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Twisted Paths Europe 1914–1945 Edited by
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T WIST ED PAT H S
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Twisted Paths Europe 1914–1945 Edited by
ROB ERT G ERWART H
1
1
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide in Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With offices in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries Published in the United States by Oxford University Press Inc., New York The Several Contributors 2007 The moral rights of the authors have been asserted Database right Oxford University Press (maker) First published 2007 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover and you must impose the same condition on any acquirer British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Data available Typeset by Laserwords Private Limited, Chennai, India Printed in Great Britain on acid-free paper by Biddles Ltd., King’s Lynn, Norfolk ISBN 978–0–19–928185–5 1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4 2
Acknowledgements The publication of this book would not have been possible without the assistance and support of many individuals who unsparingly gave their time to provide invaluable feedback and criticism. The editor is particularly indebted to Martin Conway and Robert Evans for their encouragement and support. Furthermore, Robert Aldrich, Markku Anttila, Pieter Briegel, Tom Buchanan, Sally Cove, Porscha Fermanis, Juliane F¨urst, Robert Gildea, David Harvey, John Hiden, Emese Lafferton, Rana Mitter, Dirk Moses, Thomas Munch-Petersen, Phillip Morgan, Holger Nehring, David Priestland, Paul Readman, Jay Sexton, Zara Steiner, David Stevenson, Mary Vincent, Jonathan Wright, and several anonymous readers offered challenging feedback about individual chapters and the project as a whole. For financial and logistical support, the editor is deeply indebted to the British Academy and Corpus Christi College, Oxford, whose generosity allowed for the time, space, and congenial environment to produce this volume. The editorial team at Oxford University Press provided invaluable help while the book was being produced. Finally, the editor would like to thank the many publishers and copyright holders for their permission to reprint illustrations.
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Contents List of Contributors List of Maps List of Tables List of Illustrations
ix xii xiii xiv
1. Introduction Robert Gerwarth
1
2. Scandinavia Mary Hilson
8
3. Great Britain Ross McKibbin
33
4. The Two Irelands Alvin Jackson
60
5. Belgium and the Netherlands Martin Conway and Peter Romijn
84
6. France Joan Tumblety
111
7. Iberia Frances Lannon
136
8. Italy R. J. B. Bosworth
161
9. Germany Stefan Berger
184
10. The Successor States R. J. W. Evans
210
viii
Contents
11. The Balkans R. J. Crampton
237
12. Finland and the Baltic States Kristina Spohr Readman
271
13. Russia Hubertus F. Jahn
297
14. Europe and the League of Nations Patricia Clavin
325
15. Europe and the Wider World Nicholas Doumanis
355
Select Chronology of International Events Index
391 405
List of Contributors S B is Professor of Modern German and Comparative European History at the University of Manchester. He is currently chairing a European Science Foundation Programme on ‘Representations of the Past. The Writing of National Histories in 19th and 20th Century Europe’ (2003–8). He is also completing a British Academy funded project on ‘Britain and the GDR, 1949–1990’. He has published widely in the areas of comparative labour history, history of historiography, nationalism, and national identity. His most recent book is Inventing Germany (London, 2004). R. J. B. B is Professor of Modern History at the University of Western Australia. Among his numerous publications are: Nationalism (Harlow, 2007) Mussolini’s Italy: Life under the Dictatorship 1915–1945 (London, 2005), Mussolini (London 2002), and The Italian Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives in the Interpretation of Mussolini and Fascism (Oxford, 1998). P C is Fellow and Tutor in Modern History at Jesus College, Oxford. She is currently working on a study of the Economic and Financial Organization of the League of Nations funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council. In 2000, she published The Great Depression in Europe, 1929–1939 (London, 2000). She is also the co-author (with Asa Briggs) of Modern Europe, 1789–1989 (London and New York, 1997; 2nd edn. 2003). M C is Fellow and Tutor in Modern European History at Balliol College, Oxford. He has written about the extreme right in Belgium during the inter-war years and the Second World War. He has also written more generally on the extreme right and Catholicism in twentieth-century Europe. He is currently working on a book on Belgium after the Second World War. Among his publications are: Collaboration in Belgium: L´eon Degrelle and the Rexist Movement 1940–1944 (New Haven and London, 1993) and Catholic Politics in Europe 1918–1945 (London, 1997). He is also the co-editor (with T. C. Buchanan) of Political Catholicism in Europe, 1918–1965 (Oxford, 1996) and (with J. Gotovitch), Europe in Exile: European Exile Communities in Britain 1940–1945 (Oxford and New York, 2001). R. J. C retired as Professor of Eastern European History at the University of Oxford in October 2006 and is now on Emeritus Fellow of St Edmund Hall. His research interests lie in the field of twentieth-century Balkan history. Among his main publications are: The Hollow D´etente: Anglo-German Relations in the Balkans, 1911–1914 (London and Atlantic Heights, NJ, 1981), A Concise History of Bulgaria (2nd edn., Cambridge, 2005), Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century—and After (London and New York, 1996), The Balkans since the Second World War (London and New York, 2002), and Bulgaria (Oxford, 2007). N D is Senior Lecturer in History at the University of New South Wales, Sydney. He is currently finishing a book dealing with the Greek longue dur´ee and is preparing a study on the modern Mediterranean. He is also working on pluralism
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List of Contributors
and social accommodation in the late Ottoman Empire. His main publications include Myth and Memory in the Mediterranean (London, 1997) and Italy: Inventing the Nation (London, 2001). R. J. W. E is Regius Professor of History at the University of Oxford. He is also a Fellow of Oriel College and a Fellow of the British Academy. His publications include: The Making of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1550–1700: An Interpretation (Oxford, 1991), Great Britain and East-Central Europe, 1908–48: A Study in Perceptions (London, 2002), and Austria, Hungary, and the Habsburgs. Essays on Central Europe, c. 1683–1867 (Oxford, 2006). He is also co-editor (with H. J. Pogge von Strandmann) of The Revolutions in Europe, 1848–9: From Reform to Reaction (Oxford, 2000). R G is British Academy Postdoctoral Fellow at Corpus Christi College, Oxford, and Faculty Lecturer in Modern European History at the University of Oxford. He has also held visiting fellowships at Harvard University and the NIOD in Amsterdam. His publications include The Bismarck Myth: Weimar Germany and the Legacy of the Iron Chancellor (Oxford, 2005, paperback 2007) as well as scholarly articles in Contemporary European History, German History, and Past and Present. M H is Lecturer in Contemporary Scandinavian History at University College London. Her main research interests are in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Swedish and Scandinavian history, in particular comparative social history and popular politics. Her publications include Political Change and the Rise of Labour in Comparative Perspective Britain and Sweden c. 1890–1920 (Lund, 2006). She is currently working on a general history of the Nordic countries since 1945 and on the history of the consumer co-operative movement in comparative perspective. A J is Richard Lodge Professor of History at the University of Edinburgh. His research interests lie in the political relationship between Britain and Ireland in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. He has written extensively on the Union, and on Irish Unionism. He has published numerous articles and five books, including The Ulster Party, 1884–1911 (Oxford, 1989), Ireland 1798–1998: Politics and War (Oxford, 1999), and Home Rule: An Irish History, 1800–2000 (London, 2003). H F. J is University Senior Lecturer in Russian History at Cambridge University and a Fellow of Clare College. His main publications include Patriotic Culture in Russia during World War I (Ithaca, NY, 1995) and (co-edited with James von Geldern) Birches, Bolsheviks, and Balalaikas: Popular Culture in Russian History (special issue of Journal of Popular Culture, 1998). F L is the Principal of Lady Margaret Hall, Oxford. She has published widely on Spanish social and political history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Among her publications are Privilege, Persecution, and Prophecy. The Catholic Church in Spain 1875–1975 (Oxford, 1987) and The Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939 (Oxford, 2002). She is also the co-editor (with Paul Preston) of: Elites and Power in Twentieth Century Spain (Oxford, 1990). R MK is Emeritus Research Fellow at St John’s College, Oxford, and a Fellow of the British Academy. He specializes in twentieth-century British history. At the moment he is working on the political structure of England between 1918 and 1951 which will
List of Contributors
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be the subject of his forthcoming James Ford Lectures in British History at Oxford University. His publications include Evolution of the Labour Party, 1910–1924 (Oxford, 1991), Ideologies of Class: Social Relations in Britain, 1880–1950 (Oxford, 1991), and Classes and Cultures: England 1918–1951 (Oxford, 1998). P R is Research Director of the Netherlands Institute for War Documentation (NIOD) in Amsterdam and Professor of Twentieth Century History at the University of Amsterdam. His principal publications include ‘The War, 1940–1945’ in J. C. H. Blom, R. Fuks-Mansveld, and I. Sch¨offer (eds.), A History of the Jews in the Netherlands (London, 2002), ‘ ‘‘Restoration of Confidence’’: The Purge of Local Government in the Netherlands as a Problem of Postwar Reconstruction’, in Istv`an De`ak, Jan T. Gross, and Tony Judt (eds.), The Politics of Retribution in Europe: World War II and its Aftermath (Princeton, 2000), 173–93, Snel, streng en rechtvaardig: Politiek beleid inzake de bestraffing en reclassering van ‘foute’ Nederlanders 1945–1955 (Groningen, 1991; 2nd edn. Amsterdam, 2002), and Burgemeesters in oorlogstijd. Besteren onder de Duitse bezetting. (Amsterdam, 2006). K S R is Lecturer in International History at the London School of Economics. Educated at the University of East Anglia, Sciences Po Paris, and Cambridge University, she has also held a Junior Research Fellowship at Christ’s College, Cambridge. She specializes in twentieth-century German and Baltic history and is currently working on International Law and the Baltic question in the Cold War. Publications include Germany and the Baltic Problem after the Cold War: The Development of a New Ostpolitik, 1989–2000 (London, 2004), and scholarly articles in Historical Journal and Cold War History. J T is Lecturer in Modern European History at the University of Southampton. Her research interests are focused on the cultural history of twentieth-century France, with special interests in gender, sport, and the radical right. Her publications include ‘Responses to Women’s Enfranchisement in France, 1944–1945’, Women’s Studies International Forum, 26 (2003), ‘ ‘‘Civil Wars of the Mind’’: The Commemoration of the 1789 Revolution in the Parisian Press of the Radical Right’, European History Quarterly, 30 (2000) and ‘Revenge of the Fascist Knights: Masculine Identities in Je suis partout, 1940–1944’, Modern and Contemporary France, 7 (1999).
List of Maps 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
Europe in 1914 Europe between the Wars Europe after 1945 European Colonial Empires in 1914 The British and French Empires in 1930
382 384 386 388 389
List of Tables 4.1. Religious affiliations in the Six Counties of (after 1920) Northern Ireland 4.2. Religious affiliations in the Twenty-Six Counties of (after 1921) the Irish Free State 5.1. Religious affiliations in the Netherlands, 1920–1947 5.2. Language divisions in Belgium, 1930 10.1. Ethnic composition of the Successor States, c. 1920 11.1. Ethnic composition of Bulgaria, 1920/1934 11.2. Religious affiliation in Bulgaria, 1920/1934 11.3. Ethnic composition of Romania, 1930 11.4. Religious affiliation in Romania, 1930 11.5. Ethnic composition of Yugoslavia, by mother tongue, 1921/1931 11.6. Religious affiliation in Yugoslavia, 1921/1931 12.1. Ethnic composition of the Baltic States, 1922–45
78 78 92 93 212 250 250 256 256 260 260 283
List of Illustrations Every effort has been made to trace copyright holders but this has not been possible in all cases. If notified, the publisher will be pleased to rectify any omissions at the earliest possibility. 2.1. King Christian X reclaims northern Slesvig as part of the Danish kingdom following the plebiscites, July 1920. Courtesy of Gyldendal Publishers, Denmark.
13
2.2. The radicalization of the Norwegian Labour Party: ‘Down with the War. Long live the Revolution.’ Illustration for Arbeidets jul (Christmas 1917). Courtesy of Labour Movement Archives and Library, Oslo.
17
3.1. The first FA Cup Final at Wembley Stadium, 28 April 1923. Courtesy of the Hulton Getty Picture Collection.
34
3.2. Women born in 1919 register at a labour exchange in 1941 following the British government’s unprecedented step of conscripting women for war service. Courtesy of the Hulton Getty Picture Collection.
55
4.1. The last hurrah of union: the 1919 Victory Parade in Westmoreland Street, Dublin, to celebrate the end of the Great War. RTE´ Stills Library.
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4.2. State-builder: W. T. Cosgrove at Michael Collins’s graveside, 1922. Courtesy of the National Library of Ireland.
68
5.1. Cardinal Van Roey, the primate of Belgium, attends a Catholic rally in Brussels in September 1936. CEGES/SOMA, Brussels.
100
5.2. The helmsman: election poster of Hendrik Colijn, the Dutch prime minister of the 1930s. NIOD, Amsterdam.
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6.1. ‘Paris—1924’: poster for the 1924 Olympic Games. IOC/Olympic Museum Collections.
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6.2. The battle of births between the Rome–Berlin Axis and the Paris–London Axis: number of births in 1937. From: Fernand Boverat, Comment nous ´ vaincrons la d´enatalit´e (Paris: Editions de l’Alliance Nationale contre le depopulation, 1938), 5.
119
7.1. Poster of the Spanish Republic carrying an olive branch. Frances Lannon’s private collection.
137
7.2. The three ‘F´atima visionaries’: Jacinta, Francisco, and Lucia. Courtesy of the Mary Evans Picture Library.
142
8.1. A school for Jewish children in Italian Libya (1937). Richard Bosworth’s private collection.
168
8.2. An Arab admirer of Mussolini. Richard Bosworth’s private collection.
176
9.1. The Bauhaus in Dessau. Courtesy of the Mary Evans Picture Library.
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List of Illustrations 9.2. The Eternal Jew, anti-Semitic film poster, 1940. Courtesy of the Mary Evans Picture Library. 10.1. The leader of the Hungarian counter-revolution and future regent, Admiral Mikl´os Horthy, enters the city of Budapest on a white horse in 1919. Courtesy of the Hungarian Press Agency’s Photo Archives. 10.2. The Czech composer Leoˇs Jan´acˇek (centre) on a visit to London in 1926. Courtesy of St´atní hudební vydavatelství publishing. 10.3. The architectural flagship of ‘Red Vienna’: Karl-Marx-Hof, 1930. Private postcard collection of Josef Seiter, Vienna. 11.1. The old and the new: a young boy tends his family cattle in the timehonoured fashion, alongside the newly constructed Bucharest to Czernowitz highway, 1934. Richard Crampton’s private collection. 12.1. The Border-states’ Conference, Tallinn, December 1921. Courtesy of Otava Publishing. 12.2. Poster for the (postponed) 1940 Olympic Games. Courtesy of the Helsinki City Archive. 12.3. The newly built Finnish Parliament (Eduskunta) in the early 1930s. Courtesy of the Museum of Finnish Architecture. 13.1. Model of Vladimir Tatlin’s Tower (Monument to the Third International, 1920). 13.2. The Russian actress Lyubov Orlova in Circus (1936), directed by Grigory Alexandrov. 13.3. Lenin and Stalin (1922). Courtesy of the David King Collection. 14.1. Organization of the League of Nations. From: The League of Nations: A Pictorial Survey (Geneva: League of Nations). 14.2. League of Nations’ Disarmament Conference, Geneva, 1932. Courtesy of League of Nations Archives, UNOG Library. 15.1. ‘Europeanized’ Shanghai nightlife in the 1930s. Nicholas Doumanis’s private collection. 15.2. Greek immigrant shopkeepers in North Queensland, Australia, 1917. Courtesy of the Penklis family. 15.3. Greek Orthodox Church wedding in Sydney, 1938. The community declare loyalties to homeland, new country, and empire. Courtesy of Kate Tannos.
xv 202
214 217 220
247 273 280 281 306 320 321 328 335 357 368 373
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1 Introduction Robert Gerwarth
When the German photographer Albert Renger-Patzsch published his critically acclaimed book The World is Beautiful in 1928, many of the most prominent reviewers raised the question if it was possible to appreciate the beauty of the world in an age overshadowed by the legacies of the Great War, economic uncertainty, and widespread anxiety over the future of European civilization. Seventeen years later, after the experience of the unprecedented atrocities committed during the Second World War, the answer to this question seemed obvious. For many contemporary observers who had lived through the turmoil of the period, the entire era since 1914 resembled (in the words of Charles de Gaulle) a ‘second’, but more devastating, ‘Thirty Years War’, a time in which any fleeting moments of hope or optimism had at best been an expression of naivety. Following this pattern, historical textbooks of early twentieth-century Europe have often tended to characterize the period as a crisis-ridden ‘dark’ interlude between two eras of economic prosperity and peace. Set against the ‘golden age’ of post-1945 (Western) European integration and economic growth, as well as the pre-war era of European global domination, the years between 1914 and the end of the Second World War are commonly described as an ‘age of catastrophe’ (Eric Hobsbawm), a ‘period of terrible violence, instability and fragmentation’ that can ‘be seen merely as a nightmarish parenthesis between two eras of globalization and integration’ (Julian Jackson). Given the scope of the horrors which Europe experienced both within the period and its immediate aftermath, such verdicts seem more than justified. By 1945 much of Europe was in ruins. Since 1914, roughly eighty million people had been killed in the course of wars and civil wars, in the extermination camps of the Nazi regime, and in the forced labour camps of Stalinist Russia. In the First World War alone, the dead totalled more than eight million military casualties and, according to some estimates, a further five million civilians who perished as a result of war, civil war, and famine. In the Second World War, more than forty million people—two-thirds of them civilians—were killed. Apart from the two world wars, Europe witnessed the Russian and Spanish Civil Wars (resulting in
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up to three million deaths in the first case and about 500,000 in the second), the Russo-Polish War of 1919–21, and the war between Greece and Turkey of 1920–2, as well as major revolutionary and counter-revolutionary upheavals in Central and Eastern Europe. Between five and six million Jews and hundreds of thousands of Sinti and Roma were brutally murdered. A continent that had prided itself on being the ‘cradle of civilization’ had become the site of some of the most barbaric acts of mass murder in recorded history. In the wake of war and the repeated reshuffling of borders, Europe also experienced unparalleled waves of forced migration: four to five million refugees in the years 1918–22, and as many as forty million ‘displaced persons’ between 1945 and 1950. Families were torn apart, communities destroyed, and economies exhausted. Europe’s global predominance in cultural, economic, and political affairs was irrevocably lost. When viewed from the perspective of 1945 and compared with the situation in 1900, Europe’s history in the first half of the century must have seemed very dark indeed. The question remains as to whether European history between 1914 and 1945 should be judged retrospectively (that is, from the utter devastation caused from the late 1930s onwards) or whether we are hereby doing injustice to the numerous more positive elements of the period—from social reform, democratization, and the enfranchisement of women in many countries to mass-commodity consumption, an unusual degree of cultural productivity, the expansion of leisure time, and scientific innovation, as well as new forms of state action to counter the economic depression—that existed alongside ethnic, political, and socio-economic conflict. The sheer scale of war and genocide in the first half of the twentieth century doubtless makes it difficult to appreciate any of the seemingly short-lived achievements in inter-war European history, but they were, of course, as much part of that period’s legacy as were the experiences of ultra-violence and economic crisis. It is indeed almost impossible to understand the success of European integration, social policies, and industrial practices in the post-1945 period without acknowledging their heavy debt to ideas and forms of policy-making developed before the Second World War. Even in the field of international relations, it seems questionable if a linear story of European ‘decline’ and ‘failure’ can adequately capture the pluralism and ambivalence of European history in the first half of the twentieth century. The League of Nations, for example, commonly charged with responsibility for failing to prevent rearmament and the outbreak of the Second World War, nevertheless made substantial contributions in the fields of healthcare, drug control, economic cooperation, labour legislation, and laws to prevent the illegal trafficking of women. Its work foreshadowed aspects of European and global cooperation that are usually described as emerging after the Second World War, for example, by creating the first genuinely international civil service (the Secretariat), many of whose members played an important role in post-war institutions such as the United Nations, the European Community, the World
Introduction
3
Health Organization, the International Court of Justice, or the International Labour Organization. Given the diversity of the period’s legacy, it cannot be the aim of this volume to replace the narrative of Europe’s linear decline between 1914 and 1945 with an alternative, univocal interpretation of the period. Instead, it offers a series of concise introductory essays on the often different (and sometimes similar) historical experiences of twelve European states and regions, as well as two chapters on the League of Nations and Europe’s myriad connections with the ‘wider world’. As a result, this volume differs from previous general histories on the period in two substantial ways. First, the book moves beyond the view that the history of early twentieth-century Europe can only be understood in terms of catastrophe. That history is composed of many different and often contradictory cross-currents is an insight that was articulated by two of inter-war Europe’s numerous prominent intellectuals, Ernst Bloch and Siegfried Kracauer. What Bloch called ‘non-synchronicity’ and Kracauer the ‘heterogeneity of the historical universe’ acknowledges the multiple temporal strands that rarely, if ever, cohere in any historical period. This volume consequently aims to provide a more balanced synthesis of new historical research on the twisted paths of European states and regions in this period, presenting an account that refrains from depicting early twentieth-century European history as a one-way street into the abyss. While this collection certainly does not try to paint the period in rosy colours, it suggests that both ‘darker’ and ‘lighter’ elements in Europe’s history were capable of evolving simultaneously, and that European societies followed twisted paths through the age of the two world wars. Without neglecting the more familiar stories of war, genocide, and economic depression, each chapter will demonstrate that political stability and regime collapse, social progress and mass poverty, the crisis of European civilization and remarkable cultural achievements could exist alongside each other, and that even for the belligerent European countries which participated in the wars after 1914 and 1939, the 1920s and early 1930s were a post-war period, not just a crisisridden prelude to the Second World War. This volume consequently addresses a wide canvas of events, ranging from the military struggles of the two world wars (and their manifold consequences), the intense political conflicts which resulted in the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, the challenges of political and cultural nation-building in East-Central Europe, the Fascist and Nazi seizures of power in Italy and Germany, and the Spanish Civil War of 1936–9 to the often neglected achievements of the period, such as innovations in social welfare, the introduction of far-reaching labour laws, and the breakthrough of parliamentary democracy and republicanism in countries previously ruled by autocratic or semi-autocratic governments. International history, both in terms of inner European affairs between 1914 and 1945 and Europe’s multiple connections with the ‘wider world’, also features prominently. Despite the fact that the First World War brought Europe’s global domination to an abrupt
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end, it continued to maintain multiple ties with the wider world. Apart from the continued existence of formal empires, and German and Italian attempts at empire-building, the volume addresses the beginnings of Europe’s cultural and economic ‘Americanization’ and the enduring personal networks that resulted from international migration. Secondly, in order to emphasize the extraordinary degree of diversity that characterized the period, this volume broadens the geographical focus by offering succinct interpretations of historical developments in nearly all areas within Europe’s natural borders, from the Atlantic to the Arctic Ocean, from the Bosporus to the Urals and the Mediterranean. Starting with the often marginalized Scandinavian countries whose impact on inter- and post-war concepts of welfare, education, and social peace as well as on modern architecture and design was considerable, the volume covers developments in western, southern, and eastern Europe, as well as the successes and shortcomings of the League of Nations and Europe’s close ties with the rest of the world. Some readers will no doubt be surprised to see that small countries such as the Scandinavian and Baltic states or Belgium and the Netherlands receive nearly as much space as Russia, Germany, France, and Britain. Yet one of the principles of this book is to avoid the temptation of homogenizing European history by focusing exclusively on the belligerent ‘Great Powers’ and to emphasize instead that the histories of smaller states can illuminate the diversity of Europe’s experiences in the first half of the twentieth century. Although the larger states’ particular weight and influence in inner and extra-European affairs is undoubted (and indeed reflected in the decision to devote separate chapters to their histories in the period), considerable attention is also given to countries and regions which are all too often lost from view behind the histories of larger states. Wherever possible, nation-states with similar political, social, or cultural agendas have been grouped together in one chapter to allow for fresh comparative, transnational, or transregional perspectives. In the cases of the Baltic and Scandinavian countries, the Iberian Peninsula, the Balkans, the Successor States, and the Low Countries, such an approach seemed particularly fruitful. For similar reasons, it has been decided to include a chapter on ‘The Two Irelands’ which suggests that the Irish Free State followed a very different path from Britain after 1922, while Northern Ireland, though remaining part of the United Kingdom, had a distinct political and religious life that may be seen as much in the context of Irish as of British history. There are several challenges in writing a multi-authored general history along these lines. One of the challenges for any history textbook of this scale is the reconciliation of breadth and depth. Although it would be impossible for any one-volume study to cover every aspect of European history between 1914 and 1945, this book is unusually broad in its geographical and thematic scope. Without pretending (or desiring) to be a ‘total history’, or indeed a conclusive account of European history in the age of two world wars, this book attempts to
Introduction
5
encourage debate about the multifaceted nature of a period that is all too often approached as a pathological phenomenon in textbooks. We are acutely aware that in a book with such broad coverage, many important aspects of European history in this period can only be discussed in passing and that some geographical areas (most notably Switzerland) could not be included due to limitations of space. However, it is hoped that the survey-style nature of this volume will stimulate further general interest in (and debate about) one of the most dramatic periods in modern European history. Our readers are encouraged to use this book as a starting point for further explorations of this rich and diverse period, and to read it alongside both thematically ordered textbooks and case studies on individual aspects of early twentieth-century European history. For this purpose, readers will find a short list of further suggested reading at the end of each chapter. A related challenging task was to ensure the greatest possible cohesion for this book while at the same time seeking to argue that there was no ‘normative’ European experience between 1914 and 1945. To be sure, Europe underwent many common processes, from economic change to social modernization and the transition to mass politics, but the ways in which these common processes were refracted through Europe’s political cultures differed remarkably. A contemporary traveller, Patrick Leigh Fermor, who walked through Europe from the Netherlands to Turkey in 1933, accurately conveyed a sense of the irreducible diversity of European states and societies in the literary descriptions of his journey, during which he encountered a wealth of cultural diversity as well as highly divergent levels of living standards and urbanization. Because of Europe’s diversity, it is necessary to adopt an ‘open’ approach to the subject matter, rather than a ‘hard’ definition of European history which emphasizes its common experience and its distinctiveness from other areas of the world. Both before 1914 and again after 1945, it was relatively easy to decide on the borders of Europe. In the inter-war-period, however, there was little qualitative difference between Europe and states experiencing modernization beyond Europe’s geographical borders such as Ataturk’s ‘Europeanizing’ Turkey, or indeed Japan. In this respect, ‘Europe’ was not so much a clearly definable subject as a constellation. A final point relates to periodization. Although this book starts in 1914 and ends in 1945, it should be emphasized that neither of these dates constituted decisive turning points in the histories of all European states. For the large number of countries that did not participate in the First World War—notably Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland—August 1914 did not mark the kind of caesura that it clearly did in the belligerent countries. The same applies to 1945. For a German Jew who had managed to survive the horrors of the Holocaust, 8 May 1945 obviously had a very different meaning than it did for the peoples of Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Ireland, and Switzerland, all of whom had remained neutral during the Second
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World War. Similarly, for many Europeans, the end of the Second World War did not always divide violence and repression from post-war reconstruction and the dawn of the democratic age. For a substantial number of people, the years that followed the end of the Second World War were the worst of the twentieth century. Food shortages, high levels of violence against civilian populations, economic dislocation, and mass suffering continued after 1945, particularly, but not exclusively, in Eastern Europe. As the following chapters will demonstrate, there is indeed much to be said for interpreting the period of 1914–45 as Europe’s ‘age of catastrophe’. Yet it should not be forgotten that Europe’s early twentieth century was also characterized by learning processes and often remarkable achievements and innovations that survived the devastations of the Second World War and shaped the second, ‘happier’ half of that century. F U RT H E R R E A D I N G Berend, Ivan T., Decades of Crisis: Central and Eastern Europe before World War II (Berkeley, Calif., 1998). Berghahn, Valler R., Europe in the Era of Two World Wars: From Militarism and Genocide to Civil Society. (Princeton, 2006). Berman Sheri, The Social Democratic Moment: Ideas and Politics in the Making of Interwar Europe (Cambridge, Mass., 1998). Bessel, Richard (ed.), Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany: Comparisons and Contrasts (Cambridge, 1996). Borejsza, Jerzy W., and Klaus Ziemer (eds.), Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes in Europe: Legacies and Lessons from the Twentieth Century (New York, 2006). Cambridge History of Christianity, ix. World Christianities c.1914–c.2000, ed. Hugh McLeod (Cambridge, 2006). Clavin, Patricia, The Great Depression in Europe, 1929–1939 (London, 2000). Conrad, Peter, Modern Times, Modern Places (London, 1998). Conway, Martin, Catholic Politics in Europe 1918–1945 (London, 1997). Donald, Moira, and Tim Rees (eds.), Reinterpreting Revolution in Twentieth-Century Europe (New York, 2001). Hobsbawm, Eric, Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914–1991 (London, 1994). Jackson, Julian, Europe 1900–1945 (Oxford, 2002). Luebbert, Gregory M., Liberalism, Fascism, or Social Democracy: Social Classes and the Political Origins of Regimes in Interwar Europe (Oxford, 1991). McCabe, Susan, Cinematic Modernism: Modernist Poetry and Film (Cambridge, 2005). Mann, Michael, Fascists (New York, 2004). Mazower, Mark, Dark Continent: Europe in the Twentieth Century (London, 1999). Rees, Tim, and Andrew Thorpe (eds.), International Communism and the Communist International 1919–1943 (New York, 1998). Reynolds, Sian (ed.), Women, State and Revolution: Essays on Power and Gender in Europe since 1789 (Amherst, Mass., 1987). Steinberg, Gerald, A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II (Cambridge, 1994).
Introduction
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Steiner, Zara, The Lights that Failed European International History, 1919–1933 (Oxford, 2005). Stevenson, David, Cataclysm: The First World War as Political Tragedy (New York, 2004). Timms, Edward, and Peter Collier (eds.), Visions and Blueprints: Avant-Garde Culture and Radical Politics in Early Twentieth-Century Europe (Manchester, 1988). Vinen, Richard, A History in Fragments: Europe in the Twentieth Century (London, 2000).
2 Scandinavia Mary Hilson
I N T RO D U C T I O N For a sparsely populated and relatively peripheral area of Northern Europe, the three Scandinavian countries—Denmark, Norway, and Sweden—generated a considerable amount of international interest during the inter-war period. By 1939, Sweden in particular had gained an international reputation as a model state, which had responded successfully to the economic and political crisis of the 1930s. Particularly influential was a book by the American journalist Marquis Childs, Sweden: The Middle Way (1936), which helped to establish the idea of the Swedish and Scandinavian ‘middle way’ as a compromise between free-market capitalist democracy and fascist or communist totalitarianism. Writing in The Spectator in 1938, Anthony Blunt commented that, ‘The Scandinavians are the very best sort of people, who seem to have all the advantages of being progressive without any of the unpleasantness. They have achieved real democracy of a kind, and one which is apparent at every step.’ Childs’s favourable impressions were echoed by a team of observers from the British Fabian Society, which visited Sweden in 1936 to investigate the impact of the recent social reforms. Swedish fame for innovation in social policy was strengthened by a matching reputation for extreme modernity in design and architecture, demonstrated to the world through the Exhibition of Arts, Crafts, and Home Industries held in Stockholm in 1930. In Denmark it was the agricultural co-operative societies and the Folk High Schools for adult education which attracted the admiration of international delegations. Sir E. D. Simon, in a book written for the Left Book Club in 1939, pointed to the Scandinavian countries and Switzerland as a model for the defence of democracy against the ‘terrific challenge’ of the dictators in ‘these dark days’. Most enthusiastic of all was the British Labour politician Hugh Dalton, who wrote in 1936 that the Swedish recovery from the depression had been ‘sensational’ and nothing short of ‘an economic miracle’. Swedish industrial
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output did indeed grow impressively, by 67 per cent between 1932 and 1937, though economic historians now agree that this was largely for structural reasons rather than a direct result of enlightened economic policy. It may be noted that by the late 1930s the Scandinavian governments were also actively promoting this image of their region as egalitarian, peaceable, stable, democratic, and ultra-modern, in contrast to so much of the rest of Europe. One example of this was the publication of an English-language book entitled The Northern Countries in World Economy in 1937, the northern countries in this case including also Finland and Iceland. Published by a government-sponsored organization for the promotion of economic cooperation, the book was intended to be ‘a manifestation of the spirit of cooperation among the northern Nations’. This was, however, a remarkably novel image of the region. Seen from the perspective of 1914, there was little to suggest that inter-war Scandinavian history would follow this course, and that the region would avoid the political and social upheavals which beset much of continental Europe during most of the period. Denmark, Norway, and Sweden were small, relatively poor, and strategically vulnerable countries. Rapid industrial development during the 1890s and 1900s had resulted in social polarization and conflict, especially in Sweden and Norway. In the century after 1830, almost three million Scandinavians emigrated to the New World and elsewhere, rates which measured in proportion to population were among the highest in Europe. Moreover, parliamentary democracy was a fragile phenomenon, established around the beginning of the period and no less vulnerable to political extremism than similar regimes elsewhere in Europe. Despite mutually intelligible languages and a degree of shared history, the Scandinavian countries differed from one another in important ways. Norway was a young country, which had only gained independence from Sweden in 1905 and was strongly influenced by the liberal nationalist movements which had campaigned for this independence during the late nineteenth century. It lagged behind the other Scandinavian countries in its economic development, though it had gained a degree of parliamentary government in 1884. After independence was achieved, the thoughts of Norwegian nationalists turned towards national consolidation and economic development through the rapid expansion of hydroelectric power and the related electrochemical and metallurgical industries. Sweden, by contrast, had a well-developed and rapidly expanding industrial sector by the turn of the century, but it also had an unreformed political system and a monarchy and conservative establishment unwilling to accept the final demise of great power aspirations in 1905. Denmark retained its North Atlantic possessions, including Iceland, the Faeroe Islands, and Greenland, but for the last quarter of the nineteenth century its politicians had governed in acute consciousness of their vulnerability to their much larger neighbour Germany, following military defeat in 1864. This chapter is concerned with the three Scandinavian countries: Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. As the example of the The Northern Economies discussed
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above makes clear, it would have been possible to include Finland here as well. Despite the different language there were strong historic and cultural ties between Finland and the rest of Scandinavia, since Finland had been part of Sweden until 1809, and still retained an influential Swedish-speaking minority. As Kristina Spohr Readman discusses in her chapter, however, there are also good reasons for considering Finland together with the other Baltic States that achieved independence from Russia at the end of the First World War. Moreover, it was only really from the second half of the 1930s that the idea of Scandinavia was expanded (as Norden, or the Nordic region) to include Finland. There is a danger here that one views the earlier part of the period through the prism of post-1945 Nordic cooperation, which is not necessarily appropriate. There are two main questions for historians of Scandinavia during the interwar period. The first concerns why the Scandinavian countries seemed to be able to overcome the problems of the era so much more successfully than many larger nations. The Scandinavian states were not immune to the major threats of the period: political extremism, dictatorship, social instability, violence, and war. How significant were these threats in Scandinavia and how successfully were they resisted? Secondly, to what extent is it possible to distinguish a common Scandinavian path in this period? The nineteenth-century aspiration to found a pan-Scandinavian state seemed a distant memory in 1905, when there was a real possibility that the break-up of the Swedish–Norwegian union would lead to war between the two countries. In its place, however, there was after 1917 an emerging sense of the need for Scandinavian solidarity among some small and vulnerable states. The response to this was a heightened commitment to internationalism, through participation in the League of Nations, and attempts to strengthen a sense of Nordic solidarity and cooperation. From the 1930s, this also included Finland, independent since 1917. Nordic histories seemed to converge with the Crisis Agreements of the early 1930s, and the broadly similar economic and social policies which followed. But this pan-Nordic solidarity was to be severely tested by the events of the Second World War: Finland fought two wars against the Soviet Union (see the chapter on Finland and the Baltic States), Norway and Denmark were invaded by the Nazis in April 1940, and the Swedish government emerged from the war with the purity of its neutrality severely compromised. T H E 1 9 2 0 s : PA R L I A M E N TA RY D E M O C R AC Y U N D E R T H R E AT ? Despite the tensions in intra-Scandinavian relations after 1905, the three states were able in 1912 to agree a joint declaration of neutrality in the event of a European war. This neutrality was maintained after August 1914, though none of the states was immune to the effects of the war. Like other neutral states, the Scandinavian countries experienced a beneficial increase in trade, though
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domestic prices rose very rapidly. By 1920 the cost of living index had risen to 262 for Denmark, 270 for Sweden, and 302 for Norway, where 1914 = 100 in each case. A turning point came in 1916, when submarine warfare began to cause serious disruption to international trade, and Norway in particular suffered heavy losses in its merchant marine. These difficulties also affected the food supply, so that by the winter of 1916–17 there were severe shortages of basic foodstuffs in all the Scandinavian countries, and widespread hunger demonstrations took place across Scandinavia during the spring of 1917. The situation threatened to generate grave social unrest and political instability, only exacerbated by the revolutions in Russia, and the civil war in Finland following that country’s independence from Russia in December 1917. The threat of revolution in 1917–18 was not unique to Scandinavia of course; indeed, events there were strongly influenced by developments in the rest of Europe, notably in Russia. Sweden’s neutrality and geographical proximity to Russia meant that in the immediate aftermath of the February Revolution, Sweden was the main source for news on Russia, and events there were followed with great interest in the Swedish press. Lenin himself visited Stockholm in April 1917, though historians are divided on the extent to which the Swedish communists were influenced by the Bolsheviks or by other radical political currents. The syndicalist Central Organization of Swedish Workers (Sveriges Arbetarnes Centralorganisation, or SAC), founded in 1910, had over 30,000 members in 1920. At the end of the First World War there was very little evidence to suggest that liberalism, capitalism, and democracy were any more robust or unthreatened in Scandinavia than in the rest of Europe. Despite their non-belligerent status, the Scandinavian countries in 1918 were faced firstly with problems similar to those in other European countries. These included: the internal problem of minorities and the issue of national security; secondly, the need to make parliamentary democracy function effectively; and thirdly, post-war economic instability and resulting social conflict. All three Scandinavian countries were signatories to the Covenant of the League of Nations in 1920 (newly independent Finland was admitted in December of that year). From 1923 they were treated as a distinctive block, with a rotating entitlement to one of the non-permanent seats on the League Council. Some Scandinavians, such as the Norwegian polar explorer Fridthiof Nansen and the Swedish labour politician Hjalmar Branting, played a leading role in seeking to establish the League in the forefront of post-war aspirations for international peace. Indeed, the League could claim as one of its early successes the peaceful resolution of a Scandinavian issue when, in 1921, it confirmed Finnish sovereignty over the Swedish-speaking inhabitants of the Åland islands, but with provisions for local autonomy and the demilitarization of the islands. In fact, the question of national minorities was relatively straightforward for the Scandinavian countries when compared to the complex ethnic jigsaw of Eastern Europe. At first glance, Scandinavia seemed to lack the major
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ethnic, linguistic, and religious cleavages that the Versailles Treaty and Wilson’s Fourteen Points were intended to tackle. There were ethnic and linguistic minorities in Scandinavia of course, including the Finnish-speaking Kvens of northern Norway, the Swedish-speaking minority in Finland, and a small gypsy or tattare population, but the existence of these groups lacked the potentially explosive implications of the existence of minorities elsewhere in Europe. The most significant minority group in Norway and Sweden was the Sami people (or Lapps as they were known to contemporaries), who lived a largely nomadic existence in the northern parts of Norway, Sweden, Finland, and north-western Russia. The prevailing attitude of the authorities to these people, strongly influenced by social Darwinism, was largely one of condescension: they were regarded as an inferior race which could be either safely ignored or left to the civilizing efforts of missionaries. Attempts to exploit the economic resources of the north in both Sweden and Norway had brought about encounters with the Sami, of course, but they were too few to offer any serious resistance. There was more potential for problems of national unity in Denmark, since that country still had sovereignty over its north Atlantic islands. The indigenous people of Greenland were ruled directly as a colony, but both the Icelanders and the Faeroese were gradually distancing themselves from Copenhagen, aided by the growth of a commercial fishing industry. Iceland gained what amounted to almost full autonomy in 1918, while remaining under the auspices of the Danish crown. In the Faeroes there were moves towards greater cultural autonomy, including the adoption of a Faeroese flag and the widespread use of the Faeroese language, which were tolerated by Denmark. In fact, the one ethnic question in Scandinavia which did perhaps have the potential to become a problem arose not from the north Atlantic, but from Slesvig on the southern border of Denmark. German rule over the Danish-speakers of northern Slesvig had been a source of grievance to the Danish ruling elite since 1864, and there was disappointment that the matter was not mentioned in President Wilson’s Fourteen Points. Nonetheless, the Danish government assumed that the Danish-speaking parts of Slesvig would be returned to Danish sovereignty following the defeat of Germany, while some ultra-nationalists argued for the Danish border to be extended as far south as Kiel. The peace treaty made provision for the matter to be settled by plebiscite, and for the purpose the region was divided into two zones: the northern, predominantly Danish-speaking zone voted as a whole in February 1920, while the southern zone voted by local government district a month later. The result of the plebiscites was a blow for Danish nationalists: the north produced a three-quarters majority in favour of reunification with Denmark, but in the south not a single district, including the major city of Flensburg, voted in favour. The Danish government had no choice but to accept the result, and on 10 July 1920 King Christian X rode across the border on a white horse to claim the new territory. The settlement proved to be effective, for it generated little of the ethnic tension seen in other parts of inter-war Europe.
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Figure 2.1. King Christian X reclaims northern Slesvig as part of the Danish kingdom following the plebiscites, July 1920.
Despite the lack of important ethnic cleavages, the issue of nationalism had the potential to undermine fragile parliamentary democracy in both Sweden and Denmark. (In Norway, where liberalism had formed the backbone of the nationalist movement for independence, anti-democratic nationalism was much less prominent.) In Sweden, a suffrage reform enfranchising most men over 24 had been enacted in 1909, but the aspirations of democrats continued to be frustrated by the intransigence of the unreformed upper house of parliament, and the personal ambitions of the monarch, Gustav V. Following the end of the Swedish–Norwegian union in 1905, an emergent group of ultra-right-wing conservatives began to look to the monarchy as a focus for their ambition of reviving Swedish great power aspirations, expressed above all in demands for greater defence expenditure directed against Sweden’s old enemy Russia. The Liberal government which took office in 1911 angered this group with its proposals to cut defence spending. In February 1914 the pro-defence campaign reached its climax when many thousands of demonstrators marched in Stockholm in support of increasing national defence (the so-called Farmers’ March or bondetåget). King Gustav V, admiring the stance of his relative Kaiser Wilhelm, intervened and supported the pro-defence group’s position in a speech to the demonstration in the palace courtyard. The Liberal government fell, and
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was replaced by a conservative, royally approved government under Hjalmar Hammarskj¨old, which continued in office following two elections that same year. The political situation became calmer under the auspices of a wartime truce. In the spring of 1917, however, the Liberals and the Social Democrats defeated the government’s defence proposals in parliament. This amounted to a vote of no confidence in the Hammarskj¨old government, which duly fell, but following the intervention of the King was replaced by another conservative government under Carl Swartz. Against the background of the wartime hunger demonstrations the situation was now rather tense, but the leader of the reformist Social Democratic Party (SAP), Hjalmar Branting, was able to channel popular unrest into demands for constitutional reform and, following elections in September 1917, a new Liberal/SAP government took office on the basis of its parliamentary majority. The main aim of this government was to steer through a constitutional reform guaranteeing virtually universal and equal suffrage for both houses of parliament and for municipal elections, which was duly achieved. In Denmark, the Social Democratic Party (SD) had worked in cooperation with the Liberals (RV) to secure universal suffrage, achieved through a constitutional reform in 1915. But here too parliamentary democracy faced a challenge from the nationalist right. As in pre-war Sweden, conservative nationalists turned to the monarchy as a channel for their dissatisfaction with the Liberal government’s handling of the Slesvig issue. Tensions were heightened by a simultaneous major conflict in the labour market, in the early spring of 1920. In March, King Christian X took matters into his own hands by summoning the Liberal prime minister, C. T. Zahle, and demanding his resignation. When Zahle refused, the King simply dissolved his government and established a new, conservative one. The Social Democrats protested that the King had executed a coup d’´etat and managed to persuade the syndicalists to support their call for a general strike in defence of parliamentary democracy. The King was eventually persuaded to give in, let his government fall, and call a new parliamentary election. The so-called Easter Crisis (Påskekrisen) had been resolved peacefully, and shortly afterwards the labour market conflict was also settled. There is broad consensus among historians that the years 1917–20 mark the final breakthrough for the principle of parliamentary democracy in Sweden and Denmark. In both cases the critical influence appears to have been the willingness of the majority of the labour movement to embrace parliamentary reformism as the main route to socialism, and to cooperate with bourgeois liberal parties in order to achieve that goal. This outcome was by no means inevitable, however. One concrete result of the hunger demonstrations and social unrest of the spring of 1917 was the institutionalization of a permanent split in the labour movement, with the founding of left-wing socialist parties in Denmark and Sweden. These new parties had their roots in the anti-defence socialist youth movements which had existed within the social democratic parties in both countries since the turn of the century, and were strongly influenced by
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events in Germany and Russia, though Bolshevism had perhaps less influence as an ideological force than anarcho-syndicalism. The situation remained tense throughout 1917–18. In Sweden, the Social Democrats were able to channel social unrest into support for parliamentary reform, secured through the election of a Social Democratic/Liberal government in the autumn of 1917, though there were further outbreaks of social unrest throughout 1918. In Denmark, where parliamentary reform was enacted in 1915, left-wing opposition to the Social Democrats’ cooperation with the Liberals was growing throughout 1917, exacerbated by high levels of unemployment. There were strikes and disturbances throughout 1918, reaching a peak in November with several days of rioting in Copenhagen, sparked initially by demands for the release of left-wing political prisoners. That this did not escalate is perhaps explained by the strength of the reformist leadership of SD, like their counterparts in Sweden, and the party’s declared willingness to defend parliamentary democracy. Indeed, on the same day as some of the most serious rioting, the SD congress adopted a comprehensive social reform policy. By 1920, both SD and the SAP were explicitly committed to reformism under the influential leadership of Thorvald Stauning and Hjalmar Branting respectively. Stauning’s 1923 pamphlet, ‘Parliamentarism or Dictatorship’, placed his party firmly within the democratic camp, and at its Odense congress the same year, the party adopted a new programme which broke with the past in that it amounted to a blueprint for government rather than an attack on the capitalist system. The following year, the social democrats were able to prove their commitment to the existing system when they formed their first minority government; it lasted two years before it fell over difficulties in getting its economic policy agreed in parliament. The SAP’s 1920 programme, meanwhile, amounted to a fairly radical statement of socialist ideology with its demands ‘to reform fundamentally the economic organization of bourgeois society’. That said, the party was also clear that this ambition was to be achieved through political means, and Branting demonstrated that he was prepared to give guarantees against radical action on either defence or nationalization when the party formed its first minority government in the same year. Some historians have suggested that revolution was against the innate character of the Scandinavian societies, the history of which had always been characterized by gradual, peaceful evolution. Opponents of this position argued (and have continued to argue) that the embrace of the institutions of liberal capitalism amounted to a betrayal of the true revolutionary aspirations of the working class. For the dominant groups in both social democratic parties, however, and indeed in the other mainstream parties as well, the battle for parliamentary democracy was over by the early 1920s. The problem that remained was how to make parliamentary democracy work, and in response to a succession of short-lived minority governments during the 1920s there were many critics, from both right and left, who advocated alternative means of achieving their preferred political goals.
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Meanwhile in Norway, revolution might have seemed to some to be a real possibility during the 1920s. Here the major parliamentary reform had come in 1884, much against the wishes of the Swedish king. Perhaps because of this the Norwegian Labour Party (DNA) had never developed a tradition of cooperation with bourgeois liberalism to secure reforms. According to the historian and party activist Edvard Bull, writing in the 1920s, the decisive influence on the party was the rapidity of Norwegian industrialization after 1905, which radicalized the workforce. More recent research has cast doubt on this suggestion, arguing that more significant was the party’s internal structure, which allowed radical groups from the Trondheim region in particular to gain a majority at the party’s congress. The personality of the radical leader, Martin Tranmæl, was also thought to be influential, just as Branting and Stauning were equally important in steering their parties towards reformism. Whatever the cause, Tranmæl’s radical Trade Union Opposition won a majority at the DNA’s congress in the spring of 1918 and, declaring DNA to be a revolutionary party, subsequently applied to join the Communist International. Unlike Denmark or Sweden, in Norway it was the social democratic wing which split off from the main party to form a minority splinter group. The relationship with Comintern was not a happy one, especially following the publication of the so-called Twenty-One Theses, demanding complete allegiance to Moscow, and Tranmæl is known to have wanted to leave the organization as early as 1920. The labour movement was also weakened by high levels of unemployment and declining trade union membership. In the spring of 1923, the so-called Kristiania proposal to leave Comintern was adopted, and three labour parties contested the 1924 elections: DNA, the Social Democrats, and the Communist Party (NKP). In 1927, DNA reunited with the Social Democrats and made some significant gains in the election of that year, to the extent that they were invited by the king to form a minority government. This government, which survived for only fourteen days before it was defeated over its budget proposals, was perhaps the most extreme illustration of the difficulties of parliamentarianism. Wary of its experience, DNA returned to campaigning on an explicitly revolutionary platform in 1930. It is difficult to judge the extent of genuine support for the stated revolutionary aims of the Norwegian Labour Party in the 1920s. Immediately after DNA left Comintern, approximately a quarter of its membership and half of its parliamentary representatives defected to the new Communist Party, though in many cases this was only temporary. Indeed, it was the growth of a strong parliamentary group around the moderate social democrat Johan Nygaardsvold which helped to outweigh the extra-parliamentary radical opposition centred on Tranmæl, and to push the party overall towards a more moderate position. Further, DNA’s advance in municipal elections also strengthened the party’s commitment to practical reform work. Nonetheless, support for communism remained strong within the trade union movement, particularly in the regions
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Figure 2.2. The radicalization of the Norwegian Labour Party: ‘Down with the War. Long live the Revolution.’
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furthest from Kristiania (Oslo). Overall, however, it might be more accurate to suggest that fear of Bolshevism was always stronger than hopes or dreams of its success. Certainly the bourgeois parties were able to campaign effectively on an anti-Bolshevik platform, and this may go some way to explaining the greater coherence of the Norwegian far right compared with Sweden and Denmark. Nonetheless, it cannot be overlooked that one of the major political parties in Norway, claiming with some justification to speak for a majority of the organized working class, was committed on paper at least to overthrowing parliamentary democracy until the early 1930s. In Norway, as in Denmark and Sweden, political tensions were exacerbated by severe economic difficulties and the social polarization and conflict resulting from chronically high levels of unemployment. Overall, the Scandinavian economies performed relatively well during the years 1918–39, even though rates of growth never matched the very spectacular development of the years before 1918, especially in Norway. As open economies relying heavily on exports, they were of course vulnerable to falling commodity prices and shrinking international trade after 1929, but this also aided their relatively speedy recovery from the Great Depression. Industrial expansion continued throughout the period, especially in Sweden where new technology was enthusiastically applied to developing new consumer goods industries by companies such as L. M. Ericsson, Electrolux, and Volvo. The concentration of capital and consolidation of smaller enterprises into larger ones was regarded favourably and the anti-trust legislation found in some countries was regarded with some scepticism. Fordist ideas about the rationalization of the production process made relatively little impact in Denmark and Norway during the 1920s, but Frederick Taylor’s influential book on production methods had first appeared in a Swedish translation in 1913 and influenced attempts to rationalize production and improve efficiency throughout Swedish industry. The most famous—or perhaps notorious—example of Swedish trust capitalism was a vast international business founded on the production of matches. Swedish Match developed rapidly during the 1920s to the point that by 1928 it had control of more than half the world’s match production and majority shares in match companies in thirty-three different countries. It collapsed as spectacularly as it had risen when its director Ivar Kreuger shot himself in March 1932, and the Stockholm stock exchange had to be closed for a week amid financial scandal and allegations of phoney profits. Despite the overall trend of economic expansion, the Scandinavian economies followed the European inter-war pattern of instability and crisis, accompanied by persistently high levels of unemployment. Unemployment averaged around 20 per cent in Denmark and Norway for the period 1921–39; in Sweden, it was slightly lower at just under 15 per cent. All three countries followed the European wartime pattern of a speculative boom and high levels of inflation continuing to 1920, followed by depression and falling commodity prices. The
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consensus was that these difficulties were best tackled by orthodox economic policy, namely fiscal restraint, deflation, and the maintenance of the gold standard. All three countries were able to stabilize their currencies at pre-war parities: Sweden was back on gold by 1924, Denmark by 1926, and Norway by 1928. The cost of this policy was a relatively severe depression by the mid-1920s, especially in Norway and Denmark. Some unemployment relief was provided by municipal government, though those employed on emergency relief schemes were paid strictly below market wages. The shortcomings of these policies were recognized, but they were seen as a necessary evil, to which there was no viable alternative. Classical nineteenth-century liberalism seemed to have no answers to the economic problems, but nor, at least during the 1920s, did social democracy. By the end of the 1920s, it was clear that the main political bone of contention had become the question of the extent to which governments should be prepared to intervene in the economy. Faced with falling agrarian prices and rising levels of farm indebtedness and bankruptcies, the non-socialist parties (or bourgeois parties as they are generally known in Scandinavia) did demonstrate that they were prepared to compromise the principles of economic liberalism to support the agrarian sector, through buying surplus produce and forming compulsory price cartels for some commodities. Farmers in all three countries felt deeply threatened by the post-war world. By 1930, one in ten Norwegian farmers was threatened with bankruptcy, and emigration to the New World no longer provided the escape route that it had during the second half of the nineteenth century. In addition there was a sense that the modern post-war world, with its enthusiasm for technology and industry, was a direct challenge to all that the farmers stood for. For this reason, the new farmers’ parties which emerged in Sweden in 1921 and Norway in 1920 were initially defensive organizations above all, seeking to regain some of the political influence enjoyed by the Scandinavian farmers for much of the late nineteenth century. As the economic situation worsened, however, they played a more active role in advocating farmers’ interests, in some cases through compulsory collective organization. In Norway and Denmark in particular, there was clearly the potential for the development of an agrarian proto-fascist movement. In Norway, this took the form of an organization called Country People’s Crisis Aid (Bygdefolkets Krisehjelp), which eventually became absorbed into the fascist National Unity (Nasjonal Samling, or NS) party after 1933. In Denmark, the Farmers’ Union (Landbrugernes Sammenslutning, or LS) took some votes and parliamentary seats off the traditional agrarian party; more significantly, it was also able to mobilize 40,000 farmers in a protest march to Copenhagen in the summer of 1935, in a demonstration that was clearly modelled on the Finnish Lapua movement (see Chapter 12 on Finland and the Baltic States). That these movements ultimately failed was perhaps to do with the complexity of the rural society: it was never a question of a simple divide between town and
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country. The larger freeholders, who had formed the backbone of nineteenthcentury liberalism and whose interests were represented in the three agrarian parties (Venstre in Denmark, Bondepartiet in Norway, Bondef¨orbundet in Sweden) formed a very different group to the smallholders (husmænd, arbeiderbønder) who were usually forced to seek waged employment to supplement the meagre living they could make from the land. This latter group were increasingly the target of social democratic campaigning, in the parties’ aspirations to unite the ‘little people’ (småfolk) against capitalism. The Norwegian Forestry and Agricultural Labourers’ Union, founded in 1927, was by 1930 the largest union in the trade union federation, accounting for 10 per cent of its members. This growth came during a period of considerable difficulty for the labour movement. Although the central trade union federations were able to consolidate their control over national wage bargaining in most industrial sectors, the wage negotiations were more likely to be about limiting cuts in wages than agreeing rises. High levels of chronic unemployment weakened the trade unions and led to falls in membership—of as much as 40 per cent in the Norwegian trade union federation between 1920 and 1927. It might be true that real wages continued to rise, as a result of the fall in commodity prices, and that those workers in employment at least could enjoy the benefits of a growing range of mass-produced consumer goods, but the experience of chronic unemployment had a profoundly demoralizing effect on the working class, in Scandinavia as elsewhere in Europe. And in the face of apparent social democratic impotence to tackle the problem, it was above all the communists—syndicalists in some areas—who had the best claim to speak for the working classes. This less compromising view of class conflict, together with a sense of desperation on the part of many unemployed workers, resulted in some violent confrontations between labour demonstrators and the authorities in some parts of Scandinavia towards the end of the 1920s. The most notorious incident took place in the Swedish district of Ådalen in 1931, when military personnel opened fire on a crowd demonstrating against the use of strike-breakers in the local sawmill and killed five people. T H E S C A N D I N AV I A N R E S P O N S E TO T H E D E P R E S S I O N : T H E C R I S I S AG R E E M E N TS O F T H E 1 9 3 0 s The international depression began to affect the Scandinavian economies from the summer of 1930. Falling agricultural prices had a particularly devastating impact on Denmark. The 1931 abandonment of the gold standard by Britain, which provided the market for one-third of Danish agricultural exports, made a bad situation worse, followed by the equally worrying news in January 1932 that Germany was raising customs duties on butter, thus effectively cutting off another export market. Unemployment peaked in 1932 at 32 per cent in Denmark, at 31 per cent in Norway, and at 23 per cent in Sweden (in 1933).
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There was little in the experience of the 1920s to suggest that Scandinavia was any less vulnerable to the political and social effects of the Depression than other countries. Parliamentary democracy was functioning but scarcely doing so effectively: there had been twelve different governments in Sweden between 1920 and 1932, and few governments throughout Scandinavia had been able to command a parliamentary majority. While liberal democracy seemed unable to offer a solution to the crisis, there were a number of voices arguing for a more extreme response. The Norwegian Labour Party was, as we have seen, committed to socialist revolution, while those on the right argued for the need for a ‘strong man’ to come to the rescue. The crisis in Scandinavia did not, however, result in authoritarian government. Instead, in a development that was remarkably similar in all three countries—and that was also paralleled by the ‘red–earth’ coalition of 1937 in Finland, and the ‘government of the working classes’ formed between the Labour Party and the agrarian-liberal Progressive Party in Iceland in 1934—the social democratic parties were able to negotiate a compromise agreement with the agrarian parties, which gave them the parliamentary majorities necessary to steer through some rather innovative economic crisis policies. These so-called ‘red–green’ coalitions are seen as important historically in that they marked the beginnings of social democratic political dominance in Scandinavia, and allowed the social democratic parties to embark on a programme of major social reform. Indeed, within the Swedish historiography in particular, the 1930s has generally been viewed as one of the main twentieth-century watersheds, perhaps more significant as a turning point than the Second World War. The first of the Scandinavian crisis agreements was the so-called Kanslergade Agreement in Denmark in January 1933, named after the prime minister’s residence where the negotiations took place. In fact, the agreement was less of a sudden breakthrough than the culmination of a series of compromises agreed between the social democrats and the bourgeois parties during the preceding years. The immediate trigger for the talks, however, was the need for consensus on the devaluation of the krona. Negotiations between representatives of the Social Democrats, the Liberals, and the Agrarian Party continued for eighteen hours before a deal was struck. In return for the SD concessions on devaluation and agrarian price support to help the farmers, the Agrarian Party agreed to support the social democrats’ unemployment and welfare policies and to abstain in a parliamentary vote on an ongoing labour market conflict, which was settled immediately following the negotiations. The timing of the agreement appears symbolic with historical hindsight, for it was concluded just one day before Hitler came to power in Germany. The Kanslergade Agreement was observed with great interest in Sweden. Here the SAP had formed its fourth minority government, under the leadership of Per Albin Hansson, following its electoral success in 1932. The party’s aim, once in office, was to implement its new crisis programme, but in this it was
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opposed by the bourgeois parties. Influenced by events in Denmark, from April 1933 the SAP commenced negotiations with the Agrarian Party, and in May was able to make an agreement with them, the so-called crisis agreement, or Cow Deal (kohandel) as it became known. As in Denmark, this compromise was founded on SAP concessions on protectionist measures to help farmers, while the Agrarian Party for its part agreed to support the SAP crisis programme for public works paid at market wages and funded through a government budget deficit. The arrangement allowed the SAP to continue to rule as a minority government with Agrarian Party support until 1936, when after an election the two parties formed a true coalition government. The equivalent crisis agreement in Norway was perhaps more unexpected, given the previously uncompromising stand of DNA towards cooperation with the bourgeois parties. Not only this, but only a few months before the possibility of a red–green agreement was mooted, the Agrarian Party had been negotiating with the fascist National Unity party over the possibility of establishing a new national block. But these talks came to nothing, and the agreement which was eventually struck bore a strong resemblance to the crisis agreement in Sweden, which was very influential on the process. The Agrarian Party agreed to support DNA’s new labour market policy, while DNA agreed to state support and protection for agriculture. The significance of the crisis agreements was thus above all that they allowed the social democratic parties in all three Scandinavian countries to introduce radical economic policies to tackle unemployment and thus hasten the Scandinavian recovery from the Depression. In breaching the solidity of the bourgeois front against socialism, the social democratic parties had managed to challenge the dominance of orthodox economic liberalism. In doing so, they had also abandoned their traditional commitment to the socialization of the economy. Within the SAP in particular, the finance minister Ernst Wigforss had developed a proposal for a counter-cyclical economic policy to tackle unemployment, to be put into practice through a programme of public construction works paid at market wages. Wigforss’s programme is sometimes described as ‘Keynesian before Keynes’. It is true that the SAP’s counter-cyclical policy was developed before the publication of Keynes’s General Theory in 1936, but Wigforss was well aware of the debates within contemporary English liberalism and drew on these, as well as on the Marxist theory of under-consumption and the economic thinking of the so-called ‘Stockholm school’ group of economists—including the liberals Bertil Ohlin and Knut Wiksell, and the social democrat Gunnar Myrdal—in formulating his ideas. Practically, the forced abandonment of the gold standard in 1931 was also influential, in that it released Sweden from a serious constraint on economic policy. For DNA, the electoral setback of 1930, when the party had returned to its Marxist roots and campaigned on a radical socialist manifesto, had forced a fundamental rethinking of its ideology. Similar ideas to Wigforss’s were expounded by Ole Colbjørnsen and Axel Sømme, influencing the DNA’s 1933 programme ‘Work for All’ (Hele
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folk i arbeid ). But as the title of their 1933 pamphlet, ‘A Norwegian Three Year Plan’ (En norsk treårsplan) suggests, the main influence here was less British liberalism than Stalinist economic planning, and indeed the Nazi crisis plan announced in 1932. None of Keynes’s books ever appeared in a Norwegian translation, compared with the various editions that were available in Sweden and Denmark. Economic historians have long debated the significance of the crisis programmes in helping the Scandinavian economies to recover from the Depression. Most studies have concluded that the crisis agreements and implementation of the programmes came too late to have any real impact, and that the public works policies merely helped to aid the recovery, rather than to start it. This was especially true for Norway where DNA was not able to introduce its policies until 1935. Instead the emphasis is placed on structural explanations, principally the early recovery of the main export markets for Scandinavian goods which benefited the most important industries, which was also stimulated by the 1931 devaluation. Nonetheless, with hindsight it would be hard not to see the crisis agreements of 1933 and 1935 as very important moments in the history of the three Scandinavian states. The agreements not only allowed the social democrats to introduce some innovative economic policies, based on ideas which were to form the bedrock of economic policy in many European states after the Second World War. The ‘red–green’ coalitions are also associated with the introduction of some significant welfare reforms, which laid the foundations for the post-war welfare state. The new spirit of compromise also pervaded the labour market, resulting in the famous Saltsj¨obaden Agreement between trade unions and the employers’ federation in Sweden in 1938, which established a system for the negotiation of labour movement conflicts free from government intervention. One important question which has concerned Scandinavian historians is thus why it was possible to establish a peaceable and workable solution to the problems of the early 1930s. Why did democracy survive in Scandinavia when it succumbed to authoritarian governments in so many other parts of Europe? According to the Swedish political scientist Ulf Lindstr¨om, the crisis agreements were symptomatic of the flexibility of the Scandinavian political system, and the ability and determination of all the mainstream political parties—socialist and non-socialist alike—to combat the threat of fascism. For some historians the innate pragmatism and reformism of Scandinavian social democracy—even in Norway where the 1920s were seen as a temporary distraction—was seen as influential. Others have emphasized the strength of the farmers in holding the balance of power during the early 1930s: the pivotal role in negotiating the Swedish agreement, for example, is given not to the SAP leader Per Albin Hansson, but to the agrarian politician Axel Pehrsson of Bramstorp, who did much to develop his party as a modern interest organization. More recently, Bo Stråth and ¨ Eva Osterberg among others have sought to understand the Scandinavian model
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in terms of its very deep historical roots, based on a Scandinavian penchant for democracy, consensus, and equality stretching back to the Enlightenment or even further. This approach can seem to be unhelpfully teleological, though it is certainly true that the 1933 and 1935 agreements did not merely arise on the spur of the moment but were rooted in earlier developments. Above all, perhaps, it is necessary to see the agreements as a Scandinavian phenomenon, where the Danish Kanslergade Agreement had a profound impact on the Swedish negotiations, and the Swedish agreement likewise on the Norwegian. In this sense, the crisis agreements could be seen as the partial achievement of the early twentieth-century attempts to foster pan-Scandinavian cooperation within the labour movement, in opposition to the contemporary hostility in intra-Scandinavian relations. The crisis agreements were also significant in that they allowed the social democratic parties to introduce some long-awaited reforms in welfare policy. Even if the question of the future of capitalism was still an open one for the parties, they had accepted the need to act to ameliorate the effects of social inequality and especially unemployment. Under the influence of prominent party thinkers like Karl Steincke in Denmark and Gustav M¨oller in Sweden, this had developed into comprehensive proposals for social reform by the 1930s. What was most distinctive about this social reform was the emphasis on universality: social policies were to benefit not just the working class, but the whole of society. By the 1930s, even DNA had begun to present itself as a party of popular appeal rather than a narrowly working-class one, and the formation of coalitions within the agrarian parties merely consolidated this trend. Steincke stated his vision of a welfare system that was ‘humane but not soft, democratic but not demagogic, a blend of radical and conservative so far as is necessary if we are not to end in reaction or Bolshevism. It would distinguish itself both from the bleeding-heart sentimentalism that is so nauseating and from the ice-cold rationality that is so chilling.’ These ideas were encapsulated, most famously, in the Swedish concept of the ‘people’s home’ (folkhem) introduced by Per Albin Hansson in a speech to parliament in 1928: The foundation of the home is community and solidarity. The good home knows no privilege or neglect, no favourites and no stepchildren. There, no one looks down on another, no one strives to gain advantage at the expense of others, the strong do not repress and rob the weak. In the good home equality, thoughtfulness, cooperation and helpfulness prevail. Applied to the great people’s and citizens’ home this would mean the breakdown of all social and economic barriers that now divide citizens into privileged and deprived, into the rulers and the ruled, into rich and poor, the propertied and the destitute, the robbers and the robbed. Swedish society is not yet the good citizens’ home . . . If [it] is to become [so] class differences must be banished, social care must be developed, there must be an economic levelling out, the workers must be accorded a share of economic administration, democracy must be introduced and applied to social and economic life.
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For mainly linguistic reasons the term folkhem never entered popular usage in Norway or Denmark, but the ambitions behind the welfare reforms were very similar. The folkhem concept also serves to illustrate that there were many different influences on Scandinavian welfare thinking during the inter-war period. The term first appeared in social democratic discourse during the mid-1920s, but it had its roots in turn of the century conservatism, when the provision of homes and smallholdings was seen as a means of tackling the problem of emigration. The welfare reforms introduced in the 1930s drew on conservative and liberal ideas, as well as social democracy. Social reformers from all political persuasions were influenced in particular by widespread fears about population decline, fears which were also found in other parts of Europe. Typically, this debate in Scandinavia was tinged with concerns about ‘race hygiene’ and eugenics. Steincke’s major work on welfare reform, Fremtidens forsørgelsesvæsen (The Welfare System of the Future) devoted a whole chapter to the issue of race improvement. There was broad consensual support for the laws passed in 1934, in all the Scandinavian states, sanctioning compulsory sterilization for citizens with congenital learning difficulties or mental illness, ‘sexual deviants’ and those who had committed sexual crimes, alcoholics and drug abusers, and those suffering from conditions such as epilepsy. There was also legislation prohibiting marriage between people in these groups. Between 1934 and the 1970s, many thousands (nearly 63,000 in Sweden, for example) of sterilizations were carried out; about half of these were performed using indirect force, that is, the patient was persuaded to give their consent by the medical experts concerned, and a small proportion involved direct force. The matter provoked a prominent public debate during the 1990s and the Scandinavian governments were forced to compensate some of the surviving victims of forced sterilization. It must be pointed out, though, that with the exception of some individuals with extreme views, eugenics in Scandinavia never came under the influence of the racial pseudoscience which drove the racial experiments carried out by the Nazis. In Scandinavia, eugenicist practices were generally motivated by concerns for social efficiency and productivity rather than demands for racial purity: the goal was to promote a healthy and efficient society by stamping out social problems such as alcoholism, drug abuse, and mental illness. For social democratic welfare reformers such as Steincke, forced sterilization and other coercive policies were intended to play only a minor role in improving the population. The main solution to the population problem was always seen as better social and healthcare legislation. The main architects of population policies in Sweden, the social democrats Gunnar and Alva Myrdal, whose book Kris i befolkningsfrågan (The Crisis in the Population Question) made a big impact when it appeared in 1934, insisted on the need for individuals to have free will in the rational planning of their families. Policies designed to ease the economic
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burden on young families were therefore to be accompanied by paid maternity leave and the recognition of the rights of mothers to return to their employment after childbirth, as well as the right to abortion and the free dissemination of contraceptive advice. Uniquely among European states, Sweden passed a law in 1939 prohibiting the marriage bar in women’s employment. In Denmark, married women were prohibited from working in some municipalities, but their right to work was upheld in principle, and the 1935 Population Commission advocated reforms in childbirth and family life similar to the Swedish model as the best way to tackle declining birth rates. Norway was the exception here, since DNA’s revolutionary period had tended to subjugate feminist demands to the class struggle, and a family model based on a gendered division of labour remained much stronger well into the post-1945 period. As a whole, though, Scandinavian population policies were in stark contrast to some of the more conservative pro-natalist programmes found in other parts of Europe. Social democratic welfare policies in the inter-war period were therefore characterized by the following ideas. First, they stressed individual autonomy, and the onus on individuals to take responsibility for improving their own lives. The Scandinavian labour movements had traditionally emphasized self-improvement and auto-didacticism, but the idea was also rooted in the Lutheran beliefs in self-reliance and the value of work. The aim of welfare policy was not only to help citizens, but also to cultivate in them healthy and industrious habits. Secondly, welfare policies were to be prophylactic. The state was to play an active role in creating the good society, rather than merely responding to social problems. This rested on a deep-rooted faith in the ability of the state to act benignly in the best interests of society. Finally, social democratic welfare policies reflected a profound faith in the ability of technology, scientific enquiry, and rational planning to construct this new and better society. In this way, social democratic ideology was a powerful expression of modernity in inter-war Scandinavia. This was especially marked in Sweden, where modernizing nationalists, such as Gustav Sundb¨arg in an intervention in the early twentieth-century debate on how to prevent emigration, spoke of the wish to create a new ‘great power’ era for Sweden by reinventing the nation as the embodiment of the modern age. Thus, while during the 1920s it had been Denmark—especially its agriculture and education system—which was seen as the epitome of Scandinavian democracy and progress, by the 1930s most international interest was directed towards Sweden. Most of this came from the USA, influenced by publications such as Marquis Childs’s Sweden: The Middle Way, where Swedish interventionist economic and social policies were cited approvingly as examples of how Roosevelt’s New Deal might work in practice. But the cultural affinities between Scandinavia and the UK meant that first Danish and then Swedish social and economic reforms were studied with great interest there as well. The Scandinavian reputation for modernity also found expression in the arts, specifically architecture and design. Influenced by Le Corbusier and also
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the architecture of Weimar Germany, Swedish architects in particular found that modernist ideas about the relation of form and function could be adapted to serve the need for mass-produced homes built rationally and cheaply. The functionalist concern with natural light and simple lines also corresponded with both traditional Swedish aesthetics and the contemporary obsession with hygiene. Functionalism became something of an official design doctrine in Sweden following the 1930 Stockholm Exhibition, and the co-option of many leading functionalist architects to the Social Democratic government’s housing commission in 1933. During the same year, a leading group of architects, including Gunnar Asplund, Uno Åhr´en, Gregor Paulsson, and others, published a functionalist manifesto, acceptera (to accept), outlining their vision of a modern aesthetic underpinned by democratic values. These ideas were also applied to town planning, with the rebuilding of many central parts of the major Scandinavian cities, and the design of furniture and household necessities. The modernity of the Scandinavian countries certainly impressed many visitors to the region, but the advance of cultural modernism was by no means uncontroversial. The architecture and design presented at the Stockholm Exhibition was criticized for being un-Swedish: only later did it come to be seen as a fundamental expression of a distinctively Swedish aesthetic. Although the Social Democratic prime minister Per Albin Hansson made his home in a new functionalist house in the Stockholm suburb of Bromma, some within his party, such as the mayor of Stockholm, Carl Lindhagen, criticized the functionalist aesthetic as dreary and utilitarian. Against the brave new world of the modern nation there could also be found a sense of nostalgia for the vanishing rural past, expressed in Sweden, for example, in the enthusiasm for hembygd (local heritage) societies and museums during the 1920s and 1930s, most prominently the popular open-air Skansen museum in Stockholm, with its collection of traditional farm buildings from different parts of the country. Moreover, there was also some political support for those who wished to resist the forces of modernity politically. The Ådalen riots in 1931 (see above) and similar disturbances in Denmark and Norway, even if not quite as serious in terms of loss of life, had demonstrated that the possibility of political violence lay only just below the surface. The Social Democratic government elected in 1932 did its best to play down the significance of the events in Ådalen, attributing the disturbances to the work of a few communist agitators and therefore alien and out of place in a modern social democratic welfare state. But political violence and disorder did not disappear: to take just one example, there were also disturbances, involving over 2,000 people and directed largely against police officers, at an autumn fair in Eskilstuna, a city controlled by the SAP, in 1937. More worrying, seen against the background of international developments during the 1930s, was the potential for right-wing anti-democratic politics. Disenchantment among farmers had led to the foundation of proto-fascist agrarian organizations in Denmark and Norway, and although these never had the significance of the
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Finnish Lapua movement, the Danish Farmers’ Union was able to mobilize 40,000 farmers in a march to Copenhagen in 1935. Traditionally, fascism in Scandinavia has been regarded as an imported phenomenon, which failed because of its lack of sympathy with Scandinavian ideas and values. It was certainly the case that the Danish Nazi Party, the DNSAP, drew its strongest support from Slesvig in southern Jutland, clearly influenced by German Nazism just across the border. The Swedish right had traditionally shown much admiration for and affinity with German militarism, and Swedish Nazis were also attracted by the notion of a superior pan-Nordic Aryan race. But there was also the potential for home-grown varieties of fascism. Dissatisfaction with the parliamentary system in Norway made the idea of the ‘strong man’, who would override party divisions, attractive to some, and the name of the polar hero Fridthiof Nansen was canvassed as a suitable candidate for this role. Vidkun Quisling’s National Unity party (NS), founded in 1933, was based on the clear ambition of staging a coup d’´etat and setting up Quisling as a kind of Norwegian Hitler. In Sweden and Denmark, sympathy for the Nazi cause was demonstrated by youth organizations allied to the conservative party in each country which also began to adopt Nazi organizational tactics such as the wearing of political uniforms, though they were not particularly anti-Semitic. In Sweden, the Nazi movement disintegrated following internal disputes between its leaders, and the extreme right never gained parliamentary representation either in Sweden or Norway. In Denmark, the Social Democratic Party achieved its best ever election success in 1935, campaigning on the slogan ‘Stauning or Chaos’, but the threat remained. Although the mainstream parties consolidated their position in the 1939 election, the radical parties won fourteen mandates (out of a total of 148) between them, of which three were won by the DNSAP. In the event, the main threat posed by fascism to Scandinavian democracy turned out to be external rather than internal, and this experience has unsurprisingly been influential in shaping the historiography. The escalation in international tension during the 1930s strengthened the impetus for Nordic cooperation, and from 1932 regular meetings of the Scandinavian foreign ministers were resumed. Following the Abyssinia crisis in 1936, these talks gained a renewed urgency and the possibility of a Nordic defence pact was discussed, though it foundered over the different geopolitical outlooks of the Scandinavian states. For Denmark, the vulnerability of the southern border with Germany was always the prime consideration, whereas for Sweden the traditional enemy always had been, and remained, Russia, now the USSR. Norway, meanwhile, had undergone something of a reorientation towards the north Atlantic since the First World War. Its government clashed with the Danish one over Norwegian claims to eastern Greenland during the early 1930s, and trading and diplomatic links with Britain were strengthened. These differences were demonstrated after the outbreak of the Second World War. When the USSR invaded Finland in the autumn of 1939, the Swedish government was divided between those advocating
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non-intervention, and the Social Democratic foreign minister Rickard Sandler, who was in favour of sending troops to aid the Finnish war effort. The supporters of neutrality won the day, but approximately 8,000 Swedish volunteers went to fight in Finland and there was a strong sense that ‘Finland’s cause is our cause’. This stood in contrast to the passivity of the Swedish reaction to the invasion of Norway and Denmark by Germany on 9 April 1940. The Second World War thus saw a divergence in the experiences of the Scandinavian countries. Denmark and Norway were invaded and occupied. In Denmark, the Germans governed with the cooperation of a coalition government consisting of all the major parties (with the obvious exception of the communists). There was relatively little resistance until the summer of 1943, when a campaign of strikes and sabotage initiated partly by the communists and stimulated also by Allied and SOE intervention obliged the Germans to introduce more direct rule. In Norway, the invasion was resisted militarily with the aid of Allied forces, and the delayed capitulation allowed the king and government to exile themselves to London for the duration of the war. This left Sweden alone to pursue the traditional Scandinavian position of neutrality, which its government did with the strong support of the population, though critics argued that the claim to neutrality was actually compromised by pragmatism, for example, in the concessions made to Germany in allowing the transit of troops through Sweden to Norway, and the restrictions on free speech and political expression domestically. C O N C LU S I O N S The three Scandinavian countries emerged from the Second World War relatively unscathed. Norway in particular had sustained some damage to its infrastructure, and both Denmark and Norway had lost citizens in the resistance fighting, but overall these losses (3,600 and 10,000) were extremely modest compared to the rest of Europe. Even the small Danish Jewish population was saved, thanks to an eleventh-hour evacuation to Sweden in 1943. Moreover, the political system had also survived intact in all three countries. The Danish Social Democrats, tarnished by their participation in the collaborative coalition government, lost some electoral support to the communists immediately after the war, but their Swedish and Norwegian counterparts were both strengthened by their experiences of the war. DNA’s leaders returned from their London exile as popular heroes, and were able to use the strong feelings of national unity to continue the policies begun during the 1930s. The SAP also benefited from its association with a policy of neutrality that had been both popular and effective in keeping Sweden out of the war. For these reasons, it is perhaps tempting to see the Second World War as being merely a temporary interruption to the course of twentieth-century Scandinavian history, rather than the fundamental turning point it seemed to be
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in other parts in Europe. For Scandinavia, the crucial moment came in the 1930s, when the crisis agreements allowed the social democratic parties to overcome the problem of minority parliamentarianism and to embark on innovative programmes of economic and social reform. Much of the welfare legislation was actually enacted after 1945, but the fundamental principles—universalism and the emphasis on education (uppfostran in Swedish)—had been laid in the 1930s. The myth of Scandinavia as the ‘middle way’ undoubtedly gained much of its credence from the bi-polarization of the Cold War, but the roots of this too lay firmly in the 1930s. So why were the Scandinavian countries so successful in overcoming the problems of the inter-war years and maintaining parliamentary democracy? Although it has become fashionable in recent years to denigrate the contribution of the social democratic parties to this process, in Scandinavia itself at least, the willingness of these parties to compromise, and their ability to produce forwardthinking, innovative thinkers in economic policy and social reform was certainly decisive in making Scandinavia less vulnerable to economic hardship and social conflict. The success of the inter-war Scandinavian democracies was, however, by no means inevitable. There was no Scandinavian Sonderweg, stretching back to the eighteenth century (or even earlier), which was characterized by an indigenous tradition of peasant democracy combined with a tendency towards social equality, and faith in the benign influence of the strong state as an instrument of social change. Political violence and disorder, and support for more authoritarian solutions to contemporary crises, were always possibilities. Above all, though, the Scandinavian experience of the inter-war period was in many ways similar across the three countries. There were of course important differences between Denmark, Norway, and Sweden which could not be overcome by mutually intelligible languages or shared histories. During this period, however, despite some residual hostility between Sweden and Norway, the histories of the Scandinavian countries did appear to converge, culminating in the shared crisis agreements between social democrats and agrarian parties in 1933 and 1935. Structural similarities go some way towards explaining this convergence: all three countries had fairly similar social structures, with a large agrarian sector, and all three countries experienced similar economic difficulties as small, open economies producing raw materials for export. In addition, successive governments in all three states were acutely conscious of their military weakness and strategic vulnerability between the great powers. But to understand the similarities of the 1930s crisis agreements, we also have to look to the exchange of ideas within Scandinavia, and the legacy of earlier attempts to foster Scandinavian cooperation, mostly at the level of civic society. Once again the role of social democracy has to be acknowledged here, and the Scandinavian labour congresses which were established after 1900, with the ambition to foster international peace in an era of hostility between the Scandinavian nations.
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By 1914, the nineteenth-century project to unite the three Scandinavian states was long since dead, and with it any residual aspiration to great power influence in Europe. For all three countries the period 1914–39 was thus characterized by their adaptation to their position of vulnerability as small states within an unstable international system. Despite their declared neutrality, the Scandinavian states could not, however, remain isolated from the general problems which beset the continent during the inter-war period, such as economic instability, social tension, and political extremism. The view that was until recently prevalent within the Scandinavian historiography, that threats such as fascism could be seen mainly as foreign imports, is not sustainable. Yet in Europe and beyond there was a growing perception that the Scandinavian countries had been unusually successful in containing these threats and could thus act as models for other countries. The welfare legislation passed during the late 1920s and 1930s was studied with great interest in other countries, for example, as were the policies for the regulation and planning of the economy. The Scandinavian countries had begun to gather a reputation for modernism and innovation in the fields of architecture and design in particular, which was further developed after the war. Although it is not considered here, Finland also became drawn into this stereotype from the 1930s. Pan-Nordic solidarity was to be severely tested by the events of 1939–40, but developments in the inter-war period laid the foundations for closer cooperation after the war.
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G Broberg, Gunnar, and Nils Roll-Hansen (eds.), Eugenics and the Welfare State: Sterilization Policy in Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland (East Lansing, Mich., 1995). Esping-Andersen, Gøsta, Politics Against Markets: The Social Democratic Road to Power (Princeton, 1988). Derry, T. K., A History of Modern Norway, 1814–1972 (Oxford, 1973). A History of Scandinavia (Minneapolis, 1979). Gruber, Helmut, and Pamela Graves (eds.), Women and Socialism, Socialism and Women: Europe between the Two World Wars (New York, 1998). Hadenius, Stig, Swedish Politics during the Twentieth Century (Stockholm, 1990). Johansen, Hans Christian, The Danish Economy in the Twentieth Century (London, 1987). Lewin, Leif, Ideology and Strategy: A Century of Swedish Politics, tr. Victor Kayfetz (Cambridge, 1988). Lindstr¨om, Ulf, Fascism in Scandinavia 1920–1940 (Stockholm, 1985). Magnusson, Lars, An Economic History of Sweden (London, 2000). Musial, Kazimierz, Roots of the Scandinavian Model: Images of Progress in the Era of Modernisation (Baden-Baden, 2000). Nissen, Henrik S. (ed.), Scandinavia During the Second World War, tr. Thomas MunchPetersen (Oslo, 1983).
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Nordstrom, Byron J., Scandinavia since 1500 (Minneapolis, 2000). Salmon, Patrick, Scandinavia and the Great Powers, 1890–1940 (Cambridge, 1997). Samuelsson, Kurt, From Great Power to Welfare State: 300 Years of Swedish Social Development (London, 1968). Scott, Franklin D., Sweden, the Nation’s History (Carbondale, Iel., enlarged edn. with an epilogue by Steven Koblik, 1988). Tilton, Tim, The Political Theory of Swedish Social Democracy: Through the Welfare State to Socialism (Oxford, 1990): chapters on the political thought of social democrats Gustav M¨oller, Per Albin Hansson, Ernst Wigforss, and the Myrdals.
3 Great Britain Ross McKibbin
I N T RO D U C T I O N Of all the major European powers, Britain’s history between 1914 and 1945 is probably the most exceptional. Alone of these powers she fought in both world wars from their beginning to their end. In 1914 she was one of five (six if we include Italy) European states of roughly comparable power. In 1945 she was one of only two; and much weaker militarily than the other, the Soviet Union. But undefeated she remained. She was the first European state to be affected by mass unemployment; but the international depression of the 1930s struck her comparatively lightly. For a substantial part of the population the 1930s meant steadily rising living standards and ‘modernity’ in social and economic life. Despite real class tension in the early 1920s, the decline of the great Liberal Party, and the rapid growth of a mass working-class party, the Labour Party, Britain’s political institutions—unlike those of the other major European states—retained a high degree of legitimacy and supported a remarkably stable political and social structure.
B R I TA I N I N 1 9 1 4 Great Britain, in 1914 the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, was a constitutional oddity. Of the European states, probably only AustriaHungary was as odd. It was a unitary state with one parliament, but that parliament governed four nations: the old kingdoms of England, Scotland, and Ireland and the principality of Wales. By treaty Scotland had its own legal and educational systems and also had a consciousness of not being England. Wales was administratively part of the kingdom of England, but over one-third of its people spoke Welsh and its cultural institutions promoted a sense of
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nationality which governments in London were reluctant to obstruct, and indeed often encouraged, though the Union was dominated by England even more than Prussia dominated Germany. Ireland, as Alvin Jackson points out in the following chapter of this book, was a reluctant member of the Union; but it also comprised two nations: one predominantly Catholic, whose attitude to the United Kingdom was highly ambivalent; another, in the North, predominantly Protestant, possessed of a ferocious British patriotism hardly found anywhere else. Trying to devise a system which would meet Southern Irish demands for some sort of independence while preserving the unity of Ireland and the Union with Great Britain proved to be impossible, but was one of the dominating themes of late Victorian and Edwardian politics. Sport, as always one of the most sensitive of social and political indicators, gives us some idea of how complicated this hybrid ‘nation’ was, made even more hybrid by the emergence of Northern Ireland in 1922. In rugby and football an ‘international’ in 1914 was a match between the constituent parts of the United Kingdom—England versus Scotland, for example. (They are today called ‘home internationals’.) It is as though in the German Empire ‘international’ meant Prussia versus Bavaria. The British Isles were and are represented in the football World Cup by five national sides—something inconceivable anywhere else—but
Figure 3.1. The first FA Cup Final at Wembley Stadium, 28 April 1923.
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in the Olympic Games by only two. In rugby there are four national sides. There is, however, also a team, the Lions, which is picked from all four national teams and is made possible because even after the partition of Ireland in 1922, the Irish Rugby Union—almost uniquely—remained an all-Ireland institution. Despite the existence of these self-conscious nations, however, their aspirations, unlike those of Catholic Ireland, could be accommodated within the Union, as we shall see. In 1914 this constitutional oddity was governed by the Liberal Party, which had been in office since December 1905. As a party it stood for free trade above all; but in defence of free trade it had become an agent of major social reform. In the years immediately before 1914 it had established something like a welfare state, though one by later standards very incomplete. As an electoral force it was heavily dependent upon the Nonconformist churches, on Scotland and Wales, and on elements of the industrial working class. Its geographical bias was towards the north of England and ‘Celtic’ Britain. It relied for its parliamentary majority, however, on MPs from the south of Ireland and on the Labour Party, which, though small in numbers, with its huge trade union base was potentially very strong. That the Liberals were reliant on these two parties to a considerable extent determined their policies. In particular, it committed them to ‘home rule’, a form of self-government for Ireland, something strongly supported in the Catholic south of Ireland, but strongly opposed in the Protestant north. The second great party of the British state, the Conservative Party, was everything the Liberal Party was not: it was weak where the Liberals were strong, and vice versa. It was the party of the Anglican Church, the southern middle classes, metropolitan wealth, the monarchy and most of the aristocracy, much of rural England, and a significant part of the Protestant working class. It was, above all, the party of the Empire and of the Union of Great Britain and Ireland—which is why it was officially called the ‘Conservative and Unionist Party’. It had also effectively abandoned free trade and would in government clearly adopt protection if political circumstances allowed. Britain in 1914 was still the fulcrum of the international financial and trading system. Although its nineteenth-century industrial hegemony was gone, in the face of German and American competition particularly, by specialization in certain sectors it remained the world’s largest exporter, and indeed in the Edwardian years there was an export boom. London was the lender of last resort and Britain’s huge overseas investments and its willingness to invest and lend abroad stabilized the international economy. The gold value of the pound was the yardstick by which all other currencies were measured. Britain was also the most urbanized and industrialized country in the world. Its commercial and service sectors, its sport and leisure, its theatre and entertainment, its notions of domestic comfort, arguably made it, even more than the United States, the first ‘modern’ society. In its external relations Britain looked four ways: to its enormous, amorphous empire—a strange collection of colonies, protectorates, and dependencies with little in common, difficult to defend and a constant drain on British resources;
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to the United States, with whom Britain had a close but edgy relationship; to South America, especially Argentina, which was almost part of the empire and integral to Britain’s trading system; and, finally, to Europe. There were many in Britain who wished to avoid European entanglements altogether, but no British government had ever believed that was possible. In 1914 Britain found itself allied with France and Russia against Germany—in many ways an unnatural alliance. Britain and France had been imperial rivals until the 1890s and many of the French were still suspicious of Britain. Britain and Russia had also been imperial rivals and had little in common politically or culturally. Britain and Germany, however, had much in common. They were more like each other than any other two European states. Furthermore, the international economic system revolved around them: a fact J. M. Keynes was to remind the world of in The Economic Consequences of the Peace (1919). What held this alliance together was a collective fear of German expansionism. T H E E F F E C TS O F T H E F I R S T WO R L D WA R Given Germany’s behaviour in 1914, the feeling everywhere that she was in some sense out of control, Britain could probably have done little else than enter the war on the side of France and Russia. Yet the insouciance with which the British political elite did this, the lack of debate, the insistence that it was ‘business as usual’, is surprising. It has been suggested that the government saw entry into the war as a way out of the crisis over Irish home rule—and war did indeed postpone that crisis (at the price of making it very much worse). This, however, is improbable. It is unlikely that the cabinet thought a war with Germany less dangerous than civil violence in Ireland. The government entered the war because it was not prepared to see Germany impose a punitive peace on France and Belgium (or see the French coast in German hands), and because it underestimated just what the consequences of a war with so formidable an opponent as Germany would be. Although it is possible to exaggerate the degree of enthusiasm for war in Britain, there was little outright opposition to British entry, and this remained true throughout the war itself. Even those thought to be ‘hostile’ were ambivalent: few believed that Germany should actually be allowed to win. At the outbreak of war all parties agreed to a political and electoral ‘truce’. The Irish Home Rule bill was enacted but suspended, and in Ireland both sides supported war. The country continued to be governed by the Liberals—there was no coalition government, only a ‘coalition of opinion’. Yet the Liberal Party was to be the main political victim of the war. In May 1915 it was forced into a coalition with the Conservatives and the Labour Party—though the Prime Minister, H. H. Asquith, deftly ensured that the government continued to be dominated by the Liberals—and in December 1916 its unity was shattered when Asquith resigned
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and left office altogether, taking much of the Liberal Party with him. Although this new coalition was led by another Liberal, the most dynamic figure in British politics, David Lloyd George, and had the support of the Labour Party, it was primarily a Conservative government, even if wartime circumstances concealed that. After the formation of the first coalition in May 1915 the Liberals were never again to govern in their own right. Indeed, with surprising speed they were overtaken by the Labour Party as the principal party of the British ‘left’. There is little agreement among historians as to why this happened and, in particular, what part the First World War played. Nonetheless, whether we think long-term factors were responsible or not, the morale and organization of the Liberal Party undoubtedly began to decay almost as soon as war broke out. This was not because, as some have argued, the Liberals were a laissez-faire party and therefore incapable of mobilizing the resources of the state. In 1914 the Liberal Party was not a laissez-faire party, if it ever had been, and was perfectly capable of mobilizing the resources of the state. But the war made central those policies, like military conscription, where they were reluctant to mobilize the state. The ‘atmosphere’ in which the war was fought, the fight-to-the-end anti-Germanism, the militarization of British life, and the increasingly close connections between the government and big business, deeply offended the free trade internationalism which was still fundamental to many Liberals, particularly those in the party’s Nonconformist religious networks. Many also disliked the coalition with the Conservatives, who were increasingly assertive and ideologically suited to this kind of war. Furthermore, the electoral truce merely transferred politics from parliament to the press, and the government when led by Asquith was under more or less continuous attack. Asquith himself was an ineffective war leader, whereas Lloyd George was in his element. Had Asquith recognized this, instead of insisting upon his own indispensability, the unity of the Liberal Party might have been preserved. As it was, it got the worst of all worlds. The Asquithian wing of the party was neither a real opposition to the Lloyd George government nor a real ally and paid the price for both, while Lloyd George, though the leader of a victorious government, was a prisoner of the Conservative Party, without whose support he would not have been prime minister. The result was a party whose members felt alienated from an unfamiliar political world and was apparently dependent on its traditional enemies for its survival. In much of the country, therefore, the Liberal Party almost disappeared as its activists simply abandoned political life—or went elsewhere. Those who gained most from the war politically were the Conservative and Labour Parties—especially the former. The war was not divisive for the Conservative Party. It had a long history of super-patriotic anti-Germanism, and few in it shared the view of one of its former leaders—the Marquess of Lansdowne—that the war was a European catastrophe as likely to breed revolution as anything else. Furthermore, it was better placed—as we shall see—than the Liberals to represent middle-class resentment at the redistribution of wealth for which the war was responsible. It was a more convincing patriotic
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and anti-socialist party than the Liberal Party. Like the Labour Party, it also gained from the changes to the franchise which were introduced in 1918. Before the war Britain had one of Europe’s most restricted electorates: only about 60 per cent of men and no women were enfranchised. All attempts to extend the franchise before the war foundered on the question of women’s suffrage. However, the claims of democracy could not be indefinitely denied, especially after the huge sacrifices of the war. The Representation of the People Act (1918) enfranchised all men over the age of 21 and most women over the age of 30. The electorate rose from about eight million to twenty-two million, and the age qualification for women introduced a significant bias in favour of the Conservative Party, as did the enfranchisement of many ‘Tory’ working men. The emergence of the Labour Party as the second party of the state was less predictable. The war deeply divided all European socialist parties, the Labour Party not excepted: its leader, Ramsay MacDonald, resigned his post when the Labour Party supported entry into the war. It was divided three ways: into an internationalist wing, of whom MacDonald was a representative, a centre, led by the party’s secretary, Arthur Henderson, which supported the war but not unconditionally, and a super-patriotic wing which supported the war more or less without conditions. These divisions, however, were less damaging than they might have been. In practice, the differences between the internationalist wing and the centre were not unbridgeable. MacDonald never believed that Britain could permit itself to be defeated and he even—very ambiguously—supported the recruiting campaign. Henderson thought Germany disproportionately responsible for the war, but also blamed the old diplomacy. The task of peace-making, therefore, was not to punish Germany but to refashion international relations such that war could not break out again. That was a position that nearly all members of the party and the trade unions—Labour’s base—were prepared to accept. In 1917 Labour made the final break with the Liberal Party and destroyed the old ‘progressive alliance’. Henderson had become convinced that the Russian Revolution demanded the reconstitution of an anti-Bolshevik European social democracy and that a reformed British Labour Party was essential to that reconstitution. During the war, the unions, particularly the miners’ unions, largely departed from the Liberal Party and threw their weight behind Henderson’s reforms. Labour thereafter followed a double route. Its representatives remained within Lloyd George’s coalition until the war’s end, while the party simultaneously reorganized itself and devised a new programme for both domestic and international policy which clearly distinguished Labour from the older parties. Unlike the Liberals, therefore, Labour got the best of both worlds: its patriotism was difficult to question, yet as a party of internationalism and social reconstruction it was much more plausible than the Liberal Party—which is why a number of prominent disenchanted Liberals made their way into the Labour Party. The Labour Party was also favoured by its secular character. It was certainly not anti-religious as such. Many of its early leaders were believing Christians and it was
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careful not to offend religious sensibilities. But its social networks and appeal were essentially secular. Before 1914, as far as we can tell, religion was the main determinant of voting behaviour. Anglicans were likely to vote Conservative; Nonconformists to vote Liberal. After the First World War that tendency weakened, for which the war itself was partly responsible. By all the indices of conventional religion—church attendance, baptisms, confirmations—Britain was an increasingly secular society. And the causes of ‘political nonconformity’, like temperance, lost much of their support, as did Nonconformity more generally. The extent of secularism should not, of course, be exaggerated. The Roman Catholic Church continued to grow as Irish migration to Britain had its inevitable demographic effect. Furthermore, a historic Protestantism partly shaped the way many people thought about the world: they derived their ethical systems and their ‘morality’ (particularly sexual) from this diffuse Protestantism. ‘Religion’, it was said, ‘teaches you good behaviour’. And the formal relationship between the Church of England and the monarchy and the state gave it a presence in the national life its declining congregations probably did not justify. Yet increasingly the driving forces of British life were secular, and the Labour Party was a beneficiary. The war imposed immense strains upon British society and economy. There was a huge loss of life; Britain spent more on the war per capita than any other combatant—in 1918 Britain had the largest functioning army, navy, and airforce in the world, something she certainly could not afford; she had lent great sums of money to her allies and borrowed heavily from the United States on their behalf; many of her overseas assets had been sold; much of her merchant marine had been sunk. America, formerly Britain’s largest debtor, was now its largest creditor, and London had ceded to New York its international financial primacy. Yet Britain emerged from the war much less damaged than any other European combatant. Its standard of living actually rose during the war and, due to state intervention, there was a marked improvement in diet and health. Population continued to increase and London never experienced the demographic disasters that overtook Berlin and Vienna. New industries arose from nowhere to replace German imports—optics, pharmaceuticals (even a substitute for aspirin), chemicals, fine steel, etc.—which were to be the base of much of Britain’s inter-war economy. What made this possible was Britain’s accumulated wealth, the wealth of its white dominions, its ability to pay for much of its war effort out of taxation rather than inflation, and its credit-worthiness in the United States. That wealth was augmented by some of its territorial gains from the war: especially, its effective acquisition of oil-rich territories in the Middle East. Yet in a remarkably short time the British began to regret the war and the Treaty of Versailles with Germany which ended it. Britain had acquired responsibilities which she was no longer strong enough to meet and the old international financial and trading system, which Britain felt to be essential for her own prosperity, was still in ruins. Throughout the 1920s, therefore, the main aim of her foreign policy
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was the reconstruction of as much of that system as was possible. This involved several virtually incompatible policies. Britain had to reassure the French as to their security while making the post-war settlement as acceptable to Germany as she could. She equally had to reassure her imperial dominions that she could defend them against Japanese expansion, should that occur, in the knowledge that she could almost certainly not do so without American support. And coaxing such support from America was almost insuperably difficult. Finally, Britain had to come to terms with the new Russia, the Soviet Union. While Britain was undoubtedly better off at the end of the war than the major continental powers, her experience differed less from them than is usually believed. The way the war was fought and financed introduced many of the same class hostilities, if less intensely. The war had redistributed wealth both between classes and within classes. It had, first, redistributed wealth downwards. The principal beneficiary was the unskilled working class, though the skilled working class also gained. Many believed that the trade unions were responsible for that. The trade unions had certainly grown spectacularly. In 1919 their membership was eight million—a figure not reached again until after the Second World War. In fact, the unions were not particularly successful in protecting wages, though they did to some degree protect hours worked. The working classes gained because they were indispensable in war and because the labour market was very tight until the beginning of 1920. That the unions were irresistible was, however, widely believed and resented. Those who suffered most from war-finance were the salaried middle class. Although Britain paid for much of the war from taxation, it was also driven to printing money—the result was levels of inflation without precedent in recent British history. Salaries did not keep up with inflation and much of the professional and clerical middle class suffered as a result. The value of certain kinds of middle-class assets also much declined. Owners of houses to rent, holders of shares in railways or shipping or foreign government stocks lost heavily—owners of imperial Russian bonds lost everything—and these were typical portfolios in the rentier middle class. Secondly, wealth moved around within the middle class. While the rentier lost, those in the commercial and service sectors did very well and this explains the popular resentment of the ‘profiteer’, who was everyone from the local grocer to the great soap magnate Lord Leverhulme. Furthermore, their gains, unlike those of the munitions manufacturers, were permanent. The result of such redistribution was social grievances unequalled in twentieth-century British history. THE 1920s: ECONOMICS AND POLITICS In the immediate aftermath of the war much of Britain’s heavy industry came close to collapse. Throughout the war itself Britain’s industrial ‘staples’—shipbuilding, heavy engineering, steel, and textiles—operated at full capacity. In the first year
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after the war the Lloyd George government, anxious to absorb demobilized soldiers into the workforce, encouraged an economic boom. In industries like textiles, therefore, there was a big increase in capacity. In 1920, however, the government broke that boom (by sharply raising bank interest rates) while international demand for the British staples declined rapidly. This was due partly to the disruption of international trading lines by the war, partly to loss of overseas markets to lower-cost producers like Japan, and partly to changes in the patterns of demand—oil replacing steaming coal, for instance. These industries had always been subject to international trading fluctuations, but before 1914 had always recovered. In the 1920s their recovery was slow and weak. The consequence was a huge rise in unemployment in certain parts of the country—the North of England, South Wales, and the West of Scotland particularly—and high levels of long-term unemployment became characteristic of the British economy throughout the inter-war years. In turn, unemployment became one of the major issues in British politics. But ‘solutions’ to the problem of unemployment were usually thought antithetical to the interests of the middle classes, and what was as characteristic of the 1920s as unemployment itself was the tendency of governments to put the requirements of the middle classes—which were essentially for deflationary or orthodox economic policies—ahead of those which involved active intervention in the labour market, and a reluctance to believe that such intervention could serve the interests of both the unemployed and the middle classes. This had consequences for British politics. What is striking is how inflexible that system was given the emergence of the Labour Party, the severity of industrial disputes in the early 1920s, the obvious redistribution of wealth that had occurred during and immediately after the war, and the breakdown of the pre-war international trading and financial system. The political and economic logic of Britain’s postwar situation pointed to the reconstruction of party politics on the basis of Labour versus a united anti-socialist party, on the one hand, and the abandonment of free trade, on the other. Neither of these happened. The Lloyd George coalition government could have developed into such an anti-socialist party. It had fought the December 1918 elections as a coalition and had won very easily. Both Lloyd George and the Conservative Party leadership had an interest in perpetuating it. Lloyd George wanted a new party, progressive but non-socialist, untied to traditional vested interests. And since his break with Asquith he had nowhere else to go. The Conservative leadership believed Lloyd George was somehow indispensable and that the Conservative Party by itself was not strong enough to cope either with the Labour Party or post-war social tensions. That view the Conservative leadership held until the end of the coalition government in 1922. It was not, however, held by the national membership of the Conservative Party or by many of its members in parliament. The policies of the coalition government, especially its apparently ‘wasteful’ expenditure, were unpopular with many Conservatives. Furthermore, members of the Conservative
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Party in the country had long memories. Lloyd George might have won the war, but he had also been the scourge of the Conservative Party before it, and many of his cronies were exactly the kind of people Conservatives thought had done too well out of the war. The case for the coalition would have been strengthened had it genuinely held the balance between classes and social forces. This, however, it had not done. As early as 1920 it had largely capitulated to the demands of the Conservative press and various middle-class organizations to adopt deflationary policies whose aim was the restoration of the pre-war ratio of salaries to wages. Having done this it was difficult to argue that his government was better placed to deal with the organized working class than the Conservative Party itself could do. The Lloyd George government had achievements, the most notable perhaps being the settlement of the Irish issue in 1921–2—or at least the extrication of Britain from the violence of Southern Irish politics. But the leadership of the Conservative Party was repudiated by its own members when Conservative MPs voted to leave the coalition and fight an election in 1922 as a purely Conservative government under the former Conservative leader, Andrew Bonar Law. The Conservative Party was convinced that it could establish an anti-socialist party on its own terms. There were many Liberals, however, who were also unwilling to join such an anti-socialist union. Although it was to become clear that most Liberals, when forced to face the issue, preferred the Conservatives to Labour, there was enough life within the old Liberal networks, particularly where Nonconformity was still strong, to sustain an independent Liberalism. It was a greatly weakened Liberalism with little of its old working-class support, but strong enough to frustrate Conservative attempts in the 1920s at least to appropriate Liberalism within the Conservative Party. The logic of post-war economics also suggested that Britain should abandon free trade. Britain was in the 1920s the only major ‘open’ economy in the world. Although free trade had been modified in the First World War by duties on certain kinds of luxury goods, no duties were charged on the great bulk of goods Britain imported. In the circumstances there was little justification for this, and the abandonment of free trade was arguably one way the interests of both the middle class and the industrial working class could have been served. In 1923, the new Conservative Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin, an old protectionist, surprised many by seeking at a general election a mandate to introduce protection. Baldwin’s reasons for doing so have been disputed. Some have argued that he was less interested in protection than in bringing back into the Conservative Party those of its leaders who had remained loyal to Lloyd George. That might have been in his mind, but he actually believed that protection was an effective way of reducing unemployment. Baldwin lost; and as a result the Labour Party formed its first government—a minority government dependent upon the Liberal Party, which had in the election won many middle-class constituencies from the Conservatives. Why did Baldwin lose? In part, because a significant part of the middle class still supported free trade: the election results made that
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clear. But it was more due to the fact that the Labour Party and its electorate also still adhered to free trade: a remarkable fact, since it was probably the only industrial working class in the world to do so. Like the continued persistence of the Conservative and Liberal Parties, despite the emergence of Labour, the electoral persistence of free trade demonstrated the degree to which people still thought in pre-war terms and assumed that an attempted rehabilitation of that world was justified. The extent to which this was so was further demonstrated by the decision to return the pound to the gold standard in 1925; and not just to make it fully convertible into gold, a risky enough decision, but to restore it to its pre-war exchange rate against the dollar, an even riskier one. There were critics of this step, most notably J. M. Keynes, but it had, on the whole, bipartisan support. It was, however, on any reasonable view, a step difficult to defend: an act of faith which lasted just six years. The Conservative Party’s attempt to turn itself into the sole anti-socialist party came closer to success. Much of the party had been aggressively ‘anti-waste’ and anti-labour in the early 1920s, digging freely into the seemingly inexhaustible mine of middle-class discontent. In 1924 the Conservatives accepted that protection was temporarily dead and concentrated instead on fairly crude antisocialism and anti-Bolshevism. The Labour government of 1924 lasted only nine months. It had in domestic policy been very cautious, but it had recognized the Soviet Union and the issue which brought it down concerned the nonprosecution of a prominent Communist for sedition. It was this which provided the Conservatives with their opportunity. In the general election of 1924 the Labour vote remained solid, but the Liberal vote fragmented—most of it going to the Conservatives, who gained a huge majority. It was the closest the Conservatives came in the 1920s to forging an anti-socialist party on their own terms. That victory also permitted the party to settle scores finally with the trade unions. The general strike of May 1926 was the last episode in a struggle that had actually been decided under the coalition government, but which confirmed the effective defeat of the organized labour movement. The general strike, which was a sympathetic strike in support of the miners’ unions, was provoked by the government and undertaken reluctantly by the unions. The solidarity of both sides was impressive, but the solidarity of the government and its supporters was the more impressive. The government chose not to regard the issue as an economic matter, miners’ wages, but a constitutional one: it portrayed the strike as an illegitimate attempt to force a properly elected government to change policies via unconstitutional means. This was an argument the unions found difficult to deny and that, together with the unity of the non-striking classes, was why the strike collapsed. Both the unions and the Labour Party suffered as a result. By legislation passed in 1927, sympathetic strikes were made illegal and the rules which governed trade unions’ political funds were made much less favourable to the Labour Party, even though it was largely a bystander in what was essentially a dispute between the government and the trade unions.
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On the whole, foreign policy was less partisan, though there were significant differences between the Conservative and Labour Parties over policy towards the Soviet Union. As noted, the first Labour government recognized the Soviet Union, but relations were broken during the succeeding Conservative government. Conservative attitudes to the Soviet Union were largely determined by the domestic-political uses to which anti-Bolshevism could be put. The Labour Party had no such baggage, and although the Labour Party itself was very anti-Communist, it always took the view that which regime governed Russia was a matter for the Russian people. Otherwise differences were ones of nuance. Fundamentally, the British political elite would have liked to liquidate the Treaty of Versailles, especially war-debts and reparations: this was the international equivalent of its attempts to restore the pre-war world at home. Neither the United States nor France would agree to this, while the Germans were unwilling to accept the permanence of Germany’s new eastern borders. The Labour Party was more sensitive to French fears than the Conservatives, though it was under a Conservative government that the Locarno treaties were signed by which Britain (and Italy) agreed to guarantee France’s post-1918 borders. By the end of the 1920s, Britain was in a kind of unstable equilibrium. The position of the middle classes had been restored largely at the expense of the working class, but, despite what many feared and some predicted, outside the coal industry the victory of the government in the general strike did not lead to any sustained attempt to reduce wages and thus labour costs. Much of the economy was operating at way below capacity and much of its workforce, therefore, unemployed. At the same time, however, the unemployed were paid a kind of wage via unemployment benefit for as long as they were unemployed; something no other country did or could afford to do. Britain had attempted to restore the pre-1914 international financial and trading system almost single-handed in inappropriate circumstances, and this mutilated system was clearly imposing long-term burdens on the British economy which were unsustainable. Politically, the two attempts to break with Edwardian politics—a fusion of the Conservative and Liberal Parties and the abandonment of free trade—had failed. The Labour Party had grown rapidly immediately after the war, but its growth had slackened and it was clearly unable to mobilize anything like the whole of the working class. It had disrupted the party system but had not given it a new coherence. D E P R E S S I O N , R E C OV E RY, A N D T H E H E G E M O N Y O F T H E C O N S E RVAT I V E PA RT Y This unstable equilibrium was swept away by two events: the Labour ‘victory’ in the general election of 1929, and the international depression which began a few months later. In May 1929 the Labour Party for the first time became the largest party in parliament. Although Labour made some real electoral gains,
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the result was due more to a temporary revival of the Liberal Party and the workings of the electoral system than anything else. Furthermore, Labour was once again a minority dependent on Liberal support. It was a good election for the Conservatives to lose since it left Labour to face the Depression. In Britain the Depression took the form of a major cyclical downturn in demand, which began at the end of 1929, together with (as we have seen) severe ‘structural’ unemployment in much of traditional heavy industry. Throughout the second Labour government’s two years in office (and indeed in the year thereafter) there was a rapid rise in unemployment. How many were unemployed and for how long is difficult to measure, but at its height about one-fifth of the total workforce was out of work. The Labour Party was ill-equipped to deal with the Depression. Its own history and intellectual tradition, the dogged adherence to free trade and financial orthodoxy of much of the older generation of its leaders, together with the constraints upon a minority government which respected parliamentary rules, increasingly reduced the government to a hand-wringing passivity. Ministers lacked confidence in themselves and in their dealings with civil servants and bankers: they were too easily persuaded by the apparently immutable rules of the game. Furthermore, the Depression was of unprecedented severity; that, and its international character, made it almost impossible for any government anywhere to devise rapid solutions. Labour thus had no active policy; what it had, however, was unemployment benefit. Since benefit was effectively universal and increasingly paid to people who had exhausted their insurance contributions, the ever-rising numbers of the unemployed put relentless pressure on the budget. Conventional opinion demanded cuts in public expenditure, and in particular expenditure on the unemployed. This, however, Labour would not do. While it was not a reflationary party, it was not deflationary, and to most Labour MPs cuts in unemployment benefit would have been an inexcusable betrayal. It is hard to say how long Labour could have continued in this way. A decision was forced on the government by the European banking crisis of July–August 1931. Britain was not initially part of this crisis, which was essentially one of the central European banking system. It became part via sterling. Under the ‘gold exchange standard’, which had operated internationally when Britain returned to gold payment in 1925, countries could hold their currency reserves either in gold or in pounds or dollars. But Britain and the United States were obliged to exchange their currencies for gold on demand. It became clear that Britain had insufficient gold reserves to prop up the German and Austrian banks or to defend sterling when an increasingly nervous European financial community began to exchange their sterling holdings for gold. These demands rapidly increased when it appeared that the British budget itself was now dangerously unbalanced. The easiest thing would have been either to have devalued the pound against the dollar or simply left the gold standard altogether and let the pound find its own level. Official opinion was overwhelmingly against such actions and
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persuaded the Labour government to borrow from American and French banks to provide support for sterling. The bankers demanded, in return, cuts in public expenditure, including cuts in unemployment benefit. The Labour cabinet was deeply divided over this, with one-half of the cabinet, led by the foreign secretary, Arthur Henderson, opposed to any cuts in benefit. On 24 August the government therefore resigned. Much to everyone’s surprise the Labour prime minister, Ramsay MacDonald, formed a ‘National’ government of all three parties. In fact, it was a government of the Conservative and Liberal Parties with a handful of Labour participants who included not only MacDonald but the unyieldingly conventional chancellor of the exchequer, Philip Snowden: the great bulk of the Labour Party opposed the new government. The National Government (as it was always called) was formed to maintain the gold standard and the parity of the pound against the dollar. To do so it met the demands of the foreign bankers. The budgetary cuts had the reverse effect to that intended. Rather than reassure foreign holders of sterling, the possibility that the cuts might cause civil unrest in Britain—indeed, they caused unrest in the navy—made them even more alarmed. The selling of sterling became an avalanche. Britain in effect ran out of gold. The government was forced to suspend gold payment and allowed the pound to find its own level: it was devalued by about one-third. Those who suffered most were the unemployed, those employed by government, and foreign holders of sterling. The inability of the National Government to preserve the gold exchange standard exposed the fragility of the 1925 settlement and the illusions which underlay it. It also had a liberating effect on British financial policy. The system which emerged was different from that of the 1920s. Exchange control was imposed; it became more difficult for British investors to export capital, while the role of the City of London in the formation of policy was significantly reduced. For the remainder of the decade the pound was a ‘managed’ currency, with the government rather than the Bank of England largely determining its exchange value. And free trade was finally abandoned. A general duty was imposed on all imports, while a system of so-called ‘imperial preference’ (by which Britain and its dominions agree to favour each other in trade and financial transactions) accentuated the tendency of Britain to withdraw from the international economy. Many regretted this, but in the circumstances of the early 1930s, when there was a general sauve qui peut, and the international economy came close to collapse, Britain had little real alternative. Certainly it was a much more viable and successful policy than that of the 1920s, and the tripartite agreement concluded in 1936 with the Americans and French to manage their currencies in tandem worked much better than the old gold-exchange standard. The 1931 political crisis was also responsible for a political transformation. From the moment the National Government was formed, and particularly after its fortunate failure to keep Britain on the gold standard, the Conservatives had been rather shamelessly trying to force an election on their Labour and Liberal
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colleagues, who were in the end forced to agree. The election, in October 1931, resulted in an overwhelming victory for the Conservatives and their allies. And this allowed the Conservatives to do what they had failed to do in the 1920s. They, first, won their mandate to introduce protective duties; and, second, they achieved fusion with the Liberals on their own terms. The Liberal Party did not disappear as an organization, but it was immensely weakened. The bulk of it, the so-called National Liberals, became a wing of the Conservatives and took much of the Liberal vote, particularly in Scotland, with them. The old Liberal Party left the National Government in 1932, in protest at the abandonment of free trade, and went into opposition, but now a rump. The 1931 election established the pattern of the 1930s: complete Conservative hegemony, confirmed at the 1935 election. In much of the country, a two-party system developed—Labour and anti-Labour, with anti-Labour meaning in practice Conservative. In some of the country—especially in rural England—there was de facto a one-party system, with everyone, no matter what they called themselves, in the end being Conservative. Stanley Baldwin, who led the party from 1923 to 1937, was the ideal leader in the circumstances, a man who was acceptable to everyone, not least Nonconformist former Liberals. The 1931 crisis was also important for the Labour Party. Between them the formation of the National Government and the election swept away the generation of Labour leaders who had led the party since its foundation and replaced it with men (but virtually no women) who were less attached to the old party system and less timid in their dealings with businessmen, bankers, and civil servants. Above all, it swept away free trade socialism, hitherto predominant in the Labour Party. After 1931 hardly anyone in the Labour Party advocated a return to free trade. This involved not merely a change in attitude to the fiscal system but to the state as a whole. Although Labour had been notionally interventionist before 1931, in practice it was nervous of state power. This was not true of the post-1931 generation of leaders. However, although the Labour Party recovered from the 1931 disaster—in 1935 its share of the vote returned to its 1929 level—there was little sign that it was gaining new ground before the Second World War; every sign, indeed, that its vote had got ‘stuck’ at its 1929 level. By international standards, Britain in the 1930s was a remarkably stable country—more stable than most other major Western societies and more stable than it had been in the 1920s. There was virtually no civil violence, little class tension, and a high degree of stability in all tiers of government. What were the sources of this stability? The most obvious answer is the legitimacy of its parliamentary government. Comparatively few, even those like the unemployed who had every reason to question it, questioned the nature of that government or doubted its ideological fitness. Most believed, on both the political right and left, that the country’s problems could be solved within the existing constitutional system, or else that the system only needed modification rather than drastic
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reconstruction. Those on the left who argued, as some did, that the National Government was Britain’s form of fascism never persuaded many. It is nonetheless surprising that a political system that was under real strain in the early 1920s should have been so tough at a time when the political systems of many other countries were either disintegrating or on the edge of disintegration. There were several reasons for this. The first is the nature of the British economy. The experience of the British economy in the 1930s was unique amongst major countries. Despite the problems of the ‘staple’ industries throughout the inter-war years, the Depression was milder in Britain than almost any other Western society. In much of the country it was confined to the years 1930–1. Unlike most other countries, where there was a catastrophic collapse in consumption in 1929–30 which lasted several years, rising consumption in Britain merely dipped between 1930 and 1932 and then resumed its steadily upward direction. In the south of England and parts of the Midlands, the Depression was hardly felt at all. As the great industries of the North stagnated, the service and light industries of the South flourished. They were dependent upon middle-class consumption and were closely connected to the private housing boom which was so central to the growth of the British economy in the 1930s. The policies of the National Government played some part in this. Protection channelled demand towards home-produced goods, while the management of the currency allowed the government to keep interest rates very low. Nor was it difficult for people to borrow. Unlike Germany and the United States, for example, Britain’s domestic banking system remained intact. There was no threat to savings, while the building societies were awash with cash and willing to lend for house purchase on exceptionally easy terms. Thus the chief characteristic of the British economy was its segmentation. While a town like Jarrow on the River Tyne, the ‘town that was murdered’, dependent on shipbuilding, had almost universal unemployment, towns like Luton and Coventry, centres of the rapidly growing automobile industry, were 1930s boom towns. Much of the English middle class and a part of the working class began to experience a standard of living which was not to become characteristic of the rest of Europe until after the Second World War. The segmentation of the economy and the consequent tendency of unemployment to be concentrated in certain areas rendered the unemployed much less threatening to the middle class than they appeared in the United States or Germany. The geographical isolation of the unemployed, together with indefinite payment of unemployment benefit, which to some extent placated them, politically weakened them by concentrating their own ‘politics’ not on the failures of the economic system as a whole but on levels of unemployment benefit. Unemployment was also socially segmented. Unemployment amongst the middle class, even when the Depression was at its worst, was always very low. Promotion might have been difficult, but finding a job was not. And while most members of the working class were at some point unemployed, only
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a minority were unemployed long term. Given this, and the almost negligible unemployment amongst the middle class, the pressures to find drastic solutions to unemployment were weak. Paradoxically, therefore, the effect of unemployment in Britain was to stabilize rather than to destabilize politics, and this immensely strengthened the Conservative Party. In any case, much of the working class supported the Conservative Party. A reason why the settlement of the 1920s—the deflation of the economy after 1920—was so favourable to the middle class was that a large proportion of the working class either supported or acquiesced in it. It is difficult to determine in detail how social classes voted in the inter-war years, but it is self-evident that the Conservatives would not have won as decisively in the 1930s as they did had they not gained about one-half of the working-class vote. In the 1920s that figure was probably lower, but not much lower. It was, certainly, a significantly higher figure than the Conservatives won after 1945. In no other country did such a large proportion of the industrial working class support a right-wing party, and the failure of the Labour Party to mobilize much of its potential vote is perhaps the most important political fact of the period. The result was that all those who felt they had some stake in society never had that fear of the working class, common elsewhere, which might have driven them to extreme politics: which is why the class tension so apparent in the 1920s was largely absent in the 1930s. Nor was this stability threatened—outside Northern Ireland—by nationalist movements. Given the constitutional make-up of the United Kingdom this is perhaps surprising. The simple reason for the weakness of nationalist movements is that the forces which stood for the Union were always stronger than those which stood against. In industrial Scotland and Wales class politics usually trumped national allegiances; and the Labour Party, already the party of industrial Wales and increasingly so of Scotland, was always opposed to movements which appeared likely to fragment the economy of the United Kingdom. The Unionist Party’s raison d’ˆetre was, of course, the preservation of the Union, and its remarkable success in Scotland after 1931 was a recognition of the fact that to the Scots the Union with England and via England the Empire—the Scots were an imperial master race—offered them more than was available to an independent Scotland. And Scotland did have its own entrenched institutions. In Wales the final disestablishment of the Anglican Church in 1920 removed a major national grievance. Furthermore, much national rivalry was absorbed by sport, which excited national passion but did not disturb the unitary state. After 1922, Ireland—either North or South—ceased to be an issue which much moved the British. More significant were the consequences of Irish migration to Britain. The majority of Irish immigrants were working class and Catholic. Their inclination—like all immigrants—to cluster meant that British politics, especially in the west of Scotland and in parts of Lancashire, was often as much determined by religion as class. The Irish working-class (and Catholic) vote was overwhelmingly Labour, while the Irish presence drove many other
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working men and women (often ‘Protestant’ in some way) into the arms of the Conservative Party and was another factor in its hegemony. Unlike the 1920s, therefore, British politics in the 1930s was in stable equilibrium. The 1920s had a provisional air, largely because Britain’s external economic policies were so obviously provisional. But the politics of the 1930s had nothing provisional about it. A moderate Baldwinite Conservatism was unchallenged, while the Labour Party’s growth seemed to have halted. All the electoral evidence suggests that the dominance of the Conservative Party faced no serious challenge before the Second World War. Perhaps war, however, was the one thing which could undermine it: a reason why Conservative governments were so anxious to maintain the peace. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE OUTBREAK O F T H E S E C O N D WO R L D WA R The policies adopted by or forced upon the National Government pointed to a partial withdrawal from an active intervention in international affairs. The second Labour government had a ‘multilateral’ view of international relations. Its policies were based upon collective security via the League of Nations, an acceptance that continuing French fears of Germany had at least to be assuaged, an equal acceptance that Germany had legitimate grievances arising from the Treaty of Versailles, and upon a belief that general disarmament was practicable. The policies of the National Government, especially after Hitler came to power in 1933, represented a retreat from multilateralism. Increasingly the aim was to offer a settlement acceptable to Nazi Germany and this was done without much reference to Britain’s allies, especially France. What were the premises which underlay this policy? The first was a moral one: that Germany had been unfairly treated after the First World War, as had those Germans (in Austria or Czechoslovakia, for example) who wished to join the Reich but were forbidden from doing so. This belief was one Hitler constantly exploited. The second was a consciousness that Britain had acquired responsibilities she could no longer meet. The nightmare of British statesmen in the period was the ‘three-front war’: a simultaneous war against Germany, Japan, and Italy. Britain was not afraid of a war against Italy, for instance, which it had no doubt it could win. It was afraid that such a war would damage Britain sufficiently to make a successful war against Germany impossible. At the same time, as they had in the 1920s, the Asian empire and the Australasian dominions were demanding guarantees of protection against an expansionist Japan. In these circumstances the policy of buying off Germany, which the British always regarded as the greatest danger, via ‘appeasement’, was attractive. It was also attractive economically. The Treasury feared the costs of rearmament—what it would do to the domestic budget and to taxation; what also it would do to
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Britain’s external payments, particularly its account with the United States. It was recognized that large-scale rearmament would certainly mean extensive purchases in America, and that could reduce Britain to economic and industrial dependence on the United States. One of the major questions of the period, tacitly asked, was how far could Britain both remain a great power and independent of the United States. The policy of giving Germany all that it could reasonably demand was one answer. Britain’s policy towards Germany, however, was not wholly guided by realpolitik. The extent to which Britain was prepared to appease Germany was limited. There was almost no ideological sympathy for Nazism—although there was some for Franco’s Spain—and Britain was never prepared to give Germany a free hand in Eastern Europe, as Hitler wanted. Nor was Britain ready to allow Germany to incorporate non-Germans by force into a greater Reich. The German invasion of Czecho-Slovakia (as it had become after the Munich agreement) in March 1939 cut the ground beneath Neville Chamberlain, prime minister since 1937 and the most determined proponent of ‘reasonable’ appeasement. It also brought the dominions on side. Hitherto their willingness to support Britain in a war against Germany was doubtful. It was primarily a moral repugnance to Nazism by the British and (on the whole) the dominion populations that forced Chamberlain to give Poland a guarantee of its territorial integrity in the event of German invasion—the guarantee that led Britain to declare war on Germany on 3 September 1939. But this date does not mark the end of the 1930s or the supremacy of the Conservative Party. There is a sense that amongst those responsible for it the declaration of war lacked conviction, even though the strongest opponent of appeasement, Churchill, was brought into the government, that the so-called ‘phoney war’, which lasted until May 1940, was appeasement by other means. Nothing was actually done to check Germany or save Poland. There were even some prepared to contemplate war with the Soviet Union (after it had attacked Finland)—which would have been utter folly. The most important date is 10 May 1940, when the Chamberlain government collapsed and Churchill formed a new coalition which included the Labour Party. There were members of Chamberlain’s government and of the Conservative Party still prepared to contemplate a peace with Hitler. Neither Churchill nor the Labour Party were prepared to do so. Both were prepared to fight on almost regardless of the consequences. They were thus, even if unconsciously, choosing dependence on the United States rather than subservience to Germany. But the Labour Party demanded a price: that the war should be fought and won ‘according to its ideas’. The end of the National Government and the formation of Churchill’s coalition was not a result of popular disaffection: even a week before its fall the Gallup Poll suggested that the large majority of the population still supported Chamberlain. It was a result of a crisis within the political elite which rapidly led to major changes in popular political allegiances.
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C U LT U R E : H I G H A N D P O P U L A R Although Britain was often thought to be culturally rather isolated, arguably it was the most culturally open of the major European states. It was alone in not having a government which did not at some point seriously attempt to exclude outside cultural influences. All a British government could do was prosecute literature for ‘obscenity’, which is how James Joyce’s Ulysses was kept out. But this was not aimed at any particular literature and was not very effective anyway. Indeed, the extent of this openness can be seen in literature. Of the two greatest ‘British’ poets of the period, for example, T. S. Eliot and W. B. Yeats, one was American and the other Irish. British classical ballet, which was to be so brilliant after the Second World War, owed much to Russian ´emigr´es. In many disciplines and art forms (and the sciences) the effect of Jewish migration to Britain in the 1930s was almost transformative—paradoxically much strengthening German intellectual influences at the moment Britain was about to go to war with Germany again. What most distinguished British high culture in the inter-war years from other major European societies was the almost complete absence of state support. Individual authors or composers could receive state pensions, but music, opera, ballet, painting received nothing. High culture was largely commercial. Before 1939 it was not the state but the BBC (of non-private agencies) which did most to support the arts. The BBC had a high degree of independence and large resources. It took over the ‘Promenade Concerts’ in 1927, turning them into a national institution; it founded its own symphony orchestra; it encouraged interest in French and Eastern European music and composers hitherto outside the canon of classical music; it commissioned plays and provided refuge for a number of European ´emigr´es in the 1930s and 1940s. Indeed, the ‘Third Programme’, established in 1946 and of tremendous cultural rigour, was heavily influenced by such ´emigr´es and exposed the British to a European avant-garde which otherwise might never have had an audience. Although the BBC was never quite certain how far high culture could or should be popularized, it nonetheless thought that culture could be democratic. That belief underlay the attitude of the state to the arts during the Second World War. Assuming that in the circumstances of the war the arts would simply die without state support, it then developed the view that official support for the arts was legitimate and could be legitimated by a democratic theory of society. The most energetic proponent of this view was the economist J. M. Keynes, who had always deplored the cultural withdrawal of the state as an eighteenth-century heresy, and it was he who became first chairman of the Arts Council, established at the end of the war to distribute state support for the arts. Like the BBC, it had considerable independence, but never the resources which the German or French states provided after 1945. It did, however, have a lighter hand.
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British popular culture, both what contemporaries called ‘middle-brow’ and ‘low-brow’, was intensely commercial. Britain was Europe’s only ‘mass society’. It was overwhelmingly urban, industrial, and commercial—a mere 7 per cent earned their living from agriculture—and its popular culture reflected that. The British bought more newspapers than anyone else and their newspapers had Himalayan circulations; they read more books than anyone else—best-sellers really were best-sellers, and most of the best-selling authors were also international best-sellers; they went to the cinema more than any other people; they went to dance halls more than anyone else; they watched more sport and gambled more money (usually on sport) than anyone else. Virtually all international sports had their origin in Britain precisely because of its ‘urbanness’ and advanced class structure. This did not necessarily mean the British were much interested in the international nature of the sports they had invented: here cultural introversion was real. Britain participated in every Olympic Games, but with decreasing success. It did not belong to FIFA and did not play in football’s World Cup. Although it played international football matches, they were usually ‘friendlies’ and not much was thought to hang on them, unlike the ‘home internationals’. (The politically sensitive match against Germany in 1938, on which much was thought to hang, was different.) In fact, the most important sporting international for the English (though not the Scottish or the Welsh) was the biennial cricket series, the ‘Ashes’, against Australia—the oldest sporting international in the world—which left the rest of the world mystified. Despite the precocity of its own popular culture, Britain nevertheless was subject to constant American influence—particularly via the cinema and popular music. Throughout this period the great bulk of the music played and the films watched were American, and attempts by the state to regulate this by requiring cinemas to show a specified number of British films did something to protect and improve the British film industry but little to control American cultural influence. There were several reasons for this. The first was linguistic. A common language eliminated the most important barrier to American popular culture. The second was the existence of a common Anglo-American popular culture: the vocabulary and conventions of American culture were familiar to the British and easily assimilated. The third was the sheer ‘size’ of American culture. Even at its most successful the British film industry, for instance, simply could not equal the number of American films. Furthermore, American popular culture had a dynamism which made it very attractive to the British, as to most Europeans. There was a final reason, often overlooked. Britain had a major financial interest in the export of American culture. The two great combines responsible for marketing American popular music throughout America and the world—Decca and EMI—were both British-owned: one reason why so much American popular culture came to Europe via Great Britain. Although the British were sceptical of the claims made by American popular culture and American democracy, their
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comparative closeness to America certainly contributed to the ambivalence with which Britain looked at Europe after 1945. T H E S E C O N D WO R L D WA R : P O L I T I C S , S O C I E T Y, A N D T H E W E L FA R E S TAT E Like the Great War, the Second World War put the British economy and British society under real strain. And for one year (June 1940–June 1941), apart from its dominions, it had no allies. As in the First World War, Britain spent more per capita on the war than any other power. However, unlike 1914, it did not have the accumulated wealth of a century to support it. It emerged from the war heavily indebted not only to the United States, but also to the empire. Most of its dollar assets were liquidated, often on unfavourable terms, and significant aid from the United States only came when Britain’s external account—its holdings of gold and dollars—was effectively bankrupt. It also accumulated large debts in the empire, particularly India, and these, the so-called ‘sterling balances’, were a drain on Britain for many years after the war. The destruction of property was much more extensive than in the First World War. Not only was the merchant marine again destroyed by submarine warfare (though it was largely rebuilt during the war itself ), much of the country’s industrial and housing stock was destroyed or damaged by bombing. In one area alone was the Second less destructive than the First World War. Although civilian casualties were much higher in the Second (due to bombing) than in the First, Britain had fewer military casualties, and nothing like the number of German or Russian military deaths; and even its civilian casualties were much lower than any of the continental combatants. As a military power the war had finally confirmed Britain’s loss of standing. At the signing of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, Britain had—as we have seen—the largest military forces in the world. This was true at no point in the Second World War. It was never as strong as Germany and, even with the enormous defensive advantage of the English Channel, it could hardly have defeated Germany by itself. The reason why Britain began the indiscriminate bombing of German cities was that it was the only means she had of attacking Germany militarily. The period between the withdrawal of France from the war (June 1940) and Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union (June 1941) was essentially a holding operation until Britain could acquire a powerful ally—preferably the United States, though Churchill was happy enough to acquire the Soviet Union. Britain’s military weakness vis a` vis both America and Russia was apparent by 1942, and it emerged from the war as one of the ‘Big Three’ as much for historical reasons as anything else. At the end of the war it had, however, all the burdens of a great power: it found itself with responsibilities much exceeding 1918. Territorially, Britain still occupied all the lands it had
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held in 1914 or acquired during and after the First World War, and in 1945 in addition found itself in occupation of one-quarter of Germany and Austria, parts of Italy, Greece, the Dutch East Indies, and French Indochina. The military costs of such occupation were high enough, but some of the occupied territories (like Germany) were devastated by the war, and had to be rebuilt. Others were devastated by political and racial divisions which ended in civil war—Greece and Palestine for example. Some of these responsibilities, like the Dutch East Indies or Indochina, were speedily discharged simply by returning them to their former colonial rulers, though with disastrous consequences. Others, like Greece and Palestine, were given up by handing over the obligation to someone else—the United States in the case of Greece and the United Nations in the case of Palestine. Some burdens were abandoned more reluctantly and for many years after 1945 Britain continued to spend more on defence than any other European power. The Second World War, however, in many ways strengthened British society and indeed its economy. The immense emphasis upon science and technology demanded by defence was to change the pattern of English education and industry. During the war probably only Germany was as technologically
Figure 3.2. Women born in 1919 register at a labour exchange in 1941 following the British government’s unprecedented step of conscripting women for war service.
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innovative as Britain. Innovation was not just in jet-engines or radar but in genuinely world-historical advances. Perhaps the two most important scientific developments of the war—the synthesis of penicillin and the demonstration that an atom bomb was feasible (with an accurate prediction of its consequences)—were both done in British universities during the war, though it required the resources of the American economy to complete the process. The war also encouraged the expansion of the universities. Before 1939 a smaller proportion of the British population went to university than in any other European country. The big expansion of the university population that occurred after 1945 was a direct result of the experience of the war, as were the brilliant achievements of British science in the next twenty years or so. It was also a result of the view that the problems of British industry in the inter-war years had been due partly to the defects of the education system as well as an unwillingness of British industry to invest in research. The new prestige of science and technology is to be seen in the products of the secondary grammar schools: before 1945 their main function was to train boys and girls to enter the clerical professions; after 1945 more boys from grammar schools went into engineering than any other occupation. The 1944 Education Act was another result of the war. It made secondary education free and compulsory to the age of 15. It was, however, much less successful than the expansion of the universities, largely because the system remained profoundly divided socially: the school system was one area where wartime democracy stopped short. The war laid the foundations of the post-war welfare state via a major expansion of state intervention. This was to a degree a result of the war itself. The nationalization of the country’s hospitals (central to the post-1945 National Health scheme) was due to the very high levels of civilian casualties, something with which the old decentralized voluntary system could not cope. The railways and the mines, both of which were to be nationalized after the war, were taken under state control. The big expansion in maternal and child healthcare was again a result of the needs of war, and the introduction of family allowances in 1945, though the culmination of a long campaign, was also designed to hold down wage settlements. All these changes were to be permanent and extended by the Attlee Labour government. For the fact that Labour was an essential member of the coalition, and that Labour held most of the major domestic and ‘social’ portfolios, was the other reason for such state intervention, and the reason why the social policies of the Second World War and thereafter were much more successful and extensive than those after 1918—despite the many promises made by the Lloyd George coalition at the 1918 election. Although it is possible to exaggerate the extent of social solidarity in Britain during the war, or rather after May 1940 (there was not much solidarity before then), wartime social welfare policies were an expression of this solidarity, something which remains central to Britain’s historical memory of the war.
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These social changes were accompanied by a second political transformation (the first being 1931) which was demonstrated by the victory of the Labour Party at the 1945 election. In 1939 the National Government, dominated by the Conservative Party, was politically unchallenged. No one could have predicted that it would be heavily defeated at the next election. Contemporaries were aware of the radicalization of opinion after 1940 which could take the form of an unwillingness to recognize the old social hierarchies, or the widely reported ‘rudeness’ of ordinary soldiers. The huge sales of books and pamphlets attacking the old National Government and the collapse in the reputation of men like Baldwin and Chamberlain, the success of any ‘progressive’ candidate at parliamentary by-elections (which, because of a political ‘truce’, were uncontested by the main parties), or the widespread admiration for the Soviet Union. The amour-propre of much of the working class rose as the amour-propre of much of the middle class fell, changes due not only to the war—factory workers are much more indispensable than clerical workers—but also to government wartime propaganda which tended to extol certain kinds of people at the expense of others. Such social redistribution also had a material base. As in the First World War, but more so, income was redistributed downwards, with the unskilled working class doing best—a consequence of the end of unemployment (which automatically raised working-class income), wartime wages policies, and much higher taxation on the incomes of the well-to-do. This radicalization of opinion is generally assumed to be a result of influences felt throughout the course of the war, and we can easily point to these influences. Such evidence as we have suggests that radicalization occurred not as a gradual process but very fast indeed. The crucial fact was the way in which Churchill succeeded Chamberlain. It became clear that in circumstances of possible defeat the country could not be governed without the active participation of the labour movement—which meant the Labour Party in government. This was, in effect, an admission of failure by the National Government. Nor would Labour join a coalition led by Chamberlain, who thus had to go. It was the Conservatives who called in Labour, and this legitimated the Labour Party and its programmes more than anything else. The success of the National Government in the 1930s was based upon the marginalization of the Labour Party; the conviction amongst the electorate that Labour had failed at a crucial moment in the country’s history (1931), and would fail again. Before 1939 Labour was conspicuously unable to universalize its political culture. Although it was never to do so, it came much closer in 1945 than ever before. All classes were affected. Labour won significant middle-class support in 1945, but its biggest gains were in those sections of the working class—for example, in Birmingham—who had done moderately well in the 1930s and who had been inclined to be grateful to the Conservative Party for that. Furthermore, most of the political changes which followed the crisis of May 1940 were permanent.
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C O N C LU S I O N S In 1914 Britain was unquestionably a great power—perhaps the greatest. In 1945 it was a distant third, and soon was to be overtaken economically by Germany, France, and Japan. Yet hers is hardly a story of ‘decline’. By most criteria she was in these years the most successful of the major European states. She was militarily undefeated and unoccupied; her democratic political system survived all challenges; and, despite the ravages of long-term unemployment, the standards of life of most of its people rose throughout the period. In 1945 few other states had such a high degree of social solidarity. In most respects, until 1939, she was as ‘European’ as anyone else. It is a mistake to think there is a model of ‘Europeanness’ which everyone but Britain fitted. Nonetheless, because Britain’s experience of the Second World War was so different from that of most other European states, Britain thought she could encourage forms of European unity without feeling obliged to participate in them. Furthermore, strong cultural and military ties to the USA and the ‘white’ Commonwealth, which actually strengthened during the Second World War, drew Britain’s gaze from the Continent. The result was that Britain was not so much hostile to the idea of ‘Europe’ as ambivalent about it. Britain was half in and half out.
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G Addison, Paul, The Road to 1945 (2nd edn., London, 1994). Broadberry, Stephen, The British Economy between the Wars (Oxford, 1986). Cronin, James, The Politics of State Expansion: War, State and Society in Twentieth-Century Britain (London, 1991). Glynn, Sean, and John Oxborrow, Interwar Britain: A Social and Economic History (New York, 1976). Holt, Richard, Sport and the British. A Modern History (Oxford, 1990). Howell, David, MacDonald’s Party. Labour Identities and Crisis, 1922–1931 (Oxford, 2002). Hutchison, I. G. C., Scottish Politics in the Twentieth Century (London, 2000). Johnson, Paul (ed.), Twentieth-Century Britain: Economic, Social and Cultural Change (London, 1994). Kennedy, Paul, The Realities behind Diplomacy. Background Influences on British External Policy 1865–1980 (London, 1980). McKibbin, Ross, Classes and Cultures: England 1918–1951 (Oxford, 2000). Morgan, Kenneth O., Rebirth of a Nation: Wales 1880–1980 (Oxford: 1980). Pugh, Martin, The Making of Modern British Politics: 1867–1939 (2nd edn., Oxford, 1993).
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Purvis, June (ed.), Women’s History. Britain 1850–1945: An Introduction (London, 1997). Schmidt, Gustav, The Politics and Economics of Appeasement: British Foreign Policy in the 1930s, tr. Jackie Bennett-Ruete (New York, 1986). Seldon, Anthony, and Stuart Ball (eds.), The Conservative Century: The Conservative Party since 1900 (Oxford, 1994).
4 The Two Irelands Alvin Jackson
I N T RO D U C T I O N If the years between 1914 and 1945 were a ‘dark interlude’ for the Irish, then the quality of this occlusion differed from much of the rest of Europe. If the master narrative of European history embodies a story of continental prosperity and expansion, interrupted by the two world wars, then Ireland’s ‘stories’ for the period have been differently shaped. Historicist accounts of Ireland’s struggle for liberation from the British (by, for example, Mary Hayden) stretch from the twelfth century to a triumphant denouement with the nation’s independence in 1921, in the midst of the European eclipse. For those Irish historians writing in the relatively tranquil and prosperous conditions of the early and mid-1960s (such as J. C. Beckett), the constitutional arrangements of 1920–2 (independence for the majority of the island, devolution within the United Kingdom for the largely Protestant and Unionist North-East) looked like the harbinger, not of a sectarian cataclysm, but rather of one of the most politically settled periods in the island’s history. By way of contrast, explanations for the violence of late twentieth-century Northern Ireland (in the work of F. S. L. Lyons, for example) have occasionally highlighted the cultural politics and paramilitarism of the Edwardian era, the supposed apogee of the pre-war European golden age. Yet again, some historians (J. J. Lee, for example), writing against the backdrop of spiralling national debt and public retrenchment in the 1980s, and before the economic ‘miracle’ of the 1990s, saw the relatively weak performance of independent Ireland as being the dominant motif in its history, including the post-1945 years. Moreover, Ireland’s inter-war years are framed by four, not two, great conflicts: the period has also been defined, to an extent, by two further potential wars which were, in fact, avoided. Nationalist Ireland fought and won its independence in the period between 1916 and 1921, and there is a substantial body of work exploring the vision and the achievements of the revolutionaries. This is, at
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times, a controversial literature. But, while individual episodes (such as the Kilmichael ambush in County Cork in 1920) and the reputations of individual revolutionary leaders (such as Eamon de Valera) may be fiercely contested, the idealism underlying the conflict, the necessity of the war, and the importance of its results are largely beyond debate. If there exists a wide consensus linking interpretations of the revolution, and if historians are still broadly fired by the youthful passion and excitement of the insurgents, then assessments of inter-war Ireland tend to labour under the burden of bathos and anti-climax. Fratricidal conflict, economic austerity, unimaginative or repressive government by (mostly) grey men, tend to be the motifs governing general accounts of the 1920s and 1930s. Moreover, certainly until recently, the dominant military struggles of the twentieth century, the First and Second World Wars, have proved harder to integrate into the narrative of modern Irish history than the revolution. The effective disengagement of the dominant Irish separatist tradition from each of these conflicts has meant that, until lately, they have merely provided ‘noises off’ in the national story. These were Britain’s wars, and (as such) were a distraction and an irrelevance. Recent scholarship has done much to restore the full history of Ireland and the Great War, and this has been linked with a wider popular interest and recognition. It might be argued, however, that much of this literature still concentrates (naturally enough) on the extent of Irish military engagement, on the actions of Irish units and individuals, on issues of sacrifice and commemoration. To some extent the wider social and cultural history of Ireland’s Great War—even, arguably, the wider political implications of the struggle for the Irish—remain to be written. In so far as this is the case, then the impact of the Great War on Ireland remains a contested and understated history. The history of Ireland and the Second World War is a still slighter enterprise, and remains dominated, as with so much else of modern Irish history, by the Anglo-Irish relationship. This, in turn, has provided an emphasis on the question of neutrality and related matters such as intelligence operations and partition. At one time debates within the historiography seemed to represent a continuation by other means of the angry and recriminatory exchanges between Winston Churchill and Eamon de Valera in 1945 over the issue of independent Ireland’s wartime conduct. Certainly the critique of neutrality supplied by the prominent historian F. S. L. Lyons, in the early 1970s, has stimulated a series of counter-reactions which have defended the strategy in terms of the consolidation of Irish national sovereignty. Despite pioneering work, independent Ireland’s connection with the Second World War is still portrayed in constricted and sometimes defensive terms. The fourth conflict which has helped to frame the period under consideration is the Irish Civil War (1922–3). The struggle of ‘green against green’ helped to temporarily overshadow the experience of liberation from British rule in 1922; and, though the numbers of casualties were small (perhaps around 1,200 military
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combatants fell), the intimate and fratricidal nature of the conflict meant that the impact of these deaths was disproportionately great. To some extent, the history of inter-war Ireland has been dominated by the impact of the civil war, and of the issues arising from this conflagration. To some extent, too, the story of inter-war Ireland is an extension of the narrative of the civil war, rather than an assessment (still less a celebration) of state and nation-building. Ireland’s history in this period was conditioned, not only by the battles which occurred, but also by two smouldering conflicts which might well have erupted into open warfare but which were avoided. It has been suggested (by John Regan) that one of the forgotten determinants of Irish government in the early 1920s was the prospect (however swiftly receding) of renewed conflict with Britain. Related to this threat was the simmering possibility of war between the new Irish state and its northern, Unionist, neighbour. The collective amnesia over the First World War is one ‘unseen hand’ on the history of Ireland in the inter-war years; but another is represented—for the early 1920s, at any rate—by the threats of war with Belfast and with Britain. If the role of war in twentieth-century Irish history did not fully correspond with the experience of the rest of Europe, then there are, perhaps, even wider challenges in applying the metanarrative of the continental ‘dark interlude’. Though crude arguments for Ireland’s exceptionalism are rightly dismissed by scholars, certain aspects of the island’s experience in the twentieth century were distinctive. Independent Ireland was, in a sense, a ‘successor state’ to the old United Kingdom; but, in contrast to the successor states of the old empires of continental Europe, Ireland was fighting and negotiating with an empire which had emerged triumphant from the chaos of the Great War. Ireland, in common with many other new states, fell into civil war in the aftermath of independence; but, while the conflict had some social and economic colouring, it was not fought primarily over class or economic issues, but rather over the precise relationship between the new state and the former ‘colonial’ power. Independent Ireland, like the new Czechoslovakia (with the Sudeten Germans), or Romania (with its Hungarian minority), or Italy (with the German-speakers of S¨ud-Tirol), saw itself as having a minority question (the Protestants of Ulster, who generally identified with British rule). But, unlike continental Europe, here the former imperial power, Great Britain, had intervened to impose a settlement (in 1920), namely the partition of the island, together with separate constitutional provision for each of the two new territories: moreover, the British remained in effect the lasting guarantor of these arrangements. In other words, Ireland had its symmetries with the continental European experience; but its political trajectory long after independence continued to be governed by the particular nature of its relationship with Britain. These, then, are some of the distinctive challenges in writing about the inter-war period in Ireland. The period itself is difficult to define, partly because the social and political impact of the two world wars on the island has not yet itself been fully
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defined: inter-war Ireland is hard to define, because (in a sense) wartime Ireland is hard to locate. The dominant narrative in twentieth-century Irish political history provides a counterpoint, not so much between pre-war affluence and post-war destitution, as between the achievement and euphoria of the revolution and the bathos and tragedy of partition and civil war. Other parallels with the continental European story and experience may be made, but have inevitable limitations. Indeed, some historians have depicted the independent Ireland of the 1920s not so much in the light of European contemporaries as in that of European history—the pattern of France in the 1790s, of revolution and of counter-revolution. Viewed in this particular way, the government of inter-war Ireland is the Directory without the fear, hope, or challenge of Napoleon. WA R S A N D I D E N T I T I E S The First World War impacted upon political identity throughout Ireland. It reinforced notions of Britishness and Ulsterness among the island’s million Unionists, who were concentrated in the North. Members of the pre-war and paramilitary Ulster Volunteer Force were largely recruited after August 1914 into the 36th (Ulster) Division of Kitchener’s New Army. The organization and imagery of their army life reinforced the notion of ‘Ulster’. The units of the Division were similar to the ‘Pals’ Battalions’ elsewhere in the British Isles, recruiting from local networks of family and friends (and thus ensuring that the experience of life and death in the trenches would be peculiarly intense and resonant). The symbol of Ulster, the Red Hand, was omnipresent for these men: it was on their divisional badge, on the tin hats which they wore, on the New Testaments which they carried, on the divisional gallantry certificates which they occasionally won. This Ulster identity coagulated in the blood of the Somme offensive (July 1916), at Messines and Passchendaele in 1917, and during the German Spring Offensive of March 1918: commemoration of the Somme in particular provided a binding mythology and iconography for successive generations of northern Unionists. The Ulster Division provided military training and a heightened political and cultural identity for those Unionists who helped to forge the Northern Ireland state in 1920–1. The First World War also served to popularize a more radical form of Irish political identity among the island’s three million or so nationalists. There is a superficial paradox here, in so far as the Irish revolution against British authority followed immediately from a war in which Irishmen and -women contributed extensively to the ‘British’ cause. The question of support for the imperial and Allied war effort certainly divided the dominant Home Rule party and its militant offshoot, the Irish Volunteers, with the overwhelming majority of the latter (around 158,000 out of a total of 170,000) endorsing the party leadership’s commitment to the British government. Many of these Volunteers
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Figure 4.1. The last hurrah of union: the 1919 Victory Parade in Westmoreland Street, Dublin, to celebrate the end of the Great War—the Union Jack is still flying on top of Trinity College.
and their northern Unionist counterparts (some 30,000) would die as soldiers of the British crown. But Irish service in the British Army in the Great War was by no means consistent with a crude British patriotism: in common with the experience of the Australians (for example), the baleful reality of heroic failure at Gallipoli and other battlefields, the perception of dim-witted British military leadership, and the experience of petty official humiliation all seem to have fed into a consolidation of Irish national identity. The recruitment of Irish Home Rulers in 1914 to the British Army was also, in a sense, contractual. The (third) Home Rule bill had been enacted on 18 September 1914, but with its operation suspended ‘no later than the end of the present war’. Two days later, on 20 September, the Irish leader, John Redmond, spoke at Woodenbridge, County Wicklow, calling on Irishmen to serve ‘wherever the firing-line extends, in defence of right, of freedom and of religion in this war’. The two events were, of course intimately linked. Redmond viewed the passage of the Home Rule measure as an historic act of reparation, and wanted to maximize the chances of the speedy realization of legislative independence. In effect, Home Rule and support for the war were interdependent; and, as the chances of the first receded, so, too, did enthusiasm for the other. The relegation of the Home Rule issue in 1915–16, the failure of David Lloyd George’s attempted reactivation
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of Home Rule in May and June 1916, the collapse of the great conference on Irish self-government, the Irish Convention, held at Trinity College Dublin in 1917–18, all tended to discredit Redmond and his constitutional cause, and to provide a fillip for more radical forms of nationalist protest. If the Great War momentarily raised the possibility of a historic compromise between Irish constitutional nationalism and the British state, then it also created opportunities for those who sought to assert Ireland’s legislative rights by force of arms. Traditionally (as with the Irish uprising of 1798 and the Fenian movement of 1858), Irish militant separatists had used the occasion of Britain’s foreign entanglements to seek support among Britain’s enemies, and to exploit relative British weakness through conspiracy or armed insurgency. In 1916, Irish separatists sought German military aid in planning an insurrection against British rule. With both the 1798 rising and that of 1916, the possibility of foreign support was a factor, though not a decisive factor, in the Irish insurgents’ plans. The war also largely determined the nature and severity of the British response to Irish nationalist insurgency. The Easter Rising occurred at a time of difficulty and of threat for the British, with the failure of Gallipoli (January 1916) still recent and raw, and with the humiliation of Kut-al-Amara in Mesopotamia (29 April) coinciding almost exactly with the rebels’ action in Dublin. These defeats, together with the continuing stalemate on the Western Front, were the contexts for the vigorous British suppression of the rising in Easter Week, 1916, for the execution of sixteen rebel leaders, and for the arrest and detention of around 3,500 suspected insurgents or sympathizers. But the British response to Irish insurgency in the past had often included not only armed suppression but also legislative concession; and in 1916, David Lloyd George was commissioned by the prime minister, H. H. Asquith, to explore the possibility of an immediate enactment of Home Rule. The failure of this enterprise, combined with the popular reaction in Ireland against the British counter-insurgency effort, served to promote the rebel cause. The main separatist party, Sinn F´ein (founded in 1905, and leading a low-key existence until the war), won a succession of by-elections in 1917–18, successfully reorganized in the summer of 1917, and swiftly (and in ‘vampiric’ fashion) took over much of the local organization and resources of the old Home Rule party. By the general election of December 1918, Sinn F´ein had swept Home Rule aside, gaining around 48 per cent of the total poll in Ireland, and an electoral mandate for the establishment of an Irish republic. Here again, the context of the war for these developments was central. One of the more intriguing counter-factuals within modern Irish history arises from the question of whether separatism would have prevailed in Ireland in the absence of the war, or in the context of a speedily resolved war. Separatism certainly gained strength from the delays to Home Rule which arose, in part, from the exigencies of the war. Separatism benefited from the diversion of the Home Rule movement into the British war effort. Separatism gained strength, too, from the increased
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rigour of British counter-insurgency policy, again a development which owed much to the war. The war brought the virtual ending of emigration, widely regarded as an effective safety valve allowing the dissipation of youthful and militant energies. The war brought the more vigorous regulation of Irish industry and (particularly significantly) Irish agriculture, where there was traditionally an antipathy to outside authority, and where tillage regulations pressed hard on the Irish farming class. As in Great Britain, so in Ireland, the war brought collectivist pressures and a recasting of the old social order. As in Great Britain, so in Ireland, the war brought pressure for electoral change, which in turn benefited the Sinn F´ein movement. The Great War also provided a context for the struggles in Ireland in subsequent years (1919–23). It impacted indirectly upon the conflict in the North between Unionist paramilitaries, often veterans of the trenches, and their nationalist opponents. Demobilized veterans of the 36th (Ulster) Division drifted into Unionist vigilante organizations in 1919–20, and into the reconstituted Ulster Volunteer Force in July 1920, which fed (in turn) into the state-sponsored Ulster Special Constabulary, founded in September 1920. While certain acts of violence in the emerging Northern Ireland of this period reflected older traditions of sectarian murderousness, it might be argued that many of the combatants, Unionist and republican, drew upon their experiences and training in the British Army of 1914–18. The Great War also supplied a critical context for the struggles between militant separatists enrolled in the Irish Volunteers, later the Irish Republican Army, and the forces of the British Crown: this conflict was brewing in 1918, but is traditionally regarded as having begun in January 1919. The shared interconnections between the different combatants in Ireland and the Great War were complex. The Royal Irish Constabulary, who were the chief agents of the British Crown, and the main targets of the IRA, had a strong war record, and were associated in particular with service in the Irish Guards. Other Crown forces were directly recruited from the ranks of British ex-servicemen: the Auxiliary division of the RIC contained many discharged army officers, while the ‘Black and Tans’ (again an augmentation of the RIC) were recruited from the discharged other ranks of the army and navy. But the volunteers of the IRA were also heavily influenced by the experience of fighting in the British Army in the Great War: and indeed many such men lived to unite the ‘Tan’ decoration (the Service Medal for 1917–21), awarded in 1941 by the Irish government for action against the Crown during the Anglo-Irish War, with their trio of First World War British campaign medals. The IRA’s war was chiefly fought in three locations, in Dublin, south Munster, and in south Ulster, between 1919 and 1921, and it was characterized by a gradual formalization of organization, and gradual development of scale. In a sense, the war provided a mutual learning experience for the two combatants—at least in so far as there was a perceptible responsiveness to the activities and successes of
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the other. If the Irish were seeking to regularize and consolidate their activities, then by 1921 the British showed signs of mimicking the fluidity and informality of the IRA’s highly successful ‘flying columns’. But British politicians and strategists were influenced not just by the successes of their opponents, but by a wide range of other external factors, including domestic liberal opinion and the perspectives of the empire. The international post-war emphasis on self-determination, on partition, and on plebiscites was to some extent reflected in the nature of the evolving Irish settlement of 1920–1. Federalist constitutional notions, highly influential within the British political elite at this time, fed into the Government of Ireland Act (1920), a measure which partitioned the island, and which made provision for Home Rule administrations in a new six-county, and predominantly Unionist, ‘Northern Ireland’ (with a population of 1.25 million) and in a proposed twenty-six-county, and overwhelmingly Nationalist, ‘Southern Ireland’ (population 2.97 million). The Government of Ireland Act operated in the North, and provided a constitution of sorts for Northern Ireland in effect between 1921 and its repeal in 1998; but the volunteers of the IRA were not fighting for Home Rule, still less for partition and Home Rule, and consequently the Act was a dead letter outside the Six Counties. If the Government of Ireland Act bore the influence of imperialist and federalist constitutional thought, then the eventual deal which was brokered between the British government and Sinn F´ein also bore some of the imprint of empire. In the midst of the Anglo-Irish War, imperialist ideologues took heart from the British experience in South Africa, which appeared to indicate that a loyal dominion might be created out of the unpromising materials generated by bloody warfare. Imperial leaders, pre-eminently Jan Smuts, were also a moderating influence on the British: Smuts is widely credited as an architect of the ceasefire between the British and the Irish which came into effect in July 1921, and which provided the opportunity for negotiation. But empire was both an emollient and a shibboleth; and this meant that, for the British, there were clear boundaries to what might be conceded in negotiation. In the haggling which took place in London in the autumn of 1921 between Lloyd George and other representatives of the British government and Sinn F´ein’s plenipotentiaries, led by Arthur Griffith and Michael Collins, the Irish sought to establish a republic by agreement, while the British sought to keep Ireland firmly within the confines of the empire. In effect, the deal that was signed in December 1921 granted the Irish the substance of a republic (embodied within the new Irish Free State) while preserving the vestiges of an imperial connection for the British (particularly through an oath of allegiance to the British king). Northern Ireland, already established through the Government of Ireland Act (1920), was given the right to opt out of the new Irish state, and promptly did so. It was a tribute to the capacity of the imperial imagination for self-delusion (or perhaps to the power of the South African analogy) that the Anglo-Irish Treaty should have been widely hailed by conservative ideologues as a new keystone of empire; equally it was a tribute to the susceptibility of Irish
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Figure 4.2. State-builder: W. T. Cosgrove at Michael Collins’s graveside, 1922.
separatists to symbolism and to oaths that so many should have been prepared to overlook the substance of what had been achieved in December 1921, and to emphasize instead the distance between the treaty and the republican ideal. This susceptibility would fuel a civil war in Ireland, where the purist opponents of the treaty would seek to defeat those more pragmatic patriots who believed, in the spirit of Henri IV, that Dublin was worth an oath.
S TAT E - BU I L D I N G The low-grade warfare fought in Northern Ireland in 1922 between the Crown forces, Protestant Unionist paramilitaries, and the IRA moulded the institutions of the fledgling polity, and left an indelible stain of political and religious bitterness. Much of the security apparatus of Northern Ireland (the police force, special crimes—‘special powers’—legislation) was laid down at this time. Nationalists retained bitter memories of anti-Catholic violence perpetrated by Unionists and condoned by the Unionist state: the murder of the Catholic MacMahon family in Belfast in March 1922, probably by the Crown forces, was a particularly bloody and resonant episode. Unionists preserved their own bitter memories of republican violence: the murder of six Protestants at Altnaveigh near Newry in June 1922 by republicans (including, allegedly, Frank Aiken, a future senior minister of the independent Irish state) was one such defining event. In the South, the Irish Civil War of 1922–3 probably brought little more than 1,500 casualties (as opposed, say, to the 30,000 or more who died in Finland’s civil war—a country with population numbers similar to Ireland); but the circumstances of many of these deaths were terrible, and the divisions
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between former comrades-in-arms and within families ran deep. The youth of many of the combatants together with the ferocity of the conflict meant that the bitterness of the war had a longevity beyond that which might have been expected. This was compounded by the fact that party division within the new Irish Free State largely reflected the disposition of forces during the civil war, with the supporters of the Treaty creating the Cumann na nGaedheal party (1923) as a focus, and with its opponents organizing as Fianna F´ail (1926). The traditional image of inter-war Ireland is, understandably, dominated by the civil war, and by the prevailing economic austerity of the period. The proponents of the treaty were the immediate victors in the civil war, and their Cumann na nGaedheal was in power between 1923 and 1932. Their track-record tends to be coloured by perceptions of a rigid middle-class Catholic morality, of doctrinaire economic liberalism, and of vigorous policing strategies. Moreover, where once historians tended to emphasize the democratic credibility of the pro-treaty cause (the treaty was endorsed by the Daíl, the Irish parliament, and by its ministers in January 1922, and at a general election in June 1922), on the whole they have become more impressed by the moral ambiguities of the Treatyite stand, which was formulated in the context of British threats, and which was defended with an unremitting ferocity. The corollary of this has been a movement away from overly reductionist assessments of the civil war (characterizing democratic and pragmatic Treatyites and undemocratic and fundamentalist anti-Treatyites) to a more subtle portrayal of Ireland’s political culture in the early 1920s—one which lays stress on the shared features and continuities within a superficially riven polity. Irish republican critics of the new Free State have traditionally emphasized the extent to which it continued, despite independence, to be entangled in the embrace of British imperialism. Ireland, under the terms of the treaty of 1921, was a dominion within the British Commonwealth and Empire, with a British naval presence at various strategically important locations on the Irish coast, and with deputies (TDs) in the Daíl swearing an oath of allegiance to the new constitution and to George V. Ireland remained partitioned, with (from the republican perspective) British occupation continuing in the six counties of the new Northern Ireland. Free State lackeyism expressed itself in (again, from this perspective) a brutal prosecution of republican dissent, both during and after the civil war. Interpretations of the Irish economy and society in the 1920s have tended to be equally bleak. Both Irish states were launched in a relatively difficult economic context, being burdened by the costs of civil unrest at a time when the immediate post-war boom had ended. Moreover, the first decade of independence also coincided with the global recession associated with the stock exchange crashes of 1929. On the whole, the Irish Free State was underdeveloped industrially, since one of the features of the British regime had been the tendency to define Ireland as a larder for urban England. Only 14 per cent of the working population of
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the Irish Free State, some 100,000 people, was employed in industry in the mid-1920s, and only 5,000 new industrial jobs were created in the years between 1926 and 1931. Generally high levels of poverty, exacerbated by international economic conditions, were managed by an essentially conservative political elite who were more concerned about demonstrating the new Ireland’s financial probity than about evincing social compassion. Dublin, the capital, was characterized by overcrowded tenements and slums, and by low levels of public housing development (an annual average of just under 500 homes were constructed by Dublin corporation in the decade before 1933): in 1929 it was calculated that almost 44,000 housing units were needed to meet the national need. These conditions were associated with high infant mortality, disease (high rates of tuberculosis), and constrained welfare provision. The Irish countryside was also distinguished by sharp social contrasts, with the substantial farming or grazier class predominating, but with profound poverty and landlessness blighting communities particularly on the western seaboard. Patrick Hogan, the Irish Free State Minister for Agriculture, and author of a celebrated land purchase Act, calculated in 1924 that Ireland was home to a million and a half landless men, who were ‘prepared to exercise their claims with gun and torch’. Depictions of the Irish Free State of the 1920s have often focused on the dominant middle-class, patriarchal Catholic ethos of the country. Modernity, in the form of motor cars and dance halls, tended to be regarded with official suspicion, and a source of threat to the (supposed) traditional virtues and restraint of the country. Sensitive issues such as prostitution or illegitimacy tended to be treated as scandals to be buried rather than as social challenges to be addressed and resolved through reform and improvement. Catholic morality expressed itself in rigorous attitudes towards divorce after 1923 and in the more energetic censorship of films after 1923 and of literature after 1929. Catholic campaigners sought to restrict the accessibility of guidance on birth control; and legislation in 1929 and 1935 dealt with the availability of contraceptives. But other perspectives are possible. The motifs of the historiography have arisen from a widely shared sense of disappointment that the revolution had ostensibly changed so little, and that political suppression and poverty continued to be features of Irish life. Interpretations of the new Ireland have also been framed within assumptions concerning the socially and culturally repressive ethos of the new administration. Some, though not all, international comparisons, underline this disappointment: economic growth was slower in Ireland than in many other newly established European states of the period, and at least one leading historian of twentieth-century Ireland, J. J. Lee, has strongly and persuasively emphasized the extent to which Ireland was outperformed by comparable and competing European nations. But economic performance is not the whole story of inter-war Ireland. Ireland emerged after the civil war as a relatively stable and relatively liberal democracy at a time when much of Europe was abandoning liberalism and democracy
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in favour of more extreme alternatives. Irish women, for example, were fully enfranchised in 1923, whereas their British counterparts had to wait until 1928. The Cumann na nGaedheal government saw off military threats to civilian rule (through the ‘Army Mutiny’ episode of 1924), dealt with the recurrent threat of political insurgency throughout the 1920s, and tempted its abstentionist and republican rivals, the Fianna F´ail party (founded in 1926), into entering the Irish parliament in 1927. When Cumann na nGaedheal was defeated in the general election of February 1932, there was a peaceful transfer of power, even though the divisions between it and its Fianna F´ail rivals were rooted in the passions of the civil war. Emphases on official repression exaggerate the importance of the state, while obscuring the extent of popular conservatism and acquiescence. Cumann na nGaedheal sought to bring not only its republican enemies into the operation of the new Irish state, but also its critics from within the former loyalist and unionist community. By way of contrast, Northern Irish Catholics and Nationalists fared worse under the defensive and populist government of James Craig (Viscount Craigavon after 1927). The casualties which this community sustained were disproportionately high in the Northern civil warfare of (in particular) 1922. A combination of Protestant Unionist hostility and Nationalist abstention meant that Catholic interests were largely unrepresented during the formative years of the Northern state. Catholicism was associated in the minds of the Unionist governing classes with political subversion; and very few Catholics were appointed to senior office in the civil service, police, or judiciary. No Catholic served as a minister in the devolved government until the appointment of G. B. Newe in 1971. Some of the limited legal devices which offered protection to minorities were either inoperative (as with the relevant sections of the Government of Ireland Act) or abandoned (such as the use of proportional representation in local elections). State-building in the Irish Free State was not only a matter of accommodating former enemies; it was also about self-denial, and about the definition of Ireland’s new institutions. Legislation passed in 1924 reformed the civil service; but the bulk—some 98 per cent—of the old British administration transferred wholesale into the new Irish service. Some senior supporters of the regime were rewarded, but administrative efficiency and continuity were the desiderata, and there was no thorough-going spoils system. Equally, the new police force of the state, the Civic Guard, or G´arda Síoch´ana, recruited from the pro-treaty members of the IRA, but was not simply a medium for rewarding support: it contained numerous members from the old British police force, the Royal Irish Constabulary; and indeed the British force in Dublin, the Dublin Metropolitan Police, survived the first years of independence, only being stood down in 1925. In general, the government of independent Ireland was characterized by political self-restraint, and by considerable financial probity. It was also characterized both by a relentless advocacy of Ireland’s national interests and by enthusiastic participation in the internationalist initiatives of
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the era. The government certainly suffered through its failure to secure more territory from Northern Ireland (the treaty of 1921 had made provision for a Boundary Commission, which met in 1924–5, but which did not act as decisively as Dublin would have wished). Though this setback should not be underestimated (it has been argued that it left the Cumann na nGaedheal government ‘symbolically bankrupt’), there was some compensation to be had elsewhere in Ireland’s international dealings. At the Imperial Conference of 1926 the Irish worked with the Canadians and the South Africans to establish the co-equality of the dominions with Britain. The Irish were also an influence over the Statute of Westminster (of 1931) which effectively abolished the authority of the British parliament over the dominions. They were active, too, in the League of Nations, and were admitted to the Council of the League in 1930. Nor was Ireland coterminous with its government and ruling elite. Indeed, the independent Irish state was relatively small-scale: the government certainly sought to exercise a centralized control over the lives of its citizens, but it wanted to do so on the cheap (total government expenditure in 1926–7 was a mere £24 million). Formal policing mechanisms existed, but were limited: after the end of the civil war the Irish military establishment was miniscule. The G´arda Síoch´ana was consciously designed not to be paramilitary, and lacked the arms and ammunition which had characterized the Royal Irish Constabulary. Censorship existed, but was founded primarily on religious and cultural principles, rather than upon a desire to eliminate political dissent: the debate in Ireland about birth control, for example, focused on faith and morality rather than (as was the case elsewhere in Europe) on politics, demography, and eugenics. Perhaps the most remarkable feature of Ireland in the 1920s was the extent to which republicans, the ostensible ‘losers’ in the civil war, and the enemies of the Cumann na nGaedheal regime, were given the space to evangelize and rebuild. Ireland in the inter-war years was policed, not primarily by the Irish state, but by social and cultural consensus. The Catholic Church more effectively monitored public morals than did the government (though there was a continuum of influence, binding the Church to the administration). The enforcement of a strict morality, particularly evident in sexual issues and with the temperance question, fell to the Church. But here again, as with so much else concerning the history of Ireland in the 1920s, oversimplification is possible. Characterizations of inter-war Catholic Ireland tend to be made from liberal or secularized perspectives, and not in the context (say) of the wider renaissance of European Catholicism in this era. Also, no easy dichotomy can be drawn between the Irish Church and the Irish people, since the two were so closely interrelated. It is certainly true that the Church drew upon, and reflected, certain sections of Irish society, and particularly the prosperous farming classes. It is true, too, that (particularly given the social profile of vocations) the Church hierarchy favoured the Cumann na nGaedheal government and the Free State cause in the 1920s, rather than
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the republican alternative. But the Church, whatever its unitary aspirations, was not a monolith, and (as was so often the case in its history) priests were divided, often along generational lines, over political questions, and particularly the treaty. Moreover, despite the relative strength of the Irish hierarchy and the proliferation of lay and vigilance organizations, it would be wrong to assume popular subjugation. In the end there was certainly a Catholic moral consensus; but the more extreme aspects of this should not be used to characterize the whole, and the more energetic campaigns of enforcement met with, at best, a highly qualified success. This was a policing regime which could be intolerant, which sometimes demanded obedience, but which was too uneven to effectively extinguish dissent. In fact dissent expressed itself readily enough in popular refusals to conform, and in the arts, literature, and history. It is true that there was a range of significant artists and historians who were close to the founders of the new Irish state, and who celebrated their achievement: painters such as Sir John Lavery, historians such as John Marcus O’Sullivan or Mary Hayden, and even (for a time) the national poet, W. B. Yeats (the painter William Conor, historians such as Cyril Falls, and writers like St John Ervine performed the same laudatory function for the Unionist state in Northern Ireland). There was a substantial popular literature commemorating the revolution, created by writers such as Piaras B´easlaí or Louis Le Roux (in the North Ronald McNeill celebrated Ulster’s stand against Home Rule). But there was a significant tradition of dissent, whether from exiled modernists such as James Joyce or Samuel Beckett, or from those who chose to stay at home in order to rattle bourgeois sensibilities. Mainie Jellett and Evie Hone introduced Cubist art into staid, post-revolutionary Dublin. Se´an O’Casey, a veteran of the Irish Citizens’ Army and of 1916, came to depict the revolution in highly unromantic (and thus startling) terms through his plays of the mid-1920s. Flann O’Brien vigorously debunked the pieties of the new state in his journalism. The journal Dublin Opinion mocked ‘national’ values in its cartoon art. By the mid-1930s, Irish historians, too, were laying the foundations for a cooler reappraisal of the national story: a new professional manifesto, a new scholarly journal (Irish Historical Studies), and new professional organizations paved the way for this evident ‘revisionism’. There is a temptation to equate the Cumann na nGaedheal government with other callous right-wing administrations in inter-war Europe. Such analogies would be mistaken. The rulers of the Irish Free State certainly protected the interests of its middle-class and propertied support, and often took a seemingly heartless approach towards the poor. But, in the end, their state was small, and (after 1923) their capacity to enforce was limited; and they tolerated (perhaps because they could not suppress) a range of political dissent. Ireland’s new rulers wanted to consolidate Irish sovereignty, and to create a more centralized administration. But they had little cash, no compelling political vision, and no desire to perpetuate their own command.
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N AT I O N - BU I L D I N G Cumann na nGaedheal also, arguably, taught their republican successors in Fianna F´ail that they did not need to shoot the British in order to secure political rights. The ministers of Fianna F´ail were, for the most part, veterans of the war of independence and of the civil war: some had been suspicious of the truce with the British in July 1921, most remained deeply antagonistic towards the treaty of December 1921, and all were thoroughly distrustful of British diplomacy. In essence, Ireland was now in 1932 ruled by a youthful and hawkish elite who wanted substantial reform in the relationship with Britain. Yet, despite this potentially explosive chemistry, change within the British–Irish relationship of the 1930s was managed peacefully. The oath taken by Irish deputies to the British king was removed in 1932–3, while the post of king’s representative in Ireland (the governor generalship) was quietly downgraded and finally abolished in 1937. Irish citizenship was more tightly defined through legislation in 1935, while Ireland’s relationship with the British Crown was loosened through legislation passed in 1936. The culmination of this endeavour was a new constitution, unveiled in 1937, and which defined (in a mixture of liberalism and paternalism) Ireland as a republic-in-all-but-name. The only conflict that was fought with the British in the 1930s was virtual (though it was intimately connected with sovereignty and independence), and was pursued with tariffs and import bans rather than with artillery. This was the ‘Economic War’ of 1932 to 1938, and the fact that it was defined in the language and with the vigour of the battlefield possibly helped to acclimatize the retired warriors of Fianna F´ail to the peaceful exercise of state power. But the issues were certainly difficult and sensitive, and might well have generated a more aggressive form of diplomacy than in fact was pursued. A tit-for-tat exchange of recriminatory tariffs and restrictions was pursued by the two nations between 1932 and the signing of an agreement in 1938. This brought some modest financial compensation to the British; but it also, critically, saw the removal of their naval bases from the Irish coast. The ‘Economic War’ had brought an Irish military victory: the twenty-six counties of independent Ireland had been finally divested of the British military presence through diplomacy, and without the firing of a single shot. De Valera’s genius, and that of his Fianna F´ail party, lay in simultaneously annexing and controlling Irish republican and patriotic sentiment: their particular genius lay in extracting the maximum national benefit, particularly from the British–Irish relationship, at a minimal outlay, and notably without incurring deaths or injury. In part, this was connected as much with British as with Irish diplomacy at this time, influenced (as the former was) by a Gladstonian sense of responsibility and guilt towards Ireland, and diverted by wider economic and strategic considerations. But de Valera’s vision, skills, and (his stand in
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1922–3 notwithstanding) constitutionalism were also critical factors. His rivals in Cumann na nGaedheal (melded after 1933 into a new party, Fine Gael) had built the independent Irish state, but had continued in the hegemonic traditions of the old Redmondite Home Rule movement, largely heedless of the need to cultivate a popular constituency. De Valera’s Fianna F´ail did not make the same mistake, and lavished money and energy in building a national party organization, as well as (when in government) shaping policies which were intended to address patriotic and material needs, and to smother social conflict. At remarkably little cost, de Valera and Fianna F´ail left no political space to dissident republicans within the vestigial Irish Republican Army; equally, their successful harassment of the British throughout the 1930s meant that they undercut possible support for the nascent Irish fascist movement, the Blue Shirts of General Eoin O’Duffy. Nor could any prospective Irish fascists persuasively appeal to Irish capitalism in the 1930s. Successive Fianna F´ail governments, following in the traditions of Sinn F´ein, kept watch over the interests of small businessmen, and were keen in particular to defend them from the ascendancy of British industry. In common with other European governments, the Irish abandoned a de facto free trade regime during the international economic crisis of the early 1930s, so that, by 1937, 288 articles were subject to tariff imposts, with just under 2,000 additional goods being restricted through the application of a quota system. In addition, Control of Manufactures legislation was passed in 1932 and 1934 to prevent non-Irish companies cutting through this protectionist defence by masking their control of Irish businesses. By 1936, the average level of tariff was 35 per cent, as compared with the average level of 9 per cent sustained in 1931 (and the very much slighter range of goods affected). There was an efflorescence of the state, or rather ‘semi-state’ or ‘state-sponsored’, sector in the 1930s; but Fianna F´ail was keen to ensure that these semi-nationalized industries were not competing with private business. The profit/loss account for these endeavours was complex, and it would be quite wrong to characterize the Irish economy of the 1930s as being successful in anything other than some narrow political terms. Local industrial employment and gross industrial output rose sharply, as some native industries flowered in the greenhouse of protectionism; but this was a temporary aberration. Substantial import substitution was attained in some industries; but despite the drive for economic self-sufficiency—indeed, in a sense, because of the drive for economic self-sufficiency—reliance on imported raw materials grew. Irish industry developed in a bloated and inefficient manner, protected and uncompetitive. If Fianna F´ail were able to outbid other, much more dangerous and potentially violent, patriots, and if they were keen to protect the interests of small business, then (equally) they were concerned to address any threat from labour and from socialism. Indeed, Fianna F´ail appeared to have stolen a socially progressive agenda from labour, expanding the application of unemployment assistance
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through legislation in 1933, legislating for workmen’s compensation in 1934 and for widows’ and orphans’ pensions in 1935, and sponsoring a Conditions of Employment measure in 1936 (an Act which affected working hours and holidays— but which also, controversially, empowered the government to regulate the number of women within industry). Some qualification is, again, necessary. Industrial unrest certainly remained relatively limited in the 1930s, but was beginning to grow at the end of the decade (with a major strike in the construction industry in 1937): strike action was proscribed during the war, in 1942, but again began to spiral in the later 1940s. The relative peace of the 1930s arose, not wholly because of working-class contentment, but rather because of a weak and divided labour movement, and because of the continuing dearth of employment opportunities (despite some new industrial jobs). If unemployment remained high, then wages (predictably) were relatively low: the gap between British and Irish paypackets was opening up in the late 1930s and during the war, with some inevitable consequences. Migration, traditionally a political and industrial safety valve for the Irish, was comparatively limited through the early 1930s (because of depressed host economies), but grew later in the decade and during the wartime years. Even so, the former Cumann na nGaedheal Minister for Finance, Patrick McGilligan, argued in 1937 that it was only because of emigration to England ‘that we still found it possible to limp and hobble along’. The Unionist government in Northern Ireland presided over a similarly complex piece of political and economic architecture, though with certain critical distinctions and limitations. The Unionist Party, like Fianna F´ail, successfully united strategically important sections of the working classes, the farming interest, and business by offering something to each (welfare provision, continuing land purchase, business credit and investment inducements). But Craig and the Unionists were working with the limited machinery of a devolved administration, and within the confines of a severely divided community; and, unlike de Valera and Fianna F´ail, they were seeking not so much to industrialize, as to defend an existing industrial economic structure. Eastern Ulster had been Ireland’s industrial focus—its Ruhr or Catalonia—since the mid-nineteenth century; but this preeminence was under threat in the depressed trading conditions of the inter-war years when the demand for Belfast’s ships and engineering dried up. Craig’s devolved powers did not stretch, as with de Valera and the South, to offering tariff protection to these failing local industries. As with de Valera, however, so with Craig, a heady mixture of intense patriotism and welfarism helped to prevent the conversion of popular economic misery into political activism. Intense patriotism and welfarism were strategies of state- and nation-building for both leaders and in both polities. But the consolidation of the separatists’ vision of the Irish nation and of the Unionists’ ‘Ulster’ involved much more than challenging enemies, British or republican, and subsidizing friends. In each polity there was a low-grade Kulturkampf, fought in the realms of language,
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nomenclature, ceremonial, and physical environment. This tended to be a more systematic enterprise in the Irish Free State than in Northern Ireland, though the determination of Craig and his supporters to promote a particular vision of ‘Ulster’ should not be discounted. Both governments were sensitive about the Irish language: in the South language was treated in conventional nineteenthcentury ideological terms, as one of the hallmarks of nationality, and great stress, accordingly, was laid upon the propagation of Irish. Just as nineteeth-century Irish nationalists had blamed the British-sponsored National School system for the undermining of Irish, so the leaders of independent Ireland determined to use the schools system for the revival of the language: Irish was to be the sole medium of instruction in the early years of primary school (1926), and was designated as a compulsory subject (in 1934). Knowledge of Irish became a requirement, at least nominally, for a range of positions in the public sector. In Northern Ireland there was no such emphasis on the Gaelic cultural tradition, and the Irish language was wholly excluded from all aspects of official and public life. Here, instead, Craig and the Unionists celebrated the cultural values of the planters (the English and Scots settlers of the seventeenth century), though his enthusiasm did not stretch, as those of his successors would do, to actively propagating the Ulster-Scots language or dialect. Linked with the issue of language was that of placenames. Each government fretted about the titles of their respective polity. Craig periodically sought to convert the rather anodyne ‘Northern Ireland’ into the more robust ‘Ulster’; in 1937 de Valera abandoned the ‘Irish Free State’ (a title mired in the politics of the treaty, and with pejorative connotations) for the emphatic ‘Ireland’. Placenames, streetnames, buildings, and statuary naturally reflected official cultural emphases: in the South placenames celebrating British royals or heroes were rebranded and gaelicized (King’s and Queen’s Counties, Kingstown and Queenstown are clear examples). In Northern Ireland, British patriotic, royal, and imperial allusions continued to be used, and there was some use, or attempted use, of the names of Unionist heroes (Craig himself was celebrated in Derry’s Craigavon Bridge). Public buildings reflected the power and aspirations of each of the Irish two polities: plans were laid for a grandiloquent reconstruction of central Dublin, while Belfast’s law courts (1927) and parliament buildings (1932) projected a triumphal vision of the new ‘Ulster’. Public ceremonial, similarly, reinforced the values and authority of the two polities (the Eucharistic Congress in the Irish Free State (1932); royal visits (1921, 1932, 1937); and Edward Carson’s funeral (1935) in the North). In the South, Eamon de Valera blended some of these diverse cultural and political imperatives into a political creed which helped to preserve his state from more extreme alternatives. This complex mixture underlay his new Irish constitution of 1937, a document which (on the whole) preserved liberal values at a time when European constitution-making was abandoning liberalism in favour of authoritarian substitutes: it was also a document shaped by widespread
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consultation. The new Ireland was indeed to be ‘Ireland’, and not the ‘Free State’: it was to be a de facto but not a de jure republic, with a president as head of state, a taoiseach, or prime minister, as head of the executive, and a bicameral parliament, or Oireachtas. It was to be Irish-speaking (Irish was to be ‘the first official language’). Liberal and democratic constitutional structures were complemented with Catholic social teaching: the centrality of the family within society was affirmed, divorce was prohibited, and women were located firmly within the environment of ‘Kinder, Kirche und Kuche’. Liberal critics of the constitution have been numerous and vocal, and—from the feminist perspective, in particular—understandably so. Yet (as with so much else in Fianna F´ail’s track record), the Constitution was rooted in compromise and in political realities: it was also rooted in de Valera’s particular vision and foibles. Ireland was not quite a republic, and retained some vestigial links with the Commonwealth: this, on the whole, reflected de Valera’s long-term thought on constitutional relations, and balanced the mainstream separatist imperative with some mild consideration of unionist sensitivities. Republicans were appeased by the assertion that the ‘national territory’ was the whole island of Ireland, and not simply the twenty-six counties of the South. The special position of the Roman Catholic Church was affirmed; but Catholicism was not established as the state religion of Ireland. Table 4.1. Religious affiliations in the Six Counties of (after 1920) Northern Ireland Census
Population
Catholics
1911 1926 1937 1951
1,250,531 1,256,561 1,279,745 1,370,921
430,161 420,428 428,290 471,460
Catholic % Protestants∗ 34.4 33.5 33.5 34.4
768,059 781,652 791,540 830,099
Protestant % 61.6 62.2 61.8 60.6
∗
The main Protestant denominations (Presbyterian, Church of Ireland, Methodist) used for this calculation
Table 4.2. Religious affiliations in the Twenty-Six Counties of (after 1921) the Irish Free State Census
Population
Catholics
Catholic %
Protestants∗
Protestant %
1911 1926 1936 1946
3,139,688 2,971,992 2,968,420 2,955,107
2,812,509 2,751,269 2,773,920 2,786,033
89.58 92.57 93.45 94.28
311,461 207,307 182,746 157,054
9.92 6.98 6.17 5.31
∗
The main Protestant denominations (Presbyterian, Church of Ireland, Methodist) used for this calculation
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The 1937 Constitution defined and reflected the quality of Irish democracy. Ireland was, and was to remain, liberal, patriarchal, and Catholic. Some fundamentals were given direct expression: an all-Ireland republicanism, an assertive Catholicism. Ireland in the ‘devil’s decade’ had thus some ferocious constitutional plumage; but the essential organism was liberal and democratic. WA R , N AT I O N A L I T Y, A N D W E L FA R E Independent Ireland in late 1939 was relatively well equipped to weather the European conflagration. Its defence forces were certainly in a miserable condition: the army was around 7,600 strong, while both the air corps and (more surprisingly) the navy were in a merely nascent state. On the other hand, as a consequence of the 1938 agreement, the twenty-six counties of the South were rid of the British military presence; and the existence of a staunchly pro-Allied government in Northern Ireland mitigated the strategic value of the South, and reduced the threat of British or (after 1942) American occupation. Ireland was thus able to underline its separateness from the looming presence of Great Britain, through a policy of neutrality. The function of this has frequently been explained in terms of the consolidation of national sovereignty; but it is also the case that neutrality was concerned with the internal condition of Ireland. Neutrality, arguably, was the only policy which made sense in terms of national unity, given the cultural hybridity of the island, and the competing traditions of (on the one hand) anti-British hostility and (on the other) participation in the British armed forces. Neutrality, it was once argued, cut Ireland off from the European mainstream, and corralled its inhabitants into (to use one well-worn analogy) a kind of ‘Plato’s cave’. In reality, while the Irish state remained largely neutral, Irish people, motivated by personal conviction as well as material need, joined the British armed forces or migrated to work in the British wartime economy: estimates of those in the forces vary between 50,000 and 70,000, with the numbers of casualties being perhaps 10,000. This military and industrial contribution to the British war effort relieved pressure on the faltering Irish economy; but it also tended to elide social barriers and (more generally) to increase Irish susceptibility to British and wider political and intellectual currents. Certainly the work of William Beveridge and J. M. Keynes began to achieve a tentative impact on the Irish political classes at this time, with Se´an Lemass (Fianna F´ail Minister for Industry and Commerce after 1941) evincing a particular interest. Lemass’s counterparts in Northern Ireland were being pushed in the same direction, though perhaps for different reasons. In the North the influence and acceptance of the British welfarism were linked to the fear that Protestantism and the Union would be undermined by any divergence in benefits. In the South the reputation of the independent Irish state was to some extent tied up with its ability to deliver on this score; and while the intellectual anchorage was
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quite different, ‘Beveridgeism’ did chime in certain respects with the imperatives of Catholic social thought. Welfarism in the Irelands of the 1940s was about community and social justice; but it was also, inevitably, about the national question and partition. In Britain and elsewhere in Europe, the war was associated with economic dislocation, an expansion of the state, a leftward thrust in electoral politics, and a consolidation of national identity. Despite the supposed isolation wrought by neutrality, Ireland shared much with this broad European pattern (even if there were inevitable local inflections). Pressures grew on the economy of the neutral south, and even on that of the wartime North. For the south, the war (in a sense) compounded the damage done by the protectionism of the 1930s: shortages and restrictions fed into price inflation (74 per cent between 1939 and 1945), with wages failing to keep pace (30 per cent hikes between 1939 and 1945). Rationing, falling living standards, the undermining of some traditionally high-status occupations (such as teaching) fed into mounting social and industrial unrest. In Northern Ireland employment expanded rapidly, but with this growth came the inevitable concomitants of wartime labour—greater restrictions on the workforce, longer hours, industrial tensions. In each of the two Irish jurisdictions the focus of politics moved leftwards: in the South the Fianna F´ail government (which was in power until 1948) continued to develop its social policies, while more socially radical alternatives such as Clann na Poblachta (formed in 1946) began to gather electoral momentum. In the North Unionism survived more or less intact, but only because it took on the colouring of Clement Attlee’s reforming post-war administration—and because it benefited from the wider celebration of Britishness that victory engendered for a time after 1945. Indeed, if the twenty years after the end of the war witnessed the last hurrah of old-style unionism throughout the United Kingdom (including England and Scotland), then this was a cry which was also raised in Ulster. While the Britishness of Ulster Unionism was reinforced by participation in the Allied war effort, Irish national identity was bound and reinforced by neutrality (or perhaps, more accurately, by the ambiguities of wartime policy). Irish republicanism emerged from the war in a relatively strong condition, despite the linkages between some IRA leaders and national socialism. On the whole, Fianna F´ail remained the market leader so far as republican orthodoxy was concerned; but the action taken by de Valera against the challenge of IRA dissent, as well as his failure to deliver on the partition issue, provided others with an electoral opportunity. In particular, the new Clann na Poblachta (given its heady combination of social radicalism, Catholic orthodoxy, and republican conviction) was well placed to exploit this heightened national sentiment. Indeed, it was the first Irish coalition (or ‘Inter-Party’) government of 1948–51, wherein the Clann was an important partner, that converted Fianna F´ail’s aspirational and rhetorical republicanism into action. It was this government, too, which
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began to convert the quiet intellectual and ideological networks of wartime into a set of formal international connections.
C O N C LU S I O N S The grand narrative of twentieth-century European history has some, incomplete, relevance for the Irish. Ireland’s inter-war years have, indeed, been characterized as a kind of ‘nightmarish parenthesis’, though the flanking clauses tend to be different from those relevant to much of the rest of the continent. Nationalist Ireland’s early twentieth-century apogee was the revolution, rather the Edwardian decadence of the British ancien r´egime. Independent Ireland’s post-Second World War efflorescence only began, arguably, with the economic modernization of the 1960s. If inter-war Ireland was bleak (and this essay has sought to demonstrate some of the complexities of the island’s experience in these years), then it was a peculiarly Celtic twilight, with partition and thwarted republicanism, as well as civil war and sustained economic difficulty, casting shadows. Independent Ireland in 1945 was evidently impoverished, isolated (and in the eyes of the Allies) sullied by its wartime record. It was characterized, apparently, by an assertive Catholicism, and by nationalist chauvinism. The island remained formally divided, but was also torn by cultural and religious allegiance. Northern Ireland (viewed from London and Washington) had had a ‘better’ war than its southern neighbour; and its economy was in superficially robust condition. But beyond the patriotic bunting of Belfast lay a society riven with sectarianism and guarded intolerance. It would be wrong to dismiss some of this characterization out of hand. The island clearly remained partitioned throughout the period under examination, and in each of the two Irish jurisdictions there was evidence of ethno-centric politics and cultural triumphalism. Ireland also remained poor. The revolutionaries of 1916–21 had inherited a relatively unindustrialized economy in the South, and had sought—particularly in the 1930s—to develop native industry. But the principal mechanism that they used (as elsewhere in Europe) was protectionism; and this tended to provoke retaliation and to stifle competitiveness. The South was, at least, spared the experience of Northern Ireland, where the undercapitalized, fragmented, and outmoded industrial economy was in freefall in the inter-war years. The evidence of division and poverty was inescapable; but other aspects of Ireland’s inter-war reputation are more susceptible to interrogation. Independent Ireland has often been characterized as both introspective and puritanically Catholic. Yet it was hard to be both wholly isolationist and thoroughly Catholic. Irish artists were influenced by the different expressions of modernism. Irish social activists were influenced by different trends in European Catholic thought. Irish
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historians were influenced by German and British professional and disciplinary models. Irish diplomats were involved with the internationalist initiatives of the inter-war and post-war years, contributing to the League of Nations and the Council of Europe. Irish economists slowly took on board the ideas of Beveridge and Keynes. Ireland’s economy remained protected for most of this period; but there was free trade in the market for ideas. Ireland’s Catholic hierarchy was certainly at the peak of its influence in these years. But the teaching of the Church reflected a broad consensus in Irish society, and indeed was often endorsed across denominational divides. Moreover, the Church provided education and welfare resources at a time when the southern Irish state (though developing in this respect) was relatively impoverished. A few associated with this work were guilty of cruelty and hypocrisy. But this should not wholly mar the wider record of social engagement, compassion, and justice. Ireland was judged (and found wanting) on the basis of its wartime neutrality. But the fundamentals are clear: Ireland was a small nation, recently liberated from its more powerful neighbour, and anxious to protect this newly acquired freedom. Neutrality was concerned with Irish sovereignty; but it was also about constitutional leadership and national unity. The concept of unity in twentiethcentury Irish history tends to be associated with the partition question; but this obscures the fact that the challenge of unification in these years was partly about the integrity of the South. In the aftermath of civil war, Cumann na nGaedheal lured or cajoled both republicans and ex-unionists into the structures of Irish democracy; in the 1930s Fianna F´ail created a support base which united the working classes, small producers, and (increasingly) business. The contribution of each, underpinned by wartime neutrality, meant that parliamentary democracy survived and thrived in Ireland, and that the country was preserved from the spectres of fascism and communism and clericalist dictatorship. But this success was hard won, and was far from being inevitable. Eamon de Valera ruled Ireland as its prime minister for twenty-one years (on and off between 1932 and 1959), and served as its president for another fourteen years (1959–73). Yet he was no Franco or Salazar, still less a Mussolini. He is said to have cried when he finally relinquished office. But, despite the longevity and the tears, he left in democratic order.
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G Dunphy, Richard, The Making of Fianna F´ail Power in Ireland, 1923–48 (Oxford, 1995). English, Richard, Radicals and the Republic: Socialist Republicanism in the Irish Free State, 1925–1937 (Oxford, 1994). Ferriter, Diarmaid, The Transformation of Ireland, 1900–2000 (London, 2004). Fitzpatrick, David, The Two Irelands, 1912–1939 (Oxford, 1998).
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Follis, Bryan, A State Under Siege: The Establishment of Northern Ireland, 1920–25 (Oxford, 1995). Garvin, Tom, Nationalist Revolutionaries in Ireland, 1858–1928 (Oxford, 1987). Hennessey, Thomas, A History of Northern Ireland, 1920–96 (Dublin, 1997). Hill, J. R. (ed.), A New History of Ireland: Ireland, 1921–1984, vii (Oxford, 2003). Hopkinson, Michael, The Irish War of Independence (Dublin, 2002). Jackson, Alvin, Home Rule: An Irish History, 1800–2000 (London, 2003). Kissane, Bill, The Politics of the Irish Civil War (Oxford, 2005). Laffan, Michael, The Resurrection of Ireland: The Sinn F´ein Party, 1916–23 (Cambridge, 1999). Lee, J. J., Ireland, 1912–1985: Politics and Society (Cambridge, 1989). McGarry, Fearghal, Eoin O’Duffy: A Self-Made Hero (Oxford, 2005). McIntosh, Gillian, The Force of Culture: Unionist Identities in Twentieth-Century Ireland (Cork, 1999). ´ Grada, Cormac, Ireland: A New Economic History, 1789–1939 (Oxford, 1994). O Paseta, Senia, ‘Censorship and its Critics in the Irish Free State, 1922–32’, Past and Present (Nov. 2003), 193–218. Regan, John, The Irish Counter-Revolution, 1921–1936 (Dublin, 1999).
5 Belgium and the Netherlands Martin Conway and Peter Romijn
I N T RO D U C T I O N Belgium and the Netherlands are the often neglected non-identical twins of interwar Europe. Over the previous centuries, these prosperous, densely populated, and much contested territories in north-western Europe had been central to the emergence of the commercial economy, social and cultural identities, and state structures that defined modern Europe. Throughout the twentieth century, control of their territory and industrial resources remained crucial to struggles for diplomatic, economic, and military ascendancy in Western Europe, while their respective empires projected their authority as far as East Asia, Central Africa, and South America. And yet Belgium and the Netherlands have been marginal to the ways in which historians write about twentieth-century Europe. This owes something to their relatively small size. Small states, a term that has acquired strangely pejorative connotations during recent decades, lack the evident importance of their larger neighbours: Belgium had a population of approximately eight million, while the Netherlands had almost nine million inhabitants by 1940. Their marginalization also however reflects the way in which neither state fits easily into the conventional narrative of inter-war Europe. The absence of a culture of political violence and the gradual, almost invisible, evolution of structures of socio-economic, religious, and ideological coexistence deprived the Low Countries of the abrupt ruptures of revolution which characterized many other areas of Europe during the first half of the twentieth century. The purpose of this chapter is therefore to rectify the relative absence of Belgium and the Netherlands (the ordering of which we shall periodically reverse to demonstrate its arbitrariness) from accounts of the years between the First and Second World Wars. In doing so, however, we have been conscious of the need to avoid two errors that it would be all too easy to commit. The first
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would be to approach the history of the two states in terms of absences or, to put it more crudely, of things which failed to happen. The revolutions which swept across central Europe after the end of the war in 1918, the emergence during the 1920s and early 1930s of Communist and fascist movements in many European states and the descent of almost all of Europe into an interlocking series of military, ideological, and inter-ethnic conflicts from the mid-1930s onwards constitute an obvious agenda for accounts of inter-war Europe. Applied to the Low Countries, they risk however suggesting a rather unsatisfying list of ‘dogs which failed to bark’. The relative absence of revolution, of mass movements of the extremes of left and right and of civil war was not the consequence of a failure of collective will or political imagination. It reflected the way that Belgium and the Netherlands developed political systems in which compromise rather than conflict was the defining characteristic. As such, these compromise polities might be regarded as constituting an alternative ‘happier’ history of the inter-war years from that described in other chapters in this volume. This, however, was true only in the sense that the number of the victims of civil and military conflict was fewer. Violence may not have dominated the history of Belgium and the Netherlands between the end of the First World War in 1918 and the German invasion of both states in May 1940, but the same structures of social inequality, economic oppression, racial discrimination, and political conflict which gave rise to violence elsewhere were present, and indeed omnipresent. The difference lay not therefore in the absence of conflicts but in how these conflicts were mediated. The second error, and perhaps the most obvious one, would be to approach the history of the two states in terms of a common history. The collective noun ‘the Low Countries’ encapsulated from at least the fifteenth century until the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries a shared, if bitterly disputed, socio-economic, political, and cultural heritage. After 1830 this was no longer so. The brief and highly unsuccessful experience of the unitary Kingdom of the Netherlands between 1815 and 1830, which brought together the northern and southern Netherlands under a common northern monarch, demonstrated once and for all the impossibility of political union. The two states were distinguished most visibly by differences of religion and of language: Belgium was largely Catholic in composition while the Netherlands was dominated by a Protestant majority; the Netherlands was almost uniformly Dutch-speaking while Belgium was divided between speakers of French and Dutch. Less visibly, however, the two states were divided by differences of political culture. This became clear in the decades that followed the revolution of 1830 in Brussels and the subsequent secession of the southern territories into what became in 1831 the Kingdom of Belgium. From then on, there were no wars between the two states; but nor did reunion ever seem to be a serious possibility. Indeed, during the first half of the twentieth century, there were periodic surges in political animosity between the two states. Belgium had been invaded by the German armies during 1914 and suffered a harsh military occupation,
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while the Netherlands had retained a difficult but in relative terms more comfortable neutrality. These highly divergent war experiences overshadowed bilateral relations in the immediate post-war years. During the negotiation of the post-war treaties at Versailles, Dutch diplomats had to intervene to rebuff Belgian demands and claims for territory at the expense of the Netherlands. Anti-Belgian resentments ran very high in the Netherlands during the 1920s. An agreement between the two states over the centuries-old dispute about the navigation channels to the Belgian port of Antwerp was rejected by the Dutch parliament after a successful protest campaign by conservative and nationalist politicians and further embittered relations between the two states. During the 1930s some intellectual groups on both sides of the frontier, notably Joris Van Severen’s Verdinaso movement in Belgium, did try to encourage the dream of a reunified Low Countries. But these ideas never acquired a mass following or elite support. The separation of diplomatic and political convenience initiated in 1830–1 had become a much wider division of political and cultural mentalities, with the consequence that Dutch and Belgians, including the Dutch speakers in Flanders, recognized much more readily what divided them from each other rather than any underlying similarities. FAC TO R S O F C O N V E RG E N C E A N D O F D I V E RG E N C E Belgium and the Netherlands were, throughout the inter-war years, constitutional monarchies which combined the will of the people, as expressed through their elected representatives in parliament, with the executive power of government, which acted symbolically (and sometimes rather more tangibly) in the name of the monarch, and an independent legal system and judiciary. This three-fold division of powers had its origins in the gradual processes of state formation and political modernization that had occurred over the course of the previous century. In Belgium, the founding Constitution of 1831 had imposed on the new country the template of a nineteenth-century liberal state. The initial limited suffrage had been expanded in 1893 by instituting universal manhood suffrage (from the age of 25), while granting additional votes to men overwhelmingly from the middle and upper classes who fulfilled a variety of criteria. The key elements of the 1831 Constitution remained, however, firmly in place. The monarchy, in the person of Albert I who had become king in 1909, occupied a central institutional position, combining the constitutional responsibilities of the King of the Belgians with a wider influence as one of the defining symbols of the new nation. The centre of gravity of Belgian political culture lay in parliament where the nineteenth-century rivalry between the Catholic and Liberal parties had been supplemented by the emergence from the 1890s onwards of a strong Socialist party, the Belgian Workers Party, which derived its support primarily from the working class employed in Belgium’s substantial industrial sector. This tripartite
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division between Catholics, Liberals, and Socialists proved to be the mould within which Belgian politics continued to operate for much of the twentieth century. While other parties, often dissidence from the three major political families, came and went, the three ‘historic’ parties monopolized national government as members of the often short-lived coalition governments of the 1920s and 1930s, as well as controlling the influential communal level of local administration. The relative immobility of Belgian electoral politics during the inter-war years was remarkable. In only one election between 1919 and 1939, that of 1936, did support for the three main parties fall below 80 per cent of the votes cast, and support for the Socialists varied over the course of the inter-war years between a high-point of 39.4 per cent in 1925 and 30.2 per cent in 1939, and for the Catholics between 38.6 per cent in 1932 and 27.7 per cent in 1936. The Liberals, by now clearly the smallest of the three political traditions, varied between 17.6 per cent in 1919 and 12.4 per cent in 1936. In these circumstances, the margin between success and failure for each party lay not primarily in winning over voters from other parties but in maximizing support from voters already sympathetic to its cause. This imposed a conservative logic on the strategies of all of the major parties. They appealed overwhelmingly to slogans and symbols that unified, spurned ideological innovation, and sought to prevent the emergence of dissident groups. This conservatism was reinforced by the social cleavages that had developed over the preceding decades between the Catholic, Socialist, and Liberal communities. In the relatively settled social landscape of early twentieth-century Belgium, family background, education (in Catholic or state schools), membership of socio-economic organizations such as trade unions or insurance leagues and of cultural associations such as youth movements, women’s, organizations, or even music groups and football teams served to define most Belgians as belonging to one of these three ‘pillars’. This process of ‘pillarization’ sometimes cut across but also frequently reinforced divisions of social class and linguistic or regional identity, lending to Belgian life its distinct texture of intricate social, linguistic, and ideological divisions. In the Netherlands, too, the nineteenth century had been characterized by the gradual maturation of a distinctive political culture. This combined a step-by-step evolution towards a liberal constitutional monarchy with the development of movements for emancipation among the lower middle and working classes. The liberal constitution of 1848, drafted by the great constitutional-law reformer J. R. Thorbecke, in many respects laid the basis for the gradual modernization of the fabric of Dutch daily life. This did not, however, occur without difficulty. The monarchs of the House of Orange regarded new notions such as the responsibility of ministers to parliament as an unwelcome development and it was only when the young Queen Wilhelmina (who reigned from 1898 to 1948) came to the throne that the modern idea of a constitutional monarchy took shape. This coincided with a bourgeois cultural offensive, which combined liberal ideas of citizenship with moral discipline as the response to the threats posed by the
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development of mass society. The process of liberalization during the second half of the nineteenth century brought to the fore a number of closely inter-related developments. The principal Protestant church, the Dutch Reformed Church (Nederlands-Hervormde Kerk), enjoyed a privileged position as the national church in the post-1816 kingdom. The 1848 Liberal constitution formally ended this dominant position, which had already been weakened when more orthodox interpretations of Protestantism had gained a considerable following. In 1834, an orthodox minority seceded, and later in the century, similar individuals and groups disaffected with the Nederlands-Hervormde Kerk went their own way. In 1892, the political and spiritual leader of the dissenting Calvinists, Abraham Kuyper succeeded in merging a large part of this tendency into the newly founded Gereformeerde Kerk. In the dominant Protestant and liberal culture of the nineteenth century, both the dissenting orthodox Protestants and the long-standing minority Catholic population, located predominantly in the south of the country, were treated as second-class citizens. As a consequence, they organized themselves to demand greater civil and political rights. The Calvinists and Catholics campaigned initially for the right to establish their own schools, without state control, as part of their broader goal of achieving what they termed ‘sovereignty in their own sphere’. In contrast to the Liberal concept of an ideologically neutral state school system, the orthodox Protestants of the Gereformeerde Kerk sought to base education on the teachings of the Bible, while the Catholics wanted to do so on the basis of papal doctrine. The confessional leaders combined the ambition of building space for their own way of life with the goal of their wider emancipation within Dutch society. Calvinists, many of whom belonged to the lower middle class, comprised some 10 per cent of the population. Abraham Kuyper founded the first modern political party in the Netherlands, the so-called Anti-Revolutionary Party (Anti-Revolutionaire Partij). This name indicated fundamental rejection of the revolutionary idea of popular sovereignty in favour of divine authority. Kuyper would serve, between 1901 and 1905, as the prime minister of a coalition government with the Catholic party. The Catholics, who formed roughly 35 to 40 per cent of the population, had long been unable to benefit fully from the division of Church and State which had resulted from the liberal constitution of 1848. Formal equality in no sense brought to an end the long-term informal discrimination against Catholics. Thus, by the end of the nineteenth century, the first modern political parties were established, as a product of these movements for confessional emancipation, and soon thereafter the socialists would follow the same path. This process contributed to the gradual expansion in the suffrage, which culminated in the granting of universal suffrage for men in 1917 and for women in 1919. Thus, a transition to mass politics took shape in the first two decades of the twentieth century. Their shared quest for emancipation led the different socio-cultural groups to adopt a strategy of separate but concerted campaigning directed towards
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achieving their common goals. The leaders of these movements for emancipation collaborated with each other but were careful to keep their followers apart. Solidarity within each grouping was reinforced through the creation of networks of newspapers, trade unions, and other social and cultural organizations, whereby in effect each vertical ‘pillar’ of Dutch society created its own organizational structures. The Socialists too followed this course, and the majority reformist current within the movement in effect abandoned revolutionary goals, hoping that the achievement of universal suffrage would enable them to win over the workingclass followers of the confessional movements. In 1917 this gradual process of change found its expression in what came to be termed the ‘Pacification’ of Dutch political life. This step was made easier by the political truce that had been agreed upon at the start of the Great War. Through mutual agreements between the principal political leaders, the major sources of tension in Dutch politics were resolved. This enabled the introduction of universal suffrage as well as the provision of state subsidies for confessional education. The constituency system was changed by the introduction of the principle of proportional representation, thereby ensuring that the composition of parliament closely mirrored the strength of the different political traditions. It led to stable majorities: in the period 1918–37, the Catholics held between 28 and 32 of the 100 seats in the lower house of parliament, the Calvinists between 12 and 17; the Protestants between 7 and 11; the conservative liberals declined from 15 to 4 while the progressive liberals remained stable between 5 and 7. The Socialists won between 20 and 23 of the seats, while the Communists and other revolutionary socialists held between 2 and 5. The smaller parties never won more than 1 or 2, with the exception of the National Socialists who won 4 in 1937. In this way, the introduction of modern mass politics in the Netherlands, as well as to a less marked extent in Belgium, led to a system of consensual rule which divided society into ideologically defined compartments. The system of pillarization had derived its origins from the struggle for political emancipation by the lower middle class and the workers and from the campaign for equal recognition by the non-dominant religious groups. But between the two world wars, it grew into an all-embracing system of social ordering, whereby identity was defined less by individual choice than by an affiliation predetermined by birth and upbringing to one or other of the Socialist, Protestant, Liberal, or Catholic communities. At the level of daily life, belonging to a ‘pillar’ decided which baker and grocer a family would use, which school, trade union, or newspaper they would choose, or which party they would vote for. This social compartmentalization worked well as a means of bridging divisions and mediating conflicts at the top as long as the leaders of the respective pillars were able to maintain firm control over their followers. At the same time, however, pillarization served to forestall the development of clear political alternatives. Consequently, in the 1930s, the system of pillarization came under attack because of its apparent inability to respond effectively to the results of the deep
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economic crisis of the time, and it came to be seen as synonymous with a certain narrow-mindedness and parochialism. Nevertheless, pillarization favoured the development of a political culture which found the institutional solution to conflicts and problems through the encouragement of negotiation and coalition politics. Similarities of political culture were reinforced by similarities in state power. In contrast to many areas of Europe discussed in other chapters in this volume where states struggled throughout the inter-war years to assert their supremacy over rival authorities and reluctant populations, the citizens of the Netherlands and Belgium knew who their rulers were. Both were centralized states, where authority was projected downwards through a hierarchy of central and local bureaucracies and parastatal institutions. Both possessed relatively small and subordinate armies and navies, as well as national and local police forces. The frontiers of the two states were long established and, with the exception of the small predominantly German-speaking territories of Eupen and Malm´edy annexed by Belgium from Germany by the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, contained no problematic ethnic minorities. Both were therefore nations as well as states. Whereas the Netherlands could claim a long historical continuity stretching back to the United Provinces of the Golden Age of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, revitalized by the important political and administrative reforms introduced under the Napoleonic regime, Belgium in its modern form was a creation of the revolution of 1830. Differences of historical lineage counted, however, for little in the inter-war era. Whatever Belgium might have lacked by way of past history was amply overcome during the harsh German Occupation of the country between 1914 and 1918. The material suffering experienced during those years and the emphatic disregard for the welfare of the population displayed by the German administrators had reinforced the bond that the large majority of the population felt to their Belgian national identity. Discourses of patriotism dominated in both states during the 1920s and 1930s, and were strengthened by the rituals of national commemoration and loyalty to the respective monarchs. There was therefore no crisis either of the state or of the nation in the inter-war Low Countries. The states possessed the material means and the less tangible resources of ideological legitimacy required to confront challenges to their authority, and could count on the mixture of patriotic identification, legal obedience, and occasional selfinterested evasion which characterized the behaviour of many West European citizens towards state authority during the twentieth century. These well-ordered societies were also by the standards of the age broadly democratic. Though the enfranchisement of women in the Netherlands in 1919, boosted by Queen Wilhelmina’s accession and the general drive to social modernization would not be followed in Belgium until 1948, the formal power and informal influence of nineteenth-century social elites and institutions had been greatly restricted by the evolution towards parliamentary government. Members of parliament, civil servants, and a broad array of bourgeois professionals, rather
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than aristocrats or military officers, were the principal rulers of both states during the 1920s and 1930s. Both too had well-entrenched structures of civil and criminal law, staffed by an influential cadre of lawyers and judges. A dominant legal culture therefore constrained the actions of both rulers and ruled, lending a pervasive predictability to daily life. Equality of rights was not, of course, the same as equality of conditions. Both were emphatically capitalist societies, in which the consequent differences of income were merely the most visible element of inequalities of class and gender which dominated all aspects of social experience. Education, employment, housing, and medical and welfare structures were all ingrained with forms of inequality which not so much divided rich from poor as categorized the population into complex and all-encompassing social hierarchies. Both moreover were societies in which the economic elite exercised considerable formal and informal power. The similarities of mould between Belgium and the Netherlands were, however, mitigated by important factors of divergence. In the Netherlands, the maintenance of its neutrality during the First World War had reinforced a sense of introspection and internal distancing from the conflicts that ravaged other areas of Europe. Politicians and commentators cultivated an image of the Netherlands as a lighthouse of international law and morality in the raging storm of a world at war. In this way, Dutch society came to define itself by its sense of differentness, in which unity was valued more highly than the resolution of conflict or individual initiative. A value structure of social discipline and moral austerity derived at least in part from the long-dominant Protestant churches pervaded many areas of national life and contributed to a slightly self-congratulatory cult of the ruling dynasty of the House of Orange that offset the consciousness of the national decline that had taken place since the Dutch Republic in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The Dutch were, according to this self-image, a historic people, united by a common past but also by shared values that were reflected in a historic orientation towards trade, the sea, and, in more recent times, the substantial imperial possessions in the East Indies (present-day Indonesia) and Dutch Guyana (Surinam). Few, if any, of these characteristics were evident in Belgium. The brutal shock of the German violation of Belgian neutrality in August 1914, the human sacrifice and the intense material sufferings experienced during the subsequent four years of German Occupation, left many legacies for the subsequent history of the country. Above all, however, it had demonstrated Belgium to be a modern nation-state which through the shared fortitude of its people and their loyalty to King Albert I had proved their worth to the world. The image (and reality) of a martyred nation solidified a tricolour patriotism closely tied to the royal family and the memory of the soldiers who had fought the Germans throughout the First World War from a small area of unoccupied territory in West Flanders. At the same time, the war experience had reinforced the transition to modernity. As the state approached the centenary of its foundation in 1930, it projected a
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resolutely modern image of a free trade industrial economy, based on the coal and iron and steel industries that had developed since the eighteenth century. Divisions of language or of ideology were secondary to a sense of identification with the dominant values of ‘progress’ in its various material, social, and cultural manifestations. Empire, in the form of the vast territories of the Congo (nowadays the Democratic Republic of Congo), impinged relatively little on a predominantly industrial society which found its self-image in the confident art nouveau architecture of Victor Horta and the flourishing modernist artistic movements of the principal cities, notably Brussels, Antwerp, and Gent. These differences of texture and structure were reflected, moreover, in the nature of the internal fault-lines within each society. The Netherlands was a linguistically homogeneous society divided between a fragmented Protestant majority and a homogeneous Catholic minority; Belgium was an overwhelmingly Catholic society (though one in which religious practice was far from universal) divided between speakers of French and the Flemish Dutch language (as well as a German-speaking minority in the territories annexed from Germany in 1919). For much of the previous four hundred years, divisions of religion had appeared more threatening than those of language. But in the Netherlands the tensions produced by confessional division had been gradually blunted during the nineteenth century by the development of pillarization. Each pillar developed separate worlds and, in the words of an expression of the time, pursued strength through isolation. In order to enable the development of the separate communities, a certain tolerance was required, which expressed itself not so much through an interest in other communities as through a focus on introspection and the development of one’s own community. The large public demonstrations popular among the different religious communities during the 1920s served above all to promote among their own members a sense of their common purpose and respective power, rather than to win over or to intimidate those from beyond the ranks of their confessional community. In Belgium, in contrast, the nominal unity provided by Catholicism had given way during the nineteenth century to a bitter rivalry between practising Table 5.1. Religious affiliations in the Netherlands, 1920–1947 RomanCatholic 1920 1930 1947
35.6 36.4 38.5
NederlandsHervormd Gereformeerd 41.2 34.5 31.0
9.1 9.4 9.7
others
not religious
6.3 5.3 3.7
7.8 14.4 17.1
Source: J. Bosmans: ‘Het maatschappelijk-politieke leven in Nederland 1918–1940’ in: J.C. Boogman et.al., Geschiedenis van het moderne Nederland. Politieke, economische en sociale ontwikkelingen (Houten: De Haan, 1988) 404.
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Table 5.2. Language divisions in Belgium, 1930 Principal language Flemish Dutch French German Children under 2 and those who spoke other languages
% 51.1 42.42 1.24 4.13
Source: Annuaire statistique de la Belgique et du Congo Belge, lix (Gent: Vanderpoorten, 1937), p. xxii.
Catholics and ‘free-thinking’ or atheist Liberals and Socialists. Moreover, the linguistic division between French and Dutch speakers gradually became a new source of political tension during the later decades of the nineteenth century. Linguistic identities in Belgium were not simple. The small numerical majority of those who were primarily Dutch speakers, located in the north of the country, was offset by the social and political power of the French speakers in the industrial areas of Wallonia in southern Belgium, and more especially by the tendency of the middle class in all areas of the country to use French as their language of choice. To add to the complexity, the new capital Brussels became during the nineteenth century a largely francophone city located in the predominantly Dutch-speaking area. In the politics of inter-war Belgium, campaigns for equality for the Dutch language therefore went hand in hand with a wider desire for Flemish emancipation. Bitterness felt by some in Flanders at the post-war punishment by the Belgian authorities of the small number of Flemish intellectuals who had participated in the German-sponsored Council of Flanders (Raad van Vlaanderen) during the Occupation of 1914–18 merged with a more diffuse image of the Belgian state as unsympathetic to the interests of the more rural and Catholic north in favour of Brussels and the more secular and industrial south. The image of the Flemish as a disadvantaged majority within a Belgian state controlled by a francophone elite might have been a simplification of history. But, along with the still rather tentative notion of Flanders as a geographical entity, it proved to be a slogan capable of mobilizing a vocal minority of Dutch-speaking Belgians behind its cause. Francophone identities did not possess the same power. A Walloon movement, focused on the cultural and historical specificity of southern Belgium, had developed before 1914 among some intellectuals. It lacked, however, a mass base of support, and excluded the francophone populations of Brussels and Flanders. Throughout the inter-war years, French-speaking interests therefore lacked a clear political goal, beyond the defence of the unitary Belgian state against the supposed ‘separatist’
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ambitions of Flemish nationalists and the defence of the French language against demands of Dutch speakers for full linguistic equality. Differences of social class, and more especially of the relative weight of the classes, also differentiated the Netherlands and Belgium. In the Netherlands, economic change had added to the already complex social structure. In the provinces of North and South Holland trade and international service industries as well as a number of specialized industries such as metallurgy, shipbuilding, and the diamond industry created an aristocracy of labour alongside the industrial proletariat as well as a long-established and richly differentiated middle class in the major cities. In rural areas, branches of industry had developed, which processed local agricultural produce such as potatoes and sugar beet as well as colonial products, notably textiles. In agriculture, a distinct farming class existed composed either of property owners or tenants, who worked the land independently, and it was in those rural areas where farmers worked as paid labourers on the land that social tensions tended to be greatest. The diversity of social structures ensured, however, that the workers in each industrial sector were obliged to conduct their own struggle. This pervasive social fragmentation moreover was further reinforced by pillarization, which divided the working class by creating separate trade unions for each of the ideological communities. Belgium, in contrast, was a more homogeneous capitalist society, forged under the pressure of an intense and often brutal process of nineteenth-century industrialization. Class frontiers were consequently starker, most notably in the coal and iron industries of southern Belgium, but also in the industrial suburbs of Gent, Antwerp, and Brussels. Here, the living standards of a prosperous upper middle class of bankers, industrialists, and professionals contrasted starkly with the poor living conditions and low wages of a large working class. Between these two poles, there remained, however, a substantial lower middle class of small businessmen and white-collar employees, as well as a significant rural population, most notably in Flanders and the hilly Ardennes region in the south of Belgium. P O S T- WA R P O L I T I C S The political regimes that ruled Belgium and the Netherlands after the First World War were ‘old’ political entities. This did not, however, mean that they were unchanging ones, and in many respects the dominant theme of political life over the subsequent twenty years would be the attempts in both states to adapt the status quo to the challenge presented by a more modern, more industrialized and more educated society. Radical revolution was ruled out from almost the very beginning. In the Netherlands, food shortages and discontent over the continuing mobilization of the Dutch army led in 1918 to disturbances in several cities and military barracks. The small proto-Communist Party which had split from the Socialists in 1909 saw in these events the opportunity for a
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revolution on the Leninist model. This would not prove to be the case, even if the collapse of the imperial regime in Germany and the proclamation of the Weimar Republic did have repercussions in the Netherlands. In parliament the Socialist leader P. J. Troelstra declared publicly that the revolution in Germany would certainly not stop at the Dutch border and that he stood ready to take power. He had, however, made no preparations for a seizure of power, and simply presumed that the ruling class was so intimidated by the course of events that they would hand over power to him. Instead, the parties of the right organized a counter-demonstration in The Hague and mobilized former soldiers to create a Home Guard determined to ensure the survival of the established order. Troelstra had no choice but to recognize that he had been mistaken in his assessment of the situation. Moreover, as a consequence of his impulsive action, the Socialists had disqualified themselves in the eyes of the other parties as a potential partner in government. In August 1914, the Socialist leaders had immediately declared a political truce with the non-Socialist parties, but after the war the other parties only proved willing to contemplate the entry of the Socialists into government as a last resort in the case of ‘utmost necessity.’ That would only finally come about in 1939, in response to the imminent threat of war posed by Hitler’s Germany. In Belgium, social and political tensions ran strong after the harsh suffering of the German Occupation. King Albert I moved rapidly, however, to pre-empt any challenge to the constitutional order. On the day the war ended (11 November 1918), he announced (with somewhat dubious legality) a wide-ranging set of reforms, including the introduction of simple one-man one-vote suffrage for all men aged 21 or over. The leaders of the Catholic Party, who under the former weighted suffrage had enjoyed an absolute majority in parliament since 1884, resented this executive action. The King’s decisive action succeeded, however, in rallying the population behind the regime, and most importantly ensured the support of the Socialist Party, which had campaigned vehemently for suffrage reform over the preceding decades. A series of social reforms instituted by Catholic–Socialist–Liberal governments of national unity between 1918 and 1921, including an eight-hour working day and recognition of the legal right to strike, marked a break with the notable parliamentary culture of the pre-war era and the inauguration of a new era of mass politics and social negotiation. In both Belgium and the Netherlands, the most substantial outcome of the post-war changes was to end rule by one party or social group in favour of a much more complex politics of compromise. This was most marked in Belgium. In the first post-war elections held under the new franchise in November 1919, the Catholic and Socialist parties both gained 36.6 per cent of the vote, while the Liberals won only 17.6 per cent. This pattern of Catholic–Socialist dominance, with the Liberals as a smaller but significant third party, set the pattern for all elections held over the subsequent twenty years. Socialist hopes that they would achieve an overall majority were encouraged by their success in the 1925 elections
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when they won 39.4 per cent of the vote, but this proved to be their historic highwater mark; and, under the system of proportional representation which Belgium had adopted in 1899, the leaders of the parties were obliged to adapt to the new realities of coalition-building. Unlike in Third Republic France or Weimar Germany as described elsewhere in this volume, the options were relatively limited. The most obvious coalition was an alliance of Socialists and progressive Catholics built on a shared commitment to social reform. This proved, however, consistently difficult to achieve. After a series of Catholic–Liberal governments between 1921 and 1925, a Catholic–Socialist government with the Flemish Christian democrat Prosper Poullet as prime minister, working jointly with the Socialist leader Emile Vandervelde (who became Foreign Minister), finally took office in the wake of the Socialist electoral success of 1925. It lasted only eleven months, and was undermined from the outset by the hostility of more conservative Catholics towards sharing power with the Socialist foe and perhaps more especially towards surrendering the leadership of their own party to a progressive-minded Catholic from Flanders. After the government’s resignation in May 1926, the Socialists retreated into opposition, enabling the conservative voices within the Catholic Party to form a new bourgeois coalition with the Liberals. The consequence was to set Belgian politics on a conservative, almost reactionary, course during the later 1920s. Though the reforms of the immediate post-war era remained in place, the prospect of any more wide-ranging democratization of the social and political order had effectively disappeared. In the Netherlands, the balance of political forces was broadly similar. The Pacification of 1917 found expression in the creation of an almost permanent coalition of the confessional and liberal parties. They formed a stable majority, which in ideological terms was dominated by the Christian parties but which favoured liberal policies in the economic sphere. In this way the continuing modernization of the Netherlands took shape in ways compatible with Christian ethics. This combination of expansion and constraint contributed to a complacency which in times of prosperity was not too irksome but in adversity tended to generate a certain paralysis. With the introduction of universal suffrage, the Catholic party, the Rooms-Katholieke Staats Partij (RKSP), had become the largest grouping in parliament. During the decade after the First World War, they generally provided the prime minister in the person of Charles Ruys de Beerenbrouck, a representative of the South Netherlands rural nobility. In political terms therefore the post-war era was characterized by a consolidation of the new structures created by the Pacification of 1917, as well as a certain conformism. In other spheres, the 1920s witnessed a rapid modernization of the country. In economic terms, this was evident in the expansion of industry, notably international companies such as Royal Dutch/Shell, Philips, and Unilever. The national infrastructure and urban planning developed through the expansion of the railway and road network, as well as the construction of improved waterways and new dams, which reached its culmination in 1932 with
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the damming of the Zuiderzee (now renamed as the IJsselmeer). Social mobility increased, and the process of pillarization enabled a more refined civil society to take shape. In some respects, this was undoubtedly restrictive and disciplined but it also offered opportunities for personal development. The colonies provided a new space for Dutch people who sought opportunities in business or public service. In the cultural field, Dutch artists forged links with the international avant-garde. Painters such as Mondriaan and Van Doesburg and architects such as Oud and Rietveld gained an international reputation and national influence. Especially Van Doesburg’s connection to Bauhaus linked Dutch designers and artists to the international avant-garde and brought the attention of Mies von der Rohe and Lloyd Wright to their modernist concepts. ECONOMIC DEPRESSION AND THE POLITICS OF THE 1930s The economic depression which struck both states during the early 1930s in many respects had the effect of reinforcing the similarities between Belgium and the Netherlands. As industrial and commercial economies, heavily dependent on the lifeblood of international trade, the Low Countries were unsurprisingly strongly affected by the falls in investment, trade, and consumer demand which occurred after 1929. Levels of industrial production and exports fell rapidly and unemployment rose quickly in both countries from 28,000 in 1930 to 234,000 in 1933 in Belgium and 100,000 (3.4 per cent of the registered labour force) to 350,000 (12.8 per cent) in the Netherlands over the same period, reaching a peak of 480,000 (17.4 per cent) in 1936. Misery was, however, distributed more widely than among those who lost their jobs. The price of many agricultural products fell, threatening the viability of small farms; civil servants suffered particularly sharply from the policies of financial retrenchment adopted by the governments; and many small businessmen and members of commercial and ancillary professions were hit hard by the general decline in consumer demand. By the mid-1930s, elements of a tentative recovery had begun to emerge, first in Belgium and with a delay of about two years in the Netherlands. But there was no tangible end to the Depression prior to the war; and in many respects it constituted the defining experience of both societies during the inter-war years, and continued to influence social and political attitudes long after its immediate effects had disappeared. The decline in living standards embittered social relations and encouraged a radicalization of politics, on both left and right. In both states, the Communist parties became for the first time serious competitors with the Socialist parties; while, on the right, extremist parties emerged, influenced by the style and ideas of fascist movements elsewhere in Europe. These contributed to a tangible increase in political tensions. Large-scale strikes, mass demonstrations, and consequent
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scuffles with the forces of order did not signify a general descent into violence, but created a pervasive sense of crisis. These parallel processes had, however, rather different outcomes. In the Netherlands, the economic and political difficulties of the 1930s constituted the most serious challenge which the new model of ‘pacification politics’ established in 1917 had faced. But the principal political and social actors managed to subsume their differences in the pursuit of political stability and continuity. In Belgium, in contrast, the economic depression had a much more corrosive effect. The tentative rapprochement between the Catholic and Socialist parties became more difficult, while the emergence of a vocal Flemish nationalist politics called into question the unity of the nation-state. In Belgium, the immediate impact of the economic depression was to reinforce the conservative pattern of politics evident since the mid-1920s. The four successive Catholic–Liberal coalition governments between 1931 and 1935 adopted essentially orthodox responses to the economic crisis, seeking to reduce government expenditure to avoid a financial deficit. The sacrifices demanded of the population, and most especially of the working class, created a tense social climate, which reached a climax during the protests and strikes in the winter of 1934–5. The need for a political and social compromise was ineluctable; but the form that it took marked the arrival of a new spirit in Belgian parliamentary politics. The tripartite Catholic–Socialist–Liberal government of national unity headed by the governor of the National Bank, Paul Van Zeeland, that took office in March 1935 was markedly different from those that had preceded it. Van Zeeland was a technocratic figure, and not part of the parliamentary elite. Moreover, his government gave precedence to other relatively new figures, notably Hendrik De Man and Paul-Henri Spaak from the Socialist Party. These latter two figures emerged over the course of the 1930s as the principal advocates of ideological innovation within Socialist ranks. Rejecting the Marxist orthodoxy which had long dominated Belgian socialism, they called for a more activist and nationally oriented socialism which sought to use the mechanisms of the state to achieve economic and social reforms. This new spirit strongly influenced the content of the Plan for Work adopted by the Socialist Party as its campaigning manifesto in 1934, which advocated higher government spending, welfare reform, and industrial modernization. Within the limits of the parliamentary regime, the Van Zeeland government did mark a new departure. Devaluation of the Belgian franc, long resisted, was carried through in 1935, and a wave of social and economic reforms introduced (notably in response to a further substantial strike wave in the summer of 1936) that marked a substantial departure from the free-market economics that had long been the defining characteristic of Belgium. Van Zeeland was, however, something less than the agent of a renewal of Belgian politics. He re-emerged as the prime minister of a further tripartite government after the elections of May 1936, and won a personal electoral triumph over the young francophone extreme-right leader L´eon Degrelle in a by-election in Brussels in April 1937.
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Soon, however, Van Zeeland’s reputation was tainted by financial scandal, and he resigned in October 1937. Thereafter, the spirit of renewal in Belgian politics dissipated. Though Spaak became the first Socialist prime minister of Belgium from May 1938 to February 1939 his tripartite government achieved little; and, after Catholic and Liberal advances in the subsequent elections in April 1939, the Socialists left government to be replaced by a Catholic–Liberal coalition, led by the very traditional Catholic figure of Hubert Pierlot. The failure of the Van Zeeland experiment, and more generally of projects of political reform during the 1930s, reflected the way in which the economic crisis made collaboration between the major parties more difficult. None of the three political traditions was immune from the generalized sense of crisis. Within Socialist ranks, the tension ran not so much between left and right as between a predominantly younger generation of Socialist reformers, notably De Man and Spaak, and an old guard of parliamentary and trade union figures gathered around the dominant figure of Vandervelde. The cause of reform might have had some of the best slogans, but De Man’s advocacy of ideas of economic and social planning and Spaak’s more superficial rhetoric of ‘national socialism’ was at odds with the more conservative mentalities inherent to a Socialist movement principally concerned with the defence of its established bastions of power in local government and the trade unions. Vandervelde died in 1938, and was replaced in the largely honorific post of party president by De Man. By then, however, the cause of reform had largely disappeared within the Socialist Party and it was his frustration with parliamentary politics which encouraged De Man to declare in a manifesto published in July 1940 that the German Occupation, far from constituting a defeat, was a moment of liberation for the workers of Belgium. Nor could the Socialists claim any longer to be the sole party of the left. The Communist Party, founded in 1921, became a significant rival to the Socialists during the 1930s, winning 6.1 per cent of the vote in the elections of 1936. Though they remained weak within the important trade union movement, the Communists had begun to erode the long-standing Socialist hegemony in the industrial areas of Wallonia, winning, for example, 13.4 per cent of the vote in the province of Li`ege in 1936. The crisis within Catholic ranks was more profound. The division between a conservative parliamentary leadership rooted in mentalities forged during the long period of Catholic Party rule before 1914 and younger figures who had emerged from the Catholic social and spiritual organizations of the post-war years was exacerbated by the economic crisis. Catholic trade unionists criticized the party’s response to the Depression, while many students and intellectuals denounced the leaders’ neglect of Catholic principles in favour of governmental power. This discontent came to the fore in the early 1930s with the establishment of the predominantly francophone Rexist movement led by a charismatic young Catholic journalist L´eon Degrelle. Rex, which took its title from Catholic devotion to Christ the King (Christus Rex in Latin), was composed initially of students
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critical of what they perceived as the corruption and indolence of the leaders of the Catholic Party. When, however, Degrelle decided in the spring of 1936 to launch Rex as an independent political party in the forthcoming general elections, it became the rallying point for a much wider constituency of discontented voters. With its populist denunciations of all of the established parties and vague promises of a new Catholic-inspired social and political order, Rex won substantial support among Catholic middle-class and rural electors, notably in francophone Belgium. In the elections in May, the party achieved a remarkable 11.5 per cent of the national vote, and 29.1 per cent of the vote in the southern rural province of Luxembourg, overwhelmingly at the expense of the Catholic Party. Nor was Rex the only dissidence within Catholic ranks in 1936. The undercurrent of separatist nationalism that had been evident primarily among Flemish Catholics since the First World War acquired a new momentum with the foundation of the Vlaams Nationaal Verbond (Flemish National Union, VNV) in October 1933. The VNV won 13.6 per cent of the votes in Flanders in 1936 (7.1 per cent in Belgium as a whole), again largely at the expense of the Catholic Party, and established itself as the voice of a new generation of Flemish nationalists. Attracted by the models of authoritarian politics prevalent elsewhere in Europe, the VNV’s anti-Belgian sentiments merged with a wider hostility
Figure 5.1. Cardinal Van Roey, the primate of Belgium, attends a Catholic rally in Brussels in September 1936.
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to francophone values of liberalism and democracy. Its final goal of some form of ethnic homeland for the Flemish people was however less important to its electors than the way in which the VNV expressed a wider alienation, notably among a Catholic intelligentsia and lower middle class, from a Belgian state which appeared unresponsive to Flemish demands. For this vocal minority of the Flemish population, the interminable disputes during the 1920s and 1930s over issues such as Dutch-language rights had led them to the conviction that the Flemish could not be ‘at home’ within a Belgian state dominated by francophone interests. The strongly pro-Belgian Rexists and the Flemish nationalists of the VNV were in many respects polar opposites, but their common hostility to the parliamentary system marked a significant departure from the former political consensus. An alliance between the two parties in October 1936 was a short-lived failure, but reinforced the sense of a threat from the extreme right. It also provoked a response from the Catholic Party, the principal loser in the election of 1936, which adopted a new structure composed of largely self-contained Flemish and francophone party organizations. Assisted by the implosion of Rex which, after the failure of Degrelle in his by-election campaign against Van Zeeland in April 1937, rapidly drifted towards an imitation of Italian and German fascist models, this reorganization was sufficient to restabilize the Catholic pillar within Belgian politics. The Catholic Party recovered to win 32.7 per cent of the vote in the elections of 1939, largely at the expense of the Rexists who collapsed to 4.4 per cent. The VNV, with 15.1 per cent of the vote in Flanders, however, also won votes, ensuring that the new Catholic Party was obliged to compete with the VNV as the defender of Flemish cultural and linguistic rights. The political system in the Netherlands similarly faced the enormous challenge of responding to the disastrous social consequences of the economic crisis. The world economic crisis hit the Netherlands later but harder than most of its neighbouring states. In part, this was the monetary consequence of the success of the economy over the preceding period. Because the Dutch National Bank held considerable reserves of gold and foreign currency it was not initially possible for the Dutch currency to abandon the gold standard. Eventually, the Netherlands did do so in 1936 and began to recover its position in international markets. The problems of the Dutch economy were however exacerbated by the fact that the traditionally important trade with Germany was adversely affected by the monetary, political, and economic situation in that country. The crisis was, in this respect, fundamentally an imported one. It was made worse by the fact that the Dutch government was not able to develop a coherent and effective means of countering the consequences of it. The general policy followed by the consecutive governments headed by the Calvinist prime minister Hendrikus Colijn was the political translation of classic economic theory: in other words, to let the crisis run its course until a new balance could be found at a lower level, and economic growth could again begin.
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Figure 5.2. The helmsman: election poster of Hendrikus Colijn, the Dutch prime minister of the 1930s.
This approach was accompanied by an unmistakable moral and moralizing tone. This was particularly evident in the policy of holding to the gold standard for as long as was feasible. To follow other states in letting go of the guarantee provided by gold and devalue would in the eyes of Colijn and his advisers be ‘immoral’ and an indication of untrustworthiness which could have very harmful consequences for the reputation of the Netherlands. But the effect of this policy was not merely economic stagnation but also a social crisis, to which the dominant political class was only to a limited extent able to provide a response. There was pressure not only from internationally oriented producers to
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contemplate devaluation, but also from some within the parliament itself. Just as in Belgium, Keynesian economists in the Netherlands developed an alternative to the established economic policy, which they termed (like their Belgian counterparts) the Plan for Work. This was published in 1935, and was seized upon by the Socialists, who used it to develop a new political profile. Despite, or perhaps also because of, energetic propaganda and mass demonstrations in the style of the 1930s the Plan found little political echo in the pre-war years. It was only after the war that its proposers were able to bring their ideas of demand-led economic growth and anti-cyclical economic policy into practical operation. The most important political consequence of the orthodox liberal approach which the Colijn governments adopted towards the crisis was the way in which it resulted in material hardship and a mood of hopelessness as well as criticism of the established political regime. Behind such emotions lay a sense of despair over the pervasive immobilism: something simply must be done. This criticism was not primarily anti-capitalist in nature, though the membership of the Communist and revolutionary socialist parties did indeed grow. Among young Catholics, Socialists and Liberals there was an activist tendency who felt increasingly discontented with the way in which pillarization had institutionalized ideological divisions. They saw this as a root cause of political stagnation, but also as an expression of the lack of attention paid within Dutch society to the national interest. These denunciations of the structures of pillarization also merged with criticisms of the operation of the only recently achieved democratic regime. In their view, universal suffrage and proportional representation had created a class of professional politicians, who operated under the control of the pillarized elites. In response, they advocated alternative ideas of a more organic corporatist order, which were in part borrowed from Italian or Portuguese examples but which were also rooted in Catholic social teachings. At the same time, political groupings emerged which in the manner of Mussolini and Hitler presented themselves as an extreme-right alternative to the existing order. Some early and insignificant fascist movements had existed during the 1920s, but it was in 1931 that the most important Dutch representative of this tendency was established, the National Socialist Movement (NationaalSocialistische Beweging, NSB). It began as a middle-class and anti-parliamentary grouping which brought together various conservative and nationalist figures. The leader of the party, Anton Mussert, was a qualified engineer employed in the provincial water-board administration but who had discovered in 1925 a taste for politics as one of the leaders of the successful national campaign against the proposed ship-navigation treaty with Belgium. The NSB’s programme advocated recovery through faith in national virtues and action against the effects of the economic crisis, but its appeal lay primarily in its forceful advocacy of a strong state, its pervasive martial culture, and its hostility to the class struggle and the workers’ movement. Farmers, middle classes, former colonialists, and others who felt their social position to be threatened all saw in the NSB a new hope of recovery.
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In 1935, the movement recorded a spectacular victory in the provincial elections, winning almost 9 per cent of the vote. A good part of their votes derived from the electorates of earlier protest parties, but this victory radicalized the movement, in part because Mussert drew from it the conclusion that the Dutch people were waiting for an equivalent of Hitler’s Nazi party. When founding the party, Mussert adopted the programme of the NSDAP, while omitting its anti-Semitic paragraphs. Now the movement experienced an influx of radical anti-bourgeois members, who under the leadership of figures such as M. M. Rost van Tonningen came to define the image of the movement. In place of its former solidly reactionary character, the image projected by the movement became increasingly extreme-right and also anti-Semitic. As a consequence, the NSB lost a large part of its following among aggrieved elements of the middle classes. Moreover, Colijn was much more convincing in presenting himself as a ‘strong man’ than was Mussert, and he issued an administrative decree banning civil servants from being members of the NSB. A broadly based movement developed against the NSB: religious denominations refused the sacraments to party members; a Committee of Vigilance was created by intellectuals; and even a mass movement against fascism was established entitled Eenheid Door Democratie (Unity through Democracy). In these various ways a political cordon sanitaire was established, which forced Mussert back onto the margins of politics. Consequently, in the parliamentary elections of 1937, compared to the elections of 1935, his share of the electorate was halved. TOWA R D S WA R A N D G E R M A N O C C U PAT I O N Between 1937 and 1939 most Belgians and Dutch people became newly conscious of the threat of European war. Whether war could be averted was beyond the power of either state; but how any such war might be deflected away from each state’s borders was of much more immediate concern. Both Belgium and the Netherlands were neutral states. In the Netherlands, this was a continuation of the long-standing policy of moral aloofness and mercantile necessity. After the First World War, the Dutch Minister for Foreign Affairs Herman van Karnebeek gave priority to the re-establishment of the perception among the victorious Allied powers of the Netherlands as an independent and reliable partner in international affairs. Thus, the Netherlands joined the League of Nations, partly prompted by the need to counter Belgian designs to acquire Dutch territory, but also on the more principled basis that since the time of Grotius the small state of the Netherlands had sought protection in international law. Now, as Patricia Clavin discusses elsewhere in this volume, there appeared to be a realistic possibility of preventing conflicts through international arbitration and fostering world peace and disarmament. Van Karnebeek was at pains to inform the Allies about how a Rhine delta dominated by the Netherlands was essential
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for a balance of power on the European continent. In addition, the Netherlands campaigned that Germany, which was of inordinate importance for the Dutch economy, should be a full participant in the post-war European order. Thus, the Netherlands held firm to its policy of independence and freedom from any forms of alliance, even if this was based on a rather ambiguous self-image. On the one hand, it was realized in The Hague that the freedom of manœuvre for a small state such as the Netherlands was very limited; on the other hand, the Netherlands saw itself, on the basis of its colonial possessions, as the smallest of the major powers. Dutch diplomats portrayed neutrality as a position of elevated morality and at the same time as an insurance premium against foreign aggression. Thus, it proved impossible to establish effective collaboration with Belgium in the area of defence policy. Yet, with the stagnation of the League of Nations in the 1930s, the Netherlands sought a rapprochement with other small European states through the Oslo Convention of 1932. In Belgium, in contrast, the return to the pre-1914 policy of neutrality was the consequence of the decision taken in 1936 by the prime minister Van Zeeland and his foreign minister Spaak, strongly encouraged by King Leopold III, to abandon the secret military agreement signed with France in 1920. Henceforth, Belgium adopted what the King declared in a public speech in October 1936 to be a policy of independence from all alliances. Belgium would be an independent state, the territorial integrity of which France, Britain, and Germany all guaranteed to defend against external attack. Neutrality, or independence, could, however, encompass many different nuances. For some, especially those on the left, it was a diplomatic formula which, as the mobilization within Belgium for the Republican cause during the Spanish Civil War well indicated, did not imply a wider neutrality between democracy and fascism. For others, however, including Leopold III, neutrality implied a more wide-ranging withdrawal from any form of partisanship, tinged in some cases with sympathy for aspects of the Nazi regime. Politics in both states during the late 1930s was increasingly overshadowed by the threat of war. In the Netherlands, the end of an era came with the departure from office of the dominant figure of Prime Minister Colijn. His confessional–liberal coalition fell apart when the Catholics argued for the need for the government to create higher employment and introduce more socially oriented policies. Colijn, with an eye on the rising military expenditure, held firm to a balanced budget and to his policy of cautious adaptation. Thus at last the political opportunity arose for a new parliamentary coalition, in which for the first time the Socialists would be represented. Under the renewed threat of war, the Catholics argued that the conditions of ‘utmost necessity’ for Socialist participation in government did now prevail. The new government hardly, however, marked a radical new departure, as it still rested on a broad confessional–liberal majority. Moreover, the new prime minister D. J. de Geer was a 69 year old and rather weak-willed representative of the old political class.
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He stuck firm to familiar concepts of non-intervention in economic matters and neutrality in foreign affairs. On international and defence matters, a much more active role in preparation for war was played by Queen Wilhelmina. In the First World War, she had sought to demonstrate her solidarity with the soldiers and tried to give an active lead to defence policy. Now, she saw the opportunity to perform a similar role and used her inspection visits to the troops to try to raise their morale. She also played a highly active role in the replacement of the supreme commander of the armed forces in February 1940, because of her differences of attitude with the government in the field of national defence. In 1914, the Netherlands had used a rapid mobilization of its armed forces to underscore its readiness to defend its neutrality. In 1939, this policy was followed again: when news of the Molotov–Ribbentrop pact broke on 22 August, the first regulations were issued to prepare military mobilization. E. van Kleffens, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, gave his approval to a call for peace which the King of the Belgians issued in the names of the Dutch, Luxembourg, and Scandinavian monarchs. De Geer and a majority of the cabinet were still unconvinced of the need for effective mobilization but, under pressure from Queen Wilhelmina, took the decision on 24 August to allow the armed forces to take up their battle positions. Following a guarantee of Dutch neutrality by von Ribbentrop, Germany attacked Poland on 1 September and declared war on England and France on 3 September. Already on 28 August, the Dutch government had taken a further step and had decided on a general mobilization. From that moment a beginning was made to defence preparations, intended to demonstrate that the Netherlands would defend its neutrality. In the case of a German occupation, the government would abandon the eastern provinces in order to retreat into ‘Fortress Holland’, behind the traditional water barriers formed by the major rivers and flooded land. If possible, assistance would then be sought from allies willing to help the Dutch to defend themselves. This battle plan took no account of the possible use of paratroopers and other modern methods of war, and under the impact of the surprise attack of May 1940 led to rapid defeat. In Belgium, too, the outbreak of war in September 1939, led to an expansion of the Catholic–Liberal government of Pierlot to encompass the Socialists, though not significantly the Communists, the Rexists, or the VNV. National unity, therefore, had its limits, and signified more a defensive union of the three major parties and of the state authorities against enemies both internal and external. The underlying problems that had been evident within Belgian politics during the inter-war years remained unresolved. A variety of social, regional, and linguistic grievances had not been effectively addressed, contributing to a widespread sense that the parliamentary regime was unsuited to the needs of the new society that had emerged out of the First World War. Constitutional reforms intended to create a more hierarchical and effective governmental structure were widely discussed during the 1930s. Their enactment on anything more than matters of detail was, however, at odds with a political system which privileged compromise
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over change. Above all, the two major parties, the Catholics and the Socialists, had not found the means of making common cause. A Socialist–Catholic coalition had been since 1919 the most obvious political coalition in Belgium; but, twenty years later, it remained as far away as ever. The persistence of the division between Catholics and Socialists was in part the result of the ascendancy of conservative interests within the Catholic Party, as well as the reluctance of the Socialists to enter fully into the process of coalition government. At its heart, however, lay the basic fault-line in Belgian society between the Catholic and Socialist ‘pillars’. This division between clericals and ‘free-thinkers’, between the competing ideologies of social Catholicism and a Marxist-influenced socialism and increasingly during the inter-war years between the rival Catholic and Socialist trade union federations, effectively undermined any durable coalition between the two parties until the 1960s. In its absence, however, Belgium was governed either by a centre-right alliance of Catholics and Liberals or by short-lived tripartite coalitions of national unity. If political change was to come, it would therefore emerge not within parliament but outside. With the collapse of the Rexist challenge, the possibility of any domestic fascism was largely excluded. There remained, however, the monarchy. Leopold III had succeeded his father Albert I after the latter’s sudden death in February 1934. The new king, aged 32 when he became monarch, had many advantages, including a marriage to a popular Swedish princess, Astrid, and a young family. In 1935, however, the new queen was killed in a car accident while on holiday in Switzerland. Leopold, who had been driving at the time of the crash, was only slightly injured but the personal tragedy cast a long shadow over the King’s reign. Increasingly exasperated by the feuding of the parliamentary elite, Leopold was drawn towards ideas of political reform that would reinforce the power of the royal executive at the expense of the political parties. Such plans never came to fruition. But the King’s strained relations with the political elite, and his reliance on a small group of advisers with whom he conducted an increasingly personal foreign policy, created a tension which would turn into bitter conflict after the German invasion in 1940 when Leopold chose to remain in German-occupied Belgium while the government opted for exile in France and eventually London. C O N C LU S I O N S When the long-feared German invasion of the Low Countries finally occurred in the early hours of 10 May 1940, the Netherlands and Belgium were recognizably the same societies and political regimes as those which had existed twenty years earlier. Radical change had been avoided, or suppressed. The political frameworks, but also the societal structures which buttressed them, were largely unchanged. Viewed in the comparative perspective of the emergence of authoritarian and
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fascist regimes in many other European states during the 1920s and 1930s, the persistence of parliamentary rule in the Low Countries necessarily has something of the character of a victory of democracy. The institutional strength of the parliamentary regimes, and perhaps more profoundly their historical legitimacy, had saved Belgium and the Netherlands from the acute political or social crisis that alone would have provided the opportunity for a surge of extreme-right or extreme-left radicalism from below or a royal or military coup from above which could have displaced the existing political order. The victory of democracy over Degrelle’s Rexists, Mussert’s NSB, or the Flemish nationalists of the VNV was, however, something less than heroic. Asked about his experiences during the French Revolution, the French diplomat Talleyrand famously commented, ‘I survived’ (‘J’ai v´ecu’). Much the same might be said of the Dutch and Belgian political regimes. Their survival was more a product of their resilience than of the construction of a modern form of democracy. It offered, moreover, no guarantee for the future. The violent assault by the German forces on 10 May 1940 and their rapid and apparently definitive victory brought an abrupt end to parliamentary rule in both states. In its place a self-proclaimed ‘New Order’ was established, operating under Nazi military and civilian aegis, but staffed by many of the same extreme-right groups who had challenged parliamentary rule during the inter-war years. The hopes of the VNV that the arrival of the Germans would bring about an independent Flemish state or of Mussert that it would enable the NSB to create a National Socialist regime in the Netherlands proved to be a cruel illusion. The new German rulers proved unwilling to act as the ‘godparents’ of local fascist revolutions, preferring in the initial years of occupation to strike pragmatic deals with those civil servants, social institutions, and local elites willing to work with them. Both in Belgium and the Netherlands, the indigenous Nazi parties were employed as reservoirs of reliable personnel for the German cause. As apparent military victory changed during 1942 and 1943 into impending defeat, so the Nazi rulers were forced into dependence on those extreme-right collaborationists willing to commit unconditionally to the Nazi cause. For those Rexists, Flemish nationalists, and Dutch SS who made this choice, the final years of the war brought no tangible political reward. Instead, besieged by the hostility of their compatriots and tied ever more closely to the crumbling Nazi regime, after being severely purged and punished, they followed a course into personal and political oblivion. Liberation from German Occupation, which came suddenly in Belgium in September 1944 and much more slowly and painfully in the Netherlands during the subsequent winter and spring, brought the restoration of the pre-war regimes. This second victory of democracy over its opponents was perhaps more emphatic and more popular than had been the case before the war. However, as the subsequent evolution of the parliamentary regimes in the two states during the decades after 1945 well demonstrated, democratic government was not a fixed structure but a formula that had to be adapted continually to encompass
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new social and political demands. The Netherlands and Belgium, together with Luxembourg, became at the end of the 1940s, through the Benelux customs union, core members of the new structures of West European cooperation that dominated the post-1945 decades. It would be misleading to assume, however, that both states were placid epitomes of democratic success. Neither state had been during the 1920s and 1930s democratic in the most direct sense of the term: the majority will of the people did not prevail in any simple or obvious way. Indeed, in many respects the parliamentary regimes as they had developed in the two countries since the end of the nineteenth century were explicitly designed to prevent such majority rule. Proportional representation and the consequent absence of an overall majority for any one party in the Dutch and Belgian parliaments throughout the inter-war years meant that all governments were multi-party coalitions obliged to negotiate compromises between themselves but also with other groups (the trade unions, the churches, the industrial organizations, farmers leagues, and many others) who claimed a share of the decision-making process. These compromise polities were well suited to the complex divisions of class, language, and religion which characterized Dutch and Belgian society. Power was dispersed across a range of political, social, and institutional actors, making it almost impossible to define who was in power and who was not. Thus, for example, the Socialist parliamentary leaders might only have been intermittently members of the government in inter-war Belgium and only became so in 1939 in the Netherlands; but Socialist mayors, trade union leaders, and social insurance officials were in positions of power in both states throughout the inter-war years. Compromise polities can, however, easily become trapped within a pervasive immobility. In the Netherlands, the evolution of the regime, however hesitant, over the course of the 1920s and 1930s towards a more inclusive character set a political course that would be followed in the post-war era. During and after the German Occupation, reformist elites built strongly on a sense of collective failure in the face of economic crisis and dictatorship. Their alternative assumed the shape of a mixture of moderate socialism and corporatism implemented by ‘rooms–rood’ (Catholic–Socialist) coalition governments. In Belgium, in contrast, the changes that took place during the inter-war years, and more especially during the 1930s, had created more problems than they had solved. The fissures within the Catholic Party, the authoritarian aspirations of Leopold III and his entourage, and the more marked division between French- and Dutchspeaking Belgians were indications of the strains undermining the constitutional structure. The subsequent war exacerbated these problems, leading eventually to a wide-ranging crisis during the 1960s and 1970s which threatened the very survival of the Belgian state. This divergence between the Netherlands and Belgium had many causes and was not inevitable. It serves, however, to demonstrate that the differences of political regime in inter-war Europe were more complex than is suggested by a simple division between democracy and its enemies.
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General Kossmann, E. H., The Low Countries 1780–1940 (Oxford, 1978). Blom, J. C. H., and E. Lamberts (eds.), History of the Low Countries (New York and Oxford, 1999). Arblaster, P., A History of the Low Countries (London, 2005). Netherlands Lijphart, A., The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands (2nd edn., Berkeley, Calif., 1975). Zanden, J. van, The Economic History of the Netherlands, 1914–1995: A Small Open Economy in the ‘Long’ Twentieth Century (London, 1998). Leurdijk, J. H. (ed.), The Foreign Policy of the Netherlands (Alphen aan den Rijn, 1978). Bank, J., and M. van Buuren (eds.) Dutch Culture in a European Perspective, iii. The Age of Bourgeois Culture (Assen and Basingstoke, 2004). Wintle, M., An Economic and Social History of the Netherlands, 1800–1920: Demographic, Economic and Social Transition (Cambridge, 2000). Belgium Stengers, J., ‘Belgium’, in H. Rogger and E. Weber (eds.), The European Right: A Historical Profile (London, 1965), 128–67. Kieft, D. O., Belgium’s Return to Neutrality: An Essay in the Frustrations of Small-Power Diplomacy (Oxford, 1972). Gerard, E., ‘Religion, Class and Language: The Catholic Party in Belgium’, in W. Kaiser and H. Wohnout (eds.), Political Catholicism in Europe 1918–1945 (London and New York, 2004), 94–115. Conway, M., ‘Belgium’, in T. Buchanan and M. Conway (eds.), Political Catholicism in Europe (Oxford, 1996), 187–218. ‘The Extreme Right in Inter-War Francophone Belgium: Explanations of a Failure’, European History Quarterly, 26 (1996), 267–92.
6 France Joan Tumblety
I N T RO D U C T I O N The French historians who in the middle third of the twentieth century formed what has become known as the Annales school articulated the notion that time for human societies moves at different speeds. First there is the glacial slowness of the longue dur´ee, in which human interaction with the physical landscape changes so slowly as to be almost imperceptible; then the structural time in which patterns of human organization and agency can be better perceived; and finally the time of events, or l’histoire ´ev´enementielle, the latter described somewhat dismissively by historian Fernand Braudel as ‘surface disturbances’. A survey of the early years of the French twentieth century informed by a longer term perspective may thus not be quite so overwhelmed by the material and human destruction wrought by war. One might see instead the growth of suffrage rights, the establishment of systems of social welfare, the broader benefits of technological innovation, and perhaps even something of a resolution of the great ‘social question’ that so exercised nineteenth-century reformers. Even taking a shortterm view, in fact, one must recognize that—unlike many places elsewhere in Europe—parliamentary democracy in France survived the First World War and the inter-war fascist challenge intact and that the Third Republic, like the Second Empire before it, fell in 1940 only as a result of German invasion. Nonetheless, it is hardly surprising that historians have come to see the first half of the twentieth century in France through the gloomy lens of war—the anticipation of it, the experience of it, and the quest to avoid it. After all, the body count of French war dead between 1914 and 1918 was exceeded only by that of Serbia, and the memory of the conflict was to have considerable purchase for the next two decades. It is striking, too, how far a narrative of decline dominates much historical writing on the years that followed the armistice. The French are often held to have ‘won the war but lost the peace’ after 1918, to
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be a declining world power (albeit one with the second largest empire in the world in the 1930s as in 1914), to have fragmented politically and socially under the centrifugal forces of ideological extremism, and to have slid ineluctably and blindly towards the worst military defeat in their history in 1940. The four years of German occupation that followed, in which the French republic was replaced by the quasi-autonomous authoritarian Vichy regime, have since 1947 been widely characterized as ‘the dark years’. But to focus exclusively on such a narrative of war and decline occludes other ways of seeing the era, not least the significance of longer term political and socio-economic forces. It also renders invisible the extent of alternative preoccupations especially in terms of culture, leisure, and associative life. The first half of the twentieth century was a boom period for such pursuits as sport, tourism, and youth movements and Paris, that iconic modern city, was the home of surrealism, haute couture, the cinema, and such extravagant spectacles as the international exhibitions of 1900, 1925, and 1937 and the Olympic games of 1900 and 1924. This chapter will indeed argue that the experience and legacy of the First World War is crucial in understanding the passage of French history in the period between 1914 and 1945, at political, diplomatic, economic, social, and cultural levels, and will provide evidence of just how and where such memory of the war experience resonated. At the same time, it will seek to correct the ‘declinism’ of both inter-war contemporaries and later historians, arguing that the collapse of the Third Republic in 1940 was not inevitable even if the defeat of the French armies was overdetermined by earlier tactical and strategic military choices and mistakes. The ‘dark’ view of France 1914–1945 ought to be tempered by an awareness of the pluralism of the French past and by the recognition that this period witnessed, in addition to war and genocide, the resilience of a social democratic tradition which was reasserted vigorously in 1944–5, a growing consensus among political elites and public opinion on the right of women to citizenship, the expansion of leisure time and activities, and the emergence of mass political and popular culture. E X PE R I E N C I N G A N D R E M E M B E R I N G T H E G R E AT WA R According to the renowned but not universally accepted theory of historian Eugen Weber, peasants had been turned into Frenchmen by 1914 as a result of the introduction of compulsory schooling and the extension of military service in the 1880s. Indeed, illiteracy (if not patois) had been almost wiped out by the outbreak of the First World War and children all over the country had grown up seeing maps of France in their classrooms, complete with the territories of Alsace and Lorraine lost to the French after their 1871 defeat in the Franco-Prussian war. It was true to speak of the existence of a deeply entrenched popular patriotic
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Figure 6.1. ‘Paris—1924’: poster for the 1924 Olympic Games.
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republicanism in both urban and rural France. Yet France went to war in August 1914 not to recover its former national integrity but because of the great European alliance system. Public opinion polls suggest, in fact, that whatever the spirit of revanche (desire for revenge against Germany) still meant for those who could personally remember the 1871 defeat or who had come to understand its national importance, the populace met the declaration of war with reserve rather than jubilation. Still, for a time both high politics and popular culture was marked by a union sacr´ee (sacred union) in support of the war effort, which led to a war cabinet formed of such diverse political personalities as Marxist Jules Guesde and (later) conservative Catholic Denys Cochin. The French socialist party, the Section Franc¸aise de l’Internationale Ouvri`ere (SFIO), supported the war despite the traditional pacifism that had determined its opposition to the extension of military service the previous year. Feminists, too, supported the union sacr´ee. The largest suffragist organizations formally abandoned campaigns for women’s voting rights and urged women to join the Red Cross instead; some 70,000 women volunteered as nurses during the conflict. There were limits to the union sacr´ee, however, especially in the so-called crisis of morale throughout 1917 and 1918 which similarly afflicted other European nations. Its biggest challenge was an upsurge in worker radicalism fuelled by wage-eroding inflation which in May 1917 led some 300,000 people, many of them female seamstresses, to strike. Throughout spring 1917 tens of thousands of men mutinied in the French army to protest against the insanity of mass slaughter and in 1918 another wave of strikes broke out among metal-workers inspired by the Russian Revolution. The fact that most of the conflict took place on French soil effectively meant that for at least part of the war three-quarters of French communes (townships) in the ten departments behind the lines existed under German occupation, albeit without the armistice or cessation of military hostilities which characterized the occupation of 1940–4. German troops were billeted with French families; mayors in the occupied areas were often kept on by the Germans but dismissed for any sign of ‘patriotism’; requisition of food, livestock, and buildings was common (over 80 per cent of the 1914 harvest was seized by the German authorities); and civilians fled the affected areas creating a refugee crisis which anticipated that of the exode of May and June 1940. The aftermath of war left a legacy of denuded forestation, over-exploited soil, broken transport infrastructure, and demolished buildings in the industrial heartland of France: only in 1931 was the reconstruction mission deemed complete. By the end of 1914 there were as many soldiers dead as there were men in the ‘lost provinces’ of Alsace and Lorraine. In total, a full 63 per cent of the active male population had been mobilized by 1918 and of these men 1.325 million (10 per cent of the male workforce) died, with over a million others still receiving a war invalidity pension as late as 1930. But the transformative nature of the First World War—its significance as a ‘watershed’ in political, socio-economic, and cultural terms—ought not to
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be overstated. There were certainly limits to the impact of the war on the organization of French society at a structural level, not least where gender relations were concerned. Although women’s participation in the paid workforce during the First World War increased—there were almost three-quarters of a million women munitions workers by 1918—women were conceived by government, industry, and in many cases themselves, as temporary replacements for male workers. Indeed, the French government mobilized women in the war effort reluctantly and, unlike the British, only ever in a civilian capacity. Initially, socialist Prime Minister Ren´e Viviani had expected that women’s wartime economic role would remain agricultural—he appealed to them as ‘soldiers of the harvest’ in 1914—and it was only in mid-1916 that Minister of War Albert Thomas ordered industrialists to employ women for the manufacture of munitions. In fact, one must speak not so much of an increase in women’s paid employment during the war as a redistribution of it: women left domestic service or were put out of work in the early unemployment (1914–15) in the garment and textile trades and moved into munitions later in the war. Popular attitudes even to female volunteer nurses suggest an engrained and pervasive suspicion of women’s autonomy in the public domain of work. In any case, women’s participation in the paid workforce decreased in the inter-war period, despite a labour shortage in the 1920s which brought some two million immigrant workers to France, largely from Italy and Poland. Women workers continued to be over-represented among the least well-paid and least skilled segments of the active population, and the sexual division of labour kept them in less highly valued sectors. If women worked in new areas it was mostly as a function of structural changes in the French economy, especially the development of such new industries as electronics and food production and the continued expansion of the commercial sector. Other European women were being enfranchised in the wake of the First World War (often the result of regime change or the creation of entirely new nation-states that wanted to affirm democratic principles), but this was not the case in France. At the same time, it is important to point out that women’s exclusion from the political rights of citizenship until 1944 was not inevitable and, indeed, during the inter-war period, the French Chamber of Deputies voted in favour of women’s voting rights on no fewer than five occasions. There was cross-party support for some form of women’s suffrage rights by the end of the First World War. Ren´e Viviani made an impassioned plea for women’s enfranchisement in May 1919 which led the Chamber of Deputies to pass a Bill on the issue by 344 votes to 97; and in 1936 a similar Bill was introduced by arch-conservative Louis Marin and passed virtually unanimously. The persistent bulwark against women’s voting rights came not from the Chamber but from the Senate, and in particular from a party at the centre of the political spectrum—the Radicals—whose anti-clericalism, even in this period of reduced church–state tension after 1914, continued to provide a powerful rationale for withholding the
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rights of citizenship from a female sex deemed devoutly religious and therefore inherently anti-republican. In 1919 Radical senator Alexandre B´erard had urged the Senate not to entertain the novelty of women’s vote, warning among many other things that the ‘Catholic mentality’ of French women ‘would lead to clerical reaction’. It was only in the context of transformed political structures in France at the moment of Liberation in 1944 that a debate on women’s integral voting rights resulted in their enfranchisement. Continuities outweigh changes in the economic sphere too. On a fundamental level, France remained a country built on the labours of a landholding peasantry and petits commerc¸ants (shopkeepers), despite the existence of economic superpowers such as Renault and Michelin. For the entire inter-war period, a full third of the French workforce was engaged in agricultural labour, although the lines between the agrarian and the industrial could be blurred as much small-scale industrie took place in rural areas. Although the urban population overtook the rural by 1931 (compared to 1871 in Britain), it was only in the 1950s that rural France gave way definitively to an urban and industrial economic base. Yet the First World War did alter the face of the French economy at least for a time (it also directly contributed to the demise of the centuries-long French tradition of wet nursing). The organization of the munitions industry during the conflict was both more intensive and more regulated than was the norm for pre-war French industry, and it was not unusual for economic production to follow suit in the reconstructed industries of the former war zones. The production of sugar beet and livestock farming in northern France were rebuilt after 1919 along much more intensive lines, with small firms giving way to larger corporations. This ‘modern’ model featuring mechanization and economies of scale was in fact limited in its application until the 1940s and 1950s, but the war nonetheless helped to inspire new visions of economic management. In the 1920s and 1930s, a group of individuals with disparate political affiliations and ´ often graduates of the elite training college, the Ecole Polytechnique, embraced Taylorist models of rationalized production inspired by the United States of America. Ernest Mercier, an engineer and leading businessman in the field of electricity, established a pressure group called Redressement Franc¸ais in 1926 to further such ideas, and Jean Monnet, later an architect of European economic planning and integration, evangelized about the productive merits of a managed economy. Despite winning the attention of several politicians in this period (Mercier and Monnet both served the government in its organization of the economy during the First World War), these initiatives failed to take root. The idea that the French economy remained ‘backward’ in the twentieth century has been widespread, in part thanks to the immensely influential thesis put forward by Stanley Hoffmann in the 1960s that Third Republican France was a ‘stalemate society’ characterized by a confluence of social, political, and economic inertia in which a disproportionately large smallholding peasantry set a national tone of resistance to change. It has, however, recently come
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under attack by revisionist historians who point to the relative merits of French economic organization in the modern era. It is true that the economically liberal Third Republic favoured protectionist measures above those that might have stimulated economic growth and was ‘Malthusian’ in the sense that it showed a reluctance to embrace a model of mass production and mass consumption. Mass-produced goods in France did indeed take hold more slowly than in Britain or the USA, although in the 1930s the low-cost variant of the department store was successful in attracting cash-strapped Depression-era shoppers. Such stores remained politically sensitive, however, and both artisans and small shopkeepers exerted considerable lobbying pressure on the Chamber of Deputies in the mid1930s to restrict their growth, with some success. At the same time, before 1914 French agricultural growth rates were actually above the European average despite the small scale of production; industrial production in metals and electrics was comparatively respectable; France was the biggest exporter of cars in the world; and French artisan-centred industrial production allowed the economy to remain buoyant where the manufacture and export of luxury goods was concerned. Even during the 1930s Depression French export of its ‘quality goods’ (for example, in the fields of gastronomy and high fashion) remained buoyant. The business of managing the economy in the 1930s proved particularly fraught, and it became almost impossible for governments to manœuvre around the sensitivities of the electorate. Devaluation of the franc in 1926 ushered in a short period of economic growth as investment in French industry increased: some commentators thought as a result that the French might escape the global Depression of the early 1930s. Instead, depression simply hit the French economy later (the high point of unemployment was 1935) and its crisis was arguably deeper and more protracted. French economic production did not surpass 1929 levels until after the Second World War. The Depression affected rural and agricultural areas as well as urban and industrial ones: agricultural prices halved in the first half of the 1930s and agricultural wages fell faster than the wages of industrial workers. A further devaluation of the franc, which may have helped to improve unemployment levels as it did in Belgium in 1935, was associated by the early 1930s with inflation and thus avoided by successive governments until the Popular Front grudgingly accepted it in 1936. The war may not have transformed the landscape of France at a deep structural level, then, but nonetheless contemporaries in the 1920s and 1930s often came to see political and social challenges through its refractive lens. Socialist deputy L´eon Blum opined in 1934 that the post-1918 rupture between generations was ‘one of the most important psychological and social phenomena of our times’ and communist-turned-fascist Jacques Doriot attempted to rally a whole generation of young men who had experienced the childhood privations—scarce meat and ‘lait falsifi´e’ (adulterated milk)—of the First World War. In many ways, this assertion of the significance of the war developed an agency of its own: the figures of the war dead and the war living were subsequently mobilized rhetorically across the
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entire inter-war period by a range of individuals and groups. Pacifist intellectual and wounded First World War veteran, Jean Giraudoux, was critical of the degree to which inter-war politicians were haunted by the weight of this ghost army. ‘If the war dead were asking for sports grounds, I dare say that the Paris municipal councillors would hasten to provide them’, he complained in 1928. Indeed, a veritable cult of the poilu (French infantry soldier) was established in the 1920s as part of an extensive and deeply felt memorial culture. One-quarter of French families had a casualty, and 42 per cent of French men after 1918 were war veterans, half of whom belonged to veterans’ societies that collectively (although more in rural than urban areas) grouped some 25 per cent of the electorate. Municipalities received state subsidies to oversee the process of constructing monuments to the war dead, which began as soon as the war had ended. By 1930, there were some 34,000 such memorials in France, practically one in every village. From 1919—and cemented in law after 1922—the anniversary of the armistice of 11 November 1918 became a national holiday and the occasion for ceremonies, usually led by veterans’ groups, held all over the country. As the work of Antoine Prost has shown, however, this commemoration of the war dead, although patriotic and resolutely republican, tended to mourn rather than to glorify the loss of a generation of men and demonstrates more than anything else how deeply pacifist sentiment was experienced across France in this period. The scale of human loss in the First World War certainly heightened anxieties about the low French birth rate. From being the most populous country in Europe outside Russia in the late eighteenth century, France’s rate of population growth had ever since declined and the population explosion of the nineteenth century experienced in other European countries such as Britain, Germany, and Sweden was simply not felt in France. After defeat in the Franco-Prussian War, military and political elites increasingly drew attention to the imagined consequences of such demographic stagnation for the strength of the nation. It was no comfort to contemporaries that France might be seen as a pioneer for being the first nation to make the so-called demographic transition to a pattern of low births and low mortality. Instead, the low birth rate was universally viewed as a problem and, despite the efforts of a few vocal feminists such as Nelly Roussel, it was practically unheard of to adopt publicly a neo-Malthusian position in favour of birth control. The most tangible early result of this crisis of d´enatalit´e was a legislative programme against contraception and abortion. The latter (illegal since 1810) was prosecuted much more forcefully in the 1920s and 1930s than in previous decades and the maximum penalty increased to five years in prison. Anxieties over d´enatalit´e certainly strengthened the political voice of the natalist lobby, whose most prominent member was the Alliance Nationale pour l’accroissement de la population (National Alliance for Increasing the Population), created in 1896 amid reports that death rates had overtaken birth rates. It experienced a rise in membership in the early 1920s of some 700 per cent and became a crucial player in the formulation of government policy on
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Figure 6.2. The battle of births between the Rome–Berlin Axis and the Paris–London Axis: number of births in 1937.
the family. By the mid-1930s, the widely disseminated propaganda material of the Alliance Nationale depicted depopulation as the principal threat facing France—the diminishing size of the cohort of young men eligible for military service in any given year was well publicized—and the organization held both women and men responsible for it. The social vision of the organization was a conservative paean to the traditional family model and prescribed reproductive—rather than productive—work for married women. In 1932, legislation compelled certain categories of employer (extended in 1938) to pay family allowances to workers with children, with benefits being paid directly to mothers. In fact, this was a formalization of an existing trend that was not entirely motivated by natalist concerns. Before 1932, half of industrial workers and a quarter of commercial workers were already covered by a similar scheme, reflecting the traditional preference of French employers to contribute to the upkeep of their workers’ families rather than to provide higher wages across the board. Indeed, the development of family welfare in the first half of the twentieth century as a whole owed much to the campaigns of such socially conservative actors as natalists, industrialists, and Catholic women’s groups. The latter, almost all of which refused the label ‘feminist’, mobilized far more French women than any other sector. Almost without exception, Catholic women’s groups emphasized women’s duties—specifically as mothers—over their rights. Leading politicians, especially social Catholics such as Jean Lerolle, who introduced the 1931 Bill on family allowances, or Georges Pernot, who
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presided over the Daladier-appointed committee on the family in 1938, were often members both of Catholic women’s groups and the Alliance Nationale, testimony to the political influence of such lobbying organizations. The family code of 1938–9 was the clearest inter-war product of this influence: it extended tax advantages to workers with children, increased family allowances (introducing a bonus for couples producing a child within the first two years of marriage), and raised the maximum penalty for abortion to ten years’ imprisonment. Such measures prefigured the more repressive family policy of the Vichy regime, which on the one hand extended family benefits but on the other introduced the death penalty for abortionists. The Great War also witnessed the dissipation of anti-clericalism among French elites. The 1904 ban on clerical teachers in schools was in effect lifted during the 1914–18 conflict and the state chose not to enforce de-clericalization in the newly reincorporated provinces of Alsace and Lorraine after 1918. Such a weakening of anti-clerical attitudes was felt profoundly at the popular level too: in the circumstances of crisis and loss engendered by the war, attendance at Mass soared temporarily and, as the commemoration of the war dead in the inter-war period shows, French public authorities borrowed the language of mourning (the laying of wreaths, a minute of silence, etc.) from Catholic liturgy and harnessed it to a quite republican schema of commemoration. It was not unusual to find parish priests on the municipal committees established to oversee the erection of local war memorials, and local clergy often played key roles in memorial services in strongly Catholic areas. Such features are hardly surprising in a country where more than 90 per cent of the population were baptized Catholics (fewer than a million were Calvinist or Lutheran Protestants and around 300,000 were Jewish), but were strangely at odds with the secular face of a regime that would not have countenanced such confluence of clerical and secular expressions a mere decade before. In addition, the 1914–18 conflict helped to forge popular imperialism. By 1914, the French Empire, much of which had been acquired in the previous generation, was second only to the British in terms of its geographical and demographic scope—three million square miles and fifty million people outside the metropole. It was only in the 1890s that colonialism had been able to achieve the kind of political consensus and popular appeal that had been the case in Britain for decades. In the belle ´epoque, a combination of the widely publicized falling birth rate and growing concerns about German military rivalry meant that colonial troops came to be seen as a convenient way to bolster French national defences. By all accounts the contribution of 600,000 colonial troops to the war effort was viewed favourably by the French public. The inter-war period witnessed a cultural fascination with the ‘exotic’. Images of colonial peoples appeared routinely in this period, often on advertising billboards and consumer products. An increasing number of French films had colonial themes and featured among the most popular of the time, for example, Jacques Feyder’s L’Atlantide
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(1921/1932) and the Jean Gabin star vehicle P´ep´e le Moko (1937). The 1931 Colonial Exposition held in the Bois de Vincennes east of Paris recorded eight million patrons over its duration from May to November and consisted of a series of displays celebrating the territories and colonies in north and west Africa, the Caribbean, south-east Asia, and the Indian and Pacific oceans, acknowledging their importance for the entity known as ‘greater France’. The empire was widely viewed as an important trading partner, a military bloc of significance and the chance for France to spread its republican ‘civilizing mission’ to the rest of the world. In the late 1930s, the political and popular purchase of empire grew even stronger, not least because its existence meant that France could theoretically counter German military strength with a combined population of around 100,000,000 people. Colonial troops were conspicuously on display during the Bastille Day parade in 1939, which also celebrated the 150th anniversary of the French Revolution, and premier Edouard Daladier, who had visited North Africa earlier in the year, told the assembled crowds that these armies were ‘the guardian of your liberties’. Even the French communist party changed its tune in this period. Whereas the Parti Communiste Franc¸ais (PCF) from its inception had put forward an anti-capitalist critique of imperialism, supporting anti-French colonial rebels in North Africa in the mid-1920s and opposing the 1931 colonial exhibition, the military threat to France posed by Germany at the end of the decade led the party to adopt the SFIO left humanist line that France had a duty to export the values—if not the rights—of the Revolution to the developing nations of its empire. Indeed, the full legal and political rights of citizenship were withheld from the vast majority of colonized peoples who lived under the French Empire. Instead native populations were subjected to the unequal code of the indig´enat with its many penalties, including disproportionate taxation and forced labour. Even in Algeria, the North African territory which had been deemed part of metropolitan France since the 1860s, citizenship was reserved for a tiny proportion of the indigenous inhabitants who were in fact obliged to abandon much of their cultural specificity—in particular the Islamic religion—before qualifying as ‘assimilated’ enough for such rights. That the Blum–Violette Bill of 1936 promised to extend the rights of citizenship in Algeria only to some 50,000 Muslims (from a population of around nine million) is a measure of the entrenchment of imperialist thinking in France even on the left. The benefits of ‘Greater France’ were thus clearly reserved for those living within the hexagon. Anger generated by the double-think implicit in the French ideology of empire and by the consistent failure of French governments to take seriously the claims of nationalists in the overseas territories, helped to mobilize support for independence across an empire which contributed some 500,000 troops to defend France between 1940 and 1945.
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T H E ‘ G E R M A N P RO B L E M ’ A N D P O L I T I C A L P O L A R I Z AT I O N The war demonstrated the bite of the ‘German problem’ and determined the course of French defensive and foreign policy strategies for the next two decades. Hopes that the Versailles conference would create a permanent buffer state in the Rhineland were dashed: permanent demilitarization did not go far enough to appease French political elites that the danger posed by Germany was neutralized. When it became clear that Germany was incapable of paying the agreed reparations to France, the Poincar´e government took the ultimately counter-productive measure in January 1923 of occupying the industrial Ruhr to seize payment in kind. In the realm of foreign policy, successive French governments set about securing alliances with Central European states so that France would not be isolated in case of a German attack. Although this alliance system remained largely in place until the pressures leading up to the Munich crisis of 1938 eroded it, the late 1920s were marked by a more overt quest to seek reconciliation with Germany. After the Locarno Treaty of 1925 formalized German acceptance of the post-1918 borders with France, rapprochement became official policy. Its principal architect was Aristide Briand (foreign minister between 1925 and 1932) who went on to engineer the Kellogg–Briand Pact in 1928 in which over a dozen European nations including France and Germany promised never again to go to war. This was not so much pacifism as war avoidance and it was deemed to make gut sense across the political spectrum. In keeping with this emphasis on defensive measures, the French after 1929 began construction of the frontier fortifications that were designed to protect the north-east from another German invasion—the ‘Maginot line’, named after the wounded war veteran and defence minister from the Lorraine, Andr´e Maginot. In tandem, the length of military service and the number of infantry divisions were reduced. In 1936, when the Belgians declared neutrality, the fortifications were extended to guard the Franco-Belgian frontier with a view to reaching as far as the English Channel. It is not unfair to speak of a ‘Maginot mentality’ borne of a visceral fear of war that went along with the construction of the material defences along the French border. Much has been made by historians of the chronic governmental instability of the inter-war period, with its forty-four premierships, as though the quick succession of governments explained the Republic’s eventual fall in 1940. In fact, there had been sixty governments in the period between 1870 and 1914 and, as after 1918, such change of government belied a continuity of political elites as the same figures reappeared time and again. The principal political parties, too, survived the war—the socialist SFIO which had been the second
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largest party in the Chamber of Deputies in 1914; the anti-clerical Radicals, who continued their political domination of inter-war cabinets; the moderate republican centre-right party, the Alliance D´emocratique; and the more clerical and conservative F´ed´eration R´epublicaine. Indeed, it ought to be remembered that democracy in France survived the turmoil of the Great War as well as the political and economic crises that followed it, despite the fact that the inter-war political landscape was marked by the emergence of both communist and fascist challenges to republican democracy. Communism was formalized in France at the 1920 annual congress of the socialist SFIO when a vote to join the newly formed Third International based in Moscow split the party, a majority opting for a separate organization committed to following orders from Moscow and based on the principles of revolutionary war. The early success of the communist impulse in conjunction with the recent memory of mass strikes and the success of the left at the 1924 elections prompted a response on the right. In the mid-1920s ostensibly ‘fascist’ movements, modelled in some way on Mussolini’s Fascists in Italy, made an impact in the streets and even in the Chamber of Deputies. These groups (such as the ‘blue shirts’ of Pierre Taittinger’s Jeunesses Patriotes and Georges Valois’s Faisceau) were not royalist like the Dreyfus-era Action Franc¸aise and did more to appeal specifically to workers in an attempt to make a mass movement. In general, the stabilization of the franc and economic recovery in the late 1920s temporarily took the steam out of such movements. In the early 1930s, the onset of Depression, heightened xenophobia connected to a rise in immigration, and the election in 1932 of a left-leaning majority in the Chamber of Deputies supported a new wave of activity on the radical right. On the night of 6 February 1934, around 40,000 rightist demonstrators supported by the ‘fascist’ and royalist leagues protested alleged corruption in the government. As many as 10,000 individuals clashed with police in the Place de la Concorde opposite the French parliament, calling for the government to resign. Some 1,500 people were injured—fifteen were killed—in the bloodiest civil conflict in France since the Paris Commune of 1871. Yet the night of 6 February 1934 did not constitute a revolutionary moment, and there had been no intention on the part of the demonstrators to bring down the regime. Still, the potential of the rightists to force such a violent display prompted the PCF to call for general strike action and eventually to support an anti-fascist alliance. The result of this leftist rapprochement was the Popular Front alliance—a coalition of Radicals, socialists, and communists—that won the spring 1936 elections. Its first government in particular, headed by socialist L´eon Blum, initiated a raft of redistributive policies to benefit the working classes. In its first twelve weeks in office, the Popular Front enacted some two dozen legislative reforms including general wage increases, the forty-hour week, the introduction of fifteen days of paid leave per year for all employees, the nationalization of the
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arms industry, a raising of the school-leaving age to 14, and dissolution of the paramilitary ‘fascist’ leagues. Despite this success on the left, the threat from the radical right in France actually increased over the next two years. Under war veteran Colonel Franc¸ois de la Rocque, the Parti Social Franc¸ais (formerly Croix de Feu) had a million members by 1937 and drew cross-class support across urban and rural France. By 1939, it could count 3,000 mayors, 1,000 municipal councillors, and twelve deputies among its followers. The movement desired a spiritual revolution to counter ‘flabby’ republican democracy, was bitterly anti-Marxist, and, by 1938, espoused anti-Semitism. Historians remain divided as to whether the Croix de Feu/PSF was ever fascist: some like Ren´e R´emond and Zeev Sternhell have preferred to see it as an exponent of conservative authoritarianism. There is, however, general acceptance of the fascist credentials of the Parti Populaire Franc¸ais (PPF), founded in 1936 by former communist Jacques Doriot one month after the legislative elections that saw the victory of the Popular Front. When Doriot’s movement reached its peak (with 100,000 members) in 1938, shortly before the fall of the last Popular Front government deflated its appeal for traditional conservatives, it was overtly anti-Semitic, opposed to immigration, and in favour of stripping French citizenship from the recently naturalized. By 1941, Doriot, the former PCF street fighter, was to play a key role in recruiting for the collaborationist French Anti-Bolshevik Legion and fought in German uniform on the Eastern Front. More significantly, Doriot’s PPF had some success throughout 1937 in forging links with the F´ed´eration R´epublicaine in an attempt to create a ‘liberty front’ that could counter the recent electoral success of the left. Doriot elicited the support of Pierre Taittinger as well as the FR’s Louis Marin and Philippe Henriot in a show of unity against communism. Hundreds of thousands of French men and women looked seriously to the kind of options provided by the radical right in this period. Yet neither the Croix de Feu nor the PPF ever came close to seizing power by coup d’´etat or by any other means, and such agrarian fascists as Henri Dorg`eres’s ‘green shirts’ who were ready in 1937 to put down agricultural strikes in the north of France found that the regular police needed no help to restore order. According to Robert Paxton, fascism failed in both urban and rural France because conservatives were not frightened enough to use it to protect their interests. French democracy thus triumphed over the challenges posed by both fascism and communism in this period. At the same time, the purchase of both anti-fascism and anti-communism helped to shape French responses to the ‘German problem’. By the mid-1930s, the traditional humanist pacifism of the socialist left had been eroded by the advent of Nazism. The French communists, keen in the early days to incite revolutionary war, had no real ideological objections to armed conflict in the first place, and the rise of fascism at home and abroad meant that the PCF—and some socialists—wanted to ‘fight the good fight’ against right-wing extremism,
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witnessed in their push for French intervention in the Spanish Civil War after 1936 and in their rejection of the Munich accords in September 1938. Concomitantly, the strength of French communism elicited in the conservative and radical right a responding fear of internal subversion. The greater enemy for many conservatives became the PCF and the Third International rather than the traditional German foe, Nazi or otherwise. A minority went as far as to subscribe to the view ‘better Hitler than Blum’. At the time of the Munich crisis, the French republican right was almost universally lined up against the so-called ‘belliciste’ (war-mongering) members of the French parliament who would prefer a war against fascism to the containment of the communist threat at home. Of course, this pro-Munich stance was informed by a number of factors, such as a belief in French military inferiority and the nature of Anglo-French diplomatic relations, but it also shows how an ideological war had overtaken a geo-political one for some sectors of French political opinion. Ironically, in these altered circumstances the humanist Briandism of the 1920s could even provide a rationale for the ideological collaboration with the Nazis that developed after 1940. At the very least, the former helped to provide a language to justify the latter, not least for such inter-war proponents of Franco-German reconciliation as intellectuals Jean Luchaire and Fernand de Brinon, both of whom rose to prominence in fascist-collaborationist circles under the occupation. A S S O C I AT I V E L I F E A N D L E I S U R E Associative life and leisure activities, too, thrived in France in the first half of the twentieth century despite the fragile political and economic climate. Their development was underpinned by a combination of factors—much improved levels of literacy since the late nineteenth century; increased leisure time due to labour laws introduced after the fin de si`ecle which progressively shortened the working day; and the development of new technologies of transmission (radio and film) and movement (bicycles, motor cars, and then aeroplanes). The number of radios increased from 3.2 million in 1936 to 4.7 million by the end of 1939; cinema receipts rose by 45 per cent from 1934 to 1938. Municipal libraries formed an ingrained site of popular culture by the First World War, and during the conflict itself the library became something of a haven, reflected in its increased use. A plethora of social, cultural, and sports clubs developed during the inter-war period: societies for swimming, basketball, and ping-pong among a host of others proliferated in number and size. After all, the working day had been reduced to eight hours in 1919, leaving workers with more time to spend on leisure activities. Groups such as the Soci´et´e sportive des Grands Magasins du ‘Printemps’ testify to the importance of the workplace itself in supporting sociability among staff. There was already a tradition of employers’ organizations for workers, designed
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with social control as much as philanthropy in mind. A 1930 survey in the metals industry found that around a quarter of employers in that sector already had full-blown worker leisure organizations, almost half of which involved either gardening or sport, with the rest comprising a mixture of musical societies, theatre groups, libraries, cinemas, literary circles, and lecture classes. Employers hoped that such societies would foster discipline and ‘respectable’ values among the workforce, lure workers away from alcohol and cabaret, and encourage a politically neutral use of leisure time. On the left it was feared that the involvement of workers in mainstream or employer’s sport and leisure organizations would be an instrument of their depoliticization, making workers buy into a consumerist culture that served the interests of bourgeois capitalism. The socialist newspaper Le Populaire and the communist organ L’Humanit´e both staged a plethora of sports competitions in the 1930s, from football to swimming, that were designed as an alternative to the undoubtedly more successful mainstream options. To build working-class solidarity and consciousness, both socialist and communist parties established their own sports and cultural associations, which merged after the rapprochement between these two parties in the mid-1930s. Such overtly politicized attempts to mobilize the masses ultimately paled besides the onslaught of commercialized spectator sport which, despite professing ‘political neutrality’, in the main of course carried its own values of ‘fair play’, hegemonic masculinity, and the market. Popular sport took off in the 1920s and 1930s in terms of both mass participation and spectatorship, facilitated by a growing sports press and the advent of radio broadcasting of sports matches. Sports stars, especially in the fields of cycling (Henri P´elissier), boxing (Marcel Cerdan), and tennis (Suzanne Lenglen and Jean Borotra), became media celebrities, fˆeted by a popular press increasingly attuned to the public’s appetite for sporting and cultural spectacles. Aside from the Olympics, the biggest sporting spectacle in France in the first half of the twentieth century was the great cycle race known as the Tour de France, founded in 1903, partly out of the commercial desire to sell newspapers, but which became an event that snaked its way through the heart of both rural and urban France for the rest of the century. After 1930, commercial sponsors followed the column of riders and distributed free samples of their goods to the public. Henri Nogu`eres recalls how the ‘publicity caravan’ of the Tour galvanized the attention of French men, women, and children in the towns and villages on the race’s itinerary. The sports newspaper that invented the Tour de France, L’Auto, sold almost as many copies as the biggest national dailies during this annual cycling event. This was also the era of the—somewhat sectarian—youth movement. From the mid-1920s, the Catholic Church specifically attempted to Christianize the ‘red belt’ of Paris and the industrial north by recruiting to its male and female youth organization, the Jeunesse Ouvri`ere Chr´etienne (JOC). It faced stiff opposition. The membership of the Jeunesses Communistes soared from 3,500 in 1933 to
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288,000 in December 1936, no doubt riding on the crest of popular optimism in the wake of the Popular Front victory. Among the scouts, however, it was the Catholic movement that undoubtedly had the greatest appeal: by 1939 it mobilized 100,000 members, while the secular, Jewish, and Protestant scouts numbered only some 25,000 between them. Alongside this youth movement developed colonies de vacances (holiday camps), which provided holiday accommodation and entertainment for children all over France. At the beginning of the century, such ventures tended to be organized under Catholic auspices (sending a total of 26,000 children away to the countryside every year) but in the inter-war period there was an explosion of secular ones, often flavoured with the political persuasion of the organizers. For example, each summer in the 1930s in the Paris suburb of Ivry-sur-Seine several hundred poor children benefited from free summer vacations to the Atlantic coast provided by the communist municipality. The camps themselves were modelled on a utopian left-wing society, instilling in the children a democratic and anti-bourgeois consciousness. At the other end of the political spectrum, the Croix de Feu staged its own children’s holiday camps, and the PPF for its part envisaged the creation of extensive sport and leisure organizations to rival the communist and socialist alternatives, among them youth hostels, scouts, colonies de vacances, walking associations, ping-pong, rugby, and theatre groups. In 1938, Doriot claimed that the PPF youth wing had 35,000 members. The Popular Front governments themselves sought to encourage mass participation in popular sport and physical education for reasons of ‘hygiene’—the latter in particular resonated with the era’s fixation on the falling birth rate—and to open up previously elite sporting and cultural activities like skiing, aviation, and tourism to a working-class audience. The introduction of these novelties was the responsibility of popular and athletic socialist deputy L´eo Lagrange, who was appointed under-secretary for sport and leisure in June 1936. Just in time for the August summer holidays of 1936, Lagrange introduced 40 per cent reductions on train fares for holidaying workers and their families—the so-called ‘Lagrange ticket’—and over 600,000 workers benefited from the initiative that summer. The conservative newspaper Le Figaro consequently raised fears of the ‘encanaillement’ of the Cˆote d’Azur: the measure had in their view let the riff-raff in. Lagrange also introduced an optional sports certificate in primary schools (400,000 children passed it in 1937) and the Ministry of Education set about introducing compulsory physical education in schools and training for physical education teachers. Indeed, the Popular Front is probably remembered as much for its pioneering efforts in the popularization of exercise as it is for the introduction of the forty-hour week and paid holidays. One relatively overlooked aspect of cultural life in the first half of the twentieth century is tourism. Only from the late 1940s did French participation in tourism—domestic and foreign—assume the proportions of a mass and crossclass phenomenon, although the French have continued to take holidays—and to
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live—abroad less often than their European neighbours. It is estimated that in the mid-1930s no more than 10 per cent of French people went on holiday. Yet that decade saw the purchase of tourism in France both in terms of the introduction of government legislation that underpinned it and the growth of a consumer culture around travel. Such initiatives helped to attract tens of thousands of foreign visitors to the World’s Fair in 1937, including some 20,000 Romanians and about as many Swedes. In fact, tourism flourished in 1937 and 1938, with some 900,000 foreigners travelling to France in each of those years, a figure more than double that for 1936. The increase was experienced in the provinces as well as in Paris and took place, as L’Œuvre noted, ‘despite international events’. For the French, battlefield tourism was established as early as summer 1919, when one could take a package day excursion from Paris to Arras and Lens by train. Guidebooks stressed that such visits ought to be approached as pilgrimages, and indeed many early visitors were bereaved relatives of dead soldiers. The French state permitted one free rail trip per year to the site of a soldier’s grave for his widow, parents, and children. In 1919, too, the Tour de France passed through the recent war zone and the sports press seized the opportunity to communicate a commemorative reverence to its readers. The Popular Front specifically promoted domestic tourism in France as part of its leisure policies. Camping was promoted as a ‘hygienic’ form of healthy relaxation and, in addition, as many as 150 youth hostels were created in 1936 alone. The examples in this section have collectively illustrated the common ground among quite opposed political families in addressing issues around sport and leisure. They also demonstrate the awareness in every quarter of the politically mobilizing potential of mass culture. T H E D E B AC L E O F 1 9 4 0 A N D V I C H Y F R A N C E Mythologies of the military defeat in June 1940—when French forces succumbed to the onslaught of a German blitzkrieg invasion after a mere six weeks of fighting—grew up almost from the start. It was the view of numerous independent commentators with a range of political loyalties that this spectacular collapse was inevitable, that a fifth column had undermined France from within, that French soldiers had not fought as bravely in 1940 as in 1914, and that French society itself had become fundamentally rotten and ‘decadent’ in the 1930s amid the politico-economic scandals and crisis of that decade. The Vichy regime’s ill-conceived and subsequently abandoned attempt to try Third Republican political leaders such as L´eon Blum, Guy La Chambre, Edouard Daladier, and Paul Reynaud for losing the war against Germany—the so-called Riom trials—emphasized this last point in particular. Later historians have been too ready to accept such explanations of the defeat and to see it as a political and moral failure rather than a military one. Even the elegant and largely persuasive account of the debacle, Strange Defeat, penned in 1940 by the medieval historian
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and later resistance martyr Marc Bloch, suffers somewhat from the mistake of reading French unpreparedness for the battle retrospectively from the certainty of the collapse. Historian Julian Jackson has recently done much to rescue the history of the defeat from the mythology surrounding it. The French airforce was indeed inadequate and the army chaotically organized and under-equipped, splitting up units counter-productively and placing the least well trained troops in the most crucial positions. Yet the French were better prepared than once thought: by the invasion the French had near parity with Germany where tanks and divisional strength were concerned. Contrary to common wisdom, the Popular Front had increased spending on military and defence budgets, and indeed had kickstarted France’s industrial rearmament, a programme continued under Daladier. The fighting was fiercer than is often acknowledged and, although at least two divisions panicked when the Germans broke through at Sedan, it should not be forgotten that the French won the first tank battle of the conflict. In addition, as many as 90,000 troops died in the Battle for France and the problem of low morale that characterized much of the phoney war was apparently reversed in May and June 1940. In fact, far from expecting an early French demise, the German military command was itself surprised by the speed of the blitzkrieg breakthrough. There is not much evidence either of a fifth column of defeatists operating against the French war effort. A variant of the Briandist desire for reconciliation with Germany did help to underpin both Vichy and the fascist-collaborationist alternatives in Paris that followed the military defeat, but, as Julian Jackson has rightly observed, they did not cause it. Ironically, the inter-war Republic was probably at its most robust—if not its most democratic—just before its collapse. The government of Radical premier Edouard Daladier that took office in April 1938 set about dismantling Popular Front reforms such as the forty-hour week, arguing that it stood in the way of rearmament. His government put the economy on a war footing, and between 1938 and 1939 the proportion of industrial production based on armaments almost doubled. Daladier, ruling regularly by decree after July 1939, also oversaw the introduction of the conservative family code, the restriction of immigration, the removal of citizenship from some recently naturalized French, and the internment of immigrants, including some 400,000 Spanish republicans. Strikingly, Daladier repressed communism in France even before the outbreak of war, and after September dozens of PCF deputies and thousands of PCF members were arrested. In its authoritarian and anti-communist stance, as well as its appointment of technocrats to cabinet posts, the Daladier administration prefigured the Vichy regime and underlines elements of continuity between republican and Vichy France. If Daladier engineered an authoritarian republic, however, the Vichy regime was to attempt an antidote to republicanism altogether. Nonetheless, the Vichy regime was legally constituted: once an armistice had been signed, elected French
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parliamentarians voted on 10 July 1940 by a margin of 569 to 80 to grant Marshall P´etain full powers to rewrite the republican constitution. The Vichy regime nevertheless set about replacing the values associated with the French Revolution—libert´e, ´egalit´e, fraternit´e — with the conservative and communitarian trinity of famille, travail, patrie. No longer were individual liberty and equality before the law to be the driving ideological forces of the French regime. Instead, the patriarchal family replaced the individual as the basic cell of society, and a broadly corporatist rethinking of the economy and social relations served as a counter to the perceived class conflict of the pre-1940 period. It was the tone of Vichy’s vision for national ‘regeneration’ that led the Action Franc¸aise leader Charles Maurras to record that the humiliation of the 1940 defeat was a ‘divine surprise’. Yet the regime was not strictly speaking fascist. Refusing a single party and mass mobilization (except passively through the popularization of the P´etain cult), the regime was pluralist, staffed at various stages by a combination of technocrats (‘experts’ such as the classicist J´erˆome Carcopino in the Education ministry, the lawyer Joseph Barth´elemy in the Justice ministry, and industrialist Pierre Pucheu in Industrial Production); those on the pre-war radical and anti-republican right such as Raphael Alibert and Xavier Vallat who had connections to the Action Franc¸aise; and social Catholics such as Georges Lamirand and Paul de la Porte du Theil who were dominant in youth matters. Although former PPF members such as Paul Marion enjoyed important positions in the Vichy ruling elite, by and large the dominant pre-war fascist leaders themselves were not represented in the inner circles of power in Vichy France. The regime was nonetheless built on authoritarian rule and social exclusion. Most remarkably, from the very beginning the Vichy regime overturned the republican tradition of religious tolerance and embarked on a consistent and independent programme of anti-Jewish measures (including internment) that existed in parallel to—and in some ways exceeded—measures taken by the German occupiers. Furthermore, the regime’s anti-Semitism led to complicity in the German-imposed ‘Final Solution’: in a misguided attempt to preserve its own sovereignty, the Vichy regime agreed to the use of French police in the arrest of Jews; administered the ‘aryanization’ of Jewish assets itself to prevent the Germans from pilfering French property; and offered to fill German-imposed quotas by agreeing to deport foreign Jews, including children, from the Vichy zone before the German authorities had decided to intrude across the demarcation line. As a result, over 75,000 Jews (a third of whom were French citizens) were deported to death camps between 1942 and 1944, the vast majority perishing in Auschwitz. There is widespread evidence of popular anti-Semitism, too, especially in the Vichy zone where such sentiment was heightened by food shortages and the presence of many refugees—including Jews—from the north. This was indeed a time of widespread privations. The terms of the armistice severely curtailed French sovereignty (and in any case German forces occupied
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the so-called Vichy ‘free zone’ in November 1942), around 1.6 million prisoners of war were interned in Germany until spring 1945, some 860,000 billion francs were paid to the Germans in occupation costs, three-quarters of a million French men were drafted to work in German factories, and pervasive and progressive requisitioning of agricultural and industrial produce took place. In addition, real wages fell by 40 per cent, rationing provided most adults with only 1,200 calories a day, and industrial production in 1944 was less than a third of the inter-war high-tide mark of 1929. The nostalgic vision of Vichy’s ‘National Revolution’ must have been unrecognizable in the actual landscape of France under occupation. Despite or because of such privations and repression, associative life thrived under these circumstances and the football stadium, along with the cinema and the municipal library, became a site of renewed activity. Before the defeat, around a quarter of a million people visited the cinema each year in France: in 1943 the number had risen to over 300,000. Paris municipal libraries, reflecting a national trend, loaned sixty-three books per registered reader in 1938 and ninety-six in 1942. Within three months of the signing of the armistice in 1940, the police claimed that around a third of popular sports clubs in the Paris region, featuring such activities as cycling, athletics, football, and swimming, had successfully regrouped their membership. According to Robert Gildea, a historian who has recently argued that the ‘dark years’ were not uniformly bleak for all, the small town of Chinon in the Loire valley was ‘honeycombed’ with numerous clubs and societies, horse-racing associations, and clubs for tennis, cycling, and fishing, even if some had to rebrand themselves (and purge Jewish members) in order to secure permission to continue from the German local authorities. In this way, the German attitude to sports activities in France mirrored their wider ‘policy of seduction’ of allowing enough liberty of movement in French circles to make the continuation of a vibrant cultural expression possible in a bid to keep the population distracted. Recent social histories of occupied and Vichy France have reminded us that many French sought what historian Philippe Burrin has called ‘accommodation’ with the occupiers—an acceptance by both French authorities and the population at large of the German presence and a willingness to engage with it in order to negotiate the best terms possible. Conversely, the German authorities themselves realized the importance of French popular consent in smoothing the course of the occupation. This understanding has come to replace the once dominant binary categories of ‘resistance’ and ‘collaboration’ which, not least in their implied moral judgement, were arguably less helpful in understanding the texture of power relations between 1940 and 1944. French mayors often developed close relations with the local Feldkommandant in a bid to protect the local community from more extensive German requisitions and brutality: they offered up resources, provided lists of potential hostages usually drawn from ‘suspect’ locals such as communists, and generally promised to ensure the order
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necessary for German security. It was not clear either under the occupation or in the post-Liberation courts how far such actions ought to be construed as treasonous and how far they constituted a patriotic civic defence of wider French interests. Thus collaboration was a broader and deeper phenomenon—and a more ambiguous one—than that evoked by the first generation of post-war historians. Similarly, resistance activities extended far beyond the actions of those who went on to become formal members of combatants’ groups (perhaps some 300,000). Especially after the erosion of popular support for the Vichy regime in 1942, resistance became a more thoroughly popular affair. Protests at town halls over diminishing food rations were not uncommon, the largest rallying some 2,000 people. In Montluc¸on women lay over the railway tracks for hours in an attempt to prevent the deportation of male workers to the German Reich. But resistance was also an affair of high politics, and in summer 1944 General Charles de Gaulle, leader of the Free French and now supported by Eisenhower, assumed the mantle of power when he became the leader of a post-Vichy provisional government based in Paris. Thus France, an ambiguous ally, avoided the indignity of an Allied Occupation to follow on the heels of the German one. By spring 1944, the democratic credentials of Gaullist-led resistance seemed assured: in April the consultative assembly (the resistance forum based in Algiers) had decided to enfranchise women on the same terms as men, and in March the Conseil National de la R´esistance (CNR) published a charter which articulated a vision for the post-Liberation period which included the nationalization of key industries, a systematic package of state welfare including pension rights, and a significant element of state control in a planned economy. Indeed, at the level of high politics this Liberation moment was characterized both by the Gaullist impulse for a strong state and a leftist, in fact communist, desire for redistributive social justice.
C O N C LU S I O N S Whatever recent historical research may tell us that is new about how the French thought and lived between 1914 and 1945, one can still rightfully emphasize the great weight of the First World War on the brain of the living in the 1920s and 1930s. The resonance of the 1914–18 conflict can be seen everywhere, in worsened d´enatalit´e and the resulting debates and measures to raise the birth rate, in a temporarily destroyed economy, as an explanation for a defensive foreign policy and inter-war ‘Maginot mentality’. The poilu was invoked rhetorically in political debates—often as an appeal for peace—and was ever-present materially in war memorials and ritually in Armistice Day ceremonies across both rural and urban France.
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Yet the extent to which the Great War transformed France can be exaggerated, especially in the field of gender relations and economic organization. France remained largely rural and agricultural until at least the 1930s and it was only after 1945 that, amid the ‘30 glorious years’ of sustained high economic growth, full employment, mass consumerism, and a state intervention in the economy fuelled by American post-war loans and economic integration, the French economy was transformed to a ‘modern’ and technocratic model. The great critic of France’s alleged ‘stalemate society’, Stanley Hoffmann, saw that after the Liberation period both left and right were more prepared to admit a dirigiste (interventionist) role for the state in the economy rather than a merely custodial one, and to take the political risks previously associated with any attempt to put economic expansion before the needs of social ‘equilibrium’. For whatever reason, it was principally Frenchmen such as Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman who laid the foundations for large-scale, ‘rationalized’ European economic cooperation after 1945. Monnet, a former adviser to the League of Nations, perhaps attempted to achieve through economic means the European stability that had eluded diplomatic measures after 1918. Indeed, it was the Second World War rather than the first that provided France with anything approaching a ‘watershed’ moment, even if the dreams of Liberation embodied in the CNR charter of March 1944 fell some way short of being realized. The Liberation era (1944–6) nonetheless introduced universal suffrage and instigated a comprehensive state social welfare programme (including unemployment benefits) for the first time in French history. And the population decline that had characterized French demographics since the 1789 Revolution was—perhaps inexplicably—reversed in 1943 as the French acquiesced in the wider European ‘baby boom’. Despite the association of political Catholics with the Vichy regime and the inaction of the Vatican over the Holocaust of Europe’s Jews, Catholicism emerged invigorated from the Occupation period, no doubt due to its ties with resistance activity, and Christian Democracy became a crucial new political force in France in the Fourth Republic in the guise of the Mouvement R´epublicain Populaire (MRP)—before being overtaken by Gaullism—just as it did more enduringly in Italy and West Germany. Indeed, the anti-clericalism that had fuelled political divisions under the Third Republic seemed a spent force after 1944: several high-profile politicians were subsequently practising Catholics and after 1951 the republic funded private Catholic schools, an act unthinkable in the pre-Vichy period. No wonder the greatest anti-clerical stalwarts of the Third Republic, the Radicals, did not survive in a climate in which state authorities were willing to show such a benign face to Catholic institutions. Still, if this new tolerance led to a more open practising of the Catholic faith among bourgeois republican men (a group previously inclined to leave religion to women), it did nothing to stall the decades-long French decline in attendance at mass.
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There were also significant elements of continuity as state assistance to families provided in the 1938–9 family code and extended under Vichy was further built upon after 1944, despite the formal rejection of all Vichy legislation at the Liberation. And despite the noise and fury of the official purges of Vichy-era collaborators between 1944 and 1951, many elites in politics and industry survived to forge careers in public life during the Fourth and Fifth Republics. No doubt continuities were felt more keenly than ruptures, too, in the associative and leisure life of the French population. By all accounts, political and economic crisis, war and occupation, did not do as much as one might expect to interfere with cultural pursuits such as sport, cinema and tourism. The development of such tastes depends on relatively deep currents of social and technological change, however much historical events may punctuate their (free) expression. The history of France in the first half of the twentieth century is indeed marked by the mass slaughter of war, the defeat of an enduringly democratic regime and complicity in a genocide of unprecedented scale, but the darkness of that legacy ought not to eclipse a parallel history in which the lives of millions were affected by the growth of social welfare, an increase in leisure time, and the increasing purchase of both mass politics and mass culture. F U RT H E R R E A D I N G Burrin, Philippe, Living with Defeat: France under the German Occupation, 1940–1944 (London, 1996). Clout, Hugh, After the Ruins: Restoring the Countryside of Northern France after the Great War (Exeter, 1996). Conklin, Alice L., A Mission to Civilise: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895–1930 (Stanford, Calif., 1998). Gildea, Robert, Marianne in Chains: In Search of the German Occupation (London, 2002). Kedward, R., France and the French: La Vie en bleu since 1900 (Woodstock and New York, 2005). Jackson, Julian, France: The Dark Years, 1940–1944 (Oxford, 2001). The Fall of France: The Nazi Invasion of 1940 (Oxford, 2003). Ory, Pascal, La Belle Illusion: Culture et politique sous le signe du Front populaire, 1935–1938 (Paris, 1994). Paxton, Robert, French Peasant Fascism: Henry Dorg`eres’ Greenshirts and the Crises of French Agriculture, 1929–1939 (Oxford, 1997). Pedersen, Susan, Family, Dependence, and the Origins of the Welfare State: Britain and France, 1914–1945 (Cambridge, 1993). Peer, Shanny, France on Display: Peasants, Provincials, and Folklore in the 1937 Paris World’s Fair (New York, 1998). Prost, Antoine, In the Wake of War: ‘Les Anciens Combattants’ and French Society, 1914–1939 (Oxford, 1992). Rearick, Charles, The French in Love and War: Popular Culture in the Era of the World Wars (London and New Haven, 1997).
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Reynolds, Siˆan, France between the Wars: Gender and Politics (London, 1996). Roberts, M. L., A Civilisation without Sexes: Reconstructing Gender in Postwar France, 1917–1927 (Chicago, 1994). Shennan, A., Rethinking France: Plans for Renewal, 1940–1946 (Oxford, 1989). Weber, Eugen, The Hollow Years: France in the 1930s (London, 1995).
7 Iberia Frances Lannon
I N T RO D U C T I O N The creation of the Portuguese New State in the early 1930s and the Spanish Civil War of 1936–9 have long dominated writing about the history of the two Iberian countries in the first half of the twentieth century. Uncovering the roots of the New State and the causes of the civil war have absorbed attention in much the same way as tracing the origins of Fascism in Italy and the Nazi movement in Germany. The Portuguese and Spanish Republics have been scrutinized for evidence of failure as closely as the Weimar Republic or the Italian constitutional monarchy. And the miserable teleology of democracy’s displacement by dictatorship is all too similar. In the Spanish case it is particularly poignant because of the terrible destruction of life and resources in the civil war that forged Franco’s dictatorship. By the time the European war began in September 1939, Spain was already devastated. But it is Spain, too, that provides particularly powerful contrasting narratives of constitutional and social change, extraordinary artistic innovation, political mobilization, and popular resistance. It is not just that they coexisted with the emergence of dictatorship. Their vitality is a large part of the reason why the triumph of counter-revolution in Spain took a more extreme and violent form than it did in Portugal. In both countries the democrats, reformers, and proponents of free speech were defeated. But their convictions and activities nonetheless contributed to the emergence, several decades later, of free, self-governing societies. Their story is not just one of failure and tragedy.
I B E R I A A N D T H E T WO WO R L D WA R S Even though the Iberian countries were directly and indirectly affected by the two world wars, they were minor players in these conflicts. Neither Spain nor Portugal formed part of the opposing alliances in 1914. Their geographical position and
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Figure 7.1. Poster of the Spanish Republic carrying an olive branch.
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lack of great power status placed them rather on the margins, although Portugal’s extensive overseas empire and the remaining Spanish territories in North Africa ensured that national and strategic interests were potentially at stake. In both countries elite opinion was divided. But while in Spain the debate was over which side to favour, in Portugal, with its historic relationship with Britain, the question was whether to intervene on the Allied side. Spain remained neutral, whereas Portugal joined the war in 1916 and sent about 55,000 troops to the Western Front and 45,000 to defend its colonies. Heavy casualties in Flanders strengthened internal opposition to the war, and the coup by Bernardino Sid´onio Pais in December 1917 opened the way to a scaling down of Portuguese involvement. In the Second World War neither country was a belligerent, although the famous Spanish Blue Division was sent ‘to fight communism’ alongside German forces on the Eastern Front. Portugal’s dictator Antonio de Oliveira Salazar spent some uncomfortable periods trying to ensure that General Francisco Franco’s enthusiasm for the German and Italian axis did not take Spain into the war and thereby threaten Portugal with being drawn in on the other side in support of Britain. He could not afford to alienate Britain, which was in effect the protector of the Portuguese overseas territories. Indeed, Salazar had to agree eventually to allow the allies to use the Azores as a base in 1944, notwithstanding his sympathy for the Axis Powers which had been so obvious during the Spanish Civil War. The Iberian countries were marginal in the international confrontation that eventually resulted in the destruction of the Nazi and Fascist regimes, the defeat of Japan, and the emergence of a bi-polar world order. Salazar and Franco survived the new and uncongenial post-war context in the democratic West in 1945 and remained in power until 1968 and 1975 respectively. Their opponents’ hopes that the victorious allies would complete their destruction of the Fascist and Nazi dictatorships by forcing the Iberian dictators out of power were bitterly disappointed. As the Cold War set in, the impeccable anti-communist credentials of both leaders became more important for the Western powers than the dictatorial nature of their regimes or their stance during the Second World War. R EVO LU T I O N A N D C O U N T E R - R EVO LU T IO N Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, the fundamental issue in Portuguese and Spanish politics was domestic. Would power remain in the hands of traditional elites, or would constitutional or social revolutions transfer it elsewhere? Of course the international context was always important. The rise of dictatorships of both left and right in Europe strongly influenced opinion and events in Iberia. Furthermore, Portugal always remained determined to retain its large empire, whatever the regime in Lisbon. And of course Spain became a
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central focus of international relations during the civil war of 1936–9, as other countries intervened in or sought to control the outcome of the war for their own purposes. But the origins of the civil war lay in Spanish domestic conflicts. Spain stood for a while at the heart of international affairs because its internal struggles mirrored, in a fashion, the ideological oppositions elsewhere between fascism, democracy, and communism. Political life in both Spain and Portugal was marked in the first decades of the century by constitutional crisis and breakdown. Monarchy failed. It ended definitively in Portugal in 1910 (notwithstanding attempts for some years to revive it), and collapsed in Spain in 1931 until a much later restoration after Franco’s death in 1975. Republican replacements in both Iberian countries proved divisive and unstable. But the establishment of Franco’s dictatorship in Spain and Salazar’s in Portugal in the course of the 1930s did not resolve the problem of legitimacy. Franco’s power was based on military victory over fellow Spaniards in the dreadful civil war. And although both regimes enjoyed significant domestic support, they also used authoritarian methods, including violence, to control and suppress dissent. They institutionalized counter-revolution in what had been politically divided societies. This triumph of counter-revolution was much more bloody in Spain than in Portugal. Indeed, a comparison between the two Iberian countries helps illuminate the strength of revolutionary movements in Spain. The Portuguese comparison also throws into sharp relief the scale of social change and political mobilization in Spain. If civilian politicians failed to establish any stable regime in Spain, this was largely because rapid economic and social development had created a society of sharply opposed interests. It proved easier to mobilize these than to reconcile them. The ambitious agendas of both revolutionaries and reformers challenged conservative traditionalism but were unable to supplant it. P O RT U G A L Portugal at the beginning of the twentieth century had a population of about six million—less than one-third the size of Spain’s. About 58 per cent of the working population was engaged in agriculture. The country had virtually no heavy industries, with tiny numbers employed mainly in small units. The approximately 25 per cent of the working population employed in secondary industries based on agricultural produce in 1900 rose only marginally in the decades that followed. In 1900, not more than 10.5 per cent of the population lived in towns of over 20,000 inhabitants, and this proportion increased modestly to still under 14 per cent by 1930. Lisbon had no near rival as a major urban centre. Portugal was predominantly rural and agricultural. Illiteracy rates were well over 60 per cent, and improving very slowly. The Portuguese economy and Portuguese society were, then, much less differentiated than the Spanish.
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It is equally striking that, as every history of Portugal rightly emphasizes, the country exhibited some kinds of continuity and homogeneity that made it not just unlike Spain, but unlike many other Western societies. Its frontiers were unchanged since the thirteenth century (apart from the partial and anomalous exception of the period 1580–1640 when Portugal was added on to Spain through inheritance by Philip II). It had no internal linguistic or national minorities. Less unusually, it had no religious minorities of any significance. From the point of view of anyone interested in exercising political power, the difficulties associated with the lack of economic resources must have been mitigated by the unifying force of a common history, language, and culture. These strengths were reinforced by the historic continuity and pretension to great power status afforded by the empire. The Portuguese constitution of August 1911 created a secular, liberal, parliamentary Republic. It was secular in the same mode as the French Third Republic on which it was modelled; that is, it was anti-clerical. The revolution of the previous year had resulted in the breakdown of relations with the Vatican, and the proclamation of the Republic on 5 October 1910 was swiftly followed by the banning of Catholic teaching in schools, the establishment of divorce and civil marriage, and then the separation of Church and State. The Spanish Second Republic of 1931 would follow the same model, with the same flurry of secularizing legislation. It is notable, however, that urban intellectual opposition to Catholicism in Portugal was not accompanied by the violent popular anticlericalism that was so prominent a feature of Spain in the first decades of the twentieth century. Although there was a good deal of worker agitation in the first years of the Portuguese Republic, and again in the ‘red’ years of 1919–22, these had a limited demographic base. Moreover, the cultural agenda of middle-class anti-clericals remained distant from the economic preoccupations of the workers’ movements, in which wage levels and the eight-hour day (formally attained in 1919) were paramount. Catholic reactions to anti-clerical republicanism in Portugal were varied and potent. The Academic Centre of Christian Democracy in Coimbra University laid the foundations for the Catholic Centre Party. It brought together laity and clergy who were to lead the defence of Catholic interests in the 1930s, most notably Salazar himself and Manuel Gonc¸alves Cerejeira, who would be cardinal patriarch of Lisbon for the whole long period of Salazar’s supremacy. But Catholic interests were also furthered by initiatives from beyond the frontiers of civilian politics. The 1917 military coup by Major Sid´onio Pais overthrew the regime of Alfonso Costa, leader of anti-clerical republicanism, and restored relations with the Vatican. This dictatorship was short-lived because Pais was assassinated in late 1918, and the 1911 constitution was reinstated. But the 1917 coup nonetheless set the precedent for another in 1926 by General Carmona which had the backing of conservative republicans and social Catholics. Salazar himself was not involved, but it was this coup, and the resulting regime in
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which Carmona remained president until 1951, that was the foundation of Salazar’s extraordinary political career. He left his post as an economics professor at Coimbra University to become finance minister in 1928 on terms of his own choosing, most notably financial control of the other ministries. Army support was always vital, but the regime Salazar fashioned was not a military dictatorship. The other exceptional aid to Catholic defence was the series of Marian apparitions to three young cousins at F´atima, near Leiria, in central Portugal, between May and October 1917. To the sceptical observer it seemed no accident that these occurred in the year of revolutionary crisis in Russia, and under an anti-clerical regime in Portugal. To the devout, they represented succour from on high at a time of seige. F´atima became a Marian shrine surpassed only by Lourdes in Western Europe in its attraction for national and international pilgrims. The famous secrets entrusted by the Virgin to the children in the apparition led many Portuguese Catholics to believe that their country was the site of special divine favour in a troubled world. For the Church, it was a heaven-sent opportunity to rally the faithful and strengthen popular devotion. It is interesting that similar Marian apparitions also occurred in Spain some years later when the new Second Republic began to introduce anti-clerical measures. The visions at Ezkioga in the Basque country in 1931 attracted huge numbers of pilgrims. But the local bishop, Mateo M´ugica, declared in September 1933 that the visions did not have a supernatural character. The next year, the Vatican reached the same conclusion. Ezkioga did not become a Spanish F´atima. After the coup of 1926, Catholic defence in Portugal was shaped even more decisively by civilian politicians than by the army or the Church’s own devotional culture. It was led by Salazar. His success as a counter-revolutionary lay in his ruthless determination to establish tight political control while also compromising when necessary. Between 1928 and 1933, Salazar consolidated his power. After his appointment as finance minister in 1928, he balanced the budget largely by reducing public expenditure. In July 1930, the National Union was created, following the model set by General Miguel Primo de Rivera’s Patriotic Union in Spain a few years before. It gathered together several conservative strands in support of the government. Two years later, Salazar was appointed prime minister and devised a new constitution. By means of the 1933 constitution and the legislation that followed it, Salazar’s New State was created. Although the constitutional order was anti-democratic, it carefully retained a fac¸ade of representation and consultation, with a weak National Assembly. Salazar himself became leader of the National Union in November 1932 and other parties—including the Catholic Centre Party—were disbanded in 1934. The army was respected but tamed. In 1936 Salazar added the Ministry of War to his range of responsibilities, and cut the number of officers and the size of the army. Meanwhile workers’ organizations were replaced by toothless corporatist ones. Dissent was suppressed with carefully targeted violence. It is notable that
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Figure 7.2. The three ‘F´atima visionaries’: Jacinta, Francisco, and Lucia.
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Salazar understood the limits of possible action. There was no attempt to restore the monarchy. The separation of Church and State was not reversed. Scholarly debate about the nature of Salazar’s regime continues. There has long been interest in its stability, with discussion often concentrating on how far this relied on suppression of dissent and how far on maintaining in balance several major interests, including the army, the Church, and rural and business elites. Salazar’s aim of establishing ‘government without politics’ suited well those who prized order, even if some would have preferred a monarchy or military rule. His Catholic conservatism reassured many religious traditionalists who would have preferred to see the separation of Church and State reversed. Recent analyses of the regime emphasize that Salazar’s room for manœuvre was always limited by the need to keep different interest groups satisfied or at least pacified. One historian even refers to the New State as ‘a precarious enterprise’. This is a useful reminder of the skill Salazar deployed. It may well have saved Portugal from a more extremist challenge from either left or right. Of course, for many the costs were intolerably high. Liberty was curtailed and democracy set aside. Economic development was very slow. Literacy rates remained low. The triumph of counter-revolution was, however, relatively moderate when set beside contemporary equivalents. It was certainly less repressive than the Franco regime. But Portugal was not Spain. Salazar had numerically small elites to deal with, none of which was powerful enough to impose its own agenda unilaterally. These elites were largely content with Salazar’s top-down government by administrative methods of a mainly uneducated, rural, and politically apathetic society which he was determined to keep that way. Spain between 1914 and 1945 was a different matter altogether. S PA I N The 1914–18 war had a destabilizing effect on the Spanish economy, society, and politics. Industries that gained new export markets during the war became hugely profitable. These included iron and steel, shipping, and textiles. The production of iron and steel doubled between 1913 and 1917. Some sectors, however, such as orange growers, lost export markets and suffered as a consequence. Others, including wheat growers and coal mining, benefited from the collapse of foreign competition within Spain. Rapid growth in heavy and manufacturing industry created inflationary pressures, but wages moved up more slowly than consumer prices. It has been estimated that prices rose on average by about 62 per cent during the war, but wages only about 25 per cent. Moreover, the labour market changed rapidly. Between 1910 and 1920, the percentage of the labour force employed in agriculture decreased by 15 per cent, while the size of the industrial labour force shot up by 40 per cent in the same period. The combination of inflation and rapidly changing circumstances created enormous discontent. It is
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not surprising that in the war years the two major trade union organizations, the socialist UGT and the anarchist CNT, expanded significantly. In the summer of 1917, they combined for the first time in a general strike and openly stated that its aim was to change the political regime. Even though the August strike was poorly coordinated and fizzled out swiftly in Madrid and Barcelona, it had greater strength in coal and iron mining areas in Asturias and Vizcaya respectively. The government’s response was to send in troops to restore order by force. If the constitutional monarchy established by the constitution of 1876 had been robust, this economic crisis would not have been so threatening. But the regime was already under pressure. Catalan regionalists wanted devolution, and went as far in July 1917 as convening a Catalan Assembly in Barcelona to demand a new federal constitution. Meanwhile, army officers pursued their own aims of higher wages and a revised promotions system through the organization in 1916 of military juntas that acted very like military trade unions. Government attempts to dissolve the juntas failed. Instead, in June 1917 many of their demands were met, to the detriment of government authority. With recalcitrant army officers, and trade unions and Catalan regionalists calling for a new constitution, the monarchy was in crisis. A first attempt at a national, cross-party government under the Liberal Manuel García Prieto in November 1917 failed. On the insistence of King Alfonso XIII, a second one was assembled in March 1918 under the Conservative Antonio Maura and lasted longer, but still for less than nine months. The old system in which Liberal and Conservative elites rotated in government had collapsed, unable to take the strain of anti-dynastic political movements including republicanism, socialism, and regionalism, and social unrest. Coalitions were no more successful. Government followed government at bewildering speed. Employment levels fell as industries that had temporarily expanded and flourished in war conditions contracted again. A new wave of worker protest swept over the rural south, especially Andalusia and Barcelona, as the ‘Bolshevik’ post-war years began, threatening to make Spain ungovernable. The fundamental agenda in Spain from then on, throughout the 1920s and 1930s, was social revolution and how to avoid it. Southern Spain erupted in confrontation and violence in 1918 as unions, especially anarchist unions, mobilized agricultural workers to seek better pay, better working conditions, and the new world pioneered by the Bolsheviks in which landed elites would tumble and power would be exercised directly by workers. The extent and intensity of social confrontation were unprecedented. The owners of the great estates in the south despaired of government. Eventually, in the summer of 1919, as the rural strikes began to lose cohesion, the government dispatched 20,000 soldiers to restore order through the use of force, arrests, and the closing down of union offices. But in Barcelona the unrest continued, taking the form of strikes, street violence, and assassinations. As in Andalusia, the mobilization was led by the anarchist union federation, the CNT. Employers responded with lock-outs and attempts to sabotage the unions. From just before
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the beginning of the 1917 general strike through to the military coup of September 1923, at least 300 people were killed in Barcelona province. It was not difficult in Barcelona in these post-war years to believe—with either enthusiasm or terror—that this was the revolution in action. The country reeled from the assassination of Prime Minister Edward Dato in March 1921, and Cardinal Soldevila, archbishop of Zaragoza. The government was discredited. P R I M O D E R I V E R A’ S D I C TATO R S H I P When General Miguel Primo de Rivera launched his coup in September 1923, it was greeted with relief by a very broad spectrum of Spaniards. Not many lamented the suspension of the constitution and the demise of ineffective parliamentary politics. Primo took power under the King and opened his famous ‘parenthesis’ in Spain’s political history. Order was restored. It was the first time since 1874 that the military had wrested control of central government from civilian politicians. Counter-revolution remained the underlying priority of many social sectors, institutions, and organizations in Spain. These included the army, the Church, propertied elites, and many rather frightened members of the middle classes. A further breakdown of order was a more immediate issue for many than whether Spain had parliamentary government, or was a functioning democracy. The dominant preoccupation of British and American historians writing about Spain has often been why democracy, as represented by the Second Spanish Republic of 1931–6, did not survive, and whether it could have done so. But it is easy to exaggerate the extent to which parliamentary democracy was the salient issue, even for many of the Republic’s supporters and leaders. If one begins with 1917 rather than 1931, it becomes clearer why so many Spanish politicians and citizens gave parliamentary democracy only qualified support. Overturning the existing social order or preserving it were often more immediate priorities. The Spanish population at the end of the First World War numbered about twenty million. Approximately 60 per cent of the workforce was employed in agriculture, as in Portugal. But Spain had significant industrial developments on the periphery, the greatest concentrations being textiles and other manufacturing industries in Catalonia, coal mining in Asturias, and iron ore mining, metallurgy, and shipbuilding in the Basque province of Vizcaya. Such industries employed 18.5 per cent of the workforce. Economic historians have often described Spain in this period as having a dual economy, with an agricultural heartland flanked to the north and east by modern industry. While in Portugal barely 10 per cent of the population lived in towns of over 20,000 inhabitants, in Spain more than 10 per cent lived in large towns of over 100,000 inhabitants, with more again than that in towns of 20,000 to 100,000. There were strong patterns of internal migration, from the south and centre to the north and east, and from country to town.
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This differentiation was superimposed on older cultural differences. The north was more observantly Catholic, and generally speaking formal religious practice dropped as one went south. The Catalan and Basque regions had a profound sense of historic cultural identity that was heightened as they became the powerhouses of the Spanish economy. Indeed, economic growth and inward migration from other parts of Spain stimulated the rise of regional nationalism and calls for autonomy by the end of the nineteenth century. Social and cultural identities were therefore sharply debated. Issues concerning class, religion, and region were all capable of mobilizing sectors of the population, as trade unions, regionalist parties, anti-clerical movements, and organizations for the defence of Church or property rallied their supporters. These issues often criss-crossed one another in highly complex ways. Governments in Spain faced an extremely difficult task navigating the cross-currents. It was not made any easier by the persistence of republicanism in many Spanish towns, or by the wider context of the loss of empire in the nineteenth century, culminating in the traumatic withdrawal from Cuba after defeat by the United States in 1898. Indeed, a new imperial crisis was unfolding in Spain’s remaining territories in North Africa, and the catastrophic defeat in Morocco in 1921 at Annual was part of the background to Primo’s coup in 1923, which saved the King from a parliamentary inquiry into responsibilities for the defeat. When Primo dismissed the politicians and took control, he assumed responsibility for a country immersed in imperial and post-imperial uncertainties, with an unpopular monarchy, disagreement about the role of the state, a disillusioned army, conflict between anti-clericals and defenders of the Church, and virtual class war raging in parts of the country. The contrast with the situation in Portugal when Salazar became finance minister in 1928 is stark. Portugal still retained much of its empire, the monarchy had already been abolished, there were no regional nationalist movements, and the demographic and organizational bases of worker protest were quite limited. Portuguese national identity was clear. Spain’s was contested. Miguel Primo de Rivera made no pretence of political sophistication. He aimed to sort out the country’s problems by authoritarian action, and then guide it into a new—as yet unspecified—constitutional normality. His most spectacular achievement was the eventual defeat of Abd-el-Krim’s forces in Morocco in 1925 and 1926, made possible by cooperation with the French, who were equally concerned to assert control over their own more extensive Moroccan colony. This ended twenty years of struggle by Spain. In Spain itself, the suppression of dissent was often accompanied by reformist, modernizing policies. There had never been any doubt that Primo de Rivera would repress the anarchist movement. Its newspapers and offices were closed down, and its trade unions survived only clandestinely. But his policy towards their socialist rivals was unexpected. The socialist party was not dissolved, and its trade union wing, the UGT, was allowed a major role in the new arbitration committees
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created by minister of labour Eduardo Aun´os in 1926 to deal with labour disputes. At every level, these committees had an equal number of representatives from employers and workers, with a state-appointed chair. Members of the small Catholic unions gained some elected places as worker representatives, but the UGT was the dominant group. The arbitration committees decided matters such as wage levels and working conditions. The inspiration for them was drawn from social Catholicism and its corporatist view of social and employment organization. Aun´os was also influenced by Mussolini, and indeed the Labour Code issued in 1926 was obviously based on the Italian Labour Charter. But the comit´es paritarios were not the corrupt corporatism that developed in fascist Italy or later under Franco, which was essentially a fac¸ade for employer control. They were a genuine effort to facilitate inter-class negotiation under independent chairmen, and employers’ associations frequently did not like the results. Unfortunately for Primo, owners of the great agricultural estates in southern and central Spain refused to cooperate when the dictatorship extended the arbitration committees from industry into agriculture in 1928. The dictatorship lacked both the resources and the will to impose them. A few years later, the Second Republic reinvigorated the comit´es paritarios, recognizing their reformist potential. But it also inherited the problem of recalcitrant agricultural employers and decided to tackle it head on. Where Primo de Rivera had left rural property untouched, the Republic embarked on an ambitious programme of land reform. But the Republic, like the dictatorship, was hindered by the inherent weakness of the Spanish state when seeking to implement reforms that propertied elites found unacceptable. This was something that neither Salazar nor Franco ever attempted. On other social issues, too, Primo introduced useful if limited reforms. A Royal Decree of 21 June 1926 granted subsidies to workers and state employees with large families. The pro-natalist inspiration behind this is revealed by the fact that workers of either sex were eligible, and illegitimate as well as legitimate children counted. A Royal Decree of 22 March 1929 established an obligatory maternity insurance scheme for women workers, which was eventually put into force by the Republic in 1931. Primo appointed thirteen women to the National Assembly he convened in 1927, and several others as municipal councillors. Government expenditure on education went up by 58 per cent in the 1920s and on health and social services by even greater rates. Primo was determined to modernize the economy, and used state intervention without any hesitation. A public works programme created a network of good highways and additional employment, and stimulated production. There was state investment in the railways and irrigation schemes. The chain of outstanding state-owned hotels in historic buildings, the paradores, was begun. State monopolies proliferated. The most audacious was the petrol monopoly, CAMPSA, set up to divert some petrol profits to the state. Regulatory committees sought, with mixed success, to control a whole series of different industries. Mining and industrial output rose substantially. The growth of industry attracted
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migration from a countryside in crisis to urban centres. By 1930, over 40 per cent of the Spanish population lived in towns of over 10,000 inhabitants. Primo’s brave attempt through finance minister Jos´e Calvo Sotelo in 1926 to introduce a single direct tax on all sources of income was shot down by the financial sector and the press. Spain had to wait many decades for an effective income tax. In the meantime, state expenditure including public works was financed by loans serviced from ordinary revenues. Not surprisingly, bankers considered some of Primo’s financial and economic measures unorthodox and inflationary, while many businessmen resented state interference. The drop in value of the peseta from 1928 onwards gave extra force to their criticisms. Primo also attempted to modernize the army. He was right to see that the officer corps was too large, and that promotions based only on seniority led to inefficiency. But his solutions were ineffective. He reduced the size of the officer corps enough to create fear, but not enough to modernize and professionalize the army. And his head-on collision with the artillery corps over its closed system of promotions in 1926 was disastrous. He suspended the entire corps. It had little choice but to give in. The price, however, was widespread criticism in the army of the dictator’s methods. There was some military backing for a botched coup attempt by conservative politicians in July 1929 in Valencia. Finally, when Primo asked the captains general of the Spanish military regions in January 1930 whether he had the full backing of the army, their unsatisfactory response led immediately to his resignation. He left behind a constitutional and power vacuum. When he first seized power, his governmental changes had seemed effective. He appointed military colleagues to work under him in a governing directorate. At local level, this was replicated by military delegates replacing town councillors and provincial governors. The next and more difficult stage was the reintroduction of civilian participation. In April 1924, Primo created the Patriotic Union (model for Portugal’s later National Union) as the official state party. Its members were favoured for government jobs, and it was meant to provide an administrative phalanx of reliable supporters. In December 1925, he appointed a largely civilian government. But the future remained unclear. The consultative National Assembly he convened in September 1927 to make proposals for a new constitution was not successful. Many of those invited to participate declined. The eventual draft constitution published in July 1929 was never taken any further. No consensus emerged. On the contrary, political and intellectual opposition to the dictatorship and its plans gathered pace across a wide political spectrum. Regionalism had remained a problem. Like most, if not all, Spanish generals, Primo was a centralist, intent on maintaining national unity. His coup was launched from his position as captain general of Catalonia, with at least tacit support from some Catalan elites who were relieved to see the restoration of order on the streets and in the workplace. But he was deeply suspicious of Catalanist political ambitions. He insisted on the use of Castilian Spanish, not
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Catalan or Basque, in schools and public administration and in religious services. The Law of the Provinces of 1925 made clear his determination not to allow the development of regional-level government. Catalan and Basque nationalists were alienated as surely by this as liberals, democrats, and republicans were by the failure to restore constitutional government. Primo neither undermined nor conciliated any of these groups. Rather, he merely silenced them for a while, only for them to re-emerge more determined. In the end, Primo ran out of ideas and support. In January 1930, he tendered his resignation to Alfonso XIII and took off for Paris. He had seized power in 1923 to restore order. But he tried to do much more than that. Primo’s ambition to bring social and economic improvements to the people of Spain differentiates him from both Salazar and Franco. While Salazar was content with social stagnation and Franco with social control, Primo de Rivera attempted to use the state to promote economic growth and modernization. It is impossible to know whether a more politically skilled leader could have secured greater agreement. But the rapidity with which institutions, organizations, and interest groups turned against him when his policies did not favour them shows clearly the limits of his room for manœuvre. No constructive way was found to close the parenthesis opened in 1923. Alfonso appointed General Berenguer, and then Admiral Aznar, to do the impossible. While they tried to ease the way back to the constitution abandoned in 1923, a revolutionary committee of several parties was formed to overthrow the discredited monarchy. A premature and uncoordinated military rising failed. But in the end violence was not necessary. In April 1931 municipal elections were held as a preliminary to general elections. The Republican-Socialist bloc triumphed in Spain’s major cities, and although pro-monarchist candidates gained more votes overall, it was immediately recognized that the public opinion that mattered had rejected the monarchy. On 14 April, Alfonso left Spain. The Republic was proclaimed, with the revolutionary committee as its provisional government. THE SECOND REPUBLIC The Second Republic was hailed with popular delirium. This was the regime that would right historic wrongs, and promote the interests of the masses that had never before been directly represented in government. It never, however, established a clear legitimacy. From the beginning there were unreconciled Alfonsist and Carlist monarchists and anti-democrats on the right and a sceptical and dissatisfied revolutionary left. Even for many politicians operating within the Republic and its democratic structures, loyalty depended on whether it would forward their vital interests. Elections for a constituent parliament were held in the summer of 1931, when the political right was in disarray after the monarchy’s disappearance.
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The Socialists emerged as much the biggest party, followed by the Radicals and Radical-Socialists. They, together with the Left Republicans led by Manuel Aza˜na, set the constitutional agenda. They decided on a unicameral legislature, autonomy for Catalonia and other regions that chose it, equal legal status for women (including, after some controversy, female suffrage), the separation of Church and State, compulsory secular schooling, the introduction of divorce, and the right of the state to confiscate property in some circumstances. The cultural revolution against the Catholic Church was, for Aza˜na and many others, the essential breakthrough into secular modernity. This included banning the religious congregations from teaching, and restricting religious practice to the home and the inside of churches. Zealous local councils in some parts of Spain forbade priests to lead funeral processions with a crucifix, and the ringing of church bells. To Catholics, of course, all of this was an authoritarian exercise of state power to curtail their liberty. The constitution of the Republic was never the broadly accepted framework it needed to be if the Republic was to establish its legitimacy. Other legislation sought to bring about radical improvement for workers and landless peasants. The eight-hour day, a minimum wage, the reinstatement of Primo’s arbitration committees, and the extension of state education all promised a better future for the masses. Moreover, the Republic ventured where Primo had not dared to tread, with ambitious agrarian reform. The question was whether these reformist measures would be enough to undercut demands for a social revolution, especially on the great estates and in the big cities. The Socialist party maintained its reformist line, arguing that cooperation with ‘bourgeois’ democratic parties was the appropriate way forward. But it was hard to convince its supporters that this was good enough. By the time the constituent parliament was dissolved, and the first general elections under the new constitution called for November 1933, the political situation was very different from what it had been in April 1931. First of all, former monarchists who were willing to use parliamentary means to defend property, religion, and the family had created a modern mass Catholic party, the CEDA, under the leadership of Jos´e María Gil Robles. It used modern methods of propaganda and organization, including sections for women and youth, to mobilize support. It was particularly successful among the Catholic middle classes and peasant smallholders, both of whom disagreed with the attack on religious schools and feared the undermining of private property rights and the traditional family. The Radicals, meanwhile, moved right as their anti-monarchist and secularizing agenda was fulfilled. The Radicals and CEDA constituted what had not existed in the summer of 1931, a broadly conservative coalition capable of winning a majority of seats. The Socialists had achieved a great deal. In particular, they had introduced significant labour reforms that were of real benefit to their supporters. But legislation on wages and working conditions did not suffice in the rural south and centre. Great numbers of landless labourers continued to suffer seasonal
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unemployment with no social welfare provision. Conditions were harsh. To many labourers it seemed obvious that what they needed was their own land. The Agrarian Reform Law of September 1932 was an attempt to redistribute land, but the state lacked the resources to implement it. There was very little money to pay compensation for expropriated land, and there were endless legal challenges about which land qualified for expropriation. Only tiny numbers of peasant families were actually resettled. Rural frustration flamed up in a series of violent incidents that met a predictable response from the Civil Guard. The names of Casas Viejas and Castilblanco became infamous for murderous repression. Battered by criticism that in power they had kept order in the countryside by the same bloody methods as the monarchy, and feeling compromised by their experience of coalition, the Socialists went into the 1933 elections alone. The small pro-Republican Catholic movement under Niceto Alcal´a Zamora and Miguel Maura was left stranded between the successful CEDA and the Republic’s anti-clericalism. Its fate symbolized the flight from the centre taking place on both sides in the Republic. If there had been mass support behind Aza˜na and Alcal´a-Zamora the history of the Republic might have been different. But they were outflanked by the Socialists and the CEDA respectively, and these in turn were always aware of openly anti-parliamentary forces further out beyond them. In the November 1933 elections the coalition of Radicals and the CEDA triumphed. Although the Socialists obtained far more votes than the Radicals, because the electoral system favoured coalitions their representation in parliament was halved. The new Radical government, with full support from the CEDA, set about repealing or simply not implementing much of the reforming legislation of the previous parliament. It was not surprising that in the European context of 1933 and 1934 many on the left feared that they were witnessing the first stages of an authoritarian takeover by parliamentary means. This was exacerbated by the entry of three CEDA ministers into government in October 1934. In a fatal move, a revolutionary rising broke out in Barcelona and elsewhere which was readily suppressed except in the Asturian coal mining areas. There a workers’ revolution seized control and held it for two weeks, until it was put down by General Francisco Franco and his army of Morocco. The repression was brutal. The Spanish left was in disarray, divided between those like Indalecio Prieto who concluded that the conquest of power must be by democratic and not revolutionary means, and others who had little faith in the Republic’s ability ever to bring about by legislation the transformation of property and class that they desired. On the right there was a similar division between those like Gil Robles who hoped that the next election would give Catholic conservatives a parliamentary majority, and those like Franco who decided that the left was irrevocably committed to social revolution and was illegitimate. While Prieto worried about how to harness the revolution, and find a reformist way forward,
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a great swathe of Spanish conservatives decided that an electoral victory of the left would be intolerable. The general elections of February 1936 brought victory for a Popular Front alliance with much the same programme as had been enacted in the 1931 constitution. Manuel Aza˜na succeeded Alcal´a-Zamora as president. The alliance created a weak government, run by minority Republicans without direct participation by the Socialists or the small Communist party. This was poorly placed to deal with the alarming tendency of several different forces to take matters into their own hands. Large-scale strikes and land occupations signalled the impatience of many workers and peasants with parliamentary processes. The small but growing Spanish fascist party, the Falange, under its leader Jos´e Primo de Rivera (son of Miguel) adopted another form of direct action, gunning down its enemies on the streets. A group of generals decided that the political experiment had failed, and conspired to effect a military coup. But when the rising began on 17 July 1936, it was only partly successful. Crucially, it failed in both Madrid and Barcelona, as well as in several other cities. A combination of popular resistance, and specialist forces such as the Assault Guards sometimes staying loyal to the government, defeated the rising in the capital and in Barcelona. Spain experienced not a military takeover like that effected by Primo de Rivera in 1923, but three years of devastating civil war. The Republic had represented an attempt to modernize Spain’s cultural life as well as its constitution and society. Most of the country’s famous leading philosophers, creative writers, and artists looked to the Republic in 1931 to curtail the influence of the Church in education and censorship, and to usher in a new era of artistic freedom and creativity. They included the philosophers Miguel de Unamuno and Jos´e Ortega y Gasset, and the poets Antonio Machado and Federico García Lorca. They, like many of the leading Republican politicians of the left and centre-left, including Manuel Aza˜na, were associated with the Free Education Institute, an extraordinarily influential secular school that had long nurtured Spain’s intellectual elite. No less a figure than Federico García Lorca headed one of the Republic’s most famous cultural initiatives, ‘La Barraca’ (The Shack), touring a theatre company through Spain in the early years of the Republic, especially in rural areas, giving performances of Spanish classical drama. The experience of rural Spain helped inspire his sombre, brooding plays of this period, Bodas de sangre (Blood Wedding, 1932), Yerma (Barren, 1934), and La casa de Bernarda Alba (The House of Bernarda Alba, 1936). La Barraca was part of a drive by the Ministry of Education to take culture to the masses with travelling libraries, film shows, and art exhibitions as well as theatre. The approved culture was humanist and secular (the Catholic monarchs were cut out of Lope de Vega’s 1619 play, Fuenteovejuna). Not surprisingly, Catholic traditionalists were suspicious of the whole enterprise. The 1920s and 1930s were a golden age for Spanish letters, art, and film. Luis Bu˜nuel’s surrealist film Un chien andalou (An Andalusian Dog) was made
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in France in 1929, with the surrealist artist Salvador Dalí helping create the script. Bu˜nuel’s searing documentary Tierra sin pan (Land without Bread) followed in 1932, set in the remote Las Hurdes area of Extremadura, and depicting utter destitution. The poets Juan Ram´on Jim´enez and Vicente Aleixandre were both later awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature, while others, including Jorge Guill´en and Rafael Alberti, also gained international recognition. In Catalonia, the extraordinary modernist exuberance of the turn of the century generated continuing experimentation in architecture and painting. Antoní Gaudí continued to work on his great church, the Sagrada Familia (Holy Family) in Barcelona, up to his death in 1926. In painting, Joan Mir´o and Pablo Picasso chose to work in Paris, but their artistic roots were in Catalonia. Gaudí was a devout Catholic. In this, he was the exception that proves the rule. The other writers and artists mentioned here belonged to a very different, humanist cultural world, with which the Republic became identified, and to which it gave hope. When Manuel Aza˜na famously said in the Spanish parliament in October 1931 that Spain was no longer Catholic, he meant that its high culture was not Catholic. He was right. When Franco took up arms against the Republic, he was also taking up arms against an intellectual and artistic golden age which he abhorred, and which he repudiated as alien to Spanish tradition and identity. The civil war would inevitably be a war about culture, as well as about politics and resources. One of its early victims was Federico García Lorca, shot as both an intellectual and sexual deviant (he was homosexual) by the insurgents in his home city of Granada on 19 August 1936. Pablo Picasso created one of the most famous icons of the twentieth century when he painted Guernica for the Republic’s stand at the International Exhibition in Paris in 1937, in protest at the horrors of the war in Spain, and especially the air bombardment of civilians. At the end of the war, when the Republic was defeated, a whole long generation of creative artists, writers, and philosophers joined the hundreds of thousands going into exile, most of them never to return to Spain again. T H E C I V I L WA R The military rising of July 1936 destroyed the authority of the Republican government. Power ebbed away, as many regular soldiers deserted and crowds in the streets demanded arms. The social revolution that had been hoped for by some and dreaded by others since the end of the First World War now occurred as government control collapsed. Peasants collectivized land and killed landlords. Workers seized factories and turned on employers. Over 6,000 priests and some nuns were killed in an anti-clerical rampage. Churches were desecrated and destroyed. Franco and his fellow conspirators unleashed this storm when they took up arms against the government. Meanwhile, in areas where the rising
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succeeded, the army and Carlist and fascist militias also turned on their opponents, including unarmed workers and other civilians, with terrifying ferocity. In the first weeks of the war, just being in the wrong place, caught on the wrong side, swiftly turned into a death sentence. In the days after the attempted coup, the division of territory and resources in Spain seemed to favour the Republic. It held Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia, more than half of the total population and territory, the industrial concentrations of Catalonia and the Basque country, the resources of the Bank of Spain, and most of the navy and tiny airforce. The insurgents held great swathes of rural Spain in the centre and north, Seville, Granada, implausibly—and by trickery—the erstwhile revolutionary centre of Oviedo in Asturias, and quite crucially, Spanish North Africa. Both sides faced the problem of disconnected territories. The Republican north coast was cut off from the rest of the areas that remained loyal, while the insurgent territories in the south-west around Seville were cut off from those further north. It seems quite likely that if Franco had not been able to get the army of Africa over to the mainland, the armed rising would eventually have failed. The very early, but independent, decisions by both Hitler and Mussolini to extend aid to Franco were therefore of central importance to the outcome of the war. On 29 July 1936, German military transport planes began ferrying Spanish and colonial troops from North Africa to Seville. While General Mola’s forces advanced on Madrid from the north-east, north, and north-west, Franco moved at great speed north from Seville towards the capital. Mola reached the outskirts of Madrid, but was unable to get any further, stopped by a combination of loyal Republican forces and hastily organized militias. Franco swept north as far as M´erida, pausing only to mop up Badajoz near the Portuguese frontier with one of the most ruthless actions of the entire war. In Badajoz, and throughout this march to Madrid, the policy was to leave no enemies in the rear, and to move fast. It was easier to kill than to take prisoners. Opponents, often unarmed, were gunned down in pitiless massacres. From M´erida the army of Africa turned north-east towards the capital. It slowed down only for a diversion to Toledo, to relieve insurgent forces surrounded by a Republican siege. By the beginning of November, Franco was at the approaches to Madrid. But here he ran into the first international mobilization in support of the Republic, as Soviet planes repulsed German bombers, Soviet tanks went into action, and the International Brigades of volunteers organized through the Communist International reinforced Spanish defenders of the city. A truly desperate, building by building, hand-to-hand battle resulted in the western outskirts of Madrid. But the city held, and the front remained pretty well where it was until the very last stages of the war. New attempts on Madrid from the north-west at the end of 1936, from the south across the Jarama valley in February 1937, and by Italian forces from the north-east to Guadalajara in March 1937 all made some progress but then failed. Madrid became identified
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with the Communist leader and orator Dolores Ibarruri’s slogan ‘They shall not pass’. Between November 1936 and April 1939, the main military course of the war was essentially a steady capture of the rest of Spain by the insurgents, now calling themselves the nationals or nationalists, with almost the last conquest being Madrid itself. On the Mediterranean coast, M´alaga and the surrounding area was taken, with Italian help, in February 1937. The Basque province of Vizcaya with its iron ore mines and heavy industry fell in the campaign of March to June 1937. It was in this campaign that German bombers destroyed the town of Durango on 31 March and Guernica on 26 April, providing a new model of modern warfare, the aerial bombing of civilian populations with no means of defence. A Republican offensive heading west out of Madrid in July 1937 took Brunete but was then repulsed. Similarly, a Republican advance at Teruel in Arag´on at the end of 1937 brought victory at first but was short-lived. In April 1938, the nationalists cut right through Republican territory to the Mediteranean at Vinaroz, between Barcelona and Valencia. With its territory depleted and divided, the Republic tried one final, immense onslaught in the second half of 1938, determined to drive the nationalists back west across the river Ebro. The Ebro campaign enabled the Republicans to advance impressively, but they could not hold their positions. Months of counter-attacks slowly forced them to relinquish what they had won, until by mid-November 1938 they retreated back across the Ebro. There was little now to stop the nationalist advance into Catalonia. Barcelona fell on 26 January 1939. As hundreds of thousands of refugees trailed over the frontier into France, the nationalists turned south and west. They eventually entered Madrid on 28 March 1939, and remaining Republican centres immediately afterwards. On 1 April 1939, Franco declared that the war was over. The nationalists owed a good deal of their success to Hitler and Mussolini, whose personal decisions to intervene had tipped the balance towards them in the very first days of the war, and who continued to supply military equipment, specialist personnel, and in Italy’s case thousands of troops. They also owed a lot indirectly to Britain. In August 1936, in an attempt to prevent the war from escalating, Britain developed a policy of non-intervention and by the end of that month all the major powers, including Germany and Italy, signed a non-intervention agreement in which they pledged to prohibit the export of arms to Spain. When the non-intervention committee met for the first time on 9 September in London, it was therefore already obvious that the agreement was being broken. It did, however, make it extremely difficult and costly for the Republic to secure arms. Only Mexico was willing openly to defy the embargo. When the Soviet Union decided in October to provide arms to the Republic in exchange for Spain’s gold reserves, this offer could not be refused. Soviet intervention kept the Republic fighting, and at times its military equipment was superior to that supplied by Germany. But it came with a cost beyond the
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inflated prices charged. Along with it came Soviet military and political advisers, and increasing Soviet pressure on the beleaguered Republican government. The Republic faced a double challenge from the beginning—how to defeat the rebel generals in a largely hostile international context and how to hold together the diverse Republican parties and movements. By the end of the summer of 1936, it seemed obvious to many that the first of these could not be achieved while revolutionary groups sought to create a collectivist utopia behind the lines, and militias organized by trade union or political affiliation resisted military discipline. The Socialist trade union leader Francisco Largo Caballero was appointed prime minister on 4 September in an attempt to bring the revolution within government. In October the militias were incorporated into the new Popular Army. On 4 November the anarchists took the quite extraordinary step of entering the government, thereby also giving Spain its first ever woman cabinet minister, Federica Montseny, who became minister of health. But tensions remained, and Largo Caballero became increasingly frustrated by the pressure put on him by the Soviet Union through its ambassador Marcel Rosenberg, and by the growing Spanish Communist party, to restrain the anarchists and revolutionary socialists. In early May 1937, in the midst of what was for the Republic the disastrous campaign in the Basque country, a civil war within the civil war broke out in Barcelona, where revolutionaries and their opponents fought out their dispute on the streets. The anarchists were defeated and the small dissident group of anti-Stalinist communists, the POUM, were destroyed. Largo Caballero was replaced by the more pro-Soviet socialist Juan Negrín, who remained prime minister until the end of the war. Negrín shared the view of the Prieto wing of the Socialist party, the Communists, and the Soviet Union that a disciplined and all-out war effort was the essential priority. What did the Republic stand for by late 1937? It maintained, of course, that it was the continuation of the democratic Republic established in 1931. The government traced its legitimate origins to the Popular Front victory in the general elections of February 1936, and civilian politicians remained in control. Every effort was made to keep a broad coalition. But many erstwhile Republicans were disillusioned. The early revolutionary and anti-clerical violence had totally alienated some Catalan nationalists, Catholics, and moderates. The increasing dominance of the Communists did not bode well for any restoration of parliamentary democracy. On the other hand, the dismantling of the revolution left many anarchists and left-wing Socialists wondering if this regime of order, property, and imposed discipline was really worth fighting for. Their aim of an egalitarian, collectivist, atheist society had seemed within reach in August 1936, but was now very far away. On the nationalist side, politics were brutally straightforward. Martial law was declared wherever nationalist forces penetrated. As early as the end of September 1936 Franco was named by his fellow generals as both supreme military commander and head of government. He immediately arrogated to himself also
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the role of head of state. Power was militarized, unified, and personalized. The CEDA disbanded. The Alfonsist monarchists could only hope—fruitlessly as it turned out—for a restoration when the war was won. In April 1937, Franco merged all political associations into one mass party of which he became the head. To the dismay especially of the Carlists and the fascists, their separate organizations were fused into a great conglomerate called the Spanish Traditionalist Falange (FET) whose very name—Traditionalist for the Carlists, Falange for the fascists—declared it to be a kind of depoliticization. There were parallels between the defeat of the revolutionaries in May on the Republican side and the emasculation of the Carlists and fascists on the Nationalist side in April. Some fascist and Carlist leaders felt betrayed. Where was the monarchical restoration, or the fascist revolution, for which they had been fighting? Franco’s emerging military and personal dictatorship was far from their ideal. However, it was obviously far preferable to the triumph of the revolutionary, anti-clerical mob which they feared above all else. In July 1937, the vast majority of the Catholic bishops made their support of the military rising plain in a joint pastoral letter addressed to Catholic bishops throughout the world. For them, too, the issues were stark—Franco’s order or persecution. The only sizeable group of Catholics to take a different view were the Basque Nationalists. They hated the idea of a centralized military dictatorship, and for a while, from October 1936 to the fall of the Basque city of Bilbao in June 1937, experienced—albeit in dire circumstances—the autonomous Basque government within the Republic that they had long desired. Apart from them, only a few Catholic democrats stayed loyal to the Republic at war. F R A N C O ’ S D I C TATO R S H I P On 1 September 1939, Germany invaded Poland. Two days later Britain and France declared war on Germany. The greater European confrontation that Negrín had hoped might force Britain and France at last to the defence of the Spanish Republic had begun, but too late. Franco’s sympathies were clearly with Germany. These were greatly reinforced when Hitler invaded the Soviet Union in 1941. But apart from the Blue Division sent to fight on the Eastern Front, Spain kept out of the war. It was hardly in a position militarily and economically to participate. About half a million Spaniards had died. Economic production had collapsed. Living conditions for millions were appalling. Franco’s victory was not followed by any attempt at reconciliation. Knowing that would be the case, hundreds of thousand of Spaniards chose exile in France or Latin America if they were able to get out before frontiers and ports were closed. A whole generation of liberal intellectuals and professionals left the country. The dictatorship turned usual notions of justice on their head by retrospectively defining bearing arms in defence of the Republic as ‘military rebellion’. About
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50,000 people were executed under military justice after the war was over, and huge numbers imprisoned. In another piece of retrospective legislation, the Law of Political Responsibilities of February 1939 made anyone who had supported the Republic or failed to support the ‘national movement’ from the time of the revolution in October 1934 liable to prosecution and having their assets seized. As though that were not enough, there was a political purge of teachers and many other professionals, who were dismissed, fined, moved away from their home town, or at the very least denied promotion if they were found to be ideologically unsatisfactory. Franco’s dictatorship abolished democracy and devolution. It restored property rights (except for the defeated), religion, and patriarchal authority. Trade unions were banned. The Church was given extensive powers over education and censorship. Women’s rights and opportunities were severely curtailed. Nor did Franco have Primo de Rivera’s appetite for using the state to promote economic modernization. Indeed, his autarkic policies had the opposite effect. The Spanish economy took many years to return to pre-war levels of production. Counter-revolution had triumphed, not just over the social revolutionaries of 1918 and 1936 with their vision of a collectivist egalitarian society, but also over the reformist initiatives of liberals and Socialists between 1931 and 1933, and over the intellectual and artistic achievements of Spanish humanist culture. It had triumphed in a more extreme and ruthless form than the regime of either Primo de Rivera or Salazar. Franco’s power and legitimacy were based on conquest. The great institutions, the army and the Church, were beholden to him, as were the industrial and agrarian elites. There was no king above him, and he had no intention of relinquishing power. The onset of the Cold War removed any possibility of the Western democracies making life difficult for him. Franco famously found running the country quite simple. To a much greater extent than either Primo or Salazar he had destroyed his enemies. The 1940s were known in Spain as the years of hunger. Much later, in the 1960s, more liberal economic policies facilitated growth, gradually improved living standards, and indirectly created aspirations towards self-government. By the time Franco’s successor King Juan Carlos had to respond to new calls for democracy, freedom, and devolution in the second half of the 1970s, the country’s economy and society had changed so radically that there were almost no revolutionaries of either right or left to be found. C O N C LU S I O N S Historical perspective constantly changes. It has been argued in this chapter that the fear of revolution that proved so potent in Spain and Portugal in the 1930s is best understood by looking not just at the immediate sources of Salazar’s New State and Franco’s dictatorship in that decade, but at the underlying struggle for political control in both countries from the beginning of the twentieth century.
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Similarly, if one considers the situation in both Iberian countries in 1945, the end of the period studied in this book, the two Iberian dictatorships were internally secure and free from external intervention. Their fate was sealed for decades to come. Whereas Hitler and Mussolini died defeated, Salazar and Franco remained in office. But neither internal dynamics nor external developments can be fully controlled even by successful dictators. The Salazar regime, it is true, survived the incapacitating illness of Salazar in 1968 and his death in 1970. Marcello Caetano succeeded him as prime minister. The regime continued. The dramatic army coup of 25 April 1974 that swept it away, however, did not appear out of nowhere. Probably most important of all was the anti-colonization movement sweeping through all the Western European empires in the 1950s and 1960s. Goa was lost in 1961. Sections of the Portuguese army became convinced that Angola and other colonies could only be held by unacceptable methods and the commitment of vast resources. The rhetoric of defending Christian and Western civilization in Africa rang ever more hollow. At the same time, the political and economic success of democratic Western Europe, and especially the European Economic Community, exerted an almost irresistible attraction. The Portuguese population looked at the experience of the EEC countries and wanted to share it. Salazarism was too old-fashioned, defensive, and insular. The dismantling of the Franco regime was done differently, not by the army but by civilian politicians from within the system, aided and encouraged by King Juan Carlos. When Franco died in November 1975, the restoration of the monarchy which he had planned seemed a reversion to the past. But Juan Carlos, like so many Spaniards, had decided that a transition to democracy was essential for the country. Without it, it was impossible to join the EEC, which Spain had first applied to do in 1962. Moreover, more dramatically in Spain than in Portugal, society had changed almost beyond recognition since the early 1940s. A new wave of industrialization transformed the economy in the 1960s. Rising levels of education and purchasing power led to widespread aspirations for a different and more modern kind of life. The dictatorship seemed a hindrance to a society it had once controlled. At the same time, the Church had changed. In the later stages of the Franco regime many priests and bishops became advocates of civil rights and social justice, especially in relation to Spanish workers and regional movements. As early as June 1977, democratic elections were held, and in 1978 parliament approved a democratic, secular, and devolutionary constitution. It would be foolish, of course, to argue that Franco’s and Salazar’s dictatorships were what Primo de Rivera’s claimed to be—a parenthesis in the political life of the country. They determined the fate of millions. Their repressive measures blighted and destroyed lives, with particular ferocity in Spain. As counterrevolution, both were successful. By the time they were destroyed, many of their enemies had also been destroyed. But it is right to recognize that the reformist, democratizing movements of the first decades of the twentieth century re-emerged with greater, indeed unstoppable, support in the 1970s, in an
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international context that was incomparably more conducive to their success than had been the case in the inter-war years. In the long, long historical retrospect from the early twenty-first century, it seems clear that the democrats whose day had not come, the unsuccessful campaigners for human rights, and the artists and writers who paid a great price for claiming freedom of expression, all contributed much more than they could know at the time to the eventual emergence of self-government.
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G Portugal Costa Pinto, Antonio (ed.), Modern Portugal (Palo Alto, Calif. 1998). Salazar’s Dictatorship and European Fascism: Problems of Interpretation (New York, 1995). De Meneses, Felipe Ribeiro, ‘The Origins and Nature of Authoritarian Rule in Portugal 1919–1945’, Contemporary European History, 2 (2002), 153–63. Gallagher, Tom, Portugal: A Twentieth Century Interpretation (Manchester, 1983). Spain Beevor, Anthony, Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War 1936–1939 (London, 2006). Ben Ami, Shlomo, Fascism from Above: The Dictatorship of Primo de Rivera in Spain 1923–1930 (Oxford, 1985). Blinkhorn, Martin, Spain in Conflict 1931–1939 (London, 1986). Esenwein, George, and Adrian Shubert, Spain at War: The Spanish Civil War in Context 1931–1939 (London, 1995). Gibson, Ian, Federico García Lorca: A Life (London, 1989). Graham, Helen, and Jo Labanyi (eds.), Spanish Cultural Studies: An Introduction (Oxford, 1995). Holguín, Sandie, Creating Spaniards. Culture and National Identity in Republican Spain (Madison, 2002). Lannon, Frances, The Spanish Civil War 1936–1939 (Oxford, 2002). Meaker, Gerald, The Revolutionary Left in Spain, 1914–1923 (Stanford, Calif., 1974). Nash, Mary, Defying Male Civilization: Women in the Spanish Civil War (Denver, Colo., 1995). Preston, Paul, Franco: A Biography (London, 1993). Seidman, Michael, Republic of Egos: A Social History of the Spanish Civil War (Madison, 2002).
8 Italy R. J. B. Bosworth
I N T RO D U C T I O N It so happened that I saw a market day in Bolzano [a natively German-speaking city in the S¨ud Tirol or Alto Adige, annexed to Italy after 1918], to which hundreds of peasants had come from one of the remote fastnesses, the Val Sarentino. The men looked like people visiting this world for the first time. They were tall, awkward, but deliberate in movement, silent among themselves, and painfully shy in the town streets. They had matted flaxen hair which bunched out in straggles, like a wig, round the lean weather-creased napes of their necks. Pale blue eyes. Tiny cone-shaped felt hats rested on rather than fitted their heads; trousers made of a fustian-looking felt, which only reached down as far as their shins; small Tyrolese jackets with very short sleeves; and, instead of a waistcoat, a most extraordinary leather contraption consisting of, not a breastplate, but a bellyplate of thick leather, on which is lettered their name, village and their birthday! More leather gear—enough for a horse—over their chests and shoulders. Grey stockings and mountain boots. And, as if to give a last touch to this singular attire, every man wears a green apron, which conveys to the initiated a whole who’s who and what’s what concerning the wearer, according to the various ways in which it may be hung from the waist, folded over or rolled up.
So, in a book published in 1934, Ion Munro, a Scottish journalist, sympathetic to the Fascist dictatorship then controlling Italy, portrayed a moment of everyday life in that country. For a decade, Fascist authorities had proclaimed their intention to forge a totalitarian state and society. The image of the fascio (a bundle of rods bound about with rope and reinforced by an axe threatening punishment to any who did not comply) promised national unity. Fascism and the rule of the dictator, Benito Mussolini (1883–1945) were, it seemed, directed first and foremost at uniting and nationalizing the Italian masses. The dictatorship was needed to drive Italians, whether willing or not, to national modernization (and readiness for mass war). Yet here in Bolzano, not in the economically backward South of the country but on its relatively prosperous northern borders, were peasants, men (no women were present) who used a host
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of markers to express a local and a seemingly timeless or premodern identity rather than a national, ideological, or modern one. To some extent, Munro may have been expressing that combination of romance and anxiety which has often characterized the response of citizens of an industrialized world towards the rural. Munro may have seen ‘Italy’ with British eyes. Nonetheless, his vignette raises deep questions about inter-war Italian history and its place in the story of Europe at large. Why was it that Italy was the country that first abandoned its officially liberal institutions and fell to some form of fascist dictatorship? What sort of dictatorship was it, whether in its theory or in its practice? Was its tyranny idiosyncratic or a model for those other dictatorships destined to spread across inter-war Europe from Portugal to Poland? When the Fascists pioneered ‘totalitarianism’ (the word passed from 1920s Italy into other countries), what was the effect on the everyday lives of its subjects? To what extent, at various moments after 1918 in Italy, were religion, the family, patron–client relations, the evident gap between city and countryside, class and gender difference, and a slew of other topics, matters to be understood as nationalized and/or fascistized? Or should each topic be allowed to stand on its own and be accorded its own historical comprehension and analysis? Given the arrival of Fascism to power in October 1922, after the so-called ‘March on Rome’, half paramilitary coup, half cabinet crisis, it might seem that Italy was the prime locus of that interpretation which views the inter-war decades as ‘locust years’ and defines Europe bleakly as a ‘dark continent’. Yet, maybe such phrases depend on the focus chosen. Mussolini’s dictatorship was scarcely benign. Yet histories beyond the political continued to thread their way through Italian lives. They thus to some extent countered and diverted Fascist tyranny. Despite the encouragement given by Mussolinian totalitarianism to brutality and cynicism, Italians continued to negotiate their identities and behaviour across competing currents—national, international, and local. Simultaneously the victims of Fascism and its practitioners, they also never ceased to be Italians, paesani (villagers), and a part of humankind. WA R A N D D I P LO M AC Y Italy had joined in the First World War in May 1915 and thereafter fought what was essentially its own conflict against mainly Austro-Hungarian armies. All but roated in the aftermath of the Battle of Caporetto in October 1917, Italian forces rallied and, on 4 November 1918, drove their Habsburg enemy to defeat and its empire to collapse. Thereafter patriotic commentators loved to remember that the victory of Vittorio Veneto had occurred a week before the German surrender on the Western Front. Despite this seeming success of the Liberal system, Italy was soon cast into crisis, both at home and abroad. Self-publicizing poet Gabriele D’Annunzio took
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to talking about a ‘mutilated victory’ and the phrase stuck in political discourse as a summary of the discontents of 1919. Territorially the peace-making rewarded Italy with Trieste, Istria, parts of Dalmatia, and the Trentino-Alto Adige up to the Brenner watershed, plus some minor imperial gains. By 1945, all but Trieste and Trento had been lost by Fascism and, furthermore, France had made adjustments in its favour on its Alpine border with Italy, while all of the pre-1914 Liberal empire was now taken from Italian rule. During the peace-making in 1918–19 and, in many senses, also during the Fascist years, Italy continued to play the part of the ‘least of the great powers’, that role which it had occupied in international diplomacy since the Risorgimento. As Bismarck had put it abruptly, Italy had ‘a large appetite and very poor teeth’. It was thus, frequently enough, a restless power but was rarely able to command the international scene. At Versailles, the ‘sacred egoism’ proclaimed as its war policy by conservative Foreign Minister, Sidney Sonnino, squared badly with Wilsonian rhetoric about the ‘new diplomacy’ and, in May–June 1919, Italy became something of the butt of proceedings, while the Liberal leadership remained anxiously unable to fuse their liberalism and their nationalism. In that last regard, since its formation in 1910, the Associazione Nazionalista Italiana (ANI, Italian Nationalist Association), although numerically small, had achieved a dominance over the thoughts about Italy’s proper grandeur among many of the best and the brightest of the new generation, and its ambition and aggrieved sense that foreigners were unfair and disrespectful to Italy flowed easily into Fascism. In the 1920s, the dictatorship mostly pursued policies not out of kilter with Italian traditions and, even in the next decade, its line did not dramatically break with the past. In his international dealings, Mussolini painted himself as an arch-realist, sardonic about the Kellogg–Briand peace pact (1928), for example, and the League of Nations, but nonetheless a signatory of the one and an active participant in the committees of the other. The invasion of Ethiopia in October 1935 was accompanied with violent Fascist fanfare, but Italy had attempted to seize the African empire also in the 1890s, and thereafter patriots had never ceased to dream of revenge. By the end of the 1930s, Italy was the Axis ally of Nazi Germany and, in June 1940, nine months late, it would join it in the Second World War. The explanation of this alliance was partly ideological and partly structural. In the special circumstances of a war which Germany in the summer of 1940 seemed to have won, it was natural for Italy to try to place itself on the winning side, hope for booty, and look to a continuation of schemes that might raise it some way up the hierarchy of great powers. P O P U L AT I O N A N D P O L I C Y Any review of Italy’s international posture between the wars needs to be set into the background of national history as a whole. There some facts should
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be established. When, in 1914, all the great powers except Italy entered the First World War, it was reckoned that there were thirty-five million Italians. Thirty years later, at the end of a Second World War which, since July 1943, had been partially fought out over Italian territory and which resulted in the overthrow of the Fascist regime, the total had grown to some forty-five million. This growth had occurred despite 650,000 deaths in combat in the First World War (in addition, 100,000 perished as POWs of the Germans and, especially, the Austrians) and the disabling (mutilati was the graphic Italian term) of a further 700,000. Unlike many other European states, Italy in losing 450,000 soldiers and civilians, killed in the Second World War, suffered less than in the First, although more than half of the deaths occurred in 1943–5, while the front passed across Italy and while Italians themselves engaged in a sort of civil war. The losses did not cease in April 1945 with the collapse of Fascist forces. Rather, over the next months, a further 12,000 died in revenge killings with ideological or personal impulse. Social murder of a different kind was never wholly eliminated from the South, despite Fascism’s tough-sounding campaigns against the Mafia. After liberation in 1943, the murder rate in such regions rapidly resumed the high level that had led the criminologist, Cesare Lombroso, before 1914 one of the few Italian intellectuals with a global reputation, to aver that Northern and Southern Italians sprang from a different racial mix. The earlier Fascist wars and colonial campaigns had been bloody, especially for Italy’s enemies. Some 1,500 white soldiers died invading Ethiopia in 1935–6 (according to Ethiopian historians, Fascist forces in combat and when governing from 1936 to 1941 caused up to half a million Ethiopian deaths). Italy’s colonial armies killed 100,000 Arabs as they pacified Libya in brutal campaigns at the end of the 1920s and the beginning of the 1930s. In all, after Italy seized the territory in 1911–12, the native population of Libya fell from an estimated 1.4 million to 850,000 in 1933. When Italian generals talked about imposing a ‘Roman peace’ on what they labelled the barbarous native inhabitants of Libya, they were not joking. Then and thereafter, some ambiguity was provoked in the racial purpose of Italian imperialism from the national tradition of utilizing natives from established colonies in the armed forces. In 1936, Giorgio De Vecchi, the son of Cesare Maria De Vecchi, a First World War hero and one of the chiefs of the March on Rome, hailed these soldiers as ‘black arditi’ (crack forces celebrated for their alleged heroism 1915–18). Although some of his phrases were predictably patronizing, Giorgio De Vecchi was nonetheless expressing ‘Africanist’ sentiments of a sort that squared uneasily with the more ‘scientific’ and fundamentalist racism of Nazi Germany, by then emerging as Italy’s grand, frightening, and menacing ally. In 1941, with the swift collapse of the new Fascist empire, only fifty-six Italian colonists were murdered by the victorious Ethiopians, testimony to the Africans’ humanity and to the rapidity of their rout of Fascist forces but also proof that Italian imperialism shared more with that of Western European countries than it did with the exterminationist and ideologically driven imperialism of Nazism. To
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be sure, Fascism did not merely thrust into Africa. Some 4,000 Fascist so-called volunteers (where the volunteering had often been notional) died fighting in the Spanish Civil War and 12,000 were wounded (according to official figures), while hundreds of Anti-Fascists perished on the Republican side of the conflict. Mussolini had typically ordered that any Italian Anti-Fascists taken prisoner should be shot out of hand (although, equally typically, he did not follow the matter up and expressed shock at the bloodiness of Spain when it was described to him by a rumbustious Fascist boss, Roberto Farinacci, who had travelled there). To this lamentable tally of the effect of Fascist rule, there should be added the 3,000 killed in the political and social disturbances occasioned by the rise of Fascism from 1920 to 1924. The initial coalition government, formed under Mussolini’s leadership in October 1922, had not seen the end of political killing. Rather, the Fascist murder of moderate socialist, Giacomo Matteotti, on 10 June 1924, proved that violence was an inescapable element of the Fascist mix. When, prompted by party radicals, on 3 January 1925, Mussolini opted for open dictatorship, he symbolically took responsibility for, and so endorsed, all the mayhem his movement had fostered since its foundation in March 1919. Then and thereafter, through its various aggressive wars and as a result of its other retrograde social policies, the dictatorship bears responsibility for at least a million premature deaths. No doubt quite a few of the casualties of Fascism might be as well understood as victims of the Italian version of European imperialism. Yet the empire, confined as it was to Libya, East Africa, and the occupied Greek Dodecanese islands, scarcely attracted Italians as settlers. By 1941, only 3,200 Italian farming colonists survived in Ethiopia, while, in Libya, the trumpeted immigrations of ‘Ventimila’ in 1938 and 1939 (in practice, more like 10,000) had scarcely been settled with any permanence when war broke out in 1940, soon turning the territory into a battlefield. Most commentators have dismissed the impact on metropolitan Italian lives of this imperialismo straccione (empire of rags and patches). As an unforeseen result, after 1945 decolonization was a less significant problem for Italy than it was for the other major European states, although the current re-emergence of racism, vented mostly against ‘Third World’ immigrants, is a reminder that Italy’s imperial story is another chapter of national history which could do with a more critical telling to the national populace. Although the modern empire scarcely replicated that of classical Rome, to the overall tally of Italians might be added tens of millions living in an informal imperium created by a massive emigration to France, Belgium, and other Northern European states, to the Americas and to the rest of the world. The only question in this regard is whether the peoples who migrated there should be counted as belonging to Italy or to ‘the Italies’. The emigrants were, in other words, often men and women whose identities sprang from local and familial loyalties more surely than they did from national ones. Confronted by a divided great world in the Second World War, Italian-Americans, for all their flirtation with Mussolini’s charisma before 1940, in overwhelming majority backed their
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new country and its armies, rejecting any idea that they should take up the Fascist cause of their original homeland. H E A LT H A N D T E C H N O LO G Y The physical well-being of Italians remained precarious throughout the inter-war period. Despite Fascist chatter about launching a welfare state, Italy retained a lowly rank on international indices about health. In 1914, 138 children per 1,000 perished before their first birthdays and, although the establishment of the Fascist Opera Nazionale per la Protezione della Maternit`a e dell’Infanzia (ONMI), in 1927, allowed some improvement to trickle down to the poorest classes, infant mortality remained high relative to the surrounding countries and was especially bad in such poverty-stricken provinces as Calabria, the Basilicata, and Abruzzi. Even in 1939, overall infant mortality was still above 100 per thousand births. Contrary to myth, Italians were not an especially prolific people, with a birth rate in 1913 of 21.7 per thousand. Despite noisy Fascist pronouncements that the dictatorship was engaged in a ‘battle of the births’, the number of live births fell steadily, although the population rose given the spread of some modern health practices (especially in regard to childbirth and infant illness). The death rate declined from 17.2 per thousand in 1926 to 13.6 in 1940. The median age of death of all Italians rose from an appalling 5.56 in the decade after 1861 (when almost half the deceased did not reach the age of 5) to 28.44 in 1911–20; 43.81 (1921–30) and 56.36 (1931–40). If children below 5 are eliminated from this statistic, the improvement went from 49.19 in 1861–70 to 67.14 in 1931–40, and then fell to 64.84 (1941–50). In its favouring of improved health for the nation or ‘race’, the dictatorship gave much media space to the military and patriotic virtues of sport, arguing that athletic endeavour would hone Italians into trimly healthy soldiers. Football and Fascism went well together. Italy won the World Cups of 1934 (in Rome) and 1938 (in Paris) and, from the 1920s, ambitious ras spared no expense in erecting new stadia in such provincial capitals as Bologna and Florence. The various party scouting organizations (Balilla, Piccole italiane, and the rest) similarly fostered sport at a more popular level, certainly for boys and, with doubts and hesitations lest their reproductive potential be curtailed, also for girls. Yet, in many ways, the majority of Italians in 1945 were not yet wedded to the sporting life and indeed had never contemplated play on a sports field or beach. Achille Starace, the Fascist Party Secretary 1931–9, may have taken pains to display his rippling musculature while dressed in shorts and jumping through a fiery hoop, and Mussolini may have enjoyed entertaining admiring pressmen while engaged in a (carefully programmed) tennis match with the national champions, but quite a few of their compatriots could not imagine owning sporting gear. Most Italians exhausted their physical strength in work not play.
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In very many ways, in 1914 Italy was, and in 1945 remained, a poor country. Every year malaria, pellagra, and simple starvation sent Italians early to their graves. Abortion, the favoured birth control of the poor, was a common solution to the dilemma of an extra mouth to feed and, although the regime condemned the practice, Fascist repression remained uneasy, worried by popular hostility towards the removal of a needed demographic safeguard. Peasant and workingclass Italians regularly spoke as though they were unsure where the next meal was coming from and, for example, in the late 1930s a lingering discontent with the prospect of battle against Britain and France owed much to the popular assumption that the states beyond the Alps were wealthy countries by comparison with their own. With the war after 1940 and the drastic failure of the regime’s feeble attempts to institute a socially fair rationing system, poor Italians had to subsist on a calorie intake similar to that offered by the Nazis to their subjects in occupied Poland. Mod cons of any type did not reach most Italian homes until the 1950s and 1960s, decades of the so-called ‘economic miracle’. In 1919, there was one telephone for every 392 Italians, as against one for every 12 Americans and 45 Germans. Twenty years later, phones were still a luxury item—127,333 subscribers in 1925 rose hesitantly to 566,768 in 1940. The Fascist secret police happily took over from Liberal Italy the habit of tapping the phones of political opponents, loosely defined, given that many Fascists and even Mussolini had their calls recorded (among those thus given historical record were the dictator’s dismally banal conversations with his young last mistress, Claretta Petacci). Despite the regime’s fondness for the spoken word, even radios penetrated Italy slowly and partially. In 1926, a meagre 27,000 receivers could be found in Italian households and the number was still only one million in 1939. Put another way, 0.43 per cent of the population took out subscriptions to the national radio service in 1930, 1.28 per cent in 1935, and 4.10 per cent in 1942. It was true that some radio listening was collective: 2,685 elementary schools were said to have receivers in 1934 and 18,780 in 1939. But, often, listening in such places must have resembled the scene in a Southern paese memorably recounted by the Anti-Fascist political prisoner, Carlo Levi, where forcibly assembled peasants only heard from the crackling loudspeaker on the village square an incomprehensible chant of CEDUCEDUCEDU (actually Duce! Duce! Duce!). Since many peasants clung stubbornly to dialects that could be largely incomprehensible from one agro-town to the next, rich and poor, urban and rural Italians frequently spoke different languages when they sought to portray the world and themselves. E D U C AT I O N A N D C U LT U R E In further reflection of its disunity and its technological backwardness, Italy remained a partially literate society, with a telling example of the weakness of Fascist totalitarianism compared, for example, with the communist kind being
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displayed in the Soviets rapidly teaching their populace to read whereas, in Italy in 1930, 30 per cent of the population were still registered as illiterate. This figure rose to 60 per cent and above in the South, while women were always less likely to have been instructed about reading and writing than were men. Quite a bit of Italy’s feeble military performance after 1940 can be explained by the inadequate education of the troops. If for different reasons, neither officers nor men were primed for the demands of mobile and technologized warfare. Schooling beyond the elementary level remained territory largely confined to middle-class boys and girls, with the latter composing about a fifth of a typical liceo (high school class). At university, in 1931 it was estimated that only 3 per cent of students sprang from the working class (down from 5 per cent in 1911). Fascist chiefs, led by Giuseppe Bottai, regularly minister of this or that, editor of such key party journals as Critica Fascista and Il Primato, and always an aspirant intellectual, talked glibly about a cultural revolution and were generous in subsidizing approved publications, art exhibitions, museum displays, and theatrical events. Primed by the patronage of Bottai and other party chiefs, many young men and women after 1945 destined for major intellectual careers, whether out of ideology or self-interest happily called themselves Fascists. In 1935, cultured Italy was in great part Fascist, although just what the conversion to this ideology really entailed must remain a matter of debate. Then the young and talented were anxious to join the dictator in ‘going to the people’ and so rendering their culture more ‘real’ or populist (and increasing their sales and status). The
Figure 8.1. A school for Jewish children in Italian Libya (1937).
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actual penetration of the poor by the touted ideas of the moment remained problematical, however. Fascism boasted that allegiance to the nation had swept aside class distinction but, in fact, the cultural gap between the bourgeoisie and the working class and peasantry (as well as that between men and women) was huge, obvious, and acknowledged by all. The comment by a clear-eyed townsman of Messina in 1908 that, here ‘we automatically address any member of the bourgeoisie as ‘‘Professor’’ ’ had not lost its meaning and relevance in 1945. Of the various cultural forms, film was the arena where Italians won most acclaim, at least in Europe, and certainly men and women flocked to the cinemas. In 1938, 343 million cinema tickets were sold in Italy; 469 million in 1942. A national cinema, if one with a raffish aristocratic and international cast, had begun to flourish before 1914. With the 1920s came some financial difficulties; 220 films were produced in 1920, nine in 1930. But the Fascist regime was generous in its sponsorship of an art form which Mussolini had labelled quintessentially modern and which Bottai had advised should be allowed its independence. Too much overt propaganda, he counselled, would drive audiences out of cinemas. Even Pope Pius XI acknowledged that film was a crucial educative device, although the Church advocated censorship, especially of any hint of lubricity, more eagerly than did the dictatorship. In the 1930s cinema revived. By the end of the decade, the industry could rely on the patronage of Mussolini’s eldest son, the laddish Vittorio (born 1916). Cinecitt`a, a modern production centre on the outskirts of Rome, opened in 1937 with rich government subsidy. Quite a number of avant-garde Fascist films were made there and elsewhere. Squadrone Bianca, directed by Augusto Genina (1936), and set in Italian Libya, for example, contains some marvellous visual effects in its portrayal of heroic desert war and its moral tone owes at least as much to orthodox European imperialism as it does to a cultural revolution. Continuities were evident. Roberto Rossellini, a young Roman man about town, made a trilogy for the Fascist (and Catholic) war in 1941–3 (La nave bianca, Il pilota ritorna, and L’uomo della croce) before producing the Anti-Fascist and ‘neo-realist’ classics, Roma: Citt`a aperta, Pais`a, and Germania: Anno zero (1944–8). Other ambiguities can be noticed. The most popular films were less those with themes of battle than ‘white telephone’ romances, such as Una romantica avventura and Rose scarlette (both 1940) in which a blonde draped herself alluringly over that luxury item, the phone. Moreover, in the years leading up to war in 1940, the Italian industry was under severe commercial (and, more implicitly, ideological) challenge from Hollywood. In 1938 almost three-quarters of tickets were sold for American films. Such dismal failure to compete encouraged protective measures, ones fitting the general economic line of ‘autarchia’ or selfreliance adopted by late Fascism. Nonetheless, adolescents continued to dream of the US as the paradise of sex and modernity, and their hopes were only partially channelled back towards Fascism by the common claim of regime propagandists, at least until the outbreak of the war, that F. D. Roosevelt was
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some sort of Fascist and that his ‘New Deal’ owed a great debt to Italian economics. M O N A RC H Y Constitutionally, Italy had entered the First World War as a liberal monarchy. The King was Victor Emmanuel III. He had come to the throne in disturbed circumstances in 1900 after his father, Umberto I, was assassinated at Monza by an anarchist returned from a stint as an emigrant at Patterson, New Jersey. Victor Emmanuel remained king until 1946, when a belated abdication installed his sleek but vacuous son, Umberto II, briefly on the throne. Shortly afterwards, on 2 June, a closely contested referendum turned post-Fascist Italy into a Republic. Victor Emmanuel was not a natural celebrity and, for the most part, did not directly interfere in politics in the way that Alfonso XIII of Spain, Edward VIII in England (especially when Prince of Wales), or King Carol of Romania did. Mostly Victor Emmanuel confined himself to misanthropic and anti-clerical aphorisms. Women, he thought, should concentrate on knitting socks and being taken to bed; priests, he warned, ‘in their long gowns have long arms’. Victor Emmanuel’s hobbies were such private ones as photography and coin-collecting. He let it be known that he never left his palace without his Kodak. By 1942, he possessed more than 100,000 coins and had an international reputation as a numismatician. He did, however, remain true to his class in not forgoing hunting. During the 1930s, it was a sign of a new austerity when his expected daily bag fell from 350 to 200. Victor Emmanuel may have been more moderate than some royals but he was scarcely a democrat. Not for nothing did the army officer corps between the wars remain more loyal to the monarchy than to the regime. Although his diminutive size made some aspects of military life troubling, Victor Emmanuel always strove to embody a re soldato (soldier king). The civilian sphere was of lesser significance in his eyes than that connected to the barracks. Before 1922 Victor Emmanuel viewed parliament as an unseemly battleground between ‘wolves and rabbits’ and he cohabited cheerfully with the dictatorship once it was installed. It was to be expected that, from time to time, his natural malice would cast doubt on some flight of Mussolinian grandiloquence, just as the dictator regularly mused sullenly about abolishing the monarchy. There were few signs of action in that regard until July 1943 when Victor Emmanuel sacked the Duce. Once the Fascist chief was reinstalled by German arms in northern Italy in September, Mussolini finally ousted the monarchy, calling his puppet regime a ‘Social Republic’ (the Repubblica Sociale Italiana, or RSI). Before that testing time, Victor Emmanuel retained a sort of reserve charisma, secondary to the dictator, but always there and frequently hailed in the regime’s publicity. To quite a degree, Fascist Italy was a dyarchy where children and
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crowds on public occasions successively sang a national anthem (the Royal March) and a Fascist party one invoking Mussolini (Giovinezza) and where, in offices and school-buildings, the wall was adorned with photos of both the King and the dictator. Victor Emmanuel as soldier king always gave the military salute (even to greet Adolf Hitler) and ostentatiously avoided the stretched arm ‘Roman salute’ of Fascism. No wonder, when the F¨uhrer, on an official visit to Rome in 1938, had to stay at the Quirinale, or royal palace, he remembered the event as constituting the unhappiest days of his life. C H U RC H Sometimes a third man joined the King and the dictator in official glorification. Italy was, after all, the home of the Catholic Church and of the three Popes of the inter-war period, Benedict XV (1914–22), Pius XI (1922–39), and Pius XII (1939–58). No history of Italy can omit an account of the charisma, ideas, and policy of the Vatican and of the less ‘disciplinized’ religiosity of ordinary Italians. Benedict XV had a difficult papacy coinciding with a First World War in which Catholics fought on both sides. It was natural for him to seek compromise peace—in 1917 he sorrowfully defined the endless battles as ‘useless slaughter’. The Church, however, scarcely carried sufficient political weight to stem the conflict and Benedict XV was left with a reputation in Nationalist circles as a traitor to the nation. Mussolini, ardent advocate of war, damned him as ‘Pope Pilate XV’. Benedict’s Church was also troubled financially, and it was little surprise that his successor did not style himself Benedict XVI. The tough—Fascist journals hailed the ‘sublimity’ of his sporting prowess as a mountain-climber and fencer—authoritarian and ambitious Pius XI was luckier in his historic moment. It was under his rule that, on 11 February 1929, he and the Duce signed the celebrated Lateran Pacts. This agreement resolved the ‘Roman question’ that had dogged Church–State relations since the Risorgimento. Now the Vatican city-state came into existence and the Church earned generous monetary compensation for the territory it had lost in 1870. Pius XI was soon spending the cash in massive building works, notably in Rome, aiming to express an ‘imperial papacy’ that yielded little in its public profile to the Fascist dictatorship. Pius even stated in early 1932 that his Church was as happy to be as ‘totalitarian’ in its sphere as the Fascist regime was in the lay world. More informally, the Lateran deal restored Church authority in the fields of early childhood education and adult social behaviour. The Church, as much as the Fascists, favoured a patriarchal view of gender relations and opposed abortion, divorce, and any modernizing talk about female equality. It was the Church, in its preparation of its priests, which demanded that trainee clerics be rigorously separated from their families. Fascism, by contrast, was much more hesitant about intruding into the realm of the hearth and home, and almost all
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its cadres, including the dictator, retained familial identities to which any more modern and ‘political’ ideology had to adapt. In general, rather than Fascism ruthlessly hammering its totalitarian ideas into the Catholic sections of national life, the two forces worked together with aplomb. John Pollard, a historian of Vatican finances, has concluded that, from 1929 to 1943, ‘Italy was . . . under a kind of joint Catholic–Fascist hegemony in all spheres, political, cultural, social and economic’. As the 1930s wore on, however, cracks began to appear in the relationship between the political and religious arenas, especially given that Pius XI had never yielded in his view that ‘the education of the child belongs to the Church and not to the State’. The fissure deepened when Mussolini began to move into a closer Axis with Nazi Germany. Despite persistent suggestions among some commentators that Eugenio Pacelli, from 1939 Pius XII, was a ‘Nazi Pope’, in fact both this pontiff and his predecessor deeply mistrusted Nazism as an atheist enemy of Catholicism (if, doubtless, a lesser evil than was the Bolshevik regime in the Soviet Union). Reflecting these doubts about the Italian regime’s drift in international relations, from 1935–6 the Church began to adjust its investments away from Fascist Italy. Pacelli, while still Papal Secretary of State, visited the USA in October 1936, and the Church readied itself to cope with a post-Fascist Italy. Cannily, Alcide De Gasperi, an Anti-Fascist Catholic politician who had served both in the Austrian parliament before 1914 and the Italian one leading up to the imposition of dictatorship, had been kept primed for political resuscitation, while employed in the Vatican library. De Gasperi lived in a flat across the river in central Rome and walked to work each day, invulnerable to the Fascist police given his priestly protection. During the 1930s the Church continued to train a new generation of Catholic leadership, including later prime ministers, Amintore Fanfani and Aldo Moro, with a clerical Fascism that could drop the Fascism if need be and transmute into Christian Democracy. Alcide De Gasperi was to be prime minister eight times between 1946 and 1953. Although the Church of Pius XI and Pius XII (the latter’s enthusiasm for an imperial image was, if anything, even greater than his predecessor’s) was committed to ‘Romanization’, that is, an ever tighter centralization of religious administration, and demanded that non-Italians accept the fact, within Italy one episcopal see and one parish could still differ from the next. The scholarship sorely needs a thorough modern social history of Italian Catholicism but it is known that members of the hierarchy varied in the extent of their Fascist enthusiasm. At one extreme, the cardinal archbishop of Bologna greeted war entry in 1940 as divine proof of Italy’s providential mission, while other prelates were less ready to place the nation’s cause above their dedication to humankind. The papal newspaper, L’Osservatore Romano, throughout the war offered its readers news about the conflict not identical with that purveyed in the Fascist party press. Out in society, the meaning of religion was complex. Some intellectuals talked of being purist integralists and crusaders for the Catholic cause—in the Spanish
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Civil War (1936–9), for example. However, especially in the South, more ordinary Italians preserved a religiosity of the kind that anthropologists codify as based on ‘saints and fireworks’. In the Gargano, Padre Pio was beginning a career in saintliness and publicity that would give him a huge following after 1945 and encourage the arch-populist John Paul II (1978–2005) to sanctify him. In a more humdrum sense, ordinary Italian men and women continued to regard the Church in general and their local priest in particular as a potential fount of generosity and an ultimate safeguard and sanctuary in times of trouble. Accounts of the Sal`o Republic, for example, regularly indicate that villagers then looked to the Church for protection and hope. Throughout the dictatorship, perhaps the best index of the survival of popular religion in Italy is provided in the role given to the festa of each village saint. Although the regime had Fascist festivals, the State had monarchical and military ones, and the Church cultivated its ceremonies at Christmas, Easter, and on the special days of the Virgin or leading saints, nonetheless, for many Italians the most sincere expression of their collectivity occurred when the local saint had his or her one day of the year. Similarly, Italians who lived outside Italy were much more likely to rally spontaneously in memory of their village saint than in the commanded but tinsel celebrations of the Italian nation-state or of the ideology of its dictatorship. L I B E R A L I N S T I T U T I O N S , B E L I E F S , A N D P R AC T I C E In 1914 Italy was a realm where power seemed centred in the parliament, itself a two-house body composed of a Chamber of Deputies and a Senate. Among careless writers, it is still possible to find this regime called democratic. Liberal (of a certain kind) it may have been; democratic, if the term is meant to embrace any sort of social equality, it certainly was not. It was only in 1912 that Italy had moved towards something approaching universal manhood suffrage (Italian women were denied the vote until 1945). Although there were hesitant signs of the organizing of modern political parties, with the Socialists being the plainest example, the great majority of parliamentarians, when the First World War approached, were still elected through local deals and dealing. Belief was subordinated to the practical. Patron–client networks mattered more than did ideological commitment. Sociological analysis has demonstrated that, whatever their formal allegiance, the majority of deputies were lawyers (52 per cent in 1913) or were otherwise sprung from the humanist middle classes. Businessmen and workers rarely took up seats and, both in 1913 and 1919, the elections failed to return a single peasant, then still the most numerous group of Italians. Senators were older and even more likely to belong to the Risorgimento establishment, frequently being retired military men, ex-diplomats or officials, and politicians whose careers had taken a turn for the worse. Change in this regard was not rapid under Fascism. Very many leading Fascists, despite their automatic condoning
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of Fascist murder, were lawyers, the most notorious and best rewarded of whom was Roberto Farinacci, the ras or boss of Cremona. This rough and tough party radical had shamelessly plagiarized the thesis which won him his law degree and the rich remuneration that followed. Mussolini, knowing something about the ancient technique of divide and rule among his immediate juniors, carefully preserved a copy of Farinacci’s thesis and the copied original in his office desk, with an attached bureaucratic note that plagiarism of that kind was ordinarily punished with six months in gaol. It is true that, by 1939, when the lower house had been renamed the Chamber of Fasces and Corporations, its members were not as likely as they had been a generation earlier to be practising lawyers. They were instead often employed as technocrats of some kind, risen in the luxuriant bureaucracy of the Partito Nazionale Fascista (PNF, National Fascist Party) and its numerous linked ‘parastate’ bodies. Yet very many still held degrees in jurisprudence. Moreover, even in its courses in engineering and medicine, a lot of Italian training gave greater place to the verbal than was the norm in Northern European societies. Such educational practice and vocabulary left Fascism perennially coloured by humanist words and ideals in a fashion that differed from the Nazi German equivalent, even though such seeming values, perhaps always freighted with self-interest, could readily be twisted into an authoritarian and murderous ‘humanism’. After all, until 1922 the most characteristic expression of the Italian version of liberalism was not a zealous devotion to Adam Smith, free trade, industrialization, banking, and the business life but rather membership of the Freemasons, a qualification that was all but essential for members of the pre-Fascist parliament of whatever stripe. However arcane were some of its ceremonies, Masonry was scarcely a sinister conspiracy as its clerical and later Fascist enemies were to claim. Rather, its adherents pledged to accept a rational understanding of life, a hope in science and progress, and a practical willingness to work fruitfully with each other as patrons and clients long had been accustomed to do. For Masonic parliamentarians and the doctors, accountants, teachers, and public officials who could be found in the best caf´es and restaurants of each beautiful but somewhat old-fashioned provincial capital across the peninsula, their good sense and civilization were what made Italy liberal and modern. Simultaneously, this ‘culture’ and its forms were what separated town-dwellers from the uncultivated and even dangerous world outside the city’s ancient walls. There resided the imponderable peasantry. The late nineteenth-century nationalist prime minister, Francesco Crispi, himself a Sicilian lawyer by origin, expressed the all but automatic view that such people were, for the present and foreseeable future, barbarous. Even in the gentler and kinder days of the belle ´epoque, most of the ruling elite believed that now was the time for all good men to come to the aid of the humanist bourgeoisie. Simultaneously, a deep pessimism about the masses limited the liberalism of most of those involved in politics and provided a key unspoken assumption in explaining the rise of Fascism.
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The prime ministers in the Liberal system varied in their power, given that governments rose and fell with an average life of under a year. Nonetheless, Giovanni Giolitti, five times holder of that office at periods in 1892–3, 1903–14, and 1920–1, like Agostino Depretis and Crispi in the 1880s and 1890s, was charged by some with being a parliamentary dictator. All three used their authority freely, while always being aware of the requirement to hold a coalition together. When Italy invaded Libya and annexed the ex-Ottoman territory in 1911–12, Giolitti found few impediments to his decision-making and acted with clarity, efficiency, and ruthlessness. To the wider public, Giolitti and the other political chiefs were nonetheless distant figures. Little spin sold their charisma to the masses. Although Italy had a flourishing press before 1914, its paper with the greatest prestige, Milan’s Il Corriere della Sera, sold only 350,000 copies, a significant tally but far fewer than the populist sheets already commanding the market in Britain, the USA, and France. Moreover, with the partial exception of the Socialists’ Avanti!, Italy lacked a national paper and Italians in the know reinforced their world view with local papers and local news. Fascism, by contrast, awarded a major propaganda role to Mussolini’s own Il Popolo d’Italia, founded with the help of Italian and French secret service money in November 1914 to advocate war entry. This daily was edited after 1922 from Milan by the younger Mussolini brother, Arnaldo, until his death in 1931, as a national paper, the organ of a regime which was anxiously exercising a steadily more obsessive control over the press. Yet, even under the dictatorship, most literate Italians for preference still first scanned the local newssheet and used its information to dream of local and not national, let alone global and ideological, advantage. FA S C I S T A N D M U S S O L I N I A N D I C TATO R S H I P Was there much difference between Mussolini and his Liberal predecessors as executives? Technically the answer to this question is yes. What, it might be thought, is the point of being dictator unless you dictate? Moreover, the ideology of Fascism at its base endorsed the idea of the Great Individual dominating his fellows, while party propaganda imposed onto Italians an image of their Duce (by the 1930s almost always their DUCE) as a living God. Fascism understood human society to be arranged hierarchically, with movement up the ranks being possible if a man was sufficiently tough and dedicated but where, ordinarily, the social order held and where all was pinned together by the immanent, infallible, omniscient, and ubiquitous dictator (he even penetrated Italian dreams). One of the pervasive and, in retrospect, most absurd slogans of the regime (except that the Pope, since the Vatican’s defeat in the Risorgimento, had already claimed infallibility) was Mussolini ha sempre ragione (Mussolini is always right). The florid personality cult around the dictator has left most historians assuming that Mussolini did indeed exercise total power. Certainly the queries prompted
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Figure 8.2. An Arab admirer of Mussolini.
by the suggestion that Hitler, and even Stalin, may have been a ‘weak dictator’ have rarely been raised about Mussolini. Yet a careful examination of his character and habits does suggest that the Duce was, on most occasions, as ready to follow ‘opinion’ (somehow defined) as to lead it. The key may have lain in Mussolini’s practice as an executive. Some of his time was expended in tours around Italy, during which he typically made propaganda speeches in numerous small centres as well as more wide-ranging pronouncements in Rome, Milan, Genoa, and the other major cities. Here he was dictator as speechifier, an activity which, to some extent, foreshadowed that of our contemporary politicians looking for ‘grabs’ for TV, more travelling salespeople than thinkers. When he sat at his office desk (and he never ceased to be an assiduous reader of files), Mussolini occupied his mornings and sometimes his afternoons, too, in a stream of interviews. On these occasions, pioneering the role today occupied by the radio talkshow host, the Duce was thus required to display a seeming mastery of a huge variety of subjects while also possessing the verbal dexterity to leave most of his interlocutors content with their meeting and convinced that the dictator had placed himself on their side. The atmosphere of each meeting was given a ‘modern’ and Fascist purpose by a clock which stood ominously ticking on the leader’s desk, ideally signalling that time was running out for this plan and conversation as was appropriate and necessary in the febrile modern world. It is thus no surprise to find Mussolini swiftly acquiring a reputation among his more knowing colleagues as a chief who, on many occasions, adroitly said what
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his listeners wanted to hear. Whether, through such interchanges, a decision was being made was a matter to be resolved by subsequent events, by the functioning of party and state bureaucracy and by the stamina and contacts, beyond the dictator’s office, of the person fortunate enough to have talked with Mussolini. Ian Kershaw has argued that many Germans, after 1933, worked towards their F¨uhrer. In Fascist Italy, the more common situation was that Mussolini worked towards those Italians who counted. The Lateran Pacts, for example, saw the Duce directly involved in the detail of negotiation, wheeling and dealing to the early hours of the morning. Nonetheless, the move towards an agreement had begun in 1919 and the actual terms were more a triumph for the Church than for the dictator, let alone for the idea that he was revolutionizing his country through a cultural turn that would render Catholicism obsolete. No doubt there were occasions when Mussolini did enforce his will on the nation. The decision to opt for a high value to the lira, the national currency, in 1926–7 and the determination to invade and conquer Ethiopia in 1935–6 were examples. Yet, frequently, Mussolini was more the politician as tactician than the grand strategist or fanatical ideologue. Much about his dictatorship is exemplified by an examination of its police force, headed from 1926 to his death in 1940 by Arturo Bocchini, a career official who used, with jovial sexism, to say that he was only a Fascist from the waist up. Bocchini saw Mussolini almost every day—for all his apparent power and celestial charisma, the Duce was perpetually and even neurotically alert to the possibility that Anti-Fascism might lurk still in Italian minds. Although the secret police were not numerous, Bocchini’s men were efficient and patrolled the after all not huge number of Italians with modern political ideas ruthlessly and effectively, being especially adroit in utilizing such ancient weapons of discipline as corruption, blackmail, and exploitation of the (yawning) divisions among its opponents. By the mid-1930s, there were few glimmerings of public or organized Anti-Fascism within Italy. Outside the country and notably in Paris or in Moscow, where Stalin watched ruthlessly over the fate of Italian communists, a handful of, often squabbling, opponents of the regime survived and the Spanish Civil War provided occasion for them to rally. But their influence on Mussolini’s subjects remained thin to non-existent. The irrelevance of Anti-Fascism does not necessarily prove that Fascism had fully occupied the hearts and minds of all Italians. The contrast between Bocchini’s policing and that of Himmler, presiding over the cancer-like ‘SS-state’ in Nazi Germany, is striking. Himmler aimed at a Third Reich that was still more surely ideologized, fanatical, and ‘fundamentalist’ than that presently controlled by the F¨uhrer. Bocchini, a Scarpia come to life, aimed instead at an Italy that was tranquil and depoliticized. His authoritarianism, which owed quite a bit to the principles that had been pursued in this regard in the Liberal regime where he had been trained, happily watched over Fascists as well as communists. Himmler wanted the Germans to think in only one way; the Fascist secret police preferred that Italians did not think at all.
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Equally emblematic of the regime was its key political punishment system of confino or relegation to a mountain or island commune, usually in the South. The implication of such penalty was that, contrary to noisy rhetoric about a seamlessly united modern nation mustered to serve its Duce, Italy was in fact a country where levels of ‘civilization’ and comfort varied starkly from one place to another. Prisoners themselves regularly expressed this view, one fallen Fascist eloquently complaining that his place of confinement in the South lacked any human being with whom a man of his cultural level could converse, while a communist woman was appalled by the sight in her paese of confinement of a teenage girl gunning down her seducer in the streets as though such an act was still the natural form of justice. Some 14,000 Italians fell victim to internal exile, among them such celebrated political and intellectual chiefs as communist Antonio Gramsci, socialist Sandro Pertini, the liberal democrats, Fausto Nitti and Emilio Lussu, and a number of dissident priests. Nitti and Lussu dramatically escaped but Gramsci and Pertini had their five-year terms automatically rolled over until they were released, the first by death and the second by the fall of Fascism. The typical confinato, however, was a more everyday figure who had been picked up for whingeing about national foreign policy, berating Mussolini, or singing the Red Flag. Some women were arrested after exasperatedly wishing cancer on their leaders, while at least one dreamt publicly of emasculating her Duce. These ‘Anti-Fascists’, loosely defined, were rarely forced to serve out their full terms since the regime continued to have many excuses (an imperial triumph, a royal birth, a religious festival) to offer amnesty to those of its prisoners ready to apologize and able to engage friends and patrons to plead their cause. Italy was studded with prison-sites of one kind or another but they did not really function in the same way as the camp system of Nazi Germany or even the gulag (if Soviet gaols were also characterized by many unspoken assumptions). R E S I S TA N C E A N D A N T I - FA S C I S M Despite Fascist repression, the other great ideologies of the twentieth century eddied somewhere beneath the surface of Fascist totalitarianism. Most persistent in a disciplined opposition to the dictatorship were followers of the Italian Communist Party, founded in January 1921. Despite occasional moments of flirtation with the idea of rapprochement with the regime, the communists never ceased to watch for their own scientifically determined victory (there were also Fascists who, in the mid-1930s, wondered whether Stalin was leading the Soviet Union to a Russian form of fascism). Certainly in retrospect, the key member of the PCd’I was Antonio Gramsci, the party leader, historian, and philosopher, who spent the last ten years before his death in 1937 in Fascist gaols. There Gramsci, despite great suffering from the harshness of his imprisonment and
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from the debilitating effects of Pott’s disease, was able to pen his Prison Notebooks, which, carefully marketed by Palmiro Togliatti, Gramsci’s successor as head of the party, offered worthy proof that Italian Communism had avoided the worst crudities of Stalinism and retained a loyalty to humanist traditions. Gramsci, it was said after his death, had mapped an ‘Italian road to communism’ and it was true that local communism rejoiced in a history of its own, forged in its opposition to dictatorship. The experience of being the prime target of Fascist policing and, especially in the latter stages of the war from 1943 to 1945, the active participation in a fighting resistance while allied with liberals, Catholics, and other anti-Fascists did give what was reorganized as the PCI a distinctive face and a cherished memory of its own history. Fascism had certainly done its best to eliminate communist ideas from Italian society but it never quite achieved its purpose, partly because its own line on equality and the possession of property was vague and contradictory. It talked often of being a revolution of the masses and, in 1943–5, under the RSI refurbished the slogans of its first years about a commitment to the ‘socialization’ of the economy. Similarly, regime foreign policy, even if it did debouch into Operation Barbarossa in 1941, was not fanatically anti-communist and it is scarcely surprising to find Mussolini, already in 1942 and on a number of occasions after that, baffled by Hitler’s lack of responsiveness to the idea of a compromise peace in the east (the better to fight the present ‘plutocratic’ and liberal enemies of Italy in the Mediterranean). At home, Fascist economic policy was similarly mutable. Mussolini sometimes talked as though he wanted to privilege rural life but he was equally ready to celebrate industrialization and to appease his nation’s bankers and businesspersons. Whether by planning or accident, the official policy of the 1930s of ‘autarky’, however much on occasion troubling Italian business with its renunciation of the sacred laws of Adam Smith, had led vast sums of government money to flow to industry and banking, especially through the umbrella Institute for Industrial Recovery (IRI), while national capitalism sought with difficulty to recover from the world Depression. In 1939 Italy was the country outside the Soviet Union with the highest proportion of its economy being ‘state-owned’, even if the ‘para-state’ style of ownership owed much to earlier traditions of patron–client deals. It was typical that, when the two para-state bodies coping with tourism, always the most lucrative national industry, quarrelled irredeemably, the regime simply created a third body to supervise the other two. This fondness for what would come to be called lottizzazione (a word describing what happens when real estate is chopped into blocks) long survived after 1945 as a Catholic or Christian Democrat version of ‘state capitalism’, more crudely damned as corruption by some puritan Anglo-Saxon commentators. In this, as in so many other zones of Italian life, Fascism, despite its programme to nationalize the masses, had never been able to liquidate universalist and localist ideas, contradicting or compromising that project.
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During the 1930s, the most active opposition to the dictatorship apart from the communists was marshalled from exile in Paris by the Justice and Liberty (Giustizia e Libert`a) movement, headed by the liberal socialist patriot, Carlo Rosselli (he and his brother were murdered in France at Fascist behest in 1937). The Rossellis and their followers kept alive Western European ideals about democratic social organization and, in 1945–6, Italy’s first post-war government was led by Ferruccio Parri, another patriotic and liberal-democrat ex-soldier from the First World War who had endured a period of confino before he was amnestied. Also significant is the fact that the Rossellis were Jewish; they belonged to an elite with an intimate and long-standing connection to that radical democrat and nationalist sector of the Risorgimento best incarnated in Giuseppe Mazzini. Their families had celebrated the unification of Italy as the time when they were for ever freed from the ghetto and, for example, from the automatic anti-Semitism of Pope Pius IX (1846–78). R AC E , T H E G E R M A N A L L I A N C E , A N D WA R A year after the Rossellis were assassinated, Fascist Italy began introducing its own anti-Semitic legislation in a process that culminated at Verona in November 1943, when the outline constitution of the RSI listed Jews as the ‘enemies of the nation’, with the somewhat curious qualification ‘for the duration of the war’. Such policy has sometimes been seen as the result of the Axis with Nazi Germany and so a matter of self-interested and cynical mimicry rather than a profound or scientific racism. Historical analysis, however, shows that Italians between the wars did not escape the curse of racism. Rather, racial prejudice was possessed of an Italian history differentiating it from the German story. If a body count is attempted, the Fascist regime committed its most numerous crimes against Arabs, blacks and Slavs, this last especially during its wartime occupation of much of ex-Yugoslavia, where, in 1942, party secretary, Aldo Vidussoni, at least talked about the liquidation of all Slovenes. Nonetheless, after September 1943, officials of the RSI did assist the collection and the dispatch of more than 7,000 Italian Jews to the death camps to the east, while 173 were murdered on national soil during those years. This participation in the horror of the Final Solution went against that history which had made not just the Rossellis but all Italian Jews natural fans of the Risorgimento as the victory of a nation that was by definition the modernizing enemy of traditional clerical anti-Semitic thought and practice. This natural alliance with Italian nationalism had ensured that Jewish Italians to 1938 generally thought of themselves as Italians with a somewhat different religious or cultural inheritance rather than as members of a diverse ‘race’. Despite the endorsement on occasion of anti-Semitic stereotypes, few gentile Italians demurred. Although Mussolini, as ever, said one thing one day and another the
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next, mostly he averred that anti-Semitic policy had no place in Italy. Rather, ironically, he like many other Italians was probably quicker to detect ‘primordial difference’ between Italians from different regions than to expatiate about other forms of racism. The Neapolitans, the Duce maintained in a typically cavalier and drastic manner, were naturally feckless and unmodern and could only be cured by a ruthless purge of their city. In his heart Mussolini, like many of his subjects, feared that ‘Africa’ began somewhere south of his own birthplace in the Romagna and contended that this fact helped to explain why ‘civilization’ still did not reliably command all Italian lives. Only a very few Fascists blindly took up German ideas about racial science, with the regime’s preference being instead to emphasize ‘will’. The first site of Fascist racial legislation was actually the empire, after the conquest of Ethiopia swiftly raised the issue whether Italians were fit to be imperial administrators and stern but just overlords of native peoples. In a fashion that could be paralleled with developments in British South Africa or the Belgian Congo, from 1937 a sort of Apartheid system began to be adopted in Ethiopia, designed to prove that Italians were worthy to shoulder the White Man’s Burden. Favoured by such young party intellectuals as Indro Montanelli, after 1945 an enduring Italian radical conservative, discourse began to flourish stating that the long-delayed Fascist revolution could at last be made genuine through the mobilizing effects of racism. Their backs straightened by a sense of their ‘blood’, Fascist new men and new women could stand tall both abroad and at home. It is not completely clear how enthusiastically most Italians took up this new line. The Catholic Church was unconvinced if, to a degree, it was willing to go along with racial separation, and so in large part were the rest of the elite, be they fervent Fascists or fellow-travellers, nearer to the monarchy, the army, and the lingering liberal world. Very many Italians, not excluding Mussolini and Farinacci, were ready to find special cases in which their Jewish friends might be saved from the general persecution. Similarly, Oscar Sinigaglia, a Jewish businessman who had been prominent in nationalist causes, did not altogether escape a racism of his own. In July 1938, he wrote to his Duce, disgusted that his lifetime dedication to Italy was to be thrown away. ‘Is it really possible’, Sinigaglia lamented, ‘that I must feel separated from my patria and made to belong . . . among Mongols and the Negroid?’ Where the Italian version of racism might have led is obscured by the Fascist regime’s dismal performance as a warrior society in the Second World War, once that conflict was entered on 10 June 1940. The disastrous attack on Greece, begun on 28 October, eighteenth anniversary of the March on Rome, rapidly reduced wartime Italy into being Nazi Germany’s ignoble second. This failure Nazis like Joseph Goebbels were quick to ascribe to what all German nationalists, except Hitler, believed was the inevitable racial inferiority of the ‘Mediterranean race’. Italy, it was soon apparent, was to experience a Second World War which, even more than in France or Poland, cast doubt on whether there was, or should
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be, any such thing as an Italian nation. On 8 September 1943, proof of the inadequacy of the ruling elite and of its willingness to abandon the people to their fate was given when King Victor Emmanuel and his soldier prime minister, Pietro Badoglio, cravenly and precipitously fled Rome to escape the invading and vengeful Germans. Under what was widely called the test of war, they were unable or unwilling to defend Italians within Italy or to give any clear orders to those Italian soldiers still stationed abroad. The elite of the elite patently rejected the view that it was sweet and fitting to die for the nation. C O N C LU S I O N S What was it about Italian society, culture, politics, and economy that produced this wartime disaster? What can explain the abject inability of the national economy to produce war material and of the political culture to rally Italians in the fashion expected of a modern state? After all, Italy, alone of the combatants, failed to increase the percentage of its product directed to the war effort after it entered the conflict and its men remained poorly equipped and of low morale in almost every battle. To a major degree the answer lies in the inadequacies and failings of Fascism and of the dictator since, by most indices, Liberal Italy was better at mustering its populace in the First World War, however unpopular among the peasants and the working class, than it was in the Second. Yet Liberal Italy, too, had laboured with the business of war and the structures of being the least of the great powers did much to condition Italy’s international behaviour and limit its military and political achievement. Nonetheless, the ‘disaster of 8 September’ and the calamity of the rest of the war should not be exaggerated in their significance. The year 1945 did not signal a final terminus for Italian history. Even Fascism did not altogether disappear since the Italians were soon voting in appreciable number for a neo-fascist party, the Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI, Italian Social Movement). More importantly, the theory and practice of religion, the character and imprint of the family, the functioning of ‘corruption’ and patron–client networks, the interplay between national, regional, and local identities, the relativities of gender and class, each continued to condition Italian lives into the post-war era. For all Fascism’s pretensions to constitute a ‘revolution’, the change that did indeed massively alter Italians and the face of Italy would come from the 1950s with the ‘economic miracle’ and national membership of a uniting Europe. The inter-war years were important ones for Italy. But they were not decisive. In sum, among the ideologies of the twentieth century Fascism was an Italian invention. Its resultant regime is well called the ‘Italian dictatorship’. There can be no doubt that Mussolini’s rule repressed the populace for a generation and bequeathed a negative legacy to many sectors of national history. On the other
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hand, just as Italian liberalism had varied from that familiar in Western Europe, so Fascist totalitarianism needs to be understood in its specific context. To be sure, Hitler long admired Mussolini, drew comfort from his rise and, to 1933, self-consciously followed the Italian model. To the disgust of his party comrades who believed automatically that Italians were racially inferior to the peoples of the north and unjustly occupied Germanic lands from the South Tyrol to the Adriatic, the ‘artistic’ F¨uhrer, dreaming of his own eventual retirement to Florence, set aside his German nationalism and racism to embrace an alliance with Italy which he repeatedly advocated before his rise to power and sought and achieved after himself becoming dictator. Nazi Germany, to a significant degree, bore the imprint of what happened before and after the March on Rome. But the practice of Fascist Italy needs to be understood on its own terms and not as some half-baked imitation of Nazism. Italy’s First and Second World Wars, and the tyranny that misgoverned Italy in between, were Italy’s own. The generation of Fascists from 1915 to 1945 were also Italians.
F U RT H E R R E A D I N G Absalom, Roger, A Strange Alliance: Aspects of Escape and Survival in Italy 1943–45 (Florence, 1991). Ben-Ghiat, Ruth, Fascist Modernities: Italy 1922–1945 (Berkeley, Calif., 2001). Bosworth, Richard, The Italian Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives in the Interpretation of Mussolini and Fascism (London, 1998). Mussolini (London, 2002). Mussolini’s Italy: Life under the Dictatorship (London, 2005). Clark, Martin, Mussolini (Harlow, 2005). De Grazia, Victoria, How Fascism Ruled Women: Italy 1922–1945 (Berkeley, Calif., 1992). Dunnage, Jonathan, Twentieth Century Italy: A Social History (Cambridge, 2002). Gentile, Emilio, The Sacralization of Politics in Fascist Italy (Cambridge, Mass, 1996). Knox, Macgregor, Common Destiny: Dictatorship, Foreign Policy, and War in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany (New York, 2000). Mallett, Robert, Mussolini and the Origins of the Second World War, 1933–1940 (Houndmills, 2003). Morgan, Philip, Italian Fascism 1919–1945 (New York, 1995). Pollard, John, Money and the Rise of the Modern Papacy: Financing the Vatican, 1850–1950 (Cambridge, 2005). Quine, Maria, Italy’s Social Revolution: Charity and Welfare from Liberalism to Fascism (Houndmills, 2002). Zamagni, Vera, The Economic History of Italy 1860–1990 (Oxford, 1993).
9 Germany Stefan Berger
I N T RO D U C T I O N The period between the outbreak of the First World War and the end of the Second World War is a period of dramatic changes in German history: the negative balance sheet is marked by responsibility for two world wars, political violence, economic crises on a scale unprecedented in the twentieth century, National Socialism, and, above all, the Holocaust. But even in Germany, where the first half of the twentieth century were indeed dark years, the period also has a positive balance sheet including the revolutionary breakthrough to parliamentary democracy and republicanism, a vibrant cultural scene (at least until 1933), the extension of the welfare state, and remarkable economic recovery. Overall these are roller coaster years of German history—a roller-coaster which did, in the end, crash badly, leaving the country as well as much of Europe in ruins. But do we have to judge the entire ride from the vantage point of the crash in 1945? The story of Germany in the first half of the twentieth century has often been told as a linear story of catastrophes leading straight from the Versailles Treaty to the victory of National Socialism, the horrors of total war, and genocide. This essay will attempt to take a more kaleidoscopic view which allows for the plural realities of Germany at several different moments of time and for the hetero-temporality of events. Without trying to belittle or counter the horrors of the world wars and the Third Reich, it will be suggested that even this darkest period of German history had its brighter moments. In some respects the foundations for the happier second half of the century were laid during those years. In August 1914 few people in Germany greeted the outbreak of war with the kind of resignation captured in Sir Edward Grey’s famous statement that the lamps had gone out all over Europe not to reappear during his lifetime. The reasons for the outbreak of war have been hotly contested ever since, but, whichever way one looks at it, the imperial German elites have to shoulder a large
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part of the blame for deliberately risking war or, at the very least, doing nothing to prevent it. But war was popular in Germany in the summer of 1914. Apart from a powerful wave of straightforward jingoism flooding the country, there was also, among intellectuals and the ruling elite, the notion that war would point a way out of a deep cultural and political crisis. It would stop the decadence and the disunity and lead to a renewal and rebirth of a stronger and more unified Germany. More recently, however, historians have stressed that one should not overestimate German enthusiasm for the war. Especially among the rural population and the working classes there was often little support and widespread fear. When the full horrors of modern trench warfare became apparent, opposition to the war increased. On the home front the increasing shortages of food, clothing, and other items important to everyday life and the growing militarization of workplaces also contributed to the first stirrings of unrest. Mass strike waves radicalized sections of the working classes, many of whom declared their solidarity with the Kiel sailors who, on 30 October 1918, mutinied against the decision of the chiefs of the navy to seek one decisive battle against the British fleet. Workers’ and soldiers’ councils were set up in many cities and towns. They took control of municipal affairs and toppled the monarchies and governments across the German states. The Kaiser went into exile in the Netherlands. For a while it was wide open where the German revolution of 1918 would lead. But the moderate Social Democrats were eventually successful in steering the revolution in the direction of a republic and parliamentary democracy. Questions concerning a different social and economic order were postponed. The birth date of the Weimar Republic was 19 January 1919, when elections for a constitutional assembly produced an overwhelming majority for those parties in favour of republicanism and parliamentary democracy. It looked as though the German people had at long last freed themselves from the fetters of an authoritarian political regime and were tumbling into a brighter, freer, and more democratic future. Yet the key event which cast its long shadow over the entire period was the First World War. It had led to the near total mobilization of German society. Thirteen million men, a fifth of the German population, served in the army, while the home front suffered under the impact of the Allied blockade. The war impoverished Germany and many of the economic and political crises in this period were directly related to wartime decisions and events. The soldiers at the front were traumatized by the experience of mechanized mass slaughter. It paved the way towards the legitimization of violence in the post-war world on a hitherto unprecedented scale. Former soldiers active in the paramilitary Freikorps and the paramilitary street-fighting formations, such as the National Socialist Stormtroopers (SA), the Communist Red Front, and even the Republican Iron Front, often consisted of men brutalized by four years of organized mass killing. Political violence, uniforms, marching, and political terrorism marked the inter-war years to a degree that was unthinkable in the period before 1914.
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Right-wing anti-republican veterans’ organizations, which counted their numbers in the millions, glorified the soldierly wartime experience as a school for manhood and upheld the military ethos of war in peacetime. The Veterans’ Association Kyffh¨auser (42,000 branches with more than four million members) and the Stahlhelm were among the most vicious opponents of the Republic and the Versailles Peace Treaty which ended the war on such unfavourable terms for Germany. Republican veterans’ organizations, especially the Reichsbanner Schwarz-Rot-Gold, fought an uphill battle to draw different lessons from the war. They stressed the horrors of war and preached international reconciliation and the prevention of armed international conflict. The war undoubtedly produced strong pacifist sentiments, which were expressed powerfully by Erich Maria Remarque’s All Quiet at the Western Front. And yet the negative perception of the war in Germany was far less popular and widespread than was the case in Britain or France. The idea, however, that the German people were united behind the German war effort and supportive of the imperial German army and state was a myth produced immediately after the war by the anti-republican right, which was keen to lay the blame for the loss of the war and the Versailles Peace Treaty at the feet of republican politicians. In fact, the war produced considerable resentment and rejection of imperial Germany, as people suffered from food and other shortages and struggled to make ends meet while their loved ones died like flies in the trenches of Northern France. In particular workers were deeply dissatisfied and began mobilizing behind those who demanded an end to war and the democratization of the political system. The revolution of 1918 has engendered a good deal of debate focusing on the question of its success or failure: was not enough achieved in 1918? Were the old elites largely left in place to bounce back and destroy the republic? Was too much achieved, that is, would less have been more? After all, was Germany really ready for parliamentary democracy and one of the most liberal constitutions of the world? Might not some sort of constitutional monarchy with more authoritarian features have stood better chances of survival? Was the revolution aborted, even betrayed by those who put themselves at its helm, especially the Social Democrats? Undoubtedly the democratic revolutionaries made mistakes. They did not trust the revolutionary masses and instead relied too much on a dubious alliance with the old imperial elites. They failed to be open about the responsibility of those elites for the outbreak of war in 1914. But at the end of the day, they managed to establish a republic and a parliamentary democracy in extraordinarily difficult circumstances. Seen in the context of those East-Central European constitutions created after 1918, the Weimar constitution was arguably the most successful and long-lived—despite all the problems that Germany was facing after the war. Weimar democrats also reshaped industrial relations, for the first time removing all legal restrictions to the existence of trade unions as independent representatives of workers’ interests. And culturally, the ‘roaring twenties’ were
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at their loudest in Berlin—making it a European Chicago, attracting close to two million tourists every year by the mid-1920s. The republic folded in the midst of economic depression, when Hitler seemed to many (albeit never a majority of ) German voters the only solution out of a deep economic and political crisis. It was replaced with the National Socialist dictatorship which ruthlessly persecuted political opponents of the regime and those deemed not part of the ‘people’s community’, above all the Jews. Total war and the Holocaust marked the horrendous endpoint of Germany’s march into the abyss. The National Socialist regime was a genuinely popular regime among many German Volksgenossen who were all too happy to share in an economic upturn and social policies deemed to benefit the Aryan part of the population. Sebastian Haffner once said that, had Hitler died in 1937, he would have died as one of the most popular German politicians ever. This chapter would like to trace the development of Germany from 1914 to the end of the Third Reich in 1945, focusing, first, on the development of politics, secondly, the economic, social, and cultural sphere, and, finally, on Germany’s international relations during this period. Throughout, it will be suggested that the catastrophic events which cast their long shadow over the entire period were never offset by but were accompanied by events and developments which planted the seeds for a happier second half of the twentieth century. P O L I T I C A L D EV E LO P M E N TS The Weimar Republic has often been described as a republic without republicans or a democracy without democrats. Undeniably those parties most committed to democratic change in 1918/19, that is, the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the left-liberal German Democratic Party (DDP), and the Catholic Centre Party, took a beating in the first national elections of June 1920. The SPD’s share of the vote went from 37.9 per cent in 1919 to 21.7 per cent in 1920, while the DDP plummeted from 18.5 to 8.3 per cent, and the Centre Party went from 19.7 per cent to 13.6 per cent. Disappointment about the course of the German revolution and the outcry over the Versailles Treaty were among the most important reasons for this collapse of the democratic vote. Yet various coalition governments broadly supportive of the republic saw off challenges from both the left and the right during the turbulent early years of Weimar. The newly founded Communist Party (KPD) followed an insurrectionist policy line until 1923, when the pathetic Hamburg rising ended all hopes of taking power in Berlin along similar lines to the Bolsheviks in Russia. The political right, often supported by the military and the old elites of imperial Germany, also attempted to get rid of parliamentary democracy and to return Germany to more authoritarian forms of government, most notably through the Kapp–L¨uttwitz putsch in 1920. Eventually, and despite the law courts’ lenient treatment of right-wing terrorists,
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which stood in marked contrast to the judges’ feverish persecution of the political left, the republic managed to pull through and, against the odds, establish a liberal parliamentary democracy ruled by a constitution committed to individual rights and social justice. In the circumstances this was a huge success for the democratic parties in Germany. Party politics in the Weimar Republic has often been perceived as messy and unsatisfactory. For a start, each and every party, even the most pro-republican, contained elements which were critical of the republic. Furthermore, the parties often seemed unable to forge compromises and agree on anything, which made coalition governments very difficult and led to the frequent collapse of governments and new elections. For sure, political parties had little experience playing the parliamentary game, as there was no parliamentary government in Germany before 1919. The imperial governments were responsible to the Emperor, not to parliament. Hence the Reichstag was a stage where politicians of various parties enacted their party programmes and beliefs. Cooperation between different parties existed pre-1918, but it was not paramount for parliamentary parties to reach compromise in order to maintain coalition governments. It is hence not surprising that coalition politics was difficult after 1919. Nevertheless, up until the economic depression of the late 1920s the republican parties managed reasonably well. In fact, two parties which started off impeccably opposed to the Weimar Republic, the German People’s Party (DVP) and the German National People’s Party (DNVP), came to support coalition governments, albeit, in the latter case, somewhat reluctantly. Under Gustav Stresemann the DVP turned into a staunch supporter of the republic. Under Count Kuno Westarp the DNVP was at least willing to play the parliamentary game. Only under the chairmanship of Alfred Hugenberg after May 1928 did the DNVP turn sharply to the right again, seeking to distance itself from the republic as much as possible. Rather than emphasize the failure of party politics in the Weimar Republic, one could equally stress what an impressive and steep learning curve party politics underwent in the 1920s. Some extremely talented republican politicians emerged, and it was a tragedy that so many of them were either murdered by terrorists (Walter Rathenau, Matthias Erzberger, Karl Gareis, and Kurt Eisner) or died prematurely, hounded to death by their political opponents (Friedrich Ebert, Gustav Stresemann). Given the lack of a strong parliamentary and republican tradition in Germany, the overall dearth of committed republicans is perhaps not surprising. But the republic managed to produce a reasonable amount of people who accepted and, in time, supported it as the only viable alternative following the collapse of the constitutional monarchies in 1918. During the middle years of the republic, parliamentary politics began to work better, although compromise and coalition politics were still hindered by the pillarization of German society into tight social milieux which corresponded to voting blocks for particular parties. Each party felt that it had to speak for and represent the interests of its particular social milieu: the SPD and the KPD those of the working class; the
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DDP and DVP those of the Protestant middle classes; the DNVP those of the agricultural interests; and the Centre Party those of the Catholics. The relative success of the Centre Party, but also of the SPD and the KPD, in retaining voters when challenged by the Nazi Party (NSDAP) in the final years of the republic, had much to do with the tight milieux in which these parties operated. They were part of a vast network of social and leisure-time organizations, which ranged from kindergartens to burial associations, from sports clubs to organizations for particular occupations, and from choirs to educational associations. Women’s and youth organizations, were prominent both in the Catholic and the working-class milieux. For Catholics, Socialists, and Communists it was possible to spend their lives from cradle to grave with relatively little contact with other pillars of society. It was the Protestant middle-class milieu and the farming interests which were least capable of resisting the National Socialist onslaught in the final crisis years of the republic. Farming was in perpetual crisis throughout the 1920s. The hyper-inflation of 1923 impoverished wide sections of the middle classes and the Great Depression after 1929 did nothing to inspire confidence in democratic politics. The status of many professional groups in society was in free fall, and the republic had been unable to protect civil servants and white-collar professionals from economic misery and social decline. The National Socialist share of the vote rose from a mere 2.6 per cent in 1928 to 18.3 per cent in 1930. Within two years it had almost doubled, and the elections of July 1932 saw the National Socialists emerge as biggest party in the Reichstag with 37.3 per cent of the vote and 230 members of parliament. Although, with hindsight, the threat from the political right to the Weimar Republic was always far more real than the threat from the political left, one should not forget that Weimar Germany boasted the strongest Communist Party in the world outside the Soviet Union. The KPD’s vote also rose during the years of the Great Depression, peaking in November 1932 when the party got 16.9 per cent—a mere 3.5 per cent behind its Social Democratic rival for the working-class vote. An alleged Bolshevik threat drove the conservative middle classes even more into the arms of the National Socialists. The National Socialists were the first genuine catch-all party in German history. They were successful in presenting a slightly different face to different constituencies and drawing support from all milieux in Germany. However, those who had not been part of the Socialist, Communist, and Catholic milieux were most prone to fall for the Nazi Party. But ultimately the National Socialists did not come to power through the ballot box. Parliamentary democracy ceased to function in 1930, when the democratic parties in the Reichstag were unable to produce workable coalition governments. In line with the letter (if not with the spirit) of the constitution, the president appointed so-called presidential cabinets. The Weimar constitution had set up the president as the closest substitute for the emperor, reflecting the desire of the makers of the constitution to create a
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strong executive as counterbalance to parliamentary rule. Elected directly by the people only every seven years, his powers included the appointment and dismissal of cabinets, the command over the army, the dissolution of the Reichstag, and the right to call new elections. He appointed the chancellor and he held vast emergency powers which included the temporary suspension of civil liberties. In the hands of a staunchly pro-republican president, like Ebert, these powers were used to save the republic and strengthen it. But in the hands of an anti-republican president, like Ebert’s successor, Paul von Hindenburg, they were turned against the republic. Under the chancellorship of the Centre Party politician Heinrich Br¨uning between 1930 and 1932, presidential cabinets tried to weather the economic storm and the political crisis which threatened to engulf the republic. The beginnings of the presidential cabinets spelt the end of the parliamentary democracy of Weimar. Hindenburg and his entourage had plans to use the cabinets to bring to an end parliamentary government. Br¨uning himself knew of those plans, although it is unclear to what degree he shared their ambition. But the presidential cabinets marked the slippery slope towards more authoritarian forms of government. As parliament grew weaker, interest group representatives, the army, and the civil service acquired more influence on how the country was run. It was an army man, General Kurt von Schleicher, who suggested building a ‘cross-front’ (Querfront) including both the trade unions on the left and the National Socialists on the right. During von Schleicher’s short time at the helm of a presidential cabinet between November 1932 and January 1933, he failed to bring about any such ‘cross-front’. Neither in 1930 nor in 1932/3 was it a foregone conclusion, however, that Hitler would take power. Hindenburg resisted his appointment as chancellor for a long time. It was his entourage, and in particular Franz von Papen, who convinced Hindenburg in the end to agree to the appointment of a cabinet in which the National Socialists were supposed to be ruled in by a range of other national-conservative forces. But when this new cabinet with Hitler at the helm was sworn in on 30 January 1933 the Nazis quickly dubbed it their ‘seizure of power’ (Machtergreifung), turning what was in effect the appointment of Hitler by Hindenburg into a revolutionary act of sweeping away the republic. Over the next weeks and months, the National Socialists established their dictatorship. Presidential decrees limited the freedom of the press and the freedom of assembly and gave Hitler special emergency powers. Meanwhile the Stormtroopers (SA) terrorized political opponents. The Enabling Law, passed in the Reichstag in March 1933, brought to an end parliamentary democracy, as it allowed the government to pass laws without the legislative’s consent. The opposition of the Social Democrats and the Centre Party together would still have left the National Socialists without the two-thirds majority required for the passing of the law. Yet in the end, only the Social Democrats were courageous enough to oppose the Nazis and stand up for parliamentary democracy. In a
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deeply moving speech Otto Wels defended the republican spirit: ‘we stand firm by the principles of the rule of law, and the equal and social rights enshrined in it. In this historic hour we Social Democrats solemnly profess our belief in the principles of humanity and justice, freedom and socialism. No Enabling Law gives you the right to obliterate ideas which are eternal and indestructible . . . ’ In July 1933 the Social Democrats along with all other remaining political parties were abolished and a one-party state came into being. After Hindenburg died in 1935, Hitler’s position was unassailable. The whole National Socialist state was ‘working towards the F¨uhrer’ (Ian Kershaw)—several competing institutions, ranging from the military, to civil administrations to party institutions, were all vying for influence and the ear of the dictator. An ‘institutional Darwinism’ (David Schoenbaum) was implemented which produced administrative chaos as well as restless dynamism and activism. Federal structures were abolished and replaced by a system where Reichsstatthalter and Gauleiter ruled over administrative units and were directly responsible to Hitler. Self-confident and power-hungry regional satraps emerged which often attempted to protect their authority against that of the Reich bureaucracy and increased further the degree of administrative chaos. But all of that did not make Hitler a ‘weak dictator’ (Hans Mommsen); he mattered in the National Socialist system, as no decision could be taken without his consent. As the leadership principle was adopted throughout society, the ultimate leader, Hitler, made the key decisions. His ‘blessing’ was necessary to give his satraps the security that they were acting with the consent of their F¨uhrer. That was true for the Holocaust as much as for decisions of domestic and foreign policy and the conduct of the war. Without Hitler the Third Reich would have looked very different. At the same time National Socialism was not Hitlerism. It has often been described as either a variant of fascism or totalitarianism. Although generic concepts such as fascism and totalitarianism are important in comparing aspects of National Socialist Germany with aspects of other dictatorial regimes, National Socialism’s unique features are not captured by these concepts. Its radical propagation of a racial state, ruled by belonging to a racial community, set it apart from other fascist or totalitarian regimes. Race became the new religion, and National Socialism had indeed many elements of a political religion. Prayers were dedicated to Hitler in the Third Reich and the F¨uhrer was depicted as the new Messiah, leading his people into the promised land of Aryan supermen. Germany had been reborn under the Nazis. Sections of the National Socialist movement, in particular the SS under Heinrich Himmler, were hostile to Christianity and practised Teutonic paganism, but other National Socialists were far more willing to come to an arrangement with the Protestant and Catholic Churches, provided the latter accepted the National Socialist state. The Protestant Churches in particular had been largely hostile to the Weimar Republic. When the Versailles Treaty was signed they had declared a day of national mourning. Both the Catholic and Protestant Churches were highly
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critical of the more libertarian aspects of Weimar culture and frequently called for a return to traditional moral values. In 1917 the Protestants had celebrated the 400th anniversary of Luther’s posting of the famous ninety-five theses. Luther had long been a major national hero for the Protestant community, and the festivities in 1917 were again steeped in nationalism. Protestant supporters of Hitler often compared him to a second Luther. They assembled in an organization entitled ‘German Christians’. It was founded in 1932 and led by Pastor Ludwig M¨uller. Entirely in line with the National Socialist idea of the racial state and virulently anti-Semitic, it attracted 3,000 of the 17,000 Protestant pastors in Germany, a far greater number than those who joined the oppositional Confessional Church. The Catholic Church had traditionally a much greater distance from the German state and the authorities than the Protestant Churches. But the Catholic Church also tried to come to some form of agreement with the Nazi state which would ensure the survival of the strong Catholic associationalism in Germany. Hence a concordat was signed in 1933 between the Pope in Rome and the Nazi government which seemed to guarantee the autonomy of the Church in exchange for guarantees that the Church and its clergy would stop playing a part in political affairs. Individual Catholic bishops, such as Clemens August Graf von Galen, protested against specific Nazi crimes, such as the murder of the mentally handicapped in 1941. But overall there was, for example, little protest over the anti-Semitic measures taken by the Nazi regime. For the majority, both the Catholic and Protestant Churches seemed content to come to an arrangement with the new Nazi regime. The National Socialists had important allies among other traditional elites, above all, in the army, in the civil service, and in industry. These elites were steeped in the values of the authoritarian imperial German state. But the National Socialists were always the dominant party in any power cartel, as they penetrated the state bureaucracy with great efficiency. They could rely on the popular support of large sections of the wider population willing to collude with Hitler and the National Socialist regime to produce one of the most barbaric dictatorships in history. The Gestapo, the SS, and the SA were the terroristic face of the regime. It is, however, easy to overemphasize the degree to which German society under Nazism was a totalitarian octopus governing every aspect of individual lives. Gleichschaltung, the process of bringing into the National Socialist orbit all organizations of civil society, was for real. Thousands of organizations and groups were forcibly dissolved or decreed their own disappearance or merger with National Socialist organizations. The terror apparatus of the regime was efficient enough to deal ruthlessly with acts of political opposition, but it could not control all aspects of society. It had to rely on the willingness of the wider population to conform with National Socialist values and ideals. And many among the German Volksgenossen were all too willing to follow suit. Thus, for example, the Gestapo was inundated with calls from ordinary Germans keen to denounce alleged enemies of the National Socialist state—among them neighbours, colleagues,
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friends, and family. The solidarity and fascination of wide sections of the German population with Hitler was real. Yet popular support for the Third Reich was not constant. Thus, for example, levels of support for the regime fell dramatically the year before the outbreak of the Second World War. Nevertheless, the ‘Hitler myth’ (Ian Kershaw) created a special bond between many Germans and the dictator which did not even falter during the final phase of the Second World War. Criticisms of his paladins and the National Socialist regime mounted, but Hitler remained exempt, retaining frightening levels of popularity even in the early years of the Federal Republic. The Volksgemeinschaft was a central ingredient in the ideology underpinning the National Socialist racial state (Michael Burleigh and Wolfgang Wippermann). The idea of a people unified by racial characteristics produced policies of the National Socialist state aimed at undermining social inequality. It also helped to erode the social milieux which had been such a characteristic of German society before 1933, but it needed the war to obliterate the traditional milieux and pave the way for catch-all parties after 1949. Although the notion of Volksgemeinschaft appealed to many Germans, not everyone wanted to be part of it. Active resistance to National Socialism inside Germany was restricted to small clandestine groups which remained relatively ineffective. Foremost among them were Communists, Social Democrats, Christians, and members of those groups deemed not to belong to the racial community, above all Germans of Jewish faith. By 1935/6 almost all resistance groups within Germany had been infiltrated by the Gestapo and its members were either dead or in concentration camps. By 1939 about 150,000 Communists and Social Democrats had been interned in concentration camps. Tens of thousands of Germans had fled the country and were living an often precarious existence as political refugees in Europe and elsewhere. 12,000 Germans had been convicted of high treason and 40,000 were imprisoned for lesser political offences. During the war, civilian courts handed out 15,000 death sentences for opposing the National Socialist state. Communists suffered the greatest loss of life in the fight against Nazism, but they did not pose the biggest threat to National Socialism. It was resistance from within national conservative circles and in particular from within the military which was dangerous to the regime. But the military coup against Hitler in July 1944 came very late in the day. Even if it had been successful, it would not have marked a return of Germany to republicanism and parliamentary democracy, as most of the plotters were deeply anti-democratic. Most had initially supported Hitler and the German war effort and turned against the dictator only after things had started to go wrong. Yet opposition went beyond active resistance. Many Germans partially rejected specific aspects of the National Socialist regime and in their everyday life tried to bring into line their personal ideas and beliefs with the demands made on them by the National Socialist state. This did not produce active resistance, but it did lead to acts of defiance or complaints about particular practices and policies. Arguably
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the majority of Germans were neither fervent National Socialists content with every aspect of the regime nor active opponents of National Socialism determined to topple the dictator. E C O N O M Y, S O C I E T Y, A N D C U LT U R E The new republican Germany dealt successfully with the legacy of the lost war after 1918. Six million soldiers needed to be demobilized and integrated back into civilian life. Above all, they needed jobs. Hence women, who had been recruited into the factories and offices during wartime, were either directly thrown out of a job or enticed back to domesticity by a strong discourse about maternalism and the duties of married women around the home and in social welfare. Yet the republic also gave nineteen million women the right to vote for the first time. Extremely diverse images of women stood next to each other: the voter, the consumer, the proletarian worker, the emancipated employee, and the mother and carer. But Weimar Germany was perhaps most frequently identified with the phenomenon of the ‘New Woman’, who stereotypically was wearing fashionable clothes, had short hair, held a job, smoked, and could be found regularly in the cinemas and dance halls of the cities. It was, of course, very much a male projection of a modern-day femme fatale. But the promise of greater emancipation of women was there in the republic, which witnessed major debates surrounding the female body. While many saw motherhood as a national duty, some were keen to introduce more voluntary concepts of motherhood. Sexual knowledge became more readily available to women than ever before. Diverse methods of contraception were used more widely, and women set about to reclaim their bodies and demand more rights. The economic crises of the 1920s were far more important than images of the ‘New Woman’ in threatening traditional gender roles. Among the now impoverished middle classes, wives, mothers, and daughters found it difficult to retain their home-bound status, as they were forced by sheer economic necessity to think about gainful employment. Overall, the feminization of the workforce gathered pace throughout the 1920s. Positions such as stenographers, typists, and telephonists were now routinely filled by women. All of this met with a ferocious backlash, as misogynist representations of women were directly proportional to the rising promises of emancipation. Anti-republican organizations were particularly outspoken on identifying the republic with women’s emancipation and denouncing both. The discursive processes concerning gender issues reached out and overlapped with welfare issues. Caring for the many war disabled and war widows became a prime political issue after 1918 and led to a massive extension of welfare services, in which women often played a prominent role. In 1913 Germany spent one billion Reichsmark on welfare. In 1929 that sum had increased ninefold to nine billion Reichsmark. Even considering that the value of the Reichsmark
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had decreased between 1913 and 1929 this was a massive increase in state expenditure for welfare. The 1922 Youth Welfare Law, the 1924 National Welfare Decree, and the 1927 Unemployment Benefit Law were milestones on the road to guaranteeing social security to the vast majority of citizens. Progressive labour laws, new pension schemes, and massive housing programmes added to the ambition of the republic to turn Germany into a comprehensive welfare state. The principle of the welfare state was enshrined in Article 151 of the Constitution, but time and again the ambition came into conflict with economic reality. Too often the republic could not deliver on the promises it had made to diverse groups of people whose expectations of better welfare had been raised by republican politicians. In other countries, such as Britain, caring for the victims of war was left far more to private charities and welfare organizations. In Germany the state took prime responsibility, arguing that social rights had to be expanded to honour the people’s sacrifices for the nation in wartime. But the expectations could not be fulfilled by a republican welfare state which was always overburdened. Hence the state was blamed for failing the veterans and the war dead. As disappointment frequently turned to despair, many veterans blamed the republic for their fate and moved to the anti-republican right. Taking care of the veterans’ needs was widely perceived as the least the republic could do in exchange for their sacrifice to the nation. With so many dead, crippled, and injured, the memorialization of the war became a major issue. Almost every town and community across Germany built its own memorial to their dead, as commemorating the war became a means of reasserting militaristic values that had been so prominent in the empire. The military establishment was still the backbone of such militarist sentiment. It felt humiliated by the stipulations of Versailles reducing the German army to a token force. Many officers were steeped in Prussianism and resentful of everything that smacked of republicanism and democracy. Officially, they declared that they wanted to keep the army out of politics, but in reality they were building a force which was infused with anti-republicanism. Popular among the generals in the 1920s was the idea of a ‘military state’ (Wehrstaat), where all resources would be geared towards the militarization of social life. If the military elite was unhappy with the republic, the same can be said for the industrial elite. In the early years of the republic the state subsidized many industries in order to secure jobs. Republican politicians virtually guaranteed full employment to head off further social discontent. The republic also fundamentally reshaped industrial relations. During the war, in the Auxiliary Services Law of 1916, trade unions were recognized as legal representatives of the workers for the first time. Following the revolution in 1918 unions were in a powerful position to demand economic changes. There was a groundswell of working-class support for demands for the widespread socialization and nationalization of industries. But trade union leaders settled in the end for the introduction of the eight-hour day and the notion of social partnership between unions and employers, which
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found institutional expression in the Central Working Community (Zentrale Arbeitsgemeinschaft, ZAG). Many employers, however, and in particular the influential leaders of heavy industry, found it deeply unpalatable having to negotiate with union leaders. They wanted to return to the ‘master-in-their-own-house’ attitude that had governed industrial relations in imperial Germany. Denouncing the Weimar Republic as a ‘trade union state’, they did everything to scupper the success of the ZAG, increase working hours, reduce wages, and undermine notions of social partnership. Undoubtedly sections of the German economy suffered from high wage costs, high social welfare costs, and high taxation. In a climate in which world economic growth was weak, all of these factors further hindered the dynamic growth of the economy and turned the industrial elites against the republic. Their anti-republicanism did not, however, make them into early supporters of the National Socialists. In fact, few prominent industrialists backed Adolf Hitler before 1932. Yet they certainly did not mind when the National Socialists demolished the last remnants of parliamentarism and implemented a dictatorship in which many industrialists were happy to gain from the economic advantages that the regime offered them. The troublesome union movement was destroyed by the National Socialists. As the leadership principle was introduced into the factories, the managers and employers once again became ‘masters-intheir-own-house’, although they now had to reckon with the National Socialists. Undoubtedly economic interest groups declined in importance in the Third Reich and the relationship between industrialists and the state varied enormously in different branches of industry. The National Socialist state intervened heavily in economic decision-making. Industry had to comply with the aims and ambitions of the National Socialists, not vice versa. But much money was still to be made, important leaders of industry were appointed to leading positions in the direction of German industry and, by and large, the industrial elite in Germany was happy enough to play alongside the National Socialist regime. If many representatives of the traditional German elites were unhappy with republicanism and parliamentary democracy, the revolution and the subsequent republic unleashed an explosion of cultural creativity. Many of those working in the culture industry welcomed the crumbling of the edifice of an imperial German state widely perceived as philistine. Artists and writers were enthused by the energy and dynamism of the revolution, which brought greater freedom for cultural producers. The richness and diversity of Weimar culture is an expression of this release of energy after 1918. The modernist movement, which had its origins well before 1914, came fully into its own in the Weimar Republic. German expressionist film was the only cinema in inter-war Europe to hold its own against Hollywood. In the realm of architecture the Bauhaus set new international standards in modernism. Its style became closely associated with the democratic style of the republic. It was all about clarity, usefulness, and
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Figure 9.1. The Bauhaus in Dessau.
honesty of lines and materials. There was no pretence. The beautiful merged with the practical. It also had a social vision which found expression in some of the most famous new housing estates of the republic, such as the Hufeisensiedlung in Berlin. The leading modernist architects of the 1920s, such as Walter Gropius and Bruno Taut, were keen to contribute to the making of a new Germany through a style of ‘new sobriety’, a style that consciously tried to disassociate itself from the architectural pomp of imperial Germany. Berlin itself became the very symbol of urban modernity, even if small-town Germany always remained more typical of German everyday life than the muchhated and much-maligned metropolis. Berlin had the museums, theatres, concert halls, cabarets, restaurants, nightclubs, music halls, jazz cellars, cinemas, and bordellos. It had a world-class university and one of the foremost institutes for psychoanalysis. Magnus Hirschfeld’s famous Institute for Sexology was at home in a city which seemed to encourage and tolerate all sorts of sexual experimentation. Radical artists, be they Dadaist, Futurist, or Cubist, challenged the contemporary understanding of art. Christopher Isherwood’s Farewell to Berlin is a lasting tribute to the magneticism of Berlin for many European intellectuals of the inter-war period. But in small-town Germany Berlin was denounced as ‘Babel of sin’ and a symbol of ‘sexual Bolshevism’. Here half-timbered houses (Fachwerk) dominated the skyline, people liked to listen to traditional folk music, they cherished realistic genre paintings, Christmas was celebrated as the ultimate symbol of German ‘Innerlichkeit’, and mountain and Heimat films were
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popular. Not for nothing did National Socialist propaganda identify small-town Germany with the health of the nation, whereas the metropolis stood for illness and decay. The flowering of culture under Weimar did not mean that Weimar culture was, on the whole, pro-republican. Art, architecture, and culture more generally were often difficult to pin down politically. Several Bauhaus architects, for example, continued to work in Germany under National Socialism. The National Socialists denounced expressionism as un-German, but there were expressionists, such as Emil Nolde, who were violent anti-Semites and would have been all too glad to serve the master race. In fact the cultural sphere just as much as the political sphere was characterized by processes of radicalization and polarization. Many well-known cultural producers in the Weimar Republic veered either towards the Communist or towards the v¨olkisch camp. On the left the atrocious social injustices about which the republic apparently could do little drove artists and writers into the camp of Communism. Bertold Brecht and Hanns Eisler were directly involved in some of the Agitprop activities of the KPD. K¨athe Kollwitz and Heinrich Mann veered from support of left liberalism and democracy to sympathy for the Communist position. Germany was a highly developed civil society which had a vibrant mass media, but much of it was anti-pluralist, intolerant, and xenophobic. The Frankfurter Zeitung was the flagship of the democratic and liberal Germany and republican media magnates, such as Mosse and Ullstein, published many of the republic’s finest authors. But the anti-republican right could rely on the support of the media empire of Alfred Hugenberg. A great number of authors wrote literature which praised the virtues of the Volk or produced war novels which spread the mythologies of the community of the trenches and glorified wartime experiences. National-conservative intellectuals such as Ernst von Salomon, Ernst J¨unger, and Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, representatives of the so-called ‘conservative revolution’, saw themselves on a quest to reproduce the mythical wartime collectivity and promote Volksgemeinschaft ideals. Among the young, there was a widespread desire for wholeness which turned to anti-rationalism and found expression in the Wandervogel movement. The young, more generally, but specifically university students, turned to the right in the early 1930s. To them the republic seemed elderly, unexciting, and plodding. Struggling with dim job prospects and the feeling of having missed out on the experience of the trenches, they came to identify the Weimar state with musty paternalism and encrusted structures. The v¨olkisch right enticed them with a more intoxicating brew of youthful dynamism and activism. If the young were disappointed with the republic, the latter had been trying its best to make things work. After the war republican governments subsidized industries and distributed welfare in an attempt to head off further social unrest. Under such circumstances the republic found it impossible to pursue deflationary policies which would have put the country’s finances on a sounder
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footing. Germany had financed the war by printing more money rather than by raising taxation levels. Financial policies after the war should have been more stringent, but this would arguably have dug a hole for the republic at a time when it was desperately trying to survive. One cannot blame republicans for trying to prevent the premature collapse of the republic, even if, with hindsight, post-war financial development pointed in the direction of hyper-inflation which finally caught up with Germany in the wake of the passive resistance to the French Occupation of the Ruhr in 1923. Hyper-inflation produced immense social hardship for the working classes and impoverished wide sections of the German middle classes. It alienated wide sections of the population from the Weimar republic which was blamed for this financial disaster. If politicians at the beginning of the republic were caught between the Scylla of inflation and the Charybdis of risking further social unrest which might have ended the republican experiment prematurely, did they not have more options in combating the even deeper economic crisis associated with the Great Depression after 1929? The economic historian Knut Borchardt caused a long-running debate with his powerful argument that the republic was equally without a feasible alternative after 1929. Already before the onset of the economic depression, according to Borchardt, the Weimar economy was fatally weakened by rapid rises in real wages which exceeded productivity and wage rises abroad. High taxes on industry were used to fund the welfare programmes of the republic. Uncompetitive and without the money to make necessary investments, German industry was hit particularly hard by the economic slump. As Borchardt sees it, no economic policy could have made a difference in the context of the distributional conflicts of Weimar democracy, fixed exchange rates, and the gold standard. Many historians have disagreed, arguing that it was largely lack of imagination and the fear of reproducing inflationary tendencies, which prevented Weimar governments from adopting Keynesian economic policies. John Maynard Keynes, an influential economist, argued that governments could spend their way out of economic crisis by increasing government debt short-term, in order to promote industrial growth and employment. His ideas of counter-cyclical economic policies were implemented to different degrees, but in both cases successfully, in Sweden and the United States to combat the Great Depression in the 1930s. Yet republican politicians from the left and the right clung to financial orthodoxy. Although they were undoubtedly restricted in their actions by the Bank of International Settlements and the Young Plan, they could have tried to gain greater room for manœuvre. Instead, they pursued deflationary policies in an attempt to balance budgets, thereby exacerbating the crisis and missing an opportunity to cushion the politically disastrous effects of this worst economic crisis to engulf the industrial world in the twentieth century. By 1932, Germany counted seven million unemployed. The depression caused unprecedented social misery with which the welfare system could not cope. It was this economic failure which provided the backdrop to Hitler’s rise to power.
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Hyper-inflation and the Great Depression battered industrial life in Weimar Germany. Many working in agriculture were also hit hard by economic crisis. Cheap imports of grain from North America threatened their very existence. On the vast East Elbian estates the Prussian Junkers still dominated the political interest groups and the social life of the population. Elsewhere in Germany, small farmers dominated the scene, but they too participated in a wide range of often radical and violent agricultural protest. Whereas Junkerdom was still influential enough to make right-wing governments subsidize their large estates east of the river Elbe, smaller farmers were often left to fend for themselves. As hundreds of farmers were forced into bankruptcy, the agricultural vote became easy prey of the anti-republican right. National Socialism had some of its earliest and most stable pockets of support in rural areas. Its ‘blood and soil’ ideology appealed to many people living on and from the land. It promised redemption from a modern agricultural capitalism which seemed to push them towards extinction and held out the vision of a protected niche where their traditional ways of life would be preserved. A healthy Volksgemeinschaft, the National Socialist propaganda implied, was rooted in the land. The racial stock of those who worked the land would be crucial in moulding the image of the new Aryan man propagated by Hitler’s rural ideologues, such as Richard Walther Darr´e. Although the National Socialists could not stem the long-term trend towards further de-agrarianization, they raised the social status of farmers. Rural ways of life were equated with true Germanness. Once in power, the National Socialists did protect the Aryan German farmer and his property. They could not be expropriated any more, but at the same time they were also de facto tied to the land. With the government in full control of markets and prices for agricultural products, the agricultural community could do nothing but follow the National Socialists’ ambitious plans for achieving autarky in the provision of food for the German people. But the ideal of the Volksgemeinschaft meant more than a happy community of stocky German farmers. As the central ingredient in the National Socialist world view it appealed to many different elements of the German population and rallied diverse social groups to the banner of National Socialism. The National Socialist Volksgemeinschaft had a medieval and a modern face. It incorporated Thingspiele, where people dressed up in medieval garments, performed Teutonic rituals, and celebrated ancient Germanic values. But it also included the vision of a high-tech, mobile industrial nation at the forefront of science and technology. The Autobahnen were supposed to revolutionize the German transport system. The 1936 Berlin automobile show was geared towards presenting Germany at the hub of the new age of the automobile. The Berlin Olympic Games in the same year were meant to showcase the National Socialist Volksgemeinschaft. Workers were wooed by the National Socialists through promises of social and economic advancement. The National Socialists did not produce an economic miracle but they benefited from and built on policies implemented under
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the chancellors von Papen and von Schleicher in 1932. Yet millions Germans experienced the period from 1933 to 1936 as improvement: workplaces were secure again and living standards were rising. The National Socialist propaganda included an array of positive proletarian images. The National Socialists made International Labour Day (1 May) a national holiday, praised the German workers’ ‘quality work’ and emphasized the ‘honour of manual labour’. Organizations such as Beauty of Labour and Strength through Joy were meant to improve working conditions, give more social status, and promote better lifestyles for millions of Aryan workers. Family loans, tax breaks, a consumer revolution (symbolized, above all, by the radio, dubbed Volksempf¨anger, and the car, called Volkswagen) and an authoritarian welfare state were among the promises made by the National Socialists. They remained, by and large, promises. The Volksgemeinschaft of the 1930s was more propaganda than social reality. But the National Socialists missed no opportunity to claim that social distinctions between working classes and other social classes were broken down systematically. Of course, the promises of National Socialism were available only within the parameters of the racial state. Access to services, goods, and benefits were regulated by belonging to a racial community. Rigorous exclusion of those not belonging to this racial community, above all the Jews, was an integral part of the system. The forging of the ‘people’s community’ depended vitally on the construction of internal and external enemies as the ‘other’ which threatened that community: Jews, Bolsheviks, Slavs, feminists, pacifists, homosexuals, Roma, Jehovah’s witnesses, and republicans. Their maltreatment, harassment, imprisonment, and, ultimately, elimination was a central ingredient in the National Socialist vision of Volksgemeinschaft. In the racial state the ‘healthy’ had to be separated from the ‘degenerate’. As the body of the Volk took priority over the body of the individual, the state had a responsibility for providing welfare and services for Aryans and weed out those who were allegedly weakening the ‘people’s body’. Welfare and elimination were two sides of the same coin. The national discourse became medicalized and biologized to an extent unknown before. V¨olkisch ideas were centred around notions of healing the ‘people’s body’, which had been threatened with disease and decay by sectional interests, party politics, alien Western ideas, Bolshevism, sexual promiscuity, and other evils. All aspects of society were racialized. Racism penetrated state policy at every level. The cult of physical health, the emphasis on ‘racial purity’, the rise of eugenics as a scientific discipline in the Third Reich and the practice of euthanasia testify to the overriding importance attributed by the Nazis to issues of ‘racial health and hygiene’. Skulls were now measured to prove racial purity; those deemed genetically deficient were forcibly sterilized and the mentally ill were murdered; at the same time, war, struggle, and violence were celebrated as true expression of German warriordom. ‘Jewish music’ was banned from the concert halls, ‘Jewish art’ removed from the museums, and books by ‘Jewish authors’ were burnt. National Socialist architecture aestheticized power and celebrated a cult
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Figure 9.2. The Eternal Jew, anti-Semitic film poster, 1940.
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of the Germanic hero which also found expression in the arts in the powerful, belligerent, and self-confident male nudes produced by Arno Breker. The National Socialist pantheon was, by and large, male. Women’s national vocation was motherhood. Mother’s Day was made a national holiday, and mothers were awarded crosses of honour in bronze, silver, and gold, depending on how many offspring they reared. Aryan women benefited from exemplary population and family policies, while those excluded from the racial community were forcibly sterilized and murdered. National Socialist anti-feminism led to a wave of dismissals of women from positions in the higher echelons of the civil service and the professions, but overall the National Socialists could not reverse the trend towards greater employment of women which had been such a notable feature of the Weimar Republic. Many women undoubtedly supported the racialized Volksgemeinschaft. National Socialist organizations such as the Association for German Girls, the Reich Labour Service, and the National Socialist Women’s League offered millions of women a range of opportunities outside the sphere of the home. Women also participated actively in the race war on the Eastern Front and in the Holocaust. The racial state found its most horrific apogee in the systematic murder of European Jewry. Anti-Semitism in Germany had been no worse than in many other European countries before 1933. Violent anti-Semitism and calls to cleanse the ‘people’s body’ of Jewish ‘parasites’ were restricted to v¨olkisch groups on the far right. The National Socialist Party was openly anti-Semitic, although it did not emphasize that aspect of its programme much before 1933. After 1933, however, pogroms against Jews started almost immediately, and their rights as German citizens were curbed and reduced more and more during the 1930s. The infamous Nuremberg laws of 1935 made any sexual contact between Germans and Jews a criminal offence, and the Law for the Protection of German Blood and Honour stipulated that only those of ‘German or German-related blood’ could be citizens of the Reich. In 1938 the Night of Broken Glass saw most synagogues throughout Germany go up in flames and thousands of Jews maltreated. The systematic Aryanization of Jewish property benefited thousands of German businessmen. During the war German victims of Allied bombing were often given furniture of Jewish families who had been sent to the gas chambers. The Wannsee conference of 1942 had laid the foundations for the systematic murder of European Jewry in annihilation camps in Poland and Eastern Europe. Mass shootings and mass murder of Eastern European Jewry had predated the Wannsee conference and were part and parcel of National Socialist warfare in the East almost from the beginning. The widespread support of the German people for the National Socialist regime continued, even when the war began to bite. The ordinary man in the street had never been asked to bear the full brunt of the costs for war. No direct taxes for the mass of the population were ever introduced to finance the war. The National Socialists did attempt to curb consumption and siphon
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off any spare capital into the war economy, but they also ruthlessly exploited the occupied territories and robbed European Jewry of its property. Ethnic cleansing in Eastern Europe was meant to make way for German colonizers who would repopulate the region. Heinrich Himmler’s ‘socialism of the good blood’ enticed many Germans to undergo ‘race tests’ in the hope for better homes and careers in Eastern Europe. Millions of slave labourers from across Europe (finely graded according to the categories of race) helped the German war economy and made it largely unnecessary for the National Socialists to draft women into the factories. German men often experienced occupational advancement and upward social mobility, as they were put in charge of the slave labourers. The harsh treatment of them at the hands of the Volksgenossen testifies to the degree to which ideas of the racial community had penetrated everyday life in National Socialist Germany. The very barbarity of the racial war on the Eastern Front was further testimony of the impact of racialism on wider sections of the German population. Even during the final months of the war, when everyone knew that the war had been lost, millions of Germans continued to fight until the bitter end, although increasing numbers of Volksgenossen also began to opt out of the National Socialist vision—just waiting for the inevitable and hoping to survive. Carpet bombing had reduced German cities to heaps of rubble, and millions of ethnic Germans were fleeing the advancing Red Army in the East. The war had come home to the Germans with a vengeance. I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E L AT I O N S After 1918 the lost war and the Versailles Treaty left the overwhelming majority of Germans with the desire to revise the stipulations of a peace treaty which they regarded as deeply unjust and humiliating. Under the treaty Germany lost almost 15 per cent of its arable land, three-quarters of its iron ore, and one-quarter of its coal. The Saar basin was separated from Germany for fifteen years to be administered by the League of Nations, while its coal output was to benefit France. The Rhineland was demilitarized and occupied by Allied soldiers. The Allies prohibited Austria from joining Germany. All of Germany’s overseas investments and properties were confiscated. It lost its colonies. It lost its merchant shipping. Severe restrictions were put on Germany’s military. And on top of all this, the country was to pay massive war reparations and declared the sole guilty party in the outbreak of war in 1914. Although, at first sight, these seem indeed harsh peace terms, none of them prevented Germany from quickly re-establishing its position as one of the most important economic powerhouses in Europe and a great nation among the other great nations of Europe. It was by no means as harsh a peace as was depicted in the contemporary German press. Much of the reparations were never paid. And although no German was willing to admit it in the inter-war period, the
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First World War was a bid for German hegemony in Europe which directly aimed at extending its borders and penetrating vast areas of East-Central and Eastern Europe. Some territories were going to be directly incorporated into a much bigger German Reich, whilst a range of vassal states would do Germany’s bidding in Eastern Europe. The treaty of Brest-Litovsk between Germany and a defeated Russia in the spring of 1918 gave the world a feel for things to come had Germany won the war against the Western Allies. The high-pitched hopes for German dominance, re-enforced at Brest-Litovsk, were confronted with the widespread loss of territories determined at Versailles. The nation was about to be rudely awakened to the realities of a lost war. While republican politicians were willing to consider the territorial losses in the West and the North, the much more substantial losses in the East were never accepted. The extensive loss of territories meant that the issue of borders and bordering became hugely important. German foreign policy tried to strengthen that part of Germandom in Eastern Europe that found itself outside the borders of the German Reich after 1918. German politicians argued that for centuries Germans in Eastern Europe had fulfilled a colonizing and civilizing mission. It was territory deeply imbued with German culture. The Tannenberg memorial in East Prussia, which was officially opened in 1927, became an important symbol for German cultural superiority over the Slav East. State-funded German Ostforschung provided ‘scientific’ expertise to legitimate the territorial ambitions of Germany in East-Central and Eastern Europe. The traditional anti-Slav impetus of German nationalism strengthened the desire to bring the lost territories in the East back under German control. Republican Germany was quite successful in effectively penetrating East-Central European markets, which were perceived by many German economic experts as ‘natural markets’ for German industry. German economic muscle was an important element in strategies for the revision of the Versailles Treaty. When, in 1922, Germany and the Soviet Union signed the Rapallo Treaty, alarm bells were ringing in the West European capitals. Were the two outcasts of post-1918 Europe about to join forces to bring about a revision of borders in Eastern Europe? Given the prevalence of anti-Slav sentiments in Germany, the country was far more likely to seek reconciliation with the West. Many representatives of Weimar democracy argued that Germany should demonstrate its goodwill by trying to fulfil the payment schedule for war reparations laid down in the aftermath of the Versailles Treaty. The Allies would see that these payments had a crippling effect on Germany and would in turn be willing to reconsider their demands. German politicians could indeed count on a fairly sympathetic hearing from Britain in the 1920s. Jingoism and anti-German sentiments peaked immediately after the war, but soon those who, like Keynes, had warned about the dire consequences of keeping Germany impoverished won the upper hand. British foreign policy became an important ally in attempts to revise Versailles.
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The Dawes plan of 1924 opened the path to a peaceful revision of the Versailles Treaty. It recommended evacuation of the Ruhr by the French, the setting up of a special bank to receive reparations payments from Germany, and the granting of a generous international loan to Germany. If hyper-nationalists in Germany denounced the Dawes plan as a devious plot to enslave Germans for generations to come, there could be no mistaking the fact that the tone of the Allies had become more conciliatory. And indeed two years later Germany was admitted to the League of Nations. Franco-German relations were set on the road to a genuine reconciliation under the Locarno Treaty of 1925. Its architects, Gustav Stresemann and Aristide Briand, made the first steps to overcome the alleged ‘hereditary enmity’ between the two nations. They shared the Nobel Peace Prize in 1926 for their endeavours and went on to become early champions of the idea of a European Federal Union. The Young Plan and The Hague conference were also important in furthering Franco-German d´etente. The Kellogg-Briand pact of August 1928 was essentially a pact to outlaw war, but it provided an important opportunity for Stresemann to push his case for a peaceful revision of the Versailles Treaty and an early return of the Rhineland under German control. If representatives of Weimar democracy sought to bring about an end to the perceived injustices of Versailles by furthering genuine reconciliation—at least with the former enemies among the Western countries of Europe—the anti-republican right remained impeccable and immovable in their opposition to all reconciliation. Already under Br¨uning Germany’s foreign policy moved from Stresemann’s idea of a peaceful integration of Germany into a new European order to the notion of a strong ‘central Europe’, in which Germany had a hegemonic position. On a superficial level, National Socialist foreign policies were a continuation of Weimar foreign policies, as both National Socialists and Weimar politicians put the revision of the Versailles Treaty at the top of their agenda. But ultimately Hitler quickly abandoned the peaceful search for a revision of the stipulations of Versailles. In October 1933 Germany left the disarmament conference and the League of Nations. Hitler’s confrontationist tactics wanted to push the Allies to the limit while, at the same time, actively preparing for a new war, which was perceived as the only possibility of achieving the old aim of hegemony in Europe and ultimately in the world. It also had an intensely ideological component in that it was directed against Jewish Bolshevism. Preparation for war and racialist anti-Semitism had not been part of Weimar’s foreign policy. The National Socialists showed themselves flexible enough to forge short-term alliances with the Soviet Union in 1939, but the short-term gain did not mean that the National Socialists lost sight of their ultimate goal: an ideological and aggressively expansionist war in Eastern Europe fought on behalf of a Volk ohne Raum (people without space). For this purpose the Anti-Comintern Pact was signed by Germany and Japan in November 1936. In May 1939 Italy joined to make it the ‘Pact of Steel’ between these three deeply anti-Communist and
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expansionist nations. When war broke out in September 1939, it looked as though the totalitarian dictatorships were ready to take over what remained of liberal parliamentary democracy in Western Europe. But when Britain could not be defeated quickly, National Socialist Germany made the mistake of attacking the Soviet Union. After initial successes, the German armies got stuck in the Russian winter. When Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, it brought the United States into the war on the side of Britain. In 1942–3 the battles of Stalingrad and El Alamein marked the turning point of the war. By 1945 the Communist Soviet Union and the Western democracies had jointly defeated fascism. C O N C LU S I O N S Any balance sheet of the years 1919 to 1945 in German history has to start with the Holocaust and the National Socialist dictatorship. How did a project of such primeval barbarity succeed in a highly civilized and modern society? Ideas of a negative German Sonderweg, paving the way for Hitler and the National Socialists and reaching back far into the nineteenth century and beyond, gained widespread support in the 1960s and 1970s. The loss of the First World War and the Versailles Peace Treaty, others argued, contributed much to the failure of the first German republic, as it was unjustly but effectively blamed for the lost war and the ‘treaty of shame’. The onslaught of the political right against the republic coincided with the rise of v¨olkisch nationalism after 1918 which contributed to the victory of National Socialism in 1933 and the setting up of their racial state thereafter. And yet, one should not forget that, despite its eventual collapse, parliamentary democracy had its own glorious moments between 1919 and 1933. The revolution of 1918 marked the promise of a more democratic, more liberal, and more emancipated future. Social rights were enshrined in the Weimar constitution for the first time in German history, and the experimentation with welfare state policies was extraordinarily progressive in the 1920s. The concept of social partnership between trade unions and employers, established for the first time with the ZAG of 1918, was pointing towards future developments in the second half of the twentieth century. There were also some real openings for Franco-German cooperation and European economic integration, which in the end came to nothing, but which also pointed in the direction of developments post-1945. Furthermore, the Weimar Republic paved the way for greater women’s emancipation. In the arts, the period between 1919 and 1933 produced some of the great classics of twentieth-century culture. Republicans successfully defended democracy against left-wing and right-wing extremism in the early years of Weimar. Monarchist and anti-republican right-wing parties became integrated more closely in the middle years of the republic. The pillarization of society held back the progress of parliamentary politics. Ironically, the National
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Socialists unwittingly began to dismantle this by stressing the egalitarianism of the Volksgemeinschaft, but it needed the devastation of