘correct’ is used in the explanation o f a quasi-predicate, but w ithout it being isolable. For one to be able to use a word like ‘tru e ’ the two aspects m ust be separable, for the utterance is only incorrect in the sense of

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u n tru e on the assum ption th at it is correctly used in the sense of in conform ity with th e rule. How can this separation be achieved? It is clearly not en ough that the speaker uses the expression correctly in o th er cases; for it does not follow from this th at w hen he uses it incor­ rectly in the p re se n t case he uses it untruly, for it could be that he has not yet learned th e em ploym ent-rule well enough, or that at the present m om ent he has fo rg o tten it. R ather one can only speak of an u n tru e use if the p a rtn e r can say th at the speaker is using the expression in the presen t situation in exactly th e same way as in the o th er situations, and if the speaker can agree with this. Such a thing cannot be form ulated if one does not explicitly refer to the p resen t object o f application, or the p resen t situation, and, equally explicitly, to ‘all o th ers’. A nd this in tu rn is only possible if singular term s and quantifiers are used. T his seems to me to prove that, even if we disregard the experience of e rro r and the correction o f e rro r, which is the condition o f som eone being able to describe his ow n utterances as u n tru e , and even if we confine o u r­ selves to the case o f som eone describing the utterances o f an o th er as u n tru e in his own language, this language cannot be a quasi-predicate language. T h e d o u b t concerning the claim th a t the w ord ‘tru e ’ cannot be used in a quasi-predicate language which rested on the fact that quasi-pred­ icates can also be used in conform ity and not in conform ity with the situation would th erefo re be disposed o f by the following considera­ tions: (1) situation-nonconform ity does not suffice for speaking of u n tru th ; ra th e r we m ust have the possibility of distinguishing situationnonconform ity and rule-noncom form ity; (2) the m ere fact o f situationnonconform ity does not suffice. For it to be experienceable by those who use the language they m ust u n d e rsta n d w hat it m eans to correct an e rro r. A nd fo r this it is not enough th at som ething is classified; it is necessary to hold on to it as identical am id changes in the speech-situation o f th e speakers. My thesis th at the situation-independence o f speech is th e condition of its capacity for truth thus seems vindicated. We are therefore justified in form ulating the question about how classification-expressions m ust be su p p lem en ted if one is to be able to use them independently of sit­ uation as follows: how m ust they be supp lem en ted if one is to be able to say som ething with them that can be tru e o r false? T h e reflections which have ju st been carried out have also confirm ed what we saw earlier in the transition from truth-conditions to verification-rules, namely, that the use of the w ords ‘tru e ’ and ‘false’ can only be explained by showing how one establishes th at som ething is tru e or false. T h e w ord ‘u n tru e ’ is a correction-w ord and can th e re fo re only be explained by dem on­

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strating how an erro r is corrected. T he question: how must classificationexpressions be supplem ented if som ething is to be said with them that can be tru e or false? thus has the m ore precise sense: how must they be supplem ented if th at which they achieve - a classification - is to be verifiable o r falsifiable? A nd this question is not simply a reform ulation of the question: how m ust classification-expressions be supplem ented if that which they achieve is to be situation-independent? For situation-independence is only one, negative side of the total phenom enon. T he other positive side is the reference of a speaker, whose situation changes, to an earlier or some o th er (also the present) perceptual situation, to the same one to which any other speech-partners can also re fe r from other situations. T hu s it is not an independence o f situation that would consist in no longer having anything to do with situations; rath er it is an independence of situation of speech-partners, who occupy perceptual situations and whose situations are constantly changing, in their reference to perceptual situations which they eith er occupy or do not occupy.2 T h e re are these two sides - situation-independence in situation-reference - that are presupposed in speaking of the verifiability of classifications that relate to perceptible objects. T h e reflections that have ju st been carried out, which were intended to justify the question: by what expressions m ust classification-expres­ sions be supplem ented if that which is achieved by their use is to be capable o f being tru e o r false? already contain the elements required for answ ering it. T h e answer can be divided into two steps: Firstly: the supplem enting expressions, it has em erged, must be sin­ gular terms, expressions that have a specificatory function. This confirms the hypothesis expressed earlier (p. 224) that the use of singular term s, or reference to objects, is the condition of the possibility that signs can be used to say som ething that can be true or false. O f course there are also assertoric sentences that contain no singular terms. But we have seen that the truth-definitions of the other form s of statem ent refer back recursively to the predicative form of sentence. T he latter em erged from the point of view of the truth-definitions as the most elem entary form and the one which underlies the others. O n the basis of the reflec­ tions ‘from below’ that have now been carried out we no longer have to accept this as a m ere fact. It has become intelligible why, if one starts out from the only form o f pre-veritative language with which we are fam iliar - th at of quasi-predicates - the level of expressions capable of truth is reached precisely with the predicative sentence-form, thus where classification-expressions are supplem ented by expressions whose

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em ploym ent-m echanism is that o f singular terms. We now no longer need regard the circumstance that o u r most elem entary assertoric sen­ tences have the form of predicative sentences, are composed of a spec­ ifying expression and a classifying expression, as a brute fact. B ut secondly som ething else has become intelligible: not only why the level of ‘tru e ’ and ‘false’ is reached with the constitution, in the use of signs, of a reference to objects, but also why the basic singular terms (those which ‘identify’ an object) to which the o th er singular term s refer (verweisen) are spatio-temporally locating expressions, thus why objects of perception are identified by being spatio-tem porally located; or, put­ ting it another way: why objects of perception are not only factually spatio-tem poral but such that what decides their identity and non-iden­ tity (thus what constitutes them as individual objects) is their spatiotem poral location. For, as we have seen, the expressions which supple­ m ent classification-expressions to yield expressions with which something can be said that is true or false are singular term s whose objects are perceptual situations; and as perceptual situations are distinguished from one another as individuals only by their spatio-tem poral relations, the objects for which these expressions stand can be nothing other than spatial and tem poral positions. II Reciprocal dependence of the identification of spatio-temporal objects and the identification of spatio-temporal positions We are thus faced once m ore with the question (which we have already encountered several times pp. 336, 337) o f w hether we should regard spatial and tem poral positions or the objects that exist in space and happen in time as the primary objects. This is the second of the questions 1 announced for today at the end of the previous lecture. By trying to reach a decision about it we can deepen our understanding of the m echanism of the identification of spatio-tem poral objects and answer some of the questions that have so far rem ained open. It is the approach ‘from below’, in which one does not analyse singular term s in their actual mode of employm ent, but rath er asks, in construc­ tive fashion, how singular term s must function if they supplem ent clas­ sification-expressions which are explained in perceptual situations to produce expressions capable of truth, which suggests the view that our prim ary objects m ust be spatio-tem poral positions. If one stuck exclu­ sively to this constructive approach it m ight even seem that spatio-temporal positions (perceptual situations) are the only objects to which per­ ceptual predicates can apply. However, such a view would already

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fo u n d er on the simple fact that th ere are singular terms which do not stand for spatio-tem poral positions but for perceptible objects that are merely identified by spatio-tem poral positions. B ut even the weaker thesis implied by this description, that spatio-temporal positions, though not the only objects to which perceptual predicates can apply, are the prim ary objects, founders, as we saw in the previous lecture (p. 345f), on the fundam ental consideration th at there is no absolute space and no absolute tim e and that spatio-tem poral positions cannot be perceived by themselves. T o be able to distinguish and identify spatial and tem poral positions we need perceptible objects which m ark the positions. But we cannot be content with such a vague statem ent. O ur whole train of thou g h t is conducted in such a way th at at no point may we presuppose the notion of objects, and o f a reference to objects, as som ething given. If one has succeeded in explaining a reference to spatio-tem poral posi­ tions in term s o f the objectification o f perceptual situations that is required to m ake possible a truth-relation, th en the question arises of w hether spatio-tem poral objects, w ithout which such an objectification seems impossible, can be explained from the same perspective, or w hether this requires an o th er perspective. So we m ust first ask: how are perceptible spatio-tem poral objects con­ stituted? It is clearly not enough that a spatial and tem poral extension (Erstreckung) is characterized by one o r m ore perceptible qualities. If we are in a desert o r at sea we have som ething extended that is qualitatively determ ined, but there are no objects, for there is nothing delim ited that could be distinguished as an individual. Frege drew attention to the fact th at there is a class of predicates which are distinguished from others by virtue o f the fact that they ‘def­ initely delim it’ th at to which they apply ‘and p erm it no arbitrary divi­ sion’.3 ‘Cat’, for example, is such a predicate: one cat is definitely delim ­ ited from an o th er, and a p a rt of a cat cannot itself be called a cat. ‘R ed’ or ‘w ater’, on the other hand, are not predicates of this kind. If two red objects are definitely delim ited from each o th er this is not in virtue of being red. A nd the predicate does not resist an arbitrary division; every p art o f a red surface is itself red. In m odern analytical philosophy predicates o f the first kind are referred to as ‘sortals’.4 W hat is characteristic about sortals is that such predicates (as emerges from Frege’s characterization) contain a criterion of identification and distinction; and this means: the predicate deter­ mines which o f the positions to which one can point belong to the one object - e.g. a cat - and which do not. By such predicates one object is definitely delim ited from an o th er and it is this which first makes it pos­

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sible to speak of several individual objects and hence to speak of objects at all (p. 294f). Gram m atically this m anifests itself in the fact that we use sortals with the definite or indefinite article (‘the cat’, ‘a cat’), but not oth er predicates. C onnected with this is the fact that sortals contain a principle o f countability. This is the context in which Frege introduced this concept: because such a predicate enables one to hold on to an object of a kind (a ‘so rt’) as the same, and distinguish it from others of the same kind, it is possible to cou n t how m any objects o f this kind th ere are (for instance in a certain spatio-tem poral area). Finally, we can now also see th at even the dem onstrative p ro n o u n ‘this’ can only funcdon as a singular term if it is used to g eth er with a sortal. I anticipated this in earlier discussions by com pleting the expression thus: ‘this m ountain’, ‘this beetle’, ‘this F ’ (w here ‘F' m ust be a sortal). If we consider what it is that enables such predicates as ‘cat’, ‘m ountain’, ‘chair’, ‘coin’ to definitely delim it th at to which they apply, it is clearly the fact th at they are shape-predicates. If such a predicate is to apply to som ething, that thing m ust have a definite spatial configuration. This is why an object of this kind is definitely delim ited (even if not sharply, as, for exam ple, in the case o f a m ountain) from an o th er object of the same kind, and why a p art o f such an object is not itself such an object.5 A predicate of this kind also makes possible som ething which again would not be possible with the word ‘this’ alone, nam ely, to follow an object throu g h a stretch o f tim e d u rin g which it rem ains one and the sam e.6 If spatially configurated objects did not also have d u ratio n , but were only m om entary phen o m en a, we could not count them . It is essential for the identification o f such objects th at we be able to say, for exam ple, that the cat which earlier cam e th ro u g h the d o o r is the same as the one which is now lying on the sofa, and is not the same as one that is now standing on the table. A m aterial object F th at is observed at tim e h at a place si is identical with the object F th at is observed at time tn at place sm if and only if it could be observed th at d u rin g this tim e-interval the object has traversed a continuous path betw een si an d sm- If we call the object F at time t\ a an d the object F at tim e t2 b, th en the identity o f a with b dep en d s on th e continuity o f a trajectory in space; but this is the spatial continuity o f th e trajectory of a n F , a n d it would not be the same object if th ere were not a sortal lF ’ that applies to the object at every m om ent o f its life-path th ro u g h space.7 H owever, the significance of the sortal fo r the identity of the object d u rin g the several tem poral phases of its life-duration is essentially dif­ feren t from its significance for its spatial configuration. T h e spatial con­ figuration of such an object is essentially connected with the sortal p re d ­

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icate. T he d u ratio n o f th e object, on the other hand (and clearly also the path in space it traverses d u rin g its life-duration), is accidental to the sortal predicate. A five m ark piece, for exam ple, would not be a five m ark piece if it did not have a specific form, and that means: specific parts. But this predicate prescribes to the object to which it applies nei­ th er a specific life-duration n o r a specific life-path. Directly connected with this is the fact that the life-phases of a m aterial object cannot be regarded as its parts, by analogy with its material parts. A material object is com posed as a so-and-so out o f its spatial m aterial parts. But it is a soand-so irrespective o f how long it exists, and it is not com posed as a soand-so out o f its life-phases. A nd it is in this th a t the following differ­ ence is gro u n d ed . Pointing to the object in its various phases we can say ‘T h a t is the same cat’, o r if, not know ing this, we had previously called the cat at time t x a and the cat at time t2 b, we can make such statements as th at a = b. W hereas we cannot say, pointing to different parts of the cat, ‘T h at is the same cat.’ For none o f the parts is itself a cat, thus it cann o t be the same cat as an o th er part. H ere we can only say: these are all parts o f the same cat a, w hereas this is a p art o f the cat b. So although we can only follow a m aterial object as one and the same on its life-path by subsum ing it u n d e r a sortal, the sortal only contains a principle of spatial delim itation, not one of tem poral delimitation. A lthough it is essential to m aterial objects to en dure in time we can describe them as essentially spatial objects, inasm uch as the sortal that constitutes them prescribes no tem poral delimitation; they only have spa­ tial parts, and hence only spatial positions can be constituted by them, not tem poral positions. Now if tem poral positions can no m ore be perceived by themselves than spatial positions we m ust ask: by which perceptible objects can tem poral positions be constituted? T h e answer of course is obvious: they are constituted by events. In com parison with the question of how we can refer to m aterial objects this question has been strangely neglected in analytical philosophy. In the literature philosophers frequently speak as th o u g h every state of a m aterial object, or o f a place during a certain period of time, could be called an event, e.g. the sounding of a tone, a quarrel between two persons.8 T o be consistent one would also have to describe the being red of a leaf as an event. Such a view gives rise to a series o f difficulties. It seems that if it were correct we would be able to convert any predicative sentence whose singular term s stand for material objects, by substantivization of its predicate, into a sentence about an event. T hus, for exam ple, the sentence ‘Peter and M arianne are quar­ relling’ would be converted into the expression ‘the quarrel between

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Peter and M arianne’, the sentence ‘T h e leaf is re d ’ into ‘the being red of the le a f’.9 And this leads to the question: how are events, which after all are supposed to be spatio-tem poral (and so-called ‘extensional’) objects, distinguished from the corresponding abstract (and m oreover ‘intensional’) objects, e.g. the attribute of redness that belongs to the leaf, or the state of affairs that the leaf is red. I do not want to go into these difficulties and will confine myself to that aspect which in our context is significant. States are tem porally divisible, as material objects are spatially divisible. T he sound or the quarrelling can be temporally divided. B ut their parts are again sound, or quarrel, and the tem poral duration of the state is accidental. Such a tem poral object is not ‘definitely delim ited’. Thus, w hether or not one can call such states ‘events’ temporal positions cannot be m arked by such events. T em poral objects of this kind seem rath er to be analogous to those spatial objects one can call ‘masses’, such as sand or water. In both cases a spatial, or tem poral, extension is in a qualitative state F. T h e one is spatially divisible, the other tem porally divisible. A nd in both cases the predicate ‘F ’ does not itself contain a principle of divisibility and delimitation. It seems, then, that we need sortal predicates which apply to what is temporally divisible and tem porally delimit this in a way analogous to that in which the sortals of m aterial objects delimit material objects spa­ tially.10 A nd we would expect that the tem poral objects that are consti­ tuted by these sortals are of such a character that they too only are what they are in virtue of a certain configuration of heterogeneous (in this case temporal) parts, so that the sortal predicate that applies to the whole cannot apply to its individual parts. Now there actually are such tem poral objects and the corresponding sortals. They are changes (Veränderungen), e.g. a sunrise, a revolution of the earth aro u n d the sun, a person’s birth, Peter’s flight from Berlin to Moscow, or, to connect up with the previous examples, the cessation of a sound, the outbreak, or the ending, o f a quarrel, a leaf’s changing colour from green to red. Changes are defined by the transition from one state to another state. T hus a change consists of tem poral parts: at least the two states from which and into which the change takes place, and, norm ally (always if there are such), the in te r­ mediate phases. T o none of these parts can the predicate used to describe the change as a whole be applied. Changes are thus tem poral wholes analogous to the spatial wholes which are the material objects subsumable un d er sortals. T em poral sortals contain a principle o f distinction and identification for tem poral parts, just as spatial sortals contain a principle of distinction and identification for spatial parts. By virtue of the tem ­ poral sortals what lies in the tem poral dim ension becomes ‘definitely

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delim ited’ and countable; changes are tem poral objects. A nd ju st as through m aterial objects spatial positions becom e m arkable, so through changes tem poral positions become markable. It m ight seem that by having recourse to the sortal predicates I have surreptitiously fallen back on elem ents o f a traditional object-concept. My talk o f configurated form ations, which, in the spatial case at least, would also be representable (in a non-m etaphorical sense), seems to fit this concept. I do not have any need to deny the representation-aspect - as an aspect. T h e im p o rtan t thing is to see that this aspect does not define the objecthood o f these objects and, above all, th at sortals make possible an aspect that is essential to spatio-tem poral identification and which, in my account so far, has been simply passed over. Let us cast a glance back to m ake this clear to ourselves. T h e function o f a singular term , we saw, consists in indicating which of all (of a p re ­ supposed plurality) it is to which the expression supplem enting the sin­ gular term applies (see end of Lecture 21). This holds for all singular term s, not ju st for those which refer to perceptible objects. T o explain how singular terms can fulfil this specificatory function we had to explain the em ploym ent-rule of singular term s. A nd th at means: we had to ask how - in term s of this em ployment-rule - does one establish which thing it is to which the classification-expression applies? Since this question already depends on the type o f classification-expressions that supplem ent the singular term , it was necessary to restrict the investigation to the basic case of perceptual predicates (see beginning of Lecture 22). I say: to perceptual predicates; and not: to perceptual objects; for we cannot assume th at we know what a perceptual object is. This m ust be shown by the way in which singular term s that supplem ent perceptual p re d i­ cates are used. This was why the question ‘How is it established which one is m eant?’ had to be built into the question of how the truth of the corresponding predicative statem ents is established (Lecture 24). It was this m ethodological step which m ade it possible for us to explain the distinction of a n arrow er concept of specification (a concept for which I took over the term ‘identification’ which Strawson had introduced). This distinction is obvious in the m ode of em ploym ent of singular term s but had hith erto not been understood, not even by analytical philoso­ phers. Also, in m aking this concept precise it was particularly im portant not to presuppose some prelim inary u n d erstanding of perceptible objects, but only w hat had shown itself to be the function of singular term s in connection with the verifiability o f predicates. T h e question ‘How does one establish to what a supplem enting predicate-expression applies?’ has, therefore, in the last resort - i.e. where it is a question of

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identifying the object - the sense: ‘H ow is the situation to be established in which it is to be established w hether the predicate applies?’ So in the lecture before last we reached a result th a t has now been confirm ed in the approach ‘fro m below’, namely, th a t we have to reg ard perceptual situations - an d that m eans: the veriftcation-situations o f perceptual predicates - as the prim ary objects. A nd one can see that w hat distin­ guishes these situations - thus the correlates o f classifications that in the quasi-predicate language are unarticu lated , n o t yet objectified - from one a n o th e r (not as regards their classifiability b ut as perceptual situa­ tions) are their spatio-tem poral relations to one another. T his led to the question which I tried to answ er in the last lecture: how beings whose perception- o r speech-situations change (tem porally in any case, but also spatially) can, by the use of certain signs, so designate any past perceptual situation, but also the p re se n t one, th a t one knows from the perspective o f any situation which of all it is in which one could establish th at the supplem enting predicative expression applies. T his is simply an application to the case o f p erceptual situations of what belongs to the essence o f specification and, in particular, to the essence of identi­ fication: (a) the consciousness o f a m ultiplicity, o f which one is the object m ean t (b) the possibility o f designating any object as the object m eant; and that means: the possibility of distinguishing it from others (it became clear that this designating is only possible th ro u g h the rule-governed substitution o f various expressions, so that, in addition to the negative em ploym ent of the identity-sign in distinguishing, a positive, but no n e­ theless non-tautological, em ploym ent o f this sign is essential) and, finally, (c) (the specific condition o f identifying specification): the possibility of not ju s t distinguishing it in general from others (by m eans o f a charac­ teristic) but as such, and this means: as individual perceptual situation. This is precisely what is achieved by distinguishing it as a spatio-tem poral position from all o th er spatio-tem poral positions. Now in this analysis one aspect was taken for g ran ted as obvious and thus passed over: if spatial and tem poral positions are to be distinguish­ able from one a n o th e r by th eir d iffe re n t relations to all o th e r positions, then they m ust first be capable o f being m arked o ff (delimitable); but this they are not, taken by them selves, b u t only th ro u g h the sortal p re d ­ icates by which objects are constituted, which, th o u g h essentially spatiotem poral, are n o t m ere spatio-tem poral positions. T h e m odification of the provisional thesis that the p rim ary objects o f ou r perception are spatio-tem poral positions th at this makes necessary arises, therefore, n ot from a new perspective, let alone from a reversion to the traditional object-concept, but from an aspect, h ith erto simply passed over, which

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belongs to the essence of specification, because it belongs to the essence of distinguishing an individual. But now what is the modification that is required by this aspect? W hen we p u rsu e this question it will em erge that the conclusions resulting from the introduction o f sortals do not destroy the previous conclusions, but simply refine them . O ne could easily get the opposite impression. If the distinguishability o f spatial and tem poral positions depends on the perception of spatial and tem poral objects that fall un d er sortals, then the w'hole ap proach, according to which the prim ary objects to which perceptual predicates can apply are perceptual situations, is called in question. If the objects d eterm ined by sortals are the prim ary objects, then do we not need a completely d ifferent approach if we are to make a prim ary reference to such objects intelligible? It is at this point that the d an g er arises of slipping back into a representation-theory. At least in the case o f the objects determ in ed by spatial sortals one could say: they are objects because they are spatially configurated and, as such, representable forms (Gebilde). B ut what is representable here would be merely a type, an im age, and would not yet constitute what is m eant as an individual and as som ething distinguishable from others of the same kind. So this non-m etaphorical representation-aspect is not very signif­ icant and has not even been d om inant in traditional philosophy. I only m ention it because it has, nonetheless, always played a part and could lead even us astray at the present ju n ctu re. In reality, the im pression that the priority of objects determ ined by sortals would point to an o th er kind of reference to objects would be false. Objects d eterm in ed by sortals are themselves essentially spatial and tem poral objects, and indeed not ju st in the sense that they are spatially o r tem porally extended (divisible). W hat is special about sortal predicates is not that, like oth er predicates, they are only applicable to what is spatially and tem porally extended, but that their application presupposes a specific configuration of what is spatially, or temporally, extended. We can only apply a predicate like ‘cat’ or ‘5-m ark piece’ if we can say, pointing to many spatial positions: ‘Those are parts of the same cat (or the same 5-m ark piece).’ T h a t we can point to these different spatial positions as individual, distinct positions is, of course, only possible on the basis o f the em ploym ent of sortal predicates. But quite ap art from the fact that we do not need to refer to the same object whose parts they are (we can, e.g., indicate the spatial positions which belong to the one cat or the one 5-m ark piece with o u r finger or the point of a pencil) the fact that we can only indicate spatial positions by means of objects d eterm in ed by sortals does nothing to alter the fact that, con-

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versely, we can only explain the sortal predicate by means of the indi­ cation of spatial positions, together with the identity-sign. Indeed it is precisely this character of sortal predicates which makes it possible for spatial positions to be m arked by such objects. T h e dependence of the distinguishability of spatial and tem poral positions on that of spatially or tem porally configurated objects is thus a reciprocal one. A lthough it is true th at we can only mark spatial posi­ tions because o f the contingent fact th at there are spatial objects deter­ m ined by sortals, we can only recognize these objects if we can delineate the com bination of spatial positions prescribed by the sortal. Although we cannot m ark a perceptual situation as such without a structured object, and hence cannot speak of perceptual situations without the perception of such objects, these objects are, on the other hand, nothing but a com bination, defined in such-and-such a m an n er by the sortal, of qualitatively determ ined perceptual situations. T h e perceptual situations in which quasi-predicates are used are essentially indeterm inate, diffuse. T h e re are also singular term s, place- and time-specifications, whose objective reference is relatively indeterm inate. If som eone says ‘It is snowing h e re ’, then, although the place is determ ined by reference to a m aterial object, namely, the speaker, the extent of the place thereby referred to normally remains open. On the other hand, it is now possible to delim it as precisely as one wishes the perceptual situation (which it would perhaps be better to call a perceptual position), a delim itation which would not be possible w ithout objects determ ined by sortals, but is no longer restricted to them . T h e reciprocal dependence of reference to material objects and ref­ erence to spatial positions, however, concerns not only the aspect of the markability o f spatial positions or the divisibility of material objects; this reciprocal dependence manifests itself particularly in the aspect of identification which is decisive for reference to objects. Already in the last lecture we saw (p. 345 f ) that we can only identify spatial positions by reason of the contingent fact that the majority of the extended objects that su rro u n d us rem ain constant with respect to their spatial relations. We can thereby identify spatial positions relative to an objectively fixed coordinate zero-point; and som ething similar is tru e of events and tem ­ poral positions. On the other hand, however, material objects and events can only be identified by the spatial and tem poral positions at which they occur. T h a t all identification o f perceptible objects is identification by spatio-tem poral localization is not itself a contingent fact, because perceptible objects are essentially objects to which perceptual predicates can apply, and, hence, can be nothing oth er than verification-situations,

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or agglom erations of verification-situations, of perceptual predicates, and because verification-situations are distinguished as individuals (this, however, is an empirical fact) by their spatio-tem poral relations. T he system of spatio-tem poral relations is, therefore, not merely the only com prehensive system of identification (as Strawson believed); it is the system of identification of perceptible objects. You might now ask: why m ust this function of spatio-temporal relations with respect to the identification of perceptible objects imply that one m ust also speak of spatial and tem poral positions? Does it not suffice to speak of the spatial relations between extended objects and the temporal relations between events? It does not suffice, because once the system of spatio-temporal relations is constituted an infinite ordered multiplicity of spatial and tem poral positions are thereby distinguishable and iden­ tifiable, of which only some coincide with the extensions o f objects determ ined by sortals. A rbitrary spatial positions can be identified between and beyond m aterial objects, likewise arbitrary positions within each m aterial object. W ithout this system of spatial positions a universal identification o f spatial objects is simply not possible. Firstly, we can only m ark, and then identify, masses - e.g. a snowfield, an ore-m ine, an area of rain - which are not already spatially determ ined by a sortal by reference to the spatial positions which they occupy. Secondly, we can also only identify m aterial objects by means of spatial positions, which, of course, are in tu rn identified relative to a material coordinate zero-point (or the m aterial fram e of reference that makes this possible). So we have no alternative but to recognize the identificatory system of perceptible objects - the system of spatio-tem poral relations - as the unitary and com prehensive system o f indefinitely many spatial and tem poral positions, which is, however, d ep en d en t on a finite multiplicity of m aterial objects and events as perceptible points of reference (.Bezug­ spunkte). T h ere exists between the two multiplicities - that of material objects and events and that of spatial and tem poral positions - a rela­ tionship of reciprocal dependence. T h e question is not, which of the two multiplicities has a pre-em inence over the other, but in what the pre-em inence of each consists. For the multiplicity of m aterial objects and events this has already been explained. With respect to the multiplicity o f spatial and tem poral positions, on the o ther hand, all that has so far becom e clear is that it cannot be reduced to the o th er multiplicity. W hat its pre-em inence con­ sists in has so far only been hinted at. It rests on the fact that this m ul­ tiplicity of spatial and tem poral positions stands in a universal (unitary and comprehensive) and at the same time systematic (ordered) connec­

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tion; w hereas the multiplicity of m aterial objects and events is diffuse (zerstreut) and only acquires the ordered connection necessary for their identification by being contained in the multiplicity of spatial and tem ­ poral positions (which is in tu rn only m ade possible by the dem arcations of those objects). B ut now this is the basis of fu rth er essential distinctions of spatial and tem poral positions in the m echanism of identification, without which the latter would rem ain ultim ately unintelligible. T h e singular term s which identify spatial and tem poral positions are also distinguished from the others by the fact that th eir objective re f­ erence cannot fail.11 If I say ‘this F* it can tu rn out that there is not an F here an d now, thus that the object that is identified by this expression does not exist, thus th at the objective referen ce fails; whereas the objec­ tive reference of the expressions ‘h e re ’ and ‘now’ cannot fail. This dif­ ference is evident n o t only in the case of dem onstrative identification, but also in the case o f every o th e r kind o f localization. I f we say ‘the F that is in such-and-such a place’, this identification of the m aterial object can fail, but not the identification of the spatial position that it implies. Notice that the reason why the identification of the m aterial object or event can fail is because these objects are identified by being placed in a relation to a spatio-tem poral position by m eans o f an existential asser­ tion. W hen we say ‘this F \ the tru th of the existential statem ent ‘T h e re is one and only one F that is h ere and now ’ is implied o r presupposed. And it is clear that the identification of the spatio-tem poral position that is im plied by such a statem ent does not itself presuppose the tru th of an existential statem ent. So although the identificatory system of spatial and tem poral positions as a whole depends on the identification o f some m aterial objects and events, the identification o f each individual m aterial object and event refers (verweist) to the identification o f corresponding spatial and tem poral positions. For the latter rep resen t the verificationsituations in which one establishes w hether the identifying reference to the m aterial object o r event fails or not, and that means: w hether the object exists (or occurs) in this position or not. Because the reference to the individual spatio-tem poral positions cannot fail, it is also senseless to enq u ire about th eir possible non-existence. It is therefore senseless to speak o f the existence o f such objects at all. T h e fact that in the em ploym ent of those singular term s that identify spatial and tem poral positions the objective reference cannot fail is thus identical with the fact that one cannot speak of the existence o r non­ existence of these objects. We h ere en co u n ter a question which I have hitherto neglected, the question, namely, of w hether every use of a sin­ gular term , and, hence, every predicative assertion, implies the existence

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of the object specified by th e singular term . T h ere are authors who regard this as self-evident. Searle has even called it an ‘axiom ’12 - a rem arkable view, when one considers that it seems to contradict the m odern u n d erstan d in g of the concept of existence, according to which existential statem ents are general statem ents. It would thus seem plau­ sible to accept Searle’s ‘axiom ’ for those predicative statem ents which in Russell’s sense are not genuine predicative statem ents at all but general statem ents, but reject it for those predicative statem ents whose singular term does not specify an individual indirectly, by means of a character­ istic and a uniqueness-clause, but directly as an individual. Russell himself at any rate drew this conclusion. T o him it seemed that it is only where the specification o f an object can fail that the existence of this (to be m ore exact one would have to say: of such an) object is implicitly asserted by m eans of a general statem ent, and that, hence, w here an individual is directly designated, the reference cannot fail, and, hence, that it does not even make sense to speak o f the existence of the individual object (above pp. 300f). B ut to what purpose, you wiil ask, do I appeal to Russell’s theory of logically p ro p e r nam es, the abstruseness of which is undeniable and the weakness of which I have m yself shown up? We have seen, however, that Russell’s theory contained some real insights. So it is better to link my discussion to it than to so contradictory a conception as that of Strawson and Searle who (a) share the m odern interpretation of the concept of existence but (b) reject Russell’s analysis of ordinary predica­ tive statem ents as general statem ents, and yet (c) adm it that every p redi­ cative statem ent presupposes an existential statem ent. W hat seem ed correct in Russell’s theory of logically p roper names was the idea that the prim ary reference to perceptible objects m ust be, not via p ro p e r nam es, but via dem onstrative expressions (p. 303). Its weakness was the idea that the objective reference did not reach beyond the m om entary act. T h e word ‘this’, we then saw, can only identify an object if it is used in such a way that it cän be replaced by other deictic expressions and then by objectively spatio-tem porally locating expres­ sions. We were able to retain Russell’s fundam ental distinction between two kinds o f statem ent about individuals (p. 335): on the one hand, statem ents which specify som ething by m eans of a characteristic; on the other h an d , statem ents which designate an individual directly as an individual. Except that, Russell’s use of isolated dem onstrative expres­ sions was now replaced by the system of dem onstrative identification as a system o f localization (p. 330). T his modification seemed necessary for the p articular reason that we were able to make clear to ourselves

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that an objective reference (m eaning something) is only conceivable as specifying, and that means: indicating which of all (p. 303). O n the other hand, it could seem that Russell’s distinction thereby loses its point, for now even statements which refer to an individual directly as an individual are existential statem ents and, hence, general statements. A nd the dif­ ficulty, upon which I have already rem arked (p. 304f), that we could not explain the form of general existential statem ents if there are not sin­ gular statem ents which cannot in tu rn be interpreted as existential statements, has so far rem ained unresolved. Implicitly the solution had, of course, already been almost achieved as it became clear that the two kinds of existential statem ent are verified in fundam entally different ways: the statem ent ‘T h e re is one (and only one) F at such-and-such a spatio-tem poral position’ is not verified by exam ining all F s for w hether exactly one is in that position, but by establishing whether in the specified verification-situation there is exactly one F. In the case of a locating existential statem ent one does not establish which the m aterial object referred to is by ru n n in g through (durchlaufen) all m aterial objects or all F s, for what one would be exam ining them for would already be presupposed in this ru n n in g through; rath er one establishes which is the m aterial object re fe rred to by recurring to the spatio-tem poral position specified in the localization as the verification-situation for this existential statem ent. We can now see that the identificatory system which takes the place of the use of isolated dem onstrative expressions in Russell’s theory o f logically p ro p e r names is distinguished from this theory by two steps: firstly, the isolated dem onstrative act is replaced by a system of dem on­ strative identifications, but, secondly, the elem ents of this identificatory system are not objects to be designated by ‘this’, for these do not consti­ tute a system; rather they are spatial and tem poral positions. It is this second step which makes it intelligible how Russell’s sharp distinction between general statem ents and singular predications which can no longer be construed as existential statem ents is preserved, despite the fact that the identification of material objects and events is accomplished by means of existential statements. T h e identification of material objects and events is indeed accom plished by means o f existential statem ents, but (a) these are existential statem ents of a special kind which relate the objects concerned to the spatio-temporal positions ‘at’ which they ‘occur’ or ‘exist’ and (b) this presupposes an identification of spatio-tem poral positions which is itself not accomplished by means of existential state­ ments. With respect to such positions, therefore, one can no longer speak of existence or non-existence (as was the case in Russell with

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respect to the objects o f logically proper names); and, hence, the objective reference of the corresponding singular term s cannot fail. But is there not then repeated at the level of those singular terms which stand for spatial and tem poral positions the same difficulty I found with Russell’s logically p ro p e r names, namely, that an expression that does not contain an implicit reference to all cannot function as a singular term , because it cannot specify which o f all is m eant? However, because spatial and tem poral positions are m embers o f an o rdered series, a spaceand time-specification contains the req u ired implicit reference to all other places, w ithout implying a general existential statem ent. Which of all is m eant is not specified by a characteristic for which one item after the oth er would have to be exam ined, b u t by indicating its place in the o rd ered series. In such a p rocedure is constituted the reference to an individual as an individual It is such a p ro cedure which m ust be presupposed in the explanation of how a general statem ent is verified, and it does not in tu rn presuppose this explanation. With regard to the existential statem ents by means of which material objects and events are located relative to the spatial and tem poral posi­ tions, it has already become clear that in regard to their verifiability, and hence their m eaning, they are not com parable with ordinary exis­ tential statem ents. T his can be m ade clear in the following way. Ju st as in a singular statem ent the singular term specifies the verification-situation in which it is to be established w hether the predicate applies, so in a general statem ent the expression ‘of a ll/7: - ’13 specifies the verificationfield, which is to be ru n through in o rd er to establish w hether the p re d ­ icate applies. But now because the system of spatio-tem poral positions, as the totality of possible verification-situations, is our universal verificationfield, in the case o f a locating existential statem ent (‘O f all F: there is one and only one that is in such-and-such a position’) the specified p a rt of the universal verification-field takes the place of the verification-field of all F. W hat is asked is not w hether exactly one F has a property, but w hether there is exactly one F in this p art of the universal verificationfield. But now what does the ‘is’ which expresses the presence of an object in a spatio-tem poral area mean? We speak of the occurrence of an event at a particular time, likewise o f the occurrence of a m aterial object at a place, o f a m aterial object’s being situated at a place, and of the existence of a m aterial object d uring a period o f time. I do not want to go into this problem , but would merely point out that h ere we have a genuine case of the existence of individuals. It is genuine because it does not fall foul o f the criticism of the traditional concept o f individual existence.

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If this tem poral existence can be u n d ersto o d as a predicate at all, then it is not, like the traditional concept o f existence, a one-place predicate, but a two-place predicate (x exists at tn).14 W h eth er x still exists at time tn is not tested by exam ining x - if x no longer exists, there is nothing th ere to be exam ined - b u t by exam ining the point of time tn. It is precisely this which reveals the pre-em inence o f spatio-tem poral posi­ tions, as the ultim ate verification-field, over the objects that occur in this field. T h u s th ere are various aspects which give spatio-tem poral positions a pre-em inence in the m echanism of identification over m aterial objects and events - on the existence o f which the possibility of identification nonetheless depends. T h ese aspects, how ever, a re only d ifferen t sides of one and the same state of affairs: (1) the o rd ered multiplicity of spatial and tem poral positions, as the totality o f perceptual situations, is the universal and ultim ate verification-field for the applying (Zutreffen) of perceptual predicates; (2) for this reason all perceptible objects, which are not them selves parts o f this field - spatial and tem poral positions can only be identified th ro u g h th e ir presence in parts o f this field by locating existential statem ents; and, hence, (3) - this is m erely the o th er side o f the same phenom enon - the identification of spatial and tem poral positions cannot itself fail.

L E C T U R E 27

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Despite some obvious gaps and defects in execution I now want to regard the analysis of the m ode of em ploym ent of elem entary singular terms - those with which one can refer to perceptible objects - as concluded. In this lecture I shall merely sum m arize what follows from this analysis for the u n d erstan d in g of reference to objects, the explanation of the predicative form of sentence, and the elem entary use of the word ‘tru e ’. At the outset I predicted that, contrary to the traditional prejudice, the analysis of the m ode o f em ploym ent of expressions which ‘stand for’ objects would be essentially m ore complicated than the analysis of the mode of em ploym ent of predicates. T he extent to which this is grounded in the facts of the case has m eanwhile become apparent. T he analysis of the m ode o f em ploym ent o f these expressions is m ore complicated because the m ode o f em ploym ent is itself m ore complicated. It is so because the use of individual singular term s, in contrast to the use of elem entary perceptual predicates, is not isolable. T h erefore the indi­ vidual expression cannot be explained by itself. R ather the use of any type of singular term refers (verweist) systematically to the use of singular term s o f other types; and in part, as we have seen, this reference is even a reciprocal one. T hese references (Verweisungen) are expressed in the replaceability of one expression by other expressions in the predicative sentences in which it is used. This replaceability can itself be asserted in an identity-statement. T h e replaceability of V by ‘b’ expressed in the identity-statem ent ‘a =b’, however, does not fully bring out the phenom enon which I here call ‘reference’, because in an identity-statem ent neither of the two terms has a priority over the other, whereas in what I call reference it is always the one term that refers to the other; and this is not convertible except where the reference is a reciprocal one. We first encountered this p h e ­ nom enon in connection with the question: ‘and which object is a?’ (Lee-

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ture 23). A nd we saw then that the reason for the precedence of certain types of singular term over others which manifests itself in the answering of this question resides in the m anner in which they fulfil the function of specifying common to all singular terms; and this means: in the dif­ ferent role which their use has in the verification of those predicative sentences whose predicates are perceptual predicates (Lecture 24). I can therefore define what I mean in this context by ‘reference’ (Verwei­ sung) thus: a singular term of typeX - refers to a singular term of type Y - to ‘n j 1 - if and only if (1) m x —n y and (2) any sentence F m x , where *Fy is a perceptual predicate, can only be verified by verifying ‘Fny\ T he peculiar complexity that characterizes the m ode of employ­ m ent of singular terms is grounded in the fact that there are no singular term s of any type which do not refer to singular terms of other types. O ne can, it is true, understand a singular term and also in a certain sense know for which object it stands (which it specifies) without having at o ne’s disposal a specific term 'n-J to which it refers and by which would be identified which object mx is. But it belongs to the understanding of any singular term (mx that one knows to which- other type or types it refers, thus that even if one does not have a specific ‘n y*at on e’s disposal to which the *mx refers one nonetheless knows that it refers to some ‘n j . If that were not the case then ‘m x’ would simply not be understood as an expression which stands for a perceptible object. T o ren d er concrete what has ju st been said and to recapitulate let us glance back at the reference-system that the last few lectures have yielded. T he comparatively simple cases are those in which the reference is one-sided rath er than reciprocal. In the one-sided sense both non­ locating descriptions and proper names refer to locating expressions. I have shown this for non-locating descriptions (Lecture 24), whereas in the case of p ro p er names I have confined myself to hints and left open the question of the precise understanding of their mode of employment. This is one of the gaps in my presentation; but it is a gap which seems to me tolerable. For the fact that is crucial in the context of our enquiry, viz. that any sentence Frn in which F ’ is a perceptual predicate and ‘m’ a p ro p er nam e can only be verified by verifying ‘F n, where (n is a locat­ ing expression and m —n, cannot be doubted. Things became more complicated in the case of the locating expres­ sions themselves. T he expectation that the singular terms o f this type to which those of the other types refer do not themselves refer to others was disappointed when it turned out that locating expressions are themselves divided into two types - subjectively locating (or deictic) and objectively locating expressions - and that every use of a singular term

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of one of these types refers to singular term s o f the other type (Lecture 25). It was a fu rth e r defect in my presentation that I did not show in detail how objectively locating expressions can be explained n o r what the identification-criteria are for the identification of som ething objec­ tively located (i.e. by reference to an objective coordinate zero-point) with som ething subjectively located (i.e. by reference to the speaker). Nonetheless the fact of reciprocal reference showed itself to be indu­ bitable. I can now form ulate it in a m ore inform ative way in term s of the definition ju st given: if ‘mo is an objectively locating singular term and ‘F ’ a perceptual predicate then ‘Fmo can only be verified if there is a subjectively locating expression ‘n s’ such th at the speaker knows that mo = ns; ‘Fns’ is verifiable for the speaker in the sense that he now knows in w hat relation the verification-situation for determ ining w hether ‘F ’ applies stands to his own position, ‘ns’ contains a directive as to what the speaker has to do (or would have to do if ns is a past, or in some other way unattainable, perceptual situation) in o rd er to verify w hether ‘F ’ applies: he m ust get him self into the situation in which ‘mo can be replaced by ‘Id , w here ‘Id stands for a dem onstrative expression. But, as we have seen, the converse reference also holds: an object is only identified by a dem onstrative ‘lD’ or an o th er deictic expression ‘ns' if there is a ‘ko such th at the speaker knows th at lD—k0. This too is to be understood as reference in the sense defined because, as we have seen, the correct use o f ‘Flo in the perceptual situation only has the significance of a verification of ‘F ’ ’s applying to som ething, or of a verification of the tru th o f an assertion, if the dem onstrative ‘lD’ functions not as a m ere ornam ent to a quasi-predicate (as in the case of F h ere’) but is replaceable by o th e r deictic expressions and, ultim ately, by an objectively locating singular term by m eans o f which can be specified from the point o f view of an arbitrary speaker-position what it is that ‘F ’ is being verified of. Every objectively locating expression (and m ediated through this, all non-locating singular terms: nam es and descriptions) refers to the cor­ responding dem onstrative expression (‘h e re ’, ‘now’, ‘this’), because the assertion that a is F is only verifiable in the situation in which ‘a is replaceable by a dem onstrative expression. A nd on the other hand the use of the dem onstrative expression ‘Id’ refers to an objectively locating expression, because only then is som ething asserted by using the dem on­ strative expression F/d, i.e. only then is som ething expressed th at is true or false and hence verifiable. It then em erged in the last lecture th at the reciprocal dependence in the use of singular term s o f various types at this m ost basic level of locating expressions is complicated by the fact th at in addition to the

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reciprocal d ep en d en ce o f objectively locating and deictically locating expressions we have a reciprocal d ep en d en ce o f two o th er types of sin­ gular term s, nam ely those which identify spatial and tem poral positions and those which identify m aterial objects and events. This second recip­ rocal d ep en d en ce does n o t of course have the character o f a ‘referen ce’ in the sense ju st defined. N onetheless h ere too it holds that we can only use the expressions o f the one type if we can also use expressions o f the o th e r type. T h e special com plication in the ‘explanation’ of singular term s at this lowest level o f identifying expressions consists therefore in this, that we can only explain the m ode of em ploym ent (and this means: the identificatory function) o f any type of locating expression if we include the em ploym ent o f both com plem entary types, thus if we already presuppose, o r sim ultaneously explain, their m ode of em ploym ent. As it has n o t becom e clear how this circle is to be broken into1 I m ust em phasize th at my analysis o f identifying expressions has not achieved any real clarity and can only be regarded as a provisional sketch. I believe th at it can nonetheless suffice fo r o u r purposes, i.e. for answ ering the question we started out from and fo r the sake of which I have carried out this whole discussion o f singular terms. T his was, firstly, the question concerning a positive alternative to the traditional understanding, which rests on the m etaphorical concept o f rep resen tation, of w hat it is for an expression to ‘stand fo r’ an object and how th e - linguistic or non-linguistic - referen ce to an object is to be un d ersto od. A nd secondly (this was really the question from which we started out) how in giving the truth-definition of the predicative form o f sentence we can replace the singular te rm ’s ‘standing fo r’ an object by its em ploym ent-rule (analo­ gously to th e replacem ent, carried out earlier, o f the predicate’s ‘apply­ ing’), so as to arrive at an explanation o f th e use o f the predicative sentence as a whole o r o f the word ‘tru e ’ at the lowest level o f its recursive definition. I The analytical concept of an object It is clear that the two questions are very closely connected, for they both d ep en d on a positive u n d e rsta n d in g o f w hat it is for an expression to ‘stand fo r’ an object. Let us start with th e first question. We have to consider w hether the analyses o f the actual m ode o f em ploym ent o f singular terms we have in the m eantim e carried out enable us to resum e the dialogue with the traditional philo so p h er in such a way that we do not ju st subject him to an im m an en t critique but o ffer him a positive alternative. Let us first

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recall how far we had come before we em barked on the concrete anal­ yses. W hat I call the traditional position vis-ä-vis this question is the view that a sign’s standing fo r an object is to be understood as the assignment of this sign to that object. This view presupposes that the person who uses the sign can also re fe r to the object w ithout signs, as som ething that he has ‘b efore’ him (or his consciousness); for otherwise he could not assign the sign to the object. This pre-linguistic reference to an object is in terp reted in the tradition with the help of the m etaphorically extended notion of ‘rep resen tatio n s’ (Vorstellungen). T h e characteristic traditional theory of signs was a theory of representation (Stellvertreter­ theorie)'. the sign represents (vertritt) som ething th at could also be given independently o f the use of this o r some other sign, namely in re p re­ sentation (Vorstellung). I can im agine that by now you are inclined to smile at the notion o f rep resen tatio n but that you still regard the view that the object for which a sign stands must also be capable of being given independently o f signs as self-evident. B ut if you do then you m ust give an account, o th er than the representation-orientated one, of how you conceive this sign-free givenness of an object. I know of no other. Probably to speak o f *a’ standing fo r a is already to invoke the theory o f representation (Stellvertretertheorie) - ‘a’ represents (vertritt) a - and if this were so one would really have to say that the traditional view of singular term s consists in the view th at their function is that of standing for objects. I have p re fe rre d to use the term ‘stand for’ in an abstract sense which does not prejudice the traditional conception. This verbal indeterm inateness seems to me to be harmless, for if one regards the statem ent th at singular term s stand for objects as an answer to the ques­ tion concerning their function or m ode of em ploym ent then it is clear that one holds the traditional view. If on the other hand one understands the term ‘standing fo r’ as simply a cipher whose m eaning has yet to be specified (p. 270) then it is equally clear that one regards the traditional view as simply one possible answ er to the question concerning the ‘rela­ tion’ of the singular term to an object. Prior to raising the question of the actual m ode of em ploym ent of singular terms I could only criticize the traditional conception by seeking to show that the m etaphorical character of the extended concept of representation is uncashable. T h e traditional conception could not be refu ted thereby; but the readiness to consider a wholly different con­ ception could be awakened. I then chose for the developm ent of a positive alternative to what

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seems self-evident to the traditional philosopher a starting point that seemed sufficiently neutral for me to be able to assume that the tradi­ tional philosopher could agree to it (p. 288). The neutrality was achieved by initially leaving open the question of w hether it is possible to refer to objects independently of signs. T h at objects are referred to by means of singular term s is uncontroversial. T h e traditional philosopher (and by him I always m ean the traditional voice in ourselves) was simply invited to follow an unprejudiced analysis of the actual m ode of em ploym ent of these signs. T h e traditional philosopher - at any rate one belonging to the reflective tradition of transcendental philosophy could also accept without difficulty the principle which I made the basis of my analysis and which derived from W ittgenstein’s basic principle: that what it is in general for an expression to stand for an object is answered by explaining how it is established in the concrete case for which object an expression stands. So none of this yet contained any specifically language-analytical prejudice. T h e fu rth er step of seeing the function of singular terms in their contribution to the function of the sentences whose parts they can be (p. 289) implicitly contained the decisive turn. For if the function of singular terms is built into the sentence-whole, their function can hardly consist in the m ere representation (Vertretung) of a function which can also be accomplished outside this linguistic context. Nonetheless it was still possible to think that the question o f which object a singular term stands for can ultimately only be answered by means of an ostensive explanation, that is by pointing to an object. And what else can this mean but that som ething is pointed to that is given to us in representation? As far as I can see all schools of analytical philosophy have rem ained in this question explicitly or implicitly within the traditional point of view. T he first real blow to the traditional conception came when it emerged that the function o f singular term s is that o f specification. If the ‘relation’ of the singular term to the object for which it stands consists in this, that by means o f it is specified which o f all is m eant (p. 293), then this ref­ erence (.Beziehung) to all entails that it cannot be a m ere relation between the sign and its object; and hence that this reference cannot be construed as assignment. However, this reference to all rem ained initially unclear. This much of course seemed clear: we only know which of all objects of a dom ain is m eant by a singular term ‘a if we have a criterion for decid­ ing w hether a =b or a ^ b , where ‘b’ is any other singular term with which an object of this dom ain is specified. B ut it was still not clear how deeply the identity-relation reaches into the specificatory function itself. One could adm it (this opinion is probably widespread in analytical phi­

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losophy) that it belongs to the sense of the use of expressions for the specification of objects that one possesses a criterion for replaceability by other expressions o f the same dom ain, but still be of the opinion that this is merely an additional aspect which is added to the ‘standing’ o f the expression ‘fo r’ an object but which does not determ ine the sense o f this ‘standing fo r’. This view is only tenable so long as one believes oneself able to assume that for every object-dom ain there is a pre-em inent type of singular term which is such that, whereas in the case o f all other singular term s the question ‘W hich object is m eant by “a,”?' is answered by an identitystatem ent the second term of which is ultimately a singular term of this pre-em inent type, in the case of this pre-em inent type itself the question ‘Which object is m eant by “a ”?’ is no longer to be answered by an identitystatem ent but by assigning “a” to the object, which m ust therefore be accessible independently of signs. T h e role o f functioning as this p re ­ em inent type of singular term , which is supposed to refer directly to the object, has been ascribed both to p ro p er nam es and to dem onstra­ tives. But, as we have seen, both views are untenable. Not only do they contradict the actual m ode of em ploym ent o f these types of expression; one cannot even invent a type o f singular term - as e.g. Russell did with his logically p ro p e r nam es - capable of fulfilling the postulate of the theory of assignm ent. We are now in a position to see wherein th e decisive result of the analysis o f the actual m ode of em ploym ent of singular term s lies: in the fact of reciprocal reference that obtains between those types o f singular term to which the o th er types of singular term refer. We have seen that this reciprocal reference is not a m erely contingent characteristic of our language but is g ro u n d ed in the essence of the supplem entation of p e r­ ceptual predicates to form expressions with which som ething can be said that can be designated true or false. O u r finding that there is no singular term that does not refer to others m eans that every question o f the form ‘which object is m eant by ‘V 7 ’ is answered by another sign that can be substituted fo r V. T his does not lead to a vicious circle in which one sign is arbitrarily substituted for another. R ather the rulegoverned substitution o f singular term s for one another is the condition of the possibility of a being whose perceptual position constantly changes being able to re fe r from any position to any o th er perceptual situation. T h e latter can only be held on to as identical if, in accordance with changes in o n e’s own position, o th er term s are being substituted. This concerns at first the substitution o f subjectively locating expressions for one another. B ut in addition to this, as we have seen, the subjectively

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locating exp ression m ust be replaceable by an objectively locating one. It could appear as though the objectively locating expressions themselves require no substitution; so that on e m ight think that h ere we have the pre-em in en t type o f singular term postulated by the traditional theory which does not refer to any others but is directly assigned to an object. But, firstly, an objectively locating expression identifies an object not by being assigned to it but by specifying its spatio-tem poral relations to other objects. Such an expression does not function as representative (.Stellvertreter) for a reference to the object that is also conceivable without the sign. Secondly, though it is true that an objectively locating expression stands on ce and for all for the sam e object, if the speaker did not know which subjectively locating expression he can substitute for it (and this will always be d ifferen t d ep en d in g on his ow n situation) then this would not be an identification o f the object for him; and it is clearly senseless to speak o f an identification o f an object which is not an identification f o r som eone. Replaceability by objectively locating expressions ensures that the identification is an identification/or everybody; but it is so only if everyone can replace the objectively locating expression by a subjectively locating on e. T h e reference o f every ‘m0’ to an ‘n 8*, and vice versa, does not give rise to a vicious circle for these two types o f reference are the mutually supplem enting sides o f the identification in which every speaker can specify for every other (but also for him self) which verificationsituation o f a perceptual predicate he m eans. If we now return to the principle con ced ed to us by the traditional p hilosoph er, that the question o f what it is for an exp ression to stand for an object is answered by explaining how it is established in the con­ crete case for which object an expression stands, then we reach the result that this establishing is never accom plished by assigning the expression to an object (which in that case w ould have to be som ehow given in de­ p en dently o f signs) but always in accordance with the reference-rules which hold betw een the various types o f singular term. We explain to so m eon e what it is for an expression to stand for an object (o f an objectdom ain) by dem onstrating to him the reference-rules (V erweisungsregeln) which govern the expressions that su p p lem en t the predicates (o f this object-dom ain). With this we have now achieved for singular term s too what I have several times called a ‘specifically language-analytical p osition ’ (cf. p. 158, p. 242), viz. what is achieved by a certain use o f signs does not m erely take the place o f som ething that could also be achieved without the use o f these signs; rather it requires this use o f signs. In the present case this m eans that the reference to an object - perhaps I should say

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m ore concisely: to an individual - w hich is m ade possible by the use o f singular terms is simply not conceivable w ithout the use o f such exp res­ sions and, in particular, o f the identity-sign. T h is then is the outcom e o f the dialogue with the traditional philos­ o p h er which started from the dem and that he should first agree to an analysis o f only that referen ce to objects which is achieved by the use o f signs which stand for the objects. A ssum ing that the traditional philos­ o p h er accepts this result as far as it goes he can still say that this analysis leaves u n touched that reference to objects which is achieved in depen ­ dently o f signs. Formally this is incontestable, if on e can also say what on e is to understand by this ‘reference to objects’ if it is not that kind o f referen ce on e can explain in terms o f the use o f singular terms. Should on e seek to explain what is m eant by saying that it is the reference to objects that is accom plished in representation (V orstellen ) then clearly one unintelligible thing is being explained by another. Such a view cannot be refuted . But it does not n eed to be; for it can do no dam age. So I think w e can sum m arize the result by saying that there is no such thing as a sign -free referen ce to an object (an individual). It w ould be a com plete m isunderstanding were you to suppose that this m eans that the rule-governed use o f signs would som ehow take the place o f objects, as h app en ed with predicates. T his m isunderstanding would correspond to the prejudice that linguistic analysis is concerned with linguistic usage rather than with things (die S achen). Faced with this objection one m ust always ask what is m eant by ‘things’. H ere it can only m ean the objects in space and time. But not only do these objects remain intact; it is only the m ode o f em ploym ent o f singular terms, as this has been presen ted, that makes it intelligible both that and how on e can m ean an individual spatio-tem poral object. T h e rule-governed use o f these signs does not take the place o f these objects; rather it takes the place o f a fictitious sign-free reference to these objects. In fact it was this reference, interpreted as representation, which replaced spatio-temporal objects by som ething else, nam ely by representations. It is im portant to see how far the recourse to the use o f signs has a systematically d ifferen t significance in the language-analytical destruction o f the traditional conception o f singular terms than it has in the lan­ guage-analytical destruction o f the traditional conception o f other lin­ guistic expressions, e.g. predicates. It was characteristic o f the traditional con ception o f all linguistic expressions that it did not raise the question o f the m ode o f em ploym ent o f a sign, but instead just took it for granted that every sign stands for an object. N ow in the case o f singular terms the language-analytical recourse to the m ode o f em ploym ent has the

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significance o f explain in g the sign-object schema, whereas in the case o f the other expressions it has the significance of preven tin g the sig n m eaning schem a from being replaced by the sign-object schema. In this second case, that o f predicates, for exam ple, the possible objectual ref­ erence to som ething for which the predicate stands, the reference to an attribute, is indeed based on the m ode o f em ploym ent o f the sign. We can now form ulate this m ore clearly: the identity-criterion for a = b , w here ‘a and ‘b ’ stand for attributes, consists in the predicates whose nom inalization yields the expressions ‘a and ‘b’ having the same m ode o f em ploym ent (synonymy). On the other hand, i f ‘a’ and *6’ stand for spatio-temporal objects, then the identity-criterion for a = b is the identity o f the spatio-tem poral relations o f a and b . T h us in the case o f spatiotem poral objects the identity-criterion does not concern the m ode o f em ploym ent o f certain signs. T o specify which is the object m eant one does not, as with attributes or states o f affairs, point to the m ode o f em ploym ent o f a linguistic expression, rather on e locates the object in space and time. This locating, however, can only be achieved by means o f the rule-governed use o f a species o f linguistic expression. With this I can now conclude the elucidations regarding the outcom e o f our analyses for the first o f the two questions from which we started, viz. for the question o f what it is for a singular term to ‘stand for’ an object. In the case o f singular terms that stand for perceptible objects on e knows for which object the expression stands if one knows which object it identifies; and one knows that if on e knows to which other singular terms it refers.2 Since in the definition o f ‘ “a” refers to “b ” ’ singular terms already appear as com ponents o f predicative sentences and reference is m ade to the verifiability o f these sentences (above p. p. 373) the implications for our second question - the consequences for the truth-definition o f the predicative form o f sentence - can be directly attached to the foregoing results.

II The mode o f em ploym ent o f p red ica tive sentences a n d the explan ation o f the w ord ‘tru e’

T h e truth-definition for the predicative form o f sentence was (p. 253): ‘T h e sentence “F a ” - or the assertion that a is F - is true if and only if the predicate “F ” applies to the object for w hich the singular term “a ” stands.’ Our problem was: how can we, in place o f this m eta-theoretical spec­ ification o f the truth-condition, dem onstrate a verification-rule in such a way that we thereby explain how sentences o f the form ‘F a ’ are used?

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We had seen in a general way for all assertoric sentences that they are used to assert som ething: w hoever uses such a sentence guarantees that certain truth-conditions are fulfilled (Lecture 15). From this it follow ed that on e explains the use o f a form o f sentence by show ing by m eans o f exam ples, not u nd er what conditions a sentence o f this form is used, but u nder what conditions it is confirm ed or refuted; and this shows itself in the conditions under which it, or its negation, is to be withdrawn. T h e peculiar difficulty o f explaining the predicative form o f sentence consisted in this, that (1) w hereas the explanation o f the truth-condition o f the higher-level form s o f sentence could fall back on the word ‘true’ as applied to m ore elem entary sentences, this is not possible in the case o f elem entary sentences whose truth does not d ep en d on the truth o f other sentences; (2) that we m ust assum e that in contrast to the unitary verification-rule o f the higher-level form s o f sentence the truth o f pre­ dicative sentences depends on two rules, an em ploym ent-rule o f pred­ icates and an em ploym ent-rule o f singular terms. If we form ulate this at the level not o f the verification-rule but of the truth-condition then this state o f affairs can be expressed thus: w hether the sentence ‘F a is true d epends on (a) for which object ‘a ’ stands and (b) w hether the predicate F ’ applies to this object. We can now exp ect that in relation to em ploym ent-rules this state o f affairs is to be construed thus: whoever uses a sentence o f the form ‘F a guarantees that if the em ploym ent-rule o f the singular term is follow ed the predicate can be correctly applied in accordance with its em ploym ent-rule to the result o f follow ing this rule o f the singular term. T his provides us with a fram ework into which we have to insert the two rules. T h e transition to em ploym ent-rules is accom plished in every case by the question: how is it to be established that -? T h e question: how is it to be established that a sentence o f the form ‘Fa is true? is answered by show ing how it is to be established that the predicate *Fy applies to an object and how it is to be established for which object of perceptual predicates the singular term V stands. N ow in the case o f predicates we have seen that the criterion o f our knowing how it is to be established that a perceptual predicate F ’ applies to an object is that we know how the truth o f the dem onstrative expression F m D’ is to be established in arbitrary situations. And correspondingly we have seen in connection with W iggins’ definition that the criterion o f our knowing how it is established which object a singular term ‘a ’ identifies is that we know how it is established that ‘cf>a’ is true where for ‘cf)’ an arbitrary perceptual predicate is to be inserted, a perceptual predicate that we already understand in the sense o f the explanation given in the previous

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sentence; and this m eans: w hose verification-rule we know. With this explanation o f the singular term we can now generalize the definition o f the criterion o f the u nd erstan d in g o f predicates by d rop pin g the restriction to dem onstratives: the criterion o f our understanding a (per­ ceptual) predicate ‘F ’ is that we know how o n e establishes that F m is true where for ‘m an arbitrary singular term can be substituted which we understand in the sense o f the explanation given in the previous sentence; and this means: w hose identification-rule we know. H ow ever, these explanations do not yet give us what we are looking for, for they explain the use o f the com p onent-expressions in such a way that they assum e that we already know how on e establishes that a predicative senten ce is true; w hereas it is precisely this that is to be explained. B u t having thus brought to light the rules o f the com ponentexpressions involved in establishing the truth o f a predicative assertion we will sim ply have to use these rules w hose explanation we already know - the verification-rule o f the predicate, the identification-rule o f the singular term - for the exp lan ation o f the truth o f the predicative assertion. T h e abstract explanation which has ju st been given o f what it is that is guaranteed in using a predicative senten ce - an explanation which did not yet take into account the peculiarity o f the two rules can now be rend ered concrete in the follow in g way: it is guaranteed that if on e has iden tified the object - and that m eans ultimately: the verifica tio n -situ a tio n - in accordance with the em ploym ent-rule o f the singular term, then the predicate can be correctly applied in this situation in accordance with its em ploym ent-rule. B ut this can equally well be inserted into the truth-definition as a truth-condition: a sentence ‘F a ’ is true if and only if the predicate ‘F ’ can be correctly applied in the situ­ ation identified by ‘a . I think it will be h elp fu l b efore taking the final step to bring out certain basic features o f the con ception w hich now em erges. Let us first get clear about how it differs from the traditional theory o f ju d g m en t and truth. T h e latter, which was exclusively orientated towards the elem entary case o f the predicative sentence, had, it is true, already rec­ ognized that the condition o f the possibility o f a linguistic expression (or its psychological or ontological counterpart) being called true or false is its structure (above p. 253). T h is corresponds to the fact ju st em phasized that the truth o f a predicative senten ce essentially d ep en ds on two rules. In the tradition, how ever, d u e to its object-orientation, the connection o f these two factors was interpreted as synthesis, the connection o f two objects. So on e was unable to see that the two com ­ ponents o f the predicative senten ce have d ifferen t and, in their d iffer­

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ence, com plem entary functions. In the m eantim e we have seen that the fact that one com ponent has an identificatory function must be regarded as just as m uch a condition o f the possibility o f being able to speak o f truth and falsity as the fact that there are two com ponents. W e had already seen (p. 253) that this weakness in the traditional conception is already overcom e in the first, still meta-theoretical, step in the specification o f the truth-condition - thus in the truth-definition. A ccording to the truth-definition truth depends on two factors: firstly - as presupposition - on which object the singular term stands for and, secondly - as condition - on w hether the predicate applies to this object. T hus it could already becom e clear at this level that there are two different factors involved. But how these two factors, or the two semantic expressions ‘stands for’ and ‘ap plies’, are connected cannot be m ade clear at this level, but only by asking how it is established for which object the singular term stands and how it is established that the predicate applies to it. Even then o f course the clarification o f this connection does not follow automatically but only by m aking clear to oneself that the identification o f the object consists in the identification o f the situ­ ation in which it can be established whether the predicate applies to it; and to get this clear our analysis o f singular terms was necessary. This essential com plem entarity o f identification-rule and verificationrule also explains how the function o f the singular term in the sentence is d ep en dent on the com plem entary function o f the predicate and yet in a certain sense is in d ep en d en t o f it. This is the problem o f the asym­ m etry between singular term and predicate to which I had referred at the beginning o f the discussion o f singular terms (p. 267f). In asking in regard to a predicative sentence ‘F a ’ whether the predicate applies to the object we m ust already have identified the object before we can exam ine w hether the predicate applies to it. A nd although we do not need to have identified it we must have specified it in order even to be able to form ulate the question o f w hether the predicate applies to it. W hereas the identification or specification o f the object must be achieved independently o f w hether the predicate applies to it. For this reason it seem s more correct if instead o f saying that the truth o f the predicative assertion d ep en ds on two factors - (1) for which object the singular term stands and (2) w hether the predicate applies to it - we say, with Strawson, that it only d ep en ds on the second factor, whereas the first represents the presupposition o f being able to form ulate the truth-condition at all. This also explains why the verification-rule o f the predicative sentence is not based on two partial verification-rules but only on one. T h e identification-rule is not a verification-rule; rather follow ing it con ­

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stitutes the presupposition for the application of the verification-rule o f the predicate (in that a verification-situation is thereby picked out). T he fact however that the follow ing o f the specification- and ultimately the identification-rule always precedes the application o f the verificationrule does not m ean that the specification o f which object is m eant has an independent significance apart from the function it has in the veri­ fication o f predicates. We can now m ove on to the final step in our analysis. T h e reason why the form ulations o f the truth-condition o f predicative sentences cannot be regarded as an explanation o f the m ode of em ploym ent o f these sentences is clearly that semantic expressions like ‘identification-rule’ and ‘verification-rule’ still occur in them. What has so far been achieved is that in the truth-definition the expressions ‘stand for’ and ‘applies’ no longer occur; instead reference is made to the em ploym ent-rules o f the two com ponent-expressions which are to be regarded as the rules con­ cerning how one establishes for which object the singular term stands and how one establishes that the predicate applies to an object. What is still lacking is an explanation o f what is m eant by ‘verification-rule’ and ‘identification-rule’, or the replacem ent o f such locutions by the description of the actual m ode o f em ploym ent o f the two kinds o f expression. T o replace the reference to rules in this way is the same as to explain them; for what is m eant in general by such a rule is explained by dem onstrating by means o f exam ples how the use o f expressions is explained in the particular case in accordance with such a rule. But we already possess a description o f how the use o f a particular predicate (and that means: its verification-rule) is explained, and likewise o f how the use o f a particular singular term (and that means: its iden­ tification-rule) is explained. For predicates I already gave such an account before we started the discussion o f singular terms (p. 264f). And we have seen in the last few lectures (with o f course the defects which I pointed out today) how the identification-rules o f singular terms o f the different types are explained. In both cases it became apparent that the explanation o f an expression o f one o f the two kinds (singular term or predicate) essentially presupposes that the expression is understood as an expression that supplem ents expressions o f the other kind and that the m ode o f em ploym ent o f expressions o f the other kind is already known. T hus we understand a singular term of a certain type only if we know to which other types it refers (verweist)', and this implies a ref­ erence (B ezugnahm e) to the verification o f perceptual predicates. On the other hand, in describing the explanation o f predicates one could not avoid anticipating what is essential to the explanation o f singular terms

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- their character o f referring to other singular terms. This reciprocal presupposition does not represent a vicious circle but is precisely what we should exp ect if the two kinds o f expression are essentially com ple­ mentary expressions. Besides, on e can think o f an explanation o f the expressions o f the two kinds in stages that makes clear that there is no circle in the expla­ nation: Stage 1: classification-expressions are explained as quasi­ predicates. Stage 2: the classification-expressions are supplem ented by quasi-dem onstrative expressions which do not yet refer to other expres­ sions. T h e m ode o f em ploym ent o f the resulting expressions F m o (‘this is F \ ‘here F \ ‘now F*) does not yet d iffer essentially from that o f e x ­ pressions o f the first stage. *F* is not a predicate; ‘m D’ is not a singular term (cf. p. 263). Stage 3: the use o f is explained by dem onstrating its systematic replaceability by other deictic expressions in connection with the change in the speaking-situation. If the expression ‘m ^ is used in accordance with this explanation then it has an identificatory fun c­ tion: it is a singular term. This explanation then autom atically has the consequence for the supplem entary expression *F* that it is no longer understood as a quasi-predicate but as a predicate. A lthough ‘F ’ is still explained in exactly the sam e way as at the first and second stages what is now explained is no longer the situation-related em ploym ent-rule o f ‘F ’ but its verification-rule and hence the situation-free em ploym entrule o f ‘F ’ as a predicate, i.e. its m ode o f em ploym ent in com bination with other than dem onstrative expressions (cf. p. 265): This explanation o f the replaceability o f the demonstrative expression by other deictic expressions implies (1) that if the utterance ‘F m D’ in the one situation can be described as correct one can also say o f the utterance ‘Fris in the other situation that it is correct and vice versa.3 T o understand this is to understand the m eaning o f substitutability - or the expression ‘= \ But to understand the systematic connection o f dem onstrative and deictic expressions and h en ce the use o f the corresponding predicative sentences on e m ust also understand (2) that ‘n s’ ‘refers’ to ‘m D\ This not only means that if the expression F m o is correctly used in its situation then the expression F n s’ is correctly used in its situation and vice versa, but also that the correct situation-related use o f ‘F m D’ is the criterion o f the correct situation-free use o f *Fn8y. This reference o f the correct use o f one expression to that o f the other can be explained (as is the case with all form s o f assertoric speech) by dem onstrating the corresponding verification-gam e by m eans o f exam ples, e.g. (1 ) A says F n s\ B denies it (or calls A ’s utterance ‘not correct’). (2) Both get into the perceptual situation in which they can say ‘m D is the same as that which we previously

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designated with n s\ (3) T ogeth er they d eterm in e w hether F m D\ or ‘F \ can be used in this situation in conform ity with the rule. (4) D ep en d in g on the r e s u lt s or B says that the utterance o f the other at stage 1 was correct and that his own was not correct. With this further explanation, which p resupposes the preceding one (the explanation o f *= ’), the word ‘true’ has been explained at a most elem entary level o f elem entary (predicative) assertions. For the word ‘correct’, as it was used in these two explanations, no longer has the m eaning o f ‘conform ing to the ru le’ (except in step (3) o f the verificationgam e). T h at the word ‘correct’ in steps (1) and (4) o f the verificationgam e has a m eaning other than ‘con form ing to the rule’, for which therefore a new word - ‘true’ for exam ple —is n eed ed , can not merely be asserted from without; it shows itself in the way in which this cor­ rectness is established (checked). D eterm ination o f correctness in the sense o f ru le-conform ity and determ ination o f correctness in the sense o f truth now becom e separate (cf. 3 5 4 f ). O ne shows how correctness in the sense o f truth is established by m eans o f the verification-gam e that has just b een dem onstrated. W hether som ething true is said with ‘F n sy in a situation other than the perceptual situation is established by recourse to the perceptual situation in which the sam e thing is said with ‘F m oOn the other hand, whether som eon e is using F m n or the com p onent exp ression ‘F ’ in ‘F m ^ (but also in ‘Fra/) correctly, in the sense o f ‘in conform ity with the rule’, is d eterm ined by exam in in g how he uses the sam e dem onstrative expression ‘F m D’ in other situations. Only in the spe­ cial case o f the use o f (F m D’ (thus in step 3 o f the verification-gam e) is the characterization o f the use as correct am biguous. But this am biguity in the use o f an expression in that situation in which truth is tested is (a) necessary and (b) harmless. It is necessary b ecause the testing o f truth p resupposes that the expressions are used in conform ity with the rule. It is harm less because the characterization o f the use o f the expression as correct is only am biguous so long as it is viewed in isolation. T h e characterization o f a use o f F m o as correct/incorrect has the m ean­ ing o f true/false in so far as this characterization entails the correspond­ ing characterization o f the other expressions F k s\ ‘F ls’, etc., with which the sam e thing is said (and this also m eans that w hat is called ‘correct’ [‘tru e’] is not the use o f the expression but what is said by m eans o f the use o f the expression and, what is the sam e thing, what is said by means o f the other expressions in so far as they are used in the corresponding situations). On the other hand, the characterization o f the use o f F m ß as correct/incorrect has the m eaning o f ‘in conform ity with the rule’/‘not in conform ity with the rule’ in so far as this characterization is confirmed

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or disconfirm ed by the m ode o f em ploym ent o f the same expression in other situations. O f course as long as the verification-gam e is only dem onstrated in term s o f exam ples o f the kind just described it can only explain the word ‘true’, even as restricted to predicative sentences about perceptible objects, at a m ost elem entary level. But to this first level the others can be easily attached. I can restrict m yself to indications: (1) T h at to identify the intended object dem onstratively is already to identify the verification-situation of the predicate holds universally only for spatio-tem poral positions. For material objects it only holds in the case o f predicates o f which it is presupposed that they apply to the object during the whole duration o f its existence and everywhere uni­ form ly. We cannot decide w hether the assertion that the N eckar flows into the R hine is true simply by perceiving it at som e point o f its course and referring to it with a dem onstrative expression. However, we know on the basis o f the identity-criterion o f spatio-temporal continuity which holds for m aterial objects how we m ust proceed in order to identify that section o f this object which represents the verification-situation o f the predicate. What we have h ere then is simply a m ore com plicated form o f step 2 in the verification-m odel I have just presented. (2) A more complicated form o f step 3 in the verification-model results w hen we consider that even perceptual predicates never have so simple a verification-rule that the assertion that such a predicate applies to an object can be decided by a single act o f perception. That the table at the door o f the lecture-room is red cannot be conclusively verified by looking at it. It is possible that further acts o f perception will reveal that it only seem ed red because o f the red illum ination or because on e only per­ ceived a part o f it on which there was a red spot, etc. T o the contrast betw een false and true there also belongs this special contrast between appearance and reality. H ow ever, it was correct to ignore this com pli­ cation at first for one can only explain perceptual predicates in this sequence. Only the sim ple predicate F ’ can be explained on the basis o f the quasi-predicate F ’; and only if on e already understands the simple predicate F ’ can on e learn the contrast between ‘it is really F* and ‘it seem s to be F ’.4 T h is explanation is achieved by show ing by what further perceptions an assertion already supported by perception can be dis­ confirm ed or further supported. T hus in place o f the first, sim ple decision-procedure o n e learns a graduated decision-procedure for deter­ m ining the truth o f an assertion. This com plication essentially concerns the predicate; how ever as regards the singular term it must be ensured that although the perceptions are always new the same object is still

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meant; and this presupposes that the previous point has already been taken care of. (3) T h e verification-m odel is also incom plete in so far as I have restricted it to deictic singular terms. H owever, the extension to other singular terms follows automatically from what I have said about the reference-connections between the different types o f singular term. However, there are som e com plications here which I must at least indicate. If the singular term V in the utterance at stage 1 o f the veri­ fication-gam e is not a deictic expression then its replacement by a dem onstrative expression ‘mo at stage 2 rests on the no longer analytic but empirical truth o f ‘n = m D’. But in that case one can no longer say that what is said with TV is the same as what is said with F m D\ for it is possible for som eone to hold what is said with *Fmß to be true and what is said with TV to be false or vice versa (that is if he does not believe that n — m D). We here com e up against the question o f the identitycriteria o f states o f affairs or assertions. T h e view that two sentences F n and ‘G m ’ stand for the same state o f affairs if and only if their com ponents are extensionally equivalent, thus if F ’ applies to the sam e objects as ‘G’ and n = m, has also been m aintained;5 but it hardly cor­ responds to our ordinary understanding. T h e usual view is that the two sentence-com ponents m ust be intensionally equivalent,6 thus that, in' particular, ‘m = n ’ is analytically true. And it seem s appropriate to accept the even narrower criterion o f Frege that we believe that what is said with an utterance is the same as what is said with another utterance if and only if it is not conceivable that som ebody should hold the one to be true and the other false,7 thus in particular if it is not conceivable that the speaker should hold ‘m ~ n to be false. Whichever o f these two con ­ ceptions we adopt, we shall have to draw the boundaries o f the identity o f what is being asserted more narrowly even where both singular terms are deictic expressions. I f today I say ‘today’ and mean by this the same day which som e time ago I m eant when I said ‘tomorrow’, I can nonetheless be mistaken in the b elief that it is the same day (for exam ple if I have slept through a day). Even here then the presupposed identity-sentence is empirically falsifiable; thus what is asserted in the two cases is at least not necessarily identical. It is different if one says: ‘T h e day which I m ean when today I say “today” is the same as the day which I shall m ean w hen tom orrow I will say “yesterday”.’ This is analy­ tic. So it also follows that what I assert today with the sentence ‘Today it is raining’ is the same as what I would assert tomorrow with the sentence ‘Yesterday it was raining.’8 H ere an error is impossible because the statem ent that I have just m ade no longer concerns the question

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w hether what is being said in different situations is in fact the same; rather this statem ent only claims that to express what is being asserted from the perspective o f one situation from the perspective o f other situations certain other expressions have to be used. Now the em ploym ent-rules o f these d ifferen t expressions, and with them the analytical know ledge that in every other situation one can assert the same thing only with the corresponding other expression, are presup­ posed by the possibility that what is being asserted in the second situa­ tion can turn out as an empirical fact not to be the sam e as what had been asserted in the first situation, although it was m eant to be the same. It is these identity-sentences both o f whose terms are deictic exp res­ sions, and which are analytic, through which at the level o f assertions there is constituted over against the fleeting utterance (the act o f saying) som ething identifiable, som ething said, to w hich on e can com e back as the same from any other situation and which is a possible bearer o f the predicates ‘true’ and ‘false’. In the other cases, however, in which in the verification-gam e we have to assum e the truth o f empirical identitysentences in order to ensure that both outside and inside the verification-situation we mean the same spatio-tem poral object, this (extensional) identity o f the spatio-tem poral object does not entail the (intensional) identity o f what is asserted. T h u s in verifying an assertion whose singular term is not a deictic expression we have recourse to another assertion. Since however in the verification-gam e the truth o f the identity-sentence (‘n = % ’) is assumed by both partners, what is as­ serted with ‘F n ’ turns out to be true, or false, if and only if what is asserted with ‘F m ^ is true, or false (cf. above p. 386 f), although the two assertions are not identical. More than this is not required by the verification-game.

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T h e next steps

T h e analysis o f the predicative form o f sentence was only in tend ed as a first step in an enquiry into foundations that concerned the m eaning o f all linguistic expressions; and that means: the sem antic form s o f all sen­ tences. M easured against this aim we have not achieved m uch. Firstly we have not even arrived at a general theory o f singular terms nor, consequently, at a general theory o f predicative sentences. T h e next step would be an analysis o f those predicative sentences w hose singular terms stand for abstract objects. Secondly, the conception thus far reached o f the m ode o f em p loym ent o f assertoric sentences w ould have to be w idened into a general theory o f all form s o f assertoric sentences. A nd, finally, we would have to rem ove the restriction to assertoric sen ­ tences so as to arrive at a general theory of all sentences with propositional content. Each o f these three steps relates to a new and extensive field o f inves­ tigation and in n one o f them , least o f all in the third, can we assume that the conceptuality so far worked out can be simply transferred to the extend ed field o f investigation. T h us in these steps the field o f investigation w ould not simply be extended; rather each o f the three steps would represent a further step in the enquiry into the foundations. In each o f them on e w ould be concerned with a reexam ination o f the previous conceptuality and possibly with the w orking out o f a new, m ore fundam ental conceptuality. T h e three steps would not necessarily follow on e another. T h e analysis o f those predicative sentences in which abstract objects are referred to is not a p resupposition for the analysis o f the other form s o f assertoric sentence; and equally the investigation o f non-assertoric kinds o f sen ­ tence does not have to wait until we are in possession o f a com plete semantics o f assertoric sentences. T h e three steps thus do not constitute a series; rather they represent so to speak three directions in which on e

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could continue from the stage we have now reached. T his shows that this first step, even if it does not go far en ou gh, is nevertheless fun da­ mental for the further enquiry into the foundations. What is characteristic o f this first step is the dissolution o f the tradi­ tional conceptuality (which it w ould now be better to call representa­ tion-orientated than object-orientated.) We were able to establish a new, specifically language-analytical form al conceptuality with which we w ere able to transcend, but also re-interpret, the basic formal concept o f tra­ ditional philosophy: the concept o f an object. T h e traditional idea o f a language-free subject—object relation was thereby shown to be devoid o f m eaning. T h ere is no such thin g as a reference to an object that is detached from a context o f sentences. T he use o f signs thus acquires a fundam ental significance for the theory o f consciousness: linguistic signs are not representatives o f other functions which would also be possible w ithout them . H and in hand with this ‘up-grading’ o f signs goes the new conception o f their m ode o f em ploym ent. Whereas according to traditional semantics on e understands a sign - any sign - if one knows what it stands for, according to the language-analytical conception on e understands a sign - including a sign that stands for an object - if on e could explain its m ode o f em ploym ent to som eone who does not yet understand it. A nd in the particular case of the com ponents o f predic­ ative sentences this m eans: explain their identification-rule or verifica­ tion-rule; and that m eans: explain the contribution they make in estab­ lishing the truth o f sentences into which they can enter as com ponents. T his characterization o f the stage now reached makes it clear that from it one could begin with each o f the three next steps to which I have referred; for it contains perspectives for each o f these steps. With respect to the first step this is obvious. For the second step it contains the hypothesis that o f every m eaning-bearing part o f an assertoric sen­ tence we can say that we understand it if we know what contribution it makes with regard to the determ ination of the truth o f sentences into which it can enter as a part. As regards the third step, the analysis o f the m eaning o f non-assertoric sentences, we cannot, to be sure, expect that their m od e o f em ploym ent can be explained by the dem onstration o f verification-rules. H ow ever, we have no reason to doubt that here too we can proceed on the basis o f W ittgenstein’s principle, and that if we are enquiring about their m eaning we must ask for the explanation o f their mode o f em ploym ent. T h e task o f this final lecture is to keep alive for you, and for me, the dynam ic o f the enquiry beyond the path traversed so far. It is charac­ teristic o f a philosophical enquiry into foundations that all answers are

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merely steps to new questions. A philosophical line o f thought can thus only be concluded as a philosophical line o f thought by making oneself aware o f the new difficulties into which it leads. It is in this sense that the following indications about the next three steps are to be understood. For the first o f these tasks, a general theory o f the predicative sentence, we are not without a hint. When before the clarification o f the mode o f em ploym ent o f concrete singular terms I enquired about their fu n ctio n the argum ent was still com pletely general (pp. 289-9 5 ). It em erged that the function o f a singular term, whether concrete or abstract, is to specify which o f all is meant; and this means: which object it is that is classified by the supplem enting predicate. I called this function ‘specification’. We then saw that in the case of concrete singular terms we m ust distin­ guish between specification in a wide sense and specification in a narrow sense (‘identification’). We can accept as a hypothesis that an analogous differentiation also holds for abstract singular terms. T h e notion o f abstract singular terms (or abstract objects) is defined negatively. They are singular terms with respect to which the question ‘which is meant?’ can not be answered by a spatio-tem poral identification. Since every sin­ gular term has the function o f specifying which o f all is m eant the use o f an abstract singular term also presupposes an underlying objectdom ain, a totality o f objects o f a kind from which one is picked out by the singular term . ‘O f a kind’; that means here: a totality o f objects that can be distinguished from on e another and for which, therefore, there is a criterion o f identity. T o give the criterion o f identity would be to give a positive definition o f the object-domain in question. Thus it becomes apparent that the negatively defined concept o f abstract objects is a collective concept which covers different object-domains with distinct criteria o f identity. For exam ple, if ‘a ’ stands for a proposition, ‘b ’ for a num ber, and V for a spatio-tem poral object, then it is as senseless to ask w hether a = b as to ask w hether a = c . ‘x = y ’ is only m eaningful if one has a criterion for deciding whether x —y. T h e first step - one widely neglected in the literature - towards an analysis o f abstract singular term s1 would consist in a com prehensive com pilation o f the d ifferent domains o f abstract objects. By way o f illus­ tration I shall simply m ention some im portant examples: (1) Attributes (for which nom inalized predicates stand). (2) States o f affairs (for which nom inalized assertoric sentences stand). (3) Types o f signs in contrast to the corresponding sign-events (cf. above p. 218). Abstract objects o f a similar kind are, e.g., geom etrical figures, tones, m elodies, pieces o f music. (4) Institutions and their parts, e.g. gam es and moves in a game. (5) Classes. (6) Num bers. A peculiar interm ediate position between con­

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crete and abstract objects is occupied by concrete institutions such as firms or states which in a certain way are spatio-tem porally locatable. T h e listed cases are in part them selves collective concepts, e.g. what is indicated under (3) and (4) clearly em braces several object-domains. Since singular terms are expressions that are essentially com plem en­ tary to predicates the dom ains o f objects must be distinguished not only by their identity-criteria but also by the predicates that can be applied to them . T h e clarification o f a dom ain o f objects, or o f the use o f the corresponding singular terms, would therefore really consist in a clari­ fication o f the relevant w hole predicative sentences; and this means: in the clarification o f how these sentences are used; and this means: how they are verified. By m eans o f this enquiry into the verification o f sen­ tences one also reaches a decision concerning the question o f w hether one is dealing with gen u ine objects, with a gen u in e distinctive dom ain o f objects. If in asking about verification one finds on eself referred to other, but equivalent, sentences about concrete objects, in which the abstract singular terms only appear in modified form as predicates, then one will have to answer this question in the negative. This question o f the relation o f sentences about abstract objects to sentences about con­ crete objects and about the possible reducibility o f the form er to the latter arises separately for each o f the cases just listed. An extrem e case is that in which abstract singular terms can be used, so to speak, in isolation, thus where on e cannot specify a corresponding dom ain o f objects.2 For exam ple, if one says ‘T h e lack o f vitamin C causes scurvy’ the question ‘Which o f all is m eant by “the lack o f vitamin C”?’ is clearly idle. We would not know with which predicate designating an object-dom ain we would have to supplem ent the word ‘all’. But the question does not even arise, for it has no bearing on the question o f the verification o f the sentence. O ne clearly does not verify the sentence by exam ining an object that is identified by ‘the lack o f vitamin C’ to see w hether the predicate o f this sentence applies to it, but rather by inves­ tigating whether the sentence ‘Most people who lack vitamin C get scurvy’ is true. So o f those substantival expressions which are im m ediately elim ­ inated when the question o f verification is raised one will have to say that they are not really singular terms, because they are not em ployed as such. I f all abstract singular terms were elim inated in this way in the verification-question then we would not need to speak o f abstract objects at all. In the case o f those object-domains which turn out not to be elim inable, however, the question arises: why are they not eliminable? H ow is it that we can, and possibly m ust, speak o f abstract objects o f

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such and such domains? How are such ways o f speaking constituted and what w ould be lost w ithout them? T his is the question about abstract objects which would correspond to that question about concrete singular terms which I called the question ‘from b elow ’. Just as th en the question was set against the foil o f a p oorer language which did not yet contain any singular terms, so it would now be posed against the foil o f a poorer language, nam ely, that which only contains concrete singular terms. On the basis o f these clarifications on e could now resum e in the required generality the enquiry into what it is to refer to an object. How far the results o f our analyses o f the m ode o f em p loym ent o f concrete singular terms could be generalized is com pletely o p en . For precisely that result that was decisive for the confrontation with the traditional conception, nam ely that every singular term ‘refers’ (verw eist) to others (p. 3 73ff), seem s not to apply to the abstract dom ains. T h e reciprocal reference characteristic o f the identification o f concrete objects was, after all, m erely the consequence o f the special circum stance that the objects concerned were perceptual situations to which it had to be possible to refer from every other perceptual situation. In the case o f abstract objects this com plication does not apply. Does this m ean that for abstract objects the traditional representation-theory w ould be vindicated? Or m ust we say that in their case too there can be no question o f a sim ple assignment (and this w ould mean: to a representation) though for differen t reasons? W hatever the answer may be it is at any rate clear that we m ust anticipate a th orough -going revision o f the con ception o f referen ce to objects d eveloped so far. Now to the second step, the project o f a general theory o f the semantic form s o f assertoric sentences. D o we have a concept o f ‘sem antic form ’ that is determ inate enough to enable us to form a d efinite idea o f such a project? I introduced the term ‘sem antic form ’ by saying that two sentences have the sam e sem antic form if their m ean ing dep en ds on the m eanings o f their m eaning-bearing com p onents in the sam e way; and that two m eaning-bearing sen ten ce-com p on en ts have the same sem antic form , or b elong to the sam e sem antic class, if they contribute in the sam e way to the m eaning o f a sen ten ce (p. 26). In the m eantim e it has em erged that on e understands an assertoric senten ce if and only if on e knows its truth-conditions, or knows how on e establishes w hether it is true or false. It follows from this that we understand a sentencecom p on en t if we know what contribution it makes in establishing the truth o f sentences into which it can en ter as a com ponent; and that we understand the sem antic form o f this exp ression if we understand in what way it makes this contribution. O n e can therefore, with D avidson,3

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call the semantic form o f a sentence - its ‘m eaning-relevant’ com position - its ‘truth-relevant’ com position; or, if one takes the further step to the establishm ent o f truth which has each time proved to be necessary, its ‘verification-relevant’ com position. If we disregard this further step we can say that the sem antic form o f a sentence is expressed in its Tarskian truth-definition (cf. above p. 238 f); for, firstly, such a definition speci­ fies on w hat the truth or falsity o f a sentence depends and, secondly, we dem and o f such a definition that it does not give a m ere translation o f each individual senten ce but that it be valid for all sentences o f a certain form in such a way that we can obtain the truth-condition for all individual sentences o f this form by m erely substituting particular com p onent-expressions for the sem antic variables (cf. above p. 258). So we can now, follow ing Davidson, give a determ inate sense to the p ro­ gram m e o f a general theory o f the semantic form s o f assertoric sen ­ tences: it w ould consist in the construction o f as many truth-definitions as would take account o f every aspect o f the sem antic structure o f asser­ toric sentences that we intuitively hold to be such. That the construction o f such truth-definitions is by no means a trivial affair becom es im m ediately apparent if one attempts to go beyond the sim ple cases considered so far. I have already referred to the problem o f com plex sentences which cannot be interpreted truth-functionally (p. 243). A further task is the analysis o f the other sem antic structures o f sim ple sentences, in particular the structures within singular terms and above all predicates, that I have not considered. T ake for exam ple the sentence ‘T hat is a h u g e fly.’4 O ne can, o f course, treat the w hole predicate as an unstructured unit and thus restrict the form o f the sen ­ tence to its predicative structure. But if one did so one would clearly not be d oin g justice to the understanding o f such a sentence, for this would m ean that the expressions ‘h u g e fly’, ‘h uge anim al’, ‘huge water­ fall’, etc., b elon g to our prim itive vocabulary. Each expression would have to be explained separately, and the explanation o f ‘h u g e fly’ would be unrelated to that o f the words ‘h u g e’ and ‘fly’; whereas in fact if we understand the words ‘h u g e’ and ‘fly’ we understand the expression ‘h u ge fly’, even if we have not previously heard this com bination o f words. A truth-definition o f the senten ce referred to which considered only its predicative structure would ignore this inner-predicative struc­ ture just as m uch as a truth-definition that simply repeated the sentence itself would ignore its entire structure. Now what would a truth-definition be like that did justice to this inner-predicative structure? It would be tem pting to answer: ‘ “T h at is a h u ge fly” is true if and only if the object p ointed at is h u ge and is a fly.’ B ut this suggestion clearly misses the

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mark. Such a truth-definition applies to other, apparently similar, sen­ tences such as ‘T hat is a red fly’, for som ething is indeed a red fly if and only if it is both red and a fly. ‘H u ge’, on the other hand, is an attributive adjective; and if som ething is a huge fly this m eans that it is huge as a fly, not huge simply and not, for exam ple (as would follow from the suggested definition), a h u ge animal. You could ask how one can be so sure that the form al-sem antic con­ nection between attributive adjective and substantive must be understood by m eans of a truth-definition. But do you have an alternative? Besides, this conception corresponds to what we would expect if we view the problem from the perspective o f the explanation o f m ode o f em ploy­ ment. If one has to explain to som eone how the word ‘h u g e’ is used as an attributive adjective, on e explains to him how one establishes that som ething is a h u g e F , w here F ’ is a variable; and correspondingly for all attributive adjectives. Another problem which likewise concerns inner-predicative structure is that o f the semantics o f modal adverbs, e.g. ‘Peter runs fast.’ H ere too, for reasons similar to those just given, on e clearly cannot regard the whole predicate as an unstructured expression. How does one explain to som eon e a word like ‘fast’? Obviously by explaining to him how it is established w hether the classification-expression ‘fast’ applies to an event, a happening or a state. Adverbs are thus a kind o f predicate, as on e can easily see from the transformation: ‘Peter’s running is fast.’ T h e truth-definition would have to show how the truth o f a sentence like ‘Peter runs fast’ depends on (a) the object for which the singular term stands being in a certain state and (b) this state being classifiable in a certain way.5 W e can see how far we still are from a general theory o f assertoric form s o f sentence by reference to any sentence chosen at random from the newspaper. We have here a wide field which philosophers have barely begun to work at. D espite all the difficulties o f execution we have for the time being no reason to think that the semantic concepts which we have reached so far and the hypothesis that the m eaning-relevant com ­ position o f a sentence is its truth- or verification-relevant com position will founder on this problem area. This would seem much m ore likely in the case o f the third step, which concerns the semantics o f non-assertoric sentences. Because such sen­ tences - e.g. im peratives - cannot be true or false it seems clear from the start that the thesis that on e understands a sentence if on e knows its truth-conditions, or that on e explains it by show ing how it is verified, cannot apply to these sentences. But equally there can be no question

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o f a semantics o f non-assertoric sentences that is unconnected with the semantics o f assertoric sentences, for the sentences o f the various modes d iffer only as regards m ode and not (with certain qualifications) as regards propositional con ten t (above p. 52). A nd it w ould be absurd to suppose that we must explain (and learn) the various sentencecom ponents such as singular terms and predicates, and also words like ‘and’ and ‘or’, separately for the d ifferen t m odes. T here would thus seem to be only two possibilities: (1) Because it cannot be extended to non-assertoric sentences the conception developed so far is also shown to be false for assertoric sentences or (2) it must be possible to discover a concept with the function for the semantics o f non-assertoric sentences analogous to that which the concept o f truth has for the semantics of assertoric sentences: or, putting it another way: it m ust be possible to find a concept that is wider than the concept o f truth and o f which the latter is a special case. We are thus here faced with the task o f a revision o f basic conceptuality similar to that involved in the transition from the traditional to the analytical conceptuality. Just as there it was a question o f seeing that the ‘standing’ o f an expression ‘for’ an object is only on e function and m ode o f em ploym ent am ong others, so here on e would have to show that truth is only a special case o f som ething m ore general. I referred to this m ethodological structure - the step-by-step d eep en in g or extend ing o f the conceptuality - at the beginning o f our undertaking and also used it to justify initially restricting m yself to assertoric sentences (p. 13 Iff); at any rate I do not know how we w ould have been able to reach that w ider concept that is now envisaged before we had conceptually exhausted the traditionally m ore familiar area. In those preliminary m ethodological deliberations I drew attention to the d ifferent system ­ atic procedure o f Searle, and I said that Searle pays for this systematic advantage with a com parative conceptual unfruitfulness. I m ust now give my reason for this claim, and by doing so we shall be led on to a clarification o f the problem itself . T h e characteristic feature o f Searle’s procedure is that he first specifies the semantic rules for the m odes or ‘illocutionary forces’ o f all kinds o f sentence and only subsequently proceeds to the sem antic rules o f the propositional content (com m on to all m odes). N ow I have shown, in the specific case o f the assertion-m ode, that the rules which Searle specifies are, in various respects, wholly inadequate (pp. 187f, 202, 2 1 3 ff). I have no tim e now to go into m ore detail but if you look at the rules (the ‘essential rules’) that Searle gives for the various kinds o f sentence or ‘illocutionary acts’6 you will see that they all am ount simply to para­

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phrases and that no system atic connection can be discerned b etw een these paraphrases. It is th erefore all the m ore surprising that Searle later, in that part o f the book w here he deals with the propositional content, d oes p rod uce a system atic connection and that the governing concept is the concept o f truth, a concept which did not figure at all in the them atic treatm ent o f the m od es.7 T o understand the connection you m ust realize that if on e wants to give a general theory o f predicates that is not restricted to assertoric sentences o n e can clearly no longer carry alon g the assertoric aspect which they have in their usual ex p la ­ nation as assertoric sentence-com ponents. T h e predicates must therefore be m ade either m ode-neutral or m ode-variable. Searle settled for this second alternative (rightly so as we shall see). So far so good. B ut o f course the question now arises: what sort o f a prelim inary conception o f the u nd erstan ding o f a predicate do we have? A t this point Searle’s procedu re is that which I earlier (in Lecture 8) claim ed to be m ethod ­ ologically unavoidable (though he does not reflect on the m ethodological significance o f this procedure): he starts from the concept o f an assertoric predicate that initially is the only one at our disposal and gives the fol­ low ing definition: we understand a predicate if and only if we know under w hat conditions it is true or false o f an object (p. 91). A nd then he undertakes what I have h ere dem anded: he tries so to extend this notion o f ‘being true o f ’ (or ‘applying’) as to make it also applicable to predication in the other m odes. In a predication, w hatever its m ode, the ‘question o f tru th ’ is always, h e says, in o n e way or another ‘raised’.8 What Searle m eans by this becom es clearer if we take the m odification which he considers as an aspect o f the predicate out o f the propositional content and thus regard it as a m odification o f what I earlier called veritative being. O n e can then say that in all m odes the question o f truth is som ehow ‘raised’: with an assertoric sen ten ce o n e says that som ething (a state o f affairs) is true; with an interrogative sentence on e asks whether som ething is true; with an im perative som eon e is com m anded to m ake som eth in g true; with an optative senten ce on e wishes that som ething were tru e.9 O nce again Searle has stopp ed ju st w here the real problem begins (cf. above p. 202); but in this case he has at least reached the real problem . B efore we enquire further I m ust sum m arize my criticism o f Searle. In his discussion o f the m odes o f predicates Searle has, without realizing it, m ade it clear that he still lacked the conceptual m eans for his system ­ atic procedure. B ecause the m odes and the propositional content are two n on -in d ep en d en t m om ents that reciprocally refer to on e another the conceptuality in terms o f which the m odes are interpreted must

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harm onize with the conceptuality that is relevant to the propositional content. We have seen that we cannot explain a single assertoric sentencecom ponent without referring to the concept o f truth; and som ething analogous is to be expected in the case o f non-assertoric sentences. Searle was not clear about this connection, with the result that the paraphrases he constructs in his thematic treatment of illocutionary forces in Chapter 3 prove useless for the analysis, in Chapter 5, o f the predicate-m odes. So he found him self obliged to develop a unitary concept o f the m ode o f a predicate on the basis of the concept that initially is the only one at our disposal —that o f ‘being true o f ’. And in this way he arrived at the concept o f ‘the question o f truth being raised’. What he failed to notice however was that this result conflicts with his paraphrases in Chapter 3 and that it is in any case superior to them because it suggests a unitary concept o f m odes and hence provides a possibility o f constructing a general semantics o f sentence-com ponents. But are we justified in assuming, as Searle’s concept o f ‘the question o f truth being raised’ seem s to suggest, that this unitary concept must still be the concept o f truth? T h e possibility o f so reform ulating im per­ atives, etc., that the word ‘true’ occurs in them proves little. In the sen­ tence ‘Make it true that p ! ’ we still have in the ‘make’ the unreduced im perative elem ent. A nd, conversely, assertoric sentences could be reform ulated in an analogous way: instead o f saying ‘It is raining’ one could say ‘T h e com m and that it should rain is com plied with’ or ‘T h e wish that it m ight rain is fulfilled.’10 H owever, it could be precisely these correspondences which point the way ahead. Could it not be that com ­ pliance and non-com pliance, fulfilm ent and disappointm ent have a sig­ nificance for the im perative and the optative sentence analogous to that which truth and falsity have for the assertoric sentence? W ould this not provide us with a basis for what it is to explain an imperative, or optative? Just as we explain an assertoric sentence by showing how we recognize whether it is true so it seems plausible to say that we explain an imperative by showing how we recognize that it is com plied with. A nalogously to speaking o f truth-conditions in the case o f assertoric sentences we could now say: we understand an imperative if we know under what conditions it counts as com plied with; we understand an optative sentence if we know its fulfilm ent-conditions.11 W e can easily see by reference to the sim plest case - ‘and’ and ‘or’ sentences - that in the analysis o f the structure o f non-assertoric sen­ tences these concepts really ‘bite’. A nalogously to truth-tables one can construct com pliance - or fulfilm ent - tables.12 For exam ple, an im per­ ative o f the form 7 *p or q * ’ (e.g. ‘Shut up or get out!’) is com plied with

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if one complies with ‘!*p*’ or or both; otherwise it is not complied with. And as with assertoric sentences (cf. above p. 242) we could now explain the use o f the im perative ‘or’ without repeating it (as in the spec­ ification o f obedience-conditions) by demonstrating how compliance and non-com pliance with the w hole sentence depends on com pliance and non-com pliance with the constituent sentences. T hus a semantic program m e would take shape in which for all forms o f imperative sentence we construct compliance-definitions and for optative forms o f sentence fulfilm ent-definitions. These would corre­ spond exactly to the truth-definitions o f assertoric forms o f sentence, except that the word ‘com plied with’ or ‘fulfilled’ would occur where the word ‘true’ occurs in the truth-definition. From this we can see that if the propositional structures have already been explained in the case o f assertoric sentences then, provided one knows what it is to comply with a sentence, one does not need to explain the propositional structures o f imperatives (let alone the words which occur in them) separately. But, by the same token, the converse also holds: assertoric sentences have no primacy. This is the basis o f what is justified about Searle’s view that one must be able to give a unitary explanation o f the propositional structure of all modes. However, it is important to understand this correctly. T h e reason why the different forms o f sentence have a comparable propositional content is not because this content is m ode-neutral, but because - as Searle correctly recognized in his treatment o f predicates - it is modevariable, that is to say is repeated in each o f the modes; as the truth or com pliance - definitions show the m ode is sense-determ ining for the whole propositional content and its parts. You could reply that we have the m ode-neutral form ‘that p \ H owever we have already seen that understanding ‘that p ’ depends on understanding ‘p ’ rather than vice versa. On the other hand understanding 7*/?*’ appears to be on the same level as understanding ‘p ’^ ^ p * ’). But if that is so we m ust now ask what it is that truth, com pliance, fulfilm ent, etc., have in com m on that enables them to have this sense-determ ining function. O f course it is not at all obvious that to every one o f the ‘illocutionary forces’ listed by Searle or Austin there corresponds a pair like true-false or fulfilleddisappointed. Probably there are only a few basic modes that are sensedeterm ining for the whole sentence and the other illocutionary forces are simply additions to a content that is neutral with respect to them. If one asks what it is that a true assertoric sentence, a com plied with im perative and a fulfilled optative sentence have in com m on it is clearly this, that in each case the sentence - or what is said with it - and reality

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agree. If an assertoric sentence is true, an im perative is com plied with, an optative sentence is fulfilled - in each case this m eans that things stand as the sentence says. T h ere seem to be two, and only two, possible forms o f this agreem ent. Either - in the case o f the assertoric sentence - reality is the measure; if there is n on-agreem ent then the sentence does not correspond with reality. Or - in the case o f the optative sentence or im perative - the sentence is the m easure; if there is non-agreem ent then reality does not correspond to the senten ce.13 W hoever plays the assertoric gam e sincerely (truthfully, i.e. without intentions that do not belong to the rules o f the gam e cf. above p. 215) wants to say what is the case; w hoever plays the other gam e sincerely wants what he says to be the case. I am o f course here using unexplained concepts, but for the purpose o f merely indicating how the enquiry m ight continue they might suffice. With the wide concept o f agreem ent that has now been indicated we would have found the concept more com prehensive than that o f truth required for a general semantics. This concept would do for all propo­ sitional sentences what the concept o f truth does for the special case o f assertoric sentences. At the sam e time the vague and negative talk o f ‘all other sentences’ or ‘the non-assertoric sentence m odes’ would have acquired a delim itation and positive m eaning. Because there are two and only two possible forms o f agreem ent one would have to acknowl­ edge that there are only two semantically fundam ental sentence-m odes:14 agreem ent-conditions are either truth-conditions or fulfilm ent-conditions. T h u s whereas in Searle the ‘illocutionary forces’ are m ultiplied far beyond the num ber o f grammatical m odes, even d ifferen t grammatical m odes would now belong to on e basic m ode. As I have already pointed out, interrogative sentences can be regarded as a special kind o f im per­ ative.15 T hat optative sentences and im peratives b elon g closely together can be seen from the fact that in both cases one can speak o f fulfilm entconditions and that in both cases the speaker expresses his desire that som ething be the case. If a grammatical optative is addressed to the person who is referred to in it as the subject o f the desired action then semantically it has in fact the m eaning o f an im perative. A nother class o f sentences that are closely related to imperatives are the volitional sentences and those sentences in the 1st person future indicative which I earlier called ‘in tention-sentences’ (p. -78). I already pointed out at that tim e that these sentences, which grammatically are in the indicative m ood, are semantically not to be construed as assertoric sentences but as analogous to imperatives. T h e connection between im perative and

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intention-sentence is revealed in the fact that if an imperative is affirmed or denied by the person to whom it is addressed this ‘yes/no’ is an in ten ­ tion-sentence. ‘Yes I will do it; no, I will not do it.’ T h e relationship betw een senten ce and execu tin g act is the sam e w hether the sentence stem s from another person (hence is an im perative) or from the person w ho is to carry the action out (hence is an in ten tion -sen ten ce).16 T h e use o f an im perative also p resupposes that the addressee can intention­ ally perform the desired action. T h e capacity for intentional, deliberate action thus underlies all these form s o f sentence. S om eone who did not possess this capacity could not understand any o f these form s o f sentence which, in their different ways, are so used that they serve as the m easure for reality, thus that they say what ‘o u g h t’ to be. T h e sim plest case is where such a sentence guides o n e’s own action (intention-sentence). T h e second possibility is that it is directed to others who can fulfil it (im per­ ative). Optative sentences, which have no addressee, represent a limiting case. T h e wish is fulfilled or not fulfilled w ithout one b ein g able to hold som eone responsible for this. It w ould seem plausible to say that som eone can only understand w hat it is to wish som ething if he already knows what it is to will som ething and to act deliberately.17 T h e analysis o f optative sentences w ould be especially im portant; for, if my explanation that we call that ‘good’ which is ‘rationally to be preferred’, hence worthy to be desired, was correct, then the u nd erstan ding o f the word ‘g o o d ’ too is based on the u nd erstan ding o f optative sentences (cf. above p. 8 1 f).18 O ne could call the sem antically unitary class o f sentences to which optative sentences, imperatives and intention-sentences b elong ‘practical senten ces’ (Kenny calls them ‘fiats’).19 In the T ra cta tu s (4.022) W ittgen­ stein characterized assertoric sentences as follows: ‘T h e proposition (Satz) shows how things stand i f it is true. A nd it says that they do so stand.’ C orrespondingly on e could say o f practical sentences that the sentence shows how things stand if it is fulfilled; and that it (or the person who uses it) says that things ou ght so to stand.20 A ccordingly we would have, as a consequence o f the two possible specifications o f the concept o f agreem ent, two basic kinds o f sentence: theoretical (assertoric) sentences and practical sentences. T his is not to say that it is n ot m eaningful to distinguish a plurality o f illocutionary acts (or forces). Only on e must realize that they are specifications o f the two basic m odes, and that, unlike the two basic m odes, these specifications are not sense-determ ining with respect to the com p onents o f the propositional content. Rather they contribute additional expressive or com m unicative aspects which no lon ger affect the propositional content, and w hose explanation does

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not involve the fundam ental difficulties we face in explaining the m ode o f em p loym ent o f the two basic form s. T h e considerable lack o f orien ­ tation on e finds in A ustin, Searle and the work which starts out from them regarding the question o f an adequate classification o f ‘illocutionary forces’ is d u e to a neglect o f form al-sem antic questions. Searle started from the analysis o f sentences in which som ething is prom ised. H e treated this class o f sentences as though it w ere on as fundam ental a level as assertoric sentences. It is, how ever, obvious that prom ising-sentences are a species o f intention-sentences, which in turn are only a species o f practical sentences. Im peratives and intention-sentences cannot, o f course, be form ed with just any propositional content. A dem and or an intention can only con ­ cern som ething in the future. A nd they can only have an action, not a state, as their content. M oreover they can only be directed to free beings w ho can take up a position in regard to them by m eans o f ‘yes’ and ‘n o .’ But these restrictions do not hold for practical sentences as such. It is likely that on e will be able to say that to every assertoric sentence there is a corresponding optative sentence, and that there is a on e-to-one cor­ resp ond en ce betw een the class o f practical sentences and the class o f assertoric sentences. O n e m ust not, o f course, confuse what I am here calling practical sentences with the practical statem ents I spoke o f in the discussion o f the question o f practical reason (Lecture 7). T h e analysis o f practical state­ m ents, sentences about the good, w ould be the n ext step but one, the step that would have to follow the analysis o f sim ple practical sentences. Practical statem ents, the only sentences for the clarification o f which we have an absolute rational m otivation (Lecture 7) are, o f course, sem an­ tically the m ost perplexing; they are theoretical-practical hybrids. As statements they contain a truth- or justification-claim, but what is asserted with them to be objectively justified, rational, is that som ething should be wished or d one. T h ere is, therefore, a great tem ptation to overlook either their justification-claim or their practical character. Perhaps one will have to su pp ose with H are21 that, although sentences about the good are capable o f being justified, they would lose their practical char­ acter, and we our freed om as responsible beings, if this justification were a com plete justification and could be regarded as analogous to the justification o f theoretical statem ents. In so far as they have both an assertoric side and a practical side practical statem ents contradict my thesis that there are two basic kinds o f sentence: assertoric and practical. I shall leave this contradiction as it stands. T he purpose o f the present survey is not to answer these questions but merely to give som e indication

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o f the direction in which one would have to proceed. T h e basic unity o f practical sentences and the possibility o f explaining these sentences by m eans o f a concept analogous to that o f truth are merely hypotheses. I m ust also em phasize that I have only indicated the first step in a semantics o f practical sentences, which would correspond to that first step in the semantics o f assertoric sentences that consisted in the con­ struction o f truth-definitions. T h e further question o f how on e would explain the em ploym ent-rules o f practical sentences - or the corre­ sp ond in g ‘gam e’ - is com pletely open; in particular, the question o f how one would explain the words ‘com plied with’ or ‘fulfilled’, which for the understanding o f practical sentences would have a significance corre­ sponding to that which the word ‘true’ has for the understanding o f assertoric sentences. In explaining the m ode o f em ploym ent o f practical sentences one would also have to take into account the connection between the use of these sentences and the expression o f corresponding psychological states. Just as the person who uses an assertoric sentence lp ’ expresses that he believes that/?, som eon e who utters an im perative ‘1*/?*’ expresses that he would like that p to be realized. With respect to assertoric sentences I have tried to show that one can explain the concept o f belief in terms o f the concept o f assertion, which in turn is defined by the rules o f the verification-gam e (p. 212). T h e corresponding hypothesis with respect to im peratives would be that these are used to dem and o f som eon e that he do som ething and that what this means could be explained, without recourse to volition, by the rules o f the com pliance-gam e. T hus the concept o f volition would be explained by means o f the speech-act of dem anding, just as the concept o f belief was explained by m eans o f the speech-act o f asserting. A corresponding procedure in regard to inten­ tion-sentences could also appear promising. Such a hypothesis, however, seem s im plausible in the case o f optative sentences. For, whereas in the case o f im peratives and intention-sentences we can dem onstrate by means o f the correction o f actions what it is to correspond to the sen­ tence, we cannot explain what it is for a fact to be ‘incorrect’ relative to an optative sentence without already presupposing that the sentence expresses a wish. A plausible way o f dealing with this difficulty would be to introduce the concept o f wishing via imperatives, so that this con­ cept could then be made use o f in the explanation o f optatives. However, I m ust also point out that even when explaining the psychological state o f believing by m eans o f the speech-act o f assertion I had to make use o f another psychological state, namely that o f intending (p. 212). T he problem o f ‘speech acts and psychological states’ would thus have to be

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taken up anew. And I cannot claim to have shown that there is a practical alternative to the sort o f semantic program m e sketched by Grice and D. Lewis, in which the concepts o f intending and believing are treated as basic and presupposed as given independently o f lan guage.22 What we have now achieved is at least a view o f formal semantics as a w hole. So we should also have a perspective for the clarification o f the question which, in the introductory part o f these lectures, I called the fundam ental question o f formal semantics and which has taken the place o f the ontological fundam ental question about being and not-being, the question, nam ely, o f what it is to understand a sentence (p. 37f), thus the question regarding the essence o f all sentences, the general structure o f sentences. In the introductory reflections I got as far as form ulating this fundam ental question thus: ‘how is one to understand the fact that our entire linguistic understanding has the structure o f yes/no positiontakings o f various m odes vis-ä-vis propositional contents?’ (p. 54). If the three aspects - propositional content, negatability, m ode - are the essential characteristics o f ‘our’ language (which we can therefore call ‘propositional language’) then the peculiar character o f these aspects should be revealed by contrasting our language with other, non-propositional languages; and at the same tim e the inner connection o f these three aspects should becom e intelligible. It is, o f course, signal-languages that serve for this contrast. I have called the characteristic rules o f signallanguages ‘conditional rules’ (p. 165). T hey have the form: if such and such is perceived the signal 5 is used or if the signal S is perceived suchand-such is to be done. O ne m ight try to bring out what is characteristic o f the em ployment-rules o f the independent expressions o f propositional language - sentences - in contrast to these conditional rules by calling them projective rules. I have borrowed the expression ‘projective’ from W ittgenstein’s T ractatus. W hen W ittgenstein described the sense o f sen­ tences as pictures he did not have in m ind a copying-function; rather the picturing-function was understood in a projective, or anticipatory sense: ‘In the proposition (Satz) a state o f affairs is as it were put together in an experim ental way’ (4.031). T h e sentence shows how things could stand. I have described the use o f an assertoric sentence as the op en ing m ove in a verification-gam e, and we have seen that the em ploym entrules are not conditional, but must be understood by reference to the outcom e o f the verification-game; we can now call this the ‘projective’ character o f these em ployment-rules. In the case o f imperatives it would only seem plausible to regard their rules as conditional rules if one were able to interpret them one-sidedly, by reference to the hearer, hence not as em ploym ent-rules. T h e rule o f an im perative, as the speaker’s

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em ploym ent-rule, can also only be understood projectively. A nd as the hearer’s und erstan ding is not show n by w hether he com plies with the im perative, but by w hether he, ju st like the speaker, knows what it is to com ply with it and can by saying ‘yes’ or ‘n o ’ com ply with it or not com ply with it, the hearer understands the senten ce in exactly the same way as the speaker; and that means: projectively. A nd with regard to the other practical sentences it seem s clear from the ou tset that they can only be u nderstood projectively. What is it that m akes this projective m od e o f em p loym ent possible? In the case o f assertoric sentences we have seen that this is ultimately the achievem ent o f singular term s. It is d u e to the addition o f a singular term that the classification-expression loses the capacity for being used in d ep en d en tly which it had in the signal-language, and instead o f relat­ ing in a conditional m anner to the given situation anticipates a verification-situation. T h e bearer o f this projection which specifies to what the predicate relates is the singular term. A lthough such a quasi-genetic form ulation is questionable, on account o f the em pirical hypotheses it suggests, the ‘transition’ from a conditionally regulated language to a projectively regulated language is m ade possible by the debasem ent (.D e p o ten zieru n g ) o f the in d ep en d en t classification-expression that is characteristic o f prim itive signal-languages to a predicate and its exten ­ sion to a propositional expression through its supplem entation by a sin­ gular term. W ithout using gen etic m etaphors the hypothesis can be for­ m ulated as follows. Only propositionally structured expressions can be g overned by projective rules; and all propositionally structured expres­ sions m ust be projectively regulated. T h at this hypothesis m ust also be confirm ed for practical sentences, thus that in their case too projective regulation is ultim ately m ade possible by singular terms, is clearly sug­ gested by the fact that practical and assertoric sentences correspond as regards their propositional content. T h e next point, to express it once m ore in the genetic m etaphor, is that the m ere addition o f a singular term to a classification-expression not only debases the classification-expression - in that it is now in need o f su pp lem entation - but also debases the w hole expression that results from this com bination; for the m ere show ing o f how things could stand - the ‘experim ental putting together o f a state o f affairs’ - w ould be, in contrast to the use o f a signal, a p urposeless and m eaningless activity. T h e gain that is achieved by the prop ositional-p rojective language visa-vis conditionally regulated language can be visualized by saying that language now no longer concerns only the perceptually given, but reaches as far as the spatio-tem poral im agination. Now this extension

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into the realm o f possibilities would remain without purpose if language did not acquire a new relation to reality. An expression like ‘the cas­ tle/burning’ shows how things could stand with the castle. T h e proposi­ tional expression only acquires a relation to reality if in addition it is said that this possibility is actual or that it is to be actualized; thus if either it is asserted that it is or dem anded that it be as the propositional expression represents it as being possible. T he speech-act’s initial loss o f purpose resulting from its ‘transform ation’ into a propositional expression can thus only be com pensated for by com bining a realityclaim with the use o f the expression. O nce more the thesis can be for­ m ulated without using genetic metaphors: a propositional language without m odes is inconceivable and, conversely, a modal language that is not propositional appears to be inconceivable. Now why is it that propositional language also seem s to be distin­ guished from signal-languages by the presence o f negation? Since the ‘not’, as we saw earlier, belongs not to the m ode but to the propositional content (p. 46f), it would seem natural to look for the reason in the propositional content. A nd within the propositional content it would again seem natural to think first and forem ost o f predicates. As classi­ fication-expressions are used to classify, and thereby distinguish, the use o f the word ‘n ot’ seems to be necessarily connected with the use of classification-expressions. Against this supposition, however, speaks the fact that the expressions o f signal-languages are also classificationexpressions, and yet these languages m anage without the word ‘not’. On the other hand, one can now easily see that it is the agreem ent asserted or dem anded in the basic m odes which makes the use o f a negation-sign necessary; for it is essential to the understanding o f the relationship between sentence and reality that there is agreem ent or non-agreem ent. T o understand a sentence is to know under what con­ ditions it is true and under what conditions false (or fulfilled and dis­ appointed). We can make this clear to ourselves by reference to a sub­ class o f the sentences at our disposal, in which the word ‘not’ happens not to occur. If on e is to establish o f a sentence of this class w hether it (if it is an assertoric sentence) is true or false, then if the sentence turns out to be false the word ‘not’ must be used, and there would thus be generated, if it is a predicative sentence, a sentence with a negated predicate. This is the reason why to every propositional content there belongs one that is opposed to it. Thus, although negation belongs to the propositional content, it does so by virtue o f the fact that a propo­ sitional expression can only be used according to projective rules. T here would thus result the further thesis: negation has its origin in the pro­

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jective essence o f our language. In this perspective on the connection o f yes/no with the projective essence o f our language there would be taken up again both (1) H eidegger’s basic thesis that the question o f the meaning o f Being and Not-being must be posed from within the ‘horizon’ o f tim e23 and (2) an essential aspect o f the theory of propositions o f the early Wittgenstein, the only analytical philosopher who was also con­ vinced that the key to understanding the essence o f the proposition lies in the ‘mystery o f negation’.24 It would thus now becom e clear why - as we were already able to see in the introductory reflections (p. 53f) - the m odes (we can now say more precisely: the basic modes) are essentially Yes/No-position-takings. Since a propositional expression is, as Wittgenstein put it, ‘bipolar’25 true/false, fulfillable/disappointable - and merely as it were strikes a them e and leaves open projectively the decision between Yes and No, the use o f such an expression is only m eaningful if the speaker decides between Yes and No, and this means: projectively anticipates the agree­ ment of reality with the expression in one way or the other, i.e. either asserts or dem ands agreem ent. But with this a position is always taken vis-a-vis the opposite assertion or demand (i.e. that w hich asserts or dem ands the opposite propositional content). T he basic modes, there­ fore, have the character o f affirmations-and-denials, o f Yes/No-positiontakings. T hat the speaker must decide between Yes and N o implies that the hearer can also decide between Yes and No. T h e order can be rejected, the assertion doubted: the origin o f freedom and reason. Such high-sounding theses, o f the kind one likes to express at the end of a course of lectures, could, o f course, easily disguise how fragile the whole line o f thought that I have presented to you is. T h e thesis about the origin o f negation to which it has finally led us directly invites a counter-thesis which is calculated to throw my whole procedure into confusion. It could be objected that we m ust already use a negationexpression as an action-correcting word together with that expression ‘correct’ which we already need if we are to be able to explain the m ode o f em ployment o f a linguistic expression and the understanding o f which I have presupposed in explaining the word ‘true’. This objection does not only touch the thesis about negation. It must awaken doubts as to just how fundamental one can regard an enquiry into the understanding o f our linguistic expressions which leaves unclarified the use o f actioncorrecting words. Now this is not an accidental omission, but a necessary consequence of the m ethodological orientation towards W ittgenstein’s principle that the m eaning o f an expression is what we explain when we explain its m eaning to som eone. We cannot explain the words ‘cor­

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rect’ and ‘incorrect’, for in any explanation o f a word these words must already be used. Should we not therefore re-exam ine the m ethodological orientation towards this principle? It suggested itself as the adequate principle for a specifically philosophical analysis o f language, if one understands by a philosophical analysis an im m anent analysis, a m ere making explicit o f what is implicitly already known in understanding (p. 152). But is this assum ption from which I started in Lecture 1 sac­ rosanct? A nd would not the assum ption o f a ‘specifically philosophical’ analysis o f language that is distinct from language-scientific, empirical m ethods have to be re-exam ined? But what other m ethods, w hether philosophical or scientific, would enable us to proceed further? Clearly we have reached a point at which a new and this time m ore fundam ental revision o f the basic conceptuality would be necessary. T h e question o f what it is to understand a linguistic expression seem s, if we do not deceive ourselves, as unclear as ever.

Notes

Lecture 1 1 cf. among others Passmore, A H undred Years of Philosophy, Chaps. 9 and 1518 (this can be especially recommended); Urmson, Philosophical Analysis (instructive for the beginnings but does not take in more recent develop­ ments); Rorty, The Linguistic Turn (a collection of programmatic papers with a detailed introduction); von Savigny, Die Philosophie der normalen Sprache; von Kutschera, Sprachphilosophie; Stegmüller, Hauptströmungen der Gegen­ wartsphilosophie Vol. i, Chaps. 9-11, Vol. ii, Chaps. 1 and 2. 2 Philosophical Investigations, §89. 3 Confessions xi, 14. Lecture 2 1 Cartesian Meditations §5. 2 It determines the thought-sequence at the beginning of Chap. 2 of Book i of the Metaphysics; the other is in Chap. 1. 3 cf. Plato, Theaetetus 201c and Russell, Problems o f Philosophy, Chap. 13. More recent papers on the concept of knowledge can be found in the collection edited by Griffiths Knowledge and Belief. 4 This, however, was not Aristotle’s view (cf. Post Anal. A33). However we can here disregard this particular aspect of the Platonic-Aristotelian concept of science, which does not correspond to the ordinary understanding of the word. 5 The Greek expression is gnorizein, gnosis. In the chapter in Metaphysics it only occurs incidentally (180a26); cf. however in the parallel text in Post. Anal. B19, 99b38 and 100b4 and above all De Anima 427a21. 6 This is not explicitly justified here by Aristotle where he is merely repeating the existing opinions; it is however justified in an earlier version of the same thought in the lost writing ‘Protreptikos’, Fragment 7. 7 cf. 980a21-25. 8 981bl3ff., 9 8 2 b ll-9 8 3 a l 1. 9 Nichomachean Ethics Book 10, Chaps. 7-8. 10 cf. 982a24ff. 11 cf. Plato, Republic 510.

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12 Post. Anal. A9. 13 Post. Anal. A2ff. Lecture 3 1 1003a22-25, I025b7-10. 2 998b20f. 3 Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie, I, §9. 4 Homer , Iliad 1, 70. 5 Ideen §3. 6 Metaph. VII, 3. 7 I am here following Dummett, Frege, p. 59. As Dummett shows (59 f.) this criterion of course provides only a necessary condition which must be fur­ ther qualified if it is to be claimed as a sufficient condition. In particular, the expression ‘something’ itself, or an expression which contains ‘some­ thing’ or another indefinite pronoun as a part, would also fall under this criterion. These expressions are thus explicitly to be excluded. However I do not share Dummett’s view - which is also held by Strawson (‘Singular Terms and Predication’, Section n) and Geach (‘On What There Is’) contra Quine (From a Logical Point of View, p. 13, Word and Object, p. 240) - that predicates too are replaceable by ‘something’. Rather one will have to say: if that which was expressed by a predicate is referred to by ‘something’ then we are already in what is called in logic a higher-level predicate-language and are speaking of a higher kind of objects, namely, attributes. The proof of this seems to me to be that wherever a predicate is replaced by ‘some­ thing’ it can also be replaced by ‘the same’. Dummett and Geach rightly hold that ‘= ’ can only be used with reference to objects. But if *= ’ can be used wherever ‘something’ is used then it follows that if ‘something’ takes the place of a predicate it is really taking the place of the corresponding designation of the attribute. 8 As with the previous criterion we must here exclude expressions which already include indefinite pronouns. 9 Ideen, §13. 10 ‘Predicate’ is really a grammatical-syntactical concept and does not corre­ spond exactly to the semantic concept of a general term. In the sentence ‘The horse is tired’ only one predicate (‘is tired’) occurs, but two general terms (‘horse’ and ‘tired’). Many analytical philosophers (e.g. Strawson) nonetheless speak of predicates when what they mean is general terms. I shall also adopt this improper way of speaking because the correct way (which is used e.g. by Quine) would prove too involved in the course of these lectures, for it does not permit an adjectival modification (‘predica­ tive’) and suchlike. 11 A programmatic sketch of formal semantics is to be found in the essays of Davidson, ‘Truth and Meaning’, and ‘Semantics for Natural Languages’. 12 cf. esp. the beginning of Book 7 of the Metaphysics. 13 cf. my Ti kata tinos, §§5—6. 14 cf. e.g. 1045b30 f. 15 I have interpreted the specific situation with regard to Parmenides in my essay ‘Das Sein und das Nichts’.

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Lecture 4 1 cf. Lyons, 5.2. 2 It could appear strange that the semantic counterpart to the fundamental question of ontology can dispense with the ‘as’, thus that we need not use the formulation:‘what it is to understand a sentence as a sentence’. Aristotle however only had to introduce the ‘as’-formulation because he formulated the question objectually. That made it necessary to exclude the misunder­ standing that ontology studies beings in the sense of individual beings, indi­ vidual objects. As soon as one formulates the ontological question semanti­ cally (what does it mean to speak of ‘being’?) a corresponding misunderstanding can no longer arise and the ‘as’-formulation drops out. 3 10l7a27-30. 4 996b26-997al5, 1005al9-b5. 5 1005b 19 f. 6 1006a3. 7 1006a21 f. The Greek word is semainem. 8 cf. Strawson, Introduction to Logical Theory, p. 2 f. 9 De Interpretatione, Chap. 4. 10 10l7a31-35. 11 1051b33. 12 Metaph., VI, 4. 13 Metaph., IX, 10. 14 Wittgenstein, Tractatus 2. 15 ‘Die Verneinung’, p. 149. All smaller writings by Frege are quoted by me in accordance with the original pagination for this is also given in the margin of the two volumes edited by G. Patzig. 16 A criterion for the distinction between positive and negative predicates and hence for positive and negative sentences can be obtained from the distinc­ tion between merely exclusive predicates (like ‘red’ and ‘blue’) and contra­ dictory predicates (like ‘red’ and ‘not-red’); its applicability is, however, restricted, cf. Ayer and Gale. 17 ‘Die Verneinung’, pp. 153 f. cf. also Geach, ‘Assertion’ and Dummett, pp. 316 f. Lecture 5 1 cf. e.g. St Thomas Aquinas, Veritate, I, 1: ‘illud autem quod primum intellectus concipit quasi notissimum et in quo omnes conceptiones resolvit est ens’. Duns Scotus, Ord. I, dist. 3 pars. l,q.3.no. 137: ‘primum objectum intellectus nostri est ens’. 2 1 shall not go into the problem of the ambiguity of the Indo-European and in particular the Greek word ‘to be’ and the questions of whether the differ­ ent meanings are nonetheless connected and whether this connection is suf­ ficiently universal for philosophy to be able to orientate itself to this word. Instead I refer you to the work of C. Kahn, in which for the first time this problem is discussed comprehensively and at the level of contemporary lin­ guistic and philosophical knowledge. For someone today simply to start out from talk of ‘Being’ (‘das Sein) as Heidegger has done is unsurpassably naive.

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3 I myself have fallen into this error for this reason in my essay ‘Die sprachanalytische Kritik der Ontologie’, p. 492. 4 I shall come back to these questions in Lecture 28. 5 In a certain way it is to be found in Heidegger, cf. note 14 to this lecture. 6 A formal semantics which is built on this insight and is accordingly divided into two parts - a semantics of the modes and a semantics of the proposi­ tional content common to all sentences is developed in Searle’s book Speech Acts.

7 cf. Hare, ‘Meaning and Speech Acts’ (1970) in: Hare, Practical Inferences, pp. 82 ff. The term ‘external negation’ is however also used in another sense; cf. the article ‘Negation’ by A. N. Prior in the Encyclopedia of Philoso-

Phy. 8 It was Austin, in his How to Do Things with Words, who first called attention to the so-called ‘performative’ use of sentences. 9 cf. Frege, ‘Verneinung’, first sentence; Lewis, Convention pp. 186 f.; Hare, loc. cit., pp. 80-2. In the case of so-called sentence-questions (such as ‘Is he coming?’) the range of possible replies is determined by the propositional content which can be either affirmed or denied. In the case of so-called word-questions like ‘Who is coming?’ an element of the propositional con­ tent is left open and it is left to the respondent to replace it with an appro­ priate content. 10 The subject-matter (also its demarcation from semantics) and in particular the conceptuality of this discipline are still very uncertain. J. Habermas seeks to develop a philosophical conception of pragmatics in his paper: ‘Was heisst Universalpragmatik?’ 11 Critique of Pure Reason, B 197. 12 cf. the interpretations in F. Kambartel, Erfahrung und Struktur, pp. 113 ff. 13 Connected with this is the fact that what Kant means by ‘object’ (‘Gegen­ stand ’) is really what one calls ‘objectivity’ (‘Objektivität’); the latter, however, is a mode of veritative being. But Kant could not explicitly conduct his enquiry in this way, for despite the fact that he started out from the forms of judgment he was not orientated towards sentences. 14 That which is ‘disclosed’ Heidegger called ‘Being’ (<Sein,). He was thus able to interpret the analysis of disclosedness at the same time as the resumption of the question about Being which for its part is to be detached from the traditional fixation with objects. This unusual use of the word ‘being’ can be made intelligible in the following way: from among the various meanings which the word ‘be’ has in language Heidegger orientated himself primarily to veritative being. This is shown in particular by the fact that for him the question about Being is at the same time a question about Not-being. All disclosedness which is expressed in sentences is to this extent a disciosedness of (veritative) Being. Now as we have seen we can also transfer the talk of ‘being’ to the more general concept of affirmation, so that one can now say that all disclosedness which is expressed in sentences is a disclosedness of Being. Once one has got this far one can understand that Heidegger was able to extend the talk of ‘Being’ yet again in such a way that one can now say that all disclosedness, even that which is not articulated in sentences, is a disclosedness of Being. Heidegger himself, however, has never given a clear

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account of his use of the word ‘Being’. On the one hand he has naively assumed that the meanings of the word ‘being’ constitute a unitary connec­ tion; on the other hand it seemed to him natural to say with the objectorientated tradition that all being is a being of beings, although this does not fit veritative being, let alone the extended concept. 1 have attempted to give a precise meaning to Heidegger’s equation of ‘world’ and ‘being’ in sec­ tion 4 of my essay ‘Das Sein und das Nichts’. 15 cf. Logische Untersuchungen, i i , 1, pp. 421 ff. (‘Beilage zur Kritik der “Bilder­ theorie” und der Lehre von den “immanenten” Gegenständen der Akte’). 16 cf. above n. 1. 17 cf. the quotation from Aquinas in n. 1. 18 cf. my interpretation in section 3 of my essay ‘Das Sein und das Nichts’. 19 cf. B129 ff.,B234-6,242; and for the use of the word B376 f and Erste Ein­ leitung zur Kritik der Urteilskraft, m (Werke, xx, p. 205 f.

Lecture 6 1 Both Kant and Heidegger overlooked veritative being, to which they were nonetheless orientated. For Kant cf. above p. 414 n. 13. The situation is especially confused in Heidegger. He was not only concerned with an extension of the disclosedness-thematic beyond objects; he also wanted to show that the ‘more basic’ disclosedness is one that does not relate to objects at all. By ‘objecthood’ - in Sein und Zeit ‘presence-at-hand’ (Vorhandenheit’) he meant not only that for which singular terms stand but the whole onto­ logical perspective which results from the orientation to the statement (§§13,33). In contrast to the disclosedness which is expressed in sentences he sought to exhibit a pre-logical, pre-linguistic disclosedness as more basic (but for the analysis of which he nonetheless took the statement-structure the ‘as’, §32 - as his clue). This exclusion of sentences from the core-area of the analysis which results from the rejection of the logical contradicts the central importance which Heidegger attributed to language (‘Language is the house of being’). In his statements about language Heidegger therefore reverted to the level of the most primitive theories of language, in that he emphasized the significance of the word for the disclosedness of beings. Because Heidegger restricted the notions of objecthood and objectification to the level of statements, objects could once more gain access through the backdoor of another terminology (that of ‘beings’ and ‘things’) and take up a dominant and analytically uncontrollable position. Heidegger’s concep­ tion o f ‘world’ is correspondingly ambiguous: on the one hand it appears as a whole of significance, on the other hand - and increasingly so in the later works - as the sphere of disclosedness of things (cf. Tugendhat, Der Wahr­ heitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger, pp. 399-402). 2 cf. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §§305,308. 3 Logische Untersuchungen, v, Chap. 1. Husserl also mentions a third concept of consciousness but which can here be passed over: consciousness in the sense of inner-perception. This concept falls under that of intentionality and in turn forms the basis for the delimitation o f consciousness in the

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sense of the unity of experiences {Erlebniseinheit) (§6). What I have called Husserl’s second concept of consciousness is the one he mentions first. Philosophical Investigations, esp. §§244 ff. and pp. 221 ff., Zettel, §§472 ff. cf. Sein und Zeit, §25. cf. Sein und Zeit, §§28 ff. Logische Untersuchungen, v, §10.

4 5 6 7 8 Ideen, §89. 9 Brentano, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, Appendix, Section 1; cf. also R. Chisholm, Perceiving, §11. 10 The same is true where ‘perceive’, ‘see’, ‘hear’ are used propositionally. *x sees that the sun has risen’ means: x knows on the basis of his optical per­ ception that the sun has risen. 11 cf. also Searle, Speech Acts, p. 93. The reflections so far do not amount to a proof of this statement; this requires further reflections on the form of existential statements (reflections which I shall not carry out till later). So long as one conceives the form of an existential sentence predicatively (TV exists’) the above thesis appears to contradict itself because the understand­ ing of an existential sentence would in turn presuppose the consciousness o f an object (of N ). We shall see however (p. 300) that existential sentences cannot be understood predicatively. The sentence ‘The devil exists’ really has the form: ‘There is one and only one object that is devilish’. It might also be thought that even if it cannot be shaken by phantasy-consciousness the above thesis is refuted by the holding-to-be-true of negative existential statements. For in such a case we seem to have the consciousness of an object which we neither mean as existent nor think of as such. However, this argument also fails if we do not understand existential statements pre­ dicatively. For when I say ‘There is no object that is devilish’ I do not have a consciousness of a non-existent object. However, it will later emerge (p. 367) that the above thesis cannot be sus­ tained in this generality. It holds indeed for all objects that exist (occur) in space and time, but not for the spatial and temporal positions themselves. One can believe that an object exists at a particular time in a particular spa­ tial position and this belief can turn out to be false. But this cannot be repeated for the spatial and temporal positions themselves. One cannot say of spadal and temporal positions that they do not exist and consequently one also cannot say that they exist. Meaning a spatial or temporal position is thus not founded in the holding-to-be-true of an existential statement. It is propositional only in the weak sense that it is accomplished by means of a singular term which is a non-independent element of a predicative sen­ tence. Connected with this difference is the fact that there cannot be a phantasy-modification for spadal and temporal positions in the same sense that there is for material objects and events. One can say: ‘Imagine that the Neckar does not exist, that 200 metres northwards from here the Neckar is not flowing, but there is an autobahn on which a princess is riding a bike.’ But one cannot say: ‘Imagine that the spatial position that is 200 metres northwards from here does not exist.’ A phantasy-modification is only pos­ sible with regard to spatio-temporal positions in the sense that one can say ‘Imagine a place . . ‘There was once a time . . .’ and not locate this spatio-

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temporal position in our spatio-temporal system (i.e. specify no distance from the spatio-temporal position at which one is speaking). 12 cf. Henrich, ‘Fichtes ursprüngliche Einsicht’ and ‘Selbstbewusstsein’. Lecture 7 1 For the next two pages cf. Hampshire, Thought and Action, Chap. 2 (‘Inten­ tion and Action’). 2 cf. the essentially more differentiated characterizations in Kenny, Will, Free­ dom and Power, Chaps. 2 and 4. 3 The explanation of freedom of action in terms of the action-determining understanding of a sentence to which there always simultaneously belongs a consciousness of the negation of the sentence stems from Aristotle, cf. his Metaphysics, ix, 2 and 5. 4 For the concept of a practical question cf. Hare, Freedom and Reason, 4.3 and 4.5. 5 The question concerning the meaning of the word ‘good’ is the fundamen­ tal question of language-analytical ethics; cf. Moore, Pnncipia Ethica; Ste­ venson, The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms and esp. Hare, The Language of Morals. Standing outside this tradition but particularly instructive is von Wright, The Varieties of Goodness, cf. also P. Ziff, Semantic Analysis, Chap. 6. 6 Metaph., 1006a 11-25. Lecture 8 1 The connection between the understanding of sentences and the concept of the good was first brought out by Aristotle in the famous passage in which he characterizes man as a political animal and grounds this precisely through his capacity to understand sentences {Politics 1253a 1Off.): ‘Of all animals only man speaks in sentences. The mere making of sounds serves to indicate pleasure and pain, and is thus a faculty that belongs to other animals. Only in sentences can one signify what is advantageous and what is harmful; and thus one can only signify what is just and what is unjust in sentences. For it is peculiar to man in comparison with the other animals that he alone has a perception of good and evil and of the just and the unjust. It is participation in such which constitutes a household and ulti­ mately a polis.’ 2 cf. Aristotle, De Interpretation, Chap. 4; Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B93; Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, §33. The first working out of the predicative structure is to be found in Plato’s Sophist. Lecture 9 1 The critique of Husserl’s theory of meaning carried out in this and the next lecture can already be found, in its basic features, in my essay ‘Phänomenol­ ogie und Sprachanalyse’. The impatient reader can skip these lectures and go straight on to Lecture 11. 2 cf. J. S. Mill, System of Logic, Bk. i, Chap. 2, §2.

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3 Frege, ‘Über Sinn und Bedeutung’ (SB), pp. 26 f. 4 Ideas §3: ‘Every possible object, logically speaking: “every subject of possible true predications” ’ cf. also Logical Investigations, ii, §8. 5 Thus Quine: ‘every singular term names or purports to name just one object’ (Word and Object, pp. 90, 95 f.). 6 cf. e.g. Russell, Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, Chap. 16. In Russell’s classical discussion of these expressions in the essay ‘On Denoting’ this ter­ minology is not yet used. 7 cf. Mill, loc. cit., Bk. i, Chap. 2, §5. 8 SB. 9 cf. above n. 4. 10 One recognizes this, according to Frege (SB pp. 32-5) by the fact that if two descriptions ‘a’ and V designate the same object, thus if a —b, their mutual substitution in an arbitrary (non-intensional) sentence leaves the truth-value of the sentence unchanged. The identity ‘a = b ’ is even defined by the sameness of truth-value in the sentence: a = b = def. (F) (Fa =F b). 11 SB, p. 34. 12 cf. C. I. Lewis, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, p. 52. 13 cf. my paper ‘The Meaning of “Bedeutung” in Frege’. 14 Frege’s definition of ‘object’ is to be found in his paper ‘Funktion und Begriff’, p. 18: ‘An object is anything that is not a function, so that an expression for it does not contain any empty place.’ 15 cf. e.g. Cartwright, ‘Propositions’, p. 101: Pitcher, Truth, p. 8. 16 SB, p. 32, ‘Der Gedanke’ (G), p. 61. 17 SB, p. 37. 18 G pp. 60 f. 19 cf. G 64, SB, p. 32. 20 Since he lacks this broad concept of meaning Frege speaks, strangely, of ‘constituents of the sentence’ (G 63). 21 G 63 f. cf. Dummett, Chap. 1. 22 G 62 f. cf. Dummett, p. 295 f. 23 Investigation v, §§34 f. 24 loc. cit. Lecture 10 1 pp. 301-3. The same notes are also printed in the appendix o t Philoso­ phische Grammatik, pp. 199-201. 2 cf. e.g. Aristotle, Metaphysics, vi, 4; De Anima, hi, 6; Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, §15. 3 For what follows cf. Logical Investigations, vi, §46 and v, §§17-18. 4 cf. Investigation vi §62 (p. 190) and my Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger, p. 131. Lecture 11 1 cf. the appendix to this lecture. 2 cf. Philosophical Investigations, §§65—73, Philosophische Grammatik, §§47 ff. and Lorenzen, Methodisches Denken, p. 30.

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3 For what follows cf. the essays ‘Funktion und Begriff’ and ‘Begriff und Gegenstand’ and also the treatise published in Frege's Nachgelassene Schriften under the title ‘Ausführungen über Sinn und Bedeutung’. 4 cf. above p. 115 f. 5 ‘Begriff und Gegenstand’, p. 201. cf. also p. 193. 6 loc. cit., p. 197. 7 loc. cit., p. 198 and p. 197. 8 Speech Acts, Chap. 5, §1. 9 loc. cit., p. 197. 10 loc. cit., p. 198. 11 cf. my paper ‘The Meaning of “Bedeutung” in Frege’. 12 cf. ‘Sinn und Bedeutung’, p. 31. 13 Nachgelassene Schriften, p. 133. 14 loc. cit., p. 128. 15 Lorenzen, Methodisches Denken, pp. 35 f. 16 Nachgelassene Schriften, p. 133. On ‘extension’ and ‘intension’ cf. Carnap, Meaning and Necessity.

Lecture 12 1 2 3 4 5

6 7 8 9 10

Philosophical Investigations, §§243 ff. cf. Jones (ed.), The Private Language Argument.

cf. Mittelstrass, ‘Die Prädikation und die Wiederkehr des Gleichen’. cf. De Anima 417b22. This was even seen by Aristotle himself cf. Post. Anal. 87b28: ‘Even if per­ ception as a faculty is of “the such” and not of a “this”, yet that which is being perceived is a “this” and at a definite present place and time.’ Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, Vol. i, Book i, Pt. 1, Sect. v i i . cf. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Chap. 9. Wittgenstein’s arguments, in particular, are directed against this assump­ tion, that the representation of something can explain the unified employ­ ment of a sign. cf. Phil. Inv., §§73, 86, Phil. Gram., Part 1, Sect. iv. Phil Inv., §117. cf. Quine’s notion of ‘occasion-sentences’ (Word and Object, §9).

Lecture IS 1 cf. Bloomfield, Language, p. 24. 2 cf. Brown and Dulaney, ‘A Stimulus—Response Analysis of Language and Meaning’, pp. 85 f. 3 Bloomfield, p. 139 (my emphasis). 4 G. H. Mead, Mind, Self and Society, especially §§7-10. 5 cf. Hare, The Language of Morals, i, 1.7. 6 Stevenson, Ethics and Language, Chap. 3; Morris, Signs, Language and Behav­ iour, p. 12. Lecture 14 1 H. P. Grice, ‘Meaning’. 2 ‘Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning and Word-Meaning’.

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8 9

10 11

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loc. cit., p. 59. Speech Acts, Chap. 2, §5. How to do Things with Words, Lecture 8. cf. A. Goldman, A Theory of Human Action, pp. 1 ff. The distinction between locutionary and illocutionary act, as I have described

it, does not correspond exactly to Austin’s own description, but to the revised version of Searle. cf. Searle, loc. cit., Chap. 2, §1. On the contrast with Austin see especially ‘Austin on Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts’. W. Alston, Philosophy of Language, Chap. 2, and Searle, loc. cit. Perhaps this is the reason why Grice developed his theory, which is orien­ tated towards a conception which one might think had been overcome by Austin, at a time when Austin’s theory was already known. pp. 64, 66. cf. the relevant places on p. 60 (transition from 6 to 7) and p. 63. One could call my criticism of Searle unfair, because he only applies his theory inci­ dentally to assertions and primarily presents it with reference to the speech act of promising. However, in what follows it will emerge that my objections by no means concern only accidents of formulation, but are objections of principle. cf. Lewis, Convention, pp. 147 ff.

Lecture 15 1 The Redundancy Theory is usually traced back to Ramsey; cf. Ramsey, ‘Facts and Propositions’ (1927) in Ramsey, The Foundations of Mathematics, pp. 142 f. The passage is also re-printed in G. Pitcher (ed.), Truth, a volume in which several papers of the discussion connected with Ramsey are col­ lected. 2 Metaphysics iv, 7, 1011b26f. 3 cf. Metaphysics ix, 10, 105 lb2-5. 4 cf. St Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate, quest. 1. art. 1. 5 cf. e.g. Schelling, System des transzendentalen Idealismus, §1. 6 Searle, Speech Acts, Chap. 2, §5; Dummett, Frege, Chap. 10. cf. also his paper ‘Truth’. 7 cf. also Tractatus, 4.022. 8 cf. Tarski, Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen. 9 cf. Chap. 2, §5.

Lecture 16 1 Grice has seen this difficulty but not solved it (cf. ‘Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions’, pp. 174-6). 2 cf. the essay ‘How to make our Ideas clear’, Collected Papers, Vol. v, pp. 24871. 3 I introduce this distinction between ‘believing’ (Glauben) and ‘opining’ (Mei­ nen) merely to simplify my exposition. 4 cf. Dummett, pp. 298 ff. 5 cf. above p. 14.

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6 For the distinctions in the next paragraphs cf. R. Cartwright ‘Propositions’, pp. 84-6. Lecture 17 1 Tractatus, 4.31 ff. A simple exposition can be found at the beginning of most modern text-books on logic. 2 cf. his papers ‘Truth and Meaning’ and ‘Semantics for natural languages’. 3 cf. the second paper, pp. 178 f. Lecture 18 1 cf. e.g. Pfänder, Logik, i, 9. 2 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B 96. 3 For criticism of the traditional conception cf. Geach, Reference and General­ ity, esp. Chap. 1. 4 cf. his Begriffschrift, §§11 f.; ‘Funktion und Begriff’, p. 23 ff. 5 cf. Strawson, Introduction to Logical Theory, Chap. 6, §7. 6 Plato, Sophist 262-263. 7 cf. De Anima in, 6. 8 cf. Oehler, Die Lehre vom noetischen und dianoetischen Denken bei Platon und Aristoteles, esp. Pt. 1, Sect. 2. Lecture 19 1 cf. Strawson, Logico-Linguistic Papers, pp. 56 f. 2 loc. cit., pp. 11 ff. Lecture 20 1 2 3 4 5 6

cf. S. Kripke, ‘Naming and Necessity’, p. 322. e.g. Logic and Knowledge, pp. 186 f., 201. cf. the papers ‘Über Sinn und Bedeutung’ and ‘Der Gedanke’. A System of Logic, Bk. i, Chap. ii, §5. cf. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B 376. cf. my paper ‘Das Sein und das Nichts’, pp. 140-2.

Lecture 21 1 A detailed exposition of Husserl’s conception is to be found in my Wahr­ heitsbegriff, §4. The most important texts for this problem are also cited there. 2 Critique of Pure Reason, B 236. The other most important texts are A 104 and B 137. 3 cf. esp. §19 of the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. 4 Ideen, i, § 3 cf. also Logische Untersuchungen, n, 1, 125. 5 cf. Ideen, n, §§15, 18. 6 Ideen, i, §131. 7 This statement must be considerably qualified, inasmuch as Frege, in his

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discussion of abstract objects, discovered the perspective of criteria of iden­ tity, which is decisive for an analytical theory of objects. ‘If we are to use the sign a to designate an object, we must have a criterion for deciding in all cases whether b is the same as a, even if it is not always in our power to apply this criterion,’ (Foundations of Arithmetic, §62). In the same connection the concept of representation is also sharply rejected as a possible orienta­ tion for the notion of objects (§60). 8 cf. Charles Morris, Foundations of the Theory of Signs, pp. 3 f.; see also his Signs, Language and Behaviour, p. 12; and Brown and Dulaney, ‘A StimulusResponse Analysis of Language and Meaning’, pp. 75 ff. 9 In the English literature too the expression ‘to specify’ is occasionally used for the function that is here described, e.g. by Quine, Word and Object, p. 177. cf. Strawson, Papers, p. 60. The best expression with which I am famil­ iar for what I mean here is the English expression ‘to single out’ (cf. Straw­ son, ‘Singular Terms, Ontology and Identity’, p. 438); there is, however, no exact German equivalent for it. Lecture 22 1 ‘On Referring’, pp. 17-19. 2 The original and definitive exposition is to be found in the article ‘On Denoting’. There is a more simple exposition in the lectures ‘The Philoso­ phy of Logical Atomism’, in Logic and Knowledge, pp. 242 ff. 3 cf. the essay ‘Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description’, in Mysticism and Logic, p. 203. 4 Russell himself deals with general existential statements in The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, Lecture v. For Frege, c f. Foundations of Arithmetic, §53. Kant’s classical discussion of the problem in the Critique of Pure Reason, B 620 ff. does not go as far as his treatment of the concept of existence in the earlier writing ‘Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes’ (1763) (Werke, ii, pp. 72 f). In the Critique Kant only says that existence is not a ‘real’ predicate, whereas in the early work he maintains that it is not a predicate at all and already interprets existential statements in the way Frege does. 5 Russell himself says this, Logic and Knowledge, p. 252. However he can uphold his original premise by saying: if something is ‘really a name, the question of existence could not arise, because a name has got to name something or it is not a name’ (p. 243). 6 Mysticism and Logic, p. 203, Logic and Knowledge, pp. 200 f. 7 Logic and Knowledge, p. 243. 8 ‘Über Sinn und Bedeutung’, note 2, ‘Der Gedanke’, pp. 38 ff. 9 Wittgenstein, Phil. Inv., §79; Searle, ‘Proper Names’. 10 Kripke, ‘Naming and Necessity’; Donnellan, ‘Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions’. 11 From a Logical Point of View, pp. 5-8. 12 Individuals, pp. 196 f. 13 Logic and Knowledge, p. 201, Mysticism and Logic, p. 211. 14 cf. above, p. 275 n. 2. 15 From a Logical Point of View, p. 9.

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16 Logico-Linguistic Papers, p. 12. 17 loc. cit., p. 11. 18 cf. e.g. the introduction of Fodor and Katz to their collection The Structure of Language.

19 Papers, pp. 17-19. 20 loc. cit., p. 16. 21 loc. cit., p. 15. Lecture 23 1 Logico-Linguistic Papers, p. 59. 2 Individuals, p. 16. 3 Individuals, pp. 31 f., Papers, p. 63. 4'B . A. O. Williams, ‘Mr. Strawson on Individuals’, pp. 312 ff. 5 Explicitly Wiggins, ‘The Individuation of Things and Places’, p. 183; implicitly Searle, Speech Acts, p. 85. 6 Papers, p. 63. 7 Individuals, p. 61. 8 Strawson, Papers, p. 63, Searle, p. 81, Wiggins, loc. cit., p. 183, Donnellan, ‘Reference and Definite Descriptions’, p. 285. 9 ‘Singular Terms, Ontology and Identity’, p. 438. 10 Individuals, p. 61. 11 Papers, pp. 60 f. 12 cf. Papers, pp. 62, 63 f., Individuals, pp. 26 f. 13 cf. Quinton, The Nature of Things, p. 15; Strawson, Individuals, pp. 26 f. 14 Speech Acts, p. 85 (my emphasis). 15 Individuals, pp. 18 f. 16 loc. cit., p. 21. 17 loc. cit., pp. 22-5. Lecture 24 1 His distinction between direct and indirect identification (‘The Individua­ tion of Things and Places’, p. 183) corresponds exactly to Strawson’s dis­ tinction between demonstrative and non-demonstrative identification. The pre-eminence of locating identification is acknowledged (cf. esp. ‘IdentityStatements’, p. 44) but not argued for. 2 ‘The Individuation of Things and Places’, p. 184. 3 I am here following Dummett, pp. 232-9. 4 The distinction of K. Donnellan in his important paper ‘Reference and Def­ inite Descriptions’ between an ‘attributive’ and a ‘referential’ use of definite descriptions (p. 285) does not coincide with, but is connected with, my dis­ tinction between an identifying and a non-identifying specification. One frequently uses non-locating definite descriptions in context in such a way that the speaker expects that it is understood which object he is identifying with the expression. One says, e.g., ‘the murderer of Hans’ and means this (locatable) man here. If the expression ‘the murderer of Hans’ is used in this way then according to Donnellan it is being used referentially. This gives rise to ambiguities to which Donnellan rightly draws attention. If I use the

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expression ‘the murderer of Hans’ on the tacit assumption that with it the (locatable) Mr X Y is meant and I say, e.g., ‘The murderer of Hans is mad’ then if Hans was not murdered at all the statement can still be true pro­ vided only that Mr XY is really mad. If on the other hand I am using the expression ‘the murderer of Hans’ attributively then with the sentence ‘The murderer of Hans is mad’ I mean: the one of all who murdered Hans, whoever (whichever locatable person) he may be, is mad; and in this case of course if Hans was not murdered the statement cannot be true. However correct these distinctions are and however devastating they appear to be against Strawson’s views with their unclear concept of identification, Don­ nellan has neglected to place them in the context, intended by Strawson, of the question: How can one refer to perceptible objects? The peculiar role of locating definite descriptions thus remains unconsidered by him and conse­ quently it does not become clear (1) that the non-locating definite descrip­ tions only acquire an identificatory function by being combined with locat­ ing definite descriptions (2) that his distinction between an attributive and a referential use can no longer be applied in the case of locating definite descriptions and (3) that even the so-called ‘attributive’ use of a definite description is in a broad sense of the word ‘referential’, in that though it does not identify an object it does specify it. Donnellan comes close to this last point when he says that even in the case of the ‘attributive use’ one can speak of ‘reference in a very weak sense’ (p. 303). Lecture 25 1 ‘Sinn und Bedeutung’, p. 42. 2 cf. also Wiggins, ‘The Individuation of Things and Places’, p. 179 and his quotation from Leibniz on pp. 181 f. Lecture 26 1 I do not think that pointing this out suffices to dispose of Kripke’s view; but it is here that the criticism would have to begin. Kripke himself points in this direction by making it clear that what he is concerned with is not the concept of a proper name but what he calls a ‘rigid designator’. A ‘rigid designator’ is a singular term ‘which in every possible world designates the same object’ (p. 269). Now Kripke expressly concedes that demonstratives can also function as ‘rigid designators’ (n. 16). And as he himself appears to admit that proper names can only be introduced by means of a demonstra­ tive (p. 302) he has thereby implicitly retracted his thesis of the primary and free-floating proper name—object relation which is independent of any descriptions. There are, however, several other important aspects of his theory which are not touched by this, in particular his view (which is also held by Donnellan in ‘Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions’) that with the name of an object which we only know by hearsay we do not, as Wittgenstein (Phil. Inv., §79) and Searle (‘Proper Names’) believed, mean the object to which the majority of the descriptions which are transmitted to us with the name apply but the object which those who have transmitted the

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name so designated. For criticism of Kripke, cf. Dummett, Frege, pp. 110— 51. 2 The essence of this, and of the thoughts connected therewith, can already be found in Hampshire, p. 16. 3 Grundl. d. Arithmetik, §54. 4 For the discussion of sortals cf. esp. Strawson, Individuals, pp. 168 ff.; Quine, Word and Object, §19; Wiggins, Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity, §2; Carl, Existenz und Prädikation, §6. In a certain way the modern concept of the sortal predicate represents a re-discovery of the Aristotelian concept of the substance-predicate (cf. Wiggins, loc. cit., p. 28); however the two concepts do not correspond completely. Aristotle distinguishes a hierarchy of substance-predicates; the lower ones he also calls matter-predicates (e.g. ‘water’, ‘sand’), while what distinguishes the genuine substance-predicates is that they are shape-predicates and contain a principle of countability (hen arithmo). In the early modern period the Aristotelian insight was no longer understood; substance appeared as a substrate that, itself not perceptible, underlies a bundle of perceptible qualities (Locke) and could therefore be rejected (Hume). The conception that results from this, that objects are spatio-temporally instantiated bundles of properties which could be referred to with the word ‘this’, persisted in British Empiricism until Russell and was first overcome through the rediscovery of the sortal predicate (cf. Geach, Reference and Generality, pp. 43 f.) 5 This is not to say that the application-rule of such a predicate is simply a matter of the occurrence of a particular shape; Aristotle in particular pointed out that we do not call something a chair or a cat because it has a certain shape, but because it fulfils a certain function, and that the particu­ lar configuration is only a consequence of the fact that something can only fulfil its function under this condition. But this does nothing to alter the fact that it is the configuration diat contains the criterion of identification and distinction. 6 on this aspect cf. esp. Wiggins, loc. cit., pp. 29-36. 7 cf. Wiggins, loc. cit. 8 cf. Strawson, Individuals, pp. 46 ff., Goldman, p. 10. In the important papers by Davidson about events (esp. ‘The Individuation of Events’) this error is not committed; but it is also not said what distinguishes events from states. By contrast cf. von Wright, Norm and Action, pp. 27 f. 9 However, differentiations are possible and necessary here: cf. Vendler, ‘Facts and Events’, where of course events are likewise not explicitly distin­ guished from states. 10 The following reflections on the nature of events I owe to a suggestion by Miss R. Kronseder. cf. also von Wright, loc. cit. 11 This conception has been developed independently by Quinton (pp. 38 f.) and myself (‘Existence in Space and Time’). 12 Speech Acts, p. 77. 13 That this formulation is also implicitly contained in existential (particular) statements has been shown above, p. 246. 14 I have dealt with this ‘temporal concept of existence’ in my paper ‘Existence in Space and Time’ and have put forward the thesis there that temporal

Notes to pp. 3 7 5 - 8 9

426

existence is not a two-place predicate but is reducible to the existential quantifier; I do not know whether this is correct. Lecture 27 1 On this problem of circularity with respect to the second of the reciprocal dependencies cited above cf. Wiggins, ‘The Individuation of Things and Places’. 2 Here and in what follows I am using the term ‘identification’ in a more comprehensive sense than hitherto. I had hitherto called only the specifica­ tion of locating expressions identification. The phenomenon of reference (Verweisung), however, allows one also to speak of an identification and of a rule of identification in the case of non-locating singular terms. When we understand a non-locating definite description we know which object it specifies though we do not yet know which it identifies, but we know how one establishes which it identifies and that means: we know its identification-rule (cf. p. 331). 3 That is Leibniz’s law according to which a —b if and only if (0) 0 a = 0b, hence if every statement in which ‘a’ is supplemented by an arbitrary predi­ cate is true (or false) if and only if the statement which results when ‘6’ is supplemented by the same predicate is true (or false). This law holds abso­ lutely if one restricts predicates to perceptual predicates, hence if one does not allow intensional predicates for which the law does not hold. Dummett elucidates the law thus: ‘if a predicate applies to an object, it applies to it by whatever means we refer to that object’ (Frege, p. 265). One can take over this elucidation and yet reject Dummett’s view that reference to an object and the standing of a name for an object has a meaning before the use of the identity-sign, a meaning which supposedly is given through the ostensive reference to an object (p. 406). Can one say that through the equivalence of the Leibnizian law the mean­ ing of *= ’ is defined? Only then can what is said above in the text be under­ stood as a description of an explanation of ‘= \ However, one can only say: that someone has understood the meaning of ‘= ’ is shown by the fact that under certain circumstances for any *F' he infers from the truth of F a that of F b’ and vice versa. But this does not yet tell us what these ‘certain cir­ cumstances’ are which justify his doing this. In the case of perceptible objects these circumstances consist in this, that a and b have the same spatiotemporal relations to other objects. This, which one can call the identitycriterion (Dummett, pp. 544 f., above p. 381), differs from object-sphere to object-sphere. And indeed it is precisely the identity-criterion through which an object-sphere is constituted (or through which objects of this sphere are constituted as objects (of this sphere)). Only if someone learns the use of the singular terms of an object-sphere in such a way that on the basis of the identity-criterion which obtains for this object-sphere he can substitute them for one another in the manner described by the Leibnizian law has he understood the sign ‘= ’ for this object-sphere, and hence what it is for a singular term of this kind to ‘stand for’ an object (of this sphere). 4 cf. Wittgenstein, Zettel, §§411-425. 5 cf. Lemmon, ‘Sentences, Statements and Propositions’.

Notes to pp. 3 8 9 - 4 0 6

427

6 cf. e.g. Patzig, ‘Satz und Tatsache’. 7 cf. ‘Sinn und Bedeutung’, p. 32, and the still narrower identity-criterion in Chisholm, ‘Problems of Identity’, pp. 24 f. 8 cf. Frege, ‘Der Gedanke’, p. 64 and the interpretation in Dummett, Frege, p. 384. Neither philosopher, however, heeds the distinction to which I seek to refer in the sentence which follows in the text.

Lecture 28 1 The treatment in Dummett is instructive, Frege, pp. 70—80, 370-81 and Chap. 14; also in Specht, parts in 8c iv. Cf. also Carl, pp. 153-68. 2 cf. Dummett, Frege, pp. 70 f. 3 ‘Semantics for Natural Languages’, p. 178. 4 For what follows cf. Davidson ‘Truth and Meaning’, p. 317. 5 On the semantics of adverbs cf. Davidson, ‘The Logical Form of Action Sentences’ as well as Bartsch, ‘Die logische Analyse von Modaladverbien’ and Bartsch, Adverbialsemantik. Cf. also for the solution of a related semanti­ cal problem Bartsch and Vennemann, Semantic Structures, Chap. 3. 6 cf. the table on pp. 66 f. 7 Speech Acts, 5.6. 8 cf. p. 122 8c p. 124. 9 cf. Dummett, Frege, p. 303. 10 cf. Hare, The Language, of Morals, 2.3. 11 cf. Dummett, Frege, p. 303. 12 cf. Dummett, Frege, p. 303. 13 cf. Anscombe, Intention, p. 56 and esp. Kenny, Action, Emotion and Will, pp. 22 f., and Kenny, Will, Freedom and Power, p. 38. 14 cf. Kenny, Will, Freedom and Power, p. 38, also Stenius, ‘Mood and Language Game’, above all p. 274. 15 cf. above p. 54 n 9 and the literature cited there. 16 Anscombe gives on p. 56 the example of a man who makes purchases in a grocery shop by means of a list: if the list comes from his wife then it is an imperative; if it is his own list then it is an intention-sentence. 17 The most extensive analysis so far of these connections is probably achieved in the two books by Kenny. See esp. Chap. 4 of the new book. 18 At a lowest level the word ‘good’ is already used as a simple practical affir­ mation: instead of replying to a demand or a suggestion with ‘yes’ one can also say ‘good’; thus we also call something good when we agree with it or when it fulfils our wishes. In most contexts, however, the word is used in such a way that it implies not just practical agreement but an objectively jus­ tifiable agreement. 19 Will, Freedom and Power, pp. 39 f. 20 cf. Kenny, Wittgenstein, p. 121. 21 cf. his book Freedom and Reason. 22 The connection between the theories o f Grice and Lewis has been made clear by Bennett in ‘The Meaning-Nominalist Strategy’. Bennett who has sketched a conception based on both authors has in contrast to Grice and Lewis explicitly drawn attention to the problem of a language-independent

Notes to pp. 4 0 9

428

explanation of meaning and intending which then becomes necessary (p. 145). 23 cf. the title of the first part of Sein und Zeit. 24 c£. Notebooks, p. 30 130e. 25 cf. Notebooks, pp. 93 f.

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433

Index of names

Alston, W. P., 187 Anscombe, G. E. M., 427 Aquinas, 413, 415, 420 Aristotle, 9, 14ff, 18-21, 22f, 28-31, 34f, 38-42, 50, 86-9, 148, 155, 195, 254, 413, 417, 418, 419, 425 Augustine, 8 Austin, J. L., 186f, 401, 404, 414, 420 Ayer, A. J., 413 Bartsch, R., 427 Bennett, J., 427 Bloomfield, L., 167, 419 Brentano, F., 70, 72 Brown, R. W., 419, 422 Carl, W., 425, 427 Carnap, R., 99, 189, 307, 419 Cartwright, R., 418, 421 Chisholm, R., 416, 427 Davidson, D., 99, 189, 238f, 253, 395f, 412, 425, 427 Descartes, 57f, 67ff, 77 Donnellan, K. S., 301, 325, 423, 424 Dulaney, D. E., 419, 422 Dummett, M., 118, 189, 198,325,412, 413, 418, 420, 421, 424, 426, 427 Duns Scotus, 413 Fodor, J. A., 423 Frege, G., 26, 43, 46f, 99, 107, 109f, l l l f , 115f, 117f, 146-9, 189, 208, 243, 246f, 275f, 279, 287f, 300, 301, 338, 348, 358f, 389, 414, 421, 422, 425, 426, 427

Gale, R. M., 413 Geach, P. T., 412, 413, 421, 4-25 Goldman, A., 420, 425 Grice, H. P., 181ff, 185ff, 190, 194, 201, 21 Of, 216f, 31 lf; 406, 419 Habermas, J., 414 Hampshire, S., 417, 425 Hare, R. M., 404, 414, 417, 419, 427 Hegel, 50, 63, 278 Heidegger, M., 60, 65, 69, 409, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417 Henrich, D., 417 Hume, 156, 425 Husserl, E., 14, 22f, 24, 43f, 58f, 61, 62f, 66-71, 73f, 77, 99, 102f, 104f, 107, 132, 134, 136f, 140f, 145-8, 229-33, 275f, 284-8 Kahn, C., 413 Kambartel, F., 414 Kant, 6, 9-11, 58ff, 64f, 76, 145f, 285f, 300, 417, 418, 421 Katz, J., 423 Kenny, A., 403, 417, 427 Kripke, S., 301, 325, 348, 421, 424 Kronseder, R., 425 Kutschern, F. von, 411 Leibniz, 424, 426 Lemmon, E. J., 425 Lewis, C. I., 418 Lewis, D., 406, 414, 420 Locke, 425 Lorenzen, P., 149 Lyons, J., 413

435

Index o f Names

Mead, G. H., 168ff Meinong, A., 298ff Mill, J. S., 272, 276-80, 288, 417, 418 Mittelstrass, J., 419 Moore, G. E., 417 Morris, C., 419, 422 Oehler, K., 421 Parmenides, 14, 33, 50, 378 Passmore, J., 411 Patzig, G., 427 Peirce, C. S., 212, 218Pfänder, A., 421 Pitcher, G., 418 Plato, 8f, 19f, 29f, 34, 77, 94, 411 Prior, A., 414 Quine, W. V. O., 302, 305, 305n.l5, 307, 313, 412, 418, 419, 422, 425 Quinton, A., 423, 425 Ramsey, F. P., 420 Rorty, R., 411 Russell, B., I l l , 275, 298-310, 314f, 3 l7f, 330, 332, 335f, 344, 368-70, 378, 411, 425 Savigny, E. von, 411 Schelling, F. W., 420

Searle, J., lOlf, 147, 186ff, 193, 198f, 202f, 313, 319, 368, 398-402, 404, 414, 416, 420, 422, 423 Socrates, 13, 94 Specht, E. K., 427 Stegmüller, W., 411 Stenius, E., 427 Stevenson, C., 417, 419 Strawson, P. F., 268, 298, 302, 326, 329f, 332, 344, 349, 362, 366, 384, 412, 421, 422, 423, 425 Urmson, J. O., 411 Vendler, Z., 425 Vennemann, T., 427 Wiggins, D., 325-8, 331, 333f, 382, 423, 424, 425 Williams, B. A. O., 312 Wittgenstein, L., 8, 43f, 68f, 99, 104, 122f, 142f, 1 4 4 ,1 5 0 -3 ,153n.l, 157f, 157n.8, 160, 160n.9, 163-7, 177, 182, 189, 198, 200, 209f, 237f, 248, 255, 270, 307, 321, 354, 377, 403, 406, 409, 422, 424, 426 Wright, G. H. von, 417, 425 Ziff, P., 417

Index of subjects

affirmation, 46ff, 52f ‘all’, 244-7 analytic statements, 8ff ‘and’, 228-42 answering, 190 applying, 253-6, 265f a priori, the, 8ff, 24 assertion, 185, 188f, 202f, 218f, 222, 350 assertion-moment, 44f assertion-sign (in Frege), 47 attributes, 128f, 134, 158f behaviouristic theory of language, 166f, 170-3 belief, 184, 211-14 categorematic terms, 109 categorial synthesis, 99, 122-6, 130ff changes, 36If characterization, 135f, 138f classification, 138 classification-expressions, 25, 26If, 407f communication, 2.16f composition (of meanings or states of affairs), 120f, 127f, 130, 234, 244 concepts, 145-9 conceptualism, 139-44, 153-8 conditional rules, 165f, 170, 175, 239f consciousness, 56-60, 62, 65-74 coordinate zero-point (for spatiotemporal identification), 345f correctness, 82f, 143, 352, 354f, 386ff, 409 correspondence theory of truth, 195ff countability, 258f, 295, 425

deictic expressions, 110, 221-4, 308f, 341, 343, 389 demonstrative identification, 316ff, 329 descriptions, 11 Of, 275f descriptive descriptions, 314 locating (spatio-temporal) descrip­ tions, 325n.l, 329-32, 335n.4 relational descriptions, 3 l7 ff Russell’s theory of descriptions, 298-301 determinism, 79 disclosedness (in Heidegger), 60, 414, 415 error, 352ff events, 360ff existence, 28, 72, 299ff, 367-71, 416, 425 explanation (of an expression), 142f, 164, 238f, 255f, 392 formalization, 24-7, 55f, 66, 75 freedom, 79, 81, 85, 409 function, 136-7 in Frege’s terminology, 146 of linguistic expressions, 135f, 289 o f predicates, 134ff of singular terms, 289ff, 293 of assertoric sentences, 183f, 185f general statements, 244 good, 81-5, 88f, 403f, 427 guarantee, 199f, 201 f identification, 298,310-21, 325ff, 331, 334f, 345f, 378f, 383, 426 kinds of identification, 316-19

437

Index o f Subjects

identity, 23, 294f, 340f, 344, 347, 358, 364, 379, 386f, 426 illocutionary acts, 187, 398f, 403 imperatives, 53, 80, 400f, 402f, 406f individuals, 155, 294f, 304f, 370 informing, 18If, 211 inner perception, 66ff, 71 intellectual intuition, 9, 141 intentional actions, 78f intentional consciousness, 69-74 intentionality, 67, 69-74, 108, 284f intention-sentences, 40, 72f, 402f intuition of essences, 70, 141 justification, 14ff, 82ff, 87 linguistics, 5f, 96, 152, 410 localization, 314, 316f, 329, 331, 345f, 373f meaning, 102f, 104f, 142f, 152, 221f (in sense o f ‘meaning an object’), 63, 282, 289, 293, 336 (in sense of vouloir dire), 182f, 186f, 194, 210f meta-linguistic theories of meaning, 183, 201, 223, 258f, 271, 307, 342 modes (of sentences), 40, 51f, lOlf, 401-4, 408 modes of presentation (or givenness), 58, 61, 1 Ilf, 285ff negation, 46ff, 52f, 408f ‘no’, 47f nominalization, 29, 42 nominalism, 139-44, 153-8 ‘not’, 408f objectivity, 285ff objects, 21-25, 280-1, 292, 294f abstract objects, 122, 295f, 393ff concrete objects, 275, 295f, 33Of, 356ff contrast of analytical with tradi­ tional conception of objects, 375-81 opining, 212ff optative sentences, 400-5 ‘or’, 233, 236f, 241 particular statements, 244 perceptual predicates, 330f perceptual situation, 329, 340, 344, 356

performatives, 52f phenomenology, 66f position-taking, 169, 185, 190 pragmatics, 56, 74 predicates, 25, 133-6, 138f, 143, 158f, 261-6, 385-6, 399f Principle of contradiction, 38-41 proper names, 111, 275f, 301 f, 317, 373, 420 in Frege’s terminology, 109 logically proper names, 303f, 368f quantifiers, 244 quasi-predicates, 159ff, 164, 178, 261-4, 273, 351-5 recursive truth-definition, 250 redundancy theory of truth, 195-8 reference (Frege’s Bedeutung), 11 If reference, Bezugnahme (to objects), 27If, 279f, 294, 335f, 343f, 379ff, 392, 394f reference, Verweisung (of singular terms to other singular terms), 340f, 372-5, 378f, 395 representation (VorteHung), 62ff, 140f, 145,276-83, 375f representative theory of signs, 289ff, 376 self-consciousness, 69, 74 sets, 230ff signals, signal-language, 166f, 168f, 172f, 183, 406ff situation-conformity, 35If situation-dependence (-indepen­ dence), 161, 163f, 174, 206, 223f, 35 0 ,355f ‘some’, 244ff ‘something’, 22-40 sortals, 358-65 spatio-temporal positions, 330, 336ff, 357f, 363, 364-7, 369f, 416 spatio-temporal relations, 316f, 319f, 330 sp ecification , 2 9 3 f, 3 1 3 ff, 3 2 6 f, 3 8 4 f, 426

kinds and levels of specification, 319f, 329, 332, 335 standing for, 253-6, 270, 279f, 293f, 376ff, 380f states of affairs, 43f, ll7 f, 122,219-24 criterion of identity for states of affairs, 389

438

Index o f Subjects

subject-object relation, 64, 74, 278, 392 substitutability (replaceability of sing­ ular terms by other singular terms), 308, 340f, 342f, 378f, 386 symptoms, 181, 290 synthesis, 122, 124f, 130, 134, 146, 151, 233f, 254, 285ff

truth-definition (Tarskian), 327ff, 381, 396ff, 401 truth-functional senences, 228, 243 truth-tables, 237

‘this’, 262-5, 302ff, 342, 359 thought (in Frege), 43, 117 transcendental philosophy, 58-65 truth, 83f, 135f, 189, 194-8, 207ff, 224f, 249f, 254, 341, 350-6, 387f, 398 truth-conditions, 99f, 199-206, 22Iff of predicative sentences, 381-4

verification-field, 370f verfication-rule, 202-5, 227 of predicates, 261, 264f, 283f verification-situation, 340f, 363, 370

universal statements, 244

what is asserted (Behauptetes), 42f, 185, 218-19, 222, 390