East German Distinctiveness in a Unified Germany

East German distinctiveness in a unified Germany

The New Germany in Context Series editors: Jonathan Grix (Birmingham), Paul Cooke (University of Leeds) and Lothar Funk (University of Trier) The New Germany in Context provides a forum for original research into the state of post-unity German society from a wide range of disciplinary perspectives. Since unification, Germany, and its place in the world, has undergone a period of rapid development and change. This series brings together academics from political science, economics, history and cultural studies in order to explore the legacies and debates which shape the new Federal Republic.

Other titles in the series include: Published: The Fall and Rise of the PDS in eastern Germany Dan Hough Ten years of German unification: transfer, transformation) incorporation? Edited by Jorn Leonhard and Lothar Funk Economic transition, unemployment and Active Labour Market Policy Corinne Nativel The new regulatory state in Germany Markus M. Miiller Approaches to the study of contemporary Germany: research methodologies in German Studies Edited by Jonathan Grix Forthcoming: Identity creation and the culture of contrition: reconfiguring national identity in the Berlin Republic Karl Wilds Unification) collective bargaining and the German model of industrial relations Steve French German cinema after unification Edited by David Clarke On their own terms: German literature and the legacy of National Socialism after unification Helmut Schmitz The Buchenwald Child: from truth to legend Bill Niven

East German distinctiveness in a unified Germany Edited by Jonathan Grix and Paul Cooke

T i l l * UNIVKRSITY OF B I R M I N G H A M UNIVKRSITY PRHSS

Copyright © University of Birmingham Press 2002 While copyright in the volume as a whole is vested in the University of Birmingham Press, copyright in individual chapters belongs to their respective authors, and no chapter may be reproduced wholly or in part without the express permission in writing of both author and publisher. First published in the United Kingdom by The University of Birmingham Press, University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham, BIS 2TT, UK. All rights reserved. Except for the quotation of short passages for the purposes of criticism and review, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. ISBN 1-902459-17-2 British Library Cataloguing in Publication data A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Printed in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd

Contents Acknowledgements Contributors 1:

Introduction to East German political and cultural distinctiveness Jonathan Grix

vii viii

1

2:

East German identity in the GDR Joanna McKay

15

3:

East German Identity: More Western than the West?

31

Laurence McFalls 4:

'Red is for Love ...': citizens as consumers in East Germany Patricia Hogwood

45

5:

Second-class Germans? National identity in East Germany

61

Gordon Charles Ross 6:

Viewing 'the Other': how East sees West and West sees East Manuela Glaab

75

7:

East German identity and party politics Daniel Hough

99

8:

Women, identity and employment in East Germany Debbie Wqgener

9:

Ethnicity and language: The case of Saxony (with particular reference to the Sorbs of eastern Saxony) Peter Barker

137

Literature and the question of East German cultural identity since the Wende Paul Cooke

151

10:

Index

119

169

To Andrea and Alison for their love, support and, more importantly, patience

Acknowledgements We would like to thank all the contributors to this volume for the time and effort they put into their individual chapters. Most of all, however, we would like to thank Willie Paterson and Wini Davies for their encouragement and support. Finally, we would like to thank Alec McAulay of University of Birmingham Press and Patrick Armstrong for putting up with our constant harassment. Jonathan Grix and Paul Cooke, Birmingham, September 2002

Contributors Peter Barker is Senior Lecturer in German Studies at the University of Reading Paul Cooke is Lecturer in German Studies at the University of Leeds Manuela Glaab works at CAP (Centre for Applied Policy Research) in Munich Jonathan Grix is Assistant Director and Senior Lecturer at the Institute for German Studies, University of Birmingham Patricia Hogwood is Lecturer in Politics at the University of Glasgow Daniel Hough is Lecturer in Politics at the University of Nottingham Laurence McFalls is Associate Director and Professor of Politics at the centre for European and German Studies, University of Montreal Joanna McKay is Lecturer in Politics at Nottingham Trent University Debbie Wagener is Lecturer in German Studies at Chester College

1 Introduction to East German political and cultural distinctiveness Jonathan Grix

It might seem otiose to produce a book on the distinctiveness of East German identity more than a decade after the official unification of Germany was celebrated. However, while one can say with some confidence that the 'hardware' of capitalism (i.e. the West German institutional, political, social and economic framework) has been extended to all of Germany to 'form a single unit', as the term 'unification' suggests, the 'software' of capitalism (i.e. the political and cultural attitudes and values needed to sustain it) remains far from homogenous.1 This book explores the nature of the dramatic growth in a distinct sense of East German identity in the years since the events that led to formal unification in 1990. Clearly, it is problematic to see 'East Germanness' as a singular and homogenous entity. An individual's sense of his/her identity is the product of a wide range of factors, including age, social class, gender and geographical proximity. Nevertheless, within debates on unification, 'East Germanness' can be perceived as a distinctive phenomenon and a level of identification that exists alongside local, (traditionally) regional and national identities. In particular this volume hopes to challenge the commonly held misconception, in both popular and academic discourses, that the future of the German unification process necessarily lies in overcoming the problem of an East German regional identity which, it is often suggested, is merely a Trot^identitdt (an identity of defiance), fundamentally rooted in a nostalgic rejection of the realities of living in a Western market economy.

2 Introduction to East German political and cultural distinctness

Through an analysis of the social, political and cultural behaviour of the East German populace on the one hand, and their cognitive responses on the other (that is, how they subjectively perceive of their place in German society as a whole) the volume intends to show that a paradox exists at the heart of East German identity. The existence and continuing influence of socialist values among East Germans, inherited from the GDR, do not translate into a sense of Easternness that is a wholly backward-looking identity, locked in the past and unable to catch up with life in the old Lander. Indeed, in contradiction to what is commonly termed the 'socialist legacy' thesis (see below),2 the population also seems to exhibit social and political behaviour which is in part, somewhat curiously perhaps, more in keeping with a mature capitalist state, rather than with one only a decade old.

Conceptions of Easternness The contributions to this book make reference to the factors that go into making up political and cultural identity (what I have termed the 'input' side of identity: socialisation, the transformation process and language) and analyse the most pertinent manifestations of such an identity (what I have termed the 'output' side: the political system, political culture, consumption, cultural expression and language).3 Language, as we shall see, can be understood as both a contributing factor in identity formation and as a marker of cultural identity. In West Germany, the concept of a self-conscious East German identity has been greeted, particularly within the popular consciousness, with a great deal of frustration. East Germans were, and still are to a certain degree, commonly labelled Jammerossis (moaning Easties) who constantly complain about their treatment in the new Germany, despite having received huge handouts from the State. This attitude does, on the face of it, seem to be perfectly understandable. After all, in the 1990s gross federal transfers from West to East were around DM 140 billion annually,4 leading to an increase in income levels for former GDR citizens which greatly outstripped any other post-communist state.5 Many East Germans, for their part, counter the West German label of Jammerossis with stereotypes of their own. In particular Westerners are attacked as Besserwessis (know-it-all Westies) who have simply colonised the GDR,

Conceptions of Easternness 3

with little respect or understanding of the population's past experience under socialism, or the difficulties it faces in adjusting to life within a market economy.6 This view also seems to be understandable. The transformation process in the East has had a fundamental effect on the people living there. Easterners have gone from being part of a state which guaranteed a job for life to being part of a region which is experiencing mass unemployment and widespread restructuring of previous political, social and economic frames of reference. In a survey conducted amongst East and West Germans in 1997, for example, results found that as many as one in two people in the East reported having been exposed to unemployment, an extraordinarily high percentage, particularly when it is compared to the figure of one in ten in the West.7 Within academic studies on the phenomenon of East German identity one can broadly identify two strands of analysis, both of which are hinted at in the popular mutual stereotyping described above. First, certain academics adopt what can be termed a 'situational approach' which emphasises the impact of the fall-out from the unprecedented transformation from authoritarian socialism to democracy — and especially the psychological effects of unemployment — as the key variable in the explanation of East Germans' political behaviour, patterns of social engagement and political preferences. This approach has tended to treat 1989/90 as a Stunde null, with scholars concentrating less on the collective experience of pre-1990 and more on the effects of the transformation process since.8 Second, one can identify a 'socialisation approach', which suggests that to fully understand the manner in which interests and political preferences are expressed and the channels through which people choose to express them in East Germany, we need to also consider political socialisation, a concept linked closely to identity formation and political culture.9 Different socialisation experiences in ideologically opposing political systems are seen as being responsible for the divergence in opinion of Easterners and Westerners on a wide range of topics. As we shall see throughout this volume, there is no doubt that socialisation in the authoritarian GDR society, where personal networks and face-to-face relations replaced a normally functioning civil society, left some distinct marks on the citizens of East Germany. For example, the impact of unemployment on East Germans in the post-1990 period can only be understood fully by knowledge of the social context in which work and

4 Introduction to East German political and cultural distinctiveness

the workplace were embedded in the GDR.10 Thus, according to the socialisation approach, the faltering East German economy looks set to continue to provide East Germans with reasons to feel marginalised in unified Germany, as unemployment remains stubbornly high, standards of living in the East remain lower than the West and huge annual transfers from West to East pour into infrastructure and welfare payments.11 The reasons why scholars choose either of the two approaches are, of course, ontological, epistemological and purely political: ontological and epistemological in the way in which scholars conceive of reality and what they believe there is to know about it; political in the sense that many Western commentators are not interested in, or have little knowledge of, the negotiations between citizens and state under dictatorial conditions.12 Yet, clearly, both approaches only make sense when taken together, for attitudes and values shaped under state socialism — for example, towards the role of the state, child care, employment and social equality - become far more pronounced once the state is less visible in people's lives, Kindergarten are closed, mass unemployment sets in and differential income is commonplace.13 Therefore, it is the curious mixture of pre1990 values refracted through the 'prism' of German unity and the (continuing) transformation of East German society that has led to the development of two distinct political and cultural identities in East and West Germany more than a decade after official unification. It ought to be made clear that political identity is not homogenous: as Eva Kolinsky has discussed, East Germany consists of a diverse mix of interests and political attitudes articulated by a wide range of social groups, ranging from women (who some commentators see as the 'losers' of unification — see Debbie Wagener's analysis in Chapter 8 for more on this), to youths and right-wing extremists (see Gordon Ross's contribution in Chapter 5).14 However, East Germans do share a specific level of identification with one another: their socialist past experience and the extensive social, political and economic transformation since 1990. Although these two strands might differ greatly in their emphasis, at the heart of both is the notion that East German distinctiveness is a problem which must be addressed if the Eastern regions are ever to be integrated into the FRG. For example, the development of a negative East German Trot^identitat (identity of defiance) is understood by some to be predicated upon a profound sense of dissatisfaction with the West German market economy.15 Central to this sense of Trot^ it is argued,

Political and cultural identity 5

remains an escapist, nostalgic obsession with the GDR past, an escapism usually denoted by the buzzword Ostalgie (a conflation of the German words for 'East' and 'nostalgia'). It is clear, however, that any sense of nostalgia amongst East Germans does not point to a wish to have the SED regime back.16 Many commentators seem to suggest that once economic parity has been achieved East Germans will conquer this backward-looking obsession. In so doing, they will overcome the legacies of their socialist past and at last catch up with West German society.17 The cry for the East to 'catch up' with the West mirrors many analysts' use of the term 'inner unity' to refer to an idealised state of harmony and homogeneity between West and East Germans. This is a state which some contributors in this volume (most notably Glaab and Ross) suggest is still a long way off. However, other commentators in this volume actually suggest that 'inner unity' has already been achieved, since the majority of East and West Germans agree on the basic law and consumerism, democracy is not in question and the German nation state is not under threat.1^ Nevertheless, these scholars reveal that while inner unity may have been achieved, an East German identity is emerging which cannot simply be explained by reference to either nostalgia or a sense of disappointment with the transformation process since 1990. Rather, the loss of full-time work, 'close interpersonal social relationships in a new individualistic environment'19 and the need to adapt to new social, political and economic frames of reference have acted as a binding force across boundaries of gender, age and geographical location among East Germans.

Political and cultural identity As a concept, 'identity' is among the most problematic to operationalise - that is, to turn into something that can be 'measured', seen or at least accounted for in empirical practice. As a man-made abstract notion, the concept is as difficult to define as 'civil society', 'political culture' and 'social capital'. For the purpose of this volume, identity is taken to refer to the norms and values pertaining to a particular individual or group of people over time. Current opinions gradually turn into medium-term attitudes, which themselves develop into longer-term, underlying values that function as the bedrock of a person's or group's identity. Identity itself cannot be seen, but the process by which it is constructed can be inter-

6 Introduction to East German political and cultural distinctiveness

preted and certain manifestations or indices can be detected. In other words, the 'input' and 'output' sides of political and cultural identity can be charted. However, since identity is a dialectic process between human agents and their environment, we can only hope to capture a 'snapshot' of it at any given time. Identity is not a given, rather it is socially and discursively constructed through day-to-day interaction with other human agents and our environment. The lines of this form of demarcation and delineation are fluid and ever-changing. At this moment in time (autumn 2002) East German citizens set themselves apart from West Germans on a particular level of identification: East Germans share a common past, common problems in the new Germany and common basic values. As values are central to any identity and given that they change only slowly, they play a central role in the explanations of many of the contributions to this book. Figure 1.1 offers a way of conceiving of identity using the 'input' and 'output' categories introduced above: Input'

'Output'

Social Context

Political system

Situational factors

Political culture

Language

Consumption

Socialisation

Language Cultural expression

Figure 1.1: The 'construction' of political and cultural identity in East Germany What the figure above attempts to sketch is the variety of influencing factors on the process of political and cultural identity creation in East Germany. Obviously, there are many more factors involved in such a complex process, but for the sake of simplicity I have only listed some of the most important. What this figure attempts to capture is the ongoing nature of identity formation: situational factors, for example, impact on

Political and cultural identity 7

how people respond to the political system, how they engage with the political process and how they vote. Politics and political and institutional performance affects people's attitudes towards them, attitudes that are, in turn, shaped by past experience. The process of identity formation can be understood as a perpetual wheel: the constant construction of what we are takes place at the interface of past and present experience and future prospects. While most contributions to this book touch on the 'input' factors above, the book itself can be conceived as an exploration of the 'output' factors, that is, things that can be 'read off as indicators of political and cultural identity. The data sources employed to get at the 'objective' and 'subjective' sides of East German distinctiveness are varied: mass opinion poll data; political party strategy papers; literary texts; in-depth interviews with East Germans; questionnaires and governmental statistics. All sources, however, are embedded in an interpretation of the social context in which they were generated (see below).

The Input' Side On the 'input' side we have the transformation process following unification and continuing to this day. The loss of former frames of reference for East Germans has led to a complete reconfiguration of opinions and attitudes to a wide range of topics. These attitudes are embedded in, and affected by, years of life in the GDR. While all contributions highlight this theme of socialisation, it plays a particular role in Chapter 8, Debbie Wagener's explanation of East German women's attitudes towards work in unified Germany. Among East Germans, as she shows, work is seen more as a duty or obligation, a notion which has some parallels with Max Weber's concept of the 'calling' — that is, a strong sense of duty to one's occupation — in his explanation of the rise of capitalism.20 There is no doubt that East Germans view work as central to their lives, one of the reasons post-unity unemployment has hit them so hard in a psychological sense, and there is no doubt that the 'long and arduous process of education'21 and socialisation in the GDR has led to this conviction. 'Social context' is included in the list of 'input' factors to indicate the emphasis this volume places on the interpretation of the social system in which East Germans lived and live for an explanation of the emergence of a distinct East German identity. For example, it is not enough to simply rely on electoral preferences and turnout, party membership and

8 Introduction to East German political and cultural distinctiveness

coalition formation to understand East German political culture. Equally, copious opinion polls and survey results of people's perceptions of political institutions are not enough for us to understand a region's specific political culture. Rather, one needs all of the above and knowledge of the specific social context in which questions were asked, votes cast and coalitions formed.22 Thus, survey and poll results, essential for a snapshot of identity, are grounded in an understanding of the GDR system and the socio-economic conditions under which the East Germans now find themselves. For example, if one were to (wrongly) conceive of the GDR as having been a totalitarian system to the end, the residue of the past apparent in East Germans' attitudes would be interpreted negatively as the product of repression. On the other hand, if one understands the GDR as a society with at least some room for manoeuvre and negotiation between citizens and state, survey answers highlighting preferences for social solidarity, a strong state or increased levels of child care would be interpreted somewhat differently. The point is that surveys and opinion polls record individual cognitive properties which are then translated into brute data. These data make little sense without knowledge of, and insight into, the social context in which they were generated or to which they refer. Language is included on both sides of our equation. While identity is clearly constructed via language, language is also as clear an indicator of identification as anything else, as Peter Barker's case study of language and the Sorbs in Chapter 9 reveals. Language as a medium of 'shaping our consciousness' was used to great effect by the Nazis in the first German dictatorship and again in the second, the GDR. In societies like the GDR there existed to different degrees an 'official' and an 'unofficial' political culture underpinned by an 'official' and 'unofficial' language. The outward conformity shown by the majority of citizens in these states through flagwaving ceremonies, socialist marches or celebrations certainly does not imply that the norms set out by the 'official' Marxist-Leninist political culture and repeatedly fed to the populations via political socialisation were fully internalised. The 'duality' of life for East Germans, for example, constituted a shift from an outward acquiescence to the dominant SED (Socialist Unity Party) political culture and language to a different discourse within the Nischengesellschaft (society of niches).23 Post-1990 there is no doubt that East German language usage is different to West German usage, although with time this difference is likely to erode.

Political and cultural identity 9

The 'Output' side In this volume the analyses of manifestations of identity in East Germany begin after an historical introduction to the nature of identity in the GDR. In Chapter 2 Joanna McKay traces the, at times farcical, attempts of the SED regime to create a sense of GDR identity, including reviving historical greats of 'East' German history previously shunned by the regime. She clearly shows that the FRG steadfastly remained the reference point for the majority of East Germans. Over a decade after German unification, West Germany and the West Germans remain a reference point for many East Germans, but now as a marker of difference. This difference is apparent in advertising strategies, which, both in commercial and political campaigns, have to be specifically (re)designed for East Germany, as tastes, requirements and values there are clearly distinct from the West. Patricia Hogwood (Chapter 4) convincingly shows the effects of the politics of consumption by pointing out that a distinct East German political identity is discernible as Easterners consciously turn to goods produced in their region. The paradox in the debate on consumption is — similarly to the political paradox — that East Germans are increasingly living a 'Western' lifestyle while retaining key 'Eastern' values. Both Hogwood and Laurence McFalls, in Chapter 3, come to this conclusion, although the latter, in an insightful but controversial piece, suggests that East Germans have actually 'leapfrogged' the West Germans in terms of their 'post-unification' identity, an identity which is seen to anticipate a future all-German national identity The bifurcation of Eastern identity into Western lifestyle (convergence) and Eastern values (divergence) is one of the reasons why understanding post-unity German identity has led to the variety of conceptions of what 'Easternness' is. The combination of both situational and socialisation factors can be 'read off in people's political attitudes, something represented in the 'output' side of identity under 'political system' and 'political culture'. It is uncontroversial to suggest that the German political landscape is clearly divided in an East—West axis, as is reflected in the very different political party coalitions at the regional level in East and West Germany, indicating the sharp differences in political attitudes in the two parts of the country. Thus, it becomes clear that there are asymmetries between the East and West with regard to party allegiance, political attitudes and voting patterns.24 The Green party, which is a junior partner in the ruling federal

10 Introduction to East German political and cultural distinctiveness

government plays a major role in the Western state legislatures. In contrast, the Greens play only a minor role in the East, where environmental issues are unlikely to be at the forefront of citizens' minds, given that the majority spent decades in a society that came nowhere near achieving the material wealth of West Germany, an obvious prerequisite of post-materialist politics. The main political parties of the FRG prior to 1990, the SPD, CDU and FDP, were still prominent in post-1990 West German states, with the total number of incumbent governments prior to the 2002 election running currently at five (SPD), six (CDU with the CSU) and four (FDP). This was contrasted with two (SPD), four (CDU) and one (FDP) in the East. In the East support for the FDP, traditionally a party of the entrepreneurial middle-classes, remains rocky. Support for the CDU/CSU, is far lower in the East than the West, with the PDS filling the power vacuum. Over time the numbers may change, but the general pattern is unmistakable: two different political landscapes representing different political preferences in East and West Germany. In Chapter 7, Dan Hough traces the key political parties' strategies of dealing with the East—West political divide. Interestingly, the explicit strategies developed by political parties mirror those of advertisers discussed by Hogwood. This suggests that political parties (who want to win power) and advertisers (who want to sell merchandise) are very clear that an East—West difference exists. The expression of political attitudes and preferences feeding into the political process could hardly be more different in East and West Germany, underscoring the contention that great differences in core values exist among both populations. The study of political culture captures citizen's values and attitudes towards, and trust in, the 'hardware' of democratic capitalism that is, politics, political institutions and the people who work in them. I would broaden the concept to include the above and citizen's engagement in a nation's political system and civic associations.25 Whereas political and social participation in West Germany remained stable between 1988 and 1998 (with around 50 per cent of the population belonging to at least one association or club), East Germany has seen an overall decrease in participation from 1990 to 1998 and exhibits, in total, lower participation levels than the West (only 26 per cent of East Germans are members of at least one association or club).26 These figures seem to tally with McFalls' notion of East Germans leapfrogging West Germans on the road to a mature democratic society, because falling

Political and cultural identity 11

engagement in democratic states is a well-known phenomenon in America and the UK. However, falling participation rates are not accompanied by a distrust of democracy per se, as Manuela Glaab shows in Chapter 6. Glaab offers some rich empirical data on East German attitudes to a number of political and social issues. By analysing East Germans' views of West Germans and vice versa, she sketches the historical dialectic of this relationship pre-1990 and discusses the influence of situational and socialisation factors on the way in which Germans East and West view each other over a decade after unification. Looking at the 'output' side of political culture, that is, the 'objective' indicators of political preferences, coalition formation, political party membership, trust in political institutions and so on, ought to offer us an insight into longer-term opinions, that is, attitudes towards political factors that constitute part of citizens' political identity. Underlying both survey answers survey answers (opinion), longitudinal studies and 'objective' political indicators (attitudes) of citizens in East Germany is the clear influence of certain values. As has been suggested, people's values change only very slowly,27 and there is evidence that political socialisation in the GDR has had an impact on East German values. Recurring East German values centre around equality in society (many advocate a strong welfare state), the role the state ought to play in society (typically far more proactive one than West Germans would like), solidarity and a self-perception of modesty.28 These core East German values permeate all opinion polls and political indicators and they have remained, in varying degrees, very much the same values that were registered shortly after the Wende. It is these values that underscore the difference in East and West Germans' political and cultural identity discussed in this book. The apparent distinctiveness of East German society permeates also its cultural output. The socio-political factors of identity introduced above feed into and affect a population's cultural identity, arguably a touchstone of on-the-ground, subjective sentiments of social belonging. One of the most exciting post-unity developments in East Germany has been in the field of literature: a new group of writers unburdened by the straitjacket of socialist ideology have begun tackling the socio-political issues mentioned above in their texts. Through a discussion in Chapter 10 of some key texts by leading young East German writers Paul Cooke revisits and summarises the core debates in the preceding chapters: the effects of socialisation and the transformation period on East German

12 Introduction to East German political and cultural distinctiveness

attitudes and the growth in what Cooke terms a Visceral' sense of Easternness, which has replaced the socialist East German cultural identity exercised by many writers before 1989.

Summary The purpose of this introduction has been to flag up the key issues dealt with in the following Chapters. As we shall see, the majority of the contributors agree that East German identity should not be conceived as a problem for the process of German unification. Rather, contemporary German identity is multi-dimensional (i.e. it comprises European, national, regional and local identities — see Chapter 5 by Gordon Ross — with the differences between East and West representing but one aspect of it). Common conceptions of East German identity as a backward-looking yearning for days gone by (Qstalgie) or Trot^identitdt only partially capture what lies behind the distinctiveness of East Germanness. As we shall see, core values appear to have remained different despite the similarities in East and West Germans' desires for a 'Western' lifestyle. Thus, the root of the East German distinctiveness which the following chapters seek to trace and analyse appears to lie in a paradox: East Germans have more socially oriented values on the one hand, while exhibiting social and political behaviour that is more in tune with a mature democratic society on the other.

Notes 1 2

3

See R. Rose and C. Harper, Democracy and its Alternatives, Understanding Post—Communist Societies (Cambridge: 1998). See H. Wiesenthal, 'Post-Unification Dissatisfaction, or Why Are So Many East Germans Unhappy with the New Political System?', German Politics, 7/2 (1998), 1. As the German historian Konrad Jarausch suggests 'Only a complex blending of cultural, historical, and political perspectives has a chance to capture the confusing shifts in the intellectual, psychological and political definitions' of the notion of identity at work in Germany today. K.H. Jarausch, 'Reshaping German Identities: Reflections on the Post-Unification Debate', in After Unity: Reconfiguring German Identities, ed. K.H. Jarausch (Providence: 1997), p. 4.

Notes 13 4

5

6 7

8

9

10 11

12

13 14 15 16

C. Flockton and E. Kolinsky, (1998) 'Recasting East Germany: an Introduction' in Recasting East Germany: Social Transformation after the GDR, German Politics special issue, 7/3 (1998), 6. See M. Dennis, 'Perceptions of GDR Society and its Transformation: East German Identity Ten Years after Unity' in The New Germany in the East. Policy Agendas and Social Developments since Unification, eels. C. Flockton, E. Kolinsky and R. Pritchard (London: 2000) p. 90. See for example W. Diimke, et al. (eds.) Kolonialisientng der DDR. Kritische Analysen und Alternativen des Einigungspro^esses. (Miinster: 1995). Cited in C. Zelle, 'Socialist Heritage or Current Unemployment: Why do the Evaluations of Democracy and Socialism Differ between East and West Germans?', German Politics, 8/1 (1999), 10. Variations of these themes are cited in Wiesenthal, ibid., and D. Pollack, 'Trust in Institutions and the Urge to be Different: On Attitudinal Change in Eastern Germany', German Politics, 8/3 (1999), 81-103. For an overview of the different approaches to the process of unification see S. RoBteutscher, 'Competing Narratives and the Social Construction of Reality: The GDR in Transition', German Politics, 9/1 (2000), 61-82. On approaches emphasising GDR socialisation and a specific GDR 'mentality' see: D. Geulen, 'Typische Sozialisationsverlaufe in der DDR', Aus Politik md Zeitgeschicbte, B/26-27/93; H-J Maaz, Das gesture Volk (Berlin: 1991), C. Lemke, Die Ursachen des Umbruchs 1989. Politiscbe Socialisation in der ehemaligen DDR (Darmstadt: 1991), M. Minkenberg, 'The Wall after the Wall', Comparative Politics, 26 (1993), 553-68. J. Grix, 'East German Political Attitudes. Socialist Legacies vs Situational Factors: A False Antithesis', German Politics, 9/2 (2000), 121-2. See J. Delhey and P. Boehnke, Uber die materielle zur inneren Einheit? Wohlstandslagen und subjektives Wohlbefinden in Ost- und Westdeutschland', Wissensckafts^entrum Berlin fur So^ialforscbung (1999), 30-31; K-P Schmicl, 'Subventionspark Deutschland', in Die Zeit, 7 March, 2002. On the roots of particular methodological approaches see J. Grix, 'Introducing Students to the Generic Terminology of Social Research' Politics, 22/3 (2002). See Tables 4.1,4.2 and p. 75. Eva Kolinsky, 'Party Governance, Political Culture and the Transformation of East Germany since 1990', German Politics, 10/2 (2001), 169-83. For a comprehensive study of Trot^identitdtsee D Hough, The Fall and Rise of the PDS in Eastern Germany (Birmingham: 2002). This is the view of the majority of East Germans. See, for example, the 1993 survey in R. Rose and E.C. Page, 'German Responses to Regime Change: Culture, Class, Economy or Context?', West European Politics, 19/1 (1996), 10-11.

14 Introduction to East German political and cultural distinctiveness 17 See, for example, B. Faulenbach's article, 'Die Enquete-Kommission und die Geschichtsdebatte' in The GDR and its History: R'uckblick und Revision, Die DDR im Speigel der Enquete-Kommissionen, ed, P. Parker (Amsterdam: 2000), p. 30. 18 See Hans-Joachim Veen's article "Inner Unity" — Back to the Community Myth? A Plea for a Basic Consensus', in German Politics, 6/3 (1997), 1-16. 19 L. Probst, Transition from Community to Society?' in L. Me Falls, and L. Probst, New Perspectives on the Old GDR and the Young Lander (Amsterdam: 2001). 20 See M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, (London and New York: 2001 - original, 1930). 21 ibid., p. 25. 22 See E. Kolinsky, Tarty Governance, Political Culture', 171. 23 J. Grix, The Role of the Masses in the Collapse of the GDR, (Basingstoke: 2000), especially Chapter 2. 24 On coalitions in the East see: D. Hough and J. Grix 'The PDS and the SPD's Dilemma of Governance in the Eastern German Lander', Politics, 21/3 (2001), 158-67. 25 See Archie Brown's contribution 'Political Culture' in The Social Science Encyclopedia, eds. A. Kuper and J. Kuper (London and New York: 2001) pp. 635-6. 26 J.W Van Deth, 'Soziale und politische Beteiligung' in Politische Participation in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Empirische Befunde und theoretische Erkldrungen, eds. A. Koch, M. Wasmer and P. Schmidt (Opladen: 2001), pp. 209-11. For the East German figures see H. Anheir, E. Priller and A. Zimmer, 'Civil Society in Transition: The East German Third Sector Ten Years after Unification', Civil Society Working Paper 15, London School of Economics, p. 4. 27 See M. Greiffenhagen and S. Greiffenhagen, 'Politische Kultur', in Handworterbuch des politischen Systems der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, eds. U. Andersen and W. Woyke (Opladen: 2000), p. 493. 28 For a good summary of East German values see D. Hough, The Fall and Rise of the PDS, pp.77-96.

2 East German identity in the GDR Joanna McKay

While every state and every nation would claim a certain uniqueness, the GDR was in many ways rather 'more unusual than most'.l It was a state created due to international circumstances, i.e. the inability of the victors of World War II to agree on the future of Germany, and not through selfdetermination. It was separated from the rest of what had hitherto been a unitary nation state and initially appeared to be a temporary entity. Consequently, a new state consciousness had to be created from scratch, together with a new international persona. While the same could also be said of the neighbouring Federal Republic of Germany, the population of the latter could choose their rulers, could travel freely, and soon enjoyed the fruits of a booming economy. As a result the Federal Republic rapidly acquired a reasonable degree of popular legitimacy, in addition to international recognition, as the legitimate political embodiment of the German nation. A new West German identity became established based on pride in the economy and the democratic constitutional order, combined with strong regional identities and Europeanism. In contrast, the citizens of the much smaller GDR had no say in who ruled them, nor in the nature of the political and economic system they were expected to support and were later denied basic freedoms such as the right to leave the country. All these factors impacted on the sense of allegiance East Germans felt towards their state and on the nature of East German identity. Far from allowing a new sense of identity to develop naturally, the ruling party, the SED, embarked upon the artificial creation of a new state

16 East German identity in the GDR

consciousness for the citizens of the GDR. Identity creation was treated like any other policy area that could be planned and implemented, and the results monitored. However, the revolution of 1989 showed that the regime ultimately failed to instil a sense of allegiance to state socialism, and subsequent demands for unification suggested that most East Germans saw no justification for a second democratic German state alongside the Federal Republic. Even so, it is possible that the national bond between East and West was exaggerated due to the dramatic nature of the events of 1989 (with reference to call of 'wir sind ein Volk'), high levels of emotion, and not least, the material benefits of reviving the notion of a German identity that transcended the Berlin Wall. The difficulties encountered by East and West Germans during the process of economic, political, and psychological unification since 1990 suggest that East Germans were in objective terms quite different from their Western neighbours. Some kind of distinctive East German identity had developed, although it did not appear to correspond to the identity the regime attempted to fashion over the years. This chapter provides an overview of the SED's attempts to forge a new GDR consciousness prior to 1989, the methods used, and the impact they had. This is followed by a consideration of 'real existing identity' in the GDR.

'Socialist national consciousness' in the GDR The ideal 'GDR identity' that the SED wanted the population to adopt was officially termed 'socialist national consciousness'.2 Initially, the emphasis was placed on anti-fascism, which was a founding principle of the state. Anti-fascism as a facet of GDR identity was encouraged by celebrating those who had fought the Nazis, at least those with respectable socialist credentials, such as Ernst Thalmann. Particularly in the early days, GDR citizens were told how their state had vanquished fascism via the victory of the working class, unlike the capitalist/imperialist Federal Republic, where the conditions that had allowed Nazism to flourish apparently continued. Soon the state's emphasis within identity formation shifted to socialism, modelled on Soviet-style communism and theoretically rooted in Marxism-Leninism. The word 'socialist' became almost synonymous with 'good', and was a ubiquitous adjective in the GDR, although it was not

Socialist national consciousness' in the GDR 17

part of the state's name.^ The regime set out to create 'socialist men' and 'socialist women'. Attitudes that the SED disapproved of were denounced as 'bourgeois' and by implication, dangerous and misguided. The creation of a socialist identity was largely achieved through a system of rewards for those who complied and penalties for those who did not, although it would be naive to assume that everyone who complied only did so for this reason. Those who did not conform, for example, some practising Christians, encountered difficulties, such as having visa applications declined or not getting the university place they or their offspring wanted. Not taking any chances, the SED attempted to mould the socialist identity of its citizens from a very early age. Indoctrination began in Kindergarten, which all children attended in order for the state to maintain its policy of full employment for women. School teaching was highly ideological, with compulsory classes in Marxism-Leninism and Russian. At 14, young people went through a rite of passage called the Jugendweihe, a ceremony and family celebration not unlike confirmation, although allegiance was sworn not to God but to socialism and the GDR. The indoctrination process continued in children's free time with the majority joining the Party's youth organisations, the Young Pioneers, the Thalmann Pioneers, and later the Free German Youth (FDJ). As members of these organisations, children and young people (up to the age of 25 in the case of the FDJ) participated in a range of activities, including holidays, exercise and team games (often of a paramilitary nature), and meetings with their counterparts from other communist countries. Young men would also undertake military service in the National People's Army (NVA). While there was a civilian option, namely to be a Bausoldat (construction soldier — an alternative to military service), to opt for this was an act of non-conformity which could have negative consequences. All of these organisations were part of the SED's strategy of encouraging participation in society's structures, thus maintaining the GDR's stability.4 The fact that there was so little organised opposition to the regime, at least until the mid 1980s, suggests that the strategy worked reasonably well. Even so, youth continued to be a problem for the SED, largely because it could not keep out the international youth culture of the postwar period that invaded the GDR via Western radio and television. The socialist identity of adults was also carefully cultivated. Much emphasis was placed on participation and productivity, with praise for

18 East German identity in the GDR

factories and farming co-operatives that achieved high output levels, thereby encouraging pride and putting pressure on other individuals to 'do their bit' for their community and their state. Social life for most working people revolved around the workplace, and holidays were often organised by the official trade union, the FDGB (Confederation of Free German Trade Unions), which was allied to the SED. In their spare time people enjoyed subsidised arts and culture, but only that which met with the party's approval and advanced the cause of socialism. In the case of visual art this was, initially at least, dominated by 'socialist realism' which glorified the efforts of the working class. The creation of thousands of posts as minor Party functionaries at local level was another way ordinary people were incorporated into the system. Others were involved in political parties allied to the SED such as the Christian Democratic Union (CDU). Finally, many thousands served the Party by working unofficially for the state security service or Stasi.5 Following the construction of the Berlin Wall and the sealing of borders with the Federal Republic in 1961, the SED tried to give socialist consciousness more of a patriotic feel, hence the introduction of the term 'socialist national consciousness', a combination of socialist patriotism and proletarian internationalism. The new party programme of 1963 defined 'socialist national consciousness' as 'a love for the GDR and pride in the achievements of socialism'.6 The achievements to be celebrated were not just of an economic nature. Sport was notoriously exploited to enhance the image of the GDR abroad and to encourage allegiance to the state on the part of its citizens. Ostensibly this appeared to be a successful strategy, with the GDR winning an impressive number of medals at the Olympic games over the years. However, following unification the methods that had been used to enhance sporting performance came to light, in particular the use of banned drugs and hormones. Another means of encouraging socialist patriotism was the celebration of anniversaries such as the founding of the state in 1949, commemorations of key dates in the socialist calendar such as 1 May and anniversaries of the birth and death of heroes of communism such as Lenin and Marx. These events involved parades, flag waving, and a vast display of uniforms, all designed to foster participation and a shared sense of GDR citizenship. Even the anniversary of the building of the so-called 'anti-fascist protection wall' in Berlin received such treatment. The SED claimed that socialist patriotism avoided the trappings of

National identity in the GDR 19

nationalism, such as chauvinism and xenophobia because it was complemented by proletarian internationalism. The latter term meant friendship and solidarity with other socialist/communist countries, in particular, the Soviet Union ( cf. the slogan Von cler Soviet Union lernen heiBt siegen lernen' - to learn from the Soviet Union is to learn to be victorious), and with liberation movements around the world that met with the Party's approval. It also implied pride in the socialist achievements of other nations, as well as one's own, unlike the Western bourgeois cosmopolitanism which the SED deplored.7 In practice, proletarian internationalism took many forms, for example, adulation of the achievements of the Soviet Union, parades for visiting foreign leaders, visits and exchanges between young people, and the acceptance of guest workers and students from approved countries, such as Vietnam, Angola, and Mozambique. However, there is evidence to suggest that proletarian internationalism did not take root in the GDR. Soviet troops were resented, Slav nations were considered inferior, and guest workers were kept isolated from the rest of East German society. Furthermore, even the leadership of the SED occasionally lapsed into chauvinism. In the early 1960s Ulbricht boasted about the GDR's economic achievements compared with those of other members of the Eastern Bloc,8 and once scoffed, £We, the GDR, are no Belo Russian Soviet republic'.9 In the 1980s in particular, the leadership under Erich Honecker reverted to proclaiming the benefits of GDR-style socialism in response to events in Poland and to the arrival in Moscow of the reformer Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985.

National identity in the GDR The greatest problem facing the SED in its attempt to create a new GDR identity was the nationality issue, i.e. the fact that the population were ethnically, culturally and linguistically German, like their neighbours in the Federal Republic. In this respect the regime was in a unique situation. While other regimes within the Soviet bloc suffered from a lack of democratic legitimacy, no one doubted the right of states such as Hungary and Poland to exist - they were nation states. Furthermore, their rulers could appeal to the population as a national community and give socialism/communism a national flavour. But originating as part of a larger nation, and created artificially without the support of the popula-

20 East German identity in the GDR

don, the GDR was not a nation state, which raised doubts about its legitimacy from the outset. Essentially, official policy regarding the nationality of GDR citizens was determined by the prevailing view on the 'national question' and on the GDR's relationship with the Federal Republic. Thus nationality policy underwent extraordinary transformations and U-turns, which subsequently generated convoluted arguments to justify these changes.10 When it was founded in 1949 the GDR was described by the ruling party as the one true state of the German people and as the basis or model for a future united socialist Germany. GDR citizens' national identity as Germans was not in doubt, indeed they were the 'good Germans' who had found a solution to fascism by transferring power to the working class, or rather, their party. Thus socialism was portrayed as synonymous with the national (i.e. all-German) interest. By the beginning of the 1960s, it was clear that the SED had overestimated the appeal of the GDR to its own population, not to mention to the working class of West Germany, and in spite of the leadership's words in support of unification, its deeds, such as the building of the Berlin Wall, made the division between the two German states apparently permanent. At the time, the official line was that the German nation was at different stages of development in the two German states — united in the socialist GDR, but still class-divided in the Federal Republic. Thus the notion that the population of the GDR possessed an identity that was both socialist and German was perpetuated. Then, during the late 1960s, a contradictory dual policy evolved which paid lip service to the continued existence of the German nation on the one hand, while demanding full recognition of the GDR as a sovereign state on the other. This demand was accompanied by a policy of Abgren^ung or 'fencing off from the Federal Republic, and increased emphasis on the GDR as 'our socialist fatherland'. However, with the ageing Walter Ulbricht still at the helm, the GDR remained the 'socialist state of the German nation', which concept was enshrined in the new constitution of 1968, and Ulbricht continued to hope that the working class in both German states would one day reunite what 'imperialism' had apparently torn apart.11 Clearly, official adherence to the German nationality of GDR citizens and to the aim of unification (under socialism) was undermining the GDR's claim to be an independent sovereign state. What finally provoked

National identity in the GDR 21

a rethink on the part of the SED leadership was the West German Chancellor Willy Brandt's new approach to relations with the GDR. Brandt articulated the notion that there were 'two states of one nadon' on German soil, which were bound by a Zusammengehorigkeitsgefuhl ('feeling of belonging together').12 Because Brandt would not grant full recognition of the GDR as a foreign country for this reason, the SED needed to discredit his idea of 'two states of one nation' in order to achieve their primary objective, namely international recognition of the GDR. A substantial change of policy on the nationality issue occurred in 1971. The new First Secretary of the SED, Erich Honecker, declared that a purely socialist nation was developing in the GDR and that the national question had been resolved by 'history'.13 Through his assertion that the population of the GDR now constituted a nation in itself, Honecker intended to reinforce the claim that it was a permanent, independent sovereign state. At the end of 1972, when the Basic Treaty was signed between the two German states, oudining the basis of their relations, the GDR leadership would not agree to any reference to the German nadon. This term was only mentioned in a separate letter attached by the Federal Republic, which also referred to the recovery of national unity as a longterm objective, but which was not part of the actual treaty.14 In 1974 a new constitution replaced that of 1968, according to which the GDR was no longer the 'socialist state of the German nation' but merely the 'socialist state of workers and farmers'. The goal of overcoming the division of Germany was deleted from Article 8.15 A general purge of the word 'German' throughout GDR society took place in the early 1970s in an attempt to demonstrate that the GDR was a complete and legitimate entity in its own right and not linked with the Federal Republic in any way. Numerous educational and financial institutions were renamed, and henceforth the national anthem was played but not sung due to the allGerman connotations of the lyrics. Even the Hotel Deutschland in Leipzig was renamed Interbotel Leipzig. However, the 'de-Germanisation' process was not implemented consistently, with various names surviving the purge, such as the newspaper Neues Deutschland', and the names of both the state and the party, which remained the So^ialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands.^ The notion of a purely socialist nation in the GDR was an artificial concept, devised for political purposes, namely to dispel all-German illusions among the population. It caused confusion among the population,

22 East German identity in the GDR

who wondered what they should write when asked for their nationality on forms: DDRsch as opposed to Deutsch? Surveys suggested that people felt their heritage and identity were under threat and some feared that the GDR would eventually become a part of the Soviet Union.17 The Sorb minority were also concerned about the preservation of their culture now that they too were merely members of the socialist nation in the GDR (see Chapter 9 in this volume). Aware of the confusion, complex arguments were devised which aimed to prove that class determined nations, and that ethnicity, language, and traditions were of far less importance.18 From 1975 the SED started to distinguish between nationality and citizenship,19 a distinction thought up by theorists at state-run academies in East Berlin.20 Defined by class, all citizens of the GDR were said to constitute a socialist nation, but they also had an ethnic nationality, which was German (or Sorb). This ethnic nationality was apparently of secondary importance to people's citizenship of a socialist state. Honecker himself adopted this distinction and the new Party Programme of 1976 referred to the 'socialist German nation in the GDR'.21 In 1983, a headline in Neues Deutscbland proudly proclaimed 'First German in Space is a citizen of the GDR!', terminology that would have been unthinkable a decade earlier.22 Following the SED's acceptance of the distinction between nationality and citizenship, the Party gave up its paranoid fear of all things German, which led to a major reassessment of German history and a re-evaluation of the GDR's heritage in the early 1980s. The state was no longer portrayed as a complete break with the past, but as the climax of German history, and the SED was described as 'the heir to everything progressive in the history of the German people'.23 Figures like Bismarck and Frederick the Great were rehabilitated via lengthy new biographies, and lavish celebrations marked the 500th anniversary of the birth of Martin Luther in 1983.24 Previously the only historical figures commemorated in the GDR were the heroes of the German workers' movement such as Thomas Miintzer, Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, and communists who resisted the Nazis such as Ernst Thalmann. Overall, the objective appeared to be to give the GDR historical roots, as opposed to the appearance of having suddenly been created from the top down. However, this provoked criticism from the Federal Republic. Former Chancellor Kohl called the Luther anniversary celebrations 'a subtle attempt by the SED to use Luther to bind the concept of nation with that

Real East German identity 23

of socialism, as though there were a direct line of continuity from Frederick the Great to Erich Honecker'.25 Thus whereas in the 1970s identification with the ethnic and historical German nation was seen by the SED as incompatible with allegiance to the socialist GDR, the regime now sought to make the two compatible. Other factors also encouraged the SED to accept that the GDR was a German state and its citizens of German nationality. First, East-West tension during the 1980s put the two German states in a uniquely dangerous position and prompted their leaders to feel a special sense of duty to help maintain peace between the two superpowers. Second, the GDR was increasingly reliant on loans from the Federal Republic, given by the latter out of a sense of, inter alia^ national duty. These factors led to increased contact between the two countries' leaders, culminating in Honecker's official visit to the Federal Republic in 1987, ironically his own birthplace.2^ An additional reason for the rediscovery of the GDR's German roots was the desire on the part of the SED leadership to distance itself from the Soviet Union under Gorbachev, hence the emphasis on 'socialism in the colours of the GDR' from 1988.27 In the end, however, nationality as an element of East German identity caused problems for the regime and undermined its legitimacy throughout the life span of the state. As a self-proclaimed MarxistLeninist party, the SED should not have been concerned with the nation and nationalism at all. According to classical Marxist teaching, nationalism is a device used by the bourgeoisie to weaken the class consciousness of the working class and to disguise their own selfish interests as the interests of society as a whole.28 But the SED could point to the fact that Marx and Lenin had condoned the manipulation of national sentiment as a means of advancing the revolution, providing it was vanquished once that objective had been achieved.29 Even so, since there is a fundamental incompatibility or rivalry between socialism and nationalism as the basis for social organisation,30 the logic of concepts such as the 'socialist German nation in the GDR' and 'socialist national consciousness' was questionable. On reflection, several factors explain why the SED's attempts to forge a new identity in the GDR did not entirely succeed. The first reason is the sudden and artificial division of Germany into two states in 1949. As a consequence, East Germans' identification with their state was confused and undermined by their identification with the ethnic and historical

24 East German identity in the GDR

German nation. What was more, this ethnic identity was shared with another state, one that appeared to deliver all the things the GDR did not, such as prosperity, freedom and liberal democracy. The national bond was also maintained by family ties and by West German radio and television. These media penetrated practically all areas of the GDR, with the exception of the Tal der Abnungslosen (Valley of the clueless') around Dresden. By showing most East Germans that the grass was greener on the other side of the border, West German TV continually undermined the claims of the SED. However, since it also showed some of the negative aspects of capitalist society, such as drugs and crime, the regime gave up the futile practice of dispatching members of the Free German Youth to turn round west-facing TV aerials.31 The second factor which hindered the SED's attempts to create a new sense of identification with the GDR was the state's lack of democratic legitimacy. East Germans had not consented to state socialism and had no means of choosing their own rulers. A third factor concerns the nature of identity, and national identity in particular. The SED clearly believed that socialist men and women could be created artificially, in short, that identity could be manipulated. However, national identity evolves gradually and combines objective elements, e.g. shared territory, language, history and culture, with subjective elements, i.e. a belief that something binds a people together and excludes others. In the words of Benedict Anderson, they form an 'imagined community'.32 The SED appears to have underestimated the power of subjective and emotive aspects of identity and overestimated its ability to change people's self-perception. The unification process highlights the fact that identity is highly subjective. What mattered at the time was GDR-citizens' self-identification as Germans, something they had in common with their neighbours in the Federal Republic. However, to a certain extent they had clearly developed in a different direction, but this would only come to light after unification.

Real East German identity In spite of the above mentioned factors, after 40 years of separate development, and with an increasing proportion of East Germans having known no other state, it was perhaps inevitable that some kind of identi-

Real East German identity 25

ty unique to the citizens of the GDR would evolve. While it was impossible for Western researchers to acquire detailed data on national consciousness in the former GDR, as early as the late 1960s outside observers recognised a Selbstverstdndnis or self-perception peculiar to East Germans.33 Indeed, the effective isolation of the GDR from the early 1960s appeared to have been a turning-point in the development of a consciousness unique to citizens of the GDR.34 The building of the Wall made it clear that unification was just a dream, in spite of the regime's rhetoric. Hence people had to accept their lot in the socialist German state. However, the evidence suggests that this real East German identity did not correspond with the official 'socialist national consciousness' the SED sought to implant in people's minds. Instead, actual GDR-consciousness appears to have been based on the experience of day-to-day life in the GDR, an egalitarian ethos rather than a commitment to state socialism, and solidarity in the face of hardship. According to some observers, these features were combined with the traditional Prussian/Protestant values of the region, such as deference to authority, self-denial, frugality, and industriousness.35 In fact, in the view of many outsiders, the GDR remained a typical German state in an old-fashioned sense and possessed an everyday culture that was very different from the materialistic, Americanised culture that flourished in the Federal Republic. Indeed, the SED's 'Institute for Public Opinion Research' found that GDR citizens continued to identify themselves as German.36 Surveys from the late 1960s showed that the majority still regarded Germany as their fatherland as opposed to the GDR, and that they were unwilling to regard West Germans as their enemies, despite being bombarded with propaganda to this effect.37 According to one particular survey, most respondents said they would celebrate every medal won by a German athlete at the 1972 Olympic games, in spite of the fact that the GDR and the Federal Republic had entered separate teams since 1968.38 However, lack of first-hand experience of West Germans after 1961 prevented East Germans from realising that what it meant to be German was different in the Federal Republic and the GDR. The difficult process of reconciliation between the populations of the two German states since unification appears to confirm this. A final important aspect of 'real existing GDR identity' was the Nischengesellschaft ('niche society').39 In view of the repressive nature of

26 East German identity in the GDR

the regime, the intrusion of the SED in people's daily lives, and the need to conform in public for fear of the consequences, people sought privacy, authenticity and freedom in 'niches', i.e. areas of personal space not invaded by the prying eyes of the Party. People turned to literature, colourful allotments, and the relative freedom of the church where they could be themselves without having to toe the party line. The 'niche society' is a clear indication of the dual nature of GDR identity, i.e. the official, and the unofficial, the public and the private. While people threw off the obligatory official GDR consciousness, with all its negative connotations, in 1989, much of the personal, unofficial identity unique to citizens of the former GDR seems to have endured, leading to misunderstandings between East and West Germans since unification. Indeed, as other contributions to this volume show, some have argued that a stronger shared sense of 'East Germanness' has emerged in united Germany than ever existed in GDR times.40

Conclusion The term 'socialist national consciousness', which was the cornerstone of the SED's concept of GDR identity, was a fairly unsubtle attempt to combine elements of class consciousness and national consciousness, in spite of the theoretical incompatibility between the two. Initially the SED had proclaimed the GDR to be a 'New Germany', as the name of the staterun newspaper suggested. But this new, socialist Germany was not what most East Germans wanted, hence their allegiance to it was weak. By the 1970s the SED leadership portrayed the GDR as a complete break with the German past, and encouraged people to identify only with its socialist characteristics. Then in the 1980s the GDR was portrayed as the high point in German history and people were once again encouraged to identify themselves both as Germans and adherents of state-socialism. When it came to the test in 1989/90 the 'national' or ethnic element of GDR identity appeared to triumph over the socialist element. The SED had clearly failed to instil a sense of GDR consciousness that would be robust enough to resist the lure of unification with all its democratic and material benefits. However, evidence from before and after unification suggests that a specific, unofficial GDR identity did evolve due to the highly unusual circumstances of daily life in the GDR. Over time, this

Notes 27

identity could perhaps have become consolidated, were it not for a political and economic system that failed to meet people's material and political aspirations. But, as one member of the Central Committee conceded, the GDR was 'only conceivable as an anti-fascist and socialist alternative to the FRG. What justification would a capitalist GDR have next to a capitalist Federal Republic?'41 Overall, the East German case highlights how complex and multi-layered national and state identities are. On the one hand, 40 years of separate development did not entirely destroy the subjective belief in an 'imagined community' composed of Germans in the GDR and the Federal Republic. On the other hand, East Germans' rejection of the state identity imposed by the SED temporarily obscured the strength of 'real existing East German identity' which had been nurtured by adversity and would continue to flourish in the face of new challenges and the new social order of the united Germany.

Notes 1

Otto Reinhold, ZPA IV 2/1/699. See also A. James McAdams, Germany Divided. From the Wall to Unification (Princeton: 1993), p 1 M. R. Thompson, 'No Exit: "Nation-stateness" and Democratisation in the GDR', Political Studies, 44 (1996), 285. 2 For a lengthy definition see Kleines Politiscbes Worterbuch, 1st ed. (East Berlin: 1967), pp. 429-30. 3 The issue came up in 1968 when a new constitution came into force, but a change in the state's name was rejected. See SAMPO-BArch NL182/1107 (Archive of Parties and Mass Organisations in the GDR). 4 See J. Grix, The Role of the Masses in the Collapse of the GDR (Basingstoke: 2000), p. 23. 5 According to Mary Fulbrook, estimates of the number of informers by the late 1980s range from 109,000 to 180,000. See M. Fulbrook, Anatomy of a Dictatorship. Inside the GDR 1949-1989 (Oxford: 1997), p. 50. 6 Programm der SED, Dokumente der SED, vol.9, (East Berlin: 1965), p. 247. 7 Rudi Wetzel, 'Was ist Patriotisms?' Einheit, 8 (1953), 313. 8 See A.J. McAdams, East Germany and Detente. Building Authority after the Wall (Cambridge: 1985), pp. 56-58. 9 This statement was later used against Ulbricht by his enemies within the SED in 1971. See the letter from the Politburo of the SED to Brezhnev, 21 Jan. 1971,inIPANL2.32. 10 For a detailed account see J. McKay, The Official Concept of the Nation in the

28 East German identity in the GDR Former GDR. Theory, Pragmatism, and the Searchfor Legitimacy (Aldershot: 1998). 11 W Ulbricht, Die gesel/schaftliche Entivicklung der DDR bis %ur Vollendung des Socialism's (East Berlin, 1967), pp. 51-2. 12 See W Brandt, Was ^isammengehort. Reden %w Deutscbland (Bonn: 1993). 13 See Protokoll der Verhandlungen des Vlll Parteitages der SED, vol 1 (East Berlin: 1971), p. 49. 14 See W Brandt, People and Politics (New York, 1978), p. 395. 15 Quoted in G. Zieger, Die Halting von SED itnd DDR %wr Einheit Deutscblands (Cologne: 1987), pp. 188-89. 16 I have expanded on the 'de-Germanisation' of the GDR in The Official Concept, pp. 89-91. 17 On popular responses to the 'socialist nation in the GDR' see ibid, pp. 91-98. 18 See ibid, pp. 85-9. 19 For Honecker's explanation before the Central Committee see SAMPO BArch IV 2/1/495. 20 See McKay, The Official Concept, pp. 108-11. 21 Programm der SED, (East Berlin: 1976), pp. 56-57. 22 Neues Deittscbland, 26 August 1983, p. 1. 2y Programm der SED, pp. 52-5. 24 The SED's re-evaluation of many key figures from German history prompted considerable interest in the West. See for example, A. Dorpalen, German History in a Marxist Perspective (Detroit: 1985); I.R. Mitchell, 'The Changing Image of Prussia in the GDR', German Life and Letters, 37 (1983), 57-70; GJ. Glaessner, 'Sozialistische Neohistorismus?' in Die DDR in der Ara Honecker ed. G-J Glaessner (Opladen: 1988); G. Iggers, Marxist Historiography in Transformation. New Orientations in Recent East German History (New York and Oxford: 1991); S. Meuschel, Legitimation und Parteiherrschaft in der DDR (Frankfurt: 1992), pp. 285-91. 25 Cited in R.F. Goekel, 'The Luther Anniversary in East Germany', World Politics, 37(1984), p. 125. 26 For more detail see McKay, The Official Concept, pp. 128—30. 27 See ibid, p. 127. 28 W Connor, The Nation in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy (Princeton: 1984),, p. 7. See also K. Motschmann, Socialism's und Nation. Wie Deutsch ist die DDR? (Munich: 1979). 29 Connor, pp. xiii, 7. 30 ibid, p. 4. 31 A bibliography on the role of West German television in the GDR can be found in R. Bleiker, Nonviolent Struggle and the Revolution in East Germany (Cambridge MA: 1993), pp. 50-51. *"

Notes 29

32 B. Anderson, Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism (London and New York: 1983). 33 The most comprehensive attempt to assess national consciousness in the GDR was G. L. Schweigler's National Consciousness in Divided Germany (London: 1975). Schweigler, a pupil of Karl Deutsch, accepted the limitations of his data but nevertheless believed that the question was no longer whether or not one German nation still existed, but whether or not it could be resurrected. Only with difficulty, he believed, since the answer to the German question appeared to be 'two Germanics, not one'. Schweigler, pp. 277-81. For a retrospective evaluation of GDR-identity see A. McElvoy, The Saddled Cow. East Germany's Life and Legacy (London: 1992); D. Verheyen, The German Question. A Cultural, Historical and Geo-Political Exploration (Boulder: 1993), pp. 79-97; C.B. Scharf, 'Necessity and Vision in East German Identity', in Coping ii'ith the Past. Germany and Austria after 1945 eds. K. Harms, L.R. Reuter and V. Diirr (Wisconsin: 1990), pp. 94-103. 34 See Schweigler, National Consciousness, pp. 119-120; Hans Apel, DDR 1962 1964 1966 (West Berlin: 1967); J. E. Smith, The Red Prussianism of the GDR', Political Science Quarterly, 82 (1967), 380. 35 See D. Verheyen, The German Question. A Cultural) Historical and Geopolitical Exploration, 2nd edn (Boulder, 1991), pp. 83—8. Some Western commentators referred to the GDR as 'Red Prussia' from the mid 1960s. See W. Hangen, 'New Perspectives behind the Wall', Foreign Affairs, 45 (1966), 138, and The Muted Revolution, (London: 1967), p. 184. 36 The Institute was abolished in 1978. 37 Survey data from the late 1960s can be found in SAMPO-BArch IV A2/9.03/32. 38 See SAMPO-BArch IV 2/2106/20 & SAMPO-BArch IV B2/9.04/29. 39 See G. Gaus, Wo Deutschland Kegt (Hamburg: 1983). 40 A view expressed by former chair of the PDS, L. Bisky, Frankfurter Allgemeim Zeitung, 24 October 1995. 41 Otto Reinhold, ZPA IV 2/1/699. See also A. James McAdams, Germany Divided. From the Wall to Unification (Princeton: 1993), p. 194.

This page intentionally left blank

3 East German identity: more Western than the West? Laurence McFalls

Shortly after the construction of the Berlin Wall, the East German party leader Walter Ulbricht boasted, with Khrushchevian hubris, that the consolidation of the communist regime would soon permit it to overtake the accomplishments of West German capitalism without necessarily repeating them. 'Uberholen ohne Einzuholen' (overtaking without catching up), however, became a slogan the realisation of which depended not on the construction of the Wall but on its fall. To be sure, more than ten years after unification Eastern Germans still do not enjoy their Western compatriots' levels of wealth and income, but they do partake of the same lavish consumer lifestyle centred on globetrotting and the cult of the car; and they benefit from more modern commercial and communications infrastructures than are to be found in the West. Another posthumous success for the German Democratic Republic (GDR) has come in the field of identity construction. In the late autumn of 1989, the rising, irresistible chorus of 'Wir sind ein Volk' (we are one people) seemed to prove that the communist regime had failed miserably in its ambition of forging a distinct East German identity, yet within a few months of unification, anecdotal and survey evidence alike suggested that Easterners were rallying around a common identity in opposition to Western arrogance and to the devaluation of their socialist past.1 The imagined national community between East and West that had supposedly survived, if not transcended, the physical division of the Wall quickly gave way to the construction of a 'Wall in the head' as Easterners and Westerners found themselves in real and regular contact within a single concrete political

32 East German Identity: More Western than the West?

community. This period of cultural conflict between East and West, however, constituted only a logical moment in a process that would witness East Germans' leapfrogging into a post-unification identity that anticipates a new all-German identity. Indeed, the construction of an identity logically entails the opposition of a 'Self,' in this case the East German, to an 'Other,' the Westerner, but this relationship of opposition is not necessarily one of negation (nor of 'negation of the negation' for that matter). As I shall elaborate in this chapter, through their dialogical relation of opposition to the West, East Germans have become 'more Western than the West.' That is, in terms of values and identity, East Germans today embrace subjective orientations more in tune with the exigencies of life in a post-industrial consumer capitalist society than do their Western compatriots. In proposing this argument, I wish to go well beyond East Germans' familiar claim that their ^to/experiences with the failures of real-existing socialism left them better equipped to confront the Utopian follies of neoliberal capitalism. To the contrary, I contend that East Germans have acquired a new repertoire of subjective skills and for the most part have done so unconsciously. They have learned to live in a social order characterised by high geographic and social mobility; employment 'flexibility' and insecurity; growing subordination to and awareness of global economic forces; heightened individualisation and social fragmentation; social communication almost exclusively through commercialised electronic mass media; and increasing possibilities of consumption as the primary mode of social legitimation. Although such a social order with its concomitant values may be familiar to members of Western advanced or post-industrial societies, for East Germans it represents a radical break from their life experience with a stagnant, if not static, communitarian, penurious socio-economic order. Thanks to the shock therapy of unification, however, East Germans not only have had to adjust quickly but they have done so to a late-modern capitalist consumer society in its almost pure form of ruthless international economic competition, of shrinking social-welfare protection, and of ubiquitous shopping centres, cellular phones, and car dealerships. To be sure, these traits also characterise West German society, but the effects have been buffered not only by their gradual introduction but by West Germans' greater income, wealth, job security, union strength, and remaining welfare state protection. Thus, East Germans' crash course in (post)modernity may place

Introduction 33

them ahead of Westerners on their common path to a neoliberal globalised society. I base this claim on the results of an eight-year panel study of ordinary East Germans and their experiences of unification. In 1990-91, I interviewed 202 randomly selected 'former GDR-citizens' of both sexes, of all ages, and of varying socio-economic standing in four regions (southern Thuringia, the Halle-Leipzig-Jena triangle, East Berlin, and Western Pomerania). In lengthy personal interviews including over 200 open- and closed-ended questions, my respondents recounted their life in GDR times, their experiences and political positions during the upheaval of the 1989-90 Wende, and their first impressions of unification.2 In 1994,1 reinterviewed a sub sample of 40 of the original survey respondents in order to track their experiences with the rapid social changes of unification, and in 1998 I was able to locate 80 of my original survey respondents to question them again about their adjustment to the new social order in the East. While in 1990-91 the survey respondents still stood in wary anticipation of dramatic life changes, in 1994 they were already juggling to reconcile their intellectual adjustment to the exigencies of the new order with their emotional attachment to some of their old GDR values.^ By 1998, the overwhelming similarities in their recounted experiences and attitudes made it clear—to me at least—that my respondents had 'arrived' and were firmly anchored in the new way of life.4 To be sure, they retained some identification with their GDR past and its values, and they had certainly not become indistinguishable from West Germans. But their cultural frame of reference had completely shifted to one that corresponds to their new post-industrial, post-modern social reality. The picture of ordinary East Germans that emerged from my interviews in 1998 does not correspond to popular stereotypes, yet it is strikingly familiar. The 'Ossis* are not nostalgic complainers resistant to change and scarred by their socialist socialisation, as the Western media and scholars depict them. Instead, they are the typically harried, worried, socially isolated, politically disenchanted, yet eager consumers of a fin-demillenaire post-industrial society. I contend, in fact, that the East Germans have made the subjective transition from socialism to capitalism, i.e. that they have completed the cultural unification process, though they have not yet realised it themselves. With this claim, of course, I contradict my respondents, all of whom explicitly denied that the unification process has come to an end. Whether young or old, well-off or poor, they all

34 East German Identity: More Western than the West?

expected that they would probably not experience the completion of unification within their own lifetime, for to them the achievement of German unity required the no doubt impossible (and probably undesirable) equalisation of living conditions and mentalities between the old and new Lander^ In other words, they did not realise that it had been possible for them to overtake the West without having ever caught up. Thus, East Germans continue to perceive and, in fact, experience differences in their life experiences, opportunities, and interests from those of West Germans, but these differences do not mean they that they do not belong to the same society and culture; they differ in degree and not in kind. A culture consists of the repertoire of competing values, norms, and symbolic meanings that allow social communication and, usually, the reproduction of the social structure. In addition, as I shall explain below, fundamental contradictions that both reflect and mitigate social structural tensions characterise every culture, for a culture must be able to accommodate differences among its members both in historical memory and in present experience of their conflicting positions within the social structure. During my interviews it became clear to me that respondents — who in 1990—91 were practically paralysed with fear of the unknown society into which they had suddenly been catapulted, and who in 1994 were still grappling to reconcile their loyalty to old GDR values with the exigencies of adaptation to a new society — were by early 1998 fully at home in a latemodern capitalist consumer society with all its inherent contradictions. Several anecdotes and overall survey findings illustrate and can lend credence to this claim. In Halle-Neustadt, I interviewed a couple in their late fifties. He had been a worker in the Buna chemical plant, and she a primary school teacher. Since the Wende they had gathered the typical experiences of repeated unemployment, job retraining, temporary makework employment, and finally, for him, early retirement through a disability. Toward the end of the interview in response to a retrospective question about their experiences with unification, the woman explained how she had always had a pretty good idea of what life in West Germany had been like thanks to media exposure and visits to and from the West. The one thing she had never really understood, though, was how West Germans could find unemployment traumatic because she had observed that the jobless there drove to the unemployment office in their own private cars. A few minutes later in the interview, her traumatised husband remarked, 'Today we can't even find a parking spot at the Arbeitsamt in

In search of an explanation 35

Halle.' Thus, this couple perfectly summed up the situation of contemporary East Germans: they have arrived in the new social order and have landed in the middle of its main contradiction, namely job insecurity in the midst of material excess. Another example further illustrates East Germans' experience of their new society's contradictions and their embrace of its principal legitimating value: consumption. A woman from a town near Jena spent much of our interview recounting her bitter disappointments with unification. She had not realised any of her political ideals as an SPD member and local politician; her husband had to commute 150 kilometres every day to a job much worse than the one he had had nearby in the GDR era; and her son had been clinically depressed because of heightened competition at school and university. When I asked for her overall personal evaluation of life since unification, she, like most other respondents, came up with a positive balance, for ultimately she was happy that she now always could get fresh cut flowers for her birthday in January. She realised that she did not need the infamous 'blossoming landscapes' that Chancellor Kohl had promised in order to put flowers on her own table. In other words, despite the new order's structural failings, its provision of material improvement satisfied her, as it does most other East Germans and most other members of affluent capitalist societies. More than these anecdotes, however, the remarkably similar answers of respondents to several survey questions reveal how completely but unconsciously they have slipped into their new social order. During interviews in 1990/91 and 1994 most of my respondents were traumatised by the prospect or experience of job losses, rent increases, property restitution, and the like. To my astonishment, by early 1998 very few interviewees could give any concrete personal examples of difficulties in adjusting their lives to the new conditions since unification. Similarly, although almost all of my respondents said that the Wende had been an important turning-point in their personal biographies, they claimed to have made a seamless transition from the GDR to unified Germany without any significant change in their lifestyle or Lebensgejuhl (the subjective awareness of their lifestyle). Consequently they had a hard time designating themselves clearly as so-called winners or losers of unification, for clear gains or losses would have constituted an obvious rupture in their biographies. The combination of the final two questions of my interviews, however, triggered my respondents' realisation of how dramatic their life

36 East German Identity: More Western than the West?

changes had been. First, I asked them if they could name or define the historical process that they had been through since the Wende. Then, after they had fumbled for a more or less clear response, I asked them if they missed the GDR. No one did, but almost invariably they named some feature of life in the GDR that they did miss; and suddenly I heard very clear and fascinating answers to my previous question. Many respondents regretted the disappearance of the slow pace of life in the GDR and thus recognised that they now have an entirely different conception of time and of their life plans. Others missed the spontaneous solidarity of an egalitarian Notgemeinschaft (community of hardship) and understood suddenly that the nature of social relations had changed fundamentally. Two separate interviewees gave my favourite response: they missed the widespread nudist beaches of the GDR. By the 1980s, they reported, every beach had become clothing-optional and East Germans had few hangups about stripping or seeing others naked. Since unification the beaches have become segregated again and fewer people choose to go naked. The new order thus seems to have brought on a new relationship to one's own body, no doubt one of commodification and heightened concern with body image. In short, with their new relationship to time, to others, and to their own bodies, respondents had joined a new culture, but the fact that they had not noticed this until my final questions suggests that this new culture has already become unremarkable quotidian normality. The new social order and culture to which East Germans now belong is of course similar if not identical in its broad traits to those of West Germany and even North America. East Germans experience this order and this culture's contradictions with particular acuity, however. Reflecting on their lack of time despite new time-saving amenities, on the simultaneous increases in unemployment and work hours, and on the unsustainability of continuous economic growth in the face of environmental stress and global competition, several respondents with critical social consciences claimed that they had experienced such a sense of contradiction once already, namely shortly before the collapse of the GDR. Most respondents, however, simply expressed the diffuse malaise that characterises post modernity after the loss of modernity's confidence in progress. No matter what normative position one takes on the post-modern condition or whether one even accepts the concept of post modernity, however, it is clear that East Germans, relative to Westerners, stand at the forefront of developmental trends towards social and geographic

In search of an explanation 37

mobility, social disintegration if not anomie, economic flexibility and insecurity, political demobilisation and dealignment, and cultural fragmentation.

In search of an explanation In short, my repeated interviews between 1990 and 1998 descriptively captured a remarkable shift in East Germans' culture. Such a dramatic change begs for explanation, of course. Depending on one's theoretical assumptions about human nature, however, the reasons for a rapid change in subjective orientations are either self-evident or inconceivable. If we posit, as rational choice theorists do, that the pursuit of self-interest through instrumental rationality governs most human social behaviour, then East Germans' rapid cultural adjustment to the exigencies of a post-industrial consumer capitalist society poses no problem, especially since the unambiguous, almost instantaneous transfer of West German institutions to the East left little doubt about where rational actors' interests lay. In contrast, if we assume, as most cultural sociological theorists do, that social agents act in accordance with deep-rooted subjective dispositions acquired over a lifetime through incremental processes of socialisation and learning, then the shift in orientations that my interviews discovered would have to be either merely superficial or inexplicable. To be sure, each theoretical position contains an element of truth, and as my interviews in 1994 in particular showed, people can simultaneously understand rationally the need to adjust to new norms, emotionally cling to old values, and even live comfortably in such a contradictory state. Still, we cannot adopt the theoretical juste milieu and simply assert that sometimes actors instrumentally adjust to new social conditions and other times remain entrenched in their subjective dispositions unless, of course, another theory can explain when, how, and why actors draw on their capacities to change or to resist or to do both at once. Before looking for a theory that can explain cultural stability, change, and contradiction, however, we must consider the arguments for and against a rational-choice theoretical explanation of East Germans' rapid cultural transformation. Indeed, if East Germans have in fact leapfrogged into a new culture within only eight years and if this culture corresponds to the structural exigencies of a post-industrial, perhaps

38 East German Identity: More Western than the West?

post-modern society, then rational choice theory would find a rare empirical confirmation at the level of an entire collectivity. The cultural transformation process was, of course, neither easy nor instantaneous, but overall it represents a triumph of instrumental reason. The evidence from my survey, however, suggests that the same East Germans who appear to have so rationally adjusted their system of norms, values, and meanings to their new social order did not behave so rationally when they decided for or against participating in the mass demonstrations that precipitated the collapse of the communist regime in late 1989. The quantitative and qualitative analysis of my initial 202 interviews revealed that classic instrumental motives for protest did not come into play for those who joined the demonstrations: neither relative nor absolute material deprivation, i.e. the absence of anything to lose but their chains, correlated positively with protest; on the contrary, protesters reported increasing material satisfaction in the years just preceding 1989. Similarly, the expectation of declining costs of participating in protest, i.e. diminishing fear of repression, did not motivate protest; most went despite the looming threat of a 'Chinese solution' a la Tienanmen. What did push East Germans on to the streets was an often inarticulable sense of moral outrage, which many of those who remained loyal to the regime shared, thus prompting their inaction in defence of the regime. Ultimately the explanation for East Germans' social actions in the autumn of 1989 that emerged from my interviews suggested a theoretical approach that can coherently explain the GDR's relative stability before 1989, its sudden collapse, and the rapid adjustment of its citizens to a radically different social system. More generally, this theoretical approach can reconcile three disparate, if not logically mutually exclusive, empirical observations: 1. Social structures and cultures are generally mutually reproducing, or congruent; i.e. most of the time, people's subjective orientations correspond to their objective conditions. 2. Despite their congruence with an existing social structure, cultural values, norms, and meanings at both the individual and collective levels are not always consistent; they can contradict and compete with one another. 3. Although cultures, like their concomitant structures, generally evolve only gradually over long periods, they can occasionally change radically and in a shorter time-span than structural transformation occurs.

In search of an explanation 39

The key to explaining cultural-structural congruence and stability (observation 1) as well as rapid and relatively autonomous cultural change (3) lies, in fact, in cultural contradiction (2). The theoretical importance of cultural tensions became clear to me initially as I tried to make sense of my survey results from 1990—91. The responses to the retrospective questions I asked then about GDR daily life revealed a society based on a fragile equilibrium between the positive values of modesty, solidarity, and social equality on the one hand and the negative values of consumer frustration, social dependency, and political inequality on the other. That is, contentment with mediocre but predictable creature comforts compensated for the frustration of consumer aspirations in an inefficient economy; mutual aid and conviviality in closed circles made up for public distrust and for dependence on countless connections needed to assure one's modest well-being; and the relative uniformity of living standards across regions and social classes helped to conceal not only the monotony of life but the abuses of political privilege. Indeed, social equality was perhaps the single most important value of GDR society because it was both the sine qua non for leading a modest and communitarian life and the one more or less realised value that partially legitimated Socialist Unity Party (SED) rule. In light of these interview findings, I concluded that the relative stability of GDR society up until the late 1980s had depended on the fragile equilibrium, or rather on the slightly positive balance, between these and other fulfilled and frustrated values. In the 1980s, however, relatively minor structural developments — including economic stagnation, eased travel restrictions, new privileges, and dissidence at the very top of the communist hierarchy, namely in the person of Gorbachev - undermined equality, solidarity, and modesty to produce the cataclysmic cultural confusion and dissatisfaction that motivated both popular protest and the absence of party resistance/1 Although it would not have been possible to predict the particular developments that ultimately undermined the subjective stability of the GDR, the evolutionary and, finally, revolutionary potential of the GDR society was inherent to its culture's conflicting values and not, as I have already mentioned, due to structural weaknesses that might have produced material dissatisfaction or a political opportunity structure favourable to protest. At the same time, the tensions inherent to GDR culture did of course indirectly reflect and, until the late 1980s, mitigate the structural strains of dictatorial party-rule and a centrally planned economy.

40 East German Identity: More Western than the West?

This account of the collapse of the GDR inspired by my interviews may be empirically plausible, but the question remains whether we can theoretically generalise from it in order to understand the cultural revolution that has occurred since 1990. In fact, my use of cultural contradictions to explain the collapse of the GDR, as I discovered later, corresponds to Antonio Gramsci's use of the term 'contradictory consciousness' in his theory of cultural hegemony.7 In Gramsci's revision of Marxist structuralism, social stability depends not only on one class's ability structurally to dominate, or to coerce, other classes but on its capacity culturally to direct other classes, or to obtain a form of consent from them. For this cultural hegemony to be effective, i.e. system stabilising, it cannot merely indoctrinate subordinate classes, leading them into 'false consciousness.' On the contrary, it must allow them to articulate their own interests, albeit in a form that only marginally but not fundamentally contradicts the existing socio-political structure. The resulting expression of competing interests both legitimates the existing order and leaves it open to evolutionary reforms. The existence of an organising principle, or 'hegemonic principle', around which values and meanings articulate themselves generates cultural coherence while allowing for 'contradictory consciousness'. The latter renders the social structure flexible and hence resilient, but it can also serve as the germ for a counter-hegemony and ultimately for revolution. In the case of the GDR, the hegemonic principle was quite clearly the 'leading role of the party'. Not only did the socio-political structure largely derive from the incontestable rule of the party elite but so did the particular contradictions of East German everyday life, as I briefly described them above: the practiced values of modesty, solidarity, and equality were, with the exception of the latter, not directly or explicitly imposed by the party; they were adaptive responses that made party-rule livable even as they implicitly articulated dissatisfaction with penury, distrust, monotony, and privilege. In contemporary capitalism, now extended to the former GDR, the hegemonic principle is almost as evident as under state socialism: consumerism, or the increasing individual satisfaction of material desires, integrates individuals into an unequal, environmentally unsustainable mode of production and social order, although it also allows criticisms of unequal opportunities. As I argued above, East Germans today fully participate in this post-industrial capitalist consumer culture with all of its inherent contradictions, be they stabilising or potentially revolutionary. How did they get there, though?

In search of an explanation 41

Again, Gramsci's theory of hegemony suggests an explanation for how cultural change occurs. Hegemony describes a discursive, dialogic relation in which a dominant interlocutor does not impose a meaning but proposes one. By responding in terms of the proposal, the dominated interlocutor articulates her own positions but within the constraints set by the original proposal. Although unequal, competitive, and in reality usually without closure, the ensuing dialogue nonetheless produces shared meanings and values, thus rendering social intercourse possible while legitimating the structure of domination. Because this relative cultural consensus emerges from a competitive dialogic process, its precise form does not derive directly from the social structure. Indeed, historical experience shows that a given social order, be it liberal capitalism or state socialism, is compatible with a variety of cultural forms having different (Revolutionary potentials. In Western Europe, for example, significant cultural differences have persisted or increased despite structural convergence between economic and social structures.^ Thus, to understand cultural change and the forms it produces, we must reconstruct the dialogic process between dominant and subordinate groups. For the case of East Germany, the currency union of 1 July 1990 marked the moment after which cultural adjustment to a radically new social order became inevitable. The introduction of West German social structures, however, did not determine the precise form such cultural adjustment would take. Instead, the relatively autonomous cultural battles that almost immediately erupted between East and West Germans shaped Easterners' mode of subordination to the new social order. Even before formal unification in 1990, a cultural war, the so-called Literatuntnit (literature debate), broke out in public when Western literati turned against Christa Wolf, whom they had formerly celebrated as a dissident but now accused of being the GDR's Staatsdicbterin (poet laureate).^ In private, animosities seethed as Easterners discovered that the cherished Westpakete that they had received from their ostensibly generous relatives in the old Federal Republic had contained nothing more than bargain basement trinkets and as Westerners resented their compatriots' ingratitude for both old and new material transfers to the East. Ironically, the cultural conflicts and misunderstandings that seemed to spoil all the pleasure of unification provided, as my survey interview findings revealed, the dialectical mechanism for Easterners' rapid cultural integration into German consumer capitalism.

42 East German Identity: More Western than the West?

In each of the three interview rounds, I asked about Easterners' relations with and perceptions of West Germans. Invariably, my questions elicited the banal stereotyping that broader public opinion surveys also reported: Westerners came across as arrogant know-it-alls (Besserwessis) with better appearance than substance, whereas Easterners portrayed themselves as adaptive improvisers lacking self-representation skills. Follow-up questions in my interviews, however, allowed me to see beyond this stereotyping. Despite their banality, the antagonisms between 'Ossis* and 'Wessis* that my respondents expressed seem initially to have contributed to the posthumous construction of GDR identity. Such identity construction always requires confrontation with and differentiation from an Other. Occasionally, as my survey respondents recounted, these confrontations took a concrete, personalised form such as a run-in with a new boss or bureaucrat imported from the West. In general, though, my respondents admitted that their complaints about Westerners did not apply to any particular Westerners they had encountered. Instead, the abstract construct of the despised ' Wessf articulated in an anthropomorphised form the frustrations of the 'Ossis* with a new social system in which Westerners appeared to be a privileged group, if not dominant class. In other words, the ' Wessf served as a concrete symbol for a systemic mode of domination in which Easterners could accept their evident subordination only with resistance. As Gramsci's theory of hegemony suggests, however, East Germans' initial construction of a separate identity in opposition to Western domination represents a necessary step towards their subjective integration into that structure. By defining themselves in opposition to the West, Easterners in fact facilitate their subordination to the West. This paradoxical argument becomes clear if we look closer at typical expressions of animosity voiced by Easterners such as my interview respondents in their comments on Westerners: cWe had to pay all the costs for the war by ourselves.' 'We had to work hard the whole time, too — but under worse conditions.' 'Why should we be paid less now for the same work?' Or, as one respondent summarised the whole identity question with telling ambivalence: 'Sure the West Germans are different, but we are Germans just like them.' All of these statements are calls for recognition and for equal rights and respect. Through this struggle for recognition by the dominant West, East Germans in fact assume their subordinate position and accept the values and norms of the dominant society: they feel compelled to work

Notes 43

longer, harder, and above all more flexibly than Westerners and in exchange demand the same, albeit excessive, level of consumption as in the West. In short, the competitive dialogue between East and West has assured the expansion of the hegemonic culture from West to East and in a form that perhaps renders the East a purer expression of that culture. No matter how we normatively evaluate contemporary German culture in its Eastern and Western variants and its developmental potentials, the fact remains that the cultural unification process has already run its course. East Germans have acquired a new identity, that is, they see themselves in a different, Western light. Ironically, this great subjective transformation has gone largely unnoticed. For Easterners the conflictual nature of the process has concealed cultural convergence. For Westerners this rapprochement also remained largely invisible because as dominant interlocutors they did not call their own values into question. If they noticed anything about the cultural unification process, it was Easterners' complaints and cries for recognition, which merely reconfirmed Westerners' impressions of the Jammerossis as the unreformable victims of their socialist socialisation. Alternatively, we might speculate that Easterners and Westerners have recognised their similarities and, not liking what they see, have repressed their common identity into their individual and national subconscious for still 'Others' to find.

Notes 1

2 3 4

One American observer went so far as to suggest that the post-unification process of mutual self-definitional exclusion between Eastern and Western Germans marked the beginning of the construction of an East German ethnic minority. See M. Howard, 'The East Germans as an Ethnic Group', German Politics and Society, 13/2 (1995). See L. McFalls, Communism's Collapse, Democracy's Demise? The Cultural Context and Consequences of the East German Revolution (New York: 1995). Cf. L. McFalls, 'Political Culture, Partisan Strategies, and the PDS: Prospects for an Eastern German Party', German Politics and Society, 13/1 (1995). Although it is statistically improbable that the findings of a survey of 80 Eastern Germans be representative of the nuances and variations within the entire population, the findings I report here reflect the areas of overwhelming consensus among my respondents. It is also statistically unlikely that such a degree of agreement among 80 respondents not be representative.

44 East German Identity: More Western than the West?

5

6 1

8

9

For a more complete summary of my survey findings and further methodological remarks, see L. McFalls, 'Eastern Germany Transformed', German Politics and Society, 17/2 (1999). Only one respondent gave an amusingly original response to my question, 'When will you know (or how have you perhaps already noticed) that German unification is complete?' An electrical engineer from Eastern Berlin responded, 'You have been pursuing me for seven years with these questions. When you no longer come around, then I'll know that unification has been achieved'. At the end of the interview, I explained to him why he might very well not see me again. Cf. McFalls Communism's Collapse) Democracy's Demise?. On Gramsci, see C. Mouffe, 'Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci' in ed. C. Mouffe, Gramsci and Marxist Theory (London: 1979); J. Femia, Gramsci's Political Thought (Oxford: 1981); and of course Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks (New York: 1971). Birth rates, for example, constitute a hard indicator of cultural differences: Italy and Germany have sunk deep into negative population growth while France remains positive. Cf. Thomas Anz, (ed.), 'Esgeht nicht urn Christa Wolf: Der IJteraturstreitim vereinten Deutschland (Munich: 1991). For further discussion see Chapter 10 in this volume.

4 'Red is for Love ...': citizens as consumers in East

Germany Patricia Hogwood

The rapidly evolving consumer identity of East Germans which has grown up since unification gives a telling account of a society and a polity in transition. At first sight, East German social and political identity appears to be a mass of contradictions, with East Germans displaying ambivalence towards both their former socialist social order and polity and towards West Germany and all this part of Germany represents in the past and present.1 Consumer behaviour in the East can serve as a useful focus for examining the complex and contradictory attitudes which characterise Eastern German social and political behaviour. This chapter presents a quantitative and qualitative assessment of trends in Eastern spending and consumer aspirations over the last decade. It examines the extent to which Easterners and Westerners differ in their consumer behaviour and explores the links between Eastern citizens' spending patterns and their wider identification with state and society.

The citizen consumer: 1949-1989 The ideological rivalry between the two Germanics throughout their existence as part-states (1949-1989) had effectively politicised consumer behaviour to an unusual degree in both societies. During these years a strong link was forged between the notion of citizenship and the expectation for the state to provide (in the GDR) or to facilitate (in the FRG)

46 'Red is for Love ...': citizens as consumers in East Germany

the individual's access to desirable consumer goods. In the late 1940s and 1950s, the formulation of political identity in the two Germanics had been very much a reciprocal process. In the vulnerable years of the new democracy, the FRG developed its state identity with explicit reference to the 'negative' model of the GDR.2 From the time of the 'economic miracle' of the 1950s, private consumption was an obvious vehicle for West German political leaders to portray the FRG as the 'better' Germany, particularly to its own citizens. They drew explicit comparisons between the flourishing Western social market economy and a failing socialist planned economy.3 In conjunction with sustained economic growth, a functioning democratic framework and post-war international rehabilitation, the legitimation strategy of promoting citizens as empowered consumers worked well for the FRG. In contrast, the GDR's internal regime legitimacy remained fragile in spite of repeated efforts to consolidate it. Here, too, private as well as public consumption4 had been strongly politicised from the outset, not least by the frame of reference established by the FRG. For East Germans, who had shared a common nation state with West Germans until 1949, it was natural to compare their lot with their former compatriots. When it came to assessing their material standard of living and the ability of their state to provide material goods and services, the East Germans looked West, rather than East to the more comparable economies of central and Eastern Europe.5 At first, East—West comparisons were easily made through cross-border contacts. Following the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961, West German consumer culture was communicated through the now more limited contacts between families and friends. More significantly, Western television — including Western advertising — became an important part of East Germans' lives.6 Most areas of the GDR could tune into Western television channels, making Western material cultural standards and developments widely accessible to the public. These circumstances forced GDR planners to recognise citizens as consumers and to respond to consumer demand to a far greater extent than elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Recognising the role of West German consumer society in shaping the material aspirations of GDR citizens, the Honecker administration made a conscious and consistent effort to approximate the consumption profile of the FRG. The aim was to provide an incentive for increased productivity and to enhance the legitimacy of the regime. By the 1970s, the needs of the consumer were explicitly

East-West consumption trends: convergence and divergence 47

acknowledged as the primary measure of economic success.7 Yet while actively emulating the reference culture of the FRG, the GDR officially rejected it.8 The socialist position portrayed the 'consumption civilisation' of the West as a manifestation of monopoly profit and exploitation: a product of the artificial creation of wants through advertising and consumer manipulation.9 In East Germany, then, the strategy of regime legitimation through consumer society failed. The range, quality and availability of goods in the shops was always considered inadequate and there were often long waiting lists for large items such as cars. By the time of the Peaceful Revolution of 1989, the FRG was unchallengeable in its position as material reference culture for the other Germany. Having achieved formal unification in 1990 it has been the stated aim of successive governments to achieve 'inner unity', i.e. the full social, economic and political integration of Germans East and West within the state framework of the FRG.10 The promotion of equality in material standards of living throughout the federation is seen as a key means to this end.11

East-West consumption trends: convergence and divergence Can Eastern consumers be distinguished from their Western counterparts? Differential patterns of expenditure might be expected simply on the grounds that, in spite of the convergence of territorial income patterns since unification, average income in Western households still exceeds that of Eastern households. By 1998, tariff wages in the East had officially reached 90.5 per cent of the Western level. However, the OECD estimated that by 1997, in real terms, the average wage in the East was in fact only 77 per cent that of the West.12 In April 1998, only 11.3 per cent of Eastern households brought in a monthly net income of over DM5000, compared with 21.5 per cent of Western households. At the lowest end of the income spectrum, 43 per cent of Eastern households earned less than DM2500, compared with 35.2 per cent in the West.13 For the time being, then, East Germans have less money to spare than Westerners and can therefore be expected to exercise less choice in their consumer lifestyles. A more interesting question is whether Eastern individuals and households choose to spend their disposable income in different ways than Westerners. If so, to what extent are these choices consciously defined by considerations of social and political identity?

48 'Red is for Love ...': citizens as consumers in East Germany

While it is not yet possible to give a conclusive answer to these questions, available data allows at least for some constructive speculation. The findings of a 'micro-census' conducted in the FRG in April 1998 allow direct comparisons to be drawn between the consumption patterns of the Western and Eastern Lander since unification.14 See Table 4.1 for a summary of some key results. Drawing on a complex of indicators in which income was the key determinant, the micro-census distinguished between the consumption patterns of three categories of households which we can term low-income, middle-income and high-income.15 One notable point of comparison between Eastern and Western households is that Eastern households habitually put more money away as savings. In the low-income households, the East-West discrepancy was marginal: 9.3 per cent of income was saved by Easterners compared with 8.4 per cent by Westerners. As household income rose, though, so did the East-West savings differential. Of the middle-income groups, Eastern households saved 16.1 per cent over the Westerners' 14.0 per cent. The differential became substantial with the high-income groups: Easterners saved 18.8 per cent compared with the Westerners' 13.8 per cent. One explanation for this could be that Eastern households feel more insecure in relation to free-market conditions than do Westerners. The social and economic dislocation experienced by East Germans immediately after unification left the community traumatised. Birth-rate statistics in the Western and Eastern Lander illustrate this point very clearly. Following unification, while the birth-rate in the Western Lander remained steady, in the Eastern Lander it fell dramatically, reaching its lowest point in 1994 at 79,000 live births. This represented a fall of some 60 per cent of the total births registered in 1989. Official sources specifically linked this phenomenon to the political, economic and social upheaval of the time, together with the initial heavy migration from the region. By this measure, confidence did not begin to recover in Eastern Germany until 1995.16 Having experienced ongoing uncertainties in the post-unification labour market, then, Eastern savers may be putting money aside for a rainy day. Alternatively, they may be saving for specific consumer items, preferring to pay with 'real' money rather than enter into credit transactions. The micro-census revealed that in 1997 there was as good as no East—West discrepancy in total expenditures on private consumption within each household income group. The low-earning households in both East and West spent exactly the same on private consumption: 83.3

Approximation or a distinctive consumer culture? The ambivalence of Eastern spending patterns 49

Table 4.1: Monthly expenditure of disposable income by household type: 1997 Savings(%)

Personal consumption^)*

East

West

East

West

East

Low income

2,992

2,776

9.3

8.4

83.3

Middle income

4,819

5,725

16.1

14.0

73.8

High income

6,275

9,006

18.8

13.8

70.2

Disposable income (DM)

Other (%)

('personal consumption covers expenditure on, for example, food, housing, clothes and travel) Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (ed.), Datenreport 1999. Zahlen und Fakten uber die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Bonn, Bundeszentrale fur Politische Bildung, series no. 365, 2000), figure 2, p. 116.

per cent of their monthly income. In the middle-income groups, Easterners spent 73.8 per cent compared with the Westerners' 75.0 per cent and the high earners spent 70.2 per cent in the East and 69.6 per cent in the West. Beneath the homogeneity of total expenditures, though, the way in which private consumption was subdivided did reveal some interesting comparisons between East and West. The Federal Statistical Office evaluated these discrepancies largely as an attempt by Easterners to match the material quality of life enjoyed by Westerners.17 While this is certainly a factor in Eastern spending patterns, it is interesting to consider whether East Germans are attempting to achieve a lifestyle which in some ways differs from that of a typical Western consumer.

Approximation or a distinctive consumer culture? The ambivalence of Eastern spending patterns There is plenty of evidence to support the assumption that Easterners aspire to approximate Western levels and patterns of expenditure, partic-

50 'Red is for Love ...': citizens as consumers in East Germany

ularly in spending on food, drink and tobacco, and, more recently, on household goods.18 Interestingly, though, spending on food and household goods initially appeared to have been framed as much in the context of consumer constraints during the socialist period of the GDR as in the opportunities presented by the free market of unified Germany. When markets were first opened to East German consumers, there was enormous demand for goods which had been unavailable in the GDR and which had been viewed as 'Western' goods. Given West Germany's role as the reference culture in consumer aspirations, these were equated with luxury goods. In this way, aspirations built under socialism were carried over to the post-unification framework.19 Ironically, the initial fixation with specific 'Western' goods has set East Germans apart from Westerners in their consumer behaviour in certain respects. For East Germans, freedom of choice through the market was first exercised through spending on food and drink. Immediately after unification, Eastern households were spending between one-quarter and almost one-third of their net income on food products, with the poorest households devoting proportionally more than higher-earning households. By 1997 percentage expenditures had fallen to levels much closer to those typical of the corresponding household income types in the West. Why, at a time of great uncertainty, did East Germans choose to spend so much of their income on food? The ending of the socialist state's subsidies on the most basic foodstuffs, such as bread, provides a structural explanation in that people were suddenly forced to pay more for essential items. It is not a sufficient explanation in itself, however, as demonstrated by the fact that people were later able to choose to reduce their spending on food quite dramatically. It is tempting to compare this phenomenon with the so-called 'Fressmlle9 in West Germany in the 1950s, when Germans reacted to the end of rationing and the return of luxury foodstuffs to the shops by excessive eating. This comparison holds to the extent that in 1990 East Germans were certainly reacting to the novelty of finding a vast range of food and drink readily available to the masses as well as to the elites. However, the post-war situation differs considerably from the post-unification one. In the 1950s, the West Germans were at last emerging from the constant threat of hunger, even starvation. While only a very limited range of food had been available to consumers in the GDR prior to the collapse of the SED state, there had been enough for everyone. No-one

Approximation or a distinctive consumer culture? The ambivalence of Eastern spending patterns 51

had been faced with hunger, let alone starvation. The Easterners' postunification eating binge was probably related to their past experiences as consumers in the GDR. Easterners probably overbought at first, habituated to a hoarding instinct by the unreliability of supplies in the GDR. If they found a coveted item, many consumers would be tempted to buy in a good stock, assuming that it would be sold out before long. Curiosity might have inspired people to try out new, unfamiliar foods. Also some foods, such as exotic fruits, had been available largely to the elites in the GDR and so appeared particularly attractive to the wider public.20 Table 4.2: Breakdown of personal consumption expenditures in the Eastern Lander, in per cent, 1991 and 1997 Low income Food, drink and tobacco Housing (rents) Heating Clothing Transport and news media Education, entertainment and leisure Other goods and services

Middle income

1991 30.5 7.0

1997 22.1 21.1

6.3 7.1

6.5 5.1

17.6

15.4

8.9

7.6

24.6 12.0

22.6

22.2

16.4

1991 28.2 4.9 4.0 9.9

1997 23.4 19.0 5.7 6.0

High income 1991 24.6 4.7 3.8

1997 21.7 16.6 4.9 6.6

19.1 11.3

10.2 26.5 12.5

20.9 10.7

15.5

17.7

18.6

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (ed.), Datenreport 1999. Zahlen und Fakten uber die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Bonn, Bundeszentrale fur Politische Bildung, series no. 365, 2000), table 6, p. 119.

One area in which Easterners have recently invested heavily is household goods. Spending in this area did not feature strongly at first, probably because spending on the house was initially devoted to essential repairs. Eastern spending on household goods currently far outstrips Western spending, which has stabilised at between 5 per cent and 8 per cent. In 1997, low-income households in the East spent proportionally double that of their Western counterparts on furniture and household goods (10.1 per cent compared with 5.3 per cent), even exceeding their Western peers spending in real terms (252 DM compared with 123 DM).21 Eastern middle- and high-income households also spent a little more proportionally than their Western peers', almost matching Western real expenditures in this sector. If the possession of household goods is used as a measure

52 'Red is for Love ...': citizens as consumers in East Germany

of material standard of living, then it can be claimed that Eastern households are catching up fast with the standard of living enjoyed by Westerners. Almost every German household, East or West, now owns the most basic of household white goods: refrigerator, freezer and washingmachine. Eastern households still fall behind Western standards in 'luxury' white goods such as dishwashers, microwave ovens and washer-driers, but purchasing patterns suggest that they aspire to match Western provision. For example, in 1993 only 14.8 per cent of Eastern households owned a microwave; by 1998 41.2 per cent did — not far short of the 53.0 per cent of Western households to own a microwave in 1998.22 In terms of goods for home entertainment, Easterners had by 1998 marginally overtaken the standard of living enjoyed by Westerners in some respects. With a national average of 95.8 per cent, Eastern households were slightly more likely to have a television than Western households. They were also slightly more likely to have a second television set in the house. A substantially greater percentage of Eastern households than Western had cable television (64.4 per cent in the East compared with 50.7 per cent in the West). East and West were fairly equally endowed with video recorders, video cameras or camcorders, cameras, stereos and satellite. Only in ownership of hi-fis did Eastern households fall noticeably behind, at 55.9 per cent compared with 69.9 per cent. These trends suggest an overall pattern of conformity with Western norms, modified slightly by the experience of consumer restrictions under the socialist state. However, there is evidence to suggest that socialism has left a deeper mark on the social and political norms of the East German community: one which is expressed in consumer responses at a more specific level.

Reaching the East: advertising and political identity One way of determining the extent of differential consumer and political clienteles in the East and West of Germany is to examine the approach adopted by advertisers. It is clear that both political and consumer advertisers believe they need to address distinct Eastern and Western markets, at least in specific respects. Moreover, consumer advertising achieves this differentiation partly by drawing on political referents.

Reaching the East: advertising and political identity 53

To start with political advertising, political parties have conducted election campaigns geared towards distinct Eastern and Western political perceptions and anticipated responses (see also Dan Hough's chapter in this volume for further discussion of this point). In the campaign surrounding the Volkskammer (GDR Parliament) election of March 1989, Western parties actively supporting their newly-formed sister parties in the East played on the FRG's perceived role as a consumer reference culture for the GDR and on the critical perceptions of the SED state by distributing bananas and cans of cola to the Eastern crowds. Since unification, campaigning has been conducted using more traditional methods. The reformed communist Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) has always run separate campaigns in the Eastern and the Western Lander^ campaigning on the platform of a regional party in the East and of a left alternative in the West. At the other end of the scale, the small liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP) sees its aim of achieving 'inner unity' in the FRG as incompatible with differential East/West campaigning. The FDP understands itself as an 'all-German' party; as a party 'for all the people'. As such, in the federal election campaign of 1998, the FDP campaigned with the same electoral material in East and West alike.23 However, the CDU, which also understands itself as an all-German party and vigorously promotes the aim of inner unity, took a different approach in 1998. The CDU produced a 48-page illustrated campaign magazine for distribution to all households in the Eastern Lander which addressed issues of specific interest to Eastern citizens. The theme of Eastern reconstruction was followed through with a television spot called 'blossoming landscapes' and a poster campaign.24 Radio interviews with popular participation always included selected Eastern 'voices', although the themes discussed were identical whether broadcast in the West or the East.25 The 1998 federal election confirmed that the key feature of the Eastern electorate was volatility. Only 63 per cent of East Germans consider themselves 'psychologically attached' to a party, compared to 74 per cent in the West. 31 per cent of East Germans voted for different parties in the federal elections of 1994 and 1998, compared with 21 per cent of West Germans.26 This is a factor which is likely to increase differential East/West campaigning as the 'Western' parties will need to work hard to cement a clientele group in the Eastern Lander. In consumer advertising too, there is an awareness of a distinctive East/West divide. In the euphoria which followed unification, East

54 'Red is for Love ...': citizens as consumers in East Germany

German consumers at first abandoned Eastern products for Western brands. When the immediate impact of unification resulted in mass unemployment and social disintegration, Easterners felt let down by the federal government, and, by association, with the 'West'. There was a dramatic U-turn in Eastern consumer behaviour as East Germans began to assert a distinct consumer identity through consciously buying Eastern goods. Between December 1990 and December 1991, the proportion of Eastern households surveyed preferring Eastern products over Western had risen from half to almost three-quarters.27 Now, while overall consumption patterns between East and West are converging rapidly, loyalty to local products, East and West, is persisting. Betts refers to this U-turn in perceptions as a process of 'transvaluation' and claims that GDR consumer objects have emerged as new historical markers of socialist experience and identity.28 The initial pro-Western identification has given way to Ostalgie (nostalgia for the GDR past). East Germans have begun to associate particular Eastern products with a romanticised past, which had been more stable, secure and friendly than the new turbulent times.29 The quirky, distinctively Eastern German character displayed at pedestrian crossings (the Ampelmanncben, the equivalent of the British 'little green man') has become a cult figure and has been marketed in various guises as a symbol of Eastern identity.30 The standard-issue Trabant car, the 'Trabi', which East German motorists could not drop quickly enough on unification, has likewise become a cult object. Initially they were coveted largely in the West as quaint collectors' items, but Trabi clubs and fan newsletters have since attracted an Eastern membership.31 The past has proved to be an important key to Eastern consumer behaviour. There is evidence that brand recognition not only works differently in the East, but is connected to the period of German division.32 In the West, people who aspire to own an expensive car rate the Mercedes Benz as the best. In the East, people would go for an Audi first, or otherwise settle for a BMW. The Mercedes Benz would come a poor third, because of its associations with a 'capitalist class' in the former FRG.33 The marketing agency Frit^sch undMakat specialises in advertising for the Eastern Lander. They have found that common techniques in West German advertising simply do not work for the East. Superlatives such as 'the best' or 'number one' go down badly, as do references to a stylish and luxurious lifestyle. Frit^scb und Makat define the dominant Eastern ethos as 'Prussian-puritan', with a high resonance for 'old-fashioned' values

Reaching the East: advertising and political identity 55

such as orderliness, discipline and modesty. What appeals to Eastern consumers is advertising based on a product's intrinsic merits and functionality, or which implies that the consumer is a regular, hard-working mother, colleague, friend, etc.34 The worth of functionality and 'normality' for Easterners appears to derive from social norms cemented during the socialist period. In a worker's society such as the GDR, the normative worth of equality as a social value (and specifically as a collective value) was much more pronounced than in a society based on free enterprise, such as the FRG. It was not done to try to put yourself forward; to distinguish yourself as somehow better than others. Ideally, you should be no worse off than anyone else, but not so much better off as justifiably to attract the attention and envy of those around you.35 It followed that material goods were not sought after for their ability to confer status on the possessor, but for their functionality alone.36 Interestingly, while the desire to share the material standard of living of West Germans was a strong motivation in the Eastern popular uprising of 1989, Easterners never felt comfortable with the ruthless and self-absorbed 'elbow society' of the West.37 Eastern consumers have now accepted the Western norm of acquiring more and better things, but at the same time socialist social norms relating to the individual's place in the collective and the importance of keeping to your own 'niche' seem to have been retained. How do these values translate into advertising for the Eastern consumer? The washing powder retailers Persil found that an advert which worked for the West was causing offence in the East.3^ The advert showed a middle-aged woman executive returning to work. Her husband and children couldn't cope without her until she discovered new Persil capsules. Eastern women, who until unification were accustomed to working all their adult lives, were offended at the implication that it was somehow wrong to 'leave' your family to go back to work. Faced with structural and gender-biased unemployment problems, they were insulted at the suggestion that such a woman could find a good post as soon as she chose to work (for further discussion of female unemployment see Debbie Wagener's chapter in this volume). Moreover, they disliked the snobbish lifestyle message of the advert. Frit^sch und Makat designed a campaign based on a functional aspect of the product - Persil preserves colour fastness in the wash. They built in references to the East's socialist past through political colour symbolism, coming up with the slogan 'Red is for love - let's keep it that way'. Another advert for mineral water sub-

56 'Red is for Love ...': citizens as consumers in East Germany

tly contrasts a Western, superficial lifestyle with an honest-to-goodness Eastern lifestyle, ending with the punch line: 'Lichtenauer mineral water — so beautifully ordinary'. There is increasing demand for 'traditional' Eastern products which are marketed almost exclusively for the East. Merkel argues that it is inevitable that brand recognition would become the focus of an Eastern German consumer identity as the practices of consumption learned during the GDR period (hoarding, barter, using contacts etc.) are redundant in a capitalist consumer society.39 Eastern products in demand include Radeberger beer, Florena cosmetics and Super-Illu magazine.40 A flourishing Ostalgie market caters for the social need to reminisce about the past. Tapes and CDs of the familiar socialist patriotic songs for children and young people are widely available. Books, board games and 'trivial pursuit'-style games reflect the Ostalgie theme, usually in a satirical and selfdeprecating manner. Internet mail-order companies supply utility furnishings, toys and even foodstuffs from the days of the former GDR.41 One hotel even offers Ostalgie holidays, recreating the GDR experience in rather grim detail, down to the portrait of Erich Honecker in the reception area.

Western lifestyle: Eastern values As the FRG works to consolidate its 'inner unity' project, patterns of consumption in East Germany mirror the complex social and political relationship between the Eastern and Western Lander. Eastern German consumption patterns reveal, on the one hand, a continuation of the post-war aspiration for consumer and social equality with the former FRG, and, on the other hand, an attempt to shape a distinct cultural and political identity within united Germany, one which incorporates valued elements of the forty-year experience as the 'other Germany'. Eastern conformity with Western norms is most evident in spending on material goods. From current trends, it appears that once immediate material needs have been met, East Germans will come to adopt the full range of Western consumer spending, incorporating goods, services and leisure activities. East Germans currently depart from Western consumer behaviour as a result of their underlying social norms derived from life in a socialist state. These stress the value of the collective in society and of

Notes 57 social conformity. Whether these values can survive in the long term in juxtaposition with the individualistic thrust of the free market remains to be seen. One possibility is that the self-conscious association with Eastern consumer products will move from a retrospective orientation to a forward-looking one. Social and political identification with 'Easternness' might shift from 'ostalgia', with its focus in recreating a lost sense of security, to one based on 'Ossi pride': a self-deprecating but assertively positive identification with the Western 'Oss? (Easterner) stereotype.42 In this way Easterners could keep their distinctive social values while simultaneously pursuing new 'Eastern' specialisms and developments. This type of 'oldvalues: new lifestyle' can be found, for example, in Wales, where a very distinctive traditional cultural identity is combined with business specialisms such as quality foods and innovative work in the creative arts like music and fashion. An alternative outcome for East Germans might be the development of a reciprocal relationship between a pro-Western, contemporary identification, more in evidence in prosperous and confident times, alternating with a more independent Eastern identity in times of low morale. In consumer behaviour, East Germans seem set to approximate closely terms of reference set by West Germans. At a deeper level, though, we can conclude with Frit^sch und Makat that cder Ossi tickt anders' (Easterners function differently).43

Notes 1

2 3 4

5

P. Hogwood, 'After the GDR: Reconstructing Identity in Post-Communist Germany', in journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 16/4 (2000), 45-67 ibid., p. 49. See, for example, R.G. Moeller, Protecting Motherhood. Women and the Family in the Politics of Postwar West Germany (Berkeley: 1993). Categories of public and private consumption are more difficult to distinguish under a socialist system than under a capitalist system: private consumption here refers to the acquisition of goods or services through privately controlled means, for example, individuals' income and savings. P. J. Bryson, The Consumer under Socialist Planning. The East German Case (New York: 1984), p. 186; A. Steiner, 'Dissolution of the Dictatorship over Needs? Consumer behavior and Economic Reform in East Germany in the 1960s' in Getting and Spending. European and American Consumer Societies in the Twentieth Century, ed. S. Strasser, C. McGovern and M. Judt (Cambridge: 1998), pp. 167-85.

58 'Red is for Love ...': citizens as consumers in East Germany 6 7 8

9

10 11

12 13 14 15 16 17 18

19

20

Bryson, p. 9. ibid., pp. 1-9. This internal contradiction with regard to private consumption is rooted in an ambivalence towards consumer goods and consumer behaviour which has arguably persisted into the post-unification period. Bryson, p. 9. How, then, could such an economic priority be reconciled with classic Marxist principles? Bryson, (ibid., pp. 6-7) cites the East German authors, U. Moller and G. Schilling (Planmrtschaft contra Marktwirtschaft ((Ez§\) Berlin: 1981), esp. pp. 118-21). Moller and Schilling develop a purist Marxist position on consumption: one which rejects the notion of consumer sovereignty found in capitalist theory. They argue that socialist consumers function simultaneously as producers and also as the owners of the means of production. They are therefore empowered to produce exactly what they want, rather than be subjected to the consumption preferences of an oppressive class of capitalist producers. Within this perspective, production is genuinely subjected to the predetermining control of society as a whole. Hogwood,'After the GDR', p. 48. For example, Statistisches Bundesamt (ed.) Datenreport 1999. Zahlen und Fakten iiber die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Bonn: Bundeszentrale fur Politische Bildung, series no. 365, 2000). OECD Economic Survey: Germany, (Paris: 1999, p. 39; 1998, p. 104). Statistisches Bundesamt,^. 112. Unless otherwise stated, the statistics used in the following section are from the German Federal Statistical Office, the Statistiscbes Bundesamt. ibid., pp. 115-16. ibid., pp. 35-7. ibid., p. 117. Eastern spending on housing is also tending towards the higher Western patterns of expenditure in this sector, but common constraints such as an all-German regulatory framework and continually rising rents have in practice narrowed the parameters of choice in this sector open to Eastern and Western consumers alike. Humphrey's discussion of post-transition Russia notes some interesting parallels (see C. Humphrey 'Creating a Culture of Disillusionment. Consumption in Moscow, a Chronicle of Changing Times' in Worlds Apart. Modernity through the Prism of the Local, ed. D. Miller (London: 1995), pp. 43-68 (pp. 58 and 65.) An old GDR joke makes the point: A banana runs headlong through the streets of East Berlin, a horde of GDR citizens in hot pursuit. A kiwi fruit comes up to the banana and asks Why are you running away?' The banana puffs 'Quick, follow me, if they catch us, they'll eat us!' I'm all right' says the

Notes 59 kiwi 'they won't recognise me!' 21 Statistisches Bundesamt, pp. 125-6. 22 ibid., figure 6, p. 129. 23 Email correspondence with the federal FDP, department for strategy and campaigns, 5-6 June 2001. In this case, the lack of funds to pay for a separate Eastern campaign may also have been a factor. This strategy has led to disastrous results for the party - see Chapter 1 of this volume. 24 Prior to unification, former CDU Chancellor Helmut Kohl had promoted the unification project in the GDR with the metaphor of 'blossoming landscapes'. 25 Email correspondence with the federal CDU, department for media and publicity, 5 June 2001, 2 July 2001. 26 C. Weins, 'The East German Vote in the 1998 General Election' in Bundestagsn'ahl (98. End of an Era? Special issue of German Politics eds. S.Padgett and T. Saalfeld, 8/2 (1999), 50-52. 27 A. Staab 'Testing the West: consumerism and national identity in eastern Germany' German Politics, 6/2 (1997), 139-49. 28 P. Betts, 'The Twilight of the Idols: East German Memory and Material Culture' The Journal of Modern History',72 (2000), 741. 29 See also Hogwood, 'After the GDR', 61 and Staab, 'Testing the West'. 30 M. Duckenfield and N. Calhoun, 'Invasion of the western Ampelmannchen' German Politics, 6/3 (1997); M.Heckhausen Das Buck vom Ampelmannchen (Berlin: 1997) 31 Betts, 'The Twilight of the Idols', 742. 32 See also I. Merkel 'Consumer Culture in the GDR, or How the Struggle for Antimodernity was Lost on the Battleground of Consumer Culture' in Getting and Spending. European and American Consumer Societies in the Twentieth Century, eds. S. Strasser, C. McGovern and M. Judt (Cambridge and Washington DC.: 1998), pp. 296-8. 33 J. Hooper 'East Not Sold on Values of the West', The Guardian 3 October 2000. 34 ibid. 35 W. Engler, Die Qstdeutschen. Kunde von einem \7erlorenenEand. (2nd edn) (Berlin: 2000), pp. 211-13. 36 The exception to this general rule was that goods produced in the West (and thereby difficult for ordinary citizens to acquire) were highly coveted as luxury and status items in the former GDR (see for example, Betts, 'The Twilight of the Idols', 741; H-J. Maaz Behind the Wall: the Inner Life of Communist Germany (New York: 1995), p. 86; Merkel, 'Consumer Culture in the GDR', p. 284. 37 Hogwood, After the GDR', 60.

60 'Red is for Love ...': citizens as consumers in East Germany 38 39 40 41 42 43

Hooper, 'East Not Sold on Values of the West'. Merkel, 'Consumer Culture in the GDR', pp. 296-8. Hooper, 'East Not Sold on Values of the West'. Hogwood, 'After the GDR', 59. ibid. Hooper, 'East Not Sold on Values of the West'.

5 Second-class Germans? National identity in East Germany Gordon Charles Ross

Introduction How do East Germans view their national identity and how does this compare with the situation in the West of Germany and other European countries? Do East Germans see themselves primarily as Germans, East Germans, or as a combination of both and how does national identity interplay with other possible identities at the regional, local and European level? These questions are important because the relative strength or weakness of national identification in East Germany will tell us something about the prospects for achieving the unification of the two former Germanies, a process which is still some way from completion. In fact, the latest annual report published by the German government on the state of German unity concludes rather gloomily that the completion of unification will be a task 'for generations'.1 The establishment of a liberal, democratic civic culture in the re-united Germany is not simply a process of economic, political and social unification but is superseded by the necessity of finding and developing a new national identity.2 The role played by East German identity is particularly important in this context, as it can be seen as both a gauge of what Mary Fulbrook calls 'national identity construction' and as a means of reaching it.3 In the same context, identity in the East of Germany is important in

62 Second-class Germans? National identity in East Germany

assessing the current debate about the much-publicised and hotly disputed level of division between East and West Germans; between the socalled Ossis (Easterners) and Wessis (Westerners). The critical questions here would be: do East Germans still have a so-called 'Mauer im Kopf' (Wall in the head)4 and is this hindering the unification process? Answers to these questions will give us at least some indication of the chances of the unification process in Germany. If it can be shown, for example, that East Germans have a weak sense of national identity and a strong East German identity, then presumably there is some validity in the argument that East and West Germany are growing further apart. Conversely, if it can be shown that East Germans identify strongly with the new state and its institutions, then it might be reasonably argued that the East-West divide and the 'Wall in the head' thesis have been exaggerated — at least to an extent. Finally, as it is often closely associated with nationalism, racism and right-wing extremism, national identity is important as it fits into the current debate surrounding the relatively high levels of racism and right-wing activism in Germany. This debate has tended to revolve around issues concerning immigration, the assimilation of asylum-seekers, the question of dual-nationality, and the place of the so-called Leitkultur^ This debate is particularly important in an East German context as several observers have attributed the relatively high levels of racism and right-wing activism in East Germany, at least in part, to an exaggerated nationalism amongst East Germans.6 Other authors argue that Germans (the arguments usually refer to both East and West Germans) have a comparatively weak sense of national pride and that this has contributed to the destabilisation of German unity and to the resurgence of right-wing extremism and racism.7 As Andreas Staab has argued: A coherent national identity that incorporates Germans' ethnicity would have been able to provide a buffer of tolerance for the influx of foreigners. A confident notion of 'Germanness' established over decades would not have seen the increasing numbers of foreigners as a threat but as a challenge and enrichment to the national identity.8 Whether this argument is actually true is, in my view, doubtful, but the question here is whether national identity in East Germany in particular is weak? Are East Germans ashamed to be German or, as others argue,

Background to the study 63

are they more nationalistic than West Germans? If they are, does this explain the relatively high level of racism and right-wing activism in the East of Germany?

Background to the study Although this chapter cannot give a definitive answer to this complex and difficult question, it hopes to open up the debate beyond the previous positions outlined above using a combination of primary and secondary data gleaned from a small sample survey with multiple-choice questions, opinion polls, responses from open questions, personal experience and contemporary East German writing on identity.^1 The aim of this approach is to offer a contemporary picture, or 'snapshot', of national identity in East Germany today and, at the same time, to provide a distinctly East German perspective. In contrast to other studies on this subject, this chapter looks at the interplay of national identity with other sources of identity at the sub- and supranational level, e.g. local (Stadt)^ regional (Land) and European levels. Last, and perhaps most important, the conclusions of this chapter are based on the feelings and opinions of East Germans themselves. The snapshot itself is the result of 54 questionnaires, designed and written by the author and handed out to East Germans in Jena. Given the very small number of respondents, it goes without saying that the results presented here cannot be extrapolated to the population as a whole without critical assessment and caution. 1° In view of this, I have drawn on the findings of secondary empirical studies, in particular Thomas Blank's,11 Hans SteuBloff's,12 and Bettina Westle's13 research. The rationale behind the questionnaire was simply to find out how East Germans view their national identity and how this interplays with other sources of identity in various given situations on the questionnaire. This approach was adopted starting from the premise that the individual can exhibit multiple identities, i.e. that identity is likely to change depending on who one is talking to. I also wanted to find out whether East Germans think their national identity has changed since unification and if so, how. What exactly is 'national identity? Although this is not the place to play the game of 'define German national identity', as Mary Fulbrook calls it, a working definition of national identity is needed in order for this chap-

64 Second-class Germans? National identity in East Germany

ter to make sense.14 What I want to do in this chapter is move away from notions of nationalism, patriotism and racism and focus, at least initially, on how East Germans view their identity in terms of belonging to a particular state, in this case of course, the Federal Republic of Germany. What I mean by this is: do East Germans see themselves as Germans (as citizens of the Federal Republic) or do they reject national identity in favour of alternative sources of identity at other levels, for example, at the European, local and regional levels? Throughout this chapter I understand national identity as a sense of national belonging (or nationale Zugehorigkeii). One might, however, argue that this definition is simply a claim to citizenship and that this is hardly a controversial issue that needs to be tested, given the fact that East Germans are German citizens. The situation is, however, a little more complicated than it first seems, for two main reasons: first, the way in which we define citizenship is often the same way we define our national identity; and second, the way citizenship laws are defined and employed by nation states has important consequences for issues relating to inclusion and exclusion. What is important in the German context is that the German tradition of defining citizenship is largely based on an ethnic claim to blood relations (ius sanguinis) and is inherently exclusive. This means that notions and definitions of citizenship and national identity in Germany are likely to carry implications of ethnicity and exclusion with them even where this is not intended by respondents.15 The age-range of respondents (between 11 and 65) also needs to be considered. The vast majority, however, were aged between 18 and 25. This relatively young age is statistically significant for two reasons. The first is that research has shown that the level of identification with a nation depends to a large extent on age: i.e. younger Germans will tend not to be so proud to be German as older Germans.16 This is significant in the present context as it suggests that we would be less likely to find a high level of national identification in the snapshot presented here. The second reason is that most of the respondents would have been only nine or ten years old at the time of the Wende (1989). This means that it would probably be difficult for respondents to remember how they viewed their national identity before 1989 and how it might have changed since then, a fact borne out in some of the statements made by respondents on the questionnaire. This aspect has the advantage, however, that approaches to identity formation in East Germany that focus on socialisation (in the

East German national identity - a snapshot 65

GDR) on the one hand, and those that emphasise the situational thesis i.e. that East Germans are more influenced by the present economic and social problems) on the other, can both be considered. This is because the identity of younger East Germans, it is reasonable to assume, has been partly formed by their childhood experiences in the GDR and by their formative years in the new Germany.17 The same point can be made concerning gender, as most of the respondents were females. Gender is important in the present context because national identity, in particular, nationalism, racism and right-wing extremism, are usually associated with male activists.18 The high percentage of females questioned for the present study would make it statistically unlikely, therefore, to find a high level of national identification. This needs to be taken into consideration when assessing the results. It should also be pointed out that the majority of respondents were university educated: it has been found that the higher the level of education, the less likely it is that citizens will identify with their nation.1^ Again, this factor suggests that we are less likely to find a high level of national identification in the results. This points also needs to be borne in mind when assessing the findings and reading the conclusions.

East German national identity - a snapshot A 'snapshot' of East German national identity since the Wende can be presented as follows: national identity — in terms of the definition presented above — is surprisingly strong in East Germany. Many East Germans still see themselves first and foremost as German. The majority (22 per cent), for example, chose 'German' in answer to the question which asked the respondents how they would define their identity in a 'free context' (i.e. when not talking to or thinking of anyone else). When speaking to foreigners, moreover, East Germans tend to emphasise their national identity more strongly. A large majority (61 per cent) said that they see themselves first and foremost as 'German'. This is supported by the findings of other studies. Hans SteuBloff, for example, found that national identity in East Germany is not only relatively strong but has actually been rising since unification. According to SteuBloff's study, 47.9 per cent of East Germans questioned saw themselves first and foremost as German in July 1990. By 1999, this figure had risen to 64.4 per cent.20 This find-

66 Second-class Germans? National identity in East Germany

ing is interesting because one might have expected a national German identity to have been stronger in the first months and years after unification when a nationalist euphoria was particularly strong in the East after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the implosion of the GDR. 'After the Wendel as one of the respondents put it, 'we just wanted to be German'.21 A national identity, in other words, has increased in the East since the Wende despite the perceived disappointments felt in the wake of the failed promises of the unification process. As many respondents chose a regional, local, European (all 17—18 per cent) and Weltbiirger identity (20 per cent) as those who chose a national identity (22 per cent). This shows that national identity is strong in the East of Germany but less significant at the sub and supranational levels. In many ways, of course, these findings simply mean that it all depends on who one is speaking to or thinking of in a particular scenario. When East Germans are speaking to foreigners, for example, they naturally tend to see themselves as Germans. When they are speaking to West Germans, however, more East Germans emphasise their East German identity.22 The availability of multiple identities mean that there is no reason one cannot feel East German, German and European at the same time. 'Humans,' as Weidenfeld argues, 'can exhibit different senses of loyalty and levels of identity ... without these contradictory forms of consciousness permanently colliding'.23 Nevertheless, we should not lose sight of the relative strength of national identity in East Germany within the complexity of multiple identities. We can sum all this up at this point by stating that East Germans have a surprisingly strong sense of national identity. It is crucial to point out, however, that this does not mean that East Germans are especially nationalistic, patriotic or extreme. On the contrary, most East Germans view their national identity more in terms of national belonging and citizenship and not\\\ an overtly patriotic or nationalistic sense. This is a perspective and definition of national identity that I argued for above and is supported by both the primary and the secondary evidence. For example, despite the fact that the 'nationality' question was phrased as neutrally as possible on the questionnaire, it is clear from the answers that many East Germans feel particularly uncomfortable with their national identity. Thus we find the following statement: Through contact with Germans from the old states [West Germans] and above all by meeting foreigners who are also proud of their coun-

East German national identity - a snapshot 67

tries, I also developed a stronger sense of attachment to my home country. With all due caution, a national pride. [Emphasis added] We can sense a defensiveness in this statement in that the respondent rejects the notion that s/he should feel ashamed of his/her nationality. Even this statement, the only one to suggest a nominal degree of nationalist pride, is prefixed by the statement 'with all due caution', suggesting the respondent was aware of the implications of claiming a national German pride. This is probably because national identity in Germany is often (wrongly) associated with nationalism, racism and right-wing extremism. As one of the German respondents in Hans SteuBloff's study put it, 'nationalism sounds to me like being a Nazi'.24 It seems, therefore, that East Germans are as much aware of the negative connotations of a German national identity as are West Germans. In a comparative context, moreover, there is no evidence to show that Germans (East or West) are particularly nationalistic or patriotic. On the contrary, all the evidence suggests that most Germans have a very weak sense of patriotism compared to members of other European countries.25 The snapshot further reveals an unexpectedly weak sense of a specific East German identity amongst many of the respondents. Whilst it might not be surprising to find out that many East Germans emphasise their national identity when talking to foreigners, what is surprising is that a majority of respondents saw themselves as Germans first (33 per cent) and only then as East Germans (22 per cent), even when talking to West Germans. Even a regional identity (Land — 24 per cent) was preferred by more respondents to a specifically East German identity.26 It is also noteworthy that, when talking to foreigners, East Germans completely ignore subnational sources of identity at the Land and Stadt level. In this case, only the supranational German, European and Weltburger sources of identity were chosen. Judging by some of the statements made on the questionnaire, a rejection of an East German identity and a reversion to a national identity is probably a reaction, at least in part, to the over-politicisation of the East-West debate. In fact, some respondents went out of their way to stress the fact that they did not want to be seen as East German (Ossis) even where this response was not asked for on the questionnaire. 'Before the Wendej according to one respondent, for instance, 'We were all East and West Germans. The GDR no longer exists and we should now all just be German'. Another respondent put the point more

68 Second-class Germans? National identity in East Germany

succinctly: 'From GDR citizen to German from Thuringia — not Easterner!'27 These statements are representative of several made on the questionnaire that emphasise a passionate rejection of an East German (Ossi) identity. Many East Germans, moreover, find it difficult to see themselves as East German and German at the same time. 'From the point of view of East Germans,' as Thomas Blank concludes, 'one can be an East German and a Federal citizen at the same time only with some difficulty. This is to do with a sense of belonging to competing groups'.28 In contrast, West Germans seem to be able to balance competing sources of national and regional identity more easily.29 Many of the respondents felt that their national identity had changed significantly since the Wende and that this change has made them more German. 61 per cent of respondents said that they believed their identity had changed since the Wende. 'before the Wendel according to a respondent, 'I saw myself as a citizen of the GDR. I think I probably feel more German now, more than I would have done without the Wende\ This statement shows the way in which the respondent believed his/her identity has been affected by the Wende, i.e. it has made him/her more German, a perspective that is confirmed by other studies.30 At the same time, however, several respondents also stressed a process of identity formation from a GDR, to a national German, and then to a European and Weltbiirger identity. An example of this identity development is shown in the following statement: 'Whilst I experienced an "internal change" from East German to German in the early years [following unification], I now see myself increasingly as a European/ Weltburge?. Having said this, it is important to state that the few studies which were undertaken on national identity in the GDR all suggest that a strong pan-German national identity already existed in East Germany before the Wende ?\ It is likely, therefore, that national identity formation has not been changed by the Wende as much as some East Germans seem to believe. This brings us to the question of how East German concepts of national identity compare with those in the West. Whilst this question was not explicitly tested on the questionnaire, the evidence suggests that there are a number of importance differences. The first is that, in general, East Germans have a stronger sense of national identification than West Germans, a finding that has been reached in numerous studies.32 Again, it is important to point out that this has more to do with a sense of national belonging and feelings of citizenship than it does with national-

Second-class Germans? 69

istic or racist sentiments. This is demonstrated, for example, by the fact that West Germans are generally prouder of the constitution (Verfassungspatriotismus) and other political institutions than are East Germans.33 This is not particularly surprising, however, when one considers that German institutions, and this includes the Grundgeset^ are essentially West German products. Why, as Hans SteuBloff asks, should East Germans take pride in institutions which they had no part in creating?34 East Germans, moreover, are more sceptical towards German military involvement in conflicts abroad.35 Clearly, then, there are differences between national identity in East and West Germany.

Second-class Germans? How can we explain the specifics of East German national identity? How can we account for the fact that many East Germans emphasise their national identity at the same time as being aware of its negative connotations? There are, of course, a number of possible ways of explaining this. One possibility is to point out that, whilst most East Germans still see themselves first and foremost as German, they see themselves at the same time as second-class Germans. This is a feeling, moreover, that has not changed significantly since unification.3^ What has happened in Germany since unification is, I would argue, a process of 'one-sided nation-building.' What I mean by this is that unification has forced East Germans to re-assess their national identity, as the snapshot has shown, but this readjustment has taken place in a context dominated largely by West German interests and in a political atmosphere in which East Germans have often been portrayed as a nation of second-class citizens. If we add to this the fact that unemployment is higher in the East, wages lower and that East German achievements, for example in sport and social care, have largely been ignored or discredited in the new Germany, it is not hard to understand why many East Germans see themselves this way.37 Why is this perspective important in the context of national identity? I would argue that the fact that many East Germans see themselves as second-class Germans has encouraged them to fall back on their national identity in order to compensate for their feelings of degradation as second-class citizens. At the same time, however, many emphasise their East German identity as a way of distancing themselves from their West

70 Second-class Germans? National identity in East Germany

German neighbours, or, as Hans SteuBloff puts it: 'In a nutshell [...] identification as second-class Germans in a unified nation state.'38 In my view, it is more likely to be the feeling of being a second-class German, rather than an exaggerated nationalism or racism, that helps explain the relatively high levels of racism and right-wing activism in the new Lander. This is because those East Germans who feel they are second-class citizens in their own country are off-loading their frustration and feelings on foreigners and other 'outsiders'.39 If this argument is correct, it would in my view make more sense to talk of a 'defensive nationalism' than it would to argue that East Germans are somehow nationalistic or right-wing by nature.

Conclusions and implications The snapshot of East German national identity today has presented us with a number of important conclusions. A surprising number of East Germans identify strongly with their state as citizens, even though they are acutely aware of the negative connotations of claiming a national identity in a German context. As mentioned above, this picture is particularly surprising in view of the fact that most of the respondents of the snapshot were young female students. This strong national identification, however, is not to be understood as an exaggerated nationalism or racism but as a claim to national belonging and citizenship. We have also seen that there are important differences between national identity in East and West Germany. East Germans, for instance, do not tend to have a socalled \>7erfassungspatriotismu^ and more East Germans than West Germans are against German military involvement abroad. Many East Germans, furthermore, believe that their national identity has changed fundamentally since the Wende. This change, they argue, involved a development from a GDR consciousness to a stronger sense of a German national identity and is gradually developing into European and Weltbiirger identities, sources which were generally not available in the GDR. This change demonstrates the dynamic process of national identity formation and it is reasonable to assume that this process will continue in the future. At the same time, it has been argued, a pan-German national identification was relatively strong in the GDR, before the Wende. Finally, despite the much politicised East—West German division, a specifically East

Conclusions and implications 71

German identity only becomes statistically significant when East Germans are speaking to West Germans and even in this context a panGerman national identity is favoured by a majority of East Germans. What are the implications of these conclusions in terms of the questions raised at the beginning of this chapter? First, if one takes the relative strength of national identity in East Germany as a starting-point, it seems that authors who argue that Germans have a weak sense of national identification are wrong, at least as far as East Germany is concerned. This would suggest that German unification is on the right track, at least in terms of national identity construction in the East. The implication of this would be that the East—West division has, at least to some extent, been exaggerated, although the fact that East Germans have a comparatively strong sense of national identity does not, of course, necessarily mean that they cannot stress their 'Easternness' at the same time, as this chapter has shown. It might even be argued from this that national unity in Germany has largely been reached and the differences highlighted in this chapter are simply part of German unity in the sense that all nations have local and regional differences and that these differences represent a healthy aspect of being a nation. If this is valid, then Hans-Joachim Veen is probably right to argue that it is time to move on: 'It is not about inner unity,' he argues, cit is rather about a communal future.'41 I am not sure, however, that this is right, which brings us to the second implication. In my view, it is not enough to say that the differences in national identity between East and West Germany are simply part of being a healthy nation-state. Whilst there are obviously regional differences between Bavarians, Prussians, Hessians, etc. it is highly unlikely that any of these regional groups see themselves as second-class Germans. This is an important difference. The one-sided nature of the unification process, in which millions of East Germans see themselves as excluded from the mainstream or, at least, not fairly treated as fellow citizens, helps understand the East German specifics of national identity. Finally, although East Germans often emphasise their national identity they do not necessarily do this because they are proud to be German or because they are satisfied with the state of unification but because this was the only viable source of identity left open to them since the collapse of the GDR. If this is correct, then we can assume that the unification project still has some way to go.

72 Second-class Germans? National identity in East Germany

Notes 1

Jahresbericht 2001 %um Stand der Deutschen Einheit, in 'Aufgabe fur Generationen', Th'uringer IMndes^eitung, 25 September 2001. 2 A. Staab, National Identity in Eastern Germany: Inner Unification or Continued Separation? (Westport: 1998), p. 4. 3 M. Fulbrook, German National Identity after the Holocaust (Cambridge: 1999), p. 15. 4 My translation here and throughout unless otherwise stated. 5 A leading culture', cf. the CDU's concept of a Leitkultur on the n-tv website http://www.n-tv.de. 6 Several studies have shown that East Germans are more likely to reject foreigners than West Germans. See, for instance: G. C. Ross, The Swastika in Socialism: Right-Wing Extremism and Militant Nationalism in the GDR', in German Monitor, East Germany— Continuity and Change, ed. P. Cooke and J. Grix (Amsterdam: 2000), pp. 81—95 and A. Silbermann and F. Hiisers: Der 'normale* Hass auf die Fremden — Eine so^ialwissenschafiliche Studie %u A usmaf und Hintergr'unden von Fremdenfeindlichkeit in Deutschland, (Munich: 1995). 7 See, for example, E. Noelle-Neumann, Die verlet^te Nation. Uber den V7ersuch der Deutschen ihren Charakter %u dndern (Stuttgart: 1987). 8 A. Staab, National Identity, p. 149. 9 For example: C. Dieckmann: Das Wahre Leben im Falschen, Geschichten von ostdeutscher Identitat (Berlin: 1990). 10 One hundred questionnaires were distributed by the author but only 54 were returned. 11 T. Blank, 'Wer sind die Deutschen? Nationalismus, Patriotismus, Identitat — Ergebnisse einer empirischen Langschnittstudie', in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B 13/97 (1999), 38-46. Working with Peter Schmidt and Horst Alfred Heinrich, Thomas Blank carried out an empirical study on national identity in both East and West Germany under the working-title 'nationale Identitat der Deutschen, Messung und Erklarung der Veranderungsprozesse in Ost und West', which was sponsored by the German Research Group (DFG). The research was carried out in 1993, 1995 and 1996, involving a total research population of 1,357. 12 H. SteuBloff: 'Zur Identitat der Ostdeutschen; Merkmale und Tendenzen eines Phanomens', in hefte %ur ddr-geschichte, 66 (2000). Although it is not specifically about national identity, this study is extremely useful as it focuses exclusively on the East German situation. Hans SteuBloff and his team carried out a project called Projektgruppe IDE NT over a nine year period (1990—1999) using a representative sample of between 600 and 1,000 East Germans under the auspices of the Gesellschaftswissenschaftliches Forum e.V. Berlin.

Notes 73 13 B. Westle, Kollektive Identitat im vereinten Deutschland: Nation und Demokratie in der Wahrnehmung der Deutschen (Opladen: 1997). Bettina Westle's extremely detailed, complex and wide-ranging study is based on two empirical studies that Westle carried out herself, as well as an extremely wide range of empirical data (mostly opinion polls) gleaned from the archives of the Zentrum fur Umfragen, Methoden und Analysen (ZUMT) in Mannheim. 14 Fulbrook, German National Identity, p. 10. 15 Cf. R. Koopmans and H. Kriesi, Citizenship, National Identity and the Mobilisation of the Extreme Right: A Comparison of France, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland. Nr. FS III 97 101, (Berlin: 1997). 16 B. Westle, Kollektive Identitat, p. 189. 17 The most useful discussions on this subject can be found in J.. Grix, 'East German Political Attitudes: Socialist Legacies v. Situational Factors — A False Antithesis', German Politics, 9 (2000), 109-24, and H-J. Veen, Innere Einheit - aber wo liegt sie? Eine Bestandsaufnahme im siebten Jahr nach der Wiedervereinigung', Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B40-41 (1997), 21. 18 The study by Willems et al. of right-wing violence in Germany, for example, discovered that 90 per cent of right-wing extremists were male, cf. H, Willems, S. Wiirtz and R. Eckert, Fremdenfeinliche Gewalt — Eine Analyse von Tdterstrukturen und Eskalationspw^essen, (Bonn: 1993), p. 112. 19 Blank, 'Wer sind die Deutschen?', 38-46. 20 See Tab. 17, in H. SteuBloff, 'Zur Identitat der Ostdeutschen Merkmale und Tendenzen eines Phanomens, in hefte %ur ddr-geschichte, 66 (Berlin: 2000), p. 33. SteuBloff's results are significantly close to the figures reached in the snapshot: namely 61 per cent for 'German' and 31.7 per cent 'East German'. 21 This has been shown empirically. According to one study, only 31.5 per cent of West Germans see themselves as West German. In contrast, 53 per cent of East Germans see themselves as East German, cf. Blank, 'Wer sind die Deutschen?', 41. 22 Cf. Weidenfeld, cited in: B. Westle, Kollektive Identitat, p. 54. 23 SteuBloff 'Zur Identitat der Ostdeutschen', 35. 24 Westle, Kollektive Identitdt, pp. 216-17, Tab. 29. 25 Question 4 on the questionnaire. 26 The results here are striking: East German, local and regional identity all 0 per cent. 27 'Vom DDR-Biirger zu Deutscher aus Thiiringen - nicht Ossi!' 28 Blank, 'Wer sind die Deutschen?', 45. 29 For a discussion of the interplay between national, subnational and supranational identities in East and West Germany, see Westle, Kollektive Identitat, p. 176, especially Table 18. 30 For example, Blank, 'Wer sind die Deutschen?', 41.

74 Second-class Germans? National identity in East Germany 31 See G. C. Ross, 'The Swastika in Socialism'. 32 Westle uses two opinion polls, one carried out amongst West Germans in 1991, the other amongst East Germans in 1990 to show that more East Germans feel more 'strongly attached' to Germany than do West Germans. The figures are 24 per cent of West Germans, 37.2 per cent of East Germans respectively, cf. B. Westle: Kolkktive Identitat, p. 169, Tab. 15. 33 An ALLBUS study in 1996 asked East and West Germans whether they were proud of their constitution - 'Ich bin als Deutscher stolz auf das Grundgesetz' — only 23 per cent of East Germans answered 'yes' compared to to 48 per cent of West Germans, in H. SteuBloff, 'Zur Identitat der Ostdeutschen' p. 34. 34 ibid. 35 In a recent opinion poll carried out on support for the USA's bombing of Afghanistan, for example, 51 per cent of all Germans were in favour of military action. In the East, in contrast, the figure was 38 per cent, demonstrating that there is a significant difference between East and West German public opinion on the necessity of military involvement abroad, cf. 'Der Osten will kein Dauerbombardement', in Thuringische Landes^eitung, 19 October 2001. 36 The figures here are 92 per cent for 1991 and Tchance of unifications per cent for 1999, cf. H. SteuBloff, 'Zur Identitat der Ostdeutschen'. See also, D. Walz and W Brunner: 'Das Sein bestimmt das BewuBtsein, oder: warum sich die Ostdeutschen Burger zweiter Klasse fuhlen', Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B51/97, 1999, 13-19. 37 Unemployment figures in Germany show unemployment running at 9 per cent overall, with 16.9 per cent in the East. 38 H. SteuBloff, 'Zur Identitat der Ostdeutschen', 32. 39 39 This defensive nationalism is called Abwehrnationalismus in German, cf. H. Funke, Jet^t sind ivir dranf, Nationalisms im geeinten Deutschland. Bine Streitschrift (Berlin: 1991). 40 Constitutional patriotism. 41 H.-J. Veen: 'Innere Einheit — aber wo liegt sie? Eine Bestandsaufnahme im siebten Jahr nach der Wiedervereinigung', Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B40_41/97 (1999), 28.

6 Viewing 'the Other': how East sees West and West sees East Manuela Glaab

Since the Iron Curtain crumbled in November 1989, countless surveys have been conducted in order to determine whether unified Germans are 'alike' or 'different'. To the surprise of many observers in the early 1990s, opinion polls revealed broad similarities between East and West Germans although they had been living apart for decades. Despite some diversity, their personal values as well as political attitudes towards democracy basically corresponded. Willy Brandt's famous saying: 'Jetzt wachst zusammen was zusammen gehort' ('What belongs together will now grow together')1 expressed the nation's feeling of togetherness at that time. After a while, however, this optimistic view began to fade away. Data seemed to show a growing sense of distance between the East and West. Latent tensions as well as overt resentments seemed to widen the gap. Since then the ongoing public as well as academic debate has concentrated on the so-called 'Mauer im Kopf' (the Wall in the head) which indicates a split political culture in East and West Germany rather than inner unity. Research has delivered empirical evidence for both psychological differences between those in the East and in the West (the cultural approach), and differing political attitudes towards the Federal Republic (the institutional approach).2 After more than ten years of intensive debate this chapter suggests that existing differences between East and West Germans must be seen in a broader perspective, i.e. in terms of an identity-building process. The

76 Viewing 'the Other': how East sees West and West sees East

main thesis here is that a joint German identity still has not been developed owing to obstacles which are rooted in a disunited past and partly renewed by current experiences. On a theoretical level, perceptions of the 'Other' as well as perceptions of 'oneself are formative elements of personal as well as collective identity. Identity in this sense is understood as the 'Summe unseres Orientierungswissens' (sum of our methods of orientation) which emerges from orientations towards the past, the present and the future.3 We furthermore have to consider both the view of the West towards the East as well as the view of the East towards the West. A deep understanding of German identity always has to reflect three dimensions: the disunited past, experiences since unification, and future perspectives. With this in mind, the following chapter will discuss three complex aspects. First, it will examine perceptions of 'otherness' in the period from 1949 to 1989/90. Second, it will move on to look at constructions of 'the other' since unification. Finally it will attempt to identify the current trajectory of 'otherness' debates in order to hypothesise what direction they will take in the future. In this context we have to be aware of specific limitations of the data, limitations which go beyond fundamental problems of survey methods (questionnaire design, interview irregularities, sample deficits, artefacts etc.) in general. The analysis here is restricted by an incorrigible asymmetry: substantial survey data on identity issues are available for the old Federal Republic, whereas there are only a few opinion polls to tell us about the former GDR.4 Survey research in the GDR was controlled by the state and the findings were kept under strict security. In early 1979 Erich Honecker gave the order to close the research institute which conducted regional surveys under the control of the Central Committee of the SED.5 Between 1966 and 1989 the Leipzig-based 'Zentralinstitut fur Jugendforschung' (ZIJ) (Central Institute for Youth Research) was able to carry out a number of relevant surveys.6 A few polls became accessible after the opening of the archives but parts of them are still classified as not meeting adequate methodological standards.7 From 1968 to 1989 'Infratest', a private institute located in Munich, conducted so-called Stellvertreterbefragungen ('representative surveys'), commissioned by the Federal Government. These were a special type of qualitative survey which combined standardised observations with the indirect questionings of visitors to the GDR, i.e. reports by West Germans on their travel experiences in East Germany.8 However, the data that exist are of very little

1949-1989/90: living with German division 77

use in constructing an accurate picture. Hence, for the period 1949 to 1989/90 we have to focus on attitude change in the Federal Republic. Perceptions of East Germans are referred to mainly as a complementary element of interpretation. Surveys conducted in the post-Wall era also impose specific restraints. In the early stage short-term attitude changes seem characteristic, but we should remember that survey infrastructure was in the process of being introduced to the Eastern part of Germany at this time. Lacking any long-term data basis, shifts in public opinion have to be analysed very carefully. Finally, this chapter concentrates on general trends and consequently has to ignore sub populations, i.e. it does not compare gender, age or social status. This in no way means, of course, that I am implying the existence of a homogenous East and West German population.

1949-1989/90: living with German division The 'German Question' lost its relevance the longer German division lasted — at least as far as the majority of West Germans were concerned. From the outset there was no unconditional quest for unification. During the initial post-war years economic improvement, which in those days meant basic needs such as food, clothes and shelter, was at the top of political priorities. Nevertheless there was a strong feeling of national unity and a wish to overcome the separation as soon as possible. After the bloody suppression of the 1953 workers' upheaval in the Soviet Zone, unification was considered a priority. A closer look at the data, however, reveals that this did not include a willingness to abandon freedom or to risk security for the sake of a unified Germany. Furthermore, opinion polls tell us consistently that from the second half of the 1960s economic problems once again dominated, while the importance of unification rapidly declined. In the 1980s two-thirds to three-quarters (depending on the survey instruments) of the West German population expressed their support for unification. At the same time only a small minority still believed in the possibility of experiencing it in their own lifetimes. Public opinion was apparently determined by increasing indifference - especially in the younger generation - rather than outright rejection as an 'unattainable goal'. Taking a long-term perspective, the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961 marked a turning-point in public opinion as well as in poli-

78 Viewing 'the Other': how East sees West and West sees East

tics. The Berlin Crisis pointed to the failure of Adenauer's Nichtanerkennungspolitik ('Policy of Non-Recognition') and led to Brandt's Ostpolitik which accepted the status quo in Europe, i.e. the existence of two states but one nation in Germany. Relations with the GDR were established for the purpose of humanitarian relief. While unification was officially adhered to as a vital principle it became a very abstract if not illusionary goal. It was by no means an everyday concern for West Germans. In contrast, unification had been 'banned' by the SED government. While the revisited constitution of 1968 still included the goal of unifying 'the two German states on the basis of democracy and socialism' it was deleted in the so-called 'Honecker Constitution' of 1974. The GDR no longer defined itself as a 'socialist state of the German nation' but as the 'socialist state of workers and farmers'. We know little about public opinion in East Germany on the unification issue. According to Infratest, in the 1970s and 1980s 90 per cent of the GDR inhabitants were in favour of unification, but hardly anybody believed in its realisation. In this respect public opinion was basically the same in both parts of Germany. Nevertheless, German division had a very different meaning in the East, since East Germans had to carry the bigger part of the burden. From 1971 to 1989 an average of 42 per cent of West Germans expressed an interest in GDR affairs. Personal knowledge of the 'other' Germany, however, was limited. In 1987, 36 per cent stated that they had travelled to the East at least once since 1961. Only those with close family ties used to travel to the GDR often.9 For the rest it had become a kind of 'never-never land'. At best it served as an object of negative reference for West German self perception. The 'other' Germany in this sense helped West Germans accept the Federal Republic as a democratic state. Disunity was seen as a fact which was not endorsed but which had to be accepted as inherent to the enduring Cold War. In contrast, East Germans saw the FRG as a positive reference for German unity. It was a model of prosperity as well as freedom which clearly contrasted with the reality of life in the GDR. Interest in Western broadcasting was widespread and more and more people made use of it. One consequence was that — despite all official efforts to establish a distinctive GDR identity by, for example, avoiding any mentioning of the term 'nation' — it was very difficult for East Germans to develop their own, distinct identity (see Chapter 2 by Joanne McKay for a more detailed discussion of this point).10

1949-1989/90: living with German division 79

A closer examination of comparative data from the late 1960s reveals persistent patterns in Western perceptions of the GDR.1! One basic finding here is the explicit disapproval of the SED system, which contrasts with the continuous sympathy expressed for the country and its people (see Table 6.1). Table 6.1: GDR-sympathy-index by associations

1977 Country and people Political system

1.3 -2 .2

1978 1979 1980 1982 1985 1986 1987 1.7 -2.0

1.7 -2.0

1.8 -2.0

2.0 -1.6

2.0 -1.5

1.7 -1 .4

2.2 -0.7

Source: Infas, Infratest (scale -5 to +5); cf. M. Glaab Deutschlandpolitik (1999), p. 344.

Although they actually knew very little about the place, West Germans generally had a clear-cut and predominantly negative image of the GDR. According to the data this image was characterised by three elements: 1. Lack of freedom in contrast to Western liberty: Above all, the GDR was seen as a state which lacked personal freedom. At the heart of this impression was the fact that the state authorities interfered in the private life of its inhabitants, leading to mistrust among them. Some authors argue that this pattern was not ideologically driven in the first instance but was simply a reflection of how Westerners thought the lack of freedom was affecting the everyday life of people — most visibly by travel restrictions. In contrast, personal freedom as well as social participation were the main characteristics of the Federal Republic in the eyes of its citizens. 2. Eastern Mangelwirtschaft ('Economy of Shortages') in contrast to Western prosperity: West Germans saw economic deficits and a lack of prosperity as the main characteristics of the 'other' Germany. Reports from visitors to the GDR underline the relevance of the 'Economy of Shortages', a feature experienced by most visitors travelling in the country. At the same time FRG citizens were well aware of their own robust economy with stable prices, abundant merchandise, competitive wages and a strong welfare system.

80 Viewing 'the Other': how East sees West and West sees East 3. Similarities in the societal realm-.

Despite opposing the economic as well as political system of the GDR, few differences were noticed by West Germans in the fields of education, science and technology or health care, which from their point of view characterised the FRG and the GDR alike. Neither the FRG nor the GDR were thought to guarantee wage parity. Data also repeatedly show that the GDR was seen as the leading country in sports and youth support. Consistently West Germans favoured the Western model whenever opinion polls asked them about their vision of a unified Germany. Yet here one should not overlook that the Western dislike of the GDR was influenced by the overall climate of the East—West conflict. West Germans felt much closer to their Western neighbours and allied countries. According to the data, negative feelings towards the GDR turned into sympathy only twice: for a short while after the signing of the 'Basic Treaty' between the two German states in December 1972, and in the autumn of 1987 during Erich Honecker's visit to the Federal Republic. During the second half of the 1980s, however, there was a tendency in the West to reassess the GDR in a less negative light, a tendency which clearly coincided with the new detente — symbolised by glasnost and perestroika. As a consequence, West Germans tended to believe in the possibility of a substantial reform of the SED system - paradoxically, this was the very time when its internal acceptance was actually eroding because of its rigid intransigence. In comparison to their own standard of living the situation in the GDR was still perceived as much worse. However, many West Germans also thought that their neighbours beyond the Wall at least had more personal freedom than a decade before. This misperception can be interpreted as an outcome of the intensified relations between the two German states, which were improving in the late 1980s, shown most clearly in the Honecker visit.12 The predominantly negative image of the GDR contrasts with the feeling expressed of belonging to one nation. Although we have little evidence about how West Germans perceived their neighbours in the East, data indicate that most of them felt they had a great deal in common with the citizens of the GDR. According to a comparative profile stemming from 1976, diligence was seen as most characteristic for West Germans as well as East Germans.^ Moreover, both were described as behaving

1989/90-2001: obstacles to a German identity 81

humanly rather than inhumanly and, with some small disparities, as peaceloving rather than aggressive, not dangerous rather than dangerous, active rather than passive and bureaucratic rather than not bureaucratic. Only four distinct differences appeared: West Germans thought of themselves as being much more demanding, progressive and self-confident than East Germans. Also, Westerners thought East Germans tended to be more nationalistic rather than cosmopolitan. All these factors continue to play a crucial role in perceptions of the 'Other' after 1989/90, a period to which I now turn.

1989/90-2001: obstacles to a German identity In retrospect, a vast majority of people are convinced that unifying Germany was the right thing to do: 83 per cent in the West, and 90 per cent in the East.14 Yet, at the same time Germans also exhibit a degree of indifference towards unification. According to a recent nationwide opinion poll, only 11 per cent of West Germans as opposed to 14 per cent of East Germans think it is worthwhile commemorating the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 — an event which finally ended the inhumanity of separation and opened the road to unification. In comparison, 14 per cent in the West and 22 per cent in the East declare themselves in favour of commemorating unification.15 Although these findings partly reflect the predominant role of the Nazi past in German historical memory, and the concomitant problem of exhibiting national pride, this lack of emotion also suggests that unification has still not become a distinct feature of German identity. 16 Uncertainties about the road to unification might have contributed to that feeling. When the Iron Curtain crumbled, Germans could hardly be said to be showing enthusiasm for their nation. However, for the first time since the Wall had been built unification became a viable option. In December 1989 every second German believed in the possibility of its realisation. In the West support of unification rose from 68 per cent in the autumn of 1989 to more than 80 per cent from spring 1990 onwards. Most West Germans favoured unification via Article 23 of the Basic Law, i.e. 57 per cent preferred the accession of the East German states to the existing Federal Republic instead of a new German constitution allowed for by Article 146 of the Basic Law. A striking 60 per cent did not wish to

82 Viewing 'the Other': how East sees West and West sees East

modify the Basic Law at all.17 Early opinion polls in the East showed a more hesitant mood. About one-third initially preferred a 'third way' of democratisation in the GDR. In November 1989 only 48 per cent of East Germans actually wanted unification, but by February 1990 support had risen to 80 per cent and continued to rise in the following months. Moreover the first free V7olkskammer (East German parliament) election in March 1990 — with an overwhelming turnout of 93.4 per cent — resulted in an unexpected victory for the Allian^Jur Deutschland (The Alliance for Germany) which symbolised a strong voice for a quick unification. After all, the vast majority in Germany was ready to seize the historical chance of unification. 18 Nevertheless, the the very different impact of unification on the East soon became apparent. While West Germans could easily accept the introduction of their political, legal and economic system to the former GDR, East Germans had to cope with a radical transition. As GDR dissident Barbel Bohley once put it: 'Even the dial tone on the telephone (was) different now'.19 A decade later unification has become normal, but East and West Germans still experience different consequences. Despite all efforts, living conditions in both parts of the country still differ greatly.2() In the new Lander gross income rose from 49 per cent of the West German level in 1991 to 77 per cent in 2000. Net income reached 90 per cent. While this might seem acceptable, unemployment creates a sharp contrast between both parts of the country. In 2000 East Germany had an unemployment rate of 17.4 per cent — in comparison to 7.8 per cent in West Germany.21 Despite a strong and growing feeling among East Germans that personal living conditions have improved since unification, 78 per cent think that the Federal Government's commitment to the socalled Aufbau Ost (Building up the East) is not sufficient.22 In contrast, 62 per cent of West Germans feel that 'just enough' is being done.23 An important, yet usually neglected, factor in this context is the differing media reality in both parts of the country. While the scope of TV programmes is roughly comparable — although East Germans tend to prefer private broadcasting and watch TV longer than West Germans do24 — the landscape of print media differs profoundly. Leading dailies (such as Suddeutsche Zeitung and FAZ) have a relatively poor circulation in the new Lander. Instead, we find a specific landscape of press monopolies there — formed by regional newspapers and tabloid press tides.25 A prominent example of the latter is the weekly magazine Super Illu which sells more

1989/90-2001: obstacles to a German identity 83

than 600,000 copies and has a market share of 18.2 per cent in the new Lander. Using the subtitle 'Bine fur tins' ('one for us') this magazine promotes itself as the most widely-read weekly which covers 'everything that interests and moves people in Eastern Germany'.2^ This seems to meet a specific need: indeed, 57 per cent of East Germans generally feel ignored in the media, whereas 64 per cent of West Germans think that the coverage of the new Lander is sufficient.27 Furthermore, one has to expect a distorted view of the situation due to the media's preference for negative news. Since the media are an indicator as well as a driver of cultural change in society, further research is necessary to measure media influence on the perception of the unification process.2^ Remarkably there are also signs of nostalgia on both sides nowadays. So-called Ostalgie is a popular synonym for a (partially) positive remembrance of the former GDR among East Germans which has developed along with a growing scepticism towards the Federal Republic. Above all, this tendency reflects disappointment and dissatisfaction with the current situation in the new Lander. High expectations of the welfare state, for example, contrast with the perceived loss of social security.29 While in the past the FRG had appeared as a most attractive model, reality after unification could not keep up with this image - nevertheless, comparing the East and West remains an important means of orientation. More and more frequently, the former GDR is seen in a softer light: a majority (60 per cent) of East Germans now believe that life was not that bad before the collapse of the Wall.30 This does not necessarily reflect socialist values but might be an attempt by East Germans to reconcile themselves with the past (in a sense this is an attempt to abstract positive experiences of the personal sphere or daily life from the restraints of the political system).31 The PDS, successor party to the former SED, successfully appeals to these nostalgic feelings by promoting its advocacy role for specific East German demands. Whereas Ostalgie is a much discussed phenomenon, one tends to ignore similar tendencies among West Germans that might be characterised as a nostalgic look backwards to the schone alte Bundesrepublik ('good old Federal Republic'). In 1990 opinion polls showed that West Germans had a very positive attitude towards their political system and economic order. With the fall of the Wall the widespread scepticism of the late 1980s seemed to vanish overnight. The decline of support for the political system during the 1990s might be interpreted as part of a normalisation

84 Viewing 'the Other': how East sees West and West sees East

process taking place in Germany in which its citizens began to have a more realistic perception of prevailing conditions. At the same time, West Germans had to realise that unification would have substantial long-term costs (Solidaritdts^uschlag (Solidarity Surcharge), Aufbau Osf) and would also lead to changes in the political landscape (PDS, rightwing extremism) which affect both parts of the country. Although two thirds (67 per cent) admit that unification problems so far have not been solved, a vast majority (78 per cent) think it is not fair that East Germans are dissatisfied with what has been done to improve their living conditions.^ Latent disappointment therefore is also tangible in West German public opinion. East and West Germans' mutual negative stereotyping, commonly demarcated by the terms Jammerossi (the 'complaining' Easterner) and Besserwessi (the 'know-it-all' Westerner), are interpreted as another important obstacle to inner unification. A number of comparative profiles roughly confirm the previous finding of a broad common ground between East and West Germans. Quantitative results vary with the survey instruments but most illustrate mutual negative perceptions during the 1990s. According to one of the first opinion polls stemming from autumn 1990 — when many of the problems of the unification process were not yet fully visible — a (relative) majority in both parts of the country saw no fundamental differences between East and West Germans with respect to education, middle-class conformism (Spiefiburgerlicbkeif)^ tolerance, national conviction, hostility towards foreigners, ruthlessness and diligence. A closer look at these stereotypes, however, reveals differences and specific dividing lines (see Table 6.2). Thus, in the early 1990s we already find well-known cliches: West Germans predominantly perceived the Eastern 'Other' as being obedient to authorities, easily manipulated and modest while they thought of themselves as being more self-confident, arrogant and consumer oriented. Moreover, considerable parts described themselves as being more diligent, craving for admiration, democratic and ambitious, characteristics which were hardly ever seen as 'typically' East German.34 In contrast, East Germans saw diligence as the main characteristic of Germans with no differences between both parts of the population at all. From an Eastern perspective the Western 'Other' was perceived not only as arrogant, self-confident, craving admiration and consumer-oriented, but also as ambitious, critical and democratic. They agreed with West Germans about East German stereotypes (obedient to authorities, easily manipu-

1989/90-2001: obstacles to a German identity 85 Table 6.2: Characteristics of East and West Germans 1990 ( per cent)

Eastern view

Western view No difference

More typical More typical for West

for East

Germans

Germans

No difference

More typical More typical for West

for East

Germans

Germans

Educated

62

32

3

63

26

9

Middle-

60

16

20

42

38

15

Tolerant

58

27

12

47

33

17

Showing

55

12

28

39

9

48

55

16

26

51

35

11

55

23

18

60

23

13

Ruthless

54

35

7

50

35

10

Egoist

48

37

11

48

38

11

Diligent

48

47

4

71

14

14

Actively

46

23

30

37

22

38

45

43

8

37

49

8

Critical

44

34

20

45

26

27

Self-

38

54

6

34

56

9

Arrogant

36

54

8

35

58

4

Consump-

30

53

15

31

42

24

class, conformist

solidarity Showing national conviction Hostile towards foreigners

participating in politics Craving admiration

confident

tion oriented Democratic

46

48

4

45

39

13

Ambitious

44

46

8

56

23

18

Obedient to

31

4

61

32

14

50

40

7

50

25

3

69

40

10

47

25

3

70

authorities Easily manipulated Modest

Source: Infratest: Die Deutschen West und Ost im Herbst 1990: Gemeinsamkeiten und D/Vergenzen. Analyseband, Munchen, pp. 14-16 (translated by the author).

86 Viewing 'the Other': how East sees West and West sees East

lated, modest) with one important exception: a relative majority saw solidarity as another characteristic of themselves. Subsequent surveys confirmed basic elements of this pattern of stereotypes, although remarkably stable perceptions in the West to some extent contrast with a growing scepticism towards the 'Other' in the East.35 Yet, the main problem here is — as empirical analyses indicate — that on both sides there is a tendency to project the problems and disappointments of the unification process on to the 'Other'. East and West Germans perceive themselves to be the winners and losers of unification respectively.36 In particular East Germans generally regard themselves as being under-privileged: 74 per cent still perceive themselves to be 'second class citizens'.37 Kaase and Bauer-Kaase present an interesting analysis of stereotypes between 1992 and 1997 — all of them related to the unification process — which delivers evidence of a growing distance between East and West Germans. Both tend to a positive in-group and a negative out-group orientation which did not diminish over time, but rather became more pronounced. Graphs 6.1—6.8 illustrate this trend.38 In 1997 the percentage of those who exclusively blamed the other side for the problems of unification rose to 41 per cent in the West and 76 per cent in the East. From a theoretical perspective this indicates that East—West stereotypes continue to be an important factor of the identity building process. East Germans are caught up in the tension that exists between regaining self-acceptance by demarcation from the West (Abgren^ungsidentitafiV) and the need to find a degree of accommodation with the West. In contrast, West Germans, who did not have to redefine their identity after unification, maintained a more self-confident attitude which also allowed a degree of self-criticism.40 This does not, however, mean that East and West German self-understanding is split or detached. If one moves to another level of collective identity, asking how Germans perceive themselves as a nation, a different picture emerges. According to nationwide surveys from 1994 and 2000 the German character is described in very similar ways in both parts of the country.41 The skills most often cited are 'working', 'organising' and 'thinking'. East and West Germans also roughly agree about the German profile in comparison to the French, American and British. Building cars, houses and roads still seem to be most characteristic for Germans. Generally, a positive image is created with a slight tendency to be more modest about German skills in East Germany. Hence, German identity is

1989/90-2001: obstacles to a German identity 87

6.1. 'West Germans colonised the former GDR'

6.2. 'Despite their wealth West Germans have still not learned to share'

88 Viewing 'the Other': how East sees West and West sees East

6.3. 'East Germany is primarily seen as a market for West German goods. Not enough is done to maintain East Germany as a production site'

6.4. 'In the West you find people who prefer to live as if unification never happened'

1989/90-2001: obstacles to a German identity 89

6.5. The Federal Government is not doing enough to secure jobs in the former GDR'

6.6 'A lot of former GDR citizens take it too easy. They want to live like the West but to work as they did in former times in the East'

90 Viewing 'the Other': how East sees West and West sees East

6.7. 'East Germans tend to pity themselves'

6.8. 'Many workers and employees cannot stand Western standards of pressure'

Graphs 6.1-8: Approval of East-West Stereotypes 1992-1997 (percentages) (Source: Kaase/Bauer-Kaase, 1999, p. 258. Translated by author).

Conclusions and future prospects 91

not only defined by internal Selbst- und Fremdbilder ('perceptions of oneself and of the other') but also by an external frame of reference. Furthermore German identity consists of complementary layers of identity which depend on the perceived context.42 East Germans as well as West Germans define themselves as German in the first place but at the same time a vast majority is proud to be European43 - despite a degree of scepticism towards the European Union. Finally, signs of a separate East German identity seem less vital at the beginning of the new decade. In 2001 a majority feels 'German7 (60 per cent) rather than 'East German' (37 per cent)44 — inner unity in this sense would appear to be on its way. Although, as I argue below, this situation needs to be qualified.

Conclusions and future prospects In many respects the 'Berlin Republic' is different to the 'Bonn Republic'. More than a decade after unification, however, a joint German identity is still in the process of formation. This chapter concentrated on perceptions of the 'Other' which were interpreted as an important obstacle to inner unity, rooted in the disunited past and partly renewed by the present state of the unification process. Unification obviously had a very different impact in the East and the West. Although long-term financial transfers cause some scepticism, West Germans generally still welcome unification. In contrast to East Germans, they did not experience unification as a radical brake with their past. Instead they could easily accept the expansion of the Federal Republic's order into the new Lander. East Germans tend to interpret unification as a process of Western domination. Unification for most of them was a critical event, through which their past experience has ostensibly become devalued. This has, in turn, led to a need by many in the East to re-interpret this past.45 A tendency to compare current predicaments with the GDR period leads to ambivalent results. Without questioning unification itself, the East seems to be growing apart from the FRG, whilst the GDR is presented in an ever-softer light. Moreover, the feeling of belonging together has lost its political function of maintaining national ties across the Iron Curtain. Since unification, latent as well as overt mutual disappointments have resulted in a growing distance between East and West Germans. A tendency among East Germans to

92 Viewing 'the Other': how East sees West and West sees East

assume a negative out-group orientation points at the need for regaining self-acceptance, while West Germans tend to hold on to their Selbst- und Fremdbild.Perceptions of the 'Other' thus depend on complex interactions between historical and situational factors.46 On the one hand, socialisation within antagonistic political systems on both sides of the Wall continues to exert influence on how East and West Germans perceive the current situation. While opinions on day-to-day politics are subject to short-term fluctuations, political values change only gradually. Following this assumption we have to expect that different value systems referring to the normative conflict between the liberal and the socialist order will endure in the medium run. On the other hand, situational factors, above all economic and social living conditions, define the diverging daily lives of East and West Germans. The enduring socio-economic gap between East and West is experienced as an injustice. As long as this so-called 'objective inner Wall'47 persists, perceptions of the 'Other' will refer to an Anspruchs- und Verteilungskonflikt (a conflict of demands and distribution). However, the implicit assumption that inner unity will come along by East German adaptation to West German political culture seems misleading. All Germans are subject to common challenges in the wake of fundamental global change. Modern technologies and liberal world trade are not only forcing a structural change of the labour market and the welfare system but also intensifying individual need for value change. While security is a crucial element of their value systems West Germans as well as East Germans sense it is loosing ground, e.g. both expect growing social tensions in the future. But whereas West Germans tend to believe in their ability to cope with new demands in the economic and societal realm, East Germans tend to be more pessimistic about their own prospects.48 Data show, however, a similar reaction to these challenges on both sides, namely a tendency to return to more traditional values — such as security, diligence and economical spending - which derives from growing economic scepticism and an overall loss of social security. A prominent example is the strengthening of labour ties which, until the mid 1990s, had been in decline.49 Here we see changes in values developing in the same direction in both East and West Germany. One might doubt then whether the disunited past as well as problems of the unification process will continue to hinder inner unity in the long run. An optimistic outlook, however, is slightly dimmed by signs of nostalgia among the younger generation. Without elaborating on this phe-

Notes 93 nomenon, one can note a tendency to compare the current situation which is defined by the socio-economic gap between East and West - to what is said about the GDR past.50 Apparently the perception of reality to some extent is determined by insufficient debate on the unification process, focussing on the 'Other' rather than on common challenges. In conclusion, I would thus argue that a joint identity will only emerge through an open communicative process which embraces both the past and current experiences of East and West Germans. In a 'Zeitalterderneuen Identitdtsfmdungen* (an era of new identity formation) (Wolf Lepenies) the need to develop a joint understanding about the future might be even more important.

Notes 1 2

3 4

5

6

7 8

W. Brandt in Texte %ur Deutschlandpolitik, ed. Bundesministerium fur innerdeutsche Beziehungen, Reihe III/8b (Bonn: 1990), p. 758. Cf. J. Falter, O. Gabriel and H. Rattinger (eds.), Wirklich em Volk? Die politischen Orientierungen von Ost- und Westdeutschen im Vergleich (Opladen: 2000), p. 19. W Weidenfeld, Die Idmtitdt der Deutscben (Bonn: 1983), p. 19. For an overview see W Weidenfeld and K.R. Korte, Die Deutscben. Profit einer Nation (Stuttgart: 1991); on the 'German Question' see M. Glaab, Deutschlandpolitik in der offentlicben Meinung. Einstellungen und Regierungspolitik in derBundesrepublik Deutschland 1949 bis 1990 (Opladen: 1999); if not cited otherwise, data stem from that source. Still existing reports are documented in H. Niemann, Meinungsforschung in der DDR. Die geheimen Berichte des Instituts fur Meinungsforschung an das Politburo der SED (Cologne: 1993). The samples include East Germans aged 14 to 25; for an overview see P. Forster, 'Die deutsche Frage im BewuBtsein der Bevolkerung in beiden Teilen Deutschlands: Einstellungen junger iMenschen in der DDR', in Materialien der Enquete-Kommission 'Aufarbeitung von Geschichte und Folgen der SED-Diktatur in Deutschland\ ed. Deutscher Bundestag, V/2 (Baden-Baden: 1995), pp. 1212-1380. One of the first articles on this problem is U. Meier, 'Nachdem die Panzerschranke geoffnet sind', in D]l-Bulletin, 15 (1990), 7-12. See A. Kohler, 'NationalbewuBtsein und Identitatsgefiihl der Burger der DDR unter besonderer Beriicksichtigung der deutschen Frage', in

94 Viewing 'the Other': how East sees West and West sees East

9

10

11 12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

Materialien der Enquete-Kommission^ V/2, pp. 1636-1675. For more detailed data see W Weidenfeld and M. Glaab, T)ie deutsche Frage im Bewusstsein der Westdeutschen Bevolkerung', in Materialien der EnqueteKommission, V/3, pp. 2798-2962, This has been described as an 'asymmetry of interest'; see M. Glaab, 'Geteilte Wahrnehmungswelten. Zur Prasenz des deutschen Nachbarn im Bewusstsein der Bevolkerung', in Deutsche Vergangenheiten — eine gemeinsame Herausforderung. Der schwierige Umgang mit der doppelten Nachkriegsgeschichte, ed. C. KleBmann et al (Berlin: 1999), pp. 206-20. Details of the comprehensive data analysis in Glaab, Deutschlandpolitik, pp. 304-62. See R. Hilmer and A. Kohler, 'Die Wende fur Honecker. Daten zur Entwicklung des Meinungsbildes der Bundesbiirger iiber den HoneckerBesuch seit 1982', in Deutschland Archiv, 10 (1987), 1084-91; J. Hacker et al., 'Das DDR-Bild. Einschatzungen und Wahrnehmungen in Politik und Medien', in Interne Studien (Sankt Augustin: 1995). Ranking of 15 bipolar characteristics on a scale from 1 to 7. For a more detailed account see Weidenfeld and Glaab, 'Die deutsche Frage', p. 2915; data from East Germany are not available. See Bundesverband deutscher Banken, '50 Jahre Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Ergebnisse einer reprasentativen Meinungsumfrage', in Demoskopie^ (1999), 17. Another 3 per cent in the West and 10 per cent in the East think Germans should remember the building of the Wall in August 1961; see W Weidenfeld, 'Geschichte und Identitat', in Deutschland-Trendbuch. Fakten und Orientierungen, ed K. R. Korte and W. Weidenfeld (Opladen: 2001), pp. 29-58. For more detail on specific East—West as well as generational differences see F. Ph. Lutz, Das Geschichtsbewusstsein der Deutschen. Grundlagen der politischen Kultur in Ost und West (Cologne: 2000); on external implications see A. S. Markovits and S. Reich, The German Predicament. Memory and Power in the ~Nen> Europe (Ithaca and London: 1997) See. M. Glaab, 'Einstellungen zur deutschen Einheit', in Handbuch %ur deutschen Einheit 1949-1989-1999, ed. W Weidenfeld and K.-R. Korte (Frankfurt a.M. and New York: 1999), pp. 306-16. See W Herbert and R. Wildenmann, 'Deutsche Identitat. Die subjektive Verfassung der Deutschen vor der Vereinigung', in Nation und Demokratie: Politisch-strukturelle Gestaltungsprobleme im neuen Deutschland^ ed. R. Wildenmann (Baden-Baden: 1991), p. 71-98; B. Westle, 'Einstellungen zur Nation und den Mitbiirgern', in Politische Orientierungen und Verhaltensweisen im vereinigten Deutschland, ed. O. W Gabriel (Opladen: 1997), pp. 61-80. Quoted in T. Heneghan, Unchained Eagle. Germany after the Wall (London: 2000), p. 143.

Notes 95 20 See T. Buhlmahn, 'Zur Entwicklung der Lebensqualitat im vereinten Deutschland', in APuZ, 40 (2000), 30-38. 21 See 'Zum Stand der Deutschen Einheit - Zwischenbilanz der Angleichung der Wirtschafts-, Arbeits- und Lebensbedingungen in Ost- und Westdeutschland vom 30.09.2001'; (http://www.bundesregierung.de/dokumente/Struktur/ix_ 56735.htm). 22 A massive 59 per cent of East Germans think so, in comparison to only 20 per cent of West Germans, see Wohlfahrtssurvey 1998. See, for example: 'Subjektives Wohlbefinden in Ostdeutschland nahert sich Westdeutschem Niveau', in Informationsdienst So^iale Indikatoren, 22 (1999), 1. 23 See also Emnicl opinion poll, in Potitik Kompass, eel. Konrad-AclenauerStiftung, 7 (2001), p. 6. 24 See G. Frey-Vor et a/., 'Daten der Mediennutzung in Ost- und Westdeutschland. Ergebnisse von 1992 bis 2001 im Vergleich', in Media Perspektiven 2 (2002), 54-69. 25 See W. J. Schiitz, 'Deutsche Tagespresse 2000', in Media Perspektiven, 12 (2001), 602-32. 26 http://www.mediasales.no/superillu-online.html. 27 http://www.medialine.superillu.de/crossmed/img024.GIE 28 For more detail on this see M. Glaab, Tolitikvermittlung in der Mediendemokratie — Indikator und Faktor politisch-kulturellen Wandels', in Politische Kultur im Process der inneren Einheit (Munich: 1999), pp. 25-46. 29 Social security receives high esteem in both parts of the country but East Germans have much higher expectations of the welfare state than West Germans. Half of the latter but more than two-thirds of the former think society tends to social injustice; see Edeltraud Roller, 'Sozialpolitische Orientierungen nach der deutschen Vereinigung', in Politische Binstellungen und politisches Verhalten im Transfomiationspro^efe, ed. O. W Gabriel (Opladen: 1997), pp. 115-46. 30 27 per cent agree with that assumption totally, another 33 per cent agree to some extend; see Weidenfeld, Deutscbland-Trendbuch, pp. 42—5. 31 According to Neller about one-third of East Germans have a positive view of the GDR ('more good sides than bad ones') and some sympathy for socialism ('good idea, but badly done'); see K. Neller, 'DDR-Nostalgie? Analysen zur Identifikation der Ostdeutschen mit ihrer politischen Vergangenheit, zur ostdeutschen Identitat und zur Ost-WestStereotypisierung', in: J. Falter, O. Gabriel and H. Rattinger (eds.), Wirklich ein I'olk? Die politischen Orientierungen von Ost und Westdeutschen im Vergleicb (Opladen: 2000), pp. 571-607. 32 See A. KieBling, 'Politische Kultur und Parteien im vereinten Deutschland. Determinanten der Entwicklung des Parteiensystems', Schnftenreihe der Forschungsgruppe Deutschland^ 11 (1999). 33 See interesse, 11 (1999), 4.

96 East German identity and party politics

34 ibid., 2917. 35 For an overview see M. Kaase, 'Innere Einheit', in Weidenfeld and Korte, Handbi4ch %ur deutschen Einbeit, pp. 454-66. 36 See A. Thumfahrt, Tolitische Kultur in Deutschland', in ApuZ, 39-40 (2001), 6-14. 37 See ibid.; data show fluctuations on a high level: 1990: 92 per cent, 1995: 69 per cent, 1996: 82 per cent. 38 See M. Kaase and P. Bauer-Kaase, 'Deutsche Vereinigung und innere Einheit 1990-1997', in Werte und nationak Identitat im vereinten Deutschland. Erkldrungsansdt^e der Umfrageforschung, ed. H. Meulemann (Opladen: 1998), pp. 251-67. 39 See D. Pollack and G. Pickel, 'Die ostdeutsche Identitat - Erbe des DDRSozialismus oder Produkt der Wiedervereinigung? Die Einstellungen der Ostdeutschen zu sozialer Ungleichheit und Demokratie', in APuZ^ 41/2 (1998), 9-23. 40- See Kaase and Bauer-Kaase, 'Deutsche Vereinigung', p. 264; remarkably, this tendency among West Germans to internalise unification-related negative stereotypes (1997: 12 per cent) in most cases emanates from the left-alternative milieu which actually opposed unification in the first place. 41 Thanks to the archive of the Institutfar Demoskopie, Allensbach, the author was able to compare East and West German results; IfD-Umfrage 5098 und 7000, see allensbacher bericbte, 4 (2001). 42 See Weidenfeld, Die Identitat der Deutschen. 43 According to a survey stemming from October 2001 78 per cent in the West and 81 per cent in the East are proud to be European. Only about one-third worries that European integration might replace a German identity; see interesse, 11 (2001), 6. 44 In the West 81 per cent feel German, 15 per cent West German; given the fact that we saw even higher percentages of 'Germanness' in 2000 (East: 71 per cent; West: 87 per cent) it seems at the moment that a positive trend has come to a halt. See interesse, 11 (2001), 8. 45 See L. Fritze, 'Identifikation mit dem gelebten Leben. Gibt es DDRNostalgie in den neuen Bundeslandern?' in Das medervereinigte Deutschland, eds. R. Altenhof and E.Jesse (Diisseldorf: 1995), pp. 275-92. 46 See W Biirklin, 'Die politische Kultur in Ost- und Westdeutschland: Eine Zwischenbilanz', in Einigung und Zerfall: Deutscbland und Europa nacb dem Ende des Ost-West-Konflikts, ed. G. Lehmbruch (Opladen: 1995), pp. 11-34. 47 C. Zelle, 'Soziale und liberale Wertorientierungen: Versuch einer situativen Erklarung der Unterschiede zwischen Ost- und Westdeutschen', in APuZ, 41-42 (1998), 29. 48 E. Brahler and H.-E. Richter, 'Deutsche - zehn Jahre nach der Wende.

Notes 97 Ergebnisse einer vergleichenden Ost-West-Untersuchung', in APuZ^ 45 (1999), 24-31. 49 This does not mean that post-materialism and individuality of life-styles simply vanishes; see H.-J. Veen and J. Graf, 'Riickkehr zu traditionellen Werten? Zum Zusammenhang von Wertorientierungen, politischen Prioritaten und Wirtschaftsklima 1982-1996', in Interne Studie, 131 (Sankt Augustin 1997); see also H. Klages, 'Brauchen wir eine Riickkehr zu traditionellen Werten?', in APuZ, 29 (2001), pp. 7-14. 50 See T. Rausch, 'Zwischen Freiheitssuche und DDR-Nostalgie. Lebensentwiirfe und Gesellschaftsbilder ostcleutscher Jugendlicher', in APuZ, 45 (1999), 32-38; see M. Reitzle, 'Anhaltende Kluft oder Annaherung zwischen Ost und West? Ausgewahlte demoskopische Befunde', in Entnncklung im so^ialen Wandel, ed.: R. K. Silbereisen and J. Zinnecker (Weinheim: 1999), pp. 63-79

This page intentionally left blank

7 East German identity and party politics Daniel Hough

The Federal Republic of Germany swallowed the GDR whole. And now she is causing the FRG quite a stomach ache!^

This chapter discusses how the main parties in the East German party system (the CDU, the SPD and the PDS) have attempted to come to terms with the existence of a distinctive form of self-appreciation in East Germany. It begins by describing how the West German parties expanded eastwards post-1990, in an attempt to monopolise political competition in Neufunfland, and how the PDS managed to carve a niche for itself as an East German regional party. The second section analyses how this development prevented distinctive East German interests from gaining articulation in the national programmes of the CDU and SPD, and concomitantly assisted the PDS in gaining a stronghold in the East German party system. Through this process of development the two main V7olksparteien stifled much of the opportunity for a re-orientation towards a specific articulation of East German interests, in that political competition remained dominated by the parameters of debate in the Western states. The third section discusses how electors who possess a strong sense of East German identity tend to vote, and how the parties attempt to come to terms with this. This section illustrates that the nature of the parties' attitudes towards this issue of Ostidentitat will indeed have an important bearing on how party competition develops, in both the short and medium term, in Germany's Eastern Lander.

100 East German identity and party politics

Go East and multiply! As the prospect of unification became a reality, all of the Western parties attempted to expand their spheres of influence eastwards. For both the CDU and the FDP this initially involved forming alliances with their East German sister organisations, before eventual amalgamation and the creation of 'united' political platforms. This enabled these parties to take advantage of pre-existing structures in profiling themselves across the newly created East German Lander. The Western organisations were able to provide experience, know-how and, most importantly, finance for funding political campaigning and the creation of viable organisational structures. For the SPD, the task was inherently more complicated, as ideological proximity to the 'Communist Left' and the lack of a partner party led the Social Democrats to attempt to build an 'ideologically pure' party from the bottom up. Both Alliance 90 and the PDS, on account of their roots in different sections of East German society, remained largely East German parties, concentrating on retaining their unique platforms within the broader context of a national party system. In the long-run, the PDS has broadly succeeded in doing this, while Alliance 90/Greens has developed, as East German activists have lost influence within the party, away from the aims and ideals of the East German civil rights groups of the late 1980s and towards a more Western-orientated Green political platform. In early elections in East Germany the CDU established a dominant position in the party system, subsequently shaping and controlling political life in the immediate post- Wende period.2 The charismatic leadership of Helmut Kohl and the promises of personal freedom and material prosperity enabled the CDU to profile itself as the Einheitspartei (Party of Unity) in the Eastern states. Even in 1994, as the problems of social, economic and political transformation were becoming fully evident, the CDU managed to retain its leading position in East Germany and returned to power at the federal level. In the early 1990s the FDP also gained from being able to make use of the organisation and membership base that it inherited on amalgamation with the Liberal Democratic Party (LDPD) and the National Democratic Party (NDPD) as the GDR collapsed. However, as the transformation process continued, and particularly once the popular (and Halle-born) former Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher left the political stage, the FDP's popularity took

Go East and multiply! 101

a dramatic nosedive. By 1994 it was no longer represented in any of the Eastern Landtage^ membership numbers had declined rapidly and its freemarket economic agenda retained few supporters in an electorate that was inherently sceptical of the market economy. The SPD, meanwhile, adopted, for a number of reasons, an altogether different strategy of eastward expansion. As a result of the forced unification of the Social Democratic and Communist movements in the Soviet Zone of Occupation in 1946, the Social Democrats were faced with the immediate problem of not having a sister organisation with which they could align themselves post-1989. The SPD found itself in a difficult position of not knowing quite how to deal with the communist legacy evident after forty years of one-party rule. Subsequently the SPD chose to create a completely new party basis, devoid of former SED members. It also had to do without the benefits that previous organisational structures would have inevitably accrued, as it built itself from the 'bottom up'. In hindsight, this proved to be an electoral mistake, as to this day the SPD remains a weakly organised party that struggles to compete with the CDU and the PDS. The PDS, of course, found itself faced with a different dilemma. In late 1989 and early 1990, the SED, the PDS's direct predecessor, found itself in a state of disarray. With its monopoly of power eroding, and members leaving the party in droves, it became obvious that reform and adaptation to some sort of new role was the only way in which the party could build a long-term future for itself. Wise to the fact that if it were to completely disband it would lose its property and assets, the party renamed itself and tried to steer a path between programmatic continuity and pragmatic change. Despite the PDS's initial difficulties, election results in the Eastern states in the mid and late 1990s have illustrated that expectations of a rapid demise were very wide of the mark. Indeed, one of the reasons that the PDS has been able to dodge a premature death is its adaptation to a new role as an advocate of East German interests — subsequently articulating many feelings, needs and desires that those citizens who possess a strong sense of identity with East Germany still possess.3

102 East German identity and party politics

The parties and their attitudes towards 'East German identity' It was only in the years after 1990 that the parties found themselves faced with the challenge of dealing with quantifiable feelings of 'differentness' in East Germany. Yet while journalists and academics have little or no hesitation in discussing what an East German identity may be understood as meaning, politicians are very rarely drawn into speaking in such clearcut terms. The public debate, in their eyes, needs to centre on other issues and policies that may indeed touch on the subject of identity, but rarely do they see the need to go further than superficial analyses of what Ostidentitat may actually mean. Why does such an apparently obvious reluctance to discuss such questions exist? The answer is relatively simple. None of the parties, including, to a certain extent, the PDS, see little merit in openly trying to articulate something that does not fit into their ideological ethos and/or political strategy. As this volume helps to clarify, an East German identity has arisen out of a combination of typical characteristics from life in the GDR and the effects of the transformation process that was set in motion in 1989/90. This identity is both a reaction to collective feelings of inferiority and a protective wall against dreaded social and moral de-classification.4 West Germans, whether they realised it or not, were not willing to accept that their understanding of how political, economic and social life in a 'united Germany' was to be conducted should substantially change. They remain(ed) sure of their identity and saw no need to question any of the tenets underlying it.5 It was for East Germans to learn how to become like West Germans, not for citizens of both German states to reassess their positions and come together in one new nation-state. Easterners were clearly not expected to continue to display differing cultural and psychological orientations to those of Westerners.6 For this reason the rise and stabilisation of an East German identity is often seen as either a continuation of a socialist heritage, a nostalgic look back to the certainties of an expansive welfare state or a conscious rejection of West German norms and values.7

The CDU CDU politicians, in particular, have tended to see any manifestation of an East German identity in an expressly negative fashion. While the CDU

The parties and their attitudes towards 'East German identity' 103

openly extols the virtues of territorial diversity, and the regional identities that have long existed in the FRG, it refuses to view the existence of an East German identity in such terms.8 As Thomas Klein, former General Secretary of the CDU in Brandenburg, has unequivocally described it: The recent debates about the profile of the CDU in the Eastern states highlight how the party still needs to build bridges to the citizens of East Germany. It cannot, however, do this through the prism of an articulation of a specific East German identity, as no such identity exists. Rather, one should talk of long-standing regional identities such as those in Brandenburg or Saxony, just like those that exist in the Western states of Westphalia or Bavaria.9 The founders of the CDU created a political platform that involved strong support for the social market economy, a westward-orientated foreign policy, pro-Europeanism and the adoption of morals and values based firmly on Christian beliefs. CDU politicians realise that an East German identity, however it is defined, is unlikely to centre on what have traditionally been the key determinants of their own self-appreciation. Yet it is the experience of living in the GDR, and the experience of living through the rapid transformation process, that has shaped the attitudes and preferences of East German citizens today.10 Eckhard Rehberg, the CDU's parliamentary leader in Mecklenburg Western Pomerania, has summarised this problem succinctly: Forty years of socialist propaganda have clearly left their mark in the East German states. Citizens of the GDR were systematically deprived of Christian values and of their traditional, national and regional roots. In the GDR a distorted 'replacement structure' was installed that still remains deep in the hearts and minds of East Germans.11

The most concerted challenge to this consensus within the party came in 1996, when two CDU politicians from Mecklenburg Western Pomerania published discussion papers on the CDU's position within East German politics and society. Eckhard Rehberg published a discussion paper aimed specifically at prompting debate on the values and strategy of the Eastern CDU for the year 2000, while Paul Kriiger, spokesman for Eastern CDU

104 East German identity and party politics

MPs in the Bundestag and former Federal Minister of Research, published a pamphlet discussing '14 Thesen %um Ost-Profil der CDU9.^2 Kriiger was vehement in articulating a strategy aimed at sidelining the PDS's successful repositioning as the 'Eastern German party'. He stressed the importance of fighting the PDS with its own weapon, subsequently stressing that the CDU should positively emphasise the important function that specifically regional identities play within social and political life in the Eastern states. Kriiger broadly took Bavaria as his model, emphasising the importance and vitality of regional identity in Bavaria and the CSU's successful articulation of this within the political process. Kriiger hypothesised that the only way the CDU could come to terms with the diverging differences within Germany was to actively articulate them and seek to either stress the virtues evident in diversity or, where applicable, to develop feasible political alternatives. Within the CDU, Eastern MPs needed to be more vociferous and also to be prepared to fight more vigorously for East German interests in times of conflict within the parliamentary party. The lack of any Christian underpinnings to 'East Germanness' is, however, a clear and persistent worry to CDU politicians, as it has always traditionally formed the bedrock of their political platform. Jorg Schonbohm, Deputy Prime Minister of Brandenburg, has stressed that even in East Germany, where only one-fifth of citizens classify themselves as Christians, the CDU needs to use the Christian world-view as a clear compass by which it develops policies suitable for tackling contemporary problems. Schonbohm speaks for many CDU members when he emphasises that the Christian faith and conservative value structures are the 'moral basis for the future'.13 Eckhard Rehberg articulates the same point in a slightly different way when he observes that: 'The Union has a hard task ahead of it, as it needs to sell a political package based on Christian values to a broadly atheist population.'14 The aspects of life in the GDR which Easterners positively recollect are not issues or value structures which the CDU feels it can easily identify with. According to the 1998 DFG project on political attitudes and political participation, for example, 72 per cent of Easterners felt that the GDR as a whole had at least as many good sides as bad sides.15 Nowhere in any CDU literature is one likely to find such a positive analysis of life in the GDR. On the contrary, the GDR is persistently and relentlessly condemned — inevitably leaving many Easterners with the impression that their lived experiences in the GDR are not valued in the same way as those of Westerners are. The policy positions of the CDU also have little

The parties and their attitudes towards 'East German identity' 105

in common with much of the ideological underpinnings of the East German identity. Within the Eastern electorate there is a widespread refusal to condemn socialism, the state is expected to take a much more active role in organising economic and political life, egalitarianism is stressed over and above individual freedom, and the increasingly active role of German forces in international affairs is viewed sceptically; yet none of these policy positions are reflected in the CDU's programme package. This illustrates how the core values and ideological basis of the CDU's platform, formed and developed in West Germany, and remaining largely unchanged post-1989, are far removed from East German interests and concerns. In the late 1990s, the CDU has attempted to stress the importance of regional identities in the Eastern states. On account of their historical nature, the CDU sees them as positive tools in helping to strengthen feelings of community and togetherness. As Rehberg once again observes: All our efforts ... (at the Land level) ... are aimed towards strengthening the regional identity of the CDU in Mecklenburg Western Pomerania in order to support and facilitate feelings of togetherness and community.16 The CDU sees these historically anchored regional identifications as positive attachments to the local community, and its political work in the Eastern states is often quick to call on such feelings of regional togetherness. In Mecklenburg Western Pomerania the CDU attempted to bundle such feelings together in a campaign aimed at improving the image and standing of Meck-Pomm as a holiday destination, as an area where companies might want to do business and as a generally forward-looking territory. The CDU suggested that a cross-party Imageburo be created, and that all parties work together to ensure that citizens from outside the state associate forward-looking terms like progress, development and dynamism with the region. One example of this was the CDU's suggestion that Mecklenburg Western Pomerania adopt a catchy, punchy slogan, much in line with those of other states such as Saxony (Einfach Stark! — Simply Strong!) and Bavaria (Tradition und Fortscbritt — Tradition and Progress). Suggestions included 1m Osten was Neues — MecklenburgVorpommern (In the East something new — Mecklenburg Western Pomerania), Friscber Wind aus Nordost (Fresh wind from the north-east),

106 East German identity and party politics

Mecklenburg-Vorpommern schldgt Wellen (Mecklenburg Western Pomerania makes waves),, Meer und mehr in Mecklenburg- Vorpommern (Sea and more in Mecklenburg Western Pomerania), So weit so gut — Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (So far so good - Mecklenburg Western Pomerania), although the party was also quick to suggest that the citizens of Mecklenburg Western Pomerania should chose their own slogans, and that their suggestions were merely meant to prompt debate on the issue.17 Paul Kruger's notion of East Germany following the 'Bavarian path' appears, however, unlikely to be politically successful on the grounds of a lack of historical roots in the Eastern states. The CSU is carrying on — if in a somewhat modified fashion — a long history of Bavarian uniqueness that stems from the time of the Bavarian Volkspartei and the Zentrum in the Weimar Republic. In East Germany as a whole, such deep-rooted historical traditions only exist, if anywhere, in connection with the PDS — and it remains highly questionable as to how many Eastern CDU members would support the formulation of any form of cOst-Gruppe'.

The SPD The debate has been no less difficult within the ranks of the SPD. Like the CDU, the SPD has formulated a (large) number of policy alternatives specifically for the Eastern states, as, following Gerhard Schroder's election victory of September 1998, the SPD attempted to push on the process of inner-unification. These policy alternatives have ranged from specific strategies aimed at counteracting high unemployment, to encouraging regional economic development and at recognising the achievements of Easterners in bringing down the GDR. Yet while the SPD-led federal government, like the CDU government before it, has been active in attempting to help support and rejuvenate political and economic life in the Eastern states, it too has fallen short of conceptualising what, if anything, it understands East German identity to mean. One of the few politicians who has not shirked from this task has been Wolfgang Thierse, the current President of the Federal Parliament and Deputy Leader of the party. Thierse has, on a number of occasions, chosen to openly voice his concerns at the economic, social and political problems facing East Germany, and in doing so he has inevitably cut across the question of Ostidentitdt. His candidness has ensured that he remains almost unique amongst politicians, and his speeches have subse-

The parties and their attitudes towards 'East German identity' 107

quently made headline news for Thierse's knack of talking Klartext (straight).1^ In January 2001, for example, he bluntly outlined why, eleven tumultuous years after unification, Easterners are bound to have a different sense of identity to Westerners. After it became apparent that the East was not going to rapidly catch up with the West, it became clear that whoever stayed in the East was going to, in some shape or form, identify with the territory of East Germany.19 Furthermore, Thierse claimed that two contradictory forms of identity were establishing themselves in the East German states: At the one extreme, citizens choose to classify themselves as 'Eastern German' and seek to delineate themselves from a unified German identity. At the other end of the spectrum, the self-classification of oneself as 'German' is a mechanism with which to overcome a specifically East German heritage.20 Thierse argued that for as long as a German national identity and an East German regional identity are seen as being in any way contradictory, then an atmosphere of either nostalgic retrospectiveness (i.e. looking back to the GDR) or nationalism will flourish. Multi-level identities are the norm across the Western world - and the SPD (as well as the CDU) needed to stop giving the impression that this was not and could not be the case in the Eastern states. The SPD, in turn, had to learn to appreciate its Eastern Landesverb'dnde and its voters as creative additions to its own self-understanding, rather than as organisations that need to be shaped and moulded into clones of their Western counterparts.21 In other words, the SPD needs to use the diversity that the incorporation of East Germany into the FRG brought with it as a positive tool, ensuring that Easterners realise that their inputs into contemporary political life are indeed highly valued. If the SPD is to repeat its electoral triumph of 1998, it needs to continue to appeal to the East German middle ground in the knowledge that this will not necessarily be concomitant with that in West Germany. It needs to convince Easterners that it does not seek to 'Westernise' them, but rather that it is in a position to offer them the opportunity of self-fulfilment. Given that the East German electorate is generally taken to be more 'left-wing' than that in West Germany, the SPD should, theoretically, be much better placed than the CDU to offer policy initiatives that

108 East German identity and party politics

appeal. In some states this may entail co-operation and coalition formation with a reforming PDS, enabling expressly social democratic policies to be implemented (i.e. Mecklenburg Western Pomerania and Saxony Anhalt), while in others the PDS may not be Koalitionsfdhig (fit for coalition), and a partnership with the CDU may be the only viable option. The key question for East German social democrats is whether the regional leaders of the SPD can avoid the pitfalls of sailing too near either of the ideological poles in the East German party system and retaining their own profile vis-a-vis a party that debates the very existence of a progressive East German identity (the CDU) and one that actively encourages Easterners to rebel against an overarching all-German self-understanding (the PDS). Through the 1990s the regional branches of the SPD only managed to successfully complete such a balancing act to a limited extent, hence the SPD remains in a weak position in a number of the Eastern Lander. In Saxony, for example, Karl-Heinz Kunckel, the leader of the state party from 1993 until 1999, aimed to stay true to the 1994 Dresden Declaration ostracising the PDS, and he avoided contact with the party wherever possible. Kunckel believed that the PDS represented a backwards looking fixation with the GDR, and with all that the GDR stood for, and he subsequently saw no room for co-operation with the party. Kunckel wanted the SPD to remain focused on a future that left these values behind, yet by doing this the SPD slipped into the shadow of the Grand Old man Kurt Biedenkopf and was unable to sufficiently distinguish itself in Saxon politics. Given the strength and popularity of the CDU, a party that has successfully mobilised expressly Saxon interests in the political process, why, if the SPD/PDS option was not there, would one bother to vote for SPD? The SPD inadvertently rendered itself irrelevant in Saxony, as it proved unable to connect with citizens or to engage with their feelings or desires. Subsequently, the SPD polled a mere 10.7 per cent at the 1999 state election and Kunckel was forced to resign from the party leadership. However, sailing too close to the PDS also has its perils. Richard Dewes and the Thuringian SPD also received their electoral comeuppance in state elections in 1999, as Dewes' express wish to oust the CDU by co-operating with the post-Communists enabled the CDU to poll an absolute majority of both votes and seats and to form a government without the need for the SPD as a junior partner. The SPD had, once again, not been able to convince the regional electorate of the importance

The parties and their attitudes towards 'East German identity' 108

of its role in the political system, as the PDS mobilised more socialist-orientated voters who sought greater social justice within the political system, while the CDU successfully campaigned on a more free market political platform. Only in Brandenburg, where Manfred Stolpe has successfully dominated the political Mitte, has the SPD been able to persistently gain the upper hand in East German state elections.

The PDS The PDS, meanwhile, benefits from both its heritage and its intrinsically positive dispensation towards many of the factors that have come to make-up an East German identity: these include attitudes to the GDR, a sceptical impression of the social market economy, broad expectations that a more active state is needed and sentiments that stress equality and social justice in comparison to freedom and increased economic individualism.22 The PDS is a party that is very much at home in East Germany, polling 21.6 per cent of the vote in the 1998 federal election: this is in stark comparison to the 1.2 per cent it registered in West Germany. The PDS is also a strong and vibrant actor in each of the Eastern Landtage. In Saxony and Thuringia it has even managed to usurp the SPD's role as the principal opposition party, while in Mecklenburg Western Pomerania and Saxony Anhalt the PDS has, to differing degrees, had a say in policy formation by either being part of the governing coalition (in Mecklenburg Western Pomerania since 1998) or 'tolerating' an SPD-led administration (Saxony Anhalt since 1994). While a considerable number of Easterners will never, for reasons to do with the party's history and ideological selfunderstanding, vote for the PDS, it has still been able to develop into a political party with which many can strongly identify. In the Western states, meanwhile, the picture is very different and the PDS remains a marginal actor on the fringes of political activity. The PDS's share of the vote may be increasing slightly, but nowhere has the party been able to make significant inroads into West German political life. The PDS therefore remains an East German regional party, garnering votes on account of phenomena that remain specific to the Eastern German regional space.23 The PDS would appear to offer Easterners something that Westerners do not find attractive or do not need: and one of these things is an articulation of 'Eastern Germanness' within the political process. Following the 1998 federal election Infratest Dimap

110 East German identity and party politics

claimed that Virulent disappointment ... [in the East] ... with West Germany, with the Federal Government and with Bonn polities' enabled the PDS to politically articulate feelings of dissatisfaction with parts of the transformation process.24 The PDS has concurrently 'defended' life pre-1989, and the biographies of Easterners who feel aggrieved at (in their minds) their need to defend their previous existences in a way that they never anticipated. Neither of these issues was of any prevalence when the Western parties competed in the elections of 1990, and it is only in the years since that the PDS has been able to build and expand its electoral base as a party that can give voice to East German grievances. The PDS is indeed able to articulate how political, economic and cultural life in the East is not a mirror-image of that in West Germany. The PDS has openly claimed to be the representative of East Germans within the political process, and PDS politicians have skilfully illustrated that the assimilation of East German difference into long-established West German norms, values and attitudes has not taken place. Gabrielle Zimmer, the leader of the PDS, articulated this in January 2001 by claiming that although the West German state had, by and large, successfully integrated refugees after the Second World War and, to an extent, the Gastarbeiter from southern Europe, integrating East Germans was an altogether different proposition: Assimilation [of East Germans] hasn't taken place [...] East Germans have subsequently kept themselves at a distance from the alleged 'Besserwessies', and the West Germans from the phenomenon of 'Ostalgie' [...] at the same time uniquely East German values and preferences for greater social justice, equality and social security have been, initially, denounced and, subsequently, ignored. Gradually Easterners are attempting to realise such aims through the vehicle of the PDS. We are well aware of the challenges that this brings and we are determined to use the chance that this offers to introduce elements of a modern, socialist politics, as well as to enable East Germany to shape its own future.25 The PDS wishes to see East German 'differentness', however this is defined, and in whatever context it may appear, as a positive phenomenon that should be seen as an enrichment rather than as a threat. Regional identifications have long been commonplace in Germany, whether this be

The parties and their attitudes towards 'East German identity1 111

to a small town or city, a Land, or a larger region, and the addition of the Eastern Lander has simply added more colour to this map. Furthermore, the PDS contends that the unique identity of East Germans, based on their life experiences and their attitudes to contemporary issues and events, will not simply go away. It is here to stay, and, according to PDS rhetoric, it is high time that citizens and parliamentarians got used to it. It was in this context that Lothar Bisky, the long-time Party Leader, claimed that he wanted 'the people of East and West Germany in the Berlin Republic to act as a stimulus for each other, clear in the knowledge that they possess cultural differences'.26 Given that the PDS is not scared to conceptualise the differences between East and West Germans, it is no surprise that the PDS stresses its self-proclaimed skill as being the best (and only) articulator of East German interests. In the 1998 election manifesto the party claimed that, for years, 'it had consistently represented East German interests, thereby forcing other parties to address Eastern concerns [...] and without the PDS, East Germany would not be mentioned in a political context in the Bundestag at all'.27 While the CDU and SPD have both, at times, attempted to stress how East German interests have been top of their political agendas, this has not deflected the PDS from claiming that, particularly when East and West German interests appear to be in contradiction to one another, it stands side-by-side with Easterners to ensure that they 'get a fair deal'.28

East German identity and electoral behaviour Given the differences in self-perception that exist between East and West Germans, empirical electoral research has attempted to pin down which party citizens who express forms of Ostidentitat actually vote for, hypothesising, unsurprisingly, that the PDS is the principal beneficiary. While it remains intrinsically difficult to unpack the complex relationship between abstract forms of social identification and voting behaviour, it is not an unreasonable assumption, for the reasons outlined above, to expect the CDU to poll less well amongst citizens with a strong East German identity, whereas the PDS would do disproportionately well. Detlev Pollack and Gert Pickel, following their extensive research into East German identity and cultural difference in Germany, have illustrated that if one

112 East German identity and party politics

considers the voting preferences of citizens of East Germany within the context of variables that are prevalent in discussions concerning East German identity,29 then it is indeed the performances of the CDU and the PDS that are most affected: those of the SPD and the smaller parties remain largely uninfluenced by the existence of an East German identity.30 They point out that East Germans who feel that they are deprived of influence and recognition on account of being East German are likely to show strong allegiances with the PDS. However, those Easterners who see their 'Easternness' as being fully recognised in contemporary Germany — in the terminology of Pollack and Pickel, those who feel accepted — are highly likely to support the CDU, at least in principle, over and above other parties, and are unlikely to be PDS supporters.31 This would indicate that the PDS does indeed play an important representative function within the German party system, giving voice to the subjectively less satisfied citizens of the Eastern states. It also indicates that Easterners are well aware of the ideological divide within the party system, differentiating on the one hand between the CDU and on the other hand the PDS. The SPD, as has long been suspected, finds it very difficult to develop a clear and unambiguous profile between these two bulwarks of the Eastern party system, just as the FDP and the Greens do.32 Pollack and PickePs analysis also concretises previously suspected relationships between a positive interpretation of socialism (whether it be in theory or as it was in the GDR) and a vote for the PDS. The CDU and, to a certain extent, the SPD struggle to find sympathy amongst such voters, indicating how the PDS has broadened its political platform to include broadly left of centre voters who would, one presumes, vote for the SPD or B90/Greens in the Western states. The discrepancies between the parties in the Eastern states continue on the issue of nationalism, where PDS and CDU supporters remain very much at odds with one another. CDU supporters do exhibit beliefs and attitudes that broadly fit in with a nationalist attitude (whether this be in a positive or negative sense), whereas PDS supporters are much less likely to reject all form of nationalist rhetoric.33 If one therefore takes into account all of the available data that they produce, it is legitimate to conclude that the existence of strong (if complex) feelings of 'Easternness' do indeed help to understand how the party system has stabilised in the Eastern states. Brunner and Walz have conducted further analysis on the relationship between the PDS and citizens who possess a form of East German iden-

Conclusion 113

tification. They reveal that those with expressly strong ties with the East are indeed more likely to vote for the PDS. They claim that 85 per cent of citizens who have voted for the party did so as the TDS comes from the East and is the party which most clearly represents East German interests'.34 Pollack and Pickel claim that PDS voters tend to be better politically informed and that they possess a self-identification that is different from that of Germany as a whole ('stehen in einer gewissen Distanz zu einer gesamtdeutschen Identitat' - i.e. their identity is characterised by their socialisation and life experiences in the GDR and in Eastern Germany).35 This Abgren^ungsmentalitdt (mentality of demarcation) or mternaliserte Identitdtsbegren^mg (internalised limited identity) is obviously specific to citizens of the Eastern states, and it is PDS voters who are likely to express such identifications most clearly. They conclude by stating that: the PDS is the clear beneficiary of the existence of an East German identity, and the nature of this identification ensures that the PDS acts as a catch-all home for voters who wish to give political voice to the subjective degradation of 'all' East Germans.3^ The PDS electorate finds it difficult to feel at home in the FRG and tends to look forward to the future with trepidation. The PDS has been able to increase its electoral support in these areas while maintaining its ability to mobilise older generations. This is illustrated by the fact that the PDS is supported, to broadly similar extents, by citizens of all ages. Where the PDS electorate does differ from the Eastern population as a whole, is that it is characterised by negative perceptions of the East German economic situation, a greater inclination towards the ideal of socialism and their opinions of life in the GDR.37

Conclusion Eastern German identity remains an issue with which both the CDU and SPD have problems. The PDS is the obvious beneficiary of this, and while many Easterners will not vote for the PDS on principle, on account of the party's previous life as the SED, a significant minority have come to see the PDS as an articulator of uniquely East German feelings, senti-

114 East German identity and party politics

ments and interests. Despite the CDU's initial strong showing in the Eastern Lander, CDU politicians, in particular, have been unable to incorporate the inherently left-wing dimension within 'Eastern Germanness' into their political platform. Once the euphoria surrounding unification began to subside, the CDU found it ever more difficult to convince Easterners of the validity of its traditional Western agenda. A number of CDU politicians, particularly in Mecklenburg Western Pomerania, have attempted to steer the CDU away from its (perceived) Western orientation and towards a more inclusive political agenda. The Rehberg and Kriiger papers have, however, met with, at best, mixed success and it remains hard to see how the CDU will ever come to terms with some of the traits of Ostidentitdt. Where the CDU has been successful, principally in Thuringia and Saxony, it has been on account of the role that Landesvdter have played in state politics, and on account of the charismatic leadership that Bernhard Vogel and Kurt Biedenkopf have offered. Biedenkopf, in particular, synthesised ideas based on a clear appreciation of Saxon folklore, of a state-specific industrial policy and a strong, innovate economic base to help foster Saxon identifications with their Tree State'.38 For this reason it would seem that in future the CDU will have to either open itself up to ideas that would, at present, appear somewhat alien to it, or hope that voters in the East support it simply as it is the 'best of a bad lot'. Neither option would appear particularly appetising to CDU strategists. The SPD, meanwhile, has struggled with an altogether different dilemma. The SPD has traditionally had problems profiling itself within the Eastern party system, and despite the party's electoral successes of 1998, it seems that a hard bedrock of social democratic support does not exist in the Eastern states. Given that Gerhard Schroder has governed in Berlin since 1998, the SPD will also have a governmental record to defend: and judging by the relative economic weakness in all of the Eastern states, this is a task which the SPD is likely to find very challenging. Despite the SPD's best efforts, it has not been able to deprive the PDS of its supporter base amongst those who one could describe as possessing an identification with East Germany. The PDS, meanwhile, is the clear beneficiary of the other parties' inability to get to grips with the underlying factors that make Easterners different. The PDS is the only party with clear experiences of post-1989 and pre-1989 life, and, although much of this experience is less than positive, many see the PDS, curiously, as an

Notes 115

articulator of