US-Kuwaiti Relations, 1961-1992: An Uneasy Relationship

US-Kuwaiti Relations, 1961–1992 In 1961 Kuwait began its tumultuous relationship with the United States after being granted full independence. This book sets out to investigate this alliance within the frameworks of a ‘small state’ and ‘influence’, and in particular under the US presidents Carter, Reagan and Bush. The political, diplomatic and military aspects are examined which have both stalled and enhanced the bilateral relationship at different times and events. The relationship between the two countries has not always been a straightforward one. Kuwait, overshadowed by its bigger neighbour Saudi Arabia, was regarded as a derivative interest by the United States and its role within the region more often than not underestimated. Shedding new light on this key political alliance, the book details how this uneasy relationship evolved while Kuwait maintained its independent foreign policy, which contradicted the US national interest. Illuminating and informative, it will be an essential reading for anyone with an interest in Middle East politics and international relations. Dr Chookiat Panaspornprasit is Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Department of International Relations, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok. He is also Director of the Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS), Bangkok, Thailand.

US-Kuwaiti Relations, 1961–1992 An uneasy relationship

Chookiat Panaspornprasit

LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published 2005 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to http://www.ebookstore.tandf.co.uk/.” © 2005 Chookiat Panaspornprasit All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. The publisher makes no representation, express or implied, with regard to the accuracy of the information contained in this book and cannot accept any legal responsibility or liability for any errors or omissions that may be made. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Panaspornprasit, Chookiat, 1959– USKuwaiti relations, 1961–1992: an uneasy relationship/by Chookiat Panaspornprasit. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. 1. United States—Foreign relations—Kuwait. 2. Kuwait— Foreign relations—United States. I. Title. E183.8.K9P36 2005 327.5367073′09′045–dc22 2004028862 ISBN 0-203-34118-X Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-7146-5628-3 (Print Edition)

Contents Acknowledgements

vi

Introduction

1

1 Framework of analysis

6

2 Background to US-Kuwaiti relations: the pre-196l period

19

3 US-Kuwaiti relations, 1961–1977

35

4 US-Kuwaiti relations under the Carter administration

65

5 US-Kuwaiti relations under the Reagan administration

85

6 US-Kuwaiti relations under the Bush administration

110

Conclusion

134

Notes

139

Select bibliography

174

Index

188

Acknowledgements This book is based on the revised version of my PhD thesis. In writing this PhD thesis, I have received untiring and continuous support in three ways—academic, financial and moral. To begin with, I would like to express my most sincere gratitude to Professor James Piscatori, who has been not only the prime source of inspiration for my academic interest in politics in the Middle East, but also a consistent advocate of my PhD project. His unyielding encouragement and dedication have proved to be the driving force behind the thesis research and writing process. He was determined not only to teach me substantive knowledge on the Middle East, but also the ways in which a high-quality piece of academic work should be produced—lessons that will no doubt be beneficial for my academic career in the future. His worldwide academic reputation is so well-recognised that it immensely facilitated the research trips I conducted in both the United States and Kuwait. I also owe indebtedness to Ms Jane Davis, former lecturer in the Department of International Politics, who has always shown keen interest in my research work. I have always found her criticisms and comments constructive assets, which helped to improve my arguments and analysis. Dr Simon Murden, also former lecturer in the Department of International Politics, has also played an important role in guiding my work both academically and logistically. His expertise on the Persian Gulf region has sharpened the arguments in this work. His strong and consistent encouragement has also strengthened my determination to finish the project successfully. As for the financial contribution to my study, I extremely appreciate the support generously approved by the Academic Affairs Division, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand. The key persons behind this indispensable approval were Professor Dr Pranee Kullavanijaya, the former Vice-President of the Academic Affairs Division; Associate Professor Dr Vinita Sukrasep, former Chairperson of the Department of International Relations, Faculty of Political Science; and Associate Professor Dr Chaiwat Khamchoo. I am also indebted to Professor Dr Suchit Bunbongkarn, the former Dean of the Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University, whose approval of my study leave was a major element in the success of this endeavour. Moreover, I am very grateful to all my colleagues in the department, especially Associate Professor Dr Kusuma Snitwonge, Associate Professor Dr Abhinya Ratanamongkolmas and M.R.Sukhumbhand Paribatra who have rendered their kind moral support and suggestions. I also have received incredibly supportive assistance from many sources in both the United States and Kuwait throughout the research process. First of all, former US ambassadors to Kuwait, high-ranking US officials at the State Department, Washington, DC, and leading American scholars on the Persian Gulf region spared their time for the interview sessions I had during my research trip to the United States in summer 1993. Second, I would like to express my sincere appreciation for the effective services I received from the library staff at the Library of Congress, the National Archives and the National Security Archives, all located in Washington, DC. The professional assistance

and suggestions provided by Margarita S.Studemeister, Director of Publications Archive, and Joyce Battle, analyst at the National Security Archives, made my research more productive and efficient. Moreover, Professor Saif Abdullah, the Dean of Kuwait University’s Faculty of Commerce, Economics and Political Science, kindly arranged my first research trip to Kuwait in September 1994. In addition, I also found the discussion sessions I had with both Professors Abdul-Reda Assiri and Shamlan Y.Alessa, two leading faculty members at Kuwait University, very constructive and beneficial for my research. I am deeply grateful to them all. I also need to thank all my family members whose support and encouragement were essential. Their willingness to take charge of my personal obligations in the family during my study abroad was a great contribution to its final success. In addition, I very much appreciate the moral support extended to me by some of my very good companions. The relevant information on my project supplied on a regular basis by Dr Eiichi Katahara and Theodore C.Grouya, two close former classmates in the Department of International Relations, the Australian National University, Canberra, in 1984–1985, oblige me here to express my deep appreciation to them. Panyarak Poolthup, one of my best friends at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bangkok, offered warm and kind hospitality during my four-month research trip in the United States. Finally, I need to thank all Thai students with whom I have come into contact in Aberystwyth. Their company, encouragement and amicable friendship all contributed to the most invaluable experience I have had abroad. They all have been more than willing to come to my assistance whenever needed, especially Prathan Chularojmontri, Chavalit Lupholtae and Arthon Piboonthanapatana. To make this book a final success, I would like to record my sincere appreciation to Mr John Clement, the Project Manager of Newgen Imaging Systems and Dr Saradha Rajkumar, the copy editor, for their kind coordination and assistance in the tedious proofreading process. The responsibility for any shortcomings found in this work, however, completely rests with me. Chookiat Panaspornprasit Bangkok April 2005

Introduction Overview Since Kuwait attained its independence in mid-1961, Iraq, under the leadership of two different regimes, has posed major threats to Kuwait’s sovereignty and territorial integrity in 1961, 1973 and 1990. While, in 1961, the nationalist government of ‘Abd al-Kasim Qassim in Baghdad was discontented with Kuwait’s independence and adamant in claiming sovereignty over Kuwait, it was the Ba’thist regime which in 1973 threatened Kuwait’s national security and finally in 1990 invaded Kuwait—two years after concluding a cease-fire agreement with Iran in August 1988. Given Kuwait’s ‘small’ territory of 17,818 square kilometres and ‘weak’ military capabilities, the ruling regimes in Baghdad may have been of the view that they would find no difficulty in conquering the city-state of Kuwait. However, the outcomes were not in favour of Iraq’s national interests. The fact that Kuwait maintained its sovereignty and survival was due to both the substantial military contribution rendered by outside powers and Kuwait’s independent foreign policy. In the 1961 and 1973 crises, the British military formed a major part of the countervailing force against the Iraqi threat, yet US military forces took the lead in expelling Iraqi armed forces from Kuwait in 1991. Throughout its three-decade-old history as an independent city-state, Kuwait, as one of its pragmatic foreign policy options, has had clear recourse to either the diplomatic or the military support of the great powers in order to maintain its national security and sovereignty. As mentioned, British protection came first, followed by US assurances; the American relationship with Kuwait developed after the well-established British relationship with Kuwait. Historically, US involvement with the Arab states in the Persian Gulf region (hereafter referred to as the Arab Gulf states) has been heavily confined to US-Saudi relations in every field of political, economic and military affairs. Their relations have manifestly overshadowed relations between the US administrations and the smaller Arab Gulf states. Most of the literature on the relations between the United States and the Arab Gulf states has so far disproportionately discussed US-Saudi relations, while general studies of US relations with the smaller Arab Gulf states normally consider the other Gulf shaykhdoms as a ‘whole unit’, in which Kuwait is included. The reasons behind this may be attributed to both Kuwait’s historical relations with the United Kingdom and its geo-strategic configuration and vulnerability reflected in its ‘small’ territory and the fact that it is outflanked by the three larger neighbouring states of Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran. Nevertheless, the United States, prior to Kuwait’s independence, still considered preserving its limited diplomatic and economic interests. For example, the US government in 1951 secured British approval to establish a US consulate in Kuwait, of which the purpose was to protect, facilitate and administer directly the interests of both the American companies and citizens, particularly those employed by the American Independent Oil Company (AMINOIL).

US-Kuwaiti relations, 1961–1992: an uneasy relationship

2

A complicated mixture of mistrust and collaboration, either in the fields of political or diplomatic relations, in the following decades has characterised the development of bilateral US-Kuwaiti relations. On the one hand, the United States and Kuwait hold differing official positions on the Arab-Israeli conflict. For instance, US leaders contemplated finalising the 1978 Camp David Treaty in an attempt to put a permanent end to the conflict. With their strong support for the Palestinian cause, Kuwaiti leaders regarded the treaty as being incompatible with their official positions on the conflict. On the other hand, common policies adopted by both countries emerged in the cases of the 1979 Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Highlighted by the unprecedented US military contribution to both a ‘reflagging policy’, believed to be initiated by the Kuwaiti regime, and the ensuing liberation of Kuwait in 1991, was the closer military relationship between them.

Objectives of the book Based on the general outlook on US-Kuwaiti relations portrayed in the previous section, there are two principal objectives. First, the book examines the development of USKuwaiti relations in their political, diplomatic and military aspects. Research is undertaken on the factors contributing to and constraining the development of their relations, to the effect that both the United States, as a superpower, and Kuwait, as a ‘small’ state, have entangled themselves in the roles of both ‘influencing’ and ‘being influenced’ in different circumstances. The book thus seeks to confirm the case that, in international relations, a small state is not, on every occasion, under the total control of a great power. The second objective is to fill in the gaps in the specific literature on bilateral US-Kuwaiti relations and to elaborate on an aspect of Persian Gulf international relations that has been hitherto understated. In order to achieve these objectives, the main question tackled is: under what circumstances is a small state like Kuwait able to influence a great power like the United States? In order to answer this question, related and subsidiary questions must be posed. These include: (a) what are the convergent and divergent interests that characterise the bilateral relationship and provide the background for the exercise of influence? (b) how do the two countries perceive each other at the different stages of the relationship? (c) to what extent do domestic politics create opportunities or impose constraints in the attempt to exercise influence? In the course of this examination, the book will consider how the United States has ranked Kuwait on its list of national priorities; whether and why Kuwait was categorised as a ‘peripheral’ or ‘derivative’ interest of the United States; what differences, if any, marked foreign policy under the Carter, Reagan and Bush administrations in particular; the extent to which the Soviet presence in the Gulf affected both American and Kuwaiti perceptions of each other’s role; and what effect the Palestinian issue has had on US— Kuwaiti relations.

Introduction

3

Period and scope of the book As the title of book indicates, it will discuss the relationship since Kuwait became independent in 1961, with emphasis on the periods under three American presidents, starting from the Carter administration to the Bush administration in 1992. Major events and crises, involving both the United States and Kuwait, took place during the leadership of these presidents. For example, the 1979 Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan were followed by the eight-year war, which erupted in September 1980, between Iraq and Iran as well as by the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Two chapters on the background of US-Kuwaiti relations are also included, however. A chapter on relations during the pre-1961 period will be followed by a chapter on relations from Kuwait’s independence in 1961 to the end of the Ford administration.

Outline of the book The book consists of six main chapters. Chapter 1 provides a framework of analysis upon which the entire book rests. Because Kuwait is always classified as a ‘small’ state in the international arena, it needs to be considered whether Kuwait is, in fact, a small state by the conventional criteria. One can argue that the concept of ‘smallness’ of a state actor in international relations is relative and needs to be examined in some depth. ‘Smallness’ should be gauged not only in terms of geography and land mass, but also in the context of other national attributes. Countries may be small in one sense but not in another. Kuwait lacks a huge area of territory, population and military capability, but it is well-off in terms of its economic prosperity and financial reserves. Kuwait’s ‘Dinar Diplomacy’ has been made possible by such economic prosperity. The second part of this chapter focuses on the debatable concept of influence. In international relations, questions as to who influences whom and under what conditions are relevant. Apart from examining the definition of influence, a classification and elaboration of different types of influence relationship will be examined. Chapter 2 provides the background to US-Kuwaiti relations in the pre-196l period. It shows that American private sectors, not the US government, first came into contact with the Kuwaiti regime. They had been interested in developing contact with Kuwait because of humanitarian and philanthropic missions. All these activities came under the control of the British government, which supervised Kuwait’s relations with other outside powers. The US government’s involvement in this small state stemmed from its decision to protect its citizens’ interests in dealing with the Kuwaiti ruling regime and the British government. This paved the way for negotiations between the United States and the British governments on establishing an American consulate in Kuwait in 1951. Chapter 3 examines the US-Kuwaiti relationships after Kuwait gained its independence in 1961. It reflects that in the immediate aftermath of independence, Kuwait still maintained close relations with its former patron—Great Britain. Discussions indicate that from the US government’s viewpoint, Kuwait was not as significant as

US-Kuwaiti relations, 1961–1992: an uneasy relationship

4

Saudi Arabia, the major Arab regional power in the Persian Gulf region. The US administration still subscribed to the view that Kuwait was only a peripheral interest. Material in this chapter also suggests that when Iraq posed a security threat to the Kuwaiti regime in 1961, the US government had played a low-profile role in rendering support to the Kuwaiti regime. The major political issue, which caused the two countries to drift apart, was the Arab-Israeli conflict. Kuwait’s leading role in opposing the US government’s support for the Israeli government formed a stumbling block to the betterment of relations between the two countries. Chapter 4 concentrates on the US-Kuwaiti relations during the Carter administration. The extent to which the conclusion of the 1978 Camp David Accords had an impact on their political relations is investigated. While it could be assumed that such an impact was negative, there were events that were conducive to the betterment of their relations. It was clear that crises, initiated by either a regional power or a superpower, under the presidency of Jimmy Carter, tightened the bilateral US-Kuwaiti relationship. What emerged were common political views on the crises, but, at the same time, the ruling regime in Kuwait made known its disenchantment with general US strategy in the Persian Gulf. Chapter 5 deals with US-Kuwaiti relations in the Reagan administration. When Ronald Reagan was sworn in as the president in January 1981, the fighting along the Iraqi-Iranian border showed no sign of restraint. The war between these two regional powers provided a further opportunity for the United States and Kuwait to enhance their political and diplomatic relations, with the result that they both made clear their position of support for the Ba’thist regime in Iraq. The US-Kuwaiti military relations under the Reagan administration were, however, subject to a number of twists and turns. An element of inconsistency in the US military relations with Kuwait, which is also given consideration in this chapter, was found in the reluctant US arms sales policy towards Kuwait, on the one hand, and US ‘reflagging policy’, on the other. The question of ‘who influences whom’ on this occasion is particularly important. Chapter 6 and the final chapter discuss the US-Kuwaiti relations under the Bush administration, which were dramatised in early 1991 by the first direct military intervention in Kuwait. The peak of their relations witnessed the upgrading of their political, diplomatic and military ties. The Kuwaiti leaders’ more favourable attitude towards a US-Kuwaiti defence treaty exemplify this. This chapter deals with an analysis of factors contributing to changes in Kuwait’s policy towards the United States.

Methodology As mentioned earlier, the literature discussing US-Kuwaiti relations is limited, particularly with regard to the early years of the relationship. There is, however, a slightly larger discussion of the US-Kuwaiti relations in the context of both the Iran-Iraq conflict and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. This research is heavily dependent upon documentary and archival material and extensive interviews. Access to primary sources, principally official documents, on both sides and interviews with government officials and leading scholars necessitated research

Introduction

5

trips to both the United States and Kuwait. In addition, newspaper reports and articles published in related journals are extensively consulted.

1 Framework of analysis Introduction As mentioned in the introductory chapter, two concepts used to frame the analysis in this study are ‘small state’ and ‘influence’. The emergence of small states has long been a phenomenon in the international system.1 For example, the European states of Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, Switzerland and former Czechoslovakia have often been cited as examples of small states. The process of decolonisation in the decades of the 1950s and the 1960s accelerated, politically and legally, the proliferation of small states to the extent that they form the majority of state actors in the international system. In addition, they are scattered in different parts of the globe. Starting from the South Pacific to the west, examples of small states encompass the Cook Islands, Fiji, Tuvalu, Singapore, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Qatar, Kuwait, Israel, Cyprus, Macedonia,2 Monaco, Cuba and the land-locked country of Paraguay in South America. Over a hundred small states have evolved political, diplomatic and economic transactions at both bilateral and multilateral levels. Various regional organisations and inter-governmental organisations, in fact, consist of a large number of small states on the basis of equal footing.3 While they often interact among themselves in a co-operative manner, many of them are drawn into several unresolved intra- and inter-regional conflicts directly or indirectly. Of significant note also is the fact that great powers’ relations with small states appear to be very common. As a consequence, scholarly research has, to a degree, shifted from the study of great powers’ diplomatic history to the emergence and the roles of small states in international affairs. The discussion in this chapter aims to examine the two following questions: 1 What are small states? 2 What is the nature of ‘influence’ in the relationship between actors in the international system?

The ambiguous characteristics of small states Some small states are classified as members of the so-called developed countries of the ‘North’, while some belong to the underdeveloped ‘South’. Such a categorisation is mainly based on the level of economic development. If we consider the size of population, the population of the small state of Bangladesh was, according to the 1995 census, about 117,372,0004 while that of Belize, also based on the 1995 census, was

Framework of analysis

7

estimated at only 212,000.5 In terms of geographical land mass, Switzerland is much smaller than Egypt. The examples cited earlier indicate different criteria in defining the characteristics of small states. As a result, there emerge so many different definitions of small states that a common understanding among scholars has proved elusive. As Jonathan Alford cogently remarks: How ‘small’ is ‘small’? Does the qualifying adjective apply to area, or to population, or to resources and wealth? Some states, like Singapore, are tiny but hardly weak. Others which appear large, rich, populous and powerful turn out to be so politically fragile that a small group of determined men can effectively hijack the state—just as with the small and weak—as with Iran.6 In his 1967 publication of Problems of Smaller Territories, Burton Benedict also argues that: ‘A persistent problem…was the definition of a small territory. Was the primary criterion to be area?… Was it to be population?… Was it to be population density?…’7 Peter R.Baehr also notes that ‘…there is the problem of which criteria are to be adopted. Should one look at size of population? Or also at size of territory? National income? Available natural resources?’8 According to Hilding Eek, efforts to define the term ‘small’ may give few results. The term ‘small states’, he contends, is a practical, conventional term, useful as such, but one which evades definition.9 Aware of the difficulty in defining the concept of ‘small power’, Raimo Vayrynen points out that while a definition is an explanation of the meaning of a concept, there are several types of ‘meaning’—for example, extensional and intentional meanings.10 The major difference between these two kinds of meanings is found in their differing explanatory power. The extensional or denotative meaning of a concept, as Vayrynen contends, possesses no clear-cut criteria to gauge whether or not a unit of analysis should be included in a given concept. On the other hand, the intentional or connotative meaning of a concept refers to the properties possessed by all the units encompassed in the concept.11 Intentional and extensional meanings are both necessary for defining a concept: the common characteristics or properties of all units deemed to be members of a concept will be first elucidated by the notion of an intentional meaning. To put it simply, an intentional meaning involves the multi-dimensional coverage of all the qualifications necessary to be considered as a unit of a concept. Based on a judgement of these characteristics, an extensional meaning shows how many members of the units are included within the given concept. It is appropriate to infer that an intentional meaning should precede an extensional meaning, in any attempt to define a concept. In our case, the question arises as to what the characteristics or the properties of small states are. As far as an intentional meaning for a small state is concerned, the overall agreed-upon characteristics of small states still remain inconclusive. As a result, the question as to which states should be regarded as a small state by the virtue of an extensional meaning is still in dispute. To begin with, Jean-Luc Vellut uses the size of population and gross domestic product, as examples of objective, tangible or quantitative criteria, to determine the classification of states as great powers, medium powers, small powers and smaller powers.12 The population of small powers lies between 10 million

US-Kuwaiti relations, 1961–1992: an uneasy relationship

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and 50 million, and the minimum level of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of small powers is from $2,000 million up to $10,000 million.13 Vellut also sub-divides what he calls the smaller powers into two sub-classes that is—Class I and Class II. Whereas Class I should possess from 5 million to 10 million people, based on the number of people, Class II powers need to have at least 5 million.14 With regard to the GDP criterion, whereas Class I small powers should sustain at least from $1,000 million to $2,000 million, the GDP of Class II small powers should reach at least $1,000 million.15 In a similar vein, David Vital, in his 1967 book The Inequality of States, differentiates the small states from the great and the middle states by defining the rough upper limits of the class of small states as being: (a) a population of 10–15 million in the case of economically advanced countries; and (b) a population of 20–30 million in the case of underdeveloped countries.16 Similarly, R.P.Barston agrees that ‘…a small state is defined as having a population with an upper limit of between 10 and 15 million’.17 Thomas Masaryle and J.A.R.Marriott regard as weak, those states whose populations are under 20 million people.18 However, Patricia Wohlgemuth Blair and J.R.Harbert consider a small state as a country with a population of less than 1 million.19 Moreover, Annette Baker Fox considers Turkey and Spain as small states,20 whereas, Vital and Barston would be likely to disagree because both the countries’ populations are much more than their upper-limits. Added to objective or tangible criteria is the size of territory. It is no exaggeration to say that the exact area of territory of small states is not agreed. Most scholars on small states appear to take it for granted that the adjective ‘small’ in the context of territory is self-explanatory, and none has set the upper territorial limits. This ambiguity makes the characteristics of the small states even more misleading. For example, one finds it difficult to draw a clear-cut boundary between a state with a small territory and a relatively small population but highly developed economy, like Singapore; and a state with a great land mass and a large population but with an impoverished economy, like Brazil. It is, therefore, worth emphasising at this stage that the criteria mentioned earlier remain indecisive. All such limits are, as Michael Handel argues, highly artificial.21 He further states that: obviously size of population cannot serve as a satisfactory criterion. Bangladesh with close to 72 million people must be considered a weak state, while Australia with a population closer to 13 million is best regarded as a middle power.22 Not the first scholar to focus on weak states,23 Handel, however, provides a more comprehensive approach to the study of the characteristics of weak states. What reflects, according to his analysis, the interchangeability of small and weak states is that ‘the weak states, of course, form the largest class of states and have the most diverse membership— facts which make it still more difficult to assign them any common denominator other than their overall relative weakness’.24 Another critic of the conventional definition of small states includes Baehr who argues that the concept of ‘small states’ is not useful as an analytical tool in understanding world politics.25 Anobvious difficulty, in his view, is that ‘small’ and ‘large’ are relative concepts, subject to the great differences in

Framework of analysis

9

interpretation.26 Some small states may be strong in one criterion but rather weak in another. In contrast, some large states are in fact very weak states. What should be taken into consideration in reaching a better understanding of small/weak states is, therefore, the inclusion of non-quantitative criteria.27 Non-quantitative criteria One non-quantitative criterion is the geographical location, which may determine the relative weakness of a small state. A relevant point is whether a small state is outflanked by larger or smaller neighbouring countries with hostile or friendly, aggressive or nonaggressive foreign policies. Such relative weakness derived from the geographical environment is closely related to a small state’s concern over its vulnerability to threats to its survival, territorial integrity and independence. This criterion is instrumental in determining the possibility of a small state being invaded, annexed or occupied by its neighbouring country, whether it be a great power, a middle power or a small state. Thus, a small state, which controls only a small territory and has little room to manoeuvre, is likely to be a victim of its neighbour’s military penetration. Another aspect of the geographical location which must be taken into account is the proximity of a small state to the ‘centres’ of the international system. Baker Fox, in her book on The Power of Small States, summarises that ‘…the greater the distance the small state was located from a direct line between belligerents the better was the chance of staying out of the war’.28 For example, Belgium, Poland and Hungary were the victims of their central geostrategic location, while New Zealand and Chile remained secure mainly due to their remoteness from the centre of conflict. With regard to geographical location, mention should also be made of the nature of a small state’s terrain and borders. When a state lacks easy-to-defend natural borders, it will probably be more easily penetrated, for its terrain is conducive to fast advancement of military forces. Worse still, a small landlocked state may easily face both the military and economic penetration. Depending, to a certain extent, on neighbouring countries for its economic transactions, a small landlocked state runs the risk of economic disarray if neighbours close the border as a means of economic sanction or boycott. A second non-quantitative characteristic of a small/weak state is its economic position. A small/weak state will, in most cases, have limited economic resources and prospects. It is usually and excessively dependent on one crop, service or other form of economic activity.29 As noted by Handel, territorially small states are less likely to have diverse and balanced sources of raw materials, and, because of climatic uniformity, they tend to have a smaller variety of agricultural products.30 Thus, a small state’s attempt to achieve autarky is likely to fail. It must depend on foreign trade for a large number of goods necessary for its development and the improvement of its standard of living. Above all, a small and economically weak state’s ratio of foreign trade to the GDP is higher than that of the great powers. A small/weak state’s economic disadvantage is found in its inability to invest both in large-scale industries based on mass production techniques and in research and development of new industrial products. In other words, a small/weak state normally suffers from what is labelled the diseconomies of scale, as Peter J.Lloyd succinctly argues:

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Certain industries must operate at a minimum scale or not at all, presumably because of large indivisibilities of plant. Those countries whose markets are too small to support this ‘technological’ minimum scale will import such products from larger countries. It is contended that nations below a critical size seldom have such industries as an aircraft industry, an integrated automobile industry, or a large-scale chemical industry.31 Being regarded as a third non-quantitative characteristic of a small/weak state, is its military weakness. Robert Rothstein asserts that: A Small Power is a state which recognises that it cannot obtain security primarily by use of its own capabilities, and that it must rely fundamentally on the aid of other states, institutions, processes, or developments to do so; the Small Power’s belief in its inability to rely on its own means must also be recognised by the other states involved in international politics.32 Several qualifying points should be noted, however. First, Rothstein places emphasis on the compatible perceptions of the leaders of both a small state and other states, which are conducive to the formation of an alliance. Yet, while an alliance between a small state and a great power is certainly possible and often necessary, the alliance formations between two small states or among small states themselves must not be ruled out.33 Second, it is not only the great powers that pose a threat to a small/weak state’s national security or survival; another small/weak state, whether or not supported by the great powers, may also pose a threat to its survival. As Robert O.Keohane points out, ‘…one of the major characteristics of a weak state is the inability to secure its own existence, especially against a great power, or even against another weak state supported by a major power’.34 Third, it is often believed that a militarily weak state will normally pursue a peaceful, passive, non-aggressive foreign policy and maintain the status quo and the right to national survival and self-determination. But this may not always be the case. As Robert Purnell remarks: There is little evidence that small states are more peaceable than great powers. It is rather that the former are less militarily effective than the latter, not more peace loving… There seems little evidence that the political initiatives of small states, however constrained, are characterised by a greater delicacy of scruple, or perceptibly more prudence, than those of greater neighbours We may reach the conclusion that the belief in the superior virtues of small states is a romantic illusion. Small states, in short, are great powers writ small. They behave as much like great powers as they can…. They belong to an international order which requires them to exercise what power they have…. Nor can they escape from this international order without ceasing to exist as states.35

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The fourth non-quantitative criterion that helps identify whether a state is in a strong or weak position, is the legitimacy of the ruling government. A legitimate government in power means that the population in the state recognises and accedes to the authority of the ruling party in governing the state without unjustified opposition. Different political systems have different interpretations of the legitimacy concept. In the Cold War period, the democratic and authoritarian governments viewed each other’s version of legitimacy with suspicion. As an example of a ‘small state’ in this study, Kuwait obviously has a small land mass situated at a geostrategically vital location in the Persian Gulf, surrounded by three other bigger and militarily stronger states—Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran. Only a small portion of its total population are indigenous Kuwaiti citizens. Based on the oligarchy-type government, the Al-Sabah family rules the Kuwaiti state without relying on other political groups. To preserve the states security is equivalent to preserving that of the ruling family. With the discovery of oil reserves in the 1930s, Kuwait maintains a rentier economy, in which no tax is levied on its population. The completion of most of the development programmes and strategies in Kuwait rely on the recruitment of foreign migrant workers, which generally pose no political threat to the ruling regime in Kuwait. Oil-generated income forms the major part of its huge financial reserves on which the Kuwaiti ruling regime relies for its economic and political survival and stability.36 The Kuwaiti ruling regime’s far-sighted vision led it to set up the Future Kuwaiti Reserve Fund, for the younger generations of Kuwaiti citizens. Furthermore, Kuwait’s military strength has always been called into question, it being unclear whether the country could be protected from a military threat posed by any of its neighbouring countries. Based on the criteria, mentioned earlier Kuwait is, no doubt, a small state, except for its lucrative oil economy which generates a huge financial surplus. In terms of foreign policy calculation and implementation, the ruling regime, as the main driving force in Kuwait’s political domain, maintains its independence in formulating and executing foreign policy.37 In terms of foreign policy analysis, although one is likely to conclude that the nature and structure of the international system is fundamentally determined by the group of great powers, it does not mean that the small/weak states play no role in international affairs. A small state may of course be active in some fields of interest, but passive in others. It is no wonder that a small state is sometimes quick to make the best use of chances available in the international system. Indeed, a small state may, in its relations with either the great powers or other small states both at the regional and the international levels, try to exercise its leverage or influence over them. The question is as to whether a small state has adequate capabilities to do so. In both formulating and implementing foreign policies, the national attributes of small states usually constitute more as constraints rather than opportunities. In order to understand foreign policy analysis of any small state, it is inevitable to take those national attributes into consideration.38

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The nature of influence Like power, both influence and influence-building attempts, are ostensibly common in the international system. Most of the actors—state or non-state, rich or poor, a great power or small state—become involved with influence-exercising transactions. Alvin Rubinstein classifies influence relationships between actors as follows: (1) the relationship between a superpower and a non-aligned, developing, non-European country; (2) the relationship between two countries within one alliance system; (3) the relationship between two countries, each of which is the member of a different alliance system; (4) the relationship between two non-aligned countries that are not part of the same alliance system; and (5) the relationship between one country or a group of countries interacting with another country or a group of countries within the framework of international or regional organisations.39 Although this classification may contain discernible drawbacks, it confirms the fact that influence is an integral part of the international system. The discussion in this section will examine, therefore: (a) definitions and general characteristics of influence relationships; (b) types of influence relationships; and (c) whether influence, for whatever reasons pursued, can be measured.

Definitions of influence Rubinstein defines that influence is manifested when A affects, through non-military means, directly or indirectly, the behaviour of B so that it redounds to the policy advantage of A.40 Roles played by A and B will be sometimes referred to as ‘influencer’ and ‘influencee’ or ‘influence target’, respectively. Whether he bases his definition on inter-personal relationships is still unknown, but he refers only to state actors. Over time this definition has gained some currency among scholars who study influence relationships among state actors.41 However, a simpler definition, cited by Smolansky and Smolansky, is put forward by analysts at the Center for Defense Information based in Washington, DC. They define influence as the ability of one nation to induce another, to do something that it otherwise would not do.42 In their book on The USSR and Iraq, the Smolanskys make further attempts to clarify a definition of influence relationships. Based on sociological terminology, they argue: influence is ultimately an interactive process, albeit one enacted between and among nation-states rather than individuals or simple groups… [I]nfluence relationships among states can be seen as a special subset of what the sociologist Richard Emerson has called power—dependence relations.43 Influence, as the Smolanskys elaborate, resides in the dependency of one actor on another.44 Such dependency, which later could lead to an exercise of influence, takes place in the form of a control by one country (country A) over resources which are

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significant to the other actor (country B). It may simply mean that country B will be deprived of the resources needed, unless it will do or behave according to country As wishes. W.Raymond Duncan, the author of a book on The Soviet Union and Cuba: Interests and Influence, has simply defined influence as the ways that country A tries to shape the behaviour of country B.45 Country A manages to make country B act according to country A’s wishes, in order to strengthen country A’s benefits or interests. In other words, country B is not inclined to act to serve country As interests unless country A acts in such a persuasive and forceful manner as to alter country B’s behaviour. J.David Singer succinctly points out that all influence attempts are future-oriented.46 Country A may rely on country B’s past and present behaviour in order to predict and, if possible, influence country B’s behaviour. However, country A’s predictions are far from certain. Singer argues: even if the ‘state of the art’ in international relations were well-advanced, there would still be no certainty (probability=1.0) on the part of A that B will behave in the predicted fashion. Consequently, there will always be some incentive to attempt to influence.47 In other words, if country A is confident that country B would behave according to country As interests, country A’s desire to influence country B would decline. Therefore, Singer contends that country A must distinguish boundary lines among country B’s perceived, predicted and preferred behaviours.48 The preferred and predicted behaviours may be in the forms of either ‘affirmative commission’ of an act or ‘passive noncommission or omission’ of an act.49 To derive the preferred behaviour from country B, country A needs to exercise influence over country B in order either to modify country B’s behaviour or merely to reinforce the existing preferred behaviour. Based on the earlier definitions, one should not conclude that an influence relationship is a one-way relationship. Duncan suggests ‘influence is by no means an automatic zerosum game, where country A has all the power over all the issues and country B has none’.50 Rather, an influence relationship is an interactive process. Influence may flow from country A to country B and vice versa, or simultaneously between countries A and B. Once an influence relationship takes place, it is an asymmetrical interaction process.51 An influence relationship suggests the manipulation by the influencer (either countries A or B) of the influencee’s perception and behaviour. However, such manipulation is subject to changes. To be noted, at this stage is a term coined by Singer as ‘the influencee’s decisional calculus’.52 The influencee is in a free position to weigh a range of possible outcomes, both liked and disliked outcomes, in any given influence situation. Thus, to be successful, any influence attempts must take into consideration the perceptions of or calculations by the influencee. An influence relationship involves the calculation of costs and benefits in policies pursued by the countries A and B.53 Both will probably undertake a policy which guarantees more benefits than costs. In this context, an influence relationship may take place in two scenarios: first, when country A makes country B act in such a way that it brings about more benefits than costs to country A; second, when country B still acts according to country As policy, even though such action leads country B to lose more

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than what it gains. Duncan argues that what should be kept in mind is that on some occasions, country B might act according to country A’s desires, not only because of country A’s pressure but also due to country B’s own interests. An influence relationship is, in addition to being time-bound, also issue and situation specific.54 Duncan contends: influence is an interdependent process over time, where the shaping of behaviour in A and B is occurring simultaneously. This is so because influence is issue specific and situation specific…55 In a related way, an influence relationship is a short-lived phenomenon56 and it tends not to be permanent or long-lasting. In other words, not only is an influence relationship susceptible to change with different issues and situations, but also lacks a consistent pattern on different occasions. Hence, an influence relationship is multidimensional, manifesting itself in different spheres as Rubinstein claims.57 How does country A exert influence over country B? Country A’s power, which in turn depends on the national attributes and the national resources, should be the proper answer. These resources—economic, diplomatic, political and military—will be transformed into a means of exercising influence over a counterpart. Therefore, influence may be regarded as both a means and an end; it is both a process and a product. As far as military resources are concerned, one can argue that the exercise of deterrence, the success of which mainly depends on military capabilities, is also a type of influence technique. As a result, a total exclusion of military resources from an influence relationship is still debatable. Pressures, which country A exercises over country B, may involve threats and punishments on the one hand, and promises and rewards on the other. As distinguished by Singer, threat and promise involve contingent, probable future events, whereas punishment and reward are concrete acts that already have taken, or are in the process of taking place.58 Influence techaiques of threat and promises may be made credible by punishments and rewards, respectively.

Types of influence Given the availability of such influence techniques, Duncan classifies influence into four different types: (1) indirect influence; (2) co-operative influence; (3) assertive power; and (4) coercive power.59 To start with, Duncan describes indirect influence as the relationship taking place when country A does not introduce an influence attempt on country B; however, country B adapts its behaviour because of its perceptions which may be advantageous to country A’s interests. In other words, country B voluntarily modifies its behaviour because it may conceive of anticipated results (either punishments or rewards) from country A. Second, co-operative influence emerges when country A induces, persuades, cajoles or bargains with country B to encourage it to cooperate with country A on an issue of mutual advantage to both countries.60 What we must be aware of in this case, as already argued,

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is that country B may, by its own will, choose to act because of discernible benefits to itself. If so, then country A does not have a total influence over country B. Third, an assertive power relationship is one kind of influence brought about by means of sanctions. It is likely to be the case when country B modifies its actions, despite its reluctance, because it foresees the greater cost and less benefit in not acting according to country A’s pressures.61 Duncan cautions that by using assertive power, country A has no intention of breaking off its relations with country B even though country A is in a position to do that. Nor does country A expect total concession from country B on wideranging issues.62 Finally, a coercive power relationship involves a situation in which country A possesses the capacity to affect strongly, to control or to compel country B ‘s obedience to country As demands through the use of strong sanctions. The resort to this kind of pressure is so conspicuously forceful and determined that country A may decide to break off relations with country B due to country B’s failure to yield to country A’s orders. Similarly, Oles and Bettie Smolansky classify types of influence as facilitative and instigative influences.63 Facilitative influence virtually involves the dependence of a lesser power on a great power for resources, which induces the lesser power to undertake a policy to the advantage of both parties. However, such advantages may not have the same level of significance to each of them. Facilitative influence includes two subtypes called the constructive and the protective facilitative influence,64 for which an explanation is not provided. However, it could be inferred that the protective facilitative influence, the purpose of which may be to reinforce the influence relationships, should take place after the constructive facilitative influence. Added to the facilitative influence is the instigative influence, whose subtypes include the co-operative and the coercive instigative influence. In light of the very brief definition provided by the authors, these two subtypes of influence appear to share characteristics with the co-operative influence and the coercive influence mentioned earlier.

Influence measurement As for reasons why an actor seeks influence over another, military or strategic, economic and political or diplomatic interests provide the appropriate answer. In terms of military benefits, influence is exercised in order to gain access to military bases or facilities, secure strategic commitments to its survival or national security. Economic advantages may encompass favourable trade deals and favourable access to raw materials. Examples of political benefits, which the influencer is always seeking, may include political or diplomatic support for, or others’ submission to, its domestic and foreign policies. Alliance, for example, would be a case in point. It is no exaggeration to say that the influencer—not to mention, the outside observer— is always faced with the difficulty of how to measure whether an influence-building attempt is a success or failure. Attempts at devising some indicators of influence measurement, albeit still questionable, include those proposed by the Center for Defense Information and by Rubinstein. The experts at the Center argue that indicators of ‘level of involvement’ or ‘patron presence’65 may be used, to a certain extent, to gauge an influence relationship. Such

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indicators range from treaty relationships, the presence of troops or military advisors, access to military facilities, large-scale arms transfers, significant bilateral trade, compatible voting patterns at the United Nations (UN), exchanges of high-level state visits, to properly worded joint communiques. However, this does not necessarily mean that these indicators are effective in proving any influential relationships, for most of them may be regarded as influence techniques rather than indicators of influence measurement. Rubinstein lists five categories of influence measurement: (1) measures of direct interaction; (2) measures of perceptual and attitudinal change; (3) measures of attributed influence; (4) case studies; and (5) impressionistic and idiosyncratic commentary.66 Measures of direct interaction refer to such countable and aggregate data as bilateral trade, foreign assistance, compatibility in UN voting patterns as well as exchanges of missions. When relying on these data, caution is needed because simple reference to quantitative data may not be instrumental in explaining the nature of influence relationship. For example, there is no complete guarantee that a small state, and a recipient of the foreign aid provided by a bigger state, will always be influenced by the aid-donor country. A simple reliance on the UN voting statistics cannot assure that country A’s vote in favour of country B’s position results from country B’s persuasion, enticement, pressure or threat. There may be some other factors which shape country A’s decision to do so. Measures of perceptual or attitudinal change may be made possible by thematic content analysis of joint communiqués, official speeches and statements, radio broadcasts, editorials and articles in key newspapers and journals. However, it is doubtful whether joint communiqués manifest leaders’ perceptual and attitudinal changes, for these are normally drafted beforehand by diplomatic officials. Moreover, most joint statements and official speeches regularly contain clichés and rhetorical expressions that are purposely used for diplomatic objectives. By attributed influence, Rubinstein means the polling of experts in the hope that the similarity of experts’ comments, analyses and perspectives will provide a convincing and authoritative understanding of the relationship. The researcher may conduct either a careful review of their written commentaries or personal interviews with them. However, this measurement is not without the problem of assessing the assumptions, that shape their perspectives and analysis. The researcher must be aware of the element of subjectivity in these experts’ viewpoints or perspectives. Case studies provide a good opportunity for a researcher to make the best use of all kinds of measurement in order that, a researcher may be able to ‘trace the unfolding of influence on significant issues and…bring varieties of data to bear on a particular problem’.67 The case studies approach is still a challenge to any study of influence relationships. In Rubinstein’s view, a researcher may not be in a position to analyse and examine all the other measurements with an equal accuracy and a reliability. Finally, impressionistic and idiosyncratic commentaries consist of all other possible useful sources of information—for example, journalists, declassified documents, rumours and leaks from embassies, knowledgeable former statesmen, ministers, high-ranking officials and data banks. These may be used to confirm debatable interpretations but the problem of reliability and validity of these sources of information again still remains

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doubtful. An independent analysis, for example, by high-ranking government officials may—to say the least—be hampered by their government’s official policy or position.

Kuwait’s foreign policy: an overview As an oil-rich, small state surrounded by three bigger neighbouring countries—Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia—the main objective of Kuwait’s foreign policy is, and has been, to protect its security, independence and territorial integrity. And its secondary purpose is to adhere to core values and religious beliefs. The ruling regime has always realised that the state’s security and stability have faced both external and internal threats. As historical records have shown, the immediate external threat to Kuwait’s security and territorial integrity has been in the form of an Iraqi claim to Kuwaiti territory, including an actual invasion in 1990, as discussed in Chapter 6. Meanwhile, the principal external threat to Kuwait’s core values and ideology has always been posed by the Israeli government within the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Israel’s main patron, the United States, was also considered a threat to the regime’s core values, ideology and religious tenets. The internal threat to Kuwait’s stability is shaped by the non-homogeneous society in Kuwait. The indigenous Kuwaiti citizens represent a minority of the population, with large numbers of foreign migrant workers—including the Palestinian and Shi’ite communities. The large number of these workers has compelled the Kuwaiti regime to implement ways of managing the allegiance of these workers. In order to prevent any subversive activities carried out by these workers and supported by foreign countries, the regime has used its financial resources to ‘buy off political loyalty from these various groups of workers. To achieve the objectives of its foreign policy and counter the external threat, Kuwait adopted and implemented a non-aligned and pragmatic foreign policy. A good example of Kuwait’s policy of non-alignment, resided in the fact that Kuwait was the only Arab Gulf state on the Arabian Peninsula, which established the diplomatic relations with both the United States and the Soviet Union in 1960s, regardless of the disenchantment of its neighbouring Arab countries on the peninsula. It is worth noting here that during the 1990 invasion crisis, the regime has put more emphasis on the element of pragmatism than the defunct principle of the non-alignment. With its huge oil-generated income, the Kuwaiti regime has relied heavily on its main financial reserves as the main instrument of conducting its foreign policy both at the regional and the international levels. The Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED), set up in 1961, was aimed at channelling the distribution of its economic assistance to its Arab brotherhood. The way in which the Kuwaiti regime distributed the economic assistance reflected the significance of Arab nationalism to which Kuwaiti leaders have adhered, although at later stages Kuwait had also begun dividing up its economic assistance to other Muslim and Third World countries as well. Not only have the Arab, Islamic countries received Kuwaiti grants and economic aid, Islamic countries in Africa as well as Asian countries have also been on the list of recipient countries. Kuwait also used its financial power to play a role of donor in the hope that it could win more friends to support its position on the Palestinian cause, which in turn meant

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more leverage and a better deterrent. Kuwait’s financial capability was also put to use in its relations with the US government on two important occasions—reflagging operations and the liberation of Kuwait. Given the characteristics of the monarchical regime in Kuwait, it is obvious that the key decision-makers of Kuwait’s foreign policy are confined to a small inner circle of the ruling body. But, it does not necessarily mean that the ways in which they formulate the foreign policy are free of any difficulties or opposition. The vociferous criticisms of the regime’s foreign policy on some occasions by the press in the Kuwaiti society and the Arab nationalists, who are the members of the National Assembly, always constitute the constraints imposed on the regime’s freedom to implement its foreign policy.

Conclusion The concepts of a ‘small state’ and ‘influence’ share two obviously common characteristics. First, they both are ambiguous and easily misjudged, despite the fact that many scholars are keen to portray a clearer understanding of and explanation for both concepts, Second, they are closely intertwined with conflict and co-operation among actors in the international system. More commonly, both concepts of a ‘small state’ and ‘influence’ may incorrectly reflect the nature of the international system as a ‘top-down’ phenomenon, which, again, must be called into question. A small state is widely believed to be under the total dominance of a great power’s influence—be it indirect influence, co-operative influence, assertive power or coercive power. A significant refinement is warranted, however. The influence target is not always a small state, which may play an active role in some fields of interest, but a passive one in others. As was noted earlier, an influence relationship is issue-specific and situationspecific, and the roles of ‘influencing’ and ‘being influenced’ may well be interchangeable between a great power and a small state. It is important to note here that, all the influence measurement techniques carry some drawbacks which make it impossible to rely on only one measurement technique. In this book, the author, fully aware of the subjectivity of the influence concept, intends to use the various measurement techniques wherever applicable. Evidence consulted by the author at the time of writing may point to an influence relationship in a particular issue area. Yet, it must be recognised that evidence further released or available in future under the US Freedom of Information Act may prove the contrary.

2 Background to US-Kuwaiti relations The pre-1961 period Introduction The early stage of US-Kuwaiti relations, like Kuwaiti relations with all other European powers but Great Britain, was kept at a very low level. The interests in and objectives of the relationship between the United States and Kuwait, first, had a relatively limited scope, for two reasons. First, the British government and the Kuwaiti regime both attached significance to their special relationship, which was largely based on and confirmed by the historic agreement concluded in 1899. Confirmation of this special contact was the unprecedented commitment on the part of the Shaykh of Kuwait and his successors not to: receive the Agent or Representative of any Power or Government at Koweit, or at any other place within the limits of his territory, without the previous sanction of the British Government, and…not to cede, sell, lease, mortgage, or give for occupation or for any other purpose any portion of his territory to Government or subjects of any other Power without the previous consent of Her Majesty’s Government for these purposes…1 In effect, Kuwait’s foreign relations were under the British governments almost complete control or scrutiny, despite the fact that Britain never officially declared a protectorate over Kuwait.2 Upon Kuwaiti independence in 1961, the Kuwaiti and the British governments still maintained close relations. Second, US contacts with Kuwait from the very beginning were primarily focused on non-political transactions in which the US government played a relatively limited role. Private citizens were the first Americans who came into contact with the Kuwaiti community. The US authorities and officials later acted to maintain, uphold and broaden US citizens’ interests to the extent that direct contacts between the US government and the Kuwaiti regime became inevitable. The discussion in this chapter, therefore, will focus on the development of US-Kuwaiti relations, which can be divided into the following sections: 1 American involvement with humanitarian missions in the 1910s; 2 American attempts to secure access to oil exploration in Kuwait in the 1930s; 3 American negotiations with Great Britain on the establishment of the American Consulate in Kuwait; 4 American role in improving Kuwaiti infrastructures; and

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5 American concern over the impact of regional and political upheaval in the Gulf region on the Kuwaiti regime.

American involvement with humanitarian missions in Kuwait Prior to the outbreak of the First World War, the United States, as a government and as a nation, maintained no stand and had no policy towards the Persian Gulf region,3 for the Persian Gulf, as William Polk argues, held little commercial or political interest for Americans in the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries.4 Unlike most of the colonial European powers landing on the relatively underdeveloped territories, the initial American interests in Kuwait had little to do with commercial or strategic interests. The indigenous Kuwaiti community’s skills of pearl-diving, sea-faring and ship-building, which formed the basis of Kuwait’s economy before the discovery of oil, were not in the interest of the American government and US citizens alike. The 1900s, however, witnessed the first milestone in the history of the American presence in Kuwait. US interest in Kuwait was first focused on humanitarian and philanthropic aspects,5 especially in the areas of health care improvement and education programmes. Based on the moral commitment of the ‘white man’s burden’ to popularise Christianity among local inhabitants of the Gulf, missionaries from the United States were determined to achieve two goals. At one level, their goal was to preserve and protect the Christian minorities in Iran and Iraq, for example, the Assyrians and the Armenians,6 while their ultimate goal was the proselytization of Christianity.7 Faced with the deep-rooted belief in Islam among the indigenous Kuwaiti populace, however, the missionaries’ ability to convert Muslim inhabitants to Christianity was impaired. As a result, they shifted their focus to social, medical and educational concerns.8 The health care system in Kuwait, in the first decade of the twentieth century, remained underdeveloped.9 It was the American Missions of the Dutch Reformed Church, founded at New Brunswick, New Jersey in 1889,10 which were instrumental in setting up in Kuwait fundamental health care schemes. Their humanitarian activities, as John A.Denovo contends, provided the oldest steady non-official contact with the Gulf region.11 The missions also operated two other centres on the Arabian peninsula, in Muscat and Bahrain. It was, therefore, private citizens from the United States, not the US government officials, who first came into contact with the local Kuwaiti inhabitants. The timing of the American Missions’ first arrival in Kuwait is not definitive, however. The Area Handbook for the Persian Gulf States suggests that an American physician representing the Arabian American Missions of the Dutch Reformed Church arrived in 1909 in Kuwait.12 But, Zahra Freeth and Victor Winstone’s book on Kuwait: Prospect and Reality recalls that, upon the introduction of Shaykh Khazal of Basra, Shaykh Mubarak had an opportunity to contact American missionaries who then worked in Basra.13 Given the immediate need to attend to an ailing member of his family, Shaykh Mubarak invited Dr Arthur Bennett to Kuwait in 1910 for that purpose and later to open the Missions’ station in Kuwait.14 The establishment of the mission finally took place in 1911 following the negotiations between the Shaykh on the one hand and Dr Bennett and John Van Ess on the other, on the proper location of the station. It was situated at the

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west end of the town. According to the Kuwaiti ambassador to the United States, the first American hospital in the Gulf was built in 1911 in Kuwait before the discovery of oil.15 Mary Cubberly Van Pelt, one of the members of the mission who stayed in Kuwait for almost two decades, reports that Shaykh Mubarak met with the American physician and surgeon who was then working in Basra for Shaykh Khazal. Following this contact, Shaykh Mubarak persuaded the American Missions in 1912 to come to Kuwait in the hope that it might be able to provide modern medical services for the Kuwaiti people.16 Regardless of whose evidence is more reliable, the American Missions eventually gained a foothold in Kuwait, under the supervision of Drs Bennet, C.S.G.Mylrea and Paul Harrison. They were instrumental in establishing in 1911 a hospital for men, and in 1919 a hospital for women.17 Even after Kuwait’s oil-exporting mechanism was set in place, the only modern hospital in Kuwait was still the work of the American missionaries.18 The expansion of American Missions’ medical works in Kuwait was in progress. The American Consul, Harrison M.Symmes, reported to Washington that a cornerstone-laying ceremony was held on 19 November 1954 in Kuwait for the American Missions’ new men’s hospital, constructed on the location of the old man’s hospital.19 The hospital’s name was the Mylrea Memorial Hospital, named after Dr C.S.G.Mylrea who served as the Missions’ first doctor in Kuwait for many years. The significance of the Missions’ contribution to Kuwait was recognised by the attendance of Shaykh ‘Abdullah and his advisor, ‘Abdullah Mulla Salih, together with C.J.Pelly, the British Political Agent, members of his staff, members of the Consulate Staff and a group of employees from the oil companies. In his address commemorating the ceremony, Shaykh ‘Abdullah emphasised renewal of old ties and promised his own and his ruling family’s ongoing co-operation with the medical work of the Missions. This hospital, due to be completed by mid-July 1955, was headed by Dr Lewis Scudder, an American doctor who had lived and served in Kuwait since 1939. He was assisted by another American doctor, Dr Mary Allison, who was in charge of the Missions’ women’s hospital, and one Indian doctor. In addition to medical services provided by the missions, other activities in the ‘goodwill area’20 included the development of Kuwait’s basic educational programmes. The missions established a boys’ school and a night school for men, responsible for teaching English and typing.21 Relatively, equal opportunity for Kuwaiti girls to receive basic education was later made possible by the opening of a girls’ school, administered by the American wife of one of the mission doctors.22 Most Kuwaitis aged over 60 or 70 who learned to write and read English did so through Americans, and not by the provision of the Kuwaiti regime.23 These efforts, however, failed to meet with much success in converting the Kuwaiti community to Christianity. The Kuwaitis remained suspicious of the missions’ religious orientation.24 Sunni merchants set up the Mubarakiyyah school in 1911 for special training and teaching in writing, bookkeeping, history and geography. There are two possible explanations for the decision to found the school. One was that Sunni merchants were unhappy with sending their sons overseas for higher education.25 Second, given the fact that it was founded in 1911, it may have been the case that Sunni merchants attempted to balance the influence of the missions. Nevertheless, the missionaries’ role as ‘non-official’ American ambassadors of goodwill26 was not doomed to complete failure, for through their medical work they

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maintained informal and humane contacts with Kuwaitis and, sometimes, their leaders. An American historian has shared with one Kuwaiti political scientist the argument that such ‘goodwill’ contacts paved the way for a ‘better climate for the American oil men who followed later’.27

American access to oil wealth in Kuwait During the First World War and especially in its aftermath, US interest in Middle East oil was on the rise, for the United States became the main supplier of oil to the wartime allies. The necessity of sustaining access to more sources of oil supply arose from the increasing demand for oil, for both domestic consumption and overseas supply. Consequently, the chief geologist for the US Geological Survey encouraged US oil companies to make inroads into the potential oil deposits of both South America and the Middle East.28 Based on the promising evidence of oil seepages in the desert, Kuwait became a possible target for oil-exploring operations, of which the majority were then under the control of the British government. The first attempt in November 1911 by the AngloPersian Oil Company (APOC)—better known after 1954 as British Petroleum (BP)—to secure from the British Political Resident in the Gulf the concessions on the exploratory rights in Kuwait was turned down because of the unstable conditions in the area.29 APOC’s hope of undertaking an exploration in Kuwait was not completely dashed, however. Shaykh Salim, the Amir of Kuwait between 1917 and 1921, approved APOC’s first geological survey in Kuwait in March 1917. But with the war conditions still ongoing, the Political Resident suggested further postponement of the oil negotiations; in October 1917, APOC raised the matter again. The APOC’s persistent efforts to acquire concessionary rights in Kuwait became more promising. The British Colonial Office in October 1922 instructed the Political Resident in the Gulf to help APOC’s representatives in negotiating the concession with Shaykh Ahmad, the Amir of Kuwait between 1921 and 1950. Later, in January 1923, the Political Agent in Kuwait initiated the negotiations for an oil-concession agreement with the Kuwaiti Amir on behalf of APOC. While these negotiations were in progress, an unforeseen development took place in 1923—the arrival in the Middle East oil equation of Major Frank Holmes,30 believed to have come from New Zealand31 but serving as attorney for the Eastern and General Syndicate (EGS) Ltd, a British company formed to acquire and sell mining concessions in the Middle East.32 He made attempts to assure Shaykh Ahmad that the concessionary conditions tabled by EGS would better serve Kuwait than those put forth by APOC, but he met with no success.33 The first success for EGS in setting up its stronghold in the oilfields of the Middle East was the permission, jointly awarded in May 1924 by Shaykh Ahmad and the then Sultan ‘Abdul Aziz Ibn Sa’ud of the Najd, for oil concession rights in the Kuwaiti—Saudi Neutral Zone, agreed upon at the 1922 Uqayr Conference between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, under the auspices of the British Political Resident. Major Holmes’s involvement with the American interest in Middle Eastern oil stemmed from the partnership in November 1927 between EGS—which he had represented—and Gulf Oil Corporation (Gulf),34 a syndicate which also included Gulf’s

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subsidiary, Eastern Gulf Oil Company. A significant example of their co-operation was the success in jointly securing, in November 1927, the oil concession rights in Bahrain. Still interested in taking part in exploring oil deposits in Kuwait, Major Holmes tried again in June 1928, this time representing both EGS and Gulf Oil, to offer better terms for an oil agreement with Shaykh Ahmad. Considered as inadequate by the Shaykh, Holmes’s attempts failed to make any further progress. Worse still, he was informed in November 1928 by Major J.C.More, the British Political Agent, that the British government set a British nationality clause as the condition for entering into an oil agreement with Shaykh Ahmad.35 Major Holmes’s main concern over such a clause was that an American oil company would be excluded from further bids for an oil agreement with Shaykh Ahmad. This ‘British Nationality Clause’ also drew criticism from the US government, which strongly upheld the notion of an ‘open door’ policy in order to acquire access to the abundant oil reserves of the Middle East. With the approval of the US Ambassador in London, Andrew Mellon, the US Charge d’Affaires in London, Ray Atherton, reminded the British Foreign Office on 6 December 1931 of the ‘open door’ policy with regard to Kuwait,36 whereby both EGS and Gulf Oil expressed their strong interest, with the full support of the US government, in finalising an oil agreement with Shaykh Ahmad. The delay in this case, according to the Foreign Office’s response to the American embassy in London, was largely due to departmental discussions37 in which the Colonial and India Offices, both strongly disapproved of the proposed agreement by EGS/Gulf and urged the maintenance of the ‘Nationality Clause’.38 Gulf Oil itself also reported back to the State Department in the late 1931 that the stumbling block to the oil concession was still the British Colonial Office, despite the fact that Shaykh Ahmad and Holmes were almost able to clinch a deal which met the satisfaction of both. Gulf Oil could operate through a subsidiary—either Canadian or British—which would be chosen by Gulf Oil.39 Furthermore, Gulf Oil made it clear to the British government through the State Department that Gulf Oil would accept Bahraini nationality for the purposes of concluding the agreement. From Gulf Oil’s viewpoint, there was an element of inconsistency in the British government’s oil policy in the Middle East. While the British government raised no objection to the American operation in Bahrain through a Canadian subsidiary, the same practice, however, was not applicable to the case of Kuwait. It might be the case that the British government realised by then that oil reserves in Kuwait were higher than those in Bahrain. Hence, it wanted to keep the concessionary rights solely for the British-owned oil companies. Parellel to the ongoing diplomatic negotiations between Washington and London, Gulf Oil protested with the Foreign Office against reports of the arrival in Kuwait of APOC’s geologist survey team. At the request of Gulf Oil, the American embassy in London took up the issue again with the Foreign Office. In April 1932, EGS’s prospects for negotiating an oil deal with Shaykh Ahmad later improved, for the British had given in to the US government’s consistent request for an ‘open door’ policy for American oil companies in Kuwait.40 No sooner had Shaykh Ahmad obtained from Major Holmes a newly amended draft of oil concession agreement than APOC, now having Archibald Hugh Tennent (AHT) Chisholm as its chief negotiator, also prepared a new version of its draft agreement, which was completed a few months later and ready for the Shaykh’s consideration. Encouraged by the optimism at this point, Ambassador Mellon was very active in seeking assurances from the British

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government that equal treatment should be accorded to both EGS and APOC.41 A conclusive decision, however, on the oil deal did not emerge, largely due to the necessity on the part of Shaykh Ahmad to take into account the British government’s view on this case.42 In the meantime, negotiations were underway in the late 1932 on combining the operations carried out by both Gulf Oil and APOC to obtain an oil concession in Kuwait. Finally, an agreement was reached in December 1933 between both companies on jointly forming the Kuwait Oil Company Ltd (KOC), headquartered in London, in which Gulf Oil, with some reluctance,43 and APOC both shared an equal partnership in the new company. Holmes and Chisholm were appointed as the joint negotiators for KOC. A major concern this time to the KOC’s joint negotiators was the emergence of a new competitor—Traders Ltd, a purely British-owned company based in Basra—looking for an oil concession agreement in Kuwait. This new company was allegedly led by Lord Lloyd (former high commissioner in Egypt). Its members were mainly British businessmen and politicians who stood by the imperial-oriented policy.44 With two main objectives of preserving the Gulf totally for British interests and keeping American oil companies out of the competition, the company was established just before the decision taken by the British government to adopt an ‘open door’ policy. Although the British government’s final approval of any deal was a requisite, Shaykh Ahmad, in this event, viewed the final arrangement with KOC as already in the making. Determined to maximise benefits out of the oil deals, Shaykh Ahmad, helped by his Iraqi lawyer, was keen to make the best use of the Traders Ltd’s offer in order to sustain the best possible proposals from KOC.45 Mr Hunting, Chairman of Traders, and Lt Col. Bovill, Secretary, discussed on 28 November 1934 with Mr Laithwaite, the official at the India Office responsible for Kuwaiti affairs, the company’s negotiations with Shaykh Ahmad on the oil concession agreement.46 Nevertheless, it was KOC, jointly signed by Holmes and Chisholm, which finally settled an agreement with the Shaykh on 23 December 1934. This agreement was to last seventy-five years, covering the concession area of all the mainland and some of the islands.47 In addition, KOC was obligated to recruit as many Kuwaiti subjects as possible for its operations.48 In case of any deficiency, KOC would replace Kuwaitis with the labour forces of the neighbouring Arab countries. In return for the right to maintain in the Gulf a chief local representative, KOC gave in to Shaykh Ahmad’s demand that such a representative be selected on the recommendation of the British government.49 Leading American administrators and civil engineers were involved in the early stage of KOC’s operations. These included Ralph O.Rhoades, Chairman of the Gulf Oil Corporation, and Tom Patrick, Ted Rakestraw and Paul Boots who put in place KOC’s exploration, production, engineering and administrative works.50 At this point, when a medical clinic was set up at the oil drilling operation sites, the short-age of drugs and medical facilities was redressed by the services provided by the American Arab Missions in Kuwait.51 Launched in May 1936 at a depth of 7,750 feet, the first drilling well failed to produce a satisfactory volume of oil outputs and it was suspended in April 1937. More successful at the depth of merely 3,692 feet—less than half the depth of the first oil well—KOC struck an impressive quantity of oil reserves in May 1938 at the Burgan Field.52 The

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tensions of the Second World War, however, forced all oil-based operations to come to a halt. Reactivating the operations again in June 1945, Shaykh Ahmad presided over the opening ceremony of Kuwait’s first oil terminal at Ahmadi on 30 June 1946, when he also officially opened a silver valve to load the oil tanker British Fusilier for the first export of crude oil.53 A jubilant celebration replete with fireworks took place on that night. In the meantime, the terminal area called the Dhahar ridge was given the new name of al-Ahmadi and the port was renamed Mina al-Ahmadi. Apart from KOC’s involvement with the oil industry in Kuwait, another American oil company which was capable of establishing a stronghold over the oil deposits in Kuwait was the AMINOIL. It was not the direct rival to KOC, however. Formed as a consortium by Ralph K. Davies, former Vice-President of Standard Oil of California and former petroleum administrator under President Roosevelt, AMINOIL finalised an oil deal with Shaykh Ahmad on 28 June 1948 for a period of sixty years, covering the territory of Kuwait’s undivided half of the Kuwaiti—Saudi Neutral Zone.54 The concession rights to the Saudi portion of the Neutral Zone were granted to the Pacific Western Oil Corporation, which was later renamed the Getty Oil Company. AMINOIL pledged to pay the Amir of Kuwait the total sum of $2.57 per tonne of oil produced and 15 per cent of AMINOIL’s net profits.55 A $7.5 million down payment and an annual payment later worth $625,000, were also promised by AMINOIL.56 Of particular note was AMINOIL’s proposal to provide $50,000 in grants every year for Kuwaiti students to pursue higher education in the United States.57

Establishment of American consulate in Kuwait Without an official US presence in Kuwait prior to the establishment of the American Consulate in Kuwait, it was the American Consul at Basra who was in charge of reporting to the State Department AMINOIL’s oil explorations in the concessionary zone.58 The Consul at Basra provided regular consular services for the American community residing and working in Kuwait, by correspondence and by monthly visits to Kuwait.59 However, the Consul was aware of the inadequacy of this service and recommended the immediate establishment of a resident consul.60 For their part, both Gulf Oil, sharing half of KOC’s concessionary rights, and AMINOIL strenuously endorsed this proposal so that routine consular services would be available to the scores of American employees and their dependants inhabiting Kuwait.61 All agreed that a resident consular service was needed to cover several needs. First, the necessities of renewing, replacing and amending passports for an increasing number of American citizens in Kuwait created so high a workload that the American Consul at Basra was not able to cope with it. Second, it was claimed that American citizens, wherever they might live, should be under the protection of the US government. Any American individual who was put on trial before the Agency Court in Kuwait under the legal system set up by British Orders in Council, should have ready access to the kind of legal protection only afforded by an official American representative in close proximity to the accused.62 Third, the increasing number of American tankers and American seamen visiting the Kuwaiti port for oil-related business required protection. The US Congress had imposed special duties on consuls to provide for services in a port served by the

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American ships.63 Fourth, the issuance of consular invoices verifying the goods manufactured in or transiting through Kuwait also fell under the first-hand and immediate responsibilities of the consul. Fifth, the State Department required consular reporting on a regular basis, but the consul in Basra was unable to maintain a constant contact with the local conditions in Kuwait. As a result, the substance and frequency of consular reporting on Kuwait were drastically disrupted. With the increasing volume of business transactions that American citizens had with the Kuwaitis, the improvement of the quality of consular reporting seemed to be inevitable. Finally, with the concern over the maintenance of such an intimate working relationship with the American companies’ representatives in Kuwait, the local Kuwaiti officials justified establishing a Consulate in Kuwait. The State Department also strongly contended that in order to uphold the spirit of the Anglo-American conversations on economic and cultural co-operation in the Near East, organised in Washington in October 1947, an American consular official would facilitate the compatability of commercial relations in Kuwait between the United States and the United Kingdom.64 Against the background portrayed earlier, on 8 March 1948, the State Department advised the American embassy in London to take up the issue of establishing a consulate in Kuwait with the Eastern Department of the British Foreign Office.65 The British government refused to allow the establishment of a consulate office in Kuwait for three reasons.66 First, the British government was loathe to weaken the special treaty relationships it enjoyed with Kuwait. Second, it anticipated that once an American Consulate office was set up in Kuwait, other countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq and possibly the Soviet Union would follow suit. Third, the Eastern Department of the British Foreign Office also made a point that the American Consulate at Dhahran was able to handle consular needs at Bahrain. It could also thus provide the same services in Kuwait. In August 1949, the prospects of the US government setting up a consulate presence in Kuwait were still not promising. On 19 August 1949, the US ambassador to the United Kingdom informed the State Department about the British Foreign Office’s position manifested in a letter from B.A.B.Burrows, Head of the Eastern Department of the British Foreign Office. Burrows was adamant that a US consulate in Kuwait would constitute a precedent.67 Iraq and Egypt, where the British government had to prevent the proliferation of nationalist elements, also made it clear they would set up a consulate presence in Kuwait. The British government, as Burrows sternly noted, could not allow Kuwait to be infected with what was regarded as forces destabilising the Kuwaiti regime. At this juncture, Burrows proposed three conditions regarding the status of the American consul in Kuwait, to which the US government had to adhere; otherwise, the appointment of a US consul representative would not be recognised by the British government.68 First, the consul representative’s exequatur should be issued by the British government, not by the Shaykh of Kuwait, given the international status of Kuwait based on the 1899 Anglo-Kuwaiti agreement. Second, the appointment would not mean relaxing the Political Agent’s concurrent responsibility for handling legal cases which involved non-Arab foreigners. Third, in terms of overall relations, except for routine matters with the Shaykh of Kuwait, the American-owned and American-shared oil companies in Kuwait must make contact with Kuwaiti officials through the British Political Agent.

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Further discussions took place on 22 November 1949 in Washington, DC, between Michael Wright, Superintending Under Secretary of State in the British Foreign Office, and Harlan B.Clark, officer in charge of Lebanon-Syria-Iraq affairs in the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs, the State Department.69 The British position remained unchanged. The British government rejected a compromise solution proposed by the US government, stating that the exequatur should be signed by both the British monarch and the Amir of Kuwait. Mr Wright confirmed that the British government had taken into consideration the US government’s need of consular services in Kuwait. But, it did not see how it would be possible to turn down requests for the appointment of similar consular representatives from other countries if the British government approved of the appointment of the US consular representatives.70 As for the three conditions mentioned earlier, the most complicated matter was the issuance of exequatur.71 Fred H.Awalt, Officer in Charge of Arabian Peninsula Affairs, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, the State Department, recommended in his memorandum of 13 December 1950 that the US government should open a Consulate in Kuwait under the British terms.72 However, he suggested that the case should be referred to the Legal Adviser for an analysis of the significance of the legal aspect. As a result, a memorandum, interpreting the status of the exequatur for the US consul in Kuwait, was sent to Awalt by Warde M.Cameron, Assistant Legal Adviser for Administration and Foreign Service on 29 December 1950. It supported the British government’s position: Unless this Government were disposed to refuse to recognise that the British Government had any authority over the foreign relations of Kuwait, or unless the Shaykh of Kuwait was unwilling to receive our consul under such circumstances, it would appear that there are no legal objections to accepting the exequatur prepared in the form suggested by the British Government…. If the British wish to signify their consent to the Shaykh’s receiving our consul by issuing him an exequatur, signed by the King, and the Shaykh is satisfied to receive a foreign consul who has been issued such an exequatur, without insisting on co-signing the document, or issuing a formal document under his own signature, it would not appear that the United States was in a position to object…. The United States is not a party to the 1899 Treaty, and the treaty does not affect any right of the United States. If the Shaykh is satisfied with the British interpretation that would seem to end the matter. The acquiescence of the United States to this procedure does not, however, constitute recognition that the Shaykh possesses no sovereignty at all, as the Shaykh’s action in receiving our consul…may be considered as an exercise of his sovereignty.73 Having settled the exequatur issue in line with British interests, the US government appointed Enoch S.Duncan the first American Consul in Kuwait on 12 March 1951. The US and the British governments signed in Washington, DC on 6 June 1951 a Consular Convention, which was put into effect on 7 September 1952.74 Duncan arrived in Kuwait on 27 June 1951 to open the Consulate officially.75 On that very day, Daniel Gandin, Jr, the American Consul at Basra, reported to the State Department that an Arabio-speaking

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source revealed several Kuwaiti shaykhs had signalled their concern that the set-up of the American Consulate in Kuwait would lead to the opening of other countries’ consular offices. They were principally opposed to this trend on commercial reasons. There was, however, speculation that the Amir planned to ‘play’ the American Consul against the British Political Agent.76 On 1 July, four days after his arrival in Kuwait, Duncan, accompanied by H.G.Jakins, the Political Agent in Kuwait, called on Shaykh ‘Abdullah, the Amir of Kuwait, at the Dasman Palace. Shaykh ‘Abdullah remarked ‘that the American and the British people are friends, and that they are both his friends and that it would be this way in Kuwait, that all business and relations would be conducted in a spirit of co-operation’.77 The American Consulate in Kuwait was opened to the public on 15 October 1951.78 The beneficiaries of this new US diplomatic presence in Kuwait were doubtless AMINOIL and KOC. George C.McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State, confirmed in his letter of 29 June 1951 to Harley C.Stevens, Special Counsel and Assistant to the President of AMINOIL, that ‘American nationals, including corporations, in Kuwait will continue…to be subject to the jurisdiction of the Political Agents Court’.79 However, Stevens expressed his company’s gratification for the establishment of the consulate in a letter to Burton Y.Berry, Acting Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs.80 Similarly, James MacPherson, the first General Manager of AMINOIL, had strongly encouraged the opening of the American Consulate in Kuwait.81 It would provide a diplomatic shield for AMINOIL’s negotiations over problems in its operations in the Neutral Zone, for example—its desire for further guarantees of a six-mile offshore oil concession in the zone.82

American role in improving infrastructures in Kuwait In the field of public services infrastructure development in Kuwait, mention should be made of the role of the American private enterprises. In order to lessen the reliance on the water supply from the Shatt al-‘Arab for domestic consumption, the Kuwaiti regime undertook a plan of increasing the volume of fresh water produced daily by its distillation plant. American and British firms bid for the contract. The final decision was taken to award the contract to an American firm, Westinghouse, at the expense of a British firm, G. and J.Weir Ltd.83 Westinghouse was obliged to supply and install additional evaporators in the present distillation plant so that it could be equipped with a higher capacity to produce from two million to three million gallons of fresh water daily.84 The body which examined the bidding and made the decision in this case was not the Development Board, but the Highest Council whose de facto head was Shaykh Fahd alSalim Al Sabah, who also was the President of the Department of Public Works.85 The American Consul in Kuwait at the time, William D.Brewer, was inclined to attach significance to an observation made by Lewis Grulich, a regional representative of Westinghouse in Beirut, that Westinghouse’s success in winning a contract was due to Shaykh Fahd’s personal preference for Westinghouse. However, an unforeseen difficulty arose when the US Defense Department turned down Westinghouse’s request for priority assistance in supplying nickel alloys necessary for the completion of the construction, on the ground that authority for the approval of priorities was limited to the direct defence

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contracts concluded by the Defense Department and the Atomic Energy Commission.86 The American Consul, Brewer, made a suggestion to the Department of State that ‘from the viewpoint of American interests in Kuwait, it would be helpful if this decision could be reconsidered’.87 It is, however, necessary to point out that the British firm G. and J.Weir Ltd also took part in constructing water distillation plants in Kuwait.88 This may indicate that the Amir of Kuwait feared the possible disruption of the development schemes and so decided not to rely on only one source. Another major US involvement with the infrastructure development in Kuwait was the construction of a new port, located about three miles from the old, and a small craft harbour near the city centre of Kuwait. The American firm which won the $25 million contract in January 1958 for the construction of this new port was Pomeroy ConstructionHawaiian Dreading.89 This new port was aimed at alleviating the congestion problem in the harbour, where incoming ships had to spend over forty days to unload the cargo. As far as aviation activities in Kuwait were concerned, when the national airline of Kuwait was set up in the early 1950s and financed entirely by the Kuwaiti capital, it was the British Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC) which supplied management, flying and technical personnel assistance. Furthermore, Ahmad Sa’ud al-Khalid, the Chairman of Kuwait National Airlines, confirmed the order for two British-made Viscounts 700D aircraft placed with the Vickers Viscount Armstrong Company.90 The American Consul in Kuwait, Harrison M.Symmes, reminded Washington that a ‘reliable’ source in the Kuwait National Airline revealed the airline might be poised to negotiate with the McDonald Douglas company on the purchase of DC-6B or DC-7 aircraft.91 The likelihood of this inroad into Kuwait’s aviation sector was also confirmed and encouraged by Robert A. Thayer, Civil Air Attaché of the American embassy in Beirut.92 Dissatisfied with BOAC’s services scheme, the Kuwait National Airline sought the alternative choice of aircraft and technical assistance from the Aircoach Transport Association with which Kuwait Airways had signed a contract.93 However, it did not mean an end to BOAC’s connection with the Kuwait National Airline, for both signed a new contract on 24 May 1958, giving BOAC a wide managerial power in return for the provision of at least a Viscount aircraft and the assurance of a 300,000-rupee profit per annum for the Kuwait National Airline.94 An attempt by an American firm at modernising Kuwait’s telecommunications was launched in the 1950s. The Radio Corporation of America (RCA), with the approval of the Amir, set up a demonstration television transmitter in Shuwaykh—an industrial suburb close to the new port, which was also constructed by an American firm. This modernisation undertaking was not without problems, however. For example, RCA television engineers raised the immediate problem of tuning the receiving TV sets and the long-term problem of how to supply, with consistency, programme materials for broadcasting. While leaving the solution to the first problem to technicians and engineers, Washington recommended that its Consulate request a greater supply of Arabic soundtrack 16 mm films from both the United States Information Service (USIS) in Baghdad and the Consulate General at Dhahran.95 RCA itself received assistance from an American-trained Iraqi named Diwani, in planning Arabic TV programmes at the early stage of RCA’s operations in Kuwait. Less significant but also related to the US role in contributing to the public services development in Kuwait was the Kuwaiti government’s support for a Kuwaiti police

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officer to study criminology at a police school in the United States.96 In addition, the Superintendent of the Kuwaiti Fire Brigade Department expressed his interest in both equipping his Department with US-manufactured supplies and familiarising his subordinates with American fire-fighting techniques. The American Consul in Kuwait calculated that this would constitute significant trade opportunities for American products. In January 1958, the British Political Agent approved of American plans for an aerial photographic mapping survey of Kuwait carried out by the US airforce.97

American concern over political upheaval in the Gulf region On the political front, the US government’s concern over the spread of communism in the 1950s—either actual or potential—permeated throughout the Middle East. Kuwait was no exception to this. The State Department commissioned the American Consulate to watch closely the development of what was believed to be communistinspired activity in Kuwait, even though a more direct role in providing security for Kuwait was incumbent upon the British authorities. For example, a British officer in the Secretariat of the Kuwaiti government disclosed the Amir’s decision to have a British security advisor stationed in Kuwait.98 For its part, the American Consulate in Kuwait reported that it could purchase five communist propaganda publications from the Kuwait Office—a small advertising agency and bookstore in Kuwait; the contents of two of the publications were strongly anti-American.99 It is worth noting here that despite the availability of these documents, there was no concrete evidence to suggest that the Kuwaiti regime’s attitudes towards communist-inspired or left wing-related activities were neutral or tolerant. Nevertheless, it is possible that because of the receipt of information on these documents from US officials in Kuwait, the Kuwait Public Security Department, with the full support of the British Political Agent, considered establishing anti-subversive mechanisms to counter subversive activities.100 Some of these ‘activities’ were allegedly newsletters prepared by the Kuwait Democratic League, regarded as a communist organisation by the leading shaykhs of the Kuwaiti regime. Concerned with the political trends in Kuwait, the then American Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, issued official instructions to the US representatives based in Baghdad, Basra, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Dhahran, Jiddah, London and Teheran to pass on to the US Consulate in Kuwait copies of reports on political movements, which could be of some use in keeping abreast of the situation in Kuwait. The Dulles cable reads: With the growing influx into Kuwait of nationals of other Arab and Middle Eastern countries and with some evidence that disruptive political movements from these countries are beginning to operate in Kuwait, it is important that the Consulate be as fully aware as possible of trends and movements in the Middle East which may have a bearing on the local situation. The posts receiving this instruction are…requested to forward to Kuwait copies of all future political reports which have an area wide interest and of all reports which bear specifically on disruptive extremist movements.101

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On 11 August 1955, Under Secretary of State Herbert Hoover, Jr, held a discussion with British Ambassador Sir Robert M.Makins on the developments in Kuwait.102 High on the agenda were the US concern over communist-inspired propaganda and activity in Kuwait and the Anglo-American stake in Kuwait oil. The US government wished to cooperate with Great Britain in avoiding circumstances that would impede their interests, but undermining British influence and prestige in Kuwait was out of the question, however. Dulles’s memorandum may be regarded as a response to the American Consulate s report that communists in Kuwait appeared to be predominantly Palestinians, but also Egyptians, Lebanese, Syrians and Iraqis and that propaganda activities in Kuwait were directed or masterminded by Iran, Iraq and Syria.103 Yet, it can be argued that the US government’s concern also covered the nationalist movements, triggered by Nasser in Egypt and Mossadeq in Iran. A conversation on 30 April 1956 between Willie Morris, an officer at the British Embassy in Washington, DC, and David Newsom, Office of the Near East, the State Department, revealed the divergent views on communist activities in Kuwait. The US government’s position, as Morris pointed out, was ‘a bit alarmist’ on this issue.104 He further asserted that ‘…they [the British] did not think communism represented an immediate threat, particularly in Kuwait’.105 What is noteworthy was the British government’s belief that there was no evidence of communist control over the movement, aimed at reforming the ruling or the administrative mechanism in Kuwait. Many clubs operating in Kuwait, like the Teachers’ Club the Graduates’ Club, the National Cultural Club and the sports club named the Arabian Club, had nothing to do with communist organisations.106 What perhaps highlighted the fear of revolutionary influence in Kuwait was the Iraqi revolution on 14 July 1958, led by a communist-oriented military officer, General ‘Abdul Karim Qassim in collaboration with his pro-Nasser partner, ‘Abdul al-Salam Arif. On the morning of the revolution, President Eisenhower remarked that ‘this was the country that we were counting on heavily as a bulwark of stability and progress in the region’.107 At this juncture, Eisenhower did not find himself in a position to refuse the repeated requests by President Camille Chamoun of Lebanon for sending troops to stabilise his administration. American troops from the US Sixth Fleet landed in Beirut at 1:30 p.m. (Beirut time) on 15 July, one day after the revolution. This operation was carried out under the overall supervision of Admiral James L.Holloway, Jr, Commander-in-Chief of Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean.108 In order to protect Jordan, Great Britain, on 17 July, despatched the 2,200-man Cyprus-based parachute force to protect King Hussein’s monarchical regime. This Anglo-American military intervention, as Majid Khadduri argues, was aimed at warning the Soviet bloc not to spread its influence.109 A meeting on Kuwait and the Persian Gulf area between highranking officials of the United States and Great Britain was held on 17 July 1958 in Washington, DC. The British Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, said that he wished to come to an understanding with the United States on the situation in Kuwait,110 for the unforeseen situation in Iraq would doubtless have a negative effect on Kuwait. He also speculated that the Kuwaiti ruler, Shaykh ‘Abdullah al-Salim Al Sabah, might voluntarily abdicate. Although the ruling family seemed to be in control and there was a sufficient security force, it was necessary to contemplate preventing similar incidents from taking place in Kuwait, thereby forestalling the association of Kuwait with the United Arab Republic (UAR).111

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Allen W.Dulles, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), highlighted the US government’s apprehension of the situation in Kuwait. He asked Secretary Lloyd, whether it was possible to freeze the Kuwaiti ruler’s bank accounts in London in case the situation in Kuwait became worse. Secretary Lloyd responded that ‘while it might be possible to block the bank accounts of the Ruler of Kuwait in London this would seriously jeopardise the good standing of British banking’.112 Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles made it clear that ‘he believed it would be foolish for the US and the UK to move into Lebanon and Jordan and not plan at the same time to hold other areas of greater intrinsic value…the US and the UK should agree in principle on the holding of Kuwait and the Dhahran area’.113 He further opined that if Iraq were to fall under Egyptian influence, the next targets would perhaps be Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. He seemed to support Selwyn Lloyd’s position on undertaking preventive moves before those who sympathised with the UAR could gain the upperhand in Kuwait. What was argued at this meeting was that there should be a joint working group to study the military and the political implications of the revolution in Iraq. To substantiate his pledge of support for Kuwait, President Eisenhower ordered the Chairman of the Joints Chief of Staff, General Nathan F.Twining, ‘to be prepared to employ…whatever means might become necessary to prevent any unfriendly forces from moving into Kuwait’.114 The Middle East Force (MEF) flagship Greenwich Bay, on 15 July 1958, moved into the northern Persian Gulf near Kuwait.115 Two days after, the Chief of the Middle East Force (CMEF), based on the approval of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), commanded the destroyer Holder, already deployed in the Straits of Tiran at that time, to help stabilise the situation.116 Recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a Marine Corps regimental combat team was ordered to transfer from Okinawa and to re-position in the Persian Gulf.117 There was a report that the general Kuwaiti public disapproved of the possibility of deploying British and American troops in Kuwait in order to protect the Ahmadi airstrip.118 Together with editorials in the local Kuwaiti press, the secretary of the Kuwait Student Union protested against the marine landings in Lebanon.119 Nevertheless, two weeks after the revolution, Qassim’s revolutionary regime received formal diplomatic recognition from both the United States and Great Britain. While the American Consulate reported in August 1958 that the general mood in Kuwait was relaxed and businesslike as usual,120 concern was raised over the impact of the revolution in Iraq on the internal division of two political trends in Kuwait—one in the reformist-nationalist mould, seeking closer relations with the UAR; and the other favouring close ties with the new regime in Baghdad. Parallel to an attempt at joining the Arab League, with the final endorsement of the British government, the Kuwaiti regime adopted its own guidelines for foreign relations called ‘positive neutralism’.121 It was clearly an attempt at not being drawn into intra-Arab politics. As far as the US government’s position was concerned, it could be said that, due to its greater anxiety over the communist threat, it did not automatically view the rise of UAR influence in Kuwait as destabilising of Anglo-American interests in oil. A memorandum of 16 March 1959 from the Board of National Estimates to Allen Dulles, the Director of the CIA, emphasised the importance of access to markets: A change, gradual or sudden, in Kuwait’s Government will not necessarily threaten Western access to Kuwaiti oil. Even if nationalist-

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reformist elements gained full power, or if Kuwait fell wholly under UAR hegemony, those in control would continue to want Western markets for the oil…. The outlook would be much more serious if Kuwait should come under the influence of a communist-dominated Iraq and control of two of the major sources of Middle East oil were thereby given to the Bloc as a weapon against the West.122 At Camp David, a discussion was held on 22 March 1959 between Eisenhower and his British counterpart, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, also attended by both leaders’ high-ranking officials. At this meeting, they emphasised Secretary Lloyd’s proposal earlier raised in July 1958 of setting up a working group to consider drawing up contingency plans for situations in Iraq, Kuwait and Iran.123 On 14 May 1959, Macmillan wrote to Eisenhower that the British Chiefs of Staff were involved with a revision of plans to prevent Kuwait from being threatened by Iraq. Macmillan expressed his hope that Eisenhower would go along with the joint US-UK planning for Kuwait.124 The question as to whether the US government was legally committed to come to the aid of Kuwait militarily was, however, addressed in a legal opinion of 15 May 1959 written by Loftus Becker, the legal adviser to Secretary of State Herter. This memorandum says: If we were to send troops to Kuwait, solely on the basis of a request from the British (and particularly if the Government of Kuwait objected), our position would be doubtful…under international law. …I am not aware of any treaty or agreement committing us to assist the UK in such military operations.125 In a telegram of 20 May 1959, the American embassy in London reported that, according to British reports, Shaykh ‘Abdullah Mubarak Al Sabah, the Deputy Ruler and President of the Police and Public Security Departments, had expressed the desire to undertake joint military planning with Great Britain.126 There was a meeting on 23 May in Bahrain between Shaykh ‘Abdullah Mubarak and senior British military officers in the Gulf region including the commander of the Aden-based British forces in the Arabian Peninsula. It was at this meeting that British delegates, with the US government’s endorsement, informed their Kuwaiti counterparts that the British government was ‘in touch with the United States on matters with respect to the general defence of the area, including to the defence of Kuwait by Kuwait and the UK’.127 However, the State Department made it perfectly clear to the Foreign Office that this Anglo-American cooperation should not be construed by the Kuwaitis as specific US commitments regarding the defence of Kuwait. In the meantime, the Kuwaiti regime entered into negotiations with the British government on the provisions of arms for Kuwait’s embryonic armed forces. Combined with the supply of anti-tank guns, rocket launchers, mines and ammunition to the Kuwaiti army from non-American sources,128 the 1899 Anglo-Kuwaiti agreement made it unnecessary for the Kuwaiti regime to develop military relations with the US government, at this stage.

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Conclusion The opening chapter of US-Kuwaiti relations started with the introduction into Kuwait of humanitarian and altruistic programmes by the American Mission of the Dutch Reformed Church, consisting of such philanthropic missions as hospital constructions, medical services and illiteracy-eradicating programmes. The introduction of the missions paved the way for ‘non-official’ contacts between the American citizens and the local populace. With an increasing American enthusiasm for abundant oil reserves in Kuwait, more complicated relations took place, involving more actors along three poles—the US government and oil companies, the British government and oil companies, and the Kuwaiti regime. The more complicated US-Kuwaiti relations became, the more the US government was compelled to take care of the US citizens’ interests. Initial British objection to the establishment of an American Consulate in Kuwait confirmed British control over Kuwaiti foreign relations. Parallel to a success in setting up a consulate in Kuwait, American private enterprises were able to enlist the US government’s support in securing inroads into the development of Kuwait’s public service infrastructure, even when in competition with their British counterparts. In the light of the potential threats in the 1950s to the Kuwaiti regime, the main responsibility for its defence rested with Great Britain, while the US role in guaranteeing Kuwait’s security and stability fell short of a full-scale commitment. It is obvious that direct contacts between the US government and the Kuwaiti regime prior to Kuwaiti independence came under the close scrutiny of the British government. To put it simply, an influence relationship between the two countries did not evolve because of the hegemony and interference of the British government.

3 US-Kuwaiti relations, 1961–1977 Introduction The British are my steadfast friends, therefore I am steadfast in friendship with them, but since the Americans are also friends of the British, they are my friends too.1

This citation was part of the conversation on 24 July 1959 between the Kuwaiti leader, Shaykh ‘Abdullah Salim Al Sabah and the US Ambassador to Lebanon, Robert McClintock, at the Kuwaiti leader’s grand residence in a resort town in the Bekaa valley. While seen as a firm commitment to uphold bilateral US-Kuwaiti relations, it also reflected the Kuwaiti regime’s acquiescence in British control over its foreign relations’ outlook. As soon as Kuwait gained its independence in June 1961, a question was raised as to whether US-Kuwaiti relations would become closer and more direct in their contacts. As a conservative, monarchical regime and small state, Kuwait would pose no great problems for the US government, but the relationship would be far from easy. The task of this chapter is to examine the development of the relations during the sixteen years after Kuwait became independent of British control. The discussions will be divided into two phases: 1 the period from 1961 to 1967; 2 the period from 1968, when the British government announced its withdrawal from the Persian Gulf region, to the late 1970s.

US-Kuwaiti relations, 1961–1967 Prior to Kuwait’s full independence, many activities pursued by the Kuwaiti regime reflected its intentions to be independent in its own foreign relations conduct. Apart from participating in economic and social meetings of the Arab League since early 1952, the Kuwaiti Amir Shaykh ‘Abdullah Salim Al Sabah requested in his memorandum of 10 September 1958 British permission for Kuwait to conduct its own relations with other Arab states and to join the international organisations. In the British Political Agent’s reply of 21 October 1958 to the Amir, the British government raised no objection.2 In Cairo, in September 1958, the Kuwaiti leader announced that Kuwait had decided to apply for membership of the Arab League and the Arab League Development Bank.3 Furthermore, Kuwait also joined as a fullmember of the Universal Postal Union, the International Maritime Consultative Organisation, the World Health Organisation, the

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International Telecommunications Union, the International Labour Organisation and the United Nations Economic, Social and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO).4 Kuwait was also one of the five founding members of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), set up in 1960 in co-operation with Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela.5 The Kuwaiti regime also undertook two major reforms that institutionalised the independent status of its foreign relations with the other states. Not only did the Kuwaiti ruling regime plan to set up a Ministry of Foreign Affairs,6 but the new Kuwaiti dinar also would be adopted as the national currency and put into monetary circulation, effective from 1 April 1961,7 replacing the special rupee notes and coins which were used as legal tender at the time.8 In May 1961, Great Britain abandoned its jurisdiction over foreigners residing in Kuwait, by transferring its judicial power to Kuwaiti courts.9 Poised to grant independence to Kuwait, the Macmillan government first proposed that the 1899 agreement be amended, a proposal which did not satisfy the Kuwaiti regime’s demand for a complete abrogation of the agreement.10 Due to the rise of the Arab nationalist campaign and its economic interest in Kuwait, the British government came to the conclusion that granting Kuwait’s full independence was inevitable. The Amir, Shaykh ‘Abdullah, announced on 19 June 1961 the termination of the 1899 agreement through an exchange of letters with Great Britain, and signed an agreement with Great Britain represented by Sir William Luce, the British political adviser in the Persian Gulf. This event confirmed the termination of the agreement and put an end to the British control of Kuwait’s foreign relations.11 However, both countries concluded a new friendship treaty, of which two significant provisions read: (c)When appropriate the two Governments shall consult on matters which concern them both; (d)Nothing in these conclusions shall affect the readiness of Her Majesty’s Government to assist the Government of Kuwait if the latter request such assistance.12 The reorganisation of the British Middle East Command was necessary to the effect that a new military command centre was set up in Aden, which was later withdrawn in 1967.13 Kenya, also situated on the rim of the Indian Ocean, is where Great Britain contemplated establishing a reserve base. The US government welcomed this decision. It also, as early as December 1960, began to develop direct relations with the Kuwaiti government. It directly concluded a bilateral agreement on the reciprocal granting of non-immigrant passport visas, which was put into practice on 27 December 1960,14 more than six months prior to Kuwait’s acquisition of full independence. Iraqi threat to Kuwait in the 1961 crisis While speculation about upgrading the American consul’s position in Kuwait to that of ambassador was underway,15 Iraq’s territorial claims over Kuwait were looming. Six days after Great Britain granted full independence to Kuwait, General Qassim of Iraq held a three-hour press conference at the Ministry of Defence in Baghdad, claiming sovereignty over Kuwait as an integral part of Iraq.16 He continued: The Iraqi Republic has decided to protect the Iraqi people in Kuwait and to demand all the land, arbitrarily held by imperialism, which belongs to

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the district of Kuwait which is entirely associated with the province of Basra. The Iraqi Republic will not be ready to cede a single inch of this land. When we say this, it means that we can execute it We will warn the Shaykh of Kuwait not to act arbitrarily with regard to the right of the Kuwaiti people which is the right of the Iraqi people themselves. If this Shaykh misbehaves, then he will be severely punished and regarded as an insurgent.17 Qassim described the Kuwaiti delegates who signed the new treaty with Great Britain as ‘irresponsible people who are under the sway of imperialism’.18 The propaganda campaign on Baghdad Radio remarked that Qassim could muster support from the Iraqi public to the extent that they supported his declaration of sovereignty over Kuwait to include all other territories along the coast of the Persian Gulf.19 One could argue that Qassim’s announcement of his claim over Kuwait was a surprise to everyone.20 Mustafa M.Alani argues that the issue of Kuwaiti affairs was not of great interest to Qassim, who allowed the Iraqi Foreign Ministry to handle this issue until the spring of 1961.21 Consequently, Iraqi—Kuwaiti relations remained cordial for a while. Up to mid-196l, Iraq supported Kuwaiti attempts to assert its independence and to end British control. For example, Iraq voted on 13 June 1961 to allow Kuwait to join as a full member of the International Labour Organisation.22 Be that as it may, the Iraqi claim should have been expected at least by the British Political Agent and the Kuwaiti regime itself.23 Walid E.Moubarak asserts that British and Kuwaiti leaders were in no position to neglect Iraqi territorial claims on various grounds. First, Sir William Luce stated that the British government had paid attention to Qassim’s general position upon his ascension to power in 1958, and that Kuwait was part of the old Turkish province of Basra and therefore part of Iraq.24 Second, three months before the outbreak of the crisis, Qassim denounced a suggestion that Kuwait might become a member of the British Commonwealth.25 The Kuwaiti regime issued, without delay, a formal announcement which denied the rumour that Kuwait would join the Commonwealth despite the fact that the Finance Minister at the time was in favour of joining it.26 Majid Khadduri argues that Qassim’s plan of taking over Kuwait probably took form at this time.27 Third, one day after Kuwait gained its independence, what the Kuwaiti ruler received from Qassim was not a congratulatory message, but a suggestion of the formal Iraqi claim over Kuwait.28 Moubarak, therefore, criticises Sir Patrick Dean, the British Representative at the UN Security Council, for delivering a disingenuous speech that stated it was ‘…with surprise and shock that the news was received that Iraq reacted not with approval but with a threat’.29 To forestall a military operation by Iraqi troops, the Kuwaiti regime declared a state of emergency and formed a 900-member frontier force.30 As an attempt at internationalising the crisis, Kuwait appealed for diplomatic and political support to all other Arab leaders. Saudi Arabia rendered its immediate support. King Sa’ud empowered his Chief of Staff, General Ibrahim al-Tassan, to carry out consultations with the Kuwaiti leaders.31 Radio Mecca broadcast a declaration by King Sa’ud that ‘any mishap that befalls Kuwait affects Saudi Arabia and vice versa’.32 The British initial reaction focused on the diplomatic front. Britain persuaded some countries like Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and India to mediate between Iraq and Kuwait.33 The British ambassador in Baghdad also suggested that his

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Indian, Turkish and Pakistani counterparts seek co-operation from their respective governments to restrain Qassim.34 For military guarantees, Kuwaiti leaders sought assistance from two sources. First, the newly concluded 1961 Anglo-Kuwaiti agreement was put into operation despite the fact that the Macmillan government was not so convinced that Qassim’s real motive was to take over Kuwait with force. On 28 June 1961, the British Foreign Secretary, Alexander Frederick Douglas-Home, sent a message to the US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, expressing his view that ‘Qassim is so nearly mad that military action cannot be excluded, but we have no evidence that preparations are taking place’.35 The Amir of Kuwait, still receiving confirmed reports on the deployment of Iraqi troops on the border, made the decision to ask the British government to implement their pledge of military support. On 30 June 1961, he called in John Richmond, the British Political Agent (the first British Ambassador-designate to Kuwait), and asked for British help.36 At this stage, it should be emphasised that the debate over the question of whether Qassim intended to back up his claim with military force remains unclear.37 Under the command of Air Marshal Sir Charles Elworthy, the British Commander-inChief in the Middle East, the British government despatched to Kuwait on 1 July 1961 fourteen 52-tonne Centurion tanks, 600 marine commandos and a 150-strong squadron of the Dragon Guards.38 These forces later increased to 2,000. To support a military operation on land, the British aircraft carrier Bulwark, two frigates and a dozen Hunter jet fighters were put into service.39 Second, Sayet Nofal, the Assistant Secretary-General of the Arab League, declared on 23 July 1961 that an Arab force, made up of forces from the United Arab Republic (UAR), Sudan, Morocco, Jordan, Tunisia and Saudi Arabia, would replace the British troops in Kuwait; the British withdrawal was completed in October 1961.40 This decision was made following the Arab League Council’s resolution of 20 July 1961 admitting Kuwait as a full-member of the League.41 On 12 August, Shaykh ‘Abdullah and the Secretary-General of the Arab League concluded a status-offorces agreement,42 in addition to which Kuwait joined the League’s Joint Defence and Economic Co-operation Treaty. It is notable that only a very few Western scholars, with the exception of Gott, mention the US role in the 1961 Iraqi-Kuwaiti crisis.43 This does not necessarily imply an indifference to the US involvement in the crisis. Rather, it could be indicative of an indirect or limited US reaction to the crisis—a position dubbed by the former US ambassador to Kuwait as ‘quiet diplomacy’.44 Secretary Rusk sent a telegram dated 27 June 1961 to the consulate in Kuwait, suggesting that the US consul avoid making public statements on the matter.45 Two days after Qassim’s threatening press conference on Kuwait’s territorial integrity, the Department of State’s press officer, Lincoln White, officially announced American recognition of Kuwait as a sovereign state.46 The Iraqi Ambassador in Washington, DC, ‘Ali Haydar Sulayman, was summoned to the Department of State, during which he gave assurances that the Iraqi government only considered resorting to peaceful means in its claims over the tiny shaykhdom of Kuwait.47 When the crisis was discussed on 2 July 1961 at a special session of the Security Council, called at the request of Great Britain and on behalf of Kuwait, the debate was clearly dominated by the British permanent representative to the United Nations, Sir Patrick Dean, and the Iraqi head delegate, Adnan Pachachi.48 The US official position on the crisis was first made known at the Security

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Council when it was again reconvened on 5 July, this time with the attendance of the Kuwaiti representative, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Husayn, Minister of Education for Kuwait, who could take part in the debate but had no right to vote. At this meeting, Francis T.P.Plimption, Deputy US representative in the Security Council, reiterated: The United States regards Kuwait as a sovereign, independent state and supports the desire of the Kuwaiti Government and the Kuwaiti people to remain fully independent… [T]he Ruler of Kuwait has felt it necessary to take precautionary defensive measures by inviting military forces of friendly states to assist him in strengthening Kuwait’s defensive capabilities…. The United States believes that Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom have acted appropriately and that these actions will tend to insure the preservation of peace in the area.49 One day after this announcement was made by the US delegate, the Kuwaiti representative at the United Nations insisted that Kuwait was not in a position to feel safe enough to request a withdrawal of the British troops until the US government reaffirmed Kuwait’s independence. Kuwait also wanted the United States to reiterate that the Iraqi government had no valid claim over the Kuwaiti shaykhdom.50 The US position was again confirmed when the US representative voted for a resolution tabled by Great Britain, which gave no specific schedule for the withdrawal of the British and the Saudi forces. It merely stated that British forces would be pulled out as soon as the Amir considered the Iraqi threat had died down.51 Earlier, when Badr ‘Abdullah al-Mulla, the Kuwaiti government’s secretary, announced Kuwait would apply for membership of the United Nations, the US government extended a warm reception to the announcement.52 It took the Kuwaiti government nearly two years to join as a full member,53 for the Soviet Union exercised its veto against Kuwait’s applications to the benefit of the Iraqi government. The US delegate at the UN, Adlai E.Stevenson, welcomed Kuwait’s eventual success, remarking that ‘the US believed it was “high time” for Kuwait to become a “full-fledged” member of the UN’.54 At the 486th meeting of the National Security Council (NSC) on 29 June 1961, President John F.Kennedy approved Secretary Rusk’s recommendation that ‘the US government should give full political and logistic support, if required, to the United Kingdom in connection with certain actions…to forestall any Iraq[i] attempt to take over Kuwait by force’.55 As for US military support for the British government in this crisis, one could claim that it took place only on a small scale and on a humanitarian basis. No deployment of the US fleet in the Gulf region was made.56 Designed as a defensive mechanism even though an operation in reality was not implemented, a number of warships, based in Cape Town, South Africa, headed for Kuwait in order to carry out a possible evacuation of the American nationals.57 But Dayton S.Mak, a former US Charge d’Affaires in Kuwait, argues that the US government decided not to press on with this operation due to the lack of any confirmed evidence of Qassim’s definite decision to annex Kuwait by force.58 Secretary Rusk received assurances from the Iraqi Foreign Minister that Iraq had no intention of using force.59 When the British Foreign Office reported in early July 1961 the ‘encouraging reactions’ to its appeal for joint action from the United States and other

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friendly countries,60 neither the British nor the US governments had clarified whether such reactions would encompass military co-operation. As Mak emphasised, ‘we let the British have a free hand, for our interests are much the same’.61 Indeed, most of the former US ambassadors to Kuwait confirm that the special relationship between the British and Kuwait prior to Kuwaiti independence deterred the United States from getting much involved in Kuwait, especially in military and strategic matters.62 Among the high-ranking officials at the State Department, some optimistic views were also raised. For example, Robert C.Strong, Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, wrote to Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, that ‘our embassy in Baghdad, though stressing the need for a face-saving device for Iraq, believes that a mixed Arab contingent in Kuwait, once Kuwait has been admitted to the Arab League, should provide a moral deterrent against Iraqi aggression and that Iraq would not attack such Arab forces’.63 On 22 September 1961, the US and Kuwaiti governments, as a final American official move to recognise Kuwait, established diplomatic relations;64 the Amir of Kuwait had issued, in early August, an order for the establishment of such relations.65 Mak was designated to be the first US Charge d’Affaires, who would be responsible for establishing a ‘basic embassy’ in Kuwait.66 The first US Ambassador to Kuwait was Parker T.Hart, who presented his credentials to the Amir of Kuwait on 7 January 1962.67 Prior to that, the Higher Council had approved Sa’ud al-Fuzan as the first Kuwaiti Ambassador to the United States, an approval which was made one month before the establishment of formal diplomatic relations.68 Upon the presentation of his credentials, Ambassador Hart delivered a speech in Arabic, praising the friendly relations between the peoples of both countries, and conveyed to the Amir the greetings of President Kennedy. Perhaps more rhetorical flourish than a full-fledged commitment, Ambassador Hart told Kuwaiti officials that ‘the US considered any aggression against Kuwait as an aggression against itself and as a threat to world peace’.69 He might have deliberately avoided mentioning Iraq by name as an aggressor, because the US government did not wish to make the Iraqi regime so alienated that it would move closer into the Soviet orbit.70 This exchange of ambassadors led the Iraqis to summon the US Ambassador to Iraq, John Jernegan, to protest against the US recognition of territory that Iraq still claimed as its own.71 While the Iraqi threat to Kuwait’s sovereignty did not die down until Qassim was overthrown in February 1963,72 the US government maintained political and diplomatic relations with the Kuwaiti government, on a very low-profile basis. In Kuwait’s conduct of foreign relations, the switch from close alliances with friendly countries to adoption of a non-alignment policy since independence, did not cause much concern to the US administration.73 The alliances with Saudi Arabia and Great Britain indirectly served the US interests in Kuwait. What reflected the extent of Kuwait’s independence in conducting its foreign policy were its attempts at maintaining diplomatic relations with both the United States and the Communist bloc countries. Alone among the member states of the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC)74 until the mid-1980s, Kuwait maintained diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union,75 in distinct contrast to Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy towards the superpowers. The Soviet Ambassador-designate, Cherkasov Mikhail Frolovich, presented

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his credentials to the Amir’s deputy on 28 August 1963.76 Less than four months later, the Amir appointed Sa’id Yaqub al-Shammas the first Kuwaiti Ambassador to the Soviet Union.77 Countries of the former Communist bloc like Yugoslavia, Poland, Romania and Hungary also were recognised and later established diplomatic relations with Kuwait.78 In March 1971, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Kuwait reached a decision to establish diplomatic relations and exchange ambassadors as soon as possible.79 What should be pointed out is that Kuwait, as a conservative Gulf regime, independently took the initiative of proposing the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, even though the Kremlin leaders, as mentioned earlier, vetoed Kuwait’s application for membership of the United Nations.80 According to one former US official, the US reaction to this Kuwaiti initiative was rather relaxed.81 It was regarded as a political cost the Kuwaiti regime needed to pay for its membership of the United Nations. Implying the acceptance of Kuwaiti independence, Frank E.Maestrone, the US Ambassador to Kuwait between 13 June 1976 and 5 July 1979, remarked that ‘while the US government would have preferred that Kuwait followed the policy of not establishing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, it could not offer any objection to Kuwait’s doing what the US government was already doing’.82 What perhaps concerned the US government, in the words of one former official, was that Kuwait attempted to persuade the other Gulf states as well to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.83 No explicit protest or expression of disenchantment was made known to the Kuwaiti regime as long as Saudi Arabia, a more significant ally and stronghold of the United States, remained indifferent, if not hostile, to the overtures put forward by the Kremlin leaders. Not categorised as an area of peripheral interest, Kuwait was nevertheless still regarded by the US government as a derivative interest.84 The small territory and the strategic location of Kuwait in the region of Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran, made it, in the words of William B.Quandt, a ‘listening post’ or ‘buffer zone’ between Iraq and Saudi Arabia. To put it simply, he reiterated that the US government has given more significance to Saudi Arabia and the other big countries than Kuwait.85 In the immediate aftermath of the 1961 crisis, Kuwait’s defence development programme, both in quantitative and qualitative aspects, still relied on British sources as its ‘traditionally principal military supplier’.86 Great Britain continued to provide training assistance for Kuwaiti armed forces after independence. The British military academy at Sandhurst was a popular target for overseas military training of Kuwaiti military men.87 To upgrade its military prowess, the Kuwaiti government acquired six British Provost jet planes, forming the first squadron of jet fighters for the Kuwaiti air forces at the alRumaythiyya military airport.88 Anti-tank missiles, at the top of the Kuwaiti government’s weapons shopping list, were also provided by the British arms industry.89 In the late 1960s, an arms purchase of 50 British Vickers 37-tonne medium tanks, worth approximately KD6.4 million (about $20 million), was made by the Kuwaiti Defence Ministry. To summarise this period, it is obvious that during the 1961 crisis the US government did not play a crucial role in deterring the Iraqi regime. Due to the fact that the United States followed the position of the British government, the Kuwaiti regime did not consider trying to influence the US administration to support its stance. As for the establishment of the Kuwaiti-Soviet diplomatic relations, it is clear that the Kennedy

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administration perceived it as unnecessary to influence the Kuwaiti regime to refrain from having diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, since Kuwait was regarded as relatively insignificant compared with the other powerful states in the region. US-Kuwaiti relations in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict The very first political issue straining US-Kuwaiti relations resided in the Arab-Israeli conflict. As an Arab country with a large non-Kuwaiti Palestinian community, the ruling elites in Kuwait found no justification for dissociating themselves from the Palestinian commitment to a homeland. Forming the second largest section in Kuwait society after native Kuwaiti citizens,90 the Palestinian populace played a great role in running Kuwait’s administrative and bureaucratic networks. Although native Kuwaiti citizens were in control of the top administrative positions, most of the lower-ranking positions were filled by the Palestinians, with a lesser proportion of Jordanians. In other words, the majority of the Palestinians were on the Kuwaiti government’s payroll. The decades-old history of Kuwaiti-Palestinian relations started in the 1920s.91 Coupled with the fraternal support and sympathy for the Palestinian cause, Kuwaiti individuals made a financial contribution to the Palestinian struggle prior to the export of oil in 1946. For example, a visit in 1922 to Kuwait by the Mufti of Jerusalem was aimed at receiving donations to reconstruct the al-‘Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem.92 In addition, not only was a committee set up by the Kuwaiti Youth Association, with the object of studying the Palestinian issue, but this association was also successful, in 1936, in eliciting a 7,500-rupee fund for the support of the Palestinian struggle.93 Having allowed Kuwait to be used as a political base by the founding members of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), the Kuwaiti leaders proved to be tolerant of the formation of the PLO’s revolutionary strategy in their country. An office run by the PLO was allowed to open in Kuwait in 1964.94 From the US government’s perspective, what became a destabilising policy carried out by the Kuwaiti regime was its permission for the establishment of a regional command of the more radical, George Habash-led Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.95 The long-standing Kuwaiti support for the Arab solidarity in general and the Palestinian cause, in particular, was believed to bear a direct relationship to the internal stability of the shaykhdom. The regime calculated that its future depended, significantly, on its favourable support, politically and financially, for the Palestinian cause. Considered within this context, the Kuwaiti leaders’ attitude towards the close US alliance with, and enormous support for, Israel has been one of disillusion, though not one of explicit confrontation as has been the case with the radical Arab states. Regardless of American diplomatic support for Kuwait’s application for UN membership in May 1963, for example, the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister expressed to both the British ambassador and the US Charge d’Affaires his discontent with both countries’ acquiescent reaction to the Israeli ‘aggression’ against Syrian borders on 19 August 1963.96 More strongly worded was the remark in September 1964 by the Kuwaiti Amir, stating that: The intervention of world powers in favor of Israel, in the event of war between Israel and the Arab states, will make the entire Arab nation throw

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all its weight in the battlefield, cause expansion of the battle area to international dimensions, and lead to unpleasant consequences…97 (emphasis added) It is worth noting that the Kuwaiti Amir avoided mentioning the United States by name. One explanation for this could be the fact that with the US presidential election due to take place in less than two months, the Amir might expect a more compromising US position on the Palestinian issue, an expectation that was not fulfilled. In the meantime, consistent campaigns on behalf of the Palestinian people were carried out by the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister, Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir. Selecting the occasion of the nineteenth anniversary of the establishment of the United Nations, he asserted at the UN annual convocation: I appeal to the UN on this day to exert its utmost efforts and ability to work for restoring Arab Palestine to its legitimate owners and to return the refugees to their homeland. The continuation of Israel in the Arab land is a great challenge to world peace and to the peace of Arabs in particular.98 As further indication of Kuwaiti support for the Palestinian cause, a meeting was held in March 1965 between the Kuwaiti Defence Minister, Shaykh Abdullah al-Salim, and Chief-of-Staff Mubarak Abdullah al-Jabir on the one hand, and General Commander of the Palestinian Liberation Army, Major General Wajih al-Madani, on the other, with the object of possibly using Kuwait as a ground for the military training of the Palestinians in Kuwait.99 Little objection was raised by the Kuwaiti regime when the PLO invited Palestinian youths who worked in Kuwait to sign up voluntarily for military training in Iraq.100 Further moves manifesting Kuwaiti disenchantment with American support of Israel included the National Assembly’s vociferous outcry against consistent US military support to Israel. A resolution, entitled ‘A Proposal to Denounce America’s Attitude in Supplying Israel with Arms’, was tabled at the National Assembly session of 1966.101 More explicit protest against the arms deal was made, with no significant success, in the form of a cable of denunciation sent to the US Senate,102 followed by the Kuwaiti Amir’s confirmation of the National Assembly’s position. He went on further, to remark that ‘Kuwait was the first to strongly protest against this deal’.103 Less than six months afterwards, the Kuwaiti Interior and Acting Defence Minister, Shaykh Sa’ad al-Abdullah al-Salim Al Sabah, announced an agreement with the British Aircraft Corporation (BAC) to purchase Lightning 53 and 55 supersonic fighters and trainer planes so as to strengthen the Kuwaiti air force.104 This decision, for which the negotiations launched in August 1966 paved the way, benefited the BAC, which manufactured the Lightning in Lancashire, and Rolls-Royce, which produced the Avon engines in Glasgow.105 During 1965–1974, Great Britain, based on calculations by the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), supplied about 88 per cent of Kuwaiti arms acquisitions, while the United States’s share was recorded merely at about 9 per cent.106 Given the fact that Israel had posed no direct military threat to Kuwait, this announcement should not be considered as a military counter-measure against the Israeli arms build-up programme. What should be discerned, rather, is that as

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a political gesture it confirmed the Kuwaiti regime’s displeasure with continued American military support for Israel. In the run-up to the Six-Day War in early June 1967, border skirmishes broke out between Israeli and Syrian forces on the Israeli-Syrian border. Under these circumstances, the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister, in a meeting with the Syrian Charge d’Affaires, rendered full support for Syria against what he termed ‘the Zionist aggression’.107 To put it more concretely, the Kuwaiti cabinet discussed providing, as an urgent measure, a loan for Syria to strengthen its armed forces. Added to that decision, the cabinet empowered the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister to notify the Unified Arab Commander that it was prepared to place the Kuwaiti army on alert and at the disposal of the Arab Command.108 President Lyndon Johnson’s warning to Abba Eban, the Israeli Foreign Minister, on 26 May 1967 that ‘Israel should not initiate hostilities’109 failed to mollify the Kuwaiti regime’s apprehension about the Western support for Israel. At the instruction of the Kuwaiti government, the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister summoned the ambassadors of major powers to tell them of Kuwait’s stand that any aggression, described as a direct or indirect armed attack on an Arab state or the offer of aid to Israel by any of the Western powers, would lead to a suspension by the Kuwaiti government of its relations with those powers.110 Kuwait, in the words of Abdul-Reda Assiri, set up a ‘symbolic military unit— the al-Yarmouk Brigade’,111 which joined other Arab troops in Egypt on 30 May 1967 to counter Israeli forces. On 1 June, Kuwait threatened to suspend oil shipments to Western countries which allied with Israel,112 and a few days later the Amir issued a decree comprising two major articles: Article 1

We declare and confirm that the State of Kuwait has been in a state of defensive war with the Zionist gangs in occupied Palestine as of this morning—5 June 1967.

Article 2

The premier will communicate this decree to the National Assembly. The foreign minister will communicate it to all concerned.113

On the same day, the Kuwaiti cabinet held a meeting and approved of a law that implemented nation-wide martial law, with the Kuwaiti premier acting as the military governor-general.114 A collateral objective of this martial law was to prevent the longstanding anguish over Israeli policies on the part of the Palestinian community residing and working in Kuwait from degenerating into internal political instability. In retaliation to the allegedly undue Western support for Israel, oil was used as a political weapon against the West. Like King Faysal of Saudi Arabia, the Amir of Kuwait was in a difficult position to resist attempts at galvanising Arab solidarity, even though, as Abdulaziz al-Sowayegh argues in his 1984 book on Arab Petropolitics, ‘they themselves doubted its practicality’.115 Attheconference of Arab oil-producing countries in Baghdad, an agreement was made to cut off supplies to anyone who committed aggression against an Arab state or gave aid to Israel.116 Following the Iraqi decision to stop pumping oil, Kuwait and Algeria also adopted the same position. In order to ensure that the decision to suspend oil exports to the United States and the United Kingdom was strictly observed, the Kuwaiti cabinet sent the Finance and Oil Minister, ‘Abd al-Rahman Salim al-Matiqi, to the town of al-Ahmadi to supervise the implementation of the decision.117 US interests were also affected by the policies of the Central Committee for the People’s Boycott in Kuwait, made up of four

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subcommittees.118 The first subcommittee dealt with the propaganda campaign for the Palestinian cause. The second subcommittee was set up in order to urge consumers and importers in Kuwait to boycott Western products, especially from the United States, Britain and West Germany. The third subcommittee was mainly responsible for making an in-depth analysis of both the volume of bilateral trade between Kuwait and the United States, Britain and West Germany, and the types of products Kuwait imported from these countries. The responsibility of this committee also covered a study of the possibilities of purchasing such products from other sources. The fourth and the last subcommittee solicited donations to strengthen the Arab armies. Apart from monitoring the operations of the earlier mentioned subcommittees, the Central Committee itself was in charge of stimulating a transfer of funds owned by Kuwaiti merchants or business companies from US and British banks to Arab banks or banks of other friendly states. The US government launched an oil emergency scheme to rectify the implications of the Arab oil embargo.119 The scheme was drawn up by twenty-one American oil companies, comprising the Foreign Petroleum Supply Committee and the Interior Department, and later approved of by the Office of Emergency Plans.120 In addition, American oil officials declared a day after the imposition of the oil embargo that ‘the US southern states of Louisiana and Texas could sufficiently increase production in two weeks’ time to compensate for the decreases in oil imports caused by the embargo’.121 Of the 12 million barrels of oil consumed a day, the United States imported about 2.5 million, out of which only 400,000 barrels were imported from the Arab countries, with the rest mainly supplied by Venezuela. Jim Langdon, the Chairman of the Texas Railway Commission, and J.M.Menefee, the Louisiana Conservation Commissioner, both affirmed that their states could produce an extra 1–1.5 million barrels a day within 10 or 15 days,122 an increase that could help offset the effects of the embargo. The Arab oil embargo was weakened by disagreement, among the Arab oil-producing countries, over when the embargo should come to an end. For instance, on 8 July 1967 the Saudi government called for an end to the Arab oil boycott against Britain and the United States.123 The reasons for that decision were two-fold. First, the Saudi authority asserted that there was no evidence of assistance rendered by American and British aircraft during the war in June. Thus, according to the Saudi government, there were no grounds for putting the embargo into operation.124 Second, the official Saudi statement also pointed out that there were other sources of oil in the world. To withhold oil exports would inevitably jeopardise the future of the Arab countries’ economies. For his part, the Kuwaiti Finance and Oil Minister, on his way back to Kuwait after paying a week-long visit to the Soviet Union, remarked that the Arab countries should carry on the decision to ban oil supplies to the United States and Britain as long as the effects of the Zionist aggression continued.125 It was evident to the Kuwaiti regime that, in the aftermath of war, Arab unity was in disarray. The economic, political and military bases for Arab solidarity were called into question. What the Kuwaiti regime realised was that it was in the economic field Kuwait could play its most important role. To assist those Arab states affected by the Six-Day War, the Kuwaiti National Assembly, in an extraordinary session, ratified the Kuwaiti government’s commitment to pay them $55 million per annum.126 Kuwait did not abandon the diplomatic avenues altogether, however. During the United Nations General Assembly meeting of October 1967, the Kuwaiti Foreign

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Minister complained to the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, that American unequivocal support for Israel was the major stumbling block to a peaceful settlement. Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir expressed his disappointment that the meeting did not produce much common ground for a settlement.127 He categorically stressed that ‘Kuwait’s role at the United Nations is to promote and express the Arab viewpoint, to affirm the Arab right.’128 Yet, as further evidence of Kuwait’s minimal military role in the Israeli-Arab conflict, a proposal by the Acting Premier and Interior and Defence Minister, Shaykh Sa’ad alAbdullah al-Salim, for the formation of a Supreme Arab Military Council129 received lukewarm responses from other Arab states. During the June war, the Kuwaiti regime tried to exercise a certain degree of assertive influence over the US administration—a kind of an influence relationship, in Duncan’s terms, implemented by some means of sanction, in this case oil sanctions. As shown, the Kuwaiti government failed to achieve its intention due to two main reasons. First, the disunity among the oil-producing countries weakened the strong position of OPEC. Second, the United States also enjoyed its own plentiful oil reserves, a fact which made it unnecessary to rely on the Kuwaiti oil sources.

US-Kuwaiti relations, 1968–1976 US-Kuwaiti relations in the aftermath of the British withdrawal The year 1968 produced anxiety for both the US administration and the Kuwaiti regime. The Labour-led British government, under the premiership of Harold Wilson, announced in the House of Commons on 16 January 1968 that the government, in need of making major cuts in the annual budget, was compelled to adopt a plan of completely withdrawing from the Persian Gulf region by January 1971.130 This decision was a reversal of Wilson’s support, rendered on 7 December 1967, for the July statement made by George Brown, the Foreign Secretary, to a Parliamentary inquiry. The statement reads: In the present disturbed situation in the Middle East, we must be particularly concerned about the stability and security of the Gulf area, for which we still have treaty responsibilities…. Our forces are not in the Persian Gulf simply to protect our oil interests as such, but to maintain stability in the area.131 The combined pressure of economic and financial restraints, the potential rebellion of rank-and-file members within the party over budget cuts on social programmes, and the crisis of the pound sterling’s devaluation, however, forced Wilson’s decision to scale down defence and overseas expenditures as well as the planned growth of social expenditures. Wilson and his new Chancellor, Roy Jenkins, who replaced James Callaghan, brought their austere budget to the cabinet on 4 January 1968 and called for ‘cuts in social services balanced by withdrawal from Singapore, Malaysia, and the Persian Gulf by 1971’.132

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The implementation of this decision seemed to be inevitable, even as the British government made a political gesture of consulting or informing those countries affected by the decision. George Brown, the Foreign Secretary, was in charge of explaining the case to the American and Japanese governments, while George Thompson, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, and Goronwy Roberts, the Minister of State at the Foreign Office, were despatched on missions to Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand and the Gulf region. To most of the foreign counterparts to the British representatives in these meetings, it was a significant surprise that the British government was disposed to withdraw from the region that supplied 32 per cent of the capitalist world’s petroleum and that held 58 per cent of the proven oil reserves at that time.133 Both the American Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Lucius Battle, and Vice Admiral Marmaduke Bayne, the Commander of the Middle East Force (MEF) in Bahrain, confirmed that the Americans knew of the British intention before it was publicly announced.134 But, as George Brown reported to the cabinet, the Americans were more concerned about the withdrawal from the Gulf than the Far East. Shocked and dismayed by the British government’s venture, the US Secretary of State Dean Rusk, in a meeting with George Brown on 11 January 1968, made clear his strongest opposition to the retreat from the Gulf and reaffirmed that any American commitment to replace Britain was out of question.135 Shortly after the British decision was made known, Robert McCloskey, the official spokesman for the US Department of State, reiterated that the US government was not prepared to fill any vacuum created by the departure of British forces from the Gulf region.136 The reactions of some Congressmen also reflected the US unpreparedness to play a suddenly bigger role in the Gulf. The Senate Majority Leader, Mike Manfield, remarked on 17 January 1968: I am sorry the British felt they were forced to take this step because I am certain we will be asked to fill the vacuum east of Suez. I don’t know how we are going to do it because I don’t think we have the men or resources for it.137 More receptive to the idea that the United States should play a greater role in the Gulf was Senator Edward Burke, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who believed the US government needed to figure out a way of filling the vacuum in the area.138 George Brown’s mission to Washington, DC in January 1968 was not entirely successful, and the British Prime Minister had to visit and explain the case to President Johnson in person in February.139 As it was reported at the time, President Johnson seemed to accept the British position with some reluctance. Obviously stimulated, though not necessarily caused by the British government’s decision, a debate emerged as to whether the US administration had already adopted and put into practice its own policy towards the Persian Gulf prior to the 1968 decision by the British.140 Above all, one immediate question was raised as to how the US government intended to protect the Western interests in the Gulf. It is worth bearing in mind that the Johnson administration was in large part engaged in the 1968 presidential election campaign, scheduled for November. The US policy towards the Gulf region was caught, in effect, in the transitional period between the Johnson and the new administrations.

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At the time when Richard Nixon came to power, US foreign commitments to the Third World were mainly dominated by the ongoing Vietnam War in Southeast Asia. The war prevented him from giving serious attention to any possibility of taking the place of British forces in the Gulf. As Charles Kupchan points out, no additional US forces were readily available for a special assignment in the Gulf, given the continuing operations in Southeast Asia.141 Moreover, Nixon came to view the US role in the Gulf region in the context of the Nixon Doctrine, which was officially espoused on the island of Guam in July 1969.142 One of the main thrusts of the doctrine was to propose that the United States would support and place greater reliance on regional powers to help protect its worldwide interests, at a time when US forces were stretched thin because of the Vietnam quagmire. As Hussein Sirriyeh makes clear, the US administration was left in a security dilemma. Thus, the United States made systematic efforts in 1969 to reassess the implications of British withdrawal and to formulate a framework for US conduct in the Gulf region in the 1970s.143 The Nixon administration finally came up with several decisions to fill the vacuum in the Persian Gulf indirectly.144 First, the United States would not replace Britain. Second, a symbolic US military presence in the form of the US Command Middle East Force (COMMIDEASTFOR) would be retained. In one of his regular breakfast meetings with Senator Manfield in August 1969, Nixon confirmed that the Nixon Doctrine would not lead to a total American withdrawal from Asia. Rather, it would be a foundation on which the American government would rely to remain in the region and to play ‘a responsible role in helping…our Asian allies to defend their independence’.145 Third, a goal of US policy in the Gulf would be to encourage and assist Iran and Saudi Arabia to take up the primary responsibility for regional security.146 These decisions, in fact, formed the key elements of the American ‘twin-pillar’ policy, of which the main architect was Henry Kissinger, at the time serving as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.147 The successful outcome of the ‘twin-pillar’ policy, according to Kissinger, would depend on four underlying assumptions: (a) the existence of a harmonious relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia; (b) the convergence between US interests and those of Iran and Saudi Arabia; (c) the maintenance of a US bilateral relationship with each of them; and (d) the continued stability of the regimes in both Iran and Saudi Arabia, so that the same policy would be pursued by any successive regimes there.148 The British withdrawal and the ‘twin-pillar’ policy produced a mixture of anxiety and relief in Kuwait. The immediate Kuwaiti reaction to the British announcement, according to the recollection of Joseph Wright Twinam, former US official at the State Department responsible for bilateral relations with the Gulf states, was that of satisfaction in general, with some security concerns also expressed.149 In the run-up to the announcement of its decision, the British government did not find it necessary to consult with the Kuwaiti regime. As mentioned earlier, Goronwy Roberts, the Minister of State at the Foreign Office, paid visits to the Shah, the Amirs of the principal Trucial Shaykhdoms and King Faysal of Saudi Arabia in January 1968.150 With only one week prior to the official announcement, the purpose of his visit to Kuwait was merely to inform, or, as Hussein Sirriyeh asserts, to ‘communicate’ with, the Amir of Kuwait about the decision.151 Unlike the Shaykhs of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Bahrain and Qatar who expressed their willingness and readiness to foot the bill for maintaining British presence in the Gulf,152

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the Kuwaiti regime, as a gesture of asserting its independence, failed to make the same kind of proposal. Rather, Shaykh Jabir, the Prime Minister, said in late January 1968 that ‘Kuwait was unaffected and unworried by Britain’s decision to withdraw its forces from the Gulf in the next four years’.153 He was reported as expressing to Roberts that the British government should bear in mind that it was bound to leave sooner or later, since the Kuwaiti people did not welcome the presence of the British or any other foreign troops in the region.154 Yet remaining at issue at the time was how Britain would come to the assistance of the Kuwaiti regime in case of Kuwait being threatened or attacked. In May 1968, the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister had exchanged notes on the intentions of both sides to terminate the 1961 defence agreement,155 a clause of which stated that either of the contracting parties must serve notice of intention to terminate three years in advance. Kuwait was first mentioned regarding US concern over regional security arrangements after the announcements of the withdrawal when the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Eugene Rostow, expressed his view on the Voice of America on 19 January 1968. Dubbing the withdrawal as a ‘dramatic shock’, he added: that the responsibility for filling the resulting power vacuum rested with the states of the area,…and that Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were interested in assuming the responsibility of maintaining regional security and would certainly be the nucleus around which a regional security arrangement could be established.156 Kuwait’s outright rejection of the earlier suggested scenario left little room for the US administration even to contemplate elaborating on it. Strong opposition to a joint local defence scheme particularly came from the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister, Shaykh Sabah, who stressed that Kuwait would safeguard the Arabism of the Gulf when British forces left the area in 1971.157 He further denounced the possibility of any defence agreement in the area that would include the participation of Kuwait, especially the one put forward by Rostow, who was, at the time, prepared to visit Saudi Arabia in early February 1968 to discuss Gulf affairs with King Faysal.158 It is worth emphasising here that the Kuwaiti regime discerned that it would inevitably have to pay a ‘political price’ for adopting a regional security formula, especially the one initiated by the US government. The regime’s strong support for the Palestinian cause was always a driving force behind its reluctance to have a close political relationship with the US government. There is another side of the argument, however. Several high-ranking US officials who served in Kuwait hold the view that there was no suggestion or attempt to persuade Kuwait to join in any defence scheme before the ‘twin-pillar’ policy was launched.159 Emile Nakhleh, a leading authority on the Persian Gulf, also shares this view.160 What remained true was that the Johnson administration, at least, recognised Kuwait’s independent stand in the Gulf, albeit in subordination to Iran and Saudi Arabia. The comment of a former US official serving in Kuwait on Kuwait’s active role in pressing ahead with the establishment of a federation among the trucial emirates161 confirmed the Kuwaiti regime’s determined efforts at exercising its independent foreign policy. One component of this was to consolidate solidarity among the Arab states, in the process perhaps overshadowing the Saudi role.162 The Kuwaiti Foreign Minister reaffirmed the

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irreversibility of the British withdrawal during his meeting with the British envoy, Sir William Luce, who paid a two-day visit to Kuwait in February 1971.163 In July 1972, the Kuwait Foreign Ministry Under-Secretary Rashid al-Rashid reiterated that Kuwait rejected all talk of a power vacuum. But even if one were found to exist, it was the sole responsibility of the people in the area to rectify the situation.164 Following the visits to the United States of the Shah and the Iranian Prime Minister, Abbas Hoveyda, on 12 June and 5 December 1968 respectively, President Johnson invited the Kuwaiti Amir, Shaykh Sabah, to a state visit to Washington, DC, from 5 to 11 December 1968. Led by the Amir, the delegation included the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister, Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad; the Finance and Oil Minister, ‘Abd al-Rahman Salim al-Atiqi; the Kuwaiti Ambassador to the United States, Talat al-Ghusayn; Kuwait’s Chief UN delegate, Muhalhal al-Mudaf; and the Director of the Foreign Minister’s Office, ‘Abdullah Bisharah.165 As usual, the joint statement issued on 11 December, shortly after the discussions between President Johnson and the Kuwaiti Amir suggested that the talks had taken place in ‘an atmosphere of frankness and friendship’.166 It, however, seemed to show that a greater significance was attached to both sides’ diverging positions on the Arab—Israeli conflict than to the situation in the Gulf. Only the last two sentences directly referred to the impact of the withdrawal on the Gulf region: The President and His Highness the Amir discussed the situation which will result from the withdrawal of Britain from the Gulf Amirates. They expressed their desire that stability prevail in the area as a basis for its progress and prosperity through the co-operation of the states bordering on the Gulf.167 Parker Hart, the Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East and Africa during 1968– 1969, confirmed the Johnson administration’s undecided position on the Gulf. Hart recalled that during the state visit, the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister mentioned the possibility of an American ‘guarantee’,168 of which the extent and the form were highly obscure. For his part, President Johnson’s response was ambivalent: in Hart’s words, ‘nothing was refused but nothing pressed’.169 Aware of the adverse political consequence in its domestic politics, it seemed to be essential for the Kuwaiti regime to give such conversations a very low profile. In his report to the National Assembly on his visit to the United States, the Amir merely said: Our discussion also dealt with the situation in the Arab Gulf, and the relations between Kuwait and the US and the possibilities of developing these relations in the fields of technical, economic and commercial cooperation.170 As the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister believed, ‘quiet diplomacy’ was and has been, on some occasions, instrumental in concluding successful negotiations.171 What should be noted is that at the request of President Johnson, the Amir, as the last state visitor of the outgoingPresident, also held talks with President-elect Richard Nixon. In his widely quoted memoir of his White House years, Henry Kissinger explains that he misjudged the extent of the Amir’s interest in the Arab-Israeli conflict and prepared erudite talking points on

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the subject. Instead, the Amir wanted to raise questions about the security situation in the Gulf region; for example, he wondered, what was the new US administration prepared to do in the case of an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait after the British withdrawal? It was a question to which the President-elect and his team had no assured response. As the complete withdrawal approached together with the official abrogation of the Anglo-Kuwaiti defence agreement in May 1971, the US Vice-President Spiro T.Agnew launched a ‘goodwill trip’ to ten countries, starting in South Korea, including Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and ending in Spain and Portugal.172 Five countries—Singapore, Ethiopia, Kenya, the Congo (Kinshasa) and Morocco—faced with the consequence of the British withdrawal from the east of the Suez, were deliberately included in this trip. VicePresident Agnew emphasised upon arrival in Kuwait that the prime objective of this travel was not to ‘enter into the Middle East negotiations’ but to encourage ‘better understanding for the Nixon administration’s efforts’.173 Well aware that his role in the Middle East and the Gulf was overshadowed by Henry Kissinger, he cautiously noted: I think an expression of undue optimism or opinion that things are reaching a stage where they might be resolved would not be warranted nor would it be productive.174 Although Vice-President Agnew, the highest-ranking American official ever to visit Kuwait, was granted an audience with the Amir, the significance of his visit was still far from clear and for three reasons. First, one week prior to Agnew’s arrival in Kuwait, the Kuwaiti Foreign Ministry Under-Secretary Rashid al-Rashid, indirectly played down the significance of the visit by saying ‘Agnew’s trip to Kuwait has no connection with the Arab Gulf issues’.175 Second, ten popular organisations representing various professions signed a statement opposing the visit. The statement endorsed by, among others, the Kuwaiti Workers General Federation, the Graduates Association, the Medical Association, the Lawyers Association, the Social Culture Association, the Teachers Economic Association and the Kuwait National Students Union, described the visit merely as a means to preserve American interests and to ‘assure the invulnerability of its position in the Arab area’.176 Third, the US administration was embarrassed by an unconfirmed statement attributed to the US Ambassador to Kuwait, John Patrick Walsh,177 and carried by the Daily News—the English-language daily newspaper—that the US government did not have a serious intention to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict. Worse still, Ambassador Walsh was reported as saying that ‘the aims of the visits by US officials to the area are part of the 1972 presidential election campaign the Republicans are preparing for’.178 Concerning his own attitude towards the Palestinian problem, he was quoted as saying: we have made tremendous efforts to improve our country’s relations with the Arab states. However, all our efforts in this direction have been futile because Washington does not pay any attention to my reports…but is directly affected by Zionist propaganda. Washington then tries to place the blame on us for failure to improve relations with the Arabs. This makes me think of submitting my resignation but I am waiting until the conclusion of Agnew’s visit to know its results,…and I have become

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convinced that the Arabs are right and demanding their legitimate rights in Palestine and the right of the refugees who were expelled from their motherland by alien intruders.179 The question as to when and why Ambassador Walsh expressed such remarks should not detract from the question of why they were released during Vice-President Agnew’s visit. One is naturally led to conclude that the revelation was designed to cause misunderstanding or at worst humiliation to the US administration. Agnew was reportedly thirty minutes late for his audience with the Amir because he had to investigate the leaked report. Whether Ambassador Walsh voluntarily resigned or was disciplined and forced to leave his post remains unclear. But his departure from the post in December 1971—about five months after the event—was a humiliation and setback to the US position in the region. His successor was William A.Stoltzfus, Jr, who was appointed on 9 December 1971, ten days prior to Ambassador Walsh’s official departure from the post.180 The new Secretary of State, William Rogers, paid a one-day visit to Kuwait on 4 July 1972, the first visit by a US Secretary of State.181 As part of his trip to several Asian and European countries, Rogers was accompanied by four senior officials from the Department of State, including Joseph Sisco, the Assistant Secretary of State for Middle Eastern and South Asian Affairs, also serving as a special assistant to the Secretary of State.182 From the very beginning, this visit was not without difficulties. The UnderSecretary of the Kuwait Foreign Ministry, al-Rashid, pointed out on the eve of Rogers’s arrival that this visit arose from a request from the US government, not from an official invitation extended by the Kuwaiti government.183 In addition, Rogers failed to have a meeting with the Kuwaiti Amir as he earlier announced he would. Instead, the acting ruler of Kuwait, Shaykh Jabir al-Ahmad al-Jabir, was the head of the Kuwaiti delegation that took part in the bilateral discussions.184 Whatever the reasons for the absence of the Kuwaiti Amir—health, summer vacation abroad or a purposeful avoidance—Rogers’s prior hope of boosting the significance of his trip to Kuwait was dashed, despite his claim before leaving Kuwait that the visit had been a success.185 Criticism of the visit was also echoed by the Kuwaiti press both before and after. A weekly magazine Al-Risala (The Message) viewed Rogers’s visit as ‘an attempt to impose the US wishes on the area, to enable Iran to control it, and to make Iran the protector of US interests in the area’.186 More directly critical of close US allied support for Israel was the editorial in Al-Qabas (The Firebrand) stating that ‘the US is greatly mistaken if it thinks certain Arab regimes reflect the truth about Arab feelings concerning the possibility of achieving reconciliation with the Zionist enemy’.187 The regimes to which the editorial referred surely included Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The US administration seemed to take into account Kuwait’s role in the Arab-Israeli conflict. To channel more direct contact between the two countries into movement on this unresolved political issue, the Secretary of State Rogers travelled to Kuwait for the first time. But, the whole episode turned out to be a disappointment.

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A new chapter in military relations As far as bilateral military relations are concerned, the year 1972 experienced a new chapter with the US military involvement in the Kuwaiti armed forces development scheme, in spite of Kuwait’s official position that it had received only a ‘modest amount of US arms’.188 Starting in mid-1971, the Kuwaitis first proposed talks with the private American defence contractors on air and ground defence needs.189 The principal reason behind this initiative was obviously the abrogation of the Anglo-Kuwaiti defence agreement in May 1971, which had served as one of the ‘protective shields’ for a decade in the defence of Kuwait’s territorial integrity. To diversify its reliance on sources of protection, the Kuwaiti government approached the US Department of Defense in 1972 to conduct a survey of its defence structure, a request that the US government responded to by sending a survey team to examine the status and adequacy of Kuwait’s armed forces.190 This Kuwaiti request, paid for by the Kuwaiti government, took place, as a former senior US official recollected, at a time when tension re-emerged along the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border. To substantiate Kuwait’s suspicion of Iraqi’s threatening intention, members of the US survey team were put on board a plane flying over the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border from which they could observe an Iraqi airstrip built in the desert within 5 miles of the border.191 Regarded as a document for improving military relations between the United States and Kuwait, the findings of the 1972 survey made recommendations on the improvements of the armed forces. The most significant was the necessity to provide military support for Kuwait in the case of prolonged armed fighting. In order for the Kuwaiti armed forces to deter an attack, an indispensable improvement should take place in the fields of air defence, command, control and communication infrastructure, maritime facilities and anti-tank weapons systems. The Kuwaiti government endorsed these suggestions,192 but the difficulty lay in the lack of a skilled, well-trained Kuwaiti force that would be necessary to operate all the systems installed and weapons acquired. To attend military training courses in the United States was one possible solution which the US government could provide through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Program, legalised by the FMS Act of 17 January 1971. The other alternative involved the direct presence of the American military personnel on Kuwaiti territory, in order both to facilitate the weapon operations and to provide military advice to Kuwaiti military circles. Military equipment supplied by the United States primarily included a small number of anti-tank missiles, trucks and transport equipment.193 This military relationship between the American and Kuwaiti governments had to deal with one disputed issue— the presence of US military personnel on the Kuwaiti territory. While the US government took a position that the provision of military weapons must be conditional on the supervision by US military personnel of their use and maintenance, the Kuwaiti opposition to such practice was well recognised. The Kuwaitis did not allow the establishment in Kuwait of a Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), which has prime responsibility for supervising both FMS and training in a country that acquires US weapons.

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A compromise solution was reached in April 1975 whereby a permanent US Liaison Office, Kuwait (USLOK) was set up,194 an office that would have similar functions and responsibilities to those of the MAAG. The cost of services rendered by the US Defense Department’s personnel and military contractor staff would be mainly borne by the Kuwaiti side, and the Kuwaiti government seemed to recognise ‘the need for more personnel’ at the USLOK,195 as it was planning to buy more US arms. The setting-up of USLOK took place at a time when Francois M.Dickman was the director of the Arabian Peninsula Affairs Office.196 The Kuwaiti government was obviously sensitive to any foreign military organisation which planned to set up an operation on the Kuwaiti territory. In this case, the US government exercised what Duncan called co-operative influence. Through slow negotiations on the establishment of a US defence presence in Kuwait, the United States had to persuade the Kuwaiti government to discern the need for American personnel on its soil. This means the Kuwaiti government yielded to the American government out of its own perception that it would gain advantages from the compromise solution suggested by the Americans. The Kuwaiti-Iraqi border crisis of 1973 The discussion in the following section is on US-Kuwaiti relations in the light of the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border crisis in March 1973. The Ba’thist regime, after consolidating its grip on power in July 1968, made clear its intention of securing closer relations with Kuwait. As an attempt to curry favour in Baghdad, Kuwait was the first country that recognised the new regime.197 Various forms of co-operation between the two countries took place. For example, they were involved in a series of talks on military co-operation and on co-operation in the oil sector. However, the complexities of the border issue were still far from resolved. Constructing a seaport and naval base at Umm Qasr in the 1950s, which is located on the border with Kuwait, the Iraqi regime realised that its strategic vulnerability resulted from the narrow passage between the Iraqi shore and Kuwaiti islands,198 the only passage through which naval vessels could gain access to Umm Qasr. Claudia Wright’s description of Iraq’s geopolitical vulnerabilities is that ‘hostile hands…are always potentially around the country’s throat’.199 The Iraqi leaders used this geopolitical vulnerability as the compelling factor in seeking another deep seaport in the Gulf; the new seaport would provide a strategic depth. This is the reason why Iraq was strongly pressing its claims to the islands of Warbah and Bubiyan, the two islands straddling the navigable route to Umm Qasr. When the dispute between Iraq and Iran over the Shatt al-‘Arab became worse in the late 1960s, Kuwait gave in to Iraqi pressures for the stationing of Iraqi armed forces in Kuwait to protect Umm Qasr from any potential Iranian attack.200 The Kuwaiti-Iraqi border dispute, therefore, was directly linked to the simmering crisis between Iran and Iraq. But when the Iranian threat died down, the Iraqis were determined to convert their presence to a permanent stationing in Kuwait. Such a determination was confirmed in December 1972 by the Iraqis’ building of a road through Kuwaiti territory, a route that was aimed to reach the barracks of Iraqi forces in Kuwait. Kuwait’s immediate response to the roadbuilding operation was to fortify its border police post at al-Samita.

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While discussions were being held in February 1973 in Baghdad on the boundary demarcation, a bloody exchange of gunfire broke out at al-Samita, leaving two Kuwaiti soldiers and one Iraqi soldier dead, and two Kuwaiti soldiers missing.201 Precautionary steps taken by the Kuwaiti regime included the imposition of a state of emergency, the closure of its border with Iraq, the appeal for support and sympathy to the Arab League, the United Nations Security Council and friendly governments, and the mass roundup of Iraqi citizens in Kuwait on the grounds of preventing possible acts of sabotage.202 Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and the Arab League’s Secretary General actively assisted in averting the crisis.203 Reactions of the Saudi regime were even tougher in light of the fear that Iraqi success would not only strengthen Iraq’s strategic position in the Gulf,204 but also lead to the collapse of the Kuwaiti regime.205 Added to the immediate political support for the Kuwaiti regime was the despatch of 15,000 troops by the Saudi regime to consolidate the Kuwaiti regime’s opposition and the political pressure imposed on Iraq in the Arab League. Western analysts pointed out that Jordan and Iran also deployed their troops on their borders with Iraq in a defensive operation.206 Concerned with the likelihood that its dispute with Iraq would draw in countries whose support might prove awkward, the Kuwaiti regime did not welcome the Iranian offer to help deter the Iraqi threat.207 First, the Kuwaiti regime was still suspicious of Iranian ambitions in the Gulf. Second, the Shah of Iran was unpopular in the Arab world, due to perceived support for Israel in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Third, and related to the second point, there might be criticisms of support rendered by the United States for Iran in their attempts to deter Iraq. As far as the roles of the superpowers are concerned, neither the Soviet Union nor the United States in fact played much of a role in solving this dispute. In the run-up to the outbreak of the border clashes, the Kuwaiti Amir denied that his government sought Soviet assistance in putting pressure on Iraq,208 but there was speculation that the Kuwaiti government sought American diplomatic help.209 Aware of being discredited by relying too much on the United States, the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister discussed the situation with both the Soviet and the US ambassadors on separate occasions.210 The reason for the meeting with the Soviet envoy might have been that the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister expected the Soviet Union to persuade Iraq to end the conflict, a hope which was bound to be illusory given the demonstrative Soviet support for Iraq in this dispute.211 As for the discussion with the US envoy, it was likely that Kuwait hoped the United States would pressure the Soviet Union to encourage Iraq to put an end to the dispute.212 This speculation was obviously too optimistic, however. To counter the Soviet naval presence in the Gulf, the US Sixth Fleet also flexed its muscles, although not at the request of the Kuwaiti regime.213 With the announcement of an Iraqi troop withdrawal on 4 and 5 April, probably due to the political pressure by the Arab League, negotiations on this dispute were launched on 6 April. They were doomed to fail, due to the irreconcilable conditions both sides attached to their positions on the issue. Baghdad demanded that the discussions on sovereignty over Warbah and Bubiyan islands must precede the talks on border demarcation, but this was a condition that was unacceptable to the Kuwaiti regime. In this crisis, the Kuwaiti regime sought diplomatic support from the US administration as discussed, especially in the hope that the US government would request that the Soviet Union put pressure on Iraq. Given the détente between the two

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superpowers, both countries may well have discussed this crisis. If that was the case, the US government would have come under the co-operative influence exercised by the Kuwaiti regime. There were overlapping, ‘co-operative’ interests. The US administration obviously also wanted, at least, to curtail the escalation of the crisis and, at most, to bring the crisis to an end as quickly as possible. Arms sales to the Kuwaiti regime Unlike the 1961 crisis, the border skirmishes in 1973 manifested the first actual armed incursion into Kuwaiti territory since independence in 1961. Precautionary measures mentioned earlier were merely on a short-term basis. The longer-term preparation for countering and deterring such a military threat, from the Kuwaiti regime’s perspective, involved strengthening its military defence capabilities. At the request of the Kuwaiti government, a US defence survey team again was sent to Kuwait to conduct a second survey on Kuwait’s defence requirements,214 the findings of which were similar to those of the survey undertaken in 1972. Less than two months after the outbreak of the border incident, Rashid al-Rashid, the Kuwaiti Foreign Ministry Under-Secretary, gave a cool reception to the Shah of Iran’s suggestion of setting up a regional security organisation in the Persian Gulf region, similar to the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO).215 The most likely reason behind this refusal was the Kuwaiti regime’s apprehension about Iran’s dominating role in the Gulf. Almost at the same time in May 1973, an American arms delegation was reported as paying a two-week visit to Kuwait in order to persuade the Kuwaiti government to place orders for American arms.216 The Kuwaiti government in July 1973 appropriated $1.5 billion for a military procurement budget, which was increased in July 1976 to $3 billion. Negotiated were the arms contracts worth $500–600 million of modern M-60 tanks, F-8 Crusader jet fighters, TOW anti-tank-guided missiles and anti-aircraft missiles of the improved Hawk type217—military equipment obviously needed for the defence of its northern border with Iraq, but still no match for Iraqi military capabilities. The extent of the sensitivity of the arms deal negotiations was reflected in the conflicting news report by the radical newspaper Al-Ra’i Al-Amm (Public Opinion), stating that Kuwait had turned down an arms deal put forward by the United States and intended to cover only Phantom jets.218 In addition, Kuwaiti circles strictly adhered to their long-standing practice of making no public comments on the arms deal negotiations, thereby making it difficult to secure confirma-tion of what was in fact being discussed. Most opposed to this arms deal, of course, was Israel, represented by the Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban and the Defence Minister Moshe Dayan. They both claimed the possession of these arms by the Persian Gulf states would disrupt the balance of power in the Middle East. Moshe Dayan went on even further to express his concerns over the possibility of these arms being transferred to Egypt,219 leading to a scenario in the next ten years of Israel being ‘surrounded’ by a new and different military situation.220 To assuage the Israeli dismay and guarantee the US commitment to Israeli security, Paul J.Hare, the spokesman for the US State Department, emphasised that:

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any military sales to Iran, Saudi Arabia or Kuwait [would] take fully into account our long-standing policy of support of Israeli security…. [W]e will not make any military sales that would put Israeli security in jeopardy.221 The State Department gave in to the Israeli request for a clause to be appended to any arms sales agreement with the Gulf states, prohibiting any possible transfer of US weapons to ‘belligerent states’ confronting Israel.222 In addition, the US government claimed that although the negotiations on arms deals were finalised, it would normally take another two years before the actual consignment of weapons would take place. In order to temper the outcry of the nationalists, the Kuwaiti Defence and Interior Minister, Shaykh Sa’ad al-Abdullah al-Salim, claimed the Kuwaiti government was in no position to accept any arms deal that carried conditions.223 Notwithstanding these diplomatic manoeuvrings, what clearly reflected that the conclusion of the arms deals between the US and Kuwaiti governments was imminent was the confirmative remarks by Lee Hamilton, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Near East, that ‘Kuwait was about to sign contracts…of close to $600 million for American arms and services’.224 More promising to the Kuwaiti regime was a comment by the Defense Secretary-designate, William P.Clements, Jr, an oil businessman from Texas, on the Defense Department’s proposal of selling F-4 Phantom jet fighters to both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. While reasoning that such a proposal was a gesture to keep excellent relations with oil-producing states,225 Mr Clements pursued it out of two motives: his oil-related business interests; and his hard-line support for both an increased defence budget and arms procurement by the conservative oil-producing Gulf states in order to counter the expanding Soviet role in the Gulf, especially in the aftermath of the Soviet-Iraqi Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation of 1972. It is obvious that leading US politicians maintained different perspectives on the arms sales to Kuwait. This situation showed that there were some US politicians who were in favour of the arms sales to Kuwait, and from whom the Kuwaiti regime might be able to seek support; or, even more, over whom they might be able to exercise influence. The Arab-Israeli conflict in October 1973 Bilateral US-Kuwaiti relations ran into trouble when the Arab—Israeli armed conflict erupted again in early October 1973,226 even though neither was a direct party to the conflict. Apart from what Abdul-Reda Assiri called ‘political subsidies’ which were rendered to the Arab front-line states,227 two symbolic Kuwaiti military units operated on both the Egyptian and Syrian fronts. This limited military participation by Kuwaiti forces was attributable to the fact that their armed forces were no match for the US-supplied Israeli military capabilities. Arab countries expected that suspension or reduction of the US military assistance to Israel would redress the military equation between the two sides, which was normally in favour of the Israeli government. The Arab countries’ major concern was how they could successfully put an end to the American supply of military equipment to Israel. One possible alternative was to resort to oil resources as a political weapon to put pressure on the United States, Western Europe and Japan. The Arab oil-producing states included Western Europe and Japan on their

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target list, because these countries at least could persuade the United States to change its policy towards Israel. Under this circumstance, the United States was made ‘both the direct and the indirect target of the oil weapon’.228 In February 1973, the Kuwaiti Crown Prince and Premier, Shaykh Jabir, warned that Kuwait would not hesitate to use its oil resources as a weapon.229 More strongly worded remarks in March 1973 were those of the Kuwaiti Amir, Shaykh Sabah and the Kuwaiti Interior and Defence Minister, Shaykh al-Abdullah al-Salim,230 both directly pinpointing the United States and the West as the targets of the oil weapon. Though it was claimed by the Kuwaiti Interior and Defence Minister that the Kuwaiti cabinet was united on this matter, the Foreign Minister’s conflicting remarks on this issue in April 1973 complicated the Kuwaiti regime’s position. His remarks are worth quoting as follows: Oil is a double-edged weapon. I do not approve of its use in political battles because it could backfire. In my opinion, oil has nothing to do with the Middle East crisis. We do not want to become the enemy of anybody, of Europe or anyone else because the world needs oil. If I were to use oil as a weapon against others, I would thereby be making enemies for the Arab cause. Instead, we are using the oil revenue to help the struggling Arab countries. Thus, nobody can be angry with us. Frankly speaking, this is my personal opinion of the role of oil.231 The motive behind these remarks was unclear. Given their timing, less than one month after the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border crisis, it may be surmised that the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister hoped not to alienate the West on which Kuwait’s security was ultimately dependent. The Kuwaiti regime wanted support from the West in dealing with the Iraqi threat and hoped to avoid a two-front confrontation at that particular moment. This ambivalence as to the utility of oil as a political weapon was again disclosed in an interview he gave in August 1973.232 Against this background, the Foreign Minister was on the defensive. On the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the establishment of Israel, Kuwait, together with three supposedly ‘radical’ Arab states-Iraq, Libya and Algeria—temporarily suspended the flow of oil to the West in May 1973 in a symbolic protest against the creation of the Israeli state.233 In addition, some members of the Kuwaiti National Assembly pressed ahead with their demands for the oil-producing states gradually, to reduce oil production for the West. One radical-oriented deputy went on further to request the government to replace foreign oil experts working in Kuwait with those from Egypt.234 With a determination to use oil, for the fourth time, as a political weapon—following the 1948, 1956 and 1967 Arab—Israeli conflicts235—the Arab oil-producing states launched a multi-pronged strategy, which, as al-Sowayegh argues, consisted of the cutback of oil production, oil embargoes, an increase in oil prices and finally the nationalisation of foreign oil companies.236 Defined differently in Political Power and the Arab Oil Weapon, Roy Licklider considers the oil weapon as merely comprising the oil embargo and the curb on oil production.237 What they have argued in common, however, are two points. First, in contrast to the commonly held view that it was OPEC that exercised the oil weapon, they note that most of the process of carrying out the oil weapon was under the domain of member states of the Organisation of Arab Petroleum

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Exporting Countries (OAPEC).238 In the words of Licklider, there was no ‘OPEC embargo’,239 for only Arab states were the ‘actors’ who embargoed oil shipments. Likewise, al-Sowayegh refers mainly to the activities of OAPEC. Second, they seem to share the view that Kuwait’s role in using the Arab oil weapon in the context of OAPEC should also be accorded significance, although it was perhaps overshadowed by Saudi Arabia. Four days after the war broke out, it was the Kuwaiti government that announced its readiness to host a conference among the OAPEC member states on how to use oil as a weapon against Israel and its allies.240 This announcement was followed by the OAPEC conference on 17 October 1973 in Kuwait to discuss phased cutbacks of oil production until Israeli forces were completely withdrawn from the occupied territories in dispute.241 The member states reached a decision to reduce oil production at first by 5 per cent from the volume output of September. If necessary, an additional cutback by 5 per cent each month would also be implemented. Perhaps, not considered a credible enough oil threat for the US to scale down its support for Israel, a further OAPEC move involved a decision, finalised at a meeting on 4 November in Kuwait, to carry out more cuts of up to 25 per cent.242 Another turning point that necessitated OAPEC introducing the second oil weapon—the oil embargo—was the move by the US Congress to approve emergency military aid worth $2.2 billion to Israel, at the request of President Nixon. It was the United Arab Emirates (UAE), less than two years after the inception of the federation, which took the leading role in imposing a total oil embargo on the United States. The Saudi government on 20 October followed suit when it announced: in view of the increase of American military aid to Israel, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has decided to halt all exports to the United States of America for taking such a position.243 On 22 October, Kuwait and other Arab oil-producing countries also took part in the oil embargo campaign against the Western countries, especially the United States.244 To forewarn OAPEC member states against imposing this embargo, Kissinger was reported as threatening at a press conference in Washington that the US government might be compelled to take counter measures if the Arab countries went ahead with the idea.245 Kissinger’s remark was aimed against OAPEC member states in general, not Kuwait in particular. Indeed, from Kissinger’s viewpoint, Kuwait’s role in executing the oil weapon was relatively minimal. In his autobiography, Years of Upheaval, Kissinger devotes more attention to the role of Saudi Arabia in carrying out the oil weapon than to that of Kuwait.246 Disenchanted with what was regarded as a hostile attitude towards the Arab world, the Kuwaiti Foreign Ministry Under-Secretary, al-Rashid, summoned the US Ambassador to Kuwait, William A.Stoltzfus, Jr247 to protest Kissinger’s ‘unfriendly’ remark. The Kuwaiti government pressed the ambassador to seek clarification from Washington,248 but it is unclear what responses, if any, he received from the State Department. The US administration did not expect any compromise from the Kuwaiti side. The Kuwaiti Crown Prince asserted in his meeting with US Congressman James McClure that Kuwait would prolong its ban on oil exports to the United States as long as Israel occupied Arab territories.249 The Kuwaiti Chamber of Commerce sternly warned that it would boycott all

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American commercial companies that had maintained branches in Kuwait unless the US support for Israel came to an end.250 Worse still, five members of the Kuwaiti National Assembly proposed nationalising all oil companies,251 but without any definite plans to put this plan into effect. An exchange of threats and counter-threats continued, with the involvement as well of the anti-American Kuwaiti press. Embittered by Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger’s tension-stirring remark in January 1974 about the possible need to occupy the Arab countries’ oil fields, the Kuwaiti press supported the Kuwaiti government’s proposed scenario of mining and setting ablaze the oil fields in the event of an American occupation.252 Against the background of the situation at the time, such a US threat must be regarded as incredible; the US government clearly lacked the preparedness and willingness to undertake such a venture. The likelihood of such a threat taking place was very remote. Concerning the issue of whether the Arab oil-producing countries met with success in their attempts to restrain and at best to stop US support for Israel, Licklider paints a general picture of the Arabs’ unfulfilled objective.253 Again, little mention was made of Kuwait. For its part, Kuwait’s willingness to make use of its national attributes—one necessary condition to enable itself to influence the other state—was called into question on two grounds. First, high-ranking Kuwaiti officials maintained among themselves differing attitudes towards and contradictory remarks on the effectiveness of their own oil weapon. In other words, a consensus within the Kuwaiti governing body on this issue was far from unanimous, leaving not much room for the Kuwaiti regime to maximise its leverage. Revenues generated by oil wealth were so essential for running the Kuwaiti economy that a long-term disruption of its oil exports would have produced negative consequences for Kuwaiti national reserves. As we have seen, the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister at one time looked upon the oil weapon as a double-edged instrument. Such financial vulnerability would clearly have impeded Kuwait’s credibility in exercising influence over other states. Second, and related to the first point, Kuwait’s financial outlook was closely intertwined with the economic and monetary situations of both the United States and West Europe due to its enormous investments—through its government-owned Kuwait Investment Office—in bonds and securities of both major European and American corporations. In the Kuwaiti leaders’ perspective, prosperity and economic growth in the West European and American economies, which heavily rest upon oil-based industrialisation, would also benefit Kuwait’s financial position. In the same vein, recession in or sluggishness of the Western economies would make the Kuwaiti regime face financial constraints. If the Kuwaiti regime expected to be successful in exercising any assertive influence in this case, it met with no success. Despite the strained relations due to the Arab oil weapon, the crisis still left channels for mutual contacts open. Diplomatic representations were still in place. The mutual benefits of arms sales transactions continued to attract considerable attention. Despite being subordinate to the two main pillars of the US-fostered security scheme in the Gulf region, Kuwait was not excluded from the countries receiving arms from the United States.

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The institutionalisation of US-Kuwaiti military relations It was no coincidence that the US administration paid serious attention to the Kuwaiti regime’s desire to improve its armed forces following the visit to the Soviet Union in January 1974 of the five-member Kuwaiti military delegation, believed to be the first of its kind to the Soviet Union.254 Well-known for its critical stand against the Kuwaiti government, Al-Ra’i Al-Amm warned the Kuwaiti regime of arms purchases from the Soviet Union for fear of strings attached. Against this background and at the initiative of the US government, a meeting took place in February 1974 between the Kuwaiti Interior and Defence Minister and the US ambassador to Kuwait regarding arms purchases from the United States.255 The necessity of preventing Kuwait, the only Gulf state which at the time maintained relations with the former Soviet Union, from forging close military relations with the Kremlin shaped the US decision to seek discussions with the Kuwaiti officials concerned with the potential procurement of arms. The Kuwaiti regime faced no immediate need to launch negotiations with the United States, for it had adhered to its long-standing policy of buying arms weaponry from any source. Under these circumstances, the US government showed its desire to move first, because it feared that Kuwait might move too close to the Soviet Union militarily. As a result, the arrangement for a visit to the United States by a Kuwaiti military delegation was on the talking points agenda between the US ambassador to Kuwait and the Kuwaiti Interior and Defence Minister, whose confirmation of such a visit was reported by the Kuwaiti press. Al-Watan stated that: The Kuwaiti government is studying American offers for the sale of US military fighters and transport planes to Kuwait…. [A] military delegation is likely to travel to the US in the near future to discuss the offer.256 Once arms negotiations with the United States were revealed, the Kuwaiti Interior and Defence Minister, in an attempt to denounce total reliance on the United States for arms, held a press conference at the National Assembly in order to announce an agreement with France on the purchase of a number of Mirage F-1 military aircraft. On this occasion, he also disclosed that the Kuwaiti government was examining various offers from other arms-producing countries which expressed their interest in supplying the Kuwaiti armed forces with aircraft, tanks, radar and communication networks.257 Given the smallness of Kuwaiti territory and its often-claimed non-aligned foreign policy, one could argue that the United States overreacted to Kuwaiti moves to boost relations with the Soviet Union. To counter such criticism, however, two factors may be raised. First, in light of the Soviet-Iraqi Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation, the United States could not rule out the possibility that the Soviet presence in Kuwait was a stepping stone to further expansion in Saudi Arabia. Second, Kuwait’s soaring oil revenues, resulting from the increase in oil prices during the 1973 crisis, enabled the Kuwaiti regime to finance, without any monetary constraints, its armed forces improvement scheme, which in turn provided for a lucrative market for various armsproducing countries. To miss this opportunity for getting a share in the Kuwaiti market, in the US perspective, was not rational on economic grounds, especially in light of the

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heavy lobbying pressure of the military-industrial complex. Economic benefits usually claimed by such lobbyists include job creation, both directly and indirectly, and the economy of scale advantage. President Eisenhower once acknowledged its dynamic role by pointing out that ‘under the spur of profit potential, powerful lobbies spring up to argue for even larger munitions expendituures. And the web of special interest grow’.258 The debate over US involvement with arms procurement for Kuwait received, for the first time ever in 1975 as a separate issue, considerable attention from the Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs of the House Committee on International Relations. At issue were news reports on discussions with Kuwait for the sale of Hawk anti-aircraft missiles and Skyhawk A-4-M light bombers, believed to be worth almost $400 million.259 Confirming this closer military bond was the official announcement by the Kuwaiti Interior and Defence Minister of an agreement with the United States for the purchase of modern weapons.260 The timing of the announcement was deliberate; it came on the occasion of the return of Kuwaiti troops from the Suez front where they were put into operation during the October 1973 War. It is, however, necessary to note that such an agreement was finalised by an exchange in early 1975 of notes between the US Ambassador to Kuwait, William A. Stoltzfus, Jr, and the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister. In his note of 24 February 1975 addressed to the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister, Ambassador Stoltzfus committed the United States to supply to Kuwait ‘such defense articles and defense services as their respective governments may agree upon from time to time’,261 provided that such supplies were in line with the US laws and regulations governing the FMS. As far as the US military presence in Kuwait was concerned, this note referred to it as merely the US Liaison Office, rather than the US military attaché, which remained ‘under the overall direction of the Chief of the Diplomatic Mission of the United States of America’.262 Constituted as an agreement by the note-length response dated 15 April 1975 from the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister, the US-Kuwaiti military relations thus became institutionalised. But Sidney Sober, Acting Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, testified in October 1975 to the Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs that such institutionalisation fell short of setting up a USKuwaiti joint security commission.263 In the case of Saudi Arabia, such an intergovernmental body had been in operation, since early 1974.264 Surprisingly, the leading opponent of the sale to Kuwait of the short-range air-to-air Sidewinder missiles and Skyhawk A-4-M light bombers was Lee Hamilton, Democrat of Indiana, and Chairman of the House subcommittee dealing with Middle Eastern affairs. In the hearing in October 1975 before the Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs, Hamilton emphatically rejected the necessity of supplying Kuwait with such weapons. This was in contrast with the advocacy of the sale by Sober and Thomas Stern, Director of Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs. While, both Sober and Stern based their support for the sales on the enduring Iraqi threat to Kuwait, and on the economic benefits to the US balance of payments, Hamilton believed: ‘The potential risks involved in spreading sophisticated arms too widely simply outweigh whatever short-run economic benefits that accrue to the United States.’265 Hamilton, further, urged more regulatory mechanisms to control arms exports to the region and the promotion of regional diplomacy rather than a regional arms race. His concern perhaps was in part due to two observations made by high-ranking US officials.

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First, based on the defence survey conducted in 1972 by the Department of Defense, Sober testified that there was a great likelihood that the Kuwaiti government would later place further orders for arms weapons.266 Second, the testimony by Lt Gen. Howard M.Fish, Director of the Defense Security Assistance Agency, cast doubts on the military advantages of the proposed arms package. Fish revealed that the Kuwaiti armed forces, strengthened by the deployment of advanced air-borne missiles, would be capable of holding off an unforeseen armed attack for merely three or four days, giving enough time for political and diplomatic negotiations to solve the attack.267 Hamilton was aware that the pro-arms sales lobbyists would use this argument as a justification to push ahead with the conclusion of the arms deal with the Kuwaiti regime. But even Sober tended to agree that this particular sale of air-to-air missiles would not exert much impact on the broader balance of power equation in the Gulf, for Kuwait is a very small country; and the weapons supplied this time were not sophisticated enough to tilt the balance of power in the region.268 The question was thus raised as to why the US government intended to press ahead with the sales. At one point, Fish’s testimony was in contrast with part of Sober’s testimony: we do take account of the legitimacy of the threat as they see it. There are cases…which we have simply said, ‘Look we don’t think you need this’, or, we say, ‘No, you don’t need it’, and we just decline to respond to a request.269 At the same hearing, Congressman John H. Buchanan, Jr, observed that there must be some constraints on the ability of the US side to influence the Gulf countries’ needs for defence procurement, for ‘they have all the money in the world to buy it’.270 From his perspective, Kuwait was a case in point. Based on testimonies provided by the US officials concerned, securing a share in the Kuwaiti market was the decisive purpose of supplying the arms package for the Kuwaiti armed forces. For example, the US government facilitated the presence in Kuwait of the American private sector to run the training programme for Kuwaiti military personnel. Amos A.Jordan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security, disclosed that the Hughes Aircraft Company provided a training scheme for the use of the TOW anti-tank missiles. Similarly, the Raytheon Company would take responsibility for training Kuwaiti military staff on the use of the air-defence Hawk missiles.271

Conclusion If both the US administration and the Kuwaiti regime sought opportunities to consolidate their bilateral relations, the Kuwaiti-Iraqi crisis in 1961, the British announcement in 1968 of the withdrawal of its forces from the Gulf region, and the border crisis in 1973 served their purposes. In the 1961 crisis, what the Kennedy administration offered the Kuwaiti regime in handling the Iraqi threat was merely the diplomatic recognition of Kuwait’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. It was the British government and the Arab League-empowered multinational forces that provided the military shield for guaranteeing Kuwait’s survival,

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even though no actual military operations took place. During this crisis, the Kennedy administration did not have the direct relationship that Britain and the Kuwaiti regime enjoyed. The influence relationship between them remained stillborn. The relative insignificance of Kuwait to US interests in the Gulf was evident in the fact that the Kennedy administration did not try to dissuade the Kuwaiti regime from establishing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. In January 1968, the decision of the Labour-led government to leave the Gulf prompted the United States to make more military commitments to the Gulf states. With greater significance attached to both Saudi Arabia and Iran, Kuwait, as a relatively small state in the region, was left to the side of Washington’s regional security scheme, widely known as the ‘twin-pillar’ policy. But, it is worth noting that the Kuwaiti regime also expressed keen interest in developing military ties with the United States. An opportunity was made available when a US defence survey team was, at the request of the Kuwaiti government, despatched to Kuwait in 1972 to conduct a study of Kuwait’s defence needs, resulting in subsequent arms sales to Kuwait. The exercise of a co-operative influence by the US administration took place at the time of negotiations over the setting up of a USLOK, an office obviously linked to military concerns. The Kuwaiti regime insisted on forbidding the establishment of any US representation office in Kuwait. The Kuwaiti regime gave in to the request for setting up the liaison office because it was persuaded by the US government of the benefits to be derived from the establishment of the office. In the border crisis in 1973, the US involvement was limited, even though some discussions took place between the Kuwaiti and the US officials. One thorny issue, however, which has impaired bilateral relations is US support for Israel in the Arab—Israeli conflict. The crises in 1967 and 1973 reactivated the notion of the ‘Arab oil weapon’, by which Kuwait and other Arab states exerted minimal assertive influence, as Duncan defines it, over the US administration and other Western states. Oil embargoes and oil production cuts, for example, were introduced by the Arab oilproducing countries, but without as much success as they had hoped for. With its non-aligned foreign policy orientation, Kuwait was, for some time, the only Arab Gulf state to maintain diplomatic relations with both the Soviet Union and the United States. In their political, diplomatic and military aspects, both sets of bilateral relations were best described as ‘friendly’ and ‘manageable’, even though some ‘friction’ or ‘irritations’ also occurred. A discussion of whether the Carter administration met with any success in removing such ‘irritations’ will be undertaken in the next chapter.

4 US-Kuwaiti relations under the Carter administration Introduction The discussion in the preceding chapter examined both the opportunities for and constraints on the US and Kuwaiti governments’ attempts to consolidate their bilateral relations in the 1960s and 1970s—relations which are best described as a mixture of ups and downs. As a tiny city-state, Kuwait is always believed to be under pressure from its stronger counterpart for which Kuwait is no match militarily, economically and politically. But the US government’s hope of bringing Kuwait under its influence has not been thus far without difficulties. Under the Carter administration, a few historic events in the Middle East became matters of such concern that they tipped the balance of power at the regional and the international levels. They provided the significant context in which both governments interacted, but not always in a co-operative manner. These events included the Israeli— Egyptian peace settlement in the late 1970s, brokered by the Carter administration; the Iranian Revolution in February 1979; the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979; and the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in September 1980. While regarded by some academics and government officials as, perhaps, the watershed of an uneasy US-Kuwaiti relationship, other leading figures considered such events as having little to do with improvement of the relationship. The objective of this chapter, therefore, is to analyse whether and how the relationship was transformed, under the four circumstances, into a warmer interaction.

US-Kuwaiti ties during the first year of the Carter presidency The Carter administration inherited a legacy of attitudes towards the Middle East from former US administrations. When President Carter first came to office in January 1977, US concern over the developments in the Middle East was mainly focused on the likelihood of a negotiated peace settlement between Israel and Egypt, attempting to uphold the spirit of the Sinai Disengagement Agreement concluded in 1974 and 1975. The suspension in August 1976 of the Kuwaiti National Assembly, which was widely believed to be the most democratically institutionalised body in the Arab Gulf states, failed to attract much attention from the American government. Though it was regarded as a setback to the development of a democracy-building process in Kuwait, the US officials were fully aware of the drawbacks if the United States called for restoration of the Assembly. Opposition to such a plan came not only from the Kuwaiti government but

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also from Saudi Arabia—a main ally of the United States, on the one hand, and a vociferous opponent of the introduction of the Western model of democracy to the Gulf region, on the other. Shortly after Carter was officially confirmed as the 39th president of the United States, the Kuwaiti regime underscored the significance of the unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict. The Under-Secretary of the Kuwaiti Foreign Ministry, after a meeting with the US Ambassador to Kuwait, Frank Maestrone, forewarned that the new president should ‘show a deep understanding of the roots of the problem and the need for a just solution…’.1 Interestingly enough, these remarks were released prior to the issuance of the Kuwaiti Amir’s congratulatory message to President Carter.2 Among the Arab Gulf states, Kuwait’s role in the region, in the perspective of the new administration, still lagged behind that of Saudi Arabia. On a fact-finding trip to the Gulf in November 1976 carried out by James Akin, then US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait was purposely arranged to be his second leg after Saudi Arabia.3 During his two-day visit and discussions with the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister, Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir, at issue were the civil war situation in Lebanon, the global energy predicament and overall USArab relations, but there was no special emphasis on bilateral relations between the two countries. The collateral objective of this trip was to pave the way for the forthcoming visit to the Middle East, including Kuwait, of the US Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance. After Carter’s swearing-in ceremony in January 1977, the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister voiced his optimism that President Carter would exert great efforts to solve the Middle East crisis,4 while the Kuwaiti Minister of State for Administrative and Legal Affairs asserted that a change in Kuwaiti attitudes towards the Arab-Israeli conflict was not imminent.5 Kuwait, as he saw it, still observed the Arab policy of boycotting Israel. Between these two stances slightly different in tone—the first positive, the second somewhat negative—Ambassador Maestrone accorded greater weight to the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister’s remark. First, there is a wide agreement among the former US officials serving in Kuwait that the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister plays a decisive role, on most occasions, in Kuwait’s decision-making. His remarks therefore normally carry much weight in formulating Kuwait’s foreign policy. Second, Ambassador Maestrone was quoted as stressing during a meeting with the Kuwaiti Foreign Ministry UnderSecretary that ‘the US was not opposed to the boycott, which it regarded as an internal matter concerning the Arab states…’.6 The confidence behind Ambassador Maestrone’s remark perhaps lay in his belief that the Arab strategy of boycotting Israel would be ruined by the likelihood of a negotiated peace settlement between Egypt, under the leadership of President Anwar Sadat, and Israel, under the premiership of Menahem Begin. The boycott strategy was, as Ambassador Maestrone argued, no longer effective and formidable. Confirming Kuwait’s less confrontational stand on the Palestinian issue was the remark by ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Husayn, the Minister of State for Kuwaiti Cabinet Affairs, on President Carter’s statement of 17 March 1977 calling for the establishment of a Palestinian homeland.7 Husayn commented that such an announcement reflected ‘the presence of certain concepts in the US president’s mind regarding the Palestinian question’.8 But Carter’s statement faced criticisms from both the US administration itself and the radical Kuwaiti newspaper, Al-Ra’i Al-Amm.9 In addition, the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister also warned, in June 1977, of not being over optimistic with it.10 In fact, Carter’s

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initiative, with no clear-cut plan of action, remained stillborn on paper and failed to materialise. Together with the inconsistency in using the oil weapon as already discussed in the previous chapter, Kuwait’s attempt to influence the outcome of this conflict, from the other Arab leaders’ viewpoint, was merely symbolic in nature. It is noteworthy that the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister’s positions in January and June 1977 were somewhat at odds— at least in spirit—thereby weakening the regime’s attempts to put pressure on the US government in handling the Israeli-Arab conflict. Moreover, President Sadat failed to consult the Kuwaiti Amir about his meeting with President Carter on 4 April 1977, another historic US-Arab summit. Again, this meeting was criticised by Al-Ra’i Al-Amm, saying that President Sadat still had too much confidence in US policy.11 Further complicating the situation was a call by another Kuwaiti newspaper, Al-Qabas, for establishing an Arab pact similar to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) or the Warsaw Pact to counter Israel.12 The Kuwaiti Defence Minister also recommended setting up an Arab organisation for military industries.13 No Kuwaiti leader gave a warm reception to the proposals, let alone the other Arab leaders. The Kuwaiti Foreign Minister rejected these initiatives by commenting that security in the Gulf was guaranteed through economic, cultural co-operation and the exchange of security information. Therefore, an agreement on the security of the Gulf was unnecessary.14 This military-based initiative was clearly overshadowed by Egypt’s less confrontational approach to the conflict. This perhaps resulted from Egypt’s significant involvement with the conflict from the very outset and its being a bigger actor than Kuwait.15 In the run-up to President Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem in November 1977, the Kuwaiti approach to the Israeli-Arab conflict was still relatively hard-line. Frank Maestrone, the US Ambassador to Kuwait from June 1976 to July 1979, was reportedly summoned in July 1977 to the Foreign Ministry twice within three days to receive a protest against the US decision to supply Israel with more military support.16 In the same vein, the Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs hinted that a dialogue between the United States and the PLO was a step towards establishing a just peace,17 a dialogue which was politically unacceptable to the US government because of Israeli pressure. Hoping to facilitate the negotiations between Egypt and Israel, President Carter made a significant move by expressing his willingness to recognise the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.18 This move was expected to be compatible with his previous declaration made on 16 March 1977 in Clinton, Massachusetts. The declaration read: There has to be a homeland provided for the Palestinian refugees who have suffered for many, many years… We hope that later on this year, in the latter part of this year, that we might get all these parties to agree to come together in Geneva, to start talking to one another.19 (emphasis added) Such a declaration illustrated the Carter administration’s so-called comprehensive approach to the Israeli-Arab conflict, an approach which aimed to replace the step-bystep approach used by Henry Kissinger. These two initiatives by President Carter were praised by the Kuwaiti Interior and Defence Minister who also called on the US

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administration to put more pressure on Israel,20 an expectation which had no guarantee of success. Kuwait’s marginal role in this conflict was clearly confirmed by a remark made by the Kuwaiti Education Minister and Acting Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs. Possibly stunned by Sadat’s decision to visit Israel and deliver an address to the Knesset (Israeli parliament), he claimed that Kuwait had no knowledge of or information about Sadat’s moves before they were announced.21 But the Kuwaiti government responded immediately by convening an emergency meeting under the chairmanship of Shaykh Jabir, the Prime Minister and heir apparent,22 to discuss the impact of Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem on developments in the region. At a meeting in Tripoli in December 1977, five radical Arab states—Algeria, Iraq, Libya, South Yemen and Syria—formed an anti-Sadat Front of Steadfastness and Confrontation.23 Although a Kuwaiti representative took part in the meeting, the Kuwaiti government did not go as far as affiliating with those radical Arab states. This was consistent with its general position on foreign policy during 1963– 1979, described by Abdul-Reda Assiri as ‘pragmatism and balance’.24 The participation in the meeting did not restrain the Kuwaiti Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs from giving a warm reception in January 1978 to President Sadat’s forthcoming visit to the United States. At the time, when he hailed the visit as of special importance to the peace talks on the conflict, he perhaps realised his government’s limited role in bringing an end to the conflict. He admitted that the Kuwaiti government still waited for further confirmation and information on the visit.25 A different line taken by the Kuwaiti press was found in a commentary by Al-Ra’i Al-Amm, stating that, ‘In fact, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the other Arab oil states have more than once affirmed that they adhere to Rabat summit resolutions which provide for collective action, avoid unilateral steps.’26 Leaked reports on US arms sales to Egypt negotiated during the meeting between Sadat and Carter also drew criticism from the Kuwaiti press, especially Al-Ra’i Al-Amm. Such arms sales to Egypt, claimed the newspaper, would cause an arms race in North Africa in the light of the Egyptian-Libyan territorial dispute.27 Though sharing the same concern with the press, Kuwaiti leaders fully realised that there was nothing much they could do to slow down the tide of change.

The Camp David Treaty and US-Kuwaiti relations What made President Sadat come to a decision to solve the conflict peacefully with Israel is not the objective of this book. The trilateral attempts by the United States, Egypt and Israel in this endeavour confirmed that Kuwait, along with other Gulf states, was in large part left on the outer ring of the negotiating process. William Quandt, a key member of the US negotiating team during the Carter administration, admitted that the State Department did not feel obliged to inform Kuwait, in particular, about the rapprochement between Egypt and Israel. The Kuwaiti government received ‘routine information or reports’ on the development of the negotiations through the US embassy in Kuwait city.28 No special information was available for either Kuwait or Oman. What Quandt confirmed was that ‘special friends may get more detailed explanation, for example, King Khalid of Saudi Arabia, King Hussein of Jordan, and King Hassan of Morocco’.29 Excluding other visits by US

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officials in various capacities, members of the US negotiating team, claimed Quandt, never made any visit to Kuwait. Similar to Quandt’s assertion is that of Brooks Wrampelmeier, a former senior US official at the State Department, who was in charge of US-Gulf states relations. The Carter administration notified all smaller Arab Gulf states about the rapprochement although no particular significance was attached to the briefings. ‘We kept Kuwait’, recalled Wrampelmeier, ‘and other Arab states informed about the development’.30 Against this background, both Ambassador Frank Maestrone and Joseph Wright Twinam, when asked whether the Kuwaiti government issued an ultimatum to the US government on this occasion, confirmed that the US government received no such ultimatum whatsoever from the Kuwaiti administration.31 To emphasise again, Kuwaiti involvement with America’s so-called comprehensive approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict was relatively minimal. The Kuwaiti newspaper, Al-Siyasah, was quick to try to undermine, with no success, the ongoing negotiations by reporting Stephen Spiegel’s observation made during his visit to Kuwait: the previous administration in the era of Kissinger believed that Egypt was the center of the Arab world, but…the present administration in the era of Brzezinski believes that the center of gravity in the Arab world is Saudi Arabia. It was for this reason that the present US administration was reluctant to support Sadat’s initiative for fear of embarrassing Saudi Arabia and Syria.32 With this report, Al-Siyasah, normally less critical than Al-Ra’i Al-Amm, intended to deepen mistrust between the United States and Egypt. An indirect effect of this report was also to instil misunderstanding between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, an event which the Kuwaiti regime tried to prevent. The Al-Siyasah report reflected the relative freedom enjoyed by the press in Kuwait, which sometimes caused embarrassment to the Kuwaiti regime. The regime, for example, found it necessary to close down Al-Ra’i Al-Amm for three days because it published caricatures which were considered to be humiliating to the Egyptian president.33 Visiting Kuwait in his capacity as the State Department’s special envoy, Spiegel was commissioned either to ‘inform’ or to ‘explain’ to, not ‘consult’ with, the Kuwaiti regime about the negotiations. This was a special trip because members of the US negotiating team, according to Quandt, never made a trip to Kuwait for this particular purpose.34 Rather, most of their trips were to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Morocco; it was clear that Kuwait was only of ‘second-tier’ interest in the Gulf. In President Carter’s autobiography, Keeping Faith, no mention is made of a Kuwaiti role in his decision to bring together both Begin and Sadat to Camp David for peaceful talks.35 Notwithstanding Arab opposition to the unilateral move by Egypt, President Carter succeeded in announcing on 17 September 1978 at Camp David the signing by Begin and Sadat of two basic documents—a Framework for Peace in the Middle East, and a Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel—and the Accompanying Letters exchanged between Carter and Begin, and Carter and Sadat.36 As a sequel to these Camp David Agreements, Begin and Sadat signed a peace treaty in Washington on 26 March 1979.

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Quite expectedly, the negative response by the Arab states to these agreements ran high. Concerning the Kuwaiti reaction, some criticisms were already made prior to the signing of the 1978 Camp David Agreement. The Kuwaiti Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister were pessimistic, expressing a belief that the agreement would fail because it would not create anything new and the conflict would still continue.37 Also opposed but low keyed, the Prime Minister emphasised, one day after the conclusion of the agreement, the need not to anticipate events.38 Similar to the Prime Minister’s remark were observations, made by the Kuwaiti ambassador in Washington in 1993 and a wellknown Kuwaiti professor at Kuwait University. Muhammad Sabah al-Salim Al Sabah confirmed the Kuwaiti position of rejecting a separate treaty between any Arab state and Israel.39 Only a comprehensive peace treaty would bring genuine peace to the region. But he added: ‘We opted not to vehemently criticise the accords. We tried to play a more moderate critique of the accord rather than a violent critique of it.’40 The Kuwaiti regime, according to Ambassador Muhammad Al Sabah, was reluctant to cut off the diplomatic relations with Egypt. But, at the Arab summit in Baghdad in November 1978, Kuwait was under strong pressure from other members of the Arab League to do so. Economic relations between Egypt and Kuwait, however, remained intact. Hassan Ali al-Ebraheem, Chairman of the Kuwait Society for the Advancement of Arab Children based in Kuwait city, confirmed Kuwait’s pragmatic stand on the Sadat government’s decision by saying that while a boycott against Egypt was underway, economic relations with Egypt were still in operation.41 Kuwait still welcomed the arrival of Egyptian workers and continued making large investments in Egypt.42 Major investments by Kuwait took place in Egypt under President Sadat’s regime after the Camp David agreement was signed. Kuwait still allowed Egyptian teachers and technicians to continue working and making remittances in Kuwait.43 Fred Halliday succinctly concluded that ‘…the Gulf states have remained somewhere in between the two poles. They have not, with the exception of Oman, sided with Egypt, nor have they joined the Rejection Front’.44 A telegram sent to the US Secretary of State in April 1979 by the US embassy in Kuwait reported a translation of the Kuwaiti Foreign Ministry’s Arabic-language announcement: In announcing the break of diplomatic and political relations with Egypt, Kuwait reaffirms that this decision will in no way whatsoever affect the historical and fraternal relations between the two fraternal peoples in Egypt and Kuwait. Brothers from the sons of Arab Egypt working in Kuwait will continue to enjoy complete care on the part of the Kuwait(i) government, and their brothers, the sons of the Kuwaiti people.45 Further, showing the Kuwaiti pragmatic position in this matter was the Kuwaiti Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister’s remark which conflicted with the one he made in September 1978. He then remarked that the Camp David agreement would not bring any new element to end the conflict. But, he later contended that no Arab state had the intention of isolating Egypt because it is the heart of the Arab nation.46 Against the earlier background, there is every reason to contend that the US administration viewed the Kuwaiti opposition as insignificant. Emile Nakhleh, another US authority on the Persian Gulf region, went on further to claim that the Kuwaiti

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opposition was mostly for ‘public consumption’ because of the Palestinian inhabitants working and living in Kuwait.47 The Kuwaiti regime realised the necessity of soliciting the Palestinians’ allegiance for the sake of the regime’s stability. Indeed, most ruling elites of moderate Arab countries found it inevitable to take sides with the radical groups and difficult to defend Egypt.48 Brooks Wrampelmeier confirms that Kuwait was an ordinary player on this occasion. He visited Sharjah and Abu Dhabi, excluding Kuwait, in order to persuade these two ruling regimes not to cut off diplomatic ties with Egypt,49 but his mission met with no success due to the common position adopted at the Arab League summit in Baghdad. On the day of the peace treaty signing ceremony in Washington, DC, students and youths took to the streets in Kuwait city to demonstrate their opposition to the peace treaty.50 Given that Kuwait was more relatively democratic than the other Arab Gulf states, the ruling regime in Kuwait found these demonstrations tolerable. No forcible crackdown was reported. Aware that students from radical Arab countries were also studying in Kuwait, what perhaps concerned the regime more was how many of the demonstrators were Kuwaitis. As for media opposition to the treaty, a barrage of criticisms and opposing views were reiterated in the Kuwaiti press. For example, AlQabas became very popular for its reports on an US-Egyptian secret deal. It reported that ‘President Carter informed President Sadat during the crucial phase in the negotiations that he is confident that the US Congress will take up all of Egypt’s economic problems if Sadat concludes a separate conciliation, even if Arab aid to him is cut off’.51 Al-Ra’i AlAmm, believed to be the most radical newspaper in Kuwait, argued that the Camp David Treaty would produce ‘terrible results’, leading Egypt to be trapped in an episode jointly prepared by ‘the US and Israel’.52 The approach carried out by Sadat, wrote Al-Siyasah, was a measure which even the moderate Arab states could not accept.53 Similarly, AlWatan (Nation) emphasised that it would be difficult and unimaginable for the Arab nation to accept Egypt’s unilateral endeavour.54 On 25 September 1978, Alfred Atherton, the US roving Ambassador in the Middle East, held talks with the Kuwaiti Amir during his one-day trip to Kuwait, after already having visited Amman, Riyadh and Damascus.55 The purpose of the trip was merely to ‘brief’ the Kuwaiti Amir on the results of the Camp David meeting, in the presence of the Kuwaiti Defence Minister and acting Foreign Minister, and the US ambassador to Kuwait.56 This visit clearly confirmed that Kuwait played a very minimal role in inhibiting the Camp David process. To the US government, the Kuwaiti regime was supposed to know only about the results of the meeting, although the despatch of a second ‘envoy’ perhaps reflected a feeling in Washington that the Kuwaiti regime had to be pacified. This attempt, however, yielded nothing, for Saddam Hussein, the Vice Chairman of Iraq’s Revolutionary Command Council at the time, visited and held talks with highranking Kuwaiti officials on the Iraqi initiative of convening an Arab summit conference in Baghdad.57 The Kuwaiti Amir and the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister gave their full support to Saddam Hussein’s proposal. When asked in November 1978 whether Kuwait would be the new headquarters of the Arab League in the event that an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty was concluded, the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister hoped that the conclusion of such a treaty would not have any impact on the relocation of the League’s headquarters.58 He

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further commented that: ‘In any case we must not jump to conclusions but must wait and see.’59 The Kuwaiti leaders, with their commitment to pragmatism in foreign policy, may have had hopes of persuading President Sadat to change his course of action. Once it was assured that the Egyptian government would press ahead with its own decision to strike a peace deal with the Israelis, however, Kuwait followed the other Arab states in 1979, in breaking off relations with Egypt. The evidence also shows that President Carter’s scheduled visit to Egypt and Israel did not attract as much opposition from the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister and the Kuwaiti press as the peace treaty itself.60 On 26 January 1980, Egypt and Israel agreed to normalise their diplomatic relations, a development which came under severe criticism from the Kuwaiti government. Based on the framework of influence, it is rather illogical to contend that the US administration successfully exercised influence over the Kuwaiti regime in the light of the Camp David agreement and Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. As mentioned earlier, the US government did not attach much significance to Kuwait; thus Washington found no immediate need to change the courses of action carried out by leaders in Kuwait. On the other side of the coin, even if the US government tried to influence the Kuwaiti regime not to break off diplomatic relations with Egypt, the Kuwaiti regime would have acted in its own vested interests—in this case, breaking diplomatic but maintaining economic relations. The United States and Kuwait converged in their interest not to isolate Egypt completely. Therefore, since the Kuwaitis did not act simply out of US pressure but because they would derive a benefit from what the Americans generally advocated, the concept of co-operative influence, as discussed in chapter two, is the most appropriate explanation of this occasion.

US-Kuwaiti relations and the Iranian revolution in 1979 While the Camp David agreement and the Israeli—Egyptian peace treaty arguably caused strains in Kuwaiti-US diplomatic relations, speculation has emerged as to whether the two major crises of 1979—the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan—produced an improvement in the relationship. Those who advocate that the crises constitute a turning point include Emile Nakhaleh and Bernard Reich. Opponents of this argument are Frank Maestrone, Francois Dickman, Joseph Twinam, William Quandt and Abdul-Reda Assiri. In between these two schools of thought are Hassan alEbraheem; the Kuwaiti ambassador in Washington, DC; Barbara Bodine, a high-ranking US official attached to the Office of Counter-Terrorism, the US State Department; Malcom Peck, a programme officer at the Washington-based Meridian International Center; and Thomas McNaugher, a fellow in foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution.61 From the viewpoint of those who believe that warmer relations followed the 1979 crises, the Islamic republic vowing to export its revolutionary doctrine and the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, constituted common ground for further political and security cooperation. Like the crisis in March 1973, it would have been timely for both the governments to move closer in understanding each other’s security concerns in the region in spite of the unresolved Arab—Israeli issue. Yet, the second school of thought argues

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that common threat perceptions did not exist between the two governments, and the evidence seems to substantiate the latter’s claims. With the loss of the Shah in Iran, the Carter administration secured the goodwill of the Egyptian president as compensation. But the Kuwaiti regime suffered the losses of both Egypt as the Arab world’s leader and Iran as one of the monarchical regimes of the region. Although the Shah had maintained close relations with Tel Aviv, the Kuwaiti regime had felt less threatened by the Shah than revolutionary Iran under the rule of a radical clergy. Aware that political anxiety in Kuwait might follow the revolution in Iran, the official Kuwaiti reaction to the developments in Iran was cautious. The Kuwaiti regime made clear its position that the clergy-driven revolution in Iran was an internal matter.62 Leaders in Kuwait had tried not to antagonise the Shah, but once hopes that he would remain in power were completely dashed, an ambivalent official position on Iran emerged. For example, the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister commented that ‘the right of the Islamic Republic is rectification of the wrong cause followed by Iran in the past’.63 The Kuwaiti Ambassador to Iran, Muhammad al-Jasim, spoke of non-interference in Iranian affairs.64 On the socio-religious front, however, more concern was voiced over the impact of the revolution on both non-Kuwaiti, Shi’ite expatriates working in Kuwait and the Islamist opposition. On the American side, the US administration failed to adopt a coherent policy towards the crisis in Iran. Differences between hawks and doves within the administration were indicative of factionalism in Carter’s foreign policy towards Iran since Carter took office in January 1977. Secretary of State Vance, who attached more importance to the improvement of the human rights situation in Iran, disagreed with both National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown who supported a military option, if necessary, to assist the Shah in cracking down on the opposition in Iran.65 Secretary Vance and the State Department in general were sceptical about a military operation in the Gulf, for they expected an unfavourable response from the Arab world. What further complicated the situation was a position taken by the deputy director at the NSC, David Aaron, who cast doubt on any military option. In the Pentagon, Secretary Brown encountered similar doubt. His idea of using a military alternative failed to receive strong support from the Joint Chiefs and the individual services.66 With a role, under the Shah, in carrying out the US-initiated twin-pillar policy, Iran was still regarded by Brown and Brzezinski as an asset to regional security in the Middle East. The coming to power of Khomeini in Iran was a major blow to the US position in the Persian Gulf, and the necessity to keep the Shah in power, according to Brown and Brzezinski, remained high on the priority list. During his visit to Saudi Arabia shortly after nation-wide demonstrations erupted in Iran, Brown proposed setting up a military pact in the Gulf under US supervision.67 The choice of Saudi Arabia for this announcement illustrated that the United States was more concerned about the implications of the events in Iran for Saudi Arabia than the smaller Gulf states. With similar monarchy-styled regimes to the one in Iran, the US government found it necessary to ensure both the Saudi regime and other smaller Arab Gulf states that US support was credible. Aiming to put Saudi Arabia at the centre of the pact, of course, because of its sheer size, the US administration also sought to provide a security umbrella for the smaller Gulf states. In addition to twelve F-15s despatched to Saudi Arabia in

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January 1979, the sophisticated reconnaissance aircraft, widely known as the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), flew over Saudi airspace in March 1979 with the permission of the Saudi government.68 As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Kissinger-initiated twin-pillar policy was rejected by the Kuwaiti regime. Likewise, the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister dismissed Brown’s proposal and reiterated that ‘the Gulf states are capable of defending themselves through co-operation among themselves in all economic and social spheres and through solidarity among us in the face of any outside interference in our affairs’.69 The Prime Minister underscored Kuwait’s objection to Brown’s idea by reasoning that the Arab people in the Gulf could maintain so strong a cohesion that any assistance from outside powers to expel external dangers was unnecessary.70 As a direct result of the revolution in Iran, the capacity of oil production per day was remarkably reduced, leading to the decline in worldwide oil supplies. In line with the decision taken by other OPEC countries, the Kuwaiti Oil Minister, Shaykh al-Khalifah Al Sabah, announced that effective on 20 February 1979, Kuwait would increase the price of its crude oil by $1.20 per barrel.71 In order to ensure the uninterrupted flow of oil from the region, the US Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, well-known for always taking a hard-line position, enraged the Arab world in general and Kuwait in particular. Secretary Brown and US Secretary of Energy James Schlesinger declared the willingness of the Carter administration to use military force to protect oil interests in the Middle East, if necessary.72 Secretary Brown commissioned his subordinates to study a contingency plan for military operations in the area.73 Less than two months afterwards, this US position was confirmed by Brzezsinski, whose remarks on using force to protect vital interests met with an immediate outcry from a spokesman for Kuwait’s Foreign Ministry.74 A major blow to Brown’s and Schlesinger’s idea was the opposition of American envoys in the Gulf region. The Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Siyasah reported that US ambassadors to the countries of the Arabian Peninsula warned the Carter administration of the adverse consequences of any military option. The envoys contended such a plan was ‘impractical, inapplicable and would lead to negative results’.75 This, of course, was not the first time that the threat of using force for the purpose of securing oil was made. Although the idea was shelved, it is very likely that the main thrust of this plan later formed a major part of the Carter Doctrine. With regard to the Kuwaiti regime’s reaction to Brown’s initiative, the Foreign Minister’s lukewarm response was highlighted by a more critical remark from the Defence Minister, Shaykh Salim Al Sabah. He warned that the US military intervention in the Gulf would meet strong resistance, and that local people in the area would fight to the death to protect their oil wealth.76 One can argue that the Kuwaiti Defence Minister overreacted to Brown’s announcement, given the divisions within the US administration on how properly to respond to the revolution in Iran and the resulting increase in oil prices. These divisions clearly rendered the US threat of using force less credible. However, widely known as a vigorous anti-US spokesman within the Kuwaiti regime, the Kuwaiti Defence Minister reacted unsurprisingly. What is worth noting is that the Kuwaiti Amir refrained from making any comment on the revolution in Iran.

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Considering whether or not the crisis in Iran led to a warmer chapter of relations between the United States and Kuwait, the answer could be expected to be yes. Forming a common threat to both the governments’ vested national interest was radical Iran’s foreign policy, which would upset the status quo in the Gulf region. However, the US government failed to persuade the Kuwaiti regime to look on the Islamic Republic in Iran as a common enemy, perhaps due to two explanations. First, the overall US emphasis on creating a defensive perimeter in the aftermath of the revolution seemed to be placed on the security of Saudi Arabia. Based on political, strategic and economic factors, a similar nation-wide uprising in Saudi Arabia as in Iran would be detrimental to US credibility.77 Relatively speaking, Kuwait was a peripheral interest.78 As Thomas McNaugher points out, once the Shah of Iran was overthrown, the logic of ‘twin-pillar’ policy was no longer in effect. In an attempt to formulate a new strategy, the US administration was not left with much choice except to emphasise its military ties with the Saudi regime.79 Second, the Kuwaiti ruling elites realised that Kuwait’s role in the Gulf, in the US perspective, was subordinate to that of Saudi Arabia. Emile A. Nakhleh thought it very unlikely that there was any discussion on the turbulent situation between the US and the Kuwaiti governments in the run-up to the revolution.80 Kuwaiti leaders and other Gulf leaders assumed that the opposition to the Shah would be contained. But one may find such argument unconvincing. Frank Maestrone, the former US Ambassador to Kuwait, during the crisis in Iran, pointed out that although there was no significant discussions, he himself was in constant communication with the Kuwaiti regime during this period.81 What was discussed, according to his account, was nothing significant or special; rather, both sides talked merely about their mutual interest in maintaining peace and stability in the Gulf.82 Further complicating US attempts to persuade the Kuwaiti regime to consider Iran as a common threat was the pragmatic position taken by the Kuwaiti elite. While the Kuwaiti ambassador to Iran referred to a ‘non-interference’ position as mentioned earlier, a visit to Iran by the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister in the aftermath of the revolution underscored the Kuwaiti regime’s pragmatic and independent approach in handling the crisis. A mass circulation daily newspaper in Kuwait, Al-Watan (Nation), also carried news coverage in support of the Foreign Minister’s visit to Iran.83 The Kuwaiti ambassador to Iran stated that the visit paved the way for new horizons in bilateral relations and in Iran’s relations with the Gulf countries.84 It is quite likely that he foresaw political upheaval in the Gulf states triggered by the revolutionary pattern in Iran. The chances of the Carter administration enlisting Kuwait on its side in opposition to the revolution were proved less promising by the remarks of another high-ranking Kuwaiti official. As a result of a meeting in al-Ta’if, Rashid al-Rashid, the Foreign Ministry Under-Secretary, said that ‘the foreign ministers of the six Arab Gulf states agreed to develop [their] relationship with Iran to [the] maximum’.85 US popularity in Iran plunged to its lowest point when the US government allowed the Shah, at the time receiving medical treatment in Mexico, to enter the United States for medical grounds. Those who played a major role in persuading President Carter to give his permission were David Rockefeller and Henry Kissinger.86 This decision by Carter led to an unforeseen, but very damaging, incident in international diplomatic history. In November 1979, radical Iranian students seized the US embassy building in Teheran and

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held 66 American diplomats and officials as hostages. The Bazargan government’s promise to release all hostages within forty-eight hours failed to materialise because of Khomeini’s opposition. Some speculation emerged that the Bazargan government did not want to act against the students. The Khomeini regime demanded that the Shah should be extradited to Iran and his wealth amassed overseas should be handed back to the Iranian regime in Teheran. Under these tense circumstances, diplomatic means seemed to be the best way to resolve the crisis. But, it is worth noting that the Carter administration, according to the president’s memoir Keeping Faith, ‘asked the Algerians, Syrians, Turks, Pakistanis, Libyans, PLO and others to intercede on behalf of the release of (our) hostages’.87 The monarchical regimes of the Gulf states were not chosen to carry out the ‘go-between’ role because of their similarities in regime style to the Shah of Iran; presumably, this would have made them suspect with the anti-monarchical new regime in Tehran. While there was no evidence of an official Kuwaiti response to the hostage crisis in its early stage, the Kuwaiti newspaper, Al-Anba’ (News) expressed its astonishment at the occupation of the US embassy and also pointed out that ‘the occupation… could [serve] as an open invitation to the US fleet to settle in this area’.88 This comment reflected a negative view on how the United States might respond to the crisis, and was prompted by the US government’s decision to despatch the carrier battle group Kitty Hawk, formerly based at Subic Bay in the Philippines, to the Arabian Sea.89 In addition, the Kuwaiti regime disagreed with sanction measures adopted by the United States in retaliation for the hostage crisis. For example, Carter’s decision to freeze Iran’s assets invested in the United States came under criticism from Kuwait. A highlevel Kuwaiti source condemned this as a serious, undesirable precedent in international relations.90 Kuwaiti leaders were very much concerned that the asset freezing would be used against their abundant assets in the United States. The Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Husayn, commented: Kuwait does not approve of this measure and warns against its consequences. …[T]his measure is considered…a precedent which gives a simple meaning to national interest,…thereby shaking confidence in the world banking system and prompting a hampering of international trade relations and leading up to a shrinking of international trade.91 The Kuwait Times criticised Carter’s policy of freezing Iranian assets as a violation of the Iranian people’s rights by adopting an ugly Machiavellian policy on the pretext of safeguarding the interests of American citizens.92 The US administration did not remain indifferent to this development. With the intention of pacifying the Arab Gulf leaders, William Miller, the US Secretary of the Treasury, paid a visit to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait. In Kuwait, he held discussions not only with his counterpart, the Finance Minister, ‘Abd al-Rahman Salih al-’Atiqi, but also with the Amir and Crown Prince. Although no joint communiqué was released after the discussions, both sides reached an understanding that the freezing assets tactic would not also be used against the Kuwaiti regime. Aiming to clarify the American stand, Secretary Miller described such measures as ‘defensive and marked with self-restraint’.93 In other words, he implied that the US government had been forced to

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use them because of the Iranian government’s decision to withdraw the assets that the Shah of Iran had invested in the US financial market. From an American perspective, Secretary Miller’s mission was rather successful in influencing the Kuwaiti regime not to withdraw its assets. Yet, one can also argue the Kuwaiti regime yielded to the US government’s proposal in the context of co-operative influence. The financial assets accrued from the investments in the US market remained so attractive to the Kuwaiti regime that it should not withdraw any of them. The Kuwaiti regime could foresee a detrimental effect on its own financial reserve once a major withdrawal of its assets was made. It was thus possible that the Kuwaiti leaders’ own decision not to withdraw stemmed, in large part, from both the desire and the necessity to maintain their healthy financial reserves, not actually because of Secretary Miller’s visit to Kuwait. Even if there had been no visit by Secretary Miller, then the Kuwaiti regime may never have planned to withdraw its assets. In the midst of the hostage crisis, confusion emerged as to whether the United States would deploy troops in Kuwait and Oman to stabilise the region. The Kuwaiti Foreign Ministry Under-Secretary, al-Rashid, protested against an Iranian press report on the arrival of the US troops in Kuwait and Bahrain.94 Similarly, the Omani Ambassador to Kuwait, Yusuf ‘Ubayd al-Harithi, denounced as groundless a report by Al-Siyasah which said that US paratroopers had landed in some countries in the area, particularly Oman.95 Kuwait and Oman both agreed the US military deployment would certainly aggravate tensions and enrage the Iranian regime, thereby further straining their relations with leaders in Teheran. While the Iranian sources for this report were unknown to the Kuwaiti regime, it was well aware that even only a rumour of its request for another American review of its defence structure would cause much concern within the Iranian regime. The Kuwaiti rulers obviously tried to avoid being drawn into a US-Iranian conflict. Anti-US demonstrations in front of the American embassy in Kuwait by non-Kuwaiti elements of Iranian origin caused embarrassment to the regime. Although branded by the Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs as ‘unauthorised and illegal’ demonstrations,96 Kuwaiti authorities confirmed that it was not the government’s official policy to use security forces to clamp down on demonstrators, a position which was in contrast with a news report in Al-Siyasah.97 At that particular moment, taking sides with either the United States or the Islamic regime was not a viable option for Kuwait. It was, as the Kuwaiti regime always realised, in the US interest to pre-empt the exportation of the Iranian regime’s revolutionary ideology to the conservative states of the Arabian Peninsula,98 but America’s main concern was still with Saudi Arabia. The US House of Representative’s Hearing on Developments in the Middle East 1979 devoted only a few pages to the implications of the revolution for the political outlook in Kuwait. No guarantee was given as to how the United States would support the Al Sabah regime in the event that the revolutionary practices in Iran would begin to destabilise the legitimacy of the Kuwaiti rulers. In the meantime, Al-Anba’ reported, with few details, that most of the countries in the Gulf region had adopted emergency measures for ensuring their own stability and security. As a gesture to demonstrate its confidence in Kuwait’s ability to control its internal situation, the US embassy in Kuwait repeatedly issued a statement on aborting any evacuation plan for US citizens:

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According to information the embassy received from competent American quarters, there no longer appears to be any reason for American citizens in Kuwait to leave and that the dangers threatening the countries of the area have ended.99 However, Al-Ra’i Al-Amm, the outspoken critic of US policy in the Gulf region, considered the evacuation plan as a plot to stir up the unstable atmosphere in the region, which could form a pretext for US military intervention.100 Not only did Kuwait disagree with the alleged US plan to resort to a military option in handling the hostage crisis, the Kuwaiti ruling elites also made clear that Kuwait would object to any draft resolution before the United Nations which called for an imposition of economic sanctions on Iran.101 Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad, the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister, announced his government’s decision to block economic sanctions against any Muslim country. The Kuwaiti permanent representative to the United Nations, ‘Abdallah Ya’kub al-Bishara, was instructed to exercise his authority to prevent any resolution from being adopted by the fifteen-member Security Council.102 With its economic sanctions unilaterally launched in mid-November 1979 already in operation, it can be argued that the US government was concerned less with the substance of UN-imposed economic sanctions than with Kuwait’s position, which might weaken diplomatic endeavours in ending the crisis. At that stage, contacts between the US president and the Kuwaiti Amir were reported. The Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Husayn, revealed that the Amir received from President Carter two messages, the contents of which were not disclosed.103 One can readily speculate that the prime objective of sending these two messages was to seek Kuwaiti diplomatic support at the UN meetings on the hostage crisis. Receipt of the second message from the American leader within less than two months of the capture of the US diplomats perhaps reflected a desire by the United States to bring Kuwait, as well as other conservative Arab Gulf states, into its ‘co-operative alliance’ against the regime in Teheran. This desire met with an unsuccessful result. The State Department failed to change Kuwait’s foreign policy of pragmatism and balance.104 From the Kuwaiti leaders’ perspective, the significant question arising out of the radical change in Iran was how to maintain—despite the significantly different ideological milieu—their decades-old and friendly relations with the ruling elite in Teheran. It was perceived in Kuwait that the national harmony of Kuwaiti society was on the verge of being shattered. In the words of Assiri, the changes in Iran stirred up a new assertiveness, pride and awareness among most Shi’ites, who formed a minority in Kuwaiti society.105 Added to this was the Kuwaiti perception that the changes in Iran posed a direct threat to the traditional status quo regimes in the Gulf. ‘Dinar Diplomacy’ and diplomatic manoeuvres were exercised to temper the impact of the revolution on Kuwait. For instance, the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister in July 1979, was the first foreign minister to pay an official visit to Teheran in order to congratulate the new regime in Iran. On the discussion agenda were the developments of Gulf security and the ways to improve Arab-Iranian relations. A goodwill mission also took place in the form of humanitarian aid given to Iran in the early 1980s for the victims of floods in the south of Iran.

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A noteworthy point at this stage is that less than a week after the eruption of the crisis, the US Ambassador to Kuwait, Francois M.Dickman,106 held a discussion meeting with the Kuwaiti Foreign Ministry Under Secretary.107 Though nothing was reported about the talking points at the meeting, it was very likely that the hostage crisis was on the meeting agenda. Although Ambassador Dickman could not subsequently recall the meeting, the daily Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Watan, based on a responsible Kuwaiti source, reported Kuwait’s denial that the United States had requested Kuwait to mediate the hostage crisis.108 This report was confirmed later by the Kuwaiti Foreign Ministry, upon the visit to Iran in December 1979 of the Kuwaiti Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs.109 The Kuwaiti regime did not want to be drawn into any conflict with Iran, although the Kuwaiti regime and the Kuwaiti newspapers shared the common view that they opposed the violence used by the Iranian students to take control of the US embassy. In the last week of December 1979, two months after Ambassador Dickman’s presentation of his credentials, there was a discussion again between the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister and the US Ambassador to Kuwait; the former stressed that ‘the protection of the hostages’ lives could not be achieved by other than peaceful means’.110 The minister further suggested that Kuwait would always observe its humane duty in the crisis, particularly through bilateral contacts. There was no report that the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister offered to mediate between the American and Iranian governments. Based on Ambassador Dickman’s recollection, it seems to be the case that there were no talks on the possibility of seeking Kuwait’s mediating role in the crisis.111 Moreover, the Council on Foreign Relations book on American Hostages in Iran: The Conduct of a Crisis, which includes contributions from most former high-ranking US officials dealing with the crisis, is silent on any Kuwait’s role.112 No official explanation has been available to date, but one can speculate that the US government foresaw no leverage which the Kuwaiti regime could exercise over the Islamic regime in Teheran whether strategically, politically, economically or socially. As mentioned earlier, the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister expected the hostage crisis to be resolved in a peaceful way. Disenchantment was developed within the Kuwaiti society, in the aftermath of the abortive US military operation to rescue hostages in April 1980. Kuwaiti leaders, especially the foreign minister, were enraged by the operation, not least because of the lack of official consultations between the two governments. The Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs commented on the operation: Kuwait…views this measure as a violation of international law. It is also a violation of the line in which we believe that international disputes should be dealt with peacefully and without violence, invasion attempts or bloodshed. This measure has perhaps complicated the matter and exposed the region to conflicts which are in no side’s interest.113 The Kuwaiti press, for example, The Arab Times and Al-Qabas, put the total blame on President Carter, accusing him of building up popularity in the run-up to the presidential election in November 1980. ‘In his eagerness’, said The Kuwait Times, ‘to win plus points in the current Presidential race, Carter has made some breathtaking desperate moves’.114 While the reasons behind the failure of this mission are beyond the scope of this book, one could question the position of the Soviet Union on this operation. A

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French Foreign Ministry source was quoted by Al-Qabas as saying that once the Kremlin government came to know of the operation by accident shortly after it was launched, Soviet leaders called for its halt. Otherwise, they would intervene in favour of Iran.115 That is why President Carter, according to Al-Qabas, immediately called off the rescue mission. There is every reason to believe that the Soviet factor was incorporated into the rescue-planning process, but Gary Sick, one of the officials dealing directly with the planning, attributed the failed mission mainly to the unanticipated duststorm in the desert.116

US-Kuwaiti relations and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan If President Carter tried to recollect the most devastating year of foreign relations under his administration, the year 1979 was a clear contender. Two major crises in Iran were followed by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. The ascension to power of Barbrak Karmal, supported both politically and militarily by Moscow, took the world by surprise. His regime did not cause as much tension in South Asia as the direct military intervention of Soviet troops. The presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, a land-locked but strategically significant country in South Asia, helped to establish a triangular strategic alliance with two other Soviet-supported regimes in Baghdad and Aden, encircling the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz.117 Sharing some national attributes with Kuwait, Afghanistan is also a relatively weak state in comparison with its bigger and stronger neighbouring countries in South Asia. In addition to being Muslim countries, they were both active members of the Non-Aligned Movement, an organisation that decries any armed intervention. Based on these grounds, Kuwaiti leaders opposed the invasion and optimistically called for the total withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan. From the US side, added to the renunciation of the use of force in any intervention, was an over-whelming strategic concern. Well aware of the already close relations between the Soviet Union and the Delhi government, the United States calculated that its close ally in Islamabad would be squeezed by Moscow’s two allies. More significantly, oilfields in the Gulf region were possibly the next target in the long-term Soviet strategy. One could therefore argue that the Kuwaiti and the US governments shared a common concern over Soviet expansion in the sub-continent. The relationship still fluctuated, however. The Kuwaiti Foreign Minister, during a meeting with the Soviet ambassador to Kuwait at the request of the latter, made clear the Kuwaiti position on opposing the invasion. What should be emphasised is that Kuwait, at the time, was the only Arab Gulf state which maintained diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. The Kremlin leaders might reasonably have expected the Kuwaiti regime to be their mouthpiece in explaining the case to the five other conservative Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia. Although nothing was reported on a meeting between the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister and US ambassador at the time, US leaders, in the words of Ambassador Dickman, ‘…sought to get Kuwait to publicly condemn the Soviet action and to follow our lead in taking economic and political measures against Moscow to reflect displeasure’.118 Both Mark Katz and Ambassador Dickman argue the Kuwaiti regime relied on its pragmatic approach to handling this situation. While condemning privately the Soviet

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action, the Kuwaiti government, according to Ambassador Dickman, had no intention of straining its relations with the Kremlin. But, there is every evidence to indicate that the regime and press in Kuwait vehemently expressed their opposition to the Soviet action as a result of their own perspectives, and not US influence. Mark Katz, a leading scholar in studying the Soviet Union—Arab Gulf states relationship, has pointed out that the Kuwaiti leaders promptly disapproved of the invasion and called for an unconditional withdrawal at the Islamic Foreign Ministers’ Conference in Islamabad in January 1980. However, the Kuwaiti government chose neither to cut off its diplomatic relations with Moscow nor to boycott the 1980 Moscow Olympics Games as spearheaded by the United States.119 A further irritant to the US government was the news report in the Kuwaiti newspaper, Al-Siyasah, which, based on a European diplomatic source, contended that the United States had detected the invasion plan before the actual invasion took place.120 The newspaper said it was the US intention not to avert the invasion because it would cost the Kremlin leaders both economically and politically; for example, Soviet leaders would inevitably confront the Islamic world, a situation which would be in the interest of the US administration. Kuwaiti public opinion once again distrusted the US military role in the region and regretted the Soviet invasion as ‘…something which [would] give strong justification to others to undertake military actions in any part of the world’.121 Unconvinced by the US claim that the Soviet invasion would pose a threat to oilfields in the region, the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister regarded: the build-up of US naval forces in the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Sea and the Gulf waters as an unjustifiable action and a sign of rashness… The United States is using the pretext of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In my opinion, the question of Afghanistan has nothing to do with oil.122 Critics who disagreed with the US government’s policy of dealing with the invasion crisis could compare the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan with the Israeli refusal to withdraw from the occupied territories. US pressure for an unconditional Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan highlighted contradictions between the US government’s position on Israel’s long-standing occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The US government should, as the critics might claim, adopt the same position on both conflicts. The remark by the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister noted earlier was, in fact, a clear rebuttal of the so-called ‘Carter Doctrine’, announced in the State of the Union Address on 23 January 1980, which stated: Any attempt by any outside forces to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.123 From the Kuwaitis’ perspective, the doctrine offered no proper guarantee of enhancing the national security and political stability of their regime. Their criticism of the doctrine was based on the argument that the sole responsibility for protecting the region rested

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with the Arab Gulf states themselves. They have not asked’, remarked the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister, ‘the Americans to defend them’.124 Irritated by the US Secretary of Defense Harold Brown’s earlier statement which attributed declining US ability to protect the oilfields to the Gulf states’ policy of increasing oil prices, the Kuwaiti Defence Minister said, ‘the Gulf states did not request American protection…[T]he security of the Gulf and the protection of its oilfields and facilities are the sole concern of the Gulf states…’.125 But these criticisms failed to deter the United States from pressing ahead with the implementation of the doctrine, especially in light of the possibility that Somalia, Kenya, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Oman would participate in military operations with the United States.126 The Omani Foreign Minister, in an interview in February 1980 with the Lebanese weekly Monday Morning, revealed that US forces would get access to port and airport facilities near the Strait of Hormuz, provided that the granting of such facilities, with time limits attached, would ensure the security of the entire Gulf region and strengthen Oman’s defence capabilities.127 Based on an agreement signed on 4 June 1980, the United States enjoyed the right to improve and use facilities in at least six locations: airfields in the Omani capital of Muscat (Seeb International Airport), Masirah Island, Thumrait, and Khasab on the Musandam peninsula; and port facilities at Salalah (Port Rasyut) and Muscat (Port Qaboos).128 The report that the three conservative monarchical regimes—Oman, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia—would allow the United States access to port facilities on their territories angered Kuwaiti leaders. Kuwait’s intention of keeping the Gulf region free from the superpowers’ military confrontation appeared to be weakened even by the possibility of such deals. It also can be argued that the disunity among the Gulf states had been partly due to the Kuwaiti regime’s decision in 1963 to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, a political move with which other Gulf states completely disagreed. Worse still, the radical Kuwaiti newspaper called for a move by the Kuwaiti regime to forge closer ties with Moscow, in order to counter prevailing US influence in the region.129 In light of the crisis in Afghanistan, the Kuwaiti regime understandably attached little significance to this call. Scores of unsettled territorial disputes among the Arab Gulf states also still sowed the seeds of distrust and disunity.130 With Kuwaiti influence over the other Gulf states in the context of the base rights issue uncertain, Kuwaiti leaders regarded their decisions as neutral towards both the superpowers. But the US administration perceived the Kuwaiti position as ‘relatively isolated’. Being successful in acquiring what it needed to implement its military strategy from the other Gulf states, the US administration found it unnecessary to receive the Kuwaiti regime’s support for its strategy in the region. But Thomas McNaugher, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, argues that Kuwait, located close to the Shatt al-‘Arab estuary, should have carried strategic value in its relations with the United States.131 In his view, the US administration needed to re-consider its conventional view which merely gave attention to Kuwait on political, diplomatic and economic grounds.

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US-Kuwaiti relations and the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran war Less than two months before the US presidential election in November 1980, the Middle East experienced another major crisis, which was to last for eight years. Iraq, under the leadership of President Saddam Hussein, abrogated the 1975 Algiers Agreement on the Shatt al-‘Arab demarcation with Iran, and launched an offensive attack on Iran in September 1980. The literature on the Iraq-Iran war, popularly dubbed as the first Gulf War, in terms of its historical, legal and political contexts and its implications for regional and international stability, is voluminous.132 With the Soviet Union still entangled in Afghanistan, the Iraqi invasion was certainly opportunistic. A question has been raised as to whether Iraq, conventionally perceived as a ‘client state’ of the Soviet Union, receiving both military and economic assistance from the Kremlin, informed or consulted Soviet leaders about the invasion plan. Some studies of Soviet—Iraqi relations have revealed that Iraq’s foreign policy was not dictated by the Kremlin.133 The 1980 invasion of Iran is a case in point. The Kremlin leaders were not informed about the invasion plan, let alone consulted by the Iraqi ruling regime. None of the literature on the crisis makes any mention of US—Kuwaiti relations during the first three months of the invasion, corresponding with the last three months of the Carter presidency. Immediately after the invasion broke out, the Council of Ministers of Kuwait held a special meeting under the chairmanship of the Amir to study the development of the conflict. The meeting was so urgently held that it took place at the reception hall in Kuwait international airport after Kuwaiti leaders saw off the president of the Comoros Islands.134 The Kuwaiti regime, Abdul-Reda Assiri argues, officially declared a policy of ‘strict neutrality’,135 not least because of Kuwait’s shared value of Arabism with Iraq and its concern not to enrage the Islamic regime in Teheran. Kuwait was caught between two states with expansive ambitions in the region, including designs on Kuwaiti territory itself. According to Joseph Wright Twinam, the US government and the Kuwaiti regime both thought that the war would be short-lived,136 but in the short run, Kuwaiti armed forces were put on the fullest alert. Ambassador Dickman recalled that ‘the Kuwaitis and other Arab Gulf states thought this might be a good opportunity for their re-establishing control over the Tunbs and Abu Musa islands in the Gulf seized by the Shah’s forces in December 1971…’.137 Because of concern about an escalation of the conflict and because of the US pressure, however, this scenario failed to materialise. But two other reasons may account for this. First, the military capabilities of the Arab Gulf states, with the exception of Iraq, were no match for those of the Iranian regime. Second, any military operation against Iran would be tantamount to a ‘tacit alliance’ with the Baghdad regime, a move which would be in contrast with the so-called policy of ‘strict’ neutrality adopted by the Kuwaiti regime shortly after the outbreak of the invasion. Against the background of the development of the armed conflict between Iraq and Iran at later stages, various assistance to Iraq provided by the Gulf states, including Kuwait, seemed to compromise the Kuwaiti policy of neutrality adopted earlier. Unlike the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, both the US and Kuwaiti positions on the Iraqi invasion fell short of outright condemnation. But, as mentioned earlier, the invasion

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did not suddenly transform the US-Kuwaiti relationship into a warm and easy one, for both administrations foresaw a short-lived armed confrontation between the two rivals. Any deeper dependence on the US military assistance at the time, as the Kuwaiti government perceived, was unnecessary. What should also be noted is that, unlike the aftermath of the 1973 Kuwait-Iraq border clash, the Kuwaiti regime expressed no interest in having an American team of experts evaluate its defence capabilities. It is clear that the initial stage of the Iraqi invasion did not very much alter the general outlook for USKuwaiti relationship.

Conclusion When President Carter took office in January 1977, the political and security developments in the Arab Gulf states were already on the US list of strategic flash-points around the globe. From the American perspective, Kuwait was regarded as the region’s second most important Arab Gulf state after Saudi Arabia on the diplomatic, political and security fronts. The Carter administration maintained a willingness to improve its fluctuating relationship with the Kuwaiti leaders. Opportunities to do so, one could argue, grew out of regional and international crises—for example, the signing of the Camp David Treaty and the eruption of the Iraq-Iran war in September 1980. Conflicting views have emerged as to whether these historic events improved the bilateral relationship. The overall analysis of this chapter illustrates that Kuwaiti leaders, together with the more hostile Kuwaiti press, conceived that some Kuwaiti national interests were still in conflict with the American ones. As a consequence, Kuwait proved to be less compliant than Washington may have hoped or even expected. Obviously, the US administration failed to influence the Kuwaiti regime to follow the ways in which it handled the many crises taking place at the time. However, Carter was widely believed to have strengthened the US commitment to and strategy for the Persian Gulf region. The discussions in the next chapter suggest that the interactive process was no smoother under the Reagan presidency.

5 US-Kuwaiti relations under the Reagan administration Introduction The US President-elect Ronald Reagan would show understanding for the Arab position in the Middle East crisis… [T]he question of the Presidency was an internal matter of concern only to the American people, but we as Arabs are primarily concerned that the new US President understand our position on the question of our destiny, the question of Palestine. [W]e did not wish to attach high hopes to the possibility of a change in American policy toward Arab questions ‘because what is necessary first is that we ourselves should change before we ask the United States to change or alter its policy toward us’.1

The Kuwaiti Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad Al Sabah expressed this optimistic, and arguably realistic, statement on the occasion of Reagan’s landslide victory over President Carter in the 1980 presidential election. Yet at the time, he was neither confident nor able to predict with certainty the ways in which US-Kuwaiti relations would develop. On the contrary, the Kuwaiti News Agency displayed a rather negative outlook on the relationship by asserting that President-elect Reagan would attach much significance in his support for Israel.2 From its view, the bilateral relationship was going to be generally gloomy. But a positive development, in fact, took place in the region. Iraq and Iran, two major regional powers in the region, were bogged down in the longest conventional warfare of the century, lasting eight long years. Both being located in close proximity to Kuwait’s border, their continued armed conflict threatened Kuwait’s security and highlighted its vulnerability to the war. Although, the two major crises of 1979 were important to the US-Kuwaiti relationship, there existed one historic development under the Reagan administration which was widely believed to be a ‘mending-the-fence’ milestone in their relationship. Conditions in the region formed the driving force for the change in Kuwait’s military and security policies, paving the way for the betterment of bilateral ties. The fact that the closely intertwined phenomena of the ‘tanker war’ and the ‘reflagging policy’ were the cornerstones of the new US-Kuwaiti political and military relations is indisputable. More importantly, it was shown by the

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necessity to reflag the Kuwaiti tankers that Kuwait skilfully, and perhaps successfully, exercised influence over the US administration—the discussion of which will form a major part of this chapter. But there is no denying that other contentious issues, potentially disrupting the relationship, still remained unresolved. Therefore, the objectives of this chapter are first to examine two issues in the relationships between the two governments, prior to the implementation of the reflagging policy. Second, the research will delve into the detailed process whereby the Kuwaiti administration interacted with leaders in Washington so as to be able to secure US protection for its oil tankers, which came under frequent military attacks in the last few years of the Iran-Iraq war.

Kuwait’s challenge in refusing the US ambassador-designate Two months after his inauguration on 20 January 1981, President Reagan fell victim to an assassination attempt on his life. Wounded but not in mortal danger, he had to be hospitalised at the George Washington University Hospital. As a normal diplomatic practice, the Kuwaiti Amir sent President Reagan messages both to congratulate him on the safe escape from this tragic incident and to wish him a very speedy recovery.3 Yet in August 1983, Kuwait upset relations with the United States by refusing to accept a veteran diplomat, Brandon W.Grove, Jr, aged 54, as the prospective US Ambassador to Kuwait, appointed to succeed Francois M.Dickman who officially left the post on 8 August 1983.4 The reason offered by the Kuwaiti regime for this refusal was that Grove had served earlier as the Consul-General in Jerusalem, which the Israeli government had annexed as its capital5 in an act that caused outrage among the Arab countries. Grove in fact was not Jewish, and the US State Department dismissed the Kuwaiti claim on two grounds. First, the US government did not recognise Jerusalem as Israel’s capital; the US consulate general was separate from the US embassy in Tel Aviv. Second, the primary purpose of the Jerusalem consulate was to contact Palestinians inhabiting the Israeli-occupied West Bank.6 To the Kuwaitis, however, these arguments failed to be convincing. This stand-off, as Jill Crystal argues, reflected strong Kuwaiti support for the Palestinian cause, even to the extent that the Kuwaiti regime was braced for tension with the American government.7 At a meeting in August 1980 between the Kuwaiti Defence Minister and the US Ambassador to Kuwait, F.M.Dickman who had been appointed as an ambassador to Kuwait in September 1979, the Defence Minister sought from the US envoy a ‘clear and frank’ attitude towards Israel’s decision to annex East Jerusalem and declare the entire city as its capital.8 Kuwait’s Council of Ministers toughened its stand by announcing its readiness to boycott any country recognising Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and supported the Saudi Crown Prince’s call for a holy war to liberate the occupied land and Jerusalem.9 One year after his coming to power, President Reagan complicated the Arab—Israeli tensions by telling American Jewish leaders that ‘he preferred Jerusalem to remain united under Israeli control and opposed the establishment of a separate Palestinian state in the occupied West Bank’.10 Such a pronouncement caused anger among the Arab countries,

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for it contradicted his previous optimistic remark that the United States would call for holding Arab-Israeli negotiations on the status of Jerusalem. Kuwait’s renunciation of Ambassador-designate Grove drew strong support from the media both in Kuwait itself and in such other Arab states as Libya, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.11 Given the statement by Alan Romberg, a spokesman for the US State Department, that Kuwait’s rejection could be construed as intervention in the internal affairs of the US, Al-Rayah (The Banner), the daily newspaper in Qatar, argued the US administration failed to understand the historic significance of the holy city to the Arab people.12 Romberg was further concerned that Kuwait’s decision might set a precedent for US—Arab relations and that Israel might fall victim to a ‘diplomatic ghetto’ for the American diplomats, and become a diplomatic post in which diplomats would be loathe to serve because of possible constraints on their future diplomatic assignments.13 The whole episode infuriated Mayor Teddy Kollek of Jerusalem. Ambassador-designate Grove’s service in Jerusalem aside, if one takes into account his work experience, his nomination to Kuwait was arguably rather ill-conceived. Having no extensive background in Middle East politics, Grove was mainly involved with the German and the European affairs.14 Prior to his controversial appointment to Kuwait, he had served as a Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Latin American region. To the Kuwaiti regime, this American decision probably suggested that Kuwait was of secondtier interest in the US national interest ranking. While possibly unprepared for the Kuwaiti challenge, the US State Department chose not to retaliate by either expelling any Kuwaiti diplomat or declaring any of them persona non grata. The State Department also did not summon the Kuwaiti ambassador in Washington to receive a protest note. Perhaps as a face-saving solution, the Kuwaiti government indicated its regrets at its decision one day after the rejection announcement, but remained firm in its stand.15 The State Department’s decision to appoint Philip J.Griffin as Charge d’Affaires ad interim from August 1983 to September 1984, when Anthony Cecil Eden Quainton became the new official US Ambassador, seemed to be well-calculated.16 The ambassadorship in Kuwait remained vacant for almost one year. Whether the US faced a difficulty in selecting the proper candidate to replace Grove is unclear, a point which both F.M.Dickman and Quainton avoided mentioning, let alone discussing.17 Quainton merely recalled the US administration being unhappy with the Kuwaiti decision, which ‘the US administration did try to persuade the Kuwaiti regime to change, but it was unsuccessful’.18 Under these circumstances, the United States, as a bigger and stronger state, apparently failed to influence Kuwaiti leaders to reverse their decision. In order to retaliate with an implicit diplomatic protest, it is likely that the US administration purposefully left the ambassadorial post vacant for a period of time. An immediate replacement nomination would perhaps have been interpreted as US acquiescence in the Kuwaiti position—a scenario which the US leaders found too politically costly to allow to take place. The fact that Quainton was also formerly Head of the State Department’s Office for Combating Terrorism, before taking up his post in Managua City, is intriguing. One can speculate that his position made him well-placed to co-operate with the Kuwaiti regime in combating terrorism. There is no doubt that the Kuwaiti regime has the full sovereign right to reject an ambassador-designate from any country. In this case, however, the refusal was

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noteworthy for two major reasons. First, the snub was to the ambassador of a bigger and stronger power, which obviously renders immense support for one of the Kuwaiti regime’s main antagonists—Israel. Second, the Kuwaiti regime, well-known for implementing a pragmatic and independent foreign policy, took the leading role in opposing the Reagan administration’s support for the annexation of Jerusalem by the Israeli government. As mentioned earlier, the regime’s decision received a strong support from the other Arab countries. While the State Department tried to play down the intensity of this episode, its spokesman acknowledged that Kuwait’s decision might constitute a precedent for the other Arab countries. It may thus be said that, with the fear that such a precedent would be set constituting a kind of sanction, Kuwait tried to exercise ‘assertive influence’ over the US administration. What should be noted at this stage is that although the Kuwaiti regime tried to exert this kind of influence, it did not intend to break off its relations with the US government, and in the event the influence attempt proved unsuccessful.

The controversy over the Kuwaiti request to purchase Stinger missiles Once the Iran-Iraq war broke out in September 1980, most countries on which the war had a direct or indirect impact did not foresee a prolonged confrontation. With military stalemate on land and the failure of the diplomatic efforts carried out by the UN, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), and special envoys to bring the conflict to an end, it degenerated into the so-called ‘tanker war’, first launched by Iraq. It was widely believed that the Baghdad regime launched the tanker war with two main objectives in mind. First, it tried to provoke Iran to close the Straits of Hormuz, an act which would be resisted by the West due to the disruption of oil flows. Second, Iraqi leaders and strategists aimed to limit Iran’s oil exports and, as a result, cripple its ability to bear the financial costs of the war. Iranian oil tankers, plying to and from Iranian oilproducing ports, thus came under attack from superior Iraqi air forces in the hope of further crippling the already-sluggish oil economy of Iran. Already disenchanted with the political and the financial support the Iraqi regime was receiving from the Arab Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, Iranian leaders took retaliatory measures against not only the targets in Iraq, but also the oil tankers belonging to the Arab Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. These attacks began on a frequent basis in spring 1984. As both countries’ air forces were no match for Iranian air prowess,19 advanced USmanufactured airborne missiles were urgently sought, the most desired of which was short-range shoulder-fired Stinger missiles. In January 1984, the Defense Department deployed Stinger anti-aircraft missiles on US Navy ships patrolling off the coast of the Arabian Sea—a move to forestall the Iranian threat to carry out attacks by bomb-laden jets, light planes or helicopters.20 During his trip to the United States in April 1984, the Kuwaiti Defence Minister stressed that Kuwait, as a small country, must acquire weapons that were fast and efficient enough to target hostile missiles and planes. According to Saudi calculations, the missiles were tactically essential for the safety of their tankers. Two days after a Saudi oil tanker was attacked by the Iranian air force in

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mid-May 1984, the Saudi Ambassador to the United States, Bandar Bin Sultan, met with the US Secretary of State George P.Shultz, leading to the US commitment to assist Saudi Arabia if a major crisis took place.21 Having argued that an Iranian attack was a threat to oil flows in the Gulf, President Reagan approved the delivery to Saudi Arabia of wideranging military supplies, which included 400 Stinger missiles, 200 launchers, extra fuel tanks for its F15 fighters, and 1,000 sophisticated A9L air-to-air missiles.22 President Reagan exercised his power by waiving Congress’ prerogative of consideration and approval,23 a decision defended during hearings before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs by Richard W.Murphy, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, and Maj. Gen. Edward L.Tixier, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.24 These hearings resulted from the investigation launched by the House Speaker Thomas P.O’Neill, Jr, into whether President Reagan properly used his emergency powers in concluding the sales to Saudi Arabia without the approval of Congress.25 Once the Saudi government was successful in securing the delivery of Stinger missiles, the Kuwaiti regime tried to follow suit. The Defence Minister visited Washington, DC at the end of May 1984 and negotiated the purchase of Stinger missiles to enable Kuwait to defend itself against Iranian air attacks.26 What perhaps stimulated this trip was the response of the US defence officer at the American embassy in Kuwait, who said that the Kuwaiti government needed ‘to formalise this request before any action can be taken’.27 This fell in the period when no American ambassador was in place. Based on the Defence Minister’s claim that the US government had agreed in principle to sell these missiles to Kuwait,28 the political temperature was somewhat warm. During his visit to the United States in April 1984, he had discussed with the US Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, Congress’s position, if any, on the sale. But the US refusal to sell the missiles produced disappointment for the Kuwaiti administration. The US government stated that ‘the request will not be granted under present circumstances’.29 Moreover, the United States had no intention of selling the missiles to any other countries in the Gulf region as well.30 The request by the Kuwaiti government was arguably untimely. Although the arms deal with Saudi Arabia had been successfully concluded, the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East still held hearings on this case on 11 June 1984. The US administration appeared to calculate that it was better not to confront Congress again with the Kuwaiti request. In the hearing, Assistant Secretary Murphy testified: we had a formal request from Kuwait to buy it [Stinger]. That request is under study, remains under study. We are looking at a variety of ways in which we could be helpful to Kuwait in strengthening its defenses. It is vulnerable.31 Speculating that Congress would be alienated once the executive emergency power was exercised again, this time for Kuwait, the administration clearly became less committed to the needs of the Kuwaitis than to those of the Saudis. The administration shrewdly attributed its hesitancy to conclude a Kuwaiti deal to political opposition to the sale. It

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was not in the interests of either the United States or Kuwait to be involved in a political dispute over the missiles at the time. Leading members of the Subcommittee raised concern over the likelihood of the missiles being in the possession of the Palestinian community inhabiting and working in Kuwait,32 a community which might, as the Congressmen observed, be linked with the radical Palestinian terrorists tempted to use missiles against civilian aircraft. Asked how to safeguard the missiles, Assistant Secretary Murphy failed to provide convincing answers due to the classified details of the security measures.33 Those missiles already sold to Saudi Arabia, Murphy assured, were put under a ‘stringent security scheme’.34 Concern over ‘terrorists’ taking control of the Stinger missiles and threatening Israel’s security was also raised by the Israeli Defence Minister, Moshe Arens, in a meeting with Weinberger, shortly after the conclusion of the Saudi deal.35 The Stingers will be wellguarded’, Weinberger said, ‘and if the threat of terrorism prevents us from sending help, their terrorism has succeeded’.36 This response and the subsequent sale to Saudi Arabia, of course, provoked displeasure in the Likud-led Israeli government. Another sale contract—with Kuwait, widely known as a strong advocate of the Palestinian cause— would inevitably worsen the relationship between Washington, DC and Tel Aviv. As a less convincing reason for the decision not to sell Kuwait arms at that particular moment, the US officials said there was only a limited amount of Stingers available for sale to foreign countries. Once the missiles were despatched to Saudi Arabia, it would be about thirty months before the United States could have more Stingers to sell.37 The Kuwaiti need to have Stinger missiles in service was not fulfilled. To bring about a change in the US decision, the Kuwaiti Ambassador to the United States, Shaykh Sa’ad Nasir Al Sabah, conferred with the Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Michael Armacost, to discuss both the bilateral and the regional issues. At the top of the agenda was, of course, the issue of Stinger missiles. The Kuwaiti ambassador revealed that the US administration had dismissed as groundless, news reports which said the United States had given up on Kuwait.38 The Kuwaiti Foreign Minister’s attempt to appeal to Congress also proved unsuccessful. He told Western correspondents invited to attend a televised press conference held in Kuwait city: We don’t want the Stingers to declare war, only for self-defense. I hope there will be no objections in the US Congress. Some people think we want the Stingers in order to fight Israel, but we want them only in selfdefense.39 Kuwait’s UN representative, Muhammad Abu al-Hasan, observed that the American statement on of not having enough missiles in stock was a mere excuse. ‘Even if the weapon is available’, he said, ‘the Zionist lobby in Congress is strong, and the US administration does not wish to open the door of criticism against it’.40 A meeting between the Kuwaiti ambassador and a high-ranking official at the State Department produced no favourable results for the Kuwaiti government. In order to put as positive a light on the matter as possible, the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister tried to claim there had been close co-operation in air defence between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, involving the exchange of military information through a hot-line,

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with the support of the US military technology. He perhaps wanted to convey the impression that because of already established military relations with the United States, the Kuwaiti regime should be regarded as trustworthy enough to receive Stingers missiles from the United States. This approach reflected the urgency of the Kuwaiti perception that it needed Stingers to defend its oil tankers. Aware of the adverse implications for the bilateral relationship of an American refusal, John Huges, the spokesman for the State Department, emphasised: ‘although we don’t contemplate a sale at this time of the Stingers, no final decision has been made’.41 The US administration proposed alternative defence programmes to strengthen Kuwait’s defence needs. One of them was aimed at improving the maintenance and coverage of the battalion of Improved Hawk (I-Hawk) and Soviet SAM-8 missiles that Kuwait already possessed.42 This $82-million programme involved provision of a periodic product improvement package, spare parts and updated publications.43 In fact, the Kuwaiti Defence Minister had turned down the US offer to sell Hawk anti-aircraft missiles in August 1981.44 The Pentagon now made attempts to convince the Kuwaitis that the lowto-medium range I-Hawk surface-to-air missiles were much more effective than Stingers in countering fast-flying military aircraft. The other option was to expand the area operations of the US AWACS to cover not only the territorial waters and airspace of Saudi Arabia but also those of Kuwait.45 In order to avoid enraging Congress again, the Reagan administration referred the new defence arrangement for Kuwait to Capitol Hill46—no doubt also because it faced no objection. What should be noted is that shortly after the Kuwaiti government lodged its request, the Congressional Research Service47 issued a report on the deficiencies of the Stinger missiles. Three major drawbacks of the missiles were pointed out.48 First, the missiles, never put on trial in the battlefield, were unable to prevent weapons launched by aircraft flying at significant distances from hitting their target. Second, being shoulder-fired missiles like bazookas, the missiles were designed to travel about three miles, having, in effect, a shorter effective range in combat. Third, Steven R.Bowman, a leading researcher, argued that the Stingers did not significantly bolster the Saudis’ defence. In a fight against high-speed aircraft, the missile operator had to locate, target and launch the missile within a very short period of time. More importantly, the research report stated that the missiles were not designed to provide the air defence of key installations or intended for use at sea.49 One can argue a by-product of this research report was to soothe Kuwait’s disappointment at the US refusal; in effect, the Kuwaitis could comfort themselves by knowing that the Stingers were of no use for their defence. However, two leading experts on the Gulf region, Mark Katz and Abdul-Reda Assiri, and the prominent Congressman Stephen Solarz made a strong case for the US government to supply Kuwait with Stinger missiles. Katz, then a guest scholar at the Brookings Institution, succinctly argued: What the Arab Gulf states want is for the United States to take actions that the states think is appropriate for their defense and not to publicly advise them what Washington thinks is necessary. America’s willingness to send troops to these countries when they do not want them, while it refuses to sell Stingers to Kuwait when it requests them, serves only to confirm Arab

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suspicions that the United States is less interested in defending them than in controlling both them and their oil.50 Katz and Solarz shared the common argument, which was favourable to the Kuwaiti request, that both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait experienced the same kind of threat from Iran, but Saudi Arabia had received a more special treatment from the US government than Kuwait. Solarz asked Murphy the following question during the hearing: Can you please tell me, given the extent to which the Iranians are clearly posing a threat not only to the Saudi, but also to the Kuwaiti, oil facilities, and to shipping headed to and from Saudi Arabia as well as… Kuwait, on what basis we decided to agree to the Saudi request, but have not yet made a decision with respect to the Kuwaiti request?… Why would the Stinger be an essential element of our response to the threat posed to Saudi Arabia by Iran but not to the threat posed to Kuwait?51 Assiri argued that with the Kuwaiti regime’s intention to purchase the missiles, it would be a good chance for upgrading the military relationship between the two countries, but the US administration failed to develop the opportunity. A request to buy and the appeal to Congress clearly indicated that Kuwait no longer observed its own equi-distance foreign policy towards both the superpowers.52 With Kuwait displaying elements of both ‘hostility and admiration’, Assiri further pointed out that the political pendulum might swing to a higher level of admiration for the United States with the conclusion of a deal on the missiles.53 His remark seemed optimistic: People are beginning to change their view of the United States for selfinterest and national interest. They realize the United States is the only country that can safeguard the existence of the state. There is now a consensus that Kuwait should at least try to get along better with America.54 If the arms deal had been approved by the US government, Robert O.Freedman believes that it would have constituted a major turning point in the US—Kuwaiti relationship.55 Once the US administration was not responsive to the Kuwaiti request, however, arms produced and supplied by the Soviet Union were another option available at the time. The Kuwaiti Defence Minister visited Moscow on 9 July 1984 and met with the Soviet Defence Minister Dmitri Ustinov with the clear objective of acquiring arms to protect Kuwaiti tankers and oil installation plants from Iranian attacks.56 It was reported that the Kuwaiti Defence Minister also visited air facilities and naval facilities at Simferopol and Sevastapol.57 Worth $327 million, the arms deal with the Soviet Union included surfaceto-air and surface-to-surface missiles, tanks, excluding SAM-7 anti-aircraft missiles, and MIG jet fighters.58 Announced in Moscow as a commercial deal and officially signed in August in 1984, this arms package, according to the Kuwaiti Defence Minister, involved no political agenda and offered no military facilities for the Russians in Kuwait.59 It was not a new policy, the minister claimed, but merely a result of previous negotiations;60 it

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was clearly an attempt to deny that the turn to the Soviet Union was the direct result of the United States refusal to sell Stingers to Kuwait.61 Indeed, this arms deal caused no surprise, for Kuwait’s Defence Ministry had long diversified the sources of its arms acquisition.62 This was not the first time that Kuwait took delivery of Soviet arms. There was no concrete guarantee, as William A.Stoltzfus argued, that Kuwait would have refrained from purchasing Soviet weapons even if the US administration had supplied the Stinger missiles as requested.63 Similarly, Joseph Wright Twinam, Quainton and Robert McFarlane, the National Security Adviser at the time, all downplayed the significance of the Kuwait-Soviet arms deal. They disagreed with the proposition that the Kuwaiti regime’s motive for concluding an arms deal with the Soviet Union was to influence the US government and Congress to reverse the decision taken earlier.64 However, Alan D.Romberg, the spokesman for the State Department, expressed the Reagan administration’s concern over consequences of the arms deal. It was feared that the delivery of Soviet weapons to Kuwait on such a scale might make the Kuwaiti regime become militarily closer to the Kremlin. Worse than that, news reports on the presence of Soviet military personnel in Kuwait—the first of its kind, for training Kuwaiti military officers on how to operate the weapons—raised fears that Soviet technicians might acquire access to US weapons technology.65 Romberg also revealed the US administration’s plan to press ahead with a military agreement with Kuwait, involving, for instance, the improvement of Kuwait’s air defence capability with I-Hawk antiaircraft missiles. An English-language pilot training scheme for 150 airforce officers was carried out in the United States at an estimated cost of $78 million.66 Also proposed by the Pentagon was an interim programme of command and control procedural improvements, an aerial network modernisation and the sale of tethered balloon radars for low-altitude early warning normally used by the US Coast Guard (USCG).67 US concern over Kuwait’s military reliance on the Soviet Union, however, seemed overdeveloped, for the French government also concluded an arms deal worth $650 million with the Kuwaiti regime. The French agreed to supply an additional 13 Mirage F1 fighters as part of the deal,68 with the first of the fighters to arrive in Kuwait in December 1984. Based on the discussions noted earlier, it is obvious that Kuwait, a much smaller state than Saudi Arabia, was in no position to make the US administration act according to its wishes. Both administrations calculated the costs and benefits of taking decisions. With their decision to purchase Stinger missiles from the United States, the Kuwaitis foresaw an inevitably strengthened air defence network necessary for the security of the country and its oil economy. The Kuwaiti regime may have attempted to exercise co-operative influence over the US government by persuading leaders in Washington that the protection of its oil tankers with Stinger missiles would also bring benefits to the US economy. An uninterrupted flow of oil from Kuwait to the world market would also strengthen the US economy, given the huge investment by Kuwait in the American market. The cost to this option was the likely presumption within the Kuwaiti political circles that Kuwait was becoming too close militarily to the United States. To the Kuwaiti regime, the immediate and overriding need at the time was to protect its oil tankers from Iranian attacks. After the United States turned down the Kuwaiti regime’s request, Kuwaiti leaders hoped that its negotiations with the Soviet Union

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would change the American position. This ‘threat’ of a deal with the Soviet Union constituted a kind of sanction, and it may thus be said that Kuwait attempted to exercise ‘assertive influence’ over the United States. However, the United States was not moved, just as it was not persuaded by the economic benefits to be derived from the arms sale— what may be termed a matter of ‘co-operative influence’. The US administration and Congress, therefore, did not fall under either the assertive or co-operative influence of the Kuwaiti regime. The Kuwaiti administration had to take into account by then that in order to obtain what it wanted from the United States, it had to exercise influence over both the White House and Capitol Hill. On some occasions, these two institutions maintained the same position. But it was also the case that they disagreed with each other—in the process one coming under the Kuwaiti regime’s influence while the other stayed free of Kuwait’s leverage. From the White House’s perspective, the sale of the Stinger missiles to such a lucrative market as Kuwait would have provided two undeniable benefits—financial revenue accrued from the arms sales programme and the image of being a guarantor for the Gulf states. But the simmering stand-off between the US administration and Congress, normally under pressure from the Israeli lobbyists, over the sale of the Stinger missiles to Saudi Arabia forced the US government to reconsider the Kuwaiti request. The timing of the request was clearly unfortunate, but the American response may well reflect an implicit understanding that, when all was considered, Kuwait was still a derivative interest. The US administration was not prepared to risk alienating Congress again even though it would result in the Kuwaiti regime’s dissatisfaction. What the Kuwaitis needed was less important than the risks the administration confronted on Capitol Hill. The US reflagging policy69 if Kuwait is attacked then it will be ready to defend its borders, but I did not expect this to happen, because of its good relations with both Iran and Iraq.70 This remark, made by the Kuwaiti Defence Minister during his three-day visit to Washington, DC in April 1984, illustrated Kuwait’s defence miscalculation because the Iranian regime considered Kuwait as one of Iraq’s main allies against which retaliatory measures should be launched. Not only were Kuwaiti ports used for unloading and transferring contraband arms to Iraqi troops, but a portion of Kuwait’s oil revenues was also earmarked for supporting the Iraqi war effort. The situation became more tense due to the outbreak of the tanker war. The increase in the number of merchant ships attacks by both belligerents caused alarm over safe and free passage through international waterways. With only five merchant ships wrecked in 1980, the figures soared from 71 vessels in 1984 to 111 vessels in 1986.71 Among 187 vessels damaged by the attacks in 1987, 11 were owned and flagged by Kuwait, 14 by Saudi Arabia, 3 by Qatar and 1 by the United Arab Emirates. New tactics and technologies allowed the Iranians to carry out these sortie attacks at night.72

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Kuwait turned to GCC73 for supportive defence against Iranian attacks. This was in contrast with its initial view of the GCC as a forum for mainly economic co-operation. In the Kuwaiti leaders’ viewpoint at the time, the GCC should be able to provide some security networks, either actual or symbolic, in the form of a deterrent force. At the seventh GCC summit meeting in Abu Dhabi on 3–5 November 1986, Kuwait put forward three proposals: (a) to station a unit of the GCC joint defensive forces, preferably the Peninsula Shield, on Bubiyan Island; (b) to provide measures for freedom of navigation to the Kuwaiti oil and merchant fleets through the Gulf’s international waterways; and (c) to include Kuwait in the AWACS’ surveillance parameters on a permanent basis, thereby enabling Kuwait to obtain advance notice of possible Iranian attacks.74 Quite unexpectedly, the GCC members turned down Kuwait’s request, leaving it limited options for handling the situation. As Assiri observes, Kuwait was then in a state of helplessness and frustration.75 The GCC members, especially Oman and the United Arab Emirates, calculated that the political and commercial benefits of not confronting Iran were paramount. The Kuwaiti government decided in November 1986 to ask the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council for protection of its 22strong oil tanker fleet. The fact that the Kuwaiti regime sought outside powers to protect its oil company was in contrast with its previous official position announced in 1984. Acting Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Khalid Ja’far, explained to a daily newspaper, Al-Qabas, that ‘it is not possible for Kuwait to request the protection or help of America or any other country’.76 Two weeks after that, the Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Husayn, reiterated that ‘Kuwait had no knowledge of any American measures to protect Kuwait oil tankers in the Arab Gulf and that all we know is the United States is protecting only its own tankers’.77 Since then, the deteriorating situation of the tanker war forced the Kuwaiti regime to amend its official position, as hinted by the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister’s statement made in New York in October 1985. The statement read: If Iran continues its provocative acts and attempts to drag the Gulf countries into the war, this will result in intervention by foreign powers in the region under the pretext of protecting their interests.78 Whether Kuwaiti leaders already intended at the time to put their oil tankers under the protection of foreign powers is difficult to confirm. But what they perhaps calculated was that internationalisation of the war seemed inevitable. From the statement, it is clear that Iran was likely to be regarded as the prime culprit in the prolongation of the tanker war. Most analyses which discuss US reflagging policy, except for that by Elizabeth Gamlen, tend to understate the fact that it was the Baghdad regime which was the root cause of the whole episode, especially the launching of an air-borne tanker war.79 One can, therefore, argue that the Baghdad regime enjoyed success in shifting international attention from the so-called ‘invader’ (itself) to Iran, widely perceived as a ‘recalcitrant aggressor’. In the context of bilateral US-Kuwaiti relations, one can question whether Kuwait was able to secure what it desired out of the US reflagging policy. The views on whether the US administration was under the influence of the Kuwaiti regime seem far from united. Strongly opposed to the view that influence occurred are, for example, Quainton, Assiri

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and Barbara Bodine, while those who detect Kuwaiti influence include R.K.Ramazani, Malcom C.Peck, Robert O.Freedman and John Duke Anthony.80 As far as the reasons for Kuwait’s decision to draw on foreign powers are concerned, the Kuwaiti Ambassador to the United States, Shaykh Sa’ud Nasir Al Sabah, in an interview with the Washington Post, asserted: Our whole economy is based on this [export of oil]. If we can’t pass through the Gulf, our economy suffers and the economies of countries to which the oil is going to suffer. We have to guarantee freedom of passage throughout the Gulf… Maybe from a commercial side, it’s to our advantage. Our main concern is to get our oil to our partners.81 He argued that any attempt to carry out the objective was merely a commercial deal. The Kuwaiti Prime Minister and Crown Prince also defended Kuwait’s decision to put its oil tankers under foreign powers’ protection as ‘a purely commercial operation, aimed at insuring the continued transportation of Kuwaiti oil to its markets and Kuwait’s fulfilment of its contractual commitments’.82 But, it was clear there was a strategic element behind the objective. Critics tend to argue that Kuwait’s main purpose in drawing foreign powers into the war was to internationalise the situation so that they might be in a position to help bring the war to an end. Kuwait’s tactics, as Assiri asserts, were derived from the assumption that the safety of commerce in the Gulf was part of the superpowers’ responsibilities for the safety and security of the globe.83 The safety of the oil trade could be ensured by the superpowers’ deterrence of Iranian attack. In line with Assiri’s argument, Gamlen shrewdly points out that ‘Kuwait’s prime concern over the safety of its exports relies heavily on non-Kuwaiti flagged vessels for transporting its exports’.84 At a hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs on 11 June 1987, Ted Weiss, a member of the committee from New York, referred to Senator Sasser’s interview on his recent trip to Kuwait. He held discussions with the Kuwaiti government officers who shared the view that ‘the Kuwaitis asked both increased Soviet and American involvement because they have the belief that if the two superpowers get involved there they will then be drawn in sufficiently to play a more active role in ending hostilities’.85 This weakened the Kuwaiti ambassador’s assertion that the war was not internationalised by a Kuwaiti request for the involvement of foreign powers.86 In considering whether Kuwait exercised any influence on this occasion, the timing of the original approach by the Kuwaiti side should be taken into account. Ambassador Quainton admitted that the exact timing of the Kuwaiti approach to the superpowers was difficult to establish. Different sources of information provide different evidences. Based on a report prepared by members of the Senate staff who travelled to Iraq, the Arab Gulf states and the Soviet Union, George W.Ashworth and Gerald E.Connolly referred to the Kuwait Oil Tanker Company (KOTC) version of events, stating that: Kuwait simultaneously approached both the US and the USSR in September 1986 seeking the protection of their flags. The US response was…positive in principle but only if Kuwait could qualify under stringent codes and regulations for such a procedure…

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In contrast to the US response, the Soviet reaction to Kuwait’s initiative was swift: an offer of full cooperation.87 (emphasis added) But other US official documents seem to show that while the Soviet Union was first approached by Kuwait in mid-November 1986,88 KOTC informally requested from the USCG information on US flagging requirements on 10 December 1986.89 Confirming this source were the testimonies of Richard W.Murphy, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, and Michael H. Armacost, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East.90 Two weeks later, KOTC informed the US embassy of its interest in reflagging. By early January 1987, KOTC received reflagging information from USCG; in the meantime, the US government realised that the Kuwaiti government had received a similar offer from the Soviet Union.91 Another piece of evidence proving that Kuwait approached the Soviet Union before the United States lies in Weinberger’s memoir, Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years at the Pentagon: ‘They [the Kuwaitis] came to us with their request only after making an approach to the Soviets… In fact, I knew that Kuwait had gone to the Soviets first, and they knew we knew’.92 Two reasons, according to Weinberger, account for the Kuwaiti government’s first approach to the Soviet Union. First, the Kuwaitis recognised that the Soviets would not have to undertake much consultation before giving an answer; the decision-making body in Moscow would render prompt attention to their request. Second, the Kuwaitis were assured that their request would not arouse much publicity in the Soviet press.93 This Kuwaiti move caused further disenchantment among the other GCC states, which remained dissatisfied with Kuwait’s unilateral move to persuade the superpowers without any prior consultation with them. If compelled to make a choice between the Soviet Union and the United States, the other GCC states preferred that Kuwait approach the United States first,94 even though Oman and the United Arab Emirates still considered good relations with Teheran as in their national interest.95 In a hearing on 11 June 1987, Dan Burton, a Congressman from Indiana, addressed to Secretary Armacost a question as to why the Kuwaitis first approached the Soviets. Armacost obliquely speculated that the Kuwaitis might have been embarrassed to come to the United States first; left unsaid was that it was already known at the time that the US had clandestinely supplied weapons to Iran, a principal threat to Kuwait.96 Weinberger himself, however, provided a conflicting account of the chronology. There is evidence that he told Senator Jim Leach from Iowa, during a testimony on 10 June 1987, that the Kuwaitis approached the United States first.97 But John Bulloch and Harvey Morris in their book, The Gulf War, argue that after the Kuwaitis were advised about legal considerations relating to the reflagging request, they ‘smiled politely, said little, and began talking to the Russians…’.98 The argument as to who was asked first remains unresolved, but a crucial point in common is that Kuwait succeeded in drawing both superpowers into the reflagging scheme. On 29 January 1987, the US government, through its embassy in Kuwait, informed the Kuwaiti government that Kuwait could reflag/charter its tankers if requirements were met. The initial US response, as Weinberger argues, was rather weak.99 Telling the Kuwaitis that reflagging would take at least six months under US law and that the United States had few ships able to take part in the operation had encouraged the Kuwaiti leaders

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to seek Soviet protection. It led to a Kuwaiti decision to have six of its tankers under the protection of American convoys and the American flag; the five other tankers were protected by the Soviet flag. Quainton reported this decision to Sandra Charles, Director of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs at the Department of Defense, and to Commander Skip Miner, the Persian Gulf desk officer in Washington, DC in early March 1987.100 These officers shared the same position as Weinberger on the necessity of reflagging all Kuwaiti tankers, a talking issue which Weinberger took up with other cabinet members. While Frank Carlucci, the National Security Adviser, gave strong support to Weinberger’s proposal, Shultz initially expressed his disagreement, but later capitulated to Weinberger’s position.101 Therefore, in response to Kuwait’s requests, Reagan proposed: 1 to expedite procedures for the registry of eleven Kuwaiti oil tankers under the American flag; and 2 to provide appropriate protection by US military forces (principally US Navy ships) to the eleven reflagged Kuwaiti oil tankers while operating in the Persian Gulf region and transiting the Straits of Hormuz.102 The Kuwaiti government was officially notified about these proposals on 7 March 1987, to which it formally responded on 2 April.103 To justify the decision, the Reagan administration announced its official rationale, as presented by Armacost: 1 to help Kuwait counter immediate intimidation and thereby discourage Iran from similar attempts against the other moderate Gulf states; and 2 to limit, to the extent possible, an increase in Soviet military presence and influence in the Gulf.104 Later, Reagan commented in a television interview on the US military presence in the Gulf as a means ‘to protect neutral nations’ shipping in the international waters that under international law are supposed to be open to all traffic’.105 This became one of the widely used public rationales for the policy. A second rationale was the need to protect sea lanes for oil supplies from being dictated or controlled by Iran and the Soviet Union. Third, the Iranian decision to deploy medium-range Silkworm missiles, supplied by the PRC, in the Persian Gulf coast town of Bandar Abbas, posed a major threat to oil tankers which plied up and down through the Straits of Hormuz. The fact that these tactical missiles carried a lethal payload and maintained a long range of operation led to a necessity for the United States to provide military protection. These rationales aside, it was widely believed that other political issues conditioned the US decision to reflag the Kuwaiti oil tankers. First, the disclosure in November 1986 of Irangate, a secret arms deal in which the United States allegedly sold arms to Iran, shattered US credibility in the eyes of the Arab Gulf states. Suspicions were raised of a secret US-Iranian bilateral dialogue, leading to the release of US hostages held captive by the pro-Iranian Hizbollah group in Lebanon. Once discredited by its inability to protect the Shah of Iran from the Islamic revolution in 1979, the US administration could not afford now to inspire doubts about its ability to defend its Arab Gulf allies.106 Second, as Gamlen argues, an Iranian victory over Iraq would not be acceptable to the United States, not least because an allegedly contagious Islamic fundamentalism would spread to Iraq and the conservative countries of the Gulf region. A possible disintegration of Iraq,

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breaking up into a Shi’ite-held autonomous enclave in the south and a Kurdish-controlled sanctuary in the north, would tip the overall balance of power in the Gulf. Having decided to reflag Kuwaiti oil tankers, the US deterrence against Iranian attacks was put to the test. Most US officials and experts on the Persian Gulf region seemed to share the common view that the most decisive factor for the US administration in taking a decision to reflag was the Kuwaiti request to the Soviets. Armacost, in testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee on 11 June 1987, stated: a decision was provoked because, despite the fact that oil is still getting through, prices are not rising[;] the Kuwaitis were proposing arrangements that would have ceded a large protective role over that oil to the Soviet Union. Our decision was promoted by that consideration and a desire to limit and curtail…a Soviet protective role in the Gulf, which brings into question over the longer term how effective we can be in protecting these other interests in navigation and the free flow of oil.107 Asked by Senator Steven D.Symms from Idaho, how much of the oil transported by the Kuwaiti tankers reflagged by the United States would come back to it, Armacost answered that the oil carried by US-reflagged Kuwaiti tankers would be destined for Japan and Western Europe.108 Armacost reiterated that the United States’ real concern was fear over the Soviets’ and the Iranians’ control of the west side of the Persian Gulf.109 The US reflagging plan was ‘based first on inhibiting Soviet expansion into the Gulf and meddling in Gulf states’ politics, and perhaps only secondarily on improving relations with the Kuwaitis and other moderate Gulf states’.110 A necessity for the United States to curtail the Soviet presence in the Gulf region was also affirmed in Weinberger’s response to Senator Robert J.Lagomarsino’s criticism of the reflagging policy: ‘I think it would be not only an extremely damaging confession and admission to the world that we were unable to do the things we ought to do and could do, but it would also be a magnetic attraction to the Soviets to come in and fill that vacuum’.111 Another indication of the US attempt to deprive the Soviet Union of any role in this operation was the fact that when the US administration learnt of the Kuwaitis’ decision in early March 1987 to have their 6 and 5 oil tankers reflagged by the United States and the Soviet Union respectively, the United States immediately offered to reflag all 11 oil tankers.112 The assertion of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Richard L.Armitage, that the United States acted to circumvent Soviet influence in the region was challenged by Senator John W. Warner’s observation that the cultural and historical differences between the Soviet Union and countries in the Gulf formed a stumbling block to the Soviet Union’s inroads into the region.113 But an invitation to intervene was another matter. Armitage deliberately avoided responding to Senator Warner’s question as to whether the US government could do anything to contain the Soviet Union in light of Kuwait’s invitation to the Soviets to reflag its tankers.114 The reason for the avoidance might be that Armitage fully realised the political

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embarrassment that would follow if a superpower like the United States was unable to control or influence a small state like Kuwait. Ursula Braun, Crystal, Assiri and George Lenczowski subscribe to the view that the US administration acted to forestall a Soviet presence in the Gulf region.115 As mentioned earlier, the initial US response to the Kuwaiti approach was, in principle, positive, but the USCG and the Maritime Administration expected the Kuwaitis to comply with US federal regulations on reflagging other countries’ tankers.116 Once the Coast Guard Marine Inspection Office (MIO) in New York had received Applications for Inspection for 11 vessels owned by KOTC, the inspections process was scheduled at various places in Europe and the Middle East—for example, Copenhagen, Priolo in Sicily, Rotterdam, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. This inspection process was required to verify that a vessel: a is of a structure suitable for the service in which it is to be employed; b is equipped with the proper appliances for lifesaving, fire prevention and fire-fighting; c has suitable accommodations for the crew; d is in a condition to be operated with safety to life and property; and e complies with applicable marine safety laws and regulations.117 After that, the Coast Guard MIO in Philadelphia processed the registration of the vessels under the US flag. Upon the completion of these steps, a Certificate of Inspection (COI) and documentation were issued with the concurrence of the Department of Defense and Department of State.118 Other legal issues, with which KOTC had to comply, were those of ownership and manning requirements. According to US laws, US ownership is a prerequisite for documentation. Under this circumstance, the ownership of the eleven vessels was transferred, prior to the registration under the US flag, to Chesapeake Shipping Incorporation in Dover, Delaware.119 This company was qualified as a US citizen because the chairman of its four-member board of directors was C.Miles Sheldon, an American national.120 Of the 4 members of the board of directors, 3 members were US citizens, thus constituting a majority of voting power by US citizens as required by the US laws.121 As for the manning requirements, it was made known to the Kuwaitis that all eleven Kuwaiti tankers would have US masters.122 Moreover, any vessel leaving a US port must have American officers and 75 per cent of the crew US citizens. What is noteworthy is that the Department of Defense sought a National Defense Waiver to allow the vessels one year to comply fully with the US Coast Guard Navigation and Inspection Laws and Regulations.123 In memorandum no. 16710 of 15 July 1987 by Admiral P.A.Yost, Commandant, USCG, to the Secretary of Transportation, it was reasoned that both the Department of State and Department of Defense had made it clear that ‘these vessels should be reflagged as soon as possible’.124 With this National Defense Waiver in effect from 29 May 1987, the memorandum acknowledged the vessels’ compliance with international treaties on vessel safety and the completion of an initial inspection by the Coast Guard.125 All eleven vessels were renamed before the actual reflagging operations started.126 A Memorandum of Agreement between KOTC and the USCG was signed on 21 May 1987 by Captain J.C.Card, US Coast Guard Chief, Merchant Vessel Inspection and Documentation Division, and by Tim Stafford, Manager Fleet Development on behalf of

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KOTC on 2 June.127 Together with this agreement, Reagan also approved a military escort plan on 19 May for all reflagged vessels, two days after the USS Stark was attacked by Exocet missiles fired from Iraqi-manned Super Etendard fighters. In the aftermath of this incident, Admiral William J.Crowe, Jr, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reassured the Senate Armed Services Committee that ‘escorting Kuwaiti tankers through the Persian Gulf would not be a high-risk undertaking’.128 The whole plan of the reflagging operations was not free of criticism or opposition. Condemnation came from the pro-Iranian pressure group called the Kuwaiti Hizbollah which clandestinely issued a statement describing the operation as ‘a plot to smash the Muslim movement in the region and to harm the Islamic revolution’.129 Possibly, taking refuge in Iran due to the clampdown scheme in Kuwait on alleged Iran-linked terrorists, this group broadcast on Iran’s propaganda network a statement which described the introduction of US fleets to the region by the Kuwaiti authorities, in order to protect Saddam, as a despicable act.130 Not surprisingly, the Iranian President, ‘Ali Khameini, voiced his strong displeasure with this operation in a speech in Tabriz: It is Kuwait’s disgrace that it seeks the help of others… [W]hile the US is protecting Kuwait’s oil, our ships are hit by missiles and bullets. In that case, we will not consider under which country’s flag the oil is being shipped. Even if it is the US flag, we will hit it, time and again.131 Students at Kuwait University also were opposed to the reflagging agreement. The antireflagging perspective, as Shafeeq Ghabra argues, stemmed from opposition to the US position on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the general US Middle East policy.132 Other opposition element such as nationalists and university lecturers also disagreed with their government’s decision.133 These opposition groups were deprived of an opportunity to debate or criticise the government’s position, due to the dissolution of the National Assembly since 1986, resulting from the political turmoil in Kuwait. This turmoil included bombings against the US and the French embassies in late 1983, an assassination attempt on the Amir’s life in 1985, and five hijackings of Kuwaiti airliners. In the United States, opposition came from the Democrat-controlled Congress, reflected by the hearings held on several occasions. Shortly after the USS Stark incident, regarded by the administration as ‘accidental, but unprovoked’, members of Congress expressed concern over the danger facing US forces in the escort operation. Representative Tom Lantos asked whether the United States would be drawn into the war. More humiliating to the administration was a point raised by Representatives Benjamin A.Gilman and Robert G.Torricelli, who were doubtful of the US Navy’s capability to carry out the escort operations amid its failure to protect its own frigate. What was debated between groups of lawyers affiliated with both the administration and Congress was whether a report was required under the War Powers Resolution on the Iraqi attack on the USS Stark or the possibility of Iranian attack on the reflagged Kuwaiti tankers. Six Democratic candidates for the 1988 presidential nominations expressed discontent with the US administration’s policy of reflagging. They included Massachusetts Governor Michael S.Dukakis, Jesse L.Jackson, Representative Richard A.Gephardt, Senator Paul Simon, former Arizona Governor Bruce Babbit and Senator Joseph

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R.Biden, Jr.134 Dukakis stated: ‘To act alone involves running risks which are neither desirable nor justified,…so I don’t think there should be rules of engagement’.135 Jackson, Gephardt and Simon also shared an argument that other major powers—the Western European countries and Japan—should participate in this operation.136 The issue of Soviet threat was, as Gephardt and Biden both argued, not so serious as the administration claimed.137 On the contrary, Senator Albert Gore, Jr (DemocratTennessee) took a different view, according to the Washington Post: ‘To turn down the Kuwaiti request would have “discredited the US” and would be “extremely damaging” in view of the Soviet Union’s decision to play a role of guarantor of free passage for Kuwaiti oil tankers’.138 The reaction of the Republicans, albeit not all of them, was in line with the US administration. Unsurprisingly, Vice President George Bush and Representative Jack Kemp strongly supported the US administration’s effort. The deployment’, as Bush remarked, ‘is one we can handle. We have the assets without putting a strain on our deployments in other parts of the world’.139 Former Senator Paul Laxalt (Nevada) went further, saying that: I think our interest there, in combination with our allies, requires a naval deployment…. I am sort of interested in the proposal that we be paid by the Japanese and West Germans on a fee basis for the protection we’re going to be giving to their oil… Once the Soviets had offered to help… I don’t think we had any choice.140 What is intriguing were the remarks made by two prominent Republicans—former Secretary of State Alexander M.Haig, Jr and Senate Minority Leader Robert J.Dole. ‘I am very sceptical’, as Haig asserted, ‘and nervous about it. I don’t know all we face We really jumped in responding to the Soviet Union’.141 Dole voiced his concern that the US could not avoid responsibilities for leading the free world, but ‘the model is not Rambo but Teddy Roosevelt’.142 A common concern of those Republicans was the extent of the contribution to be made by the Western European nations and Japan, which consumed more oil from the Persian Gulf than the United States. Shortly before the actual reflagging operations were due to start in mid-July 1987, criticisms of the operations also came from leading scholars and former US high-ranking officials who took part in a seminar on the Persian Gulf at the Brookings Institution. Anthony H.Cordesman, a former Director of Defense Intelligence Assessment in the Pentagon, succinctly argued that: The reflagging responds more to politics and perceptions than to the objective military situation. It is designed to negate the effect of the clandestine dealings with Iran by reassuring Arab states of American steadfastness. It is also aimed at countering any increase in Soviet influence in the Gulf that may emerge because of the Iran affair’s damage to the sense of American dependability.143 Michael Sterner, a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Carter administration, and James A.Placke, a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the

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Gulf region during 1982–1986, also pointed out an ill-planned, enhanced US military presence would be self-defeating. ‘In the longer term’, as Sterner criticised, ‘the military activity comes against a backlog of failure of this administration in the Middle East’.144 The failure to which he referred was the confidence-shaking withdrawal from Lebanon in the aftermath of the suicidal truck bombing against US military barracks in 1983, resulting in the deaths of 241 marines. At this seminar, a radical proposal for a joint US— Soviet military operation in the Gulf, apparently considered as out of the question by the Reagan administration, was put forward by Michael MccGwire, a leading expert on Soviet military affairs.145 Surprisingly, his proposal also attracted support from Howard H.Baker, Jr, the White House Chief of Staff at the time. He praised Kuwait’s approach as ‘a unique arrangement that the Kuwaitis chose to invite both the US and the Soviet Union to share the responsibility for assuring the passage of oil tankers in the Persian Gulf,146 Marshall D.Shulman, an adviser on Soviet affairs in the Carter administration, said: ‘I don’t think it’s realistic for the United States to make it an objective to keep the Soviets out of the Gulf. There’s no way in the world we could do that, even if we wanted to’.147 Another challenge to the US government’s co-operation with the Kuwaiti regime came from the newly appointed Navy Secretary, James H.Webb, Jr, who wrote a strongly worded memorandum to Weinberger in July 1987, questioning the logic behind the US military build-up in the Gulf region.148 The memorandum challenged Weinberger to provide answers to such questions as: ‘When do we know we have won?…. What are our objectives? When do we know we have achieved our objectives?’149 Weinberger responded with a clear and simple rebuttal, saying that ‘the United States achieved a victory every time a commercial ship passed safely through the Gulf’.150 In fact, many senior military officers, who remained anonymous, also expressed doubts over the military escort plan, for they were not sure how long this operation would take.151 Scepticism also was voiced by the House Armed Services Committee Chairman, Les Aspin.152 At a press conference, he said lack of clarity on the escort plan might force him to vote for delaying the operation, due to start in mid-July. The US administration, according to Aspin, agreed to escort the reflagged tankers through the Persian Gulf on their round-trip journeys to their final destinations, which might be as far away as Europe. On the other hand, the Kuwaiti version of the escort plan referred to a shuttle operation in which the escorted tankers’ routes would be terminated at an oil-loading port just outside the Persian Gulf for transferring oil to other vessels, and then they would return to Kuwait for further shipments of oil.153 Should the Kuwaiti plan be put into operation, more US naval deployments would be necessary for more escorts each month.154 There must be assurances, Aspin said, that the US naval forces would not be over-stretched by the increased escort operations. Moreover, the matter of who would bear the increased costs accrued by more operations should be finalised. What infuriated Weinberger was the public way in which differences over the escort plan were made known. Aspin made his press conference comments after leading a US Congressional delegation on a one-day visit to Kuwait, during which they held talks on the reflagging issue with both the Kuwaiti Prime Minister, and Oil and Industry Minister. What symbolised the final preparation for launching the operation was the official presentation of a US flag by a member of the delegation to ‘Abd al-Fattah al-Badr, Chairman of KOTC. The flag was to be hoisted on the first reflagged Kuwaiti oil tanker.155

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The other disruptive interference by Aspin, according to Weinberger, took place one day before the commencement of the actual operation. At hearings on 14 July, Carlucci, Admiral Crowe, and Weinberger pleaded with the members of the Congressional committees that information to be briefed was extremely sensitive and should be treated as such.156 Shortly after the hearing, Aspin called an impromptu press conference in which he revealed detailed information on the operation, for example, when and where it would begin and the total number of ships participating.157 All these were reported in the Washington Post. When the first reflagged and renamed tanker, the Bridgeton, hit a mine allegedly planted by the Iranians, at the end of July 1987,158 Weinberger indirectly accused Aspin of enabling the Iranians to get access to the details of the operation.159 No military retaliation by the US administration was carried out until 16 October when another US-reflagged vessel, the 81,283-tonne Kuwaiti tanker, the Sea Isle City, was hit while in Kuwaiti territorial waters by Iranian-launched Silkworm missiles.160 The Kuwaiti cabinet demanded the Iranian government be held responsible for the attack, and declared it would consider an ‘appropriate response’. For its part, the Pentagon embarked on retaliatory attacks against the Iranian-owned oil platform, Rashadat, in the central Gulf—a target believed to be both the staging post for the attacks on US-flagged tankers and an intelligence listening post.161 By winter 1987, the number of US naval forces reflected ‘the greatest concentration of naval firepower in a region since the Vietnam war’.162 The mass deployment of the US armada included an aircraft carrier, a battleship, 4 missile-guided cruisers, 6 mine sweepers, 2 missile-guided destroyers, 2 destroyers, 5 missile-guided frigates, 2 frigates, 2 auxiliary landing ships and 5 auxiliary support ships.163 Moreover, the operations of a new large floating barge in Kuwait’s territorial waters, requested by the United States and approved by the Kuwaiti government, fortified US protection of the reflagged oil tankers against Iranian attacks.164 In the meantime, diplomatic pressure was mounting to put an end to the longest conventional war of the century. The UN Resolution 598, unanimously adopted by the Security Council on 20 July 1987, was aimed at demanding an immediate cease-fire between both sides, exchange of prisoners of war, troop withdrawal to internationally recognised borders, establishment of an impartial committee to investigate the war and achievement of a comprehensive, just and satisfactory settlement.165 One month before the eighth anniversary of the invasion by Iraqi forces, a cease-fire between Baghdad and Teheran was signed on 20 August 1988. It is no exaggeration to assert that the reflagging operations affected the overall political, diplomatic and military relationships between Kuwait and the United States. Likewise, it is not an exaggeration to say that this transformed relationship was basically a function of the recalcitrant Iraqi position in its dispute with Iran, which led to the Iranian leaders’ decision to carry out attacks on oil tankers. To put it simply, reflagging was the direct result of the tanker war first launched by the Baghdad regime. A point of discussion which still remains inconclusive is whether the Kuwaiti regime was capable of exercising influence over the US administration in this operation. As mentioned earlier, two schools of thought have emerged—one believing that Kuwait was capable of influencing the United States; the other believing that it was not capable of doing so. The weight of evidence seems to fall in favour of the first school.

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The US administration was almost unprepared to respond to the Kuwaiti regime’s decision to resort to superpower protection of its oil tankers. Based on its rhetoric of neutrality in the Iraq-Iran war, the Reagan administration exploited every diplomatic opportunity to ensure its favourable position in the Gulf. Faced with a well-calculated political decision by a small city-state—the decision to approach both superpowers for help—the United States proved to be reactive.166 Kuwait’s pragmatic approach in counterweighing both the superpowers constituted a political trap into which the US administration reluctantly was forced to fall.167 Not for the first time, the Kuwaiti regime seemed able to gauge and exploit the anti-Soviet position held by the Republican administration in Washington. The Kuwaitis in this case, manipulated US leaders’ anxiety over any further Soviet inroads in the Gulf region. In acquiring American protection, the Kuwaitis’ interest was served; and in giving the protection, the United States hoped to minimise the Soviet role in the area. In this sense, Kuwait exercised cooperative influence over the United States.168 What further confirms that the Kuwaiti regime was able to exercise political leverage in this case was the fact, as discussed earlier, that the Pentagon was compelled to seek waivers on the reflagging regulations which were approved by the USCG. The waivers were necessary in the American view because the complicated regulations of the US government, could well have prompted the Kuwaitis to turn solely or mainly to the Soviet Union. A US official, interviewed by the author, insisted that the US government was free of the Kuwaiti government’s influence in this regard.169 But the official report on a trip to the Persian Gulf, in which that officer participated, frankly stated that the US government made the decision to reflag the Kuwaiti oil tankers because of the possibility of deeper Soviet inroads into the Gulf region.170 In short, interests converged, mutual benefits were apparent and the Kuwaiti regime seemed successful in exercising cooperative influence in this historic reflagging operation.

US-Kuwaiti relations and the F18 arms deal Closely related to the US-Kuwaiti military relationship arising from the reflagging operations, the Kuwaiti regime carried out another diplomatic move in trying to purchase 40 jets of the US Navy’s most sophisticated aircraft—the two-engine F18 fighter-bomber, costing $17 million apiece.171 This formed only part of the $1.9 billion arms deal package put forward by the Kuwaiti government. Manufactured by the McDonnell Douglas Company at the order of the US Navy, which played a major role in the reflagging policy, the sale of the F18s would mark a new threshold in the increasingly close US—Kuwaiti security relationship, for Kuwait would be the first Arab or other Third World country to deploy the aircraft in its air force.172 So far, the McDonnell Douglas Company, according to Robert J. O’Brien, the company’s director of communications, had sold the F18 to only Canada, Australia and Spain.173 With a combat radius of more than 500 nautical miles, the Kuwaiti air force could fly from Kuwait almost to the Straits of Hormuz and perform a deep strike on Iranian territory, an operation which two squadrons of aging A4 Skyhawk could not achieve. Also included in this $1.9 billion arms deal package was the proposed sale of 400 laser-guided bombs, 200 cluster bombs, 200 radar-guided Sparrow and 120 heat-seeking Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, and 300 Maverick air-to-ground

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missiles similar to the ones which the Reagan administration tried to sell to Saudi Arabia, but faced Congressional opposition.174 As for the 300 Maverick missiles, the Reagan administration offered to sell Kuwait 200 model D Maverick infrared-guided air-to-ground missiles, mainly used by planes to attack tanks. They are lighter than model G Maverick missiles, 100 of which the administration considered selling to Kuwait.175 Model G Maverick missiles, produced by Hughes Aircraft Company of Tucson in Arizona, are also infrared-guided air-to-ground missiles used to attack the underground bunkers and other heavily fortified fixed targets.176 Senator Dennis DeConcini (DemocratArizona) quickly opposed the sale of Maverick missiles even though they were produced in his home state. It was speculated that his prime concern was the rapid proliferation of high-technology weapons in the Gulf region. If the whole package had been approved by the US Congress, it would have been the largest arms sale to an Arab country in 1988. Before Reagan officially notified Congress about the arms deal proposal on 7 July 1988, opposition was looming, manifested by Representative Lawrence J. Smith (Democrat-Florida) who said he intended to lead opposition to the sale of F18s to Kuwait.177 State Department Middle East expert Peter Berleigh and Pentagon arms specialist Edward Gnehm178 testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. They defended the arms deal on the following grounds: a The sale is a strong indication of the growing strength of the US—Kuwaiti relationship. b It reflects Kuwait’s commitment to share actively in the burden of defending the Gulf. c The sale fulfils the US national interests in the political, economic and strategic spheres. d The modest sale does not threaten Israel’s security or seriously affect the balance of power in the region.179 Congress would have thirty days after the official notification by the President to hand down a resolution on disapproval of the deal. In this case, Congress could wait until 7 August before both chambers decided to block the arms deal. While the Senate focused its opposition on the sale of 300 Maverick missiles, House members targeted their disapproval on the total package.180 Kuwaiti leaders confirmed Maverick missiles formed an integral part of the whole package which had to be approved as a ‘total one’. The Kuwaiti ambassador to Washington suggested ‘Kuwait would not accept the deal without Mavericks and all the hardware they had requested’,181 a position with which the US government also agreed. Disenchanted with the Congress’ opposition to the sale, the Kuwaiti regime adopted a carrot-and-stick diplomacy in dealing with the US Senate. Without further delay, the Kuwaiti Defence Minister concluded an arms deal on 9 July 1988 with the Soviet Union represented by Yuri Grishin, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Economic Relations.182 Though believed to be a deal only on guns or communications equipment, the Kuwaiti regime made its position clear that it still adhered to the long-practised principle of diversifying its arms sources. Another concrete evidence of the principle was a signal that Kuwait and Britain were due to negotiate an arms deal when George Younger, the British Defence Secretary, visited Kuwait on 11 July 1988.183 At the top of the agenda was talk of the possibility of ordering from Britain Tornado fighters to replace the F18s. At the same time, the Kuwaiti Prime Minister, on his way to Washington, DC, held talks with David Mellor, the Foreign Office Minister, who declared that the British government

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would not give in to Israeli pressure to ban arms sales to Saudi Arabia.184 Obviously, this was a signal that Kuwait might acquire what it needed from the British arms industry. As for the carrot overtures, the Kuwaiti Prime Minister paid an official six-day visit to the United States and held official talks with Reagan, who pledged to ‘fight for the Kuwaiti arms package’.185 This was the first such high-ranking Kuwaiti official to visit Washington in twenty-one years. The Prime Minister was scheduled to hold talks with cabinet members and Congressional leaders, including Vice-President George Bush, Secretary of Defense Carlucci, Acting Secretary of State John Whitehead, and highranking officers at the Pentagon. At the National Press Club in Washington, the Prime Minister declared, ‘the issue was a barometer of friendship and co-operation between allies’.186 Direct talks took place between the Prime Minister and the members of the Foreign Relations Committee of both chambers; it is clear that, face to face, ‘he wanted to explain to the members why Kuwait needs the aircraft and missiles’.187 This arms deal was doubtless more significant than the Stinger missile negotiations in 1984. The high-level commitments of both countries’ leaders and the high-level talks between the Kuwaiti Prime Minister and leading members of the US legislative body illustrate the point. Direct contacts between the Kuwaiti Prime Minister and members of the US Congress offered the chance for him to reinforce his country’s defence needs. It was for this reason that the US administration may have conceivably invited him to pay an official visit to the United States. In this way, the administration perhaps hoped to put political pressure on Congress. A compromise arms deal, acceptable to both sides, was finalised. The changes to the initial agreement covered the following points: 1 the timetable for the delivery of the new F18 jet fighters must be expanded one year later than originally planned. 2 the Kuwaiti government must hand over a A4 fighter plane upon the receipt of each new F18. 3 limitations were placed on the basing and deployment of the F18s. The Kuwaiti airforce was not allowed to carry out in-flight refuelling operations and transfer the jet to another country. 4 the 200 model D Maverick missiles were removed from the deal. But the Kuwaiti government would be allowed to buy 200 more model G Maverick missiles. 5 there must be restrictions on the timing of model G Maverick missiles.188 Behind the successful modification of the deal was the intermediary role of the Secretary of State, George Shultz. Based on negotiations between Shultz and the Kuwaiti Prime Minister, Kuwait accepted the modified conditions proposed by Shultz.189 Representatives Lawrence J.Smith (Democrat-Florida) and Mel Levine (DemocratCalifornia) announced that written assurances from Shultz removed their opposition to the arms deal, even though Senator DeConcini declared that he still objected to the Maverick sale to Kuwait. But DeConcini saw there was no chance of preventing the sale.190 A face-saving solution like this modified agreement illustrates a certain degree of political influence exercised by the small city-state of Kuwait over the Reagan administration. The Kuwaiti government realised that it might be able to make use of the differing stances on the F18s between the White House and Hill. The regime was aware

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of the support it obtained from the White House and the opposition it faced in Congress. As we have seen in other stances, through the exercise of co-operative influence, the Kuwaiti regime managed to get part of what it wanted from the US administration by accepting a modified version of the arms deal which satisfied both countries.

Conclusion Throughout Reagan’s eight-year period in office, the roles of three traditional middle powers in the Gulf region—Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia—seemed to be challenged by that of Kuwait, as far as each of the bilateral relationships with the United States was concerned. The Arab-Israeli conflict and the Iran-Iraq war still constituted frameworks in which US-Kuwaiti relations evolved with elements of ups and downs. During the first term of Reagan, the Kuwaiti regime took an unprecedented diplomatic decision—refusal of the American ambassador-designate—that served as an irritant in its relationship with Washington. However, in the last two years of his second-term administration, another diplomatic move by the Kuwaiti regime—the request for reflagging—took most countries by surprise, especially the US administration. As a result, a new mending-the-fence milestone of US-Kuwaiti ties was reached. When the Kuwaiti regime categorically rejected the appointment of the new US ambassador, formerly serving in Jerusalem, the Reagan administration was unprepared to face that challenge. Indeed, the US government met with no success in influencing the Kuwaiti regime to change its decision. On the other hand, when the Kuwaiti government expressed its interest in acquiring Stinger missiles, which were sold earlier to Saudi Arabia, the Kuwaiti regime faced disappointment. The Reagan government saw no benefit in confronting the US Congress, which opposed the sale of the missiles to both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. In the case of Saudi Arabia, Reagan resorted to special authority to waive the need for Congress’ approval. But it was not exercised again in the case of Kuwait, which made strenuous attempts to change the administration’s position. Another unforeseen decision by the Kuwaiti regime—to seek the superpowers’ protection for its oil tankers that had come under regular attacks by Iran—took the US administration by surprise again. It seemed to fly in the face of the long-standing Kuwaiti policy of maintaining distance from both superpowers. The Kuwaiti leaders skilfully played the Soviet card to draw in large-scale US participation in the so-called ‘reflagging and escorting policy’. Being unprepared for this request, the US administration reacted quickly, almost automatically, in order mainly to forestall Soviet inroads into the region. The Kuwaitis, thus maximised their position by both surprising the US government and exploiting its instinctive anti-Soviet posture. As a result, it may be said that the United States had come under the co-operative influence of Kuwait. In the final year of Reagan’s second term, there emerged again an interesting case of a US-Kuwaiti arms deal, involving the sale to the Kuwaiti government of the F18 jet fighters and other military equipment. Congress again was the stumbling block to the sale, a similar situation to the arms deal negotiations of 1984. But, in this case, an element of inconsistency was discovered in the Reagan administration’s position, which this time was in favour of the sale to the Kuwaiti regime. Political pressure and influence

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were placed on the US government to conclude the deal, with some modified terms of agreement. The discussions in this chapter illustrate that an influence relationship is a two-way process, which can be exercised by both a superpower and a small city-state like Kuwait. On the one hand, it can disrupt the whole relationship; on the other hand, it can help improve the relationship between the two countries. Under the Reagan administration, the influence relationship between the United States and Kuwait, on which the study of the four cases in this chapter relies, seems to have improved the bilateral ties. The discussion in the next chapter—covering the Bush administration—will show that, within the context of influence relationships, US-Kuwaiti relations were to grow even warmer.

6 US-Kuwaiti relations under the Bush administration Introduction With great reluctance, I concluded, as did the other coalition leaders, that only the use of armed force would achieve an Iraqi withdrawal together with the other UN goals of restoring Kuwait’s legitimate government, protecting the lives of our citizens, and re-establishing security and stability in the Persian Gulf region…1

The abrupt invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990, leading to the unresisted occupation of the whole city-state, was the second international crisis in the Gulf region since Saddam Hussein became the president of Iraq in June 1979. Major differences exist between the Iraq-Iran war in 1980 and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. First, while the former involved antagonism between an Arab country and the Persian nation, the latter was about hostility between two neighbouring Arab countries. Second, the US policy of noninterference in the Iraq-Iran conflict stemmed from its intention of having revolutionary Iran deterred by the secular Iraqi regime, the then close ally of the Soviet Union. But the Bush administration’s swift response to the 1990 invasion by Iraq, which had already normalised diplomatic relations with Washington from November 1984, caught the Baghdad regime by surprise. One may wonder what the US response would have been had the pro-American Shah dynasty fallen victim to the Baghdad regime; or, if Kuwait’s main export was not oil, but broccoli, Bush’s least favourite vegetable.2 Most agree that the 1990 crisis has formed a major turning point in US-Kuwaiti relations. If the bilateral relationship under the Reagan administration, a major part of which involved the reflagging operation, was a ‘mending-the-fence’ milestone, the developments under the Bush administration put the finishing touch on attempts to improve the relationship. The relative ease with which Iraq took complete control over Kuwait confirmed the ‘small’ territory of this oil-rich state. The US major concern over the prompt mobilisation of international allies to liberate Kuwait reflected Kuwait’s geo-strategic imperatives. Its close proximity to the world’s greatest oil reserves made the delay in dislodging Iraqi troops inconceivable. One can, therefore, argue that the US decision to remain deeply involved with the crisis was, in substantial part, a function of its concern over Saudi Arabia’s security. Supporting this argument are news reports that consultations between the US and Saudi governments took place more frequently than those between the US

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government and the Kuwaiti regime. Be that as it may, the crisis proved crucial to both the US and Kuwaiti governments. Given the widely-held conception that the US administration failed to prevent the Shah of Iran’s downfall, the Bush administration needed to exert leadership to forestall the collapse of another monarchical regime in the Gulf. For Kuwait, the historical threat by Iraq to its territorial integrity turned into an actual invasion, which it could not resist with its own armed forces. A complete revision of its defence policy since the crisis has made the bilateral relationship with the United States more amicable. The discussion of the relationship in this chapter is divided into the following sections: 1 the relationship after President Bush came to power in the run-up to the invasion; 2 the relationship during the invasion and occupation of Kuwait; and 3 the relationship in the aftermath of the US-led liberation of Kuwait.

US-Kuwaiti relations: the prelude to the 1990 invasion Signed on 20 August 1988 under the auspices of the United Nations, the cease-fire agreement between Iraq and Iran gave a sigh of relief to other countries at the regional and international levels. An expectation of a durable peace loomed, while both antagonists implemented their own rehabilitation programmes. There was no longer a necessity for the US administration to provide an escorting operation for reflagged Kuwaiti tankers in the Gulf. One month after the signing of the cease-fire, the United States announced that it would scale down its operations in the Gulf region, while Iraqi and Iranian leaders met face-to-face in a Geneva session chaired by Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, the UN Secretary-General.3 But mutual distrust and recrimination still existed. Although the Kuwaiti regime had some hope of reconciling the two regimes in Teheran and Baghdad, it also had outstanding issues with Iraq to contend with, especially at a time when the distracting battlefront on the Iranian side had disappeared. Some experts at the US State Department speculated: ‘Iraq may soon loom bigger than Iran as a potential threat to Kuwait’s security’.4 First and foremost, the questions of sovereignty over Warbah and Bubiyan islands and border demarcations remained unresolved, due to the strategic locations of both islands. The Kuwaiti government’s claim to inalienable rights over these two islands was made clear in its plan, revealed in January 1989, to build a 30-kilometre-long causeway worth $1billion across the Bay of Kuwait to Subiya, a new city complex in the north, directly opposite Bubiyan island.5 Second, Iraq’s war indebtedness also caused concern to both the Kuwaiti and Saudi regimes. Not only did Iraqi leaders claim that the financial contributions made by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia during the war were non-refundable war premiums, they also requested further financial assistance from both countries for the reconstruction programmes they planned to undertake. Third, the Gulf states’ olive branch to Iran made the Iraqi regime feel isolated. As reported in the Washington Post of 28 September 1988, a Kuwaiti official said that his government considered resuming friendly relations with Iran, without having to consult Iraq before making the final decision.6 In addition, the Iraqi regime also made it clear that the normalisation of diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia did not serve its national interests. But both the regimes in Riyadh and Teheran finally restored their

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diplomatic relations on 26 March 1991 after they concluded an agreement on the Iranian representation at the hajj.7 Iraq’s mobilisation programme did not go unnoticed by Kuwaiti officials, who failed to see why the Iraqi regime needed to keep its one million-strong army busy. According to a high-ranking Kuwaiti official interviewed by Shafeeq Ghabra, a leading Kuwaiti social scientist: No one dared to think, however, that Iraq would under any circumstances attack Kuwait. These thoughts remained unexplored for fear that supporters of Iraq and sympathisers in the Foreign Ministry and in society at large would view discussions of such as treasonous or anti-Arab.8 Being successful in dispensing oil revenues to buy off its own subjects’ allegiance, the Kuwaiti regime expected the same outcome from Iraqi leaders. But as Joseph Wright Twinam observes, although the GCC states contributed billions to sustain the Iraqi regime, they still were unable to influence Iraq’s conduct.9 If the Soviet Union, a major aid donor and military supplier to Iraq, also experienced difficulty in exerting influence over the Iraqi leaders’ policies and actions, a small state like Kuwait did not stand a chance. Notwithstanding this tense relationship between Kuwait and Iraq, they both remained united in dealing with the United States on some political issues. As discussed earlier, US-Kuwaiti ties appeared to have improved when the Kuwaiti Prime Minister, in a speech delivered at the National Press Club in Washington, DC in July 1988, officially announced an ‘alliance’ between the two countries,10 even though there was yet no defence treaty or agreement between them. However, the Kuwaiti Defence Minister confirmed in December 1988 that, despite discussions with the US government, the time had not come for setting up US military facilities on Kuwaiti territory.11 The Kuwaiti regime, as Ambassador W.Nathaniel Howell observes, was also opposed to the concept of ‘prepositioning’ of military equipment on Kuwaiti soil—the way in which the Pentagon stocks up military supplies in European allies.12 It is also important to note that prior to the Iraqi invasion, the US military office in Kuwait was small and limited in programme.13 A final revision in the reflagging operations and further military co-operation were on the agenda of talking points between Admiral William J.Crowe, US Commander of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Major General Mizyad Abd al-Rahman al-Sani, the Kuwaiti Chief of Staff, who visited Washington in December 1988 for three weeks at the invitation of Admiral Crowe.14 This high-level military contact had nothing to do with Kuwait’s plan to diversify its sources of arms suppliers. The Kuwaiti Defence Minister concluded a deal with a representative of a British helicopter manufacturing company in February 1989, which would supply helicopters and accessories for Kuwait’s air force.15 The visit to the Soviet Union by the Kuwaiti Chief of Staff in early 1989 was hailed by the Kuwaiti Defence Minister as ‘fruitful and constructive’.16 According to an American official involved with US—Kuwaiti relations during the reflagging operation, who was interviewed by Ghabra, Kuwait remained a pan-Arab country, standing ready to criticise the US policy towards the Arab world despite the military escorting operations provided by US military personnel.17 For example, in January 1989, the US government accused the Libyan regime of producing and

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accumulating chemical weapons. Yet the US plan to demolish the pharmaceutical plant in Libya came under criticism in the Arab world, including the GCC states. Military confrontation between US and Libyan air forces over international waters in the Mediterranean, resulting in the shooting down of two Libyan jet fighters, was dismissed by the Kuwaiti Defence Minister as ‘an unjustified dangerous act’.18 It is possible that Kuwaiti leaders preferred to play down their criticism of US aggressive conduct against Libya, for they were enraged by Libyan support for Iran during the Iraq—Iran war. But, as we have seen in other cases, it was the radical Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Ra’i Al-Amm that strongly criticised the US military stand-off against Libya and thus maintained pressure on the Kuwaiti regime: The American threats against Libya have unveiled some awful contradictions in American concepts, because chemical (weapons) plants do exist in Russia, France, China, Korea, Israel and West Germany…and the Libyan plant, if the allegation were true, is no exception.19 The Kuwaiti government was also disappointed, related to this incident, when the US administration failed to respond to its request for a clarification on a news report by AlQabas. According to this report, the Israeli government, under the newly elected rightwing Likud party,20 planned to launch an air strike against Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons depots.21 It was thought that the Israeli government hoped to keep Iraq in its place after its victory in the Gulf war, and to divert attention away from its suppression of the Palestinian intifada in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The Kuwaitis expected the US government to put pressure on the new Israeli government to suspend the plan, for USsupplied sophisticated bombers would form the main core of the operation, as they had in June 1981 when the Israeli government sent American-made F16s and F15s to bombard the nuclear reactor in Osirak on the outskirts of Baghdad.22 Unlike the reaction to the Israeli military attack in 1981, the Bush administration calculated that it would be premature and counterproductive to condemn the Israeli plan, and, in any event, the attack plan was not finally executed. It goes without saying that the suspension was due to the Israeli government’s own decision, and not due to the Kuwaiti government’s pressure on the US administration to stop the attack. As far as the Arab-Israeli conflict is concerned, a landmark event took place shortly after President Bush won a landslide victory over the Democratic candidate, Michael Dukakis. In Algiers, the Palestine National Council (PNC), at its nineteenth extraordinary session in November 1988, proclaimed the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in Gaza Strip and the West Bank with Jerusalem as its capital23—a state which was recognised by a large number of sovereign states, including the GCC states, but not the United States. What angered leaders of the Arab world was the US refusal to grant an entry visa to Yasser Arafat to address the UN headquarters in New York.24 The Bush administration’s refusal remained so adamant that Arafat was forced to address a UN session in Geneva. The political price Arafat had to pay for diplomatic admission was his recognition of the state of Israel and the renunciation of terrorism. But it is surprising that no public outcry was heard from the Kuwaiti regime on this issue. On the occasion of the twenty-eighth anniversary of the Kuwaiti National Day, Kuwait’s Foreign Ministry

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Under-Secretary, Sulayman al-Shalin, advocated a conference on the Palestinian issue because of the more conducive atmosphere.25 From the Kuwaitis’ perspective, the conducive atmosphere, apart from the proclamation of the creation of Palestinian state, encompassed the decision of the Arab League to re-admit Egypt in May 1989, thereby leading to the restoration of diplomatic relations between Egypt and some Arab countries. From the US viewpoint, it was a diplomatic victory for its attempts to make Egypt acceptable again to the Arab world in spite of the 1978 Camp David Accords and subsequent peace treaty with Israel. KuwaitiEgyptian relations were renewed by a two-day visit to Kuwait, in February 1989, by the Egyptian President, Hosni Mubarak, who held high-level discussions with the Amir.26 The agenda included discussion of the newly founded Arab Co-operation Council (ACC), made up of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and the former North Yemen.27 It is obvious that the Kuwaiti regime’s official reaction to the establishment of the ACC was warm and cordial. In his official cable to King Hussein of Jordan, the Kuwaiti Amir commented: It pleases me in the wake of the proclamation of the establishment of the Arab Co-operation Council to express…our sincerest congratulations on the consummation of this important step on the road of inter-Arab integration and cohesion and of unifying Arab efforts and stands to serve our glorious nation and realise the ambitions and aspirations of our peoples as regards the attainment of understanding and rapprochement…28 In a similar vein, the Kuwaiti Crown Prince publicly dismissed fears of competitiveness between the GCC and the ACC. The establishment of any Arab grouping will’, he remarked, ‘lead to the creation of an all-encompassing Arab grouping that will provide the Arab nation with further immunity and steadfastness’.29 There was every reason for the US administration to welcome this statement, for member countries of both groupings maintained a friendly, or at least not hostile, policy towards the United States. In testimony before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East in November 1989, both Edward Gnehm, the then Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, and John Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, pointed out that it was not appropriate to perceive Iraq as a threat to Saudi Arabia, a close ally of the United States.30 With Saudi Arabia and Iraq forming the main core of the GCC and ACC respectively, the US government’s stronghold on the ten Arab countries was closely intertwined. However, despite these public stands, there remained apprehension within both the US and Kuwaiti administrations about this development. April Glaspie, former US Ambassador to Iraq before the 1990 invasion, testified in 1991: [given] the record of Iraq in the peninsula in the 1970s, and given the strategic concerns in Saudi Arabia when the Arab Co-operation Council was formed, I doubt that it is possible to legislate, so to speak, complete trust overnight with a nonaggression pact between Iraq and Saudi Arabia.31

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With North Yemen joining the ACC at the request of Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi regime intended to exercise indirect involvement in the affairs of the peninsula through North Yemen. It cannot be ruled out that despite the diplomatic statements by the Kuwaiti Amir and Crown Prince cited earlier, some members of the Kuwaiti regime were still suspicious of Iraq’s regional designs, especially with a threatening regime in Sana’a at the southern tip of the peninsula. A sense of being encircled by Baghdad was clearly feared by some Kuwaiti leaders. But to give voice to this sense of encirclement would be diplomatically counterproductive, for the Saudi and US governments appeared supportive of Iraq’s initiative of establishing the ACC. If one recalls Iraq’s diplomatic move to solve its border problem with its neighbouring country in the south, it is noteworthy that the Kuwaiti regime also initiated a diplomatic step to solve its border issue with the Baghdad regime, a move which was lauded by the US administration. About two weeks before the inception of the ACC, the Kuwaiti Prime Minister visited Baghdad on 6 February 1989 in the hope that both governments would resume talks on unresolved bilateral issues, such as the large sum of debts owed to the Kuwaiti regime by Iraq, and sovereignty over Bubiyan and Warbah islands.32 The visit was a follow-up to the Iraqi Interior Minister’s visit to Kuwait in September 1988, soon after Iraq and Iran clinched the UN-sponsored cease-fire agreement; and to the two meetings between the Kuwaiti and Iraqi Foreign Ministers. Discussed at this meeting were Iraq’s previous offers, as part of the settlement, to supply the Kuwaiti armed forces with advanced US weapons captured during the war with Iran, to pump oil and gas to Kuwait’s petrochemical industry, and to provide fresh water at the rate of 500 million gallons a day free of charge.33 Obviously, the supply of fresh water seemed more attractive than other offers, although the Kuwaiti Prime Minister could not have been unaware of the possibility of being threatened with future disruptions of the water supply. Both governments were unable to agree upon the conditions of the settlement despite the fact that leaders of both sides praised the visit as a success. President Saddam Hussein’s assertion that this visit was the most successful ever made by leaders of Kuwait was, of course, an exaggeration.34 This unsettled border issue became one of the reasons used by Saddam Hussein to invade Kuwait in August 1990. The Kuwaiti leaders would not have been reassured by the fact that the Kuwaiti Prime Minister was merely briefed by his counterpart during this visit on the developments of the ACC, not actively consulted.35 While the Bush administration followed with optimism the high-level negotiations between the two regimes, another development in the region stirred up tension between the Arab and Western worlds. Farzad Bazoft, an Iranian-born freelance correspondent for the British Sunday newspaper The Observer, was placed under arrest at Baghdad airport on 15 September 1989 on the charge of conducting espionage activities for the Israeli government. Bazoft was one of the foreign journalists invited by the Iraqi government to observe elections, held in early September 1989, to the new Kurdish assembly.36 Having learnt about a huge explosion at the military-industrial complex at al-Hillah, south of Baghdad, on 17 August 1989, he made two attempts to visit the plant, believed by Western intelligence sources to be the site of a chemical weapons depot. Obviously, the Iraqi regime implicated Israel in the sabotage. Bazoft collected evidence from the site for future investigations into the allegation that the Iraqi regime was accumulating chemical weapons. His televised confession of carrying out the espionage on the Iraqi TV network

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was, as the Western governments maintained, made under duress. All attempts to spare his life proved unsuccessful. While Bazoft was finally hanged on 15 March 1990, Daphne Parish, the British nurse working in Iraq who drove Bazoft to the explosion site, was incarcerated. A general discussion on this incident took place at a meeting in February 1990 between the Kuwaiti Foreign Ministry Under-Secretary, Sulayman al-Shalin, and John Kelly,37 a meeting also attended by the Kuwaiti ambassador to the United States and the Director of the Americas Department, Suhayl Shuhaybir. It is very likely the US government left this issue to be handled more fully by the British government. Although Kelly also sought Kuwaiti support for putting pressure on the Iraqi government, he understood that Kuwait, which still expected the Iraqi government to pay off its debts in arrears, was in no position to change the Iraqi recalcitrance and, in any event, its mind was elsewhere. To put it simply, the Kuwaiti regime was less concerned with the case of Bazoft than with the financial commitments of the Iraqi regime. Putting too much pressure on the Baghdad government for the former might prolong the Baghdad regime’s willingness to pay off the war debts to the Kuwaiti government. Kuwait’s tilt towards Baghdad became more visible, especially after Iraq in late March 1990 was able to secure the Arab League’s condemnation of Britain and other European Union states’ interference in Iraq’s domestic affairs.38 High-ranking Kuwaiti officials expressed strong support for the Iraqi regime’s stand-off against the Western world. The Kuwaiti Information, Defence and Foreign Ministers joined the fray. ‘Iraq had’, as the Information Minister contended, ‘exercised its full right as an independent state with full sovereignty in a case related to its national security…’.39 The Kuwaiti Defence Minister went on to say that ‘any aggression on Iraq is an aggression against all the Arab nation and every Arab individual Iraq has the right to practise its full sovereignty…and block mobilisation of evil and aggressive forces against its territory’.40 In comparison with the less strongly worded remarks of other Gulf states’ officials, these outspoken statements by both ministers took the US administration by surprise. What provoked this outcry perhaps stemmed from the relative American indifference to the murder of the Canadian scientist, Dr Gerald Bull, in Brussels on 22 March 1990— an execution believed to have been carried out by Mossad, the Israeli secret service, one week after the Iraqi execution of Bazoft. As a leading expert on ballistics technology, Bull was widely thought to have helped the Iraqis develop long-range weapon systems, especially the so-called Super Gun.41 News of this project broke when British custom officials seized eight pieces of piping manufactured by Sheffield Engineering, which argued that these pieces were designed for petrochemical projects in Iraq. But, based on a study by Britain’s Royal Armament Research Development Establishment, it became clear that these pipes were part of the ‘Super Gun’ with a range of up to 622 miles (1,000 kilometres) and which could fire chemical or nuclear weapons. Combined with the ongoing nuclear development programme in Iraq, this would-be enhanced military capability was regarded by the West as having a destabilising effect on the region. The Israeli government feared that if the Super Gun project were allowed to go ahead as planned, its security would be in jeopardy. It was reported in British newspapers that a blueprint for producing the Super Gun looked similar to the one published and explained in a book co-written by Bull. In addition to the unsuccessful attempt by the US administration to persuade the Kuwaiti regime to oppose Iraq’s execution of Bazoft, the

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differing positions on the assassination of Dr Bull proved to be a source of the Arab world’s mistrust towards the US administration. In the first year of the Bush administration, US-Kuwaiti relations can be best described by the concept of status quo. As soon as the Iraq-Iran war came to an end, the necessity for Kuwaiti tankers to rely on US military protection faded away. An influence relationship within that context no longer existed. From the US perspective, irritations caused by the Kuwaiti regime remained in the background as an irritant. For example, daily newspapers in Kuwait again called for the improvement of relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. The editorial of one newspaper pointed out: It was impossible to ignore the important fact of the necessity for rapprochement with the Soviet Union…to safeguard our interests and realise a required balance in the interest of our causes, top of which is the Palestinian issue.42 The Kuwait Times attacked the United States for conniving with the ballistic missile test programmes carried out by the Israeli government while criticising some Arab countries when they acquired less advanced missiles.43 The Kuwaiti ambassador to the United States, attending the inaugural conference of the Arab American Leadership Council, criticised the US administration for seeking to extract more concessions from the Palestinians without putting pressure on Israel to compromise in the Arab—Israeli conflict.44 The US Senate’s decision to recognise Jerusalem as Israel’s capital also caused discontent within the Kuwaiti cabinet,45 as well as in other Arab countries. However, together with the cases mentioned earlier, these incidents had nothing to do with the Kuwaiti regime’s plan to purchase modern advanced weapons from US companies. As part of a multi-million-dollar US—Kuwaiti arms sales agreement concluded in 1988, up to 300 Kuwaiti pilots participated in an F18 training programme in the United States. The Kuwaiti government also took delivery of large consignments of military equipment, including simulators, from the United States.

US-Kuwaiti relations and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait As an oil-rich, indefensible, and small state located at a geo-strategically vital position in the Gulf region, Saddam Hussein’s decision to invade Kuwait and the problems of liberating Kuwait put the US government in a quandary. The details of and discussions on the developments leading to the invasion are voluminous,46 but they fall short of touching on the ways in which the US and the Kuwaiti regimes interacted in an attempt to restore Kuwaiti sovereignty and territorial integrity. Most of the literature, instead, is mainly devoted to the ways in which the United States dealt with the Saudi regime during the crisis. Yet most government officials and academics in both the United States and Kuwait interviewed by the author share the view that the invasion crisis was the historic turning point of the relationship between the two countries. For example, Nathaniel Howell, US Ambassador to Kuwait during the invasion and occupation, argued that ‘the

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[post-war] relationship is going to be an important one which needs to be nurtured. Kuwaitis like Americans. They are a lot closer’.47 Crises triggered by Saddam Hussein have always involved the element of surprise. The Soviet Union, Iraq’s close ally, was neither informed nor consulted by Saddam prior to the invasion of Iran in 1980, and he followed the same pattern in the 1990 crisis. But, with hindsight, it is clear that the Iraqi leader harboured grievances against Kuwait. Indeed, the first Gulf War and the second Gulf War were so intertwined that the former formed a major underlying cause of the latter.48 Although Christine M.Helms and Abbas Alnasrawi have given more weight to economic factors,49 a combination of economic, territorial, historical and political motivations account for Saddam’s decision to invade. Ironically, the fact that the Western governments facilitated, to a great extent, the Iraqi government’s militarisation programmes also played a role in the Iraqi regime’s decision to invade Kuwait. But the Kuwaiti regime was unaware of this development until its relations with the Baghdad regime degenerated into the first major crisis after the end of the Cold War. At the Arab summit in Baghdad in May 1990, initially held to forge a united stand against Israel in the light of the Soviet Jews’ immigration to Israel, Saddam Hussein explicitly warned Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates against overproducing the annual oil outputs stipulated by OPEC.50 In effect, this practice made the oil price in the world market nose-dive drastically from $29/b to $18/b, then to $11/b, leading to a decrease in Iraq’s oil revenues on which the Iraqi government heavily relied for reconstruction programmes. The Iraqi government claimed that the decrease of every single dollar in oil price would lead to a loss of $1 billion annually for the Iraqi state. At the summit, Saddam forewarned: I wish to tell those of our brothers who do not seek war, and those who do not intend to wage war on Iraq, that we cannot tolerate this type of economic warfare…. But I say that we have reached a state of affairs where we cannot take the pressure.51 To remedy the economic hardship facing its society, the Iraqi government demanded that the oil price be increased to $25/b. After the summit, the Saudi Oil Minister was told privately by Saddam Hussein that ‘I will never agree to let Iraqis starve, and Iraqi women go naked because of need’.52 Kuwaiti-Iraqi relations suffered strains between mid-May and late June mainly due to this decline in oil prices.53 Against the background of Iraq’s worsening ties with the West, the Bush administration sent Richard Haass, the official responsible for Middle Eastern affairs in the NSC, to visit the Gulf states. In Kuwait, bilateral issues and ‘questions of common interests’ were high on the discussion agenda between Haass and the Defence Minister.54 Although the details of the ‘questions of common interests’ were not revealed, it is quite clear that the question of Kuwaiti-Iraqi tensions was included. The reason for not explicitly mentioning the tension between the Kuwaiti and Iraqi governments was that it might provoke Saddam Hussein. Another meeting was held in Kuwait in June 1990 between the Kuwaiti Deputy Prime Minister and Thomas Pickering, the US representative to the United Nations. Again, no mention was made of Kuwaiti-Iraqi tension in the official press release by the Kuwaiti

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government. At this meeting, the Deputy Prime Minister criticised the US government’s position on many issues—for instance, the US veto of the Arab countries’ draft resolutions condemning the Israeli government’s stance on the Arab-Israeli conflict; and the US government’s decision to scale down its financial contribution to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA).55 Khalid al-Babtayn, Director of the Americas Department in the Kuwaiti Foreign Ministry, observed that both the US and Kuwaiti governments hoped the tension in the Gulf region would be solved by diplomatic means.56 But the situation worsened when Tariq Aziz, the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, sent a memorandum on 15 July 1990 to Chadli al-Klibi, the SecretaryGeneral of the Arab League.57 In addition to accusing Kuwait of a conspiracy to overproduce oil, the Iraqi government claimed that the Kuwaiti government had embarked on a gradual and pre-determined encroachment on Iraqi territory. It charged that military and oil installations and police posts were set up by the Kuwaiti authorities inside Iraq, especially on the southern part of the Iraqi Rumaylah oil field from which Kuwait clandestinely stole a large amount of oil worth $2.4 billion at 1980’s market prices.58 Considered as an immediate solution to its oil revenue shortfalls, the Iraqi government demanded a new oil price of $25/b,59 for a higher oil price would enable Iraq to press ahead with its reconstruction programmes. While the OPEC’s oil ministers, meeting in Geneva, agreed to raise the oil prices,60 news reports emerged that Iraq had moved 30,000 troops to the Kuwaiti border,61 a situation which forced the Kuwaiti Crown Prince to propose direct talks with Iraq, scheduled for the end of July 1990 in Jiddah, Saudi Arabia.62 This meeting, agreed to be only a preliminary one that focused on procedural matters, was about to be followed by a second one in Baghdad, which would mainly involve substantive negotiations. At the height of the tension, the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister came under attack by governmentcontrolled media in Iraq, which said he was an American agent involved with a USmasterminded plot to destabilise the Iraqi economy.63 His displeasure with the attack was shown by his absence from the nine-member Kuwaiti delegation at the Jiddah meeting, led by the Crown Prince. No official denunciation was heard from the US government, however. As mentioned earlier, the United States was in a dilemma. Most of the former US officials who dealt with Kuwaiti affairs regard the US government’s silence over Iraqi accusations of Kuwait’s oil overproduction and encroachment on Iraqi territory as prudent. In a related vein, they disagree with Mohammed Heikal’s assertion that, in light of the Iraqi-Kuwaiti tension, Kuwait’s obduracy led Baghdad to suspect that Kuwait had secretly obtained a security guarantee from the United States.64 Indeed, Heikal’s expertise is mainly in Egyptian affairs, and thus his speculation should be questioned.65 Francois Dickman contends that ‘I do not believe there is any credible basis to Heikal’s argument. There never was a secret security agreement or guarantee between the United States and Kuwait’.66 Former Ambassador Howell indirectly dismissed Heikal’s remark by arguing that: Saddam Hussein was completely ignorant with Kuwait’s economic affairs. He didn’t realise that Kuwait had not kept cash at hand; all Kuwaiti wealth was in the form of overseas investment.

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Saddam Hussein expected to take all Kuwaiti money once the invasion took place. Nobody in his regime dared to tell him about this ignorance.67 Yet, based on the security co-operation the American and Kuwaiti governments had built up during the tanker war, it is possible that discussions secretly took place, at the request of the Kuwaiti government, on contingency plans of how to handle Iraqi moves. If such talks did in fact occur—and the record remains cloudy—it would have been imperative to prevent leaks in order to avoid antagonising Saddam. At the same time, however, it is likely that the Kuwaiti regime was displeased with the US-UAE naval joint exercise launched at the request of the UAE government. Two US warships joined with ships from the United Arab Emirates in a small-scale naval exercise, although it was denied by the State Department that American forces in the region were put on any ‘special alert’.68 To avoid provoking Saddam Hussein, the Kuwaiti regime chose, as Chubin argues, both not to call on outside powers and to appeal to the United Nations Security Council.69 This initial Kuwaiti wish to avoid American involvement is confirmed by former Ambassador Glaspie’s testimony to the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East: Our Arab friends spoke publicly, and counselled us privately, that this issue was an Arab issue. Our involvement would be very risky, we would be likely to provoke Saddam Hussein, having the effect opposite to what we intended.70 Along the same lines of this argument is Joseph Kostiner’s contention that the Kuwaiti regime’s response to Iraqi demands was largely based on its perception of the effectiveness of neutralism, negotiations and Arab mediation.71 It also calculated that military preparations on its part could lead to war and invasion; more importantly, it argued that economic development, not military adventure on foreign territory, should be Iraq’s national objective.72 From the Kuwaiti perspective, the Jiddah meeting launched a long process of bargaining, mixed with both intransigence and concession.73 But the crisis plummeted to its lowest point immediately after the Iraqi delegates received unsatisfactory responses from the Kuwaiti delegates, and finally walked out from the Jiddah meeting. The Kuwaiti side claimed that Iraqi representatives had put forward an ultimatum, not conditions for negotiations. Both sides’ perception towards each other seemed unbridgable. In addition to being widely regarded as arrogant, even by other Gulf regimes, the Kuwaiti regime responded to Iraqi demands in a confusing manner—open to bargaining but obdurate.74 It is evident that the US administration met with no success in guiding the Kuwaiti regime’s decisions at the beginning of the crisis, as indicated by Kuwait’s opposition to the naval joint exercises between the United States and the United Arab Emirates. But it is possible that, like Iraq, Kuwait was confused by inconsistencies in the US response to Iraqi demands. In the light of the intelligence reports on Iraqi troops’ mobilisation on the Kuwaiti border, the State Department spokes-woman, Margaret Tutwiler, said: We remain determined to defend the principle of freedom of navigation and to ensure the free flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz… We also

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remain strongly committed to supporting the individual and collective self-defence of our friends in the Gulf, with whom we have deep and long-standing ties.75 Because of Tutwiler’s statements, Ambassador Glaspie was summoned to the Iraqi Foreign Ministry.76 As instructed, she also handed in the remarks made by Tutwiler in writing to Nizar Hamdoon, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. It is worth noting that after the brief meeting with Hamdoon, Glaspie was granted an audience with Saddam Hussein without her full prior knowledge.77 When she was invited to the Presidency on 25 July 1990, she did not expect to have a meeting with Saddam, for there was no official preparation in advance of the meeting. Moreover, the offices of other high-ranking Iraqi officials are also located at the Presidency, leading her to believe that she would meet with one of these officials. Perhaps not surprisingly, therefore, this meeting between Saddam Hussein and Glaspie has generated immense controversy over what was actually discussed. Based on the complete transcript of the meeting released by Baghdad,78 Glaspie was quoted as saying that: I admire your extraordinary efforts to rebuild your country. I know you need funds. We understand that and our opinion is that you should have the opportunity to rebuild your country. But we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait.79 (emphasis added) This transcript stirred controversy because it was widely cited as evidence of a US policy of appeasement towards Iraq before the invasion, but Glaspie substantiated her case that it was merely a fabrication or disinformation.80 What was deleted from the transcript were half of the sentence in which she called for a peaceful settlement of the dispute and the statements that reiterated US determination to defend its vital interests in the Gulf. She further argued that ‘the remark about the US having “no opinion” was in response to hints by Saddam that the United States should side with Iraq in the border dispute’.81 The simple message which Glaspie tried to get across at the hearing before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs in March 1991, her first testimony after a seven-month silence in the aftermath of the invasion, was that Saddam Hussein was telling a lie. But this revelation emerged so late that even the Kuwaiti regime may have been misled about the definitive US position on this crisis. Having received both Tutwiler’s statement from the State Department and the Iraqi version of the transcript of Saddam’s meeting with Glaspie, Ambassador Howell recognised that the Baghdad regime had won a propaganda victory, and he was thus put in a difficult position to assure the Kuwaiti regime about the US stance at the time.82 Yet, to complicate matters further, Kuwait even now remained ambivalent: concerned as it must have been, the regime was still reluctant to antagonise the Baghdad regime and so did not wish to discuss confidence-building schemes with the United States. Tension on the border mounted with the deployment of more than 100,000 Iraqi troops, 300 tanks and 300 pieces of heavy artillery on 30 July,83 while a flurry of diplomatic activities, under the auspices of Egyptian and Saudi leaders, was aimed at promoting a peaceful settlement. At that particular moment, US credibility in the eyes of

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Kuwaiti leaders was further weakened by John Kelly’s testimony on 31 July before the House of Representatives Subcommittee on the Middle East.84 In response to Lee Hamilton’s reference to press reports on Defense Secretary Cheney’s remark that the United States would defend Kuwait in case of being attacked, Kelly presented a different picture by arguing that: I don’t know the quotation to which you refer, but I have confidence in the administration’s position on this matter. We don’t have any defence treaty with the Gulf states. That is clear.85 Kelly also confirmed that it was correct to say that the United States had no treaty, no commitments, which would oblige it to use American forces.86 He was believed to be one of the high-ranking US officials who still maintained a favourable attitude towards Iraq. Disenchanted with the US Senate vote by 80:16 on 27 July, in favour of imposing stringent sanctions on Iraq and suspending the $1.2 billion loan guarantees that enabled Iraq to purchase American farm and commercial goods,87 Kelly and other American officials tried to persuade President Bush to adopt less harsh measures.88 Through the British Broadcasting Corporation World Service, Kelly’s statements were received in both Baghdad and Kuwait. Somewhat surprisingly, the general attention accorded to Kelly’s statements was not as high as the one given to Glaspie’s controversial meeting with Saddam, even though it is evident that Kelly’s statements also reflected inconsistency in the US response to the crisis.89 Yet, unlike the case of Glaspie, he was not directly accused of hastening Saddam’s decision to invade Kuwait. But there was a price to pay. Probably due to his pro-Iraqi attitude, the Secretary of State, James Baker, penalised him by despatching him to a quiet ambassadorial post in Finland after the crisis was over. Given the deteriorating situation and Washington’s ambivalence, Ambassador Howell and Hassan Ali al-Ebraheem shared the same opinion that the GCC’s Peninsula Shield had to be the first option for the Kuwaiti regime in defending its territorial integrity.90 But Kuwaiti leaders were fully aware that Iraqi troops apparently outnumbered and outclassed all Arab Gulf States’ armed forces combined together. Relying on the Arab League’s forces, which are mobilised on an emergency and case-by-case basis, has also not been without a problem, for the unanimity principle on voting among member states is still in practice. Kuwaiti leaders did not rule out the potential division among the Arab states in the light of any military confrontation with the Baghdad regime. They also did not hold any hope that the Soviet Union could constrain Saddam’s expansionist policy. With the surprise invasion of their nation, the Kuwaiti Amir and some other members of the ruling family took refuge in Saudi Arabia while leaving their subjects in the lurch. To the Saudi regime, the occupation of Kuwait eliminated a crucial buffer against Iraq. To the US administration, Kuwait’s smallness, if it had not been before, now became strategically significant to the whole Arabian Peninsula. As Thomas McNaugher of the Brookings Institution suggests, ‘Kuwait is more strategically important by default now’.91 With Kuwait previously ranked as a peripheral interest by US administrations, this crisis necessitated a revision of strategic thinking. Thanks to its close proximity to Saudi Arabia, with the world’s greatest oil deposits, and the fear that conflict would spill over and endanger the kingdom, Kuwait now became a central concern. Kuwait convinced the

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United States of the urgent need to expel Iraqi troops from its territory before they were able to cross the border into Saudi territory. Hassan al-Ebraheem, a leading Kuwaiti scholar, confirms the point: We have every reason to believe that his [Saddam’s] intention was to move on to Saudi Arabia from Kuwait. The unexpectedly strong reaction from the United States led to the collapse of this plan.92 Given the fact that its defence forces were in disarray after the invasion, it is very likely that the Kuwaiti regime sought security assistance from the US administration at the beginning of the invasion. With the approval of the Kuwaiti government, President Bush issued an Executive Order on 2 August in order to prevent the Baghdad regime from accumulating all the Kuwaiti government’s property and financial interests,93 some of which were invested in the American financial market. The US government’s intention in curtailing Kuwaiti financial liquidity was actually to protect its own financial stakes. In the early hours of the invasion, the Kuwaiti royal family, already taking refuge in alTa’if, Saudi Arabia and later setting up a government-in-exile,94 initiated this move and sought prompt co-operation from the US administration. In this particular case, the success in protecting mutual financial interests was in large part based on the quick and decisive response of the US administration. The Kuwaiti regime did not have to exercise much influence over the US administration. If, in fact, there was any element of influence involved, it was what W.Raymond Duncan has called co-operative influence, as discussed in Chapter 1 and seen in earlier incident. As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, one may wonder what the American response would have been if Kuwait’s main export had not been oil, but broccoli. In fairness, however, it must be acknowledged that Kuwait’s geo-strategic configuration might still have played a role in US calculations, for the administration’s intention was really to guarantee the protection and security of the Saudi regime.95 When this is taken into account, Kuwait’s security may merely have been, as William B.Quandt argues in Chapter 4, a derivative interest of the US administration. Saudi Arabia’s security may well have played the leading role in the US plan to solve the crisis. Less than a week after the Iraqi invasion, President Bush, in his address from the Oval Office, announced that elements of the Eighty-second Airborne Division together with key units of the US air force had arrived in Saudi Arabia to reinforce the defence of the Saudi regime’s territorial integrity and security.96 The main thrust of this speech was about the major US concern over the Iraqi threat to the Saudi regime, even though President Bush also mentioned very briefly four simple US principles in the Gulf, one of which included the restoration of the legitimate Kuwaiti government. On 22 August, President Bush signed an Executive Order, leading to an increase in the active armed forces available for deployment ‘in and around the Arabian Peninsula’.97 Although Iraqi forces implemented stringent control over opposition movements in Kuwait, sporadic resistance to the Iraqi occupation took place in the form of hitand-run attacks on Iraqi soldiers.98 Peaceful demonstrations were more likely by Kuwaiti people stranded abroad. For example, a 25,000-member group of Kuwaitis in the United Kingdom urged Kuwaiti leaders to seek military assistance from the United States to launch a fast strike on Iraqi forces.99 One Kuwaiti, demonstrating in London against the

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occupation, asked ‘whether the Americans asked anyone before they bombed Libya’.100 This question reflects an incomplete understanding of the foreign policy-making process in the United States. The Kuwaiti Amir also suggested the US administration should launch a quarantine campaign against the Baghdad regime;101 this initiative was integrated into the military plan carried out by the US-led multinational military task force, but, again, it was secondary to the defence of Saudi Arabia. General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a member of the so-called ‘Gang of Eight’,102 also admitted that during discussions with President Bush before his trip to Aspen, Colorado, to see the British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, an agreement was reached on the necessity to ‘draw a line in the sand concerning Saudi Arabia’,103 but no clear-cut solution on how to liberate Kuwait was decided. The differing priorities the US administration attached to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait was reflected in the codenames considered for the operations. Rejecting ‘the Peninsula Shield’ as too awkward and ‘Crescent Shield’ as too ‘Arab’, ‘Desert Shield’ was finally approved as the codename for an operation to prevent an Iraqi advance and defend the Saudi regime, and ‘Desert Storm’, proposed by General Norman Schwarzkopf, was used for the offensive operations against Iraq.104 Although Secretary of Defense Cheney emphasised that the security of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were inseparable, his main concern was obviously to prevent the Iraqi regime from taking control of the Saudi oil fields. As Cheney remarked: You can’t separate Kuwait from Saudi Arabia. When the Iraqis hit the Saudi border, they’re only forty kilometers from the Saudi oil fields. We have the potential here for a major conflict.105 Cheney’s position received enthusiastic support from both Scowcroft and Baker, while Powell still did not believe that Iraqi forces would invade Saudi Arabia. It should be noted that the discussion between high-ranking US officials and Kuwaiti government-in-exile leaders was first made publicly known only almost three weeks after the invasion. It was a procedural meeting in Saudi Arabia between the Kuwaiti Prime Minister, not the Amir, and US Ambassador-designate, Edward Gnehm.106 It was not until 31 August, one month after the invasion, that the Amir held a telephone conversation with President Bush.107 Representing President Bush in subsequent discussions with the Amir was Baker, who paid an official visit to various countries in the Gulf. On 7 September, talks, which included the Kuwaiti Deputy Prime Minister, touched on a military solution if diplomatic channels failed to solve the crisis.108 This meeting was the first time the Amir officially declared that ‘Kuwait does not mind at all contributing financially to cover the cost of the military effort’.109 Perhaps initiated by the Kuwaiti regime, this assurance was probably deemed necessary by both governments in preparation for military operations. In other words, in order to regain its territorial integrity and to assure its own survival, the Kuwaiti regime needed to expend its financial surplus. Compared with the situation that prevailed in the pre-crisis period, it is very likely that the US government found it easy to seek co-operation from the Kuwaiti government in this crisis, for the need on the part of the latter to rely on US military strength clearly outweighed its financial anxieties. In the words of Charles A.Bowsher in the Comptroller General, General Accounting Office (GAO), the US government

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received allied contributions after the invasion and the commencement of Operation Desert Shield in four major categories: participation in troop deployment in the Gulf region; cash donations to the US Treasury; in-kind support to US forces in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states;110 and economic assistance to countries affected by the crisis.111 As of December 1990, Kuwait, together with the United Arab Emirates, Japan, Germany and Korea, pledged to contribute cash and in-kind support worth about $6.7 billion.112 Representing President Bush in his capacity as the Commander-in-Chief of the US armed forces, General Schwarzkopf, Commander of American forces in the Gulf region, had an official meeting with the Kuwaiti Amir, the Defence Minister, Shaykh Nawwaf alAhmad al-Jabir, and the Chief of the General Staff, Major General Mazid ‘Abd alRahman al-Sani.113 There is every reason to believe that this was intended to reassure the Kuwaitis about the American contingency plan of military operations. This meeting perhaps had nothing to do with substantive, in-depth discussion between both sides, since, according to General Powell, he had already agreed with Schwarzkopf that a twotier military response would come into operation.114 The first tier would involve some retaliatory options in the case that Saddam Hussein engaged in only minor armed conflict. But the second tier involved more wide-ranging military retaliation against a more ambitious Iraqi plan in the region. Moreover, Dick Cheney, commissioned by President Bush to negotiate with King Fahd a still-secret three-page agreement,115 received an ‘approval’ from the King in early August to move forces to the region.116 The US military personnel, which were put on alert at the initial stage of military preparations, were the Eighty-second Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, Third Army headquarters in Atlanta and the First Tactical Fighter Wing at Langley Air Force Base in Virginia. The decision to mobilise 184,000 troops entailed political implications, for mobilisation on this scale, as General Powell observed, ‘means pulling people out of their jobs, affecting businesses, disrupting thousands of families’.117 Initial criticism was raised by Les Aspin, the then Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, who demanded that the government should define more clear-cut objectives in Saudi Arabia. Although the American government could restore the Kuwaiti government’s independence and sovereignty, he pointed out, Saddam Hussein could still dictate oil policy in the region.118 Similarly, Senator Joseph R.Biden, Jr urged the Bush administration to place more emphasis on co-operation with the United Nations and the Arab League, particularly in light of the League’s decision to deploy a joint Arab force comprising elements from twelve member countries to deter a further Iraqi attack. Democratic Congressman Robert G.Torricelli from New Jersey warned that the unnecessary ambiguity caused by the delayed response of other countries might put the United States into direct confrontation with the Arabs.119 As if to allay such fears, the US government took the lead in bringing Iraq’s Ba’athist antagonist—Syria—into the allied coalition; it chose Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the son of the Saudi Defence Minister and the Saudi Ambassador to the United States, to liaise with the Asad regime in joining the multinational forces in Desert Shield/Desert Storm Operations.120 Prior to President Bush’s visit to a military base at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, on Thanksgiving, Baker met the Kuwaiti Prime Minister again in early November,121 but one must assume that he was merely briefed on American plans.122 The first summit after the invasion between President Bush and the Kuwaiti Amir took place in Jiddah during the

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President’s visit, after which a joint communiqué noting ‘full agreement’ was issued. As pointed out by Rubinstein, cited in Chapter 1, a joint communiqué may not be effective in giving an exact clue as to who is the influencer in an influence relationship; the communiqué by both leaders in this case was no exception.123 But the speech later delivered by the Amir in honour of President Bush’s visit manifested the former’s complete reliance on the dominant role of the United States in the multinational coalition mobilised in support of Kuwait. The Amir’s speech said: I am duty bound to praise the decisive role played by the Government and the people of the United States of America in standing up to aggression and standing against it. This American stand was not born out of nothing. You are children of your ancestors, who were the early settlers who centuries ago chose to risk and endanger their lives by emigrating to a distant and unknown world rather than submit to oppression and the chaining of freedom. Their hopes in building a free world rejecting humiliation and tyranny have been realised. It has become a shelter for all who love freedom…124 Following this summit, President Bush telephoned the Amir, during which the American initiative received strong support from the Amir.125 American pledges of support came close to being undercut, however, by news reports that both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait secretly sounded out the Iraqi regime to try to conclude a settlement on their border disputes following an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.126 According to Arab exiles in Europe and the United States, this initiative occurred amid the changing developments of the crisis—after the Baghdad regime released all foreign hostages and before the first formal high-level meeting between Baker and ‘Aziz in early January 1991. The two Gulf states’ proposal to Iraq appeared to contain nothing new. The Kuwaiti regime was thought to have proposed allowing the Baghdad regime to lease Warbah and Bubiyan islands for ninety-nine years, an offer which had been put forth earlier by Iraq in July 1990 but was then turned down by the Kuwaiti ruling regime. According to reports, Oman was instrumental in relaying the proposal to Baghdad, since it maintained good relations with both sides of the conflict. But as these reports spread, speculation emerged among the Arab states that the US government might lose its will to go ahead with its war plans.127 As a prompt diplomatic move to clear up the misunderstanding, the Kuwaiti Deputy Prime Minister renounced the news reports by stressing that: His government will not surrender any part of its territory to Iraq for a peaceful solution of the crisis…. The United Nations Security Council resolutions concerning the Gulf crisis do not acknowledge any partial pullout of Iraqi troops from Kuwait.128 The Kuwaiti ambassador to the United States shared this view: Talks are out of the question, as is the concession of a single inch of Kuwaiti territory. This position is totally clear. From what I have sensed

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officially—and this is not the position of my government alone, but the position of our brothers in the Arab world and the US position,…. [T]he resolute and final demand is for a complete and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait.129 Although the deadline for Iraqi withdrawal was set for 15 January 1991, President Bush still had confidence in a diplomatic solution to the crisis. When Baker’s mission to Baghdad scheduled for 12 January failed to materialise, President Bush invited ‘Aziz to Washington for further diplomatic negotiations. The fact that Bush took this decision without consulting or informing any Arab government suggested to some that the United States would be unaccountable in its handling of the crisis. Indeed, leaders of the Arab governments opposed to the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait expressed concern at becoming isolated and vulnerable. On the part of the US government, it was the responsibility of Vice President Dan Quayle to assure the Kuwaiti Amir on New Year’s Day 1991 that any negotiation with the Iraqi representative in Geneva—not in Baghdad or Washington as first reported— would not be at the expense of the Kuwaiti regime.130 He also requested greater financial support for US military operations,131 a request similar to that which he made during his official discussions earlier with Saudi leaders.132 Quayle is unlikely to have faced trouble in securing the contributions on two grounds. First, discussions on this particular issue had already taken place in meetings between Kuwaiti leaders and other high-ranking US officials. Second, the US administration fully realised that the Kuwaiti regime’s dire need at that crucial moment was to regain its sovereignty and liberation of Kuwait. To that end, financial reserves, the national capability the Kuwaiti regime still enjoyed, would be the appropriate means to an overriding end.

US-Kuwaiti relations in the aftermath of the liberation Halfway around the world, we are engaged in a great struggle in the skies and on the seas and sands…. Tonight, I am pleased to report that we are on course. Iraq’s capacity to sustain war is being destroyed. Our investment, our training, our planning—all are paying off. Time will not be Saddam’s salvation…133 Regional security system It was one month after this State of Union Address that President Bush announced the completion of the liberation of Kuwait on 28 February 1991.134 But Kuwaiti leaders realised that the border dispute with the Baghdad regime remained unresolved.135 The immediate task lying ahead for them was the necessity to come up with a defensive framework for the security of their tiny city-state, a scheme which involved an army reconstruction programme, border demarcation with Iraq and security co-operation with other countries in the region or with bigger powers outside. It is obvious that Kuwaiti leaders had the United States in mind as one of their options for this purpose. To rely only on the GCC’s defence co-operation provisions would be inadequate.

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While the crisis was underway, Gnehm, the US Ambassador-designate to Kuwait, urged the Arab Gulf states to form their own security network in co-operation with the West.136 No details were given about the exact structure of the newly proposed security scheme. He merely pointed out that ‘it does not have to be a Nato structure and does not have to be formal… [I]t could include security assistance as we have given our friends in the Gulf in the past’.137 Secretary of State Baker expressed his confidence in the US ability to formulate a regional security structure in the Gulf region after the crisis came to an end: I don’t know any reason why we can’t develop a regional security structure that can constrain this man or any other leader who might have the same ambitions and desires. It worked in Europe. We developed one,…and we developed a regional or perhaps even broader than regional security strategy that worked, and I don’t doubt for one minute that we can do it here.138 In addition to Egyptian forces, the US administration calculated that forces of the Ba’thist regime in Damascus would provide a proper counterweight to Iraqi forces in any military confrontation. It was obvious at the outset that Iraq and Iran would be excluded from any US-initiated regional security body in the Gulf, an arrangement which was criticised, however, by Phebe Marr, an American expert on the Gulf region.139 But in order to strengthen the military capability of any regional security system, the main core members of which were the GCC countries, Egyptian and Syrian forces had to be brought into the equation. This paved the way for the Damascus Declaration of 6 March 1991.140 There are conflicting arguments as to whether this new security framework was initiated by Saudi Arabia or Kuwait. Of course, the Saudi regime wanted to play a leading role in Gulf security. But the smaller Arab Gulf states were and have been suspicious of the Saudi regime’s ‘big brother’ behaviour, which has led to economic, political, and border disputes. Whether or not the six-plus-two formula—that is, the GCC states plus Egypt and Syria—was intended to contain Saudi influence, some believe that Al Sabah regime advocated it in order to keep the United States out of the region. But this argument would clearly be far from true. As mentioned earlier, the Kuwaiti government fully realised that the GCC’s overall defence capability was unable to deter any future threat posed by either Iraq or Iran. Moreover, the more immediate dilemma facing the Kuwaiti government was how to restore the whole of Kuwaiti society through reconstruction programmes with limited resources. It is thus likely Kuwaiti leaders calculated that the reliance on foreign powers to guarantee its security and stability would do no harm to its foreign policy principles. As far as the Damascus Declaration was concerned, the US administration expected that the GCC states would foot the bill for the participation of both Syrian and Egyptian forces. The original version of this new security framework, as Rosemary Hollis argues, consisted of three major parts.141 The GCC formed the main core of the framework; Arab military support cushioned the second part; and finally, if necessary, Western military provisions would be the last resort. Further proof of the US dominant role in launching the ‘Damascus Eight’ was the acknowledgement by the Kuwaiti Prime Minister:

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Kuwait will, in co-operation with its sisters within the GCC and with fraternal and friendly states, work for the establishment of the security in the region. Regarding the method of co-operation among the GCC member states in this regard, Kuwait still cannot specify this now…142 If the Kuwaiti regime had initiated the six-plus-two formula as claimed, the Kuwaiti Prime Minister would presumably have been in position to specify the scope of cooperation among the member states. The statement further indicates that the Kuwaiti regime was not completely convinced of the extent to which the new scheme would provide it security assurance. At a follow-up meeting in Riyadh, US Secretary of State Baker’s proposal for setting up a permanent Gulf peace-keeping force did not remove this sense of uncertainty.143 Hassan Al-Ebraheem’s criticism of this security regime should be noted: [I]f genuine unity of the Gulf people is a prerequisite for stability, it is also evident that the overall security of the Gulf must include the participation of Iran, Iraq, and Yemen. It would be short-sighted to think that Iraq and Iran must not be included as immediate balancing factors in Gulf security just as Egypt and Syria might be seen as external guarantors.144 There is every reason to believe that the US administration was successful in exerting influence over the Kuwaiti regime on this issue. Traumatised by the invasion episode, the regime appeared to have no other choice, except for reliance on US military protection of its vital security interests. In this case, based on Duncan’s indirect influence relationship, it is very likely that the Kuwaiti regime chose to accept the US initiative in establishing the security regime in the region because of the conceivable benefits of the scheme. The US government found it unnecessary to put pressure on the Kuwaiti regime to accept its security plan. The fact that Egypt and the GCC countries did not necessarily share the same security interests in this regional security plan was the major drawback of the Damascus Declaration. Egypt’s intention of joining in the Declaration may have been due to mercenary reasons.145 Apart from financial considerations, the participation of Egyptian forces was apparently in large part due to US pressure. Within Egyptian society, however, there was a cynical view that ‘Egyptian troops patrolling the oil fields would be unlikely to stop sabotage’.146 Moreover, the choice of Damascus as the venue for launching this regional security programme was likely to have reinforced Egyptian leaders’ discontentment with the growing political role of Syria in the Gulf region. The chances of transforming the Damascus Declaration into success were thus small. As Hollis argues: ‘It was not long after the signing of the first draft of the Damascus Declaration that the GCC states began to show signs of having second thoughts about hosting a long-term Egyptian and Syrian military presence in the Gulf’.147 The Egyptian and Syrian troops’ withdrawal from the region during May-June 1991 exposed how shaky the scheme was. The deployment of tens of thousands of these troops in the region had resulted in huge financial burdens for the Gulf states. But the Egyptian and Syrian governments questioned whether future GCC financial contributions would be sufficient

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to sustain operations and to pay for Egyptian and Syrian military personnel. The principal concern was that with a cash-flow problem, the GCC states faced the more immediate needs of settling the war debts and earmarking their decreased financial reserves for reconstruction purposes.148 As Charles Tripp observes: ‘Despite repeated appeals to the spirit of the Damascus Declaration during the following year or so, nothing substantial materialized’.149 The final draft of the Damascus Declaration was discussed and approved by the foreign ministers of the GCC, Egypt and Syria at a meeting in Kuwait on 16 July 1991, resulting in an agreement to downplay the role of Egyptian and Syrian forces in any implementation of the plan.150 Military co-operation Fully aware of this security regime’s shortcomings, Kuwait again sought military cooperation from bigger powers on a bilateral basis, especially the United States. This caused disagreement between the Kuwaiti regime and the Egyptian government, which claimed the Kuwaiti decision was against the spirit of the Damascus Declaration.151 A strong denial was heard from the Kuwaiti Information Minister: The Damascus Declaration did not prevent any of its signatories to seek the assistance of any friendly country for certain security arrangements. In this respect, Kuwaiti-American talks were underway for concluding facilities agreement.152 Prior to that, the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister had confirmed, after a meeting with members of the Kuwaiti National Council, that the government was negotiating security agreements with both the United States and Great Britain.153 The Deputy Speaker of the National Council, Rashid Awad al-Juwaysiri, announced that an agreement with the US government was ‘a matter of great importance now’.154 From the Kuwaitis’ perspective, a stimulus for concluding the security agreement with the United States was an Iraqi infiltration into Bubiyan island in late August 1991, an incident which was investigated by the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM), the head of which was General Gunther Greindl of Austria.155 Despite the strong claims of the Foreign Ministry Under-Secretary, it may have been the case, as General Greindl remarked, that the infiltration was carried out by civilians who inhabited the demilitarised zone. General Greindl himself visited Bubiyan island and found no evidence of infiltration.156 However, to investigate the claim further, an inquiry board was officially appointed, made up of three military observers, one each from India, Ireland and the United States. The Kuwaiti Defence Minister’s visit to Washington, DC in early September 1991 paved the way for an official visit by the Amir to attend the signing ceremony of the tenyear security agreement with the US government on 19 September.157 Before arriving in Washington, the Amir paid a short visit to Saudi Arabia to inform Saudi leaders about this development. This agreement manifested ‘a long and visible presence in Kuwait’.158 But Kuwaiti leaders, especially the Defence Minister, were still opposed to any plan to establish a permanent military base in Kuwait because the Iraqi regime might, in effect, be

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provoked. Widely believed to be initiated by the Kuwaiti government, the agreement involved co-operation in joint military exercises, US military training programmes for Kuwaiti armed forces, arms sales to Kuwait, prepositioning of US military weapons and equipment, and US access to Kuwaiti facilities.159 Not surprisingly, this security agreement came under criticism from various circles. The Iraqi Prime Minister, Dr Sa’dun Hammadi, considered the agreement as ‘against Arab national security and will divide the Arab nation and threaten its security and future’.160 He further argued that ‘the Kuwaiti rulers have always had intention of establishing a direct coalition with the foreigner to make sure they remain in power’.161 A stronger condemnation was heard from Ayatollah Yazdi, the head of the Iranian judiciary, who considered the American military presence as the cause of additional regional insecurity.162 The Kuwaiti Charge d’Affairs in Teheran was summoned by the Director of the Persian Gulf desk of the Iranian Foreign Ministry, who emphasised that ‘the security of the Persian Gulf region will only be achieved through co-operation between the countries of the region’.163 These criticisms aside, both the US and Kuwaiti governments moved ahead with the military co-operation programmes.164 In order to substitute for a permanent military base on Kuwaiti territory, the prepositioning of limited American equipment was put in place, starting with 58 M1-A1 and M1-A2 tanks, 58 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles, artillery, and trucks, which were adequate for three armoured and three mechanised companies.165 It has always been an American concern that too great a quantity of US weapons prepositioned in Kuwait might fall into the hands of its enemies. The Kuwaiti government had an immediate obligation to pay $215 million for prepositioning aid and support, together with $50 million in 1992.166 This military equipment played a major role in deterring Iraqi forces in border confrontations that occurred in August 1992 and October 1994. In addition to the prepositioning scheme, arms sales to the Kuwaiti government was a major element of the agreement. In order to upgrade Kuwait’s air defence systems, the Bush administration proposed selling Kuwait a $2.5-billion arms package of sophisticated defence weapons, including 450 Patriot and 342 Hawk missiles, 6 Patriot firing units, 1 training unit, and supporting equipment such as radar sets, engagement control stations, launching stations and 6 batteries of the Hawk medium-range missile system.167 The Kuwaiti government demanded the inclusion of the Patriot missiles because of their expected capability in neutralising incoming missiles launched by Iraq.168 When the Kuwaiti government decided to order more tanks, its choice was the M1-A2 tanks, produced by the Falls Church-based General Dynamic Corporation; not the British Challenger 2 tanks, manufactured by Vickers PLC, whose main business involves making tanks, Rolls-Royce cars and Cosworth engines.169 The total value of this sales transaction was about $4 billion, comprising $1.2 billion worth of 236 tanks and a $2.8billion programme for spare parts and ammunition. The Kuwaiti Defence Minister defended the decision to choose the United States because ‘it meets most of the requirements of the Kuwaiti army and performs better in desert fighting conditions, as was demonstrated during the war for the liberation of Kuwait’.170 Some politicians in London, however, charged that the Kuwaiti decision was based on political pressure from American leaders. It was disclosed that before the decision was

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made in Kuwait, Dick Cheney wrote letters to both the Kuwaiti Prime Minister and Defence Minister on 14 and 16 September 1992, respectively; Vice President Quayle wrote to the Prime Minister on 24 September; and finally, President Bush wrote to the Amir.171 From the American perspective, this sale was crucial for the Republican Party in the 1992 presidential election. A successful deal would lead to the assurance that about 5,900 jobs in Ohio and Michigan would be secured. President Bush tried very hard to win the electoral votes of both Ohio and Michigan, with 21 and 18 electoral votes respectively. Kuwaiti decision-makers had already felt beholden to some extent to the Bush administration for its crucial role in liberating Kuwait, and this high-level American persuasion only accentuated the disposition towards the United States. But considered thus as a ‘political reward’ for the administration, the decision disappointed the British Prime Minister John Major, who also attempted to secure the order for a British firm.172 President Bush’s defeat by Bill Clinton in November 1992 caused surprise and disappointment among Kuwaiti leaders. In April 1993, the Amir invited former President Bush to visit Kuwait on the Amir’s personal jet. The official treatment which Bush, considered the Gulf war saviour, received during this visit reflected the Kuwaiti leaders’ gratefulness to ‘Great Bush’—a caption on a signboard with the image of Bush in Arab head-dress between the American and Kuwaiti flags.173 An unprecedented element of military co-operation between the two countries, which first took place under the Bush administration, was the joint military exercises under the ten-year security agreement signed in September 1991. First launched as landing exercises involving a small contingent of forces from both countries, the third military exercise, codenamed Iris Gold, was carried out in December 1991.174 A joint air force military exercise, codenamed Enthusiastic Rifleman, took place in June 1992.175 Another major military exercise, codenamed Operation Intrinsic Action held in August 1992, involved the participation of 2,400 US troops from the First Cavalry Division at Fort Hood, Texas and members of the Fifth Special Forces Group from Fort Campbell, Kentucky.176 Both Kuwaiti leaders and Dick Cheney denied that these military exercises, defensive in nature, would provoke the Iraqi regime. Against the background of these closer military relations, Kuwaiti leaders did not completely rule out other opportunities for building up military ties with the four other permanent members of the UN Security Council. For instance, Kuwait has signed four defence agreements with the British government since 1991. A ten-year military pact was signed on 11 March 1992, followed by a technical co-operation agreement on 31 August 1992, an arms sales protocol on 22 September 1992 and another agreement on 2 December 1992.177 France was also another option. Two new agreements were signed on 18 August 1992 and 18 October 1993, involving the provision of technical assistance, modernisation of the Kuwaiti navy and joint military exercises. Three military cooperation agreements were also concluded with the Russian government. On 16 February 1993, an agreement was signed on the exchange of military delegations and information, followed by two other agreements signed on 29 November 1993 and 8 August 1994. The Beijing government also joined the club by signing an agreement with the Kuwaiti government on 24 March 1995, under which the Chinese government would provide assistance for the Kuwaiti government to reorganise its armed forces.178 Joint military exercises with these major powers were also carried out on many occasions, with no public objection by the US government. Having signed the agreement

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with the United States, Kuwait was no longer a non-aligned country. But its decision to sign defence and military-related agreements with four other great powers suggests that the desire for foreign policy flexibility still prevails, leaving room for its leaders to play one off against another and so exercise some influence again over the great powers.

Conclusion When President Bush took office in January 1989, his administration and the Kuwaiti government could never have predicted that their relationship would develop to be as close as it was. In the aftermath of the reflagging policy, US-Kuwaiti relations continued to experience elements of irritation, but not enough to damage the basic connection between the two countries. Agreements and disagreements over some long-standing political issues remained part of the relationship process. As always, Kuwait was a peripheral interest on the US national interest ranking list. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, a crisis which was beyond the control of both the US and Kuwaiti governments, was, of course, the catalyst hastening the improvement of relations between the two countries. An influence relationship occurred during the crisis, leading to the closer relationship. Kuwait, as a small state with a geo-strategically vital location and huge financial surplus, was able to persuade the US government to commit American lives and materiel to come to its liberation, even though there is some evidence that the US government’s real intention was to protect Saudi Arabia. Kuwaiti leaders made the reasonable calculation that it would be in the interest of the United States to play a leading role in solving the crisis; Kuwait’s need and the American hope of stabilising the Gulf converged, and a co-operative influence relationship developed. During the period of the pre-war crisis, the Kuwaiti leaders’ role was apparently overshadowed by Saudi leaders who were in close consultation with high-ranking American government officials. It should also be pointed out that in seeking Kuwait’s financial contribution to the liberation operations, the US government was in a strong position to secure what it wanted from the Kuwaitis. But the Kuwaitis were not merely passive, or simply dicated to. Negotiations on this issue took place within the context of co-operative influence, under which the US government was able to extract the preferred behaviour from the Kuwaiti government, because of a cold calculation of the benefits to be derived from the co-operation. Once the liberation of Kuwait was completed, the Bush administration was successful in putting the finishing touch on attempts to improve the relationship. More positive attitudes towards the US government naturally existed. The Kuwaiti regime showed more confidence in American military co-operation and protection, highlighted by the conclusion of the ten-year defence agreement. In order to appear relatively independent of the United States, however, the Kuwaiti regime also decided to sign similar agreements with other great powers. Notwithstanding this, US inroads into the Gulf region have been greatly enhanced by its new-found close relationship with the Kuwaiti regime.

Conclusion When actors, especially states in the international system, interact with each other, they normally have a clear-cut objective in mind—to maximise their national interests at minimal cost. There is no distinction between big powers and small states in this regard. A common myth exists, however, that, in the relationship between two states which are unequal in national attributes, the bigger and stronger power will always be in complete control over the smaller and weaker state. The small state will always be under the influence, political, military, or economic, of the bigger power. Diplomacy and the concept of influence are clearly inseparable from each other. But influence may carry a negative connotation.1 Through diplomatic skills, states seek to influence other states’ decisions and policies, but they wish to avoid being influenced themselves. The relationship between the United States and Kuwait, examples of states with widely different national attributes, was also expected to fall into this conventional category. But, according to this book, this was not always the case. Efforts in this study are heavily aimed at both analysing and explaining the bilateral influence relationship between the United States and Kuwait only, to the exclusion of other Gulf states. Any relationship or contact prior to Kuwaiti independence was monitored by the British government, which played the main role in conducting external affairs for its New Jersey-sized protectorate. Early American roles and activities, carried out by private American citizens in Kuwait, were confined to humanitarian, philanthropic and commercial missions. Therefore, any opportunity for the US government to exert an element of influence over Kuwait’s ruling regime was non-existent. However, the US government’s involvement with its nationals’ presence in Kuwait took place in the form of negotiating with the British government for protecting their economic stake in Kuwait. Direct relations between the US and Kuwaiti governments occurred shortly after Kuwait became independent in 1961, although the US government obviously considered the smaller Gulf shaykhdoms less significant than the larger states in the region—Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq. Peripheral interest would best describe the US perspective towards these smaller Arab Gulf states, which were often considered as a ‘whole unit’, not as individual states. Both governments realised these apparent discrepancies in their national attributes/capabilities. US leaders were perhaps so optimistic about influencing the Kuwaiti regime’s decisions that they overlooked the possibility, even at times likelihood, of the Kuwaiti government countering US national interests. The consequence which followed was an uneasy relationship between the two countries. However small the size of its country, the Kuwaiti government has sought to play a leading role in international politics, both at the regional and the international levels. As Peter R.Baehr observes, ‘small’ and ‘large’ are relative concepts, based on differences in interpretation.2 Common characteristics of small states as proposed by leading scholars— for example, David Vital, Annette Baker Fox and Michael Handel, as discussed in Chapter 1—are not agreed. Handel argues that a small state will, in most cases, possess

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limited economic resources, thereby weakening its ability to enjoy a strong economic system. But in the case of Kuwait, although it has only a small territory and weak military capability, its oil-generated financial reserves have enabled the regime to carry out a diplomatically active role in international affairs, at times clashing with a bigger power’s interests or policies. As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, Kuwait’s official position on the Arab-Israeli conflict was in contrast with the long-standing US position on this historical issue. The Kuwaiti government was as critical of American support for the Israeli government in the June 1967 war as it would be in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. While the US administrations provided diplomatic, political, military and financial assistance to Israel, the Kuwaiti government threw its support behind the Palestinians’ cause diplomatically, politically and financially. No change in each government’s position on the issue was forthcoming. As this issue and the issue of arms sales—discussed in Chapters 3 and 5—testify, Kuwaiti leaders were aware of the complexity of American domestic politics. They came to the conclusion that in order to effectively influence the US leaders’ decisions and policies, they had to deal not only with the executive branch at the White House but also with leaders of Congress. With the check-and-balance system in place, Kuwaiti leaders realised that the United States did not possess a unitary political order. Open discussions at various Congressional hearings sometimes revealed sensitive information, which put the Kuwaiti regime in an embarrassing position and stimulated unhappiness in the Kuwaiti media and parts of the public. On the other hand, American politicians with differing political orientations provided opportunities for the Kuwaiti government to play off one group against another, as in the arms sales deal of 1973. The chances of Kuwaiti success in exploiting domestic divisions were low, however. By way of contrast, in order to influence the Kuwaiti regime, the US administration was able to focus clearly on a small number of the key decision-makers in the Kuwaiti administration, mainly consisting of the Amir, the Crown Prince and Prime Minister, and the Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister. But the US administration was still not successful in changing the Kuwaiti government’s opposition on the Palestinian question in particular, so deep were Kuwaiti sentiments on the matter. Although public opinion is rarely thought to be relevant in a monarchical political order, Kuwait has long tolerated a degree of political openness, even dissent. Its press has been particularly vigorous and somewhat independent. The result has been that, regardless of American wishes, the Kuwaiti government has had, to some extent, to calibrate its policies with domestic opinion. As the sensitivity over accepting an American military mission on Kuwaiti soil in the early 1970s showed, the regime could not be too far ahead of its own constituencies. Kuwait, one of the leading members of OPEC and OAPEC, declared economic war on the US government by using its oil resources as a political weapon. Together with other Arab oil-producing countries which carried out the oil boycott, Kuwait wanted the United States to suspend, or at least to lessen, its political, economic and military support for the government in Tel Aviv. This preferred behaviour obviously failed to come about, and the attempt to exercise assertive influence in this specific circumstance, in the terminology of W.Raymond Duncan, failed to yield fruit. As Duncan defines it, an assertive influence relationship is a kind of influence caused by means of resorting to sanctions. The Kuwaiti regime hoped that the oil sanctions would alter the US

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government’s position on the Arab-Israeli conflict, because, despite its reluctance, the American government would foresee the greater cost in not acting according to Kuwait’s pressure. It is clear that the influence relationship in this case was unsuccessful because both parties had completely different interests. Indeed, the US-Kuwaiti relationship was not always long on co-operation. The British Labour government’s announcement in January 1968 to withdraw its troops from East of Aden should have provided a pretext for the United States and Kuwait to conclude more military co-operation. But, as Chapter 3 shows, the Kissingerinitiated ‘twin-pillar’ policy meant that the Nixon administration failed to give much significance to a ‘small’ Arab state like Kuwait. This policy depended in large part on Saudi Arabia politically and Iran militarily. However, the 1973 crisis over limited armed clashes on the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border paved the way for circumscribed military co-operation between the two countries at the request of the Kuwaiti government. In order to forge a closer relationship with the Kuwaiti regime, the US government commissioned a Defense Department survey team to carry out a study of Kuwait’s defence needs, but the US government continued to exclude Kuwait from the ‘core countries’ of its ‘twin-pillar’ policy. American policymakers apparently subscribed to the conception of Kuwait as a minor player, even almost a nuisance, despite the fact that it occupied a strategically vital position in the Persian Gulf region. Opportunities emerged for the US administration to exercise influence over the Kuwaiti regime when President Carter came to power in January 1977. Chapter 4 reveals that both the United States and Kuwait faced two major crises which were beyond their control, but which had far-reaching implications for their national interests. One would have imagined that the Iranian Revolution in February 1979 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 would have upgraded both countries’ relationship due to the common threats confronting them. But the Kuwaiti regime exercised its independence vigorously by failing to co-operate with the United States in handling these crises. Debates on whether they should be treated as the turning points in the relationship remain inconclusive. From the perspective of the Kuwaiti regime, the maintenance of the diplomatic relationship with Moscow outweighed any benefits that would be derived from following the American policy of boycotting the summer Olympic Games held in Moscow in 1980. Non-co-operative policies aside, the US government also came under a barrage of criticism from both Kuwaiti leaders and the Kuwaiti press. Under these circumstances, the US government had little room in which to transform its national power into any influence over the Kuwaiti government’s decisions, and even the implicit threat of sanctions would have had limited effect or backfired in light of the unfavourable domestic environment in Kuwait. Neither assertive influence nor co-operative influence was thus possible, and US relations with Kuwait under President Carter remained largely unchanged. With Reagan’s landslide victory over the incumbent Carter in the 1980 presidential election, nobody in the United States and Kuwait would have predicted that the two countries’ relations would be greatly transformed during his presidency. But, as Chapter 5 indicates, more evidence of influence was found during his two four-year terms in office than in the two previous decades. In these cases, Kuwaiti leaders, fully aware of the huge differences in respective national capabilities, were not inhibited in dealing with

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the United States on an equal footing. Kuwait’s surprise rejection of the US ambassadordesignate brought embarrassment to the Reagan administration. Although there was no diplomatic regulation prohibiting Kuwait from rejecting an ambassadorial appointment, the US government was concerned that the Kuwaiti decision might set a precedent for other small states to follow. It thus feared the potential sanction of wider difficulties, and Kuwait may be said to have exercised assertive influence. In the case of the attempt of the Kuwaitis to buy American Stinger missiles, one can say that they exercised leverage, to some extent, over the administration, but failed to convince the Congress. The White House initially thought that American interests would be served by the sale, but once significant opposition on the Hill emerged, Reagan abandoned the Kuwaitis for the sake of domestic political peace. As has been seen in other stances, here too domestic politics—precisely because it was divided—was a critical and constraining factor. If other examples are considered, Iran under the Shah was successful in exercising influence over the US government on at least one occasion. In 1972, the Nixon administration gave in to the Iranian government’s demand for a major arms supply out of mutual concern over the close relationship between the Iraqis and the Soviet Union under the leadership of Leonid Brezhnev. Another close ally of the United States and small state, Israel, also succeeded in influencing the US position on the Arab—Israeli conflict on some occasions.3 In each case, a significant domestic consensus in the United States facilitated the goal of the smaller state. If it is asked whether any small Arab state has proved to be as successful in directing the US position on a specific issue, the answer must be Kuwait. A case in point is the US reflagging policy, in which both parties shared mutual interests, paving the way, as discussed in Chapter 5, for a relatively minor state like Kuwait to exercise some influence over the US administration. Co-operative influence, therefore, may best describe the relationship between the two countries during this operation. This kind of influence relationship is a result of inducement or persuasion carried out by one country to encourage the other country to perform a specific action that would be of mutual interest to both. The Kuwaiti attempts to draw in the US reflagging operations proved successful because the Kuwaiti government tried to make the point that American involvement in the operation would mean a smaller Soviet presence in the Gulf region than might otherwise be the case—a scenario that corresponded with the US government’s objective. In effect, the Kuwaitis exploited entrenched American fears of Soviet expansionism, and, by inviting a Soviet role in the reflagging, prompted the Americans to recognise that their interests lay in a strong role of their own. Although one can argue that Kuwait’s success was in large part due to the context of superpower rivalry in the Gulf region, some credit must be given to the Kuwaiti regime for shrewdly playing off one superpower against the other. As a consequence, the uneasy relationship facing both the United States and Kuwait was ameliorated by this ‘mending-the-fence’ episode. The final outcome of the operations confirmed to Kuwaiti leaders that military relations between the two countries might provide a channel through which stronger relations might be forged. Another international crisis, considered in Chapter 6, which erupted with the surprise Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, was instrumental in bringing the two countries’

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ties closer. To the Kuwaiti regime, American military capability was the best option on which to rely in order to liberate the nation. But from the US perspective, the invasion also suddenly posed an immediate threat to the Saudi regime, obviously regarded as a more significant ally on the Arabian peninsula than the small state of Kuwait. The leading American role in drumming up international opposition to the invasion stemmed principally from the US leaders’ belief that Saudi Arabia would very likely be the next target of Saddam Hussein’s grand design. Under these circumstances, the Kuwaiti regime maximised the significance of its geostrategic location in getting American military assistance to salvage its independence and territorial integrity. Coincidentally, the US administration and Congress tended to agree that a clear-cut plan to protect Saudi Arabia was needed. Co-operative influence thus best explains the influence relationship in this particular case: the United States decided to get involved with the liberation plan because it saw that its interests were served in doing so, not least because of its overriding concern for the national security of the Saudi regime. The military operation, according to American military strategists and decision-makers, would serve their commitment to prevent the other Persian Gulf states from collapsing. If Kuwait had previously been seen as a ‘peripheral interest’, it was now, even more than it had been since 1979, a ‘derivative’ one—that is, more important than before but still defined in relation to the primary interest in Saudi Arabia. In the aftermath of the liberation, US—Kuwaiti relations have become firmly enhanced. Very much concerned with their own security, the other smaller Arab Gulf states—Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates—may also perceive that the United States is the proper place to seek security assistance.4 Probably to the surprise of the US administration, the Kuwaiti government’s initiative in concluding a defence agreement with the United States has provided for a wider American military presence in the Gulf region, in addition to that created by the agreements with Saudi Arabia and Oman. In addition to these security arrangements, the Clinton administration’s decision in 1994 to set up the Persian Gulf Fifth Fleet, headquartered in Bahrain,5 has created a formidable deterrent force against any possible military operation launched by the Iraqi regime again. Against this background, it seems that the Bush administration was successful in bringing all of the oil-rich Arab Gulf states closer into the American orbit. However, it must be pointed out that the Kuwaiti regime also signed defence agreements with the other four permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. There is no denying that this small state seems prepared and able to exert an element of influence in its relationship with the United States in the future as it has done in the past, and the US administration would do well to avoid complacency. Although the measure of influence is imprecise, the diverse indicators proposed by Alvin Z.Rubinstein and discussed in Chapter 1—the kinds of direct interaction, changes in perception, shifts in specific policies—suggest that Kuwait has often risen above its expected ‘station’ in the international order. If not exactly a superpower, to invoke the half-serious remark of King Faysal of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait has cast a long shadow on the regional landscape. As this book has shown, the influence relationship between the Kuwaiti regime and the US government has not been unidirectional, but has depended on the convergence or divergence of interests between the two countries and the specific circumstances of domestic and international politics which each has been able to exploit.

Notes 1 Framework of analysis 1 C.E.Diggines, the former British High Commissioner, regards small states as no new phenomenon. C.E.Diggines, The problems of small states’, The Round Table, Vol. 74, No. 295 (July 1985), p. 191. 2 Despite the Greek government’s strong opposition, Macedonia in April 1993 became the 181st member of the United Nations (UN) on two conditions: it was officially accepted in the world body under the temporary name of The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’; and it did not fly its national flag at the UN headquarters. See The Guardian, 8 April 1993, p. 13; The Independent, 9 April 1993, p. 13; 10 April 1993, p. 8. 3 A good discussion on this point is found in S.F.Lemass, ‘Small states in international organisations’, in August Schou and Arne Olav Brundtland, eds, Small States in International Relations (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1971), pp. 115–22. 4 David Crystal, ed., The Cambridge Factfinder (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 210. 5 Ibid., p. 213. 6 Jonathan Alford, ‘Security dilemmas of small states’, The Round Table, Vol. 73, No. 292 (October 1984), p. 377. 7 Burton Benedict, ed., Problems of Smaller Territories (London: The Athlone Press, 1967), p. 2. 8 Peter R.Baehr, ‘Small states: a tool for analysis’, World Politics, Vol. 27 (1975), p. 459. 9 Hilding Eek, ‘The conception of small states’, in Schou and Brundtland, eds, Small States in International Relations, p. 11. 10 Raimo Vayrynen, ‘On the definition and measurement of small power status’, Co-operation and Conflict: Nordic Journal of International Politics, Vol. 6, No. 2 (1971), p. 91. 11 Ibid. 12 Jean-Luc Vellut, ‘Smaller states and the problem of war and peace: some consequences of the emergence of smaller states in Africa’, Journal of Peace Research, No. 4 (1967), p. 254. 13 Ibid., p. 255. 14 Ibid., p. 256. 15 Ibid. 16 David Vital, The Inequality of States: A Study of the Small Power in International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), p. 8. 17 R.P.Barston, ed., The Other Powers: Studies in the Foreign Policies of Small States (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1973), p. 15. See also R.P.Barston, The external relations of small states’, in Schou and Brundtland, eds, Small States in International Relations, pp. 41, 43 and 50. 18 T.G.Masaryk, The Problem of Small Nations in the European Crisis (London: University of London, Athlone Press, 1966), p. 23; J.A.R.Marriott, Federalism and the Problem of the Small State (London: Allen and Unwin, 1943), p. 62. 19 Patricia Wohlgemuth Blair, The Mini-State Dilemma, Occasional Paper No. 6, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (October 1967), p. 3, cited in Hassan Ali al-Ebraheem, Kuwait and the Gulf: Small States and the International System (Washington, DC: Center for

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Contemporary Arab Studies, London: Croom Helm, 1984), p. 22; J.R.Harbert, ‘The behaviour of the mini-states in the United Nations, 1971–72’, International Organization, Vol. 30 (1976), pp. 109–27. 20 Annette Baker Fox, The Power of Small States: Diplomacy in World War II (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1959). 21 Michael Handel, Weak States in the International System (London: Frank Cass, 1981), p. 31. 22 Ibid. 23 See M.Singer, Weak States in a World of Powers (New York: Free Press, 1972); R.L.Rothstein, The Weak in the World of the Strong (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977). 24 Handel, Weak States in the International System, p. 30. 25 R.Baehr, ‘Small states: a tool for analysis?’, p. 459. 26 Ibid. 27 In his book on Weak States in the International System, Handel referred to these criteria as intuitive criteria. 28 Fox, The Power of Small States, p. 184. 29 C.E.Diggines, The problems of small states’, p. 193. 30 Handel, Weak States in the International System, p. 220. 31 Peter J.Lloyd, International Trade Problems of Small Nations (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1968), p. 16, cited in Handel, Weak States in the International System, p. 228. 32 Robert L.Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 29. 33 Vayrynen, ‘On the definition and measurement of small power states’, p. 95. 34 Robert O.Keohane, ‘Lilliputians’ dilemmas: small states in international politics’, International Organization, 23 (Spring 1969), p. 293. 35 Robert Purnell, The Society of States: An Introduction to International Politics (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973), pp. 98–9. 36 See the study of state-building processes in both Kuwait and Qatar in Jill Crystal, Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 37 The leading literature on this subject is authored by Abdul-Reda Assiri, Kuwait’s Foreign Policy: City-State in World Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990). However, it explains to a lesser extent the ruling regime’s decision-making process of formulating Kuwait’s foreign policy. 38 See Maria Papadakis and Harvey Starr, ‘Opportunity, willingness, and small states: the relationship between environment and foreign policy’, in Charles F.Hermann, Charles W.Kegly, Jr and James N.Rosenau, eds, New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy (Boston, MA: Allen & Unwin, 1987), pp. 409–32. 39 See footnote 2 in Alvin Z.Rubinstein, Red Star on the Nile: The Soviet-Egyptian Influence Relationship Since the June War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. xii. 40 Ibid., p. xiv. 41 Examples of which include books written by R.K.Ramazani, The United States and Iran: The Patterns of Influence (New York: Praeger Publisher, 1982); Bernard Reich, The United States and Israel: Influence in the Special Relationship (New York: Praeger Publisher, 1984); Oles M.Smolansky with Bettie M.Smolansky, The USSR and Iraq: The Soviet Quest for Influence (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1991). 42 Center for Defense Information, Washington, DC, ‘Soviet geopolitical momentum: myth or menace? Trends of Soviet influence around the world from 1945 to 1986’, Defence Monitor, Vol. 15, No. 5 (1986), p. 2. Cited in Smolansky with Smolansky, The USSR and Iraq, p. 2. 43 Smolansky with Smolansky, The USSR and Iraq, p. 2. 44 Ibid.

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45 W.Raymond Duncan, The Soviet Union and Cuba: Interests and Influence (New York: Praeger Publisher, 1985), p. 3. 46 J.David Singer, ‘Inter-nation influence: a formal model’, in James N.Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory (New York: Free Press, 1969), p. 381. 47 Ibid., p. 382. 48 The detailed discussion is found in ibid., pp. 383–5. 49 Ibid., p. 384. 50 Duncan, The Soviet Union and Cuba, p. 15. 51 Rubinstein, Red Star on the Nile, p. xv. 52 Singer, ‘Inter-nation influence: a formal model’, p. 385. 53 Duncan, The Soviet Union and Cuba, p. 13. 54 Ramazani, The United States and Iran, p. xvi; Rubinstein, Red Star on the Nile, p. xiv. 55 Duncan, The Soviet Union and Cuba, p. 15. 56 Rubinstein, Red Star on the Nile, p. xv. 57 Ibid. 58 Singer, ‘Inter-nation influence: a formal model’, p. 387. 59 Duncan, The Soviet Union and Cuba, p. 4. 60 Ibid., p. 5. 61 Ibid. 62 Ibid. 63 Smolansky with Smolansky, The USSR and Iraq, p. 5. 64 Ibid. 65 Cited in ibid., p. 8. 66 Rubinstein, Red Star on the Nile, p. xvii. 67 Ibid., p. xxii.

2 Background to US—Kuwaiti relations: the pre-1961 period 1 J.C.Hurewitz, The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics: A Documentary Record, Vol. I (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1975), p. 476; Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951: The Near East and Africa, Vol. V, 82nd Congress, 2nd session—House Document no. 82–570 (Washington, DC: US Government printing office, 1982), p. 999 (hereafter cited as FRUS). 2 Sir Rupert Hay, ‘The impact of the oil industry on the Persian Gulf Shaykhdoms’, Middle East Journal, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Autumn 1958), p. 362. 3 John C.Campbell, Defense of the Middle East: Problems of American Policy (New York: Frederick A.Praeger Publishers, 1960), p. 29. 4 William R.Polk, The United States and the Arab World, 2nd edn (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975), p. 363. 5 Interview with Brooks Wrampelmeier, then desk officer in the 1970s in the Arabian Peninsula Directorate, the State Department, Washington, DC, 24 August 1993. 6 Abdul-Reda Ali Assiri, ‘The impact of arms and oil politics on United States relations with the Arabian Gulf States, 1968–78’, an unpublished PhD thesis, University of California, Riverside, June 1981, p. 16. 7 Ibid., p. 15. 8 Ibid., p. 16. 9 Cited in Richard F. Nyrop, Beryl Lieff Benderly, Laraine Newhouse Carter, William W. Cover, Robert A.Kirchner, Philip W.Moelleer, William A.Mussen, Jr, Clarance Edward Pike

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and Rinn-Sup Shinn, Area Handbook for the Persian Gulf States (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 135. 10 Joseph Malone, ‘America and the Arabian Peninsula: the first two hundred years’, Middle East Journal, Vol. XXX (Summer 1976), p. 411. 11 John A.Denovo, American Interests and Policies in the Middle East, 1900–1939 (Minneapolis, MN: The University of Minnesota Press, 1963), p. 355. 12 Nyrop, et al., Area Handbook for the Persian Gulf States, p. 135. 13 Zahra Freeth and Victor Winstone, Kuwait: Prospect and Reality (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1972), p. 74. 14 Ibid., p. 74; Ministry of Guidance and Information of Kuwait, Kuwait Today: A Welfare State (Nairobi: Quality Publications, Ltd, n.d.), p. 41. 15 Interview with Muhammad Sabah al-Salim Al Sabah, the Kuwaiti Ambassador in Washington, DC, 18 October 1993. 16 Mary Cubberly Van Pelt, ‘The Sheikhdom of Kuwait’, Middle East Journal, Vol. IV, No. 1 (January 1950), p. 20. 17 Nyrop, et al., Area Handbook for the Persian Gulf States, p. 135. 18 Interview with Nathaniel W.Howell, former US Ambassador to Kuwait, Charlottesville, Virginia, 9 September 1993. 19 American Consulate, Kuwait to the State Department, Washington, DC, 22 November 1954, Record Group (hereafter cited as RG) 59 886D.572/11–254 LWC, the National Archives, Washington, DC (hereafter cited as NA). 20 Interview with John Duke Anthony, Washington, DC, 28 October 1993. 21 Jill Crystal also suggests that Shaykh Mubarak allowed in 1911 the Arabian Missions of the Reformed Church from America to work in Kuwait. See Jill Crystal, Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 25. 22 Jill Crystal, Kuwait: The Transformation of an Oil State (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), p. 68. 23 Interview with Duke Anthony, Washington, DC, 28 October 1993. 24 Crystal, Kuwait: The Transformation of an Oil State, p. 68. 25 Ibid. 26 Reference to this term was made in Assiri, ‘The impact of arms and oil policies on United States relations with the Arabian Gulf States, 1968–78’, p. 16. 27 Ibid., p. 17; Denovo, American Interests and Policies in the Middle East, 1900–39, p. 355. 28 David E.Long, The United States and Saudi Arabia: Ambivalent Allies (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), p. 10. 29 A.H.T.Chisholm, The First Kuwait Oil Concession Agreement: A Record of the Negotiations, 1911–34 (London: Frank Cass, 1975), p. xi. 30 Ibid. 31 Nyrop, et al., Area Handbook for the Persian Gulf States, p. 91 32 Freeth and Winstone, Kuwait: Prospect and Reality, pp. 130, 144; David E.Long, a leading US expert on Persian Gulf affairs, regards Major Frank Holmes as an entrepreneur and adventurer in the oil industry. See Long, The United States and Saudi Arabia: Ambivalent Allies, p. 12. 33 Nyrop, et al., Area Handbook for the Persian Gulf States, p. 91. 34 Chisholm, The First Kuwait Oil Concession Agreement, p. xii. 35 Ibid., p. xii; Freeth and Winstone, Kuwait: Prospect and Reality, p. 78. 36 Ibid., p. 134. 37 Chisholm, The First Kuwait Oil Concession Agreement, p. xiii. 38 Freeth and Winstone, Kuwait: Prospect and Reality, p. 135. 39 David H.Finnie, Desert Enterprise: The Middle East Oil Industry in Its Local Environment (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1958), pp. 38–9.

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40 The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir John Simon, confirmed in his letter dated 9 April 1932 to Ambassador Mellon that the British government would also observe the ‘open door’ policy in Kuwait. See Chisholm, The First Kuwait Oil Concession Agreement, p. 21; Walid E.Moubarak, ‘Kuwait’s quest for security, 1961–1973’, an unpublished PhD thesis, Indiana University, May 1979, p. 52. 41 Freeth and Winstone, Kuwait: Prospect and Reality, p. 147. 42 Chisholm, The First Kuwait Oil Concession Agreement, p. xiii. 43 John L.Sullivan, of Sullivan, Bernard, Shea and Kenney Law Offices, disclosed this position in his letter dated 11 October 1951 to the Secretary of State Dean Acheson. See NA RG 59 886D.2553/10–1151 CS/MC, 11 October 1951. 44 Peter Mansfield, Kuwait: Vanguard of the Gulf (London: Hutchinson Publishing Co., Ltd, 1990), p. 31. 45 Ibid. 46 Chisholm, The First Kuwait Oil Concession Agreement, p. 71. 47 For American Consul, Talcott W.Seelye’s report on Kuwaiti government organisational statements, see NA RG 59 786D.02/1–2659 HBS, American Consulate, Kuwait to the State Department, Washington, DC, 26 January 1959. 48 Ibid. 49 Freeth and Winstone, Kuwait: Prospect and Reality, p. 161. 50 Ibid., pp. 164–5. 51 Ibid., p. 170. 52 Richard H.Sanger, The Arabian Peninsula (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1954), p. 162. 53 Freeth and Winstone, Kuwait: Prospect and Reality, p. 173; Trevor Mostyn, Major Political Events in Iran, Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula, 1945–1990 (Oxford and New York: Facts on File, 1991), p. 3. 54 NA RG 59 786D.02/1–2659, American Consulate, Kuwait to the State Department, 26 January 1959, p. 2; Ritchie Ovendale, The Longman Companion to the Middle East Since 1914 (London: Longman Group UK Ltd, 1992), p. 46. 55 Ibid. 56 Freeth and Winstone, Kuwait: Prospect and Reality, p. 180. 57 NA RG 59 786D.02/1–2659 HBS, American Consulate, Kuwait to the State Department, Washington, DC, 26 January 1959, p. 2. 58 NA RG 59 886D.2553/6–1550 VJ, American Consulate, Basra to the State Department, 15 June 1950; NA RG 59 886D.2553/7–650 HH, 6 July 1950: NA RG 59 886D.2553/ 7–2650 HH, 26 July 1950; NA RG 59 886D.2553/8–2250 VJ, 22 August 1950. 59 FRUS: The Near East, South Asia and Africa, 1949, Vol. VI, 81st Congress, 2nd session House Document no. 81–742 Part VI (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 1567. 60 Ibid. 61 Ibid. 62 Ibid., p. 1568. 63 Ibid., p. 1569. 64 Ibid., p. 1570. 65 Ibid., p. 1566. 66 Ibid., pp. 1566–7. 67 Ibid., p. 1571. 68 Ibid., p. 1572. 69 Ibid., p. 85. 70 Ibid. 71 Ibid., p. 86. 72 FRUS, 1951: The Near East and Africa, p. 998.

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73 Ibid., p. 999. 74 Ibid., pp. 999–1000. 75 Ibid., p. 1000; NA RG 59 886D.2553/7–1051 DMJ, the US Government Office Memorandum, 20 July 1951, p. 1. 76 NA RG 59 786D.00/6–2751 HH, American Consulate, Basra to the State Department, Washington, DC, 27 June 1951. 77 FRUS, 1951: The Near East and Africa, p. 1000. 78 NA RG 59 786D.0111/2–752 CS/H, Fred H.Awalt, Officer in charge of Arabian Peninsula Affairs to Claude D. Shokes, The University of Nebraska, 15 February 1952. 79 NA RG 59 886D.2553/5–1751 CS/H, George C.McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State to Harley C.Stevens, AMINOIL, 29 June 1951. 80 NA RG 59 886D.2553/8–2351 CS/I, American Independent Oil Company to the Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, the State Department, Washington, DC, 23 August 1951. 81 NA RG 59 786D.00/1–2951 DMJ, Office Memorandum, from Fred H.Awalt, Office in charge of Arabian Peninsula Affairs to G.Lewis Jones, Director of Office of Near Eastern affairs, 17 May 1951, p. 2. 82 NA RG 59 886D.2553/1–3158 LWS, 31 January 1958. 83 NA RG 59 886D.2614/3–2156 HO, American Consulate, Kuwait to the State Department, Washington, DC, 21 March 1956. 84 Ibid. 85 Ibid. 86 NA RG 59 886D.2614/6–1156 LWC, a letter from Joseph A.Bardi, Westinghouse’s regional supervisor in the Middle East to Khalid Mishari, a local agent for Westinghouse in Kuwait, 5 June 1956. 87 NA RG 59 886D.2614/6–1156 LWC, American Consulate, Kuwait, to the State Department, Washington, DC, 11 June 1956. 88 NA RG 59 886D.2614/11–2459 LWS, American Consulate, Kuwait, to the State Department, Washington, DC, 24 November 1959. 89 NA RG 59 986D.734/5–459 LWS, American Consulate, Kuwait, to the State Department, Washington, DC, 4 May 1959; NA RG 59 986D.734/6–1059 LWS, American Consulate, Kuwait to the State Department, Washington, DC, 10 June 1959. 90 NA RG 59 986D.526/10–2554 LWC, American Consulate, Kuwait to the State Department, Washington, DC, 25 October 1954. 91 NA RG 59 986D.526/9–654 LWC, American Consulate, Kuwait to the State Department, Washington, DC, 6 September 1954. 92 NA RG 59 986D.526/11–1554 LWC, American Consulate, Kuwait, to the State Department, Washington, DC, 15 November 1954. 93 NA RG 59 986D.723/5–1357 HBB, American Consulate, Kuwait to the State Department, Washington, DC, 13 May 1957. 94 NA RG 59 986D.72/5–2568 HBS, American Consulate, Kuwait to the State Department, Washington, DC, 26 May 1958. 95 NA RG 59 986D.50/11–1857 HBS, American Consulate, Kuwait to the State Department, Washington, DC, 18 November 1957. 96 NA RG 59 886D.501/10–1559 CAA, American Consulate, Kuwait to the State Department, Washington, DC, 15 October 1959. 97 NA RG 59 786D.022/1–2058 HBS, American Consulate, Kuwait to the State Department, Washington, DC, 20 January 1958. 98 NA RG 59 786D.00/11–2253 LWC, American Consulate, Kuwait to the State Department, Washington, DC, 22 November 1953. 99 NA RG 59 786D.001/5–2954 LWC, American Consulate, Kuwait to the State Department, Washington, DC, 29 May 1964; NA RG 59 786D.001/6–954 LWC, American Consulate,

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Kuwait to the State Department, Washington, DC, 9 June 1954; NA RG 59 786D.00/ 1–2456 CS/LS, American Consulate, Kuwait to the State Department, Washington, DC, 24 January 1956. 100 NA RG 59 786D.001/5.2954 LWC, American Consulate, Kuwait to the State Department, Washington, DC, 29 May 1954; NA RG 786D.00/7–1854, American Consulate, Kuwait to the State Department, Washington, DC, 18 July 1954. 101 NA RG 59 786D.99/8–155CS/M, the State Department, Washington, DC, to various posts in Iraq, Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, Iran, and Kuwait, 1 August 1955. 102 FRUS, Near East: Jordan, Yemen, 1955–57, Vol. XIII, 84th Congress, 2nd session—House Document No. 477 Vol. XIII (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1988), p. 114. 103 NA RG 59 786D.00/9–2654 HO, American Consulate, Kuwait to the State Department, Washington, DC, 26 September 1954. 104 NA RG 59 786D.00/4–3056 CS/K, Memorandum of Conversation, the State Department, Washington, DC, 30 April 1956. 105 Ibid. 106 Ibid. 107 Dwight D.Eisenhower, The White House Years: Waging Peace, 1958–61 (New York: Doubleday, 1965), p. 269 108 George Lenczowski, American Presidents and the Middle East (Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press, 1990), p. 62; Michael A.Palmer, Guardians of the Gulf: A History of America’s Expanding Role in the Persian Gulf, 1833–1992 (New York: The Free Press, 1992), p. 79. 109 Majid Khadduri, Republican Iraq: A Study in Iraqi Politics Since the Revolution of 1958 (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 57. 110 FRUS: Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula, 1958–60, Vol. XII (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 776. 111 Ibid. 112 Ibid., p. 777. 113 Ibid. 114 Eisenhower, The White House Years, p. 278. 115 Palmer, Guardians of the Gulf, p. 80. 116 Ibid. 117 Eisenhower, The White House Years, p. 278; Peter Mangold, Superpower Intervention in the Middle East (London: Croom Helm, 1978), p. 84. 118 NA RG 59 786D.00/8–158 HBS, Incoming Telegram from American Consulate, Kuwait to the Secretary of State, 1 August 1958. 119 NA RG 59 786D.00/8–458 HBS, American Consulate, Kuwait to the State Department, Washington, DC, 4 August 1958. 120 FRUS: Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula, 1958–60, p. 778. 121 Ibid., p. 779; NA RG 59 786D.00/3–2359 CAA, American Consulate, Kuwait to the State Department, Washington, DC, 23 March 1959. 122 FRUS: Near East; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula, 1958–60, pp. 785–6. 123 Ibid., p. 218. 124 Ibid., p. 787. 125 Ibid. 126 NA RG 59 786D.5/5–2059, American embassy London to the State Department, Washington, DC, 20 May 1959. 127 NA RG 59 786D.5/5–2159, a memorandum from William M.Rountree, the Near East Division to Robert Murphy, 21 May 1959.

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128 NA RG 59 786D.5/8–459 EMW, American Consulate, Kuwait to the State Department, Washington, DC, 4 August 1959.

3 US-Kuwaiti relations, 1961–1977 1 Cited in American embassy to the State Department, Washington, DC, 27 July 1959, Record Group (hereafter cited as RG) 786D.11/7–2759 EMW, the National Archives, Washington, DC, (hereafter cited as NA). 2 Richard Schofield, Kuwait and Iraq: Historical Claims and Territorial Disputes (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1991), pp. 102–3. 3 Peter Mansfield, Kuwait: Vanguard of the Gulf (London: Hutchinson, 1990), p. 48. 4 Richard Gott, ‘The Kuwait incident’, in D.C.Watts, ed., Survey of International Affairs, 1961 (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 525; Abdul-Reda Assiri, Kuwait’s Foreign Policy: City-State in World Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), p. 7; Jill Crystal, Kuwait: The Transformation of an Oil State (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), p. 126. 5 Emile A.Nakhleh, Arab—American Relations (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1975), p. 56. 6 Foreign Broadcast Information Service: Middle East & West Europe, 1 March 1961, p. B8 (hereafter cited as FBIS: ME &WE). 7 FBIS: ME & WE, 8 March 1961, p. E1. 8 Ibid., 24 March 1961, p. E1. 9 Gott, ‘The Kuwait incident’, p. 525; Walid E.Moubarak, ‘Kuwait’s quest for security, 1961– 1973’, an unpublished PhD thesis, Indiana University, May 1979, p. 54. 10 Mansfield, Kuwait: Vanguard of the Gulf, p. 49. 11 Washington Post, 19 June 1961, p. A9; American Foreign Policy Current Documents 1961 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 692; New York Times, 19 June 1961, p. 2; Moubarak, ‘Kuwait’s quest for security’, p. 66. 12 Husain M.Al-Baharna, The Legal Status of the Arabian Gulf States: A Study of Their Treaty Relations and Their International Problems (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1968), p. 322; D.C.Watts, ed., Documents on International Affairs, 1961 (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 771–2. The Kuwaiti leader, Shaykh ‘Abdullah Salim Al Sabah, made the final decision to include paragraph (d) in the 19 June 1961 agreement of the Kuwait Supreme Council over the necessity of relying on British.assistance: see David H.Finnie, Shifting Lines in the Sand: Kuwait’s Elusive Frontier with Iraq (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), p. 131. 13 Moubarak, ‘Kuwait’s quest for security’, p. 55. 14 Department of State Bulletin, 13 February 1961. 15 Washington Post, 19 June 1961, p. A9. 16 See the extracts of press conference by General Qassim in Watts, ed., Documents on International Affairs, 1961, pp. 772–5. 17 BBC Summary of World Broadcast(SWB): The Middle East and North Africa, 27 June 1961, p. 4 (hereafter cited as SWB: ME). 18 Washington Post, 26 June 1961, p. A9. 19 Moubarak, ‘Kuwait’s quest for security’, p. 56. 20 Assiri, Kuwait’s Foreign Policy: City-State in World Politics, p. 25. 21 Mustafa M.Alani, Operation Vintage: British Military Intervention in Kuwait, 1961 (Surbiton: LAAM, 1990), p. 221. 22 Schofield, Kuwait and Iraq: Historical Claims and Territorial Disputes, p. 103. 23 Moubarak, ‘Kuwait’s quest for security’, p. 65.

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24 Ibid., p. 65; New York Times, 6 July 1961, p. 3; Finnie, Shifting Lines in the Sand: Kuwait’s Elusive Frontier with Iraq, footnote 12 on page 204. 25 Ibid., p. 66. 26 Schofield, Kuwait and Iraq: Historical and Claims and Territorial Disputes, p. 105. 27 Majid Khadduri, Republican Iraq: A Study in Iraqi Politics Since the Revolution of 1958 (London: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1969), p. 169. 28 Moubarak, ‘Kuwait’s quest for security’, p. 66. 29 Ibid., p. 65; Watts, ed., Documents on International Affairs, 1961, p. 776. 30 Washington Post, 28 June 1961, p. A14. 31 Moubarak, ‘Kuwait’s quest for security’, p. 58; Gott, The Kuwait incident’, p. 528; interview with Parker T.Hart, the first US Ambassador to Kuwait between January 1962July 1963, Washington, DC, 11 October 1993. See also the US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk’s circular telegram of 30 June 1961 to certain consular and diplomatic posts: Foreign Relations of the United States, Near East 1961–1962, Vol. XVII (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1994), p. 174 (hereafter cited as FRUS). 32 Washington Post, 28 June 1971, p. A14; The Times (London), 28 June 1961, p. 10. 33 Gott, ‘The Kuwait incident’, p. 530. 34 In a circular telegram dated 30 June 1961 signed by the US Secretary of State Dean Rusk to certain consular and diplomatic posts: FRUS, Near East 1961–1962, p. 175. 35 FRUS, Near East 1961–1962, p. 168. 36 Gott, ‘The Kuwait incident’, p. 532; FBIS: Middle East & Africa, 3 July 1961, p. E5 (hereafter cited as FBIS: MEA). 37 See discussions in Finnie, Shifting Lines in the Sand, pp. 130–1. 38 Washington Post, 2 July 1961, p. A1. 39 Ibid., 2 July 1961, p. A1; for more details of British troop deployment in this crisis, see Gott, ‘The Kuwait incident’, p. 541; Washington Post, 3 July 1961, p. A6; The Times (London), 30 June 1961, p. 12. 40 Gott, ‘The Kuwait incident’, p. 541; Domestic Service (Kuwait) in Arabic, FBIS: ME & WE, 10 October 1961, p. E1. 41 For the diplomatic struggle between Kuwait and Iraq which tried to block the entry of Kuwait, see Finnie, Shifting Lines in the Sand, pp. 137–9; Gott, ‘The Kuwait incident’, pp. 540–1; Washington Post, 20 July 1961, p. A18. 42 American Foreign Policy Current Document, 1961, p. 694. 43 Gott, ‘The Kuwait incident’, pp. 530, 536–7. 44 Interview with Hart, Washington, DC, 11 October 1993. 45 In a telegram dated 27 June 1961, from the US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, to the consulate in Kuwait: FRUS, Near East 1961–1962, p. 163. 46 Washington Post, 28 June 1961, p. A14. 47 The Times, 1 July 1961, p. 8; Washington Post, 1 July 1961, p. A4; New York Times, 1 July 1961, p. 3. 48 Washington Post, 3 July 1961, p. A1. 49 American Foreign Policy Current Documents, 1961, pp. 693–4; Department of State Bulletin, 24 July 1961, pp. 165–6; Washington Post, 6 July 1961, p. A9. 50 Washington Post, 7 July 1961, p. A10. 51 Watts, ed., Documents on International Affairs, 1961, p. 781; Washington Post, 8 July 1961, p. A1. 52 FBIS: ME & WE, 30 June 1961, p. E2. 53 After Qassim’s regime was toppled on 8 February 1963, the Soviet Union recognised Kuwaiti independence on 13 March (New York Times, 15 May 1963, p. 12). Two weeks later, Kuwait applied for membership of the United Nations (New York Times, 30 April 1963, p. 14). One week after the Security Council approved Kuwait’s membership, the UN

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General Assembly unanimously endorsed Kuwait as the 111th member of the United Nations (New York Times, 8 May 1963, p. 3; 15 May 1963, p. 1). 54 New York Times, 15 May 1963, p. 12. 55 FRUS, Near East 1961–1962, p. 172. 56 New York Times, 1 July 1963, p. 3. 57 Washington Post, 3 July 1961, p. A6. 58 Dayton S.Mak, former US Chargé d’ Affaires in Kuwait during 1961–63, gave his view that ‘particularly after the British moved in with their ships and landed their forces, it seemed pretty unrealistic that Qassim would try to move in’, Dayton S.Mak, Oral History Interview, 9 August 1989 (Washington, DC: Georgetown University’s Foreign Affairs Oral History Program), p. 5. 59 FRUS, Near East 1961–1962, p. 174. 60 New York Times, 1 July 1961, p. 3. 61 Interview with Mak, Washington, DC, 29 July 1993. 62 Interview with Mak, Washington, DC, 29 July 1993; Hart, Washington, DC, 11 October 1993; a written response of 4 August 1993 to the author’s questionnaire by Frank E. Maestrone, former US Ambassador to Kuwait during May 1976-July 1979; a written response of 2 August 1993 by Francois M. Dickman, former US Ambassador to Kuwait during September 1979—August 1983; a written response of 29 July 1993 by Joseph Wright Twinam, former US official at the State Department, responsible for the bilateral US relations with the Gulf states. The questionnaire were sent by the author in early July 1993. 63 FRUS, Near East 1961–1962, p. 198. 64 New York Times, 23 September 1961, p. 7; American Foreign Policy Current Documents, 1967, p. 695. 65 Domestic Service (Jerusalem) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 3 August 1961, p. E1. 66 Mak, Oral History Interview, p. 7. 67 Domestic Service (Kuwait) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 8 January 1962, p. E5. 68 Middle East News Agency (MENA) (Cairo) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 16 August 1961, p. E3. 69 Ibid., 10 January 1962, p. E5. 70 Interview with Hart, Washington, DC, 11 October 1993. See also the memorandum dated 29 December 1961 from Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, to George C.McGhee, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs: FRUS, Near East 1961–1962, p. 378. 71 Trevor Mostyn, Major Political Events in Iran, Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula, 1945–1990 (Oxford, New York: Facts on File Limited, 1991), p. 80. 72 Qassim expressed on many occasions threatening remarks on Kuwait’s sovereignty: see The Times, 1 January 1962, p. 10; 7 February 1962, p. 10; 15 May 1962, p. 9; 19 June 1962, p. 7. 73 Shaykh Sabah al-Salim Al Sabah, appointed as the director of the Foreign Department in October 1961, announced in November 1961 that the Kuwaiti government would adopt a policy of nonalignment in international affairs: Domestic Service (Kuwait) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 4 October 1961, p. E1; 3 November 1961, p. C2. The first scholarly study of Kuwait’s foreign policy since independence is Assiri’s book on Kuwait’s Foreign Policy: City-State in World Politics. 74 See footnote 73 in Chapter 5. 75 Other Gulf states established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union as follows: Oman and the United Arab Emirates in 1985; Qatar in 1988; Saudi Arabia and Bahrain in 1990. 76 Domestic Service (Kuwait) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 29 August 1963, p. E4. 77 ANA (Beirut) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 13 December 1963, p. E2. 78 FBIS: MEA, 20 March 1963, p. C6; 22 May 1963, p. C3; Domestic Service (Kuwait) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 8 May 1964, p. E1. 79 New York Times, 30 March 1971, p. 14.

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80 Mark N.Katz, Russia & Arabia: Soviet Foreign Policy toward the Arabian Peninsula (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 157 and 162. 81 A written response of 29 July 1993 to the author’s questionnaire by Joseph Wright Twinam. 82 A written response of 4 August 1993 to the author’s questionnaire by Frank E.Maestrone. 83 Interview with Brooks Wrampelmeier, Kuwaiti desk officer in the 1970s in the Arabian Peninsula Directorate, the State Department, Washington, DC, 24 August 1993. 84 Interview with William B.Quandt, the Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 5 October 1993. 85 Ibid. 86 J.E.Peterson, Defending Arabia (London, Sydney: Croom Helm, 1986), pp. 208–9. 87 Richard F.Nyrop, Beryl Lieff Benderly, Laraine Newhouse Carter, William W.Cover, Robert A.Kirchner, Philip W.Moelleer, William A.Mussen, Jr, Clarance Edward Pike and Rinn-Sup Shinn, Area Handbook for the Persian Gulf States (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 191. 88 ANA (Beirut) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 19 January 1962, p. C1. 89 Jerusalem in English, FBIS: MEA, 16 April 1962, p. E1. 90 Assiri, Kuwait’s Foreign Policy, p. 50. 91 Ibid.; a scholarly study of the Palestinian settlement in Kuwait was carried out by Shafeeq N.Ghabra: Palestinians in Kuwait: The Family and the Politics of Survival (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987); for a discussion of the Arab Gulf States’ involvement with the Palestinian problem, see Rosemarie Said Zahlan, The Gulf States and the Palestine problem, 1936–48’, Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1981), pp. 1–20. 92 Assiri, Kuwait’s Foreign Policy, p. 50. 93 Ibid. 94 Ibid. 95 Interview with John Duke Anthony, President, National Council on US-Arab Relations, Washington, DC, 28 October 1993. 96 Domestic Service (Kuwait) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 4 September 1963, p. E1. 97 MENA (Cairo) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 14 September 1964, p. E1. 98 Domestic Service (Kuwait) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 27 October 1964, p. E1. 99 Ibid., 3 March 1965, p. E6. 100 RNS (Beirut) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 14 October 1965, p. E1. 101 Domestic Service (Kuwait) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 16 February 1966, p. E2. 102 Ibid., 16 February 1966, p. E2; 25 May 1966, p. E1. 103 MENA (Cairo) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 27 June 1966, p. E4. 104 Domestic Service (Kuwait) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 19 December 1966, p. E1. 105 The Times, 31 August 1966, p. 1. 106 Cited in Nyrop, et al., Area Handbook for the Persian Gulf States, p. 190. 107 Domestic Service (Kuwait) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 12 April 1967, p. E1. 108 Ibid., 19 May 1967, p. E2. 109 Ritchie Ovendale, The Longman Companion to the Middle East Since 1914 (London and New York: Longman Group UK Limited, 1992), p. 87. 110 Domestic Service (Kuwait) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 29 May 1967, p. E2. 111 Assiri, Kuwait’s Foreign Policy, p. 51. 112 Mostyn, Major Political Events in Iran, Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula, p. 100. 113 MENA (Cairo) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 5 June 1967, p. E3. 114 Ibid. 115 Abdulaziz al-Sowayegh, Arab Petropolitics (London & Canberra: Croom Helm, 1984), p. 98. 116 The Times, 6 June 1967, p. 10. 117 Domestic Service (Kuwait) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 7 June 1967, p. E5. 118 MENA (Cairo) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 14 July 1967, p. E1.

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119 The Times, 12 June 1967, p. 17. 120 Ibid., 4 July 1967, p. 21. 121 Ibid., 7 June 1967, p. 4. 122 Ibid. 123 Ibid., 8 July 1967, p. 3. 124 Ibid. 125 Domestic Service (Cairo) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 31 July 1967, p. E3. 126 RNS (Beirut) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 14 September 1967, p. E2. 127 Domestic Service (Kuwait) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 25 October 1967, p. E1. 128 Ibid., 27 October 1967, p. E2. 129 Shaykh Sa’ad al-‘Abdullah al-Salim announced that the Arab states would not keep silent about the occupation of their territories in the aftermath of the Arab defeat of June 1967: Domestic Service (Kuwait) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 21 September 1967, pp. E2–3. 130 A discussion of developments which led to Harold Wilson’s decision to announce the withdrawal may be found in J.B.Kelly, Arabia, the Gulf and the West (London: George Weidenfeld and Nicolson Limited, 1980), pp. 47–50; also see F. Gregory Gause, ‘Britain and American policies in the Persian Gulf, 1968–73’, Review of International Studies, Vol. 11, No. IV, (1985), pp. 249–53. 131 Kelly, Arabia, the Gulf and the West, pp. 47–8. 132 Gause, ‘Britain and American policies in the Persian Gulf’, p. 252. 133 Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power (London: Simon & Schuster Ltd, 1991), p. 566. 134 Hussein Sirriyeh, US Policy in the Gulf, 1968–1977 (London: Ithaca Press, 1984), p. 42. 135 The Times, 12 January 1968, p. 1. 136 Washington Evening Star, 17 January 1968, cited in Sirriyeh, US Policy in the Gulf, p. 44. 137 Washington Post, 17 January 1968. 138 Christian Science Monitor, 19 January 1968. 139 The Times, 9 February 1968, p. 1. 140 A discussion of the two differing schools of thought may be found in Sirriyeh, US Policy in the Gulf, pp. 51–4. 141 Charles A.Kupchan, The Persian Gulf and the West: The Dilemmas of Security (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987), p. 14. 142 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Richard Nixon, 1969 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1971), pp. 544–56. 143 Sirriyeh, US Policy in the Gulf, pp. 42, 55–70. 144 Amitav Acharya, US Military Strategy in the Gulf (London: Routledge, 1989), p. 23. 145 Richard Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1978), p. 395. 146 Ibid. 147 Sirriyeh, US Policy in the Gulf, p. 61. 148 Ibid., pp. 62–3. 149 A written response of 29 July 1993 to the author’s questionnaire by Joseph Wright Twinam. 150 Kelly, Arabia, the Gulf and the West, p. 49. 151 Sirriyeh, US Policy in the Gulf, p. 13. 152 Kelly, Arabia, the Gulf and the West, p. 50. 153 The Times, 30 January 1968, p. 4. 154 Ibid. Before that, Kuwaiti financial circles boasted that Britain’s withdrawal from the Gulf region would very much affect the economies of the small Gulf emirates, but not the Kuwaiti economy. RNS (Beirut) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 19 January 1968, p. E3. 155 The Times, 14 May 1968, p. 7; Domestic Service (Kuwait) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 16 May 1968, p. B9. 156 Cited in Sirriyeh, US Policy in the Gulf, p. 45.

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157 Domestic Service (Kuwait) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 22 January 1968, p. E3. 158 MENA (Cairo) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 26 January 1968, p. E4; RNS (Beirut) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 7 February 1968, p. E7. 159 The written responses to the author’s questionnaire by Frank E.Maestrone; Francois M. Dickman; Joseph Wright Twinam. 160 A tape-recorded response to the author’s questionnaire by Emile Nakhleh. 161 Malcom C.Peck, The United Arab Emirates: A Venture in Unity (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), p. 51; Ali M.Khalifa, The United Arab Emirates: Unity and Fragmentation (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979), p. 10. 162 Interview with Brooks Wrampelmeier, Washington, DC, 24 August 1993. 163 Iraqi News Agency (Baghdad) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 11 February 1971, p. B2. 164 MENA (Cairo) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 3 July 1972, p. B2. 165 Al-Ra’i Al-Amm (Kuwait), FBIS: MEA, 6 December 1968, p. B3. 166 Domestic Service (Kuwait) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 13 December 1968, p. B1. 167 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Lyndon B.Johnson, 1968–69, Book II, 1 July 1968 to 20 January 1969 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 1183. 168 Interview with Hart, Washington, DC, 11 October 1993. 169 Ibid. 170 Domestic Service (Kuwait) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 3 January 1969, p. B4. 171 The Kuwaiti Foreign Minister, Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir, pointed this out at a meeting of Kuwaiti ambassadors, consuls and diplomatic representatives on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the founding of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Domestic Service (Kuwait) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 12 April 1971, p. B1. 172 New York Times, 18 June 1971, p. 2. 173 Washington Post, 7 July 1971, p. A14. 174 Ibid. 175 Iraqi News Agency (Baghdad) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 29 June 1971, p. B2. 176 Ibid., 7 July 1971, p. B3. 177 John Patrick Walsh was appointed on 19 September 1969 as US Ambassador to Kuwait. He left the post on 19 December 1971: United States Chiefs of Mission (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 109. The author could not locate Ambassador Walsh, so the interview session with him did not take place. 178 Al-Ra’i Al-Amm (Kuwait) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 12 July 1971, p. B1. 179 Ibid. 180 United States Chiefs of Missions, p. 109. 181 US Congress, House, US Interests in and Policy toward the Persian Gulf, Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Near East, 92nd Congress, 2nd session, 2 February, 7 June; 8 and 15 August 1972 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 142. 182 MENA (Cairo) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 3 July 1972, p. B2. 183 Iraqi News Agency (Baghdad) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 26 June 1972, p. B1; MENA (Cairo) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 3 July 1972, p. B2. 184 Iraqi News Agency (Baghdad) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 5 July 1972, p. B1. 185 Domestic Service (Kuwait) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 5 July 1972, pp. B2–3. 186 Iraqi News Agency (Baghdad) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 3 July 1972, p. B3. 187 Ibid., 5 July 1972, p. B3. 188 Ibid., 10 August 1972, p. B1. 189 US Congress, House, United States Arms Policies in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea Areas: Past, Present and Future, Report of a Staff Survey Mission to Ethiopia, Iran and the Arabian Peninsula, Committee on International Relations, 95th Congress, 1st session (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 90.

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190 The written responses to the author’s questionnaire by Frank E. Maestrone; Francois M. Dickman. Interview with Brooks Wrampelmeier, Washington, DC, 24 August 1993. 191 Interview with Brooks Wrampelmeier, 24 August 1993. 192 US Congress, House, United States Arms Policies in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea Areas, p. 90. 193 Jamil F.Aldandany, ‘United States foreign policy in the Gulf, 1969–1984’, an unpublished PhD thesis, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, October 1990, p. 109. 194 US Congress, House, United States Arms Policies in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea Areas, p. 93. 195 Ibid. 196 A written response of 2 August 1993 to the author’s questionnaire by Francois M. Dickman. 197 Tim Niblock, ‘Iraqi policies towards the Arab States of the Gulf, 1958–81’, in Tim Niblock, ed., Iraq: The Contemporary State (London: Croom Helm, 1982), p. 143. 198 Claudia Wright, ‘Implications of the Iraq-Iran War’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 59, No. 2 (Winter 1980/81), p. 277. 199 Ibid.; this argument could be challenged by a research document of the Centre for Research and Studies on Kuwait, Iraq Navigational Outlets, published in July 1994, stating that Iraq still maintains three major sea-borne merchant ports and three major sea-borne oil terminals. 200 Assiri, Kuwait’s Foreign Policy, p. 54. 201 The Times, 21 March 1973, p. 1. Other press reports stated that four Kuwaiti policemen were wounded and a number of others were missing. On the Iraqi side, two Iraqi soldiers were killed and several wounded. These claims by both governments were obviously for propaganda purposes: Washington Post, 21 March 1973, p. A14. 202 AFP (Paris) in English, FBIS: MEA, 20 March 1973, p. B1; 27 March 1973, p. B1; Washington Post, 21 March 1973, A14; 23 March 1973, p. A20. 203 Washington Post, 22 March 1973, p. A20. 204 Ibid., 21 March 1973, p. A14. 205 Nadav Safran, Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), p. 138. 206 Washington Post, 31 March 1973, p. A22. 207 Ibid., 13 April 1973, p. A26. 208 Ibid., 21 March 1973, p. A14. 209 Ibid., 31 March 1973, p. A22. 210 Ibid., 21 March 1973, p. A14. 211 Anne M.Kelly, ‘The Soviet naval presence during the Iraqi—Kuwaiti border dispute’, in Michael MccGwire, Ken Booth and John McDonnell, eds, Soviet Naval Policy: Objectives and Constraints (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), pp. 287–301. 212 Washington Post, 31 March 1973, p. A22. 213 Al-Muharrir (Beirut) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 20 April 1973, p. B5. 214 US Congress, House, United States Arms Policies in the Persian Gulf and Red Seas, p. 90. 215 AFP (Paris) in French, FBIS: MEA, 21 May 1973, p. B4. 216 Washington Post, 23 May 1973, p. A1. 217 MENA (Damascus) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 21 May 1973, p. B4. Another version of the detailed arms deal negotiations specified 30 US F-8 Crusader fighters, 160 M-60 tanks, antiaircraft weapons and helicopters; New York Times, 27 May 1973, p. 22. 218 MENA (Damascus) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 24 may 1973, p. B1. 219 The Times, 1 June 1973, p. 1. 220 New York Times, 1 June 1973, p. 3. 221 Ibid. 222 The Times, 5 June 1973, p. 6.

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223 Washington Post, 5 July 1973, p. A3. 224 New York Times, 1 June 1973, p. 3. 225 Ibid., 14 June 1973, p. 29. 226 At the time when the armed conflict took place, both the Israelis and the Arabs were celebrating their religious feasts. While the Israelis were in a festive mood celebrating their annual Yom Kippur, the Arabs were engaged in their Muslim month of fasting, widely known as Ramadan. As a result both the Israelis and the Arabs refer to the October 1973 war as the Yom Kippur and Ramadan Wars respectively. See Bassam Tibi, Conflict and War in the Middle East, 1967–91: Regional Dynamic and Superpowers, transl. by Clare Krojzl (Basingstoke, UK: The Macmillan Press, 1993), p. 109. 227 Assiri, Kuwait’s Foreign Policy, p. 51. 228 Roy Licklider, Political Power and the Arab Oil Weapon (Berkeley/Los Angeles, CA and London: University of California Press, 1988), p. 189. 229 MENA (Cairo) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 21 February 1973, p. B1. 230 Washington Post, 14 March 1973, p. A25; MENA (Cairo) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 14 March 1973, p. B1. 231 FBIS: MEA, 19 April 1973, p. B1. 232 Rabat L’Opinion in French, FBIS: MEA, 22 August 1973, p. B1. 233 Mostyn, Major Political Events in Iran, Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula, 1945–1990, p. 129. 234 MENA (Cairo) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 30 May 1973, p. B1. 235 al-Sowayegh, Arab Petropolitics, p. 97. 236 Ibid., p. 129. 237 Licklider, Political Power and the Arab Oil Weapon, pp. 11–12. 238 The decision to establish the OAPEC was announced on 21 December 1967 in Jiddah. Its first members were Kuwait, Libya and Saudi Arabia. The official agreement on establishing the Kuwait-based OAPEC was signed in January 1968 in Beirut. The Kuwaiti National Assembly ratified the agreement for the establishment of the organisation on 4 June 1968. Added to the founding members are the other Arab states of Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Qatar, Syria, Tunisia and the United Arab Emirates: see Mostyn, Major Political Events in Iran, Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula, 1945–1990, p. 14; Nakhleh, The Arab—American Relations, p. 58; Zahra Freeth and Victor Winstone, Kuwait: Prospect and Reality (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1972), p. 181; John Daniels, Kuwait Journey (Lution: White Crescent Press, Ltd, 1971), pp. 32–3. 239 Licklider, Political Power and the Arab Oil Weapon, p. 12. 240 Washington Post, 10 October 1973, p. A7. 241 al-Sowayegh, Arab Petropolitics, p. 127. 242 Ibid., p. 129; Licklider, Political Power and the Arab Oil Weapon, p. 12. 243 Cited in al-Sowayegh, Arab-Petropolitics, p. 132. 244 Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, p. 931. 245 Domestic Service (Kuwait) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 26 November 1973, p. B3. 246 Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston, London: Little Brown and Company, 1982). 247 William A.Stoltzfus, Jr, originally from Princeton, New Jersey, was appointed on 9 December 1971 as US Ambassador to Kuwait. His tenure lasted until 6 January 1976: United States Chiefs of Mission, p. 109. 248 Domestic Service (Kuwait) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 26 November 1973, p. B3; Washington Post, 23 November 1973, p. A28. 249 MENA (Cairo) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 28 November 1973, p. B2. 250 Domestic Service (Damascus) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 30 November 1973, p. B2. 251 MENA (Damascus) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 10 December 1973, p. B4. 252 MENA (Cairo) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 11 January 1974, p. B1; New York Times, 10 January 1974, p. 17.

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253 Roy E.Licklider, The failure of the Arab oil weapon in 1973–1974’, Comparative Strategy, Vol. 3, No. 4 (1982). 254 Voice of the Arab (Cairo) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 30 January 1974, p. B4. 255 SANA (Damascus) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 1 March 1974, p. B1. 256 Ibid., 2 March 1974, p. C1. 257 Domestic Service (Kuwait) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 16 April 1974, p. C1; 22 May 1974, p. C6. 258 Dwight D.Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 1956–1961 (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1965), p. 615. 259 New York Times, 19 September 1974, p. 7. 260 Ibid., 10 December 1974, p. 9. 261 US Treaties and Other International Agreements, Vol. 26, Part I, 1975 1–1212 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 682. 262 Ibid. 263 US Congress, House, Proposed Sale to Kuwait of Air-to-Air Missiles, Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs of the Committee on International Relations, 94th Congress, 1st session, 24 October 1975 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 25. 264 New York Times, 2 November 1974, p. 9 265 US Congress, House, Proposed Sale to Kuwait of Air-to-Air Missiles, p. 10. 266 Ibid., p. 40. 267 Ibid., p. 25. 268 Ibid., pp. 40–1. 269 Ibid., p. 40. 270 Ibid., p. 39. 271 New York Times, 20 February 1975, p. 2.

4 US-Kuwaiti relations under the Carter administration 1 Middle East News Agency (MENA) (Cairo) in Arabic, Foreign Broadcast Information Service: Middle East and Africa, 4 November 1976, p. C2 (hereafter cited as FBIS: MEA). 2 Excerpt of the message is cited in Domestic Service (Kuwait) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 8 November 1976, p. C1. 3 Qatari News Agency (Doha) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 24 November 1976, p. C1. 4 MENA (Cairo) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 24 January 1977, p. C1. When President Carter took up his presidency, many Palestinian activists also expected the new administration to play a more positive role in putting an end to the conflict. See Helena Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organisation: People, Power and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 237. 5 Al-Siyasah (Kuwait) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 4 March 1977, p. C1. 6 MENA (Cairo) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 9 March 1977, p. C1. 7 Trevor Mostyn, Major Political Events in Iran, Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula, 1945–1990 (New York, Oxford: Facts on File, 1991), p. 152. 8 Qatari News Agency (Doha) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 21 March 1977, p. C1. 9 Al-Ra’i Al-Amm (Kuwait) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 23 March 1977, p. C1. 10 Saudi News Agency (Riyadh) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 1 June 1977, p. C1. 11 Al-Ra’i Al-Amm (Kuwait) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 6 April 1977, p. C1. 12 Qatari News Agency (Doha) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 29 April 1977, p. C2. 13 MENA (Cairo) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 10 August 1977, p. C3.

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14 Saudi News Agency (Riyadh) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 1 June 1977, p. C1. 15 What confirms the insignificance of this proposal was the failure of both the US and the Kuwaiti scholars and the officials interviewed by the author to mention it. 16 Qatari News Agency (Doha) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 25 July 1977, p. C1. Surprisingly, Ambassador Maestrone failed to recollect the two meetings with the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister. 17 MENA (Cairo) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 14 September 1977, p. C1. 18 Qatari News Agency (Doha) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 3 October 1977, p. C1. 19 Cited in Helena Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organisation, p. 88; George Lenczowski, American Presidents and the Middle East (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1990), p. 161. 20 Qatari News Agency (Doha) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 3 October 1977, p. C1. 21 Ibid., 25 November 1977, p. C1. 22 In January 1978, he was appointed by the Kuwaiti Council of Ministers as the Amir of Kuwait, replacing Shaykh Sabah al-Salim Al Sabah who died of a heart attack in late 1977. See Domestic Service (Kuwait) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 3 January 1978, p. C1; The Sunday Times, 1 January 1978, p. 1. 23 Robert O.Freedman, ‘Soviet policy in the Middle East: from the Sinai II accord to the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement’, in W.Raymond Duncan, ed., Soviet Policy in the Third World (New York: Pergamon Press Inc., 1980), p. 170. 24 A good discussion on this point can be found in Abdul-Reda Assiri, Kuwait’s Foreign Policy: City-State in World Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 32–56. 25 Qatari News Agency (Doha) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 31 January 1978, p. C2. 26 Al-Ra’i Al-Amm (Kuwait) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 3 February 1978, p. C1. 27 Qatari News Agency (Doha) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 9 February 1978, p. C4; 1 March 1978, pp. C1–2. 28 Interview with William B. Quandt, the Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 5 October 1993. 29 Ibid. 30 Interview with Brooks Wrampelmeier, Kuwaiti desk officer in the 1970s in the Arabian peninsula Directorate, the State Department, Washington, DC, 24 August 1993. 31 The written responses to the author’s questionnaire by Frank E.Maestrone and Joseph Wright Twinam. 32 Al-Siyasah (Kuwait) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 7 April 1978, p. C2. 33 Iraqi News Agency (Baghdad) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 12 June 1978, p. C1. 34 Interview with William B.Quandt, the Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 5 October 1993. 35 Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York: Bantam Books, 1982). 36 Text of a Framework for Peace in the Middle East is published in Harold H.Saunders, The Other Walls: The Arab-Israeli Peace Process in a Global Perspective, rev.ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982), pp. 183–7; an excerpt of a Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty is found in Lenczowski, American Presidents and the Middle East, pp. 176–7. 37 Qatari News Agency (Doha) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 14 September 1978, p. C1. 38 Domestic Service (Kuwait) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 18 September 1978, p. C1. 39 Interview with Muhammad Sabah al-Salim Al Sabah, the Kuwaiti Ambassador to Washington, DC, 18 October 1993. 40 Ibid. 41 Interview with Hassan Ali al-Ebraheem, Kuwait Society for the Advancement of Arab Children, Kuwait city, Kuwait, 18 September 1994. 42 Interview with Muhammad Sabah al-Salim Al Sabah, Kuwaiti Ambassador to Washington, DC, 18 October 1993.

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43 A written response of 2 August 1993 to the author’s questionnaire by F.M.Dickman. 44 Fred Halliday, The Gulf in international affairs: independence and after’, in B.R.Pridham, ed., The Arab Gulf and Arab World (London: Croom Helm, 1988), p. 103. 45 US embassy in Kuwait despatched a telegram no 19043/231531Z in April 1979 to the State Department, Washington, DC: The author received a photocopy of this telegram from the National Security Archives in Washington, DC, with the co-operation of Margarita S.Studemeister, Director of Publications, and Joyce Battle, analyst. 46 Domestic Service (Kuwait) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 31 October 1978, p. C1. 47 A tape-recorded response to the author’s questionnaire by Emile Nakhleh. 48 Lenczowski, American Presidents and the Middle East, p. 182. 49 Interview with Brooks Wrampelmeier, Washington, DC, 24 August 1993. 50 Kuwait News Agency in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 27 March 1979, p. C1. 51 Qatari News Agency (Doha) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 20 September 1978, p. C2. 52 Al-Ra’i Al-Amm (Kuwait) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 21 September 1978, p. C3; The Times (London), 21 September 1978, p. 1. 53 Qatari News Agency (Doha) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 20 September 1978, p. C1. 54 Ibid. The commentaries in these newspapers also urged reconsideration of Kuwait’s relations with the United States. See Gulf News Agency (Manama) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 16 March 1979, p. C1. 55 Domestic Service (Kuwait) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 26 September 1978, p. C1. 56 Ambassador Maestrone failed, in his written response to the author’s questionnaire, to recall this event despite his presence at the meeting. Whether he failed to do so either by default or by intention remains difficult to gauge. 57 Domestic Service (Kuwait) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 4 October 1978, p. C1. 58 An-Nahar Al-’Arabi Wa Ad-Duwali (Paris) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 22 November 1978, p. C2. 59 Ibid. 60 Kuwait News Agency in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 8 March 1979, pp. C1–2. 61 In interviews with Barbara Bodine, the State Department, Washington, DC, 12 October 1993; Malcom Peck, Meridian International Centre, Washington, DC, 20 October 1993; Thomas McNaugher, the Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 11 August 1993. 62 The term was coined by Abdul-Reda Assiri in his book on Kuwait’s Foreign Policy, p. 65; also in an interview with Professor Abdul-Reda Assiri, Department of Political Science, Kuwait University, Kuwait City, 24 September 1994. 63 Domestic Service (Kuwait) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 7 June 1979, p. C1. 64 Gulf News Agency (Manama) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 8 June 1979, p. C2. 65 Lenczowski, American Presidents and the Middle East, p. 192. A Kuwaiti newspaper, AlAnba’, expressed its dissatisfaction with Secretary Brown’s suggestion by calling for his removal. Kuwait News Agency in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 25 July 1979, p. C1. No report of a similar call, made by a member of the Kuwaiti regime, for such a removal was found. 66 Charles A.Kupchan, The Persian Gulf and the West: The Dilemmas of Security (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987), p. 84. 67 Kuwait News Agency in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 14 February 1979, p. C1. 68 Kupchan, The Persian Gulf and the West, p. 85. 69 Ibid. 70 Domestic Service (Kuwait) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 23 February 1979, p. C1. 71 Kuwait News Agency in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 27 February 1979, p. C1. 72 Ibid. 73 Kupchan, The Persian Gulf and the West, p. 84. 74 Kuwait News Agency in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 10 April 1979, p. C1. 75 Ibid., 9 May 1979, p. C1. 76 Domestic Service (Kuwait) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 7 June 1979, p. C1; 29 June 1979, p. C1.

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77 David E.Long, The United States and Saudi Arabia: Ambivalent Allies (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), p. 123. 78 Interview with Thomas McNaugher, the Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 11 August 1993. 79 See the background to US—Saudi military relations in Long, The United States and Saudi Arabia Relationship, chapter 3. What also confirms Kuwait’s low ranking in post-Iranian Revolution US policy towards the Gulf is the failure by Joshua M.Epstein, an American expert in US strategy in the Gulf, to include Kuwait in his study on Strategy & Force Planning: The Case of the Persian Gulf (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1987). 80 A tape-recorded response to the author’s questionnaire by Emile A Nakhleh. 81 A written response to the author’s questionnaire by Frank Maestrone on 4 August 1993. 82 Ibid. Good accounts of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan are Beverley Male, Revolutionary Afghanistan (London: Croom Helm, 1982); and Jonathan Steele, The Limits of Soviet Power: The Kremlin’s Foreign Policy-Brezhnev to Chernenko (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1984), chapter 7. 83 Al-Watan (Kuwait) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 27 July 1979, p. C1. 84 Gulf News Agency (Manama) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 6 August 1979, p. C1. 85 Kuwait News Agency in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 18 October 1979, p. C1. 86 Lenczowski, American Presidents and the Middle East, p. 199 87 Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 458. 88 Kuwait News Agency in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 5 November 1979, p. C1. 89 New York Times, 14 November 1979, p. 17. 90 Kuwait news Agency in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 16 November 1979, p. C1. 91 Ibid., 19 November 1979, pp. C1–2. 92 Ibid., 21 November 1979, p. C1. 93 Ibid., 29 November 1979, p. C4. 94 AFP (Paris) in English, FBIS: MEA, 19 November 1979, p. C2. 95 Qatari News Agency (Doha) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 19 November 1979, p. C2. 96 Kuwait News Agency in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 3 December 1979, p. C1. 97 Ibid. 98 A lucid analysis of the impact of the revolution on different parts of the world can be found in John L.Esposito, ed., The Iranian Revolution: Its Global Impact (Miami, FL: Florida International Press, 1990). 99 Kuwait News Agency in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 3 December 1979, p. C2. 100 Al-Ra’i Al-Amm (Kuwait) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 4 December 1979, p. C2. 101 Kuwait News Agency in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 27 December 1979, p. C1. 102 Ibid. 103 Kuwait News Agency in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 27 December 1979, p. C2. 104 Assiri, Kuwait’s Foreign Policy, chapter 3. 105 Ibid. 106 He was the seventh US ambassador to Kuwait, appointed on 28 September 1979. The Kuwaiti Amir granted an audience to receive his credentials on 24 October 1979, less than two weeks before US diplomats in Teheran were taken captive. 107 Kuwait News Agency in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 9 November 1979, p. C1. 108 Ibid. 109 Ibid., 10 December 1979, p. C1. 110 Ibid., 31 December 1979, p. C2. 111 In a written response to the author’s questionnaire, F.M.Dickman made no mention of this Kuwaiti offer. 112 Warren Christopher, Harold H.Saunders, Gary Sick, Robert Carswell, Richard J.Davis, John E.Hoffman, Jr, Roberts B.Owen, Oscar Schachter and Abraham A.Ribicoff, American Hostages in Iran: The Conduct of a Crisis (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University

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Press, 1985). The contributors to this first-hand study, apart from Warren Christopher, include, for example, Robert Carswell, former Deputy Secretary of the Treasury at the time of the crisis; Richard J.Davis, former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury; Roberts B.Owen, former Legal Adviser to the Secretary of State; Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East and South Asia and the Head of the Iran Working Group during the crisis and Gary Sick, former National Security Council staff member for Iran and the Chief Assistant to the National Security Adviser throughout the crisis. 113 Domestic Service (Kuwait) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 28 April 1980, p. C2. 114 Ibid., p. C3. 115 Gulf News Agency (Manama) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 28 April 1980, p. C2. 116 Gary Sick, ‘Military options and constraints’, in Warren Christopher, et al., American Hostages in Iran, pp. 154–64. 117 See Dennis Ross, ‘Considering Soviet threats to the Persian Gulf’, International Security, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Fall 1981). 118 A written response of 2 August 1993 to the author’s questionnaire by Francois M. Dickman. 119 Mark N.Katz, Russia and Arabia: Soviet Foreign Policy toward the Arabian Peninsula (Baltimore, MD and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 170. Funded by the Rockefeller Foundation and the Kennan Institute, this scholarly study contributes immensely to the two previous major studies on the relationship between the former Soviet Union and countries in the Gulf region. They are the ones written by Stephen Page, The USSR and Arabia: The Development of Soviet Policies and Attitudes towards the Countries of the Arabian Peninsula, 1955–1970 (London: Central Asian Research Centre, 1971); and Aryeh Y. Yodfat, The Soviet Union and the Arabian Peninsula (London: Croom Helm; New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983). See also Kuwait News Agency in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 31 January 1979, pp. C1–2; 24 January 1980, p. C3. The Secretary of the Kuwaiti Olympic Committee, Colonel ‘Abd al-Hamid al-Hajji, said the committee decided to take part because of the need to distinguish between political position and sports. See Kuwait News Agency in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 14 February 1980, p. C2. 120 Kuwait News Agency in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 3 January 1980, p. C1. 121 Ibid., 31 December 1979, p. C1. 122 An-Nahar Al-’Arabi Wa Ad-Duwali (Paris) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 9 July 1980, p. C2. 123 Cited in J.E.Peterson, Defending Arabia (London: Croom Helm, 1986), p. 126; see also Amitav Acharya, US Military Strategy in the Gulf: Origins and Evolution under the Carter and Reagan Administrations (London and New York: Routledge, 1989), p. 55. Michael A. Palmer, Guardians of the Gulf: A History of America’s Expanding Role in the Persian Gulf, 1833–1992 (New York: The Free Press, 1992), p. 106. 124 An-Nahar Al-’Arabi Wa Ad-Duwali (Paris) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 9 July 1980, p. C2. 125 Kuwait News Agency in English, FBIS: MEA, 23 June 1980, p. C2. 126 A detailed analysis of the US plan to expand its military co-operation, in the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution, with strategically important countries in the Gulf and the Indian Ocean is undertaken by Acharya, US Military Strategy in the Gulf, pp. 89–116. 127 AFP (Paris) in English, FBIS: MEA, 19 February 1980, p. C1. 128 Washington Post, 12 February 1980, p. A1; 22 April 1980, p. A3; 5 June 1980, pp. A1-A10; cited in Acharya, US Military Strategy in the Gulf, p. 111. 129 Al Ra’i Al-Amm (Kuwait) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 31 July 1980, pp. C1–2. 130 See Will D.Swearingen, ‘Sources of conflict over oil in the Persian/Arabian Gulf’, Middle East Journal, Vol. XXXV, No. 3 (Summer 1981); Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, ‘Domestic politics and territorial disputes in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula’, Survival, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Winter 1993–94). 131 Al-Ra’i Al-Amm (Kuwait) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 31 July 1980, pp. C1–2.

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132 Discussions on the underlying and immediate causes of the war were undertaken by Tareq Y.Ismael, Iraq and Iran: Roots of Conflict (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1982); Jasim M.Abdulghani, Iraq and Iran: The Years of Crisis (London: Croom Helm, 1984); M.S.El Azhary, ed., The Iran-Iraq War: An Historical, Economic and Political Analysis (London: Croom Helm, 1984); Sharam Chubin and Charles Tripp, eds, Iran and Iraq at War (London: I.B. Tauris, 1988). Those who have elaborated more on the implications of the war include: Majid Khadduri, The Gulf War: The Origins and Implications of the Iraq—Iran Conflict (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988); Efraim Karsh, ed., The Iran—Iraq War: Impact and Implications (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan Press, 1989); Hanns Maull and Otto Pick, eds, The Gulf War: Regional and International Dimensions (London: Pinter, 1989); and M.E.Ahrari, ed., The Gulf and International Security (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan Press, 1989). 133 Chookiat Panaspornprasit, ‘Soviet-Iraqi relations: a case study of the Gulf War’, an unpublished MA thesis, the Australian National University, Canberra, September 1985; Oles M.Smolansky and Bettie M.Smolansky, The USSR and Iraq: The Soviet Quest for Influence (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1991); Haim Shemesh, Soviet-Iraqi Relations, 1968– 1988: In the Shadow of the Iraq-Iran Conflict (London: Lynne Rienner, 1992). 134 Kuwait News Agency in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 24 September 1980, p. C1. 135 Assiri, Kuwait’s Foreign Policy, p. 70. 136 A written response to the author’s questionnaire by Joseph Wright Twinam on 29 July 1993. 137 A written response to the author’s questionnaire by Francois M.Dickman on 2 August 1993.

5 US-Kuwaiti relations under the Reagan administration 1 Kuwait News Agency in Arabic, Foreign Broadcast Information Service: Middle East and Africa, 6 November 1980, p. C1 (hereafter cited as FBIS: MEA). 2 Ibid., pp. C1–2. 3 Domestic Service (Kuwait) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 31 arch 1981, p. C1. 4 Washington Post, 16 August 1983, p. A1; United States Chiefs of Mission (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 109; New York Times, 18 August 1983, p. A7; Kuwait News Agency in English, FBIS: MEA, 18 August 1983, p. C4. After being rejected by Kuwait, Grove took up his new ambassadorship in Zaire: see Arab Times (Kuwait) in English, FBIS: MEA, 30 July 1984, p. C2. 5 Washington Post, 16 August, 1983, p. A1. 6 Ibid., p. A8. 7 Jill Crystal, Kuwait: The Transformation of an Oil State (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), p. 129. 8 Kuwait News Agency in English, FBIS: MEA, 7 August 1980, p. C1. 9 Ibid., 11 August 1980, p. C1; 18 August 1980, p. C1. 10 Domestic Service (Kuwait) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 20 November 1981, p. C1. 11 Ibid., 19 August 1983, p. C1; Al-Watan (Kuwait) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 19 August 1983, p. C1; Al-Siyasah (Kuwait) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 19 August 1983, p. C1; Jamahiriya News Agency (Tripoli) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 18 August 1983, pp. Q1–2; Qatari News Agency (Doha) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 19 August 1983, p. C2; Ash-Shariqah Al-Khalij in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 19 August 1983, p. C2. 12 Qatari News Agency (Doha) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 19 August 1983, p. C2. 13 Washington Post, 16 August 1983, p. A8. 14 Ibid.

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15 New York Times, 18 August 1983, p. A7. 16 Ambassador Quainton was in fact officially appointed on 13 August 1984. The Kuwaiti Amir received his credentials on 19 September 1984. United States Chiefs of Mission, p. 109. Prior to the new appointment in Kuwait, Quainton served as the US Ambassador in Nicaragua. His previous diplomatic postings included the Central African Empire, Nepal, Pakistan, India, Australia and France: see Arab Times (Kuwait) in English, FBIS: MEA, 30 July 1984, p. C2. 17 A written response of 2 August 1993 to the author’s questionnaire by F.M.Dickman; interview with Anthony E.C.Quainton, Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security, the US State Department, Washington, DC, 25 August 1993. 18 Interview with Anthony Quainton, 25 August 1993. 19 See J.E.Peterson, Defending Arabia (London: Croom Helm, 1986); Nadav Safran, Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988); Anthony H.Cordesman, Western Strategic Interests in Saudi Arabia (London: Croom Helm, 1987). 20 R.K.Ramazani, Revolutionary Iran: Challenge and Response in the Middle East (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). 21 Cited in Robert O.Freedman, Moscow and the Middle East: Soviet Policy Since the Invasion of Afghanistan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 189. 22 Washington Post, 31 May 1984, p. A1; The Times (London), 1 June 1984, p. 6. 23 According to the US Constitution, members of Congress should also play a key role in formulating crisis policy. But it was not always the case. US presidents sent US troops without Congressional approval to the troublespots in Korea in 1950, Cuba in 1962, the Dominican Republic in 1965, and Cambodia in 1970. Given the debacle in Vietnam and President Nixon’s unilateral decision to invade Cambodia, Congress passed the War Powers Resolution in November 1973, overruling Nixon’s veto. The prime objective of the resolution is to prevent presidents from sending troops to battlefields without consulting Congress. This resolution stipulates various requirements to ensure co-operation between the legislative and executive branches. But loopholes still remain, and Arthur Schlesinger has considered it ‘a toy handcuff’. See James M. Lindsay, Congress and the Politics of US Foreign Policy (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), pp. 147–50. 24 US Congress, House of Representatives, Developments in the Persian Gulf, June 1984, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 98th Congress, 2nd session, 11 June 1984 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1984), pp. 10–12. 25 Washington Post, 31 May 1984, p. A31. 26 Kuwait News Agency in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 1 June 1984, p. C2. 27 Washington Post, 31 May 1984, p. A1; The Times, 1 June 1984, p. 6. 28 Kuwait News Agency in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 1 June 1984, p. C2. 29 New York Times, 5 June 1984, p. A4; Washington Post, 16 June 1984, p. A20. 30 New York Times, 5 June 1984, p. A4. 31 US Congress, House of Representatives, Developments in the Persian Gulf, June 1984, p. 13. 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid., pp. 16–17. 34 Ibid. 35 Washington Post, 31 May 1984, p. A31. 36 Ibid. 37 New York Times, 20 June 1984, p. A3; Washington Post, 20 June 1984, p. A26. 38 Kuwait News Agency in English, FBIS: MEA, 11 June 1984, p. C2. 39 Washington Post, 19 June 1984, p. A13; Al-Ra’i Al-Amm (Kuwait) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 20 June 1984, p. C1. 40 Kuwait News Agency in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 21 June 1984, p. C1.

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41 New York Times, 20 June 1984, p. A3. 42 Washington Post, 16 June 1984, p. A20; 20 June 1984, p. A26. 43 US Congress, House of Representatives, Developments in the Persian Gulf, June 1984, p. 52; New York Times, 28 June 1984, p. A3. 44 Kuwait News Agency in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 6 August 1981, p. C8. 45 Washington Post, 16 June 1984, p. A20. 46 Ibid., 27 June 1984, p. A23; New York Times, 27 June 1984, p. A9; 28 June 1984, p. A3. 47 This is a non-partisan division of the Library of Congress, Washington, DC. 48 New York Times, 5 June 1984, p. A4. 49 Ibid. 50 Mark N.Katz, ‘Kuwait should get US missiles’, Newsday, 26 July 1984, p. 76. Interview with Mark Katz, Professor of International Affairs, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, USA, 17 August 1993. 51 US Congress, House of Representatives, Developments in the Persian Gulf, June 1984, pp. 39, 41. 52 Washington Post, 24 June 1984, p. A17. Interview with Abdul-Reda Assiri, Professor of Political Science, Kuwait University, Kuwait City, 24 September 1994. 53 Washington Post, 24 June 1984, p. A24. 54 Ibid. 55 Interview with Robert O.Freedman, Baltimore Hebrew University, Baltimore, MD, 29 October 1993. 56 Kuwait News Agency in English, FBIS: MEA, 5 July 1984, p. C2; New York Times, 9 July 1984, p. A7. 57 Washington Post, 18 June 1984. 58 New York Times, 13 July 1984, p. A2; The Australian (Sydney), 23 July 1984. 59 Ibid., New York Times, 16 August 1984, p. A7; The Australian (Sydney), 17 August 1984; Al Z’Qada, 18 August 1984, p. 4. 60 Washington Post, 13 July 1984, p. A26. 61 Cited in New York Times, 14 July 1984, p. A3. 62 A tape-recorded response to the author’s questionnaire by Emile A.Nakhleh. 63 Interview with William A.Stoltzfus, Jr, former US Ambassador to Kuwait between 9 February 1972 and 6 January 1976, the National Press Club, Washington, DC, 30 September 1993. 64 A written response of 29 July 1993 to the author’s questionnaire by Joseph Wright Twinam; interview with Anthony Quainton, Washington, DC, 25 August 1993. See also Washington Post, 18 June 1984. 65 Washington Post, 18 June 1984, Washington Post, 14 July 1984, p. A1; Christian Science Monitor, 4 October 1984, p. 2. 66 New York Times, 24 July 1984, p. A8; Washington Post, 1 December 1984, p. A1. 67 Defense Week, 30 July 1984, pp. 7–8. 68 Washington Post, 1 December 1984, p. A1. 69 The process of reflagging foreign flag vessels to US flag is a routine process initially formalised by the US Coast Guard with a Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular issued on 5 October 1981. See Pact Sheets on Reflagging of Kuwaiti Vessels, unpublished documents collected by the National Security Archives, Massachusetts Avenue, Washington, DC. The author conducted documentary research there in August 1993. 70 Kuwait News Agency in English, FBIS: MEA, 13 April 1984, p. C2. 71 Abdul-Reda Assiri, Kuwait’s Foreign Policy: City-State in World Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), p. 100. 72 Thomas L.McNaugher, ‘Walking tightropes in the Gulf’, in Efraim Karsh, ed., The Iran— Iraq War: Impact and Implications (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan Press in association with the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel-Aviv University, 1987), p. 173; Anthony

Notes

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H.Cordesman, The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), chapter 5. 73 The Gulf Cooperation Council was officially set up on 25 May 1981 by the leaders of six Arab Gulf states—Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Its inception followed the process of extensive consultations among the foreign ministers of the six countries. The historic meetings of 4 February and 8 March 1981 in Riyadh and Muscat respectively paved the way for final plans for this regional organisation. See J.A.Kechichian, ‘The GCC: search for security’, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 4, (October 1985); John Duke Anthony, ‘The GCC’, International Journal, Vol. XLI, No. 2 (Spring 1986); John A.Sandwick, ed., The Gulf Cooperation Council: Moderation and Stability in an Interdependent World (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987); Erik R.Peterson, The GCC: Search for Unity in a Dynamic Region (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988); Ursula Braun, The GCC’s security role’, in B.R.Pridham, ed., The Arab Gulf and the Arab World (London: Croom Helm, 1988). 74 Assiri, Kuwait’s Foreign Policy, p. 101. 75 Ibid. 76 Kuwait News Agency in English, FBIS: MEA, 21 May 1984, p. C3. 77 Kuwait News Agency in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 8 June 1984, p. C1. 78 Al-Anba (Kuwait) in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 4 October 1985, p. C2. 79 Two pieces of work written by Elizabeth Gamlen are US Military Intervention in the IranIraq War, 1987–88, Peace Research Report Number 21, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, March 1989; ‘US strategic policy toward the Middle East: central command and the reflagging of Kuwait’s tankers’, in Hooshang Amirahmadi, ed., The United States and the Middle East: A Search for New Perspectives (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1993). Another work co-written by Gamlen and Paul Rogers is ‘US reflagging of Kuwaiti tankers’, in Farhang Rajaee, ed., The Iran-Iraq War: The Politics of Aggression (Gainsville, FL: University of Florida Press, 1993). 80 Interviews with Quainton, the State Department, 25 August 1993; Barbara Bodine, Acting Co-ordinator for Counter Terrorism, the State Department, Washington, DC, 12 October 1993; Assiri, Kuwait University, 24 September 1994; Ramazani, Charlottesville, Virginia, 9 September 1993; Malcom C.Peck, Meridian International Center, Washington, DC, 20 October 1993; Freedman, Baltimore, 29 October 1993. 81 Washington Post, 14 August 1987, pp. B1, B4. 82 Cited in Assiri, Kuwait’s Foreign Policy, p. 106. Kuwait News Agency in English, FBIS: MEA, 8 July 1987, p. J2. 83 Ibid., p. 102. 84 Gamlen, US Military Intervention in the Iran-Iraq War, 1987–88, p. 10. 85 US Congress, House, Overview of the Situation in the Persian Gulf, Hearing and Markup before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Its Subcommittees on Arms Control International Security and Science, and on Europe and the Middle East, 100th Congress, first session, 19 May and 2, 9, 10, 11 and 23 June, 1987 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1987), p. 214. 86 Al-Tadamun (London) in Arabic, 1 August 1987, FBIS: MEA, 5 August 1987, p. J1. 87 US Congress, Senate, War in the Persian Gulf: The US Takes Sides, A Staff Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, 100th Congress, first session, November 1987 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1987), p. 37. 88 US Congress, House, Overview of the Situation in the Persian Gulf, p. 51. 89 Ibid., p. 44; US Congress, Senate, Persian Gulf, Report to the Majority Leader United States Senate from Senator John Glenn and Senator John Warner on Their Trip to the Persian Gulf, 27 May-4 June 1987, 100th Congress, first session, 17 June 1987 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1987), p. 10.

Notes

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90 US Congress, House, Overview of the Situation in the Persian Gulf, pp. 12, 211; Washington Past, 20 May 1987, p. A22. 91 US Congress, Senate, Persian Gulf, p. 11. 92 Caspar Weinberger, Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years at the Pentagon (London: Michael Joseph, 1990), pp. 272–3. 93 Ibid., p. 273. 94 Ibid. 95 Peterson, ‘Security concerns in the Arabian Peninsula’, in M.E.Ahrari, ed., The Gulf and International Security: The 1980s and Beyond (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan Press, 1989), p. 123. 96 US Congress, House, Overview of the Situation in the Persian Gulf, p. 211. 97 Ibid., p. 162. 98 John Bulloch and Harvey Morris, The Gulf War: Its Original, History and Consequences (London: Methuen London, 1989), p. 177. 99 Weinberger, Fighting for Peace, p. 278. 100 Ibid.; US Congress, Senate, Persian Gulf, p. 11. 101 Ibid., p. 278; George P.Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993), p. 926. 102 US Congress, Senate, Persian Gulf, p. 12. 103 Ibid., p. 11; Weinberger, Fighting for Peace, p. 279. 104 Under Secretary Armacost, ‘US policy in the Persian Gulf and Kuwaiti reflagging’, Current Policy No. 978, US Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington, DC, p. 2. 105 Baltimore Sun, 23 October 1987, p. 2, cited by Gamlen, ‘US Military intervention in the Iran-Iraq War’, p. 18. 106 Gamlen, ‘United States strategic policy towards the Middle East: central command and the reflagging of Kuwait’s tankers’, p. 229- See also Shafeeq Ghabra, ‘Kuwait and the United States: the reluctant ally and US policy towards the Gulf’, in David W.Lesch, ed., The Middle East and the United States: A Historical and Political Reassessment (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996, p. 296 (footnote 25). 107 US Congress, Senate, US Military Forces to Protect ‘Re-flagged’ Kuwaiti Oil Tankers, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Service, 100th Congress, first session, 5, 11, 16 June 1987 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1987), p. 40. 108 Ibid., p. 64. 109 Ibid., p. 65; Under Secretary Armacost, ‘US Policy in the Persian Gulf and Kuwaiti reflagging’, Current Policy No. 978, p. 4. 110 US Congress, House, National Security and Policy Implications of United States Operations in the Persian Gulf, Report of the Defense Policy and Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, 100th Congress, first session, July 1987 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1987), p. 30; cited in Assiri, Kuwait’s Foreign Policy, p. 104. 111 US Congress, House, Overview of the Situation in the Persian Gulf, p. 147. See also his remarks prepared for delivery at the American Defense Preparedness Association, Washington, DC, 20 May 1987. 112 US Congress, Senate, Persian Gulf, p. 11. 113 US Congress, Senate, US Military Forces to Protect ‘Re-Flagged’ Kuwaiti Oil Tankers, p. 86. 114 Ibid., p. 87. 115 Ursula Braun, The Gulf cooperation council’, in Hanns Maull and Otto Pick, eds, The Gulf War: Regional and International Dimensions (London: Pinter House, 1989), pp. 96–7; Crystal, Kuwait: The Transformation of an Oil State, p. 128; Assiri, Kuwait’s Foreign Policy, p. 104; George Lenczowski, American Presidents and the Middle East (Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press, 1990), p. 246.

Notes

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116 The Coast Guard and Maritime Administration is the US federal agency which deals directly with reflagging operations. See Weinberger, Fighting for Peace, p. 280. 117 A Briefing Paper on Kuwaiti Reflag Project prepared by the US Coast Guard, US Department of Transportation, dated 9 June 1987 (document no. 4597M) for Admiral William Cockell, National Security Council. The author received a copy of this from the National Security Archives, Washington, DC. 118 Ibid. 119 Chesapeake Shipping Incorporation was registered on 15 May 1987 as a Delaware corporation, the purpose of which was to own and operate 11 oil tankers currently owned by the Kuwait Oil Tanker Company (KOTC). This corporation had offices both in Delaware and Kuwait. All of the issued and outstanding shares of Chesapeake Shipping Inc. were owned by KOTC, a wholly owned subsidiary of the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation. This was the testimony of Mark P.Schlefer, a partner of the law firm of Kominers, Fort & Schlefer, counsel to Chesapeake Shipping, Inc., before the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries. See US Congress, House, Kuwaiti Tankers, Hearings before the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 100th Congress, first session, June 18, August 6, 1987 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1987), p. 104. 120 Ibid., p. 104. 121 A Briefing Paper on Kuwaiti Reflag Project, p. 2. 122 Ibid. 123 Ibid. 124 The author received a photocopy of the memorandum from the National Security Archives, Washington, DC in August 1993. 125 Ibid., p. 2. 126 Their original names were changed to the new ones respectively as follows: (original names) Al Rekkah, Kazimah, Al Funtas, Umm Al Maradem, Umm Al Aish, Umm Matrabah, Umm Casbah, Gas Al Burgan, Gas Al Minagish, Gas Al Ahmadi, Gas Al Kuwait; (renamed) Bridgeton, Townsend, Middletown, Sea Isle City, Surf City, Chesapeake City, Ocean City, Gas King, Gas Prince, Gas Princess, Gas Queen. See A Briefing Paper on Kuwaiti Reflag Project, p. 1; Washington Post, 24 June 1987, p. A21. 127 The author received a photocopy of the Memorandum of Agreement from the National Security Archives in Washington, DC. 128 Washington Post, 6 June 1987, p. A1. 129 Domestic Service (Teheran) in Persian, FBIS: MEA, 13 July 1987, p. J2; 2 September 1987, p. 56. 130 Ibid. 131 Ibid., 21 July 1987, p. S1. 132 Shafeeq Ghabra, ‘Kuwait and the United States: the reluctant ally and US policy towards the Gulf, p. 285. 133 Interview with Shamlan Y.Alessa, a leading scholar in the Faculty of Commerce, Economics and Political Science, Kuwait University, 20 September 1994. He appeared to avoid discussing the reflagging issue, although he failed to show directly his disagreement with the government’s decision on the issue. 134 Washington Post, 6 June 1987, pp. A1, A14. 135 Ibid. 136 Ibid., p. A14. 137 Ibid. 138 Ibid., p. A1. 139 Ibid., p. A14. 140 Ibid. 141 Ibid. 142 Ibid.

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143 New York Times, 12 July 1987, p. E3. 144 Ibid. 145 Ibid. 146 Ibid. 147 Ibid. 148 The memorandum was considered as a top-secret document. But it was leaked in the Miami Herald in September 1987. See Washington Post, 6 September 1987, p. A30. Weinberger chose Webb as the Secretary of the Navy. But in early 1988, Webb decided to resign due to austere budget cuts. See Weinberger, Fighting for Peace, p. 282. 149 Washington Post, 6 September 1987, p. A30. 150 Ibid. 151 New York Times, 29 June 1987, p. A6. 152 He became the US Secretary of Defense when President Clinton first took office in January 1993. Due to the unsuccessful peace-keeping operations in Somalia in 1993 in which US military forces took part, and resulted in the deaths of US military men, he decided to resign in 1994. His successor was William Perry. Aspin’s untimely death in May 1995 stemmed from an unexpectedly sudden stroke, The Independent, 22 May 1995, p. 12. 153 Washington Post, 8 July 1987, p. A24. 154 Chairman of the Kuwait Oil Tankers Company (KOTC), ‘Abd al-Fattah al-Badr, confirmed that the arrangements for the US to reflag Kuwait’s oil tankers would proceed as planned. He reiterated the eleven reflagged tankers would engage in shuttle trips between Kuwaiti ports and the mouth of the Gulf to transfer crude and oil by-products onto other vessels for eventual consignments to overseas customers. See Kuwait News Agency in English, FBIS: MEA, 14 July 1987, p. J1. 155 Kuwait News Agency in Arabic, FBIS: MEA, 6 July 1987, p. J1. 156 Weinberger, Fighting for Peace, p. 287. 157 Ibid. 158 Radio Monte Carlo (Paris) in Arabic, Domestic Service (Jerusalem) in Hebrew, FBIS: MEA, 24 July 1987, p. J1; Washington Past, 28 July 1987, p. A7. 159 Weinberger, Fighting for Peace, p. 287. 160 New York Times, 17 October 1987, p. A1. 161 Weinberger, Fighting for Peace, p. 294. 162 Cited in Assiri, Kuwait’s Foreign Policy, p. 111. 163 Washington Post, 11 January 1988, p. A18. 164 Ibid., 2 December 1987, p. A33. 165 US Congress, Senate, War in the Persian Gulf, p. 47. 166 Interviews with Ramazani, Freedman, Duke Anthony; and a tape-recorded response to the author’s questionnaire by Emile Nakhleh. See also Gamlen, US Military Intervention in the Iran-Iraq War, 1987–88, pp. 72–3. 167 Interview with a US official, on the condition of anonymity, at the US embassy in Kuwait, September 1994. 168 The Kuwaiti government officially approached the British government on 15 July 1987. See Gamlen, US Military Intervention in the Iran-Iraq War, 1987–88, p. 131. Before that, Britain’s Ambassador to Kuwait, Peter Hinchcliffe, remarked that ‘any Kuwaiti request to raise British flags on Kuwaiti tankers will be taken into consideration and hinted that it will receive favourable response’. See Kuwait News Agency in English, FBIS: MEA, 13 July 1987, p. J2. The Kuwaiti regime also made contact with the Chinese government in Beijing for the reflagging operations. But the Chinese authorities conceded that China had limited capabilities to offer the reflagging operations. See Kuwait News Agency in English, FBIS: MEA, 27 July 1987, p. J1; FBIS: MEA, 29 July 1987, p. J1. 169 Interview with Barbara Bodine, Acting Co-ordinator for Counter Terrorism, the State Department, Washington, DC, 12 October 1993.

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170 US Congress, Senate, Persian Gulf, pp. 16–17. 171 Washington Post, 12 May 1988, p. A1; New York Times, 12 May 1988, p. A7; 13 May 1988; The Independent, 12 July 1988. 172 Ibid. 173 Ibid. 174 New York Times, 11 June 1988, p. A5; Washington Post, 16 June 1988, p. A33. 175 Ibid. 176 Ibid. 177 New York Times, 13 May 1988. 178 Edward Gnehm was later appointed to be US Ambassador to Kuwait after the liberation war in 1991. His predecessor was Nathaniel Howell who was the Ambassador during the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait. 179 Kuwait News Agency in English, FBIS: MEA, 8 July 1988, p. 18. 180 Washington Post, 10 July 1988, p. A6; 14 July 1988, p. A20; New York Times, 8 July 1988, p. A6; 14 July 1988, p. A3. 181 Kuwait News Agency in English, FBIS: MEA, 12 July 1988, p. 15; The Independent, 12 July 1988; FBIS: MEA, 13 July 1988, p. 18. 182 New York Times, 11 July 1988, p. A8; Kuwait News Agency in English, FBIS: MEA, 12 July 1988, p. 15; 21 July 1988, p. 18. 183 Kuwait News Agency in English, FBIS: MEA, 12 July 1988, p. 16; The Independent, 12 July 1988. 184 The Independent, 12 July 1988. 185 Kuwait News Agency in English, FBIS: MEA, 11 July 1988, p. 14; Washington Post, 13 July 1988, p. A16; FBIS: MEA, 14 July 1988, p. 15. 186 New York Times, 14 July 1988, p. A3; FBIS: MEA, 14 July 1988, p. 19. 187 Washington Post, 14 July 1988, p. A20. 188 Ibid., 4 August 1988, p. A28; Kuwait News Agency in English, FBIS: MEA, 15 August 1988, p. 22. 189 Washington Post, 4 August 1988, p. A28. 190 Ibid.

6 US—Kuwaiti relations under the Bush administration 1 In a letter dated 18 January 1991 from President George Bush to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, confirming that a decision to use forces had been taken. See US Congress, House of Representatives Document 102–30, Use of Military Force Against Iraq, p. 1. 2 Anti-war demonstrators in Sydney, in one of the demonstrations around the world, held a placard which read: ‘What if Kuwait’s main export was broccoli?’ The Independent on Sunday, 20 January 1991, p. 4. 3 Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Gerd Nonneman, War and Peace in the Gulf: Domestic Politics and Regional Relations, 1980–1991 and Beyond (Reading, NY: Ithaca Press, 1991), p. 234; Trevor Mostyn, Major Political Events in Iran, Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula, 1945–1990 (Oxford and New York: Facts on File, 1991), p. 240. 4 New York Times, 31 July 1988, p. 10. 5 Cited in Ehteshami and Nonneman, War and Peace ‘in the Gulf, p. 65. 6 Ibid., p. 60. 7 Simon Murden, Emergent Regional Powers and International Relations in the Gulf: 1988– 1991 (Reading, NY: Ithaca Press, 1995), p. 317.

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8 Shafeeq Ghabra, ‘Kuwait and the United States: the reluctant ally and US policy towards the Gulf’, in David W.Lesch, ed., The Middle East and the United States: A Historical and Political Reassessment (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), p. 286. 9 Joseph Wright Twinam, The Gulf, Cooperation and the Council: An American Perspective (Washington, DC: Middle East Policy Council, 1992), p. 221. 10 New York Times, 14 July 1988, p. A3. 11 Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London) in Arabic, FBIS: NES, 30 December 1988, p. 17. 12 Interview with Ambassador W.Nathaniel Howell, Charlottesville, Virginia, 9 September 1993. 13 Ghabra, ‘Kuwait and the United States: the reluctant ally and US policy towards the Gulf, p. 285. 14 Kuwait News Agency in English, FBIS: NES, 6 December 1988, p. 18. 15 Kuwait News Agency in English, FBIS: NES, 7 February 1989, p. 19. 16 Arab Times (Kuwait) in English, FBIS: NES, 10 January 1989, p. 17. 17 Ghabra, ‘Kuwait and the United States: the reluctant ally and US policy towards the Gulf’, p. 285. 18 Kuwait News Agency in Arabic, FBIS: NES, 5 January 1989, p. 20; SPA (Riyadh) in Arabic, FBIS: NES, 5 January 1989, p. 20; WAM (Abu Dhabi) in Arabic, FBIS: NES, 5 January 1989, p. 20; FBIS: NES, 9 January 1989, p. 27; 10 January 1989, p. 17. 19 Kuwait News Agency in English, FBIS: NES, 9 January 1989, p. 27. 20 ‘The Likud Party, under the leadership of Yitzak Shamir, defeated Shimon Peres’ Labour Party in the general election held in early November 1988 by one vote. 21 Kuwait News Agency in English, FBIS: NES, 3 February 1989, p. 19. 22 A good account of this incident can be found in George Lenczowski, American Presidents and the Middle East (Durham, and London: Duke University Press, 1990), pp. 256–8. 23 Domestic Service (Kuwait) in Arabic, FBIS: NES, 15 November 1988, p. 18. 24 Mostyn, Major Political Events in Iran, Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula, p. 241. 25 Kuwait News Agency in English, FBIS: NES, 17 February 1989, p. 27. 26 Middle East News Agency (Cairo) in Arabic, FBIS: NES, 27 February 1989, p. 18. 27 A brief description of this regional, now defunct, organisation can be found in Dilip Hiro, Dictionary of the Middle East (Basingstoke, UK: The Macmillan Press, 1996), p. 18; Mostyn, Major Political Events in Iran, Iraq, and the Arabian Peninsula, p. 243; Charles Tripp, ‘Regional organisations in the Arab Middle East’, in Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell, eds., Regionalism in World Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 298–9. 28 Domestic Service (Amman) in Arabic, FBIS: NES, 23 February 1989, p. 18. 29 Jordan Times (Amman) in English, FBIS: NES, 2 March 1989, p. 21; Al-Qabas (Kuwait) in Arabic, FBIS: NES, 3 March 1989, p. 30. 30 Congressman Lee Hamilton referred to both officials’ comments as part of the testimony in which Ambassador April Glaspie testified in 1991. See US Congress, House, United StatesIraqi Relations, p. 44. 31 Ibid., p. 45. 32 Kuwait News Agency in Arabic, FBIS: NES, 1 February 1989, p. 14; Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London) in Arabic, FBIS: NES, 2 February 1989, p. 23. 33 FBIS: NES, 2 February 1989, p. 24. 34 See his interview with the editors-in-chief of Kuwaiti newspapers in Arab Times (Kuwait) in English, FBIS: NES, 14 February 1989, p. 17; 17 February 1989, p. 28. 35 Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London) in Arabic, FBIS: NES, 2 February 1989, p. 24. 36 John Bulloch and Harvey Morris, Saddam’s War: The Origins of the Kuwait Conflict and the International Response (London: Faber and Faber, 1991), p. 93. 37 Kuwait News Agency in English, FBIS: NES, 12 February 1990, p. 19. 38 Mostyn, Major Political Events in Iran, Iraq, and the Arabian Peninsula, p. 256.

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39 Iraqi News Agency (Baghdad) in English, FBIS: NES, 22 March 1990, p. 16. 40 Arab Times (Kuwait) in English, FBIS: NES, 12 April 1990, p. 11. 41 A detailed account of Dr Bull’s deep involvement, revealed in the aftermath of his death, in the Super Gun Project can be found in the well-researched book by Adel Darwish and Gregory Alexander, Unholy Babylon: The Secret History of Saddam’s War (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd, 1991), chapter 6. 42 Kuwait News Agency in English, FBIS: NES, 13 March 1989, p 22. 43 Ibid.; 19 September 1989, p. 9. 44 Ibid.; 4 October 1989, p. 23; 8 March 1990, p. 13. 45 Arab Times (Kuwait) in English, FBIS: NES, 28 March 1990, p. 14. 46 See Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict, 1990–1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order (London: Faber and Faber, 1993); Alex Danchev and Dan Keohane, eds, International Perspectives on the Gulf Conflict, 1990–91 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994); Ibrahim Ibrahim, ed., The Gulf Crisis: Background and Consequences (Washington, DC: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, 1992); Darwish and Alexander, Unholy Babylon; Ehteshami and Nonneman, War and Peace in the Gulf; Bulloch and Morris, Saddam’s War; Amatzia Baram and Barry Rubin, eds, Iraq’s Road to War (Basingstoke, UK and London: The Macmillan Press, 1993); Pierre Salinger with Eric Laurent, Secret Dossier: The Hidden Agenda Behind the Gulf War (Hammondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Group, 1991). 47 Interview with Ambassador Howell, 9 September 1993. 48 Shahram Chubin, ‘Regional politics and the conflict’, in Danchev and Keohane, eds, International Perspectives on the Gulf Conflict, 1990–91, p. 5. 49 Christine M.Helms, ‘Arab perspectives of the Gulf Crisis’, in Robert F.Helms II and Robert H.Dorff, eds, The Persian Gulf Crisis: Power in the Post-Cold War World (Westport, CCT: Praeger Publishers, 1993), p. 75; Abbas Alnasrawi, ‘Oil: dimensions of the Gulf Crisis’, in Ibrahim, ed., The Gulf Crisis: Background and Consequences, pp. 38–60. 50 Ehteshami and Nonneman, War and Peace in the Gulf, pp. 72–3; Mostyn, Major Political Events in Iran, Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula, p. 259. 51 FBIS: NES, 19 July 1990, p. 21; Middle East Economic Survey (MEES), 23 July 1990. 52 Amatzia Baram, ‘The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait: decision-making in Baghdad’, in Baram and Rubin, eds, Iraq’s Road to War, p. 16. 53 Ibid. 54 Kuwait News Agency in English, FBIS: NES, 17 May 1990, p 9. 55 Kuwait News Agency in Arabic, FBIS: NES, 21 June 1990, p. 13. 56 Interview with Khalid al-Babtayn, Director of the Americas Department, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, State of Kuwait, Kuwait City, 25 September 1994. 57 The full text of the memorandum can be found in Ehteshami and Nonneman, War and Peace in the Gulf, pp. 166–73. 58 Ibid., p. 169. 59 The Independent, 25 July 1990. 60 The OPEC meeting reached a decision to increase the oil price to $21/b, the first increase announced by the organisation. The Independent, 28 July 1990. 61 The Independent, 26 July 1990. 62 Ibid., 30 July 1990. 63 The Independent, 1 August 1990. 64 This argument is part of a criticism of US policy towards the Middle East and the Gulf region which Mohammed Heikal elaborates in Illusions of Triumph: An Arab View of the Gulf War (Hammersmith, London: Fontana, 1993). 65 A written response of 1 August 1993 to the author’s questionnaire by Frank E.Maestrone. 66 A written response of 2 August 1993 to the authors questionnaire by Francois M.Dickman. 67 Interview with Ambassador W.Nathaniel Howell, 9 September 1993.

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68 The Independent, 25 July 1990. 69 Chubin, ‘Regional politics and the conflict’, p. 14. 70 US Congress, House, United States-Iraqi Relations, p. 4. 71 Joseph Kostiner, ‘Kuwait: confusing friend and foe’, in Baram and Rubin, eds, Iraq’s Road to War, p. 114. 72 Ibid. 73 Ibid., p. 113. 74 Chubin, ‘Regional politics and the conflict’, p. 15. 75 The Independent, 25 July 1990. 76 US Congress, House, United States-Iraqi Relations, p. 55. 77 Ibid. 78 It can be found in Micah L.Sifry and Christopher Cerf, eds, The Gulf War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions (New York: Random House, Times Book, 1991), pp. 122–33. 79 Ibid., p. 130. 80 The Congress Quarterly, Vol. 49, No. 12 (23 March 1991), p. 759. 81 Ibid. 82 Interview with Ambassador W. Nathaniel Howell, 9 September 1993. 83 Salinger, Secret Dossier, p. 68. 84 The author’s attempt to have an interview session with John Kelly was unsuccessful because of his appointment to the US embassy in Finland. The author was informed about this appointment by Kelly’s letter from Helsinki. 85 Salinger, Secret Dossier, p. 68. 86 Ibid., p. 69. 87 The Independent, 28 July 1990. 88 Donald M. Snow and Eugene Brown, Puzzle Palaces and Foggy Bottom: US Foreign and Defense Policy-Making in the 1990s (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), p. 239. 89 Habib Ishow, ‘Relations between Iraq and Kuwait’, in Derek Hopwood, Habib Ishow, Thomas Koszinowski, eds, Iraq: Power and Society (Reading, NY: Ithaca Press, 1993), p. 315. 90 Interviews with Ambassador W.Nathaniel Howell 9 September 1993; Hassan Ali AlEbraheem, Kuwait Society for the Advancement of Arab Children, Kuwait, 18 September 1994. 91 Interview with Thomas McNaugher, the Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 11 August 1993; US Congress, The Persian Gulf Crisis, Joint Hearings before the Subcommittees on Arms Control, International Security and Science, Europe and the Middle East and on International Operations, of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Joint Economic Committee, 101st Congress, 2nd session, 8 August, 18 September, 25 September, 17 October, 28 November and 11 December, 1990 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1991), pp. 31–6. 92 An interview with Hassan al-Ebraheem, ‘The Gulf crisis: a Kuwaiti perspective’, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. XX, No. 2 (Winter 1991), p. 96. 93 The Executive Order on Blocking Kuwaiti Government Property was signed by President George Bush on 2 August 1990. See detailed version in US Congress, House of Representatives, The Persian Gulf Crisis: Relevant Documents, Correspondence, Reports, Report prepared by the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security and Science, of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 102nd Congress, 1st session, June 1991 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1991), p. 7. The Independent, 3 August 1990, pp. 9, 17. 94 The Kuwaiti Crown Prince held a press conference on the establishment of a government-inexile on 23 August 1990 in al-Ta’if, the royal Saudi mountain retreat. He announced that: ‘With God’s will, we’ll be back home shortly in our country’. It is worth noting that the

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Kuwaiti Amir did not take part in this news conference. Washington Post, 24 August 1990, p. A29. 95 Interview with Professor Bernard Reich, the George Washington University, Washington, DC, 29 September 1993; a written response of 2 August 1993 to the author’s questionnaire by Francois M. Dickman. 96 See excerpts of Bush’s statement on US Defense of Saudis in New York Times, 9 August 1990, p. A15. 97 This Executive Order was signed on 22 August 1990. See US Congress, Ordering the Selected Reserve of the Armed Forces to Active Duty. Communication from the President of the United States, 101st Congress, 2nd session (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1990), p. 1. 98 Washington Post, 11 August 1990, p. A1. 99 Ibid., 14 August 1990, p. A14. 100 Ibid. 101 Ibid., 11 August 1990, p. A1. 102 This term was widely used to refer to a group of inner decision-makers in the US administration during the crisis, comprising President George Bush; Vice President Dan Quayle; James Baker III, the Secretary of State; John Sununu, White House Chief-of-Staff; Brent Scowcroft, National Security Adviser; Robert Gates, Deputy Adviser on National Security Affairs; Richard Cheney, the Secretary of Defense; and General Colin Powell, Chairman, Joint Chiefs-of-Staff. See Freedman and Karsh, The Gulf Conflict, pp. xvi–xvii; Colin L.Powell (with Joseph E. Persico), My American Journey (New York: Random House, 1995), p. 485 103 Powell, My American Journey, p. 463. 104 Ibid., pp. 471–2. 105 Ibid., p. 464. 106 Television Service (Riyadh) in Arabic, FBIS: NES, 28 August 1990, p. 17. 107 SPA (Riyadh) in Arabic, FBIS: NES, 4 September 1990, p. 17. 108 Domestic Service (Riyadh) in Arabic, FBIS: NES, 10 September 1990, p. 11. 109 Ibid. 110 In-kind support generally refers to the contribution of food, fuel, water, transportation, materiel, and facilities. 111 US Congress, House, Briefing on Operation Desert Shield: Costs and Contributions, Hearing before the Committee on the Budget, 102nd Congress, 1st session, 4 January 1991 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1991), p. 54. 112 Ibid., p. 54. 113 SPA (Riyadh) in Arabic, FBIS: NES, 20 September 1990, p. 14. 114 Powell, My American Journey, p. 460. 115 The Independent on Sunday (The Sunday Review), 2 December 1990, p. 5. 116 Powell, My American Journey, p. 467. 117 Ibid., p. 470. 118 Washington Post, 11 August 1990, p. A26. 119 Ibid., p. A26. 120 The Independent on Sunday (Sunday Review), 8 December 1991, p. 12. 121 Kuwait News Agency (London) in Arabic, FBIS: NES, 6 November 1990, p. 16. 122 Interview with US official, on the condition of anonymity, at the US embassy in Kuwait, September 1994. 123 See details of the joint communiqué in FBIS: NES, 23 November 1990, p. 24. 124 SPA (Riyadh) in Arabic, FBIS: NES, 23 November 1990, pp. 24–5. 125 Ibid., 3 December 1990, p. 11. 126 The Independent on Sunday, 9 December 1990, p. 1. 127 Ibid., p. 1.

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128 Kyodo (Tokyo) in English, FBIS: NES, 2 January 1991, p. 16. 129 Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), FBIS: NES, 2 January 1991, p. 17. 130 Kuwait News Agency (London), FBIS: NES, 2 January 1991, p. 16. 131 New York Times, 31 December 1990, p. 6. 132 Details of every country’s contribution, including that of Saudi Arabia, to Desert Shield/Desert Storm can be found in US Congress, House of Representatives, Review of Persian Gulf Burden Sharing, Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 102nd Congress, first session, 14 May 1991 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1992), pp. 44–92. 133 Excerpts of President Bush’s State of the Union Address Washington, DC, 29 January 1991; the section on foreign policy is published in US Department of State Dispatch, 4 February 1991, pp. 65–6. 134 See chronology of the Gulf War, 1990–91 in The Independent on Sunday (Sunday Review), 8 December 1991, p. 11; James Piscatori, ed., Islamic Fundamentalism and the Gulf Crisis (Chicago, IL The American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1991), pp. 209–44. 135 An exclusive interview with Sa’ud Nasir Al Sabah, Kuwait’s Ambassador to the United States, Middle East Insight, Vol. 8, No. 4 (March/April, 1992), p. 15. 136 The Independent, 27 September 1990, p. 10. 137 Ibid. 138 US Congress, House of Representatives, Crisis in the Persian Gulf, Hearings and Markup before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 101st Congress, second session, 4 and 27 September, 18 October 1990 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1990), p. 40. 139 Phebe Marr, ‘Strategies for an era of uncertainty: the US policy agenda’, in Phebe Marr and William Lewis, eds, Riding the Tiger: The Middle East Challenge After the Cold War (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), p. 224. 140 See full text of the Damascus Declaration in Domestic Service (Damascus) in Arabic, FBIS: NES, 7 March 1991, pp. 1–2. 141 Rosemary Hollis, ‘Whatever happened to the Damascus declaration?: evolving security structures in the Gulf, in M.Jane Davis, ed., Politics and International Relations in the Middle East: Continuity and Change (Aldershot: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 1995), p. 40. 142 Kuwait News Agency (London) in Arabic, FBIS: NES, 8 March 1991, p. 13. The term ‘Damascus Eight’ was coined by R.K.Ramazani in his article on ‘Future security in the Persian Gulf: America’s role’, Middle East Insight, Vol. 8, No. 1 (July/August 1991). 143 Kuwait News Agency (London) in Arabic, FBIS: NES, 11 March 1991, p. 17. 144 Hassan Al-Ebraheem, ‘Kuwait and the New World Order’, Middle East Insight, Vol. 7, No. 6 (May/June 1991), p. 26. 145 The Independent, 17 March 1991. 146 Ibid. 147 Hollis, ‘Whatever happened to the Damascus declaration?’, p. 41. 148 Ibid. 149 Tripp, ‘Regional organisations in the Arab Middle East’, p. 302. 150 Hollis, ‘Whatever happened to the Damascus declaration?’, p. 42. 151 Al-Ahali (Cairo) in Arabic, FBIS: NES, 3 September 1991, p. 20. 152 WAKH (Manama) in English, FBIS: NES, 3 September 1991, p. 21; Bangkok Post, 2 September 1991, p. 11. 153 Bangkok Post, 24 August 1991, p. 9. 154 Kuwait News Agency (London) in Arabic, FBIS: NES, 26 August 1991, p. 16. 155 Based on UN Security Council Resolution 687 of 3 April 1991, concerning the cease-fire between the US-led coalition and Iraq, the United Nations Iraq—Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM), comprising 320 military officers from 35 countries, was set up to monitor the

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Khor Abdullah waterway and the demilitarised zone covering ten kilometres into Iraq and five kilometres into Kuwait from the agreed boundary according to their agreement of 4 October 1963. See Hiro, Dictionary of the Middle East, p. 331; David H. Finnie, Shifting Lines in the Sand: Kuwait’s Elusive Frontier with Iraq (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), p. 163. 156 AFP (Paris) in English, FBIS: NES, 3 September 1991, p. 23. 157 Kuwait News Agency (London) in Arabic, FBIS: NES, 3 September 1991, p. 21; 10 September 1991, p. 8; 18 September 1991, p. 22. 158 Jill Crystal, Kuwait: The Transformation of an Oil State (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), p. 148. 159 Kenneth Katzman, ‘Kuwait: current issues’, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress (3 June 1993), 93–5 50F, p. 1; Anthony H.Cordesman, Kuwait: Recovery and Security After the Gulf War (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), p. 126. 160 Republic of Iraq Radio First Program Network (Baghdad) in Arabic, FBIS: NES, 11 September 1991, pp. 17–18. See further criticisms by Iraqi press in Iraqi News Agency (Baghdad) in Arabic, FBIS: NES, 13 November 1991, p. 33. 161 Ibid., p. 18. 162 Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran First Program Network (Teheran) in Persian, FBIS: NES, 16 September 1991, p. 49. See also AFP (Paris) in English, FBIS: NES, 4 September 1991, p. 50. 163 Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran First Program Network (Teheran) in Persian, FBIS: NES, 23 September 1991, p. 64; 24 September 1991, p. 38; Iranian News Agency (Teheran) in English, FBIS: NES, 26 September 1991, p. 53; Jomhuri-Ye Eslami (Teheran) in Persian, FBIS: NES, 27 September 1991, pp. 52–3; Resalat (Teheran) in Persian, FBIS: NES, 7 October 1991, pp. 50–1. 164 What should be noted is that a few days before the signing of the agreement, a US factfinding mission, comprising the Senators, leading businessmen, and prominent members of the media, visited Kuwait to view the destruction and havoc wreaked by Iraqi forces. Named as the Freedom Flight, the mission also included the Secretary of Commerce, Robert Mosbacher, former Secretary of State Alexander Haig, as well as a number of former officials who were in favour of US support for the reconstruction programmes in Kuwait: see Radio Kuwait in Arabic, FBIS: NES, 18 March 1991, p. 21. 165 Cordesman, Kuwait, p. 126; Katzman, ‘Kuwait: current issues’, p. 3. 166 Cordesman, Kuwait, p. 126. 167 Washington Post, 12 March 1992, p. A23. 168 Kuwait News Agency in Arabic, FBIS: NES, 12 February 1992, p. 18. 169 Kuwait News Agency in Arabic, FBIS: NES, 13 October 1992, p. 24; Washington Post, 13 October 1992, p. C1; Star Tribune (Minneapolis), 13 October 1992. 170 Kuwait News Agency in Arabic, FBIS: NES, 13 October 1992, p. 24. 171 Star Tribune (Minneapolis), 13 October 1992. 172 Washington Post, 13 October 1992, p. C1. 173 The Independent, 14 April 1993, p. 11. 174 Sawt Al-Kuwayt Al-Duwali (London) in Arabic, FBIS: NES, 13 December 1991, p. 32. 175 Kuwait News Agency in Arabic, FBIS: NES, 30 June 1992, p. 33. 176 Washington Post, 1 August 1992, p. A16; 2 August 1992, p. A8; Los Angeles Times, 5 August 1992, pp. A1, A14; The Guardian, 5 August 1992, p. 8. 177 Cordesman, Kuwait, p. 128. 178 Ibid., p. 129.

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Conclusion 1 Interview with Ms Barbara, Acting Co-ordinator for Counter Terrorism, the State Department, Washington, DC. 12 October 1993. 2 See footnote 26 in Chapter 1. 3 A sample of the scholarly discussion on the US-Israeli relationship is Bernard Reich, The United States and Israel: Influence in the Special Relationship (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984). David W.Lesch, ed., The Middle East and the United States: A Historical and Political Reassessment (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996). 4 Anthony H.Cordesman, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and the UAE: Challenges of Security (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997). 5 The Guardian Weekly, 10 December 1995, p. 17.

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Ghabra, Shafeeq N. Palestinians in Kuwait: The Family and the Politics of Survival. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987. Hamdan ai-Alkin, Hassan. The GCC States in an Unstable World: Foreign-policy Dilemmas of Small States. London: Saqi Books, 1994. Handel, Michael. Weak States in the International System. London: Frank Cass, 1981. Heikal, Mohammed. Illusions of Triumph: An Arab View of the Gulf War. Hammersmith, London: Fontana, 1993. Helms II Robert and Robert H.Dorff. eds. The Persian Gulf Crisis: Power in the Post-Cold War World. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1993. Hermann, Charles E, Charles W.Kegley, Jr and James N.Rosenau. eds. New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy. Boston, MA: Allen & Unwin, 1987. Hiro, Dilip. The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict. London: Grafton Books, 1989. Hopwood, Derek, Habib Ishow and Thomas Koszinowski. eds. Iraq: Power and Society. Reading, MA: Ithaca Press, 1993. Hurewitz, J.C. The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics: A Documentary Record. Vol. I. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1975. Ibrahim, Ibrahim, The Gulf Crisis: Background and Consequences. Washington, DC: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, 1992. Ismael, Tareq Y. Iraq and Iran: Roots of Conflict. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1982. Joyner, Christopher C. The Persian Gulf War: Lessons for Strategy, Law, and Diplomacy. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1990. Karsh, Efraim. ed. The Iran-Iraq War: Impact and Implications. Basingstoke, UK: The Macmillan Press, 1989. Katz, Mark. Russia and Arabia: Soviet Foreign Policy Toward the Arabian Peninsula. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986. Kechichian, Joseph A. Iran, Iraq, and the Arab Gulf States. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2001. Kelly, J.B. Arabia, the Gulf and the West. London: George Weidenfeld and Nicolson Limited, 1980. Khadduri, Majid. Republican Iraq: A Study in Iraqi Politics Since the Revolution of 1958. London: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1969 ——. The Gulf War: The Origins and Implications of the Iraq—Iran Conflict. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988. Khalifa, Ali M. The United Arab Emirates: Unity and Fragmentation. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979. Kissinger, Henry. Years of Upheaval. Boston, London: Little Brown and Company, 1982. Kupchan, Charles A. The Persian Gulf and the West: The Dilemmas of Security. London: Allen & Unwin, 1987. Layne, Linda. ed. Elections in the Middle East: Implications of Recent Trends, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987. Lenzcowski, George. American Presidents and the Middle East. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1990. Lesch, David W. The Middle East and the United States: A Historical and Political Reassessment. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996. Licklider, Roy. Political Power and the Arab Oil Weapon. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988. Lindsay, James M. Congress and the Politics of US Foreign Policy. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994. Lloyd, Peter J. International Trade Problems of Small Nations. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1968. Long, David E. The United States—Saudi Arabia Relationship: Ambivalent Allies. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985. Male, Beverley. Revolutionary Afghanistan. London: Croom Helm, 1982.

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Mangold, Peter. Superpowers Intervention in the Middle East. London: Croom Helm, 1978. Mansfield, Peter. Kuwait: Vanguard of the Gulf. London: Hutchinson, 1990. Marr, Phebe. The Modern History of Iraq. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985. Marr, Phebe and William Lewis. eds. Riding the Tiger: The Middle East Challenge After the Cold War. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993. Marriott, J.A.R. Federalism and the Problem of the Small State. London: Allen & Unwin, 1943. Masaryk, T.G. The Problem of Small Nations in the European Crisis. London: University of London, Athlone Press, 1966. Maull, Hanns and Otto Pick. eds. The Gulf War: Regional and International Dimensions. London: Pinter House, 1989. MccGwire, Michael, Ken Booth and John McDonnell. eds. Soviet Naval Policy: Objectives and Constraints. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975. Ministry of Guidance and Information of Kuwait. Kuwait Today: A Welfare State. Nairobi: Quality Publications Ltd (n.d.). Mostyn, Trevor. Major Political Events in Iran, Iraq, and the Arabian Peninsula, 1945–1990. Oxford and New York: Facts on File Limited, 1991. Murden, Simon. Emergent Regional Powers and International Relations in the Gulf: 1988–1991. Reading, MA: Ithaca Press, 1995. Nakhleh, Emile A. Arab-American Relations. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1975. Niblock, Tim. ed. Iraq: The Contemporary State. London: Croom Helm, 1982. Nixon, Richard. The Memoirs of Richard Nixon. London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1978. Nyrop, Richard F., Beryl Lieff Benderly, Laraine Newhouse Carter, William W. Cover, Robert A.Kirchner, Philip W.Moelleer, William A.Mussen Jr., Clarance Edward Pike and Rinn-Sup Shinn. Area Handbook for the Persian Gulf States. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1977. O’Ballance, Edgar. The Gulf War. London: Brassey’s Defence Publishers, 1988. Ovendale, Ritchie. The Longman Companion to the Middle East Since 1914. London and New York: Longman Group UK Limited, 1992. Oye, Kenneth A., Robert J.Lieber and Donald Rothchild. Eagle in a New World: American Grand Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era. New York: Harper Collins Publishers Inc., 1992. Page, Stephen. The USSR and Arabia: The Development of Soviet Policies and Attitudes towards the Countries of the Arabian Peninsula, 1955–1970. London: Central Asian Research Centre, 1971. Palmer, Michael. Guardians of the Gulf: A History of America’s Expanding Role in the Persian Gulf, 1833–1992. New York: The Free Press, 1992. Peck, Malcom C. The United Arab Emirates: A Venture in Unity. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986. Peterson, Erik R. The GCC: Search for Unity in a Dynamic Region. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988. Peterson, J.E. Defending Arabia. London, Sydney: Croom Helm, 1986. ——. The Arab Gulf States: Steps Toward Political Participation. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1988. Piscatori, James. ed. Islamic Fundamentalism and the Gulf Crisis. Chicago, IL: The American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1991. Polk, William R. The United States and the Arab World. 2nd edn. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975. Powell, Colin L. (with Joseph E.Persico). My American Journey. New York: Random House, 1995. Pridham, B.R. ed. The Arab Gulf and the West. London: Croom Helm, 1985. ——. ed. The Arab Gulf and the Arab World. London: Croom Helm, 1988. Purnell, Robert. The Society of States: An Introduction to International Politics. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973.

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Quandt, William B. Decade of Decisions: American Policy Toward the Arab—Israeli Conflict, 1967–1976. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1977. ——. Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1986. Rajaee, Farhang. ed. The Iran—Iraq War: The Politics of Aggression. Gainsville, FL: University of Florida Press, 1993. Ramazani, R.K. The United States and Iran: The Patterns of Influence. New York: Praeger Publisher, 1982. ——. Revolutionary Iran: Challenge and Response in the Middle East. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986. Reich, Bernard. The United States and Israel: Influence in the Special Relationship. New York: Praeger Publisher, 1984. Rosenau, James N. ed. International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory. New York: The Free Press, 1969. Rothstein, R.L. Alliances and Small Powers. New York: Columbia University Press, 1968. ——. The Weak in the World of the Strong. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977. Rubinstein, Alvin Z. Red Star on the Nile: The Soviet-Egyptian Influence Relationship Since the June War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977. ——. The Great Game: Rivalry in the Persian Gulf and South Asia. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983. Safran, Nadav. Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988. Salinger, Pierre and Laurent, Eric. Secret Dossier: The Hidden Agenda Behind the Gulf War. London: Penguin Books, 1991. Sandwick, John. ed. The Gulf Cooperation Council: Moderation and Stability in an Interdependent World. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987. Sanger, Richard H. The Arabian Peninsula. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1954. Saunders, Harold H. The Other Walls: The Arab-Israeli Peace Process in a Global Perspective. rev. edn. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982. Schofield, Richard. Kuwait and Iraq: Historical Claims and Territorial Disputes. London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1991. Schou, August and Arne Olav Brundtland. eds. Small States in International Relations. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1971. Shemesh, Haim. Soviet-Iraqi Relations, 1968–1988: In the Shadow of the Iraq—Iran Conflict. London: Lynne Rienner, 1992. Shoemaker, Christopher and John Spanier. Patron-Client State Relationship. New York: Praeger Publisher, 1984. Shultz, George P. Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993. Sifry Micah L. and Christopher Cerf. eds. The Gulf War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions. New York: Random House, Times Book, 1991. Simpson, Christopher. National Security Directives of the Reagan and Bush Administrations: The Declassified History of US Political and Military Policy, 1981–1991. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995. Singer, M. Weak States in a World of Powers. New York: The Free Press, 1972. Sirriyeh, Hussein. US Policy in the Gulf, 1968–1977. London: Ithaca Press, 1984. Smolansky, Ole M. and Bettie M.Smolansky. The USSR and Iraq: The Soviet Quest for Influence. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1991. Snow, Donald M. and Eugene Brown. Puzzle Palaces and Foggy Bottom: US Foreign and Defense Policy-making in the 1990s. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994. Steele, Jonathan. The Limits of Soviet Power: The Kremlin’s Foreign Policy—Brezhnev to Chernenko. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1984. Tareq, Y.Ismael. Iraq and Iran: Roots of Conflict. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1982.

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Tibi, Bassam. Conflict and War in the Middle East, 1967–91: Regional Dynamic and Superpowers. trans. by Clare Krojzl. Basingstoke, UK: The Macmillan Press, 1993. Trevelyan, Humphrey. The Middle East in Revolution. London: Macmillan Press, 1970. Tucker, Robert W. and David C.Hendrickson. The Imperial Temptation: The New World Order and America’s Purpose. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1992. Twinam, Joseph Wright. The Gulf, Cooperation and the Council: An American Perspective. Washington, DC: Middle East Policy Council, 1992. Vital, David. The Inequality of States: A Study of Small Power in International Relations. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967. ——. The Survival of Small States: Studies in Small Power/Great Power Conflict. London: Oxford University Press, 1972. Watts, D.C. ed. Survey of International Affairs, 1961. London: Oxford University Press, 1965. ——. ed. Documents on International Affairs, 1961. London: Oxford University Press, 1965. Weinberger, Casper. Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical years at the Pentagon. London: Michael Joseph, 1990. Wriggins, W.Howard. ed. Dynamics of Regional Politics: Four Systems on the Indian Ocean Rim. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993. Yergin, Daniel. The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power. London: Simon and Schuster Ltd, 1991. Yodfat, Aryeh Y. The Soviet Union and the Arabian Peninsula. London: Croom Helm, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983.

Articles Ahrari, M.E. ‘Rational foreign policy behaviour of a weak state: the case of Kuwait’. Australian Journal of International Affairs. Vol. 47, No. 1 (May 1993). Al-Ebraheem, Hassan. ‘Kuwait and the new world order’. Middle East Insight. Vol. 7, No. 6 (May/June 1991). ——.‘The Gulf crisis: a Kuwaiti perspective, an interview’. Journal of Palestine Studies. Vol. XX, No. 2 (Winter 1991). Alford, Jonathan. ‘Security dilemmas of small states’. The Round Table. Vol. 73, No. 292 (October 1984). Al-Haq Ahady, Anwar. ‘Security in the Persian Gulf after Desert Storm’. International Journal. Vol. XLIX, No. 2 (Spring 1994). Al-Sabah, Sa’ud Nasir. ‘An exclusive interview’. Middle East Insight. Vol. 8, No. 4 (March/April 1992). Al-Salem, Faisal. ‘The United States and the Gulf: what do the Arabs want?’. Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies. Vol. VI, No. 1 (Fall 1982). Anthony, John Duke. ‘The GCC’. International Journal. Vol. XLI, No. 2 (Spring 1986). ——.‘President’s perspective: up from ashes, rebuilding Kuwait’. President’s Report: National Council on US-Arab Relations. Vol. VII, No. 1 (Winter-Spring 1992). Assiri, Abdul-Reda and Kamal al-Konoufi. ‘Kuwait’s political elite: the cabinet’. Middle East Journal. Vol. XLII, No. 1 (1988). Azzam, Maha. ‘The Gulf crisis: perceptions in the muslim world’. International Affairs. Vol. 67, No. 3 (1991). Baehr, Peter R. ‘Small states: a tool for analysis’. World Politics. Vol. 27 (1975). Brynen, Rex and Paul Noble. ‘The Gulf conflict and the Arab State system: a new regional order?’. Arab Studies Quarterly. Vol. 13, Nos. 1–2 (Winter/Spring 1991). Busch, Briton Cooper. ‘Britain and the status of Kuwayt, 1896–1899’. Middle East Journal. Vol. 21 (1967).

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Chubin, Shahram and Charles Tripp. ‘Domestic politics and territorial disputes in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula’.Survival. Vol. 35, No. 4 (Winter 1993–1994). Diggines, C.E. ‘The problems of small states’. The Round Table. Vol. 74, No. 295 (July 1985). East, Maurice. ‘Foreign policy, size and behaviour’. World Politics. Vol. 26 (1973). Esposito, John L. ‘The Persian Gulf War, Islamic movements and the new world order’. The Iranian Journal of International Affairs. Vol. V, No. 2 (Summer 1993). Falk, Richard. ‘Can US policy toward the Middle East change course?’. Middle East Journal. Vol. 47, No. 1 (Winter 1993). Fessler, Pamela. ‘Glaspie defends her actions, US policy before invasion’. Congressional Quarterly. Vol. 49, No. 12 (23 March 1991). Fox, Annette Baker. ‘Intervention and the small state’. International Affairs. Vol. 22 (1968). ——.‘The small state in the international system’. International Journal. Vol. 24 (1969). Freedman, Lawrence and Efraim Karsh. ‘How Kuwait was won: strategy in the Gulf War’. International Security. Vol. 16, No. 2 (Fall 1991). Gause III, F.Gregory. ‘Britain and American policies in the Persian Gulf, 1968–73’. Review of International Studies. Vol. 11, No. IV (1985). ‘The illogic of dual containment’. Foreign Affairs. Vo1. 73, No. 2 (March/April 1994). Ghabra, Shafeeq. ‘The Iraqi occupation of Kuwait: an eyewitness account’. Journal of Palestine Studies. Vol. 20, No. 2 (Winter 1991). Handel, Michael. ‘Does the dog wag the tail or vice versa?’. The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations. Vol. 6 (1982). Harbert, J.R. ‘The behaviour of the mini-states in the United Nations, 1971–72’. International Organization. Vol. 30 (1976). Hart, Jeffrey. ‘Three approaches to the measurement of power in international relations’. International Organization. Vol. 30 (1976). Hay, Rupert. ‘The impact of the oil industry on the Persian Gulf Shaykhdoms’. Middle East Journal. Vol. 9, No. 4 (Autumn 1955). Herrmann, Richard K. ‘The Middle East and the new world order’. International Security. Vol. 16, No. 2 (Fall 1991). Hudson, Michael. ‘To play the Hegemon: fifty years of US policy toward the Middle East’. Middle East Journal. Vol. 50, No. 3 (Summer 1996). Indyk, Martin. Graham Fuller, Anthony Cordesman and Phebe Marr. ‘US policy toward Iran and Iraq’. Middle East Policy. Vol. VIII, No. 1 (1994). Karabell, Zachary. ‘Backfire: US policy toward Iraq, 1988–2 August 1990’. Middle East Journal. Vol. 49, No. 1 (Winter 1995). Karsh, Efraim and Inari Rautsi. ‘Why Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait’. Survival. Vol. XXXIII, No. 1 (January/February 1991). Katz, Mark N. ‘Kuwait should get US missiles’. Newsday. 26 July 1984. Kechichian, J.A. ‘The GCC: search for security’. Third World Quarterly. Vol. 7, No. 4 (October 1985). Keohane, Robert O. ‘Lilliputians’ dilemmas: small states in international politics’. International Organization. Vol. XXIII, No. 2 (1969). ——.‘The big influence of small allies’. Foreign Policy. No. 2 (1971). Khalilzad, Zalmay. ‘The United States and the Persian Gulf: preventing regional hegemony’. Survival Vol. 37, No. 2 (Summer 1995). Khoury, Philip S. ‘The Middle East: two years after the Gulf War’. The International House of Japan (IHJ) Bulletin. Vol. 13, No. 3 (Summer 1993). Lesch, Ann M. ‘Palestinians in Kuwait’. Journal of Palestine Studies. Vol. XX, No. 4 (Summer 1991). Licklider, Roy E. ‘The failure of the Arab Oil Weapon in 1973–1974’. Comparative Strategy. Vol. 3, No. 4 (1982).

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Luce, William. ‘Britain’s withdrawal from the Middle East and Persian Gulf’. The Royal United Service Institution Journal Vol. XIV, No. 653 (March 1969). McNaugher, Thomas. ‘The future of Kuwait: a personal view by a veteran of “Desert Storm”’. The Key Reporter. Vol. 56, No. 4 (Summer 1991). Magnus, Ralph H. ‘The GCC and security: the enemy without and the enemy within’. Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies. Vol. XX, No. 3 (Spring 1997). Malone, Joseph J. ‘America and the Arabian Peninsula: the first two hundred years’. Middle East Journal. Vol. XXX (Summer 1976). Marriott, J.A.R. ‘The problem of the small state’. Fortnightly. Vol. 161 (1942). Milsten, Donald E. ‘Smaller powers—a struggle for survival: a review’. The Journal of Conflict Resolution. Vol. 13 (1969). Monroe, Elizabeth. ‘The Shaikhdom of Kuwait’. International Affairs. Vol. XXX, No. 3 (July 1954). Murphy, Richard W. ‘The effects of the Gulf War on intraregional relationships’. Middle East Insight. Vol. 8, No. 5 (May/June 1992). Nye, Joseph S., Jr. ‘Soft power’. Foreign Policy. No. 80 (Fall 1990). Patterson, William E. ‘Small states in international politics’. Cooperation and Conflict: Nordic Journal in International Politics. Vol. IV, No. 2 (1969). Pelt, Mary Cubberly Van. ‘The Sheikhdom of Kuwait’. Middle East Journal. Vol. IV, No. 1 (January 1950). Peterson, J.E. ‘Defending Arabia: evolution of responsibility’. Orbis. Vol. 28, No. 3 (Fall 1984). Quandt, William B. ‘The Middle East on the brink: prospects for change in the 21st Century’. Middle East Journal. Vol. 50, No. 1 (Winter 1996). Quester, George. ‘Defending the micro-states’. International Security. Vol. 8, No. 2 (Fall 1983). Ramazani, R.K. ‘The Iran-Iraq war and the Persian Gulf crisis’. Current History. Vol. 87, No. 526 (February 1988). ——. ‘Future security in the Persian Gulf: America’s role’. Middle East Insight. Vol. 8, No. 1, (July/August 1991). Ross, Dennis. ‘Considering Soviet threats to the Persian Gulf’. International Security. Vol. 6, No. 2 (Fall 1981). Said Zahlan, Rosemarie. ‘The Gulf States and the Palestine problem, 1936–48’. Arab Studies Quarterly. Vol. 3, No. 1 (1981). Saikal, Amin. ‘The United States and Persian Gulf Security’. World Policy Journal. Vol. IX, No. 3 (Summer 1992). Salinger, ‘Pierre. ‘The United States, the United Nations, and the Gulf War’. Middle East Journal. Vol. 49, No. 4 (Autumn 1995). Sayigh, Yezid. ‘The Gulf crisis: why the Arab regional order failed’. International Affairs. Vol. 67, No. 3 (1991). Simon, Steven. ‘US Strategy in the Persian Gulf’. Survival. Vol. 34, No. 3 (Autumn 1992). Sirriyeh, Hussein. ‘Conflict over the Gulf Islands of Abu Musa and the Tunbs, 1968–1971’. Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies. Vol. VIII, No. 2 (Winter 1984). Steinberg, Gerald M. ‘Middle East arms control and regional security’. Survival. Vol. 36, No. 1 (Spring 1994). Stork, Joe. ‘Reagan re-flags the Gulf’. The Middle East Report. Vol. 17, No. 5 (September-October 1987). Swearingen, Will D. ‘Sources of conflict over oil in the Persian/Arabian Gulf’. Middle East Journal. Vol. XXXV, No. 3 (Summer 1981). Tetreault, Mary Ann, ‘Kuwait: the morning after’. Current History. Vol. 91, No. 561 (January 1992). Tripp, Charles. ‘The Gulf States and Iraq’. Survival. Vol. 34, No. 3 (Autumn 1992). Twinam, Joseph Wright. ‘The Gulf cooperation council since the Gulf War: the state of the States’. Middle East Policy. Vol. 1, No. 4 (1992).

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Vandenbosch, Amry. ‘The small states in international politics and organization’. The Journal of Politics. Vol. 26 (1964). Vayrynen, Raimo. ‘On the definition and measurement of small power status’. Cooperation and Conflict: Nordic Journal of International Politics. Vol. VI, No. 2 (1971). Vellut, Jean-Luc. ‘Smaller states and the problem of war and peace: some consequences of the emergence of smaller states in Africa’. Journal of Peace Research. No. 4 (1967). Viorst, Milton. ‘A reporter at large: out of the desert’. The New Yorker. 16 May 1988. ——.‘Kuwait’s fatal blunder’. The Independent Magazine. 12 January 1991. Wilcox, Wayne A. ‘The influence of small states in a changing world’. The Annals. No. 372 (July 1967). Woolf, Leonard. ‘The future of the small states’. Political Quarterly. Vol. 14 (1943). Wright, Claudia. ‘Implications of the Iraq—Iran war’. Foreign Affairs. Vol. 59, No. 2 (Winter 1980/81). Zanoyan, Vahan. ‘After the oil boom: the holiday ends in the Gulf’. Foreign Affairs. Vol. 74, No. 6 (November/December 1995).

Monographs Anthony, John Duke. ‘Goals in the Gulf: America’s interests and the Gulf cooperation council’. National Council Reports. Number 3 (March 1985). Craig, Theodore. ‘Kuwait: background, restoration, and questions for the United States’. Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress. 21 March 1991. Report No. 91– 288F. Gamlen, Elizabeth. US Military Intervention in the Iran-Iraq War, 1987–88. Peace Research Report No. 21. Department of Peace Studies. University of Bradford. March 1989 Katzman, Kenneth. ‘Kuwait: current issues’. Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress. 3 June 1993. Report No. 93–550F. ——.‘Iraqi compliance with cease-fire agreements’. Congressional Research Service (CRS) Issue Brief. Updated 21 October 1993. Issue No. IB92117. Prados, Alfred. ‘Persian Gulf region: US post-war security interests’. Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress. 11 June 1993. Report No. 93–586F.

Interviews United States Al Sabah, Muhammad Sabah Al-Salim. The Kuwaiti Ambassador in Washington, DC. 18 October 1993. Anthony, John Duke. President National Council on US—Arab Relations, Washington, DC. 28 October 1993. Bodine, Barbara. Acting co-ordinator for counter terrorism. The State Department. Washington, DC. 12 October 1993. Freedman, Robert O. The Baltimore Hebrew University. Baltimore, MD. 29 October 1993. Hart, Parker. Former US Ambassador to Kuwait. Washington, DC. 11 October 1993. Howell, Nathaniel W. Former US Ambassador to Kuwait. Charlottesville, VA. 9 September 1993. Katz, Mark N. George Mason University. Fairfax, VA. 17 August 1993. McNaugher, Thomas. The Brookings Institution. Washington, DC. 11 August 1993. Mak, Dayton. Former US Ambassador to Kuwait. Washington, DC. 29 July 1993.

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186

Peck, Malcom. Meridian International Center. Washington, DC. 20 October 1993. Quainton, Anthony E.C. Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security. The State Department. Washington, DC. 25 August 1993. Quandt, William B. The Brookings Institution. Washington, DC. 5 October 1993. Ramazani, R.K. The University of Virginia. Charlottesville, VA. 9 September 1993. Reich, Bernard. The George Washington University. Washington, DC. 29 September 1993. Rubinstein, Alvin Z. The University of Pennsylvania. Philadelphia, PA. 9 October 1993. Stoltzfus, William A., Jr. Former US Ambassador to Kuwait. The National Press Club. Washington, DC. 30 September 1993. Wrampelmeier, Brooks. Former Kuwaiti Desk Officer in the Arabian Peninsula Directorate. The State Department. Washington, DC. 24 August 1993.

Kuwait Al-Babtayn, Khalid. Director of Americas Department. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Kuwait City. 25 September 1994. Al-Ebraheem, Hassan Ali. Kuwait Society for the Advancement of Arab Children. Kuwait City. 18 September 1994. Alessa, Shamlen Y. Department of Political Science, Kuwait University. Kuwait City. 20 September 1994. Assiri, Abdul-Reda. Department of Political Science, Kuwait University. Kuwait City. 24 September 1994.

Unpublished theses Aldandany, Jamil F. ‘United States foreign policy in the Gulf, 1969–1984’. An unpublished PhD thesis, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. October 1990. Assiri, Abdul-Reda. ‘The impact of arms and oil politics on United States relations with the Arabian Gulf States, 1968–78’. An unpublished PhD thesis, University of California. Riverside. June 1981. Moubarak, Walid E. ‘Kuwait’s quest for security, 1961–1973’. An unpublished PhD thesis, Indiana University. May 1979.

Unpublished papers A Briefing Paper on Kuwaiti Reflag Project prepared by the US Coast Guard, US Department of Transportation dated 9 June 1987 (document no. 4597M) for Admiral William Cockell, National Security Council. Dickman, Francois. A written response to the author’s questionnaire, 2 August 1993. Fact Sheets on Reflagging of Kuwaiti Vessels. Unpublished documents collected by the National Security Archives. Washington, DC. Maestrone, Frank E. A written response to the author’s questionnaire, 4 August 1993. Mak, Dayton S. Oral History Interview, 9 August 1989. Georgetown University’s Foreign Affairs Oral History Program. Twinam, Joseph Wright. A written response to the author’s questionnaire, 29 July 1993.

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187

Periodicals and newspapers The Australian (Sydney) BBC Summary of World Broadcast (SWB): The Middle East and North Africa (SWB: ME) Christian Science Monitor Defense Week, 30 July 1984 Foreign Broadcast Information Service: Near East and South Asia (FBIS: NES) The Guardian (London) The Guardian Weekly (London) The Independent (London) The Independent on Sunday (London) Kuwait Times Los Angeles Times New York Times Star Tribune (Minneapolis) The Sunday Times (London) The Times (London) Washington Post

Other source Nakhleh, Emile A. A tape-recorded response to the author’s questionnaire.

Index Aaron, David 75 ACC see Arab Co-operation Council Agnew, Spiro T. 52–3 Akin, James 68 Al-Anba’ (News) 78, 80 Al-‘Atiqi, ‘Abd al-Rahman Salih 79 Al-Badr, ‘Abd al-Fattah 107 Al-Bishara, ‘Abdallah Ya’kub 80 Al-Ebraheem, Hassan Ali 72, 75, 126 Al-Fuzan, Sa’ud 41 Al-Harithi, Yusuf ‘Ubayd 79 Al-Hasan, Muhammad Abu 93 Al-Jabir, Mubarak Abdullah 45 Al-Jabir, Shaykh Nawwaf al-Ahmad 128 Al-Jabir, Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad 44, 47, 51, 52, 57, 64, 68, 69, 73, 74, 80, 81–2, 83, 84, 155 n.171 Al-Jasim, Muhammad 75 Al-Juwaysiri, Rashid Awad 134 Al-Khalid, Ahmad Sa’ud 29 Al-Klibi, Chadli 122 Allison, Mary 21 Al-Madani, Wajih 45 Al-Matiqi, ‘Abd al-Rahman Salim 46 Al-Mulla, Badr ‘Abdullah 40 Al-Qabas (The Firebrand) 54, 69, 73, 82, 98, 116 Al-Ra’i Al-Amm (Public Opinion) 58, 63, 69, 70, 71, 73, 80, 116 Al-Rashid, Rashid 51, 53, 54, 58, 61, 68, 78, 79, 81 Al-Rayah (The Banner) 90 Al-Sabah family 11 Al Sabah, Muhammad 72 Al Sabah, Shaykh ‘Abdullah al-Salim, Amir of Kuwait 1950–1965 21, 28, 32, 36–7, 39, 41, 44 Al Sabah, Shaykh ‘Abdullah Mubarak 34 Al Sabah, Shaykh Ahmad al Jabir, Amir of Kuwait 1921–1950 22, 23, 24, 25 Al Sabah, Shaykh al-Khalifah 76 Al Sabah, Shaykh Fahd al-Salim 29 Al Sabah, Shaykh Jabir al-Ahmad al-Jabir, Amir of Kuwait 1977 50, 54, 60, 61, 70, 73, 74, 79, 81, 117, 126, 127, 128, 129–30, 134, 135, 139, 159 n.22, 173 n.94 Al Sabah, Shaykh Sa’ad al-Abdullah al-Salim 44, 45, 47, 59, 60, 63, 64, 69, 77, 84, 91, 92, 95, 99, 110–11, 115, 117, 118, 122, 128, 135, 139, 154 n.129, 173 n.94 Al Sabah, Shaykh Sa’ad Nasir 93, 99 Al Sabah, Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad 88 Al Sabah, Shaykh Sabah al-Salim, Amir of Kuwait 1965–1977 46, 52, 60, 153 n.73 Al Sabah, Shaykh Salim, Amir of Kuwait 1917–1921 22 Al-Sani, Mazid ‘Abd al-Rahman 115, 128

Index

189

Al-Shalin, Sulayman 117, 119 Al-Shammas, Sa’id Yaqub 42 Al-Siyasah 71, 73, 76, 79, 80, 83–4 Al-Tassan, Ibrahim 39 Al-Watan (Nation) 63, 73, 78, 81 American Independent Oil Company (AMINOIL) 2, 25, 26, 28 American Missions of the Dutch Reformed Church 20–1 AMINOIL see American Independent Oil Company Anglo-American military co-operation: Kuwait 33–4 Anglo-Kuwaiti relations 1, 19, 138 Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) 22, 24 APOC see Anglo-Persian Oil Company Arab Co-operation Council (ACC) 117–18 Arab—Israeli conflict 116–17; and US-Kuwaiti relations 43–8, 59–62, 68–9, 139 Arab League 33, 37, 39, 57, 117, 126 The Arab Times 82 Arafat, Yasser 117 Arens, Moshe 93 Arif, ‘Abdul al-Salam 32 Armacost, Michael 93, 100, 102 armed forces: Kuwait 54–5 Armitage, Richard L. 103 arms procurement: F18 arms deal 109–11; Kuwait 45, 55, 58–9, 63, 64, 120, 135; Saudi Arabia 91–2; Stinger missiles controversy 92–7 Aspin, Les 107, 129, 169 n.152 assertive influence 14, 15, 47–8, 90–1, 96–7, 140, 141 asset freezing 32, 78–9 Atherton, Alfred 73 Atherton, Ray 23 autarky 9–10 aviation industry: Kuwait 29–30 Awalt, Fred H. 27 Aziz, Tariq 122 Babbit, Bruce 105 Bahrain 20, 23, 26, 34, 50, 79, 84, 85, 142 Baker, Howard H., Jr 106 Baker, James 125, 128, 129, 130, 131 Battle, Lucius 48 Bayne, Marmaduke 48 Bazoft, Farzad 118–19 Begin, Menahem 68, 71, 72 Bennett, Arthur 21 Berleigh, Peter 109 Berry, Burton Y. 28

Index

190

Biden, Joseph R., Jr 105, 129 BOAC see British Overseas Airways Corporation Boots, Paul 25 Bovill, W.J.Lieutenant Colonel 24 Brewer, William D. 29 Brezhnev, Leonid 141 British Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC) 29, 30 British Petroleum see Anglo-Persian Oil Company Brown, George 48, 49 Brown, Harold 75, 76, 84 Brzezinski, Zbigniew 71, 75, 76 Buchanan, John H., Jr 65 Bull, Gerald 119–20 Burke, Edward 49 Burrows, B.A.B. 27 Bush, George 105, 110, 125, 127, 128, 129, 130, 135 Callaghan, James 48 Cameron, Warde M. 27 Camp David Treaty (1978): and US-Kuwaiti relations 2, 4, 70–4 Card, J.C. 104 Carlucci, Frank 101, 107, 110 Carter, Jimmy 67, 68, 69, 71, 74, 78, 81, 82, 87, 88 Carter Doctrine 77, 84 case studies 16 CENTO see Central Treaty Organisation Central Committee for the People’s Boycott (Kuwait) 46 Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) 58 Chamoun, Camille 32 Charles, Sandra 101 Cheney, Dick 127–8, 129, 135, 136 Chesapeake Shipping Incorporation 103–4, 168 n. 119 Chisholm, Archibald Hugh Tennent 24 Christian missionaries: Kuwait 20–2 Clark, Harlan B. 27 Clements, William P. 59 Clinton, Bill 135 coercive influence 14, 15 communist activities: Kuwait 30–2 constructive facilitative influences 15 co-operative influence 14, 56, 57, 66, 74, 79, 96, 109, 111, 112, 126, 140, 141–2 Crowe, William J., Jr 104, 107, 115 Damascus Declaration (1991) 132–3 Davies, Ralph K. 25 Dayan, Moshe 58 Dean, Sir Patrick 38, 40 DeConcini, Dennis 109,111 Desert Shield Operation 127, 128–9 Desert Storm Operation 127, 129

Index

191

Dickman, Francois M. 55, 74, 81, 83, 86, 89, 123 diplomacy 138 direct interaction 16 Diwani 30 Dole, Robert J. 105, 106 Douglas-Home, Alexander Frederick 39 Dukakis, Michael S. 105, 116 Dulles, Allen W. 32, 33 Dulles, John Foster 31, 32 Duncan, Enoch S. 28 Eastern and General Syndicate (EGS) Ltd 22–3, 24 Eban, Abba 45, 58 education: Kuwait 21–2 EGS Ltd see Eastern and General Syndicate Ltd Egypt 27, 54, 57, 58, 67, 69, 70, 117, 133 Eisenhower, Dwight 32, 33, 34, 64 Elworthy, Sir Charles 39 facilitative influences 15 Fahd, King of Saudi Arabia 129 Faysal, King of Saudi Arabia 46, 50, 51, 143 Fish, Howard M. 65 Frolovich, Cherkasov Mikhail 42 G. and J.Weir Ltd 29 GCC see Gulf Co-operation Council Gephardt, Richard A. 105 Gilman, Benjamin A. 105 Glaspie, April 124–5 Gnehm, Edward 109, 117, 128, 131, 162 n.106 Gore, Albert, Jr 105 Greindl, Gunther 134 Griffin, Philip J. 90 Grishin, Yuri 110 Grove, Brandon W., Jr 89 Grulich, Lewis 29 Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) 97–8, 117, 126, 132, 133, 166 n.73 Gulf Oil Corporation 23–4, 26 Haass, Richard 122 Haig, Alexander M., Jr 105, 106 Hamilton, Lee 59, 64–5 Hammadi, Sa’dun 134 Hare, Paul J. 58 Harrison, Paul 21 Hart, Parker T. 41–2, 52 Hassan II, King of Morocco 71 health care: Kuwait 21

Index

192

Holloway, James L., Jr 32 Holmes, Frank, 22–3, 24 Hoover, Herbert, Jr 31 hostage crisis: United States embassy in Teheran 78, 80, 82 Hoveyda, Abbas 51 Howell, Nathaniel 125, 126, 128 Huges, John 94 Hughes Aircraft Company 65, 109 Hunting, P.L., Mr 24 Husayn, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz 40, 68–9, 79, 81, 98, 130 Hussein, King of Jordan 71, 117 Hussein, Saddam 74, 85, 104, 113, 118, 121, 123, 124, 125, 128, 142 impressionistic and idiosyncratic commentaries 16 indirect influence 14, 133 influence relationship 2, 3, 12, 108–9, 112; definition 12–14; measurement 15–16; and small states 18, 138; types 14–15 instigative influences 15 Iran 50, 56, 57, 141; attitude of US 75–6 Iranian revolution (1979): and US—Kuwaiti relations 74–82 Iran-Iraq war (1980) 67, 89, 91, 112; and US-Kuwaiti relations 85–7 Iraq: Super Gun project 120 Iraqi—Kuwaiti relations 1; 1961 crisis 38–43; 1973 border crisis 56–8; 1990 invasion of Kuwait 113, 127; 1990 invasion of Kuwait, prelude to 114–15, 118, 121, 122–6; dissension over oil production 121–2 Israel 67, 70; opposition to Kuwaiti arms purchase 58–9, 93; see also Arab—Israeli conflict Jackson, Jesse L. 105 Ja‘far, Khalid 98 Jakins, H.G. 28 Jenkins, Roy 48 Jernegan, John 42 Johnson, Lyndon 45, 49, 52 Jordan, Amos A. 65 Karmal, Barbrak 82 Kelly, John 117, 119, 125 Kemp, Jack 105

Index

193

Kennedy, John F. 41 KFAED see Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development Khalid, King of Saudi Arabia 71 Khameini, ‘Ali 104 Khazal, Shaykh of Basra 20 Kissinger, Henry 50, 52, 53, 61, 70, 78 KOC Ltd see Kuwait Oil Company Ltd Kollek, Teddy 90 KOTC see Kuwait Oil Tanker Company Kuwait: Anglo-American military co-operation 33–4; arms procurement 45, 55, 58–9, 63, 64, 92–7, 109–11, 120, 135; communist activities 30–2; education 21–2; foreign policy 17–18, 36–7, 42; health care 21; military relations 136; missionary activities 20–2; reaction to British withdrawal 50–1; reaction to Camp David Treaty 72; small state 11; United Nations membership 40–1; see also US—Kuwaiti relations Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED) 17 Kuwaiti-Egyptian relations 117 Kuwaiti Hizbollah 104 Kuwaiti-Iranian relations 75, 81 Kuwaiti-Iraqi relations 1; 1961 crisis 38–43; 1973 border crisis 56–8; 1990 invasion by Iraq 113, 127; 1990 invasion by Iraq, prelude to 114–15, 118, 121, 122–6; dissension over oil production 121–2 Kuwaiti-Palestinian relations 43–5; see also Arab—Israeli conflict Kuwaiti-Soviet relations 40, 42, 43, 57, 83, 152 n.53 Kuwait Oil Company (KOC) Ltd 24–5, 28 Kuwait Oil Tanker Company (KOTC) 100, 103, 168 n. 119 The Kuwait Times 79, 82, 120 Kuwait Youth Association 43–4 Lagomarsino, Robert J. 102 Langdon, Jim 47 Lanos, Tom 105 Laxalt, Paul 105 Levine, Mel 111 Libya: and United States 116 Lloyd, Lord Selwyn 24, 32 Luce, Sir William 37, 38, 51

Index

194

MAAG see Military Assistance Advisory Group McClintock, Robert 36 McCloskey, Robert 49 McClure, James 61 McDonald Douglas Company 20 McDonnell Douglas Company 109 McGhee, George C. 28 Macmillan, Harold 33–4 MacPherson, James 28 Maestrone, Frank E. 42, 68, 69, 71, 74, 77 Mak, Dayton S. 41 Makins, Sir Robert M. 31 Manfield, Mike 49, 50 Mayor, John 135 MccGwire, Michael 106 Mellon, Andrew 23, 24 Mellor, David 110 Menefee, J.M. 47 Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) 55 Miller, William 79 Miner, Skip 101 Monday Morning 85 More, J.C 23 Morris, Willie 31 Mossadeq, Mohammad 31 Mubarak, Hosni 117 Mubarak, Shaykh 20–1 Murphy, Richard W. 92, 93, 100 Mylrea, C.S.G. 21 Nakhleh, Emile A. 74, 77 Nasser, Gamal Abdel 31 Newsom, David 31 Nixon, Richard 49, 50, 52, 61, 164 n.23 Nixon Doctrine 49, 50 Nofal, Sayet 39 NorthYemen 117, 118 OAPEC see Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries OIC see Organisation of Islamic Conference oil: 1967 embargo 46–7; 1973 embargo 61; American access to Kuwaiti reserves 22–5; British policy 23; dissension over production 121–2; political weapon 59–62, 66, 140 Oman 20, 71, 72, 79, 84, 85, 98, 100, 130, 142 OPEC see Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) 60–1, 157–8 n.238 Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) 91

Index

195

Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 37, 60–1, 76, 121 Pachachi, Adnan 40 Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) 44, 45, 69; see also Arab-Israeli conflict Palestinian homeland: Carter’s declaration 68–70; establishment 116–17 Palestinian-Kuwaiti relations 43–5; see also Arab-Israeli conflict Parish, Daphne 119 Patrick, Tom 25 Pelly, C.J. 21 perceptual/attitudinal change 16 Pickering, Thomas 122 Placke, James A. 106 Plimption, T.P. 40 PLO see Palestine Liberation Organisation Pomeroy Construction-Hawaiian Dreading 29 positive neutralism 33 Powell, Colin 127, 128 protective facilitative influences 15 public infrastructures: Kuwait 29–30 Qassim, ‘Abd al-Karim 1, 32, 38, 42 Qatar 50, 90, 142 Quainton, Anthony Cecil Eden 90, 96, 99, 101 Quandt, William 70, 71, 75 Quayle, Dan 130–1, 135 quiet diplomacy 40, 52 Radio Corporation of America (RCA) 30 Rakestraw, Ted 25 Raytheon Company 65 RCA see Radio Corporation of America Reagan, Ronald 88, 89, 92, 101 reflagging 88, 107–8, 141–2, 165 n.69, 168 n.126, 169 n.154; American procedures 103–4; criticism and opposition 104–7; Kuwait’s approaches to superpowers 98–103 Rhoades, Ralph O. 25 Richmond, John 39 Roberts, Goronwy 48, 50 Rockefeller, David 78 Rogers, William 54 Romberg, Alan 90, 96 Rostow, Eugene 51 Rusk, Dean 39, 40, 41, 47, 49

Index

196

Sadat, Anwar 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 74 Salih, ‘Abdullah Mullah 21 Sa’ud, ‘Abdul Aziz Ibn, Sultan of the Najd 23 Sa ud, King 39 Saudi Arabia 50, 51, 67, 77, 79, 80, 85, 134; 1973 oil embargo 61; arms procurement 91–2; role in Kuwaiti-Iraqi 1973 crisis 57 Schlesinger, James 62, 76 Schwarzkopf, Norman 127, 128 Scudder, Lewis 21 Sheldon, C.Miles 103 Shuhaybir, Suhayl 119 Shulman, Marshall D. 106 Shultz, George P. 92, 101, 111 Sick, Gary 82 Simon, Paul 105 Sisco, Joseph 54 small states 2, 3, 6; autarky 9–10; characteristics 6–9, 139; geographical location 9; and influence relationship 18, 138; legitimacy of ruling government 11; military weakness 10 Smith, Lawrence J. 109,111 Sober, Sidney 64, 65 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan: and US-Kuwaiti relations 82–5 Soviet-Iraqi relations 86 Soviet-Iraqi Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation (1972) 59, 63 Stafford, Tim 104 Stern, Thomas 64 Sterner, Michael 106 Stevens, Harley C. 28 Stevenson, Adlai E. 40 Stoltzfus, William A., Jr 54, 61, 64, 158 n.247 Strong, Robert C. 41 Sulayman, ‘Ali Haydar 40 Sultan, Prince Bandar Bin 91, 129 Symmes, Harrison M. 21,29 Symms, Steven D. 102 Talbot, Phillips 41 ‘tanker war’ 88, 91, 97, 98, 108 telecommunications: Kuwait 30 Thayer, Robert A. 30 Thompson, George 48 Tixier, Edward L. 92 Torricelli, Robert G. 105, 129 Traders Ltd 24

Index

197

Tutwiler, Margaret 124, 125 Twinam, Joseph Wright 71, 75, 86, 96, 115 Twining, Nathan F. 33 twin-pillar policy 50, 66, 76, 77, 140 UN 91 UNIKOM see UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission UN Iraq—Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM) 134, 175 n. 155 United Kingdom: Kuwait’s independence 36–7; oil policy in Middle East 23; opposition to American consulate in Kuwait 26–8; role in Iraqi-Kuwaiti 1961 crisis 39–40; withdrawal from Persian Gulf region 48–9 US: attitude towards Iran 75–6; concern over political trends in Gulf region 30–4; Consul at Basra 25–6; and Libya 116; military co-operation with Britain 33–4; reaction to British withdrawal from Gulf region 49; see also US-Kuwaiti relations US-Arab Gulf states relations 1, 70–1 US-Kuwaiti relations 1–2, 5; 1961–1967 36–7, 42–3; 1968–1976 54–6, 65–6; after British withdrawal 48–54; after Kuwait’s liberation 131–3, 142–3; American access to oil reserves 22–5; American arms sales 58–9, 120, 135; American consulate establishment 25–8; American role in improving Kuwaiti infrastructures 29–30; and Arab—Israeli conflict 44–8, 59–62, 68–9, 139; Bush administration 4, 113–14, 136–7; and Camp David Treaty (1978) 70–4; Carter administration 4, 67–70, 87, 140–1; F18 arms deal 109–11; humanitarian and philanthropic aspects 20–1; influence relationship 138–40, 143; and Iranian revolution (1979) 74–82; and Iran-Iraq war 85–7; and Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (1990) 121–31, 142; and Iraqi-Kuwaiti 1961 crisis 39–42, 43; and Iraqi-Kuwaiti 1973 crisis 56–8; Kennedy administration 65–6; Kuwaiti refusal of American ambassador designate 89–91; military relations 54–6, 133–6; military relations institutionalisation 63–5; nature of relationship 2–3; pre-1961 3–4, 19–20, 34–5; Reagan administration 4, 88–9, 111–12, 141;

Index

and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 82–5; Stinger missiles controversy 92–7; Vice-President Agnew visit 53–4 US Liaison Office, Kuwait (USLOK) 55, 66 USLOK see US Liaison Office, Kuwait Ustinov, Dmitri 95 Vance, Cyrus 68, 75 Van Ess, John 21 Van Pelt, Mary Cubberly 21 Vickers Viscount Armstrong Company 29 Walsh, John Patrick 53–4, 156 n.177 Warner, John W. 103 weak states 8–9 Webb, James H., Jr 106 Weinberger, Caspar 92, 93, 100, 101, 102, 106, 107 Weiss, Ted 99 Westinghouse 29 White, Lincoln 40 Whitehead, John 110 Wilson, Harold 48, 49 Wranpelmeier, Brooks 73 Wright, Michael 27 Yazdi, Ayatollah 134 Younger, George 110

198