Trust in Market Relationships
To my loving family
Trust in Market Relationships Sandro Castaldo Full Professor of Ma...
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Trust in Market Relationships
To my loving family
Trust in Market Relationships Sandro Castaldo Full Professor of Marketing at Bocconi University, Italy
Edward Elgar Cheltenham, UK • Northampton, MA, USA
© Sandro Castaldo 2007 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical or photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Published by Edward Elgar Publishing Limited Glensanda House Montpellier Parade Cheltenham Glos GL50 1UA UK Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. William Pratt House 9 Dewey Court Northampton Massachusetts 01060 USA
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication Data Castaldo, Sandro, 1965– Trust in market relationships / Sandro Castaldo ; translated by Maria Rosaria Buri and Jacopo Madaro Moro p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Marketing—Psychological aspects. 2. Markets—Psychological aspects. 3. Trust. I. Title. HF5415.C28813 2007 381.01´9—dc22 2007017111
ISBN 978 1 84542 761 0 Printed and bound in Great Britain by MPG Books Ltd, Bodmin, Cornwall
Contents vii
Preface PART ONE 1. 2.
CONCEPTUAL ASSUMPTIONS OF TRUST
Relationship- and network-based approaches: the emergence of trust demand The value of trust
3 27
PART TWO THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE DIFFERENT DISCIPLINARY CONTEXTS 3. 4.
Multidisciplinary studies on trust Trust in marketing
49 83
PART THREE THE TRUST CONSTRUCT’S ANALYTICAL BOUNDARIES 5. 6.
Trust definition: a content meta-analysis Trust in market relationships: the main analytical dimensions
PART FOUR 7. 8.
121 141
TRUST DEVELOPMENT
A trust growth model The evolutionary and interactive dynamics of trust
185 216 245 251 262 301
Appendix A: Trust definitions Appendix B: Trust scales References Index
v
Preface Until the beginning of the 1990s, the concept of trust appeared in the literature as an expression of two often contrasting attitudes. On one hand, trust was considered a fundamental ingredient of market relations, so important that is was almost a given fact, not deserving further analytical inquiry. On the other hand, the construct was regarded as fully irrelevant, as if it were a social convention of limited utility that did not explain the true essence of relational phenomena. At a symposium, a fellow who presented a paper on the theme of market relationships confessed to me that he was so certain of the theoretical inutility of the concept that he had decided to eliminate it from all of his works. In a word, some thought that the concept was so relevant and omni-comprehensive that any interpretation was to preclude analytical relevance. Others have reached the same conclusion, but starting from the opposite position: the only relevance of trust is practical. It simplifies the attempts to explain social relationships’ functioning, but has no theoretical value, because it can be substituted by constructs that are much more apt to be analytically expressed, such as power, risk, collaborative behaviours and so on. These opposite attitudes, both linked to a limited analytical examination, have triggered my curiosity, prodding me along a path that led me to this work. In particular, being initially focused on channel marketing, I had to conclude that trust is critical, at both the theoretical and empirical levels. Thus the construct emerged as the fundamental antecedent of the cooperative dimension within manufacturer–distributor relationships. Subsequently, in dealing with the market relationships and customer-based intangibles, I furthered my studies on concepts such as brand image, satisfaction and customer loyalty, all of which are currently strongly rooted in trust. Within that scenario, I have systematically explored the concept. This book is an attempt to deal with the significant analytical complexity and the extreme variety of perspectives characterizing the construct’s research. Weary of undue simplifications, it proposes some initial guidelines for developing a trust interpretation model that defines the conceptual basis of any trust management strategy. The work is divided into four parts, each two chapters long. Chapter 1 delves into trust’s essential conceptual requirements, namely the emergence of a new economy based on relationships and, more specifically, on vii
viii
Preface
networked and interconnected economic structures. Chapter 2 explores the construct’s role in supplying intangible assets and creating value for the firm, and thus its relevance in business relations. Part Two analyses the multidisciplinary nature of the construct, synthesizing contributions offered by some of the main social sciences that have analytically dealt with the concept. Chapter 3 is dedicated to the studies of psychology, sociology and organization that capture trust in its social dimension. Also discussed are the contributions from economy and transactional cost theory, focused on understanding the construct’s economicrational nature. Finally, it is the turn of strategic management, and the attempts of what can be called the first true synthesis of the social and economic dimensions of trust. A similar path is followed in marketing, as described in Chapter 4, which discusses both the construct’s conceptual nature and its managerial implications in some high trust intensity relational contexts: industrial goods markets, services, channel relations, buyer–seller relationships, virtual environments and customer-based resources (in particular, brand equity and loyalty). Part Three establishes the concept’s nature, its main definitions and analytical boundaries. To this effect, content and cluster analyses were conducted on a definition set derived from the literature. The outcome of that research is applied to the interpretation of the various meanings attached to trust, and that is presented in Chapter 5. The following chapter starts describing the epistemological nature of the construct, its basic factors, essentially risk and vulnerability, its various constituting dimensions and its different typologies, looking at the adjacent concepts which sometimes appear to be erroneously assimilated to trust. The last part analyses trust building strategies, indicating the concept’s cognitive and affective determinants, its consequences and its evolutionary processes. In particular, Chapter 7 focuses on the analysis of trust’s antecedents and consequences. A first interpretative framework and an example of a measuring process based on an experimental cross-sectional research are proposed. Finally, Chapter 8 further studies the dynamic and interactive nature of trust, and underscores the radical transformation exhibited by the construct according to the relationship’s different stages, thus highlighting the criticality of longitudinal research. On this matter, further evidenced is the reciprocity of the concept, the importance of jointly analysing the various perspectives of the relationship, and the need to avoid unilateral visions. A few notes on trust management conclude the work, indicating some vectors for future research.
Preface
ix
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This work represents the consolidation of several years of research and thus many are those who have directly or indirectly contributed to its realization. Since my studies on trust within channel relationship started in 1993, when I visited the Marketing Department at the University of Florida, until the most recent meetings and workshop organized by the FINT (First International Network on Trust), many are the colleagues who have helped me to develop the ideas presented here. Thus the pleasure of writing acknowledgements, coinciding with the conclusion of one’s effort, becomes a difficult reconstruction and listing of events and contributors. I well know that the final result cannot but be incomplete. Still, I wish to express my gratitude to all friends and colleagues who have fostered the evolutionary creation process that has transformed an initial idea of this book into paper and ink. In this process, some have left a particular mark, because of their contribution to this work, and the trust they bestowed on me, allowing me to reach this milestone. My particular gratitude goes to all my colleagues within the Marketing Department of SDA Bocconi and the Institute of Corporate Economics and Management ‘G. Pivato’ at Bocconi University. The ideas that emerged from our meetings, brown bags and common research projects have vastly contributed to the finalization of this work. My heartfelt thanks to all the participants in FINT and in particular to Katinka Bijlsma-Frankema, Kirsimarja Blomqvist, Don Ferrin, Nicole Gillespie, Guido Moellering, Frédérique Six, Denise Skinner and Antoinette Weibel. The exchange of ideas and viewpoints offered by this network has represented an important source of inspiration for some of the models developed in this work and a unique opportunity for personal enrichment. Thanks to the Research committee at Bocconi University and to its president, Professor Lorenzo Peccati, Pro-Rector for Research and Human Resources Management, who funded the translation of the book. Monica Grosso shared with me the text refining process and the realization of two sections on e-trust. Maria Rosa Buri and Jacopo Madaro have been in charge of the not easy task of translating the book. The reader will understand the many difficulties they faced in expressing the ideas and concepts of this book in the English language. This text received extraordinary professional support from Edward Elgar management staff: Francine O’Sullivan and Jo Betteridge fuelled my original idea, and David Fairclough supported me in the whole editing process.
x
Preface
Finally I must extend my loving thanks to my family members, whom I have quite neglected while focusing my energies on this book: their unconditional trust in me is their most sincere act of love. S.C.
PART ONE
Conceptual assumptions of trust
1. Relationship- and network-based approaches: the emergence of trust demand 1.
INTRODUCTION
One of the phenomena that characterize markets today is the exponential development of their complexity, which determines major consequences on the behaviour of economic actors. Firms are incapable of autonomously managing the increasing level of environmental complexity and, therefore, require a specialization in the production of knowledge as well as in the development of trust relationships with their markets. Hence, the need to connect in networks and integrate complementary competencies and expertise emerges, in order to face the new competitive contexts. This represents a first, knowledge-based (or science-push) factor, which is crucial to the constitution of networks of subjects with complementary cognitive resources (for example, Arora and Gambardella 1994). On the other hand, the firm–market relationship is subject to a radical change, in order to satisfy the complexity of customer needs, which appear with increased frequency as bunches. Unilateral and instantaneous exchanges will have to become long-term bilateral relationships, in which the demand will actively interact with the firms’ network, thus contributing to the knowledge development. This leads to a second, customer-based (or demand-pull) vector, which contributes to the tendency towards interorganizational network creation. This not only expands the relational bandwidth that connects the set of firms seeking to satisfy a common bunch of needs, but also reduces the cognitive distance between companies and their customers. In turn, clients become co-producers of the reticular knowledge base. This seems to be the case with the so-called lead users (von Hippel 1988) directly committed to the new product development process. Evidences drawn from virtual economy clearly indicate the development of such a trend, which induces companies, customers and consumers’ communities to cooperate in the generation of innovation (for example, Iacobucci 1998; Achrol and Kotler 1999; Sawhney and Prandelli 2000). 3
4
Conceptual assumptions of trust
In such a context, the capability of connecting with customers – as well as with all economic players contributing to build the resource basis required by efficient value generation processes – is fundamental to a firm’s survival and development (for example, Dyer and Singh 1998; Morgan and Hunt 1999). To reach this goal trust plays a fundamental role. Actually, in the net-economy, the environmental and scientific complexity is transformed into a relational density that requires new resources – trust in primis – useful in managing this new dimension of complexity. Therefore trust becomes a true resource for the network and its members. It represents a factor enabling the ‘governance’ of the growing ‘relational complexity’ shown by the competitive arena. The goal of this chapter is to comprehend the major analytical factors at the basis of the trend which is leading to new relational patterns in an economy characterized by a significant cognitive complexity. To understand the crucial features of the concept of trust in the net-economy, it is necessary to investigate the discontinuity in the organization of economic systems, which are shifting from the Smithian matrix of exchanges to new post-Fordist reticular architectures (for example, Rullani and Romano 1998). The following sections will be devoted to an analysis of the reasons for such a shift in the organization of economic value production.
2. THE ONSET OF THE RELATIONAL PERSPECTIVE The concepts of exchange and relationship have been the subject of many marketing studies. The major reason for the interest aroused by such topics is closely related to the definition of marketing itself, which has led scholars in this area of studies to focus mainly on the activities promoting exchange and, more recently, the establishment of long-term relationships between firm and demand.1 One of the earliest official definitions given by the American Marketing Association establishes that marketing expresses the set of business activities necessary to transfer products and services from the producer to the consumer and/or user. This definition highlights the relationship as unilateral (assuming an active manufacturer and a passive customer), discrete (only transfer as an exchange is considered) and mono-dimensional (reference is made mainly to the physical and economic content of exchange, without considering other social, psychological and emotional dimensions). Further chapters will show how advances in research have led to the enhancement of the firm/customer relational interface, thus significantly upgrading the definition mentioned above.
Relationship- and network-based approaches
5
Marketing is not the only field in which the concepts of exchange and relation have been investigated. Actually, they have been the subject of considerable research in economics, strategic management, organizational studies, sociology, psychology and other social sciences focused on individual and inter-organizational interaction mechanisms. The outcomes of these studies and the concepts they proposed have conditioned the evolution of marketing studies, thus contributing to the generation of new interpretation models which denote new analytical dimensions of exchange and market relations. The concept of exchange that marketing resorted to, especially in the 1950s and 1960s – decades in which efforts were made to re-conceptualize marketing as a discipline – derives from the very nature of its definition provided by the neoclassical economy. The latter, in fact, refers to exchange from a utilitarian perspective, as the value/utility the parties involved can draw from the object of the transaction. Economics was concerned with formulating theoretical models aimed at defining balanced situations in the various market contexts. Hence, it had to connote exchange as a discrete event, without temporal references and with no links to companies involved in the passage of goods and/or services ownership (Carman 1980; Hunt 1983, 1991). The economic notion of exchange is compatible with the analysis of atomistic competitive systems, in which the parties have no identity and there is no long-term inter-organizational connection. This notion, however, is weak if applied to ‘peculiar’ situations such as oligopolies, where no balanced solution is actually achieved. In such cases, an appropriate interpretation has to consider the relational superstructure in which individual exchanges take place and become ‘sticky’. It is, therefore, fundamental to study the history and the future prospects of relationships between parties, implicit or explicit agreements, as well as the rules and norms regulating such relationships. This highlights the importance of the social dimension in which the economic exchange is embedded (for example, Granovetter 1985). Some marketing studies and socio-organizational theories seek to examine more exhaustively – albeit along different paths – inter-organizational relationships, thus trying to bridge this interpretative gap.
3. HIGH RELATIONSHIP-INTENSIVE MARKET CONTEXTS Marketing, as a discipline, has defined its research area referring to the very concept of exchange (between the firm and the customer), aiming at the study of activities accomplished by firms seeking to perform demand-related
6
Conceptual assumptions of trust
transactions. Alderson was one of the first authors to introduce the concept of exchange as one of the pillars of marketing, proposing the well-known law of exchange, which establishes the (economic) conditions that make exchanges possible.2 Compared with the traditional contributions given by economics, the innovative contribution of marketing in this first stage of its evolution lays in the fact that, far from being exclusively limited to the transfer of goods, it encompassed all of the so-called marketing flows, further enriching the exchange concept contents.3 By ascribing priority to the economic dimension of exchange, one might be induced to neglect other important aspects of market relationships. As a matter of fact, the relationships between the firm and the market do not involve a mere transfer of the ownership of a commodity, and the exchange of information and financial resources, as assumed by the theory in its initial stage. Aware of the above-mentioned constraint, Bagozzi (1974, 1975) was led to explicitly consider the social and psychological contents of exchanges. He introduced the concept of exchange system, defined as the ‘set of social actors, their relationships to each other, and the endogenous and exogenous variables affecting the behaviour of the social actors in those relationships’ (Bagozzi 1974: 78). Following his contribution, marketing scholars started to become aware that individual exchanges are part of more complex superstructures and assume an analytical perspective, referring to a ‘broadening of the horizon’, in order to take into account both the history and the future advances impacting the dynamics of single exchanges. At a later stage, they started to take into account relational dimensions, thus highlighting that the psycho-social content of relationships and the identity of the actors involved have a substantial influence on the terms in which the ‘economic’ exchange develops (‘broadening of the spectrum’). Thus the concept of exchange started to evolve into that of relationship. This progress was based on the effort of those scholars who faced the inadequacy of the original concept of exchange while attempting to contextualize the traditional interpretation models proposed by marketing into situations other than those peculiar to traditional markets.4 Consequently, the need has emerged to define new theoretical constructs capable of taking into account the peculiarities of market relations, especially with regard to manufacturing, distributive and services sectors. This produced the socalled relational, reticular or interactive approach (for example, Grönroos 1991, 1995; Ferrero 1992, 2000; Grandinetti 1993; Snehota and Tunisini 1993; Iacobucci 1996, 1998), which led to the definition of marketing mainly as an activity aiming at ‘establishing, maintaining and enhancing . . . relationships with customers and other partners, at a profit, so that the objectives of the parties involved are met’ (Grönroos 1994a: 355). The purposes
Relationship- and network-based approaches
7
underlying such evolution may better be understood by analysing the peculiar dyadic contexts mentioned above. The initial difficulty in applying the traditional marketing models typical of the transactional logic to such contexts has, in fact, determined the genesis of the relational perspective. 3.1
The Industrial Goods Markets
The major features of industrial markets consist of the individualization and interactivity of relationships, which determine an evolution of marketing policies towards a ‘relational’ approach. Such markets are usually characterized by highly complex products, which often require customization and, consequently, the participation of the customer in the design phase. Firms are therefore required to develop an expertise in extracting and managing the knowledge owned by the client, as well as the capability of enhancing it, in order to trigger self-specification processes of the customer’s requirements.5 Moreover, the industrial product is associated with numerous services. The importance of such an element in the value generation process makes the buyers’ process of selection even more uncertain, because they cannot verify the supply quality before the purchase. The economic lifespan of these goods implies that some services (such as assistance and maintenance) are offered for a prolonged period of time, thus increasing the ‘perceived risk’ and determining the need to establish long-term relationships. The relevance of the immaterial component of the supply, the complexity of the product system, and the need for customization associated with the variety of demand requirements – which implies intensive co-designing activities – increase the level of complexity and uncertainty related to the purchase. The rationale of instantaneous exchange cannot, therefore, be applied to industrial markets; consequently a long-term relationship between supply and demand is called for. The Industrial Marketing Purchasing (IMP) Group – aware of the peculiarities of the industrial goods market – has set out on a systematic research activity aiming to investigate the relationships between industrial manufacturers and customers. The Group started analysing individual relationships, developing the so-called interaction approach, which considers industrial markets made up of dyads of buyers and sellers interacting within a relational framework developed through time.6 More recently, the Group has shifted the focus of its scientific research from dyadic relations to the study of networks, within which interactions between individuals take place. This has given rise to the so-called industrial network approach. The need to shift from the content analysis of a single relationship to the study of firm networks was felt after observing that other relations involving the parties condition the
8
Conceptual assumptions of trust
morphology and the evolution of the individual buyer–seller dyads. This has many relevant implications, as it can be asserted that the trustworthiness of a firm is determined also by its network and set of relationships. 3.2
The Distribution Channels
As occurs in industrial markets, the rationale underlying the concept of exchange appears to be somewhat reductionist when interpreting relationships between industrial and commercial firms. In fact, long-term relationships characterized by stability, analogous to – if not greater than – what takes place in industrial markets, link manufacturers and distribution, inducing some authors to conceptualize the channel as an inter-organizational system.7 The relationship in channels is denoted, in the first place, as individual. Namely, the client size, the reduced number of customers (increased after the retail industry’s concentration process), the need to provide ad hoc services and marketing assistance, together with the growing requirement to offer customized products, services and even brands, are all elements that induce an individual-based relationship management. Relations are also interactive. In fact, distribution not only receives products, services and information from suppliers but, owing to its proximity to end markets, can also develop its own customer knowledge, which – once accessible to manufacturers – will improve the supply and enhance the value of the demand. The intermediary appears not only as the ‘channel’ which transfers downstream the innovative values developed by manufacturers, but also as a co-designer of the industrial supply, appealing to its specific customer knowledge. Interactivity also plays a role at another level, that is, in the relationship with the final markets. The intermediary has the power of conditioning the demand and, therefore, may influence customers’ preference system as well as their purchasing behaviours. Within the framework of such an evolution, the manufacturer ‘depends’ on the collaboration of the distributor as well as on the trust that the latter has developed in markets downstream. Besides being individual and interactive, the manufacturer–distribution relationship is characterized by a long-term perspective. In fact, when the product enters into the distribution assortments and obtains satisfactory results (having, thus, obtained the retailer’s trust) it is very likely that it will be repurchased, hence reiterating the relation. These elements have led scholars to consider explicitly the relational dimension of the manufacturer–distribution relationship. Therefore they partially set aside the epistemological principles and the normative approach that initially characterized the ‘economic’ tradition of studies on channels, and focused instead on the socio-political dimension, and on the
Relationship- and network-based approaches
9
opportunities of establishing distribution partnerships aimed at the value co-generation (for example, Anderson and Narus 1984, 1990; Anderson and Weitz 1989, 1992; Ganesan 1994; Heide 1994; Jap 1999, 2001b). In order to grasp such opportunities, the parties are asked to seek the development of new forms of activities coordination not easily achievable by means of free market solutions. Shifting from the conflicting aspects of exchange (related mainly to margin sharing and functions allocation) to the collaborative ones (referring to the opportunity of a joint value creation), both the need to consider channel relationships in a relational perspective and the centrality of non-formal coordination mechanisms, especially those based on trust, have emerged. 3.3
The Services Sector
In the case of transactions regarding services, as in the previous ones, it is often difficult to apply the concept of exchange that inspire marketing in mass markets.8 The immaterial nature of services is at the very basis of the uncertainty that permeates the buyer’s selection process. In fact, before purchasing the customer does not have access to reliable information on the qualitative aspect of the offer, as the service is provided at the very moment of the purchase and consumption.9 In order to reduce the risk associated with a decision-making process characterized by a significantly high level of uncertainty (for example, Murray and Schlacter 1990), the consumer is induced to select those alternatives offered by a supplier with whom she has established a consolidated relationship and developed a trustworthy relationship (for example, Crosby et al. 1990; Garbarino and Johnson 1999; Sirdeshmukh et al. 2002). This determines a drop in transaction costs, while triggering significant opportunities for the achievement of synergies in complementary activities (Arndt 1979).10 The concept of long-term relationship becomes an essential construct in service industries, as well in industrial markets and in manufacturer– distribution relations (for example, Crosby et al. 1990; Pritchard et al. 1999). This proves that there is a sort of convergence of principles related to the various contextualization of marketing (Grandinetti 1993: 126 ff.). The concept of relationship acquires a greater interpretative value in light of the ongoing evolution from the Fordist paradigm to the neo-industrial one, characterized by the convergence between manufacturing and service businesses. 3.4
The Relational Orientation in Marketing Studies
The analysis of marketing applications to the industrial goods sector, distribution channel relations and services shows that the concept of exchange
10
Conceptual assumptions of trust
is inadequate to embrace the full range of transaction phenomena. Innovative theoretical constructs are therefore called for in interpreting the peculiarities of buyer–seller relations such as those mentioned above. As will be shown in Chapter 4, it is not by chance that the first contributions of marketing studies on trust appeared in those three contexts. Today, the progress in information and communication technology (ITC) has expanded that approach beyond the boundaries of the above-said relational contexts, ‘contaminating’ most of the contexts that in the past were based mainly on mass marketing principles. Customer relationship management, interactive marketing, reverse marketing, loyalty management and, in more general terms, all management systems inspired by the relational perspective spread across consumer goods markets, proving that this perspective cannot be considered an absolute prerogative of a few industry contexts (for example, Sheth and Parvatiyar 1995; Iacobucci 1996; Achrol and Kotler 1999; Gummesson 1999). Once the relationship concept was accepted, the marketing discipline began to establish a ‘dialogue’ with the socio-organizational studies converging into the theory of inter-organizational relations. The major contribution of such studies stems from the consideration that the central analytical construct is not just the exchange, as suggested by the economic tradition, but the relationship. The analytical object becomes, in fact, the dyadic relationship between firms or, in more general terms, the inter-organizational network to which an organization belongs.11 Studies devoted to the analysis of a more general relationship between the firm and the environment have also played a considerable role in interpreting the relational dimension of the economic organization. This may be clearly seen observing that the environment is made up of stakeholders with whom the firm is in contact. We refer mainly to the theory of structural contingencies (Pugh and Payne 1977; Emery and Trist 1965; Lawrence and Lorsch 1967), the conceptual model of ‘resources dependence’ (Aldrich and Pfeffer 1976; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), organizational evolutionism (Aldrich 1979; Nelson and Winter 1982, 1985), and organizational cognitivism (Weick 1979a). Briefly, a new way of considering relations between economic subjects has emerged. The discrete perspective of exchange, abstracted from time and space dimensions and external to the organizations, is giving way to a continuous vision, anchored to specific space and time and embedded in an ongoing relational context. In the end, the traditional concept of exchange has been considered inadequate to interpret market relations, forcing the research horizon to expand to the concept of relationship. This evolution does, however, call for caution. A closer consideration of the social dimension of market relations cannot foster disregard for their economic contents. The introduction of the relationship concept leads to a broader analysis of
Relationship- and network-based approaches
11
elements, such as bilateral collaboration and coordination among parties, but cannot obscure the competitive dimension of all negotiations entailing economic variables.12 Thus, the concept of relationship conjugates both analytical dimensions. This would undoubtedly be more difficult than analysing only exchange per se, without considering that it is embedded in relations made up of both economic and social values, competitive as well as collaborative elements, triggering the well-known phenomenon of co-opetition (for example, Hamel et al. 1989; Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1996). This work is designed to examine in depth the concept of trust. This decision stems from a deliberate intention to isolate one specific variable that plays a critical role in understanding market relationships. Although such ‘isolation’ may be justified for analytical purposes, it should not be assumed that this is the only dimension relevant to the study of business interdependencies. From an interpretative point of view, there are equally relevant constructs (for example, the concept of market power), which will only briefly be noted in this study.
4.
RELATIONAL MORPHOLOGY
According to some scholars, the relational approach configures a general approach applicable without discrimination to any type of market relationship. Others have identified some relational categories to which this approach may be more easily applied, giving rise to various taxonomies. Such taxonomies have a special analytical importance in our study, for three reasons. Firstly, they clarify the concept of relationship (integrating the contents of previous paragraphs) and, above all, its different declinations. Secondly, they will enable a more exhaustive interpretation of the different meanings associated with the concept of trust. In fact, quite often different relational typologies have been associated with different needs in terms of governance mechanisms and trust, determining different trustrelated types, which will be reviewed in Chapter 6 (section 6). Thirdly, relevant management implications have been derived from the classifications found in the literature, leading to the definition of a differentiated management approach to each relational type.13 In order to define the diverse relational typologies, three fundamental categories of criteria have been used: mono-dimensional, multidimensional, which classify relations contemplating several elements simultaneously, and dynamic approach, which differentiates relations according to their evolutionary stage. The first category of criteria (mono-dimensional) is inflected in diverse ways, according to the different aspects of a relationship. The most frequently
12
Conceptual assumptions of trust
taken into account are structural criteria (the first three listed below) and the socio-political variables (the last three of those items), namely: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
the numerousness of subjects involved in the relation and the adopted analytical perspective; the identity of the subjects involved in the dyadic report; the relationship content; the parties’ orientation and the intensity of their involvement; social variables, such as commitment level, and power and dependency relations between the parties; the tie intensity which characterizes the relation.
We will analyse briefly each of these criteria and their main contributions to the relationship classification framework. 1.
The first criterion has outlined the boundaries of the object under study, identifying the set of actors involved in the relationship, and qualifying it initially by their multiplicity. In marketing the most frequently researched area is undoubtedly represented by the buyer–seller dyad. More recently some authors have expressed the need to study dyadic relations within more articulated sets, underlining the limited interpretative relevance of analysing a relationship without referring to its milieu. It has, in fact, been pointed out that the structure and type of relations influence significantly the focal dyad evolution and its analytical structure (Iacobucci and Hopkins 1992; Anderson et al. 1994). This is the reason why the set of the analysis has been expanded, taking into account a higher number of actors, that is, triads, or, in more general terms, networks of interrelated subjects (for example, Iacobucci 1996, 1998). To this effect, in researching relationships, great relevance is given to the analysis perspective. As will be mentioned later, this element is quite critical to the measurement of trust and related constructs, especially in the case of the so-called two-way relationships.14 Often relationships have been studied considering the perspective of only one of the parties (that is, trust measurements privileging the buyer’s viewpoint). More recently some attempts have been made to focus on both viewpoints of the dyad members, thus obtaining a bilateral perspective. The dynamics and the relational structure of trust, as will be examined in depth in the last chapter, are based on the interaction between the counterpart’s representations made by a subject and the relational context as a whole. Hence, limiting the analysis to the perspective of only one party is an evident source of reductionism. Therefore, in order to interpret relations exhaustively, it does
Relationship- and network-based approaches
13
not suffice to expand the number of subjects to be examined, but analytical approaches capable of contemplating a plurality of perspectives are required.15 2. The classification criteria most widely used in management refer to the identity of the involved subjects. Such identity depends on the type of industry the actor belongs to or, even more frequently, the position s/he holds in the supply chain. Thus, distinctions were made between business-to-business and business-to-consumer relations. In some cases, a need was felt to further structure such classification, for example differentiating within the first type between distributive relationships and relations between industrial firms, due to the peculiarities defining the analysis of the manufacturer–distributor dyad compared with the traditional industrial supply relationships. Among several suggested classifications, Morgan and Hunt’s (1994) defined the diverse relation types according to the ‘position’ in the value system held by the actor with whom the focal firm establishes an exchange relationship. Thus, they identified four categories of relations: supply, buyer, lateral, and internal – which, in turn, include several relation typologies, as illustrated in Figure 1.1.16 3. The third criterion, in part related to the next one, refers to the relationship contents, that is, its strategic content and the object operational level (for example, Parvatiyar and Sheth 1997). These contents are defined along a continuum that ranges from strategic alliances – envisaging broad partnership programs between a buyer and a seller involved in initiatives crucial to the firm’s future survival – to the socalled tactic collaborations, referring to isolated promotional operations or integrated marketing initiatives (co-promotions, shared communication, and so on). 4. Behavioural elements are often classified according to the orientation of the interested parties. This criterion forms a continuum modulated between two extremes: the so-called transactional and relational orientations. The former is represented by the typical instantaneous exchange, where the parties are interested exclusively in the conclusion of a single transaction and apply the typical approach of the zero-sum instantaneous games (without subsequent events). The second is a longer term approach based on collaboration, in which subjects are interested in developing more intensive interdependencies for both social and information exchanges, leading to a strong commitment and to long-term mutual benefits (Anderson and Narus 1990; Grönroos 1994a; Brodie et al. 1997; Guenzi 2002a, 2002b).17 5. Some criteria closely related to those previously mentioned have been suggested by scholars who focus on prevalently behavioural variables,
14
Conceptual assumptions of trust Supplier partnerships Goods suppliers
Service suppliers 1
Business units
2 Competitors 3
10
Employees
9
4
Focal firm
Internal partnerships
Non-profit organizations
5
8 Functional departments
Lateral partnerships
7
Intermediate customers
6
Government
Ultimate customers Buyer partnerships
Source: Morgan and Hunt (1994: 21)
Figure 1.1
The nature of marketing relationships
namely commitment, power and dependency. Regarding the commitment level, Dwyer et al. (1987) suggested a classification paradigm based on social exchange theory principles.18 Their scheme adopts as a fundamental criterion the intensity of the motivational investment of each party (favouring the bilateral perspective) and isolates three major categories of relations, each requiring different managerial and interpretative tools. These categories are the following: bilateral relationships, entailing a considerable motivational investment by both parties; unilateral relationships sustained by the seller or the buyer, according to each party’s motivational investment; and discrete exchanges (spot contracts) characterized by the parties’ very moderate motivational investments. This classification allows one to correlate the relationship’s contents and critical features with the parties’ perceptions and attitudes, rather than with external aspects. In fact, the relationship depends not so much on objective factors as on elements reflecting the individual efforts made by the parties and their respective level of commitment. Regarding the other behavioural variables under consideration, especially power and dependence, various types
Relationship- and network-based approaches
15
of classifications have been proposed, based on the balancing of power and dependence between the parties. This has led to the differentiation between asymmetrical relationships, where one of the parties clearly prevails in terms of power, and balanced or bilateral relationships, where there is a level of reciprocal dependence between the parties. 6. One final, and quite useful to our goals, type of classification refers to the strength of the links characterizing the relation. A differentiation has been made between strong and weak ties (for example, Granovetter 1973). The former present a high level of closeness, reciprocity and trust, while weak ties are characterized by a greater distance between the parties, which have fewer opportunities to contact each other. Currently, an interesting debate is developing on the consequences and advantages of these two relational typologies in terms of both collaboration and information sharing. It has been verified, however, that subjects linked by strong ties have greater possibilities of exchanging confidential and sensitive information. Weak links, instead, owing to the subjects’ greater distance, give access to new knowledge bases and a greater variety of information. Actually, less intimacy between subjects leads to totally independent planning and implementation of one’s own vector of knowledge development. Thus, the subjects set off on divergent paths, acquiring diverse relational and knowledge assets.19 Hence, in order to access truly innovative contents, it might be important to avoid the so-called strong ties (friends) and activate ties generally defined as weak (mere acquaintances). Although the classification models analysed thus far refer mainly to a single relational dimension, some studies have suggested more articulated – multidimensional – classification paradigms, taking into account, at the same time, some of the dimensions analysed above. Parvatiyar and Sheth (1997: 241), for example, simultaneously examine criteria based on: ● ● ●
the nature of the actors involved in the relation, be they customers, suppliers or competitors; the relational objective, which can be configured either as strategic or tactical/operational; the orientation of the firm, which is defined as either relational or transactional.
Crossing the first two analytical dimensions the following types of relational orientation – the ones most relevant to this work – emerge:
16
1.
2.
3.
Conceptual assumptions of trust
collaborative marketing, in the case of strategic relations with customers, which will become initiatives of cooperative marketing in the case of tactical/operational relational objectives; supplier partnerships, whenever strategic relations with suppliers are implied, which may be turned into simpler supply special agreements whenever operational objectives are involved; strategic alliances, in the case of strategic relations with competitors, which may become cartels whenever they are referred to as tactical objectives.
A similar attempt, although referring to a different context, was implemented by Sheppard and Sherman (1998). The authors, aiming at pinpointing the different trust requirements in the various relational contexts, differentiated inter-organizational relations on the basis of more abstract dimensions than those mentioned above: the different relational intensity and the level of interdependence established between the parties. Considering these two dimensions, four different typologies have been defined and reported in Figure 1.2, namely authority relationships, market relationships, and bilateral relationships either loosely or tightly coupled.20 More recently, another approach has been developed to differentiate among the various types of relationships, referring to the developmental phase of their evolutionary cycle. Referring to product’s life cycle models, some studies have considered explicitly the time spent and the intensity of relational experiences existing between the two parties as a major criterion RELATIONAL DEPTH
Dependence
Shallow
Deep
Market relationships
Authority relationships
Bilateral relationships, loosely coupled
Bilateral relationships, tightly coupled
FORM OF DEPENDENCE Interdependence
Source: adapted from Sheppard and Sherman (1998: 426)
Figure 1.2 Various relational forms defined according to relationship intensity and dependency typologies
Relationship- and network-based approaches
17
to classify relations. The relevance of this criterion is highlighted by the management implications it raises. In fact, the different stages of the relation envisage the need to manage the relationship resorting to diverse management approaches and marketing tools (Iacobucci and Zerrillo 1997; Costabile 2001). Ford (1980), a scholar belonging to the IMP Group, was among the first to suggest such a model applied mainly to business to business relationships. His model may be broken down into five stages:21 1. 2.
3.
4.
5.
pre-relationship, including everything that may induce a buyer to evaluate a potential new supplier; early stage, including the first contacts with the potential supplier, when the distance between the parties is still significant and there is a limited mutual experience and relational commitment; development stage, referring to the evolutionary stage of the relation, characterized by increasing purchasing and by a major uncertainty and risk, thus triggering the need for trust, owing to the higher values at stake; long-term stage, in which a mutual awareness of the importance of the relationship is achieved, together with a decreased relational uncertainty, owing to greater trust between the parties; final stage, which leads to a sort of institutionalization of the partnership where the conduct of business is based on industries’ codes of practice.
Dwyer et al. (1987) suggest structuring the interdependence evolutionary process in five stages: (1) full mutual awareness; (2) exploration, a phase in which the buyer tests the seller; (3) expansion, during which contacts, interdependence level and opportunities of expanding the relation are more frequent; (4) commitment, characterized by high mutual satisfaction, trust and (implicit and explicit) commitment to maintain the relationship; (5) dissolution of the relationship, determining the end of the relational experience, often caused by unilateral behaviours. Grönroos (1994b), like Ford (1980) but unlike the model just analysed above, does not consider partnership dissolution as the final stage, but proposes a very linear, three-stage process: initial stage, purchasing stage, and the use of the product. In this last stage, the supplier has to pay great attention to monitoring the customer’s satisfaction and the buyer’s trust. Grönroos’ interest in the marketing relational approach leads to his referencing of these three different stages to show how their contents change considerably, passing from a traditional marketing approach to an interactive and relational one. Wilson (1995) has introduced a model that is
18
Conceptual assumptions of trust
particularly relevant to this work’s purposes, because it demonstrates the evolution of the role of a series of relational variables, such as trust, satisfaction, commitment and reciprocity, during the various stages of the relationship.22 Thus, while studying relational constructs, relationship evolutionary models have highlighted the need to take into account the relationship stage, defining – in a cross-sectional perspective – the existence of different types of customers for each stage. Within this framework, Blattberg et al. (2001) highlight five fundamental stages of relational dynamics, which correspond to just as many clusters of customers: prospects or potential clients at their first approach; first-time buyers or potential future consumers; early repeat buyers or buyers still seeking a confirmation (hence trust) of the offer value; core customers, who are convinced of the offer quality and trust the firm and hence are less prone to competitors’ stimuli; and core defectors, who have decided to switch to alternative offers.23 Such segments require ad hoc relational approaches, in view of their characterization by different levels of relational constructs. Attempting to summarize the major contributions provided by the above-mentioned ‘dynamic’ models, four major relational stages can be identified, together with their prevailing relational constructs corresponding to different categories of customers: 1.
2.
3.
4.
First contacts, when expectations consistent with the firm’s capabilities should be generated in the counterpart, in order to lay the basis for the first satisfactory events. At this stage, the customer needs to make a relational comparison between the value expectations generated by the offer and his/her assessment after the purchase, which determines the relationship’s continuing convenience. Consolidation and mutual learning stage, when the parties develop a sort of predictive trust, based on the acknowledgement of the supplier’s capabilities to meet the customer’s specific needs, thus inducing stabilization and a recurrent interdependence between the parties. Expansion stage, in which the increasing mutual commitment, the value consonance permeating the parties, together with the increased level of trust determine the possibility to free the relationship from both traditional contents and recursive performances, thus opening the possibility to pursue new joint projects, with a consequent enhancement of the relational bandwidth. Decline stage, foreseen by some models only, in which lack of satisfaction and betrayal are expressed, forcing the supplier to implement preventive actions of relationship rebuilding.
Relationship- and network-based approaches
19
A synthesis of the criteria of the classification of relationships suggested in this section, with some examples drawn from the above-mentioned studies, is shown in Table 1.1. Table 1.1
Summary of the main criteria adopted to classify relationships
Typologies
Specific criteria
Examples of relational typologies
UNIDIMENSIONAL CRITERIA Numerousness and Number identity of the involved Sector subjects and observation perspective Position within the supply chain
Relationship observation perspective Relationship object
Parties’ orientation and behavioural variables
Content strategic value Functional specificity
Temporal level Commitment level Power/dependency Tie strength
Relationship dynamics
Relational stage
Dyad, triad, network Business-to-business, business-to-consumer, consumer-to-consumer Distributive, consumption, supply Supplier, lateral, buyer, internal Focal firm vs. multiple observation points (dyadic, triadic) Strategic vs. tactic Marketing, distribution (channels), technological (R&D), productive (supply), financial Long, mid, short term High motivational intensity, low commitment intensity Balanced or unbalanced (with a recognized leader) Weak or strong ties / tightly or loosely coupled (a) (1) Awareness (2) Exploration (3) Expansion (4) Commitment (5) Dissolution (b) (1) Pre-relationship (2) Early stage (3) Development (4) Long term (5) Final stage
20
Table 1.1
Conceptual assumptions of trust
(continued)
Typologies
Specific criteria
Customer loyalty stage
Customer typologies
Examples of relational typologies (c) (1) Partner selection, (2) Goal definition, (3) Relational boundaries determination (4) Relational value creation (5) Relationships maintenance (d) (1) Satisfaction and trust accumulation (2) Behavioural loyalty (3) Mental loyalty (4) Loyalty (e) (1) Prospects (2) First-time buyers (3) Early repeat buyers (4) Core customers (5) Core defectors
MULTIDIMENSIONAL CRITERIA Multidimensional criteria
Firm relational goal (strategic vs. tactic/ operational) and orientation (relational vs. transactional) Relationship intensity and forms of dependency
Collaborative marketing, cooperative marketing, supplier partnership, special supply agreements, strategic alliances, cartels Market relationships, authority relationships, bilateral relationships.
5. INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL NETWORKS: THE NEED FOR NEW COORDINATION MECHANISMS In order to understand the structural features and the dynamics of a relationship, the environment in which it takes place has to be considered. It has actually been demonstrated that a relationship’s structure and
Relationship- and network-based approaches
21
dynamics depend not only on the behaviour of the single dyadic actors, but also on the other relations in which they are directly or indirectly involved (for example, Anderson et al. 1994). Trust itself follows evolutionary paths that are conditioned by the development of the structure in which the relationship has developed, thus proving that a dyad cannot be considered isolated from the relational network to which it belongs (for example, Iacobucci and Hopkins 1992). This determines an exponential increase in analytical complexity. We are convinced that the environmental complexity which characterizes the actual economy should not be simplified, but rather understood and enhanced by means of appropriate analytical models. Hence, it seems appropriate to take this further analytical step, pointing out the most adequate mechanisms to meet the highest coordination requirements generated by a network economy.24 Indeed, if the coordination mechanism between firm and markets is essentially represented by price in the Smithian firm, and by the plan in the Fordist firm (Di Bernardo 1991), in the ‘network-based firm’ trust becomes the main link. The plan is based on the power code, and depends on the capability of the Fordist firm to compress the external variety, taking advantage of its ability to shape external subjects (consumers, distributors, media). In the network-based firm – which has to cope with an environment characterized by a level of complexity that is neither possible nor convenient to compress – it is necessary to use a code enabling the system to self-regulate, thus giving access to different solutions in order to implement network projects that can assume forms that were not foreseeable ex ante. Hence, a new code has to be developed which – differently from the plan – may allow the utmost design flexibility. Trust, besides contributing decisively to the governance of the complexity level, is useful for expanding the variety of alternatives pursuable by the parties forming the network.25 Actually, it absorbs the risk and the possible decision-making impasse that take place whenever the firm is incapable of foreseeing actions and reactions of the other subjects within the network;26 it acts as an adhesive (maintaining cohesion) and as a lubricant (enabling the operability) of networks. These networks are obliged to cope with levels of increasing complexity, and transfer more and more intangible and abstract resources that always require different behaviours, whose consequences are not easily foreseeable a priori. Furthermore, once the prerequisites to trust-intensive relational contexts are met, the connection potential further increases, broadening the relational boundaries and fostering the exploration of new horizons and the implementation of co-evolutionary development patterns (March 1991; Huemer 2000). The relevance of the network concept in studies on trust is not exhausted by the role this resource may play as a support to the network coordination mechanisms. Actually the network not only requires trust
22
Conceptual assumptions of trust
Network participation
Figure 1.3
TRUST
Collaboration and network coordination
The network role in trust production and use processes
to be coordinated and run efficiently (thus playing the role of absorber of trust-related resources) but is also capable of conditioning trust generation processes, thus becoming a trust generator. In fact, the environmental context and the inter-organizational network significantly condition the evolution and the development of trust (for example, Anderson et al. 1994; Burt and Knez 1996: 68; Kramer 1996; Iacobucci 1998).27 Therefore, the inter-firm network becomes analytically relevant to trust as its antecedent – where the fact of pertaining to the network can generate trust resources to be applied to third parties – and, at the same time, as its outcome – improving the coordination mechanisms and the collaboration opportunities among subjects belonging to the network (Figure 1.3).
6. CONCLUSIONS: COMPETING FOR COORDINATION BY MEANS OF TRUST The evolution of inter-organizational relations has critically reduced the ‘distance’ among firms, making it increasingly difficult to define their boundaries. The passage from the atomistic economy of discrete exchanges to the concept of relationship, heralding the convergence between firms, and finally to the establishment of inter-organizational networks, has been determined by the need to manage increasingly complex phenomena requiring highly specialized cognitive work. This leads to an evolution in the organization of economic systems, which transforms the cognitive complexity (of the new knowledge generating process) into relational complexity (due to the establishment of networks made up of subjects specialized in the production of knowledge).28 A connection economy such as the one outlined thus far has important implications for the understanding of the changes that take place within the operative mechanisms of competitive interdependencies. Firstly, the relational, reticular trend examined above produces inter-industries convergences, determining a radical redefinition of set-ups, domains and the competitive dimension, which, inevitably, becomes relationship- and trustbased.
Relationship- and network-based approaches
23
Secondly, whenever the competitive and collaborative dimensions coexist, the interdependencies begin to be more frequent, feeding upon each other and making the analysis of inter-organizational relations much more complex. The well-known phenomenon of co-opetition highlights how it is possible to manage competitive interdependencies with competitors, activating diverse types of collaboration with them (for example, Hamel et al. 1989; Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1996). Finally, new kinds of competition emerge, having the function of coordination (action which is prevalently trust-based) as their object, such as those shown in the following example: ●
●
●
An individual firm, not linked to pre-existent networks, finds it fundamental to enter a network or set up one. A competition aiming at obtaining the trust of actors who already belong to interorganizational systems with a high competitive potential is thus formed. This type of competition is focused on entering the networks that are most functional to the firm’s objectives and obtaining the collaboration of the actor clusters that are most functional to the achievement of the competitive advantage. An inter-network competition takes place at a second level, that is, among inter-organizational systems or between individual firms belonging to different systems. Also within networks, there could be competition (intra-network) to acquire a more central position in the coordination processes, allowing the appropriation of larger portions of the network’s relational rent. Within the current connection paradigm, the more central firms, capable of performing the coordination and filling gaps associated with structural holes (Burt 1992, 2005), are those which have a very ‘valuable’ function, and a value generation potential that can be far superior to the one generated by traditional economic activities. Consequently, these opportunities trigger a competition to coordinate, aimed at obtaining trust from the firms belonging to the network. This produces semi-monopolistic positions as system coordinators (channels, districts, consortia, communities loyalty card holders, and so on), thus opening a new intra-network competition for the coordination functions, which did not exist in a recent past, when competition took place at an atomistic level.
The trust-based convergence which takes place as a consequence of the relational paradigm, the coexistence of the competitive and the collaborative elements, together with the new above-mentioned dimensions of the competition for coordination, represent phenomena that require an
24
Conceptual assumptions of trust
evolution of the competitive analysis (for example, Golfetto 2000: 199 ff.; Podestà and Golfetto 2000). To understand the new dimension of competition for collaboration, an analytical examination of the concept of trust is needed, and this will be offered in the following chapters. Many scholars consider it to be the major cognitive antecedent and the very essence of some of the major coordination processes emerging from the new network economy.
NOTES 1.
2.
3.
4. 5. 6. 7.
8.
9.
The concept of demand should be intended in a broad sense. It may refer to firms using the product, distributors, consumers, buyers, but also opinion leaders, trendsetters and other subjects involved in the purchasing process. As will be shown in Chapter 6, trust may also refer to different subjects, thus having different configurations. The concept of trust, as introduced in this work, will be kept at a level of abstraction sufficient to make a generic reference to various kinds of relations between firms and markets. However, some sections of the text, to underline the situation-specificity of the construct, will highlight the elements that differentiate the relations established between the firm and the various categories of counterparts (that is, end users, industrial users, distributors, buyers, and so on). As seen further on, the type of relationship quite often influences trust typologies and its antecedents. For this purpose the author (1965: 84) underlines the utilitarian view of his analytical approach as follows: ‘Given that x is an element of the assortment A1, and y is an element of the assortment A2, x is exchangeable for y if, and only if, these three conditions hold: (a) x is different from y; (b) the potency of the assortment A1 is increased by dropping x and adding y; (c) the potency of the assortment A2 is increased by adding x and dropping y.’ Vaile et al. (1952: 121) classified marketing flows into three categories as a function of their direction: forward (flows of physical possession, ownership, and negotiation), backward (flows of ordering and payment) and either direction (flows of information, financing and risking). On this matter, Heide (1994: 71) claims that ‘as the shifts towards non market forms of governance have become more apparent, the limitations of the established research paradigms in marketing have become equally evident’. For insights on the methodologies to enhance marketing knowledge, see Troilo (2006, Ch. 4). Originally, the research focus of the IMP Group was placed on the buyer–supplier dyad, paying special attention to international markets. The Group’s major research goal is the identification of the variables that most influence market relationships. At first, Alderson (1957) suggested a definition of distribution channel as an organized social system, identifying three possible models for the coordination of the marketing functions within the channel. On one extreme there is the ‘atomistic system’, on the other end the ‘mechanistic’ one, and between the two, the ‘ecological’ one. Subsequently, Beier and Stern (1969) clarified and expounded the notion of channel as a social system. Berry and Parasuraman (1993: 50) in an essay reviewing the evolution of service marketing, assert: ‘Service marketing developed academically because it filled a need in the world of marketing practice; its development was “market driven”. Packaged goods marketing frameworks and constructs did not fit the reality of services. As many service companies sought to become more competitive, the need for fresh marketing answers became more pressing.’ To further study the peculiarities of marketing applied to service firms see also Normann (1984, especially Ch. 8), Eiglier and Langeard (1987, Part II) and Grönroos (1994b).
Relationship- and network-based approaches 10.
11.
12. 13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18. 19.
20.
25
Another aspect making the traditional rationale of unilateral exchange inappropriate to interpret service transactions is related to the awareness that the buyer can influence the role of the supplier. An interactive approach to the interpretation of the buyer–seller relationship allows to better capture the reality of services (Eiglier and Langeard 1987: 251). While expanding the concept of relationship, the socio-organizational tradition has not suggested a univocal definition and vision, showing significant differences among the research streams that have mostly influenced the interpretation of inter-organizational relationships, such as: the economic-political paradigm (for example, Zald 1970; Benson 1975; Arndt 1983), the theory of transactional costs (Williamson 1975, 1979, 1985), the social exchange theory (Thibaut and Kelley 1959; Kelley and Thibaut 1978), and their most recent conceptualizations. Aldrich and Whetten (1981: 401) advise not to follow the example of those organizational theories focusing on the study of the inter-organizational relations, which exclusively favour the collaborative dimension. On the basis of the classifications we will discuss later, different interpretative methods have been suggested to analyse the ‘relationship portfolio’ for management purposes (for example, Fiocca 1982; Olsen and Ellram 1997; Dyer et al. 1998). They have allowed the isolation of relationships’ clusters requiring different marketing and relational approaches in order to improve management effectiveness and efficiency. As will be detailed in Chapter 6 (section 6.1), it is possible to differentiate the so-called two-way relationships – which take place whenever two subjects can reciprocate trust – from the one-way relationships occurring whenever a subject relies on another party although the latter cannot ‘return’ it. Such analytical passages suffer from an exponential complexity growth, especially in regard to empirical measurement, when the object studied is not a simple dyad, but rather broader networks of subjects. In this case the ‘subjective’ boundaries of the relational set could be difficult to define. The relational typologies can be classified as follows: supplier partnerships, represented by the relationships established with product suppliers (number 1 in Figure 1.1) and service suppliers alike (2); lateral partnerships, or the alliances established with competitors (3), non-profit organizations (for public purposes) (4) and governmental bodies (5); buyer relationships, which embrace long-term exchanges with end customers (6) and partnerships with business intermediaries (7); internal partnerships, including relationships among functional organizational units (8), relationships between firms and their collaborators (9) and the relational exchanges between division-type organizational or business units (10). Other conceptually similar classifications have been suggested by Iacobucci and Ostrom (1996), and Achrol and Kotler (1999). At times, intermediate categories have been suggested, such as the so-called value-added exchanges proposed by Day (2000), identifying the relational typologies which are particularly interesting to a firm wishing to develop a long-term relationship with its market by means of customer care actions and product customization. For an insight into the principles of this interesting field of study, see Thibaut and Kelley (1959) and Chapter 4 (section 3.1) in this volume. The relevance and ‘strength’ of weak ties was first demonstrated by Granovetter (1973), who proved, in one of his empirical studies, that information regarding job opportunities is more likely to be obtained from acquaintances (weak ties) than from close friends (strong ties). On the strength of ties in trust relationships between subjects involved in new product development, see Rindfleisch and Moorman (2001). For details about the difference between tight and loose coupling in organizational systems, see Aldrich (1977) and Weick (1979a: 110–12). A similar classification is suggested by Ring and Van de Ven (1992), who differentiate relationships according to the possibility of relying on the trust among partners and the risk implied by the relationship itself. Four main mechanisms of relationship management may be defined according to the above criteria, namely: the market, where both risk and trust are limited; the hierarchy, where there is high risk and limited trust; the recurring contracts, typical of
26
21. 22.
23.
24. 25.
26.
27.
28.
Conceptual assumptions of trust limited risk situations with a high level of trust; and the relational contracts, quite relevant to the current purposes because consistent with situations where both risk and trust have reached significant levels. A model more recently suggested by Ford (1998) takes into account four basic stages: pre-relationship stage, exploratory stage, developing stage and stable stage. In line with the models analysed above, some authors have recently pointed out the metamorphosis of some relational constructs, such as brand loyalty (for example, Oliver 1999) and trust (for example, Lewicki and Bunker 1995, 1996; Jones and George 1998), which takes place during the dyadic relationship evolution. Chapter 4 (section 5) will present some of these models, examining the main customer-based resources, while Chapter 8 (section 2) will discuss trust’s longitudinal dimension. A recent study in the retail banking sector delves into the differences among three groups of customers within the so-called defectors: the dissatisfied switchers, the satisfied switchers and the stayers. Empirical research shows significant differences of involvement, satisfaction and behavioural loyalty among these categories of customers (Ganesh et al. 2000). For a synthesis of the evolution of the studies on company networks see, among others, Lomi (1991, 1997), Grandori and Soda (1995), Jones et al. (1998) and Oliver and Ebers (1998). In particular, the critical role of trust in networks has been highlighted by Creed and Miles (1996: 30) who assert: ‘in the network form, efforts to apply traditional control mechanisms are generally ineffective. . . . there is a broad agreement that trust requirements are high for networks to perform effectively and impact of trust failures . . . are clear and calculable. Indeed, it is our view that both across the firm within a network and within the various network firms, there is little choice but to consider trust building and maintenance to be essential as control.’ Owing to the critical role trust plays within networks, trust management in these organizational typologies is seen as an essential aspect (for example, Miles and Snow 1992). For a further discussion of the role of trust in inter- and intra-organization networks, see, among others, Burt and Knez (1996), Sheppard and Tuchinsky (1996) and Meyerson et al. (1996). Powell (1996: 53–5) refers explicitly to trust-based forms of governance in industrial districts. Kramer (1996: 237–8) states that ‘to a large extent, social psychological theory on trust and distrust over the past 40 years has remained surprisingly acontextual. . . . Although it has undertaken the important task of explicating the cognitive processes that influence people’s judgments about trust and distrust, research in this tradition has remained largely “inside the head” of the social perceiver. . . . In short, although there is often much that is psychological in these studies, there is often remarkably little that is social.’ The diffusion of digital networks constitutes quite a relevant discontinuity in the evolutionary trajectory synthesized in this chapter. In fact, the digital network determines a connection potential (Evans and Wurster 1999a, 1999b) that is no longer guided by firms only, but emerges following ‘spontaneous’ patterns. This makes self-organization phenomena (that is, communities) possible within trust-intensive virtual environments. Therefore, trust building strategies become the major element enabling virtual relationships. See also Camp (2000), Urban et al. (2000), Castelfranchi and Tan (2001) and Chapter 4 (section 6) in this volume.
2. 1.
The value of trust INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter highlighted the critical role of relationships and networks in enabling firms to cope with increasing environmental complexities and achieve a sustainable competitive advantage. Yet, in order to define the actual scope of the reticular or relational approach, it is useful to assess its impact on the capability of gaining a competitive advantage and generating economic value. Such an approach will prove to be sustainable whenever the firm is capable, by means of an innovative managerial strategy, of producing value – be it considered as an accumulation of intangibles or as an effect generated at the economic level. This chapter aims at demonstrating, synthetically, how firms, by gaining trust, can succeed in expanding and enhancing both their immaterial assets and economic value. Thus, according to the recent evolution of the resource-based view, this chapter will initially examine the impact of firm relationships – and in particular trust – on intangible assets (section 2). Some typologies of trust-based relational resources will be highlighted, to the extent to which they integrate and strengthen the traditional interpretative apparatus of intangible resources based on the firm’s internal competencies (section 3). Subsequently, the impact trust has on the firm’s management processes (section 4) and its economic performance (section 5) will be briefly analysed. The latter effect lends itself to a twofold interpretation. Firstly, trust can be seen as a vector capable of stabilizing relations with the demand and, consequently, increasing the firm’s customer portfolio value (section 5.1). Secondly, on a more general level, trust can have a positive impact on the current and prospective value of economic capital (section 5.2).
2. THE RELATIONSHIP-BASED COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE As already mentioned, relationships and networks can play an important role in gaining a competitive advantage. Traditionally, the resource-based perspective has linked the competitive advantage of a firm to its internal 27
28
Conceptual assumptions of trust
resources. Unlike structuralist theories that mainly ascribe the competition differential to the characteristics of the industry the firm belongs to, the resource-based view relates firms’ differential performances to the resources’ heterogeneous profile rather than to the mere commonalities shared within the same sector. The subjects capable of acquiring a distinctive set of immaterial resources will perform better than the competitors who do not exhibit the same resource set. In such a perspective, the unit of analysis is mainly the firm and its capability of acquiring specific resources. In order to gain a competitive advantage, these resources have to be highly valuable and difficult to replace (Rumelt 1984; Teece 1987; Itami 1987).1 The resource-based view initially focused on resources and capabilities that are directly controlled and internalized by a single firm.2 In general, external resources were instead considered as inputs devoid of the above-mentioned features and, therefore, available to all firms at a price close to the economic value they can generate. Hence the resourcebased view – consistently with the prevalently economic background of its first advocates – implicitly assumes the ‘relational autonomy’ of the firm in gaining its competitive advantage, hypothesizing that the latter operates within an atomistic-like environment, entertaining relationships with its supplier and customers based exclusively on ‘economic’ exchange. Recently, some scholars have partially revised that approach, in the attempt to explicitly examine the differential value generated by external resources and, in particular, the relationships that the company can establish with external subjects. Nevertheless, this goal was only ‘apparently’ pursued by scholars. In fact, they once again referred that value to an internal resource, namely the firm’s capability of ‘internalizing’, ‘metabolizing’ and ‘recombining’ the resources of external subjects. Reference has been made to the absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal 1990) and the recombination capacity of external resources deriving from the architectural competencies (Henderson and Clark 1990). Thus, the differential capability of a firm does not lie so much in the relationships it establishes with external subjects as in its ability to manage a set of external resources, absorbing and recombining them with its internal resources following original patterns, thus generating new value. Vicari (1991, 1995) suggests a different approach when studying the firm’s ‘external’ resources. His approach contextualizes the company as an autopoietic cognitive system and considers relationships established with external subjects as one of the main sources of immaterial resources. These resources are particularly important as they represent the fundamental element capable of triggering the firm’s operational mechanisms. In fact, the firm’s behaviours derive from the resources available and, in turn,
The value of trust
29
produce new resources, determining a recursive generation process of intangibles,3 namely competence and trust-related resources.4 The former appear as capabilities based on cognitive paradigms residing within the firm. The latter are configured on cognitive patterns pertaining to single subjects, internal or external to the firm. Hence, trust and competence resources differ from each other merely in that the former are generated by communication processes whereas the latter stem from firms’ internal knowledge (Vicari 1991: 85). For the purposes of this study, a further subdivision of trust resources is important. Trust resources can indeed be differentiated according to the subjects they refer to, that is resources relevant to internal or to external relationships. The former consist mainly in the values and norms that pervade any organization, while the latter are embedded in subjects external to the firm, determining the richness of its relations. External resources assume particular importance, not so much in sporadic transactions or exchanges, but each time stable bonds are established (ibid.: 78). In the resource-based management perspective (Vicari 1995), increased trust determines an accumulation of immaterial resources by means of a two-step approach. On one hand, the development of trust directly increases trust resources, and, on the other, it creates the conditions for improving the competence resources. With reference to the first point, immaterial resources increase because the firm succeeds in making its relationship with its customers ‘exclusive’. By trusting the firm, customers are induced to perpetuate their choice, reinforcing their belief in the firm’s reliability and making less and less likely an alternative relationship with other suppliers. In other words, customer trust determines a corresponding increase in the ‘distance’ that separates, within the individual cognitive system, the trustworthy firm from its competitors (who, therefore, suffer a trust gap). Hence, trust in buyer–seller relationships represents an effective cognitive type of entry barrier against new competitors. The greater the level of trust the firm has succeeded in gaining with its customers, the less will the possibilities be for other subjects to enter the relationship. Hence, the firm, in addition to isolating itself from competitors, will manage to stabilize its relationships with the other parties involved in its network.5 Focusing on the second point, trust can generate value for the firm indirectly as well, by exerting a positive effect on the competence resources. Consolidated trust relations make the transfer of knowledge from external sources easier and less subject to uncertainties, due to relational and cooperation learning mechanisms based, among other things, on joint experimentation. For example, in order to sustain a product innovation process, the firm is induced to develop stable relations with subjects specialized in the development and accumulation of specific knowledge (for
30
Conceptual assumptions of trust
example, Sivadas and Dwyer 2000). The possibility for the company to access such know-how, acquire it, and make it interact actively and creatively with its own knowledge base in search of innovative competencies primarily depends on its relational capabilities and, more specifically, on the trust relationship established with external subjects (as will be shown in Chapter 4, section 2). Only later will the (internal) absorption and integration competencies be involved. Therefore, trust appears as the element capable of conditioning the qualitative level of connections that make know-how transfer possible, thus indirectly influencing the firm’s competence resource patrimony.6 Hence competence and trust resources appear to be mutually interrelated: ‘the growth of knowledge requires the existence of trust, and trust, in turn, is fostered by knowledge’ (Vicari 1992). Besides providing an original classification of intangible resources, the resource-based management approach contributes to the understanding of the development processes of resources and, especially, trust. Such processes rely on, among other factors, the capability of both the firm and ‘its’ network to effectively act and interact, producing knowledge and trust. This is possible only if substantial trust relations are established both within the firm and between the firm and its knowledge sources. In fact, trust represents a fundamental resource to govern the self-organized co-evolutionary process7 triggered both within the firm and between the firm and its partners. The level of trust permeating the network, together with the knowledge level and the cognitive relationships established between the two, constitute the basic resources to be monitored in order to manage interorganizational processes. In fact, these are the resources that a firm should increase, adopting incremental resource-based behaviours.
3. RELATIONAL RESOURCES: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS The trust resource concept and the resource-based management model have pushed the envelope of intangible-based theory, highlighting the role of trust-based relationships in gaining a truly competitive advantage. In fact, only recently the resource-based view has acknowledged the capability of the ‘outside’, especially the relations established with other subjects (networks of firms), to generate a sustainable competitive advantage. Badaracco (1991), Pisano (1994), Shan et al. (1994), Powell et al. (1996) have underlined how the innovative capability is essentially determined by a cognitive network of many economic subjects, rather than the capabilities of a single firm.8 Literature on social capital (for example, Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998; Lin et al. 2001) has fully
The value of trust
31
acknowledged the value the firm should attribute to its capability of developing relationships and network-specific intangibles. Therefore, especially in highly complex and competitive conditions, the competitive advantage is based on both in-house and network-generated resources. Consequently, the network itself is considered as a relational resource. On this point, Dyer and Singh (1998), inspired by the resource-based view principles, have introduced what they define as the relational view. Shortly thereafter, Morgan and Hunt (1999) also suggested the concept of relationship-based competitive advantage. McEvily and Zaheer (1999) have verified empirically how the firm’s capability of being embedded in a relational network (bridging ties) represents an important source of competitive capabilities. All these perspectives, (together with those previously proposed by Håkansson 1987b, 1989; Håkansson and Snehota 1989; and Iacobucci 1996) highlight how the firm’s competitive advantage depends not only on its internal resources, even those ‘borderline’ (like the absorption capability), but above all on the relations the company has managed to develop (by means of its own external trust resources). In more general terms, it depends on the capabilities and resources of the network to which the firm belongs. The autonomous and atomistic firm perspective, originally advocated by the economically inspired resource-based view (which saw competitive advantage exclusively as a firm’s internal product), has proven insufficient to explain the different performances among firms. In fact, these differences also depend on the relational capabilities and the network in which the firm is embedded, enabling it to access new resources, information and knowledge, with a significant impact on the competitive advantage (McEvily and Zaheer 1999: 1152). This is the reason why such a perspective is developed mainly by scholars with organizational, marketing and strategic management backgrounds. In particular, Dyer and Singh (1998) point out how competitive advantage resources depend mainly on the firms’ relation-specific investments, the regular sharing of knowledge developed at an inter-organizational level, the definition of complementary resources and, above all, the efficiency of governance mechanisms.9 Specifically, they favour the self-enforcement governance mechanisms over systems based on the presence of third parties (for example, legal contracts), focusing their attention on informal mechanisms – that is, those based on trust, reputation and embeddedness – rather than formal ones, such as the equity-based systems and other ‘financial hostages’ typologies. Therefore it clearly appears that trust may play a major role in the establishment of relational rent, impacting on both the transactional costs level and partner’s orientation to enter into joint value-generating initiatives (Dyer and Singh 1998: 670). Once the firm
32
Conceptual assumptions of trust
detects the sources of relational rent, it must define the modes that allow the defence of the relation-based competitive advantage, which, residing outside its boundaries and direct control, might be considered more evanescent than the one derived from in-house resources. The mechanisms of ‘relational’ resources isolation are thus defined. They are capable of preserving the yield generated by collaborative resources, avoiding (or, at least, minimizing) the possibility of being imitated by third parties. Such mechanisms are partially related to those proposed by the resource-based view (already briefly mentioned at the beginning of this section) such as the ones referring to the causal ambiguity and the diseconomies induced by time compression. The first mechanism explains why the development of trust (especially trust founded on goodwill) represents a particularly difficult relational resource to imitate. In fact, trust is characterized by a significant causal ambiguity level, as it represents the result of processes that are quite intricate to manage, owing to their situation-specific connotation. Also, diseconomies deriving from time compression can explain why trust represents a true relational resource. It cannot be developed on a short-term basis, nor is it instantly found on the market. More specific to this peculiar resource type, the following mechanisms characterize the relational resources and safeguard their rent (Dyer and Singh 1998): 1. 2. 3. 4.
inter-organizational assets interconnectedness partner scarcity (rareness) resource indivisibility (determined by the joint development of capabilities) complexity of the institutional environment.
The inter-organizational assets interconnectedness (point 1) has a cumulative outcome (the ‘snowball effect’) and, consequently, the relation-specific investments made at a given time are determined by (or interconnected with) the previous relational investments. For example, if a manufacturer and a distributor are induced by their mutual trust to enter into joint category management projects that in turn imply significant relational investments, their trust is certainly the product of previous satisfactory experiences with shared initiatives, perhaps less strategically significant but equally based on relation-specific investments. The second element (2) refers to the lack of partners with complementary strategic resources and relational capability. Once a subject is acquired from a relational point of view, it becomes very difficult, if not impossible, for latecomers to find partners characterized by specific competencies ready to enter into new collaborations. Such a phenomenon is what makes
The value of trust
33
it difficult for new players – at least in trust-based sectors – to interact with customers, suppliers and partners already in contact with competitors which have been able to develop trust relationships. The resource indivisibility (3) is based on the fact that two actors may combine their mutual resources or develop joint capabilities, making the resulting resources both idiosyncratic to the relationship and indivisible. Trust developed through time between two subjects is typically characterized by this trait, and will dissolve the moment the partnership is terminated. Finally, the institutional environment where the relation develops (4) may also play an important role in generating rent. For instance, it could encourage the establishment of trust relations among subjects belonging to diverse sectors or social contexts. In such cases, it may be advantageous for the firm to localize its activities in favourable, non-replicable environments having formal regulations (legal mechanisms) or informal rules (social control or trust) that favour collaboration and reduce opportunistic behaviours. It is worth mentioning trust mechanisms developing within districts that Powell (1990) defines as networks of place. It follows that the generation of relational rent is not conditioned by the mere relational capability of a firm, but rather by the output of such a capability, that is the set of trust relations and their relevant resources. Hunt and Morgan (1995) and Morgan and Hunt (1999) adopt a rationale which differs from the one suggested by Dyer and Singh (1998), although they reach partly converging conclusions. Initially interested in comprehending how firms can benefit from relational marketing approaches, the authors inductively prove the sustainability of the competitive advantage obtainable with those approaches and assess its impact on immaterial resources supply.10 In fact relational marketing enables the firms to effectively access a higher level of immaterial assets.11 With the aim of assessing the extent of this relationship-based competitive advantage, Hunt and Morgan establish the criteria defining its actual sustainability, once again referring to the principles suggested by the resource-based view. These criteria can be summarized as follows: (Morgan and Hunt 1999: 285); effectiveness (Hunt and Morgan 1995); heterogeneity (Dierickx and Cool 1989; Peteraf 1993; Hunt and Morgan 1995); imperfect imitability (Dierickx and Cool 1989; Barney 1991; Peteraf 1993); imperfect replaceability (Dierickx and Cool 1989; Barney 1991; Peteraf 1993); imperfect mobility and transferability (Dierickx and Cool 1989; Peteraf 1993). By applying such criteria the authors demonstrate that organizational, information and relational resources are crucial to acquiring an effective relationship-based competitive advantage. Such a critical role is mostly the product of the ambiguity and time dependency of some relational resources (such as those linked to a distributor’s capability of gaining customers’
34
Conceptual assumptions of trust
loyalty, becoming a potentially favoured partner for manufacturers, looking for adequate outlets for their products) or the complexity of the resource mix required to establish an appropriate information stock – exemplified by projects like ECR, which requires the participation of manufacturers, retailers and logistics partners, as well as consulting and IT firms. The above-mentioned contributions highlight the need to examine the relationship-derived competitive advantage as separate from, yet complementary to, the traditional firm-based advantage. In fact, it is essential to distinguish the firm’s typical capabilities from the advantage that can be drawn from a single relationship, which is relation-specific.12 According to the relational perspective, value is ‘jointly’ generated and owned by the partner firms, meaning that the relational yield ‘belongs’ to the dyad or the network (Dyer and Singh 1998: 675).13 Thus, resources are analysed under a new light. They are now considered ‘sticky’ in regard not only to the firm, but also the single dyadic relationship or, in more general terms, the firm’s network. Therefore, relational (or trust) resources can be analysed on two different levels: ● ●
a general and firm-specific level, referring, for instance, to the firm’s relational propensity or its market reputation; a more relation-specific level, based on the capability of absorbing knowledge from one specific partner and gaining its trust.
The latter capability requires not only a general propensity to knowledge absorption but also a more accurate or detailed knowledge of the single partner, its communication codes, organizational mechanisms and internal processes of knowledge production. Without this idiosyncratic type of knowledge, the potentialities related to the firm’s absorption capability are naturally reduced. It is one thing to consider the general firm-specific capability to develop relationships with third parties, and an altogether different thing is the ability to establish a relationship with a single partner, a condition implying relation-specific elements. Unlike firm-specific assets, relational resources are directly linked to the relationship determining, at the same time, its reproduction mechanisms and existence. In fact, the end of a relationship leads to their uselessness in terms of value production, and the interruption of their recurrent generation processes. In fact, when a relationship is interrupted the relation-specific absorption capability no longer produces value, suspending the learning processes and causing the relationship consequent natural depauperation. This certainly does not imply any loss of the absorption meta-capability (the stock resource) that the relation-specific intangible has generated through time, stratifying the most abstract knowledge. Such competency (stock) is undoubtedly most useful in supporting the firm in its future relational processes with new
The value of trust
35
subjects. Relation-specific and firm-specific resources trigger mutually supplying processes (stock and dynamic ones) constituting the foundation of capabilities and relational resources and, consequently, of the firm’s relationship-based competitive advantage. Vicari (1991) suggests another differentiation useful to clarify the firm’s relational resources, based on the location of such resources, which can be either internal to the firm’s boundaries or external (referring to the relationship). In the former case, to better represent such a phenomenon, it might be useful to differentiate the in-house relational resources generating new knowledge (this first type is classed as internal interface resources) from those which enable the development of external trust resources (classed as external interface resources). The internal relational resources will thus be differentiated by the output they produce. Alternatively, relational resources may reside within external subjects (classed as external relational resources). A synthetic representation of these three categories of resources is shown in Figure 2.1. Within the framework of internal relational resources, the scheme highlights the difference between knowledge-generating resources – which
FIRM
Internal interface resources (e.g. absorption capability)
External interface resources (e.g. key accounting)
External relational resources (e.g. trust) OTHER SUBJECTS
Figure 2.1
Relational resources
36
Table 2.1
Conceptual assumptions of trust
Relational resources: a scheme and some examples Internal Relational Resources
External Relational Resources
Resources for the production of internal knowledge (e.g. absorption)
Resources for the production of external relationships resources (e.g. key accounting)
Relational resources located outside the firm (trust)
General and firm-specific level
General capability of knowledge absorption
General sales management and key accounting competencies
Firm’s image and reputation
Situationand relationspecific level
Comprehension of a specific partnercustomer’s routine knowledge production
Capability of managing the relationship with a specific customer
Trust in a single partner
mostly absorb and organize knowledge coming from outside – and external interface resources, finalized to relationship management and third parties’ trust development. By crossing the two above-mentioned types, it is possible to establish a set of ‘structural’ resources organized as follows (Table 2.1): the resources referring to the firm-specific level – belonging to the first two classes (exclusively differentiated by the type of expected output) – or the resources embedded in other subjects (here defined as firm-specific external relational resources). The same kind of classification applies to the relationspecific resources.
4. THE EFFECT OF TRUST ON RELATIONAL PROCESSES We have shown that trust is a firm’s basic resource since it enables the competitive advantage that has been defined as relationship-based. In order to understand how trust actually translates into an economic value for the company, the terms in which trust might affect costs and revenue flows should be examined. As will be detailed in the next section, in order to achieve this objective it is necessary to comprehend the possible consequences of accrued trust on organizational processes and value generation.
The value of trust
37
These roles are carried out within the company and refer to the management of external relations. An extreme synthesis of the major advantages of trust for its targets found in the literature includes the following: (a) intra-organizational relationships (b) inter-organizational relationships (c) relationships developed with the firm’s customers. On this matter, it might be useful to summarize some of the major effects commonly associated with trust with reference to each of the abovementioned relational dimensions. As to the intra-organizational relations (a), it has been widely proven that trust may: ● ● ● ● ● ●
facilitate management coordination among different organizational units (for example, McAllister 1995; Doney et al. 1998); improve the organizational climate, by reducing the level of interfunctional conflicts (for example, Das and Teng 1998); enable more effective and efficient inter-function teamwork (for example, Meyerson et al. 1996; Doney et al. 1998); contribute to an effective implementation of strategies, supporting the plan implementation phase (for example, Doney et al. 1998); determine organizational citizenship and extra role behaviours (for example, McAllister 1995; Perrone and Chiacchierini 1999); reduce control-based monitoring and defensive behaviour (for example, McAllister 1995; Das and Teng 1998, 2001).
These effects make the organized activities more effective and, at the same time, improve the efficiency, because in a climate based on trust relations control costs are lower and conflicts find quicker solutions. As to inter-organizational relations (b), the development of an appropriate set of trust resources contributes to:14 ●
●
●
limit transaction costs, especially in organizational situations whenever there is a high level of uncertainty (for example, Dore 1983; Doney et al. 1998); facilitate long-term relationships, reducing conflicts that are nonfunctional to the partnership goals (for example, Ring and Van de Ven 1992; Ganesan 1994; Doney et al. 1998); stimulate collaboration among firms (Anderson and Narus 1990; Ganesan 1994; Morgan and Hunt 1994; Jap 1999, 2001a), significantly contributing to the success of strategic alliances (Gulati 1995);
38
Conceptual assumptions of trust ● ●
simplify knowledge transfer and joint learning (for example, Moorman et al. 1992; Moorman et al. 1993; Troilo 2006); enable the firm, as mentioned in the previous section, to obtain a sustainable long-term competitive advantage (Barney and Hansen 1994; Dyer and Singh 1998; Morgan and Hunt 1999).
This makes the relational activity more effective and less expensive, with positive implications in terms of opportunities for both economic value generation and cost containment in the case of inter-organizational collaboration initiatives. In relation to demand (c), by enhancing customers’ loyalty, trust generates important consequences for the firm (Anderson and Sullivan 1993; Johnson et al. 1995; Srivastava et al. 1998; Costabile 2001), namely: ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
an increased differentiation potential, thus obtaining a premium price; a more reduced price sensitivity; a higher propensity to consumption; a favourable word-of-mouth, spreading positive information on the company, partially replacing marketing investments; trading up propensity, that is, purchasing higher quality goods within the same product line; cross-buying propensity, that is, purchasing other goods/services offered by the same firm; reduction of sales and customer care costs; knowledge sharing propensity, that is, activating co-evolutionary processes between demand and supply, based on knowledge exchange and integration.
As it may be easily inferred, such effects can enhance the value generated by the firm, either by increasing effectiveness, for example reducing customer management costs and replacing other communication investments thanks to a positive word-of-mouth, or increasing the revenue sources owing to, for example, other cross-buying opportunities and lower price sensitivity.
5.
TRUST AND FIRM’S VALUE
To understand how trust can be effectively translated into an economic value for the firm, one must first examine the effect it has on the structure and value of the firm’s relation portfolio (section 5.1), and, secondly, assess
The value of trust
39
trust impact on the current and prospective value of the economic capital (the latter point will be examined in depth in section 5.2). 5.1
Demand-driven Increase of Relationship Value
In order to better comprehend the effect of trust on the relation portfolio value, it is necessary to further study the impact it can have as a consequence of: ● ●
the consolidation and possible extension of on-going relationships with customers the expansion of the relation portfolio as a consequence of new contacts.
Although the latter – which is a direct effect of intensified contacts and the network expansion induced by firm reputation – is intuitively understood, the former effect needs to be further clarified. In fact, customers characterized by a strong trust relationship with a firm are usually willing to: ● ● ●
increase the value of each purchase, as seen in the previous section; stabilize the series of purchases through time, hence minimizing the possibilities of switching to competitors; prolong the relationship, increasing the time horizon in which purchasing opportunities of trusted products/services may occur, and thus reducing the customer turnover in time.
The quantitative effect generated by such phenomena has been traditionally examined by studies assessing customer loyalty, with special reference to its behavioural dimension (for example, Jacoby and Chestnut 1978). The first effect is assessed, for example, according to the share of the total expense budget allocated to a given brand in a specific shopping expedition.15 The second phenomenon (purchase stability through time) may be quantified according to the purchasing sequence index. Based upon the structure of purchases series in a given period, this index enables to detect specific purchasing patterns such as those related to ‘shared loyalty’ toward two or more brands or those characterized by ‘unstable loyalty’.16 The effect of relationship duration on the value of the customer portfolio may be easily derived by measuring the impact of duration on the customer retention rate (CRR).17 Loyalty consolidation, stabilizing the relations with the clients, positively affects the CRR, increasing the customers’ prospective average age.18 Since CRR growth determines more than proportional increases in relationship duration, it is possible to explain the very
40
Conceptual assumptions of trust
significant impact that albeit small CRR increases can have on the relation portfolio value. The lifetime value (LTV) is a synthetic indicator of both the size of a periodic purchase made by each customer and the stability and duration of the series of shopping expeditions made to the preferred supplier.19 The LTV measures the value, generically expressed as revenue, of a firm’s single customer throughout the relationship’s life cycle. In a simplified format, it is formulated as the product of the duration of the relationship’s average lifetime (usually expressed in years), times the purchasing frequency in that period, and the purchase average value. In quantitative terms, this index is expressed as follows: LTV V* F* P
(5.1)
where: Vaverage value of a single transaction; F average frequency of the transaction over the period (for example, a year); Pnumber of periods (for example, years) considered in the life cycle of the relationship. It is quite straightforward to establish how the increased trust/loyalty of a customer toward a company can potentially determine an increase in all LTV computational factors: the average value of each transaction (for example, owing to cross-buying phenomena); the purchasing frequency for the same offer; and the relationship time-frame (duration).20 As a summary of the relationship value, it can be useful to examine the effects of trust/loyalty on the customer equity value, that is, the value generated by a single customer (or even a specific segment of the demand), calculated according to the net cash flows s/he can guarantee throughout the lifetime of his/her relationship with the firm. Such value is given by the difference between the margins generated by a single customer and the activation, development and maintenance costs s/he determines (Wayland and Cole 1997: 101; Costabile 2001: 152 ff.): CE
n
t1
Pt (QtMt ) dt
n
(S F ) d A t
t
t
t
(5.2)
t1
where: P probability of purchase by the customer in the ith period; Q expected purchasing volume throughout the relationship cycle; M unit margins after taxes; t period (year) of the relationship;
The value of trust
n S F A d
41
total number of the relationship’s periods; customer development cost; customer retention cost; customer activation cost (connection phase); discount rate [1/(1k)].
A trust increase can positively affect every element of the above-mentioned value. Upon increasing the trust level of its customer base, a firm enjoys an increase in the likelihood of purchases by its customers (P); the expected quantity of purchases over the whole relationship (Q), for example, owing to cross-buying phenomena; unit margins (M), owing to reduced price sensitivity; and the overall relationship duration (n). At the same time, customer development costs (S) are bound to drop: a customer can be easily induced to broaden both the scope of the relationship and the range of products and services purchased from the single supplier. It also costs less to activate customers (A) and gain their loyalty (F), taking advantage of the positive word-of-mouth and the new customers’ greater positive disposition induced by the firm’s market reputation. Finally, as mentioned earlier (note 20), the discount rate (represented by d1/(1k)) drops as well.21 5.2
Trust’s Impact on the Economic Capital Value of the Firm
Having established trust’s impact on the economics of each relationship and to better understand the advantages of establishing trust relations with customers, it is useful to analyse the value of trust in the more general perspective of the firm. Such analysis has been performed adopting the analytical perspective of the value creation theory (Guatri 1991, 1996), from the point of view of one of the firm’s main stakeholders, the capital investor. This economic subject is interested in maximizing the flow of expected dividends, together with the growth in capital value, all expressed in current values.22 (Guatri 1991: 19). Trust, as inferred from the above remarks, contributes to create value in terms of economic capital, affecting the value of both its current level (W) and its growth opportunities (W).23 Such a statement will appear more comprehensible once the elements determining each of the two above-mentioned values are detected. The current value of the economic capital depends on the capitalization rate, on the normal expected income and on its duration. A positive impact on these determinants is conditioned by the capability of establishing strong external trust relations with customers, suppliers, partners, and so on, thus inhibiting access to competitors. Trust relations, in fact, reduce firm-specific risks (i), increase profitability and, as
42
Conceptual assumptions of trust
(–)
Relationship stability
Expected normal income (+)
(+)
Profit rate
(+)
(+)
Present value of economic capital
Lifetime of the expected normal income
(+)
Potential development rate
Profit duration (+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
Reproducibility of relationships
(+)
Capitalization rate
(+)
Value of economic capital growth opportunities
(+)
(+)
Potential value of economic capital
Source: translated from Busacca (2000: 30)
Figure 2.2
Impact of trust on economic value determinants
mentioned earlier, enhance the potential duration of income flows (Figure 2.2). The value of economic capital growth opportunities (W) depends on the profit rate, the duration of profit and the potential growth rate. The increase in trust affects not only the profit rate and its duration, but also the growth potential (Busacca 1994; Mazzei 1999; Costabile 2001). In fact, especially when characterized by a high level of abstraction, trust is one of the resources that can be easily transferred. Such a quality of trust finds multiple uses, as will be explained in Chapter 8 (section 3). Therefore, trust contributes to expanding the redundancy potential accessed by the firm in order to undertake innovative development projects. For example, a firm that has gained the trust of intermediaries and has been capable of offering successful innovative products can take full advantage of this potential and contribute with other new products to the distributor’s assortment. Conversely, firms that have not proven to be as reliable find it much more difficult and more expensive (if not completely impossible) to gain such access, thus curtailing all effects on the firm’s potential development rate and, consequently, the potential value of its economic capital. The same effect can be achieved exploiting the extension potential associated with the trust dimension of the brand (Busacca and Troilo 1992; Mazzei 1999; Busacca 2000).
The value of trust
43
The impact of trust on intangible resources (as previously expressed), the value of its customer portfolio and, in more general terms, of its economic capital, proves that an in-depth understanding of the construct is needed in order to usefully support managers in designing targeted behaviours and implementing resource-enhancing strategies. The following chapters seek to meet this requirement, starting with an analysis of the construct within the main disciplines of interest (Part Two), providing definitions and establishing boundaries and contents (Part Three) and, finally, exploring determinants and analytical consequences, together with the possible developmental strategies within a relationship’s dynamic evolution (fourth part). In particular, by detecting the cognitive antecedents of trust and its fundamental growth mechanisms, this work aims at highlighting the elements that may have a positive impact on the intangible assets and, consequently, on the value of trust’s economic capital.
NOTES 1.
2.
3. 4. 5.
6.
7.
8. 9.
This is due to the fact that these resources are tacit (tacitness), that it is hard to identify any cause/effect relation between them and firm performances (causal ambiguity), and that they are difficult to reconstruct and rare (firm-specific) (for example, Wernerfelt 1984; Dierickx and Cool 1989; Reed and DeFilippi 1990; Barney 1991). Reviewing the concept of competence, Reed and DeFilippi (1990: 89) affirmed that, generally: (1) the source of a competency always resides within the firm; (2) competency is the result of the modes by which the firm uses and combines skills and in-house resources vs. its competitors. For an in-depth examination of the general evolution of the resourcebased view and its major conceptual models, see De Leo (1995) and Verona (1999, 2000), who contextualize this approach with specific reference to the issue of innovation. In fact, Vicari (1991: 108) stated that value generation within the firm occurs through the production of resources that have their own economic value. On this matter, Vicari (ibid.: 85) underlines that the difference does not lie in the nature of resources as much as in their description by an external observer, who sees them as a product of the firm’s knowledge or communication processes. From the firm’s standpoint, value is ascribed not only to trust gained from external subjects but, as will be explained in Chapter 6 (section 6.4), also to trust bestowed on others by the firm. In particular, from the firm’s perspective, trusting or ‘distrusting’ potential interlocutors makes it possible to manage the growing relational complexity. Thus, the firm can order and simplify the structuring of both its own ‘cognitive’ network and decision-making processes. On this matter, Troilo (2006) has found that trust in the data provider and trust in the technological infrastructures are two fundamental factors influencing how a firm utilizes its marketing knowledge. On this topic see also the empirical research studies by Moorman et al. (1992, 1993). ‘Self-organization is a behavioural and organizational mechanism based on the subjects’ capabilities of organizing effective responses without delegating them to market or hierarchical macro mechanisms. Therefore, a complex process emerges, without an external actor to define it’ (Vicari 1996: 79–80). In particular, this thesis has been verified with regard to the biotech industry. The authors suggest hypotheses on each competitive advantage determinant, and structure them in sub-processes facilitating the production of what they call ‘relational rent’.
44 10.
Conceptual assumptions of trust The relational approach may determine, according to Morgan and Hunt (1999): the acquisition and development of resources that may improve the firm’s efficiency; ● the combination of resource-bases with the purpose of creating more complex sets of resources; ● the exploitation of the resource-related advantage in competitive situations, especially when the competitive differential is associated with the functioning of interorganizational relations; ● the maintenance and protection over time of immaterial assets, to be continuously replenished, thus guaranteeing constant access to the resources generated by the partners. Such resources are classified as: financial, legal, physical, human, organizational, relational and information resources. Hunt and Morgan (1995) assert that these are the main types of resources to be acquired activating a relationship. To this effect, Dyer and Singh (1998: 674) maintain ‘although an individual firm’s ability to work effectively with other firms may be classified as a firm-specific capability (which may generate relational rents), there is value in distinguishing a relational view, which offers a distinct, but complementary view on how firms generate rents’. Thus, the division of jointly produced rent becomes an issue as well as a topic deserving further analysis. It has been recently studied by Golfetto (2000, esp. Ch. 9); Durisin (2001); and Jap (2001a), who refers explicitly to ‘pie sharing strategies’. Such effects will be further examined in Chapter 7 (section 3), where the consequences of trust will be detailed. In reality, it would also be useful to consider the trust’s effect on the purchase absolute value, keeping in mind the trustee’s greater availability to bear price increases and expand the overall expense budget (thus conditioning also the ‘share of valley’ ratio denominator), envisaging new product categories (cross-buying). Shared behavioural loyalty means a reiterated purchasing behaviour of two or more brands with a sequence such as ABABABABAB, where A and B indicate that the consumer has selected for his/her purchases brand A and brand B, respectively. Unstable behavioural loyalty means instead a reiterated purchasing behaviour characterized by an AAAABBBB sequence. Referring to a given year, this may be calculated as follows: Instantaneous CRR (number of customers at year’s end already existing at the year’s beginning / number of customers at the year’s beginning) * 100. This same value may be calculated within a broader time frame averaging the CRRs of several periods. Valdani (2000: 125) points out the usefulness of the value-calculated CRR. In fact, this indicator establishes the firm’s capability to retain the revenue generated by each customer, ranking the different relationships according to their produced value. The average duration of a relationship is defined as the mean prospective age, and calculated according to the following ratio: 1/(1CRR). This formula establishes, for instance, that a 90 per cent customer retention rate corresponds to an average relationship length of 10 years (1/(10.9)), whereas a 95 per cent CRR is associated with an average prospective age of 20 years (1/(10.95)). Besides lifetime value, the literature offers numerous synthetic behavioural indexes, obtained by combining measurement methods, included in the above-mentioned categories. Among them is Carman’s entropy measurement (1970), which defined loyalty as the negative value of pi summation times pi log, where pi is the purchase share of a given brand/sign. Another synthetic indicator, proposed to determine store loyalty level, is the loyalty index suggested by Burford et al. (1971). An alternative formula to LTV requests the determination of the current value of expected revenue flows: ●
11. 12.
13. 14. 15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
LTV
V (1 k) n
where: Vestimated revenues for the relationship period at time t;
The value of trust
45
kdiscount rate; nnumber of periods (for example, years) considered in the relationship life cycle.
21.
22.
23.
According to this formula, besides the effects already mentioned in the text, it is quite useful to consider the effect of trust on discount rate. This is calculated according to the zero-risk activity interest rate, plus a factor accounting for the risk level presented by industry, firm and, in this case, single relationships. Trust’s growth makes it less likely for the customer to drop the relationship, fosters a greater certainty in future revenue flows, and reduces the actualization rate, with the net result of increasing lifetime value. The evaluation of the nexus between trust growth – in all of its components and typologies, which will be examined in Chapter 8 – and the variation of customer equity single components could be an interesting subject of empirical analysis. A revamping of the above-mentioned formula has been recently suggested by Costabile (2001: 154 ff.) who underlines the appropriateness of differentiating between the so-called ‘current’ customer equity, calculated according to the already described modalities, and the so-called ‘potential’ customer equity. The latter also includes the options of broadening the relationship scope, derived from the development of trust (and trust abstraction policies). The result that the shareholder tends to maximize can be synthetically expressed as follows: R1 DW1 d1 – DC, where DW1 represents the periodical variation of the economic capital between time t0 and t1, d1 expresses the dividends distributed over that time period and DC any newly invested capital (Guatri 1991: 19). Such analysis was developed originally by Busacca (1994: 59 ff.) and Mazzei (1999) and more recently by Costabile (2001).
PART TWO
The contribution of the different disciplinary contexts
3. 1.
Multidisciplinary studies on trust INTRODUCTION
Trust has been examined, at various analytical levels, by diverse disciplines. In fact, the degree of construct abstraction has enabled its contextualization in several relational contexts. Trust that develops among individuals in relationships with kin and friends has been analysed by psychology and sociology. When the interacting parties belong to the same organizational structure or to the same workteam, their interaction becomes the focus of organization studies. Their aim is to understand how social mechanisms facilitate collaboration among individuals committed to the same task, achieving greater effectiveness with less control. By the same token, two individuals interacting while playing interfacing roles in different structures, as buyer and seller, establish an exchange relationship which represents the focus of relational marketing scholars and, in particular, of those specialized in sales management. The latter are particularly interested in understanding whether trust plays a positive role in a negotiation’s successful conclusion and, if that role is confirmed, the modes that can increase the seller’s perceived reliability. The generalization level characterizing the construct makes it applicable not only to interpersonal relationships but also to interactions between different organizational structures. Even at that level, the concept may be applied to different relational contexts: alliances and joint ventures among firms with complementary competences and resources; partnerships among firms at various levels of the supply chain; inter-organizational relations in industrial districts; supply and channel relations and – in more general terms – all inter-organizational relations involving interactions between a buyer and a seller firm. In such contexts, there are many disciplines investigating the role of trust, its effects, diverse configurations and relevant growth mechanisms. For instance, economics mostly focuses on transaction and exchange governance systems; management theories and, more generally, strategic studies and organization theories are mainly interested in the functioning and governance of alliances, joint ventures and partnerships among firms; while marketing is concerned with the study of relations among firms in industrial goods markets and distribution channels.1 49
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The contribution of the different disciplinary contexts
The interest of scholars is not limited to the study of the role of trust and of its growth mechanisms at the inter-personal and inter-organizational levels. Recently, greater attention has been paid to the links between the two analytical levels. In other words, the goal is to understand how trust developed at an interpersonal level among the so-called boundary spanners impacts the inter-organizational trust dynamics (and vice versa). This determines the need to integrate the interpersonal relationship models (a subject of sociology, psychology and inter-organizational theories) with inter-organizational relations (developed by organization, marketing and strategic management studies), requiring a multidisciplinary approach to the study of trust. Recently, following the development of the new information and communication technologies and the establishment of digital networks, it has become necessary to include interaction, exchange and relationship mechanisms among subjects which can even be represented by virtual agents. Hence the need to consider new types and levels of interaction involving (virtual) communication interfaces which are considerably different from the traditional ones. This paves the way for a novel and interesting convergence between the above-mentioned disciplines and information and knowledge sciences (for example, Castelfranchi and Tan 2001). Finally, further analytical levels – which we will later define as systemic and institutional – to which the construct examined in this study can be applied should not be neglected. This is the case, for instance, for trust in public institutions, governments, national economies, banking systems, societies and, in more general terms, according to sociologists, in other human beings. It can be easily inferred that trust developed at this level will condition all inter-organizational and interpersonal relations. It should suffice to think about the difficulties in developing collaborative interactions and initiatives among firms within a somewhat unfavourable social context, when the parties show a generalized diffidence; or about less developed economic systems, lacking an adequate level of reliance on economic, political and legal institutions. The above issues are mostly analytically explored by political scientists and sociologists. This overview shows how the construct here examined has attracted the attention of numerous disciplines, which, over time and thanks to a natural convergence process, have defined the study of trust as multidisciplinary. This conclusion is based on two major assumptions. Firstly, the construct abstraction level allows the transfer of the more general conceptual paradigms among various disciplinary domains, thus triggering the cross-fertilization of their studies examining each relational dimension. Secondly, now it clearly appears that, in order to fully comprehend the relational phenomena, the different analytical levels must be considered jointly. In fact, relationships
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imply the coexistence of multi-layer levels such as interpersonal, interorganizational, systemic, institutional, and so on. This explains, in part, the progressive convergence that has taken place in trust studies, making it difficult to position each contribution in a specific disciplinary domain, owing to the tendency to overlap shown by both its inspiring conceptual models and analysed objects. To better appreciate the growing multidisciplinarity of trust studies on market relations, it appears useful to perform a synthetic review of the literature on the subject, examining the main contributions made by various disciplines with an approach that emphasizes the scope rather than the depth of analysis. Such a review should highlight two major elements: on one hand, the conceptual matrix of the main studies and their analytical goals, and, on the other, the contribution these studies provide to the interpretation of market relations. Our analysis will start by focusing on the trust socio-psychological dimension. In order to elucidate the genesis of the construct, this review starts with the contributions of psychology (section 2) and sociology (section 3), and then covers more recent advances in organizational studies (section 4). Subsequently, the interest will shift to the construct’s economic dimension, focusing on the rational choices theory (section 5) and transaction cost analysis (TCA) (section 6). Section 7 analyses the rationale underlying some of the main integration attempts (mostly carried out by strategic management scholars) between the economic and the social dimensions of relationships in general and of trust ones in particular. Figure 3.1 illustrates the evolutionary synthesis of these studies and this chapter structure. The next chapter reviews trust studies in marketing literature – the main focus of this book. That is the ideal context to understand these issues as well as the possible integration of economic models – more concerned with the rational and calculative dimension of trust – and socio-organizational models – more sensitive to trust’s ‘soft’ aspects.
2. IN THE BEGINNING: THE CONTRIBUTION OF PSYCHOLOGY Psychological and sociological studies are unquestionably the disciplines which have started to investigate the concept of trust. At first they studied it accidentally, as a constituent of broader conceptual models. Later, researches acknowledged trust’s central role in interpreting human behaviour and social relations. Psychology has, at first, examined trust from two main analytical perspectives (Lewis and Weigert 1985):
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The contribution of the different disciplinary contexts
Psychology (section 2)
SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL
Organization (OB) (section 4)
DIMENSION
Sociology (section 3) Strategic management (section 7) TCA (section 6)
ECONOMIC DIMENSION Eonomics (section 5)
Figure 3.1 A synthesis of studies evolution: trust’s socio-psychological and economic dimensions (1) within the framework of behavioural psychology as a fundamental antecedent explaining individual behaviour, especially collaborative behaviour; (2) within personality psychology studies as a descriptive element of individual personality. These two approaches are concisely discussed below, without entering into their respective merit. The first area of inquiry especially concerns the comprehension of the elements leading individuals towards collaborative behaviours. The main methodology, consistently with the principles of behaviourism, is the experiment based on models inspired by the prisoner’s dilemma.2 The goal of such experiments consists in understanding the elements – referring mainly to situational factors – inducing either collaboration or competition between individuals, making the two behaviours coincide explicitly with trust and distrust respectively. The identification of trust with collaboration (and, in particular, distrust with competitive attitudes) was subsequently refuted, pointing out how collaborative attitudes are not always a direct consequence of trusting the counterpart. In fact, the choice of the cooperative option could simply come from an evaluation of economic convenience, generating an output similar to the one generated by trust but which cannot absolutely be assimilated to the latter. As will be shown later, this
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element is of crucial importance in the critique of the above-mentioned studies. Deutsch is one of the major proponents of this research stream. He has conducted numerous experiments in order to demonstrate the mechanisms underlying collaborative dynamics among individuals. His initial assumption was that the development of collaborative relations among individuals does not necessarily require a personal predisposition (trusting personality) but comes from situational elements (Deutsch 1962: 303). In order for trust to be relevant, from an interpretative viewpoint, the following are required: a subject finds him/herself in a decision-making situation with an ambiguous alternative tree that may lead to a positively perceived event (VA) or an event that is perceived as detrimental (VA); (b) s/he should perceive that the occurrence of either event (VA or VA) is determined by the behaviour of another individual; (c) s/he should be aware that the potential harm (VA) is greater than the benefits (VA). (a)
When an individual decides to make an ambiguous choice characterized by the above-mentioned properties, s/he expresses trust. At the opposite extreme, when the individual chooses to avoid such an alternative, the option is that of distrusting or, rather, as Deutsch maintains, of being ‘suspicious’.3 Trust and suspicion are the two extremes of a continuum that, according to behavioural psychology, is constantly characterized by risk. Several experiments have investigated the situational elements that make trust behaviours more likely. For instance, some studies have highlighted the relationship between communication intensity and trust, verifying the existence of a positive correlation between the involved parties’ mutual communication of expectations and propensity to trust (or, in the words of the prisoner’s dilemma, to cooperate). Loomis (1959) also suggested a number of experimental assessments founded on the social dilemma, demonstrating the direct correlation between the communication level among individuals, trust and collaborative behaviours. Actually, these empirical studies analyse the interaction between unknown individuals, characterized by their own identity, but lacking the substratum produced by previous social interactions. Hence, they do not examine trust in depth as much as the modes in which individuals predict others’ behaviours and decide – according to such predictions – their propensity to cooperate and the actions to carry out (Lewis and Weigert 1985). Furthermore, these researches are abstracted from their relational context, and therefore do not take into account the variability of trust among individuals. Thus, it is
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The contribution of the different disciplinary contexts
assumed that whoever faces a dilemma characterized by a given set of situational variables will have exactly the same behaviour. In order to fill this cognitive gap and explicitly take into account the impact of each variable, a second area of analysis was developed, envisaging trust as a distinctive trait of each personality’s profile (point 2). Now trust can be present in individuals with different levels of intensity, depending on personal experience and the social groups to which they belong. Rotter is undeniably the most significant representative of this stream of research. He assumed that the entire network of social and economic relations is founded on the concept of trust and that almost all individual decisions are determined by the assumption that everyone has to trust someone else. This aspect becomes ever more evident as the social structure complexity increases (Rotter 1971: 443). The author applied to trust the social learning theory perspective, which links the personal propensity to trust to what is learned by interacting with others and with the social context.4 Such a propensity is defined as a ‘generalized expectancy’ that the words, promises and statements made by another person or group may be reliable (ibid.: 444). In view of the extreme subjectivity of learning mechanisms, individual propensity to trust cannot but vary, thus demonstrating the importance of profile-characterizing elements in order to achieve a broader understanding of trust. To verify such a hypothesis and to implement the conceptual model suggested, Rotter initially developed an interesting scoring method – called the Interpersonal Trust Scale5 – aimed at measuring individuals’ propensity to trust. Naturally, one of the author’s main goals is the isolation of individual characteristics (for instance, ethnic group, age, education) to which this propensity is more closely related. In one of his first studies (performed on a sample of college students) he demonstrated how the results of the Trust Scale are directly correlated with the position occupied within the family (thus starting to verify the role that the position within social networks plays in trust generation), the socio-economic level, and the religious denomination and cult differences of the subject’s parents. Rotter (1980a, 1980b) pointed out that ‘high trusters’ are more reliable, happier and, usually, more pleasant persons than the ‘low trusters’. Furthermore, he refutes the correlation – previously hypothesized by some, undoubtedly low trusters themselves – between greater propensity to trust and lower intelligence or greater gullibility. Thus, this denied the existence of a correlation that belittled the concept of trust,6 implicitly making it unimportant as a topic of analytical research. One of the limits of psychological approaches – both the one considering the propensity to trust as an individual characteristic and the experimental one studying the requirements for cooperation among individuals – is the
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fact that they tend to deal with trust as an individual or dyadic construct, neglecting its external, situational and social aspects as a whole. These aspects may have a considerable influence on the level of trust experienced by an individual, especially in some specific contexts and with regard to a single relational counterpart. This inevitably determines a simplification which does not capture the phenomenon’s real essence.7 Sociological contributions help to bridge this interpretative gap by recognizing trust as a social reality (Lewis and Weigert 1985) that permeates not only the individual but also the institutions.8
3.
TRUST IN SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES
The growing interest of sociology in the concept of trust is essentially motivated by the need to find new interpretation keys for a rapidly changing model of society. In this new context, the connective element may no longer be the strength of personal relations, as was the case with traditional societies based on small groups of individuals with scarce permeability and few social contacts. In fact, sociologists must provide an explanation for the functioning of social and economic systems more and more structured and founded on an increasing specialization of functions and a greater decentralization of institutions. In these post-modern, post-industrial, global and post-Fordist systems, cooperation among individuals and ‘dispersed’ institutions becomes increasingly critical, as there no longer is common ground (Rocco 2001a) deriving from a consolidated previous relational experience or from a shared social and value-based context. In these situations, social collaboration cannot rely entirely on the mechanism of direct personal relationships but calls for novel systems with a higher abstraction level. The monographs by Luhmann (1979) and Barber (1983)9 are among the first contributions dealing exclusively with the concept of trust. Both defined trust as a certainty of one’s expectations regarding the behaviours of external subjects (that is, individuals, institutions, professionals, and so on). In particular, Luhmann (1979) sees trust as the basic element reducing the growing social complexity and as a fundamental component allowing society to function. In fact, the sociologist’s goal consists in identifying the factor that supports social systems in coping with the ‘unmanageable complexity’ of modern times, in order to guarantee an adequate level of social order. Trust appears to be the best candidate. It is capable of activating social systems’ complexity potential, by increasing the ‘tolerance of uncertainty’ (ibid.: 50). The growing critical features of systemic trust are thus highlighted. Systemic trust is founded on the principle that all subjects belonging to the same system are implicitly ‘trusting in trust’. It appears as
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The contribution of the different disciplinary contexts
a sort of public good that succeeds in reducing the complexity level of the social system, and from which the individuals can obtain positive externalities. Luhmann (ibid.: 67) described trust as a type of ‘collective representation’ of society that constitutes the foundation of social contacts. In this way each party belonging to the system complies with the rules of the game and cooperates with others, eliciting trust-based behaviours to perpetuate the trust-based image of the society. Therefore, it appears that trust not only is an element fundamental to the functioning of society, ‘reducing’ its complexity, but also represents a ‘social construction’ of itself. In fact, trust elicits trusting behaviours learned from and shared with others. We could synthesize Luhmann’s thought saying ‘I trust because others trust’, which is not far from the social learning hypotheses proposed in Rotter’s psychological studies, comparable to a relational sensemaking à la Weick (1997) (Pruvost 2001). Following in Luhmann’s footsteps,10 Barber (1983) defines trust as a set of expectations a subject has vis à vis a third party. Such expectations11 are defined as the fundamental element of social relationships, just as matter constitutes the fundamental element of physical things. Barber contributed significantly to the understanding of the construct by accurately identifying various expectation typologies, corresponding to different ‘forms’ of trust.12 These are organized in three different levels. The more general one refers to the expectation of ‘persistence and fulfilment of the natural and moral social order’,13 which enables the functioning of society and the perpetuation of social order. Such a type of trust forms the foundations of social life, enabling individuals to carry out their daily activities without considering all the possible events that might hypothetically occur.14 The other two types of trust refer to a more specific and concrete level of expectations. The second typology refers, in fact, to the trustee’s level of competencies. The third one concerns the expectation that the partner will comply with his or her obligations and responsibilities, eventually subordinating his/her interests to those of others. The second type of expectation, based on the knowledge of the trustee’s competencies, refers to an individual’s expectation of the counterpart’s ‘competent performance’, capable of satisfying his/her needs. Such an expectation becomes increasingly critical in today’s social systems characterized by greater complexity, imposing more and more structured function division and specialization in knowledge production. In these systems, it is impossible not to delegate production and cognitive activities to other specialized subjects and trust is basically linked to the trustee’s level of competencies and capabilities. The third type of expectation goes beyond the cognitive dimension (referring to competencies) to place itself on a moral dimension, which
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envisages a trust-based obligation toward a third party. In this case, trust represents a social mechanism that facilitates a balanced use of power and knowledge, thus avoiding abuse (Barber 1983: 15). Barber’s definition of trust underlines the ‘social ordering’ function that characterizes it, providing individuals and systems with a map of cognitive and moral expectations (the former especially referring to competencies and the latter to trust obligations). This leads to a stabilization of social relations (Blau 1964) and a reduction of complexity (Luhmann 1979) for all who interact in increasingly complex and structured social contexts. Actually, Barber’s final objective was to verify the underlying elements of the diminished trust that some observers generally associated with North American society. In order to achieve that goal, the author contextualized his own definition of trust into some of the most significant North American social institutions, namely the family, the foundations, the political system, and the business and professional milieu (devoting a chapter of his book to each). The conclusions drawn by Barber are quite relevant even today. He maintained that the issue was not a drop in the propensity to trust of American society (at the beginning of the 1980s) as much as an increased need for coordination (and, consequently, trust), triggered by the growing social complexity and a greater intensity of knowledge characterizing relations among individuals and institutions. Therefore, modern societies are not facing a drop in trust level as much as a growing relational uncertainty, due to the increased social fragmentation and articulation. This, in turn, seems to call for an increased level of trust in the system or, even, for more sophisticated trust typologies (as will be discussed in Chapter 6, section 6). Parsons’ and Simmel’s conceptual contributions preceded and, in part, inspired those of Barber and Luhmann. Albeit not completely devoted to trust, these efforts delved into the issue providing explicit reference to its nature and functions within the framework of society’s interpretative models proposed by the former authors. In particular, Simmel contributed more than others to clarifying the usefulness of the concept of trust in individual social relationships (micro effects). Parsons, instead, underlines the macro aspects of the issue, referring to the functioning of the general social system and to the role trust plays within it (Misztal 1996). Simmel describes exchanges as the crucial element of his model of society, which he defines as a system of individuals linked by interactions. According to him, each social interaction stems from a conceptualized exchange in terms of ‘a sacrifice in return for a gain’ (Simmel 1971: 51), which, in turn, becomes the basic constituent of society. Hence, conditions determining the existence and functioning of exchanges make an essential prerequisite as they guarantee the very essence of society’s functioning and perpetuation. One of the major conditions for the existence of exchanges
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The contribution of the different disciplinary contexts
is trust, which becomes one of the ‘synthetic forces’ of society (Simmel 1950: 326, quoted in Misztal 1996).15 Simmel underlines that the fundamental condition of trust’s existence is the existence of uncertainty. Only if it is impossible to make an accurate estimate of the probability of the occurrence of specific events in the future will there be a need to trust (or distrust, which, according to the author, has an equal informative power).16 Whoever has a perfect knowledge of the relational context (certainty) will not feel the need to trust. On the other hand, when one lacks any knowledge of a situation, trust will have no interpretative relevance. Therefore, it is necessary to be in intermediate situations of incomplete knowledge for trust to acquire some theoretical relevance (Gambetta 1988).17 If Simmel is particularly interested in the micro aspects of society’s functioning, as mentioned above, one of Parsons’ major objectives is the comprehension of the conditions determining the social order as a whole. This is guaranteed not only by the rationality of individual concerns and the existence of a system of externally imposed sanctions (micro aspects) but, above all, by a system of shared values. Hence, trust is seen by Parsons as the equivalent of solidarity, providing a general integration of society and its diverse roles and subsystems. Starting in the second half of the 1980s, some sociological contributions have analysed the concept of trust, applying the rational choice theory. Generally speaking, such a theory stems from the principle that every decision regarding single actions aimed at cooperation may be referred to a purely utilitarian rationale: the satisfaction of the subject’s system of preferences. Hence, decision-making can be traced back to the selection of the action that can maximize individual utility. When sociologists adopted this approach, they contextualized social life as the result of all (naturally rational) choices made by individuals. This has led to the achievement of an important objective in sociology studies, that is, the combination of the micro dimension (the level of individual choices) with the macro one (interpreting the system as a whole), which became a good alternative theory to the more traditional a priori approaches focused on macro-structural and functionalist aspects. According to Misztal (1996: 77), this lies at the basis of the popularity of the theory which, by formalizing individual choice models, succeeded in defining the functioning of the social system as a whole, hence becoming the ‘most general and elaborate individualistic theory within the framework of social sciences’ (Hetcher 1987: 30). This theory intends to connect the dimension of subjective choices with the conditioning exercised by the actions of others, borrowing some principles and tools of game theory. In fact, this theory tries to understand situations in which the maximization of personal utility depends on the
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actions of the other actors involved in the interaction. Thus, beside a clear utilitarian rationale being provided for the theory, the theoretical construction’s rigour and elegance are enhanced and it assumes a distinct rational and economic character rather than social. The influence of the economic matrix is not limited to the utilitarian approach and to the analytical tools (prevalently referring to game theory), but expands itself to the very definition of trust, which takes an ‘almost calculative’ connotation. In accordance with the above-mentioned approach, Gambetta (1989) defined trust as a specific level of probability that an agent assigns to the performance of a well-defined action by other agents (ibid.: 281). Such a definition provides for, on one hand, a purely – albeit subjective – rational connotation to the choice of trusting and, on the other, the fact that trust lies at the basis of cooperation propensity, which is a fundamental element to guarantee a social system functioning. Gambetta made another step forward in this approach by developing, together with Bacharach (Bacharach and Gambetta 1997, 2001), an interesting quantitative modelling of trust, inspired by game theory. The two authors highlighted the situations in which the signals intended to increase the counterpart’s trust may represent a sort of ‘trust-based mimicry’ generating a (false) opportunistic ‘trust façade’. Hence, the problem is whether to trust not only the subject per se or his cooperative propensity but also the message he sends (Six, 2004). In order to solve what is known as ‘a secondary problem of trust’, the authors rearranged the issue by using the conceptual tools of signalling games, developing once more a quantitative modelling. Coleman (1990) suggested a similar trust conceptualization. He considers trust as an intentional behaviour aimed at maximizing utility under uncertain conditions, thus reasserting the centrality of risk in attributing to trust a significant interpretative function. Specifically, the author related risk, and thus trust’s relevance, to the presence of a growing time lag in social exchanges. He stated that the temporal asymmetry in delivering mutual performances and, consequently, the impossibility of instantaneously monitoring the behaviours of others generate the risk triggering the need to trust. In fact, trust is put in subjects who will perform future actions that are not controllable ex ante at the time at which the trusting decision occurs. Actually, Coleman claimed that trust plays an increasingly critical role in society owing to the growing number of decisional situations characterized by time lag. Giddens (1990) too identified the temporal separation added to a spatial one (defined as ‘time–space distantness’) as one of the major elements underlying the passage from traditional to modern society, which appears implicitly more risky and, consequently, more trust demanding.18 The spread of digital networks and, above all, the diffusion
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The contribution of the different disciplinary contexts
of virtual intermediation increase the likelihood of such a situation. For instance, consider the time lag between the moment the customer types the order and pays for it and the time of delivery, or the geographical distance that separates suppliers from customers in a global digital economy. Within the ‘virtual’ relationship, such situations increase the need for trust contents and chunks of trust capable of neutralizing the related risks.19 To cope with such risks, Coleman (1990) pinpointed the need for a trust based not only on the cost–benefit rationale (where potential benefits are greater than potential costs), but also on an efficient sanction system that increases trust effectiveness. Coleman’s view of trust seems to be more calculative and rational – in spite of some limitations effectively summarized by Misztal (1996: 80) – than the view offered by Gambetta (1989) and the authors that contributed to his anthology. The two analytical approaches examined here – the psychological and sociological ones (see Figure 3.2) – have been effectively integrated by social psychologists (for example, Mayer et al. 1995), who proposed a synthesis between individual and psychological dimensions of trust (for example, Rotter 1980a, 1980b; Deutsch 1958, 1962) and its social aspect, referring to personal interactions. According to these authors, trust certainly represents a psychological construct, yet based on social interaction and, in more general terms, on the context in which the relationship takes place, which is both the element conditioning trust development and the source of learning. More recently a line of research using modal theory logics, inspired by rational choice theory, has modelled the decisional process that generates a trusting outcome. Such a modelling enables the construction – through the innovative use of artificial intelligence and neural network applications – of systems and experiments capable of simulating the individual choice process and trust-based behaviours. This provided significant analytical and interpretative cues for the way social groups function. A book edited by Castelfranchi and Tan (2001) collects contributions that apply this approach to virtual social systems – a field recently opened following the
PSYCHOLOGY
Personal characteristics (trustworthiness and propensity to trust) Situational elements (the prisoner’s dilemma and social dilemma)
SOCIOLOGY
Balancing social complexity and uncertainty Trust as social learning Rational choice theory: trust and probability
TRUST’S SOCIOPSYCHOLOGICAL DIMENSION
Figure 3.2 The beginning of trust’s socio-psychological dimension: an overview
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development of relationships in digital environments. In particular, Falcone and Castelfranchi (2001) propose a distinctive cognitive approach to trust finalized in the delegation decision that can be quantitatively formalized and applied in conformance with the principles of artificial intelligence. Thus, it is possible to define the interactional logics of hypothetical ‘virtual intelligent agents’ who have to make their own trust-based choices as humans do. The trust definition offered by the authors builds upon those based on probability, adding to Gambetta’s (1989) predictive dimension another one based on individual competencies, thus better clarifying the process of trust creation in virtual environments. This brief reconstruction of the sociological contributions, which as mentioned earlier naturally converge with those of psychology, shows how trust theories have developed in parallel with the growing complexity of social systems. Now, the virtual economy is making them absolutely critical, owing to the extreme amplification of time- and space-lags and the lack of trust’s traditional substrate identified in past relationships (the socalled ‘common ground’). The concept of trust in digital society and its creation mechanisms are indeed one of the most exciting frontiers of sociological (and many other) researches (Chapter 4, section 7). Further study of trust relationships within social systems has led to analysing trust’s role within the interdependencies developed in organizations and, more specifically, in firms viewed as social systems. Hence, organization disciplines, inspired by the principles of psychology and sociology, have focused on trust as a key concept of organization dynamics.
4. THE CONTRIBUTION OF ORGANIZATION STUDIES Organization theories have made a significant contribution to trust studies, analysing the construct at two analytical levels. First, according to psychology and sociology tradition, trust mechanisms have been examined referring to intra-organizational personal relations, that is, among peers, between subordinates and superiors, and within inter-functional teams. Subsequently, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the analysis has included inter-organizational relationships, examining further trust as a mechanism coordinating alliances, partnerships and, in more general terms, channel relations. In this context, there is evidence of cross-fertilization with other management disciplines, as will be seen later. With reference to the first area – that of organization behaviour – some studies have explored trust’s role in specific organizational structure typologies, investigating both the various trust needs (their quantity and type) of
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The contribution of the different disciplinary contexts
different organizational typologies (functional, divisional, matrix-type, network-based ones), and the impact and costs of a possible lack of trust (for example, Powell 1996).20 Other researchers have interpreted personal relationships at the micro level (for example Six, 2004), that is, among peers or between manager and assistant, underlining the critical character of mutual trust as an antecedent of cooperative behaviours and organizational climate. Some scholars have proposed articulated models focused on the relationship between managers and their subordinates, such as Whitener et al. (1998), which examined what induces the managers to exhibit behaviours that promote their supervisees’ trust. The innovative element in this model may be found in the perspective adopted, which differentiates it from more traditional views. The latter, in fact, assume an assistant-based perspective; hence, they are mainly concerned with establishing the elements perceived by the supervisee as expressions of their manager’s reliability. To the contrary, Whitener et al.’s model explores organizational, individual and relational antecedents of the (trustee) manager’s trusting behaviours, which trigger and promote trust development in his/her subordinates (trustors). The trustee is seen as the ‘activator’ of the trust relation,21 which is responsible for fulfilling both organizational prerequisites (structure, functioning mechanisms and cultural climate) and relational requirements (referring to initial interactions, expectations developed by the counterpart, and exchange costs) required for the creation of an adequate trust climate and a good relationship with his/her assistants.22 The third topic addressed by organization behaviour studies refers to trust building mechanisms within specific contexts, such as teamwork and inter-functional groups. The members have to manage uncertain and risky activities such as those needed to produce singles events or develop new products, often in a set time lag. Within the team coordination mechanisms studies, trust and communication have been studied in depth as the mechanisms that best explain the group activity success rate. A free circulation of information within the group improves work efficiency, promotes alignment, increases connectivity, and enhances performance (Dougherty 1990, 1992; Johannessen et al. 1997).23 The specific elements of teamwork are: (1) task impermanence – these groups are often formed in response to a finite project, without future prospects for other joint activities; (2) high uncertainty level of the assigned task, requiring a strong interdependence among members; (3) team/group members’ significant heterogeneity. In fact, teams are often composed of individuals who do not know each other (without significant prior relationships) and have diversified cultural and knowledge backgrounds. Obviously, these conditions are hardly conducive to a prompt development of trust relationships among the involved subjects. In these cases, Meyerson et al. (1996) suggest the possibility of resorting to a
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specific trust typology, namely the so-called ‘swift trust’, enabling the prompt functioning of temporary teams. This is an almost paradoxical type of trust as it is achieved in a very short time, thus allowing the group to meet its goal in a reasonable time-frame. Great attention is currently paid to trust’s role in facilitating virtual teamwork, where team members cooperate to perform a common task while lacking common ground and significant past relationships. In this case, both the cultural and geographic distance separating the members and the absence of non-computer-mediated interaction and personal communication channels compound the problem, making coordination more difficult and, consequently, trust more critical than in the case of traditional temporary groups.24 Team members contribute to knowledge production with their individual competencies and as ‘carriers’ of the knowledge generated with external actors. Therefore, the activity does not end within the firm but, owing to the growing cognitive work specialization that characterizes our economy, also includes managing relationships with other subjects. Hence, even organization theories have broadened their scope in understanding trust that develops in inter-firm relationships. In particular, research has been focused either on partnerships and alliances or on buyer–seller dyads within channel or vertical relationships. These are indeed the themes which have triggered most interaction and cross-fertilization among organization scholars and strategic management models and theories – highly concerned with partnership and joint-venture governance systems (see section 7) – and marketing literature exploring trust’s role in buyer–seller relationships. In the literature, the models applied to the first issue – alliances – highlight, on one hand, the importance of trust to the functioning of alliances and, on the other, the elements enabling an adequate level of mutual trust. To this purpose, the model proposed by Das and Teng (1998, 2001) exemplified the modalities by which trust and the traditional control mechanisms jointly contribute to enhance an actor’s confidence in the partner’s propensity to cooperate. Figure 3.3 synthetically illustrates that model. It shows how trust building mechanisms in alliances (for example, risk taking decisions, fairness guaranty, transparency and intensity of communication, and inter-firm adaptation), together with control mechanisms (that is, goal definition, structural agreements and cultural mixing) concurrently affect the levels of both trust and control,25 making it possible to rely on the partner’s cooperative behaviour. Das and Teng underlined the different configurations of inter-firm relationships derived from the different mix of trust and control levels, thus defining different types of alliances that require differentiated levels of confidence. Such typologies range from joint ventures, based on a high
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The contribution of the different disciplinary contexts
TRUST LEVEL TRUST BUILDING Risk taking Equity preservation Communication Inter-firm adaptation
CONFIDENCE IN PARTNER’S COOPERATION
CONTROL MECHANISMS Goal definition Structural Specifications Cultural blending
CONTROL LEVEL
Source: Das and Teng (1998: 497)
Figure 3.3 Impact of trust building and control mechanisms on trust in the partner propensity for mutual cooperation and generating a strong need for both control and trust, to non-equity based alliances, which do not require high reliance on the partner’s willingness to cooperate and, therefore, are not particularly demanding in terms of control and trust mechanisms (as they rely on minority equity-based alliance systems). This confirms the correlation between the different relational typologies and structures on one hand and the different trust types on the other. This issue has already been mentioned in Chapter 1 (section 5) and will be further analysed in Chapter 6, which discusses trust’s role within different market relationships. Many contributions – mostly offered by organization and, more specifically, strategic management scholars – deal with trust’s role in alliances and joint ventures. As will be further presented later, one of the main goals of these studies is the integration of traditional relationship governance mechanisms with trust-based systems and, more generally, systems based on self-enforcing coordination mechanisms. These studies formulate hypotheses and general models demonstrating the beneficial effect of trust on alliance and joint-venture governance mechanisms, while evincing the limits of the transactional costs model (for example, Ring and Van de Ven 1992; Zaheer and Venkatraman 1995; Gulati 1995). These researches are often associated with empirical tests such as those which investigated trust’s role in relationships in several countries (for example, Cullen et al. 2000) and different sectors, such as industrial machinery and furniture
65
Multidisciplinary studies on trust
Inter-organizational trust
Negotiation
Performance
Interpersonal trust
Conflict
Source: Zaheer, McEvily and Perrone (1998: 154)
Figure 3.4 Distinction between interpersonal and inter-organizational trust: a relational exchange structural model (Lane and Bachmann 1998) or the car manufacturing industry (Dyer 1997; Sako and Helper 1998). These contributions underline the need to closely consider – in addition to economic and structural aspects – the soft side of alliances and supply chain management, often conceptualized by means of variables related to the partner’s commitment and, above all, to trust.26 Recently, a new and interesting research trend has emerged in organization studies, focusing in particular on relationship management. It stems from the observation that inter-firm relationships are managed by individuals who – at a personal level – represent the firm (‘gatekeepers’ as conceptualized by Allen (1971)). Consequently, the need to consider at the same time both the personal and the inter-organizational dimensions of trust, delving into the interactions between these two layers, emerged. Zaheer et al. (1998) have offered a model that discriminates between the inter-organizational dimension of trust (defined in terms of a leap of faith) and the interpersonal one. These dimensions are conceptualized as two different constructs, following an empirical study demonstrating their different effect on negotiation costs, conflict level and, in the last instance – through the direct and mediated impact of the previous variables – on the exchange relationship performance (Figure 3.4). By the same token, in marketing studies, Jap and Weitz (1993) and Jap (1999, 2001a) have made some first attempts to jointly consider both analytical levels of channel relationships, trying to clarify how individual trust developed between buyer and seller might affect relationships at the inter-organizational level. Similar attempts have been made by Doney and Cannon (1997), referring to the industrial goods market. These models,
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The contribution of the different disciplinary contexts
TRUST’S SOCIOPSYCHOLOGICAL
ORGANIZATION (OB)
Trust among subjects at the intraorganizational level (enabling factors and drivers) Trust among temporary workgroups Relation between trust and control
ORGANIZATION (INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL)
Trust in alliances and partnerships (evolutionary models and antecedents) Interaction between inter-organizational and interpersonal trust
DIMENSION
TRUST’S ECONOMIC DIMENSION
Figure 3.5
Trust in organization studies: an overview
dealing with trust in typical buyer–seller market relationships, will be further examined in the next chapter. Organization studies, whose contributions are summarized in Figure 3.5, highlight the construct’s complexity and various application levels (interorganizational, interpersonal and institutional). The same complexity characterizes marketing studies as well. There the participants of the dyadic relationship can be quite diversified, thus offering a considerable variety of relational typologies. To this purpose, it is also worth considering that the relational interface does not always consist of a subject (organization or individual) but may also be represented by its direct manifestations, including brands, products, signs and real or virtual stores, thus making the understanding process more complex still.27
5. TRUST’S ECONOMIC DIMENSION: THE RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY According to economic studies, trust has been an important lubricant of economic exchange relations and an effective transaction governance mechanism (Arrow 1974). In the context of neoclassical economic theoretical assumptions, which hypothesize transparency of information and a perfect individual rationality, trust plays a minor role since there are no uncertain situations. Often the term is associated with a purely social matrix, not easily integrated into the theoretical economic pattern. More recently, some contributions applying game theory principles and agency theory to exchange relationships have highlighted the critical aspects of trust in economic relations.28
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Customer
The customer does not enter the dealership A: Sells a lemon The customer enters the dealership
Profits Salesperson Dishonest
Honest
0
0
0
–b
g
m
1–b
a
d
B: Sells a good car
g > a > 0;
0 < b < 1;
d > 0; d > m
Source: adapted from Dasgupta (1989: 79)
Figure 3.6
The decisional tree of a car salesperson
Dasgupta (1989) has explicitly conceptualized trust as an ‘economic good’ demonstrating the value associated with reputation.29 His initial hypothesis maintains that individuals, guided by their rationality, willingly decide to be cooperative or reliable in order to achieve a specific goal, that is, to build a reputation that may provide them with future economic advantages. To demonstrate the economic value of reputation and the rationale motivating its building, Dasgupta proposed a model based on a game between buyer and seller, characterized by incomplete information (in the absence of seller’s guarantees, or other trust substitutes). As an example, he adopted the traditional car dealer situation. A decision-making situation in which a potential customer is buying a used car at a dealership that offers good cars as well as lemons is assumed. The dealer knows exactly which car is which. The customer, who is assumed to be the first to make a decision, has two options: to enter the dealership, buy a car (selected by the car dealer) and pay the price requested or not to go in and, hence, not make the purchase. The latter option offers no pay-off to either subject involved in the simulation. Once the customer has entered the dealership, the seller has two options as well, that is, either sell a ‘lemon’ (option A) or sell a good car (option B). Each column in Figure 3.6 shows the outcome of each of the alternatives respectively: ●
for the customer, whose preference order is: to buy a good car (1b), not to buy it (0) and as a last resort – to be avoided as such – buy a lemon (b);
68
The contribution of the different disciplinary contexts ● ●
for the dishonest salesperson, who, above all, prefers to sell a lemon (g), followed by selling a good car (a) and, as a last resort, not to sell (0); for the honest salesperson, who prefers selling a good car (d) instead of a lemon (m).
The assumption is that the customer does not know a priori whether the salesperson is honest (hence, trustworthy) or dishonest (untrustworthy) and therefore s/he ascribes a subjective probability (p) to the salesperson’s honesty. In such a decision-making context, p represents the salesperson’s honest reputation, or – consistently with trust definitions proposed by Gambetta (1989) and Coleman (1990) – the likelihood that s/he will behave in the customer’s interests. If we assume that all of the above data are common knowledge, the customer will have zero profits if s/he decides not to go into the car dealership. Conversely, s/he will gain an expected profit equal to the pay-off difference associated with options A and B, weighted by the salesperson’s reputation probability, namely p(1b)(1p) b, or pb after simplification, if s/he decides to enter and make a purchase. Consequently, it is easily deduced that the customer’s decision to enter the dealership is essentially linked to the value of p, corresponding to the salesperson’s reputation value. The above choice will occur only when the value (the ‘probability’) of the positive reputation is greater than b (the negative pay-off associated with purchasing a lemon). This proves that trust is an economic commodity fundamental to the conclusion of an exchange, and that salespersons have every interest in developing it, so that it constantly exceeds the value of b. Studies based on rational choice theory suggest considering not only instant decisions made at a given time but also the possibility that future events might occur and condition the actors’ past behaviours. To this effect, they maintain that the beginning of cooperation between two individuals – when it is reputation-dependent – should be traced back to the eventuality that they might meet on a future occasion. If the parties do not expect future involvements, trust is bound to lose much of its interpretive relevance. Instead, when the relationship between two parties is ongoing, the interdependence of subsequent events makes reputation useful. Therefore, a choice made at a given time determines not only the outcome of the single move then made, but it also affects all future decisions of both players. Hence, the future casts its shadow onto the present, affecting the current strategic situation (Axelrod 1984: 18). This is the typical effect of trust, therefore described as a shadow of the future. Applying the analytical tools of repeated game theory, Axelrod (ibid.) demonstrates that reputation derived from past cooperative behaviours is fundamental to the onset of reciprocity actions. In particular, in order to
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maximize the joint outcome, it appears fundamental to start a repeated game, clearly demonstrating cooperative behaviour from the first move and subsequently reciprocating the opponent’s behaviour, implementing a ‘quid pro quo’ strategy.30 One of the most frequent critiques of the economic matrix studies analysed thus far – in line with sociology models that apply the rational choice theory – concerns their real object of study. In fact, it has been stated that these works do not explore the trust concept, but – also as a consequence of the analytical tools employed – concentrate instead on cooperation decisions, making them implicitly coincide with the trust construct. This position cannot be fully supported because – as will be demonstrated later – the two concepts do not coincide. Cooperation may, in fact, result from a rational decision, the actual trust placed in a subject notwithstanding.
6. WILLIAMSON’S NEO-INSTITUTIONALIST MODEL: THE THEORETICAL IRRELEVANCE OF TRUST Transactional costs theory has fostered several studies which are particularly useful to better understand the scope of the debate on trust’s relevance (Williamson 1979, 1985). Initially this theory was aimed at detecting the most appropriate economic and contractual safeguards in order to reduce the threat (or, rather, the risk) of opportunistic behaviours. Such behaviours, defined as ‘self-interest seeking with guile’ (Williamson 1975: 26), represent one of the ‘taken for granted’ hypotheses of the theory, as an expression of a peculiar human behaviour occurring whenever a subject initiates an economic transaction. Consistently with the assumption of opportunistic behaviour, at first the trust concept was completely ignored by the theory. In fact, if one assumes that the other party always tries to favour his/her interests (pursuing them with guile), it is unthinkable to trust him/her. The meaning of trust presumes exactly the opposite of Williamson’s hypothesis, namely that one party – albeit having the option of acting opportunistically – behaves to protect the counterpart’s interests, even when they are inconsistent with his/hers. Therefore, transactional costs theory adopts a stance of distrust toward the behaviour of others – which determines a score of relevant consequences at the interpretive level. In subsequent works, Williamson (1985) appears to reappraise this hypothesis by introducing the concept of transactional atmosphere, which somehow seems to integrate some of the meanings of trust. Williamson’s concept seems to represent a factor capable of economizing transactional costs by reducing the information needs of transaction governance (Mutti
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The contribution of the different disciplinary contexts
1987: 228). More recently, in 1993, the author decisively refused what appeared to be a common trend in transactional costs theory, definitely excluding the trust concept from his theoretical framework. An analysis of the reasons underlying that choice will help in understanding the very concept of trust and the role it plays in economic relationships. In response to the numerous critiques of the excessive ‘opportunistic rationality’ of his model, Williamson demonstrated what he defined as the theoretical irrelevance of the trust concept. The key to his methodological proposal is the concept of transactional cost and the transaction governance mechanisms most appropriate to defend oneself from the typical ‘widespread opportunism’ of current economic systems. Williamson (1993) replies to those who criticized the extreme rationality of this approach with a four-pronged defence: ●
●
●
●
First, he demonstrated the integrity of the rational economic approach (or rational choices), as proven by the success of this perspective when applied to other disciplines receptive to the trust issue, including contract theory, political sciences, sociology – which adopts rational choices theory in direct reference to the trust issue – and the conceptualization of human choices (Becker 1976). Secondly, the author delved into the trust concept, subdividing its various logical levels. He began analysing the so-called calculative trust, considered as the only type compatible with his theoretical model. It is assimilated to risk, which constitutes – according to the author – the very core of the trust concept. In fact, social science scholars have considered the occurrences in which trust is relevant as a subclass of risk-taking situations.31 This shows the inner contradiction of the calculative trust concept, and the possibility of tackling risk by resorting to the most efficient contractual safeguards.32 Thirdly, different types of trust – besides the calculative one – are taken into consideration, judged inconsequential to the comprehension of the transaction, and described as a ‘contradiction in terms’ (Williamson 1993: 463). Institutional trust is analysed first. It is defined as a type of ‘composite’ trust (for example, societal trust, political trust, and so forth), and it is maintained that it can be easily traced back to the exogenous environmental variables of the transactional costs model, still under consideration in order to define the most appropriate transaction governance mechanisms within the framework of the calculative approach. Lastly, Williamson analysed the issue of personal trust. He defined it as ‘nearly non-calculative trust’, showing that even the willingness to behave in a non-calculative way is a rational decision. Furthermore,
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the author maintained that pure non-calculative trust situations should be considered as true exceptions within the framework of economic transaction, if they exist at all. True personal trust, seen in its emotional dimension, according to the author is related only to affective and friendly relationships, and not to commercial transactions. The latter are always pervaded by calculative rationality linked to the risk concept; hence the trust concept does not have the relevance that many disciplines ascribe to it.33 Williamson’s criticism of trust, considered an ‘elusive notion’, has triggered an unexpectedly mild debate. In fact, many authors have continued to consider trust as a fundamental aspect of inter-organizational relationships. By means of in-depth empirical research they have further proven the significance of the concept in interpreting the evolution of firm interdependencies, and also as a variable mediating the relational interpretive models. Conversely, the calculative dimension of trust has also been described as a type unrelated to the true essence of the trust concept. If the decision of trusting is a matter of mere economic convenience, one is not talking about real trust but of a rational decision based on the convenience to trust, because the potential advantages of the decision are greater than possible harm. It might be possible to refer to it as ‘initial’ trust within the framework of the evolution cycle of inter-organizational relations, whereby the decision to trust – in the absence of reliable information on the counterpart – is founded on a mere convenience calculation. Williamson’s contribution (1993) has certainly raised doubts about the consistency of the construct within a rational choice theory that favours calculative trust. We believe that the concept of calculative trust is entirely consistent with the model’s conceptual structure, especially when considering its proposed probabilistic-rational definition. However, disagreement emerges with Williamson’s attempt to trace back the exchange contents exclusively to an economic and rational dimension within the boundaries of economic risk management. Actually the overlap between the two theories – the rational choice theory and the sociological one – has generated some confusion. It is not by chance that, at the beginning of his study, Williamson refers to Gambetta (1989), Coleman (1990) and, more generally, to the sociologists who advocated the principles of rational choices theory, rationalizing trust as an economic-probabilistic (albeit subjective) calculation. If it is partly acceptable to consider this a type of ‘opportunist trust’, it is nevertheless impossible to ignore all of the other trust typologies proposed by other disciplines (‘hyphenated’ in Williamson’s parlance) and which neither have a purely rational matrix – although cognitive (for example, Falcone and Castelfranchi 2001) – nor are only emotional
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The contribution of the different disciplinary contexts
in nature. Furthermore, it is equally impossible to ignore the numerous empirical studies that have proven the significance of the construct while comparing alternative models, not including it. In addition to the abovementioned considerations, and to clarify the importance of trust in exchange relationships, it is important to synthesize some of the main replies to Williamson’s ‘provocation’: ●
●
●
●
A first group of scholars refuted one of the initial assumptions of transactional costs theory, namely opportunism, disagreeing with the excessively rationalistic and under-socialized view proposed by Williamson. The transactional costs model is founded on the assumption that the individual is completely aware of his rationality limits and capable of differentiating economic relations from social relationships (for example, Cummings and Bromiley 1996; Lane 1998: 6). Another group of authors accepted Williamson’s criticism, considering the trust definition – calculative and probabilistic in nature – proposed at first by the author,34 but subsequently kept its distance from a calculative concept of trust in se, undermining the main assumption of his logical argument.35 Some authors maintained that the theoretical framework of transactional costs is neither very ductile nor capable of assimilating social matrixes such as trust. In fact, Williamson (1993) tried to translate socio-economic principles into a purely economic language. Hence the attempted expanding of the interpretive capacity of the economic scheme to social issues enhances the reductionist feature of the model much more than when the exploration is limited to the economic variables. A last group of authors, following Gambetta’s trust definition (1989), proved that the mere calculative dimension is inadequate to understand the reality of economic relations among individuals.36
Some transactional costs theory proponents have adopted a different approach from the one chosen by Williamson (1993). As will be seen in the next section, they tried to incorporate trust instances within a more general framework, contemplating both the social and economic dimensions of business relations.37 Actually, shortly after the introduction of transactional costs theory, some breakthroughs broadened the conceptual horizon, encompassing social aspects and moving away from the theory’s early economic milieu.38 This happened at first with the concept of clan and by proposing intermediate forms of transaction governance, as suggested by Ouchi (1980). The latter helped to reduce the economic mechanistic patina over transactional costs theory by introducing the concept of serial equity,
Multidisciplinary studies on trust ECONOMICS AND RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY TRUST’S ECONOMIC
73
Trust as probability of cooperation (game theory) Reputation’s economic value Repeated games: trust as shadow of the future
DIMENSION
TCA
Figure 3.7
Calculative trust, replaceable by the risk concept Irrelevance of personal and institutional trust First integration attempts between economic and social dimension
The economic dimension of trust: an overview
which sanctions the broadening of the analytical landscape, shifting from transaction examination to relationship investigation.39 Subsequently, even the studies belonging to the social capital approach underlined the need to consider the social and trusting dimension of relations. The critical issue lies in the fact that such concepts do not fit into the economic scheme proposed by the TCA model. Hence, later developments were inspired by transaction costs theory, but moved away from its principles. The instant economic mechanism highlighted in transaction costs, representing the core of the entire model, was integrated or replaced by other constructs more consistent with the social dimension. Consequently, highly structured multidimensional models developed. These are more prone to embrace social concepts, such as trust (for example, Powell 1990; Zaheer and Venkatraman 1995; Dyer 1997; Uzzi 1997). Figure 3.7 shows a synthesis of contents developed (in this section and in the previous one) with reference to trust’s economic dimension.
7. INTEGRATION OF TRUST RELATIONSHIP’S SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS: THE ROLE OF ‘STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT’ Strategic management contributions attempted to integrate the economic and social dimensions of relationship, specifically referring them to the relation governance mechanism, along two main paths: ● ●
On one hand, integration efforts were the results of rethinking the relationship concept. On the other hand, a synthesis was derived starting from the trust concept itself, regarded as capable of directly integrating in se (thus avoiding the consideration of the relationship concept) the transaction’s economic and social instances.40
74
7.1
The contribution of the different disciplinary contexts
Trust Relationship’s Multidimensional Nature
A first series of contributions tries to integrate the relationship’s two analytical dimensions (economic and social), using wider interpretative models that allow considering them both at once. Yet, these contributions link trust only to the relationship’s social dimension. This is viewed together with the economic one and thus is enmeshed with other transaction governance mechanisms which have a more rational matrix. On this matter, there are two modalities by which integration is sought: 1.
2.
Trust is proposed as an element capable of substituting (albeit partially) the transaction governance mechanisms already indicated by the transactional cost theory (thus considering it a determinant of the governing structures) (for example, Heide and John 1992; Gulati 1995; Chiles and McMackin 1996; Dyer 1997). Alternatively, trust becomes a stand-alone transaction governance mechanism, with a role that complements and supplements those proposed by the transactional cost theory (for example, Bradach and Eccles 1989; Sako 1991, 1998; Zaheer and Venkatraman 1995; Sako and Helper 1998).
In the first case, trust’s presence reduces the safeguard level needed to counteract the risk of opportunistic behaviours. For example, it has been shown that the greater the trust existing between two partners joined by an alliance, the less the need for equity-based governance mechanisms. Also, the greater trust’s presence within a certain transactional context, the less is the need to use transactions’ hierarchical governance mechanisms. In this case, trust acts as an attenuator of the safeguard level against opportunism, becoming an important determinant in choosing the most appropriate transaction governance mechanism. In particular, transactional costs theory establishes the central role of relation-specific investments in understanding the magnitude of contractual and relational safeguards. The hypothesis is that any increase in relation-specific investments determines a transactional cost increase as well, as a result of the need to set up more complex transaction governance mechanisms and more significant safeguards, capable of lessening opportunistic behaviours associated with specialized assets. Contrary to Williamson’s theory, a comparison study of supply chain relationships between US and Japanese car markets has shown that an increase of asset specificity causes a reduction in transactional costs. In fact, while linked to the specificity level of relational resources, transactional costs can vary independently from the said resources (Dyer 1997: 539). Such an effect can be associated with several phenomena, among
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which stands out the use of non-contractual coordination mechanisms based on self-enforcing safeguards (such as the so-called goodwill trust, reputation and financial hostages). Unlike contracts that have limited validity, these mechanisms remain active over undefined time horizons (ibid.: 544).41 Non-contractual coordination mechanisms add credibility to one’s promises, and determine both a transactional cost reduction and the availability of increasing the relation-specific investments. In turn, the latter operate as pledges, increasing one’s very credibility. These consequences maximize what Dyer (ibid.) defined as transactional value (not cost), increasing the joint performance level of the parties. This in synthesis shows how, in exercising a positive effect on the parties’ credibility, trust also induces a specific investment increase and a transactional costs reduction, improving the overall value generated by the relationship (a paradoxical and unexplainable result according to Williamson’s theoretical framework). This should suffice to show how the inclusion of the trust construct within transactional cost theory allows understanding of phenomena that are otherwise difficult to understand. Similarly, while discussing alliances, Gulati (1995) notes that the familiarity developed by subjects who had past relational experiences induces the parties to choose non-equity-based transaction governance forms, contrary to situations in which prior experiences are absent. Behind this assumption an implicit hypothesis emerges: familiarity is at the basis of trust, which in turn allows a choice of transaction governance less burdened by safeguards.42 This opens the door to interesting implications in terms of governance mechanism evolution at the various stages of relationship development (for example, Zajac and Olsen 1993; Ring and Van de Ven 1994; Gulati 1995; Joshi and Stump 1999). Another group of authors considered trust as a transaction governance mechanism which is autonomous but not as formal as those proposed by transactional cost theory. In this case trust is added to transaction governance traditional mechanisms (hierarchy, market, long-term contracts). Again, it does not replace them, but makes them more effective, while also increasing learning potential and relational performances.43 On this topic, an empirical test was run by Zaheer and Venkatraman in 1995. It showed that integrating trust with more traditional economic determinants of transaction governance mechanisms (such as asset specificity, uncertainty and mutual investments level) induces a better understanding of the relationship governance mechanisms in terms of both structural dimensions (semi-integration level) and process (joint action level developed within the relationship). Demonstrating the significant difference between trust and opportunism analytical determinants, Sako and Helper (1998) clarified that trust and the other safeguard mechanisms against opportunism are not
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The contribution of the different disciplinary contexts
simple direct substitutes for each other. On the contrary, they are complementary elements of the relationship. A reduction of opportunism in a relationship is not equivalent to an increase of trust, because these two elements refer to different analytical determinants. Therefore, they need to be developed concurrently. The above integration attempts also have different operative modes. In particular, some authors start by criticizing Williamson’s theory foundation. By far the most common critique is on the adoption of opportunism as a prerequisite and driving element of the theoretical framework logic and on its normative implications (for example, Bradach and Eccles 1989; Ghoshal and Moran 1996; Nooteboom 1996). Transactional cost theory considers opportunism as the real cause of market failures and the element determining the birth of organizations.44 In particular, Ghoshal and Moran (1996), exploring the concept’s less evident implications, state that its normative application is quite dangerous (‘bad for practice’), because of the ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ effect (that is, the mere hypothesis of opportunism triggers that very same behaviour). Foreshadowing Dyer’s proposal (1997), Zajac and Olsen (1993) called for a shift from an exclusive focus on transactional costs to an explicit evaluation of transactional value. Noting TCA45 limitations, they introduced a transaction value analysis (TVA) model, which maximizes the parties’ output while explicitly considering their joint process of value production.46 Chiles and McMackin (1996) established that, considering relationships steeped in trust, it is possible to significantly modify many of the basic assumptions of transactional cost theory (limited rationality, presence of opportunism and people’s neutrality toward risk). In particular, trust is shown to reduce the likelihood of opportunism and allow the selection of transaction governance expressions featuring less contractual safeguards. Trust also affects the limited rationality level, reducing complexity and uncertainty regarding the behaviour of others involved in economic relations (Zand 1972; Chiles and McMackin 1996). Therefore ‘economies in limited rationality’ are made, lowering the transactional risk level47 and extending the trust-associated market efficiency as a transaction governance mechanism to idiosyncratic investment levels much higher than those typical of trustless situations. 7.2
Trust as an Integrating Mechanism Between Relational Dimensions
A second group of contributions tried the integrating gambit. Far from reacting against the previous one, these attempts appear to be their natural evolution, orienting the synthesis more toward the trust construct than the relationship concept. In fact, trust is considered an effective coordination
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mechanism for both economic and social dimensions. It is no longer sufficient to show that in a given relationship the social dimension (ruled by trust) is present together with the consolidated economic dimension (to which apply transaction governance mechanisms derived from economics). Now, trust itself can help in coordinating even the economic dimension of transactions, integrating within both relational aspects. For instance, Zucker (1986) conceptualized trust in social terms, as well as Kramer et al. (1996), but stated that a somewhat calculative element colours all types of trust behaviour. Similarly, Shapiro et al. (1992) and Lewicki and Bunker (1995) integrated economic and psychological views and defined trust as a state that, in a risky situation, implies a positive expectation toward the actions and motivations of others. These expectations, detailed in Chapter 6, can be based on prize or punishment systems underlying the other party’s behaviour (calculative dimension), as well as the predictability of his/her actions, or a complete internalization of his/her desires and intentions. Trust can well be characterized by contents based on economic expediency (especially during the early stages of the relationship’s evolution). Nevertheless, in time and because of the recursiveness of relational interdependencies, it develops social and psychological contents (for example, Bhattacharya et al. 1998). Considering the importance of these integration efforts, we believe that market relationships represent a valid field of research for determining the analytical relevance of trust. If psychology, sociology and organization studies naturally tend to favour the relationships’ soft aspect and economicsinspired works are more focused on the calculative-rational dimension, marketing contributions can provide the needed synthesis between these two analytical dimensions. Such a need has been clearly felt in regard to channel relations (for example, Anderson and Narus 1990; Jap 1999, 2001b) and industrial market relationships (for example, Håkansson and Snehota 1989; Ferrero 1992; Iacobucci 1996). In these areas, a greater sensitivity toward the cooperative dimension has long induced the definition of models that harmonize economic-functional and socio-political aspects. The following chapter discusses these facets in an attempt to clarify the role of trust within market relationships between buyer and seller and in all types of marketing and channel partnerships.
NOTES 1.
As we will see in the next chapter, marketing scholars are also interested in exploring existing relations between firms and customers, attempting to interpret trust’s role in the relationship established between a firm, its sales staff, stores and brand, on one hand, and the shopper or buyer, on the other.
78 2. 3.
The contribution of the different disciplinary contexts For further studies and examples on trust’s role with regard to the prisoner’s dilemma, see Rocco (2001b: 83 ff.). Deutsch (1958: 266) defines trust as follows: ‘An individual may be said to have trust in the occurrence of an event if he expects its occurrence and his expectation leads to behavior which he perceives to have greater negative motivational consequences if the expectation is not confirmed than positive motivational consequences if it is confirmed.’ An example by Deutsch (1962: 303) accurately clarifies the terms of the above-mentioned definition. A mother who has to leave the child with a babysitter makes a typical trusting choice. It is assumed that the mother: (a)
is aware that her choice may determine positive or negative consequences for herself and her child; (b) realizes that such consequences are determined only by the babysitter’s behaviour; (c) is aware that the possible damage due to trust betrayal is undoubtedly greater than the advantage derived by the babysitter’s reliable behaviour. 4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9. 10.
11. 12.
It is interesting – also considering the social implications involved – to note that ‘the development of such a generalized attitude may be learned directly from the behavior of parents, teachers, peers, etc., and also from verbal statements regarding others made by significant people or trusted source of communication such as newspaper and television. It is ironic that we can learn to distrust large groups of people without personal experience validating such distrust, because people who are themselves trusted teach distrust’ (Rotter 1967: 653, emphasis added). Such an indicator is structured in a series of items expressed using Likert’s scales, empirically verified through face validity, reliability and construct validity tests. Likert’s scales are an indirect mode of detecting individual perceptions, based on the request of an agreement/disagreement judgement regarding given affirmations. Rotter’s methodology has been revised and refined in order to highlight the specificity of some relational contexts. An example is the doctor/patient relationship examined by Anderson and Dedrick (1990) or the Dyadic Trust Scale, proposed by Larzelere and Huston (1980) to pinpoint mutual trust in close sentimental and affective relationships. Of course, measurements proposed by psychologists have considerably developed through time and have become new frontiers of research in trust literature. Lewis and Weigert (1985: 976) maintain that there may be a risk of assimilating trust to one of the many psychological states conceptualized by doctrine (for example, hope, love, faith, behaviour prediction, and so forth), thus inducing scholars to adopt inappropriate experimental models and empirical control methods that limit the phenomenon interpretation. Lewis and Weigert (1985: 686) are extremely explicit on this: ‘We see that the primary function of trust is sociological rather than psychological, since individuals would have no occasion or need to trust apart from social relationship. In addition, we would like to argue that, like its function, the bases on which trust rests are primarily social as well.’ An exhaustive review of sociological studies on trust can be found in Misztal (1996) and Sztompka (1999). Actually, by analysing contributions prior to Luhmann’s and Barber’s it clearly appears that the concept of trust had already been explored by sociologists, yet not in monographs devoted exclusively to it. The continuity between the two authors’ works is particularly evident and becomes even more interesting if one considers that Barber – as he himself states (1983: 5) – became acquainted with Luhmann’s monographic study in an advanced stage of his theoretical formulation. Barber (ibid.: 9) suggests a definition of expectation as a system of meanings associated with the system of choices triggering the subject’s actions and reactions (effective from the rational viewpoint and morally and emotionally appropriate). The tendency to classify trust into several typologies is further confirmed by other sociologists, such as Lewis and Weigert (1985), whose contribution will be explored in detail in Chapter 6 (section 6).
Multidisciplinary studies on trust 13.
14.
15.
16. 17. 18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
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Garfinkel (1967) had already examined in depth the concept of trust as ‘expectation of persistence of moral social order’. In particular, the author conducted empirical research based on experimental methodology to prove the actual existence of this type of trust, and the difficulty and impossibility of coexisting without an appropriate level of trust in the social order. Lacking this type of trust, it would be rather complicated, if not impossible, to perform even the simplest daily actions. The consequences of 11 September 2001 may be seen especially at this level of trust, by undermining the pre-established social order each one implicitly trusts. This type of trust has made it possible for a small terrorist cell to circumvent the security systems of two major institutions – the aviation and the postal systems – implementing actions beyond common sense and social order. Consequently, this undermined the institutional trust level in regard to what were considered routine activities. This is the goal of those who aim at destabilizing public order through ‘uncertainty strategies’, as interestingly exemplified by Gambetta (1992) in his reconstruction of the Sicilian Mafia. Similar effects may occur also in food adulterations as in the ‘methanol case’ in the Italian wine market and the ‘mad cow’ case in the fresh meat market. According to Simmel, to better understand the concept of trust it is worth exploring the function of money in exchange, as it plays a fundamental symbolic role replacing, albeit in more abstract terms, the personal contacts typical of traditional societies. For this tool to be effective, it is fundamental to trust its function and the economic system fostering it. Simmel, in fact, maintains that money is only a promise that the exchange will be honoured (Simmel 1978: 179). See Chapter 6 (section 6.4) for differences and analogies between the trust and distrust concepts. ‘Trust is . . . unprovable, based on knowledge and non-knowledge since it involves a degree of cognitive familiarity with the object of trust which lies somewhere between total knowledge and total ignorance’ (Simmel 1950: 318, quoted in Misztal 1996: 50). Giddens isolates two different categories of trust, namely trust in people (face-to-face commitment) and the trust in abstract systems (faceless commitment), thus discriminating between the personal and the institutional levels. He suggests defining trust as ‘confidence in the reality of a person or system, regarding a given set of outcomes or events, when that confidence expresses a faith in the probity or love of another, or in the correctness of abstract principles’ (Giddens 1990: 34). On this issue, Falcone and Castelfranchi (2001: 55) state: ‘with the growing impact of e-commerce distance trust building becomes more and more important, and better models of trust and deception are needed’. On the same subject see also Tan and Santosa (2001), who proposed a model explaining the trust gaps that hinder first transactions in e-commerce (see Chapter 4, section 7). It has been underlined that, in the case of functional typologies, the lack of trust reduces efficiency; in divisional typologies, it impacts effectiveness, thus determining higher costs; in matrixes, the typology itself fails; and in network-based structures, the lack of trust may lead to the failure of networked firms, nullifying their co-evolution (Creed and Miles 1996: 26). Whitener et al. (1998: 527) maintain: ‘from the manager’s perspective, initiating involves engaging in trustworthy behavior preemptively, perhaps before the subordinate has demonstrated his or her worthiness. . . . We propose that managers and organizations interested in establishing trust make the first step.’ The authors have also identified the characteristics of managers’ behaviours that generate trust in subordinates, namely consistency over time, behavioural integrity, control sharing and delegation, communication transparency and demonstration of concern toward third parties. Such antecedents are moderated by variables such as the perceived similarity, the manager’s competency level as perceived by his/her subordinates, the latter’s propensity to cooperate, and task’s interdependence. These are the elements composing the analytical structure of a typical model aiming – as so many others do – to expound trust’s role in organization dynamics.
80 23.
24. 25.
26.
27. 28.
29.
30.
31. 32. 33.
34.
The contribution of the different disciplinary contexts Song et al. (1996) proposed an empirically assessed model with the purpose of isolating the main antecedents in teamwork involvement and the level of information exchange among team members. Among the six factors assessed, two are fundamental to the information exchange, namely credibility and inter-functional relationship quality. See also Hatzakis (2001), which suggests a model to interpret interpersonal trust dynamics among virtual teams, and Rasters (2001). Figure 3.3 shows that trust also has a mediated effect on control, by conditioning the relationship between control mechanisms and control level. The issue of the trust–control relation is one of the new frontiers in trust studies. It was the central theme of volume 22 (2001), second issue, of Organization Studies. This special issue included a study by Das and Teng (2001), who examine in depth the relationship in strategic alliances between different types of trust (competence- vs. goodwill-based), different control mechanisms and various perceived risk levels (relational and performance-based). The authors demonstrate that trust and control mechanisms represent the main relational risk antecedents. The model suggests that appropriate trust building strategies and control mechanisms can minimize the risk associated with strategic alliances and promote their adequate development. Once the criticality of such aspects within partnership relationships is verified, it is possible to design management models that consider the dynamic dimension of relationships. In fact, as the relationship develops, the structure of interdependencies changes and, consequently, so will the governance mechanisms most apt to achieve coordination. Thus the very profile of the trust construct shows an evolution (Ring and Van de Ven 1994). The topic of trust development in the relationship evolutionary cycle will be further discussed in Chapter 8. As will be seen in the next chapter, differences in relational interface structuring have a significant effect on defining both trust drivers and the signals that manifest them. The success of those applications is confirmed by their adoption in sociological studies (that can be traced back to rational choice theory) to justify the definition of social order. For further details of the economic dimension of trust see the interesting analysis conducted by Moellering (2006, Chapter 2). Dasgupta (1989: 79) actually maintains: ‘reputation is capital. It is possible to increase it following specific courses of action or destroy it following others . . . A person’s reputation is the “public” attribution of a probability distribution of the diverse types of person an individual can be’ (translated from Italian). A large base of experimental data supports a four-fold generalization of the principles behind the success of any decision-based rule in cooperative games, namely: (1) avoidance of useless conflicts, cooperating until the other party cooperates as well; (2) provocativeness (in the sense of reaction to provocation) in facing unjustified defection by the other player; (3) clemency after reaction to provocation; (4) clear behaviour, in order to allow the other party to adapt to one’s ways (Axelrod 1984: 24). On this subject, Williamson (1993: 463) maintains ‘trust is purportedly made more transparent and operational by treating calculated trust as a subset of calculated risk’. ‘I argue that it is redundant at best and can be misleading to use the term “trust” to describe commercial exchange for which cost-effective safeguards have been devised in support of more efficient exchange’ (ibid.). Some empirical evidences (for example, Jap 1999, 2001a) refute that stance, proving that the salesperson’s personal reliability can be a significant element of cooperative performance in channel relations. Chapter 4, devoted to trust in marketing relationships, will expound how personal trust in a salesperson plays a significant role in finalizing exchanges and selling activity. Williamson’s conceptual assumption (1993) about the logical uselessness of the trust concept in interpreting economic relations is clarified by Tyler and Degoey (1996: 332) as follows: ‘The calculative image suggests that people trust others either because these others have acted in favorable ways in the past, or they can be expected to act favorably in the future. . . . Trust is seen as a subjective probability calculation of the potential costs and benefits of future interactions (for example, Gambetta 1988). As Williamson
Multidisciplinary studies on trust
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43. 44.
45.
81
(1993) has noted, however, trust thus defined adds little to our understanding of human behavior that cannot be explained more parsimoniously by economic theory.’ Tyler and Degoey (1996: 344) have empirically demonstrated that the restrictive economic conceptualization of trust as personal profit is inadequate to explain the variance in importance and meanings of the concept, while proving the social nature of trust even in what Williamson considered commercial relationships. Dunn (1989) and March and Olsen (1975) also rejected a connotation of trust based only on a calculative interpretation. For example, Bhattacharya et al. (1998) developed a quantitative model of trust (defined as ‘outcome trust’), demonstrating the validity of trust’s probabilistic definition proposed by Gambetta (1988), and ascribing to it a more solid structural validity. They also demonstrated, contrary to Williamson’s assumptions (1993), the co-existence of a calculative dimension associated with a significant psychological dimension of trust. Barney and Hansen (1994) maintain that the simultaneous consideration of the economic model – scarcely interested in considering variance in trust propensity among individuals – and of the psychological model – concerned with trust’s individual dimension and less interested in the context in which the relationship takes place – represents a clear breakthrough in theory development. Some have opted to differentiate the two theoretical development stages, seeing them as two different models. Thus the organization failure theory was identified (in reference to the first development stage) within the organization and market perspective. On this, see Grandori (1984: 62–3), Perrone (1990: 33–44) and Biggiero (1992: 120 ff.). Barney and Ouchi (1984) found it difficult to apply to all situations the ‘market and hierarchies’ dichotomy proposed by Williamson, and modulated several intermediate forms of transaction governance according to their complexity. Together with many others who will be presented later, Dwyer and Oh (1988) expressed similar opinions, stating that it is difficult to apply Williamson’s model to market relations. In reality, as seen in Chapter 2 (sections 2 and 3), an evolution has taken place even within the resource-based view in order to integrate the original models, mostly economic in matrix, with more recent ones, much closer to marketing and organizational analysis. Among the other factors that explain the transactional cost reduction, albeit in the presence of highly specific investments, Dyer (1997) highlights the following: repeated transactions with small sets of suppliers; scale and scope economies, associated with a significant volume of exchanges in the case of transactions with a small number of suppliers; information sharing, thus reducing the information asymmetry between the parties; and investments in co-specialized assets. These elements, together with the use of self-enforcing safeguarding mechanisms, explain why Japanese car manufacturers can contain the costs of transactions with their suppliers, notwithstanding the presence of high relation-specific investments. It is important to note that Gulati (1995) assimilates trust and previous experience. That simplifying assumption is partially linked to the empirical verification methodology he has chosen, according to a database of alliances, which makes available a limited set of variables. On this matter, Sako (1998: 91) states: ‘while formal governance structures may act as “safeguards” against opportunistic behavior, they are, in themselves, not sufficient to ensure the sort of performance – innovation and learning – which trust induces’. Nooteboom (1996: 990) maintains: ‘both trust and opportunism are likely to arise in transaction relations. Neither should be ignored, and we should find a way of systematically exploring their joint occurrence. Therefore, in spite of the differences between economics and sociology, we should seek to integrate them.’ Even Bradach and Eccles (1989) show the weakness of Williamson’s hypothesis, suggesting that the opportunistic risk is constantly ‘lurking’ in all economic transactions. They introduce an economic exchange notion that includes some social elements and allows considering trust as a mechanism which substitutes and complements the traditional transaction governance mechanisms (hierarchy and market). TCA’s limitations are summarized by two fundamental points (Zajac and Olsen 1993):
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●
46.
47.
individualism, which finalizes the goal of reducing transactional costs from the perspective of a single party, without considering any interdependency established among the subjects involved in the exchange during the implementation of joint value building strategies; excessive emphasis on the transaction structural aspects, ignoring other process elements.
Within this process, organized in three phases (initializing, processing and reconfiguring stages), trust plays a fundamental role in terms of cooperation toward value creation. This is particularly true during the processing stage, when the parties, upon completion of the first stage of the relationship, start to factually cooperate toward joint value production and sharing. Nooteboom et al. (1997: 329–30) state that an increase of trust, caused by institutionalization and relational repetitiveness, determines a reduction of risk seen as perceived likelihood of losses.
4. 1.
Trust in marketing INTRODUCTION
In the first years of the last decade, initial studies specifically dedicated to the systematic exploration of the trust concept appeared in marketing literature. Before that time, the term trust appeared in several works, without any precise definition of its meaning.1 Today, the situation is quite different, to the point that the quantity and variety of works and approaches on this subject require a further analytical effort such as the one proposed in this chapter. Initially, the theme has generated particular interest among those streams of research that are more focused on analysing market relationships in a business to business context. This is especially prevalent in sales management, where special attention has been paid to the relationship’s interpersonal dimension; the literature dealing with industrial goods marketing; and the contributions on relational dynamics in distribution channels. More recently, some works related to consumer marketing have considered new trust concept ramifications. These contributions are linked to the effort of developing consumer-specific constructs, such as customer satisfaction, loyalty, brand image and, more generally, brand equity. Often these works are contextualized within the reality of services and retailing, fostering the evolution of service and retail marketing. The emergence of digital channels has allowed the verification the construct’s central role in terms of development of computer-mediated market relationships, starting a stream of research centred on e-trust. Considering trust relevance in determining market relationships, this chapter analyses the modes by which each study domain has dealt with the construct. As will be illustrated in the final section, the differences among the above-mentioned areas are far less marked than one would initially expect. Actually, the overlapping of the interpretative models elaborated in different disciplines is large because of the common focus of these endeavours, that is, the relationship between buyer and supplier. Nevertheless, in this chapter the various areas of marketing studies remain separate in order to both mirror the discipline strands discussed in Chapter 1 and highlight their relevant peculiarities. For instance, specific attention will be given to multi-layer relationships, coupling inter-organizational and buyer–seller interpersonal dimensions, and 83
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situations featuring particular ‘trust devices’ such as brand, store or web site.
2. RELATIONSHIP MARKETING: INDUSTRIAL GOODS MARKETS AND NEW PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT Industrial marketing scholars were the first to consider the marketing relational aspects, studying, in line with Bagozzi’s contributions (1974, 1975, 1979), the relationship’s social dimension in addition to the economic one. They highlighted the role of trust, considering it as an element that fosters cooperative relations between the interacting actors, especially when complex mutual performances inhibit activities formalization through contracts. Thus, trust becomes the relationship’s stabilizing factor, increasing the certainty level of future situations and, at the same time, widening the set of alternatives available to the parties. On this matter, the contributions on industrial goods marketing can be classed in two groups: 1. 2.
studies that conceptualize the so-called relational atmosphere, mainly offered by the IMP Group; contributions focused on trust within relationships whose object is difficult to evaluate (that is, information provided by market research and knowledge targeted to new product development).
According to the IMP Group’s model (1) (for example, Ford 1990), trust was considered at first as a marginal element describing the relational atmosphere (Håkansson 1987b).2 Initially, it was suggested that the said atmosphere could be determined by variables derived almost exclusively from the traditional economic-political model: the relationship’s degree of power/dependency, the level of cooperation/conflict and familiarity (considered a trust’s proxy) among the parties and the typology of mutually exhibited expectations. In subsequent works, in view of the dissatisfaction toward the limited interpretative capability of the original formulation, in addition to trust itself, others set forth relational atmosphere components such as mutual knowledge level and commitment to the relationship (Ferrero 1992: 100; Marcati 1992: 7). Once the atmosphere components were defined, some models were introduced to elucidate the most significant correlations between these and some outcome variables, namely the propensity to cooperation of the dyad’s actors, and the relational performance (for example, Hallén and Sandstrom 1991).
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More recent IMP works are free from the early reduction of trust to a mere atmosphere-describing item, and focus on specific contents of the construct, which refer to inter-organizational relations and networks of firms (for example, Huemer 1998, 2004; Naude and Buttle 2000; Batt and Purchase 2004). While conceptualizing trust’s role in business relationship, Huemer’s (1998, 2000) goal was the integration of transactional cost theory tenets with IMP’s interpretative model. To this effect, trust is defined along two main analytical planes. The first dimension is aligned to traditional management studies, favours the concepts of risk and passive behaviour, and implies a degree of behavioural inertia, with the tendency to conform to habit and eschew deviations. The more innovative, second dimension focuses on the opportunities a trust relationship can present. Contrary to the risk concept, these opportunities require the assumption of proactive attitudes by the parties involved in the relationship. Thus, the contrast between a static and passive vision associated with the first dimension (hazardousness) and a dynamic and active facet of trust, linked to its opportunities, guides the evolution from trust to trusting, defined as the active use of trust in discovering new relational horizons.3 As a result the relevance of active and innovative uses of trust emerges. The construct is no longer limited by the need to minimize (and control) risk and uncertainty, but can open new relational paths, overcoming the danger of ‘sclerotization’ always lurking behind passive, riskbased only relationships.4 The second group of studies, dedicated to transactions with very complex contents, is exemplified by the contribution of Moorman et al. (1993). These authors verified trust’s relevance in the context of high informational intensity buyer–seller relations, such as the relationship between a supplier of market research and its customers. In particular, they were interested to ascertain whether trust in the research provider determined a greater propensity to use its very researches. In other words they demonstrated that surveys conducted by trusted actors do not ‘remain in a drawer’. Moorman et al.’s work sought to understand the main antecedents of trust and, therefore, the proportion in which market research information is used.5 This model has a significant analytical valence, establishing trust’s relevance in relationships centred on goods or services with high informational content (experience or credence). In particular, information and knowledge are ‘objects’ the transfer of which is exceedingly complex and whose value (and, consequently, use) is determined more by trust in their source than by actual evaluation of the object to be transacted. Similar situations are presented by interorganizational relationships geared to new product conception and development. Here, trust is put at the forefront by the uncertainty that
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characterizes all innovative processes and the intangible nature of performances expected from the members of the inter-firm network that generates innovations. In these contexts, several disciplines have contributed their perspectives to the understanding of trust, mostly pertinent to strategic and technology management. In fact, it has been proven that firms capable of developing a favourable trust climate can almost guarantee more successful products, especially when greater technological and environmental complexity requires the activation of a network of specialized competencies (Urban and Hauser 1993; Leonard-Barton 1995, Chapter 6; Chesbrough and Teece 1996; Powell et al. 1996; Castaldo and Verona 1998; Blomqvist 2001, 2002). The aspects that have been better studied are the following: 1. 2.
trust’s function in the process of knowledge transfer among actors; trust’s role in innovation diffusion and the need to enact ‘trust intermediaries’.
To build and strengthen an innovative network, lasting relationships among the network nodes need to be developed and consolidated, linking together sources of knowledge that are functional to the innovative process (1). Information and, more generally, knowledge transfers generate a significant trust demand (Moorman et al. 1992; Rindfleisch and Moorman 2001). Therefore, to achieve a real transfer and an effective sharing of the informational potential, one should not ignore the existing long-term relationships, far beyond the transience of single transactions. On this matter, Sivadas and Dwyer (2000) introduced the concept of ‘cooperative competency’.6 It indicates the mix of trust, communication and coordination that constitutes the main antecedent of successful new products developed by activating alliances and joint ventures. A more recent study, by Rindfleisch and Moorman (2001), on horizontal partnerships aimed at new product development, established a need to separate the concept of strength of ties (see Chapter 1, section 5) into two dimensions: a structural component, referring to the relationship’s redundancy level, and a motivational one, essentially the parties’ level of embeddedness. According to Granovetter (1973), strong ties differ from weak ones because of their high level of both informational redundancy and embeddedness.7 The study demonstrated that relational embeddedness, which characterizes vertical relationships enacted during new product development, is directly correlated with inter-firm information exchange, while knowledge redundancy, typical of horizontal alliances between competitors, is inversely correlated with information acquisition within new product alliances.8
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Trust is a fundamental resource of innovative activities. Not only does it allow transferring knowledge among participants in a new product development, but it also facilitates the new product diffusion on the market, reducing the decisional process uncertainty of the first adopters (point 2). To this effect, the firm can exploit its own trust resources, for example its brand equity, or leverage the trust placed by external subjects. The latter can contribute to the innovation diffusion in several ways. For example, final customers (and especially the lead users) contribute – with their behaviours, interpersonal communication and credibility – by activating the social network through which innovation is diffused (Rogers 1983; Robertson et al. 1996). Thus, they become the ‘warrantors’ of the innovation, reducing new buyers’ uncertainty about purchasing it. Similarly, distributors can participate in trust creation, triggering a process of trust extension from the retailer brand to the product brand, creating a trusted ‘product-outlet’ binomial. Also suppliers, through trust in the component brand and their knowledge (for example, INTEL and PC manufacturers or Gore-Tex and technical apparel producers, Tetra Pak and milk or juice manufacturers), warrant both innovative content and quality of product-embedded knowledge, increasing the firm’s trust patrimony. Therefore the participants of the innovative network induce a convergence of their trust resources, determining a co-evolution of both their competencies and trust level. However, optimal performance of activities linked to innovative product development cannot be achieved simply by building and managing an adequate external network as a source of knowledge and trust. To produce new knowledge that adequately exploits its competencies and effectively assimilates external informational assets, a firm must also mobilize and connect its internal knowledge sources. Complementary to the inter-organizational network, an intra-organizational network, governing within the firm the various stages of a new product development process,9 has to be created. In fact, it is the interaction between individual skills and intelligence that produces, by social interconnections, the organizational knowledge from which innovation springs.10 As we have seen already while dealing with organizational contributions (Chapter 3, section 4), trust assumes a central role as the main integration mechanism. This is also true in terms of team functioning, especially when the task is characterized by high uncertainty, as always happens during new product development (for example, Takeuchi and Nonaka 1986; Bingham and Quigley 1990; Donnellon 1993; Hershock et al. 1994; Meyer 1994; Towner 1994; Johannessen et al. 1997).11 In the end, facing a growing environmental complexity, new product development processes can be viewed only through the lens of a trust-based approach. In fact, technological and cognitive progress causes a constant increase of uncertainty and (internal and external) specialization in the
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knowledge production process. This requires more and more often the transfer of increasingly abstract know-how. Thus, trust-based relationship building becomes the main goal of any firm that innovates, especially in contexts more and more complex and undergoing significant evolutionary dynamics (for example, Blomqvist 2001, 2002).
3. TRUST AS A COOPERATION ANTECEDENT IN DISTRIBUTION RELATIONS In marketing, trust has emerged and has been studied mostly with reference to channel relations. These relationships are characterized by the coexistence, within the same inter-organizational relationship, of two dimensions: a competitive one, pertaining to function sharing (and, therefore, margin sharing), and a cooperative one, leading to collaboration and ‘pie expansion’ partnerships (Jap 1999). Some recent experiments, such as ECR’s initiative,12 offer insights into the opportunities generated by cooperation while exploiting new sources of value creation within the channel.13 Traditional channel marketing models (of economic and behaviourist origins) were developed viewing the distributor in a functionalist light. Thus, they did not capture the cooperative dimension of distribution relationships. A more recent stream of study is focused mainly on the opportunities associated with cooperation and its achievements. In particular, these studies demonstrate that trust between the parties is indeed the fundamental antecedent and essential precondition to activating a working channel partnership. The construct’s analytical relevance is much enhanced by the rising uncertainty level that characterizes today’s relationships between manufacturers and distributors, mostly as a consequence of the level of environment heterogeneity14 and variability15 (for example, Dwyer and Welsh 1985; Achrol and Stern 1988). This uncertainty (outside the dyad) requires the counterweight of ‘more certain’ relational structures, derived from instituting clear power relations within the dyad and/or a greater mutual trust among the interacting actors. The above-mentioned phenomena, namely the tendency to cooperate – seen as a new source of competitive advantage for firms belonging to the channel-system – and the increase in environmental uncertainty – which marks all distribution relationships – induced a growing number of marketing channel scholars to study the concept of trust and consider it as both the main antecedent of cooperative behaviours and the fundamental reducer of environmental uncertainty. On this issue, several works can be found in the literature and tentatively grouped as follows:
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1. 2.
3.
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at first, a few seminal contributions established trust’s central role within distribution relationships, and its analytical borders; subsequently, attempts were made to specifically delve into the relationship between trust and the same behavioural variables, developing interpretative models that isolated trust’s main antecedents and most relevant consequences; more recently, a new level of understanding has been reached, thanks to the analysis of specific aspects of relationships, such as the interdependence between the personal and inter-organizational dimensions of trust, together with its longitudinal dimension.
The first group of contributions will be discussed in detail in the following chapter. Currently, the forerunners will suffice. Dwyer et al. (1987) highlighted the central role of trust, considered a pin hinging the expectation development process. Typically, channel relationships are a mélange of competition and cooperation, and as such are extremely complex. In fact, it can be impossible, or very costly, to foresee all eventualities and include them in a formal contract. Therefore, trust assumes a central role as a mechanism of informal and self-enforcing integration. At first, channel marketing scholars gave trust a meaning in line with original psychological and sociological interpretations, linking it to expectations about the other party’s behaviour, and, in particular, the certainty that the said party will keep its promises. One of the very first contributions to explicitly consider the concept of trust was offered by Schurr and Ozanne (1985). They defined trust as a belief that a party’s word or promise is reliable and that the said party will honour the commitments of the exchange relationship. Later, Dwyer and Oh (1987) discussed the trust role in coordinating the parties, stating that it refers to the expectations that the counterpart with whom one seeks to coordinate behaviours will discharge his/her obligations and contribute to the relationship success. 3.1
Trust Models
The above-mentioned second group includes several works. Deductively at first and then inductively, they verified the hypothesis of trust as the fundamental construct activating a partnership relationship between manufacturers and distributors. Anderson and Narus (1984, 1990), and Sethuraman et al. (1988) proposed one of the first interpretative models of channel working partnerships, inspired by the principles of social exchange theory16 and, in particular, by the outcome matrix concept. In the context of a dyadic relationship, this matrix represents each party’s possible behaviour and the consequences of alternative actions, concurrently considering the
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other party’s behaviour. The interaction result (outcome) is translated into rewards gained and costs incurred by each participant, following specific actions. The logical constructs defining the outcomes of a particular relationship are summarized by the comparison level (CL) and the comparison level for alternatives (CLALT).17 The authors establish that when an exchange relationship produces outcomes that exceed one participant’s expectations, satisfaction level, trust and propensity to cooperation increase as well.18 Thus, trust’s new relevance is confirmed, but once more as the capability to fulfil promises and satisfy the other party’s expectations. Among the direct consequences of trust, most attention is given to the increase in cooperation level, and the reduction in conflict level. Both consequences have a positive impact on the parties’ satisfaction level toward the relationship, mediated in turn by the dependency structure within the relationship and the relative influence exercised or felt by the partner. This model offers a particularly relevant contribution, highlighting the centrality of the analytical perspective in order to understand the real meaning of the relationship. In its initial hypotheses, and in agreement with Anderson and Weitz’s thesis (1992), trust is considered as a construct based on behavioural reciprocity. Coherently with this assumption, the model hypotheses are verified assuming a double perspective: the industrial firm’s and the retailer’s. This analysis shows that trust’s role, its determinants, analytical consequences and structural relations between the various model variables are significantly different in these two cases, implicitly demonstrating the importance of the research perspective in really understanding this construct.19 Subsequent empirical researches have confirmed the central relevance of trust and cooperation between firms in distribution channels. This first clear empirical evidence induced some scholars to further study the construct characteristics within marketing relationships, offering specific theoretical contributions to the study of trust. Morgan and Hunt (1994) attempted to understand the relationship between two key variables of a relationship, commitment and trust, centring their model on them. The authors adopted an analysis design based on a comparison between two competitive models: the hypothesized one (defined as key mediating variable (KMV) mode of relationship marketing), where trust and commitment are the mediating variables, and the rival one, which does not consider the two variables as mediators but as additional antecedents. They verified both variables of the market relation model (Figure 4.1), and defined their main determinants (namely shared values, communication and absence of opportunism) and consequences (cooperation, functional conflict and relational uncertainty reduction). The empirical test confirmed many of the hypothesized relations, but the survey detected the weight of two other
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Trust in marketing
Relationship termination costs
Acquiescence + + RELATIONSHIP COMMITMENT
+
Relationship benefits
–
Propensity to leave
+
+
Shared values
Cooperation
+ + +
Communication
+
TRUST
– Opportunistic behaviours
Functional conflict
+
– Uncertainty
Source: Morgan and Hunt (1994: 22)
Figure 4.1 A model of marketing relationship based on the relationship between commitment and trust: the initial hypothesis variables which were not explicitly considered at first: the power coercive dimension and conflict. These variables were the central concepts of the traditional channel behavioural models (for example, El-Ansary and Stern 1972). This is a further proof of the need to integrate, with appropriate caution, the main constructs developed by different conceptual paradigms, avoiding mere substitutions. Aiming at integrating different models, and forecasting later studies of strategic management (discussed in Chapter 3, section 7), further conceptual schematizations emerged, such as Ganesan’s (1994). This analyses the trust role in distribution relationships, in association with (and not in substitution for) variables of a more economic matrix. Thus, Ganesan better detected the double content of the relationship and the interdependence linking its two main analytical dimensions: the economic and social ones. In particular, he sought to establish the variables that define the long-term
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orientation of a retail firm (trustor) toward managing the relationship with its suppliers (trustees). He hypothesized that such an orientation is determined by two main variable categories: economic, referring to mutual dependency, and social ones, referring to trust between the parties. Specifically, the first category seems to require a double construct, namely the business firm dependency (from the trustor’s standpoint) on the supplier and the perceptions of the supplier’s dependency on the retailer. Instead, according to Ganesan, trust consists of the supplier’s credibility and a component referred to as goodwill.20 As seen above, models proposed in the context of distribution relations mainly attempt to verify the cause–effect sequential relationship existing between antecedents, trust and its analytical consequences. On this matter, a meta-analysis of channel literature has shown that the most often considered antecedents of distribution relationships are the following (Geyskens et al. 1998): level of environmental uncertainty; structural state of the relationship and, in particular, its dependency structure; partner’s use of coercive power; communication transparency, intensity and frequency; economic outcomes. The consequences of establishing a trust relationship are summarized by the partners’ satisfaction increase and, as indicated above, the relationship’s long-term orientation. The analysis has further confirmed trust’s role as a mediating variable between antecedents and consequences, reasserting once more the construct’s absolute analytical significance within interpretative models of distributive relationships.21 3.2 New Dimensions of Trust Relationships in Channels: Time Lag and Multi-layer Effect More recently, the research on trust in distribution relationships has significantlyevolved.Goingbeyondthemereunderstandingof trustantecedents and consequences, the analysis has been extended to contingent and situational elements (previously considered ‘external’ to the proposed models), verifying their impact on trust creation. In particular, the aspects most often considered include the relationship’s various (inter–organizational and interpersonal) levels of interdependency, and its longitudinal dimension. Jap (1999, 2001a, 2001b) has verified the relevance of both aspects in terms of distribution relationships, with interesting results. Firstly, explicit consideration is given to the impact of the seller’s personal reliability on decisions and behaviours of the dyad’s actors, referring both to the coordination efforts and the idiosyncratic investments in the relationship (Jap 1999, 2001b; Iacobucci and Hibbard 1999). Secondly, as seen already, the model has deliberately included the relationship’s dynamic dimension, verifying the impact of antecedents (personal
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trust and other structural dimensions of the relationship, competency complementarity and goal congruence) on later outcomes. This way the time lag between surveying a relational variable state, the (cooperative) behaviours and its future outcomes has been explicitly evaluated. Therefore the longitudinal dimension of relationships emerges and requires analysing trust as a dynamic concept. This is a twofold problem. On one hand, we need to measure the performance of a cooperative behaviour when it really happens. It is crucial to avoid referring all variables to the same moment in time, ignoring the lag existing between the unrolling of an event (trust or cooperation emergence) and the outcome of that event (performance). On the other hand, as will be shown in the last chapter, one needs to consider trust’s metamorphosis during the relationship’s evolutionary cycle. In fact, many have verified that actors with a different relational past show markedly different intensity and typologies of trust. Jap and Ganesan (2000) showed how, during a relationship between a retail firm and its suppliers, specific investment protection mechanisms can significantly evolve in time, differently affecting the parties’ commitment level.22 This level, in turn, has significant effects on the relationship outcomes in terms of relationship satisfaction, supplier’s performance evaluation and conflict level.23
4. ‘SALES MANAGEMENT’ CONTRIBUTION: THE PERSONAL DIMENSION OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS Following the firms’ market orientation evolution, more and more relational in nature (Grönroos 1994a, 1995; Sheth and Parvatiyar 1995), sales management is induced to renew its customer relationship management modes. Thus the seller figure decisively evolves into a ‘relationship manager’ profile.24 In a sales context increasingly seeking cooperation beyond mere negotiation, the firms have experienced trust relevance first hand. In particular, firms are interested in understanding the modes by which those who are responsible for interfacing with the demand (salespeople, key account or sales engineers) can conquer and develop the buyers’ trust and, more generally, the trust of those subjects working as interface at the customer firm. In fact, it has been ascertained that the level of trust is the variable that most conditions the decisions of those in charge of buying, their propensity to cooperate, and the time horizon of the relationship. Thus, trust conditions the customer’s lifetime value and the firm’s customer retention rate, with a far from secondary impact on the firm’s economic results and its capital economic value (as seen in Chapter 2, section 5).
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The contributions on this set of issues have mostly focused on three themes: (a) trust building between seller and buyer and trust antecedents (b) interaction between personal and inter-organizational dimensions of trust (c) inter-organizational relationships between salespeople and sales manager. Starting with the first analytical context (point a), a few managerial-type models were originally proposed with the goal of describing the building stages of trust between salesperson and buyer, and the factors that most impinge on trust creation. In the model proposed by Swan and Nolan (1985), trust building depends most of all on the customer’s past experiences with the salesperson or the represented firm. In the absence of those experiences, great importance is acquired by the salesperson’s personality and his/her skills and motivation not to behave in an opportunistic manner.25 Following this new path, Swan et al. (1985) performed an empirical research on a sample of salespeople in the pharmaceutical and medical instrument industries, and proposed a prescriptive model of behaviours aimed to gain the customer’s trust on the industrial goods markets. Their research proves that to look reliable, honest, competent, customer oriented and friendly is critical to building a trust relationship (Weitz et al. 2001).26 Thus they introduced a management model finalized to trust development and capable of differentiating behaviours according to the state of the relationship with a specific customer (first contact vs. established relationship) and the latter’s trust propensity. More recently, the focus has shifted from the trust creation process as a whole to the impact of specific selling strategies. In particular, Strutton et al. (1996) verified the impact on trust of different typologies of ingratiatory behaviour, showing that offensive behaviours (for instance, self-promotion and favour rendering) have a negative effect on trust. On the other hand, defensive behaviours (such as court and counsel and other enhancement) have positive consequences. Hawes et al. (1996) conducted a structurally analogous study on the effect of five different closing techniques27 upon the level of trust the buyer puts in the salesperson. An empirical research on a sample of buyers showed that, in the long run, these techniques cause the erosion of the trust relationship. As previously remarked, the relation between interpersonal and interorganizational dimensions of trust (point b) is the focus of a growing interest, due to its managerial implications.28 Some researches in this area have shown how the relationship evolves differently according to the diverse states of knowledge and/or trust both between buyer and supplier and
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between buyer and salesman. In a consolidated relationship with a firm represented by a new salesperson, personal trust building and the extension at the interpersonal level of the reputation derived by the inter-organizational relationship are critical. The opposite case presents exactly the opposite problem, namely how to use the potential offered by personal trust to guarantee a new firm’s offer. Both scenarios establish the significant relation existing between the trust developed on these two analytical planes. A study by Doney and Cannon (1997), sampling manufacturing firms’ buyers on the industrial goods markets, evinced the significant role of trust in the seller as an ‘order qualifier’, but not as an ‘order winner’. In fact, no significant correlation was found between trust in the seller and his/her firm and purchasing decisions. The latter are dictated by elements directly linked to product performance, its economic value and delivery service efficiency. This is quite expected in view of the fact that many purchases in this sector are based on auctions and competitive tenders. Instead, trust in the firm (determined in turn by the trust put in the salesperson) influences future purchasing intentions, amplifying the relationship’s time horizon, and eases the firm’s inclusion in the buyer’s consideration set. Finally, a set of works have been dedicated to the relationships between salespeople and sales manager within the firm (point c). Rich (1997) highlighted the crucial impact that trust in the sales manager has on the sales network activity. In particular, his contribution clarifies the effects of role modelling29 on the salesperson’s level of trust in his/her manager, job satisfaction and overall performance. An empirical research conducted on a sample of sales manager–salespeople dyads belonging to different firms operating on the industrial goods market, has confirmed role modelling as an important influence on trust in the manager and, indirectly, on the salesperson’s job satisfaction and overall performance. A similar empirical research by Perrone and Chiacchierini (1999) confirmed the correlation between trust in co-workers, management and immediate supervisor, and organizational citizenship behaviours,30 namely altruism and civic virtues of the sales force.
5.
CUSTOMER-BASED TRUST RESOURCES
Within the large field of consumer marketing, trust has been directly or indirectly addressed in the context of three main areas of study: the concept of brand image; its direct evolution, brand equity and, more specifically, consumers’ loyalty; and, lastly, services marketing, a much broader area, which intersects the previous two. A brief summary of the main contributions in each area follows.
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Brand Image
Studies on the image concept have shown that it basically depends on two orders of elements: those related to the firm or, more generally, the observed object (stimulus), and those more directly referring to the consumer. As a consequence, in cognitive terms, the image is the product of the interaction between an object (the firm, its products, brands, and so on) and an observing subject (actual or potential customer), within whom the image is formed and resides. Scholars who privilege the perceived object’s perspective paid particular attention to identifying the image determinants (antecedents), namely those elements that most contribute to the creation of an object’s mental representation. Some of these authors have reached the conclusion that a firm’s reliability and reputation often assume a central role among the factors determining the image of a brand or store (for example, Golden and Zimmer 1988). Thus, trust (or, more precisely, reliability and reputation) is reduced to the rank of an item within the set of elements that shape the image, becoming a brand and store image component. This approach has an evident limit: it forgoes the analysis of the individual cognitive mechanisms, soon to be shown as a main influencer of image formation. Contributions that focus on consumer related aspects while also considering, albeit not explicitly, trust’s role can refer to: (a)
behaviourist studies focused more on the role of experience than on trust; (b) cognitivist studies, which have first conceptualized the trust content of image. The behaviourist model is based on the principle that most human behaviours are learned by experience, thanks to a stimulus–response mechanism; the likelihood that a given behaviour will be repeated again varies as a function of its consequences, be they prizes (reinforcing stimuli) or punishments (adverse stimuli). The response that produces reinforcement is considered more valid and ‘stronger’, whereas that which is not followed by reinforcement is weakened.31 This implies that experience is a fundamental element of image (and trust alike). The expression of continuous reinforcing stimuli referring to a given object (brand, sign or firm) positively affects the consumers’ trust level and loyalty, as a product of learning reinforcement and behavioural consolidation. The analytical framework of the stimulus–response paradigm, though useful to image conceptualization, especially in defining the role experience plays in building a trust relationship, seems far too simplistic. In fact, it
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does not analyse the so-called intervening variables, namely the reasons for a certain response to follow a given stimulus. To fully understand the relationship between the concepts of trust and image, it should be not ignored how cognitive and affective mechanisms influence consumers’ decisions (for example, Mazursky and Jacoby 1986; Williams 1989). On this matter, some authors (for example, Howard (1977)) consider brand image as a synthetic construct, essentially based on confidence. The last is once more a product of past experiences and allows the consumer to balance the uncertainty associated with the evaluation of various purchasing alternatives. Mostly, trust depends on the experience stratified in the historic memory of individuals. In fact, brand image is deeply conditioned by the satisfaction level derived from past purchasing experiences. In turn, according to the confirmation/disconfirmation theory, satisfaction depends on the comparison between actual results and expectations about the selected brand. The post-purchasing evaluation affects attitudes and, especially, trust, increasing the certainty associated by the customer with his/her own judgement skills and reducing the quantity of information needed to take future purchasing decisions. Trust is positively correlated with the evidence (image) persistence in time and, even more, the consensus of others. As previously mentioned, this moves trust’s social dimension to the foreground (Howard 1977; Luhmann 1979). In fact, the trust accrued by some brands is essentially the fruit of the collective and socially shared representation acquired by the brand image.32 Basically, if an attitude is mainly referred to as the judgement attributed to a stimulus by a subject, trust contributes to increase the certainty of his/her evaluation. Trust is an image’s critical component, especially when it is difficult to find identification criteria and, consequently, the consumers cannot precisely define their attitude toward each alternative offer. Lacking sufficient information to decide on a given transaction, one ends up relying on trust in brand or sign, thus reducing the risk of deciding. Therefore, trust is represented by ‘adequate cognitive schemes’ that allow both reduction of uncertainty and containment of the information search effort (Vicari 1991). Consequently, trust has a priority role, especially in those purchasing situations characterized by a high level of perceived risk.33 5.2
Trust as Main Component of Brand Equity and Customer Loyalty
Studies on brand management (for example, Aaker and Keller 1990; Aaker 1991; Dimitriadis 1994), highlighting the critical role of brand image in the context of the firm’s customer-based intangible resources, identify confidence and trust as one of the main cognitive antecedents of brand equity and customer loyalty. According to Howard (1977), as already seen, ‘a brand concept
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is made up of three parts: ability to identify a brand, liking of the brand, and the strength of the concept. These are called brand identification, attitude, and confidence respectively’ (Howard 1977: 46). The latter element is based on the consumers’ confidence in their ability to judge brand quality. ‘This is defined as the degree of certainty that a consumer subjectively experiences with respect to satisfaction expected from a brand. . . . It is merely the capacity to judge.’ This capacity is based on three main elements: distinctiveness of a brand, consistency of evidence over time and consensus and support from others (ibid.: 55–6). Therefore, trust toward the brand is mainly derived from confirming – at individual or social level (consensus) – the expectations that motivated its choice. This confirmation defines the customers’ satisfaction level.34 According to the level of past satisfaction generated by positive experiences with a brand, consumers assign it a given likelihood of future satisfaction, simplifying the buying selection process.35 Brand image is closely related to another intangible resource of great value to the firm: customer loyalty. This appears only in instances of the copresence of the behavioural dimension (repeated purchases) and the cognitive dimension (expressed as favourable image or satisfaction level), or when a systematic choice in favour of the same brand is derived from a buyer’s precise act of will, which in turn is based on a clear preference and a strong attitude for a single alternative (Jacoby and Chestnut 1978). Brand image is thus configured as the fundamental element of loyalty’s cognitive dimension, which materializes only when a favourable attitude is followed by a repeated purchasing behaviour. Loyalty has been further qualified in many dimensions and typologies; for example, the one following the purchasing process’s different phases: cognitive loyalty (based on product attribute evaluation), affective loyalty (founded on the overall product preference), conative loyalty (indicated by the intention to buy) and behavioural loyalty. Conative and behavioural loyalty, according to Oliver (1999), constitute different typologies of customer loyalty and, at the same time, its main evolutionary stages (Table 4.1).36 Some works (for example, Singh and Sirdeshmukh 2000; Chaudhuri and Holbrook 2001: 83) have noted that trust is the main cognitive antecedent of consumer loyalty,37 proposing specific approaches to customer relationship management, and loyalty and trust management. On this matter, Costabile (2001: 109) asserts that satisfaction, or the relation between customers’ perceptions and expectations, is the main antecedent of trust, which in turn determines various loyalty typologies within a relationship evolutionary model. Recently, some empirical studies have attempted to escape the restrictions of the consolidated view of the relationships between satisfaction, trust and loyalty. In particular, Reichheld (1996) coined the expression
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Loyalty stages
Loyalty stage
Identifier
Cognitive
Loyalty based on information such as price, characteristics and benefits. Loyalty as approval: ‘I buy it because I like it.’ Loyalty as intention: ‘I am interested in buying it.’ Loyalty as behavioural inertia: ‘I buy it because I am used to it.’
Affective Conative Behavioural
Source: Oliver (1999: 36)
‘satisfaction trap’ to indicate that the customer satisfaction orientation does not guarantee customer loyalty. On the contrary, when it becomes structured intervention, it leads to resources wasting. Specifically, research by Bain & Co. in the US has shown that significant percentages (from 65 to 95 per cent) of very satisfied and satisfied customers buy a different product from the one with which they expressed satisfaction. ‘Satisfaction is not enough’ reads the title of some recent works, which suggest a break with traditional approaches to customer satisfaction (for example, Jones and Sasser 1995: 91; Stewart 1997: 112). Contrary to such a vision, numerous authors have closed ranks, including Mittal and Kamakura (2001) and Oliver (1999). The former focused their attention on problems related to the quantitative dimension of the opposition’s thesis, showing how the alleged non-existence of the satisfaction–repurchase relation is mostly caused by errors in satisfaction measuring.38 Instead, Oliver (ibid.) faced the issue in conceptual terms, showing that a radical posturing and complete refusal of customer satisfaction are not justified. In fact, after considering various and somewhat direct relationships between the concepts of satisfaction and loyalty, the author proposed an evolutionary model of the transformation from satisfaction to loyalty which takes place during the relationship, just as ‘a caterpillar becomes transformed into a butterfly’. After their metamorphosis the two creatures (namely, concepts) are no longer comparable and do not share any characteristic, beyond their common biological origin (ibid.: 42). From this it is clear that satisfaction is a fundamental step in the loyalty formation process, becoming less and less relevant with the progressive development of the relationship and the consolidation of loyalty by other mechanisms, including the social and communitary variants,39 mostly based on the trust concept.40 Albeit limited in terms of a variable set, Chaudhuri and Holbrook’s contributions (2001, 2002) represent the first empirical researches about the
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PRODUCT-LEVEL CONTROLS
Utilitarian value Hedonistic value
BRAND TRUST
PURCHASE LOYALTY
MARKET SHARE
BRAND AFFECT
ATTITUDINAL LOYALTY
RELATIVE PRICE
BRAND-LEVEL CONTROLS
Differentiation Share of voice
Source: Chaudhuri and Holbrook (2001: 83)
Figure 4.2
Brand trust, brand loyalty and brand performance
relationship between the above-mentioned customer-based intangibles (brand equity, trust and loyalty) and competitive performances.41 In fact, their model hypothesizes a direct relationship between trust in a brand (generically called brand trust) and loyalty in its dual cognitive and behavioural dimension (Figure 4.2), translated in turn into competitive performance. The detection of the said competitive performance is limited to the measure of both market share and competitive differential in terms of premium price. The model has been empirically verified with reference to various product typologies, classed in utilitarian categories (mainly based on functional-type utility) and hedonistic categories (producing emotionaltype utility). The hypothesis underlying the research foresees that brand trust, mainly considered in its calculative aspect, prevails for utilitarian categories of products. Contrariwise, the affective component of brand equity is assumed to prevail for hedonistic categories.42 Chaudhuri and Holbrook’s empirical research, in addition to proving the above-mentioned hypothesis, has confirmed that the relationship between brand trust and competitive performances (market share and premium price) is mediated by the loyalty concept in its dual cognitive (attitude) and behavioural dimension. Notwithstanding the already mentioned limitations, the following casual relation is empirically confirmed: trust – loyalty – economic and competitive performances.
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Trust in Service Marketing
Trust is particularly relevant for firms operating in the services business. The good’s immateriality forms the basis of the uncertainty that permeates the whole selection process. In fact, before purchase, the services buyer cannot access sure information on the qualitative level of the offer, which is often characterized as an experience good (Nelson 1970). Thus, the firm–market relation is regulated by trust, as this is the resource that can deal with the relationship’s complexity. Within the framework of empiricalmanagerial literature, Normann (1984) explicitly considered the image as one of the basic elements of his model of a ‘services management system’. Considering that services can be illustrated with less precision than material products and are seldom experienced ex ante, Normann maintained that it is strategically important to enact an effective image (and trust) management, counteracting the uncertainty that characterizes the consumer’s decisional process (ibid.: 129). Image is also a critical variable in the managerial model proposed by Eiglier and Langeard (1987) to define a new service formula. Within the process that guarantees an adequate perceived quality to the customers, reliability and trust are listed among the main elements proposed by Grönroos (1994b). He defined them as the firm’s capability to face any unforeseen situation occurring during a service performance, satisfy the customers’ needs and fulfil the firm’s promises. In the context of the well-known SERVQUAL model, Zeithalm et al. (1991) introduced the concept of reliability, namely the capacity to deliver a promised service while satisfying the expectations of the demand, as one of the main antecedents of service quality and customers’ satisfaction level.43 Following the same trajectory, Crosby et al. (1990) developed the concept of relationship quality as the element most instrumental in reducing perceived uncertainty and complexity of service choices. A consistent ‘relational quality’ allows the customer to rely on the supplier’s integrity and the value of its offer, even without in-depth checks and evaluations beforehand. According to the authors, the relational quality construct comprises two fundamental elements: trust and past satisfaction. Jointly, these factors trigger virtuous circles boosting the firm’s patrimony of intangible resources. Garbarino and Johnson (1999) have expounded the relation between the concept of trust and other customer-based relational resources, in particular commitment, satisfaction and loyalty. In order to verify the central role of these constructs in customer relations within the services industry, the authors have tested the soundness of two competitive models, adopting a logical path similar to the process followed by Morgan and Hunt (1994), albeit with dissimilar analytical objectives. Specifically, the two considered
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models expect the same antecedent set (satisfaction, familiarity and attitudes toward the supplier), the same consequence, namely future purchasing intentions, but different intervening variables. In the first model the mediating variable is overall satisfaction, from which directly derive future propensity, commitment and trust. The second model considers trust and commitment as intervening variables linked to future purchasing propensity. The empirical research yields an interesting result, which partially confirms the already mentioned conclusions about the ‘dynamic’ relationship between trust, satisfaction and loyalty. In fact, occasional customers rely on satisfaction, which in turn generates trust, commitment and future purchasing intentions, but more consolidated customers with higher relational propensity (specifically the subscribers to a theatre season) look upon trust and commitment as the fundamental intervening variables, between the antecedents and future purchasing intentions. In other words, the first satisfaction mediated model is more useful to interpret the cognitive process of occasional subscribers and individual buyers, still at the first evolutionary stage of their relationship. To the contrary, the trust and commitment mediated model is better suited to the interpretation of relationships with faithful and top customers, who enjoy an older relationship with the supplier. Thus, the relational stage relevance to the interpretation of trust is verified in the services industry as well, together with the extant relationships between the concepts of trust, satisfaction and loyalty, exactly as highlighted by Oliver (1999) and Costabile (2001). If in the first stages of the relationship loyalty is essentially determined by satisfaction, in the more advanced phases of relational dynamics, loyalty is substituted by trust, which, along with commitment, assumes the role of central variable in terms of prediction of future purchasing intentions.44
6.
e-TRUST45
In the recent past, the technological development that has invested the whole society has led many authors to emphasize the relevance of trust in the online context. The aim of this section is to provide an overview of the main studies on online trust. The development of IT technologies and the consequent increase in Internet users have influenced an excessively positive forecasting of the virtual marketplace potentialities, which has led to the well-known phenomenon labelled ‘Internet bubble’. Following the collapse of the new economy, many studies investigating the causes of this phenomenon have appeared. Their results converge in showing that the problems in online transactions are mainly due to the high level of risk and uncertainty characterizing this
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marketplace46 and the lack of the trust needed to overcome it. Customers seem to increasingly rely on the Internet as an information tool, but they actually do not conclude their purchases in the virtual channel (MacGraw 1999). Online transactions often do not involve simultaneous exchange of goods and money; indeed spatial and also temporal separation between partners is common. Therefore, Internet shopping creates uncertainty and increases risk through the delay between payment and delivery (HeeWoong et al. 2004). Furthermore, risk and uncertainty are increased by anonymity (Grabner-Krauter and Kalusca 2003) and information asymmetry between the involved parties (Hee-Woong et al. 2004), which can easily lead to a lack of control and to opportunism (Grabner-Krauter and Kalusca 2003). In the presence of such a risk, lack of trust has been identified as one of the greatest barriers inhibiting Internet transactions (Hoffman et al. 1999a). Researchers have proved that trust encourages the purchase intention of both potential customers (Gefen et al. 2003; Jarvenpaa et al. 2000) and repeated customers (Garbarino and Johnson 1999), and increases the loyalty of repeated customers (Gefen 2002). On the opposite side, the lack of trust has been identified as the main reason why individuals do not shop online (MacGraw 1999; Luo 2002). Therefore, trust is regarded by scholars as one of the most important prerequisites for the success of electronic commerce (Hoffman et al. 1999a). The review of the main contributions on this subject supports the conclusion that studies of trust in the online marketplace focus basically on four different topics: conceptualization, multi-level dimensions, antecedents (and consequences) and evolutionary process. A brief analysis of these lines of research will follow. 6.1
e-Trust Conceptualization
Basically, the efforts in conceptualizing online trust refer to previous research conducted in the off-line environment.47 The conceptualization of trust in e-commerce has been advanced by McKnight et al. (2002a), who identified the following four aspects of trust in e-commerce:48 disposition to trust (that is, general willingness to trust others), institution-based trust (that is, perceptions of the Internet environment), trusting beliefs (that is, perceptions of web vendor attributes), and trusting intentions (that is, intentions to engage in trust-related behaviours with a web vendor). Bhattacherjee (2002) is the author of the second relevant contribution to trust conceptualization. He specifically addresses individual trust in online
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firms (the ‘trusting beliefs’ of McKnight et al.) by developing a seven-item scale for the construct.49 Nah and Davis (2002) adapt to online settings McAllister’s (1995) concepts of cognition-based and affect-based trust. They argue that, in the e-commerce context, cognition-based trust refers to reliability and dependability of the trustee, which Mayer et al. (1995) called ‘integrity’. Affect-based trust refers to care and concern for the other party, or ‘benevolence’ in the parlance of Mayer et al.50 Several empirical studies have also developed measuring instruments for increasing online customer trust. For instance, Newholm et al. (2004) attempted to summarize previous studies and classified the tools identified in the literature in five categories: interface features, offer fulfilment, reputation policies, web site transactions, and multiple contact points. Finally, some authors have analysed the relationship between trust and distrust in e-commerce and argue that trust and distrust are not just two ends of a single bipolar construct51 but two distinct constructs, with differential effects on behaviour (Kramer 1999; Lewicki et al. 1998). For instance, McKnight and Chervany (2001) argued that distrust is based on different emotions from trust: the former comes from feelings such as fear and worry, while trust is based on feelings of calm and security. In a subsequent study, McKnight et al. (2004a) provided support to demonstrate the distinct nature of trust and distrust.52 6.2
e-Trust Multi-level Dimensions
An online setting peculiarity is that it involves trust not simply between the customer and the vendor, but also between the buyer and the transaction medium – the Internet environment (Lee and Turban 2001; McKnight et al. 2002b; Shankar et al. 2002). Unlike the vendor–customer relationship in traditional business settings, the primary interface that connects buyers, sellers and third parties is an electronic market structure supported by information technology (IT), the web site53 (Gefen et al. 2003). Many studies have highlighted the concept of ‘Technology trust’, defined by Ratnasingam (2005: 22) as ‘the subjective probability by which organizations believe that the underlying technology infrastructure is capable of facilitating transactions according to their confident expectations’. Actually, Ratnasingam (2005) argues that trust in the e-commerce context takes two forms: trust in the technology54 and trust in one’s partner. In particular, the author examined trust from four different perspectives (technological, economic, behavioural and organizational) and, on the basis of case study research, argues that trust in e-commerce relationships gradually evolves from technology trust to relationship trust.
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A multi-level analysis of e-trust has emerged in the literature, based on studies which have demonstrated that online shoppers simultaneously trust or distrust (Harris and Goode 2004): ● ● ●
the e-vendors themselves (for example, Fukuyama 1995; Urban et al. 2000), which refers to interpersonal trust; the payment systems (for example, Hoffman et al. 1999a), which lead to technology trust; the very nature of the Internet and online shopping (for example, Hoffman et al. 1999b; Schoder and Yin 2000), which involves institutional trust.
Given the reality of the online setting, and contrary to the traditional environment, in Internet transactions interpersonal trust seems to play a secondary role if compared with that of technology and institutional trust.55 Gefen and Straub (2004) attempted to focus on the concept of interpersonal trust in the virtual setting. The authors investigated, by means of a simulation experiment, which of the established dimensions of trust in interpersonal relationships and in traditional commerce pertain to consumer e-trust.56 Finally, since the web site is in essence an information technology, some studies focused on the role of the technology acceptance model (TAM) in developing trust in online shopping (for example, Gefen et al. 2003).57 6.3
e-Trust Antecedents and Consequences58
Studies on e-trust antecedents and consequences can be classified in two main groups: ‘general’ and ‘clustering’ studies. The researches belonging to the former group – which basically represent the first approach that has been conducted on this topic – are aimed at identifying trust antecedents and consequences that can be generalized to every virtual setting. On the other hand, the latter group includes studies which have investigated how e-trust antecedents and consequences change according to some variables (that is, types of customers and different site characteristics). Among the most quoted ‘general’ studies on this topic in the online trust literature are those developed by Jarvenpaa et al. (2000). The authors conducted a causal research model assuming that two independent variables, the perceived size of an Internet store and its perceived reputation, are positively related to the consumers’ initial trust in the Internet store. They posited that trust in the store would have a direct positive effect on the attitude toward it and an indirect positive effect on attitude through the mediating variable of perceived risk associated with buying from that store.
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Additionally, they assumed that both the latter constructs would have a direct effect on the consumers’ willingness to buy from the Internet store. Using structural equation modelling techniques, Jarvenpaa et al. (2000) found that their model provided a good fit to the data. Perceived reputation had a much stronger effect on trust than perceived size.59 Gefen and Straub (2003) generated a research model in which they expected the predicting variable of social presence on the web site to affect trust in an e-service provider. They further assumed that trust in the e-service provider would be positively related to the consumers’ purchase intention. In addition they hypothesized that the perceived usefulness of a web site would affect the purchase intention, affected in turn by perceived ease of use of the web site and social presence on it.60 Lee and Turban (2001) presented a more comprehensive model, which introduced the multi-level dimensions of trust in the study of its antecedents and consequences. Their framework hypothesizes four antecedent dimensions of trust: trustworthiness of the Internet merchant, trustworthiness of the Internet shopping medium,61 contextual factors62 and other factors not fitting the other three dimensions but possibly influencing trust. The dependent variable in Lee and Turban’s model is consumers’ trust in Internet shopping. Additionally, consumers’ propensity to trust (dispositional trust) is included as the moderating variable that supposedly mediates all relationships between trust and its antecedents. The variables of trustworthiness of the Internet shopping medium and contextual factors are indicators of system trust.63 Among studies belonging to the ‘cluster’ group, some classified e-trust antecedents and consequences on the basis of customers’ typology, while others tried to verify whether sites with different characteristics would require different antecedents for trust. Hee-Woong et al. (2004) investigate trust antecedents distinguishing two different typologies of consumers: potential and repeated customers.64 For potential customers, because of the unavailability of a complete purchase experience, the institutional mode of trust building (Zucker 1986) can constitute an important way to build trust. For repeated customers, however, in addition to the institutional basis of trust, personal experience offers further evidence.65 Potential customers tend to be more exploratory with an Internet store, carrying out tasks like product search, comparison shopping, and negotiation terms (for example, the evaluation of service policies). At this stage, potential customers can experience only the web site quality of an Internet store, not its service quality.66 In addition, potential customers may interpret the web site information (for example, service policy) and attempt to determine the vendor’s intentions (vendor’s concern for customers) in the exchange, implicitly invoking intentionality in trust building. In Internet shopping, legal and
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technological safeguards are important not only for potential customers but also for repeated customers. Repeated customers, as system users, have comprehensive experience with the web site of a vendor, as well as having full transaction experience with the store. Therefore, they are able to evaluate both web site quality and service quality.67 Bart et al. (2005) investigated trust antecedents’ strengths across different web site categories according to some site factors they have identified: financial risk, information risk, involvement with or ticket price of the product or service in the web site, information on the web site, and search for the product or service on the web site. The results of the study showed that different site characteristics require different e-trust antecedents.68 B