World Christianity in Muslim Encounter: Essays in Memory of David A. Kerr, Volume 2 volume 2

World Christianity in Muslim Encounter

David A. Kerr (photo courtesy of Revd Per Håkansson)

World Christianity in Muslim Encounter Essays in Memory of David A. Kerr Volume 2

Edited by Stephen R. Goodwin

Continuum International Publishing Group The Tower Building 80 Maiden Lane, 11 York Road Suite 704, New York London SE1 7NX NY 10038 www.continuumbooks.com © Stephen R. Goodwin and Contributors 2009 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN-10: HB: 1-8470-6511-2 ISBN-13: HB: 978-1-8470-6511-7 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data World Christianity in Muslim encounter: essays in memory of David A. Kerr, volume 2 / edited by Stephen R. Goodwin. p. cm. ISBN 978-1-84706-511-7 1. Islam--Relations--Christianity. 2. Christianity and other religions--Islam. I. Kerr, David A. II. Goodwin, Stephen R. III. Title. BP172.W66 2009 261.2’7--dc22 2008026817

Typeset by Newgen Imaging Systems Pvt Ltd, Chennai, India Printed and bound in the UK by the MPG Books Group

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List of Contributors Part One: Textual and Thematic Issues 1. Christians and Muslims in the Qur’a¯n and Muslim Tradition Mahmoud M. Ayoub, Macdonald Center, Hartford Seminary, USA 2. Abrogation: Muslim and Christian Christopher Lamb, formerly Interfaith Relations Advisor to the Church of England 3. Forgiveness and Reconciliation Through the Lenses of the Bible and the Qur’a¯n Sigvard von Sicard, University of Birmingham, UK

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Part Two: Issues Relating to Christian-Muslim History, Dialogue and Pluralism 4. Dialogue and Religious Truth Claims in Christianity and Islam Christian W. Troll, Philosophisch-Theologische Hochschule St Georgen, Germany 5. Christian-Muslim Relations in Ethiopia: Lessons from the Past, Opportunities for the Future F. Peter Ford, Jr., Mekane Yesus Seminary, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

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6. Some Medieval Muslim Views of Constantinople Carole Hillenbrand, University of Edinburgh, UK

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7. The Abrahamic Faiths in their New Context David B. Burrell, University of Notre Dame, USA

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8. Recent Developments in Christian-Muslim Relations Hugh Goddard, University of Nottingham, UK

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9. Christians, Muslims and Religious Freedom: A Christian Perspective David Marshall, Freelance Lecturer, UK

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10. Islam Hostage to Itself? Kenneth Cragg, Bishop, Jerusalem Archdiocese; University of Oxford, UK

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11. Europe and the Arab World in the Twentieth Century: Behind the Myths of the ‘West’ and ‘Islam’ Jørgen S. Nielsen, University of Copenhagen, Denmark

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12. A Tale of Two Cities Revisited: Jerusalem, Medina and Justice in Today’s Urban Centres Anton Wessels, Free University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands

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13. Seeking to Overcome Islamophobia Through Education and Dialogue: Some Personal Experiences at the Selly Oak Colleges and at the WCC Related to the Early Work of Dr David Kerr John B. Taylor, International Association for Religious Freedom, Switzerland 14. Re-forming American Views of Muslims: A View from the Trenches Robert Hunt, Southern Methodist University, USA

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15. An Open Letter for Open Religions Jacques Waardenburg, Professor Emeritus, University of Lausanne, Switzerland

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16. Christian-Muslim Dialogue: Mirage or Destiny? Khurshid Ahmad, Institute of Policy Studies, Pakistan

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17. An Enduring Vision: The Study Centre at Selly Oak C. T. R. Hewer, St Ethelburga Fellow in Christian-Muslim Relations, UK

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Part Three: Christian-Muslim Encounter in Local and Contemporary Contexts 18. For the Peace of the City: Bradford – A Case Study in Developing Inter-Community and Inter-Religious Relations Philip Lewis, University of Bradford, UK 19. The Central Role of Religion on Europe’s Periphery: Christian-Muslim-Muslim Relations and State Viability in Bosnia-Herzegovina Stephen R. Goodwin, University Lecturer, Istanbul, Turkey

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20. Christians and Muslims in Denmark: Possibilities for Mutual Recognition Safet Bektovic´, University of Copenhagen, Denmark 21. Debates on Jesus and Muh.ammad in Europe, India and Pakistan Jan Slomp, National Advisor for Relations with Islam, Reformed Churches of the Netherlands 22. The Changing Face of Islamists in Sudan Edward Riak Kajivora, Bible Society of Sudan 23. Christian-Muslim Relations in Contemporary Nigeria: A Contextual Approach Akintunde E. Akinade, High Point University, USA

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Appendix: Publications by David A. Kerr

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Index

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List of Contributors

Senator Prof Khurshid Ahmad is Chairman, Institute of Policy Studies, Islamabad, Pakistan; Chairman, The Islamic Foundation, Leicester, UK and has served as Member Senate of Pakistan for three terms (1985–91; 1991–97 and 2003–present). He has authored or edited over sixty books and is the recipient of the Islamic Development Bank Award on Islamic Economics (1999) and King Faisal International Award (1990). Dr Akintunde E. Akinade from Nigeria is Professor of Religion and Philosophy at High Point University in High Point, NC. He is the co-editor of The Agitated Mind of God: The Theology of Kosuke Koyama. He is also a visiting Professor in Theology in Qatar as part of the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. Dr Mahmoud M. Ayoub has been Professor of Islamic Studies and Comparative Religion at Temple University. He took his BA in Philosophy from the American University of Beirut (1964), his MA in Religious Thought from the University of Pennsylvania (1966) and his PhD in the History of Religion at Harvard University (1975). Upon completion of his education, he has authored a number of books in English and Arabic in the area of Islam and inter-religious dialogue. The most notable are Redemptive Suffering in Islam and The Qur’an and its Interpreters, a multivolume work. He has published over fifty scholarly articles both as chapters in edited works as well as in well-known academic refereed journals. Among his recent works are Crisis of Muslim History: Religion and Politics in Early Islam (2003); Islam in Faith and History (2004); A Muslim Looks at Christianity: Essays on Dialogue (Faith Meets Faith Series, 2007). In Autumn 2008 he took up a new post at the D.B. Macdonald Center for the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, Hartford Seminary, where he will live as a scholar in residence. Dr Safet Bektovic´ is Bosnian born and has lived in Denmark since 1992. In 2000 he earned his PhD on Søren Kierkegaard and sufi-philosophy at the Faculty of Theology in Copenhagen. He is the author of Kulturmøder og religion (Cultural Encounters and Religion), Copenhagen, 2004. He lectures on Kierkegaard, Sufism, Islamic Theology and Social Ethics at the Faculty of Theology in Copenhagen. He currently is working as research-lecturer at the Centre for European Islamic Thought at the University of Copenhagen, working on Islamic Theology and Philosophy in the European context. He also worked with David

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Kerr on the project: New Ways – tackling discrimination in Malmö through dialogue among Christians, Muslims and voluntary organizations (2006). Dr David Burrell, C.S.C., Hesburgh Professor Emeritus in Philosophy and Theology at the University of Notre Dame, is currently serving the Congregation of Holy Cross in the District of East Africa, as Professor in Ethics and Development at Uganda Martyrs University. He has been working since 1982 in comparative issues in philosophical theology in Judaism, Christianity and Islam, as evidenced in Knowing the Unknowable God: Ibn-Sina, Maimonides, Aquinas (Notre Dame, 1986) and Freedom and Creation in Three Traditions (Notre Dame, 1993), Friendship and Ways to Truth (Notre Dame, 2000), and two translations of al-Ghazali: Al-Ghazali on the Ninety-Nine Beautiful Names of God (Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 1993) and Al-Ghazali on Faith in Divine Unity and Trust in Divine Providence [=Book 35 of his Ihya Ulum ad-Din] (Louisville: Fons Vitae, 2001). With Elena Malits he co-authored Original Peace (New York: Paulist, 1998) on the importance of free creation for Christians and Muslims, and a collected set of essays on Faith and Freedom (Blackwell, 2005). He is currently completing a translation of the portions on existence from Mulla Sadra’s [Sadr al-Din alShirazi] Asfar al-Arbain, and he has published a theological commentary on the book of Job: Deconstructing Theodicy (Brazos Press, 2008). A recurrent scholar at the Tantur Ecumenical Institute in Jerusalem, he is a corresponding member of the Dominican Institute for Oriental Studies in Cairo. Bishop Kenneth Cragg was born in 1913, and read history at Oxford, followed by ordination training at Bristol. He was ordained at the youngest possible age in 1936, and went to Lebanon in 1939 with the British Syria Mission. He returned to Oxford in 1947 for doctoral studies in Islam, and lectured subsequently in Hartford, Connecticut, and in a roving commission throughout the Middle East and the Islamic world based on St George’s College, Jerusalem. In 1956 he published his classic book The Call of the Minaret. Some years in St Augustine’s College, Canterbury were followed by consecration as Assistant Bishop in the Jerusalem Archbishopric, based in Cairo. He lectured at Sussex University and was a parish priest in the diocese of Wakefield before retiring officially in 1981 to continue writing his stream of books, the latest to date, Mosque Sermons, published in 2008. Revd Dr F. Peter Ford has been a missionary of the Reformed Church in America since 1982, working as a teacher and professor primarily in the Arab-Muslim world, Amman, Jordan; Muscat, Oman; Khartoum, Sudan. He is currently Coordinator for the Program in Christian-Muslim Relations, Mekane Yesus Seminary, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. He studied in the graduate program of the Religion Department at Temple University (Philadelphia) under Mahmoud Ayoub (1991–94) and received the PhD in 1998. He is the translator and editor of ‘Abqariyat al-Masih (The Genius of Christ) by ‘Abbas Mahmud al-’Aqqad

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(Binghamton, NY: Global Publications, 2001). His prior education includes a BS in Mechanical Engineering, SUNY at Buffalo, NY (1975); MTS in New Testament, Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary in South Hamilton, MA (1977); MDiv, Western Theological Seminary in Holland, MI (1982). Dr Hugh Goddard is Professor of Christian-Muslim Relations, based in the Department of Theology and Religious Studies, at the University of Nottingham. He was an undergraduate in Oriental Studies (Islamic History) at the University of Oxford, and then a PhD student at the University of Birmingham, under Professor David Kerr, researching ‘Christianity as portrayed by Egyptian Muslim authors – an evaluation in the light of earlier Muslim views’. He then taught for three years at the College of St Paul and St Mary in Cheltenham before moving to Nottingham in 1984. He is the author of Christians and Muslims: From Double Standards to Mutual Understanding (London: Curzon Press, 1995); Muslim Perceptions of Christianity (London: Grey Seal, 1996); and A History of Christian-Muslim Relations (Edinburgh University Press and New Amsterdam Books, Chicago, 2000). Dr Stephen R. Goodwin earned a Masters and PhD at New College, University of Edinburgh under the supervision of David Kerr. His interdisciplinary studies include Political Science, European History and Religious Studies. He holds the position of Lecturer in International Relations at a university in Istanbul, Turkey, with specialties in post-communist, Balkan and Turkish studies. His book, Fractured Land, Healing Nations (Peter Lang, 2006) focuses on nationbuilding and peace-building in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and he is a contributor to the book series of the European Academy of Sciences and Arts entitled, Religion and European Integration: Religion as a Factor of Stability and Development in South Eastern Europe (Edition Weimar, 2007). Dr Chris Hewer studied at the Selly Oak Centre founded by David Kerr in 1986 after study and research in Christian theology and a career as a school teacher. He read for the degrees of MA (Islamic Studies), MPhil (Islamic Education) and PhD (Islamic Theology). Based at the Centre, he coordinated the development of a teacher training programme (BEd, Primary, RE) with a major in Islamic Studies and then founded and ran the Muslims in Britain Documentation Project. From 1999 to 2005 he was Adviser on Interfaith Relations to the Bishop of Birmingham and now works in London in adult popular education as the St Ethelburga Fellow in Christian-Muslim Relations. Dr Carole Hillenbrand is currently Head of the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Edinburgh. Her first degrees were in Modern and Medieval Languages, and in Oriental Studies, Arabic and Turkish. She earned her PhD from the University of Edinburgh in 1979, and began as a Lecturer in Arabic at Edinburgh in that same year, becoming a Reader in Arabic in 1990. From 2000 until the present she has been Professor

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of Islamic History. Her research interests include Islamic thought, Islamic history and the Crusades. In 2005 she became the first non-Muslim to be awarded The King Faisal International Prize in Islamic Studies, the highest scholarly award in the Arab world. Among her recent publications may be counted The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives (Edinburgh, 1999), which is now being translated into Arabic, Russian and Malay, and Turkish Myth and Muslim Symbol: The Battle of Manzikert (Edinburgh, 2007). Dr Robert Hunt was born in Dallas, Texas, in 1955. After attending school in Austin and Richardson, he majored in History at the University of Texas in Austin. After completing a Master of Theology at Perkins School of Theology (SMU) he served as associate pastor of the Bethany United Methodist Church in Austin, Texas. In 1985 he and his wife Lilian moved to Kuala Lumpur, where they taught at the Seminary Theology Malaysia. He received a PhD from the University of Malaya in 1993, focusing on Christian attitudes towards and relations with Muslims in Southeast Asia. From 1993 to 1997 he taught at the Trinity Theological College. From 1997 to 2004 he was pastor of the English Speaking United Methodist Church of Vienna, and an adjunct professor in comparative religions and international relations at Webster University in Vienna. Dr Hunt is presently Director of Global Theological Education at the Perkins School of Theology, Southern Methodist University, where he teaches courses in World Religions, Islam, Interreligious Dialogue and Mission Studies. Dr Hunt is author of several books, including Islam in Southeast Asia, and Muslim Faith and Values: What Every Christian Should Know. Dr Edward Riak Kajivora is a Bible Translation Consultant for the Bible Society of Sudan based in Khartoum. He was a former Lecturer at Bishop Gwynne Theological College, Juba, Sudan and a visiting lecturer at St Paul’s United Theological College, Limuru, Kenya. He holds a PhD in Islamic Studies from Birmingham University, UK. He is fluent in both English and Arabic languages. Dr Christopher Lamb was born in Bristol in 1939, read history and theology at Oxford, and was ordained in the Church of England in 1963. After missionary service in Pakistan with the Church Mission Society he was involved in missionary training at the Selly Oak Colleges where he completed a PhD under the supervision of David Kerr on the work of Bishop Kenneth Cragg. He then became a consultant for interfaith relations to CMS and BCMS (now Crosslinks), followed by a similar post in the diocese of Coventry. From 1992 to 1999 he was the interfaith officer for the Board of Mission of the General Synod and for the then Council of Churches for Britain and Ireland. He retired in 2006 after further years as a parish priest in south Warwickshire. Dr Philip Lewis is the Interfaith Adviser to the Bishop of Bradford and lecturer in the Peace Studies Department at Bradford University on ‘Islam in the West’

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and ‘Religions and Conflict’. His most recent book is entitled Young, British and Muslim (Continuum, 2007). Revd Dr David Marshall studied Theology at Oxford University and Islamic Studies at the Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, Selly Oak Colleges, Birmingham. He is ordained in the Church of England and has worked as a parish priest, a college chaplain and as a teacher in a number of theological colleges. He has also worked on the staff of the Archbishop of Canterbury, where he was responsible for a number of initiatives in ChristianMuslim relations. He is currently working as a freelance lecturer, mainly in the London area. His publications include, God, Muh.ammad and the Unbelievers: A Qur’a¯ nic Study (Surrey: Curzon Press, 1999) and Learning from how Muslims see Christianity (Cambridge: Grove Books, 2006). Dr Jørgen S. Nielsen is Professor of Islamic Studies at the University of Copenhagen. Prior to this he was Professor of Islamic Studies, University of Birmingham. He earned his BA and MA at the University of London, and his PhD at the American University, Beirut. His research interests include Islamic history, Muslims in Europe and Religious pluralism in Europe and the Middle East. Among his recent publications are Summary Report on Islamophobia in the EU after 11 September 2001, jointly with C. Allen (Vienna : EUMC, 2002); Muslim Networks and Transnational Communities in and Across Europe, ed. jointly with S. Allievi (Leiden: Brill, 2003); Muslims in the Enlarged Europe, ed. jointly with B. Maréchal, S. Allievi and F. Dassetto (Leiden: Brill, 2003); Muslims in Western Europe (3rd ed., Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004). Dr Sigvard von Sicard is currently an Honorary Senior Research Fellow in the Graduate Institute for Theology and Religion at the University of Birmingham, England. His main area of research is in the field of Islam and Christian-Muslim relations in Africa. He was Lecturer in Missiology and Islamic Studies at the Selly Oak Colleges and the University of Birmingham when David Kerr was appointed and took over the teaching of Islam. He worked closely with David in the preparation for the 1975 conference of Christians and Muslims, which established the Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations. He subsequently joined the CSIC staff on a full-time basis. His most recent publications are Islam in Mozambique (JIMMA 2008); ‘Ziegenbalg and the Muslims’, in G. Oommen and H. R. Iversen (eds). It began in Copenhagen. Junctions on 300 years of Indian-Danish Relations in Christian Mission (Delhi: ISPCK 2005); ‘C. F. Schwartz and the Muslims’ in Halle and the Beginning of Protestant Christianity in India (1706–1845) (Halle: Francke Foundation 2006). Revd Dr Jan Slomp completed theological and Islamic studies at the Free University in Amsterdam and the Graduate School of Ecumenical Studies, Geneva, and Urdu at the University of Amsterdam. He was ordained in the Reformed Church Zijldijk in 1962, and became a district missionary associate

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with the Reformed Presbyterian Mission, Sahiwal Pakistan, 1964–68. He was part of the staff of the Christian Study Centre Rawalpindi 1969–97, and the Islam Desk Reformed Churches in the Netherlands 1977–94; Following this post he was the secretary, moderator and adviser of the Islam in Europe Committee of the Conference of European Churches and the R.C. Consilium Conferentiarum Episcopalium Europae 1978–94. Since 1996 he has been on the Advisory Editorial Board of the Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs. Among his publications until 1993 are, G. M. Speelman, J. van Lin and D. C. Mulder (eds), Muslims and Christians in Europe. Breaking New Ground. Essays in honour of Jan Slomp. He has also been recognized in his Christian-Muslim work with the Internationaler Mohammad Nafi Tschelebi Medienpreis 2001 Zentral Institüt Islam Archiv, Deutschland. Dr John Taylor studied and taught Islamics at Cambridge University (England), University of the Punjab (Pakistan), McGill University (Canada), University of Birmingham (England) and Harvard University (USA). After ten years with the WCC (World Council of Churches) Dialogue programme, ten years as Secretary General of the WCRP (World Conference on Religion and Peace/ International) and six years with the CEC (Conference of European Churches), he serves, since 2001, as UN (Geneva) representative of IARF (International Association for Religious Freedom). He has edited several works on interreligious dialogue for WCC and WCRP. Dr Christian W. Troll was born in Germany in 1937 and is at present Hon. Professor for the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations at the Philosophisch-Theologische Hochschule St Georgen, Theologische Fakultät SJ, Frankfurt/M. He studied Philosophy and Theology at the Universities of Bonn and Tübingen (1957–61), Arabic and Islam at the Université St. Joseph in Beirut (1961–63) and, between 1966 and 1975, Urdu and Persian Literature (BA Hon.) and Islam in South Asia (PhD) at SOAS, London University. From 1976 until 1988 Professor of Islamic Studies in the Vidyajyoti Institute of Religious Studies in Delhi. From 1988 until 1993 he was Senior Lecturer at the Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations in Birmingham. From 1993 until 1999 he was Professor of Islamic Institutions at the Pontifical Oriental Institute in Rome and regular Guest Professor at the Faculty of Theology at Ankara University. From 1990 to 2005 he has been a member of the Commission for Religious Relations with Muslims of the Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue (Vatican City) and since 1999 he is a member of the Subcommission for Interreligious Dialogue of the German Bishops’ Conference. Among his recent books may be mentioned Muslime fragen, Christen antworten (Regensburg, 2003) and Als Christ dem Islam begegnen (Würzburg, 2004). He has edited four books in the series Islam in India: Studies and Commentaries (Delhi 1982–89). In 1998, together with John J. Donohue he edited the volume Faith, Power and Violence. Muslims and Christians in Plural Society, Past and Present (Rome, 1998), Unterscheiden um zu klären (Freiburg, 2008).

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Dr Jacques Waardenburg first studied law and theology at the University of Amsterdam 1948–54, and undertook his doctoral studies in Paris, Amsterdam and Cairo, finishing the thesis at the University of Amsterdam in 1961 with the thesis L’islam dans le miroir de l’Occident, a study on scholarly image formation of Islam. He completed post-doctoral research at McGill University, Montreal, and fieldwork research on universities in Arabic countries (1963–64). He has held teaching posts at University of California (UCLA), (Arabic and Islamic history); University of Utrecht, 1968–87 (Islam and Phenomenology); University of Lausanne (Science of Religion); He holds honorary doctorates from the University of Helsinki (1991) and the Université de Montréal (2006). In retirement he has continued work in Muslim-Christian relations, participating in workshops with Muslim colleagues on Muslim-Christian perceptions and dialogue. He has also worked at University of Toronto, Harvard University and Wissenschaftskolleg in Berlin. Among his recent publications are Islam et sciences des religions 1998 (lectures at Collège de France), Islam et Occident face à face (1998), Islam: Historical, Social, and Political Perspectives (2002), Muslims and Others: Relations in Context (2003), Muslims as Actors: Islamic Meanings and Muslim Interpretations in the Perspective of the Study of Religions (2007). Dr Anton Wessels did his studies in Theology and Comparative Religion at The Free University Amsterdam; Rijks Universiteit Utrecht and Leiden (Netherlands) and Cairo University (Egypt). His doctoral thesis (PhD) was on the image of the prophet Muh.ammad in modern Arabic Literature. He was Associate Professor of Islamic Studies at the Near East School of Theology in Beirut, Lebanon (1971–78) in Islamic Studies, and Professor Emeritus at the Free University Amsterdam from 1978 until 2002. His field is History of Religion with a specialization in Islam. He is an author of many books and articles in Dutch, English, Italian and Indonesian languages. Among his English publications are A Modern Arabic Biography of the Prophet Muh.ammad (E.J. Brill, 1972); Images of Jesus: How Jesus is Perceived and Portrayed in Non-European Cultures (SCM Press, 1990); Understanding the Qur’an (SCM Press, 2000); Europe: Was it Ever Really Christian? (SCM Press, 1994); Islam in Stories (Peeters, 2002); Muslims and the West. Can They Be Integrated? (Peeters, 2005).

Part One

Textual and Thematic Issues

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Chapter 1

Christians and Muslims in the Qur’¯a n and Muslim Tradition Mahmoud M. Ayoub

This chapter first appeared in Arabic in al-Naza} r¯at al-mutab¯adalah bayn al-mas¯ıhi} yy¯ın wa-al-Muslim¯ın fı¯ al-m¯ad¯ı} wa-al-ha¯} di} r (Commonly Shared Perspectives Between Christians and Muslims in the Past and the Present).1 It is based on reflections which I offered during this summer study circle on the Qur’anic and Prophetic h{adı¯th principles behind the concept of dhimmah as a divine covenant between a growing Muslim world power and its Christian and Jewish subjects. In the field of interfaith dialogue there are three kinds of scholars: scholars of the book, scholars of the heart and scholars who try to balance the two approaches. During the many years of friendship and collaboration with my esteemed comrade David Kerr we learned, together, to combine our quest for the spiritual fruits of Christian-Muslim dialogue and academic integrity in studying the sad history of Muslim-Christian relations. The years when David and I shared this quest with our Christian and Muslim sisters and brothers in Europe and North America were the best and most productive years of my life. It is in the spirit of our fraternal relation in God (al-ta’¯akhıˉ fıˉ-ll¯ah) and in humble recognition of all of David’s spiritual gifts to me that I offer these reflections for a book honouring him on one of the thorniest aspects of Muslim-Christian relations. This chapter does not seek to catalogue the applications or misapplications of the juridical rulings governing the treatment of ahl al-dhimmah in Muslim domains. Rather, my aim is to reflect on the Qur’anic principles that lie behind these rulings and the extent to which Muslim society has honoured these principles. I do this fully aware of the fact that while numerous and useful studies of the status of the people of dhimmah have been carried out by Muslims and nonMuslims, few scholars have taken the trouble to reflect on the theological and social implications of these principles. I offer the following reflections as a token of appreciation of an enduring friendship, and as a modest contribution to the discussion of the true meaning of dhimmah as a divine covenant between the Muslim ummah and the People of the Book in its midst. Although the classical rulings governing the status of Christians and other peoples of the Book as

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ahl al-dhimmah are not applied in the modern Muslim nation-states, a study of the Qur’anic ideas governing Muslim relations with Christians may help clear up many areas of misunderstanding. The period between that of Alexander the Great and Muh.ammad may be regarded as one of the most fertile epochs of the history of human civilization, or at least the history of the Middle East and the Mediterranean basin, for during this period different peoples belonging to diverse cultures, from Persia to Egypt, and from Syria, Iraq and Palestine, as well as all the nations of the Mediterranean, were united under the banner of Hellenistic power, which represented a truly universal civilization. Hellenistic civilization did not exclude or abolish other cultures; rather it absorbed them. It consequently became a strong link which bound together these different cultures. This intellectually and spiritually open and creative environment made possible the rise of two world religions, Christianity and Islam, with their two enduring universal civilizations. Islam arose and grew within this Hellenistic-Christian universalistic milieu, wherein the two languages of Greek and Aramaic were dominant. Islam was therefore nourished by the rich heritage of ancient Greek philosophy, Eastern Christian spirituality, as well as the Biblical religious morality of Judaism. Thus Islam evolved into one of the most universalistic religious civilizations of the world. The fact that Islam came after the great religious traditions of the Middle East – Judaism, Christianity and Zoroastrianism, which appeared during the third century CE in the guise of Manichaeism – no doubt contributed to its religiously pluralistic theology. Beginning with the Qur’¯an, Islam dealt with these religions and their followers in the context of this universalistic worldview. It therefore based its relations with these faith-communities on the assumption that they were peoples of revealed religions. A careful look at the Qur’¯an would therefore reveal that its worldview is one of religious pluralism, which acknowledges the right of the other religious communities to coexist peacefully with the Muslims. Furthermore, the Qur’¯an regards racial, cultural and religious pluralism to be the result of divine wisdom and one of God’s signs, second in importance to ‘the creation of the heavens and the earth’ (S. 30:22). How then did the Qur’¯an deal with People of the Book, who were in the first instance the Jews, Christians and Sabians? The Qur’¯an laid down a general framework for the validity of any religion; it is faith in God and the last day and righteous deeds (see S. 2:62 and 5:69). The first to acknowledge the truth of Islam and the prophethood of Muh}ammad as the Messenger of God, as we see in the Prophet’s biographies and even in the Qur’¯an itself, were some Christians and Jews. It is not improbable that a monk known as Bah{¯ırah, who lived in the Syrian town of Bus}ra¯ did meet the Prophet, while yet a youth and saw in him the signs of prophethood. He is reported to have exclaimed to the Prophet’s uncle Abu ¯ T}¯alib, ‘A great future lies before this nephew of yours, so take him home quickly’.2 According

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to other traditions, the Prophet Muh}ammad met another monk named Nas}t¯u } ra who likewise observed in Muh}ammad’s physical and moral characteristics the signs of prophethood. Furthermore, when Muh}ammad was preparing to answer God’s call to him to shoulder the burden of apostleship, with the command to recite: Recite in the name of your Lord who created; Created humankind from a blood clot. Recite, for your Lord is most magnanimous, Who taught by the pen; Taught man what he did not know. (S. 96:1–5) Muh}ammad’s wife Khadı¯jah took him to Waraqah b. Nawfal, her Christian cousin, to ascertain the truth of his claim to prophethood. Waraqah was a Christian priest or pastor (qiss) who lived in Makkah, dedicating himself to the study of the Gospel. When Waraqah heard Muh{ammad’s divine revelations, he joyfully exclaimed: Holy! Holy! [is God], verily by him in whose hand is Waraqa’s soul, . . . there hath come unto him the greatest Namus who came to Moses afore-time, . . . he is the Prophet of these people . . . ’ ‘Would that I were a young man now, and would that I could be alive when your people drive you out! . . . If I live to see that day, I shall come firmly to your aid.3 We thus see that Waraqah encouraged Muh}ammad, as he declared that what he received was revealed to him by God. But soon after, Waraqah died. We can conclude from all this that Muslim-Christian relations since the rise of Islam have been positive ones. This is also affirmed in many Qur’anic verses, as we shall presently see. The Qur’¯an views Christians as ‘the nearest in amity to those who have faith’, that is the Muslims, ‘for there are among them monks and learned men (qissı¯ssı¯n) and they are not arrogant’ (S. 5:82). The Qur’¯an continues, ‘When they hear that which was sent down to the Messenger, you see their eyes overflow with tears, because of the truth they recognize’ (S. 5:83). Qur’¯an commentators and h}adı¯th traditionists have differed concerning the meaning of the term al-h}aqq (the truth) mentioned in this verse. According to some, it refers to the truth revealed to the ancient prophets of the Christians, others referred it to the truth that was proclaimed by Christ, still others said that it is the truth that was revealed to Muh{ammad.4 The same verse reports that the Christians covetously desire that God bring them into Paradise and pray that He inscribe them among the [righteous] witnesses. Furthermore, the Qur’¯an declares that ‘There are among the people of the Book an upright community (ummah), reciting God’s revelations through the watches of the night as they bow down’ (S. 3:113). I believe that the

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Christians so affectionately described in these verses were the desert monks who spread Christianity in the Arabian Peninsula before and during the formative period of Islam. They also helped the early Muslims, and the Sufis in particular, to learn their ways of devotion, asceticism and other spiritual exercises, which they had already practised for centuries before the coming of Islam. The Qur’¯an acknowledges the privilege of the people of the Book, Jews and Christians, in being the first to arrive at the knowledge of God and His will for humankind. It cautions the Muslims that if they were in doubt concerning what God had revealed to His Messenger to inquire of those who read the scriptures before them. It asserts, ‘Inquire of the people of remembrance (ahl al-dhikr, that is, the people of previous scriptures) if you do not know’ (S. 16:43). The Qur’¯an likewise calls on the people of the Book to come to a just word common between them and the Muslims, and that is to worship God alone: ‘Say, ‘O people of the Book, come to a just word, common between us and you that we worship no one except God: that we associate nothing with Him, and that we do not take one another as lords instead of God . . .’ (S. 3:64). The Qur’¯an further enjoins the Muslims to call others to God with wisdom, fair exhortation and the best means of debate. I have no doubt that this verse which commands the Prophet and all the Muslims individually, saying, ‘Call to the way of your Lord with wisdom and good exhortation, and dispute with them in the best means of disputation’ (S. 16:125), refers primarily to the Jews and Christians. This ‘best means of disputation’ or dialogue presupposes faith in the One God and in his revealed books and messengers. God commands the Muslims, ‘Do not dispute with the people of the Book except in the fairest manner, save those of them who commit acts of wrongdoing . . .’ (S. 29:46). The same verse further enjoins them to say, ‘we accept faith in that which was sent down for us and that which was sent down for you. Our God and your God is One, and to Him we are submitters’. Those who do wrong among the people of the Book are those who, in one way or another, associate other beings or things with God. For, the Qur’¯an describes associationism (shirk) as ‘great wrongdoing’ (S. 31:13). It is also possible to interpret wrongdoing here to mean those who wrong others. In fact, both interpretations are valid as they do not contradict or negate one another. Associationism or shirk does not only mean idol worship, but it is also to show loyalty and obedience to other humans as though they were God. However, this term is used in the Qur’¯an primarily to refer to Arabian associators of the Prophet’s time. It is important to observe here that the Qur’¯an does not call Jews and Christians associators (mushrikuˉn). Associationism in the sense of wrongdoing manifests itself in that human proclivity to set up equals to God, as the Qur’¯an asserts: ‘Yet there are those among men who take idols as equal to God, loving them with the love due to God alone . . .’ (S. 2:165). Wrongdoing is therefore turning away from God. Since, however, human beings are by nature (fit}rah) created with an innate

Christians and Muslims in the Qur’¯ an and Muslim Tradition

7

quest to know God, wilful turning away from God eventually would lead such people to turn to other gods instead of, or along with God. The Qur’¯an depicts such people as those who take their own capricious desires as their god (S. 25:43). In spite of the many positive aspects of Muslim-Christian relations, there is nevertheless an aspect of ambivalence in the Qur’¯an regarding the treatment of Christians. Thus we see the Qur’¯an praising the people of the Book, and particularly the Christians, but at the same time criticizing some of their theological doctrines and beliefs. This Qur’anic ambivalence arises from two fundamental principles. The first is, the Qur’¯an asserts that faith in God must necessarily be based on the principle of pure divine oneness, or tawh}¯ıd, without any theological ideas or doctrines that may violate this cardinal principle. Yet like any sacred scriptures, the Qur’¯an must deal with God’s self-disclosure through revelation. It must therefore speak about God and His essence and attributes. Here, I believe that Islamic theology, or kal¯am, can help in appreciating some Christian doctrines, such as the divinity of Christ, even if they remain unacceptable to Muslims. Moreover, although the Qur’¯an insists on the humanity of Jesus, Christ is nonetheless the ‘word of God and a spirit from Him’. In the context of its discourse on faith in God and the relations of the Muslims with the people of the Book, the Qur’¯an sharply criticizes the Christian doctrine of the trinity. It repudiates this important doctrine, regardless of any proofs or formulations. One such Qur’anic repudiation is the assertion, ‘They have indeed rejected faith those who say that God is the third of three’ (S. 5:73). Another and more direct Qur’anic repudiation of the trinity is expressed in a brief colloquy between God and Jesus, where God asks: ‘O Jesus son of Mary, did you say to people “take me and my mother as two gods instead of God”?’ (S. 5:116). Jesus dissociates himself from such an erroneous belief and leaves to God the decision to punish or forgive the people who hold such a belief. In these and other verses, the Qur’¯an presents and argues against simplistic and naïve popular beliefs which may have been erroneously held by uneducated Christians in the Arabian Peninsula. Christians do not believe that ‘God is the third of three’ gods, nor do they consider Mary to be a person of the trinity. Perhaps it is for this reason that the Qur’¯an does not consider the Christians who affirm the divinity of Christ as rejecters of faith (kuff¯ar) but as people professing extremist beliefs (ghul¯at). Thus the Qur’¯an admonishes the Christians saying, ‘O people of the Book, do not go to extremes in your religion, and do not say about God except the truth’ (S. 4:171). The same verse goes on to assert that Jesus, son of Mary, is only a created messenger of God, His servant and His word which He cast into Mary. It ends by cautioning the Christians, ‘Do not say three, desist; it is better for you’. The second basis for this Qur’anic ambivalence is the manner in which both the Qur’¯an and Islamic heritage, in general, view Islam and its nature as a religion.

8

World Christianity in Muslim Encounter

Islam is not simply a collection of beliefs and rituals that a person observes in his or her home or in the mosque. It is, in addition, a polity or state which arose out of the Prophet’s migration (hijrah) from Makkah to Madı¯nah. The first thing that the Prophet did in Madı¯nah was to build a mosque, which primarily served as a place of gathering for the Muslims wherein they worshipped God and managed their affairs. The mosque brought the Muslims together, first as a community and subsequently as a state or commonwealth. Moreover, since the two great powers which the Islamic state confronted were the Persian and Byzantine Empires, politics came to constitute an important factor in the relations of Muslims with the Christians. This is because soon Persia entered into Islam and became an integral part of its domains. Hence, the major cities of the Persian lands, like Bukhara, Samarqand and Rayy became important centres of Islamic learning, where the major religious sciences, such as h}adı¯th, Qur’anic exegesis (tafsı¯r), Islamic law (fiqh) and other fields of religious, scientific and philosophical knowledge flourished. In contrast, the Byzantine or East Roman Empire – which included Syria, Palestine, Egypt and other Middle Eastern regions, but which were soon incorporated through conquest into a rapidly expanding Muslim empire – remained at war with Islam and Muslims. Since that time, Muslim-Christian relations have been determined by these two principles. Another important factor which had a considerable impact on Muslim-Christian relations is the theological or doctrinal factor, which encompasses many ideas and principles, and even commonly held beliefs. Still, it too was often subject to political conditions and expediencies. We can conclude from our discussion of these principles that peaceful coexistence prevailed in times of social harmony and tranquility among Christian and Muslim societies, as was the case in Muslim Spain. However, in situations of war and conflict, as was the case during and after the time of the Crusades, Muslim and Christian polemics began to obscure the positive teachings and ideas of the Qur’¯an and Christian-Muslim relations altogether. In modern times, Western colonization of most of the Muslim world exacerbated further an already volatile situation. Muh{ammad’s meetings with the Christian individuals discussed above have been subjected to much scrutiny by Western scholars of Islam, which cast doubt on their value. The first official diplomatic meeting between Christianity and Islam took place when the Prophet received the delegation of the Christians of Najr¯an in Madı¯nah in 9 AH, which is known as the ‘year of delegations’.5 We can discern in this important encounter both the positive and negative aspects of Muslim-Christian relations. It must be noted at the outset that the positive aspects were more important and more decisive than the negative ones. There is no doubt that this encounter between Christianity and Islam continues to have a useful lesson for us, Christians and Muslims, who strive with honesty and sincerity to achieve constructive dialogue and peaceful coexistence. The Prophet did not receive the Christians of Najr¯an in their official and pompous attire, but

Christians and Muslims in the Qur’¯ an and Muslim Tradition

9

in their travel clothes, exactly as ordinary men like the Muslims. Furthermore, when the time came for them to pray, he allowed them to pray in his mosque, in spite of the protestations of some of his companions. The negative aspects are represented in the imprecation (muba¯halah) verse of the Qur’¯an, which instructs the Prophet – after the knowledge that was revealed to him concerning Jesus – to say to the Christians, ‘come let us call together our sons and your sons, our womenfolk and your womenfolk, and ourselves and yourselves; then let us pray fervently and lay God’s curse upon those who tell lies’ (S. 3:61). Fortunately, the religious leaders of the Christians of Najr¯an were possessed of much wisdom and sagacity. They preferred harmony over conflict, and peace over war. They thus refused the confrontation of imprecation and instead concluded a peace treaty with the Muslims, which was later represented by the jizyah, or poll-tax ruling (see S. 9:29). This ruling covered the relations of the Muslim state with its non-Muslim subjects till the rise of the modern Islamic nation-states. We shall have more to say about the jizyah law later in this discussion. On close examination of the relevant Qur’anic texts, we see that the fundamental perception by the Muslims of their power to rule and the consequent spread of Islam underwent a number of stages in the process of its legal and political developments. At the beginning of his prophetic career in Makkah, Muh}ammad was ordered to call to Islam his close relatives, that is the descendants of H¯ashim. Later, he was ordered to proclaim publicly his message, ‘to warn the mother of the towns [Makkah] and its surroundings’ (S. 6:92; 42:7). Later Qur’anic revelations in both Makkah and Madı¯nah universalized Muh}ammad’s mission by declaring him to be sent ‘as a mercy for all beings’, and that he was sent as a messenger to all of humankind (S. 21:107). There are besides many prophetic h}adı¯th traditions which corroborate these two assertions. Shortly before his death, the Prophet sent a military expedition against the Byzantine city of Tabu ¯ k, just at the border between Arabia and today’s Jordan. This limited raid was a costly and profitless engagement, wherein the Muslims lost several important men, such as ‘Abdullah b. Ruw¯ah}ah, Zayd b. H}¯arithah, Muh}ammad’s client (mawl¯a) and close friend, and Ja‘far b. Abı¯ T}¯alib, his cousin. Just before he died, the Prophet ordered the preparation of a large army under the leadership of Us¯am¯a son of Zayd b. H{¯arithah to confront Byzantine fighters at the town of Mu’t¯a, in present-day Jordan. But the army did not set out until after his death. It too was a symbolic gesture meant to signal the Prophet’s wish to extend Muslim rule into Byzantine areas. These two raids represent the beginning of the presence of Islamic power in Byzantine territories. Muslim authority outside Arabia proper led to the rise of an elaborate juridical system of rulings and precepts known as rulings of the covenanted people (ah{ka¯ m ahl al-dhimmah). More raids and deadly wars followed, all of which resulted in the end in a contradiction between Islam’s religious and spiritual call for all peoples to the

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worship of the One God in a harmonious and religiously pluralistic world and the call for the jih¯ad and Islamic conquests of Christian territories. The original Qur’anic tolerance of religious differences is succinctly expressed in God’s saying to Muh{ammad, ‘Had your Lord so willed all the inhabitants of the earth would have accepted faith; would you then coerce people to become believers?’ (S. 10:99). In spite of the long history of wars between Muslims and Christians, the basic Qur’anic morality of war was not completely obscured by hostility and conflict. Thus when Us¯am¯a’s army was ready to depart for the lands of the East Romans, Abu ¯ Bakr accompanied the fighters to the outskirts of Madı¯nah where he reminded them of the Prophet’s instructions to his own fighters not to mutilate the body of their enemies, be they alive or dead, and not to commit treachery. He continued, ‘do not kill a youth, an old man or a woman. Do not burn crops, or cut down fruit-bearing trees’. Nor should they slaughter a sheep, cow or camel except for food. He then told them that on their expedition they will meet monks who have dedicated themselves to the worship of God. They should leave them undisturbed to pursue peacefully that to which they had dedicated themselves. Then in conformity with the Qur’anic dictum, the Prophet continued, ‘It may be that some people would bring you while on your expedition different kinds of food, invoke the name of God over the food and eat’ (see S. 5:5). The Prophet went on to instruct his fighters that if they conquer a fortified settlement, they should offer the people thereof one of three choices, and whichever the people choose, they should accept it from them. They should first call them to Islam and to move to the abode of the Muslims’ migration, that is, Madı¯nah and its surroundings. If they refuse, they should be invited to Islam, and that they remain in their homes, but receive of the booty only their share of what they themselves gain through the jih¯ad. If, however, they refuse both choices, the Muslims should accept from them the jizyah tax. Only if they reject all three choices, the Prophet said, ‘then ask God’s help against them until they accept one of these choices’.6 It is noteworthy in this regard that the prophetic tradition just cited does not limit the jizya tax to the people of the Book, unless we infer this from the reference to the monks. This important h{adı¯th tradition clearly indicates that modern warfare, which kills both the guilty and the innocent, is against the Islamic precepts of war, which stipulate that war must be only between combatants. Islam forbids the killing of innocent non-combatants even in war. Tradition relates that in one of the Prophet’s battles, his fighters killed some of the children of their enemies. He angrily reprimanded them saying, ‘Why is it that the fighters are not satisfied with killing the men who fight with them, but they kill the children as well?’ One man answered, ‘O Messenger of God, they are the children of associators [of other things with God]’. He retorted, ‘The best among You are children of associators’.7

Christians and Muslims in the Qur’¯ an and Muslim Tradition

11

As has already been observed, what in the end determined Muslim relations with their non-Muslim subject was the jizyah verse of the Qur’¯an. We see in the Muslim treatment of the people of the Book stipulated by the legal framework engendered by this verse a large measure of ambiguity. This is because the Qur’¯an calls at one and the same time for harmony, amity and peaceful coexistence with the people of the Book, a fact which we cannot deny, while in the jizyah verse it calls for their humiliation: ‘. . . until they give the jizyah with their own hand, humbled’. Some Qur’¯an commentators have gone so far as to argue that this verse has abrogated most of the verses which call the people of the Book, including the Muslims, to the ‘fairest means of debate’ and to live together in peace and harmony. In my view the jizyah verse did not abrogate any verses. Rather, it stands as all other verses dealing with the people of the Book stand. The jizyah verse orders the Muslims to fight the people of the Book under three conditions. They should fight with those who do not have faith in God and the last day, who do not regard as unlawful that which God and His messenger have made unlawful, and who do not follow the religion of truth. It is in fact not possible for us to affirm or deny the actual existence of these conditions in any faithcommunity. As for the first condition, we cannot tell a Christian or a Jew who affirms his Christian or Jewish faith, you do not have true faith in God, when the Qur’¯an itself says to them, ‘our God and your God is One’ (S. 29:46). In fact Islamic law stipulates in matters of faith that people should be taken at their word. The Qur’¯an warns Muslims, ‘do not say to someone who comes to you with the greeting of peace [or isl¯am] you are not a person of faith’ (S. 4:94). The second condition, namely that Jews and Christian should regard unlawful what God and His Messenger have made unlawful, creates an even greater difficulty. This is because what God may have made unlawful may mean only in Islamic law, and not in the religious laws of the Jews and Christians. The third condition appertains to Jews and Christians who do not follow the religion of truth. This raises a serious question, which is, what is this religion of truth which Christians and Jews do not profess? Is it the truth of their own religion, or is it the religion of Islam? If it is their own religions, then it is not for us Muslims to judge the religions of the people of the Book as false. If it is Islam, then we cannot impose our religion on the people of the Book. In other words, we cannot fight with them only because they are not Muslims; for, this contradicts the Qur’anic verse which says, ‘Let there be no coercion in religion, for right guidance has become distinct from transgression’ (S. 2:256). This verse has many corroborative verses in the Qur’¯an which forbid Muslims to convert others to their religion by force. When Muslims fight with non-Muslims they should convey to them the message of Islam, particularly if that person is one of those who are subject to the jizyah law. These are the Christians, the Jews, the Samaritans, the Sabeans and the Zoroastrians. This list was later extended to include the Hindus. Thus the promulgation of the jizyah law based the relations of the Muslims with the people of the

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Book on very specific considerations. These relations, however, were also established on a more general principle, which is the principle of dhimmah, to which I would like to briefly turn. The term dhimmah occurs only once in the Qur’¯an, but without any reference to the people of the Book. It refers to the Makkan associators (mushrik¯un) who respected neither pact nor binding covenant (dhimmah) with the Muslims (S. 9:8). The term dhimmah as used in the Qur’¯an and early sources means a binding agreement or covenant and protection (jiw¯ar). When a person, male or female, gives another person his binding word (dhimmah) in a protection agreement, he or she must honour this agreement for the duration of its terms. Many h.adı¯th traditions hold Muslims responsible for caring for the people of dhimma, for they are under the protection (dhimmah) of God and His Messenger among them. The Prophet Muh{ammad, with his sharp insight into human psychology, enjoined his Muslim fighters, ‘If you besiege a fortified settlement and its inhabitants, request that you give them the dhimmah of God and His Prophet, do not give them either the dhimmah of God or that of His Prophet. Rather, make with them the covenant (dhimmah) of yourself, your father, and your fellows. For it is better for you to violate your own dhimmah than to violate the dhimmah of God and His Prophet’.8 Nevertheless, the covenanted people in the Muslim domains remained the people of the dhimmah of God and His Messenger. Thus, before his death, the second caliph ‘Umar b. al-Khat.t.¯ab gave strict orders to his Muslim subjects to treat kindly their Christian and Jewish subjects because they were the people of the dhimmah of God and His Prophet. This is significant because it was ‘Umar who conquered the Christian territories of Egypt, North Africa, Syria and Palestine. This challenging definition of dhimmah as a divine charge chronologically preceded the juridical rulings which came to be known as ‘rulings of covenanted peoples’. These rulings reflect, in my view, the inherent contradictions discussed above. In the early stages of Islamic rule, the jizyah was, for example, informally gathered as the caliph or governor saw fit, because it was not subject to a strict juridical law. We are not actually sure when the jizyah ruling was first enforced. According to some reports, the first to pay the jizyah were the Christians of Najr¯an. But Ibn Kathı¯r convincingly argued in his commentary on S. 3:61 that the jizyah verse was revealed after the coming of the Christians of Najr¯an to Madı¯nah.9 It is unlikely that the jizyah ruling was applied by Abu ¯ Bakr. This is because his short rule was occupied with fighting the wars of secession and quelling the ambitions of individuals who claimed prophethood like Musaylimah, the woman prophetess Saj¯ah{ al-Tamı¯miyyah and others. It is most likely that ‘Umar was the first to regulate the poll-tax, as he organized the registers and other government organs for the administration of a vast Muslim empire. He is reported to have taken the jizyah tax from the covenanted peoples of Syria, including Jerusalem, and from the people of Iraq and Egypt and other conquered lands.

Christians and Muslims in the Qur’¯ an and Muslim Tradition

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Historians have disagreed on the amount of the jizyah, which may have varied between the people of Syria and Iraq. This may have been due to the fact that the people of Iraq were mainly farmers, while those of Syria were mainly merchants and may have had some light industries. The general application of the jizyah law may have differed among the different regions and population concentrations. I believe that many later rulings and practices were wrongly ascribed to ‘Umar. Important among these were the limitations and edicts that were decreed in order to distinguish the Muslims from the dhimmah people. These included the wearing of a special sash (zunn¯ar) over their garments, and other distinctive marks over their hats. ‘Umar is said to have also decreed that the people of the Book should build their homes lower than the houses of the Muslims. He also permitted the Christians to restore their damaged churches and cathedrals, but they were not allowed to erect new churches. Nor were they allowed to ring their church bells loudly. Most of these rules and limitations, in my view, were instituted during ‘Abb¯asid rule, long after ‘Umar. We have already seen that the jizyah tax was never strictly regulated by the jurists. One of the reasons for that may have been the influence of Arab nationalism. ‘Umar, for instance looked with favour at the Arabs, whom he preferred over non-Arabs. This special status of the Arabs continued under Umayyad rule. For example, the men of the tribe of Taghlib, which was a Christian tribe, refused to pay the jizyah and chose instead to fight in the Muslim armies, and received their share of the spoils of war. Likewise the tribes of Jar¯ajimah who lived in the valley of Antioch, and who later moved to mount Lebanon, also chose to fight alongside the Muslims in order to escape the humiliation of the jizyah. The Jar¯ajimah, I believe, were the ancestors of today’s Maronites of Lebanon. This clearly shows that the jizyah ruling was not established on a strict juristic foundation, nor was it universally applied. We see in this regard that some jurists are strict in their codification of the law of the covenanted people while others are more lenient. Two reasons may be adduced in this regard. Jurists who lived and worked in multi-cultural and multi-religious regions of the Muslim state were more open than those who lived in more traditional societies. Furthermore, many of the medieval jurists who wrote books on the fiqh of ahl al-dhimmah did not take into account historical, political and demographic changes, but only juridical changes, which were far fewer and in no way far reaching. Thus they followed the dictates of their legal school, without much regard to the changing circumstances. I believe that the treatment of the people of the Book, as well as the issue of the jizyah, which was the basis of the relations of the Muslims with them should in the end be looked at from the vantage point of political exigencies. In fact, Islamic politics is an integral part of Islamic law. Depending on the prevailing political conditions between the Muslim world and Christendom different jurists, often from the same legal school, treated the law of the covenanted

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peoples differently. Another determining factor in the treatment of non-Muslims in Muslim domains was the political circumstances and even temperaments of petty rulers and governors. In conclusion, it may be said that Muslim-Christian relations have been diverse and variegated. Yet these relations were based on one single presupposition, which is that the Muslim state was the conquering and ruling state. It is not an ethnic or nationalistic state, regardless of any nationalistic characteristics that it may exhibit. The Umayyad state, as has been already observed, was characteristically and culturally an Arab state. Because of its geographical and demographic conditions, the ‘Abb¯asid state was a multi-ethnic religious state, where Arabs enjoyed no privileges over non-Arabs. The people of dhimmah were not citizens of this state, but subjects of the Muslims and the people of their dhimmah. This situation continued during the golden age of the Ottoman state. But it has been completely altered by the demands of the parliamentary system of the modern nation-state, where citizenship rather than religious affiliation governs all social relations. Now there is no Islamic state based solely on religion, except perhaps Saudi Arabia, simply because it has the two holy places of Makkah and Madı¯nah. The Islamic republic of Iran, with its parliament and president, is not strictly an Islamic state, in my view. This is also because it does not apply the rulings of the covenanted people to its Christian and Jewish citizens. Iranian Christians and Jews are, at least theoretically, equal to their Muslim fellow citizens in all rights and responsibilities. This radical change in the status of Christians from a protected people to fellow citizens raises an important question, with which I conclude these reflections. Can we practise a sort of ijtiha¯d in interpreting a religious-legal phenomenon that prevailed during the period of Qur’anic revelation without annulling an important verse of the Qur’¯an? Should we not instead say that this verse can no longer be implemented because of changing circumstances? In this way we can preserve the integrity of the Qur’¯an as a sacred Book. We also can stress in our relations as Christians and Muslims the verses of the Qur’¯an which call for peace and harmony among the peoples of different religions, which far exceed those verses which call for the treatment of the people of the Book as defeated and humiliated minorities.

Notes 1

2

Koura: Center for Christian-Muslim Studies, University of Balamand, 1997; Proceedings of the Second Summer Study Circle, 1997. A. Guillaume, The Life of Muh.ammad, a Translation of Ishaq’s Sirat Rasul Allah (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1997), p. 81. See also, The History of al-Tabari vol. 6, Muh.ammad at Makkah, translated and annotated by W. Montgomery Watt, M. V. McDonald (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988), pp. 44–6.

Christians and Muslims in the Qur’¯ an and Muslim Tradition 3 4

5

6

7 8 9

15

Guillaume, op. cit. p. 107 and Tabari, op. cit. pp. 68–9. For a detailed discussion of this verse, see Irfan A. Omar, editor, A Muslim View of Christianity: Essays on Dialogue by Mahmoud Ayoub (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2007), pp. 187–211. See W. Montgomery Watt Muh}ammad at Medina (Oxford: the Clarendon Press, 1966), pp. 127–8 and M. Ayoub, The Qur’¯an and its Interpreters, 2 vols. (Albany: State of New York Press, 1992), ii. 1–5 and 188–202. Bayhaqı¯, al-Sunan al-Kubr¯a II: 1551 See also Muslim, S}ah.¯ıh. Muslim, K. al-jih¯ad wa-al-sayr: 3261. Ah}mad b. H}anbal, Musnad: 15713. See also 15037. Tirmidhı¯, Sunan al-Tirmidhı¯, 5:338. See also Irfan Omar, op. cit., p. 101. See M. Ayoub, The Qur’a¯n and its Interpreters, ii. 193.

Chapter 2

Abrogation: Muslim and Christian Christopher Lamb

Is there anything for believers to learn from the way that followers of other faiths approach and interpret their respective scriptures? The interest in what is called ‘scriptural reasoning’ suggests that there may be. Between Muslims and Christians in particular there have been a series of meetings bringing together scholars of the two faiths concentrating on common themes. One recent meeting focussed on the Qur’a ¯ n and the Bible.1 In this chapter, I explore the way in which believing readers of the two texts attempt to reconcile divergent strands of ethical teaching in their foundation documents.

‘The Scripture whereof there is no doubt’? In Islam abrogation is the classic method of resolving apparent or real contradictions in the text of the Qur’a ¯ n, . . . the Scripture whereof there is no doubt, a guidance unto those who ward off evil. (2:2)2 Of any two or more verses dealing in apparently contradictory ways with the same issue, the one revealed later is regarded as effectively cancelling the earlier. It is allegedly authorized by the Qur’a ¯ n itself: Such of our revelations as we abrogate or cause to be forgotten, we bring in place one better or the like thereof. Knowest thou not that Allah is able to do all things? (2:106, cf. 16:101, 87:6, 22:52) Such luminaries as as-Shafi’i and al-Ghazali affirmed God’s changes in his guidance to humanity both before the sending down of the Qur’a ¯ n and within the text of the Qur’a ¯ n itself, for example in the change of the direction of prayer ¯ n, abrofrom Jerusalem to Mecca.3 Despite its antiquity in interpreting the Qur’a gation has been the subject of continuing controversy. Few commentators agree on which verses are abrogated and in what respects, and some reject the idea that

Abrogation: Muslim and Christian

17

any verse of the Qur’a ¯ n is so made redundant. They are convinced that S. 2:106 refers to the previous scriptures of the Old and New Testaments. Contradictions in the Qur’a ¯ nic text they explain, in each case, as apparent and not real. It is not surprising then that the question of abrogation has given rise to controversy. For such a procedure clearly implies several things which are seriously at odds with faith in the literal meaning of the Arabic text and its origin from an eternal scripture in heaven. First, it implies that context is important. Whatever was ‘sent down’ to Muh.ammad at one stage in his career could in principle be countermanded by a later directive. It thus becomes important to establish the chronology of the Qur’a ¯ n, which is not agreed in every detail, and preferably the details of the biography of the Messenger. Second, it implies that Allah is in some degree responsive to that career, and to the vicissitudes and development of the Muslim community. The ‘guidance’ (2:2) is tailored to the emerging needs of the ummah, the sacred community, while also being authentic for the whole human race. Third, there is at least a suggestion that the will of Allah is known progressively and not all at once. There is a development in the revelation, at least in ethics if not in doctrine. Whether or not abrogation applies intra-Qur’a ¯ nically, to the Qur’a ¯ n itself, the term can be applied uncontroversially to the Qur’a ¯ n’s acknowledgement of previous revelations made to Jews and Christians in the Torah (Law of Moses), the Zabur (Psalms) and the Injil (Gospel). These previous Scriptures are in large part affirmed in the revelation of the Qur’a ¯ n, but it is clear that their fuller meaning is now regarded as apparent in the Arabic Scripture: O people of the Scripture! Now hath our Messenger come unto you, expounding unto you much of that which ye used to hide in the Scripture . . . Now hath come unto you light from Allah and a plain Scripture. (5:15) Allah has completed his favour to his people. (5:3) Islam is the final religion. On the fabric of the Central Mosque in Birmingham ¯ N, that claim is made in bold letters to every passing vehicle: READ THE QUR’A THE LAST TESTAMENT. But does abrogation apply to the Qur’a ¯ n itself? Some are convinced that it does not. Muh.ammad Asad, Austrian convert to Islam and a distinguished translator of the Qur’a ¯ n, is clear that it refers only to the previous Scriptures. He writes on 2:106 in his widely used commentary ‘The Message of the Qur’a ¯ n’ (2003): ‘The “doctrine of abrogation” has no basis whatever in historical fact . . . the abrogation relates to the earlier divine messages and not to any part of the Qur’a ¯ n itself.’ He comments similarly on 16:101, and on 41:42, ‘No falsehood can ever attain to it [the Qur’a ¯ n] openly, and neither in a stealthy manner’ (his translation), and he approves the remark of Abu Muslim al-Isfahani (quoted by Razi) as saying that this verse rejects any sense of abrogation in the Qur’a ¯ n, since any verse so abrogated would be batil, or false.4 Another convert, the American mathematician Jeffrey Lang, agrees with Asad

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that all traditions attributing confirmation of abrogation in the Qur’a ¯ n to Muh.ammad himself are weak and unreliable. Lang also cites 4:82: ‘Will they not, then, try to understand this Qur’a ¯ n? Had it issued from any but God, they would surely have found in it many an inner contradiction’ (Asad’s translation). He and other commentators regard this verse as a warning against the supposition that there are any contradictions in the Qur’a ¯ n. He concludes: ‘I feel that there is no real need or justification for the classical theory of abrogation.’ And he sees a significant issue behind the theological question: Yet without this theory, the Qur’a ¯ n cannot be used to support waging war other than in self-defense or against oppression. This is proved by the fact that such a massive application of the theory of abrogation is needed to justify the type of military expansion advocated by the dar al-Islam – dar al-harb formula. Clearly, the Qur’a ¯ n’s passages that deal with warfare weigh heavily against such unprovoked aggression.5 In Lang’s remarks we encounter the point where the debate ceases to be a somewhat abstract discussion of the internal coherence of the Qur’a@n, focussing on, for example, the developing clarity of guidance about the use of alcohol by Muslims.6 Lang clearly has in mind the use of abrogation by those who want to deny freedom of religion and who support an aggressive understanding of jihad. Most commentators, including such heroes of radical Islamism as Syed Qutb and Abu Al’a Maududi, credit Islam with standing for freedom of religion on the basis of 2:256: ‘There is no compulsion in religion.’ Those who want to defend Islam against the charge of intolerance, both Muslims and non-Muslims, frequently quote this verse. Yet there is a long-standing view that this very verse is abrogated by 9:5, ‘Slay the idolaters wherever ye find them’, and 9:29, Fight against such of those who have been given the Scripture as believe not in Allah nor the Last Day, and forbid not that which Allah hath forbidden by his messenger, and follow not the religion of truth, until they pay the tribute readily, being brought low. The twelfth-century rationalist commentator Zamakhshari notes that some have also considered 2:256 abrogated by 9:73 and its parallel 66:9: O Prophet! Strive against the disbelievers and the hypocrites, and be stern with them. Hell will be their home, a hapless journey’s end. But he does not appear to support that interpretation, which would be alien to his convictions about free will.7 Zamakhshari may have had in mind the

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hadith from as-Suddi about the occasion of the revelation of 2:256. Most traditions concerned with this verse record its context as that of Muslim parents agonizing over their children who had been brought up either as Jews or Christians and who refused to follow their parents and become Muslims. Sura 2:256 would then be understood as supporting at least the right of Jews and Christians not to be compelled to become Muslims, even by parental pressure. As-Suddi, however, declares the verse abrogated by Sura 9.8 Other Muslim scholars reject abrogation in this case at least. At-Tabataba’i, the Shi’ite commentator, is firmly of the view that the command ‘Let there be no compulsion in religion’ is not abrogated by the jihad verses: It is one of the verses that show that Islam is not based on the sword and killing, and that it does not allow Muslims to compel or coerce others to accept Islam. It is contrary to the view held by many Muslims and non-Muslims alike that Islam is the religion of the sword.9 Others take a different view. Abdullahi Ahmed an-Na‘im, Professor of Law at Emory University in the United States, who himself promotes a ‘liberal modernist understanding of Islam’,10 concisely states the classical view on the doctrine of abrogation and its impact on the historical use of force in the propagation of Islam – a view he aims to overturn: All the verses of the Qur’a ¯ n and related Sunna that sanction the use of force in propagating Islam among [non]-Muslims and in upholding it among renegade Muslims were revealed and uttered by the Prophet during the Medina stage. In accordance with the principle of naskh, abrogation or repeal, the founding jurists have held that these subsequent texts and practices of the first Islamic state that was based on them must have legally abrogated or repealed all previous texts and practices that were inconsistent with what was perceived to be the final message of the Prophet in Medina. In this way, the earlier Meccan texts and practices were seen as a transitional stage, dictated by tactical considerations, namely, the small numbers and the relative weakness of Muslims during that stage. With the massive conversion of Arabs to Islam and the establishment of the Islamic state in Medina, it was perceived that the Muslims became strong enough to propagate their faith by force and subjugate all the enemies of the Islamic state, whether within or outside the Muslim community.11 This broad development of the Islamic movement from numerical weakness to political power is undeniably a marked feature of the career of Muh.ammad in contrast to that of Jesus, as noted by David Marshall, among many others. He observes that the Biblical analogies of Muh.ammad at Medina are figures like Joshua and Gideon, ‘in whom the warrior and the man of God are combined. The Qur’a ¯ nic transition, in military and political terms, is from weakness to power. This transition implies a confidence that such power is necessary to the achievement of the divine order in this world. The Biblical transition inevitably

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suggests other lessons. . . the quite different power-in-weakness embodied in Christ and celebrated in the New Testament.’12 It is of course a feature of the Islamist and of all conservative Muslim thinking that there is no freedom to leave Islam, once having embraced it. Indeed many regard the state as obliged to enforce the shari’ah, regardless of opposition or the consideration of religious minorities. Yusuf al-Qaradawi, a Qatari scholar seen as moderate by many in the West, says ‘An Islamic society is responsible for implementing the shari’ah, even if the issue is of concern to a non-Muslim’, and like Maududi, goes on to support the death penalty for apostates.13 The issue of abrogation is then linked with that of religious and political freedom in a way which raises serious questions about how Muslims regard the use of power in the contemporary world. Is compulsion in religion permissible or even obligatory once Muslims gain political power, as in Medina? And if so, how is 2:256, which condemns it, to be understood? Is it no longer God’s word, though once it was? And if it is no longer in force, how is the Qur’a ¯ n eternal? These are questions which are concerned not only with theological consistency in Islam, but with the intensely practical issue of the legitimate use of power in a world full of injustice and conflict.

‘It was said . . . but I say to you . . . ’ Christians also face acute issues of interpretation, though they regard their Scripture differently from the Muslim view of the Qur’a ¯ n. The latter is seen in Islamic thought as eternal and uncreated, having always existed as God’s speech. The proper equivalent to the Qur’a ¯ n in Christian theology is not the Bible but the eternal Word of God made known in Jesus the Christ ( Jn 1.2–18). Nevertheless, there is a kind of equivalence to abrogation in the New Testament. Though Christians have always maintained that the coming of the Son of God into the world was prophesied in the Scriptures of the Old Testament, and that the New Testament fulfils the Old, Jesus himself appears to ‘abrogate’ on his own authority several Old Testament texts, or at least the ways in which they were commonly understood. In a number of sayings beginning with the words, ‘You have heard that it was said (to those of ancient times) . . .,’ Jesus continues by matching each ethical issue with a contrasting demand: ‘. . . but I say to you . . .’14 In most cases, his new understanding of the ethical issue involved requires a much more wholehearted engagement which goes to the root of the personal intention concerned: Again, you have heard that it was said to those of ancient times, ‘You shall not swear falsely, but carry out the vows you have made to the Lord.’ But I say to you, Do not swear at all . . . Let your word be ‘Yes, Yes’ or ‘No, No’; anything more than this comes from the evil one. (Mt. 5.33–7)

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In a few places he seems to go further by either reducing the severity of the religious law, or by a greater demand. One of the principal causes of official opposition to his public appearances was his insistence on his freedom to heal on the Sabbath. This was regarded by the pious as work, and so prohibited on that day. Jesus’ response was that The Sabbath was made for humankind, and not humankind for the Sabbath; so the Son of Man [Jesus’ particular term for himself] is lord even of the Sabbath. (cf. Mt. 12.8) Another issue was Jewish purity laws, which Mark, at least, regards him as having abrogated in favour of an inner spiritual integrity. After a dispute about the washing of hands and food utensils he said to his disciples: Do you not see that whatever goes into a person from outside cannot defile, since it enters, not the heart but the stomach, and goes out into the sewer?’ (Thus he declared all foods clean.) And he said, ‘It is what comes out of a person that defiles . . . fornication, theft, murder, adultery, avarice, wickedness . . . All these evil things come from within, and they defile a person. (Mk 7.18–23 – emphasis added) On divorce, however, his counsel was less lenient than tradition allowed. Asked to adjudicate on a debate among the rabbis about the conditions which made it valid for a man to divorce his wife, he declared that It was because you were so hard-hearted that Moses allowed you to divorce your wives, but from the beginning it was not so. And I say to you, whoever divorces his wife, except for unchastity, and marries another commits adultery. (Mt. 19.8, 9) These few examples indicate the authority of Jesus, often remarked upon by his hearers, and the freedom with which he treated the text of the Hebrew Scriptures. Many would claim, however, that these were not truly cases of abrogation but rather instances of Jesus going to the heart of Old Testament rulings and opening up their true intention, so fulfilling them. He warned: Do not think that I have come to abolish the law or the prophets; I have not come to abolish but to fulfil. (Mt. 5.17) Similarly Paul, concerned that Gentile converts to Christianity should not be required to be circumcised (so first becoming Jews), ‘abrogates’ the Law of Moses, claiming that the Jewish Law was only a paidagogos, a ‘tutor’ or ‘disciplinarian’, until the coming of Christ (Gal. 3.24f.). The Law given to Moses was in his view subsequent and powerless to annul the promise given to Abraham 430

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years earlier (Gal. 3.17). Like Jesus, then, and unlike the process of abrogation in Islam, Paul goes back behind Moses to the earlier intention of God as revealed to Abraham, who is recognized both in Christianity and Islam as the archetypal man of faith. The Protestant reformers of the sixteenth century, anxious to escape from the authority of Rome, and convinced that the Catholic Church had departed in several ways from the authentic Christian faith of the early centuries, called for a return to faith based on the Bible. The Articles of Religion of the Church of England, known as ‘The 39 Articles’ (1562) state that the Holy Scripture containeth all things necessary to salvation: so that whatsoever is not read therein, nor may be proved thereby, is not to be required of any man. (Article 6, ‘Of the sufficiency of the Holy Scriptures for salvation’) So far, so good. But Article 7, Of the Old Testament, leads us into deeper water: The Old Testament is not contrary to the New . . . Although the Law given from God by Moses, as touching Ceremonies and Rites, do not bind Christian men, nor the Civil precepts thereof ought of necessity to be received in any commonwealth; yet notwithstanding, no Christian man whatsoever is free from the obedience of the Commandments which are called Moral. The distinction between ceremonial or ritual law and moral law may seem at first sight obvious to moderns, though it would have been strange to those who lived in biblical times, and is arguably unbiblical. Paul quotes Deut. 27.36 ‘Cursed is everyone who does not observe and obey all the things written in the book of the law’, in his polemic against those who urged circumcision on Gentile Christians (Gal. 3.10 – emphasis added). Is the observance of the Sabbath part of moral or ritual law? And if it is part of the moral law why do Christians not worship on Saturday rather than Sunday? And should its infringement be punished with death, as in Num. 15.35? Or is that a ‘civil precept’ not binding on Christians? The second commandment, about graven images, has led to huge controversies within the churches, from the dispute about the validity of icons in the Orthodox Church to the smashing of statues and stained glass windows by the English Puritans of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Moral or ritual? In Leviticus and Deuteronomy the death penalty is also to be applied to idolaters, those committing fornication, incest, adultery, homosexual acts, bestiality, or blasphemy; to mediums, wizards and female sorcerers, to anyone who kidnaps, enslaves or sells another Israelite, and to a son who will not obey his parents. A wife who intervenes to support her husband in a fight by grabbing his opponent’s genitals is to have that hand cut off. Parents are not to be punished for

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their children’s faults, nor children for their parents’, yet no illegitimate person can be ‘admitted to the assembly of the Lord’ down to the tenth generation. Impotent males are likewise disenfranchised, and no handicapped person can serve as a priest.15 Were these moral or ritual provisions? It is clear that in many ways the moral outlook of the Jewish Law, as revealed in the Old Testament, differs significantly from most contemporary Christian understanding, endorsing as it does capital punishment, slavery (at least of non-Israelites), polygamy, the subordination of women to their fathers and husbands, and in the case of entry into the Promised Land, ethnic cleansing. Joshua 6.21, recording the destruction by the Israelites of every living being in Jericho, has elicited the comment: ‘In Bosnia we called such behaviour war crimes’.16 Meanwhile many Christians have set aside not only virtually all the Old Testament notions of what constitutes cleanness and uncleanness, and the New Testament prohibition by Jesus of divorce, but also the law against usury. The whole economic system now depends on the taking of interest on loans, known as ‘investments’. It is true that the ban on usury was intended to prevent the exploitation of the poor, not to hamper trade, but this is still ‘abrogation’ on a considerable scale. Not surprisingly Muslims, who have developed Islamic banking precisely to avoid usury, are inclined to say that as far as ethics is concerned, Christians ‘make it up as they go along’.

A more attentive reading Setting side by side Muslim use of the Qur’a ¯ n and Christian use of the Bible in this way raises a number of questions not covered by the obvious dissimilarities of the two texts in length, authorship and antiquity. As already noted, the Qur’a ¯ n plays approximately the same role in Islam as the person of Jesus in Christianity. It is the Qur’a ¯ n which in Muslim understanding is of divine origin, and Muh.ammad was merely its mouthpiece to humanity, not its author. Though the Bible is described as the Word of God, Christians have generally regarded it as significantly shaped by human agency and as pointing to the eternal living Word in Jesus Christ: ‘The Word became flesh and lived among us’ (Jn 1.14). There is no suggestion among Christians, as there is in Islam, that their scripture is ‘eternal’ or ‘uncreated’. In fact it is likely that these very terms as used by Muslims of the Qur’a ¯ n were first heard by them in controversy with Christians who applied them to Jesus as the eternal, uncreated Word of God. This, coupled with the attitude of Jesus himself and of Paul to the Hebrew Scriptures as described above, has meant that Christians have always felt able to take a freer hand in interpreting their sacred text than Muslims in theirs. Nevertheless, the current controversies about gay marriage and the status of homosexual persons, especially in the Anglican Church, has focussed attention on the way Christians interpret the Bible, and in particular the significance of

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those parts of the Old Testament which lay down rules of behaviour in personal and communal life. Arguments have raged about the historical context of the few verses which condemn homosexuality, and precisely what is being condemned there. For many the silence of Jesus on the subject indicates that it is at best a minor issue compared with his recorded concern over hypocrisy in spiritual life and the place of women, children, lepers, Samaritans and others not given due consideration as persons in the society of his time. The Catholic Church claims to base its teaching not only on the Bible but also on natural law, and concludes that homosexual acts are intrinsically disordered.17 Many conservative Christians, especially in the developing world, would agree. What effect does this have on the way Christians and Muslims understand each other? A consultation was due to take place in New York in 2003 between representatives of the world-wide Anglican Communion and of al-Azhar, the premier international centre for Sunni scholarship in Cairo. At the last minute, the Cairo delegation pulled out of the meeting because of the election in the American Episcopal Church of the gay bishop Gene Robinson. While this may have been due to Egyptian government pressure, we should not under-estimate the distaste of many Muslims for a way of life which is still subject to legal sanction in much of the world. Inevitably they will ask how it can be accepted by Christians who claim to believe the Bible. As already noted, Christians may reply in terms of the paucity of references in the Bible to the issue, and the uncertainty of what precisely is in mind in such references as there are. This is likely only to deepen Muslim distrust of the Christian Scriptures as we have them and confirm their confidence in the contrasting clarity of the Qur’a ¯ n. But the true difference between the faiths lies much deeper. The Qur’a ¯ nic term for Jews and Christians is ‘People of the Book’, and this underlines the prophetic tradition in which Muslims believe all three faiths properly to stand. But to take a significant statement of the Catholic Catechism, The Christian faith is not a ‘religion of the book’. Christianity is the religion of the ‘Word’ of God, ‘not a written and mute word, but incarnate and living.’18 The Christian Scriptures are interpreted in the light of Christ, by tradition and reason, and in the light of new knowledge which was not available to their authors. Nevertheless, both faiths have to wrestle with the significance of texts which are either difficult to reconcile with contemporary understandings of ethical issues, or are frankly regarded as abrogated, no longer valid. In the latter case, the question must be asked: What is the status of the abrogated text? Is it still part of the Word of God, though only as a historical relic, not now operative? And can God’s Word, even in part, so become redundant? These questions are sharpest for Muslims, because of their doctrine of the Qur’a ¯ n, but must also be

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asked – perhaps in a different form – by Christians. What is the use of much of Leviticus and Deuteronomy, now rarely read in public worship? Some carefully selected verses from these books are often praised for their compassion and care for the poor,19 but most Christians probably regard them as irrelevant to the contemporary world. Are we, however, so much wiser than our forebears in faith? While the punishments prescribed both in the Old Testament and the Qur’a ¯ n may have little appeal to us, we cannot claim to have resolved many of the problems they seek to address. A more attentive reading, perhaps in company with those of the other faith, may help us.20

Notes 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9 10

11

12 13

A detailed record of this meeting has been edited by Michael Ipgrave, Scriptures in Dialogue. Christians and Muslims Studying the Bible and the Qur’a¯n Together (London: Church House Publishing, 2004). Unless otherwise noted translations from the Qur’a ¯ n are from Marmaduke Pickthall, The Meaning of the Glorious Qur’a¯n. See article on ‘Abrogation” in The Encyclopaedia of the Qur’a¯n by John Burton, <www.brillonline.nl>. Asad, Muhammed The Message of the Qur’a¯n (Bristol, UK: Book Foundation, 2003) ad loc. From an article in The American Muslim, November 2005 ‘On the Theory of Abrogation’ accessed from www.theamericanmuslim.org on 11 July 2007. Other American Muslims take a different view in affirming abrogation: See the website of the Free Muslims Coalition (www.freemuslims.org) and the 2004 article by a Tunisian lecturer entitled ‘The Shari’a must not be implemented today’. 16:67, 2:219, 4:43, 5:90 (in chronological order) are verses about the use of wine suggesting to many commentators a gradual move towards complete prohibition with only the last in force. Anya Munster, ‘Let there be no compulsion in religion’, Tafsı¯r Comparison on the verse 2:256, Unpublished paper, 2007, p. 4. Article on the Context of Revelation in the Qur’a ¯ n: 2:256 in <www.altafsir.com/ asbabalnuzul> accessed on 17 July 2007. Anya Munster op. cit., p. 11. As noted on his personal website www.people.law.emory.edu/~annaim an-Na’im is a disciple of the martyred Sudanese thinker Mahmud Muh.ammad Taha, who was in favour of privileging Meccan over Medinan passages in the Qur’a ¯ n, a process described as ‘reverse abrogation’. This has found little favour among Muslims. See Kenneth Cragg: Am I not your Lord? (London 2002) pp. 215, 137–9. Abdullahi Ahmed an-Na‘im, Toward an Islamic Reformation: Civil Liberties, Human Rights and International Law (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1990), p. 158. David Marshall, God, Muh.ammad and the Unbelievers (Richmond 1999), p. 203. Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Non-Muslims in the Islamic Society, (Burr Ridge, IL: American Trust Publications), p. 14.

26 14 15 16

17 18 19

20

World Christianity in Muslim Encounter Translations from the Bible are from the New Revised Standard Version. Deut. 13.9, Lev. 20.10, 24.16, 20.27, Deut. 24.7, 21.18, 25.11, 23.1. John Sandys-Wunsch: The Anglican Tradition and the Use of the Bible (privately published) p. 8. Catechism of the Catholic Church (1994) paragraph 2357. Ibid., paragraph 108 quoting St Bernard. E.g., Deut. 24.5 which frees a man from military service in his first year of marriage, and 24.19f. which prohibits a total harvesting of field or vineyard, so that something may be left over for the poor to gather. See websites on scriptural reasoning: www.stethelburgas.org/sr and www.etext. virginia.edu/journals for the Journal of Scriptural Reasoning.

Chapter 3

Forgiveness and Reconciliation Through the Lenses of the Bible and the Qur’¯an Sigvard von Sicard

Introduction Dialogue and Diapraxis1 are not new concepts in the field of Christian-Muslim relations. Much of what has been undertaken in this field however has tended to result in restating firmly held positions or been presentations of prepared statements in spite of pleas by Paul Knitter and others for greater openness.2 One of the reasons for this is what Wittgenstein has called the ‘language games’ in which words and expressions have different usages and meanings conditioned by the context in which they are used.3 One aspect which to a large extent has been neglected has been a search for ‘dynamic equivalents’.4 The following is therefore an attempt to consider two central topics, ‘Forgiveness’ and ‘Reconciliation’ in the Holy Bible and the Qur’a¯n al-Karı¯m and to let the texts speak for themselves. A consideration of these texts does undoubtedly demand a certain independent analysis by the reader. It involves principles of interpretation on the part of the reader.5 The texts require a meditative attitude. Hopefully they will trigger recollection of many other similar passages which will widen the basis of appreciation for the common heritage that Muslims and Christians have, particularly when they begin to study each others’ scriptures, both of which arose in a Semitic context. In spite of this, however, as followers of their respective religious traditions, their assumptions about each other are not only coloured, but indeed often distorted. This it would seem is even more the case with regard to what has come down in their respective scriptures. As a result what they have in common has become distorted by differently perceived theological, intellectual and sociological concepts. It has also been distorted by over 1400 years of shared history which at times has been painful and at others very fruitful. In this context it is appropriate to recognize the debt which Christian thought and the Enlightenment owe to Muslims.6 When it comes to their respective scriptures, Christians and Muslims share the concept of prophethood and the Qur’¯an affirms this oneness of revelation in S. 2:136, which states:

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We believe in God, and the revelation given to us, and to Abraham, Ismail, Isaac, Jacob and the tribes, and that given to Moses and Jesus. As early Muslim thinkers began to reflect on their holy texts, they drew on many strands of thought, including those of Christian theologians.7 Behind this development probably lies the exhortation in S. 5:2, which states: Co-operate with each other on the basis of righteousness (birri) and piety (taqwa), not on the basis of sin (ithm) and transgression (‘udwa¯n). And from the Bible, which says: If you love those who love you, what reward do you have? Do not even the tax collectors do the same? And if you greet only your brothers and sisters, what more are you doing than others? Do not even the Gentiles do the same? (Mt. 5.46–7) The Letter to the Hebrews 10.24 calls Christians to ‘consider how to provoke one another to love and good deeds’. The Qur’¯an also envisages, or at least calls for, cooperation between likeminded communities, . . . argue not with the People of the Scripture unless it be in (a way) that is better . . . and say: We believe in that which hath been revealed unto us and revealed unto you; our God and your God is One, and unto Him we surrender. (S. 29:46) This same spirit of interaction and mutual enrichment is also expressed in S. 10:94, which states: If you are in doubt concerning what We reveal unto you, then ask those who read the Scripture before you. Likewise S. 4:26 says: God would explain to you and guide you by the example of those who were before you, and would turn to you in mercy. The challenge to approach the scriptures in this manner appears in S. 49:13 the meaning of which in English states: O mankind! We have created you male and female, and have made you nations and communities, so that you might come to know each other.

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Verily the most honoured of you in the sight of God is the one who is most deeply conscious of Him. (See also S. 5:48; S. 10:100; S. 2:148; S. 42:8) The implication is that neither the Islamic nor the Christian tradition is monolithic. The quote concedes the fact of divergence and by implication encourages interaction and mutuality – taba¯dulı¯yah.

Background To fully appreciate the challenges which face Christians and Muslims in undertaking taba¯dulı¯yah they need to consider their ethical condition. According to the ethical perspective of the Qur’¯an, insa¯n (human being) must always keep in view his/her own moral constitution and status in the design of things (S. 49:13). Insa¯n’s problem is that his/her view of his/her-self is very limited. This consciously or unconsciously can lead to limiting his/her understanding of God, or as it has been expressed ‘Your God is too small’.8 Insa¯n therefore can easily become petty and narrow-minded and selfish. This happens in all fields of human action be it individual, political, social, economic or religious. Insa¯n is much too weak and small-minded, as the Qur’a ¯ n says: Insa¯n was created weak. (S. 4:28) Or, Insa¯n was ever hasty. (‘aju¯lan, S. 17:11) Or again, Verily insa¯n is rebellious. (S. 96:6) As well as, No, but (insa¯n) has not done what He commanded him. (S. 80:23) Insa¯n is by nature unstable (halu ¯ ‘an). When evil touches him he panics, but when good things come his way he prevents them from reaching others (S. 70:19–21, cf. S. 76:3–4). Insan’s condition is perhaps most dramatically presented in S. 79:17–20 where s/he is described as not honouring the orphan, not feeding the poor, devouring heritages and loving wealth: Insan is indeed niggardly. (S. 17:100)

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The basic weakness of insa¯n, from which all of his/her major ills spring, is described by the Qur’¯an as ‘pettiness’ – d∙a‘f, and ‘narrowness of mind’ – qatr.9 The same assessment is found in the biblical tradition where it states: There is no one who does not sin. (1 Kgs 8.46) Against you, you alone, have I sinned and done what is evil in your sight. (Ps. 51.4) All have sinned and fall short of the glory of God. (Rom. 3.23) If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us. (1 Jn 1.8) The remedy for this condition is to open up one’s heart and mind to a vision which rises above one’s pettiness. This is achieved by means of cultivating taqwa – piety. This comes about when one realizes that insa¯n’s ‘real’ nature and status in creation is exalted. Insa¯n has been granted intellectual powers even above the angels (S. 2:30ff.). The Bible indicates the same when it states: What are human beings that you are mindful of them, son of man, that you care for him? Yet you have made them a little lower than God and have crowned them with glory and honour. (Ps. 8.4f.) The only way insa¯n can attain taqwa is to recognize the powers and the limits God has put on his natural condition. Insa¯n is neither free like God nor helpless like a stone; neither omnipotent nor impotent, neither omniscient nor ignorant. Only by staying within the framework laid down by God can insa¯n maximize his/her moral energy and make progress, which is the essence of taqwa: O you who believe! Establish justice, being witnesses for God – even if the evidence goes against yourselves or against your parents or kinsmen; and irrespective of whether the witness is rich or poor, under all circumstances . . . (S. 4:135). The Book of Proverbs 21.3 likewise stresses, To do righteousness and justice is more acceptable to the Lord than sacrifice. This is spelt out in Mic. 6.8, which makes it clear that God requires man . . . to do justice, and to love kindness, and to walk humbly with your God. The Qur’¯an takes this even farther. One is not allowed to develop an unfair attitude even towards enemies.

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. . . let not hatred of any people seduce you that you deal not justly. Deal justly, that is nearer to your duty – taqwa. (S. 5:8) The same Su ¯ rah 5:2 is even more poignant as it reminds the believers of the time when the Meccans excluded them from the al-Masjid al-H . ara¯m. . . . let not your hatred for some people who shut you out of the Sacred Mosque lead you to transgression; but help one another unto righteousness and pious duty. A similar idea comes out in 1 Jn 4.20–21 which warns, Those who say, ‘I love God’ and hate their brothers or sisters, are liars; for those who do not love a brother or sister whom they have seen cannot love God whom they have not seen. The commandment we have from him is this: those who love God must love their brothers and sisters also. Jesus taught his disciples, Love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you. (Mt. 5.44) The essence of all human rights is the equality of the entire human race. O you who believe! Let not some men deride other men who may be better than they, nor let women (deride) women who may be better than they are; neither defame one another, nor insult one another by nicknames. (S. 49:11–13)10 Abu Huraira reported that the Prophet said, ‘Whoever believes in God and the Last Day should not hurt his neighbour . . . ’11 Paul exhorted the Colossians in a similar vein when he wrote, Do not lie to one another, seeing that you have stripped off the old self with its practices and have clothed yourselves with the new self, which is being renewed in knowledge according to the image of its creator. (Col. 3.9–10) In the Hadith Qudsi Abu Dharr al-Ghifari reported that the Prophet related from His Lord saying, O My servants, I have forbidden oppression for Myself and have made it forbidden amongst you, so do not oppress one another.12 All this amounts to a call to forgiveness.

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Forgiveness Forgiveness is a central concept in the Qur’a ¯ n. In the first instance because some of the asma¯ al-h}usna¯ – the ‘beautiful names’ or ‘attributes’ of God indicate this concept. One of these is Al-Ghaffa¯r – The Very or Much Forgiving One (second form, S. 38:66 and S. 39:5). It denotes an extreme forgiveness. It occurs 96 times. Its meaning is exemplified by a Hadı¯th Qudsı¯ reported by Abu Hurayrah that the Prophet said, A servant (of God) committed a sin and said: O God forgive me my sin. And He (God) said: My servant has committed a sin and has known that he has a Lord who forgives sins and punishes for them. Then he sinned again and said: O Lord, forgive me my sin. And He (God) said: My servant has committed a sin and has known that he has a Lord who forgives sins and punishes for them. Then he sinned again and said: O Lord forgive me my sin. And He (God) said: My servant has committed a sin and has known that he has a Lord who forgives sins and punishes for sins. Do what you wish, for I have forgiven you.13 This is reminiscent of Jesus teaching Peter when Peter asked how often he should forgive his brother in Mt. 18.21–2. Peter wondered if seven times was enough. Jesus told him: Not seven times, but, I tell you, seventy-seven times. God’s forgiveness is clearly dependent on humans being aware of their forgetfulness, egocentricity and wayward ways, as is clearly indicated when God spoke to Solomon in the night, saying, If my people who are called by my name humble themselves, pray, seek my face, and turn from their wicked ways; then will I hear from heaven, and will forgive their sin . . . . (2 Chron. 7.14) Jesus stressed the importance of asking forgiveness when he taught his disciples the Lord’s Prayer, the Pater Noster, the Our Father. They were told to say, Forgive us our trespasses as we forgive those who trespass against us. (Mt. 6.12) But Jesus also issued the challenge when he said, If you forgive others their trespasses, your heavenly Father will also forgive you; but if you do not forgive others, neither will your Father forgive your trespasses. (Mt. 6.14–15)

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Another attribute pertaining to God as regards forgiveness is Al-Ghafu ¯ r – The Most Forgiving One (S. 12:98; S. 15:49, etc.). It denotes an extensiveness of a different kind from that denoted by the attribute al-Ghaffa¯r. Al-Ghafu ¯ r, derived from the root meaning ‘to veil’, denotes a perfect and complete forgiveness, representing an ultimate degree of forgiveness. The root ghafara and its derivatives are found hundreds of times in the Qur’a ¯ n. God is constantly referred to as ‘forgiving’ for example, S. 2:173, 182, 192, 199, 218, 225, 226, 235; S. 3:31, 89, 129, 155; S. 4:23, 25, 43, 64, 96, 100, 106, 110, 149, 152 and so on. It should be noted that the Arabic root GhFR can be compared with the Hebrew root KPR used in Ps. 78.38: Yet he, being compassionate (rah·u ¯ m), forgave (yekaper) their iniquity (‘a¯wo¯n), and did not destroy them. The sense of the limitlessness of God’s forgiveness is highlighted in a Hadı¯th Qudsı¯ reported by Anas who heard the Prophet say, God the Almighty said: O son of Adam, so long as you call upon me and ask of me, I shall forgive you for what you have done, and I shall not mind. O son of Adam, were your sins to reach the clouds of the sky and were you to then ask forgiveness of Me, I would forgive you. O son of Adam, were you to come to me with sins nearly as great as the earth and were then to face Me, ascribing no partner to Me, I would bring you forgiveness as great as it (the earth).14 A third attribute relating to forgiveness among the asma¯ al-h}usna¯ is Al-‘Afu ¯w – The One who erases sin (S. 22:60; S. 58:2, etc.) The root afw means to efface, obliterate, wipe out, eliminate; then to forgive, excuse, free, exempt, and so on; hence pardon. It occurs eight times in the Qur’¯an. It is different from both alGhaffa¯r and al-Ghafu ¯ r, which derive from the root for ‘veiling’ whereas Al-‘Afu ¯w indicates One who erases sin which is more far-reaching than simply veiling it. Literally it means effacement, elimination, pardon, forgiveness, waiver of punishment. Technically it means to gloss over the sin and skip the punishment for the committed sin. This attribute and that of al-Tawwa¯b – The Forgiving One – in the sense of God repenting to carry out a punishment he had intended. It also carries the meaning of The One who accepts a person’s penance. These two concepts occur 15 times in the Qur’a¯n (see S. 2:35, 51; S. 4:20, 67; S. 9:105, 119; S. 24:10; S. 49:12; S. 110:3). The concept of forgiveness therefore has its roots in the very being of God. Al-Tawwa¯b is reminiscent of the biblical expression, . . . if that nation, concerning which I have spoken, turns from its evil, I will change my mind (hashabeti) about the disaster that I intended to bring on it. (Jer. 18.8)

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World Christianity in Muslim Encounter Humans are therefore exhorted to . . . compete with one another for forgiveness from your Lord . . . those who control their anger and are forgiving towards humankind; God loves the good. (S. 3:133–4)

God loves those who forgive others. The Prophet himself is encouraged to forgive, as it states in S. 15:85: So forgive, O Muh.ammad, with a gracious forgiveness. God’s forgiveness of human beings is related to their forgiveness of others. This aspect is emphasized in S. 2:265 which states: We make no distinction between any of His messengers – and they (the believers) say: We hear, and we obey. (Grant us) Your forgiveness, our Lord! Unto You is the journeying. This is even more sharply focused in S. 42:40: Let the recompense of evil be only a like evil – but he who forgives (‘afa¯wa) and makes peace (as}lah}a), shall find his reward for it is from God; verily He loves not those who act unjustly. . . . Whoso bears the wrongs and forgives – this is a bound duty. Human beings are conscious of how difficult this is. How often they fall short of this duty comes out in their plea: Our Lord! Impose not on us that which we have not the strength to bear! Pardon us (a‘fu‘anna¯), absolve us (aghfir lana¯) and have mercy on us (arh}amna¯). (S. 2:286) Whatever the position of a person, the Qur’¯an warns against a closed mind. Rather it encourages forgiveness and indulgence: Let not those who possess dignity and ease among you resolve by oath against helping the near of kin and to the needy, and to the fugitive for the cause of God. Let them forgive and show indulgence. Do you not yearn for God to forgive you. God is Forgiving, Merciful. (S. 24:22) The meaning is that, should a relative, a neighbour or someone close to you act in a hurtful manner, this should not prevent you from helping that person, but rather you should forgive that person and continue to support him/her.

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This would seem also to indicate that God’s forgiveness of human beings is related to their forgiveness of each other as indicated in S. 64:14, which reads, If you efface (ta‘fu ¯ ) and overlook (tas}fah·u ¯ ) and forgive (taghfiru ¯ ), then behold! God is Forgiving, Merciful. This reflects the teachings of Jesus when he said, You have heard that it was said, ‘An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.’ But I say to you, Do not resist an evildoer. But if anyone strikes you on the right cheek, turn the other also; and if anyone wants to sue you and take your coat, give your cloak as well; and if anyone forces you to go one mile, go also the second mile. (Mt. 5.38–41) Likewise the Qur’a ¯ n calls for forgiveness even in matters of faith, for example, Many of the People of the Scripture long to make you disbelievers after your belief, from envy on their own account, after the truth has become manifest to them. Forgive and be indulgent until God accomplishes his purpose. Behold God is able to do all things. (S. 2:109) Even the Prophet himself is admonished to seek forgiveness: So know that there is no god but God, and ask forgiveness for your sin and for believing men and believing women. (S. 47:19) Seek forgiveness of God. Behold God is Forgiving, Merciful. (S. 73:20) But above all, the Prophet is commanded to exercise forgiveness – al-afu(w): Practise forgiveness, and enjoin kindness . . . . (S. 7:199) In this context, there is a passage in S. 2:286 that is reminiscent of an ancient prayer in the Christian tradition. The passage in the Qur’a ¯ n reads: Our Lord, do not take us to task if we have forgotten or erred. Our Lord, do not lay any obligation upon us such as You have laid on those before us. Our Lord, do not overburden us with more than we can bear. Pardon us, forgive us, and grant us mercy.15 The words from the Christian prayer are:

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World Christianity in Muslim Encounter Almighty God . . . We acknowledge and bewail our manifold sins and wickedness which we from time to time, most grievously have committed, by thought word and in deed, against Your divine majesty, provoking mostly justly Your wrath and indignation against us. We do earnestly repent, and are heartily sorry for these our misdoings; the remembrance of them is grievous unto us; the burden is intolerable. Have mercy upon us . . . . (General Confession: Book of Common Prayer)

Thus it may be appropriate to sum up this section with a reference to S. 3:193, which proclaims: Our Lord! Behold we have heard a caller calling unto faith: (saying) ‘Believe in your Lord!’ So we believed. Our Lord! Therefore forgive us our sins (aghfir lana¯ dhunu ¯ bana¯), and remit from us our evil deeds (kaffir ‘anna¯ sayyi’a¯tina¯), and make us die the death of the righteous. A similar conviction is found in Ps. 86.5, which reads, You Lord are good, and ready to forgive; and plenteous in mercy unto all them that call upon You. Ultimately forgiveness is a uniquely divine prerogative, for example: He is the one who accepts repentance from His servants and pardons evil deeds and knows what you do. (S. 42:25) And those who, when they do an evil thing or wrong themselves, remember God and implore forgiveness for their sins – Who forgives sins except God only? (S. 3:135) God is ‘the Best of forgivers’ (S. 7:155). In his most recent book, Islam. The Quranic Overview, Dr Ibrahim Surty ends his references on the subject of forgiveness – al-‘afw with these words: This noble value controls disputes, reduces litigation and grants peace of mind. It helps greatly to make a person kind, sympathetic, considerate, polite and farsighted.16 By implication the call to forgiveness challenges human beings to follow God’s example, as pointed out by Jesus: Be perfect even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect. (Mt. 5.48) This attitude is summed up in Paul’s Letter to the Colossians, where he wrote,

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Bear with one another and, if anyone has a complaint against another, forgive each other; just as the Lord has forgiven you, so you also must forgive. (Col. 3.13) There is also the hadı¯th no. 13 in al-Nawawi’s collection of Hadı¯th Qudsı¯ which states: No one of you is yet a believer until he loves for his brother what he loves for himself. Both the Christian and the Muslim scriptures make abundantly clear the fourfold nature of forgiveness. They point out that 1. there is a need for confession, i.e., admitting that one has done wrong; 2. there has to be a cessation, i.e., human beings are called to stop sinful practices; 3. there has to be avoidance, i.e., one has to amend one’s way of life so as to avoid any occasion of sin; and 4. there has to be restitution, i.e., one has to recompense those who have been affected by one’s sinful behaviour. This then paves the way for reconciliation.

Reconciliation The etymology of the word ‘reconciliation’ – from ‘re’ – and ‘conciliatio’ indicates a renewal of conciliating measures and is related to ‘conciliar’ – religious councils. It implies a return to a previous state, a bringing together or alongside, hence gain esteem, goodwill. This is reflected in the Arabic term s}ulh} from s}alah}a ‘to be right, good honest, upright’ and al-s}a¯lih.a¯t – good works. The fourth form as}lah}a – meaning to make whole and sound, amend, reconcile, make reconciliation, peace. It should also be noted that in the Qur’¯an the word s}a¯lih} is closely related to the term ¯ma ı ¯ n - faith. Wherever there is ¯ma ı ¯ n there is s}a¯lih.a¯t. One of the most frequently used phrases is alladhı¯na a¯manu ¯ wa ‘amilu ¯ al-s}a¯lih.a¯t – those who believe and do good deeds. ‘Those who believe’ are not believers unless they manifest their inner faith in certain deeds that deserve to be called s}a¯lih}. These s}a¯lih.a¯t are listed in S. 2:83. They are: Worship none save God and be good to parents and to kindred and to orphans and the needy, and speak kindly to humankind; and establish worship and pay the alms – zaka¯t.

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In S. 46:15 there is the term as}lih} – be gracious, to show kindness; is}la¯h} uprightness, righteousness, reconciliation, reformation. A righteous person, a peacemaker is a mus}a¯lih}/mus}lih}, and al-mas}lah}ah (al-‘a¯mmah) – the (common) good. There is the same concept in the Bible, for example, Mark the blameless, and behold the upright, for there is posterity for the peaceable. (Ps. 37.37) The ultimate implication in each case being that there is the underlying concept of ‘reconciliation’. The purpose of s}ulh} is to end conflict and hostility so that people can interact in peace. This is expressed in the term muwa¯da‘ah – implying peace and a gentle relationship. In law s.ulh. is a legally binding contract (‘aqd ) which involves an offer (ı¯ja¯b) and an acceptance (qabu ¯ l ). It is sometimes interpreted as ‘amicable settlement’, for example, S. 4:128. Reconciliation is a restoration to favour, making friends with those before which you were at variance with. This applies as much to the relationship between God and human beings as it does between human beings themselves. In a biblical context this is highlighted in the statement, All this is from God, who reconciled us to himself through Christ, and has given us the ministry of reconciliation. (2 Cor. 5.18) It could be argued that in a Qur’¯anic and Muslim context, God has reconciled Himself with human beings through the revelation of the Qur’¯an as it is written, This is a blessed Scripture which We have revealed. So follow it and be righteous that you may find mercy. (S. 6:155) This the Book wherein there is no doubt, is a guidance to the righteous. (S. 2:2) By implication people can only be righteous by following the ‘guidance’. Jesus too showed that reconciliation with God is dependent on being reconciled with fellow human beings, when he said: So when you are offering your gift at the altar, if you remember that your brother or sister has something against you, leave your gift there before the altar and go; first be reconciled to your brother or sister, and then come and offer your gift. (Mt. 5.23–4) Putting it in another way, it means that if we come to pray but have some outstanding issue with a fellow human being, there is no point in performing or

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saying our prayer; it will simply be a meaningless exercise. We must first settle our differences before we can approach God with a clean and pure heart. Reconciliation is a divine act. This in a Christian context is brought out in the phrase, We love Him because he first loved us. (1 Jn 5.19) The conceptual position on reconciliation rests finally and ultimately in the character of God. This is indicated in S. 8:61, If they (the enemy) incline to peace, you too should incline to it, and trust God. And, You were once estranged and hostile in mind, doing evil deeds, he has now reconciled . . . . (Col. 1.21, 22) Ultimately reconciliation of the differences and diversities in human society according to the Qur’¯an goes back to God’s inscrutable wisdom as expressed in S. 5:48, which states: For each we have appointed a divine law and a traced-out way. Had God willed He could have made you one community. But that He may try you by what He has given you. So vie with one another in good works. To God you will all return, and He will then inform you of that in which you differ. Reconciliation – taba¯dul – involves, calls for and requires reciprocity. If Christians and Muslims are truly committed and submit themselves to the way of God then it behoves them to tread the path of forgiveness and reconciliation. Jesus summarized this when he said ‘Forgive, and you shall be forgiven’ (Lk. 6.37). Likewise it would be true to say ‘reconcile and you shall be reconciled’ because in the end the call is ‘be reconciled to God’ (2 Cor. 5.18) which is the essence of both the Christian and the Muslim tradition.

Notes 1

2

3

L. Rasmussen, Diapraksis of dialog mellem kristne og muslimer i lyset af den afrikanske erfaring (Aarhus: Aarhus Universitetsforlag, 1997). P. Knitter, No Other Name: A Critical Survey of Christian Attitudes Towards World Religions (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis 1985). L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico Philosophicus (Routledge 2001).

40 4

5

6

7 8 9

10 11 12

13 14 15

16

World Christianity in Muslim Encounter The term ‘dynamic equivalents’ was first suggested by Eugene Nida. See also Charles H. Kraft in a paper entitled ‘Dynamic equivalence churches’ published in Conference on Media in Islamic Culture Report ed. R. C. Shumacher (Marseilles: Evangelical Literature Overseas 1974) and ‘Dynamic equivalence churches in Muslim society’, in D. M. McCurry (ed.), The Gospel and Islam: A 1978 Compendium (Monrovia, CA: MARC 1979), pp. 114–22. This methodology has been used by contemporary scholars, such as Mahmud Ayoub, Abdulaziz Sachedina, Ziauddin Sardar, Abdurahman Wahid, Y. al-Qaradawi and others on the Muslim side and M. J. Borg, R. W. Funk, E. Pagels, J. D. Tabor, and others on the Christian side. N. Daniel, The Arabs and Medieval Europe (London: Longman, 1979) pp. 323f. A. Chejne, ‘The role of al-Andalus in the movement of ideas between Islam and the West’ in K. I. Semaan (ed.), Islam and the Medieval West. Aspects of Intercultural Relations (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1980), pp. 110–33. W. M. Watt, The Influence of Islam on Medieval Europe (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1972), p. 84. See B. Roggema, The Legend of Sergius Bahira (Leiden: Brill, 2008). J. B. Phillips, Your God is too Small (London: Epworth Press, 1956). F. Rahman, Major Themes of the Qur’an (Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica 1989), p. 25. See also Rahman, p. 45. M. Khan’s ed. of Bukhari (Riyadh: Darussalam, 1997), Bk. 60, no. 3331, vol. 4, p. 329. Forty Hadith Qudsi selected and translated by E. Ibrahim and D. Johnson-Davies (Beirut/Damscus: Dar al-Qur’an, 1980), p. 82. Ibid., p. 124. This hadı¯th has also been related by al-Bukhari and Muslim. Ibid., p. 126. T. B. Irving, K. Ahmad, M. M. Ahsan, The Qur’an. Basic Teachings (Leicester: Islamic Foundation 1979), p. 134. I. M. Surty, Islam. The Quranic Overview (Birmingham: Qur’anic Arabic Foundation 2007), p. 198.

Part Two

Issues Relating to Christian-Muslim History, Dialogue and Pluralism

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Chapter 4

Dialogue and Religious Truth Claims in Christianity and Islam1 Christian W. Troll

The fundamental question There really is no such thing as a relationship of religions as such with each other, and therefore we also cannot speak of a relationship between religions, ‘shaped by the spirit of dialogue’. It is living persons and human societies that meet and in more or less respectful ways interact with each other, speak with and about each other, and decide to come to terms with each other or not. Therein many factors play a decisive role, such as established cultural phenomena, customs, the legacy of historical circumstances, possible fear of the loss or diminishing of one’s identity and similar concerns. Have the specific characteristics of a given religion – including its doctrines – therefore nothing to do with how people as individuals and as groups interact with each other? This cannot be the case because many people – if not even most – in their ethos are stamped in different ways and to different degrees by the teaching and rituals of their religion, as well as by their respective holy texts and religious institutions. Accordingly, the religious factor does play a role, even if only as one factor among the many others (such as economic, psychological or political factors) influencing one’s thinking, feelings, dealings and behaviour towards others. Thus it can be said that a certain tension exists between the truth claim of a religion on the one hand and tolerance, which generally today one implicitly must regard as a virtue, on the other. Here, in what is necessary brevity, we investigate the strands of tradition of Christianity and Islam and ask how in the light of their respective truth claim today they understand themselves and relate to each other. Do they know themselves to be called to respect one another and even to learn from one another? One should address next the area of tension between the poles of truth claim and claim to tolerance in Christianity (and here especially in its contemporary Catholic variety, which, without any hubris, may be considered the most important worldwide and, in its self-understanding, the most tangible group among the Christians). Thereafter, I attempt to present how this looks analogously in

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the realm of contemporary Islamic culture. Finally, I formulate some basic points of reference for a type of Christian-Muslim thinking and acting that would be marked by a spirit of dialogue. The central question, then, is this: Can the religious worlds of Christianity and Islam, given their respective truth claim, come to an understanding whereby they not just hesitantly and reluctantly accept, as it were, a socio-political pluralism and its required tolerance, but also feel compelled both to recognize the Other in her/his Otherness, and to step in and act as effectively as possible for socially just treatment on their behalf? In other words, on the basis of their specific religious views and their religious conscience, can Christians and Muslims work together in partnership for the well-being of all? And further, can Christian and Islamic doctrines and ethics together develop or provide a valuesystem, along with a corresponding moral conviction and motivation that in essence emerges for the purposes of thriving in pluralistic societies and for pluralistic co-operation at the global level? Here the theme is being taken up on the normative level alone. However, from there we also want to anticipate discussion about concrete chances and difficulties, as well as the possibilities and barriers, of Christian-Muslim co-existence and co-operation in our pluralistic societies.

Truth claims and requirements for tolerance from the Christian perspective The Church’s claim to religious truth and the right of each person and community to social and civic freedom Revealed Truth According to the witness of the New Testament and established in the consciousness of the Church, the truth claim of the Church is to be sent (gesandt zu sein) in the completeness and power of Jesus Christ. The Church knows in faith that it is appointed to be a working sign, an instrument and bearer of the message of Truth, of a message that brings a saving reality to light that until then had remained hidden. This Truth wants to be understood as an event that seeks to press into the public forum and become accepted. This leads to the following question: Can this Church, which believes itself to be a sign and instrument of the revealed Truth entrusted to her, in the view of competing truth claims in pluralistic societies, earnestly claim to tolerate nonChristian individuals and groups – that is, individuals and groups that (at least insofar as Islam is concerned) in similar ways lay claim to be a witness of Truth, which they hold to be universal and final? Beyond this, can this Church credibly call upon its members to respect these others as believing persons, to potentially learn from them, and even in certain ways, to need them?

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Pluralism. Legal and ethical-religious levels Pluralist composition in different constellations is probably a defining feature of contemporary society/ies. The word ‘pluralism’ refers generally to a situation in which – in a person’s thinking, their outlook and their explanation of reality – a great heterogeneous variety of systems co-exist, without one of those systems monopolizing or seeking to monopolize the others. In what follows, we ask first how does the Church envisage co-existence in a pluralistic society on the level of justice, and how does it evaluate this? Is it acceptable for the Church to co-exist with social groups that represent and promote beliefs about humanity and societal living that are contrary to its own truth claim? Correspondingly, in the context of a pluralistic society, is it essentially a matter of how the Church sees its relationship to the other religions on an ethical-religious level, especially her relationship to Islam, a religion whose conception of religious and ethical truth differs substantially from that of the Church, and which considers its own view of individual and community life to not only be final and conclusive, but also to be God-revealed Truth? The traditional, normative Roman Catholic standpoint on the question of civic co-existence in situations of religious or ideological difference was characterized by persistent rejection of civic tolerance. The Church had always refused to accept tolerance as a de-iure principle. Wherever and in whatever measure she had practised tolerance in the past, the Church had only expressed the readiness to accept tolerance as an objective evil – in the sense of a concession to the facts on the ground. The background of the earlier position of the Church was, according to the expression of Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, ‘the principle of the primacy of Truth over freedom, and with that the associated thesis, that no privilege for error over Truth can be permitted; or otherwise conceived, that belief constitutes a legal fiduciary relationship (ein rechtsartiges Treueverhältnis) whose violation is punishable as a “breach of law”’.2 Crucial to the Church’s teaching in this matter before the Second Vatican Council was that the issue was not about people as persons, but rather about ‘Truth’, that is to say, about an abstract concept. In this view the human Person was in fact reduced to be an object of Truth. Justice was not afforded the human Person per se, that is to say, as an outflow of a Person as being, or for the protection of a Person’s human freedom, but rather only in the capacity and insofar as the human Person is situated within the religious and moral Truth. So it was that in concrete life, where Truth does not exist as an essence by itself, but rather as the conviction of truth of real people, everything just lay in the hands of one authority that determined what Truth was. In practice only the Church and those who belonged to her were in possession of justice. In order to secure religious freedom for all citizens, the modern state had no other alternative but to oppose this theory of the Church and to prevent her from putting it into practice. In this way the modern state paved the way for religious freedom against the incipient resistance of the Church.

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From ‘Right of the Truth’ to ‘Right of the Person’ With the Declaration ‘Dignitatis Humanae’ of the Second Vatican Council the universal Church took the step from insisting on the ‘Right of the Truth’ to insisting on the ‘Right of the Person’. It understood ‘ius ad libertatem religiosam’ (right to religious freedom) as an unconditional and publicly acknowledged right of the human Person – whether alone or in relation to others, or, in other words, as freedom of private and public practice of religion corresponding to the requirements of one’s personal conscience. This right stands independent of whether the religious conviction of a particular individual is objectively true or not, and is also independent of the way in which a truth of a particular individual is practised. So, for example, the Church no longer raised any claim to a privileged place in the state. Further, the Catholic state would no longer be seen as the most worthwhile ideal form of a political system. Certainly the Church did not intend that the disintegration of its privileged place should also mean the abandonment of its responsibility to the truth claim of the Catholic faith. She continues to teach the necessity of all persons to search for, recognize and preserve the Truth, especially in those matters that involved God and His Church. The Church does not contradict itself in this matter insofar as she distinguishes between the legal order on the one hand and the ethical obligations on the other. She speaks about the responsibility to seek and hold to the Truth, always in the sense of a moral duty, and leaves untouched the right to the freedom of religion that turns against every form of interference from either the side of individual persons or from the side of the political courts. Clearly religious freedom in the context of the legal framework had to face up to the problem of its limits – limits that arose out of necessity to protect order and freedom in civil society. In practice, it is not easy to determine these restrains. The Declaration of the Second Vatican Council’s ‘Dignitatis Humanae’ refers here to the term ‘public order’: ‘Individual men and social groups are bound by the moral law to have respect both for the rights of others and for their own duties toward others and for the common welfare of all’ (Article 7). Accordingly, this religious freedom in no way represents a general charter for socially inhospitable and intolerant behaviour. It must be controlled through the principle of ‘social compatibility’, which fundamentally stands for legal freedom for all. Personal freedom finds its limits in the freedom of others. Precisely at this point a wide field opens for dialogue between all groups that make up modern society at national and global levels and, not least, between Muslims and Christians. The goal of such dialogue should be the following: On the one side, to continually define the parameters of public order that

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emerge as inalienable for its implementation and sustainability, and which are supported and defended by all participants of the polity. On the other side, the concern is to motivate the various religious and ideological groupings that make up today’s pluralistic society to actively support the ‘common welfare’ (understood in the comprehensive sense) of pluralistic civil society on the basis of their respective confessions. The catalogue of responsibilities for Christian-Muslim dialogue also includes the question, To what extent Christians and Muslims as citizens of a particular state – and as fellow-citizens worldwide – can reach an ethical consensus, the component of which is an undivided and binding ethos – ultimately for the whole of humanity.3 Conversely, efforts in this regard should never overlook that a dialogue of this kind must necessarily stand in profound agreement with the religious truth that becomes known, is witnessed and is nourished through faith.

The witness of the Church for the Truth: Her proclamation mandate and inter-religious dialogue We have already asked whether the Church as an instrument of one such Truth – as confessed in the faith, and as is revealed in Jesus Christ – can raise the honest claim to be open to other religions and their truth claim and message. How can the mission (Sendung) of the Church be understood in a way that goes hand in hand with that, which we understand as dialogue and which maintains the kind of candid openness that is a condition for dialogue? Now, the conviction of the Christian faith, that the fulfilment of revelation is offered by the Church in Christ, does not release her from the duty to hear and learn. Just the same, Christ as well as the Church as one whole must come to terms with the evident notion that He/she does not have a monopoly of possessing as it were the Truth; Rather He/she must be aware of the fact that it is rather the Truth that wants to take ever more possession of the believer, and this holds true for the community of believers, the Church, as well. Even if the dialogue partner may not yet have heard of this revelation, in which God disclosed himself through Jesus Christ, it is nevertheless possible, that s/he – through the power of the Spirit of Christ, which through the rays of Truth enlightens the hearts of all humanity4 – is already captured by this Truth, which s/he still seeks. In reality Christians and others aspire to Truth through dialogue.5 Dialogue and proclamation thus represent inter alia two different measures to articulate and implement the sending of the Church in living. Other measures for instance, are the service of Caritas or engagement for justice. In these instances proclamation and dialogue have two different objectives. Although inter-religious dialogue should not be understood as a means to proclaim the Gospel, it nevertheless remains open to this possibility.6

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Contemporary Islam, societal pluralism, tolerance and dialogue The ummah and ‘Others’ in classical Islamic teaching Islam’s self-understanding as it finds expression in the Qur’¯an is not that of a new religion but rather as a cleansing and restoration of the unique monotheistic religion, which the Creator had foreseen for humanity from the beginning. The Muslim umma bears witness to this ‘Islam’ through its faith and through the Muslims’ ‘practice of good and the forbidding of evil’ (al amr bi’l ma‘ru ¯ f wan nahy min al munkar; cf. S. 3:110). In obedience to God and in brotherly equity the ummah understands itself as the chosen carrier of all God’s blessings, strengthened through His spirit. It will grow and have success (Cf. S. 8:72, 74; 23:1; 33:71; 49:9–19; 58:22). Unbelievers constitute the counterpart to the ummah. They are accused of the sin of equating other gods or things with Allah (shirk). These sins God can never forgive (4:48, 116; 31:13). Because the unbelievers have abjured the unity and oneness of God, they are threatened with damnation at the Last Judgement (39:60, 71–2). God will punish them both in this life and the next (33:73; 48:6). However, with an eye towards the possibility of conversion and salvation, the ummah also can tolerate unbelievers (9:6). But fundamentally the relationship between the ummah and the mushrikûn (polytheists that ‘associate a partner with God’) is once and for all decided: These are not only the enemy of God but also the worst opponents of believers (S. 5:82; here the Jews are named apart from Christians). From the Islamic view, the history of humanity stretches from Creation to the end of time. In the beginning the first man – and subsequently the whole of humanity – found himself in unbroken unity. His fitrah, that is, his nature, enabled men and women to recognize and serve the one God. Thus, the intention and goal of the prophetic proclamation is to preserve this unbroken unity. But precisely this proclamation of one belief and of one cult of worship also provides the cause for the division of humanity into believers and unbelievers. The justice of God, which takes place in history, determines a double fate that corresponds to this division: Believers are saved and rewarded, and unbelievers are punished with humiliation and destruction. The dividing up of humanity into two halves runs through the whole of history. At the same time, the division is based on the free will of humanity and the righteousness of God: On the one hand men and women can, by means of their natural gifts, understand and accept the word of revelation and on the other hand, God’s power preserves their works from the invasion of chaos that would result from idol worship. What begins in unity ends in the division of belief and unbelief, salvation and damnation, reward and punishment, Paradise and Hell.

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Contemporary interpretations of the Qur’a¯n-determined relationship of the ummah to ‘Others’ The integralist, monolithic version To this point our discussion has moved forward on this basis: The message of the Qur’¯an, as it unfolded in the world of the Prophet of Islam in the seventh century, who passes down a divine judgement, then challenges first the Arabian clans and subsequently the entire world to accept radical monotheism and Muh.ammad – as the last of its prophets – to be the ‘seal of the prophets’. As long as it remains true to itself, Islam, in the shape of the ummah, gives testimony to the unity of God and the mission of Muh.ammad, and puts all humanity before God’s adjudication and judgement. This implies the divine command effectively to render and position God’s judgement and challenge into today’s context. But what does ‘effectively render’ mean? As a possible answer to this question, the socio-political dimension, including the fully developed legal infrastructure, such as was developed in Mecca and Medina, could rigidly be adhered to throughout subsequent centuries, at least as a projected target. An answer of this sort denies any positive value to historical change. Developments and new insights do not really exist, according to this view. In this view ‘progress’ is reached only through revision of the deviations and errors of the last centuries. Foundation and criterion for all subsequent times is the unadulterated law-giving phase of Islam, shaped by the Qur’¯an, and which, according to Sunni understanding, also includes the epoch of the four Caliphs ¯ n) that correctly led Islam. This worldview implies a literalist and (al-ra¯shidu unhistorical or timeless ‘reading’ of the Qur’¯an. In regard to the revelation of the Qur’¯an and the foundational model of the Meccan and Medinan periods, this reading rejects, on the one side, any distinction of a metaphysical and ethical-moral level and, on the other side, a legislative or judicial level. Consequently, those religious and political thinkers that privilege this fundamentalist approach to Islam and its foundational period call for a ceaseless effort towards the realization of a universal Islamic state that should be organized according to the model of Medina.7 According to Hasan al-Banna ¯ n) and (1906–49), founder of the Muslim Brotherhood (al-ikhwa¯n al-muslimu representative of the fundamentalist understanding of the Qur’¯an and Islam, such a conviction will set everything into motion in order to establish Islamic sovereignty in the whole world. As he would have it, this goal will be reached through the conquest of both political and military mobilization of the whole ummah.8 With disarming openness al-Banna defended jiha¯d (holy war), the goal of which is, according to his interpretation of the law, ‘to slay unbelievers’ and ‘to destroy their Temple and to shatter their gods’.9 Al-Banna understands this to mean even ‘the duty to fight against the People of the Book’, which in reality means to take action against everyone who does not accept Islam.10 Al-Banna wrote in Egypt in the 1920s and 1930s and in a predominantly Muslim society

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that suffered under colonial bondage. Even to this day his ideas have great powers of attraction. But also many non-Islamist, traditional theologians and legal experts, appear not to accept any real alternative to the ideal of an Islamic, theocratic regime. This would be accomplished through Muslims ‘who have the power in the lands in which they live’.11 As for Muslims that live in non-Muslim lands, ‘they can only make a sincere and earnest attempt, within the limits of possibility, to stir the ruling class or influential groups to absorb into their political system as much Islamic teaching as possible.’12

Interpretation in light of the different levels of the Qur’a¯n However, other Muslim scholars, such as for instance Fazlur Rahman (1919–88) from Pakistan, Mohamed Talbi (1921–) from Tunis and Syed Vahiduddin (1909–98) from India, appeal with various accents for a fully other kind of approach. Their views can generally be summarized as follows: Many injunctions of the Qur’¯an refer to a specific historical situation that is not repeatable. Thus political means, which in that situation were demanded, today may no longer be so, or at least not in the same way. Rather, one has ‘to distinguish their [i.e. the Statements of the Qur’¯an’s] moral value/content and their purely legal aspect. The moral content has a permanent feature whereas the legislative infrastructure must not fail to adapt itself to circumstances which were not foreseen’.13 Cases in point would be what the Qur’¯an prescribes with regard to dealing with military opposition and slavery, with the idolaters, Bedouins and Jews, then, in their specific historical conditioning.14 Thus, according to Syed Vahiduddin, ‘moral and spiritual values and principles claim universal validity and demand compliance without any compromise, social practices with their implicit norms and mores are relative and time bound.’15 Islamic teaching concerning the relationship of Muslims with non-Muslims in the opinion of Vahiduddin, does not have to be read narrowly from the limited context of the life of the Prophet in Mecca and Medina, but should be developed from the framework of the message of the Qur’¯an and from its general moral principles.16 The ummah will always remain entrusted (ama¯nah) with the precious word of God, that makes its appeal on all people and on the whole creation (cf. S. 7:158). The ummah is commissioned to invite (da‘wah17) everyone to the building of a single community of brothers that ‘loves God with one’s whole heart, and each other in God’.18 It is an invitation to the purity of monotheism and to practical brotherhood in justice, an invitation to true humility under the divine law. The catholicity of this consummate community is still a utopia. For its realization it needs the credible witness of Muslims, an exemplary belief, and a contagious practice of faith. Doesn’t the Qur’¯an itself say, ‘[. . .] Had Allah willed He could have made you one community. But that he may try you by that

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which he hath given you (He has made you as you are). So vie one with another in good works [. . .]’ (S. 5:48, cf. 11:118; 16:93; also 2:104; 2:143). The challenging invitation, which goes out from the ummah muslimah to humanity, presupposes the freedom of the individual to accept or refuse the invitation. But Vahiduddin continues still further: Besides the possibility to join the Islamic ummah in its extant, concretely institutional form, there are other ways to positively respond to the encounter with Islam, because Islam can be reached in different dimensions. Conversely, the original and universal Islam may be recognized in all religions and ideologies of the past and present as the profile of commitment in brotherhood to the absolute God, and in the various symbols and models of belief and action. Ultimately every response to the call of the ‘hidden mystery’, the source of all existence, engages Islam in personal ways. When so viewed, the religious harmony of Islam (which is supported by the Islamic spirit) and the understanding of Islam (in all its observable and hidden dimensions) would become operant as an all-penetrating process that since the very beginning was and now is called upon to bestow the expression and definitive imprint to the reality of Islam. Vahiduddin appeals here for a ‘Qur’¯anic humanism’, which ‘is sustained from the vision of man as khalı¯fah on earth, the vicegerent who has to carry out the will of God and yet who is given freedom enough to deviate from His injunctions’.19 God could have prevented any free decision against the original unity by an individual or group. But he created women and men free so that differences in belief and behaviour could arise. Hence it ultimately does not depend on conformity to a given system of forms and symbols, but rather on competing in doing good (cf. S. 5:48). In other words, all depends on whatever measure a person contributes to that which the Qur’¯an calls ma‘ru ¯ f (right conduct), and avoids that which is signified as munkar (reprehensible; cf. S. 3:110, 114 and parallels).20

Concluding remarks: The imperative of the Qur’a ¯ n today It would be a fundamental misunderstanding of Islamic thinking, were one to adopt the commonly given assumptions of the tendency to withdraw from the legislative and political world into a purely private and non-political/religious sphere. Contemporary Muslims like Mohamed Talbi, Syed Vahiduddin and many others21 represent the completely opposite conception, that, if the Muslim ummah wants to enter the constantly changing arena of social legislation and political influence, it cannot be interested in developing its own special world. Rather, together with others, it should participate in fostering the common welfare with the aim to reach maximum justice worldwide. In our pluralistic societies it is essential to work together with others on the basis of mutual respect and real equality. The spiritual mindset that is necessary from Muslim believers as witnesses of God in a pluralistic world may be seen as this: to listen

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to God, who is near to every person. It is a mindset of respect in regard to the deepest obligations of the other – and it is a manner of agreeing with all who seek and strive sincerely for what is true, good and beautiful. It should thus be clear from Christian and Muslim belief that there are established theological grounds for fruitful, pleasant living and working together by Christians and Muslims in secular (in both the sense of pluralistically established as well as maintaining the separation of state and religion) democratic societies. However, the urgent question is this: Will such a way of thinking as we have here presented prevail on a broad basis in the majority of Muslim societies in the foreseeable future? In our reciprocally interdependent, inter-connected world, there hardly would seem to be a genuinely acceptable alternative.

Notes 1

2

3

4

5

6 7

8

9

10

With modifications the text forms chapter 4, ‘Dialog und Wahrheitsanspruch in Christentum und Islam’ in Christian W. Troll, Unterscheiden um zu klären: Orientierung im christlich-islamsichen Dialog (Freiburg 2008), pp. 78–92. It is here produced in English for the first time. Translation by Stephen R. Goodwin. In Second Ecumenical Vatican Council, Declaration Regarding Religious Freedom. With an introduction by Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde (Münster 1968), p. 6. (Cf. also Christian W. Troll, ‘Remarks to the contents and meaning of the Declaration of the Second Vatican Council about religious freedom “Dignitatis Humanae”’, in Islam und Europa als Thema der Deutsch-Türkischen Zusammenarbeit, III. Religion und Tradition: Determinanten moderner Zivilgesellschaften? (Ankara: German Embassy in Ankara, 2004), pp. 36–42. Cf. Hans Küng, Global Responsibility. In Search of a New World Ethic (London 1991), pp. 27ff. Second Vatican Council, Declaration of the Relationship of the Church to Non-Christian Religions (Nostra Aetate), Article 2. Papal Secretariat for Non-Christians, ‘Dialogue and mission. Thoughts and instructions over the position of the Church to the adherents of other religions,’ in L’Osservatore Romano (A weekly in the German language) 14:34–5 (1984), 10f., here p. 10. See also: Päpstlicher Rat für den Interreligiösen Dialog/Kongregation für die Evangelisierung der Völker; Dialogue und Verkündigung (19th May 1991), published by the Secretariat of the German Bishops’ Conference, No. 49–50, 80. Papal Secretariat for Non-Christians, Dialogue and Mission. No. 77. ‘Model (paradigm) from Medina’: The specific religio-political form that Islam took on in the first centuries after the emigration (622) in Medina. Syed Vahiduddin, ed. by Christian W. Troll, Islam in India. Studies and Commentaries, vol. 3: Islamic Experience in Contemporary Thought (Delhi: Chanakya Publications, 1986), p. 236. Cited by Syed Vahiduddin p. 237, n. 4. Cf. Five Tracts of Hasan al-Banna¯ (19061949). A selection from the Madshmu ¯ ’a Rasâ’il al-Imâm al Shahîd Hasan al-Bannâ, trans. Charles Wendell (Berkeley 1978), pp. 80–4, 134–5. Five Tracts, 80–4, 134–5.

Dialogue and Religious Truth Claims 11

12 13

14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

53

Mohammad Manzoor Nomani, Islamic Faith and Practice, trans. Md. Asif Kidwai (Lucknow 1973), p. 140. Nomani, p. 140. Quoted in the Editor’s Introduction to Syed Vahiduddin, ed. by Christian W. Troll, Islam in India. Studies and Commentaries, vol. 3: Islamic Experience in Contemporary Thought (Delhi: Chanakya Publications, 1986), p. 15. Vahiduddin, ibid., (paraphrased). Vahiduddin, ibid. Vahiduddin, ibid., p. 10ff. (paraphrased). Literally, ‘invitation’. Today: terminus technicus for ‘Islamic mission’. Ibn Hisham, Sirat an-nabi , Cairo, no date, 348; Cf. Qur’a¯n 3:104. Vahiduddin, ibid., pp. 141, 142. Sure 3:17; Cf. Z. H. Faruqi (note 4), passim. For more information about contemporary thinkers of this direction, see in Christian W. Troll, ‘Progressive Thinking in Contemporary Islam’, in Encounter. Documents for Christian-Muslim Understanding (PISAI, Roma, N. 317–18, January– February 2007), pp. 27ff. Reprint in: SALAAM. Quarterly to Promote Understanding (New Delhi), 28:3 (July 2007), 97–121. Arabic rendering of this text by Dr. Hamid Fadlalla: ‘Al-fikr al-taqaddumi fi’l-Islam al-mu’asir: nadara Naqdiyya’, in AlMustaqbal al-Arabi (Beirut), 340 (June 2007), 6–23.

Chapter 5

Christian-Muslim Relations in Ethiopia: Lessons from the Past, Opportunities for the Future1 F. Peter Ford, Jr

Introduction When one thinks of the religious landscape of Ethiopia, what usually comes to mind is the historic and colourful Ethiopian Orthodox Church (EOC). Established in the fourth century in the ancient kingdom of Abyssinia (today covering only the northwest section of Ethiopia), the church quickly came under the influence of Athanasius of Alexandria. This developed into an ecclesiastical dependency on the Coptic Church of Egypt, including a theological affiliation with the so-called Monophysite group of Eastern Churches. Apart from this link with the Egyptian Church (which appointed the EOC’s patriarch right up to 1959), the EOC was relatively isolated from the rest of Christendom due to the geographical seclusion of Abyssinia on a mountainous plateau and to the fact that it became nearly surrounded by Muslim regimes. This led to a variety of unique features, most notably the EOC’s distinctive Jewish character reflected in practices such as circumcision and the observance of the Sabbath along with Sunday. The Church has its own canon of scripture, incorporating apocryphal works to both testaments, and its own liturgical language, Ge’ez (generally called ‘Ethiopic’ among Western scholars) from which the modern official language of Amharic derives. A number of sacred legends connected with Israel also arose, especially the belief that the biblical Queen of Sheba was the monarch of Abyssinia, and that during her visit to Jerusalem King Solomon tricked her into a sexual union that produced a son, Menelik I. When the crafty son came of age and visited his father, he managed to abscond with the Ark of the Covenant to Abyssinia, where it is still said to reside in the ancient capital of Axum. Menelik subsequently became the progenitor of Abyssinia’s ruling dynasty, bequeathing a divine sanction that was reinforced by the country’s acceptance of Christianity. Church and state were thus inexorably connected until the fall of Emperor Haile Selasie in 1974, and this political-religious marriage has almost always played a central role in Christian-Muslim relations.

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Christianity in Ethiopia has also been represented in more recent centuries by a very small Roman Catholic presence (forming less than 2 percent of the current population), and by a large number of Protestant denominations who together represent 10–15 percent of the population. The largest of these are the Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus, built on the work of several European and American Lutheran missions, and the Ethiopian Kale Heywet Church, initiated by the interdenominational mission agency SIM. Smaller denominations have developed from the presence of various Baptist, Mennonite and Pentecostal mission agencies. Yet together, the number of Christians in Ethiopia is no more than 60 percent of the people, and it is more likely that only half the population (which now numbers about 70 million) considers itself to be Christian. While accurate statistics are notoriously elusive, the other 40–50 percent is primarily Muslim – a fact that is generally overlooked in contemporary surveys of the Muslim world. In addition, Ethiopia’s contact with Islam began earlier than for any other country. The coming of Islam to Abyssinia and the convoluted relations between Muslims and Christians in this small corner of the world is a complex story that can barely be given justice here. Yet it is a story which bears a striking resemblance to the history of Christian-Muslim relations in the rest of the world. Furthermore, the challenges now facing Ethiopia with regard to ChristianMuslim relations are very similar to those confronting Christians and Muslims elsewhere. It is my hope that this brief study of both the past and the future of Christian-Muslim relations in Ethiopia will lead to valuable lessons for us all in an increasingly globalized society.

The past: A pendulum between concord and conflict2 Foreigners across the Red Sea3 Abyssinia was already politically and militarily involved in southwest Arabia during the centuries prior to the rise of Islam. Although most of Arabia was pagan, both Christians and Jews were also present. The city of Najran in the southwest interior was a Christian (Monophysite) stronghold when a neighbouring king converted to Judaism in the early sixth century and proceeded to persecute the Christians. So great was their distress that they appealed to the Byzantine emperor Justinian for help. Despite theological differences, Byzantium was on good terms with Abyssinia and Justinian prodded their king, based in Axum in what is now the far north of Ethiopia, to send an army which defeated the Arab Jewish king. One of the leaders of the Abyssinian expedition, Abraha, subsequently rebelled against Axum and established his own city-state in Sana. There he built a cathedral which, according to later Muslim sources, was intended to lure pagan Arab pilgrims to Sana along with their lucrative trading. Instead, the

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sanctuary in Mecca to the north, known as the Ka‘bah, which was then in pagan hands, continued to attract most of the pilgrimage business, prompting Abraha to lead an attack on Mecca sometime after the year 540. Abraha’s far superior force, which included elephants, encountered a defeat which Muslims later attributed to divine intervention, as depicted in su ¯ rah 105 of the Qur’¯an entitled ‘The Elephant’. Muslims also claim that the year of Muh}ammad’s birth around 570 coincided with this event, calling it the ‘Year of the Elephant’, although this chronology does not agree with other sources. By the time Muh}ammad was a boy the Persians had conquered southwest Arabia, expelling the Abyssinians for good. Nevertheless, individual Abyssinian Christians could be found throughout Arabia, including in Mecca. In fact, Muh}ammad’s nurse was an Abyssinian slave girl named Barakah Umm Ayman who continued to look after the young boy following the death of his mother at age six (his father had died prior to his birth). As Muh}ammad was reared first in his grandfather’s home and then, following his grandfather’s death at age eight, the home of his uncle, he was undoubtedly influenced by the stable presence of this Christian foreigner (although she later converted to Islam). Muslim tradition also refers to an Abyssinian slave in Mecca named Jabr who would sit at his booth reading aloud from the Bible (presumably in Ge’ez); the young Muh}ammad would sometimes stop and listen, and his later enemies accused him of falling under Jabr’s influence. Yet another Abyssinian slave in Mecca was Bil¯al who became one of the earliest and most committed Muslims; later in Medina Muh}ammad chose him to be the first mu’adhdhin (the one who gives the public call to prayer), due to his melodious voice. The first direct contact between Christian Abyssinia and Islam came during Muh}ammad’s early preaching career in Mecca. Following his initial experience of revelation in 610, Muh}ammad shared his new convictions about God’s unity and justice with family and friends in mostly private conversations. But after a few years of ministry he began preaching publicly, earning disfavour from fellow members of his Quraysh tribe. They were not prepared to change their traditional pagan beliefs and practices, and the tribal elite especially ridiculed his call to get rid of their idols and to reform unjust business practices. In accordance with ingrained tribal custom, Muh}ammad himself was under the protection of his uncle Abu ¯ T}¯alib who, as a clan leader, graciously offered a measure of security to his resolute nephew, even though he never accepted the message Muh}ammad preached. However, other Muslim converts, especially those from the lower echelons of society, were targets of harassment by the Quraysh establishment. During a period of intense persecution (around the year 615), Muh}ammad felt that the fledgling community of believers could not survive in Mecca, and he sought for a place where they could find refuge until their hardship subsided. Despite Mecca’s negative history with the Abyssinian Abraha, it was apparently Muh}ammad’s positive experience with individual Abyssinian Christians which led him to look across the Red Sea and to send most of his followers to the king in Axum.

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Abyssinian chronicles for this period are sketchy and make no mention of this incident. However, several reputable Muslim sources relate how the group of Muslims (numbering 40 in some sources, more than 80 in others) came to the Abyssinian king, often referred to by the Ge’ez term Negus or the Arabic al-Naj¯ashı¯. Following their somewhat secret departure from Mecca, however, the Quraysh leaders also sent two envoys to convince the king that he should send the Muslims back where they could be dealt with by their own people. The king is portrayed as a man of fair judgement who held an open hearing inviting the Muslims to offer their defence. Their spokesman, Muh}ammad’s cousin Ja‘far, described their pagan background and how they began serving the one true God after being convinced of Muh}ammad’s preaching. Asked by the king for a quotation from their scripture, Ja‘far related the story of the annunciation and birth of Jesus from su ¯ rah 19 (Maryam). The king wept upon hearing this, saying ‘This and what Jesus brought have come from the same niche’ and he offered them refuge. But the Meccan envoys did not give up; they privately told the king that the Muslims believed Jesus to be only a creature. So the king held a second session the next day, at which Ja‘far conveyed Muh}ammad’s teaching about Jesus, that he was God’s slave, apostle, spirit and word which God implanted into the virgin Mary. The king picked up a stick and exclaimed, ‘Jesus does not exceed what you said by the length of this stick’ and he sent the envoys away empty-handed. Later Muslim historians referred to this event as the ‘First Hijrah’ in contrast to the Hijrah of 622 when Muh}ammad and most of his followers migrated to Medina. The Muslim contingent remained in Abyssinia for some years; most returned to Mecca when it seemed to be sufficiently safe, while others waited and moved to Medina where local persecution was no longer an issue. Arab sources indicate that only one of the emigrants, ‘Ubayd All¯ah bin Jah}sh, remained in Abyssinia following his conversion to Christianity. Today, however, a group of Muslims in the far north of Ethiopia claim direct descent from some of those who came on the First Hijrah, although there is no record of this assertion. Meanwhile, Muslims have naturally tended to hold the Abyssinian king, whose identity is not certain, in high regard. A few traditions even claim that he later converted to Islam; although most Muslims accept this idea, it is disputed by most non-Muslim scholars. In any case, Abyssinia remained a solidly Christian nation while Islam spread quickly into other regions beyond Arabia.

Neighbours in the Horn of Africa4 In the years following Muh}ammad’s death, the predominant Muslim attitude towards Abyssinia was one of conciliation and restraint. As the early Muslim armies swept across Syria, Persia, Egypt and North Africa, not a single offensive was made against Abyssinia. Most scholars (both Muslim and otherwise) attribute

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this approach to Muh}ammad’s legacy of appreciation for his Christian neighbour across the Red Sea. This is evident in a fascinating statement attributed to Muh}ammad in a h}ad ¯ı th (an account of something Muh}ammad purportedly said or did): ‘Leave the Abyssinians alone as long as they leave you alone.’ Although this statement is not found in what Muslims consider to be the most reliable h}ad ¯ı th collections, and thus its authenticity cannot be fully attested, it nevertheless represents the primary Muslim position during the classical Muslim era. Furthermore, Abyssinia was treated as a special case with regard to the typical Muslim division of the world into two spheres, that is, the ‘Realm of Islam’ (da¯r al-isla¯m) and the ‘Realm of War’ (da¯r al-h}arb). Belonging to neither of these regions, Abyssinia alone was assigned its own domain, the ‘Realm of Neutrality’ (d a¯r al-h}iy¯ad). Instead, during the centuries following Muh}ammad’s death Islam entered the Horn of Africa by peaceful means, primarily through trade and intermarriage. Historical documentation for this early period is sparse and derives mostly from inferences in both Arab and Abyssinian records. One early incident proved to be of consequence, when in 702, in response to an attack on Jiddah by Abyssinian pirates, the Muslims established a prison colony on the Dahlak Islands off the coast of what is now Eritrea. Muslim traders soon followed, establishing settlements there and at other locations along the Horn’s coast, especially the port of Zayla (today in the far north-west region of Somalia). From there the traders gradually penetrated inland to areas east and south of the Abyssinian plateau, and eventually many settled within the Christian kingdom itself. The non-violent nature of this early expansion in the Horn was marred by a growing demand in the Muslim empire for slaves; Muslim traders responded by supplying African captives via the coastal trading centres of the Horn. Since initially these areas were under the control of Abyssinia, the settlers paid tribute to its king, and the two communities achieved a relatively peaceful coexistence. But Axum suffered a decline in the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries, primarily due to its growing isolation from its Christian allies in Egypt and Byzantium and to increasing pressure from the dominating Muslim empire in the north. The Christian kingdom experienced two major dynasty changes whose kings progressively relocated south along the Abyssinian plateau. This instability allowed the Muslims to establish themselves into several sultanates along the southeastern rim of Abyssinia. Among these was the city-state of Harar, destined to become one of the most influential cultural and political centres of Islam in the region. The Christian kingdom regained its former power in the late thirteenth century, and the kings re-established their claim to Solomonic heritage, taking on the title of ‘emperor’. But by this time, Abyssinia was on a collision course with the Muslim states on its border. The constant skirmishes that ensued stemmed from each region’s desire for political and economic control, but religion inevitably played a role. The lack of unity among the Muslim sultanates generally allowed Abyssinia to gain the upper hand; its

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rulers frequently invaded Muslim territories, setting up puppet governors and exacting tribute. Sometimes the Muslims launched counterattacks into Abyssinian territory, but any success was short-lived. However, Abyssinia’s domination over the Muslims peaked in the midfifteenth century. Subsequent decades witnessed a gradual decline in control by the Christian kingdom as regional governors sought to exert their own local influence at the expense of loyalty to the emperor. Meanwhile, in the Muslim sultanate of Adal, east of Abyssinia, an authoritarian style of leadership arose which combined strict Islamic rule with a call for jih¯ad against the Christian kingdom. One of these rulers was Ah}mad bin Ibr¯ahı¯m, called by his Abyssinian enemies Ah}mad Grañ (the ‘left-handed’, sometimes spelled Granj or Gragn). He began by consolidating power over Adal in 1526, establishing the city of Harar as his base. He then considered it to be his divinely appointed mission to unite the Muslim sultanates against Abyssinia and to lead a jih¯ad that would subdue the Christian kingdom forever. Grañ’s vigorous and charismatic personality allowed him to succeed almost completely in his task. After unifying the neighbouring Muslim states under his direction, he incorporated into his growing army the eastern nomadic Somali and Afar tribes (which had also converted to Islam). In 1529, he embarked on his conquest of Abyssinian territory, repeatedly victorious over a weakened kingdom. In the process he destroyed a great number of churches and monasteries and forced the masses to convert to Islam. The emperor was compelled to hide among mountain strongholds until in desperation he appealed for help to the Portuguese, who were quite happy to respond, seeking a foothold in the Horn as part of their own quest for control of the region. Their intervention turned the tide of the invasion. In 1542, Grañ was killed by a Portuguese bullet, and his army quickly disintegrated and fled the troublesome highlands for their more familiar homes in the southeast. Abyssinia was left devastated, its political structure fractured and its people demoralized. Yet the monarchy had not surrendered and the ruling line continued. The church hierarchy had not given in to Grañ and they made it possible for large segments of the population to return to the Christian fold. Meanwhile, the Muslims were also in disarray at the loss of their charismatic leader. Their attempts to recover political unity and to resume their attacks on Abyssinia failed. Furthermore, the Muslim region was soon overrun by the mass migration of the huge Oromo tribes from the southeast area of the Horn, which gained full control of the Muslim areas by the end of the sixteenth century. The Oromos integrated with the local population and mostly converted to Islam; but they made no attempts to expand into Christian territory, and the threat of militant Islam against Abyssinia ceased. The pendulum swung back and another period of relatively peaceful coexistence followed. In Abyssinia, Roman Catholicism made a brief incursion in the early seventeenth century, when Jesuit priests (who had entered following the

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Portuguese intervention) enticed Emperor Susenyos to convert. His son Fasiladas was so alarmed at this influx of Western Christianity that he collaborated with the Muslims to expel or kill all European foreigners. Fasilidas’ policy allowed Islam to become more ingrained in the Muslim areas. Sufi preachers travelled throughout the region, allowing traditional religious customs to become integrated with ‘official’ Islam. Harar was established as an influential Islamic cultural and religious centre. Islam even spread into areas of Abyssinia, which soon caused the local Christian population to react. Thus in the late seventeenth century, Fasiladas’ son Yohannes I took steps to prevent this renewed threat of Islam. His decree of religious discrimination forced Muslims in Abyssinia to live in segregated ghettos where they were often treated with contempt by the Christians. An officially sanctioned attitude of Muslim repression developed, what some have called the ‘Ah}mad Grañ syndrome’, which would ensure that never again would Muslims triumph over the Christian establishment. Subsequent emperors more or less continued this policy right up to modern times. Thus, for example, the erratic reign of Tewodros II (1855–67) was primarily characterized by his obsession with eliminating Islam from his Christian empire. His attempts to carry out this objective were limited, however, by the threat of Muslim incursion on the borders of Abyssinia from Egyptian and Ottoman forces. His successor Yohannes IV, after succeeding to keep the foreigners at bay, embarked on a zealous campaign to Christianize the entire country. His Edict of Boru Meda, issued in 1878, required all Muslim subjects to convert to Christianity or be killed. Most Muslims complied outwardly for the time being but were extremely resentful, and by the time Yohannes’ successor Menelik II reversed the edict more than a decade later, Islamic identity in opposition to Christian supremacy was even more entrenched, both within and outside of Abyssinia.

Residents of the same country5 Menelik’s approach was only slightly more conciliatory than that of Yohannes. It was he who expanded the kingdom’s borders in the late nineteenth century to incorporate most of what is now Ethiopia. Large Muslim regions thus came under his direct rule, sometimes in the face of fierce Muslim opposition. He set up governors in each area and built churches to cater to administrative officials. He also allowed a degree of local autonomy, including the freedom for Muslims to practise their own religion. Nevertheless, Islam became a permanent major feature of the Ethiopian kingdom, and for decades Muslims would be considered at best second-class citizens. Their situation is somewhat comparable to the dhimmı¯ status accorded to Christians and Jews under Muslim rule during medieval period, whereby those communities were allowed relative freedom of religious expression while simultaneously they faced a number of social and political restrictions.

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Thus, as long as the Muslims of Ethiopia acquiesced to Christian supremacy, they were allowed to live in peace; but any resistance was quickly suppressed. During the twentieth century, three brief episodes gave hope to Muslim aspirations in Ethiopia, but each was short-lived. The first of these was the unusual reign of Lij Iy¯asu (1909–17) who adopted Islamic dress and customs in an apparently genuine conversion to Islam. In any case, he raised the fortunes of the Muslims by building mosques, arming local Muslim militias, and making an alliance with Turkey. His actions naturally caused an uproar among both church officials and the Christian populace, and he was deposed and went into exile. The Italian occupation of Ethiopia (1935–41) was the next positive episode for Muslims. When Italy finally sought for a share in the colonial partitioning of Africa, there was little left outside of Ethiopia. Menelik had successfully kept the Italians at bay in Eritrea, but eventually Italy found the opportunity to invade Ethiopia and occupy the entire country until Allied forces managed to push them out and re-install Emperor Haile Selassie. A major part of Italy’s policy of domination over Ethiopia’s church-state establishment was to support the oppressed Muslim population who welcomed the Italians as liberators. Mosques were again built, Arabic was introduced in schools, and Islam was given official recognition. At the end of the occupation, however, the Muslim community again found itself the object of discrimination and repression by the restored Christian regime, partly as a punishment for their cooperation with the Italians. Haile Selassie’s few concessions to the Muslims, such as the establishment of Islamic courts to settle family disputes, did little to dispel Muslim feelings of victimization. The third brief episode of opportunity came in 1974 when Haile Selassie, who increasingly alienated himself from the problems of the people, was deposed by the military, which in turn ran the country through their ‘Committee’ or ‘Derg’. Muslims had formed a major contingent in the demonstrations that led to the coup, and they were initially rewarded with increased rights and a recognition of equality with other Ethiopian citizens. However, the Derg’s increasingly socialist agenda led to the severe repression of all expressions of religion during the dark period of 1977–91. With the downfall of the Derg in 1991 and the establishment of a federal republic officially detached from the church, Ethiopian Muslims finally achieved a sense of equality unparalleled in their previous history. The constitution of 1994 granted equal status to all citizens and to all forms of religious expression. Muslims gained many new freedoms, including the official recognition of Muslim festivals, Islamic education, and travel outside the country (e.g., to Mecca for the H}ajj). Several Muslim organizations were established and Islamic literature began to be published openly. Ethiopian Muslims began to participate in both local and national governments, although they have been careful to deny any intention of establishing an Islamic state. Contacts with neighbouring Muslim countries have increased, allowing for the influx of funds (primarily through informal rather than official channels) for the building of mosques and

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Qur’¯anic schools. Scholarships are provided for Ethiopian Muslims to study in Saudi Arabia, and other countries, whereby those educated can return to help establish and reform Islam in their home communities. This latter feature has led to some dissension among Muslims in certain areas, since those trained abroad often return with a more conservative orientation to Islamic belief and practice which is sometimes stylized as ‘Wahh¯abism’ (after the dominant strain of Islam in Saudi Arabia). Traditional Muslim communities, which have often incorporated a number of practices stemming from local religious customs or from a Sufi orientation, have sometimes resisted the reforming agenda of foreign-trained ‘experts’. Muslims are also frequently divided along ethnic lines (as are Ethiopian Christians), making a national Muslim consensus on certain issues difficult to attain. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the Muslims of Ethiopia have become more visible and more active since 1991. Some would say that they have also become more numerous, yet this claim cannot be substantiated. Although many conversions to Islam (from either traditional belief or from Christianity) are reported, many conversions from Islam (to evangelical Christianity) are also reported. It is more likely that those among the 40–50 percent of the population who have always been Muslims (since Menelik II expanded the borders to incorporate the Muslim regions) are simply expressing their faith more openly than was the case during the decades of repression. Despite this increased visibility and activity of Ethiopian Muslims – or perhaps because of it – Christian-Muslim relations in Ethiopia have, for the most part, returned to a state of concord. At least it can be said that the intense conflict and subjugation of past generations is not present today. Rather, Ethiopian Muslims and Christians live and work side by side, and are often represented in the same family or neighbourhood. Both communities have the opportunity to propagate their faith, a freedom which both exercise regularly. Muslims are gaining access to the political process in many regions, and business and educational opportunities are available to all regardless of religious affiliation. However, the predominance in many areas of one religious community often leaves the other group to experience alienation and sometimes discrimination. Clashes between Christians and Muslims have erupted on several occasions across the country in recent years, resulting in the destruction of houses of worship and a number of injuries and deaths. Efforts by both Muslims and Christians to win converts are frequently met by mistrust or hostility. Many (both Muslims and Christians) have therefore seen the need for improved relations between the religious communities. Yet little has been done practically from either side, other than occasional meetings among local leaders from both groups to seek for peace at a time of instability in a particular region. Formal programmes aiming to provide education about or cooperation with the other group have been virtually non-existent within the Muslim community and the EOC. The situation is somewhat better among the Protestant

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churches, where a few staff persons and educational institutions have been conducting workshops and offering courses to help Christians better understand Islam and to engage in evangelism which is appropriately respectful. This has especially been the case with the Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus (EECMY) which has intentionally sought to provide leadership and training in Christian-Muslim relations since 1969. Progress was rather limited due to the small number of personnel able to devote time to this endeavour, as well as to the difficult situation facing the Ethiopian churches during the Derg period. In 2003, however, the Mekane Yesus Theological Seminary of EECMY initiated its Program in Christian-Muslim Relations, which continues to provide a specialized two-year course of study integrated into the seminary’s Bachelor of Theology curriculum. Although the number of students involved in this program has so far been small, interest in this kind of in-depth training has been growing within EECMY and also among other Protestant churches. Ethiopian Christians are finally beginning to realize that the time is long past when the world of Islam was a foreign entity from which they could keep their distance, although Christian acknowledgement that Muslims now form an integral part of Ethiopian society is still developing. Meanwhile, the year 2006 witnessed the flare-up of three major clashes between large groups of Muslims and Christians in quite separate regions of the country. In each case, property was destroyed (especially churches and/or mosques) and a number of deaths and injuries occurred before local police could move in to quell the unrest. Reasons for this apparent increase in acute sectarian violence are still not fully clear. Many believe that individuals from neighbouring countries (especially Sudan and Somalia), who adhere to and preach a more radical and militant form of Islam, have entered Ethiopia, travelled to these areas, and stirred up local animosity towards Christians. At the same time it seems that Christians in these areas have sometimes engaged in vigorous proselytism that has given rise to a number of Muslim conversions to Christianity, leading to strong resentment from the local Muslim communities. As a result, tensions have increased between the two groups, not only at the local level in these areas but also nationally. This has been intensified by Ethiopia’s military involvement in Somalia at the beginning of 2007. Muslim and Christian leaders (both locally and nationally) are making some effort to meet together and discuss their concerns so as to diffuse any simmering antagonism. But there is a long road ahead before mutual trust, respect and cooperation between Muslims and Christians in Ethiopia are fully realized.

The Future: Challenges for both Muslims and Christians It is clear from this historical survey that relations between Christians and Muslims in Ethiopia have suffered many setbacks since the initial positive experience

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which occurred during Muh}ammad’s lifetime. Overall, the frequency, length and intensity of periods of conflict have without doubt outweighed periods of concord. Although the present situation, built on the changes that have occurred since 1991, offers many opportunities for promoting peaceful coexistence, Christians and Muslims in Ethiopia, both independently and together, face numerous challenges if they are to overcome the hostilities of the past and to maintain a positive relationship in the country of which they are both citizens. Following are some of the more important points that I believe must be addressed in order to achieve this goal. 1. Both Muslims and Christians must strive to overcome barriers of cultural division, misunderstanding and attitudes of antagonism. In some areas of Ethiopia, Muslims and Christians have lived together for decades, even centuries, in harmony and cooperation. But in other parts of the country, divisions run deep, communities are separated, and feelings of fear and suspicion dominate relationships with the other group. Christians and Muslims will often refuse to eat meat slaughtered by the other group or to enter the others’ restaurants or shops. Villages may be divided along religious lines or else inhabited by one group with the clear message that the other group is not welcome. Much of this ill-feeling and maltreatment is based on a lack of knowledge about what the other group believes and how they live out their faith. Both Muslims and Christians, then, must engage in self-education about the actual religious life of the other group. Community religious leaders should take the initiative to gain first-hand knowledge and then to pass this on to those who look to them for spiritual guidance. Educational courses and programmes should especially be developed in training institutions where leaders can be exposed to the real situation rather than hearsay. Members of the other group should be invited to explain the faith and practice of their own community. People should then be encouraged to become true neighbours to those around them who are of the other faith, sharing everyday life experiences, visiting them on religious holidays, and helping them in times of need. Both communities should strive to develop this approach of neighbourliness first, before attempting to convince the other of the validity of their version of faith and practice. Evangelism, whether Muslim or Christian, that is not based on mutually respectful relationships usually leads to defensive attitudes that will produce antagonism rather than honest dialogue and reflection. 2. Both Muslims and Christians must learn to cooperate in matters of community interest. Many of the problems that face Ethiopia as a nation affect all people without regard to religious affiliation. Poverty, weather-related famine, lack of local resources such as clean water, and the HIV/AIDS epidemic – to name just a few – are problems that strike both groups with equal intensity. Communities do themselves a disservice when only one religious group takes

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the initiative to deal with such issues and/or becomes the beneficiary of development or aid concerning any of these problems. One key to overcoming this kind of imbalance is to form local committees which incorporate leaders of all religious communities within that district, allowing all groups a sense of involvement and representation in tackling the problems that face their entire neighbourhood. Such an endeavour can also be extremely effective for maintaining peace between religious groups in a given locality. Many of the destructive clashes that have occurred in recent years might well have been tempered or avoided altogether if leading members of each religious community had come together to air their grievances and search for mutually acceptable solutions. Such dialogue and cooperation at the national level is of course also important, but unless local communities likewise get involved, people at the grass-roots level will fail to benefit. 3. Both Muslims and Christians must search for means to instil religious reform in their respective communities without succumbing to religious extremism. This would seem especially to be a concern for Ethiopian Muslims in the context of regional and global tendencies towards extremist expressions of Islamic religion. To their credit, Muslim leaders in Ethiopia have recognized that religious adherence among their people has often been diminished by over-accommodation to traditional beliefs and customs. Large segments of the Muslim population do not understand or observe even the basic tenets of their faith. One of the main reasons for this has been the restrictions imposed on Ethiopian Muslims in the past by the Christian imperial regime. It would be natural for the Muslim community to react to this fact by trying to impose a puritanical form of religion, retreating into a religious-ghetto mentality that did not take into account the reality of their pluralistic context. Ethiopian Muslims must resist this temptation that has overtaken certain Muslim groups in other areas of the world if they are to fully exercise their new freedoms and take their place as full members of the social order. However, Ethiopian Christians have also not been immune to this tendency. Due to the dominant role that the church has played for centuries in Ethiopian society, Orthodox Christians today often behave as if Ethiopian identity is inherently Christian, and that Muslims do not really belong to their country. It is time for members of the EOC to strive for a church that allows biblical principles of hospitality to reform national tradition. Likewise, Protestant Christians who have disengaged themselves from the strictures of the EOC sometimes follow paths of extreme evangelical fervour which alienate relations with fellow Ethiopians, Muslim and Orthodox alike. People of religion in Ethiopia need to reform themselves along principles of religious moderation explicit in both the Bible and the Qur’¯an, so that they can learn to find common ground as Ethiopian citizens while also respecting each others’ religious differences.

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4. Both Muslims and Christians must help each other to become fully engaged in the political process without domination. Ethiopian Christians especially must recognize the necessity as well as the difficulty of turning from centuries of Christian political control to a truly democratic society. For years the Ethiopian Muslim leadership has expressed rejection of any intention to establish an Ethiopian Islamic state, and it is time that Christians learn to work with their Muslim colleagues on the basis of this assertion rather than fuelling fears of Muslim political supremacy. Ethiopian Muslims likewise must resist any pressure from Muslim-dominated countries in the region to turn their newfound opportunities into one-sided political advantage. However problematic may have been the past political hegemony, and however complex may be the present political state of affairs, Ethiopians of all persuasions are generally committed to the ideal of equal representation and involvement in government at all levels. But this can be achieved only when all groups learn to trust each other and to allow – even assist – each other with regard to their role in the political process, mutually striving for a healthy balance. Only in this way can Ethiopia avoid the dissension that has beset so many nations around the world because one religious group chooses to impose its religious-political agenda on the country as a whole. 5. Both Muslims and Christians must work together to address constructively the complex international issues involving neighbouring countries. The tensions that have often existed between Ethiopia and some of her neighbours, especially Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan, are well known. Although the reasons for such tensions are quite diverse, incorporating regional ethnicity, political ideology and national pride, they also entail issues of religion, especially since all countries on Ethiopia’s border except Kenya have populations where the significant majority are Muslims who often display fundamentalist inclinations. Both Christian and Muslim leaders in Ethiopia have expressed the need to keep radical forms of political Islam out of their country, recognizing that the presence of such elements would only lead to instability. Nevertheless, the Ethiopian Muslim community often feels that statements and actions by the government with regard to bordering nations, which are generally supported by the Christian community, are taken without due consideration for the complications involved concerning the religious aspirations of these countries. Similarly, some Muslim communities have apparently been rather lenient with regard to the infiltration of foreign radical preachers among their people who have been partly responsible for instigating local sectarian violence. Here is another area where both Muslims and Christians in Ethiopia must come together to wrestle through the complexities involved and search together for solutions that will serve the common interest of all. 6. Both Muslims and Christians must find appropriate ways of expressing the unity of their respective communities. Unity among Christians has been

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a perennial problem for the world-wide Church, but in Ethiopia it is exacerbated by the nationalistic dimension of the EOC in contrast to Western characteristics found in most Protestant denominations. Since Protestant churches have drawn many of their members from Ethiopians of Orthodox background, relations between the two bodies have been reserved. The diversity of doctrinal background and practice among Protestants, as well as differing ethnic associations with most groups, have resulted in few churches working together on issues of mutual interest – despite the loose association of several denominations within the Evangelical Churches Fellowship of Ethiopia. One currently hears many calls for Christian unity, but unfortunately this is often invoked for the purpose of taking a joint stand of aggressive resistance against Islam. At the same time, Ethiopian Muslims are often divided along ethnic lines or according to their degree of association with reform movements. Calls for Muslim unity can likewise carry overtones of a unified opposition to Christian provocation. The search for religious unity among either Christians or Muslims must instead be induced by a desire to exercise tolerance in the face of disagreements, by an appreciation for common ground that is simultaneously respectful of genuine differences. It is when Christians learn to work together with other kinds of Christians, and Muslims with Muslims, that the two larger groups can begin to appreciate the need for tolerance and cooperation with each other along with consideration for where they diverge. 7. Both Muslims and Christians must identify shared religious concepts by which they can establish constructive religious dialogue. When it comes to matters of faith, both Christians and Muslims in Ethiopia often assume that members of the other group hold doctrines which are completely antithetical to what they believe. Of course, each group endorses certain teachings that are not shared by the other and which distinguish their own faith as unique. Some religious leaders, however, tend to accentuate those differences as if there were virtually nothing which the two religious communities have in common theologically. Both groups should recognize that there are important commonalities of belief between them as well as differences, and that these shared beliefs can become bridges of communication and understanding. Dialogue on such issues is not meant to minimize the distinctions, but to discover a shared foundation of similar doctrines such that points of divergence can then be meaningfully discussed. A clear example in this regard is the concept of God. Ethiopian Muslims tend to assume that the Christian Amharic word for God, Egziabiher, represents a deity which has nothing in common with All¯ah. Ethiopian Christians likewise often imagine that the name All¯ah refers to some pagan god or even a demonic being, unaware that Christian Arabs have always used this term to refer to the God of the Bible. Both groups need to realize that their distinctive terminology for God does

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8. Both Muslims and Christians must conduct their activities of propagation in accordance with honest dialogue and mutual respect. Christians and Muslims alike in contemporary Ethiopia enjoy the freedom of inviting others to consider the claims of their particular beliefs and to convert from one religion to the other. Yet this freedom is often viewed with suspicion by each group towards the other. Indeed, the attempt by either Christians or Muslims to win converts of the other group is almost always seen by the ‘target’ group as aggressive behaviour intended to persuade individuals away from the truth and onto a path of error. Methods are often used that are considered to be forceful or deceptive, often criticizing the other faith in a manner involving exaggeration or caricature. Such approaches naturally arouse resistance rather than the intended curiosity or attraction. Muslims and Christians often engage in debates; yet despite the outcome of the argument, both parties tend to adopt defensive postures that close the door to genuine consideration of what the other has to say. Furthermore, Ethiopian culture (as in many other non-Western societies) is characterized by strong family or tribal loyalties, and conversion from one religion to the other is frequently considered to be a betrayal of that allegiance. It is time for both Muslims and Christians to recognize the futility of an aggressive approach to evangelism and to appreciate that such methods in fact often bring about the opposite of the desired result. Some would say that it is better to refrain from conducting evangelism in any form. Instead, all should realize that both Christianity and Islam are by nature missionary religions; the desire and even obligation to bear witness to what one believes is for each group part of their religious identity. Christians and Muslims should thus approach each other as fellow seekers after God’s truth; each other’s convictions must be viewed as a personal choice that should not be abused. At the same time, each must recognize the right of the other, as many have said, ‘to convince and to be convinced’. In Ethiopia, both groups have the right to persuade others that what they believe is true, and both groups have the right to change their minds about what they believe. Respect for these concepts, in the context of appreciation for Ethiopia’s pluralistic society and of cooperation between religious communities, will help to enable efforts of propagation to be conducted without mutual animosity and can instead lead to constructive engagement about matters of faith.

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Conclusion: Lessons for us all It should be fairly clear that both the past and the future of Christian-Muslim relations in Ethiopia in many ways parallel relations between Muslims and Christians in much of the rest of the world. The paradigm of a pendulum swinging between concord and conflict is characteristic of the history of ChristianMuslim relations in many other regions. Of course, in only some of those situations has Christianity been the dominant religion; in much of the Middle East, North Africa, parts of Southeast Asia, and so on, that role has been filled by Islam. In any case, there are numerous examples where peaceful relations have existed in Christian-majority areas as well as in Muslim-majority areas. And there are numerous examples where conflict has developed from Muslim aggression as well as Christian aggression. Furthermore, all of these possible scenarios can be found in today’s world as well as in the past. It is thus incumbent on both Christians and Muslims around the world to develop attitudes and approaches towards the other group that will foster concord rather than conflict. The eight points outlined above which delineate the challenges facing Muslims and Christians in Ethiopia can apply, at least to some degree, to both groups in many if not in most other regions. Christians and Muslims together must acknowledge that it is in their best interest to apply principles of tolerance, moderation, and collaboration to the various types of relationships they have with each other, recognizing that what benefits the other group often benefits one’s own group as well. The frequency and intensity of religious extremism in today’s world (whether Muslim or Christian) means that the majority of adherents who seek to live together in peace must be proactive in preventing tragic incidents and in encouraging mutual contact and cooperative ventures. It may require a great deal of effort to put such principles into action; but the cost resulting from indifference or inactivity would be very high indeed.

Notes 1

2

Themain text of this article is reproduced, with kind permission from the editors, from ‘Christian-Muslim Relations in Ethiopia: A Checkered Past, a Challenging Future’, Reformed Review 61:2 (Spring 2008), 52–70. The article there includes an appended bibliographic essay and extended bibliography. An excellent survey of Ethiopian history, including its important religious elements, is given in Harold G. Marcus, A History of Ethiopia, 2nd edn (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 2002). For an overview of Islam in Ethiopia, see Lidwien Kapteijns, ‘Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa’, in Nehemia Levtzion and Randall L. Pouwels (ed.),The History of Islam in Africa (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2000), pp. 227–50; and especially J. Spencer Trimingham, Islam in Ethiopia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952; London: Frank Cass, 1965).

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4

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Resources valuable for this section include J. Spencer Trimingham, Christianity Among the Arabs in Pre-Islamic Times, Arab Background Series, ed. N. A. Ziadeh (London: Longman, 1979), pp. 287–307; A. Guillaume, The Life of Muh.ammad: ¯ l All¯ah with Introduction and Notes (London: Oxford A Translation of Ish}¯aq’s S¯ırat Rasu University Press, 1955), especially pp. 146–55, 180; and Hussein Ahmed, ‘Aksum in Muslim Historical Traditions’, Journal of Ethiopian Studies (Addis Ababa) 29:2 (December 1997), 47–65. Resources valuable for this section include Mordechai Abir, Ethiopia and the Red Sea: The Rise and Decline of the Solomonic Dynasty and Muslim-European Rivalry in the Region (London: Frank Cass, 1980) and Ethiopia: The Era of the Princes: The Challenge of Islam and the Re-unification of the Christian Empire 1769–1855 (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1968); and Richard Pankhurst, The Ethiopian Borderlands: Essays in Regional History from Ancient Times to The End of the 18th Century (Lawrenceville, New Jersey: Red Sea Press, 1997). Resources valuable for this section include Hussein Ahmed, ‘Islam and Islamic Discourse in Ethiopia (1973–1993)’, in Harold G. Marcus (ed.), New Trends in Ethiopian Studies: Papers of the 12th International Conference of Ethiopian Studies, Michigan State University, 5–10 September 1994: Humanities and Human Resources (Lawrenceville, New Jersey: Red Sea Press, 1994), pp. 775–801; and Terje Østebø, ‘Creating a New Identity: The Position of Ethiopian Muslims in Contemporary Perspective’, Swedish Missiological Themes 86:3 (1998), 423–54.

Chapter 6

Some Medieval Muslim Views of Constantinople Carole Hillenbrand

Constantinople before the coming of Islam Even before the coming of Islam in the early seventh century, the Bedouin tribes of the Arabian Peninsula had heard of the distant city of Constantinople, the Byzantine emperor and the vast realms he governed. Embedded in the oral traditions of pre-Islamic tribal culture, whose principal artefact was poetry, are stories of visits made by semi-legendary Arab rulers and poets to the Byzantine emperor1 in Constantinople. The Bedouin poet, ‘Adi b. Zayd, is reported to have visited Constantinople where he was well received at the court; on ‘Adi’s departure, the emperor instructed the officials in charge of the post routes to provide his guest with horses and every other assistance so that ‘Adi might see the size and strength of the Byzantine Empire.2 An even more celebrated Bedouin poet, and also a ruler, ‘Imru’l-Qays, went to Constantinople to ask for help in regaining his lost kingdom. The emperor Justinian was not unsympathetic to the plight of his visitor but nothing more was heard of this request since ‘Imru’lQays died on his way back to Arabia around the year 540.3 To many inhabitants of Constantinople such visits must have caused quite a stir. The garb of the Bedouin Arabs, their alien speech and ‘otherness’, left a profound impression on the Byzantine court and capital alike. The Arab Monophysite Christian ruler, Harith b. Jabala, from the Ghassanid tribe, had been appointed by Justinian in the early sixth century to police the Byzantine border with the Bedouin Arabs in the peninsula. Around the year 529 Harith came to Constantinople to discuss the succession in his kingdom. He created a powerful impression on the city at large and on the emperor’s nephew Justinus in particular. According to John of Ephesus, years later when Justinus had fallen into his dotage and began to rave and his chamberlains wanted to frighten him, they would simply threaten that Harith would come and attack him.4 Stories of visits such as these indicate that even before the coming of Islam the Bedouin Arabs knew something about Constantinople and that it was a familiar, if somewhat nebulous, concept to them, a distant but not totally inaccessible city.

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Conquest There are echoes of Arab aspirations to capture Constantinople in the earliest Muslim religious literature. In a very rare reference to a historical event, Byzantium is mentioned specifically in the Qur’¯an itself; S. 30:3–5 declares: The Rum have been defeated in the nearer land, and they, after their defeat, will be victorious within ten years. This allusion to Byzantium’s defeat at the hands of the Sasanian Persians in the early seventh century and to Byzantium’s subsequent triumph is then followed by the clear pronouncement that God will give the ultimate victory to the Muslims: In that day believers will rejoice in God’s help to victory. He helps to victory whom He will. God’s word on this issue remained in the hearts of the Muslims and was interpreted as a constant reassurance that they would one day surely conquer Constantinople. It is well known too that sayings (hadith) of the Prophet exist which reflect the conviction that God’s will to bring Islam to the whole world would eventually be accomplished.5 From the very beginning of the Islamic period, then, the adherents of the new faith knew about their mighty Christian neighbours and their capital city, Constantinople. The extraordinary series of conquests in the seventh century saw the Arab Muslim armies destroy the great Sasanian Persian Empire and its capital at Ctesiphon and seize the Byzantine territories of Syria, Palestine, Egypt and North Africa. By 711 the new Islamic empire stretched from Spain in the west to northern India and Central Asia in the east. Yet a much reduced Byzantine Empire and above all Constantinople were still there, and would survive for another seven centuries and more. Already by the middle of the seventh century, when the new rulers of the Muslim empire – the Umayyads – had moved to Damascus and established it as their new capital, they had their sights set on capturing Constantinople for Islam. After all, Damascus was right in the heart of an area previously ruled by Byzantium and it was still permeated by Byzantine cultural and administrative elements. There were good religio-political reasons for this. After a while the Umayyads began to divest themselves of the Byzantine models of government they found in Syria. They wanted an Arabo-Islamic character for their state, they changed their coinage so that it bore Islamic slogans and they made Arabic the lingua franca of their empire. The Umayyad ruler ‘Abd al-Malik (d. 705), the first caliph with a conscious and explicit imperial purpose,6 commissioned the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem, a triumphal statement of the superiority of Islam over the two preceding monotheistic faiths, Judaism and

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Christianity. It was scarcely surprising, therefore, that the Umayyad caliphs also wanted to own and claim for Islam the great city of Constantinople, the very symbol of Christianity and of the Christian imperial tradition as they knew it. Even in the extreme west, hopes of conquering Constantinople were cherished: Spanish Muslims were familiar with the saying attributed to the third caliph of Islam, ‘Uthman: Constantinople will be conquered from al-Andalus. If you succeed in conquering al-Andalus, you will associate with those who will finally take possession of Constantinople.7 Muslim attacks on Constantinople were especially important in the Umayyad period, and in 672 and 715 they were protracted, but there was still a desire to take it under their successors, the ‘Abbasids, who came to power in 750. These regular expeditions are often mentioned in historical sources, geographical works, tradition literature and popular stories; but the chronology of the campaigns against Constantinople and sieges of the city is very difficult to disentangle. It was inevitable that legends would grow up around these expeditions to Constantinople. A close Companion of the Prophet, Abu Ayyub al-Ansari, was the focus of a number of such stories. Despite his advanced age, Abu Ayyub wanted to go on campaign to Constantinople. Tradition had it that he wished to venture forth with Mu’awiya’s son, Yazid, on this hazardous campaign so as to acquire special blessing (baraka) and perhaps because of the tradition predicting that Constantinople would be taken in the time of one of the Companions of the Prophet. Islamic sources report that he was indeed buried beneath the walls of the city.8 Religious scholars at the Umayyad and ‘Abbasid courts attributed traditions to the Prophet which actually reflected contemporary realities and aspirations. The Umayyad ruler Sulayman b. ‘Abd al-Malik may have been inspired to send his brother Maslama on campaign to Constantinople because of the hadith which predicted that the city would be taken by a caliph bearing the name of a prophet (Solomon). Maslama began a siege of Constantinople which began on 25 August 716 and lasted a year, before he was forced to retire. The campaign of Maslama left behind numerous legends and stories. His name became attached to a mosque which he had allegedly built in Constantinople.9 It is possible that there was one mosque at least in Constantinople from early times. Muslim tradition fondly called it Maslama’s mosque, although there is no proof that it was Maslama who had it built. It is far more likely that it was constructed by the Byzantines in response to the needs of many Muslims living there – prisoners, exiles, merchants and travellers. It must be emphasized, however, that by the ninth century, despite their deeply held ambitions, the realization dawned on the Muslims that they were simply not going to take the Byzantine capital in the near future. The fulfilment of this long-cherished aim was, after all, not imminent. In the Muslim

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consciousness, therefore, in popular religion and legend, this ambition was relegated to the distant, indeed messianic future. A group of religious traditions put the conquest of Constantinople back to the end of time and associate it with the Last Day and the appearance of Dajjal (the Antichrist). As for Christianity, in both east and west, it was able to survive, despite the enormous expansion of the Muslim empire, not, as Gibbon argued, because of the Muslim defeat far to the west at Poitiers in 732, but, as Bernard Lewis put it, because of the ‘failure of the Arab army to conquer Constantinople’.10

Conflict It was important for caliphal prestige and Muslim religious self-confidence that the public stance presented in speeches, sermons, chancellery prose and court panegyric poetry should focus on the Byzantines, and their capital city, as the official enemy against whom jihad should be waged. The public position expounded in propaganda between the two great power blocs represented by these two ruling empires was inevitably defined by religion. These blocs shared certain prevailing characteristics – above all, self-confidence and self-sufficiency. Both were heirs to the traditions of Greece and Rome, and both based their power to a large extent on the possession of the Mediterranean. The House of Islam and the eastern Christian empire state both felt culturally superior to each other, since both believed that they alone possessed the ‘truth’. Although the borders between these two medieval ‘super-powers’ remained relatively stable from the eighth century onwards, it was regarded as necessary by the ‘Abbasid caliphs in Baghdad that annual jihad campaigns should be conducted on the Byzantine frontiers, and so for several centuries Byzantium remained the principal military enemy of the Muslim world and was pre-eminently ‘the House of War’.11 Yellow, the colour of flight and cowardice, was long associated in the medieval Muslim sources with the Byzantines, who were known as the Yellow Tribe (Banu’l-asfar).12 In the Muslim accounts of the early conquests, in apocalyptic writings and in popular folklore, the Byzantines were shown as tyrannical rulers whom God had replaced by the Muslims. In such narratives Byzantine armies always outnumber Muslim forces; yet the Banu’l-asfar are reluctant to fight and try to bribe the Muslims. The Byzantines are treacherous and cowardly; some may be mighty warriors but the Muslim victory over them, decreed by God, is total and inevitable. In their long acquaintance with their neighbour Byzantium, the medieval Muslims formed stereotypical views of this mighty Christian power on their doorstep. The Byzantines are seen through the eyes of prejudice, religious differences, propaganda and lack of much first-hand knowledge. In addition to being cowardly in war, they are pale, bad-mannered, and lacking in generosity and hospitality.

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High and low literature still cherished dreams of conquering Constantinople for Islam. Poets flattered their patrons who achieved minor victories on the Byzantine frontier: the capture of a single Byzantine fortress could permit expectations to be raised all over again. When Harun al-Rashid as heir-apparent to the ‘Abbasid caliphate reached the Sea of Marmara in 781–2 and obliged the Empress Irene to agree to a peace treaty and the payment of tribute, a contemporary Arab poet, Marwan b. Abi Hafsa, ignoring the fact that yet again a Muslim army had failed to take Constantinople, rises to panegyrical heights in the following bombastic lines: You have gone round Constantinople of the Byzantines, resting the spear on it so that its walls were covered with ignominy. You just went towards it, and lo, its kings came to you with its poll tax, while the pots of war were boiling.13 The Arab poet Abu Tammam (fl. c. 805–45) celebrates the Muslim victory over Byzantium at Amorium in 836 in the following lines, proclaiming: The days of victory have left pale of face as their name the sons of the Yellow Ones (the Byzantines) and have brightened the faces of the Arabs.14 The prolonged struggle between the ‘House of Islam’ and the eastern Christian empire of Byzantium is portrayed in the ode of an even more famous Arab poet, al-Mutanabbi, celebrating the capture of the Byzantine border fortress of al-Hadath in 954 by the Hamdanid ruler Sayf al-Dawla. Here the poet’s hyperbole reaches a climax in the lines addressed to Sayf al-Dawla: You were not a king routing an equal, But monotheism routing polytheism.15

Co-existence Despite their repeated failure to take Constantinople and the Muslim publicly trumpeted anti-Byzantine polemic and stereotyped expressions of hostility, caliphs and governors kept the city and all that it represented in their memories. Their admiration for this city is clear. Constantinople epitomized imperial power, pomp and ceremony: It was a yardstick by which Muslim rulers everywhere could measure their own greatness. It was a model to emulate, refine and surpass. The great capital cities of the medieval Islamic world, Damascus, Baghdad, Cordoba and Cairo, gauged their prestige by diplomatic contacts with the kings of Western Europe. But it was above all by embassies

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to and from Constantinople, by the exchange of elaborate gifts and splendid luxury goods with the Byzantines, and by the Muslims seeking to outdo Constantinople in grandeur and magnificence that this competitive attitude is revealed. Constantinople is mentioned repeatedly in Muslim geographical literature, diplomatic correspondence, chronicles, travel reports and popular folklore, and an aura of immense prestige and mystique clings persistently to these accounts. Popular literature in the medieval Islamic world also enshrined memories of the Muslim ambition to conquer Constantinople, and oral tradition kept alive stories of the Muslim attempts to take the city; pseudo-historical romances then followed. In the Alf layla wa-layla (The Thousand and One Nights), for example, the sons of ‘Umar b. al-Nu‘man undertake an expedition to Constantinople: In a sea battle they are victorious against the Byzantines. An unsuccessful siege of the city then follows. These legendary elements also infiltrated Turkish folk tradition long before the Ottomans appeared on the scene.16 Given all this interest, it is remarkable to discover that accounts of actual journeys by Muslims to Byzantium are relatively rare. However, some early Islamic geographical books contain quotations from the lost work of a Muslim prisoner of war who languished in Byzantine captivity in the ninth century.17 A Syrian, Harun b. Yahya, was captured by pirates off the coast of Palestine. As a prisoner of war, he visited Constantinople, Venice and Rome. We know little of how he fared in Byzantine hands but he left a very detailed account of the palace of the Byzantine emperor in Constantinople and of the glory of that city, the Church of Haghia Sophia. The account attributed to Harun became the canonical version used by later Muslim writers. The Muslim geographers whose works contain Harun’s account show no concern for its verisimilitude; it would seem that they quote it verbatim, despite its juxtaposition of allegedly precise measurements of buildings, flowery but vague descriptions of Byzantine luxury and accounts of the interior of Haghia Sophia which are clearly in the realm of fantasy. Harun speaks of a cistern in the church from which water is raised to statues on top of the columns: On the festival day it is filled with around ten thousand jars of date-wine and one thousand jars of white honey. Then this mixture is perfumed with lavender, cloves and cinnamon . . . When the emperor. . . enters the church, his glance falls on those statues and he can see this liquid flowing from their mouths and ears . . . Each of the courtiers who escort him in honour of this occasion drinks a mouthful of it.18 The grandeur of the emperor’s retinue and processions deeply impresses Harun: The cortège is preceded by the procession of ten thousand old men, dressed in red brocade, hair flowing down their shoulders, without headgear. They

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are followed by ten thousand young people, dressed in white brocade, all on foot, followed by ten thousand pages, dressed in green brocade; then come ten thousand more pages dressed in sky-blue brocade, holding in their hands double-bladed axes encrusted with gold: then five thousand middle-aged eunuchs, dressed in thick white Khurasani fabrics, then ten thousand pages, Turks and Khazars, dressed in striped waistcoats, carrying lances and shields encrusted with gold . . .19 And the flowery list continues in the same vein, followed by a description of the emperor; this mentions that he wears a tiara and two boots, one red and one black. He carries in his hands a gold box and he goes on foot.20 It is obvious that this account is a mishmash of fact and fiction, exaggerations and precise details. It would appear that Harun witnessed personally a royal procession to the Great Church on Ash Wednesday. The fabled splendour of Byzantine ceremony is recorded here, with the aim of entertaining and titillating the imagination of Muslim readers. We move to safer ground with the work of the great Muslim polymath al-Mas‘udi (d. 956). He had a firm knowledge of the location of Constantinople: Constantinople is in the great land mass which includes the land of Rome, Spain and the countries of the Franks, Slavs and other people of the north. Al-Mas‘udi knew several names for the Byzantine capital – al-Qustantiniyya and Buzantiyya (to indicate the environs of the city). He also mentions two other names, used by the Byzantines themselves: ‘queen of the cities’ (malikat al-mudun) and simply ‘the City’ (tés pólis).21 The Muslim geographer Ibn Hawqal (d. 988) also mentions Constantinople. His description of the city is based on an eye-witness account from a certain Abu’l-Husayn Muh.ammad, a man ‘who was more than 100 years old, a very wise and cultivated person’.22 His narrative concentrates on the Byzantine emperor and his entourage: I have noticed with them that the emperor is followed in hierarchical order by the Logothetos who is the vizier. After him comes the Eparch; his rank allows him to wear two boots, one of which is red and the other black; he is the only person who is able to wear this accoutrement. It is he who has the power to judge, cut, decapitate, imprison and castrate, without needing to consult the emperor. Then comes the Domesticos, then the Patricians numbering 12, no more, no less; when one of them dies, he is replaced by a suitably qualified person. Then come the Zarawira, in innumerable quantity, who are like the commandants who follow the army chiefs. Then come the Turmaques, members of the bureaucratic aristocracy and rich families of Constantinople.23

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It should be noted that the information above is, broadly speaking, not inaccurate. But there is no interest shown in this account in the monuments, religious customs, topography or people of Constantinople. The account bears all the hallmarks of being borrowed from another source, at least once removed from its true originator; hence its lifeless quality. As already mentioned, after the ‘definitive’ account of Constantinople attributed to Harun b. Yahya and recorded by Ibn Rusta, later writers used the same information verbatim, although sometimes extra details were added. Far away in Muslim Spain, the Andalusian polymath al-Bakri (d.1184) writes a long account of Constantinople based on Ibn Rusta. Al-Bakri is, however, interested especially in the horses of the Byzantine emperor which, he says, are the descendants of the horses of Alexander the Great: They bear saddles with saddlebows adorned with green emeralds and rubies; their stirrups, harnesses and other refinements are inlaid with precious stones.24 Al-Bakri also refers to several swords that had belonged to Alexander. Thus a canonical Muslim account is embellished with legendary flourishes that place it firmly in the tradition of Islamic ‘marvel’ literature. The short account of Constantinople written by the eccentric travelling scholar al-Harawi (d. 1215) focuses first on some points of interest to Muslims which have already been discussed above.25 His remaining description of Constantinople mentions . . . bronze and marble statues, columns, amazing talismans, . . . and antiquities the like of which do not have their equal in the lands of Islam.26 His account of Haghia Sophia is disappointing: Haghia Sophia is their great church. I will describe the arrangement of this church later.27 Unfortunately, this tantalizing promise from a veteran traveller is never fulfilled and his narrative ends rather tamely: This city is even greater than its reputation; may God, in His grace and generosity, deign to make of it a land of Islam.28 Did he, one wonders, ever visit the city at all? The whole account has a second-hand feel to it. The account of the late thirteenth-century Muslim ‘Abdallah b. Muh.ammad, a merchant from Sinjar in upper Mesopotamia, who had lived in Constantinople

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for twelve years during the reign of Andronicos II Paleologos, contains some interesting, indeed idiosyncratic, material.29 Relying on an account from his own father, the Muslim scholar al-Jazari writes about ‘Abdallah as follows: My father and he had known each other a long time. . .when my father found out that he had been in Byzantium for twelve years he exclaimed. ‘Hajji ‘Abdallah, is it possible that Muslims who have performed the pilgrimage can settle among the Franks?’ He replied ‘Brother, if I described this city to you, you would understand better and you would know that those who live there have nothing to fear. Thereupon the father of al-Jazari obliges by asking for a description of Constantinople, and ‘Abdallah proceeds: It is a large city, like Alexandria, situated by the sea, and to cross it from one end to the other you must walk from morning until noon. There is a place there, as large as two-thirds of Damascus, surrounded by a precinct wall and provided with a gate which can be opened and shut, which is reserved specially for Muslims so that they can live there. Similarly there is another place where the Jews live. Every evening their two gates are closed at the same time as those of the city. Having established that Constantinople contained Muslim and Jewish quarters, ‘Abdallah then turns to the city’s churches: There are these one hundred thousand churches minus one, but the Great Church completes this number. . . It is one of the most extensive and marvellous buildings that one could possibly see. The place where they position themselves for their prayers consists entirely of ornamental grilles: deacons go and place incense-burners and the incense fume rises up under their clothes. On the walls of this church all the cities of the world and similarly all the professions are represented. . . . They have placed there all the professions and where the tools for each of them come from, but above all of these they have placed a blacksmith who is holding his member and urinating on all the others. In response to the questions which I asked about that they replied that it is because the tools of all the professions come from the blacksmith.30 By far the most famous medieval Muslim traveller was Ibn Battuta (d. 1368), a Berber from Tangier. Often dubbed in Europe the ‘Marco Polo of Islam’, this travel addict included Byzantium among the countries he visited. His account of Constantinople is unusually long.31 He was given an audience by the emperor Andronicos II, but before being allowed into the royal presence, four Greek pages searched Ibn Battuta to see if he had a knife on his person. After this

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procedure, two men on each side of him and two behind him brought him into a large audience-hall: . . . whose walls were of mosaic work, in which were pictured figures of creatures, both animate and inanimate.32 During the audience the Byzantine emperor questioned Ibn Battuta about Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Damascus, Cairo and other places. Pleased with his response, the emperor rewarded Ibn Battuta with a robe of honour and a companion to show him round the city.33 Ibn Battuta goes on to describe what interested him about Constantinople. He notes, for example, that the city wall is formidable ‘and cannot be taken by assault on the side of the sea’. The city itself: . . . is enormous in magnitude and divided into two parts, between which there is a great river, in which there is a flow and ebb of tide.34 He mentions that the two parts of the city are Istanbul on the eastern bank and Galata on the western; in the former are situated the royal residences and bazaars, while the latter area is reserved for European Christians who reside there. Ibn Battuta describes these people as men of commerce and comments that the bazaars there are ‘overlaid with all kinds of filth’. Their churches too are ‘dirty and mean’– stereotypical comments whose origins date from before the anti-Frankish Crusades. His narrative then moves to a description of the ‘Great Church’. The details he provides are flowery, if not fanciful at times, but there is no doubt that he wishes to suggest that Haghia Sophia made a profound impression on him: It is one of the greatest churches of the Greeks; around it is a wall which encircles it so that it looks like a city (in itself). . . . They allow no person to enter it until he prostrates himself to the huge cross. . .which they claim to be a relic of the wood in which the double of Jesus (on whom be peace) was crucified. . . . Inside it is another church exclusively for women, containing more than a thousand virgins consecrated to religious devotions, and a still greater number of aged and widowed women.35 Once again these and other observations are a revealing melange of fact and fiction, including details designed to titillate ‘the folks back home’. Haghia Sophia is the very symbol of this great city; its beauty and splendour are apparent to Ibn Battuta, although his account of the monument focuses on specific elements of interest to his Muslim audience. An important point to note is that Ibn Battuta did not go into the interior of the church, presumably because he did not wish to prostrate himself before the Cross. He therefore remained

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ignorant of the very essence of the building. His stance is that of a conventional medieval Muslim, although he is clearly impressed by aspects of this grand building.

Conclusion As has been shown in the preceding discussion, Constantinople is frequently mentioned in Muslim historical chronicles, religious traditions, geographical works and accounts, tales of the fantastic and other works. Yet the actual level of information recorded in such a wide range of medieval Muslim sources about Byzantium, and the city of Constantinople in particular, is disappointingly meagre and repetitive. It is interesting to note that Muslim accounts of Constantinople written by those who had actually or allegedly visited the city concentrate on the Byzantine emperor and his awe-inspiring entourage, the splendour of the palace and, above all, on the very epitome of Constantinople, the church of Haghia Sophia itself. There is in all this an interesting juxtaposition between high-flown antiChristian polemical writings against Byzantium and the works of travellers and geographers which focus on the fabled city of Constantinople with its aura of grandeur and luxury and which form in many ways part of the literature of marvels (‘aja’ib). However, considering the normally introverted nature of many medieval Muslim writings – the knowledge of the House of Islam sufficing for all the community’s needs – it should be stressed that Constantinople is deemed worthy to receive a significant amount of attention by Muslim authors.

Notes Author’s note: I chose the subject of medieval Muslim views of Constantinople for this Festschrift in honour of Professor David Kerr for a number of reasons. When I first met him forty years ago, he was working at Oxford on the Maronites, and since then he has never lost his early interest in the Christian communities of the Middle East. However, David’s focus in his academic life since Oxford has extended to embrace Muslim-Christian relations where he has played a very important role in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and the Middle East. In all this, his training as an Arabist and theologian has been crucial. This small contribution is dedicated to him with love and admiration. 1 2 3 4

Known in Arabic as Qaysar (Caesar). R. A. Nicholson, A Literary History of the Arabs (Cambridge, 1969), pp. 45–6. Ibid., p. 104. Ibid., pp. 51–2. He is citing John of Ephesus.

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World Christianity in Muslim Encounter For example, Sahih Muslim, Book 14, nos. 4282 and 4283, www.usc.edu/dept/ MSA/fundamentals/hadithsunnah/. B. Lewis, The Political Language of Islam (Chicago, 1988), p. 45. Cf. al-Himyari, Rawd, ed. and trans. E. Lévi-Provençal (Leiden, 1938), 3/6; apud M. Marin, ‘Rum in the works of three Spanish Muslim geographers’, GraecoArabica (Athens) 3 (1984), 117 and n. 51. For example, Muslim in his Sahih mentions a tradition which reports that Abu Ayyub ‘was buried in Constantinople’; Sahih Muslim, Book 14, no. 2506. He died in 669. Cf. for example the report given in Ibn al-Faqih, Kitab al-buldan, ed. M. F. de Goeje (Leiden, 1885), p. 145. B. Lewis, The Muslim Discovery of Europe (London, 1982), pp. 19–20. A. Shboul, Al-Mas‘udi and his World (London, 1979), p. 227. This epithet would easily be transferred to another Christian enemy, the Crusaders, at a later stage; for a recent discussion of this topic, cf. C. Hillenbrand, The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives (Edinburgh, 1999), pp. 240, 255. A particularly outlandish explanation of the origin of the name Banu’l-asfar is given by the geographer Ibn al-Faqih, who tells a story about a Byzantine ruler who was the son of a black father and a white mother and who was therefore called al-asfar (the Yellow One); Ibn al-Faqih, Kitab al-buldan, trans. H. Massé as Abrégé du Livre des Pays (Damascus, 1973), p. 178. Quoted by al-Tabari, Ta’rikh al-rusul wa’l-muluk, 10, ed. M. J. de Goeje et al. (Leiden, 1879–80), p. 505. A. J. Arberry, Arabic Poetry (Cambridge, 1965), p. 62. Ibid., p. 84. Cf. R. Irwin, The Arabian Nights: A Companion (London, 1994), pp. 88–9. Ibn Rusta, Kitab al-a‘laq al-nafisa, trans. G. Wiet as Les atours précieux (Cairo, 1955), pp. 134–43. The Spanish geographer al-Bakri also reproduced Harun’s account; cf. Marin, op.cit., pp. 110–11. Ibn Rusta, trans. Wiet, pp. 137. Ibid., pp. 139. Ibid., pp. 140. A. Shboul, Al-Mas ‘udi and his World: A Muslim Humanist and his Interest in NonMuslims (London, 1979), p. 243. Ibn Hawqal, Kitab surat al-ard, trans. J. H. Kramers and G. Wiet as Configuration de la Terre (Paris, 1964), pp. 190–1. Ibid., p. 191. Marin, pp. 10–11. For example, al-Harawi mentions the tomb of Abu Ayyub and the Great Mosque in Constantinople; cf. al-Harawi, Kitab al-isharat ila ma‘rifat al-ziyarat, ed. J. SourdelThomine (Damascus, 1953), p. 56. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., p. 57. M. Izzeddin, ‘Un texte inédit sur Constantinople byzantine’, Journal Asiatique, 246 (1958), 453–7.

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Izzeddin comments that this description is unusual for a Muslim writer in that it mentions the mosaics of Haghia Sophia. He does not think that it is likely that ‘Abdallah ever entered the interior of the Great Church but that he did see the atrium and the mosaics. After all, Ibn Battuta, ‘Abdallah’s far more famous contemporary, gave up the idea of a visit to Haghia Sophia in order to avoid having to prostrate himself before the Cross; cf. Izzeddin, p. 454. Ibn Battuta, trans. H. A. R. Gibb as The Travels of Ibn Battuta A.D. 1325-1354, II (London, 1962), pp. 504–14. Ibid., p. 505. This is a truly remarkable way of referring to some of the greatest Byzantine mosaics. Ibid., p. 506. Ibid., p. 508. Ibid., pp. 509–10.

Chapter 7

The Abrahamic Faiths in their New Context David B. Burrell

Although Louis Massignon first suggested the umbrella title of ‘Abrahamic faiths’ for Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, the phrase has perdured, for reasons which I shall outline in this homage to a person who introduced me to this new world more than a quarter century ago. In the summer of 1980, after a brief ‘roots journey’ to Edinburgh and to Glasgow (to taste the ‘Burrell collection’), my overland journey to the Holy Land began with Selly Oak Colleges in Birmingham, where the director of the Christian-Muslim Study Centre, David Kerr, welcomed me into the next and most creative stage of my life of inquiry. He did not know he was doing that, of course, but then mentors never realize what their welcoming portends. I had just completed a decade as chair of Theology at the University of Notre Dame in America, where we had creatively incorporated a Judaica position into our faculty by reconfiguring the departments of Hebrew Scriptures, New Testament, and Early Church under the rubric: Judaism and Christianity in Antiquity. (Ironically, if ours had been a ‘Religious Studies’ faculty, we could easily have engaged someone to teach Rabbinics without any reconfiguring at all. As it was, we learned to welcome a Jewish colleague into a theology faculty.) Fresh from that experience of collegiality, and imbued with the realization that Christianity could never be what it is without an intrinsic link to Jews and to Judaism, I still felt something missing. Following a favourite American philosopher, Charles Sanders Peirce, who invariably introduces triadic relations to overcome the dualism inherent in bipolar relationships, I had a premonition that Jewish-Christian relations, like any bipolar relationship, could easily become stuck. (That is what employs marriage counsellors, after all!) So before beginning my trans-European backpacking trek to Jerusalem, in an effort to slough off nine years of administration, I had planned a visit to David Kerr’s Centre. My destination was the Tantur Ecumenical Institute, where I had been deputed to serve for the year as its rector, with the mandate to find my successor and the promise of a sabbatical as the incentive. Founded in 1967 by the then-president of Notre Dame, Theodore Hesburgh, C.S.C., at the behest of Pope Paul VII, Tantur’s brief was inter-Christian ecumenism, Orthodox-CatholicProtestant (including Anglican), yet it was located between two societies – Israeli

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and Palestinian – in which Jews or Muslims predominated. That geographical fact was to shape the rest of my life, and gradually to open fresh perspectives for the Institute itself. My introduction to the world of Abrahamic faiths had begun in 1975 at Tantur, when an American sister, Marie Goldstein, RSHM, with the assistance of the Lilly Endowment, had gathered a group of Jews, Christians and Muslims for a summer in the Holy Land, to learn their respective faiths from each other. At that time few had the foresight to include Muslims in such exchanges, so we participants have always been grateful for that opportunity. Lasting friendships grew out of this shared experience in the Holy Land. In that same year, serving our Holy Cross religious community in Bangladesh had introduced me to Islam in the Asian subcontinent, an experience which made me want to learn yet more about this multi-dimensional faith. So the prospect of an entire year in Tantur drew me to ask advice across Europe regarding ways to undertake the study of Arabic so as to expand Jewish-Christian exchange to include the logical third, Islam, following Peirce’s general recommendation, and so enter a new world of ‘Abrahamic faiths’. Yet all this was quite inchoate when David Kerr and I first met in Selly Oak. He had, as I recall, some astute advice about learning Arabic, yet could say little more, since my mind was a virtual tabula rasa with regard to Islam. Yet we had met, and I was later to look to him for direction when he and Gunn were living in Hartford, Connecticut, at the Duncan MacDonald Center for Muslim-Christian Relations. When they had returned to Scotland, we always promised to get together in Edinburgh, a prospect which pleased me no end, but David’s insouciance about email inhibited pursuing that invitation any further. So this invitation to celebrate his role in my life, on the larger screen of ‘contextual Christianity in the twenty-first century’, offers an unexpected yet serendipitous opportunity. As a philosophical theologian, with roots in the exchange among Jews, Christians and Muslims in a medieval period formative for all three religious traditions, the prospect for ‘comparative theology’ looms inescapable in the century facing us. There simply is no way forward other than dialogue; not as an ‘extra’ but as constitutive of inquiry in each of our Abrahamic traditions. Medieval precedents show us how our traditions have already engaged in significant exchange, carried out when the climate for ‘interfaith relations’ was far less propitious than it has become after the challenge of the Vatican Council II of Nostra Aetate to all Christian churches, and as intellectual inquiry in the West began to move beyond an Orientalist cast.

Christian Mission David Kerr’s consuming interest in the world Church helped me to appreciate the intellectual fertility of studies in mission. My own Catholic religious community of men and women, the Congregation of Holy Cross, was founded by

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a French priest, Basil Anthony Moreau, in 1837, developed in North America, and then followed the founder’s missionary impulse to establish a presence in ten countries in Asia, Africa and South America in little more than a century. An initial visit to Uganda in 1975, en route to my first teaching assignment in our initial mission, Bangladesh, whetted my intellectual interest in missionary strategies, as well as confirming my recent appreciation of Christianity’s internal relatedness to Jews and to Judaism. This first visit to the African continent took me to Mbarara in the southwest of the country, in the heart of East Africa’s ‘great lakes’ region, to celebrate 75 years of Catholic Christianity in Uganda. I was stunned to realize that 1900 marked an ‘Acts of the Apostles’ situation; that is, conveying the message of Jesus to people with no background for it at all. ‘What did they do?’ I asked an older ‘White Father’, the French Missionaries of Africa who had been the first to evangelize this region. Not that my interlocutor had been there 75 years ago, but religious congregations have an ongoing lore which I wanted to tap. His response was telling: ‘We were told that the first ones listened to the people’s stories.’ Two good marks: They learned the language and they listened. He went on to say that his predecessors could then respond, ‘We have stories like that; there was this man Abraham . . ..’ So Paul’s insistence, in the Letter to the Romans, that pagans who came to believe in Jesus were like ‘wild olive shoots grafted . . . to share the richness of the olive tree’ (i.e., of God’s original people, Israel) found a startling verification here. For without those ‘stories’, what meaning could ‘Jesus’ possibly have? Besides this lesson in Judeo-Christian theology, the vibrancy of the celebration in Mbarara bespoke a freshness whose resonances I later came to discover and savour. On to south Asia, where the tiny minority of Catholic Christians (about .3 percent, i.e., less than 1 percent) was virtually eclipsed in a predominantly Muslim populace (92 percent), yet everyone had been united in their battle for independence from Pakistan, culminating four years previous, in 1971. Their independence movement was cultural-linguistic in character, brutally yet unsuccessfully put down by the Pakistani army, eliciting an incursion by Indira Gandhi’s Indian regulars to stop the massacres of civilians. In one of the few candidates for a bona fide ‘just war’, Indian troops broke the siege, demanded the removal of Pakistani troops, and returned home after establishing a modicum of order. Originally united as East and West Pakistan after the 1947 partition, the sole link between the physically separated regions had been a Muslim plurality in each, yet anyone familiar with Islam knows that it presents a variety of cultural faces. Bengali can justly claim to be the literary language of the Asian subcontinent, while the ways of the Bengali people reflect the delta in which they live; whereas the Punjabis of the west inhabit a semi-arid landscape, sloping up to the mountains of Afghanistan, so could boast of being the mainstay of the British imperial army. Moreover, of a piece with these climactic differences, Islam had been brought to eastern Bengal by Sufis with cultural roots in Persia. One senses a ‘softness’ in Bengali Islam, a willingness to share their faith with other-believers.

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It is also a non-Arab Islam, reminding us that 80 percent of Muslims are not Arabs, suggesting ways of living together which tend to distinguish Asian forms of Islam. And our people – Holy Cross priests, brothers, and sisters, now in east Bengal for more than 150 years – had responded in kind. Living at first in Christian villages, where we were asked by Rome to assume the responsibility of once-Portuguese missions, we soon established educational institutions, gaining an influence in the entire society quite disproportionate to the size of the Christian community. Yet predominantly Muslim students and their families never experienced us proselytizing. Prudence could well have dictated such protocol in a predominantly Muslim area, yet I suspect something deeper to have been at work. A clue came when I visited the friend of a friend, then directing the Ford Foundation in Dhaka. After listening to me for a while, he said: ‘You talk like a missionary!’ Taking his measure as a conventional American Jew, I wondered what he might mean by that, yet when I asked, he responded quite simply: ‘You sound like you have time; we have to finish projects by the end of fiscal whatever.’ That, of course, is what a continuous multi-generational presence of religious communities can bring: time; what one begins, another will carry on. For the seed of witness, like friendship, takes time to germinate, so our people tried to live the gospel, primarily Mt. 25 – the parable of the ‘last judgment’ where no one is asked whether they know Jesus, but only how they have treated the least advantaged among them. As a result, after a few decades, those who came to know us through our works would regularly tell us, ‘You are doing what we should be doing’. During my first extended stay in a Muslim country, Bangladesh, I experienced a palpable sense of the presence of God in ‘ordinary believers’, finding that we shared a faith in God. However different the faith-traditions may be, our God was clearly the same.

From ecumenical to interfaith endeavours This experience had become part of me by the time I set out for Jerusalem, meeting David Kerr en route in England. So besides the programmatic insistence of Charles Sanders Peirce that triads were less troublesome than dyads, I needed to come to know as much about Islam as I had about Judaism, to enrich the initial attraction of the 1975 semester in Bangladesh by intellectual inquiry into Islam. The opportunity would present itself before long, as the culturally Jewish milieu of west Jerusalem drew me to the figure of Moses Maimonides, who had been on the periphery of my consciousness since completing a study of the philosophical theology of Thomas Aquinas, Aquinas: God and Action. On arriving by ferry from Piraeus, I entered an ulpan immediately, hoping to gain a working knowledge of Hebrew as a stepping stone to Arabic. I have always been grateful for that step, for mixing with Persian Jews emigrating to Israel in the

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wake of the Islamic revolution offered me a rich sense of the mosaic of Jewish culture, often eclipsed in Israel by dominating European (or Ashkenazi) Jews, and in Jerusalem by their black-coated ‘ultra-orthodox’ counterparts. The presence of ‘Sephardic’ (or ‘Arab’) Jews in an Israeli institution for linguistic assimilation (ulpan) would contrast with their virtual absence among Israeli intellectuals whom I would later encounter in Hebrew University. The ‘pecking order’ of this fledgling Israeli society began to emerge, and I became acutely conscious how it betrays a fatal flaw in the Zionist dream, whose bizarre result has turned out to resemble ‘a bit of Holland’ in the Middle East. Fortunate to identify within a few months my successor as rector at Tantur, a distinguished English Catholic academic and spiritual activist, Donald Nicholl, I could then relish the inherent advantages of this ecumenical institute: located on a hill between Jerusalem and Bethlehem, a thirty-five acre walled-in oasis at a checkpoint, poised between the worlds of Israel and Palestine, so sandwiched between Jewish and Muslim majorities. I came to love the place itself, in part because its prescient location meant one dared not overlook either population or cultural group, and because its largely Palestinian staff evidenced a quality of hospitality and dignified longsuffering which would teach me how to jettison my native American optimism for something more theologically tenable: A perduring hope. Over its thirty years of existence, countless scholars have discovered what one of its founding lights, Oscar Cullman, discovered: Heilsgeographie is every bit as instructive as Heilsgeschichte. My role as rector also introduced me into the ‘ecumenical’ atmosphere of Jerusalem. In the wake of his encounter with the ‘ecumenical patriarch’, Athenagoras, on the Mount of Olives, Paul VI had told my confrere, Father Hesburgh, that he wanted to respond to the urging of the Protestant observers at Vatican II, by founding an ecumenical institute in Jerusalem ‘where we had all once been one!’ Now as Vatican secretary of state, Montini certainly realized that Christians are nowhere more divided than they are in Jerusalem, so the witness of Tantur would have to be a gradual, and for its rector, often an exhausting one! For me, the posturing of ecclesiastics in Jerusalem, often without substantive communities to serve, offered an X-ray vision of the major pitfall of progress in ecumenism: Property. (Karl Marx would have predicted that as well, of course.) So I found the immensely rich panoply of interfaith exchange, already tasted between generations at Tantur in 1975, to be far more attractive than ecclesiastical jealousies. And as the following year of study was to reveal, the subject of my recent study, Thomas Aquinas, had found critical inspiration from both Jewish and Islamic thinkers for his sustained project of showing how ‘sacred doctrine’ could be a proper ‘mode of knowing’. Moreover, generations of Western students of his thought had in fact failed to follow his citation trail to notice the role these Jewish and Muslim thinkers played in his work. In the Mediterranean perspective of Jerusalem and then of Cairo, however, one began to see how his Summa Theologiae, the acknowledged syntheses of Christian theology, had already represented an intercultural, interfaith achievement.

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It would take a few more years to show that, with the supportive Dominican milieus of Isaiah House in Jerusalem (1980–81), with the inspiring presence of Marcel Dubois, OP (d. 2007), and of L’institut Dominicain d’etudes Orientales in Cairo, with its commanding presence, Georges Anawati, OP (d. 1994). These mentors introduced me to the inescapably philosophical dimensions of interfaith work, Dubois with Jews and Anawati with Muslims, as comparative work will always involve entering into different traditions in such a way as to see how one fertilized the other. And as the summer at Tantur in 1975 had shown us all, this begins with persons, for only persons can engage in dialogue, holding out the hope of moving forward ‘one friendship at a time’, as my Notre Dame colleague, Michael Signer, says and exemplifies. In my own case, the twin Dominican venues in Jerusalem and Cairo encouraged me to enter a world of medieval exchange in philosophical theology, suggesting the shape of our task today. The results have been presented in two books, Knowing the Unknowable God (1986) and Freedom and Creation in Three Traditions (1993), supplemented by translations of three major works of the ‘Islamic Augustine’, al-Ghazali. But such historicosystematic inquiries can but offer background for the drama of twenty-first-century Christianity to be enacted on the world stage.

Asia and Africa: Beyond European Christianity As he exemplified it, David Kerr’s consuming passion was Christian mission; that is, the ways in which the gospel continues to be transformed as preaching it in new milieus leads to discovering fresh faces of Jesus. I am reminded here of Jean Danielou’s reflections nearly fifty years ago. In two slim companion volumes, Advent and Salvation of Nations, written in the relative obscurity of occupation to be published in 1948, and soon translated into English, Jean Danielou exercises his engaged scholarship in early Christian relations, both to Judaism and to paganism, to find patterns germane to the continuing missionary activity of the Church.1 (His perspective is decidedly European Catholic, yet that will prove instructive when encountering Tariq Ramadan’s inverse proposals in Western Muslims and the Future of Islam.2) He proposes fascinating ways of using scripture to discern patterns for reflection and action today, as evidenced in the chapter headings: Abraham and the Hebrew covenant, Melchisedech and the covenant of the natural universe, John the Baptist, the mission of the angels, the blessed Virgin and the fullness of time; culminating in the missionary meaning of the cross, the ascension and missionary expansion; and concluding with a prescient reflection on Christ as prophet. Such a use of scripture reminds us that missionary activity is God’s activity, not ours; effectively removing an entire set of questions regarding the neuralgic issue of the ‘salvation of other-believers’ from the agenda, since (one has to say) salvation is God’s business; not ours. Parallel to Thomas Aquinas’ deft definition of a teacher as an ‘inadequate

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secondary cause’, missionaries can at best catalyse and at worst hinder that divine activity: Those whom the Holy Spirit takes hold of to be instruments in carrying out the works that will divinize the world are the prophets of the Old Testament, and apostles of the New: . . . There is always a sacred history going on, accomplished by the Holy Spirit, whereby all spiritual creation is divinized. This is a work of God’s quite beyond our minds to conceive. And the Holy Spirit carries it out by means of chosen human instruments, whom the Holy Spirit must empty entirely of themselves if they are to be of any use.3 Here we have the central thesis of Danielou’s reflections on mission. To the extent that we become instruments of the Spirit we will have carried out mission authentically, yet a conventional way of thinking about mission can eclipse this central condition. Were we to think of ourselves as ‘bringing Christ to India’, for example, we would soon discover, as we tried to do it, that we had brought Portugal right along with us! So the only reasonable way to think about mission is to think of meeting Christ there. And of course that is what happens to those open to the Spirit; it is as simple as ‘reader-response’ criticism: Whoever tries to speak of Jesus to someone formed as a Buddhist will be confronted with questions they will be hard put to answer. So the Spirit has a chance to enter into that cognitive dissonance to reveal to us a new face of that same Jesus. And is that not how mission becomes a continual learning process? As Jesus himself foretold: ‘The Spirit will lead you into all truth’ (Jo 16.13), but only if we realize that truth can never be our possession, but ever calls us to a richer understanding of its immense reaches. It is this capacity to reveal to us a new face of that same Jesus that makes mission indispensable to our attempts to follow him. From another side, let us consider Tariq Ramadan’s recent Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, a study reflecting a person of faith: Someday we are bound to come back to the beginning. Even the most distant pathways always lead us inward, completely inward, into intimacy, solitude between our self and our self – in the place where there is no longer anyone but God and our self.4 He sets out to explore ways in which Muslims might become enculturated in Western society, as they have in so many others. Displaying his grounding in traditional Islamic legal sciences, Ramadan finds few if any real obstacles to adapting Islam to a West which respects freedom of worship, so proving to be a ‘domain of witness’ rather than a ‘domain of war’. Yet one obstacle emerges starkly: the demand for ‘economic resistance’. Despite his clear recognition that

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‘the whole of the Islamic world is in subjection to the market economy’,5 and that ‘western Muslims live at the heart of the system’,6 he reminds us forcibly: The Northern model of development is unexportable: a billion and a half human beings live in comfort because almost four billion do not have the means to survive. The terms of exchange are unequal, exploitation is permanent, speculation is extreme, monopolies are murderous. The prohibition of riba [interest], which is the moral axis around which the economic thought of Islam revolves, calls believers to reject categorically an order that respects only profit and scoffs at the values of justice and humanity. By the same token, the prohibition obliges them to consider and to work out a model that comes closer to respecting the prohibition. In the West, as in the East, we must think of a global alternative, and local projects must be implemented with the idea of leaving the system to the extent possible and not affirming it through blindness, incompetence, or laziness.7 On this issue, there can be no possibility of compromise: The neoliberal capitalist system that has been imposed on the whole world represents a universe in the face of which Muslims must resist and propose an alternative: this is for us an alam al-harb, a sphere of war, which promotes an economic logic responsible for the deaths of tens of thousands human beings every day.8 It is unclear, of course, how many Muslims will be willing or able to acknowledge Tariq Ramadan’s clarion call to be faithful to their tradition in this critical arena, but does not his clear reading of the prohibition against interest remind us how another religious faith can call us to more stringent fidelity to our own? John Noonan has detailed how Christianity deflected a longstanding prohibition against usury, while recent shifts in global economic policy have all but rendered nugatory the Catholic social teaching which inspired European social democracies.9 Quite aside from those disingenuous apologists for ‘the neoliberal capitalist system’ who try to persuade us that it exhibits Christian values, cannot the rest of us be convicted of ‘blindness, incompetence, or laziness?’ No wonder Islam can be perceived as a threat, in this case, to our tepid faith! In fact, when Christians tried to ingest a new revelation to a human being in the Arabian Peninsula in the seventh century, it proved quite impossible, so they could only think of the result as a ‘Christian heresy’. Yet Gerhard Bowering, SJ, has suggested that the purpose Islam might serve, in the providence of God (whatever one may think of its status as a divine revelation), could well be to remind Christians of the truths of their faith! And is not this what is happening to those of us who live and interact with Muslims?10

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A theological interlude. Ramadan insists that ‘the first and most important element of Muslim identity is faith, which is the intimate sign that one believes in the Creator without associating anything with Him. This is the meaning of the central concept of tawh}¯ıd’,11 which he invokes to centre his reflections on ways Muslims’ can enculturate and adapt to fresh cultural milieus. It is worth reminding ourselves that the primary reason it took us four centuries to clarify the central Christian affirmation of faith in Jesus (via Nicaea and Chalcedon) was, of course, the shema: ‘Know, O Israel, that God our God is one and beside Him there is no other’ (Deut. 6.4 and 4.35; Mk 12.32). So, far from tawh}¯ıd contradicting Christian faith in divine triunity, such an uncompromising assertion of divine unity can only reinforce a rigorous orthodox Trinitarian affirmation, particularly in contrast to the bizarre candidates the Qur’a ¯ n itself offers for Christian trinitarian faith. In short, Muslim denial of a bowdlerized version of ‘trinity’ reminds us of the centuries-long struggle our tradition went through to be faithful to the shema: ‘that God our God is one and beside Him there is no other’ — pace some recent Christian theologians enamoured of a ‘social trinity’! Now what does an authentic trinitarian faith entail? Let us turn to Jean Danielou again, to see how he distinguishes the prophethood of Jesus from that of others, including ‘the Prophet’: Jesus. . . never acted as one to whom this knowledge had been revealed, but always as one who possessed it by right of nature, in as much as it was the Father’s secret, and the Father had given all things into the hands of his Son.12 Carrying this a step farther, we can assert this uniqueness of Jesus, which would lead to explicitly trinitarian affirmations regarding the creator, by reminding ourselves that he is God’s revelation. Revelation for us is not primarily in a book but in a person; and whatever may be worthwhile in the controversial Vatican document, Dominus Jesu, comes to this. Moreover, not only is he God’s revelation, but the one through whom all things come to be (Jo 1.3). This parallels Ibn al-Arabi’s insistence that the primal command of God is the one whereby ‘God said “be” and it is’ (Qur’a ¯ n 6:73), while prescriptive commands are secondary to that.13 We might say that the grounding gift is God’s freely creating all that is; the second gift is inviting us creatures to participate in that creating life. Here is where we realize the centrality of our trinitarian faith, all of which stems from the fact that Jesus is God’s revelation, and in being that revelation, sets us straight about free creation as well.14 Nothing more need be said about the distinctiveness of Christian revelation, except to note that those Christian thinkers and faithful who neglect this central fact, and tend to locate our revelation primarily in the words of scripture rather than in the Word made human, have in fact adopted the Muslim view of themselves as ‘people of the book’, and unwittingly placed Christian revelation on a par with Judaism and Islam.

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How may we best appropriate and witness to the revelation given us? There is no gainsaying, of course, the personal path enhanced by friendship. But experience suggests another tried route to which we may have given little reflection, namely, institutional presence. I have already sketched our Holy Cross presence in Bangladesh, yet the Islamic world is studded with schools, sponsored by Christian religious communities, which excel in educating youth. A majority of their students are inevitably Muslim, as parents entrust their children to these schools because the personal care of teachers for students elicits better performance. They also learn that proselytizing is simply not on the agenda of such schools, though ventures like ‘service-learning’ may well be. So the witness these institutions give is one of service, not of domination, with the additional benefit of distinguishing an authentically Christian witness from one which fails to respect the revelation already given to Muslims. Indeed, living in Islamic societies has made it clear to me that any set of practices which fails to respect the faith of others can hardly claim to reflect the revelation God gives in Jesus; while correlatively, institutions which do respect the faith of the students entrusted to them display a way of thinking which does justice to that revelation in practice. And we all know how recurrent practices will display sophisticated understandings of a situation far better than attempts to articulate ‘mission statements’, especially when the practices are institutional. From my experience in Bethlehem and in Cairo as well, I would contend that institutions of this sort effectively exemplify Jean Danielou’s teaching regarding the presence of the Holy Spirit in missionary endeavour, together with the requisite detachment from self required of any authentic missionary. Similar things can be said of Muslim institutional presence in the West, which may offer the best way of implementing Tariq Ramadan’s proposals for ‘western Muslims and the future of Islam’. For that reason, Muslim leaders in the United States resonated with Francis Cardinal George’s seminar at the Chicago ISNA meeting in 1999, when their affinity with Catholics emerged precisely around the question of institutions. For much as nineteenth-century Catholic immigrants who entered a resolutely Protestant society in the United States felt the need to develop parallel institutions of schools and health care to serve their faithful (as well as empower it to assimilate into this society), so Muslims entering a society which beggars description at the beginning of the twenty-first century feel the very same need. So the witness which Ramadan calls for, in this ‘domain of witness’, may best be an institutional one. Yet the primary ‘institution’ for Muslims is the community (umma), of course, as for Christians it is the church. So what I am saying, quite simply, is that the witness expected of each group, in the current ‘domain of witness’, is for each to live the life their respective revelation enjoins. We have seen how the centrality of tawh}¯ıd for Islam can be translated into the centrality of trinitarian faith for Christians. The only sure test of superiority, as the Qur’a ¯ n implies, is their quota of ‘good works’. And such animadversions seem particularly apt when speaking of

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Christianity in the West today, be it in Europe or (in a quite different key) in North America. Yet the tone of discourse from ecclesiastical leaders can exude nostalgia for a ‘past glory’, which in fact meant hegemony and exercise of power. The vitality of African churches reflects a people without power (though individual Africans seek power where they can gain it, like people everywhere), as Christians in west Asia (which is only ‘middle’ or ‘east’ from London!) can teach a hope quite detached from optimism, because they are bereft of power. (When I asked my friend, Alex Awad, dean of the Bethlehem Bible College, how it felt to be utterly powerless, he could only remark, ‘It brings us closer to Jesus, doesn’t it?’ So a Palestinian Baptist reminded this expatriate Catholic how much he still longed for power!) What if the ‘future of the church’ were in the hands of the powerless? Is this not what Christians in the north and west have to learn from the south? So mission returns to its origins, for ‘what goes around comes around’, as a fresh face of Jesus may be re-discovered in those regions which have long thought of the faith as their possession, once they come to realize that no one can possess faith, especially when the ‘message’ is found in the person of Jesus. There are signs that some in Western Europe are realizing this, evidenced in a work sponsored by Cardinal Angelo Scola of Venice, which reaches out to both Jews and Muslims for a renewal of religious life in Europe.15 So we may infer that the revelation of God in Jesus has the capacity to be ever-new, as the lives of persons, together with the institutional presence they exhibit in their work, can put the lie to an all-too-human nostalgia for ‘past glory’. For that glory was of a Christendom securely in power, regularly marginalizing Jews as the ‘other’ in its midst, and demonizing Muslims as ‘the enemy’. We can thank Vatican Council II, with the Spirit who inspired it, that such ‘glory days’ are a thing of the past. Ought the ‘future’ not better be left to the powerless?

Notes 1

2

3 4 5 6 7 8 9

10

Jean Danielou, Advent, trans. Rosemary Sheed (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1951 [1947]); Salvation of Nations, trans. Angeline Bouchard (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1962 [1848]). Ramadan, Tariq, Western Muslims and the Future of Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004). Danielou, Advent, p. 176. Ramadan, p. vii. Ramadan, p. 175. Ramadan, p. 176. Ramadan, p. 188. Ramadan, p. 195. Noonan, John, The Scholastic Analysis of Usury (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957). Gerhard Bowering, S. J, ‘Challenged by Islam’, Concilium 253 (1994) 103–15.

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Ramadan, p. 79. Danielou, Advent, p. 171. Readings in the Qura¯n, selected and translated by Kenneth Cragg (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1999). See Aquinas’ observations of the ‘necessity’ of a trinitarian faith to understand free creation correctly, Summa Theologiae 1.32.1.3. Centro Internazionale Studi e Ricerche Oasis (Dorsoduro, 1, 30123 Venezia, Italia) at http://www.oasiscenter.eu, e-mail: oasismarcianum.it.

Chapter 8

Recent Developments in Christian-Muslim Relations Hugh Goddard

Introduction It is something of a truism to say that the question of the relationship between the Christian faith and other faiths, and perhaps the relationship between Christianity and Islam in particular, has been, and remains, a controversial one, with very widely differing opinions being presented. Someone with a deep appreciation of the diversity of Christian opinion on this question, as well as someone who has made an outstanding contribution towards the constructive discussion of it, particularly with reference to Islam, is of course Professor David Kerr who, as the Chairman of the Mission and Other Faiths Committee of the United Reformed Church in England in the 1970s and 1980s, had to preside over discussions between such widely differing figures as the (broadly Barthian) Dan Beeby and Lesslie Newbiggin and the (famously pluralist) John Hick, an experience which vividly illustrated the range of opinions which existed within just one church in the English context. Out of this experience, however, emerged one of the pioneering studies of the relationship between Christians and members of other faith communities, the United Reformed Church’s Study Handbook for Christians entitled With People of Other Faiths in Britain.1 This study, in 80 pages, provided, after a brief introduction outlining the background to the production of the report and the work of the committee in general, constructive discussion of some of the practical issues involved in relations between Christians and members of other faith communities, nine personal testimonies from people from a wide variety of backgrounds who had found themselves engaged in inter-religious relations, and then discussion of some of the theological issues which had arisen in the course of these developing relations, such as ‘What is the significance of other religions in the purposes of God?’, ‘What is the relationship between dialogue and conversion?’ and more ‘immediate’ questions such as the use of church premises and interfaith worship. A great deal of useful information about different religious traditions and their representative organizations and publications was also included.

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The extent to which new ground was broken by the study can be illustrated quite simply by the use of the words ‘with’ and ‘people’ in the title. Rather than formulating guidance ‘about’ the issues, in other words, and focusing on ‘things’ (i.e. ‘religions’ or ‘traditions’), the study focused on the human dimension of relationships, and while hard questions were not ducked or avoided, particularly in the theological sections, the tone of the handbook was throughout on ‘alongsidedness’, and the conclusion, entitled ‘In the struggle is the blessing’, made it absolutely clear that the business of inter-encounter is neither easy nor comfortable but, for all the difficulty, it is tremendously rewarding, even blessing. Dialogue is an adventure, a risk, a struggle and a wrestling with issues which will injure us, break our comfortable convictions and perhaps challenge us to deepen our convictions by changing them. But we believe that this is one way in which the Church is being led by the Holy Spirit in our times, and we must “go forth” trusting in the continual blessings of the Spirit . . .2 The handbook thus made an enormous contribution to the process of promoting and encouraging positive relationships between Christians and members of other faith communities in England and in the wider United Kingdom, with Professor Kerr contributing one of the nine testimonies included in the handbook, focusing on his own experience of trying to help Christians develop a sensitive understanding of Islam (pp. 53–5), particularly in the Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations in Birmingham which he had founded in 1976 and in which he was then based. Much water has flowed under the bridges of the world since the publication of this handbook, however, and in the more than a quarter century which has passed since then Professor Kerr continued to make an enormous contribution to the promotion of better mutual understanding between Christians and Muslims, in Hartford, in Edinburgh, in Lund and in all the continents of the world which he visited in order to teach and to advise. Considerable progress, on the one hand, has been made in achieving this ambition, but on the other hand it cannot be denied that there is no shortage of spectacular examples of ongoing wilful misunderstanding, and even conflict, between the two communities. The challenge therefore remains, and this chapter will review four recent developments in Christian-Muslim Relations in order to try and assess the extent to which progress has been made and the extent to which difficulties remain.

Pope Benedict’s Regensburg lecture When Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger was elected Pope on 19th April 2005, much speculation ensued concerning the extent to which his Papacy would bring

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about a change in both tone and substance with reference to many different issues, including attitudes towards other Christians and towards other religious traditions. With reference to Islam in particular, where his predecessor had taken a number of significant initiatives, including addressing a large gathering of young Muslims in a Muslim-majority context (in Casablanca, Morocco on 19th August 1985, and being the first Pope to visit a mosque (the Umayyad mosque in Damascus on 6th May 2001), it was not very long before a significant shift became evident.3 Newspaper reports spoke of a meeting between the Pope and a number of Roman Catholic experts on Islam, some of them his own former students, at Castelgondolfo, the Papal summer residence, in September 2005, at which it was suggested that there were inherent tensions between Islam and democracy, and that it was difficult for Muslims to accept the idea of re-interpreting the Qur’a ¯ n, given its status as the eternal word of God. On 12th September 2006 this shift in thinking about Islam then became very public in the course of Pope Benedict’s second visit to Germany, a return visit to his Bavarian homeland, as a result of a lecture given by the Pope himself in Regensburg, his old university, where he had taught from 1969 to 1977. The occasion was an academic lecture, with the Pope speaking in his native tongue to an audience made up essentially of former colleagues and associates, almost certainly with no Muslims present, so that he must have felt that he was ‘among friends’, as it were, and the topic of the lecture was not Islam but rather the relationship between faith and reason in the Christian tradition. In the course of the discussion, however, a number of observations and comments were made about Islam, and when these were more widely disseminated it quickly became clear that even if the physical audience, that is those in the lecture hall, were friends, the wider, global, audience, was not necessarily so, and the reaction, particularly in some parts of the Muslim world, very quickly made it clear that the statements of a Pope are of much wider interest, to a universal audience, than the statements of the Prefect for the Congregation of the Doctrine of the Faith, Benedict’s previous office. What the Pope actually suggested in his lecture was that Christianity, properly understood, enjoys a profound harmony with the Greek tradition of reason, so that there is an inner rapprochement between biblical faith and Greek philosophical enquiry. Modern Western thought, however, he suggested, has witnessed the undermining of this synthesis, as a result of both attempts by Christians to ‘de-Hellenise’ Christianity and attempts by other thinkers in the West to limit the sphere of reason to what is empirically verifiable. Europe in particular, the Pope concluded, needs to recover this sense of harmony between the two spheres. In the course of elaborating his argument, however, Pope Benedict included a number of comparative references to Islam, utilizing in particular a dialogue which is supposed to have taken place in the autumn of 1391 between the Byzantine Emperor Manuel II Paleologus and ‘an educated Persian’, the text of

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which has been edited and translated by Professor Adel-Theodore Khoury of the University of Münster.4 The seventh theme of this discussion focuses on the question of the relationship between the law of Moses, the law of Christ, and the law of Muh.ammad, with the suggestion being made that the law of Christ centres on grace and promise, with the law of Muh.ammad focusing much more on such things as vengeance and prohibition, and one illustration of this thesis is the difference which is perceived with reference to the use of violence in order to bring about the spread of the faith. After a reference to S. 2:256 of the Qur’a ¯ n, the verse which asserts that ‘there is no compulsion (ikrah) in religion’, the Pope’s lecture then goes on to quote two paragraphs from the dialogue: Show me just what Mohammed brought that was new, and there you will find things only evil and inhuman, such as his command to spread by the sword the faith he preached;5 and then God is not pleased by blood. . . . Faith is born of the soul, not the body. . . . To convince a reasonable soul, one does not need a strong arm, or weapons of any kind, or any other means of threatening a person with death.6 It needs to be remembered that the context of these quotations is a discussion of the general relationship of faith and reason, with the main thesis therefore being that violence is incompatible with the nature or God and the nature of the soul. It is implied, however, following Khoury’s commentary, that this rejection of the use of violence for the purposes of bringing about conversion, and a preference for the use of reason, is self-evident to the Byzantine emperor, as a Christian, but is viewed differently by Muslims, for whom God is absolutely transcendent and not bound up with any of our categories, even that of rationality. Here Khoury is quoted verbatim by Pope Benedict, and the Pope then goes on to reproduce Khoury’s reference to the comment in the 1956 work of the French Islamicist Roger Arnaldez on Ibn Hazm to the effect that God, as absolutely transcendent, is not bound even by his own word, with the result that nothing could oblige Him to reveal the truth to us and He could, if He wished, instruct human beings to practise idolatry.7 It quickly became clear when the lecture was circulated more widely that there were two problems with this section of the Pope’s lecture, namely its apparent assumption that Islam is somehow inherently violent and its suggestion that Islam is somehow fundamentally irrational. There was a strong reaction from different parts of the Muslim world, with the Pakistani Parliament passing a resolution criticizing the Pope for making derogatory comments about Islam, which have injured the sentiments of Muslims across the world,

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the Head of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt saying that the Pope’s words did not express an accurate understanding of Islam, and a number of leading Muslim thinkers, including Yusuf al-Qaradawi in Qatar and Ali Bardokog˘lu in Turkey calling for the Pope to apologize for his remarks. The Organization of the Islamic Conference, which represents the 57 Muslim-majority nations of the world, commented that it regretted the Pope’s remarks, and the lecture may have been one factor behind the murder of a Roman Catholic nun, Sister Leonella Sgorbati, in Somalia, on 17th September, though local tensions probably played a more significant role in the killing. The statements in the course of the Pope’s lecture about ‘the truth of both’ (i.e. Islam and Christianity), and in the concluding section about the urgent need for a genuine dialogue of cultures and religions today were overlooked (or perhaps subverted) by the two statements about Islam. Efforts were very quickly made by the Vatican to emphasize the point that the two paragraphs which had caused the greatest upset were actually quotations from the Emperor Manuel rather than the Pope’s own words, but this was somewhat disingenuous as unless quotations are mentioned in order to be immediately refuted, which was clearly not the case in this instance, quotations are generally used in order to substantiate a point, in other words they are being commended by the author or lecturer. As well as clarifications, which usually included references to the Nostra Aetate declaration of the Second Vatican Council about Islam, which was described as the ‘Magna Carta’ of Interreligious Dialogue, and which indicated a much more positive view of Islam in what was an official statement of the Roman Catholic Church, in a way that the Regensburg lecture technically was not, Pope Benedict did express his regret for the offence which his remarks may have caused, and apologize, and a number of meetings were held in Rome both with diplomats from Muslim-majority countries and with Muslim scholars in order to stress his desire to strengthen the bonds of friendship and solidarity between the Vatican and Muslim communities around the world, and his desire to build bridges of friendship with adherents of all religions. Perhaps the most significant reaction came from a group of 38 scholars from different parts of the Islamic World who together composed an ‘Open Letter to His Holiness Pope Benedict XVI’ in response to the Pope’s lecture.8 This letter is a powerful testimony to the increasing significance of ‘transnational Islam’, with signatories coming from Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Russia, Slovenia, Yemen, Morocco, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, the Gambia, Malaysia, Oman, Iraq, India, Indonesia, Croatia, Kuwait, Jordan, Iran, Kosovo, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Belgium, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, with eleven Chief Muftis of different regions of the Islamic World included among their number, and including representation of both Sunni and Shi‘i Muslim schools of thought. The tone of the letter is throughout both constructive and positive, but the authors gently correct one or two factual

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errors in the Pope’s lecture, particularly his statement that S. 2:256 comes from the early (i.e. Meccan) period of Muh.ammad’s career when it does in fact come from the later Medina period, and his reference, following Khoury, to Ibn Hazm as a representative figure for Islamic teaching about God: In the Islamic spiritual, theological, and philosophical tradition, the thinker you mention, Ibn Hazm . . . is a worthy but very marginal figure.. . . If one is looking for classical formulations of the doctrine of transcendence, much more important to Muslims are figures such as al-Ghazali . . .. (Section 3) With reference to matters of history, they also make the point that ‘Had Muslims desired to convert all others by force, there would not be a single church or synagogue left anywhere in the Islamic world (Section 6), and, perhaps most importantly, observe in Section 8: You refer at one point . . . to ‘the experts’ (on Islam) and actually cite two Catholic scholars by name, Professor (Adel) Theodore Khoury and (Associate Professor) Roger Arnaldez. It suffices here to say that whilst many Muslims consider that there are sympathetic non-Muslims and Catholics who could truly be considered ‘experts’ on Islam, Muslims have not to our knowledge endorsed the ‘experts’ you referred to, or recognized them as representing Muslims or their views . . . It seems to us that a great part of the object of inter-religious dialogue is to strive to listen to and consider the actual voices of those we are dialoguing with, and not merely those of our own persuasion. Very important questions are raised here about method in the study of religion, namely the respective roles of insiders and outsiders in describing the teaching of different religious traditions, and the crucial question of representativeness – who speaks for, and about, religious traditions and communities – and the Open Letter is thus perhaps the most positive document to emerge from the whole unfortunate episode, in terms of the questions which it raises and the suggestions which it makes for the future. The immediate question in the aftermath of the controversy was whether Pope Benedict’s visit to Turkey, which had been planned for just ten weeks later, at the end of November 2006, would be able to go ahead, but in the end, despite largescale demonstrations in Turkey against the visit, it did. The original intention behind the visit had been an ecumenical, in other words, intra-Christian, one, namely to meet the Ecumenical Patriarch of the Eastern Orthodox Church, Bartholomew I. But in the light of the controversy about his Regensburg lecture, Christian-Muslim Relations acquired a higher profile, with the Pope meeting Ali Bardakog^lu, the President of the Directorate of Religious Affairs, who had been one of the earliest critics of the Regensburg lecture, and, even more significantly,

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during his time in Istanbul, visiting not only the Hagia Sophia, the building built as a Byzantine cathedral by the Emperor Justinian, but then converted into a mosque following the Ottoman Turkish conquest in 1453 and now a ‘secular’ museum, but also the neighbouring Sultan Ahmed (Blue) Mosque, where the Pope took some time to meditate, or even pray, alongside the imam of the mosque in front of the mihrab (i.e. facing Mecca), something which even Pope John Paul II had not done in the course of his visit to the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus. So the day was perhaps in the end saved for Christian-Muslim Relations, but it has to be said that the Regensburg lecture remains something of an ‘own goal’ for the relationship between the two communities in a Christian-majority context, and lessons do need to be learnt, and surely have been learnt, from the whole incident. Perhaps the most important involves the question of whose advice is taken before Papal addresses, in whatever capacity (i.e. either personal or official), and one crucial factor in explaining how the incident occurred is almost certainly the fact that among Pope Benedict’s staff at the time he had lost not only the services of Pope John Paul’s Adviser on Islam, Archbishop Michael Fitzgerald, who had been moved to become the Papal Nuncio in Cairo in February 2006, but also the services of the very experienced media adviser Joaquin Navarro-Valls, a layman who had been the head of the Vatican Press Office for 22 years and who resigned on 11th July 2006, the long-serving Vatican Secretary of State, Angelo Sodano, who resigned on 2nd June 2006, and the Secretary for Relations with States within the Secretariat of State, Giovanni Lajolo, who was in the process of moving to become the Governor of Vatican City. The co-incidence of the recent changes in all four of these important posts must surely be one of the most important factors in explaining how the likely impact of the Pope’s lecture was not properly appreciated in advance. There is also the suspicion that there may have been some influence from some rather unlikely sources, such as the Italian secular journalist Oriana Fallaci, whose two books on Islam, published after the events of 11th September 2001, The Rage and the Pride (2001) and The Force of Reason (2004), verge on the scurrilous, but which became best-sellers, and as a result of which the author was invited for a private audience with Pope Benedict on 27th August 2005. She died, ironically, very shortly after the Regensburg lecture, on 15th September 2006. If this was the kind of opinion which had any influence, however subtle or even subliminal, on the Pope’s thinking about Islam, then it is not surprising that the Regensburg lecture provoked such an outcry.

The ‘Building Bridges’ seminar in Malaysia We turn now to what might be described as an own goal in a Muslim-majority context, involving another region of the world, South-East Asia, and another element of the worldwide Christian community, namely the Anglican Communion.

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The ‘Building Bridges’ Christian-Muslim seminar is an initiative which was begun by the then Archbishop of Canterbury, George Carey, in 2001, to bring together Christian and Muslim scholars from around the world on an ongoing annual basis in order to address issues of common interest and, as the title of the seminar indicates, to seek to build bridges of mutual understanding between the two communities. The events of 11th September 2001 gave an added urgency to the agenda of the seminar, and clearly hung over the first seminar when it met in Lambeth Palace in London on 17th and 18th January 2002, even though planning for the seminar had commenced before the events in New York and Washington DC. The theme of the first seminar was a broad one, the title ‘The Road Ahead: A Christian-Muslim Dialogue’ being intended to allow a review of the road so far, in other words the history of the relationship between Christians and Muslims up to this point, and then move on to a look ahead at the two traditions’ view of their future relationship. Questions of the grass-roots relations between the communities in different contexts were also discussed, along with their respective attitudes towards change. Each theme was introduced by a Christian and a Muslim scholar, with formal responses then being offered by a member of the other tradition, and the discussions were expertly summarized and very efficiently edited by Michael Ipgrave.9 During the course of the next year Rowan Williams was elected as George Carey’s successor, on 23rd July 2002, and following his enthronement and installation it was made clear that this Christian-Muslim initiative was one which he wished to continue, so planning began for a second ‘Building Bridges’ seminar, to take place in Qatar in April 2003. Archbishop Williams had in fact been in New York on 11th September 2001, in Holy Trinity Church very near to the World Trade Center, and his short Writing in the Dust: Reflections on 11th September and its Aftermath10 was one of the most profound reflections on the meaning and significance of the events of that day for both what he calls ‘the Anglo-American World’ and also for the members of the different religious traditions involved. He had also already been closely involved in Christian-Muslim Relations at a grassroots level during his time as Bishop of Monmouth (in Wales) from 1991 to 2002, and one of the first topics on which he chose to deliver a major public lecture was the relationship between ‘Christian Theology and Other Faiths’, which was delivered in the University of Birmingham on 11th June 2003.11 The second ‘Building Bridges’ seminar took place in April 2003 in Doha, at the invitation of the Amir of Qatar, H. H. Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, with a slightly different format from the first in that the programme focused on a close study of the scriptures of the two traditions. Attention was therefore devoted to the whole question of ‘Listening to God, learning from scripture’, to Christian and Muslim scriptural statements about Abraham, to the perspectives of the two traditions about gender, and to their respective attitudes towards ‘the

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Other’, and these themes were studied through detailed investigation of the appropriate texts in the Bible and the Qur’a ¯ n.12 Apart from being of interest in itself, the meeting in Qatar was also interesting in that it was followed by Archbishop Rowan undertaking a pastoral visit to the Supreme Allied Military Command nearby, the headquarters for the invasion of Iraq which had just begun, and also by Archbishop Rowan then laying a foundation stone for a Christian Church building in Doha, the first church building to be built there since the seventh century CE, and the visit as a whole therefore illustrated both some of the opportunities and some of the complexities of Christian-Muslim Relations at the start of the twenty-first century. The fact that the seminar met in Qatar represented the beginnings of another tradition whereby its annual meetings alternated between a Christian-majority and a Muslim-majority venue, and this was continued over the next few years with the third (2004) seminar meeting in Washington DC to discuss the theme of prophecy,13 the fourth (2005) meeting in Sarajevo, Bosnia, to discuss ‘Christians, Muslims and the Common Good’,14 and the fifth (2006) meeting taking place once again in Washington DC to focus on the theme of ‘Justice and Human Rights: Christian and Muslim Perspectives’.15 The year 2005 had also witnessed the bombings on the London underground by four young British Muslims, on 7th July, and again on that day Archbishop Rowan happened to be visiting a Muslim institution, a Muslim madrasa (school) in Wakefield, the county town of the county from which three of the four bombers came, and his statement on the attacks makes very clear the shared condemnation of the attacks and compassion for their victims on the part of both the Christians and Muslims whom he met in Wakefield.16 Planning for the sixth (2007) ‘Building Bridges’ seminar determined that the theme would be ‘Humanity in Context: Muslim and Christian Perspectives on the Vocation of Human Beings’, and with respect to the venue, following the tradition that the seminar alternates between a Christian-majority and a Muslimmajority venue, it was planned that the seminar would be held in Malaysia. The rationale for this was partly geographical, in that the previous seminars in Muslimmajority venues had been in the Middle East (Qatar) and Europe (Sarajevo), so a meeting in Asia, where the majority of the world’s Muslims live, seemed an obvious progression, and partly more strategic in that Malaysia is the most religiously diverse Muslim-majority nation in the world (with significant numbers of Buddhists and Hindus as well as Christians in the population), so there is currently considerable interest in and discussions of questions of religious diversity in general, and of Christian-Muslim Relations in particular. In addition, as the only Muslim-majority country with a significant manufacturing base, Malaysia has a keen interest in issues associated with globalization, and this is symbolized by the fact that for its new English-language service, the al-Jazeera Broadcasting Station has four bases for its rolling 24-hour broadcasts, Kuala Lumpur, Qatar, London and Washington DC.

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Finally, the Prime Minister, Abdullah Badawi, is currently the elected Chairman of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the grouping of the 57 Muslim-majority nations of the world, and in this position he has made a number of speeches, both inside Malaysia and in international contexts, about the importance of ‘Building Bridges’. In August 2004, for example, he addressed the Plenary Commission on Faith and Order of the World Council of Churches, which was meeting at the Federal Hotel in Kuala Lumpur, under the title ‘Dialogue the key to unity of multireligious, multiethnic and multicultural societies’, and in the course of his speech, which included a number of pleas for dialogue, he quoted not only the Qur’a ¯ nic text which is often used as a legitimation of religious diversity and therefore of interreligious conversation, ‘O mankind! We created you from a single pair of male and female, and made you into nations and tribes that you may know one another, not despise one another’ (S. 49:13) but also the Biblical text from the book of Isaiah, ‘They shall beat their swords into ploughshares, and their spears into pruning hooks; nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more’ (Isa. 2.4), concluding ‘These are the common values we have, that if we hold on to these principles, we hope to God, that this world may be more peaceful in future’.17 In a lecture delivered at the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies six months later, on 1st October 2004, Prime Minister Badawi indicated his intention to establish Malaysia as a centre for conflict resolution, both between and within the different civilizations of the world.18 And in a speech to an international conference arranged jointly by New York University and Malaysia’s Institute of Diplomacy and Foreign Relations at the Shangri-La Hotel in Kuala Lumpur on 10th February 2006 on the theme of ‘Who speaks for Islam? Who speaks for the West?’, he specifically called for both the West and the World of Islam to multiply bridge-builders: It is such fine men and women who are capable of reaching out to one another, who are willing to transcend the civilizational divide, that we badly need at this juncture in history. It is a pity that there are not enough of them. One of our most urgent tasks is to multiply the bridge-builders. We must develop through the family, through education and the media tens of thousands of men and women who can be critical of the weaknesses and wrongdoings of one’s civilization and, at the same time, are empathetic towards ‘the other’ civilization. When the bridge-builders reach a critical mass, their collective power would become so overwhelming that it would destroy the walls erected by those who are hell bent on keeping Islam and the West apart. . . . At that point, when the bridge-builders reign supreme, the people of the West will speak for Islam and the Muslims will speak for the West.19 For all of these reasons Malaysia thus seemed an eminently suitable venue for the sixth ‘Building Bridges’ Christian-Muslim seminar.

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It was not to be, however, as some ten days before the seminar was due to take place notification was received by the organizers from the government that it would not be possible to hold the seminar as it was ‘inopportune’ to do so.20 Quite why it was inopportune was not fully explained, but a number of possibilities have been put forward, of which probably the most likely reason involved the timing of the seminar in May 2007, a month during which there was likely to be some sensitivity in inter-religious relations locally as a result of an important legal case on which judgement was due to be delivered at the end of the month. This case involved the controversial matter of conversion, with all its implications for identity politics in the Malaysian context, with Lina Joy, born Azlina Jailani in 1965, appealing against a decision of the Malaysian High Court in 2001 which refused her permission to renounce Islam and apply for ‘Islam’ to be removed from her national identity card. In 1991, aged 26, she had decided, outside Malaysia, to become Christian, and she was baptized in 1998. In 1999 she applied successfully for her name to be changed on her identity card. The statement on her card concerning her religious identity, however, proved more controversial. In 2005 the Appeals Court, by a majority ruling, upheld the decision of the High Court, and on 30th May 2007 the Federal Court, the highest legal authority in the country, again by a majority ruling, rejected her appeal against the High Court decision. The legal situation was complicated by the existence of a dual system of courts in Malaysia, with the civil courts being paralleled by a system of Shariah courts which decide on issues in areas on which Islamic Law has traditionally been influential, particularly involving matters of personal status such as marriage, divorce and inheritance and therefore including, of course, conversion. The Federal Court therefore decided that the National Registration Department, which is responsible for the issuing of identity cards, was justified in arguing that Lina Joy’s religious identity could not be changed on her identity card without a formal certification from the Shariah court that she had converted to Christianity or, to use the traditional term of the Shariah, apostatized. The ruling was, however, a majority one, with the two Muslim judges, Chief Justice Tun Ahmad Fairuz Sheikh Abdul Halim and Justice Alauddin Mohammad Sheriff arguing that the appeal should be rejected and the Christian judge, Richard Malanjum, the Chief Justice of the States of Sabah and Sarawak, arguing that it should be allowed. He also suggested that it was unreasonable to expect Lina Joy to seek a judgement from the Shariah court since in that jurisdiction apostasy is punishable by a fine or imprisonment, or both, but his was the minority opinion in the Court, and considerable resentment was caused by a comment of the Chief Justice, Ahmad Fairuz, that ‘you can’t at whim and fancy convert from one religion to another’, with its suggestion that Lina Joy’s decision had been an impulse rather than a considered judgement.21 The fact that this important legal decision was expected at the end of the month in which the ‘Building Bridges’ seminar was due to be held was

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therefore probably the most important reason for it being regarded as ‘inopportune’, but other factors may have been some concern on the part of the Foreign Ministry about a the seminar serving as a possible distraction from its own seminar, entitled ‘Islam and the West: Bridging the Gap’, which was held just a month later, under the auspices of the Institute of Diplomacy and Foreign Relations, from June 15th to 18th. This was an interesting occasion as the keynote address was delivered by Karen Armstrong, in the presence of the Foreign Minister, Dr Hamid Albar, despite the fact that her book The Battle for God: Fundamentalism in Judaism, Christianity and Islam (London: Harper Collins, 2000) was among 18 books which were banned from distribution in Malaysia by the government in the summer of 2006. Another factor may have been the increasing influence within the government on religious matters of more ‘conservative’ advisers, as opposed to more ‘liberal’ ones, in a way which perhaps parallels the increasing influence of more ‘conservative’ commentators on Islam within the Vatican, which as we have seen is one of the factors which contributed to Pope Benedict’s lecture in Regensburg. But putting all these factors together the cancellation of the ‘Building Bridges’ seminar would seem to suggest first some tension between some of the international pronouncements which are made about ChristianMuslim Relations and local internal actions. Something of this tension may also be seen with reference to the position of Hindus and Buddhists within Malaysia whereby, on the one hand, in tourist spots such as Penang and the Batu Caves, on the outskirts of Kuala Lumpur, very conspicuous statues of respectively the Buddha and Lord Murugan are permitted, whereas in other, more isolated, areas local government agencies are responsible for the destruction of places of worship, particularly Hindu temples.22 Pleas for harmony on the international scene thus sometimes seem to exist alongside a rather harsher local reality, a development which has also been seen in some actions of the religious police in Malaysia, such as the raid by religious enforcement officers at 2 a.m. on an American couple in the tourist area of Langkawi, demanding to see the couple’s marriage certificate. The couple did receive an apology, however.23 Despite the rhetoric of harmony and good relationships between different communities, therefore, and the production of glossy books such as Volume 9 of the Encyclopaedia of Malaysia, on Religions and Beliefs, which in addition to highlighting the religious diversity of the country also points to the good relations which they enjoy with each other, the reality is sometimes different.24 But in this respect Malaysia is no different from most other societies, where publicly stated ideals are inevitably not always realized in practice. As in any other society there is always a debate going on about the future path which the country should take, and it is clear in Malaysia, as elsewhere, that there is a debate taking place both about the role of religion in society – whether or not Malaysia is, or should be, an Islamic state – and about the precise nature of the dominant religion, in this case Islam.25 And in any situation where citizens have an

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opportunity to select those who will hold political power internal forces, or what might be called the ‘home market’, are bound to have significant influence on what is said and done by those who aspire to political office: in a democratic system, the need to secure election is a powerful factor.26 In the light of the cancellation of the sixth ‘Building Bridges’ ChristianMuslim seminar, it would be tempting to re-phrase the famous question asked by Macduff in William Shakespeare’s Macbeth: ‘Stands Malaysia where it did?’ But the organizers of the seminar are not the first people to have had an experience of this kind in the Malaysian context: Ziauddin Sardar, the British Pakistani commentator who spent a number of years working in Malaysia, producing one of the most perceptive descriptions of the changes which he observed during his time there, The Consumption of Kuala Lumpur,27 had a similar experience with reference to a project of his own, which he describes in his autobiography, Desperately Seeking Paradise: Journeys of a Sceptical Muslim, and the conclusion to the book begins: ‘After the Malaysian debacle, I began to spend a great deal of time in the small garden of my house.’28 With respect to the reaction of Archbishop Rowan Williams himself to the cancellation of the seminar, there is a certain irony in the fact that the day before news of the decision reached London from Malaysia he delivered the first Zaki Badawi Memorial Lecture at Lambeth Palace, on the subject of ‘Islam, Christianity and Pluralism’, and in the course of the evening he received the 2005 Building Bridges award from the Association of Muslim Social Scientists, in recognition of his contribution to better understanding between faiths, with messages of goodwill from both the Foreign Minister of Turkey and the Chief Mufti of Egypt.29 His response to the cancellation of the seminar was characteristically gracious, commenting simply that Muslims and Christians need to ‘keep our bridges in good repair’.30 In a possible reference to the previous seminar in the series which had been held in a Muslim-majority context, the 2005 seminar in Sarajevo, he thus urged that careful attention needs to be devoted by Christians and Muslims to maintaining their existing bridges, even if attempts to build new ones are sometimes frustrated.31 The two incidents discussed so far are clearly in different ways negative recent developments in Christian-Muslim Relations. In order to make clear, however, that these need to be balanced by positive developments, two of these, again from different parts of the world, will be discussed.

The Christian-Muslim Forum in the United Kingdom This initiative is one which has grown out of a whole series of discussions which have been taking place in the United Kingdom over the past decade, going back to a visit to London by the Shaikh of al-Azhar, Muh.ammad Sayyid Tantawi, during which the possibility of establishing a national organization to bring

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together Christians and Muslims in the United Kingdom was discussed. This progressed to a more formal meeting to discuss this possibility in October 2000, under the chairmanship of the then Archbishop of Canterbury, George Carey, and from this emerged a Planning Group which consulted widely within the two communities in those parts of the United Kingdom where they are most strongly present, that is London, Bradford, Leicester, and the North-West of England, during 2003 and 2004, before presenting their final report to Archbishop Rowan Williams in June 2004.32 Further preparatory work then took place to establish the Forum, which was formally launched at Lambeth Palace on 24th January 2006. The form which the Forum took was very much as recommended by the Planning Group, with equal representation from the two communities, and, within each community, contributions from the different branches of which each is made up. The Chairman is thus an Anglican Bishop, David Gillett, the Bishop of Bolton, the Vice-Chair is Dr Ataullah Siddiqui, the Director of the Islamic Foundation’s Inter-Faith Unit, and the six other Presidents represent the Roman Catholic Church, the Free Church Council, the Joint Council of Afro-Caribbean Churches, the Shi‘i community and the Deobandi and Barelvi schools of thought within the Sunni community. The Archbishop of Canterbury is the Founding Patron of the Forum. The work of the Forum is focused on six main themes: Community and Public Affairs, Education, the Family, International Issues, the Media, and Youth, and its activities in each of these areas are co-ordinated jointly by a Christian and a Muslim specialist. There are also scholar consultants, among whom is a Coptic Orthodox Bishop; the full-time Director of Management and Communication, Julian Bond, is a Methodist layman; and the process of appointing a full-time Muslim Director of Programmes and Project Development is currently (August 2007) underway.33 One of the models on which the Christian-Muslim Forum was based is the Council of Christians and Jews (CCJ), established in 1942 in order to create better mutual understanding between Jews and Christians at a time of extreme duress for Jews in Europe, and the CCJ has actively supported the establishment of the Christian-Muslim Forum.

The Indonesian Consortium for Religious Studies As a kind of complement to the establishment of the Christian-Muslim Forum in a Christian-majority context, the establishment of the Indonesian Consortium for Religious Studies in Yogyakarta is an interesting initiative in a Muslimmajority context. Yogyakarta is in a sense the intellectual capital of the country with the largest Muslim population in the world, and its reputation is wellestablished both as a centre of traditional Javanese culture and as a centre of

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learning with at least five universities located in the city. Of these, three, namely Gadja Mada, the oldest and largest university in the country, Data Wucana, a ‘Christian’ (i.e. in the Indonesian context, Protestant) institution, and the State Islamic University Sunan Kalijaga have recently agreed to establish a consortium to promote the study of inter-religious relations, with the first students being admitted in September 2007. There is also some collaboration with the Jesuit Sanata Dharma University in the city.34 In a sense Indonesia already has a quite sophisticated approach to issues of religious pluralism, as a result of its official policy of Pancasila, the Five Principles, which involves the granting of official recognition to six religious traditions, Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism, but this has not prevented the outbreak of conflict between different communities at certain times and in certain places, particularly between Christians and Muslims in the Moluccan islands.35 It was these issues which prompted the International Association for the History of Religions (IAHR) to sponsor a regional conference in Yogyakarta and Semarang (on the northern coast of Java) at the end of September 2004 on the theme of ‘Religious Harmony: Problems, Practice and Education’, and the proceedings of this conference have been published in both Indonesian and European editions.36 The establishment of the Indonesian Consortium for Religious Studies in Yogyakarta is a very creative initiative to carry the agenda of this conference forward.

Conclusion This review of recent developments in Christian-Muslim Relations has focused on two apparently negative developments and two more positive ones. There are, of course, many other developments which could have been discussed. Some might have expected discussion of the Danish cartoons controversy of 2005–2006, but given that the cartoons were published in a secular newspaper I have not considered them as properly an issue of significance for ChristianMuslim Relations, important as they undoubtedly were for the relationship between the World of Islam and the West. More positively it would have been possible to include discussion of The Alliance of Civilizations, the joint initiative of the Prime Ministers of Turkey and Spain, two countries with a long history of Christian-Muslim interaction, José Luis Zapatero and Recep Tayyıp Erdog^an, under the auspices of the United Nations, to promote better mutual understanding between Muslim and Western societies, or the work of the WestIslamic Dialogue Group of the World Economic Forum, under the joint chairmanship of Lord Carey, the former Archbishop of Canterbury and HRH Princess Lolwah Al Faisal of the King Faisal Foundation in Saudi Arabia. But the fact that these groups function essentially under the auspices of primarily political or

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economic organizations has meant that, interesting and worthwhile as they are, they have not been seen as essentially Christian-Muslim initiatives comparable to the ones which have been discussed.37 It is also true that the developments which have been discussed happen to focus on two geographical regions of what, following Richard Bulliet, might be called the ‘Islamo-Christian World’,38 namely Western Europe and the MalayIndonesian World, in other words the two extremities of Eurasia, with no reference to the central zone of the Islamic World, the Middle East and South or Central Asia, but in a survey article there is no choice but to be selective. The geographical location of the developments which have been chosen for discussion is just coincidental, and they do illustrate the range of recent developments effectively.39 The crucial question in conclusion is whether these developments, considered together, represent progress or regress in Christian-Muslim Relations. Do the gains outweigh the losses, in other words, or vice versa? Is it a case of two steps forward and one step back, or rather of one step forward and two steps back? The answer to this question, I suspect, will depend on whether the observer or commentator is temperamentally an optimist or a pessimist, but in a world where so much clamour is forthcoming from militants in both communities, whether born-again Christians of a dispensationalist persuasion in the United States or radical Islamists in parts of the Middle East or Afghanistan it is sometimes hard to be optimistic. In the midst of all the clamour of confrontation, however, quieter and less widely publicized initiatives of a more positive kind are undoubtedly taking place, and the hope must be that in the longer term these win out over the more strident voices in both communities. The reality is therefore that in most parts of the world some Christians and some Muslims are trying to advance the cause of better mutual understanding and interaction, as commended and practised by Professor Kerr, while other Christians and other Muslims are not, with both opinions, the more confrontational and the more peace-loving, often managing to exist alongside each other in the most remarkable ways.40 The hope, however, must be that the peace-lovers win out over the war-mongers.

Notes 1 2 3

4

5

London: United Reformed Church, 1980. Ibid. p. 76. See B. L. Sherwin and H. Kasimov (eds), John Paul II and Interreligious Dialogue (New York: Orbis Books, 1999), esp. pp. 58–69 (John Paul II on Islam) and pp. 169–204 (two Muslim responses, by Mahmoud Ayoub and Ibrahim Abu Rabi). T. Khoury, Manuel II Paléologue: Entretien avec un musulman, 7e controverse (Paris: Cerf, 1966). Khoury, p. 143.

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Khoury, p. 145. Khoury, p. 144 n. 1 , quoting R. Arnaldez, Grammaire et théologie chez Ibn Hazm de Cordoue (Paris: Vrin, 1956). See http://www.islamicamagazine.com/online-analysis/open-letter-to-his-holinesspope-benedict-xvi.html. M. Ipgrave, The Road Ahead: A Christian-Muslim Dialogue (London: Church House, 2002). London: Hodder and Stoughton, 2002. See at http://www.archbishopofcanterbury.org/sermons_speeches/2003/030611. html. M. Ipgrave, Scriptures in Dialogue: Christians and Muslims Studying the Bible and the Qur’a¯n Together (London: Church House, 2004). M. Ipgrave, Bearing the Word: Prophecy in Biblical and Qur’a¯nic Perspective (London: Church House, 2005). See at http://www.archbishopofcanterbury.org/releases/2005/050512.htm. See at http://www.archbishopofcanterbury.org/releases/060323a.htm. See athttp://www.archbishopofcanterbury.org/releases/2005/050707.htm. See http://www.pmo.gov.my/WebNotesApp/PMMain.nsf/f0d8126d117745db4 825674f00069cba/94a86d7e1656b5e948256ee50029f61a?OpenDocument, (Paragraph 21). See http://www.pmo.gov.my/WebNotesApp/PMMain.nsf/8b5b580b84fee6b248 256db300306a24/cba26328a1c7cc3948256f230002ab65?OpenDocument, (Paragraph 58). See http://www.pmo.gov.my/webNotesApp/ABDULLAH.nsf/75b3202912e2d4f 6482570c400031dbc/7634015fd47b94ca482571110039168f?OpenDocument (Paragraphs 27 and 28); date accessed: August 2007. See http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/faith/article1769414.ece. See http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6703155.stm, http://www.economist. com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9262452 (‘Lina Joy’s despair’, and http:// english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/DDE2E871-F12D-4EFC-B98B-A972424A978E.htm? FRAMELESS=true&NRNODEGUID=%7bDDE2E871-F12D-4EFC-B98BA972424A978E%7d>, (date accessed: August 2007), the very interesting recording of a discussion about the case on the English channel of al-Jazeera, from its Kuala Lumpur Studio, with Syed Ali Tawfiq Al-Attas, the Director General of IKIM (the Institute for Islamic Understanding), Farish Noor, formerly of the University of Malaya, and Lee Heng Seng, a representative of the National Evangelical Council of Malaysia. The issue of conversion has also caused controversy in Kuwait, with the case of Hussein Qambar ‘Ali/Robert Hussein – see http://web.amnesty.org/library/ Index/ENGMDE170051996?open&of=ENG-KWT and in Egypt, with the case of Muh.ammad Hijazi – see http://www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/ articles/2007/08/11/threats_force_egyptian_convert_to_hide/ - which also involves an attempt in the courts to change the statement of religion on an identity card. For a wider theoretical discussion see A. Saeed and H. Saeed, Freedom of Religion, Apostasy and Islam (London: Ashgate, 2004), esp. Part II on Malaysia. Contrast http://www.gg2.net/viewnews.asp?nid=169&tid=travel&catid=Travel%20 News (date accessed: August 2007), on the unveiling of the statue at the Batu

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Caves, and http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/HG11Ae01.html on the destruction of Hindu temples. Seehttp://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2006/10/28/nation/15839442&sec= nation. Edited by M. Kamal Hassan and G. bin Basri, Singapore: Archipelago Press, 2005. See http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/08/05/asia/AS-GEN-Malaysia-IslamicState.php which summarizes Prime Minister Badawi’s response to the suggestion of the Deputy Prime Minister Najib Abdul Razak in July 2007 that Malaysia is an Islamic State. See Kim Quek, Where to Malaysia? A Future with Anwar’s Reformasi or Back to Mahathirism? (Kuala Lumpur: Strategic Information Research Department, 2005). On the cover of the book are photos of former Prime Minister Dr Mahathir Mohammed, Deputy Prime Minister Nabib Abdul Razak, of opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim and of Prime Minister Badawi. The preface to the book is by Anwar Ibrahim. London: Reaktion Books, 2000. London: Granta, 2004. Chapter 14 describes his Malaysian experience, and the quotation from the conclusion is on p. 325. http://www.archbishopofcanterbury.org/releases/070426.htm and http:// amssuk.com/home_pressreleasesarchive.htm. The lecture has now been published (August 2007) by the Association of Muslim Social Scientists. This was the caption to the photograph of Dr Williams which appeared alongside the article about the cancellation of the seminar in The Times. See above, note 18, though the caption does not appear in the electronic version of the article. Compare the well-known image of the bridge over the River Neretva in Mostar, which was destroyed in the course of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1993 and re-opened in 2004, or the bridge over the River Drina in Višegrad whose history is so effectively evoked in Ivo Andric’´s novel The Bridge over the Drina, first published in 1945, translated into English in 1959, and for which the author received the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1961. See at http://www.christianmuslimforum.com/downloads/35E_04-06-18_Archbishops_Initiative_Report.pdf. A great deal of material about the Forum is available at http://www.christian muslimforum.org/mainpage.asp?id=17& and for details of the launch event, including speeches by the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Prime Minister Tony Blair, and the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Forum see http://www.christianmuslimforum.org/subpage.asp?id=202. See http://www.icrsyogya.net/. See K. Steenbrink, ‘Interpretations of Christian-Muslim violence in the Moluccas’, Studies in Interreligious Dialogue 11:1 (2001), 64–91. Eds. Alef Theria Wasim, Abdurrahman Mas’ud, Edith Franke and Michael Pye, Yogyakarta: (Oasis, 2005, and Berlin: de Gruyter, 2006). See respectively http://www.unaoc.org/repository/report.htm and http:// www3.weforum.org/en/initiatives/c100/index.html. See R. W. Bulliet, The Case for Islamo-Christian Civilization (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004).

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Discussion of (relatively) recent developments in different regions of the world can be found in the special thematic issue of The International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church which was devoted to Christian-Muslim relations in 2003 (Volume 3:2), with articles by myself on Christian-Muslim relations in the Middle East, by Klaus Hock on Christian-Muslim relations in the African context, by Tom Michel on Asia, and Philip Lewis on the situation in the West. See http://www. informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=g751045271~db=all. Compare, for example, the situation in the United States where on the one hand there is ‘an ambiguous and tortuous process of public symbolic recognition of Islam as an American religion that resembles the processes of incorporation of Catholicism and Judaism’, as seen in the shift from public references to the idea of a ‘Judeo-Christian’ nation to the new descriptor of ‘Abrahamic’, and on the other there is ‘a mainly Protestant nativist backlash against Islam’ and a ‘new anti-Muslim evangelical discourse’. See Casanova, J., ‘Immigration and the new religious pluralism: a European Union/United States comparison’, in T. Banchoff (ed.), Democracy and the New Religious Pluralism (Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 59–83, esp. pp. 74–6, ‘The Particular Challenge of American Islam’. The quotations are respectively from p. 74 and p. 75.

Chapter 9

Christians, Muslims and Religious Freedom: A Christian Perspective1 David Marshall

Although I only studied under David Kerr for one term (his last at Selly Oak, in 1987), this was long enough for a deep impression to be made on me. I have often drawn on his wonderful lectures on the development of Islamic thought and the history of Christian-Muslim relations. As well as first-rate teaching, David also gave his students much to think about on the challenges and opportunities in Christian-Muslim relations today. I offer this chapter with much gratitude for what I have learnt from him. This chapter addresses the question of how Christians should approach the issue of religious freedom in the interface between Muslims and Christians. Two main aspects of religious freedom are in mind: First, the freedom of believers to practise their faith without persecution; second, the freedom to change one’s religious allegiance – to ‘convert’ to another faith – without having to undergo persecution or legal punishment. It should be emphasized that although some Muslim and secular perspectives on this issue will be mentioned, the primary aim is to consider what is involved in formulating a specifically Christian approach. It should also be acknowledged that this discussion is carried out almost entirely within Western Christian terms of reference; a fuller treatment would require engagement with other Christian perspectives.

Christian relations with Muslims: Some general observations This question can only be adequately addressed within the wider context of Christian approaches to relations with Muslims. We therefore begin with some general observations relevant to this discussion.

Love of neighbour The fundamental commandment of Jesus bearing on how Christians are to relate to Muslims is ‘You shall love your neighbour as yourself’ (Mt. 22.39).

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This commandment might be applied in many different ways, but what are some of the distinctive ways in which it might be fleshed out in the context of Christian relations with Muslims? In what follows, ideals for Christian attitudes towards Muslims are sketched out. The fact that they are not by any means always attained makes their re-statement all the more important. First, Christians will seek to love their Muslim neighbours as human beings created in the image of God (Gen. 1.27). This will incline Christians to relate to Muslims as people in whom something of God is to be seen. This in turn will generate humility and a readiness to be taught important lessons by God through the encounter with the Muslim neighbour.2 Second, love for Muslims should be expressed in a will to understand them and so also to think and speak about them as truthfully and accurately as possible. We do not feel loved by people who do not take the trouble to understand the traditions and convictions that shape and motivate us. In relating to Muslims, Christians will therefore want to echo the famous prayer attributed to St Francis which asks that we might seek to understand more than to be understood – though Christians will also hope to be understood. This will apply to all levels of Christian-Muslim meeting, from the scholarly to the grassroots; in all cases the key is the willingness to see through the eyes of the religious other. A related ideal is the determination not to ‘bear false witness’ (Exod. 20.16) against Muslims by misrepresenting their convictions, propagating inaccurate stereotypes about them or citing the worst practices of some Muslims as typical of them all. Third, Christians will seek to express love for their Muslim neighbours (whether local or at some geographical distance in the global village) by acts of service. In his 2005 Encyclical Deus Caritas Est3 Pope Benedict XVI includes an extended discussion of Christian diakonia or charitable service, especially as this is carried out by Christian organizations serving those in acute need. He argues that although Christians have a particular responsibility to meet the needs of other members of the Body of Christ, they should also be committed to loving service of all people (sec. 25 (b)). He makes the further point, widely recognized among Christians and very important for our present discussion, that such service ‘. . .cannot be used as a means of engaging in what is nowadays considered proselytism. . . . Those who practise charity in the Church’s name will never seek to impose the Church’s faith upon others’ (sec. 31 (c)).4 Fourth, Christian love for Muslims will also show itself in a concern for justice on their behalf. This concern might be expressed in many ways, especially where Muslims tend to be disadvantaged members of a particular society. In the present discussion, however, we should particularly note that a commitment to justice for all is now widely understood by Christians as involving a commitment to religious freedom for all. Developments in the wider world have in recent times led Christians to the consensus that religious freedom is a divine gift to all people, a gift which all have the right to exercise (cf. the Vatican II document Dignitatis Humanae,5 the most influential Christian treatment of the theme of

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religious freedom in modern times). The love for Muslim neighbours that implies a commitment to justice on their behalf will therefore also imply a defence of their right to religious freedom.6 These four examples, to which others could of course be added, give some sense of what it means for Christians to love their Muslim neighbours as themselves. Christians need consciously to set the potentially divisive subject of religious freedom in this context; they should also seek to ensure that the difficulties that can arise in discussing religious freedom do not weaken their commitment to the forms of love of neighbour outlined above. Many Christians would add another point, which they might see as taking us closer to the source of all specifically Christian love of the Muslim neighbour. Christians are bearers of the message of God’s reconciling love in Jesus Christ, a message that applies to all people, who should therefore have the opportunity to hear and respond to it. In other words, the proclamation of the Gospel of Christ is an expression of Christian love towards all people, just as God’s presence and action in Christ were for the sake of the whole world. Although other Christians might not understand the mission of the Church in the way just outlined, it is a view with deep roots in Christian tradition and with continuing support today. Since it is this understanding of Christian witness that is most likely to raise the issue of religious freedom in relation to Islam, it requires further discussion.

Witness to Christ The New Testament sees the Church as existing to make known to all people the love of God in Christ and to draw all people towards that love. The proclamation of the Gospel has therefore always been seen as part of the Church’s God-given identity and purpose (Mt. 28.18–20; Lk. 24.46–7; 1 Cor. 9.16; 2 Cor. 4.5). The Church should carry out this task with humility – it is commending not itself but Christ – but also with confidence, because its mandate is given by God. When Christians have been confronted by forces seeking to silence their proclamation of Christ they have often recalled the words of the Apostles: ‘We must obey God rather than any human authority’ (Acts 5.29). The Church is also aware that the Gospel of Christ has always encountered opposition and knows that suffering and even martyrdom can be the cost of faithful witness.7 Just as Islam teaches that ‘there is no compulsion in religion’ (Qur’a ¯ n 2:256), so also Christian witness should proceed not through coercion but through testimony and persuasion. The Church ‘proposes’ its message; it does not ‘impose’ it. Here, however, we must again acknowledge the painful contrast between ideal and reality in Christian history, which has seen widespread use of power to compel people to be baptized at certain periods, such as the reign of Charlemagne in the late eighth and early ninth centuries.8 How the vocation of the Church to proclaim Christ and ‘make disciples of all nations’ (Mt. 28.18) is to be related to the existence of other faiths, and notably

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Islam, is one of the most debated issues within contemporary Christianity. Some Christians call for an end to any attempt to make converts from other faiths, while others continue to see evangelism among all people as a touchstone for the Church’s faithfulness. We cannot settle this debate here, but what we can say is that it makes little sense to attempt to construct a formula for ChristianMuslim relations which includes the demand that Christians give up all idea of proclaiming the Gospel of Christ to Muslims (or, indeed, vice versa). First, this would be a formula which a very significant proportion of the world’s Christians could not accept. Second, such a formula would require a balancing commitment on the part of Muslims to cease working for the conversion of Christians to Islam, which seems equally unlikely. Rather, what is needed is to seek a way in which Christians and Muslims can live together with respect for each other’s genuine conviction of a missionary responsibility given by God. It is noteworthy that in the period since Vatican II, when the Roman Catholic Church in an unprecedented way stressed its desire for positive and harmonious relations with other faiths, official Roman Catholic teaching has repeatedly underlined that this openness for dialogue is not to be understood as being at odds with the Church’s call to proclaim the Gospel.9

Concern for the Church Just as Muslims of many different races understand themselves to belong to the one worldwide umma, or community of Muslims, so also Christians consider themselves members of the Body of Christ, the Church throughout the world. The relevance of this observation to the present discussion is that Christians in any one part of the world cannot give an adequate account of Christian-Muslim relations without keeping in mind the very varied interfaces between Christians and Muslims around the world. A Christian Filipino working in Saudi Arabia, for example, is likely to have a very different experience of Islam from that of an English clergyman in Oxford. Just as Muslims express concern at the difficulties faced by their fellow Muslims in some parts of the world (sometimes at the hands of Christians, as in Bosnia or Chechnya), so also Christians feel compelled to speak up for Christians who are denied basic rights in certain parts of the Muslim world. It should be candidly acknowledged that Muslim majority societies (such as Saudi Arabia, Iran or Pakistan) are one of the main contexts in the world today in which Christians, especially converts, are likely to suffer on account of their faith, or at least be very limited in their freedom to express it. A nuanced Christian awareness of the varieties of ways in which Christians encounter Muslims around the world will also take into consideration the different approaches to co-existence with Islam which have developed in different Christian traditions. The historic Churches of the Middle East, for example, have developed a modus vivendi in Muslim majority societies to which other incoming Christian groups have not always been sensitive. It is important that

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Christians who raise the question of religious freedom in the Muslim world do so in ways that take into consideration the experience and wisdom of Churches which have co-existed with Muslims for centuries.

Faith and the political order Christian support for the right to religious freedom is bound up with Christian reflection on the relationship between faith and the political order. Any attempt to summarize the complex history of Christian thought in this field will inevitably involve some very wide generalizations. It is, however, an observable feature of the history of ‘the Christian West’ in recent centuries that one version of the relationship between faith and political order (‘Christendom’) has given way to another, in which a particular religious tradition is no longer imposed as the framework for public life. Although they might initially have opposed it, the Churches have now by and large accepted this transition, and along with it the emergence of the right to religious freedom; there is no longer a widespread wish to ‘turn the clock back’ to restore Christendom. As Christians engage with Muslims (or members of other faiths) on the question of religious freedom, it is important for them to remember how recently this transition within their own tradition has occurred. For example, within the last few decades the position of the Roman Catholic Church on religious freedom has evolved dramatically. Christians with any knowledge of their own history will therefore be aware of the complex issues involved in responding to the approaches of some Muslims to democracy and human rights. The current Christian consensus on such matters is comparatively recent; taking Christian history as a whole, even its more recent centuries, the link between Christianity and the right to religious freedom is very far from self-evident. As one Christian writer on Christian-Muslim relations comments: ‘If we are aware of the long and painful development of the idea of religious freedom within Christianity, this can help us achieve a better understanding of certain attitudes, reactions and difficulties on the Muslim side.’10

Tensions between Christians and Muslims So far we have considered some of the main factors to be held in mind in seeking to identify a Christian approach to the issue of religious freedom in relation to Islam: the commandment to love your neighbour as yourself; the call to witness to Christ; awareness of the worldwide Church; the need for reflection on the relationship between faith and political order. Although we have noted how these factors apply to Christian-Muslim relations in certain ways, they would in fact also apply to the relationship between Christians and various other communities. We now need to look at some of the tensions at work specifically in

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the interface between Christians and Muslims; tensions which shape perspectives on the question of religious freedom today.

Theological questions In the interface between any two religious traditions it is possible to identify points of both agreement and disagreement. The same applies to Christianity and Islam. In this case, however, disagreement has often been particularly sharp and strident. Political factors have certainly contributed to this, but the significance of core theological differences should not be underestimated. Christianity and Islam both claim to give the definitive and final account of the same monotheistic tradition. Furthermore, both Christianity and Islam claim universal validity; the truth each proclaims is not of merely local significance but is in principle addressed to all people. The very closeness of Christianity and Islam can thus be a major source of tension; they are in competition over the same religious territory. Islam understands Christianity to have corrupted the original message of Jesus, replacing it with the mistaken doctrines of the Trinity, the Incarnation and the Atonement. Islam therefore seeks to restore Jesus to his proper place as a human prophet and to clarify that he points ahead to Muh.ammad. For Christians, Islam can thus appear to present a direct attack on the heart of their faith, while for Muslims there can appear to be a stubborn perversity in the continuing reluctance of Christians to accept the Qur’a ¯ n as God’s final revelation and so to submit to the correction of their errors. These theological differences are worth emphasizing in this context because they remind us that Christians and Muslims care passionately about the truth and so cannot be expected to support the right to religious freedom on the basis of indifference to truth. Truth matters to Muslims and Christians; they wish to make their understanding of the truth known to all people and they feel concerned when members of their own community depart from the truth. The right to religious freedom therefore needs to be seen to rest not on indifference to truth. For Christians and Muslims a better basis is the conviction present in both traditions that divine truth is not served by any form of coercion but should be allowed to address itself to hearts and minds that are free to respond as they will.

Political conflict From the time of Muh.ammad the encounter between Muslims and Christians has never been merely an exchange of theological ideas; there has always been a political and often a military dimension as well. The rapid conquests made by the Arab Muslim armies in the decades after Muh.ammad’s death brought the

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Christian heartlands of the Middle East and North Africa under Islamic rule; in the following centuries there was further Islamic expansion into previously Christian territory. Hugh Goddard comments, ‘Muslims sometimes forget that it is the memory of these losses which is largely responsible for the fear of Islam which still exists in the West today, especially when reinforced by Ottoman Turkish sieges of Vienna in 1529/935 and 1683/1094’.11 Conversely, in many Muslim minds Christianity is bound up with episodes from the past such as the Crusades and the more recent history of Western domination of the Muslim world through colonialism and current American policy in the Middle East. As Christians and Muslims discuss the issue of religious freedom today, and as they seek constructive forms of co-existence, they have to be aware of how political and military conflict, past and present, has shaped their views of each other. Christians and Muslims do not simply have to negotiate their theological disagreements; they also have to cope with the mutual suspicion that has deep roots in their respective communities. It is not always a climate conducive to the growth of trust.

Ways forward Before discussing some possible shared Christian-Muslim approaches to religious freedom, I will briefly mention two forms of encounter between Christians and Muslims which may not necessarily address the question of religious freedom directly, but can help to set this issue in a less confrontational context.

Common values and co-operation Despite their theological differences and the amount of conflict in their history, Christians and Muslims can point to a number of values which they share and which can provide the basis for significant co-operation. A recent initiative in this field is the Christian-Muslim Forum for England, launched in January 2006. The aim of this national body is not primarily to foster theological dialogue, but to enable consultation and co-operation between Muslims and Christians for the common good on practical matters of shared concern, and also to encourage communication on the kinds of issues which could become sources of conflict between the communities. Before the Forum was created a listening exercise was carried out, during which Muslims and Christians around England were asked if they supported such an initiative. They did, overwhelmingly.12 The creation of such initiatives depends on the willingness of Muslims and Christians to recognize that they share values with each other. As such initiatives mature, it is to be hoped that the respect and co-operative spirit thus nurtured will make it at least slightly less difficult to address some of the issues (such as

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religious freedom) which have historically been sticking points between the two faiths.

Dialogue The same basic point could be made about dialogue between Christians and Muslims. The Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams, has commented that the aim of inter-faith dialogue should not be ‘the sterile and abstract task . . . of identifying a common core of beliefs. [Instead,] . . . it is about finding the appropriate language in which difference can be talked about rather than used as an excuse for violent separation.’13 Thus while dialogue should not be expected to resolve the differences between Islam and Christianity, it can help to create a climate of intelligent and respectful understanding of difference. Again, this does not hold out a promise that on the thorny question of religious freedom Christian and Muslim perspectives will immediately converge. What it does suggest, however, is that where Christians and Muslims are in serious dialogue with each other there is more chance that they will be able to extract themselves from engrained misunderstandings and identify better ways of approaching their differences.

Religious freedom: Towards a shared approach It is difficult for Christians and Muslims to establish shared terms of reference on which they can address the question of religious freedom. Any proposal from one side is likely to be open to criticism from the other on the grounds that it has unacceptable assumptions built into it. An interesting illustration of this occurred in an exchange of views in the mid-1990s between the Islam in Europe Committee (an ecumenical Christian body) and the Islamic Foundation, Leicester. The Islam in Europe Committee produced a paper entitled ‘Christian/Muslim Reciprocity: Considerations for the European Churches’. This identified the concept of reciprocity as a basis on which Christians and Muslims could address questions such as religious freedom. The paper’s conclusion included the appeal, ‘We make an initiative of the Spirit to Muslims, asking for a reciprocity of heart and mind which will enable us to live together in our one world under God with a common sense of justice and a mutual care for each other’s integrity as believers.’14 The late Khurram Murad, then Director General of the Islamic Foundation, wrote a substantial response in which he argued that the very concept of reciprocity was ‘a poor, highly ambiguous, fragile and morally unsatisfactory basis for enduring good relations’.15 Criticisms of the concept of reciprocity had in fact already been expressed by Middle Eastern Christians.16 The Islam in Europe Committee came to the conclusion that reciprocity was not an adequate basis for the dialogue and suggested that there might be more potential in focusing on ‘reconciliation’.

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Some Christians might feel that it was a pity that the concept of reciprocity was not explored further, but for present purposes the main point to be noted is that even agreeing how to begin a discussion between Christians and Muslims involving issues such as religious freedom is in itself a considerable challenge. Perhaps, echoing the comments of Rowan Williams quoted above, what is needed initially is not so much agreement on shared terms of reference, which may prove endlessly elusive, but rather a shared will to listen to the perspective of the other, in all its difference from one’s own, and from there gradually to work towards a more constructive way of living together. Christians and Muslims certainly have to recognize that ultimately the other must decide what their faith requires of them. Muslims will not have Islam dictated to them by Christians any more than Christians will have Christianity dictated to them by Muslims. We have already noted how problematic it is for Christians to press Muslims to accept a Western understanding of religious freedom when this is still a comparatively recent enthusiasm for Christians. A related point is that if Christians appear to be demanding that Muslims should be free to convert to Christianity this will not be seen (as Western Christians might feel it should) as a purely spiritual matter. In the present political context, in which many Muslims feel that they are being humiliated by overbearing Western Christian powers, an initiative to allow Muslims to leave their ancestral faith will appear as part of a wider plot to subvert and subjugate the Muslim world. These observations might lead to the conclusion that any Christian initiative aiming at a change in Islamic teaching and practice in relation to religious freedom is counterproductive: The more Christians demand that Muslims accept the ideal of religious freedom (as Christians define it) the less likely it is that any progress will be made. It is better, the argument might continue, to leave it entirely to Muslims to address this question, in their own terms and in their own time. One might be further encouraged to take this view by the fact that significant Muslim scholars are themselves challenging some of the traditional Islamic rulings which Christians find most troubling.17 Vociferous Christian intervention may well do more harm than good. That approach would, however, be difficult for many Christians to accept, chiefly because it would seem to require that they should remain quiet about the challenges faced by their fellow-believers and new converts to Christianity in some parts of the Muslim world. It is expected of the leaders of global Christian communions, such as the Pope and the Archbishop of Canterbury, that they will speak up for Christians suffering for their faith. What is beginning to emerge is that a Christian approach to the issue of religious freedom in the Muslim-Christian interface requires the balancing of a number of different serious concerns. The challenge involves holding together, on the one hand, the desire for authentic Christian witness among Muslims and effective support for the Church in the Muslim world, and, on the other hand, an awareness of both the political tensions between the Muslim

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world and the West and the complex history of the approach of Christians to religious freedom, as well as the realization that it would be both inappropriate and counterproductive for Christians to seek to define how Muslims should interpret Islam today. One way forward might therefore be to appeal beyond the two faith traditions to standards and legislation defined by third parties, such as, most obviously, the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights. However, the UN will understandably strike many Muslim observers as being far from neutral. Both in its origins and its current workings the influence of the West is disproportionate, so Muslims will understandably question whether the UN is really a forum in which they can expect their convictions and interests to be given due weight. For many Muslims the views of the UN on religious freedom are ultimately irrelevant; if these are in conflict with the traditions of Islam, so much the worse for the UN. Muslims should resist pressure to recreate Islamic societies after the pattern of the secularized West, with all the social chaos that is perceived to flow from its abandonment of divine guidance as the basis for social order.18 Such Muslim reactions give Christians plenty to think about. As Christians have stressed the right to religious freedom, especially in recent decades, have they not witnessed a marked decline in the social impact of Christianity? Should Muslims be eager to see the same story played out in the Muslim world? Christians therefore have to struggle with the question of how religious freedom can be emphasized without at the same time surrendering much of public life to the kind of secularism that is hostile to the influence of religion in society. This poses a searching challenge to Western Christians, but their consensus is that the challenge must be faced. The dangers associated with the Western emphasis on individual liberty cannot be overcome by denying freedom; rather, we must re-learn and promote the easily forgotten Christian paradox that freedom exists for the sake of service of the common good. Implicitly, the modern Christian consensus is that, though this is difficult territory, Christians (and believers of other traditions) must learn to move within it confidently rather than running away from it in fear. So Christians have emerged from the last few centuries with the strong conviction that for religious faith of any kind to have any credibility in the modern world it must commend itself not through any form of coercion but through the free witness of believers. But how should Christians relate to Muslims over this question, bearing in mind some of the complexities this chapter has been exploring? Again we face a dilemma: While Christians may believe that there is a universal validity to their convictions about religious freedom, these convictions cannot be imposed. On the question of the freedom to convert to another faith, Christians will naturally continue to express their concerns about Muslims who are either persecuted for becoming Christians or dissuaded from receiving baptism by the

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threat of punishment or social exclusion. Christians will also welcome the views of those Muslims who hold that neither the quality of faith within their own community nor the relationship between the two communities are well served by the punishment of those who freely choose to move from one community to the other. Christians should also recognize, however, that such views are more likely to be held where there is some attempt to address fears of inappropriate forms of ‘proselytism’, generally understood as referring to manipulative and deceitful ways of inducing conversions, especially through financial or other incentives and through targeting those who are especially vulnerable. It might well prove extremely difficult for representative Christian and Muslim leaders to agree on what distinguishes authentic witness from proselytism (whether by Christians or Muslims), but the effort could make a modest contribution to easing some tensions and could have genuine symbolic value.19 There would also be a need for realism about the multitude of largely autonomous religious organizations which would be likely to ignore codes of practice for religious witness sanctioned by ‘mainstream’ authorities. On the question of the freedom of religious minorities, a way forward combining both principle and pragmatism might be to recognize that although Christians and Muslims may disagree on some of the issues involved, there are also ways in which some Christians and some Muslims can agree and work together. Many Christians and Muslims ought, for example, to be able to agree that there are ways in which religious minorities are harassed that should not be tolerated. A particularly effective way for Christian and Muslim leaders to respond in such cases is for them to speak up for minorities of the other community undergoing such harassment. For example, in recent years there have been cases of Muslim leaders in Britain speaking out against the harassment of Christian communities in parts of the Muslim world. This kind of courageous stance is to be welcomed and to be emulated in every way possible. If it could become more widespread (in both directions) its subversion of the normal human tendency to defend the interests only of one’s own group could be enormously beneficial in challenging and weakening some of the hardened adversarial postures that can separate Christians from Muslims. This scenario of Christians and Muslims concerning themselves for the religious freedom of minorities from the other community is perhaps a fitting point at which to conclude. Although there are many conceptual and practical difficulties in any discussion of religious freedom between Christians and Muslims, there are also significant resources in each faith to encourage the kind of mutual advocacy mentioned above. This kind of ‘looking after one another’20 would require the courage and imagination to move beyond habitual patterns of communal self-interest, but it would be very heartening if it could become a more established feature of Christian-Muslim relations. For Christians, it represents a very appropriate way of expressing that love of neighbour with which this discussion began.

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Notes 1

2

3 4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 13

14

15 16

I gratefully acknowledge permission granted by the St Ethelburga’s Centre for Reconciliation and Peace to publish this chapter, which is a revised version of a research paper commissioned by the Centre. Recent studies have drawn attention to a strand in the Bible encouraging an attitude of openness and humility towards the activity of God in and through the religious ‘other’. Cf. Jacques Dupuis SJ, Toward a Christian Theology of Religious Pluralism (Maryknoll: Orbis, 2001), ch. 1. Available at http://www.vatican.va/. From a different Christian tradition, the same point is made in a ‘Proselytism Policy Statement’ approved in 2003 by the Evangelical Alliance Relief Fund (Tearfund). Walter M. Abbot SJ and Joseph Gallagher (eds), The Documents of Vatican II (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1966), pp. 675–96, and available at http://www.vatican.va/. Dignitatis Humanae also acknowledges that religious freedom can be exercised in ways injurious to social order; ‘the just requirements of public order’ are explicitly mentioned (sections 2 and 3) as a consideration that might legitimately limit the expression of religious freedom. In the Christian-Muslim interface this is a significant principle which could be invoked to limit certain expressions of either Muslim or Christian religious freedom in different contexts. The link between witness and martyrdom is apparent in Christian and Islamic terminology alike. Both the Greek and Arabic words for martyr, marturos and shahid, have root meanings of ‘witness’. Cf. Richard Fletcher, The Conversion of Europe: From Paganism to Christianity 371– 1386 AD (London: Fontana, 1998), ch 7, e.g. especially pp. 195 and 215. See the document jointly published by the Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue and the Congregation for the Evangelization of Peoples, Dialogue and Proclamation: Reflections and Orientations on Interreligious Dialogue and the Proclamation of the Gospel of Jesus Christ (Vatican City, 1991). For reflections from the World Council of Churches on witness, dialogue and religious freedom, see the ‘Statement of the Stuttgart consultation on evangelism’, in Vinay Samuel and Chris Sugden (eds), Mission as Transformation: A Theology of the Whole Gospel (Oxford: Regnum Books, 1999), pp. 286–7. Christian W. Troll SJ, Muslims Ask, Christians Answer (Anand: Gujarat Sahitya Prakash, 2005), p. 113. (Also available at http://www.answers-to-muslims.com/, ch. 11.) Hugh Goddard, Christians and Muslims: From Double Standards to Mutual Understanding (Richmond: Curzon, 1995), p. 138. See http://www.christianmuslimforum.org/. Rowan Williams, ‘Analysing atheism: unbelief and the world of faiths’, in Michael Ipgrave (ed.), Bearing the Word (London: Church House Press, 2005), pp. 1–13; this quotation is from pp. 11–12. Reciprocity and Beyond: A Muslim Response to the European Churches’ Document on Islam (Leicester: Islamic Foundation, 1997), p. 9. Ibid., p. 11. Ibid., p. 20.

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Cf. Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Freedom of Expression in Islam (Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 1997); Abdullah Saeed and Hassan Saeed, Freedom of Religion, Apostasy and Islam (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004). A range of Muslim responses to the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights are surveyed in Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Islam and Human Rights: Tradition and Politics, 3rd edn (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999). As an example of extreme hostility, Mayer cites Ali Khamene’i, who, when president of Iran, described the UDHR as ‘nothing but a collection of mumbo-jumbo by disciples of Satan’ (p. 27). Islamochristiana 9 (1983), focused on human rights in Islam and Christianity, is another useful resource. For an account of a major Christian-Muslim gathering which addressed this theme in 1976, see Khurshid Ahmad and David Kerr (eds), Christian Mission and Islamic Da’wah: Proceedings of the Chambésy Dialogue Consultation (Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 1982). The proceedings were published earlier in the International Review of Mission vol. LXV (October 1976) and, with the permission of the editor, reproduced here as an appendix to the article by Khurshid Ahmad. The title of a seminar for leaders of different faith communities convened by the Archbishop of Canterbury in 2004.

Chapter 10

Islam Hostage to Itself? Kenneth Cragg

i. It may seem a curious notion and the title needs a question mark. But why should it be that the current image of Islam (however prejudicially) belongs to the verbal root S.L.M. which has to do with sala¯m and ‘peace’. To be sure, al-sala¯mu ‘alaykum is of the restrictive kind valid only between Muslims. Yet why this steady incongruity between what deals in violence and yet defines itself as ‘peace’? The query is surely apt for inter-faith concern as a quandary for all and sundry. A peaceable isla¯m matters crucially for the world at large. (The point of distinguishing the italicised word from Islam institutionalized will be clear throughout in what follows.) But why suspect that a religious isla¯m is ‘hostage’ to Islam political and imperial? Can faiths be other than in their own custody? How are they ever in forfeit to themselves? Islam has long instincts of complete self-assurance, never in doubt about its ends in its means. It is hardly minded to agree with Karl Marx observing: There is something in human history like retribution and it is a rule of historical retribution that the retribution be forged, not by the offended but by the offender.1 Do faiths undo how they began by dint of what they become? What Constantine did to Christianity took it far from the New Testament Church. There is tragic evidence of a Zionism that travesties Judaism in a betrayal of Zion. Was not Hosea (13.9) moved to cry: ‘O Israel, thou has betrayed thyself’?2 Are not Muslim suicide bombers somehow ‘suicidal’ of Islam itself, still more so of isla¯m? Its sala¯m, akin to the Hebrew shalo¯m,3 leads via the fourth form of the root to isla¯m as performative as well as descriptive, that is, ‘entering into peace’. Hence the frequent translation ‘submission’, as the condition of doing so. Islam/isla¯m are thus seen as ‘the order of the peace of human society’ via the régime it established in its juncture of meaning and power. These, in their twin relation, were at length achieved in the Hijrah from Mecca to Medina, from preaching to power.

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Yet the ‘concord of human society’ never ensued. The pattern of contriving it occasioned its failure as the dark future of history proved in schism and conflict. For there were dimensions of supposedly necessary enmity in the form of the venture. Its belligerence meant steady atrophy of any will to reconcile. Its very will to greet and take into peace sanctioned its coercive means.4 Only ‘submission’ spelled peace. There is a fascinating passage close to this paradox in Su¯rah 4:94 which encloses both the will to conflict and the miscarriages of ‘greeting’, though in its own immediate context: O you believers, when you take to striking (d}arabtum) in the path of God, well take care to discriminate (tabayyanu¯) and do not say to one who gives you peace greeting: ‘You are no believer!’ having in mind the spoil you would have accruing. Alla ¯ h has spoils enough for you! As he is you yourselves were once and God has since been gracious to you. So then be careful to discriminate, knowing that over you Alla ¯ h is all-aware. Thus the extent of ‘peace’ or of response to another’s offered is not to be withheld on the ground that you would lose your advantage (i.e., giving him the right, as now Muslim, to claim your alms). Su ¯ rah 4:94 does not say, though it may imply, that greeting offered under duress may well be suspect and insincere. But what – if your genius is for inclusive peace – of greeting offered in good faith? What might ‘Be careful to discriminate’ mean in the open world, all belligerence apart? If we have only rejection tuned to our advantage how does our peace obtain? Do Muslims all too often ‘stand in their own way’, in respect of any wide human comprehension of their theism? Or why must they deprecate what is not ‘of their turn’? This suggests some exploration of their theism and its Qur’a ¯ nic commendation. Is it imprisoned in lex talionis?

ii. Shakespeare’s ‘O what a piece of work is man!’5 is a good place to begin, or with the word of the Greek Euripides about humankind in careful tie with nature: Happy is he who has knowledge That comes from enquiry . . . Surveys the unageing order Of deathless nature of what it is made, And whence, and how . . .6 For within the sovereignty of Alla ¯ h in the Qur’a ¯ n there belongs a celebration of mankind in entrusted tenure and ‘dominion’, in a world reciprocal to our

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intelligent study and, thereby, responsive to our needs and to our sciences. This sharp perspective of the Qur’a ¯ n’s theism is often overlooked, or overlaid by a perception of divine Lordship which is incompatible with its own truth concerning creation and this human authority within it. We need always to remember that the mandatory Muslim greeting just noted via Su ¯ rah 4:94, is always accompanied by wa-rah}matu-lla¯h, ‘and the mercy of God’.7 One is hardly extending and invoking the mercy of God in any threatening guise of relating that carries denunciation or enmity. Essentially that ‘mercy of Alla ¯ h’ upon us is self-identified in His strange bestowal upon us humankind indiscriminately the dignity of khila¯fah, the grant of a cosmos responsive to our powers and needs as defined in Su ¯ rah 2:30f. It was a trust the angels were chagrined not to be allowed in preference to a fickle, frail and feeble humanity. The point, however, of that story in 2:30 is that only the human realm has the aptness for sense experience and, thereby, for the comprehending, harnessing and enjoying of the natural order, whence derived all culture and all civilization in an economics that makes necessary the political realm for its monitor. This divine scheme of things in the relative enthronement of humanity as ‘deputies’ or ‘agencies’ for Alla ¯ h, alike in the Bible and the Qur’a ¯ n, is the supremely empowering and ennobling measure of that theology of either. For it interassociates God and ourselves in the ruling mulk that is His and the tributary mulk that is ours. It is the crowning assurance of His magnanimity as greeted in the cry: Alla¯hu akbar.8 We can only be truly measured and understood in these terms of our obligation to God: God is necessarily, but not exclusively,9 understood as presiding over that obligation of ours, the obligation He has manifestly Himself willed and ordained as ours. There are two aspects of this divine/human situation that ought to serve to control and restrain all the suicidal postures of Islam. For these deny and disown it in a dire negation of themselves. The self-destruction is inclusive alike of life and limb and of faith and truth. The one aspect is that this khila¯fah belongs, with no exclusions, to us all: the other is that it comes true and sound in the very neutrality by which the sciences proceed, in that they are operable without prior reference to theological alliance. The ‘secular’ thus has its place inside them. That first aspect has its warrant in Su ¯ rah 7:172 which depicts a single human audience comprising all generations as at one time, to whom comes the question of Alla ¯ h: ‘Am I not your Lord?’ to which they all reply: ‘Truly indeed: we so acknowledge.’ It follows that all in their long sequence are self-confessed as tributary to God, liable for a trust they enjoy, so that none could blame their forebears for misleading them.10 Nor should we miss the point that here is a Lordship putting a negative question, one that waits for its answer – clearly a seeking, not an imposing, form of omnipotence, a sovereignty deferential to its underlings. This scene-set in 7:172 precedes all directional revelations, all patriarchal or other scriptures, the ‘sheets’ of early prophets, the tah}annuf of Abraham, or the Torah of Moses. It is pre-Sinai and assumes the Noahid ‘covenant’ of a seedtime

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and a harvest enjoyed by all places and economies, however diverse and unequal in climate or yield. It does not exceptionalize that triad of land, people and worship that ensued for Hebrew self-understanding as a uniquely intended ethnic ¯ n reads all human covenant other lands and peoples did not share.11 The Qur’a cultures and economies as equally enjoying and pursuing the same khila¯fah. Moreover, its incidence to all is, like the precept in 4:94, about greeting. It does not say: ‘You are not a believer.’ It certainly has its moral conditions about truth, justice, honesty, probity and compassion, but it rests these within the human imperium, whether of conscience or of law and precept. It does not hitch its processes to the right discharge of these ethical norms and duties. It leaves them inside the khila¯fah. It would not be a cosmos did it perform otherwise. Our trust is bound to be ‘secular’ in the means if it is ever to be ‘holy’ in the ends. Our physical operations in humans-being are not only ethnically common: they are also effectively ‘neutral’ about our confessio fidei. They ‘work’ whether or whom-ever we worship. The biologist, the chemist, the surgeon, the airline pilot, the engineer, the astronaut, the laboratory technician – all these may be, or not be, Muslim, Christian, Jew, Hindu, Buddhist or Sikh. Their sciences, their techniques, their structure of skills, will perform and function at their will and thanks to their wits, whatever their shaha¯dah, or lack of one. They can be empirical without being theological. There will always be a vital distinction between shukr and kufr as the Qur’a ¯ n insists, but it will not affect whether the sun rises or the water boils or the stars shine.12 It is not at all that nature is amoral, but that its morality resides in its being in the custody of human hands. We are right with it when we are right within ourselves in due surrender to the word and ways of God in heart and mind and will, that trinity of a sound isla¯m. We may not wisely say – as some are prone to do – that there is no ‘secular’ because all things are under God. Indeed they are, but their ‘under-God’ status, by the very will that has it so, is in delegacy to us, so that they have to be ‘hallowed’ – as they only ever can be – at our hands. It is precisely here that the urgency of an isla¯m belongs, an isla¯m of ours which does not just happen but has to be willed. Islam was, and has always remained, about a summons, plea and liability for a willobedience. Hence the greeting too. One does not say to a machine: al-sala¯mu ‘alaykum. It has no consciousness either of debt or duty.13

iii. There are two features of the Qur’a ¯ nic doctrine of creation that under-write this reading of the human scene, namely the role of names and naming and the ‘sign’ quality of all we know and do. Su ¯ rah 2, in line with the biblical narrative of Adam, the first creaturely trustee, has him acquiring the names of things (whether as bestowing or learning them). The Sciences have always proceeded by the giving and the multiplying the names of things, commodities, phenomena of every kind.

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For to name is a first pre-requisite of employ and harness. Not to identify this or that is not to understand. To begin to identify is to embark on control, on management and further discovery. There was a long Semitic tradition concerning God that to ‘name’ was somehow to exert power over, to exploit, to have under constraint. Hence the Hebrew ban on the ‘mention’ of the divine Name on the lips. Our very word ‘invocation’ implies staking a claim on. Islam also has its careful reservations about expecting the divine Names, al-asma¯’ al-h}usna¯, to mean in any normal sense. There are biblical usages that avoid the problem by circumlocutions like ‘Heaven’, or ‘Presence’. How contrasted then the ‘dominion’ had over things by dint of having their names, so that the advance of science has ever been the multiplication of nomenclature, as more and more items came to be added to the known and demanded to be labelled. This aspect of human khila¯fah has always been cumulative and historical, raising ever larger questions about the range and liability of human aegis, while evermore witnessing to its grant-in-trust quality. This feature blends directly with the other concern, namely that all things physical are a realm of ‘signs’. The term a¯yah (sing.; pl. a¯ya¯t) applies to the verses of the Qur’a ¯ n itself, as in numbered sequence, which may be taken to indicate how nature – in its own order – gives us to know about God’s way, before or while Scriptures do so verbally. This ‘sign’ quality in things corroborates, for ‘dominion’ purposes, the scientific equipping by the names. But it also has a deeper role in the inspiring of the poetic, the musical, the sublime – and in all these the grateful or, as the Christian would say, the ‘priestly’.14 The same ‘signs’ which arrest the Darwins of the world, the laboratorians, the explorers, the investigative scholars of the earth’s surface and its deeps, should no less summon to thankfulness and praise the souls of human folk. It is in such celebration that the Qur’a ¯ n excels, before the pre-occupations post-Hijrah took its Su ¯ rahs into tactics and politics.15 It has to follow for the Qur’a ¯ n ‘greeter’ that the worship of Alla ¯ h recruits the sober celebration of man as denizen of this enthralling theatre of nature, this endless domain of us humans. It is out of the benison of a significant world that the impulse of adoration derives – the adoration of the divine ‘whence’ of all we discern and own, not the idolatrous worship of the things themselves in a paganism of that literal order. This most authentic dimension of the Qur’a ¯ n makes it important to let it firmly qualify the frequent Muslim assumption of the divine/human relationship in other than this inter-associative form, namely as almost a realm of dissociation in nearly tyrannical terms of omni-controlling Lordship. Such measures of rigorous determinism go entirely contrary to the divine bestowal in the Qur’a ¯ n of human khila¯fah in genuine liability for its responsive isla¯m in willingness of mind. There is a twin feature of the khila¯fah which confirms and symbolizes this ‘dominion’, namely the place of honour the Qur’a ¯ n assigns (that ‘sign’ again!) to

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procreation and parenthood. It has much to say about the womb and sexuality, about birthing and orphans – among whom Muh}ammad himself was well-nigh ¯ rah 96, reputedly the first, invokes al-‘alaq with khalaqa, ‘the sperm-clot’ one.16 Su with ‘Him that created’. Su¯rah 56:58 asks the hearer to wonder and ponder over ‘intercourse’ and what it enacts in its physical exchange. For this, too, is deeply ‘creative’ but only inside the order of creation, which – by human participation – it perpetually renews. ‘The Qur’a ¯ n and sexuality’ would make a very different sceneset than the one usually assumed by Western impressionism or patterned on frequent Muslim usage. Marriage and intercourse are among Alla ¯ h’s ‘signs for a people who comprehend’ (30:21). It is this appeal to qawmin yatafakkaru ¯ n, ‘a folk who use their wits’ – like the frequent call elsewhere for tadabbur, or intelligent thought, alike for the Qur’a ¯ n and for phenomena in general – that warrants the link made earlier with the questing thought of the Greek spirit. The Qur’a ¯n does not commend either itself or life-experience to the lazy mind. ‘The names’, ‘the signs’, the ama¯nah, ‘the trust’, the human ‘agency’ on behalf of God – all these verify that central theology of Islam as the Alla¯hu akbar, of God over all things competent. But they also rectify all popular prevalent measures of it which fail to take full account of the significance within it of our creaturely dignity-in-trust and of the prophethood which educates us in it.17 That faith bids us see in this created cosmos a crowning divine intention for humankind in a vocational destiny of meaning and hope, a setting not devised in jest or frolic or frustration or pointlessness,18 but fashioned by al-Mus}awwir, whose artistry it tells and whose sovereignty it speaks. Both engage the human dimension as crucial to their divine intent making creation itself their greeting to the creature: ‘Be and you are!’ ‘Peace and mercy of Alla ¯ h upon you!’

iv. It is not this – to draw language from elsewhere – ‘the pearl of great price found in the field’, for joy of which we give all that we have to won it such? So it is, so ¯ n is the estimable essence of must we let it be.19 This central theme of the Qur’a Islam, a comprehension of humanity under God, apt for contemporary engagement with the technological liabilities that have seriously confused and desacralized the popular mind in the West and bewildered its social and ethical patterns of life. As a theological humanism it realizes the twin affirmations of the shaha¯dah, in which ‘God and Messenger’ relate to human, caliphal ‘agency’, in a world of created intention signally guided by the prophethood which itself witnesses supremely to the ‘trust-principle’ that belongs in common terms to the humankind it guides, so that prophethood is the ultimate witness to all personhood.20 Insofar as Western prejudice, dismay, anger or puzzled apprehension – whatever it may be – have been liable to despair about Islam or braced for some inevitable

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‘clash’, it needs to halt and measure this deep human dimension of its founding theism, its Meccan theism shall we say? For the burning question that promptly follows is: How well this precious meaning is served by those other elements of historic Islam of which Medina was the source and powerfully remains the symbol? For, in the way they developed subsequently, there was a self-violation of the faith’s defining meaning, by an institutional proprietar-ship of the sort to which all religions are prone. When a theological humanism of this Semitic order is enforced or brought to bear upon humanity, as if by unique auspices, it counters the very truth it brings – the truth of a version of humanity belonging to humanity per se not somehow conferred upon them by the faith that brought it.21 All ‘mission’ in the name of that vision about us all has to do with its confession and commendation, not with its bestowal. Faiths can only well know themselves as trustees of this truth not its masters. Such was the situation with Meccan Islam as ‘witnessing’. In measure, it ceased to be so with Medinan Islam as power-enshrining it in sole mastery. Did it not first know itself as having in its care what had been essentially the theme of all whom Alla ¯ h had sent? Or, in the language of 4:94, we should hesitate to say when we are ‘greeted’: ‘You are not a believer’, because we have a self-interest in mind to think it so.22 The point is so vital that it deserves careful review. First, as we saw, that the ‘pledge’ in Su ¯ rah 7:172, of all ‘the progeny of the sons of Adam’ in confession of divine Lordship was antecedent to all scriptured revelation that summons to it. If it is thus constitutive of human being, it does not consist in their tuition in it. Theirs is simply the crucial witness to it, the recalling ‘reminder’ of it. Moreover, that ‘inherence’ in us of the truth of it applies to us all indiscriminately and universally. It can in no way be privately monopolized by allegedly singular people, land, time or ancestry. Is its meaning not then forfeited or subverted in the sheer authoritarianism of some sole purveyor, the more so if that authority is politically wielded or takes imperial form? There will also be a violation of its truth if, in the self-interest of its custodian, it establishes that authority in obscurantist terms that exclude all conscience or integrity of private thought. Any zealotry is liable to demand to override the scruples or anxieties of private souls in requiring an entire surrender to its claims. The Qur’a ¯ n’s own dictum: ‘You are in charge of your own souls’ (5:105) is then forfeit as are its insistent pleas for tadabbur as a careful cognizance of Alla ¯ h’s ‘signs’ facing us in all our experience, material and emotional. Indeed, a cognizable world that has us responsible for responsiveness on every hand is just the other side of the ‘pledgedness’ we all transacted. Thus a faith rooted in the care of that ‘pledgedness’, its reminder and its discipline, is hardly self-consistent in despising or impeding it, as bigotry or fanaticism or harsh custodianship will do. Shakespeare’s question will then be apposite: What, Cardinal, is your priesthood grown peremptory?23

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It is these considerations that lead us to see as vital, in respect of Islam, the argument for the priority of Mecca at least in care for Islam’s contemporary relevance as a major custodian of a human ‘pledgedness to God’, as requiring to call in question the unilateral and political shape it has long had itself give to it. To many, any significant distinction between the Meccan and the Medinan Islam will seem invalid and impossible. They seem so fully welled together despite the careful distinction the Qur’a ¯ n has for its Su ¯ rahs. Message and muscle are inseparable. Dı¯n and dawlah, faith and power, are twins like Jacob and Esau, born of the same womb. Yet, however out of the question, there was a Hijrah, a watershed was crossed. Islam did emerge and persist through thirteen years in not-yet-empowered terms, and only survived by so doing, without benefit of Caliph or Sultan. Its only jiha¯d was its inner tenacity of conviction, its dogged witness to our human ‘belongingness-to-Alla ¯ h’ where all began. Only so did any subsequent Hijrah eventuate. It was the Meccan witness, via the requested ‘teacher’, that laid the ground in Yathrib for its access. Medina became such only by dint of what Mecca brought as that out of which its destiny was made. Were the welcoming Yathribites not named ans}a¯r, that is, the ‘aiders’ – not the makers – of what they received? There can be no question over which city was on behalf of which, if we take them as symbols of a story. The priority of the Meccan in the identity of Islam is corroborated further in the shape Muh}ammad gave to its re-possession in 630, two years before his death. The clemency he offered may have been tribal and politic24 but it indicated how the whole Medinan enterprise had been no unprincipled power-lust or wild aggression but a disciplined campaign to realize a religious goal. It cared for the one crucial surrender of idolatry and the idols, a cleansing of those ‘Aegean stables’ of the Quraysh so that ‘pledgedness to Alla ¯ h’, the original witness to Mecca, prevailed again. It did not stay so in the subjugation at H{unayn and al-T{¯a’if or in the call upon neighbouring powers to acknowledge Islam in the celebrated ‘Letters’ sent them, nor in the advance of Islam after the Prophet’s death. The voice of Islam became more peremptory outside those Meccan precincts and shed the solicitude its victorious return to them showed, in its far expanse beyond them. ‘The peninsula of the Arabs’ would know Muslims only and elsewhere a political dominance would firmly obtain ‘surrender’. It is impossible to know how far Muh}ammad’s passing explains the distinctively Medinan form which Islam’s expansion took to bring its Meccan word to its power guise. That his death as sudden and unexpected meant deep crisis is not in doubt. There were many practical reasons for the emergence of the political Caliphate. Islam as ‘established’ in Medina plainly needed a political order for the direction of its own community in law and regulation and powerstructure. While he lived he combined in his person the dual role of prophet

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and leader. In the former, he was irrepeatable and irreplaceable: in the second, succession was urgent and vital. There was a vacuum that Abu ¯ Bakr filled. But the inevitable distinction this perpetuated between what faith preached and how the faithful were ruled left the ever vexed and vexing issue of their reconciliation – hence the early and bitter schism between Sunnı¯ and Shı¯‘ah, and several other tensions over the rightness of the political aegis of the faith or faith’s reckoning with its political servants. These stresses could only accentuate as Islam physically extended the reach of its faith as an ‘imperial’ thing. Inevitably its being ‘imperial’ conditioned its being ‘missionary’. It would only be coming as a preaching in that it was coming as a regime. The compromise between them would always be like the difference that had obtained initially between Mecca and Medina.25 The more jiha¯d was understood in physical terms the less essentially was it understood in spiritual terms.

v. Thus the historic Caliphate came into being and became, of necessity, something that enlarged the precedent of Muh}ammad’s own quest for hegemony in Medina. It was an enlargement required by the ever-widening stage and by the abiding absence of the one prophetic voice. Hence the steady emergence of Tradition and then of other technical devices for reading his mind and will as denoting those of Alla ¯ h. That more circuitous way of knowing what wah}y had once ensuredly conveyed in itself heightened the role of authority and the need for its political expression. Yet the essential pragmatism in the institution of the Caliphate underlines the case for the priority of Mecca. What Muh}ammad most signifies for the world belongs in the message he had in the Qur’a ¯ n’s revelatory terms. His being ‘final’ in prophethood meant that his political leadership in Medina could only be perpetuated in empirical terms. It is notable that the Caliphate finds no mention in the Qur’a ¯ n, where the only khila¯fah is that of the personal self and the only khulafa¯’ are you and me and ‘all the progeny of Adam’.26 If we use the verb rightly, Islam does not ‘consist’ in its political regime shape: it ‘consists’ in what Mecca first heard and the world is meant continually to hear concerning our ‘belongingness’ to Alla ¯ h and to Alla ¯ h alone.27 This means that political aegis will always compromise religious truth. To think that empirically Mecca and Medina may ever be separated is idealist. To think they can be crucially differentiated is mandatory. There will always be risk to the meaning by the fact of the means, wherever faith is the meaning and power the means. The long image of Ima ¯ m H{usayn in Shı¯‘ah piety testifies to this truth and is the deep source of its pathos in the memory and the liturgy of Karbala ¯ ’. There

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hangs over the tragedy an aura of strange diffidence about joining the combat with the Umayyad army in H{usayn’s demeanour. As loyal reading has it, he was bringing the pure claim of ahl al-bayt, the house of ‘Alı¯, against the unworthy and pretentious de facto, but not de jure, Caliph Yazı¯d with his deplorable expression of Islam. It was not a cause to be pursued in the grim full-blooded style of martial combat like some interbringandage. Somehow its essential sanctity should be preserved – and told – in the yet necessary military form of its pursuit.28 It was kind of a dilemma in which all religious belligerence is inevitably caught. H{usayn paid for his fight-restraints with his military defeat. There was honour in his pattern but an evident unsuitedness in his will to victory. If his grandfather, the Prophet, had been of his mind, would Medina have ever fought and won? Would Islam have emerged in the shape it has? Would some H{usaynlike Muh}ammad have stayed in Mecca where he originally began? But then in the event, H{usayn also did not stay there in 680 in a passivity like that of his brother H{asan earlier, but made his grief-laden sally to the fatal encounter. How well, or not, religion and power might relate will always perplex and divide us. Perhaps the only crown to be worn is one of thorns. Even the Shı¯‘ah, when success came their way, did not emulate their H{usayn, in indulging in their triumph, being then centuries removed from the decades of early Islam. It is, however, significant that the dilemma was so registered in its costly terms and the memory of it immortalized in the legend of H{usayn, and also so harshly repudiated by the Sunnı¯ mind. It would be false to think of what happened for the victims of Karbala ¯ ’ as ‘suicidal’. Rather there was this apprehension lest the faith itself be violated, its meaning forfeited in its means. It would be wrong to identify the two, seeing that – in a paradox – the suffering was its vindication, but only so by dint of being paradoxical. Suffice it to say, that here for Islam, as for Christendom and Zionism, there was – and is – a ‘self’ at serious risk in the form of its being implemented. No small part of this quandary in Muslim experience is the capacity of power to provoke antipathy. This, no doubt, can also happen, as in Mecca at the first, in reaction to things preached. For the vested interests of unbelief (of every sundry kind) that run counter to things taught and resist persuasion, are then more robustly set against coercion. Given the difference inside their common faith in that human ‘pledged belonging under God’, Christianity and Islam have long had a mutual capacity to excite a mutual antipathy, despite long centuries of local co-existence and genuine efforts, old and new, to move to a certain mutual appreciation, of which these pages are a token. The hope is taxing because it cannot be, if not also critical. There is much at stake. A first duty here is to ask how ready faiths are to be keenly liable for their own image, liable in radical terms? To be sure, ‘imaging’ by other parties, especially

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offended ones, is prone to be miscued, negative and hostile and likely for dismissal out of hand, rather than registered, for hones correction, not mere rebuttal. The more a faith is buttressed in political terms, the less open it is likely to be to self-correction. Self-interest will be in the way of its truer interest or the latter will be farther to seek or see. Tolerance only on its own terms will not readily reckon with the criteria others would bring to it. The art of truly exchanging tolerance is a searching one for both parties. Where so much currently is transacted in media terms, of ‘covering’ and ‘uncovering’ (in the newsmaking line’s vocabulary),29 there is need for something better than so-called ‘exposure’, or pressure for more outspoken ‘disowning’ of violence, lest we only ‘radicalise’ each other. There is need between us for that sort of moral ‘justification by faith’, which can serve to help elicit the attitude it awaits by the attitude it brings. This needs to be vigilant against its obvious pitfalls but it remains true to hope that ‘In what measure ye mete it will be measured to you.’ The Qur’a ¯ n may have some sense of this in warning against saying prematurely or angrily: ‘You are no believer!’ To exclude the other is to occlude the meaning, whether pro or con. This is not to imply some reluctant ‘benefit of the doubt’ idea but a genuine effort to seek a right and positive appraisal of ‘the benefit of the case’. Necessary critique may even point the way. Thus, for example, recent interior criticism of Muslim militancy post-Hijrah by Muslim scholars has argued for a validity then that must be superseded now. In the setting of seventh century Arabia arguably Muh}ammad had no other alternative than the belligerence Medina employed, given Arab norms, immediate tensions and cultural traditions. Now, however, in a global scene and current nationalisms at issue with hope of international order, religious faiths ought to care for that hope, not connive with its frustration by their cruel zealotry. If Islam claims ‘finality’ it must recognize what a contemporary shape of it demands. Witness has to be again of that first Meccan order but, happily, now without these wretched Quraysh around. There are other ways, too, of seeing how this ‘time and place’ factor can avail to ‘mediate’ between a faith and its valid continuity, as is the case for all religions unless they mean to museumize themselves. Response to ‘where and when’ is part of their claim to relevance. Hearts and minds ‘with locks upon them’ (47:24) by dint of taqlı¯d, or ‘hide-boundness’, are no part of a loyal isla¯m. Sheer authoritarianism both forfeits the meaning of belief and violates the human trust in which it must subsist. Nothing is well commended in the creating of antipathy. Where Islam was most aggressive, as in the Ottoman dynasty of the Sublime Porte, or the Mughals under Awrangzı¯b, it finally over-reached itself and succumbed from within in the long arm-reach of history. That essential message to humankind was – and is – its ‘greeting’ to them, invoking the ‘peace’ of our universal engagement with that tenant-tenure of the

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good and serious earth which is our vocation under God and by His magnanimity. It is a destiny only truly told and owned in its own terms of awe and liberty, of dignity and khushu ¯ ‘.30 Muh}ammad was reminded at an early point in his sı¯rah: ‘I have not made you a warden over them’ (Su ¯ rah 39:41).

vi. While the Muslim mind is likely to be long resistant to any plea about a Meccan self distinguishable from its Medinan self, or to holding it now prior and definitive, it is noteworthy how capable Islam proved of renewing the quality of its Meccan self, even in the centuries of strong and successful power-expression. It did so in its ability to inspire and sustain the entire S{u ¯ fı¯ tradition of a quietism that gently prayed, fasted, taught and wrestled inwardly with truth, re-writing the very nature of jiha¯d. To be sure, there was nothing ‘quietist’ in Meccan years in that sense of contentedness with simple witness and foregoing strife. The sı¯rah then was in virile witness against idolatry – a condition the S{u ¯ fı¯ za¯wiyahs, thanks to Islam as regnant, did not have to face. H{asan al-Bas}r¯ı and al-Muh}¯asibı¯ did not have to confront the Quraysh. Yet the first Muslims, if not actually foregoing power, were also not wielding it. In situ, until the Hijrah, it was beyond their reach. For the S{u¯fı¯s of the middle centuries it was beyond their needs, glad as they were to recite their takbı¯rs, ponder their tas}liyahs, muse over their awra¯d and devotionally ‘mention the Names of God’.31 It has often proven in the stresses of the long centuries that the S{u ¯ fı¯ tradition preserved the resilience and kept the spiritual conscience of Islam as often the very crux of its survival. When the secular regime of Mustafa Kemal in the second quarter of the twentieth century de-Islamized the State, consigning Islam to a cultural feature of Turkism, which Turks had better shed, and prohibited all religious education, it was the S{u ¯ fı¯ tradition around Konya, via Jala ¯ l al-Dı¯n Ru¯mı¯’s legacy, and others, that enabled a clandestine Islam to survive and insured its subsequent renewal in Turkish politics. The legacy and literature of Sufism are vast and manifold. There is no place to review them here. The point is the capacity of Islam to develop, often against odds, this version of its spirituality as, in measure, an Islam again in Mecca. Out of its wealth, it may best be savoured here by attention to that strangely un-Hijrah-like Hijrah of that same Jala ¯ l al-Dı¯n Ru ¯ mı¯, arguably the most memorable of all the S{u¯fı¯s. He may well exemplify an Islam saved from the risk to itself. In giving the world to know its essential meaning as its perennial ‘greeting’. The irony is that this most renowned exponent of a gentle Islam was involved in a long hijrah, not into a quest for power but in steady pilgrimage from it. It

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lasted the whole decade from c.1218 until 1228, the years when Jala ¯ l al-Dı¯n left his birthplace in Balkh (Afghanistan, b.1207) with his celebrated father, Baha ¯ ’ al-Dı¯n al-Balkhı¯ (1148–1231) who was known as ‘the king of scholars’, until the family finally settled in Konya in c.1228, then the centre of the Seljuk Turks. They travelled, not only in spiritual search to escape from upheavals close to home but from the advancing menace of invading Mongols led by Ghenghiz Kha ¯ n. Their hijrah was no replica of the Prophet’s will for some Medina of martial Islam but with its Meccan soul in hope of a secure haven for its spiritual story. It possessed that soul in the twin fire of personal yearning for Alla ¯ h as the theme of love and the ascetic norm of life they believed crucial to their goal. It was after hazardous sojourns in Khura ¯ sa ¯ n and Nı¯sha ¯ pu¯r with circuits westward to take in Baghdad, Mecca, Medina, Jerusalem and Damascus, that Jala ¯ l al-Dı¯n came at length to Konya. There he encountered the wandering mystic Shams al-Dı¯n al-Tabrı¯zı¯ whose profound influence deepened the practice of divine ‘awareness’ he had first learned from his father.32 The theme that came to be enshrined in the Mathnawı¯ of Jala ¯ l al-Dı¯n, a supreme classic of Persian poetry, might be expressed as the capacity to say ‘Thou’ to God, not in the nounal sense of some discursive ‘He’ of scholastic pattern, but in the intimacy of soul-absorption alike into the meaning of pronounal love and in the near ecstasy crowning the h}a¯l that knew it so. I have cleaned the house from good and evil, My house is filled with the Love of the One, Whatever I see in it other than God, That does not belong to me: it is a reflection.33 It was the wealth of imagery with which his poetic genius told such absorption into Alla ¯ h that earned Jala ¯ l al-Dı¯n his eminence in the soul-lore of a world-renouncing, yet by the same token, a world-abiding Islam as a full flowering of its first Meccan bala¯gh of la¯ ila¯ha illa¯-lla¯h. When he died in 1273 his legacy became a perpetual summons to the Islam of his desire. The historic Hijrah of Muh}ammad sensed, according to Tradition, the journeying presence of the Sakı¯nah (Shechı¯na¯h). Jala ¯ l al-Dı¯n told Shams al-Dı¯n: In my hand was always the Qur’a ¯n– Now I seized the Sakı¯nah out of love.34 The legacy of this authentic expression of Islam – it must be acknowledged – offers no answer to the vexed question of how religion ought to resolve its relation to the necessary role of the political in human society. There is neither final nor contemporary answer in their near identity after the Medinan manner.

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The spiritual and humanly ‘caliphal’ stature we studied in its Meccan origins is close to the demands of our current global crisis, and a far cry from that selfsuiciding Islam so tragically hostage here and now to its suiciding partisans of violence. In Su ¯ rah 29:52 Muh}ammad was commanded to say to his detractors: ‘God is all the witness that I need between you and me!’ Is not knowing and having it so the whole meaning of ‘Letting God be God’ which is the sufficient definition of Islam/isla¯m? There is a role for a Christian mind and will, Western and non-Western, in serving how it might be so.

Notes 1 2

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5 6

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Writing in the New York Herald Tribune, 16th September 1857. Though there have been trenchant critics, for example, of Pakistan’s half-century of experience of defining and creating ‘Islamic statehood’, as in Roehad Khan, Pakistan, A Dream Gone Sour (Karachi, 2000). Arabic ‘S’ being the ‘SH’. Shalo¯m ‘alaykum is strictly inter-Jewish greeting which the Talmud prescribes as specially due to teachers. They are the opening words of the hymn welcoming the angels to the house on a family’s return home from synagogue on Sabbath Eve. Despite the disclaimer of Su ¯ rah 2:256 concerning ‘No compulsion in religion’. Yet, if there is duress, it exists and belongs. That it ought not to be, however, is a vital rubric. Su ¯ rah 10:99 asks the Prophet: ‘Would you compel people to become believers?’ William Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act 2, scene 2, line 315. See C. M. Bowra, The Greek Experience (London, 1957), p. 173. Muslim eschatology would demur about any ‘unageing order’, with its frequent images of apocalyptic transience, but at least an ageless ‘mortal’ than its peoples. The sala¯m word comes over forty times in the Qur’¯an. ‘God guides into the path of peace he who seeks His good pleasing’ (5:16): 6:54 enjoins it as greeting to believers: it often occurs as saluting entrants into Paradise as da¯r al-sala¯m: it is the practice of the patriarchs and is ‘I@s¯a’s invocation on his ‘day of birth, of death and rising’ (19:33) and in 59:23 al-Sala¯m is among the divine Names. Does not this capture the sub-sovereignty of humans, not only in affirming the generosity in His granting it, but that its ‘sub quality’ is crucial? All¯ah is always ‘greater’ – a formula to disown all human pretensions, whether crude idolatry or the pseudo ‘arrogance’ of nation, profit, commerce, ‘fronts’, or religion. ‘Not exclusively’ in that the human and the cosmic may not exhaust the realm of divine enterprise, however certainly it engages it. This would seem to counter the long Muslim tradition holding that it is parents who take their offspring away from ‘the straight path’ of Islam which is the faith fitting human nature (30:30). The point in 7:172 that we are all already pledged to a divine allegiance rules out any excuse incriminating parenthood. If we ‘go astray’ we do so in our personal capacity.

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Effectively Islam universalizes this way what Judaica holds to be ‘unilaterally covenanted’ to Jewish people in Judaic land. Islam does so by dint of its inclusive doctrine of creation and of creaturehood in it. The New Testament does so also by the same means (cf. Acts 17.26 et al.) but also, and more, by the inclusivity of divine grace, embracing all ‘in Christ’ (cf. Jn 1.12–14, Eph. 2.13–22 et al.). Judaic exceptionality still speaks to all, if only all peoples in any native land can believe themselves distinctively meant to glorify the Lord. That shukr and kufr, ‘gratitude’ and ‘atheism’, the Lord to honour or the Lord to ignore – are classic antitheses in the Qur’¯an, the first being of the essence of belief, the second of shirk. As its repeated phrase has it, we may go through life min du¯ni-lla¯hi, having or being ‘to the exclusion of God’. Our ‘denial’ of God takes the dumb form of mere indifference – which is, by the same token, an indifference to wonder, to mystery, to meaning and its claim. Though we may well want and need to ‘greet’ hopefully (i.e. to care reverently) the products and processes of the machine, on which so much for culture and community will darkly or blessedly turn. The point is that things may be procedurally mechanical: they are always morally accountable and so within ‘greeting range’, even if dumb in themselves. The term tends to be either opaque, or anathema, to the Muslim cast of mind, not because there is no sanctity to transact, but that it can only ever be a private thing and not liturgical as an ‘office’. Otherwise the ‘Pillars of Islam’ are full of ‘liturgy’, and ‘significance’ calls for register. Readings in the Qur’a¯n, (London, 1988 and Brighton, 2000), gathers the Qur’¯an’s doxologies on pp. 86–92 and ‘God with Man in Creation’ on pp. 93–112. It is only the situation which calls for the ministry of prophethood, pp. 113f. The contrast between Meccan and Medinan Su ¯ rahs in this respect is not total and abrupt yet it is no less marked. His father, ‘Abdallah, died before Muh}ammad’s birth, while his mother, A<minah, died in his early childhood. Hence the important role of his uncle and staunch protector, Abu ¯ T{¯alib and of Khad¯ıjah, his wife, both of whom died just before the Hijrah. For prophethood also involves, at its unique level, the same principle of the divine engaging with and through the human that belongs with all creaturely khila¯fah, in the freedom-to-be of the created order. Divine ‘agency’ – a state of being-on-behalf of – is present in both. Islam would never presume to say, as Jewry allows itself: ‘God depends on Man as Man on God.’ (See Louis Jacobs, Jewish Values, London, 1960.) See Su ¯ rahs 21:16 and 44:38 for this accent in the Qur’¯an. That all that is was not contrived by any divine ‘jester’ is important for all human sanity also. ‘Vanity of vanities’ is no Islamic cry. There is danger in borrowing Mt. 13.44 in this way, out of its context, yet it is important to see this ‘theological humanism’ as indeed ‘treasure to cherish’, as the central witness of the Qur’¯an, in the inheriting of a cosmos and under the tuition or education of prophethood. See note 17. All¯ah’s readiness for the ‘agency’ of human messengers parallels and heightens His making of human ‘deputies’ as His ‘orderers’ in the physical world.

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Or, otherwise expressed, the things that make the different Semitic faiths distinctive do not warrant any monopoly on their part of this meaning of us humans under God, seeing how common it is to each. In respect of being all of us alike khulafa¯’ we have no right to exclude each other from greeting when on this ground. On disparities see note 22. This may seem to ignore the central ways in which, for example, Islam wants to disown and disqualify Christian belief in the Cross, in ‘God in Christ’, in ‘the Word incarnate’ and all that belongs with these themes in its theology, like the Eucharist. Nor can it remove these issues from what Christians must reproach about Islam in lack or rejection of them. However, ‘man under God over this cosmos’ is common faith and inviolable even given these issues between. For they are issues which turn, not on humans being such, but on whether in this khila¯fah role, advice and guidance suffice them (‘as the Qur’¯an assumes) or whether in this very dignity their perversity call for more than words to the wise and requires grace for the sinful. William Shakespeare: 2 Henry VI, Act 2, Sc. 1, line 24. There follows the Latin tag from the Aeneid: tantaini animis caelestibus inae?, ‘Can there be such anger in heavenly souls?’ In the different patterns and locality of the surrenders according to preceding relationships. Clemency also helped to encourage and cement surrender. Islam’s expansion was certainly ‘faith-bringing’ but how far ‘preaching it’, as distinct form ‘holding it’, obtained is conjectural. T.W. Arnold’s The Preaching of Islam (London, 1913), was an apologetic work, as its title implied. It dealt also with ‘mission’ in later centuries through trade and cultural expression and – as for the early decades – concedes that ‘In the following sketch of the missionary activity of Islam, it has not always been possible to discover whether . . . purely religious motives have determined conversion’ (p. 10). He adds that ‘Wars of conquest were for the extension of Muslim domination does not imply that the aim in view was unbelievers’ conversion’ (p. 5). It is a cryptic comment. That is invariably the usage, with no hint of the historic Caliphate (apart from a solitary reference to David as such in its own kingship long before the ummah concept of a politically unitary Islam). I.e., ‘to have its being in’ or ‘to be constituted by’. See, e.g., S. H. M. Jafri, The Origins and Early Development of Shi‘a Islam (London, 1979), pp. 202ff. See Edward Said, Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine how we See the Rest of the World (New York, 1981), and Split Vision: The Portrayal of the Arabs in the American Media, ed. E. Ghareeb (Washington, 1983). A frequent attribute in the Qur’¯an of the true believer, as ‘gentle’, ‘lowly’, selfabasing’, and ‘submissive’. It is almost the antonym of the other Muslim virtue of ‘zeal’ and ‘wrathfulness’. Su ¯ rah 41:39 speaks of the earth itself as being ‘lowly’ in meekly turning its showers into its fruits. It is among the several descriptives of Muslims in 33:35. Takbı¯r, reciting Alla¯hu akbar rhythmically: tas}liyah, calling down blessing on the Prophet in obedience to Su ¯ rah 33:56: awra¯d (also ah}za¯b) are the Prayer Manuals used by S{u ¯ f¯ıs and bequeathed by the ‘Masters’ of their sundry ‘Orders’.

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See Anne-Marie Schimmel, The Triumphal Sun: A Study of the Works of Jalaloddin Rumi (London, 1978). R. A. Nicholson, ed. Mathnawı¯ yi Ma‘nawı¯ of Jala¯l al-Dı¯n in 8 volumes (London, 1925–40), vol. 3, p. 1144. Cited in Schimmel p. 23 n. 32 – spelling Arabicized.

Chapter 11

Europe and the Arab World in the Twentieth Century: Behind the Myths of the ‘West’ and ‘Islam’ Jørgen S. Nielsen

At a time when public and very often also academic debate appear to have accepted the dichotomy of the ‘West’ and ‘Islam’, even if only as some form of shorthand, it is useful to recall how this situation has come about. Taking a bird’s eye view of the two sides of the Mediterranean, I focus on some of the key interactions over the longue durée of the twentieth century which have fed into the tensions in which we find ourselves today. This is not only a story of European impact on the Arab world and Islam. It is also a story of the empire ‘striking back’ through the immigration and settlement of rural communities of the Muslim world in their own cities and in the cities of Europe.

Europe’s moment in the Arab world During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the predominant experience of the Middle East has been the impact of European expansion. But the initial encounter was not all negative. The early encounter of Europe and the Middle East in the modern period had had its promising dimensions. When the balance of power between Europe and the Ottoman Empire had begun to change late in the eighteenth century, the Ottoman response for several decades had been to seek to learn from Europe both in military and civil organization. When Mehmet Ali took control in Egypt in 1805, after the shock of Napoleon’s landing and defeat of the Mamluks in 1798, he also had sought to reorganize Egypt on European lines. The groups of young men he sent to Paris to learn French, so that they could translate administrative and military manuals, brought back the excitement of post-revolutionary France. Many of them were attracted by the ideas of freedom, equality and brotherhood, of the declaration of the rights of man, and the way parliamentary democracy involved people in their own government. These were ideals, they felt, which were much closer to those of Islam than the practices of their own authoritarian military rulers.

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Unfortunately, such early positive encounters soon turned into disappointment. It first happened in Algeria, when the French invaded in 1830. After several years of resistance, its leader Abd al-Qadir al-Jaza’iri had to go into exile in Damascus. In 1882 the British occupation forces quickly crushed resistance led by ‘Urabi Pasha. Gradually other areas fell under French, British and, to a lesser extent, Italian control. In this context it is salutary to remember that the collapse of the Egyptian public finances which were used by Britain as the excuse for occupation in 1882 was, at least partly, the result of economic globalization. The government had borrowed on the strength of future cotton production, but the world price collapsed when the Union blockade of the Confederate States was lifted at the end of the US Civil War in 1865. Globalization is certainly not only a late twentiethcentury process. However, it must be remembered that the European impact was very uneven. It was concentrated in the urban centres of trade and political power, and there touched more closely the lives of the wealthy, the educated and the political elites. The urban lower classes – small-scale craftsmen and labourers serving the local neighbourhood – were less affected and certainly saw less of the benefits, and the rural majority saw even less. The further one moved away from the major towns and cities, the less one saw of European influence. Even in the 1950s it was possible for European explorers like Wilfred Thesiger and Freya Stark to travel through areas of the Middle East, which to all intents and purposes had seen no impact of Europe, although that did not last much longer. The social anthropologists of the generation of my teachers still had the option of whether to do fieldwork in ‘traditional’ societies or whether to select sites where they could study the impact of change. It was the great Egyptian Muslim scholar Muh.ammad ‘Abduh who at the end of the nineteenth century warned that the increasing but uneven impact of European culture and politics was in danger of creating two separate Egyptian societies. One was accommodating to, even committing to the new ideas and practices which were coming in from France, Italy, Germany and Britain. Its familiarity with tradition, above all Islamic tradition, was becoming shallow and limited. ‘Abduh could very well have been talking of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk who during the 1920s imposed European customs and looked to Europe for cultural and political models in his project for a new European Turkey. The other Egyptian society, said ‘Abduh, was the traditional, to be found in the towns outside the Europeanized sector and, above all, in the countryside, where life continued to be imbued with religion. Certainly, this religion was not one which would have been approved of in the urban centres of Islamic – or, for that matter, Christian – learning. But it was one which looked to the urban centres for guidance and leadership, and it was often in the traditional countryside that the manpower of the religious classes was recruited. The First World War was a watershed. In Europe it had been fought hopefully as ‘the war to end all war’, and the war medals issued to British soldiers afterwards

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had the inscription ‘The Great War for Civilisation’.1 In the first exuberance after victory, US President Wilson’s Fourteen Points were made the ostensible basis for much of the peace settlement. The League of Nations was established as the international parliament. The ideas of liberal democracy and constitutionalism seemed to be winning, if they had not already done so. In 1922 the League of Nations formalized the concept of ‘mandates’ for countries which had been ‘liberated’ from the control of the losing powers, mainly Germany and the Ottoman Empire, but which were not yet regarded as being sufficiently ‘mature’ to take on full independence. These mandate territories, including in the Middle East the former Ottoman provinces that were to become Palestine, Transjordan, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq, were officially to be ‘educated’ and ‘trained’ towards ultimate independence. That this was merely a cover for continuing colonial rule was betrayed by the timetables for independence envisaged initially by France and Britain, namely several generations. But the language of the mandate on top of the experience of the war had created expectations among the Arab leaderships of independence within their own lifetimes. Through the early and mid-1920s these expectations led to revolts in all the mandate territories, which were often ruthlessly suppressed. In 1925, the Locarno treaties were signed, and four years later the Kellogg– Briand pact signalled the powers’ renunciation of war as a means of international politics. But rather than being the beginning of a new era, these developments turned out to mark the end of an old. The year of the Kellogg–Briand pact was also the year of the Wall Street crash, the symbol of the collapse of liberal economics. The desolation of depression, unemployment and hunger spread across Europe and the United States with knock-on effects throughout the world. But due to its effects the crash also became a symbol of the decline of the Western democracies. Italy had already fallen when Mussolini came to power in 1922. The 1930s were characterized by the rise of fascism – Hitler from 1933, civil unrest in France, Britain and Austria, and the introduction of fascist regimes in a number of other Central and Eastern European countries, not to mention Franco’s Spain. Such developments were noted in the Arab world. The news from Germany and her withdrawal from the disarmament conference in October 1933 were regarded with misgivings in Egypt.2 Western developments were seen as being part of a pattern. They could be understood positively as a new preference for action rather than words. Stalin’s Soviet government concentrated on administration after the departure of Trotsky. Britain had had a coalition government since 1931. The US Congress had given President Roosevelt wide powers of action in the so-called New Deal legislation of 1933, not to mention Germany’s following in the footsteps of Italy, ‘although in her own manner’.3 Finally France formed a national front government under Leon Blum in 1936. The ineffectiveness of the League of Nations was embarrassingly displayed in its treatment of the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in December 1934, a move which indirectly

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threatened Egypt and Sudan and was a contributory factor in the conclusion of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936. So by the middle of the 1930s, hopes of the world having become any more reasonable had been dashed. So long as the European democracies could still be held up as a model to aim for, similar ideas could be kept alive in the Arab world, despite the fact that the powers were clearly reluctant to implement them there. Political independence was the top priority for the native urban elites who were already, in effect, ruling their countries but on behalf of the colonial masters. In Egypt, the British High Commission constantly interfered in internal affairs, so much so that government was in reality a contest for power between the prime minister and his cabinet, the King, and the High Commissioner. The Egyptians had hoped that the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936 would put an end to this, but the interference continued. In Palestine the same year saw the beginning of a three-year Arab revolt against mandate rule and increased Zionist immigration and influence. The French national front government of Leon Blum in 1936 negotiated treaties of independence with Lebanon and Syria but failed to stay in power long enough to oversee its implementation, thus delaying independence for almost a decade.

Independence and social upheaval It was only with political independence that the countryside, the traditional sectors of society, experienced their first great shock. Constructing the new states was seen by the leaders of independence as a task requiring central planning, a trend which was strengthened in the many countries where the military took over and allied itself to the Soviet Union in the Cold War. The model had been established already by Atatürk and the Pahlavi Shahs of Iran between the two world wars. It meant modernizing agriculture, reducing nomadism, and building modern industries and infrastructure. The former pushed people off the land, the latter pulled them to the towns. An indicative period over the region as a whole could be the decade and a half from 1960 till 1975. Over those fifteen years the percentage of the population of Algeria living in towns rose from 31 to 50 percent. In Iraq it was 43 to 62 percent, in Syria 37–46 percent, Lebanon 35–60 percent, Tunisia 32–47 percent, Egypt 38–48 percent, and Turkey 30–43 percent.4 In practice this meant that most cities in the region had, by 1975, more than doubled in size and some, such as Tehran, Ankara, Beirut and Baghdad, more than trebled since 1950.5 But this was not an urbanization such as that which we associate with the north European industrial revolution of the nineteenth century. Social scientists working in the Middle East have long identified one of the characteristics of these great new cities not as one of urbanization but of ‘ruralization’, that is, ‘in the city but not of the city’ as one geographer remarks.6 This migration from

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the countryside did not correlate with any relative industrial expansion. In fact, the proportion of manufacturing in GDP in all of these countries in 1973 stayed stubbornly less than 1 percent higher than it had been in 1960, in many cases growing by less than half of 1 percent,7 in Iraq not changing at all despite the increase in the urban population from 43 to 62 percent of the total. Around such developments we must now again locate developments in the political field in the Arab world. In many Arab countries, the people who had taken control of the newly independent states had been those urban elites which had arisen out of generations of experience with Europe. These were the elites which had made the switch from traditional Islamically oriented education to the European styles gradually introduced from the nineteenth century. They were the elites which had increasingly been the mediators of political power between the colonial rulers and native society. It was from these elites that much of the pressure for political independence had emanated. Following independence, their relations with the former colonial powers were preserved, sometimes as the explicit price for independence. However, it soon became apparent that they were not able to deliver on the promises of improved material living conditions, of a more equitable distribution of the national wealth, which the colonial powers had previously been said to be skimming off. Very specifically, they lost credibility when they failed to prevent the establishment of the state of Israel in 1947–48. In 1949 the first military coup took place in Syria, and three years later the monarchy was ejected from Egypt in another military uprising. Campaigning on policies of modernization, often based on Soviet-style central planning, and increasingly allied with the Soviets in the Cold War, these were the regimes which kick-started the process of urbanization already outlined.

Upheaval in Europe after 1945 The decades after the Second World War in Europe were dominated by three parallel and interrelated processes, all with profound impact in the Arab world. First, there was the increasing East-West tension as the US-led Western countries found themselves in opposition to the Soviet-led systems of Eastern Europe. By 1950 talk was of Cold War and an ‘Iron Curtain’. The foreign policies of the countries of Europe, especially towards the immediate neighbourhood (Turkey, the Arab world and Iran), were determined primarily by Cold War considerations. As Abd al-Nasir discovered during 1955–56, the option of a third way, namely the development of the nation independently of the old colonial masters, was regarded by the West as in essence an alliance with the Soviets. The principle of ‘if you are not for us, you are against us’ served to push Egypt and a number of other nationalist governments into the Soviet sphere of interest,

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while elsewhere, as in Iran in 1952, political intrigue was successful in keeping the regime Western-oriented. The 1950s in the Middle East were thus dominated by US-led attempts to form anti-Soviet alliances along the southern edge of the USSR and by Soviet attempts to establish its spheres of influence and to break the encirclement. This was the context for the events of the late 1950s: troubles in Lebanon in 1958, the overthrow of the monarchy in Iraq, the outbreak of full-blown rebellion in Algeria, and the short-lived union of Egypt and Syria in the United Arab Republic. Second, the World War had exhausted the European imperial powers, Britain, France, Italy and the Netherlands, all of which in one way or another had come to depend economically and increasingly also politically on the United States. The latter retained a strong reputation of being against the empires and in favour of national independence, a reputation which seemed to be confirmed with its role in the process of French retreat from Vietnam and the rest of south-east Asia and in its opposition to the three-power attack on Egypt in 1956. But the US involvement in the 1952 return of the Shah to Iran displayed another side: The royal coup against the nationalist government of Mousaddeq not only removed the remnants of British influence but turned out to have replaced it with US influence. British economic and political weakness led to a gradual withdrawal of British influence from the Arab Gulf states and its replacement also there by US influence. At the same time France, under General de Gaulle, finally accepted the inevitable and withdrew from Algeria in 1962, but only after one of the most bloody of many wars of independence. Third, the domestic priority of the countries of Europe after the end of the war was reconstruction of the devastated infrastructure and means of production. This had manpower implications. Initially, the demand for labour was satisfied by the returning soldiers, then by the continuation of the steady migration from country to city which had characterized the time since the industrial revolution. But already during the 1950s it became clear that this was not sufficient. The imperial powers had on previous occasions imported colonial labour, especially France from Algeria during the 1920s and 1930s. But from the 1950s labour migration became a permanent feature of West European labour markets. Initially workers were sought in the poorer parts of southern Europe: Portugal, Spain, Italy, Yugoslavia and Greece. But soon this also was not enough. Britain was the first to look to its colonies. The first shipload of West Indians arrived in 1948, and immigrants from India started arriving during the 1950s. In the following decade, large number of Algerians, Moroccans and then Tunisians started emigrating to France, while German industry started recruiting workers in Turkey. Gradually other smaller European countries also began to recruit labour from outside Europe following the pattern set by the three big countries.8 The scene was set for a new dimension of the ongoing relationship between Europe and the Arab world.

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Islam, the alternative By the late 1960s it was becoming clear that the Arab military dictatorships were finding it difficult to deliver. Despite all the rhetoric, they could not hold off the Israelis in June 1967 and only achieved an ambiguous restitution in October 1973. While there was some improvement in living standards, more noticeable was often the inequality of wealth distribution, the inefficiency and bullying of massive petty bureaucracy, and corruption so widespread that all were affected by it in one form or another. And the provision of basic health and social security was found wanting. The economic disruption caused to the region by the quadrupling of oil prices in 1972–74 starkly showed up the imbalances and inefficiencies. European ways, whether of the Western type or of the socialist type, were perceived to be failing. One alternative on offer was that of Islam. Muslim intellectuals and activists had for several generations been working on Muslim responses to the contemporary predicaments. Some had concentrated on political ideas, others on Islamic education for the masses, while the traditional Islamic scholarship of the higher education establishments had continued more or less unaffected by numerous attempts to ‘modernize’ them. But they had seldom found a mass audience with the potential for initiating political change. The migration of the countryside to the city was creating that potential. The estrangement of the political classes from the urbanized rural masses was an accumulative process. One aspect was the increasingly narrow power base of the elites, in Syria achieved through a series of coups and counter-coups culminating in the coming to power of Hafiz Al-Asad in November 1970 with a regime identified with one small sectarian community in the northern coastal mountains. In Iran, the Shah almost gratuitously rejected the support offered by those, mainly urban, groups whose interest lay in the maintenance of the regime, while he equally gratuitously insulted the traditional majority of the population, including with a Hollywood-style celebration of 2500 years of Persian monarchy at Persepolis. For both the Shah and, increasingly, Egypt’s President Anwar al-Sadat the audience that needed to be satisfied was to be found in Washington DC and not in the streets and quarters of Tehran or Cairo. This was a mistake. Economic dislocation had already been a major factor in the breakdown of the Lebanese system starting in the spring of 1975. In 1977 there were food riots in Egypt followed by the first portents of Islamic militancy, when the security forces clashed bloodily with members of the Islamist group labelled Takfir wa-Hijra who had kidnapped and then murdered a former cabinet minister. Then President Sadat added insult to injury by going to Jerusalem in November. A study conducted at the end of that year by a team led by Saad al-Din Ibrahim showed that over two-thirds of the young Islamists imprisoned after these events came from the countryside.9 Two years later, the marching

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crowds that were the downfall of the Shah were overwhelmingly from those suburbs of Tehran where the greatest concentration of immigrants from the countryside were to be found. The immigration from the countryside and its concentration in the towns was thus the mechanism by which traditional society gained the potential for political visibility. In connection with the Iranian revolution Said Arjomand talks of this as an ‘enfranchisement’ of sectors of society hitherto excluded.10 This was shown in the increasing political participation of groups and movements with explicitly Islamic programmes already referred to. This dimension, often the one dismissed as fundamentalism by outside observers and by regimes under threat, was, however, only part of the picture. The visibilization of Islam spread much wider. So, for example, in the Algerian town of Constantine seventy new mosques were added in the eleven years from 1973 to the twenty already in existence.11 The role of mosques as a physical focus of community-based action cannot be underestimated. Ahmed Rouadjia places them at the centre of the development of the Islamist movement in Algeria,12 and the contributors to the project ‘Civil Society in the Middle East’, conducted in the early 1990s regularly find themselves referring to the centrality of the mosque.13 But it also seems clear, as well as being reasonably expectable, that public politicization was not the only version of the resurgence of Islamic activity – although obviously that is the form which has attracted most attention. Quieter forms of piety also appear to have grown around such mosques and in the wider networks of the ruralized urban society. There was a time during the 1960s and 1970s when outside observers assumed that the Sufi orders had had their day, either because the social structures in which they were rooted were disappearing,14 or because they were simply behind the times and could not cope with the modern world.15 It is very difficult to uphold that view today. Likewise, a movement like the Tablighi-Jama’at, originating in northern India, has spread all over the world calling its growing numbers of adherents to personal piety and peripatetic preaching, rather than mass politics.16 Having said this, however, one should not underestimate the continuing potential for dislocation caused by social trends and the globalization of communications and politics. The trends outlined earlier, covering roughly the decade and a half till 1975, have not stopped. In Iraq the percentage of the urban population has increased from the 62 percent we saw in 1975 to 70 percent, in Syria from 46 to 51 percent, in Tunisia from 47 to 60 percent. Only in Egypt has it fallen from 48 to 44 percent, while in Lebanon it has soared from 60 to 86 percent.17 And this urban population is one of the youngest in any region of the world and suffers from some of the highest youth unemployment rates. As the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP’s) first Arab Human Development Report points out, the Arab world also has one of the highest illiteracy rates, the highest rate of female exclusion, and the lowest rate of internet linkage, lower even than sub-Saharan Africa.18

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The marginalization and frustration which such dry statistics disguise find expression at their most extreme in violent militancy, especially in those environments where violence for other reasons has become endemic – one thinks immediately of Algeria and Israel/Palestine. At the same time, many more withdraw from the violence, sometimes desperately looking for daily bread, and find reassurance in the revived Sufi networks and traditional forms of personal piety, as one sees in countries like Lebanon, Syria and Egypt. Trends seem to be contradictory but, within a general pattern, the local reasserts itself and breaks the pattern even if the underlying processes are similar. Communications bring the world to one’s living room in real time. Al-Jazeera and other satellite TV stations are ubiquitous, and only in Iran is there still serious official resistance to the satellite dish. But once you have started to think of your own world in terms of Islam and of a contest between its reassertion as a popular process and its repression as one carried out by the authorities on behalf of alien global interests, then events elsewhere involving Muslims are fitted into that scheme. Clashes between the Moro National Liberation Front and the authorities in Mindanao in the Southern Philippines, between Serbs and Albanians in the Balkans, between Muslims and Christians in Northern Nigeria, or between young Asians and the British National Party (BNP) in Blackburn and Oldham become part of a mythologized universal history of victimization of Islam by the West. The local has its own roots, its own context, its own rationale, its own biography, but it becomes part of a global discourse which in turn acts on the local discourse. The local actors are now often the children and grandchildren of the immigrants from village to city of the 1960s and 1970s. Their priorities are economic and political, and so long as the hegemony of outside powers leaves them little autonomy, personal piety and various degrees of political activism within an Islamic discourse and world view appear to be the only viable options.

Islam comes to Europe There are significant similarities and interactions between Europe and the Arab world in this regard. The Muslim immigrants to Europe had initially come for solely economic reasons. But during the 1960s and 1970s the emphasis of migration shifted to family reunion. This was caused primarily by the decisions of European governments to close the doors to labour immigration, in 1962 in Britain and in 1973–74 in the rest of Western Europe, at a time when their economies were under pressure. The effect was to encourage the young men to stay and bring their wives and fiancées rather than returning home, their original intention. But with the establishment of family came also culture and religion, especially when the vast majority of Muslim migrants to Europe came from villages and small towns and were not highly educated.19 Their encounter

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with European bureaucratic institutions such as health service and schools were deeply alienating. Their experience was one shared by all migrants from country to city, but in this case the contrast was sharpened by the move from cultures which had a sense of traditional integrity, which found its conscious expression in a relationship to Islam, to an environment which seemed to lack cohesive social networks and a shared religious basis. From living in consciously Muslim societies they had moved to secular societies where religion had fast been losing its hold. For the immigrant generation, the parents, the priority was material wellbeing – after all, that was what they had come for. Life could be very difficult, particularly as they were setting up their families at a time when the old industries they had come to work in were decaying. Among the immigrants unemployment was usually markedly higher than among the native population. The children of the immigrants went through school and started entering the job market in the late 1980s. On meeting the discrimination there, which their parents had mostly taken for granted, many felt challenged in their identity. Especially in Britain and France they were citizens but felt that they were not treated as equals. The year 1989 was the first test of the new circumstances. In Britain the publication of Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses provoked an angry response from many young people of Muslim background, many of whom had not grown up with any relationship to a mosque. The Rushdie affair was the trigger for their new identification with the religion of their parents. Later the same year, the head scarves affair in France played a similar triggering function. Through the immigrant Muslim communities, the Muslim world in general and the Arab world in particular linked with Western Europe in ways which previously had not been possible or imagined. The collapse of the Soviet system between 1989 and 1992 created a new international environment in which all these various dimensions took on new forms. In Europe itself the disappearance of Soviet power uncovered the latent nationalisms whose pressures had not been ended with the establishment of the rule of ‘the international proletariat’ of communist regimes. National and ethnic identities had merely been suppressed, and they were a tempting resource for political mobilization by authoritarian rulers, when the traditional party machinery fell apart. In some of those identities, religion was an important element, especially among Serbs (Orthodox), Croats (Catholic) and Bosniaks (Muslim) in Yugoslavia. The disappearance of the communist cover meant that in many countries of Central and Eastern Europe, old tensions around issues of ethnicity, nation, citizenship and religion resurfaced. To that extent, despite the marked differences in historical experiences, there were signs of a convergence with countries in Western Europe, where similar issues had entered public debate as a result of immigration.

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Soviet collapse and the new ‘Clash’ Another consequence of the Soviet collapse and the end of the ‘Cold War’ was that many regions of the world found themselves facing political options other than the simple choice between East and West, which they had faced since 1945. This meant that new priorities and choices could be considered. In many parts of the Arab world, the stage was thus opened for a much more public and active role for Islamic movements. This focus was reinforced and sometimes encouraged by Western and especially US interest in Islam as a political dimension of regional politics. Clearly for the Western ‘military-industrial’ interests (against which US President Eisenhower had warned at the end of his tenure in the late 1950s), the talk of a ‘peace dividend’, common in the early 1990s, was a threat rather than a blessing. They were quick to encourage those who started musing about ‘Islam, the new enemy’, a trend which culminated in the popularization of the idea of a ‘clash of civilizations’ by Prof Samuel Huntington in the spring of 1993.20 The response to Huntington was initially overwhelmingly negative outside limited circles which included those later to become known as ‘neoconservative’. Within six months of the appearance of the original article, there started a wave of seminars and conferences around the world aiming at disproving his thesis or at counteracting the anticipated clash. Where previously, the long history of dialogue meetings between Christians and Muslims had usually taken place at Christian initiative, it is my distinct impression – in part through my own involvement – that from the mid-1990s more such meetings were the result of Muslim initiatives. The ‘dialogue of civilizations’ became a common response to the talk of clash, reaching the point that the United Nations at the beginning of the twenty-first century declared a year for dialogue of civilizations, the result of an initiative by Iran’s President Khatami, and then set up a high level group on the ‘alliance of civilizations’. The irony of this massive counter-response to Huntington’s thesis was the almost unquestioning acceptance of his categorization of the world into blocks of ‘civilizations’.21 However, sharp disagreement with Huntington’s analysis was not the only response, although it was initially the main response. As already mentioned, the trends in the United States, which later became widely known as the neoconservatives, were already in broad sympathy with Huntington who in due course became identified with this trend. The idea of clash found a more sympathetic response among certain Islamic tendencies which had for some time regarded the West as the main threat to the Muslim world and to Islam. Without going into details of the various tendencies, one might generally identify those which were in sympathy with people like Syed Qutb and Abu al-A‘la Maududi, to which could be added sympathizers of the Islamic revolution in Iran. By the time the airliners struck New York and Washington on 11 September 2001, those on both sides who were in sympathy with Huntington’s analysis had made

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a comeback, and the event became a symbol of the clash. Huntington’s thesis was threatening to become a self-fulfilling prophesy.

‘Fundamentalism’ and ‘Terrorism’ as dominant discourses? The relationships between Europe and the Arab world – and more widely the ‘West’ and the Muslim world – was now in danger of becoming imprisoned in several mutually reinforcing discourses. The first was that of the ‘clash’, but this was being linked in with ‘fundamentalism’ and ‘terrorism’, two concepts which have to be looked at briefly before we can move on to the conclusion. As is well known, the term ‘fundamentalism’ originated about one hundred years ago and was applied to the movement of Christian scriptural fundamentalism in the United States. The first of their seven beliefs was in the literal truth of the Bible, text and content. It is fundamentalism in this sense which most Muslims and scholars of Islam reject when applied to certain modern Islamic movements and trends. The argument here is that, in an Islamic context, the term becomes meaningless, because if a Muslim is not fundamentalist in this sense, then he or she is not a Muslim – such is the standard theological understanding of the text of the Qur’a¯n. But the growing prevalence of the term during the last two decades has also by sheer frequency of use made it common shorthand for a rather more complex set of phenomena. While it was quickly accepted by the media, it was also given academic credence through the so-called Chicago Fundamentalism Project whose outcome was five volumes of papers published in the early 1990s.22 While the project organizers attempted to present some common features of the phenomenon across the various religions and regions of the world, the papers as often as not seem to contradict the thesis of certain core commonalities. Fundamentalism as a self-descriptor has, in fact, been adopted by many Arab ¯ lı¯ (from aşl, meaning root, Muslim writers, but the Arabic neologism used, uşu source or foundation), more readily permits for a broader meaning. Since, for Muslims, scripture-fundamentalism does not make sense as a distinguishing ¯ lı¯ can readily refer more generally to a element in internal differentiation, uşu reassertion of first principles, a claim to be taking one’s stand on the founding principles of the religion. The debate can then shift to what those fundamental principles might be and how one might arrive at them from the required starting points of Qur’a¯n and Sunna. While many, both Muslims and those involved in studying Islam, have continued to resist the blandishments of the term, others have met the challenge of the term head on and sought to provide it with theoretical justification and meaningful content. Over a decade ago, the Syrian scholar Sadiq al-‘Azm argued coherently for the validity of the term fundamentalist/usuli, stressing the fact that a broad sweep of the people and movements involved have long

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since regularly used it about themselves.23 More recently, David Zeidan has argued that the term can be used to denote shared features of certain Christian and Muslim positions in recent religious thinking. Fundamentalism exists, he says, if correctly analysed and understood.24 Despite a variety of sharp as well as more nuanced differences, he asserts that the common elements are strong enough to be able to talk about ‘family resemblances’, the most marked of which relate to ‘the anti-secularist discourse, the integrated theocentric world view, as well as the various conceptualisations of holy scripture’, this last most usually meaning some form of textual literalism.25 Fundamentalism in this sense, if we allow the use of the term, is essentially a religious discourse engaged with modernism. As a result it is itself modern, even when it finds precedents in great authority figures of the past. It is committed to a struggle against the marginalization of religion in the public space: in politics, in economy and culture, in worship, and in scholarship and intellectual debate. But the struggle takes place on a shared battlefield, and many of the methods used have been adopted from the opponent, including those of modern technology. The significant point about fundamentalism in this sense is that it is not limited to one particular religion or even to religions as such. Fundamentalism is to be found not only in Islam and Christianity, but also clearly in Judaism expressed most actively in the settler movements colonizing the territories occupied in 1967. But it is also to be found in Hinduism, where it found political expression in the electoral dominance of the BJP during the 1990s and into the following century. Buddhism also has its fundamentalists expressing themselves in the politics of Sri Lanka and Thailand. It is equally arguable that there is a fundamentalist facet to be found in the hard-line secularist trends in French laïcisme at the time of the head scarves affair in 1989–90 and in the aggressive responses in parts of the Danish political spectrum towards the cartoons crisis in 2006–7. The other concept which, by the end of the twentieth century, had become part of the everyday language of Euro-Arab relations, certainly at the media and political levels, is terrorism. During the 1970s and 1980s the term was usually associated with Palestinian militancy. This identification was diluted by the fact that terrorism could also be identified with various extreme leftist movements, especially in Europe as with the Red Army Faction (Baader-Meinhof) of Germany, the Red Brigades of Italy and various similar groups, which sometimes had operational cooperation with politically more significant movements such as the Basque movement ETA and the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA). By the late 1990s, many of these groups had disappeared or, in the case of the PLO, IRA and ETA, entered into some form of dialogue process with their opponents. The rise of militant Islamic movements culminating in al-Qa‘ida in the context of the discourse of clash, discussed earlier, meant that the transfer of the accusation of terrorism to them was comparatively easy to achieve.

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As with the idea of the clash of civilizations, the idea of terrorism has also become primarily an instrument in the competition for control of the public discourse. The result has been that one side tends to define all its opponents’ activities as terrorism while refusing to accept the term as applicable to anything committed by themselves or their allies. This effectively renders the term meaningless. Only if some consensus can be accepted as to what constitutes terrorism, can the term be of any use.26 But until such a time, it continues to stir emotions, misunderstanding and political exploitation. As a result all kinds of in themselves isolated events are first interpreted as being interlinked and then do become in fact interlinked. The language of the ‘war on terror’ started in the United States after 11 September 2001 but was soon adopted by other governments in other parts of the world to ensure US sympathy for their own policies against internal dissidence, or at least discourage US sympathy for the dissidents. Local grievances against the economic impact of globalization or the oppression of central governments began to make common cause. Incidents in Pakistan could have immediate repercussions in Nigeria through the immediacy of media communications. The combined effect of all these dimensions is that by the beginning of the twenty-first century, the relationships between Europe and the Arab world are in danger of being absorbed into a perception of a larger contest between the ‘West’ and ‘Islam’. The fact is that the rivalries within each of these so-called blocks and the common ground which exists between many parties across the imagined boundaries between the blocks are as much, probably a stronger, part of the whole picture than the perceived larger contest.

Notes 1

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Robert Fisk uses this ironically as a book title, The Great War for Civilisation: The Conquest of the Middle East (London: Fourth Estate, 2005). Al-Muqtataf 84 (1933), 210–16. Ibid. pp. 207–10. J. I. Clarke, ‘Contemporary urban growth’, in G. H. Blake and R. I. Lawless (eds), The Changing Middle Eastern City (London: Croom Helm, 1980), p. 39. Ibid. p. 45. A. M. Findlay, ‘Migration in space: Immobility in society’, in Blake and Lawless, p. 63. Z. Y. Hershlag, ‘Industrialisation in Arab countries: Patterns, options and strategies’, in Roberto Aliboni (ed.), Arab Industrialisation and Economic Integration (London: Croom Helm, 1979), p. 25. See Jørgen Nielsen, Muslims in Western Europe, 3rd edn (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004). Saad Eddin Ibrahim, ‘Anatomy of Egypt’s militant Islamic groups: Methodological note and preliminary findings’, International Journal of Middle East Studies 12 (1980), 423–53.

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Said Arjomand (ed.), From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam (Albany: State University of New York, 1984). Ahmed Rouadjia, Les Freres et la Mosquee: Enquete Sur le Mouvement Islamiste en Algérie (Paris: Karthala, 1990), p. 38. Ibid. passim. Augustus Richard Norton (ed.), Civil Society in the Middle East, 2 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 1995–96); see particularly the papers by Ahmad Mousalli, Muh.ammad Muslih, Nilüfer Göle and Sarah Roy. See J. S. Trimingham, The Sufi Orders in Islam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971). ‘Abdallah Hama, ‘Mizan al-qiwa al-ijtima‘iyya bayn al-turuq al-sufiyya wa-harakat al-tajdid al-islami fi ‘asr al-nahda’, in Al-din wa’l-mujtama ‘al-‘arabi (Beirut: Markaz Dirasat al-Wihda al-‘Arabiyya, 1990), pp. 327–38. Khalid Masud (ed.), Travellers in Faith: Studies of the Tablighi Jama’at as a Transnational Islamic Movement for Faith Renewal (Leiden: Brill, 2000). UNDP, Arab Human Development Report 2002 (New York: UNDP, 2002), p. 143. Ibid. This is in marked difference to the migration of Muslims to the United States and Canada, where the majority have been from professional and university educated backgrounds. Samuel P. Huntington, ‘The clash of civilizations?’, Foreign Affairs, spring 1993, was later developed into a book, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996). See my critique in ‘Western civilization: Myth or reality? A debate about power’, in Irfan A. Omar (ed.), Islam and Other Religions (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 181–91. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (eds), The Fundamentalism Project, 5 vols. (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1991–95). Sadik J. Al-Azm, ‘Islamic fundamentalism reconsidered: A critical outline of problems, ideas and approaches’, South Asia Bulletin, 13 (1993), 93–121, and 14 (1994), 73–98. The Resurgence of Religion: A Comparative Study of Selected Themes in Christian and Islamic Fundamentalist Discourses (Leiden: Brill, 2003). Zeidan, p. 277. I have tried to do this in my article ‘The discourse of ‘Terrorism’ between violence, justice and international order’, in T. Abbas (ed.), Islamic Political Radicalism: A European Perspective (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), pp. 15–24.

Chapter 12

A Tale of Two Cities Revisited: Jerusalem, Medina and Justice in Today’s Urban Centres Anton Wessels

In 1948 the first meeting of the World Council of Churches took place in Amsterdam. It was three years after the Second World War during which many European cities were in part or wholly destroyed, such as London, Coventry and Dresden. The theme of the conference was: ‘Man’s Disorder and God’s Design’. What is God’s design for the city today? What is the perspective for our present-day multi-cultural cities? What has changed in our West European cities since many – such as Amsterdam, Antwerp and Brussels, with the presence of Turks or Moroccans – now have well-established Muslim quarters with their own cultural and religious life? The Christian faith is essentially connected with the city. The Bible can be characterized as A Tale of Two Cities: namely Babel and Jerusalem. The final perspective for the future is directed towards ‘a city which has foundations, whose builder and maker is God’ (Heb. 11.10). The Qur’a ¯ n can also be called A Tale of Two Cities, namely, the cities of Mecca and Medina. The prophet Muh.ammad had to leave (hidjra) Mecca and had to go to Yathrib. But soon this city would receive the name Medina which means ‘city’, Medina al-munawwara, ‘The city of Light’, the new city where justice would be done. Is there any relationship between these stories of the two cities in the Bible and the Qur’an and our cities today, and if so, what is the nature of the relationship? Charles Dickens wrote his famous book A Tale of Two Cities in 1859, which was largely based on Thomas Carlyle’s French Revolution. The two cities, London and Paris, are the focus of Dickens’ book in which he tries to understand his world and strives to give explanations of and insights into his time. He is convinced that ‘revolution’ is a monster, a nightmare. The famous opening sentence runs as follows: It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity,

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it was the season of light, it was the season of darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair, ... How should one react to such a revolution, that monster that cannot be fought by hanging people and sentencing even more to prison? One can only respond by asking what caused the revolution? Dickens tries to understand the serious social grievances of his time. He criticizes the terrible social circumstances which only deteriorate because of the prevailing selfishness. Dickens understands it in the word of the great British poet W. H. Auden: Those to whom evil is done Do evil in return. Many sense that we are living today in a time of transition and revolution. The world is not the same anymore since the 11th of September 2001, they claim. The term we use today is not revolution but terrorism, and we are witnessing a war against it. But should we not also ask from where this terrorism is originating? What caused it? Is it not, in our revolutionary time of terror and counter-terror, crucial to remember the very same words of Auden? Many in the ‘West’ find that evil is done to ‘us’. The terrorist attacks in the cities of Madrid, London and Amsterdam we find shocking, of course. But should we in the West not ask ourselves, ‘What evil we did do in turn?’

What could be the role of the Bible and the Qur’a¯n today? In our time the three Abrahamic religions – Judaism, Christianity and Islam – should work together and be in constant dialogue, or rather trialogue, with each other. The question of whether Muh.ammad is to be reckoned among the prophets should be answered by Jews and Christians with a clear affirmation and therefore a trialogue is a condition sine qua non. It is of utmost importance to realize that the prophet Muh.ammad stands in the tradition of the Biblical prophets: Abraham (Ibrahim), Moses (Musa) and Jesus (Isa). Jews and Christians are seen by the Qur’a¯ n as the people of the Book (ahl al-kitab), respectively the Torah (Tawrah) and the Gospel (Injil). That is, the so-called Old Testament or Tenakh and the New Testament. The three books interpret each other and should be discussed among the three traditions together. Prophets are often a nuisance for the people around them. They are very critical in particular towards the ‘temple’ that is, the religious authority, and the ‘palace’, the political authority. They criticize priests, kings or rulers and suffer the consequences. They are mocked, despised, suppressed, driven out and sometimes even killed. This too was Muh.ammad’s story. In Mecca, the city of his

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birth, Muh.ammad started his ministry as prophet around the year 610 CE. He ministered there for about thirteen years under great opposition and persecution, even at the point of threat to life. In the year 622 he was forced to leave that city of injustice and went to Yatrib, which later was renamed medinat-al-nabi, ‘city of the prophet’. There he continued to work for ten years until his death in the year 632. In the context of the precarious situation we live in today I want to pose the question, ‘What could be said about the “Design of God” for our cities on the basis of the Bible and Qur’a¯ n?’ I want to use these two texts to represent ‘A tale of two cities: the city of justice and the city of wrong’, the city that kills the prophets in contrast to the city of justice and peace for which Jerusalem and Medina are the model; the city where righteousness and peace will kiss each other (Ps. 85.10). The city stands also for the country, or for the earth at large. I also want to present the prophetic message from Abraham until Muh.ammad against the background of the creation project of ‘Man/Woman (Adam/Eve)’. Therefore I begin with the story of the creation of Adam/Eve and the effort of Satan/Iblis to frustrate that project.

Adam’s creation and the temptation by Satan (Iblis) The story of creation in the Qur’a¯ n begins with a Prologue in Heaven. In the meeting with the angels God announces his plan to create man: And when thy Lord said unto the angels: Lo! I am about to place a viceroy [caliph] in the earth, they said: Wilt Thou place therein one who will do harm therein and will shed blood, while we, we hymn Thy praise and sanctify Thee? He said: Surely I know that which ye know not. (Qur’a¯ n 2:30 [28]) In so many words the angels find it a bad idea of the Almighty God to create man because he will shed blood on earth. One cannot deny that the angels have a point. They realize what is about to happen, namely, that God’s design will lead to violence. What is all the more striking is that God is not diverted from his plan and says: I know what you don’t know. One wonders what God knew that the angels did not know. One cannot imagine that God did not know that man would shed blood on earth. In the very least, this foreknowledge means that God has confidence in his own project and gives his trust to man to be created. When man is created by God his opponent, Iblis, Diabolos, devil, satan (shaitan), comes on stage: ‘But the devils whispered to him, saying: O Adam! Shall I show thee the tree of immortality and kingship (mulkin) that wasteth not away?’ (Qur’a¯ n 20:120 [118]). God’s adversary gives man the prospect of kingship (mulk), to be a king (malik) (melek in Hebrew). The titles or terms of king

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or kingship both in the Bible and the Qur’a¯ n are very negatively loaded. Usually these terms designate unjust kings and oppressors because they serve ‘moloch’ (a play of words with melek in the Bible), that is to say, these kings are the ones who spread ruin and destruction on earth. What is the key point here? God wants man to become caliph, his representative on earth. Satan offers man kingship (mulk, malik) and promises him an imperishable kingdom, while God wants man to become his vicegerent. Satan suggests that man can be like God, who is King and to whom belongs kingship. In other words, Satan suggest in his design that man will get the competence of God. That is the temptation which was also offered to Jesus, the second Adam, in the desert. The devil took him to a very high mountain, and showed him all the kingdoms of the world and their splendor; and he said to him, ‘All these I will give you, if you will fall down and worship me.’ Jesus said to him, ‘Away with you, Satan! For it is written, “Worship the Lord your God and serve only Him.’’ ’ (Mt. 4. 8–10; cf. Deut. 6.13) The kingship (being king or malik) that Satan offers is directly opposed to the vicegerency that God intends for man: being caliph, deputy of God, which means to do justice, to follow the straight path, the road of justice. According to the Qur’a¯ n, Adam – that is to say any man or woman – has an option, a choice. Does s/he want to be a ‘righteous’ caliph or to be unjust king with all that this last option contains, including exploitation, suppression and injustice. What is humanity opting for? To be a caliph or to be a king? To be a believer or unbeliever, thankful or ungrateful? Walking the straight path or the crooked one? Does s/he want to become the leader (imam) of justice or the imam of injustice? Does s/he belong to God’s party (Hizbollah) or to the party of Satan (Hizb Shaytan)? According to the Bible and the Qur’a¯ n only God is the real king. It is possible that God gives man power and installs kings, such as David (Qur’a¯ n 2:251 [252]). The Qur’a¯ n speaks about Joseph (Yusuf) as being king under the pharaoh (Firawn) of Egypt. King Saul (Talut) is the first king of Israel. After him there are the great kings David (Dawud) and Solomon (Sulayman). But in the Bible and the Qur’a¯ n a clear tension exists between the kingship that only belongs to God on the one hand and humans who rule as kings. When the people of Israel want to have a king the prophet Samuel is most embarrassed and objects to the whole idea. But God makes clear to him: ‘And the Lord said to Samuel, “Listen to the voice of the people in all that they say to you; for they have not rejected you, but they have rejected me from being king over them”’ (1 Sam. 8.7). It is striking in this respect that the Qur’a¯ n calls David not a king but a caliph (Qur’a¯ n 38:26 [25]). In other words, the Qur’a¯ n wants to say: it is possible to be king in the way God intends to, namely in the way he

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sees man to be his caliph. The fundamental question for any man is: which way are you following? The very same question may be asked to political leaders: Do you want to be caliph or king? This important question is taken up by all the great prophets like Abraham (Ibrahim), Moses (Musa), Jesus (Isa) and Muh.ammad.

Abraham versus Nimrod (in Assur and Babel) Abraham comes from Mesopotamia, home of many great empires such as those of Assyria and Babylonia. The king who ruled there is called Nimrod, both in the Bible and the Qur’a¯ n. He is seen as the first on earth ‘to be a mighty man’ (Gen. 10.8). He was the famous ruler of Babel and Assur and the founder of the city of Nineveh (Gen. 10.10–12). Assur was called the country of Nimrod (Mic. 5.5). So Nimrod is king of Babel and Assur of old. Assur and Babel under the leadership of such kings are in particular the models for the unjust rule of empires characterized by injustice and oppression. What offence did this king commit? Nimrod claimed the kingship of God for himself although he thinks that God gave it to him. The Qur’a¯ n records that Nimrod enters into a discussion with Abraham about it (2:258 [260]). Abraham is called to break with such a king and with the injustice that he stands for, and must get out (Exodus, hidjra). Abraham is called to leave his land and to go to another land, the promised land that God will show him, a land where justice will be done. In this way Abraham becomes a leader or imam, an alternative word for caliph, and a model, ideal, example for humanity (Qur’a¯ n 2:124 [118]).

Moses and the Pharaoh (Firawn) of Egypt In the next stage of history and in another region, something similar happens. The Egyptian king, or rather pharaoh, rules Egypt, which is the archetype of an unjust ruler. Just as in the Bible, the pharaoh in the Qur’a¯ n is the model of an arrogant ruler who proudly claims the kingship of Egypt. The pharaoh caused a proclamation to be made among his people saying: ‘O my people! Is not mine the sovereignty of Egypt and these rivers flowing under me? Can ye not then discern?’ (43:51 [50]). His image is that of a tyrannical ruler, (79:17. cf. 22:24, 34), who causes oppression on earth (28:5), misleads his own people, (20:79) and claims to be a god, (29:40; 28:38) and requires absolute submission and obedience of his people without further question (40:29). There is no God like ‘I’ (namely he, the pharaoh). It is not difficult to hear in this last remark a counter witness to Islam. While the Islamic confession states: ‘There is no God but God’, the arrogant, proud pharaoh proclaimed, ‘I (Pharaoh) am your Lord the Highest’ (79:24). So

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in the Qur’a¯ n the pharaoh stands for the proud, arrogant tyrant who misuses his power to get at the weak and powerless, and commits murders. Moses must break with the oppression and injustice. He had to lead his people from the land of bondage (Exodus) and go to the promised land, where justice will be done to the oppressed: ‘And We [God] desired to show favour unto those who were oppressed in the earth, and to make them an example and to make them the inheritors’ (Qur’a¯ n 28:5 [4]). The oppressed on earth become leaders (imams) ‘And We [God] caused the folk who were despised to inherit the eastern parts of the land and the western parts thereof which we have blessed’ (Qur’a¯ n 7:137 [133]). This is a description for the promised land which is Israel/Palestine.

Jesus and the unjust Jerusalem In the New Testament the same expression is used to indicate this process of breaking away from injustice, to be liberated from oppression, Exodus (hidrja) and go the way of justice. In the story about Jesus having a vision, described as the transfiguration on a mountain, Jesus meets Moses and Elijah. These two represent the Torah (tawra) and the prophets and together they discuss what is about to transpire: ‘Suddenly they saw two men Moses and Elijah, talking to him. They appeared in glory and were speaking of his departure [Exodus], which he was about to accomplish at Jerusalem’ (Lk. 9.30, 31). Jesus must also break with the injustice of the city of Jerusalem. He will be crucified outside its walls.

Muh.ammad facing the unjust rulers of the city of Mecca Muh.ammad sees himself in the succession of earlier prophets and refers to the prophets before him who had to break with injustices encountered in cities. The prophet Lot (Lut) for instance, a relative of Abraham, must break with the injustice of the cities Sodom and Gomorra. He has to go away (muhajir) to another place: ‘And Lot believed him, and said, “Lo! I am a fugitive unto my Lord. Lo! He, only He, is the Mighty, the Wise”’ (Qur’a¯ n 29:26 [25]). Even before Mohammed makes the move himself and breaks with the city of Mecca where injustice rules, a number of his followers move to Ethiopia. The first hidjra, or emigration, was an equivalent of the Exodus. In Mecca Muh.ammad belongs to those who are oppressed. He is declared to be a liar, is mocked (9:65; 25:41; 36:30; 37:12). He is someone that is not believed (17:94; 21:3; 74:25) and is threatened and persecuted: ‘And when those who disbelieve plot against thee [Muh.ammad] to wound thee fatally, or to kill thee or to drive thee forth; they plot, but God plotteth and God is the

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best of plotters’ (8:30). In line with the prophets before him, Muh.ammad has to lead his people from the city of wrong, Mecca, and set out to go to the new city, Medina. The hijra, the breaking of old ties with heathenism, idolatry, injustice and going to a city where justice will be done: ‘How many were the habitations (qarya), mightier than your city [Mecca] which has turned you out (akharajatik), which We have destroyed, and they did not have a helper’ (47:13 [14]). In the first period of his ministry in Mecca the emphasis is on preaching the faith in the unity of God (tawh}¯ıd) and future life. In Medina the emphasis is more related to social, economic, legal and political matters of the community. In Medina Muh.ammad receives also the mission to convert Mecca, the mother of the cities (umm a-qurra). The Tale of Two Cities continues by breaking with the city of wrong and going to the promised land, the promised city. That includes calling the city of wrong to conversion: Mecca, like Nineveh in the book of Jonah, or Sodom and Gomorra ( Lot/Lut in the Qur’a¯ n 7:80-84 [78-82]). Also Jerusalem and Medina can each become a city of wrong (Isa. 1.9, 10)! Thus, the hijra does not come to an end until the sun rises at the place where it goes under (hadith of the Prophet Muh.ammad).

Where does this lead? The prophetic message of these three traditions – Judaism, Christianity and Islam – all deal with Exodus, hijra, liberation. In the Tenakh (Tawra or Old Testament) and the New Testament (Injil) and the Qur’a¯ n one finds liberation from bondage, slavery, oppression in centres like Assur, Babel, Nineveh and Egypt. But God says, ‘I am the Lord, your God, who brought you out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of slavery’ (Exod. 20.1). Why is God doing that? Because he listens to the cry of the oppressed. He cannot but hear it and acts to liberate them. So Abraham (Lot), Moses, Jesus and Muh.ammad become leaders of the Exodus to liberate their people from oppression. What could the relevance of those texts about liberation be for present-day forms of oppression? The way to the answer is to begin with a question: Who today are the pharaohs? Who belong to the axis of evil? In the Bible, symbolically speaking, it is Babel with king Nimrod and Egypt with the pharaoh. Does this mean that only specific countries or empires mentioned by name belong to this axis of evil? What about other political leaders and rulers of other countries? It is very crucial to realize that in the Bible and the Qur’a¯ n the prophetic ministry means that in the first instance prophets are addressing their own people and their own religious and political leaders (temple and palace). What was the purpose of the liberation from bondage and oppression in Assur, Babel, Nineveh or Egypt? The liberation from the yoke of exploitation sought to establish a new society, and a new city would be built where justice

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would be done. But what happened in reality? What occurred when the liberated people came into the holy, promised land and city of Jerusalem for the Jews, and into Medina for the followers of Muh.ammad? What did the Children of Israel (Banu Israel) do when they came to the new country? Did they start to build a society where justice was done for the oppressed, food given to the hungry, (Ps. 146.7)? Was an alternative (different from Assur and Egypt) rule installed without unjust kings or a regular army and a military leadership? That was the intention, but did it happen? The shocking thing is that very soon in the promised land developments went in the same direction as in the country of the pharaoh. Against the advice of the prophet Samuel, the people opted for kings, generals, military experts, taxes and forced labour. The first step on this road of a new pharaoh – to become a malik in the sense of the Qur’a¯ n (and for that matter the Bible) – was taken by the installation of kings! Saul (Talut), David (Dawud) and Solomon (Sulayman). The most decisive turn in that direction took place under King Solomon. He modernized the army, and did not hesitate to enter into an arms race and arms deals. When other nations had ‘wagons and horses’, why not Israel? Against astronomic prices he gathered many thousands. And from where were they imported? From Egypt of course! ‘And Solomon gathered together chariots and horses; he had fourteen hundred chariots and twelve thousand horses, which he stationed in the chariot cities and with the king in Jerusalem’ (1 Kgs 10.26). Solomon does exactly what is condemned by the Law for the king to do: ‘. . . [H]e must not acquire many horses for himself, or return the people to Egypt in order to acquire more horses, since the Lord has said to you, “You must never return that way [to Egypt] again’’ ’ (Deut. 17.16). This policy of King Solomon causes a fundamental change in the society. In order to finance the military budget the rural population is forced to pay. Solomon’s decision for the most sophisticated military outfit of his day makes him into a despot. The great king of peace becomes a pharaoh. Immediately after his death people called for a new liberation (Exodus), and the nation split because people no longer accepted the pharaonic yoke placed upon them (cf. 1 Kgs 12.4ff.). So prophets direct their message first to their own people, their own community, (qahal), their own ummah. The first four leaders who succeeded the prophet Muh.ammad were not called kings but caliphs, even ‘the rightly guided’ caliphs. However, it did not remain that way. Caliphs in Baghdad for instance called themselves not only caliphs in the sense of succeeding the prophet in his political functions (notably, not the prophetic one), but they claimed also the title of ‘the shadow of God on earth’. Soon the prophetic protest was heard and one made a distinction between the rightly guided caliphs and the secular, worldly kingship (mulk), the idea of God’s opponent. The caliphate also demonstrated periods of pharaonic oppression and injustice. When a new caliphate emerged in Damascus under the Umayyads (661–750), pious Muslims labelled their caliphs ‘kings’ because the rule of the

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caliphs had become like that of an unjust kingship (mulk). They followed the advice that Satan gave Adam. Hence, it was impossible to express the contempt for their godless, worldly rule in stronger terms than calling them kings.

Party of God or Party of Satan? In the summer of 2006 a war took place in which the three Abrahamaic traditions in a sense were involved. This was the war between Hizbollah, the party of God, and the state of Israel. Hizbollah is the name of an important shi’ite movement (since the early eighties of the last century) and also of a political party. Hizbollah takes its name from the Qur’a¯ n: ‘And whoso taketh Allah and His messenger and those who believe for guardian (will know that), lo! the party of Allah, they are the victorious’ (5:56 [61]). On the other hand the opponents are called the party of Satan (Hizb Shaytan). ‘The devil hath engrossed them and so hath caused them to forget remembrance of Allah. They are the devil’s party. Lo! is it not the devil’s party who will be the losers?’ (58:19 [20]). Once, the famous Lebanese poet Khalil Jibran wrote: ‘Pity the nation that is full of beliefs and empty of religion.’ What is authentic religion and what are just shallow ‘beliefs’? As a family we were living and working in Lebanon during part of the Lebanese civil (or rather ‘uncivil’) war (1975–90). One day our apartment was hit by an Israeli rocket, launched by Maronite Christians towards the Muslim section of West Beirut where we were living. It was a time when many checkpoints were set up at random by different competing militias. You could be checked on your Muslim or Christian identity cards. If you were Christian, you could be taken hostage by Muslims or even killed, and the other way around for Muslims. I lost friends and acquaintances on both sides during that period. I especially remember a nun, easily recognizable as a religious person by her habit, who one day was stopped at a Muslim checkpoint. She was asked which side she was on, or in Arabic: ‘Which party (hizb) do you belong to?’ Her spontaneous answer had a deeper meaning with much further reflection: ‘Party of God (Hizbollah)’. To what other party do you belong when you are a nun? She was spared because those people at the checkpoint thought that she was a member of Hizbollah. Or perhaps they realized that she might really belong to the party of God. During that time in Lebanon I happened to read the book of the Latin American theologian Gustavo Guiterrez, Theology of Liberation. I was struck by his treatment of a text from the prophet Jeremiah (22.13–16, 20, 21) which appealed to me in a new way. This passage deals with two kings of Israel, a father and son, Josiah and Jehoiakim. The son was a godless and unjust king. He is addressed by the prophet Jeremiah with ‘Woe to him who builds his house by unrighteousness, and his upper rooms by injustice.’ What was so striking during

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that ongoing civil war was that the then prevailing social economic, political and religious tensions and circumstances in Lebanon in the 1970s and 1980s looked similar to those of the time of the prophet Jeremiah. My first reaction was to ask which of those was applicable to what recently happened in Lebanon, especially the phrase, ‘Woe to him who builds his house by unrighteousness, and his upper rooms by injustice.’ Beirut’s magnificent luxury homes were striking in contrast to the most painfully impoverished quarters of other Lebanese and Palestinians. ‘Woe to him who does not give them their wages’ (22.13). In Lebanon at that time some 300,000 Syrian labourers were working for minimum wages and sometimes less since they were illegally in the country. ‘Your eyes and heart are only on your dishonest gain, for shedding innocent blood, and for practising oppression and violence’ (22.17). This text needs to be read aloud in Beirut, as I once did during a church service. Even without comment everyone understood the message in that context. What also struck me was that the words of the prophet did not only seem to be so applicable to the situation in Lebanon, but that Lebanon was even mentioned by name in the text. When one saw the wanton destruction, buildings and homes destroyed, floor by floor, raised by fire, and blown up, and how people were tortured or killed, then the word of the prophet returns as a great shock: ‘Go up to Lebanon, and cry out, and lift up your voice … for all your lovers are crushed. I spoke to you in your prosperity, but you said, “I will not listen’’ ’ (22.20). I do not suggest that we read this text as a prophecy about future events; Prophetic texts are not intended to be read as being expressly to the point and applicable for others, in this case the Lebanese. They are meant for anyone in his or her own situation today. What is the message of the prophet Jeremiah? The small state of Judah, not much larger than the city of Jerusalem, leads a threatened existence. It is not far from its final downfall and destruction, crushed between the big imperial powers of that time. Under the father, King Josiah, reforms had taken place. The father-king did what was right in the eyes of God. Jeremiah compares the father, Josiah, with his son, Johoiakim, without mentioning them by name. He presents two kinds of kingship (that of caliph and king in the Qur’a¯ nic terminology), and two ways to govern are juxtaposed. The son lived lavishly despite the poverty in the city-state of Jerusalem. As an oriental despot he forced labourers to be in his service without giving them their due. He embellished his palace by following the newest fads, and built spacious upper rooms with cedar panelling and painted with vermillion. Jeremiah is clear about this misuse of power and injustice. The king is not undertaking this building campaign to provide affordable housing blocks for the poor; it is merely for his own private use and pleasure. His father was a completely different kind of king. Justice and righteousness were trodden underfoot by the son, but righteousness was the father’s daily food and drink. There is nothing wrong in eating and drinking and enjoying

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the good things of the earth. The mistake of the son was that doing justice and righteousness was not also his daily food and drink. The government of his father was directed towards doing justice to the poor and the needy and thereby he showed that he knew God. That is the heart of the matter and of this text. That is what the prophet intends and wants to say: ‘He [the righteous father king] judged the cause of the poor and needy; then it was well.’ That is obviously the true knowledge of God, the true and authentic religion. One knows God, justice to God is done, when man comes to his or her justice. That is the true knowledge of God, and what it means to know God.

Conclusion What does the word of the prophets – from Abraham, Moses, Jesus until Muh.ammad have to say to Jews, Christians and Muslims today, or for that matter to anyone? It is obvious that two kinds of government and means of ruling are presented: Being caliph or king in the terms of the Qur’a¯ n. The names of those kings matter little to us today, but what really mattered then matters still today. It is here instructive to return to the Lebanese poet, Jibran, ‘Pity the Nation full of beliefs and empty of religion.’ Pity any nation that is empty of authentic religion. What does it matter to know God in the world of today? Saint Paul addresses this in the letter to the Romans: Therefore, do not let sin exercise dominion in your mortal bodies, to make you obey their passions. No longer present your members to sin as instruments of wickedness, but present yourselves to God as those who have been brought from death to life, and present your members to God as instruments of righteousness. (Rom. 6.12, 13) Like Jeremiah there are two items, namely, to satisfy passions and to know and serve God. Often we are pleasing only our own bodies. There is nothing wrong with this per se. However, the question raised by the prophets as well as the apostle is, ‘At whose expense are we satisfying our own needs?’ Mostly the starting point is what we eat and drink, how we are satisfying our needs. Then it progresses to how we clothe ourselves, and how we shall live, enjoy life, build houses, so that we lack nothing and live in safety. But one cannot live in safety alone. Security is indivisible. The Israelis will never live in safety as long as the Palestinians are not living in safety, and likewise the Lebanese and vice versa. When we want to know what God and religion mean in our (world) communities, in our cities we have to learn to ask: What will others eat, what will others drink, how will others be housed, how will others receive their rights, and how will others live safely and without fear?

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The essential question is and remains the same, and all the prophets testify to it: what choices are we and others making? To be righteous vicegerents of God, to care for and preserve the earth (Gen. 3.23) or to be kings like the Nimrods and the pharaohs? It is also a choice for political and religious leaders of whatever background. Who is really from the party of God? The West or the Islamic world? And possibly even neither – or both.

Chapter 13

Seeking to Overcome Islamophobia Through Education and Dialogue: Some Personal Experiences at the Selly Oak Colleges and at the WCC Related to the Early Work of Dr David Kerr John B. Taylor

A wave of Islamophobia has spread across the world, most notably in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. The Runnymede Trust had already in 1997 provided a good definition of Islamophobia, ‘anti-Islamic racism’, in its report ‘Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All’. Islam is increasingly feared as a result of such terrorism wherever it has occurred or is being planned or justified; all terrorism must be condemned not least when it has been or is still being fomented through manipulation or misinterpretation of Islamic teachings by some extremists and fanatics. It is no excuse for Muslims that some extremist Christians, Hindus or secularists have done harm to Muslims, as well as to the image of Christianity, Hinduism or secularism. This chapter, addressing a cause to which Dr David Kerr has contributed so much, long before Christian-Muslim relations became ‘flavour of the month’, seeks to show some of the causes, real or imagined, for Islamophobia among non-Muslims, and some of the perceptions, accurate or exaggerated, among Muslims about the existence and significance of Islamophobia. In particular, the chapter goes on to recall initiatives of education and dialogue which may have helped to reduce Islamophobia in the past and which may need to be replicated in new contexts in the present and the future.

Attitudes and perceptions of Islamophobia, and education and dialogue as challenges to overcome it In many cases, especially in a more traditional society, an immediate cause for fear, suspicion or resentment in relation to Islam is reinforced among some non-Muslims by selective memories of actual or perceived wrongs suffered by their communities in the past. There can be an invidious comparison of the

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ideal in one’s own tradition with the aberration in the other’s tradition. Stereotypes and caricatures are dredged up from history or from a sometimes unconscious level of inherited prejudice. Today whole Muslim communities are stigmatized or punished for the terrorist deeds of a few individuals. Horrifying instances of honour-killings, brutal punishments and hysterical mob violence are generalized by some non-Muslims as being typical of Islam, but they are no less offensive to the great majority – a moderate majority – of the billion Muslims across the world. Intolerance towards neighbours or strangers on the basis of their religious or non-religious identity is a violation of universally recognized fundamental human rights for freedom of religion or belief and for freedom of expression. Such intolerance also compromises other values such as democratic governance and cultural diversity. Some particular acts of exclusion or marginalizing, for example, in banning what some regard as religiously sanctioned dress or in preventing free choice of religious allegiance, may violate the rights of the child, the right to education, or the dignity of women. Prohibition, imposition or neglect of religious education may also, variously, violate fundamental human rights or exacerbate ignorance and prejudice. Education, where Dr David Kerr made such a distinguished and dedicated contribution at many levels, is seen as a privileged way to prevent the growth of intolerance and prejudice. There needs to be knowledge of one’s own tradition as well as that of other people’s different traditions. Such education may start in the family or religious community where attitudes of curiosity and respect can be cultivated; it may continue in schooling and adult education. At every level dangers of chauvinism and self-righteousness should be avoided and an intercultural and interdisciplinary dialogue could be encouraged. An understanding of Islam is relevant not only to the history of religions, but to the history of politics, of science and of culture as they all exist and evolve in today’s globalized world. Globalization is to be measured not only in terms of promoting political security, economic links and environmental responsibilities but also in terms of facilitating the interpenetration and communication of ideas and ideals. Modern communications and information technology need to be used wisely and fairly, and this calls for universally accessible education and a reduction of the digital divide. It is a salutary challenge to attempt an understanding of the common ground and differences between Islam and other religions and world-views, as well as an understanding of what are common or distinct elements within the rich varieties of Islam. On every continent and in every nation there is a different chemistry of cooperation and alienation. There is common ground and shared society between Christians and Muslims in many parts of the world, and there is conflict in others; a similar variety of neighbourliness or of feuding exists in relation to Jews, members of the same Abrahamic family. In some places Islam is to be understood mainly in the context of indigenous cultures, in other places

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Islam must exist mainly in the context of secular and atheistic societies. In every case there is the context of membership in the wide human family which struggles together for values of peace and justice, for balancing rights with responsibilities, for fulfilling duty to God and duty to humanity. Respect of differences and avoidance of generalizations help to remove phobias that are often based on ignorance, caricature or misunderstanding. Fears too often focus on one’s own need for security whereas true security must be shared and protected for all. The existence of Islamophobia can be exaggerated by some Muslims who are preoccupied by their sense of being victims, just as it can be exaggerated by some members of other communities who look only to their own sense of insecurity. One must allow for difference of perspective and must not absolutize one’s own position of real or imagined fear. There have been many opportunities to compare failures and disappointments within and across the various traditions. The current wave of Islamophobia has challenged some Christians and others to seek deeper empathy with Muslims and has challenged some Muslims to seek ways to redress a situation where their religion can be so misunderstood and misrepresented. It is not enough to blame a minority of fanatics within Islam or within other religions; we must seek out the contributory causes and the corroding effects of fear and prejudice throughout our respective societies and commit ourselves to education, dialogue and cooperation in place of caricature and mutual insulation. An unfolding understanding of another tradition of faith, or indeed of one’s own inherited traditions or chosen convictions, need not begin at the same point for everyone. Some will be drawn by theological curiosity or by spiritual discovery, some will be challenged by political or social ideals, some by artistic expressions. A particular entry point may lead to the discernment of further dimensions of an experience or issue. The observation of Muslim neighbours, whose lives are punctuated and empowered by prayer, can lead to awareness of their longing to build justice on earth; discovery of their social solidarity and aspirations for political cohesion can bring one to recognize this as a form of their obedience to God and of their emulation of His prophets; admiration of magnificent art and architecture, sometimes sober and sometimes exuberant, can draw oneself to recognize and celebrate the multiple ‘signs of God’. Dialogue does not require and should not promote either relativism or syncretism. When an outsider or non-Muslim attempts to understand and describe Islam both accurately and respectfully, there may be the possibility of finding deep common ground and empathy with the Muslim insider. However, this should not lead one to minimize the reality and the value of some important differences in beliefs and practices. Recognition of common ground and of differences is not an either/or situation, but a question of balance and emphasis, of intention and openness. I recall that Dr David Kerr respected the need for such balance and carefully avoided inappropriate and counterproductive apologetics or polemics.

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One particular consideration when engaged in an institutionally organized dialogue is how far to participate as an individual or in the role of a representative of one’s community, and how far to regard one’s interlocutor as an individual or as a representative. Since a sense of identity may include identification with and loyalty towards a community, there may be compatible and complementary aspects to the two roles. In many situations it may be unhelpful to require a formal sense of responsibility to be considered as a representative or to recognize the partner as such; a greater freedom and frankness may be possible when each speaks or works in direct individual and mutual answerability. But there may also be a possibility for a person to address concerns and commitments, and possibly feelings of trauma or guilt, that go beyond the individual and that reflect the experiences of his or her community or the positions taken by his or her organization.

The Selly Oak Colleges’ development of Islamic studies When, as Dr David Kerr’s predecessor, I started to teach Islamic studies in the Selly Oak Colleges and the University of Birmingham in 1965, I was deeply conscious of an important demographic and cultural change that was under way in Great Britain. The politician Enoch Powell, my home constituency MP, had been warning that there would be ‘rivers of blood’, if immigration were not controlled. When I had returned from the University of the Punjab, Pakistan, and before continuing my postgraduate studies in Canada, I had been recruited for a term to teach English to newly arrived Punjabi children whose families had rushed to beat by mid-1962 an imminent deadline on unrestricted immigration. They had struggled with culture shock but quickly learned new skills and were perhaps reassured to have a short-term teacher who had so recently been in some of their own villages and towns. By 1965 the religious demography of many parts of Britain had changed and the prophets of doom were being challenged by a new expectation that immigration was bringing not only economic benefits but cultural enrichment. The academic study of Islam in Birmingham had been the initiative of members of the Society of Friends, Quakers, who had financed at the Selly Oak Colleges the Mingana Collection of Christian Arabic and Islamic Arabic manuscripts. Since the 1930s scholars like Professor James Windrow Sweetman, a former Methodist missionary, had been appointed to undertake research and teaching. This field had originally been the preserve of a few theologians interested in the history of religions. In several of the Selly Oak Colleges, however, there were missionaries preparing to work in Muslim countries and seeking an accurate and respectful understanding of Islam. Accordingly special emphasis was laid on Islam as a religion and as a way of life and on the relationship of Muslims with adherents of other religions.

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In the University of Birmingham an interest in Islam was shown by a few specialists in West African Studies or Byzantine Studies. In the 1960s the School of Theology began to offer courses given by Professor Ninian Smart on world religions. He rightly eschewed defining people negatively as ‘non-Christians’ since, as a Christian, he did not want to be described as a ‘non-Buddhist’. Nor did I want to be defined or pre-judged essentially as a ‘non-Muslim’ when I was invited in 1965 to start a course on Islamic Studies; this was added as an optional subject to the syllabus, and there was general surprise about the number of students who chose this as a specialization, especially at the post-graduate level. The interest in Islamic Studies at Birmingham grew still wider, particularly in the School of Education, not least because of the inspiration given by Professor John Hull. The Extra-Mural Department of the University of Birmingham began to attract teachers who taught ethnic minorities in their classes; they were joined by social workers from inner-city areas, by hospital administrators and medical staff who wanted cultural sensitivity towards their patients, and even by prison officers with similar concerns about some of their inmates. Instead of learning about Islam as a purely historical or spiritual phenomenon there was new interest in the social and political concerns of their new Muslim neighbours as well as in their religious identity and experience. In teaching about Islam, it was helpful to expose students to personal encounters with their neighbouring Muslims, whether in the Student Islamic Society, which accepted to share space in the St Francis Hall religious centre, or in visiting house mosques or newly designed purpose-built mosques. Just as I had studied alongside Muslims in McGill and in Pakistan, I now welcomed a steady influx of Muslim students, some established in Britain but others from West Africa or South Asia. Academic teaching, supplemented by field trips to local Muslim mosques and community centres, led to more intimate visits to newly arrived families. In cases where children were still awaiting admission to school or where women remained isolated in their homes, it became possible to offer language courses, advice on domestic issues or child care, or help in finding employment. Once a month the city authorities invited to the Mayor’s Parlour religious leaders, Muslim, Sikh, Hindu and other newcomers to meet long-established Christians and Jews; community leaders in social welfare, medicine and education were also invited and many practical questions were addressed, ranging from the provision of ritually slaughtered meat to the inauguration of multi-religious hospital chaplaincies. The availability of religious education, first in the child’s own tradition, but then in respectful and accurate understanding of his or her neighbour’s ‘different’ religion, was also a major preoccupation, leading to teacher training courses for established and newly arrived teachers. Especially where a local community arranged for a religious teacher to immigrate, for example from the Middle East or from the Indian sub-continent, there might be need for intensive linguistic,

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pedagogical and cultural training and orientation if the newcomer was to relate to children and young people brought up in Britain. One of the main needs of newly arrived Muslims, Sikhs, Hindus and others (as of Christians or Jews arriving in a new country) was the establishment of places of worship. While city authorities in planning departments or social welfare departments could be relatively quickly persuaded of these legitimate needs, it was sometimes a different story when local residents could not understand why a house mosque was being set up in their street, with every parking place taken on a Friday noon. Accordingly, led by Professor John Hick, one of the senior Professors of Theology in the University, several of us made house-tohouse visits to explain the newcomers’ needs, and we almost always were found welcome and understanding. Some redundant or under-used church premises were offered, and sometimes eventually sold, to newcomer communities to become, after renovation and alteration, mosques or temples. This seemed to some of their old congregations far better than seeing the church or chapel become a warehouse or Bingo Hall. One unusual example involved the congregation of a large church in Aston. Much of the original population had moved out to the suburbs; the small continuing congregation decided on continuing to use the chancel for their worship, and opened the nave as a recreation and community hall for all the local inhabitants, while the vestibules and cloakrooms were converted into a small mosque with ablution facilities and classrooms. One did however hear of other congregations which preferred to pay for the demolition of the building rather than see its being used by ‘non-Christians’. In parallel with my teaching and my community relations activities in Birmingham, I became involved in a nationwide Schools Council project to propose changes in the established ‘agreed syllabus’ system for religious education, a compulsory requirement in British state schools; the requirement was laid upon the school to provide religious education but there was always a clause for parents or pupils to opt out of this course if they did not have confidence in the syllabus or in the teacher. I was asked to write a textbook, Thinking about Islam, for British schools and I did this with the valuable collaboration of several Muslim friends or scholars; subsequently the book became, at one time, the only book about Islam written by a non-Muslim that was on sale in the Washington DC mosque! The decade from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s gave me several opportunities to revisit Asia. I lectured in the University of Punjab where I had once studied and, by then, found the classroom divided with men and women on opposite sides of a curtain and the lecturer feeling rather like a tennis umpire; but the number of women students was encouraging, as was the openness to intercultural dialogue. I was also able to arrange for some of my own Christian students to live and study in Islamic societies and institutions as well as visiting the societies and institutions from which some of my Muslim students came. This was also

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a time when Christian Study Centres for the study of other living faiths were being strengthened or established in many countries. Many Christians were increasingly asking questions about a proselytizing approach to people from other religions and were choosing instead to follow vocations of respectful study and cooperative social work, of ‘Christian presence’ as good neighbours. As a university teacher I often learned from my students, both Muslims and Christians. I taught Muslim students who had been educated to a high level of understanding and sophistication about Islamic philosophy or jurisprudence in Pakistan, India or Saudi Arabia; they welcomed new opportunities to understand the sometimes more critical methods of enquiry in Western scholarship. Among my Christian students I had Greek Orthodox and Romanian Orthodox students who, sometimes with difficulty, shed their prejudices about Islam. African students came from civil war situations in West Africa and determined to return home in order to teach mutual understanding between Muslims and Christians. I was able to organize at the Selly Oak Colleges a student dialogue between Muslims and Christians which went beyond definitions of dialogue to explore such subjects as ‘living in dialogue’, ‘the possibility of prayer and worship together’, ‘common ground and tensions in dialogue’, and ‘conversion as a possible experience in dialogue’. Several of the participants in this discussion, both Christian and Muslim, went on to make significant international contributions.

The World Council of Churches’ first initiatives for Christian-Muslim dialogue An interest grew in developing interreligious study and in promoting multicultural community relations at local and national levels, various initiatives began to be taken by international religious bodies. The World Council of Churches (WCC) followed the lead of many of its member churches in Asia, the Middle East or Africa and moved beyond studies ‘about’ other living faiths to preparing for actual dialogue ‘with’ them. Already in 1966, at Broumana in Lebanon, I had attended a meeting of the WCC between Orthodox and Protestant Christians, together with Roman Catholics who were, for the first time, invited not only as observers but as full participants. We had, at that time, discussed experiences and future possibilities of developing Christian-Muslim dialogue while avoiding artificial syncretism, and we had agreed on the need for breaking down barriers of prejudice, indifference, suspicion and fear. The following year, in Kandy, Sri Lanka, this approach was extended to the whole sweep of world religions. Participants affirmed that dialogue in an increasingly secularized world must encourage a common approach to ultimate questions and to immediate social needs. These first ecumenical meetings recognized that there were hesitations and prejudices about dialogue both in the Christian world and among ‘neighbours’

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of other faiths; the word ‘neighbour’ was emphasized since it is so central to Christian teaching, not least in the parable where the person of another faith, the Samaritan, teaches the meaning of the relationships with God and with neighbour. Trust must be established and fears allayed; self-criticism was a prerequisite, not least for Christians with the burden of the Crusades, still invoked by some Christians as if it were a noble episode in Christian history. One important emphasis of these meetings was that dialogue should not be seen as the preserve of academic specialists but that interreligious education was needed for every age group and at every level of society. While it might be premature to start a dialogue around issues of theological disagreement or tension, it could be urgent to address together common social and political concerns. The first formal multilateral dialogue under WCC auspices together with neighbours of other faiths was organized by Dr Stanley Samartha, the first director of the Dialogue programme under the supportive and prophetic leadership of the General Secretary, Dr Philip Potter. It was held at Ajaltoun in Lebanon in 1970 with Muslims, Buddhists and Hindus; Jews, Sikhs and others were to join these multilateral dialogues from 1974 onwards, and the planning process began to include members of several faiths. Whereas not a single ‘nonChristian’ journalist had been accredited to the WCC Assembly in New Delhi in 1961, where I first attended an international ecumenical meeting as an observer from the Student Christian Movement, and whereas the Fourth Assembly at Uppsala, Sweden in 1968 had not admitted dialogue as a subject for major consideration, there were finally in the 1970s a series of actual dialogues which led to official invitations to guests from several world religions to attend the Fifth Assembly in Nairobi in 1975. The change in official policies and public awareness about the need for interreligious dialogue and understanding which had taken place in Roman Catholic circles after the Second Vatican Council (1962–65) had its parallel in other Christian and secular communities, but also in other world religions. Attending conferences of the International Association for the History of Religions in Jerusalem (1968) and in Stockholm (1970), I met scholars of many faiths as well as agnostic and atheist scholars; they were committed to objective academic understanding but many were also engaged in the challenges of intercultural communication, the dismantling of stereotypes and the building of shared societies. In retrospect, one may ask if the hosts of these international conferences, in Lebanon, Sri Lanka or Israel, were aware of how fragile and threatened were the possibilities and commitments for dialogue. Civil wars or wars with neighbouring countries would soon break out and those who had been content with coexistence would be obliged to undertake still more intentional efforts ranging from education to diplomacy in order to preserve or re-establish their multicultural heritages. The optimism of the mid-1960s and beyond was faced with serious challenges but the lessons and experiences of dialogue were not lost and were upheld,

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often at great personal or communal risk, in the following decades of violence. Meanwhile the word dialogue was becoming more familiar as a description, even as a technical term, for interreligious communication. Some Christians demanded a Biblical precedent for its use and found that the very same concept was part of Biblical vocabulary and used to summarize two full years of St Paul’s teaching in Ephesus (Acts 19.9). Muslims who sought precedents for dialogue took pride in the multicultural heritage of Mesopotamia and Spain; Buddhists and Hindus, attracting more and more co-religionists outside Asia, stressed universal values and meditative practices. Dialogue was also used as part of the language and methods of political diplomacy, a most necessary challenge to the otherwise inevitable and far too prevalent recourse to confrontation and conflict. Multiculturalism began to be perceived as a challenging and enriching phenomenon – much more than as a slogan or a politically correct idea, as detractors claimed. It was relevant as a principle and obvious as an experience both in the context of voluntary migration and of forced displacement. At a more private, albeit increasingly widespread level, the phenomenon of mixed marriages raised questions about multiple identities and loyalties. Further factors included expanded opportunities to travel and revolutions in communication, as well as a new awareness of economic interdependence and, belatedly, of shared environmental threats and responsibilities. Some of these issues were to cause still more dramatic changes to attitudes throughout the last quarter of the twentieth century, but seeds of change had been sown in the 1960s and the 1970s as winds of political and social change were starting to blow. It came as a surprise to me when, in the midst of a sabbatical year from 1971 to 1972 at the Center for the Study of World Religions at Harvard University, I was invited to take leave of absence from academic teaching in order to join the newly established World Council of Churches programme on ‘Dialogue with People of Living Faiths and Ideologies’. I decided with my wife to move our family of three young children for three years to Geneva. We have stayed there for 33 years! Yet one major reason for accepting the wrench to leave Birmingham was that Dr David Kerr was appointed to succeed me; he graciously invited me to serve for several subsequent years on the advisory board of the fast developing Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations. I have continued to follow the growth and evolution of the Birmingham centre which owes so much to David’s leadership. The challenge to lead from Geneva a world-wide programme in ChristianMuslim dialogue was humbling and exciting. I worked with dedicated colleagues from all over the world in the interconnected ecumenical fields of promoting Christian unity, building relations with neighbours of other faiths or ideologies, engaging in humanitarian work without distinction of race or creed, creating opportunities for participatory and sustainable development, and so on. In our dialogue programmes we were careful to plan and implement together with our

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neighbours of other faiths and ideologies. Too often in the past, even with the best intentions, Christians had planned the menu and cooked the meal before inviting others to eat with them. There was still hesitation in some Christian quarters and among some of our partners in other faiths about engaging in a dialogue, especially if it raised theological or spiritual issues. It was necessary to clarify that dialogue was not an exercise of relativism or compromise, nor a denial of the right of either partner to bear witness to his or her faith, and that it was definitely not a subterfuge for a proselytizing wolf to dress in a dialogical sheep’s clothing! Our partners often helped us to see that each could be secure and confident in their own faith tradition, while maintaining respect for the belief of their neighbours. We worked with examples of dedicated Muslims, Jews, Buddhists, Christians or others who lived alongside each other, sometimes as small minorities, and sometimes in situations of violent conflict, but who remained undeterred, faithful to their own tradition and open to that of their colleague, neighbour or spouse. The basis for their security and confidence was often their faithful religious practice in private or communal worship, although there were also models of humanist and secular ideologies which inspired common struggles for peace and justice. The developing interreligious dialogue was not a spiritual front against secularism or atheistic communism but rather a means to address and respect differences within religions and beyond religions. After I joined the newly established programme of the World Council of Churches on Dialogue with People of Living Faiths and Ideologies in 1973 it was necessary to define the methods and goals of dialogue. The priority at this early stage was seen not so much as a theological reflection on the phenomenon of religious pluralism as recognition of the urgent practical challenges to work for cooperation between different religious communities, especially in situations of conflict or competition. At Accra, Ghana, a workshop was held in 1974 on the theme ‘The Unity of God and the Community of Mankind: Cooperation between African Muslims and African Christians in Work and Witness’. Muslim and Christian participants from many parts of Africa and beyond addressed practical needs such as that for religious education about each other’s traditions; the participants discussed issues like mutual hospitality, family life and religious tolerance, as well as facing problems around medical ethics or religious propaganda; they affirmed that ‘We need each other for each other’. In early 1975 in Hong Kong, a mixed group from the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia prepared a memorandum entitled ‘Muslims and Christians in Society: Towards Goodwill, Consultation and Working Together in South-East Asia’; coming from situations which knew both old and new tensions, but also harmonious experiences of shared society, they urged cooperation in social relief and rehabilitation, building understanding through education, and the commitment to unity in diversity.

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These community-based concepts and experiences of dialogue were put to the test in the following years when traditions of harmony deteriorated into virtual civil war in countries like Sudan, Chad and Uganda, Cyprus and Lebanon, Philippines and Indonesia. It was quickly observed that in many of these places Muslims were on one side of a conflict and Christians on the other; the issues were often concerned with land tenure, political influence and economic jealousies, but disagreements about perceived religious discrimination or privilege or about the application of secular or Islamic judicial or political systems often heightened the tensions. If politics and the rule of law are to be understood as attempts to create conditions of justice and equality, then the goals of the secularists and religious fundamentalists need not be incompatible; but pure motivations have too often been subverted by the manipulation of religion or ideology on all sides. A just and peaceful local, national, regional or global community might be the vision of every group, but the forces of greed and violence, exclusivism and rivalry too often prevailed, and threatened the goodwill and trust which years of sharing community had forged. Lebanon and Sri Lanka suffered civil war for the next decades, although these same countries had hosted some of the first international interreligious dialogues in the 1960s and early 1970s. Yet, rather than discrediting the idea of dialogue, many came to feel that this argued for more rather than less dialogue. The proponents of dialogue, even in the thick of violent conflict, warned that trust had to be built rather than assumed or hypocritically claimed. There was a determination to persist in all dimensions of dialogue even at the risk of criticisms of compromise or disloyalty. Commitment and loyalty to values of peace and justice, not just for their own community but for all communities, sustained the partners in dialogue, who often emerged as the most effective mediators and architects of post-war societies. The crises addressed in these Muslim-Christian dialogues were not only of a political or communal nature. Natural disasters ranging from flooding in Bangladesh to desertification in sub-Saharan Africa had challenged the world community to new efforts in humanitarian relief and development aid. Christian churches were active in many projects of rehabilitation and reconstruction and it became increasingly normal for Muslims to be appointed not only into the implementation teams but also into the policy-making bodies of some Christian agencies. Many Christian agencies were scrupulous not to allow humanitarian aid to be practised as a strategy or inducement for covert proselytizing, and they tried to prevent their work from being perceived as such. Similarly, some Christian initiatives for dialogue had to be defended from suspicions that they were attempts to proselytize. Working alongside each other as Christians and Muslims in situations of distress or injustice, and seeking to empower the weakest members of society, regardless of their religious affiliation, became a major challenge for adherents of both religions, especially since an increasing number of other Christians and Muslims who rejected ideals of cooperation and

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dialogue were using substantial financial resources to expand aggressive forms of mission/da‘wah. In 1976, a small consultation between Christians and Muslims was held at the invitation of the World Council of Churches, with Dr David Kerr as one of the leaders, on the theme ‘Christian Mission and Islamic Da‘wah’. Any compulsion by adherents of either religion was disavowed. A later conference, jointly sponsored by the WCC and the World Muslim Congress included explicit rejection by both sides of the misuse of humanitarian aid as a method of proselytism. These ecumenical and interreligious conferences were the last opportunity for me to work closely with Dr David Kerr but they confirmed my appreciation of his knowledge and his skills.

A personal tribute to Dr David Kerr As my own professional path moved beyond Christian-Muslim relations into wider areas of multi-lateral dialogue, and beyond responsibilities within Christian institutions to service of multi-faith organizations, I lost some of the regular contact with David, but I admired from a distance the contributions he continued to make in Birmingham and beyond. I believe that he has shared some of my own experience in so far as teaching has both an objective and a subjective aspect, both in relation to academic disciplines and in relationships with students and scholars. The same may be said for the challenge and privilege of engaging in dialogue. I admire and treasure the wisdom that David showed in his academic pursuits and achievements, but also the wisdom and grace he exemplified in human relationships and dialogue, helping to overcome prejudices and reconcile tensions. He helped to overcome Islamophobia not only as it was felt or practised by some observers of Islam, but he also helped some Muslims to feel less vulnerable to perceptions and mentalities which they themselves could then help to overcome.

Chapter 14

Re-forming American Views of Muslims: A View from the Trenches Robert Hunt

Introduction A recent Pew survey on American understandings of and attitudes towards Islam shows that a slight majority (53 percent) have a favourable attitude towards Muslim Americans. Only 43 percent have a favourable attitude towards Muslims in general. These attitudes are based on relatively little knowledge of Islam or Muslims. Fifty-eight percent of respondents know little or nothing of Islam’s practices.1 The media was the most significant single influence by far on those who had negative attitudes towards Muslims. Forty-eight percent of those with an unfavourable view of Islam listed it as the primary source of information and views. There was a greater variety of significant influences among those with favourable views of Muslims. Media (20 percent), personal experience (26 percent) and education (24 percent) influence significant portions of that population. Perhaps most importantly, knowing a Muslim or Muslims has a significant influence on attitudes. Fifty-six percent of those who know a Muslim have a favourable view of Muslims while only 29 percent of those who know a Muslim have an unfavourable view of Muslims. Religious affiliation appears to also be a significant factor in attitudes towards Muslims. Only about 25 percent of white evangelicals have a favourable view of Muslims, compared to 51 percent of white mainline Protestants. To this researcher the data suggest that reforming American attitudes towards Muslims must focus on understanding the role played by media and religion in forming those attitudes, ways in which the media and religion can change in their presentation of Muslims, making more information about Islam available to Americans, and finding ways in which to expand personal interaction between Muslims and non-Muslims. As will become clear later in the chapter, this hypothesis is borne out by actual experience of working to change American attitudes towards Islam. There are good reasons for seeking to reform American attitudes towards Muslims. American society is built on the concept of equal treatment of people

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regardless of religious affiliation, ethnicity, and social status. Negative attitudes towards Muslims mitigate against such treatment regardless of their actual legal status, and surveys by the Council of American Islamic Relations report that many Muslims have experienced or feel they have experienced inequitable treatment.2 As importantly anti-Muslim attitudes may influence American public policy, and particularly foreign policy. The Pew survey suggests that 68 percent of conservative Republicans believe that Islam encourages violence, as do 56 percent of white evangelicals. To the extent that US foreign policy under President George W. Bush was based in part to satisfying the demands of these constituencies, then negative attitudes towards Islam and Muslims are significant. James Carroll, in an editorial published on 22nd January 2008 notes that all the then Republican presidential candidates adopted harshly negative stances towards Islam. He asks, ‘How could the U.S. advance the IsraeliPalestinian peace process if its government upholds, however implicitly, the Christian-Zionist dream of a God-sponsored Jewish state from the Jordon River to the Mediterranean?’ Yet all the Republican candidates sought endorsements from evangelical Christian leaders advancing exactly that Christian-Zionist dream. A harshly negative misunderstanding of Islam, in this case through the use of the term Islamo-fascism, leads directly to a crippled foreign policy in regions of the world where the United States has significant interests.3 It may also be dangerous to base policy on uninformed attitudes in that it significantly misreads the actual causes of extremist behaviour by Muslims. The Gallup poll on Global Migration Patterns and Job Creation states, ‘Western leaders tell us religion drives Muslims to war. But Muslim extremists tell the World Poll that their anger is not about religion, it’s about politics.’4 The threats to the United States from extremism cannot be addressed and resolved if their underlying causes are misunderstood. This is true of both domestic politics and personal relations. If Americans are ignorant of and misunderstand their Muslim neighbours, then the possibilities for fruitful relationships in building society are diminished. This is particularly the case when Muslims represent significant social capital. A demographic survey of Muslims undertaken by the Council on American-Islamic Relations in 2006 shows that Muslims are younger, better educated, more politically active, more family oriented, and more active in civic organizations than the average American. Indicators are that they are highly integrated into American society. Eighty-four percent strongly emphasize shared values with Christians and Jews.5 These results are affirmed in a report by Qamar-ul Huda for the United States Institute of Peace, which also details national fatwas against terrorism and the Muslim institutions and scholars seeking to reform American views of Islam.6 These results are not surprising. US immigration law since the 1960s has favoured the migration of Muslims who come for higher education or who already possessed professional qualifications, and their American-born children have followed in their footsteps. This

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may correlate with the Pew Foundation survey findings on the relationship between personal acquaintance with Muslims, higher education, and positive views of Muslims. Given the demographic evidence it is more likely that those with higher education will have some acquaintance with Muslims. How then, if the Muslim community in the United States appears to have such positive qualities, do strongly negative attitudes towards Muslims arise, particularly among evangelical Christians? This paper will review the origins and perpetuation of those negative attitudes in recent literature, the continuing problems leading to negative views of Muslims, and will suggest ways forward in increasing American knowledge of Islam and Muslims. The purpose of such reform is not simply to create more positive views of Islam and Muslims, however desirable this might be, but to create a new framework for interpreting inter-religious encounter that allows for fruitful partnership in a shared society. Forming this new framework in the public mind is not only the work of the media, but all mediating institutions (including schools, churches, and civic organizations) with an interest in civil society. It is the thesis of this chapter that a new framework can emerge out of a dialogue initiated and guided, but not determined by academic, religious and civic leaders.

The roots of American attitudes towards Islam and Muslims Islam and the construction of Christendom The interruption in the West of a dichotomous world of Christian civilization vs. heathen barbarism It was in the initial encounters between the expanding Islamic empire of the companions of the prophet Muh.ammad that the first enduring Christian attitudes towards Islam and Muslims arose. These attitudes were complex on both sides. Both the Qur’a¯ n and the traditions of the Prophet suggest that Christians and Jews could both be seen and treated by Muslims positively yet could also be the object of sharp polemic when there was a clash of community interests. The first Christians and Jews who encountered Islam had similarly mixed experiences and attitudes towards Muslims. Many Christian groups in the region stretching from North Africa eastward towards Persia were regarded as heretical by the Orthodox Christians who dominated the Byzantine Empire. Those in Persia lived as an often suppressed religious minority under Persian Zoroastrian rule. For many of these Christians the Muslim armies were greeted, at least initially, as liberators. For those more closely allied with Constantinople, or whose Christian states were overrun by Muslim armies, Islam appeared the driving force behind a new set of violent imperial ambitions. Nor were the politics of conquest all that was at stake. While forced conversions may have been rare,

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social and economic pressure within realms dominated by Muslims would help foster a growing movement of conversion to Islam, weakening Christian communities. By the eighth and ninth centuries both Christians and Muslims were engaged in virulent polemical attacks on one another.7 In Spain, North Africa and the Middle East, this polemic was not entirely uninformed, as both Christian and Muslim scholars and leaders had immediate access to one another’s texts and teachings. This was less the case in Byzantium, and particularly in Europe. That Muslim expansion was a threat was well understood as successive Muslim empires conquered Christian territories and controlled critical trade routes to the East. How that threat related to the religion of Islam was less well understood. Nor did the Crusades and reconquista, both Christian attacks on Muslim states intended to reestablish Christian control of conquered territories and trade, significantly improve Christian knowledge of Islam and Muslims. Such knowledge of Islam as existed in Christendom was refracted through the lenses of apocalyptic fears, travellers’ tales and political manipulation. As a result there developed a set of enduring images of Islam and Muslims that through preaching, popular tales, theatrical performances, and ballads and songs would become deeply engrained in the Christian consciousness.8 For the purpose of this study the complex origins of these images is less important than the demonstrable fact that they have endured, and that encounters between Christians and Muslims going back as much as 1000 years are still regarded by many as normative indicators of the nature of Islam and Muslims. Pope Benedict the XVI’s citation of one such encounter in his 2006 Regensburg address is one example. Popular anti-Muslim works like those of Andrew Bostum and Bat Yeor, which draw on such encounters and images as evidence for the nature of contemporary Islam and Muslims, are another.9

Colonial encounters In the fifteenth century there began a perceptible shift in relations between Christian Europe and the Muslim world. The Iberian Peninsula, after seven centuries of Muslim kingdoms ruling mixed religious populations, was gradually re-taken by Christian rulers from its northern reaches. This resulted in the expulsion in 1492 of all Muslims and Jews. The capital of mutual understanding that had been built up was squandered in an instant. As importantly, the reconquista was based on the idea that the natural order for Europe was Christian – a single civilization with a single religion. Islam and Judaism threatened this order, and thus both needed to be expelled. This concept of a natural social order based on a single religious foundation for social values continues in Western societies until today. In Europe the debate over whether to recognize Christianity in the proposed European Union constitution created a deadlock. Both secular politicians and the Vatican have opposed allowing officially secular but

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predominately Muslim Turkey into the EU. While concerns have been expressed about human rights abuses, the freedom of the press and other shortcomings of the Turkish government, analysts suggest that the real antipathy in Europe towards Turkey is anti-Muslim xenophobia. Cardinal Ratzinger, now Pope Benedict XVI, was quoted by Catholic News in 2004 as saying that the bringing of Turkey into the EU would put European culture at risk.10 In the United States the presidential campaign of 2007–08 has focused on the presupposition that all candidates will be committed Christians and will make so-called Christian values central to their government.11 In Central Europe the successful defence of Vienna against the Ottoman Empire in 1683, followed by the gradual Hapsburg conquest of the Western Balkans, signalled the gradual erosion of Ottoman Muslim influence in these areas, and the assertion of Hapsburg Catholic dominance. With the ending of the Crusades, as well as the increasing interest in seaborne trade in the Mediterranean by the English, the Dutch and the Germans, establishing diplomatic relations with the Ottomans and an understanding of the inner workings of Ottoman society became critical for Europe as a whole. Muslims (and Islam) were no longer a distant, and largely faceless, enemy but were becoming an integral part of the European world. Indeed by the late nineteenth century the Ottoman Empire would be called the ‘sick man of Europe’, recognizing both its weakness, and its critical role as a potential strategic asset in the overall equation of nineteenth-century European imperial politics. The average European might never meet a Muslim, but neither Muslims nor their religion were strangers to members of Europe’s educated and ruling classes. Translations of the Qur’a¯ n into European languages began to be circulated, as were translations of classical biographies of Muh.ammad. Islamic law, of early interest to the Hapsburgs, became of increasing interest to colonial powers like England and France as they found themselves ruling significant Muslim populations, and seeking to dominate others through trade and diplomacy. Thus by the nineteenth century the political elite and educated classes of Europe were deeply engaged in Orientalism, a fascination with all things of the ‘east’ including Islam. Spiritual adventurers followed in the wake of traders and diplomats seeking to explore (and exploit) whatever Islam had to offer those of eclectic spiritual tastes. Thus Sufism, with its poetry, music, and ecstatic worship, became another lens through which Europeans would understand Muslims and Islam. Despite the fact that European colonial powers dominated much of the Muslim world by the end of the nineteenth century, and had scholars with a growing familiarity with both Islam and Muslim cultures, there is little evidence that European understandings of Muslims bore any close relationship with Muslim self-understandings. Whatever the shortcomings of Edward Said’s study Orientalism it was surely on point in showing that European (and eventually American) understandings of Islam were in large measure a projection of Christian fantasy and fear on the Muslim world.12

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Ultimately Western understandings of Islam and Muslims during the colonial era were based on the need to establish (and affirm) European Christian identity in the face of increasing encounters with other civilizations, the need for a rational to justify dominating, controlling, and finally converting these civilizations to Western Christianity, and finally the pragmatic need to use indigenous workers to maintain colonial institutions and to quell anti-colonial movements. These needs led to a perpetuation of negative images of Muslims, since such images justified political domination and religious conversion. Even when Muslims were portrayed in apparently favourable ways, these represented projections of European ideals. Carlyle’s characterization of Muh.ammad as a ‘hero’ in his On Heroes, HeroWorship, and the Heroic in History is one example. Calling Muh.ammad a ‘spontaneous, passionate, yet just, true-meaning man! Full of wild faculty, fire and light; of wild worth, all uncultured; working out his life-task in the depths of the Desert’ would hardly match a Muslim description.13 In Arabia, Nigeria and Malaya, for example, Muslims were portrayed by British colonial officers as ‘nature’s gentlemen’. It was a backhanded compliment, since it attributed to ‘nature’ those characteristics of honour, self-control, and honesty that Muslims themselves saw as a hallmark of their religious heritage. Colonial officers characterized Islam among Muslims in Malaya as ‘broad but not deep’, finding in pre-Islamic cultures the roots of those attributes they admired most about Muslims.14 Complimenting colonialist attitudes towards Muslims were those of missionaries. By the late nineteenth century these had shifted from a negative view of Muslims (and all non-Christians) as sunk into evil and idolatrous depravity towards a view that their religious life might be a preparation for receiving the gospel. Thus Muslims were evaluated on the ease with which they could, or could not be converted and the degree to which they forcibly opposed Christian missionary activity. Because Muslims almost never converted to Christianity, even in those Muslim civilizations at the periphery of the Muslim world, and because Muslim leaders inevitably opposed Christian missionary activity, a dominantly negative attitude arose among missionaries. This attitude was reinforced by Christian assessments of Islam as a religion. Typically it was characterized as both legalistic and ritualistic, terms with negative connotations for Protestant missionaries. It is noteworthy that a Christian scholar such as Duncan Black MacDonald, who influenced generations of American missionaries to the Muslim World, regarded The Thousand and One Nights as an essential window into the Muslim mind, and the works of al-Ghazali on Sufism as an essential bridge between Islam and Christianity.15 The first work played to orientalist images of Muslim sensuality and decadence, the latter those aspects of Islamic spirituality most similar to Protestantism. The result could be a Christian understanding that Islam either bred fanatical religious loyalty and violent opposition to Christian missions, or was overly effete and sensual and ready to encounter a ‘manly’ religion. Islam was seen as both irrational and opposed to freedom of religion – in other words as barbarian by the new standards of Enlightenment Christianity.16

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Enduring images Virtually all of the negative attitudes towards Islam found in contemporary American society have their genesis in those images formulated out of earlier encounters with Islam and Muslims. Gottschalk and Greenberg in their work Islamophobia offer a useful overview of these images. The earliest concern the prophet Muh.ammad. While Muslims did not regard him in any way as comparable to Jesus, who they also revere, Christian apologists against Islam unfavourably compared his multiple marriages, involvement in trade and government, and leadership of Muslim military operations with the chastity, otherworldliness, and pacifism of Jesus. Since Christians could accept no revelation after that of Jesus (and it must be borne in mind that such assertions were part of internal Christian wrangling for centuries) Muh.ammad’s assertion that he received the final revelation from God in the Qur’a¯ n was projected as either heresy or a trick.17 Overall Christians faulted Muh.ammad for his failure to be like Jesus, someone Muslims never claimed that he was. A suggestive alternative did emerge in a dialogue when Patriarch Timothy of the East Syrian Church was called before the Caliph Mahdi in 781CE. Pressed to answer on how Christians saw Muh.ammad, Timothy answered that ‘he walked in the way of the Prophets’ a nuanced answer that avoided Christian admissions that he actually was a prophet as Christians understood the prophets, but which recognized the similarity of Muh.ammad’s aims with those of the prophets.18 This approach has been atypical, however, as were the favourable judgements on Muh.ammad by nineteenth-century writers like Carlyle, noted above. The challenge for Christians has been to find a framework within which to place Muh.ammad that allows a Christian understanding of him that Muslims too can acknowledge at least in part as accurate. But thus far Christians have generally both failed to understand Muslim views of Muh.ammad and failed to seek in dialogue a shared understanding of him.19 Just as Christians tended to understand Muh.ammad by comparing him unfavourably to the founder of their own religion, so they have interpreted Islam and Muslims through an unfavourable comparison to their own religious values. In the process they have projected on Islam those characteristics that are the opposite of their own religious ideals. The essentially Christian and particularly Protestant understanding of authentic religion relates religion to faith in opposition to good works, and relates salvation to God’s grace as opposed to salvation through obedience to the law. Islam, which emphasizes obedience to God’s command as essential to salvation, is seen by Christians whom this author encounters as essentially a religion of ‘works righteousness’ and law rather than faith and grace. This image is sometimes reinforced by Muslim converts to Christianity such as Ibn Warraq (a pseudonym) and Samuil Abd Al Shahid, who teaches at the Dallas Theological Seminary and often interprets Islam to Christian groups. Muslims, by extension, are depicted as either oppressed by futile efforts at obedience to strict law, or as decadent hypocrites. The burkha and the

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licentious sheik of Arabia become the twin symbols of legalistic Puritanism and cutthroat hedonism which in the Western mind are the yin and yang of Muslim life. And as Gottschalk and Greenberg point out, both reappear continually in Western images of Islam.20 Such a caricature falls far short of being an accurate characterization, as it also falls short in Protestant understandings of Judaism and Catholicism. While Muslims have distanced themselves from any idea that God would provide an atoning sacrifice for human sin, they have consistently insisted, as does the Qur’a¯ n, that God’s mercy is the only basis on which humans can be saved, both in the sense that God in God’s mercy provides the dictates that make humane life possible, and in that God’s mercy alone makes possible the work of repentance. Islam has also been negatively contrasted with Christianity as a religion of violence as opposed to being a religion of peace, and thus Muslims as inherently violent.21 That this contrast as such has no basis in historical fact is almost selfevident. There is no shortage of examples of Christian and Christianly-inspired violence in history. But in Spencer’s work, for example, the focus is theological. He contrasts Jesus’ teaching about peace and non-violence with Qur’a¯ nic passages that appear to incite violence. And again Muh.ammad is compared unfavourably with Jesus in this regard. This, despite the fact that Jesus warned his followers of impending violence and the need to be armed, and he is understood by Christians to return as an apocalyptic warrior in a great final battle (see Mt. 10.34, Lk. 22.36, Rev. 19.15, 21). As with the question of prophecy and revelation, a closer examination suggests that the theological distinction between Christianity and Islam is not so clear on this point. Both the word Islam and its cognates in Arabic mean ‘peace’ and the Qur’a¯ n speaks frequently of the value of peace and the peace that comes through embracing Islam. There is no distinction between Islam and Christianity in valuing peace. Nor are Christian scriptures devoid of violence and calls to violent action – calls which have justified centuries of Christian warfare (see Deut. 7.1–2, 20.16, for example). Differences come down to differences in the actual historical contexts in which their respective books, the Qur’a¯ n and the Bible, initially guided Muslims and Christians respectively, as well as the theological analysis of those contexts. Early Christian belief in the immanent inauguration of God’s Kingdom by God coupled with the relative freedom to propagate their views within the Roman Empire allowed Christian scripture to coalesce around the teaching of Jesus that emphasized personal and communal righteousness, preaching, and steadfast faith in God’s saving power in the face of oppression. Muh.ammad by contrast called people to an urgent return to righteousness before the coming of God’s wrath. Muh.ammad and the first Muslims living in the grip of tribal demands for solidarity had no free realm in which to preach their message, and met immediately with violent opposition to it. Finally entrusted with power both temporal and spiritual, and beset by enemies whose triumph would mean eternal damnation for themselves

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and all others, the revelation Muh.ammad received coalesced around a longing for peace tempered by the necessity of war. It is instructive to note that with the passing of years, Muslim theologians, in reflecting on this revelation, would acknowledge the spiritual danger, and sometimes futility, of war for God’s purposes and would hedge its possibility round with regulations. Christian theologians like Thomas Aquinas and Hugo Grotius would, conversely, recognize the necessity of war for those entrusted with both power and responsibility, and would likewise seek to hedge in that possibility with what is usually called ‘just war theory’. In other words, what is different in the two religions is less their values than the times in which they have been called to live them out. And this remains so today, as most Western Christians can bask in a half century or more of peace stemming from military and economic dominance while the majority of Muslims worldwide chafe powerless under the yoke of one form or another of political oppression.

Contemporary encounters Contemporary caricatures of Islam and Muslims have emerged out of a history of political conflict and religious dispute, and have been shaped by the need to justify colonialism and colonial missions. Yet however embedded in the Western conscience, these caricatures are not the only source of negative attitudes towards Islam and Muslims. Most of what contemporary Westerners hear of Muslims comes from two other sources: reporting about events involving Muslims, and reports about Islam coming from agencies, in particular Christian mission agencies, engaged in seeking to influence the Muslim world to achieve religious or political aims.

Event-driven discourse on Islam Events in the Muslim world do not come to the American public purely as such. Journalists, politicians and others place those events in a framework they think will be comprehensible to their audience, will serve the purpose of attracting the audience to the story, and will sway the audience to a commercially or politically useful understanding of the event.22 In its most extreme form this leads to the ‘branding’ of events found on the contemporary 24/7 news channels or the similar ‘branding’ of events used by politicians to influence political discourse in a way that favours their own desire for power. Thus, for example, violent events involving Muslims are frequently branded as ‘terrorist’ in order to place them in the framework of a ‘war on terror’, which sells newspapers and airtime. Incumbent presidents facing a recalcitrant and slow moving congress have numerous ways to respond positively to war, crisis and tragedy even when they cannot significantly change existing laws and social policies. This makes shaping the discourse

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on Islam around the ideas of war, crisis, and tragedy an important political tool, with the current ‘war on terror’ a key component in Republican presidential politics in the run up to the 2008 election. Branding events as a ‘crisis’ and ‘tragedy’ may be equally effective for the media seeking market share. As a result events in the Muslim world elicit and are framed by discourse around crisis, terror and tragedy in order to meet political and commercial ends. It is these distorted frameworks that provide paradigmatic understandings of Islam and the Muslim community for the American public. And these have been predominantly negative understandings in recent years. This is not to deny the events themselves, but simply to point out that it is the framework within which they are placed that determines American attitudes towards the parties involved. The key to re-forming American attitudes towards Islam will be replacing existing paradigms with others that allow Americans to more realistically assess their Muslim neighbours.

The Arab-Israeli conflict – Muslims as anti-Semitic The most enduring American images of Islam and Muslims to arise in the twentieth century are those shaped by the conflicts between Palestinians, Arab states and Israel since 1948. The result of these conflicts has been three enduring sets of images of Arabs, and by extension Islam. The first of these is intransigent opposition to the formation of Israel: intransigence that the media has sometimes attributed less to the just claim of Palestinians on their own land than to anti-Semitism. While anti-Semitic discourse is increasingly common in Arab lands, the question that the media has not addressed is whether that popularity stems from religious or political causes. Matthias Küntzel addresses Nazi fostering of anti-Semitism in the Middle East in Jihad and Jew Hatred, a useful complement to those who focus on scriptural sources or the role of Israel in the modern Middle East.23 The second enduring image is of large-scale corruption and incompetence in Arab governments and armies, typified by the disastrous losses suffered in wars against Israel in 1948, 1967 and 1973. The third image is of Palestinians, Arabs and by extension Muslims in general as terrorists, an image arising from PLO hijackings in the 1970s, the killing of Israeli athletes at Munich, and more recently the suicide bombings by both the Lebanese Hezbollah and, more recently, the Palestinian Hamas. The events are, again, undeniable. The question less often asked is what relationship specific terrorist acts have to Islam and Muslims as such. The PLO, which carried out the Munich killings, was and is a secular political organization. Religiously inspired suicide bombings have arisen since the rise of a new Islamic theology of martyrdom formulated by the Shi’ite Hezbollah in southern Lebanon and adopted by Hamas since the late 1990s.24 In other words there is no common religious link between PLO terrorism and that of Hamas.25 Nor can the suicide bombings be understood strictly as attacks against Jews and Christians. The strategy of suicide bombers has been employed by Al Qaeda and other groups primarily in attacks against fellow Muslims

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in Iraq and Pakistan. The relation of religion to violence between Arabs and Israelis, and between Arabs, is far more complex than is projected out of events in the Middle-East by the popular media.

9/11 and the discourse on terrorism – Islam as a religion of terrorism The 11th September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon were almost instantly portrayed in the American media as attacks by Muslims on the United States. Soon they were linked to earlier attacks on the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen, attacks on the US Embassy in Kenya, and other supposedly Islamic attacks on the United States and US interests. Nor were the perpetrators of these attacks slow to characterize them as attacks in the name of Islam. On the internet emails began to circulate with longer and longer chronologies of supposed Islamic terrorism, some extending back to the earliest Muslim conquests and continuing forward to 9/11 or even to prophetic visions of a future of apocalyptic Islamic violence. (As a teacher of Islamic studies, the author received these emails constantly by those wishing to ‘inform’ him of the true nature of Islam.) Such links have been made by popular writers such as Robert Spencer and Ayaan Hirsi Ali as well.26 What emerged rather quickly was a discourse in which Islam was characterized as a religion which relied on terrorism and violence as means to achieve its ends. This discourse ignored mainstream Muslim denunciations of terrorism and violence, the readily accessible Islamic legal tradition regarding just war and its means, and the historical ‘cherry picking’ involved in finding a supposed pattern of Islamic violence. Yet it was persuasive to many. At a lecture in August of 2006 this author pointed out to one Christian group that a local Muslim group had condemned terrorism in the harshest terms. One of the audience responded that the Muslims ‘must not be real Muslims’. Efforts to criticize such caricatures of Islam are themselves characterized as merely being ‘politically correct’.27 As a result in the discourse on terrorism non-Muslim attempts to accurately portray Islam and the Muslim community are marginalized. Muslims in the popular mind were now constructed by the reporting of terrorist events rather than their beliefs, actions or self-understanding.

The ‘Clash of Civilizations’ discourse Samuel Huntington’s article in the Summer 1993 edition of Foreign Affairs entitled, ‘The clash of civilizations?’ followed by his book expanding on this theme in 1996 appeared just in time to provide what appeared to be an intellectually rigorous and theoretically complete framework for understanding the apparent conflict between Muslims and the West.28 What made it both persuasive and damaging to images of Muslims was that it supposedly rose above mere events to explain the deeper causes of civilizational clashes. While particular attacks

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on US and Western interests could be dismissed as one-off events saying little about Islam and Muslims, in popular understandings of Huntington’s thesis they were in fact proof of a much deeper and more abiding conflict of worldview and values. It did not matter whether Islam or most Muslims were against terrorism, at a deep level they were presented as opposed to the West and everything it stands for. It must be said that such an anti-Western discourse has been easy to find in popular Islamic literature. Islamic anti-colonialism as found early in the writings of Al-Afghani or much later in the writing of Muh.ammad Mahathir (former Prime Minister of Malaysia) tended to berate Muslims for their technological and economic shortcomings while encouraging them to resist westernization with its immorality and secularism. Muslim identity has been and continues to be defined in opposition to the supposedly ‘Western’ values of individual freedom as personal irresponsibility and immorality and secularism as abdication of society’s responsibility to God’s law. But of course if this is a caricature of the West, then it is also part of the contested social space within the West. Authors like Meic Pearse and Dinesh D’Souza, as well as others, have suggested that the real clash may be between traditional, family-oriented, God-fearing societies and a godless West that needs to cast out its own secularism.29 Nonetheless, however refracted through the lens of presentations by the popular media, Huntington’s thesis has provided fertile ground for seeing Muslims as people whose way of life is incontrovertibly opposed to that of most Americans. And this goes beyond the matter of violence to achieve political ends. As Muslims have sought to assert their own distinctive identity in the face of cultural imperialism by the West, they have reinforced among themselves certain distinctive patterns of behaviour. This include an emphasis on codes of modest dress for both men and women (but particularly women, who are required to cover their hair), an emphasis on religious education, strict obedience to rules regulating economic transactions and contracts, dietary rules, and an emphasis on the requirement for five times daily prayer.30 All of these can be seen by some Christians as signs of a distinctly legalistic, anti-modern religion that oppresses women and encourages religious fanaticism. Islam is thus considered to be almost the doppelganger of a Western civilization that is liberal in all matters of personal behaviour and economics and discourages outward displays of religiosity. More extreme, but highly limited, forms of behaviour from the Muslim world such as the so-called honour killings of women among some Muslim groups and female genital mutilation among others appear to bolster the thesis that Islam is almost an ‘anti-civilization’. In January of 2008 the author was asked to comment on the murder of two young Muslim women by their father in Dallas. His comments, as well as those of a local imam and two other scholars, appeared in a long article in the local newspaper. Complaints were made in response to this article saying that neither this author nor the others had accurately represented Islam in saying that it did not condone honour killings. The

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work of Ayaan Hirsi Ali – Infidel, was cited as proof that Islam allows honour killings, although in fact Ms Ali’s book has a somewhat more nuanced argument concerning the nature of Islam. That Ms Ali’s work, which is primarily autobiographical, should carry such weight (like that of Robert Spencer and Bruce Bawar) indicates the depth of feeling that Islam is inextricably antiWestern. Similarly Muslim violence against publications (from Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses to the infamous Danish cartoons), however clearly incited for political purposes among Muslims largely ignorant of their content or context, can be placed in a discourse that plays Islamic intolerance against Western recognition of ‘inalienable rights’ to free speech. What popular conceptions of Huntington’s thesis ignore is that it is difficult to distinguish between the character of a culture or civilization and it aberrations. Christian culture is not defined by David Koresh and Jim Jones, nor Western civilization by Adolph Hitler, although their movements would certainly have to be accounted for in any full representation of culture or civilization. Nor is the assertion of a distinctly religious identity in the face of Western secularism a monopoly of Muslims. Conservative Christians have been engaged in adopting distinctive styles of modest dress ever since the Jesus people wore granny dresses and overalls to set themselves apart from their peers in the 1970s. Dissatisfaction with secular public education has led to a large increase in Christian schools, not to mention continued efforts to introduce religion into public schools through the teaching of ‘creation science’, the banning of sex education that does not promote abstinence, banning of supposedly ‘immoral’ literature in schools, libraries, and so on. Fundamentalist and evangelical Christians have likewise promoted strong, distinct, gender roles in a hierarchy in which men are leaders of both the family and society. In 2007 the largest Baptist seminary in the United States, Southwestern Theological Seminary, ceased training women for ordination because of the conviction of its leadership that women should not be pastors of churches. It also dismissed its only female professor. Between conservative Christian efforts to promote and even impose a Christian identity on the public space and liberal Christian efforts to limit unbounded capitalism in the economic sphere almost the full gamut of Muslim responses to Western modernity are found in some form in the American Christian community itself. Nonetheless Muslims continue to be portrayed as the ‘other’ in terms of social values.

Sectarianism and tribalism, racism and Muslims as ‘primitive’ When Huntington posited the Muslim world as an alternative civilization, this positively suggested to some Muslims the prospect of civilizational dialogue rather than clash. The University of Malaya even formed an ‘Institute for Civilizational Dialogue’ in the late 1990s and the Islamic International Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization began sponsoring annual conferences on

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civilizational dialogue that continue to today. With its recognition of a distinct Muslim civilization (in contrast to colonial dismissals of Islam as barbaric), Huntington’s thesis could be seen as a stepping stone to a more equal intercourse between Muslims and the West. Yet these efforts have borne little fruit (and have been mostly unreported in the West). Instead, the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and Sudan have been the occasion for the media’s utilization of a far different discourse about Islam, one which portrays it as uncivilized and indeed primitive. The key terms in this discourse are sectarianism (or sectarian violence), tribalism and racism. Almost as soon as the Western media recognized that there were tribal distinctions in Afghanistan and the role they played in post-Taliban violence, there was a new emphasis on how the problems in uniting Afghanistan under a secular and presumably democratic government were rooted in tribalism, tribal rivalries and refusals of tribes and tribal leaders to give up their prerogatives to a central government. Closer scrutiny of the social situation in Iraq also ‘revealed’ to the American public that it too was divided by tribal loyalties. (This was apparently also a revelation to the American political leadership engaged in incompetent and ill-informed efforts at nation building as well.) One former diplomat even suggested that only dividing the nation into three regions: Sunni, Shi’ite and Kurd would result in peace.31 In Iraq the ‘sectarian’ violence (as it is characterized in virtually all American media and by the US military and political establishments) has been seen likewise as proof that Muslim societies are ridden with primitive forms of rivalries. And the Darfur crisis, which was initially reported as violence against black Christians by Arab Muslims, seemed to confirm racism and religious intolerance as characteristic of Muslim society. That tribe and clan play key political roles in these societies cannot be disputed. What is problematic is when these societies become representative of Islam and Muslim civilization as a whole. There is some irony in these images since Islam as a religion is so clearly opposed to tribalism and racism in its scripture. Islamic empires ruled over and managed some of the most ethnically and religiously diverse states in history. The focus of the media on Iraq, Afghanistan and Sudan also ignores Muslim societies which, while not absent of social problems, are not dominated by problems of tribe, clan or ethnicity. And these societies make up the vast majority of Muslims in the world. Southeast Asian Muslims, for example, equal or outnumber those in Arabic speaking countries.32 A moderately wide-ranging and objective look at the Islamic world suggests that Western attitudes towards it are created more by the media’s framing of events in a few Muslims nations in terms of primitive social systems than the reality of Muslims or Islam worldwide.

Islamic imperialism and Islamo-Fascism The most recent discourse around Islam has arisen around Muslim preaching (within both traditionally Muslim societies and among Muslims in the West)

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that calls for the creation of a new Muslim empire that will complete the supposedly unfinished work of Muslim expansion started by Muh.ammad. (Building a Muslim Empire in Southeast Asia, published by Al Arqam of Malaysia, is one example of this genre. Lorinzo Vidino documents many others in his article ‘The Muslim Brotherhood’s conquest of Europe’ in The Middle East Quarterly, Winter 2005.) These works are augmented by the efforts of Iran to develop an indigenous nuclear capability and the supposed desire of extremist Muslims to gain control of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. Islam is portrayed (as in Ephraim Karsh’s Islamic Imperialism) as a form of millennial fanaticism directed towards the violent imposition of itself on the entire world. In its anti-Semitic manifestations (highlighted by the Iranian president Ahmadinajad’s threat to obliterate Israel) these political movements have been labelled ‘Islamo-fascism’ and suggest an image of Islam and Muslims that links them with the particularly grandiose, decadent and grasping nature of Nazism. Given that at least some Arab leaders allied themselves with Germany in the first half of the twentieth century it may appear that there is a compelling connection.33 Pro-Israel writers such as Bat Ye’or, Robert Spencer and Ibn Warraq have also promoted this view of Islam, with the Prometheus Press in the United States playing a leading role in disseminating anti-Islamic polemical literature directed at its supposed fascist tendencies.34 Certainly these images are entirely negative from an American perspective. They also demand, however, a degree of further analysis. First the term ‘fascist’ is of little use in describing contemporary political movements. This is particularly true in a society like post-revolution Iran, where the entrenched economic and political elite has been overthrown and complex interests align themselves towards political power in ways that are historically unique. Nor is it accurate to regard Iran’s ambitions to both protect itself from and influence its neighbours as a recognizable form of imperialism, unless every nation on earth be regarded as imperialistic. Finally, there are certainly Muslims who desire or would accept a violent imposition of Islam on the entire world. It is questionable whether these are more than a small minority. Most Islamic preaching concerning a worldwide Islamic state focuses not on military conquest, but on converting non-Muslims to Islam and theoretically higher birth rates for Muslims in the West. This is no different from very public Christian efforts to convert the entire world to Christianity under the reign of Jesus as King. Public perceptions, however, are not merely based on claims and strategies, but on the reporting of actual events. And this author has discovered a widespread perception that Islam is in fact growing at a rapid pace. This rapid growth is asserted at virtually every event at which he has spoken. This portrayal of aggressive Muslim evangelism serves well those who for political, religious or commercial purposes would seek support from a frightened Christian public. It is not, however, entirely accurate. Works like that of Richard Jenkins lay bare how problematic Muslim expectations (and Christian fears) of an Islamic Europe are – assuming they are widespread.35 Muslims, like many Christians,

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may hope for a day when the truth of their religion triumphs in the religious marketplace, but there is little or no solid statistical evidence that this is happening worldwide. David Barrett of the World Evangelization Research Center in Richmond, Virginia has gathered data worldwide on the growth of religious movements. His statistics indicate that Islam is growing slightly more rapidly than Christianity, but projects that even in 2025 the Muslim population of the world will be approximately 70 percent of the Christian population.36 In the end terms like Islamic imperialism and Islamo-fascism, as well as claims of rapid Muslim population growth, confound complex and frequently unrelated events and movements in the Muslim world to create an emotional response towards Islam that draws an audience for the media and support for politicians but obfuscates the actual aspirations of Muslims and Muslim society.

From wrong to not right One can find examples in the American media of the recognition that these forms of discourse applied to Islam and Muslims are inaccurate or misleading. Reporters and writers realize that events occur and stories appear for which the dominant discourse clearly provides an inadequate framework. Yet this has not necessarily led to a more nuanced presentation of the Muslim community that recognizes its complexity, but rather to the new frameworks that are equally simplistic and the projection of a new set of misleading images of Islam and Muslims. Thus we have seen, in both the media and among politicians, a lurch from portraying Muslims as terrorists to portraying Muslims as victims of terror. In the coverage of Iraq the media (possibly prompted by the US administration) moved from portraying the Iraqis as victims of Ba’athist inspired violence to being victims of sectarian violence gradually forced into religious enclaves to being tribal peoples uniting under tribal leaders to oppose a ‘foreign’ Al Qaeda. In each case one picture of Arab Muslim society was replaced by another that was equally problematic. All too rarely was it reported that in Iraq complex loyalties and social interrelationships were present, varied from city to rural areas, and shifted within geographic regions. Similar unhelpful image shifts have occurred in portrayals of Islamic political movements. The broad term terrorist has been both replaced by and used interchangeably with islamist, jihadist, radical and radical islamist. Sometimes the media and politicians refer simply to ‘political Islam’ as a catch all for dangerous Islamic movements. In opposition to this kaleidoscope of images virtually all other Muslim political movements are simply portrayed as moderate and secular, or in the case of Iraq, as sectarian. These simple categorizations have two equally negative effects. First they mislead with regard to the actual complexity of Islamic politics, a complexity marked by significant regional variations at the very least. As importantly they portray politically active Muslims as a general danger to American society whether from afar or within. The media

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has given little coverage to Muslim organizations like the Islamic Society of North America, the Council of American Islamic Relations, and the Fiqh Council of North America; and thus little attention to the Muslim organizations with the largest membership and most pervasive influence in the United States. This author has found that audiences are amazed when he mentions that according to a 2006 Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) survey many American Muslims are social conservatives inclined to vote Republican. Yet even a cursory review of Islamic social and economic values, as well as where Muslims fit into an overall demographic description of American society, would make it clear why this is likely. In the end none of the frameworks for understanding Islam provided by public discourse make a place for positive Muslim political activity, or even a clear understanding of Muslim political aspirations.

Enemies of true faith An important subset of Americans is those who learn about Islam through Christian religious teachers and the self-consciously Christian media. The Pew survey notes that they are more likely to have negative images of Islam and Muslims, and this is not surprising. The Christian media has frequently portrayed Islam as engaged in a struggle with Christianity for world religious domination. The preaching of Christian leaders like Pat Robertson and the late Jerry Falwell, as well as the writing of Robert Spencer, encourage the idea that Islam and Christianity are locked in a struggle for world supremacy. These images arise not only from the coverage of the growth of Islam worldwide and images of Muslim oppression of Christians in Sudan and Nigeria, but also appeal to conflated biblical images of tribal rivalry (Ishmael vs Isaac), national rivalry (Egypt, Assyria and Babylon vs Israel), and apocalyptic stories placing a Middle Eastern conflict at the centre of Christ’s second coming. For some evangelicals Islam appears to have replaced modernism, theological liberalism and communism as the primary enemy of a Christian civilization that has consistently defined itself in terms of opposition by powerful cultural forces. Christians who can understand themselves only as being on the offensive for world domination by their Lord Jesus and on the defensive against all religious and ideological rivals are now encouraged to find in Islam both their greatest potential conquest and most dangerous enemy.37 This Christian misreading of and inaccurate portrayal of the Muslim world is, like other inaccurate portrayals, the result of a limiting framework for understanding Islam. Beyond claims that Islam is violently opposed to Christianity, evangelical Christians misunderstand Muslims as people desperately needing and wanting to be saved from a legalistic, works-righteousness religion that offers no hope of real salvation in the face of sin, or as ferocious servants of the anti-Christ. In fact both Muslim needs and aspirations are far different, and are different in complex ways. Thus evangelical Christians seeking to understand

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and relate to Muslims are engaging a fantasy rather than a reality, making them a major current in the misguided American mainstream.

What Americans know, and what they don’t The Pew survey cited at the beginning of this chapter indicates that most Americans know about Islam and Muslims through the popular media. What they know is what they learn by watching television, reading newspapers and through emailed stories and blogs. I have suggested above that these media presentations of Islam and Muslims often work from simplistic and misleading frameworks and a discourse that almost always casts Islam and Muslims in a negative light. In concluding this survey it is important to note what Americans do not know about Islam and Muslims. It appears that few Americans know anything about the actual history of Muslim societies in terms of their positive contributions in human history, the complexity of Muslim history and civilization and the impact on Muslims of colonialism and US foreign policy. This ignorance derives in part from a well-documented ignorance of geography and history outside the United States by Americans. The 2002 National Geographic Survey of Global Geographic Literacy found that American young adults came in last among the nine developed countries surveyed.38 That this ignorance exists specifically in relation to Muslims has been borne out for this author in speaking to church and civic organizations. With rare exceptions most people in his audiences had never heard of the major Muslim empires, did not know within several hundred years when Muh.ammad was born, and were completely unaware of Islam outside the Middle East. The reasons for this ignorance are myriad, and certainly relate to education. Yet the focus of American knowledge on the world cultivated by the government and media also play a role. Both government and media portray US engagement with the rest of the world largely in terms of foreign aid, the defence of democracy (against communism and more recently terrorism), the promotion of free trade and the promotion of human rights. This means that American engagement with the world is often fleeting, and usually self-interested. Small wonder then that in 2006 a Dallas member of the World Affairs Council stood to confront a Muslim academic with the question ‘Why don’t you people appreciate all the sacrifices we Americans have made for you?’ and received a standing ovation from 200 of the Dallas business elite. (This occurred at a World Affairs Council lecture by Akbar Ahmed on 26th June 2006, which the author attended.) It takes little imagination to see that the supposed beneficiaries of American largesse might have a somewhat different view – having seen the US prop up dictators like Saddam Hussein, create and support Islamic militants like the Taliban and defend its own economic interests through tariffs and subsidies for US agriculture and industry. Yet in large measure Americans appear to be ignorant of the strong negative impact of US foreign policy on most of the world’s

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people’s much of the time. Americans, who have little experience meeting with Muslims to start with, have almost no sense of how Muslims have experienced America and its actions abroad.

Summary American images of Islam and Muslims have in common that they derive from both deep-rooted culturally transmitted pictures of Islam and the discourse surrounding events in the Muslim world. Neither of these sources has given Americans an accurate picture of contemporary Islam. The distortions derive from ignorance, the wilful manipulation of the discourse to achieve religious, commercial and political ends, and perhaps most importantly from a lack of participation by Muslims in shaping understandings of Muslim society and Islam. Any effort to reform American attitudes towards Muslims and Islam will need Muslim participation, as indicated by the Pew survey cited above. Yet that participation is also problematic. Muslim Americans, like Christian Americans, are relatively ignorant of their neighbour’s religion, and thus present themselves in ways that may contribute to negative attitudes.

Muslim efforts to frame the understanding of Islam in new ways For several decades American Muslims have actively sought to enter into the public discourse about Islam, in part to attract converts and in part to build better relations with the non-Muslim community. Since 2001 such efforts have redoubled in an effort to counter negative publicity relating Islam and Muslims to terrorism and attacks on America.39 These efforts have been hampered by conflicting aims, such as both justifying and excusing Muslim violence in defence of the Palestinians, or in opposition to the imposition of Western ways on Muslims, while promoting Islam as a religion of peace. They have also been influenced by the complex forces shaping the formation of a new Muslim identity, one which on the one hand is modern and on the other is supported by and expressed through patterns of behaviour embedded in the history of the Muslim tradition. Finally Muslims have also been hampered by Muslim misunderstandings of Christians and Christian values, leading to apologetic literature and presentations that are either ineffective or positively offensive to Christians.

Defending Palestinians Perhaps nothing unites Muslims worldwide as sympathy for Palestinians and a strong distaste for Israel’s policy towards them. In this American Muslims find themselves in conflict with the majority of Americans who apparently support Israel. This difference may stem in part from the fact that Muslims have access,

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through family ties, religious teachers and their own media, to very different perspectives on the Palestinian situation than are found in the US media. Yet in the author’s conversations with Christians and Jews other factors emerge. First, even non-Jewish Americans have as a deep part of their culture a belief in the biblical account of the holy land as God’s gift to the Jews. Israel, its importance and the claim of the Jews to possess it run deep in American Christian consciousness. Thus it is particularly difficult in the American context to defend an absolute right of the Palestinian Muslims to have a relationship with the land based on historical precedent. Too often the American concept of the history of the holy land ends with Jews under Roman occupation and begins again when they (heroically) return in the mid-twentieth-century exodus celebrated by the 1960s’ film and song of the same name. The history of all other inhabitants of those lands is either unknown or told in terms of the biblical narrative of Hittites, Philistines and other ancient interlopers on Israel’s claims. At least for persons of the author’s generation and older the American reception of this history is in turn coloured by America’s own myths of beginnings, which in essence posit that God led doughty pioneers to take a land from its native inhabitants by Manifest Destiny in order to establish something like God’s Kingdom on Earth. And that in turn is fed by an American tendency to otherwise disregard all claims to land except those based on the ability to possess and use it. The myth that Israel took a Palestinian-managed wasteland and made the desert bloom is one that resonates deeply with Americans who sing with pride of amber waves of grain where buffalo (and native Americans) once roamed. Given the complexities of the American relationship with Israel it is small wonder that American Muslims have had difficulty in justifying their sympathy for and support of the Palestinians. Neither rational arguments nor factual history alone can speak to the emotional resonances felt by most American Christians with Israel. Moreover, any accidental confusion of Israel as a nation with Jews as a people immediately leads in the American context to the charge of anti-Semitism, something American Christians fear as only those who are deeply guilty can. Even they, and indeed American Jews, find expressing support for some aspects of the Palestinian cause and criticizing of Israel’s policy towards them is a political minefield to be negotiated only by the most light-footed or foolhardy of religious leaders. It is thus even more difficult for Muslims. It is the judgement of this author that in the current US political environment there is probably no workable way in which the great majority of Muslims and Muslim institutions can work in solidarity with Palestinians except through partnerships with sympathetic Jewish and Christian groups.40

Defending Islam and science In response to eighteenth and nineteenth-century colonialist claims that Muslim societies were backward with regard to scientific learning, Muslim reformers in the earliest colonial era both emphasized the contributions of Islam to modern

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society and the need to introduce the sciences to Muslim school curriculums and thus show the compatibility of Islam with science. By the late twentieth century these efforts fostered a renewed self-image, and engagement with modernity had spawned a full scale pro-Islamic apologetic intended to demonstrate to Westerners that Islam and Muslims had made foundational contributions to modern culture and that Islam was not only compatible with modern science, but was in fact more compatible than Christianity. Literature making these twin points is available in every mosque the author has visited, and is often the centrepiece of Muslim presentations to non-Muslims. The works of Ahmad Deedat and Maurice Bucaille have become standards of Muslim apologetics.41 Their use is, however, somewhat problematic in terms of changing American attitudes towards Muslims. In the first place this type of Muslim apologetics is very similar to nineteenth-century Christian apologetics that sought to show the consistency of revelation with scientific findings. In this case works like that of Bucaille, and the contemporary Muslim magazine The Fountain seek to show that statements in the Qur’a¯ n anticipate what scientists would later discover by rational investigation.42 There are two problems with this. The first is that such a correspondence clearly depends on interpreting the Qur’a¯ n in a certain way, often a way that is not found in traditional Islamic interpretations from the prescientific era. Second, while seeking to show that the Qur’a¯ n gives validity to science, as an apologetic for Islam in the face of the claims of modernity, it ultimately uses human science to give validity to the Qur’a¯ n. From the standpoint of American attitudes towards Islam this apologetic has two negative consequences. First, in most popular Islamic apologetic works claims for the scientific validity of the Qur’a¯ n are paired with the claim that the Bible is unscientific. In particular Muslims claim that the Qur’a¯ n has no problem with a scientific view of creation, and unlike the Bible is historically accurate. Whatever the merits of such claims, books like that of Bucaille and other Muslim apologists can only alienate Christians who long ago decided that the historical and scientific accuracy of a literal reading of the Bible was unimportant to its spiritual and theological meaning, and even those Christians who continue to maintain that the Bible is inerrant. Moreover, this apologetic does not extend to an acceptance of pure Darwinian evolution. It generally favours what in Christian circles is called a creationist or intelligent design approach to the evolution of life on earth and particularly rejects evolutionary accounts of human origins. This approach ironically puts Muslims in sympathy with precisely those conservative Christians most likely to reject all claims of the Qur’a¯ n and Muh.ammad while alienating those mainline and liberal Christians most inclined towards sympathy towards Islam as a genuine form of religious faith. It also highlights the fact that many Muslims do not fully understand the evolution of worldview in the West from modernity through post-modernity. They are continuing to place themselves in a modern world which in the West is now past history.

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Defending the Qur’a¯n as revelation This failure to address post-modernity is also manifested in Muslim attempts to defend the Qur’a¯ n as revelation. As presented in Muslim popular literature this defence is based on the miraculous nature of the Qur’a¯ n in terms of its transmission through an illiterate Muh.ammad, its supernatural eloquence, its flawless transmission from one generation to the next and its absolute correspondence with scientific truth.43 All of these arguments might well have made sense to nineteenth-century Westerners, but the deep scepticism and bent towards deconstruction in post-modernity now makes them appear quaint, and Islam as thus outmoded. Contemporary Westerners, even evangelical Christians, understand that all communication through language is inextricably bound up with interpretation. There is no pure transmission of unambiguous ideas. And interpretation in turn is radically contingent on the social, cultural and historical situation of the interpreter. In this worldview, to suggest that Muh.ammad is merely the mouthpiece for unchanged words from heaven seems absurd, as does the implicit claim that God somehow speaks a particular dialect of Arabic. In this worldview, the eloquence of the Qur’a¯ n is not seen as a characteristic of the text, but of the text in the context of a community socialized to receive it as eloquent. Its flawless transmission is seen not as a miracle but as an accident of history in which powerful political forces destroyed all variants. And its supposed correspondence with scientific truth is again not a characteristic of the text but an artefact of a particular modern interpretation of the text. Muslim scholars like Fazlur Rahman and Ingrid Mattson understand well the problem with this apologetic, and have sought to explain clearly to Christians and Muslims the sophisticated forms of reasoning that justify and explain Muslim claims about the Qur’a¯ n. It does not appear to this author that they have influenced either Muslim apologetics or Christian perceptions at a popular level.44

Defending gender equality while delimiting gender roles In the fall of 2007 the author organized a series of Christian-Muslim dialogue groups involving local Muslims and Christian theology students, more than half of whom were women. Issues of Islamic dress, which the Muslim participants were most ready to address, turned out to be secondary concerns. The Christian women accepted that Muslim women might choose modest dress and a covering for the hair as a sign of piety and religious identity. Moreover it was clear that among the Muslim women there were different opinions on the demands of Islamic law. Some chose to wear a headscarf, others did not. What the Christian women could not appreciate was the way in which all of the imams and several Muslim women justified the maintenance of distinct gender roles in a hierarchical setting, and in particular the segregation of women and men in worship and the complete absence of female leadership in the mosque.

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In those groups, some of which were made up entirely of women, it quickly emerged that the Muslim participants were largely ignorant of the development of feminism and its sharp critique of limiting gender roles while claiming equality. The reason for this appeared to be that the Muslim participants saw equality from a distinct theological perspective, one which might well be embraced by some Christian groups. For the Muslims equality was determined in the first place by an equal demand for righteousness and hope for salvation from God. They frequently quoted the Qur’a¯ n to this effect. Second, equality was discussed by the Muslims in terms of honour and material security rather than opportunity and autonomy. Thus one imam, Naim Elibiari, speaking at the Carrolton mosque on 12th November 2007 presented Muslim women as privileged because their husbands and fathers were obliged to ‘maintain’ them even when they had their own income. The Muslims we met were apparently unaware of (or rejected without explicitly saying so) the great divide between the pre-modern concept of honour and security as conferred through a divinely appointed role and the modern concept of honour and security as earned through wilful self-determination. In any case this author has not witnessed a single instance where American Christian women have emerged from these dialogues believing that Islam grants women any real equality, although they often had enormous admiration and affection for the Muslim women they met. There are Muslim feminist authors such as Amina Wadud who have offered a Qur’a¯ nanic critique of Islamic practice in this regard.45 Yet so long as every mosque in the Dallas area has the strictest segregation of the sexes and allows no women in leadership it is a hard sell among Christian women that Islam is a religion of gender equality. This does not necessarily place Muslims outside an America culture which tolerates Christian and Mormon groups that equally constrain the role of women in religious institutions. But the Muslim situation is different because American Christians can, if they wish, regard other Christians or Mormons as aberrations, while they take the Muslim example as representative of Islam.

Defending Islamic law Since 2005 the author has worked with several groups of Muslims who wish to initiate interfaith dialogue and find opportunities to explain their religion to a largely ignorant American public. In the presentations that they have made the phrase ‘Islam is a way of life’ has come up time and again. They have stressed the value of living under God’s perfect law, the shari’a, by which they can confidently navigate daily life. They have also found themselves having to act as apologists and interpreters for shari’a to sceptical Christian audiences. Three particular issues arise in these discussions, and illustrate the kinds of misunderstandings that arise as Muslims seek to create a more positive image for their community.

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The first of these relates to the role of women in Islam, as noted above. The second relates to conversion from Islam to other religions and an Islamic law that most Christians assume forbids conversion on pain of death. Not surprisingly the Muslim community is divided on this issue. The great majority of American Muslims that the author has worked with regard the apostasy laws as antiquated and point out that Christians had similar laws until the modern era. There are those however who have put forward an apologetic for apostasy laws both classically and in some modern Muslim countries. While they disagree over the proper punishment for apostasy, they agree that it is crime because in an Islamic state apostasy is a form of treason that undermines the security of the state. This argument is found in the works of Mawlana Mawdudi among others.46 There is a problem with this argument from a Western perspective. The entire rationale for modern Western states since the nineteenth-century Treaty of Berlin is that religion cannot be a state ideology, and that holding a particular religion or changing religions is therefore never treasonous. Even if, as Mawdudi argues, Islam is not merely a religion but an integrated way of life, it is difficult to argue that within an Islamic society there can be no dissent from certain beliefs – which is the basic definition of apostasy. In the West the rationale that equates the holding of ideological beliefs with loyalty to the state is associated with communism and other forms of totalitarian government, not with contemporary democracies. Although American Muslims cannot be held responsible for human rights abuses in the name of Islam elsewhere in the world, it is difficult to defend the value of shari’a law when in its name a large number of Muslim countries have failed to sign the UN Declaration of Human Rights. The third problem is the general need to explain how Islam can be both a faith and a religion of mandatory religious practices with rigid laws of social interaction. Most of the Muslims with whom I have worked believe and seek to convey to their Christian audiences that submitting to God’s law in its particularities is a profoundly spiritual experience. For some it represents a kind of religious awakening. What they often fail to understand in extended dialogue is the extent to which mandatory religious laws are associated by their Christian audiences with a lack of faith (a common Protestant interpretation) or worse, a kind of controlling sectarian fundamentalism. For these Christians personal faith is closely associated with the freedom to seek out idiosyncratic but fulfilling forms of worship, to develop one’s personal spirituality, and to make one’s own moral choices in complex situations. Islam (and Judaism) appear both communitarian and legalistic in the face of the demands of personal self-fulfilment. In this particular regard, however, it has been noteworthy that many of the Muslims with whom my students engaged in dialogue were able to articulate the importance of shari’a for authentic spirituality in terms the students could understand, if not accept. Ironically the students’ openness to varied

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forms of spirituality made them open to a rather different Islamic spirituality as well, so long as it was presented by winsome and friendly interlocutors.

Explaining the relationship of Islam to Christianity Muslims face a twofold problem when explaining the relationship of Islam to Christianity. The first is that they frequently do not understand Christianity as Christians themselves understand it. This emerged again and again in our dialogue groups and with the imams. The Muslim participants were unaware that Christians do not believe what Muslims think Christians believe. None of the Christian participants could accept Muslim understandings of the Christian view of the Trinity, particularly when one Muslim imam (based on S. 5:16) maintained steadfastly that Mary was part of the Christian trinity whether modern Christians knew it or not. Christians could not accept the same imam’s judgement on the Bible as a flawed scripture because it was clearly written and redacted by humans. Christians have a different understanding of the mechanisms of revelation. While most Muslim participants in dialogue were far more open to allowing Christians to define their own religion, they had difficulty understanding why many Christian participants were unimpressed with Muslim admiration and respect for Jesus as a prophet. What the Muslims seemed unaware of, and what Christians may not have been consciously aware of, is that the battle for the divinity of Jesus is not in the first instance one that modern Christians associate with Islam, but with certain forms of Christian liberalism, Deism and Unitarianism. Muslims had unwittingly aligned themselves with what many evangelical Christians regarded as long-standing enemies of true faith. At the core of these misunderstandings is the implicit or explicit claim by Muslims that Islam, being the final revelation, comprehends all things and all religions better than those religions understand themselves. Of course they are not alone in making this claim. Christians make a similar claim with regard to their own religion. The difference that has emerged in dialogue is that Christians have for some decades explored a theology of religious pluralism that recognizes in some way the equality and validity of competing truth claims rather than trying to validate them by placing them in a hierarchy shaped to insure that Christianity is on top. In short Christians themselves (at least those educated at the author’s seminary) have critiqued the Enlightenment project of engaging in a supposedly objective study of religion that actually masks a Christian bias. Modern Muslims tend to present an understanding of nonMuslim religions that comes straight out of that now discredited Enlightenment approach. They do not understand that their offer to respect Jews and Christians as ‘people of the book’ carries a covert demand that Jews and Christians redefine themselves in Muslim terms, since neither has regarded itself as a religion of the book as understood by Muslims. Similarly the Muslim recognition of Moses and Jesus as prophets carries with it the covert demand that Jews and

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Christians redefine their understanding of prophecy and, in the case of Christians, denies the central claim of their faith. Again, it is the case that Christian and indeed Western behaviour in this regard is no different than that of Muslims. All too often Christians insist on understanding others within a framework that they create rather than one which arises out of dialogue and is mutually acceptable to both parties. Christians and Muslims are thus challenged by the need to find a shared framework within which they can understand one another and the society in which they live.47

Summary There are other ways in which Islam and Muslims are either misunderstood or negatively valued by Americans. American Muslims are often regarded as somehow responsible for the beliefs and behaviours of Muslims outside the United States, and even clearly un-Islamic governments in dominantly Muslim countries. Westerners and Christians in particular find problematic Islamic teaching about the place of religious minorities in Muslim countries, and the actual treatment of those minorities. In these cases, and those mentioned above, the Muslim community is in the difficult position of defending Islam, and themselves, while trying to explain with fairness to a largely ignorant audience Muslim behaviour which sometimes appears loathsome. In doing this they are hampered by their own lack of understanding of Christianity and contemporary Western culture, as well as the leadership of foreign imams whose limitations in terms of both language and experience make them ill equipped to address the American context on sensitive issues such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and gender roles and equality. Reforming American attitudes towards Islam involves both equipping Muslims to be more effective partners in dialogue as well as educating non-Muslims about Islam, changing the dominant discourses in the popular media, and encouraging personal interaction and dialogue. The business of making Muslims more effective dialogue partners is one which the Muslim community is already addressing through organizations like CAIR and Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), as well as many Muslim Student Associations.48 In the third part of this chapter we will consider what can and should be done by both Muslims and non-Muslims to encourage more fruitful relationships.

Changing the discourse The presentation of the sources of American images of Islam suggests three broad problems. Americans have inherited a range of stereotypical images of Muslims that arise out of a combination of ignorance and religious conflict and are perpetuated by popular literature, cinema, cartoons and music. Second, the

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American discourse about Islam has often been initiated by events that cast Muslims in a bad light and shaped by the need of politicians and the media to cast Islam as the dangerous ‘other’ against which Americans must unite and to which they need to pay constant attention. Finally Muslims themselves, through ignorance of or misunderstandings of American culture have represented themselves in ways that play into the existing negative discourse. Yet Gayatri Spivak in her essay, ‘Can the subaltern speak’ suggests a much deeper problem for American Muslims. If they are understood to be a subaltern group then all their speech will be unheard or misheard in ways that reinforce their marginality.49 Indeed no one can speak for them without reinforcing their marginality. Undoubtedly there are Muslims whose self-understanding and ambition to establish their own identity is so peripheral to the discourse of American values and political systems that they are moulding their own Islamist discourse, creating a new centre which allows them to understand American culture as marginal to the dar-al Islam being revived across the world.50 Yet it does not seem that most American Muslims feel so marginalized, perhaps because, as indicated in the surveys cited at the beginning of this chapter, they are among the economically and educationally privileged. Though confronted with marginalizing forces they continue to engage the American discourse in dialogue, and thus attempt to shape it.

The re-presentation of Islamic history, belief and law Because American images of Islam are rooted in a distorted history, an important component of the reformation of those images must come through the retelling of that history. This is not to say that balanced presentations of Islamic history do not already exist. But it is this author’s experience that few Americans read such histories, and even fewer are capable of choosing between polemical attacks on Islam, shamelessly pro-Islamic propaganda and more balanced presentations. This problem can be approached on four fronts. First, we are fortunate in Dallas that the local newspaper runs regular reviews of books on religion and an online blog. This has allowed the author to frequently review popular books on Islam and Muslim history, showing their shortcomings and recommending those that are most readable and balanced for a larger audience. Second, there are well-maintained online sites with information about Islam from Muslim groups broadly representative of American Islam. Making lists of these available to Christian and community leaders is another way of re-dressing some of the anti-Muslim polemic found in other types of media. Third, the distribution of popular articles on Islam and Muslims by both Christian and Muslim authors can help reform American attitudes. These three indirect ways of promoting a better understanding of Muslims by non-Muslims can be greatly enhanced by direct presentations to non-Muslim

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civic and religious groups. Presently in Dallas there appears to be a real curiosity about Islam and Muslims, as well as a healthy distrust of media presentations of the same. The observable result has been that numerous groups are seeking knowledgeable speakers on Islam. Precise statistics are difficult to come by, but the overall demand can be gauged. This author has received from fifty to sixty speaking invitations a year in the past three years from Christian and civic groups. Muslim leaders from CAIR and ISNA have told him that their organizations likewise receive many such requests, and local imams also receive direct invitations to speak, as do other Muslim leaders. To this need the Muslim community has responded by training speakers to present Islam to non-Muslims. Groups like the CAIR, ISNA the Institute of Interfaith Dialogue (IID), and the Zaituna Institute both prepare Muslim speakers to answer the kinds of questions that non-Muslims will ask, and to present a view of Islam that Americans can understand. Yet at this point, at least in Dallas, presentations by Muslims alone are not adequate. Fairly or unfairly, not all non-Muslim groups have confidence that a Muslim speaker will make an honest presentation of his or her religion and community. Many Christian groups are more comfortable inviting a Christian speaker on Islam than a Muslim. For this reason the author has found that forming partnerships between Christians and Muslims is a useful strategy for reforming American attitudes towards Islam. Both this author and his students have made such arrangements in speaking to Christian and civic groups. Typically the Christian speaker makes a presentation on Muslim history, basic Muslim beliefs or Islamic law – all topics on which objective presentations by a non-believer are possible. Those used by the author were developed in cooperation with local Muslim leaders. The Muslim speaker talks about Islamic spirituality, challenges faced by the Muslim community and Muslim values. Such a partnership allows a Christian and a Muslim together to model the sorts of conversation that highlights and overcomes the potential forms of misunderstanding found in American society. In some cases the author or sponsors of the lectures or lessons have issued an open invitation to members of the Muslim community to attend. This allows even more Muslim voices to be heard in the discussion. The content of these presentations is as important as the method of involving both Christians and Muslims. For this reason the author, working with Muslim partners, has developed a presentation of Muslim history that focuses not only on Muslim expansion, but also on the ethnic and cultural diversity that arose through expansion, the ways in which the Muslim community was debilitated and transformed by invasions of Mongols, Turks and later Europeans. Particular attention is given to the ways that colonialism and imperialism shaped the modern Muslim world. In this way Americans begin to realize that the Muslim community is not only diverse, but has a complex relationship with the West; a relationship that cannot be reduced to a series of conflicts over territorial, religious or economic

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domination. It is a presentation that presents the great attainments of Islamicate civilization (to use the term of Marshal Hodgson) without denying that by Western standards these attainments are inadequate to sustain a contemporary society.51 Similarly in his presentation of shari’a law the author both presents the classical divisions of Islamic law and the breadth of issues that it addresses, and compares and contrasts it with the Western legal tradition. This presentation (or presentations), worked out on the basis of courses and texts on Islamic law by Muslims and discussions with practising Dallas lawyers helps shed light on the real problems of making classical jurisprudence relevant in American society, but also offers Christian audiences a glimpse at the kind of legal reasoning being applied to that very problem.52 Finally, in presentations of Islamic belief and practices the author focuses on how methods of theological reasoning can be shared by Christians and Muslims, even if they begin with different assumptions and reach different conclusions. As with law and history, Christians and Muslims can engage in a shared discourse towards mutual understanding, if not necessarily agreement.

Challenging the media, alternatives to the media monopoly on defining Islam It has been noted above that the media play a critical role in shaping American attitudes towards Islam. For this reason reforming American attitudes must involve the media as well, both locally and nationally. The most common approach to changing media coverage in Dallas has been through letters to the editor challenging assertions about Muslims and Islam, as well as longer op-ed pieces and interviews with Muslim leaders. In Dallas CAIR has been particularly vigilant in responding to biased reporting, as have Christian organizations such as the Dallas Peace Foundation. Unfortunately a reactive strategy may have only a minimal effect. Fewer people will read a letter to the editor than read or hear the initial story. And radio and television hardly ever offer the possibility of a rapid response. The story has passed and made its impact before Muslims can respond. On the other hand the consistency of the Muslim community in responding to every report appears to have sensitized the local media to the need for seeking input and comment by Muslim leaders before running major stories on Islam or Muslims. This change has been most evident during the January 2008 coverage of the murder of two teenaged Muslim girls, apparently by their father. Within hours of the first reports of the murder a local television station had contacted the author for information on so-called ‘honour killings’ and were referred to a respected local imam. The Dallas Morning News, which already had links to Muslim leaders, judiciously waited two days after the murders to run a major article and featured a sermon on Islamic law and honour killings by a different imam, as well as interviews with three academics, including the author.

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A more proactive approach in reaching significant numbers of Americans to change American attitudes towards Islam has been a documentary titled American Ramadan (produced by Naeem Randhawa) for which the author was interviewed. This hour-long documentary has been broadcast nationally on PBS as well as having showings in local Dallas theatres and other theatres nation-wide. American Ramadan does not address all of the negative images Americans have of Muslims, but it does demonstrate the diversity of American Islam and Muslims worldwide as well as comparing Christian and Muslim beliefs and practices in a positive and objective way. In order to garner positive publicity and re-form images of Islam mosques in the Dallas area, and around the United States, have begun sponsoring Iftar celebrations for civic, religious and media leaders. In Dallas such dinners have been held by virtually every mosque for more than five years, and are sponsored as well by ISNA, CAIR, the IID and the Texas Muslim Women’s Association. Media coverage of these events is always sought, but depends on the public profile of the guests who attend. In 2007 the Dallas ISNA Iftar dinner was attended by several local congressmen, the Dallas Country sheriff and her staff, pastors from large area churches and other civic officials. It was reported in all the local television outlets. In addition to providing the occasion for personal interaction between Muslims and non-Muslims these Iftar dinners, particularly when held in the mosque, de-mystify a central aspect of the Muslim community and expose the public to concerns it shares in common with other religious people. Apart from media coverage Iftar dinners have been the occasion for educational campaigns by Muslims aimed at improving the image of Islam. The Plano mosque has annual seminars for local educational, law enforcement and political officials to discuss the needs and problems of the Muslim community. It has cooperated in these seminars with a nearby synagogue. Having Muslims and Jews present some of their particular concerns together appears to be helpful in undermining accusations against Muslims of anti-Semitism. Similar programs have been carried out in the largest Dallas area mosque, in Richardson, as well as smaller mosques in nearby suburbs. Almost all area mosques have offered courses in understanding Islam for the general public at various times of the year. This author has received positive reports on many of these from students and church members. Some have, however mis-represented Christianity and Judaism (relying on the work of Muslim polemicists as described above) or offered more of an aggressive apologetic for Islam than a factual presentation of Muslim beliefs, practices and values. That said, and despite reaching a relatively small number of people compared to the population of Dallas, the opening of the mosques to the general public, and continued public invitations to visit the mosques and meet their members, has helped reform attitudes towards Islam and has helped Christians see Muslims as part of a religious organization not greatly different from a local church in its problems, concerns and relationship to the community.

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The imperative for dialogue, not necessarily inter-religious The core value of the presentations of Islam and Muslim society by the author and others, efforts to put Muslim perspectives into media reports on events in the Muslim community and Muslim invitations of non-Muslims to religious celebrations and other public events is the fostering of dialogue between Muslims and non-Muslims. The Pew Foundation survey mentioned at the introduction of this chapter suggests that personal acquaintance with Muslims is an important indicator of a positive attitude towards Muslims and Islam. Through personal encounters with Muslims, non-Muslims see the human face of Islam and begin to understand Muslims as fellow citizens with shared concerns and values. Formally organized dialogue, such as has been arranged in Dallas through the Texas Conference of Churches and local Christian leaders, Thanksgiving Square of Dallas, the Institute of Interfaith Dialogue and sometimes by local congregations, certainly has a role to play in encouraging such encounters. But in this author’s experience formal dialogue is of minimal use in bringing Christians and Muslims together. In the past three years most of the ‘dialogue’ sessions organized by the groups mentioned above feature lectures and panel discussions in front of audiences ranging from 20 to 200 people. Such interaction as takes place generally involves only the speakers, and Christians and Muslims in the audience seldom have a chance to meet one another. Moreover these city-wide dialogue sessions are often attended by the same people with a strong interest in interfaith relations, rarely reaching out to a larger public unlikely to drive a long distance for such an event. By contrast Iftar dinners organized by local mosques frequently bring together several hundred Christians and Muslims living near the mosque in informal table talk with little formal program or discussion. Similarly Saturday luncheons held by the IID are the occasion for a range of Christians and Muslims to make informal acquaintance. The author’s students, who in 2007 engaged in formal dialogue meetings with Muslims as well as informal social gatherings, found the latter as important as the former in coming to an appreciation of their Muslim neighbours. And those relationships have continued long past the formal dialogue sessions, just as other relationships between Christians and Muslims were initiated not through formal dialogue sessions, but through meetings of the PTA and the organization of soccer leagues. Nor is this surprising. As Jane Smith and Yvonne Haddad discuss in their book on Christian-Muslim dialogue in America, inter-religious dialogue presupposes that religious people have something to learn from one another about religion.53 To the extent that learning something about religion means simply learning about a different religion, then lectures and panel discussions and even sharing in dialogue groups is useful. It is more problematic when inter-religious dialogue presupposes learning something from a different religion that will impact one’s own religious life. Such learning presupposes a theology of religious pluralism which is well developed in some Christian traditions, but not in

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others, and is even less evident among Muslims the author has met in Dallas. Inter-religious dialogue may initiate the kinds of face to face encounters that the Pew survey suggests broadens American appreciation for Muslims, but it is less likely in its religious aspect to foster ongoing relationships. Yet beyond religion all humans have things they can learn from people with different lifeexperiences, not least those which are religiously and culturally different. The author’s wife is a regular part of a group of Christian and Muslim women who gather to socialize and play games. They share with each other about the problems of child-rearing, managing work and family, seeking further education, and fostering a spiritual life in the midst of a materialistic world. They never discuss theology, law or religious ritual. They are good friends, and that appears to be sufficient. And friendship is consequential. Immediately after 11th September 2001 there were reports in the Dallas area that Muslims were being verbally attacked and sometimes abused. In Richardson, the home of the largest mosque and Muslim community in the area, a number of Christian women made it a point to escort Muslim women and their children to the school and supermarket. Muslim women have expressed appreciation for this to the author many times. When he asked one of the Christian women about her motives she was clear, ‘I didn’t know anything about Islam. I just knew our children went to school together.’ It may be that finally reforming American attitudes towards Islam will depend less on inter-religious dialogue than sharing the common concerns of civil society and love of neighbour. Yet beyond friendship, encounters between Christians and Muslims, particularly over shared social concerns, raise the possibility of changing the dominant American discourse through dialogue so that Muslims and their distinctive concerns, attitudes and values become part of rather than problematic to American society. Right now one of those shared social concerns is precisely the American attitude towards Islam. But it is by no means the only one. Muslims, like other Americans, are concerned with the quality of public schools, problems of drug and alcohol addiction among teenagers, child abuse, homelessness, economic development, immigration and indeed the whole gamut of issues that affect equally all members of a community. It is easy given the intensity of post 9/11 problems with American attitudes towards Islam and Muslims to forget that the Muslim community has been and continues to be engaged with these other issues. Dallas area mosques have been engaged in local elections over legalizing the sale of alcohol, providing health care for the poor, addressing homelessness and negotiating ways of allowing prayer for Muslims and others in public schools. More broadly Muslims have distinctive, usually conservative, views on abortion and civil unions between homosexuals. It is unclear how these views will affect political affiliation, but at least locally the willingness of city council persons and state representatives to attend Iftar celebrations suggests that the Muslim vote is not regarded as inconsequential. At a national level the organization American

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Muslim Alliance and the related American Muslim Taskforce seek to bring Muslims directly into the American political process. Ultimately the goal of dialogue must be to find a shared discourse within which both Muslims and non-Muslims can describe themselves and their aspirations for participation in American society. Only in part does this mean abandoning hegemonic claims. It also involves finding a shared history, patterns of theological and social reasoning and contemporary concerns. In the authors view this task is not trivial, but is being accomplished through the initiatives already discussed.

Conclusion The problem of negative American attitudes towards Islam, documented in recent surveys of public opinion, is consequential for both the health of local communities and the nation as a whole. Negative attitudes and images run deep in American and Christian history, but need not be perpetuated and can be corrected. Education plays a critical role in both undoing false images and introducing Americans to an understanding of Islam that is nuanced and realistic. Campaigns to correct negative images in the media and proactively help journalists more realistically frame reporting on events in the Muslim world can also play a role in reforming American attitudes. Ultimately, however, both experience and research suggest that face to face encounters between Christians and Muslims in the course of working together on the common project of building a community offer the best opportunity for reform. By encouraging their members to participate in those encounters increasingly organized by local mosques, and by initiating such activities themselves, Christian churches and other non-Muslim organizations have a key role to play in reforming American attitudes towards Islam. Ultimately civil society, and a nation with a realistic and positive foreign policy, will depend on human interaction replacing polemic and propaganda as the way of interfaith encounter. Christians and Muslims must find a shared discourse within which they can understand each other and their role in the unfolding American narrative.

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Pew Research Center for ‘The People and The Press’, Press Release, 25 September 2007. CAIR, ‘American Muslim voters: A demographic profile and survey of attitudes’, 24 October 2007. In ‘The cost of containing Iran’ (Foreign Affairs, January/February 2008) Vali Nasr and Ray Takeyh explore how misconceptions about Islam have a negative effect on US Foreign policy in relation to Iran.

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Gallup World Poll on Global Migration Patterns and Job Creation, Press Release, 11 October 2007. CAIR, ‘American Muslim Voters: A demographic profile and survey of attitudes, 24 October 2007. United States Institute of Peace, Special Report 159, February 2006, by Qamar-ul Huda. D. J. Sahas, John of Damascus on Islam: The ‘Heresy of the Ishmaelites’ (Leiden: Brill, 1972). See also J.-M. Gaudeul Encounters & Clashes: Islam and Christianity in History (Rome, Pontificio Istituto di studi arabi e islamici, 1990); K. Samir and J. S. Nielsen, Christian Arabic Apologetics During the Abbasid Period, 750–1258 (Leiden and New York: E.J. Brill, 1994); Y. Y. Haddad and W.i.Z. a. ‘Hadd’ad, et al., Christian-Muslim Encounters (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1995). R. W. Southern, Western Views of Islam in the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962); E. W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1979); P. Gottschalk and G. Greenberg, Islamophobia: Making Muslims the Enemy (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007). Y. o. Bat, M. Kochan, et al., Islam and Dhimmitude: Where Civilizations Collide (Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2002); A. G. Bostom, The Legacy of Jihad: Islamic Holy War and the Fate of non-Muslims (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2005). Catholic News Service, 8/16/04 at http://www.cathnews.com/news/408/96. php. Barak Obama has been forced to publicly refute emails circulating with claims that he is a Muslim http://www.newsday.com/news/nationworld/nyusdems245549568jan24,0,7472362.story. In January 2008 a group of Christian religious leaders from across the theological spectrum became so concerned about these attacks against political candidates on the basis of religion that they issued a joint statement asking candidates to refrain from divisive religious talk. See http://www.christiantoday.com/article/us.presidential.candidates.asked.to. reject.divisive.religious.talk/16255.htm. Said, 1979. T. Carlyle, Heroes And Hero Worship (Washington, DC: Ross and Perry, Inc., 2002). R. A. Hunt, William Shellabear: A Biography (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: University of Malaya Press, 1996). John Jermain Bodine, ‘Magic Carpet to Islam, Duncan Black MacDonald and the Arabian Nights’, Muslim World, 67:1 (Jan 1977), 1–11. Hunt, 1996. Gottschalk and Greenberg, pp. 20–1. S. H. Moffett, A History of Christianity in Asia (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1992). Kenneth Cragg has written voluminously on Muh.ammad in order to bridge this gap, but this author has seen little evidence that Cragg’s work has made an impact on the public consciousness, or even the Christian community for which Cragg writes. Gottschalk and Greenberg, 2007. Bostom, 2005; R. Spencer, Religion of Peace? Why Christianity is and Islam isn’t (Washington, DC, Regnery Pub., 2007).

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http://www.editorsweblog.org/print_newspapers/2005/11/study_reveals_western_ media_coverage_con.php. M. Küntzel, Jihad and Jew-Hatred: Islamism, Nazism and the Roots of 9/11 (New York: Telos Press Pub., 2007). S. Bar, Warrant for Terror: Fatwas of Radical Islam and the Duty of Jihad (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006). M. Viorst, Storm from the East: The Struggle Between the Arab World and the Christian West (New York: Modern Library, 2006). Spencer, 2007. The author has been accused of this on several occasions, with one letter citing the recent work of Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Infidel in support of his claim that those who say Islam doesn’t encourage abuse of women are trying to be politically correct. S. P. Huntington, The Clash Of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996). M. Pearse, Why the Rest Hates the West: Understanding the Roots of Global Rage (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2004); D. D’Souza, The Enemy at Home: The Cultural Left and its Responsibility for 9/11 (New York: Doubleday, 2007). M. Chandra, Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia (Petaling Jaya: Fajar Bakti, 1987). P. Galbraith, and United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Saddam’s Documents: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate (Washington, US G.P.O., 1992). https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html. Küntzel, 2007. This complete 2007 book list title Islamic Studies from the Prometheus website gives an idea of what they publish. The Myth of Islamic Tolerance, Al Qaeda in Europe, An Illusion of Harmony, Averroes and the Enlightenment, Crossroads to Islam, Defending the West, In Search of the Original Koran, Islamic Mysticism, Jihad in the West, Jihad Incorporated, Leaving Islam, Osama’s Revenge, Qur’a¯nic Studies, Radical Eye for the Infidel Guy, Rage against the Veil, Shame, Sword of Islam, The Al Qaeda Connection, The Day of Islam, The Kemalists, The Legacy of Islamic Antisemitism, The Legacy of Jihad, The Losing Battle with Islam, The Origins of the Koran, The Quest for the Historical Muh.ammad, The Sectarian Milieu, Understanding the Hadith, What the Koran Really Says, Why I Am Not A Muslim, Women and the Koran. It must be noted that the Prometheus Press also has little use for Orthodox Christianity. P. Jenkins, God’s Continent: Christianity, Islam, and Europe’s Religious Crisis (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). http://www.gcts.edu/ockenga/globalchristianity/resources.php. Richard Cimino, ‘New Boundaries, Evangelicals and Islam after 9/11,’ at http:// www.religionwatch.com/doc/2005-Cimino-Evangelicals-Islam.pdf documents the various forms this discourse takes in the evangelical community. http://www.nationalgeographic.com/geosurvey/highlights.html. K. Abou El Fadl, The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists (New York: HarperSanFrancisco, 2005); A. S. F. B. Ahmed, After Terror: Promoting Dialogue Among Civilizations (Cambridge; Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2005); M. Ayoub and I. A. Omar, A Muslim View of Christianity: Essays on Dialogue (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2007). Dallas Morning News, 28th October 2007.

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M. Bucaille, The Bible, the Qur’a¯n and Science: The Holy Scriptures Examined in the Light of Modern Knowledge (Elmhurst, NY: Tahrike Tarsile Qur’a¯n, 2003); A. Deedat, Islam and Christianity (Islamabad: Al-Balagh, 2004). The Fountain is published by The Light, Inc in New Jersey, a corporation closely related to the followers of Fetullah Gülen and his intellectual predecessor Said Nursi. Nursi, who is frequently quoted in The Fountain, was among those Muslims arguing the compatibility of Islam and modern science. The following websites are illustrative of these arguments, as tailored for American audiences: The Scientific Miracle of the Holy Qur’a¯n - http://www.scienceinquran. com/; The Miracle of Qur’a¯nic Eloquence and Style - http://www.islaam.com/ Article.aspx?id=421>; Al Qur’a¯n, The Miracle of Miracles http://www.jannah.org/ articles/qurdeed.html. F. Rahman, Islam & Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982); I. Mattson, The Story of the Qur’a¯n: Its History and Place in Muslim Life (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2008). A. Wadud, Qur’a¯n and Woman: Rereading the Sacred Text from a Woman’s Perspective (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). S. A. A. Maudoodi, Human Rights in Islam (Lahore, Islamic Publications, 1977). J. I. Smith, Muslims, Christians, and the Challenge of Interfaith Dialogue (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). United States Institute of Peace, Special Report 159, February 2006, by Qamar-ul Huda documents several examples. C. Nelson and L. Grossberg Marxism and the Interpretation Of Culture (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988), pp. 271–316. See David Thurfjell, ‘Islam’s alternative arena’, The Bulletin of the Council for the Study of Religion 36:4 (2007), 91, 92. M. G. S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974). Most audiences that the author addresses assume that contemporary Islamic jurisprudence is dominated by Wahhabis, Shi’ite militants, or groups inspired by Sayyid Qutb or Osama bin Laden. Without denying the political importance of such groups and their legal rulings (and the author sometimes recommends reading Schmul Bar’s Warrant for Terror) it is useful to make people aware of the work of Tarik Ramadan, Fazlur Rahman, Abou El Fadl, and others. Smith, 2007.

Chapter 15

An Open Letter for Open Religions1 Jacques Waardenburg

Since their beginnings, Christianity and Islam have been considered and treated as distinct and in many respects opposed to each other. Adherents distinguished themselves religiously, socially and politically from each other. Mystical and gnosis-oriented thinkers sought experiences that transcended worldly borders, but the social context in which they lived was often grim and stressed differences between Muslims and Christians. Improving relationships between Muslims and Christians would not be an easy task. Attitudes started to change in principle when better knowledge about the two religions became available. If religious leaders had stressed differences between the two belief systems, scholars found historical influences, made comparisons and established common elements on a literary, historical and social level. They acquired knowledge of Islam as a religion as well as knowledge of Muslim history and Muslim societies. This made for a distinction between studying Islam as a religion and believing in it.

Scholarship of religions This distinction has accompanied the scholarly study of religions from the outset. On one hand there are believers who accept a particular religion as truth. They should live accordingly and may or may not be interested in knowing that religion better. On the other hand there are scholars who study one or more religions because they are interested in obtaining a knowledge that is generally valid. In as far as they carry out scientific critical research, they do not ‘believe’ in what they study, or at least they suspend such a belief during their research work. Scholarly research looks for empirical knowledge of religious behaviour, representations, beliefs and the like. without taking necessarily their ‘religious’ character into account. The scholarly study of religions made clear that religions have been interpreted by their adherents in various ways. This could lead to misunderstandings, conflicts and even splits between them. It took some time, for example, to accept that Catholics and Protestants have two different kinds of interpretation

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of the same religion. Scholarly knowledge can seriously influence our view of inter-religious relations. Such research can be of a more systematic or a more empirical nature. In the case of systematic thinking, the search is often for the fundamental basis of all religions, often called ‘natural religion’. The various historical religions would have developed out of it according to natural conditions, cultures, and of course human experiences and needs. The concept of ‘faith’ has been proposed to indicate the root of religious commitments. In such systematic thinking the search is for a deeper or higher reality that underlies religious beliefs and practices. In the case of empirical research of religions, the concept of religion as such can be deconstructed. Religious data can be studied as human creations that fulfil a religious function but do not always do so. A religion can be studied as a human construction of absolute reality without being itself necessarily such a reality; it only fulfils a ‘religious’ function. The forms which a religion has taken in different times and places are then seen as human constructions according to particular needs of human situations and particular orientations of the mind. At the core of the study of religions is the interpretation of religious data: That is to say, the hermeneutics of the believers and of the scholars studying them. It is clear that the results of the scholarly study of religions – their texts, history, social reality, meanings, and so on – can be highly relevant for the relations between the faithful. Most important for such relations, however, will remain the initiatives the adherents take to improve them. During the last half century a number of ‘dialogue meetings’ have taken place to this effect, with participants of various faiths. A recent initiative on the part of Muslims is an ‘Open Letter’, written to Christian leaders with a view to improving relations between Muslims and Christians.2

Scholarship of Islam Knowing the relevant facts is the basis of Islamic Studies, as it is of scholarly knowledge in general. Usually this is followed by rational reflection about them. Such thinking gives research its characteristic scholarly weight, provided the conclusions are of general validity. In Islamic Studies and scholarship in general I would like to distinguish three types of rational thinking. 1. We can develop a hypothesis and possibly a theory to arrive at a general scholarly explanation of given facts. Such a hypothesis should have a minimum of presuppositions to be acceptable on a scholarly level. Claims of general validity, as necessary in scholarly knowledge, should be proved by available evidence.

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2. We can develop a particular view of the connection between particular facts, apart from causal relations. Such a view can be based on philosophical assumptions or scholarly premises the general validity of which cannot strictly be proved. Their truth claim rests on a particular philosophical or theological system or, more broadly, a specific worldview or ideology. 3. We can accept particular discoveries which are not contrary to reason but imply a slight change of current epistemology. They do not lead to wrong conclusions but the truth of them cannot be incontrovertibly proved by reason. It may be proved, however, through future research. Contrary to these three types of scholarly rational research are unscholarly statements.3 So it is for the study of Islamic data as facts is concerned. But many of these data are texts, that is to say not only ‘facts’. The core of Islamic studies is studying the ways in which religious texts such as the Qur’a¯n have been interpreted by Muslims. We have to understand hermeneutics: that of the believers when they study and interpret, for instance, the Qur’a¯n and record their interpretations in their tafsîrs; and that of the present-day scholars who study these tafsîrs, that is, the interpretations Muslims have given of the Qur’a¯n. I submit that a scholar’s hermeneutics – the way he or she interprets the meaning of a given text beyond the literal meanings of the words – is perhaps his or her most important professional proficiency. It is certainly true for the scholarly study of Islamic texts. To understand a scholar’s writings, we should be able to reconstitute his or her hermeneutics, that is, the way in which he or she reads texts, especially religious texts. It may be called the secret of the craft, the professional secret of an Islamic scholar. When we are concerned with the meaning of a religious text in Islam or elsewhere, we should try to grasp the particular hermeneutics of the scholar studying it. The art of understanding each other’s hermeneutics is indispensable for any fruitful scholarly discussion of meanings. To become an independent scholar of religious texts and spiritualities, one has to acquire one’s own hermeneutical capacity and be able to present it accompanied by arguments. Existing scholarly concepts, interpretations and evaluations of Islam mostly go back to one of the three types of rational thinking mentioned, or they are based on a hermeneutical procedure. I am not talking about concepts of Islam that serve political or other purposes that claim to be scholarly but have little to do with scholarship. I do not speak either about the many ways in which Muslims use the term ‘Islam’ in daily life. They have no scholarly character either, but they do not claim to have it. Since the Second World War a considerable number of meetings between Muslim and other scholars of Islam have taken place. These meetings have contributed to a better factual knowledge of Islamic data. In fact, however, their most important contribution has been to lead participants – beyond scholarly

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knowledge – to a kind of ‘understanding’, that is to say an understanding of each other as ‘believers’.

An open letter In September 2006 Benedict XVI gave a lecture in Regensburg, Germany, in which he referred to the warlike character of Islam in relation to Christianity, for instance during the Ottoman conquests of the Byzantine empire in the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries. This statement led thirty-eight Muslim leaders to write a letter of protest to him, dated 13 October 2006. They hinted at the need for an agreement between Muslims and Christians, based on love for God and love for one’s neighbour. Exactly a year later, on 13 October 2007, no less than 138 Muslim leaders wrote an official open letter to the leaders of a number of Christian Churches in the Near East, Europe and North America, and the world at large. It is a sequence to the previous letter, looking for the basis of a new kind of relations between Muslims and Christians. This document may well make history.4 The title of this letter is ‘A Common Word between Us and You’, a quotation from the Qur’a¯n (S. 3:64). Historically, ‘us’ in that text stands for Muh.ammad with his community and ‘you’ for a delegation of Christians, apparently from Nejran in Yemen, who were visiting the Muslims in Medina in AH 10 (CE 632–3) to avoid a conflict. The ‘common word’ between both parties seals a conditional recognition by Muh.ammad of the Christian community in Nejran, after the so-called mubâhala (ordeal) which Muh.ammad would have proposed to the Christian deputation from Nejran and which the latter would have rejected. This letter was sent by Prince Ghazi bin Muh.ammad bin Talal, at the Royal Âl al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought, Amman, Jordan. It arose in the circle around Prince Hasan of Jordan, the younger brother of the late King Husain. Hasan is known for his interest in the study of religions, and for his support of dialogue efforts especially among adherents of the major monotheistic religions. He had responsibilities in the Royal Institute of the Study of Religion in Amman and was involved in study sessions between Muslims and – especially Orthodox – Christians which were organized in Amman, Chambésy and Istanbul in the later 1980s and early 1990s. The ‘common word’ to which the letter of 2007 refers is love of God and love of one’s neighbour. In their letter the Muslim signatories appeal to the Christian Church leaders to come to a common word ‘between us and you’. It states explicitly that Christianity, Judaism and Islam have love of God and of one’s neighbour as the heart of their faith. It is doubtful whether this has ever been said publicly before in the Muslim world. This letter seeks to re-establish relations between Christians and Muslims in the spirit of the mubâhala treaty between Muh.ammad and the Christians from

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Nejran. It does this by quoting texts in this sense from the Qur’a¯n and the Bible – as Scriptures – that can be paralleled. The purpose is to highlight common foundations of the two faiths. Qur’a¯n texts that contradict Christianity, consequently, are not treated. Great importance is accorded to the text of S. 5:48, recited shortly before Muh.ammad’s death: Religious diversities are destined by God; to vie with one another in good works is a method of dialogue; God in fact wants the differences between human beings. The letter sets as a condition for the normalization of relations between Muslims and Christians, on the Muslims’ part, that Christians do not declare war on Muslims. Since Muslims perceive the West as a Christian power and since the West in their view has been and still is aggressive towards Islam and the Muslim world, present-day Western aggression towards Muslims – as Muslims see it – is not only a political and ideological problem. Muslims see it especially as a most serious religious problem that concerns Christians and Muslims today. The letter affirms that it seeks to open relations between Muslims and Christians and to end a dualism that exists between the two communities and that would go back historically to the Crusades or even earlier.

Some personal reflections The letter makes unique reading. Its authors are searching for common ‘fundaments’ for peace and justice between the Muslim and Christian religious communities. Their quest does not address practical aims and purposes or the factual well-being of these communities. It does not deal with theological doctrine (except faith in God, love of God)5 or with moral prescriptions (except love of one’s neighbour). In their search for common fundaments they opt for two religious principles prescribed in both religions’ Scriptures: the human being’s love first to God and second to one’s neighbour. When I read this, I spelled out this common ‘fundament’ of Muslims and Christians who share life in this way, as a kind of living together of human beings in the sense of Jesus’ preaching. It represents little less than a kind of pure Christianity. Yet, while reading this with great sympathy, I could not suppress certain questions. What can we do in this ‘spiritual’ approach with the awful burdens with which human beings on earth increasingly have to wrestle? All problems are elevated – or reduced – here to the faith and resulting attitudes of persons. No attention is paid to human collectivities and social institutions, to material problems and problems of power, to the irritations which arise between human beings by the sheer fact of differences between them. What kind of solution does this give to the problems of the real human world with which the authors of the letter declare themselves primarily to be concerned? Does this kind of ‘spiritual fundamentalism’ not lead to a new kind of religion, that is to say a kind of spiritual faith for chosen or elected Muslims and Christians?

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And yet, in fact, I recognized in this spiritual ‘fundament’ something essentially Christian. This holds true in particular for what the authors of the letter consider the ‘common ground’ between the two religions: the unity of God, the necessity of love for Him, and the necessity of love for one’s neighbour. Paradoxically, this Muslim letter encourages Christians to become better Christians. Referring to S. 3:64 of the Qur’a¯n, Muslims call on Christians to respect the unity of God and ascribe no partner unto Him; to be totally devoted to God and to worship none but Him; and not to obey someone else in disobedience to God’s commandment, thus taking others as ‘lords’ beside God. They also appeal to Christians to practice justice and freedom of religion as part of the rule of love of one’s neighbour. One problem is that it is extremely difficult to practice such justice and such freedom of religion, both for Muslims and Christians. Another problem is that the second commandment, love of one’s neighbour, is humanly near to impossible both for Christians and Muslims. In their absolute forms both commandments are impossible to implement. There will always remain a lack of justice, an infringement on freedom of religion, a shortcoming in love of one’s neighbour. At the end of the ‘Summary’ of the Letter, the Muslim authors invite Christians – not to become Muslims but – to come together with them. This should happen on the basis of what is common to both and to what is most essential to their faith and practice, that is to say the two commandments of love. This is an invitation and a call to the Christians. Again, I could not refrain from thinking: Is such a coming together not in fact only a spiritual being-together? Is such a fundament not outside the world of real life? Is it not basically mystical and inaccessible to ordinary people? Consequently, if in actual fact most human beings remain excluded from such a spiritual being-together, how can this call then change the sad human conditions under which most people have to live? It seems to me that in ordinary Muslim life such an orientation cannot be realized, as it cannot be done in ordinary Christian life either. At most it can be performed by exceptional people. For ordinary human beings Islam is then a religion beyond human reach, as is Christianity. It is in the nature of both religions and we should recognize this.

Contents of the letter6 The letter consists of three parts: (1) Love of God; (2) Love of the Neighbour; (3) Come to a Common Word Between Us and You. I may here briefly summarize the messages contained in these parts, quoting the words of the letter itself.

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Love of God In Islam The central Qur’a¯nic text here is: ‘There is no god but God’ (S. 47:19), often repeated in Islamic ritual.7 The Qur’a¯n stresses the modes of love of God but also mentions love from God to people. It stresses God’s sovereignty and power, and in reverse human gratitude to Him, praise of Him, and prayers to Him for grace and guidance. God orders people to fear him as much as possible, to listen and thus to understand truth, to obey and thus to will the good, to be generous and thus to exercise love and virtue. In the end, people should be saved from the pettiness of their own souls. ‘Love of God in Islam is thus part of complete and total devotion to God; it is not a mere fleeting, partial emotion.’8 Muslims must be totally devoted to God and realize this love with everything they are.

In the Bible The authors mention various forms and versions of the First and Greatest Commandment at various places in the Bible, ‘. . . the command to love God fully with one’s heart and soul and to be fully devoted to Him’.9 Both the Islamic and the Christian formula arise in different versions and contexts, emphasizing the primacy of total love and devotion to God.

Love of neighbour In Islam There are many injunctions in Islam about the importance of love for and mercy towards the neighbour, as part of faith in God and love of God. Empathy, sympathy and formal prayers must be accompanied by generosity and self-sacrifice (S. 2:177), and one should be generous of giving what one loves (S. 3:177).

In the Bible Lev. 19.17–18 says explicitly, ‘. . .You shall love your neighbour as yourself. . .’ The Second Commandment, like the First, demands generosity and self-sacrifice.

Come to a Common Word Between Us and You ‘A Common Word’ The two greatest Commandments constitute an area of common ground for the Christian and the Muslim community, and they constitute a link between the three Scriptures, especially the statement that there is only one God.

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‘Come to a Common Word’ Muslims urgently call on People of the Scripture, ‘. . . that none of us shall take others for lords. . .’ (obeying them and prostrating to them). ‘There should be no compulsion in religion. . .’ (to prostrate before kings and the like, S. 2:256). Giving justice and freedom of religion follows from the love of the neighbour (S. 60:8). The letter invites Christians to remember Mk 12.29–31. ‘As Muslims we say to Christians that we are not against them and that Islam is not against them so long as they do not wage war against Muslims on account of their religion, oppress them and drive them out of their homes’ (see S. 60:8). Even in the Christian community there are various understandings of the figure of Jesus and various kinds of recognition of Jesus. The Muslim community recognizes Jesus as Islam understands prophethood. Referring to Mk 9.40 and Lk. 9.50, the signatories of the Letter invite Christians to consider Muslims not against and thus with them. This call continues: ‘Finally, as Muslims, and in obedience to the Holy Qur’an, we ask Christians to come together with us on the common essentials of our two religions. . . Let this common ground be the basis of all future interfaith dialogue between us, for our common ground is that on which hangs all the Law and the Prophets’ (Mt. 22.40).

‘Between Us and You’ This part is the end of the letter. The concern of the Muslim authors and signatories has been to find common ground between Muslims and Christians. In their view, the relationship between these two religious communities may be the most important factor in contributing to meaningful peace around the world. Conflict and destruction should not exist between them. ‘So let our differences not cause hatred and strife between us. Let us vie with each other in righteousness and good works. Let us respect each other, be fair, just and kind to another and live in sincere peace, harmony and mutual goodwill.’ In the end, it is God who has established the differences. ‘So vie with another in good works’ (S. Al-Ma’idah 5:48).

Scholarly inquiry into the Letter: A blueprint Further inquiry does not only imply research into the facts of the letter, such as the precise content of the text, or historical data about the letter or the social and political context in which it was written. This would be scholarly research in the strict sense, adopting a philological, historical, social scientific or political science

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approach. Nor is it to be made only on the basis of a particular hypothesis or theory, or a certain philosophy or theology about Islam or about religion in general. The data are then considered on the basis of a particular scholar’s vision or put together according to a particular theoretical scheme. But a letter like this one is to be studied for what it wants to be and is; a direct call or invitation addressed by Muslim people to Christian people. The Christians are called here to act. Scholarly inquiry should thus be chiefly concerned with seizing the designs or intentions of this letter written by particular Muslim leaders to specific Christian leaders. Next, it should be concerned with the answers the latter give to it, the designs and intentions of these answers and their practical implications. How do the intentions of the senders relate to those replying? Third, it should trace reactions in broader Muslim and Christian circles to this letter and the precise responses given to the invitation. Fourth, it should explore adhesions given later by further Muslim signatories and also possible refutations given by other Muslims. All of this will throw some more light on the relations existing between particular Muslims and Christians known by name – most of whom do not know each other personally – at the turn of 2007/8. The facts are simple: A letter sent on 13 October 2007, after the one sent a year earlier, on 13 October 2006. But the relevance of the letter is formidable, since it has to do with the notion of God, and the love of the human being for this God and to his or her fellow-human beings. Not only now but also later all of this should be the subject of serious study. There are some further interesting points for research. First, the authors and signatories of the letter are not political authorities. What does it mean that the Muslim authors have sent their letter to the leaders of the Christian Churches? Do they know the structures of the various Churches? Are they aware of the problem of authority in the Church (and of political authority in the state)? Is it only because these leaders know existing attitudes in their Churches, or also because they can be held co-responsible for the current situation? To what extent are they held to be able to change Christian-Muslim relations? Second, in the course of time there have been many Muslim reactions to Christianity and to ‘the Church’ in general, mostly criticizing or rejecting them, sometimes with violence. This time Muslim reactions are addressed to specific Christian leaders with responsibilities in their particular Churches. What kind of authority is attributed to them and what kind of cooperation with them is hoped for? Third the authors of the letter identify themselves as believing Muslims who ask to be recognized as such also by Christians. They offer their services for cooperation and dialogue with Christians. Christians are encouraged to become better Christians. What kind of recognition do they hope for and what would be the consequences? Fourth, by implication the authors want to know the reasons why they have been excluded in practice to a large extent from practical cooperation and

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dialogue, whereas Christians admit such cooperation and dialogue on a theoretical level. Fifth, is it fair to see this letter as a fundamental invitation and call to brotherhood among people whose faith implies and requires love of God and their neighbour? Sixth, in what ways has this letter a particular relevance in the present-day context in which Muslims and Christians have to live, with its tensions and conflicts, including the global political and economic situation, injustice and human suffering, and the present-day state of interfaith dialogue? Seventh, some Christian and Western leaders have publicly responded to the Open Letter, welcoming it as a significant breakthrough. Can this Letter be seen indeed as a breakthrough not only for Muslim-Christian relations but also for the broader relations between the Western and the Muslim worlds? Finally, what can the authors and signatories themselves do to improve conditions for better relations between Muslims and Christians in the Muslim world itself?

Some general considerations The situation When it concerns human life situations, I personally happen to be – unintentionally – a bit cautious of general declarations by religious leaders, groups and institutions. Mostly such declarations proclaim religious views to which people are called to subscribe, but they rarely bring about significant changes in society and the world. Yet they may lead to discrete changes in the religious conscience of people. Except for certain militant forms and for guarding particular values, religions do not have much visible impact on societies nowadays. Relations between Christians and Muslims have suffered a great deal from the dualist scheme held on both sides of a monolithic imperial Islam squarely opposed to a monolithic imperial Christendom. Although this scheme has been broken down by personal encounters and on the level of research and thought by a certain elite, dualist views and practices concerning Islam and the West (including Christianity) are still rampant on the part of ordinary people, not only Muslims and Christians, but also secularists. Muslims need to overcome hatred of an aggressive West and Christianity. Christians need to overcome fears of other ways of life than standard Western ones. Secularists need to overcome their instinctive distrust of religion. And all three need to overcome any open or hidden desire to dominate. The letter of October 2007 corresponds with the needs of a time in which people in many ways start having a certain ‘global’ awareness. Its spread suggests a mental climate open not only to feelings of anxieties and clashes but also

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to longings for encounter and reconciliation. Such a climate is furthered by the worldwide spread of information, and also by social and political bodies in other parts of the world. The letter represents a positive new vision, on the part of Muslims, of worldwide Muslim-Christian relations on the Muslim side. That demands a major effort from people used to living under traditional rules and clinging to deeply rooted habits and ideas. It also clashes with the vested social and material interests of people – including religious leaders – keen to defend a privileged status quo. The authors present themselves as actors rather than victims in the grip of forces of which they do not know the nature, for whom Islam and Christianity have primarily a traditional religious meaning and who tend to accuse Christians and Westerners generally of having mistreated them. They present Muslims and Christians as human persons who are in relation with each other. They do not perceive interfaith relations as a kind of ‘mythological’ affair in which participants are more or less the dupe of their own and each other’s illusions. The letter reflects the human need for communication, trust in people of Christian faith and readiness for common action with them.

Communication People living in a world of worries of survival and pressures from outside are in need of communication not only with insiders but also with outsiders to their daily world, with other experiences and ideas. Present-day communications between Christians and Muslims are part of a longer process of Christians’ more or less sudden discovery of Muslims as ‘others’; friends, enemies or otherwise. A very elementary knowledge of these other people followed, including contacts with them in battle but also in commercial exchanges. Association, social intercourse, curiosity and political interests would further this knowledge which was supplemented through the results of scholarly research by what were called ‘Oriental Studies’ in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Besides the colonial trial of the Muslim side more constructive encounters, too, took place, with creative cultural efforts made on both sides. An important element in the relations between Muslims and Christians has been the role of the religions. This calls for impartial investigation. On both sides I would like to distinguish two major shapes of religion. At one extreme has been what I would call an orientation, in which religious institutions are linked to power. In the end religion dominates all exchanges and functions as an instrument of the exercise of power. At the other extreme is the venture of individual and social search, discovery and construction of life. Religion here can be a force in a personal or social life project. Between these two extremes have been the ordinary religious communities, each adhering to a lifestyle

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rooted in common traditions, practices and beliefs giving them a religious identity and legitimacy. In the first case, Muslim-Christian relations fell very much under the authority and control of religious authorities. In the second case, they were the result of experiences and encounters of particular persons and groups. In the third case they represented relations between more or less established communities. In certain contexts, experiences brought Christians and Muslims to each other, in other cases they created distance between them. On the basis of such experiences certain rules of behaviour were developed, as part of the life of Muslim and Christian traditional societies in relation with what were perceived as ‘outsiders’. One should keep in mind that it is only in recent times and in new contexts that new forms of interaction between Muslims and Christians have developed, especially among younger people, in certain professions and in new situations of encounter. Relationships between Muslims and Christians are inextricably linked to the social life of the societies in which they live – both Muslim and Western – with the role of religion in these societies, various kinds of exchanges, and the need for communication. Still nowadays, the life of people outside one’s own religious community is hardly known, not only in the Muslim but also in the Western world.

Cooperation For several decades Christians have taken the lead in Christian-Muslim dialogues, as they had been active in missionary work earlier. The letter represents an important initiative on the part of Muslims. As I see it, the first thing to be done now by Christians is to leave or give the Muslims room to act. Christians should follow what is happening among Muslims worldwide but they – and the West at large – should be wise enough not to force their own readings of Islam on Muslims. Several crises already have been the result of Western efforts to regulate Islam. Furthermore, in efforts of cooperation I would like to distinguish a level of reflection and a level of action. On the level of reflection, the track of the letter can be further pursued with questions like the following: First, are there – besides the fundamentals of faith – also clear ‘fundamentals’ of life experience that particular Christian and Muslim groups have in common? Can they work together on this basis? Second, where do obvious possibilities exist for thinking in common? How can people obtain skilfulness in it and should there be a leadership? Third, how can mutual consultation be organized for a fruitful discussion of specific questions? Which forms of deliberation can profitably be developed in consultation sessions?

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Fourth, how can important common positions and standpoints be identified and how should important differences be clarified and treated? Fifth, what sorts of mutual ‘recognition’ of Muslims and Christians can be distinguished in order to come to common action? Sixth, should there be an overarching Muslim-Christian ‘Committee of Sages’ to keep track of developments in Muslim-Christian thinking? Seventh, which literature can be recommended for reading and discussion? On the level of action freedom should be respected, given the wide variety of people, groups and local conditions, and given the differences that exist in the Christian as well as the Muslim community itself. Local groups of different age and social composition with competent and experienced leadership can be established. Youth groups with various activities can be stimulated.

Concrete forms of Muslim-Christian relations Already in Europe alone, Muslim groups and Christian Churches vary considerably. One only has to think of the differences among Christians, between, for instance, the Roman Catholic Church, the ‘liberal’ Protestant Churches and the Unitarians. One must take into account, moreover, the socio-political nature of the various Muslim organizations, even among immigrants coming from the same country. North America has a great variety of Christian and Muslim communities; the Middle East, Asia and Africa have their own diversity. In these group relationships no one should be asked to change or to give up distinctive liturgical formulas or ritual forms. Besides their relations with particular institutional Churches, it may be wise for Muslims to develop contacts with Christians who are not directly linked with a particular Church. Such contacts may pursue especially free interests, for instance of a social, artistic or cultural character. Certain groups may be interested to know more about European history and culture and about historical and present-day connections between European countries and particular Muslim regions and countries. And just as Christians may learn about the history of Muslim regions and Islam, Muslims may want to learn about the history of particular parts of Europe. The ideal would be to have mixed Muslim-Christian study groups about such subjects. We should be aware of the many forms Muslim-Christian relations have in very different contexts such as the various Muslim and Islamic countries, the various European countries, African and Asian countries with (non-majority) Muslim inhabitants, and the United States. Whereas in Western countries the problem of integration (with various meanings) of Muslim immigrants dominates the discussion, in Muslim countries it is the problem of the legal status and social recognition of Christians and other non-Muslims who often lived

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there before the coming of Islam. With growing numbers of Muslims living in non-Muslim countries, a new problem has arisen: In what ways should Muslims participate in the general public facilities and to what extent are typically Islamic facilities needed? Where do specifically Islamic organizations play an important role and where do Muslims participate in more general organizations? And a core question is that of the politicization and de-politicization of Muslim organizations. For Muslim cooperation with Christian Churches it is important that Muslims have comparable religious-cultural organizations without political programs and alignments. In Western countries, in the public sphere including political bodies as well as government offices there should be competent Muslim representatives working together with non-Muslims. Other, more practical matters also call for attention. Support given from Muslim countries to Muslims living in Western countries, like support given from Western countries to Christians living in Muslim countries, should be de-politicized. Socio-political campaigns hurting religious minorities should be forbidden. Social welfare and health care meant for inhabitants in the country should be also at the disposal of Christians in Muslim countries and of course of Muslims in Western countries. Humanitarian organizations may or may not have separate services for Muslims and others, like the Red Crescent and the Red Cross. Equality of treatment of Christians, Muslims and others should be a matter of course. Besides Islamic institutions there should always be general institutions where Muslims are welcome.

Where scholars can contribute Scholars of religions such as Islam and Christianity can contribute directly and indirectly to make Christians and Muslims more sensitive to each others’ faith and way of life, culture and society. They can give information about the societies where Muslims and Christians live together and about the problems with which people have to cope. As a rule, I suggest, they should abstain from taking part in political debates for or against Islam or Christianity. A much needed contribution such scholars can make is to warn people against the many generalizations that are made about Islam and Muslims, and about relations between Muslims and Christians. Historical research has shown that these relations everywhere have been very different in various times and places, depending on the people and on a number of factors that have nothing to do with religion. Scholars can also give information about how relations between Muslims and Christians have developed in crucial situations such as the colonial period with the missions, rapid social and economic development after independence, migrations of Muslims to Western countries, undemocratic regimes. There have been serious conflicts and wars in Muslim countries in which the West has been

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involved, and there are fateful tragedies arising from the relations between Armenians and Turks or Palestinians and Israelis, and the policies of Terrorism and the War on Terrorism. We need information on them from both journalists and scholars. Scholars can give reliable information about developments in Muslim countries since independence and the revitalization of Islam since the 1970s. They can analyse the reactions which all of this has brought about in Israel, the United States and Europe, including armed interventions in Muslim countries. We need to have reliable scholarly knowledge about the recent history of Christian communities in Muslim countries and of Muslim communities in Europe and North America. Studies will be welcome of how relations between Muslims and Christians have been and are depicted in literature, movies and other cultural expressions. Most important and urgent, however, it seems to me, is that scholarship unmask and disabuse current stereotypes about Muslims in the world as a particular species of mankind, and current representations of Islam as a homogeneous identity. These stereotypes and images run counter to present-day scholarly knowledge and are eagerly used for political purposes, as was the case with the anti-Semitic propaganda the Nazis used for their destructive work. There is no homogeneous Islam opposed to a supposedly homogeneous West and constituting a threat to other civilizations. Modern scholarship studies Islam as a highly fragmented civilization with great ethnic, religious and cultural variety. Fear of Islam has a crippling effect on Western minds; much of what is said and written about Muslims and Islam are Western ideas only, and bad ideas at that. Scholars should speak the truth.

A provisional conclusion Few people had thought an event like the ‘Open Letter’ written by Muslim leaders to Christian Church leaders possible. Its argumentation goes squarely against current presentations of Muslims and Islam in Christianity and the West. Present-day religious views and practices need to be better known and taken more seriously; they may surprise not only a few scholars but also a number of believers. Boundaries between religions have sometimes become blurred and ‘religion’ itself, at least in Europe, is now hard to define. When relations between Muslims and Christians become more dialogical, a variety of questions call for discussion. How should we deal with questions and claims of truth, religious and otherwise? Or with questions of conscience, for human relations and for personal honesty? Education may give religious instruction or an elementary knowledge of existing faiths. But what should we think of so many beliefs and superstitions around us, therapies of mind and spiritual enrichment which are cultivated because they supply deeper needs? And what

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are we to think of our own mental constructions – that is to say our social and cultural, philosophical and theological schemes – when facing conditions of human life and survival in the future? Such questions may become relevant in discussions between Muslims and Christians. We have been living for some time in our own houses. As the Open Letter shows, the time has come to open our shutters, our windows, our doors – to each other, trying to come to a common word.

Notes 1

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When a detailed history of Muslim-Christian relations in Britain is written, the Birmingham Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian Relations (CESIC) should have a place of honour. Thanks to the initiative of David Kerr together with Khurshid Ahmad, an international consultation took place at the Selly Oak Colleges in May 1975. The participants pleaded for the creation of a Centre where Christian and Muslim scholars together would study Islam, Christianity and the relations between their followers. David Kerr became its first Director and established it on the international scene. His dedication in Birmingham and elsewhere has made an indispensable contribution to Muslim-Christian relation. He was committed to happy encounters and creative thinking. I am glad that these lines can be published in this book in his honour. Compare Jacques Waardenburg, Muslims as Actors. Islamic Meanings and Muslim Interpretations in the Perspective of the Study of Religions (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, November 2007), 471 pp. At the time of writing, the author did not know about this Muslim initiative. Unexpectedly it corresponds with my idea of Muslims as ‘actors’, in religious matters as elsewhere. Such statements either reflect arbitrary ideas of the person himself or stereotypes and images current in society. They are then presented, however, to the general public as being scientific. Whatever may be the true reason and purpose why certain researchers give their personal – positive or negative – opinion or a stereotype about Islam with scholarly pretensions of being ‘true’, they are in fact cheating, exploiting the prestige of scholarship. It can be found in English on www.acommonword.org Also the Unity of God, given by the fact that there is no partner unto Him. One of the best treatments of the text I have heard was given by Professor David Thomas of the University of Birmingham. I hope that it will be published. Compare what is called the ‘blessed saying’: ‘There is no god but God, He alone, He hath no associate, His is the sovereignty and His is the praise and He hath power over all things’ (Sahîh al-Bukhârî, Kitâb al-Adhan, Hadîth no. 852). ‘Say: Lo! My worship and my sacrifice and my living and my dying are for God, lord of the Worlds. He has no partner. . .’ (S. Al-An’am, 6:162). Open Letter, p. 9.

Chapter 16

Christian-Muslim Dialogue: Mirage or Destiny? Khurshid Ahmad

Two questions have agitated my mind and tormented my soul ever since my early youth. I am still grappling with them, not without hope. I have always believed that there is light beyond the tunnel, however long the tunnel may be. Faith continues to be the greatest source of strength. And it is faith that makes life and its strivings including failings, meaningful, purposeful and hopeinspiring. The fact that one is not alone in this search for light is an added source of strength. Commitment to serve God and humanity is the ultimate ambition of all men and women of faith. I am taking this opportunity to share with the intellectual and spiritual community engaged in inter-faith dialogue some of my own reflections and experiences. The Qur’a¯ n suggests that humanity can be grouped into two major streams of human beings: Under one umbrella can be seen all such human beings and communities which believe in God and aspire to follow the path shown by Prophets and Messengers raised by God to convey His Guidance to mankind. The other umbrella takes care of the other stream consisting of all people who do not relate their life and destiny to God and His Guidance, regard themselves self-sufficient, and look upon this life as the be-all and end-all of human existence. Within these two streams there have been many belief-systems, cultural configurations and socio-political articulations. However, these two Grand Paradigms provide two huge umbrellas under which all human beings, past, present and future, can be grouped. In the first group one can see in our times followers of divinely inspired religions, particularly, Islam, Christianity and Judaism. The other paradigm is currently represented by the secular civilization of the West currently dominating the world. The two questions that have disturbed me are products of this understanding of the human situation: First, why is it that despite belonging to the first stream there is so much tension and serious lack of cooperation even antipathy between the forces that represent Islam and Christianity today? And second, why is it that even a large number of good Christians, who are committed to the mission of the Prophet Jesus (peace be upon him) to bring the Kingdom of God on the Earth, yet most of them seem to have reconciled themselves to the paradigm of

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secular civilization to an extent that they, wittingly or unwittingly, have become instruments for promoting secularization of human life and society in our times, disturbing the equation between humanity’s moral and material life. I am equally worried in respect of Muslims who are caught up in this contradiction. The Qur’a¯ nic Paradigm inspired me to look towards other religious faiths and traditions as part of my own past. Tawh}¯ıd (belief in Oneness of God) and belief in all Prophets of God as His representatives, acting as mankind’s real source of guidance, prompted me to approach other religious leaders and communities, particularly those described in the Qur’a¯ n as ahl-al-Kitab (followers of Divine Books) as members of my own wider family, the family of Prophet Abraham (peace be upon him). Prophet Muh.ammad’s (peace be upon him) message represents continuation and culmination of the Divine Message, linking the past with the present and identifying pathways for the future. The Qur’a¯ n expounds this concept of the unity of Divine Guidance in very clear terms: He has prescribed for you the religion which He enjoined upon Noah and which We revealed to you (O, Muh.ammad), and which We enjoined upon Abraham and Moses and Jesus, commanding: ‘Establish this religion and do not split up regarding it.’ (42:13) Addressing all believers the Qur’a¯ n makes the clarion call: Do they now seek a religion other than that prescribed by Allah and this despite all that is in the heavens and the earth is in submission to Him – willingly or unwillingly – and to Him all shall return? Say: ‘We believe in Allah and what was revealed to us and what was revealed to Abraham and Ishmael and to Isaac and Jacob and his descendants, and the teachings which Allah gave to Moses and Jesus and to other Prophets. We make no distinction between any of them; and to Him do we submit. And whoever seeks a way other than this way of submission – Islam – will find that it will not be accepted from him and he will be among the losers in the Life to Come.’ (3:83–5) As Muslims we believe that all the prophets of God called humanity to the way of the Lord, the way of submission to the Will of the Creator, the way that leads to peace within and peace without. Yet the Qur’a¯ nic paradigm has built-in space for pluralism. As humans are endowed with freedom, the right to choose, and that there is no compulsion in religion (2:256), multiplicity of faiths and faithbased communities may go to make up the matrix of humanity. If compulsion is not the way, what is the right course? It is da‘wah, dialogue, discussion and acceptance of diversity and co-existence. However, the Qur’a¯ n paradigm assigns

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to the people of the Book a special place – spelling out guidelines for intellectual discourse, solidarity in respect of shared values, and desirability of common pursuits and socio-cultural interactions and institutional relationships, despite differences in belief perspectives. The need for intellectual discourse and its imperative as to search for common ground has been succinctly pointed out by the Qur’a¯ n: Say: ‘People of the Book! Come to a word common between us and you: that we shall serve none but Allah and should associate none with Him in His Divinity and that some of us will not take others as lords over other than Allah.’ (3:64) The Qur’a¯ n is sensitive to even the modalities of this discourse. The clear instruction is: Argue not with the People of the Book except in the fairest manner, unless it be those of them that are utterly unjust. Say to them: ‘We believe in what was revealed to us and what was revealed to you. One is our God and your God; and we are those who submit ourselves to Him.’ (29:46) In human relations two points of contact are of critical importance: Food, on which human life depends, and family, which ensures continuity of human race. The Qur’a¯ nic Paradigm creates space for both in respect of the People of the Book: This day all clean things have been made lawful to you. The food of the People of the Book is permitted to you, and your food is permitted to them. And permitted to you are chaste women, be they from among the believers, or from among those who have received the Book before you, provided you become their protectors in the wedlock after paying them their bridal-due, rather than going around committing fornication and taking them as secret-companions. The work of he who refuses to follow the Way of faith will go to waste, and he will be among the utter losers in the Hereafter. (5:5) The Qur’a¯ n enjoins kind conduct, friendly relations and equitable dealings with all human beings save those at war on the basis of religion and even in respect of those at war there are clear edicts, differentiating between the belligerents and non-belligerents, combatants and non-combatants: Allah does not forbid you to be kind and just to those who did not fight against you on account of religion, nor drive you out of your houses. Surely Allah loves those who are equitable. (60:8)

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The Qur’a¯ n acknowledges the presence of noble souls among other faith communities and does not demonize people on the basis of differences in faith and culture: Yet all are not alike among the people of the Book: there are upright people who recite the messages of Allah in the watches of the night and prostrate themselves in worship. They believe in Allah and in the Last Day and enjoin what is right and forbid what is wrong, and hasten to excel each other in doing good. These are among the righteous. Whatever good they do shall not go unappreciated. Allah fully knows those who are pious. (3:113–15) The presence of people in different faith communities pursuing the medium course is recognized, not merely as an existential reality, but something relevant to human contact and relationships: (O Prophet), the Book We have revealed to you is the Truth, confirming the Books that came before it. Verily Allah is well aware of His servants and sees everything. Then We bequeathed the Book to those of Our servants that We chose. Now, some of them wrong themselves and some follow the medium course; and some, by Allah’s leave, vie with each other in acts of goodness. That is the great bounty. They shall enter the everlasting Gardens, shall be adorned with bracelets of gold and with pearls, and their apparel therein shall be silk. (35:31–3) Among the good and godly there is a special mention of the followers of the Prophet Jesus (peace be upon him). The Qur’a¯ n says: And you will surely find that of all people they who say ‘We are Christians,’ are closest to feeling affection for those who believe. This is because there are worshipful priests and monks among them, and because they are not arrogant. And when they hear what has been revealed to the Messenger you see that their eyes overflow with tears because of the Truth that they recognize and they say: ‘Our Lord! We do believe; write us down, therefore, with those who bear witness (to the Truth).’ (5:82–3) This has been the intellectual and ideational perspective that helped me in building my relationships with other faith communities during my stay in the United Kingdom (1968–78), particularly, as Director General, The Islamic Foundation, Leicester (1973–78). I had rich and rewarding opportunities of participating in international dialogues, and inter-faith consultations focusing more specifically on Christian-Muslim relations in Europe. One document that influenced my own approach deserves to be mentioned. In December 1967, six months after the Israel-Arab War, Pope Paul VI took an important initiative by

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sending through personal representatives the New Year’s message to some of the Muslim luminaries the world over. Mawlana Sayyed Abul A‘la Mawdudi was one of them. Mawlana Mawdudi responded to this message with a frankness that was the hallmark of his personality. But this response also unveiled new opportunities for Christian-Muslim dialogue and avenues of cooperation in the pursuit of a common objective: the establishment of a just world order (see Annexure-I to this chapter). Although I had been active on a number of inter-faith platforms, my most rewarding experience relates to participation in a three-day consultation (May 9–11, 1975) organized at the Selly Oak Colleges, Birmingham, that led to the establishment of the Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations (CSIC). I had the honour to serve as a member of its Advisory Council (1976–78) which worked under the chairmanship of late Prof. Albert Hourani. The Chambesy Dialogue (1976) was also an outgrowth of these efforts. Its proceedings epitomize a new approach to the whole dynamics of Christian-Muslim Dialogue (see Annexure-II: Statement of the Conference). Despite little progress towards the goalposts identified in these efforts, it is undeniable that these, among others, constitute milestones on the road to closer cooperation between the two faith communities of the world. Looking back on these thirty years I feel proud to have been associated with these pioneering efforts, however minor or peripheral my own role may have been. I firmly believe that these efforts are their own prize and to be a participant in this process gives one a sense of fulfilment. There is, however, a more personal and very valuable dimension. To me the greatest reward was the discovery of a host of noble souls and consequently building with them personal and intellectual relationships that went beyond friendship, a kind of fellowship and spiritual communion. In the galaxy of this spiritual fraternity, David Kerr’s fellowship remains outstanding. My first in-depth encounter with David was on the occasion of the May 1975 Selly Oak Consultation. Dr Norman Goodwill chaired this consultation. Dr Albert Hourani and I were key speakers. David Kerr was the Coordinator and the real spirit behind the consultation. His sincerity and openness won our hearts. He was always firm in his commitment to Christianity, but this did not hold him from going more than half way to welcome the other viewpoint. He was eager to build bridges with the Muslim community and his openness to discussion and respectful acceptance of dissent and alternate approaches impressed us all and brought us closer to him. He cared more to win our confidence, and not necessarily agreement. These early impressions were profoundly confirmed and deepened when we took up a joint project to co-chair the Chambesy Consultation on ‘Christian Mission and Islamic Da‘wah’ which was organized at the request of the World Council of Churches, Geneva. It became a joint project of the Selly Oak Colleges and the Islamic Foundation. A journey that began in the fog of apprehensions, moved through honesty and frankness, into brighter pathways of mutual trust,

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meaningful cooperation, and fruit-bearing engagements aiming at serving God and humanity. David and I have worked together as people committed to serving God alone, and as persons resolved to live and work in accordance with the religious values and tradition they belong to. I recall, with fresh endorsement, what I wrote in 1976 on the occasion of presenting our joint effort in the form of the Special Issue of the International Review of Missions: We hold no brief for syncretism, nor were we interested in producing compromises on matters religious and moral. Similarly, we did not enter the consultation with a view to scoring points on each other. We met with the objective of understanding each other’s position more sympathetically, of identifying the areas of agreement and disagreement and of trying to build mutual trust so as to co-ordinate our response to threats and challenges that beset humanity today. Instead of merely talking about each other, we have tried to talk to each other, however haltingly. That is why we, instead of producing an impersonal collection of scholarly papers, have tried to collect around one table a few distinguished religious leaders of the two faiths and invited them to face each other as much as face the real issues that confront them. It is our considered opinion that the right approach in Christian-Muslim dialogue is to face the problems and issues that unite or divide us. These issues are legion: religious, theological, historical, socio-cultural and political. As mission/da‘wah represents the outreach of one’s religious tradition to the other and as the role of Christian missions in the Muslim world is regarded by the Muslims to be at the root of estrangement between the Christian and the Muslim worlds, the conference on mission and daw’ah provided a natural point of departure for a meaningful dialogue. Although there have been moments of stress and strain, expressions of human weakness and pugnacity, even wars and political encounters, Christians and Muslims have lived side by side in the Muslim world, on the whole, in peace and harmony with each other, ever since the final revelation of Islam in the seventh century. But with the arrival of the Christian missionaries in the company of European colonizers, a new chapter began in Muslim-Christian relationships. That some of them might have been motivated by the best of spiritual intentions is not among the points in dispute. But the overall Muslim experience of the Christian missions was such that it failed to commend itself as something noble and holy. Any dispassionate evaluation of the experience would suggest that what has been achieved is a loss for Islam and religion as such, and not a gain for Christianity – the real beneficiaries being the forces of secularism, materialism and of moral insensitivity. The Muslim critique can be summed up in four points: a. Gross and flagrant misrepresentation of the teachings of Islam and of the life and message of the Prophet Muh.ammad (peace be upon him). Instead

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of examining Islam as it is, a totally unreal picture of Islam was concocted and used to denigrate Islam and Muslims. Although the high watermark of this type of approach to the study of Islam has passed, the efforts still persist, even though in low profile and under many a disguise.1 b. The methodology of Christian mission concentrated upon influencing the object in a state of weakness and helplessness. Instead of direct invitation, approaches were made to those who were disadvantaged, exploiting their weaknesses for the sake of proselytism. The poor, the sick and the immature were made special targets of economic assistance, medical aid and education. Many a Christian mission acted as an organic part of colonialism and cultural imperialism. All this was a very unfair way to bring people to any religion. c. Whatever the ultimate aim, subversion of the faith and culture of Islam seems to have been the prime target of the Christian missionary enterprise. Nationalism, secularism, modernism, socialism, even communism were fostered, supported and encouraged while the revival of Islam and the strengthening of Islamic moral life among the Muslims were, and even now are, looked upon as anathema. d. Muslims were treated as political rivals and as such subjected to overt and covert discrimination and repression. Their just causes fail to evoke any significant moral response from the Christian world. Western Christendom’s attitude, towards the Palestine problem in general and towards Jerusalem in particular, for example, agonizes Muslims. Majority rule is denied to Muslims in a number of African countries. The sufferings of the Muslims in such places as Eritrea, Mindanao, Kashmir, Patani, to mention only a few, fail sufficiently to arouse the moral conscience of the Christian world. Muslims are puzzled when they compare the relative lack of Christian concern over the increasing de-Christianization of the Christian world with their obsession with what amounts to de-Islamization of the Muslim world. Christian-Muslim dialogue in the twenty-first century must take cognizance of these issues and realities, if it is to prove meaningful and productive. Looking back on over quarter of a century of my involvement in inter-faith dialogue I have no regrets in having chosen to pursue this path. While the fellowship of persons like David Kerr and others like him remains my greatest personal wealth and treasure, I think we have covered only limited ground in this long march towards destiny. I have always believed that Christian-Muslim dialogue must be founded on foundations of sincerity, transparency and acceptance of diversity. The essence of dialogue is openness. It consists in two-way communication. To be genuine, it must take place between authentic representatives of the faith communities. It is only people who firmly believe and uphold their faith and

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tradition and enjoy the confidence of their respective communities as their trustworthy representatives who can deliver. Dialogue involves discussion but it is much more pointed and focused than discussion per se. It may have all the contours of debate but it is essentially different from verbal encounters that characterize debate. It has to be more focused towards exploration of issues, themes and subjects that cry for solution. It must lead to grappling with strategies capable of resolving problems and facing challenges. Dialogue can thrive on trust. It can bear fruit only if it is grounded in mutual confidence and esteem. It involves argument, yet this argument must be devoid of heat and point-scoring. Most important it is a process, and not simply an event. Time is of essence, and timeconsuming it cannot but be. Its real merit lies in talking to each other and not merely about each other. Its success depends on acceptance of diversity and disagreement as acceptable, and a stepping stone to measure search for common grounds and areas of agreement and disagreement. The real soul and breath of dialogue is effort to understand each other and explore avenues of cooperation and common concerns therefrom. Conversion or silencing is not the objective. That may kill the very process of dialogue. That is why eclecticism and syncretism are enemies of dialogue. Its success lies in identification of areas of agreement and disagreement – pursuing common concerns, building on shared values and visions, co-participating in effort for perusal of agreed goals and targets, and continuation of and respectful discussion on issues of divergence, accepting dissent and differences are genuine and authentic and not merely deviations and aberrations. That is how I have visualized dialogue, and I have found David Kerr a trustworthy co-traveller during our rumblings in these thorny pathways. Let me conclude by submitting that dialogue is at best a method, not an objective in itself. The real objective is serving God and humanity and the immediate target is to involve leaders and members of faith communities to understand each other and work hard to remove irritants and road blocks that hamper close cooperation between them, so as to build new bridges of trust and goodwill and explore possibilities of cooperation and co-participation in the pursuit of values and visions we share. My agenda for structured efforts in this direction include the following: 1. Sustained efforts to understand each other’s position on moral, theological and cultural issues through respectful discussion and acceptance of divergence and dissent.2 2. Research, discussion and dialogue on shared values, visions and concerns from the respective perspectives. 3. Greater emphasis on community-oriented issues and services. 4. Joint efforts towards elevation of sufferings of humanity and its moral regeneration and uplift, strengthening of the institutions of family and community, promotion of right type of education and above all, strength for the

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establishment of Just Social Order in all parts of the world. Looking beyond oneself is a decisive step on the road that leads to serving God and humanity. 5. Search for peaceful solutions to conflicts that afflict humanity at all levels, individuals, groups, countries, the world community. It is men and women of faith and faith-based communities that represent the real glimmer of light beyond the tunnel. I hope and pray that dialogue between these two greatest faith communities – Christianity and Islam – will harness the best in us to the service of God and humanity. Then only we can have our tryst with destiny.

Annexure-I

Message of His Holiness Pope Paul VI and a Reply by Sayyid Abul A’la Mawdu¯dı¯ [On 8 December 1967, Sayyid Abul A’la Mawdu ¯ dı¯ received a message from His Holiness Pope Paul VI, Vatican, Rome, containing his appeal to observe 1 January 1968, as a ‘Day of Peace’. The Message was also addressed to the Roman Catholic Church and prominent religious leaders of the Muslim world. Given below is the text of the Pope’s message and the English version of Sayyid Mawdu¯dı¯’s reply.]

Message of His Holiness Pope, Paul VI for the Observance of a ‘Day of Peace’ We address ourself to all men of good will to exhort them to celebrate ‘The Day of Peace’ throughout the world on the first day of the year, January 1, 1968. it is our desire that then, every year, this commemoration be repeated as a hope and as a promise, at the beginning of the calendar which measures and outlines the path of human life in time, that peace with its just and beneficent equilibrium may dominate the development of events to come. We think that the proposal interprets the aspirations of peoples of their governments, of international organizations which strive to preserve peace in the world, of those religious institutions so interested in the promotion of peace, of cultural, political and social movements which make peace their ideal; or youth whose perspicacity regarding the new paths of civilization, dutifully oriented towards its peaceful developments is more lively; of wise men who see how much, today, peace is both necessary and threatened. The proposal to dedicate to peace the first day of the new year is not intended, therefore, as exclusively ours, religious, that is, Catholic. It would hope to have the adherence of all the true friends of peace, as if it were their own initiative, to be expressed in a free manner, congenial to the particular character of those who are aware of how beautiful and how important is the harmony of all voices in the world for the examination of his primary good, which is peace in the varied concert of modern humanity. The Catholic Church, with the intention of service and of example, simply wishes to ‘launch the idea’, in the hope that it may not only receive the widest

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consent of the civilized world, but that such an idea may find everywhere numerous promoters, able and capable of impressing on the ‘Day of Peace’, to be celebrated on the first day of every new year, that sincere and strong character of conscious humanity, redeemed from its sad and fatal bellicose conflicts, which will give to the history of the world a more happy, ordered and civilized development. The Catholic Church will call the attention of its children to the duty of observing ‘The Day of Peace’ with the religious and moral expressions of the Christian faith; but it considers it its duty to remind all those who agree on the opportuneness of such a ‘Day’, some points which ought to characterize it. First among these is the necessity of defending peace in the face of dangers that always threaten it; namely, the danger of the survival of selfishness in the relations among nations; the danger of violence into which some populations can allow themselves to be drawn by desperation of not having their right to life and human dignity recognized and respected; the danger, today of tremendously increased weapons of extermination, which some nations acquire only through enormous financial outlays, which should lead to thoughtful reflection, especially in light of the desperate developmental needs of so many people; and the danger of believing that international disagreements cannot be resolved through reason, that is, by negotiation founded on the rule of law, justice and equity, but can only be resolved by means of deterrent and murderous forces. The subjective foundation of peace is a new spirit which must animate co-existence between peoples, a new outlook on man, his duties and his destiny. Much progress must still be made to render this outlook universal and effective; a new training must educate the new generations to reciprocal respect between nations, to brotherhood between peoples, to collaboration between races, with a view also to their progress and development. The international organizations which have been set up for this purpose must be supported by all; become better known and be provided with the authority and means fit for their great mission. The ‘Peace Day’ must honour these institutions and surround their work with prestige, with confidence and with that sense of expectation that will keep alive in them the realization of their most serious responsibility and keep strong the consciousness of the charge which has been entrusted to them. A warning must be kept in mind. Peace cannot be based on a false rhetoric of words which are welcomed because they answer to the deep, genuine aspirations of humanity, but which can also serve, and unfortunately have sometimes served to hide the lack of true spirit and of real intentions for peace if not indeed to mask sentiments and actions of oppression and party interests. Nor can one rightly speak of peace where no recognition or respect is given to its solid foundations; namely sincerity, justice and love in the relations between states, and within the limits of each nation, in the relations of citizens with each other and with their rulers; freedom of individuals and of peoples, in all its expressions, civic, cultural, moral and religious; otherwise, it is not peace which

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will exist even if, perchance, oppression is able to create the external appearance of order and legality – but an unceasing and insuppressible growth of revolt and war. It is therefore to true peace, to just and balanced peace, in the sincere recognition of the rights of the human person and of the independence of the individual nations that we invite men of wisdom and strength to dedicate this Day. Accordingly, in conclusion, it is to be hoped that the exaltation of the ideal of peace may not favour the cowardice of those who fear it may be their duty to give their life for the service of their own country and of their own brothers, when these are engaged in the defence of justice and liberty, and who seek only light from their responsibility, from the risks that are necessarily involved in the accomplishment of great duties and generous exploits. Peace is not pacifism; it does not mask a base and slothful concept of life, but it proclaims the highest and most universal values of life; truth, justice, freedom, love. It is for the protection of these values that we place them beneath the banner of peace, and that we invite men and nations to raise, at the dawn of the new year, this banner which must guide the ship of civilization through the inescapable storms of history to the harbour of its highest destiny.

Reply by Sayyid Abul A’la Mawdu ¯ dı¯ President, Jamaat-i-Islami, Pakistan Dear Pope Paul VI, I would, first of all, like to express my heartiest thanks to you for your esteemed message of December 8, 1967, sent through Dr. R. A. Butler, Counselor of your Secretariat and Director of Loyola Hall, Lahore, in which you have appealed to everyone associated with the Catholic Church and also those belonging to the major world religions and all men of goodwill, to observe 1st of January every year as a ‘Day of Peace’. I would have liked to communicate with you immediately but I am sorry my preoccupations did not permit me to write to you earlier. I extend my hearty felicitations to you that you have invited mankind to pursue an objective which indeed is a cause common to all. There is no denying the fact that peace is among the primary requirements that form the bedrock for human welfare and advancement. Unfortunately, however, in spite of all the lip service for the cause of peace and consciousness about its importance, mankind remains deprived of it. Why has this been so and why the objective remains elusive? It is precisely due to the reasons some of which you have very correctly mentioned in your letter and drawn the world’s attention towards them. I sincerely believe that unless something is done firmly and in a concrete manner to eliminate these factors, mere pious wishes and expressions of the sentiments of goodwill and cooperation can offer no peace to this troubled world of ours.

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It is, therefore, of great importance to me that each one of us from among different peoples, comity of nations and followers of world religions should sincerely and honestly do a little bit of introspection and soul-searching to find out if he has been guilty of some shortcomings and lapses which might have been instrumental in depriving his fellow human beings from peace and security. He should then try ceaselessly in all possible manners to rectify those lapses as best as possible. Similarly, everyone of us should try to identify to all wellmeaning persons of other groups, in unequivocal terms and with all sincerity as also with a desire to reform and not to create bad blood and aggravate dissention, those aspects of their conduct which are painful for others. Such sincere efforts are bound to reform our approach and attitudes and remove irritants in the way of peace. It is with this spirit that I wish to draw your attention to some such matters which do not bode well for Muslims’ relations with Christian brethren. I hope, that you would try to use the immense influence, command and respect you enjoy as the highest dignitary of the Christian Church to redress the current situation. I would similarly welcome your guidance to help us remove any reasonable cause of conflict which our Christian brethren might be having in our conduct towards them. We assure them that we would leave no stone unturned, In sha¯ ’ Allah, to remove the causes of such complaints. Indeed, it is only by doing justice to each other that we can work for the establishment of a climate of peace, amity and cooperation in the world. Even if we lack the courage and magnanimity to be more generous, we may at least feel the imperative need to refrain from causing pain to others. I, therefore, take this opportunity to briefly and candidly apprise you, in the following paragraphs, of the major irritants in our Christian brethren’s conduct towards the Muslim community. (i) It is extremely painful for the world’s Muslim community to notice the Christian scholars’ attacks, carried on since long, against their Prophet Sayyidna Muh.ammad (Allah’s peace be upon him), the Holy Qur’a¯ n and Islam. I am purposely using the word ‘attacks’ to remove the misunderstanding that as Muslims we are against any genuine scholarly criticism. We take no offence to any well-researched criticism, howsoever strong, provided it is duly supported by cogent arguments and non-partisan approach and remains within the bounds of decency and reason. In fact, we welcome such scholarly attempts and are always ready to provide answers with equally matching response. We are, however, genuinely perturbed by those vile attacks which are false and couched in extremely derogatory language. So far as Muslims are concerned, we as a community cannot even think of hurling any abuse or insult against Mary and Jesus (May Allah’s peace be upon them), as it is contrary to our faith and conduct as Muslim Believers. You cannot find a single instance of any blasphemy committed by any

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Muslim against the Prophet of Christianity and his Holy Mother. Though we do not believe in the divinity of Jesus Christ, we have faith in his Prophethood the way we have in the Prophethood of Sayyidna Muh.ammad (Allah’s peace be upon them). No Muslim can remain a Muslim unless he reaffirms his firm belief not just in the Prophet of Islam but in all those Prophets mentioned in Old and New Testament. Similarly, we believe not just in the Holy Qur’a¯ n but in all other revealed Books like Bible and Torah and no Muslim can even think of committing blasphemy against them as well. The main point of Muslim scholars’ discussions have been concerning the authenticity of the Bible in its present form. In fact, they are not alone in this debate. It has been the topic of discourse even among the Christian scholars. Nevertheless, no Muslim has ever ventured to deny that Allah subh.a¯nahu wa-ta‘a¯la¯ revealed His Message to Jesus, Moses and other Prophets of the Gospel. He may not believe in all that is included in the Bible as the word of God, but he does believe that the Bible contains the word of God. This is why our Christian brethren have never complained about any desecration of their Prophets or Books by us. Contrary to this, we have always been the target of their onslaught. The mudslinging has been going on since last so many centuries and the Christian authors and speakers have continued their tirade against the Prophet of Islam and the Holy Qur’a¯ n. This is one of the major causes of ill-will between the Muslim and Christian communities. As a consequence of such writings and anti-Islamic propaganda, much hatred has been generated among Christians against the Muslims. You would be doing a great service to the cause of world peace if you could counsel the followers of Christianity to at least desist from such practice so that their tirade against the Prophet of Islam and the Book of God may not become an instrument of further hatred and provocation. (ii) Another cause of serious concern for the Muslims are the methods applied by Christian Missions and Missionaries for the propagation of Christianity in the Muslim countries. Whatever they may have done in other countries and communities is not our concern, but the type of activities we have witnessed and experienced in states with the Muslim majority is hardly plausible. They are not content with preaching their religious tenets only. They have used methods which degenerate from the bounds of preaching into the realm of political pressure, economic exploitation and moral and religious subversion. No sane person can condone these in the name of missionary activities. In the African continent they deprived the Muslim population from the right of education with the active support of the colonial rulers. The doors of academic institutions were closed to everyone who declined to accept Christianity as his religion, or change his Muslim name for a Christian one. The Christian minority, thus created, rule the roost politically, militarily and economically, in a number of African countries where the majority of population is Muslim. There can be no greater

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injustice than this. In Sudan, the Christian missionaries have secured the South as their ‘safe heaven’ with the help of British imperialism. The right of education and preaching is now the sole prerogative of Christian missionaries there, while the local Muslims cannot even freely move around, let alone practising and preaching their religion. Here in Pakistan too the common practice in Mission hospitals and educational institutions is that they charge exorbitant fees from Muslim patients and students and the poverty stricken persons are tempted to convert to Christianity in return for better medical and educational facilities free of charge or just on nominal charges. It is obvious that this is not religious preaching, it is an attempt to barter human conscience and faith for some crumbs. It is due to this unholy and highly objectionable conduct that the missionary activities are generally viewed today as indulging in well-planned acts of sabotage and intrigue against Islam and the Muslim society. I will, therefore, request you to seriously ponder over the far-reaching consequences of such activities and use your good offices to improve and reform the institution of Christian missionaries. (iii) There is a general feeling among Muslims concerning the Christian world that it is intensely biased against Islam and Muslims. This feeling is supported by our day-to-day experience. Its latest manifestation is what was noticed during the recent Arab-Israeli war. The way Israel’s victory in this war was celebrated in most countries of Europe and America was extremely painful and heart-rending for the Muslim world. You will find no Muslim who may not have felt the pinch of this celebration and realized that it was the result of the Christian world’s deep-rooted bias and hatred against Muslims. The way the State of Israel has emerged, or rather been carved out on the Palestinian land, is but an open secret. Palestine has been the homeland of Arabs since last over two thousand years. In the beginning of this century, it had no more than 8 percent of Jewish population. In such a backdrop, the British government decided to make it a national home of the Jews. The League of Nations did not just ratify this decision, but also authorized the British government with Palestine’s mandate and directed it to co-opt the Jewish agency for implementing the scheme of a Jewish state. This was followed by transporting Jews from every nook and corner of the world to settle in Palestine. Consequently, within just three decades their population in Palestine rose from 8 to 33%. There could have been no greater injustice and tyranny than forcefully depriving the native Palestinians of their land and doling it out to an alien community. Even more cruel than this was then to get the United Nations formally to declare this artificial homeland of the Jews into a Jewish State. As a result of this unjust decision, 33% of the Jewish population was allotted 55% of the Palestinian land and 67% of the local Arab population was left with 45%. The Jews, however, did not remain content with this generosity of their European

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patrons. They used their newly acquired might to grab 77% of the Palestinian territory and with their acts of massacre, loot and plunder rendered millions of Arabs homeless. This is the true picture of the State of Israel, which remains a living ‘tribute’ to the British imperialism and a testimony of the Christendom’s hatred against Muslims. The biggest irony of the situation is that the same Jewish state is now not willing even to remain within its current boundaries. It has continually pronounced its desire to grab the entire area extending from the banks of Nile to Euphrates, which it regards as part of its fancied homeland. In other words, it has aggressive designs against the neighbouring Arab countries and plans to forcefully occupy them and evict their natives to allow the Jews from all over the world to settle in the occupied territory. The Israeli blitzkrieg of last June (1967) was part of the same scheme as a result of which it occupied 6000 sq. miles of Arab land. The Christian world is entirely responsible for this gruesome episode. It is because of them that a nation-state has been carved out of the land of another nation. It is due to them that this state was then formally inducted as a member of the UN. It is they who then provided the essentially required capital and armaments to sustain and strengthen this illegitimate state to a level that it now expressly has nefarious designs against the neighbouring states; and now it is the Christian world that is jubilant over the Israeli aggression and victory. Do you think that the Arabs in particular and the Muslim world in general can now ever trust the Christian world’s moral conduct, its love of justice and religious harmony and tolerance? Do you sincerely believe that this is the right approach for promoting world peace? This is indeed not our responsibility but up to our Christian brethren, who I think, are morally bound to put their rulers and community elders to shame and try to let them feel the qualms of conscience on this sordid record and purify their souls of impurities. (iv) There is another excess the onus of which falls directly on your esteemed self, though I believe, it is not ill-intentioned and you did it in good faith. I am referring here to your proposal to put old Jerusalem under international control. Perhaps the idea behind this proposal is to protect this holy city from conflicts and bloodshed. But the fact of the matter is that the proposal would result in a grievous injustice and tyranny. In the event of international control the writ of the city would obviously pass into the hands of the same world body that exercises control of the land. This world body would be no other than the one which was responsible for the creation of the illegitimate State of Israel. This organization also has been unable so long to stop Israel from aggression, or rectify the wrongs committed so far. The moment the world body gets control of the city it will open its gates to the Jews to settle there. The history of aggression and occupation will thus repeat itself as witnessed when the British government opened the land of Palestine for Jewish immigrants under the League of

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Nations’ mandate. The Jewish settlers who earlier purchased or grabbed the Palestinians’ land would thus enjoy the same facilities once again. The latest step, if taken, would eventually turn the old Jerusalem into a Jewish city within a short span of time, making the Jews the sole arbiter of its fate. One should also not forget that it is the same community who, throughout its known history, has cherished no love or respect either for the Islamic or Christian holy sites. I seek your indulgence for this lengthy and frank response to your message. I have tried to share with your Holiness some matters of common concern, as I deemed it my duty to point out to you some of the actual impediments in the way of world peace, which call for immediate practical steps for redressal. I may also reiterate here that in case there is any grievance concerning the Islamic world, which in your view may be an obstacle to world peace, I would be too glad if informed. I am prepared to try the best I can and use whatever influence I may be commanding in the Muslim world for its redressal. I would also try to invite the attention of other Muslim leaders to remove such obstacles. Lahore, January 17, 1968

Yours sincerely, Sayyid Abul A’la Mawdu ¯ dı¯

Annexure-II Statement of the Conference on ‘Christian Mission and Islamic Da‘wah’3 Chambesy, June 1976 1. In recognition that mission and da‘wah are essential religious duties in both Christianity and Islam, a conference on Christian Mission and Islamic Da‘wah was organized by the Commission on World Mission and Evangelism of the World Council of Churches, Geneva, in consultation with the Islamic Foundation, Leicester, and the Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, Selly Oak Colleges, Birmingham, on Jumada 28 - Rajab 4, 1396/June 26th–30th, 1976. Besides examining the nature of mission and of da‘wah, and the experience of each community of the missionary da‘wah activity of the other, the purpose of the conference was to promote reciprocal understanding between Muslims and Christians and to explore the means for a modus vivendi assuring the spiritual well-being of all. 2. The conference is in essential agreement that their respective communities, wherever they constitute a minority of the population, should enjoy a de jure existence that each religious community should be entitled to live its religious life in accordance with its religion in perfect freedom. The conference upholds the principle of religious freedom recognizing that the Muslims as well as the Christians must enjoy the full liberty to convince and be convinced, and to practice their faith and order their religious life in accordance with their own religious laws and principles; that the individual is perfectly entitled to maintain his/her religious integrity in obedience to his/her religious principles and in faithfulness to his/her religious identity. 3. The conference agrees that the family is a supremely precious and necessary institution. It expresses serious concern over the threats of disintegration and secularization facing the family institution, and it recommends that religious family law, whether Muslim or Christian, be not interfered with or changed in any way, directly or indirectly, by outsiders to their traditions. It also agrees that the family and community should have the right to ensure the religious education of their children by organizing their own schools, or by having teachers of their own denominations to teach religion to their children in the school, or by other suitable means. In any case they should be allowed to organize their cultural and spiritual life without outside interference, though with sensitivity to the situation in multi-religious societies. 4. The conference was grieved to hear that some Christians in some Muslim countries have felt themselves limited in the exercise of their religious freedom

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and have been denied their right to church buildings. The Muslim participants regard such violation as contrary to Islamic law as well as to the principle of religious freedom enunciated above. 5. The conference recognizes fully the right of Christians as well as of Muslims to order their corporate life in accordance with the injunctions of their own religious principles and laws, and to have and maintain all requisite institutions in accordance with their religious principles and laws as equal citizens. 6. The Christian participants extend to their Muslim brethren their full sympathy for the moral wrongs which the Muslim world has suffered at the hands of colonialists, nee-colonialists and their accomplices. The conference is aware that Muslim-Christian relations have been affected by mistrust, suspicion and fear. Instead of co-operating for their common good, Muslims and Christians have been estranged and alienated from one another. After more than a century of colonialism during which many missionaries served the interests of the colonial powers, whether deliberately or unconsciously, the Muslims have felt reluctant to co-operate with the Christians whom they have fought as agents of their oppressors. Although the time has certainly come to turn a new page in this relationship, the Muslims are still reluctant to take the step because their suspicion of Christian intentions continues. The reason is the undeniable fact that many of the Christian missionary services today continue to be undertaken for ulterior motives. Taking advantage of Muslim ignorance, of Muslim need for educational, health, cultural and social services, of Muslim political stresses and crises, of their economic dependence, political division and general weakness and vulnerability, these missionary services have served purposes other than holy – proselytism, that is, adding members to the Christian community for reasons other than spiritual. Recently revealed linkages of some of these services with the intelligence offices of some big powers confirm and intensify an already aggravated situation. The conference strongly condemns all such abuse of diakonia (service). Its Christian members dissociate themselves in the name of Christianity from any service which has degraded itself by having any purpose whatever beside agape (love for God and neighbour). They declare that any diakonia undertaken for any ulterior motive is a propaganda instrument and not an expression of agape. They agree to exercise their full power and use whatever means at their disposal to bring Christian churches and religious organizations to a proper awareness of this situation. 7. The conference, being painfully aware that Muslim attitudes to Christian mission have been so adversely affected by the abuse of diakonia, strongly urges Christian churches and religious organizations to suspend their misused diakonia activities in the world of Islam. Such a radical measure is necessary to cleanse the atmosphere of Muslim-Christian relations and orientate them towards mutual recognition and co-operation worthy of the two great religions. The conference urges strongly that all material assistance donated by outside churches and religious organizations henceforth be distributed wherever possible through or in

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co-operation with the governments and local communities of people for whom they are intended, respecting the dignity and integrity of the people concerned. 8. The conference urges that soon after the measures mentioned in the two preceding paragraphs begin to be implemented, Muslims and Christians should be invited to an assembly representative of the two faiths to consider the methods of mission and da‘wah, and the rules pertinent to each religion, and to seek modalities for enabling each religion to exercise its missionary call (da‘wah) in accordance with its own faith. The conference recognizes that mission and da‘wah are essential religious duties of both Christianity and Islam, and that the suspension of misused diakonia services is to the end of re-establishing mission in the future on a religiously sound basis acceptable to both. Such an assembly may also establish permanent organs with Christian and Muslim participation for the purpose of preventing or dealing with aberrations or violations of Muslim/Christian understanding by either party. 9. The conference is aware that good neighbourly and co-operative relations between Christians and Muslims cannot exist or endure unless there is a deepanchored reciprocal understanding of theologies, histories, moral and legal doctrines, social and political theories and problems of acculturation and modernization faced by the two faiths. To this end the conference urges that the World Council of Churches, the Vatican and the international Islamic organizations sponsor conferences at which these themes will be examined and discussed at regular intervals. 10. The conference, and especially the Muslim participants, express their deep and heartfelt appreciation to the WCC and the editors of the IRM for calling and sponsoring this conference. All participants express their joy that God has granted them the grace to bear in patience and empathize with one another. They are thankful to God that this conference may have made some contribution towards purifying the atmosphere of Muslim-Christian relations, and they pray that relations between their people may soon blossom into spiritual fellowship, to the glory of God alone.

Notes 1

2

3

Unfortunately the trend has once again been reversed after 9/11. The present tirade comes more from secular and liberal forces representing current American hubris. Although not agreeing with him, I cannot forget David Kerr’s seminal effort to understand the Muslim position without compromising his own, in his paper on The Prophet Muh.ammad in Christian Theological Perspective (Birmingham: Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian Muslim Relations, No. 2 Sept. 1982). Have others followed the lead? The following is reprinted with the kind permission of the editor of International Review of Mission 65:260 (October 1976).

Chapter 17

An Enduring Vision: The Study Centre at Selly Oak C. T. R. Hewer

Introduction For those of us involved in the world of Christian-Muslim relations, the name of David Kerr will forever evoke the Centre for the Study of Islam and ChristianMuslim Relations that he founded at the Selly Oak Colleges in 1976. As the reality of the Centre passes into memory, it is important in the context of the current Festschrift to record something of that vision from early documentation and the memories of those involved over the first decade. The Federation of the Selly Oak Colleges was an ideal setting for the Centre. The Colleges grew up from the early twentieth century onwards around an original Quaker foundation. Each College was independent, formed by a particular Christian group, generally with the original vision of training missionaries for service overseas. In the second half of the century, the emphasis gradually shifted from being sending agencies to being receivers of students coming from many countries around the world for further study, better to serve their communities at home. The flavour of Selly Oak as an international community is best summed up in a favourite saying of one of its Presidents, ‘You can go to the farthest flung parts of the world, where people have never heard of Birmingham, but if English is spoken there you will find in Christian circles an immediate recognition of the name Selly Oak.’ My own experience reflects that of countless others, to walk into the library of John Knox College in Dunedin, New Zealand, and mention that I had come from Selly Oak, only to find a group of people gathering around to say: ‘I studied there’ or ‘my father was there’ and so on. The second essential characteristic of Selly Oak was that the Colleges were founded on faith and lived by faith. There was no pretence of disengaged secular study of religion, many had given their lives to the cause of God. Finally, the Selly Oak Colleges were a rich tapestry of Christian diversity, in which, for example, although each College had its own traditions of worship, every Wednesday morning there was ‘Federal Worship’ in the George Cadbury

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Hall, which was led in turn by each College or teaching unit, so that all were exposed to all. The Federation is no more and most of the Colleges and teaching units have been closed or absorbed by the University, but many surely around the world bless its name in their devotions. David Kerr himself wrote, ‘Our success is due in large measure to the Selly Oak tradition of which we are part, a tradition which elicits dedication to ideals and courageous determination to turn them into the best reality possible – which will not be as good as we want, but is likely to be much better than our many cynical observers tend to expect.’1 It was at Selly Oak after the 1914–18 War that the story of Islamic Studies began, with the appointment of Dr Alphonse Mingana, a displaced Syrian scholar, as the first Lecturer in Islam. This was part of the vision of Prof Rendell Harris, a renowned scripture scholar from Woodbrooke College, the original Quaker foundation. It was Rendell Harris who endowed the Central Library of the Selly Oak Colleges with his own collection, on condition that it should always be available for public access, and this occasioned the construction of the Central Library building, in which the Centre in due course was to be housed. Mingana, facilitated by the financial support of Dr Edward Cadbury, toured the Middle East to gather together Syriac and Arabic manuscripts of Christian and Muslim provenance to form the world renowned ‘Mingana Collection’. Harris’ successor as Director of Studies at Woodbrooke was Herbert G. Wood, later to become the first Professor of Theology at the University of Birmingham in 1940. In his inaugural lecture he spelt out his vision, which prefigured so much about the Centre, which was to be formed some thirty-six years later: It would be a unique achievement if we in Birmingham could do something parallel to the programme which Rabindranath Tagore is attempting to carry out in Santiniketan. There he hopes to have the great cultures of East and West represented side by side with their own scholarly exponents … In all this he aims at promoting a fellowship of faiths based not on the assumption that all religions are equally true and mean the same thing at bottom, but on the sure foundation of mutual respect and honest undertaking.2 Mingana died in 1937 and his work continued from the mid-1940s under the direction of James Sweetman, who wrote the magisterial four volume work Islam and Christian Theology, built up the book collection of the Library and for more than twenty years guided generations of Christian missionaries going to work in Muslim lands. Sweetman had served at the Henry Martyn Institute for Islamic Studies in Hyderabad, India, thus he combined an academic interest in the study of Islam with active missionary endeavour. The spirit of Islamic studies at Selly Oak changed under Sweetman’s successor, John B. Taylor, ‘for whom interfaith dialogue was an integral part of the ecumenical ministry of the

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Church, not to be subsumed under mission’.3 It was in Taylor’s time that Muslims as well as Christians began to study Islam at Selly Oak, and the arrangement began with the University of Birmingham to enter students for their postgraduate degrees. After John Taylor left for Geneva in 1973 to work in the dialogue departments of the World Council of Churches, the stage was set for the appointment of David Kerr as Selly Oak Lecturer in Islam.

The preparation of the man David began his academic career by reading Arabic and Islamic Studies at the London School of Oriental and African Studies. It was here, fuelled by the study of Norman Daniel’s Islam and the West: The Making of an Image, that an abhorrence of the polemical character of much of historical Christian-Muslim relations developed: [This was] the book which first stirred my sense of Christian obligation to try to root out this evil from the soul of Western Christianity. . . . polemical characterisation is as seriously a cancerous malignancy in the polemicist as it is maligning of the polemicised: equally, dialogue helps us avoid false witness against ourselves as well as against others.4 It was also at this time that another key concept of the Centre was born, that of friendship and hospitality: . . . [T]he intellectual hospitality of the discussion group, the spiritual hospitality of friendship, or the many human hospitalities which I received as a vagabond hitch-hiker in the Middle East, I felt myself richly gifted as a human being by Muslim acquaintances. In my time in Birmingham my experience of Muslim hospitality has been deepened and enriched through extensive personal contact with the Muslim population of this city.5 From London, David went on to read Christian theology in Oxford under the tutelage of men such as Professors George Caird and Robert Zaehner, the latter it was who introduced the ‘awkward Calvinist’ Kerr to the mystical theology of Christianity and Islam. It was Zaehner who wrote, ‘The Qur’a¯ n is to the Muslim not as the Bible but as Christ to the Christian, and by it the Muslim may rise to the same and ultimately unspeakable mystical experience and knowledge of peace with God as the Christian can through Christ.’6 After theological studies, David began to prepare his doctoral thesis under the supervision of Albert Hourani on relations between Christian and Muslim communities in Syria and Lebanon.

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For the period of this research and afterwards as a BBC journalist and broadcaster, David was immersed in the history and contemporary situation of the Arab world. It was at this time that he came under the influence of the Bishop of Mount Lebanon, George Khodr, who expanded his imagination in thinking about the Trinity as a co-equal partnership: Hence the Holy Spirit is free to roam wheresoever it/she/he wills – outside the Church of history as much as within; and wheresoever the Spirit is operative, the fullness of the Godhead is proleptically present in mystery, in the inseparable activity of creation and salvation whereby God graciously brings all creation and all human beings to perfection . . . The mission of the Church, in Khodr’s sense, is to be spiritually affirming of the truth of God he expects to find in Islam, not in spite of Jesus Christ but because of the nature of God the Holy Spirit.7

The seedbed of a vision The man who had been formed by these human, spiritual and intellectual experiences was appointed as the Selly Oak Lecturer in Islam in 1973, and in the near seclusion of the Mingana Room at the far end of the Central Library, ‘the guiding hand of God’, to use Prof H. G. Wood’s phrase,8 began to lead him to develop a vision of a Study Centre in Islam and Christianity, as ‘a place where Christians and Muslims may meet to study together at all levels in total obedience to their respective faiths, and in a spirit of openness to one another and of trust’.9 These ideas of course did not grow in a vacuum. The particularity of the Selly Oak context has already been noted, but in other parts of the world there were Christian study centres established for the study of Islam, notably the Henry Martyn Institute in Hyderabad, India, the Christian Study Centre in Rawalpindi, the Pontifical Institute for the Study of Arabic and Islamic Studies, Rome and the Near East School of Theology in Beirut. The work of these study centres was explored and expounded in a background paper for a consultation of around one hundred Christians and Muslims interested in the possibility of establishing ‘a Christian centre for the study of Islam’ at Selly Oak held on 9–11 May 1975.10 Of particular importance from this survey as regards the Centre are the following: the growing trend towards Christian ecumenical partnership in such endeavours, the creative tension between theological study and developing tools for work within society, the emerging need to be ‘talking with’ and not just ‘talking about’ Muslims, the need for such a study centre in Europe where a much more religiously plural society was developing and not just in Africa and Asia, and the close relationship between such a study centre and the churches to which it offers its services.

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An important development reported in this consultation paper was the meeting between an equal number of Christians and Muslims in Broumana, Lebanon in July 1972 to discuss the theme: ‘In search of understanding and co-operation: Christian and Muslim contributions’. Two elements from the closing agreed memorandum are worthy of note in the context of the Centre: Frank Witness: We did not ask each other to suppress or conceal his convictions. In dialogue each should bear witness to his motives to his fellows and to God. This frank witness can help to remove complacency, suspicion or unspoken fears. Mutual Respect: We believed that mutual respect was a necessary principle for our dialogue. This does not involve a stale co-existence of ‘live and let live’, but a sensitive regard for the partner’s scruples and convictions, a sympathy for his difficulties and an admiration for his achievements. We should avoid all invidious comparison of strength in our tradition with weakness in the other, of the ideal in one with the actuality in the other.11 Another area of the world where Christians and Muslims have lived side by side for centuries is West Africa. It was in Accra, Ghana, that the World Council of Churches drew together Muslims and Christians from across Africa to explore the theme: ‘The unity of God and the community of mankind: co-operation between African Muslims and African Christians in work and witness’. From its closing memorandum the following paragraphs are instructive: People of living faiths from both sides ought to share their concerns and understanding not in an attempt to forge an alliance against anybody but as a sign of their witness to God and of their responsibility for each other and the world … Dialogue is therefore concerned about personal meeting and encounter and co-operation in work and worship as well as about sustained mutual involvement in local level contacts. It can lead to a common desire for a search for truth and a reciprocal exchange of intimations and insights with each other, thus deepening and strengthening our knowledge of each other and religious truth. This personal dimension needs to be stressed lest dialogue be mistakenly seen simply as some kind of comparative religion wherein academic comparisons are made of creed and dogma for their own sake. Also dialogue as the meeting of persons is different from, indeed critical of, conversion understood as a ‘numbers game’ or a crusade for a membership drive. The attitude that sees conversion either as a piece of statistical manipulation or a triumphant band-waggoning is contrary to the spirit of dialogue.

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Dialogue sees conversion as a growing awareness of the presence of God in an encounter in which each becomes responsible for the other and where both seek openness in witness before God.12 Finally, this time from the Southeast Asian context, in early 1975 a regional meeting of Muslims and Christians took place in Hong Kong under the theme ‘Muslims and Christians in society: towards good-will, consultation and working together in Southeast Asia’. From its memorandum the following paragraph is important in our context: Our religions have the responsibility to alert society to religious, moral and spiritual values in the changing circumstances of daily life. Our responsibility is to enhance the total development of the human personality, spirituality and society, and to stand squarely behind all that promotes justice and peace. Our religions are called upon to offer fresh motivations and fresh guidance for the growing expectations and changing aspirations of human beings in society.13

A Centre at Selly Oak These then were the situations around the world that contributed to the development of an idea for a Study Centre at Selly Oak. The development of Muslim communities in Britain and the rest of Europe was a powerful impetus behind the move, and Birmingham by this time had a Muslim population in the region of 25–30,000. ‘The time is overdue for the Church in the West to show a more direct and extensive commitment to its part in the Christian apostolate in relation to Islam, not only overseas but, just as important, to the increasingly large Muslim communities now resident in parts of Europe.’14 The four headline objectives for the proposed Centre, written by David himself in a discussion proposal, are noteworthy for the power and balance of the language: 1. Within the contexts of the theological interests of the Selly Oak Colleges, to assist Christians, in brotherly collaboration with Muslims, to study the faith and practice of Islam in a spirit of reverence and compassion. 2. To help the Church in the United Kingdom and Western Europe to understand and accept more fully its part in the Christian apostolate in relation to Islam in Europe and beyond. 3. To initiate joint study ventures, bringing Christians and Muslims together to discuss their mutual concerns, and to encourage and support others in this pursuit. 4. To cooperate to the fullest possible extent with all other centres for the study of Islam.15

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In proximate preparation for the critical May 1975 consultation, the vision for the Centre sharpened in a background paper prepared by David the month before. Here we read that: The conception of the nature and function of the centre … is as follows: ‘That the centre should be a place of research, teaching and information, in which Christians and Muslims may co-operate in the study of Islam and ChristianMuslim relations to their mutual enrichment and toward the deepening of friendship and understanding between the Christian and Muslim communities, especially in Europe.16 In addition to standard teaching and research work, particular attention was drawn to ‘service to the wider community’, by which was meant the many people, services and institutions which were coming into contact with Muslims and Islam but without the necessary background knowledge of faith and practice to facilitate their service to the same. These included what would today come under the heading of ‘Islam awareness training’ for police, social workers, teachers, members of the caring professions, clergy and various other interest groups. The Centre was envisioned as a support provider for others delivering frontline service in these fields. ‘Within the European context it could function as a centre for the gathering and dissemination of information about ChristianMuslim relations throughout the continent.’17

‘Study-in-dialogue’ A key phrase that enters into the literature at this stage is ‘study-in-dialogue’, by which was meant, ‘the approach should be dialogical since men of one faith cannot expect to understand, let alone appreciate, the faith of others without their closest collaboration. This clearly goes as much for Muslims who wish to understand Christianity as for Christians who wish to understand Islam, and the centre would properly be concerned with both’.18 Ten years later, this phrase had come to symbolize ‘the key principle in the whole enterprise of the Centre’: ‘Study-in-dialogue’ rejects syncretism or compromise on the one hand and defensive apologetics on the other. It searches for deeper understanding of Islam and Christianity as each religion is understood by its adherents. Its interest lies in people of living faith and thus with religious traditions as dynamic realities, not historical relics. It takes seriously the challenges of society in which Muslims and Christians live and seek to apply their faith. It tries to ‘feel’ what it means to be Christian and Muslim, not sentimentally, but in recognition that we are bound together as people of faith in the One God.

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Faith is properly expressed in the language of creed, doctrine and theology; in these Muslims and Christians say much in common and much distinctively, and their language(s) can be understood intellectually. But faith is also expressed in the language of ‘worship’ as lives are lived in thanksgiving to God, in obedience to His Loving Will, in openness to all His human creatures, and in inward reflection. This moves us to the language of service and of prayer, and here ‘study-in-dialogue’ helps us to perceive freshly how God touches the lives of those of another faith and what this means for our own.19 Indeed the importance of this phrase can be seen in the final wording selected for the title of the Centre: ‘Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations’, by which the key verb ‘to study’ relates both to Islam and ChristianMuslim relations and yet the latter also has the active sense of practical positive engagement; so, both doing and studying the relations between Christians and Muslims. ‘The concern for academic excellence could thus be combined with the ethical and spiritual quest for interfaith understanding with the result that the Study Centre would have a distinctive place among the universities of Britain and western Europe, offering the Christian and Muslim communities a unique resource.’20

Consultation, May 1975 All this reflection resulted in the consultation of Christians and Muslims in Selly Oak from 9 to 11 May 1975 to discuss the potential establishment of the Centre. Much of what emerged from that consultation has already been foreseen in the foregoing but certain phrases have become seminal: a Centre where Christians and Muslims may meet to study together at all levels, in total obedience to their respective faiths and in a spirit of openness to one another and of trust.21 We accept as a guiding principle in the study of each religion that full account be given to the ways in which each religion is understood and practised by its followers. We desire that the Centre should be a place of meeting between Christians and Muslims where, within the bond of friendship, both parties may pursue frank and rigorous enquiry, and prepare for sensitive response to their varied vocations.22 In order that these objectives should be achieved, we strongly urge that Muslims be invited to take their place alongside Christians at all levels of the planning and working of the Centre – in the studentship, on the staff and on the consultative bodies.23

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Both Muslims and Christians were to be appointed to the academic staff; ‘In making appointments to these positions we feel that requirements of academic excellence should be combined with commitment to the ideals of the Centre.’24

People make the Centre And so the Centre was born. From the outset, the element of service to and links with the churches of Europe, North America and Africa was important. The support from the churches was immense; for several years in the 1980s, no less than three posts from the five at the Centre were supported by church links: two staff members seconded from North American churches and one other salary provided by the European churches. In return, there were specialist research projects on Muslims in Europe (Jørgen Nielsen), the history of Christian-Muslim relations (Bert Breiner) and the Islam in Africa project (Sigvard von Sicard), staff members travelled to read papers at conferences and teach intensive courses, clergy and church workers were sent to the Centre for up to a year’s tuition and every year several came for shorter periods to gain knowledge and experience to take back to the churches that sent them.25 This work had an impact too on secular agencies that were disposed to view European minorities only in terms of race, ethnicity, culture or sociology; they learnt to take religious identity seriously into the equation and realized that the Centre’s resources were second to none.26 The Centre is a deliberate attempt on the part of its Muslim and Christian founders, advisers and staff members to deal with the fact that their two religious traditions have a common, if unequal, historical and contemporary presence in Europe as ‘neighbours’. Consequently, the Centre is consciously committed to breaking out of the spiral of polemics which, as we have already inferred, marks the continuing history of European Christian attitudes towards Islam as a religious civilisation, and towards Muslims as people, and vice versa. To break out of the polemical tradition and to heal the wounds and scars it has inflicted means nothing less than to live faithfully to two of the Toraic commandments accepted by Christians and Muslims alike: ‘You shall not bear false witness against your neighbour’, and ‘You shall love your neighbour as yourself.’27 The contribution of Muslim scholars who shared ‘the ideals of the Centre’ cannot be overestimated. It was this lived reality and example of ChristianMuslim interaction that set the tone for the Centre’s life and spirit. The first full-time Muslim member of staff, Hasan Askari, was no stranger to pioneering thought and applying intellectual rigour to the study of Islam and interfaith relations. In the early 1980s there was a stream of part-time and visiting Muslim lecturers, who brought a breadth of wisdom and credibility to the work of the Centre as never before. Mention must be made of Syed Mitwalli El-Darsh, from

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al-Azhar,28 Khalid Alavi, from the University of the Punjab,29 and Al-Tayib Zein al-Abdin, from the University of Khartoum, who commented: To my surprise, I found that the Islam Centre in Selly Oak Colleges is more tolerant and accommodating to Muslim points of view than the secular universities. The Centre is committed to present Islam as a true faith of God and to present a Christian-Muslim dialogue which promotes understanding and peaceful co-existence. This is where the real merit of the Centre lies.30 Over the years, there was a steady flow of visitors from both faith traditions and from all parts of the world. Truly, the Centre was a place of pilgrimage, and ‘Pilgrims discover that they have gifts and strengths which they may share with others, and that their fellow pilgrims have gifts and strengths to share with them.’31 Some visitors would come to share their experiences with the Centre or to seek wisdom and good counsel, some would give a formal seminar and others share in Centre activities for a time. Some visitors appeared only once but many more made frequent visits; all hopefully became ambassadors of the message of the ideals of the Centre and passed on the word that there was an open door. To all these visitors we would express our gratitude for helping us achieve one of the fundamental purposes for which the Study Centre exists – to be a place of meeting between Christians and Muslims from different parts of the world, where experiences can be shared, situations analysed, and friendships deepened by thinking through the challenges which confront those of us who are committed to living interfaith.32 One element of the original Consultation that established the Guidelines for the Centre was ‘appropriate practical outreach’ within both faith communities and to the wider human society in which we all live. There was a conviction that, ‘The academic study of religions emasculates its subject if it refuses to take seriously the religious convictions by which the faithful live and relate to one another as “witnesses” in the world of human society.’33 Within five years of the foundation of the Centre, David wrote: . . . [W]e have learned how the Study Centre’s internal teaching and research activities themselves need to be informed, in both mind and spirit, by the everyday experience of both Muslims and Christians as they meet, or avoid each other, in western society and in the many other parts of the world from which we in the West have so much to learn. The Extension Programme, therefore, should not be thought of as an appendage to the internal activities of the Study Centre – a concession to ‘ordinary’ Muslims and Christians by a privileged few. Such a view would be repugnantly

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elitist, arrogantly hypocritical and worst of all, would betray the insight we value within both Islamic and Christian consciousness – that before the One God all humankind without distinction stands in need of God’s Guidance and Grace. It is within this framework of thought that the ‘Centre’ element of our title finds its meaning. We must strive to stand at the centre of the Muslim and Christian communities in Britain – or more exactly, in the centre of that area of eclipse, sometimes smaller sometimes larger, between the ‘circles’ of Muslims and Christians in this society. Only thus will the Study Centre be authentically a place of existential meeting between Christians and Muslims, and only thus will it be able to relate authentically to Muslims and Christians in other parts of the world.34 The principal way in which this extension ideal was fulfilled was through the annual ten-day residential Summer School, which drew people from all five continents, from both communities and from a wide range of backgrounds. They were of course hugely demanding on staff time and effort as people came expecting access to those who could educate and inspire them from breakfast to bedtime. However, this extension element of the Centre alone touched the lives of many hundreds of people, and through them the communities to which they belonged and which they served.

The intimacy of friendship The collective term ‘the Centre’ stands above adequate definition. Many of those who came as students or visitors had decades of experience to contribute and were established academics or religious leaders in their own right, thus often ‘students’ taught ‘teachers’. Leaders from the local Muslim communities showed their support for the Centre by enrolling themselves for higher degrees and thus broadening out the Centre community into the city and beyond. The very setting of the Centre within the Central Library meant that seminar room, library, student study facilities and staff and administrative offices were physically interwoven. Students knew that if the Library was open and even if their own tutor or supervisor was not present they would soon find the door open to another staff office where someone would be waiting to help. Within the Central Library itself, there was a discrete Centre library arranged in such a way that facilitated the use of Centre students, so that it became in itself a pedagogic tool. The Centre could never be economically independent and would not have been created or survived without the generous support of the Cadbury Trusts and thus the wider family of the Selly Oak Colleges. The ‘spirit of Selly Oak’, to which reference has already been made, inspired not only dedication from employed personnel but also the

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willing contribution of volunteers; how many students, faced with writing a thesis in their second, third, fourth or even fifth language, to this day bless the services offered by such volunteers! A natural support system was created by holding incoming post in the administrative office, so that students and staff were bound to ‘look in’ each day, to what was the living hearth around which everyone gathered. At times there was a ‘Centre book’ selected for a term, which everyone read and discussed together, so as to break down the isolation of research and ensure that all were fed by and contributed to ‘the Centre spirit’. Each week there was a ‘Centre seminar’, attendance at which was expected from all staff, visitors and students, so that all might learn from one another. On the principal teaching day, which drew in the part-time students, there was also ‘Centre tea’ to create a social forum where people might meet naturally. The size of the Centre, generally in the region of thirty people with a stable core around which others came and went, meant that friendships developed as natural loci of learning and support. Many of those friendships have endured for decades and people who could hardly acknowledge each other ‘at home’ found in the Centre a safe haven where it was possible to break through barriers of suspicion and prejudice. Being made up of women and men of faith from both Muslim and Christian communities, there were of course provisions for prayer, fasting and the celebration of festivals woven into the fabric of the Centre. No-one was expected to ignore or subjugate their faith; to the contrary the whole vision of the Centre was that ‘study-in-dialogue’ would not just inform an awareness of the faith of the other but in that process strengthen one’s own faith through shared reflection and learning from the other. It became the practice at the Centre for everyone to meet for a timetabled period of ‘Reflection’ each week, during which in turn people from both communities would share something of their own scripture and writings, and then reflect on them in a way that could illumine all. In the stillness of the Reflection, hearts were expanded just as intellects were in the seminar room or library. The final words on this belong to David himself: What cannot be programmed but is nonetheless essential to the Study Centre is the dynamic of spiritual reflection and prayer – a fundamental life-stance of Muslim and Christian alike. ‘Prayer’, said one of the Muslims involved in the Study Centre, ‘is the actualisation of peace’. As the Study Centre is a place of peace between Christians and Muslims, so also is it a place of prayer that God will lead us, as in a pilgrimage, into His future.35

Needed now more than ever And so we return quite rightly to ‘the guiding hand of God’ with which Prof H. G. Wood launched the vision without quite knowing it in 1940. This

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article has focused exclusively on the development of the man and the vision behind the Centre, and the way in which that vision worked towards its fulfilment until 1988 when David left for Hartford Seminary. For a constellation of reasons, in the subsequent years the vision has shifted and other things have been achieved. Birmingham’s Muslim population now heads towards 200,000, an increase reflected in Britain and around Europe. The hypothetical question, ‘What if the original vision had endured and developed over these twenty years?’ can be the subject of speculation, but surely we can conclude that ‘the Centre’: People, faith, community links, study, vision and outreach, would have much to contribute to the twenty-first century. The original enduring vision remains somehow wraith-like, waiting to be called into a new birth, in circumstances that will be different but in which elements of the enduring vision will find their fulfilment and future generations will come to bless the name and vision of David Kerr.

Notes 1

2 3

4 5 6 7

8 9 10

11

12

13

14

15

16

Short form: The Newsletter of the Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, Selly Oak Colleges, Birmingham B29 6LQ, is shortened herein to Newsletter. David A. Kerr, ‘A personal pilgrimage with Islam’, Newsletter 19 (1988), 6. David A. Kerr, ‘The 10th anniversary of the Study Centre’, Newsletter 15 (1986), 10. David A. Kerr, ‘The 10th anniversary of the Study Centre’, Newsletter 15 (1986), 5. David A. Kerr, ‘A personal pilgrimage with Islam’, Newsletter 19 (1988), 9. David A. Kerr, ‘A personal pilgrimage with Islam’, Newsletter 19 (1988), 10. David A. Kerr, ‘A personal pilgrimage with Islam’, Newsletter 19 (1988), 15. David A. Kerr, ‘A personal pilgrimage with Islam’, Newsletter 19 (1988), 17. For further reference see G. Khodr, ‘Christianity in a pluralist world – the Economy of the Holy Spirit’, The Ecumenical Review (April 1971), 118–28. David A. Kerr, ‘A personal pilgrimage with Islam’, Newsletter 19 (1988), 7. David A. Kerr, ‘The 10th anniversary of the Study Centre’, Newsletter 15 (1986), 5. John B. Taylor, ‘Selly Oak Colleges Consultation on Possibilities for a Christian Centre for the Study of Islam, May 9–11, 1975’, April 1975. John B. Taylor, ‘Selly Oak Colleges Consultation on Possibilities for a Christian Centre for the Study of Islam, May 9–11, 1975’, April 1975, p. 5. John B. Taylor, ‘Selly Oak Colleges Consultation on Possibilities for a Christian Centre for the Study of Islam, May 9–11, 1975’, April 1975, p. 7. John B. Taylor, ‘Selly Oak Colleges Consultation on Possibilities for a Christian Centre for the Study of Islam, May 9–11, 1975’, April 1975, p. 8. David A. Kerr, ‘Proposal: The creation of a centre for the study of Islam and Christian-Muslim relations, to be part of the Selly Oak Colleges’, 31 October 1974, p. 1. David A. Kerr, ‘Proposal: The creation of a centre for the study of Islam and Christian-Muslim relations, to be part of the Selly Oak Colleges’, 31 October 1974, p. 2. David A. Kerr, ‘Background Paper: Suggestions regarding the work of a centre for the study of Islam and Christian-Muslim relations in Selly Oak Colleges’, April 1975, p. 1.

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18

19 20 21

22

23

24

25 26 27

28 29 30

31 32 33

34

35

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David A. Kerr, ‘Background Paper: Suggestions regarding the work of a centre for the study of Islam and Christian-Muslim relations in Selly Oak Colleges’, April 1975, p. 3. David A. Kerr, ‘Background Paper: Suggestions regarding the work of a centre for the study of Islam and Christian-Muslim relations in Selly Oak Colleges’, April 1975, p. 3. David A. Kerr, ‘Editorial’, Newsletter 14 (1985), 2. David A. Kerr, ‘The 10th anniversary of the Study Centre’, Newsletter 15 (1986), 5. Draft Statement of the Christian-Muslim Consultation: 9–11 May 1975, at the Selly Oak Colleges. From the Guidelines that emerged from the Consultation, cited in: David A. Kerr, ‘The 10th anniversary of the Study Centre’, Newsletter 15 (1986), 6. Draft Statement of the Christian-Muslim Consultation: 9–11 May 1975, at the Selly Oak Colleges. Draft Statement of the Christian-Muslim Consultation: 9–11 May 1975, at the Selly Oak Colleges. David A. Kerr, ‘The 10th anniversary of the Study Centre’, Newsletter 15 (1986), 7. David A. Kerr, ‘The 10th anniversary of the Study Centre’, Newsletter 15 (1986), 7. David A. Kerr, ‘Special Focus: Part One, Christian-Muslim relations: a challenge within Europe’, Newsletter 9 (1983), 8. See ‘Interview’, Newsletter 12 (1984), 3–11. See ‘Special Focus: Professor Khalid Alavi’, Newsletter 16 1986, 9–18. Al-Abdin, Al-Tayib Z., ‘How did I find Selly Oak? – A word of encouragement’, Newsletter 17/18 (1987), 4–6. David A. Kerr, ‘Editorial’, Newsletter 13 (1985), 3. David A. Kerr, ‘News and Events: visitors’, Newsletter 10 (1983), 7. David A. Kerr, ‘The Extension Programme: a conceptual introduction’, Newsletter 3 (1980), 2. David A. Kerr, ‘The Extension Programme: a conceptual introduction’, Newsletter 3 (1980), 2. David A. Kerr, ‘Special Focus: Part One, Christian-Muslim relations: a challenge within Europe’, Newsletter 9 (1983), 10.

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Part Three

Christian-Muslim Encounter in Local and Contemporary Contexts

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Chapter 18

For the Peace of the City: Bradford – A Case Study in Developing Inter-Community and Inter-Religious Relations Philip Lewis

This chapter argues that the city is a neglected unit in international relations and conflict resolution studies. Yet, in our post 9/11 and 7/7 world, the city is a critical site where the struggle to enable positive inter-religious and interethnic relations will be won or lost. Bradford, in the North of England, is home to a large and increasing number of Muslims. It was the location of two major riots largely involving young British Pakistani men. It is offered as a case-study mapping a number of initiatives which seek to create the conditions and actors for a more peaceful city. These projects involve Christians and Muslims working in collaboration with secular institutions and agencies. Where ‘religion’ is part of the problem it has to become part of the solution. There is also a pressing need for a sustained dialogue between religious and secular traditions.

The revenge of God During the last days of the Shah as the Iranian revolution was unfolding, the only proposal made by the Central Intelligence Agency to investigate the religious dimension of the revolution was vetoed on the grounds that it would amount to mere ‘sociology’, a term used in intelligence circles to mean timewasting study deemed politically irrelevant!1 Twenty-five years on, the US Foreign Service Institute – the training arm of the Dept of State – now requires its students to study religion and international relations.2 This represents a search for new interpretive models and new actors to understand and address conflict since the collapse of the familiar binaries of the Cold War. Writing a few years ago, Scott Appleby pointed out that ‘two thirds of contemporary wars turn on issues of religious, ethnic or national identity. Less than 10 percent begin as interstate conflicts’.3 Not surprisingly, there is a growing literature indicating how religious actors and institutions can and should engage in peacemaking.4

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With globalization and increased flows of people across borders, it becomes more and more difficult to separate domestic from foreign policy. 9/11 and 7/7 made that very clear. In Britain the Home Office has set up a faiths unit and the Foreign & Commonwealth Office now regularly meet with members of the different faith communities and recently produced a CD-ROM on ‘Faith and Foreign Policy’. Such government departments regularly liaise with a national interfaith NGO, The Inter-Faith Network for the UK. The Department for International Development (DFID) has researched the extent to which poverty reduction can be enhanced by engaging with Islamic NGOs, alongside Christian and secular NGOs. The porous nature of geographical boundaries is evident in the Muslims chosen by the government to join the seven working parties to reflect on deficits in the Muslim communities, which saw four young British Muslims blow up fellow citizens on 7/7. These included the controversial Swiss Muslim scholar/activist, Professor Tariq Ramadan – grandson of the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt – drafted in to join the group charged to make recommendations to tackle ‘extremism and radicalisation’ – and an influential, American Sufi, Shaikh Hamza Yusuf to join those reflecting on ‘engaging young people’. The group considering mosques, imam training and accreditation included the Egyptian Islamic scholar, long resident in the United Kingdom, the late Shaikh Dr Zaki Badawi, but also a Canadian Muslim, Dr Jamal Badawi.5

Faith in the City: Bradford – a case-study in identifying and mobilizing bridging social capital? I want to offer four glimpses into how religious actors, embedded in religious institutions, can in partnership with other agencies and institutions, religious and secular, address some intractable inter-ethnic conflicts which include a religious component. I take the city as a unit of analysis – not least because the future health of Muslim and non-Muslim relations, especially in the West, will be tested by what happens in our cities where Muslims are disproportionately clustered, usually, as recent events in France made clear, in deprived inner city or outer city estates. I use Bradford – my home for more than twenty years – as a case study, given its growing young Muslim population. The four issues I wish to touch on involve an initiative which anticipated and sought to limit the damage in the city of a 7/7 type event; a second reflects on an attempt to contribute to a new leadership in Bradford which could move across the ethnic and religious divide; the third reflects on an attempt to address radical Islamic politics on a university campus and finally the beginnings of some work on conflict resolution involving some British educated ‘ulama. I shall conclude with a few more general comments and questions.

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Bradford: Background Bradford has been the site of two major riots in 1995 and 2001 – both of which largely, involved young, disaffected British Pakistanis.6 The second riot was part of an unfolding pattern across a number of northern cities which triggered a plethora of reports. The broad conclusion was that ‘Muslim’ and non-Muslim communities were living ‘parallel lives’. There was shock at the depth of polarization: Separate educational arrangements, community and voluntary bodies, employment, places of worship, language, social and cultural networks, means that many communities operate on the basis of a series of parallel lives. They do not touch at any point, let alone overlap and promote any meaningful interchange.7 Since the 2001 riots the city has had to cope with additional problems: four BNP councillors have been elected within the district and university Islamic campus politics have been dominated by the radical group, Hizbat-Tahrir (Party of Liberation), a breakaway group from the Muslim Brotherhood with roots in Palestine. All this was before the tragedy of 7/7. It is clearly not helpful to conflate a growing problem of youth disaffection with Islamic terrorism. However, there is undoubtedly a crisis in the transmission of Islam in a relevant manner to a new generation of British Muslims. Young Muslims between the ages of 5 and 16 can spend two hours a day, five days a week in a mosque school after state school. This massive investment of time and energy generally has not contributed to a confident Muslim identity. Important research by Dr Abdullah Sahin into identity formation of Muslim Sixth Formers in Birmingham schools noted that most started with a positive attitude to Islam and an ‘exploratory identity’. However, where Islamic religious teachers could not make connections between the two, their Muslim identity became either ‘prematurely closed’, and therefore inflexible and incapable of responding to criticism, or ‘diffuse’ and so vulnerable to extremist groups.8

Bridging social capital (i): Towards an integrated civic network9 There were three influences behind the attempts to develop an integrated civic network in Bradford in June 2004: 1. First, the Madrid bombing on 11 March 2004 and the subsequent insistence by the Metropolitan Police Commissioner that an attack in Britain was almost inevitable. In Madrid the Mayor immediately offered a public statement that

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the bombing was not the responsibility of any one religious or ethnic group. This message played a role in preventing a backlash against the Moroccan community. This posed the question: did Bradford have in place people who could intervene in a responsible way to dampen down tensions? 2. Second, the seminal, academic study of Ashutosh Varshney which asked in the context of India: why did three cities implode into Hindu-Muslim violence after the Ayodhya debacle, and three other cities with similar demographic profiles did not.10 His broad conclusion was that while everyday interactions – children playing together, participation in each others’ religious festivals, eating together and so on – were important, the crucial variable was the presence or absence of a variety of robust crosscutting associational forms of civic engagement: the examples he gave of such associations were business, professional organizations, cultural groups and political parties. 3. Third, a Bradford time-line, which gave a chronology of conflicts in the city since 1964. This suggested that the District had long periods of relative calm interspersed with regular disruptions. These tended to become more violent and damaging. There were doubts that underlying causes were being addressed, for example, evidence of spatial segregation around class and ethnicity/religion and correlations between youth, ethnicity, unemployment, crime and turf wars that often were drug-related. These triggers led to the co-convening by the Bishop of Bradford, a Professor of Peace Studies and a leading local policeman of sectoral groups across the district (education and youth, business, community and voluntary sector, faith groups, and media, and politics/labour). The emphasis at each meeting was cross-communal participation. We were especially concerned that each sector identified and incorporated young, Asian Muslim professionals. The reasoning was to incorporate a new generation of young people, who were often excluded by their elders; also, it was vital that there was adequate Muslim involvement to signal that this initiative was rooted in a shared appreciation that any terrorist atrocity would be considered an assault on all people and communities rather than being allowed to exacerbate Muslim and non-Muslim tensions. The meetings were specifically to get each sector to reflect on what they would do to prevent an escalation of conflict. A plausible scenario was developed by the police to which they had to respond. We held five sector meetings in the course of 2004 and a meeting of representatives of all sectors at the Bishop’s home where Professor Paul Rogers talked about the international situation and reminded us that most respected anti-terrorist specialists agreed with the Metropolitan Commissioner’s comments. This concentrated the minds wonderfully! In practice we did not manage to convene all sectors. Labour was not well represented and only a few politicians turned up (mostly Greens and Lib

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Dems); however, an influential policy maker in the Local Authority did attend who was able to keep the political leadership informed. In fact, we were cautious about too much political involvement: the aim was to present a civic face to the local state and by so doing encourage them to engage more proactively with difficult issues. One of the aims of the sector meetings was to encourage and enable different institutional actors to talk to each other. We discovered that there was minimal interaction between schools and youth service; or schools, local college and University. Each sector also chose a couple of people to meet together across sectors to share experiences and initiatives. We can draw some provisional conclusions. The civic network proved its worth on 7/7 when it met on the very day and was able to enact a range of initiatives: the education authority sent schools guidelines on how to address the issue; the local Chamber of Commerce and a sister organization representing Asian, largely Muslim businesses – the Asian Trades Link – publicized a prepared joint statement. The police capitalized on the network – which had involved some 100 people – and held a series of meetings, especially with vulnerable communities, to reassure them that attacks on them or their places of worship would not be tolerated. There were high profile signings of a civic condolence book for victims by a cross section of civic dignitaries and young people from all communities; further, mosque, synagogue, Cathedral and Hindu Temple were opened for silent prayers for all the communities. The civic network continues and hopes to encourage the different sectors to deepen an interaction strategy involving Muslims and non-Muslims.

Bridging social capital (ii): The Inter-Cultural Leadership School (ICLS) Before the riots in June 2001 a small group of Christians and Muslims organized a conference entitled ‘Shared Citizenship, Across Separating Communities, A Christian-Muslim Contribution’ where convergences and divergences with regard to attitudes to politics, urban regeneration, local schooling, business and community building in the voluntary sector were explored. Leading policy makers – a Christian and a Muslim – were invited from cities in Europe that also had growing Muslim communities, such as Rotterdam, Berlin and Copenhagen, to share their experiences with us.11 To each meeting local policy makers were invited. In all, it was an attempt to encourage or enhance ‘religious literacy’ among local policy makers.12 At this meeting we were joined by Geza Tessenyi from the Council of Europe. Geza held responsibility for asylum and immigration work. He suggested that as a next step we pilot in Bradford an Inter Cultural Leadership

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School (ICLS) – which in embryo he had attempted with young professionals in post-conflict Bosnia. So the four-day residential ICLS was born with Regional Development Authority (RDA) funding. The intention was to identify young professionals in their twenties from the majority, notionally ‘Christian’, communities, Asian Muslim communities and from a third holdall category dubbed ‘humanist’ (this enabled Sikh, Hindu, and secular participation). The aim was to select fifteen young people who were role models within their respective communities, especially with the 13 to 16-year-olds whom policy makers could not reach directly. In the four day residential they were to be given a range of skills: one day was devoted to ‘religious literacy’ – here specialists were invited from each tradition and asked to reflect on questions of identity, how difference was construed and where commonalities existed across traditions. The ICLS provided a ‘safe space’ to enable people to ask all sorts of questions. Further, it enabled them to begin to craft a vocabulary to talk about difficult issues.13 The second day was devoted to conflict resolution skills drawing on colleagues from Bradford University’s Peace Studies Department; the third to developing leadership skills – where we were able to draw on the services of an inspirational trainer from Pakistan and the final day was devoted to understanding and working with the media. The four days begin a process of building a network of trust in Bradford and contribute to developing a new leadership at ease with religious and cultural diversity who can move across the major ethnic/religious divide in the city. We have just completed our ninth such school. It has already developed an ongoing group of alumni – Society for Intercultural Leadership (SOIL) – and pioneered some innovative projects across communities. The model has also been exported to other English cities including Leicester; further, Geza has set up ICLS as an international NGO and with seed money from the European Commission and is piloting the model in other European cities such as Berlin, Rotterdam and Lyons – as well as Indonesia and Pakistan.14 In Bradford its success turns on a small group of committed Christian and Muslim activists with input from Peace Studies academics working in a secular university. ICLS has honed a series of principles which we seek to embody.15

Bridging social capital (iii): Addressing Muslim radicals on campus Let me start with an anecdote. One of my MA students in Peace Studies confided in me that he had stopped attending the university mosque because he was fed up with anti-Western harangues by a young British Pakistani, the organizer of Hizbat Tahrir (Party of Liberation).

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Ten years ago, the historian of the Hizbat Tahrir movement, already noted that many recruits in Britain were of South Asian ancestry: highly educated youth from factory-worker families. Compared with their parents and many organizations within British Islam, the party appears not only intellectually sophisticated, but also radical and highly political. This combination has enabled it to exploit the growing cultural chasm between such youth and their tradition-bound elders, and to tap into their feelings of alienation as they struggle to find a new identity against a background of their elders’ traditional preoccupations with subcontinental politics and social norms.16 We are hoping to apply some lessons developed by a friend of mine, a welleducated traditional imam with a mosque base who is also a part-time university chaplain on a London campus. ‘Ali’ has watched with anxiety the radicalization of sections of British Muslims in London and the deepening hostility to the West many British Muslim professionals evince.17 As university chaplain he has sought to address the issue of radicalism head on. From the start of his appointment there was a concerted attempt by Hizb- at Tahrir to de-legitimize him, as well as physically threaten him.18 In all, he has patiently worked to isolate them on campus, enjoying the full support of the university administration and fellow chaplains on his team. This he has sought to do by making sure that all Muslim groups on campus are represented on a chaplaincy advisory board – not simply the Islamic society which has often been hijacked by one or other radical and sectarian group. Further, he has developed written guidelines both for visiting speakers and for those delivering the khutbah (sermon) on Friday which could well become models for other Muslim university chaplains. These guidelines provide an insight into both the feverish ideological and sectarian world of Muslim student politics and how one imam, willing to engage with such a world, can begin to challenge its paranoia, in part by addressing the language in which issues are framed. Any would-be mosque speaker on campus now has to negotiate various hurdles: first, they have to provide two references of people who can attest the speaker’s standing and experience; they also must adhere to university rules and conform to equal opportunities policy, and enhance ‘mutual respect and understanding’. The guidelines for the Friday khutbah reminds the invitee that students are drawn from many different traditions and so it is important ‘to respect other people’s madhabs [legal schools] and personalities by not … attacking them directly or indirectly’; ‘controversial issues must be avoided’; speakers must not ‘incite hatred or violence in their talks … If one disagrees with a particular madhab or school of thought [this] is not the time to air it’; ‘words that have

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become symbols of hate, such as kuffar, dajjal, taghut (infidels, “anti-Christ”, and idol) and pagan systems of rule, should be substituted … with alternatives such as people of other faith, non-Muslims, etc … It is important to avoid denigrating remarks about university education in preference to other ways of learning …Speakers should not [seek] to recruit students to their causes …’19 ‘Ali’ worries that Islamic vocabulary rooted in the Qur’a¯ n and Sunnah are routinely torn out of context and misapplied in such a way as to suggest binary worlds of ‘us’ and ‘them’. Christians and Jews are seldom referred to by the correct Qur’a¯ nic term, Ahl al-Kitab, People of the Book, but demonized through use of the pejorative, kuffar [non-believers/infidels]. Similarly, the West is reified and essentialized as a pagan system over and against an Islamic system – this latter, is, of course, the coinage of such groups as Hizb- at Tahrir and the Salafis.20 This is another reason, ‘Ali’ contends, for serious study of the Qur’a¯ n to be given pride of place in religious formation. To this end, he has started an innovative, weekly Qur’a¯ n study session among his university students on campus, to help them engage with the text directly. Clearly, on a Yorkshire campus we are seeking to learn from ‘Ali’ – unfortunately, there does not yet exist a pool of educated and confident ‘ulama such as ‘Ali’, trained for chaplaincy work, although this is slowly changing. At our local university, we have sought to support young Muslim students disillusioned with the rhetoric and practises of radical groups. They are given active support to provide alternative Muslim speakers to develop quite distinct readings of the tradition. In November 2005 the university hosted free of charge some 500 people to listen to Professor Tariq Ramadan. However, this process of addressing extremism on campus remains a very difficult area – given the proper need to respect freedom of speech. The least the university can do is to enable a variety of voices to be heard rather than silenced.

Bridging social capital (iv): Imams and conflict resolution The mainstream Christian denominations in Britain have always had a public and civic role, especially England and Scotland with national churches. They are trained to minister to the pastoral needs of all in their parishes. This is why, for example, Anglican church-schools as community schools are often happy to include students from a variety of faith backgrounds – also why each Anglican diocese has appointed someone full-time or part-time – to advise them on interreligious relations. Such churches take for granted as part of their ethos a bridging role. Now, historically, in cities with growing Muslim communities – especially the two-thirds with roots in Indo-Pakistan – most ‘ulama are neither equipped nor expected by their paymasters, the mosque committees, to have such a role. This has created some dismay among clergy and ministers who have naturally sought

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to work collaboratively with an imam on issues of common concern in their locality. Worse, not a few of the ‘ulama embody a Manichean discourse which demonizes non-Muslim society.21 However, there are signs of change. There are now more than twenty-five Islamic seminaries in Britain.22 The most able of their alumni go on to further study in Cairo or Karachi, and some continue with MA and a few PhD programmes in Britain. Some of these young men are venturing out of the Muslim ‘comfort zone’ to become chaplains in prisons and hospitals. A few have pioneered multi-purpose mosques. In all, a small group of pioneers are developing new social and intellectual skills. It is with these young men that a colleague – Dr Margaret Nunnerley, a specialist on mediation services – and I began to work in Bradford. Between November 2004 and June 2005 we ran two one-day workshops on the themes of ‘Muslim Scholars and Conflict Resolution’, and ‘Working with Conflict in Muslim Families during Separation and Divorce’.23 We approached a small group of English-speaking scholars, and set out our aims which, in retrospect, were too ambitious, namely: to share current research on the experience of Muslim families during divorce; to facilitate the participants in sharing common issues in working with Muslim families in a non-Muslim environment and to identify peace-making resources within the Islamic tradition and identify local agencies with which they could collaborate. Their feedback was resoundingly positive and they pressed for another meeting with local professionals. The second workshop attracted fifteen people, of whom five were imams and the rest representatives from the police, senior family lawyers, CAFCA (Child and Family Court Advisory Service) family mediation, and local community and advice agencies. Ten participants were from the local Pakistani community. Police welcomed the opportunity to meet ‘ulama; one worker from a key agency had not known that there were local sources of knowledge on Islamic jurisprudence and a senior lawyer realized how little he knew about Asian Muslim families. For their part the ‘ulama felt confident enough to open channels of communication with key local professionals. From these workshops arose a request for a short course on developing skills in working with conflict in Muslim families, and this was held over five weekly two-hour sessions in the Bradford Council for Mosques new community centre. While the first two workshops were funded by the Churches Regional Commission; the latter was supported by the police. It attracted a similar constituency and allowed space to explore different social roles, the distinct legal and professional constraints within which people worked; as well as common difficulties, and convergences and divergences between English family law and Islamic law (shariah). We began to tentatively open up sensitive issues such as forced marriages, family violence, gender differences in divorce, finance and property arrangements, and eventually we addressed the distinction between Islamic prescriptions

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and cultural norms. The evaluations were positive and we are seeking to respond to a further request from the ‘ulama to put on a course on conflict resolution skills.

Conclusion Clearly, the specificities of Bradford apart, this case-study reminds us that we can no longer immunize the local from the regional, the national and the transnational. Muslims continue to have deep, ongoing links with their countries of origin, not least in recruiting religious leadership; British Pakistanis are now part of Islamic movements with roots outside South Asia, as was clear from comments about Hizbat Tahrir. Post 7/7 the government has enabled a serious process of reflection within the Muslim communities in Britain, again drawing on Muslims who have prestige and standing from outside Britain – Professor Tariq Ramadan and Shaikh Hamza Yusuf. The national church has long been engaged with Muslims at an academic and institutional level. Indeed, in January 2006 it launched at Lambeth Palace, a national Christian Muslim Forum, which among other initiatives has opened a structured dialogue between clergy and imams.24 This has kick-started local relations in Bradford which in the summer of 2007 saw a cricket team of imams and clergy from Bradford play a similar team from Leicester. All of these developing networks can generate trust and social change actors – what a leading peace practitioner and theorist calls ‘critical yeast’.25 I have chosen the city as a unit of analysis because this is frequently overlooked in favour of a focus on the national or international by policy makers and academics in international relations and conflict resolution. Irrespective of levels of analysis, I would hold that certain neglected dimensions of analysis need to be recognized and harnessed if ethnic and religious conflict is to be avoided. First, policy makers and academics need support to develop what Lord Parekh has called ‘religious literacy’. Diplomats, international relations specialists and the intelligence community have paid a heavy price for ‘its learned repugnance to contend intellectually with all that is religion or belongs to it’.26 Then, the relationship of politics and religion in the West needs to be re-opened. This is exemplified in an award-winning study by the American ethicist, Jeffrey Stout, Democracy & Tradition. The burden of Stout’s book is that democracy is itself a complex tradition fed by many intellectual and spiritual sources. He worries that where religious people have no space in civic and public life to bring their deepest convictions then public life is enfeebled as such people disengage and ethical discourse is thinned out. Stout reminds his readers that The first modern revolutionaries [in the USA] were not secular liberals; they were radical Calvinists. Among the most important democratic movements in

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American history were Abolitionism and the Civil Rights movement; both of these were based largely in the religious communities … If the religious Left does not soon recover its energy and self-confidence, it is unlikely that American democracy will be capable of counteracting either the greed of its business elite or the determinism of many whites to define the authentic nation in ethnic, racial or ecclesiastical terms.27 Finally, there is a pressing need for a sustained dialogue between religious and secular thinkers and policy makers. The old paradigm of ‘secularization’ has probably run its course, certainly outside Europe. ‘Secularization’ as it developed in the 1960s in the West, assumed that modernity – urbanization, universal education, mobility, the juxtaposition of religious and cultural diversity in urban spaces, and so on, would produce increasing levels of disbelief, disenchantment and desacralization of the world; in short, the decreased importance of ‘religion’ in personal, civic and public life. In reality, ‘secularization’ – the main theoretical and analytical framework through which the social sciences have viewed the relationship of religion and modernity – comprises three very different propositions: Secularization as differentiation of the secular spheres from religious institutions and norms; secularization as decline of religious beliefs and practices, and secularization as marginalization of religion to a privatized sphere.28 Stout considers that ‘this theory now lies in shambles, having nearly all of its predictions falsified over the last four decades’.29 The Bradford case-study points to an attempt to activate all these complex dimensions in the search for a more peaceful city which gives little space for extremism, political or religious. The church’s involvement is predicated on its history of inter-religious relations – locally, nationally and transnationally – as well as the public and civic role that clergy, cathedral personnel and bishops still fulfil. Moreover, the bishop, cathedral and some churches – along with the university – can provide ‘safe spaces’ for honest and robust discussion. An increase of such ‘safe spaces’ is necessary for developing ‘religious literacy’ at different levels of the city, institutional and spatial.30 However, as Bradford makes clear, church personnel work in partnership with secular institutions as is evident from all the initiatives identified. In the long term, none of this work is more important than the relationships being developed with some of the ‘ulama in the area of conflict resolution .31

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Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson, Religion: The Missing Dimension of Statecraft (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 12. See M. Scott Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations: the Struggle for the Soul of the 21st Century (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

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R. Scott Appleby, The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), p. 17. See Harold Coward and Gordon S. Smith, Religion and Peacebuilding (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004). James D. Wolfensohn, President of the World Bank, has recently justified incorporating ‘culture and religion into the recognised legitimate discourse of international statecraft and development’. He cited a recent study by the World Bank, Voices of the Poor, which indicated that ‘faith institutions, especially at the local level, inspire greater trust and confidence than governments, donors, or secular non-governmental groups. Moreover, faith-based organizations are hugely important providers of social services. In many countries, they are the source of half or more of health and education services. In countries and areas in conflict, they are often the only source of social services’. ‘The fellowship of dialogue’, in Akbar Ahmed and Brian Frost (eds), After Terror: Promoting Dialogue among Civilizations (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), p. 163. See ‘Preventing Extremism Together’ Working Groups, August–October 2005, available at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/cons-prev-extreme. In the 2001 census Bradford had 16 percent Muslims in the city or about 75,000, a large majority of whom were from Pakistani/Kashmiri backgrounds. This bald statistic masks distinctive features about these communities, notably a disproportionately young community – some 28 percent in local schools – concentrated in eight inner city wards. If there are wards of the city which are 70 percent ‘Muslim’ – the schools are more segregated: many 90 percent+. While demographic projection is not an exact science, it is assumed that the ‘Muslim’ communities within will probably double within the next twenty years. For an excellent overview of the geographical distribution, socioeconomic profile and ethnic diversity of British Muslims, see Ceri Peach, ‘Muslims in the UK’ in Tahir Abbas (ed.), Muslim Britain, Communities under Pressure (London: Zed Books, 2005), pp. 18–30. Ted Cantle (chairman) Community Cohesion: A Report of the Independent Review Team (Home Office, 2001), p. 9. Dr Sahin shared his findings in an open lecture delivered at Bradford University entitled ‘Mosque and school: bridging separate intellectual worlds – an urgent task for the Muslim educator today’, (27-11-03). For this section, I have drawn on discussions and background discussion papers prepared by Professor Jenny Pearce in the Peace Studies Department at Bradford University. Ashutosh Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India (Yale 2002). The three peaceful cities were Calicut, Lucknow and Surat, and the three chronically violent cities Aligarh, Hyderabad and Ahmedabad. They included the vice mayor of Rotterdam and a member of the Berlin senate who had responsibility for inter-ethnic relations. The phrase ‘religious literacy’ is used in an important report commissioned by the Runnymede Trust which was published under the title The Parekh Report, The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain (London: Profile Books, 2000). Too often, a well-intentioned anti-racist rhetoric has been used as the only explanatory tool for inter-ethnic tensions. Such an analytical tool does not begin to explain why some ‘Asians’ have circumvented ‘racism’ so much more successfully

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than others. Clearly, we have to factor in a full panoply of variables, such as class, culture and religion, different migration histories and so on. Geza, a gifted and imaginative civil servant, sacrificed a secure career at the Council of Europe to establish the ICLS with an office in Rome. For information about ICLS, see www.intercivilization.net and [email protected]. These principles are honesty and openness; mutual respect; personal participation; teaching wisdom; proportionate financing and a network of trust. Each is amplified in a short commentary. ICLS has been slightly expanded as the Intercultural Communication and Leadership School. Suha Taji-Farouki, A Fundamental Quest, Hizb al-Tahrir and the Search for the Islamic Caliphate (London: Grey Seal, 1996), pp. 177–8. The author Hanif Kureishi in his novel – The Black Album (1996) – has vividly depicted the leadership, dynamics, ethos and appeal of such radical groups. The novel was grounded in research of such groups on the campuses of north London in the mid-1990s. Ed Husain’s The Islamist, Why I Joined Radical Islam in Britain, What I Saw Inside and Why I Left (Penguin, 2007) is an excellent insight into the dynamics of the movement in Britain by an ex-member. Anti-Western, anti-Jewish and anti-Hindu sentiments have long been embedded in the literature produced by South Asian Muslims in Britain. For examples and bibliography, see Philip Lewis, ‘Mosques, ‘ulama and Sufis: Providers of bridging social capital for British Pakistanis?’ forthcoming in Contemporary South Asia. For an accessible recent study of their activities, see Parveen Akhtar, ‘(Re)turn to religion’ and Radical Islam’, in Tahir Abbas (ed.), Muslim Britain, Communities Under Pressure (London: Zed Books, 2005). I have cited from guidelines, a copy of which was given to me by ‘Ali’. For a good entry-point into the Saudi-funded Salafi tradition see, Olivier Roy, Globalised Islam, The Search for a New Ummah (London: Hurst & Co., 2002), and for their impact on Britain, J. Birt, ‘Wahhabism in the United Kingdom: Manifestations and reactions’, in M. Al-Rasheed (ed.), Transnational Connections and the Arab Gulf (London: Routledge, 2005). See Pnina Werbner, ‘The predicament of diaspora & millennial Islam: Reflections on September 11, 2001’, Ethnicities 4:4 (2004), 451–77 and Lewis, ‘Mosques, ‘ulama and Sufis’. The Times devoted its front page to exposing the teaching of a leading British trained imam in the Deobandi tradition who it accused of generating a teaching of contempt for British society, Jews, Christians and Hindus (see 7th September 2007). See J. Birt and P. Lewis, ‘The pattern of Islamic reform in Britain: The Deobandis between intra-Muslim sectarianism and engagement with wider society’, in S. Allievi and M. van Bruinessen (eds), Producing Islamic Knowledge in Western Europe (London: I.B.Tauris, forthcoming). Dr Margaret Nunnerley completed a doctoral study exploring why South Asian Muslim women were not accessing mediation services during separation and divorce. I have drawn freely form Margaret’s article in Peace Studies News, Autumn 2005, which contains a fuller account. For background and papers from the first international conversation between Christian and Muslim scholars held at Lambeth Palace in 2001, see Michael Ipgrave (ed.), The Road Ahead, A Christian-Muslim Dilaogue (London: Church

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House Publishing, 2002). The Christian Muslim Forum has CMF has a website www.chrisitianmuslimforum.org on which the inaugural speeches, including those by the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Prime Minister can be read, along with details about its history, structure and six working parties. John Paul Lederach, The Moral Imagination, The Art and Soul of Building Peace, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 91. Johnston and Sampson, Religion, The Missing Dimension, p. 10. Jeffrey Stout, Democracy & Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), p. 300. This understanding of ‘secularisation’ has been developed by J. Casanova, Public Religion in the Modern World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). Stout, p. 101. The focus of this article has been on the churches’ role in partnership with secular agencies. Of course, Bradford does have a few other excellent initiatives which create such ‘safe space’ to discuss difficult issues whether ‘Common Purpose’ or the Programme for a Peaceful City in the university. If during the Cold War, diplomats, foreign ministers and secretaries of state had to engage with ideology now, ‘. . . [They] may have to learn a little theology if the looming clash between embattled elements both in the West and in the Muslim umma is to yield to disengagement and peaceful coexistence, to say nothing of fruitful collaboration . . . [C]ontaining the threat to world peace that it [al-Qaida] poses may entail constructing and promoting a viable and authentically Muslim alternative to its fatally appealing, political vision. Rather than the threat within, the Muslims of the West must be seen as the ally within . . . the Muslim communities of the West must be dignified with much more than the occasional courtesy invitation to the diplomatic dinner table. They must not just be cultivated as allies of convenience . . . [but] be . . . supported both materially and spiritually as they take on the enormous challenge of raising from their own ranks the political and religious thinkers and leaders whose labours may yet save two worlds at once.’ Jack Miles, Foreword to Sohail H Hashmi (ed.), Islamic Political Ethics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).

Chapter 19

The Central Role of Religion on Europe’s Periphery: Christian-Muslim-Muslim Relations and State Viability in Bosnia-Herzegovina Stephen R. Goodwin

Introduction With the expansion of the European Union to twenty-seven member states that now includes former socialist nations, Europe is struggling to find unifying factors that will adequately redefine the continent in ways that are recognizable by all amid the increased diversity resulting from expansion. One such unifying factor – or so the Preamble to the Treaty of Lisbon – is Europe’s religious heritage, which is the foundation for the development of Europe’s ‘universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law’.1 But the place of religion for contemporary European society is by no means unambiguous. This was evident with the circulation of the Treaty of Lisbon’s predecessor, the Draft Constitution of the European Union (2003), in which its authors dared only make reference to Europe’s ‘spiritual and moral heritage’, but cautiously avoided any reference to ‘God’ or ‘Christianity’. Such circumspection did not go unnoticed by pundits from both liberal and conservative wings, nor by the Malta representative to the European Convention, Peter Serracino Inglott, who remarked, ‘This sort of hidden presence of a superficially absent God is the best way for Christianity to be felt in the lay context of the European Convention.’2 The kerfuffle over the Constitution’s ‘deus absconditus’ serves well to highlight some important issues in Europe, namely that as she seeks to redefine herself and her values while undergoing far-reaching changes in the early twenty-first century, religion – in its many and disparate European expressions – continues to play an important role for the diverse constituency of the Union. This is nowhere more the case than in the new and would-be accession states of the Balkans, which, after the collapse of communism and Soviet hegemony, are being battered by competing ideologies owing to the presence of both Western

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and non-Western foreign influences. Here too the role of religion is important for clarifying values, establishing identity and expressing solidarity with international and supranational entities. This chapter will undertake to examine these religious dynamics as they relate specifically to the ongoing post-war reconstruction and renewal in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Bosnia’s rebuilt infrastructure signals the completion of the physical recovery, but competition for the heart and soul remains heated and partisan, and the outcome uncertain. Because religion and politics are fused into an inseparable amalgam in Bosnia-Herzegovina, religious confession plays an acute role in this process and continues to divide the populace along nationalist lines. Catholic Croats see their future as part of the European West while Orthodox Serbs look for support from co-religionist Russia. The Bosnian Muslim community is increasingly divided. Official voices advocate a future within the Western European context and ultimately within the European Union, but are increasingly challenged by the presence of Wahhabi-oriented Islamists who aggressively oppose the European values of multiculturalism and religious pluralism. An assessment of the religious circumstances in Bosnia-Herzegovina thus serves as something of a political barometer of its in/stability and consequently is an indicator of the likelihood for integration into the European Union.

Europeans and religion: Believing without belonging? To many, the ambiguity about God, Christianity and religion in Europe may serve to confirm the secularization theory, which, as a simple maxim, states, ‘modernization necessarily leads to a decline of religion, both in society and in the minds of individuals.’3 Data collected by religious sociologists over the last twenty years or so has largely falsified this theory, leading eminent sociologist Peter Berger to state, ‘The world today … is as furiously religious as it ever was, and in some places more so than ever.’4 However, he and others have viewed Western Europe to be something of an exception to the desecularization of the world’s societies.5 Data available from the European Values System Study Group (EVSSG) consistently show that secularization is not as pervasive in Europe as is commonly thought. This is especially now the case with the addition of Eastern and Central Europe in the mix, but was also the case in Western Europe. While it is so that only 15 percent of Swedes believe in God, 96 percent of the Irish population do, and the European average is well over half at 70 percent of all Europeans.6 Davie makes a different kind of inquiry and asks not whether Europe exceptionally supports the secularization theory, but asks rather, ‘Might it not be the case that Europeans are not so much less religious than citizens in other parts of the world as differently religious?’.7 She suggests, then, a qualitative rather than quantitative

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distinction. Davie says this phenomenon may be characterized by ‘believing without belonging’ in which Europeans reject institutional religion – Christendom as historically and traditionally practised in Europe – in favour of individual and privatized expressions of their otherwise deep-seated beliefs.8 Even this phenomenon is a result of religion, because it may be attributed to the rise of individualism and rationality resulting from the Protestant Reformation.9 As is so often the case with large volumes of raw data, the importance for public policy-making is in the interpretation, and policy is hugely important for those regions of Europe with large Muslim populations, such as Turkey, BosniaHerzegovina, (FYRO)Macedonia, Kosova/o and Albania. Here the European Union is often characterized as a ‘Christian Club’ whose doors remain closed to predominantly non-Christian nations, impervious to whatever other mitigating factors there may be for entrance, such as economic viability, trade partnership, wealth creation, state or regional security, strategic geographical location, and the like.

The precarious relationship of religion and politics in Bosnia-Herzegovina One very significant finding of the European Values Survey is the consensus that religion and politics should be separate.10 This varies in the Mediterranean region, especially in Orthodox Greece and Catholic Malta, where the populace ‘prefer religiously-inspired political leaders’,11 but even in Malta the preference is to prevent religious convictions from influencing political issues. A strict separation of religion and politics is not, however, a shared value with a large portion of the Balkans where the fusion of religion and politics is seen as a positive expression of identity and an integrating factor of national solidarity. This is most evident among the Serbs, whose historiographic interpretation of events runs along the line of the passion, death and resurrection of Christ,12 and who symbolize national solidarity and salvation with the Orthodox cross surrounded by four Cyrillic ‘S’es, which stands for ‘Само Слога Србина Спашава’ (‘Only Unity Saves the Serbs’). Likewise, the patron saints of the Serbian nation are the patriarchy of the founding family and political rulers of the medieval Serbian Empire.13 Monsignor Mato Zovkić, who officially represents the Catholic Church on behalf of Bosnia’s Vinko Cardinal Puljić on inter-religious matters, has astutely identified the kind of religious expression in Bosnia-Herzegovina as the opposite of that of traditional (Western) Europe and as described by Davie by the notion of ‘believing without belonging’. Zovkić likens religious practice in Bosnia-Herzegovina from all three of the confessions as ‘belonging without believing’.14 This is so, says Zovkić, because religion represents an important factor of personal and communal identity, and persons may belong to a specific

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ethno-religious community without a deep-seated faith. Nedžad Grabus, a professor on the Islamic Faculty in Sarajevo and Mufti of Slovenia, says, ‘Islam began in Bosnia as faith, then evolved to a nation and today lives as a culture.’15 In their history faith has always had, and continues to have, an integrating role into the community, says Zovkić,16 but it may mean that faith in God and all that is therewith concomitant is displaced by national communities and their political elite. Significant differences between Bosnian and Western European decisions on the separation of religion and state may be seen by reviewing the historical precedent of a century ago. While the Serbian nation had a concrete and developing national identity by mid-nineteenth century, the Bosnian Muslim identity developed only later. So long as they were related to co-religionists in Istanbul/ Constantinople there was little need for the Bosnian Muslims to develop a separate identity, and thus there ‘was no deep-seated national identification during the Ottoman period’.17 At virtually the same time that France and Germany formally decoupled the State and the Church, the Muslim community formed the first political party in Bosnia in 1906, called the Muslim National Organisation (Muslimanska Narodna Organizacija) or MNO, to articulate and advance their religious, educational and cultural requirements.18 Soon thereafter the Croatian and Serbian communities also organized religio-national political parties. Thus, while Western European powers were defining their national identity by disassociating it – at least officially – from religion and a national Church, national identity in Bosnia-Herzegovina was shaped by consciously joining it to religion.19 Despite profound political turmoil in Yugoslavia throughout the twentieth century, three of the four major political parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina today are founded on religio-nationalist interests.20 Thus, for more than a century religion in Bosnia-Herzegovina has been an integral part of politics with the express purpose of articulating and advancing the interests of the national communities. This is especially the expectation in times of national confrontation and peril. Given the recent conflict and the ongoing tensions extant in Bosnia-Herzegovina, this would unfortunately seem to be the operative motif for the religious institutions for the foreseeable future.

Recent religio-political developments in Bosnia-Herzegovina Institutional religion and political nationalism work hand in hand to maintain entrenched views. The Serb heart and mind remain oriented to Belgrade where the new basilica dedicated to the St Sava has finally been completed after decades of delay. The enormous cost for the project, which features a white marble façade and mixed-marble interior, contrasts unfavourably with the harsh economic circumstances of most Serbs, and has not gone unnoticed by more

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progressive Serbs who resent their harsh economic circumstances foisted on them by religio-nationalist elites. In Sarajevo, a city that once published its newspaper in both Latin and Cyrillic scripts out of respect for its multinational readership, division and segregation have now created separate communities. In Lukavica, a Serbian suburb of Sarajevo, new SOC churches have been built where none previously existed to serve the growing Serbian community that shifted to the Republika Srpska side of the city. Most of the city remains in the Federacija and is now estimated to be 80–85 percent Muslim as a result of the destruction of Muslim homes in rural areas during the 1990s war. Only two municipalities in the whole of BosniaHerzegovina remain multicultural, namely, Tuzla in northern Bosnia, and Grbavica, the city centre of Sarajevo, a portion of which was never shelled during the 1992–95 siege. Recently amendments to the Dayton Accord, which is the foundational document for the restructuring and administration of Bosnia-Herzegovina, were hotly debated in Parliament. The Croat and Muslim communities believe that the constitution established by the Dayton Peace Accord is fundamentally unjust and a structural source for social unrest.21 For their part, the Serbs want no changes in the Dayton Accord because through it the Serb entity of the Republika Srpska was created and is sustained. They fear that changes to the Accord would lead to an erosion of their autonomy. If the Croats and Muslims push for changes to the Accord, Serbs threaten to retaliate with a referendum. Were that to take place, both Serbs and Croats would choose to leave Bosnia-Herzegovina and become annexed to their respective co-nationalist states. It is inconceivable that a double secession – which essentially would mean the disappearance of Bosnia-Herzegovina – could see realization without renewed bloodshed,22 and the Bosnian Muslim community would be left with no homeland.

The threatened Bosnian Muslim community For more than a decade the international community’s efforts have rebuilt Bosnia-Herzegovina and prevented further outbreaks of violence. The conflict through their eyes is largely inter-communal and nationalist-oriented. Although the fractious relationship between nationalist Croats and Bosnian Serbs cannot be overlooked, the most obdurate is between the hardline Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Muslim community. However, an insidious and potentially more dangerous threat to the Bosnian Muslims is intra-communal, or intra-religious, and stems from the Wahhabi presence that has now rooted itself in the Bosnian Muslim community. The Wahhabis seek to impose a return to a ‘pure’ Islam and call for the abandonment of the accretions often found in Balkan Islamic practice, such as pilgrimages to shrines and tombs, belief in omens, the invocation of saints and the use

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of tespihs (prayer beads). Wahhabi supporters seek to impose more rigid practices and teachings into the Balkan Islamic community. These include the rejection of excessive luxury, and the use of wine and tobacco.23 They also want to prevent women from wearing silk dresses, and want to remove carpets from mosques because they distract worshippers from ‘true Islamic teachings’.24 Dress codes are also imported from Saudi practice and include loose, short trousers and long beards for men, and full veils for women. These rigid codes conflict with traditional Muslim practices of the Balkans that have followed Sunni traditions and have been influenced by sufi practices stemming from Turkic presence during the Ottoman period. The tensions have been present since the time of military conflict in Bosnia when foreign Muslim fighters (Mujahidin) entered Bosnia to protect the Bosnian Muslims. This was especially critical then since the European powers would not contravene the UN arms embargo and equip the Muslims for fear of escalating the conflict.25 For their part, the United States publicly held to the line that they also would not arm the Bosnian Muslims, but in fact did not interdict third party channels supplying weapons to the Bosnian Muslims through Iran, an unwritten policy that was later dubbed ‘covert inaction’.26 With the signing of the Dayton Peace Accord in 1995, fighting in BosniaHerzegovina came to an end and many foreign fighters, the majority of which were Arabs,27 exited the country to fight elsewhere. But others stayed on after the conflict despite pressure from Washington, which believed the continued presence of jihadists constituted a security threat to the fledgling Bosnian state.28 Some managed this by marrying Bosnian women and, although motives were often mixed, became citizens with Bosnian passports. Concerns were especially pronounced following the 9/11 attacks and the US State Department repeated its demand to have foreign-born ex-fighters removed from Bosnia, fearing that Bosnia-Herzegovina would become a haven for Islamist militants.29 The Bosnian government then set up a commission to review the status of those who had been granted citizenship after the war, and has revoked the citizenship of around 420 of the 1300 foreign fighters thus far.30 The first of these was deported in December 2007. The legal battles of those being deported continue however, and many will seek a review of their case, and demand a right to habeas corpus, since the commission met behind closed doors and permitted neither right of representation nor defence.31 Many remnant freedom fighters – along with Islamist missionaries that arrived following the conflict32 – remain in Bosnia in order to transform Islam in Bosnia-Herzegovina. ‘Wahhabism has seriously divided children and parents, spiritual leaders and priests, professors and students, neighbourhoods’, says Adnan Silajdžić, lecturer in comparative religions at Sarajevo University’s Faculty of Islamic Studies.33 In the post-war period this Muslim sect has built huge mosques,34 the most obvious of which is now Bosnia’s largest, the King Fahd mosque erected in 2000 by the royal family of Saudi Arabia.35

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Several incidents involving Wahhabi encounters across the Balkans highlight the growing tensions: On Christmas Eve of 2002 three members of a Catholic family were killed by a bomb explosion in a small town near Konjic in central Bosnia. The attack was carried out by a young Muslim who had just completed his ‘Noviziat’ (New life, training by the Wahhabis).36 Several of the freedom fighters formed a community under Shari’a law in the former Serbian village of Bocˇinja. The government closed them down, which resulted in the community of fighters being dispersed throughout central Bosnia.37 Four other Islamist Wahhabis in the Sandžak region of southern Serbia near Novi Pazar were arrested in March 2007 on suspicion of plotting terrorist acts. Police claimed to have seized a weapons and explosives cache.38 These arrests followed an incident in late 2006 in which violence broke out at the Arap mosque in the Novi Pazar town centre when Wahhabis attacked a group of Muslim worshippers attending afternoon prayers in the Saudi-funded mosque. The attempt by the Wahhabis to impose their form of worship on the service provoked a brawl wherein three Wahhabis were wounded by gunfire and seventeen people were arrested.39 Tensions have been high for a long time and continue to be so as the Wahhabis accuse the local Islamic leadership of deviating from original Islamic teaching.40 Another recent confrontation was in Tetovo, Macedonia when Wahhabis, armed with Kalashnikov rifles and pistols, seized the historic eighteenth-century Harabati Baba Tekke from the Bektashi sufi order and converted a portion of it, the Kubeli Meydan41 into a mosque. They installed a mihrab and mounted speakers on the structure’s chimney to broadcast the call to prayer.42 The tekke had never been used as a mosque, nor was there a need for a mihrab, since Bektashi practice does not require one. That the Wahhabis forcefully took over this Tekke when there are twenty-five other mosques in Tetovo points to a larger agenda to impose their politico-religious ideology on Balkan soil. For their part the Bosnian Muslims, or Bosniaks, also have faced significant challenges since the end of the war in the 1990s. They try to present a unified face to the international community through the Reis-ul-ulema, the position created in 188243 through which the Muslim concerns could be addressed to the Viennese authorities during the period of Ottoman decline. There has always been a plurality of Muslim communities in Bosnia, which have varying degrees of interaction and solidarity, but for doctrinal reasons there remains little contact between the Sunni establishment and the Sufi orders. However,

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the Sufi orders pose no destabilization threat to the Muslim establishment in contrast to the greater challenge of foreign Islamists, which now constitutes a ‘very acute clash within Islamic civilization’.44

Reaction to the Wahhabi presence Acceptance of Wahhabi presence and religious practice is growing with an estimated 13 percent of the Bosnian Muslim population broadly supporting it, although only 3 percent declare themselves to be followers.45 This increase in support and adherents is creating division within the Muslim community and constitutes a sectarian and Islamist threat to multicultural and multireligious tolerance that Bosnian Islam has been known for, and the European Union expects for integration.46 Thus, the presence of the Wahhabis under the Islamic community has become something of a growing crisis. The Reis-ul-Ulema, Mustafa Cerić, has attempted to address the situation by promoting the positive aspects of Bosnianstyle Islam with two specific initiatives. The first is his Declaration of European Muslims, which Cerić issued on 24 February 2006 from the mosque in Zagreb, Croatia, where he once was imam. In the Declaration Cerić reminds its hearers that, as Slavs, Bosnia’s Muslims are truly European – not Muslim immigrants from another land. He then affirms that European Muslims are unequivocally committed to European values, such as the rule of law, democracy and human rights,47 the same values as are inscribed in the EU Draft Constitution, and now the Lisbon Treaty. But the Declaration is not without controversy. Intriguing, for instance, is his assertion that ‘Europe is the House of Peace and Security based on the principle of the Social Contract.’48 This is a variation on a theme that Cerić has elsewhere elaborated with the following: Let me say, also, as an European that I believe that Europe is not dâr al-Islâm, (the House of Peace), but is not dâr al-harb (the House of War) either. I believe that Europe is dâr al-sulh (the House of Contract). It is not dâr al-Islâm because Muslim Law cannot be fully implemented. And it is not dâr al-harb because some aspects of the Muslim Law can be implemented. Therefore, the land of Europe is dâr al-sulh because it is possible to live in accordance to Islam in the context of the Social Contract.49 One may legitimately want clarification for this assertion in the Declaration, that Europe is the House of Peace, because a Muslim audience might read him to say that Europe is the dâr al-Islâm, that is to say, a place where Muslim Law (one day) may be fully implemented. Thus, this statement, along with his admonition

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for European Muslims to fight for their rights,50 could very easily be (mis) understood as not supporting fundamental European values, leastwise those set forth in the Lisbon Treaty. Elsewhere he has elaborated the challenge of living as European Muslims in the European context, which constitutes the House of Contract or Conciliation (dâr al-sulh): Our difficulty lies, nevertheless, in the lack of a genuine concept of dâr al-sulh that could be applied in the context of an European environment that would guarantee the decent status of Islam as a way of life and of Muslims as citizens in Europe.51 Importantly, the Declaration also calls upon the European Union to ‘establish a common platform for religious coexistence in the spirit of a goodwill that can be found in both the books of God and the hope for our common future,52 and calls upon European Muslims to build a Muslim future that is not built on the past.53 Achieving these aims at the European level would be a magisterial accomplishment, given the diversity of the Muslim communities of Europe. A more modest achievement would be the realization of these aims and intentions in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the rarefied atmosphere of inter-ethnic tension between Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats, and intra-religious challenges now presented by Wahhabi Islamists. If the Rijaset (Muslim governing body) in Bosnia-Herzegovina were to take a more direct stand with the Wahhabis, who in every way oppose the values of Europe in its cosmopolitan diversity, religious pluralism and tolerance, and multiculturalism, then non-Muslim Europeans would have reason to believe that the Reis-ul-Ulema is sincere in wanting the Muslim community to be full participants in the European experiment. Cerić’s other initiative also highlights the European-ness of the Bosnian Muslims. In July 2007 he promoted the 600-year presence of Islam in BosniaHerzegovina. This celebration gave occasion to promote ‘indigenous Muslims in Europe’. As Cerić says, ‘[b]y celebrating 600 years of Islam here we want to naturalize Islam in Europe’. As with the Declaration, Cerić is keen to show that Balkan Islam maintains the same values and way of life as other Europeans, upholding ‘human rights, democracy, transparency, accountability, the rule of law and all those values that are also Islamic values’.54 Predictably, this celebration met with mixed reaction from the non-Muslim communities. Detractors point out that by reaching back 600 years to the original Muslim traders and sufi orders, there is intention to present an image of a peaceful arrival of Islam that purposely glosses its more dramatic and hostile advent through Ottoman conquest of Bosnia in 1463.55 Again, this is an attempt to present the Bosnian Muslim community as both indigenously European and completely compatible with Europe’s values. For a growing number of Muslim academics, however, these positive initiatives do not address strongly enough the menace constituted by the Wahhabi

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presence in the region, and some professors at the University of Sarajevo and the Islamic Faculty have become publicly vocal over the matter. Esad Duraković, professor of Arabic at the University of Sarajevo has described Wahhabism as a snowball rolling down the Bosnian hill, and calls for an urgent and energetic effort by the Rijaset to counteract Wahhabi activities before it is too late for Bosnian-style Islam. He likens the threat to the unrecognized deception of the 1992 Serbian aggression launched against the Bosnian Muslim community, stating that there are now ‘many more domestic Bosniaks among the Wahhabis’ than foreigners, and that their numbers will continue to grow. Part of the deception, says Duraković, is that many believe that the Wahhabi agenda is restricted to the confines of the mosques, how to pray and other such practices. However, the larger ideological and political agenda will unfold only after they are sufficiently strong enough to implement their objectives. The statements go on to claim that not only has the Rijaset not done enough to forestall the advancement of the Wahhabi agenda, but that it supports Wahhabi leaders in order to maintain good relationships with Saudi Arabia. The clear indication is that the Rijaset can ill-afford to antagonize the Saudi leadership for risk of losing their financial support. That is taken to be the meaning of Cerić’s response to professor Hafizović’s public statements when he reportedly said, ‘We should not cut the branch on which we are sitting’.56 Prof Rešid Hafizović of the Faculty of Islamic Studies claims that by bowing to Saudi pressure, the handing over of centuries-old decorations in the Gazi-Husref Beg Mosque in Sarajevo was tantamount to Wahhabi vandalism. Now the Muslim community is selling itself for Saudi support, requiring nothing less than the forfeiture of their religion, 500 years of religious and cultural tradition, and the minds, hearts and souls of the Bosnian people.57 The statements of these professors in turn have sparked a response ‘Resolution of the Rijaset of the Islamic Community of Bosnia-Herzegovina on the Interpretation of Islam’ (27 March 2006) that acknowledges the turmoil within the Islamic community. The Resolution names specifically the incidents in Sandžak and condemns without specifically naming the Wahhabis ‘those who, by any means, bring disquiet into the mosques under the pretext of enforcing the right faith’.58 The Resolution, authored by Cerić, seeks to protect ‘Islam on the basis of Qur’an, the Sunnah, and our Bosnian experience’.59 The elevated place given to the Bosnian experience is here significant because it affirms and sanctions the current leadership and rejects interlopers from foreign lands. Yet at the same time the Resolution is dismissive of the Islamist presence, stating: ‘The Rijaset believes there are no extremist individuals or groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina who may undermine the unity of Muslims as displayed in the spiritual framework of [the] Islamic community in Bosnia-Herzegovina …’.60 It would seem, then, that the Resolution resolves little in regard to the ongoing tensions presented by the Wahhabi Islamists, and serves only to rebuke certain professors

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who would counter the Rijaset by pointing out the continuing turmoil dividing Bosnia’s House of Islam.

Concluding assessment For more than a decade the international community in both intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations have spent the equivalent of billions of Euros to bring change to the Balkans and inculcate the cosmopolitan values of the West – to relatively little effect. Communitarian values related to the preservation of national identity prevail and continue to threaten the viability of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s statehood. Were it not for the enduring presence of the international community to enforce a precarious ceasefire, the return of armed conflict and open violence is taken by many to be inevitable.61 Now a previously unknown threat to the state security of Bosnia-Herzegovina is present in the form of foreign-organized and funded Islamists who seek to reform Bosnian Islam from within. Because the issues are intra-communal and religious, the international community is ill-equipped either to recognize or engage in the challenge presented by the political and religious activism of the Wahhabis. Further, this kind of engagement lies outside the remit of the High Representative, who is mandated to implement structural and societal change, as outlined by the Dayton Accord. As a result, the importance of the religious communities addressing this threat to state stability and security will only grow. Mere platitudes by the Rijaset are not enough, however. Even if they want to remain European, the Bosnian Muslims may not be able to resist Saudi financial enticements in an economically depressed post-war environment, or deter persistent Wahhabi infiltration that threatens to transform ‘European Islam’ into something that is intolerant, sectarian and foreign. Thus a reasonable attempt to take on these issues and head off a growing storm may come from the new initiative from the Islamic Theological Faculty in Sarajevo who is addressing both the Wahhabi threat and advancing the proper relationship between ethno-religious communities. The effort goes by the title of the Platform of the Islamic Community in Bosnia-Herzegovina for Dialogue, which, in part, says: There is no alternative to forgiveness and reconciliation in multi-cultural Bosnia, and the role of the religious communities in this regard is enormous. Dialogue and co-existence is not our tactic for intellectual enjoyment, but is our strategic option, because in these we see our only means of survival.62 The situation is just that critical, that survival of the Bosnian Muslims is on the line. In order to avoid another round of violence and the eventual state

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collapse of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and to promote and sustain a multicultural and just society that supports the fundamental liberties, rights and freedoms of European society, this kind of initiative must succeed.

Notes 1

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The entire title of the document is: Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community (2007). The Treaty of Lisbon amends the original document, which is the Draft Constitution of the European Union (2003), and, with some measure of optimism, is expected to be ratified by all twenty-seven member states by 2009. Peter Serracino Inglott, ‘Why God stays out of it’, The Tablet, 24 May 2003. Peter Berger, The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, and Washington: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1999), p. 2. Berger, p. 2. Berger, pp. 9ff. Cited in Grace Davie, ‘Europe: The exception that proves the rule?’ in Berger, 1999, p. 30. Davie, p. 65. Davie, p. 66ff. Davie, citing Steve Bruce’s, Religion in the Modern World: From Cathedrals to Cults (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 74. Anthony M. Abela, ‘Solidarity and religion and the European Union: A comparative sociological perspective’ in Second International Conference ‘Values for Europe’ (Lakitelek Conference Centre, Hungary, 11–13 September 2003), pp. 79ff. Abela, p. 80. See, for instance, the following sources: Branimir Anzulovic, Heavenly Serbia: From Myth to Genocide (London: Hurst & Co., 1999); Tim Judah, The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia, 2nd edn (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000); Michael Sells, The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Serbia (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1996). There is, however, the glaring exception of Stefan Dušan (d. 1355), who confronted both Patriarch and Byzantine emperor in Constantinople, and who is widely suspected of plotting the assassination of his father. Mato Zovkić, Der Interreligiöse Dialog in Bosnien und Herzegowina und seine Politische Dimension: Ein Vortrag an der Tagung der Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung in München, 9 July 2007, p. 8. Nedžad Grabus, ‘Die europäische Erfahrung des Islam in Bosnien-Herzegowina’, Ost-West. Europäische Perspektiven 5:1 (2004)’ 55, trans. Stephen Goodwin. Zovkić, p. 8. Francine Friedman, The Bosnian Muslims: Denial of a Nation (Boulder, CO and Oxford: Westview Press, Inc., 1996), p. 46. Friedman 1996, p. 72. Robert Donia holds that it is essentially the MNO that re-emerged after World War I to become the Yugoslav Muslim Organisation that

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represented the interests of the Bosnian Muslims. See Donia, Islam under the Double Eagle: The Muslims of Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Brief History (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs and New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), p. xi. This followed the millet (Tk. ‘people’, or ‘nation’) practice for administrating minority peoples in the Ottoman Empire whereby, in the absence of a political ruler, the religious leader was authorised with the responsibility of overseeing the community and representing them to the sultan. These are the HDZ (Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica, Croatian Democratic Union), the Muslim SDA (Stranka Demokratske Akkcije, Party of Democratic Action), and the SDS (Srpska Demokratska Stranka, Serbian Democratic Party). The other major party is the SDP (Socijalna Demokratska Partija, Social Democrat Party) which is neo-socialist. Zovkić, pp. 3, 4. Zovkić, p. 4. Amela Bajrović, ‘Wahhabism Fuels Novi Pazar Religious Tensions’, Balkan Insight, 7 December 2006, at http://www.birn.eu.com/en/62/10/1844/?tpl=30&ST1=T ext&ST_T1=Article&ST_AS1=&ST_max=1. Bayrović 2006. Roger Cohen, New York Times, 22 April 1993 at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/ fullpage.htmal?res=9F0CEFDB153AF931A15757C0A965958260&scp=6&sq=arm s+bosnian+muslims. Cohen 1993. Nicholas Wood, ‘Bosnia plans to expel Arabs who fought in its war’, New York Times, nytimes.com, 2 August 2007. ABC News. ‘Bosnia deports first Muslim ex-fighter: report’, at http://abcnews. go.com/International/wireStory?id=399943, December 14, 2007. Wood 2007. Wood 2007. Wood 2007. Daria Sito-Sucˇić, ‘Bosnia’s Muslims divided over inroads of Wahhabism’, ABC news, 28 December 2006. Sito-Sucˇić 2006. Zovkić, p. 6. Sito-Sucˇić 2006. Zovkić, p. 6. Wood 2007. Reuters, 20 April 2007 at http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L20140144. htm. Bayrović 2006. Bayrović 2006. From Turkish, Kubbeli Meydan, ‘domed centre’. Stephen Schwartz, ed., ‘WahhabiWatch #19: When Wahhabis attack: The case of the Harabati Tekke in Macedonia’, 14 October 2006’ at http://www.islamicpluralism.org/wahhabiwatch/ww2006.htm. Grabus 2004, p. 52. Stephen Schwartz, ‘The Arab betrayal of Balkan Islam’, Middle East Quarterly, Spring 2002, at http://www.meforum.org/article/166.

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Sito-Sucˇić 2006. Grabus 2004, p. 57. Mustafa Cerić, ‘Declaration’, Part I, §5, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 16 March 2006, at http://www.rferl.org/features/features_Article.aspx?m=03&y=2006&id=5C31A59E79E6-435B-B3AB-B0DAF924782F. Cerić, Declaration, Part I, §1. Mustafa Cerić, ‘Keynote Address of Mustafa Cerić, Grand Mufti of Bosnia, at the meeting of the World Conference on Religion and Peace in Europe (Rovereto, Italy, 26–28 October 2000)’, Islamochristiana (Rome: Pontificio Instituto di Studi Arabi e D’Islamistica) 27 (2001): 183–6, pp. 183,4. Cerić, ‘Declaration’, Part II, §6. Cerić, ‘Keynote Address’, p. 184. For more on this motif employed by Cerić, see my Fractured Land, Healing Nations: A Contextual Analysis of the Role of Religious Faith Sodalities Towards Peace-Building in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Frankfurt/Main: Peter Lang Europäisher Verlag der Wissenschaften, 2006), pp. 46ff. Cerić, ‘Declaration’, Part I, §6.1. Cerić, ‘Declaration’, Part II, §6. International Herald Tribune, ‘Bosnian Muslims mark 600 years of Islam in Bosnia’ 27 July 2007 at www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/07/28/europe/EU-GEN-BosniaIslam.php. The conquest came in 1467 to Herzegovina, or Hum as it was then known. Grabus in this context is more forthright about the arrival of Islam when he writes, ‘Die Situation wurde komplizierter, als die Osmanen in die südöstlichen Teile Europas vordrangen. Obwohl es auch früher Kontakte und Einflüsse gegeben hatte, hat erst mit der offiziellen Eroberung Bosniens 1463 die lokale Bevölkerung in größerer Zahl den Islam angenommen’ (Grabus 2004, p. 52). Rešid Hafizović, ‘“We will return Saudi Arabia’s aid”, Sarajevo, BH Federation TV, 7 December 2006’ in WahhabiWatch #24, Stephen Schwartz, ed., at http://www. islamicpluralism.org/wahhabiwatch/ww2006.htm. Hafizović 2006. Mustafa Cerić, ‘Addendum to the resolution on the interpretation of Islam’, §5, in Center for Islamic Pluralism, 2006 at http://www.islamicpluralism.org/wahhabiwatch/ww2006.htm. Cerić, ‘Resolution’, II, §2, italics added. Cerić, ‘Resolution’, II, §4. Zovkić, p. 4. Alibašić, Ahmet, Nedžad Grabus, Fikret Karcˇić (2006) Platforma Islamske zajednice u BiH za dijalog, III, c, as cited by Zovkić, pp. 5, 6; trans. Stephen Goodwin.

Chapter 20

Christians and Muslims in Denmark: Possibilities for Mutual Recognition Safet Bektović

Recognition is one of the most important anthropological and social elements in a society. Religious and cultural diversity which characterizes most of contemporary Western societies, including the Danish one, brings forward the need for mutual acceptance and a new kind of recognition on a social and personal level. A German successor of Jürgen Habermas, Axel Honneth, argues in favour of a new form of societal dynamics in which ‘the struggle for recognition’ between individuals and different groups sustains a considerable force.1 To understand the challenges brought about by diversity – taking into account that recognition goes hand in hand with a critical perception – is crucial in relation to the regulation of mutual relations as well as in relation to the development of a social cohesion. On the basis of Axel Honneth’s social-philosophical considerations on the problematic of recognition, and with reference to the Danish context it makes sense to talk about four levels of recognition: (1) Personal recognition which refers to personal integrity; (2) Legal recognition which refers to legislation; (3) Cultural and political recognition which encompasses several aspects of the cultural and political spheres; (4) Religious recognition which refers to theological aspects of inter-religions communication.2 This is an adequate and relevant differentiation, also in relation to a Muslim standpoint. I will in the following discuss some of the most important questions related to the recognition of Muslims in Denmark and Muslims’ recognition of ‘others’.

Personal recognition Whether we stress the collective or the individual aspects of one’s identity, it is centrally a question of intercultural communication and intersubjectivity. Development of personal identity always takes place in social contexts. The possibility for realizing one’s needs as an individual depends on acceptance from others.

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Our self/identity is formed in an intercommunicative process of dialogue and common recognition. I can only become aware of myself as a person if others recognize me as a person. But, at the same time, I have to be able to take the role of others and reflect on how they see me, including my cultural and religious background. There is also a moral side to social relationship. That is about recognizing moral autonomy and dealing with different moral standpoints. Ways of argumentation about humanity can be very different. In order to prevent a possible moral conflict, all individuals have the duty to respect and treat each other as persons to whom the same moral accountability is attributed. For this reason mutual recognition is a deeply ethical activity highly relevant to the common society: First, because it implies a discussion of universal ethical principles, and second, because it opens up to an inclusive, cross-ethnical (world-centric) ethical view based on a consensus of common values and interests. The question of universality is, however, not only ethical. In a pluralistic society it also relates to a critical investigation of religious and cultural diversity. It has to do with a revelation of common elements in different views and simultaneously with respect of elements that differ from each other. It is about creating a new social reality – one of belonging together, integrating universal as well as particular aspects and engaging them – actively and reflectively – in dialogue.

Legal recognition A clarification of the legislative rules in relation to the legal position of religions is a good starting point for the discussion of recognition of the different religious communities in Denmark. According to the existing legislation religious communities are grouped into four categories: (1) The Evangelical-Lutheran Church which has a status as national Church and a distinguished position in relation to the other religious communities. (2) The recognized religious communities – eleven in all (such as the Roman Catholic Church, the Danish Jewish Community, the Russian Orthodox Church) which have full recognition granted by Royal Decree concerning the right to celebrate religious ceremonies such as baptism and marriage with legal effect according to civil law and rights to maintain their own ministerial records and issue certificates. (3) Religious communities with limited recognition granted by the Danish Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs, which includes between 50 and 60 groups (among others several Muslim communities and the Hindu Community), and concerned the right of religious spiritual leaders to celebrate marriage with legal effect according to civil law. (4) Non-recognized religious communities that enjoy religious freedom, that is, freedom to organize and express their religion, but not one of the above-mentioned groups.

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Legislative regulation and recognition of the Muslim presence in the Danish society provides for an overall plan and thus sets the agenda for a discussion of Islam’s status in the newly multi-religious Denmark. At the same time it has to do with the question as to how Muslims understand themselves as new citizens in Denmark. Islam’s current legal status can be summarized in the following sentence: It is not ‘recognized’ under the state/constitution, only ‘approved’ that is, semirecognized as a religious community by the Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs. There is a difference. Whether this difference has a decisive significance for the Muslims has been heatedly debated, especially during the Cartoon-crisis in 2006 which focused on the notion of freedom of speech and recognition. The discussions have, among other things, shown that the terms ‘recognized’ and ‘approved’ can be used in very different ways, depending on one’s point of view and motivation. Furthermore, the unclear distinction between the term ‘recognized religion’ and the term ‘approved religious community’ – which refers to the legal status one has with the Danish state – can lead to great misunderstandings. Thus the majority of participants in the public debate – that is, Danish politicians and public figures on the one side and Muslim representatives on the other – were talking at cross-purposes. The former wanted to make clear that the case was about freedom of speech and that it thus can be concluded that Islam is recognized in Denmark, whereas the latter was focused on presenting the case as a matter of discrimination of religious feelings and how just that showed a lacking recognition of Islam. In general, there was not much room left for an objective debate and an attempt at understanding the other side. Freedom of speech is obviously foundational in the Danish democracy, but that should not prevent an understanding of the Muslim need for recognition. Professor of Theology Troels Engberg-Pedersen has, among others, observed this and critically commented on the government’s and Prime Minister’s handling of the matter, saying that the fact that recognition is of vital importance to people should be obvious to everyone. But apparently it is not. The government could have listened to some of the experts available, but did not take them seriously at all. Anthropologists, sociologists, experts within science of religion, theologians etc.: Each of them would in details be able to explain that mutual recognition is a crucial precondition for the social cohesion in the Danish society which the Prime Minister speaks of so fondly.3 This is not to imply that recognition is a simple and unproblematic matter. Quite the contrary, it is a great task and a challenge to us all. Danish politicians and Muslim representatives, however, have a special responsibility. This means that the task cannot be completed without mutuality

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which as a minimum requires the distribution of objective knowledge of the other, comparative culture studies and the will to contribute to the development of an intercultural society. According to a significant number of Muslim residents, especially those who consider themselves Danish Muslims, the juridical recognition of Islam – on a par with, for example, Judaism, Catholicism and a number of other Christian denominations that are already recognized under the Constitution – would have an important symbolic and political significance for the Muslim selfunderstanding and integration in the Danish society. The legislation on recognition, however, also concerns other religious movements and communities, which are reviewed for approval by the Ministry of Ecclesiastic Affairs,4 and they should be taken into consideration as well. This is a clear challenge to the Danish government as it requires an amendment in § 83 from the 1849 (1953) Constitution and the configuration of a corresponding legislation in that area.5 Lisbet Christoffersen, associate professor in religion and law and the research-coordinator for the research area ‘Religion in the 21st Century’, emphasizes that it is necessary that, the Danish government clarifies both the legal and the symbolic role of religious communities in Denmark. First of all, there is a need for clear and unambiguous rules which can be read in an assembled legislation and not just in dispersed comments – so that the rules can be understood by those they concern. Second, there is a need for recognition. Those two things are inseparable.6 The fulfilment of the Constitution’s paragraph would imply a regulation of the rights and duties of the religious communities in the Danish society, as well as the shedding of light on the issues concerning religious liberty and equality. Potential legislation, which would place the religions in a more equal position, would without doubt accede to the wish for recognition of the religious minority including a large part of the Muslim population. Still, it should be mentioned that a number of Muslims are not interested in this form of recognition. As an imam expressed it at a Christian-Muslim conference held in August 2006, ‘The Muslims have not asked to be recognised by the Danish state, and they are not of the opinion that the state should recognise Islam.’ This statement is presumably due to a misunderstanding of the recognition-solution. It is not concerned with recognition of the religions as such. Christianity, Judaism or any religion, for that matter, needs not be recognized by the state, because religion is concerned with people’s relationship with God and not their relationship with the state. Furthermore, it should not be a matter of the state to decide upon the character of a religion. Nevertheless, there is a need for legal recognition of religious communities contained in a legislation which can help regulate rights and duties for

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religious communities as well as for a number of organizational and practical matters which are related to their functionality and role in the new situation characterized by multi-religiosity. And only when that matter has been dealt with can one ask whether resident Muslims are still willing to settle with the current status which only provides authorized Muslim religious communities with the right to perform wedding ceremonies. Whether these would still be content with the current status, because they in fact do not care much for a secularist arrangement or for religion/Islam in general, is another issue. However in a broader perspective, in which the religions represent an element in the cultural encounter and in political and cultural recognition, there is no doubt that a legal regulation of the religions’ status is of great importance.

Cultural and political recognition According to available statistical information it is estimated that there are about 200,000 citizens with a Muslim background in Denmark. This means that Islam is the second largest religion in Denmark. This development has occurred in a relatively short time-span and due to a massive immigration of Muslims during the last decades. Consequently, there are still a number of open questions in relation to Islam as a new religion in Denmark. Discussions on the Muslim headscarf, Muslim children and gymnastics, admittance of Islamic practice in the public space with, for example, approval of ritual prayers in school and at work; these are only a few examples of the characteristically tense relationship between accepting and throwing suspicion on Muslims in Denmark. Simultaneously, the Muslims are fighting their own battle by trying to become recognized and accepted in the new society, without losing their identity. And yet Muslims do not feel acknowledged even though a considerable number of them do not regard being Danish and Muslim simultaneously as contradictory. This attitude was consistent among the Muslims I spoke with during an inquiry in March–May 2006 at Muslim organizations and mosques in Denmark, which was initiated by ‘National Church and Religious Encounters’ (Folkekirke og religionsmøde) an organ established by the National Church with a view/ aim to create cordial relations to Danish Muslims.7 However, they emphasize different elements when speaking of acceptance and recognition. Some speak of a legal recognition on par with Judaism and different Christian religious communities. Others are concerned with the (negative) media and political attitudes and call out for a public recognition of Islam as a part of the Danish society, in which Muslims are not conceived as a foreign object and as antidemocrats. A third group insists on permission to build mosques with minarets and to establish Muslim cemeteries, which would mark the Muslim presence in Denmark. Some of the interviewees are also astonished by the fact that in an officially secular society they must register their newborn child at a church

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office instead of the local council.8 Especially the younger generation, that is, those who were born and raised in Denmark and who in many ways consider themselves to be Danish, insist on recognition. This brings us to the question: What does it really mean to assert that Muslims are also a part of the Danish society? To what extent do they function as an integrated part of the society, and in which way do they contribute to its development? Since integration is a process that is characterized by many difficulties and which can only be contemplated through an extended period of time, it is impossible to give an unambiguous answer. Certain criteria must be met before one can start speaking about integration. First and foremost, the Muslim population has to show full loyalty towards the Danish institutions and authorities and approach the secular and multi-religious society as a challenge related to the development of a new cultural identity. Equally they should not be met with demands of assimilation and of dismissing their religious identity in order to be accepted as citizens. They shall be able to contribute to the Danish society as Muslim citizens, just as ethnic Danes should not make sacrifices in order to make room for Muslim immigrants. Since it is possible to ‘care for the others without renouncing oneself’,9 the point is not to choose between ‘either-or’, nor to make compromises on behalf of one’s own cultural and religious key principles. Rather, the point is to gain better understanding of oneself by being aware of the new reality in which people with different cultures and religions are part of one’s daily life; hence, understanding the universal element in one’s own and the others’ cultures and religions and having an inclusive view on the world. And of course, as a guiding factor, you need to have a consensus on shared rules on the overall institutional (legal) level. This is not easy to achieve considering that Danish society historically has been ethnically and religiously homogenous, and that most Muslim immigrants have no experience with secular, pluralistic societies that seek to uphold the principles of religious and cultural diversity. These circumstances result in the situation in which many are sceptical towards religious and cultural diversity. So a certain amount of vigour is needed in order to overcome the fear of others and to be open to changes and reciprocal influence. The current situation in Denmark is characterized by a field of tension, in which the others are considered both a threat and a challenge. This means that an important task still awaits us; we are to (jointly) define where we are united and what we do not, necessarily, have to agree upon. As already mentioned, the things we have in common must include a general, cultural reference and communal political rules, whereas the distinctive covers the specific norms and values which are characteristic of one’s cultural identity. But our understandings of multiculturalism differ. From the viewpoint of the minority it might be considered as a liberal and undiscriminating society-model.

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From another point of view, often (but not necessarily) taken by the majority, multiculturalism is regarded as a model in which cultures – in this case the Muslim cultures and the Danish culture – exist independently and develop side by side, and as such constitute a clear threat to national identity and societal cohesion. Furthermore, it is seen as a hindrance to integration and must be rejected. However, these stances tend to emphasize the normative aspect, meaning that multiculturalism is presented as a norm which is either to be accomplished or rejected. This approach seeks to use multiculturalism as a political strategy and put forward the issue in an artificial way, that is, either as a multicultural or a mono-cultural society. Nevertheless, we live in a composite society in which other cultures and religions have become a part of our everyday life. Intercultural relations have become characteristic of our reality. The question remaining is how will we respond to this multiculturalism? How do we relate to the changes brought about by the interaction with others? What does it mean when we are told to adapt to the new situation, and in which way is this adaptation mutual? The subject for the Muslim population is to develop a new identity in an environment with entirely new premises, which is predicated on an understanding of Islam’s relation to modernity and secular society. The matter seems to revolve around developing a European Islam, that is, an interpretation of Islam and a Muslim identity which is in harmony with Europe’s democratic tradition. Is that possible, and in which way? Will it be mostly advantageous for the Western societies or for Muslims as well? It is a question which cannot be answered clearly as there are several interpretations of the different terms attached to it, such as modernity, secular society, adaptation, integration. One can only point out some of the conditions that are crucial for an understanding of the problem, and which can be useful as a starting-point for eventually resolving the problems. One must first state that Danish Muslims tend to disagree on a majority of issues. At this time, they have no representative institution, that is, no unifying organ that can be their public profile, voice their needs and manage their interests. Furthermore, they lack the capacity to contemplate the significant questions related to a contextual interpretation of Islam and the future of the Muslims in Europe. Additionally, they are in need of an educational institution that can formulate and respond scientifically to the prevailing challenges facing Islam. As pointed out by H. R. Iversen, access to education is an essential element for cultural and political recognition. The point is however not about the opportunity to establish private schools (friskoler) since Muslims already benefit from this; the point is rather to establish a theological Islamic education at university level which, apart from offering a relevant education for imams, could also provide a scientific contribution to understanding the relation between Islam and modernity. It is quite correct when the Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs stresses that the Danish government very much accommodates the Muslim

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need for private schools by financing them with 85 percent of their budget.10 This, however, does not abolish the poor teaching at many Muslim private schools, and does not contribute to the advancement of the European Islam which is called for by a number of Danish politicians, including the Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs himself. Scientific work can be found in Islamic literature, philosophy and theology relating to Muslim views and responses to the challenges of modernity, and that can also at the same time provide a solid foundation for understanding the position of Islam in Europe, historically and currently and for an integration of Muslims in Europe. Additionally, experiences can be gained from other European countries that have, in cooperation with Muslim religious communities, developed Islamic Studies at universities.11 However at the current moment the Danish government seems to have no interest in an active commitment to such a project, whereas the resident Muslims are reluctant because they consider such a project to be a governmental attempt to control Islam. Nonetheless there should be no doubt that in the longer run Islamic theological education would benefit the Muslims as well as the Danish society as a whole.

Religious recognition Mutual recognition between religions are characterized by a field of tension which on the one hand insists on the absolute character of one’s own religious truth, and on the other hand a recognition that other religions are also based on God’s revelation and are thus legitimate ways to God’s truth. Whether it is at all possible to recognize one another without compromising one’s own standpoint has been discussed over time by Jews, Christians and Muslims, however, without reaching a consensus on the criteria for such recognition. Despite the common cultural-historical background that Judaism, Christianity and Islam represent in particular ways, one tends to take one’s own religion, one’s own understanding of revelation and of the Divine as a point of departure when considering the religion of others. At the same time it is characteristic for the younger religion to see itself as a corrective or fulfilment of the older ones. This further complicates the mutual recognition. The explanation to this problem reaches far beyond this paper’s field and is as such an assignment for a philosophy of religions and/or theology. Here I must limit the discussion to some specific, relevant conditions that foster mutual recognition between Christianity and Islam. It is no secret that Muslims from the beginning have expected Christians to recognize Islam as a religion and Muh.ammad as a prophet. This is due to the idea imprinted in the Muslim self-understanding upholding Islam as a basic religion which was first revealed to Adam (who was, according to the Qur’a¯n, the first prophet in a line that ends with Muh.ammad) and which is, in its original form, considered to be the mother of all religions. In the historical

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course of revelation whereby each people have received the same divine message through their prophets, Abraham, according to Muslim tradition, holds a special position. He is considered to be one of the most important prophets; the one that marks the belief in only one God, the strongest and the one that re-established the original monotheism leading back to Adam. Furthermore, Abraham is the example of monotheists, or hanif. Additionally it is stressed that the prophet Muh.ammad ‘is closest to Abraham’ and is obliged to verify the faith of Abraham. Expecting Jews and Christians to recognize Islam as the truthful religion derives from this position. The expectation is still present in discussions and conversations that Muslims have with Jews and Christians. Why is it a problem for them to recognize our prophet and the sacredness of our Qur’a¯n when we recognize their religion, their prophets and holy books? The other way around, one could ask if a recognition of Muh.ammad as a prophet and the Qur’a¯n as God’s revelation would not be tantamount with confessing to Islam, being that the Islamic dogma stresses these two elements (The Qur’a¯n as God’s revelation and Muh.ammad as God’s prophet). One can further ask if a potential Christian recognition of Muh.ammad would take into account the Muslim belief that he (Muh.ammad) is ‘the seal of prophets’ and that the Qur’a¯n is the direct speech of God. Or would it rather be based on Christian criteria for prophets and for understanding the word of God? This brings me to bishop Niels Henrik Arendt who puts the problem forward in the following matter, ‘Seriously considering if Muh.ammad can be recognised in such a manner brings forward another problem, namely whether or not the potential recognition the Christians might be able to provide would be the kind of recognition the Muslims want.’12 Conversely, because of historical asymmetry and their distinct view of previous religions of revelation, Muslims do not have such a problem with acknowledging Christianity because the belief in Jesus as God’s prophet and the gospels as God’s revelation is part of their faith and is actually one of Islam’s articles of faith. However is this form of recognition – one that acknowledges Jesus as God’s prophet but rejects the belief in the incarnation and thus the belief in Christ as God, and that acknowledges the divine origin of the Gospels but believes that the Christians have falsified them – satisfactory to Christians? That is to say, it is impossible to provide a complete recognition of the other religion, but that is in fact not the issue. Basically human beings are never in possession of an absolute truth. Our entire existence, including our religious views, is submitted to relative truth and relative criteria. Regardless of which religion we belong to, The Ultimate remains unreachable. Paul Knitter would say that we must give up the myth of religious supremacy. Even some Sufi schools of thought, especially those who take their point of departure in Ibn-Arabi’s (1165–1240) teachings of the ‘transcendent unity behind the religions’, argue for a religious diversity. One must also acknowledge the fact that besides the believers of other religions, atheists and religiously indifferent people have an expectation

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of recognition. No one should be denied the possibility of recognition, but neither should be overlooked by the critical eye. Also, it is important to stress the need to regard seriously the religious convictions and outlook on life of others without compromising one’s own standpoint. Exactly this undertaking demands a ‘critical recognition of others and a realistic understanding of oneself’.13

Notes 1

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That is the title and motto of Axel Honneth’s work called The Struggle for Recognition (1996). He attempts to formulate a new critical theory in which the mutual relations of recognition between people are given an essential meaning. Honneth’s thesis is to prove that self-realization is highly dependent on recognition, which can be achieved in respectively one’s private sphere and the broader social context. He also argues that social recognition is a political process. This categorization is inspired by Honneth, but not directly taken over from him. He distinguishes between three types of recognition (1) love, (2) respect and (3) social esteem where the cultural and religious recognition is situated in the third sphere (Honneth, p. 174). Troels Engbjerg-Pedersen, ‘Profetkonflikt: striden står om anerkendelse’, Politiken, 28 January 2006. According to the Christian Daily (Kristeligt Dagblad 29 November 2007) administration of the approved religious communities is now moving from Ministry of Ecclesiastic Affairs, named as Ministry of Church, to Ministry of Justice. In the current Constitution § 69 it still says ‘the affairs of religious communities outside of Danish National Church, shall be regulated by statute’, but such a statute has never been passed. Lisbet Christoffersen, ‘Anerkendt som trossamfund’, Politiken, 21 February 2006. The project of inquiry included visits and listening to twenty-two Muslim organizations (mainly mosques) from different parts of Denmark, represented by different ethnic and theological background, which resulted in a ChristianMuslim conference in Nyborg (19–20 August 2006). ‘Rapporten fra lytterunden blandt muslimske organisationer og moskeer’, in Folkekirke og Religionsmøde, 2006, p. 17. Hans Raun Iversen, ‘Anerkendelse og selvforståelse’ i bogen Gudebilleder Ytringsfrihed og religion i en globaliseret verden (Tiderne Skifter: København 2006), p. 209. Interview in Berlingske Tidende, 20 August 2006. Experiences with university education in Islamic theology from a number of European countries, among others Bosnia and Herzegovina, Austria, the Netherlands and Germany are presented in the report Imamuddannelser i Europa (Københavns Universitet, 2005) and Islam at European Universities (University of Copenhagen 2006). The report is written by Birgitte Schepelern Johansen based on the background of her studies of that field in 2004–2005. Niels Henrik Arendt, Gud er stor! Om islam og kristendom (Forlaget ANIS: København 2001), p. 96. Iversen, p. 226.

Chapter 21

Debates on Jesus and Muh.ammad in Europe, India and Pakistan Jan Slomp

When the Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian Muslim Relations was established in 1976, David Kerr became its first director. In the same period an advisory committee was installed with members from various academic and ecclesiastical backgrounds. The Dutchman on this committee was Dr Dick Bakker, director of the Hendrik Kraemer Institute, the Protestant centre for missionary training in Oegstgeest, the Netherlands. Bakker had worked in Indonesia, and had written a thesis on Man in the Qur’a¯n (1965). In March 1977 our family returned from Pakistan, where I had served on the staff of the Christian Study Centre, founded in 1967, and Bakker asked me to succeed him on the committee in Birmingham. His argument was that the Study Centre in Selly Oak could benefit more from my experience in a similar institution in Rawalpindi. So I served on the committee from 1978 to 1993. During that period I became acquainted with David Kerr and, after his departure to Hartford in the United States, with his successor Jørgen Nielsen. The main difference in that period between the centres in Rawalpindi and Birmingham was that the board and the staff in the former were at that time all Protestant and Catholic Christians, whereas the centre in the setting of Selly Oak Colleges employed Muslim teachers and was open to Muslim students. The Christian Study Centre even now has two Muslims on staff. During that initial period comparison of the centre in Birmingham with the McGill Institute of Islamic Studies in Montreal would have been more appropriate. In 1989 I visited Hartford after attending an international conference in New York, organized by the Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs in Jedda and London. David Kerr invited me to deliver an ex tempore lecture to his students about the work of the joint Islam in Europe Committee of the Conference of European Churches (Geneva) and the Roman Catholic Consilium Conferentiarum Episcopalium Europae (St Gallen), of which I happened to be the moderator from 1987 to 1994. When I suggested that I should speak on a similar topic at the farewell conference in 1990 in

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honour of my countryman, Willem A. Bijlefeld, whom I had known since 1954, David hesitated a moment. He said, ‘Jørgen Nielsen is supposed to speak on “Muslims in Europe in the late twentieth century”, but if you can propose a good subject you are welcome.’ I suggested the topic of ‘Calvin and the Turks’, which he accepted. With many friends and colleagues from all over the world, we met again in Hartford in 1990 around the theme of Christian Muslim Encounter.1 Our next meeting was on Saturday the 15th of September 2001 in Birmingham at a dinner to celebrate the 25th anniversary of the Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian Muslim Relations. This celebration took place under the shadow of the events in New York on 9/11, the impact of which we could hardly imagine at that moment. Our latest encounter so far was in Lambeth Palace, London, on the 27th of March 2003 at the occasion of the presentation of Essays for Kenneth Cragg: A Faithful Presence.2 As I have known him David Kerr always sought to find common ground between Christians and Muslims. In this respect he often went ahead of others. His ability to formulate a consensus became evident during a five-day consultation in June 1976 convened by the World Council of Churches (WCC) in Chambésy in Switzerland on ‘Christian Mission and Islamic Da’wah’. David Kerr wrote the Christian editorial and Khurshid Ahmad of the Jama’at-e-Islami in Pakistan the Muslim preface to the report. David Kerr’s hand can also be recognized in the statement of the conference. This meeting in Chambésy is in my view the most important conference of Christian and Muslim scholars and church-leaders ever held until the present time. The October 1976 issue of the International Review of Mission3 contains a verbatim report of this conference. The London-based Muslim Journal Impact republished its complete text in 1981. But for the then General Secretary of the WCC, the Revd Dr Philip Potter, its recommendations went too far. Christian relief organizations felt offended by the sentence, ‘The conference strongly urges Christian churches and religious organizations to suspend their misused diakonia activities in the world of Islam.’ So Potter refused to present the recommendations to the Central Committee, the governing body of the WCC. David Kerr also drafted the Chiang Mai Statement on ‘Dialogue in Community’.4 It was held in a centre of living Buddhism in Thailand, and was a consultation on dialogue, not a dialogue in itself. This consultation was organized by the sub-unit on Dialogue with People of Living Faiths and Ideologies (DFI) of the WCC. Its moderator at that time, Prof Dr D. C. Mulder (b.1919) told me about David Kerr’s participation at the Chiang Mai consultation. The same DFI of the WCC 1–7 December 1979 convened a conference on Christian Presence and Witness in Relation to Muslim Neighbours5 in the Conference Centre of the Kenyan Council of Churches in the coastal town Mombasa. Its moderator was again Dr D. C. Mulder. During the last night of the conference David Kerr drafted the conclusions. As one of the participants I was deeply impressed by this performance.

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Removing obstacles and misunderstandings It has always been one of David Kerr’s concerns in dialogue to remove obstacles and misunderstandings between Muslims and Christians. One of these obstacles is the lack of status of the Prophet Muh.ammad in Christian thought. Thomas Carlyle’s second lecture ‘Friday 8th May 1840’ in a series On Heroes Hero-Worship and the Heroic in History dealt with ‘The Hero as Prophet. Mahomet: Islam’, in which he states, ‘He is by no means the truest of Prophets, but I do esteem him a true one . . . I mean to say all the good of him I justly can.’6 These words hardly received an echo in Christian theology. Though some British-based nineteenth-century Christian scholars wrote sympathetically about Islam, the image of Muh.ammad remained in the dark. William Muir, who wrote a biography of the Prophet which was much consulted by missionaries in India and Pakistan, ‘could express some positivity towards Muh.ammad in Mecca, none at Medina’.7 But that is all. I know of only one Dutch theologian and Arabist Herman Bavinck who in 1899 wrote in his Gereformeerde Dogmatiek (Reformed Dogmatics) Volume I, that thanks to the Prophet Muh.ammad people came in touch with the God of the Bible.

David Kerr’s predecessors in the debate on the recognition of Muh.ammad During the above mentioned conference in 1990 in Hartford David Kerr read a paper entitled, ‘He walked in the Path of the Prophets: Toward Christian Theological Recognition of the Prophethood of Muh.ammad’. In this paper David Kerr mentions several predecessors who had already been pleading for Christian theological recognition of the prophethood of Muh.ammad. He mentions among others Kenneth Cragg (1984) and Hans Küng (1985) and a statement by a consultation organized by the ‘Islam in Europe Committee’ of the Conference of European Churches in March 1984 in St Pölten in Austria. The conference in Salzburg that Kerr refers to, took place in 1978. I quote the whole statement because David Kerr only quoted the summary, which does not contain the explicit clause about the recognition of Muh.ammad’s prophethood. The authors of this summary added also Jn 1.14 about the Word made flesh. A further question deliberated by the working group centred on the theme ‘How do we as Christians understand Islam theologically?’ and asked the question, ‘Can Christians recognize Muh.ammad as a prophet?’ It was received by eighty delegates and other participants. Only the delegate from Norway abstained. The meeting in St Pölten was the first semi-official Church meeting ever to make such a positive statement about the Prophet Muh.ammad. The statement reads as follows: One current in Christian thought has consistently honoured Muh.ammad as a preacher of repentance in the service of the One God. It is uncharitable

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and unnecessarily offensive to condemn him out of hand as a false prophet or worse. Christians must always remember Christ’s injunction: ‘Judge not that ye be not judged’ (Matt.7:1). The Muslims revere a succession of holy prophets from Adam to Muh.ammad who were entrusted with an infallible message. On the other hand Christians respect the Old Testament prophets as fallible yet inspired messengers of repentance in the service of the One God. The New Testament writers continue this tradition, speaking of ‘the spirit of prophecy, which God shall pour upon all flesh’ (Acts 2:17). It is therefore possible for Christians to recognize Muh.ammad as a prophet, but only in the context of this tradition. We must nevertheless ensure that our Muslim friends understand the subtle differences between the two perspectives, for Christians believe that revelation comes from one who is greater than all the prophets. ‘ . . . being the brightness of His glory and the express image of His person . . . and has by Himself purged our sins . . . ’ (Heb.1: 3). There was a long and rather controversial discussion following the reading of the report.8 The questions in St Pölten were formulated by Dr Ulrich Schoen. The answers were drafted by Dr Sigvard von Sicard of the staff of the Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian Muslim Relations in Birmingham and Dr Stuart Brown of the Islam Desk of the WCC. They were writing of course as private persons. The report in English, French and German was sent to all member churches in Europe. The Islam in Europe Committee, for which the present author served at that time as secretary, received only one protest, from the Evangelical Church in Greece. A few years later Roman Catholic clergy in the Middle East commented orally to the secretary, that by upgrading the status of Muh.ammad the clear borders between both religions would be perforated, which, from a pastoral point of view, was undesirable in their countries. They added that they as Christians in the Middle East had already learned to speak with respect about the Prophet Muh.ammad, and European Christians ought to learn to do the same. David Kerr could have added to his list Anton Wessels (1978)9 and the present author who modestly contributed to the Christian upgrading of the status of Muh.ammad during the International Congress on Seerat, 3–15 March 1976, in Pakistan. I return to this congress below. Unfortunately David Kerr missed what the Pakistani scholar Daud Rahbar, author of God of Justice: Study in the Ethical Doctrine of the Qur’an (1960), had to say on this subject. After his conversion to Christianity, Daud Rahbar wrote in 1965 in The Ecumenical Review, the official journal of the WCC, about ‘Muslims and the finality of Jesus Christ in the age of universal history’.10 He refers to ‘centuries of ungraciousness from the Christian Church toward brethren in the world of Islam’. He further asked, ‘Are Christians honestly convinced that they are serving the Church by denying

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Muh.ammad a status equal to that of the distinguished ones among pre-Christian Hebrew prophets?’ This statement is the more remarkable, because few would expect it from a person who had left his parental religion. The Roman Catholic priest Jean-Mohammed Abdeljalil from Morocco showed an equally reconciling spirit towards the religion he left for the Church.11 He wrote beautiful books in French about Islam. The Muslim scholar Khalid Duran, himself of partly Moroccan extraction, calls such men Islam’s gift to the Church.

The debate in Agra in 1854 between Pfander and Al-Kairânawi In the second part of this chapter, I want to explore how the status of the prophethood of Muh.ammad became a very important focus both in the internal Muslim debate and in the debate between Christians and Muslims, which is in part linked to Christian missionary activities and publications. In the wake of the colonial expansion of the British in India many missionaries entered the country. Muslim and Hindu leaders started to feel uneasy and even threatened by their presence. Some organized societies in defence of the old religions and the same people or others started modernizing Islam or Hinduism. Because missionaries used both English and the vernacular languages such as Persian, Hindi and Urdu, to spread the Gospel and to establish churches, the ‘ulama began to respond. Public debates became important meeting grounds during that period. So far intellectual debates had been limited to the courts of emperors, nizams and rajas. In 1854 Rahmatullah al-Kairânawi (1818–91) invited the then well-known missionary Karl Gottlieb Pfander to a public debate.12 Pfander (1803–65) was in those days considered to be the Christian champion against Islam and had written a book, Balance of Truth, which contained a refutation of the claim of Islam to be God’s final revelation. Part I starts with the testimony of the Qur’a¯n to the Bible, Part II contains an exposition of the teaching of the Bible, Part III compares the contents of the Bible and the Qur’a¯n. It denies that the Bible contains prophecies about Muh.ammad. It rejects the miraculous character (ijâz) of the Qur’a¯n, its inspiration and so on. It contains an inquiry into Muh.ammad’s alleged miracles. It examines his conduct and the manner in which Islam at first spread in Arabia itself and in the neighbouring countries. The Mizanu’l Haqq (Balance of Truth), spelled this way on the cover of the 1910 enlarged English edition, became the centre of the controversy.13 The German manuscript of 1829 was never published. The first edition in 1835 was in Persian, the language of the educated in the Mughal Empire. The first Urdu edition appeared in about 1840, the Arabic in 1865, the English in 1866 and so on. Many reprints followed.

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The debate took place on the 10th and 11th of April in a school of the Church Missionary Society in Agra. A lot of time was lost because the opponents could not agree on procedure. Both debaters were assisted by friends and colleagues. William Muir (mentioned above) and Thomas Valpy French, later the first Anglican bishop of Lahore, helped Pfander. Al-Kairânawi also had his less wellknown helpers. The sources do not agree about the number of others present. The younger al-Kairânawi was well prepared for the debate. He had studied critical books about the Bible and Christianity written by European scholars in order to prove the falsification (tahrif) of texts of the Bible. Pfander was not familiar with those publications and found it difficult to respond in an adequate way. He was obviously less learned than was assumed on the basis of the 1910 edition of his magnum opus. Comparison shows that the 1866 edition is much shorter. The greater detailed learning came from the editor of the second edition, W. St Clair Tisdall. As there was no jury, both sides claimed that they had won. As a result a few ‘ulama became Christian. Al-Kairânawi wrote a reponse Izhâr al Haqq, Revealing of the Truth, in which he elaborates his claims of tahrif. Al-Kairânawi used the existence of the Gospel of Barnabas in this context. He had read about this spurious gospel in the introduction of George Sale’s translation and commentary of the Qur’a¯n, where he quoted a Spanish manuscript of this gospel. Al-Kairânawi’s book was also translated into several languages. The modern Urdu version which I consulted in three volumes has a new title, Bible se Qur’a¯n tak (From the Bible to the Qur’a¯n).14 Both Pfander’s and al-Kairânawi’s books are still available in modern editions and are used by apologetic authors. It would be unfair to apply the conclusion of Barbara Metcalf to the main Christian actors in the debates, namely, ‘The missionaries probably did not have the intellectual sophistication or even the cultural refinement of their Muslim opponents.’15 William Muir, Thomas Valpy French and later W. St Clair Tisdall were great intellectuals. They were all three well informed about Islam, but they saw it as their calling to replace it by Christianity. But there were of course (and still are!) missionaries with no more education than high school and bible school, who preached, ‘a medley of Gospel truth, erroneous statements of Muslim belief, and misdirected assaults upon Islam and its Prophet’, which is a reference cited by Barbara Metcalf quoting E. M. Wherry, an American Presbyterian Missionary in 1883. In those days a negative attitude towards the people of India and their religions prevailed. The disdain and contempt with which many missionaries looked down on Muslims and Hindus and their religions may have been widespread, and most likely belonged to the causes for the outbreak of the mutiny in 1857, as William Dalrymple assumes in The Last Mughal.16 Many missions in the nineteenth and even the twentieth century failed to provide proper historical, anthropological, linguistic, cultural and interreligious training to their candidates. Debates such as the one in Agra had a long-lasting negative impact on the events which followed.

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Consequences of the missionary challenge to Islam after Agra In the years after the debate in Agra three responses may be distinguished among Muslims in India, and also in Pakistan after 1947; the coming into existence of the of Hizb al Ahnaf, better known as the Barelwi Movement; and the coming into existence of the Ahmadiyya; the production and promotion of Muslim apologetic literature, with its increasing focus on the Gospel of Barnabas. From a Christian point of view these three have in common that the superiority of the Prophet Muh.ammad over Jesus Christ is emphasized. All three will be dealt with briefly. The present author himself became involved in these debates.

The Barelwi Movement of Ahmad Rida Khan (1856–1921) Many soldiers from Bareilly, a town in Uttar Pradesh, took part in the Indian Mutiny of 1857.17 It is also the birthplace of Ahmad Rida Khan, the founder of the Barelwi movement. After partition in 1947 many Barelwis moved to Pakistan, where about 40 per cent of the population are believed to have become followers of this movement. This movement is strongly represented in Surinam and among the Muslims from Surinam in the Netherlands and migrants from the Indian-subcontinent in Britain. Their umbrella organization is the World Islamic Mission, with some rival branches. Ahmad Rida Khan’s family came from Afghanistan and his ancestors served the Mughal emperors. He founded the Hizb al-Ahnaf, the party of the true believers and he was addressed by his followers as A‘la Hazrat, Your Highness. He believed that veneration of the Prophet, combined with sufism and the veneration of the saints – all of which were rooted in the hearts and the emotions of the believers – were essential for the survival of Islam in India. In this way an ethnically Indian Islam would be formed. This movement is deeply integrated within India’s culture. He therefore opposed the Deobandi and Wahhabi schools, because, in his view, they put too much stress on the mind and the intellect. Yet he was a great intellectual himself, known for his enormous memory and prompt factual knowledge of hadiths. Through his many fatwas he boosted the spiritual status of Muh.ammad and the saints. He left sixteen volumes with essays on the Prophet, fatwas, speeches, poems called na‘t, to honour God, the Prophet and the founder of the Qadiri tariqa, with which his movement was associated. He believed that the power of holy persons to perform miracles and to hear supplications of followers continued even at their tombs after death. His belief that the Prophet possessed prescience of the future was contested by his opponents as violating a sole prerogative of God. Barelwis say that they experience the presence of Muh.ammad in worship in dhikr, for example.

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Under Barelwi influence milâd un nabi celebrations (as they are called in Urdu) have become very popular. Their festivities are attended by thousands of believers, which is still the case in the Netherlands and Britain. Instead of anti-missionary apologetics or polemics Barelwis boosted the veneration of the Prophet to heights not known before. Instead of following the advice of their founder not to seek contacts with non-Muslims, they invite Christian ministers to speak at their milâd celebrations. At these occasions these Christian ministers cannot avoid making positive remarks about the Prophet Muh.ammad. The present author was invited four times to attend these meetings, with an average of 2000 participants, in The Hague. Three times he was the only Christian speaker. When we arrived in Pakistan in 1964 milâd un nabi celebrations were rare and between. During our stay we noticed a gradual increase. During the International Seerat Conference on the 11th and 12th of April 2006 I noticed that the milâd un-nabi had become a national holiday and that celebrations were taking place in the whole country. Even those who initially considered these innovations to be unlawful, or bidat, participated in these celebrations. Opposition against overtly praising the Prophet was explained by Barelwis as lack of respect. The International Seerat Congress in March 1976 (mentioned above) showed that the Barelwis no longer had the monopoly of organizing great events in honour of the Prophet of Islam. The organizers had also invited non-Muslim scholars, especially authors about Muh.ammad, from European and American universities. One invitation was sent to this author at the Christian Study Centre in Rawalpindi. I happened to be the only Christian in the delegation from Pakistan. The night before the conference the Minister of Religious Affairs, Maulana Kausar Niazi, announced the conference on television. He showed my paper entitled, ‘The meeting of the Prophet Muh.ammad with Christians from Najran and the present Muslim-Christian dialogue’18 and continued to tell his audience that he had even been so generous as to invite a Christian missionary to address the congress. The minister, who was unpopular among Christians and was known for his anti-missionary policies, had of course in mind that he wanted us in the Christian Study Centre to take a Christian stand on the status of the Prophet. A similar idea must have guided the Ministry of Religious Affairs Zakat & Ushr when I was invited to speak at the above mentioned conference exactly thirty years later in April 2006 on the theme ‘Universality of the Message of the Holy Prophet Muh.ammad (saws)’, with a sub-theme of ‘Interreligious harmony’. I suggested that Christians and Muslims should recognize the factual universality of the other religion. As for the confessional universality claims, they are conflicting, but not absolutely because believers of both religions believe in the one true God. I quoted the Declaration Nostra Aetate of the Second Vatican Council on Muslims and other non-Christians of 28 October 1965 and the above-mentioned statement on the prophethood of Muh.ammad of the conference in St Pölten in 1984, as proofs of the fact that the official Churches, whatever the past may have been, are no longer anti-Islamic. I also addressed the

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issue of religious freedom and the right to change one’s religion in both directions.19 Boosting the status of the Prophet Muh.ammad was accompanied by a great output of ‘Lives of the Prophet’ both in English and in Urdu. At a random moment in 1975 the Revd Alexander Malik, a Pakistani colleague on the staff of the Christian Study Centre, counted twenty different biographies that could be obtained in the bookshops. This increased interest for the Prophet also had the negative effect of increasing sensitivity for any expression of real or supposed lack of respect for the Prophet. This sensitivity increased as a result of the debates over Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses. Events outside Pakistan worked as a catalyst. The old Indian blasphemy laws made it a criminal act to injure or defile a place of worship with the intent of insulting the religious sensibilities of other communal groups. In 1980 a new section was introduced into the old British Penal Code by an ordinance of president Zia ul-Haq and became law in 1985. The changes made old general formulations concerning blasphemy more specific by mentioning the members of the family of the Prophet, the Prophet himself and the Holy Qur’a¯n. The punishment for the first category was changed from two years’ imprisonment to three years. The punishment for defiling the Qur’a¯n was life imprisonment and offending the Prophet became a capital offence, which the Federal Shariat Court later ruled also should have the option of life imprisonment. In the period between 1986 and 2004 many were accused, resulting in 265 decisions against Muslims, 87 against Christians, 80 against Ahmadis, and 11 against others. The law caused widespread unrest in the country. Communal tensions between Sunnis and Shi’ites increased. It became evident that many accusations were false and were sometimes made to settle property disputes. The death – whether suicide or murder – of the Roman Catholic Bishop Dr John Joseph on 6 May 1998 in Sahiwal is interpreted by his biographers as the result of the nationwide protest he had organized against this law.20 The death threat contained in this law does not enhance the readiness of Christians to recognize any prophethood of Muh. ammad. Still I wonder whether any timely positive statement by churches, missions or individual Christians about the status of the Prophet Muh.ammad might have had such a positive impact on the political and religious climate in the country that some of these events might have been avoided. Posing these normative questions will not change the course of history, but it may not be too late to try to be more positive in view of the future of the relations between both religions. David Kerr’s studies can help us to find the right words for it.

The Ahmadiyya response According to the Pakistani scholar Fazlur Rahman (1919–88) the rise of the Ahmadiyya movement was partly a response to Christian missions.21 Mirza Ghulam Ahmad may have read the following passage in Pfander’s Balance of Truth:

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At Medinah, between the tombs in which lie the bodies of Muh.ammad and Abu Bakr, there may be seen an empty grave, which Muslims call ‘The grave of our Lord Jesus, the Son of Mary.’ It has never been occupied. Its emptiness reminds the pilgrim that Christ is alive, while Muh.ammad is dead.22 But against the missionaries in India who used the above passage quite often, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad maintained that he had found the tomb of Jesus in Srinagar in Kashmir. This was against the traditional Muslim exegesis of the Qur’a¯n, that Jesus was elevated by God just before the crucifixion. Had Mirza Ghulam Ahmad said nothing more, he would not have annoyed his fellow Muslims so much as by stating that he had fulfilled the mission of Muh.ammad, just as Jesus had fulfilled the mission of Moses. The result of the missionary activities of the Ahmadiyya was a permanent conflict both with Christians and fellow Muslims. The conflict resulted in the first major religio-political crisis in Pakistan during the Punjab disturbances in 1953. The life of Ahmadis and the property of the movement were in danger. After the disturbances the court hearings focused on the definition of a Muslim and the Christology and prophetology of the Ahmadiyya.23 The instigators of the khatm-e-nabuwwat movement, who were defending the finality of the prophethood of Muh.ammad, were punished. Three groups were the main actors: the Ahrar party, the Majlis-e-Amal and to a lesser extent the Jama’at-e-Islami. A few leaders received a death sentence, among them Maulana Mawdudi, but they later received amnesty. The conflict arose from more than religious causes. The Ahmadis formed a prosperous, well-educated and influential community in Pakistan, and a certain jealousy may have been one of the motives to attack them. When in 1974 during the rule of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto the parliament declared that the Ahmadis were a non-Muslim community on a par with the Christians, they lost most of their influence. Under president Zia ul Haq their position became even weaker and they felt targeted by the blasphemy law. Many Christians sympathize with the plight of their religious opponents. The law of 1974 reducing their status caused a braindrain of Ahmadis to the West, and the blasphemy law caused another exodus. Among recent refugees there are many Ahmadis, but to date they have not changed their views on Muh.ammad and Christ.

Apologetic literature on the increase From the early 1960s onward most Christian churches and missions have stopped writing, reprinting and distributing polemical and apologetic literature in which Islam is described in a negative way. In Pakistan this was both the result of self-protection and of a changed attitude towards Islam and Muslims. In 1963, shortly before our departure to Pakistan I received a brief brochure On Loving Islam written by Jim Gittings, a unordained American Presbyterian

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missionary in Lahore. Jim Gittings refuted the fallacy of those who maintained that they loved Muslims but hated their religion. The brochure made a deep impact on me. Apologetic literature was reduced to the bare necessary minimum because it harms the spirit of dialogue, which started spreading in those days. Dialogue is based on the recognition of definitions of identity of the partner in dialogue. This implies for example that Christians accept the fact that for Muslims the Qur’a¯n contains the Word of God. This respect of course does not mean that Christians share this belief, but they respect it as belonging to the integrity of the Muslim dialogue partner. Without this mutual respect and the trust that it will not be misused, no genuine dialogue is possible. The Christian community was therefore deeply shocked when in 1973 they felt threatened in their identity. The Pakistan Times started publishing the entire text of the so-called Gospel of Barnabas and claimed that it was more authentic than the four gospels in the New Testament. Christian letters explaining why all churches without exception do not accept this spurious gospel were either refused or distorted beyond recognition. Matters became worse when the Ahmadiyya and the Jama’at e-Islami started promoting it. Maulana Mawdudi even wrote a preface for the Urdu translation. The Christian Study Centre published two brochures, first in English by the present author and later in Urdu by Yusuf Jalil, offering a Christian perspective on the Gospel of Barnabas. Early 1976 a colporteur of the Jama’at-e-Islami visited us. He showed us the books he was selling, Fundamentals of Islam by Mawdudi, The Myth of the Cross by Ajijola from Nigeria, published by Islamic Publications in Lahore (1975) and the Urdu version of Indjil-e-Barnabas. I decided to contact the author of the preface and asked by telegram to be received. An interview was granted on the 26th of September 1976. But during a conversation of more than one hour in Urdu I was not able to convince Maulana Mawdudi that by the publication of this obvious forgery no service was done to Christians and Muslims or to dialogue between them. He declared that he was not in favour of dialogue. When I reminded him of the fact that his colleague Professor Khurshid Ahmad was involved with Christians in the Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian Muslim Relations in Birmingham, he stated emphatically, ‘We need you there, we do not need you here.’ In his posthumously-published biography in two volumes of the Prophet Muh.ammad, Seerat-e-Sarwar-e-‘Alam, Maulana Mawdudi elaborates on the reasons why he believes this ‘gospel’ to be truer than the canonic four. The arguments that Yusuf Jalil and I had presented in our brochures were not even mentioned.24 It is easy to see why some Muslims are tempted to give credit to this forgery because it portrays Jesus as far inferior to Muh.ammad. Jesus plays the part of John the Baptist in the New Testament, announcing the advent of the real universal Messiah, Muh.ammad. The gospel moreover affirms an old Muslim legend, that Judas took Jesus’ place on the cross. The Gospel of Barnabas is still distributed worldwide and has become a major obstacle for real dialogue between Christians and Muslims on the status of both Jesus and Muh.ammad. Its

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propagation certainly does not enhance the readiness of Christians to recognize Muh.ammad as one David Kerr referred to in his study on the matter, and of whom the ninth-century Assyrian patriarch Timothy said ‘He walked in the way of the Prophets’.

Notes 1

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David Kerr, ‘“He walked in the path of the prophets”: Toward Christian theological recognition of the Prophethood of Muh.ammad’, pp. 426–46, and J. Slomp, ‘Calvin and the Turks’, pp. 126–42, both in Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and Wadi Z. Haddad (eds), Christian-Muslim Encounters (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1995). I return to David Kerr’s essay several times. David Thomas with Clare Amos (eds), A Faithful Presence: Essays for Kenneth Cragg (London: Melisende, 2003). ‘Christian Mission and Islamic Da’wah’, International Review of Mission, LXV:260 (October 1976), 365–460. S. J. Samartha (ed.), Faith in the Midst of Faiths. Reflections on Dialogue in Community (Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1977). D. C. Mulder and John B. Taylor (eds), Christian Presence and Witness in Relation to Muslim Neighbours: A Conference (Mombasa, Kenya, 1979). Thomas Carlyle, On Heroes Hero-Worship and the Heroic in History (London: Cassell, n.d.), p. 41. Clinton Bennett, Victorian Images of Islam (London: Grey Seal, 1992), p. 177. J. Slomp (ed.), Witness to God in a Secular Europe. Report of a Consultation held in St.Pölten, Austria 5th-10th March 1984 (Geneva: Conference of European Churches, 1985), pp. 38, 39, 56. Emphasis added by J.S. Anton Wessels, ‘Erkenning van Muh.ammad als profeet?’ (Recognition of Muh. ammad as a Prophet?) in De Moslimse Naaste. Op weg naar een theologie van de Islam (Kampen: Kok, 1978), pp. 134–6. Daud Rahbar, ‘Muslims and the finality of Jesus Christ in the age of universal history’, The Ecumenical Review, 17 (October1965), 360–8. Cf. Alfred-Louis de Prémare, ‘Le Retour de Jean-Mohammad Abdeljalil au Maroc’, in Marie-Thérèse Urvoy, rédaction, En hommage au père Jacques Jomier, o.p. (Paris: Du Cerf, 2002), pp. 321–41. The most detailed study of this period is by Christine Schirrmacher, Mit den Waffen des Gegners: Christlich-muslimische Kontroversen im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert dargestellt am Beispiel der Auseinandersetzung um Karl Gottlieb Pfanders ‘Mizan al-haqq’ und Rahmatullâh ibn Halil al-‘Uthmâni al-Kairânawis ‘Izhâr al-haqq’ und der Diskussion über das Barnabasevangelium, (Berlin: Klaus Schwartz, 1992); Because of German academic regulations concerning dissertations, this standard work is not available in English. C. G. Pfander, The Mizanul Haqq (Balance of Truth), revised by W. St. Clair Tisdall (London: The Religious Tract Society, 1910). Hazrat Maulana Rahmatullah Kairânawi, Baibel se Qur’ân tak (Izhar ul Haqq), (Karachi: Maktaba ‘Ulum, 1391 H,[=1971]). Urdu translation Akbar Ali, explanation and research Taqi Ushmani.

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Barbara Daly Metcalf, Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860–1900 (Princeton: University Press, 1982), p. 221. William Dalrymple, The Last Mughal The Fall of a Dynasty, 1857, 2nd edn (London: Bloomsbury, 2007), p. 74. See the index under M. J. Jennings. See s.v. Bareilly, Encyclopaedia of Islam: New Edition, vol. 1, pp. 1042, 1043; Metcalf, passim; Philip Lewis, Islamic Britain (London: Tauris, 1994), pp. 81–4; J. Slomp, ‘Brelwi Prophetenlob und Mystik in Nordindien und in den Niederlanden’, in Reinhard Kirste (ed.), Religionen im Gespräch. Die dialogische Kraft des Mystischen, Band 5 (Nachrodt 1998), pp. 293–310. J. Slomp, ‘The meeting of the Prophet Muh.ammad with Christians from Najran and the present Muslim-Christian dialogue’, Al-Mushir (The Counselor) (Rawalpindi, Pakistan: Theological Journal of the Christian Study Centre, 1977), pp. 227–34, and in the Proceedings of the congress published by the Ministry of Religious Affairs, Government of Pakistan, 1977. I discussed this subject in greater detail in J. Slomp, ‘Zur theologischen Verantwortung eines reformierten Islammissionars in Pakistan (1964-1977)’ in Heine Otto Luthe and Marie-Thérèse Urvoy (eds), Relations IslamoChrétiennes Bilan et Perspectives (Paris: Editions de Paris, 2006), pp. 175–200, French translation in the 2nd edition 2007. The proceedings of this conference are forthcoming. Linda S. Walbridge, ‘Chapter 7: Blasphemy’ in The Christians of Pakistan: The Passion of Bishop John Joseph (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003); Gulzar Wafa Chaudhry, Sermon in Blood: Sacrifice and Struggle of Bishop Dr John John Joseph. A Symbol of Christian-Muslim Harmony (Lahore: Zafar and Mumtaz, 1999). The description of the circumstances of his death by Walbridge in the court area in Sahiwal leaves, in my view, room for the argument that it was murder, not suicide. This author has lived in Sahiwal and knows the local scene. Moreover would a Roman Catholic bishop commit suicide, and would he help his community by doing so? W. S. Smith, s.v. ‘Ahmadiyya’, Encyclopaedia of Islam: New Edition (Leiden: Brill, 1960), vol. 1, p. 301 mentions as possible causes reactions against Christian and Western influences. Pfander, op.cit., p. 369. Added emphasis by Tisdall. Full details may be found in the ‘Report of the Court of Inquiry constituted under Punjab Act II of 1954 to enquire into the Punjab Disturbances of 1953’. Specific references are: Ahmadis were murdered, pp. 18–24; Ahmadi mosque burnt, p. 30; involvement of Jam’at-i-Islami, p. 243. Pseudo-Barnabas in the Context of Muslim-Christian Apologetics (Rawalpindi: Christian Study Centre Series No. 9, 1974); See also J. Slomp, ‘The Gospel of Barnabas in Recent Research’, Islamochristiana 23 (1997), 81–109; J. Slomp, ‘Vérités évangélique et coranique. L’ Évangile de Barnabé’ in M. T. Urvoy, réd., En Hommage au père Jacques Jomier o.p. (Paris: du Cerf, 2002), pp. 359–82.

Chapter 22

The Changing Face of Islamists in Sudan Edward Riak Kajivora

Introduction The rise of Islamic reform movements in the nineteenth century began in the countries that were under the direct control of Western imperialists. In these countries, Western and Islamic cultures clashed with each other, leaving the Islamic way of life acutely vulnerable to decline. This is especially true in Egypt, the most populous country in the Middle East where people for a long time had seen themselves as the cultural and religious leaders of the Muslim World. The influence of Islam spread out from al-Azhar University, the oldest and most famous centre for higher Islamic learning and which has produced numerous ‘ulama¯’ for many centuries. The British occupation of Egypt and the westernization of its major faculties, such as education and law, led to competition with the religiously oriented mosque schools, which meant that Egyptian society and culture came under attack. It was such a situation that produced the Society of Muslim Brothers, the first modern politically- and socially-oriented Islamic organization to stand as an inspiration for Islamic activities throughout the Muslim world. The Muslim Brothers organization has served as a general prototype for many fundamentalists of recent times. It set precedents for future Islamic fundamentalists as it spread to Palestine and Lebanon in the 1930s and to Sudan in the mid-1940s.

The Islamists’ ascent to power in Sudan Sudan shares its northern border with Egypt and the River Nile, which is the lifeline of Egypt, passes through Sudan. This has made it easy for Egypt to have a close association and a great influence on Sudan. For instance, it was through Egypt that Christianity first entered Sudan and it was from Egypt that Christianity began to decline and then ultimately disappeared from Sudan (Nubia). Similarly, the influence of Islam was first felt in Egypt before being felt in Sudan. Consequently, it is not strange for the Sudanese to copy some of the Egyptian ideas, as seen in the saying that ‘the wind of change in Sudan often blows from

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Egypt.’1 One of these influences is seen in the Egyptian Muslim Brothers movement which entered into Sudan. To understand the concepts of the Sudanese Muslim Brothers it is necessary to have an overview of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers’ ideology. The Sudanese Muslim Brothers (al-Ikhwa¯n al-Muslimı¯n al-Su ¯ danı¯yya) movement in Sudan was based on the ideology of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers and followed its concept of dawlat al-da‘wah, an Islamic state, where the Islamic community would be brought back to a true understanding and practice of Islam. This meant going back to a lifestyle that was based on the Qur’a¯n and Sunnah, which is essential for Muslim advancement in the contemporary world.2 In Sudan throughout the early 1950s, the Sudanese Muslim Brothers3 remained a loose organization with no clear political direction. This was partly because most of its supporters were drawn from among students of higher institutions of learning with few recent graduates who had yet to win the support of the local people. When it became obvious that Sudan was heading for independence, the Ikhwa¯ n organization proceeded to organize itself to spearhead an Islamic alliance whose aim was to press for an Islamic Constitution for an independent Sudan. The alliance failed to be an effective pressure group. It also failed to make Sudan an Islamic state. Most distressing of all, perhaps, was its failure to translate that alliance into a durable political influence.4 During the years of the civilian rule, 1964–69, an important landmark in Sudanese political life was realized. The issue of writing a permanent Constitution for the country resurfaced where each party tried to push through its own agenda. The Islamists emerged as a definite political party under the name of the Islamic Charter Front (ICF). Hasan al-Turabi, who emerged as its godfather is considered to be one of the most controversial political figures in post-independence Sudan. When he became the party’s General Secretary with maximum power to push his Islamic ideas through, he grouped around him some of the younger radical members of the party. He was confident that his support would be realized through these young radical members. Thus those opposed to his ideas, particularly the old guards were alienated.5 At one point al-Turabi even came to a proposal that Sudan be called the ‘Islamic Republic of the Sudan’, arguing that The Islamic idea had a positive role in the liberation of ‘our’ people, it contains the concept of shura (council) which vests power in the people, and that Islam integrates Sudanese society with a large entity (the World of Islam). Furthermore, Islam guarantees justice and equity in the distribution of wealth by abolishing riba [usury]. In addition, an Islamic constitution links the Sudanese with their Arab-Islamic tradition, protects minorities’ rights and preserves national unity. Moreover, calling the state ‘Islamic’ would indicate its orientation and give the constitution a ‘sacred’ image. And, the call for an Islamic constitution has become a popular drive and a rallying point of the major parties.6

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Forgetting that Sudan is a multi-cultural and religious affiliation, his party went on to argue that Islam was essentially a state and a religion, and that a true religion cannot be without an Islamic state and constitution. They even invoked Qur’a¯nic verses to press their argument further. Let the people of God judge by what Allah hath revealed therein. If any do fail to judge (the gospel) by what Allah hath revealed, they are (no better than) those who rebel. (S. 5:47) Al-Turabi never believed in democracy to implement his Islamic agenda. Attempts to rise to power through political means proved futile. Moreover, he never secured a comfortable majority through democratic means to institute an Islamic state. In this respect, al-Turabi had switched to dictatorship which can only be achieved through a military rule. It is worth noting that the Islamists all along had been infiltrating the army in order to get the power they yearned for to create an Islamistic state. Thus, on 30th June 1989, Islamist military officers seized power with a monolithic vision for the identity of Sudan. Although Brigadier Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir led a military coup, seized power and set himself on the throne, it became apparent that the Islamists were connected with this new regime, as the later policy of the new regime would indicate. In addition, al-Turabi was later to confess that his party was behind al-Bashir’s coup and that the Islamists would devote themselves to turning Sudan into a strict Islamic state.7 It follows that for ten years (1989–99), al-Turabi was the ultimate power behind the throne as leader of the Islamic party (National Islamic Front) or as speaker of the assembly. In fact, he held the post of the speaker for several years before he was axed by the military regime. It was during his pseudo-rule that many atrocities were committed, including summary executions, torture, arbitrary detentions, denial of freedoms of speech, assembly, and religion, and violations of the rules of war, particularly in the south and Nuba Mountains. But later the military found al-Turabi too hot to handle and the only solution was to lock him securely behind bars. But as a charismatic leader al-Turabi is a man who never runs short of ideas. He quickly established another Islamic party, negotiated an agreement with Garang8 to forge alliance and accused the military of making Sudan a sinking ship. Al-Turabi’s accusation of the military rule spread like wild fire as politicians and the civil population in the country became fed up with the Islamist regime. The common talk on the streets was that the country had become the property of only three Arab tribes, the Ja’aliyin, the Shayqiyah and the riverine Arabs widely known as awlad al-balad.9 They have no genuine ideology and they had already spent their sacred arrows. Now with nothing left, they turn to oil revenue as a tool of oppression. The local populations are not benefiting from the oil money and anyone questioning the regime is immediately done away with in a ruthless way. In a recent interview, Sadiq al-Mahdi, the former president,

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stressed that the only way to save the soul of the country is to call for a democratic transformation of the country through a general election.10 Surprisingly, the same al-Turabi who had little or no sympathy for the opponents of democracy is now preaching this same idea that he first killed and buried. With an apologetic smile for engineering the overthrow of the military regime, the Islamic godfather professes that he let the people choose by the ballot box whether the people of Sudan want an Islamic state and whether the Islamic state will solve the chaos that is characteristic of the present Sudan. He accused the military regime of leading the country to the path of disintegration because of its failure to accept democracy as a means of running the country. In an interview with him a few months ago, he asserted that The Islamic state should be based on religious conviction and it has to have: (a) freedom for all people. If you don’t like other people’s views then you respond verbally; (b) elections for all leaders to the head of state, nobody should be appointed; (c) be clean in public life, you don’t have to misappropriate public property just because you control all the finance and revenue; (d) if you sign any contract you have to abide by it and be loyal to it. That’s where we actually differ with this government.11 Obviously, the democracy that al-Turabi calls for is questionable. Many believe that this call for democracy is only one of his many tricks to get to power and install a totalitarian Islamic regime in the country to thereby execute his Islamic ideas. Although al-Turabi is an old man now he is never short of ideas and many of his followers flock to his house to learn at his feet.

Islamists and the Civil War The relationship between religion and state is the most controversial issue that divides Sudan. Since independence successive governments in Khartoum have exploited Islam in trying to solve the country’s problems and cling to power. After the Islamists took over the government in 1989, they designed a brand of Islam to which every Sudanese Muslim was expected to subscribe. Otherwise, he or she was considered to have apostatized, a crime punishable by death in Islamic law. The execution of Mahmud Muh.ammad Taha, a reputable Muslim thinker, is a notable example of Islamists’ ruthless killings. Earlier, Taha argued for a distinction to be drawn between the Meccan and the Medinan sections of the Qur’a¯n. Meccan Islam, which is peaceful, he argued, is applicable for the modern world where freedom and democracy prevail, whereas the bellicose Medinan teachings should be consigned to history. His line of thinking brought him in conflict with the Islamists where he was tried for apostasy, found guilty and quickly executed by the Sudanese government in 1985.

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The explanation for this is that the Islamists were swayed by the projected impression that the country was entering a new and promising phase where people were being swept along by a powerful Islamic wind. Because of this they promised to address the country’s problems solely through an Islamic orientation (sahwah) in which every aspect of life should be strictly subjected to the rules of Islam. Using its slogan of al-Isla¯m hu’wa¯ al-hall (Islam is the solution), and stressing the mubayy‘a¯t (oath of allegiance) ceremonies to the leader of the Islamic nation heightened the euphoria of Islamic superiority.12 Soon Islamic punitive policies were revived, as several executions for illegal currency, drug dealing and flogging resurfaced.13 Alcohol was banned, shops and public buildings were closed during jum‘ah prayers and all Christian gatherings for prayer outside the church were prohibited. In addition, segregation of the sexes in public transport was introduced and women’s employment was limited to the field of welfare only.14 In short, Islamic precepts were imposed on many facets of public and private life on the assumption that only through strict and uncompromising adherence to Islamic principles could the Sudanese achieve unity, social and economic progress and political autonomy. The Islamists demanded that shar–ı ’ah be enforced on all citizens without exception. In reality, all these are al-Turabi’s making as he later confessed. The government launched a full-scale war in the south in 1992 and declared it a jiha¯ d, a ‘holy war against the infidels and the traitors in order to consolidate the Islamic state’, but the matter remains controversial, given the multi-religious complexity of the country. As a religious slogan for continuing the war, the word ‘jiha¯ d’ was written on mountaintops and on big posters throughout big cities. At the same time, the subject of jiha¯ d was included in the school curriculum.15 Companies that were alleged to have contributed substantially towards the jiha¯ d effort enjoyed exemptions from business taxes and custom duties. By making a one time contribution of five thousand US dollars towards jiha¯ d, a company would qualify as a charity, eligible to receive government concessions on taxes and duties worth millions of dollars. It reached a point where even churches were asked to contribute. Any organization that refused to contribute to the cause of the jiha¯ d was dealt with either directly or indirectly.16 Many people believe that the resistance of the Church to this order prompted the government to demolish and confiscate many church buildings in Khartoum and other big cities in the north. Islamists’ vision of making Sudan an Islamic state to solve the many problems the country is experiencing proves to be bearing no fruit. The Islamists are now even more divided as to who has the prerogative to implement Islamic programme in order to create an Islamic state. The Darfur region is at war with the Islamic government, which is accused of committing genocide against the fellow Muslims in Darfur. Islamists claimed that the implementation of shar–ı ’ah would produce law-abiding citizens, but it seems to be producing a contradictory effect. Sharı¯’ah has failed to protect the very Muslims it is supposed to

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guard. To some of these Islamists it is not Islam that has failed the Muslims in Darfur, but it is a human failure.17 The crisis in Darfur erupted just when the government of Sudan was hopeful that peace with the south would finally prevail. Unfortunately the situation escalated to the point of a new civil war that could in turn demolish the foundations of peace in the south. Darfur, literally means the ‘Land of the Fur’ and is inhabited by two groups. The first group comes mainly from three African tribes, the Fur, Marsalit and Zargahwah that have natural extensions into Chad. The second group is of Arab origin that migrated to the region many centuries ago. Diversity in customs and traditions in addition to competition over territory, water and pastureland has led to clashes, but historically such altercations have been resolved peacefully by the inhabitants themselves. Although in the main the conflict in Darfur can be attributed to social and economic problems, other factors contribute as well. The presence of the military conflict in Darfur originated by an attempt to curtail the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) by recruiting militias en masse. After signing a peace agreement and when the killing in the south stopped, the militias regrouped to confront the Islamist government in Khartoum. Coincidentally, the crisis in Darfur erupted and the militias were redirected to continue their atrocities on the Darfurians. Because most of these militias are/were Darfurians, they were not willing to kill their own kinsmen and so they disobeyed their superiors while others joined the rebellion. This action provoked the Islamist government so much that they branded these African Muslims as kuffar and released Arab militias popularly known as Janjaweed on the Darfurians. Darfur was inhabited by over seven million people before the conflict erupted in 2003. According to UN statistics, 5 to 6 million have now been forced to flee their homes after attacks by Sudanese troops, planes and the Janjaweed militias. Some of them have crossed to the neighbouring countries of Chad and Central African Republic, and a larger number have become internally displaced persons (IDP) in main Darfur towns. It is therefore imperative that the government resolve the crisis quickly and satisfactorily. A prolonged conflict could threaten the country’s independence and unity given the fact that the South is on the brink of breaking. For centuries Darfur had been an autonomous state with international relations of its own. It had an established government with direct impact in its territory. Only during Mahdiyah did it join the rest of Sudan. However, it once again withdrew from Sudan as an autonomous state from 1899 until the First World War. Then the British occupied it and co-opted it into the present Republic of Sudan (1916). Whether this amalgamation policy has played a role in the ongoing conflict in Darfur is still unclear since some of the rebel groups are demanding Darfur to be a separate entity if peace talks again fail.18 Nevertheless, as a long-term plan of the Islamic government to change the demography of Sudan, Arabs from Chad and Niger are crossing into Darfur in

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unprecedented numbers with all their belongings and are welcomed by the Sudanese Arabs. These new arrivals are hurriedly issued official Sudanese identity cards granting them citizenship. They are relocated to the former villages deserted by the Fur, evidence that the government is trying to repopulate the war- ravaged region. Chad and Niger are countries ruled by black African tribes and the Arabs in both countries have been suppressed. Last year Niger threatened to remove 150,000 Arab nomads to Chad from where they moved to Niger in the 1970s. The order was rescinded but many Arabs decided to move to Chad voluntarily and at the end of the day found themselves in Sudan this year. Nomadic Arabs have been crossing the present-day Chad border for centuries, even before the partition of Africa, looking for grazing land for their cattle. By contrast, in Mauritania, a country like Sudan that has a long history of Arab rule, the black African tribes suffered most. But it is consistently rumoured that the government is bringing Mauritanian and other North African Arabs and settling them in Darfur areas deserted by the IDPs, further complicating the Darfur conflicts. Of course, the Darfur rebels will not let the government change the socio-political map of Darfur by letting their land be occupied by the Arabs from abroad. They will one day have to remove them forcibly.19 In a similar vein, the government offered to host about 1800 Palestinians affected by the Iraq war and left stranded between the Iraqi and Syrian borders. The Palestinians together with the North African Arabs settling on the lands of displaced African farmers and herders is an explosive development. On the one hand it threatens any peace deal between Khartoum and Darfur rebels. It is logically clear that ‘you cannot talk peace with a government that gives your land to foreign citizens’ says El Nur, the leader of one of the many rebel factions in Darfur. On the other hand, the government action will affect the peace concluded with the South. Many diplomats and analysts see that peace in the South is strongly linked with the peace in Darfur. As long as the war in Darfur continues, the unity of Sudan is at stake. Southerners may decide to vote against unity, prompting Darfur to break away and the map of Sudan will have to change in 2011, the year Southerners are expected to vote in a referendum for unity or separation.

Religious tolerance with the Islamists Religion has infused Sudan’s long history of civil wars. The Arab-dominated regime, led by Islamists who preach a fundamentalist brand of Islam, has labelled its conflict with the Christian rebels in the south as a jiha¯ d, or holy war. Its aim was to gather the support of all the Muslims in Sudan to fight against the infidels in the south and make Sudan an Islamic state ruled by shar–ı ’ah. Having failed to get the support it hoped for, it turned against the African Muslims in the Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile and Darfur. The recruitment of Janjaweed to

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fight the rebels went out of the government hand as the Janjaweed also attacked the black African Muslim civilians, tribally associated with the rebels. The government denies it controlled the Janjaweed and argues that the Janjaweed are defenders of their faith, not assassins. However, the Islamists consider any person who does not subscribe to their brand of Islam an apostate. Given this position of the Islamists, is there any room for dialogue between the Christians and the Muslims or Islamists in this context? Within the framework of Islamic shar–ı ’ah, Christians are dhimmis (protected ones), and are supposed to respect Muslims. What about dialogue between ordinary Muslims and the Islamists? Above all, who should start the dialogue? Should it be between Christians and Muslims or among the Muslims themselves? The right to religious freedom applies to individuals as well as to religious communities and includes both the right to practice a religion and the right to share that religion with others. Theoretically if not practically, this right should be exercised in all countries whether they are predominantly Christian or Muslim. But this seems not to be the case. For instance, there are no Christian churches built in Saudi Arabia and Christians are not allowed to practise their religion openly lest they be harassed and deported to their home countries. But Saudi Arabia exploits the secularism of other nations to build mosques as it pleases. One can argue that the case of Saudi Arabia is unique and therefore exceptional, first because Saudi Arabia is the birth place of the Prophet Muh.ammad and it controls the holy places of Islam. Second, Saudi Arabia has an abundant deposit of oil and this makes it untouchable. Therefore, Saudi Arabia’s case is special, it may be argued, because it holds a place of honour as the true Islamic state that should not be defiled by infidels, and may be intolerant even of other Muslims whose practices do not conform to the rigid expectations of a state trying to protect what they perceive to be the tenets of true Islam.20 By contrast, the city of Rome, considered as the centre of Roman Catholic faith and the See of St Peter, allowed Muslims to build a grand mosque. Probably Rome’s initiative to allow Saudi Arabia to build a mosque on the holy land is inspired by the illusion that Saudi Arabia would reciprocate by allowing a church to be built in its holy land. Saudi Arabia overlooks the historic fact that Muh.ammad sent his followers to live in peace under a Christian King in Ethiopia. Muslims were treated as equals there and they were even privileged to choose where they would like to live. Unfortunately such hospitality is not extended to Christians in Saudi Arabia, and were it to allow this, it would send a message of tolerance to the whole Arab world, and countries like Sudan in particular. Religious tolerance is afforded only lip service in Sudan, especially following the Islamist ascent to power. Under the Islamists Sudan has witnessed confiscation and destruction of many church buildings and church centres. In their place mosques are built just to anger the Christians. In one instance, a cathedral was confiscated and its tower lowered to the level of house tops while a mosque

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was erected high next to the confiscated cathedral. This leads Christians to conclude that the Islamists have come to eradicate Christianity from the country and that there is no point of having inter-religious dialogue with them. Because of international pressure and criticism, the Islamists quickly formed an Inter-religious ‘Dialogue Association’. The function of this Association is to call for international conferences on inter-religious dialogue. The Association looks more like a political organ since Christian participants are not allowed to present information or talk about Christian persecution. Moreover, Christian members are selected in such a way that only those who beat the drum of the government policy are included. Whatever the government says or writes about religious tolerance in the country is not to be disputed. Meanwhile some of the Islamists expressed reservations about dialogue and interpreted it as a covert form of Christian intellectual colonialism. Some of their imams were courageous enough to confront the Inter-religious Dialogue Association as a tool for converting Muslims. This attitude brought weakness to the function of the Association especially on the side of the Christian members. Nevertheless, since the 2005 peace agreement, Islamists are facing new challenges. In one of the inter-religious conferences organized this year in Khartoum, some of the Church leaders who for reasons of political expediency had supported the Islamists requested that Islamists hand back confiscated church properties if there was to be genuine dialogue and peaceful coexistence between Christians and Muslims in the country. It is unthinkable to hear such words coming from those who had been the mouthpiece for the Islamists among the Christians. This may be a clue that the future of dialogue in Sudan is in jeopardy.

The future Given the prevailing political situation in the country, it is inevitable that the North and the South will divide and become two independent sovereign states on the Nile Valley. The prospects for creating a consensus after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the North-South relations are nil. There is nothing that can change this trend since they are being forced to this by the hostile policies of the Islamists. For more than forty years the South has been waging armed struggle for the right of self-determination or independence from the Islamists in the North. This right of self-determination is only incorporated in the CPA signed in 2005. Almost every Sudanese is convinced that a third war is inevitable and cannot be averted. Some people calculate that it will start around the time of referendum in 2011, while others portend an earlier beginning.21 The main issue that will trigger the war is the demarcation of the boundary between the north and the south, which has a profound impact on the forthcoming census, elections and subsequent referendum. A year ago international experts drew the borders

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of Abyei but the government completely rejected these recommendations because Abyei is rich in oil deposits and other mineral resources. In October, the SPLM announced that it had withdrawn from the Government of National Unity by recalling its ministers and presidential advisors. The ministers heeded the call and abstained from their offices. In the south the air smelled of impending doom. Some people suggest that the South should be allowed to declare independence while others worry that the country is going back to war. Many living along the borders of the neighbouring countries crossed the borders in anticipation of the conflict. Similarly, the Islamists are aware that war is inevitable, and constantly worry and seek ways to contain it. A war in the south will be more disastrous this time. There are many questions about whether the government can conduct wars in all corners of the country. The answer is obviously no! The Islamists know that the South is no longer the South of yesterday when it was kicked around without protest. As a solution to the impending problem, they quickly drew up a programme for implementing the CPA and incorporated some of the South’s demands, such as reshuffling the SPLM ministers. Yet the SPLM remains adamant and the National Government continues to stand on one leg. A date set for implementation of withdrawing the northern troops from the South will have its impact on the immediate war. Furthermore, the war in Darfur may give birth to a complex situation in the North. As pointed out earlier, the Islamists are trying to change the socio-political map of Darfur by resettling Arabs from the neighbouring countries and from as far as Morocco and Mauritania in a way which will create a prolonged war. The redrawing of the map of Darfur is a replica of what happened to the south that ignited the just-ended war. In the late 1970s the Islamists tried to construct the Jonglei canal in the south where they planned to settle more than 2.5 million Egyptian peasants and to redraw the inherited political boundaries between the North and the South to include the oil rich Bentiu, the rich agricultural lands in Renk and the rich nickel and uranium discoveries in the South to be annexed to the North. Whatever political games the Islamists play, it is obvious that one day the conflict in Darfur will end and so every Sudanese – including the Islamist government – should be concerned about the future of the Janjaweed. When their role in the current term expires, what will become of them? Will they be satisfied with the livestock stolen from their victims and simply return to their nomadic way of life, or will they receive their ‘just reward’ for carrying out the bloody policy of the Islamists? Many people believe that having tasted the booty and spoils of their conquest, the Janjaweed will never be satisfied with the reward the government will offer them. Instead, they will ignore the call to disband and refuse to hand over the guns. Whatever the case, the changing face of the Islamists will change the face of Sudan. Sudanese from all corners of the country are singing the song of breaking

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Sudan into four parts. As the saying goes ‘When Allah created Sudan, Allah cried.’ Probably Allah knows that there will come a time when Sudan, the biggest country in Africa, will break into pieces. Let us wait and see!

Notes 1

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10 11 12

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17

This is a common saying in Sudan given the fact that Egypt has had a great influence in Sudan. In the recent past Egypt opposed the settlement of the conflict in Sudan through referendum as put forward by the peace negotiators in Kenya. Hasan Makki Muh.ammad Ahmad, Harakat al-Ikhwa¯n al-Muslimı¯n f¯ı-al Suda¯n: 1944–1956, 4th edn (Omdurman: Da¯r el-Balad, 1998), pp. 2–3. The Sudanese Muslim Brothers will henceforth be referred to as ‘Islamists’, the name they are comfortable with. Abdel Salam Sidahmed, Politics and Islam in Contemporary Sudan (London: Curzon Press, 1997), pp. 191–3. Abdelwahab El-Affendi, Turabi’s Revolution (London: Grey Seal, 1991), pp. 74–7. Proceedings of the National Committee of the Constitution (Arabic), 6th Session, Khartoum: Government Press. See also Sidahmed, p. 63. Atabani, ‘Sudan: Growing Pressure to Change the Law of the Country’ <www.allafrica.com>. John Garang is from the Dinka ethnic group who led the Southern Sudan rebellion for twenty-one years. After the peace agreement in 2005, he was appointed vice president of Sudan. Unfortunately, he ruled for a mere twenty-one days owing to his untimely death in a plane crash while on official business. The three are the ruling elite in the present government and claim to be the owners of Sudan. Interview with Sadiq al-Mahdi, www.sudantribune.com. Accessed May 2007. Interview with Hassan al-Turabi in Khartoum on 10th September 2007. Binga Otomi, A New History of the Sudan (Khartoum: Newday Publishers, 2000), p. 188. Andrew Wheeler et al. Day of Devastation, Day of Contentment (Nairobi: Paulines Publications Africa, 2000), pp. 618–19. A Coptic pilot working for Sudan Airways was arrested with two other Sudanese men and executed for possessing foreign currency and a Coptic child was flogged for refusing to recite a verse from the Qur’a¯n. Abdel Salam Sidahmed, Politics and Islam in Contemporary Sudan (London: Curzon Press, 1997), pp. 219–22, see also al-Inqaz al-Watan, 5 January 1991. Ann Mosely Lesch, The Sudan: Contested National Identities (Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1998), pp. 160–1. International Crisis Group, God, Oil and Country (Brussels: ICG Press, 2002), pp. 104–5. The government tried to rally the support of religious and NGO organizations by asking them to contribute towards the war. Names of organizations that contribute are broadcast over Radio Omdurman. Interview with Hassan Ali in Nyala on 15th January 2006.

The Changing Face of Islamists in Sudan 18

19

20 21

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A position paper written by Jar el-Naby and Suleiman Marajan has been proposed as a condition for further negotiations. Steve Bloomfield, ‘Arabs pile into Darfur to take land “cleansed” by janjaweed’, BBC World Service, 14 July 2007. Interview with Daudi El Nur on ‘Dialogue between Religions’, Khartoum 2007. The incident in Malakal and the recent hand twisting between the government and the SPLM almost led to a renewed war.

Chapter 23

Christian-Muslim Relations in Contemporary Nigeria: A Contextual Approach Akintunde E. Akinade

Introduction: A lifetime commitment There is perhaps no other subject that is more relevant to David Kerr’s intellectual legacy than Christian-Muslim relations. His academic odyssey has been shaped by his passion for crafting new paradigms for understanding global manifestations in Christian-Muslim relations. He has been particularly helpful in pushing Christian-Muslim discourse beyond the narrow trajectories of Western colonial and missionary history. His writings have affirmed that there are other Christian-Muslim modes of engagement beyond the West that must be taken seriously in order to have a more holistic understanding of how Christians and Muslims have interacted with one another in different historical and cultural contexts. This book project is indeed a worthy tribute to a man who has spent most of his academic life wrestling with the perplexing conundrums and amazing complexities that characterize Christian-Muslim relations. I have fond memories of our passionate conversations during our travels for our Pewfunded project on new initiatives in Christian-Muslim relations, directed by David. The project was mainly concerned with developing new resources for Christian theological education in societies and communities where Islam has extensive influence. The project led to a series of consultations that provided me with the opportunity to take a fresh look at some of the issues that are germane to Christian-Muslim relations today. The project sought to move beyond the pessimistic perspectives behind the ‘clash of civilizations’ paradigm of Samuel Huntington, to new ways of understanding some of the common interests of Christians and Muslims in the twenty-first century and new approaches to building a ‘community of communities’, to borrow a phrase from Wilfred Cantwell Smith. Since Christians and Muslims make up about 60 percent of the world’s population, grappling with issues that can contribute to peace and dialogue among the adherents of both religious traditions is of paramount importance. The thrust of this essay is to analyse the centrality of Christian-Muslim relations both globally and within the context of Nigeria, and also to provide

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some helpful insights for engaging in a contextual approach to Islam and Christianity in contemporary Nigeria.

The centrality of the subject matter Throughout the world, the relations between Christianity and Islam have gone through many incarnations, marked by dialogue, polemics, cordial disputations, and vitriolic confrontations. To Bernard Lewis, Islam and Christianity ‘for most of their history, have been locked in combat, but even in struggle and polemic they reveal their essential kinship and the common features that link them to each other and set them apart from remoter civilization of Asia.’1 Yet, nowhere is the need for inter-religious cooperation and understanding more pressing than with the followers of these religions. In fact, Christian-Muslim relations, in their various incarnations, represent an important global reality that affects not only Muslims and Christians, but also people of other religious traditions. That we now live in a global village is a cliché. This so-called global village is, however, a distressed one that is full of stories of pain, agony, and horrendous calamities in the name of religion. Religious identities, loyalties and affirmations have accentuated many international and inter-ethnic conflicts. Violence in the name of religion is ubiquitous from Bali to Baghdad and from Cairo to Casablanca. This ‘holy madness’ continues to send frightening ripples of fear all over the world. In spite of these sacred fury and disturbances, however, one can still affirm the transformative power of religion. Its compelling power, faith and enduring virtues can transform evil into good. Charles Kimball’s recent study2 on the ambivalence of religion may help to answer the persistent questions, ‘Why is religion so violent?’ and ‘Why does religion provide a cloak for violence?’ Kimball further identifies important factors and potential pitfalls that must be taken into consideration in order to safeguard religion from becoming evil.

The Nigerian story Nigeria, one of the largest and most important countries in the Third World, has been in the news in the last twenty years as a major African theatre of religious conflict and violence. The implosion of Christian-Muslim conflicts and violence in contemporary Nigeria continues to pose tremendous challenges to the survival of the country’s democratic dispensation. Although the Nigerian constitution provides and guarantees for each citizen the freedom of religion, religious practice and religious association, the most daunting task in Nigeria

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today is how to provide a safe and stable haven for religious liberty and peaceful co-existence. Archbishop Tessiers from Algiers once described Nigeria as the greatest Islamo-Christian nation in the world. Indeed, Nigeria provides a litmus test for emerging themes in Christian-Muslim relations in Africa. With a population that has an almost equal number of Muslims and Christians, it is an excellent case study for understanding the dynamic nature of Christian-Muslim engagement in Africa.3 The Nigerian story clearly underscores the terrors and the triumphs of religion. Like many other African countries, Nigeria has confronted a plethora of internal troubles since its independence from Britain in 1960. A civil war from 1967 to 1970 claimed many lives, just as have several recent ethno-religious conflicts. Without a doubt, the incessant bloody conflicts, coupled with long military interregnums, bad governance and pandemic corruption, have contributed immensely to the stunted growth and continual underdevelopment of Nigeria. Yet, with its robust population of over 130 million and vast natural and human resources, Nigeria has the potential to play an important leadership role in the West African sub-region. Volatile and destructive ethnic and religious conflicts continue to be the bane of Nigeria throughout the 1990s and into the first decade of the new century, and will continue to pose a formidable threat to its survival as a nation. With their apathy and lack of political will, Nigerian rulers have demonstrated neither the ability nor the means to prevent or manage these bloody conflicts. Rather than undertaking a careful and rigorous analysis of the sources of these conflicts, such authorities merely suppress their symptoms, which inexorably lead to further conflicts. In fact, the Nigerian military and political leaders have often exacerbated many conflicts by dismissing them as illegitimate dissent.

Nigeria: A divided nation Nigeria is a Federal Republic composed of thirty-six states and a Federal capital territory, with a democratically elected president and bicameral legislature. The most persistent and pertinent question that all Nigerians have grappled with is how the various ethnic and religious groups can amicably live together. Religious and ethnic chauvinism have found fertile grounds in Nigeria. The incendiary inter-religious and ethnic conflicts in contemporary Nigeria have reached a frenzied climax in recent years, with attendant chaos and loss of lives and property. The two nagging concerns for all Nigerians are how to keep the polity intact and how to throttle some of the fissiparous forces that seek to rend the nation asunder. This indeed is the Nigerian predicament. The Nigerian state continues to bear this pesky predicament like an albatross. The religio-political odyssey of Nigeria presents a compelling and fascinating story. For the past three decades, the country has vacillated between uneasy

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harmony and open hostilities across religious lines. Sometimes the nation teeters on the brink of extinction. But like the proverbial cat with nine lives, it bounces back with renewed vigour and valour. Thoughts and opinions about the Nigerian State range from cautious optimism to downright scepticism. Many political commentators believe that Nigeria will always remain one united country. In spite of this optimistic vision, many observers believe that the ethnoreligious pressure cooker in Nigeria is building perilously to an explosion, and this situation is beyond salvage. In the words of Adebayo Williams, ‘Like a badly mauled elephant suffering a thousand cuts, Nigeria lurches about in wild disorientation, stomping and stamping as life drains away and the earth quakes in terminal expectation.’4 The ethno-religious conflict in Nigeria is the concern of this study. Nigeria is a multiethnic, multireligious and multicultural nation. One of the most persistent challenges facing the country today is how to throttle the rise of ChristianMuslim conflicts and invidious ethnic violence. Since the 1970s, the country has been plagued by many religious conflicts that have claimed thousands of lives and properties worth millions of Naira. The religious landscape in Nigeria presents an interesting picture: The north is predominantly Muslim, and the southeast is predominantly Christian. In southwest Nigeria, there is an equal representation of Christians and Muslims. For the past three decades Christians and Muslims have been engaged in vitriol and violence. We can only dismiss the caustic consequences of this open violence at a great peril to the continued corporate co-existence in Nigeria. In a nation that is already tottering on the brink of collapse, inter-religious conflicts present a real threat. The blatant manipulation of both religions by many myopic merchants and political demagogues has contributed to the climate of mutual mistrust and harsh polemics. The infantile infatuation to dwell on misinformation and unbridled ignorance has not helped to heal old wounds. These old wounds continue to fester and spread to other parts.

The contextual approach Christian-Muslim engagement in contemporary Nigeria calls for a sound contextual analysis that is deeply rooted in a careful understanding of the nuances of the Nigerian situation. It takes the social, economic, political and cultural dynamics into consideration. The word ‘context’ has its etymology in the Latin contetus, which means ‘weaving together’. The definition underscores the fact that the word context ties together dispositions, ideas, attitudes and values. There is no universal norm that applies to Christian-Muslim relations all over the globe. Each context is different and unique. In fact, the tendency to strip Christian-Muslim engagements from their contextual situations has led to facile generalizations and hasty conclusions. It is, therefore, imperative to study Christian-Muslim relations as

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they are experienced indigenously within specific contexts and situations. This approach gives more consideration to the whole range of Christian-Muslim experiences within a specific milieu. It is germane to add here that contextualization is a dynamic process; it is a fluid process that takes social, economic and political transformation into consideration. The contextual approach is also helpful because it challenges idealist paradigms of how Christian-Muslim relations ought to be or how they have been in the past. Such a liberal view of dialogue and interreligious encounter tends to be arrogant, guilt-ridden and ultimately obfuscates the real issues and concerns in inter-religious relations. In spite of Lamin Sanneh’s warning that a ‘context is not passive but comes preloaded with its own biases, ready to contest whatever claims it encounters’,5 I am still convinced that a context-sensitive approach to inter-religious engagement provides legitimate avenue to probe the deep questions that affect both Christians and Muslims in contemporary Nigeria. I also believe that the dynamic nature of the contextual approach provides the critical lens for understanding the protean nature of Christian-Muslim relations in Nigeria. It is an encounter that is very dynamic, and it is always in a state of flux. A methodological approach that is too rigid will ultimately gloss over important elements in the ever-changing interaction between Christians and Muslims in different parts of Nigeria.

Crafting crucial conversations The Nigerian context calls for continuous and critical conversations that are germane to inter-religious connections. These conversations are very important for the overall well-being of the nation and its populace. All relationships are sustained by candid conversations and dialogue. A relationship that is bereft of communication is prone to unmitigated disaster, and it will ultimately collapse. Christians and Muslims in Nigeria find themselves in a situation that calls for collaborative engagement. Such an agenda rests on the conscious efforts to engage in dialogue on many issues ranging from thorny theological issues to practical matters. Felix Wilfred has remarked that ‘what is glaringly lacking in Christianity today is pedagogy of encounter, in which Christians may learn not only the arts of listening and speaking but also the ability to be creative and imaginative in negotiating conceptual boundaries in relation to people of other religions’.6 Christians and Muslims in contemporary Nigeria have tremendous resources that can engender serious inter-religious conversations and a new pedagogy of encounter. The programs within PROCUMRA are indications that Christians in Africa in general and Nigeria in particular are serious about creating an auspicious forum for conversations with Muslims. Such efforts can prepare the groundwork for collaborative inter-religious efforts in nation building and conflict resolution. When Christians and Muslims develop the capacity to talk together, they can then begin to discover new areas that can mutually

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benefit their respective religious traditions. They can start to make tremendous gains from many non-negotiable social, economic, political, cultural and theological factors that tie them together. Both religious traditions are in Nigeria to stay. In fact, it is not out of place to regard both religious traditions as African religions. The way forward in Christian-Muslim relations in contemporary Nigeria is to shy away from relationships and encounters that are borne out of paranoia, polemics, scepticism, nihilism and guilt. Rather, Muslims and Christians must embark on meaningful conversations that are relevant to human wholeness, piety and the sustenance of the Nigerian nation. The path that I am suggesting here requires the elimination of the assumption of any a priori claim of superiority on the part of Christians or Muslims. Such claim of superiority will only nip the possible gains of a good conversation or dialogue in the bud. Theological hubris will deepen the existing interreligious chasm in the country. No doubt, both Christianity and Islam have transformative impulses that can have positive effects on the Nigerian nation. These impulses will not flourish in an atmosphere of hatred and mutual distrust.

The dialogue of life It seems to me that one of the viable resources for appropriating the contextual model in inter-religious relations in Nigeria is through an understanding of the dialogue of life that is part and parcel of the daily encounter of Christians and Muslims in many parts of Nigeria. Western theories of dialogue tend to be textand doctrine-centred. The dialogue of life, on the other hand, takes into consideration other issues that are not addressed in this theoretical approach to inter-religious relations. One of the most remarkable African contributions to interfaith ventures is the dialogue of life. Africans have made significant strides in this area. It is my contention that the advances in this arena are no less significant than abstract academic discourse on dialogue. The Yoruba people, with their enduring legacy of inter-religious connections across religious lines, provide the best case study for understanding a contextual approach to Christian-Muslim relations. Within the Yoruba context, Islam and Christianity have adapted to the continuing influence of traditional Yoruba religion. This context of Christian-Muslim encounter in relation to a third, or primary, religious tradition points to one of the distinctive characteristics of Christian-Muslim relations in Africa, intimately part of family and communal life. In the dialogue of life, one relates to the other with respect and attention in all of his or her otherness. One recognizes one’s basic community with the other at the human and even at the religious level, in spite of differences. One discovers one’s own true identity in the relationship with the other, and one is truly enriched by such interpersonal contacts and connections. When people share the same economic, political and

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cultural situation it is very important for the promotion of common human and spiritual values in the process of building viable communities of peace and solidarity. The dialogue of life underscores essential issues and conditions that are imperative for developing a theology of hospitality. This is a theology that is based on the love of God and one’s neighbour. On 13 October 2007, the feast of ‘Id al-Fitr, the Royal Aal al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought in Amman, Jordan, invited Christian leaders all over the globe for inter-religious dialogue with Muslims based upon two important scriptural themes: to love God and to love one’s neighbour. Entitled A Common Word Between Us and You, the text represents an agreement of 138 Muslim scholars and religious leaders to engage in dialogue with people from other religious traditions. This important call beckons Christians and Muslims to cherish the religious encounter and dialogue in the ordinary course of life, in the street, in the marketplace, in schools and everyday encounters. In a world where religion with all its multiple manifestations has become an increasingly powerful and divisive force, the gains within the context of life provides hope for the future within the context of Nigeria. I will also affirm that a theology of religions that is consistent and meaningful to the human experience can only be pursued by taking seriously some of the useful paradigms that have emerged in the everyday stories and experiences of Christians and Muslims. Christian-Muslim engagement and dialogue must be deeply rooted in the concrete experiences of people. Since these experiences take multiple forms, scholars must seek to interrogate the various issues that constitute the context in which Christians and Muslims find themselves. The dialogue of life presents a useful heuristic device for discovering these issues. Although this is not an organized form of dialogue, it has the potential to facilitate community understanding and community building. The non-negotiable aspect of being a Christian or a Muslim in Nigeria is the common life that they share together. They are inevitably drawn into the same struggles, concerns and agitations. The dialogue of life valorizes what is already present or occurring within the Nigerian context. It is neither a prefabricated nor a contrived form of dialogue. Rather, it is a daily engagement and encounter with people’s existential realities. It wrestles with the salient factors and circumstances that make people human.

PROCMURA and contextual inter-religious initiatives One of the most promising projects on the Christian understanding in Africa has been in the efforts in the PROCMURA, the Programme on ChristianMuslim Relations in Africa. The programme was initiated because of the dire need to have a contextual understanding of Christian-Muslim relations in Africa

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and also to have inter-religious projects that are meaningful to the African experience. Christians and Muslims from Nigeria have been very active in the activities of PROCMURA. It started as the Islam in Africa Project in 1959 and embraced its present name in 1987. The central mission of the enterprise was to create an institutional structure that will promote the importance of understanding Islam and Muslims within the African context. The initiatives by PROCMURA affirm the importance of the contextual approach in understanding Islam within the African context. The project also underscores that within many contexts in Africa, Christians and Muslims share many common experiences and they have used such experiences to create avenues for solidarity. PROCMURA is a telling testimony to the fact that African Christians and Muslims are passionate about constructive engagements for peaceful co-existence. The project has taken many proactive and collaborative initiatives to ensure that differences and volatile conflicts between the adherents of the two religious communities are amicably resolved.

Conclusion: A testimony of hope It is my contention that the present state of religious pluralism in contemporary Nigeria presents a real opportunity for celebration rather than a source for paranoia and violence. Through a dialogue of creative engagement, Christians and Muslims can create new tools for peacemaking, conflict resolution and community building. The agenda for this creative engagement must have cultural relevance, ecumenical vision, theological fidelity and existential implications. Most of the studies on the contagious conflicts in contemporary Nigeria assert that the situation is beyond salvage, and that there is no feasible solution to the current religious dilemma. I believe that such scepticism and apathy are the twin products of an uncritical understanding of the transformative power of religion. I conclude that religious sensibilities, with appropriate applications, have the potential to contribute to peace, stability and wholeness in contemporary Nigeria.

Notes 1

2

3

Bernard Lewis, The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror (New York: The Modern Library, 2003), p. 5. See Charles Kimball, When Religion Becomes Evil (New York: Harper Collins Publisher, 2003). Nigeria is about equally divided between Christians and Muslims. Estimates of this breakdown vary. Some give Islam a 50-40 edge. Others suggest that each religion claims about 45 per cent of Nigerians, with the remaining 10 per cent adhering to the traditional religions. See Joseph Kenny, ‘Christian-Muslim Relations in

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4

5

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Nigeria’, in Richard W. Rousseau (ed.) Christianity and Islam: The Struggling Dialogue (Scranton: University of Scranton Press, 1985). Adebayo Williams, ‘Towards the transformation of Nigeria: A jubilee of elite infamy,’ http://nigeriaworld.com/articles/2003/Oct/201.html, 20 October 2003, p. 1. He further listed the plethora of problems confronting the Nigerian nation as follows: ‘deepening economic misery, political instability, insecurity of life and property, lack of feel good factor, and a conurbation of one hundred and fifty million hapless souls tottering on the edge of despair and desperation.’ In another caustic observation, another Nigerian scholar states that the present-day Nigerian state is faced with ‘darkness and decadence, poverty and prostitution of power, greed and graft, incompetence and inertia’. See Femi Ojo-Ade, ‘Dividends of a Nascent Democracy,’ http://nigeriaworld.com/articles/2001/jun/231.html, 23 June 2001, p. 4. Lamin Sanneh, Whose Religion is Christianity?: The Gospel Beyond the West (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2003), p. 5. See CTC Bulletin XVIII:1 (April 2002), 2–3.

APPENDIX Publications by David A. Kerr 1. Christian-Muslim Relations a. Historical Studies i. ‘Christian Witness in Relation to Muslim Neighbours’ in Islamochristiana, 10(1984), pp.1–30. ii. ‘Christianity and Islam: “Clash of Civilizations” or “community of reconciliation?”’ in Studies in World Christianity: Edinburgh Review of Theology and Religion, 8(2002)1, pp. 81–98. iii. ‘The Challenge of Islamic Fundamentalism for Christians’ in International Bulletin of Missionary Research 17(October 1993)4, pp. 169–173. b. Theological Studies i. ‘Muh.ammad Iqbal’s Thoughts on Religion: Reflections in the Spirit of Christian-Muslim Dialogue’ in Islamochristiana, 15(1989), pp. 25–55. ii. ‘Muh.ammad, Prophet of Liberation: a Christian perspective from political theology’ in Studies in World Christianity: Edinburgh Review of Theology and Religion 6(2000)2, pp. 139–174. iii. ‘‘He walked in the Path of the Prophets’: Toward Christian Theological Recognition of the Prophethood of Muh.ammad’ in Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and Wadi Z.Haddad, eds., Christian-Muslim Encounters (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1995), pp. 426–446. iv. ‘Christian Theological Engagement with Islam: African and Asian Challenges to Western Methodologies’. Paper presented to the LundSweden Group on Religious Pluralism, and awaiting publication in the conference book. c. Missiological Studies i. ‘Mission and Proselytism: A Middle East Perspective’ in International Bulletin of Missionary Research 20(January 1996)1, pp. 12–16. ii. ‘Christian Understandings of Proselytism’ in International Bulletin of Missionary Research 23(January 1999)1, pp. 8–14. iii. ‘Islamic Da’wah and Christian Mission: Towards a Comparative Analysis’ in International Review of Mission, 89(April 2000), pp. 150–171. iv. ‘Christian Mission and Islamic Studies: Beyond Antithesis’ in Yale Divinity School Library Occasional Publication (New Haven, CT, 2001). Republished in summary in International Bulletin of Missionary Research, 26(2002)1, pp. 8–15.

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d. Regional Studies i. ‘Islam and Christianity in Europe: toward a new relationship’ in Swedish Missiological Themes, Uppsala, 2000. ii. ‘One hundred years of Christian-Muslim relations: A challenge for theological education, with reference to East Africa’. e. Edited Volumes i. ‘Christian Mission and Islamic Da’wah’ in International Review of Mission, 1976. ii. ‘Editorial’ for the issue on ‘Christianity in Muslim Society: Toward a Contextualising of Theology’ in Studies in World Christianity, 3(1997)2, pp. i–iv. 2. Middle Eastern Christianity i. ‘Maronites and Mossionaries: a critical appraisal of the affair of As’ad al-Shidyâq (1825–1829), in D. Thomas, ed. A Faithful Presence: essays for Kenneth Cragg, (London: Melisende, 2003). ii. ‘A Western Christian Appreciation of Eastern Christianity’ in M. & M. Bailey, ed., Who are the Christians of the Middle East? (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2003). 3. Ecumenics i. ‘Come Holy Spirit – Renew the Whole of Creation: the Canberra Assembly and Issues of Mission’ in International Bulletin of Missionary Research 15(July 1991). ii. Revivalism in Britain: Review of the 17th to early 20th Centuries; with a Concluding Comparison with the 1907 Pyeng Yang Awakening.

Index

Abdeljalil, Jean-Mohammed 314 ‘Abduh, Muh.ammad 146 Abi Hafsa, Marwan b. 75 Abraha (Abyssinian) 55–6 Abraham (scriptural character) 164, 166 Abrahamic faiths 84–5, 103–4, 208–9 Bible and Qur’a ¯ n in dialogue between 161–2 Islamophobia among 173–4 abrogation Christians and 20–4 Scripture whereof there is no doubt and 16–20 Abyssinia 55–60 Adam, creation and temptation of 162–4 Advent 89 Africa Christianity in 89–94 Horn of 57–60 Nigeria 337–43 Sudan 324–34 see also Ethiopia ahl al-dhimmah 3–4, 13 Ahmad, Khurshid 312, 321 Ahmad, Mirza Ghulam 319–20 Ahmadiyya movement 319–20 Al-Afghani 195 Al’a Maududi, Abu 18 Al Arqam 198 Al-Asad, Hafiz 151 Alavi, Khalid 264 al-Bakri 78 al-Banna, Hasan 49–50 Albar, Hamid 107 alcohol use by Muslims 18

al-Dawla, Sayf 75 al-Di ¯ n, Shams 140 al-Di ¯ n al-Balkhi ¯ , Baha ¯ ’ 140 al-Din Ibrahim, Saad 151 al-Di ¯ n Ru ¯ mi ¯ , Jala ¯ l 139–40 Alexander the Great 4, 78 Al Faisal, Lolwah 110 Alf layla wa-layla 76 Algeria 150 al-Ghifari, Abu Dharr 31 al-Harawi 78 Ali, Ayaan Hirsi 196 Ali, Mehmet 145 al-Isfahani, Abu Muslim 17 al-Jazari 79 al-Jazeera Broadcasting Station 104, 153 al-Kairânawi, Rahmatullah 315–16 al-Mahdi, Sadiq 326–7 al-Malik, ‘Abd 72, 73 al-Mas’udi 77 al-Mutanabbi 75 al-Nasir, Abd 149 al-Nazara ¯ t al-mutaba ¯ dalah bayn al-mas¯hiyy I ¯n I wa-al-Muslim¯n I f¯I al-ma ¯ d¯I wa-alha ¯ dir 3 al-Qadir al-Jaza’iri, Abd 146 Al Qaeda 193, 199 al-Qaradawi, Yusuf 100 al-Rashid, Harun 75 al-Sadat, Anwar 151 Al Shahid, Samuil Abd 190 al-Turabi, Hasan 325–6 American Ramadan 213 Anawati, Georges 89 Anglican Church 23–4 Building Bridges seminar 102–8

348 an-Na’im, Abdullahi Ahmed 19 anti-Muslim attitudes 250–1 changing discourse and 209–16 contemporary caricatures of Islam and 192–202 roots of 186–92 surveys of 184–6, 201–2 see also Islamophobia anti-Semitism 193–4 apologetic literature 320–2 Aquinas: God and Action 87 Aquinas, Thomas 87, 88, 89–90, 192 Arab countries see Middle East, the Arab Human Development Report 152 Arab-Israeli conflict, the defending Palestinians and 202–3, 250–1 Hizbollah in 168, 193 Muslims portrayed as anti-Semitic in 193–4 Arjomand, Said 152 Ark of the Covenant 54 Armstrong, Karen 107 Arnaldez, Roger 99, 101 Asad, Muh.ammad 17 Asia Building Bridges seminar, Anglican Communion 102–8 Christianity in 89–94 Indonesian Consortium for Religious Studies 109–10 Askari, Hasan 264 associationism 6–7 as-Suddi 19 Assur 166 Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal 146 At-Tabataba’i 19 Auden, W. H. 161 authority, human 129–31, 236–7 Awad, Alex 94 Ayman, Barakah Umm 56 Babel 160, 166–7 Badawi, Abdullah 105 Badawi, Jamal 274 Badawi, Zaki 274 Bakker, Dick 311

Index Bakr, Abu ¯ 136 Balance of Truth 315, 319–20 Bardakogˇlu, Ali 100, 101 Barelwi Movement 317–19 Barrett, David 199 Battle for God: Fundamentalism in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, The 107 Battuta, Ibn 79–80 Bavinck, Herman 313 Beeby, Dan 96 Benedict XVI, Pope 97–102, 107, 116, 187, 188, 223 Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali 320 Bible, the Abraham and Nimrod in 164 abrogation and 20–4 Babel and Jerusalem in 160 compared to the Qur’a ¯ n 27–8, 162–4, 224 creation and temptation of Adam in 162–4 forgiveness in 32–7 love for one’s neighbours in 115–17, 226 love of God in 226 Moses in 21–2, 161, 164–5 reconciliation in 38–9 Scripture whereof there is no doubt 16–20 see also Christianity; Jesus Christ Bible se Qur’a ¯ n tak 316 Bijlefeld, Willem A. 312 bin Ibra ¯ hi ¯ m, Ahmad 59 Blum, Leon 147 Böckenförde, Ernst-Wolfgang 45 Bond, Julian 109 Book of Common Prayer 36 Bosnia-Herzegovina 288, 289–98 Bowering, Gerhard 91 Bradford city, United Kingdom 273, 274–82 Brown, Stuart 314 Bucaille, Maurice 204 Building a Muslim Empire in Southeast Asia 198 Building Bridges seminar, Anglican Communion 102–8 Butler, R. A. 247

Index Byzantines of Constantinople co-existence with Muslims 75–81 conflicts with Muslims 72–4 Muslim conquest and 72–4 Cadbury, Edward 257 CAIR see Council of American Islamic Relations (CAIR) Caird, George 258 Caliphate 135–7, 163–4, 167–8 capital, social 275–82 Carey, George 103, 109, 110 Carlyle, Thomas 160, 313 Carroll, James 185 CCJ see Council of Christians and Jews (CCJ) Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 256–68, 311, 312, 321 Ceric´, Mustafa 294 Chad 330 Chambesy Dialogue 240 Christianity abrogation and 20–4 in Abyssinia 55–60 apologetic literature and 320–2 in Asia and Africa 89–94 Babel and Jerusalem in 160 Christians of Najra ¯ n and 8–9, 12 claim to religious truth and right of each person and community to social and civic freedom 44–7 common word between Islam and 226–7 concern for the Church in 118–19 conservative 196, 200–1 in Constantinople 72–4 conversion to Islam from 11, 60 faith in 92–3, 119 the Holy Spirit in 90 images of Muh.ammad in 190–2, 309 love of neighbour in 115–17, 226 missions 86–7, 189, 241–2, 249–50, 253–5 as one of the Abrahamic faiths 84–5, 103–4, 208–9 People of the Book and 3–14, 24

349

pluralism and 45, 108 prophetic message in 166–8 recognition of prophethood of Muh.ammad 4–5, 136–6, 161–2, 205, 313–17, 322 religious freedom and 115–19, 122–5 revealed Truth in 44 shared values with Islam 121–2 and tensions between Muslims and Christians 119–21, 186–92 truth claims and requirements for tolerance from in 44–7 witness to Christ in 117–18 women in 196 see also Bible, the; Jesus Christ Christian Mission and Islamic Da‘wah, conference on 253–5 Christian-Muslim Forum 108–9 Christoffersen, Lisbet 304 circumcision 21–2 clash of civilizations 194–6 Cold War, the 149–50, 155 college students 278–80 Commission on World Mission and Evangelism of the World Council of Churches 253 “Common Word between Us and You, A” contents of 225–7 dialogue of life and 342 future impact of 234–5 origins of 223–4 practical matters and general considerations of 229–33 scholarly contributions to 233–4 scholarly inquiry into 227–9 spirituality in 224–5 communications between Christians and Muslims 230–1 conservative Christians 196, 200–1 Constantine 128 Constantinople Arab conquests of 72–4 co-existence in 75–81 conflict between Byzantines and Muslims in 74–5 before Islam 71 Consumption of Kuala Lumpur, The 108

350

Index

conversion of non-Muslims 11, 60 cooperation between religions 231–2 Coptic Church of Egypt 54 Council of American Islamic Relations (CAIR) 200, 209, 211, 213 Council of Christians and Jews (CCJ) 109 courts, Islamic 106–7 Cragg, Kenneth 313 creation of humanity 131–3 Cullman, Oscar 88 cultural identity of Muslims 195–6, 305–8 Dalrymple, William 316 Daniel, Norman 258 Danielou, Jean 89, 90, 92, 93 Darfur, Sudan 328–30 David, King 163 Day of Peace observance 245–52 Declaration of European Muslims 294–5 Deedat, Ahmad 204 de Gaulle, Charles 150 democracy 66 Democracy & Tradition 282 Denmark 301–10 Desperately Seeking Paradise: Journeys of a Sceptical Muslim 108 dhimmah 12–14, 60 dialogue, inter-religious aims of 122 Bible and Qur’a ¯ n in 161–2 blessings of 97 Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations and 262–3 changing American discourse and 209–16 “A Common Word between Us and You” in 223–35 foundations of 242–4 informal 214–16 Islamophobia and 172–5 of life 341–2 mutual respect and 68, 174, 178–83 Pope Benedict XVI on 99 religious freedom and 46–7 removing obstacles and misunderstandings about 313

Selly Oak Colleges and 240–1 World Council of Churches’ first initiatives for 178–83 see also education; Muslim-Christian relations Dialogue with People of Living Faiths and Ideologies (DFI) 312 Dickens, Charles 160–1 Dignitatis Humanae 46, 116–17 divorce 21, 23 ‘dominion’ 129–33 Draft Constitution of the European Union 287 D’Souza, Dinesh 195 Dubois, Marcel 89 Durakovic´, Esad 296 Duran, Khalid 314 Ecumenical Review, The 314 Edict of Boru Meda 60 education Islam and science 203–4 Islamic studies 175–8, 221–3, 256–68 Islamophobia and 172–5 and Muslim efforts to frame understanding of Islam in new ways 202–9 see also dialogue, inter-religious Egypt 148, 151, 152, 164–5, 166 Sudan and 324–5 Eisenhower, Dwight D. 155 El-Darsh, Syed Mitwalli 264 Elibiari, Naim 206 Elijah (biblical character) 165 Erdogˇan, Recep Tayyıp 110 Essays for Kenneth Cragg: A Faithful Presence 312 Ethiopia Abyssinians and 56–60 Christian-Muslim relations in modern 60–3 community interest issues and cooperation in 64–5 cultural divisions in 64 democratic processes in 66 Ethiopian Orthodox Church (EOC) in 54 future challenges for 63–9 international issues facing 66

Index Italian occupation of 61 modern Christianity in 54–5 Muslim political power in 61–3 religious reform in 65 shared religious concepts among people of 67–8 unity in 66–7 see also Africa Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus (EECMY) 55, 63 Ethiopian Orthodox Church (EOC) 54, 67 Euripides 129 Europe independence and social upheaval in the Arab world and 148–9 militant groups in 157 Muslims in 153–4, 291–8, 301–10 occupations and influence in the Arab world 145–8, 187–9 relationship of religion to politics in 289–91 secularization in 288–9 upheaval after 1945 149–50 World War I and 146–7 World War II and 147–8 see also Denmark; United Kingdom evangelical Christians 196, 200–1 event-driven discourse on Islam 192–3 faith 92, 119 Falwell, Jerry 200 Fasiladas, Emperor 60 Fiqh Council of North America 200 Fitzgerald, Michael 102 Force of Reason, The 102 Foreign Affairs 194 forgiveness 32–7 Fountain, The 204 France 145–6, 150, 154 freedom, religious 46–7 Christian approaches to Muslims and 115–19 shared approach to 122–5 Freedom and Creation in Three Traditions 89 free will 18–20 French, Thomas Valpy 316

351

French Revolution 160 fundamentalism 156–8, 194, 278–82 Fundamentals of Islam 321 Gandhi, Indira 86 gay marriage 23–4 gender equality 195–6, 205–6, 207 George, Francis Cardinal 93 Gereformeerde Dogmatiek 313 Gillett, David 109 Gittings, Jim 320–1 God creation of Adam by 162–4 dhimmah of 12 divinity of Jesus Christ and 7 forgiveness of 32–7 Islamic law and 207 judgment of 49 love of 226 Mecca and 165–6 Goddard, Hugh 121 God of Justice: Study in the Ethical Doctrine of the Qur’an 314 Goldstein, Marie 85 Goodwill, Norman 240 Gospel of Barnabas 316, 317, 321 Grabus, Nedžad 290 Grañ, Ahmad 59, 60 graven images 22 Grotius, Hugo 192 Guiterrez, Gustavo 168 Habermas, Jürgen 301 Haddad, Yvonne 214 Hadith Qudsi 31, 32, 33, 37 Hafizovic´, Rešid 296 Halim, Tun Ahmad Fairuz Sheikh Abdul 106 Hamas 193 Hawqal, Ibn 77 Heilsgeographie 88 Hendrik Kraemer Institute 311 Hesburgh, Theodore 84, 88 Hewer, C. T. R. 256 Hick, John 96, 177 Hitler, Adolph 147, 196

352

Index

Hizb al Ahnaf 317 Hizbat Tahrir 278–82 Hizbollah 168, 193 Hodgson, Marshal 212 Holy Spirit, the 90 homosexuality 23–4 Honneth, Axel 301 Horn of Africa 57–60 Hourani, Albert 240, 258 Huda, Qamar-ul 185 Hull, John 176 humanism, Qur’a ¯ nic 51, 133–6, 139 Huntington, Samuel 155–6, 194–5, 196–7 Huraira, Abu 31, 32 Ibn-Arabi 309 Ibn Hazm 99, 101 Ibn Warraq 198 ICLS see Inter-Cultural Leadership School (ICLS) icons 22 ¯ d 14 ijtiha imams 280–2 Impact 312 imperialism, Islamic 197–9 ‘Imru’l-Qays 71 Indonesian Consortium for Religious Studies 109–10 Infidel 196 informal dialogue 214–16 Inglott, Peter Serracino 287 Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs 311 Inter-Cultural Leadership School (ICLS) 277–8 International Association for the History of Religions (IAHR) 110 International Review of Missions 241, 312 Iran 148, 150, 151–2, 273 Iraq 152, 194 Islam in Abyssinia 55–7 ahl al-dhimmah in 3–4 Ahmadiyya movement 319–20 alcohol use and 18 American attitudes toward 184–6 among non-Arabs 86–7 apologetic literature on 320–2 Barelwi Movement 317–19

in Bosnia-Herzegovina 291–8 Caliphate 135–7, 163–4, 167–8 college radicals and 278–80 common word between Christianity and 226–7 in Constantinople 71–81 contemporary caricatures of 192–202 courts 106–7 cultural identity 195–6, 305–8 ‘dominion’ in 129–33 efforts to re-frame understanding of 202–9 in Europe 153–4, 301–10 event-driven discourse on 192–3 faith and Muslim identity 92 as the final religion 17 free will in 18–20 fundamentalist 156–8, 278–82 had¯th I tradition 10 in the Horn of Africa 57–60 hostage to itself 128–41 human authority in 129–31 interfaith endeavors and 87–9 law 206–8 legal recognition of 302–5 love for one’s neighbours in 226 love of God in 226 media representations of 199–200, 212–13 as one of the Abrahamic faiths 84–5, 103–4, 208–9 People of the Book and 3–14 personhood in 133–6 political and imperial 128–9, 151–3, 168–70 as a polity or state 8 Pope Benedict XVI and 97–102, 107, 187, 188, 223 power and 11, 19–20, 49–50, 60–3, 120–1, 128–9, 197–9, 324–7 prophetic message in 166–8 religious freedom and 122–5 re-presentation of history, belief, and law in 210–12 scholarship of 175–8, 221–3 science and 203–4 sectarianism and tribalism in 196–7 shared values with Christianity 121–2

Index spread across Horn of Africa 57–60 and tensions between Muslims and Christians 119–21, 186–92 terrorism and 103, 155–6, 158, 172, 194 ummah and ‘others’ in classical 48–52 in the United Kingdom 153–4, 273–82 in the United States 184–6, 199–200, 202–3 Wahhabi 294–7 in the West 89–91 women and 195–6, 205–6, 207 see also Muh.ammad; Qur’a ¯ n, the Islam. The Quranic Overview 36 Islam and Christian Theology 257 Islam and the West: The Making of an Image 258 Islamic Imperialism 198 Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) 200, 209, 213 Islamic studies 175–8, 221–3 Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 256–68 Islamo-fascism 197–9, 278–82 Islamophobia 172–5, 190–2 see also anti-Muslim attitudes Islamophobia 190 ISNA see Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) Iversen, H. R. 307 Iya ¯ su, Lij 61 Izhâr al Haqq 316 Jabala, Harith b. 71 Jailani, Azlina 106 Jalil, Yusuf 321 Jama’at-e-Islami 312, 320, 321 Jenkins, Richard 198 Jeremiah (biblical character) 168–70 Jerusalem 160, 165, 167, 251–2 Jesus Christ abrogation used by 20–4 apologetic literature and 321 Asian/African Christianity and 89–90 divinity of 7 faith in 92 on forgiveness 32–3 Jerusalem and 165

353

on loving one’s enemies 31 on loving one’s neighbours 115–16 Muh.ammad’s teachings on 57 on reconciliation 38–9 revealed truth through 44, 47 role similar to the Qur’a ¯ n in Islam 23–5 witnesses to 117–18 see also Bible, the; Christianity Jibran, Khalil 168, 170 jihad 19, 74 Jihad and Jew Hatred 193 jizyah 10–14 John of Ephesus 71 John Paul II, Pope 102 John the Baptist 89, 321 Jones, Jim 196 Joseph, John 319 Joseph (biblical character) 163 Joy, Lina 106 Judaism anti-Semitism and 193–4 in Constantinople 79 conversion to Islam from 11 interfaith endeavors and 87–9 Islamophobia and 173 Jerusalem and 160, 165, 167, 251–2 moral laws of 22–3 as one of the Abrahamic faiths 84–5, 208–9 People of the Book and 3–14, 24 prophetic message in 166–8 Zionism and 128, 185 see also Arab-Israeli conflict, the justice and righteousness 30–1 Justinian, Emperor 55, 102 Justinus, Emperor 71 Kale Heywet Church 55 Karsh, Ephraim 198 Kellogg-Briand pact 147 Kemal, Mustafa 139 Kerr, David Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations and 256–68, 311, 312 David B. Burrell and 84, 85, 87, 89 David Marshall and 115

354 Kerr, David (Cont’d) inter-religious dialogue and 97, 180, 183, 240–1, 242, 256, 313–15, 336 on Islamophobia 172, 173, 174 Jan Slomp and 311–12 journalist career and training 258–9 Mahmoud M. Ayoub and 3 predecessors of 313–15 on prophethood of Muh.ammad 313–14, 322 United Reformed Church and 96 Khalifa al-Thani, Hamad bin 103 Khan, Ahmad Rida 317–19 Kha ¯ n, Ghenghiz 140 Khatami, Mohammad 155 Khodr, George 258 Khoury, Adel-Theodore 99, 101 Kimball, Charles 337 Knitter, Paul 27, 309 Knowing the Unknowable God 89 Koresh, David 196 Kuala Lumpur 107–8 Küng, Hans 313 Küntzel, Matthias 193 Lajolo, Giovanni 102 Lang, Jeffrey 17–18 Last Mughal, The 316 law, Islamic 206–8 League of Nations 147 Lebanon 152 Hizbollah and 168–9 legal recognition 302–5 Lewis, Bernard 337 life, dialogue of 341–2 L’institut Dominicain d’etudes Orientales 89 love of God 226 for one’s enemies 31 for one’s neighbours 115–17, 226 MacDonald, Duncan Black 189 Mahathir, Muh.ammad 195 Maimonides, Moses 87 Majlis-e-Amal 320 Malaysia 102–8 Malik, Alexander 319

Index Man in the Qur’a ¯ n 311 marriage, gay 23–4 Marshall, David 19 Marx, Karl 88, 128 Mary, mother of Jesus 7, 320 Massignon, Louis 84 Mattson, Ingrid 205 Maududi, Abu al-A’la 155 Mawdudi, Mawlana 207, 240, 321 Mawdu ¯ di ¯ , Sayyid Abul A’la 247–52 Mecca Abyssinians in 56–7 God and 165–6 humanism and 135–6 Medina and 135–41, 160 Muh.ammad in 165–6 media representations of Islam 199–200, 212–13 Medina humanism and 135–6 Mecca and 135–41, 160 Menelik II, Emperor 60–1, 62 Metcalf, Barbara 316 Middle East, the anti-Semitism in 193–4 European occupation and control over 145–8, 187–9 independence and social upheaval in 148–9 modern Islamic political power in 151–3 Middle East Quarterly, The 198 Mingana, Alphonse 257 missions, Christian 86–7, 189, 241–2, 249–50 conference on Christian Mission and Islamic Da‘wah 253–5 Monophysite group of Eastern Churches 54 moral laws 22–3 Moreau, Basil Anthony 86 Moses 21–2, 161, 164–5, 165, 320 Muh.ammad 133, 309, 331 Abyssinians and 56–7, 58 Christian and Jewish acknowledgement of the prophethood of 4–5 Christian images of 190–2

Index on dhimmah of God 12 humanism and 135–6, 139 Islamic state and 8–10 in Mecca 165–6 prophethood of 4–5, 136–6, 161–2, 205, 313–19, 322 teachings on Jesus Christ 57 see also Islam Muh.ammad, ‘Abdallah b. 78–9 Muh.ammad, Abu’l-Husayn 77 Muh.ammad bin Talal, Ghazi bin 223 Muir, William 313, 316 Mulder, D. C. 312 multiculturalism 180 Muslim Brotherhood 49 Muslim-Christian relations in Abyssinia 55–60 “A Common Word between Us and You” and 223–35 associationism in 6–7 Building Bridges seminar on 102–8 Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations and 256–68 Christian-Muslim Forum in the United Kingdom and 108–9 Christians love for their Muslim neighbours and 115–17 “clash of civilizations” in 194–6 common values and cooperation in 121–2, 231–2 communication and 230–1 community interest matters and 64–5 concern for the church in 118–19 concrete forms of 232–3 in Constantinople 72–81 contemporary caricatures of Islam and 192–202 cultural divisions and 64 Day of Peace and 245–52 democratic processes and 66 dialogue and mutual respect in 68, 178–83 forgiveness in 32–7 holy scriptures and 27–8 identifying shared religious concepts in 67–8

355

Indonesian Consortium for Religious Studies 109–10 international issues and 66, 110–11 Islamic state and 8–10 in modern Ethiopia 60–3 in Nigeria 337–43 political conflicts in 120–1 Pope Benedict XVI and 97–102, 107, 116, 187, 188, 223 Programme on Christian-Muslim Relations in Africa (PROCMURA) 340, 342–3 prophethood of Muh.ammad and 4–5 reconciliation in 38–9 religious freedom and 46–7, 122–5 religious laws and 11 religious reform and 65 social capital and 275–82 studies of 96–7 taba ¯ daliyya and 29–31 tensions in 119–21, 186–92 theological tensions in 120 truth claims in 44–7 unity and 66–7, 181 ways forward in 121–5 witnesses to Christ in 117–18 see also dialogue, inter-religious Muslim-Jewish relations, religious laws in 11 Muslims see Islam Mussolini, Benito 147 mutual respect 68, 174, 178–83 Myth of the Cross, The 321 Napoleon 145 Nas.t.¯u ra 5 Navarro-Valls, Joaquin 102 Nawfal, Waraqah b. 5 neighbours, love for one’s 115–17, 226 Newbiggin, Lesslie 96 New Deal legislation, U. S. 147 Nicholl, Donald 88 Nielsen, Jørgen 264 Niger 330 Nigeria 337–43 Nimrod (scriptural character) 164

356

Index

Nineveh 166 Noonan, John 91 Of the Old Testament 22 On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History 189, 313 On Loving Islam 320–1 Orientalism 188 Pakistan 194 Pakistan Times, The 321 Paleologus, Manuel II 98–9 Palestinians 157, 168–70, 193–4 defending 202–3 Pancasila 110 Pasha, ‘Urabi 146 Paul, apostle on circumcision 21–2 on forgiveness 36–7 on loving one another 31 Paul VI, Pope 239–40, 245–7 Pearse, Meic 195 Peirce, Charles Sanders 84, 85, 87 People of the Book 3–14, 24, 238 Peter, apostle 32 Pfander, Karl Gottlieb 315–16, 319–20 Pharaoh of Egypt 164–5 Platform of the Islamic Community in Bosnia-Herzegovina for Dialogue 297 pluralism Christian perspective on 45, 108 Qur’a ¯ n on 48–52 political power, Islamic 128–9, 151–3 Hizbollah and 168–70 recognition and 305–8 Potter, Philip 179, 312 power, Islamic 11, 19–20, 49–50 in Abyssinia 60–3 imperialism and 197–9 political conflicts and 120–1, 128–9, 153 in Sudan 324–7 PROCMURA see Programme on ChristianMuslim Relations in Africa (PROCMURA) Programme on Christian-Muslim Relations in Africa (PROCMURA) 340, 342–3

prophethood of Muh.ammad Barelwi Movement and 317–19 Christian recognition of 4–5, 136–6, 161–2, 205, 313–17, 322 Pfander and Al-Kairânawi debate on 315–16 Puljic´, Vinko Cardinal 289 punishment 22–3 Qur’a ¯ n, the Abraham and Nimrod in 164 on abrogation 16–25 associationism and 6–7 on Christians 5–6 compared to the Bible 27–8, 162–4, 224 on conversion of non-Muslims 11 creation and temptation of Adam in 162–4 on creation of humanity 131–3 dhimmah in 10–14 on Divine Guidance 237–9 on ‘dominion’ 129–33 forgiveness in 32–7 on human authority 129–31, 236–7 on the human condition 29–30 humanism and 51, 133–6, 139 Mecca and Medina in 160 Moses in 164–5 on Muslim rule and power 9–10 on People of the Book 3–14, 24, 238 on pluralism 48–52 reconciliation in 37–9 as revelation 205 role similar to Jesus’ in Christianity 23–5 scientific validity of 204 on ummah 49–52 see also Islam Qutb, Syed 18, 155 radical Islam 18 Rage and the Pride, The 102 Rahbar, Daud 314 Rahma ¯ n, Fazlur 50, 205, 319–20 Ramadan, Tariq 89, 90, 91–2, 93, 274, 280, 282 Randhawa, Naeem 213

Index Ratzinger, Joseph 97, 188 recognition cultural and political 305–8 legal 302–5 personal 301–2 of prophethood of Muh.ammad 4–5, 136–6, 161–2, 205, 313–15, 322 religious 308–10 reconciliation 37–9 reform, religious 65 Regensburg lecture 97–102, 107, 223 relationships between religions areas of tension and 43–4 truth claims and requirements for tolerance in 44–7 religions communications between 230–1 cooperation between 231–2 recognition 308–10 relationships between 43–4 scholarship of 220–1 re-presentation of Islamic history, belief, and law 210–12 respect, mutual 68, 174, 178–83 revealed Truth 44, 47 revelation 205 righteousness and justice 30–1 Robertson, Pat 200 Robinson, Gene 24 Rogers, Paul 276 Roman Catholic Church, the in Abyssinia 59–60 Day of Peace observance 245–7 dialogue 178, 179 in Ethiopia 55 missions 86–7 Pope Benedict XVI and 97–102, 107, 116, 187, 188, 223 Pope Paul VI and 239–40, 245–7 right of the person in 46–7 tolerance and 45, 331 witness to Christ and 118 Roosevelt, Franklin D. 147 Rouadjia, Ahmed 152 Runnymede Trust 172 Rushdie, Salman 154, 196, 319

357

Sahin, Abdullah 275 Said, Edward 188 Sale, George 316 Salvation of Nations 89 Samartha, Stanley 179 Satan, temptation by 162–4 Satanic Verses, The 154, 196, 319 Saul, King 163 Schoen, Ulrich 314 scholarship into “A Common Word between Us and You,” 227–9, 233–4 of Islam 175–8, 221–3 of religions 220–1 science and Islam 203–4 Scola, Angelo 94 sectarianism 196–7 secularization of Europe 288–9 Seerat-e-sarwar-e-’Alam 321 Selassie, Haile 54, 61 Selly Oak Colleges 175, 178, 240, 311 Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 256–68, 311, 312, 321 September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks 103, 155–6, 158, 172, 194, 215, 273, 274, 292, 312 Sheba, Queen of 54 Sheriff, Alauddin Mohammad 106 Siddiqui, Ataullah 109 Signer, Michael 89 Silajdžic´, Adnan 292 Slomp, Jan 311 Smith, Jane 214 Smith, Wilfred Cantwell 336 social capital 275–82 Society for Intercultural Leadership (SOIL) 278 Sodano, Angelo 102 Sodom and Gomorra 165, 166 Solomon, King 54, 163, 167 Southwestern Theological Seminary 196 Soviet Union 147, 149–50, 155–6 Spain 275–6 Spencer, Robert 198, 200 Stalin, Josef 147 Stark, Freya 146

358

Index

Stout, Jeffrey 282–3 Sudan civil war in 327–30 future of 332–4 Islamists’ ascent to power in 324–7 religious tolerance in 330–2 Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) 329, 333 Sufism 139 Summa Theologiae 88 Surty, Ibrahim 36 Susenyos, Emperor 60 Sweetman, James 257 Syria 149, 152 taba ¯ daliyya 29 Taha, Mahmud Muh.ammad 327 Talbi, Muh.ammad 50, 51 Tale of Two Cities, A 160–1 Ta ¯ lib, Abu ¯ 56 Tammam, Abu 75 Tantawi, Muh.ammad Sayyid 108–9 taqwa 30–1 Taylor, John B. 175–8, 257–8 tensions between Christians and Muslims 119–21 terrorism 192–3 in Spain 275–6 in the United Kingdom 273–5, 277 in the United States 103, 155–6, 172, 194, 215, 273, 274, 292, 312 Tessenyi, Geza 277–8 Tewodros II, Emperor 60 theological tensions between Muslims and Christians 120 Theology of Liberation 168 Thesiger, Wilfred 146 Thinking about Islam 177 Thousand and One Nights, The 76, 189 Tisdall, W. St Clair 316 tolerance Christian perspective on 44–7 in Sudan 330–2 Treaty of Lisbon 287 tribalism 196–7 Trotsky, Leon 147

truth claims and requirements for tolerance 44–7 revealed 44, 47 right of the 46–7 witness of the Church for 47 Tunisia 152 ul-Haq, Zia 319, 320 Umayyads 72–3, 102 umma 48–52 United Kingdom, the Bradford city in 273, 274–82 Building Bridges seminar, Anglican Communion 102–8 Christian-Muslim Forum 108–9 college students in 278–80 imams of 280–2 Islamic studies in 175–8 Islam in 153–4, 273–82 terrorism against 273–5, 277 United Nations Development Programme 152 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 124 United Reformed Church 96 United States, the attitudes toward Muslims 184–92 Cold War and 149–50, 155 media in 199–200, 212–13 Muslim Americans in 184–6, 199–200, 202–3 New Deal legislation 147 terrorism against 103, 155–6, 158, 172, 194, 215, 273, 274, 292, 312 Vahiduddin, Syed 50, 51 Vidino, Lorinzo 198 von Sicard, Sigvard 314 Wadud, Amina 206 Wahhabism 294–7 Warraq, Ibn 190 Wessels, Anton 314 Western Muslims and the Future of Islam 89, 90

Index Wherry, E. M. 316 Wilfred, Felix 340 Williams, Adebayo 339 Williams, Rowan 103–4, 108, 109 With People of Other Faiths in Britain 96 witnesses to Christ 117–18 women Christian 196 Muslim 195–6, 205–6, 207 Wood, Herbert G. 257, 259, 267 World Council of Churches (WCC) 105, 160, 178–83, 312 conference on Christian Mission and Islamic Da‘wah 253–5 World War I 146–7 World War II 147–8

Writing in the Dust: Reflections on 11th September and its Aftermath 103 Yahya, Harun b. 76–7, 78 Ye’or, Bat 198 Yohannes I, Emperor 60 Yohannes IV, Emperor 60 Yusuf, Shaikh Hamza 274, 282 Zaehner, Robert 258 Zamakhshari 18–19 Zapatero, José Luis 110 Zayd, ‘Adi b. 71 Zeidan, David 157 Zein al-Abdin, Al-Tayib 264 Zionism 128, 185 Zovkic´, Mato 289

359

Scriptural Index

Biblical References Genesis 1.27 Genesis 3.23 Genesis 10.1–14 Exodus 20.1 Exodus 20.16 Leviticus 19.17–18 Leviticus 20.10 Leviticus 20.27 Leviticus 24.16 Numbers 15.35 Deuteronomy 4.35 Deuteronomy 6.4 Deuteronomy 6.13 Deuteronomy 7. 1–2 Deuteronomy 13.9 Deuteronomy 17.16 Deuteronomy 20.16 Deuteronomy 21.18 Deuteronomy 23.1 Deuteronomy 24.5 Deuteronomy 24.7 Deuteronomy 24.19f. Deuteronomy 25.11 Deuteronomy 27.36 Joshua 6.21 1 Samuel 8.7 1 Kings 8.46 1 Kings 10.26 1 Kings 12.4f. 2 Chronicles 7.14 Psalm 8.4f. Psalm 37.37

116 171 164 166 116 226 26, n.15 26, n.15 26, n.15 22 92 92 163 191 26, n.15 167 191 26, n.15 26, n.15 26, n.19 26, n.15 26, n.19 26, n.15 22 23 163 30 167 167 32 30 38

Psalm 51.4 Psalm 78.38 Psalm 85.10 Psalm 86.5 Psalm 146. 7 Proverbs 21.3 Isaiah 1.9, 10 Isaiah 2.4 Jeremiah 18.8 Jeremiah 22.13–16, 20, 21 Hosea 13.9 Micah 6.8

30 33 162 36 167 30 166 105 33 168 128 30

Matthew 4.8–10 Matthew 5.17 Matthew 5.23–4 Matthew 5.33–37 Matthew 5.38–41 Matthew 5.44 Matthew 5.46–7 Matthew 5.48 Matthew 6.12 Matthew 6.14–15 Matthew 7.1 Matthew 7.18–23 Matthew 10.34 Matthew 12.8 Matthew 13.44 Matthew 18.21–22 Matthew 19.8, 9 Matthew 22.39 Matthew 22.40 Matthew 25 Matthew 28.18–20

163 21 38 20 35 31 28 36 32 32 314 21 191 21 142, n.19 32 21 115 227 87 117 (2x)

Scriptural Index Mark 9.40 Mark 12.29–31 Mark 12.32 Luke 6.37 Luke 9.30, 31 Luke 22.36 Luke 24.46–47 John 1.1–18 John 16.13 Acts 2.16–21 Acts 5.29 Acts 17. 22–31 Romans 3.23 Romans 6.12, 13 1 Corinthians 9.16 2 Corinthians 4.5 2 Corinthians 5.11–21 Galatians 3.10 Galatians 3.17 Galatians 3.24f. Ephesians 2.13–22 Colossians 1.21, 22 Colossians 3.9–10 Colossians 3.13 1 John 1.8 1 John 4.20–21 1 John 5.19 Hebrews 1.3 Hebrews 10.24 Hebrews 11.10 Revelation 19.15, 21

227 227 92 39 165 191 117 20, 23, 92, 142, n.11 90 314 117 142, n.11 30 170 117 117 38, 39 22 22 21 142, n.11 39 31 37 30 31 39 314 28 160 191

Qur’anic References S. 2:2 S. 2:30 S. 2:35 S. 2:51 S. 2:62 S. 2:83 S. 2:104 S. 2:106

16, 17, 38 30, 130 (2x), 162 33 33 4 37 51 16, 17 (2x)

S. 2:109 S. 2:124 S. 2:136 S. 2:143 S. 2:148 S. 2:165 S. 2:173 S. 2:177 S. 2:182 S. 2:192 S. 2:199 S. 2:218 S. 2:219 S. 2:225 S. 2:226 S. 2:235 S. 2:251 S. 2:256

S. 2:258 S. 2:286 S. 3:17 S. 3:31 S. 3:61 S. 3:64 S. 3:89 S. 3:110 S. 3:129 S. 3:113–15 S. 3:135 S. 3:155 S. 3:177 S. 3:193 S. 4:20 S. 4:23 S. 4:25 S. 4:26 S. 4:28 S. 4:43 S. 4:48 S. 4:64 S. 4:67 S. 4:82

361 35 164 27 51 29 6 33 226 (2x) 33 33 33 33 25, n.6 33 33 33 163 11, 18 (2x), 19 (2x), 20, 25, n.6, 7; 99, 101, 117, 141, n.4; 227 164 34, 35 53, n.20 33 9, 12 6, 223, 238 33 51 33 5, 51, 239 36 33 226 36 33 33 33 28 29 25, n.6; 33 48 33 33 18

362 S. 4:94

S. 4:96 S. 4:100 S. 4:106 S. 4:110 S. 4:116 S. 4:128 S. 4:135 S. 4:149 S. 4:152 S. 4:171 S. 5:2 S. 5:3 S. 5:5 S. 5:8 S. 5:15 S. 5:16 S. 5:47 S. 5:48 S. 5:56 S. 5:69 S. 5:73 S. 5:82–3 S. 5:90 S. 5:105 S. 5:116 S. 6:54 S. 6:73 S. 6:92 S. 6:155 S. 7:80–84 S. 7:137 S. 7:155 S. 7:158 S. 7:172 S. 7:199 S. 8:30 S. 8:61 S. 8: 72, 74 S. 9 S. 9:6 S. 9:8 S. 9:29

Sciptural Index 11, 129 (2x), 130, 131, 134 33 33 33 33 48 38 30 33 33 7 28, 31 17 238 31 17 141, n.7; 208 326 29, 39, 51 (2x) 168 4 7 5, 48, 239 25, n.6 134 7 141, n.7 92 9 38 166 165 36 50 130 (2x), 134 35 166 39 48 19 48 12 9, 18

S. 9:65 S. 9:73 S. 9:105 S. 9:119 S. 10:94 S. 10:99 S. 10:100 S. 11:118 S. 12:98 S. 15:49 S. 16:43 S. 16:67 S. 16:93 S. 16:101 S. 16:125 S. 17:11 S. 17:94 S. 17:100 S. 19:33 S. 20:79 S. 20:120 S. 21:3 S. 21:16 S. 21:107 S. 22:13 S. 22:17 S. 22:20 S. 22:24 S. 22:34 S. 22:52 S. 22:60 S. 23:11 S. 24:10 S. 24:22 S. 25:41 S. 25:43 S. 28:5 S. 28:38 S. 29:26 S. 29:40 S. 29:46 S. 29:52 S. 30:3–5 S. 30:21 S. 30:22

165 18 33 33 28 141, n.4 29 51 33 33 6 25, n.6 51 16, 17 6 29 165 30 141, n.7 164 162 165 142, n.18 10 169 169 169 164 164 16 33 48 33 34 165 7 164, 165 164 165 164 6, 11, 28, 238 141 72 133 4

Scriptural Index S. 30:30 S. 31:13 S. 33:35 S. 33:56 S. 33:71 S. 33:73 S. 35:31–3 S. 36:30 S. 37:12 S. 38:26 S. 38:66 S. 39:5 S. 39:41 S. 39:60 S. 39:71–2 S. 40:29 S. 41:39 S. 41:42 S. 42:7 S. 42:8 S. 42:25 S. 42:40 S. 43:51 S. 44:38 S. 46:15

141, n.10 6, 48 143, n.30 143, n.31 48 48 239 165 165 163 32 32 139 48 48 164 143, n.30 17 9 29 36 34 164 142, n.18 38

S. 47:13 S. 47:19 S. 47:24 S. 48:6 S. 49:11–13 S. 56:58 S. 58:2 S. 58:19 S. 58:22 S. 59:23 S. 60:80 S. 64:14 S. 66:9 S. 70:19–21 S. 73:20 S. 74:25 S. 76:3–4 S. 79:17–20 S. 79:24 S. 80:23 S. 87:6 S. 96:1–5 S. 96:6 S. 110:3

363 166 35, 226 138 48 28, 29, 31, 33, 48, 105 133 33 168 48 141, n.7 238 35 18 29 35 165 29 29, 164 165 29 16 5 29 33