Who Governs Scotland?
This book addresses the premise that the question of who governs Scotland has become increasingl...
17 downloads
941 Views
880KB Size
Report
This content was uploaded by our users and we assume good faith they have the permission to share this book. If you own the copyright to this book and it is wrongfully on our website, we offer a simple DMCA procedure to remove your content from our site. Start by pressing the button below!
Report copyright / DMCA form
Who Governs Scotland?
This book addresses the premise that the question of who governs Scotland has become increasingly ambiguous, due in part to European integration, globalisation and devolution within the UK. It argues that although the concept of multi-level governance helped illuminate regionalism with the EU, it was not an appropriate model for Scotland. In particular, this book argues that the pragmatic arrangements that underpinned inter-governmental relations between Scotland, the UK and the EU are inadequate, and that Scotland’s international profile has markedly changed in the aftermath of devolution. Alex Wright asks whether the EU itself should regionalise more radically in functional areas of policy. In turn, this is allied to the notion that the Scottish Executive itself has increasingly adopted its own ‘low-politics’ foreign affairs’ agenda, both in relation to the EU and internationally, in functional areas of policy. The author suggests that this could be conceptualised as ‘functional regionalism’, and as such, it offers a more suitable conceptual model than multi-level governance, as far as Scotland is concerned. This well researched and powerfully argued book adds greatly to the debate on constitutional reform, and offers invaluable insight into the Scottish parliament’s foreign affairs agenda. It offers an illuminating read to students, policy-makers and politicians. Alex Wright is Lecturer in Scottish, UK and EU Politics at the University of Dundee.
Routledge Advances in European Politics 1 Russian Messianism: Third Rome, revolution, communism and after Peter J.S. Duncan 2 European Integration and the Postmodern Condition Governance, democracy, identity Peter van Ham 3 Nationalism in Italian Politics The stories of the Northern League, 1980–2000 Damian Tambini 4 International Intervention in the Balkans since 1995 Edited by Peter Siani-Davies
13 European Union Council Presidencies A Comparative Perspective Edited by Ole Elgström 14 European Governance and Supranational Institutions Making States Comply Jonas Tallberg 15 European Union, NATO and Russia Martin Smith and Graham Timmins 16 Business, The State and Economic Policy The Case of Italy G. Grant Amyot
5 Widening the European Union The politics of institutional change and reform Edited by Bernard Steunenberg
17 Europeanization and Transnational States Comparing Nordic Central Governments Bengt Jacobsson, Per Lægreid and Ove K. Pedersen
6 Institutional Challenges in the European Union Edited by Madeleine Hosli, Adrian van Deemen and Mika Widgrén
18 European Union Enlargement A Comparative History Edited by Wolfram Kaiser and Jürgen Elvert
7 Europe Unbound Enlarging and reshaping the boundaries of the European Union Edited by Jan Zielonka
19 The European Union and E-Voting Addressing the European Parliament’s internet voting challenge Edited by Alexander H. Trechsel and Fernando Mendez
8 Ethnic Cleansing in the Balkans Nationalism and the destruction of tradition Cathie Carmichael 9 Democracy and Enlargement in PostCommunist Europe The democratisation of the general public in fifteen Central and Eastern European countries, 1991–1998 Christian W. Haerpfer 10 Private Sector Involvement in the Euro The Power of Ideas Stefan Collignon and Daniela Schwarzer 11 Europe A Nietzschean Perspective Stefan Elbe 12 European Union and E-Voting Edited by Alexander Trechsel and Fernando Mendez
20 Gender Politics and Society in Spain Monica Threlfall, Christine Cousins and Celia Valiente 21 European Union Negotiations Processes, Networks and Negotiations Edited by Ole Elgström and Christer Jönsson 22 Evaluating Euro-Mediterranean Relations Stephen C. Calleya 23 The Changing Face of European Identity A Seven-Nation Study of (Supra)National Attachments Edited by Richard Robyn
Who Governs Scotland?
Alex Wright
First published 2005 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group This edition published in the Taylor and Francis e-Library, 2005. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” © 2005 Alex Wright All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. The publisher makes no representation, express or limited, with regard to the accuracy of the information contained in this book and cannot accept any legal responsibility or liability for any errors or omissions that may be made. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record has been requested ISBN 0-203-49969-7 Master e-book ISBN
ISBN 0–714–65513–9 (Print Edition)
For Caroline, Mike, Rosie and Millie
Contents
Preface Acronyms 1 Who governs Scotland?
ix xiii 1
2 An emerging political arena
10
3 The chimera of multi-level governance
25
4 Scotland and the EU’s structural Funds
37
5 1973–1999: a Westminster by-pass?
51
6 1999: business as usual?
67
7 Territorial mobilisation in the EU and beyond
84
8 2003: A Scottish foreign policy?
98
9 Functionalism, subsidiarity and the denizen of the deep
117
10 The EU and international affairs: drivers for autonomy?
131
Notes Bibliography Index
142 180 190
Preface
The research for this book started in 1993, a year after the Conservatives were returned to office at Westminster and constitutional change appeared as distant as ever. Even so, following Maastricht it was clear that the EU and its policies were having an ever increasing impact on Scotland. In addition, the SNP’s call for Scottish independence in Europe raised the prospect that Scotland would be better off seceding from the UK and becoming a member state of the EU in its own right. Cumulatively, these various dynamics formed the kernel of the original research project which ran from 1993 until 1997. This explored the following hypotheses: that Scottish organisations and institutions by-passed ‘London’ at times and dealt with the EU direct; that they had undergone structural re-organisation as a result of the EU; that they had formulated an EU strategy; and that they possessed the potential to influence the EU. The subsequent study proved to be something of a Herculean task. Part of the research was through interviews with officials in governmental bodies and agencies (e.g. the former Scottish Office, the Regional Councils, with the exception of Tayside, the Enterprise Companies and other quangos). Interviews were also conducted with peak associations such as CBI Scotland and the STUC and with a plethora of pressure groups along with multinational companies such as BP. In themselves interviews are vulnerable to bias (both the author’s and the interviewee’s). To offset that as much as possible, I used official papers at the Scottish Records Office and government publications. In order to explore Scotland’s relations with the EU in more detail, two areas of policy were examined rather more intensely: the structural Funds and the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). The net result was a wide-ranging study, which was completed in 1997. It concluded that Scotland’s influence in the EU was quite limited. But by then, Labour had won its election victory and Scotland looked set to have its own parliament once again. Consequently, further research was undertaken in order to ensure that this book would be something of a comparative study. The first phase ran between 1998 and 1999. It followed the evolution of the new constitutional arrangements and it assessed how they might affect Scotland’s relations with the EU. The second phase ran from 1999 to 2003. It assessed how Scotland conducted its relations both with the EU and with the wider world during the parliament’s first four-year term.
x Preface As such the latter can be no more than a preliminary study. Despite the book’s thesis that Scotland lacks sufficient political authority in relation to international affairs and that potentially this has ramifications for the current constitutional settlement, it is already apparent that Scotland’s international profile has increased markedly after devolution. Thus, there is cause for optimism as to what the future holds. This book could not have been written without the assistance and support of many people. I am very grateful to the many anonymous civil servants and other public officials who have been kind enough to be interviewed (sometimes on several occasions) and who, where so permitted, have supplied me with official papers. The research into the Scottish fishing sector and the CFP would not have been possible without Bob Allan, who when chief executive of the Scottish Fishermen’s Federation (SFF), gave me unrestricted access to the SFF’s archive on the CFP dating back to 1973. The SFF also allowed me use of their facilities during my six months of research at their offices. The case study on the structural Funds would not have been possible but for the support of Scotland’s Regional Councils, Cosla, the structural Fund management teams and officials at the DTI, the Scottish Office, the Enterprise Companies and the European Commission. Despite a heavy workload, senior figures in Scottish pressure groups have been extremely generous with their time when responding to requests for interviews and for information. I would also like to thank Professors K. Middlemas and H. Wallace, at the Sussex European Institute, the University of Sussex, for allowing me to use research data during 1994. More particularly, I am acutely aware of the breadth and the quality of the scholarship by others that has been undertaken with regard to both Scotland’s involvement in international affairs and on regionalism, more generally. Examples include: Regions in the European Community (Keating and Jones 1985), The European Union and the Regions (Jones and Keating 1995), The Regional Dimension of the European Union. Towards a Third Level in Europe? (Jeffery 1997a), Paradiplomacy in Action. The Foreign Relations of Subnational Governments (Aldecoa and Keating 1999). Much of this work has been cited in chapters two, three and seven of this book. The latter especially would not have been possible without such excellent analytical studies. At a personal level, I would like to thank Peter Lynch, Lindsay Paterson and Norrie MacQueen. Each of them kindly commented on the book’s structure, when I first drafted its proposed layout, and they offered me a number of good suggestions, which I duly took up. Thanks also to James Mitchell, David Millar and Sean Loughlin for their support over the last few years. Last, but by no means least, I would like to express my gratitude to John Berridge, who taught for thirty years at the and without whom this book would not have been written, I think. Undertaking research is by no means cheap. I was extremely fortunate to be awarded the Queen’s College Scholarship by the , thereby covering the cost of my studies between 1994 and 1996. The Friends’ Property Trust also assisted me financially during 1993–4 as did the Carnegie Universities
Preface xi Trust. The latter subsequently provided me with a travel bursary during 2002. That enabled me to go back and forth from Arbroath, when I held a visiting research fellowship at the Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities at the University of Edinburgh. The staff there could not have been more helpful. The fellowship was particularly valuable for me, as I was able to draw on the excellent resources at the University Library and the Europa Institute. I was also able to continue examining official papers at the Scottish Records Office, together with Scottish periodicals dating back to 1957 at the Scottish National Library (extracts from which have been cited in this work). That I was able to put this to some use was the result of an excellent course on historical research methodology, which was provided by the Institute of Historical Research in London in 1994. In sum, therefore, whilst this book is the result of ten years’ research, I am acutely aware of how much it is also a by-product of the generosity and the scholarship of many others. Alex Wright, Department of Politics,
Acronyms
AC AER BIC CAP CAREC CBI CFP CoR COSLA CLRAE CPMR DEFRA DTI EC ECJ EDP EEZ ELO EP ERDF EU FCO FRG JMC JMCE MAFF MAGP MEP MLG MP MOU MSP
Autonomous Communities Association of European Regions British-Irish Council Common Agricultural Policy Inter-governmental Conference for Affairs Related to the European Communities Confederation of British Industry Common Fisheries Policy Committee of the Regions Convention of Scottish Local Authorities Conference of Presidents of Regions with Legislative Powers Conference of the Peripheral Maritime Regions Department of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Department of Trade and Industry European Community European Court of Justice Europeanisation of Domestic Policy Economic Exclusion Zone European Liaison Officer European Parliament European Regional Development Fund European Union Foreign and Commonwealth Office Federal Republic of Germany Joint Ministerial Committee Joint Ministerial Committee Europe Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries and Food Multi-Annual Guidance Programme Member of the European Parliament Multi-Level Governance Member of Parliament Memorandum of Understanding Member of the Scottish Parliament
xiv Acronyms NDPB NFFO NFUS NORPEC QMV PP PQ RAC RETI RSPB SCU SDA SEA SFF SLF SMSAs SNE SNP SPD SOAFD SOED STUC SSGA SWA TAC TEU WWF UK UKRep
Non-Departmental Public Body National Federation of Fishermen’s Organisations National Farmers Union Scotland Network of Regional Parliamentary European Committees Qualified Majority Voting Popular Party Partie Quebecois Regional Advisory Councils Association of European Regions of Industrial Technology Royal Society for the Protection of Birds Scottish Crofters Union Scottish Development Agency Single European Act Scottish Fishermen’s Federation Scottish Landowners Federation Member States and Sub-Member State Administrations Sub-national Entity Scottish National Party Single Programming Document Scottish Office Agriculture and Fisheries Department Scottish Office Education Department Scottish Trades Unions Congress Scottish Salmon Growers Association Scotch Whisky Association Total Allowable Catch Treaty on European Union World Wildlife Fund United Kingdom United Kingdom Permanent Representation
1
Who governs Scotland?
As our car drove up to the real West Wing with myself and the British Ambassador, I did reflect on the fact that this was no small honour for our small nation. It became very apparent very quickly however that the President does have a special fondness for Scotland, stemming in part from time spent here in his youth. (Henry McLeish 2001)1
The image of Scotland’s First Minister visiting the White House for an audience with the US President was somewhat surreal in 2001. Yet it seemed to symbolise how much had changed in so little time. Now that Scotland had its own parliament, for a brief moment it appeared that the country was once again master of its own destiny. Yet as a good many Scots soon discovered, ‘the parliament did not have the powers to meet their expectations’ (Mitchell 2001: 48). Whilst the parliament would be responsible for ‘domestic’ matters such as education and health, other areas of policy which also fell within its competence, such as fisheries were for the most part determined not in Edinburgh nor even necessarily in London but more so in Brussels. Thus, although 1999 appeared briefly to have been something of a turning point for Scotland, more latently that was not necessarily so. In turn, that raises the question as to whether devolution is ‘unfinished business’, the underlying issue being whether the country possesses sufficient autonomy.2 This has long been a hallmark of Scottish–UK relations, with some arguing that Scotland enjoyed a fair degree of self-government prior to 1999 under what was then termed ‘administrative devolution’.3 For instance, Kellas (1989) maintained that Scotland had its own distinctive political system and it possessed a measure of autonomy within the UK.4 He was by no means a lone voice.
Scottish autonomy within the UK Although Mrs Thatcher may have been culpable of penetrating the soft underbelly of administrative devolution, that rather underestimates its potency during the previous 50 years or so. Bulpitt (1983) argued that for many years a ‘dual polity’ had existed within the UK and that in essence both polities led somewhat separate existences. The UK polity concentrated on issues of high politics (e.g. defence and
2 Who governs Scotland? foreign policy), whilst the territorial polities in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland focused on low politics (e.g. transport and economic planning). The existence of the dual polity was dependent on a number of variables, of which two were particularly significant. First, the government in London was reliant on the acquiescence of local elites who administered these territories. According to Bulpitt that began to fracture when the UK government launched its modernisation initiatives in the 1960s and 1970s, thereby encroaching not only on the autonomy of local elites but also calling into question their ability to govern effectively. Secondly, for the dual polity to persist there needed to be an amenable external environment. Empire was one example which united both the territories and the ‘centre’,5 so too were the 1914–18 and 1939–45 wars. According to Bulpitt the reverse applied to the EU, in part because it fractured elite consensus in London during the 1970s. From this perspective, it could be argued that as European integration gathered pace, it added to the pressure on the dual polity and, so too, on administrative devolution. Yet Bulpitt remained cautiously optimistic about the robustness of the dual polity, arguing that in practice it survived the tumults of the 1970s and that it was largely unaffected by the rise in Scottish nationalism during that era. That said, he also recognised that the informality of administrative devolution could be its own undoing. The centre lacked any legitimating support structure in the peripheries other than the existence of territorial bureaucracies.6 Could it hold up if it came under sustained pressure? As the years of the Conservative governments demonstrated between 1979 and 1997, the answer was ‘not necessarily’. Some clearly had misgivings. Midwinter et al. (1991) maintained that not only was Scotland’s autonomy open to question but that the Union with the UK was increasingly ‘under stress’. Paterson (1994) stood rather closer to Kellas in relation to the period before the 1970s, but by the time Mrs Thatcher became Prime Minister, he too had his reservations. Brown et al. (1996) also had their doubts. Such arguments may have been consigned to history as far as ‘New Labour’ is concerned (the party which oversaw constitutional change in 1999), but whether legislative devolution as it now stands offers Scotland sufficient autonomy rests in the eye of the beholder. In so doing, potentially, ‘the constitutional question’ continues to haunt relations between London and Edinburgh. As Mitchell observed, it ensures that post-1999 there is no such thing as consensus politics within Scotland, as some had once hoped.7 Although it is too early to arrive at a definitive judgement over how much autonomy Scotland actually possesses as a result of constitutional reform, there are grounds for supposing ‘not enough’. In the first instance, this is inimically connected to the issue of financial resources – at the time of writing the bulk of this originates from the UK Treasury. The parliament8 does have a tax-varying power but to date it has not been used and, even if it was, at plus or minus 3 per cent, this does not amount to much. Financially, therefore, the Scottish government is dependent ultimately on the largesse of whichever party is in office in London,9 though for those who believe that the country cannot pay its way if there were to be fiscal autonomy, that dependency is no bad thing. Even so, legally, the Scottish
Who governs Scotland? 3 parliament (also sometimes referred herein as ‘Holyrood’) is a subordinate institution to Westminster. The Scotland Act (1998) was a product of the parliament in London, and in passing this act, it was indicative of Westminster’s ‘sovereignty’ – something that was made quite clear in the 1997 White Paper.10 Yet sovereignty may not amount to much in practice. Rather, ‘post-sovereign’ might be a more apt description on the assumption that today no single institution or state enjoys a monopoly of power vis-à-vis a given territory. That is especially so when taking the EU into account.11 This too has ramifications for Scottish autonomy, not least because it calls into question ‘who governs Scotland?’12 Is it Holyrood, Westminster or Brussels, or should we also consider actors beyond the EU as well?
Who governs Scotland? In practice Holyrood, Westminster and the EU all have an involvement in Scotland’s government. But is there a hierarchical chain of competencies (i.e. powers), with Edinburgh at the bottom tier, London in the middle and Brussels at the top, or is it more ‘intricate’ than that – especially regarding the interface between the Scottish and UK governments?13 Under The Scotland Act (1998) Westminster can enact legislation regardless of whether this falls within competencies which have been devolved to Holyrood.14 Moreover, a number of powers have been reserved to Westminster and, where that is so, the latter retains competence.15 But Westminster is itself subordinate in terms of its law making powers, where competence has been assigned to the EU.16 Amongst the reserved powers, foreign relations is of particular significance because it also includes relations with the EU. The UK’s membership of the EU therefore poses something of a conundrum, given that the re-establishment of a parliament in Edinburgh was intended to provide Scotland with greater autonomy. As decisions taken in Brussels affect Scotland increasingly,17 it could be supposed that now Scotland possessed its own parliament, formally, it should have a measure of competence for foreign affairs. Yet, as far as inter-governmental channels are concerned, formally, the government in London is responsible for promoting and defending Scotland’s interests in the EU’s Council. Consequently, it could be suggested that as Scotland continues to be indirectly represented (i.e. by the UK government) in the Council of the EU18 (hereafter mostly referred to simply as the Council) – a body which continues to enjoy considerable power – its autonomy is open to question. However, the issue of who fights for Scotland in the EU is not that simple. Ministers at the former Scottish Office19 could not avoid becoming entangled in European matters. For instance, they attended meetings of the Council, and on occasion they played a not insignificant role as part of the UK delegation. Sometimes those ministers enjoyed their successes, as was so in 1984 with the Danish by-catch,20 and at other times they suffered reverses. For example, the Iberians were incorporated into the Common Fisheries Policy during the 1990s against the wishes of Scottish ministers, who were powerless to do much about it. Either way, the Scottish Office (herein sometimes referred to as St Andrew’s
4 Who governs Scotland? House) has long taken a close interest in European matters, even if the outcome did not necessarily go its way.
Scottish autonomy in the EU Scotland’s relations with the EU have for some years now been a source of academic debate. One of the earliest concerns was whether the Scottish Office would open direct links with the EU in the aftermath of the UK’s accession in 1973. That such a topic merited attention should come as little surprise, as it coincided with the first (doomed) steps towards legislative devolution during the 1970s. The underlying issue was whether this might be to Scotland’s detriment because it risked undermining the relationship between St Andrew’s House and the government departments in Whitehall (some of which were responsible for representing Scottish interests in the EU). Kellas (1977) believed that the Scottish Office’s capacity to develop its own relations with Brussels was dependent on the level of trust that existed between it and the ‘lead’ ministries in London.21 By implication they acted as ‘gatekeepers’. But he also warned that this bond might be undermined if power were devolved to Scotland. If that were so, given the pivotal role of state governments in the EU, Scottish influence in Brussels could be eroded. Kellas’ point retains its salience at the time of writing, where trust and goodwill remain the lynchpins of the current constitutional arrangement. Archer and Main (1980), the editors of Scotland’s Voice in International Affairs, sailed a parallel course to Kellas. Here too the Scottish Office had a key role to play by virtue of its links with departments in London. They not only believed that it was extremely effective, they also believed that it enjoyed better access to the EU than would be the case under a devolved or federal arrangement.22 Hence, early works on Scotland and the EU implied that the then-current set-up worked in Scotland’s favour and constitutional reform, whatever configuration it took, short of outright independence (which they did not address), would be a change for the worse. Others were more circumspect, however. Keating and Waters (1985) were ambivalent over the role of St Andrew’s House. On the one hand, they wondered if Scotland could be worse off if it was not ‘retained in some form’ in the aftermath of constitutional reform.23 The underlying assumption here is presumably that London would still act as gatekeeper, with the result that there needed to be a territorial branch of the UK government in Scotland. But they did raise questions about its influence at that point in time. In part, this was because its ministers and officials could be outranked by their counterparts in Whitehall. This rested on the premise that, compared to departments in Whitehall, the Scottish Office was small in terms of the size of its staff but wide in terms of its responsibilities.24 That was a moot point. If those officials and ministers were outranked, and, as such, they were relegated to little more than bargain hunters in relation to a particular area of policy, then Scotland’s influence in the EU was open to question. The authors acknowledged, however, that there were times when St Andrew’s house triumphed,25 more usually when Scottish interests adopted a coherent position. But they also observed:
Who governs Scotland? 5 On the other hand, Scottish influence in Europe should not be exaggerated. Except in relation to fisheries, the Scottish Office is a junior department in UK government and its role is more of that of a lobby, to gain concession within the limits of UK policy than to set the policy itself, and there is always the suspicion that in any cross-functional trade-offs in Europe, Scottish interests might be neglected. (Ibid.: 86) That is to say, that a Scottish position on fisheries might count for nought, if UK ministers were intent on securing concessions over agriculture or the single market. Keating and Water’s contribution was but one chapter in Regions in the European Community. This was written when the study of regionalism in the EU was really quite new. It was also written at a point in time when the regions26 were beginning to flex their muscles in the run up to the Single European Act (SEA). The latter mattered a great deal. It marked the moment when the European ‘experiment’ was re-invigorated after a period of stagnation. It was also the point in time not only when substantively more competence was assigned from the Member States to the EU, but also when there would be more voting by Qualified Majority (QMV) in the Council. Where this procedure applied, potentially one Member State could be outvoted by the others. In so doing, it called into question the gatekeeping role of state governments (sometimes referred to herein as central governments). The inception of a Single European Market would also have implications for the EU’s regions, not least because they stood to be affected increasingly by decisions taken by the Council in Brussels (and also by the European Commission). Furthermore, not only were they confronted with the ‘diffusion of decision making’, but from the late 1980s onwards, more and more areas of policy which formerly fell within their ambit, or which were shared with their central government, were assigned to Brussels (see, for example, Jeffery 1997a). In the face of this emerging polity the regions had little option but to mobilise. The emergence of regionalism in the EU helped cultivate the (short-lived) expectation from the late 1980s that a ‘Europe of the Regions’ might supplant the Member States and that, perhaps, the latter would simply ‘wither away’. These dynamics came briefly to a head at the start of the 1990s with the Treaty on European Union (TEU). This treaty (re-)committed the Member States to ‘Ever Closer Union’. But deeper integration, the product of further transfers of power to Brussels would be counter-balanced by subsidiarity – something, which potentially was of relevance to the EU’s ‘third level’ of government, a level which technically included Scotland. But that was not to be. By the mid-1990s, however, it was evident that a Europe of the regions had not come to fruition as some had wondered, instead there existed a Europe with regions.27 Moreover, from a Scottish-UK perspective, the failure to abide by the state/sub-state nexus of subsidiarity was something of a lost opportunity.28 It merely helped to highlight the extent to which Scottish actors were dependent on the government in London to promote and
6 Who governs Scotland? defend their interests in the EU. In so doing, from a Scottish perspective, this further called into question the adequacy of the pragmatic style of government, which had long been the hallmark of the UK polity.29 Within Scotland itself, a country where constitutional change looked increasingly likely, as the millennium drew to a close, relations with the EU remained contentious in the aftermath of the TEU. Scott argued that whenever there was a conflict of interest between Scotland and the UK (by implication the English), the latter’s view would prevail. Such a perspective rested on the twin assumptions that the ‘English’ acted as a bloc and that when this occurred it could be to the detriment of Scotland’s relations with the EU.30 Thomson, however, claimed that the representation of Scottish interests at the European level could hardly be better.31 In so doing, they were indicative of the dividing line between those who called for greater autonomy (and in Scott’s case independence) and those who argued in favour of the status quo. In some respects Scott’s line of argument was a retrenchment of the ‘divergence of interests’ thesis (see below). From Scott’s perspective, as far as the UK government was concerned, if Scottish interests diverged from English interests, then the latter would prevail for democratic reasons. Did administrative devolution enable Scotland to enjoy much influence in the EU? If not, was it simply because the ‘English view prevailed’ or was there more to it than that? Potentially the Scottish Office was well equipped to interface with the EU because it had already accumulated experience of dealing with a ‘remote administration in London’. But, as Smith also observed, its room for manoeuvre in relation to the EU related not to territorial autonomy per se, rather it was comparable to the type of autonomy departments in London enjoyed as they underwent structural change as a result of European integration (Smith 2002). That said, from the perspective of officials, inter-governmental relations between the territorial administrations and the UK government had been for the most part something of a success, as far as EU policy-making was concerned. Consequently, there was an underlying concern amongst the architects of the arrangements which underpinned devolution32 post-1999, that constitutional reform should not damage a system which previously worked well (Bulmer et al. 2002).33 Potentially, however, there was a downside. The UK’s membership of the EU meant that decision-making would be further removed from Edinburgh, both in terms of its physical distance and so too politically. That was of concern to Scottish officials even before the UK joined the EU and this dilemma holds true at the time of writing. Nonetheless, there have been some potentially significant by-products of constitutional reform. Scotland now possesses a ministerial body, which in turn is drawn from the Scottish parliament. Its political leaders have adopted a more strategic approach to foreign affairs than was the case prior to 1999.34 It also has the potential to enhance transparency concerning inter-governmental relations between Scotland, the UK and the EU. Whether all of this results in Scotland actually securing more influence over the EU and its policies is an open question. Sloat, for example, was cautious:
Who governs Scotland? 7 In terms of Scotland’s role in Europe, elites stressed participation over influence. They did not expect the Scottish Executive to sway legislative outcomes; rather, they believed it would enable a nuanced approach by publicising Scotland’s views, implementing directives in an appropriate manner, lobbying Whitehall and speaking with greater democratic authority in Brussels. (Sloat 2002: 224) If the Scottish Executive were to become a ‘participant’, then presumably it would seek to improve its links with Brussels and at the very least secure a modicum of autonomy from the centre regarding EU affairs. Yet, as Keating wondered, had much really changed?35 Other territorial governments have faced much the same dilemma. Yet the EU is not their only concern. Increasingly, they have not shied away from focusing on the wider world. Consequently in recent decades, regions and stateless nations have stepped onto the global stage as significant actors in their own right (see, for example, Aldecoa and Keating 1999, also Mitchell 1997). This is particularly so in relation to economic development (Bachtler 1997) and globalisation (Keating 1997). As Keating observed, the regions’ participation in the international arena has been a mix of experimentation and opportunism where ‘political considerations play the main role in deciding on strategy and initiatives’ (Keating 1999: 11). On the one hand they have competed with each other for inward investment from trans-national capital. On the other, they have formed alliances based on their mutual self-interest. Yet the question remains whether they would have more clout both within the EU and in relation to the wider world if they were ‘independent’ states in their own right. From one standpoint, the answer is no. So it is argued, independence does not amount to much in practice today. From a post-sovereign/post-statist perspective, rather than focusing on the attainment of independence, it would make more sense if territories should instead attempt to maximise their influence in international bodies such as the EU. In so doing, this would enable them to further the process of ‘nation building short of becoming a state’.36 It could thus be argued that stateless nations such as Scotland would be better off by capitalising on all the channels of influence open to them, including those provided by their central governments. Such views are allied to the concept of plurinational diplomacy, whereby a mix of multi-national actors within multi-national states can each involve themselves in international affairs to their mutual benefit. That though rests on the proviso that both the central and territorial governments remain ‘loyal’ to each other in the pursuit of their international agendas. The underlying rationale is that when a central government formulates its foreign policy, it should take into account ‘the international needs and the projection of its regions’, whilst the latter should ‘take into account their state’s position when they conduct their own “paradiplomatic” foreign action’ (Aldecoa 1999: 92). Such a notion clearly has its attractions but is it rather too utopian? Clearly, for those opposed to the idea of the break-up of plurinational states like the UK, this is seductive. But on its own, is mutual loyalty sufficient in the long run or does a territorial government’s ‘influence’ need
8 Who governs Scotland? to be taken into account as well? Thus in any such study as this, the question remains as to whether Scotland actually possesses sufficient ‘power’ under the current constitutional arrangement to exercise, directly and indirectly, substantive influence over decision-making in the EU, or beyond, as aspired to by post-statists? Intrinsically, a successful outcome is more likely if there is goodwill and coordination between the central and territorial tiers of government vis-à-vis international affairs. Indeed, there are good grounds for supposing that it would be in their mutual interests to collaborate closely. Yet would this always be the case? Discounting, for the moment, how far the relevant Scottish elites37 could bring pressure to bear on the centre, the outcome could well be dependent on the extent to which the interests of UK and Scotland converged in relation to a given EU policy. If they were one and the same, then the UK government could continue to act as the key channel of influence. If not, then Scottish actors might be tempted to develop a more extensive relationship with Brussels. Thus it could be supposed that in some respects divergent interests could be one catalyst for Scottish mobilisation in the EU.38 Whilst such a divergence may well occur in relation to a particular policy at a given moment in time, it could equally be the case that this was more deeply embedded (i.e. structural rather than temporal). Whilst Scotland has much in common with other parts of the UK, that is not the whole picture.39 There are good grounds for supposing that Scotland is markedly dissimilar to Yorkshire or Cornwall, for example. Aside from significant distinctions such as Scottish national identity, its culture, law, religion and media,40 70 per cent of the UK fishing fleet is situated in Scotland. Aberdeen is the UK centre for the oil sector. Edinburgh is a global financial player and whisky is a substantial revenue earner for the UK Treasury. Moreover, the country occupies around one third of the UK land mass. Scotland, therefore, in all sorts of ways is quite dissimilar to Cornwall or Yorkshire in terms of its attributes, commercial activities and its interests, whereas, arguably, the latter are less distinct when compared with each other (though their constituent populations might disagree virulently with such a premise). Yet the divergence of interests is not the only variable which has to be taken into account. A key factor is the extent to which the UK government could accommodate those interests when it formulated its position in relation to a given EU policy, or international matters more generally. That could be dependent not only on the ‘capacity’41 of the government to respond adequately to Scottish needs when reaching its position but also on its ‘attitude’. That is to say, not just the attitude of officials in London, but their ministers also, as the latter are likely to have closer involvement in issues of strategic significance or of political sensitivity. It should also be added that the robustness of Scottish ministers also has to be considered when they are fighting their turf.42 Thus bureaucratic processes and ministerial decision-making, which more often than not are a ‘private affair’, would be extremely germane to whether or not Scottish interests were adequately promoted in the EU. An absence of accommodation might therefore encourage Scottish actors to develop closer links with the EU if they perceived that, for one reason or another,
Who governs Scotland? 9 the UK government was unable or unwilling to promote or defend their interests in Brussels. Yet even that is not the whole picture. Actors within a particular territory might well be intent on developing a more direct engagement with the EU because of its impact on their welfare. But their room for manoeuvre could be affected by the existing constitutional arrangements. So, aside from the divergence of interests and the issue of accommodation, we also need to take into account the autonomy of that territory. This could mean that the political elite in a given territory possesses the ‘political authority’ (i.e. ‘power’43), both formally and informally, to exert a measure of influence over their state government vis-à-vis the formulation of EU policy. Equally, a degree of autonomy might ‘enable’ sub-state governments to enjoy substantive influence more directly within the European political arena. To no small degree, that currently holds true both for the German Länder and the Belgian regions and communities (Jeffery 1997b, Kerremans and Beyers 1997). However, unlike Belgium and Germany, Spain does not have a federal system of government. Here the autonomous communities have struggled with varying degrees of success in their attempts to exert control over their Spanish government’s handling of EU matters (Börzel 2002, Bourne 2000, 2002 and 2003). It could therefore be inferred that territorial governments in federal polities have potentially more influence over international affairs than those which do not, and, that consequently, a territory’s constitutional status is potentially the key variable as to whether it enjoys sufficient influence in relation to the EU and its policies. Scotland’s situation is especially interesting because of the pragmatic arrangements that underpinned inter-governmental relations between London and Edinburgh prior to 1999. On the one hand, it could be argued (somewhat akin to Bulpitt) that there is nothing inherently wrong with pragmatism, as such, because much of government is intrinsically informal. Moreover, it could also be suggested that, as practised in the UK, government by tradition does not lend itself to rigidly defined structures of authority delineating power between the centre and its territories. But the question remains as to whether the arrangements, such as they were prior to 1999, actually enabled Scotland to enjoy sufficient influence in Brussels. That may have been so in relation to day-to-day policy-making, but historically did it also hold true concerning matters of strategic significance? If the answer to that is no, not necessarily, is it fair to ask if the same deficiencies could re-occur under the current arrangements? Are they too largely pragmatic? Do Scottish ministers currently lack sufficient political authority in relation to international maters, and is there an absence of constitutional safeguards to redress this? If so, then it could be argued that the country’s international strategic interests remain vulnerable at a moment in time when the issue of who actually governs Scotland is considerably more salient than hitherto. Consequently, relations with the EU and international relations more generally, potentially, could act as drivers for further autonomy – an issue which has long vexed some in Scottish society.
2 An emerging political arena
It is generally recognised that the establishment of a Common Market in Western Europe will have considerable repercussions upon this country whether we do or do not associate in one way or another with it. (The Scotsman, 1957)1
As The Scotsman forewarned, the Common Market would have ‘repercussions’ for Scotland regardless of whether the UK belonged to it or not. Even before the UK’s accession, Scottish civil servants viewed membership of the EU with a combination of alarm and excitement. In the aftermath of the UK’s accession to the EU in 1973, sections of Scottish society were sceptical of the worth of membership and the same could be said of the country’s politicians. Membership also coincided with the first attempt at devolution and here too the issue of European integration proved to be divisive. The 1980s marked something of a watershed. As European integration gathered pace, it became even more politicised in Scotland as the SNP campaigned for ‘independence in Europe’ and Conservative politicians at the former Scottish Office attempted to prove that Scotland’s interests were safe in their hands. But functionally, the existing constitutional arrangement raised doubts that Scotland was too far removed from decision-making in the EU. Potentially, this had ramifications for Scottish politics and the constitutional status of Scotland prior to 1999. Moreover, for some at least, concern over Scotland’s situation persists to the present day. For instance, although Scotland is but one of a number of stateless nations in the EU, that has not deterred leading figures in Scottish society from arguing that it is quite unique. Within a year of Labour’s return to power (in 1997) Cardinal Winning, then Archbishop of Glasgow, warned his colleagues at a conference in Brussels: I mentioned before that the new Scotland would provide a challenge to the rest of the European Union. The reason is this. A devolved Scotland does not fit easily into the two categories recognised by the European Union – sovereign states and regions. A devolved Scotland will have its own parliament, its own legal and educational system, everything up to and including its own football
An emerging political arena 11 team. In short it is a Member State in all but name. That very separate identity marks Scotland out as distinct from the German Länder; the French Departments; the Spanish regions or the Padania so beloved by Signor Bossi! Scotland’s separate religious identity, sporting identity, legal system and educational system mean that it has to be considered in a different way from Catalonia, Bavaria or the Basque Country. Therein lies a problem for the legislators and officials of Europe.2 Winning was but one in a long line of Scots who had recognised the challenges which European integration posed.
An English appendage? When the former Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, submitted the UK’s first application for EU membership in 1961, the SNP’s leaders appealed to him to re-convene the Scottish parliament. This was on the basis that under the 1707 Treaty of Union, the parliament at Westminster did not possess the authority to cede sovereignty to the EU. Their letter read: Sir, The Writers are citizens of Scotland and office-bearers of the Scottish National Party. In view of the negotiations now in progress for the admission of the United Kingdom to the European Economic Community we wish to draw your attention to the existence of certain Scottish rights, and of limitations on the constitutional powers of the United Kingdom Parliament. To remove sovereignty over wide fields from the United Kingdom Parliament to what is in effect a European Parliament obviously alters the whole basis of the Union of 1707, and consequently this is a step which the parliament of Great Britain has no power to take as far as Scotland is concerned. The correct procedure, if the government wish to alter the system of government set up in the Treaty of Union, must be to call the Scottish and English parliaments separately to negotiate a new basis of association appropriate to the present circumstances, both between themselves and in respect of the European Economic Community. It is obvious that one of the first things a Scottish Parliament would insist on is full Scottish representation on the institutions of the EEC, including a seat on the Council. Since these rights have been accorded to the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg we cannot believe that the nations of the European Economic Community would withhold them from Scotland.3 Unsurprisingly, a civil servant responding on behalf of the Prime Minister rejected the request. This was partially on the basis that Westminster’s competence could not be in doubt, as its existence and that of the Union, was the product of two
12 An emerging political arena separate Acts of the English and Scottish parliaments. He also advised that the UK’s obligations stemming from membership of the EU ‘would be limited to the economic sphere and certain other matters directly connected with the operation of a Common Market’.4 However, an official at the Foreign Office warned the Lord Privy Seal, who was about to visit Scotland, to avoid any mention of the issue if at all possible. His briefing note advised: ‘If, however, he is unable to avoid saying more, the opportunities for endless argument which this subject provide to those so inclined make it desirable for any further comments to be as anodyne as possible.’ A covering note explained that: ‘As you may already appreciate, the whole question of the position of the Treaty of Union in the constitutional law of the United Kingdom is a very difficult one, affording material to those so inclined for endless argument.’5 For a while the issue was laid to rest, in part because President de Gaulle vetoed Macmillan’s application. Even though the above could be portrayed as an early attempt by the SNP to politicise Scotland’s relations with the EU, it was also indicative of Scottish concern about European integration, a concern that was not merely restricted to a single political party. Six years later, when the UK made another attempt to join the EU, the ramifications for Scotland were once again a source of controversy. On the one hand the Europe Panel of CBI Scotland concluded that there were ‘likely to be clear advantages if the UK joined the EU’.6 On the other, the Scottish Trades Unions Congress (STUC) at its annual congress (1969) emphasised that ‘entry into the EU would weaken Britain’s special relations with the Commonwealth and result in increased prices and a loss of political sovereignty’.7 This divergence of opinion between the unions and employers was to persist over the next few decades. They were not alone, however, in attempting to decipher the advantages and disadvantages of membership for Scotland. By 1967 Scottish civil servants were also beginning to consider what the consequences of membership might be for them. When they received a report from an official at the Ministry of Health who had just visited the Hague to learn about the implications of joining the EU, Scottish officials expressed their alarm not just about the potential workload, but also the threat to their autonomy. A memorandum warned: What I should particularly like to draw your attention to, however, is the discussion in the first 17 paragraphs of the paper of the machinery involved in working out and applying Community directives. This seems to involve an alarming amount of administrative work; and the Ministry of Health have already drawn their Minister’s attention to the possible staffing implications. I think that the Scottish Departments will have to consider at some stage what part they are to play in these operations if we come into the Community. It appears that each of the Community countries has to take responsibility for certain ‘working groups’ and the natural tendency will be for various English departments to take over this country’s responsibilities in the fields
An emerging political arena 13 which may be assigned to it. I think we ought to consider whether the Scottish Departments should be given responsibilities in particular fields and not merely exist uncertainly as appendages to their English counterparts. But the author also highlighted the possible advantages: In the new situation which will arise after we enter the Community I suggest that the Scottish Departments ought to look at the possibilities here. Apart from the possible decentralising advantages of having certain blocks of work done from Edinburgh rather than London there might be thought to be political advantages in demonstrating that Scotland was fully involved in the practical working of the Community.8 This was a moot point. Although in this instance this related purely to health (an area of policy that was not a high priority in the EU at the time), the idea that some work should be undertaken in Edinburgh rather than in London was significant. It was indicative of the aspiration that Scotland should not only possess a measure of autonomy in its dealings with the EU, but that there were ‘political advantages’ for it to be seen to do so. The responses to this memo underlined the extent to which Scottish officials were not content to be merely consulted on EU matters, they believed that they should also play a leading role. One commented: I would hope that even if there is a considerable staffing problem we shall be allowed to take a full part in formulating British policy and will be seen to have a part in it. I doubt if it will be sufficient to receive papers and comment on them or even to agree policy with the Ministry’s representatives in London. I support Mr Hogarth’s suggestion that at least the Scottish Home and Health Department ought to look at the possibility of work being done in Edinburgh.9 Another stressed that it was insufficient for them to ‘tag along’ behind their colleagues in London. Scotland should take the lead at times: For my part I entirely agree with your view of the part we ought to play in the work arising out of Community directives. It would be far better to take the lead for the UK in a small group of subjects than to tag behind the Ministry of Health in everything.10 It should come as little surprise that these officials believed that there should be a measure of autonomy for Scotland in its dealings with the EU. This was an era when territorial governments in the UK enjoyed a degree of freedom over the management of their affairs – albeit by the late 1960s that freedom was increasingly at risk as a result of ‘modernisation’ by the centre (Bulpitt 1983). It was also a moment in time when the UK stood on the cusp of a debate on constitutional reform. Over the next decade, it appeared increasingly likely that Scotland would have its own devolved legislature – something that would run in tandem with the UK’s accession to the EU.
14 An emerging political arena During the late 1960s and into the 1970s there was a growing belief that there needed to be alterations to the way that the UK was governed and that led to the formation of a Royal Commission on the Constitution in 1969. Its terms of reference centred on the functions of government in relation to territorial interests and whether constitutional change was ‘desirable’.11 The Royal Commission recognised that its primary mission was to assess whether there was any justification to the claim that authority should be transferred or devolved to the UK’s territories.12 In this instance we are concerned primarily with its deliberations on the EU. Indeed, that was one issue that deeply divided the members of the Royal Commission when they issued their Report in 1973. The Report addressed the issue of whether membership of the EU would affect the ‘climate for devolution’. It was suggested that the UK’s citizens might not only be opposed to another tier of government at the regional level, it was also possible that they might attain a greater sense of ‘unity’ (in response to the EU). However, the Report also considered the implications of EU membership from a functional perspective. It concluded that membership would have little effect on ‘substantial’ devolution though it might affect ‘the freedom that the regions would have to exercise their devolved powers’.13 Yet there was by no means a consensus over the EU. Two of the Royal Commission’s members, Lord Crowther-Hunt and Professor Peacock, published a memorandum of dissent in which they argued that the impact of EU membership would be ‘profound’.14 They warned that if there was devolution, there could be ambiguity as to which tier of government had competence for a particular area of policy.15 They also claimed that under the Treaty of Rome there was no provision for regional ministers to participate in decisionmaking at the European level.16 In the view of the dissenters, it therefore made sense for relations with the EU to be dealt with by the UK government. Under this scenario the administrative departments in Whitehall would remain the focal point of Britain’s relations with the EU17 and the executives of Scotland and Wales, as well as the regional bodies in England, would only have a subsidiary role. The latter would merely be consulted by central government on EU policy.18 The dissidents therefore concluded that as a consequence of the UK’s membership of the EU, there was ‘little scope for legislative devolution’.19 When the proposals for devolution were published in a White Paper during 1975, it was clear that competence for relations with the EU would continue to reside with the UK government.20 It was accepted, however, that some functions could be ‘delegated’ to Scotland, though this related more to the implementation of EU legislation.21 This first attempt at devolution eventually came to nought after the 1979 referendum. Had it actually come to fruition it probably would have been of little consequence to Scotland’s relations with the EU.22 Scottish departments for the most part would have remained mere ‘appendages’ of English ministries – this had already been apparent when the UK stood at the edge of accession to the EU some years earlier.
An emerging political arena 15
EU Accession and UK pragmatism Following President de Gaulle’s political demise in 1969, one of the major stumbling blocks to the UK’s membership of the EU was removed. The following year Edward Heath, the leader of the Conservative Party, and a committed European, became Prime Minister. In the ensuing months there were a series of protracted negotiations between the UK and the EU, but there was little doubt that membership was imminent. By this time it was apparent that Scottish officials were conscious that they would not take the lead for certain areas of policy, in contrast to the aspirations of civil servants in the Scottish Health Department in 1967. Nevertheless, they were determined to secure as much influence as possible over the EU. As an internal memo dated 1971 made clear, Sir Douglas Haddow, the Permanent Under Secretary wanted someone working away on the ‘inside’: Haddow is anxious that we should have at least one man on the Permanent Delegation capable of advising on Scottish Affairs and of keeping an eye on Scotland’s particular interests. It is a wide field for any one man to cover – since our administrative responsibilities include economic and physical development, agriculture and fisheries, education and social work services, health services and all ‘home’ services – but our main interests in the early stages will relate to economic and industrial matters. We have modestly assumed that we are unlikely to get a place at any level higher than First Secretary and have selected a first class principal for this purpose.23 A year later, following an exhortation from the Under Secretary of State, heads of the Scottish departments agreed that a variety of Scottish actors, especially ministers, should cultivate links with the EU and its institutions. An internal memo advised: Suitable occasions should be sought for Scottish Office Ministers to attend meetings of Community and other European bodies; and every encouragement should be given to Scottish local authorities, professional bodies, nationalised industries etc., to establish contacts with their opposite number in European Countries.24 Hence, even before the UK joined the EU, Scottish civil servants and their political masters recognised that the EU was going to have enormous implications for Scotland’s government and that the responsibility fell on them to ensure that informally there should be direct links between Scotland and Brussels. Arguably, this was because it was insufficient for the Scottish Office to rely wholly on the channels provided by London. Concern about inter-governmental relations between London and Edinburgh was by no means a new phenomenon, it was integral to the long-standing debate on the need for Scottish autonomy. However, from 1973 onwards, Scottish actors would have to deal with an emerging polity at the European tier, but at the same
16 An emerging political arena time departments in London would have an intermediary role vis-à-vis Edinburgh and Brussels. That raised a number of issues, not least the adequacy of communication channels between the Scottish Office and the ministries in Whitehall, and whether Scottish officials and their ministers possessed sufficient influence when they lobbied government departments in London on EU matters. The consultation arrangements were little different to those that were outlined in the 1975 White Paper on devolution. It stated: No formal statutory machinery is needed for consultation; it will be better to develop pragmatic arrangements between members and officials of the Scottish administration and the Government. These might operate most effectively through the Secretary of State for Scotland and through the particular Ministers representing the United Kingdom in Brussels or elsewhere.25 Whether these ‘pragmatic arrangements’ were sufficient is questionable. As an official at the Scottish Office explained subsequently in the 1990s, there were no fixed channels of communication, and consultation procedures were very informal at best. He observed: There are no formal linkages between Whitehall and the Scottish Office. When a directive or a proposal from the Commission arrives in London, the ministry concerned may or may not pass it onto the Scottish Office depending on whether it thinks that there is a Scottish dimension. However sometimes they can forget to include Scotland until it is too late for the Scottish Office to comment on it. So the links are quite fluid.26 By 1995 this may have been remedied, after the Cabinet Office issued questionnaires to territorial departments in order to assess whether they had been adequately consulted (Bulmer et al. 2002: 111). That this was necessary was indicative of past problems,27 and it remains to be seen whether it has even been resolved satisfactorily at the time of writing (see chapter six). Even so, there are also grounds for supposing that there were times when the Scottish Office did enjoy substantive influence within the UK polity. Sir Douglas Haddow’s oral evidence to the Royal Commission on the Constitution in 1969 was potentially illuminating in this respect. For example, he agreed that the Scottish Office had been able to influence UK policy over Doonray (a nuclear facility), albeit that he was a little vague on the fine detail: ‘The Scottish Office finger would usually be in the pie. It would be wrong of us to flaunt it and I would like to be excused from explaining how this exercise works, but it does work.’28 When questioned if this was an isolated occurrence he said: ‘I can think of others.’29 When he was then asked if he ‘got away with things’ he replied: ‘Got away with things? I hope I did not put it in quite that way. We get our fair share, and our fair share is sometimes more than the arithmetical share.’30 Yet he also agreed that St Andrew’s House did not always get its way: ‘None of us, I think, is ever able to get all the things he wants when he wants them.’31 In his view there was little
An emerging political arena 17 likelihood of English bias in the functional ministries. But if there was: ‘We should quickly put the matter right.’32 It is unsurprising that Haddow observed that the Scottish Office was well able to influence government policy. First, this evidence was submitted during the late 1960s, when Scotland possessed rather more autonomy than it did during the 1980s and 1990s. Second, as a senior civil servant he could hardly claim in public that his department lacked influence in London. He did concede, however, that the seniority of Scottish officials could be a problem when they attended interdepartmental meetings in London. The aquaculture sector was but one such example of this. From the late 1980s the Scottish Salmon Growers Association (SSGA) lobbied for anti-dumping legislation in the EU because of an influx of subsidised Norwegian salmon. But, allegedly, it faced opposition from UK ministers (e.g. Nicolas Ridley) who argued that the UK should not favour uncompetitive industries. In 1991 the SSGA intensified its lobbying but it faced opposition from the Treasury and the Foreign Office, whilst the Department of Trade and Industry took a neutral line. By then the SSGA had become such a thorn in the government’s side, according to its then director, that responsibility for the sector was ‘shunted off’ to the Scottish Office in 1991. Then the SSGA discovered that the official from the Scottish Office was outranked at the interdepartmental meetings.33 The Scottish Office sent a Higher Executive Officer to London. But the meeting was chaired by an Assistant Secretary from the Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries and Food (MAFF). According to the former director it was ‘an uneven match’.34 This was by no means a new predicament for the St Andrew’s House, as Sir Douglas had observed two decades earlier: The problem is this, I think, that a Department may have a relatively small volume of business in Scotland, but it may be important. The trouble is that the volume of business would not justify the appointment in Scotland of a senior officer. This is the dilemma: either you have an officer who matches up to the volume of business, in which case he is possibly not senior enough to be of real value, or you do not have anyone, because you cannot really employ a high-powered man, who does nothing for half his time. I wish this dilemma did not arise, but it does.35 Cumulatively, these difficulties deterred some Scottish organisations from relying on either the Scottish Office or departments in London, when they wanted to influence events in the EU. A director from a major Scottish energy company summed up the conundrum as follows: The governmental arrangement in the UK is quite complex. Each ministry is really dedicated to protecting its minister. Then there is the division between the Scottish Office, the Department of the Environment and the DTI. We do not have much to do with the Scottish Office and they are not much assistance to us. They very much take second place to the ministries in London. When
18 An emerging political arena the Scottish Office sends an official to one of our meetings with the DTI, for example, the rank of the official tends to be lower than his colleagues in London, so he gets all the knocks. The Scottish Office does not tend to be very well briefed about the energy sector anyway, quite often their consultation papers tend to be out of date and it is quite common for Scotland to be forgotten anyway. Then there is the rivalry between the DTI and the Department of the Environment; they refuse to sit at the same table. So we prefer to go to Brussels where possible.36 Although civil servants have consistently denied that the issue of being out-ranked at meetings in London was of much, if any consequence,37 that Haddow referred to it in his evidence to a Royal Commission implies that potentially it was cause for concern. No doubt for the most part Scottish officials fought their corner successfully, especially in relation to technical/routine areas of policy (see for example Bulmer et al. 2002). Indeed, if the situation arose where they were out-ranked in relation to a given issue, and if they believed that the issue was of sufficient consequence, then they could bring it before their minister. If necessary, it could be raised with Scotland’s Secretary of State, who was a member of the UK Cabinet and thus potentially had the ear of the Prime Minister. But as far UK channels were concerned, ultimately Scottish influence over EU matters was dependent on the attitude of the government of the day and on whether the latter possessed sufficient clout in the Council of the EU. Thus it could be argued that, whilst the Scottish Office acted as lobby for Scottish interests in the UK political arena, it was one step removed from the EU. Although Scottish officials did attend the Council’s working groups, if an issue was being dealt with that mattered to Scotland, they were part of the UK delegation. For their part, Scottish ministers did attend meetings of the Council but here too they were a part of the UK delegation and they did not even have the automatic right to be present. They needed prior permission from their ministerial colleague in the relevant department in London. The Scottish Office might be consulted but the arrangement was relatively informal. If an issue mattered to Scotland, then officials and ministers at the Scottish Office were ultimately reliant on the goodwill of their colleagues in London to pursue it. But there was no absolute assurance that they would do so. Potentially, therefore, the pragmatic arrangements governing Scotland’s relations with the EU left it too far removed from the loci of political authority in Brussels. Arguably, it was Scotland’s political and physical peripherality which contributed to the country’s relative disenchantment with the EU in the aftermath of the UK’s accession. Although the result of the 1975 referendum (on continued membership of the EU) was decisive for the UK as a whole, with 67.2 per cent in favour and 32.8 per cent against, compared to the English and the Welsh, Scots were less certain.38 Of those that voted on the EU north of the Border, only 58.4 per cent were in favour. Two localities were strongly opposed to membership: in the Western Isles, 70.5 per cent were against and in Shetland the figure was 56.3 per cent.39 The political parties echoed this concern.40
An emerging political arena 19 In the run-up to the referendum, the SNP was suspicious of the EU on the basis that it further eroded Scottish autonomy. Winnie Ewing (who was later to become the SNP Member of the European parliament for the Highlands and Islands) called for a ‘no’. Yet others in the SNP also raised the possibility that an ‘independent Scotland’ could re-enter the EU but on different terms to those negotiated by the British government.41 At the same time key figures in the Scottish Labour party were vehemently opposed to membership. For example, Jim Sillars, the MP for Ayrshire, warned: When Mr Wilson visited Glasgow today he would come for the first time without the full-hearted support and consent of the Scottish Labour movement. In seeking a Scottish ‘yes’ he would be speaking against the considered views of the Scottish Labour Party, a majority of its MPs, the Scottish TUC, the Co-operative Party and his own Secretary of State for Scotland.42 How far Mr Sillars was wholly representative of the Scottish wing of the party and its allies is open to conjecture. He subsequently left Labour to start his own splinter party but later joined the SNP (see below). However, at the very least his warning was illustrative of the depth of feeling in some quarters. Both the Liberal and Conservative parties were broadly in favour of the EU during the 1975 referendum campaign.43 In the case of the latter that is unsurprising since a Conservative Government under Edward Heath was responsible for Britain’s accession to the EU two years earlier. Yet, Teddy Taylor, the leader of the Scottish Conservatives, was staunchly anti-European.44 Nevertheless other senior Conservatives were so supportive of membership of the EU they were ready to ‘bribe’ Scottish electors. For instance, on the eve of the referendum, William Whitelaw, the deputy leader of the Conservative party, told an audience in Edinburgh that if the UK stayed in the EU, there was little to prevent Scotland from having its own representation at the European Commission in Brussels. He also hinted that Scotland might stand to benefit from the EU in other ways; for instance one of its institutions could be located in Edinburgh.45 In the event Scotland was not to have its own representation in Brussels until Scotland Europa was established more than fifteen years later (and even then, aside from secondee’s at UKRep and the EU’s institutions, no civil servants were based in Brussels until 1999). Whilst the attitudes of the Liberals and Labour remained much the same during the early 1980s (i.e. the former supportive and the latter hostile to the EU), there was a marked change within the SNP. Until now, one strand of the party’s argument against membership had been somewhat similar to that of Labour: the EU was simply an organisation dedicated to big business. But by the mid-1980s its attitude had undergone a remarkable transformation. By this time Mr Sillars had joined the SNP after briefly forming a breakaway Scottish Labour Party. In contrast towards his earlier stance, Sillars became one of the leading advocates of the SNP’s campaign for Scottish independence in Europe. He admitted that once the Scottish electorate had voted to remain in the EU in the 1975 referendum, ‘a page in history
20 An emerging political arena turned in such a way that nothing of the past can be re-captured’.46 He conceded that whilst Scotland could not be wholly independent if it joined the EU, it would enable Scotland to secede from the Union with England. Even though it would be part of a larger union in Europe, Scottish national identity would be preserved. He then argued that the nation states which belonged to the EU or kept to international agreements had not lost their status as independent countries. Scotland would therefore enjoy considerably more autonomy if it were a sovereign state in its own right in the EU, as opposed to simply being a region of the UK. Furthermore, it enabled Scottish independence to be framed within an international setting.47 Thus, supporters of ‘independence in Europe’ could hardly be portrayed as inward looking separatists; instead they were ‘internationalists’ (Lindsay 1991: 95). That contrasted increasingly with the parochialism adopted by Mrs Thatcher. For the first few years or her premiership, Mrs Thatcher’s attention focused on securing a rebate on the UK’s contributions to the EU budget. That was finally resolved in 1984 at Fontainbleu after four years of negotiations.48 Three years later, the SEA marked the moment when Mrs Thatcher’s free market principles were most in harmony with the EU but that was not to last for long. Within a year or two as the decade drew to a close, she and elements within her party (the so-called ‘Euro-sceptics’) became ever more hostile to what they perceived were the federal tendencies of the EU. This was self-evident when Mrs Thatcher declared her opposition to a European federation at Bruges in 1988, albeit that such a view could have been expressed by almost any British Prime Minister since the 1939–45 war.49 Nevertheless, one of the consequences of Thatcher’s attitude to European integration was that the UK became more isolated in the EU and her European partners increasingly doubted whether the UK had much commitment to the European project. Towards the end of the 1980s, the Labour party was also re-thinking its European strategy under Neil Kinnock’s leadership. The party no longer called for withdrawal from the EU, as it had done in the 1983 general election.50 In part, this was because the EU was apparently becoming more socialist.51 By the 1994 Euro-elections Labour argued that there should be decentralisation of power within the EU.52 It also believed that Scottish Ministers should participate directly in policy-making in the Council and where appropriate take the lead.53 David Martin, the Labour Member of the European parliament (MEP) and (formerly) a Vice President of the European parliament, even took this a stage further; he suggested that the Council should be replaced by a ‘European Senate’ whose representatives would originate from the EU’s nations and regions.54 That would have meant presumably that relations with the EU would no longer have been conducted solely by the government ministries in Whitehall. Scotland, England, Wales and Northern Ireland, it would seem, would therefore all have had their own representation in the EU. The SNP’s position on the EU has also not been without its tensions. The mantra ‘independence in Europe’ has had its attractions, not least because it acted as a vehicle for promoting constitutional reform within the UK. However, the EU had undergone considerable change since the mid-1980s. After the TEU, the EU moved
An emerging political arena 21 a step closer to becoming a federation in its own right. It is partly for that reason the SNP has emphasised consistently that Scotland would be a Member State in a ‘confederal’ Europe. But that did not deter critics from calling into question its stance on the EU during its conference at Perth in 1995.55 However, the SNP has had little option but to be reactive towards the EU since European integration was an ongoing process and there was no certainty as to how the EU would develop (Lynch 1996: 50–51, see also Keating 2001a: 57–59). Following Mrs Thatcher’s ‘resignation’ her successor, John Major, had to balance the Euro-sceptic wing of his party with those who favoured European integration, such as Kenneth Clarke or Douglas Hurd. That was compounded by the fact that in the final term of his premiership he was the Prime Minister of a minority government. Mr Major therefore effectively became the prisoner of his own backbenchers, a good number of whom were hostile to the EU – it took only a few MPs to side with the opposition for the government to be defeated in the House of Commons when it voted on European matters. That Britain was governed by a minority government had a marked impact on the UK’s relations with the EU. Although there was little sign that his administration supported European integration – quite the reverse – at least Major attempted to convey the impression at the beginning of his term of office that Britain’s relationship with the EU would be more constructive than it was under Thatcher. That was not to be, however, and the Conservatives’ opposition to the EU once again left the country with few friends amongst the other Member States. So, the UK may well have been even more marginalised in the EU during Major’s leadership than it was under Thatcher. To some extent it may not have mattered if the Conservatives had begun to disapprove of the EU if the party had been out of government. But for the whole of the 1980s and up until 1997, its ministers represented the UK in the EU. That mattered a great deal to Scotland where the Conservatives enjoyed minority support at elections during the 1980s and early 1990s, thereby calling into question the UK government’s legitimacy north of the Border. Confronted with the SNP’s demand for independence in Europe at successive UK elections, the onus rested with Scottish ministers to demonstrate that Scottish interests in the EU were safe in their hands. In 1991, Ian Lang, the newly appointed Scottish Secretary of State, initially supported the status quo by stressing that Scotland’s interests in the EU were adequately represented by the UK government.56 But within a year he advocated a ‘multi-pronged approach to Europe’.57 This new tack implicitly conceded that informal networking would enable Scotland to improve its influence in the EU. The multi-pronged approach was to be an amalgam of ministerial visits to other territories in the EU, an up-grading of the Scottish Office’s European functions, the launch of Scotland Europa in Brussels, and the cultivation of closer links with Scottish MEPs. Yet by default, it was also indicative of the extent to which Scottish ministers found themselves on the back foot when challenged about the adequacy of Scottish representation in the EU. Where inter-governmental channels failed to support the needs of a Scottish interest, the latter could lobby parliamentarians at Westminster. But the influence of the House of Commons was limited and the same applied to the House of
22 An emerging political arena Lords. In spite of the principle of Scrutiny Reserve58 and the existence of the Select Committee on European Legislation, MPs had very little control over ministers when the latter voted in the Council. What Scottish MPs could do, however, was to pressure ministers by asking parliamentary questions or publicising an issue in the hope that the government would adopt a particular approach towards an EU policy. Otherwise their power was mainly retrospective in the sense that ministers could be held to account for their conduct in the EU. Peers, who sat in the ‘Upper House’, had even less control over ministers, though the House of Lords did conduct substantive inquiries into the EU and its policies, and it was less partisan. There were a number of other channels that were available to Scottish actors, but their worth was also debatable. If it so chose, an interest could approach the European Commission directly or indirectly; in the case of direct contact, it could write to or meet officials in the Commission. However, this related more to intelligence gathering, though that in itself could be valuable because it enhanced an actor’s chance of influencing the outcome later; for example it was of benefit when a local authority sought EU funds. Likewise, lobbying the Commission was to an interest’s advantage at the pre-draft stage when policy was being formulated. However, in the main, the Commission preferred that individual actors dealt with it via European umbrella groups, thereby reducing its workload and deflecting the possibility that it would be seen to be unduly biased towards a single national interest. Euro-umbrella groups were valuable at times because they enabled sectoral and territorial interests to shape the EU’s policy processes. There were two ways that Euro-umbrella groups could access the Commission. They could be consulted in their own right, and certain Euro-umbrella groups could nominate delegates to the Commission’s advisory committees. This ensured that they were given the chance to comment on EU legislation and in some instances they assisted the Commission during the formulation of policy in highly technical fields. Although Euro-umbrella groups also dealt with the Council, this tended to be intelligence gathering before and during its meetings. However, there were occasions where they enabled separate national interests to conduct a joint lobby of their national governments in relation to a particular policy.59 Their main deficiency was that they only worked to the lowest common denominator. Therefore, whilst they were of some use where the membership had a common view in relation to a particular proposal, conversely they were of less worth when there were conflicts of interest between the various national members. If that occurred, an interest could form or join an ad hoc trans-national network. As with umbrella groups, these networks could target the Commission or more likely their state governments. There were a number of representative bodies through which citizens and interests could articulate their views in the EU. Of these, the European parliament (EP) had the most influence because it had a range of powers at its disposal including (after the TEU) the right of co-decision in an increasing range of policy fields. However, unlike state parliaments, it was not a true legislature since only the Council had final authority to create legislation. Even so, where it applied, its
An emerging political arena 23 veto was significant, and the EP could enable interests to induce MEPs to amend a proposal if they had failed to influence it at the formulation stage. Aside from the EP, the Economic and Social Committee represented sectoral interests and the Committee of the Regions (CoR) enabled the EU’s regions to participate formally in the European policy process. The formation of the CoR was potentially of great significance for Scotland because the EU had acknowledged that territorial actors had a right to articulate their views in the EU and they need not be reliant on their central government to do so. However, in practice its power was limited at best (see chapter three). From a Scottish perspective these bodies all suffered from a similar shortcoming: Scottish representatives did not have a sufficient majority within them to affect policy unless they secured allies. They thus had insufficient power to affect EU policy directly unless they could secure wider support. The representation of Scottish interest was therefore potentially inadequate where formal procedures applied. As Kellas observed in 1977, the dilemma for ‘Scottish representative institutions’ was to ensure that the relative influence they enjoyed in the UK was replicated at the European level.60 However, Scotland did not have the same level of representation in the European political system as it did in Britain (e.g. its own minister in the UK Cabinet) and decision-making had become more remote, as a consequence. When the Conservatives were wiped out north of the Border in the UK elections in 1997, there can be little doubt that this was partly because of their antipathy to constitutional change. It is therefore rather ironic that the Conservatives, as the only mainstream UK party committed to the constitutional status quo, should be inadvertently responsible for devolution as a result of their own actions in Scotland. Although Scottish dissatisfaction with the Conservatives related to a host of factors, including Mrs Thatcher’s legacy (e.g. the poll tax, privatisation and industrial closures) and her government’s encroachment into areas which formerly were left to the Scottish Office to administer (e.g. education and health), there are grounds for supposing that European affairs also need to be taken into account. Whichever party was in power at Westminster, it had to justify the way it handled Scottish affairs at the European level. But for the Conservatives, who held office between 1979 and 1997, and who denied Scotland the opportunity to have a more direct involvement in EU decision-making, the pressure was even greater. If they were to remain in office, ministers needed to demonstrate that under the existing constitutional arrangements Scottish interests could not be in safer hands. Judging by the 1997 election result they manifestly failed to do so, both in relation to the EU and also with regard to Scotland’s welfare generally. Yet, it would be wrong to suppose that successive UK governments have been solely responsible for Scotland’s lack of influence in the EU. The EU itself should also be called to account. For the most part it was too remote from its regions and stateless nations (something that the Commission conceded in its recent White Paper on governance).61 The CoR has been something of a disappointment to date. The EP represented the collective interests of the EU’s citizens but offered little by way of influence to the EU’s regions and stateless nations. The Council represented
24 An emerging political arena primarily the interests of the state governments, though there have been reforms which potentially offered territorial governments a vote in this body. Consequently, European integration has posed its own challenges for the EU’s regions, and the difficulties that Scotland experienced prior to 1999 were by no means unique.
3
The chimera of multi-level governance
When the European Union advances, so does regional autonomy. Conversely, when the project of Union falters, a Europe of the Regions also begins to slow down. (Neal Ascherson)1
Whether the EU has been the midwife of ‘regional autonomy’ is a moot point. On the one hand it has offered its regions an additional political arena. Yet, as far as its territorial governments were concerned, each time more competence has been transferred from the state to the European tier of authority, there was the attendant risk that they endured a loss of autonomy as a result.2 Despite the fact that it has been in existence for nearly half a century, the EU is something of an enigma and that too cultivates a degree of ambiguity as to whether it is a force for regional autonomy. Although it has its own currency and embryonic foreign and security policy, it is not a state, in a conventional sense. Yet it is beginning to acquire the vestiges of statehood both in terms of its institutional structure and its powers. But, unlike most states, thanks to successive enlargements, territorially, it rarely remains the same size for long. Moreover, each new treaty marks the moment when more power is ceded to the EU. It is tempting to view this as a zero sum game whereby each transfer of competence to the European tier amounts to a loss of power at the state level. But as the Member States exercise power collectively, and where the veto applies, individually, in the Council it could be suggested that the EU has not really eroded the power of its Member States at all. Instead, it could be argued that if anything European integration has strengthened their influence in the global arena (Milward 1992). As the Member States are the authors of the treaties, it could be categorised as an inter-governmental organisation – only the former possesses the competence to decide whether there should be more integration. But, as the EU possesses supranational authority, where the treaties so allow, then it cannot be regarded purely as an inter-governmental body like the Council of Europe or the Nordic Council. In essence, where its supranational authority is applicable, its laws take precedence over state law and consequently EU regulations have direct effects at the state (and sub-state) level. Increasingly, therefore, it has become a powerful
26 The chimera of multi-level governance polity in its own right, and in so doing, it has encroached into areas of policy which fell within the competence of territorial administrations. However, there is no certainty as to what the future holds for the EU. On the one hand, it is the product of ‘ever closer union’, which implies at some point it will become wholly integrated. But the final outcome remains unclear in part because there is no consensus on this (i.e. among its constituent members, nor for that matter, the EU’s citizens). There is also the issue of whether it will be able to function effectively with 25 or more Member States. Will they be able to agree on policy, or will the Council find itself embroiled in successive rounds of negotiations and trade-offs, with the result that it becomes gridlocked on any potentially divisive issue? It therefore comes as little surprise that Jacques Delors, a former president of the European Commission, described the EU as a ‘unique venture’3 – in effect there is nothing else quite like it – and there is no cast-iron assurance that it will even survive. During the EU’s initial years its procedures were relatively simple to comprehend. The European Commission formulated policy and submitted proposals to the Council, the constituent members of which were the ministers from the Member States. Where the treaties so allowed, the proposals were also submitted to the EP. But as far as policy-making was concerned, up until 1987, the EP possessed consultative status. It could issue an opinion but there was no assurance that this would influence the Council – the body which had the authority to decide whether or not to adopt the Commission’s proposal. Following the SEA in 1987 and again under the TEU in 1992, the EP acquired more power with the result that increasingly it shared decision-making with the Council – especially in those policy fields where voting in the Council was by Qualified Majority. Even so, for the most part, the Council retained its primacy. But the premise that it is ministers themselves who decide on policy and that this sometimes is undertaken in conjunction with the EP is not the whole picture. In some respects, it is not ministers who necessarily determine policy (though they can be pivotal in relation to highly contentious matters). For routine policy issues, their officials undertake inter-governmental negotiations as members of the Council’s ‘working groups’. Allied to which, the negotiations in the Council can be the result of quid pro-quo’s. This can occur where one Member State offers to add its votes to those of another in order that the latter attains the result that it seeks, but in so doing, the former will expect support in relation to a completely different matter. In addition, the Commission is a powerful actor in its own right. Firstly, because as the initiator of policy it is well placed to set the agenda. Secondly, in some areas of policy, especially those that are the ‘common policies’ such as fisheries or agriculture, it enjoys delegated decision-making powers (over which the EP can have limited influence at best). For their part, the governments (and territorial administrations) of the Member States are responsible for implementing EU policy. The net result is that there appears to be no single locus of political authority in the EU.4 It is shared between the EU’s institutions and between the Member States, but even here there is fluidity. The power of each of the various actors is dependent on which stage the policy process has reached and on which policy is involved.
The chimera of multi-level governance 27 The existence of multiple centres of power had its advantages, potentially, because it implied that territorial actors enjoyed a variety of access points to the policy process. But equally the EU’s regions and stateless nations have been something of ‘also rans’ in the race to an integrated Europe because essentially the EU is the creature of its Member States. For the most part in relative terms, the regions possess less political authority in relation to the EU and its policies, than do the Member States (this is less clear-cut for federal polities – see chapter seven). Nonetheless, it should also be said that the regions were not entirely relegated to being mere bystanders as the European project evolved – they increasingly took a close interest in the EU and its policies. When the EU was first established in 1957, the status of its sub-state government was rather ephemeral. For many years the governments of the Member States regarded the EU as ‘foreign policy’ and as such the regions were excluded from decision-making at the European tier. Allied to which, to begin with, the regions were in relative terms, constitutionally ‘weak’ as regards the EU – even those with federal systems of government. Yet, right from the start, the EU mattered to its regions. European integration, albeit in the context of a Customs Union or Common Market, inevitably had an impact at the sub-state level. For instance, some rural regions stood to benefit once the tenets of the Common Agricultural Policy had been settled at the end of the 1960s, whereas industrial regions were vulnerable when local markets were subject to competition as barriers to trade were dismantled. In the final stages of the UK’s negotiations for membership two issues of concern for Scotland were agriculture and regional funding.5 In practice the two were interconnected. It was apparent that there would be some kind of structural funding but it was feared that this would be allocated to rural development and the new Common Agricultural Policy. However, Scotland suffered from industrial decline, with the result that aid was required in urban/industrial rather than just rural areas. Scottish officials therefore expended considerable effort in ensuring that the UK government adopted a hard line when negotiating with the other Member States’ governments in the run-up to the country’s membership in 1973. But all was not plain sailing. There was considerable disquiet amongst those in the Scottish fishing industry that the EU’s 1970 regulation on fisheries was a done deal which was potentially very damaging to their sector. As European integration gathered pace, the regions were confronted with the dilemma of how best they could influence the EU. Prior to the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 (the forerunner of the EU) they only had to interface with their state government. How that worked in practice depended on their internal arrangements. In a federal system, such as existed in Germany, the separation of powers between the state and regional level was determined by a constitutional mechanism. In a unitary polity, such as existed in the UK, regional autonomy was dependent to no little extent on the attitude of the government of the day. Now the EU’s regions also had to deal with an emerging and increasingly influential polity at the supranational level, which impacted directly on their interests. As long as the use of the (state) veto remained the norm, a region could look to its state government as the final protector of its interests in
28 The chimera of multi-level governance the EU. But with the increased use of QMV, one Member State could be outvoted by the others and a policy could then be ‘imposed’ on its territory whether it liked it or not. They now had to take the governments of the other Member States into account. In sum the regions increasingly had to become more pro-active. Consequently, over time, they established their own umbrella bodies to lobby both the other Member States and the EU’s institutions. They opened offices in Brussels, they were also formally incorporated into the EU’s policy processes following the inception of the CoR, and some regions secured direct access to the Council. The establishment of inter-regional associations has long been one of the building blocks of European integration, albeit that it exemplified ‘horizontal’ rather than ‘vertical’ integration (Weyand 1997). The first such groups can be traced to the 1960s and 1970s and were usually related to those regions with common borders (Ibid.: 166). A further category of inter-regional association ‘shared common political or economic objectives’ (ibid.: 167). Some of these organisations had a ‘legal base’, whereas others originated from no more than a ‘declaration of intent’ by the participants (ibid.: 167). However, although there were a host of distinctive umbrella groups in the EU, which enabled regional government to exchange ideas, develop trans-national collaboration and undertake collective lobbying, to begin with one organisation was particularly relevant to Scotland. The Conference of the Peripheral Maritime Regions (CPMR) was formed in 1973 when Brittany invited 30 ‘peripheral areas’ to discuss their ‘common problems’.6 The CPMR’s formation coincided with the UK’s accession to the EU and Scotland was one of its founding members.7 In 1977 the CPMR held its annual conference in Inverness by which time Scottish actors were playing a leading role in the organisation’s affairs. An official from the former Dumfries and Galloway Regional Council who was once depute secretary general to the CPMR explained why his council had joined: Dumfries and Galloway Regional Council thought that the CPMR would be a worthwhile pressure group and decided to join. They do not try to seek grants but they do try to influence policy. CPMR members are in Brussels almost every day, so they could put the CPMR view if they were organised, rather than be parochial. There is more chance of success through a transnational alliance. What is important is knowing someone in the Commission and forming trans-national alliances. The trick is how to combine the two. A Spaniard might ask a Scot how best to approach Millan [a Commissioner at the time and who was a Scot] or his cabinet, so the key thing is to play as a team and know where influence is to be applied.8 Hence, it was advantageous to belong to the CPMR in part because it enabled individual members to capitalise on each other’s contacts in the EU. The CPMR was also consulted by the Commission on the structural funds.9 In addition, a number of those who once had personal connections with the CPMR were subsequently employed in the Commissioner’s cabinets, where they were well situated to ‘influence events and have a word in the right place’.10
The chimera of multi-level governance 29 Following the formation of the CPMR, there was the concern that the nonperipheral regions in the Community lacked their own umbrella group – that contributed to the formation of the Association of European Regions of Industrial Technology (RETI). It also led to the establishment of the Association of European Regions (AER) in 1985 (formerly entitled the Council of European Regions) which initially operated under the guidance of the CPMR. The AER’s membership extended well beyond the EU’s borders, however: by 1993 it embraced 230 regions across Europe.11 It therefore had a much wider remit than the CPMR or RETI, as it promoted inter-regional co-operation across the whole of Europe rather than simply within the EU. It may have been partly for that reason that when Bavaria organised its first conference of a Europe of the Regions in 1989, only those with strong constitutional powers were invited (e.g. territorial governments in Spain, Italy and Belgium). For its part, the AER’s approach to the EU was viewed by some as little more than a ‘crusade of the weak’ (Weyand 1997: 177). For a while, during 1990, this divergence became more overt but eventually the AER retained its remit for articulating the regions’ view in the run up to the TEU. By now the Consultative Council of Regional and Local Authorities had been created by the European Commission after pressure from AER members and this became the forerunner of the Committee of the Regions (CoR).12 At the moment of its conception the CoR was viewed as something of a milestone because sub-state government would from henceforth be formally incorporated into the EU’s policy processes. But not only did it lack decisionmaking powers, its constituent members were very diverse. Delegates to the CoR could range from a President of a German Land to a local councillor from Plymouth. Yet there was a reason for that. Before it was established, there was the dilemma about whether municipal bodies (i.e. local councils) should be excluded. But that was not to be because countries such as the UK, Ireland, Greece, Denmark and Portugal would otherwise have been prevented from sending delegates. Thus the inclusion of the municipal authorities was a necessary compromise (Loughlin 1997: 157). To date, however, it still remains to be seen whether the CoR becomes an influential player in the EU. During the 1980s and on into the 1990s, the regions established their own offices in Brussels. Birmingham City Council set up the first in 1984. There were 15 offices four years later, rising to 54 in 1993 and 140 by the end of 1995 (Jeffery 1997d: 183). Essentially they had two primary functions. They conveyed information from the EU to their regional administration and thus could act as an ‘early warning system’. They could also be rather more pro-active. For example, they could supply information to the Commission during the early stages of policy formation. The UK and German offices were an amalgam of both functions but not identically so. The UK offices tended to be more reactive, whereas the Länder offices more overtly set out to ‘shape policy’ (ibid.: 193). Although Jeffery’s study pre-dated constitutional change in the UK, one of the explanations for the difference was that potentially the Länder were better resourced than their UK counterparts and they were intent on securing access to EU policy-making in areas which fell within their competence. For their part, the UK offices had somewhat lower ambitions (ibid.: 200).
30 The chimera of multi-level governance The establishment of regional offices at the EU’s epicentre was indicative of the extent to which sub-state governments were mobilising. They were no longer content to rely solely on the channels of influence and communication provided by their state governments, or for that matter umbrella groups like the CPMR. More significantly in the run-up to the TEU, some of the more powerful regions (e.g. the Länder) attempted to ensure that decision-making in the EU should, where appropriate, be taken at the lowest levels of authority. In effect it was hoped that political union would not result in the centralisation of power. Consequently, from the early 1990s, the principle of subsidiarity became increasingly the focus of attention. In the immediate aftermath of the TEU there were three possible interpretations. First, that where appropriate some functions should be transferred upwards to the European level; secondly that it delineated competence between the Member States and the EU but in so doing it protected the sovereignty of the former; and thirdly, that where appropriate authority should be devolved to the sub-state tier. This last interpretation posed its own problem for the UK government at the time because the Conservatives, under the leadership of John Major, were opposed to devolving power to the country’s constituent territories. Major’s government therefore worked behind the scenes to ensure that the second interpretation prevailed and its goal was realised at the Edinburgh Summit in 1992. Despite the reiteration of Article A of the TEU (which stated that ‘decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen’), the conclusions of the (EU) Presidency confirmed that subsidiarity ‘safeguarded’ the powers of the Member States, albeit with a reference to citizens.13 In November 1993, when the Commission made its report to the Council on the adaptation of Community legislation to subsidiarity, it maintained that ‘its function was not to distribute powers’ – that rested with the Member States themselves.14 From this perspective subsidiarity effectively related to the separation of authority between the EU and its Member States. By default it was up to the Member States themselves to decide individually as to whether the principle also applied to the sub-state level. However, subsidiarity was subsequently referred to in the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, at the instigation of the German Länder. A protocol relating to the principle was included in an appendix, which stated that it could also apply to the sub-state tiers of government (Börzel 2002: 75). Even so, ensuring that the principle was actually applied correctly soon exercised the Scottish Executive during Holyrood’s first four-year term (see chapter eight). Aside from the CoR, and subsidiarity, the TEU offered its regions another source of empowerment but this too was of questionable value. Under (the then) Article 146 of the treaty, where their state’s constitution so permitted, sub-state ministers could act as the representative of their state in the Council (or in practice the representative of the sub-state governments in their entirety within that country). This was potentially of worth for regions which possessed federal constitutions such as in Germany and Belgium, but it was of less relevance to territories in unitary polities like the UK. Scottish ministers did attend the Council from timeto-time but they did not possess the automatic right to be present and if one of them
The chimera of multi-level governance 31 ever headed the UK delegation then at that point in time de facto he or she was a UK minister. For the most part, the regions continued to be represented indirectly by their state government in the Council, which further called into question whether their influence in the EU was sufficient. At the time of writing, arguably the TEU represents the high point of the ‘regionalisation’ of the EU – a subject which has become increasingly the focus of academic debate.
Multi-level governance, Europeanisation of domestic policy and para-diplomacy Formulating a conceptual model of territorial participation in the EU has been far from simple, not least because there is no consensus on a single archetype. That certainly holds true for ‘multi-level governance’ – the construct which attained particular prominence from the early 1990s onwards. Governance, it would appear, relates not just to the processes of how we are governed, it also implies that our government has undergone something of a transformation.15 ‘Multi-level governance’ recognised that power within the EU was extremely diffuse. Simply put, it implied that it was no longer sustainable to conceptualise the EU/European integration in terms of supranationalism versus inter-governmentalism. Territorial mobilisation needed to be taken into account as well.16 As such, initially it was intellectually seductive for students of regionalism,17 but was it too ephemeral to be of any worth? Multi-level governance (MLG) was based on the notion that sub-state actors were involved increasingly in the European arena as ‘players’ in their own right. More particularly this was, some claimed, a less hierarchical political arena.18 Hitherto, conceptual models of European integration had pivoted between functionalists and neo-functionalists on one side, and, inter-governmentalists on the other. The former tended to view European integration from a supranational perspective, the latter from a state-centric perspective. But Marks, one of the MLG’s protagonists, believed that both approaches had failed to take into account the changing status of sub-state actors in the EU. He claimed: I suggest we are seeing the emergence of multi-level governance, a system of continuous negotiation among nested governments at several territorial tiers – supranational, national, regional and local – as the result of a broad process of institutional creation and decisional reallocation that has pulled some previously centralized functions of the state up to the supranational level and some down to the local/regional level. (Marks 1993: 392) This was held to be especially apt in relation to the EU’s structural Funds, where the principle of ‘partnership’ applied not just to the state–EU axis but also extended downwards to the sub-state level.19 Marks acknowledged, however, that the extent to which this scenario applied across the EU varied, not least because some states were highly centralised. However, he perceived not only that as far as the structural
32 The chimera of multi-level governance policy was concerned, decision-making competencies were amorphous, but also that potentially there could be conflict over who exactly should be responsible.20 In part MLG was a consequence of the EU’s ‘regionalisation’ under the TEU (i.e. the formation of the CoR, subsidiarity and sub-state ministers voting in the Council) along with the reform to the EU’s structural funds in 1988. According to ‘multi-level governmentalists’ regional actors were drawn upwards into the EU’s political arena – with the encouragement of the European Commission – and on occasion they participated in that arena out of their own volition (Hooghe 1995a). MLG was an attractive concept and it coincided with an era when regionalism in the EU appeared set to take off. It contributed to the thesis that potentially, the regions could be semi-autonomous actors in their own right in the EU. It also implied that they had acquired some decision-making powers in relation to EU policy – or more precisely, for the most part, the EU’s structural Funds. But was the concept at risk of being too vague, and if so, did the fault lie partially with the usage of the term governance? Governance is something of a multi-dimensional term.21 For example, Rhodes acknowledged that it appeared to have too many meanings to be of any use. He cited six meanings: ‘the minimal state, corporate governance, the new public management, good governance, a socio-cybernetic system, and, self-organizing networks’ (Rhodes 1997: 47). He then ‘rescued’ it by applying just one meaning – namely that it related to ‘self-organizing, interorganizational networks’ – something that was indicative of the changes as to how we are governed. Integral to this was the inclusion of non-state actors, the interdependence of the participants, the levels of interaction and negotiation between them and their relative autonomy from the state (Ibid.: 53). Rhodes singled the ‘Hollowing out of the State’ as but one example where MLG could be of value. ‘Hollowing out’ implied that the EU’s Member States were no longer necessarily the powerful actors they were once. This was a by-product of European integration, along with the transfer of competencies to sub-state government and the lateral erosion of power as a result of globalisation. In effect, as was the case elsewhere in the world, state governments still had a role to play, but their capacity to control events was diminished. A tangential interpretation of governance was that in the contemporary world, state governments could do little more than ‘steer’ society and the economy by providing ‘political brokerage’ (Pierre 2001: 3). Rhodes, however, took a slightly different view. He implied that state governments could no longer necessarily even provide ‘steerage’. Instead all we were left with was the idea that we were ‘governed’ by ‘interorganisational networks with no single actor in sole authority’.22 In effect the notion that governments actually governed in the way that supposedly they once did had become an anachronism. Both governance and MLG offer interesting perspectives as to how government works but do they actually provide fresh insights? First, the premise that there are multiple layers of government is by no means new. Scotland’s version of administrative devolution formed the centrepiece of Kellas’ Scottish Political System. This book’s first edition pre-dated the TEU by many years but its tenets bear a remarkable resemblance to those of MLG. It too was based on the notion that there
The chimera of multi-level governance 33 were interdependent networks (in this instance they focused primarily on the former Scottish Office). Here too non-state actors (i.e. Scottish civil society) were involved in a process of negotiation. Although the EU had yet to integrate more fully when this book was first published, within a couple of years Kellas acknowledged its significance, not least because of the likelihood that the Scottish Office might deal directly with the EU’s institutions. Thus in terms of offering a description of a multi-level polity and the processes involved, MLG is not necessarily so new after all.23 Equally, MLG risked appearing ephemeral by virtue of its asymmetry. For instance, Hooghe observed that sub-state governments had the option of participating directly in the European arena but she also conceded that the extent to which they secured access to the EU was dependent on their resources. It was then rightly argued that ‘subnational authorities in decentralised or federal states’ were best placed to achieve this, in part because of ‘their strong legal-constitutional position’ (Hooghe 1996: 18). Consequently it risked being of less relevance to Scotland, for example. Protagonists of MLG also had a tendency to rely on the EU’s structural funds as a means of promoting its validity (e.g. Marks 1993, Hooghe 1996). When the Funds underwent reform in 1988, one consequence was that it was intended that sub-state governments, together with other territorial actors, would be participants rather than spectators in the funding process. In part this stemmed from ‘partnership’, which was but one of four such principles that were to govern the application of EU aid (the others being additionality, concentration and programming). The significance of partnership lay in the premise that at times the regions’ status would be somewhat akin to the two ‘higher’ tiers of government and that territorial administrations would have a more direct relationship with the EU’s institutions (primarily the Commission). The issue that then arose was how far the state government could act as a gatekeeper between sub-state actors and the EU in relation to the funding process. If it could, and if it actually did, then that could call into question the veracity of multi-level governance. According to Hooghe, the ‘state was at best an imperfect gatekeeper’, albeit that this was somewhat qualified with the caveat that how partnership actually applied in practice varied across the EU.24 There are grounds, however, for supposing that state government remains extremely relevant to sub-state actors in relation to EU aid. For example Bache, who had undertaken a study into the Funds’ implementation, observed: While multi-level governance has considerable merit in describing the emerging polity of the EC, the evidence from regional policy is that national governments operate as gatekeepers at various stages of the policy process to put a brake on the emergence of a truly multi-level system of governance. He then suggested that there was a form of ‘multi-level participation’, but central to this was the ‘flexible gate-keeping’ undertaken by state governments (Bache 1998: 155–156). By implication they could be pivotal to the outcome, which in
34 The chimera of multi-level governance turn calls into question the notion that sub-state government could be an equal partner with the state tier in relation to the structural funds. Indeed, somewhat in contrast to Rhodes’ perspective (see above), there is the view that a strong ‘centre’ is an essential element of governance. The underlying reason being that if governance comprised a series of semi-autonomous networks, the result would be policy incoherence without some central authority which possessed the capacity to ‘steer’ those networks in a given direction. In addition this was also necessary, so it was argued, in order that the activities of these networks were ‘representative’ of the expectations of society. That related not just to legitimising their work but also democratising them.25 Whilst this may be true, the notion that strong government was integral to governance risked clouding further what the latter really amounted to when it was distilled into its purest form. All in all, perhaps MLG was attempting the impossible. As Jeffery observed, MLG was ‘a phenomenon which was structurally restricted to decentralised states’ (Jeffery 1997d: 201). For his part, Keating was rather more critical of the term, believing that it offered ‘little by way of guidance’.26 Although it could also be claimed that the EU’s regions and stateless nations are simply too dissimilar to be categorised under a single model, all may not be lost. Unsurprisingly, when the regions have mobilised, this related primarily to those areas of policy that fell under their competence. Thus perhaps we should not examine the European activities of sub-state actors in terms of MLG but in terms of their ‘Europeanisation’. Even though there is no precise consensus on its meaning (Olson 2002), Europeanisation is of potential worth to the study of regionalism in the EU. For instance, John suggested that: Europeanization can be defined as a collection of processes which progress from greater awareness of European legislation, growing willingness to search for European finance, networking with other European local authorities and experts, direct lobbying of Brussels institutions, and the influence of EU ideas on sub-national policy making. (John 1997: 133) This is a useful exposition of the term because it relates not just to the sub-state governments’ awareness of the EU but also how they responded to it. Europeanisation can also be conceived in terms of it being both- a top-down and bottom-up process. As far as the former was concerned, this related in part to the creation of EU institutions and law, whereas as regards the latter, the emphasis was on the effects of this at the state level – which is of salience to the ‘Europeanisation of Domestic Policy’ (EDP).27 Over time territorial governments have seen their autonomy eroded as a result of European integration. As a consequence their state government acting in concert with its counterparts in the Council secured competence over areas of policy which were formerly the preserve of the territorial government, or which the latter shared with the centre. Yet, the dividing line between domestic and foreign affairs had become ‘blurred’ and consequently the state government could no longer legitimately monopolise relations with the EU,
The chimera of multi-level governance 35 as would be so under the classic foreign policy model. Accordingly, sub-state authorities, especially those which enjoyed legislative powers in a federal system, sought to regain a degree of autonomy in relation to those areas of domestic policy, which now fell under the EU’s competence (see Gerstenlauer 1985 and 1995, Jeffery 1997b, Börzel 2002). However, other sub-state bodies, for example those in the UK, could be constrained by existing constitutional arrangements.28 Yet, we are left with the possibility that that Europeanisation and EDP may be rather too ‘narrow’ in their focus. This is because these models related primarily to the EU and its impact at the sub-state level and in so doing they did not address the ‘internationalisation’29 of territorial politics. Here, the concepts of ‘para- and proto-diplomacy’ were potentially of value. Essentially para-diplomacy advanced the premise that sub-state governments have entered the global arena as participants, alongside unions and international organisations, for example. According to Duchacek (cited in Aguirre 1999) paradiplomacy consisted of: Political contacts with distant nations that bring noncentral governments into contact not only with trade, industrial or cultural centers on other continents . . . but also with the various branches or agencies of foreign national governments. Whereas, proto-diplomacy related to: Those initiatives and activities of a noncentral government abroad that graft a more or less separatist message onto its economic, social and cultural links with foreign nations. In such a context, the regional/provincial parent authority uses its trade/cultural missions abroad as protoembassies or protoconsulates of a potentially sovereign state. Such missions may be sometimes viewed and treated by the recipient foreign government in a similar fashion.30 The notion that sub-state governments had developed distinctive international policies differed from Europeanisation inasmuch as this simply did not relate to the sub-state–state–EU axis; it also applied to international matters more generally. Para-diplomacy faced a number of hurdles, however. Aldecoa believed that paraand proto-diplomacy were too closely related to ‘the old realism’ which took as its ‘point of reference the foreign policy of states’, but in so doing, they failed to address the ‘transformation of diplomacy in the contemporary world’ (Aldecoa 1999: 83). Instead, he chose to use the term ‘plurinational diplomacy’, whereby the formulation of foreign policy within a state merited ‘reciprocal loyalty’ between the state and sub-state governments. Integral to this was the notion that diplomacy itself had been transformed. The state had lost its monopoly over foreign affairs and sovereignty was shared. The net result was that there were ‘multiple loyalties to the state and the [European] Union’ (Ibid.: 92). Aguirre, on the other hand, suggested that the participation of ‘non central governments’ in the international arena was not really tantamount to diplomacy. Their activities in the
36 The chimera of multi-level governance international arena were not necessarily ‘parallel’ to those of the central government or even ‘abnormal’. Rather they could be best described as ‘post-diplomatic’ because they occurred ‘beyond the state’ and by default ‘beyond diplomacy’ itself. That is not to say that the regions were not involved in international affairs. According to Aguirre, the fact that they were was indicative of ‘the unavoidable challenge of the contemporary process of localization of international relations’ (Aguirre 1999: 205–206). In sum, whilst each of these models had their merits, they had their limitations too. One explanation is that the EU is still evolving and therefore conceptual models require revision or replacement as a result of new empirical data.31 MLG faced particular problems in part because by adding various caveats as to how it could be applied, not only did it lose its simplicity and so became less easy to comprehend, it also called into question what it actually amounted to in practice. In so doing, it risks telling us little that is not known already concerning regional mobilisation.32 Nevertheless, to begin with, at least, it did make a valuable contribution by highlighting the salience of the regions to European integration, a subject which hitherto with the exception of Keating and Jones (1985) and Jones and Keating (1995) had largely been dominated by inter-governmentalism and supra-nationalism. But it was on less sure ground concerning regional autonomy. Arguably one of the lynchpins of MLG was the hypothesis that potentially the gate-keeping role of the state government had been eroded. But empirically this may not necessarily be the case, even in relatively decentralised states. Thus for the moment at least MLG remains something of a chimera. More particularly, the regions themselves are so diverse in terms of their aims and powers that there are grounds for wondering if their mobilisation can be encapsulated meaningfully within a single conceptual framework. The net result could be that a model which applied to Scotland, for example, might be less well suited to federal polities such as Germany or Belgium.
4
Scotland and the EU’s structural Funds
The modernisation of the older industries, on which we became so dependent as a result of our early industrial success needs to be pushed ahead with renewed vigour. Our regional policies are designed to help us in this and they will continue after our entry into Europe. We shall also qualify from existing Community Funds and Institutions. (Gordon Campbell, Secretary of State for Scotland, 2 Jan 1973)1
As Gordon Campbell intimated in 1973, Scotland would ‘also’ qualify for EU Funds after the UK joined the EU. Indeed, by the early 1990s 85 per cent of Scotland’s population resided in localities which were eligible for EU funding. At the time this was portrayed as something of a coup by the former Scottish Office, albeit that securing European aid was by no means a novel experience. Between 1975, when the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) was established, and 1988, Scotland was assigned £2,594 million from ERDF grants under the quota scheme, much of which was devoted to improvements to the infrastructure. Between 1989 and 1993 the country was allocated £897 million, and a further £1,992 million under the 1994–99 tranche.2 Whilst the amount of monies involved should not be belittled, the fact that Scotland was even entitled to this was indicative of the country’s relative economic under-development. Scotland had long endured economic disadvantage compared to other parts of the UK. For instance, during the period 1960–6 its average unemployment was almost double that of the UK, and by 1965, its ‘loss of population through migration’ amounted to 45,000 in that year alone, a figure which exceeded ‘natural population increase’ (McCrone 1969: 20). Prior to the UK’s accession in 1973, therefore, Scottish civil servants were concerned that this disparity would be exacerbated by EU membership, unless Scotland secured ‘additional’ regional assistance over and above that which it already received from the UK. Whilst officials focused primarily on ensuring that Scotland would receive its fair share of EU aid, UK ministers had an entirely different agenda. This was because the UK would be a net contributor to the EU’s budget as a result of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). In public, ministers, including Mr Rippon, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (who was responsible for negotiating the UK’s terms
38 Scotland and the EU’s structural Funds of entry), were quite content to imply that EU funding would be of value to Britain’s regions.3 In private, as informed commentators had long been aware, the government decided that EU monies should replace UK regional aid, as opposed to their being genuinely additional to UK regional funding.4 Consequently, despite the sums involved, which itself attracted public interest, EU aid would be of limited worth to Scotland well into the 1990s. In so doing the issue of EU funding became a bone of contention both during the run up to 1973 and in the decades which followed.
Where will EU aid go? In the years immediately prior to the UK’s accession, one of the main concerns was that any future aid programme would be predetermined by the existing Member States (i.e. ‘the Six’) and that the net result would be to the detriment of the UK. A British official warned: The immediate point is the tactical one. When these proposals become generally known in the UK, as they will during the next few months, they will offer ammunition for critics of Government policy. FEOGA is an agricultural fund and it is perfectly legitimate to use it to assist with regional development in primarily agricultural areas. This is a major objective of the modified Mansholt plan. It could hardly be expected that this fund could be devoted to industrial or urban areas. But from Britain’s point of view there is a danger that under this proposal the agricultural areas will come to be regionalised de facto as the problem areas of highest priority. They will then get both the largest share in whatever assistance is going and a high proportion of the mobile industry in Europe. The UK might accordingly find that the priorities of regional policy had been settled in advance of our own membership and that this, therefore, became difficult to alter. It is in our interests therefore (while recognising that the development of problem agricultural regions is a legitimate use of FEOGA funds) to emphasise that this must form but one aspect of regional policy in the EEC, that the Commission have themselves made clear that assistance must also be given to other types of problem areas; and that in due course, therefore, a parallel scheme of equal priority and importance must be prepared to help industrial and urban areas from other parts of the Community budget.5 George Younger, then a Scottish Office minister, was well aware of the political sensitivities involved. He warned his civil servants: I find this a little difficult to understand, but I wonder whether this is an indication that the EEC are going to be formulating regional policy at the very moment we are trying to convince our public to join? If so this is very dangerous from the point of view of public opinion in Scotland. Between now and October any views on this other than a clear indication that Scotland will
Scotland and the EU’s structural Funds 39 retain all its preferences will terrify Scots opinion and in my opinion would result in a significant number of Government MPs refusing to support entry. Can I please be assured that no decisions are being taken by the EEC and that no such news or rumour will come out before October? G.Y.6 Others took a ‘political and psychological’ line: A member of the UK delegation in Brussels observed: There must surely be political and psychological advantage to be gained in Britain, especially in the more remote development areas, in arrangements under which people and firms in such areas can be made to feel that support for their investment is coming direct from the Community and is thus a direct consequence of British membership, and that the fund is not simply a vehicle for channelling money between governments. We may in the end decide that the balance of advantage lies in the latter course. But until we have had time to think this through it would be a mistake to appear ‘anti communautaire’ in the present and much more limited context of the Feoga fund.7 By 1973, however, it was evident that EU funding would not be additional to UK regional expenditure. An official from the Cabinet Office advised: In a sense we are now asking ourselves whether we can look at the financial return on the basis of the next three years and then hope for a fundamental reappraisal of the policy after 1976. But in the short term the financial return is all important on the policy approved by Ministers and adopted by the Commission’s outline proposals. For reasons which the Treasury will explain in detail our policy objectives provide for payments from the Fund which will replace or refinance existing national expenditure. Otherwise there would inevitably be what you call a ‘further burden to this country’ in exchequer terms.8 A minute from a civil servant conveying the position of the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster was even more blunt: At the Summit, one of our main aims, which we achieved, was to obtain agreement on a commitment and a timetable for a Community Regional Policy including a Regional Development Fund to be financed from the Community’s own resources. We emphasised the need for a Community Regional policy to help incorrect imbalances which might otherwise make it impossible to forgo the use of the exchange rate as we move progressively towards Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). But our short-term objective was essentially to get a substantial net return from the Community to offset the cost of us of the CAP. We saw the Community Fund as a means of transferring part of the cost of our own regional measures from the United Kingdom budget to the Community Budget, rather than as a source of additional funds for the regions.9
40 Scotland and the EU’s structural Funds This prompted one Scottish official to draft a note in the hope that the Scottish Secretary might lobby the Prime Minister behind the scenes. It read: I agree we cannot expect a Community policy to replace what we are doing nationally for the regions, but I do feel strongly that we need to make a start now with a genuine Community policy which would start by complementing our own measures and gradually assume more importance as we move towards Economic and Monetary Union. Whilst reimbursement of our own national expenditure is clearly important, if we limit ourselves to that, it may well prove difficult to negotiate. The chance we have now to initiate a Community policy may not recur; and it is important politically that we should be able to demonstrate that our Development Areas have something to gain from EEC membership and that the benefit of a common policy is not confined to the Exchequer.10 Whether such a letter ever reached the Prime Minister remains a matter of conjecture but at the very least it exemplified the sense of alarm at the Scottish Office that a window of opportunity for Scotland had been missed. As will be discussed below, ‘additionality’ remained something of an enigma well into the 1990s.
The Funds’ reform: the regions as partners To begin with, EU aid was implemented on a piecemeal basis. Whether their regions required European assistance or not, the Member States were allocated a fixed annual quota under the ERDF. The first hint of change emerged in 1979 when the European Commission was given the authority to assign a proportion of ERDF monies outside the quota arrangement, though it applied to just 5 per cent of the ERDF at most. There was a further modification in 1984 when a two-tier scheme was introduced. A Member State was automatically eligible for a minimum quota but there was no guarantee that it would be awarded the maximum figure since it had to compete with others in the Community.11Thus by 1984 although the Member States still exercised considerable control over the allocation of the ERDF, the EU was already attempting to assert its influence over the distribution of European aid. Even so, from the EU’s perspective it was not intended that this policy would replace the existing regional policies of the Member States, it would complement them (i.e. it was to be additional). Moreover, it was not even termed a regional policy as such; instead it fell under the euphemism ‘economic and social cohesion’. The EU recognised however, that a comprehensive funding programme was integral to European integration. Under-performing regions were detrimental to the EU’s economic growth. It therefore made sense for functional reasons for the weaker regions to be assisted. As such, economic and social cohesion was indicative of the EU’s ‘regionalisation’. It was also recognised that the inception of the single European market, which involved the removal of barriers to the free
Scotland and the EU’s structural Funds 41 movement of labour, capital, goods and services, would leave some regions vulnerable to competition from market forces. The SEA therefore contained a reference to the need to review structural Funding, which a short while later was duly undertaken.
Priority objectives in 1988 Objective 1: promoting the development and structural adjustment of the regions whose development is lagging behind. Objective 2: converting the regions, frontier regions or parts of regions (including employment areas and urban communities) seriously affected by industrial decline. Objective 3: combating long-term unemployment. Objective 4: facilitating the occupational integration of young people. Objective 5: with a view to reform of the common agricultural policy; (a): speeding up the adjustment of agricultural structures. and (b): promoting the development of rural areas. Source: Council Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88, Article 1. [c]
In the aftermath of the review, the European Commission called for a doubling of the financial commitments allocated to the structural Funds, under the ‘Delors I’ proposals. Despite British doubts, Delors’ package was agreed at the European Council in Brussels during February 1988.12 One of the most far-reaching consequences of the 1988 ‘reform’ was that the quota system was abandoned in favour of a scheme based on priority Objectives. Aid would be available on the basis of a locality’s status and its ability to meet socio-economic criteria which had been pre-determined by the EU. For example, eligibility under Objective 1 depended on a locality having a GDP of 75 per cent or less than the EU average. The aim was to avoid spreading European aid too thinly across the EU, as had been the tendency before 1988. The 1988 reform of the structural Funds was held to be something of a watershed. In part this was because it was underpinned by a series of principles, one of which was based on the ideal that the regions would be ‘partners’ alongside the EU and their state governments. In addition, it was agreed that EU aid should be concentrated in those territories that needed it most. The Funds were no longer to be allocated to the Member States on a piecemeal basis, as had been the case hitherto; it was agreed that there would now be multi-annual funding programmes. From this point on, the Member States in theory took something of a back seat
42 Scotland and the EU’s structural Funds when aid was applied for. The onus would now rest with regional partnerships13 to demonstrate whether their localities met the criteria of eligibility. The funding partnerships would also consist of a mix of governmental and non-governmental actors. If their submission were successful they would be awarded EU aid under one of the multi-annual funding programmes. The premise that regional actors would from henceforth be partners in their own right was a reflection of the ethos that the allocation and implementation of EU funds should not be a top-down process but also a bottom-up one. In effect, it was supposed that where possible, the entire arrangement would be non-hierarchical save for the twin prerequisites that the EU would firstly need to acquire sufficient monies from the Member States for the Funds and then secure their agreement on the criteria which would determine their allocation. From that point on, it rested with the regional partnerships to argue their case successfully. In principle therefore, where possible, the allocation of EU Funds was to be technocratic. The allocation of aid was to be based on merit, it would be concentrated where it was needed most and it would not replace existing regional funding by the Member States; it was to be ‘additional’ to that. When further monies were allocated by the Member States to the Funds in the aftermath of the TEU under the Delors II ‘package’, there was no radical reform on the lines of 1988 and partnership remained a key principle. As far as the funding arrangements were concerned, the UK government adopted a twin-track approach during the 1980s and the 1990s. Initially it would be hostile to any changes that would enlarge the funding cake, as this could prove costly for the UK. Then it would try to garner the biggest slice for Britain. When the Funds’ resources were being negotiated, the Treasury was the leading protagonist. Its main concern was that since the UK was a net contributor to the EU, there should be no increase to the Funds’ budget.14 Once the budget had been agreed, then the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) tried to secure the maximum funding envelope for the UK during its negotiations with the Commission and the Council. Even at this point the Treasury could still act as a countervailing force. It had no wish to increase public expenditure in the UK and that included the implementation of European aid. Only after the UK was allocated its portion of the Funds, could the territorial departments then negotiate their own share.15 When the territorial ministries submitted bids for their slice of the Funds the DTI had a considerable bearing on the outcome. Although a DTI official was keen to maintain that his department was little more than a ‘facilitator’ there was more to it than that, as he explained subsequently: As the lead ministry the DTI does have ministerial and administrative authority over the Scottish Office though generally there is a common consensus. Over time a UK-wide view has evolved as to how the Funds are to be applied. This has originated in a semi-formal way as a result of question and answer sessions e.g. when co-operatives came to the fore, what was the UK position to be? This has led to a distinct set of guidelines as to how the Funds are to be applied to the UK as a whole, but they are highly confidential because of their potential
Scotland and the EU’s structural Funds 43 value to lobbyists. The guidelines might change over time, e.g. in 1989 local authorities took a large slice of the Funds but at present the tendency is to widen the net to include new partners such as airports or business links. It is therefore likely that under the 1994–99 programmes that local authorities will take a proportionally smaller share.16 Therefore Scottish applicants had to cross yet another fence if they were to stand a chance of success. Apart from meeting the EU’s criteria so that they could be awarded Objective 2 status, for example, their funding proposal also had to be compatible with the UK-wide ‘common consensus’ which in effect were guidelines laid down by the DTI. This aspect of the funding process was an additional burden for potential applicants in the regions. In the first place, as the civil servant from the DTI stated, the guidelines could change, with the result that some actors were less likely to be successful at different points in time. Secondly, the Commission produced its own list of measures which determined whether or not an application for assistance would be eligible for European funding. Some Scottish actors found the arrangement confusing, not least because they were uncertain over whether the Commission or the DTI had overall authority. A senior official from Fife Regional Council observed: There is a muddle over who exactly is responsible for taking the decision to allocate funds to a region. Both the Commission and the DTI maintain that the other has responsibility for this, so we have to lobby both groups. Once we have secured eligibility for funding the next aim is to get on the DTI/ Commission list. It is unclear what criteria are used to allocate finances to a region. Unemployment is one factor but the Commission wants to use unemployment forecasts in future, something that we are keen on but the DTI is hostile to.17 This uncertainty rather calls into question how the partnership principle was being applied. It also raises the question as to whether the regional ‘partners’ had sufficient authority to influence how European aid was distributed in their localities. After a region had secured its Objective 1, 2 or 5b designation, there was a further round of negotiations between the European Commission and the partners in Scotland. There were two ways whereby a Member State, or a designated actor, could submit an application for funding for a particular locality. One option was to produce a Regional Development Plan which would be incorporated into a Community Support Framework (CSF), within which there would be one or more Operational Programmes (e.g. the Tayside Operational Programme for 1992– 93). Alternatively the Member State, or a designated actor, could produce a Single Programming Document (SPD) which would also be based on a Regional Development Plan. The second method was supposed to save time and the Scottish Office subsequently adopted it. Although the SPD option appeared to be relatively straightforward, that was not to be. In the first instance a Regional Plan Team, chaired by the Scottish Office,
44 Scotland and the EU’s structural Funds prepared regional development plans for the Scottish regions (e.g. one for Objective 2 in the east of Scotland and a separate one in the west). However, when the Regional Development Plans were despatched to the European Commission the latter had its own views. An official from Fife Region explained: The Scottish Office chairs a Plan Team for each region and expert advisers set out the strategy and the method of delivery for each particular area. The strategy itself is quite a complex issue. What does it mean? Formerly central government did this but now the local authorities and their partners are involved. They sit down and discuss it with the Scottish Office before the strategy is submitted to the Commission. This can be frustrating because the Plan Team will have arrived at an agreed strategy based on the lowest common denominator over an eighteen-month period. At this point the Commission may reject the strategy on the grounds that it is not a strategy at all. For instance the Commission wants to see quick measurement, so that an audit team can measure how many jobs have been created within two years. But the Commission does not understand the process of creating jobs – something that can take longer – while the government is more interested in the flow of money and controlling expenditure. So what we need in order to simplify things is either a clear strategy laid down by the Commission or a consensus arrangement. You cannot have both.18 Hence, despite the partnership principle, the Commission could override local partners. All in all, as far as the implementation of the Funds was concerned, the Commission could therefore be highly influential.19 As the official suggested, it would have made more sense if the Commission had decreed what the strategy should be. However, then it would be self-evident that the implementation of the Funds would be a top-down process. Others too had their doubts. An official at Tayside Enterprise commented: ‘To a certain extent the funding process comes from the top down. The partnership can identify priorities but what we started out with was a long way from where we ended up.’20 A director of another Local Enterprise Company observed: ‘Fife has been good at getting money. The problem is that most of the money from the EC has been supply led in the sense that they tell us how to use it instead of it being demand led, thus responding to local needs.’21 Some believed that this situation had arisen because the government could no longer draw on the support of the other Member States; at the implementation stage it had to fend for itself and it was out-gunned by the Commission. An official from Grampian Regional Council claimed: We submitted our own strategy but the Commission had its own views and we had to submit a standardised text on the Commission’s lines. You need to be aware that at this stage of the funding cycle the relationship between the Commission and the Member State is much more even-handed. The Member State is dealing with the Commission on its own and cannot look for allies
Scotland and the EU’s structural Funds 45 amongst the other Member States. At this point decisions do not go through the Council of the EU – but they are rubber-stamped by the ‘Star’ Committee [the management committee on agricultural structures and rural development, comprising representatives from the Member States]. So at this stage the Member State was dealing with the Commission in its entirety on the individual plans. So the Commission is much stronger when conducting bilateral negotiations than multilateral ones.22 A Scottish civil servant in the European Funds and Co-ordination Division made a similar point: It is harder to influence decision-makers at the implementation stage, whereas at the designation stage officials like ‘X’ [Scottish Office] and ‘Y’ [DTI] are in direct contact with people like ‘Z’ at the Commission. When the areas are being designated it has a higher profile. It can be more politicised and so a small group of senior officials deals with it. However at the implementation stage a mass of lower-grade officials in the Commission become involved. They are more focused and narrow in their approach. They tend to be the desk officers and deal with the nuts and bolts. But with so many people involved it becomes impossible for us to have any significant influence. For instance, it would mean someone from the Scottish Office having to negotiate with these people every time there is a problem, and we do not have resources for that. If we only become involved on odd occasions we would run into problems of bias, e.g. supporting one case on behalf of Grampian but not Tayside.23 That leads us to the issue of why the Commission should have disagreed with its Scottish partners in the first place. According to a Scottish official an underlying cause was that the Commission had not only adopted a pan-European approach to the implementation of the Funds, there had been times when it had little faith in the regional partners. He said: The Commission has to take the macro approach and this leads to tension between it and the Scottish Office/partnership over what is effective for their locality in Scotland. We also have the impression that the Commission does not trust the implementing authority and this can add to our problems. The SPD document was intended to short circuit the red tape during negotiations over what would be eligible for funding but in the event it led to a lot more work because of disagreements between the Scottish Office and the Commission. Even after the Commission had settled how much funding was available for an area, the arguments continued right into the PMC [programme monitoring committee] meetings. This should not have occurred. The SPD set out the broad aims and principles, the measures and the sort of projects that would have been eligible. It should have been acceptable to the Commission on the grounds of subsidiarity.24
46 Scotland and the EU’s structural Funds Such antagonism over the Funds’ implementation may have been little more than the Commission and the UK government squaring up to each other and it could be supposed that the fact that this had occurred in relation to Scotland was purely coincidental. Nevertheless, during the early to mid-1990s the regional partnerships were in the unenviable position of being required to draft a strategy (plus the measures relating to the implementation of that strategy) in an SPD which could then be rejected by the Commission. Then there was the question of additionality; by the 1990s this was of considerable significance, as EU funding to Scotland had increased once more. In theory this had been resolved by the Kerr-Millan agreement in 1991 whereby the UK government had agreed to abide by the additionality principle. But whether that was so in practice remained an issue of some complexity.25 An official at the Scottish Office maintained that there were two sides to additionality. He observed: In essence it means the absence of substitution, i.e. Euro Cash not being used as a substitute for national spending. Each Member State has to submit an expenditure summary for each EC Objective but there is no disaggregation. So that can be problematic, as there is no proof that it is additional in the case of particular projects. However, if national expenditure has not decreased then additionality has occurred [in the sense that EU aid would be genuinely additional to existing national expenditure]. A second dimension to additionality is that funding has created a specific project. From his perspective if on occasion additionality failed to materialise, the fault lay with individual councils. He continued: Each year the Local Enterprise Companies and the Local Authorities prepare their annual budgets which forecast their expenditure. If they are liable to get EC funding they need to take account of that, so that the additionality element is taken into account. They then have to bid the Scottish Office’s local government finance department for more money and then if they are successful, the annual settlement will take account of EC funds.26 This sounds relatively simple and several Scottish-based consultants suggested that to some extent Scottish councils were at fault during the 1990s.27 In theory a local authority merely had to include a provision for EU aid in its budget for the following financial year and the matching aid was then met by the government. Yet, a senior figure at the Scottish Office acknowledged that until the KerrMillan agreement additionality had not been ‘automatic’. But he did suggest that it might have acted as leverage during the Secretary of State’s negotiations with the Treasury when he submitted his annual bid for government expenditure in Scotland. In so doing it would enable the Secretary of State to argue: ‘I am helping the Treasury by reducing the net contribution to the EC Budget, so I need a quid pro quo.’ However, the official added that government departments would have to deduct additional money for Scotland from their own programmes but he then
Scotland and the EU’s structural Funds 47 maintained that after the Kerr-Millan agreement special provision was made for matching funding.28 How far that was really the case is open to debate.29 For example, Strathclyde Regional Council faced a number of difficulties as a result of the Scottish Office’s budgetary procedures. According to one account, the latter deliberately deducted £20 million from Strathclyde’s budget for roads and transport during 1993–4. The intention was that the shortfall would be recouped from a combination of the structural Funds and ‘additional expenditure’ from the government. An official from Strathclyde’s Economic Strategy Section explained: Under the ‘new’ arrangement the Scottish Office removed £17 million from the Region’s 1993–4 capital budget on the assumption that the Region would secure the money from the ERDF. This ensured that the Region had to work hard at its relationship with the EU, in order to realise its capital expenditure plans. Another technique of the Scottish Office is called ‘top slicing’. It occurs when monies are removed from the capital budget deliberately so that they can be inserted later as ‘additional’ funds to the ERDF. Thus in the 1993–4 budget for roads and transport, which amounted to £90 million, the Region was only allocated £70 million and needed to make up the £20 million via the EU and additionality from the UK.30 If this is true, and there is no reason to suppose that it is not, it is clear just how the government of the day manipulated additionality post-Kerr-Millan. It was not simply a matter of special funds being held in reserve or councils applying too late – the government deducted money from Strathclyde’s budget so that it was apparently able to keep to the rules without there being any genuinely additional funds whatsoever. Strathclyde was by no means alone in articulating its concerns – Highland Regional Council, Banff and Buchan and no doubt others each had their own problems.31 When the Scottish parliament’s European and External Relations Committee32 subsequently conducted an inquiry into the Funds and their implementation, MSPs’ reservations on additionality were self-evident.33 Yet, the ensuing report cited testimony from the European Commission whereby the latter maintained that it ‘had no indication that additionality was not being respected’.34 But that presumably was as it stood then in 2000 (when the inquiry was underway), as opposed to the 1980s and 1990s. For example, the report cited evidence from the European Court of Auditors covering the period 1989–93, which stated that ‘the situation regarding the verification of additionality in the UK was considered unsatisfactory’.35 The information provided to the Court of Auditors for 1994–1999 was reported to have ‘improved’ but it ‘was still too early to establish whether the UK has complied with the regulation’.36 The committee’s report continued: The verification of additionality at Scotland level would enable the Committee to answer the important question of whether there is a net impact on overall expenditure in Scotland. This has not been possible [the Report’s italics]37
48 Scotland and the EU’s structural Funds For their part UK ministers and their departments were of little assistance to MSPs: Although requests were made to UK Government Ministers to attend the Committee’s inquiry meetings, they declined. The Committee feels that the subsequent written information provided was not sufficient to verify the net impact of EU funding on economic development spending in Scotland as a matter of regret.38 The reason why UK ministers declined to attend was in part because they were already accountable to MPs at Westminster and they maintained that there was no need for duplication. The European committee was not alone in its inquiry into EU Funds, however, so also was Holyrood’s Finance Committee and here too there was cause for concern about the reluctance of UK ministers to provide oral testimony. Mike Watson MSP, who was later to become a minister in the Scottish Executive also had his doubts about the refusal of UK ministers to appear before Holyrood’s committees. This was because Wendy Alexander, then a minister in the Executive had herself given evidence to the Scottish Affairs select committee at the Commons just a few weeks before. He observed: There is a lack of consistency in the matter which needs to be resolved. As Convenor of the Finance Committee, I can say that we were unanimously of the opinion that our inquiry into EU funding could not be completed without Treasury evidence. The Committee eventually had to accept this in writing, while the European committee completed its report without any UK-level input, a conclusion which was less than satisfactory. Sooner or later this tugof-war will re-occur. (Watson 2001: 184) All in all therefore the issue of additionality remains something of an enigma, albeit that by 2000 this appears to have been resolved satisfactorily.39 Whilst successive UK governments have been the main culprits, the EU itself is also open to question. Since the four principles that underpinned the structural Funds were not applied as was originally intended, this raises the question as to whether the EU itself shares responsibility for the deficiencies of the funding programmes in Scotland. If so, were its regionalist credentials open to question? The concentration principle was largely forgotten when the Council met to consider which localities should be eligible for Objective 1 status in 1993 (albeit paradoxically this was potentially advantageous to the Highlands and Islands). The partnership principle appears to have been of little tangible benefit to Scottish actors and additionality was ephemeral to begin with at least. Only the programming principle seems to have worked in the sense that there were multi-annual programmes. However, there are good grounds for supposing that the implementation of the ERDF suffered from ‘short-termism’ (Turok et al. 1994: 81). This was certainly evident at the implementation phase, when delays in approving Objective 1 meant that the partnership
Scotland and the EU’s structural Funds 49 had only a few months to allocate millions of pounds for the Highlands and Islands’ programme. Borders suffered from a similar problem over 5b. By April 1997 the European Commissioner with responsibility for Social Affairs himself had admitted that the implementation of the structural Funds required ‘less bureaucracy and more focus’ and that the Commission should adopt a more handsoff approach.40 However, in spite of the flaws which under-cut the EU’s economic and social cohesion policy, there is little reason to suppose that the Scottish funding partnerships or their management committees were inherently defective either in terms of their professionalism or probity. Individuals who had accumulated experience of the Funds over a number of years administered them efficiently and their primary aim was to ensure that the implementation of the Funds fell within the EU’s rules. The same could be said in relation to civil servants at the Scottish Office. Notwithstanding the issue of additionality, they too were concerned primarily with ensuring the funding process ran as effectively and efficiently as possible. It could also be argued that if the EU funding arrangements had not existed in the first place there would not have been a quasi-regional policy in Scotland during the Thatcher and Major years when there was a marked antipathy to economic planning. It is also self-evident that Scotland secured sizeable amounts of EU monies during the 1980s and 1990s, thereby ensuring that there was substantive aid for economic development. But this aid should have been in addition to existing UK expenditure and there is reason to doubt whether this was so even by the mid1990s. More particularly, as the Scottish Office’s own records affirmed, EU receipts were intended for the Treasury not Scotland per se – much to the consternation of Scottish civil servants in the early 1970s. That such a situation could have arisen, and that Scottish MPs at Westminster appeared unable to do much if anything about this raises questions about democratic control and accountability prior to 1999. That said, as far as Scotland is concerned, EU funding is set to wane. In so doing, from the UK’s perspective this calls into question the future worth of the EU’s economic and social cohesion policy. Early in 2003, Gordon Brown, the UK Chancellor called for the ‘devolution’ of regional policy from Brussels. Writing in The Times he explained: A recurrent theme in the European convention is that an enlarged Europe will work well only if it is a more centralised Europe. I disagree. And today, as we make proposals for a new European regional policy, we call for greater devolution in economic decision-making from the European Union to the regions and nations of our country. With our plans to increase UK funding for regional policy, devolve decision-making power to the regions and return key regional policy responsibilities from the EU back to Britain, the future control of regional economic policy is moving from Brussels to London and then from Westminster to the nations and regions themselves.41 This antipathy towards EU centralisation is not unexpected, given that such sentiments have long been the hallmark of successive senior British politicians
50 Scotland and the EU’s structural Funds over the years. Equally, since the UK is unlikely to benefit markedly from future EU funding post-2006, because the lions’ share will be allocated to the accession states from Central and Eastern Europe, the Treasury’s clarion call for devolution should not raise eyebrows either. If ERDF receipts no longer acted as a rebate for the UK’s contributions to the EU and the implementation of the Funds was too bureaucratic then it would be illogical for the UK to continue to support the ERDF in its present form.42 In contrast, the 1980s and 1990s, were decades when a sizeable part of Scotland was technically eligible for significant sums of EU money. Sums that were supposed to have been over and above those that were allocated towards regional assistance by successive UK governments. As Scottish civil servants had originally forewarned in the early 1970s, there are grounds for supposing that this became a squandered opportunity. These Funds were designed to assist those parts of the EU, which were suffering from disparity and which were vulnerable to the effects of the Single Market. Both, it could be said applied to Scotland, a country which lay on the EU’s periphery – as was so with Ireland – itself a major recipient of EU aid during this era. From the perspective of Scottish actors during the 1990s the funding process could have been improved upon. It was overly hierarchical. The allocation of EU monies was politicised right from the moment the Member States met to decide the criteria of eligibility. At times there was too much interference by the European Commission over exactly how EU aid was to be employed in Scotland. The UK government also had its own agenda, which at times it did not hesitate to put into effect both in relation to additionality and the criteria of eligibility. This in itself was indicative of its status as gatekeeper. All in all the implementation of the EU’s economic and social cohesion policy in Scotland was a far cry from the image of sub-state autonomy promoted by some in multi-level governmentalist ‘camp’. Nor does it come as much surprise that when the chief executives of Scotland’s local authorities met during 2002, one of the issues on their agenda was consideration of whether they should attempt to claw any monies back under the additionality principle. These receipts were those that Scottish councils had originally been entitled to prior to 1991. There was little optimism that this would bear fruit.43
5
1973–1999 A Westminster by-pass?
As early as 1981 we ‘found’ MEPs and decided that the European Parliament was not going to go away. We were probably one of the first organisations to lobby MEPs collectively. We wanted to influence them in the decision-making process. We invited them to lunch. However, we were not impressed with them. They were too keen to listen to their own voices, arrived over an hour late – some of us were senior executives – they were improperly dressed for a formal luncheon i.e. sweaters, and they had little idea of our role. In a way they were just playing at being MEPs. But from that time on we built on the relationship. (Chief Executive of a Scottish employers’ trade association, interviewed c1995)
Despite the difficulties which Scotland faced over the structural Funds, that did not deter a growing number of Scottish interests from developing their own links with the EU. When the Europeanisation of Scottish institutions and organisations neared its climax in the aftermath of the SEA, it seemed for a moment that the UK government risked losing its status as gatekeeper. Whilst it is tempting to believe that there really was such a thing as a Westminster by-pass,1 the actuality was rather more modest. On the one hand, Scottish interests could, and did, join pan-EU pressure groups and lobby MEPs, the CoR, other Member States’ governments and the Commission with varying degrees of success. But few ignored the UK government entirely. In part this was because of its potential influence in the Council. It was also because the government was responsible for overseeing the implementation of EU policy within the UK. For the most part, however, EU affairs remained the preserve of the lead2 departments in London. The Scottish Office, as a territorial branch of the UK government was responsible for aggregating Scottish interests in relation to a particular EU proposal and then transmitting this upwards to whichever lead department was responsible for representing the UK in relation to the policy in question. Whilst the Scottish Office clearly underwent Europeanisation, the notion that it pursued a form of para-diplomacy is less tenable by virtue of its status. That is to say that its foreign affairs’ agenda was largely subsumed within that of the UK government. Some of its officials were seconded to UKRep and no doubt many others participated in the Council’s
52 1973–1999: a Westminster by-pass? working groups as a part of the UK delegation. As a consequence, if any paradiplomacy did actually occur this would be most likely to be pursued by Scotland’s regional councils3 and Scotland Europa in Brussels. But whether their activities really amounted to para-diplomacy in practice is open to question. Around the time of the UK’s accession, Scottish actors4 were on something of a learning curve. The Scottish Office was best placed, because as a territorial department of the UK government it had for some while taken a close interest in the EU and its policy processes. During this era, the EU’s remit was relatively modest compared with the competencies which it currently holds. Nonetheless it stood to affect a swathe of sectors including agriculture, fisheries, economic development, whisky and engineering. From the Scottish Office’s perspective a key priority was to ensure that some of its staff were seconded to UKRep in Brussels. An official observed in 1971: We foresee that in certain fields it may be desirable to have Scottish Office men included in the UK representation in Europe. Just what these fields will be is a matter which will have to be discussed with our colleagues in Whitehall (and may of course, vary from time to time with changes in EEC objectives) but you will be aware of our particular interest in the preservation of special arrangements for regional development.5 It was hoped that up to four of its civil servants would be based in Brussels, though to begin with they settled for just one.6 At the same time estimates of staff requirements were quite modest. This amounted to about twenty-five field staff and fifteen inspectors, with personnel from other departments bringing the grand total to fifty.7 That was a far cry from the 1,200 Scottish civil servants who dealt with the EU in the 1990s, though to be fair the last figure did not relate to dedicated staff and was purely an indication of the number of officials who had an ‘involvement’ with the EU. Nevertheless, the comparison is an interesting one. After British entry in 1973 the Scottish Office was soon engaged in the EU’s policy processes, especially the implementation of the agriculture and fisheries policies. By the late 1970s and on into the beginning of the next decade two factors added to its involvement with the EU. Regional councils like Strathclyde were intent on forging their own links with the EU’s institutions in order to acquire European aid. According to one observer, as Strathclyde accumulated expertise, the Scottish office could not afford to be seen to be lagging behind.8 In addition, it was under pressure from business and commerce to promote and defend Scottish sectoral interests as competence was transferred to the European level. For instance, it was engaged in the negotiations on the framework of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) throughout the 1970s and on into the early 1980s. In some respects Scottish local government ploughed a similar furrow, save for one significant difference. Unlike the Scottish Office, councils had a freer hand as to whether they should take the first steps towards Europeanisation. This was in part because the EU’s impact on their activities was potentially modest during the 1970s and early 1980s. Consequently, aside from the desire to secure EU funding
1973–1999: a Westminster by-pass? 53 (the true value of which was questionable during this period), Europeanisation could stem from little more than the enthusiasm of a senior council leader. Western Isles was one such example, as an official explained: We first became involved with the EU via the Conference of Peripheral and Maritime Regions (CPMR), which is tantamount to a political lobbying organisation. This council was particularly influential in setting up the CPMR’s Islands Commission. Essentially all this was due to one politician who liked going to Europe. We also viewed it as an avenue for funding. Our involvement in the CPMR was neither nationalistic nor altruistic. You need to bear in mind that this locality voted against membership [of the EEC] in the 1975 referendum. The Council nevertheless saw it as beneficial to become involved in European matters. Our Convener became president of the Islands Commission and that degree of interest was then reflected throughout the Council in general. So the Europeanisation of the Council was a gradual process, with the Chief Executive and the Director of Planning being responsible for EU matters on a part-time basis around 10 years ago.9 The first steps towards the Europeanisation of Scottish local authorities were by no means assured, however. Some council leaders desisted from involvement by virtue of their Euro-scepticism or because they lacked the confidence that they ‘could or should influence the EU’.10 For others, the structural Funds were a driver for Europeanisation. In 1976 Dumfries and Galloway Region appointed its European Liaison Officer (ELO) – one of the first in Scotland. That coincided with a ‘big push’ from the European Commission ‘as many of the councils in Scotland had failed to take up their quotas’.11 The situation for non-governmental actors during the initial period of the UK’s membership was not too dissimilar from the councils or the Scottish Office but there were several variables which could affect their Europeanisation. First, for the most part they lacked the financial and human resources compared to governmental actors. Second, EU Funds were of little immediate consequence to non-governmental actors (an exception being Scottish farmers). Third, a key determinant was the extent to which the EU impacted on their activities. The net result was some sectoral pressure groups, such as the fishermen, began to lobby the EU quite early on, whilst others did not. One of the first tasks, for those affected, was to learn about how the EU worked, as the Scotch Whisky Association (SWA) soon discovered. Shortly after the UK joined the EU, the SWA was approached by the distillers for information on the EU and that coincided with an influx of legislative proposals from the Commission relating to bottle sizes, cereals and metrification. So the SWA had little option but to be involved with European issues. Although it decided against establishing its own office in Brussels, it was self-evident that it had to develop its own linkages with the EU. But the first problem was to find its way around the ‘Brussels maze’. Sir James Marjoribanks, a retired diplomat with a knowledge of the EU, was therefore recruited to the SWA’s board and he enabled
54 1973–1999: a Westminster by-pass? the SWA’s Director General to meet the ‘movers and shakers’ in Brussels. The (former) Director General observed: He took me under his wing and opened doors for me. Within six months I knew all the Commissioners and Chefs de Cabinet who were going to have an impact on the SWA. So I began to know the state of play on all the draft Directives and Regulations.12 Even though the ministries in London acted as the main channels of influence for the SWA, the organisation did not neglect the Scottish Secretary of State. It updated him on any developments in the EU that were of concern to the sector. Almost right from the beginning of its relationship with the EU, the SWA set out to influence the key players. Apart from Sir James on the Board, the SWA also employed a lobbyist in Brussels during the 1970s and 1980s who would telex draft EU proposals to the SWA before the Director General visited the Commission’s Chefs de Cabinet. At the same time the SWA began to develop its own linkages with the EP and the Economic and Social Committee. The aim was to cover as many of the ‘levers of power’ as possible even if some were more influential than others. Similarly, the SWA developed a close rapport with UKRep.13 At the UK level, the all-party Scotch Whisky Industry Group at Westminster was an additional pressure point. Its members could submit parliamentary questions on behalf of the SWA, and MPs from the governing party arranged meetings with the Chancellor or other ministers.14 That was particularly important in the run-up to the UK Budget, as all too often the duty on whisky was increased. In so doing the latter undermined the SWA’s position when it called for the harmonisation of duty across the EU (see below).15 By the second half of the 1980s, the EU’s impact on Scotland became even more far-reaching. As a consequence, the transactions between the Scottish Office and the EU increased markedly. The reform of the structural Funds in 1988 meant that the Scottish Office’s Industry department now had to justify why Scotland’s regions should be eligible for EU funding and devise an implementation plan, whereas, according to one official, up until then his section had been little more than ‘a post-office’.16 The Scottish Office also took a keen interest in the Single Market. In turn, the EU’s environmental policy was having an increased impact in Scotland, especially in relation to water and sewerage services, although to some extent that had begun in the late 1970s. So, it would be misleading to suggest that the impact of the EU was constantly on an upwards curve as far as individual divisions were concerned. An official observed: It was more a case of extra staff being allocated to EU-related work simply because the volume of legislation picked up in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Then it quietened down for a while before picking up again from the end of the 1980s to the present day. So the number of staff partly depended on what was happening in the EU at any one time. Certainly the SEA was a factor as there was a rise in legislation after 1987, though this should not be over-
1973–1999: a Westminster by-pass? 55 emphasised. In some of our divisions staff numbers have gone up and others down.17 Nevertheless in general the workload of civil servants increased substantially. That was especially the case where European Directives necessitated UK legislation or where their implementation had to be audited, as the official went on to explain: One factor that was very significant was that there were a series of court cases in the late 1980s over implementation. At that time we were issuing circulars in order that the implementing authorities complied with EU legislation but since then we have sought to transpose EU legislation into national legislation. That has also had an impact on our staff numbers, as people now have to draft legislation. As the volume of legislation increased, so too did the requirement that we had to report to the Commission on how they were being implemented. That is very labour intensive and it also added to our workload from the late 1980s.18 As the volume of European legislation multiplied, it became clear that some of the ministries in London were either unable or unwilling to handle the increased workload, whilst at the same time civil servants in Scotland wanted to become involved more directly in certain areas of EU policy. Though the lead ministries retained their strategic responsibilities, the result was a gradual decentralisation of a number of EU-related functions from London to Edinburgh as the 1980s drew to a close. That led, for example, to the Scottish Office’s Education Department becoming more directly involved in the EU’s education policy in 1990 and its Environment Department assuming overall responsibility for conservation in Scotland a year later.19 A transfer of functions followed over the implementation of the European Social Fund. The Scottish Office’s Education Department (SOED) provides an interesting model of the Europeanisation process. The original stimulus according to an official was the SEA in 1987. He explained: The real impetus for change originated in the late 1980s through a combination of people and circumstance. The trigger was the SEA in 1987. It promoted the movement of goods, capital, services and people. It was to have a profound effect in Scotland. A lot of people said here is a market opening up. There will be a need for education here. In the 1950s education covered what do you know about Europe? During the 1960s and 1970s the emphasis was on school trips across Europe. But after 1986 the emphasis was no longer about or through Europe. Our kids will have to be educated for Europe. This was something that never really caught on in England. The SEA was important because of what followed from it.20 By the late 1980s the Department of Education in London was becoming overloaded and it made sense for the Scottish Office’s own education department to undertake European work. He observed:
56 1973–1999: a Westminster by-pass? This was the result of events that had taken place in the late 1980s. Firstly so much was happening that London could no longer cope. It was therefore no good relying on London. Secondly, the education system in Scotland is quite distinct, so we needed to know things that the Department of Education would not necessarily pick up.21 When these administrative functions were decentralised from London to Scotland in 1990, that led to the creation of an International Relations Branch within the SOED. An official from St Andrew’s House was then permitted to attend the Commission’s Education Committee and the Council’s working groups. This enabled the Branch to develop its own contacts with ministers from the other Member States and with officials at the Commission. It also allowed the Scottish Office to contribute to the EU’s educational policy – albeit as part of the Department of Education’s team. Thus, Europeanisation could evolve incrementally.22 The findings of a survey of its European responsibilities that was undertaken in 1990 confirmed the depth of the EU’s encroachment into the Scottish Office’s activities. It revealed that 20 per cent of its staff, amounting to some 1,200 personnel, were performing EU-related work and that 300 separate EU-related functions were being undertaken. Of the 117 Divisions surveyed, 89 had a connection with the EU, whilst 34 gave their European functions a ‘crucial’ or ‘major’ rating.23 All of the Scottish Office’s functional departments had an involvement with the EU, though the Agriculture and Fisheries Department, and the Industry Department, tended to enjoy closer links than the rest, as a result of the CAP, CFP and the structural Funds. Yet the ensuing report emphasised that UK government channels remained an important conduit between Scotland and the EU. Understandably, therefore, it contained the dictum that on no account should Scottish officials open up their own (formal) linkages to the EU without clearance from the lead department first.24 It was also stressed that St Andrew’s House should not undermine the government’s position when it sought to influence the EU. Yet the report also indicated that the Scottish Office should cultivate its own (informal) links with Brussels in some instances. For example, it was proposed that Scottish civil servants should remain in Brussels for an extra ‘day or two’ once any formal meetings were over so they could develop a closer relationship with EU officials.25 It was also intended that they should encourage reciprocal visits to Scotland by Commission staff.26 Over the next few years the number of visits undertaken by individual civil servants to Brussels increased by 25 per cent. In 1989 the figure was 200.27 By 1994 this had risen to 250,28 so that on average someone from the Scottish Office was in Brussels every working day over the course of a year, and that figure takes no account of reciprocal trips by staff from the Commission. By the early 1990s Scottish local government had also widened its relationship with the EU. One such example was Central Regional Council. Its EU specialist explained: The Council first appointed a European Liaison Officer in 1990 [. . .] the reason for doing so were the changes to the structural Funds in 1988 and the advent
1973–1999: a Westminster by-pass? 57 of the Single Market, plus a greater awareness of the European dimension for the region as a whole.29 In some respects Scottish councils had little choice but to increase their involvement with the EU. By now the transfers of competence to the European tier could less easily be ignored. Councillor Anderson of Central Region included the following introductory comments in the council’s strategy paper: Since the advent of the single market there is a greater awareness of European issues and the purpose of this strategy is to enable the regional council and its people to participate more fully in the European scene. It is not a matter of choice but one of necessity. Decisions taken in Europe affect us all and will determine the economic wellbeing of present and future generations. Equally there is a continual stream of legislation and directives which impact directly on the regional council.30 As the European Commission became much more relevant to their activities, Scottish regional councils showed little hesitation in forging direct links with Brussels. Partly this was because they not only had to establish in detail what exactly were the criteria for eligibility with regard to the Funds but also whether the Commission would be sympathetic to their requests for structural aid. As the EU’s influence grew, it was also in their interest to learn how European policies were likely to develop in future. Consequently, they and Scottish Non-Departmental Public Bodies (NDPBs), or ‘quangos’, recognised that where necessary, they needed to influence the EU’s wider agenda.31 By this time councils could not afford to be seen in the back seat any longer as far as European integration was concerned. They faced increased pressure from their localities to adopt a pro-active approach. Partly this was because the EU had visibly emerged as a new tier of authority by 1992; it was no longer simply ‘the Common Market’. Equally, at a time when the legitimacy of the UK government was plummeting in Scotland, the EU offered Scots an alternative to Union with the UK; there was now a European political arena which they could participate in.32 At the same time two other forces were at work. As Scottish local authorities became more successful at accessing European Funds after 1988, it became less acceptable for a council to be seen to be lagging behind its Scottish counterparts. That was self-evident in the south of Scotland where both regional councils, which had largely been excluded from funding in the previous decade, were intent on securing EU aid by the 1990s. An official from Dumfries and Galloway explained: There was considerable competition between the regional councils when bids for Funds are submitted but after that, the partnership returns. One of the factors that determines the Council’s approach to the EU and funding is the public perception that it must be seen to do well i.e. if Borders succeeds but DGRC fails, questions will be asked about the officials.33
58 1973–1999: a Westminster by-pass? Central government itself also contributed to their Europeanisation. The channels between Brussels, London and Edinburgh could be inadequate at times, moreover government ministries like the DTI34 and the Scottish Office35 were not supposed to favour one local authority over another. Thus if a regional council wanted to steal an edge on its rivals, it would be advantageous to develop its own linkages with the EU, without having to rely purely on those channels provided by central government. Apparently however, some in the Scottish Office were increasingly nervous of the evolution of direct linkages between the councils and the EU. According to one ELO, after the funding round was complete in 1994, Scottish local authorities were asked to check with civil servants at St Andrew’s House before meeting officials at the Commission.36 Whether the councils were legally obliged to respect such guide-lines is open to question and even if they were, there is little reason to suppose that an SNP or Labour-led council would seek the Scottish Office’s permission before holding a meeting with the Commission. There was unlikely to be much empathy between the two as long as the Conservatives remained in government, especially after they ceased to control any councils north of the Border. Even so, by the early 1990s ‘Scotland Europa’ offered Scottish actors, especially its councils, an additional source of influence in Brussels. Scotland Europa, Scotland’s own ‘representative centre for Scottish organisations’ in Brussels, offered a range of facilities including despatching monthly briefing reports on the EU’s activities to its members, providing a lobbying service, arranging introductions and offering office accommodation. There were also more specialised services for those that required them. Yet, its status was rather indeterminate; it was a subsidiary of Scottish Enterprise and there was no direct connection to the Scottish Office.37 Nevertheless, since the government’s permission was needed before it was set up38 and as Scottish Enterprise fell under the umbrella of the Secretary of State, central government, albeit indirectly, retained ultimate control of its affairs. However, it was symbolically important because Scotland now had a representative office in Brussels. Whether this could really be conceived as an exemplar of para-diplomacy is questionable partly because Scottish civil servants were not stationed there and its staff did not appear to pursue even a quasiform of diplomacy.39 Its primary mission was to gather intelligence and represent Scotland more generally within the EU, especially in those matters relating to the Single Market. The idea of having an office representing Scottish interests in Brussels had attracted support in the late 1980s. There were two strands to this. One was political; this mainly emanated from the STUC and the councils, each of which wanted a form of Scottish representation in the EU which was distinct from that of the UK government. The other strand was economic; this originated primarily from commercial interests, which perceived that Scotland needed improved representation in the EU because of the Single Market. Mazey and Mitchell observed that the Scottish Office was cool to begin with, however.40 One explanation was that St Andrew’s House feared that such a scheme would be over-ruled by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Yet, an official who was partly responsible for its formation explained:
1973–1999: a Westminster by-pass? 59 The origins of Scotland Europa can be traced to 1989 when I gave a presentation on setting up a Brussels office to the Scottish Development Agency (SDA). But there was opposition to the idea on the grounds of cost. That was linked to the fact that EU money was going direct to the Treasury at that time. This attitude was a mistake because by the late 1980s there had been a growth in para-diplomacy and trans-national networks in the Community. However a short while later ‘X’ was asked to look into this at the SDA and he in turn asked one of his lieutenants to investigate. He recommended the establishment of Scotland Europa. At that time we had the following concerns. What would be the reaction of UKRep? Would they see it as interference? Then there was the bilateral embassy; they also had their own trade mission – would they welcome another one for Scotland? There was also the Scottish Office. In the event there were no problems. UKRep was not concerned at all – an advantage would be that Scotland Europa would siphon off some of their workload where it related to Scottish businesses. There was no objection from the Scottish Office or the bilateral embassy.41 Hence, even if it originally had its doubts, the Scottish Office eventually accepted that Scottish businesses needed representation in Brussels as the Single Market neared fruition. Equally, it was clear that the new round of structural Funds was of relevance to Scottish local government and more latently the Scottish Office as well. It therefore made sense on functional grounds to have those representing Scottish interests in a single location so that they could co-ordinate their lobbying and exchange intelligence. Scotland Europa exemplified the informal side of the EU’s policy processes. On the one hand it had semi-official status since a governmental body set it up. Yet its personnel accessed various informal networks across the EU. Their modus operandi was the long-term cultivation of personal contacts in the EU’s institutions and beyond. That enabled personnel at Scotland Europa to provide their client organisations with high-grade intelligence about future policies.42 Nevertheless it had no formal diplomatic status, it did not participate formally in the EU’s policy processes, and it did not provide separate representation for the Scottish Office in Brussels.43 It therefore supplemented existing inter-governmental channels, rather than replacing them altogether. More particularly, it represented the interests of its constituent members rather than those of Scotland per se, and as such, to begin with at least it was not ‘pro-active’ (Mitchell 1997: 418). Nor were its early years an easy passage. For instance, during the second half of the 1990s, it ‘lost’ some of its most ardent supporters. In 1996, the regional councils were abolished (as were the smaller district councils). From this point on there would be 32 unitary authorities. That had a number of ramifications for the Europeanisation of Scottish local government. There were grounds for supposing that the new bodies would lack the resources of the former regional councils, with the consequence that Scottish local authorities would lose their EU expertise. However, initially this was offset by the EU team at the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities (COSLA).44 A COSLA strategy
60 1973–1999: a Westminster by-pass? document suggested that its EU specialists should be increased from two to five. There were also expectations that COSLA would hold regular meetings with MEPs, Scottish ministers and members of the European Commission.45 Much of this came to pass in the short-to-medium term but it was little more than a holding operation until the Scottish parliament came into being in 1999. Arguably, therefore, the period from 1989 until 1996 was the high point of local authority Europeanisation. This was an era not only when a good number of the regional councils had their own well-staffed EU units (see table 5.1), but also when some were intent on formulating comprehensive EU strategies, which were somewhat distinct from UK government policy towards the EU. They participated in pan-EU networks such as the CPMR and AER, and their officials frequently visited Brussels where they lobbied members of the Commission and MEPs. Where possible they encouraged EU officials to visit their localities in an attempt to cultivate a closer relationship. As such this brief period was probably the nearest Scottish governmental bodies came to conducting their own para-diplomacy prior to the inception of Holyrood. Table 5.1 The Europeanisation of Regional Councils The years when ELOs, EU Units and Representation in Brussels first established Name
ELO
EU Unit
Representation in Brussels
Borders Central Dumfries and Galloway Fife Grampian Highlands and Islands Lothian Strathclyde Tayside
1989 1990 1976 1989 >1992 1975 >1986 1980 >1989
d
1990 1996 (SEO) 1976 1996 (SEO) SEC SEC 1996 (SEO) 1984 1996 (SEO)
Note: d: ELO: SEC: SED: SEO: >:
1993c d d 1992 d 1986 (1980)d >1989
Acronyms No EU unit at time of interview, EU functions decentralised across departments European Liaison Officer Scotland Europa, consultant Scotland Europa, dedicated member of staff Scotland Europa, office only until 1996 when ELO based there on behalf of ESEC unsure of date when first established but was evident in the year set out on the chart
Sources: Based on interviews with staff and documents from the Regional Councils
The testing of pragmatism As the EU and it policies affected Scotland increasingly, the pragmatic arrangement which underpinned inter-governmental relations between Scotland, the UK and the EU was put to the test. The net result was that the adequacy of Scottish
1973–1999: a Westminster by-pass? 61 representation in the EU was called into question across a swathe of sectors. For example, the financial sector lobbied the UK government in order that the European Central Bank’s HQ (or an offshoot) would be situated in Edinburgh. But apparently the UK Cabinet faced with pressure from the City of London vetoed it. A senior figure in the sector explained: With reference to the HQ, the UK was determined to push for London but there was little hope for success. Fierce competition from France and Germany who had been ‘better’ members of the EU thus vetoed the proposal. Scottish Financial Enterprise meanwhile was pushing for Scotland as a possible site for the ECB but could not bid without government support. The Government only pays attention to the Square Mile [i.e. the City of London] and the Secretary of State was like a broken reed on the issue. He said that he had to abide by Cabinet consensus.46 For its part, the energy sector in Aberdeen required EU funding for research and development but the UK government failed to provide the necessary additional monies, thereby affecting the industry’s chances of securing finance for research at a time when the oil sector was starting to winding down. An official at the Organisation for the Promotion of Energy Technology in Aberdeen recounted: In principle they [the Member States] can provide up to 9 per cent with 40 per cent coming from THERMIE and the rest from the contractors i.e. 51 per cent. But in the UK it is difficult to get this as the DTI agreed unilaterally not to top up the THERMIE programme. They decided to keep their money for R&D but the whole process is a four stage one.47 The Scottish fishing sector called for adequate money for decommissioning in the early 1990s, but for some while this was not forthcoming, and when it was available, the amounts were too modest. In practice the government preferred a tie-up scheme but that proved to be both unworkable and legally questionable. It was to have far-reaching consequences for stocks of fish and future viability of the industry (see chapter nine). The whisky sector endured successive hikes on duty in the UK until 1995. In so doing, the UK government undermined the SWA’s attempts to secure the harmonisation of duty on alcohol across the EU. This also had ramifications even further afield. A senior figure from the industry recounted: At present there are minimum rates, so the task of the Chancellor is to persuade his opposite numbers to reduce this rate. But he shot himself in the foot during the recent mini-budget when he raised the duty on spirits by 4 per cent, thus increasing the disparity between spirits, wine and beer, which makes it more difficult to make a case in Europe for harmonisation. The problem is that European law bases the variations on duty on the different categories of drink. We argue that duty should be based on the level of alcohol so that all alcoholic
62 1973–1999: a Westminster by-pass? drinks get the same treatment. If we are unable to achieve this in the EU, we will make little headway in Japan.48 Naturally, there were times when Scottish officials and ministers successfully fought their corner (see, for example, Bulmer et al. 2002). The resolution of the Danish by-catch dispute in the mid-1980s was one such high profile example and securing Objective 1 status for the Highlands and Islands was another. As Mitchell observed, it would be fallacious to think that Scotland was wholly ‘at the mercy of international influences’ in part because ‘international links have proved invaluable’ for the country in the past and also because at times ‘a distinct Scottish response had been possible’ (Mitchell 1997: 421). Moreover, it could reasonably be argued that the examples cited above, where Scottish actors failed to influence the outcome to their satisfaction, were relatively few in number and it would be unreasonable to conclude that Scottish influence in the EU was insufficient per se. However, at the very least these examples serve to underline that in relation to issues of strategic importance to Scotland, the representation of Scottish interests potentially lacked efficacy under the existing pragmatic arrangement. That is not to say that the bureaucratic mechanisms (i.e. civil service) interconnecting the Scottish Office with London departments were necessarily flawed, save for consultation problems and the perception by some Scottish interests of ‘out-ranking’ (see chapter two). For the most part they were not (for example, see Bulmer et al. 2002). But when strategically significant issues were at stake, all too often the key decisions were taken not by civil servants but by ministers of the UK government in London (an example being additionality – see previous chapter). This is where the root cause of Scotland’s dependency lay. The examples cited in this chapter and elsewhere of those instances when Scottish influence over EU matters was insufficient were indicative of a structural deficiency in intergovernmental relations between Edinburgh and London. In effect that deficiency was the product of the distribution of political authority within the UK (i.e., it was primarily situated in London), and how ministers in the UK government exercised that political authority. Thus, Scottish officials hoped in 1967 that there would be areas of policy where the Scottish Office would act as the lead department. But that was not to be (see chapter two). Faced with EU Funds being treated as a rebate to the UK Treasury, an official lobbied behind the scenes for a more effective arrangement during the early 1970s. That came to nought because ministers in the UK government thought otherwise. The BSE crisis in the mid-1990s was another example of this deficiency. Although a senior figure at the National Farmers Union Scotland (NFUS) once maintained that the NFUS possessed ‘adequate mechanisms of influence at present to reach the levers of power’,49 the BSE scare demonstrated that reaching for those levers was one thing, but applying them successfully was another. BSE affected livestock, with cattle most at risk. But, as a result of reports in the media during the 1990s, there had been a latent fear that it could spread to humans. This turned to public alarm in the spring of 1996 when the BSE unit in Edinburgh (the government’s own scientists) reported that it was unable to verify conclusively that there
1973–1999: a Westminster by-pass? 63 had not been a crossing over of the disease from animals to humans. That led eventually to the EU imposing a global ban on the export of British beef (and related products) which had an immediate impact on Scottish agriculture. It was then argued by some that Scottish beef producers relied on organic methods, as opposed to English farmers who used the artificial feeds that were thought to have spread the disease. This encouraged two SNP MEPs from the north of Scotland to make their own overtures to the European Commission in order to get the ban lifted. Although they were treated with sympathy, their requests were politely refused because such an application could only come from the UK government. The government took the view that the ban itself was unfair and that if it lobbied for it to be lifted in one part of the country, then that would be tantamount to recognising its legitimacy elsewhere. Officials at the Scottish Office were also quick to point out that Scotland itself had suffered from BSE, so its farmers did not deserve special treatment. Much to the farmers’ dismay, the ban stood.50 The BSE crisis raised a number of issues for the NFUS. In the first place, it demonstrated that there were limits to its influence within the EU, even when its members’ jobs were in peril. Whilst the NFUS may have had high level contacts in the Scottish Office, when the Council of the EU met there was little that Scottish ministers could do because they did not have the right to vote purely on behalf of Scotland. Instead the NFUS had to rely on the Secretary of State to advance their case in the UK Cabinet. If the Cabinet was unwilling to give Scotland’s farmers preferential treatment during its deliberations over the EU’s ban there was nothing that the Secretary of State could do about it, other than resign – which he did not do. Instead Mr Forsyth (then the incumbent) blamed the other Member States and admitted that he was politically impotent. When asked when the ban would be lifted, he commented in a BBC TV interview: ‘I’m not in a position to confirm when it will happen, because it’s not down to me. It will be decided by politicians in Germany, in France, in Spain and elsewhere, and I am not in a position to direct them.’51 He did decree, apparently, that the European flag should not be flown on government buildings in Scotland on ‘Europe day’ during 1996. As the crisis deepened, a gulf emerged between the NFUS and the government as to how the ban could best be lifted. The latter opted for a policy of noncooperation with the EU in the hope that this would induce it to shift its position. But the NFUS preferred a more conciliatory approach, which was designed to garner support from those states that were more amenable to the UK’s position.52 The BSE debacle demonstrated just how little power Scottish interests could have when the government acted on their behalf in the EU. In part this could be attributed to the latter’s lack of allies amongst the other Member States. It also served to expose how UK ministers could discount Scottish views altogether. Arguably the government’s policy of non-cooperation was directed more towards placating the Euro-sceptics from within its own ranks, than defending the interests of Scottish farmers (John Major’s minority administration was at the time beset by factional infighting over the EU). All in all, therefore, under the existing pragmatic arrangement, Scottish influence was open to question, as far as the EU was concerned. If Scottish civil servants
64 1973–1999: a Westminster by-pass? failed to influence their colleagues in London over a key EU policy, then they could bring it to the attention of their minister. The latter could then write to the relevant UK minister or if necessary he or she might choose to have a quiet chat about it ‘behind the speaker’s chair’ at Westminster. If that too failed to yield the desired result, then the matter could be brought before the Secretary of State. However, there were limits as to when such a course of action could produce the desired outcome (e.g. the NFUS and the BSE ban). More particularly, there appeared to be an absence of political leadership at St Andrew’s House in relation to EU matters (though historians might subsequently arrive at a different picture when official records are available). That is not to say that ministers did not have EU responsibilities. They did. For a while during the 1990s Lord Fraser of Carmyllie held the portfolio for Scotland’s relations with the EU but the results were intangible. Others, such as Sir Hector Monro were responsible for fisheries and thus on occasion attended the Council as part of the UK delegation. But underlying this was a lack of strategic vision as to how best Scotland should conduct its relations with the EU, other than Ian Lang’s call for a multi-pronged approach.53 Accordingly, it could be supposed that if the channels provided by the Scottish Office were ineffective at times, then Scottish interests might have been tempted to circumvent the UK government entirely where possible and deal with Brussels directly, the end result of which would be the so-called ‘Westminster by-pass’.
A Westminster by-pass? By the mid-1990s a good number of Scottish actors had developed direct links with the EU and its institutions. This particularly applied to governmental bodies, which is understandable. First, they were most likely to be affected by the EU, as decisions that affected their work were taken increasingly not in London but in Brussels. Second, in the main they possessed sufficient resources to despatch their personnel to Brussels for meetings or to secure EU secondments for individual staff. The picture was more diffuse for non-governmental actors. Some, such as the NFUS, the Scottish Fishermen’s Federation, the Scotch Whisky Association, were frequent visitors to Brussels, and individuals from these organisations were often as not members of one of the Commission’s advisory committees. Other interest groups were represented by their parent bodes, as was the case with WWF Scotland or CBI Scotland. In some instances the opportunity to deal direct with the EU was constrained by their lack of resources – that applied to the Scottish Crofters Union, for example. But even here, its membership of a pan-EU umbrella group ensured that there was a measure of assistance towards its travel costs. Nevertheless, it did not necessarily follow that when interest groups lobbied Brussels, they could afford to ignore the UK government completely – in effect there was for the most part no such thing as a Westminster by-pass. Once EU legislative proposals were in the pipeline Scottish pressure groups ensured that UK officials were briefed in good time. A senior figure in the whisky industry observed:
1973–1999: a Westminster by-pass? 65 When dealing with the EC the most critical thing is to make sure that the government is up to date on a specific draft regulation or directive. You can inject that in various levels but the decision-making level in our civil service is Assistant Secretary and upwards. We therefore had to devote effort to Principal and Assistant Secretaries and upwards. If we faced a major issue we had to secure a meeting with a Permanent Secretary or the Secretary of State. But the benefits of meeting ministers and MPs is limited, unless officials at all levels are totally aware of your case and that when they do meet you they [the minister] are already working to a well-informed brief [from their officials] recommending a particular course of action.54 Hence, if interests could win the support of more junior officials who were responsible for briefing their seniors, that prepared the ground for meetings with the Permanent Secretary or a minister. As the lobbyist subsequently observed, interests had to adopt a multi-track strategy. They should be aware that policy development was markedly different in Brussels but they must never overlook central government in the UK. When you go to the EC you must identify the directorate responsible and the cells within the Directorate General that deal with your sector. Unlike the UK where power stems from a minister, within the EC it can emerge from the lowest level. Therefore you must go in at the soft pencil stage and you must get your own government on side.55 Essentially, legislative proposals could emerge from the most junior officials. Yet, depending on a proposal’s legal base, it might be little use in securing allies in the Commission, if the UK government was opposed to the whole idea. It was therefore worthwhile to sound out civil servants (and UKRep) on the proposal as early as possible, since they were likely to play a key role later on in the Council and also when the policy was implemented in the UK. Besides, if UK officials perceived that an interest group had chosen to ignore them one minute and then asked for help sometime later, they might be less amenable in a crisis. Yet, when things did go wrong, as the farmers discovered over BSE, Scottish ministers were largely relegated to ‘bargain hunters’. Primarily that occurred within the UK political arena, not the EU. For the most part, when they wished to influence the UK line on a particular EU policy, Scottish interest groups were expected to do so through the Scottish Office.56 The latter usually consulted those interests who stood to be directly affected by the proposal emanating from the Commission. But at the end of the day interest groups were reliant on influencing the outcome through the rationality of their case and the exercise of pressure (i.e. lobbying). Unsurprisingly, given its status as a territorial branch of the UK government, the Scottish Office lacked more formal (i.e. constitutionally entrenched) mechanisms, which would have enabled it to exercise substantive control over the formulation of the UK line on EU policy. That rather stood in contrast to the situation in Germany, for example. Unlike the German Länder, Scotland did not possess the
66 1973–1999: a Westminster by-pass? right of veto over the UK signing up to further transfers of competence to the EU. Hence, as far as the EU was concerned, in the years prior to 1999, Scotland was politically dependent on the centre because this was where for the most part political authority resided in the UK. There may have been administrative devolution regarding those domestic matters which fell within the competence of the Scottish Office but that was of little consequence concerning European affairs. Even though some EU-related work was transferred from London to Edinburgh during the late 1980s and early 1990s, for the most part this was little more than decentralisation. In sum, therefore, during the 1990s the pragmatic arrangement governing Scotland’s relations with the EU had been tested and to some extent found wanting. This, however, was but one facet of a Union that was no longer sustainable under the existing constitutional arrangements. Even so, the BSE crisis was something of a milestone for Scottish–UK relations. The decision to ban the export of beef was taken not by UK ministers in London but by ministers from the other Member States in EU. They were entitled to do so because QMV applied in this instance in the Council. As a consequence this policy was ‘imposed’ on Scotland (and the rest of the UK for that matter), regardless of the views of UK ministers. This was by no means a new scenario, as Scottish fishermen had discovered some time earlier. But as far as the CFP was concerned, usually the outcome was based on a compromise of sorts, and at times the UK veto applied in relation to key issues. BSE was another matter entirely because of its high public profile and the absence of compromise. In so doing, and just a couple of years before the Scots secured their own parliament again, it brought to the fore the growing ambiguity over who exactly governed Scotland.
6
1999 Business as usual?
I strongly believe that we have got to get Scotland the best possible deal out of Europe. Although I accept that there are other legitimate arguments about how we do that, I submit – with overwhelming evidence in my support – that the best way is to remain within the UK and, as the documents on the concordats made clear, to be fully and directly involved in every way possible in the formulation of UK policy to ensure that that policy is tailored where necessary to Scotland’s interests. We shall then be able to push and achieve advances and we intend to continue to do so. (Donald Dewar 1999)1
Two words sum up the events of 1999 – change and continuity. Scotland now had its own parliament but under the Scotland Act (1998) formally ‘sovereignty’ continued to reside at Westminster. Scottish civil servants performed much the same work as before (albeit that their workload had increased due to devolution), but they could work for one of two territorial branches of government. The Scottish Office ceased to exist and was replaced by the Scottish Executive and by the Scotland Office (recently subsumed within the Department for Constitutional Affairs). The country would now have its own First Minister at the head of the Scottish Executive. However, the office of Secretary of State was retained, the post-holder heading the Scotland Office.2 The latter handled those Scottish matters which were reserved to Westminster, including in theory foreign affairs.3 The Secretary of State retained a seat in the UK Cabinet and participated in its committees including the sub-committee on European issues (Bulmer et al. 2002: 21). The Secretary of State also acted as the ‘custodian’ of the Scotland Act, the intention being that Holyrood should not exceed its powers. As foreign affairs was reserved to Westminster, it could be supposed that the Scotland Office would be the key player regarding the conduct of Scotland’s relations with the EU. However, because so many of the EU’s policies impacted directly on devolved matters, it was tacitly acknowledged in the immediate period leading up to 1999 that in practice the Scottish Executive would be extensively involved in EU affairs. For its part, the parliament would have the authority to scrutinise proposed legislation emanating from the EU. The Consultative Steering Group, the body responsible for drawing up the parliament’s procedures,
68 1999: business as usual? recommended that it should have its own European Committee. That duly came to pass (it was subsequently re-named the European and External Relations Committee). The other substantive change was that a handful of Scottish civil servants would be based in Brussels at Scotland House. This would not replace Scotland Europa, which continued to exist, though each would be based in the same premises. With a plethora of new governmental bodies in situ, and the establishment of the Executive’s office in Brussels, surely Scotland’s influence over foreign affairs could only but improve. Yet it was far from clear that the new arrangement would be the panacea that some hoped, not least because devolution threw up more ambiguities than certainties. As Salmon rightly observed, reserving foreign affairs to Westminster was little more than an ‘oxymoron’4 – this was especially so in relation to the EU. On the one hand, amongst other things, devolution was intended to provide Scotland with greater self-government. On the other, Scotland already belonged to another union, the EU (albeit as a territorial component of the UK), a union which over time had increasingly called into question the autonomy that Scotland possessed. This conundrum had been apparent during the early 1990s when the Scottish Constitutional Convention had been established. Amongst its tasks the Convention would prepare the ground for, and act as a driver for, constitutional reform. The EU naturally figured in its deliberations but, as Taylor observed, there was a shift in ‘emphasis’ regarding its position on Scottish representation in the EU. In its 1990 document there was the demand that ‘there should be a statutory entitlement for Scotland’s parliament and/or Executive to be represented in UK ministerial delegations to the Council’.5 But its 1995 paper had watered this down somewhat. It stated that ‘Scotland’s parliament will be represented in UK Ministerial delegations to the Council where appropriate, and Scottish Ministers will lead these UK delegations when the areas under discussion are of specific relevance to Scotland’ (Taylor 2002: 270–271). The idea that Scottish ministers would have some involvement in European affairs set the tone for the 1997 White Paper (outlining the government’s proposals for a Scottish parliament). That was published in the autumn of 1997 in the immediate aftermath of Labour’s election victory and an entire chapter was devoted to the EU. Although foreign affairs was to be ‘reserved’ to Westminster (i.e. it retained competence), the White Paper proclaimed that Scottish ministers would have ‘an important role to play’ and for its part so would the nascent Scottish parliament.6 However, the following year there was little mention of foreign affairs in the Scotland Act; primarily this related to its reserved status and the implementation of EU and international laws by the Scottish Executive. Nor would there be some form of ‘statutory entitlement’ regarding Scottish representation in the Council as the Scottish Constitutional Convention had originally hoped. Rather, for the most part, the UK government would continue to remain pivotal to Scotland’s relations with the EU. As Donald Dewar, Scotland’s initial First Minister, surmised within a few months of the parliament’s re-establishment, Scotland had to ‘get the best possible deal out of Europe’. But he believed that this could be attained most propitiously through its ‘involvement at all levels in the formulation of UK policy’.
1999: business as usual? 69 So, did it follow that this amounted to little more than ‘business as usual’ as far as inter-governmental relations between Scotland and the UK/EU were concerned (i.e. little if any substantive change)? Or would there be something of a halfway house (i.e. limited structural and procedural changes)? The White Paper struck an optimistic note when it stated that: The UK Government wishes to involve the Scottish Executive as directly and fully as possible in the Government’s decision making on EU matters. It is part of the Government’s intention that Scottish Executive Ministers and officials should be fully involved in discussions within the UK Government about the formulation of the UK’s policy position on all issues which touch on devolved matters.7 But it added: The emphasis in negotiations has to be on working as a UK team; and the UK lead Minister will retain overall responsibility for the negotiations and determine how best each member of the team can contribute to securing the agreed policy position, so that in appropriate cases, Scottish Executive Ministers could speak for the UK in Councils.8 This raised the question as to whether the ad hoc arrangements which pre-dated 1999, would be up-graded and if so whether it would engender a greater degree of ‘formalisation’ than was the case before. Hitherto, inter-governmental relations between Scotland and the EU had evolved over time and they were based on custom and precedence. They were inherently pragmatic, as the authors of the 1975 White Paper on devolution had originally envisaged. If they were to be formalised, that had a functional logic to it inasmuch as civil servants in London and in Edinburgh would be reporting to different political administrations. The political administrations in London and Edinburgh were of the same political hue prior to 1999 because Scottish ministers were UK government ministers who had been appointed by the Prime Minister in London. Now that was not to be. Scottish ministers would be drawn from the ranks of MSPs at the Scottish parliament. The First Minister was to be elected by MSPs and that individual would then be responsible for forming his or her ministerial team, which in turn, would collectively act as the political leadership of the Scottish Executive. Sooner or later, therefore, completely different parties would form the governments in London and in Edinburgh. So, officials risked finding themselves in something of an invidious position as ultimately they all belonged to the same ‘British’ civil service. Allied to which was the concern that where possible devolution should not result in running conflicts between the UK and territorial tiers of government. From a civil service point of view this would have been abhorrent, as it did not make for efficient and effective government. Blair’s government, the author of devolution, had its own concern. The underlying intention was that constitutional change should strengthen rather than undo
70 1999: business as usual? the bonds which held the UK together. But some senior figures in ‘London Labour’ were concerned that devolution could lead to the ‘Balkanisation of Britain’ (Taylor 1999: 149). More particularly, one of the consequences of constitutional change was that there would no longer be a single ministerial body bound by collective responsibility. Yet ministers from the devolved administrations expected to have a close involvement in the UK’s handling of EU affairs (Bulmer et al. 2002). All in all, it therefore made sense if at the very least something was written down (i.e. ‘codified’) to guide how inter-governmental affairs in the UK should be conducted from henceforth. Equally, there needed to be some kind of inter-ministerial forum, which would enable ministers from the different tiers of government to consult with each other, and, where possible, to collaborate in areas of common interest. Potentially this same forum could provide a facility for conflict resolution between the different administrations. But if these various mechanisms were to have a legal status of some kind that risked undermining the pragmatism that had been the hallmark of the UK constitution and the Westminster system of government. Thus, whilst ensuring that it had no formal legal status as such, there needed to be some form of declaration by the constituent administrations which incorporated in principle their commitment to collaboration – the origins of which can be traced to the White Paper itself. The net result was a ‘Memorandum of Understanding’, which in turn engendered a ‘Joint Ministerial Committee’ (in practice there were a number) and the concordats.
A ‘new’ pragmatism? The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was referred to as ‘the principal agreement’ between the UK government and the devolved administrations. As such it framed the principles which would apply to inter-governmental relations between the two tiers of government. These related to ‘communication and consultation, co-operation, exchange of information, statistics and research, confidentiality, correspondence, parliamentary business, international and EU relations, nondevolved matters, the Joint Ministerial Committee, implementation of devolution business, reviewing bilateral relations and the need to review the MoU itself’. As far as communication was concerned, the intention was not to ‘constrain the discretion of any administration’, but to ensure all sides were adequately consulted in good time. This was because of the concern that one administration should not be wrong-footed by another due to it being ill informed about a given issue. A key element, therefore, was the need for confidentiality. The MoU listed a number of instances where this could apply including ‘when the provider of information deemed it necessary’. For those unwise enough to consider breaching confidentiality, there was the explicit warning: ‘each administration can only expect to receive information, if it treats such information with appropriate discretion’. Yet an explanatory note affirmed that the MoU and supplementary agreements ‘were not legally binding’.9 It was under the aegis of the MoU that the Joint Ministerial Committee (JMC) was established. The MoU stated:
1999: business as usual? 71 The UK Government and the devolved administrations believe that most contact between them should be carried out on a bilateral or multi-lateral basis, between departments which deal on a day-to-day basis with the issues at stake. Nonetheless, some central co-ordination of the overall relationship is needed. Therefore the administrations agree to participate in a Joint Ministerial Committee (JMC) consisting of Ministers of the UK Government, Scottish Ministers, Members of the Cabinet of the National Assembly for Wales [and Ministers of the Northern Ireland Executive Committee].10 Its terms of reference were: a. b.
c. d.
To consider non-devolved matters which impinge on devolved responsibilities, and devolved matters which impinge on non-devolved responsibilities; Where the UK Government and the devolved administrations so agree, to consider devolved matters if it is beneficial to discuss their respective treatment in different parts of the United Kingdom; To keep the arrangements for liaison between the UK Government and the devolved administration under review; and To consider disputes between the administrations.11
The most significant aspect of the JMC was that it possessed the potential to resolve a dispute if this could not be dealt with bilaterally between the administrations concerned. In the first instance disputes should be dealt with by the appropriate Secretaries of State and if that failed to bear fruit, then a dispute could be addressed by the JMC secretariat. Aside from a plenary JMC which would meet once a year, chaired by the Prime Minister (or his/her representative), it could also convene in other functional formats including the EU (e.g. JMC Europe). The ‘Agreement on the Joint Ministerial Committee’ made particular reference to JMC Europe, chaired by the Foreign Secretary. It stated that it would: Also operate as one of the principal mechanisms for consultation on UK positions on EU issues which affect devolved matters. The fact that rapid decisions have to be taken on EU issues to meet the timetable of negotiations in the Council of Ministers, as well as the Government’s own wish to involve the devolved administrations as fully as possible in discussions on the formulation of UK policy positions, necessitates a mechanism which enables the lead UK minister to consult other UK Government Ministers and their counterparts in devolved administrations simultaneously. In this functional format, it is likely that the majority of business will be conducted through correspondence, although meetings will also be convened where necessary.12 In essence, this meant that for routine matters contact between departments and administrations would be outside JMC Europe because of the speed of events, whereas this JMC would be of more value prior to EU summits, for example.
72 1999: business as usual? However, JMC Europe along with its counterparts only possessed ‘consultative status’. The supplementary agreement explained: The JMC is a consultative body rather than an executive body, and so will reach agreements rather than decisions. It may not bind any of the participating administrations, which will be free to determine their own policies while taking account of JMC discussions. Nonetheless, the expectation is that participating administrations will support positions that the JMC has agreed.13 Hence, as with the MoU, the JMC was rather an ephemeral entity, so far as its status was concerned, and this was indicative of the pragmatism which continued to underpin the ‘new’ constitutional framework. The MoU also set the scene for the four ‘overarching’ concordats which were designed to ‘apply broadly uniform arrangements across government’, some of which were reserved to Westminster, and some of which fell under the ‘responsibilities of the devolved administrations’. They aimed to resolve two conundrums in the aftermath of devolution (Scott, cited in Bulmer et al. 2002). This related firstly to ‘concurrent powers’, whereby: The UK Government and the devolved administration effectively share competence with respect to a particular policy area and, as a result, must find a common position if jurisdictional (and political) conflicts are to be avoided. And, secondly, ‘policy contagion’, whereby: Policy decisions taken by one administration have an effect on the policy options facing another administration – for instance where one administration finds itself under political pressure to conform to policies adopted by another administration.14 This was particularly germane to European affairs because of the overlap of competencies. For instance, the CFP is determined at the European tier of government, but ministers from the UK government not only take the lead on behalf of the UK in the Council, they are also responsible for overseeing the implementation of CFP policy in non-devolved parts of the UK. The Scottish Executive is also involved in the CFP, as fisheries is a devolved matter and it too has responsibilities regarding implementation. Hence the concordats are of particular relevance to Scotland’s relations with the EU. One of the concordats related to ‘the co-ordination of European Union Policy’ another to ‘international relations’. As far as the former was concerned, it restated the commitment to ‘involve the Scottish Executive as fully and directly as possible in decision-making on EU matters’. It also stated that arrangements governing ‘consultation and the exchange of information’ would continue as they did prior to devolution. But it added that ‘participation would be subject to mutual respect for the confidentiality of discussions and adherence by the Scottish Executive to
1999: business as usual? 73 the resulting UK line, without which it would be impossible to maintain such a close working relationship’. In effect this was something of a warning. If the Scottish Executive (or the other devolved administrations) failed to play by the rules concerning confidentiality then it had to face the consequences – the implication being that it would lose access to the inner workings of the UK government on EU affairs. The concordat also stated that: Decisions on Ministerial attendance at Council meetings will be taken on a case-by-case basis by the lead UK Minister. In reaching decisions on the composition of the UK team, the lead Minister will take into account that the devolved administrations should have a role to play in meetings of the Council of Ministers at which substantive discussion is expected of matters likely to have a significant impact on their devolved responsibilities.15 And: Attendance by officials of the devolved administrations at EU meetings will continue, as at present, to be agreed bilaterally with the lead Whitehall Department. Such agreement would also cover attendance at Presidency and Commission chaired meetings, including those discussing implementation matters. The role of officials from the devolved administrations will be to support and advance the single UK negotiating line which they will have played a part in developing.16 Effectively this was little more than a re-iteration of the arrangements which pre-dated devolution, save for the fact that, formally, they were now set out in writing. However, although the Scottish Executive was involved in the inception of the concordats and it proposed alternations, due to the absence of transparency it is difficult to determine how far it was an equal partner during their formulation (Lynch 2001: 151). In turn this raises the question as to what would occur if a separatist party (or coalition) secured power in Edinburgh one day. It would certainly seem that these arrangements are not legally binding as such (Bulmer et al. 2002: 38), and the JMC lacks executive power – it ‘merely’ possesses consultative status. Yet latently and in places overtly, the implication is that the devolved administrations are expected to toe the UK line, albeit after they have offered their own input to the formulation of UK policy. If they fail to do so, or worse still they breach confidentiality, then they would suffer the consequences. Yet the status of the concordats themselves is rather ambiguous. Winetrobe (1999) highlighted a number of instances where they might be of legal significance. One such example was a response to a question from Jim Wallace during a debate at Westminster as to whether they might be subject to a judicial review. Henry McLeish replied: The Hon Gentleman asks a good question. The concordats are not intended to be legally binding contracts or to substitute for matters properly covered by
74 1999: business as usual? the Bill. However, it is likely that they will be justiciable to an extent. For example, if the Scottish Executive did not follow the consultation procedure set out in a concordat, it could be legally challenged on the ground that the concordat had created a legitimate expectation that the procedure would be followed.17 Lord Falconer of Thorton (then the Solicitor General) ploughed a similar furrow when the Government of Wales Bill underwent its second reading in the House of Lords. He explained: They will not take the form of binding contracts: they will not take the form of statutory documents, but it may well be the case that they will create a legitimate expectation of consultation. For instance, if one party to a concordat suddenly ceased to consult the other, in accordance with the concordat, the result might be that its decisions could be challenged by way of judicial review, so it is wrong to say there will be no legal underpinning of these concordats. The precise limits of that underpinning would have to be worked out by the courts in the context of the terms of the concordat itself. But the important point about judicial review is that it will not permit one party suddenly to whip away the concordat and then act entirely contrary to its terms.18 However, Winetrobe believed that any such claimant faced ‘a number of hurdles in pursuit of a claim based on legitimate expectations’ (especially in Scotland) because the ‘parties themselves had expressly accepted that the documents were not legally enforceable’ (ibid.: 13). Equally, as Rawlings (cited in Winetrobe) claimed: ‘The concordats are a fine example of the reworking of the informal character of the British constitution. But [. . .] soft law usage of this kind demands firmer underpinning in a changed constitutional landscape.’19 Yet, as Bulmer et al. rightly observed, to all intents and purposes the concordats did actually ‘underpin the new constitutional situation in which there are two tiers of UK governance’ (Bulmer et al. 2002: 38). Criticism of the current arrangement has been wide-ranging. There is no Scottish parliamentary committee with responsibility for overseeing inter-governmental relations or the concordats (Lynch 2001: 156).20 Moreover, there was no UK parliamentary oversight of the original drafting process (ibid.: 150). That though did not deter MPs at Westminster from airing their concerns. In its report on multi-layer democracy, the Scottish Affairs Committee warned: We were frequently told that there would be constant consultation and discussion between Scottish and UK ministers and officials, but there is no provision for an open forum at parliamentary level for the public discussion of matters of common concern. Even the announcement by Baroness Ramsay on 28th July of Joint Ministerial arrangements [. . .] does not go very far to remedy this deficiency.
1999: business as usual? 75 There is considerable and legitimate potential scope for disagreement between state and sub-state (and even between sub-states) even where both administrations are of the same political complexion, but any disagreements will be exacerbated when they are not. And inevitably, even if the political control in the UK and Scotland start the same there will come a time when they differ: the staggering of elections, the proportional representation systems for electing the devolved assemblies which will favour the creation of coalition administrations and the possibility of people voting differently in regional and national elections all tend towards such an outcome. This makes the possibility of reaching common ground for a delegation to Brussels, agreement on a disputed point of vires or even on a matter of honest political disagreement, more difficult to achieve.21 There was also the possibility that the current arrangements could even result in re-centralisation. With the caveat that it was too early to arrive at any definitive judgement, Burrows suggested: Under these circumstances there is always a possibility of competence creep where central government can use its powers in relation to European matters as a means of imposing a centrally determined policy on the devolved administrations. The intra-governmental mechanisms in themselves provide little reassurance against this possible encroachment on the powers of the devolved administrations. For these reasons the acceptance or adoption of a principle of subsidiarity or some other form of constitutional committee is needed to secure the devolution settlement. Otherwise intra-governmental mechanisms for policy co-ordination could become the back door to recentralisation. (Burrows 2000: 141) Others have warned that far from presaging an era of stability, the new governmental arrangements were a ‘recipe for independence’ because from the Scottish people’s perspective this was not the ‘best way of binding Scotland to the UK’. Kellas observed: Lawyers are everywhere in the new Scottish political system, and a new ‘Dundas Despotism’ is on the way, albeit mostly for Scotland’s own political system, not often as a feed-in to the House of Commons. That is because the Scotland Act puts the Scottish Parliament and Executive under judicial control, unlike the ‘sovereign’ U.K. Parliament and Government. Not only can judges rule Acts of the Scottish Parliament and decisions of the Scottish Executive ultra vires, but even the procedures of the Parliament have come before the Court of Session on two occasions. A U.K. Court, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council,22 is the final court in ‘devolution cases’, and in time no doubt a legal canon will develop comparable to that of the Supreme Court
76 1999: business as usual? of the United States in federal–state relationships but with the important difference that no Court can overrule the British Parliament and Government. (Kellas 2000: 30) In sum, there are grounds for supposing that the new constitutional arrangements could well be improved upon. They are biased in favour of the UK government (which is unsurprising as devolution was itself the product of an Act of the Westminster parliament). There is too little parliamentary oversight, in Scotland at least. There is too much secrecy and there is no assurance that conflicts would be resolved to the satisfaction of the devolved administrations. Even so, there were high expectations for the new pragmatic arrangements. In the immediate aftermath of the formation of the Holyrood parliament, officials in London and Edinburgh believed that times had changed for the better. A civil servant at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) commented: We have opened up the consultative process and we must take the views of the devolved administrations into account. We ignore them at our peril. It would be foolish for the government to set up these bodies and then not take their views into account when formulating policy. We must now make sure that Scotland is no longer forgotten – this used to happen in the past and it is one reason why the FCO and other Whitehall departments have set up Devolved Administration Departments.23 Scottish officials too were optimistic. One individual who was responsible for work on the concordats observed: If there was a faction in Scotland which had a different agenda concerning an EU issue, and where the voting in the Council was to be fairly close, the Commission would love to undermine the UK position by pointing to the public position of a part of the UK. So it is in the UK’s interest to take into account the Scottish position and it is therefore essential for Scottish factors to be taken into account. There are times in the EU where from a UK perspective there is no immediate interest, so you have to recognise that in such cases the Scottish voice would be absent.24 However, he believed that the concordats were not set in stone: I have no doubts that some people in London believed that the concordats were intended to ensure that the Scottish and UK Governments were singing from the same hymn sheets but what would happen for instance if there was an SNP Government in Scotland? It would be geared towards independence and it would have an electoral mandate, so the concordats are not binding. In terms of drafting I did not want to cut across the Scotland Act but equally I was not looking into the future when there might be a new Government in situ.25
1999: business as usual? 77 Revealingly both interviewees believed that MSPs’ involvement in foreign affairs would be circumscribed by their need to focus on domestic matters, if they wished to be re-elected. That apart, it was also apparent that they shared the belief that Scotland would not be ‘forgotten’ again and that London could not afford to ignore Scottish interests. In their oral evidence to the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, senior figures from the Cabinet Office, including Sir Stephen Wall, the head of the European Secretariat, were upbeat in their assessment of how relations had progressed between UK departments and the devolved administrations. He admitted that: Conflict is necessarily built into the system as a test of whether it is working. It is in part, a product of a real determination on the part of the Government and on the part of Civil Servants to make it work. That is perhaps a habit of government in Britain and I personally think it is a good one.26 But equally it was essential that there should be a single UK line at the end of the day. He explained: My competence is limited to trying to ensure that as regards the formulation of EU policy we succeed in arriving at a UK policy because at the end of the day we have a single UK negotiating position which has to take account of the constitutional position that we have.27 He was then asked whether there had been a ‘basic change’ in the way in which the UK had dealt with the aggregation of territorial interests when formulating its EU policy. It perhaps under-estimates what from my perception [. . .] is a greater degree of intensity in those relationships and I think it under-estimates the extent to which politicians of the devolved administrations not only have a right to be consulted but an expectation to be consulted. Although the JMC Europe has so far met only three times, my sense from the last two meetings in which I have participated is that it is a body whose significance is valued and which will probably meet more frequently in the future.28 He later admitted, however, that to-date there had not been issues before the JMC that required resolution.29 So, the underlying impression is of a sound working relationship between the various tiers of government with all sides intent on ensuring a high degree of collaboration. Territorial needs would be taken into account but at the end of the day ministers and/or their officials needed to arrive at a common UK position. Thus it would appear that inter-governmental relations could hardly be bettered. However, a key issue was whether the ‘new’ arrangements would engender any more influence for the territories over the UK’s formulation of EU policy, than had
78 1999: business as usual? been the case prior to 1999. According to Bulmer et al. this had not been the primary intention. It was not [emphasis in original] intended that the territorial input to UK European policy either should be enhanced or given greater political clout as a consequence of devolution. Instead, the objective was to reconcile current good practices of UK policy-making with the transfer of competencies and political ‘authority’ that attended devolution. (Bulmer et al. 2002: 66) Nevertheless, the devolved administrations would be one step removed from ‘core processes’ (e.g. representation on UK Cabinet committees on the EU)30 but at the same time they needed to ‘retain an involvement in European policy pathways’ in the UK (ibid.: 66–67). From a civil service perspective, the arrangements concerning territorial–UK–EU relations had worked well hitherto.31 As far as bureaucratic procedures were concerned, little substantive change was necessary, other than ‘codifying’ them and establishing various inter-governmental mechanisms such as the concordats and the JMC to counter-balance the devolved administrations’ semi-detachment from key policy-making fora within UK government. But somewhat paradoxically, in the aftermath of devolution, Scotland could be worse off not better. In terms of power relations, the new arrangements could exacerbate Scotland’s political dependency. For example, were different parties to be in office in London and Edinburgh would it be of much consequence concerning EU relations? Here Bulmer et al.’s position is of particular salience. Firstly, they acknowledged that ‘the UK’s political authority over the EU remained intact’ and that the devolved administrations would be concerned primarily with ‘policy’ or matters relevant to their ‘territorial expertise’. Second, they observed that the onus lay with the devolved administrations to respect the ‘rules of the game’: If the devolved administrations seek to ensure that ‘legitimate’ territorial interests are reflected in UK policy, then they have to abide by the agreed rules of inter-administration policy co-operation and co-ordination, including being ‘bound’ to adhere to the agreed negotiating line. Should they breach these rules – for example, to exploit opportunistically a short-term domestic political advantage – they might find themselves being excluded from the policy process as consequence. (Bulmer et al. 2002: 65) However, there was also the caveat that it was much too early to arrive at a definitive judgement. This was primarily because the political complexions of the various tiers of government ensured that there was ‘a broadly harmonious UK-wide political environment’ (ibid.: 69). It therefore comes as little surprise that goodwill and informality provide much of the latticework in support of the current arrangements. This is not necessarily for the best. A House of Lord’s report on inter-institutional relations observed:
1999: business as usual? 79 A large amount of contact takes place between the four administrations, frequently and at variety of levels. Many devolved administration Ministers have a high level of contact with their counterparts at Whitehall. Officials, whether senior or junior, also have a high level of contact with their counterparts. These contacts are highly informal. They often take place by telephone or e-mail. Many of the meetings in person are quick words when people meet socially or for other purposes. Consequently it is impossible to keep records of them. Formal, minuted meetings – especially of representatives of all four governments – are a rarity. The justification for this informality is the fundamental goodwill of each administration toward the others. The bulk of the informal contacts tend to be bilateral, between the UK Government and one devolved administration. This appears to be where the bulk of working level matters are dealt with – they are not referred to the JMC or discussed in other settings with the other devolved administrations.32 The committee then made the following points: We have noted the heavy reliance on goodwill in inter-governmental relations. Many of our witnesses emphasised the need for goodwill to make relations work, and attributed their smoothness to date to the existence of such goodwill. The view that came across was that such goodwill permitted the high level of informality that presently exists, and meant that the need to have more formal procedures, or use those that already exist, was reduced.33 And: We would certainly not seek to recommend the absence of goodwill as an element of inter-governmental relations [. . .] We are also concerned that goodwill appears to have been elevated into a principle of inter-governmental relations: it is used to explain the avoidance of disputes and to justify maintaining the present informality of the system. Some also argue that it works against the pluralist concept of devolution in that informality helps perpetuate previous practices.34 It therefore recommended ‘the use of formal mechanisms’: We recommend that further use should be made of the formal mechanisms for inter-governmental relations, even if they seem to many of those presently involved to be excessive. Formal mechanisms, such as the Joint Ministerial Committee (JMC), are not intended to serve as a substitute for good relations in other respects, or for good and frequent informal contacts, but rather to serve as a framework for such relations and to act as a fall-back in case informal personal relations cease to be sufficient. Such mechanisms are likely to become increasingly important when governments of different political persuasions have to deal with each other.35
80 1999: business as usual? The significance of this for Scotland is potentially far-reaching. Firstly, the current inter-governmental arrangement is little more than ‘ad hoc’36 – it is debatable whether it could work successfully if a territorial administration’s position deviated ‘materially’ from that of the UK government in relation to a ‘UK-level policy’ (Trench 2003: 164–165). Second, a high degree of informal contact could result in confusion and misunderstandings between Scottish and UK administrations over a particular policy, especially if there was an absence of minuted material which could provide a record of what had been agreed. Thirdly, a reliance on informal contacts could mean that inadvertently there might be times when UK ministers and their officials failed to consult their colleagues in Scotland adequately about a particular development. Likewise it could enable some departments to choose not to consult the devolved administrations at all, if they so wished, especially where reserved matters were concerned. For example, Bulmer et al. observed: Some Whitehall departments appear to regard the ‘reserved’ status of UK European policy as meaning that they have no requirement to involve the devolved administrations in the policy process – merely to inform them of decisions reached and expect their support for these decisions. Clearly this is not how the devolved administrations see matters.37 Lastly, there is the issue of transparency. The JMC and the concordats are all bound by the need for confidentiality but the absence of transparency risks fermenting discontent in Scotland whenever stories surface in the media that the Scottish Executive has been outflanked by, or hard done by, its counterpart in London. This was a source of tension that devolution was supposed to ameliorate.
The restoration of a dual polity? As has been suggested in previous chapters, there were a number of occasions prior to 1999 when Scottish influence over EU matters was questionable. This was so in relation to BSE, the duty on whisky, the oil sector and the financial sector. Then there was the issue of additionality concerning the structural Funds, which was never resolved satisfactorily even by the early 1990s – and which Holyrood’s European and Finance committees continue to have doubts about. Those Scottish records that are available to public scrutiny reveal that there were strongly held concerns within the Scottish Office about both additionality and Scottish departments being little more than ‘an appendage’ of ministries in London, where EU relations were concerned. As will be discussed in the chapter on fisheries there were times when the outcome was a success but on other occasions the reverse applied, especially during the 1990s. This was not necessarily because Scottish civil servants were reluctant to fight their corner in Whitehall. They did when they could. It is not to say, either, that they lacked channels of influence in Whitehall, though a number of interest groups maintained that at times officials could be outranked, and so were potentially vulnerable. It is purely and simply that not all policy issues could be resolved satisfactorily by bureaucratic means (i.e. consultation,
1999: business as usual? 81 correspondence or inter-departmental committees), rather, in the last resort the most sensitive decisions were dealt with by ministers. Thus in the final analysis, when contentious issues were at stake, and when Scottish officials had failed to influence the outcome through bureaucratic channels, were Scottish ministers willing or able to secure a satisfactory accommodation with their colleagues in UK departments? Sometimes they could and sometimes not. And the same holds true vis-à-vis the Scottish Executive and the EU at the time of writing, despite the potential for the JMC to act as a conflict resolver, because for the most part political authority38 resides not in Edinburgh but still in London, and increasingly in Brussels. Ultimately, therefore, the key variable is not so much inter-governmental processes (i.e. consultation, the aggregation of interests and the formulation of a UK ‘view’) which are rightly or wrongly perceived to be excellent, but, the structures of power.39 Under the existing constitutional arrangement, the power structures retain their potential to militate against those processes. As Bourne surmised, ‘of all the sources of regional power, legal-constitutional powers are the most fundamental’ (Bourne 2003). Whilst the EU served to highlight Scotland’s constitutional weakness prior to devolution (Mitchell 1997), the same holds true today. Thus, on the one hand, day in and day out, officials and their ministers work together to ensure that Scotland can influence the outcome where necessary. But in contrast to those who advocate multi-level governance, in terms of power relations, and in spite of competence overlap in some instances, this remains overly hierarchical so far as the UK’s territories are concerned. Ultimately, Scotland is politically dependent on decisions taken in London and beyond that in Brussels – the UK government and the EU each in their own way possess greater political authority than the Scottish Executive. More particularly, London remains not only pivotal, but potentially, it is the weak link in the chain because so much rests on goodwill rather than constitutionally entrenched mechanisms. Post-devolution there are plethora of devices which are designed to ensure that Scotland is adequately consulted (where necessary at the highest levels of government), that Scottish views and concerns can be articulated and where there are conflicts of interest these can be resolved. But in the final analysis, albeit that they might engender ‘judicial expectations’, they do not have legal standing, and, they involve a degree of ‘gamesmanship’ in the sense that if it is to retain sufficient influence at the centre, the Scottish Executive must respect the informal ground rules. Thus, in sum, there are grounds for believing that not only is Scotland no better off than before, potentially its influence over international matters may be set to decline further, especially if different parties are in office and their relationship is conflictual. Yet that could be rather too negative a prospect. Scotland now possesses its own parliament; where necessary it can act as a rallying point for Scottish grievance. Whilst the prospect of having divergent political parties in government in London and in Edinburgh is the ‘joker in the pack’, the parliament in a corporate sense also needs to be taken into account. In part this is because regardless of which parties are in office at Holyrood, Scottish ministers will have to answer to MSPs for their actions. That includes foreign
82 1999: business as usual? affairs by virtue of the extent to which the latter impact directly not only on devolved matters but also, more generally, on Scotland’s welfare. Moreover, as Bulmer et al. rightly surmised, it would not be in the UK government’s interest to encourage ‘the devolved administrations to publicly claim that their involvement in UK policy-making was inadequate’, otherwise this would threaten to call into question the worth of the current constitutional arrangement.40 Indeed, as far as the Foreign Office was concerned, ‘the issue of devolution was a key objective for all departments across the board’. Sir John Kerr, then permanent Secretary, described devolution privately ‘as the most significant structural challenge facing his department’. In sum that led Brian Taylor, the well-respected BBC’s political editor for Scotland, to observe: The Foreign Office quite definitely wants to make devolution work, but not purely as an academic or administrative exercise. Its corporate concern, the concern of Her Majesty’s government more widely, is to protect the state, to show that the present, reformed set-up can provide more than Scottish independence would offer. To defend the Union if you like. (Taylor 2002: 278) It could also be argued that the years of Conservative rule between 1979 and 1997 were wholly anomalous. Mrs Thatcher’s governments were noted for their centralism, which encroached increasingly on Scottish autonomy (Midwinter et al. 1991, Brown et al. 1996). This was relatively novel, if the centralism of the 1960s is discounted (Bulpitt 1983). In addition both the Thatcher and Major governments were increasingly hostile to the EU, which at times called into question their capacity to influence the outcome on behalf of the UK, and by default Scotland. Furthermore, neither premier did much to enhance UK–Scottish relations. Though Major undertook his ‘taking stock’ exercise early in his premiership, it amounted to little more than tokenism, save for the concession in Scotland and the Union: a Partnership for Good, that if a majority in Scotland wished, the country could secede from the UK.41 Otherwise he was resolutely anti-devolutionist in his outlook and conduct, and he turned it into something of an election issue in 1997, despite widespread antipathy to this in Scotland. It could therefore be suggested that in conjunction, these events were exceptional and they are unlikely to be repeated in their entirety. If they were something of an historical anomaly, then it could also be argued by those who support the constitutional status quo, that pragmatic and informal arrangements worked well during the era of Bulpitt’s ‘Dual Polity’. In the ‘right hands’, therefore, they would continue to do so in the future. Consequently, as such, the New Pragmatism can also be viewed as yet another ‘bargain’42 between elites in the UK and Scotland, against the back-drop of popular aspirations for Scottish autonomy during the 1980s and 1990s. Whether this ‘new bargain’ is sufficiently robust to withstand forces external to the UK remains to be seen, however. In sum, it is far from certain as to whether devolution will markedly transform Scotland’s influence in relation to both the EU and international relations more
1999: business as usual? 83 generally. From a bureaucratic perspective, at first glance at least, it appears to be business as usual. Although various mechanisms have been established to ensure that the Executive is interconnected with London, they do not appear to have much if any legal standing and to some extent their efficacy is dependent on the UK government’s largesse. If a future Scottish administration were not to respect the ground rules concerning the concordats and JMC, then it would have to suffer the consequences – it could be excluded from the formulation of EU policy at the highest levels of government. Given the deficiencies which pre-dated the current constitutional arrangement, that is cause for concern. The flaws prior to 1999 related not to bureaucratic processes per se but to the lack of political authority in Edinburgh. As far as EU policy formulation is concerned, to no small degree ‘power’ continues to reside in London and the UK government continues to act as gatekeeper. In 1999 it therefore appeared as though Scotland was little better off with regard to international affairs than was the case before – something which rather stood in contrast to other territorial governments in the EU and beyond.
7
Territorial mobilisation in the EU and beyond
The role of regional democracy and of regional Parliaments and Governments is only wakening up. Our time has finally come. The debate will be about sharing sovereignty at a European level, and about what the use of national sovereignty at the beginning of the century will be about and what the contribution of real, bottomup democracy will be. (Hans de Belder, Secretary General of the Assembly of European Regions)1
As Hans de Belder observed, Scotland was by no means alone in having to come to terms with European integration or globalisation. Other territories, especially those with legislative powers, faced much the same dilemma – how best should they respond? In practice, the outcome varied from country to country. Some territories, such as Quebec, had historically enjoyed a degree of competence over international affairs, in part thanks to their constitutional status. Likewise, in Belgium or Germany, where there was a federal system of government, the regions and the communities eventually managed to secure greater influence over international matters. For other countries the situation was less clear cut. The Spanish autonomous communities enjoyed a degree of autonomy but this appears to have been rather less ‘constitutionally embedded’ compared to their counterparts in Germany and Belgium. As their attempts to secure a measure of influence over foreign affairs has not been without its problems, it could be supposed that potentially the constitutional arrangement in a particular country could matter a great deal. But that was not the whole picture as a successful outcome also rested on collaboration and goodwill between the two tiers of government (i.e. the state and sub-state tiers).
The Europeanisation of domestic policy The notion that European affairs and domestic matters were quite distinct has become less tenable, as more and more competence has been assigned to the EU. The net result has been the ‘Europeanisation of Domestic Policy’ (EDP). EDP is based on the twin premises that the EU can no longer be classified as foreign policy
Territorial mobilisation in the EU and beyond 85 in the traditional sense, and that by default, it is no longer sustainable for central governments to monopolise the handling of European matters. Some regions, especially those with relatively high levels of autonomy, have therefore demanded that they should be entitled to the same degree of influence over EU policy-making, as was the case when competence for that policy originally resided with the territorial and/or the central government. But rather than attempt purely to secure greater control over the EU itself, EDP was essentially ‘introspective’ because potentially central government could be pivotal to the outcome. From this perspective, the governments of the Member States were the most influential actors with regard to EU policy-making. Hence, if the regions wished to offset the potential for political dependency as a result of European integration, this could best be done if they exercised greater control over how their central government formulated its position in relation to the EU and its policies.2 The German Länder For the most part, the arrangements, which evolved between 1957 and 1987, were ad hoc and pragmatic. Ultimately, however, they also proved to be wholly inadequate from the Länder’s perspective. When the latter called for the right of consultation with regard to the formulation of Germany’s position on EU policy, this was at first resisted by the Federal Government of Germany (FRG) on constitutional grounds. Although representatives from the Länder were allowed to join the government’s delegations to the EU,3 the Bundesrat (the chamber comprising delegates from the Länder) was not automatically entitled to representation in the Council.4 However, there was an informal understanding that the FRG should inform both the Bundestag and the Bundesrat if EU legislation had to be ‘transposed into German law, and if such legislation had direct effect at the domestic level, then the Bundesrat had to be notified before any decision had been taken in the Council’. It was also agreed that the Länder should have their own representative in Brussels (Börzel 2002: 61). Although these arrangements were not insignificant, not least because they conceded that the Länder had certain entitlements regarding the FRG’s handling of European matters, they were not legally binding and as such they fell outside Germany’s Basic Law. In 1975 a working group was established to consider how co-operation between the Länder and the FRG could be improved upon. Four years later the FRG agreed to up-grade its provision of information to the Länder and from time to time representatives from the Länder did vote in the Council.5 The conundrum remained, however – whether the Länder should attempt to increase their influence directly over the EU and its institutions or whether they should also focus on intergovernmental mechanisms within FRG. By the mid-1980s, matters came to a head when it became increasingly apparent that the ad hoc pragmatic arrangements were insufficient. For instance, by March 1986, there had not been a single occasion when the Länder had managed to arrive at a common position, as had been hoped under the 1979 procedure.6 All in all the existing arrangements were held to be ‘toothless and ineffective’ (Jeffery 1997b: 59).
86 Territorial mobilisation in the EU and beyond The SEA represented something of a watershed in 1987 because it marked the moment when the Länder, or more specifically the Bundesrat, looked set to secure formal control over European affairs (Burgess and Gress 1991). By now it was apparent that the EU could no longer be regarded as falling simply within the ambit of foreign policy. It was from henceforth viewed as being akin to domestic policy.7 More particularly, the early 1980s was an era when the co-operative federalism, which hitherto had been the hallmark of inter-governmental relations was supplanted by a more competitive relationship (Gerstenlauer 1995: 198). Consequently the Länder showed less hesitation in standing up to the FRG, if necessary bringing matters to the constitutional court. But with European integration set to gather pace once again, it was clear that decisions which previously fell within the Länder’s competencies, would now be assigned to the EU. The Minister Presidents therefore argued at their annual conference in 1987 that the EU should have a similar federal structure to that of the FRG and that decision-making should be reflective of the principle of subsidiarity.8 For its part, the FRG was accused of failing to consult the Länder sufficiently over EU matters. Although the Länder did not possess any formal entitlements when the FRG signed up to the SEA, the FRG did in practice seek their approval. They therefore treated this potential veto as ‘a window of opportunity which would enable them to secure formal and participatory rights in European policy making’ (Börzel 2002: 65). Consequently, they called for the entitlement of ‘extended rights of participation’ to be incorporated in the ratification Act.9 The ensuing negotiations lasted a year but eventually the Länder got what they wanted. Their rights over EU policy were legally enshrined, thereby supplanting the pragmatic arrangement dating from 1979, which by then was demonstrably ineffective.10 The Länder subsequently put this to good effect with regard to the inter-governmental conferences (IGC) which predated the TEU, during which time they were increasingly involved in shaping the regional agenda both within the FRG and within the EU itself (see section below on third-level mobilisation). As far as the Länder were concerned, the TEU had far-reaching implications. A Commission of Minister Presidents was established in 1990, which met on 37 occasions the following year.11 When the TEU was finally agreed between the Member States, some of the Länder’s demands had been realised. The establishment of the CoR ensured that the regions now had a formal role to play in EU policy-making. Article 146 of the Treaty enabled sub-state authorities to vote in the Council, where their constitutions so allowed. Although the latter was the product of pressure from the Belgians rather than the FRG, it was of considerable relevance to the Länder.12 Despite these gains, however, doubts persisted over the continuing ability of the EU to encroach on the Länder’s competencies.13 It therefore became apparent that the Basic Law had to be amended accordingly. Thus, from the Länder’s perspective, up-grading internal mechanisms within the FRG became the optimum means of exercising control over European matters and offsetting the detrimental effects of Europeanisation. Article 23, in particular, was something of a milestone for the Länder. Under this article the Bundesrat would be ‘involved’ both in relation to ‘matters concerning the European Union’
Territorial mobilisation in the EU and beyond 87 and ‘the decision-making process of the Federation’ in those areas which fell within the Länder’s remit. It also included the following provision: Where essentially the legislative powers of the Länder, the establishment of their authorities or their administrative procedures are affected, the opinion of the Bundesrat shall prevail in the decision-making process of the Federation. Article 79, which related to those occasions when the Basic Law needed to be amended, was also significant; it required a two-thirds majority in favour in both the Bundestag and the Bundesrat.14 This was no mean achievement as far as the Länder were concerned. From that point on, they enjoyed certain legal rights with regard to the formulation of the FRG’s position on EU policy, in those areas which fell within their exclusive competence. Collectively, they now enjoyed a veto (in relation to the German government) over further transfers of competence to the EU (a two-thirds majority being required in favour of such a transfer). Hitherto, they were supposed to have arrived at a common position through unanimity