We Are All Slaves: African Miners, Culture, and Resistance at the Enugu Government Colliery, Nigeria (Social History of Africa)

V Q,.\ Y I t M · I ’ I\\`. l I dedicate this book to my parents, éhe Rem Hero; B. ian¢;·Gert;t;Z;;€ , - ‘ t`ll in me on un ers an mg o Heinemann James Currey Ltd. David Philip Publishers t _. R MltChell' They have bath ms I 8, . . It . this Cammitmem A division of Reed Elsevier Inc. 73 Botley Road An Imprint of New Africa Books ` ` importance ofthe Sl`T‘ugg‘l€]%1' SOCZ£Il_]uSfZC8. ZS l 1?;61ltHanoti;1erI`SIt';·i)¤§8O1 3912 8xt;réiIgX2d0BS P gf;) Lr;962 _~ J; {0 Social justice that led me to this Slildy ofthe coal mirters cf 0 mm l I m ng Om Cilcsdegrlit 7702 ; Nigeria, Although today their industry ts but a ghost of its past Cape Town, South Africa ’ Y importance to Nigeria, West Africa, and Bfltalll, I hope that this - book commemorates their role in the labor history 0fAfr1ca. Wwwlhemcmmnlcom I ` I ` 'l l dedicate this book to them Ofiices and agents throughout the world Sum may © 2003 by Carolyn A. Brown. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic onrnechanical means, including information gt storage and retrieval systems, without permission in writing from the publisher, except by _~ a reviewer, who may quote brief passages in a review. 5 ISBN 0—325-07007-5 (Heinemann cloth) — j ISBN O-325—O7006-7 (Heinemann paper) · A lf ISBN 0-85255-684-5 (James Currey cloth) , 3 ISBN 0-85255-634»9 (James Currey paper) _` British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available upon request. I Library of Congress Catalugirig-in-Publication Dam ' _ Brown, Carolyn A. 1944- ` , "We were all slaves" :African miners, culture, and resistance at the Enugu government ` ~ colliery / Carolyn A. Brown. ‘ p` p. cm. — (Social history of Africa, ISSN 1099-8098) it . Includes bibliographical references and index. Q ` ISBN 0-325-07007-5 (alk. paper)- ISBN 0—325-07006-7 (pbk. : alk. paper) . 1. Coal miners—Nigeria—Enugu—History. 2. Strikes and . V ; ’ 1ockouts—Miners—Nigeria—Enugu. 3. Coal mines and rnining—Nigeria— ; _ Enugu—I·Iistory. I. Title. H. Series. — _ HD8039.M6152 N63 2003 . 331.7'62234'0966949—dc2l 2001051630 Cover design by Gail Ivaksa . Cover photo: Sculpture of the 1949 Iva Valley Shooting Incident. · Printed in the United States ofAmerica on acid-free paper _ 0706050403 SB123456789 ' Humboldt-Unixrevrsitat zu Berlin — Universitétsbibliothek Z¤;mi¤hm:;(.4i-ma,

.zV V J Illustrations xi A V ’ Acknowledgments xiii ~ ‘ s African Workers and European Theories: . t. The Enugu Coal Miners and West African Labor History 1 ` PART I: THE CONTESTED BIRTH ; OF THE COLONIAL LABOR PROCESS: LABOR, COAL, AND THE STATE 27 1. Udi District on the Eve of Conquest: Slavery, Power, Q and Resistance, circa 1909 29 I Q 2. "Chiefs," Slaves, Forced Labor, and Rural Resistance: _ ;` Labor and the Contested Birth of the Colonial State, Udi ` I 1909-1915 56 1 _ 3. Creating the Colonial Workplace and the Colonial City: i j Enugu and the Coal Fields during World War I 93 4 3 4. The Postwar Conjuncture: Agitation, Urbanization, and the Emergence of a Culture of Protest, 1920-1929 139 PART II: THE ECLIPSE OF COLONIAL PRODUCTION I T y RELATIONS: WORKERS’ VICTORIES AND DEFEAT 4 177 A i 5. The Colliery on the Eve of War: State Intervention » i in the Home and the Workplace , 179

x Contents \ ;` 6. The Politics of "Productivity": Unions, the War, and Changes , i in the Political Apparatus of the Mines, 1940-1945 225 . , 7. The Iva Valley Massacre of 1949: Trade Union Struggles i V in the Cold War 282 V Conclusion: Work, Class, and Identity in Igbolaud 327 ' Bibliography 331 yi Index ` 351 G { 1 ie ILLUSTRATIONS * . MAPS ` 2.1. Udi District, circa 1917 64 ” . 3.1. Enugu. 1917 103 ` 1 PHOTOGRAPHS j Q 2.1. Chief Chukwuani, Nwangwu 1928 73 2.2. Chief Onyeama Onwusi 74 Y ét 2.3. Chief Or1yeama’s Palace, built in 1914, 1977 75 · 2.4. Ameke Railway construction, circa 1914 77 i ·J’ 2.5. Chief Eihukumere of Uzuakoli with railway workers, circa 1914 79 : 3.1. Workers digging first boreholes, circa 1913 96 ` Q 3.2. Early coal miner in his village 97 `~ 3.3. Udi military outpost, circa 1913 101 3.4. Mining conscripts in Udi 102 ~ i 3.5. Construction of railway to the Udi Mine, circa 1915 108 ~ 1* 3.6. Port Harcourt—A1·rival of first coal train alongside the S.S. Sir Hugh 109 ` ` 3.7. Boys with baskets of coal 112 3.8. Hewers with leg wraps 117 ‘ YQ 3.9. Proud miners at mine entrance 120 i Q 3.10. European underground manager and tubmen . 123 Y ih 3.11, Young men with head baskets at mine entrance 124 V . ~ 3.12. Miners with tallies around their necks 125 ` 3.13. Udi Colliery Adit, coal stacked at the mine entrance 126 Q 6.1. Entrance to Ugwu Alfred, July 1975 235 ij:. 6.2. Ugwu Alfred: Charles Ugoji, Gabriel Mbalemlu, ifi Michael Nwakuache, and Clement Egbogi.mba, 5 July 1975 236 i 6.3. Garden City Housing Estate 253

Xl 4 I Illustrations 6.4. William Leck and unidentified prominent African men 255 ii; 6.5. Isaiah Ojiyi, Amawbia, July 1975 255 ~ °. DIAGRAMS AND TABLES · Figure 3.1 Pillar and Stall Minin Dia l = Table 4.1 Chief Recruiting Feeslig192§mm g Table 42 Output per worker, 1923/24-1929/30 in cwr 162 I . Table 5.1 Colliery Accounts, 1915-1937 200 . if Tam 52 °“9“*99*M9¤-Sue 1928-1940 20] 2 .Z ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Table 6.1 Sales of Coal to African Colonies, 1944/45-1945/46 256 . `. Table 6.2 Hewers as Percentage of Underground Workforce 258 . Table 6.3 Wages of Hewers and Tubmen Based on Long Award, 1945 263 · il i Table 6.4 Number of Workers, 1938-1948 (Annual Average) 265 i l Table 6.5 Accident Rates, 1943-1946 266 I Table 6.6 Classiiication of Causes of Injury, 1944 267 I _ I have had the suppo1·t—both moral and material-—of many individuals and instiTable 6.7 Total Colliery Output, 1916-1951 269 ` tutions throughout the years during which I researched this book. First, I would Table 7.1 List of Dead Miners, Towns and Occupations, < like to mention how I came to study this coal mine. In the early seventies I became · November 1949, Iva Valley Shooting 312 2. 2 interested in labor history and was particularly fascinated by miners. However, be` ’ cause of apartheid and being anAfrican—Ameiican, I was unable to study the most GRAPHS ~ 2 important mines in Africa’s political economy—the gold mines of South Africa. I ~ wrote to a friend, Walter Rodney, about my interest and he suggested that I read Graph 6·1 H€W°YS in Relation to Other Categories of Workers 259 ' li Emile Zola’s Germimzl, to get a sense of the material conditions of coal mining Graph 6-2 Percentages of Workers by Category · 2 60 ' Y and mentioned that no one had worked on the Enugu coal mines in southeastern Graph 63 O“tP'-It PSY Man Shift, 1945-1951 260 T Nigeria. Walter’s death was a devastating personal loss at a time when the CaribGraph 6-4 Total Output of Coal in 100,000 Tong` 19404948 261 bean movement was at its peak and many times his presence is still felt in the curGmPh 65 PIOduCtivity Charted Against Wage Awards 262 rent debates about slavery and the slave trade, concems over which his shadow still towers. It was Walter who mentioned the shooting of demonstrating coal minN ers in November 1949, a date which many call the "birth date" of Nigerian naV tionalism. This incident, the Iva Valley Shooting and concluding chapter of this 9 book, was a constant presence in all my interviews in Enugu. VV The field work for this project was conducted after the Nigerian Civil War in which many documents, both held personally and in the archives, were destroyed. °’· However, these were available to both David Smock and Agwu Akpala, two scholars who had done the bulk of their research before the War and both generously ‘ ,· shared their notes and personal documents with me. Dr. Akpala was an important source of referrals for people to meet in Nigeria and was extremely helpful in ex; plaining the technicalities of mining as well as the complex system of industrial · I ` relations in force for the latter part of the industry’s history. _ py The coal industry’s history is very interwoven with that of the town of Enugu · and the immediate environs. For that reason it was quite easy to locate excellent fu ~ informants and, in many cases, to speak with the very people discussed in the vol@¤ ` umes of documents found in the Public Records Office, Kew Gardens. This al" lowed me to have more than one perspective on a specific event. There are so many,

Ac/vwwledgmenrs I Acknowledgments xv many people in Ni eria u on · - . ` Q phases of this Pmjit thatgt is {EXE $5:*; 1;* WRYIGUB through the various " 3_ Documents on the colliery were scattered through a number of record groups in sistants, Matthew Nwabucze and Charles Ugdi gC:th° im? specrfic names. My as- h' L the Public Reeords Office and among other archives in England. For the British a slfategy for identifying ihfuhmmh We Wang Ud_;_AkPakW“m°· Udl. devised ~ V Trades Union Congress records, I would like to thank the Modern Records Project when P€¤sl0¤¢fS were paid, They [heh hckkcd im I hiding Paymastcr 0** I-he day e ~ of Warwick University, Coventry. The staff of the Colonial Records Project, Rhodes pointmentS_ {conducted a series of Opcmended _ t 0 _ 6 Villages to schedule ap. House, Oxford University, Royal Commonwealth Society, British Library of l’0— out the image Of these Proud Working mm from til °fV¤sWs that helped me to nosh h , linear and Eeonomic Science, London School of Economics all helped me use perRaphael Ani, Genera] Manager of the Nigcdan C°;?Ig"S€m¤€{0HS IH the archives, V _ Sonet Papers, {-lelrl notes, letters, and other memorabilia of various colonial Civil Views and accommodations ucar the Compu 7s; dmpcmuonl Zifallged inter- V E servants and officials, Because the industry was a parastal, I often f0l1Dd ¥·ll€S€ I Wish to thank the many coal miners and Otger C eg quarters and T-he archives, ‘; Z records full of anecdotal references to the colliery. mt? to interview them and Sham than persona] wc Od wry Persolmel Wl`10 allowed Y The project was generously supported by a number of research grants. IH its lulcult arrangements to meet with me on my Vmo gh S' Ma·I}Y of them made diffi- is v tial stages, the research was supported by the now defunct Ford Foundation Pr0had lest their documents and Personal mememgs vslfrts F0 Nlgena. Although many , ~ gmt-rr for African Americans Conducting Fieldwork in Africa and the Middle East. the many hours that they spent speaking with H; SH P°l”s0¤al recollections and · li This prggrmn, which supported a generation ofAfrican-AmericanAf1‘ica11iSt scholth1S_"a°u¤m· My most useful jhfohhams were the .adi0Y§d me t° comlmnsats fOr I 1 ars and activists, enabled me to divide a year between England and Nigeria. This the 1ndus¤·y’s militant reputation and mmsfom dm _"‘ mh Wsflfefs who created 2 ig was my nrst trip to Africa and without it I could not have supported held workin slid the "rnodem_” both the City of Enugu and th; ziwuh their Vlsloll of the future I Africa, I also had several research grants from the City University of New Y01'k their spirit I Went d°¤P into the mines Watch€d;hgaC§:[c0unUys1d€‘To °aPmT¤ ,. 3 Research Foundation and a post-doctoral fellowship from the American Council m‘?a·“°r· and V€¤¤11’ed into their- homes the Vina V: bay Worked md their d€— _ of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council. These grants al¤f Enugu. These were meh like Samuel Anckc of a 0* °a{*"PS» and Other areas t { lcwed me to reiine my understanding of the way the colliery impacted upon a form Wll0 Was among tl-re fh-st meh to Work in the mine Ilglaglb Udb my llfst interview, I `_ of indigenous slavery in the early decades of the century, an important component epidemic helped me to dam his age and his de; _ S_m€m0i`1€s Ofthe "Fluenza" W _ of the soeia] history of the industry’s regional role. I also held 8 two—year l°f€Sl· moved me to attempt to characterize the honor CEIPEOU Of the British invasion s { dentiel Postdoctoral Fellowship from the University of California, during Whichl “°°1°“i*’] ¤¤¤Sf¤nnaticn.” Others, Ijke peter andOA;v at We hlsmmms d'YlY call j was based at the University of California Berkeley. The Stanford—U1·liversity of and wife who was a leader of the Womerhs dem *C°'Af€m¤f11na, a coal miner ig California Joint Program on African Studies provided an excellent context for the scribed the events that led up to the 1949 Crisis °;Smm0¤ at the coal mines, de. _” resting gf interpretations and Michael Watts, Richard Roberts, and PearlA1i<=e tcrgltiuudef Which miners’ Wivgs mobilized an gave me Some mslght into the l g l Marsh were wonderful colleagues always willing to read my work. ers were more rominent · · . T, Most recently, I received support from the American Philosophical Society, and Chukwahh C-C. Onih, Eze 0;;;/Vireigcggg the Shchrval record: Chief Nwafor 1 ‘_ the National Endowment ofthe Humanities at the Schomburg Center for Research OkP°kW¤i Isaiah Ojiyi, Josiah Aglh Bb Ai asgg ch Charles Maris, ·I¤s¤Ph j h. in Black Culture of the New York Public Library. These grants, while largely used was WUI-lllded in the 1949 Shooting They d ZERO Elnmanucl Okafvr. Who · W for research on another project on the city of Enugu, did allow me to collect sevduring the war but they Spcm hours Speakin wihn 1 [lanes that W€Y¢ destroyed eral additional interviews that are incorporated in the latter part of this book. For {would also like [O thank the Crown Agcmg fol mefo-hclP 1'€¤0l1Strl1ct events_ I 2 this phage of the pr0jectA_nayo Enechukwu, Director ofthe Ellllgll I‘I.lSl¤1'lC8l DOCerphotogwhs taken during me construction frthemusnon to use their rich me umennnon Bureau, has beenakey person in ¤¤m1>1¤¤¤e the limi interviews i¤ Iva ian Railway and the Udi Coamcldsl These mah s hastern Branch ofthe Niger. ~ ;_ Valley Camp, one ofthe earliest coal labor camps. the °aI1Y mines and I have tried to use them hberillfuty nlmmmjng Ph°t?gmPhs of I T7 I would like to thank Marcia Wright, who has been with me during the years human dimension. I have taken these Pictures to thy}? gw? this nlmmve a m0fe I hi that this project has evolved. She encouraged me during the confusing days when, E"“g“= Where they can be available to other mscarchc agmm a¤°'m Archives, Q fresh home from the iield, I was totally overwhelmed with the material and had U.0.A. Esse, djyggtor of these archives and his sigh “’°“ld_l1k€ to thank Chief _ Q_ not s clue what to make of it. Marcia diligently read my various drafts, made condocuments on the last phase of this Pmjéct Mr ESS . or zllcmmé me tc f<`{l¢Vant ` ti" crete suggestions and always encouraged me to overcome the many obstacles in has W¤rkedrire1ess1y, despite the dhrhcuh éonchti B is an infionlltalllc SPm¥Wl1<> j my path. I thank Rutgers University which supported several leaves of absence produce volumes of hmm, aids and guides th (ms P°m{¤}¤g in his archive, to ., that allowed me to renne my analysis and to collect additional material and my task I W0¤ld also like to thank Mh Aha 0 En athtglucly faclhmc the 1`°S‘”IChs1"S Q eg" colleagues in the history department who listened to numerous versions of segDocumentation (jemeh Y ec Wu Of the Enugu Historical · ments of this project, These colleagues at Rutgers created an intellectual environ; ,; ment that encouraged me to probe deeper into my data. The strength of gender

l xvi Acknowledgments studies at Rutgers encouraged me to identify the role of gender in the rich systems of self-construction that so motivated Enugu’s coal laborers. AN AND The title for this book came from an interview in the South Nkanu village of Ob1olia,Akegbe—Ugwu (5 August 1986), an area with a large and militant ex-slave • (Oka) P0pulat1on. When I asked if there were any salves working in the Enugu . $;;°‘};“;P[ COUIGYY Gm P€fSon said "We Were All Awbin to the Europeans? I . colosial Wfrlgzgcin excellent title for a book that describes the dialectics of the A I Z£“;iZl§Z?Z'25.§LZ`§?Z§§§Q’di`;""°*2§°‘1“ ““ "“"° °f “"‘ Vg 7 een ee o ‘ Nkanu area. As a result the erstwhile slaves got the govemr:i;:?t§;;;l;1r;ht;t§;E AND ?;2;\;5Q§E}guEfl;g7a;0a1r;¢;;o require tl;Ce1na1nehAwbia to be used. Today this name t , , eve one ows ' ' ‘ Finally, I thank my family, gy children, lgeii;fi1§:;;·i;lg,sI§Ia;ldIee C Brown l and Kathia Brown, who for a great part of their lives have "lived with" the Enu coal miners, and their fathers Sam Anderson and Humberto Brown. Quite impti-. ;;;”12ly\;J;t;1;r;l; my parents, the Rey. Henry B. Mitchell and Gertrude R Mitchell, of my Ogscssi with this book and understanding the complex elements , rica and its history. On 18 November 1949 police fired on a group of miners engaged in a sit-in at the Iva _ Valley mine of Enugu Govemment Colliery in southeastem Nigeria, killing twenty` one miners and injuring several hundred. Additional fatalities occurred during protest demonstrations led by radical nationalists in eastern Nigeria`s major cities of Calabar, Aba, Onitsha, Port l-larcourt, and Enugu. The shooting riveted the Colonial Office and opened Labor to attacks in Parliament over the pace and nature of political change in Nigeria as well as the state’s conduct towards its own African workers. From the standpoint of the state, a policy designed to insulate the labor movement from political radicalism, thereby creating “depoliticized" trade unions, backfired. The subsequent urban ~ riots involved a very dangerous alliance that the state had worked assiduously to avoid. ` Radical nationalists, some espousing Marxist rhetoric, led the urban working class, V casual workers, the unemployed, and disaffected indigenous traders to take over the streets. In the ensuing violence they attacked the buildings of European expatriate · tinns and opened the possibility of a general insurrection. ’ In some cities the police could restore order only after pitched battles in the ` streets against mobs of market "boys" and unemployed men, On the political front the tragedy forced a temporary alliance among the contending nationalist groups who formed a new coalition, the National Emergency Committee, that temporarily papered over the deep regional divisions in their fragmentin g movement._A similar rapprochement occurred in the national trade union movement, itself fragmented by Cold War ideologies and battles, with the formation of the National Labour Committee. Both coalitions hurried to Enugu to investigate the incident and to serve as self-proclaimed mediators and representatives for the miners in the investigation that followed. The incident became a dramatic illustration of the abuses of British colonialism in popular memory, and the dead miners became j icons for a national narrative of the birth of the independent state.

2 J s` "Vk WereAll Slnves" t V Ahiean Workers and European Theories 3 For the miners, the shooti · , , ; tem of conflict resolution inr;1§cWi:;:;;];c1]§;`i?1cv$;?l?;:Si;;“r?dt?; Siam “S“a1 Pat- Z i litical history of Nigeria, but with the exception of a seminal article by Agwu Akpmya] occurring On the heels of a War in which they had a ed t S 0;;-ng as §b€· pula,2 no scholars have moved beyond the incident to study these workers in their and heroic Saclmccsr It was even more inmugmous to mfg; Ohmh e sustained 5 own right. There are two other monographs but each focuses on a specific period the State to recognize them as loyal smc employees Sim 1 den W gi aq °’fP5Cl€d of the history or on the problems confronting management} There are no monorjustw trcamwm from their government/employers p y man ng ‘fa1r and . graphs on the subject. This paucity of studies is symbolic of the historical obfusNormally the Smeg response to the WOIkc1_S,p£Otcst was 1 1 ` 5 cation which has burdened the colliery’s labor movement in the more than eighty tive. Previous unrest led to the deployment of state officials to Zlzxlgllllodad K years of its existence. gg’u?;¤dgg;a?l; Wag; adjustment or improvement in conditionsahig waghvri- l _ mms were aummig He rndustry s parastal status and the c0l.liery's industrial con- i CONTIN U ITIES BETWEEN COLONIAL Dming World W Eihy thm$t_1¤¥0 The Pvlltical arena gf Payhamemary pOHdcS_ 1 AND METROPOLITAN LABOR: AFRICAN ”ClTlZENS" the Colonial Statcar e Qolomal Oflice was especially preoccupied to represent 5 ·4 OF THE UCOUNTRY OF COALN U as enlightened patemalistic power, especially with an indus- ,I . . f d I 1 1 h. b k k th h. ICN. . _ Y Whose m¤tf¤p0l1tar1 wor-ker-S were so problematic at home T th, _ J ;_ Qn its most un amenta eve rs oo see sto rescue e rstory o I igerran launched a series of Social and labor mfomls that mem tedt . 0 rs endl rt ` it colliery workers from its absorptron by nationalist hrstoriography. In this respect labor movement imo the ideological and Organizational; Stm0t¢0—0pt the colonial ' " it is a case study of a key group of colonial workers. But on the other hand it uses the United Kingdom—industtial relations procedures com ul C mcs Sung usedhrn 1 this history as a prism to examine both changes in colonial labor policy and in the _ concilliatjm, and controlled trade unions. These rcfmims Opcniiry at m`a¤°¤·J01m ’ , evolving consciousness of African men employed in colonial industries. One emtcmkm which frequently €1'¤pted into work disputes in th; 0 { new areas ?f con. { g phatic thread runs throughout the narrative—that the history of these men must be AS was the Case with many postwar labor conflicts at CO ; W;ll`Pg1L;>d· · ` contextualized within the international historiography of coal miners’ narratives. arose Over conmcting imcrpmmitons of a recently inuoduccgawe hi zdrspute i Most of the miners were of the Igbo-Speaking ethnic gfoup, one of Nlg€H37S three czfse was against Casual labon This was a time Of considerable byu cl 111 this · n-rajor P0Pulat1pns and dominant g;l’0uP in southeastern Nigeria, east oi the N1ger mmty_the Cold Wm__wh€n State Officials were debatin the ne E fr ca uncer- , tg River. These miners were a profoundly self-conscious sector of WBStAfHCH’S workOf political reforml But in the meantime, they repressed gw t € Or and-forms Q ing class, sharply aware of their position within the regional economy. They were industrial agtign that appeared to threaten thc process The lg VIE °f Polmcal OT · { a key sector of the colonial working class positioned in the enclave economy of African Workers to form ,,r€sp0nSib1c” trade unions aid wich 5W at they wanted ,2 ~` West Africa. Their coal fueled the railways of West Africa, produced electricity in Workers, but they were not quite Sum how to achieve what the ave ap drespectable , " eastem Nigeria’s cities, bunkered the ships that plied its coasts, and Powered the tify it when they Saw it_ They had yet to determine their abil; Vind? nmto ldcm Q ` steam engines that mined tin in northern Nigeria. These were the only coal mines [ml the Complex and rapidly changing political mvimnmcngitlp rrect and con- ‘ in West Africa and Britairfs first experiment with a nationalized coal indusify, both decolortization. Many government officials were imprisoned b tha? acccmmnred p factors having a profound influence on the course of the industry’s history} visions of colonial Order and its mythologicsl But Even me Izosslf OYHQHYOPIS V ,5 Throughout the period covered by this study, Enugu’s miners had ia. wellagent, the Labour Party, was determined to Prevent “POHtica1 U · en 1% tened ` deserved reputation as West AfI]C&’S most belligerent working class. This milrtance, the Cvnttadiction in its Own ggncsisl By an ironic twist of fam xmomim dcspltc { sharpened by their work traditions, gave them an autonomy in the workplace and would Prove most violently repressive against colonial Work 7 1 Was abour that V yp encouraged pride in their skill and their confrontations with danger. They had a The state’s assumption that the struggles of param] W0[k;;s' Id b _ _ _ { propensity for solidarity which supported their intractable negotiation positions Sized was naive and was but another Example of their misrcadigotlh e dBP0lllC1- V with the state. Predictably, they conceptualized the state within a context of intion of their workem The explicitly political Ways that the smc h 5 $0Ph1$T:1¤¤· · digenous understandings of power and authority, self·esteem and ‘justice," a cenAfrican labqy encouraged these couicry Workers to gms the a mélf conceived ` tral feature being a reciprocal relationship of loyalty. Their history engages the their industrial problems and the mam Government 0f%ciaI§;;1;€°¤Fn$ betwficn t , creative tension, which Fred Cooper noted in E.R Thompson’s later work, between Wéré involved in the mq-uimwm and Comm] of labor Each Strikso 0;}:111 Chiefs V Ig` the industry’s attempt to treat them as abstract labor power and their personal °°nfY°m¤[i0¤ béfween labor and the State, drew the inimediatc tt ’ lc was a jp gles to be recognized as real labor power.5 They were important men rn their villayérs of the state from the loca] district Omccr to the Colonial gfgnuon of many lages and not simply an abstract category-——"lab0r"—and their individual and Finally, martyrdom has not generated scholarly interest in th J collective values, priorities, and goals became the driving force of their history. Wimm the hismdogmphy OfAfI_ican1ab0L The incidc t_ QCD 1ery workers ` Behind these traditions of militance lay a curiously autonomous power which ~ n is mentioned m WHY PO" i lc coal miners have in the workplace and is quite absent under the forms of supervi~

"We mrc All Slaves, l' /\/t‘Ir'rm Workers and European Theories 5 sion to which other industrial wo ‘ · · V ? in dispersed underground sites m;il:;Sn:Va‘:;g;l;i2F;:;;r$i;?e;r§i?enhiillhogog Wmk ’ It is far more compromised than that of European and American miners before with state comm} and corrupt undeigmund Supcwisois Ehueue miheeen EWS 2 mechanization. Most performed a distinct set of skills related only to the opening work cultures which expressed the degfees of workplace control that maligcaml ` T of the ma] face, the cqmng of the coal, md dmbcring the Work Space While other miners so exceptional among industrial workers. Miners determined the fr usoa H tasks, such as Supporting the roof in madW?yS’ Pushing the mbs’ etc" were perand intensity Ofrhcir Worki the length Oi me Working dey end the ee eejgi nc}; J ti formed by other workers."’ But Enugu’s mines were never significantly mechathe labor process l[sg]f_ Until World Wai H ihey created their ewh Wei ee On Oh . i nized, partially because of unfavorable underground conditions, and partly because made critical decisions about the actual mining Opemhcns deeieiehe eieelzps all ji of state unwillingness to invest in expensive machinery. This created a workplace tutetheintuitive sian that is so indispensable to mvni¤dcigrOu¤d¤a§’§,S“` -’ = *1WhichtemiisiobwasF~·¤¤·=¤ed¤¤fm¤¤h==m¤¤¤¤W¤¤¤b¤¤¤·»¤¤<=¤r more, most of the induSffY’s workers integrated mine labor with farming lbecomiiip i ` never dOcS~ Tyglcalily Fha h¥cmm1l€—PDmays the miner as a labor adstocrzm Ever permanent Cgmmuters and forcing the indusiiy to eeeermeedeee he ’eedeee g i msistent upon distinguishing his position from that of other less skilled—and less schedules to the seasonality of the agiicuiiumi cyciel P °n — ai uut0nomous—-underground workers and not always willing to join with others in Like COG} miners elsewhere, the Emigu Workers proved cspccieii r i . ‘ K solidarity against capital. This was one element of comparative importance bedustrial action and Promoted ideologies of solidarity and democraticy griircit Stim- i ii tween Enugu miners md their Scottish counterparts. Scottish miners, themselves as prominent members af mai Viiiagce This Study reeoehieee eee elzmfeelie [En (> { only emancipated from serfdomein 1799, as noted in Alan Campbell and Fred analytical tension between the specificity of their experiences as African me ' c J Rclcvs “Th° Independent Comer In Scotlandwll held romantic attachments to the colonial industry and the univeisaiiiy of their responses eeieihe hem thee xmka i land and the personal validation it brings to assumptions of the autonomy of the A mg in an international lndusiry_cOai_ Among the Complex ef feeeeee eedeeh OF ' i patriarchal household. Even when the autonomy of these miners was eroded by this similarity is gl-le material reality Of the W0ikpiece_the “eh,,_ehd the ehnmg , { the decline of the small collicries, they retained the ideology of their independence, experiences pfmgn Working under iis imiqueiy gmehhe eehdhiehe ef Week TER in transformed into ea working class respectability which often made them reluctant conditions, common to all mai iiiiiicse have ied David Henk e Cehedieh 1 SSE t i~ to loin in solidarity with less skilled workers against capital. This respectability Scimieh io cali the imemehehei Weeld ef eeel mehhe e eeeuehy ef eeele al or i was a core element in the consciousness of Enugu’s miners but it did not lead them "the people Of [hrs relatively unrecognized country heve me h h_ _ W are . i to reject solidarity. In fact, they played a vanguard role in cultivating the unity that mon."7 C mow m °°m` i informed the militant history of the miners through this period. These Wes; Afrlcan eeal miners hold itciiizenshhf, in this Heeuhey ,_ Th J Secondly, l was particularly influenced by the literature that examines the concalled into being not by the Industrial Revolution, but by the im erialist Ztwérc motions between the Ways that production was Organized in The WOrkplac€_th€ and conquest of their Camlaeme Coioiiiaiism ieformuieied the egeeie eeielgr Itifn · labor process—and the impact that this had on both power relations and on the to the world economy, It shifted from Siippiyim human eeeee fee im {OPS Iii V i; consciousness of particular groups of workers of the value of their skill. In this reslave tradjugi an anathema re the —·fiect» market iiieoioey ef eeehehem im?i:1°m ; spect Keith Dix’s Work Relations in the Coal Industry: The Hand—Loading Era, pm Ompica products to supply Eur0pe’s rams. ne apart mm; is will ° 188'M930;Mlm]B“"‘W°y'm‘l°“ss‘“di`*S* T"‘P°’i””‘“fP'”"”°’i”"’ F"' an infrastructure (Lev railways and Pons) and this infresiruehue heeded elhel Qplhrc i fg tory Regimes Under Capitalism and Socialism; and Harry Braverrnarfs Labor and the discovery gf goal in Eastem Nigeria in the hist decade ef ihie eem ‘ lil? `~ Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century were of thousands of lgbo-spcalcing men from the villages in south N' pu C ‘ A; major impommca "country of cog]? em lgcua mm the _ Worker consciousness is not just created nor expressed in the workplace alone. The commonaltieg of me War lac · — - . f ] It is also cultivated or discouraged in the interactions between workers and the the industry in Eurgpg and the Ailfilgticgsl;;$;lhIF;i;;i;;K$gatil;;h;e$1t?;;$° °f A 9] broader community. In this respect this study has benefited from the community ianiminers and have Provided an Opportunity to draw Afrieen iehee hjeegey imegge — studies of the mining industry. A central contradiction of coal miners’ indepenmainstream of Western labor hiswiiogiaphyir A number ei themee eee debee iu I dence in the workplace before mechamzatron was the control that the company characterize this literature and are of mixed relevance for this emd I heve f eg 3 placed on the life outside the mines. Companies usually controlled housing, stores, the ambigious role gf the ··lrrdePendem coiiicheg the ieieiiveiy eieiiieyii miner (hun ` Z`~ regulated access to medical care, and ran the politics of the towns. Two excellent control over the labor Process is so Strong mei he Ofieh eeheideee himself eeV{ee°;° t smdies ofthe consequences of this power, Anthony EC. Wallace’s St Clair: ANineartisan, to be of Some relevance in understanding the proud end eemewhee eee? i teenth-Century Coal Towns Experience lrWth a Disaster·Prone Industry and Milgant stance taken by the =¤pli men~· in many Oi; the industrepe ehiieee Hewev ’ dred Allen Be1k’s The Miners of Windber: The Struggles of New Immigrants for when one compares the cer-mel which Emigii miners exert Over the i GL 4 Unionization, 1890 Lv-1930 s, presented models that contrasted with even the state‘ a or pmC°SS’ it run labor camps in Enugu. Because of the miners’ resilient connections with the ' Y ,.

6 “We Were All SIaves" ` i African Workers and European Theories 7 m;£;g;;;1°;mnui;T12;;“;1?l;:s file ¤·=>¤1<{¤1¤r guarantee the types of economic 4 Nigerian miners proved just as troublesome to the colonial state as did. Elritish Finally, this Study attcmpwd to inte Zpnunrges such pmnacles of class confhct. ` _ miners to the metropolrtan state whrch, durmg World War I, breached and 1n1t1al1y Process- In this respect several book? ° genfer Wd qw Orgamzatron ofthe labor " ~ rejected but later (lH.WOfld War H), assumed state ownership of IES own coal 1nthis mgumeml One On the Chilean C0 Were o major mfluence 1n stirengthemng V dustry. Whale there 1S only anecdotal evidence that the state’s ekperience w1th Communities: Class Gehder and P0?$t>f n11n;1;;l 'I;ho1nas Iilubock s Contested ` Enugu mmers had any relevance to the recontlguranon of the B1'1lZ1Sh coal 1ndus— 1904-1951* has benehtcd from Some Diggs m 1 e s El Zkmente Copper Mme, E y= try, at certam mornents Colonial Office loperatrves were sharply conscious of the con-clauon to jobs involving dan er and ne newpitlresearchlon masculmrty and 1lS V; I broader rnetropohtan 1mpl1cat10ns of their [lDllC1BS towards the Enugu mdustry and and Vivienne Ndatshck Goin fir Gold. lima A; OI- Sm'¤1aflY» launbar Moodre » ~ its colomal workers. The specter of a state mdustry 111.the colomes, that promoted Somhem African migrant Woicrs hel .d ten,. mes and Mzgmtum, a study of ~ Ev "l*ree" labor for 1[S educatronal value to the ‘lnat1ve," vrolatrng the most basic pr1n— the Workew attempts to retain at;-hwg;] 0 smxftte a mascuhnework eth1c 1l'l[O ` CIPIBS of sound management and labor policy? was a condruon that the Colonial spending yeas away as mjgmngwm-ker contro over their f3.IIl1l1BS even whrle ` V Qflice sought to avoid. Thus 1t responded raproly to each str1ke at whrch This book also explores the connectii b 4 I msked callmg attent1on to the deplorable c0nd1t10ns of [1118 "state SOC13llSlZ mduspolicies as WED as the less iusmmionaljz nc; etween domesuc and colonial labor , 1 Tl"h1s was a specral concem dunng the periods when state ownersh1p of the I Workers- The boundaries between metre cpntacts betweenlthese two groups of 'T Bnt1sh coal mdustry was bemg debated. v · l U aworking mmf, and _$na[iV€” laborers WSPO HHH ind Colorual mdustry, British The cornrnonalnes of work and S1l'l'l1l&1'1l11€S 111 workers’ protest strateg1es pre— text cf Work was Often Similar Mem; lic momd mlagm€dA than real. The con- 9 sent an additional challenge to the conceptual barrier between European and col0» imo The Colonial Workplace helm-ISE (god; P1`0 “fm0¤ F€g¤m€S YV§f€ projected _ ; j mal workers and encourage the scholar. it/lost literature on colomal I workers , mem of management and their models Ofe 1mpe§at1ves or coal Recruit- ; _< emphas1zethe1r "d1fference" from metropohtan workers and rgnore the 1deolog1— cxtmctive systems and production tech l workphace d1sc1plme, dec1s1ons about I { cal and socral 1mpact of the dauly contacts between native worker anal European agement and the Standards of Séfet ac Eqtles, e procedures for dispute man- V1 gl “boss."‘2 The auth0r1ta.r1a.n nature of colomal work cultures has led histomans to Samm, all were tmnsfcrmd from thi.]; in corgpfznsatron, workmen s compen— ~ j forcelthe personal relauonshrp between European boss and Afrrcanworker 1nto la Comply with colonial conditions and m 1S coa e ds. But they were modified to conllrctual paradrgrn that masks a relatronshrp that was rfa: more cornplex. Ev1» deficient Character OfAfdcm labor Theanydaccommodated Britrshlrdeas about the yy H dence-of_]o1ntpart1c1pat1on by "nat1ve" foremen and British "bosses’ 1n corrupt of colonial racism- The Power of {his r;€ 1:;; were often framed in the tlrscourse ij extoruon schemes, and of the fraternal socral relat1onsh1ps between others, 1nd1Bmish industrial Omcials and Cm hasizi 51 AH-iSC0Ltrse 1n shaping the attitudes of _ 1 cate areaspfor further scholarly COl'lS1d€l'3U0ll.A · “ · ” markablc because of the myriad V`; S main ECM dniference was espec1ally re- A second factor that challenges a facrle d1st1nct10n between metropol1tan and tems Ofresismncc resembled those gf]; _t _ ? mlgu mruers work culture and pat- s i;. "c0lon1al" labor the s1m1lar1ty between Brmsh and Nrgenan workers’ patterns the subject of colonial dcnigmmm Wa n arn s ow; co1l1ers. The African worker," 3 of part1c1pat1on 1n both the rural agrrculturali economy and 1n the coal prt. Thrs cial Construction to rationalize théfaili an linapirl l fantasy which evolved as a so- » ¤1 encouraged me tolook for other contrmntres m work antl protest culture, orgamlamms in the mines Unblindcd b cn; 0 tcp onral caprtal to transform work re- I I zatron of production, contributions of work to mascuhmty, et cetera, between recognized the men? similam Wit; Bpittgnra raersmf management would have ` Z; "sub]ect—worker" and Bl'llZ1Sh "boss." Most of stafii came from the northern coal But While the Study Seeks tglcstabush rl? S Own 'm“€YS· A I A 4 { y; fields of England, near Durham, and were farmhar w1th a system of work organithc “cOumry of mar, it does not im 1 th t€i;01r‘g1r1onalt1es of Nrgerian mmers .1n zatron that was most frequently useti there. Management brought 1deas to theworktics to the Workplacel In fact Elm zine 3 CY d not bring Unique charactens- place about the ments and slull reourrements of particular types of work orgamzatxon historically from the comméniticfgnd mrs operate; under pnnciples that emerged y and the des1gnat1on of tasks. S1m.1larly, Enugu workers adopted a drscourse of workgcndcmd ideas of Work and its rewards pges m xg ch they These included · ers” protest culture, such as the use of the term ‘c¢r ’canny tor ‘go slow," a term from leadership, and their Sense Ofnfaimcssw 2;-HEIKIS o nrale 8SSOC12lUOIl, standards _of L the Durham coal Eelds. 'llhese COHIIHODHIIIBS exrsted 1n yuxtapos1t1on to the .sepa~ mdcal context of the Period The bm ht fgstrce, all operatrng wrtlnrrthe hrs- ‘ 5 ration of colon1zer—colon1zerl and challenge the underlyrng assumpt1ons or much Workplace and used them to (ixda gmk vt/lg ld velse rdeologres with them 1nto the ‘ of the earher African labor lnlstory that consrders AfHCHH· workers to be so dl&CSI— mm with two categories Of elements. (1) 3; · Q QRH therefore delinea work pn]- em" from metmpolrran, In thrs respect the concept of irnpenal soclal fonmtnon of Coal mining as an industry and (25 oth ose ansrng trorn the objectrve realities y fg proves most useful 1n descr1b1ng.a worlung class 1n wluch myriad exchanges occur Ofpower and authority Work lcadcrshi erifooted 1n mdrgencus understandrngs T across natronal boundanes that lmk workers}3 A.n awareness of these contmumes [ice? = » P» S5 -€S¥15¢m and rmprovement, and ‘jus- strikes African workers durmg tl1e depress1on when the1r access to radros as well as , fz contacts with European b0sses—themselves members of the British working class_

» ct i 8 "lMz were All Sluves" V can Worker: and European Theories 9 planted the seed of membership to an international working class.“ In the process ` T ` (industrial) systems or power, anthonty, and control andito subsgggegtlysgigle I have tried to construct these African employees as colonial workers and as men v i n the points of contestation. These insights pushed the stu y eve p in the multiple situations in which they live and work over time. I therefore reject * ~ place and to an examination of the labor processi we for the lang perieh approach that constructs these men as exotic or primitive curiositieg, as did hoth , Tho recent work of Frederick Cooper Vilas of Simi M Ve U ban Disorder and eolonialist administrators and historians ofthe time, t ,3 opvorod by this study. His On the African Weielffenn ' b h arks in ‘ it Transfarmazian afWark in Colonial Mombasa, identified the enc _m p ` .~ jving policy debates among colonial admimstrators over the social dimension ENUG U MINERS IN THE HISTORIOG RAPHY ~ Ah·ican labor. By noting the autonomy that casual workers had over dock work, OF AFRICAN LABOR ‘ Illuminated the connections which policymakers made between sgigh infgnliriil The research for this study began when African labor history was charting a long r but Systems and politically dangerous urban disorder- Eottémtgdt-irc§€;§S§;)lc_, and often tortuous path away from the dominance of social scientific studies of tl . saw the nuclear famttY as {mmm] to creating a dlsclg me a Olicicspthat wok African labor. Until the late 1960s African labor studies were dominated by pohr. rkrorce and post-war colonial governments embsrke tgolggdcan homctm In ieal scientists, anthropologists, and sociologists who were preoccupied with rho 1 Qi, over deeper into Africans’ lives and nlnnmely mm _ id Workers, Organ? role of labor in nation building and assumed that trade unions were the highest nugu, as glggwharc, while trade union experts Feefgafuz d Children They expression of worker consciousness and class formatiorhli Most studies gmphg- _ tions, sggig] workers and welfare experts monltefed W¤"*i;¤;‘Om€ from pm cxsized labor migration and used theories such as the “[argct worirerr arrri esemi- Mold not oooceive that a stable and moderate worker cet; at about mating an proletarianized pe3S6J1U'y” to describe Workers’ resistance to industrial diseiplirre}6 ` nded polygyrigus household, and the Nlgemm E0Y;ur§m€“d;r€d labor Estate reThis research agenda was shaped by a scholarly preoccupation with the mimi-rg r xporimerit in state welfare at the mi¤es—e beennal Yufigtics The linkage b€_ ' complexes of southern and central Afiica}7 Similarly, African labor history strained = splotp with social services, schools, and recreation se b ram was 8 Crucial under the shadow of more established (and more parochial) labor histgrjogygphjgs , giwccn a Stabilized and “respons1ble workforee nndE“¥ tmlobm u on urban soofthe United States and Western Europe, and drew upon the traditions of the Marx. éncxus for my study ofthe influence of perceptions of ’ nutit a ucmlgmdy Decalist English social historians, such as E.R Thompson, Gareth Stedman Jorres_ and r cia] pphoy arid refumi during the 1940sl And C¤¤PeY Sl§“ Sit; mmadvés at me Eric Hobsbawnils By the mid-1970s Afzicanist scholars spoke of “riew labor st-oo- t pnizarion and Afriggn Society, helped me to contextna I? Sfa at the Colonial ies" Which broke with thc preoccupation with labor unions, strikes, and migrant » oomory vvithirt the broader framework of lrrlpeneljlws Ti °g‘g1diti0nSthatchal_ labor and focused on a broader range of adversarial and subversive behavior _ Omoo This permitted this study to identify the speelllc 0% ct Various Colonial through Which, they argued, workers expressed their consciousness}9 These stud- ` ng longed ooiopial policy as well as African workers responses O dum and after ies moved beyond the workplace to examine laborers as social beings with posi- ft Office interventions that Occlmed with mcmasmg frequency g tions in communities, families, and the broader society. r World War ll» _ _ . · · _ One area of particular concem was the formation of the working class in the w * The srody is therefore positioned within the debetesi i’f‘gV1¤¤‘i;t];§;"}`;;i;)ar;,l‘£:€ early years of colonial economic transfomiation. In this respect the work of Kgletgo i wnggraphjcal traditions of labor history in general- a“;_d_ conmbmions Atkins holds a special place.’° She has written a redemptive project which ohai- spccrocauy_ it has also drawn fruitfully upon the mn { isc Pnd azldsr Studies}, longed the pejorative characterization ofthe "lazy Arrioann by recorioepttiaiizirrg r of cultural studies and the new debates within rose C ?S§·_a ui IO may of the behavior of early Zulu workers within the framework ofart existing, arid mod. I p, Several proved to be of considerable salrenee rn elf? auilniin tie §1ySt€1_y_ lllebly relevant, indigenous work culture, Atkins’ work was of considerable sig. ` Q Enogrps cog] workers to engage in industrial action, l¥é_'·“l °° f vxirkew Political nilieanee for this study because it enabled me to understand the roots ofthe acdvigm Z jj and Pygggcupation of a generation of african lelfef Stu gs? of norms and WL of those early Enugu workers, who were forced into an unfamiliar labor system. 3 ~ awareness and the context and conditions inzyvlueh the a Etyd indeed this Study Wage leb0r—and had to fashion their own ideological and associatiohal weapons ` ` “ ~ pos r]-rar oodergird their actions are culuyatetl I-¤bf>T_hlSt°1'gg as as Eciauy in mei; for survival. Until her study, few Africanist historians recognized an “Afi·[g;;m work p; ty , has prohrcd greatly from the contributions of fennéust stir fdgn il: Similarly cup e¤lt¤re" With its system of values attached to certain types of work, a moral ecorr. problgmatizing masculinity as a subieet of snstfnne erm; F with an Othmjthan omy of authority, and adaptation of rural forms or consultation to organize protest; _ , tural Studigg have also encouragedlrne to examine the yr 1; 5 challenged labor This led me to investigate the connections between pre-industrial work systems Z coopomistic “leris,” Together, feminist end cultural Stllay es _nY1crcm in the proleand power hierarchies and the ways that Enugu workers experienced the capital- j historians to move from a crudely teleelegical matcm ftnctivmcs that are an €S_ ist Workplace. From this perspective it was then possible to appreciate the cor-rr. mriarrizatiori theory and forcedscholars to engage ttlilstgcfl plicated power relations that ensnarled workers in a labyrinth of old (rural) and r {,` sential element of the “W°tk“ S cxlstcnce as a Som g'

i 10 "VW Were All Slaves " ` Apimpt Wm-kgrr and European Theories U Of all the eoonomistic explanations of worker activism the proletarianization T played the i-ole gf "independent and patriarchal proprietors over nltal household tl1oSiS has proven especially inadequate for this study, because Eriugu’s wor-kers’ pt·odnotion_"26 It was in this context of near seamless articulation of 1H€lt1St¤¤l and milita-noe did not arise after their alienation from the land-—this never, in fact, hep- , { ng,-lonltntnl pi-odnotion that workers drew upon indigenous social forms to <>1’€¤t€ peue
I2 ttm were All Slaves U c A/)‘in· Thus l hs- l i cantly taken on the ensuenge of this inrersecuensmy and has found s rich trove of came attuned to these men’s self—construction as influential community leaders and . ~ insi ii · th f t 1 di rr Af pan male workers to dig in their heels over g ts 1nto e ac ors ea n fl self-styled "progressives" who acted as protectors of their communities’ demo- t 3 conditions of Wai-k and gf pay}; stalls tra<1iti¤ns· This irnpananss af nnal validation hslpad ms is inlsivsst mana- i L` newever, me challenge re historical reconstruction is rcrrnramc; how to idengellal c°mPlaiilis abans Werk Peifelmence and ffeiluellt absences as sxaspsiatad ` tify resources that allow an examination of the various ways in which "what it admissions of the failure of capitalist labor discipline on men intent to remain so- ` meant tc be 3 may changed Over time, I have had to cobble together a tentative sially and Politically astiva in Village Ccnununities- I ’ reconstruction of these changes by using oral testimony, fleeting observations of Ws c0¤cePme1lZe masculinity as hath e set af cultural an-dbutes and as e sasial . missionaries and military officials, and anecdotal references in published anthro— » stems damariztratsd lll speclflc scclai contexts lll Which Public aflinnaslsn is 3 cen‘ : E pological studies. These permit a hypothesis: in the opening decades of the indus} tral element. The book’s speciiic tasks around masculinity are in the beginning ` ` t · f ]' 'r were es eciall influenced by the emergence 0 I _ · , ry conceptions 0 mascu 1n1 y p y _ _ _ chsPiel”s» ta ldellilfy hcw Selldeied sxprassians sf Pclliilcsi Pcwec Pesitlcn seme ` sharp status and power differentials among men rooted in the commercialization prominent local men to control the labor power of others and to deliver this, through ` I of the loca] gggngmy during the several hundred years’ participation in Thfs SIHVE forced labor, to colonial authorities. The second is to detine how mine labor both . { ti.nde_ This established masculine non-nS...nt—,m-is that renamed the ascent of ti nm-reinforced and/or undermined older symbols of masculinity as well as created new ticnini class, the Wealthy merchant capitalist, The tension between these relatively symhnls ar snprsssisns nf massnlins idannty and pnwan new nerrns and me cid will be explored in Chapter 1. The ascent cr these wesirny In Igbclamds the Pfccess gf “beccmll'lt% ii msilw required ii mars Public Pmeess s men affected power relationships amongst groups of men—“native" and imperial, than “beccl'l”llllg a woman-" Whils girls become Women nndar the mcihefs nite- V socially mature and immature—and between men and women. This is because lager bays become msn through c Public cclllllei-l'dVe Pmeess in which the}? me ` these "Big Men" represented a "culturally exalted form of masculinity," which as tested by their peers and senior men. Manhood is "achieved" through various con- ' rt hgggmgriic model may only correspond to the actual experiencptof a srnall numtasts in Whish tha hay/man pravas himself- Caal mining inaarparasad many af shsss l ` per of men.34 Nenetneicss these men became e powerful rneac or ma e aspiratests for manhood—a willingness to confront danger, the ability to lead others in rr [jane Public demonstrations of masculinity—in polygynous marriage, in the a risky venture, the possession of an unusual skill that gave rewards. The book ar- is { membership in Ppgstjgjgug male, associations, and in the workplace--became H »_, gues that a historically dynamic masculinity is an important component of sub- t { centmi pm Of the experience of egliiery men. Jsativa idantisy rhatralarad in sha sxarsisa af Warksr agency in rhs w¤rkp1a<>a, farms l ¤.. t wnue it is useful to nnacrstsnrr gender beth as s eccnsmunve element er social of collectivity through which the men identiiied and mobilized around their inter— V relationships based gn perceived differences between the sexes” and as 3 “pfim21fy GSTS, and The ralas that thssa men Played Withjll hash their mrs] villagss and the ` way of signifying relationships of power,”” the hierarchies of power in colonial "r1ative" areas of the colonial city of Enugu. Local rural communities had estab- _? society ienniie that We eeccgnize Mccinneting innscniinitiesy which in colonial sc. lished processes through which this transformation occurred, as will be treated in 1 ciety i-einem genera] racial hiemrchics.36 In Enugu`s mines European bosses BXthe first chapter, but it was not a static process. F d =·h ‘ uiiriit " which irrco orated their position of p0W€f as _ _ _ _ _ ii presse a egemonrc masc y rp { _ _ Althnngh Afnsan lahar hist¤ry’s investigations sf indnshial racism fasns an 4* enforced in the power reirncns within production. Constitutive elements er their sainlniin Afnsar racial inaqnalisias wars an andaniis aspsss sf rhs salanisl Wark- ’ power rncrnaed knowledge er the organization of mining practices, the recliner Place- Tha leiailclls beiweefl Wciklllg lllell ara marked hy s hleTeTchY sf racial- » ~ they seldom performed hard manual work themselves, that they could be ver y ized power which pulls race, class, and gender into a synthesis whose character ~ j_ and physiaaiiy abusive to "native” workers, and that they used titles such as "boss” lmlcects uP°l”l the censclcusfless nf African W°ikel's·32 It is nat Productive ra PYiV‘ ` to enforce social space between them and the workers. The state endorsed their ilege one factor over the others but to recognize the intersectionality of these three , QY" discretionary use cf violence which constituted a Culture Of anthnntananism nmaspects af identity- Nnnaihalssss analysis raquiras a frasmaniarisn af this intar- i moted to enforce industrial discipline. This brings in another rnrnensren cr the

I4 "We Were All .5`laves" 2 /l/`rlcan Workers and European Theories J5 3231;; aiigglalgjlg W0TkP;¤¤€ is ·f8I more-than a site of produc- i' ylorpspeciajjsts, A series of strikes which are broadly clustered in three key phases Comcstation of raéializcd colonial VENUE T lli'1€1l’1’£fQdUCt10n, reproduction, and I S provide a central narrative of the tiext:'(l) 1914-1920, the establishment of the 1l’l· me mmsfmmd imo the “nmvB” HEDWGL 1;] ations. It 1S here that African "hieh·· K, dustry; (2) 1920-1940, its consolidation; (3) 1940-1949, post—war period, IIS d1minforccd by bmw force and the ;•il:g“b e iacial orgamzation of inequality as vestment, and decolonization. h P I tion of the smc. AH Afdéan Wmkgs ¢ 0s; is established withhthe collahora- The first two chapters of the book create the setting for the opening of the mines cpithets which further dem amd th YVUE Jecied to brutal beatrnlgsrand racial ;;`ll1I]9l5. Chapter l introduces the people of tldi district, an area in southeastern Process can stm be heard mgjhe im €11'_P¤Sti¤0n as men. The hurnihatiou of this R Niger-ia where the nunes are located, and explains the intersection of ec0logy,.econ— mum the demeaning tmamem b 5/;§i1¤;€ recollections of informants who Ire- `; iomy, and power with Igbo notions of masculinity. Itscentral task 1S to explain two to mcg as it was Constructed and)! Crfl S asses. This pushed nge to pay attention ,` apparently contradictory phenomena: (1) the histoncal processes that made the Cukmng discourse dcmcancd the Fncnomg diluf-he workplace, brutally emas- é ~ urea a “labor reserve" with- the consequent ease of recruitment of labor and (2) the native labomn This discourse used 8 dancd Stlflglllshed the white hoss from the , ability of this labor to achieve a significant degree of control over the l8.b01' pl'0,_iS frequently associated with chain; ¤f tenns toggcpress sub0rdinat1on,whroh ~ eess, the supply of labor and Ito shape the culture of work itself, The chapter loused the appcuat-ion isbcy ” dem mt. 6 gnmatl-ll`1¥Y· All African _]0b categories , L gates the workers’ militance 1n rural gender and generational COHQICIS 111 which boysw were hswcrs “mb=b0 svg u iigda glen T-0 éiperrnanent adolescence; "prck · young and poor men struggled to establish households and to acquire-the mascupcwisory staff were-locked il-10 tl; S € bill Underground, etc. Even African su- Q line symbols of prestige and status. It argues that the region’s centur1es’-long inms cf WDOSS boys _, S6 Su Or nate categories in a contradictory sm. V volvemenr in the slave trade fostered a class of merchant capitalists, prominent This was the férmative ex me th I U I p men called Ogaranyan, who created an "ehte" masculinity that was represented in » established the meanings of £’Sub_;*°;’ ag Tait? {ace real to Nigerian miners and 5 their polygynous families and membership in elite male associations, called title lation govemi-ngAfdcan1ab r in-lm; in _ m er In factrjhé nrst b0dy of leg1s— _ societies. As an elite model of masculinity, it was attainable by only a few men, acm But there were a numb; of fa {C0 0};u¤s Was a set of masters and servs_rits” . but other men asprred to achieve indigenous norms of self-respect, personal cularing ism in colonial mai °a°” tom °h3H°"gC° tm °°i°”°y °f ‘““ °'¥“"` » * “°‘“°“°"‘°“" md s°“"'“*"°”““c“" township While the other came :3 _¤:il YE came from the village and "hanve·’ ~ y The second chapter, covering the period ofthe conquest lQ09—1914, focuses on important socialization __]cSSOn’; to Olin the smneracist workplace, This - the construction of the colonial state under the then current ideology of “md1rect form in the Workplace than in the C0 011; f§¢1¤l hierarchies proved easier to on- ` ru]e_" It weaves together several threads, including the collective ideology of such the men who mzkkcd to Work dai? [Fm SEQIBYY- This Was especiallylthe case for c gg state officials as liredenck Lugard, which shapes the models of social reconstrucdom Visited. Their Wages umhasclsj Em a JSCTHK Vlllages where white men se]- lj tion that the state introduced mth the conquest and the new structures of local poand Zinc m0fS· P 5 Sym 0 S of m0dem1ty—b1cyc1es, radios, I ., litical order that strengthened the power of wealthy men under the fub¤C of The Occupational culture of coalmi _ 'th _ _ V J, "cust0mary law."39 It situates the first recruitment efforts in the context of the vicxhaustive Physical requirements en mhz, Wg its dangerous work conditions and lp E olentconstr·uctron,of1;l1e colonial state which incorporated a group of wealthy forminfomed lube mms of mascump COUSZE; Z solidarity among Igbo miners that _ E mer slave traders, the Ogamnyan, into local govemment. The imprint of their power- This¤cOntradictiO¤ bEtWcc1t};];md€¤_ aimed their individual autonomy and ‘ , state-endorsed coercion gave the first stages of labor mobilization a nlllltaly caste Place and the amlmauon of masculfl _ E ?]:UgT&U0H of African men in the work- and elicited forms of resistance that swept through whole communities. Thus, as danger and Skin _nh _ 1mtY arfsmg from the Y€QU1S1[€ physical strength, _ $¤ the Great War began, the Udi area erupted into a spate of convulsive uprisings that P , l 1 erent in the work, laid a foundation for a masculine identity , ; both interrupted the opening of the mine, and, in defeat, forced scores of men to which was s0c1al1y reinforced in the village and "native" areas of Enugu. the colliery, In Chapter 3, which covers the Great War, the book goes into the coal pit to deTHE STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY _ " scribe how British ideas about Igbo "othemess" evolved into racialized systems of conceptually the book is divided _ I t _ ' T "power in production? It argues that this colonial workplace reflected the princihismry of the Source ccmmlmmcs an WO ;$CT;0|1S· qflilpliers 1-4 are a social ples of "1nd1reot ru]e’i through which rural life was reC0nSLi’l1cted.4° The chapter its Early confrontations with the State d$;?h¤$§ d6 Ofmatlon ofthe labor force and V features an intricate drscussron of the actual system of coal mmmg which set the thodox labor Study with discussions apth §1¤· \1Su'Y. Chapters 5-7 are a more or- ‘~ s material context in which underground workers developed a group consciousness. cram: Contexts in which GSW/M lag iénupcacies of disputes and the bureau- ‘ This chapter captures some ofthe fearsome and strenuous nature of this labor prothc Second cluster f h P OT S Ugg 65 WHS lfrétmed. This focus gives ` cess which was such a determinative factor 111 the shaping of the W01‘kerS’ identity o c apters a texture that is more specialized and challenging to and in fostering forms of association that make them such a formidable industrial ,»= ;

I6 "We Were All Shaver" ,/lyricnn Worker: and European Theories 17 g.l;0g1;i1};;0I¤;lgt;li As Brltlslfdmanagerlal staiifrecognized,-the evolving work cul. V ` The second section of the book, chapters 5-7, covers the period from 1920-1949, duction andgthc gif ;’£;cd Eqlslfc agustments 11'l the1r organization of pro- _ 1; and has a more detailed explanatory texture than the previous section. Chapters 5 discipline was mlgtcd his their “ Ia I;/or ers ”1‘eS1Stance to industrial time and and 6 cover the period of policy elaboration concerning African labor andhsoclety their Villages they Secured the- P1`11111ti V€1'1€SS. AS the men remained involvedrin V _ They have a distinctively different texture in that they detail a "reg1rne” of dustry was erratic Ummaml 151 Eos; OHS asdmen but their participation in the in- g 3 power/lqiowletige characteristic of late colonialism. In a penod H1 wluch coloimplicadons of Igim mea-nin YS of in 8 J,11Sied as It confronted the industrial zi nialism was being challenged both by the colonized and by.Br1tam’s war allies, the Colonial commons are ingvitablm . megs. A l _ · ` j state tried to demonstrate its legitimacy through the superiority of its knowledge. ideological museum of the come wi/1 Sites 0 fgompetlng masculinities, perhaps an i _ The state identified the institutions through which Africans could express their ll1· Of the colony 41 Thus the “ ick bs ’11i;11;€l;> British hegemony the early years · V, terests_ Colonial society and workplaces were fraught with problems but the metinnucnual uéwardl mobif; 2md0Y$» ti IU UYS, A and i Hill boys of tlleplt were J 21 ropolitan state claimed to have the capacity to “dellneate Bud b0l11'1d the P1'0bl€1Tl formed Wérkcry OIY mzmgns Grieg get? n;en in their rural communities, They 4 I area and show that it knew how to set rtnght.‘"*2Abattery of intellectuals and labor adaptation of the mgm im OV 21 et ZM -0 fummya that became an industrial p , specialists was deployed throughout Brita.1n’s colomes to conduct social surveys, elite to govern the mnsmogft engen hissticlatlons, lVzuk0, formed by the Ari-rcan l` to collect statistical data on costs of living, and to delineate "legal” areas of ConSocim d V P our an er tithe colhery thesehwere mutual aid as- K 5 llict and spaces for legitimate contestation. They ignored African forms of knowlons an negotiating bodies for the miners. In these myriad ways the miners t edge and were loath to develop a meaningful understanding of the complexities of gatéiglguuxvnhdedmupn to the category "worker." U _ · l { An-icnn life and the nuances of labor mobilization. They insisted that only British Cade when th; Czgglg P Llvgiiiggzlge f7l`§0l—‘l[(§2;1-Tltilllstila-l mlllell or the post-war de- ‘ 5 institutions of worker representation and disputes management Were “H’l0deI'1'l” 31'ld . uary *1919 and late 19;}; It EX lows Sgu;11 ls; Sptltesjslx Strikes between Jan- ~ t‘useful" and forced mine workers to abandon the Nruku and use trade unions and Conmcdng processes The “l;l-B led b es emselveswluch were a product of many ` i` Joint consultative bodies, lvloreover, these "experts" introduced a shared discourse men from more distagt ang Bain (nc- Hgegpectable artisans and clerical workers, 1 t through which all interactions between labor and capital were to be expressed. This Empire Many were West Indiangfsh 1V1 Ie areas ofN1gena and the West African j t discourse arose from European models of industrial relations and the welfare state. Nigm;7 who saw themselves as J h 1§1g1'&d’?0He¤IlS, as well as Yoruba from Western ~ . Thus the struggles of colonial industrial workers were plunged into a context of manumss For them Wa cs were 01V_ g? men, and accepted a Victorian notion of A`, foreign procedures and institutions which these workers could not understandlln of meaning and Status B8 This ti an [11111 spenifgile component of their construction I defense, the workers sought out leaders who could decipherthe maze ot legal inhabimms encoma in · agmbm 111¢an;:1ty’c nugu had grown to over 10,000 ine ; _ gtruments and mandatory procedmes and employ the new discourse of industrial nuanced}; th _ if-g l U"; Qfs a1T1011g g0Ve‘1'rtment clerks that was in- J resolution, The colliery workers found such a man 1n Isaiah Ojlyl, a secondary y eir se perception as loyal employees of an imperial power they had _ " school teacher with radical nationalist sympathies, only to have him reviled by the supported durmg the Great WM. This perception, of themselves as "subjects" of a t state as a manipulative demHg0gL\€· 3;;1;11§itl;>lWer, fuetlled thetr protests which converged with the wave of postwar Chapters 5 and,5 center on two major themes: (l) the changing nature of colomscim gidufesl flgesouated among the white civil servants-in Nigeria, The , { nial labor policy forced by worker activism to accept responsibility for the reproEal Work;-1; E) SOE eglc I ;tr1keS Shaped a culture of protest which iniroducedlmari- t T tinction of the colonial working class and (2) the state’s simultaneous attempt to Professional lm; W;t;?Si0‘:?t10¤ii;fd1S1ieut, Thus colhery l\/zuko commissioned ` __ introduce more efficient systems of managerial control to regulate production and less habimated mmbbased wor; De 5:315 ailarticulated their demands, while the _ _ exert control over the social lives or miners in the villages and labor camps. The decade the Suphisdcation of this figl t iwt eu labor through desertion.ABy mid- `· Nigerian state embarked upon aipohcy of labor force stabihzation which pushed Ordmatgd their smkc with a SHOE Ofes gl? l7u;?(;’V8S suggested when the miners co- g management into the workplace in ways that reduced hewers’ autonomy, while the Strike of 1926 In 19224 9; the P6 Q0 emand during the English General 1 workers pushed ever more articulately to enhance and preserve the hyes that they harmed through a S Stem of Slévc 1"f!P$;011SS101'lS ot the Hee market in labor rever- I V ,> theniselves had created, Management-sanctioned forms of representation werellrlforced to W k _ it _ TY 1H e countryside and slaves, locally called Ohn, p posed with limited success in reducing activism because the leadership was seized or ·m e mines, became unwilling to remam subordmate men. Their by the old Nzuko leaders who now had more legitimacy through association with protest destabilized rural government in one of the adjacent areas and indicated how QV state-approved fomms of worker representation. Calilytslj labor Systems could erode pre—e>tisting structures of labor mobilization and I Chapter 7 describes the events leading to the Iva Valley Massacre of November Sghgg buitzil; ;:;;fe¢t¤— Status as Nfr ” E €¤¢1`¤10n IHYO 'free laborers and insistent that their t t tions and the labor reforms introduced by a confident, yet arrogantly unaware, Coloee men e recognized within the idiom of their commumty. ~ nial Office. The primary task of the chapter is to expand the customary treatment

i V " ” ` ( iv p _' "Wg Were All Slavgy `V African Workers and European Theories I9 ~ ,»~*Y~j?w ith — · 3 beyond the interpretations ofthe official report, the Fitzgerald Com- , to the colonies."" The Joint consultation meetings.- trade umons, labor d1sputc lcg, Report. Both the C0mmission’s hearings in December 1949 and the re- i islation, and compulsory arbitration failed to survive the deep antagomsms of late ., ,.;~== ' ltlclf require more penetrating analysis than can be accommodated in this V _ colonial society. These included the clash between p0St—Wa.t workers frustrated ex— monograph of the miners’ entire history. However, I have used both to push the ` ~y pectntions, resentful white bosses resisting the dismantling of the colomal labor i `'i’ narrative beyond the Commission’s analysis, most especially to challenge its ° i, pi-ocess and the shifting political landscape. Metropolitan colomal archuects were j scathing critique of trade union leadership at the colliery and in the national union T also insufficiently aware of local industrial conditions, and the "men onthe spot p movement. Disturbingly, with few exceptions the "of§cial story" has entered the . j who viewed all labor reforms with suspicion. Moreover, 0fficia1s’ persistent un-` ` orthodoxy of the independence narrative. ' . derestimation of the consciousness, tenacity, and sophistication of African workInterestingly, the charge to the Commission refuted the Colonial Office’s _ ers led them to see most workers as naive dupes easily manipulated by demagogic bounded concepts of "political" and "industria1" conflict. It was charged to exam- , Q _ labor leaders more interested in politics than in industrial improvements. Tgey were ` ine the question at hand--the colliery’s turbulent history andthe immediate causes ‘ quite unprepared when the miners organized their own strike without e umon ` of the strike. But it was also instructed to rove freely and examine the state of the Q leadership. l , national trade union movement as well as evaluate the proposals for political re- I P Additionally, both the colliery management and state officials resented the state s form as put forth by the Nigerian government. Again, the rniners’ struggle was sub- V i. reform efforts which they saw as unwarranted concessions to an irresponsible nasumed under a national critique. 4· Y tionalist and trade union movernent."$ The state’s decision to use violence in NoIn examining this tragedy I have taken another avenue of investigation which vember 1949 represented local political off1cials’ opposition to the application of , includes both oral and documentary resources. However, continuing security re- 2 disputes management principles in the colonies and their emphasis. on the politiStdctions over the archive deprived me of access to a crucial trove of materials, . ; cal implications of this industrial action. In many respects this decision was an mcurrently in the Foreign and _Commonwealth Ofiice, that are still not declassified 5 Z validation of a conventional fiction—that there was a distinct difference between despite the expiration of time restrictions. These included the Commissioners’ ; an economic and a political dispute in the colonies. — notes, material submitted as evidence, and other memorabilia. Speciiically, this en- t `. The labor reforms created sharp tensions in the industry between labor and mancumbered my attempt to verify allegations made in testimony asserting the trade Q agement. Similarly, state legislal-l0¤ enforong b¤r¤¤9¤r¤¤¤ SYSEQHS Of dlipdlites union 0rga.niz.er’s role in misleading the miners to strike. However, I was able to . management entangled the union leaders in consultations that un ermine err 1156 3H0£hSf series of Colonial Office tiles which detail decisions about the post- ` standing with their workers. This encouraged the miners, the m0St mllltallt-S€Gt0l' shooting disposition of the colliery manager, the police officer in charge, and the , of the workforce, to break away from the trade union and act to secure their fate. trade union leader, Ojiyi. These proved quite valuable. Secondly, I used the testi- Q 'J lt was left to a single, nervous pol1cen·ian——who approved the barrage of bullets mony published in the Commission proceedings. In many ways they read as “the— _ that m6lTyf¢d The W0fkeTS—Y° ignite this eembusuble mlxtum atre" on whose stage played all the major actors in the industrial and political , ii narrative of the industry and the birth of the independent Nigerian nation. These I " . . . . . . . t SOURCES hearings also reproduced the same antagonrsms between imperial officials and . 3 I _ African subjects that had brought the industry to the brink in 1949. I found con- I l The collection of evidence for this study was-both challenging rewarding. siderable divergences between the characterization of events and individual re- The destruction of S<>01’€S of P¢1’S0¤¤l PaPe1’$ dfmng the Nlgemm CW11 Wm fomcd sponsibilities as detailed in the Report and the testimonies of witnesses as in the · { mc to collect ff3gm¢1'¤tS of material from e Wide range ef s°“I°eS· This was P"` hearings. A final source was oral evidence collected from eyewitnesses of the shoot- , tially ¢0mp€¤S¤f¤d by the ge¤ef0S1tY ef David Sm¤¤k· Ham and Aswu Ak' ing. In this respect, my interviews have only scratched the surface. On each re- · l pala. Who shared ¥1h€i1'1'€Se¤-Teh notes and documents Whml; “ier€ cgndlsstcd bcfgm search trip I found additional informants who added new material and insights into t { the war. However, many record groups were permanent y ost. or e opening the event and often reveal new problems and inconsistencies. However, a thorough 3Q years—the early twentieth century—both written and oral sources proved probanalysis of these inconsistencies must await further study. ' _ lematic, Although the study begins in the not too distant past—the earlyiitwenueth The Iva Valley sit-in strike, like many others during this period, was unwittingly fg. century—there is little written documentation of the early years. Few uropeans sparked by the social reforms promulgated by the imperial state at home and in the , and literate Africans entered the area before the relatively latedco1·§1};1est,lm colonies during and after World War H. While introduced to discourage disruptive s 1909-1912. Moreover, the few available documentary s0urces—pro uce y co oWork actions and to prevent social problems £rom feeding political radicalism they 4 nial missionaries, state ofticials, and military commandersjiilteredthc complex had the opposite effect.‘“ Industrially the reforms reflected the emergence of in- L and evolving reality of Igbo society through the- static raciahzed VISIOH of H 0011dustrial relations as a "scientihc” field in the United Kingdom and its application I quemi as articulated in a discourse of the "c1vi11zmg mission. Thus these docu-

‘ 20 "We Were All siavay ` `: /\h·ic:zn Workers and European Theories 21 R ments give only a dim glimpse ofthe concerns of this part ofthe study; indigenous V . proud memories of modern trade unions. Despite probing questions they insisted ` labor systems and their transformation by the conquest, rural social relations of E; ‘ that they only had unions. This may have reflected their assessment that imions [ production, and men’s status and generational conilicts. ‘ I were "modem" organizations and their concem to present themselves to me, a forQ The earliest missionary records from the Enugu area were a 1913-1914 series 3 eigner, in the most progressive light. of Chufeh Missionary Society minutes of exploratory trips by missionaries to cnn. i A second limitation of oral sources is that they were still laced with the deep sider the opening of mission stations and the mines and several diaries of techni- ~ conflicts among various groups of workers, between "1ocal" and "foreign" African Cialis W01’k-ing 011 railway construction or on the opening of the mines. Both spoke _ 2 workers, and between loyal union members and dissenters. Some of these diviGnly Obliquely about the workers, There was some anecdotal material from the sions come from the “politics of production" and reflect conflicts arising from insmall group of westemized, literate Africans clustered around certain nodes of Eu- { scribed inequalities that were structured by the labor process. Still others reflect ropean contact-Lagos in the west and Calabar and Port Harcourt in the squtheagh V `, the complex transitions of labor systems as for example, the tensions between slave, This evidentiary difficulty, which can only partially be compensated for through ~ ‘ Ohu men, and freeborn, Amadi, conscripted in the iirst labor force, The issue of Oral history, was an unavoidable difficulty in the first two chapters of the hoo].; In slave descent is still of considerable importance today in the Enugu area and tensorne cases I have had to extrapolate from the accounts of travelers, missionaries, T ll sions arise over the selection of chiefs, admission into male societies, and marand political oflicials from l9l4 to outline some possible scenarios of the periods ` ` riagc. As in most communities where affiliation is structured along lineage and before the conquest. V kinship lines, it is generally known which families were descended from slaves Oral sources have proven somewhat more useful in capturing some of the im. and which from freebom. Moreover, in the 1920s Ohu turned their exclusion into # portant transformations that occurred after the conquesh At the time gf my first { , tt basis for solidarity and secured state support to establish several autonomous vilfield W01'k in Nigeria, in 1975, informants on the inaugural years of the industry 4 i lages and to change their name to Awbiu. Thus today, most if not all people in cerwere not difficult to locate. For most of the period of the study the industry re- E tain villages or in designated wards of freebom villages are known as Awbia."‘ 01'¤it€d its manual Workers from within a fifteen—mile radius and artisans and clerks · These contemporary antagonisms are expressed in interviews. The accounts of from either two core areas in central (the town of Owerri) or riverian (Onitsha on Y Freeborn retlect persistent prejudices towards descendents of slaves and interviews the Niger River) Igboland. The pool of local informants was large and qualitatively _ T. with slave descendants, which required special sensitivities, assumed a defensive diverse since few local men managed to become socially mature males or prcmi- V f- posture.47 Nonetheless, I was able to use these perspectives to capture the resilience nent without episodes of colliery work—whether to raise biide wealth to take a t of pre-colonial status divisions that suggest the depth of the impact of the Atlantic wife, to earn extra cash to bury a parent, sibling, or spouse, or to pay membership it slave trade. fees in prestigious male organizations. Virtually all the men in the adjacent viiiages _ r. Archival holdings reflect a wealth of documentary material for the period, mostly wove waged colliery work into their individual economic strategies. Mining was ` i YT0m th€ P0St·1935 P¤1`i0d. which ¤Yi$€ f1'0T¤ The i¤d¤S¤'Y’S Status BS 3 Pamstal and such a Central part of the economy of this area that it became a defining element ` the involvement of various multiple layers of state bureaucrats in its concerns. The in the regional identity of its inhabitants. It is with considerable pride that retired official records of the colliery itself as well as the reports of the provincial resiworkers speak of their role in an industry with such illustrious credentials in Niger. jj dents, district officers, and urban authorities are in the Nigerian Archives, Enugu. ian political history. It is still possible to visit adjacent villages and easily identify Quite by luck I was able to locate a stack of Hles containing a series of monthly articulate men, many of whom were mentioned in government records, who are 1*1 manager’s reports in the Nigerian Ministry of Labor archives in Yaba, Lagos. At anxious to give their accounts of the labor history. I the time of my visit, these records were not catalogued but stacked on industrial However, enthusiastic informants were often unable to remember important ma- shelves in a large abandoned warehouse. These began in the early 1930s and deterial from the more remote period. For example, I was especially interested in the V tailed weekly output, surveys of labor, accident rates, etc. I also found amongst the forms of workers’ organizations that predated trade unions, the Nzuka Himanya, Colonial Records Project of Rhodes House, Oxford University, diaries of district and through which workers shaped and articulated grievances, organized work ac. »· officers and less prominent colonial officials as well as such notables as Major tions, and negotiated with management. This was an important concern because it f Granville St. George Orde Brown, the Colonial Office’s tirst labor advisor, and gave important insights into indigenous work cultures and their adaptability to the Q Arthur Creech I ones, Labour Party leader. The British Trades Union Congress industrial setting. Moreover, it indicated that these men were not just peasants r j * archives at the Modern Records Project at Warwick University, Coventry, gave im“tempora1‘ily” engaged in wage labor (i.e., a semi-proletarianized peasantry) and ‘ portant insight into the policies of the Congress towards the African labor moveunable or uninterested in creating viable organizations to structure grievances and » { ment and documented the experiences of the bevy of labor advisors who worked protests. Most informants’ recollections of early organizations elided with their V, Vjjé through the colonial service in fostering "responsible" trade unions.

gg ··We were Ag gjavgsn ` is African Workers and European Theories 23 Materia] on the colhgry was found in a numbgr gf yccgrd groups in the public j ` velop their communities. lt is the intent of this study to use these memories to inRecords omce, Kew Gardens. In addition to me emciai mes ofthe Nigerian gov- , scribe these men in the i¤d¤s¤ia-1 histary of Africa ernment, the series C.O. 508, there were wartime records of the Colonial Labor Advisory Committee and other coordinating bodies, such as the Social Services { _ division within the Colonial Office. These were all useful as they indicated the of- ii NOTES Hcial anxicty that Surrounded many Every incident °f Worker Protest This- in mm= . l. For a discussion of the wave of post-war general strikes see Timothy Oberst, "Cost ¤¤°°“mS¤d mc *0 determirw the W¤fk¤fS’ ¤¤d¢fS*¤¤di¤g ¤1° this imperial ¢<>¤¢er¤· . ·* ‘ of Living and stakes in British Africa, C. 1939-1948: Imperial Policy and me impact ofthe Both helped me to understand that this industry, although small in comparison with , T Second World War" (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1991). the mining complex in central and southern Africa, was quite pivotal both in re- . 2. See Agwu Akpala, "Background to the Enugu Collieiy Shooting Incident in l949," Spect to its role as the region’s strategic fuel resource as well as a laboratory for 1 j Journal ofthe Historical Society efNigeria 3, 2 (1965): 335-64; and S.O. Jaja, "The Enugu British social policies affiliated with the welfare state and industrial patemalism. Q .. C0lli¤¥Y Mamcfe in R€¤°5P€°[¤ An EPiS°d€ i¤ British Admi¤iS¤'¤*i°¤ °f Nis<=ria»" JD"' This point became especially salient in the correspondence after the Japanese vic- ‘ , Ml Ofme Histvriml SUM'? ‘{fNi$'°"l" Z 3‘4 = $6’l06·_ _ _ {cries in South Asia during World Wm II. i ·. 3. Agwu Akpala, Managing Industrial Relations in Nigeria (Case Study oi N1?;;n In creating this story I was especially concemed to tind images that would often { dL2;§;;)1984; md David sm°Ck’ Conflict and Comm! m an African r E ml m voids m the verbal evidence` One of Ty most mfcmng finds came from the Mi i 4. There are mines in South Africa (Natal) and Zimbabwe but there is only one monoOfmafthecrawreserteth—=s¤r¢¤¤¤=¤*S¤¤r¤ha¤1¤a¤s·=¤tf¤=s¤¤dS¤¤dS¤r- i . graph on these mums. an Phlmistefs with Km Cai, Capital inatow in ca,. * vices for the entire Empire. This was a beautiful album of photographs from . E mal Zimbabwe ]894_ 1954 (Hmre 1994) 1914-1915 taken during the construction of the Eastern Branch of the Nigerian 5_ Frederick Cooper, "W0;k, Class, and Empire; An African rilstqi-mrs Retrospective Railway and the Udi Coal Fields. It is a remarkable collection of images that con- , Y on E3 Thompsonf Social History 20, 2 (1995); 239. tain invaluable historical evidence of the massive organization of labor required ” { 6. Royden Harrison, ed., The Independent Collier.- The Coal Miner asArcl1etypal Pm· for the construction of the railway. It included photos of chiefs, thousands of work- ~ Ietarian Reeensidered (Sussex, 1978). ers manually removing tons of earth, and several excellent photos of the Udi coal . 7· D¤Vid F1'¤¤l<» “Th¢ COT-\¤¤'Y Of €¤aL"1·¤b{>w/Le Tmvail 21 ($P*'i¤§ 1988): 234mine, the mst colhery mine, as Well as many groups of W0rke1.s_4& These images One particularly useful collection is a series oi essays hononng the one hundredth helped to confirm my assessment of ways work intersected with masculinity and . annwgrsmy af the Ummd _M{n° Workers °f Amepiag T5!} H'£V[bL?S1ctis ihekvgi the Obstacles to managerial control Over the labor process- i — Q i&g4tne Workers 0fAmerica. A Model oflnduszrza 0 1 arity. ( mversi y ar , Finally, this study has benefited from the industrial ethos of Enugu which is sur- I '· 9?`ROydcn Harrison, cd', Independent Coma ¤¤Si¤slyS¤¤¤s=V=¤ mah thei¤d¤S·rvis¤==¤¤¤¤¤¤¤t-Avimmdavismak . A m. This wmsysem called taeabystlic mmuadmacsoasm mmm. was by the Way that the city vrwdly =¤Ss<>¤i=¤¤S its identity with wai even thwah the > i in many wars it~'represented as r·dsSnin.g·· of as mma, Enugu miners nonetheless industry has long since been eclipsed by the Nigerian petroleum boom. Through- _ saw their job of cutting cog] K, be gf Crum] impgytgngg out the city the words "Coal City" appear in the labeling of businesses, on ban- ‘ Q 11_ Ibm 54-74_ ncrs, and, in the case of one area, "Coal Town," as a designation of a city area. 4 if 12. One provocative study that pushes for these continuities is the discussion of genThe city’s illdusltial identity is most dramatically signified in two public stat- l __ der/bending, race, and empire in the British coal industry of Anne McC1int0ck’s Imperial ucS_ Qnc, at the entrance gf the ahpom is an ilnposing statue gf a proud, long mmm-_ ` l` Leather: Race, Genden and Sexuality in the Colanial Contest, (London, 1995). 4 with his pit helmet and his Pick The Other, at the center of a major traffic circle, is ` [ 13. See Nlrinalini Sinha, Colonial Masculinity: the Manly Englishman and the Efemta dramatic contemporary interpretation of the shooting. It is an excellent example J `· ”“ie4B;;§’;{;i:;i;l;;i;':O{ 51 Zloigggngggzngggfgfi 1995) ' of hlsmngal rcmterpmtéuon replete with hm-mc mmcrs mscumg failcli comrades · 15, The best review of the genesis of the field is Bill Freund’s "'I`l1e l-listoriography of and standing firmly, against guns. The accuracy of the statue as a depiction of what ` ¤~ African Labour,. in The Aftmm Wgrker (London, 1988) actually happened IS not as Important as the ways that Enugu residents mcorpm . 16. For a review ofthe literature in French and British Africa see Frederick Cooper’s exratethepastiruheir¢¤¤re¤tv¤Si¤¤¤Wi¤¤i¤t¤¤e¤¤<><1¤r¤Nia¢¤ia¤¤Sf¤¤e·H¤Vi¤ae¤- . T Ccllent may, Decaigntwm andAfi-ican May; The any quam in French aruiBritish dured years of military rule, the people of Enugu proudly reiiect upon the sacrifices _ Africa (Cami),-;dg€_ 1996) that their brothers, sons. and fathers made for the birth of the Nigerian nation as if 3. 17. see crimes vm onseien, Chibam:African Mme Labour in southem Rngdma, (Len. to reclaim their position with the contemporary state. As they recount the memory ~ ` don, 1976); Charles Perrlngs, Black Minewarkers in Central Africa (London, 1979); Jane of their past industrial battles older men speak with pride about the ways that their 3 Parpart, Capital and Labor an the African Copperbelz (Philadelphia, 1983); Ruth First, Black labor S11pp01’I€d The regional economy and the ways that mine work helped to dg- V i. Gold: The Mozambican Minen Pmletarian and Peasant (New York, 1983).

24 .“We Were All Slaves" V /\h·icun Wurkerr and European Theories 25 18. For an early review of the historiography of South Africa see Belinda Bozolli and 31. This literature constitutes ms;) of Jlhe studieslon i<;uL\;;r5S»:£1;>¤:f:?:;;·5?::'0i ig; Peter Delius, "Hist0ry from South Afr·ica," Radical History Review, 46/47 (Winter 1990). ~ ‘ outdated review of South African ay lr story lsee on l W » N . 4 _ __ 19. See Robin Coburg ..R€siSmmS and Hidden {mms of Consciousness among African [my;AI-Iist01'i0graphiCa.lASSeSSm€I£1 1nB0;§r;11;xd Dehus eds., Hnstory in South Africa, W0rkers," Review 0fAfrican Political Economy, 19 (1980): 8-22. ' g ll Special issue of Radical Hurary evrew: — . _ k 20. Keletso Atkins, The Moon Is Dead! Give Us Our Maneyfs The Cultural Origins af y 32. For a collection on the mrerseeuon of race and claisgee Peter 2;; an African Work Ethic, Natal, South Africa, 1843-1900 {Portsmouth, 1993). Atkins was in- $· Halpern, Racializing Clwgbfldfiwlng R¤¢`¢·' Labgw fm {ference · iiuenced by the work of E.R Thompson in her article on the clashes between Zulu and Eu- and Africa (New York, 20 . l _ 4 _ I _ _ · _ ropean men over the temporal reckonings each was using to determine the wage period. ' 33. Amongst one of the most mterestmg sl‘ud1€S I5 I1lS¤uE·1¤¤¤ · ` 21. Frederick Cooper, "From Free Labor to Family Allowances: Labor and African So- y > labor/history studies. See Dunba; 1;/goodie ir; Vivieggig N<;4;t?;1;;0;;;€qJ$€'ai;l;a;:; ciety in Colonial Discourse," American Erhnologist 16, 4 (1989): 753. { Patrick Harries Work, Culture, an enmy: tgmn we 22. One particularly useful contribution was Anne McClint0ck’s Imperial Leather. _ S Africa, 1860-1910 (Portsmouth, NH,-1994} “ I _ M H At _ Gender Power 23. The discussion of the political role of African labor arose within the developmental ., " 34. Andrea Comwnll and Nancy Lmdsfarne, Dnslvctitléli ¤S¤¤d;¤ Zislacazié Mas: paradigm which was a preoccupation of social science studies in the early 1960s. The clas- ’ E und Anthropologyf-’ m Andrea Cornwall and N¤¤¤y T11; S 6-FHS. 5 -» 8 sical articulation of the position that trade unions were of little political importance as a \ culinity: Comparative Eih¤0gV¤Ph¥¢¤ (L¤nd¤n. l99‘l)» _·a1 Anal _S ” in Gender and the * force of change in Africa is Elliot Berg and Jeffrey Butler, “Trade Uni0ns," in James Cole- 35. Joan Scott, "Ger1der: A Useful Caiegvfy of H1$Y¤¤¤ YS! · man and Carl Rosberg, eds., Political Panies and National Integration in Tropical Africa, g Pnlizics 0fHist0ry (New York 198§), 42. · V 4 18 (Berkeley, 1964). Bill Freund paints out that the year that this article was published, de- i 36. Comwall and·L1ndsfarne, Dl€l0€¤€!{ig M¢S€MZ¤m'Y} - 1975 grading the unions as instruments of nationalist transformation, Nigerian workers launched . 37. Thomas Noisike, Agbaja, UfiP¤0¤ of [hc enum PTUCBSS is Ff¤d¤¤¤k C°°P°T S Df`c”lf’”*Z“"””:” drew Zimbalist‘s Case Studies nn the Labor Process (New York, 1979). See particularly I i' Affiwn S0€i€¥`)’· In fact, this is PBYMPS the most S“P°Yb b°°k ff)? P°“'jAf“°am?ts t0 ma or Keith Dix, ‘·w¤rk Relations in me com Industry: The Hamiieaumg En, 1880-1930** and , the majvr ¤h<>m=S in 1¤b¤$hiS¤>¤9g?aPhY· “‘°H°°“;“1 °‘;F‘°"‘d‘°°‘°“S m °°l°m°1 lam P0 _ Michael Yarrow, "The Labor Process in Coal mining: Struggle for Control"; Michael Bu- I i icy, and thc impact ofAf1·1can arctivrsm on po cy orma ion, l rawoy, The Paliiics 0fPraducti0n: Factory Regimes Under Capitahsm and Socialism (Lon- E Y 44. Richard Hyman, Industrial Relgzzoréigl Jggcisr Infgzliggilznfgggzdgghgggsgéwrodon, 1985). " 45. They were especially conceme wi e' s mov V Y V _ ._ f 28. Michael Burawoy has critiqued much of labor studies for failing to really delve into J geneous ideologists compvsid of m¢;hd1S€;11¤hm¥i:g‘;’;g¤hi:;5$;\;1f;lt;*r;]¤;B;;i?ii§u the workplace and the labor process. He argues that only when scholars understand the f the more mainstream nauonanst-po l11C12?i1S· E 0 y m0 I · _ _ _ power relationships created by the ways that production is organized can we understand the ` ·, E.G, Iweriebor, Radical Palms: m Nzgerm, 1945-1950. The Sxgngicance ofthe Zzkzst MOVE tensions among groups of workers and between workers and their erstwhile supervisors. ‘ ment(Za1ia, 1996). y · _ See Burawoy, The Politics 0fPruducti¤n. _ V ~ ‘ 46. The word Awbia, means “S¤’¤¤g€1" 111 *115 V1U¤S?#·E¤'°“P$ that °°mP°s° the Nkanu ian 29. John Tosh, 124. ‘ . ma. As a result ofacivil war in 1922/23 between me slaves (Ohm and the fr¢¤b¤1n
i 26 "We Vkre All SIuves" V \{ ,1 V 'i erase the stigma attached to the slave term it resulted iu the slave connotation being attached . V: to the new word—Awbia. This stigma continues today. ‘ RT I Q 47. In one instance, when I was unsure how to broach the subject of slavery, I opened the . p t interview by stating that I was, myself, a descendant of slaves, This relaxed the discussion p € and the group leader, Ephraim Ene, then stated that they were an Awbia, ex-slave, commu- . V' nity. Interview with Ephraim Ene, Nnamani Onovo, Nwolie Nnamuchi, and Nnaaji Ogbodo T H E C O N T E E D B I H . Akegbe Ukwu, Enugu, 20 August 1986. j . 48. One such photograph was of a Chief of Uzuakoli, a prominent village in the Cross · ,g Rivers area of Igboland, and the men he supplied to the railway. The village was ecstatic p I O F T H E C O I" O N L B O R 1 whenl gave them this picture while on a tour in the summer of 2000. They have since re- F. , * produced it and placed it in a prominent place in their local government house. .. L; P C E S S . B O R , C I. , `i. .i .V 2,

5 Um D1sTR1cT ON THE ‘j ` A EVE OF C0NQUEsT· A Y SLAVERY POWER .277 .; AND RESISTANCE, r' *1 e CIRCA 1909 ` The development of the coal mines changed the villages in Udi division very `¥ much. It provided more jobs. lt stopped much thieving and selling of people ’ into slavery. Minimized hunger. ` Y —Thomas Noisike, former miner, Ezearna Owa, Udil , y This comment, by a former miner, expressed in contemporary tems the startling _ impact of the Atlantic slave trade on the area of southeastern Nigeria where the coal mines would open in 1914. The region had a history of intense involvement ” in the trans-Atlantic slave trade in which, as part of the Biafran hinterland, it con` tributed to the estimated 1.5 million Igbo slaves from the seventeenth through mid— _ nineteenth century. Recent statistical studies suggest that these exports reached a ~' peak in the 1780s with a brief resurgence between 1820-1840 when palm oil and ` . ‘i kernels replaced slaves as the region’s contribution to the world market.2 The palm ;, trade continued the area’s involvement in the world economy and further strength‘ .; ened tendencies towards social stratification and accumulation which began during the slave trade period. · This long period of integration into a global mercantile economy shaped rela[ tions of production, valorized the accumulation of wealth in prestige goods and , forms of currency, and strengthened the political influence of wealthy men. It also . encouraged internal slavery and other forms of subordination which influenced · Y masculine ideals and aspirations. This stratification affected the recruitment of Udi

4 30 "We Were All S1uvgs" I Udi District on the Eve of Conquest 31 men into the coal industry, their ideas of just treatment and remuneration, and forms . f yeafs of The <=ol1iery· IT is eSPe€h‘hY Chahehghlg *0 get these S°“l`°°S to “SP"”·k” *0 of leadership and self-organization that helped them to articulate and secure their ` I the concems of contemporary historical inquiry. These problems with sources have interests in production. r ` created a lively debate among historians of Igboland on the periodization of oriMasculine status systems and the enviromnental constraints on their achieve- i gins, the impact of the world market on domestic socioeconomic development, and ment made Udi into a surplus labor area and an auspicious site for the recruitment ` the nature of political Changes Shml-113Ted by The ¤1’e¤’$ 1¤¤01P0Y¤T10¤ h'TT0 The W01’1d of labor for the mines. But the popularity of coal mining jobs and the area’s role _ C , market, a process of heightened intensity between 1600 and 1800.5 Nonetheless it as a regional labor reserve did not make the men victims of management or the 1 , ` is possible to use fragmentary oral history, archaeological evidence, and the few Sfaie control. It was virtually impossible to mold these meh into a eemphaht and . early—twentieth-century written accounts to outline a tentative series of processes disciplined workforce. The extraordinary degree of control which the men had over T t that may have been operative during the early years of the industry. These propothe pace, intensity, and duration of mine work was the eentra] paradox gf the ih. , r sitions are necessarily contingent upon the current state of historical reconstrucdustry’s labor history despite the mines’ location in a labor surplus area. The causes 1 { tion. of this paradox are examined below. . V Given these restrictions it is difficult to historicize gender relations from fragThe chapter begins with the impact of the slave trade on the ecology and de- , L mentary sources or to account for the extreme variation of customs and "traditions" mography of the area, the pre-industrial systems of labor mobilization, and the that were considered "Igbo." However, coastal sources documenting the slave emergence of incipient political hierarchies. The argument is organized ground two 1 U trade, most especially the new quantitative data, and local oral traditions, suggest points: (1) the constraints that the local environment placed on farming systems . ¤ an increased social stratification associated with the penetration of the world mar* and the consequent ability of young men to raise the requisite wealth to marry and ~ ket and the circulation of prestige goods? Many of these processes strengthened establish an independent household; (2) the ability of socially mature—married— E the gendered construction of political power and social status. The most extensive men to gain access to the institutional hierarchies of prestige and status that cre- *_ of early twentieth-century sources on Igbo society, a series of anthropological studated political power. Because of the diversity of land, labor, and settlement systems 1 ies conducted in the 1930s, suggest a reconstruction of the values and nomis of in Igboland, the discussion focuses on the villages adjacent to the coal mines in V ’ late nineteenth-century Igboland to reiiect the mercantilist ethos.7 Specifically, durthe Agbaja and the Nkanu regions of Udi. ‘ ing the turn of the century, self-esteem, honor, prestige, and influence became imrinsuy, uic chapter establishes inaiviauar and collective perspectives on work . T P¤¤T¤¤T markers of male status giving sender a class-like dimension-8 and identifies a system of values attached to various forms of labor and their treat- ` H mm ‘gkP§"°°· ?*§.C°‘;P‘?‘ has “°‘°d· I ,1 U DI AND rr-it ArLANrrc srnvr rumor; socmr _ “ ’_3 S eheefu ess Y grin lng wing Workers I 5·rRAT||=|CAT|ON, ECOLOGICAL STRESS, AND ASCENDANT into abstract labor power. Rather, as Atkins found in her study of mneteenth- . , FORMS OI; POLITICAL POWER AND MASCULINI-I-IES century Zulu workers in South Africa, Africans in the workplace struggled to ex- 1 .· press their own definitions of useful work and just treatment. Colonial epithets to V 1 The Nigerian G¤ve¤¤¤e¤¤ colliery was located in Udi Dismch in the north °°“' T-he Contrary. Workers found dignity through labor and wnmched stems, prestige, · tral region of Igboland, an area in southeastern Nigeria. Virtually all colliery workand sclf-respect to jobs and tasks assigned and perfomied_"4 By expierihg pre- 3 ers were Igbo-speaking men, the largest ethnic group in southeastern Nigeria, who industrial labor systems and the values these workers attached to work, bghavjgr, ` occupy the area between the Niger and Cross Rivers and a narrow strip on the west and initiatives, we can identify an "African work eth.ic." These mencame from a ,1 _, bank of the Niger River. Today there are some 20 million Igbo—speaking peoples pre—industrial work culture, in which status hierarchies, a variety of labor systems, { hl the 15,800 Squaw hhlcs ef their h°m°la“d· s°m° areas °f Igbdand have the gendered tasks, and expectations of compensation, shaped definitions of "work,” ` highest population densities for rural Africa, and this appears to have been the case time. responsibility, and self—respect. These Nigerian miners drew on this work , g~ at the turn of the century. In the Udi area, densities of 400 to 1,000 per square mile culture to make their imprint on the organization and rhythms of colliery work. In W I were quite common.9 . so doing, they prevented capital from creating the "idea_l wr3rkgr_" . Q; Igboland is in the Guinea coastal climatic area, a region of heavy rainfall on the The analysis of these labor systems is burdened by the problem of reconstruct- g West African coastw However, within this broad region there are several microing the past with few written and oral sources. The area was not conquered until 1 ecological zones with varying soil types, rainfall, and vegetation. The social im1912 and missionary and traveler accounts only exist after 1914, Most om] smh-ees ` pact of this diversity was manifest culturally and economically in strong regional were unable to give more than anecdotal evidence of labor systems, status struc- h S identities. Although the Igbo shared dialects and other cultural traits before the ‘ tures, and masculine values, a limitation that makes it extremely difficult to his- ,1 conquest, they never perceived of themselves as a distinct "people" and operated ‘ Tioricizc pre—indus11ial factors that influenced the behavior of workers in the em-ly ; < within a strongly detined regionalism of uncertain origin.

32 “We Were All Slaves" , Uzli District an the Eve cf Conquest 33 Traditions of Igbo origin are inconclusive, but current research suggests that j nealogical connections to the founding fathers of the village. In areas settled by they originated in the savanna region of West Africa near the confluence of the . I successive waves of migrants iieeing slave raids, this "credential" often proved Niger-Benue River.11 During some still disputed period, they dispersed to the Awka- ` _ ` difficult to establish. Through an innovative spiritual process, the Ani cult estabOrlu plateau and then to Owerri and the southeast. During the early Christian era . I lished a common genealogy. People believed that when a person was buried, Ani ~ one group, the Westem Igbo, spilled over the Niger to inhabit the western shore of s. supervised the transformation of the deceased into ancestors and his/her subsethat river. Although the precise dates of these migrations are vague, archaeologi- , , quent reincarnation in a newborn child. After several generational cycles of death cal excavations near Nsukka in the north found pottery 4,000-5,000 years old}2 ` ~ and reincarnation, a spiritual genealogy was created through which formerly unHistorians believe that the heartland of Igboland was the tr-iangulated area ofAwka, . related pan-ilineages became a common lineage.2° This spiritual genealogy was a Orlu, and Okigwi.13 A stabilizing force in both Agbaja and Nkanu villages. People lived in village-groups or "towns," a cluster of villages founded by the L The mines opened in an area called the Udi district, a region inhabited by two offspring of a common ancestor, usually male but occasionally female. Individual communities which the British called the Agbaja and the Nkanu "clans.” Regionvillages were founded by descendants of this ancestor and their population be- i `.i alism, migration, and village conflicts over land are recurrent themes in the hislonged to related patrilineages. Villages were divided into wards or quarters in- ‘ * tory ofthe Udi district. These two groups lived in two ecologically distinct regions habited by sub-lineages, called ummuna. Members of various ummumz lived in 2 separated by a ridge, called the Udi escarpment, a ‘“spine" of hills running north to compounds, sometimes walled, other times simply a cluster of households near a 1 I south. The Agbaja lived in the area to the west of the ridge which had thin, sandy, b central meeting place. The compounds were called ezi or abi. li Y eroded fields that offered no other attraction except as a redoubt. The prominence t The ummuna was the smallest unit of political cohesion}5 The status hierarchy ` · of migration in the legends of origin supports the hypothesis that the area was setof the abi, quarter, village, and village-group was gerontocratic and gave the old- g` Y tled by successive waves of people fleeing slave raids and overpopulation in the est village in the village-groupsthe oldest quarter in the village, the oldest ummumz , palm belt to the south.“ in the quarter, and the oldest man in the obi, a special social and spiritual place Agbaja included eight village-groupszzz Akpakwume, Atta, Egede, Abor, Udi, within the community, Although seniority by age was not necessarily transformed ’ Ngwo, Eke, and Nze.23 Before the conquest these villages had no permanent asto political power, it did confer respect and prestige that could not always be se- sociation save an occasional military alliance that often proved treacherous and cured by younger men of wealth. ( i unstable. The high population densities of Agbaja’s villages, some reaching l,0O0 In each village, growing rights to land were divided among the ummumz and » Q people per square mile, and severe land shortages further support the thesis that subsequently, the extended family in the obi. All village land was of two types: K ii the area was a refuge. farmland, ala agu, where people farmed but did not live, and household land, ala ~ _ To the east of the escarpment is a fertile plateau, inhabited by the Nkanu "clan," ula, the site of the abi. Farming in the obi was restricted to women’s gardens and , A of twelve village-groups: Akpugo, Agbani, lhuokpara, Amagunze, Akegbe, Ozapermanent crops such as the oil palm and other trees.16 The relative availability of E lla, Ugbawka, Nomeh, Nara, Amuni, Nkerefi, and Mburubu. Many of these farmland to household land reflected the stage of development of the town, which * T village-groups are small but some, such as Akpugo, had 25,500 inhabitants in was driven by the requirements of male rural identity and status. ~ 1935.2* Nkanu’s demographic composition also appeared related to the various peLand was more than a simple factor of production, and even during colonialism, ~` riods of Igboland’s role in the world economy. In the nineteenth century Nkanu urbanized men preserved their connections to the earth. It had spiritual significance, . ~ became the bread basket of the palm-belt villages to its immediate south}5 Proxdcfmed one’s social status, and symbolized the solidarity of the community whether = t imity to slave trading routes encouraged the incorporation of slave labor into local "town," village, or household}7 It was the home of the ancestors who, while buried production systems as a supplement to the household. Consequently Nkanu farmin the earth, were still considered present actors in everyday village life. The im- ing communities included a number of prosperous farmer-traders and many vilportance of land for village cohesion was expressed ritually in the prominence of ,.. lages with large populations of slaves. Many villages were highly stratified with the cult of Ani or Ala, the Earth Goddess. Ani was the custodian of the earth and "Big Men" who headed large compounds with scores of wives and many slaves. guardian of human and public morality. Socially disruptive crimes like murder, the 1 “‘ At the colliery both Agbaja and Nkanu were "locals" in contrast to “forcign" Igbo theft of yams, and child stealing offended her and the earth.*“ Every village, ward, _ { from more distant areas.Z° and obi had her shrine which functioned like a town charter and validated a settle- · Q The contrast between the ecology of the two communities—Agbaja and ment’s existence as a legitimate entity. Every myth of origin had the founding fa- A i' Nkanu—was reflected in their economic role in the region. The Agbaja were disther or mother building, the ihu ala, a sacred area., in the village}? Z . paraged for either selling their children into slavery, or for themselves being en- ` A person’s relationship to the land determined one’s status as freeborn or slave. r 2 slaved. At the tum of the century people of Udi district lived in relatively To be considered a freebom person or Amadi, one had to be able to establish ge- ·4 small-scale communities, usually composed of patrilineal clans, devoted to re-

i, 34 UWE %’a All Slaves V, V Udi District an the Eve of Conquest 35 gldllally hasEd aSl`lEultuTE and suPPlElllElltEd by Elaft PTEduEtl°ll· lll tllE vast mar ° ‘ nokpabi, which served a crucial judicial function in disputes between villages. But jority of villages there were no chiefs and there was no precolonial state that united t {hen. saerpjnndieej 1-Ole gave them eeenenne power to Organize and control an in. all of Igboland. Although the precolonial history of Udi is unevenly documented, . J tricatg trading ngtwgyk that spanned southeastern Nigeria, dla-l EVldEllE° llldlEatEs that thE supply of slaves alld Pallll Pmdudts ful tl’lE Wdlld I V The Aro were very active in Udi, which was the northem sector of their trading lllalltEt Ptutuuudly shaPEd loeal Edlldltldlls lll Ways that tacllltated the mcmluhcut t IU system and an important source area for slaves. It was their network that processed of '·l¤sldllEd labor. alld set tllE staSE ful VldlEllt Edlllllut di-u‘lllg thE colonial PEll°d· ` I most Igbo slaves for export. Arc colonists operated from several settlements—in Migration features prominently in the tales of origin of most villagesroups and V · lake, Ntegbe-Nese,37 and Umuaga in Ashaja, and the Nike and Nara viiiage-grcups the association of movement with self-improvement was an important part of Igbo gt of Nka_nu38..and {rem [his vantage point near the cenrrnei-cial nerve center of the Eultul'E·27 Tllls had signilieant lmPllEatl°lls fol thE lat’°l' PattEllls df the llldustly· , ` regional economy they gathered intelligence on piices, brought in imported goods, This migration meant that the peoples of the area were in constant contact, and n and purchased Slaves 0l°tEll Edllfldlltat-ldlli Wltll thEll llElghbdls Wlth Wlldlll tllEy EdlTlPEtEd tdl lalld·ZS This r · All of the prominent merchant farmers, who would later work as labor recruiters struggle for resources may explain the strong lgbo ethos of individual and village ` 3 for thc ccuicry, were in scme way associated with the Arc. At the time, the Aro competition and a persistent personal aftiliation based on regionalism, vvhioh is _ still retained interest in impoverished Udi as a source cr slaves both rcr use as labor proieoted llltd tllE llldustly as Elall ldE¤tlty· t f for the domestic market and as sacrifices at funerals. Even as late as 1916, Ede Ani High population densities eneourazed the development of a large group of skilled L Q Chikiri, a wealthy merchant in Nara, South Nkanu, was caught supplying slave nonagrioulmral producers, traders. blaeksmithsr and religious funetionaries They 1 ‘_. women to the Arc for sacnncc at funerals cr prominent men throughout ighniana i fostered a culture in which itinerancy became an adaptation to productive and eco- 2 and the Delteds logical E0llstlalllts· ThE migratory PattEl'lls El Udlls TllalE lallll lab°lEl’s dt Within Q The socioeconomic impact of the trades became generalized throughout Igthis lTl0l'E BEllEl'al PattEl'u fdulld ElsEWhElE lll lglldlalld- " boland’s intricate commercial networks which were rooted in ecologically diverse ThE Ellgllls df lglldlalldls lllV°lVElll€l’lt lll thE slave tl`adE aIE dbsEul'E· HOWEVER Q production systems. Social goods circulated through intricate commercial networks _ `there is some evidence that it preceded the New World sugar revolution of the mid- j in Whieh periodic mgrkgtgjw usually held on one day of the four-day or eight—day · tr;sEVElltEEllth EElltul'y·29 l-ll the early sEVEutEElith EElltul'y a SPa·u-ish PllEst found sis- Igbo week, were found in every village-group.‘l These markets framed the Igbo l. f ., ' mlieant numbers of lhos among the slave population in Peru- By the eighteenth , . week and created a temporal context rei thc work rhythms ofthe ecai industry. The oenturyr evidenee of Igbo involvement is more substantiated- During the peak pe- li market day was an indigenous day cr rest that ccnhicten with the industrial week riod of expansion of the Atlantic slave trade, between 1700 and 1800, Lovejoy es- " and stweekendjtdl timates that 832,000 slaves, more likely one million, were exported from the Bight t ¥ The Sgcjgl pr-ice gf the system of slave supply was incr-eased Warfare, deacon. dt Blatlai lgbdlalldls coastal al'Ea·3° Sllllllallya Malllllllg notes that dl-ulllg thE 1780sr r Y ian legal procedures, social insecurity, and the violation of the restriction against llldst slaVEs dEstlTlEd td thE NEW World Ea-lllE tldlll this al'Ea alld Augdladl Oral EVl‘ V ~ enslaving one’s own kinsmen}3 In the Agbaja village of Umuaga, one elder redence confirms that the export of such a massive volume of slaves had a severe l called; impact upon the political and social stability of Igboland’s polities.32 V _ _ _ , , The Exact Conmbnnnn of nnnnncm Igbnlnnd to the general Slave nnnnlnnnn was n j People could sold into slavery for certain offenses, ranging from stealing, difficult tn datnmnncl But anecdotal Evidence and local traditions Suggest that it ‘ n adultery, 1nab1l1ty to pay debts and contravemng some sacred laws. But some was Significant. Old Cnlnbnl, and Bonny were the main Pons of Smbnnknnnn and ,· people who werenm great need of money could abduct onnisecredyr not minding hath pulled slaves from the Igbo hinterianci. In sierra Leone, Sigmund w. Keene, , . lt °¤° was a '°la“°“ 0* “°‘· md s°ll hui ‘° Sl’*“" *‘s€““· a lllllEtEEllth·EEhtul’y missionary. tuulld sEVETal “AbadsllaV’ EEa¤lE aedve lll tllE British at>°ll· l l; pliiied commercialized social markers of male status and prestige. All men were tldlllst lll¤VE¤1E¤t·34 f Y influenced by their consumptive habits which conspicuously incorporated imported The involvement of Igboland in the slave trade is associated with the emergence ,. n ggodsfts They used slaves as both s labor for-ee and as prestige "goods" to indicate dt thE Are PE°PlE as a PuWEl’l=ul Ecdlldullc l0l”EE lh thE lllld·sEVElltEEllth EElltuTy-35 ` , sccia-pciiticai status. This was the context in which village men constructed "masFrom their capital at Arochukwu, the Aro designed and operated an internal slave , culinityp . llla-lkEtlllS systElll whioh dlgall-lZEd thE suPPly dt slaves TOT tl'lE Atlantis slave tTadE >r The accumulation of wealth in Udi was more pronounced in Nkanu than in landlh sEuthEastEl'll NlgElla fldlll l650 td the mld·lllllEtEEllth EEllt'ul”y aud thE d°lllEs· ` starved Agbaja. There merchant/farmers augmented their kinship units with large tie market thereafter·“ They were custodians of a powerful oracle. Cltakwu lbi- i ‘ siavehckiinss. Access to household and slave labor allowed wealthy men tc he

V 36 i "We Were All Slaves" l/di District on the Eve uf Conquest 3 7 51 come successful farmers, or dvi, growing the numbers of yams necessary to take i 7 some whom they settled in satellite villages to protect from Igala attacks from the the prestigious yam title, Eze ji, or Yam King."6 There were a number of such , north.5" wealthy men in the southemmost areas of Nkanu, and, to a lesser extent, in Ag- ` · Concurrent with the ascent of merchant capitalists was the emergence of a milbaja. In Nara, an Nkanu village-group to the south, a junior but prosperous ward , itary elite which defended communities against the kidnappings by slavers and war of the village-group had become wealthy in people and influence. It was their pa- * ` f ravages of Aro allies59—the Abam, Ohaftia, and Ada Igbo-—who cut broad swaths triarch, Edeani Chikiri, who had over eighty wives and several hundred slaves. He ` p of terror across northem Igboland, attacking Nike, Agbaja, and several towns northsuccessfully convinced the British that he was the "traditi0nal" leader and was ap- , west of Onitsha in the l89Os.6° In Udi the associated violence heightened the sopointed a colonial chief.47 Similarly in Nomeh, a neighboring vil1age—group, one > cial insecurity of the period. Both Agbaja and Nkanu areas were shaken by this wealthy but junior patrilineage had seized judicial functions in their town using p , violence. their large number of slaves as enforcers, and exploiting commercial cormections _ ¢ Communities in the southern parts of Nkanu were confronted with yet another with the Aro slave dealers to whom they sold offenders."$ None of these new lead- ; Q threat. The Ezza, a militaristic lgbo group from the Cross River area, were ex. ers nor their lineages would have had social rank under the old system that privi- _’ panding westward into Agbani’s farmland. For them the tum of the century was a leged age. Yet, as the reality of their economic power and consequent numerical i t period of agricultural expansion stimulated by their unique farming techniques.61 superiority made an impact on village politics, they were consolidating power. _ It was their pressure on Agbani, their neighbors to the west, that encouraged the 4 After the conquest three such men became wealthy colonial chiefs by supply- · if ascent of military men as leaders. Among the Ezza, military values and mores were ing conscripted labor for the railway and government colliery. Some were part of V _~ encouraged, and young men were schooled in the military arts throughout their * a spiritual elite, men whose families controlled the performance of certain rituals . » youth.6Z that shaped the political process in Igboland. The fact that all were tied into the . Q Wealth and proficiency in war were often related. Rich men purchased gms and slavet trade suggests the pervasive nature of the trade, its denigration of public r · ammunition, attracted dependents through lending money and other resources, and morality, and the importance of slaving for accumulation in the area. All had large ` V 9 acquired a number of slaves through war.‘3 This militarization influenced cultural households of wives, slaves, and other dependents and were powerful in their own " life and was articulated in the valorization of military skills as a component of rural right. The first mine workers in 1915 came from near Onitsha, through Eze Okolie, = masculinity as well as the rise of "head hunting" as a symbol of virility. These were . an Ogaranyan, who was a wealthy dibirz, or priest, and from Owerri through Chief ` jg even expressed in the performance arts.“ J .0. Njemanze.49 While locally, Chukwuani Nwangwu of Ozalla, whose family t The second phase of the area’s integration into the world market came with the were Ani priests, and Onyeama Onwusi of Eke,5° a prominent slave trader, sup- ‘ T palm tradeQ With the decline of the slave trade in the mid-nineteenth century, Udi ` plied the mines and railway with men from their villages. The role of colliery re- — became the northern sector of a new regional economy focused around the supply cruitment in enhancing these chief ’s personal power will be treated in the next p { of palm kernels and oil. This new economy built upon existing merchant elites, exchapter, Their ability to benefit from the colonial economy attests to the resilience _· ]_ panded family-based production to incorporate large numbers of slaves, and furand adaptability of precolonial commercial elites. . ther commercialized the local social structme, gender hierarchies, economy, and ln Udi, Nike became infamous as an important supplier of slaves to the Aro.5l V; political processes. In a type of ripple effect, while villages in the pahn belt conLocated on the northern fringe of Udi near the Igala people, they traded slaves from ~ centrated their productive capacities to the harvesting and processing of palm fruits l the Igala, a non-lgbo group to the north, in exchange for horses.52 They were al- _ V and oils, communities to the north, especially the villages in adjacent South Nkanu, lies of the Aro and located at the crossroads of two slave routes from the north.53 ` i I put new resources into the production of food to supply them. Men with labor reSimilarly in Umuaga, Agbaja founded the largest market, Nkwo Agu, to supply p ‘ sources and fertile or proximate fields were able to benefit from this new market. the slave trade. This market was surrounded in treachery. An elder recalled: ~ j For lgbola.r1d’s poor the "legitimate" trade did not end slavery but, by stimulating me mum not go to mother t0Wn,S Sector of the market Without being led by an V .2 the internal market, actually increased it. The wealthy, on the other hand, profited armed elder Any lapse in this protection might lead to [a] person’s enslavement.5" . colgzgfgléxlilids Change was represented in the popularizamm of the “B_g C . , 1 omA kidnapping by one village would surely evoke retaliatory war by the victim’s ` ‘ pound" which became a powerfulideal of patriarchal aspiration. 'Ihe "Big Comkinsmen. The special skills in warfare brought new families to power in the Nkanu ’ Q_ pound" was the household of a prosperous or powerful man whose many wives, village-group of Agbani where a skilled warrior was elected leader and became “ children, clients, and slaves gave him an inordinate degree of influence over vilcaretaker of the shrines associated with war and hunting.55 With assistance of mer- Y _; lage affairs, and enabled him to control vast amounts of labor—power. In addition €€l'l&1'i€S from the Ada and Ohaffla viHages,5° Nike waged W3rthI011gh0¤tUdi at- i 2 to the appropriation of his family’s labor-power, a man could purchase and work tacking Agbaja village- groups and selling prisoners to the Aro.57 Nike retained ;¤ slaves. Slaveholding became an important characteristic of wealth. Because he had

.,. 38 "We Were All Slaves " ‘ `. Udi District tm the Eve 0fC0nque.rz 39 ` a large household, he was entitled to large farmland allotments and he could pro- ? THE CHALLENGE OF THE SLAVE AND PALM TRADES: SOCIAL duce large surpluses.65 ` ” STRATIFICATION AND POLITICAL EXPERIMENTATION The slave household had to work for the owner at least one day of the four—day ; ~ , , , _ _ , ini, week. During the weeding an harvesting periods, ne women nie eiiiitiren 2 t The ¤¤¤·*¤¤¤é ¤f¤·S¢¤¤¤ty andthe PWC? ¤f*he¢P¤V11¤ged wps Cheofthe slave household worked beside their treenein counterparts. Masters also de- t , ; l°“g°°‘ “‘° "°‘y ‘d°°'f’g‘°sl ““d°‘T"‘“““gs °f ?"“sg? g°"?“““°“‘· OV? sy"‘°“°° . rnanded a portion of the food crop produced by the slave household on the portion I I suggests that many y‘“sg°“g‘°“Ps were llxllillllilcnllllg wlllll new Pollllcal fOmls` » of their masters, fmnland designated for their use-66 . , The ascent of the Ogarartyan forced a flexibility in the "trad1t1onal” goveming sys— A second source of labor came from informal ties the “Big Man" developed with l' lem O acFOmm0dalc,lllCll emergence llS_llll lmpolllllll ccollomlc f°lc°' This mma clients through the extension of favors, or lending of money or land. At the lower K camllg lime was msllllclcd flllm full Plllllllcal léallzatloll by the Older lgbo Pollllcal ranks of Udi society Wm, the mom mlmcmus POOL mh Ugbmyg) who Wm Often i ~ $l’$t€m1B-WI11€I'1§€?¤1Fil position, prestige, and influence were based on age, While reeeeii by destitution to etteen themselves ts the pevvei-rni men in the village. Many t< s ?"“"g°"y""‘ d°‘?‘s‘°“s Wsss msds by su f‘°°'s°'“ “‘°“ and ,sg°°‘ "“°“"’“ “‘°sF‘“g became obligated to these men and were forced into relationships of dependency. ; in C0uHCll’ ‘h°.“°‘"P°1“‘ Of? Wlsa elder was glvcll more wclghl all that Pl a·Illll_ ° This allowed these "Big Men" to extend their political iniiuence among various , lol Despllc lllll Vellclalloll sf age as soclal slams} lgbll s°°‘s‘y plllllillllcd all families in the village, who could be called upon to work during periods of need.67 I I tcl-Pl-lslllg mem lcgzlldless of lllell age’ to Valldlllc lllcll Wealth and glllll lllllllcllcc Since the most intensive demands for labor were episodic, these could be fulfilled ~ and pollucal aulhollty , , _ , , ‘ in the Short mm by Such dcpcndcmsl , i The slave and-palm trades created a complicated process in which tradiuonsof J The trade in palm kernels and Oilplaccd cxuaordmary demands On f m_m1y_bas€ d . broad-based political participation coe>usted,.w1th considerable difficulty, with productive systems and, without a market in labor, slave labor was one of the major sharp ccomllmli md Smilill lllemlclllw Igbo pllllllcal Systems Obscllvcd ccmllll Fusways that merchants could augment household production. The processing of these ‘ J tommy govclrmng lmdlllolls that logcllllil f°““sd a bsdy of Oclally llcccglllzcd fruits, rei betn eii and kernels, wss exceedingly labor intensive. Btnii sente from ‘ ¤ ‘“°‘“s· P“‘°“°ss· md f°““s °f °°“'s°‘*¥""y· Tlssss "‘““ss "’h‘°*% °°“s“““‘F‘* s sss the Same fruit: the mesucarp was used for Oil and the palm nut for the kemclvsg A il , of values that men attached to leaderslup, affiliation, and collective behavior may thi1_ty_Six pound un of Expormblc Oil required mma to me person/days. Nonhmp 4 . be called "orgaruzat1onal culture? These traditions were not static and in the i notes that at sixty—two tins per ton, it took 10,000,000 person/days to produce the i colllcxl Ollllclcaslld comlllelclllllzlllloll ‘i‘°y_"f°‘° lllldclglllllg °°"si*’s’s*’l° Cllllllg°’ over 20,000 tons of Nigeria’s oil exported to Europe in l863—l864.6° By 1900, this l s Ag€’ as a dctcnlllllam of rank filml the lndlvldual to lhs y‘“?gs‘g"’“P lcvEl’ was amount ned doubled. Thus the history of uni snppsns Lovejoy’s thesis tint the : I ‘m"‘?‘ “sss“I‘ ‘”%“““ s°y°‘s‘ Ush y%“s$°s· T*‘° “‘°"“ "“‘i‘°'“y af °ld°‘ mm “°W ending ofthe trans—Atlantic slave trade setnsiiy stinniisteti internal slavery in ig- t — ‘?q'¥“°d y"l‘d“"°“ F*“°“g‘"‘ s“ ‘“sF‘F““°“ si W°s“h· “?" mls s°°‘°‘y 's“ksd sss°‘ bound-70 _ ciations which required fees. Additionally, in many v1llage—groups the moral and The palm trade continued the Process of mal Smtmcmion in many Udi com 4 ’ spiritual position of the semor quarter of the village paled in comparison to the ponninities. This wss reflected in s number of pisetiees nin associations tiist ieer- s ¥ "“°sI ‘““““?°° mst y°““g°" b“‘ ‘”s"·I““°" yi“sg° ‘*“*“‘°‘s ?°““ °’“"?sss·7l finned status and encouraged both men and, to a lesser extent, women to fullill ~ · One Agbaja eldeln NOD Uda1@sW*=¤ lll l973 was l02’ dcscllbed the Slllfllllg Pap certain hierarchical norms.71 Farming was such an important aspect of rural male l mms. nf zlmholllty lll me lam lllllelcclllll celmllly when mall who belonged to exstatus that no self—respecting man could afford to appear divorced from his farm, i i pcllslvc llllc Soclcucs collmsled the Powell of elders: even when most of the labor was performed by slaves or hired help. His commu- , V , AS time went On, this gmdatiun of authority right from the town to the family nity would ridicule him were he not involved in producing his own sustenance. umn depending on age as the mtmonv gave Way to the authority Of the Wealthy. Thus, Sven ¤¤¢¤ ffem ms w1¤h¤¤¤gf=¤mg¤z1¤¤¤¤ f¤¤¤¤¤1r==¤·=¤_*¤v S<>¤¤a1<=¤¤· ; " .,,In eetenn developed, se test it becameacomrnon feature rei senie ndi isnt ventions surrounding masculinity to farm, no matter how little. Since each fam- ` ani (elders to be forced to take tmesjz _ ily performed its own farm work, only men who controlled large amounts of , t labor-power could grow the numbers of yams required to become Eze ji, or Yam — Despite these challenges the prevailing principles of age rank and authority, enKing, a title which symbolized a man’s expertise in famiing. Therefore, many men sluined in group practice and individual choice, were still embraced by most men aspired to head large households, the "Big Compound," with many wives, chil— ` ~. and women. These principles shaped the men’s responses to colonial governing dren, arid slaves. This sociopolitical function of farming explains the miners’ re- f' structures that erroneously validated many Ogaranyan as "chiefs.” luctance to sever their involvement in the economy of the village, a factor that I The prevailing ideology of Igbo politics emphasized a diffuse political process thwarts managerial control over the duration of work in the coal industry. “ which venerated consensus and consultation at every level of social organization.

40 "We Were All Slaver" Urli District on the Eve qfC0nque:t 41 While aspects of this ideology may have accurately described some political pro- 5 if men did not control equal human and material resources, and all Obi were not of cesses, it was an oversimplification of the complex ways that political power and i equal size, wealth, or influence. Thus, wealthy, successful men did attain political influence were exercised within villages on the eve of the conquest. Specifically, Q influence within these broadly participatory procedures. the ideology does not recognize the power inherent in a person’s ability to influ- i V ence the collietqluve to adoptlliiis point of viezvgn the precolfomal period, rglith few — A JFARMI NG AND ECOLOGICAL CONSTRAINTS exceptions,. ere were no ngs or evenc e s in most vt age-groups. e exer- Q ON MASCUUNE STATUS ACHIEVEMENT cise of political power was shared by various corporate groupings and councils of . men, and sometimes women at multiple levels. Executive powers were exercised . As many men aspired to be Ogamnyan they stimulated a dynamic in which land by title associations, expensive ranked organizations composed of influential men { tenure practices and farming systems propelled Udi into a pre-industrial labor resuch as the 010, as well as Dibirz societies of local doctors and organizations of ji serve. When the area between Benin and Calabar focused on the production for priests who administered oaths and maintained shrines.75 Additionally, most vil- _ Y export of the raffra palm, elaeis quinensisfn Udi’s farming systems followed a rolage men belonged to secret societies which appeared masked and enforced social ; tating bush fallow system in which fields were worked only one season in a series control.7‘ Age-grades, or groups of men born during a three- to four-year period, ° of years.“ brought together men from individual families and lineages to perform public du- Y Farmers in both Nkanu and Agbaja focused on the cultivation of the yam, ties, such as policing the village, insuring public morality, and monitoring their ~ Diasccrea cayanensis and D. tundata. It was the most important crop in Igbo farmmembers’ behavior.l7 , » ing and required considerable ritual and technical expertise. This was especially ·* At the village level, all men met in a general assembly (Amrzka or Oha) to de- · r the case in Udi where land fertility was fragile and unpredictable. lt was considcide on the control and regulation of economic affairs, war, peace, and defense, ered a "prestige" crop and produced yields of from 1,500 to 4,000 pounds per and to discuss judicial, administrative, and executive matters. There was little sep- I acre.83 In this respect it was a very efficient crop for areas with scarce farmland. aration of powers as the Amaka made, interpreted, and executed laws. And it was Y gf The yam was a male crop, and legend says it sprang from the head of a male child in the Amaka that a man’s prestige and influence could be politically exercised, ‘ ritually sacrificed in prehistoric times to create food for the community. Only men and where his status could be transformed in political power. ~ ` can perform the rituals that insure its growth.“" . This diffuse political structure valorized a man’s ability to negotiate between var- . y. The fertility requirements of yam cultivation both shaped land tenure practices ious power centers that constituted a political skill. Men who become leaders in the . la and influenced the spiritual life of the village. As a crop, the yam was suitable for Amaka were those who could reconcile different points of view and help the group V. land-deficient areas because it grew under large mounds that could be planted with reach compromise rather than dominate the group. Such a man would be selected r l other crops. However, the yam severely depleted the soil and forced the rigid sysfor the izuzu, a select subcommittee ofthe Amaka formed to discuss a particularly , { tem of rotational cultivation, which were interspersed with frequent ritual interdifficult issue. Membership was restricted to men of prestige, wisdom, and balance. · ventions by men toinsure a good crop. Soil fertility was a severe problem because During deliberations the izuzu selected a spokesman, usually a man of strong ora- I the tsetse fly prevented communities from having large animals whose manure ~ tory skills, a man who “has mouth" and who could present the decision to the gen- ` could fertilize the fields.“5 These constraints created a preoccupation with fertility eral village in a persuasive way.78 Th.is presentation was important because only the V in northern Igboland, leading communities to rely on designated men to make ritAmaka could make the final decision and the collective judgment prevails.79 ‘ ual interventions that evoked sacred assistance to insure farm productivity. AddiOne crucial ingredient of Igbo organization culture which held implications for V tionally, communities used some variation of a rotating bush-fallow system in the rnines’ labor movement was the absence ofthe principle of representation. Al- ` f which fields were worked two or three seasons every four, six, or even fifteen though many levels of the polity selected representatives to confer in larger groups ` r` years.B6 In a system called "block farming," the entire village designated a particthere were real limits on what a representative could exercise on behalf of his con- , ular section of the land for farms that season?7 _ stituency. At the level of the village-group, political issues were discussed by del- Under such conditions the qualitative nature of a family’s farmland played a cruegates from the member villages, but they were not representatives and could not . I2 g cial role in its very survival. Individual growing rights came through the ummuna. commit to a decision without a village consensus. All "town" decisions had to be · Y A just distribution of farmland took into consideration differences in the quality of by consensus of member villages. The only defined powers held by the "town" , land—its fecundity, water, accessibility (distance from the household), all of which concerned the Earth Goddess, Ani, or common market sitesm { affected production. But an ummunris land allocation was determined by village Although all decisions were through consensus of the freeborn, all men were z councils in which merchant/farmers played a prominent role. not equally influential. Consequently, the opinion of all men was not given equal I In Agbaja, where erosion and high population densities made farming precariweight. As noted above, the intemational trade stimulated social hierarchies, all " § ous, men entered specialist non-agricultural occupations and monopolized ritual

42 “W" were All Slaves H i A Udl District an the Eve 0fC0nque.s! 43 kriewiedge and oraft $Peeiai—iZai?i0ri·8S Women were asS°°iat°d with Othcr varraurs ’ . payment, while in others it took the form of labor service by the prospective groom of yanrs, whioht Whilo having a lowor statust Woro an indisnonsabio souroo of food * no ins future in—laws. In stiii other areas the bride price was only syrnbeiie-een This gondor Specialization dofiootod ihe sooiaty’s dePerider*ee on tho er°PS grown j ntituting a "gift" of palm wine and/or a kola nut—and the signiiicant expenditure by Werner! on e°mP°‘-uid gardens and between i-he Yam m0u¤
44 uw? Wwe All Slaves}, ` Udi District on the Eve 0fC0nquest 45 ;_ control, and appropriation of labour power" that was the "dynamic social princi— I In northem Igboland, the rapid accumulation of wealth from intemational trade { P1? UPON Whi¤h most Pi'€·°¤Pim1i$t Societies in Affica WWE b8$€d-ml Given the ` ncouraged membership in exclusive title societies to become a compelling goal for environmental restrictions on the productive base and the problems of storing 5,. {my [gbg mm md an important means of pgliticgl expression for wealthy menmg wealth, prominent men and women could only symbolize the potential to gener- I i. cmbcrshjp functioned as a way gf testing political aspirams,U° Titled men danced ate it. These representations of wealth took symbolic forms and were converted ` glusivg dances, sat on Special chai;-S, wm-e dl-ess what displayed symbols of status, into symbols of prestige and power. V ` { t d were buried in bigger funeralsm While there were numerous such societies, the i "Wealth" was gendered and historically and culturally specific. Male wealth was ? l ost prestigious in most Agbaja village-groups was the Om tit1e.“2 We have no Y€PF€$€¤T¤d in m9·¤Y SYmb0lic f01`mSi houses. m¤¤Y S0¤S and wives and daughmfsi I · ord of the membership requirement before the conquest, but anthropologists relivestock, voluntary and involuntary titles, yam and cocoyam farms, a large yam l gg ned in the 1920s that in Agbaja membership required a big feast, followed one Store, vbajiym an €Xt€¤$iV€ ¤¤¤€SU'a1 ¤¤mP0¤¤d with S'1¤'0¤¤dl¤g l¤¤d» vsisi NZM » 2 ear later by £2O cash, 100 fowls, another feast, and payment to an Nrim represenand food and cash—crop trees. On the other hand a woman’s wealth was represented Y g t {jvc who pg;-fo;-med facial gqayiiigatign fm- £2 10s,“" 0;;; men were recognized as ` in Ownefship of livestock (fowls, dogs), rich g¤Id¢H and farm yields, many d¤¤gh· sacred elite throughout Igboland because they were considered intermediaries beters whose marriage brought in—laws and presents, and many wealthy influential , 5 can the dead members ofthe descent group, i,e,, the ancestors, and the living. Their Sons. In both respects "wea1th" in “p€1'SOHS” WBS =l¤iH1P01T¤Ilf C0mP0¥1€¤t0f$0ci31 · ves were restricted by taboos and scrupulously observed restriction. They were stams.*°3 Women could take the ogbueji title, the only voluntary title that both men ~ own by their [mhi marks and the regalia of oftice—ared cap, ankle cords, an ivory and women could hold.*°4 Some of these signitiers were actually congealed value ' v Om, and an jym Staff People were forbidden to harm an 0;;; man, to remove his » (the yam store, and titles) while others, wives, and descendants, could produce value. ` all Oy Show my signs gf disrespect "[`hgy held a pmmctcd s;ams_ and it was an abom. In Udi a series of products came to symbolize this form of conspicuous con- j .l ation to kill them or members of their family. Because they represented the ancessumption: cases of imported gin, slaves, Dane guns, and yams.‘°5 Further, a wealthy , rg they were accorded powers to adjudicate disputes, especially over land, to stop man had 16125 Yam hams, ¤6i€l’i¢S of slaves, and many wives and ¤li€¤¥S-[06 These V ghts, and to collect debts.“$ Their homes were a sanctuary and for a fee, one could were all symbols of his actual or potential control over the labor power of others. ` ; , prow some of the insignia to use, when uaveling, as a type of guarantee of safe But the foundation of his wealth was his access to his wives’ productive and re- . ussagg, Om men were politically very injiuemial in the village. , productive capacity. Alarge number of wives signified the appropriation Of a Gon- . The distribution of goods and funds to society members was one mechanism, · siderable amount of labor-power. As they produced children, their labor—power and ` jlqmg with 1if€.4;yq1e ceremonies, for redigtriburjng the social wealth generated by hers became the main factor of production controlled by the householdwl The con- 1 Qbnc household to Othcl-S}16 Some have Evan argued that this and Similgy mdjsmb. straints on reinvestment of wealth were not totally uniform in Udi, but were gen- t give systems prevented the development of a centralized Igbo state,117 erally quite severe, In the Agbaja area, the thin sandy soils and large populations . ,` The Ogg society was strongest in those towns incorporated in the Aro slave tradeliminated expanded agricultural production as an investment of wealth. In the . g network, It was especially powerful in Umuaga, Agbajaflg where by 1900 it Nkélml MBR Wh€1’€ land W6S m0f€ féflile and Well watered, $0I¤€ men did P¤I¢h¤$€ had usurped authority from lineage authorlties.“9 An elder described this process ~ slaves and used them I0 BXPB-Hd fwd P1'0dUCtl0H· ; of status reformulation and economic polarization that followed: . Male Sm-us was Flldorscd pimugh Simlmal md nlawnal achlcvcmcns mn T I In fact, much respect was given to these titled men, who because of their wealth drcated by membership in prestigious societies or associations. These associations I ; ____ _ , validated personal achievement which the Igbo felt was demonstrated by success A ., ` were known as nd! umqdh as aglmst mh égbetye The POOL These mh lvluldz in the mamma world as pcm]-med by the Support of the ancestors, 0nc.S family, V. thenlformed the governing council of the village or town. They took the initiaand neighbors. Membership in these associations conferred recognition of his role ` J me m Caumg mwimgs ed S°°n’ after Some mm` Om élders were hapljy to ba . . . . ¤ called to such meetings without any efforts to show the influence of their age at in furthering the interest of the ummuna as a whole (1.e., both ancestors, present , ; _ , _ _ _ _ , _ _ . members, and others yet to be born). In some respects these associations reflected , ~ Such m°?°tmgS` During dehbcllauons m the govammg council of hdl amadh the ~ the n1an’s reoccu ation with a cons icuous dis la of affluence. The dis la of " Suggestion made by an amd; was more agreeable to those present than that of PPPPYPYA. Wealth in Symbolic farm was an indication of the limited Opportunities for min_ I ¤ a poor elder, no matter if he was the eldest. I do not mean that we now have two . . . . , separate goveming councils. But what I am telling you is that even though the vestment of the surplus in improved systems of production. Such wealth, often _ , _ _ _ _ _ , _ . r. . ,, . ’ nd: zsh: am summoned meetings, the views of the rich titled men are more readgenerated by trade and farming, was therefore displayed in ways that brought p, _ _ _ _ _ 120 prestige to the man, his abi, and ummuna. Because material success indicated the , uy accepted B°th mh and poor Sun amended the Council m€etmgS' sanction of the ancestors to one’s neighbors it was an impressive display of po- . i Wealthy merchants could sometimes assume the Eze title, perhaps the closest {Emi?-1 Of mma-l P0W<`¢F-108 ` ilcgitimate office to that of a "chief." It connoted leadership of a community and

46 "We Were All Slaves" l` Udi District an the Eve 0fCorrquzrt 47 was "awarded to the man who, [had] good character ... the right lineage" and 1 p cific qualities, served to sanction certain social practices by suggesting divine in"cou1d fete people and pay expensive fees to elders."m Found mainly in Onitsha 2 tervention. Most masquerades were played by men, even those that were explicProvince the Eze, according to Jones, was a"convenient way foraself—made leader 4 . itly "female’° and certain cults, such as Oda, and Omaha, had as their explicit . . . to consolidate his position as village group head by converting it into traditional ` function to discipline and subjugate women.*3° office." In many areas only men descended from the original founder of the vil— , One ofthe strongest signifiers of masculinity was Ikenga, amultidimensional conlage could hold it}22 But in Nkanu such positions of leadership "were reduced to , I cept that was a shrine, symbol, and an idea. The public fomr that lkenga took was a a minimum" and political leadership was exercised through the senior grades, or ` mask, usually carved from a strong "male" wood. It depicted a virile man with homs, the oldest man of speciric, often senio; liniages. f Ih kp th _ _? holding a long-bladed knife in one hand and a severed trophy head in the other. The But in South Nkanu areas, such as t e vi age-group o uo ara, e Igajji, or ` mas symbolized a series of qualities that are valued as "manliness." The face was "Tying Cloths" title was the highestm While most titles required higher fees to ~ ‘ usually scarred with ichi marks, that symbolized the prestige of title taking, and the reach the upper more influential grades, not all titles were based on money. This ` ability to endure the pain of the facial scarification. The knife symbolized action, t was the case with the South Nkanu horse killer or Obu Anyimz title, or headhunt— { willpower, and decisiveness, while the severed head meant hard-fought achievement. ing societies, another reflection of the militarization of culturem lv i [kenga masks usually had ram horns, but could have also been carved with two proOne other type of title society had some relevance for the labor strategies of j truding eagle feathers. The rams exemplified aman`s ability to stubbornly launch an local men in the coal industry. This was the society of the yam kings, Eze ji, an as- · 1 attack on a difhcult problem until it was resolved, and his ability to endure pain. But sociation of the most successful farmers in the community. This title reflected the t the ram's aggression was usually a last resort, and a good man would fight only when » ritualization of agriculture,"5 a condition arising from the importance attached to _ necessary, exercising restraint when confronted with a problem. The eagles were a the soil, as the resting place of the ancestors and domain of the spirit-force Ani. It ` "metaphor for forceful, heroic men of accomp]ishment."*3l emphasized the spiritual qualities of the "male" yam, njoku or ihiejicku, and the .. `» Ikenga were owned by male cults, individual men, and occasionally by women. material role that yam played as the main sustenance for the Igbo. This ritual aura { The cult itself encouraged these traits among its members. Young men acquired an extended to farming itself, and, contrary to the colonial allegations of the "lazi- ` ? Ikenga at marriage and at subsequent periods in their life cycle when they accomness" of Igbo men, farming was a respected profession. · plished an important feat. , A series of rituals dictated how the yam was grown, handled, and eaten.126 A r` it The wealth generated by the slave and palm trades sharpened the contradiction man became an Eze ji because of his agricultural knowledge, large labor supplies, i E between personal achievement and social responsibility. While the society valued and alleged support from the ancestors that enabled him to produce large surpluses { { individual success and achievement as a compelling norm, individual success came of yams. To become a member he had to feed members of the society for a prede— . through human interdependence and reciprocitym It was only possible if one had termined number of days and pay the required fees.m In 1920, entrance required Q moral strength and the support of the ancestors and the community at large. Cona thousand "g1·owing-sticks" of yams.'28 The prestige of this title was projected po- , , sequently, a man had to assume responsibility for helping the common good. One litically because these men could sanction political decisions with their religious `~ l L way of attaining prestige, respect, and fulfilling reciprocal obligations was by authority. Their success, which signified the support of the ancestors, gave them » t Y, helping others to “get up," a recognition of the interdependence of human life. But considerable influence in village council meetings. _, the benefits of being a socially responsible and generous male, in the final instance, Masculinity was not just physical but also moral.”9 Many attributes of Igbo mas- 3 ~ — resulted in individual power, personal wealth, and prestige. culine power did not differ significantly from those of middle and working class ,` ` These contradictions in Igbo male values were further sharpened with the inmen in Western societies: aggression, perseverance, stoicism, restraint but deter- ` i { tervention of British rule. It was then possible for prominent men to accrue indimination, achievement through hard-fought effort, bravery and courage, etc. Men ~r t vidual prestige and "ignore" their social responsibility to the group. These were expected to help the less fortunate with resources from their household as · * contradictions produced two tendencies: an extreme competition for personal well as sponsoring some development project in their village. Either practice, which ` V achievement on the one hand, and a "concern" for the position of one’s family, vilredistributed resources within the community, earned one notoriety as a "big man" ‘ { lage, and village-group on the other. The political consequences of this tension will and benefactor. But such benevolence was not just male "generosity." Assisting 2 be discussed in the next chapter, when such prominent men became colonial others also established important ties of obligation and dependency that "bought" . ° "chiefs," inventing a tradition of govemance at odds with the underlying princithe support of the recipient in the many political coniiicts and contests in village i I ples of lgbo political organization. politics. These political benefits were not of small consequence in village politics i during the colonial period. They were very pervasive qualities that were symbol-, i The social repercussions of the slave and palm trades were felt throughout Udi’s ized in art and ritual. Masquerades, in which men wearing masks acted out spe- .; i various village—groups. For men, it created new requirements for social maturity

48 "We Were All Slaves" — lt Udi District on the Eve 0fC0nquest 49 and the desired goals of social mobility, The stakes were especially high for the ` t uments. See R Amaury Talbot, The Peoples afSauxhem Nigeria, 4 vols. (London, new ediogbenye (poor), who shared with wealthy men a compelling desire to enhance sta- f UGH, 1969); G.T. BaSden,Am0ng the lbos 0fS0urhem Nigeria (London, 1921); Ibid., Niger mS_ For Agbajys young men, status attainment appeal-Gd difflculn if not impossi- » » [bas (London, 1938); C.K. Meek, Law and Authority in a Nigerian Tribe (London, 1937), bla Because of their poverty in land and resources they could not many ‘ L This latter study was conducted following the "Women’s War" of 1929. The research was The acquisition of wealth, status position, and prestige were important factors ` °°'Td"°°8d during l9?0‘193l and did mt "f’m“·uY "°““f“’ mm P°“h°m Igb°1m'*d» §¤=1¤behind worker agitation in the Enugu mines. These values were rooted ih a pre- ‘ t gg1;;·;¤;¤·= mj mmcs' ITI°}iV°Y?r’ Talbm S Study' which sp°°1H°aHy “°t°s Agba-la md industrial rural ethic, but they were strengthened by participation in a capitalist i J Bl i.h;iEu:,;n¤il?;2{|;;r§;?g§;§`symbcll The names Dftwo Such med women appear lndustry Thls P}'°‘?°SS Suggests that the P’°l°*”‘amZ“P°“ thcsls Hlay be an m` J g ln a recent history of Udi district: Akuenyi Nwofor (Oforama) and Uzodimma Ozobu. Inadequate and hmltcd comicln E0 4¢¤1>¢¤ Ufsfmdf Sfudigs in Igbv Hisfvfy and Cullum (Lagos, 1981) S0Ci0_pO]itiCal change and Economic u.ansf0H.nadOn_ These processes were fm. {mm { ri 12, Ibid., 4; Herbert M. Cole and Chike C, Aniakor, Igbo Arts: Community and Cosmos _ peaceful, as development seldom is. Old political mores were being challenged by ` ~ (LDS A"ge1°S’ 1984)* l" * the realities of an insecure present. Adjustments in political structures and gov- 1 Sole xd Amakm-’ [gb') l' 1 th _ eming processes were being made to satisfy the insatiable needs of a mercantile ·' f ` S Wil mnxsfeeazhgbo culfm-e’ gr? ls ml agreement °u,the exam pammcms elite rooted in both the past··and present export economy of the region. These new r` ° ummwm n Cen S lm g (ZW . csc dc mmm is used ab°Ye’ is Uchendu who Says _ _ _ _ _ V V (hm. the ummunu is a Hurd term that in its smallest sense means children of the same father °mcS· Whcsc legitimacy was far from €m"€nch€d· Wém especially recfzptlve to col' ` " but different mothers; in its widest referent is the patrilineal members, real or putative, whom l¥ib0f&U0\’1 with the l'l€W ¤0l0i118l I'¤l€1‘S 35 PKFUIEYS IH the system of indirect Yule- r F one cannot marry.“ Victor Uchendu, The lgbo of Southeast Nigeria (New York, 1965), Many would become the tirst generation of "col0nial chiefs" whose services would I » 39-40, ` ~ be indispensable for the recruitment and control of the coal industry’s workers, V Q 15. A.E. Afrgbo, "Southeastem Nigeria in the 19th Century," in History of Wesretjrica, Their involvement would introduce all these issues concerning masculinity and ~ gg VOL 2, Zd ed., ed. J.F.A. Ajayi and M. Crowder (New York, 1974), 535-36, stratilication into the mines. L t 16* Ibid` 17. Aniakor, "Igbo Life, World View and Cosmology," Genéve Afrique 21, 1 (1988). 100. F ’ 18. Forde and Jones, Ibibia-Speaking People, 24-26. » ,, 19. Uchendu, The Igba 0fS0uzhcasr Nigeria, 96. ‘ 20. This analysis is an interpretation of Horton’s conclusions about the foundations of ` uulidarity in slave villages in the Nike clan area of northern Nkanu. W.G.R. Horton, "God, NOTES E Man and the Land in a Northem 1'bo Village Group," Africa 26 (January 1956): 23-25. 21. Phillip A. Oguagha and Alex I. lkpoko, History and Ethncarchaeology in Eastern 1. Interview with Thomas Noisike, Agbaja, Udi Division, Enugu, 7 June 1975. _ 1·Nlgeriu: A Study oflgba-lgalzz Relations with Special Reference ra rhs Anambra Valley, 2, David Eltis, Stephen D. Behrendt, David Richardson, Herbert S. Klein, eds. The Y ;, [Cambridge Monographs in African Archaeology 7 (Oxford, 1984), 239-40. Trans-Arlanric Slave Trade: A Database an CD-Rom (Cambridge, 1999). J f 22. A village-group is a cluster of villages that claim to have been founded by the de3. Frederick Cooper, "Work, Class, and Empire," 236. _ _: sccndants of a common ancestor. Therefore the village-group of Ngwo, for example, will 4. Keletso Atkins, The Munn Is Dead! Give Us Our Moneyf, 6. ‘_ V bc composed of several villages, each with a legend of origin attributed to a son or daugh5. This debate is summarized in several of the essays in A.E. Atigbo’s Graundwurk in ; _` ter of the founder of Ngwo. ' [gba History (Lagos, 1992). o 23. David Smock, Conjlicz and Control in anAfrican Trade Unian:A Szudy afrhe Niger6. There is a rather extensive literature of slave ship captains’ correspondence as well Q Q'- lan Cnal Miners’ Union (Stanford, 1969), 18-19. as missionary accounts. For a recent interpretation of these sources and a new analysis of t 24. NAE, "Intelligence Report for Agbani—Akpugo," 1935, 4. the Huancial infrastructure of European-African trade relations see Paul E. Lovejoy and I {V 25. Robin Horton, “The Ohu System of Slavery in a Northern Igboland Village-G·roup," V David Richardson, "Trust, Pawnship and Atlantic History: The Institutional Foundations of / _` Africa 24 (1954): 311-36. the Old Calabar Slave Trade," American Historical Review, 104 (2 April 1999): 333-55. 26. The latter, the first colliery workers, hailed from Owerri in centrall boland or Onit— 7. Several of the major ethnographic studies were based on research conducted in the · " `IllE1, the large commercial center on the Niger. Both areas had experienceii earlier contact late twenties and have been treated as contemporary accounts rather than as timeless doc— V with European rule and integration into the world economy, and came to the colliery with

50 “ We Were All Slaves" ` { Udi District on the Eve of Conquest 51 marketable skills honed in industrial missions and church schools. They saw themselves as _ _ 39. Mrs. A.H. Richardson, "Account of the Pioneer Work in the Agbani Area of Nigeria more "civi1ized" than the locals whom they disparagingly called "wawa,” or backward. , " undertaken by the Reverend Arthur Humphrey Richardson of the Primitive Methodist Mis27. This is the case for many of the village-groups in Udi. See NAE, Onprof 8/1/4740, ~ sionary Society, 1916-1920," unpublished manuscript. London: Methodist Church Over"Intelligence Report on the Nara Village Group, Nkanu Clan-Udi Division,” 1934; Ondist { _ seas Division (Methodist Missionary Society), 1976. 12/1/708, "Intelligence Report on the Village Groups of Agbani—Akpugo Group, Udi Divi- ~ X 40. For a discussion of the Igbo market system, see Ukwu’s sections of Barry W Hodsion," S.RL. Beaumont, 1935. 1 _ der and Ukwu I. Ukwu, Markets in WestAfrica (Ibadan, 1969) and Ukwu, "Trade and Mar28. Cole and Aniakor, Igbo Arts, 2. l 7 keting," 647-62. 29. See Alonso de Sandoval, S.J. De Instauranda Aeethopum Salute (Bogota, 1956), a 41. The Igbo have two types of week: the little week, Izu, which is divided into four reissue of Naturaleza , . . de Totos Etiopes, Sevilla, 1627, as cited in David Northrup, Trade Ubochi/Mbosi or days—Eke, Orie/Olie, Afo/Aho and Nkwo-—and the big week, Izu Ukwu, Vlhthout Rulers: Pre-Colonial Economic Development in South-Eastern Nigeria (Oxford, si of eight days, In the big week the four days have the same name, and the second four days 1978), 50-51. Although calculations of the numbers of slaves are actually estimates, Curtin . j end in ukwu or "big." Hence the fifth day is Orie Ukwu (big Orie) and so on. Ukwu I.T. and others estimate that between 1750 and 1810 slave exports from the Bight of Biafra rose ` ‘ Ukwu, "The Development of Trade and Marketing in Ibo1and," and Meek, Law and Aufrom 4,500 to 14,000 per year, ` , thority in a Nigerian Tribe, 36n. 30. Paul Lovejoy, Transformations of Slavery (Cambridge, 1983), 57. L _ 42. The seminal discussion of this process in British labour history is EP Thompson‘s 31. Patrick Manning, Slavery and African Lie: Occidental, Oriental, and African Slave , essay “‘Time, Work-Discipline and Industrial Capata1ism" Past and Present 28( 1967):56-97. Trades (Cambridge, 1990), 68. _ · 43. Some South Nkanu adapted "cleansing" rituals to enable them to sell relatives. See 32. The full extent of this impact, while not adequately recognized in Igbo historiogra- E video interview "Memories of Pain and Loss Project" with Prince Harry Chukvvuani, 8 De‘ , phy, is clearly evident in the interviews in a wide range of communities. See interview with . ( cember 1999, Ozalla, A/EN/NK/1. The Prince demonstrated a ritual involving a sacrifice to Thomas Noisike, 7 June 1975. , 2 a sacred crocodile. 1 am currently directing a video/audio-tape oral history project, "Memory and the At- . 44, Paul Nwaba, oldest inhabitant of Umuaga, Agbaja as quoted in Isichei, Igbo Worlds: lantic Slave Trade: A Pilot Project in Southeastern Nigetia." The regions centuries of in- 2 An Anthology of Oral Histories and Historical Description (Philadelphia, 1976), 76, volvement in the slave trade and sheer magnitude ofthe victims (estimated 800,000 between ‘ i 45, One of the most conspicuous examples of this culture is a series of decaying wooden the seventeenth and early nineteenth centuries) has seared indelible scars in the collective \ Victorian mansions scattered throughout the palm belt. I saw some of these beautifully ramconsciousness of these villages, reflected in the culture, current power struggles and lin- A j bling mansions in the village of Mbieri, Owerri, in 1975. Most were two-story buildings t gering discriminatory practices against descendants of slaves. The key states of ~ i with elaborate verandas and many bedrooms and wings. Iunderstand that a number of them the project are Anambra, Abia, and Enugu. The project is jointly sponsored by the t Q are still standing. [Communication from Dr. Austin Ahanotu, 14 July 2000, Enugu, NigeUNESCO/York University Canada Nigerian Hinterland Project, Office of the Executive . ` ria.] Dean, Faculty of Arts and Sciences, Rutgers University, Rutgers Center for African Stud- _ Q , 46. Adyi had to feed members of this society for a fixed number of days with yarns from ies, Schomburg Center of Black Culture of the New York Public Library, and the Enugu ` ,` his barn, pay fees, and perform certain sacrifices to become a member. Atigbo, Ropes of Historical Documentation Center of Enugu, Nigeria. The tapes are available at the Schom— f Sand, 127-30. The symbols of this wealth were large "yam barns/’ wooden framed strucburg Center, the Alexander Library of Rutgers University, York’s Nigerian Hinterland Proj- ` ’ tures on which yams were tied to enable them to retain their freshness for long periods, For ect, and the Enugu Historical Documentation Center. t E a flctionalized account of the significance of yams, see Chinua Achebe, Things Fall Apart 33. Sigismund Wilhelrn Koelle, Polyglotta Africana (London, 1854), 8. A (London, 1959). 34. Olaudah Equianc was captured in 1756. His Equianois Travels, the story of his ab- - , 47. Richardson, "Pioneer Work,” 122. duction and eventual liberation, was an important abolitionist treatise in the late eighteenth . “ 48. NAE, OP! 1070, "Intelligence Reports on Nomeh," Beaumont; "Village-Groups of century. See Ai‘igbo’s attempt to locate Equiano’s home in A.E. Aligbo, "Through a Glass ., ~ Agbani-Akpugo," Beaumont. Darkly," in A.E. Afigho, Ropes of Sand. ~ t 49. On Eze Okoli, see Amadiume, Male Daughters, 137-40; for Onyeamn, see Mabel 35. Felicia Ekejiuba, "Higl1 Points of Igbo Civilization: Tha Arochukwu Period a Soci- ‘ g Ifejika Okolo, "A History of Eke Community 1800-1993," (unpublished interviews, Owologisfs View," in A.E. Aftgbo, ed., Groundwork of Igbo History (Lagos, 1991), 315. , W erti, 1979). On Njemanze, A.E. Afigbo, The Warrant Chien: Indirect Rule in Southeartem 36. There are a number of studies of the Aro: K.O. Dike and Felicia I. Ekejiuba, "Change " Nigeria 1891-1929 (Longman, 1972), 64, 70, 72; and interview with J ,K. Ohale in Amaand Persistence in Aro Oral History," Journal of African Studies 3, 3(Fall 1976): 277-96; V j wom, Owerri, 9 August 1975. Ohale said that the chief supplied fifty to one hundred peo` Felicia Ekijiuba, "The Aro System of Trade in the Nineteenth Century," pt, 1, Ikenga 1, 1 ` ple in each group to the coal mines. Many would desert when they saw the conditions of — (January 1972);1'bid., pt. 2, lkenga 1, 2 (July 1972); Ukwu 1.T. Ukwu, "The Development Q; ` work., of Trade and Marketing in Iboland," Joumal ofthe Historical Society of Nigeria 3, 4 (1967): 3 ` 50. Onyeama’s grandson, Dillibe Onyeama, wrote the biography, Chief Onyeama: The 647-62. `_ Story cf an African God (Enugu, 1982). Although it is not an academic text, the book is 37, NAE, CSO 26/29601, "Inte1ligence Report on the Ntegbe-Nese Clan, Udi Division, ·,, ‘? nonetheless a valuable, synthesis of oral and archival information on the chief. Onitsha Province,” SPL. Beaumont, 1933, ll, 35-36. Northrup, Trade lrldthout Rulers, 136. ‘> 51. See R. Horton, "The Ohu System? 38, ONPROF 8/1/4740, “Nara Village Group." = _ ' 52. Oguagha and Ikpoko, History and Ethnoarchaeology in Eastern Nigeria, 239-40.

52 "We Were All Slove_g" ` " Udi District on the Eve of Conquest 53 53. R. Horton, "'l`he Ohu System,” 311. i ’ 72. An additional example was Nomeh, where the most junior kinship group, Onoha Eze, 54. Interview with Paul Nwanba, 16 June 1973, in Isichei, Igbo Worlds, 76. ’ became powerful because of its size, numerous slaves (over half their population), and 55. Oral tradition alleges that Eze Nwachi was the tirst man to call Agbani to arms when ` Q wealth. While the senior quarter had ceremonial powers, the opinion of the more junior they were invaded by Awkananu, and was the first to secure a head. He was then elected ( Onoha Eze patrilineage was valued in village decisions, and they were often called upon to leader and the oldest man of his lineage, and became the titular head of the town. His du- settle disputes. They zealously used "their slaves as police to arrest and sell recalcitrant ofties, however, were largely religious. In the past the descendants of Eze Nwachi were ex- ~ fenders? Onprof 8/1/4740, "Nara Village Group." ecutive heads of the town, and heads of both Ikoro drums and shrines associated with war ` E` 73. Interview with Noo Udala, Umuaga, Agbaja, 19 June 1973, cited in Elizabeth Isichei and hunting. See NAE, OP/1070, "Village-Groups of Agbani-Akpugo." i , Igbo Worlds: An Anthology of Oral Histories and Historical Description, 73. For discus56. Phillip O. Nsugbe, Ohafjia: A Matrilineal Ibo People (Oxford, 1974), 25-32. j sion of title societies see page 76. 57. One Agbaja slave, Aneke (alias Thomas O’Connor) was kidnapped in 1819 and sold ' Z 74. These exceptions, in the precolonial period, included Onitsha where the Oba, or kingto the Aro who in tum dispatched him to the coast. Koelle, Polyglotta Africana, 8. Y _ ship came from Benin. See Richard N. Henderson, The King in Every Man: Evolutionary 58. Ibid. These communities still exist and are today engaged in a struggle for political I Y Trends in Onitsha Society and Culture (New Haven, 1972); lkenna Nzimiro, Studies in lbo autonomy. They are still discriminated against. See Axel Hamiet-Sievers, “Repercussions I -2 Political Systems: Chieftuiney and Politics in Four Niger States (London, 1972). of Pre-Colonial Slavery in Contemporary Local Politics: The Case of Nike, Enugu State, . 75. See also continuing discussion on p. 43 of this hook. Nigeria," unpublished paper presented at "Repercussions of the Atlantic Slave Trade: The _ 5 76. Elizabeth Isichei, A History ofthe Igbo People, 22. Bight of Biafra and the African Diaspora," Enugu, Nigeria, 10-14 July 2000. , 5 77. Uchendu, The Igbo of Southeast Nigeria, 43. 59. Elizabeth Isichei, History ofthe Igbo People (London, 1976), 82-87. K I 78. Amadiume, Male Daughters, 14. ` , 60. A.O. Arua,A Short History of Ohajia (Enugu, 1952). Also Isichei, History ofthe Igbo ·‘ ` 79. This description is based on Uchendu, The Igbo of Southeast Nigeria, 41-42. People, 81-87. ~ 80. Ibid., 44. 61. Ezza expansion was related to their ecology. Unlike most of Igboland, which had 1 { 81. After the mid-nineteenth century, palm products gained commercial importance durmore rainfall, the Ezza‘s dry climate allowed them to leave mature yams in the ground until l ing World War I, when their glycerin content made them valuable in the manufacture of exthey were used. Thus their planting season extended through most of the dry season. There- , Y plosives. Previously the kemels became an important foodstuff for cattle, especially in fore each individual farmer could produce unusually large supplies of yams by planting seed =` Germany. The development of the hydrogenation process in the late nineteenth century led yams in huge mounds of a cubic yard or more of soil. For this reason, Ezza cultivation was , I lo its use in producing a cheap butter substitute, margarine, for the growing European workexpansive, leading them to seize land from their neighbors. Because of this, military values ing class. Anthony Hopkins, An Economic History of West Ajiica (New York, 1975), 129. permeated the culture. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Ezza were expand- 82. G.I. Jones, "Ibo Land Tenure," Africa 19 (1949), 313. ing to the west, pressuring the Nkanu village group of Arnagunze. Isichei, Ibid., 88-89. it 83. Amadiume, Male Daughters, 29. 62. Ibid., 87-91. U J 84. Ibid. 63. R.E Stevenson, Population and Political Systems in Tropical Africa (New York, » 85. Afigbo, "Southeastem Nigeria in the 19th Century," 451. 1968), 199 as cited in Amadiume, Male Daughters, 56. I i 86. Jones, “Ibo Land Tenure," 311, fn. 1. 64. Cole and Aniakor, Igbo Arts, 30. , ji 87. Uchendu, The Igbo of Southeast Nigeria, 24. 65. Uchendu, The Igbo of Southeast Nigeria, 54. [ Y 88. Ibid., 29. 66. See also Carolyn Brown, "Testing the Boundaries of Marginality: 'I`wentieth- _ 89. The Portuguese brought cassava from America. It became an important food crop beCentury Slavery and Emancipation Struggles in Nkanu, Northern Igboland, 1920-1929," . cause of its drought resistance and high per—acre yield. Despite its utility cassava was conJournal ofAfricart History 37 (1996): 51-80. .—V sidered an inferior crop associated with urban poverty. Ohadike discovered that it spread 67. Atigbo, Ropes of Sand, 129. ` f after labor shortages following the devastation of the Intiuenza Pandemic. D.C. Ohadike, 68. Processing involved "boiling or fermenting the fruit, depulping by pounding or mash- . iii "The Influenza Pandemic of 1918-1919 and the Spread of Cassava Cultivation on the Lower ing with the feet in a container and squeezing the depulped fiber by hand to obtain the oil." Niger: A Study in Historical Linkages," Journal of African History 22 (1981): 379-91. Palm nuts were then allowed to dry and later cracked to reveal the kernels. The production , 5 90. Uchendu, Igbo People, 25. process was gendered. Men climbed the trees and cut down fruit while preparation for pro- , Y 91. Ibid., 24. ' cessing was usually done by women and children. There were two systems of oil produc- ‘ il 92. Aftgbo, "Southeastem Nigeria in the 19th Century," 450-51. As with many aspects tion. In one, which produces "soft” edible oil, most labor was performed by women while { of Igbo culture, the farming practices varied with the village—group. "[’his is a general dein the other, for "hard" oil, most was done by men. Eno I. Usoro, The Nigerian Oil Palm I i ,1 scription not intended to be definitive, but to give some sense of the division of tasks and Industry (Ibadan, 1974), 10. `. interdependence of male and female agricultural labor. 69. Northrup, Trade Without Rulers, 186. - , 93. Uchendu, The Igbo of Southeast Nigeria, 40. 70. See Lovejoy, Transformations of Slavery, 153-58. `. 94. Age grades were broad groups of men who were bom within a certain period. For ex71. See Uzeochi, "The Social and Political Impact of the Eastern Nigerian Railway on _ r ample, one group would include all the men bom between 1920 and 1930. These men would Udi Division, 1913-1945," 212. [ _ remain in this particular group throughout their lives, moving from youth to intermediate

54 "We Wye All $[§vé;" I-_ Util District on the Eve of Conquest 55 to elder. Each group had particular functions and prestige within the village. See Cole and " . 121. Jones, Influence of Chiefs, 16-17. Auiakor, Igbo Arts, 118. ‘ 122. lbid., 17. 95. Uchendu, Igbo of Southeast Nigeria, 86. e Q 123. Talbot, The Peoples of Southem Nigeria, 775, 778. 96. Jones, "Igbo Land Tenure,” 315. The men of Agbaja were known for being black- * 124. lbid., 778. smiths. ` — 125. Ahgbo, Ropes of Sand, 126. 97_ This system of migrant labor, which pyedated o¤]¤nia]ism_ seems to support; Hop. ; L 126. The women’s crop was the cocoa yam which had its own ritual and proscriptions. kins’ contention that an African labor market predated colonialism. Anthony 1·1opkins, An · 1 Th€S¤. however, lacked the prestige of the "male" yam. For a discussion of the gendered Economic History of West Ajiica (New York, 1975), 20. V ¥tllsli11ctions of these yams see Ibid., 127-28, and Amadiume, Male Daughters, 29. 98. Ibid., 96. _ , , 127. Aiigbo, Ropes ofSand, 127-28. 99. Uchendu, The Igbo of Southeast Nigeria, 92. b I L 128. Yams are grown under huge mounds. Above the ground they grow long vines that 100. Ibid., 52. I arc supported by sticks. Hence, a thousand "g·rowing sticks” means a thousand yams, a con101. For a complex discussion of “wealth in people" which creatively uses Marxist tl1e- . D I1<1¢l'ab1¤ bounty. Talbot, The Peoples of Southern Nigeria, 778. ory see Jeff Guy, "Analyzing Pre—Capitalist Societies,” Journal of Southern African Stud- ` j 129. Dunbar Moodie makes this point. Moodie and Ndatshe, Going for Gold, 38, ies 14, 1 (October 1987): 22; Beverly Grier, "Invisible Hand: The Political Economy of Q . 130- Fbf a diS<¤1SSi¤¤ of these rites, see Cole and Aniakor, Igbo Arts, Chap. 4, especially Child Labour in Colonial Africa." Journal of Southern African Studies 20, 1 (1994): 31. 1 24-32. 102. This is a wooden house-like structure to which harvested yarns are tied. This allows ` Y 131- This 1¤t¤1'pf¤tati0¤ of Ikenga is based on my reading of Cole andAniakor, Igbo Arts, _ the yams to be stored until eaten without rotting, as they would if left in the ground. ' 24-34· 103. For a discussion of this concept, see J .I. Guyer, "Wealth in People and Self-Reali- ~ ._ 132.Nwa1a, lgbo Philosophy, 194 and others. Uchendu, Igbo ofSoa;hgqs;Niggyiu_ Chap zation i.n Equatorial Africa," Man (n.s.) 28 (1993): 243-65. f -1; Cole and A11ia.k0r, Igbo Arts, 24. 104. Amadiurne, Male Daughters, 29. l 105. Isichei, The Ibo People and the Europeans: The Genesis of a Relationship to 1906 (New Y`gi'k;wl973), as. 106. In most of Igboland yams would rot if left in the ground and therefore were removed g » during the dry season. As a system of storage they were tied to the walls of a wooden house, 1; ? called a yam bam, where they remained and free from rot until eaten. The larger a man’s l }. yam barn the wealthier he was. f` 1; 107. Jeff Guy, "Gender Oppress' n in Southem African Societies" in Women and Gen- . 2 der in SouthernAfrico, to 1945, . Cheryl Walker (Capetown, 1991), 33-47. — -. 108. T. Uzodinma Nwala, I o Philosophy (Lagos, Nigeria, 1985), 191. j 109. Aiigbo, "Southeaste Nigeria in the 19th Century," 442. 1 t 110. G.I. Jones, Report of he Position, Status and Influence of C hiefs and Natural Rulers ` fe ‘ ~ ‘ in the Eastern Region of Nigeria (Enugu, 1956). ri 111. Amadiume, Male Daughters, 31. » 112. Talbot, Peoples of Southern Nigeria, vol. 3, 775. .` 113. The Nri were the sacred "kings" of Igboland. Historians feel that they were con- ’ `~ V ` uected to the society unearthed in Thurston Shaw’s Igbo Ukwu excavations. They were re- ` .. `f garded throughout Igboland as a sacred elite and frequently performed particular ritualistic functions throughout the region. For further discussion of the Nri, see Afigbo, Ropes of Sand, ` y 0 33ff. , *19 V 114. Talbot, Peoples of Southern Nigeria, vol. 3: 775. ` ' 115. C.K. Meek, Law and Authority, 181-82. , 116. Amadiume, Male Daughters, 29ff. 117. Cole and Aniakor, Igbo Arts, 5. ` ~ 118. This village-group had the biggest market in Udi and it was completely generated M ti by the slave trade. Isichei, Igbo Worlds, 76. i 119. Interview with Paul Nwanba, Umuaga, Udi, 16 June 1973, as cited in Isichei, Igbo J wands, 76. : _ 120. Ndi Ishi Ani were the elderly men. Ibid., 73. , I- ‘

Q "Chiefs, " Slaves, Forced Laban and Rural Resistance 57 i nn opportunity for them to "reinvent" themselves, with more power, jurisdiction, 2 , vi und tyranny than could ever be exercised before. British military officers, who had y , been delegated as political officials, hardly knew where they were, much less anyl thing about the people they had conquered. They were imbued with the power and g` arrogance of the machine gun, and identified "influential men" they assumed to be G 6 C 7 7 S ` chiefs. After all, "all Africans had chiefs" and if they didn”t in actuality, they should S , S 7 have in reality. Thus many Ogamnyan became "chiefs," finding in the embrace of [ . colonialism the powers which their people refused to concede to them before the F L i conquest. g The organizational philosophy that guided the political reconstruction of Ig~ boland was "indirect rule," a concept that incorporated local "men of prominence" S I S T • ` .v in the governing project. This was a partnership of despotism between an outlaw ° j state and the local collaborators that it recognized. Further elaboration would fol’ ‘ low in 1914 when the architect of "indirect rule," Frederick Lugard, came from L . - northem Nigeria and fused the administrations of the north and south according to ` ' , the political model of the centralized, Islamic north. But ruling southeastem Nige» . ria proved to be a "unique" experience fraught with pitfalls and embarrassing outC S B ¥ 2 bursts of local indignation. These outbursts threw into stark relief the weakness of t .. the nascent colonial state, It was difficult to tread softly on local conventions and ` 5 negotiate new contradictions. C S T 9 4 V At the center of the decision to incorporate local leaders into the colonial state I ' was the intersection of labor and the land. Administrators feared that land alienU 9 1 9 1 5 I i ation and sale to expatriate farms for mines and plantations would undermine the ` ~ political authority of "chiefs" in their villages, whose power was allegedly based ~ Q on their allocation of growing rights to families on communal land. Officials asV , sumed that any policy that alienated and sold land undermined the "chiefs"’ pow‘ _} ers and reduced their effectiveness as partners in the preservation of the social , order. This erroneous analysis of "traditional" power relations would not be aban_ , doned until the govemment anthropological investigations following the "Women’s The disruptions of the ttun of the century were insignificant when compared to the g _ War."1 At that time women, who were often victimized by the “chiefs" and court raw violence that introduced Udi to British rule. From 1904 to 1913 the colonial * . messengers, revolted in disgust against the "chiefs" and taxation, and brought down army cut a bloody swath throughout Igboland, forced, by the lack of an Igbo cen- p Y the entire chief system with them. tralized state, to conquer the area piecemeal—village-group by village-group, vil- . In the initial and subsequent periods, much of the "chiefs"’ power concerned lage by village, quarter by quarter. The conquest proved ephemeral as villages V the question of labor—supplying the thousands of workers needed by a state opconquered one month would rise up the next causing the army to retrace its steps erating where no labor market existed. As "Native Authorities," the "cl1iefs" relover and over again. _ ished this new access to the labor-power of their erstwhile neighbors and often But the most visceral and protracted violence of colonial rule was yet to come. — E seized the moment to appropriate it for their individual projects.2 In Nkanu, where ~ It followed the institutionalization of the state on the local level. This was the "in- . G Chukwuani Nwangwu secured an appointment, Ohu or slaves, fell victim to forced vention" of the so-called "Native Authorities," those colonial chiefs whose brief , labor and the endless petty but disruptive abuses of a man made too powerful, too would be the daily and most intimate operations of the unlawful and brutal state. ‘, `I ' soon. While in Agbaja, a more calculating Onyeama coerced his people for state As noted earlier, in Udi there were many positioned to assume this role. For them I projects while seducing them with his patronage? He carefully plotted his ascent wealth from the slave and palm trades had created prestige and considerable po- j t to become powerful paramount chief. litical power. But custom and political culture circumscribed their powers in def- For those so anointed, the tasks of governing were formidable and risky, for deerence to the diffuse goveming process of Igboland. Now, the new state presented ` , spite the military superiority of the state, Europeans were too few when one’s vil-

58 “We Were All Slaves" ( ' "Chiefr, " Slaves, Forced Labor and Rural Resistance 59 lagers decided to end, once and for all, a "chief’s" despotic rule. Thus, while ‘ = trol, and industrial relations at the colliery. Specifically, management responsibil"chiefs" used the colonial state to create far more than customary power, they could ` ‘ ities were shared by a hierarchy of state functionaries, colonial chiefs, and Euronot eam prestige and authority in their villages unless they fulfilled Igbo notions ¤ r pean and "native" staff. Connections between the “native" staff and "chiefs" were of authority. The ability to mediate these two realities was based on the political sometimes personal and intimate, thereby insuring that industrial discipline grew sophistication of the chief, his access to important state functionaries, and the ex- , roots as well in the rural villages, and rural systems of control found expression in tent to which he could fulfill the goals and concerns of his people, The people of I the industry, Relations between the "native" staff and the workers were mutually Udi, more Nkanu than Agbaja, made it very, very difficult for wealthy men called , · hostile because the organization of power in production gave “native" bosses the Ogaranyan to rule, and their resistance limited the nature of "indirect rule.” To i ? same type of predatory autonomy in the workplace as the chiefs had in the village. them the insatiable demand for labor was the most bitter violation of their free- · In one more important respect "indirect ru1e" made its imprint on the industry. dom. They were required to supply it gratis, for long and unpredictable periods, ` { In 1914 officials reorganized many chieftaincies and “Native Courts." The state often far away from their homes, and under the worst of conditions. And usually t arbitrarily grouped clusters of villages into administrative units under a paramount the same chiefs who seized them ran the labor camps where they lived as exten- ‘ i "chief." The groupings had more to do with administrative expediency and the limsions of their "Native Courts," and served as paymasters. In violation of all con- t i its on a district officer’s ability to supervise numbers of villages than any pre-exventions, labor systems, and local regulations, "chiefs" pulled men and women · V, isting affiliation between viHage-groups. Without any scientific knowledge of the into the service of the state. The demand was almost immediate—even as the con- ._ peoples of the area, the state introduced the category of "clan," which, in the Euquest was still in process. People were drafted to carry military equipment, clear ` , i ropean mind, suggested some intermediate social stage between the "tribe" and * roads and streams, and construct govemment rest houses. For those villages that . empire. In one fell, ill-inforrned swoop, colonial administrators transformed Udi fought the invasion, a stint of forced labor was most often their punishment. The , pr regionalism, in which political alliances were fluid and temporary, into a fixed colowork was hard and demanding. It was very difficult to see the difference between · i nial category, "cla.n." A village’s ability to negotiate temporary alliances, of a milconscripted labor and the sl w o struction was promoted as the raison , ' itary or political nature, which was an adjustment to the uncertainties of the d ’étre of the conquest ist impulse of the conquest was nom- i Qi late-nineteenth century, now ended. As a new colonial category, the "clan" initially inal, for consumption ck home and ultimately not real, for state officials all rec- ` ' had little legitimacy, but industrial policy a.nd this reorganization of "native" adognized that the only way to get unskilled Afiican labor was through force. ~ ministration planted seeds of self-identity that were both strengthened and underThe people’s reaction to these depredations was formidable and timely. During i 5 mined by the exigencies of the working class in the mines. World War I when the British opened the Cameroonian front to the east in the fall of Y f' The chapter begins in 1909 with the conquest and subsequent reconstruction of 1914, South Nkanu’s people erupted in a vigorous but doomed outburst of retribu- . Udi. This sets the context for the supply, control, and activism of labor in the mines, tion. For several months, a once cocky Lord Frederick, then Govemor-General, Lu- ` which opened in 1915. It introduces the institutions of "indirect rule," the colonial gard had to concede to his superiors at the Colonial Office that he had no control over ` Q "chiefs" and t.he°Native Courts, and describes their role in recruiting and controlthe area. The railway survey and mine construction had to await the conclusion of ` g, ling labor. The political reconstruction of Igboland occurred in two phases, from "this Udi business."" Chiefs were slain, courthouses burned, and Chief Chukwuani, L 1909 to 1913 and from 1914 to 1930. Each phase had different implications for who had ingratiated himself with the conquerors as a guide through his own villages, ~ · the concentration of wealth and political power in the rural areas, and the develescaped, within an inch of his life. Onyeama, on the other hand, was more successful Q p opment of systems of labor mobilization, control, a.r1d resistance. The first phase in fusing Igbo conceptions of authority with the despotic powers authorized by the { · featured the state’s frantic attempts to stabilize rural society by appointing "cl1iefs" colonial state. He was richly rewarded for preventing his people from joining the fray. I . and using a series of coercive ordinances to force labor into early infrastructural This is the context in which the Enugu coal mines began operations. Their work- ~ projects. In Udi several prominent Ogaranyan embraced conquering armies and ing class was forged in the crucible of violence, social trauma, and imperial arro- . were rewarded with appointments that positioned them to accelerate their congance. Conscripts and prisoners made the first cuts into the earth. Aregime of force, centration of power, wealth, and influence in their villages. The enstung corrupof "colonial despotism," permeated the labor process in the mines and was an- , 5. tion, extortion, and bribery sharpened the contradictions that were already visible chored in the coercive laws and militarism of early colonial rule, This production , in preconquest Udi. In outlining the second phase, from 1914 to 1930, the chapter regime was a racialized system of industrial discipline in which "force prevails ~, i ` focuses on the "early" period from 1914 to 1916 when Lugard’s northern model over consent" and "one racial group dominated through political, legal, and eco- I ` of centralized rural power reduced state surveillance of the courts and pemiitted nomic rights denied to the other."5 The doctrine of "indirect rule” that pushed work- V ‘ an elaboration and intensification of chiefs’ abuses and corruption. ers into the mines was duplicated within the mines as an industrial concept. It " " Britain’s West African policy was still being shaped when the colonial armies structured the daily deployment of labor, the labor process, systems of worker con- ‘ i entered Udi. Anne Phillips argues that until World War I, many in the Colonial Of-

Y A 5* ii "VW MM AU Slaves ” i '_ " Chiefs, " Slaves, Forced Laban and Rural Resistance 6} _ .-·’ ' ` {Ice still assumed that the development of the "tropical estates" could best occur ' divisions between slave and free, prevented Chief Chllkwllalli ffvm establishing efr J 2 ¢hr¤¤sh Private British °aPilal invested ill mining and 3gfi¢¤l¥l1f¤- The implica- . leetive control. But in Agbaja, an impoverished area with a few "Big Men," one ` tions of this policy were the dissolution of communal land tenure, the development ` ’ mam Onygajrna 0hwusi_ successfully prevented his people from rising up. _ Y f of a market in land, and the dispossession of village producers, who would become _ yd ».,~ alandless laboring class. Officials also assumed that a similar process ofproletar— r i NIMAGININGH IGBOLAND: BRITISH RACIAL IDEOLOGY ianization would follow the emancipation of the large slave populations found V » D THE POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION OF UDI ,g' throughout Igboland, but especially clustered in the Niger Delta. But the possibil- — AN ` ity was gradually viewed with foreboding when it was realized that "African work- . ~ The people here apparently before the advent of the Government were an unruly g ers" would be beyond the authoritarian controls of the village chief and the other A A lot of marauders and their so-called Chiefs had little or no iniluence over them. ' political and social institutions that ordered rural village life.“ By 1912 some pol- · V Commanding Ofiicer, West African Frontier Force, 9 November l9l4-8 icymakers feared that proletarianization would generate such far—reachiu social :5 V , . . , . ’ transformations that it would undermine the economic and social stabiliti of the i The image of Afncm In simm was ‘“g°1’§‘“"Y°Q‘ imspc ttl Sulgigiiiig colony. Containing this process might have been beyond the capabilities of the nas- vi n°€dS_s0me¤l?1€s_ mammal Heads` liners 9 mp in E cc U . imc _ ~ · - . . . . . · needs allowed, it might touch on reality, as it did 1n the empirical victory of trop ‘ cent colomal state which, at any rate, coul ot exert the coercion implicit in the t a _ _ , . . il . ,,7 . . · ical medicine. Otherwise the European Afrrkaanschauung was part of a Eurowage relation. The state had, therefo , to rely on the assistance of precolomal ~ 1 h d .t d as {mess to make hm imo the larger l leaders in preserving social order. Si e officials assumed that his political au- il pam Wg msc am'mg` an 1 was Warm my j . thority rested on his allocation of wing rights to families on coirununal land, ` Whole` MY POHCY that ahenamd amhlld and destroyed his P0W¤1' and heme usefulness ` Q The invasion of the Igbo hinterland did not actually commence until 1900. But 35 8 P1\'l1H€1' lil p1'€S€¤dHg social 01’d€1'· I it was mai-ely the culmination of an encroaching colonialism spanning the second While the Spccmc POHCY t°WaIdS communal land and the “€hl€fS” €11l¤H6¥€d DUI i half of the nineteenth century. This intrusion was marked at one end by the estabof Whitehall. it was encouraged by the "man on the spot," the Held ofiicer. It re- = 2 lishhieiit ofthe small British consulate to the west in Eko (Lagos) in 1851, and at ilected less about the social realities of Igboland than a muddled British attempt to ~ `, the other by the termination of t.he charter of the Royal Nigef C0mP6-HY lll l900· build and maintain a rural fantasy that existed only in their imagination. "Indirect { _ In the interim there was the economic recession of the 1870s and the Scramble for rule" was rooted in the "invention of Africa," which incorporated Darwinist con- ` ’ Ah-lca in the 18805, when British merchants on the coast and the staff of the varceptions of social evolution interlaced with Catonist views of rural life, a life at Q y ious "informal" imperial entities became a powerful lobby for imperial expansion. home in England that was swept away by the harshness of industrial revolution. _ Oh the Niger River Sir George Goldie amalgamated the competing British trading For the field officer, "colonial Africa" held all the personal ambiguities and con- ` Y hi-ms into the Royal Niger Company and succeeded in 1886 lfl obtaining 6 €hm€F tradictions about nature and civilization, distorted mythologies and racist eon- i ° that ceded both total political power and an economic monopoly in the lower Niger structions of early—twentieth—century Europe. This "imagined Africa" had no place V i iegiohlu Again the deprecarions indicted on the Igbo peoples on the Niger, in both for an African working class, a "detriba1ized" social strata, strategic and modern 7 t their political and commercial dealings with Goldie’s company, were rationalized in its economic role, and progressive in its political impact on rural communities. ` _- by the eiidiiig of the slave trade and spreading civilization.“ In the anxious years of the Great War, the opening of the Enugu Government . ` Tg the east of the Niger, an earlier "informal" British presence was institutionColliery industry was impatiently awaited by the expatriate commercial commu- 4 it alized in 1891 with the appointment of Major Claude Macdonald as commissioner nity and the Colonial Ofiice as a local source of coal to feed the Nigerian railway ~ I and consul general over a new entity called the Oil Rivers Protectorate. While iniand complete the infrasuructure needed to effect the evacuation of Nigeria’s agri- · tially the protectorate status was defined rather narrowly to include only foreign cultural and mineral exports. Thus, it was with great concern that the Colonial Of- [ control of external relations, by the mid-1890s British colonial officers were definHce watched unfolding events in the industry, and evaluated the competencies of y y ing it to mean "unrestricted sovereignty."l2 local managers and political officers in dealing with local labor. This was the only ` ` In the decade of the 1890s. the protectorate extended control farther inland hy coal mine in West Africa and the Colonial Ofnce did not permit local oflicials to V `( g gradually destroying the sovereignty of all the major middleman trading states in jeopardize this important resource. V V ' the Delta}3 The penetration ofthe interior followed two trajectories to the Cross The chapter pulls together the threads of discontent and unrest that produce the 1 jg and lmo Rivers, both important waterways into p&ll1'l·pf0d¤Ci¤g f€gl0¤$~14 C°¤$Ya·l uprising of 1913/14. The location of the uprising in the slaveholding regions of 1 li British traders applauded the fall of first one, and then ·°1H0ih€1'i wealthy African Nkanu, and not Agbaja, reveals the constraints that communities placed on the pow- f g merchant of the coastal trading kingdoms under the heels of "gunboat diplomacy? *5 ers of colonial chiefs. In Nkanu, a large number of Ogaranyan, and the sharp class y i` Evan when a i-tile; tried to submit peacefully, the British preferred total military

62 "We Were All Slavew l · "Chiefr. " Slaves, Forced Laban and Rural Resistance 63 subjugation to foreclose any semblance of residual civil rights, an important aspect ` tcristics were generalized to all of Igboland. In the discourse of both popular litofthe establishment of the colonial state.16 At the tum ofthe century, the Cross River _ `» orature and official correspondence, the Igbo were the epitome of the "ba.rbaric, area became an imperial preoccupation because it was considered the gateway to ; { uncivilized, immoral Africans" who needed colonial tutelage to protect them from northeastern Igboland, and the citadel of the "noto1ious" Aro slaying empire, ' themselves. It was the "white man’s burden" to save these people and drag them, This expansionism coincided with a new imperialist thrust promoted by Joseph - » albeit "kicking and screaming," into the "civilized" world. Chamberlain, colonial secretary from l895—1903." Charnberlain’s appointment ' Q The punitive expedition against the Aro launched the first full-scale invasion of to the Colonial Office symbolized a new imperial urgency in response to a grow- p ; Igboland. lt Was authorized in latte 1901 after intensive lobbying by Macdonald’s ing German economic presence in west Af;-;Ca_l8 Chamberlain initially envisioned ¤’ V successor, Sir Ralph Moor, consul of the Oil Rivers Protectorate from 1899, aud developing the colonial "t:ropical estatc" with infusions of private capital for plan- ` ‘ the British merchant community in the Niger Delta. In preparation the protectorate tation and mine development. The state’s role would be to fund those crucial and I 1 had·been transferred from the Foreign Office to the Colonial Ofiice, and with the expensive iufrastructural projects s urking behind his advc- ` Q addition of the territories controlled by the Royal Niger Company, was renamed cacy for state—owned railways was a concem that private capital was too ineffec- “ ithe Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. tive to handle such pivotal ventures}9 This skepticism would remain in the Colonial g " The €XP€difi011, launched ill November of 1901, WAS fa! FFO111 conclusive when Office throughout World War I and would influence the ownership of the Enugu , \ it ended the following March.2" The oracle was destroyed and several prominent cclliery, ; A Aro leaders executed, but the British only succeeded in forcing the oracle and slave In 1900, imperial expansionists confronted reluctance among important sectors t market underground. The limited success of the expedition was an omen of the dif* of the British ruling class to support military annexation. Politicians and their sup- , Iiculties to come in the conquest of Igboland, but this was neither recognized nor porters among the manufacturing and commercial classes launched a campaign to ~ heeded. Consequently, for the greater part of the first decade of the new century generate popular support for expansion. One part of this campaign involved cre- Y J the WestAi‘rican Frontier Force (WAFF) was involved in the conquest of Igboland, ating a heinous foe whose removal was imperative to further the interests of British ` ,~ conducting a village—by-village war to "open" the area to British commerce, adtrade and the civilizing mission. The Aro, whose commercial and judicial role in Y ` ministration, and "civilization." As Isichei notes, victory continued to be "curi— the Igbo hinterland had been known to Europeans since the mid-nineteenth cen- Z I ously impermanent" because even after the razing of villages and uprooting of tury, were suddenly maligned as an irupertetrablc barrier to British access to mar- 4 i.' crops, the people "replanted their farms, rebuilt their houses, and failed to apprekets in the interior. They became a 1 it ciate that they were a conquered people."“ , , __ , _, _ _ _ _ _ ` _ The conquest of Igboland was rationalized on moral grounds in the racial pas‘“s‘°‘ {mh p‘¥‘”"* d°*P1y ‘F‘“’l"°d We%1¤V=¤a·*¤·¤»¤¤¤¢¤*u$·¤¤=¤S=¤¤¤ > p, temalism so Characteristic cr this impenaiisne period. British perceptions of the Em-Opggm P€n°tmu°n md Wleldmg very great mnuence Over the pohucs Of wher · s Igbo were shaped by a racial ideology rooted in the technological superiority of states' ·’ t` their society,26 pseudo-scientific notions of racial evolutrion}7 and idealized notions The hundreds of village—groups who used the Aro oracle were characterized as r it of a timeless yet capricious peasaritrry. Social Darwinist hierarchies, further mytholpoor, illiterate victims to an insidious, manipulative power. Not coincidentally, the I J cgized by sensationalist speculation and reports of missionaries and abolitionists, Cross River area, their homeland, was the gateway to the rich palm markets of the ` = were reinforced by travelers’ reports of rampant slave trading, widespread slavery, interior and had to be opened to the "civilizing" influence of western commerce, { human sacrifice, headhuntiug, and cannibalism? These allegations were embelNow this trading system, which for several centuries had brought European goods i ¤ /1iShed by "0bservations" of pro-expansionist merchants, government oflicials, and to the far reaches of Igboland, was an obstacle to "free trade.” The Aro’s role in A » missionaries. As this "primitive" image assumed moral decay, missionary societies resolving disputes among Igboland and Ibibioland’s fragmented village-groups be- · i` found comfort in a coalition with commercial armexationists and military advencame a sinister manipulation of a "chi1dlike," ‘ullible" people. As Isichei has ar- , t turers. Similarly, abolrtromsts played an important role in mobilizing broad popugued, to the British they symbolized all that was wrong with Igbeland and had to t ,¤ lar support for the annexation of territory from Lagos to the Eastern Provinces, the be eliminated.2* E F area east of the Niger Rivcr.2° As elsewhere in Africa, abolition became the facade for imperial conquest giv- , { yi In the early years govemrnent policy was shaped by the "man on the spot," who ing the campaign a moral dimension, It was a crusade to abolish the slave trade as j came from the older, nomcommercialgrlniddle classes of the church, armed forces, well as "the fetish . . . known as the ‘Long Ju-ju,’ which causes many evils."22 With 3 ° ; civil service, and learned professions. They had a particular perspective on rural the Aro objectified as slave dealers, practitioners of human sacrifice, and "war ‘ Y; Africa that they. considered static, timeless, and controlled by autocratic chiefs. lords" interfering with free trade, the state was free now to release unrestrained vi- _ These W€Y€ the idea-ls €mb1`¤¤€d by the mail Wh0 b€¤&m¤ the arehiteet f01’ “i¤dl· olence against their villages? Predictably many of the Aro’s undesirable charac- rect rule" in Nigeria—Frederick Lugard. In 1897 Chamberlain chose Frederick

64 “We Were All Slaves " Y. "Chiefs, " Slaves, Forced Laban and Rural Resistance 65 y QH; {Egg; { U M ’,.,,;,m:,,_, , it _ , { saw themselves as impartial, above politics and guided by a sense of "fair play" jr faq up ~—_, KLV;. », .,.· ~··· . , A —.¤ »¤»·.¤ i f` ,,3* jj ‘ I and ‘justice" They understood administration as ameliorative and protective: it ' [I ` ‘° 3;, · corrected the disruption and exploitation introduced by uncontrolled changes * tj; ri! ’ x . and the intrusion of individual selfishness. Their self·image was suffused with J · M agi gi ` moral eamestness and self-righteousness, summed up in the imperial ideals of Wjl ; gu i p ,jj§j;;§5g J _ T . . *‘tmsteesn1p’*a¤d me "civilizing mission."32 ; : ‘ After establishing and successfully commanding the West African Frontier ui V A pe-·*··~·Lt_;,;;]Eg jug., l `_`` L A V v~ Force, Lugard became high commissioner in northem Nigeria, a post he retained pa }»h` _ gy ·=1__._uu;;§. ,»r, ui u p . from 1900-1906, During this time he adapted the system of indirect rule to incorC 'Ef "*“‘*¥§·'° `""°°"" ‘"*"" t I porate the political systems of the Sokoto Caliphate, the large imperial Muslim U gf """·u‘ ; ~``` It _ _ state established by the nineteenth-century Fulani jihads. He promoted the adhl ff, Egcdc uu" i V pirtixstlanqn of sit; poixr through rcgentgfied lcépal golyerrungpnt structure?. lcfherg ,= gu, . ·`;__ . , n e us rm no s au ori arran an mr rtary erarc y 0 e emrrates, e oun 1 fj! AGBAJA {gk · ` I J ideal structures to institutionalize his native administration. A clearly defined rulQ u i VILLAGES ENA; N¤k¢ ty ` ; lng class was willing to share power, thereby becoming the local level of the colo» ` um rl! Emcnc Q Q nial state. Lugard’s experiences in northern Nigeria influenced his response to the uk Ekc Enugu l complexitiesof southem Nigeria. In 1912, he was charged to reconcile the disitu Om r g E NKANU {qu , parate admrnrstrations of Northern and Southem Provinces during the amalgamaZ, V ·{;_` -,` Owa DBWBTUR v;L[_AgE5 I { ``. tron of the coionydoi gligeria. The implications of his disdain for the south on the { ,_;l>`»ru mm; { Ak Ugg (3 . ,; governmenta mo e e imposed on Igboland will be explored below. 3 . _ Awkanannu P {S .`~_ V To colonial administrators, Igboland’s political fragmentation, complex amriifl `gu Amokwe Udi".`O”*“° Agbnni ` i , biguous political structure, and multiple levels of decision-making were political " éghx \` . U, ~r>`` ` chaos. It indicated Igbo incapacity to rule. Lugard, like most of Nigeria's field of` »4 I ·},___~ Umuugu '~._` Amar; Q j T ficers, assumed that the African had an “essential incompetence in dealing with the { if 5, _` gc. _ &.i=`,:;t§;.;_" ~ *·`_‘ E; " V; evils of his own society," and therefore required the benevolent, though necessarLAWKQ s i ```_ ‘ ,~ ,gi;,·,Q§*°`i;,.__ _§\ UubuwkaN“"“ _ gr ily bfuia-L fl-\i¤l¤g€ of British 1'ule.33 Thus, as Crawford Young has argued, "the new ` l` A up ~` ‘ r gu up i;;u,~`·u.,____ '_ Nomchmumbu Q I 7 colonial regime, no magpr how harsh and extractive, was axiomatically beneficial ` _, ‘,-T ` gl? J. ..‘f"¤j;_?§g —_-T§7*·‘5’Tjg,.§i gg ,,3, __,.,._ i I § to the African subject? ’ i `—`. uri; gp _§,‘}"j`¤,`fa Yi" ;`.ijQ7f;_NkgmEi . f` In the racialized discourse of the conquest, subordination was "frequently as,¤ fj I j j uociaged with childlike immaturity" and was represented as weakness or effemii-it I Y §__,gi' f _l, ` j~rn¤°§’· 5 AS Dubcw Fifgued élbflllt racial discourse rn early-twenueth.gen;uyy Sgutgh Hmm _l~ ·_~`` is Q_ H ~`»l 4.;,;- m,·;,g; .,’» ,~ L I; ` _ E Africa, the rntersection of imperial with racist thought merged rn Lugard’s "dual Map 2.1 Udi District, circa 1917, showing villages mentioned in the chapter. (Rut- i imandatciy Wasfoomd In Scientific racist mmonsz gers Umvemty Cartography) ` ' Deeply embedded evolutionist assumptions together with the doctrine of "surL d _ _ f th N_ _ him 1 dt _ 1 thi 1 f th " vival of the tittest" came to be applied to thehuman situation .... Racial thought uga? as °°mm1ss1°mr Or ° lgcmm er an ° imp emcn _S P ans °r ° g, . . . drew heavily on the metaphor of the farmly, an area where subordination was colony. As the chief government representative in southeastern Nigeria, Lugard lcgiuuuzcd Imagery dmved from the biological sciences and the fmmy gave played a special role in the evolution of labor policy and the opening of the col- ` y use to ubiquitous mucus of the adcpcudeme or acluld message liery. In many respects, Lugard was quite typical of the military/political officer of , `2 the early colonial state, resembling in class origin, ethos, and training, the bulk of , As "children," the Igbo were still "dangerous" and needed the tough, ruthless the colonial civil service. His father was both a priest and military officer in India `. hand of the state or the "ch.ief " to "force" them to mature. Colonial officers spoke where he grew up, and was typical of the type of man who entered the colonial ser- V , of their "truculence," "savagery,” et cetera. Given these etimo-historical percepvice.3* Lugard’s ideas on governing expressed the ethos of this strata who * vg tions of the colonial Held officer and imperial scholars, it was little wonder that the

\. i 66 "We Vlkre All $l0Ve$" ` » "Chiej%. " Slaves, Forced Laban and Rural Resistance 67 Igbo tumbled to the bottom rung of the human evolutionary ladder. They became V expeditions against Udi villages continued from 1904 to 1908: (1) The Onitsha nre repulsive primitive "other" at its lowest level. The lgbo exempliied ` l Hinterland Expedition of 1904 captured western Udi and Nsukka; (2) The Bende_ ‘_ _ _ _ _ _, d _‘Chd ti _t _, H The one hand and * Onitsha Hinterland Expedition of 1905 brought the eastem part of Udi under coloths d‘S°“’Pa“°Y betwwn Civilization an S am y 0 .. 1 ti .. ‘ , nial control; (3) The expedition of 1906-1907 armexed central and southern Udi; “Pl'iml*l"€“°Ss” and iipagamsmw °“ de when amgghc demands of evo u on r . and (4) in the final invasion of the Niger—Cross River and Northern Hinterland Ex0* "¢<>¤v¤rSi¤¤" fmm the mst Stage tc The Second ipcdition of 1908, the armies moved into the northem reaches of Udi and Nsukka These distinctions, so consonant with imperial economic designs, gained suste— , rind defeated the remaining villagtygroups in South Nkanu_“ Guns ablaze, nnlrnance at the trough of scientific racism, and fascinated colonial officials as they {pry officials identined “chiefs_” gave [hem a “wa_i·rant” of gfficg and moved nn to comfortably settled on the upper rung ofthe evolutionary eh6i1'1·38 Lille next area. Although the first political officers were military officials, most The early proposals for political reconstruction emanated from this ethos-and a _ , village—groups were "barely" under imperial rule. The South Nkanu area, some series of ill-inforrned and inaccurate perceptions of the political efgenlieliell of · `distance from military headquarters in Udi, was especially problei-natic_ The ar-ea’s lgbbland The diffuse political structure was far less intelligible Y0 e0l0¤l¤·l efli- ; proximity to the Aro slaving networks led the Ogamnyan to be especially resis. ejajs who cravcd order and clear lines of &llIll01’l(y tl'1B11 the centralized systems of i l limi to 3l'1l2iSl3ViI1g prOCl8.mat.i0ns. Further, Nk,8.HU’S large slave populations began the Muslim north ur the Yel-uba sgares in the west, Further, coming from a cillfllfe _ to exhibit signs of restiveness when "traditional" systems of their masters’ conof parliamentary monarchy, colonialist administrators looked for distinct insutu- Q · t_rol.coei·cion_ eXtcrtinn_ and salc.were prohibited by the new Stat; The alchemy nbnal indicators ofpower and authority. Armed with their rural fantasies (wd mghb ~ E of these two developments made this a contentious area of state control, l mares) and notions of "authentic" African “prirK1iT.iViSm.`° they Pfesumed that all V j For Udi these four years of conquest were an apocalypse}5 The battles ibern. African societies had indigenous chiefs who could appropriate communal labor E Belves were traumatic, aiming precision weapons and cannon against people with and exercise necessary though( tyrannical controls. Using these Slmpllsfie and ee { Dane guns and spears. Many times villages amassed to confront their eneniy but rgnequs assumptions, and blinded by imperial &l`l’0g3¤C€ from recognizing msu i » were frightened Off by the loud sounds of their weapons, Some, feeling they had own ignorance, these early officials blundered their way through the first years of l' no possibility of winning military confrontations, attempted to reach a peaceful acimperial reconstruction, creating "chiefs" along the way. r commodation. Others tragically confronted the West African Frontier Force. In In theory qnduect I-ulee allowed the fragile new state to use indigenous gov- ` .; desperation they fought with magic.“ The trauma of this experience is engraved erning classes to rule, It was a pragmatic philosophy l¤e¤&l1$e human and flllanclsl . in The memory of Old men who recall a particularly brutal officer in northern Nkanu resources were wanting. Thus, the first local colonial government institutions in us ···l··he DeSu.uyer_»·47 Udi were the *‘Native Courts,” modeled after the coastal equity ¤¤11fTS of the l'¤¤e· .` '_ As the armies moved into the hinterland of southeastern Nigeria, military/poteernb cenniry}9 which adjudicated disputes between Europeans md the P1'0m1· Q _Q litical officials established Native Courts. These courts, headed by colonial ap— nam local traders who led ·=hOuSeS_”40 The coastal pattern of state support fer Qi pointed "chiefs," combined executive, judicial, and administrative functions, and anrbbrnarlan local rulers was projected into the Igbo interior. where political Pewef I > violated the precolonial system. The court was promoted as a stabilizing force for was dlfpuse and a pglitical culture of popular participation prevailed The lH‘lP0S1· Q y conquered territories permitting the exercise of "customary" law.48 But as Mam[ion of this foreign political model would lllldefmllle, fethef msn foster. Yum] sm' · `dalll has emphasized in his recent study,‘9 the content of "cust0mary" law was far bglny_ V _ from settled by the turn of the century.5" This was especially the case in Udi where . ’ the diffuse political system struggled to accommodate the concentration of wealth · ‘ln the Ogaranyan social class. Village struggles between the Ogarcznyan and the THE CONQUEST OF UDL 1 904-1 gl 0 'F .` isi ani (elders) over the nature of the political system were ignored when a wealthy The rust labor demands on Udi began with the conquest While being l>l¤dS· Q` EQ man was appointed colonial chief. To the British, "customary law" was whatever ecned inte submission by the army, the people were fcfeed, lil defeat, to suPPlY V the “big men" claimed it to be. The Ogaranyan took the opportunity to claim as labor for a plethora of colonial projects. Under the law of ¢0¤
l` 68 "We Were All Slzzves" I i "chiafa " Slaves, Forced Laban and Rural Resistance 69 with a rotating presidency, and native councils, similarly composed of colonial Y A of power, they lacked the ritual sanction that connected the indigenous system to "chiefs" but presided over by the district commissioner in his headquarters. The ' ’ the ancestors. Even though the principles of age as status were being challenged jurisdiction of both varied. Minor courts could only try minor civil and criminal Q by “NeW Men" of wealth, older men were still respected for their age because they cases, while the native council could consider major criminal cases, impose up to _ were close to the ancestors as well as an organic part of the community. While the two yea.rs’ imprisonment, and levy large fines. In 1903 the district commissioner A Oldest man of the senior lineage in most village-groups had certain ceremonial became a member of all Native Courts in his district, a policy that aimed to in- powers, his position "was not wholly or even mainly a political office, but signicrease the use of the courts as a vehicle for administration?] By 1906, following ` lied the ritual status which its occupant enjoyed through his standing in the gethe amalgamation of the Southem Nigeria Protectorate and the Lagos Colony and Q i nealvgical history of the gr0up."6° Even Big Men in many Udi villages, especially Protectorate into the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria, the judicial func- r ln the Nkanu area, whose wealth or military skill had earned for them some polittions of all warrant chiefs were subsumed under the Nigerian judicial system to re- l , ical power, nonetheless exercised their influence through recognized institutions duoe the abuses that were already visible. Thus the Supreme Court had The fight - Y Wd legitimate political pl'0CeSSCS, even as they were evolving, Certainly, Om title to review any decision made by a Native Court, and the provincial commissioner . i men and Ogamnyan in general had prestige and influence in village—based democand assistant district commissioner became ex ayjicio members. The corrunissioner t lfaoies, but their opinions could be ignored if considered unsound by the village could become president, at his discretion, of any court in his area? , €0¤¤Cil· The implications of imposing such an abrasive colonial political system These provisions did not prevent the courts from becoming iiefdoms controlled ,; ‘ 011 the people of Udi would be suggested by the period of unrest during the war. A by the newly appointed "chiefs.” The corruption of the courts Was facilitated by V Before then, h0W€V€1', The people would be illltroduced to the "civi1izing" influenge their financial underpinnings, the "native treasury," whose court fees and fines paid · of British rule through the brutality of the cnnqucsn the salaries and operating expenses for the court. Lhe treasury was not covered by 2; _ central auditing and was clearly subject to abuse. L ‘ _ In addition to the "chiefs" whose appointments were legalized by a "warrant" t W :§§9F?;$lT4PHASE` OGARANYAN T0 HWARRANT CHIEF/' or license to rule, there were the court clerks and messengers. In many cases the , ‘ court clerk, the only literate member of the court, controlled the illiterate chief, and Since the conquest was neither expeditious nor definitive, resistance did not end was often a iiklllg maker" supporting the candidacy of prospective “chiefs." Liti- , · When initial hostilities concluded. While some villages used passive resistance, garlts plied him with money and gifts since the outcome of a case could depend on * ’ 0u'l€T$» all-h0Ugh defeated, l'€1Tl&iI'l€d D’UCl.ll€nt. Among the most difficult section to whatever he recorded in the court books and on his “interp1'etatiOIl” ofthe “lHW.`°56 { i’ subdue Was th€ South Nkanu area where powerful Ogamnyan headed households Because the clerk received all written government communications demanding V ~ with large slave populations and many wives. Located to the east of the Udi eslabor and various services, he kept all records of court proceedings, and collected · Garpment, it was invaded in 1908. While some Ogamnyan threw in their lot with fines. Many of these men were either from areas of Igboland with mission schools » `T the colonialists, others continued to resist, especially those deeply involved in the or from other parts of British West Africa.57 The court messenger served sum- 3 domestic slave market, Two of the most remote Nkanu village groups, Nkereii and monses, guarded properties ofthe court, maintained order at sittings, guarded crirn- i ` lhuokpara, both heavily committed to the slave trade, were actually beyond effecinals, and carried messages from the court to village headmen, residents, and the {tive government control. These people, whose social structure was drastically transdistrict off1cer.5“ To the average inhabitant, messengers were a pmticularly heinous I Eformed by the palm and slave trades, were extremely resilient. With considerable group. When they delivered government notices for forced labor, they terrorized i . social stratification and a powerful merchant capitalist presence, these villageconn-nuiunes, demanding bribes and "blind eyef gifts not to conscript villagers for I ilfaups attempted to preserve the slave trade, their primary means of accumulation government projects. Such a stint of forced labor wordd deprive the household of llnd an important source of labor for "Big Men." In some districts, the West African male labor, so crucial to the economy of the family and village. _ {Frontier Force (WAFF) singled out slavers for special "treatment" and slave marChieftaincy appointments in Udi usually endorsed Ogaranyan. The experience ikcts were destroyed.6* The Amurri village—group, although visited several times in of Udi’s two most powerful chiefs, Chukwuani Nwangwu and Oriyearna Owusu, Y 1909. "fefllsed to recognize the govemment in any way."‘2 A similar fate bgfgll told below, shows the endless forms of corruption permitted under the “Native j §Nk€1'¤H. which was burned in June 1908 because it confronted the disn-let com. Court." The system held little resemblance to the preconquest legal process. The t imissioner and persisted in selling slaves at the Ubuyu mmketpa . courts violated the most fundamental principles of the Igbo political system—the i QJ ? The government set up headquarters in Udi on the escarpment that separated diffusion of power and broad-based political participation, Throughout Igboland V Agbaja from Nkanu. Many ofthe more remote villages correctly assessed the practlie few strong "chiefs" had more ritual than political authority.” Although court i UGH} limitations on the ability of a single white man to closely monitor village af. appointments eventually rivaled title societies as symbols of prestige and vehicles ‘ V if¤ifS and awaited an opportunity to reassert their sovereignty, Overextended and

70 "We Were All Slaves" i "Chiefs, " Slaves, Forced Labor and Ruml Rerismnea 7] limited by the absence of roads and clear waterways, the district officer- could i lQ0l.6° But oflicials feared that even this moderate bill could accelerate the del h t isit all the areas in his district. Thus the most remote villages = cline of the Delta’s house system and passed the Masters and Servants Proclama;i?;¥;gN;;If 1\?k;r-iii, and Ihnokpara were simply "left al0ne” unless they m¤d€ , ; UGH in 1901. Like masters and servants laws throughout the empire, this law arti larl obvious challenge to colonial rule. _ "captured" labor by making it a breach of contract to desert.7° SOHV@ti,1 thsdonqiiest the echelons of the colonial state erupted like a rolling wave i` j ' In 1901 they passed the Native House Ru1eIOrdinance which reflected this arrxof terror, In 1907/08, in a frenzy of administrative energy, political officials estab- t j iety about freed slaves. The House Rule Ordinance should not have been apphed ]‘ h d ‘ t te seventy courts in the Eastern Provinces alone. Pclmcal and ¤dm1¤· y . lh Fhehlldl area, which had no houses, but it became the "common genge"pol1ey i;ir:tiv?i1d]tho1ity had to be established as quickly as possible because the army’s ~ S of political officers who were startled by the large slave populations in Nkanu. Both control was very precarious and vulnerable to 1'€V€fS2ll ill H g€Il€I'¥i1 iH$“l`Tf;€{T—;0H~ , E Eli? S1;\;iDeali;1]g Plslciimatipn andthe Ifltiuie Fu? Ordinance becarrée lgw etrierr W akn ss, ra matism, and expediency required the preservation of use ea- _ y oug e soci an I po itica structure o g 0 an was not as centra ze as at tuiees ogpregolgnial society and the "invention" of others. But the immediate need t t of the Delta.72 By using the House Rule Ordinance in concert with the Roads and for unskilled labor required a systemic approach. Labor for the initial short term _ 3 Creeks Proclamation, the state fused a coercive form of capitalist wage labor and tasks could be generated by military force but more sustained supplies of unskilled _ V slavery. This wedded slavery to the recruitment of labor and endorsed the powers 1 b , needed in railway construction and colliery work, required a more t of slaveholders over their slaves. s;s(ti;nil;ti\d/sifalution, Assuming the presence of coastal political traditions, the mil- iQ E I In Udi the problem for colonial reconstruction was that no men in positions of ‘t fii ' ls believed that they could use the "chiefs"’ customary rights to 00m- _ ¢6d¢fShlp had the type of powers the state was prepared to authorize, Nerrethe. i inarziali laggr to recruit workers. In reality such "customa.ry" rights t0 l¤b0\' did HOT { l¢SS. Pf0mil1ent men were either co-opted or brushed aside and replaced with ee]. exjst_N(methe1ess, the centralized political structures of the coast became the frame 2 lirboraters. Officials even insisted that they could identify "house heads" who were of reference for early labor legislation. ·` Li in control of these villages. Often powerful Ogamnyan secured colonial appoint5] at the center of colonial labor policy. It was the most important labor J E ments that further accelerated their acquisition of power, systeziiflz-iiiidvilss eradication was given as a reason for the invasion. In many areas , E In Onitsha Province three local men used the recruitment of labor for the colrt was the foundation for the coercive recruitment of the earliest workers. S€V¢¤1l R { ll€f}’ to enhance their power and prestige in the region. They sensed the benefits of the earliest laws tied the labor question to the brutality of conquest 8-Hd galgigle , ` 0; Q¤H¢1b0f6ti¢m early in ihe congluest an; distivpliishked themselves by convincing ttheri ht to impose alabor punishment on any commumty found ty ; t e1r commumties to we come e mva ers. e t ere were undoubtedly many gg/ggsltiilrigleelemgil rule. The Collective Punishment, Unsettled Districts, and P€¤¤¤ ` others, these are the most thoroughly documented. Solomon Eze Okoli of Nrrebj,"3 preservation ordinances, which applied only to the Central and Eastcm provinces, f V Chukwuani Nwangwu of Oza11a," and Onyeama owner er Eke]5 an Ogargnyan, "]eggliZed" punitive patrols against insubordinate villages. The Collective PUB- _ Were associated in some intimate way with the Aro slaving network, In Nara, a ishments Ordinance (1912) tried to break village solidarity by punishing the whole ; g highly populated aslaveholding area in South Nkanu, Edeani Chikiri, a renowned community for refusing to identify a particular cnlprit.“ The Roads and Creeks ‘ · slaveholder, was appointed chief. Eze Okoli supplied the first coal workers who Proclamation of 1903 gave village "chiefs" the right to demand free labor for gov- 1 ·` came with the new manager from Onitsha in the fall of 1914. Chiefs Onyeama and ernment projects, Most often, this became the occasion for Work on the chiefs 1 E Chi-E-<WUZ;i,;0dt?prosp;rI$e1ta “h0use" heads who ruled over women, slaves, and clients.°6 I ` The careers of Chiefs Onyearna and Chukwuani demonstrate how opportunisSlavery policy, emanating from the Delta, was ambivalent; While slavery an tic, wealthy men manipulated the state to attain far more power than was sgeiajly anathema to the "free" labor ideology that colonial 6UIh0I'lil€S \1S€d tf) JUSUFY T-he ~ ?€l§l'|1é€d, and 8[i€SI;I0 the l€X¥.\”eIjne conceptrgtion of power encouraged by the st_ the feared that a public emancipation policy would bc socially d1$I`UP‘ = ` hj 8-T-1Ve 01111 system. omcal y their ascent ul lled accepted Igbo norms of selfiicirleilgiierefoé, they merely banned slave trading and slave raids while leaving the t improvement and status development drastically deformed by the new colonial ' rjtuti 't lf 'ntact, Lugard encouraged the hideous distinction beT2WB€K1 Oui- ¢01”l¥€XL The Cvusequellces of Their individual quests were the destruction ef the iiiiving i@1‘;;gai status" of slavery while not abolishing the "institution of do- li very political system that promoted these ideals and values.76 Both Udi chiefs were mestie s1avery_"6" He instructed his aides to "discourage the wholesale ¤SS€f¤0¤ _ { wealthy farmers and slaveholders before the conquest. Onyeama, whose father was of freedomyas This position was embodied in the Slave Dealing Proclamation of l" t El prosperous farmer and Ozo title holder, traded in slaves. He had an apprentice-

72 "We Ware All Sluve.r" 4, ship with the Aro with whom he had intimate commercial connections and who iv ` {Q .. y ~ `, , ji ` `’‘ _‘ had a large settlement in Eke, his home town.77 By the time of the conquest he had i 9 it . ~~ ` _ , V i ` ~·`_ ~` » already diversified into trading in ivory, omaments, and an assortment of European t ‘,_ ` " ` ft ~`~`, jj , " ~\t—~ , Qt · ~" g Q » = t, i items. He used his itinerant trading activities and contacts with the Aro to acquire · T ” ' MW? TQ" ```` ' A i tj a considerable amount of wealth while still a young man, as indicated by his ac- , ~ 2 ~ V; li l-; '”il—'°" ;° ; _ N A ; quisition of the prestigious Oza title. Like "New Men" throughout Igboland, the ` A ¢~ ff 4 *1 ,:§.`”` acquisition of a title transformed his wealth into political influence within the ~ r_ Y; _ it '‘`` "’ » broad-based democratic traditions of Eke, his town.7B However, because of the im- , if yi A _»; "’ portance of seniority, intergenerational conflicts between him and the village e1d— 1 ' ` V — __ ` ers blocked his political ascent. Before the conquest he still did not have the status, _ ; gil Y ii? 'Y ' fi} Q influence, and prestige of the older members of the society and was viewed as Y ' something of a brash upstart by village councillors. ; Ki Ty ' i" , Much of the information about Chukwuani is anecdotal. He was from the ritual " ‘ `j `‘‘·‘ , V 4 · elite; his family produced the important Ani priest of Ozalla, his home town. As a q Q " young man he lived for seven years in Arochukwu as a trader.7° The connection _ '* ` between ritual power and wealth was intimate, and ritual leaders were often able ,v A 4 ` _, it t to acquire goods in payment for services rendered. By converting these resources VQ — into slaves he produced surpluses that allowed him to purchase titles which con- A 2 ferred political power. Little: is known about his other activities except that he " ` ` ` ' owned many slaves and married many wives, further evidence of the material ad- A ,_ *` * . V `“ vantages held by the ritual elite. While many of these slaves were used in farm j 4 i labor, others served as messengers and assistants in policing his area.8° In Chuk— Er Q _' I · wuani’s area, slaves, called Ohu, were in the majority of some village-groups. The , ` _. political marginalization of such a large, subordinate community gave Nkanu vil- ' `;r · lage politics a heightened instability. The more enlightened members of the slave - gi _ community quickly understood that without a recognizable legal status slavery was i " dead. But given the cautionary laws governing colonial slavery, it was incumbent _ on the slave to "declare" his own freedom. Masters, who often had Native Court J appointments, tried to use the courts to crush this activism. The conflict between ` A the two plagued Chukwuani’s tenure as a warrant chief. ` { For both Chukwuani and Onyeama, the appearance of troops in their village was ` i ` a defming moment, offering new opportunities which they immediately seized. ‘ Both assisted t.he military/political officers of the colonial administration. As chief } ii priest of his town, Chukwuani "readi1y assumed a role of guiding the British around when they first came into the area."“‘ Onyeama, having heard of the devastating `* power of the colonial army during his trading rounds, advised his village to wel- = g_ come them rather than iight?2 As a young titled man this advice must have ran- ?’ · kled the authentic village leaders, the headmen, elders, and senior Ozos. However, ` Q" ` his awareness of the devastating consequences of resistance, confirmed by the 2 ._ refugees running from bumed villages and iields, allowed him to carry the village r I ilufggrxlgvlgtglliggoglflt::;fu§;1“?§1i:h;;;Liii?;si(;$;,V€;;OE;tt1;;;;\;;g;{?{ gggg Photo 2.1 Chief Chukwuani, Nwangwu 1928 (Courtesy of Anayo Enechukwu] someone as local headman to assist in British rule, Onyemrna manuevered to be- — Q. come an indispensable partner in enforcing law and order. Although he was obse— * _>

76 NW2 were All slave-Y', ‘ 4 "CI1ir·fs," Slaves, Forced Labor; and Rural Resistance 77 _ _The P°Wel’s Onyeama assumed within his [e¤`it°"les were iaeilily ePPT0Ved by i’0· i The Governor and the Commandant were quite excited, and all the evening the h¤¤¤1 officers even though they ¤v¤rS¤¢r¤1¤¤d the hea} fequuements ¤f the Nauye i V conversations ran on me advantages that would acme ta the district and to Courts- Belefiguered P9lmc8-I ¤f¤¤¤r§ were all mo Wlumg to ¤11¤w Onyesme YU '·`hs‘ ` Southern Nigeria generally, if coal should be found in sufficient quantity to be a ciphne hrs villages, as rt reduced their burden to ensure observance of colonial law. _ , paying pl-OpDsid0h_ They discussed the buiidiuc cf d idiiwcy iiiic ic Udi, for Fmjiheli they eheweii a b¤¤¤¤¤9r¤¤y te deVel0P heheh?-li the warrant chief because it , the transport of the coal, that would run through the middle of some of the richfacilitated the execution of their orders, Many chiefs divided their area into wards, ~ ` est palm-oil count:ry.9" each under an Udumani, headman or messenger, who implemented their orders.“° ` ‘ i The Udumani was responsible for recruiting forced labor under the Roads and Creeks ~ The Chal hhldsl 1°°ah°¤· S"m° 150 miles mm-h of The Emmy ESFUZIY. H€G€SSiOrdinance. The position of Udumani was often an entre into a warrant chieftainship · `mhd almk with the Bonny _°°aSt from which sea-1 Ceuhl be T-Y¤¤sP0Yi€d 'f0 Lagos ` upeu the death ofthe Wmuut ehiefso They suse ueduiied Weuhh Wheu iiiicdmci WiSh_ V und points west. When a suitably deep channel was discovered at the Bonny Esinc ic indiiciicc com dccicidnci Wcuid curry dicii favci, tc icccii thc chicfigl ‘ E tuary, the rail route was finalized and a major port city, Port Harcourt, was founded. The ccicnidi cmd cuvc thc achicfsa ucwcii but did uct give diem dudiciiiy in ~ · Named after the secretary of state for the colonies, Lewis V Harcourt, the city beihc cydc cf their pcccidi Aidicdch cciciiici chiefs Wcic aimpciici cicaticnss, ihcy · J came the southern terminus of the railway which was constructed between 1913 were still a part of a village society that had its own criteria for power, status, and i ' hhd 1915* Whhs Enhgh was c°m°‘€°ted with Onitsha by ¤”0¤d» the principal mode prestige. For this reason even the most authoritarian "chiefs" could not afford to of mmspoh fa the hhhhwhs th° railway r°“tc· ignore the cultural expressions of power within the Igbo polity. Chief Onyeama Tht °°lh°ry was hhhahy d°‘{°1°P°d as an aPPehdsge °f the Nigefifiu Railway 5 recognized this and paid obeisance to the old systems of acquiring authority even 5 hyhtchh Whlch was [O be the rhalor mnsumer and the m°h0P0ly UEUSPOTYET of the as he usurped the conventions and undermined them. One basic tenet of Igbo power — V hhhc S Ohtphh when thh °°lhc"Y 0P°n°d in 1915, it Was admi¤iS¤'¤T-iVely H diviimd dudiciiiy is iccipiccity, ddd ii Pcwdifui mm bccamc d aidcdci., by resuming , a mon of the rarlwdys Its first fiscal allocation of £l5,000 was debited from "Open some of his wealth to his subordinates. Onyeama devoted considerable resources L L1h°S‘ R=¤lW¤y¤a’ and the annual mP°*`ts for the colhefy were included in those to fulnlling this ideal by cultivating clients through gifts of food and other prizes, ` and sponsoring festivals and contests. He operated his own soup kitchen and fed _ hundreds of the poor daily from his pig farms and yam barns. He was given the ? Q gy oig,. ii . ai i ii.,,s_, i i · title Oogbuzubosi, "one who slaughters animals daily" in honor of this role. Like 1 l J ` ij ( I '“‘;*;jf;,i;ji ‘ · a monarch, he loved conspicuous displays of generosity and he often flung coins _ — · ''`'» .,.; if if M ‘ to the poor from the upper windows of his palace, Always acutely aware of the _ r I i" I _ L_ '“''` ' · benefits of western education, he paid the school fees of all Eke children.92 Even r »? . ` I I . as a paramount chief, he entertained his subordinate chiefs lavishly, showering A ,~ t in `V ~ ¤ »— Y them with copious amounts of palm wine and food. In retum he expected undying ` U E me ` I " { _ _ 1 · , _ loyalty and compliance with his demands. 2 E , are ` .qa"‘ i · ddd — " ,.,.,1 j _ .` ‘ es » Thus between 1910 and 1914 the fomral framework of the Native Court system _ mh: .`'t · .JS¥ Qi? * · » Q,. ; ;. j1??"{‘ A. of Udi took shape, It received its first test within months of the “chiefs"’ appoint- · i -— ‘ “'`*' H i·_l"x ments when it was used to perform its most important function: the mobilization , i . · sy · ` *7;C7:i;.__ H " ° iM"-i' , if V ` L of labor for state-sponsored railway construction to link the proposed colliery to 7 .~r· _ " :. ~ , V, s_,g “'_, {ZIV ` 1 me Delta coast. 1 i ° I 5 l` ~» ·c I I i ·‘,- ` ‘»` I ?* i , » ~ e.,, ~ ,.f¤l:"1¤~ .»‘;i‘ * __; iii 1 ` t CREATING ”FREE LABOR" WITH COERCION: FORCED LABOR { ,§_ I" . ··L, { '_,,a xi] Ir. `'``. I . ¥· ` 5` » AND RESISTANCE IN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT 1913/1914 i - lcd ” n A gi. V v' .'i` ij idgiai —. “ i The British discovery of coal was accidental, but local people had used it for ` I Y _ " is A Ii ,~ JT ew; I many years.93 In 1909 early field officers used it to warm their post in Udi. Ap- ` ;V z_ ° _· i A ‘ sa? · patently a report of their findings to headquarters received little notice until the ,i ‘ » Y , i ·£"i y I ij, ` visit of the acting governor and his staff. Lt. Gerald Adams, a soldier in Udi, gave . **’· ’ ·‘ · V . ~` " E 51- iii? ·' E- Y 33 ,, · .. his KCCOUHIZ of the initial enthusiasm of T.l1€ g0V€¤10l'2 i 4 Photo 2.4 Ameke Railway construction, circa 1914 (Crown Agents)

78 "We Were All Slat/es"l "C/iiefis, " Slaves, F0rcedLab01; and Rural Resistance 79 of the Nigerian Railway. The first colliery manager submitted his accounts to the tutors, were eager to assume these roles and felt secure in their actions with the chief construction accountant, Port Harcourt. Administrative and financial matters) military support of the new state. related to the operation of the mines were under the administrative supervision of ; The system usually worked as follows. The railway or colliery decided it needed the appropriate official in the rai1way.°‘ y It given number of workers. “Chiefs" in the local area were then told to recruit a The mines and railway were the two major capital works projects in the East—jQ iven number of men and sometimes women. The "chief" dispatched court mesem Provinces. When wartime cuts stopped other projects, the harbor works at Port A engers to contact headmen in his villages to supply unskilled labor. Sometimes Harcourt, the Eastern Railway, and the coal held received priority attention in the; _ e would call up a specific age-grade, i.e., the "company of 1913." Other times a budget and from the colonial administration. Colonial Secretary L. Harcourt re- ` ndom selection of men would be made. When messengers were so dispatched jected the request for additional staff and funds for all other branches of the rail-; V-» ey terrorized communities, demanding "blind eye” gifts to exempt a person from way but that of Udi-Port Harcourt: y ervice, abducting women for ransom or as concubines, and seizing property. ln view of the present financial prospect I would sanction no more additional 0£;;hc2:;’;:2;;;n§f$kt?fazl;;l $5;; §;ts§;:;;£; Fgtzzgegnghliid ;[°1-liars staff for railway construction at present, except so far as may be required for the , d Servants Act they bmu ht inyworkcrs Established counsin Thgiabe as ers uti1.1>crt Harcourt section and the Bernie bridge .... The Udi-Pt. Harcourt sec- g . hi h th ’ d . gm . * .1. °‘ °““Ps~ tion is the only one of any urgency and will be extremely useful by itself for car- ~ C Sy mamigc using. , eu Own pmlaml nary groups to keep erdcn Chmf _ 97 _ , nyeama used his Ogwumrlr force, as well as labor headmen who insured that rymg palm produce and coal to the sca' _ ` orkers, once in the camp, complied with regulations.l°‘ Onyeama had an elabo~‘ The construction of a railway from Port Harcourt to Enugu between 1913 and‘ ate labor recruitment system emanating from his Native Court. He contacted ad1915 not only paved the way for the evacuation and distribution of coal, but sharp- Zi ucent chiefs, instructing them to call up specific age-grades and ordered them to ened the contradictions between the "chiefs" and their subjects. Between 1913, V ir port to a series of transit camps where agents checked off their names against when rail construction began, and 1915 when colliery work started, Udi’s people their villageswz He also used the court to enforce workplace discipline, all with came under increased victimization by the Native Court officials. By the time Wil? fi e tacit approval of the political officers. Onyeama, as well as the other chiefs, liam Leek, the new manager, arrived in Onitsha in late 1915, Udi was in open re—~* l L bellion. Initially there was friction between the Igbo peoples and the authorities _ H _ M r»_>rrr r___ WM __ V} V _ i — over the terms of the railway’s existence, including the price to be paid for exprof . ,,1 ````` `, Ki l ._ if ` ai _ ,- .· ` 3 -.[ priated land, the terms of service as workers, and the role of the warrant chiefs as , , ‘ t "" ‘ ~ ` gap · ' ·=, J fl ` _ recmiting agents. At the outbreak of World War I, as preparations were being made; ;~ Qi? F · it ¤ gl . ¤ ' aq ji;. :??`";` _. " `V Y' ," in the area ofthe eastern branch of the railway, the survey parties encountered de- . " { if? '=. YK ` . ~ ` » _ ' _. J" `*i*E_ rf ' ‘°j; B termined resistance from village-groups along the route between Udi Mine and the Qig. li _ ? cy 1-z`}` > ` `~ _t , ’.` . ', Y ?· V future site of Port Harcourt?8 They were attacked and several surveyors k.illed.°° Q, · if _ · gi _ ii Ryo; ’ ` 9 ’ ~ "` it I M * i` ll Q-; At the center of the problem was the recruitment of labor for the railway and l V lf? _; ;g·,g_;“‘-_?,:,¤;.,j ,,3 jr road construction. Recruitment followed three systems: (1) bringing labor from a. ug? { _ {gf ‘ l“¤ , ,E; git pH ’'i..` L. { ‘ ` _ distance, which entailed certain costs but recruited small numbers of Hausa and · ~ v` ; y ` Ti jj} l Qi , EQ Yoruba workers who, by this time, were accustomed to colonial labor policies and i gf `Y ~ “Q‘· L = .,,,, ,_ Jil I ii; .`*?_lt t i . ( lpiilh 7% · would work for lowerwages tha.n the eastemers; (2) trading prisoners near the sitej l ‘; 4. = . 4 $5* 7 2. '>,$. _ ·-.}¥`jl`iv fig" it Q, ·;r . f*···’ EQ}? to serve as a reliable labor force; and (3) a system called the "local method" or "po— ' if "_;t_ __} * 2} · _; T .. gg? xL; _ i lit:ica1labor“ in which warrant chiefs were engaged to recruit labor. . » . U , I V ii The "local method" was adopted under the assumption that requests throughi 1 fi? ig? ,V l_ Q it .· , : :_ »* i I "native chiefs" would be accepted by their subjects who, it was alleged, were ac- Q ii`? y. L · · I ` Y t` -Fr,\,",,t>g·f§?;;Qi` Q ‘."jv*T*&` *3 ° cate time. Most inhabitants of Udi had yet to be brought under British rule so they I * Z ~ lj .Q; , p .'`' —, _`‘. j Y ,r`.. ` `* district officer ignored the methods used to obtain workers, becoming concemedf l if "$' l ` ` · ~ ` 9 ‘— ` rr.r . ...r usa only when a "chief" was unable to supply the specified numbers OI When local Vi}-; iPhoto 2.5 Chief Eihukumere of Uzuakoii with railway workers, circa 1914 [Crown lagers rose to resist these exactions.1“° The "chiefs," as newly appointed collabo— _ jikgents)

80 "Wc Were All Slaves" `* · "Chiefr, " Slaves, Fnrced Labor; and Rural Resistance 81 were allowed to make deductions from their wages to cover feeding costs and other, i ~ ory that, given the iight conditions, a strong “native" government could be cultiless legal, expenses. l J Vutcd in lgboland. He considered the corruption of the Native Courts to be the re; ° nult of the collapse of "native society." He condemned the government in the ,, r_ ` n0uth—speciIically the political ofticers and tl1e Supreme Court, as well as the misTHE SECOND PHASE: CREATING PARAMOUNT ”CHlEFs’ , t1ionaries—for undermining the political leadership of local chiefs and preventing GREAT} NG cLANS_AMALGAMAT|ON' REFORMS’ * the emergence of strong, responsible authorities who could be partners in colonial AN D POLITICAL CRISIS 1 gl 2`1915 ’ rule. This ideology had deep contradictions. On the one hand he embraced the ideal The crrmtion of "Agbaja" and "Nkanu" as clan categories arose from the reor- t pof a "pristine" rural Africa, stable under the authoritarian control of "chiefs." But ggnization of local government by Governor General Ff€d€I`iCk Lllgafd when l'l€ 1011 thc 0Ih€l' lléiltd, in Cases where this authorita.t‘ian idea] had not yet emerged, he amalgannated the Northern and Southern Provinces into the colony of Nigeria. The ‘ ifclt it was the duty of the state to accelerate a "natural" evolutionary movement toinstirutional structure for "clans" was embedded in the regional implementation of f wards centralized pewer.l°" _ Lugard’s reforms. Enamored with the system of local government that he created { l—lis reforms were specific and myopic, arrogantly following abstract principles in the north, between 1912 and 1919, Lugard attempted to restructure the south’s . frooted in his northern experience, and ignoring the warnings and experience of local government to resemble that Native Authority system. Between 1900 and southern political officials. Like a typical colonialist he distrusted specialists and 1906 he and his men renned the principles of "indircctru1e" to accomodate the j ;t=chnicians and rejected the policy suggestions ofthe iirst government anrbropbl. niemehy of the Islamic state created by the nineteenth-century Fulanijihad. There ` ogist, Ncrthcote Tho1nas,‘°5 and argued that the best persons to understand me area * the colonial state governed through the ruling class of the Sokoto Caliphatc. the ] ¤wcre the political ofncers who were "in daily contact with ine nat_ives,"l°6 largest state in nineteenth—century West Africa, Exemplifying what Mamdani has . i Lugard’s official position was to protect "native" society from the disruptive Eucalled the privileging of an interpretation of "customary law" introduced by the { iropean iniluences and to strengthen "native" institutions in preparation for eventual nineteenth-century conquest states, the northern model used emirs, each profess- , tlclf-rule. To cultivate responsibility and good government by "chiefs,” he removed ing loyalty to the shakih or head of the empire. After defeating the Caliphate in V `fthc political officer from the presidency of the Native Court and created a position 1903, Lugard welcomed the ordered and regimcnted patterns of g0V61’l’lI¤€l'lI ES the , bf president, or Sole Native Authority. Concluding that there were so many "chiefs" framework for local government. In turn, the defeated emirs found that by coop- , {that it was difficult to identify those most qualiiied, he restricted the numbers of - erating with the colonial state, they could exert more power over their subjects than ~~ rchiefs to make appointments more competitive. Finally, in recognition of the exthey could before the conquest. This partnership of Islamic and colonial state ap- ~ ;cesses of court messengers he reduced the numbers attached to each eourt_l°7 peeled to Luga_rd’s preference for deeply ordered, authoritarian hierarchies in which _ _, In areas without paramount chiefs he instructed his officers to "encourage any each social strata performed its role and the ruling classes, who governed fairly ‘ chief of influence and character to control a group of villages with a view to makbut autocratically, insured order. Order WAS an obsession with ¥h€ 1'l‘llllT·2i-\’l$ll€ Ll-lr __ jing him chief of 21rQiStt‘lCt later if he shows ability."l°g This policy gave Onyearria gard who ranked societies in a hierarchy determined by the degrco of political G€¤· ‘ ` ilmd, to a lesser extent, Chukwuani, the opportunity to legitirnize the elaborate pertralization, To him, the "stateless" Igbo peoples, with their diffuse political ’ T'I0l'l8l bureaucracy and authoritarian powers they had carefully assumed since 19l()_ processes, were deficient and "primitive." During the amalgamation he took on the p Q Even before they were appointed paramount chiefs in 1917, they elaborated their challenge of "preparing” them for “indirect rule." In his treatise The Dual Man- `qwn legal structure and positioned themselves to accrue both wealth and power date he used a teleological argument on the most expeditious way to encourage I V , ith the Lugardian reforms. From 1 January 1914, when Lugard abolished all the development of "indirect ru1e." He proposed that government polioy should Q nouns, both chiefs lobbied to control the single court established per disn-ict_ Lu» _ , _ hal th _b I ta and induce those · igurd also allowed the courts to appoint unsalaried assistants and untitled men, haswn the mmsmm from the pamam to E m a g€’ . ~ pulled “recrLut.s," to assume the messengers’ functions. This, in effect, legitimized who acficpt n° wm-,am‘h°my tm the head of the family nimxigmzc a com ri the chicfs’ paramilitary groups. While Onyeama’s Ogwumili became more powmm °h1€f‘ W*‘F“’ this stag? he akcaciy been reached the ilbjcct is tqgioup O- ,» i rful, Chukwuani created his own group, the Umu Ojiba Chukwuani, who were gether small tribes, or sections of a tribe, so as to fomx a single admimstraltive V mquauy abusive to his people-wg “'“*_‘”h°S° °‘“*fS “”"“‘“Y °‘ }“ ?°““°“ ··· may b° °§,§s“‘“‘°d " Nam “` 3 5 When Lugard created Sole Native Authorities and the paramount ence, the Reslhmty through wh°m thc Dlsmct Ommi can W°rk` S ident, Onitsha, suggested Onyeama and Chukwuani as candidates. By then To Lugard_ the abuses and corruption of the Native Courts were not caused by ; *0nyeama had become the rnost powerful chief over thirty-four village-groups, covrob much power, but too little power in the hands of qualified "chiefs." His pro- — _ uring 686 square miles and including 137,500 people.“° He had subordinate chiefs posed reforms addressed these concerns and were driven by an overarching Y-l1€· I ' whom he controlled through patronage, inclusion in the ritual of his court, and

82 "We Were All Slaves" ; ` "Chiefs, " Slaves, Forced Labor and Rural Resistance 83 __ sharing in the proceeds of his corruption. Similarly Chukwuanfs position, though l V I directed that every laborer have his wages paid into his own hands, in cash, and less secure than Onyeama’s, was over the villages in the area called Nkanu. There l not through the intermediary of any "Chiet" or other labor manager. These are were differences in the political economy of these two regions of Udi. Agbaja, with Y ~ the rules which I have always insisted upon, in spite of the extra trouble involved. its overcrowded and infertile land, had evolved into a precolonial labor reserve n — The receipt of his wages by each individual without deductions by a middle man with ancient traditions of male migration. Nkanu, on the other hand, had a strong . , not only popularizes employment by the govemment but is the greatest incentive agricultural base with rich fields in proximity to the palm belt. After 1915, the rail- ` _ to free labor, and constitutes a most effective and practical blow to the system of , way came through many of her villages. Nkanu men preferred farming to supply _ _ forced labor and slavery which is so inherent in all African comrnunities.“‘ the villages of the palm belt, and later to provision the city of Enugu, which was , · ,, ,, . , founded as the headquarters of the mines. Vldth these appointments "Agbaja" and l l 2 g6lil)g;l;lnli;;v;lI£l;;;£l;c1h;;T;?i:fl;? dildlg; mlll; E;‘l}°* that F°b‘u;‘¤’Y _%914’ beam¤m¤e1P¤¤¤·=a1=¤¤¤¤S¤fmme¤ge1¤v~·¤e- " r dvr,. Su twrsorstormintnttitgitrc Et TE.§fi2lZ$°" dlllkwlii As the chiefs pressed unskilled labor from their restive populations, the fraud- .1 I ickini u pthc use of tools ,, The smgwas f lc dt g _ g fgllo lvm an ulence of their "customary" powers was exposed to, but not fully appreciated by, ‘ [ E) Onczhslin er da to Attract Workers uslxlsh 0 zlllsc Wages acm nine Pence colonial agents. Confronting Lugard’s plans was the reality of the limits of power ` comin from gh; castgm interior are the' 1_O,cct;;gc1;;l;c cllilll Tllollt cls Well? that even Chief Onyeama could exercise. Forced labor assumed a stronger state a I b g d h d th . . b ll" th? J rf S I y qlll cle all on pcm and more control over land than was the case in southeastem Nigeria, and work- `Y ` ll Ol all ll Wllllll ell llslllsllll ll Olll ell pc °mlll‘ll°c' ers’ protest took a characteristic form—desertion, Despite the degree of coercion { At Port Harcourt a large prison is now complete and is capable of housing 1,100 * in the camps and in the workplace, workers could still control when and with what , j men. The prisoners perform good work at clearing, putting up buildings, etc., alintensity they worked. Increasingly, desertion was the protest of choice, and men i `Q most equal in fact to that of the laborer to whom is paid one shilling a day. Later demanded higher wages. By 1914 Lugard was frustrated by the realities of south- ` on it is proposed to employ prisoners in off-loading ships. Arrangements will ern labor which defied his understanding of the "labor question" from the north, . also be made to employ two thousand on the heavy banks and cuts in the Bende and indicated that the battery of laws that shaped colonial labor policy was inef- V district.“6 fective. As construction of the Eastem Railway progressed in the first quarter of f , . . _ 1914, Lugard complained bitterly about the quality, cost, and discipline of the local _ , lll `lalllllllly/Fcbllllaly l?l4 Lugald llllsllllllllsslllllly Pllllllollad TB °i°l°‘“a1 Ollllce labor,111 Despite his theories on "native administration" he could not secure the Ti { ‘?d“g;"°‘;,1‘h°‘°°P“°l°S lll lab0l.ll€clllllllll€lll' HB proposed an Ollllmallcc lc PQ: type and volume of labor he needed. He was embarrassed by the railway's cost ’ l Vlhlll Ol g llllllllllll of lalge lllllllcs of laborers employed lm govcmmcm Works Ovemms from labor and The land disputes- In April 1914 he Proposed in fmSu_a_ V ; w ch specified fines of from one to two pounds for men who deserted an oral contion that local labor be abandoned entirelym While clearly impractical, the gov- ~ r lllllcl allliillll lllllse Wllo collllsllllllll lllcllll lll desert fllom gllvclllmclll pll0·l€Cls' Tllc eminent did bring in contingents of workers from northern and western parts of j- Klflglosc Ogdlllllllsellalgglelll llils llcllllcslsqlllc llllllgoslllll lllllc’ llllllsll Fllllcllllelll Nigeria. He found these men more disciplined than the locals and in December he . »_ msgllllll pgotcsslg is all dig; Slllvllllills W ho amllldcll lgls bl-llllll P°1%°“*Sj“ lllc meultimatelymy¤¤¤¤S¤¤1¤b¤r·H~===¤m¤l¤i¤¤·* Y F.....g.~·¥..iE§f.dZ E$1iZr-,...r€.l1'$T{ai"...“§$ liiiligiigiiol;(;1l;;ePi;iillri;lii$e’F;lriil Increasing numbers of Hausas and Yorubas are being recruited. They do double l ics.“7 Opposition to forced labor was also among the many grievances championed the work and are not so difficult to feed since they eat rice and corn, whereas ` May "native" lawyers in eastern towns. He proposed a £50 fine for anyone who "inlocal rnen require yams which are difficult to procure and costly to transport. It ’ ’`., cites or counsels, or attempts to procure" any person who is working on governwas arranged also for the location of a large number of prisoners from Lagos and { Di ment projects.“B Harcourt objected and argued that the Masters and Servants other jails at Port Harcourt, and this has been a most valuable addition to the 2 i Ordinance contained sufficient provisions to regulate the behavior of large groups labor supplym » { of W0rkerS.u° In fact, the Colonial Office knew that the chiefs themselves had Despite the realities of forced labor and its moderate success, officially Lugard l l` lllcllllllls Ol lllsclplllllllg llcsllllllls mlll P‘$’b*‘b‘Y Sllspecled um lhcll methods might cxmucd the Virtues of the free labor market and the populmty O 1, Wage labor with I , reek of coercion. An intemal memo reviewed the pumshment for deserters: the "primitive” tribes. Ever sensitive to the critics of forced labor in England, he l _; The ordinary system, I believe, is to ask the chief to furnish so many laborers, shrouded the recruitment methods in secrecy and lauded the power of the "free L explaining the conditions of service. The chief furnishes them, and if they run market" in labor which he knew did not exist in southeastern Nigeria. InMay 1914 Y ` away he provides some more. No doubt he deals with the men who run away. he insisted that wages had popularized railway work and was less than truthful in _ ,» Bur so long as he acts in accordance wizh the law, that is a matter between the _ explaining the pay system: L g I chief and the native labourers (emphasis rnine).12°

84 hwg Were All Slavesv "Chiq€r, " Slaves, Forced Laban and Rural Resistance 85 But this was precisely the problem. The law gave them such extraordinarily i Vtih€\A1€;U1’E0ld§;:\fSlH Uni-1 wept out fc;-Ca1·r1eroonsQNaiL;§1€¤ PGOPIC at Ak5$b¤ despotic powers that both Onyeama and Chukwuani operated with near 1mpun1ty p ~ [Sw, eq tv] [ ought] ere s no so ter again an so _ ers are ¤¢V¤1' ¤¤¥¤1¤S in their territories. In this case, Lugard was advised that the Colonial Office would ~; _ back to Udr. Then they have to Este that they are coming to capture the very "deprecate the enactment of the proposed ordinance."m I ” `=` Q Small number °f mldms at Udh Lugm·d’s instructions concerning thé T-Y¤6¤`¤€¤t 0f “mtW° labor fomgd the i v Lugard reported in November 1914 that "[t]he unrest in Udi district . . . has unforb80kb0¤¤ of labor POHCY during this early Pedcd of ¤<>1¤¤ia1r¤1¤· HOWBVEL m ac' 1 tunately interfered with prosecunon of the railway survey and colliery work."“° mai 1¤r¤¤t=i¢¤ th¤ ¤¢¤¤m=¤¤ <>f Izbv 1¤b¤r r¢¤¤¤t¤d the rights ¤f ¤ <=9¤q¤¤*9f *0 °*‘ t sevemi companies ofthe wes¤Armm Frontier Force were wimdmwn mm me tract unpaid labor from the vanquished. Provisions of the Collective Punishment = Cmneroomm from and dispatched to Udi_ By November, Six dcmcmmms of 200 Ordinance of 1912 and the Roads and Creeks Ordinance gave chiefs the right to l men were Operating in the Nkanu towns Of Aksbq Akpugo, Amagunzc, and require fr¤¤ village labvr f¤r any pr¤J¢¤¢» was ff€‘l“°“tlY °"°k?d dtmg tm P°¤°§* 2 _ Amuri.‘“A1though me most visible mgm ofthe rebeiuon were me mmm chiefs, of ‘*pa¤ification," and supplied sufficient W01'k€TS ft)? most lnfmstructuml P*°J‘ 4 { the political officer at Udi recognized that the insurrection came from a deeper reccmm _ k § sistance to the entire colonial state}32 Patrols were placed on the Udi-Abakaliki Before the conquest there were H0 p¤liTi¤¤l rulers who Could ~=1¤¤m morcfhan ` S road where work for the railway was under way and preparations were being made ritual ¤¤th0Yit}’ 0"€T their Vmagwm NGW there were man likc Chukwuém md X ; in anticipation of the arrival of the new colliery manager.'33 The initial excavations Onygama, colonial "chiefs" with eX¤’¤0fdi¤1¤1'>’ P°W€YS· BY law 1914 their cg"' , ; of the Enugu Government Colliery would take place under armed guard amongst _ give req-nin-nent methods and auth0I'it6Ii6·¤ P1’a€ti°€S had the Very cfkfzt °°1°ma1" g ft communities that had been bludgeoned into acceptance of the new colonial order. ists attempted to avoid, The "chief’s" despotic powers created such disorder that ` Some of their resistance infected the mines and hindered the new mmagcfs cf_ a second conquest was necessary at a period of extreme state vulnerab111ty——du1‘- A fom to recruit local labOrv1z4 At the conclusion of the revolt in April, the g0Vem_ ing World War I. The consequences of the reconstrucuon of the local level of the c U mam Estimated that about 250 men had been kmednas The uprising clearly colonial state for the recruitment and discipline of the colliery’s first workers will I J indicated the reconstruction of Udi would not be Easy, Just as Such nchiefsn as be discussed below. » it Onyeama and Chukwuani seized every opportunity offered by the new political I ?_ changes to cement their power, the people of Udi registered their rejection of these ,,_ , . excesses. ”“*'“""““S'"“2t$?§€é§*$’°"s‘T°*“°"““"""‘ K ammoniamycmshtdtatbtitomOmnnttmmmmsh. REFORMS AND FOR { I ments Ordinance again was used to require that the people supply laborers for eiWirhjn months of Lugard’s r€f0l'mS. ¤¤d in the midst Gt the harsh l¤b¤t demands { { ther the road or railway construction. For the people in the xdcinity of the new of railway construction, the people of several Udi villages rose up. Government ¤ · Colliery, the labor plmishmcm was Even more onerous, for may were expected to [1-Oops had been deployed to the GBSI t0 Hwct the G¢rm¤¤S On t-he Camtmoman g ` supply workers both for the road to the Udi Colliery and for the initial stages of front which opened in September 1914. The violence and terror surrounding labor ` —` Colliery cOnS¤.ucti0n_ Villagers on the mum between Onitsha and Udi had-inst cOm_ rgcnritment only further accentuated \h€ abuses 0f the Paramount chefs- Chu]? L t pleted one stint of road construction when they were called upon to prepare the wuanj and Onyeama, and their S¤b0l'di¤¤’f€S· Th¢f¢ were em`]-lar Sigfts Of “°“t¥l° m ‘ road to the colliery. The railway engineer reported problems in Onitsha province law 1913 when Survey P¤¤‘¢i<‘=¤ Wm attacked °“ th° ‘°¥“° °°““?°?“§C?i“t;;rSc“£ ip lin obtaining additional workers for me colliery md; g;t;;;;;)2;_l(;f;%(3é%;§Ig;;udl;§SE.n£;;cdg;;§;1r?;;]l; with the gi`;- I Sextant Onitsha reports difnculty in obtaining labour for road to Coalnelds due emmem. Twenty-eight were killed and two wounded? But in October Udi erupted . it KQ wwns have been granted three months h<>kd¤y· D0 ¤¤t ¤¤d¤rSt¤¤d- Cm y¤¤ in general insurrection against the Warrant chiefs and forced labonrzs The 1-abc]- tl L kindly assist as most 1mportant that rcg;11 be made for motor lorry 111 order to get lion centered in the heavily slave-populated South Nkanu village-groups of wh Railway and Coaliields materials up. Akegbti AkPug°» wd A-maglmzc along the Udi'Ab“k"·md mad Otémber 1914 , The government was not divided as to the propriety of using labor extracted as _ the people of Akegbe killed sixteen Hausa traders, chased out the1r Ichiefs, fought { p pm of 8 peace settlement in constructing the railway HOWEVER the lieutenant g0V_ both court messengers and the p0li¤€,m and attacked savenfl ‘fuhw·rY_ c“°?mP' ` temor expressed his misgivings over the use of unpaid labor in completion of this ments. In some areas people prepared fo; protracted war by; `tgxildidng fpqrsfrgations, W Project: tt at · ` e e a su · t 1 c:i1;;1fo;a;rl:;h;I§1;;1;1:1§sl;(;):¥nt;?1liitl1;l:ri?11;g;T1g§;?Ym;cOna;a of Agbudu, { 5 I am doubtful, however, as to the dplrisgom of insisting on free labor Tflprvthe RailUdi, an eyewitness to the revolts noted: ~ { way, but there is no objection to s e1ng one of the conditions of eir surren-

86 "We Were All Slaves" `E "Chiefs, " Slaves, Forced Laban and Rural Resistance 87 der, although in all probability it will be found better, after matters have settled _ 20. Elizabeth Isichei, A History of Nigeria (New York, 1983), 367. down, to pay fm the labour so cmp1OyBd_l37 . V 21. Igichei, The Ibo and the Europeans, 131. She cites A.G. Leonard, "Notes of a Jour· ne to ende," Joum · · . For the gqvemmem, however, the construction of ihc railway P1"€$€n¥€d PT°b‘ " ` g2. Public Record giiizizzhgcilhilniigiigwiiizgmitgtgicghgcéeg 190-207. lem; as the 1-ecalcitrant lgbo workers resisted the new capitalist Wélgc SYS€¤m· Thc _ 1nS¤‘¤c’rionS with regard to the Aro Expedition 12 Novemiyer :90] ht Znimiindmn of turmoil in the rural areas was the context in which the coal mines opened and the `= Q Ibaland, 100, ’ as C1 e m Wabam city gf Er1ugu.Ngwg (Enugu) was founded, For the men of UC11 111 the €IlV11’0IlS of 1 23· YOV-mgi The African Cvivnilli Stale in Comparative Perspective 93_ the mine, the period would bring a rapid transformation that would make them into ` j ' 24- I¤i¤h¢i. A History of the Igbo, 130. ’ "new men." It would also place them at the center of West Africa’s export econ- { 25· Ibidv 367·68· Omy because, as producers of wal, The premier fuel of the mgicips railways, they ~ 26. Michael Adas, Machines as Measure of Men: Science, Technology and Ideologies of would become a pivotal sector of the area’s small working class. , i Wmem D‘?"‘"'“”‘e (mlacai 1989} Q; 27. Curtin, The Image ofAfrica; Saul Dubow, "Race, Civilization and Culture: The Elabi oratton of Segregationist Discourse in t.he Inter-War Years," in The Politics of Race, Class NO-I-ES i V gl; 20th Century South Africa, ed., Shula Marks and Stanley Trapido (New 1, See Judith van Allen, "‘Sitting on a Man’: Colonialism and the Lost Political Insti— L ` 28- Nigcrian National Archives Ibadan (hereafter NNAI), QSO 1/2 1l5_ Enclosure 1 O C tutions of Igbo Women," Canadian Journal of African Studies, 62 (1972): 165-181. ‘i V Commanding Nkereii Patrol to 0.C. Southern Nigerian Regiment, 4 November 1909.as ‘ g_ Mahmood Marndani, Citizen and Subject; Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of f y ¤l¤°¥€d in 1¤n¤ccn¤Ui¤¤chi, "The Social and Political Impact of the Engram Nigel-gm Rai]. Late Colonialism (Princeton, 1996), 56. { ~ way on Udi Division" (Ph.D. diss., Kent State University, 1985), 91. 3. Onyeama was an extraordinary example of a man who could create an empire within T 29. Cotton interests were especially anxious to replace American supplies with imperial cglgyyial rule He was careful, however, to observe the principle of reciprocity in Igbo pol- ` °°lm¤· Churchill lwfcd that thc protectorate of Nigeria would not be eeO1·10mic;,_11y bump. itics and developed a vast social welfare system even as he extorted and oppressed his peo- V ' ¤i¤1 for England unless its commercial development could be €nhanc5d_ The possibilities ple. He was known for feeding hundreds of poor daily, and paid the school tuition of all the i ij of opening areas to cotton growing was cominggm upon railway development. TN Tamum children in his village of Eke, Agbaja. Onyeama, Onyeama, p. 59. § ~ HTM G¢¤¢SiS of the Nigéfifin Railway? Nigeria Magazine, 84 (196$);3].43· Ofm-,0; 4, Igichei, History ofthe [gba People, 133-36. ¥°m· "Th¤ Ollening UP of S0Uth€lT1 Nigeria to British Trade and Its C()n55q115;1c3g·“ (ph D 5. Michael Burawoy, The Politics of Production, 226. { Y_ diss., Columbia University, 1971), 247-50. Y l l 6. Anne Phillips, The Enigma of Colonialism: British Policy in West Africa (London, ` . 30. As cited in Bruce Berman, "Bureaucracy and Incumbent Violence: Colonial Admin1989), 29_ i , imadcn and the Origins ¤f thc ‘Mau Mau' Emergency? in The Unhappy Valley- Cmlfllcy 7. Ibid., 11. `» il in Kenya and Africa, vol. 2, Violence and Ethnicity, Bruce Berman and John Lonsdale eds 8. ONPROF 1/ 15/3, Captain Massey to Acting Lt. Governor, Onitsha. 9 November 1914. _ ‘ (London/Ohio, 1992), 234; see Margery Perham, introduction to Yesterdays Rulers: The 9. Phillip Curtin, The Image of Africa: British Ideas and Action, 1780-1850, Vol. 2 , _ Making of the British Colonial Service, Robert Heussler (New York 1963) xx· lou ert (Madison, 1973), 480, ’ V · Wilkensnn. The Prefectss British Leadership and the Public sehegl Trqditién (1_0n§0n 10. John E, Flint, Sir George Goldie and the Making of Nigeria (London, 1960), 9. . · 1965), 4. ' ll. Elizabeth Isichei, The Iho and the Europeans: The Genesis ofa Relationship to 1906 Y 31. See Margery Perham and Mary Bull, €ds__ The Diaries of Lord Lugard vol 4 (New York, 1973); E.] . Alagoa, The Small Brave City-State: A History of Nembe-Brass in I {Evanston, 1963), 18. ’ ` the Niger Delta (Ibadan, 1964). T ~ 32· Berman. “Burcaucracy and Incumbent Violencef 235_ 12. Crawford Young, The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective (New zi 33. Berman argues: "’I’he characteristic beliefs of colonial administzrators in patemalism Haven, 1994), 92. `i ilmd social hierarchy, their emphasis on reciprocal obligations of ruler and ruled, and their 13. Obaro lkime, Niger Delta Rivalry: Itsekiri-Urhobo Relations and the European Pres- , ‘~ preoccupation with order and control reliected a traditional concept of authority and soci~ ence 1884-1936 (New York, 1969); Alagoa, The Small Brave City-State. i ;` ¤ly. Thcrc was an archaic, even atavistic quality to colonial administration as if it repre14, s_N_ Nwabara, rzmlnndni century ofContact with Britain, 1860-1960 (Atlantic High- `_ ;¤¤nf¢d T-he last place where the old prerogatives and power of e r-1111,,; Q111.; c0,_,1d be lands, NJ, 1978), Chap. 5. 1 j' ¤xcrcised.“ Berman, "Bureaucracy and Incumbent Violence," 237. 15. Aiigbo, "Southeastem Nigeria in the 19th Century," 482-83. i j. 34. Young, The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective 98. 16_Ygn11g, The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective, 92. 1 ° 35~ Audml C91’nW¤-U and Nancy Lindsfame, "Dislocating Masculihiiry; Gender power 17. Margery Perharn, The Native Economies ofNigetia, voL 1., The Economics of a Trop- :‘ { Kind A.nthropology," 18, 19, ` ical Dependency, ed., by Daryll Forde and Richenda Scott (London, 1946), 6-7. ·, if 36. Dubow, "Race, Civiljzatjgu and Culmmin 72 18. Phillips, The Enigma of Colonialism, 27. i , 37. VY Mudimbe, The Invention 0fAfrica: Gnosis, Philosophy andthe Order of Knowl1g_ [bjd_ _ udge (Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1988), 20.

88 4'WF We"? All Slaves,} i . “ChiefZt. ” Slaves, Forced Labor and Rural Resistance 89 38. In the ideological context of the conquest of southeastern Nigeria, in this period it , · 49, Mamdsmi, Citizen and Subjgch 117..23_ was not generally recognized that serious Study of Sllbjefii 136013155 could BBW?-iiY ¤$$i$l· ad' _ 50. The most authoritative study on the "invention" of customary law is Martin Chan¤ck’s rmnrsqagien, A_E_ Afjgbg, “Anthropo1ogy and Colonial AdminiSL\'6ri0l1 ill S0i1ih·E6Sl€r¤ ‘. . Law, Custom and Social Order: The Colonial Experience in Malawi and Zambia (CamNigeria, 1891-1939," Journal ofthe Historical Society of Nigeria 8, 1 (December 1975): . bridge, 1935)_ 21. With the exception of two studies by field officers. H0 S¤h¤i¤i”iY studies were made of 51. Mamdani, Citizen and Subject, 122. For areference to the conllict between elders and the Igbo until the appointment of the first govemment anthropologist, N.W. Thomas, in i the ··B1g Merr*· see Chapter 1_ [rr serrre vr]_1ege.gr0ur,s me Ogaranyan were ea11edA,,,ad;_ ]9()9_ Despite his extensive investigation, no one in the field Seriously considered his W01’i< ¤ 52. For a discussion ofthe evolution, see Adewoye, The Judicial System, Chap, 6. relevant for policy development. Thomas published live volumes on the Igbo-speaking peo- · 53, Ibidq 43_ ples before Lugard rejected his reappointment in 1913. Northcott W. Thomas, Anthropa- .1 54_ A_E_ Angbrys The Wamm; Chiefs, 1()1_ logical Report on the Igbo-Speaking Peoples 0fNigeria, part 1, Law and Custom ofthe Iba ` L 55_ [bid_, 127_ on the Awka Neighborhood (London, 1913), and part 1, Law and Custom ofthe Asaba Dis- p 55_ Adgwgyg, The judicial System, 13()_ trict (London, 1914). ,. 57. Several were from the Gold Coast Colony or Siena Leone. See Aiigbo, The Warrant 39. The institutional form of "indirect rule" evolved through trial and error from the Niger , t Chiefs; Delta Courts of Equity. In 1891 the Hrst courts had been established to govem t.he Oil Rivers . ji 5g_ [bid 174_ (Niger Coast) Prctectorate. It was pr¤m¤¥¢d as 3 Way r<> =¤’¤id the enmity ¤f the “°iii¤fS” ` , 59. G.I. Jones, "Chieftaincy in the Former Eastern Region of Nigeria," in We.viAfncon and give "stability and permanence to what had been ¤¤i1i¢V¢d by i<>r¤€ of ¤1`ri‘i$·” Omlmiyi I » Chiniv Their Changing Status Under Colonial Rule and Independence, ed., Michael CrowAdewoye, The Judicial System in Southern Nigeria, 1854-1954 (Atlantic Highlands, NJ, I der and Obarg lkjmg (He.[fe_ Niger-ja, 197[))_ 312_ e 1977), 41. , 1 60. Aflgbo, The Warrant Chiefs, 35. 4[jv The ··heuse*· was e knnbased commercial and political unit that was ruled by 6 m¤r— V 61. W.A, Beverly, Military Report on Southern Nigeria, 1908, 2 vols. (London. 1908); chant who had life or death powers over his household. The "head" was a middleman be- 1 V NNAL QS 1/21, 5 Erre1_’ nr,_ 1_ O_C_ Commanding Nkereh Pam] rc O_C_ Somham Nigmn tween European traders and inland palm—pr¤d¤¢i¤g villages. Tim “h¤¤S¢” iriciudcd his . inn Regiment, 4 October 1909. Both as cited in Uzeochi. "Eastern Nigerian Railway," 56. family, which was considered something of an aristocracy, many fr€¤b0¤’1 Sl1b01'di¤¤¥€S who 1 62. NNAI, CSO 1/21, 5 Encl., no. 2, (Conf) in Egeiton to Secretary of State, 27 Novemwere his employees, and usually a large number of slaves. Slaves engaged in trade arid war. I ber 1909, as cited in Uzochie, "Eastern Nigerian Rai1way," 57 . an interrninable by-product of shifting trading relations and disputes. Trusted slaves, who , 4 63_ NNAI C50 1/21, 5 Ene1__ my 1, O_(;_ Commanding Nkgyga perl-01 re gg, Seurherrr ggnld represent the "head" in negotiations with supplier villages and with E\if0P€6-rl S¤P€r· Q Nigerian Regiment, 4 November 1909, as cited in Uzeochi, "Ea.stern Nigerian Railway] cargoes, could retain a portion of the eamings. There is evidence that it evolved from lcin- ` g P, 56_ based villages in the Delta area. See T.N. Tamuno. The Evolution ofthe Nigerian State (New =. · 64_ During this pgrigd, e group of Lagos ~·ne;1ye·* lawyers farmed gut me gre southeast. York, 1972), 325; K.O. Dike. Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta 1830-1885: An Intw- .V em provinces from me errres of Onrrshm Ward, and Calabmr canvassing the mea just be_ duction to the Economic and Political History of Nigeria (Oxferd. 1956), 34-37- Ai¤§¤¤» hind the "pacilication" armies, they showed villagers how to challenge the government in Small Brave City-State. _ f. court. They also drove up the cost of land much higher tha.n it had been in the northern area 41. Young, The African Colonial State, 93. , ofthe country, when the Kano railway was built. See PRO, CO 583/14, Harcourt Memo42. For the best description of the conquest in Udi, see Uzeochi, "Eastern Nigerian Rail- 5 l` rmrdum, 19 May 1916; Lugsrd rr, He_reOrrrr_ ··Eesrerrr Lrrre Frrsr progress Reporryv 22 May way.” l 1914. They were often successful in the Nigerian Supreme Coun where they clashed with 43. Ibid. K the district oflicer. In 1911, the court ruled against one district officer who imprisoned one 44. Tamnno, The Evolution of the Nigerian State, 44: Ulevchi. “Ea$l€T¤ Nigerian Rail- Y 1 .1 of these lawyers because he refused to remove his hat. The district ofticer was taken to court way," Chap. 2. . Q and lined £20 and court costs. Justice William H. Stoker stated, in an interesting ruling, that 45. For the most thorough summary of the invasion of Udi, which made extensive use of . there wes une Such thing as a p0]_1g1ga[ e1=5reers> pr-1yr1ege me there were s1eref ~herrereb1esi eral testimony and colonial records, see Uzoechi, "Eastem Nigerian Railway? Chap- Z ~ around who had no right to the title." But the Supreme Court Ordinance of 1911 limited the 35-64. Q courfsjurisdiction to the more settled and developed areas of the east and central provinces, 46. Isichei, History of the Igbo People, 123. i` I, nnd ended these lawyers’ official presence. Adevvoye, The Judicial System. See Chap. 4, es47. NNAI, CSO 26/211, "Report on Nkanu (North) Villages of Udi Division, fo. 5, Clark; ~ Pggiauy 117-25_ NNAI, CSO 26/19, "Report on Adaba, Nkurne, Okpata, and Umulokpa Villages of Onitsha i 65_ ·1·srmrrrO_ me Evolution Ofrhe Nigerian Stare, 31g.1g_ ])ivigion_" no, 7, Stone and Milne; NNAI, CSO 26/211, °°I1’1¥€iiig€H€€ R€P0i'l· on Nkanu · ’i 66. By the end ofthe century, the "house" system was showing signs of distress, Some (North) Wllages of Udi Division," 1933, p. 5, as cited in Isichei, Ibo People and the Euro- ; j Mheusesv were eema]1y headed by s1eyes_ Jeje ef gpebs is erre hrrrrgrrery exs_mp1e_ Marry peans, 142. ` _;- heads had lost control Over their slave members who both refused to work for the head or 48. For a discussion of the “invention" ofthe “customary," see Terence Ranger. "The In- " _. to pay cugtpmagy fees_ Djkgr Trgdg and politics vemjon of Tradition in Africa," in The Invention 0f Tfr1di!i0n, eds., Eric Hobsbewm and Tei" 67. ED. Lugard, The Political Memorandum: Revision of Instructions of Political Oficers ence Ranger (Cambridge, 1983), 221-62. 5 vn Subjects Chiefly Political and Administrative, 1913-1918, 3d ed. (London, 1970), 218.

}’ 90 "We Were All Slaves” " A "Chiefs, " Slaves, Forced Labor; and Rural Resistance 9] 68. 1'bid., 224. . V 90. The regalia of colonial power, which included a "cap and staff," were introduced as 69. This model, first used by the East India Company government in 1843, outlawed slave a way of decorating these men and creating a "tradition" of warrant chiefs and satisfactory dealing and removed slavery from its legal status. It did not inform the slaves of this dee A; *, headmen. Aiigbo, The Warrant Chiefs, 105, see photo on p. 81. velopment, but had they left their owners, the courts could not have been used to reclaim l I 91. Ibid., 104. them as property. In West Africa it was seen as an ideal method of outlawing slavery with- , 1 92. Onyeama, Chief Onyeama, 67. out creating social and economic disruption. Suzanne Miers and Richard Roberts, The End .' 93. The special commissioner in West Africa of Westzlfrica magazine alleges that a Capof Slavery in Africa (Madison, 1988), 12-13. E` v· tain Mitten "discovered" the coal deposits after noting *1he habit of certain natives of bum70. "l-louse" heads could contract young “apprentice" workers (up to age sixteen) for · ing in their homes coal chipped from the hillside," West Africa, 24 February 1917 76 periods of up to five years. Following a barrage of criticism by metropolitan abolitionists, .\ 94. Rhodes House Library, Mss. Afr. s. 375 (1), "Miner and Executioner " contained in the proclamation was amended to include a quarterly review of the impact of the law by_ `». _ “Five Nigerian Ta1es," Lt. Gerald Adams, n.d. l the British commissioner. But later, in 1902, the law was tightened and the period of ap- ,’ V 95. PRO, CO 683/26, Director Nigeria Railway to Under Secretary of State for the prenticeship was extended to twelve years. Tamuno, The Evolution ofthe Nigerian State, I 1 Colonies, 23 September 1914. 324. < , 96. PRO, C0 583/26, M.E. Bland, · - - 71. It fined disobedient or vagrant "house" members and authorized the ‘“head" to claim ` ` sha, 18 December l9l4_ Ganaml Manager Railway to Commlssmlm Omia percentage of their profits and/or earnings when employed outside the "house." Further, Q i 97. PRO, CO 583/26, Harcourt Minute, 1 September 1914; PRO, CO 583/26 Lewis V it imprisoned any person hiring "house" members without the consent of the "head." De- ‘ L Harcourt Minute, 1 September 1914; PRO, CO 583/44, "Address of the Governor;Genera1 ’; < spite humanitarian opposition, the ordinance remained in force until 1914. I _ Proceedings of the Second Meeting of the Nigerian Council, 29 December 1915 8-9 l ` 72. PRO, CO 588/1, No. 15 of 1903, clause 5(a) as cited in Tamuno, The Evolution ofthe · _ 98. PRO, CO 583/14. Harcourt Memorandum, 19 May 1916. l V Nigerian State, 319. l.C. Anene, Southern Nigeria in Transition: 1885-1906 (Cambridge, 1 V 99, Ibid, 1966 , $08. ¢ i? I 100. An bo, The warrant Chia S, i · 73l The most extensive discussion is in Amadiurne’s Mole Daughters, 137-40. I 1914, g f 76-77, PRO, CO 583/9* Bayncs Mmme’ 18 February 74. There are no studies of Chief Chukwuani. The most extensive treatment is in a { = 101. Only anecdotal information is available about this group. Dillibe Onyeama whorerom; Study by a n0n.1nstor·ian, Anayo Enechukwu, History of Nlwnu (Enugu, 1993)- SR ·‘ , lisd on oral testimony, notes that Onyeama selected members from Ngwo, Nsudg land Ekc Chap. 12. ’; I Who participated in wrestling and boxing matches he staged at Eke. Tignor and Mgboh sug75. Despite his prominence, Onyeama has not received serious study. With the exception , gest that they terrorized Onyeama’s villages as a paramilitary force. They were not paid cash of anecdotal references to him in Afigbo’s Warrant Chiefs, there are only two studies: => ·. but "in kind and lived primarily on loot and plnnder," and even seized other men’s wives Onyeama, Chief Onyeama; Felix C. Mgboh, "Biography of Chief Onyeama," (Research ‘ Onyeama was very big on "inventing" regalia so they wore a distinctive unifonn—long red paper of 1-11snn·y.(;1v1;;s, Alvan Ikokn College of Education. Owerri. Nigeria. -11-U18 1980)- ` WPS Md matching unifomt. Tignor alleges that "the Agwumili (sic) , ,, 1ir€;a11y tm-Oyizcd There was a fourth chief in the Owerri area, Chief Njemanze, who brought in large num- _ ’_ local communities committing all kinds of crimes, including a number of murders with imbm-S gf Qwgni men, However, he has not been studied to tho €X1€1'\E0f T-116 0*-l1€1` \hI€¢· `i` " Pu¤l1Y·” And, he asserts that the impending govemment prosecution of Onygamglfgy com. 76, Amyo Emchukwm Hispgyzy DfNk,mn, see especially Chap. 12. - W * [11i€itY in S¤V€f&1 niimiers they committed was the reason behind Onyeama’s suicide in 1934 77, Onyeama, Chief Onyeama, 21. ` l I O¤Y€¤m¤. Chiefwtyeomo, 40; Tignor, "Colonial Chiefs," 350; Mghoh, “Th5 Biography or 78. Ibid., 24. — V Chief Onyeama," 12, 79. Interview with Chief Nwafor Chukwuani, Enugu, Nigeria, 15 June 1975 and Prince ` — 102. Interview with C.O. Ude, Amokwe, Udi, February 23, 1972; interview with Chief J Harpy Chukwumi, omni, is July 1999. see several pages in Enechukwn. History ofNk¤¤¤. , ‘ » Nwankwo. Eke. Udi, March 7, 1972 as cited in Uzeochi, “Eastem Nrgsnim Ranway ~ iggl Chap, 12, ` 103._ F.D. Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa (Hamden CT ,1965). 80. Enechukwu, History ofNkanu, Chap. 12. . . 217-18. ' ’ ’ 81. Interview with Nwafor Chukwuani. 104. For a discussion of Lugard’s policies, see Afigbo, The Warrant Chiefs Chap. 482. Onyeama, Chief Onyeama, 26. Mi 105. Thomas, Anthropological Report, vol. 1-4. , I 83. Ibid., 28. i g . 106. Afigbo, The Warrant Chiefs, 158. ' 84. Interview with Chief Edwueme II, Egede, 19 February 1972, as cited in Uzeochi, , I 107. Ibid., 126, 162 for summary. "Eastem Nigerian Railway," 122. t 108. Ibid., 137. 85. Onyeama, Chief Onyeama, 28. Y , 5 109. Enechukwu, History of Nkonu, 288. 86. Uzeochi, "Eastem Nigerian Railway? 122. V fj 110. Onyeama, Chief Onyeama, 43, 87. Robert L. Tignor, "Colonial Chiefs in Chielless Societies," Journal ofModemAfrican g ` lll. PRO, CO 584/15, "Report on the Cost of Construction of Eastern Railway " Lugard Studies 9, 3 (1971): 350. · V to Harcourt, 12 June 1914. ’ 88. Onyeama, Chief Onyeama, 40. ~. 112. Ibid., "Nigerian Eastem Railway Construction Estiniate—First Revise " 22 April 39, Aiigbo, The Warrant Chieh, 104. ‘ y ` 1914. enclosure in Contidential dispatch, Lugard to Harcourt, 12 Jung 19i4_ l

, ’= 92 "We Were All Slaves " 113. Ibid., Lugard to Harcourt, "Eastern Line First Progress Report," 22 May 1914, ¥ 114. Ibid. · E 3 115. PRO, CO 583/21, Lugard to Harcourt, 18 December 1914. ‘ C 116. Ibid., "Eastem Railway Progress Report," 18 December 1914, enclosure in Lugard ` i to Harcourt, 6 January 1914. , V 117. Ranger, "Invention of Tradition in A.f1ica," 220. _ E 118. PRO, CO 583/9, "An Ordinance to Provide for the Control of Large Bodies of I , Labourers Employed on Govemment Works," 24 January 1914. j. j 119. Ibid, Harcourt Draft Despatch, 20 February 1914. T 5 120. PRO, CO 583/9, Baynes Minute, 18 February 1914. ~· ,_ ‘ 121. Harcourt Draft Despatch, 20 February 1914. { , 122. Tarnuno, The Evolution ofthe Nigerian State, 45. · 123. Jones, "Chieftaincy in Southeastern Nigeria." ~ ‘ 124. NNAE, Onprof 1/15/3, Lt. Governor’s Office Onitsha to H.E. Govemor-General , i Lagos, 16 November 1914. ~ 125. PRO, CO 583/12, Despatch from Lugard, April 15, 1914. Q • E _ e ,,6_,,,,,,_ , CITY. NUGU AND THE 127. PRO, CO 583/32, Despatch from Lugard to Harcourt, 29 April 1915. ' 128. PRO, CO 583/20, Lugard to Harcourt 19 November 1914. 1 4 F 129. Interview with Chief Yaro¢Onaga, cited in Isichei, A History of the [gba People. S 130. PRO, CO 583/19, Lugard to Harcourt, 10 November 1914. , ‘ 131. Interview with Chief Yaro Onaga, lsichei, A History ofthe Igbo People. PRO, CO j g ` N 7 ` N l I 583/32, T. W Dann, DO Udi, "F`inal Report Upon Operations of the Udi Pat:ro1," 18 Feb- · j ruary 1915, enclosure in Lugard to Harcourt, 29 April 1915. . ` 132. PRO, CO 583/32, T.W. Dann, DO Udi. Q 133. Ibid., Lugard to Harcourt, 29 April 1915. 1 134. Documentation of the Udi Revolt is included in two records series, NNAE, Y, V ONPROF 1/15/28 and PRO, CO 583 tiles /12, /14, /19, /20, /23, /32; Akinjide Osuntokun, ' "Disaffeey;i¤n and Revolts in Nigeria During the First World War, 1914-1918/` Ccvulditm Q With ih€ Udi 11pI`iSing defeated, the state concentrated on establishing the ma] inJournal ofAfrican Studies 5, 2 (1971): 180. I dustry and T-h€ of Eflllgll. Ellllgll WB.S 3. BSW type of settlement-a colonial 135. PRO, C0583/31, Despatches February-April 1915. · —. `, ¤ity—and the colliery a new system of preduction—the ea italist mine Both 136. NNAE, Onprof 1/15/28, EngineerWarri to Commissioner Onitsha, 16 March 1915. Q = emerged under the watchful cya of Frederick Lu ard the P ' 137. 1b1a.,n1s¤-act omcei our to commissioner omaha, 31 March 1915. ; Nigeria Lugmdg personal interest in the my andih 3 d ‘:§l°V°m°;§°¤;;db°f , _} _ · _ e in us arose m 's e1 _ V, 11ef that while wage labor was of educative value for African labor, Africans should · ' remain socially rooted in their rural communities away fmm the "dan " · _ _ _ gcrous temp» I Lationsa-pf;·baa1 lg 13ut neither the city nor the workplace was shaped only by ~ o om o cia s. rican men and a small number of women from both local and ` g more distant areas entered Enugu and the colliery and shaped them according to » { their life strategies, values, concerns, and cultures. With the oppression of the chiefs L gl in the countryside, Enugu became a refuge for men and women seeking "freedom" = and it would never be the ordered, racially segregated colonial city that Lugard t ’ hopeid to create. In a similar manner workers in the mines, both voluntary and covr, , erce , conditioned the industry to accommodate the rural rhythms that , , _ I pulled them » -1 away from theirjobs to farm or to fulfill village social obligations. They too forced VI management to acknowledge a limited control over the supply of labor and the ; labor process itself.

94 “We were All Sidney " Creating the Colonial Workplace and the Culorrial City 95 For the slave and rreeborn men of Udi, most especially the young, urtrnarried r their values clashed with the needs of the coal companies of the rnid—nineteenth men, the conquest presented new possibilities and challenges. On the one hand, y Century: they had to develop strategies to avoid the disruptive impact of the chief’s exac- i V The bslisvsdth t rt . . , . _ _ _ tions on their lives. On the other, they tried to position themselves to benefit from . 1 as L]; lsu th of if CB Thmn clilucms d°°m°“S °°“°"’mmg the mmmg Of COB-L such any new opportunities that emerged under the nascent state and new market econ- i should gout limcufygl wl spcrid undcrgmund md h°W much Coal they omy. Subordinate men—the young, slaves, and the indigent—became adept at : must O1? m an a ’sry WIT? B gemgmvc °f the we getter a}‘d “°° °f the °aPl‘ evading the exploitation of their superiors (i.e., senior men, Ogamnyan, slave- , the nsw com ' ' .mieY ues cléshed at evmiy Pm? with the ““°“&1° Of owners) in the village. The Udi uprising during the war had proven that direct con- 1, musm ,,i P S’ wl Bu Emphasis °n Wmk d1¤·=¤r>1¤¤¤ and °°mP*mY Pamfrontation with the colonialialists was futile and it was prudent to make a judicious ` s ` accommodation to the new conditions. The problem was how to manipulate this i E¤¤g¤’s miners Shared these values, but, unlike British ntinei-s_ were able to pw nep; system of authority while avoiding a conflict with me-state, most notably the , I SFYVS thiim throughout the iuduS¤'y”S history because as a state enterprise, the eo]eru;;s_ Bath she city and tl; industry offereri new gossrbrlitrgs. Th hl t f th r` y ;;>;;*’:iE;’€1' $0ggY drive? by the ingperatives of the capitalist market, Because s c ap er examines e war years as a orma ve perro in e is Oty 0 e ` ‘ _ SUSE arming 0 temper eir reliance on the coal indus ,tiie‘ industry and the sity of Enugu_ it investigates the many ways that ioeai men ma. `I l sciousness retiected elements of the peasantry and of independent ruruayl craflisinoeln neuvered against authoritarian chiefly control, forced labor, and workplace ex- E ; contracting to work on mutually agi-eeabic te,-ms_ { plgitation by "native" and expatriate staff. Despite the context of extreme state *_ They abscmed themselves ffum the mines to participate in the planting and hat. gppressigns workers septired some measure gf eqntrgl ove; the terms under which I j V€S'Ei11g SS2lS0l’1SiH thCiI villages, and IO fulfill social ObIig8ti0llS (L8. f\.ll'lS1'é1IS milf- . they ggld their labgppower, theeqrgariization of work in the mines, the intensity ` i Iiagesi festivals, ¢t¤·) to their families and communities, And to the dismay of with which they were prepared to work, and the frequency with which they pre- i ` management they sold their labor-power in small and irregular units. The British sented themselves at the colliery. They molded the workplace according to their ` imerpreted this spirit of rural-based independence as Connrmauon of their racist culture, beliefs about work, and their strategies to improve their positions as men ' aSS“mPti¤¤S about the urationality, laziness, and inherent moral infei-ini-ity of in the village, In so doing they exemplified the creative strategies that early African ` · ' Afficail W0fk¤fS· Their interpretation of the workers’ behavior said moi-e about the workers developed to insure that they benefited from the colonial eXperiBn¤¢· Theif `Z ` “im·agi“€d” Africa in their heads than the reality of the society they had conquered work eulture andthe priorities they attached to village life enabled them to ncgo- ~ The TWHYY Was that T-h¢S¢ men had developed strategies to elude the "rnai-ket_” tisliate ai-gas rflgcontigyl within the labor process at the mines and to humanize and de- `· i CWB; ¤X¤H1i;¤1¤g0n of rural life, and an acknowledgment of the integiity gf Igbo ne ur an ` e in nugu, j 2 Some Yi WUI-‘ aV€ revealed 6. competing economic strategy with its Own if lh Din-ing this peiisogi eolliery mnejrlisgtabltished agattegnvsl ot; gevsifstaiircph that grystalic _ j f’·lgYd”~¤d validity. Sigctg Africans would not respond to the market in ways tif; si;. Us In s Wave O smpme s s is C W S 0 O1. al. _ S sn ject O ; is is e emp oyerssan e state, the salient characteristic of the "African w k " Chapter 4. Some of these wartime protests reflected the problems posed by rapid V E bewmc his "Africa.nness" and as Cooper has noted the two Words scsmsdc; ;l;_ urbanization for the region`s food system, as well as the difiiculties of monetiz— I PYESS two incompatible concepts? ing new currencies. Others were related to c¤il0ny—wide grievances of both African . S€1f·imPf0V€m€Hf and commitment to uplift the village, two dynamic nm-ms of · and European civil servants after the Great War. The connections between this I Igbu masculinity, also iniiueneed the men’S behavior in the industry and the mls unrest and the agitation of civil servants and workers in England, demonstrated g R that mine Workers played in village pbiitiss They were a progressive force Chas that some Afi-iean weikets saw themselves as pai-t of a iai-ge; eommunity of Biitish . ~ lenging the, autocratic policies of the chiefs while operating from a position of coneivii servants with legitimate expectations of improvement while working for the j i sidefiblc PFTUSS The progressive role they played in the village also drew upon state. [ i an ur an po 'tic culture in Enugu where men from more distant re io f I Although some coal employees saw themselves as workers or loyal staff, racism , _ bfgldfid and 3-U regions of Nigeria created new institutions of assggigtiqis sgprevented colonial authorities and the industry’s managers from recognizing the ` it 61 IZQUOH, and power. similarities between Nigeria’s miners and their British counterparts. In the mid- `Q ` In '-ha °itY» Skiucd l¤b¤1’¤1‘S and Clerical workers in the railway and the cgiljery nineteenth century, British miners were fiercely independent, reserving the right ` r f°¤'m°d OTS?-¥uZ¤ti0¤S, Called Nzukv, to give shape and order to urban 1i£e_ They Cie. to work when they pleased in the mines and, alternatively, to farin on their own ' Bled networks that acculturated newcomers to city life, established judicial proce{ields. They shared “the connnon traditions of the peasantry" and considered them- 3 s ’ d“1i°;f°1‘ Settling disputes, transferred resources to the rural village, and functioned selves to be rural tradesmen and not proletarrans. In many important respects g 4 HS 21 Or bureaus for men seeking Jobs And because they incorpommd misans and

l 96 ww were All Slaves" J l= Creating the Colonial Wcrlqylzzce and the Colonial Ciry 97 th H t Christian cme as WGH as laborers, they became anin]p()]'1‘_3]){C()I\·~ , The city offered protection and "freedom" to subordinate men who used Enugu cl°rkS’ 6 tcm €’ ’ ~ ‘ [ ' ` t challe ethee erc'se of h` il th ' ' the v'lla es "C 1 " e d text for disseminating the nationalist ideas emanating from the westermzed e ite in ~` . 0 HE _ X _ I C *6 Yfm IOUYY U1 1 S · °g·m°¤ gm Tg? L War ro a anda that emphasized the rights to Self-determination, democracy, ` j as a contentious social group, the inevitable consequence of the mdustry’s exisag°s' . P P g · - ‘ ’ ire held a ainst the ` tence and in sh enin contradiction with colonial rural olic . The rural-based and equality resonated with the grievances that the Nigerian ¢l g V V · 31'P g l Q p y E iadon Of The colonial service at the tum of the ccmm-y_3 i miners transferred and adapted these liberal ideas to the villages where they beump g came an ideological counterpoint to the despotism of the chief. As a group the elite _ V _ V _ mx __ _ t and the coal workers opposed the state policy that favored "traditional" chiefs and . . ij,. . · ig ‘ P5? . *5* ; { 4 _ . V‘ l consciously campaigned against both Onyeama and Chukwuani. By the war, the iw V, ., —~ ,g.—. g_ ‘ ‘ , V X V `¢ *. V "· , · T-—·‘;é;.__V i { V city had become a center of anti—chief agitation, further popularizing it as a refuge P4 4/F" · · ` g:<· ~.1_;?.M 1 ~ the village and the industry was made quite intimate through the use of the "Na— . 5 `xz ·f' -» .·=: —_ nt., V __ E ‘ l ‘ »3i ~ ~ , .· _` : -3 i`>·.r.T' . ‘·‘i"".. l . ‘ . r l ;»» ‘ VV t - V V L V. 6 ‘·?¥ `» .,» ` - ’ .;=. si. -‘ ; . ~ ‘'»_ ` Vw! V V · ’ . . ‘ A ;..V; ` bah J e 5: R B V . .: >_ ., _ _$` .-1;;* . . i 4 V _ Att: V VJ: ` 2 l"%»r”Y` NY ** ~ ‘-'"*»¤ » ~ *”·#c· ~ V; "°*X$ - lt. .- ¥V l` · __; ...t itc ; *1;; i"zI@;;.`>¢,‘§;`;i.a;*’.;i_ . ”.`°` - ` ‘ { l = ` _V.. · · li __ · V IQ V · V ~ wv -· V ‘ P’*¤_`¤».'·’C.;*;·r -·(— * , V L ' l . · : ‘ · . - A "i» V _ 1 bx F, _ ·. ~{, *;£_';_.f¤va J, 5 gy ' A ` ,= {fg.; V A i _ V AV yl M ;»»·.,—`\ yy: Q: wg] 1 ~ °'\ .'“” T ’ i ~ ;-— » ,· ~, ¢·4 I . ` '`'` ` =~ » t··· gi » ’?l`¥*`*’l¤J’ {V 'tlrg lf , V .VV ·::— ’$“°—. in V yy _;.,,@‘;.: V g ‘- ?.i·‘·$re¤%·i V *' . l li = ;j ati i ·· x i. _ ..~··.,:a ‘—‘“ `; IV l, _ _ · ' ’ ", fl"` . ,6 i _ {gv? ., 1 It . el l — _ V V gy M Vp y, .. KV- _ V it »¤_— il yi; Vi "· *.4% wi ... J ~ _~ \ il` " ~, V .1 »4 .. ~‘ LV V.: Vi.: _: -—g__ j r f ( l ·· ¢r.__ V - { -%u\ ·A ; »." I: V- _ it l l >LL_’£,` _ 4 fn; W " ' - lu V “i’é° A l ` wi · " l ` l ' ` 4 ~ ri ‘ "'l» ¤~ w ~» . V ·.. ’t " ···+··"‘ * r r »·-— { . i. i ·. ' · A 5* V · V r ,. .·~t·—* »~ ·iV _ 4V V · . ;.;. V V _} gtciéq l T" Ib -:2. 1¤*;_;;_§»•.·__ ~ It ` V ~ MQ'. ri ` V LE 'ilaw HJ V·~ ·y__ L n I . C`} mi .. ‘ ’ Z ‘ ’ · · ` ‘ w n · *· I Pg"“‘f‘""*~r??*&é$ V l , i r· ,, ; V ._ ._ ¤ V .~.V V —— V ·#*· ’i‘j5‘yl?· " will ` Q`? Yyf 4*. · E,.·L• (A · 1 V 1 ` M` ` I A L, V ~ J` —— -— . s` ·‘i gi · ~ set t, · ’ t W i . · l .. V Q .. _V_;V`»Q _ . V. , V. 3 *» Q: ¥ " "·e""?. photo 3,1 Workers digging first boreholes, circa 1913 <MS.AFR.s. 384 lv N0- ` Lgl';<<;;¢:di·-Z Early wal miner in his village (MS.AFR.s. 1507 Fel, 3-B0d|€ian Library, 7l—Bod|eian Library, Oxford) i

` 98 “We Were All Sluv¢S” ‘x r` Creating the Colonial Workplace and the Colonial City 99 _ ,, - ·· ‘ "’ `ntment of re resentatives ,L ` Nigerian Transport Directorate with the colliery being an ap endage of the NigerUW C°mTS to mcim1tW0fl(€‘S° md me chlafs appm P , l ~ ian Railway system. The frst skilled surface workers and ldlerks were also sec[(0 Supcwlsc cm m the mmcsl was far more complex than the simple relations " r ended from the railway.‘° They came from Britain’s black colonies throughout the - The cxciclsc of vlclkpllccdaowiiad roblems for management. It was relatively V Atlantic World-Sierra Leone, British West Indies, as well as more colonized areas in pr0dl1CU0n· md xt mv0.VS glyt ccuild they be made to produce? lf so, for how ii ‘ of Nigeria—Westem Nigeria, and Onitsha, on the Niger River. All administrative easy T0 S€t_m°“ to the mm? ;»dOn‘> As Burawoy and Cooper have argued, cole- i` A and financial matters related to the operation of the mines were under the adminking and WIL? what ljegl-ce O gx S wig] for-ms of political support in the legal and _ istrative supervision of the appropriate official in the railway}1 mal l”°d°°°°n rfglmcé rcqmmt the "Native Court" system proved useful. Chiefs y “ The railway was the key factor in the coal market and had its seasonal vagaries. Pqhllclll system In this fcspccf infractions of industrial discipline. The connec— Q V This caused an irregularity of work, characteristic of most coal industries. While l/Ymmgly used mem Fcfuay lgllii Pindustrial representatives gave management new ~ ` in temperate countries fluctuations in the availability of mine work reflected seauons between uic chic S an ' the mines as well as outside in the villages and if , sonal temperature change, Nigerian coal miners found their work interrupted by ways tv SUPEYVISF the men ,ms1 in ter loca] chiefs ran the labor camps using their , L I the export calendar for the colony’s agricultural goods. From October to Decemca-mpsl AS Ilqtcd m The privlgufdiesg levels of coercion were more difficult to en- · ber the trains transported ground nuts, leaving few cars to evacuate coal from tl1e Own P‘“”"“1'Y”y gmupfh ilate was forced into an uneasy alliance with the new Q l colliery. Then mining operations were reduced, shifts cut, and workers dismissed, force m th°.°‘Yy Whew ·;;j d ia; gl controlled by the African elite. ll 0HlY to be re-engaged when wagons were once again available. In Scotland this mban assoclauons Ol-gam an g y i type of mining seasonality led miners to value a certain autonomy by maintaining * ’ M ` their fields and livestock as insurance against the off season. Similarly, in Enugu FROM LABOR CAMP TO CITY: F workers negotiated mine work with the gendered farm cycle in their villages. Men’s EN UQU AND EARLY URBAF CULTURE 1 91 4'1 gl 9 it 1 fanning chores increased during three specific periods: from January to February, ' ' erations co enced just as Europe entered World War L l , March to April, and parts of October. At that time the men absented themselves Wha? mmmg OP d l lgilel in state projects in Nigeria to support the war 5 from the mines to work their fields. As luck would have it, the railway and farmccommlcs were afgcte filicw llie was considered a priority and went forward I ‘ lng cycles did not always coincide. Thus management was forced to discharge and Eff°n‘ But thi Opcmilg O H; T;} CO; the P;-{mary fuel source of the railway, were Q j re-engage workers on the one hand, and futilely seek workers on the other. as Scllcduladl Sugphcs O' l e est there and the danger posed by German U-boats. p I ` The railway schedule reduced the workers’ ability to integrate colliery jobs with cmmc because of mdusiniii nin ex loit the coal fields. The first mine, Udi Mine, _ agricultural labor because they were not always able to get work when they wanted Govemrlmm moved qmc yd Oat I; Valley in 1917. Shortly after. Obwetti Mine it li It Alilwllgh the iDdl1St1'y’S irregular labor needs frustrated those workers who Opened m 1915 and a iicmfi y ed until 193o when the old Udi Mine was closed. i wanted full employment, it discouraged the development of anAfrican proletariat, was 0pcne‘lvA1ltT-lflrrkic turd: tlile Iva and Obwetti mines were the principal work- i ti social class that the state had anticipated with dread.” These conflicting poliFix ggzpcnod O S S y if cies and priorities made it very difficult to stabilize the collicry’s industrial relaP ac ' · - · ’ m cred unfavorably with the Z tions. Enugu coal was Sub_b1llt‘mui;\;da2ildmv;liExila(;/Uanld Scottish bituminous coal, ` Y When the mines began production in 1915 the workforce was an eclectic colWalsh Stcmlmg coal that 1 rcgf i ition and combustion. It was, therefore, a good action of forced and voluntary unskilled labor, prisoners, unskilled contract workIt was Superior to both lll Caljglerf? But its chemical and physical qualities were a . rs, and voluntary clerical workers and artisans. This heterogeneous mixture of $$6f*m °°?‘l for locomolwcthm aj-im; beyond the regional area. As a "soft" coal it . en with differing skills and commitments to wage labor under different systems d`s'"°°“°l° to Fltcndlng C [ith each handling into ever smaller-and less us- ` it- labor control, and familiarity with the capitalist workplace, created eclectic patbI°k° easllyl dlsmwgllrlunilgl ro ortion of undersized coal was useless in steam I j» ms of protest and work culture in the industry. In the initial period, it was the arab1°'°hlmks' A consldemtr ilzaliconditions its high carbon content made it prone I tisans and clerical workers of the railway, who organized the first protests. Although fumac6S.M0t€0V€L in Ollhus most purchasers intentionally held small re- j jg ey looked down on the manual workers underground, their forms of protest to Sponmncoui com us 1%; The Hiarket especially vulnerable to work stopp3g€S netheless became a model for subsequent wage bargaining by the more "local” selves, a practice that Hhad led durin periods of coal scarcity.9 Enugu workers _ nderground laborers. Because the railway and coal industries were functionally which Workers Often icthc u traintsgon reserves and planned their protest-S RC- `B it nked, their respective workers also had close ties. During the war the influence were acutely aware O e cons ij i· militant railway workers on the less seasoned colliery workers was noticable. °°rdmgll` the industry’s major transporter and consumer, and was oiigk p e connection was especially close because unrest in one industry affected the nal'1l}yli.l1i;li:\ll1i"t§Va,c}li?runistrative unit over the industry. Both were assigned to the t other since it interrupted either the coal market or the supply. As the older of the

100 We were All Slaves ` Cmaling the Cvlvnial Workplace and the Colonial City 101 two, the railway workers were the vanguard for the wave of protest during and im- i ` r ~~~~~~~ ,- ~ y .. mediately after World War I, which incited the nrst wave of unrest in the colliery. i . { . 1 i , Even in this early period both groups understood their strategic importance to West , l ¤ · , ` Africa’s colonial economy, and they protested in individual and coordinated ways f ` * ` ` against the organization and conditions of work, the quality of their life, and their ~ . · ` PW · Work relations in the Enugu mines demonstrated many of the characteristics of I i the colonial capitalist workplace. An overt and explicit system of racial authority t j ` _ { ` ` was deliberately crafted inrthe early rnines and the city, Colonial "whiteness," a f l ` . new, socially constructed category, had to be concretized and empowered if it were l ` , ` to become a signifrer of authority and a crucial element in social control. This is . V 1 _ _ 1 ` ` i ` not to imply that Africans could not see the physical difference between themselves g , 1 `. . _’ A. 1 ` · and the "white" authorities, but difference did not mean superiority nor hegemony, , `· _ 1 ·/1 f,,..;.y·5. ._ l ·V i _ That had to be created and legitirnized. Certainly, after the brutality of the con- x ,,,,h_.;,, " l" il *'·v j "f `_ quest, Africans could see the destructive power of a colonial army, but this army ` _` »_ _` W {_ hi" ” “· Q n it “ was not "white" but black soldiers under white command. Thus the conquest alone V; ` » = psa, ’ iw ````yh\` si ml z is _·'` _ r v did not imbibe "whiteness" with power. Furthermore, the people did not neces- Q ( fw ’ sarily believe that Udi’s subordination to British rule was the result of their "in- f ji ; r§w.·~'· `*_iE?’i3°f§Y¥·*$_`”]=;-;;_,_j ‘ _, , " herent, biological inferiority," an assumption made by Lugard who supported Z i._` s scientific racist notions. The people of Udi were overpowered, but this was a sub- , . this ·Li_,,.sY 5 ' ordinate status contingent upon the state’s ability to create "enduring forms of dom- Y rt Y. pf"; ` tf if `Z ‘';` W inance.""’ Such forms were not well established in the first half-decade of colonial ,· ] Photo 3 3 Udi mh i ` M `L`;""“ V `” " ` ` " · " t ~ V · · M . rule. Thus the racial dimension of colonial power had to be deliberately encour- Oxfmdy I I ary °utp°st* mma 191 3 (M$·AFR.S. 384 b 99-Bgdlgian Librswl aged in myriad structural and ideological ways. Self-representation played an ima ¤ portant part in this process, and officials were intent on emphasizing their cultural Q p and racial superiority over their Nigerian subjects. . 1 i In the first three years of the war, the city of Enugu did not formally exist. There, Q r1%:_;;?$hI;;an;1i;:;°V°¥;n;f“· mcchim-l°$» Bild electricians lived Ou tho os_ was only a military outpost at Udi (see photos 3.3 and 3.4) and a cluster of labor} { mocks to The mines dgl 16 ter Wmid Wa? IL m€11 Carried them in hamcamps near the mine entrance and at the site of the railway station. During the war, Q hh the maths consciousilléss 5 Impact Of @8 1’1¤1=¤l of racial power and Privilege there were three camp sites: "Coal Camp" in Enugu proper and two "un0fticial” ‘ _ minor cited this practice as gas so dmmm°_th“_ thmy W6-FS later, nearly every camps, Ugwu Alfred (Alfred’s Hill) and Ugwu Aaron (Aar0n’s Hill), which were. . The land for the town and hjxanilplc °fm°1sm_m the mi¤€S·l7 administered by "native" labor contractors.*" African workers lived in "bush’T, cess of dubious legality mr c mlllcs was accluiféd ffvm Udi "cliiefs" in u procamps in the valley near the Udi escarpment, and Europeans lived in temporary hmhhs lahdug From 1914 tgliiligvhlch the NSWO Village-group lost almost all its housing high on a ridge overlooking the future site of Enugu.iDuring this period, ized as a township hundred ft wen before the S€ifl€ment was legally yocog_ when conditions were so rudimentary, political authorities like Lugard attempte grsohmxysidc and iu ahtici mos Of tnlicn Were d1'¤WH to the site by the umost in the to institutionalize the racialized system of authority implicit in colonialism. For J, h 1917 when The Iva Vasc n_° ° amval Of Y-he T¤1lW&y and mining opemuons_ race to become an important expression/signifter of power in a recently ooriqnere pm the campsg Most of the ;'m"fm`*° was OP€H€d, over 400 "bush*· houses were hum area, colonial "whiteness”’ had to be given meaning and authority. This was es . · 3 isshmary Society Schools _ S?)“S_md Clmml workers had been munod in Church cially important when there was so little difference in the material conditions an d those unskilled laborcrslgvh ¤¤tSh¤, OW°!`¤· and to the west in ]_agOs_20 Thoy_ living arrangements of both colonizer and colonized. Both lived in "bush" houses} j um, were the hm Seth _ ;W°r° df¤g¤¤¤¤d by Chiefs Onyeama and Chuk. with thatched roofs and dirt iioors.15 Until the town was formally designed wi ii ohm, Community with 1;; m mgm The Qlerks and afliiscns formed a Cosmoboundaries between "European colon.izer" and “Affi¢¤¤ S11bj¢¢L” Affi63·¤$ had li V gainst the Conquest and mts izshdj Ligfs elim gmt had mobilized SO Vigomusly interpret the political meaning of European settlement high on the Udi escarpmeu V ’ ormom they h a d dcclagcd as s°¤mm"‘¤"“ m g°"°1T¤'¤¢¤f Smployment. Furln case the significance was missed, there were the "harnmock boys." The Euros he amhcty icah _W" QH l-·ug6·l’d· Wlwm they attacked in their moss as V g p y arrogant rmpena1rst.2* In August 1916 the Enugu group Wroto

102 "We Were All Slavzslfj ‘r Creating the Colonial Workplace and rhe Colonial City 103 ~ _ r r . r :·;~~ee ’ , ~ ee ·· e q s- re ·¤ r ·.. s. ' it A ~ 1 1 l r 1 i ollll r r l` _yr,r?‘{ l , A _ r l , i l r _§s.,s.* ra . t j; ·" git llll 1 * 1 * it 1 ¤ 1 it- i it EJ"' re. r r 1 · ; r » ~ 1 1 ~ ~ ~ l. L -if-¤*r" 1 "t=~ » . _ n, _ , » i ~ n pyro i ; not tz¥;.; ®;;·. levi r if _. e ~`;» re . l r ~·~» r · Q t rs 1% ` ` r, `pirrjhg ` V .: V igléé ;,£,i.;rs;,;}_,,·1_ ;•’ www ‘Z~ tj ,3 n n é' in i r _ — n ee i ii · P of °°' Ma. U if =‘ hi‘ Je i ~ . ~ ~ r ~ rr ,· t r¤· $:"‘",.4 lh · D Q 1·~ ?` ,. n gl in , eee, ger Q :.i¤r;ii ium )ir~ lofi ` n , ` r ` , it nl`, r i· ,e_ii.i.— _¤'-· it 2, ... a..~ ii ~` ` ~ rr “ . l'ié»i.r’*"" ‘I ` · O§l U isi ` 1 1 ~ r ~ 1 r u i , :~ . 1 ~ rmi · . 1 lh b iol el r gi J r l i 1 r , , ,, v »~ in ~‘ l _.`»- • l ~»» .. ~ rr or n . t , , r n 1 , , _1 l r 2; ,.,...., •.+ *~ é is ¤¤»~l` *”d . ‘ l ~ ~ ~ `,``,`` si 2, ’ ’ ·` ’;'-L2;} ‘·,`‘`· rg r~····, €;e U . - , i , ,_· Q l npr Q O umm V M g __ A A } r V} ` t§__` , l ib nih ‘;.*» ~ . , ‘ ,,~ ¤-· ’ r:;l?$.i‘1..; ¢· ‘¥iE “ Y 1 V ` i JJ · ,...,. ,» ,,,,,, » · ‘ ‘ 1 . We _,m.,¤.i.., an , . nsrrrnir mir rg; -'fr j¤ ¢31 ‘=:}i`+ — _,,t E : .,,,, w..·.n.·n. ·¤.*§1 ;;i ‘ I ; S•···i¤¤n¤··` ll? ' · . F »·~»·* "°"“ '°“`° ” » i, ”*'l"i'éi?‘?ll° `__ ` __,4 », fgi e ;i* z~=e ~ ‘; 2c;§t§ `T = ‘‘·’ * . -_ `,, ‘ ;R 3 :5::;:. A , j £j {t l @$¢= Lv rjini l ·` Photo 3.4 Mining conscripts in Udi (MS.AFR.s. 384—Bodleian Library, Oxford) V ` "‘ n ·- "`¢‘~—- °$n . Map 3.1 Enugu, 1917. Drawn from PRO, COSB3/67[4) Station Plan No. 107, Gov} _ ernment Station, Enugu—Ngwo. (Rutgers University Cartography) the Church Missionary Society’s Niger Mission on behalf of 100 rail, colliery, an prison workers, offering to construct a church and requesting a ministerzz Man g of British society. It is contrasted with the disorder, dirt, and chaos of the African _ were Ygyuba conveiis who held their own weekly church S€1'Vi€€$»· Whdo crher ‘ hfoaifhe “Na¤Vc Town" His most elaborate musings on the spatial requirements were [goo clerical workers both from Owerri province, about 100 miles south · ' * ‘ cf this 1'¤¤i8hZed,¤ud1ority are expressed in intricate and obsessive derail in Lnfrsrn Onirshs roWn_ They made Enugu an lgbo city of "strangef” Isbe frvm jE¤Fd’§ memorandum on "Townships." Here he explained the racial protocol of more developed and earlier colonized areas of Igboland. Even before the town W = _ colonial Nigeria to his political officers?7 The design of Enugu was an important formally laid out you could see the contours of an African urban culture. In th ` aspect of the new authoritarian structure because it gave physical form to the racial midst of a bush camp, these men created an urban African life that challenged L, l und class stratification that constituted colonial order. Residential segregation was games assertions that Africans were essentially rural beings. h · 23 _ also important because it symbolized cultural, racial, and class boundaries in a By latg 1915 rhere were 400 workers at the colliery of varying OHSUL Th? {9 f lFP¤¤¤ (tho Guy) Shared by European/African, colonizer/subject, black/whire_ Such mal layout of the town was made by a senior health officer with frequent inte kboundaries were especially important in spaces where Africans and Europeans were Venrieris by ]_,uggrd_ (see Map 3.1.) Lugard’s ideas about urban dwgh W darly ¤oHt¤ot—the city and the colonial workplace. Inthese spaces sucliernarkt represenrsrive or early-twentieth-century British theories nbouturbou Planning; E »¤FS had Pohhcal srgriificahce. Lugzrd translated racial segregsrion into principles reaction to the nineteenth-century industrial city; early-twentieth-century planm ·";r o f urban design and “native" control in the layout of Enugu, which he initiated durernpnssizeri enesldi, light, and sir} in a type of "envirenmenral determuus Yi ,‘ lng ¤ Yrsit in_Febr¤ruy 1915. His ideas exemplined e second chsreererisric of Brnisn which squgh[ ro resolve "social pathologies" by the mcrupulohod ef Phllslh loolofhal d€SlgTl*[h€ obsession with health or "the sanitation syuidrorne_~Z8 Hg desPacg_24 Sggrggatignr largely but not exclusively racial, was an irnporwut ¢olo¤1_ ;` hded ¤ ru1le—Wide cordon soniraire between the ‘*nearest European dwellingu and rnnriifreriiion or these general principles? Lugard clearly understood tho 1mP , the “¤¤hVe ¤rec"—a separation that he wrote of in his Political Memomminm_ In rsnee of eresring die lvlsnicheon worlds of the colonizer and co1om{¢d·Z° The of oxenrplcry stcternent of this racialization or early health problems, he expressed of ine European Reservation was a metaphor for the cultural supencnty and of lr his rnorsm m the discourse of public health and social hygiene;

104 “We Were All Sl¤rve.v" Q i Creating the Colonial Warkplaee and the Colonia] City 105 The first objective of the non-residential area is to segregate Europeans, so that _ Lugard found that it was ve ' they shall not be exposed to the attacks of mosquitoes which have became in- Q` ing class from developing}5 lgggiteullxi;0eI;`;;rYt;¤t?l;5; lYa1r§il;a;-bmcd workfeczed with the germs afmularia or yellow fever, by preying on Natives, and es- ` ‘ associations with an urban cultural autonomy distinct fromihe mraigml to form pecially on Native children, whose blood so often contains these germs .... W Warrant chiefs preferred by colonial authorities, The first form of ass CP tim? and Finally, it removes the inconvenience felt by Europeans, whose rest is disturbed `Q ated by the working class and urban salariar helped to CO E with th Omatron creby drumming and other noises dear to the Native [emphasis mine]_29 urban life in the disorganized environment of the nascentl;0l0nia.l citygroblcms of The meticulous attention that Lugard paid to the more mundane aspects of urban i NZ13;`1 ;l§iV°srthE’t':‘g“’S Africa? BUN? began W hold “f&milY" meetings? called planning (i.e., speciiications ofthe yards of frontage to surround each compound ~ Owen; discuc d Sh Soniabmad from large Pamlineages of SI-mcmc villages in in the European Reservatilon, the height at Whig? tree branclges should be cliyiped) i gem cfllrbw ;s;rk€rSo1é1(;H;;i§dI;;];;1r1;0n rérban pr0blems_3v As the largest commwas far more than an aes etic preoccupation. It was an 0 sessive acknow edg— ‘ , _ # P ayé an 1mp0I'ta.ntr0le in these associations, ment of the relationship between spatial organization and power. Urban design was ~ gave urban hfc Shape and SUUCU-\1'€· E3Gh Nzuka had its own Offical-s_a a part of "native" control and in an area so recently, and precariously, conquered ` Fhc zdigdandda i§°r°tm`Y· The first meetings Occufmd during UW WHI and included it was hence politically imp0rtant.3‘ T0 Lugard, Africans, after all, were not urban i ~ Cause of tha: t; ucated wage earnerswho were excluded from village politics bepeople, and no one in a position of authority in Enugu was particularly cencemed · “famil ,_ O; _t° PY€f€F€¤¤€ for mdrrect rule by *·u-admonap rulcm when the with encouraging urban African life. But Lugard found that it was much easier m L Wide uidoi Tin? P*’°V§d YQO Small in scale, they amalgamated to form dismcp " design the layout for the town and to pontificate about urban order and "native" I a come clérk ch fS%·¤¤¤¤ m E¤¤{s¤. thi Owen`! U¤j°¤» was fvunded in 1917 by control than it was to create the type of colonial city he desired. Men poured into` r V tween tz; N ukw cg thnugu was stm Fhc buSh·i’3B_Th° f¤¤¤¤¤¤¤1 Telatmnship b€· Enugu, fleeing oppressive conditions in the countryside, looking for new oppor- ` la as t th Z 0 6 district meetings Was Similar to that of the individual vi]_ tunities, and women came seeking to escape unwanted marriages.32 They settled ° 1 {hg _‘ 9 i_¤<>¤¤¤11 Of the VmaE€·S1‘0¤P· Each Nzuka sent two representatives to where they could, taking advantage of the inevitable chaos of early settlement. A V ci;iO:;1;;_€r;?;daul;°u°my °fth° ¤<>¤Sri¢¤¤nr_¤ni¤ Was scrupulously respected, dc_ Enugll also became a refuge for runaway Slaves fleeing masters who were ex- U i amd E y consensus after extensive <=¤¤S¤1=¤¢i¤¤¤i¤ which ¤U1>¤¤i¤— ploring new ways to use their labor more systematically? In the South Nkanu area, i - P Bccgus 1 _al l slave-owning Ogaranyan were contracting with the govemment to supply work- · Z duction 0;;; 5;; ufbind policy assumed little responsibility for the social repm. ers for construction ofthe railway, which passed their area en route to Enugu. Many r i _ amd networks f lvm ng °IasS· these “m0¤§ Sfépped into the breech, Thgy cm, slaves, Ohu, were drafted into this workforce. Quite often they did not understand , 7 and assisted Wid;’;j° Sélcxtcnded loans ff)? b¤S1H€SS ventures, taught new v8_]ucS_ the concept of "pa.id lab0r." They assumed that their work for the government was ` ' they had a stm ng, S of mémbcm Alihough authoimes d€°P]Y diSU`¤Si€d Them, the same as the "unpaid" labor they supplied to their owner. But the wage experi- l _ worked as mnng civtilftionscrousness, informed by Christian education. They ence was enlightening and transformative. One elder, an ex-slave from the Nkanu Z T hmm thelimmgrslwg d c émc utgmscwmg urban °Td€f by “checking and elimvillage—gr0up of Ugbawka recalls his gradual awareness of the new forms of free- ‘ ¢ bers tiachin Scggfdim. ewables tin towri,3° adjudicating disputes among mem. dom which the labor systems of colonialism brought: . ` to uic ca it t I k1S°1pI?3°· =*¤d1¤¤¤1¢¤¤¤g ¤€W Values that habimatcd the men I I 4 , P S Wcr place. rfhey encouraged new notions of time and idleness and Edenwede Ogbu of Isigwe were pace setters sort of, to the Ihus or Obzas. V through an almost obsessive insistence on prompmess enforced thr h ii We were the first set of people to enlist personally to the Europeans without the . V their meetings.41 Although the state tolerated them and’welcomed th Qug ` nes at cgmsem of the chief for their personal bcttetruent .... Iwas ¤H10I1g V-h0$¢ SSN by { ,_ in controlling the CitY’S POPUIZHOD, Officials suspected quite con-cgi? astilitatgcc the chief to work in the construction of the railway line from Otakpa, new in kno ` , were a training ground for political leadership that inevitably would chalal, a cy State. Otakpa was where the Nkanu people under Chief Chukwuani of Ozalla ; ; nialism. They were a "f0mm f 1'tj 4 Frige c91°` _ _ _ _ _ _ V, I or po 1 cal expression and a structure within which Joined rn the railway construction .... All payment for those that were sent out _ l neg groups could assert their leadershipgwz by the chief whether on the coal mine or railway construction was directed to V r €¤8¤Se Nzukos included bg · · · the chief. We were left with nothing but at alater date the chief started giving us cellent forum for the political i;l};;l d;l?;;d1i:ctiEi%!i1‘:lriat€y Wcmfq? cxsmall amount of what each of us realized. This was after we had realized from · ~ war. An environment of heightened expectation swept through warti)r1:; {nig the Euyqpeams um we were paid for the job we had been doing for long. Because * ‘¤ This led Miisarns and clerical workers no be optimjgtic that the O lgcm of the chief’s action we deemed it unnecessary not to be obligatory to the chief. , 1 be responsive to their complaints. Additionally they assmcd 51 \;cmment would In the circumstance, we started looking for our own greener pastures for per- ` I: cal reforms wotdd give them some role in the siate, a hope that ;>\;(:;iEl¥ar.pO1m' * sonally paid jobs and the most possible area to look for jobs was in Enugu.3“ ` Moreover, inflation made it difficult for these skilled and clciigal workeil; 1;:111% I

/` 106 "We Were All Sim/8S" ij ‘ Creating the Calonial Workplace and the Colonial City 107 , t lc Commensumm with their Sclfddemitics as “rospootnble" men. To make Ti » These associations established a syncretic organizational culture with elements In a S y nr [hem were being retrenehed under new discrimi¤¤t¤fy P¤l· `w of indigenous leadership pattems, consultative forms, and western organizational inimcrs W0ISc’ many; .Zed ideas that resonamd with the n_nti.irnperia1ist agitationll . techniques. In the urban Nzuka, men learned the technical skills of running orgamsg; Th? Wm pipigggal nsw; oper editors most notably Th0H1¤S Horatio -la~°k‘ Ti nilations, structuring and presenting grievances, and mobilizing support, In so of Nlggixsa Zing; in Os wgsk[;Recgrd.“ Jackson launched attack after amck in T J doing, they presented an organized challenge to the state’s ability to make the ooio. hi? iiesscggainst Lugird, leading the governor in 1917 to propose a censorship bill nial city and workplace. The workers were not the only inhabitants of the city. ihngpwns snbsoqnontly rejected by the Colonial Office-45 The Pf0P¤Sa¤da ¤1><>r}td¤· Ti T ` ofthe Others were less concerned with presenting such "respsotnb]o" oppo. c and Woodrow Wilson’s calls for "self—determination" shifted the inter- Ty 4 smon to the state. They were the men who seized "il1egal space" to forge new types miirag discourse around colonialism and ind to a rgfgrmulaticn of the rationale 1 of households with several men, usually single, and one or two boy-servants. Their KE; E; Coinnini state, Authorities argued that the new task of ¢<>l<>¤i¤li$m was *0 ``‘* [ * presence gave Enugu a dennite male working class ··nsvor_·· , d the ascent of the Tmcivihzcd peoples 0fAi=ncn through "ma.ndates," "trustee- `T As authorities designed the physical space for Enugu, the new manager organized gu} 2 d ·· ti aramountgy "46 This new patemalistic packaging Was ViY¤l€¤dYx { Work and created structures of power and authority to instill industrial order, But he Sh1p’ {mb IE Vcdp cated elite Mm were Paniculgxly disgruntled by the renewed X did not work in a vacuum. The Igbo men in the industry defined the limits of manaammkéd y ic ingnitinnnin rulers 47 But they also positioned themselves to me Q J gerial control and carved out areas of freedom and autonomy. The relations of power c?mnmmtim.:h nt commdictimés in this idcniogy_ They too were British Ser- Q in the early workplace were the context in which the miners developed their notion mpulatc d gh; Ciiim as arbmamf of superior British law, could not ignore their T of moral economy. As they measured their experiences against the moral and social { Xaigsa; loyal British subjectsf"; ~ fF¤¤1€W0fk that shaped their approach to work, they created new patterns of rosis. The seditious political content of elite discourse was disseminated to the village T tance The Enugu workpioos was snow and unpleasant; oxpsr-ionooT fraught with darinnd bi-ond sectors of the urban African community through the m¤mb€YSh1P ba$° Of i ° ger- It required that they become a different type. of man-a colonial worksn This the unions. They included a cross section of all "respectable" sectors of urban so- TT workplace operated under different rules, conventions, and regulations than the rural cig thereby making the group a conduit for radical ideas t0 the illiterate “f9{kmE ` economy with which they were most familiar. A harsh system of authority and rogi ty’49 Political] these unions rallied 0pp0si1i0¤ I0 The 1'Lml chiefs and T-hw meas i imemed work rhythms were enforced through racial discrimination and violence? ciiiizind into the tillage through the coal miners who daily Weill between mine rrd `— While as a capitalist workplace it required their hnbitnation_ mining was work and village 50 As seliianointed agents of modernization, civilization, and progress, mem- T — the men had well-formed ideas about work.55 It was these ideas that they adapted bers assumed the task of marshalling resources to develop the village. In addrtionrr and applied to their experiences at the colliery. These constituted a work ethic.56 to raising funds for village improvement, they also served as advocates for ruralp communities with the authorities and sent delegations to meet wrthresponsrble gov- TTT . MI Nl NG OPERATIONS BEGI N: THE PHYSICAL CONTEXT emment officials? They presentedadilemma forthe chiefs. Their respnrces V . OF AN EVOLVING W OR K CULTURE were important for village development but therrhostihty to the rnstrtutronp I cps; , , I · U tommy,. colonial chicfmjncy ulmmtcly undcnninod the powers-of chle S- T T ·On 23 June 1914, Wrlham J. Leek was selected as manager of the future Udi While the role of urban "unions" in nationalist political mobilization has bee; ,T _ Mme by Professor John Cadman of the Umversrty ofBu·m.1ngham, the Colonial Ofrecorrnized their relationship to working class agitation has not been explored. ~T T T tice’s technical adviser, and J. Eaglesome, director of the Nigerian Railway and Howizver cities like Enugu, these "union" members were in the forefront ofthe T Works. He was only twenty-five years old but had seven years’ managerial experient-1 labdr struggles in the city, This particular strata was most aware of the fonns ip I ence at Wniihavcn and Mm Hm Coumcs following his mining as a mining engif y t what were Within the lights of Subjects of the British Crown.53 The pror111·~` neer in the Northumberland area, Britain’s largest coal flelds.57 Leek sailed for Flcgftiii played by eouiery employees in the "uni¤ns" created ri Structural °°*}· ; · Nigeria in September 1914, reaching Onitsha several weeks later and finally mw. nccnnn bgigwggn this new type of association and the iHd11S¥Iy`S W°l”k€TS· There is , i lng at Udi in February 1915, only a few weeks after the insurrection was or-nshod_5K documentary evidence that the "unions" and the cultures of protest that they fos- TT Let;k’sdgp3_i1;|_u·5 from Njorthurnbgrland was woi].tnnod_ The vga; pinngod those ooni tered were adapted to industrial protest. While the precise dates of the foundation ; T tields into a deep ISCSSSIOH with the loss of the German, Belgium, and Baltic (Rusgf c¤]_[jgry.ba55d Nzuko are not l€110WI1, the l`BSl1 of strikes that Spammd the lénerr. Bla-H) Hl61'k€¥S That i.l’I1pOl'I€t‘l 80 percent of the area’5 0utput_59 Nigeria was a fom]ars of the war and the twenties indicates the existence of worker 0IgBl'1lZZlZl‘{U$ T . itous move that would prove decisive for him. It launched a career in the colonial iliat lanned and coordinated protests and selected deputations to negotiate with ‘ civil servigg Hg wonid roninin in Enngn fgr tho noxt thirty yonrs_ manggement. The structure of these worker organizations and their role in the first ; ~ The mines proceeded at a remarkable pace given the insurrection, inexperienced series of colliery protests will be examined next. `e Tj labor force, and war—induced shortages in the desired tools and equipment. The z·

3 "Wg Were All Slut/es', Creating the Colonial Workplace and the Colonial City 109 108 _ = ’s anxiety as his , that supplies were available for sale to the commercial and shipping community railway YEPQHS of 1315 gfx in MaICh 1915 a in Nigeria and other West African (;0](mig5_63 Yescwcspf Import? co · md thgh- Supply could only last twenty days.6° The`. ` The govemment usually recruited workers from villages near such major projwhen mdway Offugalstljiilfiizan) coal was used up and the hostilities in E¤r0p6; · ects under a system called the "local method." But because of the unsettled narcscwc of Natal (you f Welsh coal doubtful. By May the locomotive superinten- j ~ ture of the district it was considered more prudent to bring workers from Onitsha made flmhcr supplieliod onl two weeks’ reserve and had resorted to burning Hl‘€·" and Owerri. Political conditions also required that clear institutions of authority dam rcpmltad that E amcicit and ajso dangerous, especially during the hamartarf and colonial control be established at the colliery, where a handful of Europeans wood, which was less; hmm Of june with all coal stock depleted, most trains, tried to transform men, who had just been defeated at the battlefield, into indusOr dry Siascml By td: woogl as fuelland in 1916, the railway lost twenty—SlX{_ trial workers. The warrant chiefs and their associates were brought into the enWcm bcmg opiate WLS fmm the wood 61 Thus, the British commercial contmui terprlse as recruiters, managers of the labor camps, and as “native" staff in the Vlagclns kiumFd y spat dc abgut the new Enugu coal fields. In February 1917 re- ` mines. The chiefs’ main representatives were the "boss boys," who brought in mty In Nlgcna Xvaigg amen- kg journal West Africa, noted with enthusiasm “itC , their crews and were in charge of particular underground districts. It was expected P°rtS from the QF, m y , ’ H=,€1ds··62 , » that they would handle all grievances their teams had, just as the warrant chief is certain that Udi is one of the Wvfld S great we _ · ld t _mmdimc1y, , did in the Village · f th ` 't`al excavations cou no 1 L , · Coal extracted m the cgllisctlfe wgruliih by the end of 1915, 8,000 tons were Lugard also took a personal interest in the colliery and the railway and regarded meet the shimag? cauign E-Ac railway (see Photo 3.13). The railway arrived int i both projects as a type of experiment in social engineering. His dispatches to the J Stacked at Pu hea a\lJ;7 riarked the refinement of the coal transport system all ~ Colonial Office were decidedly enthusiastic, as if he felt his massive project was May 1919 The year th ;;e11'e manifest in the increase in coal output to $5,405 truly bearing fruit. He visited the area soon after Leck’s arrival in February 1915, m01’€ 6391*31 wvrks at ° _} ry’ . { 130 to 150 tons per day. By ~ and again in April.6" At that time, he reported that mining operations were well untons. The new Iva Valley Mine delivered at a rate o · , t Houma. d Th _ V September 1917, Lugard felt confident enough of the mine s outP“t O an 2 ` °YWaY— 6 miners Wem~ ` .·r:r” , ~ ¥?‘ W5 , · ‘ l " 1 ` W-? ‘‘l· § ` , ` T if t 1; l lv ·` . ~ `l _V ` A Q ` i ~ Y l ‘ V V4 V ` , ,, , l _ M`, { " . , t., , H. ., ~ , , [ ·*:?’»#;g~, .,~,, ,¤~; _ , V, ; ·_. Vg.; ·`.,» { .5 ~' . M l ‘ · ‘*“1‘Zv=* . ~` U ‘ ~ " t·`‘`` ` El . " ,2 ° ‘‘’` V s ¥:’“?¥i ` V , ‘· .;. ` ` .i`· .. ., , · · · .V _ '¢»·~1'“Q ”` "" 7 · ’~ :.—;Q§‘ia"’¢€§f -. . ‘ ·` if l. t . , dt t e; M ` A it l~ . .... . , , .a ~· - ` P-°i a <€;.’i,, ;_, — ~ t i it lwcxl ng “ 4 L ,5, `_1 xg · > ·‘ A , , - »_ · , ·"r.__r':j`l Ké`&.llHt.t>t§i.` ‘ ·`. _. ’L ... _ zi . . . g . _ v I V V _ . A ‘_ Wah. r ; 1 r Miclhg ~ ~ t. p . ’ xi . V. ` ` i 5 F; t V i ._ _ V 4 . . Q .t·· hiv 2, `.`_ j‘ .· ;· r l , it eiigtiaitizet-¤;g¤·-*?i¤*> ;~ ‘ A . I- ` _ VA f L A ii _`· -`L_r " 7_ I . ei ` · A ·' _,‘£;;;:` — _ - V V _ I' lv Y 4 · tt-‘· -» »r· jay. , 1 _ I !_ me ·°_ _ ` x it , l ( = ` , . · ·‘ i " ‘’»’ — ‘ 4 . — U _ · -,. ,.., , ** " n l ‘ ' V V i V. . ..,,._.. » '_ ., ,... ft an rr ‘ V X ’*’*" ‘ ` F_ . ‘ _ l g , Tir" _ ,` ¤ "“‘j”" ‘ .. ¤ " ` l · e »#`* i t if ia 1 .,,,., , · ~ ··ee—— . . . · TL., A} ` `,`W,_v rv .-, N. . ._ T -.. te;- _. , l l , A _,?,» _ . . ···“· ‘ . .. .;% ‘‘.t ; ;=—;-·-mam, _ . .. . l l ., . t " "i V " `. ie ;""#rii ‘‘·. . ‘~,. 1 V. ° l ‘`‘ ·»=- . · — . . i _;· ‘· t; tag Q M , t - `ti t .a.e ‘ · . .. i .~ 1 ?`3l , ` ; ; a · ~ aq T" ; —.·· . — e~ . .’:» =e·;T·¥ T ‘ » ‘ · _ _ _ ~ ei _ I §%;iif€*“Q;a?;¤&i:a: " ;z· , ~ · -§'° p hoto 3.6 Port Harcourt—Arrival of first coal train alongside the S.S. Sir Hugh 3 5 Construction of railway tothe Udi Mine, €if<3¤ 1915 lC"°W"' Agents] . crown Aa¤¤·s>

1 [0 “We Were All Slava {mating the Colonial Workplace andthe Colonial City J1] engaged in driving an adit tunnel in the opposite hill across a ravine, where he " ` rnte system of camp control, young men could still escape persecution by disapexpects to strike the same seam at 1073 foot level. From thence a short colliery ie tir nring into the mass of humanity clustered mound me mjn5g_ L5gk’g ggnug] Ovalline will convey the coal to the main line.6S M:} ' lcse men was precarious. In 1916, when the mines employed 700 men, he was In December 1915 he boasted to me Nigerian cmmcii that ·‘rme* labor had ` °l*’l°ss ‘° P“"°“§015° d°““ lf‘*‘““$ whe" he '€d“°°d Wm? f‘°m nlm P°“°€ l° convinced the "savages" of the value of wage labor, a claim that fell quite wide ·· E ixggesggegggigé _E1;;r;§;€l11;dP;E1u[;daI;;:%°3j°°“1;d r§t_°°n;1“‘;; fh? l0c*;]hP:;’sl° thetmthl qw ~»· . ns ep cism ec scaim a ey Z yi ould carve mines out of the hil1s.7‘ ' Prompt and fair payment, combined with kindly treatment have resulted, I am ; By intemational standards the Enugu mines were not extremely hazardous bemld, in an actual competition for employment, and those wild tribes who year FQ [`· ¤ USB they had negligible amounts of black damp and {ire damp, the explosive gasses by year, and indeed only a few months ago, had to be coerced by armed forces, __ i BI make coal mining so dangerous.72 There was also a little coal dust, which was with loss of life, are already learning confidence and acquiring wealth by hon- V7" so explosive and caused silicosis or "black lung." Without the danger of gaseous esi labor-.66 j xplcsions, management became less diligent about ventilation in its general engiDespite Lugard’s proclamations very little of a "free market" in labor was l g cdrmg schdmcds It was also assumed than as pwd P°°P1°·Af“°""S would be _ _ _ · _ _ _ ` 27 .i.· uickly acclimatized to harsh underground conditions. Nevertheless the mines were cvldencc at the COHIEYY sim On the °°“mu'Y· an mmospldcm of Hdhtmsm and C r ad enough to frighten away many locals who were brought there by their chiefs. ercion hung over the labor camps, with the warrant chiefs sending in their co" ey resembled a dark, steamy, muddy hole, with a precarious roof. Lighting and Scripts ““d°*` the watchful °y° of mak Pmmdl"’·'Y POHCS or a Trusted “b°SS boi :2 ventilation were inadequate and most men worked in near total darkness The indomitable Chief Onyeama was especially adept at creating an elaborate sy { Mining Operations in May 1915 engaged a crew of 106 labcrces and hi Skeleton tem of labor control that extended into the labor camps themselves. According i` staff of one 01, two European Supervisors- Leek introduced an engineering design l°°al Sources he deivelopefi his °W“ sllivclllancc system wuh Spies md °°m_m° jlhat dominated production at Enugu throughout this study: the pillar and stall sysSweets WM ¤¤¤ he ¤¤¤S¤¤ ¤¥¤¤v¤- Whwh Wm 1<>¤=¤¤¤d me Pm me Of mlwe item. rms was the extractive system used in his home, Eames north coal seas. Construction from Pod H‘“`c"“d· HB was alleged to have had his Own Kqabor agcn, [He considered it to be most suitable for the natural conditions (i.e. condition of who Checked Dfflaborcrs against med °°mm‘{“lti°Sj" Al dim Iva cam!} hlssgarge rl ` roof, size of seam) and "native labour available." In the year befofe the railway camp, hc d"Pl°Ydd Workers m the Vmoud Pr°J°°tS· ¤¤¤1¤d¤¤g the °°1h”Y· Li ' reached Udi, in May 1916. Leck directed these new workers in the basic conL¤¤k bwght hls °W“ Wmkers from Omtsha WP') had been drafted by Eze Ok°h l struction of the mines, driving main roadways to the limits of coal deposits. 'I’he a Warrant chg? His broader mamhcd them t° Udi lmdcr de guard Of thc hated C? Q · Initial process of driving main roadways and side entries, which constructed the m°SS°‘}g€"s· Among Gus gnu? Wfls a_°°mm°t°r— A1f¤=dI¤¤m¤· Wh° has been Fmine, was performed by teams of men called "special labor g21l‘lgS,” a broad work modal-lied by UeW¤{*1fT¤da;J¤i3§s;im§shu;; EXE! j a {Tab _ me E- SKF 0 th ° fst Id!-mls 2_ of therroadways. The timbermen set timber to support the roadways, and railmen · Pcncmc m cmg Pus e mm S mm"s· , i lay rails for the tubs used to carry coal from the work face to the surface. HowWe were forced to carry barrels of cement from Onjtshe le Udi Where they were I ' ever, in the year before the railway reached Udi, coal was carried in head baskets building Udi Customary Court. A barrel of cement will be carried by four per- V wher by young boys or by P"isO“m`S· sons from Onjtsha to Udi, though they wm be changed by another fem men when 2 The special labor gangs built the main road, or adit, into coal outcroppings on theyre med That is they Wm be eighe when we reached Udi We were forced I the side of the hill. Branching off from the adit at specific intervals like ribs from to Continue the construction of the present Mdiken Hm [e mad} When We ,`.` . the spine, were secondary roads or side entries. The side entries were mutually reached Enugu, We were forced to stm working in the mine Oh! We suffered! parallel and extended some distance into the seam. The area between two side enWe cannot go back for we were under the guard of court messengers. We at long ; V mes wa? ¤¤ll=d aP“”El· wd was managed as a distinct unit of dw mine. The BClast discovered that working in the mines is beneficial for we are being paid and ` we dumng operations were l¤¤¤¤h¢d from These Bmdds imo the wal- E¤¢h 8101-IP We were no more being harassed by the chiefrsg { { of mmers opened a coal face at regular intervals along the side enrijy, working from 3 j the entry back into the coal. (See Figure 3.1.) Mbamelu’s gradual accommodation to the mines was fairly typical for youn 2 The heading is the miner’s workplace, the coal face where he excavates the coal. men who were usually the targets of the corrupt chiefs. Even with Onyeama’s elab I _ The dimensions of the space depend on how wide he makes the coal face, and the

V "We Were All Slave.r" f l. Creating the Colonial Workplace and the Colonial City 113 112 g . Figure 3.1 Pillar and Stall Mining Diagram ~ ` , ` i ` Bird's-eye view of a typical Enugu mine district that is being worked in "develop_ `_ i ment." Coal is extracted in the process of dividing up the site. Pillars are left to » . , · A ` ,. ` g _ . W , support the roof. The extraction of the pillars is called ”robbery." As the pillars are ' v` ““' ` y. , ~•x _ :-» { mined, the area is temporaroily supported by timber which, when withdrawn, . 4 { ` _ ` ` allows the roof to collapse. Q T sine Errrkv . i l r w i an s o MCE ` o· ` ·» i ,_ , _, ;_ E , tgp { 4_ ·;,§.»_ig, g lu. Fin.; ` . { _____ J 1 . l ‘r‘’ Y a 4 i l 'r _ _....., 1 _ ’ ua g E . ¢ » Q ' rm X » . . s... _ E ` . = 2 ·{>léi§ei23`*Z~‘=i
it 1 14 "We Wm All Sims" Q Creating the Colonial Workplace ,1,.4 me g,,i,,,,i,,; Cm, H5 terity, and mental alertness.78 But the broader society did not recognize the spe- I L tub of coal th · . sialized nature of these skills. It has been argued that coal mining Sxhibiwd mall? ii he produced ;iqldch;l;;iu;;db;;1S allowed mma clerks to assess the amount Of coal of the characteristics of a craft: ii Poor ventilation and lighting flooded k . . . 4 . . . i ` near saturation ’ · · ’ wor acm and hlgh tcmpcmmrcs with the essence of a craft is its dependence on a precarious combination of rnampu- i _ P01m]'1Um1d1Iy cut the hewers’ productivity and created re ' lative skill embodying a Physical training and ajudgment re¤1uix·ing both exP€— ~ : mncsSFs' Momovm-’ the cmirc Opemtion was P€i'1°01`m€d in near total iipiiimry rience and intelligence. The resulting almost unanalyzable pieces of expertise 9 MOSt'llgh[lHg at the coal face was by candles or a makeshift lamp which 1; dcssv constituted the "knacks" of a trade and the essence of a knack is its difficulty of ` ` 31-_vmh sm°kc‘ The Wnecuons Of one miner who began in thi$’P°Ti0d Tiioxrige Cmmnunicmomvs M 01S1k€, on how lighting reflected industrial power relations; i S As male manual workers, the possession of these skills and “the aggressive celees _ In mes? days we USS H lamp with an empty perforated can and an e ‘ ‘ ‘ bration of physical strength" were key contributing factors to the masculine ethos that poured me it and °°m°" i“sid°· This a‘·'t°maFiC¤HY b€c0IT|5S a lamngglc Oiiils developed in coal mi.ning.“° Hewers, called "pit men,"*“ had a self-identity of skilled '. ; advamégc is that it was always smoky ih the mgm-,_ Carbide ca S WP. ne Swqykei-s and were proud, independent, self-improving, and resentful of SUP€1'Vi$i0H·B2i} . sqme uma' Then °a“dl" was i¤“<>d¤¤¤d later for the pick meh gpl; mijs used for These values defined a social hierarchy within mining communities in Britain. Theyi b‘d° lamps is fm *h° headmen and the timber boy and the rail bo Be mm can would similarly emerge as important bases of a proud identity among hewers in Enugu;1. des were Vary °h°¤P it has I0 be Supplied to the poor labourers aime cana In Northumberland and Durham, Leck’s home area, all preliminary tasks to the? _ [hats Why is for the headmcmss · 1 e 1S costly actual coal getting were performed by specialized workers?3 Under the "Derbyshi1‘d ' Althou h candle ‘ . system," hewers only hew the coal and put it in the tubs.84 Other workers set tim-is i ily sxijggugshcd ievgg-;ga31;n$5§;;]€nicnt,0V°r the m¤k==S1¤f¤1amps, Kh€y Were easber, lay the rails, and remove stone to make roadways of sufficient height, and build ; 1 I as In Pitch dMk“€SS· Anmhef i¤f01’m¤.nt recalled; packing wal1s,'I`o Leek this fractionalized division of labor seemed appropriate f01T i * candles were bang used than as a light inside the mine Whengvg th "the African worker,” whom he deprecated with typically ethnocentric arrogance ’ hg}? g°?S DE me has *0 End Mwther pickman di- iubman-nearest to ids? canine for being incapable of handling more than a single task.“5 This was the system upod ' t° hght It up again- B°°a“S° the mine is very, very dark_ that you mmm scicglqgln which he organized Enugu`s mines. y A °“t h$ht_Y°“ have t0 ind YOF-lf Way by feeling blindly along the walls or all . At the coal face the miners’ first action was to shear the seam with two paralle ~ the ml Imc to next Person? p¤siti<>n to light up your candle Whe (mg vertical cuts, one to the right, the other to the left. This defined the coal face to A` . was much heat insidc the mincs the Candle light g0€S ZS soon. as it geiiihntixggi worked. Then, lying prone on the wet Hoor, the hewer kirved or undercut the C06.LQ It was not ih · . ° ` and made a cavity by hgling or batmming out the coal 8bOl-It tW0 fee! from th In mining engi;e2(;i1ii;h}?is$§;;n€:;Sg;$ aha candles but the iow levels Of Oxygen iioor.86 The cut would be three to five feet into the seam. This was the most dan 1. ~ tempts to remove noxious and éx losivec Opmim of ventilation Wa? mlatcd m ap gerous and demanding phase of extraction. A miner would spend several days 0 ; mines had little gas or dust maiigcmeliafeskrom the mines. But since the Enugu weeks, on his side, haling the coal with a good part of the operation being pet, T lation. The deeper the mines plunged imo glo hi rather relaxed position on vemifm-med [ying under this shelf of coal with wedges of W0<>d Sl-\PP01’*-ing me overt UGH b€¤6m€. Consequently the mines had hu Soils, the more pwbicmatic Vcmilw hang. His second task varied with the quality of the coal. In some cases the c0 · p saturation and average temperatures abov 1;; dry levels aPPma<>h1ng 100 percent was dislodged by driving wedges or pneumatic picks between the coal face J 3 ciency worsened as one moved from the c' agrees Fam-°“h€*t· Oxygen defithe mei, bringing the whole section dovsm.“’ In Enugu, however, it was broug ¤¥ V, level above ground was 20 percent b t .mam mads t° th€_W°*k Sims- Thc Oxygen down by explosives, called shntjiring. A European shot fire! ddued holes at a i i P¤f¤€¤L9l Initially the ventilation }O·Ll]cm new roadways It was a dangcmus BA propriate angles into the coal face and set the explosives. When detonated, the C0 , l ’ naces, but as ¥¤i¤€ V/01'kings spreigi out as iimmucd byfimfts {mm two fup fell on the floor. In the third phase of the operation, the miner loaded the dislodg 1 By the end Of 1917 a Sirrocd fan ca gbl? gm Od Pmved lneffectwg V coal into tubs, which were supplied by "tubboys" from the main roadways, and _~ p was installed. But this was also of limited gf "’P‘¤¤·¤g 40,000 square feet of air, which he mashed his tally disk with his employee number, S0 that he was CW , i Pillar and stall, with its 1ai-ge numbers of med ect m the Fcmmd workings? The ited with the output. The tubboys then pushed the tubs to the main roadways whe ij very difficult area to ventilate 93 Hewers 21;,WByE and isolated work faces, was a haulage men transported them to the smface. When the hewer performed all thess these poor conditions. European mana ers Jlistfththeir effort to compensate for {asks he was said to have been within the "siugl6 place tf¤difi01'l·” IH Enugu ' i `WOFK Vigorously for a full shift The gvoriggi at mosihcwcrs were unable t° [ypigg] work group was one railman, eight tubmen, eight h€W€fS» md TWG timb€?i§ @9 thi? madways to cool down and re; It be or a few mmutcs before returning m€n_¤8 Each miner had a number emblazoned on a token which h¤ attached to th i Pairs quite like the mam; f th l came cusmmmy for hcwers t° Wmk in V `; r» 0 e Durham coal fields,°‘ with one hewer working

116 ·-We were All Slaveyh Creating the Colonial Workplace and the Colonial City 117 while the other recovered.95 The Enugu hewers worked barefoot, wearing only V? , , V y l? , §I;¥;f.2V ` ` loincloth, with small fans protruding from the backgs A . . { , V V' * _,;.a·Q A V- ` V Water was always a problem and became even more so when the Iva Mine was * ` QI -Q · Z ‘; _ VQ , jr ’,_V I 1 opened in 1917. As the workings extended, many seams encountered water subsis df " V_ - VV, dl] ‘°, V ”¤ LY;. 1:;. , dence, especially in those districts located under river beds. Water seepage fro ‘- L _ V. `E ` di ~·~, , V 1 V surface streams flooded the coal face and caused frequent cave-ins.°7 It was evii V ` _ V _ } _; V ~ dent even i.n 1915/16 that roof timbering would be a far larger cost than had bee _ V V _ · . , di 'ji _ anticipated.98 The sheer difticulty of working under these conditions was describe V V V 5 V `V · V V ~‘ V“ V i . , I ‘ by an early miner, James Alo, who began in 1916.99 3 “ V ;. " ,,, Q, gi V V 4 . ¤ »· i e z ~ v.»-r at » In some sections of the mine water reaches one as far as the chest. Special labour- VV V i ¤ Vi V` 'V ’ i js? ·—·*-— ` ~ ~ V" ; » ers it is their duty to draw the water inside the mines to outside. Hewers stay in- Q · ` U ~ . V'; side the water and do their job. When they came out from the mine their body Q . i *‘ V _ V _ ; would look like that of a 1izard.‘°° ‘ . _ V · ' ` ¤ V V . Mine work was so unlike any work local people had experienced that despite . _ · , , . , V V » . V , V, state attempts to use local luminaries as recruiters, the local Enugu people were ati Q · ` ,` V _ ._ _ ·. V ‘ , w tirst reluctant to enter the mines.““ The exhaustive nature of these operations, and'; ` ¤~ _ V “ V VV » ` ’ ’»·?`=V V the uncomfortable positions in which they were performed, led the men to developi ; J , V ' A . ’ Q t ` workplace traditions that adjiisted their expenditure of effort to these conditions} s .V V _ . . " ""i- . Ei _ - . Q The roadways usually had a brisk air flow, but at the coal face, because it was aV , V . ·‘ ' j . ‘ ' V V _ . dead end, there was little if any air tlow and oxygen levels were dangerously l0W.1°2 J _ V 1V ’ - · ' Despite these intolerable and substandard conditions, management assumed that V; ij V ` H ·V: _ · · V_ ' i‘V·,;V Africans could be induced to work in them. When they saw that the workers ` `· · V V _ V ; .`,.. V ‘ {V couldn’t, they said it was because of some inherent deficiency in lgbo work cul-.; ` —s· arf i · V , _ i Y_ {hd? ture or a physiological problem with their bodies. Management accused the men" .· V -.· t V V -VVi V AV _V Q of "slacking" or alleged that the local diet had such poor nutritionional value that ` V J' _ _ V ’ ,` V` · V. ' the men could not sustain consistent effort.“’3 It was never acknowledged that 100 V Y L » ,V V' · ‘ ' V V ;V V ` _ V ` V V percent saturation rates, oxygen deficiency, and high temperature would be a dis- 3 V _ ` V' · g · _ _V j _ = V;;Vi . V incentive for productive labor. V VV . V · "' V.V, ,· · V' _ ` V The tirst miners were given no protective equipment, nor training in safe C , f V, EV VV: » ,V,?§ ` ing practices. Although fully aware of metropolitan standards, management was; §_ ·V· gi·; X i; V * not particularly concerned about the safety of their workers. African workers Were, · i V VV i z )? o i} if = Y cheap, plentiful, and expendable. Leck did little to bring the colliery up to recog-{ i ` g V .< j` V VV ~ V , V nized mining standards until forced to do so by the workers themselves, in a sei V Vi A Q' Qi-3 .`V*§s?J V, W Q 2 ` ries of strikes in the late thirties. At that time the workers used conditions in English' i VV . V Vi " V VV i 1 V and American mines as the standard for their demands. Leck assumed that Africari . Photo 3 8 Hewers with le Wm S .r 1 91 5 t Ud. _ _ _ workers could be made to perform under far more severe conditions than Britisliy , Shin pmhecmrs and basket? usedpp CI Ca I a h 'V:"'"°· Note the "“p"°"‘$€d miners. This was most obvious in the substandard conditions that he allowed to ' { O Carry CD3 Ont E Bad` (Crown Agents] exist. A source gave this description of a hewer coming to work in the thirties: _ “wear-ing only a loincloth, carrying his pick and shovel on his head, a water gourd V hands from ml tubs, md fmm 1'°°f €0U¤PS€· W¢1”€ the largest percentage of acciih one hand and d candle Pan ih the 0thgl._»104 `V Z dents in the mirtiis. Eprly photographs show that even in 1916 the men had makeshift what htde safety equipment they had was usually hhpmvisgd by the meh t_hdm_ ·V 5 wrappings on eir egs to protect the shins from injury while kneelin at work. selves. There were no helmets to protect them from roof collapse, and the ment. { The aSS“mP‘i°¤S that Leck made about the Standards of Wcrkplaceiafety for worked barefoot where the damp, nne coal cut imo the feet. Injuries to the feet or 1 . Amcan W°Fk°¥S Wm ¥0¤¤¢d in the Particular Way thstwce. class, and gender (mas-

118 "We Were All Slave.v" Cfwfing the C¤l0ni¤I Workplace and the Colonial city 1 19 culinity) intersected in the discourse on coal mining. Coal mining had already been f Work. In the final anal Sis, ·t W · _ associated with the concept of "race" before the British even discovered the mines. , priorities. y 1 as the lndustry that had to accommodate to than McKlintcck noted that since the 1840s, race and gender were contlated during the t n attempts to bring l3ritish coal miners under factcry—like discipline. In public dis- NEGOTIATING THE WORKPLACE. course the fierce independence and protest culture of the coal miners were con—h l; RELATIONS IN PRODUCT. · sidered evidence that they were a "‘race’ apart, ‘outcasts,’ historically abandoned, J ‘ OVER CONTROL ON AND STRUGGI-ES isolated and primitive."*°5 Although celebrated by labor historians today, symbols ‘ ‘ AT THE COA'- FACE gf a fiercely independent working class masculinity, their militancy dhfihg this i_ The management S¤’¤¤t¤1‘e and system of industrial relations at Enn n o [img was seen as a badge of their backwardness.l°° For men like Leck, this 3550- l ‘ hl¢d an industrial ¤PPii€Hti0n 0f“indirectm1e." lt shaped the fggfuitmgnganlii Scilciation between race and coal mining must have been especially salient in Enugu, , deployment of labor, the systems of labor comml and um mum Structure Ofal Y where the miners were truly a distinguishably different race. The fact that the jo dustrial relations at the coiijol-y_ It was Z colonial imncy and concept based O2" British had well-formed ideas about this race—the black race—and where it was Q l series of erroneous assumptions about the nature of African political s, stems and situated in the evolutionary hierarchy, facilitated all types of racialized assurnp— g it therefore permitted abuses that would be intolerable in British mines {While the tions about the physiological impact of these working conditions on African labor. ; are many accom-its of tha djsnsu-ous Consequences of amdircct mlcu clicks fg; This was reflected in the general conditions under which Enugu’s miners were Q i rural Igbo society, historians novo not Exalnincd the impact Df this phgoso h » forced tc work, British miners’ conditions were the most arduous and dangerous The workplace"] AS was the oaso with the uwanam Chiefs ,, in The mines ifgcon of any other industrial workers, and their agitations had led to improvements in nl; intermediaries were givgn many managerial and Supcwisoiy functions with msn safety regulations and working oonditions by World War I.“"’ But despite advances ; European supervision The c]nofs· eboss boysn and Vmous other nnativsn su E 5 in metropolitan standards of protective clothing, underground atmospheric stan- ViS01’S handled daily colliery operations. With the general manager insulated fibrdards, lighting, et cetera, management reproduced conditions in Africa that were n ` the daily supervision of the men, a culture of predation emerged in which box a hundred years behind those of England. Even as late as 1940, a Colonial Office of African and European bosses used corruption, extortion and physical Violem t labor adviser visiting Enugu commented that he doubted that anyone but Africans Q l push the workers to pi·0duce_ ` 6 0 could he induced to work under these conditions.‘°“ Managers also accepted as · As men like Gabriel Mbaiomu ontmd the pit Each bgcame entangled in amaz f “normal" high accident levels, maimings, and serious injuries that they attributed ` ¥¤ ` exploitation that extended from tho oonupt chiefs in the village tu the amdvcn xd to the "primitiveness" of the men. { ~ European supervisors in mines. His experiences were shrouded in the darkne f Nonetheless, when Gabriel Mbalemu entered the Enugu mines, he joined an an- f the mine, invisible to a disinterested general management and hidden from 31 cient brotherhood Of the wcoumry of COal_·~l09 HC nmol-od nn "occuPar_i(m5l life- I 2 ¤UTh0I'ili€S· The ¤0€l'Ci0l‘t which Sl1ITOl.l¤ded him Was not gratuitous but a, “s5ii,1ti C " world characterized by both fear and pride, leading to warm but a rough male " ` to a seemingly inljrigctablg Problem that confronted the management dau Gets: camaraderie on and off the job, and h.igh levels of personal tension resulting in high 5 ’ the worker into the mine was only one pm Of a complex process The S;0 d ai absenteeism and n-ounont Work StoPnngoS_~1i0 Ho developed the intuitive skill that Was converting his l¤b01‘—p¤Wer into labor, in other words getting the men tn P k allowed him to survive the danger, psychological strain, and exhaustive work , l with Sufficient energy for the time that they were being paicf There were sever; iylor regime. He constructed a proud self—identity as a "coal person" which gave him y A Of achieving this, One was to ol-gaunzo production around Semrcgulating gmu S :58 prestige in his village. Granted, as a colonial worker, there were particularities to ' Were paid piece-rated The second was to use a esystcm of coercion ,,n2 Boi WET; his experience that set him apart from his "brothers" in t.he United Kingdom; the ~' used in Enugu. Only in the colonies could this "system of coercion" be used In met racial hierarchy in the mine, a managerial contempt for recognized protective stan- u _ TOPO]-ltilll Britain the pay system was structured around the problem of gettin the dards, the frequent use of physical violence as discipline, and an overarching man- ¤ men to produce. For this reason, coal mining had perhaps the most com lex gm B ageriall attitude that Africans could be made to work under conditions that were ’ l System of any Olherindustiy incorporating Various bonuses to compensatgfor aiunsuitable for Englishmen. A double standard evolved, giving British staff limited l ticipated geological pfgblgmsu tho unique Skin demands the severity of Workin C0 _ exposure to the severe underground conditions while perpetuating them for ` dififms, and the inherent danger of the workplace. Thefundamental distinctioi H Africans, This convention persisted despite the clear signs that \1¥1d€fg1'0U-Hd €0¤·` { i between PieCe‘1”at€ W¤g€S (tOHIlHge ratrx) and day ratgg_U3 In Enugu tho minors (h;J;s ditiqms reduced African productivity and interfered with their willingness I0 Sel} A 1 ers, Pit b°Y$) W¤1'€ The OHIY Workers on piece-rates, the i-atidnala being that tho their labor-power on a consistent and predictable basis. Thus, while Mbaiemll and ‘¢ , PT0d¤<>€1'S heeded financial incentives to work other early miners may not have been aware of how different their conditions were ` ·_ The basic mana erial structure of ` ‘ from their metropolitan “brothers," they nonetheless had their own ideas about il L highest ranking official over all the itiiiii-;0iii;E(§);;:;?;ig ;§;;;1uT?]£§§gé2;;

120 "We Were All Sluve.t"‘V Creating the Calomkzl Workplace and the Colonial City Ig] T V " V_ _ , V ; ;ft*`·€,;, " V under their respective "boss boy." Of all the supervisory staff, the men complained l _` ‘ ’ “VVV " ’ VV .;-.:tV~ V p; “ V ` most bitterly about the exploitation of the "boss boys." From the position of the J _ ';,.,V·t~ { , V _ ’z,,V; z ·e ,; l worker, the "boss boy" was the most powerful "native" supervisor in the mine. He r VV;iVtVVVVV V» ,5 V V V decided who worked and where he would work. He was responsible for discipline Vey Vp V q wgluqh hei often executed beyond the workplace in the villages with the help of the wi VT . I V ’· Q V V V. . u ; c e an Native Courts. He used physical violence, extortion, and fines to force · V the men to produce. His power over individual men was ominous and arbitrary. V , L ‘`.·, [E ` The "boss boy" had control over the hewers’ wage-eaming capacity. He could _ Z.i€iQVt ,.... V ' V place the hewer on a difficult coal face which reduced his shift output. Hewers Qui" ` iv`; h“*“'*’;M "`"" “"":“"“‘;‘ ' l iiollld be 3SSlgl'l€Cl I0 work on three types of faces; development gn [mam', deve]. V V p gpment an end, and robbery. All development work was more strenuous than robwe ¤ V ~ _ ’ , _; l ery and it paid higher piece rates. However, certain development sites were more . ·`V · l I é l difticult than others. Work cn board was harder than on end because the coal face V V_ {V " r , J was at right angles to the natural cleavage of the coal and required more skill and ` , geological knowledge. The men gave an Igbo name to this coal, ukpaka, a hard oil _, ‘ ` l bean tree. Work an end was parallel with the cleavage and the coal peeled off with ga V _ V . V _ V V V th; cleavage. Thus woqlgng on such soft coal or akwukwa, produced higher yields , ’ 22 V ‘ ._—‘ `: · V V .· . ” V j an required less skill. r I ‘ l _l ’—· ` ` There were also geological variations in the work sites. At some faces the coal . V V » ·_ V _ 3 seam was split with rock, or it might have a fault, a break in the seam that was · A ec ·· · _ V filled with dirt, sand, or stone. Some faces required the removal of stone, called »· r *— r it V, V ,_ ” * ` i dead work, before coal could be extracted. Since the hewer was only paid for the ' ,, V V, V_ , V B , amount of coal he mined, time spent working the stone was money lost. In EnQVV t V VV V l l V V , ‘ r ‘; .¤ ,1 V gland’s northern coal fields, the vagaries of the geology of the mines were acix VV VV; V.,VVV; . VVV VVVZVLVJV V V V V , V V eommodated by the men themselves. They developed a system of equalizing the VV V . VVVV *‘ V t V V . . · ·‘ Q ` risks qfsdiflicult coal faces by drawing lots every few months, a process called cav~ ’ V.._iVg V.VV V _ V V V zllzng. In Enugu, however, such democratic traditions had not evolved, and placeV VV · 'V V _ _ · V - ` V V ment was in the hands of the ‘jboss boys," thus becoming another instrument used , .V. ~ _ ;, ; K ~~ ._ to dorrunate workers. Allegations of these abuses by the "boss boys" were recurV `V V2 `V V_ V V rent themes in thejinterviews with miners, suggesting that they were rather wide{VV · · V R E j sppiad. One miner recalled: "What happened was that if you were in logger head ;J:,g_;;,iV•i¢, yy `_,,` _ ‘ ‘ , _ wi the boss, he will always send you to the most difficult side of the mine until A V ;V i· you are able to give a tip or bribe l1ll'Il.”1l7 3 V VVVVV V ‘ , Z The "boss boys" and headmen selected their work crews daily from the men in {VV ;· V V V -=‘ V, V V A the labor camps.“” Consequently, they alone knew who was in their crew. In some " ‘ “''` ` ' ‘“‘ ~ ` ~ cases they received the wages for their entire work .1*9 Th Photo 3.9 Proud miners at mine entrance; such work required skill and ability to , ` il predictable; crew c consequences were use tools. The pride of work is seen in the faces and comportment of these men, { { V circa 1 91 5. (Crown Agents) VV 2 The Colliery was paying its workers by the month. The boss—boys and headmen VV exploited this and often arranged to dismiss labourers a few days before pay day who supervised all underground operations. At the mine level there were techni- `V yd ulkc °n °Lh°r m°“‘ The headmcll thfm drew the PW for the Wh°l€ ¤10¤¤h and cal supervisors, European overrnen, whose ranks by the 1920s included West In- g l cpt 1**2* themselves that °f the dlsmlsscd men Th? lmymg ¤ff¤¤¤r ¤¤u1
122 “W2 Vhre All Slaves ” V~ Creating the Colonial Workplace and the Colonial City 123 ropean supervisors relied on them to translate instructionsm Interpreters extorted t j _ ‘ ‘ *:'_ . . "‘j_"eggé. " j? _:·¤ j Y , . money from the men by threatening to falsify management commands and mis- r . e}_,,gQ_· —, . V_ V translate instructionsm One Agbaja tub man complained; 1 ' ' V fl ` . _ T ‘ Interpreters caused the sudden dismissal of many workers. They really were very "`— · " { ` QV r wicked to workers. When they End one resting in the working place and if such , . M" sgi; 1 a one rehises to bribe him he would accuse such a one [of] sleeping on duty or ‘§ ·V accuse him of one serious offense which will le[a]d to his dismissal. They al. r . r _~ , og; , ga . ways report them to the Europeans who dismissed such a one}23 V { t jl.,_‘-Y rg "¤, ~ ». i ;»»¤ Z tl-' r " As would be expected for men m such intimate contact with Europeans, theyf at if · j ry. »·-·r“ itgiyifg » ` 2% r ge became trusted coniidants whose opinion was often solicited about particular work-; ’ r ,1fV V VVV ' ,.,4 ji? { ifi; _ V ers. They often functioned as surrogate "Europeans” and were permitted to beat f, X V ' ce ‘ , V °‘*‘"““‘“S· t I ,·§`.`4 lg V . . Interpreters were taking bribes. They would tlog the African ifhe wouldrrt do p april ‘ li ·-,·_ t___,,» LVL! . "V gif ,» it. He would offer a bribe so he won`t get punishment. Sometimes he did this for V °VV V '=‘ E ?;,V:._] F _,``_ l" ‘ Q? a promotion. The interpreter would recommend him as a hard workers if you ` p i ri; r_·` ,-V _ fi e V; ,__ :;l—~.‘V[ r V give him a bribe. Promotions weren’t regulated. You can be sacked without ref- V ~ V V` r E! Q __ ` Vi cv? if V V V; V t , e,..mcc_124 ` e { { ;_ Q ·‘ . rr » ,-`_w` A x · In their defense, one former intefpreter reflected on these accusations; - T -, -TlVyVV’l ‘ SV ‘ 7 ,·: lV‘ .- » VV i · r. .- »~ __; *1; :;_;_;‘;·,__ r .;·l°»‘»· l·»;:*¤. t {ral: ’¤ ` ·‘· ~ _, r · .. ~ ;;;;f§‘§;‘i£;‘;r‘;;°;i‘;*§;eSvi‘;;]5;r;‘jv‘;;;2;;:;;*;% ·;‘;;;?g;‘;;; EI: , Phgtg 3,10. European underground manager and tubmen. A European underground th h V , _ th th _ _ _ in ` manager, circa 1915. Notice the lamps and his protective clothing, including plth CY a er ‘ Simi- °Y °“gh‘ that li was *h° m*€‘PF€*°l'5 wh<>t<>1dth¤ El-lm ~ - helmet and boots. The workers used candles to light their work, had no protective Pew not m give *1*8 Wage l¤°Y°aS€· { clothing and worked barefoot. The tub is filled with coal. (Crown Agents) When asked about the accusation that they took bribes, he noted, "Everybody wants V . a wage increase. It is not only the labourers."1Z$ ,f .V Because of their intermediary role in production, they were some of the few L ? "downed tools" to demand increased wages. lnflationary pressures were severe Africans allowed to live in the European Reservation area. Their proximity to Eu- V and few of the urban—based workers could actually live on their wages. They also ropean residences privileged them to observe the nuances of British culture, which Q protested token cheating which deprived hewers of the income coming from their they used to their advantage. By using these cultural insights they made themselves `, ' production. Little is known about the leaders or organization of the industry’s first indispensable to the production regime and in at least one instance, were caught r , strike, but it appears that some rudimentary w0rkers’ organization was evolving. collaborating with a European supervisor in extorting the workers. The informal network of coercion and corruption, using the industry’s superviFor the workers 1917 was a year of discontent. The war had caused inflation that V ; sory staff and the Native Courts, was not sufficiently entrenched nor coherent to was reflected in high food prices. This was exacerbated by shortages in metal l · suppress all worker initiative. Resistance took many forms; direct and indirect, incoinage, which was replaced by paper currency. The new economy was not suffr- ` ` dividual and collective, physical and cultural. In the early years most 1aborers’ reciently entrenched to monetize such a worthless commodity as “paper," and traders . J sistance was unpredictable and informal, usually consisting of the withdrawal of _ as well as workers refused to accept it as legal tender. Further, the sudden growth { ; their labor from the workplace. For example, several hundred men brought from ofthe coal labor camps and the city of Enugu created a considerable urban popu- ` r Bende, in central Igboland, deserted to a man when they saw the nature of underlation without a rational system of food supply. Rural communities could have been , . ground conditions. Agbaja miners, who had unskilled underground jobs, refused induced to supply some of this population’s needs, but the existence of so per·ma— V ‘ - to work more than two weeks in the month, retuming home for a fortnight allegedly nent an urban market had not been fully appreciated. Many work stoppages occurred , to supervise their farms."7 Soon after the strike the industry was hit by seasonal simply because workers had to retum home to get food from their own farms. , ‘ labor shortages during the farming period from May to July. While technically the A lightning strike on 28 March 1917 highlighted these transitional problems and I men were "farming," these men were also insuring their presence in the political protested one form of corruption in the minesm The underground workers and cultural life of the village. In the early years men escaped the controls of the

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126 ew, were All gjaves·· ` ` Creating the Colonial Workplace and the Colonial City lil inqprrre · ~- ¤, sg; _, r · VV ri disadvantage ofthe capitalist. While the rest day insured this .V ' ’ " <·"’···‘ `. VV " ‘ ` l , worker and not the employer who determined when the rest da , V — ' · · `1 ` when employers could be said to have succeeded in instilling e ~l~.»Vl · · . V “ V eliminating irregular work rhythms, and teaching an awareness of · 4 , ,. V _ _' _ _ _V _V Q of time and its frugal use, they still had to make concessions to the seas th, r 4‘r_ _ V - -_ » · ‘ ~` ll V it _ of the countryside "with its festivals [and] religious holidays."”3 This was »r_ ,.` tn;. QV - V ,? in Enugu during the early years. Some men moved in and out of the mines, Vu i V VQ}. · * in ing wage labor into a rurally based pattern of economic survival. Mining" V; L_ i_= , I VV I helped finance preindustrial social rituals that were important for village cohesid VV Vis; VVVT ; nfs _ ~-·**~ = · , and personal status. For one miner, these obligations were his incentive for enter-` *< V . ¥ · ‘”g““°‘“‘“”‘ iiil z» V *";» r » A ll 4 ` ` i' ' I joined the mine when I felt like. In those days what normally happened was V" , g »~ T ~» ef. ig i' » " VZ that whenever the villages wanted to celebrate certain feasts, people will rush to ` . _ 1 V t the mine to get money. (That is to work for sometime) and get money for their i ‘ { . feast. When you must been you retire home to celebrate the feast with the money { L _ , ' you got from mining work. When the money finished you go back again to anV V g, · other money. Payments in those days was every two weeks. This was the method A . i ` `. V , Z` ‘ I joined the mining work. Nobody forced mem V · V . V ‘ · . Other work habits accommodated the general severity of working conditions _ _ _ _ · underground. In En land it was assumed that miners would have hi h absentee Ph°t° 3'13 Udl Conwy Adm Coal stacked at the mma entrance (cmwn Agents) _ , rates because this wgs not an occupation in which intense efforts could be contin— Q V uously expended}35 Predictably, hewers and haulage workers had the highest ab— tgypyjgg, gtnlctuyed the judusuyts prgdugtjgn rhythms uucdydulg tu judusu-ia] dmd ~· sentee rates.l’° In Enugu when conditions became unbearable the men simply left Shifts were eight hours, three eight-hour shifts constituted a full day, and five and a · the mine, returned to their villages, and remained there until they wished to i-enn·u_ half days gqnsijtjmgd u wggk_ The wgykjng mouth Val-iud wj[h the pumps; df Weeks Additionally, as noted above, workers also curtailed their effort when underAg d prejudusidal people the Igbo had d notion uf “;usk (im5V" and vyhjlg [hey j ground ventilation problems were onerous. They took long rest periods in the main worked vigorously to accomplish a particular task, work ended when the task was ‘ roadways and Sometimes ldd as well. Rothcr than l1'¤P1’0V€ 00H village.?-uup_ Fu; Example, dud Ngwu viuggg may ubsui-V.; dud day while spdyhdr ’ V ployment in the mines. This managerial accommodation to African work pattems, village would observe a different day. The rest day was an important cultural insti- . and the m€n’S adjustments to poor Working conditions, Were possible because the tution, scrupulously observed as a socially important practice that helped village- . Agbdjd 61% functioned as 3 ldb01' 1'€S€TV€· group cohesion and economic life. It is a day when people refrain from farm work, V Al Sdmd point during the Wal', thc H1¢1'l f0HIl€d associations to discuss their grievsums the market,and sb household chores, hobbies, and enteraimnent.v111sgeres- ~ succs aud conditions st work. Although the manager assumed that the "boss h¤ys" tivals also occur.m Since villages have different rest days, observance of the rest day j ` and “¤stivs h€dd¤’l¢¤” Wdllld houdlc SFl€Vd¤¤€S, Ofldh they WWE lhd grievance and would not be reflected in high absenteeism on a particular day. But if work pattems ` V-hd meh had little ccuhdoucc lh them-137 The exact dflghls of these ¤fgdl1lZ2ii0nS, coincided with what early missionaries noted about church attendance, when it was Q ; called Nzuko U°l”*d’l}'d»m OF “m¤€llhgS»°` are hdl clcor, h0W€V€1', Théy appear to be virtually impossible to get new converts to attend church on a rest day, one would Tdlaldd to the urhou lml0hS· Anccdctc-l l’€l€T¢hC€$ ld “¤hl0h$” dfgdhlilhg 8 1920 expect that many men would be absent on their village’s rest day}32 V strike suggests that they began during the latter years of the war. The Nzuko fulIronically, the Igbo week resolved one problem usually confronting African colo- lllldd md-hy of thc functions of d usdo Uhldh dhd mutual oid Sdcldly-139 They met nin capitalists: me separation of work time from leisure time, but it did sc tb the .i tc discuss such erislvoucss as "focd shortages, token cheating, bribery and cor-

128 "We Were All Slaves" { V Creating the Colonial Workplace and the Colonial City 129 ruption in the obtaining and retaining of jobs and in the allocation of work on hard ` in the impoverished communities ofAgbaja. These projects—schoo1s, roads, zinc or soft coal faces.”"*° .' j roofs, bicycles—all symbolized modernization in their community, They also used They WSIS structured by job category and included both "foreign" and "local" P 2 these wages to attain status within the cultural idiom of their Village. They joined men. The basic structure followed the job classifications at the mines. Each of the V ; the higher ranks of title societies, institutionalizing their prestige within the sacrimajor labor classes, such as "Special Labour,” in other words, machine workers, Q political structures. But their ideas about manliness were being reformulated betimber drawers, railmen and timbermen, held their own meeting under a president ` cause of the new opportunities and ideologies created under colonialism. One and secretary known as the "Head Committee" which would represent their men E Agbaja worker, Samuel Onoh, used his income in both “traditional" and "modem" in a "Special Labor Meeting." Similar structures were formed for each category of Ig ` ways. He invested in his children’s future by funding their education, married six work. Their meetings were held either in the mines or in remote areas. The meet- ; wives, and bought membership in the Ozo society: mgs were wily S?"r?F“° bcciause die men were aware that both European man- i The development of [the] coal industry did a lot to my village. But for coal in;$;n;;r;t a1T;?,;;sSs;§EgX1;;gsi:;;d igtiligpéis;;;1;l;§?§;;l;L11tV;;i;I;1;1§)L;;2 `» · dustry civilization would have not reached us as early as it had reached us. The Secrecy? y rp ’ ` i coal industry initiated me into Qzo title. Now I am Ozo Samuel N. Onoh. I Although the colliery Nzuko may have had mms in the urban ‘,¤_ibal,, unions, _ able to tram up myhchildgen, build good houses. We contributed money and build _ they differed in significant respects. They were working class organizations that ` schools and Ohm: ES` represented all workers. Secondly, they were not organized by clan, but incorpo- Z , With six wives he had attained the Big Compound ideal that had captivated so rated all groups of workers, regardless of their home village. This universal aspect " many men at the tum of the century. confused the village "chiefs," especially from among the Agbaja, who could not Q This economic foundation allowed the men to participate as influential memunderstand how their countrymen would follow the "foreiguers" who held many . ; bers of village life. As industrial workers they symbolized the new opportunities of the leadership positions. The types of men who were elected to head these var- 2 offered by the colonial economy. But, despite the state policy to discourage proious Nzuko had many of the samé qualities that, noted earlier, were prized in vil- " letarianization and the “‘dangerously" disruptive behavior it produced, these men lage leadership. R.H. Croasdale, a rather unsympathetic district orticer, suggested " V rapidly became adversaries of the chiefs, even when their primary residence was that men of "energy, personality and slight extra knowledge of a.ffairs," were se- in the village. One Agbaja miner commented on the political role that miners saw lected by the "ordinary unsophisticated local men," allegedly because they could `< ` themselves playing as a force against corrupt chiefs: l”°d“°° °°“°F°T° g"*“S·`41.Th"’ NZ""" ‘”°¥° i‘“*’°‘T”"Fl“?“‘“*l°“$ f°’ °°“S““€’“°"s [ nre miners were most modem and power[fu1]. Because they were aways after al Well polmcal Bducamn They Provider? msmutmml stmctlmi for discus` I democracy. And they don’t allow the chief by opposing him to harass his peosion and interchange between foreign "soph1st1cates" and local "p¤m1t1ves." The ii · 1 And [thc 1 alwa S succeeded in O gsm himhm impact of this connection could be seen both in the villages and in the mines. P E` y y PP g V ,` ' · As early as 1919 a political official complained about the problems "colliery THE MI NE ,,B0Y,, AND THE VI LLAGE ,,MAN,,: ` _. boys caused for the chiefs in the village-groups, or towns, most heavily involved Mwwc AND IGBO cowcrrrlows or MANLINESS Y i ‘“ tm ‘“d“st'y’ DURING WORLD WAR I S i This system of boys [in Enugu-Ngwo, Abor, and surrounding towns] living in . . ,, . ,, . . { their town and working at the mines is not one I prefer. The trouble is that the C033;;:;§IV;;SS3;;:;;Qg;;u;;n?1@;§ 3;;:; O?1I:;;1;lui;it;h§sC;;1m r;?A ' colliery boys living in the towns will not obey the chiefs who complain to thg Chapter 1, the strongest masculine qualities were represented symbolically in the i V Pomml Officer that these boys are loafmg m the towns and Wm not Obey them. Ikenga sculpture and cult. Manhood was defined morally rather than biologically, S ’ Too disruptive to live in the rural towns and too threatening to the tenuous urban and included staying power, bravery when confronted with danger, and strength, " ` order to live in the city, the mine worker challenged all imperial fantasies about both physical and moral."2 All of these qualities were tested by the exhaustive, { ,~ the nature of African rural society. Their very existence contradicted the pattems dangerous, and oppressive conditions in the mines. .~ of authoritarian rule that officials tried to insinuate into village politics. Their inThe miners’ position in the workplace also affected their social role in the vil- y t . sistence on "democracy" challenged what colonial authorities assumed was an enlage. They were agents of "progress" in Agbaja villages where they earned con- , ; g demic authoritarianism rooted in African society. siderable esteem. With piece-rates they could earn a higher wage than the other * j As against this prestige was the racist culture of the colonial workplace, in which classes of underground labor. Their wages financed many improvement projects ` managerial control was represented in job titles that infantilized men who were re-

130 HW? were All SIAVB-in V ' Creating the Colonial Workplace and the Colonial City 131 I garded with Such Prestige in their OWU Communities and Villages- Thus Pick "b0Y~V ut ~y 6. PRO, CO 583/26, Lewis V Harcourt, Minute, 1 September 1914; CO 583/33, "Ad(hewers) undercut coal and loaded the tubs. Tub "b0ys" hooked the tubs to the cen- Q ` dress ofthe Govemor—General," Proceedings of the Second Meeting cf the Nigerian Countral haulage system in the main roads. Tracks were laid by the rail "bays, " and } ‘ cil, 29 December 1915, 8-9. timber "boys " reinforced the roof with timber. Such infantalized racial titles were ]· 7· Agw¤Akp¤1¤, "B¤°kg¤'<>¤¤d *0 the E¤“8“ C°m°*'Y Sh°°‘i“g Incident in 1949;, ]"“" offensive to the men but they had 110 recourse until they had developed a stronger ; Ml Gflhe Himliml SOCMY °fNi8€'i¤ 3· 2 (1965): 337labor movcmenn j 8. Powell Duffrgm, Technical Services, "First Report to the Undersecretaiy of State for the As the Great War came to a close, labor problems and transport difficulties re¥ i ¤¤1¤¤1¤S»°¤*9¤·e* Om°€'D°ver H°uS°‘WhmhaH’ SW 1.°n The Qovm-nm€ntC0éhcgZ,Egu?$’ duced the rnines’ output. Four mines were worked that year—Udi and Obwetti the t` The Charactmstics of the Coal Produced mq me Invesugétwn mm the Othcrn O ` _ ` . .... ’ . 9. Ibid., Section G, "Chem1ca.l and Physical Examination of Enugu Coal. oldest inmesr were in robbery while two sections of Iva, Little Iva, a temporary ~t U 1O_NNAE’RE4H_HajI,..Enugll: An Industrial West Amen Cityj (mimeogmph 1954% L production site, and Iva Main, the future major site, were less advanced. In July , IL PRO, CO 583/26, M_E_ Bland_ General Managen Railway to Cormnissiohen gmt. roads had been driven throughout Little Iva, pillars had been demarcated and rob- . ly sha, 18 December 1g14_ ben" commenced at eight sit°S· At Iva Majm the newest mine. miners Were COW .` 12. For much of the early twentieth century, colonial authorities spoke of the disruptive centrated on development, a process that was proceeding at the slow rate of _ impact or "detribalized” Africans. Lugard, for example, argued: "It is. as I have said, very thirty-six yards per month partially because of the lack of power—driven drills. In V _ desirable that Natives should as far as possible live in their own towns, under their own April a new adit, Palm Valley, was opened to the Iva reserves. By the end of the 7 Chiefs and Native Courts." Freder1c1eLugard, The Political Memorondum:·Reviszon oflnyeary 130 yards had been reached and a Second road to com-toot it with Udi Mine A ` struction: ofPolttical Ojfcers an Subjects Chtefly Political andAdrnmtirtrotzve, 1913-1918, reached twenty yaIds_ Work at the coal face employed Over 2,000 W01.kcrsv146 Q 3d ed. (London, 1970). The more orthodox deiimtion of proletariamzation assumes that Bm just as the manager reported Ou the encouraging labor Situation, a Crisis in n workers are totally separatedofrom the means of subsistence. However, Dunbar Moodie has labor su 1 struck the mines. In November 1918 the Influenza Pandemic hit Udi 3 argued that in the case of migrant labor cultures in Africa}, movement back and forth be. . PP y. . . . . ; tween rural farms and the rmnes may, in fact, not he so sigmticant. "Once workable land Fhsmcg caugmg Widespread dchstauon and.d1Sc0}`u-agmg ‘°?“lP°°P1‘?“°’"“ com- · became scarce or migrant remittances were so fully used for basic subsistence that the mg to the mm€S‘ Them were 39-510 deaths m Omtsha P1-°Vm°°’S csumatcd POP' i land lay fallow, then proletarianization was complete, even if people continued to migrate ulation of 1.970,000. As is often the case with natural disasters, the people of Udi ~ ' and families remained in the mm] areasy Mgodig and Ndatshg, Gogngfnr Ggldy zz, sought respite in their traditional medicinal and spiritual practices, resorting to · 13, Young, African Cglgytigl stare, 95_ some rituals which they memseives had come to consider TBPUERKTW .· V 14. Alfred’s Camp was established by an Onitsha contractor, Alfred Inoma, who refused . . . i to live with the “loca1s" from Udi. He returned home in the twenties, and subsequently Awka In the town 0fAgbaJa mm out of mn P°°P1° Seemed to be down The roads were ,J _ men flocked to the camp from the village of Nneni. By the late thirties it was an Nneni deserted. Here and there across them could be seen clumps of feathers and ` colony See Hail., ··Enugu_·» 12o_ Imewiaw with Gabd€1MbB_temlu) Mtohae1NWakuaehe_ ashes—the sacrifices of dibio: to keep away the spirits that bring the diseasc.“" t; - and Clement Egbogimbm Ugwu Alfred, 5 July 1g75_ The epidemic had such an impact on the villagers that even today it is used as M g *}ar°n,S camp Wasg°;rg°d by Am $13; aimivc Oi 3wa* *j*A§°@;;;‘g‘j°é§;f§§j a Pm **5 ***1* ms ed me Sigeicet ms; For *h*··=·= Weeks eu 1 EEE? %hZ2l?1‘Z.1°AtiE2ii?§°?E1Z§u. OZQSEEQ Zum Mott; Osaliwe, 8 production at the mines stopped Just as the mines production dramatically in- ~ July_1975 and CI€mcmUd€’ 9 July 1975, Ugwu Amon, Enugu ceased f¤¤¤¤4°9 =<>¤S Pe day ·¤ J=·¤¤=¤v 1918 *0 805 ms pe day ¤· my 191S·‘“ » 15. Nutmeg, British com was transferred to me ——bush.·· The mtssimyimhm. g pclogist Rev. G.T. Basden noted on a visit to Ngwo village—gr0up Udi in 1916 that it was NOTES { "the custom in Ngwo to sit at the fire as in E11gland." Church Missionary Society Archives 1 . (hereafter CMSA), University of Bimiingham, G3A/0 1913-1916, Rev. Basden, "Report 1. Allan Campbell and Fred Reid, “Thc Independent Collier in Sc0Lland," in The Inde- il oh Visit to the Udi Distnetji _ pendent Collier: The Coal Miner asArchetypal Proletarian Reconsidered, cd., Royden Har- ` ’ ]6_ This cgntinugd nntjl ]947_ Duffryn, "Ch;n-gr;terist_i4;s of the Coa1,” D-138. riS¤¤ (I-¤nd¤¤. 19781 56- · = 17. see interview with Eze O20 wu. Amankwu, Um, 2 June 1975. 2· Frederick C°°P°‘— Dmlvnizatian “”dAf’i~°“” SOCM'}'- 56- t i 18, This initial gram was augmegted several years later by another "gift" to the state. The 3. The story of this grievance weaves a thread through all histories ofthe elite at the turn I _ people of Ngwo knew ngflqjng about their "ehiefs"‘ deed, but eventually, as they realized of the century. For a discussion, see Kristin Mann, Marrying Well: Marriage, Status, and l the reduction in then- fenntandst they dernnnded preferential hiring in n-iiiiii-ig posts. Social Change Among the Educated Elite in Colonial Lagos (Cambridge, 1985). Q V ]9_ Q_H_ Cr-easdaie, "Rep¤rt on the Enugu Colliery," 1938. The original report was IGS! 4. See Michael Burawoy, Politics of Production; Cooper, Decolonization and Ajriean · from the National Archives, Ehngn, dnt-mg the Biafra;] Wm-_ I thank Dr_ RE]-[_ I-{air, for-» SUFWO'- Q merly of the University of Liverpool, for lending me his personal copy. The title sheet and 5. Uzeochi, ‘Eastem Nigerian Ra.i1way," 119-20. f Several pages at-e nnssjng V

132 "We Were All Slliveen Creating the Colonial Workplace andthe Colonial City 133 4 20 CMSA GBA 3/0 1911 nvlsn to the Udi D1s1;n;;r," Rev. G.T. Basden. wl l 44. For a brief biography of Jackson, see Omu, Press and Politics in Nigeria, 50-55. See 21. Fred I.A. Omu, Press and Politics irt Nigeria 1880-1937 (Atlantic Highlands, NJ`, also Chap. 7 for the struggle between govemment and the Record during and after World 1978), 50-55. { V Wa_1·I_ I I I I 22. CMSA, G3 .A 3/0, 1913-1916, "Niger Mission," Eso Nzeche and eleven others, The , 45. Omu, Press and Politics rn Nigeria, 192-94, Christians at Coalmines to Bishop Tugwell, 24 August 1916. l V 46. Akinjide Osuntokun, Nigeria in the First World War (Atlantic Highlands, NJ, 1979), 23. Ekene Michael Gbanite, "Third World Urbanisation: Enugu, Nigeria," (Ph.D. diss., . 314_ The New School for Social Research, New York, 1978), 83. if 47. Upon Lugard’s retirement in 1920, the Lagos Weekly Record sarcastically attacked 24_ Anthony D_ King, Urbanism, Colonialism andthe World Ewrwmyr Culfuml and $P¤· ., him as being "the victim of exaggerated personality induced by the autocratic power eential Foundation.: ofthe World Urban System (London, 1990), 53-54. .. ferred upon him through the discretion of Lewis Harcourt," Osuntolcun, Nigeria in the First 25_Wln11n the nm P1ans for Enugu’s design were two areas for European Seftlememf elle- V 1 World War, 90, Throughout his administration Lugard carried on a running battle with the for "first c1ass" Europeans, the other for "second class Europeans," a transposition of met- V V Lagosian elite and attempted to muzzle their newspapers. See Omu, Press and Politics in ropolitan class structure to the colony. However, both were within the European reserva- ; Nigeria, 88-103. tion. PRO, MPGG/129, Station Plan No. 107, Government Station, Enugu Ngwo, 12 March .` 48. This Anglophile ideology, which was quite prominent among this sector of the African 1919. ` people, has recently been examined for both South African and Nigerian examples. See 26. Frantz Fanom me Wmched ofthe Earth (New York, 1963). V, 1 Brian William, "An Alrican in Kimberley: Sol T. Plaatje, l894—1898," in Industrialization 27. Lugard, The Political Memorandum, 405-422. and Social Change in SauthA]rica, ed. Richard Rathbone and Shula Marks (London, 1982), gg, Maynard W Swanson, "The Sanitation Syndromei Bl-lbenie Plague md Urban Na' I 238-58; Brian Willian, Sal Plaatie: South African Nationalist, 1876-1932 (Berkeley, 1984), tive Policy in the Cape Colony, 1900-l909,” Journal of African History 18, 3 (1977): L and Kristin Ma1]n,Mgrrying Wgll_ 387__41O_ Fm a discussion of the intersection of medical knowledge (or ign01'¤¤ee)» when V: . 49. The concept of "respectability," a theme in British history, has also been treated in planning: racism, and segregation, see,Phillip Curtin, "Medie¤1 Knowledge and Ufben New . African labor historiography. Cooper has examined it in terms ofthe shift in colonial labor ning in Tropical Africa" American Historical Review 90 (1985): 594-613. . _ policy in the 1930s towards grooming a "respectab1e" working class that was distinct from 29. These erroneous views of the ways malaria was transmitted reflected early .' ` the undisciplined, erratic, casual laborer. See Frederick Cooper, On the African Waterfront: twentietlrcentury assumptions about contagion. Lugard, Political Memorandum, 416. `_ — Urban Disarderand the Transformation of Work in Colonial Mombasa (New Haven, 1987). 30. Ibid., 416. ‘_ . 50. Lugard noted in his Political Memorandum that: "lt is .. . very desirable that Natives 31. Ibid., 417. Q , should as far as possible live in their own towns, under their own Chiefs, and Native Courts. 32. Uzeochi, "Eastern Nigerian Ra.i1way,” 217. ·_ Only Aliens . .. who reside for purposes of trade and access to a railway siding, or Natives 33. Horton, "0hu," 334, and C. Brown, "Testing the Boundaries? ‘, who are employees of Europeans, or artisans, and those who administer to the requirements 34_ Interview with MaZiAny10m,v0 Nwgdg, U1-nnma, Ugbawka, 18 August 1988.. · of the community, should as a general rule be allowed to live in the actual precincts of a 35. Frederick Cooper, "Urbau Space, Industrial Time, and Wage Labor in Africa," in The _ . wwnshjpyi Lord Lugard, pglltlcal Memgrlmdm 417_ Struggle for the City, ed., Frederick Cooper (Beverly Hills, 1983), 7-50. . .= 51. Offodile, "Growth and Inlluence of Tribal Unions," 941. 36. Much of this discussion is based on the Croasdale report which was researched in the ' 5g_ See Haj_,._ ·-Em_,·gu_» 284617; Immzmucl Wallmteim ..VO1untm_yAss0ciaucns,, in Pm late thirties. He is the primary source for the information on the co1liery’s Nzaka. ~ lizical Parties and National Integration in Tropical Ajiica, ed., James S. Coleman and Carl 37_ Ngukg is a rather generic Igbo term meaning any type ef “mee*i¤E·” Therefere the Rosberg (Berkeley, 1964), 318-39; Offodile, "Growth and Influence of Tribal Unions," urban “tribal” unions were also called Nzuko. . 937-41; Coleman, Nigeria, 213-15. 384 Cmasdalcl ukcpon Ou the Enngn C0111e1·y_” 19_ i A 53. This is the subject of Kristin Mann’s Marrying Well. For a discussion of the South 39. E.P. Oyeaka Offodile, "G·rowth and Intluence of Tribal Unions,“ WestAfi·ican Review African va;-lanr, San W111ian, ··_A_n African in K1mb,~a·1ay_·· and Wuhan, 5,;] plmga (August 1947): 939. _ \ " 54. Michael Burawoy argues that management rnust secure consent from the worker 40_ Ibid Offodila gnmselia member, says men leam "simple Soeivl discipline end ¤°“¤’· 1 . for the terms of exploitation in the capitalist workplace. See The Politics af Production, _ ,, . 226. l WSZ1 David srnqck gives a more contemporary example efhow these seeieties f°$f°l' eleek V ` _ 55. For a discussion of the concept of "habituation” in reference to African workers, see awareness. In speaking of one such association, the Peace U¤i¤¤ ef Okwe Vmegc m Nféwo Q V Rvbin Cohen, “ReSistance and Hidden Forms of Consciousness Among African Workers," Uno, an organization of colliery employees, he notes the obsessive consciousness of time, Review gfAf,~lmn Pglipigal Ecanpm 19 (1930); 8.21 They had a ren minute break for refreshments, which was rigidly enfeieedt md an 1*19*96*5* { Q ‘ 56. The pioneering study that raises the issue of an African work ethic is Atkins’ The ing scale of fines for being five, ten, and iifteen ruinutes late. David Smock, "From Village ~ l . Moon Is DeatLr_ to Trade Union in Africa," (Ph,D. diss., Cornell University, 1964), 70. i · 57. PRO, CO 583/15, William I. Leek to Colonial Office, 25 May 1914. 42. James C. Coleman, Nigeria; Background to Nationalism (Los Angeles and Berkeley, ’ _ · 5g_ ONPROF 1/15/28, DO Udi to Cqmnjsgiongr Onnsna, 19 January 1915_ 1958), 215. »< · 59. Barry Supple, The History ofthe British Coal Industry Vol. 4, 1913-1946: The P043. See Omu, Press and Politics in Nigeria, Chap. 7. { l liticol Ecanorrni af Decline (Onford, 1987). 'I’his was especially disastrous for the miners in

s 134 WW Were All Slaves " 1 Creating the Colonial Workplace and the Colonial City 135 the northern coal fields because their union had agreed to accept a "sliding wage scale" 80. John Tosh, “What Should Historians Do With Masculinity?: Reflections on Nine· which pegged their eamings to the price of coal. When this plunged, it threw thousands of 5 teenth-Century Britain," History Workshop Joumal 38 (1994): 186. miners into utter destitution. E . 81. Colls takes great pains to explain the distinction between a "pit man” and a "co160. These shortages were partially due to dislocations in the wartime coal market, and yi · lien'? "The word ‘pit man’ with its gendered connotation carried with it meanings of social partly to labor unrest in the Welsh coal fields. In 1913 the two major coal fields for export {Q ' bearing; other men were ‘co1liers’ compared to ‘pit men,’ and others again were labourers were South Wales and northeast England. South Wales had superior deposits of anthracite, `€. _ compared to col1iers." Robert Colls, The Pitmen ofthe Northern Coahield: Work, Culture, dry steam, and coking steam coal, and the northem coal field districts of Northumberland and Protest, 1790-1850 (Manchester, 1987), 12. and Durham were the major source of prime coking fuel and gas-making coal, The early C, 82. Ibid, I months of the war (fall 1914) immediately disrupted the export-oriented fields of the British 1 V 83. For a good discussion of the system of work in these fields, see M,]. Daunton, "Down wsj 1m1usu·y_ By 1915 workers throughout England protested the rapidly rising inflation- { * the Pit: Workin the Great Northern and South Wales Coal Fields, 1s70.1914_·· Eggngmig The miners joined in late February with a demand for a 20 percent wage increase based on , g . History Review (2d ser.), 34, 4 (November 1981): 582. national and not district variations, The biggest crisis, however, was in South Wales where _ 84. Ibid., 585. militant miners and recalcitrant owners brought the war effort to a standstill in mid-July , , l 85. Powell Duffryn noted in 1947 that this tradition may have been justified when the 1915. Supple, British Coal Industry, 49, 62, 64-69. gy lndustry tirst opened, but had since become an uneconomic practice. Duffryn, "Character61. PRO, CO 741/1, Nigerian Railways, "Minutes of the Board," 1916. _ istics of Coal," D-16445, 62. West Africa, 24 February 1917, 76. " 86. Campbell and Reid, Independent Collier, 58. 63. PRO, CO 583/46, Lugard to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 3 September 1917. 87. Supple, British Coal Industry, 30. . 64. Croasdale, "Report on the Enugu Colliery," 9. 2 . 88. Duffryn, "Character1stics of Coal," D-19. · 65. PRO, CO 583/31, Lugard to Harcourt, 9 April 1915. `X 89. Interview with Thomas Noisrke, Ezeama Owa, Udi, 7 July 1975. 66. PRO, CO 583/44, Address ofthe Govemor General, Proceedings of the Second Meet- 90. Interview with B.U. Anyasado, Owerri Town, 23 July 1975. ing of the Nigerian Council, 29 Delzember 1915. J 91. This calculation was made in 1947 by the Powell Duffryn company, Oxygen levels 67. As cited in Uzeochi, "Eastem Nigerian Railway," 125-26. y relied on natural air currents. When the mines were only a few hundred feet from the en68. Interview with Gabriel Mbamelu, 5 July 1975. trance, they were not severe. However, as the workings branched off the main roads into 69. Ibid. Y 1 the seam, one could assume that the levels would drop. Duffryn, "Characteristics of Coal," 70. Hair, "Enugu,” 125. 1 D-70. 71. Ibid. Leck wrote later in an article that when they were told "tl1at it was the govem- 3 · 92. PRO, CO 657/4, NRAR, 1917. ment’s intention to drive roads into the hills, they were very skeptical and would not enter- 1 93, Duffryn, "Characteristics of Coal," D-82-83. tain the idea." Hair quotes an article written by Leckin 1932, He does not give afull citation. 1 I 94. Murrus are two men who work the same coal face either together or on opposite 72. Black damp is air in which oxygen has been displaced by carbon dioxide. Fire damp j , l shifts. The system developed in the north coal fields. They are partners in more t11an an inis the very dangerous methane gas, It is highly explosive in even small quantities and prone , _ dustrial sense, and have a powerful bond tl1at extends to their families as well. For a disto spontaneous combustion. Dave Douglass, "Pit Talk in County Durham," in Miners, ( V cussron, see Douglass, "Pit Talk in County Durham," 227. Quarrymeu, and sa/1: Workers, History Workshop Series, ed., Raphael Samuel (Lendvn. »* ’ 95. NIGCOAL 1/ 1/ 10, "Research on Hot Climate Physiology; Experimental subjscrsy 1977). .1 3 Dr W.S.S. Ladell, 12 December 1946, 73. Powell Duffryn found that ventilation air reached 94 percent saturation the first 1,100 ‘ 96. See Hair, “Enugu," 194. feet from the entrance and increased rapidly as one approached the working face. Levels of `,' I 97. PRO, CO 657/4, NRAR, 1918. 100 percent were detected. Duffryn, "Characteristics of the Coal," D-70. = ’ 98, libido l · I _ · I ” 74. The issue of which jobs were designated "skilled" and “unskilled" would become a ; , 99.. During that time you could stay outside and sight somebody working in the mine. point of contention between labor and management during a strike in 1937. See Chap. 4. ‘ It Interview with James Alo, former worker, 6 July 1975_ 75. PRO, CO 657/2, Nigerian Railway Administrative Report (hereafter NRAR), 1916. W 100. Interview with James Alo. Another informant mentioned that the water in the mines In August 1916 the seam was over six feet tall. From the main shaft the men opened head- `· x also served as a toilet, for human waste floated throughout the mine workings. Interview ings right and left every twenty-live yards. There were fifteen such headings. B8Sd€H. “V1S11 j ~_ with IK. Onale, Amawom, Owem, 9 August 1975_ · p 4 to the Udi District." * , 101. NNAE, ONPROF 1/15/28, Commissioner Omtsha to Engineer-in-Chief, Port Har76. I.C.F. Sttacham, Coal Mining Practice, vol. 1 (New York, 1958), 265. Lv court, 13 March 1915. 77_ 1-1,1; Bulmzm and R,A.s, Redniayne, Colliery Working and Management. (London. if . 102. Experiments in the 1940s found that some areas had dangerously low Oxygen ]gv~ 1896), 324_ oy els of 13.4 peroent. One could safely assume that conditions were atleast as bad, if not 78. Campbell and Reid, "The Independent Collier in Sc¤tland," 59. , , worse, in the opening decades. Duffryn, "Characteristics of Coal," D-82. 79. J,R. Harris, "Skil1s, Coal and British Industry in the Eighteenth Century," History 61, , : 103. As we shall see later, rn the thirties this analysis of African culture would become 202 (Jul-lo 1976); 182, as quoted in Harrison, The Independent Cvllief. in , an 1¤1D0l'la¤t rationale for the developmentalist thrust of colonial policy, For a discussion ·yl

136 _ "Vlk Vkre All Slaves " · ` Creating the Colonial Workplace andthe Colonial Ciry \ 137 see Cooper, Decolonization and African Society, Chap. 4. Also see Orde Browne’s ideas. 124. I.nterview with J.K. Ohale, Amawom, Owerri, 9August 1975. Ohale himself was an PRO, CO 554/125, Granville St. George Orde Browne to O.G.R. Willians, 15 February y interpreter in the late twenties. 1946; Granville St. George Orde Browne, Labour Conditions in West Africa, Cmd. 6277 g 125. Interview with Augustine Ude, Umuaga, Udi, 5 August 1975. (London, 1941), 61. Q 126. Croasdale, “Repor·t on the Enugu Colliery," 62. 104. Hair, "Enugu," 194. 127. For a fascinatingly complex discussion of gender in lgbo villages, see Amadiume, 105. Anne McClintock, Imperial Leather, 115. _ Male Daughters and Female Husbands: Gender and Sex in an African Society (London, 106. McClintock notes that authorities considered that one indicator of backwardness of .} 1987). coal miners, an indicator that cast aspersions on the "mar11iness" of the profession, was the yi 128. Duffryn, "Characteristics of Coal," D—185. inclusion of women, who were being "unsexed" by work in the mines. Ibid., 116. ` ; 129. See Frederick Cooper, "Colonizing Time: Work Rhythms and Labor Coniiictin Colo107. See Supple, The History ofthe British Coal Industry, 99-111. , nial Mombasa," in Colonialism and Culture, ed., Nicholas B. Dirks (Ann Arbor, 1992), 209. 108. PRO, CO 554/125, Orde Browne to OGR Willian, 15 February 1940. f _ 130. Thompson has traced the problems of imposing clock awareness that preoccupied 109. This is the title of a review essay on several coal mining texts. It is a very apt de- 1 British industrialists for several centuries, as they transformed English country people into scription of the universalizing characteristics of coal mining. David Frank, "The County of . a proletarianized workforce. ln his discussion, Thompson assumed a historical accomrnoCoal." r. V dation of wage labor to industrial time. However, in the British coal industry, conllicts over 110. Moodie, Going for Gold, 18. ‘ A the calibration and use of time characterized workplace struggles until the mechanization 111. The classical critique of indirect rule in eastem Nigeria is Afigbo’s The Warrant · and nationalization of the industry after World War H. E.R Thompson, “'I`ime, Work, DisChiefs. . _ cipline and Industrial Capitalism," Past and Present 38 (1967): 56-97. Keletso Atkins has 112. Burawoy, The Politics of Production, 236. ` traced a similar process of struggles over time as a pivot of resistance by Zulu day workers 113. The logic of selecting pay systems was based on the manner in which specific jobs `, V in nineteenth-century Natal, South Africa. Keletso Atkins, "‘Kaffrr Time’: Preindustrial Temnt into the labor process. Pieceratescwere paid where "intensity of effort was necessary to l r poral Concepts and Labour Discipline in Nineteenth Century Colonial Natalf Joamol gf maintain production, continuous supervision was impossible and incentives were judged to ` M ’ African History 29 (1988); 229-44, be necessary? Usually hewers, tubmen, timberrnen, and roadmen would be in this group. ` ` 131. Ukwu, "Trade and Marketing? 128, Day-rates were paid to men "whose work was irregular, unskilled, routine, or dependent on ' 132. See Richardson, "Rev. Arthur Humphrey Richa_rdsOn_" production of others or problems outside their control." However, at Enugu, only one cat- ` 133. Thompson, "'Iime, Work," 397. egory of worker, the hewer, was on piece-rate pay, an indicator of managerial ineptitude. ` ; 134. Interview with J arnes Alo, Okwojongwo, 6 June 1975. Supple, The History ofthe British Coal Industry, 36, 37. `? ’ 135. Supple, The History ofthe British Coal Industry, 58. 114, Nigerian Railways and Udi Colliery Administrative Report (hereafter NRUCAR). , 136. In the Durham mines when workers encountered conditions thatinterfered with their 1924/25. On Yoruba workmen, see interview with Anieke Chiegwu, Umuagba, Owa IHIGZL ~1 P1'0d¤€T-10n, they Swpped and renegotiated their piece-rate to reduce the burden of such con. 6 July 1975. ‘ y _ ditions on the worker. Douglass, "The Durham Pitman," in Miners, Quarrymen and Salt115. Interview with Onoh Ozoani, a former tubman and pick man, Ameke, Ngwo, 18 No- workers History Workshop Series, ed. Raphael Sarnuel (London, 1977) 205-95 227-28, 239. vember 1991. r 137. Duffryn, "Characteristics of Coal," D—183. 116. There is an entire culture surrounding the cavil. It was usually held every three J V 138. Uiznanya is difficult to translate, but its closest English meaning wouldbe "se1f-help" months, and meant a day off, as well, which the men usually spent in the public house drink- or "mutua1 a.id." ing. No work could be performed because the equipment would have to be moved from the . I 139. Most evidence of Nzuko comes from the intelligence report written by C.H. Croasprevious period’s work site to the new site. Douglas, ‘“Pit Talk in County Durham," 239. 4 ' dale, the local authority and the colliery’s first labor ofticer. He was appointed in 1937 fol117. Interview with James Ogbodo, a retired "tubboy" and "pick boy" in Obuofia Ak- · lowing a strike that forced a thorough investigation and reorganization of the col1iery’s agbe, 2 June 1975. ; managerial structure. See Croasdale, "Report on the Enugu Col1iery," 28-30. 118. Croasdale, “Report on the Enugu Co1liery," 25. · 140. Ibid., 29. 119. OP 45/1921, Railway Construction: Recruitment of Labour and Arrangements for 1. 141. Croasdale, "Report on the Enugu Colliery," 29-30. Control Thereof, cited in Akpala, "Enugu Colliery Shooting Incident," 341. é _ 142. Moodie and Ndatshe, Going for Gold, 38. ' 120. Interview with Chief Thomas Ozobu, Imezi, Owa, Udi, 21 June 1975. ._ 143. Interview with Samuel N. Onoh, Ngwo-Etiti, Nigeria, 9 August 1975. Onoh began 121. Interview with B.U. Anyasado, Owerri Town, 23 July 1975 as cited in Carolyn `· ' work in 1915 as a tubman and worked up through the ranks until he became an underground Brown, "I-Iistory of tl1e Development of Workers’ Consciousness of the Coal Miners .; X - foreman after World War H. at Enugu Government colliery, Nigeria, 1914-1950” (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1 5 ` 144. InI€I'Vi€W with Augustine Ude. Ude began work at the colliery in 1919 when only 1985), 98. Q . ten years old as a messenger. ln 1922 he becarne an interpreter and was the subject of many 122. Ibid., 140-46. Q ‘ complaints by miners. His name was raised many times in my interviews as a perpetrator 123. Interview with Anieke Chiegwu, Umuagba, Owa, Imezi, 7 July 1975. { · of extortion and bribery. KV

138 "We Were All Sl¢zves" ~ 145. PRO, CO 657/4, Nigerian Railways and Udi Coal Mines Administrative Report ,l (hereafter called NRUCMAR), 1919, EM. Bland, General Manager, 96, as cited in Uzoechi, p 4 "Eastern Nigerian Ra.ilway," 208. Here he means rural settlements/towns, not Enugu. ` 146. NRUCAR, 1919. j I 147. PRO, CO 583/77, "The lniiuenza Epidemic of 1918 in the Southern Provinces of Nigeria," J. Beringer, Sr. Sanitation Officer, 5 September 1919, as cited in D.C. Ohadike, "The Iniiuenza Pandemic of 1918-1919 and the Spread of Cassava Cultivation on the Lower `X · I P ` N 7 Niger: A Study in Historical Linkages," Journal ofAfrican History 22 (1981): 384. °· — O S T 148. Ohadike, 384; PRO, CO 657/2, Report on the Nigerian Railways and Udi Coal ~1 Mines, 1918. j` • ( t CON] UN CTURE. a, Z AGITATION, . URBAN1zAT10N, { . AND THE MERGENCE PR0TEsT, 1920-1929 It <· xl { As I look back on these early days ... I think I must come to the conclusion , I that the 1920’s were critical for us. It was during this period that the Nigery ` ian workers began to understand what it meant to be an inferior; to be sub. ¥ ¢ ject to the "busts" and “booms" of Westem capitalist manipulations. While ~r ° the suffering of our workers was great, they learned to stand on their own V ~ J . feet. They expressed themselves by means of strikes and unrest which the British did not appreciate. More important than the strikes were the expres`f _ sions of fratemal interest in workers elsewhere. We did not have an effective . .n , trade union organization in the l920’s, but we had a lot of Nigerian workers Z who thought and acted like trade unionists. _ rv 1 —Michael A. Imodou, founder of the Nigerian Railway Workers Union} l'· Q~ · The signing of the armistice escalated the industrial and political unrest that j , emerged during the war in both Nigeria and England. At the colliery, workers ex; _ hibited increased sophistication in the timing, organization, and strategy of their E industrial protests. There were some six strikes from January 1919 to early 1921,

140 nm were All slavesn The Postwar Cvrijuncture 141 gotttiweg PY tt seeonddwaveérat924ftiéi·7nrit;?gtnat;ri;tf The Protege? _ villages. It was shaping an identity that challenged systems of production control Y C ef Sr 8-l’tlS¤¤S an “Pl<> 0Y$” ln » r sn een sneeess 3 t in the workplace as well as those icons of "indirect rule," the colonial chiefs in the in securing pay increases tc rnect ydrdrne inflstien- Bnt indnstrisl pretest in the t i village. In somewhat sdperhehd respects this errdeered them to the nationalists as twenties was more tenacious and widespread, engulfiug categories of labor hereto- Z ` a symhei Of militant ai.iti_cOhmiai resistance f¤T¢ l-l¤lnV0lV¤d» and drawing in thc dbaekwefdtt Agbele and Ntfenn Werkersftvno A This chapter explores the causes, organization, and ideologies behind this postusually protested by desertmg. The recurrent character of these industrial actions, [ Wat activism and traces the Contours ei an emerging euittite of pretest drawing his nsehor accepted ronn;_i{r_Wort;e§] Protest, tng ;isnrnPtton;]tt§t Woetgers rnleide t ` upon indigenous ideas of leadership and driven by personal economic strategies. tl Ont e Snel Te$P0n$l l Ines 0 e state. nn en me-rnP e cn o e Po CY { t This culture was expressed in a new instituion of collective action, Nzuko himanya, disapnanci amoriigi state actor; indicates a tiuahhitrve changie in the corésciousriiless { r that preceded trade unions. Nzuko syncretized Western voluntary associational o e wor ers· eY ePerate rorn tt Pesttton ati es wor ers· eY eserve to ii forms with Igbo principles of corporate affiliation. The postwar agitations exllV€ rind W0l'k nntilef cellilnl Cnnentlnilsr and n1eY Wanted the jtsre tn sccnre these ig pressed personal and collective definitions of ‘§iust" and "unjust" compensation oondtttons en tnetrbenatn Most n`nPertenttY— even tne toeets were heeenhns rn` ¢ and treatment for employees and an evolving set of expectations from the colonial dnitnal Wnlkefsginlélle ielnieznrieice lndelnendence as IE6 C0;} mmcrsiofiiingliiiinnr i ‘ state. Protest forms reflecteddifferential employment pattems, residential options, an more e$Peel Y cnt sn · eee n'l-lnere ecnnnne tc e eornnntte te en S and variations in the regional significance of wage labor. These ideas were first exninil ccnnnnnitics and ec<>n¤niics· lt lsccsine increasingly clear thtit hehevier that 3 pressed by drhsrdzed erereighe clerical, artisan, and skilled underground workers, ePPeer ed tra-nsttor}; tn the nrst Yenrs sf the rndnst-rY was tn rnot n Permanent ren' V but by mid-decade this protest culture was rapidly embraced by local men even as ture ef ithedeelliery; Wcrk ctiltgreiilflie tneii rnclegd vgiised wcrkpsrennd the set- they fought assiduously to maintain their connections with their village. This labor sons r Y nis o srrntng sn t err rnra seer o tgtttrons· arttetPntton tn `Q‘ J model that synthesizes industrial and farm labor was an important dimension of festivals, rituals, and celebrations established their existence as socially mature e the response ef Ahieah Workers to eeiehiai eapitaiism men and were not abandoned. These types of linkages between agriculture and .~ This Chaptei. Outlines the eompiex Strategies that Workers used to mediate the rninins were rntnY tYPtetn cf tste eighteenth- dnd esrtY ninctecntheentiny soot` j capitalist workplace. As Fredrick Cooper argued in his tribute to E.R Thompson, tnndfvnere garden Plots snd n_reW sninisls were trnlnortnnt snrvrvnt strategres fer ' we must capture the ways that African working people shaped the capitalist workccsl S orr‘eeeson· rn Enngn nnners hnssinedt fltnte sneeessrnt-tY= for htne te tend i . place and reject the homogenizing tendency of industrial capital to transform them hheir farms, or abinted tliemselves froir; the pirt to seek food frodrrii hoiiine. Thls bei ` i into abstract "lab¤r p0wer.”" Labor militancy is not always an index of proletarieVl°r eneenrege scme reni among e P0 ey Stn to argue e n vsntngcs o = Q anization. The only workers who wholeheartedly embraced urban residence were state-snppcded hcnsins with nest senden plets- lint s gcvennnent censensns cn » the eterergrre workers from Onitsha and owerrr whose homes were tee distant to the gegree of freeiiliombmiriere would be allowed to have regarding their social re- t aiiow daily eemmutihg The ieeai Agbaia and N-kann who drifted imo the W0i.k_ Pre nennn Pmve tc e e nSlVe· it t force either lived inthe village and commuted daily to work, boarded in Enugu _ Potsed agntnst the evidehee er sn ernergting Worker eenseteueneee itvtts steels- [ i during the work week, and returned home on weekends or, in a very few cases, esnihhst eonstrnettdn_tne gsfncsn Wortien ne west? 1eZY sleeke; end nre' tablished residence in the city. In the postwar period at Euugu a strategy emerged spcnsihlc givin; rcctcd in lisieikwsrdk nagineinid _¤riiiiisciplinedt_ si-id£sl>le i V that enhanced the wer1rers· role as political and economic pertretpehts in their ynte eernpre en e vagenes o e mer et· e v rn e trnagtnatton o oro" . lages. Increased wages became a commonality for fully proletarianized workers pean colliery staff and state officials, and reflected ethnocentric assurnptions about the nfeteighv uthehized Wotketsi and their mtahbased ··i0e8_i»· eOi_mtei.PaitS_ Both Africnn abilities. racism, and s ncstalgie view cf an cidcrcd snd repressive nirsl . ‘ felt eh enduring commitment to remit reeedrees ter the development ofthe home lifes Wnne vilifying African men as bein; too etmottwatdd t° b°°°nt° dtsctptmed . Z village. But while the "foreigners"’ involvement in village politics was more rev¤ri<ersr_ celenid efghits scrnevvhst envied their lives in the hdedhe vet sed¤¤· t mete, the philosophical errerrretreh wes stm against the city, which they considtive Y Pnnnttvet nn nge- t ered "made and owned by the white man." This ciileniclist pnsni prevented the rnsnsserr Leek. frcin seeing these Ennen E i For s·1eee1’· weekly or daily eerttrrrdters the connection was more intimate ehd incn as miners- Despite his awhreness cf the deeply rccted trdditicns cf indepen- r ‘ _ they were active errd respected participants ih the social and political hre er the denee= resrstnneet end absenteetsrn ctthc Nonnnrgbertand nnners <Eit·shsh)· sllhe ` village. Steady and adequate wages from government work allowed them to preccnld see in the Enngn nnncrs wss difference They were heys snd net in- g r serve and ehhehee their role as men in the yrnege, edd gave them ehetrgh her. dnstnd rnen rgrtinerr etttervenees fren; tne lshcr market was tnljerlsreted as sn ` gaining power to shape a pattern of work that maintained this involvement. rndreanon cr their taztness snd PnnnnYe ennraeter- Howeveri rn ree·ntY e dt‘ Z ¥ Although this pattem contradicted the capitalists’ conception of work discipline, verse ccllicry Wcrking class was defining itself in the tcwnshipr lshcr enrnpsr and rri _; punctuality, and hdehty, it nonetheless indicated the perrdttrrerrt place 0fl’IllD€ work

142 "We Were All Slaves" The Postwar Crmjuncture 143 in their social reproduction. They were committed to work at the colliery but on ` organizational patterns that they developed reflected Igbo sensitivities, political their terms.5 Their high rates of absenteeism, equally characteristic of their British ` ` structures, and processes, but were filtered through the new challenges of the incounterparts, were also related to the danger and unpleasantness of their work site. dustrial workplace, the city, and the political institutions introduced by the coloThey were social beings and not just a social category, and their priorities, com- `i nial state. plaints, and goals had to be examined in light of their overarching concems.° The } Thirdly, the chapter argues that the organization of work, and the ways in which industry accornrnodated itself to this pattern. workers relate in the process of producing coal, shapes the struggles that occur in After the war Enugu workers recognized their increased power in a nascent labor _ , the mines. By identifying the lines of authority within the various systems of exmarket that was further weakened by the influenza epidemic, new demands for un- g traction, one can outline the conflicts, autonomy, and interdependence of various sldlled labor from the extension of the Eastern railway to Kadima, and the con- i I categories of work.7 This sociology of production, aptly analyzed by Michael Bustruction of the Southern Protectorate headquarters in Enugu. These conditions ~ rawoy, and noted in the previous chapter, allows us to identify the points of fricpulled even harder at the fragile fabric of the labor system. Even when export mar- i 7 tion and potential for collaboration between workers, and to understand the forces kets collapsed during the recession of 1921, the labor market was too weak to at- fi that encouraged and encumbered collective action. tract workers, and management experiments with various systems of recruitment Y It is therefore argued that as African workers interacted with each other and with had limited success. { European staff, they both experienced and reproduced "par1:icular social relations" This chapter makes several arguments. First, it contends that the postwar period `T and the "political and ideological notions that regilate production."“ These nowas a critical conjuncture for the development of a culture of protest with an evolv- Y t tions, that included the assumptions about white and African labor, constituted an ing ideology of reciprocal rights and responsibilities of employers, employees, and `i_ "apparatus of production" which was reinforced by the legal and "customary" pathe state. In this new culture, workers used delegations, strikes, petitions by pro- ` rarneters of colonial labor policy. In Enugu the centrality of "indirect rule" in both fessional letter-writers, and pre-tmde union organizations to place their grievances ` j· · the workplace and general society was an important aspect of this apparatus. The before the industry. Even inexperienced, unskilled workers came to the workplace .`.. i ` . "Native Court" and its officials were charged to supply and discipline labor from with goals, expectations, and approaches to work that shaped their responses to the 4 ` the villages. And the mines reproduced the co1·ruption, extortion, and graft which material conditions of the mines and their relationships with fellow workers, su- c they sponsored in the villages outside.9 The ability of workers to defend themselves pervisors, and European staff. These formed a moral world against which they mea- .` against these industrial abuses was initially circumscribed by their vulnerability to sured their experiences in the mines. As workers for a state industry they had j strong rural chiefs and the weakness of their movement. But by the end of the despecitic expectations of treatment that reflected the cultural dimensions of politi- cade, they had begun to chip away at the hegemony of "boss boys" in the discical authority. Their ideas about political authority reflected Igbo notions of the re- f plinary structure of the mines. sponsibilities of leaders in which reciprocity was an underlying principle. They ~ ~‘ In the workplace, points of friction between various categories of workers and accepted the ideology of "progress" and "personal improvement," which they were A the African and European supervisory staff created a dynamic that affected the optold were the reasons for imperialist conquest. However, the exact nature of this `. Z eration of the mine. These contradictions in the workplace were the cause of much "progress" was not just a reproduction of the ideologies of colonialist architects. _ of the unrest in this and subsequent decades, and reflected Burawoy’s "politics of It was nltered through the cultural idiom of their cornrnunities and incorporated ‘ production,” that is, the exercise of power and authority within the production progender ideologies that reflected the deep social transformations of the early twen- · cess.1° By identifying how individual men and categories of men affected the pay tieth century. Igbo men were com.m.itted to their families and villages, and utilized il V pocket of a worker, the dynamics and contradictions between men in the workmine work in creative ways to fulfill old and new masculine norms. ", _ ` place can be traced. Second, the chapter explores the connections between the men’s position in the ;; The chapter will establish the connections between the organization of work and hierarchy of production and the self-identity and consciousness that this encour- “' the miners’ involvement in village life, which brings the villages in Nkanu and Agaged. As the men entered the various sectors of the underground workforce and baja into our analysis. While a full social history of rural life requires more suslearned the tasks that constituted their jobs, they developed an acute awareness of ~ ., tained research, anecdotal references in the archives and corroborating interviews the power relations in production. One part of this awareness empowered them to Q suggest that the socioeconomic ascent of colliery men in their villages was organize collective action at favorable moments with good effect. Another part of ~`i ' watched with foreboding by political officials and "chiefs" alike. They became this awareness led them to challenge colonial forms of industrial discipline that 5, vectors of new, and often insurrectionary ideas in the countryside and championed victimized them daily. The unfavorable conditions at work and the harassment and J [ new definitions of "freedom" that challenged the "irnagined" authoritarian order brutalization by various "native" and European staff encouraged the workers to , that colonialists created in the rural areas. The interplay of these rnen, asserting experiment with new organizational forms to mobilize around their interests. The H Z their position as social beings, and the management’s perception of them as mere

144 "We Were All Slzwes” Tl The Postwar Canjunr-ture 145 “units of labor," makes this a particularly rich period in the history of labor at the { J critical to the attem of protest at the colliery. 'These men, often semiliterate and TP colliery. I = familiar with the law, framed working class grievances and complaints in the pe* T ` titions to the government. James Jaja of Oha, an ex-slave of King Jaja of Opobo, THE CITY OF ENUGU: A CRUCIBLE OF POLITICAL T was a railway worker and petition writerll wh;) became famous throughout OnitAND INDUSTRIAL FERMENT s sha Province until lns death in the late fifties. T T Although in many respects Enugu was a typical colonial city (i.e., the predomBy the end of the war Enugu had rnany of the trappings of a fuH-fledged c01o- TT inance of single men, overcrowded housing, poor sanitation, and a cordan saninial town. The layout was complete and it now had a "native" and European area, ` l tuire between the “Native" and European areas), it differed in many significant expatriate trading firms, and several schools run by the Church Missionary Soci- ways from colonial towns in settler colonies. For example, urbanization did cause ety and the Roman Catholic Church." In addition to the colliery labor camps at ~ adjustments in gender roles, but working class men did not delegate domestic tasks Coal Camp, Iva Valley 1 and 2, and Riverside Camp, there were several for rail- ‘ to prostitutes, as White has described in Nairobi.1’ Neither did they perform "fe— way, the Public Works Department, the police, prisons, and other govemment agen- VT male" tasks which, as socially mature men, they considered to be beneath them. cies}2 The housing stock was still rather rustic with over 500 "bush houses," but Y, They used young boys, usually relatives, to cook and clean for them. In Igbo so- ’ the opening of the indus1;ry and railway attracted the major expatriate trading {inns .r ciety mature men did not cook, and they did not trust non-relatives to cook for and the Christian missionary societies. The competition for "sou1s" between the 1 them.7·° The boys also retumed home with the men on weekends and brought back Protestant (Church Missionary Society and Primitive Methodists) and the Catho- { yams and food on Sunday. It was not uncommon for several men to share one "boy lics (Holy Ghost Fathers) was already in full swing, and by the twenties both had T . servant." This use of junior men to perform women’s tasks suggests that one critchurches and schools in the city}3 — ical social differentiation for males in Igbo society was between men and boys.2l The city grew rapidly during World War I and became increasingly cosmopol- T The boys also assumed tasks that symbolized the ma.n’s position in the workforce. itan. It was a bustling working—class town in which most wage laborers worked for Y, In a ritual of workplace status they carried the "pick boys’ " tools to work daily.22 the state. Fully 7,000 of its 10,000 inhabitants were employed by various govern- This preservation of socially matme male privilege created problems for urban ofment departments in 1927.** Of this total there were 200 African staff and some licials who were confronted with overcrowding in the labor camps}3 "Small boy" 786 skilled workers and artisans (colliery skilled workers, carpenters, bricklayers, servants outnumbered women and children in the colliery’s labor camps.2" But state Htters, etc.) with incomes of £40 a year}5 'I’he varieties of jobs in govemment em- officials never reached a consensus on the organization of space in Enugu, unlike ployment gave Enugu’s African population a class complexity uncommon in most T i. T more strictly controlled settler towns like Johannesburg, Nairobi, and Lusaka. Nigerian cities. The railway always had a significant number of artisans, men who _ . While the working class elaborated an urban culture, colliery employees transworked as electricians, mechanics, fitters, et cetera. Many were seconded to the T; formed the countryside as well. In the twenties only a third of the colliery’s 2,000 colliery, where they constituted the most conscious sector of the mir1es’ working employees lived permanently in the city, and were usually "foreign" skilled or clerclass. All had had some prior training, often in mission schools, and considered { . ical Igbo and others. Another third of "local men" lived in the various labor camps themselves in a class apart from the "common" laborers. ` and commuted home to the village on weekends. The iinal third lived in the vilSpanning all categories of govemment employment were a crucial group of ’ T lages within a fifteen·mile radius of Enugu and cormnuted daily to work.25 These clerks, all literate, Christian men, most often from areas considered more "civi- ,» 1 differential commitments to urban life did not prevent the enlightenment and lized" than Enugu. Some were also employed as civil servants when the adniinis- t modernity of the city from influencing the countryside. On the contrary, both daily trative ca ital was moved to Enugu in 1929. These men played a prominent role i and weekly commuters thought of themselves as, and were perceived by others to P. in establishing and running the many urban improvement ("tribal") unions that cre- ,, be, a progressive force in their villages. District officers often mocked their selfated some order in the city and became important sites for networking and the prac- V confidence and prestigious position in the village. For these men steady wages from ticing of valuable organizational skills. , T colliery work brought enhanced status in the village as patriarchs. The steady wages of government employees stimulated a small but significant T j After the war the discontent of the elite found institutional expression in the African business class in transport, real estate, and commerce. Predictably, Udi’s ` V _ founding in 1920 of the National Congress of British West Africa. While this early ovm Chief Onyeama was among the most prominent, having invested his recruit- ‘ J nationalist organization did not successfully galvanize the support in Lagos that it ment and trading income and proceeds from extortion in land. There was also one ` I had in Britain’s other West African colonies, Sierra Leone and the Gold Coast, it trader and lorry owner named Brodrick, from Benin, who owned Enugu’s tirst hotel T? ~ nonetheless systematically articulated the grievances and demands of the educated and cinema.*‘ The large working class also attracted a service sector of tailors, "na— i . elite.26 During this period the elite became aware of the commonality of their istive doctors," goldsmiths, and the ubiquitous letter writers whose services were so . ? sues with their counterparts in the African diaspora. While Africans were under-

r. [46 “We Were All Slaves Y The Postwar Conjunczure 147 represented in the Pan African Congress movement organized by W.E.B. Du Bois, whose strike threat led to wide-ranging concessions on salaries and pensions, Nigerian newspaper coverage fostered a sense of the international dimension of I ` African workers also succeeded in securing a 30 percent wage increase? The derhe struggle for the rights of the black man. Even stronger racial awareness €m€fg¤d`}g' gmc of militaucy of the European civil servants shocked Lord Milner, Seeremry with me Garvey Movement, whose development between 1920 and 1925 Was folj ` of STZIS f0l' fhé C0l011ieS, who considered them to be very close to seditious,34 For lowed with enthusiasm in West African ` { Affiwn Civil Servants. this coniiict produced a crack in the facade of imperial eoThese new ideological formulations aroimd the central pivot of race and co10-` ` hesion and racially based control. Emboldened, they began to agitate to emphanialism encouraged challenges to the colonial state. They crystallized in a national size their grievances. mobilization that engulfed both European and African civil servants. These move- aj While in most respects these men were a westemized elite, the dissonance bements pulled iu the colliery workers who had their own speciiic difficulties. 5 tween their cultural affinity with England and their political critique of the racism ` V of British rule created an ambiguity that was expressed in both cultural and political wa s. While the fou ht a ainst racism in the ovemment service the viewed THE POS-I-WAR CONIUNCTURE: RAD'€AL'$Mr SEDI-HON' ""QL laborer;] with disdaih, ang resinted having to liv? so close to their "soci>ail inferiAND RECAI-Cl-{RANT WORKERS ~ ~? ors" in the "native" areas of town. Thus to them, low wages and squalid living conWorld War I had as much of an impact on Nigerian coal miners as it had on their , ditions were both cultural and economic issues and they joined their counterparts British "brothers." Both Welsh and Nigerian miners felt that the state treated them in Lagos and Port Harcourt in a postwar general strike for higher wages and against unfairly after they had given so much to the war effort, and both had been forced _ the color bar. by conditions to strike during the war. After the armistice they continued to press M Among the most compelling demands of the Nigerian staff was the call for an their dissatisfaction with economic conditions. For Nigerian government workers; _ end to job discrimination. From the late nineteenth century, the African westemthe severity of the wartime economy was exacerbated by imperial economic pol- U ` ized elite had increasingly lost prestige as the state replaced them with British civil ioy_ Bulk purchasing agreements, import shortages, and pl'iC€ ceilings offered by ir; I servants at the tum ofthe Century. The color line became an important indicator of British expatriate firms reduced the income for the thousands of farmers selling E` ` col0nialism’s racial system of authority, and restrictions on the upward mobility palm products, The economic impact deepened with trade dislocations following " I of African staff were onerous, especially for men who considered themselves to the banning of popular German merchants, who had purchased over 54,000,000 _ be the epitome of the civilized Victorian gentlernan.35 Since the tum of the century Nigerian agro—exp0rts before the war. Wartime inflation was exacerbated by short- racial issues had long been grist for the mill of the Nigerian press, whose lively ages of silver specie which the United Kingdom used to tinance the war, The hoard- A agitation attracted the attention of literate and illiterate Nigerians alike. Now, after ing of coins by trading companies and individuals pushed prices higher.28 The l Q, _ a war fought against injustice and for democracy and self—determination, these introduction of paper currency, widely unpopular and often rejected by traders, in#`_; - protests continued with renewed vigor, creased prices exponentially? . The P0]1t106l and labor unrest in England, and the agitation of expatriate civil Some of the economic conditions that sparked Nigerian unrest were common to·‘ I servants and the Nigerian educated elite, created a discourse about the responsiboth Britain and Nigeria, and encouraged an atmosphere of political diSCOut€Ht and ’ bilities of the State to those workers who had sacrificed for the prosecution of the labor unrest that erupted after the war. In early 1919 English miners struck for a j . war. The Nigerian elite felt their loyalty to the British state was not being repaid, 30 percent wage increase, a six-hour day, and naticnalization of The iIld\1ST-YY-30 The" KS lh€ state WRS Sl1pp0Sed t0 bring progress, advancement, and "civi1iza\;ion" to the political environment was so unstable that in January and February, British sol-` i colony. Instead, the govemment’s treatment of its African civil servants made it diers rioted demanding dernobilization. Additionally there were disturbances in ` ` difficult for them to progress or to live as civilized men. Their meagre wages made Glasgow and Belfast, and threatened strikes in public transport in London? This ` { it impossible for them to support their dependence on prohibitively expensive imunrest encouraged government to pay attention to colonial protests. wg 1 ported clothes, furniture, and the like. To them the conditions in which they were The first series of oolliery strikes were cormected to the postwar u11I€Si 0fAfI`i¢6I1 y t f0l'¤€d to live WSIC humiliating. In Great Britain the theme of the social responsiand European civil servants. The reverberations of metropolitan unrest ripplcdg bility ofthe state was thrown into public debate in February and March 1919 by through the European and African civil service in Nigeria. Africans in the Niger- ~) ` _ national hearings convened by the Sankey Commission that investigated strikes in inn Civil Service Union petitioned for salary increases and protested diS¤Iimiu¤* ‘ the Coal industry. In dramatic presentations before the commission, the Miners Fed» gory treatment in 1918 to no avail.32 But officials could DOI igl”l01’€ E111'0P€31l~Y ¢f8¥-i0Il of Gl'€8I Britain detailed the harsh realities of their lives.36 These testimonies colonial servants who in early 1919 formed the Association of European Civil SB1'*i» ~ captured public sympathy with their brilliant use of the occasion to describe the vants in Nigeria. They launched an escalating campaign for wage increases and j severe conditions of work, and the poverty suffered by their families, which they improved conditions of service. In the vanguard were the European rail W01‘k€fS* ` contrasted With the lush, prosperous life of company owners, By franijng their ar. 2—*

148 awe Werenll Slaves,. The Postwar Conjunczure 149 gument around the concept of social responsibility and the expectations of better Ucatmcm cxpamatc Stf*fj`· A m°ml_ incident sparked dd acimn "{ thc "“1W*‘Y noatmom by tho slats, the Brnlsh minors provldod a dlsourslvo framework with io when a_Br1t1sh employee ridiculed African members of the African Civil Servants broad resonance for the Enugi miners, In early 1920 this would become a refer- ', . Umdd m Lag°s·40 While the Pc"? dddtdr was Lag°si P°n Hdrdddd- thc tcnmnus woo Point for the mss sodas of sn.lkos_ ` ofthe eastem branch of the Nigerian Railway, became the command center for the While the activism of the colliery workers was contextualized in national and * i sulkc In th°_ castfm Pr°Ym°°s· Thd mst scrles °f_P°StWar Eddgd Smkcs W°'° m` metropolitan political and labor unrest, it was activated by tha specihc conditions i dvddd by ddddddddd d¤$v¤¤¢· dmhdddvddddgddvddddddddtddtdthdvrdbddmd and concerns of their own reality. In addition to the hardship from general infla- tl m bmh uic ujdumy and m th? my _ _ _ tionary pressures, they faced food shortages resulting from the rapid growth of ` Thcm is mac d°°“m°mau°“ °“ me first Smke Dafxmbcr 191* b'j“ mrcc Enugu Colonial olsllolals had failed to create a food system to food sho bul.goou_ i events occurred that would characterize worker activism in the colhery. Fl1'SI,·[l’l6 lng urban Population in the olly and in the labor camps Rural agdoulmral systems men contacted the- general manager of the railway in Lagos rather than negotiate ofthe area were unable to adjust to this sudden demand, aaa food shortages atappaa ( wd Lddk thc dddidx ddddgd dr Md Said ¤fd<=¤dd· dhdwddg ddd ddddiddddcoal Production many limos as minors resumed home for food mg of the adnnnrstrative structure of the colliery as an appendage of the Nigerian V; ` Railway. Secondly, they compared their condition to that of the English miners. And thirdly, they threatened to bum dovm the houses in the camps/“ THE COLUERY RESPONDS T0 THE GENERAL STRIKE: ` The following February workers organized intermittent strikes around the food DECEMBER 1 91 9‘EEBRUARY 1 920 ` shortages, which may actually have been just the men returning to their villages to The strikes following the influenza epidemic of 1918 were related to the eco- ; gg f°°d· The milwg Strike in Pm; Hddddd P““’°m°d The rdddddddd °f th? Eddgd nomic dislocations after the war and the socioeconomic consequences of rapid ur- J dispute bcczlusc it hmdcmd the mmspmt °f yams t° Eddgd fmm ·°ggb=¤¤· df kdy saaisatios. The city onssaga Ngwd(later snags) grew so quickly it strained aaai » i Nkddd fddmds idddgd when dddydmd ddd bddd dddddted- O¤‘h° mh- dmddds food systems.’7 The shortages were exacerbated by a drought in the Udi area. At- [ . ddddk against the inmcllcy Smlauon and fwd Shcmagcs Hi th? maIk°tS· In adm' tempts to organize the local chiefs for supplies of yams faltered over the issue of ,. ~ ddd fl Smaupfm epldemlc mgcd thmugh Udli further °°mPh°atmg the 1ab°I sh°n` payment in paper currency. The crisis was articulated in protests at Enugu in late I ‘ ag°s m the jm“°S·42 _ _ _ _ lglg and early l92O_ Q V On the-night of February lf7, when it appeared that the strike was subsidinguall The initial unrest began in mid-1919 when merchants’ rejection of paper money me Agba-la mhncrs Icft Iva Mme}; Whdd POSSMY ddddddddd by the ddddd smkc som sho price of yams, sho food slaplo of lgbo communities, on an luhanonao, spl_ l l on the tenth, it appears that the major cause_was the brutally harsh treatment of aai. Unpopular noo notes was exchanging forll shiuisgs in cash.3“ had Euro- i. i mddddmdgbdidsdvvddd byP¤d¤$¤¤¤¤t€d¤¤f0¤y¤d¤¤-Tddddddtddtddwdvdd pean and African colliery staff joined the workers in registering the unpopularity ii t *`°P01'i€d that &fI¤f W01"k.1ng the reqwred half-day on Saturday, the fourteenth, these of paper Cuuonov { , men were forced to carry palm oil from Eke to Enugu Ngwo all that mght and again { on Sunday, the iifteenth.“ The ¤1¤¢S¤i¤¤ df immddidtd ir¤1¤¤¤t¤¤¤¤ Y9 assist the Railway ddd Cdllidry td Sd- The strike exposed the weaknesses in tho labor market and tho oohtiadiotiohs cum d medsum 0f S“°¤€S$ in its 8€¤°1’dl Wmking isa to WSWS dn adequate SuP‘ { t inherent in the state’s labor policy. The district officer gave his opinion of its causes: ply of metal coinage without delay, in replacement of the present currency notes i _ _ A _ _ _ which are universally unpopular and have raised local costs in ovory Wayne l l The whole stnke was only brought m the Colliery Manager’s opinion and rmne ~ _ by the dilatory action in not sending silver here after many applications from These initial labor problems also arose from a contradiction in labor policy. Fear- *· hini and lhs Rssidsnt and ihs Disnisi ofhssn This shnnhgs had hssn isnnnsii ing the pr<·=S¢¤¤¤ ¤f dnprddidtdblda "d¤trib=diZ¤d" African Wdrkdrda the stm did mt { many times and it was left for the iahoaois to toms tha hand of the Government want to make the city into a magnet for arnbitious or dissident villagers. But the by s dstsnninsd sh-iks [0 ni-Oiiiiss ihs siivsn which inusi hsvs hssn ihsis, as is mines needed a stabilized labor force. If the state wanted to keep production run- 5 . t nmvsd hy lhs Gsnsisi Msnsgslus (Railway) whs sf which I hsvs ii sony shan ning, it had to provide sustenance for at least this segment of the workforce. The [ sntssing lhiss nnsnsis of lhs Cnilissy nay in siivsn45 necessity for this social infrastructure was demonstrated when work stopped in ‘ _ _ _ _ _ _ April and lam. in August While mon resumed to lhsn. vlllagss fol. food V Despite the general thrust of colomal policy that ignored the reproduction of the lssum Dsssmbsr lglg until lssbmso, l920 colliery missns hunalsd s ssnss of I 1 urban labor force, the state was forced to organize a system that controlled the price strikes that coincided withageneral strike tad by railway waaiaaaa. The strike an- I e dddddpvlv dffddddfdtwdmdddddddry dvdiddddstdsdddddd-Td·=dFdd<·=hdd*==r9minated in an escalating series of protests by African government employees that _ P°““1Y Smppcd dd Fcbmary mthdé when the dlsmct °fH°° Pmlmscil m dbwd included complaints about racial discrimination in wages, job titles, and racist ll Yams and ddl them fm Paper currency b°1°W dd market mt°·47 Omcmls tappcd

150 "We Were All Sluve,v" ` _} i The Postwar Canjuncmre 151 the Native Court system to secure yam supplies for Enugu, thus opening new op- tives of a "Uni0n" (Nzuka 7) who put forth their demands for food and payment in pcrtunities for the chiefs’ personal enrichment at the expense of the population, ‘ , ’ silver. The state responded by dismissing the leaders.5‘ but farmers were reluctant to comply. The hated comtt messengers were dispatched ` lr . The strikers used normal forms of industrial protest, demonstrating their growto villages to collect yam supplies. In the rich Nkanu area this request added to a ' . y ing maturity as a workforce. They picketed workers who didn’t support the strike, litany of offenses committed by Paramount Chief Chukwuani and the other Ogg. ~ .3 _ forcing the assistant district ofncer to request troops for protection. They tried to mnyan, contributing to a climate of unrest that would be manifest in dramatic de- ~* L shut the mines through sabotage, by smashing a condenser and pump used for retail, with a massive slave revolt in 1922. .` moving water from the mines. The February 19 settlement crumbled on the twentyThis was at best a temporary solution to the complex dislocations caused by the I — V first, when the strikers left work in solidarity with the thirty artisans who were rapid urbanization of Enugu. During February the resident and district officer of . i dismissed for leading the strike. Ignoring subsequent instructions from the railway Udi canvassed the adjacent divisions requesting thousands of tons of yarns, but ~ ` workers in Port Harcourt to return to work, the walkout demonstrated the relative their transport to Enugu was initially complicated by the rail strike and later by the ’ independence of the Enugu suikers. On February 23 the Iva Valley strikers visited underdevelopment of the road system. Throughout February and March selicita- ` ~2 Udi Mine tc generate support among other workers? tions of yarn supplies met with the same problem that generated the Udi strike- l Both the state and management tried to restrict the strikers' access to the food the shortage of hard coinage to pay chiefs.“ The chiefs preferred "I.O.U.’s" ~ j market but, given the relaxed managerial style of industrial "indirect rule," it was redeemable in silver currency when supplies arrived. Later in March when the Act- ly difficult to identify cooperative workers? Even when the food market was moved ing Lieutenant Govemor H.C. Moorhouse met with the chiefs at Awka to negoti- ' to the executive compound to facilitate the screening of buyers, such restriction ate yam supplies, he found that their reluctance to accept paper currency led them { was impossible because there was no labor registry of workers, and the district ofto hold up yam supplies: . ticer remarked in exasperation: "When selling yams to the Colliery Staff the time. . ug} . . . [ . keepers even did not know their ovm men."$‘* It I? clear that a cemm number ef 5 Chefs were h°l$m{g beck Supplies °f Yams i . These tirst strikes introduced a pattern of protest that indicated a keen awarewhich they had ready for sale because they were paid in currency notes. I had _ ness of Ponting] hierarchies, Despite the managerial structure of the iI1du$¤'Yi fh€ Just pmvwusly ·=>=¤1e¤e¤*¤ them that_P°ss1bly three sr fm"? mouths ¤·¤S$e1¤rSe , * men considered political authorities to be the "Big Men" of the district. They sobefsreme¤=Wt¤kee¤¤·¤¤e=w5e¤ve¤¤b1e·b¤¤Ie¤*f¤¤~¤¤mesueeeseeeuet 4 . med me assistant district new (ADO) to mediate between themselves an me they would b? even I'O'U‘ S by_ thc D'O' which Weed b° redeemed by { { manager. They explained that “the Political Ofncer owned the division."55 Despite the new wken °0mag°' Thc Suggestion was Very fawmbly recewedfg ° 7 his formal refusal to intervene—"it was not my business to correct their comWhile the temporary arrangements would pacify the colliery strikers in February, _Q — plaints"—he nonetheless crushed the strike. The district officer evoked his powa long-term solution required considerable plarming and an elaboration of market `Y ers to underscore the state’s refusal to extend trade union rights to African workers. relations in labor and food. This would not occur until well into the decade, I He reported: L In}hS.F€bmary Smkm the Workers behaved hkc a swsqncd Workmg class' While i_ They then went off to see Mr. Leck who refused to re-admit the dismissed artiThe dlsmct Offwcr reported on the Scxjcmccmh that the émkc appeared smleq sev- sans, and the "Union" definitely asserted to me that they would picket. So I gave eral days later it resumed under the miluence of the railway workers. The district K them a very elw and Solemn waming as to likely consequences and definitely Officer reported: 1 J stated thatl should take every means possible to secure free egress from the camp Agitators arrived from Port Harcounlast night and got all colliery on strike today ·' V to the Mine for the non-strikers, aud after a somewhat lengthy consultation they as well as local department. Have thought it necessary ask troops send 20 men * collapsed.5° here as Pmvémwe nicasum smug Conwy people mls aFm?w°n‘ Wm m` Q I Confrcnted with this ultimatum the men shifted their negotiating positionand form that their promise to work is broken. Pggpose therefore distribute collected ~ agreed to mmm to work if the dismissed artisans could remain in Camp umu Pay Yams to local Se*t¤¤1eSs they rem W°rk` { ` day. When this was granted the strike was over at Udi and Iva. On the twentieth the whole colliery went out on strike and despite the district L _ Although the artisan leadership was fired, the strikes succeeded in securing sig0fticer’s attempts to restrict access to yarns, it was not until February 23 that all , 1 nificant raises of 10 percent for salaried local staff, a 30 percent raise over 1918 mines were in fn]; operation The Strike was led by aytjsang fel-med in e I-ndjmen- * wages. Higher paid staff received graduated increases. The burden of these wages tary workers’ organization, possibly the Nzuka, which negotiated with the man- E Q fell heavily on a contracting market for coal. Both the marine department and priagemeht. The administration use noted that the strikers were in contact with Pm 5 i vate shipping cempeuies reduced their purchases beesuse the war had ended- When Harcourt. The assistant district officer reported that he was visited by representa- Q ‘ output dropped from 145,407 tons in 1918 to 137,844 tons in 1919, lab0r’s per-

152 ··we wm All szam·· ?_ » The Pustwar Cvnjuncture 153 Gemagé of lhe <>0lliery’s cost of production rose steadily from 29,51 pe;-gem (1918) S This consciousness was not specific to men worldng in Enugu. It often Smcfgéd t0·36.41 percent (1919), and to an astronomical 49.91 percent in 1920.57 Despite ` wherever coal mining occurred. The hewers were at the pinnacle ofthe hierarchy Lhxs onerous burden, tile state could ill afford to risk further work stoppages. [ ` of production. A11 jobs in the iudustry—iuc1udi.ng the more “respectable" clerks The gams of tl1e c01l1ery’s staff encouraged skilled workers to protest, and a sec- g and a.rr.isaus—were dependent on their work. The viability of the colliery as an cuorlcl wave of smkcs hlt the colliery in March. These were lcd by a new but most ; ` tcrpzisc rested upon their effort, skill, and bravery. They were the only workers on ¤¤¤<>¤l gT0¤p—fJ}e H11Jl€IS themselves. On March 10 the hewers 0; “pick bOys” ` l piepewages, thus making their earnings contingent upon their skill and effort. This struck for an addmonal war bonus and they brought out all classes of labor with L V reinforced their awareness of the importance 0f their skill because their ability to them on March 12. This second mterruption of production, occurring amidst the ` F l use tools and interpret the geology and other conditions affected their output, and problems of tluc small pox epidemic, lcd the state to revise the recruitment system _ _ hence, their wages? In this period, the hewers were largely from Owerri, while run by the chiefs. L the local men were in "spccia1 labor" gangs or haulage.‘° Until this period, most The tumult of the early year continued from May until the end of 1920. From strikes were led by artisans, but in the twenties the miners "camc into their own" M§Y_ thfeugh August tile "Pick boys" agitated for additional war bonuses and a 2 ` { and expressed a self-comidcnce and pride characteristic uf coal miners everywhere. sh1ll1ug mcrease m their pxece-rates. By the end of the year it was clear that the { Like their counterparts in England, the United States, and elsewhere, they now had eollmy rleeded. to develop a better system of obtaining labor, and once securing ` a keen awareness of their indispensability and were in an excellent position within 1t, deploying It m production. ` V the labor process to do something about their wages. Thi 1’f>]€ l?l6§’€d l>y artisan}, spd tlne key producers in the colliery, the “pjck `I Toward the end of 1919 there were signs of an economic crisis. The PHGES of boys, gives insight mto the pnonues, mtolerances, and expectations of these work- ~ palm products began to drop. The return to "n0m1z.lcy" by March 1920 did not SFS. It IS mnt Colnclclental that they should be in the vanguard of this period of un. _ ] mem what the labor problems of the collicry were over. Labor Supplies W€1’€ still rest. Bolh were foreigners and members ofthe urban ethnic unions which, by now, ` short because the labor market had not recovered from the iniiuenza pdndcmjc. has culmfeted a style of protest adagtcd for the mines. In sending deputations and ; \ Moreover, the smallpox epidemic, the labor demands of other government deUsmg P€Ul-IOHS, Théy Deed Z fathéiz standard form of citizen pronegp ~ E _ pgytmems, and the paper currency crisis sti]1 made 1’€CI'U.i¥1T1€1‘lI difficult. Th€ di$· H {he amsan class, ]1kB.t]'1€ clerlcal workers, saw themselves as part of an en- { » trict oflicer called for the expansion of the catchment area for rccruitzmennél The S mled g1’0¤P wgth 3 Sk1lljWr1T1ng—that was valuable, if um indispensable, for ; Q ’ Enugu djsuict officer proposed a rational recruitment system that deplfryed IHUOF the smooth operatxon of the mdustry. As "f0reig11ers" they assumed an awareness " I masters to check off names cf village companies. of colemal society t:l1at came from their earlier exposure to mission education and _ Cognizant of the labor shortage, the hewers requested that they be permitted to colomal adrrumstrauoln Tihey were loyal members ofthe colonial civil service and ’ ` take on assistant hewers and "tubb0ys" in an arrangement that resembled the butty they em}1lated·the radicalism of their European counterparts. They were enemies 3V . system of the Yorkshire coal fields}; The "tubb0ys," who were also paid by the of ‘H’8d1UO[lZ.11SH1,” and most especially of the rural chiefs, and contributed to a [ · hewers, in tum took their own "helpcr" "tubb0ys." The master hewer was paid a general envuorlmcnt of resistance and protest characteristic of urban life. They I ` tonnage (piece) rate and he in tum paid his "helpers." The "helper" hewer paid his were what cfficxals fca1icd—"dc¤ibalized” Africans beyond me moderating mm,- f . corresponding “hé1pe;" "mbboy." The "he1pers" did not appear on the nfiicial rcs€1'1¢¤ Bild-€0¤¤”0] of th€1I Chiefs. But in their urban associations they were an im- le; gf meu actively employed at work on a particular day. By 501116 i1C¤0l1HiS» U1€ Eongntgnxllsr of urban order for a belcagured colonial administration, reliant on rl “ hewer, tubmen, and their respective assistants functioned as a team with internauve allles both and usban `L ` changeable work functi0ns.‘3 Given the pride the hewer had for his skill it is very Their politics was anu—"11·ad1ti0na1ist" and they led the urban opposition to the l ° doubtful that such an egalitarian distribution of tasks actually existed. However, Shlefsf Qvmplalllts by the chiefs of the insurrcctionaxy influence of these urban L ; the principal hewer was clearly the leader and the recognized Worker W}10 Was paid seph1st1cates" became more frequent after World Wa: I, and most officials shared ‘ the wages by the management, and he then paid the helpers? their concern about this autonomous urban population. Missionaries also became * The hewer contractor system continued until 1937 when a strike scttlegnent alarmed at the fhght of young men to the city. In 1928 they remarked that large A ' brought it to an end. The contractor system had several implications for the dc¤1¤fHb€1'S Qf y0¤Hg men Of the church were leaving the villages for Enugu mwuis s , velupmem ofthe werkers’ movement and the productivity levels at The miH€S· First, It was quite easy for young men, disenchanted with the depredations of the rural y it provided an opportunity for the supenexploitatiou of the "helpers" and "tub— chiefs, tg ‘flee’ fo Enugu and join other discontented men and women in the city’s ` b0ys," because their payment was at the discretion of The principal hewer. Secscvc-:ra1“ shanty towns, areas of African autonomy. 2 ondly, it distorted the productivity figures for hewers from 1919 until 1937 when I The Plfk b0}’S,” 011 the Other hand, had a consciousness arising from their I-Ole > * it ended It was virtually impossible for management to accurately 385555 the f€<·1l in Pf0d¤CU¤l’l. Bild the status these jobs gave them in the camps and home vil]agcs_ output aud the development of skills of the worldcrce. In fact, the radical iIlGf€¤S€

154 NW2 Were AU Slaves" · The Postwar Crmjuncture 155 In °“tP“t PH nlmkshm m°mi°¤°d ¤b¤v¤ in 1921/22 and 1922/23 could be attrib-—i i But that was precisely what the state feai·ed—militant mining villages like those uted to the beginning of the systern.“ Y of Wales and Bmam doilgfegggvtgrzg‘2;;1‘;;;;:;ct°;S};t€W was an imP01’¥&¤( ?&Ct01' in the consolida- ` i The two proposals, one which linked the state directly with forced l8b0I, 8Ild T.l1€ that their Skm brave andssé 10 _mi*}€*S ’~‘§“aUY had artisan ZSPIHIUOHS and felt ,V ; other, that risked creating militant mining villages were rejected by the central govgm society m*Englm‘?S Pmgcgtjglca m¥€;hg¢¤l<>¢ WSR undervalued by the gen- { ernment. The state preferred to work through the "native" "chiefs.” The "chiefs" Work which appeared indistin _°h’°I;S°;r OY this Was the manual nature of their J were still considered indispensable to civil peace and were reinforced when their mm 'in other Words Licom anglfs a ° gm Y-he tasks P€¤‘f01'ff1¤d by less skilled ` people rose up in protest. Their role was assured, at least untilrthe Igbo women pcmiablcl It was difficult fo? mg émglan b$mlY b€¤¤¤S¤' their product was ex- 1 · went to "war" in 1929 and destroyed the fraudulent “wai·rant ch1et".system. produced by a “Skmed” he S H6 P¤“ 1¤ IQ S€¤ 316 diffeggznce between coal cyl . In addition to the contractors, the state used the Native Court cluefs to supply coming a contractor the E Wcrhvcrsus 3-31 lmskllléd hewer. However, in be· ~`; · labor, This was forced labor which increased the discontent in the countryside. In Chamctcdstics that EOStCrc;L;*‘-iii cwcr a _°d One mom °1€m°m_t0 the $P€€tmIl'1 of i ` some cases, men coerced to work in the mines were able to protest once there by his Own assistant who was aids?) ¤¤$€1¤¤S¤¤¤S— HE Owned his OWU YOOISY hired l y deserting, which was common among men from the Agbaja and Nkanu areas. But dctmmncd me hours of Wolsk 67 H m uliiu mméger °0¤c°Pt'·‘a11Z¢d the work, and { . many men had difficulty avoiding repeated conscription. ~ so desired. - 6 C0 i and d1d,walk out of the mines when he N Among the most critical functions-of the Native Court system was the mobiIt was therefore no coincidcm Th t f th _ h y ‘ I lization of African labor for those projects that preceded the existence of a "labor Wmk and recruitment dcvclo cdcth a ;3’m· € ¥W€l'lU€S, when this new system of ` V `L market? As persistent shortages demonstrated, despite its abuses, this 81T3Ilg€1‘Il€l'lt Scmve Within th an P g _ ° C0 m1¤¤1'S and fll€ hewers became more as- V . was still ineffective. It became more so after a strike in the winter of 1920. e gener zed mrlitancy of the colliery s workers. ; The entrapment of reluctant villagers in the court’s labor recruitment net led to ` T complaints that went largely unheeded. Despite his abuses it was impossible for BECOMING A MINER; THE TANGLED WEB .``` ` Chief Chukwuani to pull his men away from commercial agriculture. One of his OF RECRUITERS, 1 919-1922 i j subordinate chiefs claimed innocence to accusations of extortion in a petition in Despite the economic mssums f rh W F · 1919. In his denial of extortion, he implicated the Paramount Chief Chukwuani, come ,S lab H P V 0 G Postwar °c0¤¤mY f>1’1~Ud1 S farmers, the `_ who used his "customa.ry" rights to labor as a village priest to trick his men mto _ ry °r Supp cs remained tenucl-*S· The d€m0gT9·Pl11C impact of the pan- ... going to Iva Valley but explained how villagers resisted: demic, the demand for labor to construct a railway extension to the north, and the ‘i C0¤Stt‘uct1o11 of government buildings for the relocation of the southern Secretariat 2 · I heard the townspeople say that they had to tum up with hoes to Chukwuani’s to Ellllgl pulled at the fi-agile labor mafku Market fumes and the Old coercive Sys_ " _ house (Paramount Chief under D.O.), They left their hoes there and went to Iva [51715 required some modification The smc Wanted Sufficient Supplies Of nfmc ` Valley, They were at Iva 21 days when they came back to his house, they said 1ab0r," but only without wyenchjng the ··natiVE Wcrkep from the moderating in A they would work no more. And [if] they did not work for a month they would fluence and autocratic controls of village rulers. This was a contradiction that W * get no pay mmwould the Chick The people refused to go back to Work and deplagued the state for most of the Colm-dal pcdod The labor Crisis lcd amhmmes to y j i manded their hoes. I said they did not want money. They ran back and did not entplore two radical proposals to stabilize labor supplies, One, offered by the dis- l finish this Work and got no pay not did I when I Ordered P°°pl° to work I did trict officer of Enugu, called for the appointment of a labor officer who would de- i J I not take any mmlcy`70 XELOESEEFTSES gig;} slits; Iain in °a°f};Vm¤§€» keep 1'¢¢0rdS Of labor needed, I Even with this extortion and oppression, labor was still not forthcoming. Afrr-isfound this to be unaccg table Eaczizs Hill gequests. Cigvemor Hugh Clifford · trated district officer painted this exaggerated piQ¤¤f= of the ?f¤¢d¤m of Vma8°*’$ the railway manager SE pimp 16 ¤0¤f¤1¤n. I The other, offered by E. J pushed into the mines, He advocated a more "rat10nal" recruitment scheme. ‘, ggested stabilizing labor by establishing housing estates 1 ‘ . - - · · ¤10d€led·0n domestieity myths and mm] fantasies mythologized in English and { , A man is detailed by his chief to do a month s work. He starts off and on the way Welsh mining villages. Q his wish persuades him that the Chief must have meant a fortnight. He arrives would it be of any use if We con ml ted d _ ' ` and goes to camp. So far as I know he can do what he likes. There are no rules. a certain quantity of mmd and? dc _ a ;f°° typ? °fh}1tg§V¤¤s each l§b¤\1f€f l` - Even if there are, he can break them all with impunity. The only fom-i of control him and make their irrmamm In fum"? m m bnnglus Wife and family with j y is his pay, the amount of which depends upon his punctuality. lfhe is such a nuiin time é _ rh P _ S6 0 Emp Oyges Who might also produce colliers li sauce that he is sent away itis probably the very thing he wants. In any case when s is e case in England and Wales. ij he feels inclined and his respect for the order of the Chief and the Govemrnent

156 ·*wa ware All szamc ` W P¤¤W¤* C¤"fW*¤¤”e 15 7 \ has dwindled snfneiendy hg naeks up and gees heine_ Theie are no binding agree. This abuse interfered with the colliery’s functioning. Colliery overmen complained: lllellls f°l lllllallllll °l w°l`ll* ll° by laWs* ll°llllllg‘7l ll When used for carrying oil after their Colliery day’s work is finished they usuDescriptions of the earliest labor camps (noted in Chapter 2) attest to far more `1 any mum for Work at 7 °l` 7:30 (Very llml) ll`lSl°llll °f al 6 AM q“ll° flllsll Hence coercion than the district ofhcer cared to acknowledge. What frustrated some of- i li *1 PYOPBT d¤Y'$ W0l’k ¤¤¤¤0Y bv 20* out °f Yh°m·l5 ticials was their inability to operate a sufficiently coercive labor system to obtain r Ohyeemee efforts ebbeered selndefeaung because he ennld not Pygvgnt his inen numbers of required workers, or to insure that once at the mines, they would re- t ` frem deeerring when {breed td work all nighh gfien men deployed for ii nienlh main. This reached to the heart of the "West African labor problem." A colonial Q i` only lasted rvve ei. three Weeks befere they beeeme in er simply iefrjs hr he had economy built on peasant production could not risk weakening that peasantry in L i diirieibered this, Onyeema would probably have ineasui-ed his earnings fi-ein nadllle lllllilcsl °f S“PPlYl“g lab°’ for all lllllllslly that Wast llll°l alli allxlllaly l° lllc if Z ing activities against income from mine recruitment and deferred to the former. In Pcasllll c°°n°mY· · — ' trict officer and collie officials, concemed because of the Further, as Phillips has argued for the West African colonies, the state was too . i 5;;,;] ?;ge1.£;igrt;;£ seembiained er Onyeeniyds reealeiuanee and insnbeidinaiien weak to exert the coercion required to enforce wage labor, a coercion that took sev- if aiieging than eral centuries to dispossess the peasantty in Britain where the state was on more i ~ _ _ solid ground. But as the Enugu case demonstrated, the colonial state was so weak ` l , H5 ia-kes 0¤ ¤¤¤¤’¤¤€S Slibly Wlf-h°“* the S1i$ht°§t Idea vf Whilt a ignuacl lS· md it could only be "sustained .. . through a complex of shifting aJliances with local [ Wm TTY md wrigle [sic] Om when thc €l“°S¤0¤ is Pm “P *0 him}, llllclsll Wlll°ll· as s°°ll lll Ellllgll· “°ll°lal€'l lllll mms °ll which °°l°lll‘°lllSlll °P°ll“ l ` There is no evidence that the lieutenant govemor ever responded tc the comated." At the crux of Enugu's labor problem was free access to land. As long as a A pidihre efieeei erheie_is_va The ··ehief·s·· abuses were eensidei-ed a ··iradiiienal·’ ex. mall Could lcmm to his land Ol. llllggalc clscwllellc lll flll`lll’ he would llol be a dc` ` · ercise of his rights to his people’s labor. Officials were too dependent on Onyeama pendable "worker." There could be no landless proletariat. Colonial authorities be- ». » re diseibiirie him Rather than censure him in Maieh 1920, Liguignant Gevei-ne; llcvcd that the Pl'°S°llVllll°ll °f rural Stabiliw md Economy required mat llle smc ~ Moorhouse increased recruitment incentives with a fee schedide. Chiefs were given Support the clllcfs to lllsulle that llelllllmls of colllllllllllll llllld lclllllc lclllalllcll This Q £lO per shift per 100 surface workers and £l5 for underground. The differential llelllg lllc °lls°* lllc Stale was f°l°°ll l° lcly °ll lllc llclllcfsll l° S“PPlY llll°°l* llllll at l` reflected two things: the importance of underground labor for the colliery’s operleast in the early decades, was quite dependent on their whims, which in the case i * eriehi and seeendiye reeegninen that getting n-len undeigiennd niay_ in faeh require lll Clllffs Cllllkwlllllll md Ollyeallllwelll clillslllclablce llllll ‘”hal°Y°‘ llcglcc of l extra coercion. The revision was agreed to in a private meeting between the chiefs °°‘ll°l°ll lll°Y °x€llll°lj72 ll_WaS lllls lllllflllllll lll Wlllllll l°°l’ll llllllls llll°l°lllallllg°‘l · V and Moorhouse after amass recruitment meeting at Eke, Onyeama’s home town.79 lllllll P°plllall°llS· Vlcllllllzlllg lllclll lll pclly WayS· llllll gcllcllllad lcslslllllcc lll lllc i The district officer convened a meeting in Eke to attract men previously emNkanu areas of Udi during World War I. The weakened co1on.ia.l state failed to win i Pieyed by The ebiherv He Offered in pay any i-nan whe i-en_n·ned in wei-k fg; iwe legitimacy in the eyes of the people because of its close association with the abu- .i 1 months the bid relie bins a 20 bereeni war beuus_ At the end ef tvyo inenins this pay sive chiefs. In many ways, as Phillips has argued, "the state .75. was incomplete and Weuid be reereeerive te 1 January 1917.80 ¤¤d¢v¤l¤v¤d - -- i¤ mw Ways =¤ mw f¤¤Simi1= Of ¤ St¤¤¤·" · nhs hawaii an nam can ma his uota of workers to the Despite their schemes to extort and coerce their people, neither Chukwuani nor .2 4 gihuglegnrsgras W;h en his Way in beebining a #·nied§i—n*· businessman, eager O“Y°”·‘“*‘ Could Plcvclll lllc lllllsslvc dcscllllllls when lllcll lllcll lllllllllcd l° lllell l · to identify opportunities in urban real estate and he did not entertain the illusionfalllls °ll llllsmlldcll l° thc °itY· B°lll lllllllllslllllll this wellkllcss llllll Seized the lll°` ll ary models of colonial control that the field administrators held. He lcnew he was ment to conscript labor for their own economic activities. Onyeama was more suc- powerful and he was pursuing his nwn inndel of dgvcloprngnt Bin he was also cllssflll lllall Cl‘“l"”“*‘“l~ llflcll l°°P*“‘llZl“€ S“PPli°S °f llllsklllell lalllll in thc z A aware of the threats that urban leaders posed. He knew he could not supply all those l“°l“S"Y· lll lll° msc lll Agbaja men, llllllll lal°°l llld ll°l cxcmpl llllllll from lllc workers he was contracted to recruit. In April he supplied only 220 of the prom°l‘l°fls °Wll a°llVlll°S‘ lll lllllllllly lgzo Lcck wlllpllllllcll llllll llls men Wclll being · ised 600-900 Agbaja laborers. At the end of May, 700 workers left Iva Valley mine f°ll°lld’ allcll W°ll°’ l° cllllly O“Y°“m“lS Palm °ll lll llllllkcl llll°llgll°lll the lllglll .i l before replacements arrived. The real limits of even Onyearna’s powers were unAll Udi llcld °lllC€l. descllbcd sllcll a callavlllll l E l derscored in June when he was unable to force some 200 new workers to work unLast month when I was coming on here to see the Resident . . . I saw on the road l d€l'§'°lmd~ Yeilul-Ying that r<=¤r¤i¤¤¤¤t be cxlcllllcd llll° llcndc lll Owcm Pll°Vlll°°‘81 inany nnndieds of inen and wen·ien_ eaiiying nil inte Enngu Ngwe_ when l , ° The 1920 crash fostered changes in recruitment alhanees and gave the state a ieaehed there l asked Lheui fi-ein whni-n they enine and nie answer was ~·l:i»nni i chance to renegotiate its new recruitment arrangements with the chiefs. ModificaOnveamy the teen number ei: beebie must have been Wen ever. 7O0_74 1 i tions reflected a slackening coal market and the fact that a considerable part of the

LW ··wg were All Slayey J` The Postwar Ccnjuncrure 159 ~ ‘ , . · · t `s workforce was coming to the mines independent ofthe chief’s efforts. Despite the ` Q I The cr1s1s bode tmfavorably foxhxef Chggcsigaziéndgizializy Lot; Es crisis of 1918, mine jobs and other employment in Enugu had gained popularity ` V? · aPP°mtm°m t° thc Nauvc CO?m’ S paY;’mUdi Dgtrict ss By Jamial-y 1922 he was for many reasons. Young men from Agbaja and slaves from South Nkanu began ( Villages ‘fV°r° rcfiefined as mmcly OTESI 6 B6 In Au ust 1922 his mk as surto see wage labor as an important way to resist the interminable demands of abu- only a mmor ch1ef over the Ozalla vt age-grqupé smrfgcc labor was abundant. sive warrant chiefs, Ogaranyan, and slaveowners. Secondly, for Agbaja workers, $ l face law? Suppleef was revoked baits; VO uumagytimc in coming and this withit replaced their migration to less—p0pu1atcd areas as farm laborers, and allowed `_ The polmcal eclipse of Qhukwuan]; a ldienbioas much a matter 0} Political con*1¢mt¤b¢·=¤m¤i¤¤¤=¤¤z1 meby=S*ab¤s%·i¤gh¤¤S·=h·»MS·“2. . ‘”"WS,§$ §L"Z?3}1§Z§Zi"$?ZE$a§vefhi3§djEmd by am Supply. A Under the new arrangements Chukwuam and the Nkanu cluefs found 1t espe— t gl Scqu _ _ _ fh linked the unrest to the rising expectations of cially difficult to prevent voluntary labor, and became more abusive as they stmg— y An unsympatheuc dlsmct 0 CH gled, in vain, to contain the How of labor to the colliery and Enugu. Their actions J i Ohu workers, I 4 generated another protest from their communities. In Chukwuani’s area, these : Serfs who worked at the Cquiery and on C0nS¤'¤¢Vi<>¤ of the Imc, entloyed grievances became ensnarcd in the agitations of Ohu pressuring t0 bc treated as ,` gong Pay and complete temporary independence, on their return home dxd not cqualss Throughout South Nkanu the unrest destabilizcd the Native Court system V ` mush a reversion to discipline. They started an ¤gii8ii<>¤ Which led *0 bmcmsss and led rv his ddhroning- which is only now subsiding and in some towns to blond-shed.87 It was difficult for the "chiefs" to prevent men from voluntarily signing up for ~ " _ _ ,‘ . - - ·» M ndv in mine wmk.83 Their men could always run away to one of the squatter areas of · Unltkc Agbaja where Onyiiarialz/216 ltE;§1fi;};;l‘;ha}}Qi§l;5§;;;€gfciglex hiEnugu. The city became a safe haven for exploited men seeking relief, and with fj I South Nkanu was quite crow c . in snlslavc DOI Chukwumj was just one of _ pexsonal initiative, trying to earn a living For Agbaja’s young men, casual labor ‘Y I erarchxcs of wealthy rncn, slave? an uma 8- n};uPS· While Onycama was umiin Enugu offered an Gpportunity to reach male majority, that is, they could raise th° many Ogamnyan In th? r2’1;n·S,v mi Villa es. in Nkanu Qhukwuani was the money to marry and acquire those prestige goods so necessary for cementing ` `E valed m wealth andjgewer 11; ag Egg; Chikjri 5 Iéarmgg and iqweke Obodo of alliances and becoming powerful. ( Y l Challenged by Such __ lg in Oflabor Su ply came from his political Wc8_kn€sS_ The ftrs! signs of trouble in the slave—h¤Iding area of Nkanu came in 1920 when · Akpugo. Chukwuaxn s pro ems alliance Bm South Nkanu posed the owners and the entire frcebom community attempted to prevent the Ohu from i» and thc smc recognized the Womllcssflss Ot I5 0 arm; an persisted in holding using their new wages to improve their status in mixed villages by joining title so- V an even greater problem for the coldm SI?. €· 5 8 Y cieties. As we have noted before, Nkanu villages were the breadbasket of the me- Q: slavesand these slaves were becommg res 1ve.atSd the mms of Chief Onyeamfs Eion, emPl0Ying Slave families in the cultivation of large Yam sufpluses. With the ` ° While Chukwuam s arrangement wziinemughcd, AS early as March 1921, only settlement of Enugu, there were new incentives for the Ohu to push for more au- Ki contract for underground tahor were 0 y {ugh lkcsidem of Onitsha proposed a r€_ touomy from their masters. Commercial agriculture offered them new options for ¤ ` twelve monthspafter the 0ng1na.l agreeme; ,° 51 bm in in fees and introducing accumulating wealth. For those who were ccvnscripted into railway and colliery ;’ ;‘;\“Qa°ifstL?;c:l}1;§§;€é§]L;EE; gjxrgsggild giukjvumf Ai patamoump thgy were ;;¢;i1;&y¤(:l
tx 160 "We Were All Sl¤ves" The Postwar Cvnjuncture 161 reported that the agreement was "quite successful" in maintaining the requisite la- L I Chief Onyeama warned: burst? at the mm€s` The management at un? P”f°“°d pohucal mcmn?`ng’ re Therefore, if you are still claiming the reduction of the fee during this period of mainmg to some extent hostage to the cluefs power, and to the vagarres and ~. . , . . . . . , rmsery, we also have to claim that our money should be increase when the good competition of the open market for labor. In 1921 the railway itself had been re- 1 V time mi ht Evan for it 98 cruitirrg in the Udi district and the manager feared that if their subsidies ended, the _ g P ' chiefs would simply direct labor to the railway which was offering a capitalization _ ` Onyeama’s recruiting income had steadily deteriorated since the spring of 1921. fee of four pence per day for each man recruited and fed by the chief.9‘ While Chuk- §` It had gone from £l5 per 100 men per month and £lO per 500 in 1921 to £50O wuani was dismissed and demoted, Chief Onyeama of the Agbaja, as supplier of the _ , per year which he then distributed to his subordinate chiefs. Now, with the 1922 more critical underground labor, required comparatively subtle treatment. By July f revision ofthe agreement, which was effective January 1923, he was placed on a Agbaja workers had 100 percent redundancies; only 454 of the 900 were needed 1 . £20O "political subsidy" with no specific fee for recruitment. The lieutenant govdaily.’Z There were two ways to cut labor costs, either reducing wages or the salary emor speciried that this subsidy was not to come from colliery funds. The reviof the broker. In 1922, the hewers’ piece-rate was reduced by almost 30 percent from ~ , sions clearly showed that the chief ’s days as a labor recruiter were numbered. six pence to four pence per tub.93 It was inexpedient to do away with the power of _ Ironically, having helped to create the working class, often using force and corChief On eama in the face of this lower wage, complain as the management did at Q ru tpractices, the chiefs found that the now had become redundant. Des ite his YPYP the high price of £4l.13.4 per month that they were obliged to pay him.°‘* , attempts to bargain with the administration and the management, he was forced In August 1922 R.C. Wilson, then acting manager, proposed a sliding scale that in the end to accept their offer.°9 He made it clear, however, that should a shortgave the government more iiexibility and considerably reduced the financial bur- ~ ’ ` age in rmderground labor result in the future, the colliery would have to pay dearly den of the chief’s payments. Onyeama received a minimum quarterly payment of it for his services. £10O and maximum of £150 accordingto demand for labor.°5 Onyeama tried to pro- Q ~ . , . . . . . . . ~ I have granted my own consent to the Agreement but as it is now written, I theretect his recruiting fees, arguing that he was not responsible for the recession. The . . . . . . . . . . » . fore hope that 1t1s well confirmed and will not be terminated as per year. In fact, £500 subsidy (which he was obliged to share with his subchrefs) was unacceptable. , . . . . . _ V , we have to say this before the period that rs if you require more labourers for He argued that he should not be blamed because the coal market contracted. , your Work that of Abaja we must ask for more increment wo Rcmcmbclthat a Trader does cvlfy year bin Snmaycars Should be misery and r ‘ The drive for productivity seemed to be brilliantly successful. In one week in others unmisery, therefore the rmsery of this year did not refer to our side as we y b 1 22 . . . am in readiness to supply labourers for our Work Whenever they are Wants *196 1 , Septem er , a record quantity of coal was extracted. It rs evident that several J; Q factors combined to make this possible, among them being the emphasis on robWilson proposed this table of retaining and recruitment fees in August 1922: _; ~ bery rather than development, which meant that tubs were easier to produce and Q 5 hewers’ wages inxaggregate would not dec1ine.“” Management was not oblivious , , . ' Z I to the necessity of keeping its master hewers satisfied, and indeed was entering { ’ into a new relationship with hewers which could only be called collusion in the · . way it led to the exploitation of unrecognized "helpers." ll mmm °f ,_ Coming out of the 1921/23 recession, the colliery s management had proven its ability to trim production and costs as need be. The costs of production per ton had 500 £20 Plus ¥¤¢f¤i¤¥1¤¤¥ fw of £20/ q¤¤1T¢1’ ' been reduced, single shifts were mandated, and half the recognized labor force was ; . retrenched by 1922/23. The uneconomic Obwetti Mine was abandoned in July 500 to 1000 £20 plus recruim-rent fee of £20/ quarter iv ;. 1923. But certain costs could not be shirked. Mine districts that were temporarily Z _ abandoned still required some labor and capital inputs to prevent permanent dete1000 m 2000 £30 plus rccmiuncm fcc of ,::45/ quarter Y. Z rioration. The roof supports that rot every few months required replacement to preff ~ vent a roof collapse. Water that seeped into most of the Iva and Udi work faces had _ ~` f to be removed or serious flooding would damage the mine.‘°’ 2000 tc 3000 MO Plus mcmltmcm fe °f M5! quam], ` ,i -° Expansion of the workings after 1923 entailed investment in more machinery _ I and plant. Management distinguished between extraction and "capital work" in the °"°* 3000 £50 Plus "°°“mm°m fu °f £75/ q“‘“"·°‘°7 " . annual reports. The official figures of ou ut during the mid- and late 1920s are _, . IP `V given in Table 4.2.

I Oi "VW Wm? All Slaves " " 5 The Postwar Canjuncture 163 T¤b|e 4·2 Output per Worker, 1 923/24-1929/30 in CVVT‘°3 g again increased re its previous level-—-1,435 Africans and 27 European;. The hew_ . er-S produced 3.5 ewt per shift in continuation of an upward mind- WINS d€V€l”P· Omvutve shift 1923/24 1924/25 1925/26 1926/27 1927/28 1928/29 1929/30 mem at Udi Mine was halted until electric power was available, four districts at ` ii T Iva were worked in development. The railway transported its largest coal cargo to Per "b0y" on V dam—87,376 tons since the slump in agro—exp0rts released more W&g0HS·1°° 134 138 119 13-88 13-692 1477 1612 `l y Near the end of 1924 the Enugu Electrical Plant had sufficient power to elecml surfacc & ` ` li Y trify the Udi Mine. By February 1924 arecord 23,286 tons was produced in twenty» underground { two days. These production surges were possible despite a month-long strike from ` December 1924 to January 1925 and a reduction to 220 working days.1?7 H Pm. rbcyr incl ` * . .` The largest productivity increases were exhibited by the hewers or "p1ck boys. A 10.7 11.4 11.7 12.73 12.40 12.99 14.28 Q I whose annual output rose from 585 tons in 1921/22 to 1,003 tons m 1922/23. This capital work . increase was partly due to the emphasis on robbery, but also of course, because of '· V the increased presence of the unrecognized workers on coal. In one week in SepPer- hewer-/shift 3,5 3,7 3_55 3_45 3_4g 359 4_o2 3 tember, 7,031 tons were produced-a record for the mines.‘°8 Q ; Managcmenys smregy for {nine development anticipated a World FBGOVMY and Source: Nigerian Railway and Udi Coal Mines Report for the years 1923/24 to 1929/30. { T Expanded demand by the Nigerian Railways. III 1924, hOW€V€Y» the s¤v¢r¤m¢¤t Q was not at all confident of the wider marketability of Enugr coal. Among the rea`Y sons that Governor Hugh Clifford gave for rejecting the case for privately capital- ized coal mining in the Enugu coal Held by Sir Alfred Jones of the Elder Dempster BY 1923 thc mines had YEWPOTEIHY W€¤lh€Y€d the Period of acute 13bOT Sh01'¥· Y Lines, was the fact that Nigerian coal was not competitive with South African coal. Z$"‘“‘““"""?g“"”°*`““?**‘slf‘??‘°’*‘·‘l°‘”°fY°1‘%f""‘¥“"?°"H°Wf’“°" Chef t Up to the present rmt, re demand ret our eirrpms eee, as has eirerdy been nyeama continued to receive hrs political subsidy, whrch insured his coopera— . _ , . _ . . . - - · · · ` ointed out has fallen short of potential production. and an invitation to this tron 111 not interrupting the flow of workers to the mines. The management was , . P ’ . d . d me demand with other mduccrs fm. therefore able to concentrate on developing the mines and embarking on major "Q, * Govcmmcm to sham thm alma y ma eqn me P ’ capital works. The mine plant changed from being a group of semipermanent , · the Pmscm at any mm lacks any auummem “b“sh” h°“SEs md sheds to a gmup Of concrete structures illuminated by €l€¤¤i¤ Y i The governor went on to justify a defensive attitude towards the govemmenfs lights. Underground, many roadways were reinforced with concrete and steel ` labor Supply, suggesting that it would not tolerate the piracy of its Slowly dcve1· bwms and an ¤1¤¤t¤i¤ haulage system was completed, thus reducing the cost of r Open ieber force because of the strategic importance er coal fer the railways. The head porterage to the mine surface. Electriiication also assisted in improving crm- government monopoly was [hug COn5ymcd_¤¤0 ditions of ventilation and flooding as fans and pumps were installed. However, both » _ In 1924/25 the mine’s workforce was 1,336 African l=1b¤f€1'S Bild 25 African and failed to solve these problems and miners on most work faces labored in high tem- r _ ¤ West Indian gtaff, For the first time the admiuistrativé f€P01’[ m¤¤ti¤¤¤d the Size Of peratures and often in several feet of water. The improvement of the mine plant in- Q the aniggm group in the workforce—lO4. An unspecified but i1'l¤T€¤$i¤E number Of creased the percentage of the cost of production owing to electrification and V ` artisans were West Indians, arefieetion ofthe employment crisis in Lh¢ C¤I'ibb€¤¤ maintenance of machinery. However, increased annual output as well as output per ‘ and a funhgr mmifesmqjrm of the managemenfs attempt to find highly skilled labor shift per hewer ("pick boy") facilitated the expansion of production.m‘* at a COS; below Eumpcrm wages}11 Higher V°1“m° and lower Pmd“°‘i°” costs Pcfmimd *-h° management tv l¤W€1' é , Despite the east of electriiieation of surface shops, ofhces, and inclines, the cost of ‘h° Pdcc 0*0**1 at Law fwm 49 Sh*Ui¤gS 1>¢¤¤¤ w 42-2 shillings p=r ron in an ‘ · pewermd maehinery perton droppedfrom 9s. 8.1din 192223to 4e. ll.5din 1929/30. ammpt t° Expand the market- Ami°iPa*i“8 an UPSWWS in Uadtl the m9~¤¤g€1'¤€¤f `L This drop in the cost of production was relatively constant throughout the dccadem embarked upon a fairly ambitious program of capital development. The amount of i ’ £l7,4l4 was allocated for culverts, drains, and retainin walls at Iva Mines, and ~. earthworks, tracks, surface drains, and small station buildings on the surface.‘°$ » _ THE IANUARY 1925 STRIKE: AT REHNEMENT In 1923/24 the mines were opened only 225 1/2 days (rrr 1922/23 they worked , Q RUMBUNGS OF A PROLETARI 241). but the total output increased by 62,317 tons. When there was a slight resur— ` By 1925 the majority of the workforce had been attracted to the mi¤¤S V0l‘m‘ gence in demand hom the Nigerian md G°ld C<>¤¤tR#¤1Way¤» thc Work-force was ~ taiily. A substantial nucleus of a modem proletariat committed to wage labor for i2 >—

lad "Wr Were All si¤~¢r" _ ~ The Postwar Cnnjuncture 165 its subsistence existed. Approximately one—third of the workforce lived in Enugu, ° On the heels gf the ehortive strike, the management was approached by repreand the other tWo‘thllds oame nom the villages clusteled around Enugu within a .1 i` sentatives of the Agbaja clan group, who argued that insofar as the land on which tel; to lltteglkm-ile radrus·“’ But many of those “loca·l” inen boarded in the town é ` the mines were located came from them, they should have exclusive rights to the an oarnps urine the week The sirike was organized by the "piok boys? the min- . , jobs in me mine. Management knew that me Agbeieas were net sunieienuy sinned era themselvec. Although it was of considerable duration, there is little documen- tl A to per-for-m the higher-.leVel jobs at the eo]]iery_ But thinking that the “bnekwurd" tation oonoem-ing the event in the atchiVes· V Udi—based miners would be malleable workers, it decided to comply whenever The sgsgdcloscd ins mules for tlttoo weeks The l'leWets Wele calling lot a Ye- J. 1 possible with the request. Another factor tempered the management’s inclination tum to t e . per tub rate. The wage cut made during the recession 1920-1923 , Z to eomply with rheir request for all the mine john The Ngwg, as n village.;-oup, glad no;ibeen authoilzilhhy tlieliolonial adniifiistfatlcni but neithef had it overruled " 1 also argued that since the colliery was located on their lands, they alone should e co ery manager. e "pic oys" or hewers demanded a 50 percent increase [ enjoy the proposed monopoly of mine jobs, thus undermining the pan-Agbaja in piece—rates retroactive to 1920, the time of their negotiations with the Resident. `* elelm_ The management opted to fO]]0w e Pgttgm of preferential hiring, again using T he management reiooied the demands and dismissed the protesting miners, al- V V Chief onyenine and elected to irein Agbajas for en categories erieber in the mines. lowing them io be ohasod imo the woods by the station magistrate and four po- .; V . Within five years nre Agbajas were mere men s majority ofthe underground worklicemou- ' force. “Foreigners" became largely confined to clerical and administrative posil Very little is recorded about the organization, size, and leadership of the strike; `_ = tionS_i19 h0WeVef, it is likely that if was led by the mens Nzuko·115 One of the leadels slnr iv ‘ The short work stoppage between December 1924 and January 1925 did notregled out management, liuiopean stain and Aiiican headnieri was Edward Okafor Q ally disrupt production. The Iva Mine was the mine of future exploitation and thus of UmouJl· Omtsha dlVislon· He was dlsmissed·foi’ insuhonilnation when he and i Q Q received considerable capital expenditure during 1925/26. A new tippler chute, reins group refused to wori<_on_a hard ooai face rn March- Edward petitioned the g, taining walls, and drainage duets were built during die period. However, rnsunigrgnnagen claiming Zlctlmizationw by the Ei-n'oPean underground foreman and the cient electrincation made it difficult to control water seepage which had reached can 01'enian, an feceiying no sqiisfaotion. Went as high as the Resident who { . an unmanageable level. The mines had used hand methods of removal prior to elecsubsequently ruled against l`llm·_ The management aPPaicntly noriiied other goV· » trification, and some districts were abandoned during the year pending installation eminem dopamnems to refuse him employment and he reported borne biaoidisred ., . er electrified pumps. At Udi mine, however, where werer wes less er e preiiiern, by both the railway and the Public Works DePa-nment·u6 ·’ _ development work proceeded throughout the period. Main headings were extended Following the disnnssallhthg othef hcwefs were °`1`esilless” and threatened a snikei { 5 and over fifty pillars of coal were mined. The management expected a resurgence Plomliting a meeting wi e Resident in APtil in Whioli demands were made. l of demand and laid a solid foundation for expanded mining operations.12° There is no record of the deniandsi hilt the incideniir coming on the lieels of the Ple· ¥ t But the cavalier attitude management assumed with the conditions of work had Vious l920 stnke in whioh ttloleignll lieWei's Played a key roio, encouraged the _‘ ’ severe consequences. The human costs of intensified production included a major management to be leeePtiye to ovoriures by Aghala clans seeking a monolioly on ' r jump in the number of accidents. In 1923/24 seventy minor accidents and one death mine EmPloYment· _ _ _ ` V were recorded. But the following year, 519 minor and two fatal accidents are I In 1924, Tecoid outliuts ooourrod in the Pellotl fiom Alilll to August, hilt shrink-- { noted.121 The cause of the accidents was never specified but the two fatalities were ing dgrigafrlo ledhtoh a di'? tt; on-liydlo»579 tons in December When the Strike cc- . both from "falls of root" while timbering roadways. If the pattern of accidents fol~ cutie · t oug e stil e e osc e mines for thtee weeks in laniiatyi output still [ lowed those of subsequent years which were detailed in the reports, the large maTcse I0 242,582 tons in 192s/26. There is no evidence that dismissal of the sink- { 1 jority were related to haulage. The potential for haulage-related injuries must have ing hi;Wi§s1;edncgdftPTo¤21c;1i£l;y· Igikewiso. there is no indication in the oost Pet ,_ ` been great since most miners used only candles until the late 1930s.m Mine electon W io oPPe om S · to S 4·5d· P1ain1y.rhe aggtleyed heWel's Welc not ` · trification involved only main roadways and not the actual coal face. numerically significant and their interests as individual workers were not aligned r . with those of the Agbaja hewers and their "helpers."1l7 1 Following the strike the administration attempted to improvise grievance ma- THE COLUERY RESPONDS TO THE ENGLISH GENERAL ' chinery. In recognition that the center of the militancy was with the urbanized "for- " Y STRIKE OF 1926: THE IULY 1926 COLUERY STRIKE eign" skilled workers, the railway stationrnaster was instructed to make monthly Despite the comparative inferiority of Enugu coal on the world market, the col. visits io the labor oamps io soiioit complaints from the workers The manager ro- ; liery was an nnpeusnt irupenni asset during nie prolonged eeei strnre in Great Port-od that no comPlaints were made to the stationmaster in 1925.118 . Britain, May to November 1926. As Britain’s first state-owned coal mines, Enugu

nr. neu: nu aiu von , ' Illll I’0$IWdl‘ (/0|l[l4IIClllIQ ,67 colliery was especially important, given the unpredictable nature of the metropol— Q ] Demonstrating that they too understood the administrative hierarchy of the state, itan coal industry. The relationship between the two industries——one colonial, the ‘ the Agbaja daily paid workers refused to meet with the local railway magistrate, other metropolitan—suggests that the boundaries between "native” labor and the ; who functioned as the judicial authority in Enugu. They insisted on seeing the British working class were more permeable than is usually assumed. In mid—May — } higher officials. The Resident of Onitsha province was despatched immediately to the colliery was asked to expand its operations to supplement supplies of coal in ' negotiate personally with the miners. Because of the urgency of the situation, the England. The mines quickly prepared to meet the new demand for coal. The col- ¤ colliery manager conceded to the miners’ demand and granted the one-penny wage liery manager summoned the district officers of Udi and Awka to assist him in re- I , inerease.'25 The miners who resumed work on July 14, however, were clearly conhiring former miners from their districts. He needed 220 hewers, tubmen, i _' tinuing the foreign skilled workers’ tradition of timing their collective action to extimbermen, and railmen for Udi Mine, and 280 of the same categories for Iva Mine. } ; ploit conditions of high coal demand. They also understood that local officials were The mines decided to resume the second shift, terminated earlier because of the . i the lower and less powerful echelons of the administrative structure concerned trade slump, and hired new workers using the warrant chiefs. The labor shortage Ei I with their behavior. This aspect of the strike, ignoring local political officials and continued into the new year. The district officer of Enugu, however, cautioned that ` Y management, would be repeated time and time again in the mines and in most cases it would be useless to try to obtain gangs as “they generally refuse to go into the Y would meet with success. mine." l-le suggested instead that some of the "more reliable" men be sent to their I. The strike also revealed another important change in the workers which the manvillages to assure the men that the work was not so da.nger0us,t23 ` `V agement did not fully appreciate. Having assumed that preferential hiring of AgRecruiting extra labor became difficult because of labor demands by other gov— i rj bajas would prevent future strikes, the management faced a strike by the most ernment departments in the Enugu area. The Soudiern Secretariat was moved to "backward" sector of their workforce. In contrast to the 1925 strike in which the Enugu, creating a strong demand for labor, and railroad construction in the north- _ g "foreigners" from Onitsha, Awka, and Owerri played a leading role, this one was ern section of the Eastern Railway Line attracted workers who might otherwise I, g, led by the “locals." The workplace experience of the "unskilled" Agbaja special have come into the mine workforce. Nonetheless, by the end of 1926 the mines { g labor gangs had encouraged them to use conventional forms of worker protest, hired 400 additional workers, extended its working days to 282, an increase of 58 rather than leave the worksite as they had done in the past. They understood that days over the previous year, producing a record output of 353,274 tons. The in- 5 ` by downing tools they could restrict production. Without their tubs, the hewers creased output, 90,000 tons, was roughly equivalent to the 95,823 tons purchased ' ; could not produce. Without their timber, no new work faces could be opened, nor by the Elder Dempster and Company shipping lines, *2* i —~ roadways reinforced. The relationship between this consciousness and position in In July of 1926, in the midst of this tight coal market, the predominantly Agbaja { the workforce would be demonstrated in the next decade, when these same "un— day laborers, tub, rail, and timber, walked off their jobs demanding a one-penny . fi skilled" workers eloquently explained why their wage demands were reasonable. increase which would raise their wages to ls 3d per day. Agbaja men held that se- , A, In 1926/27 it appeared that the 1ong—awaited economic recovery was close at ries of underground support jobs, often called “dead work," that facilitated the "pit hand. While the general strike in the United Kingdom created a sudden demand boys"’ jobs. They were all on daily wages rather than tonnage rates, as were the X ` for Udi coal, the tin companies on the Jos plateau increased their demand over 300 hewers, and could therefore not increase their income by working harder. The pay- ` percent to 6,093 tons when the Eastern Railway reached Bukuru. The colliery hired ment of day wages to such a broad spectrum of the underground workforce en- X 400 additional workers and attempted to meet the expanded market. Iva Mine was couraged solidarity and collective action. With day rates, increased effort had no j Q still problematic, however, even though parts of the working districts were elecimpact on income. Thus, securing higher wage rates was crucially important for g trified, Most Iva work was in development, in anticipation that the demand would this group of men. The strike was short, lasting from July 12 through 14. In this continue its upward swing. Robbery was hindered by flooding until the complete case the "locals," whom management assumed to be much less militant than the ~ electrification of the working faces.'2° “foreign" workers, acted on their own. They realized that, given their position in 4 As the colliery continued preparations for expansion. the market suddenly colthe labor process, they could bring the industry to a standstill even though they 5 lapsed with the settlement of the English strike. The market for 90,000 tons of coal were considered ‘“unskilled" workers. By timing their action in a period of a tight r { used to bunker ships suddenly reverted to Welsh sources. The market contraction coal market, they had clearly learned an important strategy for industrial action. `Q was so significant that even though the tin mines’ demand increased to 29,000 tons Coal supplies were desperately needed for bunkering ships during the British ~ l in 1927/28, it was insufficient to maintain the production levels of the previous mineworkers’ strike, and given the shortage of unskilled workers in Enugu, they V year}27 The mines were never able to recover their record low levels of cost. The had little to fear from replacement by "scabs." Timing a strike at such a period, J overhead of the plant was expanding as mechanization and electritication projects when the Nigerian government had been asked to help the metropole in nme of il j were completed. Electricity expenditure increased by over £2,000 in 1928/29 and need, must have embarrassed the government. It moved quickly to resolve the issue, Q' · maintenance for building and machinery by nearly £l ,000. The operating cost per

168 “We Were All Slaves " ii The Postwar Crmjuncture 169 ton rose slightly from 63.62s in 1927/28 to 64.06s in 1928/29. The workforce de- ‘ it large amounts of coal. Altematively, he could arrange with the European overman crelalsidafrong 2.369tto %10l. d g to have the miner med, Management neglect was not coincidental but expressed a CC1 en ra e, owever, remaine very high—956 minor accidenrslzl Y generalized assumption that the "boss boys," as men from the village, Should be Nonetheless, the management still saw no reason to either provide protective equip- ., given carte blanche in the mines. Extortion, illegal seizure of wages, and physical ESRI fOr the haulage Workgs and tubbcgs, the groups that sustained the bulk of `E i violence mered out by the "boss boys" was of little concern to m8.¤Hg¤m€11t-130 ese injuries, nor 0 train e men in s ety procedures. There were no first aid Q The similarity in complaints against corrupt "boss boys" and interpreters indigggiifi Eli €¤ll.¤;'l¢;:l0 011; 111 Cgaérge of igilstructing the men in safe mining prac- j V cared that both functioned as informers and collaborators on the mines. They at. s porn , e wor ers 1 not re 'ze that the mining standards that gov- , tended wcrkers’ meetings and informed the administration on the ringleaders who emed their workplace were significantly inferior to those in the metropole. y were subsequently dismissed. The men attempted to use "traditional" methods of Alllmilgh Thelf earlier Strikes, in 1920, were associated with their awareness gf the yi securing solidarity and began using oath—taking at their secret meetings.”‘ As F-lm C01111€¤t10H between themselves and their metropolitan brothers, not until the next I working class became more conscious and organized, clutailment of ¥h¢S€ PTMdecade would_they· have a comprehensive conception of the types of conditions tices was considered a priority. that should exist within their workplace. p when the decade opened, increased state investment in chicily recruiting sys; tems increased rural abuses and caused unrest both in the village and in the inATTACKING THE ~(jU|_TURE OI: pREDA-I-{ON": · dustry. With colonial chiefs, "boss boys," and "native foremen"·involved in WORKER5 (j0NFR()N·[ I/BOSS Boyn CORRUP-I-ION, ‘ securing labor, monitoring the labor camps, and resolving worker grievances, the Tl-IE $`|'R||(|5 OF 1929 ; degree of abuse was formidable. All echelons of the colonial state chose to ignore 3 - the exact processes that chiefs and “boss boys" used to produce and control workat the close of the decade underground Iworkers had gathered considerable ex- Q ers at the mine. Despite the role of forced labor in stimulating the uprisings dur5;;';:;€ 11: S¤'¤0;1cI:1;§ gI`1?V3H€€S, igengfyéng foes, and mobilizing, relatively suc- V t ing the wai-, government still held to the belief that the autocratic chiefs W€I`€ Only Y, 0 P1'0 61I 1I1t€l'€StS. m 0 ened by the successes of other strikes, i` ` ` exercising the normal prerogatives of “traditional” rulers, and the g0V¢1'I1m€¤¥ Sl·¤1· E€i’9l;g1t;;ly attzfked gs iupervisory stilata to whom they were most vulnerable; i ply tightened the link between chiefs and labor recruitment following the Wal l A e wor ers s c not against e manager, but against the types of ex- `F l Again they were surprised when rural discontent reached a dramatic pitch in Elgizatgcn :1; alloweclc all Cl€\{§0§ ll'! the glines. In September 1929 the hewers V 1922/23 among an especially vulnerable SeCt01'r In Nk3I1\.l slaves (Ohil) f0$€ UP · e vu ecause 0 ega e uctions y "b0ss boys" from their pay, The en]- against conscriptjon for colliery and rail work, the owners’ seizure of their Wages, ESI?/1‘1:2¤§€m¤;1t Espondied by prosccutirlrg several "boss boys" and nine were ` » and escalating violence against their families. In their rage they crushed local Struc_ IC € 0I` SX 0 011 an COITUPTIOH in t e magist.rate’s court, The adrninjsti-a. A tures of stare power, the "Native Courts," and forced the state to n€g0tl¤t€ 2 MW tron felt that it had successfully solved the dispute and concluded in the Onitsha 1 social space for them in rural communities. The protest was a revolutionary attack il?T0V1H¤?H?i1I'lI1U3l Report of 1929: °There is reason to believe that strikes arising ` — 5 · upon qld_ pre-colonial social hierarchies. It quickly became vi0l€I1I leading C0 tl1€ 1'0m 3.51 at CBS? are unlikely to occur for some considerable period_”l29 t ’ murder and eviction of dozens of slaves and, in retaliation, their attacks UPOH the Dogg?. git; atilftxlstlfiilon lnnaxiagement demonstrated their self-imposed ig- f V freebcrn, Amndi. The state was forced to constitute a punitive patrol and GZIHVHSS 0 e en e ne wor 0 ‘ at1ve" superwision and discipline in the mines. ti the village-groups in the south Nkanu area for several months. I have argued elseThe SYSICKH of llldllsttlal relations at the mines was characterized by spontaneity, K wherem that this constituted a crucial period of protest for the Ohu because T-l1l’0\-lgll lack 0f planning, and ineptrtude. Management understood the network of extortion t , these struggles they forged a new identity demanding that henceforth they be called Mlfl ¢t>1T¤Pt10H in the mines, but as long as this secured industrial discipline they y Y Awbig, a word meaning stranger. Unfortunately discrimination proved HIOTB tenapaid little attention to the costs that the workers had to pay. In fact, the system of cious than names and the new term came to be understood as but a euphemism for labor recruitment and control at the colliery was a microcosm of the problems in- t t Ohu, slave. lgprent in the mdrrect rule system at large. It gave ample opportunity for individu- ‘ For the state the price of expedience and alliances with the oppressive ruling s chosen as warrant chiefs and their assistants to enrich themselves at the expense ‘ V class should have been recognized as the survival of the state itself. Similarly in of the population they were supposed to be governing. At the mines this role was e the industry, worker protest against the chiefs took the form of desertion, volunllézgg l;Y €l£€·bb0f b:E’S- blHd1;1d1w.ll5£fthe m1ners were powerless to reject the de. ; vt tary enlistment into waged jobs, and strikes, But both systems would be rei¤f0f€€d or rr es y e " oss oys." a miner refused to pay a bribe, the "b0ss ° until the colony faced the imminence of yet another world war and a dangerous boy retaliated by placing him on a difficult work face where he was unable to win t eruption of colonial working class activism. wr,

‘ 1 71 170 "We Werezlll Slaves " 4 Y The Postwar Conjuncture C, it ·~ ' 'c with one of Brodrick’s sons in Enugu indicated that he was a NOTES 7 pl·;\i?i\;ou3:;i1?;lo§l?;li;a`i`ed businessman who owned a number of col;nmer;;;l)e;;e“f;§§S;; 1. Personal communication to Peter Gutkind, 24 June 1964, as quoted in peter CW F (bakery, Stores, laundry, carpentry shop, printing PF€S$Lm;°1'3£§ 2 $51 mil In fact: he Gutkind, ‘“I’hc Emergent African Pro1etariat," Centre for Developing—Area Studies, Occa- i n sponsored Culll-11'91 lnsmumns (f°°tbaH team' a brass an ` his businagsea Biotiiiek ap. sional Paper Sexics, no. 8 (McGill University, Montreal, Canada, 1974), 7. ,` claims his fathef emPl°Y€d a numbcrff Eljmwsans to mmagg the ..O]d»» Precoioniai for-ms 2. In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, when coal mining was still practiced . peat-ed to straddle values of l-he Mnelv °aP‘tallst‘?°°riOi11ya2;]`? a S_58 Wives and 42 chil. like H crafm colliers, as independent men, felt that a responsible miner should have “enoogh · of status indicators. He validated his Wealth 111 l““1‘“°“ Y ymical and ccmwmic fam_ land to provide himself and his family with basic subsistence when the coal trade was slack-- il V dn,n_cen,enting duough kinship nes linkages with 1¤‘1Pl;>¤1°“ En of Benin the ma of As gafden SP8¤€ WHS C1'0WClSd Out by mining expansion, a nostalgia for this agrjculturally ` E iiir,s_ It was said that he was from the f?i1T111Y of the O ar °r gg that wha'; he died the based independence pulled Scottish miners to the American coal fields at the end of the een. U Nigeria renowned for its beautiful bronze Soulpuuss- Th: S°“;;i·;ld the “f0mn€,, quickly fury. Many mined on the east const but purchased land in the midwest to reproduce the eee V 1 Wives dud children were manipulated by ¤¤s¤mP"l°“S “WY nomic inde endence the had lon lost in Scotland. C bell nd Rei , ‘ e d rl e t Y ` ' i ated. _ =·· Y " Collier in Sl;otland," 65Z67. g amp 3 d Th In cpe d n i d1ll¤;*Vi°"’ Wim Th°"“*S O”“°g°?° Bmdmk? Elmgm-16 Iu1y·1??i?Qt§uclihi2(g§;?: Es 3· Ba1`1'll18i0l1 M00f€. Social Origins ofDicmtorship and Democracy; Lord and Peasant ‘: 3 entrepreneurs are still an uriderstuslled g1”0¤P Wm'111`1 African S_°°i;H Studi;] of Enugul Sec in the Making of the Modem World (Boston, 1966), 491-97, if These charagtggjgticg have if been researched in Lagos by Kristin Mann. but there ali H9 511;*1 Mobility in Early C0lO_ been called “Catonisrn" by Moore, who argues that it emerges when "c¤mi-nercigil relation. ; ~ Krisiin Mann, ··The Rise ofTaiwo t)lowo¤ Law. A<><>¤1T1 a11°“d Kdstin Mann (pmsmcum $111175 h€1V€ b€EU-1'I to 1l1'1€l€1’miI1€ a peasant cC0n0my" and conservatives, Often Iandhgldgys, J nid Lagosf in Law in CalanitzlAfTzCa, ed., R1¢ha1`d Roberts an adopt repressive methods of control. The ruling classes s ke of the need for the "moral re- 4, { NH, 1991). “ ,, Ig al generation" that characterized the "g0od old days." Bruc1?;Berrnan has used this ggnguuc- 5 i7_ These men were sometimes called bush 1¤WY€*'S b§‘;L:;‘;§‘;i1;;l%;§)?;; gg/_ tion to describe the typical Kenyan field service officer and his autocratic reign in the ` * group assisting in Petlmniug the °°“m· dmfullg commcm an function for both urban and C0u1`111'Y$ldB- 11'1 i€iTl1S of Ehugll. l10WSV€r, the romantic rural past informs the support for J ernment attempts to remove them, they Wmlnucd to SEFVB; am to tha social history of and ultimate complete fabrication of, a rural political Sl]`LICCl11'€—[hB colonial chiefs and their ,; mini iitigants through the 1930s. Although 1l‘1€Y WBT? $@**11*9 f their history- For a good ¤<>uftS—not With authenticity in the aré, but with considerable intellectual arid emotionai ~. 5 Niger-ian Cities, to my knowledge, there l$.11O Sysismauc S;‘dY 90 Q The Judicial System, appeal to the individual civil servant or high official in the colonial service. See Berman, i . introduction to their role within the Judicial system, see ew y , "Bureaucrac and Incumbent Vi0lence," 230-37. . 188-97. _ . . . · · · ‘. 4- Fmdegck C°°P°r’ “W°'k* Class md Empires, 235—4l‘ ‘ I 18, For an extensive discussion of the rise of Krug Jalaland l11S S1gil1E€&\“l0e as 811 11'1d1 5. Their elusiveness from the control of capital is a variant of the forms of ijansitjgnal i 2 cm, Ot rapid change in the Delta, see Dike, Trade and Pgilnes ca when the mm, Aku_ “W0i’ker" behavior that characterized early U.S. and British workers, Herbert Gutman, work, ~ ig_ The one study on prostitution focuses Ou the C1'°s$ lylers 3; minemnt Gold Mines: Culture and Society in Industriolizing America (New York, 1977), 3-5; E12 Thompson, The Q · naknna, became the Igbo name for 111`0$11mF€· $1** Beucdgsoéflgixfrrgcan Smdies Review 34, Maki"? ”f’h" E”€lish W°’l
172 "We were A11 Slaves 1. v The Postwar Conjuncture 1 73 ft Du Bois: The Fight For Equality and the American Century, 1919-1963, (New York, 200), ` v 49 Ibid Mmrhouse to Rm Ouitsha 24 March 1920 For Garvey see Robert Hill’s Marcus Garvey and the Universal Negro ImprovementAss0- ` ' 50. 1-bid" Exec- Udi to RcS· Ormshaj il February l920_ 011111011 1’**Pm (1101110101]* 1983400)* 9 11015* _ _ _ _ . 51. Ibid., Exec. Udi to Res. Onitsha, 24 February 1920. It is unclear if only artisans were 28* mekwe O1°11°g°1°* Cur eney Re1'°1"110" 111 _S°"1he"1_N1gem1 1880"1948* , on sn·ike. Croasdale, in his report on the colliery, claimed that all surface workers were on Occasional Paper No. 14 (African Studies Center, University of California, Los Angeles, g . strike 21_23 February. Cmasdale .tR€pOn on Enugu Comefv .1 65i“1>’ 1966* OS“111°k‘·1“·Ni$”’i“ D”’i'ig iiie Fi"' W”’i‘i Wan 292- 1 1 $2. 01~11:»1sr 12/1/1562 Assiseht DO tu Res. Onitsha 3 li/latch 1920. 29- O1°“°g°‘6· The C”"·""°>f i1"""i”’i””· 2 1 sa. mtu., nxee. nai zu Res. Onitsha, za February 1920. 30- S‘{PP1°- Hi’i°’>’ ”f’ii2 Bmiiii C°“i1”d“”’?’~ 123- · 1 54. una., Assistant DO to Res. ohnsha, s Merch 1920. 31~11*1i1·· 122- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , 1 · 55. ONDIST 12/1/1565, Asst. DO to Res., 3 March 1920. 32. There were a whole series of drscnmrnatory practices that elicited African protest. · 53 Ibid Africans had not received a wage increase since 1906 and there was a ceiling of £30O per I 1 57_ NRUCMAR 1919. year on African employees, regardless of qualification and job. Africans weren’t qualilied _ L 58. CMSA 63*,:3/0 18 July 1923 for pension until thirty—seven years of service. Most usually died before they could receive , ‘ 59_ Hmisén The Inbepgndem, Cvmer 57_ 11* They 11*110 °0111P111111e°1 111111 1110 use 01 1110 1110111 “11e11Ve” 11111011 1efe11`111g 16 A111111111 me01` ` 60. This is a generic term that refers to men who, in United States coal-mining history, cal ofticers was derogatory. Osuntokun,Nzger1aDuring the First World War, 296-297; M.A. 1 · were called hcompmv men], These were mm who drove the coal mads laid tracks tim_ T01°111111011* Lab"' Movement "1 N1ge'1“‘i P"11 and resent (1"ag0S* 1985)* 22* _ ` bered the main roads and coal face and, in Enugu, operated the pumps. They were in a rather 33* W0g11 A111111ab11* Trade U"11"1 Moveme"1 111 N ig er 111 (New Y°11‘— 1909)* 11* Os` v broad job category that management considered to be unskilled. In the thirties they con1*“11°111111* Nigeria i" 111e 1111 Wmid Wen 290497* tested this designation when they agitated for wages and explicitly articulated the skills im34. Osuntokun, Nigeria in the First World War, 295. Puck in their Work. See Chapter 535. The best social history of these Wctorian Nigerians is Kristin Mann’s Marrying Well. GL ONDIST 12/1/1562 DO and CM to RBS, Onitsha 14 February l920_ For a synthesis of their political role seeilobert July, The Origins ofModern African Thought `; 62_ The buniv was a conkmtor who mmged with the, Owner to Work a specific scam of (New 110111* 1907)* 4 _ _ _ _ I 7 _ ` coal at a set rate. I-le then brought in his own workers whom he paid from the group wages 30* 111 111S P1ese1111111°11 10 1110 S111111eY C°1111111ss1°11* 1*110 P1es111°111 01 111011 111111010 11111011 `Q* he was given. The system is considered very exploitative in British coal m.ining. Douglass {Ed jjhat ¤¤¤=¤S we xix ¤1=¤¤¤;¤g1 *>=¤¤;¤:¤ 91 thm ¤S=f};}¤gSS ¤¤ gw See **;¤=*¤¤; ,1 - noted: --11 would be he who collected the money as p&1d1I011lZ(1f you were 1ueky>. Mee 0 e 11*11ge10110 1111111111 0 011 em? 0y111e111j “F1116Y me 61111 e 10 11 g11€‘_S111“ 1111 0 `~ ` men were robbed blind. I have heard older Yorkshire miners say that after working a full 111:8.,1 Sankey Evidence, I QQ 4353, 6893 as cited rn Supple, History of the British Coal In- ` , week, bloody hard U h they would have to fight the bum, man in the Pit yard to get their ‘1“11ry* 122- _ _ `I ` money" (Douglass, "Pit Talk in County Durham," 228). In Enugu there was only anecdotal _ 37-E****S“Ng“’°W¤S¤°1“¤11Y*66"111**g°·g*°“P“***11°S*m“?1*°f“$1”¤**1=*¤*11°*1*°°°1· z evidence of conflict between the meh. In 1943 shew manager hea is ihhssuee 1 system lrery. As the town beca.me known as Enugu, Enugu Ngwo continued to be the name of the v g of gmup Work and group pay- The men protested that it was alike a conuacwn 1. Su ChaP_ v1llage—group. 41 . wr 6_ 38- Of°“6g°’°· C'”'”i°¤’ R"’”i”1'°”· 21- v 63. see Akpeie, *·Arneau Labour Productivity—A Reappraisa1." African Quaneny, 12, 39. NRUCMAR, 1919. vg 5 3 (1972); 233_5l_ 40* T01°1111b011* Lab 010 M "1'emei11* Z3`211", 11 - 64. Ibid., 236-37; Reports on the Colliery Department, 1938, Sessional Paper, No. 11 of 41. Croasdale, "Report on the Enugu Coll1ery," 62-63. , ‘ 1939 42‘ O1\1D1ST 12’1’1562· Exec' U111 10 ReS* 011110111* 17 Fe11111111y 19261 111100* Enugu 10 ‘ 65. It is difiicult, however, to determine if all hewers used the system, or at what point it ReS‘ 011110111* 19 F61’111i“'Y 1920* _ v ` actually ceased to exist, because management took over the direct manipulation of a sur43* 112111** 1111011* 11111 10 ReS· O“11S113· 17 Fe11111111y 1900* _ _ _ " _ plus labor force through the system of “rostering," keeping large numbers of workers 44* 111111** CM 19 100* 17_F°1°11*1°1y 1920* e11°10S111e 111 A°1111g DO 10 ReS111e111 01111211*- v 1 on the books who were recognized but employed only at the discretion of the colliery. 45* 111111** 10 Res O1111s1111* 15 1:e1°111111y 1926 _ ` From this point the manager, not the hewer, determined the composition of the productive 46. The district officer noted that "It appeared on February the 13th that the strikers were ` UML ¤¤r$¤¤¤ mw hm *¤¤= apparently the ‘U¤¤¤¤’ gm wm fom Pm H¤;¤¤¤¤ imd 9m ¤¤= T ss. ses csmpheu and Res, ‘“I'he rhuepehaeht csuie 1.. sesah.a,~· me nm1se¤,hu1s. agarn on the 17th. It became necessary to transfer extra police from Udi.” Ondrst 12/1/1562, 11* 1" duction in The Independent Comer 4_5_ Aish D9 *6 Res- O'1“$1“· 3 M1“`°11 1920- L z 67. Prisilla Leng, were the sua Never shines.- A History ufmerieuh Bloody coal 1u47. Ibid. “ I . 4 4 _ _ dusrry, (New York, 1991), 59-61. 18- 1116 120 “°16*1· 1°6“ 111S 6*16 mm 11*6 611161* 16 S°“‘1 11* Yams 1°“i *116 §“PP1Y 1S 6“11Y . · ss. ONDIST 12/1/1562, Hugh cisnehi, "Copy sr Minutes by His Excellency and His exhausted and one cannot starve the local nauve upon whom we rely for native food-stuffs. _· Hmmm. the Acting Licut€nam_G0vem0r s. 30 July 1920. Af¤¤h¤r¤¤m¤S *11***°1*°“g1**1*°°1*1€1S***°@PP°S*?*1'°1°6‘¤°1°*¤‘°11*€?"**1*¤**°1*°”P°°P16· ¤ 69. ONDIST12/1/1562, J.1v1. Bun, is July mu, SIICIOSUICTHLELBIIGI with enclosed 1e. they do not understand paper any more." Ibid., Assistant DO to Res. Onrtsha, 3 March 1920. 2 1 Pons? 4 August 1920

J 74 "We Vléare All Slaves " J The Postwar Conjuncture [ 75 70. NNAE, C.S.E. 1/218/14, “Petition Against Conduct of Chief Eze Okoli and Chief i ?_ 99. Ibid, Resident to CM, Memorandum, 4 September 1922, enclosure in DO to Res., Onyeama," 16 February 1919. _; 4 November, 1922. 71. ONDIST 12/1/1562, DO Enugu to D.O. Udi, 7 June 1920, enclosure in Acting DO ; 100. Ibid, Onyeama to CM, 21 August 1922. to Resident, Onitsha 11 June 1920. 101. NRUCAR, 1921/22, 1922/23. 72. Phillips, Enigma of Colonialism, 10-11. ` 102. Ibid. 73. Ibid., 11. . 103. A CWT is a hundredweight. In England this is 112 pounds. 74. ONDIST 12/1/1562, Acting DO to Res. Onitsha 17 February 1920. ‘ 104. NRUCAR, 1921/22, 1922/23. 75. Ibid, CM to DO 17 February 1920, enclosure in Acting DO to Res. Onitsha, 17 Feb- I 105, Ibid. , ruary 1920. ` 106. Ibid. 76. Ibid., D.J. Murphy, Assistant Surveyor to C.M. 17 Febmary 1920. i 107. NRUCAR, 1924/25. 77. It is very unlikely that a shrewd businessman like Onyeama was ignorant of contract ‘. , 108. Ibid., 1922/23. law. He was, quite probably, hiding behind ignorance and pursuing his priorities. Ondist r 109. Nigerian Legislative Council, Sir Hugh Clifford, G.C.M.C., Address of the Gover12/1/1562, Acting DO to Res. Orritsha 17 February 1920. Z nor (Lagos, 1924), 50. 78. Correspondence to this effect is in the frle Ondist 12/1/1562. ,-1 ` 110. Ibid. 79. Ibid, H.C. Moorhouse to DO Lyons, 9 March 1920. ~ ` ‘ 111. NRUCAR, 1924/25. 80. ONDIST 12/1/1562. · 112. NRUCAR, 1922/23 to 1929/30. 81. ONDIST 12/1/1562, Moorhouse Minute, 21 March 1920; CM to Res., 6 April 1920; ` 113. See PE.H. Hair, “Enugu: An Industrial Urban Community in Nigeria, 1914-53," in Exec. Udi to Res, Onitsha, 31 May 1920; Acting DO to Res. Onitsha, 11 June 1920. Hi Proceedings ofthe SecondAnnuoZ Conference (Sociology Section) of WestAfrican Institute 82. This raises a question about the complexity of precapitalist forms of labor mobiliza- K of Social and Economic Research (Ibadan, 1953), 156. tion. In this case men had historicallyleft the home village to work while retaining land . . l \ 114. NRUCAR 1924/25;Agwu Akpala, "Background to the Enugu Colliery Shooting," 347. claims in the village. This contrasts with another option, which would be to ·leave the home ., 115. Few of the petitions to the management remain and only tangentially relevant docvillage to seek fertile areas for colonization. G.I. Jones, "Igbo Land Tenure." , uments exist in colonial records. We only know that skilled underground workers or hew83. Interview with Mazi Anyionovo Nwodo, Uhuona, Ugbawka, 18 August 1988. See ; ers from Awka, Owerri, and Onitsha town participated in the strike. It was rumored that quotation in Chapter 3. : Onyearna may have encouraged the strike. However, most of the participants were actually 84. For a discussion of the role of waged work in stimulating the Nkanu slave uprising ` ` "foreign" men over which he had little induence. For a discussion of the strike see Nigerin the twenties, see Brown, "Testing the Boundaries of Margina1ity.” , V ian National Archives, Ibadan (hereafter, NNAI) CSO26/1 "Onyeama-Recognition as Para85. ONDIST 12/1/1562, DO Enugu to Resident, Onitsha, 11 August 1922; Resident to .` ’ mount Chief of Abaja Tribe (2), Subsidy of." Confidential Memorandum from the Secretary, Executive, Enugu, 17 August 1922. * . Southem Provinces, Lagos to the Chief Secretary, N0. c.1/1925 of 14 February 1925. 86. Ibid., DO Enugu to Resident Onitsha, 11 August 1922; Resident Onitsha to Execu— " ` _ 116. Ibid.; Ondist 12/1/1562, Res. to CM, 11 March 1925; CM to Res., 12 March 1925. tive Enugu, 17 August 1922. , 117. NRUCAR, 1924/25. 87. NNAE, OP 268/1921, A.G.C. Owen, "Memorandum,“ 2 September 1923. , _ 118. ONPROF 1/26/99, "Onitsha Province Annual Report for the Year 1925." 88, When visited by Rev. Humphrey Richardson, Edeani had over eighty wives and un- i _ 119. Ibid., Res. to Exec. Enugu, 28 March 1925; File no. PA 260, "Labour Force Colliery told numbers of slaves. See Richardson, “Pioneer Work." I thank Mrs. MJ. Fox, archivist, j, ; Department, Towns of Origin," (destroyed) as cited in Alcpala, "Colliery Shooting} 339. Methodist Church Overseas Division (Missionary Society), for locating this valuable man- = E 120. NRUCAR, 1925/26. uscript. ` ‘ 121. Ibid., 1923/24, 1924/25. 89. NRUCAR, for the Year Ending March 1922. · , 122. See Chapter 3. 90. ONDIST 12/1/1562, Resident Onitsha to Secretary, Southem Provinces, Lagos, 5 ~~ ` 123. NIGCOAL 1/2.4/29, Manager to DO Enugu, 11 May 1926; Manager to DO Awka, May 1921; Ibid., 20 February 1922. ~ v 18 May 1926; DO Enugu to Manager, 14 January 1927. 91. Ibid., Resident Onitsha to Executive Awka, 7 May 1921. ` i 124. NRUCAR, 1927. _ 92. ONDIST 12/1/1562, "Confrdentia1Memora.ndum," CM to DO Enugu, 2August 1922. I 125. Ibid., Ondist 12/1/1562, Res. Onitsha to CM, 12 July 1926; Magistrate Enugu to 93. NRUCAR, 1924/25. j , Res. Onitsha, 12 July 1926. 94. ONDIST 12/1/1562, CM to DO Enugu, “Recruiting Fees-Chief Onyeama," 2August ’ , 126. NRUCAR, 1926/27. 1922. 127. Ibid., 1927/28. 95. Ibid., DO Enugu to Res. Onitsha, 3 August 1922; DO Enugu to Res. Onitsha, 11 Au- j 128. Ibid. gust 1922; Res. Onitsha to Exec. Enugu, 17 August 1922. 129. ONPROF 1/28/203, Onitsha Province Annual Report, 1929. 96. Ibid, Chief Onyeama to CM, 21 August 1922. `~ " 130. Interview with Chief Thomas Ozobu, Irnezi Owa, Udi, 21 June 1975. 97. ONDIST 12/1/1562, CM to DO Enugu, "Coniidentia1 Memorandum," 2 August 1922. , 131. Interview with B.U. Anyasado, Mbieii, Owerri, 23 July 1975. 98. Ibid., Chief Onyeama to CM, 21 August 1922. », _ 132. Brown, "Testing the Boundaries of MarginaIity.”

PART11 V THE ECLIPSE OF COLONIAL PRODUCTION RELATIONS: _. WORKERS’ VICTORIES Q AND DEFEAT

= T THE CoLL1ERY ON THE 4 _ VE OF AR. TAT E I INTERVENTION IN THE H0ME AND THE E ORKPLACE ¢, The stock market crash sent ripples through the Nigerian coal industry. Having ` V weathered the recession of 1922 the workers were again forced to adjust to eco" nomic crises over which they had little control. The coal market contracted as the tin mining companies withdrew entirely and the railway cut back staff, reduced g ` · trips, and Africanized its salaried workforce to reduce costs} The colliery’s man— il ` agement used typical strategies to accommodate the depression but there were no ` j strikes during this period. The men were somewhat restive in 1931 when jobs were 4 ` withdrawn, shifts reduced, and wages cut. But there were few alternatives to these ji jobs, and they were restricted. In such a bloated labor market, those hewers who if , had work became even more important in the village and urban areas as a means L to the few mining jobs available. Opportunities to earn cash through agriculture ` i also declined as the price of palm products reached an all—time low in Onitsha, the w » major market} Farmers producing for Enugu were hurt by the reduction in gov` " 1 ernment wages and employment. The colliery workers’ wages were reduced July . j 1931. Daily paid workers (i.e., tub, rail, and haulage men, etc.) suffered a cut of Y , i 1d in 1 shilling while the hewers’ piece-rates were cut from 4d to 3d per tub. The `_’ old Udi mine was closed in 1933, reopened briefly in 1934, and abandoned per— Q ~ manently in 1936. Colliery men apparently returned home, and in 1934 the mines J5 A found it virtually impossible to get labor from Udi. ` ’_ ` That third of the colliery’s workers who lived either in the camps or the "native" `~`‘ K P locations were most drastically affected by the collapse. Conditions in the colliery’s

180 “M Wim; All S],;vgs·· The Colliery on the Eve af War 181 Ram ;_"kl;°;*O‘l3‘;¤; ;l·;§i@l;.?8l'd duriapg the best of economic times, deteriorated " creative ways. These contrasted with colonial assumptions about the static, "prirnto the myth that their wnnectiggssoelh uiesponsnbility for its labor force and clung A1 V itive" state of their societies. Fortunately for historians they have left a richly docnomic crisis. The men were dis W1 tl debc0untrys1de eusluoned the blows of eco- V A umented record of their ideas in a series of petitions and letters written by mm Collective action Thou h Sgrun Z ut in thxs CI'1S1S 1t was d1fficult to orga~ ~1 i professional letter writers, and in their voices that came through in the minutes of by 1936 their frusu-atilms rcihedgniovueconomic recovery were visible in 1935, , consultative sessions with management. In these documents they expressed their other Wave of Worker agitation Coa poi ;11igt5o1nt that pushed the industry into an- ideas about the-conditions under which they lived and worlced and their visions for CIS drew upon the experience of “f mrng” r the unrest of the twenties, the work- i ` the future. Their words also revealed an awareness of then economic importance Strategies they had used quite Su orc1gfnHa.nd local leaders of the Nzukv andthe ; and a pride 1n their arduous work, all sent1ments characteristic of coal miners This pedod became the most mnfcisls y to exttract concessions in that period. ` throughout the world. Through these sources the “primit1ve" coal "boy" emerges actually the initial Phase of the H; ou; phase m colhery labor history and was as anhonorable coal miner.4 . ml that Continued with incl-casig l acte- struggle between labor and (state) cap- " Tl'l1S chapter covers a period from March 1937, when the "pick·boys" strike oc— immpomtcd the Sgcds of the Sub? m BUSH! l`-h1”0ugh World War H. These disputes r l curred, to August 1939 when the system called "r0stermg," or sharing work, began. tragic shooting of 22 miners at thaéiluela/tarlaostwar struggles that culminated in the A It describes the escalating context of class struggle between workers on the one AS Britain approached World vga H EY m1¤€ N oveniber 1949, — I l haudrand the inclustryls management and the political authorities on the other. changed Nnamdi Ali-kiwe the mo t ar t the poliucal enwronment in Enugu X Bulldmg on previous discussions of the nature of work in the industry, it moves Nigeria in 1937 and Stmcdthc firsts Flxgniréient nauoriahst leader, had returned to Q beyond the workplace and describes those more general social factors that stimuPilar} The Pilot was mad avidl b E S 7 1.k Clroup of papers, the WerzAfric;m lated worker unrest. As such, the chapter argues that it is precisely because the men the City Nigcmfs mghestlitcrag gt 4s(;ler1cal workers whose presence gave , f are full social beings that they Ifought-most vigorously force their industry, a tc mad- The March 1937 Suikelgti B d percent of 1ts 13,000 inhabitants able ` state industry, to treat them as industrial men, with families, goals, and concepmem Workers, and government a cant a e unrest among other groups of govern- { tions of personal and community improvement. Further, I argue that contrary to mm of depmssiun cuts 4 The Citi 36; struggled to meet the demands for restora— L ` racialired characterizations of colonial supervisors, they were, in many respects, both the wml- and mbémbas 51 migcr ?hnent in the city attracted the support of pf quite similar to the independent, truculent, and proud coal rmners that expatriates to the Village. Such ideas heightened e rural men took back the radical ideas - left at home in the Umted Kingdom. l l young men who generally O Osed medgeneratronal coniltcg between the "angi·y" l Tlus unrest occurred in an imperial context of increased Colonial- Office attenMetropolitan Officials b e IE a EIOMI _l€ad€i'Sh1P· l ‘ tion to the state of labor relations within the colonies. In the beginning of the desuch as Nigeria or of Colonial mamss patiellrt with the bunglmg of goverrunents ` " {Jade, the International -Labor Organization (ILO) moved towards establishing the case mm the uprisings in the We §?S:1i1 e William Leck. Tlus was especially ~ ' 1ntemat1ona1 standards in the-areas of employment, penal sanctions, wage—fix1ng per Beltlé In both Cases a labor dis ut H YEL and on the Northern Rhodesian Cop- V ` machinery, and protective legislation. While most colonial powers assiduously deSwcpt dismmsmed colonial Subeg § ;l¤1¤ y moyed beyond the workplace and ' ` ceived the League in its reports, in England there were some stirrmgs of reform as by the threat that these posed fmlthcscllg 0 aaizonvulsion of violent protest, Shaken ‘ t early as 1930. Secretary of State Sydney Webb sent a circular dispatch to all coloitsglf, the Colonial Office mem tedt 0 Om stat? by implication, the empire Q nial govemors urging them to introduce trade union legislation. Nigeria was slow labor Policies- Under attack th; me; Piiyent the pohtrcal rmmfications of chaotic · to respond to these overtures. It was left to a conservative government in 1995 to ism and secure social pcacgb advocgpio 1tan state sought to yauonauzc gglgnial. carry through a policy of labor reform. In 1937 events pushed the local adminisrequired increased pmductionind iv nt? economic development. Development ~ tremon to action, for they were faced with a plethora of strikes, to which the Enugu nial industrial regimes gcvmmnmiti hegt To resistance of Afncan workers to colo- L 1 workerslcontributed. I I h h that African laborers lived and workc; Tl? gcome more concemed with the ways 2 Also 1n 1930, the Colomal Oflice established a coordrnatmg body for the purpohcy that it med to implement from I6 [;lll¢?1'Ll2.l Office hadha model of social _‘ pose of developing the broad outluies of imperial labor policy. The Colonial habour ciplincm Working class intervene in Th e ate Lrues: order society around a dis- · V Commrttee drew upon representauves from a series of govemment muustnes, but ductivg and in The homies to make it m ¢ Wgjfkplace to make that class more pm- w ‘ few of 1ts members could be considered "expert" mlthe tleld. As a policy coord1— Indigenous initiatives in umjzin inc Om fSc1Plm€d· l I ` _ natmg body the committee stumbled along, struggling to conceptualize colomal a generalized nationalist discomscifmome, U omurig assoc1at1ons,·and tapping into " p "subjects" as colonial "workers." of development- Nigman Workers sha e getplod demonstrated African conceptions ~ In Enugu changes in social and labor policy began 1937, following alstrike fcmmlated their ideas abc t k Pe qt "f’°rkP1a¤€ and life and re- W; by the "pick boys" that March. They called for conforrmty to metropolitan indus“ WOT · Persona] digmty. and masculinity in numerous ' trial standards regarding the treatment of workers in the workplace and their places

182 "We Were All Slave.s" The Cnllierjy on the Eve of War 183 0»_,4 nf01:;;;1;;;u;;;;;¥::;ii c(;eIedmQH$ for their families, for e ~ ; RACE, MASCULINITY, AND THE CHANGING CONTEXT service md for eovemmem imeeveeeee me ee or ancral rewards for 1or.g-rerm _~ V or INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: INDUSTRIAL COMMONALTIES dmons under which they Weeked Weee eem0 tie:/Orkplace to insure that the corr- ·‘ WITH METROPOLITAN LABOR Although the positive result · Pm Fm ‘?”°°P°l"”“ S'“¥d"‘ds· i t Th · a # · [1 1 at th ti 'll th warn e s were rmpm-cepublc m London, admmistmtive U em ustry s supervisors an co oru au on es su saw emenas can changes at the C0U1ery had begun almost immediately following the 1937 mk _ » workers," with all the deprecating implications that the term carried. However, the BY °"1Y 1938 the m¤j¤1” Pillars of a Coherent reorganization were in I S Tha i workers felt that they were part of a brotherhood of coal miners with close linkCokmial Offme attributed the nine-momh delay in the managcmmps rgsaia te if ages with the miners of England. They resented the racialized system of industrial the Wf’*'k¢TS` Petitions of 1937 to the orumsy supervisory structure and I1; use O E ' authoritariauism that subjected them to demeaning forms of address and brutality. mem m$€¤SitiVi1y. At this time the manager- was directly supervised b the mag; They understood, through their personal experiences, the racialized power that enmamiggr °f the Nigerian R**llWaYr Whv in tum reported to the g0v€;O1.·sg;l§r l , forced colonial production regimes, in which "one racial group dominates through Ad¤¤¤1Str¤tive aud financial authority over the Comer}, was held b the 0 C; P “ political, legal and economic rights denied the other."9 However, they also conmanager. In 1936 the Transport Directorate was formed and the direciitor oiilincr " Sidcl-Sd themselves to be Working mem mm employed in an industry_c0a1 minPon was his immediate Supervisor. The management lacked anal authod mm" · ing—that everywhere symbolized the struggles workers waged for workplace m the Mruitment cf labor, let alone over conditions in the camps and WO ty Tren » power and against increased supervision. The culture of coal, with its celebration afld the Settlement ¤f grievances. The Resident of Onitsha the Chief Crkp a
184 "we Were A11 Slave.v” A V The Colliery tm rhe Eve ¤fW¢1v‘ 185 Comparisons with European and American coal miners were a dominant thread _Q ; that gave supervisors so much power over their African workers ;vasdu11;oi¢§1§;‘§¢? that informed demands and shaped worker militance. From 1938, the struggles { to the state. Practices that had been enshrined in the systems o inf usldrcss and they waged showed a heightened political sensitivity to the issues of racial dis- ‘ V piine, such as assault against workers, the use of insulting for-ms o Z cd, RW crirnination and workers’ rights. At this time they explicitly raised issues of dig- " t manager-ncnt’s dismissive attitude towards worker complaints were C agi “;Ork_ nity, respect, social justice, and racial parity, and brought customary and insulting " alizing that the state no longer sanctioned colorual production regimg, nfmmed industrial practices into the public eye by using the nationalist press and calling Q ers frequently violated the moral economy of race the workplacirzgnd co dm Crtheir supervisors before the courts. They argued that their low wages made it im- " ; ’ their bosses. "Cust0mary" forms of colonial discipline were lgg e BS S possible for them to fulfill the male breadwinner norm, an ideology that did notre- ; Q ously pr0V0¢8tiV€ and led to Seven} llghtmg smkcs IF 1938' . cmcm flect their domestic reality in which wives worked and held their own income. As ` » The men’s activism forced Britam to push tue 1'1€gl1g€1'it-€i0lh€YYdI;laU?ich the men they could not protect their families from the ind`uities that they were forced V to intervene in the colonial workplace, SHPE?/IS? the conditions und lrgv am S to endure because of overcrowded and unsuitable housing. ` I ~ men worked, and to improve conditions in the nauve townslups an 3 Este dl;.) The boundaries between metropolitan and colonial industry, British "working if that structured working class life. The Nigerian government began tg reg duced men" and “native" laborers, were more "imagined" than real. The physical im- at terms under which African labor-power was being appropnaféd dmg;1 mmf; peratives of coal mining projected metropolitan production regimes into the colo- .` _ To miners this intervention was a v1nd1cat1on of their existence as, in us Ilia] industry. Recruitment of management and their models of workplace L ~ rather than the “p;imitive" and undisciphned :Af¤€¤¤ W0Yk§TS· _ m am discipline, decisions about extractive systems and production techniques, die pro- ` I Moreover, following the 1937 strike, the Golhefy b€g&!1 8 YV1d€%1'9-Dglng Pcdgiglun cedures for disputes management and the standards of safety, accident compeusa- _` » of reform. But a consensus on the extent and nature Of social {6 011:1 §f0}’th socil tion, and workmen’s compensation were transferred from the British coal fields. * i sive and colonial authorities debated issues of policy and eacperrru? S Some But in their adaptation to the colony they were transformed to accommodate British ° £ etal models that had evolved to contain class contradictions in Bi;t1;Ei;;1€B§;ns had ideas about the deficient character of African labor, ideas that were framed within { t involved a series of changes that underrmned the arbitrary con 0 Pm “bOSS ihé diS¤¤¤1fS€ of ¤0]¤11i8l f¤¤iSm· ( ~ i . over the men. They establishfd relpresentauvi xgtgsr than trust e Arbitr hysical violence was an im ortant art of this racialized industrial ~ _ bqy5” or Europeans to articu ate B g¤¤‘/ém _ · _ power, agldytgok a form that deliberately {challenged the masculinity of working l The council members had been leaders in the colliery }YZY{k0 *i¤€:1;h°$°;;;Vu?§n class men. Beatings were common as was the occasional, and deprecating slap in » poinunents legitimjzed these worker associations as negouanng hom es ra S to the the face. This coercion was not gratuitous but a strategy to solve a seemingly in- `V creating ap}i311¥3dVi$0YY b°**`*"d that mcrcly wnvcycd mmagcml cc we that tractable problem that confronted management daily. Getting the worker into the J » men. Both H13-¥16g€m€nW·Hd European Staff as wsu as mal gada]-S W€r;?¥bOd_ mine WHS 01'dy One part of the process. The second part was convening his laboy. t ‘ the govgmmcnt insisted on using the representative Councils as °¤¤S“ 3 hu atv Power imo labor; i'°" making him W°rk with Sumcicm GHWEY during U15 P€Ii0d ;;- ies for the workers, Underground "nat1ve’ and expatriate staff weriespecl ssguu that he was being paid. Wages paid for his labor time, it was rnanagemenfs re— Z; ~ tuned to their loss of power to enforce colonial dlSO1p1l!1€· The ¤¤¤¤¤ Stiuccc t nc; sponsibility to convert this time into useful labor. A } lobbied to eliminate the interpreters, a significantly powerful gf<>;Paft¤* ex gmcBut on the eve of World War H there was a noticeable change in the state’s treat- ; t the workers and frequently ¤SS¤¤lt€d Th€¤'1 if W€H· FmaHY» in 193d — f EI Zgmon ment of physical abuse in the workplace. Court cases began to appear in which { ularly disruptive, buélfrom ¥11e1W?fk€fS' P0S1¤0¤, successful P€¤0 0 WB · workers successfully sued Euro ean staff for these assaults. The olitical envi- · I the manager ended e couuci s. _ _ , ronment of change and reform, erganating from the Colonial Office, glradually trick- t ° — Expatriate ¤0Ui€1'Y and Eovemmcm Staff were divided on the gmc Offvisgigi-it kd down 10 the local level of the colliery, and it disturbed the racial pl-Omoo] of ` U councils and the Prop;-my of improvements m th€.I§b¤1' <>¤§1I?S;l fm;1 ° _ and the workplace. It affected European and "native" staff, and more importantly, the M i would only ¢¤€0\1¥¤g€ the men to bc °V°“ mom mucél of mi) 5;. Org; that men themselves. Emboldened by this new environment and armed with a sharp- { settle in town where the state had little control over their behavior. t E htcmd cned awareness of their role in the imperial economy, they began to push for rights { i the best way to forestall future C0]11?1'Y'SU`1k€S WHS to HPPIX Th¢ mg; 6 8 in Euthat they felt entitled to as working men with families. Their quest would fuel the I Z managerial p0Ii¤i¤S d€V€l°P€d in Br{mm‘ N°n5th°l€SS’,th€ mmm nixclar rcvem ripples of unrest that rocked the colliery during and after the war. 1 rope required that the colonial working class bé Sl1fEC1€I1T-ly appease 0 P For the average expatriate "boss," the shift in state policy on the eve of World Z L their interrupting production during such critical times. th l us asWar II must have been an unsettling experience. Until the late thirties assaults Y! ` Nonetheless, it was important that the state establish control over theY;;1; mm-_ against workers were protected by the state’s refusal to give Africans the right to I T pects ofthe industry in which workers had considerable autonomy. l e f Orkcrs contest this treatment in the courts. Suddenly, the racial protocol of the workplace ; ket or supply of l3b01' to ’£h¤ mines, thc POWW that Va-UOUS categones 0 W

186 "Wg were All glaygy S The Colliery an the Eve 0fW¢zr 187 held over the m.ines’ output, and the urban sprawl and disorder of the m.ines’ labor Y occasional visit hY a· “hetTVe” °r_E“r°Pea“ sjiljcwjson Whig mls dcgrccgglumm camps. These initiatives would preoccupy the state and management for the dura- 7 Omy Wes typi¤¤1¤f¤¤¤—m¢¤ha¤1Zed Coal mhhhg lh the Umted steics a“_ urgi? tion of the colonial period. Policies to control the labor market involved several Q in Enugu the degree of workplace control was even stronger. The sanction o cr; innovations. First, in 1938, a decision was made to restrict all future hiring to the `Y t sack," the ultimate managehel WehP°h» was Of moderate effectwcness to mimb adjacent villages. This would prevent overcrowding in Enugu and also allow the .. 1 who integrated farming with bouts of mine work. Until 1937 the hewgers were 3 or industry to pull in and dismiss workers without causing social unrest. Secondly, t - contractors who created, directed, and paid their own 'work group; happgleh ce the employment cards were updated, and superfluous men were retrenched and Tr { heWerS and “tl1bh0yS” similar te the “hhttY Syftem In Englamlh T ey so ge; evicted from the overcrowded camps. Because mine work had become an impor- I i peared to have inc01'P°mted mahY Of the hhtty S hbuses¤ as the eww S Viazhi tant part of male strategies to marry and achieve status, there were thousands of I J only name on the colliery Payrohehd he Peld the W°rk team from the Outpuh 0 I; men in adjacent villages who had worked at some time in the industry. These con- t t group. Like the “11'1dePehdeht mine? Of England am? Scotland Enugu S iw? stituted an important pool of labor with a level of skill that could not be attained ° , nursed a vision ef themselves as Pf0¤< l2' 10' $ePe1`ated by Pamal pammms iid mppc _ like coal miners everywhere, jealously guarded their autonomy and preferred to V j with corrugated 1*00fS- They Wefe meuffehahly hm dhhhg the dey and he _ ever work at a self-regulating pace. The piece—rate system encouraged Enugu hewers’ . age of 5.5 peoplerm The 0Ve1'<>1'0Wd1¤g Vielated 18190 (me Western) mm 12mm; independent self—identity. First, they were the only workers whose wages were T ` by l‘eq\1h'111g Parents ehd ehihhehm Share ahem-meh $TeeP1hg_$Peee· Thiignetg iu? based on piece rates, a factor that reinforced their sense of skill "since their earn- , _ the housing to be demeaning, irr1m0r61, Hhd ihmhlpahble with fajmlg °‘ u or ing depended . . . on their ability to use a wide range of hand tools, and to interpret those who were far from home it was the 0¤1y OP"-wh to h¤¤s¤¤g m Hug? fthcsc the geological and other conditions under which they worked."l5 Secondly, be- 1 hl 1938 0hlY 30 Pereeht Of the meh lh the_e9·h`*PS WeIe_mem°d· ami lands 9 cause ofthe high worker-to-supervisor ratio, and the dispersal of work faces under were from Owerri.18 The overwhelming majority were either urtmarrre jurupr nglen the pillar and stall system, they functioned with little direct supervision but for an J t or "local” men who had left their wives in the village The PYeP°hde1'eh"e O m e"

188 "lrl@ Vlkrz All Slaver" . The Colliery un the Eve ufWur 189 headed households is suggested by the number of servants. Of the total camp pop- tl Dlffclchhal acccss tn aho Y-hc hhPol'lahcc ef mine lohs hccamc a ocllhlhg clc‘ iiiiriidri of over 4,000, 741 were servants, more than women (eas) or children (ss;4). , ment sf "el¤n" identity, s eeneept lesiiiniized ihreugh the psrnmeunt ehiefieinev This was an average of one servant for every three labor-ers_l9 l , system. "Cla.n" was being redefined as a colonial category of political power durThe iiidirrrryre required labor redundancies, erriiri daily recruitment practices, 1 ing the thirties- ln 1929. when eflieisls surveyed lghelvnd in rrersrndnn fer mrand the men’s own gender ideologies about male domesticity all exacerbated the ` ' allcl'l» the Wolhch nf the sohthcm Ycglolh fcallhg that they Would he laxcch hosc UP housing crisis, The labor camps, ‘*native" location, and unregulated squatter oarnps ] t. and pulled down Lugard’s elaborate paramount chief system. During the uprising, reflected the imprint of colliery chaos To accommodate the rnen·s erratic Work ' ; the Women’s War of 1929, they destroyed unpopular Native Courts, attacked chiefs, habits, nie eeiiiery had to keep 100 percent mere werirereeri their beers [l'l8.\’l were ‘ rnd ureridished svmhels ef w=rr·"Fimrll:vr gevemmem realized its ewn ignersnee daily necessary, and house them as well Many Agbaja and Nkanu men stayed in y i Q of the people it claimed to govern and commissioned a rash of intelligence reports town, commuting home on the weekends, because daily work assignments de- ~ oh most VlllaEc‘gso“Ps lh lShclahd·23 A-lhlcll Wlth “sclchllhc” evidence from tllclf pended on selection by the "boss b0ys" who made up their crews at the pit mOum_ intelligence reports, officials decentralized rural political structures but retained rrr was the eeuiery employed 2,650 werieerr daily, with eppreiriirieteiy 600 eem. g "¤lsn" ns n edneept nf rielirienl <>rgsninini<>n· Thus, the rest ef pernniuum shief was muting from neighboring villages each day. The total population of the four labor r ` shelishedr but Chief Ohyoama hccamc Oklml AWhc» nr cla-ll hcad» uf a eeuneil of camps, was 4,316, of which 2,326 were la‘oorers_ Thus the Collier-y was housing j · "tradit:ional" leaders selected by village-groups. Because of Onyea.ma’s power, the approximately 500 people not employed in the mines .5 1, Agbaja "clan" reorganization proceeded relatively uneventfully until 1933 when Because most adult and junior men lived in villages a reasonable distance from ; Q he cchlmlhcd shlcldc-24 the worksite, they connnuted daily or weekly to wgrk in the n·unes_ This allowed » [ For the colliery the implications of rural reform were threefold. First, it emphathem to be a social force in their communities where often their status in the hier- ‘ l_ sized ah llwchlcd calcgol"Y- “cla-h·” es a velid catcgoYY fer [hc olgahlzalloh nf slatc ereiry er prediietieii was recognizedfTheir eeiririiiiiiitiee iierieiired from their iri- Q , p<>wer· Seeendlvr liv limiting vsrdeuleriehs in speeilie "¤lsnsr" it used "¤lnn" ns come and progressive outlook and regarded them as powerful "modem" men. 3 Q ah olgahlzallohal Prlnelple for acccss te mine lohs- Cchscql-lchllY· *hc dlffclchllal District officers called them eeeai seiiiieirierigr who were recognizable by their , rule ef mine w<>rl< in luesl e¤¤n<>mies made mining nn irnrrernmt element in the flashy clothes, bicycles, arid airofjaunty reireerrriderieeén nieir proximity to home TF Q definitiun ef "elnn" idenrifv Thus, wnrlrinrhe viihewne sehereelerishs nf “Agallowed them to remain involved in the social, political, and economic ]j_fe of their ; _ bajariess" while a resistance to mine work or preference for unskilled surface jobs village. This was especially important since farming, not just an economic neces- · heenme a chalaclcflsllc nf “Nka·ll'·lllcss·” sary, was ideologically iiriperrririt as ii source of prestige rer rsiie rrieriel neeriree 1 i Bv the 1930s, ever 60 pereem ef Aghnis men were Wnrldng er hed vvnrlred in there were no labor contracts, the men made individual determinations of the time .1 the mlllcsi maklhg these villages similar lc the lllllllam c0al·lTlllllllg ¤0lTll¤lllll¥l€S arid duration of their work, 111rie inyiiig tire flexibility to respond 16 the demands 1 in Engle-nd-*5 A srim in mine lenur heesme nn impermm dimensinn ef lieenming ¤ of rural society. · ~ mature man. Not only did it provide these villages with resources that came to sigTo the industry, the adult rnale population in adjacent villages, labor can-rps_ and Z J nify progress and modemization—bicycles, schools, health centers, zinc roofsthe erieiiyer locations of the city constituted ri labor reserve cf erperierieed irririe i but it nlsn rerrnined the men re require the prestige geeds ther signified male workers who could be called upon to supply labor when the fluctuating market re- 7; ` PoWcl·26 While sclhc holclghcssll from Owclll aho Onitshe held the most skilled quired. Brit these rrieri elected to sell their labor power iri eri1e11 aid iiripredieiebie 1 "uit l><>v" rests undergreundr their edueetinnnl levels led them in dnrninsfe all clerunits, often leaving the colliery short on worker-s_ To some extent this rural estrad. , ` ical posts. Thirdly, officials still believed that rural, clan-based leaders were the diirige reiieyed nre state of H10 prebieiii of maintaining workers arid their families li A must effeerive menus nf enntrelling the wnrldng elessr end developed n mutually during slack coal periods, But it still gave the men rar too rnueh control over the beneficial relationship in which they allowed the councils to recommend men for industry’s labor market. ; r colliery posts. This gave rural leaders a power that became a new basis for paThe connection with rural life was also encouraged by the colliery’s contined lrnnege end Pollllcal lhhhchcc l pattem er irreerpereriris rural leaders, chiefs, and elders iii tire iedirerryie affairs. ; A As sn "invemed" eelenisl estegnrvr "elsn" idemifv wss unstehler end eenThis practice was even less successful than the chiefs were in controlling the men ; J lchl?lohs· cslacclally Whch ll was cvokcd lo mask cxhloltallvo Plachlocs that Vlc‘ in their villages and regulating their responses at work. In the countryside, the men I lllhlzcd thc mch lh the mlhos· Alrheugh “clah” afhllahloh hcca-mc a base ef somc crafted their own model of are "responsible" worker, and he was rier an iirdiierri. it i struggle nmnng Wnrlrers in the thirties, ii is unelenr if it hed nnv slznifledm elsims ally "discip1ined" man, Rather he used colliery work to construct the type of rural Q , on workers’ affiliations. Nonetheless, management and the state evoked "clan" as existence that made him feel important and fulfilled as a rnan_ . t a counterpoint to all other forms of workplace association—be they Nzuko or the 1

190 "Vlk Were All Slaves" , `_ The Colliery on the Eve af War 191 Representative Councils that management created in 1937. The clan councilors, both the management and the local administration lacked a coordinated plan to suwhile reliant on the income of the miners for village improvements, watched sns- ~; pervise the treatment of Udi miners.2“ piciously as these men brought new, and threatening, ideas about democracy, so- I ° . Late in 1935 the colliery made several timid attempts to form a coherent labor cial development, equality, and political representation into the village. The Nzuka Y . policy and to undertake direct supervision of the recruitment and conditions of sermobilized members by job category and legitimized competing groups of leaders { vice of the working class in a manner that circumscribed some of the powers of Who had the coniidence and loyalty of the village’s miners. For most of this pe. li ~ the "boss boys." These moves, initiated in the environment of increased Colonial riod, the rural leaders could not understand why their men would listen to, let alone " $ Ofhce scrutiny at local levels and major strides in England toward a colonial labor follow, a man from another area of Igboland. yr ‘ policy, were related to the separation of the Enugu colliery from the administraDuring the late thirties conflicts over access to jobs at various levels in the work j i tive hegemony of the Nigerian Railway following an important strike in 1937.29 hierarchy pulled at the fragile unity that "locals" and "foreigners" had created, and . These bureaucratic innovations did not mean that the older, more stereotyped plunged the workforce into a frenzy of clan bickering. For the Agbaja men, mas- t . views of the "African worker" were completely abandoned however. Not all polculinity was very bound up with coal mining, and they had clear ideas about enti- ,· icymakers were convinced that colonial workers were sufficiently "civilized" and tlement and the responsibilities of the state for their welfare. These ideas were _; , economically “feSPO¤Sible” to be t1'¤Sted to fO1'm OT fl-in their OWH trade ¤¤iOnSstrengthened by the strategic importance of the industry during the war and the `» But the strategic location of the small colonial working class in the political econconsummate attention they received during this period of unrest. By now the old ,g . omy indicated that a system of consultation and grievance resolution was needed. system of industrial "indirect rule" had outgrown its usefulness and new, more sci- i` ThefefO1'e» at the end ofthe decade the COlO1'li¤-l Office Pilshed the Nigerian g0V· entitic managerial methods were required. The Colonial Office pushed Nigeria’s ' { emment to legalize trade unions, which it envisioned as institutions of colonial central administration and the industry’s officials to use these new systems. But ` R order. They had no intention of their functioning as effective vehicles of workers’ the Workers still retained considerablezcontrol. ‘ , — interests, and the unions labored under all types of restrictions such as compulsory Management encouraged "cla.n" differences, which they considered primordial, l l registration. But initial manpower shortages in the colonial service prevented ofby selective hiring practices, but it is unclear how much these differences meant l ticials from guiding the direction of these unions, and many of them functioned in to the underground workers. They were thrown into sharp relief when the first state- · , their initial years with very little direct intervention by authorities. Later the exiendorsed workers’ organizations, the Representative Councils, stepped to the fore- Y gencies ofthe war forced the Colonial Office to overcome initial suspicions of the front of the workers’ struggle. `i British Trades Union Congress and to invite the congress into a partnership to proNew currents of colonial labor policy were felt in the Enugu area in 1935. The i mote "responsible” trade union activity in the colonies.3° By 1942 the BTUC and Secretary of State for the Colonies WG.A. Onnsby-Gore dispatched a circular on _’ the Colonial Ofdce experts were institutionally joined in a new Colonial Office the question ofthe supervision and treatment of colonial labor which may have been l J . committee, the Colonial Labor Advisory Committee, which together with overprompted by questions from the Labour Party, now in opposition, to embarrass the g seas employers’ federations, coordinated colonial labor policy? conservative ministry on the treatment of labor in the colonies, The Ormsby-Gore A , However, during the thirties, distrust of the TUC led the Colonial Office to "go Circular required both reports on the existing machinery for inspection and super- . I it alone." At the colliery the activism of the "pit boys" and the prospects of war led vision of colonial labor, and proposals for remedies where inadequacies were found. ` , the Colonial Office to question the competence of management and its ability to The circular drew special attention to new industries such as mining and suggested 3 , l ` contain the aspirations and expectations of the workers. In effect, the government the creation of a permanent administrative position to report on and monitor labor l ‘ beeeme more concerned With the SO¤i¤·l fePf0d\1¤tiO¤ of the workforce and SPORconditions. He identihed several conditions requiring special attention: (a) housing, I , sored several local investigations into the world of work and family life at the colSanitary arrangements, hospital facilities; (b) observation of labor contractlaws and _ " liery. These studies became the basis for a comprehensive experiment in social regulations; (c) application of English inspection procedures to mines; (d) applica- _ , engineering and increased industrial discipline. This experiment continued during tion of English inspection systems to factories.27 In Nigeria the governor could use ‘_ , the war and into the postwar period. In the city it included extensive social polithe Labour Ordinance of 1929 which gave him wide-ranging powers to monitor { cies that differentiated a core of the most skilled men in the workforce, gave them conditions in places that were designated as "Labour Health Areas," and Enngn was Q ° housing, attempted to restructure their families, and claimed to make their famiso designated in 1935. This required that the Residents include in the annual provin- i lies more healthy and better educated. These policies also attempted, though less cial reports those steps they had taken to implement the directives. Ormsby-Gore . · successfully, to make these men more reliable, efficient; and productive workers. also appointed labor inspectors for industrial and plantation areas. The senior med- ` Y ’· The men, on the other hand, had their own ideas about their work and family lives, ical officer in Enugu made frequent visits to inspect labor camps at the colliery but 2 and they articulated these ideas explicitly, through petitions and demands placed

192 “VI@ Were All Slaves" A ] The Cnlliery an the Eve of Wur 193 before management and the central government, through workers’ associations, y diately, Governor H.T. Bourdillon dispatched Bulkeley by special train to investiand in their struggles at the point of production. “` V gate, and the chief commissioner for southern provinces to alert the miners of These social and industrial reforms did not meet overwhelming support from ei- *,_ T Bulkeley’s task.3" While he was to inquire into their grievances, he complained: "I ther the Nigerian govemment or the Enugu industrial and political authorities, who C I considered their action in striking without giving time for consideration of their often subverted them. But by the end of the decade Britain was at war and the pres- [_ demands to be unreasonable?35 Warning that the administration was not respondsure on the Nigerian state to modernize its labor policies was expressed in a cor- i ing to their "beck and call," he noted that should any increase in pay be decided pus of labor laws that attempted to direct worker unrest into controlled channels ji ‘ upon, it would take effect from the date of their return to work.36 of expression, and to position the state as custodian of the social and economic `* » His wamings were futile. Unintimidated, the "pick boys" agreed to work on welfare of its workers. Although these laws were derived from British labor prac- . i March 20 and warned him that he had until Tuesday the twenty—third or they would tice, they never fully extended to colonial workers the rights and privileges of V resume the strike.37 At the meeting Sunday, March Zl, they clarified their demands: British workers. However, they did encoura e a eneralized discourse on work- X . . . . ers’ rights that led the miners to measure thgeir oivn conditions against those of `I ` Incl-caseq Wages retrospective frcim ’“‘¥1.°3?’“"“?"°i’,5€Q_‘;,"‘° amlgum fhmd to British and American coal workers. This worker awareness of metropolitan and · . mln ccmhed as mm LO work Owmg to mjmges Noel`; wd ·€ wm, Eg}, C imintemational labor standards, and sensitivity to the racially based differences be- it W pmmmem of Om Europiign Oval-mm lm el-gmun ’ an Improve Ousmg tween their conditions of work and their European supervisors, drew upon the if ` mnangcmcms m the camps. men’s experiences in defining their demands and strategizing to attain them. Their " The governor noted in his report to Colonial Secretary Ormsby-Gore, that the desire to bring their conditions on a par with those of workers in Britain pushed r _ strike appeared to have been influenced by "an increase in the rates of pay to labor the colliery into the throes of persistent unrest which outpaced the war. The impe- a employed generally in the Onitsha and Warrl Provinces."9 Beyond their attempt rial state WHS n0W confronted with an internationally conscious working class. to restore wage concessions made during the Depression, the “piCk b0yS” were ` ~ aware of the norrrral systems of workrnen’s compensation. The demand for more worrrryvrsioss or nn Worrnrcr AND HOME: * mdir-¤¤¤>V¢dh¤¤Si¤gWssimrmtforFheemdmtewimfeelitseF“"“ -I-HE AGI-I-A-I-IONS OF 19374 940 . T J for single men and local mamed men living rn Enugu without their families. All » ~ needed to be in the camps to be selected by the “boss boy" for work da.1ly."° From the spring of 1936 until late 1940 the colliery workers maintained a period ·J ' When the Director of Transport, G.\/CO. Bulkeley, visited the pit site, he was of unrest and worker agitation. It all began in the spring of 1936 when, despite the Q { shocked by the dangerous, cramped, and grueling conditions of work and reported economic recovery, redundancies in the workforce led to retrenchments of a ftuther Q that the demands were justified. Bulkeley concluded that the underground work was 600 men}2 Even in the midst of these retrenchments (a labor surplus), the "pick boy5" 3 . “pi-ohably more onerous than those of any other government empl0yees" and “the nafelt sufficiently confident to initiate an industrial crisis by demanding the restoration ` _ ` ture of the labor compels them to effect much of it in cramped positions and in a hot of wages to the prel93l level. On 9 March 1937 they sent a petition to the colliery ' humid atmosphere."‘u Nonetheless, he was mindful of the importance ofthe industry manager for increased pay, improved working and camp conditions, and other de- » to the region’s economy and the historic difficulties with its troublesome workforce, mands. Three days after the petition was presented, it was forwarded to the general , and he initiated a wide—ranging government attempt to bring the coal miners under manager ofthe railway, then direct supervisor of the colliery. On March 15, the day { ~ closer managerial conu·ol. At a meeting on March 22, he announced his eonCl11SiOI1S. the general manager received the petition, giving no further notification, the miners ` l` First, he changed the pay system. He restored the ld cut for all workers but he stopped work. The manager tried desperately to get the men back to work. A worker l proposed a change which further underscored the unique skill and power which described how the Nzuko leaders came to represent the strikers; . the pick men held in production. He recommended that they be paid a figced rate a ` r da in addition to amounts they earned at present piece—work rates, Before 3:15 Management aided to and a Wax to get th? Workers to resume YVm’k’ so · T gse suilre the hewers’ piece-rate earnings averaged between 2/3d and 2/9d per man. ey sent for the District Officer, the Pohce Superintendent, and the Resident for — 3 , f ft wd t 1 h-H- d€_ Onitsha Province. These men went from camp to camp trying to talk to workers { Und`? Bulkclcy S avlml the bcwcrsdiad a fixed mm 0 Om 0 S- I H5] and get them to return to work. They finally decided to ask the workers to select T e Pcndmg On than Scm0my’ Wlth *‘dd‘“°‘“’l tonnage mms gf Bd pct mb m ra my two hewers, two tubmen, two railmen two timberrnen and two surface work- C · and id m develapmem Amiough the miw Wages gave the hcwers an average of 3 . ’ ’ * · ' further underscored the ers to meet with the Management to discuss the strike.33 ` ~ slluumgs per day’ a mere ld mcrcasm this spam? Payment . I pivotal role of hewers. The proposal was a saving. It added £4,576 per annum at The men selected those most identified with colliery protest——the Nzuko lead- · Y the given rates of production, while the hewers’ original demands would have cost ers. It was decided to summon the Director of Transport G.\/IO. Bulkeley, Imme— the colliery an additional £8,l00 per year in addition to the retroactive increase}3

194 "W¢ Wm All $!·¤vv¤" _: ¤ The cezzzeiy on me Eve of war t 195 While Bulkeley wnsidered this d¤y—rate as ¤¤mpe¤s¤ti¤n for harsh underground ._ J rever, me eeriierya accounts (see Table 5.1, p. 200) snowed that there was no ri¤¤¤di¤¤¤S it did not conform to the °0mPl€X i¤¤e¤tiv¤ System necessitated by lhc t i nancial reason why wage improvements and amenities in the labor camps could variable ¢ft;¤¤—¢;¤tS :>1fp¤¤i¤¤l¤rJ;;>bS in the mines From the standpoint ¤f men- r not have been impiememed ear1ier."‘ After allowing for depreciation and other agemcnb S wm ine tonnage an tim°‘WaE° $YSt€m reduced the il1¢€11fiV€ fOr i char es, both absent from the colliery accounts, the governor found that the anfrcductlogé In me aliecmc ¤iT°umSm¤€€$ Of Emlglb Where few wcrkers WHS PTO- ]/ ` nualiurplus of revenue over expenditure was approximately £20,000, a sufficient etvimiz » SVCD ° tonnage Wage System Was 3 PCO? 8-llemative *0 direct SHPE? amount to ermit both the wa e increases and im roved labor carn s. The mines Vi$i0n· S°°0¤dlY» given the fragmentation vficbs under the D€TbY$hi1'° System, the , ' could havepiinanced improved working conditiorg and wages in niheteen of the hewers’ combined day and tonnage rate did not encourage the coordination of tasks ' t twemyqmg yam of its gxjgjggncg}7 and provide incentives necessary to integrate the various categories of workers in- w . Thn»d]y_ Bulkglgy improvised n grievance Syg[gm that he hoped would reduce Vclvcd in the actual Coal PT0d“C[i0¤· l ‘ the power and autonomy of the Nzuka, Management was to appoint workers to an The miner relied On the tubmen Y0 SUPPIY him with tubs that he filled with wal- If `V — industrial council that would meet regularly with management to discuss problems. me tubman was On 3 day mm, there was H0 i¤¤¢¤¤v<= for him to SUPPIY lh°S€ tubs €X· ~ i ` This new system, which closely resembled the existing system of consultations Pcdi¤°“slY· Fl-mh°I`m°T€— the PaY system actually encouraged ¤°¤-mm b€lW€€¤ W0fk· .' with Nzuko leaders, tacitly acknowledged the failure of the "boss b0ys" to resolve ers who interacted in Production From the $m¤dP°l¤t Of the hewer. a t¤bm6·¤’S failure ` " grievances. The men did not trust the "b0ss boys" and in many instances, the "boss to PT0Vid€ him With mbs had a dif¤¤¤ imPa°T “P°¤ his Wage Packet, which Was based Q boys" themselves were the problem}8 Authorities were also concerned that the $0l€lY Ontomage mms- Ycnecdng his dal1}’ 0“tP“t· Simi1a1'lY· the hewer also d°P°¤d€d A Nzuko, the only organized worker bodies, were secretive, violent, and operated on the •=i¤¤b¢¤¤==¤ t° 0P*m a new coal face for his °P€l'a'j°¤S· Thus. in most mines. the ` y outside the control of management. Leck appointed the Nzuko leaders to the new heW“YS> mbmclh dmb€¤`¤°n» and those Specia-I 1ab<>r workers whv i'iPP€d me mad , ` councils, attempting to coopt them into a body where they could be monitored W°l;j_b€ P3·i%Pi°°;gY¥;1!<;1i-TMS w0L;l1dzen<:o11r?1e ?em tc wv? quickly maung V-h€ ` openly by management. The impact of these new appointments on the coercive mn mms un ET W C 6 main C0 §°t€€F— E °W€T—€° d PF0d“°€· In Enuglk I I s stems of industrial disci line is examined below. ‘ however, even the tubmen, those most obviously involved in daily production, were 1 V y P on day rates. Soon after the award, hewers complained that the tubmen were not pro- , , viding them with sufficient tubs to maintain their output."" Certainly, when the hewer- E _ THE COLON IAL OFFICE RESPONDS WITH IMPATI ENCE contractor system existed and the entire group functioned as one production ·. e While the Nigerian govemment bungled on the ground, Colonial Secretary unit—hewer, tubmen, each with his assistants—the tonnage rate encouraged coordi- ` I E Ormsby-Gore, became alarmed at yet another example of govemrnemnl jncom. nation of energy and effort. This, however, ended with Bulkeley’s day ratef , petence being exposed by worker activism. These conditions embarrassed the gov¤¤¤l—m;i¤g praigces. mgmgemelrg tlsuillly pgtshewers tgn a day rate when I ernment at a time when proposals to bring the troublesome British coal industry l’K111‘Ll1'lg m0V I0 mac ne pro 11CtiOIl. S nite tates an E¤1'Op€ it WHS I6- Y T under state control were a ain bein debated. Every instance of l'H3Il8g€Ii31 H€gl€CT1 Sismd by Workers because it threatened increased $“P€YViSi°¤ and Scientific m8·¤· , ` and archaic or coercive lziaor policies offered the possibility of being thrown into aimgnti U.S. mirzers complained tliatjigvtzill ;}2:(§;l0l'YlZ€’ the mine . .. [and] make I _ me national debnte.49 The secretary, aware of political vulnerabilities, noted his a or p ant out 0 every coa mine." ou nugu’s mines were never thor- , mis wm s about the condition gf the indus ; oughly mechanized, one cannot dismiss the possibility that Bulkeley and his su- W gl g _ _ , uy , . periors anticipated the movement into mechanization as a way of reducing ' '~ _ Iyas mt Fm? easy m my md about this example of State Socmhsm when I dependence on a recalcitrant and unreliable workforce. Further, by requiring that `· ' Visited Uql mgm Years ?gO’ me financial cfmsldmmons me not gse only Ones to every hewer be paid a day—rate, the director pushed the industry to keep accurate W Q j be bmw m mind In an mdusmal undertaking °f Such Chamctcn records of the nlieg working ¤;ail;1This-hw? bccauserilach worker was, at the very I A Previous Colonial Ofnoe appeals for governments to develop systematic provim-‘mm“m· Gnu C to Wagcs as on e aY‘mt€· 'S increased managerial Su" Y ` sions to monitor African labor went largely unheeded.51 Now with the economic pervision eroded some of the autonomy that the "boss boys" had in determining _` , recovery, perhaps something could be done to improve their conditions. He theretheir daily work crews and the informal hewer contractor system became obsolete. Zi , fore responded to the March strike with bewildered exasperation that a state—owned gut havinglrelegsed thi lgewers’ earnings from its dependence solely on his pro- i i cologne] lndustry could prove as insensitive to workers’ lives as a private one. uctivity, e in ustry a to restructure its management to create the supervision ` OI-ms}, .50;;; fc]; that it was the yes Onsiblljty gf the im eyial stare to be an exnecessary to insure output. This would prove far more difficult than anticipated. " Y emplarygf enlightened labor policy fog the colonial working class, especially when S°°°¤d1Y» B“lk"l°Y launched a financial i¤V°StiBali°¤ im!) the 65%-I ¢¤nditi¤¤ t 3 5 it had not organized into trade unions to protect the workers’ interests. Moreover, Of the ind'-‘S¤'Y· In ]“¤€~ in futher teStim°¤Y t° Hegligmce at The highest POHUCB-I A as a state-owned industry the Enugu colliery was open to public scrutiny in Par-

796 “W‘·’ M'? All Slave: I, i The Colliery an the Eve 0fWur 197 liament, and intemationally to the criticism of the ILO which was tentatively in- i llzsda Oweiiishs, mam, of Whom were me ihdiish.y»s hist Workers, housing was truding into the world of colonial labor relations. The Secretary complained: I ah iiiwlsmblg affioht to their slams as Working men Although they iemiiied com The conditions at Iva Colliery revealed in connection with this strike occasion Y mchwith that villages through the Owmt ImP*0V€m‘mt Umom Eastem Nigotials me Considerable eeneeml The existence of a eollieiy Owned and managed by ~ earliest urban umon, Enugu was now their home, the place where they established Govemment in a territory where there are no effective Trade Unions or other as- , their families md raised their °hi1d"°n· Their argumcnts were rooted in the dignttY seeiamms for Safeguarding me interests Of the workmen calls mi. a more vigi_ ` of their work, the uniqueness of their skill, and the consciousness of themselves as lant government supervision than would appear to have hitherto been exercised It a cultural md °°°“°m~t° thm CH- €r<>¤S¤¤1¤, local a“th°tttY· Enugu- notodt in this oaso it tl}: f¤¤¤SIw;r= ;'§‘§a;lod in?;;idiil>;t¢hd¤¤;d¤s_¤¤1¤T;?WIlI§ds- A These long-service labourers have gradually come to regard themselves and the men were wi e y own, s ou n grea cu m e en mg e ige- I I ··c ~~ ·· · »· · · rian Government from the criticisms which would inevitably be provoked? J ahgaggggdelogiligilgs 2; silgiglc;;i5;;;le;h;hilu;€;.;$;?;;?;l§isgf the t°W“sh`P He f¤1'th€1' noted that because tho ¤¤11i¤ry Was admi¤iSt<=r¤d by tho Nigerian Rail" 1 These "foreign" workers saw themselves as pioneers who helped to carve the way, critics might speculate that wages were kept low and conditions poor to i Q mmss mid city out of the ··hiish~ at a time when the indigenes were shll ·»cmmi_ cheapen transport costs. I.B. Sidebotham correctly assumed managerial disinter— I . hslsy Many of them still cohsideied the ·»l0eals»- te be wawas a derogatory term est in tho conditions, and he notod that Look- tho managon { _ that means “backward" and "prirnit.ive." These sentiments were especially strong ought . . . to have been aware of the unsatisfactory conditions in the labor camps · amtmg the Owmtaus Wh°= being Close to Coastal Society tn tho Ntgot Delta Wont and the lack of certain amenities, and certainly should have seen that regulations K tndcctt better ¤d¤¤¤t¤d md more f¤mi1i=¤ Wtth the “Whito mans WaY$·”_Th-is alitWere Properly complied with The question ef wages, mo, if admmedly ih_ vi i s ist attitude was further encouraged by their possessioneof highly technical skills adequate, as the Director of Transport considers, is again a matter which should I A mtlltgtod $1¤11s Wnton wom mai Sgsoia-Iliad than ;nY of thogaski have Come uhdei. review eailiehsz j` } pe rme in e in igenous economy. ey, e e ra1 way wor ers, consi ere . themselves to be a breed a art an ' ‘ Subsequently, Governor Bourdillon was notified: _ fuidmi. encouraged this sel;f_pemi;?i;;i?act1On of the government to mw demands From the facts before us it is rather difficult to understand how it is that the un- · ` Four mcmths after ttm Workers met with Butkcleyl the Nigerian goVom-mont had satisfactory conditions revealed at the Labour Camps should not have come to 4 stm nm mspondcd to their d°ma“dS· Thaya °“ thc °th°¥ hmm had kept their ag"' light until attention was directed to them as a result ofthe strike last March. We j · mam m mmm to Work Pending a decision tm that grievances- When no decision do not of come wish to Pi.e_iudge the question in any Way but we shall be glad ~ # was announced, the various Nzuka contracted professional letter writers to com— to learn whether you are satisfied that the management of the Colliery is in fact * . ' POSC Petition? stating their dcmaufta-56 Althotlgh oncumborad with a olumSY and being efficiently carried out. I see that Leek, who went on leave in January and i Q aclffdepmcatmg language thEvP€tmonS ¤>¤t¤b¤t a d1S¢¤¤tS<{¤b¤¤t Work and fam' se was absent from Nigeria when the strike occurred, is quite Well reported 0h_s4 ~ 1ly life that reveals a moral umverse in which the workers judged their treatment _ _ I 3 by the state, the value of their work, and the importance of their home life in the Despite this i¤¤r¤¤S¤d Scmtiny the Nigerian government Still mlsmd the Signs 5 4 winery camps. They based their case for improvements on me morality and jus<>f eminent W¤rk¢r prvtest Wh¤¤ Bulkeley ¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤d that h¤ w<>¤1d i{w¤S¤g¤t¢ th? » . acs of their cause and not just on the conaluans of me coal market. Each petition ¤th¤r domands but only restore tho dol>YoS$ion_PaY oat at a mass mootmg on Match ` I I explained the importance of their work for the safe and economic operation of the 22, all classes of workers were dissatisfied with their increases. The Colonial Of- I I mines, emphasized me skill iiiheiem ih the job, and argued that meh. Wages made lice and Nigerian government refused to recognize that the cost of living had in- — Q it impossible fm. them to he male Pmviders ¤r¤¤S¤¤¤b¤v¢th¤v¤¤-d¢Pr¢SSi¤¤1¤v¢1·F<>¤¤m¤¤¤¤S1¤t¤¤¤h=Nig¤¤¤¤2¤Y¢m¤*}¢¤¤ , They considered the poor raciimes avaiabie for their ramiiics to emuim animstill had not responded. It was left to the workers to shake them out of their reprise. mom] lifestyle and I0 expose them to miliealihy, subsiahdaid conditions beneath t their status as working men. Although the colliery camps were free, and to the “for— WORKING FOR aI_AB0U R_I_0VE»: THF CRISIS E eign" workers an important alternative to high—cost rental housing in Enugu, they OF F AMI I_y AND WORKING LIFE I N -I-HE 1930s _‘ were unsanitary rural slums. The camps were built in the style of range-type hous. i ' ing an imperial housing style originally developed for indentured workers, but now The protests came initially from the urban-based workers. Although Enugu was J Y declared unacceptable fm. family life by the ILO and me British govemmehhsv an {Soo town, the majority of its Ponnanont inhabitants wom ttofoignw 1zb¤ from For "pick boys" at the top of the hierarchy in production, these conditions were Owont ot Ot’itsha· areas that workers Ctmstdctcd moto “°t"iHZ°d·” To tho “ClVt‘ I an insult to their status as workers. They were especially outraged because occa-

198 "We Were All Slaves " Y ` The Calliery on the Eve of War 199 sionally they were forced to board a single "pick boy" with their family or to share " ; We would point out the hardest work we laboriously undertake which is unquesa room with another family. Reminding the administration ofthe conditions under A tionably in the obvious knowledge, and that is that every work in the mine which which they had retumed to work in March, they asked for only one family to share , ` . . looks fearful is not undertaken by us willingly, not for the stead of avarice but for · a room or in the case of single men, only two "pick boys." In July, they demanded: i` the labour-love, and in required order such as the opening of a novel place of the new construction of quarters with more accomrnodative rooms that [sic] the L · Eurgisfgga ami danger before any man mule Vcimm make entry mm lim present ones enough to live in, that is to say, quarters of providency [sic] of suf- E y , [ ug at It by méans of lockcm as ming milbers to Support the mfaulng nam mms each of which ma be able to accommodate r mama and his = “°"‘°“ °f l"y°‘s· md “ ‘°°*’““"g md '°“°““'“°“"g a Pl"°° W“°‘° *‘ °“°k“‘g . . . . Y , = ` ' heard and where from the workers of the lace suddenl sall out.62 wife alone meaning either a pick boy coupled or a coupled tub-boy without to ' muse is P y y be tampered with, by an uncoupled workman or without two couples to occupy ` Even the twenty "boss boys" evoked allegations of the danger of their jobs, their or share one room without a party wall or partition as this mode of living is i — indispensable skill, and their bravery to support their claims. Working as supervioften unbecoming.5“ ~ T sors of the hewers, they considered their functions to be "comparable to any other In a dramatic testimony to their awareness of "modem" ideas of hygiene, the hew— ` , ` ;;;k?OO;é[;;;;i:5ai;I;€mgélllitggénccS In the mms` They had to Inspect Work ers saw that such overcrowding violated colonial sanitary conventions and com- [ T y ` plained that "our current mode of living is rather an inconvenience and far out of considering the amount of difficulties and periods we have to daily encounter. sanitation so wellf`59 Conditions were especially unpleasant for polygynous fam- `Q _ That all places of perils and dangers resulting death if suddenness called the fatal ilies. In this case a rural symbol of masculine status that many men embraced as a . F accidents are those to which we are exposed to open for all workmen of all ranks validation of their power clashed with the spatial constraints of urban living. Some Q and files to pass freely out of fear.63 ggpvrrgli an employee, three to four wives, seven to ten children, and one or two I I Fmhmmrc, as SmmS_CqnsCim{s héadmcn may were conccmcd dm? thcirgliw The "tubboys,” as the other coal face workers, also based their claims on the , i mmggmg n?;1En;ct thm; mnkgng thesuncslglghéy noted that gu, families dangerous conditions at the coal face. They were paired with a hewer and were , D {lit life S e a fquaul y as ami Cs 3 men 0 img Empl0yS` . . . . . . · e tub headmen, next in rank to the boss boys, complained that their pay exposed to many of the same risks of cave-ins and injury. They reflected the his- 1 was not Substantially higher than that of The mbmcn they su cwiscd Their cd_ toric awareness of underground workers of the uniquely dangerous and skilled . ~ mm emphasized The importance Of the mbmen to the hewer P ` P nature of their work. Like coal workers everywhere, they argued that they de- { ` served compensation for the risk they confronted every time they entered the pit. `; : We are next in rank to the Boss—Boys and that our work in the mines is superGiven that all men worked barefoot with no protective equipment in poorly lit , Q abundantly incomparable in its own special way, considering that by our superstalls, it is no wonder that haulage injuries, especially mutilation of fingers and V, visions and controls consistent of both physical movements hither and thither feet, would lead the list of accidents. The "tubboys" cite these accidents as rea- V ; vocal sounds, the work in the mine enhances and pushes on and forward.°5 sons for mmf raises; V . €· j Under the Bulkeley award the "tubboys" received a 1/3d daily wage while the That your humble petitioners beg to inform you that we are the people who al- Z P headmen had l/4d, a mere 1/d difference. The "boss boys," on the other hand, reways got accident in the Mines for this reason the amount of 1/3d (one shilling ` V ` ceived 2/6d. The petitioners complained: md three Pence) We aim receiving Peldlem ls not sumclcm fOr.uS` Many of us rl ii i The big difference is a conspicuous indication by their wages of 2/6d earned per have got wives and children, after receiving our monthly wages is not enough to . . . Support Omselves and them.6, i. ` diem by each and, by subtraction process, we ind that what they earn almost ( ~ doubles our per diem by an outstanding odd remainder of 1/2d while the differSimilarly the "timberboys" and "rai1boys" called attention to the risks they en- ` — ence of our wages from that of the tub-boys, our ruled subordinates, only shows counter when they lay rails and timber at a new work face, or removed them after 1 ld, the two different wages being then almost tantamount.66 robbery to allow a cave-in. Although both jobs are considered unskilled the men i` ’ iE§?i€.“§§t.?“$t‘.‘£5i§'?§.‘;‘;L?2Ziiiiiléf,S32}}f‘Q?$.i‘£i.°EV§?;‘§k.‘??.;“'.IZ?;°E3 " THEE~·>¤FTHE¤¤~T·
299 "We Wwe All Slayey , The Colliery an the Eve afWur 201 I` Table 5,1 COM iery Accounts, 1 91 5-1 937 . and 1939, but in actuality, these figures were the iirst reliable reflection of the work— ; ’ ers’ capacity since 1920 (see Table 5.2). Year Revenue Total Deficit! Amount of Surplus ¤r · Although management knew that the OMS figures before 1939 were actually a E"P°“d"'·"`° surplus Deficit ~& ; product of a team, as labor and management locked homs around issues of pro1915,16 mm wm., Da, 151580 Q duction control neither the state nor management ever acknowledged the underly.9., 1201950 51191,, Su, Bmw { ing causes of this statistical drop in hewers’ output, Both used the statistics to .918 mm 608500 Su, 3,,1 S20 K? I support their argument that wage increases had led to dramatic drops in the hew1919 wma BSWD su, mm Z ers’ output. Conveniently, this subjective measurement of "productivity" was never 1920 1054540 mam De, mm ` articulated. As long as labor was plentiful, cheap, and paid piece—wages, manage1921,22 — mem 1314480 Sw 251500 * ` Q ment could reach the goal of increased production by allowing hewers to hire more 1922/23 mm 721 MD Sur 55540 . unskilled labor from the pool of villagers in the area. But as the price of labor1923,24 mm 754150 sm 165580 ` _ power went up with each worker being paid what amounted to an underground al1924/25 mam mm sw mm p ` lowance, and as the skills demanded by production prevented the facile 1925/26 1198840 mm Sw 346400 ._ _ replacement of militant miners with unskilled recruits from the "reserve army of mam 1715200 mama Sur 654840 , labor," the colliery was forced to examine the production process more scientifi1927/28 1535530 1126580 Sur 408550 ` cally. No longer able to hire unlimited numbers of men, the colliery now had- to 1928/29 1455910 mm`] Sur mm } . find alternative methods or effecting savings in the cost of production and-to in1929/30 1449340 mmsu Sur Bmw ‘ crease the output of the miners. This interest in a more systemic examination of 1930/31 WMD 94515% sm 301260 s{ Y labor productivity was alocalresponse to. the concems of labor managers at the 1931/32 msm mm sur mm 5 r Colonial Office level as imperial labor policy began to take shape during the war. mma 944300 Bmw Sur mm . V As they plunged into the “h1dden abode of product1on," colonial authorities and L` I management found that the Enugu miners had so shaped the culture of work and 2;;:: 2:;;; Zig; i ’ workplace traditions that their intervention would be largely ineffectual in reconwaszse mean sown sur zvavoc ~ 3 ` sumhm 550.,330 i e Table 5.2 Output per Man-Shift, 1928-1940% mma mm ` . Surplus over 21 yam sumuu = V Source: CO. 583/216 Governor to Ormsby-Gore, 24 june 1936, Appendix B, ”The Col|iery's l r 1928 70 CWT Financial Position/’ Y ` f` 1930 80 CWT basic production unit—the work group. He could no longer coordinate the pro- i V. I 1932 110 CWT ` duction process. It was the iinal blow to the contractor system which govemrnent · i had begun to attack when it instituted direct recruitment.67 Under the new wage Q 1934 116 CWT system, every hewer at the coal face was to be paid at the day rate. Therefore, the { ` _ names on the central labor registry had to be reconciled with the tin1ekeepers’ ._ . books, leading to the retrenchment of a significant number of redundant workers _ 1936 130 CWT at the mines. By eliminating the redundant men hired by the hewers, the manage- ‘ ` mem assumed responsibility for the creation of the work team. Now, for the first g Y 1938 60 CWT time, the output attributed to a single “l'l13ST.€I” hewer was accurate. The statistics ` " suggested the full extent to which actual output per man (OMS) was obscured by . _ 1940 $0-60 CWT the hewer’s work group. At tlrst glance it appeared that the award of a day rate led — hewers to become less productive. The men’s productivity plunged between 1936 V 1 —-—

—s*_i 202 "WP VWW All S!aver" _ _ The Colliery an zhe Eve 0fWar RW ¤‘ l figuring both power relations and achieving the control they wanted Over the l¤b0l' ,, ,` impression as to the actual material welfare of the inhabitants."7" Nonethelelll. ~ process. The ramitications of these innovations for the colliery will be examined . should the government go forward with its plans to improve housing, Croasdalo 2 in a subsequent chapter. , r, _ felt that their layout and location had to be carefully planned. They should be nemr ` `YJ By August, 1937, the administration still had not responded to the W01‘kerS’ de- » the "native" location and kept small "to facilitate ease of control and to preventthc ` , [ rnands, putting the mines on the verge of another strike. The govemor, hoping that · growth of a ‘mining vi]lage’ spirit."75 Further, he suggested that only the labor mas- ` i a personal appeal for more time to evaluate the claims would forestall a strike, vis- Y J ter determine who lived in the cmnps, thus me colliery could use access to hous·· ` ited the mines at the request of the men, and held a mass meeting on September ,` Y ing as areward to reinforce good work habits, encourage discipline, efficiency, and ` 4.69 He thought he had secured a pledge from the miners not to strike until the gov- V long service for the industry,7° ernment had responded. However, six days later, on September 10-11, production [ , Despite his misgivings about the propriety of colliery reforms, Croasdale aostopped when the "tubb0ys" went out after 8 European boss man tlssalllted One of i __ cepted a position as the collie1y’s tirst Labour Master. Working with F.I.WZ Skeates, them.7° The case will be detailed below. The strike should have been interpreted ` i ri forrner headrnnsrer gf a Salvation Arrny’s Boys’ Industrial School in Yaba, who as a sign of worker impatience and an unwillingness to accept the old racist forms ` ‘ became the social welfare officer, his First task was to examine the labor registraof colonial discipline. However, the Transport Director and the national govem— ` , tion system at the mines. While the colliery’s daily labor needs averaged 2,600 unment still deliberated and stalled giving no response to the workers” petitions. { dei-ground and surface workers, Croasdale found over 4,000 workers’ nan-res in the j registration tile.77 Anumber of men had identical tally numbers while others listed COLUERY REFORM AND THE SHIFTING STRUCTURES W on the more accurate time books had no card at all. Several “dead lTlEH” were still OF INDUSTRIAL POWER I N ENUGUI 19374 940 ` _ on the list. -At the conclusion of the study, the registry had 54 percent more names q _ than the mine’s daily requirement, which far exceeded the 20 percent redundancy The men had embarrassed the colliery’s management by voicing complaints in A rate that the management kept to accommodate the miners’ irregular attendance public that raised questions about the true nature Of colliery Opefatiens. The entire `* v` and railway fluctuations.78 The staff welfare officer assumed responsibility for the system of discipline was pushed into the public arena, and was subject to discus- ` ~` · updated {iles and was charged ro report monthly to Lagos on conditions. sion by the various layers of the state as well as the general population of the city. V i Ci-oasdale’s arguments notwithstanding, the colliery could not avoid making imThis was a new political environment, and ofticial and unofficial abuses that were Q ° provements in housing in the labor campsr In these interventions into the domes- · hidden from the public eye could no longer be concealed. Management became ` · tic sphere, the industry tried to reshape African single and married households to uncomfortable with this new attention Bild the i¤d¤StfY slowly moved mwafd I6- , t facilitate social control and industrial discipline. Croasdale’s camp census found form. The workers celebrated, realizing that they had the industry "0n the run." t " that many men lived with two or more servants, and in other rooms one employee By early 1938 the contours of the g0vemment’S reform process Were becoming - lived with 3-4 wives and 7-10 children with servants. The industry began by setvisible. The District Officer of Enugu, C.H. Cmasdale, Was commissioned I0 0011- j _ ting occupancy at 5.1 persons per room and restricted the number of servants to duct a study of the mines on the order of the intelligence reports then being writ- [ 5 one pei- room, thereby restructuring the domestic arrangements to comply with ten about rural communities? From November 1937 until April 1938. C1’03Sd8l€ ‘ state health standards. When evictions began in 1939 the greatest resistance came visited the mines, camps, and neighboring villages conducting a census of the , ; from the most prestigious men, those with two or more servants. Almost 1,000 camps, investigating the Nzuko, and meeting with the men. His recommendations, ~ _ were cleared in six months."9 New houses ofthe "range type" were still constructed however, were controversial. Croasdale clearly understood the relationship be- — and i-oods_ drains, kitchens, and latrines were impmved,8D Showers were installed tween "spatial 0Ig8IllZ8[lOl'l” and The W01`k€IS` 3glt8tiOi1.72 He explicitly Wamed the I / at the mine enuances, and became immensely popular, Two sports grounds were government that in improving conditions they could be encouraging a class con- , laid out as were some tive "socia.l shelters," where the inhabitants could hold meetsciousness and creating a Working class. ‘ _; ings and arrangements were made to establish a large market.3‘ . He understood the political threat posed by a mine working class and deplored ,‘ V Adrninisti-ative1y_ the colliery was pulled from under the railway and became a any effort to improve the camps. He felt this would cause the men to "10se contact 2 separate department under the Transport Directorate. While the accounting, marwith their homes and native authorities, learn new wants, become dependent on I V keting, and stores remained with the Nigerian Railway Manager Leek now reported the colliery for a livelihood, and thus be liable to destitution and discontent in the , direoriy to the Transport; Directorate in Logos on adrninistrotivo matters, case of a slump in the coal market; such has been the experience elSeWhe1‘e."7° Ig- _ ¥ It was hoped that this arrangement would improve communications between noring the prominence of poor housing in the men’s complaints, he argued that " Lagos and the management. The manager also had full control over production most people were quite happy with the acconmwdations, though the “¤ntidy and ' g concerns. But employment and control of labor was still not vested in the induscongested appearance of the camps gives to the temporary visitor a quite erroneous l t try bu]; was nndei- ine Chief Cgmmjsgjgner, Eastern Provinces, who was not an in-

204 "We Were All Slaves " The Colligry an the Eve 0fWar 205 tlusttial nfticial- Hs was designated the head ¤f lahtn welfare nt tus ¢¤llit=ty· This $5 · knowledgeable of their own needs to warrant serious consultation, anti too ansgsin sugesststi that the stilts had tiifnculty in statins the msn as funtlstnentilly in- { tmetwonhy to engage in fruitful negotiation with eeieniai management. gustriazlworkers. To permit closer supervision of the conditions at the colliery, the Despite Leck’s misgivings about the leadership of the underground Nzuko, thesg oloni Secretary demanded that monthly statistical and narrative reports on the " _ were they mm who wei-E yooognizod as leaders. They had become very experience mines and camps be sent to the governor and thence the Colonial Office.82 ` I in mobilizing support amqng the hewoi-s_ tubmeu, and special labor gangs for many Front thc st¤n- " ~ stature in the eyes ofthe men. As in the village, a 1eatiet·a authority even the wat;} b0ys’ " Nzuko, one Lawrence Amukenebe of Agbaja. In an unusual act of solidar— ‘_ ers depended on his ability to "de]_iver" what the men demanded, be that i¤0f€3S ity against this common form of discipline, the "tubboys" struck in protest. Kerr f Wages, Prosgcutjgn of an abusive boss, or better housing. In this crisis these l¢&d¢l’S was apparently known for his abusiveness and Leek noted that "he is inclined to T l found new Strategies of protest that uljlizgd the ‘*i-igl-its" extended to gglonjal Subbe impetuous in his handling of the bo s."85 Althou h the olice initial] refused Q ~ · the assistance of rofessional letter writers to f0¤'m1lal€ lhttlf Y E P Y . jects. They secured p to prosecute the case, Amukenebe insisted on pressing legal charges against Kerr, l ° grievances in a yhetoiio understandable by colonial employers. and the Secretary of the Southern Provinces agreed that the case should be heard}6 I In the Eyes Of the Workers, the appoinmlcm of these leaders to the Repmscmaa He assigned his assistant to prosecute even though there was no significant injury. ‘ _ tive Councils legitimized the Nzuko as an officially recognized orgém of Worker The meglstrnte Pnbl—lolY elltlclzed the victim, bl-it fol-md Kerr 8“lltY nf ll “reollnl‘ _ ·l representation, and elevated its leaders to positions of power as brokers between cal assault" and ordered a minimal fine and ccmpensationnl The incident embar- Q the smc management, and the Wmkcm This was resented by the Clerical Work. rassed the management, which admonished Kerr for being so impulsive. To the _ V ers, ·=nam,B» Staff, mm] Clan cOunci1m.S’ and the European bosses, all of Whom 1-Scmen whti were daily subjected tv th¤s¤ fsnns tif il<¤rs’ gnsvsn¤¤s· l viaata teahzea that the cenneiia undermined inenattiai aiaeiphne. The "boss boys" [ ji felt that the Councils violated the job hierarchy and elevated men who were their M AN AG E MEN-I-is vNZUKO t: E subordinates to a position of undeserved privilege. Further, culturally, thiy con` t sidered such leadership to come only viuth seniority, a semority that they ad acTHE REPRESENTATIVE COUNCILS l i ` d hr h th ` f k tthe mines and which was validated by their t quire t oug err years o wor a Further erosions of the powers of European bosses came in October 1937 when ~ I imjngnts as "na[iv€" stal=f_92 Wlla e "clan" leaders could not undofsialld the appo 8 _ the Dnccnn °fTmnsp°n instructed Lne manager tn appoint three consultntlve °°“n' ` i l new forms of affiliation that ignored village-based authorities. The president of the elle to rePresent tht underground sllrreeet and oemP Workers- Although the oo'·ln‘ t ‘ innuential underground council, Daniel Iwagu, was from Owerri, and Agbaja’s vilells Were not elected bY Worlrers» management aPPoll'lted lhé men, all Nzuko I lage elders could not understand how a "stranger” could be "chief" of their men leaders, Wl’l0 were Selected by the Worker s dnrlng the Merch Srrllre·88 The €¤un— [_ ~ working in mines that were located on their grounds.93 European supervisors were tils implicitly challenged the suthttritsnsn. pstsintilist ethos that gnvtnind <=<>lli¢ry l t outraged that Artiean ··heya" were given a status within the industry that gave them tiptistions until this point lending ts cnntentivus ¢n¤t>unt¤ts with nivniissnient y access to many echelons ofthe state that were tienieti them. Moreover, they teaLeck was clearly annoyed that govemment felt that these men could be trusted to ’ o Ognized that tho Councils violated the racialized hierarchy in the industry and their articulate coherent demands and be truly representative of the men, but he was ‘ arbitrary use of oooioivo disciplinary forms. Conflicts between white bosses and forced to accept them. To Leck the men were still irrational "boys," insufficiently .t tho (jounoil members occurred with increasing frequency as the "bosses" strug-

l2 206 “We Were All Slaves" V V V The Cclliery an the Eve of War 207 gled to preserve a racially based system of industrial authority in a political envi- i be placed on piece-rates to give them an opportunity for increased pay and to proronment in which this was a liability. V vide an incentive for productivity. Finally, they asked for wage increases for all ln-appointing the Councils, the govemment tried to coopt the Nzuka into the i . categories of work.95 While the government deliberated, the Councils held negoofficrally recognized channels of industrial relations. In so doing they hoped to · L tiations with the management. The state did not respond until January 1938. push an autonomous, secretive, and militant organization into the open where it I · As state workers, the men felt that they had specific rights which related to how could be more closely monitored. Leck and others in the Enugu administration did they conceptualized the responsibilities of political authorities. Some of this arose HOTZ agree that g0Ve1’l11T1ellt should endorse any type of worker organization, and al- ,V V from Igbo concepts of the obligations of leadership. Others, to 11eW ideas that they though they had to follow the policies, they nonetheless worked to undermine the ' had crafted from their understanding of western political hierarchies and industrial Councils. The workers` leaders, on the other hand, seized the legitimacy granted J V regimes. They knew that political officials had jurisdiction over the industry’s manby their appointment and basked in the prestige that it conferred upon them. They ’ i agement so they paid attention to the conflicting bureaucratic levels of the state astutely used their appointments to manipulate the conflicts between the various Y g and continued to take grievances to the highest officials—violating the chain of layers of the state and to gain power and influence among the workers. Even from Vb V command. the first meeting, it was clear that they were not going to function within the nar- Q ~ ln the meetings of late 1937 the Councils again revealed a sharper awareness of 1'0Wly dedrled terms of reference ofthe national government, Rather, they used the i ` sound managerial procedures than either the management or state H11th0ritieS~ To Councils as negotiating bodies and seized the opportunity to challenge the arbi— { ' resolve a problem with "tubboys" not supplying tubs, they suggested that by puttrary and brutal powers exercised by the various European and "native" staff. Many ` ’ ting them on piece-rates, the colliery could use the wage system to coordinate the of their demands called for management practices that would bring the colliery in V V tasks, as in the Derbyshire system.96 Secondly, they were concemed with the large tune with the standards of industrial relations used in England. V number of minor but debilitating accidents sustained by the hewers, haulage workThe Councils were determined to function as a bargaining unit, despite the gov- , ers, and tubmen. To management, accustomed to the high mortality rates of ernments’ instructions that they were to be merely consultative bodies to alert the `V ` Britain‘s gassy mines, Enugu’s number of injuries was insignificant. To the men, govemment to problems before they erupted into a work action. At their first meet- Y ‘ on the other hand, these accidents were intolerable. They attempted to get manmg 111 POI'! Hé\rC011rt with the Director of Transport on 9 November 1937, they pre. V agement to issue some protective footwear to the hewers to replace that which the sentedha list of seventeen demands. As a document the list called for standardized _` Y men had to improvise. For example, the hewers placed a shovel near their bare foot disciplinary and promotion procedures, institutionalized safety equipment and mea- Q when hewing to protect it from falls of roof. The men made their own form of shin Sllres, the adoption of annual increments that accepted the principle of seniority, , Q protection from rags. (See Photo 3.8.) Managemenfs careless disregard fOr the ¤Ve1‘iiH‘le pay, W0rkmen’s compensation, and the establishment of wage-bargaining , . men’s industrial safety, and cynical sentiments that these workers did not deserve machinery. The demands called for procedures that, if followed, would prevent V_ , equipment granted British miners, was evident in its resp0nSe2 "native" and European "bosses" from using promotions or infliction of punish- ’· » . . . . ments to exercise their power. The men tried to insinuate the Councils into the dis- ~ _ Thcle is no doubt thm.man¥ mmm acmdems mic to mai Hymg from lh? face when ciplinary process by asserting their right to review and receive written notice of V · hevlmg would be Obvlemd lf boots md pmmmve leggmgs were PmV1d€dV [fpm. any punishment. They argued for due process in disciplinary actions such as fines, V wmv? footwear were given K? one class, the Ommhcléssas would asltfm boots. I rcdegrading, and dismissals, which would prevent "bosses" from victimizing, work- Ii gm I am “‘Tab'° to forlnimy Idea of the costsi This Idea I upposel li based on di; gl-S_94 , i home pracuce of providing underground face workers with protective helmets. The demands were the first comprehensive critique of the deplorable work con- . V The Council meetings continued through 1937 and 1938 with the men reassertditions that existed at the colliery for many years. They had never been aired in 1 _ V ing the issues first presented in the earlier petitions. The meetings with govemment public because disinterested European staff and political authorities had managed V l officials in Lagos and the complex legislation that the state was creating during the to intimidate the men individually to hide them. But now, an air of relative trans- late thirties encouraged the men to seek professional representation, and they hired parency prevailed. The men demanded criteria be established for promotions so a Lagos lawyer to assist them with Lagos officials.°8 that advancement within scales was no longer at the discretion of corrupt supervi- I ~ sors and also sought to systematize advancement within scales. The demanded ’ V that gratuities be granted routinely when long-service employees let`? their posts, ( THE EVANS AGREEMENT: ABORTIVE ATTEMPTS and criticized the indefinite period for apprenticeships, where many men remained } V TO REDUCE IOB CONTROL for many years. The workers also attempted to adjust the wage system to permit a * i On January 28, the government finally responded to the demands. The acting more effective coordination of tasks in production by demanding that "tubboys" ’ . Director of Transport, F.D. Evans, went to Enugu to announce his decision.99 The

208 "We Were All Slave.t" _ The Cvlliery an the Eve of War 209 administration thought that they could use the dispute to introduce more supervi- g . Evans tried to simplify the colliery’s system of over seventy grades by groupsion over the underground workers by making employment contingent upon per- ~ ing jobs into several new categories for skilled labor: artisans, carpenters, electriforrnance on the job, regularity of attendance, and ability to make production cians, fitters, turners, and helpers to whom he also gave graded wage scales. In his targets. Evans hoped to exert more control over the men’s erratic work habits. He · r reluctance to accept seniority as an employment principle, he created an elaborate tried to restore the hewers’ wages to piece-rates by offering: "lf the hewers are pre- i » ranking pay system with promotions based on job performance rather than time pared to willingly forego the shift rate of 10 pence (or 1 shilling) per shift, Gov- ; worked. His revisions became yet another attempt to bring the workers under inemment will be willing to pay a piece rate only of 8 pence per tub from " dustrial discipline. development and 41/2 pence per tub from robbery."*°° The average hewer would Q Evans was as annoyed as were other authorities with the way that the Councils earn 40*/2 to 45 pence per day regardless of his years of service. Under the daily » had evolved. He rejected any suggestion that they be incorporated in the discipliplus piece-work wage rate, those with less than ten years’ service would average ` . nary process and asserted that such matters were only under the purview of man37*/2 pence in development and 24 pence in robbery. The director argued that "rates · agement, not the workers. Further, he arrogantly suggested that in granting his of pay to employees on daily pay must be decided by grading according to quali- , * award he had practically eliminated most of the questions that they would raise fications and the principle of time scale increments cannot be admitted.”*°l ~ ‘ with the management. Moreover, he proposed that to prevent "prolonged and unOn the issue of poor and overcrowded housing, Evans had little sympathy for I necessary discussions," the men should submit any discussion subjects prior to the the men because he argued that overcrowding was caused by the industry’s need * V meeting and he would reply in writing to any question. He also tried to redirect the to compensate for poor work attendance, and the men’s housing of unauthorized “ Councils from pressing the case of individual workers by instructing them to raise persons. Further, he argued that govemrnent could not provide housing for all. Ad- " ‘ issues of "general" interest, and instructing them to encourage the men to submit ditionally, he deprecated the "pick boys"’ request that two men and not three be " ’ individual cases directly to the manager. Further, he informed them that the Lagos housed in a single room, but agreeckthat only married couples should share a sin- · ~ office would only entertain their visits in exceptional circumstances. Normally, gle room. Nevertheless, the colliery had already begun to improve the most hor- ’ _ therefore, they should present their grievances to the manager. Aware that disruprendous of the camp conditions.“’2 r` tive grievances could nonetheless arise, he outlined a structure of visitations by the For many years the men had argued for yearly increments as an indicator of sen- X . Director of Transport, Resident, Onitsha, and other political authorities during iority, and the Director of Transport had always rejected them. Evans struggled to , , ` which he hoped the men would present problems to the authorities.1°3 reconcile his goal of encouraging long—term employees with his refusal to ac- · A number of issues such as workmen’s compensation were deferred pending knowledge time increments. He tried to make a hairline distinction by introducing ' govemment legislation or further consideration. The Governor was still considera grade scale with a rough time dimension: those who had worked less than ten —` ; ing legislation on injuries and would notify the men when it was introduced. There years and those who had worked more. Under this system a man with more than , would be no consideration of any retirement program for men too old to work. ten years’ experience would not normally have a ranking lower than grade three. [ Despite the debilitating effect of frequent accidents, in 1939 the mines changed Undoubtedly one reason Evans rejected seniority-based increments was because . the method of compensating injured miners for accidents, granting less pay. Forat Enugu, seniority did not indicate that a man had worked consistently over a pe- ' q merly, the accident pay had been based on the total number of working days per riod of years. When the records indicated that a man had begun working, say, ten . j month. Under the new reorganization, an injured miner’s pay was determined by years ago, it said little about how many days during those years he had actually ` ' the number of days he had actually worked the previous twelve months. This sysworked. More likely than not, the local Agbaja would have had erratic work habits, ji _ tem penalized those men who worked infrequently. Resident D.Rl. O’Connor noted but they were nonetheless seasoned workers. i i that this had resulted in a "drastic reduction in pay for a large number of poor and The men had also questioned the indefinite period of most apprenticeships. In- indifferent workers." F.D. Webb, of the Colonial Office, was amazed that the mincredibly, Evans denied that any official apprenticeship program ever existed before ` ers accepted the terms, noting that it was a "drastic measure, but the men appeared, 1938, and claimed that the title "Apprentice Fitter," "Apprentice Carpenter," etc., . , surprisingly, to have accepted it."1°‘ were only job categories and not training programs. His assertion that these titles §· Evans’ Agreement was rejected by the men. Having waited nearly a year for the were "no more than a classification for rates of pay" was perhaps one of the most . . state’s response, the workers were enraged that he had dismissed so many of the blatant examples of his underestimating the sophistication of the men. But while he i Y issues that they felt strongly about. The next day, 2 February 1938, the men again did begin time—scale rates for so-called apprentices, he argued that they had little to , V went on strike. The Colonial Ofhce was frustrated with the cavalier way that the do with time worked, but with skill, reliability, and capacity. However, he did agree ' ' Nigerian goverrunent had handled the entire crisis from March 1937. l.B. Sideto consider longevity as one criteria that could lead to promotion to a higher rank , , botham commented:

210 "We Were All Sluves" The Cclliery an the Eve of War 211 It was pretty obvious after the strike of March last that wages and conditions A Colliery-Manager, Under—Manager or Overman dismiss boys or suspend them. enerall wanted lookin into, but it has taken nine mouths to do this, and the `V Sir, if the are not accusin us, maliciously, we beg to have concrete underE Y 8 ., Y S npshot is another strike.l°s ._ standing in this matter.l°° The Evans Agreement managed to alienate every category of labor in the mines The Agbaja interpreters used this opportunity to plant seeds of division among the from ‘“boss boy" to unskilled screen workers, thereby creating the conditions for tt ' men. They were influential men in their natal villages and utilized the pre—existing worker solidarity. A Colonial Office ofhcial remarked: f _ suspicions held by their clan councils to defend themselves from what they charOn this occasion it looks as if the pick boys took action not so much on their own , ;;ai;`;t;l;;te;:r1ul§);::)et]';lxr z:§;§`;l2E;;g;;t Zgisiizg SE;-l ag;] 22;;; account as with the object of assisting their grades of workers in obtaining greater * I for mm se amtton from Owcrdms ’ ’ improvements in their pay and conditions.l°6 _ P ' The degree of worker frustration was expressed in the violence of the strikers who t V } ¤¤¤i¤a¤v_v¤ van? to be one but Owings; patavgr rslsghmgl ‘“‘hd°‘°“$ SEO? dealt roughly with "scabs."l°l They picketed the roads and forcibly removed men ` _ by QW°TanS_W; 0;; ng;] hmm ngidgw ° WIN hfemefb B _e a from the 5:30 AM. shift. This unusually violent response reflected their moral in- ‘ giiring asltxxig t an e slits Sm cy 1 Winn O mm Wl d weiuanst digllatlon that they had patiently waited for 11 months, agreed to an endless suc- 5 I Vc WY nz F0 SZY Erie im :?Pa;¥° Y· Y vte S¤;;¤, we 0 110t 2/HH cession of meetings to discuss their grievances, and had refrained from striking ¤?¤v¤¤fS1¤l-tr<;v··%¤ to S regu at Csk ihwe come 0 m_1 E Igloncilgg our only to be presented with an offer that, in some cases, granted workers lower wages I _` :V°`§lW°l;I;md_ egvlge men m go an_ m B cu Own coun; an lwcm e mei than they currently made. But by now the state had put legislation in place to pro- r e S, Oh B lh S ry Exo Pam m every case or pan- e on y P We WIS tect its interventions at the point of production. The men could not oppose the Evans ,} t to lom is on one pay ta e' Agreemeht bv shllres Or lllrerrerlhg yylrh meh who ehdse re Welle They Were_°r` ° , The more the "foreign” Underground Council pressed for the elimination of the fered the opportunity to enter arbitration, but they demurred and ended the strike, st interpreters, the more ethrrre qtrsrreliirg iidred In the turmoil that followed, the surHeweyeh lr was eleer that the lsshe was fm rrem resolved The Qelehlel Office { ~ face workers also endeavored to go beyond the limits set by employers and beWes hdr Pleased j came aggressive. Confronted with this behavior, Leck emerged as increasingly , f S authoritarian in the minutes of meetings held in early May 1938. He arbitrarily maTHE DIVISIVENESS Ot: »C|_ANr V nipulateg the rules gotzetrrriing the Councitslto reduqe the pglwetrls of the represen_ · _ ____ . tatives. ne particu ar y omy point was e type 0 cases at e representatives Thwarted in their attempt to interrupt production, the Councils refocused their _ could raise irr the Council rrreetirt s_ Leak surrtmsrrly dismissed inquiries Cdn, .....g efforts on corrupt "nat1ve" and European staff who victimized the workers Thou E cc,-[dug me grading or specific workers. Assuming that this applied only to indimeetings Wrth tht manager became mere e°htehh°“s· In se delhg they reehehed ° vidual workers, the councilors raised a grievance on behalf of four workers who ttm ¤¤¤¤ we in ¤ divisive Wav- 0¤ 28 Ami] 1938- the U¤d5=ta{¤¤¤d R=P{¤S¤¤t-¤- F , had been demoted td d lower pay mis. what he refused to mddd the cms, hye Cehrlell demanded rlldr largely Aged-le lhterpreters be dlsrhlssedi arghlrlg that = 5 they requested clarification; "how many persons will be in a case before it can be they were responsible for "bad treatment," caused "most of the confusion," and [ I celled general as to eeme to eeuneiwu Arregsndy, Leek argued that rt was self_eV_ delhehded hllbesdgg The eeellsadeh had sllfhelehr dddl te ardder the Trdhsperr Dl’ ‘= _. ident. Nonetheless the councilors eloquently asserted their solidarity: rector’s attention. He realized that they often caned the men, intentionally distorted Q j I r translations, and dismissed workers who failed to bribe them. Moreover, he sus- ; l W6 want tf! lei Y¤¤ k¤¤W SU that Wellleht for the mw Eradc t¤s=th=r and that We pected that some ofthe European staff may also have been implicated in the abuses. ‘ am MY Eomg Y0 €¤k€ tht? Cast? as indmdual Case? as W? kifow Scme P°°Pl° haw Nonetheless, Leek stalled and asked for a formal complaint naming specific inter- t ‘ not well gfaded We am 50mg K0 mgefhef f°YJu$¤°° m *`fV°TY °aS°· O'·“” 16** preters, but before the case was presented he decided to abolish the position of in- `_ _ WY I0 G¤V€Y¤m5¤¥ about the Omlssmns will be f¤!'W?~fd°‘rx’“l* name Of P€°Pl° terpreter, only to reverse himself several weeks later. The tumabout was in part a t . who Set bad grade, wh¤¤ 1'€¤dY OY MY Othcf W¤Y We likergsplrgisg to the protests of the interpreters who demanded to see evidence of their tr rr In June 1938 when the hostility at the Underground Cotmcir meetings made them ` ` l ineffective, the men took matters into their own hands and followed the pattern of We understood that the Colliery Manager said that Interpreters are receiving i ` collie rotest. Althou the Councils were blocked from encouraging strikes they YY P _ bribes. We beg to know from whom'? We should like to know why we are Q r increasingly used legal redress to press cases of corruption. The Underground treating as un—known workers, Is it right that we should be blamed, when lr j Council sued one C.H. Matthews, a European, and Joseph Okpokwu, his inter-

212 wwe were All Slnvesn ~ " The Calliery rm the Eve afW1r 213 preter, for depriving them of their livelihood alleging that they replaced them with r { ` Siells Elll0Peell Oyellllell had been eenyiered with their iniellireiers ef e°nsPil’eey tb men who had paid bribes. tnus use or whe judicial system to prosecute workplace t s extsrt bribes, but the sehtehees were eemmhted- The Direstbr hed little sympathy corruption was a new tacticr The Council also sent a delegation to Lagos to appeal ‘i rei inierPreiers and eritisized the European sinriiis reluctance in eunnnnie uienii in this Duccmr °f j[mnSp°n‘ Aimed with mmiemus se¤tt¤¤s fmm W°rk°rS= they i i i I understand that these men live in the compounds of the European officers .... l¤{smAsbeie—l”¤ev were Bee l>¤t¤»e“‘v¤¤l¤ei>et¤t·¤¤themeeeslsedtbetsu- ~ here ugruiwotherwherour see that hhy hurhorhy the on has, uprerehr, will gusmie Udc et Uimmgie Udiyand Juseph Okimkwu et Ab°r* Udlt be kept Out °f Q t be entirely lost. This is a principle on which it is not possible to give way in the the mines for making unauthorized dismissals for bribery.ii‘ The complaint claimed y " / snghtcsnm that these interpreters’ actions had been the major grievances for a number of past . _· strikes aud wamgd of rggungnt su-ikss if msy ismuiiisd iii piass}17 ~ .~ It was subsequently revealed that the group had openly defied Leck, who had deAlthough the Councils had violated the procedures laid out in the Evans Agree- " ll-led iilelll leave end Passes te Se re Lsgss When he warned the rnen hist the Di' msu; by cii-sumvsmiiig ms Cuiiisiy msmigsi, ms Dimcmr gf Transport nonetheless E n rector would not decide on their complaints without consulting him, the men merely took seriously the threat that interpreters would be the cause of further strikes. He _ 5 “isugileii end Welli eWaY·”m when ine men renirnen Leek attempted te nre i-ne suggested that they be disbanded hhd assigned to "har·m1ess eterione positions. Lastly, i s delegates, svguiiig that they had dismissed themselves by beihg absent Withsut he put his finger Ou what may have been me hem gf ms maiisi-, ms Way in which . leave. The Director’s response revealed the extent to which he deprecated Leck me Euygpggm uvsi-msu wei-s uiiisu Wim iutspPisisis_ll8 Cisaiiy ms isiiuiiss Ou iiusi-. I and wished to avoid another strike. Saying that while the delegation should have prgtgys had sucuui-ugsd u rglatignshjp of cmivsiiisucs bsiwssii Euyopgan and imsi-. ‘ u obtained formal leave, the fact that they were absent without leave was not inconpreter. The Councils recognized that Europeans were involved in corruption and ` j slslellr Wiril lhe ll0l`¤l9·i beilsyier br men ill r-ile eeiiiery Where e lliell degree br ab" interpreters wielded oonsiderable power in their Agbaja villages. On several occa- , H sellreeism was llerlrlei?

i `Z gg, 4 2].; "Wg Wgyg All $[avg;" T The Calliery cm the Eve of War W {ii`j Ara l understand there are many more men 011 the colliery books than are ever at _ - representative agreed with the ma¤ag€1"S Criticism of the June delegation}? ~ work at the same time, and that these men are in the habit of absenting them- ` claimed that it was a fundamentally Owerrian scheme. if ZZZSSTSZLZUEZZZT§‘§'§2.T§§§2‘E§i.fTiE§§§1Z?tET;l“W”2`l€‘i3fg§T,ZtZ2ZTdaf¤EiZZS§?§ * * ThepettotsmcLagosedWM?We¤¤·PeS¤d#¤¤¤gh*=¢¤m=¤ Mm Q1; ..-¤, position clear to thcmim F ager shows how the·Owemans despised both the Abagas and Colhery Manager. W _ , V [fAba]a want anythmg they will hrst approach the Colliery Ma.nager.m tea; I _Clearly, the Direotor felt that it was more important to prevent a strike than to A " While clan affiliation was undoubmdly important given the persistent links be- ` i gjnftjtjgimegttbjgty ¤fj1g1¤Eag{~;*;¤j;;¤jl;¢ Yes ;;l“b";?;q;“1‘g;‘;¥J“1g V mm mine and Village, it is difficult to determine how much support the Agbaja ¤.;mFOO§$§rp2L‘Is HuZ€§` HEsu§gLmuLE’..§"igri§§’ia§]pE`0ys~~Lili. 2 l Pt°P0S¤1h¤dm¤¤g*h¤m¤m- Butatmtmegmupofegbetmithedemeés ¤ terpreters and established that demands for bribes would be punished by dis- " ` for segregated Workplaces as 3 scheme to penmtconrupmm OfAgbaJaS by Agbala . UA , . . . . 4 , , ~ interpreters. The signatories of the May petition from “Agbaja Pe0ple” attacking m1Ssa1` The mlerpmtcr comllct brought cthvlc clmsmns F0 the foréfmm at a uma Ii P the interpreters were all from Ukana, Ebe, and Amaokwe towns of Agbaj a, but they when the tionneils were proving most effecttve tn attaektug <>0ef¢1V¤ Systfmls (ff ` an nvm in Cglljgry labor camps, They clearly spotted the opportunism of their ¢¤¤¤¤¤*y tv the Workplace- Wwe me Agbata were 2·t*¤d¢ee¤Si_°Wir¤¤¤S» It n l clansmen who manipulated the cm mm ofthe what we do not wm ls unclear if mls mis ll generalized response qt a mampulamm by (alan leédcrs , to make a mechanistic correlation between residence and clan-based behavior, it and resentful Agbaja interpreters. In May, prior to the first temunation of mter- 4 would appear that the experience in the camps removed them from the manipukk tme stm Df ttmgbaiehad d=¤¤¤¤d¤d¤¤=it¤W¤¤*¤¤Sm¤¤ ¤¤ *h¤R¤¤t·=S¤¤· i» ~ tions ofthe village leaders and allowed them me more mm on their mmm tative Council: Moreover, they suggested that they be given a separate workplace as Workersm The mmcs dmmct from the OvZ€manS' }· ` The fragility of clan affiliation was made clear by the people of Ngwo, an AgWe have the honor most respectfully to forward this our humble application be- g ' baja village—group who lost most of their farmland to the mines. Seeing that manfore you. Again to notify you that Agbajie under Colliery Mine wished to have ` V; agement was favorably disposed to clan-based work groups and representation on their own meeting different from Owerre people. And in working place, we Ag- ¤ the Councils, they put forth their demand for Ngwo work districts, supervisors, bajie beg you with honor so that you may look us with money and divied [sic] l t and representation. The Ngwo demands were undoubtedly stimulated by recent remine work section by section, and let Agbajie section get their own working sep- ji organization of the Agbaja Native Court, separating it from that of the other Agarately. Likewise to Owerre let them get their own section differenee."5 y baj a, in an act that apparently authenticated their existence as a distinct group."8 . _ , _ , , , i ·* At the base of the demand la Ngwo’s lon —standin rievance that they had been The amgcmcmi exploited and encouragsd this tyRc_0f dmswc €thm(i1Fy’ an- I I cheated of their land by the fillaudulent "chifs" whogsiggned the original agreement CouewgtheegbataheadmenWhoptoeoted ¤¤S t¤m¤t¤m¤¤¤*¤·-¢y J t with the gommem for me winery, and may have represented their Simeon V°$¤hZed.by*he0?v¢t¤a¤S·Th¤OW·e·"¤¤¤S·¤¤d¤t%e¤d¤b*y»¤P¤¤S¤d¤vy¤¤¤¤¤ it l thattheywould royaltiesforthelands.Theysawjobsintheminesascomrationale m dctmmnmg Worker Status` Bu? the posmon of another Agbaia %mup Q ` pensation for this injustice. In July 1938 G.O. Ugwo, secretary of the Representaasscmd that the proposal for Separate Working Places was a maneuver by the boss t Y tive Council, wrote Leck that the Ngwo workers were still waiting for him to honor mmf, to Exploit their Own Workcm · V his agreement to place two Ngwo miners on the council. They argied that Ngwo Two or three of our headmen often make meeting without our knowledge and _ was the most underrepresented group in the higher positions at the mines and butthey come and speak in favour of Agbqa, witsh we know nothing about the whole 5 I tressed their arguments by asserting that N gwo was not an Agbaja group. mm ~——- If%’i¤dM¤¤¤iSt¤b=¤·¤¤·=mwteu¤Si¤W*·i¤h¤d¤¤*¤=€¤¤¤¤¤¤¤S h We im that the division of work mmm workers ofthe mmm Wn at our head will be? then, have we to have two Managers, one of Agbaja and one ; _: . . . . . . for the other part. Consider this case properly for a great riot will come out if the l Z take place on Monday showing Bach town its Own pm? or position i ' ' In Aha']?. division is being made Those head—mer1 that come to you are planning for an- ~ there are 1436 H°“d“TB“ or Hwds of Laboumrs ctc; and In Owem there are may _ _ ' _ _ _ _ 126 ·. of these kinds mentioned. We have often quoted, and should say, we spoke m other Way of bubmg themselves after the division is mad€' · V many occasions of time that Ngwo is a separate entity, in this regard we mean The demand for separate councils was a call to institutionalize clan cleavages in j 3 that Ngwo is neither Abaja nor Owerri, and can Ngwo go for nothing Ngwo the workforce at a time when clan was a declining category of alliances. The man- » { has no Bosses and so on. Are we late in the Coal held? There are no men of ager agreed to "seriously consider" the proposal and immediately began to com— I argument in this Town, but we now Want to put points after point and arguments municate with the two groups of representatives separately. The Agbaja 4 on argument that Ngwo should with countless reasons have its own foremen of

216 "We Were All Slaves" I The Cvlliery on the Eve of War 217 Lt works, its own Bosses, its own Heads of labourers etc. In the office the Agbaja ·, workin a system called “rostering," after the work roster containing the names of and the Owerri are the only town in which clerks and Interpreters were being en- I workers on a day’s assignment. "Rostering" created a regulated pool of workers gaged; ih Ngwo there is m;.he,1Z9 1 that were trained, although they only worked infrequently and could be engaged . . . { Y ? l l l d d' h I k .*32 Th The separation of Ngwo from Agbaja court was cited as evidence to support the · _; more Or ess regu ar cpm mg on t C Goa mmkct . E Systcin bummed the . . . . tt management by keeping on the books all the qualitied miners, which reduced the claim for separation. The call for N gwo preference and representation was anim- ~ é . . . ,, ,, . . . , time and cost required for new recruitment. The roster gave the state and not portant issue for the miners of that village-group, because they had lost so much . t Eh . . . , . _ _ , » e men control over the composition of the work group. But as workers discovof their land to the colliery and to the forest reserve that was opened in the thirties. tt . . . . . . t. ered how infrequently they would work, they became more disgruntled. In thc last The effort was undoubtedly championed by the Ngwo council in the Native Court. ~ .5 . . _ , _ _ _ _ _ . ·— three months of the year most of the men worked only eight or mne days per month, While there is no written record of direct intervention by the Ngwo councilors, E . . . _ , , _ _ ·, although they had expected that retrenchments would increase their number of there 1S evidence that they attempted to use the courts to enforce solidarity among it r U3 . ,‘ ,, . _ _ working days. Further, posting a roster did not protect the men from new systhe Ngwo rrnners. In August 1937 the Ngwo chiefs attempted to prosecute one . tr . . . , ,_ ,, , _~ tems of fraud and corruption. A group of men petitioned the manager about two miner, Samuel Mba, who had been promoted to boss boy on their recommen· . = h ,, . . . . . . . . boss boys, again Augustine Ude, a former interpreter, and Jacob Amogbo, for dation, but had later refused to support N gwo demands. The incident underscored . 1. - · r. ,. _ _ _ _ _ _ . assigning them to a hard coal face, the claims of several miners that often work-related conflicts spilled over into the V gj villages-"° _ ‘ We members of pick-boys in No. l Coal mine require your visit to our list-board. The clan leaders’ intervention to enforce Ngwo unity was a natural consequence ~ g Our rntentron was that many of ue attend good nlaeee Where they ean nh ef the menegemenfs use ef Native Autheritv effieieie te eemml werkere at the ht least about 10 tube (teh) of een while others who were hated attend to bad mines. The overlapping of political rniiuence in the villages with labor control in [ places where they eannor hh 3 tubs (three) of ooa] before rt was trme_ We ask the mines created an environment in which village leaders assumed that they could `_ ° your honour to take away Mn Jacob Arnogbo from our part, and let mm become lead the werkerf mevemem The eemmdietery positions taken by ve-rieue Seetere · ti erthhary tteveihhg starr; aha put either Mr. Peter or Mr. Methrite ih his instead, of the Owerrian and Agbaja workforce revealed the coniiicting allegiances held by or Mr Amthony [ore] the Starr rake the Whole ohrft}34 the miners, Some disregarded clan affinity and argued against the exploitative in- ` ji terpreters, while others continued to assert that the major contradiction was be- ' Z As war approached, the Colonial Office was less willing to allow Leek to use tween the Owerrian and Agbaja clan groups. But the fragility of clan identity and Z is his old methods of worker consultation and control. The post-depression recovery the capacity for infinite kinship fragmentation was evident in the defection of the ` `_ had generated a frightening rash of colonial labor protests. In both the EnglishNgwo group from the Agbaja position. Even clan cohesion became tenuous when V _; speaking Caribbean and on the Zambian Copperbelt workers with trade unions and the village political leaders lacked the mechanism to enforce it. It could be possi- , ; without launched a wave of strikes that came dangerously close to challenging the ble that in segmentary societies such as the Igbo, the possibilities of fragmentation Q existence of colonial rule and property relations of capitalist production. In Jamaica are infinite and could theoretically break down to the base of the household unit ‘ an unions attacked the existing system of land ownership}35 In Zambia workers ator extended family. , tacked Europeans and went on a rampage at the mine site. These strikes moved beThe entire dispute over the interpreters, the charges and countercharges by the i' { yond workers’ actions and became broad militant populist movements that made Agbajas and Owerrians, and the Council’s relatively successful struggle to become L { political demands on the colonial government.““ The dangers of the alliance bea functioning organ within the constellation of forces at the colliery led the man- “ _' r tween colonial workers and an independence movement with leaders whose poager to suspend the Underground Council in late 1938. He had written in July of ‘ _l, litical motivation often iiirted with communism, provided the stimulus for a more his frustration as the entire system collapsed into a series of suits and countersuits: o serious consideration of imperial labor policy. "Personally, I think this Underground Council has gone too far and I propose to _ ] The eminence of war reinforced the Colonial Office’s responsibility to moddismiss them as a Council for this season.""‘ By the end of 1939 the colliery, de- P g emize labor policy. These initiatives were a demonstration to the private sector, spite the many efforts at reform, was nonetheless tottering on the brink of another . which often Created meSSy social Crises in their myopic quest to maximize profits, wave of worker action. With improvement being made in the camps, the men began ~ ? and to colonial subjects who now, more than ever, needed proof of the benefits of to feel the impact of yet another new system which nonetheless kept redundant ,` vt continued British rule. In Enugu, as elsewhere, the policy involved a number of workers on the books. The management did not continue the series of retrench- Z initiatives. On the one hand, there were modest improvements in urban living and ments begun in 1938. Instead of reducing the size of the workforce, the colliery . working conditions in the colonies to diffuse discontent. Colonial labor experts ascomplied with the request of the Iva Valley miners in August to allow them to share t " sumed that by acculturating African workers to the industrial and urban environ-

218 “We Were All Slaves" l T l The Colliery on the Eve of War 219 ment they could create a disciplined working class capable of reaching increased Y ‘ at any organization introduced by the management. During the war, they would conlevels of pr0ductivity.1" On the other hand, ofiicials nonetheless developed more ‘ tinue to struggle to be treated as modem industrial men. This time their struggle elaborate schemes to thwart the activism ofthe colonial working cmss}38 After the g ; would pit them against the colonial state with tragic consequences. last series of West Indian riots.‘3° the Labour Party successfully got the Tory gov- i = ernment to bring the British Trade Union Congress (TUC) into the main policy- ` · making body on imperial labor policy—the Colonial Labor Advisory Committee, ,l { NOTES a tripartite organization with members of the Colonial Office, the TUC, and over- " ; L NRUCAK 1933/34_ seas employers’ federations. "‘° The Congress proved especially cooperative in en- ’ ` 2_ NNAE Onpmf 1/32/1 10_ =·Oni,sha provinces Annual Repm for 1931 _·· Coumging aP°mica1 trade ¤¤i¤¤s, and even Seconded their members as Colon-la] j ` 3. Richard Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties: Power in an Emergent African Nation agents to be labor advisors to many ofthe colonies to oversee the creation of "re~ . j (Princeton, 1963), 165-67. sponsible" colonial trade unions.*‘“ ` ' 4. NNAE, UDDIST 3/1/5, "Divisional Annual Report: Udi Division, l937," 9. In order to insure the levels of production needed to supply sufticiem colonial `s` ·; 5. In my interviews in the "unofficial" camps of Ugwu Alfred and Ugwu Aatron reresources for the war the workforce had to become stabilized and made more pro- A ` $P0¤d€¤¥$ ¤mPha¥i¤¤HY §¥a'Q€d that they did mt aH°W "“’§ditl°“?1” "“l°*'S [0 esmbhsh any ductive. Stabilization, if handled reasonably, could avoid proletarianization, a pro- T l °°““°I Wm?} i:m‘1"[gf;‘ §"2"§r1t";°g;" Stated ‘ the mmm always me fm d°` · · · - - - 1 . ~ ocrac . n erview in ¤wa e , u . Sess tha nlany in the COMM] Omcc Vlewcd Wm? f°reI?°dmg' At Enugu this mam ~ m 6. 0);] the Copperbelt, gee rm Phimiszeritnmiy African Leadership: The coppenmr msmsmllmg which created a abor pool from Whlch dluly Workers could bg drawn T turbances of 1935 and l940." Journal of Southern African Studies 2 (1975): 83-97; Ibid., according to requirements Without completely scpamtmg the men from their fm`ms‘ V "Wage-Eamers and Political Protest in Colonial Africa: The Case ofthe Copperbe1t,"Afiican To control urban overcrowding officials had decided to recruit locally from the ad- A ; Affairs 57 (1973): 288_99. Charles Pcn,mgS_ Black Mineworkeys in CMM; Afma, I,,du,_ jacent Agbaja villages. Nonetheless, the city grew by 400 percent during the wwr, . r mag strategies and the Evolution 0f¢mAfnm¤ Prolemriaz in the Copperbelr 1922-41 (Lencmating a Social Problem that Subiested urban Workers, lives tu more gowmmem ` don, 1979). On the British Caribbean, see Arthur Lewis, Labour in the West Indies: The attempts at control and monitoring. But this new population entered au increas- r li smh afs W0rker.r’M0vement (London, 1977); Ken Post, "Arise Ye spmzmgm The Juingly radicalized city. New immigrants were socialized into city life by the l i muican Labour Rebellion of 1938 and its Aftermath (The Hague, 1978). improvement unions (sO.ca]]ed "·qjba]" union;) in whjgh the 1-estjvg cle;-[ca] pgp. ` ; .i 7. Agwu Akpala, "Background1o the Enugu Colliery Shooting Incident in 1949." Jour- ' ulation played a crucial leadership role. Their significance in generating discon- ‘ Ml Uflhe Hismricffl Society 0fNi§”i” 3· 2 (1965)* 343tent was enhanced in 1938 when the city became the regional capital of I §;?5$;]‘;‘;f; :)?(rE'j;;l;;@:* ¥iE';h§2§E2'ii?.1g§§‘.iY.?iEt§‘1$2lgJ§‘§€Z§1L?ZI.$.’3f§L°3§‘§§iZ‘E§£§§.ZZ";'fT§F $232 A t if1‘;*$d@I;‘s“;£;;Sj;;'”°“°“l·"L‘”’°'”’L€T’“”“”“ Grieg 1988>ie4» Warl with the inequities in colonial life that pulled them between the expectations ` _ 12; Aniaimn [gba Am: 30 ' of a westernized elite and the harsh racial realities of the life of a native civil ser- ` 13_ During this pmicumly volatile period of Worker umm, following the economic rg vm- This diS¤<>¤l¢¤t msds the slerks 1>iv¤¤¤1 players iu the risius fvrms ¤f 1¤<>1i¤i- ' 5 covery from the depression, a European mmm known as img ··mhsi impetuous with cal agitation on the eve of war, Given their interactions with the city’s workers in [ the »bOys~~— was Charged in com with slapping gng ofthe leaders of me Nzukg and the Rep. the improvement unions and the rising levels of nationalist discourse, they were _. 1 reseritgtive Council. The magistrate was disgusted that the case was taken seriously, but , bound to have an influence on the many govemrnent workers in railway, colliery ` t under instmctions ofthe Secretary of the Southern Proxdnces, had to levy a (ine against the , and other Employment amas_ . E "boss." ONDIST l2/1/1562, Manager to Transport, 6 July 1938. In the mines, managerial control had been considerably compromised by a her-- ` , ' 14. Among other things the Councils hired a Yomba lawyer in Lagos no represent them itage of corruption, neglect, and incompetence. Now, with legislative provisions to > ? ;;?5°¤i;g>?;i¥;;§;m¤ Tm¤SP°¤ D¤’€°*°m*°— me 8°"°mm°“m ¤8°“°Y mal S“P°""S°d me i§5ZE§i§ZiZ£$§Z1$i?;I;1'§2?§§§ 2222"$~L2i}‘£§TZ§2‘§;Z?t‘2§..“.Z§§§T§§;Z22}? · i 15—“émr»e1»¤Re¤·“ue¤¤¤¤=¤¤=m¤<»·e~··S¤·»¤-¤~"57— , ` . . l . . . ’ s . 16. The "butty" is a master hewer who contracts with the colliery owner to mine a parlerrsd ¤¤¤ede¤blv with **¤¤NZ~’<¤· hsdlm d1Sm¤¤¤¤d· bums r¤=bs*·1·= M T = ticulararea mmm pm. He msn rings in his M workcrew M they mm the mi they Continued to meet infomlauy The attempt to replace the Nzuka with g°Vcm` i under his supervision. The pay is by the tonnage and given to the master hewer who in tum ¤¤e¤¢-·=¤d¤rS¤d¤¤¤¤¢¤Sh¤<1f¤¤¤d¢¤S¤bS¤m¤¤¤¤i=rv uml-F¤¤¤¢¤r·b=¤¤¤S¤¤1¤v ; . pays me work mm. In Yorkshire this red to many abuses. ses Dsugiass, —·pmikmc0¤my were not worker controlled, the men only showed them guarded support. The clan L Durhamy 309_ righting that proved so divisive would not succeed in breaking workers solidarity `· g 17. co 5831263/30544, coimnai oem Press section, "M0de1Villages romrncan Mauwhen the war began. However, the underground workers would look suspiciously ` i ers," ll May 1943. M

220 "We Were All Sloves" J V The Colliery on the Eve of War 221 18. Croasdale, “Enugu Colliery," 55. capital expenditure from its revenue under the heading of "Special Expenditure? There 19. Ibid., 7. ` was no renewals account so the depreciation of plant and machinery was estimated by the 20. NIGCOAL 2/1/94, Colliery Manager to Director of Transport, 20 June 1938. : , government in its review in June. Finally, while the costs of African employees’ Provident 21. See discussion in Chapter 1. ` Fund were included in expenditure figures, the funds for European pensions, a substan22. Judith Van Allen, "‘Sitting on a Man’: Colonialism and the Last Political Institutions # . tially larger sum, were absent. CO 583/216, Report of Acting Colliery Manager to Coloof Igbo Women," Canadian Journal ofAfrican Studies 6, 2 (1972): 168-81. ` . nial Administration, 8 June 1937, Appendix A, enclosure in Bourdillon to Orrnsby—Gore, 23. In the Udi area there were reports for both Nkanu and Agbaia regions. See NNAE L · 24 June 1937. OP/1070, "Agban.i-Akpugo," Beaumont. ’ V 47. Maybin in the Colonial Oftice noted that profit might have been slightly less than the 24. There are many theories as to the cause of his death. Some claim that he was being ,§ ` figures if calculated using the system of commercial enterprises. However, clearly there was investigated for a murder while others say he was despondent because of his demotion. At ` { sufficient surplus to permit a wage increase. Ibid., Maybin to Ormsby-Gore, 24 June 1937. any rate he died as dramatically as he lived. He shot himself in the mouth while traveling V ' 48. Croasdale noted that the "boss boys" were resented by the men and seldom interacted on a train. Onyeama, Chief Orzyeama, 123-26. Also see file CSO 26/1 for the accusations ‘· Y with them socially. They were called Nduku or "Big Man." Croasdale, "Enugu Colliery." of his involvement in several murders. f j 49. See Supple, History ofthe British Coal Industry, Chap. 11. 25. Croasdale, "Enugu Col1iery." i· 50. Ibid.; CO 583/216 Orrnsby—Gore Minute, 26 April 1937. 26. See Chapter 1. This included title societies, many wives, etc. · V 51. Cooper, Decolonization and African Society, 61-62. 27. UDDIST 3/1/4, "Circular from the Secretary of State to the O.A.G.," 9 November Q 52. In the original draft he had written "some" concern, but he crossed this out and wrote 1935; Bourdillon to Ormsby-Gore, 1 October 1936. Y ` "considerable." CO 583/216, Ormsby-Gore to Bourdillon, 13 May 1937. 28. UDDIST 3/1/1. 1931, 17. Q e 53. Ibid., J. Sidebotham Minute, 20 April 1937. 29. Annual Report on the Colliery Department for the Year 1938. .. 54. Ibid. 30. For an attack from the left (British Communist Party), see J ack Woodis, The Mask is V Z 55. Croasdale, "Enugu Col1iery," 40-11. Of? An Examination oft/1eActivities of Trade Union Advisers in the British Colonies, (Lon- 2 ` 56. Professional letter writers were a critical element in the multifaceted strategies of don, 1954). —V urban colonial workers. They were somewhat like paralegals, having some knowledge of 31. Although the cornrnittee was only established in 1942, infomral meetings had been ”‘ = the laws and assuming the role of community protectors for both villages and urban groups. held in the colonial office since 1931 to discuss labor policy. The documentation is avail- ~» ·` Several of them frequently wrote petitions of this period: J. Beresford Jarrett, whose name able in the Public Records Office, Kew Gardens, England. File series CO 323/1117 and CO i 9 appears on several of these petitions and wrote for slave ohu cornmunities from Nkanu dur888/ 1. Files CO 888/2-11 contain the documents of the committee. . ing this same period, and M.O. Ogbenika. NIGCOAL 2/1/94, See letters #1, 7, 9, 10. Dis32. UDDIST 3/1/4, "Udi District Annual Report l936." _ . trict Officers complained bitterly of the "number of semi—literate youth who, rather than 33. Unfortunately, Smock does not identify the respondent. Smock, "Village to Trade V retum to hard manual work, set themselves up in the profession of letter-writer." NNAE, Union," 125. `_ ONPROF 1/32/110, "Onitsha Province Annual Report 1931." 34. CO 583/216, According to Govemor B0urdillon‘s report to Orrnsby-Gore on 3 April, . , i 57. Major G. St. J. Orde Browne, Labour Conditions in West Africa, Cmd. 6277 (Lon1937. " V don, 1941). 35. Ibid. V —; 58. NIGCOAL 2/1/94, Letter from Colliery Department, Iva Valley to the General Man36. Ibid. ‘ ager, Railway, Lagos, 12 July 1937 and Colliery Manager. 37. Ibid., Bourdillon to Ormsby-Gore, 20 March 1937. ` 2 59. Ibid. 38. Ibid., 3 April 1937. " i 60. This infonnation followed a survey of the camps during the period of labor force sta39. Ibid. ‘ bilization in 1939. CO 583/237, Bourdillon to MacDonald, 30 August 1939. 40. Croasdale, "Enugu Colliery,” 36-37. j ’ 61. Ibid., "Petition from the Southem Native Location, Enugu Township to the Colliery 41. Ibid. , " Manager, Colliery Department, Enugu through the Under Manager, Iva Valley Coal Mine, 42. Ibid. I I Enugu," 21 August 1937. 43. Ibid. ` _ . 62. Ibid., "Letter from Colliery Department Iva to Colliery Manager, Enugn1," 30 August 44. NIGCOAL 2/1/94, Minute of Meeting, Port Harcourt with Surface and Underground _ 1937. ` Representatives, 9 November 1937. ` 63. Ibid., "Letter from Colliery Department, Iva Special Headmen to Colliery Manager, 45. United Mine Workers of America (UMWA), Proceedings, 1927 Convention, 442-45, V Enugu," 30 August 1937. cited in Keith Dix, Whats a Coal Miner to Do ?: The Mechanizotion of Coal Mining, (Pitts- g ` 64. Ibid. burgh, 1988), 165. c . 65. Ibid., "Letter from 'I`ub Headmen, Iva to Colliery Manager, Enugu," 31 August 1937. 46. The mines’ books also showed ineptitude and outdated accounting methods. Rather f 66. Ibid. than using a costing system which would permit a more accurate calculation of the fiscal ` ~ 67. Akpala, “AfTIC3.|'1 Labour Pr0dl.l¤tivity," 236. status of the colliery, a simple receipts expenditure system was used. The mine had to meet i ` 68. Ibid.

222 “We Wwe All Slnvgy . ‘ · The Calliery an the Eve of War 223 69. Croasdale, "Enugu Colliery," 70. . V 99. Nigerian Coal Corporation (NCC), New No. 1, “F. D. Evans: Complaints and Peti70. Lawrence Amukenebe of Ebe, Agbaia, chairman of the Haulage and Tubboy Nzuka, ` tions by Collieiy Employees," 2 February 1938. ` was slapped by a European "boss." ONDIST 12/1/1562, Manager to Transport, 6 July 1938. , 100. Ibid. 71. This study has been a key source for infomation on early worker collective action as — 101. Ibid. well as details on the labor camps. See Croasdale. "Enugu Colliery." A series of such stud- , 102. Ibid. ies was made of every village-group in southeastern Nigeria following the Women‘s War `Z V 103. Ibid. of 1929. See Van Allen, "Sitting on a Man." Q 104. CO 583/237/30046/21, D.RJ. O’Connor, "Colliery Labour General Reorganization," 72. Frederick Cooper, "Urban Space, Industrial 'I`ime, and Wage Labor in Africa." In The 1; . ¤¤¤1¤S¤f€ iii B01-11'di110¤ to MacDonald, 30 August 1939. Struggle for the City: MigraniLab0x Capital and the State in Urban Africa, edited by Fred- ,» 1 105. CO 583/233/30037, Sidebotham minute, 8 February 1938. erick Cooper, 35. Beverley Hills: 1983. . — 106. Ibid. 73_ Crgagdglg, "Enugu Cgllieryf 70, » . 107. NIGCOAL 2/1/94, F.R James to Chief Secretary, Lagos, 7 February 1938. 74. Ibid. I ` 108. NIGCOAL 2/1/94, "Meeting of the Underground Council," 29 June 1938. Memo75. Croasdale, "Enugu Colliery,” 53. N » randum from Director of Transport to Colliery Manager, 22 July 1938. 76. Ibid., 50. `· , 109. NIGCOAL 2/1/98, Underground Interpreters to Colliery Manager. 77. Federal Ministry of LabourArchives, Yaba, Lagos, Nigeria (hereafter FMLA), Labour e, 110. Ibid., "Meeting of the Underground Counci1," 29 June 1938. Ministry Files, no. 3, vol. 4, Croasdale to CM, 17 September 1938. .` _ 111. Ibid., "Meeting of the Surface Council," 5 May 1938. 78. CO 583/232/30331/K/3, Bourdillon to Orrnsby-Gore, enclosure in D.RJ. O’Connor, W 112. The Was the same man in the assault case that caused the lightning strike in sep. "Colliery Labour General Reorganization? . . tember. 79. CO 583/237/30046, Governor Bourdillon to MacDonald, 30 August 1939. ·, 113. NIGCOAL 2/1/94, Ogunyemi Ajose to Transport, 6 July 1938. 80. Range housing was a line of single {coms, each with an entrance on a common porch. 1 , 114- NIGCOAL 2-/1/98, “Grievance of the Underground Council," 14 June 1938, Kitchens and bathroom facilities, rudimentary, open sewers, were usually detached in the ‘_, . 115. Ibid. Memorandum, 8 June 1938. back. . 116. NIGCOAL 2/1/94, Director of Transport to Colliery Manager, 12 July 1938; "Mem81. CO 583/266/30046, Govemor to Orrnbsy-Gore, 27 January 1938. , orandum,“ 8 June 1938. 82. CO 583/216/30046/12, Govemor to Ormsby-Gore, 24 June 1937; CO 583/227, Bour— , 117. Ibid. dillon to MacDonald, 30 August 1938; CO 583/216, Ormsby-Gore to Bourdillon, 9 August I 118. There Was at least one court case implicating a European supervisor and inteypyergn 1937; Akpala, "Colliery Shooting," 324. . V Au ex-tubman, Eugene Onu of Ebe, Agbqa, claimed £100 damages against C.E. Matthews, 83. Michael Burawoy, The Politics 0fProducti0n, 226. Q t underground supervisor of all colliery operations and his interpreter Augustine Ude of 84. Ibid., 236. ` . Umagua, Udi, for depriving his work gang employment in the spring of 1938. NIGCOAL 85. NIGCOAL 2/1/94, Colliery Manager to Director, Transport, 20 June 1938. · 2/1/94, DO Enugu to Secretary, Southem Provinces, Enugu, 9 August 1938. 86. ONDIST 3/1/5, "Udi Division Annual Report for 1937." 119. Ibid., Director of Transport to CM, 22 June 1938. 87. CO 583/229/30159, Bourdillon to Ormsby-Gore, 2 March 1938. Kerr was a particu- ~ 120. Ibid., Director to CM, 8 June 1938. larly abusive supervisor. In 1940 "boss boys” accused him of making false charges against Q 121. Ibid., CM to Director, 20 June 1938. them and "slapping and knowking (sic) us in the mind and disgracing us in many other re- f 122. Ibid., CM to Director, 17 June 1938, spectsd." NIGCOAL 2/1/126, "Boss-Boys to Colliery Manager," 6 January 1940. ‘ · 123. Ibid., Director to CM, 4 July 1938. 88. See Croasdale, "Enugu Colliery,” for a list of members, 30-32. V _ 124. Ibid. 89. Uchendu The Igbv ofSuuthea.tt Nigeria, 90-91. _ i 125. NIGCOAL 2/1/98, Joseph E. Ekowa et al., to CM, no date, May(?) 1938. 90. Croasdale, "Enugu Col1iery," 29-30. ~ I ' ' 126. Ibid., Agbaja People to CM, no date. 91. See earlier discussion in Chapter 1. { € 127. NIGCOAL 2/1/94, "Meeting of the Underground Council," 29 June 1938. 92. Croasdale, "Enugu Colliery," 32-33. _· , 128. CSE 1/85/6411, "Intelligence Report on the Ngwo Clan of Agbaja Area, Udi Divi93. Ibid., 33. . I sion, Onitsha Province," H.J.S. Clark, Assistant DO, 1933. ` 94. NIGCOAL 2/1/94, "Representat.ion and Deputations from Surface/Underground Col- ` i 129. NIGCOAL 2/1/98, Ngwo Town through Under Manager to Manager, Enugu, 10 liery Staffs," 9 November 1937. J June 1938. 95. reid. . 130. NIGCOAL 2/1/94, CM to DO Um, 20 July 1933, 96. NIGCOAL 2/1/94, Director of Transport, "Minutes of Meeting at Pt. Harcourt with A < 131. Ibid., CM to Director, 22 July 1938. Surface and Underground Representatives? 9 November 1937. L 132. N.C.C. Files, R 1/9, O’Connor to Secretary, Southern Provinces, 6 September 1939. 97. NIGCOAL NII94, CM to Dir. of Transport, 20 January 1938. ` 133. UDDIST 3/1/7, "Udi District Annual Report for 1939." 98. NIGCOAL 2/1/94, Transport to Leck, 6 July 1938. . ‘; 134. Ibid., Pickboys to Underground Manager, Iva Mine, 15 September 1939.

224 "We Were All Slaves " ' = 135. Peter Weiler, "Forming Responsible Trade Unions: The Colonial Ofrice, Colonial , 6 Labor, and the Trades Union Cong·ress," Radical History Review 28-30 (1984): 370; KW.J. Q Post, "The Politics of Protest in Jamaica: Some Problems of Analysis and Conoeptualiza- ~ tion,” in Peasants und Prolemrians: The Struggles of Third World Workers, ed. Peter ‘· Gutkind, Robin Cohen, and R Brazier (New York, 1970). 136. On the Caribbean, see A. Lewis, Labour in the West Indies, and Post, "Arise Ye ` . T Starvlings." On Zambia, see Charles Perrings, "Consciousness, Conilict, and Proletarian- ` S ization: An Assessment of the 1935 Mineworkers’ strike on the Northem Rhodesian Cop- V, perbelt," Journal of Southern African Studies 4, 1 (1977); Ibid., Black Mine Workers in _ g g 7 ’ , cam: Africa (London, 1979). ; i . 137. Frederick Cooper, “From Free Labor to Family Allowances," 753. ` . 138. Weiler, "Fonning Responsible Trade Unions," 371. ` 139. Sir Waiter Citrine was appointed to the Royal West Indian Commission, and during *1 ~ I I S , his visit to Jamaica, made acquaintance with Alexander Bustamante, the Jamaican nation- it » ’ alist and trade union leader. Under Bustamante’s aegis t.he TUC pressed the Colonial Of- { lice over the conditions of colonial labor. In their annual congress in 1938, they discussed i_ . Q H S colonial labor conditions and passed a resolution that the Colonial Office pressure govem— j, ments to introduce trade unions, collective bargaining machinery, and improve labor con- , S ditions. They touched on political issues by asking the govemrnent to "give natives · P A responsibilities in government by extending the franchise and adopting . . . democratic prin- ~ 4 · O I C ciples.” CO 323/ 1536/1751 "Resolution Put Down for Discussion at the 70th Annual Con- ` gress of the TUC, to be Held at Blackpool, September 5-11, l938." Q ` M 1 9 4 O- 1 9 4 140. See Frederick Cooper, "Rethinking Social Policy: Colonial Bureaucrats and African ' O F T S Labour in the Age of Decolonization," unpublished paper, 1990. The Conunittee’s docu- < ‘ mentation is in PRO, CO 888. 1 , 141. For a communist critique of this practice, see J ack Woodis, The Mask Is O]? ‘ l k Please note that in [the] future the designation "men" must be substituted for 4 . "boys" in all communications referring to the Colliery labour either collecJ I ` tively or individually. No person employed by this department must be ad` .4 dressed as "boy.“l 2 *‘ —Announcement by Colliery Manager, 23 DBC¢mb€1' 1941 ` V Y The governments which ruled French West Africa and British Africa during · the early war years had one characteristic in common: both were planmng for . ‘ futures that did not exist. _ _ 3 ‘ I —Frederick Cooper, Decolonizarion and African Society A Britain declared war in September 1939 but it was not until 1940 when Italy’sdeck laration for Germany closed the Mediterranean route to the Middle East and Asia 4- that Nigeria was drawn directly into the tight for the very survival of England. ‘ ` When France’s West African governors declared for the Vichy government, the ex\ _ ception being Felix Eboue, the West Indian governor of Chad who supported free V ` France, Britain’s colonies, Nigeria, the Gold Coast, and Sierra Leone, were the ‘ only secure territories from which military operations could be launched in the

226 "% Mrs All Slaves" The Politics of "Pmductivity" 227 Egzdggzégxoxziizgégémzii §;;1:;;sS;;;;I;;r;;E;a;F§:l;nm§g;;at}L$ Al- ,` the shell of Britishvindustrialhrelations institutions and processes—i.e;, trade unions, ian economy and society, which shafpened the contradictions 0% coloniil rhiirf ~ collective bmglmg md disp}-HCS pmC€dules_d1StO¥tBd by colomal autliommxk At the ccmcl. of these changes and Bmaids involvement in Nigeria was the ·— i anism. Thus unions were legalized but required to register, and laws specified the cmitmcm and Control Of Nigerian labor. Thousands of Ni man me d *5 S J procedures of wage bargaining but locked in strike prohibitions. The right of workwere Pulled mm the massive constmcmm projects that 1; Ht and n· _W€:im§¤r r _ ers to select their own representatives, a precondition for effective unions, was {adds, Constructed bmacks, roads, harbors and muwa S AH the mzjm ml? am r x _ practically nonexistent as trade union leaders were often targeted by the state. For Pmenccd population explosions with Enuéu gmwin y46O crccncilloigggs €X· J, v` example, Michael Imoudu of the Railway Workers Union was summarily arrested demand for labor both stimulated and undermined foid rolcluctiol `alll The wil i and dcpoqcd when he attempted E0 wd a Job Protest. Other? hke the·°°1hery S raPid urbanization of the civilian Populadon and the statiollling of tluilusanflls ofrme * in l most °hmSmm° leader, Isaiah Ojlyl, were subjected to summed Offma] harassit ersonnel ex ande _ li · mem pggmanu becalinc HL;?;;§la;1;;;lf;;O;’1Ctill§g Iggggg l;Ed;ci9I23EL?1“Eu The P50- p, Between 1941 and 1943 Nigerian workers, particularly in Lagos, challenged fisOf the Expanding labor market caused manpower shma es inyihc a l isttgacnons ` cal policies that restricted imports, Hxed depressed prices of agr0—exportS, created 0my_ This in mmtmnslatéd imo swam food Shortages thi la ed ggiud? icon' g ° food shortages, and froze wages. The state responded aggress1vely,w1th legislaWith imported foodstuffs in Short Supply md normal [rage igtwo k tc C0 WY- y V tion that c1rcumscribedworkers’ rights to strike, persecuted workers leaders, and these Shortages further exacerbated the inflationary Spiral confmn S “:)°"mPmd· , . burdened the functioning of trade umons. These laws, collectively known as the ers. It was only E mmm of time before urban Workers were ushcd tg UF an Vg¤1'k· , ‘ 1 Nigerian Defense. Regulations, rapidly provoked resistance by the most organized economic conditions, a fact being watched with dread by tl1IeColom;f}COff§;; gse Sectors of th? nauolfs Wqrklpg class- Rmlway Workers and gmicmlnmlt °mpl°¥` The previous chapter outlined the tentative changes in colonial labor olic — ccs engaged m S°V°l&l agmlmms between 1941 and 194; Culmmatmg In 1945 lp which recognized the social nature of colonial labor. But under the strain gf y V I a 50`day g€n€m1·Sml<€ which bmugklt me Ccmeomy to ul knees- However, mm] these timid measures barely Papered SVU the deep Stmcmml mblc nh War ·‘ 1945 the new legislation secured relative peace in the coal industry. But there were colonial peoples and splitting colonial society. Nloreover Ni errils Eh) Ommg if ?y many Signs of dlscontclm Confhct Empmcl on Scvcml flows: foams Fight lo Work ment Proved Particularly inePt in answering the Political challenge ir 'G gov?-H- J ` und€r.“mstcrmg’” agamst cusklnjmry racist Systems of mfiusmal F1“°‘Ph“°· for by the nascent nationalist movement. It made few political com; S, clnglflccd C ` wage increases, to secure recogmtion of worlcers’ organizations, for improvements the Nigerian people professed their loyalty to the Ames Sem scvemlslilonsimd olugh —` in conditions underground, etc. But the conhrct that would plunge the mdusify into Sand mm to bank in the Middle East, Ethiopia, and Bimm supplicduggdcuitggi Q 4 1ts most severe wartime crisis would occur when a new manager altered the orgaand mineral exports at low prices, and voluntarily contributed more than £100 000 I ’ mzamm pf Work and the systcmfof pay. 4 th b to the war. Government insensitivity to the Nigerian people was ex ressed in it ll ` For miners the dem-édatlons O th? War °°°m°dJuSt as Sy scam? more aware refusal to Evan appoint any Nigcriém personnel to the Nigerian Ak SPH d E _ S ~` . of the Struggles of British and American coal miners. The war emphasized the comTraining Scheme or the Royal Air Force. When nationalists demang 31 Hkgmc R i momlucs of ma} mmmg `lh°m°r In Engliuid Or Nlgmlh and th? lvm Were?/an what benefits Nigeria would receive after the war Governor Bourdill S fil Olv i l more 1m€r€SF€d m how thgui Wages, comlmons pf Service, wld hvmg commons responded “Sm,ViVaL,,5 In Nigeria, as throughout khc Empire umn 05; PHS} J ` compared with those of British and American miners. Increasingly, they behaved new bottles failed to stop the inevitable surge for Political Partigipatign Thlevdeli ln 2 as pm of an lnmmmqnal brotherhood, 8 br°th°fh°°d of mmcrs agutcly aware that tiques were alive in Enugu where nationalist politics {flourished among restless am; Tl they Pmdu?6d th? Pmiuly energy r°s°°r?° for the Imwlls mung the war- peimcd govcmmcm Employees. · 8 J y l spite iiloniali racial pohies tgeset coigipansons casne easily girth the information E · . . . . 4 _ _ y » avai a e in e wire ess roa cas s o govemmen propagan a. COiilcs;V;}£1;f;utl;$;lp:;;1gip§pl;;:g?;; éxgi ;;l;t;1€r;1;sS;lr*;1d1sarray at the ep i; Between 1939 and 1942 the cost of living increased 75r percent in Nigeria. The Over, the one organization mar represented me miners’ interests meliim? More- 1 ` ?°“ “““°“ °“d“‘°d l°W ‘”*‘g°S’ d°pl°“*"1S “°‘¥s“?g °°“"‘“°“S· md Wm ‘“°"’“?‘ Representative Council, had been disbanded by management P;ut warn erlgilgimd A n ji mgly unakflc to Save resource? to Fnlnsfcr to their Vlllagcs for “dcV€1OPmcnl" Prolmandated some type of worker representation and a reluctant adrninistrafiglli wolillld `l V EFS} In this Way, the ccqnormfl cnsls threatened than role as m°d°m`Z°ls In than accede to the Colonial Office demand that it establish the ind t ’ f ~ 3 Ymagc md as Pammhs In than- homes-Noncmclcgsl they made cxuraorfimarll Saclmi(mS_ Us rv S ust trade g nfices to build schools, educate their children, and improve health care in their vilThe ·· ·» . . . _ ‘ Y lages because they could see a future. But to construct it, they had to struggle for and the 1;;; ·Y;;;;;;?§ln;;Hé;"i0l;E§1°g%a; W;rk°; Bad not Yet b°°°f¤ d€¥f`¢1`¤11Ited § the income to lay its foundation. This expenditure, which was never included in 4 ce um e along, experimentmg with t ` any ofthe govemment’s assessments of the "cost of living," implicitly challenged

228 WW Vlkre All Slave.r" j i The Politics of "Pmducriviry" 229 British assumptions that Africans were incapable of conceptualizing, let alone ex- :* ~ putes procedures, and mandated various forms of consultation. The chapter deecuting, their own model of development? While authorities recognized that the _` Q scribes this difficult period in which workers struggled to retain their prominent workers were putting a tremendous amount of energy into "improvement"—both e positions as "modem" industrial men. of self and cornrnunity-—-the state felt that only the government had a coherent plan i. for the future. ; _ Although weakened by restrictive laws, newly established colliery trade unions ELI;:,;/VQ WORKING CLASS exploited provisions of the new labor legislation to engage in a discourse on their j rights as working men, as subjects of the Crown, and as loyal supporters of the im- Like the working class throughout Nigeria, the men at the colliery were profoundly perial war effort. They astutely continued to manipulate tensions among the lay- r affected by the war both economically and ideologically. They watched the vicissi— ers of the state on social and labor policy to leverage more power. They raised these tudes of Britain in the early years of the war when the German Blitzkrieg dumped issues in a series of disputes during World War H, which led the state to circum— [ 20,000 tons of bombs, killing 42,000 and injuring 50,000.7 The men’s realization of vent the management and to further force a comprehensive transformation of col- “ _ the vulnerability of England further underscored the strategic importance of their liery labor regulations. Many of these changes intensified earlier interventions into { · labor to the survival of the metropolitan state and undermined the myth of British the social dimension of workers’ lives—the composition of the African family. ` ” superiority. From June 1940 until June 1941 Britain could only stand alone against Would men with several wives be allowed to occupy government housing? What — Germany with U.S. help} She had exhausted most of her hard currency reserves purcf other relatives who compose the extended family? Or would they have to ac-. i ` chasing war materiél from the United States. Conditions worsenedin 1941 when the cept the model of the nuclear family to have access to modem housing built for lf 4 German invasion of the Soviet Union gave the Japanese an opportunity to push to workers during the war'? the south in Asia. And in the summer of 1941 they entered Indochina, threatening The war intensified management’s determination to force the colliery’s workers i ‘ Britain’s access to Malay’s rich rubber and tin resources and the oil reserves in North to attain production targets needed to support England. Industrial struggles at the i Bomeo and Brunei. By January 1942 the threat had become a reality and Singapore colliery pitted a working class staggering under the weight of spiraling inflation ~ 5 fell, followed soon thereafter by Malaya, the Philippines, and the Dutch East Indies. against a management intent upon ending its traditions of militance. The nexus of ’ The Japanese occupied Burma and threatened India. This gave Japan three-fourths this conflict was productivity—a seemingly objective calculation that measured ~ of the world’s rubber, two—thirds of its tin and enough oil for its needs.° By the late the ratio of output against the number of workers. But it was precisely the decep- ‘* ' summer of 1942 the future of the British war effort looked very grim. tive nature of this simple calculation that led Enugu’s miners to wage their most W It was in this context of savage bombing raids, humiliating defeats at the hands intense struggles against the industry. In doing so, they revealed their recognition Q; of the non-white Japanese, and the rapid depletion of the treasury that officials in of those production conditions impacting output that were under their control and _ , the Colonial Office searched for a policy to increase colonial labor productivity those that were under control of management. The state still used as an index the , r V and prevent collective worker action. Propaganda became an important instrument deceptive output figures before 1938 when the tonnage of a work-group was at- { r for the extremely complex task: to secure the loyalty of colonial subjects without tributed to a single hewer. Such eschewed measurements of current production ii if making major concessions to the most vocal critics—the nationalists. For the first were politically advantageous for securing state support. Thus, it was to manage- ' time, wartime propaganda emphasized colonial peoples' importance to the impement’s advantage to define productivity as narrowly as possible, ignoring the un- rial war effort and "appealed for the loyalty of their subjects" rather than assumderground conditions or the composition of the work-group. But, for workers, it .. ing it as a right. *0 was important to identify those conditions that reduced their ability to produce and `Q y } Additionally, after the Japanese victories in Southeast Asia in 1942, West Africa to recognize that many, such as the ratio of productive to nonproductive workers, i _’ became Britain’s main supplier of tin and tropical food products.11 Colonial exports were management’s responsibility alone. These wartime disputes about produc- § were critically important as supplies for British factories, to earn hard currency in tivity plagued the industry until the close of the decade. They also give us an op- trade outside the sterling area, and to buy war materiel from the United States}2 portunity to situate a managerial concept—productivity—within the contradictions J _ Colonial exports helped Great Britain to earn over £3,000 million in sterling balof the colonial capitalist workplace. _ ` ances.” It was therefore critical to push production to its highest levels, a process These reforms were especially critical because, as WestAfrica’s only coal mines, ' 5 requiring increased managerial control of the workplace. In Nigeria’s tin mines, the the industry was crucial for the economic and military role the region played in the Q` only source available to the Allies, the state violated the ILO Forced Labour Conwar. Industrial unrest continued after the war in the volatile political context of ‘ ' vention of 1930 by using forced labor to recruit workers for private companies. radical nationalist agitation. The men eventually challenged the legislation that le- ` i ` Africans also watched the debate between Allied nations about colonialism. The galized restricted trade unions, introduced collective bargaining, prescribed dis- T Soviet Union and the United States were highly critical of Britain’s imperial sta-

230 "VW l/Wrc All Slavss"4 The Politics of "Pr0ductiviry" 231 tus. American politicians engaged in well—publ.icized debates with British governi t bosses assaulting w¤rk·§rS Oeehhedm Buhsh bosses foundtg V53; gnfiigggzsagé ment apologists over the propriety of colonies in a world in which Germany and l just to the changing mem] reahm me {hell-_°utbmSt;1Yi;?€ fine Warp lapan’s acquisition of colonies had become a central focus of the Allied critiquey 1 H dying racial Work culture meompauble wld] the mb I gs 0 on n rnnnvc colnery Roosevelt’s opposition to colonialism put Churchill on the defensive but other ; But mlleh of the WaI’s 1mPaet was to lzvy SOE _l:En°;-iion exorbitant mms members of his government appeared to have acknowledged the contradiction beg., _ W0rkf0f¢e· Reel Wages Were Pdlmded hY_ eu en el E control; on a 1_0_axp0 ng tween the Allies’ principles and practiceh The tension focused on the application" ; and food shortages. Moreover, the state impose EUC t .0in the uicm layed of Article II of the Atlantic Charter, signed in August 1941, to Britain’s tropical _ which ful'?-hg e¤¢§>dl'aged mm-1 fehhers te hee to nugu OJ P colonies. Conceived as a statement to Nazi—occu ied Euro e, it was uickl emq", and the WG? ng C ass- _ . . braced by A.t`rica’s nationalists.15 It floated man; "danger§us" ideaschuch gs the . Y Reforms begun before the wer were cam? fore/ard c$;:;€;;;P;:g-digg? right of sclf.deiermihati0h_ which declared; ` ` overcrowding still threatened political stability. roas e s e _ B th me ` { ‘ forcement of public health standards and occupancy rates continued. ut e s the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will n " 4 Secured Colonial Office funding fg; a major labor estate Pmleet that became a Plat' liveMdtheywlsht¤Se=S¤Ve=ig¤¤ghtS¤¤¤S¤**’·g¤Vem¤¤*t¤S*¤*=¤t°*h¤S= t = form for tntewentttns inte the working crass home: home visitslby social Waite who have been forcibly deprived of thern.1‘ F Officers, matgma] and child health projects, regulation of the size of the fnanlnly, Churchill’s interpretation notwithstanding, it became increasingly more difficult ` i , schools, clinics. etc. The Pmleet Yemhheedththe male bii;;W;§i;;§£1:;;§l;g_ to argue convincingly that this clause did not apply to the "darker races,” and the t I ding women from dpemng Qfadufg tables eh B csxtcsfc Hliena of Ovcmmcnt Charter gave ideological directionto the growing dissatisfaction with colonial ex— ` X . yfly. a 1'\11’a1 male status sigmfieh and te stdPfthe P_ 20 Sector Wogkcrs These pressions of racial superiority.17 In Nigeria there was an air of anticipation that . i emp10yeeS’h¤¤Seh<>ldS b=1¤sl=*;¤2¤;*h=m these O tip nnn, of the Sn-nn yards since the country had remained loyal to England and had proven so indispensable V estates ¤1s0 sepafatdd ereslaehshhe Wehkeriifmm E H to the war effort, major improvements, both political and economic, were in the 1, where many ¤¤q1r¤{¤¤r¤ had te live or bum ' t labor dis urns from innnmnnng effing. Moreover, working class men expected that they would have the income to ` ` Secondly. 1¤g1S1¤¤<>¤} Wes develepedio Prev? h rt nngwas the n ncannn nf assume new leadership roles as family heads and modemizers. Unlike the Niger- ` ’ I pfeducddn and eseahhmg me seem disorden S 0 ’ nin cnncnc pgln England ian govemment, they were planning for a future that would existh Personal, vil— Q} l the elabefate i\’1d¤st¤a1·1'€1at1°¤s machinery that was gain Snug colgdvbn bccausn lage, and family improvement became ever more compelling goals as workers { ` The Colonial Office knew far too well how d1srupt1\;> ri; rglnlvas a incorrect Wayn to · expressed their expectations of a better jiuure when hostilities ended. In Enugu, ~ of the Problems Whh Bhhsh were during df.}vnaI'.. Hint,. Wn was to acknown workers’ understandings of these ideological changes were enriched by the dis- ‘ 4 helldle labor d1sPdtes and an lheerhect Way` [anime évanglcs from sennnsly course of the nationalist movement, which was particularly popular in this, the , edge that workers had gflevmcest but td Prevfh ESS mcess was conectiva "city of clerks." The influence of literate nationalists on Enugu’s miners made , je0P¤fd1Zi¥¤g the Pmddeddfl Pfeeessj The key e emenlmug align industrial conflict Britain’s goal of depoliticizing colonial unions more difficult. Moreover, because K _ befgaitddgi iethe great Seem] gwchuon that has Tn Dnnblnm was Whether mlnminers either lived in the village or, in the case of locals who boarded in the city, `~ and · »· created a Stable meehe fonts rcsoluumh cig; workplace Could nemnt returned there on the weekends, they brought the ideas and debates of the nation- nial social relations, a racialized state, and the opnress f r ns funcn0ning_md€ alists into Udi Divisional politics. After the war a district officer noted: . the formadeh and exlstehce Ott the com msmu. mn O » · t c unions-as legitimate social institutions representing empklyses dltetes S· _ _ Divisional politics in Udi Division are always strongly influenced by the views Y 2 T Trades disnntcs machinery was immdnccd with mandatory nrbln-anOn_ cgnclli. of the intelligentsia in Enugu as interpreted by the illiterate colliers, who, com- L ° ' anon, and a Series of industrial relations b0dieS imP0Tt€d ftdm Enghlheh hm ing home at weekends, and particularly at month-ends with cash wages, are able ‘ I Should that fan, the Nigerian government introduced Essential Works Ordens winch to pay the piper and call the social, and to some extent the political tune. lg rcsnintcd the right to sn-jkc of all workers in industries deemed "essent1al for the Workers also continued to target racialized systems of industrial authority. The , ~ war- effort. Although this law resembled 1tS eenltltelilllattntg §l;g§’·?IdélT§EgeIi‘;h;; privileges of superior "colonizet" over inferior "native" caved in under the weight I D of "essential" industry Wigs se hbel-any apphc mh Ein be coached away from a of propaganda and Britain’s dependence on colonial human and material resources. “ \ the small Wdddhg Clash C°1°mal govcmrgents hilt Sn cumbersome cnnsnna. Racial discrimination became an important signiher for the undemocratic nature X knsezlerk reachhh teqhhsh every protest an tango S12; down and n was honed of imperial rule. In the colliery workplace, white bosses were under increased pres- f dye Pmeedhree md htmcate dlsputcifpricgigesc islnnnn gnvnmmi production bg sure to end the abusive forms of colonial discipline as workers challenged racist . , moderate mest mddstmd eel-‘0hS· hl e ec ’ i t . tewcnn in the nint of nmtraditions. The more the workers tested the new reality, the more incidents of white locking in a Process that Weihd allow mamgamen 0 m P

232 “We Were All Slaves " ~ Y , The Politics of "Pr0ductivi?y" 233 duction to increase output while denying workers the ability to exercise a right to 1 nial state a new raison d’étre but refusing to recognize the essential nature of Nigerstrike. ian coal miners as industrial men. The other was held by Enugu’s working men Employers had to admit that despite their generally deprecatory assessments of ` and women who, caught in the vise of rampant indation on the one hand and wage African workers, they were not interchangeable. There were differential levels of “ freezes on the other, were squeezing their meager incomes to support their own viskill, commitment to jobs, and importance to colonial industries Colliery workers r, sions of progress and development. Labor unrest during this period was driven by who had made their arguments in grievances before the war would continue do so ~ , the men’s visions for their future, as well as their sense of entitlement to a respectful with increased determination during the warnzs Now, some even argued for inclu- A , and decent life. Moreover, most of Enugu’s workers, like colonial workers elsesion in the senior staff.26 The Colonial Office acknowledged that segmentation of i; 3 where, were compelled by a deep-seated sense that the state was treating them unthe labor force could be the best antidote to those huge, political general strikes Q justly. that shook the West Indies and Copperbelt in the 1930s. This meant dropping the i °°l°r ba" md *"i“fV“"g S°“‘° Af“?””s “? “‘° s°‘“°¥ S°‘T"°°· SP"°i"“‘Z?d ““““?g e mr srvrrnv or URBAN nrt; mr cm oumnc rut wan programs were rmtrated to put Africans into the "prpeline" for supervisory posi- — tions. Differential privileges and elaborate grading systems were envisioned as a , The political importance of Enugu was associated with both the strategic value way to encourage men to be productive, diligent workers. r , I of Nigerian tin, tropical products, and the opening of the theatre of war in North In order to make informed decisions about colonial labor, in 1939 the Colonial { Africa.2S Enugu coal was the fuel for the Nigerian Railway, its transporter which Ofrice appointed Major Granville St. J. Orde Browne, a former colonial official in — brought Nigeria’s exports to the coast. EastAfrica, as the first colonial labor advisor. He toured the colonies, reporting on _ A In North Africa Allied fortunes swung back and forth until May 1943, when all labor conditions and making recommendations to the Colonial Labour Advisory A p Axis troops were expelled from the region. From September 1940 when the ItalCoirunittee. I-lis visit to Enugu in 1940 and again in 1942 led to a round of reforms · ` ians began their desert campaign until the coordinated Allied surprise attack at the that targeted the health and workingponditions of the workers and their lack of · end gf 1942 many West African cities became important staging areas for British. representation}7 Undergirding most of the reforms was the assumption that British i colonial, and American troops. Under the Trans African Air Base Program, Amerindustrial relation systems and trade union structures could be transferred to the i i ican and British airplanes were assembled in and deployed from newly constructed colony and would work there just as they had in England. This assumption proved _ airstrips?9 Consequently more than 100,000 British and several thousand Arneriflawed in Enugu. Laws developed for fully proletarianized workers will not have ? ’ cans came through such cities as Lagos, Kano, Ibadan, and Enugu.3° the same impact on stabilized workers who move in and out ofthe worldorce and ` . The British stationed thousands of troops from the West African Frontier Force are committed to this pattern. Moreover, the colony was not a tabula ram upon V ~ (WAFF) in Enugu. The presence of these troops, and the govemment projects they which English organizational and disputes patterns could be imposed with little . ‘— stimulated, created an economic boom in the city. Villages in the Nkanu area supinterference. Enugu’s miners had established work pattems, forms of protest, or- ` . plied food to the city’s ever-growing population. The township report noted that ganizational cultures, and leadership styles that shaped their responses to indus— ` _· “Enugu became a Mecca for those who set out from home to seek their fortrial reforms. Any "foreign" institutions or disputes management systems were _` tune."31 Men seeking jobs found posts in construction. The population grew from deflected through the prism of these experiences, often with unpredictable results. I ., 13,000 in 1930 to nearly 40,000 in 1945 .32 The labor disputes during the war were in reaction to the insidious ways that Y The colliery workforce tripled during the war from an average of 2,500 in the management and state officials manipulated this new legislation to reassert con- i thirties to 3,600 in 1940, and 6,800 in 1945 .33 Despite the earlier plan to recruit trol over the workplace, the labor market, and the character of urban working class .¤ _ only from adjacent villages to reduce urban settlement and overcrowding, many family life. However, these same reforms also gave workers the tools with which , n I colliery workers still relocated to the city, if only as weekly boarders. With "rosto resist the arbitrariuess of the boss’s power in the workplace, such as preventing E F tering," one needed to present oneself at the mine daily to secure a post for the day. lockouts. The new laws constituted a framework for the conduct of labor relations g , The colliery’s estates could only accommodate 1,640 workers and an additional and workers were less subjected to the whims of authoritarian supervisors and man- E ~ 3,100 miners lived in private housing. Three thousand living in the villages walked agement. Moreover, with the implementation of wartime Africanization policies ~ _' daily to work, a distance of from two to ten miles.3" Although the state was presome colliery men received training in these laws, which they subsequently ma- i * gqcupied with African labor productivity, the industry still refused to plan a s¤b— nipulated in their struggle against colliery management. This was the case with the ; V sidized transportation system to bring the men to the mines. industry’s first modem trade union leader, Isiah Okwudili Ojiyi. ‘ .: But the boom strained scarce housing resources. Until 1943 the govemment still In many respects this is the story of two models of "development." One was en- had not assumed responsibility for providing housing for urban workers and most visioned by colonial officials and policymakers trying to give an embattled colo- V , lived in deplorably sub-standard hovels. The various sectors of the city were sep-

234 "l/lk Were All Sluves" V The Politics of "Pmducrivity" 235 arated by bush and in some areas, particularly Ogui, a settlement on the fringes of i · is at present being carried out by the Colliery then it 1S totally inadequate. NothEnugu town and Abakpa Nike, an adjacent village, there was no regulation of hous— if A ing except demolition will improve the space between the houses and the ventring construction.35 Many Africans just erected shacks and rented them out to des- Y i lation of the houses themselvesf'2 PQI-am Workcm Soon Ogui became known as mcfcsidcncc Om]? “dr€gs”.Of society ii Like the households of other government workers, colliery employees’ homes with the unemployed and casual workers, prostitutes, and crmnnals. 'l`h.is was the had higher Occupancy mms than mcse Of workers in private employment. Over 63 type of cross—class social intenningling that Orde Browne wamed of. Proximity of cream of govcmmcm quarters were overcrowded compared to 41 percent for nonWm-kcrs to the lumpcn proletariat Encouraged Poor Work habits’ ““d°““j“°d m` Povemment quarters/*3 This disparity reflected the increased familial responsibildustdal discipling md reinforced “cdmma1” forms of Worker pmtcst`36 This so- `: i igties of men whose wage stability in government employment attracted the attention cial contact between important sectors of the working class and the "dangerous" r of their extended families. with rhcrr meager but regular- wages, gove1nrnentem— (lumpen proletariat) classcs’ was a recipe for insurrection that could threaten both ' · l es were under considerable pressure to accommodate relatives seeking jobs administrative and commercial functions in the city.37 In 1944 the local authority `» ‘ cys gave a Snapshot of the citys social Composition: { m gl;/;§;owding was a thrcmt to health, as the men had noted in their protests of M¢¤¤WM1¤b¤¤¤¤¤¢¤f¤·¤w¤ and th¤1=·¤z=RWAFF
236 NW9 were All Slaves N _ The Politics of "Pruduvtivity" 237 tion with these issues was evident in their requests for medical care and accident ; their white coworkers. They, like the workers, f0¤¤d it difllcult to s“RP°“ their Pmvcmion [mining amlmg the demands raised during me-ny dlSP“€€S·45 A 1'HB-\’1`S ~A ` families in a style to which they felt entitled. Moreover, it was critically lmP0I't€}Ht cmccm with the provision Df g°°d htalth fm his fam-HY was also im ll'*diCaY0T Of " for their status that they be able to consume those products that symbohzed “C1V· “m0dSmity” and masculine r°SP°“sibimY·46 The village Of NEWO, The P*`imm'Y area * . ilization" and status. Their expenses reflected their heavy dependence on impfmed of mine recruitment. bl-lm and maintained its OWU mamnlity home, €mPl¤Y€d Fi ¥ I goods, and the importance of the social distance that it reilected between them— midwih and contracted with the comery to have a d°°t°r and muse Visit Period` ~ ` selves and the urban working class. Overcrowded "native" locations pushed them i°all5’·47 l· mr, glgsg to [base "lower” glasses forcing them to live below their p€1‘C€iV€d `°S(¤· As a regional government center, Enugu attracted young male clerks whose frus- . gory in life " tmdons with the Pace nf political Change fueled ¤¤ti¤¤¤1iS¤p¤1iti¤s, tmnsfonniug V Urban associations also put Workers in contact with Nigerian bl.lSiIl€SSIl'l¤Il Wl'l0 Enugu into an exciting center of nationalist agitation. An informant described this 1 · ‘ were hun by the new forms of monopoly control the expatriate firms held 011 111groupi [4 B ternal trade, which excluded them from govemment bulk purchasing agreemepts A "new middle class" of government employees and men of initiative in the pro- _ admlmsmmd ily These mms' It was 110 Comcldencc that Nlgcma S mst mmona 1; · - · » .1 art the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), was forme fessional, business, and service fields, drawn from all pans of the region, settled . P y’ _ _ in the burgeoning city_48 ly 1 from a coalition of these groups. With incomes higher than the working class, they financed political movements ‘ t _ and were avid patrons of radical nationalist press. The WestAfrican Pilot, the Hag- _ L TOWARD A COLONIAL LAL? 942 ship of Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe’s newspaper empire, avidly covered colliery affairs, lr . ORDE BROWNE IN ENUG ' _ _ _ l a seizing Every ¤PP0¤¤¤itY to Mflibute t¤ this state industry the abuses of the impe- Z i In February 1940, Major Orue Browne investigated labor conditions IH Burma _s Pia} 0fd€1'· These y0L1Hg men and women honed their organizational skills in the _ fom- west African colonies-Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Gambia, and Ghana·Tl1e Visit umm"' imP“’V°m°‘“ **SS°°i¤¤°¤S d°m°¤S¤¤*i¤€ *0 the CWS railway Workers and L aimed to assist governments in preventing labor disturbances that would Jeopae coal mi¤€1'S49 Slfamgles that would P1'¤V¢ useful in Organizing government protest. > djzg gram Leonrfs Mtg] port of Freetown, Ghana’s bauxite, gold mines. and Pm Govemment clerks were as outraged, as were their predecessors in the First World Z city, and Nigcriars ports, mr and coal mines. Since miners, railway. and d0<{l{W0Yk· Wan with the disparity between their wages and conditions of service and that of V ers were crucial groups in the region with long traditions of d1srupt1v¢4H{1lH¤¤¢¢· ` Ordc Browne included the colliery among the "trouble sp0ts" to v1s1t in 194lO. ' l B While he considered the colliery to be "a great asset to the country," he noted with ` . . . ` rr . ` M x . ` L considerable understatement that conditions ";;armO[ be Considered ga[igfag[0l·y_" A` I " l ll ` l ’ ` ’``` l ~ I — "~· l ` · *7 M ‘ l - The workforce remained disgruntled because conditions that led to the l937 stnke l Il = ` 1 vi ~’ L ` L I l lf*·.l· I Y had not changed, and in some cases had worsened. Orde Browne idennfied as the V. l B 1 _ V- _ ‘ B ~$3.;i». ‘Q .l major problems an "acute shortage of housing? and low wages made worse by the l `lll Q.; —` ` "rostering" or sharing work system.5° _ an- Nl r As a military man, Orde Browne was particularly concerned that urban and 111‘ . i J l dustrial disorder not interfere with the region’s wartime functions. He concentrated ‘`:4 E fl limb J n l il . l A on those areas of major employment—mi.nes, railway, docks, and plantations. HIS l »l " l1l""*"`f y 'preoccupations were with “detriba.liZati0n,” labor migration, diet, hOl1SlIlg, WHgBS, · l " f education, and medical care?] In addition to recommendations for improvements . . in these areas, he also suggested appointing administrative personnel to allow the me V l A supervision of workers in the jobs and communities. I `S ` ` To his credit Orde Browne recognized that many broad social problems, such I { as urban overcrowding, were actually labor problems arising from insufficient ~~ ` · ll- ` . wages, and he made suggestions for improving the social conditions under which Photo 6.2 Ugwu Alfred: Charles Ugoji, Gabriel y . workers lived.52 The general thrust of Orde Browne’s recommendations was the Mloalemlu, Michael Nwakuache, and Clement y =“ social and not industrial experiences of labor. Most of his suggestions concentrated Egboglmba, 5 luly 1975 (Carolyn Brown) ~ on housing which hg ljyked to family policy and social order. He noted With HS-

238 "Vlk Mare All SMvz.r" ` I ` The Politics cf "Pmducrivity" 239 tonishment that most colliery housing was single—sex dwellings that violated ILO Orde Browne was attuned to the political attention race was getting throughout standards and discouraged family life.53 He believed that an "industrial man" r Nigeria. His instincts were quite correct. Nigeria’s first nationalist party, in fact, headed a nuclear family so employers would find that investments in family life emerged as a coalition of the urban improvement unions controlled by this elite produced diligent and contented workers, He recommended additional construc- B, social strata. But the biggest challenges during the war would come from Nigetion near the mines of adequate bathing, washing, and latrine facilities, and argued i ria’s organized working class—the trade unions in Lagos. l . ~ strongly against the colliery’s outmoded "range” style quarters with six to ten ' . The political environment of change and reform sweeping Nigerian society em12' >< lO' adjoining rooms which also facilitated the spread of infectious diseases. ; boldened colliery men to push for rights they felt entitled to as working men with However, Orde Browne had remarkably little to say about improving who condi. ,» famjljesi Their initiatives in utilizing income, forming associaucnsl, and tapping tions under which Africans worked. He commented, here and there, on how horrible into a generalized nationalist discourse of the period encouraged the industrial turthese conditions were but did not offer any guidelines to management or the state, bulence of the war. save improving wages, housing, nutrition, and family life. It was apparently easier “ for him to comprehend miners as a social category than as an industrial one. His com- Q ments after visiting the worksite suggest the extent to which his own reformist ideas Q THE NATIONAL TRADE UNION STRUGG LE, 1939-1943: TH E were imprisoned by his racialized assumptions about African workers: ~ COST-OF-LIVING AGITATION IN LAGOS Working conditions on the mine are also very trying; I went as fu as me ooa1. x ‘ Between 1941 and 1943 the Nigerian economy registered the full consequences face and watched the men at work under conditions of damp heat, cramped space, j ` of the wartime restrictions on the economy. The colonial govemment mtervened pour ventilation and very little light. I could not help feeling surprised that mon 9. imo tho economy in unprecedented ways. The war required a level of central plancould be induced to work regularly under such conditions. Small wonder there- — _ ning largely absent in the earlier years. The Colomal Office established anumber fore that they are discontented, Indeed, I doubt yanyone butAfricans would have , of coordinating bodies in West Africa to facilitate the centralization of policies conbeen as patient as they have been [emphasis mjne].5" t coming the economy in general as well as labor. For theffirs;1meA;l§e.C0l¤ri;I2':l ~ l ' ‘ - e esident Minister or est rica wr u gilthough the men; grcductigity Was deeply ¤0mPf¤¤1iSFd by ghesc conditions. { gfgiggg? ;;t?ga;E(;1;t;1;?g;§;l1ol;t consulting Whitehall}9 He headed a West Or e Browne ignore t e speci c working conditions and oeate the cause in in- `_ ' 4 . . - · em and mint Omcials cOOfdi_ digenous culture—the deficient nutritional habits of the Igbo. Noting that the diet §§a;lc\;;a;I5i(;u; $21: l:h21:;;1;?i§§;r pciliy was cogginatcd through a was extremely Smchy’ he was appammly convinced their lack of Stamina came ‘; ` series of West African Labour Conferences in which policy was discussed, profrom protein d°HCiency’ rather the harsh underground coudmcusés Correctly an- in ‘ duction tar¤ets set and strategies for containing working class unrest developed. “°iP‘*““g ¤¤¤¤Si¤¤¤ff¤m th·=m¤¤- he Suggmd agmm i¤·¤¤d¤¤¤<>¤ mod * 1 stm trim Weis inmates within the cor.-mia mcmseivcs. wagering boards mmmS’ beginning with cocoa and saline s01uti0nS’ and culminating in a hot smW’56 i V were founded in Onitsha Province as were similar urban initiatives in Enugu. ConW-hilc recognizing that problems endemic to the milWay’ the seasonality Of its ~ cern with the escalating prices of essential goods led the state to experiment with supply of rolling stock, created objective conditions for an unstable pattern of labor V Q ' controlled market Schemes, which were largely ineffective and only succeeded in SiE12i“ZZ?I;££S§EEEXTZ§iZZ§i§`sLEEZf‘;2iQ}§‘§Sn§§§1'§E‘$2§§$§5f2§Z,“€L,?;i` * i m¤b¤iZi¤gm¤k€¤¤gW¤mc¤agm“g,§*€g*§‘€·7§] Og I km ,,11m ba, » · » r · · ‘ ‘ ce oo 0 c — He also cautioned against retrenchments at short notice, suggesting improved mine ` _ gaézxgnaghgis ;;3nIa;;§gZs;;;;}ci;g SH2; imo predictable and less dgsmp. site storage facilities to bridge the periods when railway bottlenecks prevented re- K? t , me forms cf collective action. Although colonial trade unions were an impormnt m0Va]‘ J V precondition for this process, this was war and these were African workers. These He was also concerned about the political transformation of Nigeria, most es- ` ` ` two faCtOl_S_thc urgency Of Wa! and the udiffcmncev Of African Workarstwguld pecially, the accommodation of the African elite. After his second visit to Enugu, · 3 influence the pammaters that would be drawn around ·»lcgmmat€~ Collective ac. Otdc Browne cmphasizei in his discussions atthc Colonial OfEce’ the importance ‘ Z tion the powers trade unionists would be allowed to exercise, and the forms of of a development policy that included the "plantati0n owner, mining prospector, l e pmtgst tolerated by the Smet shopkccpcn factory ma“mg€r’ Skilled mcchamcf HS noted than ~l { By 1939 the Colonial Office had pushed governments to allow unions to operThe development of this class would go far to give the African the feeling that { — ate as "the surest means of securing industrial stability and the removal of extremist he owned his country and exploited its resources, instead of seeing these con- if tendencies."“ As Colonial Secretary Ormsby—Gore noted, not allowing unions to stantly in the hands of the white man? `_ 1 develop would "enoourage the formation of illegal organizations wh1ch may eas-

240 ··wa were Au Slrzve_v" ~ s The psiisrr qi ··1>mausriviry·· Z4] ily develop into ‘secret societies’ and extend their operations into the political { pay structure became the basis for generalized reforms for government workers isfield-"6’· But colonial unions did not have the full rights of inerropolitsn unions `; sued in a circular of 6 October 1941- _ _ _ They had to be registered, which was granted at the discretion of the government, , _~ In late 1941 the Colonial Office’s new strategies received their first test when follow a six-months’ waiting period, and submit their books to a close monitor- ri the ACSTWU agitated for a cost-of-living 1ncrease,'wluch it considered a war ing of flnances.63 After an initial period of distrust for what were, after all, state- Q bonus." The Colonial Ofhce response was to ignore inflation, which had steadily i¤¤'¤dl-wed illstitlitions, Workers tried to use them as vehicles of mobilization and A e spi;-gled from 1935, and argue that any hardship was only TemP0fi11'Y as it Wes came up against managerial restrictions. g caused by war conditions. It therefore held base wages constant and added variThere was no consensus among expatriate department heads and colonial offr- `J ous allowances. Special attention was given to the lowest paid workers. The stancials over the value of trade unions as vehicles to contain worker militance. At the [ dard pattern of response was clear: a state-appointed commission that used new colliery management smarted under the conflict in the Underground Representa— { i social science research techniques (especially thehousehold suryey) to deterrrune tive Council and was loath to authorize yet another worker—chosen consultative " living costs and indices to locate these costs relative to normal 1939 prices. By body. Even though the new unions were burdened by bureaucratic restrictions, 1 . selecting 1939 as the base year the Colonial Office underestimated the decline in management was not convinced that they would be useful in securing the indus- , ` real wages which began in the mid—thirties.69 Finally, some type of bonus would trial peace necessary to meet war demands. But under pressure of war, manage- J · be granted. _ _ _ ment could utilize all of these restrictions to circumscribe trade union leaders and, ` . In response, the govemment appointed a Comnussron of Inquiry headed by when these failed, could withdraw recognition of the union. Thus, in its first ex- ii 1 A.F.B. Bridges, formerly Resident, Onitsha Province. The composition of the comperience with govemment-imposed unions, the workers’ movement would be sub- q mission was unusually representative for a state-appointed body; The majority of jected tc the full weight of repressive legislation. r ire members were Nigerlans with s signinoant number representing trade unions. N1g€1`i¤ legalized trade 1lIl.l0nS in 1939, extending the restrictions suggested by including an official ofthe ACSTWU. There Were also several lll/Qmell and I`€PY€· the Colonial Office of compulsory registration and the six-month waiting period. sentatives from the major govemment departments concerned with social welfare. Throughout Nigeria, workers responded rapidly to the opportunity to form unions. r _` 1 The Commission deliberated for some eight months, but in December 1941, recForty—0ne unions representing more than 17,000 workers were registered in 1939 L ~ ognizing the urgent nature of the crisis, asked the govermnent to make an interim and 1940.64 But between 1941 and 1943 the state chipped away at the rights of J award of a 3d (pence) per day pay to all govemment employees on annual wage these unions through a series of wartime legislation covering "essential industries," or salary of less than £36 (pounds). 'The Commission s investigation found that a rather broad category which, in an economy so dominated by the state, covered I {1 there had been a 150 percent increase in the prices of selected, domestically prothe majority of Nige1ia’s workers. Soon thereafter, in 1942, the Nigerian Genersl { , duced food items in Lagos from 1939 to 1942-70 _ _ Defense Regulation prohibited strikes and lockouts,65 mandated disputes proce- E i While protests and negotiations were going on in Lagos, the colliery workers dures that included binding arbitration, waiting periods, and prohibitions of the . ’ . were distracted by leadership struggles following the collapse of the Representaright to strike." v . (ive (;omreiis_ In 1940, the Udi District Report noted that the prices of sglected The coal miners' struggles during the war occurred in a national context of es- 1, , food items in Enugu showed a 30-50 percent increase over those in 1938. They calating conflict between Nigerian workers, employers, and the state. Two major V did receive some wage adjustments from nattonalhnegotiatrons. Under the Bridges worker mobilizations occurred, one in 1941 and another in 1943. In July 1941 the g Award, Enugu was grouped with the northern cities of Jos and Kaduna and reRailway Workers’ Union took aleading role in forming afederation of government V ceived a 9d increment. All daily-paid workers received a 3d per day increment workers, the African Civil Servants and Technical Workers Union (ACSTWU) in provided that the increase did not place them over 7/6d per month. 'Ihe cost-of1-6805- F01l0Wi1‘ig its registration in July 1940, the Railway Worker-s’ Union, under ’ living gllgwagice (COLA) increase was 100 percent for those on the 5d daily fate the leadership of Michael Imoudu, and the African Locomotive Drivers’ Union ` and 50 percent for all other daily-paid workers making from 5d to ls 6 1/2p. Those successfirlly waged a struggle against the replacement of the daily-wage system ` i on monthly pay schedules of 15s to £2 and on an annual schedule of £48 received by an hourly system of pay.67 j` a 50 percent increase. Colliery workers received a further increase in April 1942, The transformation of the pay scale, which divided the workers into established . ¤_ when the 1938 Evans Award was revised with a ld increase to most grades of dailyStaff and laborer. followed the Colonial Office strategy to reriuee worker sender. Q paid labor end s is increase in the daily—rate of hewers} ;l'he1r piece rate for tubs ity by S€gm€HF1!`lg 11118 W0l'1
242 "We Mre All Slaver" , l The Politics af "Pr0ductivity" 243 the comn-ntment to fumre review, taken without consultation with the Colonial ‘ rnen’s ability to integrate mining with bouts of farming. Additionally, rostering had Office or the West African War Council, established to coordinate labor policy, l a drastic impact on income. Optimally hewers should have earned 17s 6d per week e¤1`ned_GoVeH10r Bourdillon a pointed reprimand by the Colonia] Office which ` based on a rate of from 2s lid to 3s 6d per shift. Other underground workers should questioned the competence of sectors of his administration.”” The Colonial ‘ have made from ls to ls 4d per shift, and surface workers from ls to ls Sd. HowOmee [fled to formulate and implement economic strategies on a regional basis `V ever, with "rostering" most men worked only three days 21 week, earning barely and encouraged all- the West African governors to follow the same policy. How- ` half. With food averaging between 3d and 4d per day and rent from 4s to 10s per ever, the partrcularrties of worker militance in Nigeria led Govemor Bourdillon _ month, most workers could barely survive"? to break ranks and grant a wage increase retroactive to October 1941 and commit ` `" Moreover, because of corruption a man couldn’t even be sure that daily selechrs government to periodic cost-of—living reviews.7" The pattem was set for fu- Y; tion of workers was fair. Timekeepers tampered with the lists, even after they were ture negotiation and worker agitation. _ posted in glass cases, and "native" bosses still replaced those Whose names were _ In May 1942 the government gave another increase that highlighted the patently Q on the roster with workers from their villages who, most often, had paid them discriminatory nature of economic policies. Govemor Bourdillon relieved the hard- I bribes. ship of his European employees by giving “separation allowances" to those expa- W · Local men thrown out of work who returned to farming could not benent from triate men, whose wives were not in Nigeria, followed in November 1943 by 2 ' wartime price increases of primary products because bulk purchasing agreements addrtronal increments for other dependents.7$ The award was a recognition that the ’ held down the prices of their palm products to subsidize metropolitan production. war economic pressures undermined a man’s role as provider. Blatantly dis- The Association of West African Merchants, an organization of the major expatricrrnnnatory, the award. supported the responsibilities of white men to their fami- , ` ate commercial firms in West Africa, formed a group in 1937 to set prices and dilres, while leaving African working men barely able to meet their individual, let `, vide markets among themselves. As an entity they totally controlled all West alone family, obligations. Incredulously in October 1942, Governor Bourdillon j ` African trade during the war because they contracted with the state to process all naively reported to the West African War Council that he doubted that these in- `~ bulk purchasing agreements of commodities allegedly held by marketing boards."9 creases would mcrte "the more highly paid African grades who did not receive this , As farmers, Enugu miners were cheated out of the just prices that their goods allowance at presentf"5 He was wrong. _' F could get on the world market. As workers, they were hurt by the price-gouging in 2 I consumer goods. And African merchants, squeezed between their customers’ low ENUQU’$ M|NER5 4¤|:EE|_rr THE WAR: ECONOMIC CRISES t V ' wages and the exorbitant wholesale prices charged by the firms, struggled to keep AND ‘|'|-{E CQND|T[ONS FOR SOUDARI-I-y » . afloat. As the cost of hvrng escalated with the prices of imports controlled by these J ` firms, they became politically vulnerable to generalized African critiques of the Although the demand for coal would increase during the war, initially labor re- ` abuses of colonialism. Again, economic policy set the conditions for a political alqurrements were not significantly higher. The state decided to use this period to . liance that could challenge colonialism. eST11bl1Sh ratronal labor practices in preparation for anticipated increased den-iand_ . WOrkers_ farmers, African merchants, and market women also suffered from When hostrhtres began, Enugu’s miners were in a particularly vulnerable position. . ` food shortages, import restrictions designed to conserve gold and dollar resources Management had refused to recognize their only organization, the Underground l ` and the use of British goods to eam foreign exchange. Furthermore, these policies Representatwe Councrl, and although the Council had succeeded in forcing the Di. ,, r were experienced against the backdrop of heightened expectations that life would rector of Transport to eliminate the interpreters’ post many of these same people j r improve, especially after the depression. But the net result of these policies was a had sr.mply moved to other positions of authority. Additionally, the Staff Welfare $7 i deepening plunge into poverty. The three prongs of British fiscal policy—price Officer evrctedthousands of people from the labor camps and upgraded the hous- ' , I regulation of colonial exports, reductions of metropolitan and foreign imports to mg for the families of the core workers. , the colonies, and the accumulation of sterling and dollar reserves—worsened the I Croasdale’s retrenchments in 1939 and the introduction of "rostering" made col- _ economic conditions of Enugu’s workers before they could recover from the delrery employment less reliable and secure. Moreover, workers found it difficult to ` F pression.8° keep then name on the employment lists for future jobs unless they bribed village ' The severity of economic conditions and the importance of colonial resources leaders. Management extended "rostering" to all mines to accommodate the ` . for the war required that colonial labor policy be more systematic and professional, men s erratic work habits to the variations in the railway’s ability to transport the and local administrators, usually a conservative force, could not be trusted to avoid coal, exacerbated by the frequent shortages of railway rolling stock during the war. ` provoking industrial conflict. Nigeria moved rather rapidly to establish labor adUnlrke the period before rostering, the men now had less choice over the days 2 ministrators. In 1939 and 1940, C.H. Croasdale and W.G. Wormal were appointed that they would present themselves for work. This substantially reduced the local · — labor inspectors. Subsequently, Wormal became Inspector of Labour for the col-

244 npw Weld All Sldvslw · V The Politics of "Praductiviry" 245 A ; · ‘5 t f ' eco 'tion to the liery, and RH. Cook of the BTUC, seconded to the Labor Department, became In- i ~ In March 1941 the goglgmulillit ilslligigliz 1;; sgsgsglggsggvc $rlcll Seized dustrial Relations Officer. Because of his experience, Cook was given the respon- n. EWTU’ but Several mem rs Ohl c and hsld ll fdr several Weeks bgfgrg detection, sibility of supervising the Staff Welfare Ofticer’s work, advising the manager on ’ the document from the gust 0 cennnnnn Anlnnbn both wboss boysl” were found labor organization, and educating the colliery workers on the principles of "re- V When the c“lPmS- EZ? Zogwu an ’ dll l d ll · - - - · ` d b e uentl umshed by the management, the surface workers ea enc spons1ble" trade umomsmfn Finally, in October 1942 the Labour Department was ‘ an su S q Y P - d hl f this council · - tz “ trike Under management encouragement the clerical lea ers p 0 established and by the end of 1943 had grown to include over twenty officers. t ; ·n nl _ lnn Enngu Surface lmpmvsmslll Ulllsll (ESIU) and Secured ~ orme ano er union, * t' , · · · ’ ‘ ' d the support ofthe NZMICO, r · recognition in November 1941 .“° Neither umon enloye CONSTRUCTING THE FOUNDATIONS OF ”REFORMED" t~, ’ and the Workers were resistant to participation. COLONIAL INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: THE TROU BL ED ~ : The leaders of beth unions regarded the l¤b0f€1'S with °0¤Y°mPt· The clerks fclt GENESIS OF TRADE UNIONS ' that as literates and leaders in the urban improvement associations, they should run ‘ . , · · ‘ ' rface union. The V ~ the industry s organizations as well, and they did in fact runlthe su When maltreatment became so much we started going into the bush to have meet- _ Aghsja absss boys,. assumed that they had acquired die i-ight to lead the underings. lt was during this meetings that we discussed about go-slow and strike. It ~` . ground union as A reward for their long-term loyalty to management: Now, both was then that we were put into light and registered our union. Before we were l resolved is seize command of these new government-sponsored organizations and not allowed to talk. Because the whites did not want us to discuss together: When l not bg eclipsed as they were with the Representative Councils. The underground they met us together discussing they would call in a police to arrest us. Now that Q Workers watched with suspicion as management tried ¥¤ bring in new °1`g*’·mZ*m°ns we registered and discussed about go-slow and strikes the Govemment started Q ro replace the militant councils. One respondent npiedi hearing our voices. Then whites agreed to talk with us. Then all African work- l i . . . r I c·lS_ The meh ers were titled boy e.g. timber man was called timber boy, peak called peak boy, I Mmagelncm med to bl-E unl:zl;st;:;)l';1:_l;;;1l;;;l}st$v;;;’ ggigglulillgllps Orgahh tub man called tub bolrneverythingf boy boy. Only the Europeans were called {eggs; gnifgnlgtzililnns gicfnsn the Ordinance allowed llvs pslsdlls to form Z d f _ l za o . · l _ Overmm an Ommén _ _ _ _ _ , union, Okpokwu and Ude could bring as many people from their areas as they Orde Browne had drsparaged the formation of collrery unions, arguing that the Wanted ld form the llldddsv men were "main1y of a primitive and uneducated type, and the formation of any _ _ _ , . . d r h f dl Emlgu were dhkind of trade union is for the time being quite beyond their powers."“ Unions did 3 ` The lmlxovcmcllts Ul hwlgg 9°¤;h2;ri;nTn;yZgniglxsnnnrnnnn around an not lit into his vision of industrial paternalism, despite the long history of worker- ' Tnedmtfd b}? the Cxlgancms 0 .prl;?l§ ll Elmdor majdl, slgllldcdllcc at the nadohdl management consultation and the relatively effective role played by Nzuko in or- V, ' industrial dispute thalnbeggrlnlnnl nun Wnlnnt nn nnnsnnn Wnnnnn nnnnnnnc nnlln ganizing earlier forms of protest. While most of Orde Browne’s suggestions became l · alld mdusmal l€V°lS' y l _ nl E knrs and they Weld Pllshsd dvcll further hm, the blueprint for the collie1'y’s social welfare reforms, the indus?-FY rejected his ad- ‘ { cies was unlenashednm egngn 5/In mnbnlnnn nnnnnst 150 nnnnnnn lnllnnnnl ln vice and followed the national trend which encouraged trade unions. The experi- 5 ` P°V‘mY· In gos _ elw _ g _ . ll. s also dlllclal for · r · · · · · . Enu the trade umomsts likewise pushed for relief. T is year wa U l l ences of the collrery s frrstumons,establ1shed1n 1940, illustrated the hostile context r · lll S called ll on to cdllllldllsdld for the crlsrs m in which African workers organized. The unions were banned the very first time r _ the lndustry bmausc the CO cry wa P h t · the re sed ih rh ·O di te I . the British coal fields where worker protests, manpower shortages, and a sen eersm y We u F aj I . spu ` . . · i 5 I h t d fuel shortages Management made several administrative decisions In the early period of umon organization management and state officials used _ , I exacer a e dln -_ n nn nns ond nnnny ln this dnmnnd, nlllmntnly the new labor legislation to restrict effective union activity. Although they held on l that, while they enable nne tnnllsffys nnn Penn nilnnn Innnnn O-nyi bnnnnns Gnnnlnl to old assumptions about the "primitive" African workers it was management, and I reduced output. And lin Lny, lsnwli Ulnlnn (OWU) and lnnnchnd the nnllnny not the underground workers, who pushed to form the first unions. Having dis- _ . SECYCWIY Of néw (-i°b irlilstnm Us ’ ..ao. banded the Undefgfonnd Representative Council, the manager responded to pres- E wolnkerslntnoln niinlnennnn nntwnnn Ynlnn nnnlnnsnnn of nnn two nnlnnsn the complexity sure from the Colonial Office by selecting trusted workers from the survey # j cspl ° _ l _ l , d the Continued dcchllc lll lcdl wages ehcoud department, several former interpreters or supervisors, to establish the Enugu Work- 5 · of the evolving labor eg1S 3¤0¤ 611 _ _ . si Th — l ex e· WTU ss · - = ed under ound workers to become mvolved in the unions. elf 691 Y p ers Trade Union (E )to represent underground workers. He was 111-disposed j zfg gr _ _ d th nm not at ah convinced dldr these haw to permit effective African trade unions after his bruising encounters with the Un- l nn memes were d1S°°um$mg_ M2, Zn; worth of dlsll lllvslvsllldld Od several derground Representative Council, whom he felt received far too much attention V l government—sponsored instrtu ions ln nninn lnnynnnsnin nnsnnnns mnnnnnnnnd nnn from the central goverdmehh 1 V occasions former interpreters, now 1 ·

246 ww Wm? Ay ggm,_,g:·· i The Politics of "Pmductiviry" 247 mem at one mine into breaking a strike by falsely claiming that workers in another A Igb¤ vpvrkers mmilhmm th;;;H';a;r€SP°nS? °Ec{[n;:sg¤;;t;;r§;r§h?‘::;? gllcg; mine had rammed tr, WOrk_89 V pact o wartime i ation. cu a ng a racia s r p - As the war progressed the mines’ output reached unprecedented levels, climb- 2 SPM who knew his “¤mVeS·” Grantham assured the Celema-I Secretary that the ing from 330,000 tons in 1940 to over 500,000 in 1943/44 after doubling the work- RV E Igbo workers force to Ready 7*00090 On 1 April l943’ the ¤¤¤i=fv began a Second Shift f¤¤¤Wi¤g . attempt to see whether Govemment could be coerced into granting unwarranted rccmimmm of a thmlsaud new miners through the Nadve Colm Clerks me Clan S ` concessions. It is desirable to emphasize, in connection with the Colliery, that Councilors, exposing workers to further corruption and bribes. By the summer of t , the majority of the employees [wel-C] drawn frgm prgmjrjvg communities, and 1943· ’¢hem¤¤· ¤k¤¤1¤i~¤¤¤¤¤f¤=mS i¤L¤g<>S»¤=¤¤g*¤W¤if¤¤¤¤¤¤tW¤m¤¤¤g¤- { that par events have rtpnncniy shown nn nar temperament n nnrrnbzr nn mamis refusal to misc wages md improve living °°ndm°ns‘ They were °v€rW°Ik€d’ that their reactions are often unpredictable. They have a natural predilection for burdened by inHaG°n’ and restricted by Nieman Dcfcnsc Rcgulamms from °X°r` t demonstrations, and their excitable character renders them ready tools for asCismg their ¤gh¤ *0 S¤ik=· The €°"emm°“‘· *mi¤gi¤S*gr¤¤t=d ¤ C0LA¤W¤d· 2 tuteleaderswhornaybelievethatshowofforcewi11in1iuenceGove¤nnent.The was ¤¤ab1¤*<> cmu-°1 the spiraling °f f°°d pri°€S· and mmcd t° amj'inHad°mry J mass organisation of bluff on a large scale amongst the Ibos is not necessarily policies that while used successfully in England, further impoverished the popu— l` so smous a phemmcmm as it would be in Other cnnnrncs and amongst other lation in Nigeria. Fearing that higher wages would lead to spiraling prices the gov- ` _ People [emphasis mjnB]_9s ernment lowered the minimum annual salary for income tax from £24 to £l8 { _ _ _ _ W . allegedly to pull money out of circulation. The national trade union movement be- ~· ' This- jisgtiineam thigisxgslvc fa°ad;wh1§hdd$i;;;;":1f;;;;n;:;k:;;;t;;1 came restive. In June 1943, the ACSTWU in La os etitioned the ovemment to R men" ur e e essenti " esrnan," s rou e · · · make a comprehensive review of salaries, wagesinndlivther conditiogs of service? € When all other fgxplmziionziiiledé :liiiV\;/$5 Eg ¥YItEk‘;f Yzilefsxlagilzndgag ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘ ’ ‘ colonial field 0 cers o en cte 0 1 e a . e s w prrggiggf-;§;;Ir?;t:qt§A3;2?%2l; I(§E;:;;1;la%si(1;1§`$g) ts:;$;;c;i?;€tl;]$g];a;g€Hj? E i record quarterly output of @8,314 tons ensued, but the issues that generated the pared their situation with other coal miners in the United States and England. Now _` K di¤¤¤¤¤=¤t were left Simmemfg b°“°?t·h the SuFfa°°‘ The Workcts movement was the gl-ievmccs iuc1udgd’ for the mst [gmc, a demand for an nndcrgmnnd allowance, * · still too weak from its recent mtemecme conflict to unite against the management * · · · ‘ and the state. ;g;nt:;§{;n;gr?ciL;;?;S;;?;;1;f;;rl;,E1; gi;I?;g1§;al;1;¤yc;:a;;PC;;V55;§ gg; ; ’ The responses of the state to wartime colliery protests clearly indicated that this heard a "wireless" report that the same had been granted to American miners.92 j Was an entirely different efmtext for ¤¤d¤S¤m1 negemtlen- D1$Pute$ mmiagerfiem The initial demand for a 10 (shillings) per day underground allowance was subse- P mach-i¤eYY was being Pm mm Place, 1¤b¤r Person-nel were more Closely momtee quently reduced to 6d. The union also requested a war bonus of 1/6d for all daily- i V ing Workers OH theivb wd at h¤m¢, and the state ne longer trusted leeal Ufmagers paid Workers and incrggsgd allowances of 6d pm- mb for rgbbgpy and 1 (Shilling) e to resolve colliery problems. Nonetheless, the workers still understood their power rnr drvrzbpmrnr. Other demands were for annual increments on basic wager and 2 ` over the industry, althvvgh they ww Somcwhat ¤kS<>¤¢¤¤¢d by the N¤g¤¤¤¤} D¤free boots for each underground miner}'3 Rebutting the union, the manager returned V ‘ fense Regulations and the chaotic management-sponsored unions. The seventy of the petition for further clarification, dismissing it as "inc0mprehensib1e." But the . t the economic conditions forced them to recognize that they ncedéd T0 engage seme nnners refused runner clarification rnd from August 12-16, me same connnvbr- ; Q of the states institutions and p§¤¢<=d¤;¤S» Thw belief that thm 1937 gu¢v¤¤¤¤S sial Augustine Ude, the president, called out the CWU on strike, apparently with- V · were largely unmet fostered e Sunmermg eueeee- made all the more Home bY the out infomijng other officers or attempting to coordinate the action with the · - I Saefiiees ¥heY were making ee SUPPWT BUFKW m the Wfu’· The War encouraged 3 leadership of the CSIU. The remaining CWU officers subsequently disassociated t ` Sense of msi? imPem’·“°evtw}*;ch was espilcijallzilgiligicwlgrgllttlcggxglzggigcivizc · · · ¥ r restive, an to some exten ou maneuvere y , · thi1—‘T;Bit\/E;;;;I;lut;;da§;O§;7E;§i§2;gn;lggggtioux the new legislation pm_ E J cumulated, an industrial crisis was inevitable. The context for this crisis arose in hibitiug strikes in essential industries, and served notice that all strikers would be · 1943, when The e0HieTY Was askee {O m¤r¤¤§¢ Pfeduemn te e°mPe¤Sate for Work' pwsécutcd as of August 18. 'I`wo days before that deadline he began rccnnnng new . ers` restriction of output in the Bnush coal industry. workers. By August 19, most workers had returned to the mine and production pro- .` ceeded at a normal pace. One hundred new workers, hired during the strike, were Y -I-HE EMERGENCE OF A NEW LEADER; |5A|A|-| 0]|Y| retained to fulfill the demand for increased output. The government and manage- 1 AND -I-HE UNDERGROUND WORKERS ment thought the issue was sett1ed.9" i i _ _ _ _ In Lagos, O.A.G. Grantham in the Nigerian Secretariat deprecated the serious- BY 1943 The miners? }*m°¤~ CWU- was m d1S*maY¤ at a me when the Wodgcrs ness nr the strike by nnrrbnnng me unrest rb the pncnnrr bninnai characteristics of I ` were squewd by i¤¤¤¤<>¤· Th¤y f<>¤¤d ¤ 1¤¤d¤r fmm amvng ¤h¤S¢ Afwms bm;

248 “We Were All Slam" ` . The ppliiier gf ··1>rednetiviry·* 249 i » ' ig . . . ss 100 Prepered to “Nigerie¤iZe" the industry. Among the contradictions unleashed by the _ duns was irresponsible, inexperienced, and pohucallyrnlhded leeders H go if Celehiel Ofhee labor reforms was the ascent of the industry’s first modem trade l meh Ojiyi had [kengn, a willingness to confront an unjust edVe:$ag(;;€Sm§f0r union leader, a product of their programs to train Africans to move through the .y , Song] risk, a stubbornness in attacking a [7l’0bl€Tll» and} slrehglh Of Om within the eeler ber- The Nigerian state and the Colonial Office reconceptualized gglgnjal Z what was morally g00d.l°l As he struggled against hls deeeclfgih Y as Ofmcial labor within an existing context of improved social welfare, increased worker pro- ~( { CSIU as well as Within his own ““l°n* he deliberately challenge C typ dl-1C¢iVifY. and G0n¤‘0lled systems of representation, The elaborate legislative snns- ` ~ author-itar—lanism exercised by white 11hderg1’0¤¤d staff _ _ _b1 S Otisdcal ture Ther bllreaueratized worker protest encouraged workers to geek out their Own . Whjlg Qjiyi was popular and loved by the men. he Wes·1¤<>;mE1 €» 15 he used “i¤ferprelerS" of this administrative maze. Most often these *‘interpreters” were ‘ 1 and arrogant, I-le practiced many aspects of Igbe lee· ’ who were aeeustorned to near total power over their Workers·BI¤ kureikm was Adi¤—Moses of the Arnalgarnated Union or United Africa Company (UAC) Afr-{gap ;: ‘ the Erosion of their privileges to physically and verbally abuse oe Wemcm that Workers (UNAMAG), to name a few.°‘ The colliery produced its own leader_ _ . viewed as the loss of work discipline and they eemplelhed f¤ mana? dc O_i i Isaiah Okwudili Oji}/L Q r` “their boys" were exhibiting a new, and dangerously reeelellram 3 ud tp hg`; Ojiyi Wes e former schoolteacher from Amawbia, Awka, near 0nitslia_ He began ' " typified these intolerable forms of "cheeky beheV101' Whleg he aplggiilf at the eolliery in July 1938 as a temporary clerk and was quickly recruited for h — gn-·igy5d_ However, he became a target of mmageilient rem umn t h Often smpilot program for underground "mine improvers," and later for Junior Technica] ih his eonfrontations with the state and the eelllery mehegemen SHS awaw Sieffi beth supervisory positions to integrate Africans into the established stag `; _» tied them with his knowledge of pertinent trade Union 01’d1¤¤;C§h‘;* mic a tmc Ojiyi entered into union politics justzas the workers’ movement had besoi-he de- yi » Bess gf the gains of the national. trade uhleh m0Veff1;m· héfailcd to Obmerelized by the resignation of the ofhcials ofthe two unions,” He responded to _ hatihhalistrebelling against the racial practices of Golem were Y· b th in me im a request by some underground workers to assist them with establishing a new serve the protocol of °°1°uia·l dcfcmncc to llls Eulopcafn superiors O ti b ¤¤i0¤·98 4* dustry and in the state at large. This made a lightning rod for lpepsecu 0; ey Ojiyi made H bid for leadership in the context of the union or-isis in l943_ As a *_ — European bosses angry that the state was mtrudmg mm the Ever P *;§'x;¤c0;0_ "foreigner," from Amawbia, he rejected clan-based policies and targeted the Ag- ' mictipg the forms of discipline and subordination formerly gs grrizryor were so beje hewers end other underground workers as his constituency Unlike mmiy of nih] WOrkplace,l°3 By 1943 management eomplelhts 0 S IDEB {mem ts to the other African staff who saw their posts as opportunities for personal advance. i Y Q vrisiferons that they drew the attention of the Chlef Se<{Fem}’Y· “ _ gades ment, he used his training in Nigerian labor law to develop demands that fnliy 3 ’ hrs him for ihsuliordination were blocked by the new legrslehegleencequggr rc exploited the legal parameters set forth by the state. His contempt for the racial ~ dispi_ires_ when the manager tried to serve notice Olryr elfed A e Hel; a 0 05;eulmre of the mines and his arrogance toward his European superiors made; hirh a . — . isriohs to argue that he needed three months wrégfeh ¤¤¤f{<>e*§>}”* it Ha? PP me natlufil hero of the workers and a béze naire of European bosses, one infrimiahr { r nity to answer the charges before any dismissal. Ile perslsle lh _e evm? 9 _ l recalled: i correctly, that he was being persecuted because of his union activities and- or vrg . . ` orously representing the union’s case. He noted in a letter to the manager. This age is also known as the turkey getting age because without being able to ir _ _ _ th M er and the Unions SW6 present of turkey and possibly money and pay inhuman adoration to the En- 2 r I I agree that, at trade drspute interviews held between e I mag f d and mpeeh Over 1'heheger one cannot aspire to have a penny increase on his salary_99 { V I always possess strictness in my discussions, and that 15 3 r¥1el¥e1' 0 my, 106 l should not be reckoned as evidence of unrulmess and conduct to the Managen While the CSIU llouudered in disarray, Ojiyi strengthened the CWU by solidi— ` Q I _ _ _ k , Sim lc in the diS_ fying his base among the underground laborers. By the end of 1943, he had pulled I . Ojiyirs political inclinations led to frame T-he WOT el; d tial bvmccs the Gfgehiletien away from Augustine Ude and had become General secretary of “ f course of radical nationalism. As a unionleader, he emeulefe in ul; b gyleen the the Colliery Workers Union. ._ Within the context of colonial exploitation. Hi saw the relatrousl P ed_t_OnS in Unlike the edueated Clerks, he did not look down on the miners and other ia. F wcrksrsr political status as colonial “sub]ects and the 1¤¢0le1'ebbef>¤l; fi); Workborers. but relished his role as their leader He was a populist, quite similar to rhhhy _ which [hey worked and lived. These connections were eveh mere ¤H;1°a'-I contradiclradc union leaders of the period, men whom the Colonial Office viewed with sus- Q { ers in e state €¤'?°"PIlSc such as the ?°1hcry‘ Olly} damned the PO C le he used picion. Whitehall concluded that the major problem in West Africa’s labor rela- tions ih his Prescmation Of the ¤°lh°*Y Workers dcmaHdS' For cxamp

250 “We Were All Slaves” Q I The Palitics of "PV0du€!i"i'Y" 25] { I . ‘ ` 1 ` dt ' il — allegations of racial discrimination to link the workers’ industrial struggles with the i Mlnuslissls-W moliomom Hs alS° Ylmmcdiitihat Yat€S;;digri;;;;:a¥i;1;0 ioiiiimiiiti; general nationalist campaign against colonial racism. A key component of his ide- `» ence htm to voteim dig May electron for e mairzdgi i Ciiipmedi ology was the expectation that those in authority——the state—had a responsibility i y to Y°P1soo T-ho umo“· In a mm to the manage J yl I for the social development of their employees. These themes of racial discrimina- I . I was beaten to distraction this you [by] the Overman, Yates Pf€Vi°“s tv the tion and state responsibilities were echoed throughout the nationalist movement. ~i beiiiiiig iiicidciiii ML Yates adviggd me io take part in the votlng of the Pooldo ' . who would constitute the Managefs New 0¤gw¤¤iZ¤ti¤¤- In mY {°P1Y· Itoid mg; RESISTANCE T0 RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AMQNQST ri , _ that that would be impossible as far as I remained a Secretary m the Union. BROAD SECTORS OF THE POPULATION This was ` ' `d tt `t O'i ito demonstrate his militant posture as . Just the rncr en 0 permr J y _ _ _ ;,5 g .. . . · ‘ 1 d I d Racial coniiicts between British “bosses" and the workers were pushed to the sur- i` · I 3 }¤¤d€¥· Ojiyi Tolootod Sovolidmom adV1°ci;° settle Lhiiiiglg .i¥ii;ntii:il§i;i€ face. The colonial labor process, with its racial forms of control, was unsustainable ’ z on taking the GKSG to the m¤S}sLfsto· Whom C was aw ii hisioiic i_iiC_ now that the political apparatus was being reshaped to accommodate indepen— ‘ r him a hero and reinforced his image as a grave ieaddiiiciiiiiufgiliyniigpcnid B3 his dence.“” Ofhcially, the state could not protect what white bosses did to "native" , tices that had ierrorrzed underground wor ers isrnc; ii sm cd and Eumiiiiiiii staff workers in the dark recesses of the mines. The frequent resort to corporal punish- tf, I personnel mo dldlostos that °m;il };;r?S;Lli;1;C:[:;him pp ment and the dehumanizing racial discourse in the mines became indefensible. The = `, i W¤1’€ €V€f 100kmE or my oPPo m ° ' whole political apparatus that supported the colonial labor process was being { iv chipped away as old conventions were being discarded and replaced with "new" I V INDUSTRIAL PATERNAUSM AND STRUGGLES systems of industrial control. The coll.iery's European staff were not convinced that OVER SOCI AL REpR()DU(j‘|‘I()N; TH E COL LIERY VE NTU RES tliciiirirsw systtiims cidiuciil work but thzi wg iightingiia ltiiiiirrg battle tg retidiin the oldi Ji . IN-I-O -I-HE AFRICAN HOME arges o racr scrrminatron ter into pu rc scourse an co `ery raci ii i _ _ _ __ _ _ I d di · dI_ tensions increased as bosses tried futilely to preserve the colonial labor process. In addition tothe 1156 of OJ1}¤, tho ¤¤¤r·=¤S·;id d$ii“;a;?S;;i;;;iii;iia'i;iiici; Workers reported incidents to the press, throwing into public view abuses that were r ` ing cost of i¤H¤T-1011, 1943 Was also tho Year (MF iiii Emiiic with unions being formerly hidden in the mines, protected by "white skin" privilege. Through the na- · i made strides toward a coherent housing policy. 11 cciidiiiiiiiis and the Wciiiiiii tionalist press, they reached a receptive audience among the clerical workers so dis- formed, tho Hd0P¤0¤ of Malo? Ofdo BmYV:*° iiiccfggnmeni cmiic to use the COL satisfied with the direction and pace of political change. Most incidents of assaults » I fofofms sogggsiod by the BF“:ig°E;a(iI;iri:;i;cF0i Example the Social Wcifaie Of_ octmrred when Africans refused to be subservient. Such was the case with Ojiyi. ` — HWY as s mo o site t° test m us _ ‘ .’. . . i Later, in August 1945, Ojiyi had the opportunity to present himself as a "hero" r . HGH developed Programs to reduce the acgiiicm IEEE; glgliggiggstgigggginssgig in the eyes of those workers who had felt the brunt of violent discipline in the ~ provision of boots, S¤f€¢)I h€k¤€€S, 1;;_ngYmmi?i5 Pifvglicd by iiiii British Safety mines. In this instance as was often the case the British superwisor was a man e aid and accident prevention W¤1'€ o I _ _ _ _ . . .’ ’ . . » - · f the Collrery s Inspector of from the British working class probably attracted to colomal service by opportu- , l in Mines Research Board under the supervision o i i ii_ iii nities to earn more money and live better than at home. The underground manager, i ` Labour WCG. Wormai. Alitiliiiiugh the industry had no doctor, an assrstan me is T. Yates, claimed that Ojiyi refused to foHow his instructions and then laughed at Q f ofdcer fiom Emigu Visim al Y·_ _ _ _ _ i i ii ii ii him. This was more than Yates could take and he slapped Ojiyi. He gave this ac- `* i , Heeding Orde Bmwuo S ossortlons aboutnutirno1*i;liH1;ii>;id:im;i1:dsm€: gidicliidiigni count of the incident in the grammar of an undereducated English worker who en- ~ ` Salitlo beverages Woso Provided at Va·“°‘dS SP° S u“_ g ’ , . ihii joycd ii privileged Status in the cdioiddsios i I ( using cocoa drinks began with plans for implementing a food ration system rn . I r future.“" As Orde Brovtme anticipated, the men resisted any attempt to supply food Then Isiah started to laugh soltold him that it was notalaughing matter, he per- rations ai-guihg that if they had more pay they could buy their ovm food. I-le sisted on laughing so I wamed him a second time that he need not laugh about it I _ iamiiiitcd the fact that the coiheiy wquld not be able to use rations in Enugut which He still laughed so I slapped him across the mouth with the back of my hand. He I Q he iioiiid had been SO effectively jhtmduced in both South Afrioall and CoPPoYboh laughed again so I slapped him again, then he seemed to go mad at the thought i ? miiicsiug that he had been struck and went and called two hewers to witness the fact that I i · iii keeping Wiih Oidc Biowiiiis Suggestions mid Cdkmiid Office puiicyi the sci. had Severely dogged him when an the time the only Witness was my Cloth bDy'w9 ` d liery’s reforms were directed at the social wage rather than at increasing the base { . · · ‘ {1 ' `ties Ojiyi insisted that the assault was not due to insubordination but because man- ~ g Salary- This was because Officials expected dat by lmpmvmg cc am mem agement was trying to "level false accusations on rne" to prevent his receiving his ` W01'k¤fS would not request mosossod Wagos

252 ··We View All _giavE_r·» The Politics of "Prvductivity" 253 While before the war many officials were concemed about encouraging a sta- ' ’ _' · _ . . » t ble mining community, now they saw such communities as an important context r j , » .’ * it ' h in which to cultivate disciplined workershs . ha » . As anticipated, when Orde Browne’s report was made public in late 1941, it led ,_ ` r ~ _ ' ` to queries in Parliament that embarrassed the Colonial Office and the Nigerian gov- · . , · I, y ‘ , ` ernmenth" Nonetheless, it was not until March 1942 that the Nigerian govemment Z ; , " ' he , i ` " ` i " " s ` applied for a loan under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act to finance an , — s » ` . _ ~ _` 7 . ’*' ambitious housing scheme to correct many of the abuses mentioned in Orde ` .. ··t»» V _" ‘ * Browne’s rep0rt.h“ In the interim the Nigerian govemment had tried to upgrade — ' ‘ Z ` , - _ . ‘ ' some of the housing and continued evicting what they considered to be superfluous ` ` , A `»`>` .» J “ ,9 , people from the camps. This act itself tampered with the structure of family life and . { I M _) ‘ met with considerable opposition from the men. To them these evictions, while log- . ~ `sr ·. *%i¤=¤1¤i‘*——=# ’°“ or L ical from a health standpoint, were an unwanted invasion into their homelife. The L .r _ .4,t ‘ if Q'.,r,r£Z?§Lh i ,_ ability to head a large household, a rural norm expressed in the "Big Compound," ~ . -_ hw t _ _ “n’“"" ?'Ji"-··--y ~— " was a sign of male prest.ige.hs Although it presented difficulties in the city, the sta- V; L =t·eY?iesh“f*` "_;" °“fQ,,.,. ' ` ‘ ’‘‘· *· T . . tus connotations did not necessarily disappear. As noted above, many goverrmrent h ` _ ·;- ·- - . _, ` employees were expected to open their homes to rural relatives, and apparently did ,1 ~ "f§;_ ~`;.· L M _, I ‘ ' ei so to such an extent that their rates of overcrowding exceeded those of privately , Q t »`~rr iih*'_`~Y Q ‘ i i- r _ f N _, employed men."° Colliery men relisshed this role, provided they could negotiate ‘ V ~` M; y [ ge" U `“”°f“t·‘ — 1` i ‘ sufficient wages to endure the economic stress of the war. Their opposition to the C ` :1 M ` 4 ,y `V s J V f occupancy restrictions indicated the cultural character of the social wage. : ' " "“”‘ ‘ `’‘` '°" " `‘`` `°" “” "" " ""`hN"-V W wm '``` M ` V _ _ By November ig42 the British Treasury had approved e iouu ¤f£104’00O for f , Photo 6.3 Garden City Housing Estate (MMS.AFR.s. 1507 Fol. 24—Bodlenan Library, the construction of 461 semi-detached houses, providing 922 rooms.m From its ` , OXf°’d) inception, the project was envisioned as a model of state ownership for critics in ‘ Britain and a demonstration to Africans of the correct, "modem" way to construct _. , houses. Construction began in February 1943. Orde Browne, like many in the Colo- . .d H, t al minin vii_ nial Office, perceived the project as an "object lesson on the possibilities of gov- , ' W0fk€r unrest. Rather, they modeled the camps on an 1 y ic pas or b _ hg d emment ownership, both as a business proposition and in maintaining satisfactory , lags that followed the “f3arden City, model of town planning. ordered rrg t and conditions for working people."m In Enugu, a colliery "Housing Committee" had .' " airy houses, with sufficient vegetation. In-fact, the Udr Siding Camp wais ca ed finalized the plans in a series of meetings held as early as October 1940. Mem- , — G9-Fdeh Ciiym But it Was One Thing to design the Physical space that Wg Us ahh bership in the committee touched all major govemment agencies involved in land V s their h’-nhhes °°°nP1°d· md hmm another to make [hem occupy lt amor ng to E use and social welfare, as well as labor officials and colliery welfare staffhs At no I i_ Y Phehhes Of eelemal 1¤b¤;¢¤<j¤S~ _ ,1 .th . point did the committee bother to consult with the unions or the workers. It was . · , Officials ignored the miners own preference in modern homes blur t vga assumed that they Wouid be impressed by me superiority df Biirisii piauuirig Again, ; roofs in the village. lt was assumed that once the communities saw owl eautr lu they were Wrong , ` and modern these buildings were, they would modify their own construction rn t e The three estates were an excellent example of an "imagined" English mining it y Viheges-125 _ _ ld b · village, an illustration of the fantasies colonialists entertained in the world inhab— j A The Plan was that °h°° In the estates the Womch and ghlkirhn WO"; . if sgpgited by African workers. Not surprisingly, they reflected the frustrations of con- `° r Vised by femfne Welhne nfhcers wh° °P?rat°d ¤t¤1y¤¤¤¤ S chmcs may ESM Omg trolling the British coal miners. Two-room cottages on plots 40 by 60 feet were i g homes, teaching nhmh°n md h°ah‘h‘ Immhly he which sf the Siaff C Em us built with a verandah, electric lights, and a small garden. The camps had wide I Y ee? *md_DePuty Manager held these P°sts· Thcy also Vlshed ¤d1“°°'i;“ sigh roads, open spaces, bathrooms, social halls, and chlorinated water. It was to pro- ` The nnmhs hascnwd these lntmslohs and asked that the Women W;,,g€T; cars vide the spatial context for a new, more cooperative workforce. i [ SYOP “S“PeYW$ihg and meheshhg then yyiyes when they went} Wes · me min Although officials saw these estates as mining villages, they were not the rowdy t t imeheshhgly hhdehseered this by nafhmdlng the °fh°la1s of thggubstmu quo a type of English village that for centuries, and even in this war, fostered militant 1 i the Celhery Wmkcfs were whmbutmg towards the War CHO]-L

254 "We VI/ere All Sl¤ves" ‘ I V ``r» c ~ ~~ ~: —·*y V · ·< ~. ¤ e·;e‘ e :· ar »_ ’i,v`**’ s Despite the attractiveness of these new homes the men put up a formidable re- I .__ _ V Q , `V Y§,. i‘i; ` , ,· sistance to the more subtle but invasive dimensions of this project Many of the ur. , ; it V vg `4 4 Lg: ;4vr,,,gY iii; , $4444 htluiled mel'! were p0lYgYll0uS and insisted on having adequate housing for their , ,i> 4 4 4 4 4,24 » ;%&t · families, and servants as well. The unions organized a boycott of the estates and " ` a. if Vi . .; -., A,. qi of '‘`' fil Z N i fined people who agreed to occupy them.‘2° It was apparently effective, as in No- g~. in Y _, __VV . a sp V V gag; `*` Lx, _`V» 4 vember the Colonial Secretary ucted that only one hundred people had consented ( 4 if V, 4 4 i k? ·.;-1 _ 4 ~i~~ gi {»=.v to live in them.”° He noted that while they looked "very nice." they were "hog ’ "—-lie? · 7 ’ .t.ll ,,—s;;·.¤~Pv wash" and they cost over £100 per room as compared with £30 per room in Accra 4`T _ . 4 — fg . i i f if: rrl . . ,4 s , before the war, Moreover, he commented with disgust that “no one had appéueutly . · l 'Q, ';;» Q 1 ` ‘A all '§;r*¥\...l wi I , ‘~ J., attempted to find out the sort of accommodation which, while satisfactory from i, Q"]; ·· . ‘i . · ___ ,, ., T" the health point of view, would be acceptable to the Africans."l3l 3. `·i 4 ”¥`Z il " ' cgi, y ;· . ` i i' ` Y I { ° To the men the central coniiict was the impact of the houses on the famiiy’s an. i V P ijiili gt `} ; ${14% ,4 4 Y *.4 * . rg ¤ _ 5 4 tonomy. At a meeting with the Senior Resident and Acting Manager, AuguSti11e i , \ ‘ fil `, I. wl Ude. of the C0lliefy W0Tk€TS Union, complained that under the occupancy limits 4 ,4 *774},% ’ 4i; ` L 4 ,,4*4 4 .L » · . 4 4 A 2 4444 of 3% people per room in Garden City, they would have to leave PMT of th€lI f&m· { ·, _§ l 1 l ``A` ,,»_ l ° l MW; ily "beh.ind or throw them away,"m 4 Q E4,. 5,,, 4 — it v_ _ THE COLLIERY AND THE LABOR CRISIS IN THE BRITISH } , e. _ J l , _“ ' ` { COAL INDUSTRY: MANAGERIAL MANIPULATION V. ° ;~Q;·§;—¥ _ ° I ` ` » OF IIPRODUCTIVITY ’ STATISTICS ’* Photo 6.4 William Leck with deputy colliery manager, district officer, and unidentiOne further change occurred at the Colliery in 1943. William Leck, the colliery’s fied prominent African men (Courtesy of P.E.H. Hair, personal collection) only manager, retired. He was replaced by Russell Bracegirdle, a thirty—one—year- l old mining engineer with no experience in Africa.*”.Bracegird1e “inherited" the , summer dispute just as the Combined Production and Resource Board of London ` asked the Nigerian govemment to increase the output at Enugu by some 250,000 P tons per year to supply the Allies' West African railways. For a young, inexperi— {Z ‘ enced manager faced with this challenge so early in his tenure at Enugu, tensions , — R were bound to be exacerbated. The request reflected the failure of the metropoli- ` ( tan state to resolve the endemic problem of the British coal industry—a slow but . A determined decrease in worker productivity and serious decline in manpower. By I _ , i August 1939 the British coal industry had already lost 65,000 men to better pay- 2 I , 1 ing jobs in war manufacturing and the armed forces. By 1943 this crisis had be- ' . 4 4 i J .. come full blown. That November the British government was forced to take T _ y, i extreme measures: it began compulsory recruitment of men for the mines. Twenty _ ~ ~ l " percent of all drafted men, 18-25 years old, were sent underground.l3" l I .~ ri` _ gi " · _ ‘ In Enugu, Bracegirdle calculated that he could increase the monthly output to ` "7* ‘‘‘‘ M ’ M i ~ U ` 60,000 tons with minor alterations in the colliery’s railway facilities and the hir- `4 ;4 ‘~ _ _ ,_, Ei,. ing of an additional 1,000 miners. The previous year’s output had averaged 530,000 lemme J tons. The size of the workforce expanded to 4,000 in 1943/44 and 7,300 by 1945/46 _ ” Qr H (see Graph 6.1). The additional staff permitted an output of 668,148 tons making . 5 lg TTM “```` TT" Q5 Enugu coal the sta le throughout West Africa (see Table 6.1).135 y I f _ ,_ . . In the process olf reaching these production goals the new management made ` ·>4` Ph°t° 65 {Salah Ow" Amw/bla' my 1975 (Carolyn technical decisions that, while increasing production, both reduced the output per I l` Bmwnl , ik

i '5 I 256 l "We Were All SIaves" \ ’ The Puliriqy of ·‘Pmdummy" 257 . opment and it was necessary to redcploy men to cawe out new pillars for future ex- ` · { Lraction. Instead of retrenching workers who were no longer able to perform mb- l Q@Y i 1 bery, they retained them, and the number of men exceeded “the demands of · ,` develo ment and ¤ot out of ro onion with the strict needs of the circumstances."‘39 Gold Coasi 89,403 84,510 i { Theliechnical gcploymeigt oilabor in production was of cmcial imporrance durSomh Amca 6,149 — ing the war because of changes in the pay system that was instigated by wartime V Q strikes. As shall be seen in Chapter 7, managemenfs concem with productivity inBclgium 17,156 _ ~ ‘_i creased when all face workers (hewers and tubmcn) successfully won a basic un1 dergmund allowance in addition to tonnage or piece ratesi Previously, under the Siem Lggnc 14,882 17,020 Bulkclcy Award, only the hewers had both basic and piccewatos, while the tubmcn * _ were only on time rates. As noted previously, this aspect of Enugu’s pay systemGambia 602 1,502 i the payment of time rates to tubmen—dched the logic of productive coal payment ¥ systems. Tubmen, whose supply of tubs determined the output of hewers, should D¤h¤1'¤¢>’ 541 — `_ Q have been paid by the numbers of tubs pushed (piece-rate) as an incentive for them ~ ` to supply tubs expeditiously. Interestingly, as early as 1937, the Representative FICE Fmncc 83»033 46,341 i Council raised the issue of putting the tubmen on picce—rates (ie., payment per rub S _ · supplied). It took fully ten years before management applied this basic component pamsh Gov, 6,559 785 _ of production incemivesi The issue of worker productivity, in all its mystitied exTOTAL 21 &325 ISO 158 E istence, obscured more than it revealed and sparked more critical struggles in 1945. l q, In this deployment of hewers to robbery, management diverged from the "ideal” l i i ratio of jobs that mine managers used in deploying workers to robbery and devel- ‘*` ’ opment tasks. Only 1 hewer was assigned to development for every .7 hewers in . _ ; ~ ` robbery as against the ideal ratio of l in robbery for every 2.26 in development glixiilxigS(ill;/Iiloifx?c;(;/tL;;;d§:-§;;;n};;(;1tf°r°€ and ¤¤¢r¤¤Se<1 the CUE vf P10- _ The estimated costs of this imbalance was 0ver'£l7,000 per year. lm Conveniently, increases they confronted incmasin I “Sci€mm11'1?1”€ S1J<>C€SSf1.1I m securing wage ii _ management igrioired these calculations when linking any future Wage gains I0 lllmcm and the smc Worke , d C °¤¤¤1€1¤1$¤m¤¤1S bY 11‘1¤11é1g€- ` creased productivity, Since the hewers were the actual coal getters, any deploy- { I . rs pro uctivity becameacentral point of contention, Bc- 1 ment of labor that decreased their numbers in relation to other classes reduced cause calculations of output per man shift were often considered "objeciive" ’ ` OM5_ $;;i?;°;;£;i;§§ ;;c;1;;;1?l§§;§; l;';);`$tl11g‘1{Z7`2g,1`(1)2;Jl¥ to COI'1§Xt;aliac't1‘1cm and subject ‘. 2; In this Case, several ohanges lcd to a radical dBCli1'1€ in the I1111TllZ1€li of h€W€l’S— `* can be used to Obscure mmm- than cx DSE thI;f¤¢iSS- F0 11ct1v1ty measurements j [ho producers-in relation no other workers underground. Reorgamzing the w0rk» ` According to management Wm-kcrP méucti 1:11 Evgsgaints on worker output. zo _ group management followed what had become a customary pattern of underground from the 19374938 Strike Whén The Bulllzcle A 1 lc; 3 SSH On a sleady decline ir deployment, wliich xyao supposed Lo compensate for harsh underground conditions as noted in Chapter 5- While Output Smjstigs Y1? iwéd BWQIS a rmmmum wage K Q god the alleged mfenomy 0f‘“nat1vc"1ab0r.14‘ Worlg groups were composed of one 6.5) the underlying Cause Of this decline the c;H0W€ 2; d;0i1n OMS (see Graph Fgilwayman, two umbermen, eight tubmen, mid eight hewers. The primary coal tcm, was Obscuwgby the mmm of mmf; Work Ialitég B €W¢r contractor sys- " exLract0i·5, the hewersawcrc less nhan half of this nineteen-man group. In fact, this ‘ bulk Of the new Workers to mbbery mmovin - 31 fmagjigéméntkassigned the . decline; in hewers relative to other underground workers became a fatal trend dur gped miH€S· Tha impact on Output And labor gi; HYS 0d;) lil previously devel- I g mg the ova; Tho he:wers’ propomori of the total workforce declined from 20,54 dmon bugged to the Colonial Office that c S 1·1l;&S drmauc. Governor l3our- Q peroent m 1940/41 mo 14,43 percent in 1946.***2 Additionally, the large number of numbers of Wm-kms the Comery reached a 220V€1'l 21 KG1 3St1C·rcduct10ns. in the Z auxiliary underground workers was a natural consequence of this largé l'111mb€1’ of 1 percent lower mice pm- mn 138 While This ma IIEYCSHI mcrgasc in output with a 40 I wo;-1$s;;os undo; the pillar qyid smll system. As the management opened new work that Enugws management émd the Ni Emmlét tV€ P€1”S1-13 id the Colonial Qffice i dlsmogs or ";·obbed” thooe m development, more and diore men W€l’€ ¤€€d€d FOI managcmentpracticcs and hmmm thin Work? 6 W€1’g]€F1¢1;y olaserying iiauonal ‘id€adwo;k," Le., the maiplenance of roadways, pumping of Water, and replacing illusion was Shomhvazi I _ El E I 01’¢€ Ul'1 er lll llSU`1H1 discipline, the j Limbo;-_ Moreover, as addmonal men were deployed for surface tasks, the hcw€rs` . nevina y, extraction reached the limits of existing devel- proportion of the workforce fell even more drastically.

258 "We WM All Sl¤v¤4·" Q The Purim of ·*1>maumvrry·· 259 Table 6*2143 Hewors 46 Percentage or Undorgrouod Workroroo r ' Graph 6.1 Hewers in Relation to Other Categories of Workers Total Hewers % Hewers % of 4 ww Year Undng. Hewers Undgnd, Total Total , "°° , ` { _ ` 1940 1,365 461 34% 2,244 21% { p ¤¤°° _ ‘ ’ . 4. 4 A T 1941 1,461 503 34% 2,377 21% f S 5°°° _ buriace V . * ¤s,,r,,,_ 4 . . , " 4 f Z Y u 11 rd 1942 1,822 658 36% 2,928 36% 1 j E ‘“°° _ V p ,_ , K ._ ,'·, , ~; :H:,,Z,$ 1943 2,470 920 37% 4,070 23% 3 = °°°° 4 4 Q Q` F , ‘ ° ` r ‘ r n if 1944 2,986 1,046 35% 6,625 16% =°°° , Q ‘,., l. 4 if ro V 1946 24766 941 44% 7.476 1s% . *°°° __,___,_._.,,,.,,,,,·,,--,1,14-14 ° ·==1¢‘j_’{=;` ·,`41;ii_§j"§g` `_§24 j_`f;;-_;Z- 4, -,5,,;;;. =;§;¢Z;駀;:;§;4,i;§;2;a;§2.:§4;"é2;=§e§Z.‘ 1946 2,940 955 33% 6,660 14% 44 _ 1m 19,1 19,, ,9,: ,9,, ,9,5 ms 1941 me 1947 3,465 1,187 34*V 6,704 18*7 Y` ¢° D , ,;· Source: Great Britain, Colonial Office. Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Disorders 1948 3,422 1,355 39% 7,134 19% in the Eastern Provinces 0fNigeria. C.O. No. 256, London, 1950, Table lV, 57. 4 4 4 4 4 4 r B The deployment of workers was but one factor impacting production. The se44 n`°"‘?"?‘°Y4°“h“d?°““‘“”‘°?"?'t‘°“°“°a‘°"‘“‘°‘°“‘”“S€*‘*"“*‘“°"°°*‘“S° 1 vm underground conditions thatreduced worker 446441.44, discussed 1Il chapters, productrvity was calibrated by dividing the number of workers 111tO the total out- — _ _ , . 4 145 4 4 4 ’ » did not improve apprecrably during the war, and in fact worsened. The haulage put, or similarly, the number of underground workers into total output. The smaller ‘ . t muapscd under the strain of mis Surge in production creating costly d€_ _ _ 4 4 4 4 4 . sys em — _ g;;;;I;);;;;;;2a2s§;(;;;i:r; 2 2;:;;-sa hi]; aigigfhc pmducuvltyl This ls 4 lays in the supply of tubs, Outside the mine shortages of replacement parts for traigz 4 4 . 4 P I · : ~` also caused costly delays in availability of rolling stock to evacuate coal, as well, This unfavorable ratio of productive to non—producnve face workers reduced ei , . . - - f H output by 30 percent and added 9d to the total cost of production per ton Hew— 11 1 Fmm the 444¤d¤¤4¤* of the mmcm any pay system that made than mow; u y · r · · 4 4 ` 4 4* _ dependent on production made them carry the burden of wasteful managerl pracgm Wages were only 3'gd of this amormti While the rcmammg Sid was Paid to 1 4 tices poor environmental conditions underground, and delays in the supply of tubs other underground workers. The tinancial impact was obscured while wages were g : ’ . 4 t t V tthis Ship? 4 4 4 ` _ underground and of railway cars on the surface. Their attemp s o pre en low, or when only the hewers received a basic daily tub—rate. The full consequence , , _ f . 31 cs Onsibmt chuactmzad the indusmal Struggles towards the of this decision would become obvious after the war when, in 1946, the tubmen, , V, ’ mil) frglanagcn I P y as well as hewers, received daily rates. In this case the hewers’ output was not high p · an O c Wu enough to compensate for this large number of workers, and it distorted the pro- >i ; _ ductivity calculations. However, as a postwar st11dy noted, the costs of hewer out- THE LONG AWARD, AN ”ILLEGAL LOCKOUT" put was obscured: V PAVES THE ROAD TO IVA VALLEY, 1944-1945 It is obvious that any decrease in Hewers’ O.M.S. must correspondingly result ‘. Wankng 1ndus¤1a1 policy was largely successful in preventing work Stoppages at in an increase in the production cost of their coal. However, the whole signifr- . , Enugrr However, by lnte 1945 the conflicts between the two trade u1110nS,1he CWU cance of this rise in cost of roduction is not so a arent, and is due to the inci— " 4 and the CSIU, clashes between Ojiyi and Bracegifdlei and T-he crushtng W¢1sht<>f1¤P PP , _ _ _ dence of rho mod daily Wage not of H=W6r6 o¤lY» bur of thc Whole SYOUP of f¤¤5 i V' nation brought the coljiery to the brink of another cnsis. Several elements converged. Wvrkefsm 4 ` the state’s use of the new Nigerian General Defense Regulations to curtail strikes,

260 "We Were All Sl·zves" ' , ‘ The Palmer of “r·rar1miviry*· 261 Gra h 6.2 Percentages of Workers by Cate ory l Gra h 6.4 Total Output of Coal in 100,000 Tons, 1940-1948 PEP il WWW .;· ..-,n\._¤ ·: nrc,. .,, . ;», a ·~¤ .- ,=- .. . =‘»‘ : - `; a ="_;·‘· - Q.3E‘§r` lm e..rr.a. 1945 lm r. 5 = t ,,,, , 1¤0¤¤¤ a f ·; gas _ s 7 : r . is ~. ;% 7 ~ , Qt ay 2 = · ¥ E · *¥ ‘ as ¤ sua 2 600000 = · · ;~; _- ; = 5*; no · ; e an * s ` =. 8....... me nil:. H , _ , ,, mm l a. ·; ? *··-··· ¤=·· “* Ti" ~ 5 is =§ t 2 me . i. wanna 2 T senate --·=—- ·—·· v aa ‘· =- : :=z ` if s_.s=-s= - r as- ‘··‘ , l g °°°°°° s M *5* er w ‘°“°°° at . - t i $ource:Great Britain, Colonial Office. Report ofthe Commission errnqurry ima rhs prscrders ¢ ~ 0 - M it in the Eastern Provinces of Nigeria. C.O. No. 256, London, 1950, Table i\L 57. wm 1941 an 134; 19(4 1945 1946 1941 1848 j Graph 6.3 Output per Man Shift, 1945-1951 i i Source: Powell Duffryn Technical Services, “First Report to the Under·Secretary of state for the ‘ Colonies, Colonia; Office, Dgvgy House, Whitehall S.W.1., on the Government Ccllierv, EnusuV l The Characteristics ofthe Coal Produced and the investigation into the Other Coal and Lrgnite '°-""'*’“"'°l . I Resources/' London, 1948, D-2. —X-—AIlIIm‘kvqr0•nd Q l I ··t--'I'¢|¤|Ur•trgr¤un¤lSur(•¤• V um i day, an underground allowance of 2/6, and improvement in underground condiml ~ tions to prevent occupational diseases—rheumatism, consumption, lock_iaw,· and g ZM l other infirmities. He also asked for free mining equipment (i.e., shovels, picks, E W `L Q ere.), a divergence from British practice, arguing that tools should be supplied by E Mn X X ` ` the state because Enugu miners worked for the Nigerian govemment which repMD ‘‘’'`‘‘ A ` , resented the people. Further, in a personal attack against the new manager and an Mliw iw mv nn me im rm l V attempt to curry favor among surface workers, the memorandum COHlpl8.1l\€d that l, i conditions for the surface workers had deteriorated, and wages had fallen since the i ` coming of the new managerlil i A · ‘ ' `lt` fth Absolute Fi ms of cm u, HM/an Shih OMS g When management did not respond, Ojiyi threatened a strike, m vio a io; 0 e Year Ne. ot"Days Output 0Ms S , Defense Regulations. It appears that Bracegirdle may actually have set up e con_-_h°"‘ -l-°“ -I l-°"‘ M AH frontation to create an opportunity to change both the pay system and further tighten EK 267 668,158 2,02 0,505 - ogg; r . managerial control over the labor process. He made two proposals Wh1¤h he BIIEK 2¤¤ 505 565 2.22 0.543 rms ` · , gugd would give the increased pay the union demanded. The tirst grouped the men :3:; gl), 0551 0374 ` l into symdicates of sixty—30 hewers and 30 tubmen—to be paid an aggregate wage IEE 307 610 283 iss ams 0,327 Y ; [hat they could divide equally between them. Tubmen were to fill rather than push -® 230 526 S13 l·3° °·3°B ‘ tubs, a clear fragmentation of the hewers’ skill. The second option used the same -m— 307 583 lm l lll 0 all ·,_ , , work groups, but with p1ece—rates based on individual work.1‘“ Both terrmnated all ` = ~ time payments (i.e., daily pay rates) and put the key underground workers-the the Struggles with union l“d€YShiP to secure l-he Confidence Gf the W0*`k"IS= and the Y} , hewers—fully on tom1age—rates (i.e., piece—rates). With hewers,·spec1al labor, and attempt by a new manager to rcgm m¤¤¤s¤ri¤1 a“th°*`l'iY OVEF the l¤lZ>0f P1'0<>¤SS- 1_ " tubmen on piece-rates, he argued, they could earn the money m the union S deThe crisis began in August 1944 when Ojiyi submitted an extensive mernoran— gr ~ mgnd_l‘i9 dum that mlS°d a ““mb°r °f grlcvanccs that rchccmd lh° gains Of British COE] mi¤· ` y ‘ From the perspective of management it was a brilliant but naive proposal. since ers. Referrin to conditions in En lish mines, he demanded: a seven-hour workin » , me Bulkglg sgttlgment the newer; had earned both day and tonnage rates, givmg ES2X_y

262 "We Were All Slaves" » The Politics of “Pr0ductivity" 263 Graph 6.5 Productivity Charted Against Wage Awards E lockouts, for example. Bracegirdle’s action looked curiously like a lockout, an il1 Legal lockout, Ojiyi, representing the underground workers, anticipated an lmfa'·°° 4 i vorable outcome of arbitration and attempted to withdraw the demands and deal — V' ` directly with the Chief Secretary. He asserted that if forced to arbitration, the union son A , ~ would not accept responsibility for the workers’ response. He submitted his letter wr ¤··¤·¤·r¤····¤ ’ ‘ to both the Chief Secretary and to the nationalist press, attempting to alert the larger m y 5 I community of an impending confrontation}53 Surface workers, on the other hand, 3 g under advisement from Nnamdi Azildwe, the nationalist leader, refused to partic, M V y · Q Thus, in its first major protest, the union became ensnarled in the compulsory E r ` arbitration requirements of the Nigerian General Defense Regulation (1941) giv’·°° 2,3551/.11;Awe1d t· "`°/“_:J;°;:__v°_;;1`x';1°;m'd ·` 5 ing it firsthand experience with the laws then being targeted by the national trade rms inn Award i `, ` union movementlss no . . .. W C°mm°°°°° wm , ` As Ojiyi anticipated, the arbitration under Harold H. Long, a chartered accoun“""°‘” ‘·'°°' W H C n A tant from Lagos, was far from impartial. Although Long was extremely unsympa— W rtsouap. 1 Q thetic to the union’s case and Ojiyi, he was locked in by the restrictions of the . . , Defense Regulations. The union presented its case, demanding return to individk V ual pay and the maintenance of the daily wage with piece-rates and underground °"° » f r further increases and u adin of the staff. The manaMeeer··~e··aeer~eearers~·ae~r » ZQ§Z?25inZ2§`i“F£sZitsmns. iii g .Q _ The anbgnaden award annguncgd 111 january 1945, rejected 1he nnienis demand 5¤¤r¤c= NN/*5 5/6 <2> Nigerian Ccci €¤t¤¤r¤ti¤¤ ”0¤¤¤¤t Pct Hewcr Pct Dat-” 1 . and ruled in favor or the nianagenientis nrst proposal, syndicate work with group = pay. The union was dissatisfied with the ruling but was mandated to comply under ` ‘ the Defense Regulations. The new system was to begin April 1. To the manager, management little control over the pace of work or of productivity. Each hewer ` the men were finally put under the full incentive program. The possible earnings was entitled, in the very minimum, to the day—rate and this he would be paid for . 1 under the Long Arbitration are summarized in Table 6.3. only showing up to work even if he sat down throughout his shift. Moreover, by _ paying a daily rate the colliery was in essence shouldering the cost of productiv- _ » Table 6.3'5° Wages Of Hcwefs and Tubmeri B¤5€d 0¤ i-WB Award, 1945 ity caused by deplorable conditions underground.‘$° Putting all workers on piece- i ¤ rates forced workers to carry the economic burden of these conditions on their if -` H°‘”°’S R°bb°'i’ D°"°1°*°"‘c"‘ wage packets. Were all workers on only piece-rates, management could increase { I 1 1,,1, 2/2 2/5 productivity simply by hiring more workers, as they had done before the 1937 V i changes.‘5l Thus the manager’s proposal to restructure work relations was far more 2 _ . 2 mbs 3/6`1/2 4/gd than an attempt to enable the men to make more wages. It was a desperate move i ' , 10 ,,,1,, 5/3 7/; to recapture managerial control over the labor process at a time when Enugu coal i i was of strategic value to the Empire. Workers recognized it as such and responded A " accordingly- ~ . runner . Bracegirdle was fully aware of the powers he now held under the new labor leg- * i islation. Thus on 22 September 1944, he dismissed several hewers when the unions l f 1 mb UH/2 Us responded with a trade dispute}52 The unions rejected both options, and the dis- 1 _ 5 ,,,1,, 2/1-1/2 2/; pute went to arbitration under the Nigerian Defence Regulations (1941). This- 1 2 iike Britrins Essential work (con Mining industry) order or 1941-prohibited .1 i° *****5 34 "’5 strikes in strategic industries and mandated compulsory arbitration in trade dis- { ` 15 ,1,1,, 4/1.1 .. putes. But the law also offered some protections to workers—protections from ¢ ,

264 wk were AH ggavey V * The Politics of "Pmducrivity" 265 The manager decided to conduct an experiment in March to determine the bes; T : Table 6.4 Number of Workers 1 93 8-l 948 (Annual AVEFGSS) timekeeping methods to use. When output during the trial period dropped drasti- * ` C8-lly—0l1€ mb per hcW€1”—it was clear that the miners were in dispute against the ~ ` _ No. ofWorke`;;faAxmu¤lAvtv1; ml U amd Oiglcwm asglm award. There may have been other reasons why the system was unworkable but ` p YW Hmm {(33; ; S cc ir; su;·m und ri Labor the manager did not think them through. Rather, Bracegirdle decided to force the L was 507 1387 ig ig) miners to accept his new system, demanding that they all sign individual agree— `_ V ig? 879 2244 34 21 ments to follow the award. Refusal to sign was interpreted as resignation}57 Under J ’ lg; 503 gsi; 916 2 377 34 21 Part 8 of the Nigerian Defense Regulations, he could argue that the arbitration » { ldd 658 1163 gig gg award was compulsory}58 VV = gil igilo 3639 6 625 35 16 Of the over 2,000 underground workers confronted with what the manager de- lr — 1945 9;; gg?) Egg gg lined as “the new terms of service," only 117 headmenlsupervisory staff and six . _ E2; 19187 2278 my 6 m4 34 Q1 hewers agreed to sign. Among the signatories were former officials of the CWU- } _ 1948 i ass 2067 3712 7»l34 39 19 Augustine Ude, Joseph Okpokwu, Sam Ude, and Jacob Ahamefule—men with pre- s V i Vious histories Of Sympathy with managemcrm On March 23 the management V . $gurge;CaIcuIared from Nigerian Government Colliery, "Annual Report for {he C0||ierv DB¥1l'1H0l1IlC€d that 1,800-1,900 miners were considered to have resigned and imme- l · pmmgml 1933-194;;** and Nigeria, Federal Ministry of Labour, "Udi C0||iery Quarterly Repwf diately recruited replacements in Owerri. A trade dispute was declared and Cap- Q, and Staff Welfare Oflleersi Q'-*ene*’lY Renons l938'l 94dH tain D.H. Holley, acting commissioner of Labour, came from Lagos and made an I ` unsuccessful attempt to break the miners’ resistance.'5° ‘? i The tenuous position of the CWU under the new labor legislation was clear on , V _ _ April 3, when the manager Bracegirdle, the Secretary, Eastern Provinces, and . Y Nsnkkeh leading Bmcogddld to Suspend all recruitment m Ukmla’ mm and Abi)h’ Labour Commissioner declared the CWU unrepresentative of the workforce, ( the Offelldlilg villages- Nonetheless, minors canvasscd other Udl villages ¤¤v1S¤¤g thereby revoking the union’s recognition. In a classic example of circular reason- li ¤0TrHsooPe;‘*don with {cC“‘1t€"s· _t ff ti and forced govcmmcm to focus most ing they cited the m.iners’ refusal to comply with the arbitration award, which the i r e Wo? ers) oamP?dgn was dm F ° cc Vc _ , Defense Regulations had made mandatory, as proof that me union was hor {cpm. g ' ofthe recruitment in Oweni Province, the area in the palm belt that hed ¢0¤*¤b· sentativc of the miners.*6° Thus, while the union tried to express the resistance of ” uted so many "f0reign" workers m tlle llldustfy S early l¤Sl<>¥Y· This Fe{n°°YPom· the men to the new arrangements, they were nonetheless held responsible for mak- _ tion of the “f0l”eigT;‘§, T grouldr glglcll gn ws ;1?i:;;n;§;T;;; 1§;§;;2i;i;;;) ing this unpopular arrangement palatable to the resistant workers, In destroying r militant, was one 0 e iromes 0 ein us s 1S . “ · . ” 7 tho uhjohy tho mm-mgoh the Secretary, and tho Labor Commissioner had ol-cated t . once heralded for their industrial docility, were now the rmlitants who were to the very conditions that the legalization of unions was designed to prevent—work— ` be dlsnnsteddéz BY May of 1944 the lndustry had between L800 and 1,900 new ing class militance organized secretly beyond the watchful eyes of the state. Thus _ r` me¤·‘°’ V __ _, management was surprised when they mobilized the Agbaja villages to support ` 4 The banning 0f the ¤¤i0¤ was greeted Won Pleasure bY OJIYI S dc“`a°F°rS from their position. i . among the clerical and underground supervisory staff as well as the ehte of While initially the managemenfs actions appeared to have "solved" the prob- I urban l!nPl"oVen'lent “nionS· Bod? they and EPS ml Clam Ccuncllors rdsemgdbojgl lem of a militant union, it nonetheless created two new difficulties—the recruit- ‘ * ( because he dePnVed [oem ef their nghtful role as leaders' In the Vmd kit .y E ment of replacement men and the need for a representative body for the workers, L or l1l'|.l0H, Tllétllilfball d1ST-25; nmoris ?·ndfVt?aéo o;;‘§;i;;?§l§£;;rg1a§; As punishment for confronting the management, recruitment bypassed those Ag- i fepfesent e nnne*'s· a [dee mg ° 6 ml _ ’ baja villages that were previously given preferential access to jobs to prevent over- `, ; Thomas N0isll<e~ a cvlliery 1nte"Pl`ote'~ blamed the dispute dw pmtllems Of dams` crowding in Enugu, leading village leaders to complain vociferously against the ` · _ lining the Pl'oPos*d into the localldwlcct °f Igb°j The Dmswn Umm} Offered ti) exclusion of their people}61 Despite their dismissal the miners remained adamant ; · translate the ¤W¤1’d inte the Agbela md Nl<¤—¤¤ dialects of Igbd md med i° lm; in lighting for their jobs. They launched a vigorous offensive to discourage and , · ¤l<>¤ itself as s ¥ePTesenmn"o bedy fol =h¤1;¤rk¢fS· They asked I0 be Homie; 0 forcibly obsixuct new recruits. The DO Udi, reported that they crowded recruit- C _ impending dlsP‘-dos so *he¥ Could media? Amlough tile mmcrs WH? mem cts ment sites and prevented the enlismient of new labor. Moreover, miners also re- » vf these associations dominated by clmcal and nfmvc Slam they did not mm fused to assist him jh mooring workors who had 1-obbod a {oooh; you-ui; from l T them in industrial issues. And they had always considered village leaders to be too

266 “Vlk Were All Slaves" ` E unsophisticated to understand the complexities 0f workplace issues. In essence = - 165 . ’ · they distrusted these leaders. I ~ . . U V $ Q __! E _Q N I O, V) __, V] ,1 ,,,2 As workers rebuffed imtiatives by alternatives to the urnon, management real- 1 = lg 2 E 3 ¤¤ M sr Q E ·· N r N ° ized that by stripping the CW U of recognition, it was confronted with a disgrun- 1 ~ tled workforce with a long history of successful use of industrial disruption with . _ ` > Q U W _A _n C M W no organized group to represent them. The search for an alternative representative j ’ Q E g @ 2 .: g ‘ g 41- uu ' N -— body divided the manager from the Labor Department and the "old" from the ` ` "new" approaches to managing colonial labor. Bracegirdle, clearly bruised by his ` 1 H Q encounters with Ojiyi and the CW U, subsequently argued that he was sure the men , , , 8 E 2 E _E 0; 1 S 2 2 · Q N . . r . . . {1 Y "'° would accept the leadership of the village authorities and urban tubal umons. Al- ig ~ V though a newcomer to the colony, he felt that he “understood" native labor: 1 , g ~ 1 {weve eao _ ; ·~$·~~<~1 . . . . # ua . ... · · 1:4 · · · · Having had some experience of Ibo labour brought directly from ‘bush’ mto the A _ 5, r ,7, 2 ·- "‘ "‘ · " ° ”‘ ° N N mine I am not still satisfied that representation of workmen by a Committee com- j ` prised of their Native Authorities and Tribal Unions with a leavening of Colliery . g 3 § .4 ,,9 Q, ,,, sq _ E Q eq _ q q workmen would not be in the best interest of all concemedlsé ~, · < r ; 2 `* " N ·· ° On the other hand, the Commissioner of Labour, Capt. Holley, who recognized i` >_ Q Q . . ¤ sr Q . ·· 9 "i the signs as labor discontent, argued for a worker-elected body. He proposed the ,; _ § 3 g P5 E E E Q 1 2 ; us ' - ' election of an interim committee of delegates who could become the nucleus of a L , “ · new and perhaps more controllable trade union.167 ’ ul Q Q '_ M [_ _r °_ ......‘_0.O·...1 The debate was a local reilection of discussions within the Colonial Office on , E E Qg js 1< g c 2 — ¤- ' ¤ the principles for establishing organs of employee representation. To Bracegirdle, y ¥ the men’s status as workers was less salient than their existence as rural and urban ,‘ >_ Q v __ N __ . . . . . ·— = . . -; - · - .. . "tnbesmen." On the other hand, Holley recogmzed that the miners, as industrial ‘ — E Q gi g Qi ‘* ~¤ 2 ' 2 `* ` workers, were unlikely to accept representation by men who were outside the in- ,» dustry. This debate, which would pit one view of African labor against another, * E W g 3 _Q G 3 2 M g S 3 Q prevented a consensus within the state on worker representation. Workers recog- " 1 Q E 3 E ;* S 2 Q .4 1< ni i1m K 1 U = -· sq 0; Table 6.5 Accident Rates, 1943-1946 j J g g § E E E 3 E 5 E Z ' ' ' A pa 1¤¤,:oo Man sun; Type unuguuy ‘ ‘ E` Period m Output mi ::1:1 $31;,:1 ruui Nuiuruui sent mt 1-11uu1 leg ` .` F g E § 2 Q Q Y I aq 2 ,3; _ 2 _ o¤i.·¤¤¤. xm 4,s74 1:6,0:1 , _ » _: ¤_ ::4 ,; ..., ... N <* ... °° 11uu.1v1um11 1:44 4,:9: IZ4,l0l 1: :414 1 I 2 ».p111..vu11u1s44 4.:14 144,1:7 u zsz V Q Q g iu1y.suut. 1:44 5,::: l73,494 1 41: 7: ::.:4 6,1::.1: 1,::: sam 27.5% 1:.::4 ` I E 5: gi; § E 1 Z § Q E 2 · E OcL·Dec. 1:44 e.nza l79,B22 u 4s4 72 4,59:.:11 1.471 z4.u~/. :4,4% 23.4% , ` ff *·· '° ·¤ "' "' " "' Q iuu..Mua11:4s 6,142 l5l,664 o 4:: 5: :,4:1.:: 1,553 :4.4% 28.1% 20.0% i l O S ' Auu11.ruuu1a4s· :,:4: 100,540 o 4:: sa 5,106.24 1.::6 ::.1% :1.:% l6,l% , 45 ,7, .1 ,§° .E¤ July-Sept. 1:4:~ s.4oo 96,611 1 :2: 57 16.82 :,41111.4: 1,::6 ::.4% :11.:%, 14.4% · *,3 = E 3 B Ei 2 3 Z · u Zi ‘¤ o l-'· E ‘= °° 1: V1 3 sr oa..1:u¤.1:4:· 7,306 1:,:74 : :111 zz 4:16 s,:7:.au 1,848 :2.:% :11.1:% 1:.:% 1 E 5 za 5 E; E E ,6 g 5 _g 8 _3 2 Inn.-Mmm:1946 7,17: 14z,us¤ o 41: ts: 4,su:.4s 1,::s ::.4% :1.4% 17.1:% .» _ ,2 Tg ,___ 5 § G E L? § z 8 E '§ E rg 6 Ap111.1u11u 1:4: 7,:4114 1:4,4:1 z 41u 63 ::.:7 4,:71.so 1,723 4:.4% ::.4% 14.:% ` _` 5 { gig 5:% E T, ,3 gi} § ,,5: 76 E ¤ ru1y.sup¤. 1:4s 7,1:u 157,316 z :44 77 1:.:4 3,527.61 1,::7 323% 29,9% 23.2% , w E ·6 2: g 5 Tg 2;, G E 13 gf E E §° 5 E é . . . ¤ __ 4: ‘ •= *·· ¤¤ = ·- < o .. *Long arbitration dispute leads to drop in output and eventual strike. 1 . j *‘ E § E ;§ E g § E Q E ig "’ U" Q l J _ ¤ = B I/1 ... ; 3 ~ ·¤ Z1. E Q 2 2 LE ru E va e Source: Ministry of Labour 3/5.2 Vol. 1., Colliery Manager Quarterly Report. _ E "’

268 "W¢‘ WM/til S/Mr" . ,~ The Pnzttirr aj ·*Pmanrnviry" M9 nized this fracture in the armor of imperial labor policy and seized upon it when- ` j Table 5_7 Total Celliery Output, 1916-1951 ever possible. , , The resulting Representative Committee was an uneasy synthesis of the two per- . ` Yea' T°"S spectives: delegates were elected by the workers, but representation was based on , V, 1916 21511 both job (industrial) and clan (i.e., "tribal") categories. In late May, RH. Cook, a , ;t 1917 55·?€7 BTUC labor adviser to the Department of Labour, who became the colliery’s in- 1 1 1g;’844 dustrial relations officer was charged to call the election. Voter tumout proclaimed 1 _ 1920 1801122 the workers’ dissatisfaction: only 5.2 percent of the workers participated.1“ Blind t 1921,22 1941073 to this reality, management and the state insisted that the forty-six member Rep» ‘ ` 1922/23 112,818 resentative Committee was the new "representative" body for the workers. From _ { 1923/24 1751137 its inception the miners refused to accept them, as reported in their first meeting 1924/25 220*61 tm 21 my 1945; ? F 1352/ii iéiiii After explaining to the workers our object of convening the meeting, Mr. Joseph, { .1 1927/28 345303 Tubmaker, who replied on behalf of the workers said that the workers were not t ` 1929/30 547-15 1 prepared to discuss anything with us as the workers do not in any way associate ? 1930/31 themselves with our selection as Corruriittee Members. After Joseph’s reply all 1 259`Bm the worker shouted on us and disperseddég V i 1933/34 234:296 Moreover, workers also blocked managerial attempts to exclude the union from g Q 1954/35 participation in other committees. When management attempted to appoint a hous— 1 31 0:308 ing committee to supervise the labor estates, one worker responded by asserting 1 f 1937/38 391l15Q his faith in the defunct union: _ i 1938/39 323,256 . . . ~ E 1939/40 300,090 We have heard what you told us about starting a Housing Committee. After ex- , 1940/4,1 318,59,1 amining ourselves, we find that we are not competent enough to make any de- j 1941/42 4021640 cision in the matter We have a Union .... You will allow us time to discuss the e V 1942/43 463,978 matter in our Union meeting and you will hear from us in the course of time. If T, ,i 1944/45 668.158 the Manager wants a Housing Committee, he should notify our Union and reach 1945/46 505-555 a decision with them.17° 1 The management’s incorporation of rural leaders failed to recognize the "pro- ° ¥ 1948/49 610-283 gressive" role that miners felt they played against authoritarian village leaders. Au- j ` 1949/50 525*513 . _ A 1950/51 583,433 gustine Ude, CWU, noted. 1 — Total 1116451128 The miners were most modem and power[ful]. Because they were always after , democracy. And they don’t allow the chief by opposing him to harass his peo- , " ’ Source: POWEH D““’Y" Techmcal Sen/ICQSI D_2A pm And [they] always succeeded m Opposmg mmm nonetheless placed his modification before the newly elected Representative ComManagement had created a leadership vacuum which it proved incapable of till» t ' mittgg which of eenrse endorsed his revision ofthe original Long Arbitrauon ing. Every option was tried—the urban unions and the village counei1ors—and nei- ’ _ AWaId_173 Immediately, Ojiyi, on behalf of the CWU, challenged the ondorsernent ther was able to secure any legitimacy with the workers. 1 5 as a violation of the arbitration provision of the Nigerian Defense Regulations since Underground, meanwhile, the Long Award was no more popular with the new Q the committee was not party te the Original arbitration. The manager countered that workers than with the old. On 8 June 1945, confronted with a drastic decline in ` 1 since the new committee and not the CWU represented the workers, its members’ output, Bracegirdle decided to revise the award by instituting his second altema~ approval was sufficient compliance with the law. Despite this attempt to wrap the tive of syndicate work with individual pay of piece-wages."2 It was unclear if he V 1 committgc ih a cloak gf legitimacy the men refused to accept the Rep1”€S€¤t¤t1V€ had the authority to do so, given the legal standing of the arbitration. But he 1 Commttee and ignored every attempt to impose its powers 0\'1[h€m·

270 "We Wbre All Slaver" 4 1 The Politics of "Pmductivity" 271 When the former miners saw resumption of individual pay, more of them de- L : problems. From 22 June to 6 August 1945, over 40,000 workers downed tools.17° manded to retum to work. Management was besieged by petitions from ex-rnin— ` The years of negotiating with largely unresponsive colonial department heads as ers requesting reinstatement. Although most were reincorporated into the colliery Q ` well as the Colonial Office had proven unbearable. But it did give the nationalists where they worked with scabs, they were far from admitting defeat. Even when 2 · an audience among important sectors of the working class, and the independence the first group of miners demanded reinstatement, the struggle for higher wages ¥ movement, which had expanded beyond its regional divisions, coalesced into a had moved from outside the colliery to the workplace itself. Their displeasure was ` ` mass-based national movernent.1S° graphically illustrated in the output figures. By the second quarter, output had Thus the coal industry lumbered through the armistice with the seeds of the next dropped from 151,664 tons to 100,539. In the July-September quarter, it plunged , phase of miners’ struggle deeply embedded in the patterns of industrial relations. to 96,611 and reached an all-time low of 16,576 CWT in the final quarter.17" . Despite the progressive intent of the new labor reforms both management and the Managerial control over production was contested every day. First, the reinstated · ' state were deeply wedded to the old systems of authority and control in which tubmen would not cooperate with newly hired hewers and disregarded instructions . 5 Africans were marginalized from substantive areas of decision making in the inof tub headmen. Q dustry. It was not just local political and industrial authorities who tried to under. . . . . . I mine the develo ment of strong trade unions but officials at the national and I End that msteid of assistance bemg gmin to imims mulls a Smmg tendency - . Colonial Office ;ve1s. The progressive vision was to have unions function as a on the part of reinstated tubmen to rnalmgrng (src) in the ordinary course of a tub- Y ~ f b.], . labor for dcvclo mem but the mean-in of devclo mem was men’s work . . . Ihave also noticed that the tubmen disregard the headman tub com- » ‘ means O mo 1 mug. P ’ g P ‘ pletely to the extent of sitting laughing athim when trying to chase them to work 175 `Z ‘ dehncd by the colonial Siam ' r, "Development" itself was being reconceptualized and narrowed, now that the At the Obwetti mine supervisors recognized a general air of insolence and com- · { war had ended. Britain had to confront the reality of its money shortages in United plained of malingering and deliberate sabotage by the old miners. In response, the { States dollars, shortages that, given the destruction of its industrial infrastructure, miners blamed their poor performance on unfavorable working conditions or ob- V 1 it had few possibilities of resolving. Formerly characterized as a process that ernstructions presented by other groups of underground workers. Collaboration be- , , phasized impiovements in social welfare and raising the living standards of colotween hewer and tubman was evident in reports from British bosses who alleged ` nial people, "development" was now defined as an economistic construct which that the hewers claimed: ~ » emphasized those projects that facilitated the redirection of colonial products to . , 4 } metro olitan reconstruction and, naturally, made African labor more productive. the mal was hard Or they were Wamng OH the *“1’“1’°Ys·T1‘° ¤`ib_bOyS wher? asked ` Th; explanation of this shift lay in the particularities of Britain’s postwar eco... stated they were waiting on coal, The tub-boys are definitely not giving the — ‘ . . al bla to the economic hewers any assistance but at the same time they are being supported by the hew- , nomic qualidary NOW African Products WSR even mma V in f d dx . d BIS regarding assistance to be given While Waiting on CO 3].176 : p reconstruction of Britain. After the war, an unfavorable ba ance ol tra e ainpgl _ _ Brrtarn s monetary holdings borrowed from the Umted States during the war. By the final quarter of 1945, output dropped to a record low of 16,546.177 This . ~ British productive capacity was dwarfed by that of the United States which was declining output was a devastating statement of the workers’ resistance to the Long { I now the world’s major manufacturer. With her industry in shambles, dependence Award, and a testament to their ability to maneuver around the govemment’s De- 1 on American imports depleted her dollar reserves. Moreover, members of the Cornfense Regulations. The purposeful restriction of output, which constituted a "go ‘ monwealth who had agreed to restrict their imports during the war began to relax s1ow," did not violate the law because it was not technically a strike. Although "of- 1* this policy and ran import deficits that required that they convert their sterling curftcially" the union did not exist, it continued surreptitiously. Ojiyi held meetings V reney to U.S. dollars.1*7 While Britain could not control these decisions among the usually in the villages or at "Seven Mile Corner," a road junction between Udi and J / dominions——Australia and newly independent India—they could enforce import Enugu.17“ Moreover, even without the union, the miners proved that they shared ` . controls in the remaining colonies to retain their sterling balances.11;3 Ojiyi’s aversion to the Long Award and could act against the system without overt Q Additionally, Nigeria was important because postwar shortages drove up the leadership. ‘ 1 prices of primary goods. Nigerian groundnuts and palm products now commanded Q prices higher than during the war. They were wonderful sources for earning hard THE POLITICAL POTENTIAL · K. Eurrency, 1.65;, dcglllars, andilgrgetitrng themhfroim the colomes Ee sterOF ORGANIZED COLONIAL LABOR I j ng area, Britain nee tspen ea y scarce ar currency purc asrng em on V g world markets.18" While the coal miners labored under restrictive industrial relations machinery, Y 7 When the Labour Party came to power in July 1945 it was confronted with this the Lagos working class demonstrated political consequences of unresolved labor r _} desperate postwar fiscal reality. The previous concerns in organizing African trade

272 ··we were A11 Slaves" ‘ The ’°°”"“ °f "P""’“‘”"i"” 273 unions, shaping industrial relations through the application of “m0dem" process e K The hcwers Wcm deeply troubled by these attacks UPG? than paver (QVC; thi and institutions, and raising the productivity of African workers by improving the l _ labor P“’°€SS· Llke their cghorts m Englaml Th? Efmgu miners We dun ers (Ec social welfare of the colony, gave way to a narrowed concern with output-pr0- Q _ the pressures théy Could bx-mg I? tlcar On the mgm S economy Eshun Srécom _ ductivity.185 The role of colonial resources was clear. The Labour Parry planned to Y ° tcfms Undef which they wer? Wlllms I0 Sell thcu labm P°;V°I‘ 6 mgm come "inc0rp0rate the postwar colonial hinterland, now predominantly Africa, as 21 source qucnccs Of this k¤¤W*=dg¤ will be the subject of the next C aptcn of food and raw materials t0 replace imports from dollar sourcesjuss _ i As long as Britain needed Nigeria’s resources, the Nigerian Railway needed ’ NOTES Enugu’s coal. But few officials trusted that African workers were able to be sufii— ~ 1 . ‘ ciently productive to supply these goods. Those old images of the backward prim- l 5 l, Nigerian Coal Corporation Files (hereafter NCC), New l~Io. {Tl, ‘LetLer from Col. itive were so familiar they proved resilient. Moreover, officials were locked into · i HWY D€Pmm€¤'[ t° All Officials and s'aH_E“'°P°a“ and Afmam 23 December 1941` the notion of "lhe peculiarity and backwardness ofthe African."'87 They were i]~ “ l 2- Ibid 4 , _ _ 4 literate unsophisticated laborers who were an easy "mark" for unscrupulous 1 l 3‘ Frederick COOPEL Demlnmmmm andAfrmm S"”'“"*F’ lm, “ l ” ‘ · ·· · 188 l I Z 44 J,O, Olnsanya, The Second World WarAnd Politics in Nigeria (London, 1973), pr 48. warped trade union leaders, like Ojiyi. Few would accept that the workers had , ¤ 5 Ibid pl 56. d€"c“’P"’d ‘h°“ °‘”" °"“q“” °f the °°“‘““°‘“ °f “’°"‘ am Sysmms °f ”‘““"°" E sj preriéner Cooper ms sm even me Labour Party mrs not conceive ¤rAmcim sr,. Mm-Bmmeumm¤V¢m¤¤*¤¤¤ldd¤V¤l¤PS¤¤¤g¤>¤*Si¤*hlSlyP·=¤fh¤S· 1 ¢ ciety rang able is generare is M. plan for me rm. Cooper, Decalanizarian, ni. me Political cnvironmclm 7. R.A.C. Parker, The Second World War: A Short History (Oxford, 1977). M¤¤¤z¤m¤¤l’S Simggle tv ¤¤¤¤¤1 p¤>·i¤¢¤i¤¤—¤¤¤¢h¤d in the ¢¢¤¤1¤¤1¤ey Of 1 ‘¢ s. France had einer in June imo and mw had the Wehy govemmem, which declared “P’°d“°‘i"i‘Y”_W*'S an industrial ¤KP*¤SS*°¤ 0f the "Pf¤d¤¢¤i<>¤iSt" development i Q its neutrality in the will rms denied Britain security of valuable air bases with which me arproject. Almost immediately upon his a.rriva1Bracegirdle had met the challenge. lj rack German submarines in the A¥l=1¤ii¤ and MediterraneanHe had led the industry to produqe unprecedented coal tonnage, thereby respond- V ° 9. Parker. _ __ _ _ ing favorably to the Combined Resource Board’s request, But he had dime SO at · QQ 10. Michael Crowder, "lhe l9;’>9—l945 War and WeStAf¤¢¤· In Hlsfwv O1;/Wei! afgf? the expense of future operating costs. Once this target was met and robbery ex- , IJ V0] 2- E°"_“P im“°S““g d‘S°“SS'°" °f lzgilnhér °°lF;1§"g;k?gga§($;§;One?9;9A§,; hameudMl0~m¤S·h=Shouldhmeganiedl¤*mPl¤ymm¤¤Pe· $25JZ?3i‘i§E2EZgZ?i2i5“2?i4Mf9;;?1Z?;§.i,‘irmi Crowder and J§F.A. Aja5;i, pare for future extraction. The failure to do so only accelerated the decline in . i 612 Lundow Longman Gmulgy 167 p*°°'“°"”“y· This was °“h°' ‘“““g°““l i“SP‘““"€ °‘ i“°"P°“°“°°· N““°“"’I“S· V T ii, Michael com and Nicholas wsmii, ·—Bniisr Imperial Economic Policy omg was*¤=W<¤k·=rSWh¤Sh¤¤ld¤r¤d*h·=b¤f¤=¤¤f¤1iSm¤¤¤e¤¤¤*¤=¤*Si¤¤¤¤dWh¤· ‘ a ns ww in Africa and M nnnn ii WM wm, ed. David ieiiingay and Richard Rathbone were judged "gui1ty" in state investigations of the industry. It appeared that they ` i (London, 1986), 44_ reduced productivity with each successive wage award. Productivity statistics be- · ` ]2_ Ibid Came the “Ob-lcctivy pr°°f because the “m“h” was hidden undergwund in the l ·' 13, These were export earnings in excess of expenditures. For colonies these earnings inabode of production. E creased during the war because of the resuictiuns on imports. Before the Lend Iiease Act with Could Enugu’s unions be “parl11ers" in "devel0pment" or were they doomed to ‘ ` the United States, these balances financed half of the United Kingd0m’s deficit and 15 perbe pawns of the "demag0gue" Ojiyi? The labor experts were trying [g cgi-ivinge 5 it cent in 1929. These restrictions of imports, raised prices and created scaremes. Ibéd., E, 19. colonial employers and officials that it was better to have w0rkers’ activism con- I. 14 D"’P“‘Y Prime Minism C1?m°"tAm°c cgnmwmedm the Wcsmfncan Sm cm mon · · · · - · ‘ - (WASU) that "You will not find m the declarations made on behalf of the Government any tamed by Suugml-as llke [rad? umfms-who could be partners m negotqmons and I ’ suggestion that the freedom and social security for which we right should be denied to any the numerous industrial relations institutions than to be confronted with wildcat 1 ofthe races of mankind}, Wm_Afrim’ 23 August 1941, p_ 818, as cited in Hakim Adi, Wm Smkes md industrial Vmlcnca Bm even these “cxp€rtS” were held captive by the _ V Africans in Britain, 1900-1960: Nationalism, Pan-Africanism and Communism (London, imagined ‘“Af“°”¤* Wmkerw who appeared SO “diff€rem” as to can imo question A ` 1998). During the war the Union was an important political force representing Africans in the Word Liworkcrfl Just how much of a “W°rk€r” were they? Of were they just ly ' l the United Kingdom and lobbying for political change in Africa. See also Coleman, Nige~ "tribesmen,” in which case should the "t.riba1" councils and unions be sitting at the » L ria 239.243, negotiating tablc? Ln 1945 the Pcndulum was i¤¤hi¤e Y°W&YdS the “¥fib¤Sm8¤" Side- V li 15, For the ruuesl discussion see Adi, np. cit. The narionalists were prolific writers leavWith the manager arguing for the essentialism of "clan" and the new Labor De- ~ ing a generous record of their thoughts on the charter, For one discussion, seeA.A. Nwafor partment gingcrly pushing for an “elected" representative committee, neither ree- 1 5 Oi-izu, VWzhgu;Bi1remesr; Western Nations in Past-War Africa (New Yvrk, 1944)- 4 _ Ogniléd the Sig|1i6C3HC€ ofthe men’s loyalty to the CWU and Ojiyi_ because, after l 16, William Roger Lewis, Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decvlvmzcltlvn all, the men were incapable of responsible behavior-_ i nfihe Brirish Empire, 1941-1954 (New York, 1978). 124. `l lll

274 “Wz Were All Slaves" " The Politics of "Productiviry" 275 17. Winston Churchill tried to argue that the clause should only be applied to European 32. NNAE, NIGCOAL N1/138, Local Authority to Resident. 20 March 1945 nations invaded by the Axis Powers. Atdec met with the West African Smdcnts’ Assccia— _ ` 33. NIGCOAL Z1! 138, Dewhurst, Local Authority, "Ccnsus of Enugu,” 1945, 57. tion and clarified that the right to self-determination did in fact apply to "c010urcd peoples, U ` 34. Ibid., 57. as well as whitc." Lewis, 125. _ 35. UDDIST 9/1/1/, "Udi Division Annual Report 1942.** I 18. This is a paraphrase of Frederick C00pcr’s introduction to Chapter 4 of Decaloniza- J I 36. For a discussion of crime as a form of worker protest, see Robin Cohen, "H1dden zion and African Society, 110. ` A V Forms of Consciousness? _ 19. UDDIST 9/1/1/, "Annua1 Report 1947—Udi Divisi0n." ` ` 37. In 1939 Enugu had become the seat of the Eastern Provinces Secretariat and It was 20. Such behavior lcd to a lighming strike in 1937. See Chapter 5. " the headquarters of many of the large expatriate trading firms who were the purchasing 21. Supplc, History ofthe British Coal Industry, 558. Q agents of palm products and other goods designated as critical for the war effort. 22. Richard Hyman, Industrial Relations: A Marxist Introduction (London, 1975), 191. ` Jr 38, ONPROF 8/1/4902, "A11nuaI Rep0rt—1944." I _ 23. As part of the standardization process in operation during thc war, the Colonial Of- ] . — 39. Orde Browne feared that the economic crisis would spill over into a p011t1c?1 chalEcc used a set model of trades disputes law and sem it throughout me colonies, The most J lang.; to me mw, He argued wirh mcse in the Colonial Office who did not Sh§\‘¤ his S¤{¤§= popular model was the Trinidad Trades Disputes Law which was drafted with the help of ` ` ~ of the urgency of labor reform, that such discontent formed a "pen·na.n?nt bags fo? palmOrde Browne by the Colonial Labor Committee, Sec PRO, CO 859 Social Services De- X , cal agitation of the unscrupulous typ¤." Such challenges were more hkely m cmes. CO pzmrnent, CO 323. " ¥ 554/ 132/33718, Orde Browne, Memorandum, "Lab0u1· Problems in Relation to Develop24. The Nigerian worldng class was so small, and in such narrow areas of the economy- ment in West Africa," 31 March 1943. with a large percentage being state cmpl0yces—that it was rather easy for the law to et‘fec· ` 40. For a similar example of a pivotal urban working class whose industry encouraged tively eliminate the possibility of strikes for the majority of the working class. E ` casual labor and the colonial government recognized its dangerous consequences, see Fred25. Sce petitions in the 1937/38 strike in which men note the quality of their skill and eyick Cooper On zhe African Waterfront: Urban Disorder and the Transformation of Work their importance tc the production process, Sea Chapter 5. , ` in Colonial Mombasa (New Haven, 1987)- 4 4 26. For examples, scc petitions submitted to Orde Browne on his visit to Enugu, scc - ` 41. 314/39/PE 476, DO Enugu to Provincial Commissioner, 24 February 1939, cited m NNAE, N'IGCOAL2/l/ 126, “B0ss Boys-Cp11icry," 1940-1947. I Gutkind, "The Emergent African Urban Proletariatf 32. Peter Gutkind, The Qmergem 27. Orde: Browne’s report was so critical of the Nigerian G0vemmentC01liery that the V ~ Apieun Pralezuriaz, Centre for Developing-Area Studies, Occasional Paper Series, no. 8, Colonial Offnce considered withholding publication until after the war, For a discussion and ‘ Montreal, 1974. ` critique of Ordc Browne’s recommendations, sec PRO, CO 554/125, 129, 130, 132. Orde V. 42. NIGCOAL 2/1/138, Local Authority to Colliery Manager, 20 June 1944. Browne, Labour Conditions in Wes1Africa, 162-167. 43. NIGCOAL 2/1/138, Lbcal Authority "Census of Enugu," 56. 28. For an account ofthe tim m.inss‘ response to the defeat, see Chapter 5, Bill Freund, " 44. UDDIST 9/1/1/, "Udi Division Annual Report, 1942." Capital and Labour in the Nigerian Tin Mines (New Jersey, 1981). Ord: Browne, that bea- L 45. Recall 1937/38 demands. _ con of "pmg,rcssive" labor policies, helped the Colonial Office no contravene the 1]..0 1933 g 46. Lisa Lindsay makes this point in her study of Lagos-based Yoruba employees III dia Forced Labour Ordinance, which Britain had signed, that forbade thc use of forced labor ` > ' Nigerian Railway. She argued that the provision ofhcalth care was an expression of a mam s for private industry T ` responsibility m his family and a reflection of his status as a "big man." Lindsay, "Shum29, The story of the Airbase Program concems a seldom acknowledged role played by ` _ ing Among Masculine Idea1s," 6. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the African StudWest Africa before Pearl Harbor and the United States entrance into the war. Forbidden by ’ ‘ r' ies Association, Orlando, Flvrida, 1995 · neutrality clauses from selling airplanes to Britain, Roosevelt contracted with Pan Ameri- ¥ 47. Interview with B.U. Anyasado. Mbicri, Owcrri, 23 July 1975. can Airways to lease their tra11s—AL1amic routes from Natal, Brazil, to West Africa and to · · 48, Richard Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties (New Jersey, 1963), 208. Y have their pilots deliver aixplancs to British forces in Libya and Egypt. The project required Q r 49_ women were gmemdy prominent in the nationalist movement but they also had lhelf ccnstmcticn and maintenance of airbases along the WestA.ii·1can coast. Following me Taka- _ t éwn organizations, One was a mutual aid and dance group called Igbvenwezy which W5 radi route, named after a terminal city in the Gold Coast (Ghana), and crossing the Sahara , { ’founded in Coal Camp, Enugu, by Mme. Janet Okoye. They performed at polmcal rallies at Chad, declared for Free France by Felix Eboué, Francc’s only Black govemcr, hundreds ` ef the NCNC to attract followers. NNAE, Box 202, Lie Profile and Mass ofthe Resurrecof pilots became an important lifeline for besieged Britain. When the United States did enter _ _ tion far rhe Late Madam Janet Mamgu Peter—Ok0ye, MBE, 25 July 1991, p. 5. the war, the Pan Am bases were militarizcd, giving the Americans a route across Africa ` , 50. Major G. St. J. Orde Browne, Labour Conditions in West Africa. The report was FO through Ethiopia to access the Pacific. The full story of this fascinating episode is found iu ; { critical of me govemment that the Colonial Office engaged in a lively debate over the w1sDeborah WZ Ray, "Pau American Airways and the Trzms—African Air Base Program of World , V dom of publishing it, See C.O. 554/ 132 for the correspondence. War H" (Ph.D. diss. New York University, 1973) and her article "'1`hc Takoradi Route: R00· V . 51. Ibid. scve1t’s pre-war venture beyond the Westem Hemisphere," Journal afAmericun History, " ` 52. For an index of the recommendations, see [Ibid.], 78. LXII, 2 (September 1975). · V 53. CO 554/125, Orde Browne to O.G.R. Vhlliams, 15 February 1946. 30. Coleman, Nigeria p. 253. ° 54. Ibid. ‘ 31. ONDIST 12/1/1207, "Annua1 Report of Onitsha Province, 1940." ; 55. Sec Chapter 3. 4

276 ··we were All slimy e r The paiiiiar of"Pr0duc1iviry" 277 . v, ’ 56. Orde Browne cited the experience in South African and the Copperbelt mines as evi. ‘_ Lignitg Resenraesjl London, 1948, D-165. The discussion of the Evans Award is in Chapdence diat increased protein would affect productivity. Orde Browne, Labour Conditions _ ;` ter 5. _ W C _l (47) N 17 O t b 1942 in WestAfrico, 61-62, , 73_ @,0, 554/129, "Minutes of the West African ar ouncl , I G 0 ef · 57. Ibid, p. 57. — , 74. Department of Labour Annual Report 1942. PP- 16, 17 as quoted in Ananaba Trade 58. CO 554/132, Orde Browne, "Labour Problems in Relation to Development in West » Union Movement in Nigeria (1969) 28—29}V A 159 A b T ad U _ M ve M Africa? 31 March 1943. ' ~ 75_ Robin Cohen, Labnnrami Politics in igerza, ; nana a, r e Mori 0 me 59. Michael Crowder, "The 1939-45 War in West Africa," 608, I in Nigeria, 1969, 47—48. _ I it f _ 60. Market women were angered by Conditional Sales, in which they were required to _ 76. CO. 554/129, Secretary of State to O.A.G. Nigeria, 10 July 1942, Extract 0 Mm· sell slow-moving goods with more desirable products. In 1943 govemment initiated the i Z utes of the West African War Council (47), 17 October 1942. Pullen Marketing Scheme in which government established markets in Lagos that sold food I J 77, Interview with Charles Morris, 19 Iune 1975.* at below market prices, the state attempted to restrict price gouging, distributing eonsnmer , ,' 78, Orde Browne, Labour Conditions in West Africa. 581 _ Af _ items to market women, and prohibiting high profits. The scheme failed for several reasons, 79, AWAM included the largest firms in West African trade such as the United ries including families who cheated on their quota, reselling acquired foodstuffs at 100.300% Q Company Ltd,, G,B, Ollivant Ltd., John Holt and Co. (Liverpool) Ltd., and'C¤mpa¤l¢ above purchase prices. Riots at these markets also deterred housewives from attending, see ‘ i Francaise de L’Afrique Occidentale. This was butoni example ¤fIrl¤?;1lp¤lgStl¤ Wl O 3k' d ,“Th P ll M k ' S h :AT' l' F dPr` C l' N‘ . e ` d ' th'; eriod, The AWAM was also involved ms lpplng Carte S, GCG 0110 1 fiaal;4 giorfrnul ¢;‘tPi`e Ijisto§c;il.SI}§ci;ry&o;1”7Vigeri;1a6li]l97;); aigiziimm m lge 5 1 li;;il;s_ img the distribution of American goods. P.T. Bauer, West African Trader A Study 61. Royal Commission on disturbances in Trinidad as cited in Weiler, ··i=m-ming Re. ` , in Cgmpgtifign, Oliggpoly and Monopoly in a Changing Economy (New York. 1967) 67. sponsible Trade Unionsflz The Colonial Office, Colonial Labour, and the Trades Union Con- ~ , 172-73, 189-91. A V P _ “ 20 21 gress, Radical History Review 28-30 (1984). 374, V` go, Cowen and Westcott, "Impenal Economic olicy. ,I -» 62, PRO, CO 1766/37. Ormsby-Gore, "Circu1ar," 24 August 1937 as cited in Wgilery ,` `, 31, C0 583/261,/30425, Secretary of State to Governor I\ilg5f16,42 Marllh 1943- Ft>1’ 6 “F°"mi“g Responsible Trade U“i°"S·” 372 E · discussion of the Colonial Office attempts to contain trade union activism, see Peter Weiler, 63. CO 554/ 132/33729, Sec. of State O 'ver Stanley, to HM Tewson, Assistant Secretary, _ "Forming Responsible Trade Uni¤nS1" BTUC, 8 July 1943. li V 82, T.M. Yesufu, An Introduction to Industrial Relations in Nigeria (Oxford, 1962), 23-25. 644 Nigerian Department of Labour Annual Report, 1941, * 83, Interview with Eze Ozogwu, Ildi Qlune 19754. 65. Robin Cohen, Labour and Polirics (Nigeria, London) 1974, 159, . i ` 84, Orde Browne, labour Conditions in W/estAfr§:é 60. ; 66, Ibid. ¥ i » 85. Akpala, "Enugu Colliery Shooting Incident," . 67. Tokunboh, Labour Movement in Nigeria, 32; Ananaba, The Trade Union Movement , ·, 86. Smock and Akpala have different names for the unions, Akpala referred to them as the in Africa, 27ff; Robin Cohen, "Nigeria’s Labour Leader No, 1; Notes for a Biographical Q ‘ — Enugu workers Trade Union and the Enugu Surface Improvement I.II\101’l- This wnter will Sflldy 0fM.A»O. Im0udl1," Jnurnal ofthe Hirtorical Society ofNigerio 5, 2 (1970); 303-08, l ' V use Smockls nomenclature, Tl: CEIIIBTYVYKUYKBTS gfggngndoihf C;2$;¥;i\l;|:?;€;?gs'g;:‘ 68. Timothy Oberst, "Cost of Living and Strikes in British Africa, c, 1939-1948; Impg- I L I ment Union, See David Smoc , " rom 1 age to r e nl it ln A - I- Y; · tial Policy and the Impact ofthe Second World War," Ph.D. diss. Columbia Uriiversity_ 327, s l neil University, 1964), 129; and Agwu Akpala, "Enuigu Ecgllliery ih00llH$ l¤¢ld¢;1l. Pg}? 69. For a thorouvh discussion of this Hawed process, see Ibid. ` 5 87. Morris referred to Joseph Okpokwu and Augustine e, two ormer in erpre ers I ni 70, The fact thai: the committee was so representative of the various government agen- I G Agbaja. Both featured prominently in the dispute following the Representative Cotipcal s cies and had a Nigerian majority may explain why its recommendations expressed sensi— ’ attempt to eliminate interpreters in 1939, discussed in Chapter 5. Interview with C ar es ~ tivity to a broad range of issues that affected the working class, The eomniitiee members “ J Morris, a **foreigner" clerk from Owem, Ogbete, Enugu, 19 June l975· were A.F,B. Bridges (Chairman), W.G. Wormal, Inspector of Labour (Secretary); Mrs, O,M, ¤ 88. Akpala. "Enugu. Shooting Ine1derl1." 3$8· I A Abayomi; Miss T.O.A. Pearce; WH. Biney; C, Enitan-Brown; i-L Chapman; G, Cgtgreave; ` ~ 39, Interview with Isaiah 0. Ojryr, Amawbia, AWk¤,£lN1g€l`l3. 27 July 1975. Rev. T.O. Dedeke; E.J.B. Gahan, Agricultural Chief Engineer, Nigerian Railway; E.G. Gar- l ’ 90. NIGCOAL 2/ 1/138, Dewhurst, Local Ptuthotity, Census of Enugu, 1945. , rity, Works Manager, Public Works Department; Dr. J. Hamilton, Ag, Deputy Director of V 91, Ananaba, Trade Union Movement in Nigeria, 32·A 943 Health Services; R.J. Hook, Food Controller; C. Macdonald, Principal Assisrani senrenny, py 9;, C0 553/261/30425, O.A.G. Grantham to Colonial Secretary, 30 November 1 V - { Nigerian Secretariat; Honorable Jibril Martin; J.A. Ojo; Hon. H.S.A. Thomas; Lamidi '~ ji 93. Ibid. Thompson; and ArE. Normal Williams. Tokunboh, Labour Movement in Nigeria, 32. 94. Ibid. 71. UDDIST 3/1/8, "Divisi0na1Annual Report-Udi Division, 1940"; Wogu Ananaba, The 95. Ibid. I V V 75 C h “M_ h 1 I d H4 Wale Trade Union Movement in Nigeria (New York, 1969), 27, 29, _ Q 96. Arianaba, Trade Union Mavementlin Nigeria ; o en, tc ae mou u ,I 72. Powell Duffryn Technical Services, "First Report to the Under-Secretary er stare gf ` i Oygmgkinde, ··The Nigerian General Strike of 1945, Journal of the Historical Society of the Colonies, Colonial Oftice, Dover House, Whitehall S.W.1., on the Government Colliery, : _ Nigeria 7, 4 (June 1975): 693-771. · _ Enugu. The Characteristics of Coal Produced and me Investigation into the Other Coal and ~ 97_ The resignations followed a disagreement birilwseen the urggrgeadelghii gig? the ~ Y 1943 strike. CO 583/261/30425, Grantham to Co om ecretary, ovem er . i

278 “We Were All Slaves " ` ` g The Politics af "Prvductivity" 279 98. Interview with Isaiah O. Ojiyi. 27 July 1975. 121. CO 583/263, "Report of a Committee Appointed to Review the Question of Housing 99. Personal Collection of David Smock, Jacob A. Diewait Typescript. , , Accommodations for the Employees of the Govemnnent Colliery, Enugu," 27 September 1941. 100. CO 554/129/33636 "Record of a Meeting Held on 23 June 1942.“ ` » 122. CO 583/261, Orde Browne Minute, 4 March 1943. 101. For extensive discussion of this concept, see Chapter 1. ` ‘ 123. Members include the Resident, Onitsha, Manager Leck, and EJ.W. Skeates, the Col102. Interview with Dr. Agwu Akpala, London, 14 February 1975. . i liery’s StaH Welfare Officer. "Report of a Cornmittee." -103. The correspondence in his personnel files strongly suggests that there was a con- V 124. According to an informant it was better placed than the others. People were ensprracy against him. In some cases management actually documented their attempts to co- K, ` couraged to beautify thei.r compound, and they held competitions on the best-looking garerce him into leaving the union, arguing that it would interfere with his career. See NNAE, ‘ den. The district officer and colliery manager awarded prizes. Interview with B.U. Anyasado. P/2/ 1/1 "Personal Papers of Mr. 0.1. Ojiyi." ~ 2 125. CO 583/263, Gerald Wormal, "New Homes in Old Africa" n.d. 104. One European supervisor complained, "This Isaiah is either a mental case or an im- _ 126. 1-lansards, 37th Parliament. Debates 1942-43, 11-17 November 1943, 344. P0SS1ble P¤rS0¤»” NCCE R2/1/1, Angus Kerr to CM, 30 March 1942; B_s_s, to CM_ 14 ]u]y [ . ` 127, They also asked for a woman who was not married to be the Lady Welfare Officer. 1938, U U · r , The current officer was the wife of the Staff Welfare Officer, Skeates. UDDIST 3/1/104 1/1, 011yr to Colhery Manager, 19 October 1944. “Emrgu Colliery Workers and the New Housing Scheme." The Eastern Sentinel, 21 May · · 1943. 107. For a discussion of the "politica1 apparatus" that sustained the "colonial labor pro- { 128. Ibid. cess" see Michael Burawoy’s The Politics of Production. , I 129. Ibid, 108. The educational gap between British managers, such as Yatm, and many of the men ii 130, CO 583/261, "Notes on Points Arising in discussions with the Secretary of State on whom they supervised, such as the Junior Technical Staff (JTS), was glaring. Many Niger- 1 Wednesday 27 October and Thursday, 28th October 1943." ran. managers in training commented that some of these men could barely write. The edu- ` 131. Ibid. catronal requirements for ITS service put these men far above them. This also contributed " 132. "Enugu Colliery Workers and the New Housing Scheme." to the feeling of injustice. . ` 133, Colonial Office, "Enquiry into the Disorders in the Eastem Provinces of Nigeriai 109. R 2/1/1, T Yates to Colliery Manager, 21 August 1945 . `· i Proceedings of the Comrnission," vol. 1 (London, 1950), 78. 110. P 2/1/1, Ojiyi to Chief Secretary, Eastem Provinces, 16 November 1945 , For dis- 134. Supple, History of the British Caal Industry, 558. cussron of this election, see p. 259ff. * . 135. NIGCOAL 2/1/175, Paraphrase of cypher telegram Lagos to Secretary Eastem - 111. Ibid. `{ ` Provinces, 15 September 1943. _lI2· IH 6 remarkable coincidence Ojiyi was defended by one "Mr, Qnyeamah Or-re Orme Q Z 136, Nigeria, Report an the Accounts and Finances for the Years 1944/45 and 1945/46 chref’s sons was a lawyer and became involved in the proceedings following the shooting i } Y (Lagos: Govemment Printer, 1947). Ul 1949. R 2/1/ 1, RW Holm, "In the Magistrates Court of Niger·ia," 13 November 1945, i ' 137. However, it was not until the 1948 publication of a monumental report on the cel113. See Table 6.5, "Accident Rates, 1943—1946," 266. ,» _ liery by the Powell Duffryn Technical Services, that the question of declining productivity 114. CO 583/261/, O.A.G. Grantham to Stanley, 27 July 1943. · was adequately and systematically examined. The report indicated that the war period was 115. Orde Bjrowne, Labour Conditions in WestAfrica, 61-63. _` . crucial in determining the full causes of the phenomena, specifically from 1942 through 116- Frederick Cooper, "From Free Labour to Family Allowancesf 753, ’ F 1945/46, Since during this period the workers’ snuggle for a representative organization in117. Having read Orde Browne’s report, C.W.W. Greenridge, Secretary of the Anti- " tensified, it is important to look most closely at the dynamic of the work process. Powell Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society, questioned the government on redundant labor “ l Duftryn Technical Services, "Characteristics of the Coal," 18. and housrng accommodations. Private employers used the scandal to comment that govem- 138. C.O. 583/261/30425 23, Governor Bourdillon to Stanley in Colonial Office, Janument housrng was worse than private. Lord Trenchard raised this in the House of Lords. CO ary 1934. 583/263/30544, C.WW Greenridge to Secretary of State for Colonies, 30 December 1941, .1 i 139. Ibid. 118. l`brd,, Bum, O.A.G. to Lord Cranbome, Colonial Secretary, 18 March 1942. The I 140. This ratio is an ideal that cannot be attained given the real conditions in the mines. Colomal Development and Welfare Act was the imperial state’s response to the West Indian I However, by approximating this ratio the management could significantly reduce labor costs, riots of 1935-1938 strikes in Rhodesia, Gold Coast and Dar es Salaam between 1935 and i` and thence, costs of production. Powell Duffryn, “Cha.racteristics ofthe Coal," D—12, D-14, 1939. It purported to mandate reforms in the workplace and living conditions of colonial " ? D-15. ' labor and to mandate systems of worker representation—trade unions. It included a mod- ‘ 141. In 1947, Dr. WS.S. Ladell of the Hot Climate Physiological Research Unit in Lagos est amount of funds for housing construction, as well as improvements in health and gen- ‘ ` made the first scientific study ofthe underground conditions at Enugu. In 40 percent of his eral social welfare. For a discussion of the debate in Parliament and the Colonial Office, see r ` observation sites, the temperature exceeded 85 degrees Fahrenheit, a totally unacceptable Cooper, Decolonization andAfricun Society, 113-121. level for effective work. Under such conditions it was necessary to double up the hewers, 119. For discussion of this concept see Chapter 1. ' permitting one to rest and fan himself while the other worked. W.S.S. Ladell, "Applied Phys120. See NIGCOAL 2/1/138, "Census of Enugn." ` . iology in Nigeria," WestA]i·ican Medical Journal (March 1952): 35-37; Ibid., "Some Phys-

280 "we were All stave.- ·· r fhg patina.- of ··pmai¤nvny*· 281 iological Observations on West African Coal Miners," British Journal of Industrial Medi- R 171. Interview with Augustine Ude, Umuaga, Udi, August 5, 1975. Ude, of which more cme 5· 16 (1948): l6`20· ‘ is written in earlier chapters, began at the colliery in 1919 as a messenger at age ten. In 1922 142. Powell Duffryn, "Charactetistics of the Coal," D.18. . . he became an interpreter and was the subject of many complaints by miners. His name was 143. Calculated from the Report ofthe Commission of Enquiry into the Disorders in the , i raised many times in my interviews. Eastern Provinces of Nigeria, Report. C.O. No. 256 (London, 1950), 59. The Powell Duf— Y ` 172. Srnock “From Village to Trade Union In Airica," 137. fryn report used more exact ngures and thus had slightly different calculations. _ 5 . 173. NIGCOAL 1/1/3, “M.inutes," 30 June 1945. 144. Powell Duffryn, "Characteristics of the Coal," D.18. 174. Ministry of Labour Archives, 3/S.2, vol. 1, Colliery Manager Quarterly Reports, 145. See Chapter 3. .` E 1945. 146. Powell Duffryn, "Characte1istics of the Coal," D.20. : ~ 175. NIGCOAL 2/1/182 George Barclay to Colliery Manager, 3 May 1945. 147. NCCF, P 2/1/1, Ojiyi to CM, 16 August 1944. . 176. NIGCOAL 2/1/182, Paton to Bracegirdle 3 May 1945. “ 148. Great Britain, Commission of Enquiry into tl1e Disorders in the Eastem Provinces `· . ` 177. Federal Government of Nigeria, Ministry of Labour Archives, 3/S.2, Vol. I, Collof Nigeria. Proceedings ofthe Commission, vol. 1, 12 December to 19 December (London, Q liery Manager Quarterly Reports, l945.” · 1950); Testimony of R. Bracegirdle, Proceedings, vol. 1, 79. X} 178. Interview with Isaiah O. Ojiyi, July 1975, Amawbia, Nigeria. I l 149. Report ofthe Commission of Enquiry, pp. 18-19. ~‘ ; 179_ For the most recent analysis of this strike, which emphasizeshthe manipulation of 150. This is explained in the American example in Priscilla Long, Where the Sun Never 1 the male breadwinner norm by strikers, see Lisa A. Lindsay, "Domestic1ty and Difference: Shines, 76. QA Male Breadwinners, Working Women and Colonial Citizenship in the 1945 Nigerian Gen151. Ibid. , ‘! ` eral Strike," 17reAmerican Historical Review 104, 3, (June 1999): 783-812. 152. NIGCOAL 2/1/77, "Minutes ofthe Meeting," 12 December 1945; Testimony of RH. i 180. With the exception of afew articles and references in the general histories of the naCook, "Proceedings," vol. 2, p. 13. " tionalist movement there is little investigation of the event. See Wale Oyemakinde, The 153- Ibid· . j· V Nigerian General Strike of 1945," Journal ofthe Historical Society of Nigeria, 7, b3 (De154. David Smock, "From Village to Trade Union In Africa," 137. , cember 1975). For two classic studies of nationalist politics see Richard Sklar, Nigerian Po155. Cohen, Labour and Politics in Nigeria. ,~ litical Parties and James Coleman, Nigeria. For the relationship between labor and the 156. NIGCOAL 2/1/182, Long Award Development-Hewer; Long Award Development . . movement see Robin Cohen, Labour and Politics in Nigeria, 1945-1971, (London, 1974). Tubman; Long Award, Robbery Tubmen; Long Award Robbery, Hewers., n.d. N 181. Kenneth O. Morgan, Labour in Power: 1945-1951 (Oxford, 1984), 339-40. 157. Proceedings ofthe Commission, vol. 1, Testimony of RH. Cook, Proceedings, 14_ .. lg; Pm-tha Samthi Gupta, Imperialism and the British labour Movement. 1914-1964 158. Ibid., Testimony of R. Bracegirdle and RH. Cook, 14, 78. i (New York, 1975), 305-09. 159. "Coal Miners Tender Wholesale Resignation? Nigerian Eastern Mail, (7 April - 183. Cowen and Westcott, "British Imperial Economic Policy," 59. I . . 1945). J 184. Cooper, Decolonization, p. 203; see also RJ. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, British Impe160. Proceedings ofthe Commission RH. Cook, 78. Q -· rialism: Crisis and Deconstruction, 1914-1990 as cited in Cooper. 161. NIGCOAL 2/1/182, Agwu Branch to DO Agwu, 11 April 1945; Deputy CM, "ln- i s 185. Cooper, 204. _ terview with Awgu District Union, Enugu Branch," April 1945(?). ` `, ` 186. Ibid, p. 59. 162. Ibid., DO Udi to CM, 18 April 1945; Telegram, Coals to Executive Owerri, 9 April ` 187. Ibid., p. 202. ~ _ _ 1945; Sealey-King to Executive Udi, April 1945. . 3 188. R 2/1/3, DO Udi to Colliery Manager, 12 February 1946. E.R. Chadw1ck,.DO Udi 163. Report ofthe Commission, p. 19. ., argued that Ojiyi was "warped . .. by that section of the African press that makes it appeal 164. NCCF, RM1! 182, Enugu Division Union to CM, 16 April 1945. ‘ ' to the semi—literate on the grounds of racia.lism." ics. ibid. [ 166. NCCF, P 2/1/3, 1949. R. Bracegirdle to Secretary, Eastern Provinces, 15 Septem- Q Y ber 1945, Labour Dispute; Fimgerald Commission of Enquiry Representations, Attachment `, HI. 1 . 167. Bracegirdle to Secretary, Eastern Provinces, 15 September 1945; NIGCOAL 2/1/21, . , Capt. Holley to RH. Cook, 24 April 1945. , A 168. NIGCOAL 2/1/182, "Notice of Election Results," 30 May 1945; R2/1/3, 1949 i I Labour Dispute; Fitzgerald Commission of Enquiry Representations, Attachment HI, R. if — Bracegirdle to L.'1Z Chubb, Secretary, Eastern Provinces, 15 September 1945. 169. R 2/1/3, 1949 Labour Dispute: Fitzgerald Commission of Enquiry Representation, ’ Attachment H, J.C.M. Durake, 20 December 1949. * ~ 170. NIGCOAL, 1/1/21, M. Oba, Staff Representative to Manager, 29 November 1945.

Q V The Iva Valley Massacre 0f1949 283 7 .» _ the site and scores were wounded. Within a few days the death toll climbed to Y twenty-two. Riots erupted in all the major cities of Eastern Nigeria and crowds atV V tacked those expatriate trading firms that had profited so greatly from the war. Zik, rl ists, the most radical wing of the nationalist movement, were prominent among the i crowds in the streets of Port Harcourt, Enugu, and Calabar where soldiers shot A V L l L more victims. ln the United States, W.E.B. Du Bois and Paul Robeson of the CounH = cil of African Affairs dashed off a protest to the Colonial Oftice and miners’ unions , , throughout England, Scotland and Wales voiced their indignation. The nationalM S 1 9 4 9 • I ists had their dramatic moment and briefly, a workers’ dispute occupied the center ' .` ,· stage of the political debate over the future of Nigeria. Today, despite the complex { _A factors contributing to the success of the nationalist movement, most Nigerians TR . ` cite the Iva Valley Massacre as the primary event ending British colonialism in f Nigeria. ln Enugu the memory is even more intimate and many of the older gen` eration can cite at least one person who died or was wounded. The tragedy is emS bedded in popular memory as the sacrifice coal miners made to the birth of the _' , Nigerian nation. An imposing bronze statue commemorates the shooting from a C ¤ Y central crossroads in Enugu. l Something had gone terribly awry. The Labour Party’s ambitious plans to con_ tain and reform colonial labor had collapsed into a paroxysm of terror more befit¢ Q f ting a Conservative govemment. The legalization of trade unions, the deployment of cooperative BTUC advisers to coach "responsible" trade unionism, the prod· f ding of colonial governors to modemize labor policies, the endless proposals and Omen Omismm We were com lm] hammcd _ b 4 convoluted procedures designed to diffuse industrial conflicts, the various "enQuashiwdom HOW many mmm? P Y rn y rnrners. i is 1tgh;ened" seein] welfare po1icies—al1 had failed to prevent th1s tragedy. Rather, Omccl. Ormismn: The Whole place was black with mem. _ Q they had led to the type of embarrassing excesses of brute force that Colonial Of_TcmmOny at the Commission of Enquiry F { tice policies had sought to prevent. The shooting occurred under the govemment ' , ¥ of the same Labour Party that, in opposition, had promoted workers’ rights (albeit I am saying um the workers never knew they would Open me because there · ` l circumscribed) during the war. lt now was responsible for shootingyunarmed colowns nglgguga There was no Struggle of any kind} Them was no Hghmlg with " nral workers rn cold blood, not unlike an authoritarian throwback to early colothe police. They were an just them 5 V~ mal times. But pushing a package of labor rights while custodian of the imperial -Censmb]e M_ Ogbm-ma_ Iva Valley Dcmhmemi _ _ state had its contradictions and these contradictions bubbled up and slapped Labour Testimony at the Comyygjssjcn OfEnquil.y_ ` t in the face. Colonial workers were not imbeciles and they proved able to manipu— ' late the cumbersome industrial relations machinery in unanticipated ways, most A mfi¤lf€S¥¤ Shows that they are becoming increasingly Subject to com . often under the leadership of sophisticated men. These men, whom state officials murust influence. It is clear .. . that those who prepared it have not only read V considered "dernagogues," manipulated the new laws, exploited the new industrial [a] considerable amount of Communist propaganda but must also have made if institutions, unraveled the cumbersome procedures, and skillfully navigated the s°m° Study °f C°mm““l$l °l'EmlZ¤fl¤¤; Y if ` minefield of state legislation to secure their membership’s demands. b _Nlg€““;i§;g;[mm€¤l $t¤€§¤ R€l;]01't;>;l4;l1§ I The Iva Valley tragedy is a lens that captures the obstacles confronting colonial 0V€m€¤ , Mem er . QI workers who viewed the new forms of employee 1‘epreS€:1'ltati0l'1, lHSl.lU.1Il0HS cf luThc comcry Workers had never SX mem d th ak d h I · § dustrial relations, and processes for disputes. management with skepticism. lt was 18 November 1949 On that day UFOOPS Him €‘;g‘;1ty€Scv;l;;£;:jl;l;;’;l<;l;?n¥;$]¢ ggrtrl - ; caused by a constellsttioni of events rooted in thgihistcipical %ll1HOl'1 pf worke; f _ _ “ U1 On 3 rotest, mana emen , an state intervention in e co rery. e trans erence o gl? Elcgicillggsélilgrlélig Of m;·“\‘;; °°°“PY“lE llle lV¤ Valley Mille to prevent a lock- \ %ritish industlgial management techniques, being excitedly applied to the postwar spum cn the Shomlng $[°PP€d twenty men lay dead on V British working class, proved ill-suited to the explosive context of the postwar `l .r

284 "W¢ Wm All Sims" li l The Iva Valley Mmmm #1949 285 colonial workplace. This chapter argmes that many of the i¤dustry’s most signixi- Y t to Vicw Them as eunivcrsal industrial men" not totally dissimilar fron} the British cam postwar °°"m°tS acmauy °"°l"°d b“`““S·" °f €°V°mm€¤t’S labor f€f0¤¤S· A wg;-king elass_ Hence they assumed the relevance of British mdttstnal r¢l2tt1¤n5 Most Often the Stat€,s im€rvcmi0ns’ fm from resolving industrial c°nm°tS· Shaq} Q structures and processes for Nigeria. On the cther hand was The reslhence of old [med thésc conmcts and pushed [hem to the Surfa°€‘ This had bcfm d¤m¤¤S¤¤t¤d L · conceptions of African workers held by officials in all echelons of the state, frem in thc crisis °v°r the L°"g Agreement °f 1945 The S¤¤i¤11=si¤¤¤¤¤y Of uadc ¤¤i¤¤S K labor advisors in the Colonial Office to the manager in the colliczy. Could the 1r— as organizations of worker representation was undermined when management and ' 1-espgnsjblg miljtanee of the "primitiV¢ Afl`i¤¤¤ w¤rk¤r" be mcgawd by $tm°mr°; the Smeys l3·b0T °ffi¤€T$ used °°mP“lS0!Y arbitration *0 ma¤iPukit° the union Y0 { t and procedures that enjoyed success with most sectors of the British worlcrng class. accept a settlement that neither the workers nor their leaders supported and then J ` Did Enuglys Workers deserve m have me rights "won” by stmgghrrg Brmsh W¤fk· disbanded it as nomrepresentative when it failed to win the w0rkers’ support. There { ing Class men? Were these men capable of forming the WW of unions that “i°u1d f¤¤<>W=¤ a l¤¤k¤¤* Of ¤¤¤S¤¤¤ab1¤1¤ga1¤yi¤ wm management ¤i¤d to 2 · t stabilize the Nigerian economy and assist the statem the development project? reorganize the labor process in ways that reduced the miners’ autonomy. And al- V ` While Oflieials pondered these q¤€Sfi0¤S they ig¤°¥€d the fundamental qu?s¤°n‘ thmlgh th': State su°°E°d°d in imP°Si“g this SYst°m— it ¤¤¤11y had *0 Fccmt because I l It was nm; Cguld Africans form unions? But, would state officials and the lndusno sector of the workforce felt it had been treated justly, The industrial climate " 5 U-y*s management allow meaningful ¥I3d€ 11¤i¤¤S to d°V€1°P? Thclmtcwal between steadily deteriorated md $16 ind]-‘s‘TY lumbemd Y0 its ¤€XY ¤Yi$i$· the disarray of the 1945 Long Award lockout and the 194Q shooting suggests not. Now that the war was over, the Colonial Office could hone in on industrial pol- _ . On the ground, labor policy vacillated b¢WV€€¤—Y-hc “md“$ma1” man Qld the mes introduced during the War to Sha*`P°n their effectiveness in Preventing indus` K "native" worker-—-reflecting the ambiguities of authorities themselves. This was trial unrest. Colonial resources were still of importance to rebuilding the B;-lush V ` manifest in a number of ways, most fundamentally in a patemalistic refusal to TDS"°°“°mY· md W°‘k s‘°PP“g€s by "¤¤¤v¤"1¤*¤<>r¤rs Wm 0f ¤¤ Small ¤¤¤S¢q¤¤n¤¢ ` new that the key workers, me miners, were capable of analyzmg their owrzwork to the possibilities of metropolitan economic growth, These policies were never ; ` Simation and fomulaqng grievances withautthe manipulation ef allegedly d¢¤}· designed t¤ give real power and authority to African unions but to channel dis- J agogiy labor lgadgyg like Ojiyi, concomitant with this assumptwn Was ¥h¤ Silk s content into directions that were least disruptive. Now the state concentrated su an g · persistent attempt to replace the union with either rural or urban l¤§d¢fS of ¢Yh· ¤1ab<>r¤ti¤n—¤¤¤ promotion of collective bargaining—as the only legitimate con- " ,,muy·· based associations, be they me rural village council or the rmprovemenr text for expressions of worker grievances. Legalized but restricted trade unions, , unjgng After all, they felt that beuéath ih€ skin of the Enugu mma Y°“ ffmnd a cumbersome consultative machinery, and joint consultative processes were all 1'e— ·` ·v rural "tribesman" on whose consciousness "tribz1l” leaders had a deelr primeval ined to W€ak€¤ Worker POWER ~, claim even if he "appeared" to be an industrial worker. Yet at sarne ume, some But all these attempts failed in thm p“‘p°S° *0 derail W‘”`k°* mi]-imnw The , A state offlcials, especially the labor professionals, promoted Brrtnsh 1nEiust.ri?lre1a— biggcsr labor disputes erupted in the postwar period. when Enugu miners attempted r z i Lions procedures that structured industrial conflict as if me men were we workto address the depredations 0f the war, to get their union reinstated, and to secure ` ` cm Clearly there was ambivalence within V¤1`i0¤$ layers Of the smw €md· m Tnany the Same types of amenities and Wage aummcms as British miners in Engla-“d· The ` A cases, within the same ofiicial. This ambivalence confronted the dzuly reahty of effectiveness of reforms crafted in London by Colonial Office experts in mcdiat- · ` the m5n’5 ggrivism. _ _ ing thc levels of conflict in the colliery were undermined by their ignorance of loca] E _? This final chapter brings forth these Y-h¤¤1€$ i¤ a °°mPl°x ¤¤;r¤¤v¤ b°gmS cm-lditions md a blind assumption that my mechanism developed for dw English _ . with attempts by workers to restore their union and to settle claims first raised beWorkmg Class could Cammy be used to g°°d °ff°°° with ““ati"°” labor- Rh=¢¤ri¤ i L fore the wai-, It chronicles a ilawed process of state intervention mto the workplace to the contrary, the Colonial Ofiice was still locked imo old racialized iwaimis of l ~ during a period gf uncertain political change. T0 the metropehvm stm this Wa§ 3 Afriw-¤ 1¤b¤r which made it impossible for them t¤ ¤¤¤¢<=1¤¤¤¤1iZ<= Africans as mod- ’ political mmm of dangerous possibilities. Many local 0?HC1&1S saw Qcmmumst em, industrial men. This led ofiicials to see every outburst of worker protest, every ` v conspiracies behind gvgyy nationalist strategy and most believed that African W¤1'k· memorandum listing dcmandS‘ md Every argument raised in consultations with ` ` ers were mo unsophisticated to recognize when they were bemg llséd. BDI the c¤1» management as the insidious result of the capricious "demagogue" Ojiyi’s mariip- Q Hay was racked by industrial struggles over the nature of power m p1‘0d¤¤f1¤¤1» ¤0t ulation of "illiterate manual w0rkers." Surely Euugu’s workers were incapable 0f = the general political disposition of Nigeria. T0 the mdusl:ry’s workers this was a r°°°g“iZi“g dm Pmblcms in their Own °°¤dm°¤ and °¤'ga¤-izing ¤¤'0¤¤d th¤if S0- 1 ‘ time gf exciting possibilities which they had "paid" for Wllh thexr labor during Tk 1'·"i°nS· I war. They were poised to demand wages that allowed them to prepare thCl.l1f3.\’{l1· There was a blatant contradiction between the ideological foundations of the ’ ligg, villages, and communities to accept ¤'1¤f€ P°]-{tical 1'€SP°ns}b‘l{tY fm N‘g°“?· mw POIMES and dw reality °f °°m°rY industdal r°1a'i°“s· On the one hand, the i The postwar struggles reflected the aspirations of workers, vtfh1c}r1nf0rmed their exigencics of the WM and the mimmcc °f °°1°“i*’·l Workers "“°°“”B°d °m°i6lS ly determination to settle unresolved claims and to revitalize their umon, hobblcd by

286 "Vlk Were All Slaver" l _ The Iva Valley Massacre of 1949 287 l` . i. ;l;;;;;Pula¤0¤S of the m€¤"9P¤Iitan and colonial state and the industry’s man- ~ I sons, state policy was never able to successfully create an environment in which jg! The rcgolmion of mdu mal H l . management could get substantial control over the labor process. Secondly, both mandated pmccdums Ofs O cpn lict becarnelmore and more complieated by state- ¤ . the umon leadership, Ojtyi in particular, and the management failed to understand lll class conflict and its imc nsu tation and 2l1'bllII'2l[1011.'ThlS was the ritualization of , L the sense of power and leadership that the hewers felt as the producers who "dr1ve" n tions um Pwciuctionh fc ricaoies emphasized the critical role of the shifts in rela- ` tht! 1HdL1Si!}’.L A I l l I · M activism 4 This bumauciiixp iuningfthe more public collective displays of worker ‘_ L The deteriorating industrial environment at the colhery severely compromised iw union aid dis mcs mana iza ioplo the class struggle generated a body of trade j 2 the policies of labor reform drafted in Lagos por London. All the various instrulabor dispuwspdurin thi genie; 5 tfislation that was applied, insidiously, to the , _ rnents of "respons1ble" worker-management dialogue were burdened by this real- ` ers were those who im; P€;'1€>d. f onioallyathe types of men who became lead- V ity. The chapter then locates the genesis of the 1949 shooting m a dispute in 1946/47 1 ments of this le islam) vc? ue hor their ability to weave through the entangle- p ‘ when management failed to consult with the union on the application of a national xl ‘\ workers, gdévaglccs n an use t IS or that aspect of the law to articulate historic V _ wage award to the colltery`s workers.AF1nally, it chronicles the series of events in ll 5 These realities ak th k ’ _ _ 2 V j late 1949 that catapulted the colhery into the center of nationalist consciousness. lar Sl b A g e wor ers struggles of this period a complexity that was `- At that time, the hewers ignored both management and the union leadership and ,,\` S 3 SGH! in the pre-war period. Now many of the conflicts were over inter- J. g plunged the industry into a crisis in which a confused and paranoid state proved W} gfgfxlgng %ff€§¤]*1g1011S. Iégulattons which quite often management and loca] au. ‘ ; incapable of distinguishing a "political" from an “induS¤‘ial" CGHIUGL7 ` P the dctailezi nzimlzfzecjziglgufgtlfizhgpipgg. gihese fluid complexities are reflected in , T yl' - , e n . —· ~ , daily struggles of African workers in a historiiladagelriic§;C;f)L;’;r?pg]:eil>)a;l;;i;tidld; 2 t AN ”ATT|TUDE OF SUSPICION AND HOSTILITYn: il and hope. It documents their sophisticated understanding of the nature of the cha]- L " ‘ LEVELS OF IN DUSTRIAL CONFLICT, 194*1947 ll §;;g§E_;?;;°€`:g th? stgehand thcrways €h€Y devised to circumvent it. The reader `V S The war changed the housing pattems of the workforce. Almost half of the workbeing mfm-mulatcgrgllainw t e emotional and political context in which labor was `j »Av` 4" ers now lived in the city, rather than commuting daily or weekly from adjacent vilColonization as asserting its tntegnty amidst the chaotic process of de- p J lages. This was partially caused by recruitrnentrof Owerrt strike breakers during Unlike mést Studies Ofth h _ _ Y h~ E, 1945 and) partly by the more general urbanization which affected most African recommendations Of th F-te s rtgpéirég, whrchlrely heavily on the conclusions and ` — cities during the war.“ The city’s expansion was also related to military establish- msi ticativc bod this cha t€ QIZEE ommrssion Report, the government’s inves- · ments which housed several thousand troops stationed there during the war. The all" Czmmissicgr imewig €1‘ fists upon eyewitness accounts in testimony before the demobilization of troops after the war also had an impact as there were over 600 llil Sources 6 Whhc most ws wi viptims, and a contextual analysis using archival `~ in the·Udi district alone.9 These men oftenpunemployedwere a radicalizing force clusion at Ohi i lmjssulrleersh exp ain the crisis by echoing the Cornm1ssion’s con- ' in national politics and exhibited a certain impatience with the slow pace of polrttween Consci 21) lysncss e A Ie wprkers, this study examines the relationship be- ‘_ ¢— ical change.‘° Many were "Boma Boys," some of the 30,000 Nigerian troops who responsibilities and sélfpositlonagty in the labor process, and the changing » r fought in B¤1‘m6· U P I I explore the Wa S that rhciilagc 9 Igb0 umn. By centering on the miners we can Politically, Enugu’s inhabitants were swept into the nationalist mainstream by the Organizmoi of Work aregvgrs proiwer in production was affected by changes in 9 3, the fonnatton of the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCN C) in l [xl importance to the nam) I ow s sharpened their awareness ofthe industry’s , r August 1945. It was through Council that the pohtical energies of the disconthe adoption 0fBl-iush ln; economy. Additionally, the chapter demonstrates how z I tented urban elite found expression. As a federation of urban improvement unions, ll' indigenous Orcmizam) a lotgigion structures could be problematic when it ignored I r trade unions, and political associations of the Nigerian educated elite the Council Suggests that 5,1 cir rcahlxtl tptolns. Thus, the chapter centers on the hewers and J further enforced the transmission of nationalist ideologies to broad sectors of the mpulaticns of Ori i d O 12: 0 _ err power and entitlements, rather than the ma- _ population. Although the NCNC leadership was multi-ethnic, its strongest base {W The narrative kill); ;e e crisis of 1949, Y · _ ` among the Igbo and it was very popular in the cities, like linugu, of eastern Nige- lll?. Olution Of one Om if as E P1‘€SC1ont;enes of conflicts in which the successive res- { ria.-H While the NCNC was a mass-based organization, its ideology was not neces- \ it f planted the Seeds if pupcg over ij e deeply rooted problems in the industry and ` A sarily radical nor its programs activist. In 1946 a group of “angry" young men and U l identities two Waves Of C gvel an more severe phases of conflict. The chapter _ L women dissatisfied with the pace of change towards self-govemment formed the ll ` underestimated the SO h ict. in 194-6l47 and 1940/49. In both cases, the state il Ztkist Movement using Nnamd1Az1krwe (Zik), the NCNC leader,·as its symbol but Wl rank d fd d p is icationi of union leadership, the determination of the not its leader}2 The Zikist advocated a strategy of "posit1ve act1on" or civil dis- Ml an e, an me level of political consciousness of the miners. For these rea~ ‘_ obedience similar to that being used by Nkrumah in Ghana and espoused an eclec- ,W‘ r11 i

<§ 288 Uwe Wk1z>AlISI¢zvc.r" T/zu Im W1lIr·yMusxuc·rw oj`1949 2w 5;;;?:l°§;’V*;:;i;g1;F;;>;axl§;;;;Th;r1£or;em;nt appealed to the restless junior ` Under these uncertainties Bracegirdle reinstated "rostering" to keep surplus Vanccmcm WHS cimumscribcd b th§;C_ {iles OLPCWPKYIOQBII and P}>l1¤C¤l Sd- Q workers `“on the books" and fully n1ob1l1zed but underemployed. As noted earlier, States proclivmcs towards Mtmdmlimalw 131 ierarcwies m the cwrl servrce and the “roster1ng" was a l0ng»stand1ng grievance and despite condemnatron by labor exists Sought to create viable links with nigga emh ang ¤1°¤h¢r¤<>r¤ $0¢|€ihSfZ1k- N perts such as Orde Browne, themanager telt he needed the tlexrbrlrty of havmg mmm tbr Political mobilization M Th; moumcns at {FY €0nS1derecl tolhold po- · v workers available at A21 day’s notice. But lt disadvantaged workers- because III preand tactics appealed [O a Sector 0% the nam) Vin? S ITU lfilfll nattonalrst rdeology vented rhern from bemg ablelto plan therr finances zmd to meet therr oblngatmns LG Srcd Ound "" €“d°‘‘ A l of the United Africabompany W0rk€rSgUm?m ZEAMHIQ EZ€~ W2? {lm $€f€\'€!8Yy The trmmg of "roster1ng" after the war was provocatrve because relatrons be~ be a member of 8 local Chapter established WO; ( A AG) and Opyr clarmed to tween workers and management were at when worst and there was no umonto preswas a rmliNm_ f h ’ ln mlgu- S 8 member, 011}/1, hke Eze, ent the men’s feelmgs to management. léostwar mflatrortary pressures contrnued to L 'qn 0 I c gcvefnmem S Ef€cttest tear—a leader who lmked an un- * mount and it was di lhcult to earn at living wage when worklng so tew days. The poiam workers movement with an ““PF°d'°mbl€ radical ¤¤¤¤¤¤1iS¤par¤y. men saw the system as another indication that management had little concern For had i0:3Sb?;ncgj_r;1;gu\§;T1u;hgliIE{£(lgrc at [TS {§m‘{· the E'j“`0Pean community their conditions and abilities to-carry I`orth their roles in their-comxnunities and gressivecbehavior of African men whichcwn (:1 30 Om?] Pm’l1€$€ and the trans- gil tamrlnes. This was all the more important because this was time ot excrtcd exLhc Wm-This insubmdimtion was come treftc 5 considerable frequency durrng pectatron and seennngly endless possibilities tor a better luture. Although the carlicn indusmauy it appeared as acts IZ; 8 dgmgercus dlsvrder. As noted blrgermn goycrnment was slow to serze the initiative 1n proposing a model ol polic Works departments k_AbuSiV€” m?H;_HSu Of ugaucn lll the *'ml"Ya}’ Hnd hub- S htrcal transformation. everyone kncw that some forrn of majorrty rule was emlSIOWSV were t_mquem‘Thc Commgms O; QPPBEE 0*7 C0¤\Cli€S; S¤‘1k€S-and go nent. Th1s pressured colhery men who felt responsible for insuring that lherr alarmist position Of Sigma in the Euro ca One orrnan Smith exemplrfred the children and therr v1llages were posrtroned to take advantage of the new N1gCl`li`l.` Starck tolerance Of I. l' I I p n community. Complzumng about the Now colhery jobs were even more important 1n frnancmg thelarge number ol na wm lst agitation he was aPPaH€d by the l development projects being organrzed 1n the villages. Drstrrct Olhccrs frequently aggressiveness ofthe Africans and the licenses allowed [hem by higher aulhmu commented on the rninerspecholng the opinions ol` the "intelligentsia in Enugu." l tty to pursue a policy of viljflcation of the British Or indulge in Strikes and go For example, they, l1ke the rntellrgentsra. rejected the government's Mass Literacy ‘ Slow methods which, in the opinion Of many were quite unjustmedns programs as inadequate in favor of compulsory educatron;0 when the state proved . . [1= reluctant to expand education they created lt rs drfiicult to assess the extent of social hysteria among the European popu- ll latron. Nonetheless, if not a dominant sentiment it did reflect an air of uncertainty a quite phenomena] Omburst during 1946 and IQ47 Oil building Of [argc Slow} iHStZtbility, and concem among European Colonialsw many of Whom would be ir; { built primary schools, paid for to a large extent from the wages of collicrs amd crucial decision-making positions over the colliery. Despite Colonial Office claims ~ Y Wage gamers living in Enugum gllggrsgiéz$f§;;S0;;;”;;;lzX;i§;;;;·C;{ lgciaioqlcialsl were more sanguine about -As men of considerable stature and prominence, collieryworkers were also comcommanders at the Iva Valk mike recall Z ? lem lghtly. Many ot the police » rnrtted to support maternity clmrcs, burld roads, and to brrnlg potable water to by Whystcrical natives ” and bgn in amine ed ee rngfclaustrophobrc, surrounded r J vrllage. These comrmtments were based on stable wages wlnch were eroded rnnd by wangcmus dénccrs .*16 E U WSH 0 being attacked bY W€é\p0ns, .. V Hatton and undermrned by "roster1ng." To be unable to meet these resp0ns1b1l1ues The postwar period wm 'a time of mdusl _ I U V _ ; was a source of consrderable shame. The hewers resentment was deeply telt beam] demand and the raiwayk imbim to na con Simon reiiectmg a decreased vf cause the hnancral solvency ofthe industry depended on therr skull and labor and railways Secondhand mum Smck mg b €Va€¤i¤:€d € iiull output oi`_c0al. The . they dtd not reel that they were berng treated tarrly. and collapsed afterwards und; the strain lgen pus e to 1ts hmrts clurmg the war ~ Perhaps the deepest source of worker resentment was the refusal of the manbccause Of the condition of British indilstclulpglefawas ¤'¤0[1m¤T1§dl2li€ly feparred Q agement to accept "the1rj’ umon. Al-though workers‘ support otlthc unron was not also had to rcsemc ckscrviccmcn Snme 6;% a Ht E _Wm`· Aqdmollallyj Nlgerra ` _ uncondrtronal, they dtd teel that OJ1y1 had rnore than proven hrs smcerrty rn couabsorbed imo an already Su IHS 51ine W kf Weregrefrstered rn Ud1 Drvrsron and ` irontrng managementrand pohucal authorrtres onibehalf of therr denaands. But the that mdicalizcd Nigerian pcjiics in engr; (gcc-HA S §P0l1U§al gf0l-lp they fur- , ~ debate over the proprrety of "modern” metropohtan mclustrtal relatrons practrces ticularr Nine hundred of a mm Surfin? and and C0 1€YYdmduSUi!61 F€l6I10flS 111 par- and rnstrtutmns wrth colomal workers contrnued between local management: state redundant at 1946 pwducmm levels 19 UH €TgYOUH Workforce of 6,325 were ~ 0{m;;Iu|$_ and the Colomal Office labor experts. Not even the labor experts were ‘ p convrnced that Afrrcan workers were responsrble enough to select good leaders. ` ll

290 "W¤ Wars All Shaver" j` . t The Iva Wzlley Mamma cj"1949 Z9] ` Workers confrontations with management often incorporated persona] conflicts ` _ gf African descent, was denicd 3CCOmHl0d&tiOH at the Lagos Bdstol Hotel? The that Symhohzed a masculine ¤¤¤f1”0¤t¤ti0¤ b€tW€€¤ Africa and B1'it6·h‘i· Sl-ich Was ‘ nationalists orgzmjzed mass meetings, forcing the gcvemor to issue a circular banthe case by late 1945 when relations between Ojiyi and Bracegirdle had reached i ` ning discrimination in all public facilities. their lowest point, In addition to those disputes arising from the union/manage- ` ~ At the mjnes, the colliery’s African clerical staff and laborers were also conmeiit Stftiggiiia thc tW0 meh W€1'€ icckcd in ii P¤fS0¤a1 Cohlhct Th€Y hated cach ` i cemed with racial discrimination. They evaluated their conditions lain work against other. To Bracegirdle, Ojiyi was an "uppity native" who certainly didn’t "know his a the allowances and prixdleges reserved for European employees. ' ers were es— place" and was hell bent on antagonizing every European underground. To Ojiyi, ` _ poojally rankled by the separation allowances given to British employees whose B1'¤<>¢Sifdl€ Was 8 di$f€SP¤<>¥1f¤l and ¤1T0g&Hi Y0i1¤g P€1'S0I1 Wh0 W¤i-iid Hm gil/6 i wives remained in England. Others alleged that Europeans even had allowances himthcrcspccrhc was iiiic as his scriic¤A
292 ··W_,, were All Sluvey x \ . The Iva Valley Massacre uf 1949 293 tinction to be rather contrived. To those state functionaries charged to administer i Euugu Where Pesrwar resettlement Peiiey iriiegreieii iiieiii iiiie iiie rieiieiiei Werie Enugu and adjacent villages, every industrial dispute was potentially a political g ing ¢1¤sS.by ¥°°l¤i1”i¤S government dePar‘mem$ ie riii 5 Pereerii er iiieir Pesiiieiis crisis. In one respect, they were quite right because the distinction between poli— i with Vetenmsei Ar the eeiiiery they eriiered iiie Weriereree as eeiipeiiiiiiiieiiiiieste tics and colonial industry was more imagined than real. But, to the Colonial Of- ~ i·¢·· excess W¤rk=rs hired Preferemieiiy and absorbed iiiie ari iiiready eiiipiiis iiiiiie {ice, there were "correct" ways of handling industrial disputes that could channel W01’k1°0Y¤°·i8 As Z ¤¤¢ia1sr¤¤v *·heY rim-her radieaiizeii Nigerian Peiiiiee iii geiierei broad workplace issues—issues that questioned the very foundation of colonial so- { ° md ¤¤Ui€fY industrial relations in Pmieuiar They were eslieeiaiiy iiiimgeriieiie ie` ciety—into manageable economistic solutions. And there were ways of coopring I wards the village leaders and PiaYed an imP°rre·“r rele iii iiiiiiiiiiiig eiiiiiieriges ie nationalist leaders to “win" them away from radical ideologiesee But the state could i i me Vm°“S management Schemes ie iiirieiei Werieers iiiie igiieriiig iiie iiiiieii hardly make these distinctions without the assistance ofthe labor advisers regarded 2 IH lm l948· the Zikists ¤PP°aY°d *0 be metering dangerously eiese ie inciting ii with suspicion by many ofthe "old hands" and stumbled from crisis to crisis in the Q · V Similar demonstration er iipesiiiye iieiieiiii iii Nigeiie Oii 27 Oeiebei i94ii* Osiie minefield of Nigerian domestic politics, ~~ Agwuna, a member from Onitsha District, delivered a speech called “A Call for Even the local state ofticials had long-standing misgivings about Bracegirdle’s — Revoiutienii which made thirteen Pr0P°$aiS fvr CMI diS0b€di€¤€€· Thi? govcmrnent competence and the extent to which his apparently "difficu1t" temperament would V b¢<>¤m€ alarrned and ¥¤PidiY arrested the malor members er ihe groupee BY iiie time p1'0V0ke conflict. Confronted with an ineffective Representative Committee in 1946 it of the e0iiierYi$ November 1949 crisis iiie geyemiiieiii iiiiiieipeied the Peseibiiiiiee he revived his suggestion to replace it with a body including representatives from T Of radical disruliiieris ihreiigii the Ziieisi iiiiieeges Wiiii iiie trade iiiiieii iiieyeiiiene the village and urban unions.3i But E.H. Chadwick, D.O. Udi, and L.T. Chubb, i §:;t;;x;ii;‘i;§;°;;?t;»£;$?$5;:iLt‘:§t;“5§;‘;?.;ir§;‘s2t“;§;‘g‘;$.;tS.ti;t A . i¤W~=¤ ethnic unions that they would be next. But the Resident, D.RJ. O’Connor, simi— ii ` SETTLEMENT AND THE ROOTS OF THE 1949 CRISIS any critiqued chaawieics suggestion that as an airemanve me Colliery Manage- — While smc ¤ffi<=i¤1S in Biitish West Arm muddled thmugh the P°i“i°¤i Um mimi “k€€P ill t0¤Ch With the men as at present through noiices_"32 ()’(j0nnOr noted I = sition to representative government management, the local authorities stumbled sarcastically: ’ i from crises to crisis at the colliery, arrogantly ignoring the indicators of impendwith au m . _ _ ‘ ing disaster and confidently assuming that they could rind a more "coopera1jve" ings ikjgeg ieniiigueégiiieif;Vi;‘;ge‘;'e“i1a;":}l"’;fiI‘ "° ‘i“‘“’ ‘° W°“¤d r°°i· . alternative to ojiyi and his Union. The Nigerian General srnke and me rash or has , P _ g ` ‘ ' P iee y W e e ¤¤¤z¤{¤¢¤¤f·¤·r 1¤¤¢;v¤=¤S wildcat strikes in various govemrnent departments led the Colonial Office t0 IBCsrgnally failed to do. I doubt whether the Management will ever acquire that ` V - th mm dc 10 gbl t t f labmumana E cm Bl ti ithjn Ovsmmcm trust and confidence which has been reposed in Administrative Officers in the V Ogauzc (5 de 3 the S a $0 — · uhm g I? { a mas 1 g · 1 past. The mere fact that for so many years before 1943 little or no attempt was ei i eu wm: `icopei 126 E pm ucumils S 0 poe Vim CO (ima Ccemomlc PO e made to establish this "touch“ will occasion deep sus icion of an attem tto at ~i A mil. The Colonial Office ought to diffuse dec vpleme miiusmel environment by tain it now or in the hmm- P Y P " * i using various forms of joint consultation which in the Umted Kingdom fostered a i , "respectful can in handling civil service ass0ciationism."‘“’ The promotion of conHe ¢h¢11 made 3 surprisingly prescient comment, that he would leave manage- I cilliation processes became a keystone of government labor reform, but it presupmem alone "until me 1ast possible minute when nannies have become a denials . t i posed ¤ Set of i¤S¤it¤¢i¤¤S mid Practices that management did mt *‘°°°P‘political issue."” The manager sensed this lack of confidence and harbored great i SP€¤ifl¤¤UY· it Wluircd i¤d°P°¤dem rerms er emPi°yee ¤¤vr¤¤¤¤t¤¤<>¤ arid at the resentment against Officials who often overstepped his authority or undemqjned his _ i colliery, as in many colonial workplaces, it was difficult for employers to acdecisions by Hcgotiating with workers behind his back, _ knowledge this principle. The underlying problem was that this "culture of conPolitical officials also had larger concerns. Regional authorities were disturbed i ` Suirétierri reeliii-red that eiipeiriiiie iiepiiriiiieiii iieiids iieiii uiieiive iiiiierii as by new political developments in eastern Nigeria. First, there were rumors that ex- in ~ €¤TPl°Y€°S Within the rubric er indusrriai reiaiierie Biii they ee reseiiied iieyiiig ie plosives had been stolen from the coal mines and construction si1;es.3‘* This was es- mat iithe mtiveii as an indusml Werker that iiiey iiiiiieeii iiiese iiieeiiiigs with Siieii pecially serious because there were some 600 ex-servicemen in Udi district alone,35 ‘· i¤V€°tlV€ ma they became Yer enelher site er r¤¤i¤1iZ==¤ eeiiiiiee Nigeiieii Weiie Mfmy had bwil trained in guerilla warfare in Southeast Asia and were among the f ers’ representatives were sensitized to a racialized managerial culture that subjected most vociferous critics of the slow and unenlightened pace of political change, them Y0 dchummizins md emaseiiieiirig iieiiayier iii Siiriir eeeiieriiiiye e°iiSiiiia` nre mic of ns on can cm aX-sawicamsn~s riots in Samnarng Kwame ; ; ¤<>¤ ¤¤¤1¤ mt bw the Wcisht ¤f ¤¤*¤·¤¤l rmi and class ¤¤¤¤¤di¤¤¤¤SNkrumahis “P°Sl¥i"€ ¤¢¢i0¤” campaign made the Nigerian govemment even more J As the conflict in 1945 showed, state commitment to labor unions was clearly €¤¤¤€m€d abvllt the political radicalism of this group,36 Many gf them lived in E contingent upon their rejection of militance. When they proved problematic at the

294 "We Were All Slaves " , The rm vang), Mmmm af]949 295 colliery management and the state used compulsory arbitration, launched court = 156 of the same Nigerian Defense Regulations that management used to enforce challenges, withdrew union recognition, encouraged union dissidents, and even re- I , the Long Arbitration he argued that the dismissal of the workers was a lockout and sorted to personal harassment. Ojiyi had resisted personalized management attacks i ` hence prohibited by law."7 He succeeded in sparking a debate between regional for several years, alleging throughout, and quite vociferously, that he was being ' and national officials over the interpretation of the lawfm The state could bureausingled out because of his trade union activities. The archive fully supports his con- t 1 cratize labor relations in many complex ways, but this would encourage workers tentions."' In April 1946 management tinally succeeded in hounding him out of his ` to secure educated trade unionists to assist them in understanding these realities, position and he submitted his resignation. From this time onward he was a full- 1 V The union unleashed a brilliant tactic that eircumvented the Defense Regulatime labor organizer. But Ojiyi, who had trained in Nigerian labor law within the I , tions prohibition against strikes and drew upon the protest traditions of Britain? Junior Technical Staff, was a capable adversary. He was just the type of leader ’ ` militant coal miners. In February 1946 the workers launched a brief "go slow ’ workers COUHISG OH t0 demystify the Complex bureaucratic procedures that char- ‘, ` which Ojiyi called a ea ’canny.4° “G0 ca'canny” WHS 3. Dllfhéim féfm f0f “g€? $l0W” acterized postwar industrial relations. In an undoubtedly coordinate effort, Lagos y , or "work to rule."5° Ojiyi indigenized the temi by calling it "welu nway0" rn Igbo officials sued the leadership for failing to follow the financial provisions of the V , and spent many days in the mines teaching the men.5' Although the demonstration trade Union MW.42 But Ojiyi responded, pointing to the absurdity of suing a mm- _ ‘ quickly folded in the face of a lockout, it nonetheless should have been S€€¤ ¤§ 8 existent union: barometer ofthe levels of discontent simmering beneath the surface of industrial Ifthc Government docs not recognise me Uni0nS' Why then did me Govsmmcm `L callgvents were brouvht to a head by the management’s handling of a national wage suc the very Unions in the Magistrate com Of Lagos for failing to abide by Some ‘ negotiation in 1946;7. At that time Ojiyi was asked to make presentations at two of the Trade Union Ordimmce?43 , state investigative bodies appointed to propose adjustments in national wages for The 1947 dispute did more than any single event to push the industry towards Q, established and unestablished government staff. Despite the legal position of the the tragedy of 1949 and underscored the difticulties of transferring British indus- `; CWU they could not omit the colliery from their investigations. It is unclear Wifi} 1'€lHfi0IlS procedures to the colénial workplace. The colliery had an environ- —r whether these commissions were ignorant ofthe Ul’1iOn’S status OF W6? SIHIPIY ac|T|€UY0f\1¤I€S01V€d and long-held grievances, dissident challenges tothe credibility * A` kmwledgjng the reality ofthe union’s strength among the workers. Ojlyl gave f<>Sof union leaders and ofticial harassment from local state officials and management. 3 timony at both the Harragin Commission,52 that examined the wages of established Ojiyi adopted 21lWO·p1’Ol‘lg€d strategy. First, he continued to lodge the men’s griev- ` Staff, and the Miller Commission,53 of unestablished staff. Perhaps €1'l`lbQld€T1€dlJY ances. In January 1946, Ojiyi, besieged by detractors, revitalized the unresolved ° the reality of the union’s importance to national govemment wage—tix1ng bodres demands that had generated the 1945 Long crisis, But this time he drew upon the " and the necessity of their meeting with him, amidst challenges to his leadership, anti-discriminatory discourse of the nationalists and challenged the management Q Ojiyi chastised the Manager: m gxtcnd Fha recent award of a £5 underground allowance for expatriate staff to Thatthe Government Colliery refuses to negotiate with the Colliery Unions does Afncan Imners-44 H5 Shmwdly argued: K not, in any way, mean that the unions do no longer exist and will no longer exist The W01’k€rS believe that the approved Underground allowance is not only legally That will not also be a necessary ground to deprive the Unions cf f}t€i1' applicable to European Underground workers, but also to the African workers. , legal rights to act and function for the members within the ambit of Trade Union If the Colliery Manager allows only the European workers to get their allowances 2 laws as approved. . . . S0 no-recognition has very little to do with the existence ... then he is showing a grim discrimination in that respect."S and functions of the Uni0nS.54 Ojiyi had identiiied an issue capable of politicizing industrial grievances in a Because of the numbers of manual workers at the colliery, the Miller Commisform that resonated with the deeply rooted resentments workers harbored against { · sion was the more relevant for the mine workers. The Commission only consoliTlh€ I`3CiSHl of the colonial Workplace. Workers responded with a brief protest, which 1, ft — dated wages and did not grant wage increases, a distinction ihé HIBH falléd to m§k€will be discussed more fully below. His strategy was to undermine martagement’s `, The Commission’s purpose was misunderstood and caused unfulfilled expectations withdrawal of recognition by ignoring loca] ofticials and placing these demands [ of further wage increases. Because the colliery operated with such a complex wage before various government agencies, a tactic that briefly succeeded in manipulal— ` E system (Le., time wages, tonnage rates, various allowances, and sentonty pay) the ing fh€ admiHiS¤‘ali0rl in L&g0S.°6 manager was asked to develop his own wage consolidation proposal in consultaLike many early trade union leaders throughout Africa, he had rapidly mastered . · tion with the workers’ representatives—Ojiyi. Relations between managernent and the rhetoric, legalities, and structure of the Colonial Office’s labor reforms, and ; " workers were at their lowest and, as should have been expected, Bracegirdle was manipulated them against the state. For example, citing provisions of Regulation ill—disposed to consult with either the workers or the banned union. Thus, when he ,Q

296 "We Were All Slaves" The Iva Valley Massacre of 1949 297 announced his adjustment in October 1947, several months after the national award, idays and supervisory staff were given a six-hour workday comparable t0 Eurohe met with angry opposition?5 Within days the industry was in the throes of an- $ ? pean staff. other industrial crisis. The mes; important provision of the agreement was its wage award which In November 1947 workers launched another "g0 sI¤w" to underscore the griev- j ` ; gramed over £150,000 in back wages from 1 January 1946. The amount was based ances of 1944, to protest against racial discrimination in wages, and to demand im— i ` · on the retroactive application of the councillors’ findings and was both a dramatic proved ¢<>¤di¥i0¤S of Sf>fVi¤€· M¤H¤g¢m€¤f attempts I0 USS U18 village l€¤d¤1”S, ‘ g, indication of the benefits accruing to workers if they accepted the state`s industrial ` improvement unions, and supervisory staff to mobilize workers failed again when Q relations procedures and evidence of the benefits of a strong trade union. the men refused to even discuss their grievances with outside groups.“ But when V 2 But while a victory in wage terms it also planted the seeds of controversy that Bracegirdle followed the same procedure as in 1945 and began firing hewers, J .G. would prove fatal to the stabilization of the union. This principle of retroactivity PYk€‘N0“· the Chief C0¥¥m‘¤iSSi0¤€F» EKSIBU1 PF0Vif1¢€S, i¤i€fV€¤€d and attempted ~ it became the Achilles’ heel ofthe agreement because it only applied to certain groups i to channel the dispute into conciliation, but with a decidedly colonial twist.5’ Nor- of workers. The union leaders argued that if the agreement was retroactive, then mally, conciliation uses an impartial party to assist labor and management in set- : V all provisions held within were likewise retroactive. If certain groups of workers tling differences. However, in this case, the conciliator came from the same Labour V were given salary awards based on retroactivity, then all had to be. Ojiyi immedi~ Department that had helped to create the problems requiring negotiation. The ately recognized [heimplieations ofthe retroactive provision and raised it again in t Labour Department violated the spirit of the conciliation system when its Senior * 1949, Moreover, a second problem came when the men received their pay. Ojiyi Labour Officer, RH. Cook, met with management and the Secretary (Finance) East- _; and the union executive collected a levy from each worker, a sum of £2,000 which ern Provinces, to plan strategy for the conciliation. The violation of the principles , was apparently distributed to the negotiating team in payment for their securing y and conventions of conciliation was yet another example of the colonial corrup- i the award?] The exclusion ofthe clerical staff leaders from the levy infuriated them L tion of industrial conflict procedures. y and stoked the tires of resentment which encouraged them even more to challenge ~ Conciliation hearings were held from 3-20 December and were highly con- f Ojiyi’s leadership among the rank and file and his compliance with the state’s trade tentious. The minutes reilect Ojiyi’s initial concems to enlist management in crush— L i union legislation. They would hound him for most of this period, forcing Ojiyi t0 ing the union dissidents who had become increasingly disruptive when the union Vg ‘ stave off their challenges, Additionally, the Agreement left a number of issues pendlost its registration. Under attack, Ojiyi had to reassert his position against man— E E ing further discussion, These included safety equipment, transport facilities, and agement in order to retain the support of his men. Additionally, Bracegirdle was L * ending the unpopular system of “rostering." These issues would be sufficient t0 even more insulted that he had to meet with a man he considered to be a scoundrel L prolong the conflict. pi and charlatan. Des ite administrative collusion and the challen es to leadershi , ` ~ Finall ,the Colonial Office commissioned a comprehensive industrial study by P S P y _, Y _ _ they did reach an agreement that favored the union.58 ` 5 a major Welsh mining company, the Powell Duffryn Technical Services, Ltd. The The settlement expressed elements of a broader postwar colonial labor policy ’ * company had extensive operational experience with African coal mining and ran ` to break up the solidarity of the working class that was reileeted in the wave of g the infamous Wankie Colliery in Zimbabwe}! Their repon, released in 1948, was general strikes, which had been encouraged by undifferentiated work areas in which ; V re provide a blueprint for the reconstruction of the industry in preparation for re- ; the commonalties of economic hardship created a strong incentive for collective ( ~ structuring under decolonization. protest.” Clearly the state had to offer the prospect of some parity with expatriate ~ ` . , ;;‘;E‘;°?§E§$$2i;;?§d‘I;g$‘&;§§§E5§u2£1?afLETQLF$f§§fOE££‘§i§i2i§’;§§‘C€2f » i ·<E¤·<E»~T·~¤T~E¤¤¤·E·=Y¤~·¤~= “ , ’, . . . . . ? I ; IGBO VERSUS BRITISH ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURES tradictions, Many strikes during this period were focused around the regrading of V , ` jobs which often ex ressed workers’ challenges to the ways that mana ement as- , Q I The A reement initiated a process to reinstate the colliery union but to reor- ` Pg7gr0Bnn1b scssed the level of skill required by their job. This was uhe case with the 1947 strike. f Q; genize it no insulate the workers from the influence o jiyi. ot t e new a or ‘ All labor was reclassitied into three groups: established staff, special labor, and Q ~ experts and state officials were caught in the mythologies that characterized much } general labor with corresponding amenities and wage increases.6° The undergmund if ` of colonial labor policy during the period of decolonization. They had imagined a ` allowance that symbolized racial discrimination was extended, although in a much A polarity; the irresponsible, demagogic trade union leader and the cooperative "re- il smaller amount to all underground workers. The hewers regained the daily rate lost ‘ spo¤sib1e" tribal elders. Therefore, Ojiyi—who manipulated the legitimate griev- y under the Long Arbitration. For the clerical workers, the agreement upgraded many · ‘ ances of the workers—could not be trusted. He was a literate African exerting l staff posts and extended to them fringe benefits that were formerly restricted no Eu- _ ’ control over the unschooled masses which he incited for his own beneiit.‘” Because ropeans, such as leave and holiday pay. I-Iewers were given overtime pay for hol- Q e the clan/village couneilors andthe leaders of the urban improvement association

298 "We Were All Slaves" K The Iva Willey Massacre of 1949 299 sympathized with the position of management, the workers refused to acknowl- i The impact of the reorganization was to changehthe dynamics between Ojiyi, the edge their leadership. The workers understood which among these contenders could f union dissidents, and the underground workers, his base. The new union structure successfully win them gains. did drive a wedge between Ojiyi and the workers by creating a new level of branch The state used a bureaucratic solution to attack this problem. In November, _’ officials authorized to negotiate their sectional interests/concerns with manageRobert Curry, a labor adviser from the British TUC, restructured the ba.nned CWU _ ment. But it also reduced the accountability of all officials, branch and central, to in preparation for restored recognition.“ Curry used a model of union organization, ` the membership and to each other. Secondly, it gave the clerical branch and the the branch structure, which he hoped would reduce the direct control Ojiyi ap- I mines supervisory staff, the center of opposition to Ojiyi, an organizational basepeared to exercise over the workers. However, this model was interpreted in a way { their own branch—from which to continue their campaign against Ojiyi. Morethat refiected the different cultural meaning of the Igbo labor force. This had trag— , over, in the new union executive these clerks had equal representation with the ically unintended consequences. g _ more numerous miners. Doing so reduced the relative power of the largest and The previous CWU structure was united with all classes of labor relating di- { most productive sector of the workforce, the hewers, within the union executive. rectly to the executive committee. There were mass meetings, largely dominated ; Thirdly, the reorganization gave dissenters an accepted organizadonal base, it also by Ojiyi’s charismatic oratorical presence. In many respects Ojiyi exemplified the , gave the underground workers an independent expression. The hewers assumed pattems of leadership exercised by powerful and influential men in the village. ,` that they now had an independent union with more local decision—malcing power Ojiyi’s style resonated culturally with that of Chief Onyeama at an earlier period: ? . to formulate strategies. The reorganization had created a setting for industrial chaos. If a leader observed the principles of reciprocity, dispersing goods or patronage in ` ' On the other hand, the settlement undermined Bracegirdle’s position in the inhis community, he could exert considerable power. Consequently, while Ojiyi en- , dustry because officials clearly rejected all of his proposals for resolving the crijoyed the workers’ support his power was contingent upon his fulfilling these pat- I sis. The men could see that he had little power; one minute officials invested him tems of leadership. f V with the authority to deal with the workers, the next they were overriding his deCurry divided the union into fivetbranches, each with its own officers dealing ` cisions. He was outraged by the settlement. Independently with managcmcmv These branches were for Surface wm.kcrS’ mw- " The fact that Govemment deemed it wise to concede on practically every point ers, mechanics and fitters, general underground workers, and clerks. The new Ex- r . . . . . , . . . ~ was omitted in the Concrlrator s Report. The Management does not agree that ecutrve Committee was composed of elected branch officers who formed a - , . . . Representative Committee from which the union’s Executive Committee was L r ih? Workmen S grievances were to Some cxtemjusuhcdf " I should be g‘?"’€"l . . . . . j _ if rt could be placed on record that the management realized Government s difelected for negotiations with management. Such negotiations, however, would only . . . . . _ ficulties and for that reason and that reason only, were we prepared to concede occur rf branches were unable to resolve grievances with management. Thus, these H . . . . . . .. . ‘ V to the rate of pay and conditions of service which were unreasonable when various branches assumed many of the functions formerly held by Ojiyi and the , . . . . , . union executive' E considered in light of the work performed, the skillépequrred and the rates in exThere was nothing in Igbo organizational culture that resembled the federalist ~ mance for other Workers m the Eastern Frm/meas` representative structure implicit in the branch trade union model. For purposes of VY Complain he might, but he had no authority to reject any concession. It was a comparison the most relevant voluntary organizations were the urban improve- ’ V hard pill to swallow and Bracegirdle was angry and felt betrayed. This was the perment unions. Enugu was filled with these unions that both influenced village pol- ,r son the govemment entrusted to participate in joint consultative systems. itics and assisted the state in securing urban order. Although they were organized J Despite the impressive wage award, the Agreement also contained a number of by village, each urban improvement union operated with relative autonomy from Eg erroneous wage calculations that left the key underground workers—hewers and the village of origin and the central executive. The single instance of coordination Q ' tubmen—feeling that they had been cheated. In actuality, they had. Some groups and centralization was the annual or biannual conference in which decisions taken l were improperly graded or put into incorrect wage systems. 'I`ubmen, who had been at the home village were passed to constituent branches. But the basic principle of = on piece and daily rates of pay were converted to only a daily-wage. increments representation was individual and in no case did one have the right to represent the - j for most apprentices were incorrectly determined and failed to incorporate previinterests of his particular branch of the union.65 Most colliery men belonged to 3 ous COLA increments in their overtime calculations.67 There were errors of calthese unions, which were their point of reference for "modem" organizational struc- · culation with some wages and the hewers’ increases ignored seniority increments ture. Curry’s intention had been to create structural barriers that isolated Ojiyi from made in 1946 and 1947 settlements, The state also used the Agreement to make his base, the rank and file underground workers. However, to the men he had ac- " yet another attempt to change work rules by setting minimal performance levels tually created five independent unions. Y ` as a prerequisite for continued employment in the mines. For tubmen, it was six

300 “We Were All Slnves" , 4 The Iva Valley Massacre of 1949 301 tubs pushed per day; for hewers it was eight in robbery and four in development W Ojiyi prepared the case to reject the 1947 pay scales amidst an expanded camwith provisions for review at the end of 1948. Moreover, the grading of a number ` paign by the union dissidents. The nucleus of dissent was in the clerical workers’ of groups was yet undetermined. branch of the newly organized union and may in fact have been caused by the exAlmost imrnediately there were signs that the award was unacceptable. Tubmen , ? clusion of the dissidents from the distribution of the more than £2,000 which the refused to push the minimum number of tubs and stopped using their tokens, the — negotiating team collected in the levy after the 1947 agreement.7° In 1948 they suconly way their output could be assessed. Hewers, dissatisfied with the revocation ‘ ceeded in getting government to call a new election to contest Ojiyi’s position as of seniority pay, slowed down and refused to fill the required number of tubs. And ·; p General Secretary but the scale of Ojiyi’s victory—4,604 votes to 97l—clearly inmanagement still had no organization of employee representation accepted by the dicated that the reorganization had failed to undermine his popularity. workers. Moreover, despite its role in negotiating for the workers, the CWU was In late 1948 the anti-union group appealed to the manager to investigate several still not recognized as the authorized union to represent the workforce, _ · grievances that they attributed to Ojiyi’s mismanagement: 1) the Union’s poorly The 1947 agreement was a bold application of the new framework for resolv- y held accounts; 2) failure to account for the 20 shillings of the £2000 levy; 3) selfing industrial disputes—cooperative consultation—which the state hoped would ~ promotions by the General Secretary; 4) consistently misrepresenting the workfoster a new culture of submissive acquiescence. The settlement clearly indicated ers’ and managers’ positions in negotiations; and 5) the union’s refusal to hold with whom the state was willing to negotiate when disputes occurred, within what { meetings since the last election of official union members.72 In October the dissiinstitutional context such discussions would occur, and what procedures had to be U dents could only secure the signatures of 165 workers protesting Ojiyi’s misapfollowed when crises occurred. In order to complete the model, the colliery union . r propriation of union funds. On ll November 1948 he unsuccessfully tried I0 get had to be legitimated and reconstructed as the primary institution through which j` management to dismiss these dissidents, claiming that they caused most work stopemployees participated in cooperative consultation. From the state’s perspective, * pages."3 "responsib1e" unions required that workers understand the need for discipline and Despite this intemal conflict, the union’s recognition was nonetheless restored “sound" trade union principles."“ Tor the workers, it was not completely clear if at ` in December 1948 following an agreement brokered by M.E. Tokunboh, a Nigerthese new state-instituted bodies were of any value to them. r . ian staff member of the Ministry of Labour. In the agreement, additional arrears The basic institutions for workplace consultations varied with each department. F were given to screen and haulage workers, screen foreman, token collectors and At the colliery the system of consultation was quite complex, utilizing Whitley- , hangers, shouters, and clerks. Recognizing that outstanding claims might still reism, of which more will be discussed below. As in the United Kingdom, consulta— `g , main, it set a deadline date of March 1949 for any further adjustments. It was the tion assumed independent trade unions whose existence "preempted more radical `= l Tokunboh Agreement that finally recognized the Colliery Workers Union as the challenges" to managerial power over production. The basic framework of the if ~ sole representative of the workers. The 1948 agreement decreed that any further Whitley process was outlined by T.M. Cowan, of the U.K. Ministry of Labour and ‘ disagreements arising from this or any previous awards be resolved through joint National Service of which more will be featured below. i consultation machinery.7" th As negotiations continued into April, the union pressed grievances representing ` I e complaints of the dissatisfied groups. Again, Ojiyi was able to use an inter- _. pretation of the laws regulating industrial disputes to raise yet another demand on ‘ THE COLONIAL INTERPRETATION behalf of a group of workers. In this case, he targeted the Joint Teclmical Staff, l` OF COOPERATIVE CONSULTATION those men, who like himself, were training for managerial responsibilities now rel- = In confronting the 1948-1949 crisis, the colliery continued to use the system of egated to Europeans. This was a group whose support he undoubtedly sought to _, joint consultation, although conditions were so hostile as to make it fatally flawed. win, against the machinations of union dissidents. In this case he used a brilliant i `_ This implied frequent meetings between labor and management to discuss potenmanipulation of the principal of reciprocity that was popularized in the generous » ` tial probler/nareas before they become grievances or managerial demands. Official wage award. Ojiyi argued that the Junior Technical Staff was owed additional ar- g . advocacy of joint consultative machinery came in the Tudor Davies Commission rears under the new trade union legislation of 1946. Although the Agreement gave ·: ·` Report after the 1945 Nigerian General Strike but this was its first application in the Junior Technical Staff a six-hour workday, they had previously worked in ex- i Enugu,75 In 1948 the Cowan Commission Report suggested appointment of Whitcess of six hours. Since the agreement was retroactive to 1 January 1946, Ojiyi Q V ley Councils,7‘ aparticular form of joint consultative body which was used by govclaimed additional pay for all Junior Technical Staff (JTS) who had worked in ex- 2 ernment agencies in the United Kingdom to encourage "cooperative consultation" cess of six hours before 7 December 1947.69 The demand showed Ojiyi’s sophis- t rather than "adversarial bargaining? Again trade unions were the only institutions ticated understanding of the law, confused management and sowed seeds of of employee representation.77 Additionally, the Commission made several proantrcipalion among the JTS. ` posals to insure that Nigerian unions were following a "responsible path"—in-

302 ·»We were Ai! Sluvey · The Iva Valley Massacre cf1949 303 .. . . · · · ‘ lr ' 1 ank dtilethatre uired creased numbers ofBnt1sh trade unionists were to serve as labor advisers and the , l€¤d°i'Sh1P was Confromgd wh an mcmasmgly S Simca T an k , . tq ests accelerated educational Programs in England and Nigeria were to mlm Nigerian ` ‘ that Ojiyi demonstrate his integrity as a leader to represent the wor Ecgshin er l. . . . . . l ' ‘ f the colliery industrial relations strain t e capaciunionists in acceptable trade union practices.78 W In these ways, the realities o h _ · The Nigerian State was following the principle that states usually prornbre jgin[ ties of the new Whttely Conrgcli to 8 b;;6;<;l§cI;‘Z)¥;-l1;h1tatiVc system at the Collieryl consultation "when political considerations made rhe dn-es; repression of sonio or. Q The Whitley Council was u Eric Pen the CWU and the personnel manager ap ganiled section of the wage—earning population impossible or imprno;ionl_"79 This I , There were l31—We€klY S€SSi0¤Sl 6 VF al manner A labor Officer Could also be Was most certainly the case in 1948. The postwar inrensiiienrion of nationalist ng. legedly to air grievances lnda gis lfijmt he lackcé Statutory power and his deciitation thrust each industrial confrontation inte the political arena and there had V called in when there was a ea ¤¤ ¤ H. cr who b · · · I sions were non—b1nding. The next level of appeal was to the co iery manag , een several explosive developments. In June 1947 a group of United Africa Com- _ , h lik 1 h d b a pmy to the Original disagreement Failing these in_ ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘ l moretan ey a een . paw (UAC)€mP1°y°es were shot by Police In Bumm northern Nlgmal dmmg a ~ ‘ temal bodies a conciliator could be requested.8" The system was severely comstnke, The event popularized an effort to federate all UAC umons into the Amal— · _ _ , . . mh th fit to reach gamatcd Union of UAC African Workers of Nigeria (UNAMAG) under me read- I p promised, slow, often involving dlgsggintled '<(;;f1§ilkiCt;/I;du;1L<;y¤*}[h;rc {Vere only ership of a Marxist and radical Zikist, Nduka Eze. To the government, Eze was rr t bindirrgllagreeitéentsr and Stitmiein >l;1id°1§2;* A fourth Schcduied for November dangerous radical influence in the national trade union ;noven·ien;_80 Clearly any v · three It ey OUHCI moo 1ngS ‘ _ · _ ·_ h d a had Such ma. . . . . . ’ , , , JO? fmthef labor incidents like Bumtu would likewise strengthen the hand of other rm]. { 7, was postponed to aihe liourteenztil; lgsy that time the cHS1S ii Y6 G itant nationalists like Eze. This the state did not want. t PTOPOYUOHS as {0 m B1 me SV ' . . , · · _ 4 ’ _ _ _ t · · - · _ li eration in such The Whitley Councils were promoted as an alternative ro eonfi-onrnnorr Thi-oo ·g Given the complex instabtlitykof the colllcry t e unions gncigioradon among · · · · · . · ? extensive management consultations generated suspicions o co H U national Whitley Councils were established in Lagos. one was for senior staff, _ L d b th d. Sidcms 86 To the Workers Ollyps f1.g_ and two for junior supervisory staff and clerical workers. A separate council was V _i the W°1'k€'s that were °“"°“{ag° y ° is ' nf Y dl it with SEI UP at the Colliery because of the cparticularities of ming employment, rho dis. ,j quent meetings with Bracegirdle suggested that he had become Hin 7Yb h tance of Enugu from Lag0s—the venue of the National Whitely Council meet~ , management and perhaps could not be trusted. The underground wor ers ranc in s—a d becau e the CWU t ftil` t d `th ti ll b ' ti l ' ofthe ‘mi°“· led by the hewcm increasingly b°ga“ [0 act as an mdcpmldem umm thgt could fepfcsint it at the vI\;;gs) gouriiilis 8\;V}[‘h; gin?-;?ls Elvgseogigi-2;; gl ` ` Trade unions had not earned the confidence of these workers, who considered them . ' ' ` ‘ ‘ ` f worker control. 1) promote cooperation between the government as employer and rho CWU ro · » ~ to be state—sponsored institutions ol ‘ _ _’ V _ _ _ _ _ _ , r ‘ t hib tion ofthe 1947 improve efficiency and promote "wel1-being ofthgse ernployedtg 2) provide grrev. p , ~ In the fall of l9ft9 the manager violiatiitti; v;<;lEj¤;iur%;"LrO;t€dng,_ to com&n<>€·h¤ndling machinery, and 3) to provide a forum for communigarign between ` _ agreement and unilateral annonnfiihat rc uh-ed reduced pmducdom HC flmhcr representatives of all sectors of the colliery workforce, They were not to oonsider ~ ·5 pensate for shortage of Tal WHY cagls ' C cage in the Cost Ofpmducmm from 1 l/6d individual Cases but to make decisions on general principles of oondirions of ser. vi ; 2 argued that because of labor costs em F _ 7 k t Morevice S¤<>h RS fecfuitrnent promotion tenure hours remuneration and Superm-r_ *4 in March 1947 to 25 shillings in May 1949 threatened the Colllefy S maf € · U nnntion S2 l , ’ Q ’ i; , l qvgr, he alleged that unless costs were reduced it was inevitable that the mines ` · · - · - - · · it 87 He laced this ultimatum on the table. In the industrial environment at the colliery, it was not surprising [nn; nre Coun- 4 1 would becloscd. · P “ _ ’_ I d th b den of the railway CHS Wore being improperly used as a forum for negotiations and collective bar, ’t The union executive countered that rostenng P ace sbin for the mblcm · · · · · · · · · · · · ` — ‘ wa on shortage on the colliery workers who had no responsi 1 ity p U . gaining, Even under the best of conditions it is difficult to distinguish between Joint ( ;, g th _d E tpmblem Further they argued that the umlateml i l ` ' ` . ' ' ig ' This ey sai was a managem n . r e consultation and col ective bargaining Consultative machinery was useful { Vi instimmm Of“r0stmng” violated both the 1947 and 194% jtxgmcmcng Bm the H€w_n_ to exchange information and consider suggestions . { . of common interest rather ‘ j' agcmcnys ultimatum Placed Ojiyi in the unenviable poSlt10n of llaVmE to collvmcc than as in collective bargaining, on a basis of divergent interests and demands.83 f_ ? [hc Workers {0 Suppgrt the same "rostering" system Whliih the union had P¤'€“*‘;I'SlY . . . . . . _ 1; , » “ · · ‘ ‘ ‘ l nd der uestion. OW Predictably conditions at the colliery could not sustain this level of “cooperat1ve" amC1$°q· Just at the we ;Vl§€I;hh1i;?::1?;r]it(};;;n2;i$ cjgrvjvaitglgful fir an Oppomk discussion. Most especially, Whitley Councils could only work when rliere was a i r, the dissidents yvcrelloineh YH c dt assist the méélager in convincing the Hmm broad consensus on industrial issues. At the eolliery, they were unable to snrvive r i mty to d1scred1tQli:{i, W 0 01 nic dtzhat Oi VS inaumcc among the Workers had the personal and racial contradictions between the manager and Qjiyj_ Moreover, { vi; to accept rostenng. They G Kaine €€’;’“fricnd_7 and they Offered to play the management Was unable to make decisions to settle inevitable ggnfijcrg vvirlionr declined smce he had beotizie hodmaniicessfuu Offered during the 1945 msisgs fefemil to Lagos. On the staff side, the dissidents had begun to besr {ruin The union t j same collaborative role as ey H uns Y ` zi!

. i ii 394 ~WE Wwe All _g[m,m··· ` t The Iva Valley Massacre of I 949 305 ~R05TER|N(;" AND TH E pm N(j|p|_E gp RETROA(jT|v|Ty; J ~ Discussions at the Whitley Council turned into negotiations. On July 11 and t2 THE U N|()N’5 MAN] PU|_AT|()N QF THE 1947 AQ REEM ENT ` ` considerable progress was made org the fourteen demands hn meetings at tthe Whit· l C il. Amon the most signi cant concessions wast e managcmen ’s agreeC¤¤f*¤¤*¤dbi¢h¤l1¤¤g¤S*¤hiSimg¤ti-Oiiiipimf¤¤¤¤¤¤d·=mmdSb¤f¤i= V r;lentOll;>n;xtend piymddd dd seniority ddddds dwdddd td dd hewers dd OTLll€l' the management on May 18. The demands clearly represented an attempt to refute A eategeriee et Wetketetgg This decision Opened 3 Pendomis bex when payment was rumors that he had become a Smcgc °f,mam$cmcm‘ The msumption °f msmling i made later in the summer. Although they had received their increased pay, the hewOpened a new dispute' Rumors were ¤¤¤¤1a¤¤g amlmg the men that the COHIHY Q ers revived their claim for additional payments. Ojiyi, of course, endorsed their owed an additional £180,000 in back pay to compensate for hours of work lost by } elajm m¤¤¤l¤¤i¤¤¤h=¤PP¤¤¤¤i¤it¤ Wk4¤=i¤gthei¤t¢m1b¤*W¤·=¤t¤·=¤¤¤¤Wi¤g Of g F0fII`ll1Ch ddsdpidmbd dddoddbd 1949the h.€WCI`S Wdddddsdvdrd Ndvdm. *¤S*¤¤¤sbi th¤J¤¤¤ 1946Tt~i= U¤1¤*;,0td·¤¤¤¤= Miha ¤¤¤i¤i’S $¤S¤¤¤Si¤¤ bddid own Exddddvd raised UIC lSSLl€ ofthe hdwdda dddddty ddddd ddddid. , gf rosgctqng Llndérlthc @947 Agn?°?n°m‘ Thésc m1jn°;; `Ag-;7a;°g1°a1 Interpret? ` gal "rostering" at its bi-weekly consultative meeting with the Assistant Personnel Hon O E P““°‘P cs 0 nmoacuvlty so Pmmmcm m B grccmem if ` M E.J. S anlon, but it was re`ected. In response, on November 8 the hewThis demand for additional back pay came from an interpretation of Sections 31 ; etglggigted 8 age Slew., Whieh apptated to b e a awhdeetd, Strike, While it may and 3?6_°f The ucW_Tmdc Union Oldimmcm cffcmvc 1 June 1946 These secmns have been encouraged by the union dissidents, it was solidly rooted in the hewers’ prohibited "roster1ng" and established penalties for employers who persisted in ,_ belief that the union could het he trusted to Pursue their dem8_hds_ using it. Section 31 stated that an employer was obligated to give all workers on ‘ ` Curtyie 1947 reorganization, with its loosely federated Sh.uchHe_ had HOW oral contraets seven days’ notice lzefare their contract could legally be terminated. _' S P awe e d e Semhautenemeus hewers, executive which was Opetathtg Without eOh_ Under Section 36 employers failing to follow the period of notification must pro- Sultatien with the e entml exeeuttvevgé Throughout the mines, history the hewers vid? Work for all physically Ht cmpmyces who sh°“;euP_f°F Wmk °r pqy wages t had perceived themselves as powerful and distinctly different from other workers. ?quwal€y{t I0 the am°"m_th_gy wmfld Oghgrwlsg ear"' Ojiyi had a new 1SSuc’ an Now their distinction was institutionalized in their branch organization. They no Issue mslllg from 8 sophlsucawd mtcrpremmln of th? law' i longer accepted the central executive as their representatives. In fact, even the rankThe clam? Caught the govemmém l?l2tSurPn§°' j“°“hFf Phe pcrsonlkjl manfgcr and-tile support for their representative was tentative. When the hewers’ repremat Ofticiglé m Lagos {mild dgcmune lf mstmng, Ht within the d¤i¤¤¤<>¤ °f_ tcp sentatives agreed to terminate the strike, the underground workers persisted. The mmgm? d;;ttth°a?rdmanc°' Stlilin dli;;m;n¤°":;;n;:r°nmint itdthc mine? ·~ V underground workers were in a complete state of insurgency against both layers wor O a on mem SPIE 1 E W1 rc anne y 5 wor Hs mp Suspk 5. of leadership—branch and central. The decline in the union’s control was graphiclcgis mit Tanagzvzqt Yhas ict F°;%Fm§§°dtDr0P§ig BED the c?n§Inu°"ls ini? 1 cally illustrated in a meeting the night of November 8 which was broken up by the ac ions e ween jiyi, e c eric issi en s, an e ewers in e mine, e when dtsstdentspv Promise that an add1“°¤=’l £180’00O Wm: owed to libc hewers fen OH receptive cam > The crisis continued to escalate on November 12 when Bracegirdle suspended The bcciuilc jiotyéi clfhmsgt whe leaderslglf; S¤gg1j;>_f¤gt¤S¢¤;m; hw? ~* iifty workers. The strategy had just the opposite effect from its objective and the cm Jlyl was a er 0 C mm a E was Pressure ° accep is mmm ‘ S BW` " ~ tubmen joined the hewers in the "go slow." The strikers had now become an indence of mischief he alleged that the dissidents were circulating a paper to the local » = dependent force physically attacking Several of Ojiytse Stmmeheet Supporters in the chiefs that claimed that £2,000,000 had been set aside to improve w0rkers’ condi- V mines. The manager T e e 0 gnized the hewetse insurgency and determination; tions if they removed him from leadership? Later, he subsequently placed an ar- , tide in ¤1<>¤¤1 newspaper, New Africa. claiming that thc s¤v¢mm¤¤t <>W¤d this E — The dvmgd hdwdi who has Carefully ddisdd his hddgihdry gI`l€V&l’lCBS during additional amount. Ironically, this became a crucial piece of evidence to substan— 5 the past four days, is still convinced that Government will agree to his demands tiate the state`s claim that Ojiyi had manipulated the hewers.93 { ~ before the next pay day early in December and the dismissed workers, who conWhile authorities deliberated, Ojiyi pressed the other demands designed to A; mma to go underground each day, are confident they will be reinstated. There is counter the dissidents’ propaganda. He called for a regrading of all categories of , no tendency to follow leaders as the men now prefer to rely on their own igforis labor: hewers. tubmen. timbermen, riilmen, haulage men, machine laborers, pipe V. rather than to ehhnsr their me to any wodm-he champion or their rights. workers, and even cocoa workers were to move to artisan status, Protective equip- , ‘ _ A I _ V _ ment was to be supplied to all working with acid, electricity, and haulage. Atrans- ` ¤h€ 11‘t1dSf of this ¤1‘1S1S tht? state bcgim fo 1mPl€fmm the l€°°mnl°¤d““°PS °f ponation allowance of 5 shillings was to go to all living more than nine miles from tl Yh€ mdusuml Study by P0W€H DUETYH Technica] S€i'V1°€S· SP°‘fUl°”·u5f· lt cstabhslfcd work another demand arising from a provision of the 1946 Trade Union al- t the Emigli CMI B0a¥d as a Stammfy b°dY I0 °V°T$€‘»€ '-h€_ad¤¤-mslmhlon mid P°h°Y lowdmcdgi V gt of the industry.99 The Board constituted a govemment drvcstment/distancing from U

306 "W•: Were All Slaves" ` l ` The Iva Valley Massacre af1949 307 the troublesome management ofthe colliery.*°° Among its six members were a lawyer yl eases of colliery explosives. Eleven had never been rec0vered.1°l On the sevenand two prominent Nigerian businessmen, Louis R Ojukwu and L.N. Obioha. How- " teenth the government decided to arm the police to remove all mine explosives on ever, rt had scarcely a chance to organize when the crisis occurred. Their attempt to Q . November 18. The decision was made by Pyke-Nott, in consultation with the manintervene was unsuccessful. ., ager, the Coal Board Chairman, the Secretary of Finance, Eastem Provinces, and The men then occupied the mines launching a sit-in which became a "go slow." .1 the Assistant Commissioner of Police. It appears that the government assumed a Output dropped from 922 tons on November 13 to 500 tons on November 14. The · connection between the Zilcists and the miners, perhaps in the person of Ojiyi himmen sabotaged the chain conveyor. While the night shift men left, the day shift re- _ self. At this point the dispute ceased to be an industrial crisis and had become a semarned underground two hours after the third shift.*°' On the fourteenth the Per. — rious political one. sonnel Officer transported a large group of new recruits from the Colliery Office C The strategy adopted was two—pronged. While refusing to open any avenues of to the Labour Office in Enugu. Two hundred were examined by the doctor. This i . , communication with the union, the government activated District Officers to propconfirmed the men’s fears that the govemment had determined to replace them and . agandize the villages, to create public pressure on the miners to end the strike. The hardened their resolve to retain control over the workplnce.l°2 .3 efforts were unsuccessful. One political officer visited the major villages in the i area-—Enugu Ngwo, Ngwo Uno, Eke, etc.—and met with suspicion and distrust. M A N ATMOSPHERE OE A WAR CDU NCIU: li, Even the clan councilors were uncooperative because they resented not being conn-rt srart Ptusrakrs TO c0NrR0NT ri-it wokkrns { Sultcd when mmgy was bcmg d°°‘d°d‘m As the trouble in the mines escalated, the management and the state took actions that indicated a break with past state responses to colliery unrest. The government l _ THE W"/ES, DEMONSTRA-HON' 15 NOVEMBER *949 had obviously decided that the crisis should become a showdown and was more _ The first confrontation involving the police was with the miners’ wives. When of a political than an industrial dispute. They began to prepare for the immediate the "go-slow" became a sit-in the informal network of miners’ wives was activated coal shortages by requesting coal from the Gold Coast Railway and cutting back and the women congregated to discuss the crisis. Their primary concern was with passenger and goods traffic. From the sixteenth to the eighteenth a group of state i at the men’s failure to return from the night shift on the fourteenth. While they were and industrial officials held a series of daily meetings. They included J.G. Pyke- i aware of the issues involved, they seemed not to know that the conflict had escaNott, Chief Commissioner, Eastern Provinces; Dr. Raebum, Board Chairman; E l lated during the night. According to the spokesperson of the group, Alice AfaB1'¤€€g1¥Clle, the manager; and other state officials.l°3 The African members of the ` muefuna, wife of a blacksmith residing in Coal Camp, emissaries were sent to all Coal.Board were conspicuously absent. The tenor of these meetings was of im- T the camps to bring the women to a meeting. The decision was taken to seek claripendrng violent confrontation. No offers to diffuse the crisis were seriously enter- f fication from the manager the following morning and to take food for the husbands tained. In fact, the group rejected assistance by the only person trained in labor t in the rnines.l°" relations: HJ. Honey, the new Senior Labour Officer. Any mediation was consid- J On the moming of the fifteenth, 200-300 women met fifty baton—wielding poered to be a sign of weakness. Honey subsequently characterized the atmosphere lice when they visited the manager’s house. A confrontation ensued when the group of the meeting on November 16 as that of a "War Council," more concerned with { failed to disperse and the women were beaten. Undaunted, one group doubled back the deployment of police and armed forces than in reaching a settlement.l°" The <‘ , and wrecked the manager’s office where they were joined by some youths stoning govemment likewise rejected an offer by the N gwo Clan Council on the sixteenth l the police vehicles. Later that aftemoon the group reached Obwetti Mine and one [0 m€¢l1Hl€.w5 ` contingent held four European staff in their office while & second raided the Sl0I€A Wlule the miners continued the "go-slow" and the management and CWU de- · A house. From the descriptions ofthe affair, the demonstration appeared to have many liberated, the govemment made preparations for a military confrontation with the V I of the characteristics of the traditional "sitting on a man."“° Efforts by the Loeal rrnners. One hundred fifty policemen came to Enugu from the northem provinces. t i Authority to peacefully disperse the women failed and the police used batons in a They were Hausa Munshi soldiers, whose black uniforms distinguished them from charge to secure the release of the European staff. Mrs. Afamuefuna claimed tear the local police. By the seventeenth there were 900 policemen in Enugu, 150 were gas was used to disperse the women. armed with rifles.“’“ The government alleged that it feared that the explosives would " The following day at a meeting in Udi Siding, 200 women put forth their grievbe seized by the miners and fall into the hands of "terrorists." Government intel- ances to the Local Authority. The two spokeswomen, Alice Afamuefuna and lrgence rn Lagos had been alerted that "ext:remists" had been attempting to acquire , Christina Amadi, asserted that their husbands’ back pay was important because arms explosives to be distributed to "terrorist parties" (i.e., Zikists?) to use in ~ _ they were poorly paid and couldn’t afford the taxes. They also complained that the a "pos1tive action" campaign. Some thefts had evidently occurred, including 30 .` colliery’s European employees’ wives received pay, free coal, and allowances for

308 "Vlk Were All Slave.v" i \ The Iva Valley Massacre of 1949 309 their dogs, obviously an allusion to the family allowance allocated to European Y The process began when Mr. Moran, the Personnel Manager, visited the mine employees. and attempted to encourage the men to help him remove explosives from an adjaThey also resented the rough treatment they received at Obwetti. The Local Au- cent store. When he met with their refusal, he assumed that they intended to retain thority responded that Europeans were not responsible for holding down their hus— ‘ the explosives. However, the testimony of J.E. Nzerogu, a screen foreman, sugbands’ pay but the Coal Board was. The Coal Board had African members on it, ` . gested that the refusal had more to do with job hierarchies. md $$0 they coulddmt Say’ as They had iaggcstgd cadim {hill European wuiciy ` What they said was that they were not carrying men, They are tubmen and pickofficials were trying to deceive them. He discounted Ojiyi s announcement rn , d h hi t d .th th . f the ma Eine This .0b is the Zikist-controlled (but not Zik-owned) New Africa newspaper that arrears were E boyi an ave not ng O. O wl B canymg O g H; ` J owed to the mincrshm if ~ for trmbermen, some special laborers. He should call them. At a subsequent meeting with the women addressed by the Resident Onitsha, ~ · Moran then left, leaving the men to face the Hausa policemen alone. VK. Johnson, on the seventeenth, Ojiyi reasserted that arrears were owed to the " The first contingent of police arrived at Iva Valley Mine around ll :30 that momworkers. The women were disappointed with the Resident because he didn’t sym- l, ing under the direction of OPS. Jones, Assistant Superintendent of Police (J os). pathize with their complaints against treatment by the police. To Mrs. Afamuefuna, ii When he arrived there were no men outside the mines but some soon gathered out "he came to abuse the women," not to help them.“3 { · of curiosity, When the initial plan to remove the explosives proved unworkable because there were more than anticipated, officials then secured a train to transport _ `~ the explosives. In the interval one worker was given the key to lock the magazine Iggzlkg NOVEMBER 1 949* THE MARTYRDOM and did so with no resistancem Seven to eight hundred men had gathered at the ` . mouth of the mine to watch.““ The actual tenor of the crowd is subject to conThe events at the Iva Valley Mine that culminated in the shooting of striking ] iiicting interpretations. One constable said the crowd was so relaxed it was eating coal miners was a snapshot of the escalating contradictions in colonial Nigeria on . lunch, chattering cordially, and even brought bananas to share."° Constable Okolie the eve of independence. On the one hand were anxious political officials fearing Q described friendly discussions between the workers and the constables. In fact he workers’ contacts with potentially violent radical nationalists and disgruntled local overheard one saying, Officials highly 91-mi?1 of what they felt was govcmmcmis Concmamry mm to- ·* ` We do not come to shoot you people. You are demanding your rights from the wards ‘und1sc1phned workers. On the other wasanexpectant group of state work- — G t Th G t .11 a Ou co Ie this mom 120 ers sensitized by their role in a crucial wartime industry and a trade union leadership ri Dvemmen ' e Ovcmmcn W1 P y y P P y` under siege. The elements for a tragedy were clearly present. Two ofiicial docu- Y To this he alleged that a worker replied "We are glad you people know this, but ments provide some insight into the motives, expectations, and tragic decisions i you people should remember we be brothers."m The men had little indication that that led to the massacre—the Fitzgerald Commission Report and the Cornmission’s f they were in danger. "Proceediugs."“" Both are arich, and largely unplumbed, source for scholars doc- Q However, this was nar the scene that greeted E.J.R. Ormiston, the Senior Asumenting the personal and political tensions between European and African dur- , sistant Superintendent of Police, Enugu. The chatter, singing, and fratemizing aping this period of rapid change. By comparing the testimonies of "colonizer” and ~ ' peared threatening to him. He felt hemmed in by the miners who were so numerous "co1onized" we can see how conflicting assumptions and racialized stereotypes led { that "the whole place was black with them."m Similarly, Captain F.S. Philip, Seto a dangerous escalation. Space will not allow a thorough treatment; however, we y . nior Superintendent of Police, saw only menace. These were not industrial men can get a suggestive glimpse of this fatal dynamic through the testimonials of par- conducting a protest but savage, hysterial natives, doing "dangerous dances," ticipants, Despite conflicting claims and evidence, a tentative reconstruction of { screeching unintelligible noises, poised to attack his troops. He had been anxious events follows, ~ since he brought his troops through the Iva Valley Camp which seemed suspiThe shooting occurred at Iva Valley Mine when the police commander panicked r ciously vacant. Only a few women and children were about and these angrily shook during an attempt to remove mine explosives. The officers realized that they had ` their fists at him as he passed in the lorry with his men. Earlier, he had removed underestimated the amount of explosives. The miners, believing that the removal ~ the explosives from-the Obwetti mine with no incident. Iva Valley Mine, however, of the explosives signaled a "lock-out,” appeared hesitant to permit the operation. , ‘ was shaping up as quite dangerous. At about 1:30 1>.1vr. he got to Iva Valley Mine Several eyewitnesses, Emanuel Okafor and Peter Afamuefuna among them, said L A and became worried about the numbers and the mood of the crowd. They seemed that the miners crowd was not unruly but only curious about the commotion of the j ' to be "pouring" out of the mines on to the grounds by the hundreds. Nonetheless, police arrival and the unusual color of their black uniforms. Neither witness con- l ; he felt sufficiently confident to try to enlist their support in removing explosives sidered the crowd to be hostile.“5 ~ from a nearby magazinem

310 "We Were All Slaves " ~ The Iva Wiley Massacre of J 949 311 Ignorant of the language and unfamiliar with the traditions of colliery protest, p r the wounded and the dead remained on the ground for the rest of the day. Villagers Captain Philip panicked. Within fifteen minutes the workers were in an angry ~ in Iva Valley Camp hearing of the slaughter, lay in wait to ambush the troops as mood, brandishing "weapons—bows, arrows, machetes, long steel bars/’m Curi- i they retumed but lost their courage. Sunday would become famous as t.he first one ously, many of the men had red pieces of cloth tied to their miners’ helmets, wrists, ' ' shot. Nationalist leaders said the shots were the inaugural bullets of Nigeriais naor knees which Philip assumed to be the signs of "some organization along mili- I tionalist struggle. The days of colonial rule were numbered. my lines."”$ As the minutes passed the men began to sing hymns and songs of C The tragedy reflected a hysterical reaction of British non-commissioned officers S¤lidarity—"We are all one!"‘26 Philip only heard a "trernendous howling and , when confronted with African men “out of place." E.J.R. Ormiston had even forscreeching noise going 0n"‘27 to which several men danced in a "dangerous” ’ ~ gotten to load his rcvolveitm way}28 After giving me order to sneer, Philip nnnseir aimed ins revolver at a dancer Despite the te¤¤r of the m¤m¤¤r the p·=¤r>1¤ ¤f Iva V¤11¤y Camp- ¤1¤¤s the md immediately in front of him who "was jumping up and down and his eyes were J » to the mine site, reacted in bold hostility. They felled trees and put debris on the popping out of his head—like a lot of the others."’Z° Within a second he had shot ’ . Toad to PT€V°m 6-Home? incursion bY “0°Ps· Word reached the NEWO clan °°'·“`*` Sunday Anyasado in the rnouth.*3° `, cilors as they negotiated with the management behind the backs of the union leadSunday Anyasado had been among the miners who came out of the mines when — ~ ership, trying to get the men to leave the mine. l.nAgbani a group of women armed the train approached the explosives stores. He was a hewer and the brother of B.U. with sticks targeted the rural symbol of state repression and African collaboraAnyasado of Mbieri, Owerri, a prominent clerk and union dissident during the for- 2 ti0n——the local court—and confronted their elders and councilors who had been ties, and was in the forefront of the crowd outside Iva Mine. He was a young mart, re. r supporting management and the state.‘” cently married, who had come to Enugu to eam a living. He occupied the mine to *_‘ A virtual panic ensued as a mixture of fear and anger swept Enugu, the mines, prevent a repeat of the 1945 lockout and had come outside when the black—shirted =‘ and the villages in Udi. Ojiyi claimed that he spread the word nationally with the Mushi troops from northern Nigeria disembarked from their transport ioniog And help of a telegraph operator in Enugu who was a Zikist sympathizer.”° Testimony they were prepared to risk everything to prevent the removal of explosives, which F of hospital personnel at a subsequent investigation revealed no substantive reason would be a sign of a lockout. Sunday joined his brother miners chanting, singing, and , for an untimely delay in the removal of the wounded. But to the miners it was a dancing in front of the crowd facing the troops and their oornrnnnding ofiiogi-, ]=,g_ Q further attempt to intimidate them into breaking the strike. The account of one of Philip. He probably did not hear the warning shots, nor did he expect that the police the wounded appears to indicate that the delay was more than coincidental. Y/Oulddliirei Ptghlzhmmcd hlsfévolvcr at Sunday md Shot em m the mouth He dice ` _ When white men came to visualize the shooting I told them to shoot me to death uiupc été y` B cn Smit Lwmus Qkechukwuméh 2} machuic mm from Ohh OWem’ if for I was then on the verge of dying. They refused. I told them to give me drinkkillmg lum as well. Hearing the noise, Okafor Ageni, an Udi tubman, ventured out of . Th f d Ong Mr Nm',-i Nm Owl, Ou -a we me Wale, and I me mine, askin ··Anyrinng wrnngvmbniierinued himon the s stm mg W°“"" em “s° ‘ . . ‘ J y’ g . Th g . . . . . P ` xt} became unconscious after drinking the water When I recovered I was in the hose shots were maudible over their singing and the men pushed CIOSBI and closer `t im 140 to the action. Philip saw "an avalanche coming down from the back, rolling on top `> P Y of us."132 But as it became clear that shots were fired and men were dying they ran Emmanuel Okafor, a blacksmith, was also attracted to the outside by the singing. in horror. Many were shot in the baclcm The volley kept coming for n good two J Sensing that the men were in trouble, he “had to go there" because "I am a worker." minutes and some eighty—seven rounds were spent.*3" R.A_ Brown, Assistant su- A ` As he ran towards the noise he saw Felix Nnaji, an electrican apprentice from Agperintendent of Police, Kano, shouted the order to stop shooting and went along » bani, lying on the ground with a chest wound. Felix begged: "Please Emmanuel, can the line of tire and deflected the rifles into the air. But Superintendent Philip was Q you give me help7" When he bent down to comfort him he took six shots in his leg. still shooting, having completely lost his wits, after being terrified by the native lx Nonetheless, he tried to carry Felix to safety but collapsed after only a few yards. He "with the machete, dancing round and round, and slowly coming tgwardg ng, .» rested Felix’s head on his chest to comfort him but watched in alarm while blood circling round and round."135 '_ trickled "through the nose and mouth." Felix died there on his chest and Okafor gently The men Bed in all directions as the dead and wounded collapsed on the ground, I laid him down and removed the undershirt soaked with Felix’s blood. Okafor lay in Many lied into a nearby stream, while others retreated back to the mines, Many r the sun for two hours until a group of workers removed him to the hospital. anticipated more shots. Emmanuel Okafor asked Philip to take him to the hospi- J · All around him men were "groaning and crying." Chikelu Eluke was one of the tal, "I surrender. Take me to the hospital? He alleges that Philip answered, *1 don*t { men who fell near him with a shot in his leg.‘“ After the policemen had left some care," and left him behind.l’° _ j` miners came out of hiding to help but lied when a second group of policemen came. After the barrage, the troops calmly fell into formation and marched back to `. i But despite the sheer terror of the police attack the miners refocused on their their depot in Enugu. The commanding officers made no arrangements to care for , _ protest. Radier than evacuate Iva Valley the workers fled back into the mines, more

H2 UWB Wwe All Sldves" The Iva Valley Massacre uf1949 313 Table 7.1 List of Dead Miners Towns and Occupations Nove b 1949 l V I l ` ‘ ' ‘ ' ' ' ` l ley Shooting ’ · m Et I V6 H - . t provinces and quickly deteriorated into urban riots. The targets and composition . of the crowds su ested that issues broader than the shootin had venerated their ~ . Eg 8 is · anger. In furious outrage market women and casual urban workers attacked the ‘ most obvious target of imperial rule—the expatriate firms that had squeezed Names HMM Towns Oeen . ations ’ E the countr durin and after the war. Several more would die in these rotests. To 1 L` ' Ok hukwu · · y g P O 0“’°“"`* Machlne Man the chagrin of ofiicials, the uprisings gave the Zikists a platform to rally the “danShim M gerous classes —casual workers, market boys, the unemployed, and drscontented 4. Okafor · erri Um bi di Tuallzmss an ~' ’ traders. At first it appeared that the state had blundered into the type of urban in5. Thomas Chukwu Ubshu Old e hin V ; surrection that nearl to led the colonial state in the Caribbean in the late 1930s, l 6 _ Mac eMan , Y PP r ·‘l°"{"°h““E“*“" Railman E = the insurrection that all Colonial Office labor olic had sou ht to deter. But in . 7 AmAmu A‘ukwu Ek “ ` l ` P y g 8: Onoh Ou ia I this case the outburst collapsed under the swift, brutal response of colonial po9. Nnn`i Nwachukwu Arn bo Owerri ' Screen Labourer l V ll°°‘ M2 . . . , l l0. Simeon Nwschulcwu Us r mum owen.; Machinehdan i ~ The popular response to the shooting was almost immediate and became rn- ` ?“‘§;El‘°"“ Nkmu Udi l ` creasingly politicized as the Zikists moved to the forefront of organizing mass i 13‘ FEEX Nn .i °s°d° Hover _ _ zi I demonstrations. The targets and locations of the demonstrations and composition l i4_ Andm., Okcnkwo . of the crowds acknowledged that the incident had ignited deep—seated grievances 15. Wlliein Nwelni Amuz; Bmd, Bu m Driver = about declining wages, high prices, and the stranglehold that the expatriate firms ` l6- Au suns Arnwoke news, 3 ' continued to have over the Nigerian economy. The targets of the demonstrations “g;Cbl““‘·" Machinelvlan __ ., 1 were the expatriate tirms and many were looted and burned. All occurred in the ` ` u Ammm° " M“l“°° Mm ` i five lar est cities in the east—Enu u, Aba, Umuahia, Port Harcourt, Onitsha, and l9·Nw¤¤h¤kw¤ U Machine Man i g - g 20, Ndun hanzs OWL Udj Tubmmc i A Calabar.l“ According to one Zikrst, Mokwugo Okoye, eastern chapters were Amnnkwg N o Uni , largely composed of market women and casual urban workers attached to the mar- ` kets, the groups directly affected by the policies of expatriate l"llTIlS.lM : In all cities the Zikists played key roles both in organizing the demonstrations , ;. and in delivering political speeches linking the massacre with generalized griev;A"a"*‘ba* Fade U”l°” ’l’l°V€"'€‘”fl¤ Nigeria says l’¤e’s from Akukwu Ebe, Udi., 108, ances against British colonial rule. S.O. Masi, Margaret Ekpo, J.A. Wachukwu, Ananaba says he’s from Ndembara Amaimo Owerri V ~ and Frnneis I Nzirniro were named in l` ` ` ' M5 ` I . _ . po ice reports of incidents in the area. ;_O¤¤il>o A€l¤¤Bb¤¤ lists only a narne..The occupation is from Ananabal p, ros Na yaney Q Eyewitness accounts of the actions of these Zikists suggest that While leading thé U;1¤§al’bi\€/;;€n11Zr¤ble incident in Nigerian National and Trade Union History Enngn; The Con. — · demonstrations, they also were fearful of the lawlessness ofthe urban “IT10b” Whliill ' ` ` Q; they tenuously controlled. . . The shootinv also ¤alvanized the more moderate sectors of nationalist move;)?uT:g§d tl1?Hh€V€1'th?t government/management would make a lockout, Given the I ;, ` ment as well I; fact, ilhelped to abate a crisis that had occurred inthe unity ofthe ` HY 0 t S sms s l'°sP°¤s€» they refused to rclmqulsh the only leverage they i s movement which had begun to break down into contentious regional/ethnic par- l lg;?*th€ Coll`;-lY!`0l €l\1;€l’·[l'l€ W01il
314 "W¢ Wm AU Sims" t » The Iva Valley Mmmm af1949 315 (NNFL) and the more moderate elements in Trade Union Congress, was established THE STATE RESPQNSE; TH E CgMM|55|ON H EAR| N(;5 i as 3Il'B.fi'il18[€ the'Nat1onal Emergency C0mmittee."‘8 Both groups, while at— AS MTHEATREH tempting a coalition, incorporated all the contradictions that had split both the pclit— _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ipa] and {grade union Organizations in Nigel-ia_ wqthin days delegations of prominent ~ On November 28 the Colonial Office appointed a commission of investigation I nationalists representing all the major factions of the nationalist movement arrived which included tW° Bmish and tW° Afrimn judgES‘ The chain Wl FitZg°mld’ was ~ in Enugu and attgmptgd to position themselves as representatives Of the miners O1. as »; former Chief Justice in Palestine where he had recently served on a commission 1 mtemedimes between me workers and me smc. A thorough examination ofthis in- M ¤¤ Enquire ¤¤ Lwl Admi¤iS¤¤¢i¤¤ ¤f J¤r¤S=¤1¤m-‘5‘* Th¤ GUM was PW- Williams i teraction between militant workers and largely moderate muonaiist politicians IC. ‘ ¤¤1>¤=S¤¤¤¤¤v= of Wim i¤ the Hm 0f C¤m¤·¤¤S Md WJ advise I0 the Naqujygs fmhm- rggeggch md Om] dOCmnemmOn_ HOWEVER The tensions between them ` tional Union of Mineworkers. The two African members, S.O. Quashie-Idun of the and the workers were even sharper than those between the union leadership and the Y G°ld Coast wd N‘A‘ Adcmola °f Nigcmh Sat °“ thc supreme Colm Of their rc` hewe;S_ Imtiajly, the delegations cautioned the miners against resuming wOI.k_ Bm 5 spective countries.l5$ Despite protests by socialist and communist MPs, no British by the twenty—seventh they were advising a return to n0rrnalcy."‘° Nonetheless, the Q °r Nigerian trade unmnists were S°l°°t°d· miners gqndnued their *‘g0 slow" throughout the month Of Dccembcn { j The Commission convened on December 12 amidst a state of emergency and The NEC and Igbo State Union (a coalition of urban improvement unions) del- , mminucd Workcr Pm°°St‘ Zikists Wcre aggvcly Pr°S°iYLiZi“g md the miners Wém egations gathered evidence from a broad spectrum of people involved in the affair ‘. muy producing at 70 percent capacityisé Ojiyi was Shu Struggling against the dis` and agreed to Serve as counsel fm- the mmm-S during the government im,€Stiga_ { ` sidents who now claimed that he was responsible for the massacre. Attendance at tions. Initially, the nationalist press was virulent in its condemnation of the gov- ` the hcmng bccamc a litmus mst fm authenticity as nm°mHSts made the Pilgrim` emmgnys version gf the Shooting, but the declaration Of a stats Of emergency V V age to see the miners and offer assistance. As many were lawyers, they represented quieted their attacks. This restriction of civil liberties opened the Labour gsm- é il me ¤¤i¤¤ md its dissidem as WGH as both ¤h= N=¤¤¤¤¤1 Em¤fg¤¤¤v C¤mmi¤¤= mem to further attack by both the nationalist movement and the opposition in pm. l { ¤¤¤th=N¤¤¤¤=¤ L¤b¤¤r €¤m¤¤i¤¢¤¤fNig·=¤¤a¤dt¤¤Cam¤¤¤¤S-‘“ liamgrm *50 It The hearings became a microcosm of the contradictions in colonial society. Na~Z tionalists used them as a platform to attack the Nigerian government for its failTHE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE ' ure to offer a suitable program of decolonization. Some, like A.A. Adio—Moses { the trade unionist, gave a pointed criticism of the trade union legislation. The govThe intemational reaction was similarly immediate. The timing could not be . ¤¤¤m=¤* Witnesses wed M *¤= Sh<>¤¤¤gS— though f=gr¤¤*¤b1¢-Wm ¤i¤S¤¤· t more embarrassing LO the Labour pm-ty under pressure from both the United States ** able response to the dangerous radicalization of the nationalist movement. The andthe Soviet Union to quickly dissolve its empire. As luck would have it, their tcstimmy °f one govcmmcm imcmgsmc Omcar alleged evidence Of bitcnoristn nemesis, the Igbo nationalist, Nnamdi Azikiwe was on a speaking tour in the United "` gr°uPS‘158 States. He used the event to generate outrage against the colonialists and for Niger- > g ian independence among the African American community. E ·;` Azikiwe found a warm reception among the African American left, particularly · NATIONAUSM AN D WORKERS, STRUGGLES the members of the African Aid Committee of the Council of African Affairs, it IN POSTWAR NIGERIA V\;.E.B. Du Bois and Paul Robeson condemned the British, and noted that the blood A _` g The Fitzgerald Cgmmissign Rgpgrt was a brqad critique of the Nigerian gov. O Slaufghtcmd African coal mmcrs lay squarely, at the foot °f Lhcsc _*mP"mhStS· " ernment’s constitutional proposals as well as its labor policy.“9 It was such a Du BMS rcspvndcd t¤ an appeal frvm the Nieman N¤¤9¤¤1 F¤d<·>r¤¤¤¤ ¤f Labor M { scathing critique that me Colonial ornce aumonzed the imusuai printing of a re(NNFIT) and gave them E $200 Check fm the EHUSU mma w¤rk¢rS·'“ Du Bois buttal by the Governor of Nigeria. Predictably, the most severe critiques focused Wmt€’ m hls note to the NNFL: 2 on the Nigerian w0rkers’ movement in general and Ojiyi in particular.1°° , Atangible token ofthe Concern gf progressive Americans Over the inhuman and if The shooting demonstrated the difticulties that the state confronted when it atshocking answer gf the Nigerian aummues to the rightful demands OfAf1,icm tempted to control workers who did not accept the parameters of industrial strugworkers for a dgggmglivjng wag&_152 gle created in England. The postwar period of industrial unrests suggests that Th L A _ I 4 _ _ _ _ _ _ L Y although the labor reforms were essentially developed to contain worker protest, _ € €aSu€· Sams? mP€¤ah§H§· a Fabian S¤¤¤¤11st¤rz¤¤¤Z¤¤<>¤» d€mQ¤$'Ia[€d i workers’ leaders were capable of using them to negotiate on behalf of their mem111 ·L0Hd0I1 Figitlnsi Chief C0mm.iss10ner Pyke—N0tt, who was on a speaking tour. ` Yi bers, The state’s distinction between an industrial issue and a political issue proved Mmcrs locals m SC°tkmd’ Wal°S‘ and England Vmccd their PYORSLISB , difficult for the state itself to determine. On the other hand, the colliery workers Y' ? 1

316 "we were A11 slavery ~ \ The no Valley Massacre af1949 317 through their history of struggle with their employer, the state, instinctively un. z` [ The report is an astounding outline of a particular proposal for decolonization derstood the political nature of the capitalist workplace. , and one perspective of the role of workers and trade unions in the process of deAs this study ends we see how much the miners’ movement changed over the _ ` velopment. It made a generalized critique of trade union leadership throughout thirty—six years of the industry and yet how little had changed in the state and man- i Nigeria, arguing that unions’ main function should be economtstic issues, "when agement’s ability to manage and control it. The work of David Smocle chronicles . the leaders stray from this they betray their responsibilities."‘6° Its most fundaanother decade—the l960s—of conflict between labor and management at the ’ ` mental comments ranged far beyond the massacre itself and ventured into thelpomines and within the labor movement itself. *61 Nonetheless, several officials were ~ ` litical realm. The report rnade broad comments on the Nigerian govcmmenfs p ans subjected to sharp questioning and subsequent criticism for their handling of the ` . for political change, the current state of Nigerian trade unions and its leaders,. and crisis. One, J.G. Pyke—Nott, the Chief Commissioner, Eastem Provinces, came I i made recommendations for labor reform at the colliery and throughout Nigeria as ` under fire for authorizing the armed removal of the explosives and rejecting offers ~ i well as political reform. It noted that West Africa’s strategic impogtance during for mediation by the Department of Labour advisors. As a military man, Pyke—Nott ’ World War II had encouraged political activism because it "assume a temporary handled the industrial dispute as a threat to intemal peace, a conclusion reflected ` ‘ importance out of proportion to its peace time place in The British lliffiiplfe. WO IES ` in the critical questioning by the commissioners. The others, R. Bracegirdle, the ~ Q general assessment of the Nigerian government was that it had fat e to propose unpopular manager, and ES. Philip, Senior Superintendent of Police, were severely progressive political reforms that would capture the imagination of the population. ~ criticized for making crucial errors that either exacerbated the severity of the cri- z Similarly, it criticized the colliery management for being similarly outdated in its sis or, in the case of Philip, for panicking in the midst of the ctisis,'62 · framework for industrial relations. At the core of the Comm1ss1on’s critique was The testimony and questioning at the hearings were fascinating examples of the I Y its determination that the state’s characterization of the industrial dispute as a posubtle power shifts in the interactions between Nigerians imbued with a sense of ` _i litical one was fatally erroneous. In treating a simple industrial protest as a threat eminent political change and British investigators begrudgingly adjusting to the j to the public order the Chief Commissioner had unleashed unnecessary force on new realities. Nduka Eze, the Zikist trade unionist, was subjected to hostile ques- »· unarmed minersm tioning that challenged his integrity as a leader. The same manipulative "derna- I Predictably, the report leveled its harshest criticisms at the ‘“rascal Ojiyi" who ` gogue"—illiterate worker paradigm that shaped the solicitor genera1’s reaction to ~i it accused of misleading the workers, fomenting discontent, and being guilty of fi- i Ojiyi was clear: "you are not interested in the workers at all, you are using them s nancial impropriety regarding the 1947 levy."2 It had little sympathy for his allefor your own political ends."‘“ Eze replied, “That is your own personal opinion? gation that the union dissidents fomented much of the unrest in the industry and Some of the harshest criticism came from moderate/conservative Africans Quashie. F their impact on the context in which he formed the workers grievances. · ldun and Rotimi Williams, who used this as an opportunity to chastise Eze for his ·.>t The Commissioifs critique of Ojiyi was used by both the state and the union ` political views and ridiculed him—"What do you call Impetialists? Are you con- dissidents to deal the final blow to his leadership. The Coal Board psefd it to expel t fused? Are you sure you know the meaning of Imperialists7"'6" ·; t Ojjyi from his post as General Secretary of the CWU and banned him rom al loo - t The hearings lasted until January 5 and the report was made public the follow- Q t liezy installations and mines. The dissidents then formed a rival union, the Nigering June. The Colonial Office had considerable consternation about the response to · ian Coal Miners’ Union, which was dominated by artisans, clerks, and foremen. t its contents and debated the propriety of releasing the report amidst the continued i f By November 1950 the CWU was dead and, for t.he final time, its recognition withpolitical tension in Nigeria}65 Specitically, the Colonial Ofrlce was concerned with drawn}73 The state’s plan was to reconstruct the colliery labor movement through ‘ the attack on Chief Commissioner Pyke—Nott to whom it attributed the decision to l}? the transformation of the union. Subsequently, a delegation of labor relations exremove the explosives "at all cost." Because of the serious nature of this critique, f j pens and mine managers were sent to the colliery from England to restore normal die Colonial Office took the unusual opportunity to allow the Governor to write a operations}74 But Ojiyi remained as an encumbrance. Dissidents failed to have defense Which was published with the report. The Colonial Office also judged Philip him convicted of misappropriation of funds in a court case becaus; they hddé:0 to be dangerously unstable and judged him to be "a sick man," ‘*unftt medically for " . legal standing since they had ceased to be members of the CWU. ov/ever.; e further service in the tropics" and feared that the victims could quite possibly win Q ; government used the 1947 levy to bring Ojiyi and his executive up on criminal 1 a civil action against him in the couxts.‘6° It therefore suggested that the government _t charges for fraud and conspiracy to steal funds. This time they succeeded and Ojiyi ‘ award compensation to the relatives of those lcilled.l°’ Bracegirdle was similarly was convicted and given a harsh sentence of four and a half years which he served considered to be a liability and a colonial official who proved unable to exercise the in Kaduna,17$ By the time he was released in February 1953, a new umonlleader- . most skillful judgment in managing colonial workers. They suggested that "it was mtr ship had emerged but the union still did not function as "respons1bly" as tr e state ofthe iirst importance that he should cease to have executive rcsponsibi1ity_"16S He had planned. The NCMU hired as its General Secretary a left-wing nationalist had been secreted out of Nigena, never to appear again as a colonial civil servant, 1 leader with links to Michael Imoudu, leader of the railway workers and member ` és li $° l ll

3I8 "We Were All Slaves" ji The Iva Valley Massacre of l949 319 , ofthe World Federation of Trade Unions. The colliery workers continued to block ~ I 11. Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, 52 ff; I. Coleman, Nigeria, 249tf. the government’s best—1aid plans and plunged the industry into several more de- i 12. "Zik” had a problematic relationship with these young men. He appeared to be too cades of militant worker protest, It was remarkable that despite their tumultuqus moderate to the most activist members and he assiduously distanced himself from them puhhistory the industry’s managers still refused to see them as industrial men. The ji liclt as he negotiated with the Colonia] gOV°‘”"m€“l· comments Of the Chair of the new Nigerian Coal Corporation am instmctivcl The *, 1} ~ 13. Skim; Nigerian Political Parties 72-75; Olusanya, The Second World War and Poliold assumptions about the "primitive" nature of the miners still persisted. It was g zlC"i;"éV’gma’ ]ii9_I€;3 U“°l¥i;n’_g97$)’ _l1T;i15'] I fm I Eh, d ..1 H . .b1 f th I b k d d . . . _ . · E . or an exec ent tstory o e i eo ogica eve opmen o e movement see ie u ` Em? y lmpml C or cm 0 e ac mwle gc M·d¤Sm1m€¤·h·¤y Sm Wm , ~ Ee. twenebor, Radiol: Politics in Nigeria 1945-1950.- The signmmm aj the ziktozwoio- ~ ` ° i ment, (Zaria, Nigeria, 1996). It is at fact that mining is not a traditional form ofemployment and the older men 15- CO537/‘l631~ `igepgrl bl' N°"“““ Smith- 30 November 1949]) especially are peasants who do mining. They have a peasant’s outlook and are ' ` 16* Fm d·=t¤·1S we _ Pmccedlngsi L 507 H _ N cmmca with putting away money against .i...ugi.i, amine, peaiim and Wa. s . "~ E‘;“g“ Q?Ve;m¤¤¤ C¤**·j_¤ghA¤·¥¤a*lR€t;m Qitgf Yet Em"; 1946- i They still do not realise that they are in a steady job. This makes them con- r z` 1S` A pam Bac ground [Ot B. .00Upg nm ` tem mom Of Wclthre CB ith h d th I th _ h ld ll b _g‘ 19. Powell Duffiyn, "Characteristics ofthe Coal, Table D-XXXVI. P d ` d h ( ’;x P ei 0pS’ an ?y_0pBn y éay at It S gu Ll 5 A ll 20. The government proposed mass literacy in which rather basic reading skills were Smppa an t C msi Q ded FO their Wag€S‘ Thls ls an altitude not easlly unda? ·@ i taught. The nationalists demanded formal primzuy and secondary education, which they felt stood by well—meantng advisers from overseas who think that an extension of would hmm. prepare the People 50, mdependencg i Welfare *5 needsd 1° bfms about ¤¤d¤St¤¤l P¤¤¤=· 7° 21. Uooisr 9/1/1/, ··Annua1 Report 1947-Udi Division," Both cetiters resident inthe l villages and those who boarded in town held regular meetings to discuss their contributions to the school, R 2/l/3, DO Udi to Colliery Manager, 12 February 1946. NOTES 22. Bracegirdle was apparently quite unpopular with his senior staff. After the shooting, ' ,& the governor mentioned ... "had the Colliery been a commercial undertaking it is probable 1 1. Testimony of M. Ogbonna, 3rd Class Constable, Iva Valley Detachment, "Enquiry that it would have parted company with Bracegirdle long ago." CO537/5800 Governor l into the Disorders in the Eastem Provinces of Nigerias: Proceedings ofthe Commission," Macpherson to Andrew B. Cohen, Colonial Oflice, 13 April 1950. Mirneograph, Vol. 2. Loudon, 1950 (1-lereafter "Proceedings"), 805. 23. The railway workers struck because ol` a racist supervisor. Many of these men were ` 2. CO 537/4727 “Political Intelligence Reports l948—l949.“ Secret 28 Nigeria. Politi» i from the British working class, the group often classified as ‘“Second Class European? (See cal Summary of December 1948. t Map, Chapter 3). Colonial jobs gave them more income than they could eam at home and 3. "Proceedings,`” 541. Q they clearly relished the power they could exert over African men. whom they considered 4. For a discussion ofthe “ritua1istic“ role of industrial relations in mediating the con- I their inferiors. Decoloniztttion hit them hard and they desperately tried to retain the types tradictions between labor and capital, see Chapter 7. "Cont’lict and Accommodation: The i of arbitrary power they formerly held when the legal apparatus to preserve this was disDialectics of Industrial Relations," Richard Hyman, Industrial Relations: A Muncist Intro- V solving. , ditetion (London, 1975), 184-203. ” 24. Sir Arthur Richards was the Govemor of Nigeria. Nationalists objected to a number l 5. Ibid. `— 7 of provisions ofthe Richards Constitution, including the fact that it was introduced with- ` 6. Despite the importance of the shooting in nationalist mythology there are only two ‘ out any consultation with the people. They were particularly incensed that it did not give , major published accounts of the shooting. The most prominent is Agwu Akpala’s "Back- ` elected political representation to Nigerians in the legislature. Moreover, it allowed chiefs ground tothe Enugu Shooting Incident? See also S.O. Jaja, "The Enugu Colliery Massacre l and emirs ofthe old "native authority" system to hold positions. It encouraged a split in Retrospect: An Episode in British Administration of Nigeria? Journal ofthe Hi.rtorir·al tl ; between the two nationalist power groupings. one. in the west of predominantly YorubaSociety qfNigeria, 2, 3-4 (December 1982-June 1983):86-106. — { speaking peoples and the other, to the east ofthe Igbo. For a discussion ofthe controversy 7. Gt. Britain, Colonial Oflice, Report ofthe Commission ofEnquiry into the Disorders ` see Coleman, Nigeria, Chapter 12. in the Eastern Provinces ofNigerin, Col. No 256. London, 1950 (Hereafter Fitzgerald Com· 25. Ibid., 289. mission). , 26, P.E.H. I-lair, "Enugu; An Industrial Urban Community in Niveria 1914-1954,” -Re8, A census in 1945 claimed that of a colliery workforce of 6,800 only 2,081 lived in ` port qfrheAnnua/ Conference-Sociology Section, West African Instiiute of Social and Econon-govemment quarters in Enugu, 1,640 in Colliery quarters and the remaining 3,100 lived nomic Research, Ibadan, University Colleve, March 1953, 164. in nearby villages. NIGCOAL 2/1/138, Local Authority, "Census of Enugu," 1945. This 27. Coleman, Nigeria 292. D was conducted by the local authority in 1945. I thank Dr, P.E.H. Hair for allowing me to 28. See Powell Duffryn, "Characteristics of the Coal," D-138, Interview with Eze use his copy. 1 Ozogwu, 2 June 1975. 9. UDDIST 9/1/1/ "Annua1 Report 1946-Udi Division." 1 29, David Sn-rock Papers, Jacob A. Diewait, typescript response to questions, mimeo— 10. Coleman, Nigeria 253-254. I graph, n,d_ i

320 "We Were All Slaves" Q The Iva Valley Massacre of 1 949 321 30. Documents in the PRO show how confused they were even at the Colonial Office 1 58, NCCF] P. 1/3/1, R. Bracegirdle, "Report on Trades Dispute at the Col1iery—1947,” level about nationalists’ ideologies. I.e., Zik, himself. See C.O.537/4727 Political Intelli- , 10 January 194g_ gems R°P0l’1s 1948-49; CO537/5807 “The Zikist Movement” 1949-1950. ` 59. The best treatment of the most prominent of these strikes is by Timothy Oberst in his 31. R 2/1/3, F1fZg¢l‘61d C0l'i1¤‘11SSl0ll R€Pl”€s€1'li3lil0l’lsr A1T¤€hI¥1¤1‘l£ 111. R- Braeegirdle 10 t doctoral dissertation; "Cost of Living and Strikes in British Africa, c 1939-1948: Imperial L-T- Chubb. Sec. Enstern Ffrevrnees. 15 September 1945- -_ Policy and the Impact ofthe Second World War," 1>h.1:». Diss., Columbia University, 1991. 32. R 2/1/3 E.R. Chadwick to L.T. Chubb, 7 March 1946. " { 60. This discussion is from the actual text of the agreement, NCCF R 1/3, "Memoran33. Ibid, DP]. O’Connor to L.T. Chubb, 11 March 1946. ` dum of Agreement—1947," 22 December 1947. 34- Fitzgerald Cemmtsrten. 35- ‘ 61. David Smock papers, Interview with 11.1. 1-rnney, iviaeeiesriehi, Cheshire, England, 35- Akpnle "Beelreeeetiings," v. 1, p. 316; Airpaia, react36. Unrest among ex-servicemen began in 1946 when they demanded better conditions r ground to me $noonng1nen;1en;," 353, ef life end peyrnent- The eentrest between their living eenditiens and these ef Enrepeans ‘ 62.For a study ofthe eeiiiery see Ian phinusrer, wnnei Kahn.- cant, capitaz and Labour 1 increased their ire. Great Britain, Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Disturbances in Colonia] Zimbabwe ]894. [ 9 54 (1-1a_ra;o_ 1994), ”1 the Geld CWS'- 1948· C¤i<>ni¤1Ne- 125 g J 63. This was an industrial application of what Cooper called "the demagogue-mass con37. NIGCOAL 1/1/36, Manager to Engineers, 11 September 1945. j ` nection." Frederick Cooper, Decolonizntion, 254. 38. In 1947 the senior clerk claimed that timekeepers were angry because ex-servicemen ·. » 64, Testimony of Roben Cun·y, "Proceedings," v.l. 93. were given iniiated grades without the requisite qualilications. NIGCOAL 1/1/22, EO. Eri- i· 65_ Akpgla, Qgaokground to the shooting 1noident,” 356.57 nose. te Celliery Manager. 11 Angnst 1947- » ' 66. NCCF 12 1/3/1, Manager Comment, 10 January 1948. 39. Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, 75; Olusanya, The Second World War, 116. { 1 67_ 1>_ 1/3_ "Merno1-andun-1 ofAg1-eemenr, 22 December 1947]* 40 22 Augusi 1977r ROY Adnrns 19 -1911 Haydn 1111911191 Exchange Oh H-Lebenr. pested ` 68. This was included in a report by T.M. Cowan of the British Ministry of Labor on ne21 Augus1 1997- * gotiations between govemment and its employees in which he feared that trade union lead41- 0jiyi’s persensl papers tire replete with internal memes between expetriate s¤pervi— - " ers might be rereeri to use eageressive tastiesr to secure what he considered to be sors, the manager. end $1919 01:11C1i=11s 1YY11lg°19 ¤1€V€10P strategies te Pulilsh him fer his l-fads ‘ . "unreasonable demands." Report 071 Methods of Negotiation between Government and Govuh10h ¤C11V111€s· ses NIQQOAL 1).2/1/1 (New Numbsfl- Q_ V. ernment Employees on Questions ajecting Conditions of Service in Industrial Depart42. NCCF RM1/1, Ojlyl tc C0111€1’y Manage?. 12 M2-1‘¢11 1946- 1* i ments," as cited in Ananaba, The 7i·ade Union Movement, 71. 45- R 2/1/Lpliyl te CM 1 AP1'11 1940- i f 69. R 1/3/1, Passmore, Acting CM to C.W.U,, 27 July 1948; Saint to Cook, 9 April 1948; 44 1:11/3- 01154101 1-hs C911i9l'Y W0l‘1<€l’s» 10 N0V€mh€l’ 1947- Ig , "Petition for Regrading by Machine Drivers," 2 August 1948; Ugwu, Runners Group to 45. R 1/3 Ibid. .* 1 CM, 21 December 1948. 46- Akpnla. "Beel
322 "Vlk Were All Slaves" V The Iva Valley Massacre of I 949 323 on the State and Employee Representation in the Era of World Warl (Illinois, 1997). Haydu fense against women and make scurrilous comments and songs. Sometimes they beat down argues that they also effectively privileged trade unions over more radical forms of work- 4 his house using large sticks. The 1929 Aba Women’s Riots followed this format but were ers’ representation. i actually a protest against tl·re corruption of the unpopular warrant chiefs and an attempt to 78. Report ofthe M€¢h0dS vfN€g0!i¤¢i¤H b€YW€’€7l the G0V€mm€Yll and G¤V€mm€”l Em" _ institute taxation in the east. From the description of the singing and jovial mood of the ployees on Questions Afecting Conditions of Service in Industrial D€pL1f!m€HfS (l-AIEOS. l crowd surrounding the ma.nager‘s house it appears that this was the case, See Judith Van 1948). Allen, "‘Sitting on aMan’: Colonialism and the Lost Political Institutions of Igbo Women," 79. Rob Davies, “The Class Character of South Africa’s Industrial Conciliation Legis— Canadian jgumal gfA./iriggyg _5‘;udig_t·_ 6, 2 (1972); ]65..gl_ 1ation," in Essays in Southern African Labour History. Eddie Webster. ed (l¤h¤¤¤eSb¤f2» 111. Ondist 12/1/1562, Local Authority, Enugu, "Account ofthe Colliery stnkef 1978), 79. . 112. The article in New Africa claimed that the miners were owed additional back pay 80. Ananaba, The Trade Union Movement, 75-76; Cohen Labour and Politics, 75-76. i ~ because of illegal rostering. The Fitzgerald Commission reserved special comments for the 81. Testimony of Sir Hugh Foote, Governor of Nigeria, "Proceedings," v. I, 7. paper, blaming the article for spreading misinformation which fanned the crisis. Fitzgerald 82. Ibid. l Commission, 10. 83. Yesufu, An Introduction to Industrial Relations in Nigeria, 51. 4 ¥ 113. Interview with Alice Afamuefuna, 26 July 1975. 84. Fitzgerald Commission, 21-22. /7 ,4 114. "Proceedings of the Commission," and Fitzgerald Commission. 85. Ibid. 4 V 115. Interview with Emanuel Okafor, Uwani, Enugu, 10 July 1975. Interview with Peter 86. David Smock, "From Village to Trade Union in Africa," Ph.D. Diss., Comell Uni- ; Afamuefuna, Tinker’s Corner, Enugi, 26 July 1975. versity, 1964, 142. ‘¤ 1 116. Testimony of J.E. Nzerogu, Screen Foreman; "Proceedings," 763. 87. R N1, "Minutes of the Meeting of the CWU Executive with Manager, 17 May 1949.” T 2 ]]7_ [bid__ 76]_ 88. Ibid. V 118. "Proceedings," 519. 89. Akpala, “Africa.n Labour Productivity," 239. 1 119. Testimony of A. Okolie, Lance Corporal Police Force, "Proceedings," 775. 90. Ibid., 299. I 120. Ibid., 782. 91. R 2/1, "Minutes ofthe Meeting, l'7 May 1949." E 121. Ibid. 92. Fitzgerald Commission, 26. ~ 122. Testimony of E.J.R. Ormiston, Senior Assistant Superintendent of Police, Enugu, 93. Ibid. · . "Proceedings," 435. 94. R 2/1, Labour Officer to Labour Commissioner, 17 May 1949. 1 123. Philip’s testimony is an excellent example of the hysterical response of a colonial 95. R 2/1, "Minutes of the Whitley Council, 12 July 1949." l ~ policeman acting from his instincts and misinterpreting the demeanor and intent of an 96. P 2/1, CM to Chief Secretary, 10 November 1949; Fitzgerald Commission, 28. i_ African crowd. See "Proceedings," 452-88. 97 , R 2/1, Code Telegram from Chief Secretary to CM. rrd.; CM R0 Chief Secfelafyi 9 ,. V 124. The presence of weapons was challenged by many witnesses. Ihave included it here November 1949; CM to Chief Secretary, 10 November 1949. _i i because it is part of the testimony and because it attests to the state of mind of the ofticers. 4 98. R 2/1, CM to Chief Secretary, 12 November 1949. ,4 * See testimony of Philip above. ‘ 99, The Powell Duffryn Technical Services firm had been commissioned by the Colonial ". 4 125, Philip, "Pmr;eedings_" 485, Secretary to conduct an extensive investigation of the technical and personnel problems of ‘ 126_ lmcyvlew Wim Emmanuel Okafgp the coal industry. Its report is a detailed description of the industry`s operations. See Powell ‘ 127. Philip, "Proceedings," 460. Duffryn Technical Services, "First Report on the Government Colliery. Enugll." l948· ~ 128. Philip was challenged in this characterization by Quashie-ldon, a lawyer for the men. 100. Powell Duffryn Technical Services, H. 8-9. ’ ‘ "Proceedings," quote from Philip testimony, 483. 101. R 2/1, CM to Chief Secretary, 14 November 1949. ~ 129. Ibid., 457. 102. R 2/ No. 1111, "Minutes of the Meeting at Government Lodge, 16 July l950." . l30_ ]`bid__ 477_ 103. Fitzgerald Commission, 36-37. 3 i 131. This dialogue is based on the Proceedings of the commission of investigation, the 104. David Smock Papers, Interview with H.J. Honey, Macclesfield, Cheshire, England, `4 . Fgizgemld C,;mm{_;sg0n_ 7 December 1961. [ ~ 132. "Proceedings," 412. , 105. Fitzgerald Commission, 36. · g 133. When questioned by H.O. Davies as to how six men could have been shot in the 106. Ibid., 33. j ’ back, Philip said drat a ricocheting bullet could strike another person. Philip, 488. , 107. Ibid., 34; The Times of London, 6 January 1950. V 134_ "Pmceedings,” 541, 108. ONDIST 12/1/1563, Local Authority, "Account of the Colliery Str1ke”; "Statement Q; _ i35_ pm]jp_ 45g_ by A,J,W. Clarke, Assistant District Officer, Udi," 2 December 1949. 136. Emmanuel Okafor, a blacksmith, Uwani, Enugu, 10 July 1975. 109. Interview with Alice Afameufuua, Tinker’s Corner, Enugu, 26 July 1975. il i 137_ Phillip, 475_ 110. "Sitting on a man" is a traditional fomi of women’s protests in Igbo villages in which f l3g_ Interview wi[h Ermmmucl ()k;,_fm-_ the women of a market grouping surround the house of a man Who has committed HH Of- . 4 139, Interview with Isaiah Ojiyi, Ai·nawbin_ Awka, 27 July 1975 _ . ». , ll

324 "We Were All Slaves " V The Iva Valley Massacre of 1949 325 140. Interview with Onovo Ana, Akegbe Ugwu, Enugu, 30 July 1975. i 161. David Smock, "Vi1lage to Trade Union"; Conflict and Control in an African Trade 141. Interview with Chikelu Eluke, Ugbo’ dogwu, Enugu, 5 August 1975. Union: A Study ofthe Nigerian Coal Miners' Union (Stanford, 1969). Both emphasize the 142. For eyewitness accounts of these incidents see "Proceedings," 542-682. ‘ period after 1950 and focus on the centralization of power in the union. Smock includes a 143. In Calabar the ethnic divisions between the Igbo urban working class and the Etik , formidable historical section in the thesis though not in the book. former slaveowners led to a wave of ethnic violence immediately following the shooting. ` 162. For both see ‘“Proceedings." The Ekpo Society joined police in dispersing the predominantly Igbo demonstrations. Anti- _ 163. Ibid., 749. i Igbo violence continued for several days in December. The Times, 19 December 1949. ~, 164. Ibid., 752. F 144. Interview with Mokwugo Okoye, East Central Broadcasting Layout, Enugu, 16 July 165. The Colonial Office debate about the publication of the report is in C.O. 537/5794, 1975. . ~ /5795, /5796, /5797. One particularly unsettling development had been a series of tense 1 145. Fitzgerald Commission, 41-49; Mokwugo Okoye, 16 July 1975. ; demonstrations by ex-servicemen in several cities in eastem Nigeria. Several had bordered i 146. Ananaba, Trade union movement Nigerian Political Parties, 109; Sklar, 77. i , on insurrection. See Geoffrey Nwaka, "Rebel1ion in Umuahia, 1950-1951: Ex-servicemen 147. Nduka Eze, "Memoirs of a Crusader,” (typewritten) as cited in Nigerian Political t and Anti-colonial Protest in Eastern Nigeria," Transafrican Journal of History, Vol 16 Parties Sklar, 77. ._ Y (1987): 47-62. 148. According to Sklar, the NEC included from the NCNC, KO. Mbadiwe, EU.Anyiam, , 166. C.O. 537/5799, Minutes, Andrew Cohen to W.C. Johnson, Sir C. Jeffries, Sir T. ` Oged Macaulay, A.K. Blankson, Mbonu Ojike; from the Zikist movement, Mokwugo Y Lloyd. Okoye; from the Northem National Movement, Dr. Akinola Maja, F.R.A. Williams, Oba Q 167. "Notes of a Meeting Held on Z1 April to Discuss the Fitzgerald Report." i Samuel Akisanya, H.O. Davis, and J. Akanni Doherty. Trade unionists who were members `* 168. Ibid. 5 included P.O. Balonwu, and A.A. Adio-Moses. Undetermined affiliation: S.O. Gbadamosi, 2· 169. Fitzgerald Commission, 14. 1 Odemo of Ishara, O.A. Thomas, G.B. Okeke, M.A. Ogun, N. Okoro, and Dr. I. Olorun- . . 170. Ibid., 11. i Nimbe (expelled from the NCNC in 1948). Ananaba, 109; Sklar, Nigerian Political Par- V 171. Ibid., 101. ties, 78n. _ 172. Ibid., 25. 149. ONDIST 12/1/1564, "Minutes of Meeting between Lagos Delegates and Udi Clan , 173. David Smock, "From Village to Trade Union,” 145. Councillors, 27 November 1949." [ 174. One of the labor experts, H.J. Honey, objected to the Commission critique of Ojiyi 150. Great Britain, 38th Parliament, Hansard it Parliamentary Debates (Commons), v. j and tried to give a more balanced perspective of the crisis. Perhaps for this reason he was 470, 7 December 1949, 1866-68. ‘; removed from Enugu relatively soon after his opinions became known. R2, No. 111 "Min151. "African Aid Committee Sends Help to Nigerian Strike Victims," New Africa, 9, 1 { utes of the Meeting held in the Senior Labour Offrcer’s Oftice on Friday 16 June 1950." (January 1950). “Minutes of a Meeting Held at Govemment Lodge," 16 June 1950. 152. Ibid. ~ 175. David Smock Papers, Interview with Okwudili Ojiyi, Amawbia, Awka, 3 October 153. The African»American press also carried reports on the shooting. See "Wi1d Riots 1962. Sweep Nigeria, Police Kill Four," The Pittsburgh Courier, 10 December 1949; "18 Killed { 176. New No. P. 2, Acting Chairman, Nigerian Coal Corporation, "Secret: Labour Relain African Riot," Amsterdam News, 26 November 1949. For Parliamentary Debates see ; tions at Enugu Collieries,“ 29 May 1951. Hansards V 470, 38th Parliament 1948-49, 21 November-16 December 1949. ' 154. Anthony Kirk-Greene, Biographical Dictionary ofthe British Colonial Service, 1939-1966 (London, 1991). ? t 155. The Times, 28 November 1949. I _ 156. ONDIST 12/1/1564, Colliery Manager to Chief Secretary, 7 December 1949. Q t 157. For the CWU there was M.O. Ajegbo, G.C. Nkemena, and G.C.M. Onyuike. Charles i D. Onyeama, son of Chief Onyeama, represented the union dissidents. F.R.A. Williams, H.O. Davies, H.U. Kaine, J.A. Chukwu, and G.C. Nonyelu represented the National Emer- _ gency Corrunittee. See, Fitzgerald Commission, 4-5. » Y 158. Fitzgerald, 34. E ' 159. The chairman, W.] . Fitzgerald, was president of the Lands Tribunal and had served , in the colonial legal service in Nigeria, Northern Rhodesia, and Palestine. The Hmes, 28 ? ` November 1949. » ; 160. One of the unfortunate aspects of the event is the prominence given to this official report by historians of the period. The cornrnission "Proceedings” give a more complex pic— ' ture of evolving events and suggest that Ojiyi may indeed have been correct in his inter- V, pretation of the Trade Union Ordinance’s position on rostering. "Proceedings." V,

i C ON' ONCLUSI . I W oR1<, CLASS, AND it J_ IDENTITY IN IGB OLAND .% ¤S l J 4 V The first part of this study documented the construction of colonial labor relations V V in a state industry. The British charged into Igboland and created the first group of Q workers from the vanquished. But gradually Igbo men set the parameters of what , they would and would not do, even within a system of exploitative structures in V I 5 the workplace. Some were slaves, for whom wage labor was a prelude to emanciL · pation, and others were free. But both were conscripted by the dragnet of forced " labor. The second part of the study, from the late 1930s, describes the gradual ero' . · , sion of the colonial labor process. Strikes over dignity—the slapping of a worker ' i by a white boss, the insistence of respectful forms of address (the end of "pick A boy")—all were markers that the old racist forms of authority were no longer ten`. , ` able in the workplace. V ; The narrative ended with the Iva Valley shooting which was in many ways an j . inevitable result of a conventional fiction: that there was a clear distinction between .‘ 1 ~ economic and political disputes in a colony. The crucial difficulty was how to de"? fine this distinction. When pressed to do so, as in November of 1949, few officials in authority were able to determine when a "labor" dispute had become a threat to ` f political stability. In fact, this distinction, which became a mantra of the Colonial Office social reforms during the war, was the articulation of a political position to * {»` Q moderate the activism of colonial workers and insulate them from nationalists. .>_` ° Such moderation was especially important at a time when the state could not difii J ferentiate a “safe" nationalist from a communist fellow traveler. The difficulty in A the industrial/political distinction was that it was antithetical to the industry’s his~ if tory. In Nigeria as in most African colonies, the state was too dominant as an emi ployer to make this analytical distinction a reality. From the foundational years of the industry the Nigerian state had acted as if colliery labor were political and _ z_ Enugu mine workers understood this reality early and manipulated it. And it was , iT incredibly naive for officials to assume that government employees wouldn’t understand the political nature of their protest. Y t In fact, the system of labor recmitment used in l9l4—forced labor—was called ' ~; » "political labor." It was the state that introduced capitalist production relations into the area. The chief architect, Lord Lugard, explicitly crafted a patemalistic role for ·» the state which intentionally introduced what he considered to be a superior labor

328 Conclusion · Conclusion 329 system. Brushing aside the apparent contradiction of recruiting "free" labor using V The British never seemed to respect or to recognize the complexity of Igbo gov"forced" means, Lugard established a managerial structure in which political offr- _A eming traditions and organizations and the roles that these men played within them. cials consistently intruded into industrial affairs. Intimate connections were simi- ` By the late thirties the Colonial Office acknowledged that the best way of conlarly made between the purveyors of "customary" law, the warrant "chiefs" and t taining colonial workers’ unrest was to develop industrial disputes procedures that later the village councilors and the industry. This, consequently, entangled the in- i acknowledged that workers had a right to some form of representation. But workdustry’s concerns within the lower echelons of the colonial state. , ers spent the remainder of the colonial period fighting over the form and degree of The workers usually recognized the political impact of their grievances and al- i autonomy that these organizations were allowed to have. Initially there were the ways realized that the center of industrial authority lay not with the management Y Nzuko but their militance and secretiveness made officials wary. Then managebut with the state. They were propelled by a strong concept of social justice with { ment appointed Representative Councils, but the old Nzuko leaders seized their a definition of workers’ rights and entitlements. As state workers this concept re- f leadership and they remained disruptive. Thirdly were the state-mandated trade lated to the ways that they conceptualized the responsibilities of political authori- — unions which were initially controlled by parasitic sectors—"boss boys," interties and leaders. Some of this was rooted in Igbo concepts of the responsibility of , preters, foremen, and later Ojiyi. But as soon as the men began to use the new leaders; others in new ideas that they had crafted from their understanding of west- S unions, recognition was withdrawn and a new representative committee was ern democratic forms. Their expectations of the state’s responsibilities came from .` formed with members based on clan and job category. The men boycotted them. their experience with its frequent interventions which brought this or the other na- I Finally, the state restored the union but restructured it in a way that institutionaltional official from Lagos in times of industrial crisis. Workers understood the bu- ized divisions among workers and especially emphasized the autonomy of hewreaucratic hierarchy of the state and often took their grievances to the highest ~ ers. The consequences were the November tragedy. level—violating the chain of command. Usually they did not see the manager as ‘ Similarly, officials failed to recognize the role that hewers played before the the person who had the power to deal with their issues and often treated him with `Y I Bulkeley Award in organizing work to produce the output reflected in output stacontempt. , V . tistics before 1938. When management dismantled the hewers’ work- group the inBy the inter-war period they were acutely aware of their power to summon of- ` dustry was never again able to achieve these levels of production. But the most ficials from the highest echelons of the colonial state to tend to their complaints. i` tragic example of this arrogance was Curry’s reorganization of the Colliery WorkIt did not take long before their protests used petitions to govemment as a pivotal * ers Union following an organizational model quite alien to the associational strategy. These petitions articulated a discourse through which we can glimpse the culture of Igbo society. The consequences of this error were the destruction of cenelements of a model of the state as perceived by African workers. The use of these , tralized negotiations between workers and management and the hewers’ audocuments suggests an important means to determine the political sensitivities of i tonomous strategy of protest. African workers that may be more useful than the usual search for explicit con- ` Officials also underestimated the workers’ understanding of their conditions of nections between labor and the nationalist movement. Planted within workers’ pe- _ work and pay and saw them as easily victimized by unscrupulous leaders. Ojiyi titions, the grievances, the demands, and the expectations is a philosophy of i, was maligned in the Fitzgerald Commission Report and singled out for especially political authority held by broad sectors of the men. ~ ‘ severe censure in its aftermath. Sending a trade unionist to four years in prison for The men assumed the state had responsibility for the well-being of its employ- t a financial infraction was a fairly typical example of the types of state-orchestrated ees. It had claimed to bring "civilization," "enlightenment," and "progress" to Ig- Q repression that stifled trade union development in Africa. But Ojiyi retained his inboland and the men evaluated the conditions under which they worked and lived i V domitable spirit. A local Enugu newspaper in 1975 reported on yet another petiagainst this promise. These expectations became a yardstick which shaped their ` tion which he sent to Queen Elizabeth to secure the missing arrears that caused the protests as they assumed the responsibility for improving their villages and com- `~ 1949 sit-in. munities. The income they earned was not simply used for subsistence, it was A The Colonial Office had a model of social policy that it tried to implement from "banked" for the future in the education of their children, the improvement of health . the late thirties. lt sought to order society around a disciplined working class and care facilities, and the introduction of modern sanitary conditions. It was also used j to intervene both in the workplace and home to insure social control. But the workin more established ways—to asstune the highest ranks of title societies, to expand A ers had their own ideas about reform. These were articulated in their grievances, the household through polygyny, and to create a modern "Big Compound." All of petitions, actions, and the initiatives they took in developing their villages. Their these social uses of mining income transformed the meaning of masculinity, giv— i , modes of struggle were very progressive, involving support from lawyers and proing it complexity and fluidity. When officials called the men "coal gentlemerr" they f fessional letter writers and implied a self-image deserving of rights. were describing a type of manhood linked to the industry and the "modern.ity" it There is the imprint of the coal mines on the urban identity of Enugu and the fostered. s` { rural identity of the Agbaja villages. Senior men in Agbaja villages eagerly recall J

330 Conclusion ’, their experiences i.n the mines and proudly speak of the importance of the indus- ` · , try in the social and economic development of the area. In the thirties, Croasdale , ` had warned govemrnent not to invest in the urban camps lest they encourage the . creation of militant mining villages as existed in England and Wales. The men were A more suited to rural life, which, he apparently assumed, brought more quiescence. _ The role of Agbaja’s\miners in the history of the industry suggests that he was wrong. ’ g Finally, this study wanted to retrieve Nigerian miners from the domination of 1 nationalist historiography. While it is true that most Nigerians see the massacre as ~ the birth date of Nigerian nationalism, it is also true that they base their under- ; ~ B standing of this event on the interpretations of the Fitzgerald Commission Report. As nationalist icons, the dead miners become but a backdrop for the more dynamic , drama of nationalist politics, a fate so amply suggested in the politician’s perfor- =, I mance at the Commission hearings. This project suggests that if labor history is . only a backdrop for the narrative of the emergence of the independent state, it will be difficult to understand the deep contradictions that so penalize contemporary { INTERVIEWS Africa- l` Afameufuna, Alice, 'Iinker’s Comer, Enugu, 26 July 1975. ¥ Afameufuna, Peter, Tinker’s Corner, Enugu, 26 July 1975. Agu, Josiah, Enugu, 22 May 1975. z Akpala, Agwu, London, 14 February 1975. j, A10, James, Okwojo, Ngwo, 6 June 1975. *i Amahalu, Gabriel, Forest Hill Camp, Enugu, 17 July 1975. . A Aneke, Samuel, Obinagu, Udi, 28 May 1975. ~ Anyasado, B.U., Mbieri, Oweni, 23 July 1975. i Ana, Onovo, Akegbe Ugwu, Enugu, 30 July 1975. _ ~ Brodrick, Thomas Osanogoze, Enugu, 16 July 1999. Chiegwu, Anieke, Umuagba, Owa Jmezi, Udi 6 and 7 July 1975. Q} Chime, Samuel, Awka, 27 June 1975. , Chukwuani, Chief Nwafor, Enugu, 15 June 1975. ; Chukwuani, Prince Ha.rry, Ozalla, 18 July 1999. ` Cohen, Robin, London, 1 May 1975. ` Ekwereonye, Joseph, Enugu, 15 July 1975. Eluke, Chikelu, Ugbo’d0gwu, Enugu, 5 August 1975. 1 Ephraim Ene, Nnamani Onovo, Nwolie Nnamuchi, Nnaaji Ogbodo, Akegbe Ukwu, 20 { August 1986. . Ene, Robert, Obinagu Udi, 4 June 1975. V Eze, Johnson, Obinagu Udi, 4 June 1975. i lgbodiegwu, Philip, Iva Valley, Enugu, 17 July 1975. ° lwuagwu, Daniel, Enugu, 3 July 1975. · , Iwuagwu, Shedrack, Asata, Enugu, 12 July 1975. ‘ , Madubuegwu, Chivulu, Umuagba Owa, 3 June 1975. ·. · Mbalemln, Gabriel, Michael Nwalcuache, and Clement Egbogirnba, Ugwn Alfred, 5 July 1975. . Mokoro, Osakwe, S July 1975 and Clement Ude, 9 July 1975, Ugwu Aaron, Enugu. _ Morris, Charles, Ogbete, Enugu, 19 June 1975. I $ Nicholson, Marjorie, TUC Library, 1 October 1974, London. ` Nnandi, Gabriel, Nsude, Udi, 7 August 1975.

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350 Bibliography V Smock, David, "From Village to Trade Union in Af1ica.” Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1964. V Uzeochi, Innocent. “The Social and Political Impact of the Eastern Nigerian Railway on Udi Division, 1913-1945." Ph.D, diss., Kent State University, 1985. Van Onselen, Charles. "Black Labour in Central African Industry; A Critical Essay on the · . Historiography and Sociology of Rhodesia? Seminar paper, Institute of Common- · wealth Studies, University of London, 1974. ’ -—. "The Randlords and Rotgut, 1886-1903." Paper for seminar, The Societies of 5 , Southern Africa in the 19th and 20th Centuries, Institute of Commonwealth Stud- ` _ ies, University of London, May 1975. J , Adio-Moses, A.A., 248 confrontation with workers, 261; and . Afamuefuna, Alice, 307-8 rostering, 289 / African Civil Servants and Technical Bridges, A.EB,, 241 , Workers Union (ACSTWU), 240 Browne, Major Orde: housing reform, ' African labor studies: and African fonns 252-54; investigation, 237-39; opposi' ` of knowledge, 17; and African work tion to colliery unions, 244 - culture, 8, 30, 95, 140; nation building Bulkeley, GMO., 193-95 ` focus, 8; and racism, 12-14, 232; and Y stereotypes, 191, 272; working class Ca’::anny tactic, 295 ` A formation focus, 8. See also Nzukc Chamberlain, Joseph, and imperialism, 62 ( ~ Agbaja clan, 33-34; divisiveness of inter- Chukwuani, 72-74, 84; vs. coal miners, . preters, 211; land issues, 41-42 97, 158; and labor recruitment, 79-80, ‘ Agwuna, Osita, 293 155-56; and Lugard’s policy, 81-82 3 · Ahamefule, Jacob, 264 Clan: as colonial invention, 189-90; Q Akpala, Agwu, study of workers, 3 divisiveness, 210-12, 215 _ r Alfred Inoma, 110 Coal mining industry: "countiy of coal," g _ Amadi, Christina, 307-8 4, 6, 118, 184; Enugu response to Amalgamated Union of UAC African English general strike (1926), 165-68; i Workers of Nigeria (UNAMAG), 302 history of nationalization, 3; impact of I Amukebe, Lawrence, 204 World War 1I, 227; management of, Aniogbo, Jacob, 217 3-4; and post-World War I protests, ` Aro people, 34-35; slave trade, 36-37 140, 146; and racism, 94-95, 183; and Atkins, Keletso, 8 workplace physical abuse, 184-85 ' Azikiwe, Dr. Nnamdi (Zik), 181, 236 Cold War, impact on African labor poli· r cies, 2 4 · "Boss boy," 121, 199; infantilizing titles Collective Punishments Ordinance, 70 ` vs. status jobs, 129-30; strike against Colliery Workers Union, and Tokunboh Q cormption (1929), 168-69 Agreement, 301 _ · Bracegirdle, Russell, 254; and Miller Colonialism British West Africa policy, ¤ Commission, 295-96; and reorganiza- 59-60, 62; "clan" identity invention, ( tion settlement (1947), 299; role in 189-90; colonial capitalism, 30, 100;

352 - Index `A . Index 353 Colonialism British West Africa policy Enugu Govemment Colliery, 31, 60; i Interpreters, 121-22 Mbamelu, Gabriel: and “country of coal," (continued); impact on social status corruption, 122-24; managerial struc- ,¢ Iva Valley Massacre (1949), 17-18, 118; mining experience, 110 system, 47-48; importance of in World ture, 119-21; operations, 111-15; V 282-83, 327; background elements Miller Corrunission, 295; principle of War H, 229-30, institutionalized vio- origination, 58-59, 76-77, 98-99; _ (1944-1945), 259-6]; dam sources, 18; retroactivity, 297 lence, 56-57; post-World War H impor- production, 107-8; production control, y govemment preparations, 306-7; intertance, 271-72; and racial patemalism, 201-2, 254, 256-59; reforms ‘ national response, 314; investigation, National Congress of British West Africa, 63; reaction to breakdown of, 288; (post-1937 strike), 185, 203, 226-27; ` 315; precursor dispute (1947), 294; role 145-46 resistance to, 69; violence of conquest, reforms (World War H), 231; as symbol I of state interventions, 284; rostering National Council of Nigeria and the 56. See also Native Authorities of colonial abuses, 1; and use of colo- ` _ issue/new demands (1949), 304-5; Carneroous (NCNC), 237, 287 "Commuter" labor system, 11 nial power, 85, 204; wotkers’ reputa- _· shooting (November 18), 308-12; Native Authorities, 56-57; system origin, Cooper, Frederick, 9 tions, 3; working conditions, 111, V Wives’ Demonstration, 307-8. See also 67-68 Croasdale, C.H., 202-3, 243, 330 115-16, 127, 207, 251; World War H ( Bracegirdle; Zikist Movement N gwo, 215-16 Culture of protest, 142 operations, 233. See also Indirect rule *- Nigeria: development policy, 238-39; Curry, Robert, 298-99 concept; lva Valley Massacre ` Jackson, Thomas Horatio, 106 political history studies, 3; and slave Enugu Workers Trade Union (EWTU), ~ 2 Jones, Garedr Stedman, 8 trade, 29 Derbyshire system, 114, 187, 207 244-45, 247; and racism, 247 Y Nkanu clan, 33-34 Du Bois, WEB., 146 Evans, F.D., 207-8; Evans’ Agreement, Kerr, RV, 204 Nkrumah, Kwame, "positive action" 209-10, 212 ` campaign, 292 Enugu, 100-102; during World War H, Eze, Nduka, 248, 302 Labor policies civil service protests, Noisike, Thomas, 265 233-37; housing issues, 197-99, ; 146-48; domestic vs. colonial, 6, Nzuko, 95-96, 105-7, 204; as worker 234-35, 238, 251-54; politicallindus- Fitzgerald Commission Report, 18, 308, 125-27; and industrial unrest, 139-40; representation organ, 205 trial ferment center, 144-46, 236; as ° 315-18, 329 and labor/management tension, 19; and Nzuko Hunanya, 16, 127-28, 141; reiiige for runaway slaves, 104; strate- * V militancy, 141; new currents (post sources, 20 gic importance (World War H), 233; Garvey Movement, 146 `I 1935), 190-91; "political labor," urbanization/dislocations, 150, 287 Gender and the organization of the labor ~ 327-28; "po1itics of production," 11; Ogaranyan, 15, 58; and labor recruitment, Enugu coal miners, 3,4; in African labor process, 6, 142-43; and feminist study, Li post-World War H, 286; recruitment 71; and land issues, 41-43; and Native historiography, 8-11; and anti-chief 9; masculinity considerations, 12, 14, systems, 78-79, 109; and slavery, 70; Authorities system, 68-69 agitation, 97; artisans’ role, 152, 232; 30, 128-30; prestige issues, 46-48; i work organization commonalities, 7; Oil Rivers Protectorate, 61 autonomy, 186-87; and colonial state, status issues, 44-46; wealth issues, ; . and World War Il, 217-18. See also Ojiyi, Isaiah Okwudili, 232, 247-50; 7; consciousness as elite, 197, 328; 43-44; and worker/management con- l Lugard, Frederick ca’canny tactic, 295; characteristics, and English general strike (1926), frontations, 290 V` , Land, social importance of, 32-33, 41-43 298, 300; efforts to reduce influence, 165-68; and general strike (1919- Goldie, Sir George, 61 . ; Leck, W'rlliam I., 107; colonialist prism, 297-99; and Fitzgerald Report, 1920), 148-54; hewers’ role, 153-54, Q _. 140-41, 204-5; and "Derbyshire sys- 317-18, 329; and hewers, 287; 287, 329; industrial ethos, 22, 94-95, Hammock tradition, 291 E ` tem," 114, 187; management irradequa- personalized attacks, 294; proposal 97, 227; living conditions, 187-88; as Hobsbawm, Eric, 8 ; cies, 180; and worker consultations, 213; of grievances, 260-61; resistance “modernizers," 11,227-28; pattems of Holley, Capt., 266 'j_ workplace safety assumptions, 117-18 to racism, 250-51; and rostering resistance, 94, 106; pick boys’ role, `— { Long, Harold H., 263 issue (1949), 304; and work slow152-53, 197-98; pick boys’ strike Igboland, 31; colonial conquest, 56, 63; ' _ Lugard, Frederick, 15, 63-65; colliery down, 270 (1937), 181-82, 192-93; and railway, colonial origins, 61-63; marriage cus- , ~ interest, 109-10; Enugu city creation, Okpokwu, Joseph, 211-12, 263, 291 99-100; recruitment, 154-55; solidar- toms, 42-43; origins, 32; and represen- q= 102-4; and free labor market poli- Onyearna Onwusi, 61, 71-72, 74-76, 84, ily 0f; 5; and Sl0<>k m¤1'k€i €1'¤Sh. ¥¤ii<>¤ P1'iH¤iPl¤. 40-41; slave Yf¤d€ i i cies/"politica1 1abor," 82-83, 110, 144; and "clan" organization, 1892 vs. 179-80; strike (1925), 164-65; strike involvement, 34-35 { 327-28; local govemment reorganiza- coal miners, 97; and labor recruitment, against corrupt "boss boys" (1929), lruoudu, Michael, 227, 248 ; .‘ tion, 80-81; reforms (reaction to), 79-80, 110, 156-57, 160-61; and 168-69; tubboys, 198, 207; underesti- Indirect rule concept, 58-59, 66, 80; Q ` 84-86; slavery policy, 70-71; social Lugard’s policy, 81-82 mation of, 208; in unfamiliar work implementation at Enugu, 119; princi- , ., vision, 93, 104; The Dual Mandate, 80 situation, 8, 116; unique characteris- ples, 15; reform of/modernization, , _ Palm trade, 37-38; challenges to village tics to workplace, 6, 143; and urban 187-92, 200 V V Macdonald, Major Claude, 61 govemment, 39-41; social repercusorder, 9 Influenza Pandemic, 130 `Q E Matthews, C. H., 211-12 sions, 47-48 ,1

354 . rrraer ; Philip, Captain F.S., 309-11 43-44. See also Gender and the orga- " l Pillar and stall system, 186 nization of the labor process , ~ Powell Duffryn Technical Services, Ltd. ? study (1948), 297, 305-6 Thompson, E. R, 8 ~ ` Power in production, 15 Tokunboh, M.E., 301 J Proletarianization thesis, 10 Trade unions, 232, 240-41; ambivalence ’ toward, 285, 289; bamring, 265; , Racism: and colonial hierarchies, 14, ca’canny tactic, 295; "cooperative con- 3 63-64, 230; and labor discourse, 6, sultation" vs. "adversarial bargainirrg,” ` 12-13; obscuring coal miners’ solidar- 301-2; foundations, 244-46; impact of i ity, 94-95; public healtlilsocial hygiene World War H, 228-29, 246-47; and ` policies, 103-4; and racial patemalism, racialized managerial culture, 293-94 S 63; resistance to, 250-51; as trade , , union and nationalist issue, 290-91; Ude, Augustine, 217, 263, 291 . and worker relations, 247, 293. See Ude, Sarn, 263 · also Hammock tradition; Power in Udi district, 31; clans, 33; coal discovery, V production 76-77; conquest of, 66-67; reaction to . ;j Railway Workers’ Union, 240 l..ugard’s reforms, 84-86; slave trade, { E About the Amjwy Research sources, 30-31; archival hold- 36-37 18; U”*'"“”“· 32 ‘ . cAR01.YN A. BROWN is so Associate Professor or History at Rutgers Urrrver30821 5_18 329 Fmgcmlijd éomiuig , Wesmfrimn Pilot 236 j i sity where she is also the Director of the Center for African Studies. In addition to Simps ..1,m céédingsf, 308; missionary wmdey CDuncils,’302_3 ` _ her work on Nigerian coal miners, she has published articles that exarrune the rerccordx 20; Nigemn Civil War impact Workers. consciousness, 5_6 r k latronshrp between labor processes rn the colomal workplace and African on, 19; oral sources, 20-21 Workers’ protests (under colonialism), 2; 1 WOYkmg‘c1aSS maSC'·lhmtY· Roosevelt, Franklin D., opposition to civil service protests, 146-48; and I colonialism. 230 European/colonial cornmonalities, 7; t Rostering system, 181, 218, 233, 238, general strike (1919-1920), 148-54; 289; and employment insecurity, pick boys’ strike (1937), 181-82; ‘ l 242-43; violations (1949), 303 pre-1va Valley dispute (1947), 294; and l Royal Niger Company, 61 racism, 13; strike (1925), 164, See also Iva Valley Massacre f Slave trade (Igb0land): challenges to World War H impacts on Nigeria, 225-26, " village govemment, 39-41; origins, 229; economic consequences, 239, 243; 34-35; Slave Dealing Proclamation, housing patterns change, 287; strategic * `, 70-71; social repercussions, 47-48 importance of Enugu, 233 _ ` Status and the labor process: "Big Com- Wormal, WG., 243 ’ pound" aspirations, 37-38: male status , issues, 44-46; masculine status sys- Zikist Movement, 287-88; and demon- “, , tems, 30, 35; prestige issues, 46-48; strations against Iva Valley Massacre, . renegotiation of s1aves’s social position 312-14; and trade union linkages, 293; ‘ via Enugu jobs, 158-59; wealth issues, “Zik Group" papers, 180 » i .3 ` .5