Eco Crime and Genetically Modified Food (Criminology S.)

Eco Crime and Genetically Modified Food

The GM debate has been ongoing for over a decade, yet it has been contained in the scientific world and presented in technical terms. Eco Crime and Genetically Modified Food brings the debates about GM food into the social and criminological arena. Eco Crime and Genetically Modified Food highlights the criminal and harmful actions of state and corporate officials. It concludes that corporate and political corruption, uncertain science, bitter public opposition, growing farmer concern and bankruptcy, irreversible damage to biodiversity, corporate monopolies and exploitation, disregard for social and cultural practices, devastation of small scale and local agricultural economies, imminent threats to organics, weak regulation and widespread political and biotech mistrust – do not provide the bases for advancing and progressing GM foods into the next decade. Yet, with the backing of the WTO, the US and UK Governments march on – but at what cost to future generations? Reece Walters is Professor in Criminology, and Head of the Social Policy and Criminology Department at The Open University. He has published widely on the politics and governance of criminological knowledge, including Deviant Knowledge – Criminology, Politics and Policy and Critical Thinking about the Uses of Research (with Tim Hope).

Eco Crime and Genetically Modified Food

Reece Walters

First published 2011 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016 A GlassHouse book This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2010. To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2011 Reece Walters All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication Data A Catalogue record for this book has been requested ISBN 0-203-84415-7 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN13: 978-1-904-38522-6 (hbk) ISBN13: 978-0-203-84415-1 (ebk)

For someone who lived through times of both food scarcity and abundance; someone who mediated, nurtured and cherished relationships through a deep understanding of the cultural significance of food. Hilda Irene Lacy (1906–2000)

Contents

Acknowledgements

viii

Introduction: planting the seed

1

1

The politicisation of GM: terrain, terms and concepts

7

2

The perils, prospects and controversies of GM food

23

3

Risk, public opinion and consumer resistance

51

4

Biotech, papal and trade ‘wars’: third world hunger, exploitation and the politics of GM food

64

5

Regulatory regimes: ensuring safety or enhancing profits?

79

6

Green criminology: power, harm and (in)justice

104

Reflections and conclusions

123

Appendix: methodological considerations Bibliography Index

126 130 159

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the British Academy for a small grant that funded a field trip to Zambia and to the Carnegie Trust that supported interview and archival research in Italy and the UK. To the 19 participants in Zambia who I interviewed for this book, and who cannot be named, I am indebted to your willingness to speak to me at length under difficult circumstances in such an open and forthcoming manner. To Laura Piacentini, Jackie Tombs, Dave Whyte, Barbara Hudson, Phil Scraton, John Muncie, Louise Westmarland, Deb Drake and Abi Rowe, Steve Tombs, Janet Newman and John Clarke – your voices echo in many pages and your support, guidance and personal encouragement is greatly appreciated. To my mentor Professor W.G. (Kit) Carson – always with me. To Geoff Baxter and staff at the National Archive in Kew Gardens in London for their courteous and impeccable service in retrieving documents from far and wide. Many thanks also to Colin Perrin from Routledge for his patience and belief in the project. To Wills T-W for meticulous proof-reading; I owe you a banquet of baguettes! Special thanks to Mike Presdee (who is no longer with us) for support and intellectual inspiration throughout many years of long friendship. Moreover no project is ever completed without the intellectual and emotional support of those closest to you. To Steve, Lisa, Stephanie and Lewis Holman for a very special friendship. And to Gen, Lachie, Wills, Cath, Don, Gabriel, Francesca, Dav and Lucy – for all the things that matter most. Finally, to Georgie, without whom this book would never have been written.

Introduction Planting the seed

GM food has nothing to do with food and nothing to do with the world’s hungry, it is about the power of certain companies to corner a large part of the world’s food supply with unprecedented profits not seen before in human history … This whole story [in Britain] is really the complete domination and triumph of organized industry over an utterly disorganized and pulverized democratic political practice where the regulatory regime is fixed to conform to what industry will tolerate. (Michael Meacher MP, former Minister of State for the Environment, interviewed 8 November 2006)

In years to come, what will be remembered about these present times? The war in Gaza, the ‘Credit Crunch’, ‘bank bailouts’, the worst stockmaket crash since the Great Depression, Barak Obama’s victory as the 44th President of the United States, or ‘Swine Flu’. Or will it be remembered for the one thing affecting the very existence of millions of people – the food crisis, or what has been termed ‘the silent tsunami’ (The Economist, April 2008). I suspect not the latter – at least not in the minds of the affluent West where such issues fail to resonate in the memories of those whose material and fundamental needs are met in abundance. Indeed the World Health Organization reports that 1.6 billion men, women and children worldwide are ‘overweight’ with 400 million adults ‘obese’ – such figures represent the excesses of the West. Yet, Western governments and corporations are deeply embroiled and embedded in the contexts, politics and resources that give rise to the circumstances and solutions surrounding food shortage and world hunger. Towards the end of 2009, when industrial nations were reporting a rise out of recession, announcements were made by the world’s richest countries to slash $US 2 billion in food aid. The head of the World Food Aid Programme, Rosette Sheeran, warned that such cuts could result in ‘the loss of a generation’ (quoted in Vidal, 2009a). The globalisation of inflation and rising food prices, combined with debt, poverty and civil war have conspired to produce 850 million people on the brink of starvation (Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United

2 Introduction

Nations, 2006 and 2009). The United Nations Secretary-General has warned that ‘food production needs to rise by 50% by the year 2030 to meet the rising demand’ (Ban Ki Moon, 2008). In contrast, Tristram Stuart’s compelling book Waste – Uncovering the Global Food Scandal identifies how food wastage in North America and Europe is so extensive that it could feed the world hungry six times over. Moreover, he points to the 40 per cent of all crops that fail in developing countries due to a lack of resources to process and store food, and not the ability to successfully grow and feed the world’s hungry (Stuart, 2009). That said, food security remains a topic of international concern. Issues about the production, sale and distribution of food are constantly called into question. Such issues have included widespread condemnation of large areas of agricultural farming used for the production of biofuels – ‘feeding cars and not people’ and have brought into focus the ongoing immoderation of the West at the plight of impoverished people in the developing world. For some, food has become a way in which to understand contemporary economic inequality, environmental crises and Western governance. The increasing political and social discourse around food poverty, food prices, food miles, obesity, BSE, GM, supermarket monopolies and fast food offer ‘a distinctive way in to critical discussions over the nature of globalization and the burning human questions of our time’ (Andrews, 2008). The global food crisis has also reinvigorated the debate about genetically modified (GM) food. Yet the battle lines have been drawn, and the arguments are polarised. Indeed, the international reputation of GM technology, including research, has been reportedly placed on the ‘bad industries black list’ alongside, and I quote, ‘pornography, arms trade, animal experiments, human rights abuse, nuclear power, tobacco, fur and GM Research’ (Jamieson, 2008 emphasis added). Among the dictators and pornographers are those engaging in genetically modified research? How and why has GM research come to be regarded in such a negative light? How can scientific research ever be viewed through the same lens as human rights abuse? This answer is partly explored in this book through the lens of political economy. For some, the issue of GM food remains a poisoned chalice; while for others, it provides the solution to world hunger. And why political economy? Because the scientific, social and legal discourses around the acceptance or otherwise of GM food has more to do with issues of politics and economy than hunger and food security. Let us emphasise this point with a recent example in Britain. UK supermarkets have reportedly held ‘secret talks’ to pave the way for more GM food products to be sold in British supermarkets. The argument is not food crisis but cost, contending that food sourcing and labeling has become so expensive that determining products to be ‘GM free’ is driving up supermarket prices (Bloxham, 2009). In other words, the ‘GM free’ stance that has reportedly preoccupied Europe for the past decade is now costing

Introduction

3

supermarkets, and more importantly, consumers vast amounts of money. Supermarkets, with the ministerial and Defra backing, are arguing that the increasing production of GM maize and soya is making it difficult and costly to source non-GM products. As a result, a re-education of the public on accepting GM food and embracing GM technology is called for (Hickman, 2009). This call, which emphasises a slow but increasing public support of GM food (FSA, 2009c), has been preceded by earlier government reports that have questioned the value of organic foods and highlighted the pesticides in commercially grown products all in an attempt to subtlety put GM back on the public and political agenda (FSA, 2009). Chapter three examines this further and identifies how public opinion has been manipulated to endorse a pre-determined pro-GM government policy. The opening quotation to this book from Michael Meacher serves as a powerful reminder of the ways in which corporate enterprise can sometimes clash with, and dominate, public political and media opinion. Yet that is just one piece of the puzzle. The production of GM food and its associated GM technologies is a complex web of actors and actants involving multiple dimensions of power, harm and profit. What does this mean? It means that GM crops are much more about differing ideologies and turf war fares than scientific neutrality and progress. It means that a scientist, a gene, a laboratory and a seed are combined with water, soil and air to produce one of the most vexatious debates of the past 20 years which has polarised governments, consumers, farmers and academics across the world. As a criminologist wishing to develop the boundaries of the discipline, I’m interested in questioning the role that criminology might play in understanding the complex dynamics and deadlocks of global issues – including the international GM food debate. This project is by no means the end, but merely the beginning. A way of suggesting that genetic engineering, an area traditionally dominated by and reserved for the ‘pure scientist’, is central to social scientific inquiry. Much of my focus will be on the UK, but the fieldwork has necessitated field trips to Africa, Europe, Australia and New Zealand. In the UK, genetically modified (GM) crops have been grown within ‘contained sites’ since 1987 while commercial cultivation has been partially granted with restrictions.1 Recent media has warned that Britain also faces ‘food shortages’ and that we must embrace GM crops through ‘agricultural reform’ (Doward, 2009: 15). Such media has responded to reports from the Royal Institute of International Affairs suggesting that the UK is ‘not immune’ from the global food crisis and must reconsider its GM options and ‘re-open the GM debate’ (Ambler-Edwards et al., 2009). This will come as good news for pro-GM advocates and the UK Government. Yet, as this book details, the GM debate has not been a debate; and the public opinion opposing GM crops has been sidelined and usurped. It should be remembered that the UK Government’s decision to commercially grow GM crops

4 Introduction

in Britain was taken three years ago, well before any suggestion of food shortages in the UK and during a period of intense public and political opposition. Issues about the safety of GM food have routinely been catapulted to front page status with, for example, allegations that the UK Government’s food watchdog, the Food Standards Agency, had permitted Morrisons to sell a brand of GM rice banned in the United States. The Shadow Environment Secretary, Mr Peter Ainsworth referred to this particular incident and the likelihood that British consumers were consuming illegal GM products as ‘a massive scandal’, involving a government ‘cover up’ (Lean, 2006: 1). The Prince of Wales has also publicly accused the biotech industry of conducting a ‘gigantic experiment with nature’ with GM crops that were an ‘absolute disaster’ (Randall, 2008: 1). ‘Corruption’, ‘scandal’, ‘disaster’, ‘bankruptcy’, ‘contamination’ and ‘exploitation’ are just some of the terms that have been widely used to describe government and corporate involvement in the production of GM foods. There is no doubting that the introduction of genetic or living modified organisms to the world’s food chain has divided the people including the world’s hungry. Emerging from international discourses on genetically modified organisms are issues of commerce, health and safety, environment, politics and science and technology, as well as illegal, unethical and harmful practices. As already mentioned, millions of people worldwide suffer from malnutrition and starvation. For some, international hunger is a humanitarian crisis, for others, it is a commercial opportunity. The political economy of food and hunger is a long established debate (Harle, 1978), and the emerging discourses about GM food and its development and consumption must be seen as an extension of the politics of humanitarian relief, free trade and sustainable development. Within these discourses are issues of economic hegemony and the politics of world trade; as Mulvany (2004) argues, ‘those with power, particularly the United States, have used hunger as justification for trade supremacy and the promotion of genetically modified (GM) crops owned by northern multinational corporations – much to the delight of pro-GM advocates’. The international commercial growth of GM crops is steadily rising. An estimated 21 countries are reported to be commercially growing GM crops across 90 million hectares of land. As a result, 39 countries across five continents have reported GM contamination to their environment (Genewatch, 2008). The production and sale of GM food remains an issue of intense conflict in global trade as issues of health, the environment, economics and consumer protection are widely contested. While biotech corporations (and governments) reposition and rebrand themselves as ‘green’ and ‘eco-friendly’ and promote what is referred to as the ‘second wave’ of GM crops (where the emphasis has shifted from food to medicines and biofuels), public opposition to GMO’s remains strong.

Introduction

5

Structure and content Chapter one charts the terrain under study and identifies what is and what is not GM food. It explores the definition, meanings and usages of GM food. It identifies conceptual analyses through ‘eco crime’ which integrates discourses of power, harm and political economy to examine GM food. Chapter two synthesises the existing international research on the benefits and dangers of GM food. The aim of this chapter is to question the hegemony of scientific fact and present the disparate findings on the risks and dangers of GM technologies and food products as well as the reported benefits. This will include a critique of the research relating to human health and safety; the reported ‘solutions to world hunger’; the risks of genetic pollution; the reported demise of alternative farming techniques; economic exploitation; disputes over intellectual property; the rights and abuses of indigenous peoples as well as further ethical and legal dilemmas. Chapter three introduces the public voice and identifies how public opinion has influenced or been sidelined in debates about GM food. Chapter four examines the actions of the US Government’s ‘trade war’ on the European Commission and its illegal actions towards third world countries, notably economic bribery and what has been referred to as ‘the dumping of GM food in Africa’. It will also critique the actions of biotech companies in patenting indigenous plant life in Africa or ‘bio-prospecting’ as well as examining the use of PR firms to favourably present GM technologies to impoverished and starving countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Chapter five provides an overview of the laws and regulatory regimes in the UK and abroad. It examines both international environmental law and British food law covering GM food. It also charts the historical antecedents of events and decisions that culminated in the early years of law and policy relating to GMOs. Chapter six explores Green Criminology within notions of power, harm and justice. Moreover, it will also examine the politics of defining and assessing risk, the regulation of knowledge and the politics of power in the governance of world GM food markets. Finally, the reflections and conclusions provide a reflexive account of GM food and look ahead to its future place in international trade. It will also examine various future strategies and option for international regulation and environmental justice.

Concluding comment In 1983, the Australian criminologist, Professor Richard Harding asked, ‘what do criminology and criminologists do to decrease the chances of the extinction of mankind and the destruction of the planet?’ (1983: 82). Harding’s work on nuclear proliferation asserted that criminology must move beyond local issues and become a global enterprise that engages with issues of international significance. As a result, we should ask what criminology

6 Introduction

can offer discourses about issues that threaten the planet. This emphasis provided the impetus for this book: to shift the criminological lens to include harms of ecological and global concern and to critique actions that adversely effect nature and humanity. Given that human and environmental existence requires fundamental ingredients for survival, namely, food, water and air, green criminologists should construct research profiles that encapsulate these areas. In doing so, it is important to further the cause of what Elliot Currie has recently referred to as a ‘public criminology’. For him, this includes ‘one that takes as part of its defining mission a more vigorous, systematic and effective intervention in the world of social policy and social action’ (2007: 176). This book seeks to interact and engage with intellectual, political and public voices to stimulate debate about GM food, an issue of ongoing environmental and human concern. The GM debate has been ongoing for over a decade, yet as Mayer (2002: 2) points out, it has been ‘contained in the scientific and industrial communities and couched in technical and scientific terms alone when the social, cultural and ethical challenges are enormous’. This book aims to bring the debates about GM food into the social and criminological arena. It examines the legal and ethical dilemmas that surround this new food source and examines the controversies that surround its production. It also seeks to shift the existing discourse to include ‘eco crime’ where corporate and state illegalities and harms are seen as crimes and not as mere ‘scares’ or ‘scandals’. It questions the existing legal regimes in the UK and abroad and proposes initiatives for regulation and environmental justice. Finally, this book identifies that GM food has little to do with feeding people and much to do with corporate power and profit.

Note 1 The government decision to authorise the commercial growth of GM crops in the UK in 2009 was taken in 2004 at the height of public and European opposition. Defra has since reported that uncertain science regarding safety and biotech industry hesitancy is the reason for preventing commercial crop rollout, ‘ … we agreed in principle to the commercial cultivation of the GM maize grown in the trials, subject to certain conditions. In any event, Bayer CropScience subsequently announced that they would not in fact market this particular GM maize variety’ (Defra, 2008).

Chapter 1

The politicisation of GM Terrain, terms and concepts

Introduction The globalisation of food has changed the way we eat and shop. A visit to any supermarket across the UK in mid-winter may result in the purchase of Shamouti oranges from Israel; savoy cabbage from France; Angeleno plums from Australia; alpine nectarines from South Africa; aromatic ginger from Brazil; asparagus tips from Peru; freshly picked blueberries from Poland; onions from Argentina; bananas from Cameroon; beans from Zambia; and so on. Such purchases have become routine daily consumer practice. Food is a global industry where items from around the world are transported swiftly to our supermarket shelves or discarded all in the name of ‘consumer choice’ and ‘freshness’. Consider the following advertising of Upper Crust, a multi-national baguette and coffee chain established in 1986: Fanatical about freshness! We are obsessed with ensuring you get the freshest baguette around that’s why after 3 hours we throw them away. We believe we are the only people that do this. That’s how fanatical we are. So much for the world’s starving! In the affluent West, perfectly edible ‘three hour old food’ can be discarded as waste. There is nothing new in this. It has been estimated that the United States wastes up to 50 per cent of its overall food supply (Harrison, 2004). In Britain alone, it is estimated that discarded food in households, supermarkets and restaurants could possibly feed 113 million people annually (Stuart, 2009). While some of this wastage is related to health and safety regulations and household excess, it is also about corporate profit and the marketing of freshness and consumer choice. It is only recently that leading supermarket chains have begun to utilise their food waste for renewable energies and biofuels (Stiff and Ford, 2009). Foods from near and far fill our supermarket trolleys, stack the pantries of our ‘global kitchens’ often within a non-critical and hedonistic vacuum. Yet, the production of food is an industry rife with illegal and harmful actions. As a result, ‘food crime’ is an emerging area of criminological scholarship

8 Eco crime and GM food

(Croall, 2006; Walters, 2007). The pollution created from long-distance transportation, the erosion of soils, the sale of contaminated meat, the illegal use of chemicals, the exploitation of farm workers, the use of fraudulent marketing practices and the aggressive trade policies of governments and corporations are some of the areas involving unethical and illegal behaviour in Britain and abroad (Mathieson, 2006; Lawrence, 2004; Lang and Heasman, 2004). Such issues have found a voice in discourses on food security and regulation but little has been written in criminology. Unlawful food trading practices have been constructed within notions of risk and presented as food scandals and not food crimes. This book aims to redress the focus by concentrating on one area of the food crime debate, namely the use of genetics in food production or what is now commonly referred to as GM food. It examines the political economy of GM food within criminological contexts of state, corporate and transnational crime (Green and Ward, 2004; Tombs and Whyte, 2003; Ruggerio, 2000), and within discourses of harm (Hillyard et al., 2004). Elsewhere, I have explored the use of genetics in food production and examined the exploitation of hunger, the monopolisation of GM technologies and the aggressive trade policies of Western governments and corporations (see Walters, 2004 and 2006). This book further examines global dimensions to GM food through an examination of ‘eco crime’. In doing so, we need to move beyond what Bruno Latour refers to a ‘punctionlist’ assessment of our food production to one that investigates broader networks of connectivity (discussed later).

GM food – terms, definitions and techniques Before embarking upon a discussion of what we do and don’t know about the risks, harms and potential benefits of GM food, it is important to establish what is and what is not genetically modified food. It is widely acknowledged that human beings have been involved in selective and natural breeding of plants and animals for thousands of years. However, it was not until the Darwin-inspired Augustinian monk Gregor Mendel’s 1866 work with garden peas, bees and mice that the scientific world was presented with the ‘laws of genetic inheritance’. Through breeding round with wrinkled peas and peas from green pods with those from yellow ones, he was able to ascertain that colour, height and shape are determined by certain dominant or recessive factors, subsequently called genes (Orel, 1996). The subsequent developments in biotechnology and plant genetics have been well documented elsewhere (see Bud, 1994; Lurquin, 2002; Federoff and Brown, 2004). It is a history that conveys, inter alia, the exploits of scientists and their quest to understand theories of natural and artificial selection, the laws of inheritance, the chemical processes of chromosomal combinations as well as the yet unsolved mysteries of apomictic or asexual

The politicisation of GM

9

reproduction in plants and animals. From Louis Pasteur’s nineteenth century discoveries with microbes and fermentation to Berg and Boyer’s work with insulin and to enzyme cultures for dairy produce, genetic knowledge has been used to advance scientific, medical and food technologies. That said, it was not until 1983 that tobacco became the first fully transgenic plant to successfully grow with ‘foreign genes’. Moreover, while field trials of GM crops had occurred throughout Europe and the North America during the late 1980s and early 1990s, it was not until 1994 that the first GM food product was approved for public consumption. The long-life tomato (Flavr Savr) was developed by Calgene and accepted by the US Food and Drug Administration. While lacking commercial success, it provided the impetus for commercial farming of GM potatoes, soybean and canola that were resistant to insects and fungal diseases (Paarlberg, 2001). Genetic engineering or modification is a scientific process designed to manipulate the genetic makeup of cells. It involves the unnatural alteration of DNA and RNA from one organism and its transfer into the cells of another organism. Genetically modified organisms (GMO) may be animals, plants or micro-organisms such as bacteria and viruses. For some scholars, genetic modification is so ‘anatural’, that it should be termed ‘genetic mutilation’ (see Ho, 1998; Anderson, 2004). The unnatural character of genetically modified organisms was determined in the pivotal 5:4 decision in the United States Supreme Court case of Diamond v Chakrabarty [1980]. Chakrabarty, a microbiologist, invented a genetically engineered bacterium capable of breaking down various components of crude oil in the event of an oil spill. His application to the Patent and Trademark Office to patent his genetically modified bacteria was declined on the basis that naturally occurring living organisms could not be patented. The US Supreme Court disagreed on the grounds that a genetically modified bacteria was not a naturally occurring phenomena but a product of human invention and as such could be patented. The court argued that: a new mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant found in the wild is not patentable subject matter. Likewise, Einstein could not patent his celebrated law that E = mc2; nor could Newton have patented the law of gravity. Such discoveries are ‘manifestations of nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.’ Judged in this light, the respondent’s micro-organism plainly qualifies as patentable subject matter. His claim is not to a hitherto unknown natural phenomenon, but to a non-naturally occurring manufacture or composition of matter – a product of human ingenuity having a distinctive name, character. Not only did this decision provide a legal definition of GMOs as non-natural in character but also provided the legal basis upon which biotech corporations could develop and patent their organisms (Hughes et al., 2002).

10 Eco crime and GM food

Similar definitions of GMOs to that established in the above case were adopted in the first Royal Commission on Genetic Modification which defined genetic modification as the ‘use of genetic engineering techniques in a laboratory, being a use that involves’: the deletion, multiplication, modification, or moving of genes within a living organism; or the transfer of genes from one organism to another; or the modification of existing genes or the construction of novel genes and their incorporation in any organism; or the utilisation of subsequent generations or offspring of organisms modified by any of the activities described above (Royal Commission on Genetic Modification, 2001: 366). This definition is reflected in the UK Environmental Protection Act (1990) as Part VI defines a genetically modified organism when: any of the genes or other genetic material in the organism (a) have been modified by means of an artificial technique prescribed in regulations by the Secretary of State; or (b) are inherited or otherwise derived, through any number of replications, from genes or other genetic material which were so modified. It is also reflected in European Environmental Law at Article 2 of the Deliberate Release Directive 90/220 which defines genetic modification organisms as those that do not ‘occur naturally by mating and/or natural recombination’. Therefore, both national and international law has asserted the artificial and human intervention aspects to GMOs that emphasise unnatural characteristics of these organisms and the manipulative processes that produce them. Various techniques and processes are used to achieve the desired genetic alteration of a plant. Gene guns were developed in the 1980s to physically transfer DNA particles from one organism or culture. This method has been advanced with the use of ‘marker genes’ that identify the transferred DNA and permit more systematic tracking of gene performance. These antibiotic resistant marker genes are used to control the functioning of ‘foreign genes’ and bring with them their own risks and uncertainties (Nottingham, 2003). The gene altered state of a commercially grown crop is intended to make it both herbicide tolerant and insect resistant. Herbicide tolerant plants can flourish while all other surrounding plants (mostly weeds) are destroyed by poisonous sprays such as ‘Roundup’ produced by Monsanto and Bayer-Aventis’ ammonium gluphosinate herbicide (Toke, 2004). Insect resistant crops (often referred to as Bt crops after the bacterium bacillus thuringiensis) secrete a toxin that kills various species of predatory

The politicisation of GM

11

insects. With the threat of weeds and bugs eliminated by the self-defences of the GM crop, the yield of the harvest is maximised. The creation of herbicide tolerant and insect resistant plants occurs from the insertion of a ‘foreign’ gene into the chromosomal make-up of a crop seed. For many, like the agricultural biotech giant Monsanto, this process is simply an extension of traditional plant breeding. Monsanto claims that genetic manipulation in the human food chain is not new. For example, Monsanto’s website states: [w]hat has come to be called ‘biotechnology’ and the genetic manipulation of agricultural products is nothing new. Indeed, it may be one of the oldest human activities. For thousands of years, from the time human communities began to settle in one place, cultivate crops and farm the land, humans have manipulated the genetic nature of the crops and animals they raise. Crops have been bred to improve yields, enhance taste and extend the growing season. (Monsanto, 2006a) The Monsanto interpretation of GM plant technologies as ‘nothing new’ is misleading (see Leeder, 1999). To suggest that GM plant technology is an ‘extension’ of traditional breeding is akin to saying that nuclear power is merely a hybrid of solar energy. As mentioned above, the scientific process of genetic modification differs from traditional forms of plant breeding in that ‘foreign’ genes are inserted into the DNA make-up of plants and animals. Traditional plant breeding occurs through the trial and error of cross genetic experimentation from the same gene pool. The genes of the same species of plants are mixed to create hybrids with newly created characteristics. With GM technologies the new or desirable traits or characteristics are achieved through inserting alien genes from a different species of animal or plant. It is this insertion of a foreign gene into an organism that has produced uncertainty and controversy as the biochemical and physiological effects remain unknown. In Britain, GM food technologies operate in ‘contained use’ (laboratories that require secure access) where control measures are designed to enhance human safety environment protection. Such scientific measures involve ‘the insertion of genes into micro-organisms that have been deliberately “crippled” with disabling mutations so that they will not grow outside of the controlled environment of a laboratory test tube’ (Health and Safety Executive, 2006 – see also chapter five). While GM crops have been grown for research and development at undisclosed sites in England since 1993, as yet, there are no commercially grown GM crops in the UK (Defra, 2009c). However, GM derivatives in flour, oil, soya, yeast and dairy are contained in a variety of supermarket products and available to British consumers.

12 Eco crime and GM food

Corporate power and monopoly capitalism While ‘consumer choice’ in the UK dictates the trade policies that bring outof-season produce from around the world to our supermarket shelves, such notions of choice are less available when it comes to the stores from which food can be purchased. In March 2006, the consumer watchdog, The Office of Fair Trading, responded to the Federation of Small Businesses’ concerns by proposing to refer Tesco, Asda, Morrisons and Sainsbury’s to the Consumer Commission for a formal inquiry into their ‘monopoly position’. In 2007, the Competition Commission identified how a number of these leading UK supermarket outlets were squeezing farmers and factory owners (often in poor and developing countries where £7 million a day is generated for UK supermarkets), in what has been identified as ‘unfair trade’ and ‘abusing buying power’ (Melamed, 2007; Competition Commission, 2008). Moreover, the European Parliament has stated that supermarkets across the EU have been abusing their positions to fix prices, resulting in the UK Competition Commission to call for tougher regulations (Attwood, 2008). In addition, the UK Competition Commission has since appointed a ‘Supermarket Ombudsman’ to address the ‘buying power’ of leading supermarkets that is ‘not in the public interest’ (Competition Commission, 2009). In Britain, £95 billion per annum is spent on grocery shopping constituting 13 per cent of total spending for each household (Office of Fair Trading, 2008). The supermarket industry in the UK, dominated by the ‘big four’, has become an example of corporate power and market capitalism. The Competition Act 1998 is intended to prevent market control and promote economic diversity. The detriments to consumers of monopoly capitalism in Britain’s major supermarket chains was recently realised with the Office of Fair Trading having Sainsbury’s and Asda confess to the price fixing of milk (BBC, 2007). With the production of GM products controlled by a diminishing number of GM biotech giants, we are witnessing a growing form of ‘monopoly capitalism’ (Walters, 2006: 35). The aggressive corporate policies of control are openly acknowledged by the directors of the biotech industries. Mr Rob Fraley, from DuPont stated that ‘what we are seeing is not just a consolidation of seed companies, it’s really a consolidation of the entire food chain’ (quoted in Assouline et al., 2001: 30). Such monopoly capitalism infringes human rights and international trade law (see Cottier et al., 2005) and is in direct opposition to the competitive and free trade policies of the WTO. Yet, it is in the WTO that the US Government sought rulings for the ongoing biotech hegemony in world food trade (discussed later). The overwhelming majority of GM food and its accompanying fertilisers, seeds and herbicides are produced from four chemical corporations, namely Monsanto, Syngenta, DuPont and Bayer (see Nottingham, 2003). Clearly GM food and genetic engineering remain big business. Yet free-trade

The politicisation of GM

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ideologies espoused by the WTO to enhance notions of competitive capitalism are compromised by a status quo of monopoly capitalism. The costs to consumers and industries when market dominance is controlled by a select number of large conglomerates has been examined in discourses of corporate or ‘elite’ deviance for some time (Simon and Eitzen, 1990; see also Tombs and Whyte, 2003). Such discourses remain important for understanding the inherent dangers of market control, particularly in developing societies where economic vulnerabilities create opportunities for corporate exploitation. The lucrative global trade for governments and the four GM giants are essential for understanding pressures, unethical and illegal actions discussed later in relation to Zambia. As Winston (2002: 174) argues, ‘genetically modified organisms would be only an interesting academic sideline if there was no money to be made. The heavy investments in research that have driven corporate biotechnology would not have been forthcoming without the product protection provided by patents’. The monopolisation of four biotech companies in what is commonly referred to as ‘bio-imperialism’ (see Engdahl, 2004) continues to mount concerns and fears within agricultural and consumer groups. Farmers, for example, remain sceptical of the motivations and tactics of corporations that attempt to control and profit from food production through the laws of patent and intellectual property (discussed later). In addition, the aggressive and unlawful business practices of the GM giants have heightened widespread anxiety about the technology. The biotech corporate lobbying of government officials, the bribing and threatening of scientists, the theft, manipulation and subversion of scientific data, the strategic placement of GM corporate employees on regulatory, funding and government decision bodies have been documented and continue to raise serious concerns about the actions and motives of the GM giants (Smith, 2004). In 2007, 30 countries reported that unapproved GM rice owned by biotech giant Bayer CropScience had entered their respected food chains (Greenpeace International, 2007). The power of transnational biotech companies has been permitted to exercise an unchecked reach in pursuit of global trade and, as the next chapter identifies, has directly influenced and shaped knowledge in favour of ‘pro-GM science’.

Developing a conceptual framework There are numerous legal, ethical and safety issues surrounding the production, sale and regulation of GM food products. This book integrates law, political economy, environmental studies and the sociology of harm to examine GM food within a proposed analytic of ‘eco crime’. Environmental issues continue to capture international media headlines and remain the subject of political and public debate. As a result, environmental law is currently the fastest growing area of international law (Galizzi and Sands, 2004; Bodansky et al., 2007). That said, the Oxford Handbook of

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International Environmental Law (2007) is the most comprehensive collection of articles pertaining to the various areas of law that protect the environment. Not a single paragraph is devoted to ‘environmental or eco crime’. While the language of precaution, liability and responsibility are used, the actions of those that harm the environment are rarely referred to as crimes. Hence, whilst law remains a leading instrument in the protection and development of environmental matters, it is only one lens through which to view and understand the complexities that link trade, politics and GM food. One of the objectives of this book, in the spirit of critical narratives, is to continue to push, integrate and critique the disciplinary boundaries of criminology. Eco crime, political economy and harm The prefix ‘eco’ emerges from the Greek word ‘oikos’ meaning habitat, home and the Latin ‘oeco’ or household relations. Combined with the origins of ‘crimen’ (to accuse, injure, harm – see Pavich, 2000), we observe the injuries or harms of habitat. This includes both human and non-human species and adapts a holist account of ‘being’. Eco’s subsequent scientific usage in the study of ecology has been to understand the complex networks of evolution and interaction involving species and their habitats. Ecology is a term often used synonymously, and erroneously, with the term ‘environment’. Eco is therefore used here to encapsulate both ideological understandings of ecology and the environment and to embrace the social, political and cultural perspectives, experiences and existences of human and non-human interaction with changing environments. This approach emphasises Raymond Williams’ and E.P. Thompson’s view that the meaning of words (such as ‘environment’, ‘crime’, ‘harm’, ‘power’, etc.) should not be found in the static confines of dictionary definitions but in the social reality in which the terms evolve and are constructed. As this book suggests, the social realities surrounding GM food are complex, contentious and constantly changing. Analyses that attempt to capture rapidly evolving events occurring locally and globally require critiquing the established ‘tools of the trade’. Eco crime is therefore an attempt to harness different narratives to explore the contexts and vagaries that form the issues pertaining to the research, production, distribution and consumption of GM foods. Its construction begins with a review of existing environmental law. There is no ideological reason for starting here, other than that my debates and exchanges about environmental issues with individuals from diverse backgrounds at both national and international fora almost always commence with a discussion of law, politics, economics or harm – the ingredients of my eco crime perspective. When actions violate international environmental agreements or domestic laws they are most often referred to as ‘breaches’ or ‘offences’ and not

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crimes. From a purely legal perspective this is best explained by the fact that environmental offences are often not contained within either international or municipal criminal law. As such they are dealt with as administrative offences and prosecuted in civil jurisdictions. Such offences only become issues for the criminal courts when offenders fail to comply with a court sanction and are subsequently referred to a criminal court. While the language of eco crime is used (most often by activists and NGOs) it is not expressed in such terms at international law and only in reaction to anti-social behaviour within domestic law. In the United Kingdom, the Home Office, refers to ‘environmental crime’, ‘fly-tipping’, ‘littering’, ‘graffiti’ and ‘vandalism’ (Home Office, 2007). The House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee has also published findings on what it refers to as Corporate Environmental Crime as ‘any environmental crime that has been committed by a corporate body’ (House of Commons, 2005: 8). Interestingly, the corporate environmental crimes referred to by the House of Commons do not include transnational issues mentioned above, but include issues to do with water, sewerage and landfill that are dealt with in British civil and criminal courts. As a result, many countries see environmental crimes as acts of civilian disorder and not acts of serious environmental degradation caused by international corporations. The international law, including EU law does not define what an eco crime is. Interpol (2007) divides ‘environmental crime’ into ‘pollution’ and ‘wildlife crime’, comprising the illegal disposal of waste that contaminates air, water and land and the unlawful trade in endangered species. These two broad categories are further expanded upon by the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Institute’s (UNICRI) which focuses on ‘crimes against the environment’ prohibited by international law. UNICRI categorises crimes against the environment as ‘illegal trade in wildlife and ozonedepleting substances,’ ‘dumping and illegal transport of various kinds of hazardous waste’, ‘illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing and logging’ (Hayman and Brack, 2002: 5). Eco crimes covered under the above legislation have been identified as a $US 10 billion industry per annum (Environmental Investigation Agency, 2008). Such is the expanding nature of this subject covered under international and national environmental law that it has necessitated the integration of diverse expertise and knowledges that must include criminology. With new laws emerge new regulations and new offences. Eco crime, therefore, must be an important area within a global criminology (see Aas, 2007). As discussed earlier, in an evolving discipline, criminologists must constantly be asking what criminology has to offer issues, debates and actions that threaten the preservation of the planet. In doing so, this book argues that the harms associated with the sale and production of GM foods constitutes eco crimes. In saying this I recognise the self-imposed trap that criminologists lay for themselves, notably a compulsion to ‘shoehorn’ areas into the criminological lexicon. To avoid the shoehorn is to render the topic potentially

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‘not criminological’. It is not an issue that confronts the sociologist in quite the same way. As a sociologist I can write a book about the perils, prospects and controversies of genetically modified food without feeling the need to legitimate my topic as ‘sociological’. Yet, as a criminologist, there is the uneasy self-imposed requirement to organise one’s topic so it connects neatly with established definitions of crime. This is clearly an ongoing legacy that resonates with criminology’s origins as an academic discipline and its current developments as an enterprise that continues to be dominated by state defined concepts of crime and illegality. Throughout this book the term ‘eco crime’ will be used in preference to ‘environmental crime’. There are several reasons for this. First, ‘environmental crime’ is a government term that has been constructed and used to define specific disorder type offences such as property and anti-social behaviour. While these acts clearly have social and environmental impacts, they are miniscule when compared to damage caused by large companies and governments of ‘the powerful’ who intentionally or negligently contaminate and destroy the natural environment. Second, environmental crime unfortunately remains wedded or misinterpreted as those acts confined to environmental criminology (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1981; Bottoms and Wiles, 2002; Wortley et al., 2008). Throughout the past five years while speaking at conferences and seminars or in communication with colleagues throughout Europe, Australia and North America, the term ‘environmental crime’ has been interpreted as ‘crime mapping’ or charting the spatial and geographical occurrence of crimes involving violence, drugs, property, and other various street-type offences. While recent bold attempts have been made by critical and green criminologists to reclaim the term ‘environmental criminology’ to explore corporate and state acts of environmental harm (see White, 2008 and 2009), such movements remain overshadowed by dominant discourses that refer to the urban geography of criminal acts. Third, environmental crime, while adopting the term ‘crime’, is viewed and dealt with as an administrative offence, if it is dealt with at all (Walters, 2009). Eco crime is a term that seeks to harness existing illegalities or environmental offences defined by municipal and international law, but also integrate diverse discourses to explore ‘harms’ against, humans, non-humans and the natural environment. Others before me have situated eco crime within domestic and international legal frameworks arguing that it is ‘an unathorised act or omission that violates the law and is therefore subject to criminal prosecution and criminal sanction’ (Situ and Emmons, 2000: 3). Many such violations are reflected in the growing number of domestic laws as well as international environmental protocols, treaties and conventions that provide legal mandates that prohibit a range of activities identified as hazardous and deleterious to global ecosystems. Other definitions locate eco crime within acts of environmental harm not necessarily covered in legal statute. As a result, environmental harm,

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constructed from various philosophical perspectives, extends the definition of eco crime beyond legal codes to licensed or lawful acts of ecological degradation committed by states and corporations. For Westra (2004: 309) eco crime is unprovoked aggression, ‘committed in the pursuit of other goals and “necessities” such as economic advantage’. Westra’s work extends the definition of eco crime beyond ecological degradation to human health, global security and justice. She suggests that eco crimes committed by governments and corporations in pursuit of free trade or progress are ‘attacks on the human person’ that deprive civilians (notably the poor) from the social, cultural and economic benefits of their environment. As a result, eco crime is an act of violence and should be viewed as a human rights violation as citizens are deprived of freedoms and liberties. The diversity of subject matter covered under both international and national environmental law, and within notions of environmental harm, has necessitated the integration of diverse expertise and knowledges including criminology (Walters, 2009). Within criminological studies, debates about eco crime have emerged within discourses on state and corporate crime or ‘crimes of the powerful’ and within developing debates of ‘green criminology’ (Carribine, et al., 2004; Lynch and Stretesky, 2003; South and Beirne, 1998). Eco crimes must also be contextualised within broader notions of social justice and exclusion. For example, individuals who experience the adverse affects of illegal toxic dumping are often the poor and marginalised. As a result, eco crimes must also intersect with discourses of political economy, race and class in order to understand environmental victimology and ecological justice (Cullinan, 2003). Moreover, it is important to recognise that eco crimes involve harms to humans, non-humans and the natural environment that require analyses involving violence, power and justice (discussed later). In addition, it must be noted that the European Court of Human Rights has ruled that all member states and their subjects have a ‘right to a safe environment’ (Mularoni, 2003). Actions that prevent, jeopardise or compromise this right require critical assessment within discourses of harm and law. As others have noted, harm is a diverse concept involving acts that pertain to physical, psychological, financial and social injury (Hillyard et al., 2004). The concept of environmental harm has been mainly discussed outside criminological discourses with a few notable exceptions (South, 1998; Halsey and White, 1998; Beirne, 1999; Stretesky and Lynch, 2003; Halsey, 2006; White, 2008). As White accurately notes, debates about environmental harm have hinged on constructions of environmental problems. Who constructs the problem? Historically, it has been scientists, activists and the media. However, as this book identifies, the public and the corporate are also crucial players in shaping and defining environment. Halsey (2006) meticulously reviews the intellectual traditions that shape existing notions of environmental problems or harms. He rightly observed that ‘liberal ecology’, ‘ecomarxism’, ‘ecofeminism’, ‘deep ecology’ and ‘social ecology’ have been pivotal narratives

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for understanding the interactions between human, non-humans and nature, and the various perspectives of environmental protection, development and regulation (such narratives are explored further in chapter five). Halsey and White (1998) also note that it must be recognised that environmental harm is often publicly and politically accepted as necessary for maintaining human well-being. As a result, it is essential to inculcate discourses in political economy to analyse and understand the ways that notions of harm, risk and justice are mediated between publics, government policy and corporate and agricultural practice. Such approaches have an established tradition within discourses on crime and justice (Chambliss, 1964; Pearce, 1973; Hay, 1975; Carson, 1980; Taylor, 1992). From these traditions the current analyses integrate political decision-making, economic and technological change, quality of life (see Taylor, 1998) with environmental conservation and development. There are environmental costs in ensuring that people have the resources and technologies to enhance their lives. For example, transporting oil for use in commercial and personal machinery and vehicles can result in devastating ocean spills; factories that supply products for our furnishing and building needs may produce alarmingly dangerous levels of pollutant air emissions; timber from rainforests and native woodlands for housing and construction result in the destruction of habitats and essential biodiversity; and factories which produce building materials, clothing or food often burn-off or release toxic chemicals into our waterways and the atmosphere that not only compromise soil and water quality while destroying numerous species of flora and fauna but also adversely effect human health. Can human beings maintain high standards of living without compromising the integrity of the environment? Are the two ever compatible? (Walters, 2009).

Corporate exploitation, liability and prosecution Governments and transnational corporations whether intentionally or negligently, contaminate and destroy the natural environment in the course of trade and development.1 As Reiman (1979) has succinctly argued in his classic text The Rich Get Richer and the Poor Get Prison, ‘the more likely it is for a particular form of crime to be committed by middle – and upperclass people, the less likely it is that it will be treated as a criminal offence’ (cited in Carribine et al., 2004:77). In relation to GM food there have been a number of high profile prosecutions involving ‘the powerful’. In December 2006, Syngenta Seeds was fined $US 1.5 million by the United States Environmental Protection Agency for distributing an unregistered and contaminated GM seed to farmers (Grain Net, 2006). The same Swiss multinational corporation has recently had a Brazilian governor sign a decree to expropriate land from an agribusiness giant for illegally planting 12 hectares of GM soybean. Moreover, it

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was fined $US 465,000, an amount the corporation has yet to pay (Kenfield, 2006). In January 2005, the US biotechnology and agrochemical giant, Monsanto, agreed to pay $US 1.5 million in fines for bribing an Indonesian official. The United States Securities and Exchange Commission filed two enforcement proceedings against Monsanto under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act for illegal payments to a senior environment official in an attempt to have the Indonesian Government repeal policies that were unfavourable to Monsanto products (United States Securities and Exchange Commission, 2005). The Department of Justice has agreed to dismiss its criminal case if Monsanto conforms to all the regulations and close monitoring proposed within a deferred prosecution arrangement. (US Department of State, 2005; cf. BBC News, 2005) This is not the first time that Monsanto has been embroiled in corporate scandal and illegality over its GM practices. In 2003, it paid $US 63,000 for ‘undisclosed violations’ involving the testing of genetically modified crops. Since 1990 the biotech company has admitted that in 44 separate cases, it has breached government laws regulating the testing of gene-altered crops (Gillis, 2002). Moreover, in what is the largest class action in legal history, more than 6.5 million farmers in India are requesting that they join the Public Interest Litigation (PIL), an action against Monsanto before the Indian Supreme Court for the widespread contamination of fields by GM crops (OCA, 2007).2 Furthermore, the aggressive trade practices of Monsanto have been described as an ‘assault on US farmers’. The US Center for Food Safety has identified that Monsanto continues to exploit patent law and has been awarded in excess of $US 15,000,000 from farmers from successful litigation (Culp, 2005). More than 100 lawsuits launched by Monsanto have resulted in numerous farmer bankruptcies. Mr Andrew Kimbrell, executive director of the Center for Food Safety has stated: These lawsuits and settlements are nothing less than corporate extortion of American farmers. Monsanto is polluting American farms with its genetically engineered crops, not properly informing farmers about these altered seeds, and then profiting from its own irresponsibility and negligence by suing innocent farmers. (Kimbell quoted in Culp, 2005) Much of the litigation has been lodged after the decision in the Supreme Court in Canada case of Monsanto v Schmeiser [2004] which held that patent law should supersede property rights. In this case Monsanto sued a farmer for using their GM canola seed products without a license. The respondent claimed that the GM seeds from a neighbouring property had transferred and contaminated his crops. The court ruled that even though the GM seeds polluted the respondent’s crops he was not entitled to use a seed variety that had been patented under the Patent Act 1985. This has been deemed a

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landmark case in farmer liability and transgenic contamination with broader implications for patent protection and biosafety regulation (see Cullett, 2005). Not only is this a landmark case for patent law but also for issues of eco-sovereignty. This issue has recently received international attention with the Kenyan Government pursuing a multi-million dollar ‘bio-piracy lawsuit’ against US biotech company Genencor for patenting and genetically modifying an organism found in the lakes of Kenya’s Rift Valley which has been used by the corporation as both a fabric softener and for its ability to ‘eat indigo dye from jeans’. The faded jean fashion has become a multi-million dollar world-wide industry, and the Kenyan Government is claiming that its bio-diversity has been forcibly taken and patented without consent and subsequently used for massive commercial profit (Barnett, 2004). The illegal planting or selling of GM produce has been widely documented. In 2000, GM Starlink corn, a food product prohibited for human consumption because of its allergens and subsequently used for animal feed only, was discovered by Friends of the Earth in taco shells sold in supermarkets. Hundreds of consumers experienced allergic reactions, yet the Food and Drug Administration in the United States relied upon assessments from scientists employed by the manufacturer to determine the culpability of proteins contained in the Starlink (Smith, 2004). Further accounts of hundreds of tons of illegal GM corn entered food produced by Syngenta in Europe and China have further identified the inadequacies of self-regulation upon which GM products, notably in the US, are based (see Rees, 2005). Moreover, the unwillingness of powerful states and corporations to comply with international food regulations has resulted in illegal GM food recently entering markets in Britian. For example, in August 2006 the genetically modified LLRice 601 produced by the German biotech company Bayer CropScience was identified in rice imported to Britain from the US. The United States Department for Agriculture acknowledged that this particular GM rice variety had not been approved for sale in the US, yet it had been consumed in the UK without consumer and British Government knowledge for the past three years. In 2004 alone, the UK imported 82, 625 tons of rice from the US. As a result, many environmental groups have called on a government ban of all US rice products (Vidal, 2006). In 2009, farmers and consumer groups successfully brought a case against the US Department of Agriculture’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) for violating federal law. The regulatory agency had failed to prepare environmental impact statements ‘before deregulating genetically altered sugar beets’ (Gillam, 2009). Therefore, it is important to note that the political economy of GM food and the laws pertaining to its production and sale provide necessary contexts for understanding the ways in which states and corporations bypass existing regulations (see Walters, 2007). Finally, when we move beyond existing legal regimes and contextualise eco crime within notions of harm (see Hillyard et al., 2004) we observe that

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the range of risks associated with GM foods including its cultivation, production, consumption and trade become matters for criminological enquiry. For example, antibiotic resistance, allergenic reactions, genetic pollution, the creation of superweeds and the degradation of ecosystems (see chapter two) are all areas of reported ‘harm’ caused by the use of transgenic food technologies.

Concluding comment In 1971 during his debate with Noam Chomsky on Human Nature: Justice versus Power, Michel Foucault identified the relationship between power, culture and the construction of knowledge using the developments in medical practice as an example. Let me take a very simple example, which I will not analyse, but which is this: How was it possible that men began, at the end of the eighteenth century, for the first time in the history of Western thought and of Western knowledge, to open up the corpses of people in order to know what was the source, the origin, the anatomical needle, of the particular malady which was responsible for their deaths? The idea seems simple enough. Well, four or five thousand years of medicine in the West were needed before we had the idea of looking for the cause of the malady in the lesion of a corpse. If … you tried to establish the place of disease and of death in society at the end of the eighteenth century, and what interest industrial society effectively had in quadrupling the entire population in order to expand and develop itself, as a result of which medical surveys of society were made, big hospitals were opened, etc.; if you tried to find out how medical knowledge became institutionalised in that period, how its relations with other kinds of knowledge were ordered, well, then you could see how the relationship between disease, the hospitalised, ill person, the corpse, and pathological anatomy were made possible. In a similar way, why should criminology after 137 years, when it was first coined by the French anthropologist Topinard (see Mannheim, 1972), begin to seek new horizons in the environment and globalisation? For much of its history, and its present, criminology has been a government-embedded discipline, so what is conspiring to permit new critical narratives evolving towards new discourses that encapsulate eco crime? Issues pertaining to the protection of the planet continue to capture media headlines and continually focus public and political debate. For some commentators, global warming, and not terrorism, is the weapon of the mass destruction (Houghton, 2003). As a result, the essential ingredients for the existence of human and non-human life, notably food, water and air, are

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increasingly jeopardised by climate change, pollution and ozone depletion (WHO, 2006; World Water Council, 2006). The need to protect natural resources and curtail environmental degradation has recently been reflected in environmental law which is the fastest growing area of international law (Galizzi and Sands, 2004). The diversity of subject matter covered under international environmental law must necessitate the integration of diverse expertise and knowledges that must include criminology. Moreover, the intersection of environmental issues with global trade provides new terrains for crime to flourish.

Notes 1 Notions of environmental negligence have been expressed in UK law. British environmental law has for some time attributed liability to polluters who have harmed the environment without intent, but whose actions were deemed to have ‘caused’ environmental harm. In the landmark case of Alphacell v Woodward [1972] the appellant, Alphacell Ltd, operated a business that included the preparation of manila fibres for paper manufacturing. The court ruled that while there was an absence of intent, an absence of knowledge and an ‘assumed absence of negligence’, there were no intervening acts of a trespasser or acts of God of such a powerful nature as to prevent causation. Lord Wilberforce stated that ‘causing’ should be given a commonsense meaning, that there was not a requirement to prove mens rea. Moreover, the court ruled that if breaches of the legislation were to solely relate to intentional or negligent actions then ‘a great deal of pollution would go unpunished and undeterred’. As a result, if a person or company is charged with ‘causing’ a noxious or polluting matter to enter a controlled water, as opposed to ‘knowingly permits’, it is unnecessary to prove that the accused acted intentionally or negligently (McEldowney and McEldowney, 1996; cf. Brown, 2003). 2 For a full account of legal non-compliance by biotechnology companies in the United States and a list of penalties and settlements, see United States Department of Agriculture (2008).

Chapter 2

The perils, prospects and controversies of GM food

Britain’s future will be lit by the brilliance of science. (Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, 3 November 2006)

Introduction The emerging intersection of biotechnology with medicine, health care and agriculture identifies the growing influence of genetics in contemporary social life (Pilnick, 2002). For some, the ‘genetic revolution’ provides substantial potential for improving human health, while at the same time there are widespread concerns about ethics, regulation, commercial exploitation, civil liberties and scientific impropriety (Nottingham, 2003; O’Sullivan et al., 1999). Recent discourses in human cloning, international security and DNA forensics, along with plant and animal manipulations have further intensified and polarised debates about ‘bio-power’ and biotechnological hegemony and the role of genetics in society (McGiffen, 2005). Genetically modified foods are at the centre of these debates with concerns about health and safety. These concerns focus on the potential dangers to human health, the risks of genetic pollution and environmental degradation, the demise of alternative farming techniques as well as economic exploitation by large private corporations (Alterie and Rosset, 2002). Moreover, during 2002 advocates of GM food received substantial blows on several fronts. US GM giant Aventis CropScience, one of the largest GM companies in the world, along with Kraft Foods, Azteca Foods and AstraZeneca Garst Seed Company, agreed to an out-of-court settlement of $US 9 million brought by consumers in a classaction that alleged that genetically modified corn caused allergic reaction. In 2000, consumers discovered that Starlink, a genetically modified additive, produces the human allergen Cry9c in taco shells and corn (Franz, 2002).

Politics of GM knowledge As many writers in the area of GM food have discussed, there is often no middle ground in the GM debate. The battle lines are clearly drawn between

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the proponents of GM food and the critics, with each side equally passionate and convinced by their respective stance. Such strongly demarcated positions of resistance or advocacy have been widely criticised. As Winston (2002: 236) argues: all sides fail to deal with the scientific data objectively, and tend to create biotechnology legends from small bits of unconfirmed information. The broader public has been besieged by sound bites and public relations hype rather than exposed to comprehensive and informed public debate. That said, the polarised positions have more recently become embedded in international annual conferences that, on the one hand, promote scientific knowledge in favour of food and biotechnology (WASET, 2009) and, on the other, scientific knowledge against (Food and Democracy, 2009). Clearly the mixed messages from various scientific fora contribute to public scepticism and caution. The uncompromising positions of those ‘for’ or ‘against’ GM food must be contextualised within a political economy of GM knowledge or as Foucault (1976) argued a ‘political economy of truth’. Disentangling the ‘truth’ is fraught with bias, hidden agendas and unobtainable information. However, this chapter attempts to synthesise what we do and don’t know in a manner that seeks to provoke public and political debate. As governments and corporate entities seek environmentally friendly images for power and profit, the production of environmental science has become subject to widespread suppression, collusion and misrepresentation. Kuehn (2004) identifies how corporate bodies in the United States are increasingly using the law to suppress environmental research that criticises the ‘green policies’ of large commercial enterprises. Moreover, Clapp (2003) outlines how biotech corporations play an increasingly influential role in environmental policy-making and global environmental governance. This is achieved through the presence of biotechnology representatives who are actively involved in lobbying at international negotiations. As a result, transnational corporations are not simply reacting to the decisions of environmental governing bodies and protocols but are ‘increasingly engaged directly in public debates to maximise industry profit’ (Clapp, 2003: 3). Of course, the duplicitous and unethical involvement of corporations in environmental politics is not new. The use of green media campaigns and corporations rebranding themselves as environmentally friendly while at the same time polluting the environment, and lobbying politicians and environmental groups for commercial opportunities, has been widely reported (see Karliner, 1997). However, as deGrassi, (2003: 51) argues, the manipulation of the GM debate serves to exploit vulnerable societies stating that ‘governments and corporations have mobilized funding as part of high-stakes international dispute over biotechnology, in essence rendering African agricultural research – and our understanding of poverty dynamics on the continent – pawns in the conflicts of the powerful’.

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The UK Government has come under widespread criticism recently for the reported impact that biotech lobby groups have had on Prime Minister Brown’s decision to ‘relax’ the position on GM crops and commercially harvest transgenic foods to address world hunger. On the evening prior to the Labour Government announcing its support of GM, the Environment Minister Phil Woolas reportedly met with the Agricultural Biotechnology Council, whose board of directors comprise representatives from Monsanto and other leading biotech companies, to promote GM crops as a solution to the world food crisis (Grice, 2008). More recently, the Royal Society’s Reaping the benefits: Science and sustainable intensification of global agriculture openly supports the environmental and social benefits of GM food as well as identifies it as a possible answer to the ‘urgent challenges’ of global food security. The report’s key author is Professor David Baulcombe a geneticist and Head of the Sainsbury Laboratory of the John Innes Centre, a plant biotechnology institute that received substantial funding from the biotechnology industries. Professor Baulcome has previous spoken out in favour of GM crops and is reportedly a long time advocate of GM technologies (Lobbywatch, 2009). Andy Rees’ compelling account of the ‘biotech lobby’s dirty tricks’ provide a detailed overview of the ‘corporate takeover of the British Government and of science’. His research identifies how biotech companies through advertising and sponsorship influence key scientific journals such as Nature and Science, and how powerful biotech sympathisers, such as Lords Sainsbury and Draysons have made substantial donations to the New Labour Government and been rewarded with ministerial posts (Rees, 2006). Such findings endorse the views of George Monbiot, author of the best selling book Captive State, which demonstrated how members of the British Parliament, and leading agriculture research institutes, were lobbied and paid by biotech companies (Monbiot, 2000). The former Labour Environment Minister, Michael Meacher, confirmed in an interview with the author the ways in which biotech lobby groups had not only influenced MPs but also senior civil servants: Officials in Defra were wholly pro-GM and I found myself pushing water up hill … the former head of the FSA was more fanatically pro-GM that Mr Blair or Ms Beckett and his appointment was another case of the government stitching it up … Defra, the FSA and government regulators have laid prostrate to the biotech industries … the biotech industry and Defra are in each others pockets … and rules are not being imposed that have made any difficulties for industry … ACRE are complete believers in GM but who chose them … the government is appointing people who it knows will tell them what it wants to hear, it’s a charade … there is no independence … the advice system is riddled with conflicts of interest … They (the biotech lobbyists) decided very early on that they weren’t going to get very far with me … they also knew very quickly that Margaret Beckett was much more favorable,

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and also it’s quicker to do what industry does and go straight to number 10 … Because they have the ear of the Prime Minister they arrogate themselves a great deal of power … they are totally unknown, unelected and unaccountable … Industry persuades key personal advisors to the PM, and you need to do a lot of work as a minister to present an alternative view … they are very very influential in creating the official view … Similar conclusions about the biotech industries’ influence over politicians and the media in the United States is comprehensively documented by Geoffrey Smith in his international bestseller Seeds of Deception – Exposing Industry and Government Lies about the Safety of Genetically Modified Food You’re Eating. Scientific knowledge has become a key ingredient in corporate and government practices, or as Abell and Oxbrow (2001: 267) argue ‘the combination of explicit data and information to which is added tacit expert opinion, skills and experience to result in a valuable asset which can be used to make key decisions’. Global commercial environments are continually seeking added value or competitive advantages through the development and promotion of knowledge economies. These economies are underpinned by a new economic theory that is driven by a cost-reduction productivity (see Drucker, 1998). The monopolisation and manipulation of governing bodies stated above is of considerable concern with relation to risk assessment. Suzuki (2001: 5) argues that the production of knowledge and scientific enquiry in the field of genetics is becoming regulated by the vested interests of corporate entities: Today the incredible techniques for manipulating DNA have created a rush to patent DNA sequences and genetically altered life forms, and to realise massive fortunes. Where once scientists sought answers to fundamental questions, they now seek venture-capital investors for their biotech companies. Even when methodologically sound and sophisticated research on genetic transfer identifies the dangers of GM technology (see Rieger et al., 2002), GM corporations such as Monsanto will selectively utilise the findings of research to favour their economic position (Monsanto, 2002). There is no democratisation of risk assessment in GM foods but a corporate hegemony over science with claims to ‘absolute or scientific truth’. As Wales and Mythen (2002) argue ‘despite recognized social and political dimensions of risk, science, as a totalising discourse, still regulates the production of “truth”’. This is clearly problematic on various fronts, not least of which because the science of biotechnology and GM organisms remains fraught with ambiguities, uncertainties and complications (see Ahmed, 2004).

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There have been numerous claims that biotech industries worldwide continue to lobby governments and produce commercially favourable GM research. In a meticulous critique of the ‘GM lies and cover-ups’ of the biotech industry and the ways in which governments worldwide are systematically lobbied and tainted by falsified or bias research, Jeffrey Smith provides a compelling overview of the corporate and government corruption surrounding the knowledge, politics and policy of GM food (Smith, 2004; see also Caruso, 2006). More recently, it was estimated that Monsanto spent $US 2 million in the first three months of 2009 lobbying politicians on Capitol Hill (Philpott, 2009). There have also been high profile and internationally reported examples of scientists raising questions about the safety of GM food being threatened or pressured to alter findings. In 1998, Dr Arpad Pusztai was subject to disciplinary action and widespread condemnation for highlighting the dangers of GM foods. His research was published in Nature and sparked international controversy. He has recently reflected upon the events surrounding his research and has publicly identified how his data was ‘seized’ and his reputation tarnished for criticising a technology with widespread economic benefits. He was recently reported as stating: ninety five percent of GM is coming from America, so naturally it is in their interests to push it, I have no ideological grounds against Monsanto … For me it’s scientific argument. They have not done a proper job [of testing], and they are just using their political and economic muscle to foist it on us. (Pusztai quoted in Randerson 2008) Moreover, in 1999, Dr Richard Horton, the editor of Lancet, was reportedly threatened by Peter Lachman, the then Vice-President of the Royal Society, that his position would be jeopardised by publishing scientific research that questioned the safety of GM food (Flynn and Gillard, 1999). In another case, Dr Andrew Stirling, a member of the UK Government’s GM Science Review Panel, was ‘warned by a leading member of the scientific establishment that his career would be ruined unless he stopped questioning the (GM) technology’s safety’. Dr Stirling, who was a member of the 24-person panel of scientific experts refused to name the senior British scientist who was attempting to sabotage his career (McCartney, 2003). Another member of the same scientific panel, Professor Carlo Leifert from Newcastle University, resigned from the government panel amidst concerns that biotech companies, notably Monsanto, were invited to provide written contributions to the panel’s report on issues of GM safety. In another widely cited case, Professors Chapela and Quist, both from the University of California at Berkeley, discovered GM contamination in native Mexican maize. The research was published in Nature, and for the first time in its 133-year history, the publisher withdrew the article after pro-GM scientists lobbied the editor. Professor Chapela widely reported the links between the biotech

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industry and science and the pressures on scientists to be supportive of biotechnology or risk alienation and funding cuts. He further stated that ‘I cannot avoid now realising that this is a very, very well-concerted and coordinated and paid-for campaign to discredit the very simple statement we made’ (cited in Rowell, 2003). The more recent example of Emma RosiMarshall from Loyola University in Illinois highlights the ways in which scientific researchers who are critical of GM technologies are subjected to widespread and systematic intimidation from biotech companies and pro-GM scientists (Waltz, 2009). In addition, even scientific research that favours GM technology is subjected to pre-publication approval by biotech corporations in ways tantamount to censorship and suppression (Scientific American, 2009). Moreover, since the US Government’s submission was made to the World Trade Organisation in 2003 against the quasi anti-GM stance in Europe, we’ve witnessed the emergence of the Journal of International Biotechnology Law. The journal publishes articles that are almost exclusively supportive of biotechnology in what has become a self interest defined and motivated area of international law. Emerging within the GM debate is a privatised knowledge, whereby commercial biotech entities are able to generate their own science that is skewed towards an economic rationality and a free-market politics (Jones, 2004). The marginalisation of public opinion and the emerging governance of GM science serves to blur the boundaries of truth and risk and to regulate and neutralise voices of opposition. For example, public relations have reportedly entered the fray by representing biotech companies in the promotion of GM food technologies. Allegations of fraud have been pitted against Bivings Group, hired by Monsanto to discredit the findings of research that criticised GM maize in Mexico. It was alleged that Bivings invented bogus citizen movements and phantom corporations to challenge environmentalists and independent scientific research that criticised GM food technologies. Bivings have denied the allegations but have not pursued the matter legally. The evidence of anti-GM hostilities from fake people and companies, bogus websites and fraudulent emails all linked to the computers of the Bivings Groups may explain their lack of legal intervention (see Monbiot, 2002; cf. Engdahl, 2004). The actions of GM corporations and the negative press that accompanied it, coupled with the reported risks of GM food (discussed below), has plant biotechnology, according to Lurquin (2002: 138) facing ‘possibly more opposition today, at least in some segments of society than nuclear power plants’. Moreover, in the United States, recent reports indicate that two-thirds of all crops are contaminated with genetically modified organisms ‘dooming organic agriculture and posing a severe future risk to health’ (Lean, 2004). Cook provides a fascinating critique of the ‘war of words’ in his book Genetically Modified Language. In doing so, he challenges all sides of the debate for developing their own discourses and for influencing policy and

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public opinion. He deconstructs the language of biotech companies and concludes that organisations such as Monsanto (while adopting a range of deliberately ambiguous and contradictory terminology on websites and in advertising) are clearly in business where ‘shareholders come first’, and where the use of phrases such as ‘our communities’ more than likely refers to the customer or shareholder community (Cook, 2004: 71). Furthermore, Khann and Anton’s (2002) examination of 500 corporations in the United States revealed that those firms that had instituted environmental strategies and auditing within company policy and practice were motivated by increasing the competitive edge and by improving relations with shareholders. Finally, the public and farmer anxieties surrounding GM technologies (see chapter three) has required new marketing strategies for biotech companies. Researchers and corporations now often avoid ‘GM’ in the titles of reports or announcements preferring to identify new seeds as ‘persistent resistant’ or ‘drought tolerant’ (Adelaja, 2009). Therefore, it is against this backdrop of distortion, manipulation, aggressive business and intense ‘patch protection’ between those ‘for’ and those ‘against’ GM food that the following synthesis must be contextualised.

Untangling the risks, controversies and benefits In attempting to unravel the risks and potentials for GM food, McHughen (2000) identifies that ‘safety’ in relation to food is a subjective term. He asks what is meant by GM food safety and whether it is ‘relative to other foods currently on the market. Is safety absolute?’ (2000: 19). Clearly this a valid question, and it is important to remember that issues about the production, trade and safety of GM products are a part of a broader debate about food per se. There is a danger that a discussion that focuses exclusively on GM food fails to adequately acknowledge a whole host of serious concerns about non-GM contamination, exploitation and misrepresentation. For example, in Britain alone, 5.5 million people suffer annually from food poisoning at a cost of £350 million to the economy (Food Standards Agency, 2002). Therefore, McHughen’s work, notwithstanding the legitimate anxieties about GM food, serves as an important reminder that politicised debates about GM foodstuffs must not colonise all discourses on food security and sustainable development. That said, there are several safety concerns that are unique to genetically modified foods. For example, Weaver and Morris’ extensive annotated bibliography of all available published scientific literature systhensises a range of concerns that requires further examination as well as promoting a range of issues for regulatory authorities. They conclude: risks associated with the expression of the transgenic material include concerns over resistance and non-target effects of crops expressing Bt toxins, consequences of herbicide use associated with genetically

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modified herbicide-tolerant plants, and transfer of gene expression from genetically modified crops through vertical and horizontal gene transfer. These come about because of the unstable nature of the transgene and vectors used to insert it and because of unpredictable interactions between the transgene and the host genome. (2005: 157) Such studies have raised a variety of concerns about health and safety that necessitate further examination. In doing so, they require us to ask what is risk? And how much risk can we risk? (cf. Caruso, 2006, discussed later). Health issues On the one hand, advocates for GM food propose that it provides a solution to world hunger while providing greater nutritional and health benefits to consumers. On the other hand, international concerns have been raised about the possible risks to human health, including toxicity, allergenicity, antibiotic immunity, chemical reactions to human cell structure, illness and whether deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) in GM foods can invade human genetic structures. Issues about GM food and human health received international attention in 1989 after 37 people died and 1,500 suffered long-term disabilities in the US after consuming a food supplement (L-Trytophan) derived from genetically modified bacteria. While some commentators have suggested that the fatalities and illnesses were associated with non-GM processes (Anderson, 1999), the incident provoked much needed research and debate into the safety of GM food products. In another widely cited study, Arpad Pusztai found that rats fed genetically modified potatoes suffered organ and immune system impairment. While subject to sustained criticism, the work of Ewen and Puzstai (1999) has sparked international concern about the negative impact on human health from consuming GM food products. Other studies identify various unintended and unknown human health consequences that require further investigation (Cellini et al., 2004). In Argentina, where GM crops provide the government with $US 5 billion per year, a legal application has been lodged with the Supreme Court that, if successful, will halt the production of all GM agriculture for six months. The pending legal case emerged from Argentine research identified embryonic defects in frogs consuming GM seeds and the coinciding higher birth defects and cancers in people living near to farms spraying the GM herbicides on GM crops (Webber and Weitzman, 2009). In an unusual move, general practitioners in Ireland have called for a ban on GM foods claiming that potential risks pose problems stating, ‘Doctors have an ethical and moral duty to highlight concerns in relation to these issues and in the interest of the health of present and future generations.

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Permission to grow or consume genetically engineered foods in Ireland should be denied’ (Irish Medical Times, 2009). Nutrition, hunger and gene transfer A synthesis of available scientific evidence identifies that health related benefits from consuming GM food is either exaggerated or inconclusive. Indeed some authors have pointed to the ‘weak science’, notably in the United States, that ‘conceals value-laden features of safety claims’ about GM crops (Levidon and Carrs, 2000: 257). That said, some studies report that GM foods provide improved fat, protein and carbohydrate quality, while demonstrating no adverse genetic or reproductive side effects (Uzogara 2000; Bakshi, 2003; Rhee et al., 2005). Monsanto argues that their products provide consumer benefits ‘such as increased protein or oil, improved fatty-acid balance, or carbohydrate enhancements’ (Monsanto, 2006). Scientific staff working for Monsanto have conducted extensive research and published the results in reputable academic journals. Cockburn’s analysis of dozens of varieties of GM food products concluded that: the evaluation of more than 50 GM crops which have been approved worldwide, the conclusion has been that food and feeds derived from genetically modified crops are as safe and nutritious as those derived from traditional crops. The lack of any adverse affects resulting from the production and consumption of GM crops grown on more than 300 million acres over the last five years supports these safety conclusions. (2002: 79) Some pro-GM scientists acknowledge that toxicity in food production can result in harm to humans but conclude that there is no evidence that technologies used for GM foods ‘poses an allergic threat per se compared to other methodologies widely accepted in the food industry’ (Lack, 2002: 337). Without doubt, the most widely acclaimed health benefit from the proponents of GM food is its ‘remedy to world hunger’, to vitamin A deficiency and food shortages (see Borlaug, 2000; Guerinot, 2000; Trewavas, 2002). In addition, there has been no shortage of media commentators arguing that we ‘must go GM’ if we are to feed the world’s hungry (Bridges, 2008). Research in China has revealed increased rice yields with lower amounts of insecticide, a reported breakthrough for food shortages (Huang et al., 2005). With the world experiencing food shortages the GM debate has again been reignited in the UK. Among those advocating for GM crops are eminent scientists such as Professor Chris Leaver at Oxford University arguing that the ‘earth’s population will reach 9 billion by 2040. We need crops that offer better nutritional quality, can withstand drought, use fertiliser more efficiently and resist diseases and pests. GM can contribute to achieving that’

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(quoted in Leake, 2008). However, the International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development (IAASTD), a prestigious intergovernmental body similar in stature to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, published a 2,500-page document in April 2008 concluding that there were adequate resources to produce the world’s food needs without pushing GM technologies. It claimed that biotechnology has a role to play in future agricultural security but GM crops were not the answer to world hunger (IAASTD, 2008). It reified the position that GM food is not the answer for future food shortages; instead the solutions lie in reducing poverty, disease, war and economic exploitation while increasing access to technology and resources (FAO, 2006). Moreover, biotech claims that GM is a solution to world hunger is an argument that sits uncomfortably with other recognised facts about food oversupply and worldwide obesity. For example, the world’s three largest food companies, Danone, Unilever and Kraft are currently vying for the right to patent the Hoodia gordoni cactus that produces a compound known as P57 which has been used by indigenous African tribes for centuries to stave off hunger. With an estimated 300 million people worldwide clinically assessed as overweight or obese, the use of ‘dietary control products’ promises to return £300 billion a year to the leading corporate franchise (Milmo, 2006). Such profitable enterprises from excess food run counter to biotech claims that the world’s food shortages will be solved with GM food products. With over a billion small subsistence farmers throughout the world, most of them living in poverty, the World Food Programme has identified that ‘efforts must be stepped up to promote broad based agricultural and rural development that will create the opportunities for sustainable exit from poverty’ (WFP, 2002: 9). It is widely acknowledged that the elimination of poverty and disease combined with the development of economic stability is the way forward for reducing hunger. The UN’s Food and Agriculture Organisation has argued that ‘sustained economic growth leading to increased productivity and prosperity at the national level will result in reduced hunger’ (2006: 10). If hunger is an economic and developmental issue and not a food shortage issue (WHES, 2006), it must be questioned how GM food with its corporate patents and licence-dependent farmers/clients can be an answer. If the biotech industry is concerned with solving problems of world hunger, how will patented seeds being sold to the world’s poorest people provide a long-term solution? From a nutritional perspective, advocates of GM food have also pointed to ‘golden rice’ to reduce vitamin A deficiencies. Rice is the staple diet of two billion people, and GM golden rice created by Dr Ingo Potrykus contains increased levels of b-carotene and iron. In the majority world, an estimated 140 million children are affected annually by vitamin A deficiency resulting in death, disease and blindness (World Food Programme, 2006). However, the Rockefeller Foundation which was funding developments in golden rice denounced the actions of public relations companies for exaggerating the claims of the product and admitted that golden rice was a mere ‘supplement’

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vitamin A to a healthy diet of fruit and vegetables and not a panacea to world health problems (Conway, 2001; Brown, 2001). The response by Gordon Conway of the Rockefeller Foundation came after Dr Vandana Shiva had called golden rice a ‘hoax’ manufactured by PR campaigns representing the biotech industries to maximise profits and not scientific research (Shiva, 2001). Subsequent views in the scientific community have supported the notion that the rice is incapable of redressing the majority world’s shortage of vitamin A (Nestle, 2001). The case against GM food on the grounds of health related concerns includes the possibilities of gene transfer, the risks of antibiotics immunity, the creation of new food toxins and allergens and the potential carcinogenic side-effects. Such concerns are supported by a corpus of reputable scientific evidence including some of the world’s most eminent geneticists and biophysicists (see Wan-Ho, 1997, 2004 and 2006). For example, on 15 June 2003, the Independent Science Panel, an autonomous group of 26 world renowned experts from various disciplines including biomathematics, medicine, microbial ecology, molecular genetics, nutritional biochemistry, physiology, toxicology and virology released a 120-page report that synthesised all available scientific evidence. The report provides disturbing reading about the lack of regulation, the manipulation of scientific research, the lobbying activities of biotech companies as well as stating that GM foods pose serious health and environmental dangers. Numerous scientists identified that antibiotic resistance in humans could be acquired through ingestion of resistant microorganisms from animals or soil contaminating food or water. The summary findings of the IPS final report conclude that: Transgenic DNA from plants has been taken up by bacteria both in the soil and in the gut of human volunteers; antibiotic resistance marker genes can spread from transgenic food to pathogenic bacteria, making infections very difficult to treat. (Institute of Science in Society, 2003) The conclusions of this highly reputable and experienced group of scholars were emphatically opposed to GM food stating: GM crops have failed to deliver the promised benefits and are posing escalating problems on the farm. Transgenic contamination is now widely acknowledged to be unavoidable, and hence there can be no co-existence of GM and non-GM agriculture. Most important of all, GM crops have not been proven safe. On the contrary, sufficient evidence has emerged to raise serious safety concerns, that if ignored could result in irreversible damage to health and the environment. GM crops should therefore be firmly rejected now. (Institute of Science in Society, 2003)

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Similar concerns over contamination, lack of GMO regulation and gaps in scientific knowledge were expressed in Frankfurt in December 2005 during an international symposium involving leading scientific experts (see Katja, 2006). As a result, there have been widespread concerns expressed about antibiotic resistant genes in food that may combine with beneficial human bacteria to form harmful virile strains (or superbugs) within the human body that are immune to existing antibiotic technologies (discussed below). Some scientific research is not disputed. For example, it has been conclusively established that not all foreign and reconstructed DNA in GM food is broken down during digestion. Genetically modified DNA is capable of surviving in the small intestine and bowel of various farm animals (Chowdhury et al., 2003a and b; Duggan et al., 2003). The presence of GM DNA in the gastrointestinal tracts of animals fed with GM feed products provides cause for concern, but can such traces of recombinant DNA transfer into the cell or tissue structures? Espanier et al. (2001) identified that GM DNA from the gut of pigs had transferred into the bloodstream of the animals that had consumed GM feed. In addition, there is evidence of GM DNA being transferred or taken up in the tissue cells (Hohlweg and Doefler, 2001; Filaci, et al., 2004) and results of attachment to genomes (Ho, 2003; de Vries and Wackernagel, 2002). More recent and alarming findings were revealed by Dr Irina Ermakova at the Russian Academy of Sciences which demonstrates that unborn children could be harmed by GM food products (Bean, 2006). Her research demonstrates that 55.6 per cent of rodent offspring to mothers fed a diet of GM soya died within three weeks of birth compared with nine per cent from a control group. This study is the first of its kind to address issues relating to the unborn and provides justification for ongoing concern. This research supports earlier findings that identified cell structure and functioning were altered in the organs of mice after consuming GM soya. In a comprehensive study which included a 24-month feeding programme of GM soya, Italian researchers discovered that the liver, pancreas and reproductive organs of mice were structurally rearranged, damaged or dysfunctional from consuming genetically modified soya products (Malalesta et al., 2003, 2005; Vecchio et al., 2004). The Netherwood et al. (2004) study, funded by the Food Standard Authority (Britain’s independent food watchdog), concludes that whole epsps DNA transfer did not occur in their study involving GM soya and human ileostomists, and risk to human health was ‘unlikely’; however, they do identify that genetically modified DNA can survive in the human gut and small intestine and that low frequency gene transfer can occur. This conclusion was based on the finding that small GM gene traces were detected in the intestinal microflora of subjects consuming GM soya. In another FSA funded project, Flint et al. (2002) discovered ingested, partially degraded GM DNA surviving in the small intestine and foreign gene invasion, stating that it was a ‘possibility of rare acquisition of GM sequences by resident bacteria in the mouth or gut’.

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In a further FSA research project that focused solely on E.coli transformation, bacterial hybridisation and antibiotic immunity, it was concluded that ‘no gene transfer from GM plant material to E.coli enterobacteriaceae component is detected’ (FSA, 2004: 4).1 In sum, the Food Standard Agency’s research programme has identified a variety of mixed results that point to ‘low level’ risks associated with GM DNA transfer and antibiotic immunity. However, a full reading of the research reports does not appear to be reflected in the media releases of the FSA. Indeed, the concerns expressed by the above mentioned studies are more significant and in some instances more forcefully stated than FSA sources would lead the public to believe. This is not completely surprising; the FSA has been widely criticised for its failure to be independent by backing the US Government’s opposition to labelling and not supporting policies on traceability. Some have even suggested that the FSA is ‘pro-GM’, arguing, for instance, that its ‘GM Public Debate’ was ‘nothing short of an advertising bonanza for the biotech companies’ (Rees, 2006: 40). Antibiotic resistance, allergenicity and toxicity In addition to concerns about GM DNA breakdown and transfer, and chemical reactions to human cell structure, widespread alarm surrounds antibiotic resistance, toxins, allergies as well as the possible carcinogenic effects of consuming GM food products. More than a decade ago, American geneticist Ricki Lewis identified the growing increase of antibiotic resistant bacteria and the near futility of available pharmaceuticals to counteract hybrid and mutated infections. Dr Lewis attributed the reasons for the rise in untreatable diseases to drug company complacency and the overuse of antibiotics (Lewis, 1995). The United States National Health Council has re-affirmed the increasing global threat posed by fatal infections that have adapted and mutated to resistant or untreatable disease status (NHC, 2000). Millions of people worldwide die each year from infectious diseases resistant to modern medicines (WHO, 2004). The World Health Organisation has identified that the over and under use of antibiotic medicines as well as the promotion of antimicrobials in agriculture have contributed to a worldwide crisis. The use of antimicrobials for growth enhancement in animals is practised widely in commercial agriculture. The drugs used to promote growth are similar or identical to those substances used to control human diseases and there is clinical evidence that antibiotic resistance can be passed from animals to humans (WHO, 1997 and 2003). With drug resistance already an established worldwide problem that has called for a UN global strategy (see WHO, 2001), serious concerns have been raised by the antibiotic resistant marker genes (ARMs) that are used to produce GM food. Naturally occurring food contaminants such as enterococcus cause infections that are becoming increasingly more difficult to treat because of antibiotic resistance (Eaton and Gasson, 2001), and the

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threats posed by GM food threaten to exacerbate the struggles encountered by modern medicine to combat bacterial disease. ARMs are used to identify or ‘mark out’ which cells in a DNA sequence have been altered with foreign genetic material. Once the GM food is consumed there exists a widespread concern that the ARM will transfer into humans and agricultural livestock and produce antibiotic immunity (Lack, 2002). Moreover, research identifies that genetically modified pigs and fish created with antibiotic resistant marker genes are capable of producing new viral sequences. Kleter and Kuiper (2002: 280) argue that ‘inserted retroviral sequences in animals recombine with wild type viruses giving rise to new retroviruses’ (see also Mikkelson and Pederson, 2000). Studies that identify that antibiotic resistant gene transfer is ‘remote’ and that the creation of new drug resistant bacteria is unlikely maintain that they ‘cannot entirely rule out the possibility of rare transfer events’ (Bennet et al., 2004: 418). Scientific research that reports the remoteness or rareness of ARMs to bacterial, humanoid or animal DNA maintain that transfers are possible and have occurred (Nielson et al., 1998). Moreover, high temperatures and pressurised steam used during the preparation of the marker gene is capable of degrading the ARM and preventing transmission and take-up in the human gut (Chiter et al., 2000), however this method is rarely used. Scientific advocates of GM food, including Gordon Conway of the Rockerfeller Foundation (an organisation that has funded more than 400 biotechnology scientists in underdeveloped countries) support the phasing out of antibiotic resistant maker genes in favour of alternative technologies (Conway, 2000). These alternative technologies have been shown to be more efficient and less time consuming and have shown that ARMs are not necessary for the production of transgenic plants and that increased growth can be produced without antibiotic selection (Joersbo, 2001; Daniel et al., 2004). That said, Monsanto scientists who currently favour the use of ARMs claim that these new or alternative technologies ‘have yet to undergo full safety assessment and regulatory evaluation’ (Goldstein et al., 2005: 22). In addition to antibiotic resistance, cell biologists have expressed concern about the capability of GMOs to alter metabolism through the engineering process and create hybrid proteins that are toxic (Schubert, 2002). During his time as Britain’s Chief Scientific Advisor, Lord Robert May remarked that ‘there can be questions of health and safety associated with GM foods, particularly if we introduce genes coding for production of toxins against certain kinds of pests’ (May, 1999). This position was adopted from an emerging corpus of scientific research that raised concerns about GM food and allergencity as well as the case involving protein methionine-rich nuts that were introduced into GM soybean in Brazil that caused widespread skin and respiratory allergenic conditions (see Nordlee et al., 1996). Allergic reactions to all kinds of food often occur within minutes of consumption and comprise various ill effects from diarrhoea and nausea, to

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asthma, muscular and cellular swelling and dysfunction. As Metcalfe (2003: 1111) identifies, ‘These reactions depend on the synthesis of antigen-specific immunoglobin E (IgE) by B cells in allergic individuals with an inherited tendency for T-helper type 2 cell-like reactions, in which the T cells, when activated, secrete cytokines such as interleukin (IL)-4 and IL-5’. However, there are delayed allergic reactions caused by non-lgEs that may be present in GM foods that are not subject to the same degree of scientific analysis (Metcalfe, 2003). This concern is particularly relevant to children where growth and developing metabolism provide vast uncertainties about the impact of GM foods on child gastronomy (Perr, 2002). It is widely known that eight food sources produce the overwhelming majority of allergenic reactions and illnesses, namely from milk, peanuts, eggs, fish, shellfish, soybean, tree nuts and wheat. These food products when used in GM foods have identified allergic qualities (Metcalfe et al., 1996). Moreover, Connor and Jacobs (1998) show that not only were proteins capable of producing allergenic or toxic reactions but cellar components could also produce pleiotropic or mutagenic effects. Of considerable concern are the bacteria, viruses and non-plants with no previous scientific analyses for allergens that are used for gene transplant and GM food production. In 2005, researchers at the Australian National University identified allergic lung damage in mice caused by consuming a GM pea with a designer resistance to weevil (Young, 2005). The effects on mice included higher counts of white blood cells and structural alteration to the immune system. The researchers posit that such findings raise serious concerns for humans arguing that ‘transgenic expression of non-native proteins in plants may lead to the synthesis of structural variants processing altered immunogenicity’ (Prescott et al., 2005: 9023). Similar findings in relation to the instability of bacterial properties used in GM foods have demonstrated the uncertainty of food toxicology and the reality and risk of allegenicity (see Kulikov, 2005). Alternative scientific techniques have been proposed to reduce the risks of allergenic gene transfer, yet such technologies remain underutilised and unproven (Goodman et al., 2005). Moreover, Alexander Haslberger, a microbiologist at the Department of Food Safety (WHO), has argued that existing risk assessment must be extended to identify the effect of GM microorganisms on the human immune system, an area lacking in scientific expertise (Haslberger, 2003). Others have pointed to the lack of scientific exactness to predict the likely allengenic qualities of all GM food and their derivatives (see Kleter and Peijenenburg, 2002). Environmental issues In addition to risks to human health, GM food poses substantial ecological and environmental concerns (Thomson, 2001; Rieger et al., 2002; English Nature, 2003). Such concerns include invasiveness of genetically modified

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organisms or xenotransplantation on other living matter, more commonly referred to as genetic pollution; the reduction in biodiversity; and the creation of new pests, pathogens, superweeds and superbugs that continue to raise questions about safety and risk management. Existing methods to contain what is often referred to as ‘genetic pollution’ are limited and remain unsuccessful. The UK Advisory Committee on Releases established a sub-group and assessed the existing containment strategies and concluded that ‘none of the methodologies currently available guarantee transgene containment and that adoption of any genetic containment strategy will require continuous assessment and monitoring’ (ACRE, 2006). While some authors suggest that GM crops can improve the environment through annual reductions in millions of kilograms of environmentally degrading pesticides (see Phipps and Park, 2002), the weight of evidence points to greater environmental risks and concerns through GM crops and ecological contamination. Genetic contamination In August 2002, a team of scientists from the University of Lille published an article in the Journal of Applied Ecology that identified that crosspollination had occurred from GM sugar beets to non-GM plants and created superweeds (Brown, 2002). In addition, Rieger et al. (2002) discovered that herbicide resistant pollen seeds from GM canola plants could travel up to three kilometres and contaminate non-GM vegetation, concluding that gene transfer is an unpredictable reality. Other studies identify that gene flow from transgenic crops can occur on average up to two kilometres but have also discovered gene flow as far away as 21 kilometres (Watrud et al., 2004). The Biosafety Information and Advisory Service of the UN’s Industrial Development Organisation provides an international database on the worldwide release of GMOs into the environment. This database shows an increase in field trials in the United States, Asia, Africa and Eastern Europe, notably in countries where regulatory regimes are fragmented or inadequate (Nap et al., 2003). The increase in field trials and commercial cultivation of genetically modified crops has resulted in widespread genetic contamination. In 2006, 39 countries across five continents reported GM contamination to their environment and food supplies (Genewatch, 2006); this figure has risen to 55 countries (GM Contamination Register, 2009). This represents more than triple the number of countries that grow GM crops. Greenpeace International and Genewatch’s ‘GM Contamination Register’ identifies that cross pollination is the most frequently identified form of contamination from maize, soybean and oilseed rape. This occurs from both poor agricultural and regulatory practices as well as illegal planting of GM crops in emerging ‘black market economies’. Genetic contamination has had deleterious effects on flora, fauna, soil and water tables, and serious concerns have been identified with putative invasiveness horizontal gene transfer (Connor et al., 2003).

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Scientists from various disciplines specialising in horizontal gene transfer identify both the complex and invasive ways in which genes transmute in the natural environment (Syvanen and Kado, 2001). The European Environment Agency conducted an extensive evaluation of gene transfer involving the six most commonly grown GM crops, namely, oilseed rape, sugar beet, maize, wheat, barley and potatoes. It concluded that gene transfer was present with GM plant varieties and that crop-to-crop transfer and transfer from crop to wild relatives was high for oilseed rape and medium to high for sugar beet and maize. It concluded that ‘at present none of the crops has pollen which can be completly contained’ (Eastham and Sweet, 2002). There are various molecular approaches adopted to limit GM gene flow including seed sterility and maternal inheritance, yet these have proven ineffective. Alternative methods are proposed including apomixes, cleistogamy and genome incompatibility, but as Daniell (2002:581) identifies ‘no strategy has proven broadly applicable to all crop species’. Defra conducted several ‘farm scale evaluations’ (FSEs) on herbicide tolerant GM crops between 1998–2003. Combined with the Economic Review and the Public Debate (discussed later) the FSEs were an integral part of the government’s decision to commercially plant GM crops in Britain from 2009. The research commissioned by Defra on FSEs is available on the department’s website. The first notable point is the narrow terms of reference for each report, a reflection of the FSE remit for which many have been very critical (Rees, 2006). Moreover, the findings of the research highlight significant concerns that are not reflected in Defra’s decision-making. For example, Chamberlain et al. (2002) in a study assessing the impact of GM crops on birds and mammals, identify a ‘high probability of detecting significant differences in bird abundance’. While much of the report is apologetic and contains much scientific jargon, it does identify concerns about bird and mammal feeding behaviour (discussed further below). However, it is the methodological problems identified in the report that are highlighted by Defra in stating that decisions were made ‘not to extend the FSE to include the direct measurement of birds’ (Defra, 2003). Further Defra commissioned studies have identified the potential damage that GM crops can cause to soil ecology, whilst highlighting the inadequacies of existing monitoring strategies. Firbank et al. (2003) describe the FSE as ‘best considered as an investigation into the effects of contrasting crop management regimes on farmland biodiversity, rather than a study of the effects of genetic modification’. This finding causes some concern, given that the British Government’s decision to commercially grow GM crops in 2009 was significantly influenced by the effects of GM as presented in field trials. Atkins (2004: 8), in an examination of the impact on soil structure and functioning following GMO release, concluded, ‘GM plants have the capacity to affect soil quality through altered root architecture, altered decay of plant residues (modified lignin for example), or altered root exudation for

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example’. Other studies that have not conclusively identified the direct effects on root exudates and changes to microbial function and populations do, however, point to the possible ‘indirect’ effects of transgenic crop residues on soil erosion (Motovalli et al., 2004; see also Dunfield and Germida, 2004 for discussion of soil and plant microbial transfer and contamination). The extent to which GM crops can potentially contaminate and hybridise plant wildlife has been a concern for some time (Raybould and Gray, 1993). Biologists have expressed concerns that genes designed to give crops a competitive edge are being passed onto wild plants – particularly weeds. Herbicide-tolerant canola in the US has cross-pollinated with related weeds to produce a herbicide-tolerant weed. Scientists are concerned that these superweeds cannot be controlled with existing herbicides and are destroying native plant life and biodiversity. While some biotechnologists argue that the creation of superweeds is ‘unlikely’ (Trewavas and Leaver, 2001), the Weed Science Society of America continues to express concerns about weed biomass and the uncertainties surrounding GM herbicide-tolerant crops (Martinez-Ghersa et al., 2003). In July 2006, Defra published proposals endorsing coexistence between GM crops and non-GM plants varieties. Britain’s leading certifier of organic food and farming, the Soil Association, has referred to this decision as a disaster that provides a licence for GM contamination. Furthermore, the Soil Association vociferously argues that Defra’s report is ‘highly biased favouring the few people with GM interests’, that it reneges on previous political pledges to protect organic agriculture, represents an appalling disregard for public opinion with no regard for liability or precaution as GM sites will be kept ‘secret’ (Soil Association, 2006). Such decisions have angered the wider British public. Amidst these decisions, the public is informed that the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs has discovered breaches of GM regulation by biotech giant Aventis involving the growth and contamination of oilseed rape in Lincolnshire, England. This has further fuelled public mistrust of GM companies and heightened the need for a national GM inquiry in the UK (BBC News, 2002b, discussed further in chapter two). Finally, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in the United States has recently ruled that GM alfalfa can ‘cause potentially irreversible harm to organic and conventional crops’. The Center for Food Safety stated: This ruling affirms a major victory for consumers, ranchers, organic farmers, and most conventional farmers across the country,’ said Andrew Kimbrell, Executive Director of the Center for Food Safety. ‘Roundup Ready Alfalfa represents a very real threat to farmers’ livelihoods and the environment; the court rightly dismissed Monsanto’s claims that their bottom line should come before the rights of the public and America’s farmers. This ruling is a turning point in the regulation of biotech crops in this country. (Center for Food Safety, 2009)

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Wildlife The ecological consequences of genetic pollination, discussed above, have possible deleterious effects for soil ecology, microflora, underground water tables and loss of biodiversity (Royal Commission on Genetic Modification, 2001). In addition to producing superweeds, there are concerns that herbicide tolerant GM plants can reduce several natural weed populations with severe consequences for populations of birdlife. As one commercial farmer in Zambia interviewed for this research stated, ‘Monsanto’s Roundup kills absolutely everything but the GM plant; what it is doing to native wildlife, God only knows because it just kills everything’. The ability to control or reduce weeds using herbicide such as Roundup Ready (Culpepper and York, 1998; McKinley et al., 1999) is a major factor in increasing yields (see below). However, Watkinson et al.’s (2000) simulated studies identified a ‘major loss of food resources’ for various species of bird that will result in a decline in bird numbers. Similar conclusions were reached in the extensive field trials conducted by Heard et al. (2003) on 12 weed species in England that identified the volatility of GM herbicide tolerant plants on arable weeds. In some instances, weed species increased biomass, and others such as beat and oilseed rape seed mass decreased. The authors concluded that ‘these differences compounded over time would result in large decreases in population densities of arable weeds’ (p. 1833) However, other non-targeted insect life including Monarch butterfly larvae have been exposed to insecticide resistant crops and the poisonous Bt and have subsequently witnessed accelerated mortality rates (Jesse and Obrycki, 2000). While other studies identify that bt11 and Mon810 pollen had a ‘negligible’ affect on the survival rate of Monarch butterfly larvae feeding on milkweed in surrounding fields, such research fails to eliminate the negative impact on lifetime or reproductive rates (Stanley-Horn et al., 2003). Back in 1998, English Nature, the UK Government wildlife advisor, welcomed a statement from ACRE Chairman Professor John Beringer about the ‘possible damage’ caused to wildlife from GM crops (English Nature, 1998). International scientific research has also posited the potential damage to wildlife flora and fauna from the spread of genetically modified seeds (Hails, 2002). The increase in commercial farming has reportedly had an adverse affect on birdlife, and GM crops present further threats (Krebs et al., 1999). Subsequent field trials in Europe confirmed the threat to various bird species. GM varieties of oil-seed rape and sugar beet were deemed to have long-term negative effects on populations of bees, butterflies and birds (Levidow et al., 2000b; Brown and Vidal, 2003; Carrell, 2003). Crop scientists in the UK, noted for their support of GM technologies, have reported that ‘gene flow’ and contamination are areas that remain under-researched and surrounded with uncertainty; ‘since our understanding of the role of many insect vectors and the interaction of their contribution

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with features of the landscape remains vague, our ability to predict gene flow for new crops and new situations remains very restricted’ (Ramsey, 2005: 73). Others claim that ‘hybridisation between most GM crop species and their wild relatives is, sooner or later, a certainty without extreme risk management procedures’ (Richards, 2005: 109). It is this scientific ‘certainty’ of GM contamination and gene flow that continues to pose safety concerns and precautions that have resulted in widespread opposition to GM crop technologies. As chapter four explores, the existing regulatory regimes for preventing and controlling risks are far from ‘extreme’. Water The increased worldwide demand for grain, whether as an independent food source or as a means to feed livestock, continues to rise. As a result, water is a necessary ingredient to sustain increased grain productivity. Brown (2005: 10) argues, ‘with 1,000 tons of water required to produce 1 ton of grain, food security is closely tied to water security. Seventy percent of world water use is for irrigation, 20 percent is used by industry, and 10 percent is for residential purposes’. Yet water security is emerging as an area of global concern equivalent to food security. The third edition of the United Nations World Water Development Report was presented at the Fifth World Water Forum in Istanbul, in March 2009. The second report of UN-Water highlighted the severity and urgency of water scarcity (WWAP, 2006), and it is expected that the third report will further identity the global crises in world freshwater supplies. One of the challenges facing agriculture is to meet food demands while utilising less water. GM food has been hailed by some to deliver on this issue (Kallman, 2008). The former chief scientific advisor to the UK Government has supported a GM future stating, ‘we need more crop per drop [of water] because of the fresh water problem. Unless you move into plant technologies to develop these crops, food provision is not going to increase,’ he said. ‘The future lies there [with GM]. And this is urgent’ (quoted in Harvey and Parker, 2008). The characteristic of drought resistance has been a widely reported benefit of GM crops (Huang, 2002). For some, this characteristic is essential for developing nations adversely confronted with water shortages (Cohen, 2005). Yet biotechnology is not the only field engaged in plant science to enhance yields during drought. Physiological studies in plant biology and microbiology have proven successful for screening out traits that improve crop productivity in drought and water stress (Izanloo et al., 2008; OliveresVillagas et al., 2007; Reynolds et al., 2005; Chaves et al., 2002). Indeed, the increasing focus on biotechnologies has shifted the emphases away from conventional breeding programmes and their role in producing drought resistant harvests.

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Irrespective of drought resistance, water is still essential. Monsanto’s solution to water shortages is to produce its ‘water efficient maize’, a drought tolerant grain that has been trialled in the Hawaiian Islands at reportedly substantial costs to residents using massive amounts of water (Pearce, 2009). However, it is a misnomer to refer to ‘drought resistance’; no plant can survive without water; the term tolerant or efficient is more practical. Water will remain an essential agricultural ingredient, and one issue posed for meeting such needs is the damming of rivers. Yet, damned water supplies are one of the failed methods identified for increasing agricultural output. The widely cited Namada dams project in India, funded by the World Bank, has reportedly created over 6,000 new dams while causing widespread environmental devastation while displacing an average 40,000 people per large dam (Buckingham, 2008). Another solution to supplementing water shortages for agricultural purposes is desalination. That said, it remains extremely costly, produces air and soil pollution and is reliant on uncontaminated water sources. Moreover, there is also the argument that GM crops require fewer herbicides and pesticides (Phipps and Park, 2002), and as a result the world’s rivers and streams will be less contaminated by the chemical bi-product of commercial farming. That said, studies by Dr Charles Benbrook contradict this finding, claiming that GM growers in Argentina were using ‘twice as much herbicide as conventional soya farmers’ (Branford, 2004). Indeed recent figures estimate that the largest GM growing nations, Aregentina and the USA, have increased their use of the herbicide glyphosate 15-fold since the late 1990s (Ashton, 2009).

Economics, patents and farmers The promise of higher yields, greater productivity and fewer costs were the call-signs of what has become known as the ‘Green Revolution’. The late 1960s witnessed increased crop production with the new seed varieties, improved irrigations systems and the widespread use of chemical fertilisers. Dr Per Pinstrup-Anderson, a long time advocate of these new agricultural technologies, claimed that more than a million acres of land would have been required to harvest the amount of additional food successfully grown from the innovations of the green revolution (Pinstrup-Anderson and Schioler, 2000). Announcements of success were widely acclaimed. Industrial agriculture had managed to rapidly increase high-yielding varieties notably in developing countries where funds from the World Bank and the IMF were heavily invested. However, this ‘revolution’ did not solve problems to world hunger but instead witnessed the demise of small farming, the contamination and poisoning of water and soils, the loss in biodiversity while increasing the profits of ‘agricorporations’ (Paul and Steinbrecher, 2003). Moreover,

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agriculture became a political weapon for international trade (discussed further in chapter three) and was reportedly used by capitalist governments to suppress socialist administrations while increasing corporate control of land and food (Perkins, 1997). For example, Cuba had adopted the new techniques of industrial agriculture and had become dependent on the chemicals of Western corporations. As a means to suppress socialism after the collapse of the USSR, the US Government denied the Cuban Government access to bio-agriculture. In a reversal of fortunes, the Cuban economy developed its subsistence and small farming and continues to produce an independent food supply (see Kinnear, 2004). Similar issues provide the backdrop of the GM debate or the ‘Gene Revolution’. Will increased yields eventually plateau with economic and environmental costs? Will the short-term benefits have long-term consequences? Higher yields One of the biotech company’s reported benefits of GM crops is that they will increase farmer profits by increased yields and reducing pesticide and fertiliser use.2 Such statements were supported by scientific research in the late 1990s (see Astwood et al., 1997). The pro-GM microbiologist, Professor Jennifer Thomson, has since published widely on the benefits of transgenic crops (see Thomson, 2006). Her analyses identify that higher yields from herbicide-resistant GM crops have resulted in substantial financial ‘gains in farm income’ (p. 41). There are other studies that confirm the increased yielding performance of GM crops, notably with cotton (Pray et al., 2002; Qaim and Zilberman, 2003; Qaim and Janvry, 2003), but also with canola (Fulton and Keyowski, 1999). Advocates of GM crops have made grandiose claims of the benefits of agri-biotechnology. Claims that are difficult to substantiate with empirical evidence. For example, Bookes and Barfoot (2005) argue: The analysis shows that there have been substantial net economic benefits at the farm level amounting to a cumulative total of $US 27 billion. The technology has reduced pesticide spraying by 172 million kg and has reduced the environmental footprint associated with pesticide use by 14 per cent. The technology has also significantly reduced the release of greenhouse gas emissions from agriculture, which is equivalent to removing five million cars from the roads. The commercial benefits from higher yields and the reported lower costs of pesticide have attracted farmers worldwide. For example, one Australian farmer interviewed for this research stated, ‘milk is our regular monthly check, but we can’t wait for GM crops; we can make a fortune from grain, and GM is the only way to do it because we’ve heard that the yields are

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massive with low maintenance’. The ‘hearing’ of the benefit of GM crops was reported to be circulated in farming magazines as well as word of mouth. For small scale or commercial farmers alike, GM crops have been presented by the biotech industry as the answer to increasing yields with fewer resources. Within contexts of diminishing government subsidies, increasing labour costs and the ever-present threat of drought, farmers continue to face substantial challenges. Consider the words of the chief executive of Monsanto, Mr Hugh Grant, at a food agriculture seminar on 9 June 2008: Our commitment has three parts. And they cascade. The first is that we aim to double yields in our key crops by 2030 … The second commitment follows from that. We’ll double yields but consume a third less resources. Those resources fall in the baskets of land, water and energy. Inside energy you have the whole derivative of fertilizer. And by doubling yields and making the commitment to be more resource efficient, there’s an opportunity to contribute significantly to habitat preservation. So, we’ll be producing more and conserving smarter. And the third and final commitment is the algebra of ‘if.’ If you successfully double, if you double by consuming less and preserving habitat more efficiently, then you have an opportunity of significantly contributing to improving farmers’ lives. And this commitment applies broadly to all farmers, but it will play out dramatically in smallholder agriculture. (Grant, 2008) The Monsanto chief executive poignantly addresses the failures of the green revolution by identifying that ‘habitat preservation’ and the interests of small-scale farmers, through increased GM yields, are priorities for the biotech industry. GM companies have spent considerable resources demonstrating to farmers that chemical farming (the most common of all crop farming) is costly, risky to human health, exacerbates soil erosion, pollutes ground water while compromising the safety of the food produced (Walters, 2004). However, a consortium of farmers in Australia have recently rejected the claims of seed companies claiming that GM technologies are more myth than reality (Network of Concerned Farmers, 2009). Simultaneously, biotech companies have continually advertised the benefits of GM crops to farmers through increased yields and high profits. Scientific research emerged in the late 1990s to support the growing number of ‘bumper crops’ produced from GM technologies (see Astwood et al., 1997). However, the North American Soil Association hailed the development of GM crops as a ‘economic disaster’, costing the US and Canada (where 80 per cent of all GM crops are grown) more than £9 billion since 1999 in contamination to non-GM crops, insurance and compensation in lost trade (Arthur, 2002). Furthermore,

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Roundup Ready (RR) has proven too costly or inefficient for many commercial US farmers, notably on the East Coast (Bullock and Nitsi, 2001). Recent research has questioned the performance of certain GM crops under high yielding environmental conditions (Gordon, 2007). However, Gordon (2008) has publicly challenged the exaggeration and misrepresentation of his research, notably in The Independent where claims were made that the study had identified that GM crops ‘produced 10 per cent less food than its conventional equivalent’ (see Lean, 2008). That said, Barny Gordon’s original research does raise issues regarding the crop performance of a Monsanto soybean variety. He concludes that glphosate-resistant soybeans (the GM variety) produced a lower yield than the conventional variety and that ‘it did not accumulate Mn (manganese nutrition) in the same manner as conventional varieties’ (p. 13). This was partly explained by ‘evidence to suggest that glyphosate may interfere with the metabolism and adversely affect populations of soil micro-organisations responsible for reduction of Mn to a plant-available form’ (Gordon, 2007: 12). The European Commission’s Joint Research Centre has recently published the findings of a large-scale study that concluded that ‘farmers adopting bt maize experienced higher average yield than conventional maize growers.’ However, this finding was statistically significant for one region only (Zaragoza). Trials were conducted across seven EU countries (Spain, France, Czech Republic, Portugal, Germany, Slovakia and Romania). The fact that only one country’s GM crops produced a higher yield must cast doubt on those supporting the higher yield argument and may influence future farmer choice. The report concluded that farmers utilising bt maize paid more for their seeds, but used almost three times less insecticide than conventional farmers. The farmers adopting bt maize claimed they did so because of ‘lowering the risk of maize borer damage and obtaining higher yields’ (European Commission Joint Research Centre, 2008: 1). Issues of increased yields have also had market implications for farmers and traders. As chapter four explores, an increase in ‘bumper crops’ in early 2002 from large-scale US farmers produced a surplus that necessitated aggressive and ‘unlawful’ government trade policies in Africa. Moreover, the implications of biotech companies and trade arrangements with large agricultural entities has had detrimental effects on small-scale farmers in places such as sub-Saharan Africa who are increasingly pushed out of the market by rising food prices (see Kuyek, 2002). The most recent large scale study on higher yields was conducted by Doug Gurian-Sherman and published in April 2009. He identifies how the claims of higher yields from GM crops are vastly over-estimated. He concludes, ‘this record, compiled over the 13 year period transgenic crops were first commercialised in the United States, compared unfavourably with the historical and current trends of major crop-yield enhancements achieved by other

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means’ (Gurian-Sherman, 2009: 32). He concludes that billions of US dollars have been devoted to more than 2,000 field trials, all of which (with the slight exception of bt corn) have shown lesser yields than conventional and organic farming which offer great yields, farmer returns and environmental safety. Organic farming The future of organic farming is seriously jeopardised by policies that endorse co-existence. Organic farming is a growing worldwide industry and is known to increase biodiversity through the expansion of animal, bird and plant life habitats (Fuller et al., 2005). It has also recently been identified as a means of reducing emissions from greenhouse gases. It is also predicted to be the preferred method of agriculture amidst global warming. The use of organic composts produces nutrient rich soils with more organic carbon which retains water (Leahy, 2006). European Union subsidies have attempted to persuade commercial farmers to adopt bio-friendly and organic techniques. With an estimated 120 countries now producing organic food across 31 million hectares and 623,174 registered farms, the organic industry continues to steadily grow on an international scale (International Federation Organic Agricultural Movements, 2006). This trend is likely to be reversed by co-existence combined with the increasing use of Bt. Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) is a soil bacterium that produces a protein that acts as an insecticide. It is a natural process of producing insecticide, commonly used by organic farmers, whereby insects that digest Bt toxins are eliminated. GM companies have transplanted Bt genes into corn to control corn borer (a lepidopteran insect) that is difficult to control with chemical spraying (National Research Council, 2000). Several scientists have also pointed to the ‘myth’ of co-existence between organic and GM farming, stating that genetic contamination of organic farms is a ‘certainty’ (Altieri, 2005). Copyright, profits and debts The signing of the 1991 Union for Protection of New Varieties of Plants allows exclusive rights to breeders who genetically modify ‘distinct’ varieties of existing plant life. A distinct variety carries all the characteristics of the original organism, with the exception that the hybrid is genetically modified. There is an emerging worldwide practice adopted by GM companies of patenting the seeds and biodiversity of indigenous plantlife and thereby colonising local nature and wildlife. A corporate activity referred to by the Royal Commission on Genetic Modification as ‘mutation of the common biological heritage into corporate property through patent monopolies’ was occurring ‘without social oversight or democratic input’ (2001: 282). The rush to patent indigenous plantlife for commercial gain has been addressed

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under various banners including ‘bio-prospecting’, ‘bio-piracy’, the ‘corporate colonisation of nature’ and the ‘privatisation of life’ (South, 2007). The economic returns for corporations that extract biodiversity for the production of consumer goods from pharmaceuticals to chemicals and foods are substantial. Most often it is the biodiversity rich nations (usually from the South and most often ‘developing’ and comparatively poor) that are the victims of nature theft (White, 2008). In the Yungas and Great Chaco, both biodiversity rich regions of Argentina, indigenous peoples have their traditional food sources threatened by GM contamination. The encroachment of GM seeds on areas utilised for centuries by indigenous tribes is also viewed as a colonization of food sovereignty (Pengues, 2005). This not only raises the issues of food and ‘land’ sovereignty but also points to the important social value of grain and staple crops in certain societies (discussed further in chapter three). Such countries are stripped of their heritage, their unique biological diversity while being denied the fiscal advantages of their own ecological sovereignty. The patenting of GM seeds by biotech companies has been accused of similar exploitation. Moreover, the corporate seed monopoly of biotech companies is driving up costs: The possibility of patenting genetic modifications can attract investment in agricultural research. But it also tends to concentrate ownership of resources, drive up costs, inhibit independent research, and undermine local farming practices such as seed-saving that are especially important in developing countries. It could also mean new liabilities, for example if a genetically modified plant spreads to nearby farms. (IAASTD, 2008) The implication for farmers has attracted worldwide attention. Anti-GM campaigners have stated for years that farmers who purchase genetically modified seeds will ultimately become slaves to the biotech companies. This view received significant credibility in February 2008 by Mr Terry Boehm, Vice-President of Canada’s National Farmers Union. The Canadian agricultural sector, along with US and Argentineans, has embraced GM crop technologies more than any other farmers around the world. Now, Mr Boehm is identifying the economic disasters that have stricken Canadian farmers and warning other countries to reject this contaminating technology (Caldwell, 2008). Boehm identified with extensive first hand accounts how farmers have become impoverished by the aggressive and restrictive tactics and contracts of biotech companies. The increase in seed prices and the lawsuits lodged against farmers for copyright infringements have escalated corporate profits while effectively eliminating farmer rights and creating an irreversible position of dependency, servitude and farmer debt (National Farmers Union, 2008; Boehm, 2007). Monsanto reportedly hired a team of private investigators to

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monitor farmers across the US to ensure that seed contracts are not breached. Colloquially known as the ‘seed police’, these private security personnel provide Monsanto with essential information to compile hundreds of legal suits against non-compliant farmers on an annual basis (SourceWatch, 2009).

Concluding comment The corporate power and influence of biotech companies cannot be over emphasised. The ability to produce sympathetic and supportive ‘science’, to lobby politicians, to sue farmers, to exploit developing countries and undermine conventional and organic agricultural technologies has become part-andparcel of the political economy of GM foods. This is not to say that the anti-GM fraternity does not indulge in hyperbole, weak science or scaremongering – yet it is my view that such ‘tactics’ reflect the actions of their opposition and are utilised to forestall an uncertain and potentially dangerous biotechnology that threatens to alter the course of the human food chain. A synthesis of existing literature reveals that GM food technologies are fraught with uncertainties and dangers that demand caution. To proceed to commercial GM cultivation, as the UK Government has decided to do, is not only unwise but cannot be supported by existing scientific research. The potential health, environmental and economic effects of commercially grown GM foods provide too many risks at this point in time to warrant a commercial roll out. Existing debates about global food shortage have intensified the call for GM crops. However, countries that experience food shortage are often those stricken by poverty, debt and internal conflict. To suggest that GM food is necessary to curb a reduction in world hunger is not supported by existing research. The answers to reducing hunger lie in poverty and debt reduction combined with sustainable development in agriculture and transport. This chapter commenced with former British Prime Minister Tony Blair declaring how ‘science’ would illuminate the way; it was a subject he said he was ‘born-again on’ … ‘fascinated by scientific process, its reasoning, deduction and evidence based analysis; inspired by scientific progress; and excited by scientific possibility’ (cited in Barry and Paterson, 2003: 238). Mr Blair, while always walking a careful line on the subject, was a supporter of GM foods. He once stated: contrary to the myth that somehow wicked multinationals and politicians have pressed us to be pro-GM, I am fully aware of the potential impact on biodiversity and people’s concerns about health. I am neither pro not anti. I simply say: let us evaluate the technology, test it, and then make a judgment; rather than ban it before we even look at it. His basis for belief and trust in the possibilities of GM technologies resonated in his new found passion for the ‘wonders of science’. However, this

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chapter concludes that issues of truth and fact are always hotly contested, or as Oscar Wilde once famously remarked ‘truth is rarely pure and never simple’. The GM debate serves to remind how politics, power and profit often dictate the contours of scientific research and the decisions of political leaders. Against this backdrop of scientific, political and economic uncertainty, manipulation and distrust is the voice of the public. The following chapter explores notions of citizen participation in the GM debate.

Notes 1 Further concerns have been raised by the US National Academy of Sciences regarding the likely transfer of E-coli infections to consumers who eat ‘cloned livestock’ (Reid and Hawkes, 2006). 2 Monsanto’s website, www.monsanto.co.uk, provides a detailed number of farmer testimonies of higher yields and the benefits of GM crops.

Chapter 3

Risk, public opinion and consumer resistance

Introduction The increasing privatisation and politicisation of scientific knowledge has for some time raised concerns about the uncertainty of empirical exactness and its utility for public policy. More than a decade ago, Warren (1998) argued that for too long there has been over-reliance on scientific voices in the creation of environmental policy. When scientific evidence becomes skewed, tainted and contradictory, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, common sense, caution and public opinion become important aspects for policy-making and regulation. Existing notions of precaution (discussed later) require both scientific and commonsense analyses. As a result, public opinion has become important for the development of environmental law and policy in the UK. Some writers suggest that consultation processes about biotechnology are creating a ‘scientific citizen’ (see Irwin, 2001). Others have suggested that policy and law-making regarding conservation and the precautionary principle that ‘puts the environment first’ is less about precaution and more about commonsense (Earll, 1992). While recognising that science and reliable programmes of research are useful tools to formulate sound policy, he argues that ‘absence of evidence’ is often used by commercial enterprises and developers to pursue initiatives that result in environmental damage. He asserts that the precautionary principle must direct all future environmental initiatives as well as policies and laws of regulation and control. In this sense preventing environmental harm is seen as a priori knowledge rather than a scientific and technical specialism. Others for some time have been arguing that the scientific hegemony in environmental decisions is unacceptable. For example, Gray (1990: 174) argues ‘that it is no longer necessary to have scientific facts to back up environmental legislation, one can simply “have reason to assume” that an effect can take place. This argument clearly is not good enough and has no place in science’. This chapter explores GM food and the public voice, and ways in which public opinion has been both mobilised, marginalised and manipulated. Public opinion has become a form of science in its own right, a means

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of political persuasion, a method of risk measurement and management and a means of social resistance.

Enter the ‘scientific citizens’ – caution, commonsense and mistrust The recruitment of the citizen voice in decisions of public policy has long been recognised as a means of reducing the democratic deficit and enhancing democratic legitimacy (Gyford, 1991). Discourses in public participation have identified how ‘publics’ often identified as either ‘the empowered’, ‘the consuming’, ‘the stakeholder’ or ‘the responsible’ have identified how the ‘selected’, and often unrepresented citizens have been activated to inform public policies across a range of state and voluntary sector services (Barnes et al., 2007). To the above we add ‘the scientific public’, the voice of ordinary people in decisions involving ‘hard’ but often disputed science. Before we do, some reflections on the uptake of bio-agriculture during the past five years and its concomitant lack of public support. The year 2005 represented the tenth anniversary of commercially grown transgenic crops and marked another self-proclaimed milestone for the biotech industry – the planting of the one-billionth acre of ‘biotech’ or GM crops by one of the reported 8.5 million GM farmers across 21 countries (James, 2005). The increasing uptake of biotechnology in agriculture and the everexpanding farmer conversion to GM crop was, and continues to be, often cited by proponents and allies of the biotech industry. However, as the previous chapter identifies, farmer dissatisfaction and impoverishment from GM technologies is becoming more and more a common story. But it is not only farmers, but consumers and the general pubic that have strongly voiced their concerns and opposition to GM foods. Interestingly, public opinion has demonstrated a form of social resistance and regulation that has arguably informed policy, notably throughout Europe. One such movement, Food and Democracy, identifies that: [m]ore than 260 regions, over 4500 municipalities and other local entities and tens of thousands of farmers and food producers in Europe have declared themselves “GMO-free” expressing their commitment not to allow the use of genetically modified organisms in the agriculture and food in their territories. (2009: 1) Such forms of public resistance have often been the site of political scorn and bemusement. As a result, new battlegrounds have been found in the contemporary media, where the protagonists of biotechnology subvert, condemn and belittle opponents as naïve, unscientific and, as shall be discussed in the next chapter, ‘criminals’. Consider the full page opinion piece by

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Dr Nina Federoff, geneticist, GM advocate and scientific advisor to former US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in The Scotsman on 27 December, 2008 arguing that ‘they’ve proved their worth, so why are we scared of GM crops?’ This use of the press to garner GM support and denounce opposition provides a further example of the ways in which power is mobilised by corporate elites and advocates of biotechnology in an attempt to sway public opinion. Even the day after the commencement of the Iraq War inquiry when newspaper headlines were occupied with the opening proceedings, GM food was a front page item with FSA findings suggesting that opponents of GM food were driven by ‘emotion and ideology’ and not ‘reasoned, scientific approach’ (Pierce and Bingham, 2009). On this point, Rees (2006) provides a detailed account of the ways in which the public have been denied access to information on GM food through a ‘corporate takeover of the media’. In numerous examples he identifies how reputable, outspoken and critical voices of GM food have been systematically neutralised by biotech strategies of denunciation including well funded PR campaigns and media initiatives. Such strategies have not only served to dismiss critical opposition but have been reportedly used as a key mechanism to lobby public opinion (Smith, 2003). This battle for public confidence has witnessed some extreme tactics, as indicated in the GM Watch case.1 George Monbiot once described GM Watch as the most comprehensive database on the politics and PR of GM crops. It is a website created in 1998 by its editors Jonathan Matthews and Claire Robinson and provides daily updates of international events and news articles about food and genetic engineering. It is a legally constructed vehicle for individual citizens worldwide to access up-to-date events in the rapidly changing world of biotechnology and agriculture. It is a voice of resistance, a campaign entity that seeks to inform and activate the public. The contents of its website contain all sources of knowledge from both sides of the GM debate, but its primary purpose is a campaign against the development and production of GM foods. It has been subjected to sustained Internet hacking that has included the deletion of databases resulting in the closure of the website. It has recently re-opened but remains vigilant against an orchestrated and targeted sabotage that seeks to eliminate publicly available information critical of biotech industries and GM crops (GM Watch, 2008). The re-opened website on GM Watch provides a treasure trove of international media and scholarly articles reporting up-to-date developments in GM food technologies. Whilst having an anti-GM agenda it is an outstanding database that, inter alia, identifies how biotech companies and pro-GM lobby groups continue to strongly influence media, politics, agriculture, and the economy at both a global and local level in a mendacious and aggressive manner to promote transgenic food products (Robinson, 2009). On the other hand, the International Consortium on Biotechnology Research (ICBS) identifies that media reporting of scientific testing of GM food in the UK and USA highlighting the negative aspects of research has contributed

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to consumer rejection of GM products (see Marks et al., 2002). In a separate piece Marks et al. (2002) claim that the agrobiotechnology scientists have contributed to the communication problem by not publishing their work in peer-reviewed journals. As a result, pro-biotech organisations such as (ICBS) have developed economic models and marketing strategies to enhance consumer and business confidence in GM foods (see Santaniello et al., 2002). Such marketing models have been widely condemned as PR stunts and fronts for propaganda or what Rees (2006) calls the ‘dirty tricks’ of the biotech companies. International public opinion – a brief overview International public concern in the 1990s demanded that GM foods be labeled to provide consumers with the right to choose between GM and nonGM products. However, in May 1998 the Codex Alimentarius Commission (an international food standards authority established jointly by the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations and the WHO) rejected calls from international consumer institutes for mandatory labelling of all GM food, stating that it would be discriminatory to enforce mandatory labeling and that it could hinder international trade. Codex was concerned that GM labeled food would be boycotted on the basis of misinformation or ambivalent research and would thus jeopardise and discriminate against the GM industries (Codex, 2001; Walters, 2004). This decision acted to fuel further public scepticism and resentment. Public opinion about all forms of biotechnology in the US was ‘divided’ in the late 1990s (Priest, 2000). A 2003 food and biotechnology agriculture survey revealed that 58 per cent were ‘unwilling to eat genetically modified’ (GM) food (see Fedoroff and Brown, 2004: 313). In 2004, the majority of Americans were opposed to GM food products (Roseboro, 2004). This growing groundswell against genetically modified organisms has been castigated by biotechnology companies in the US who claim that Americans have contracted ‘the European disease’ (Collins, 2004; cf. Baker and Burnham, 2002). That said, an extensive study examining pro-GM public information implemented by biotechnology companies with science-friendly terminology, concluded that public perception had not been altered; indeed such information initiatives served to make citizens more sceptical. A more receptive approach towards the future of GM food technologies is arguably linked with a greater trust in government and not more information about the origins, processes and proposed benefits of GM food (Durant and Legge, 2005). Public opinion across Europe has for some time supported biotechnology for medical purposes, however, widespread condemnation has existed for use in food production (Gaskell et al., 2000; Pinstrup-Anderson and Sandoe, 2007). From 1998–2004 EU countries had a de facto moratorium against the planting of GM food. This ‘quasi ban’ was ruled illegal by the WTO in 2006

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(see next chapter) and resulted in EU members deciding to cultivate GM crops in 2004 (Goodman, 2009). However, at least 62 per cent, and upwards of 79 per cent, of European citizens remain strongly opposed to GM crops (Nature, 2009). Indeed, while the EU is preparing to vote on the commercial cultivation of GM rice by German biotech giant Bayer, hundreds of thousands of EU citizens continue to petition parliament to prevent its introduction in the EU food chain (Greenpeace, 2009).2 This is occurring amidst widespread public protest and opposition in Germany, Poland, Spain, Luxemburg, Hungary, Austria, Latvia and Italy where GM food advocates claim that the 70 per cent opposition to their technology may influence the upcoming national elections (European Biotechnology News, 2009a; Lopata and Rose, 2009; Euronews, 2009). The European Commission has been informed that ‘mass rejection’ of GMOs with 79 per cent opposition across Europe must influence future environmental policy (EU Business, 2009). Eleven EU member states have since petitioned the European Parliament for a right to ‘opt-out’ of all proposed economic legislation and agreements that would require all 27 EU countries to trade in GM foodstuffs (Smith, 2009).3 For many, this rejection of GM food throughout Europe is linked to negative media reporting not experienced in the US (Gaskell et al., 1999). For others, it is irretrievable corporate mistrust that serves to remind governments and corporations of the importance of public confidence in the marketing and production of food products (Lassen et al., 2002). Yet the spread of anti-GM public sentiment extends beyond European borders to include Australia, Asia and Africa. Farmers in Australia have released a report based on two years of consultations about performance of GM seeds, and they conclude in a strong attack on biotechnology companies that ‘the truth’ is more modified than the genes (Network of Concerned Farmers, 2009; Mitchell, 2009). The Japanese Government is now moving to place strict controls on the labelling of all food products including canola. This is a move against GM food and given that Australia is a high exporter of GM canola to Japan, such a move is expected to influence the Australian economy (Sydney Morning Herald, 2009). Widespread and outspoken protest against GM food and the patenting rights of multi-national corporations have been witnessed in India. Farmers, consumers and traders have condemned GM food as a risk to food security and food sovereignty (New India Press, 2006). This widespread public opposition has recently resulted in the Indian Environment Minister, Jairam Ramesh suspending all plans to develop GM crops (Nelson, 2010). Farmers in Pakistan have also recently taken to the streets in protest against Monsanto’s planting of GM crops (Action Aid, 2009). As mentioned in the previous chapter, Brazilian authorities have fined and expropriated land from the biotech company Syngenta for illegal planting. This action was reportedly precipitated by widespread public pressure against GM food (Kenfield, 2006).

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The UK GM food debate In May 2002, the Secretary of State announced that a public consultation process on GM food would take place alongside two other government reviews. The first included the Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit (PMSU) assessment of the economic benefits and costs; and the second was an ‘independent review’ of available science chaired by the government’s own Chief Scientific Officer. The final report of the public consultation exercise self-declared that this was an ‘unprecedented event – a special public debate for a potentially far-reaching change in public policy’ (Department of Trade and Industry, 2003: 10). This was to be a consultation where the voice of the British public was to impact public policy, where the UK would listen and respond to the wishes of people, and in doing so, contribute to what Habermas refer to as ‘deliberative politics’ (discussed later). The summary of the main conclusions of the UK consultation exercise that included 37,000 submissions was presented to Westminster by the Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology:     

People are generally uneasy about GM crops; There is little support for early commercialization; There is widespread mistrust of government and multi-national companies; There is a broad desire to know more and for further research to be done; The debate was welcomed and valued. (2004: 1)

In September 2004, 60 per cent of Britons stated that they were opposed to genetically modified foods and feared that they were consuming GM products ‘unknowingly’ (Lawrence, 2004). Indeed, scientific research at the time confirmed the suspicions of many British consumers. Partridge and Murphy (2004) identified that genetically modified soya was detected in 40 per cent of foods examined in their research labeled as ‘organic’ or ‘health products’. The opposition to GM food has remained strong in the UK. More than 50 trial sites for growing GM crops have been vandalised in Britain during the past eight years, prompting many scientists to move abroad to experiment with biotechnologies (Block, 2008). The UK ‘public debate’ on GM food has been widely criticised. Indeed, on the morning of the first public consultation exercise held in Birmingham, newspapers around Britain were already reporting that the exercise was a ‘farce’ with too few people in the UK aware it was occurring (Sample, 2003). The ways in which the UK Government has repeatedly supported biotechnology and the commercial interests above public sentiment in food policy has been outlined elsewhere (Toke, 2004). Horlick-Jones et al. (2007: 168) have extensively analysed the public ‘GM debate’ in Britain and concluded that this was a novel exercise in ‘extended democracy’, however, one

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that was methodologically constrained and unrepresentative of the British public. Irrespective of its shortcomings the debate formed the catalyst for the then Minister of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Margaret Beckett, to announce that the government should ‘agree in principle to the commercial cultivation of GM herbicide tolerant maize’ (Beckett, 2004), something not reflected by public opinion across the UK or Europe at the time. The current government position is reflected in the former minister’s words: The Government’s overall policy on GM crops was set out in a Parliamentary statement in March 2004. The Government has concluded that there is no scientific case for a blanket ban on the cultivation of GM crops in the UK, but that proposed uses need to be assessed for safety on a case-by-case basis. The Government will continue to take a precautionary approach and only agree to the commercial release of a GM crop if the evidence shows that it does not pose an unacceptable risk to human health and the environment. (Defra, 2009a) Interestingly, Defra refers to ‘science’ in a very broad sense: We can say that evidence is any information that Defra can use to turn its policy goals into something concrete, achievable and manageable. It can take many forms: research, analysis of stakeholder opinion, economic and statistical modeling, public perceptions and beliefs, anecdotal evidence, and cost/benefit analyses; as well as a judgment of the quality of the methods that are used to gather and synthesise the information. (Defra, 2009b) Here, public opinion may comprise a form of science however, ‘any information’ that can support, shape or help implement policy is utilised. Herein lies a tension. The government that has prided itself on ‘evidence based policy’ is unable or unwilling to pin down what is meant by evidence. Instead, evidence becomes this fluid and malleable concept that is so often moulded to conform to the political priorities of the day. Amidst widespread public opposition in Britain, Europe, and the US, and with a substantial scholarship pointing to the risks of GM food, the British Government made a decision in 2004 to commercially grow GM crops. What evidence informed this decision? And what does it tell us about public participation in the policy process? Moreover, the government’s wish to harness supportive public opinion in favour of decisions taken six years ago have been revealed with FSA’s new independent steering group that will ‘shape and manage a public dialogue’ (FSA, 2010: 1). The purpose of the group is to gauge people’s understanding of the risks and benefits of GM food. However, this was broadly the intention of the public debate.4 Now that we have the British

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public voicing its opposition, the government has established a steering group to ‘identify what information people need and want in order to make confident, informed choices about the food they eat’ (id.). Is there evidence that people do not currently make confident and informed choices? Is the point that they are making the wrong choices about GM food and this group aims to allay GM concerns? It has not been set up to dismiss GM technologies, but to garner public participation in the GM debate. In doing so, it clearly has a pro-GM emphasis. The concerns about GM food are already widely known. Why do we need to pay more advisors to ‘understand’ these concerns? There is a sense that this FSA steering group is more a pro-GM lobby or pressure group that will report instantaneously the moment that data becomes available that public sentiment towards GM foods is warming – will it do the same when the opposite is true?

Governance, risk and public participation As mentioned above, public opposition to GM foods has been manifested in consumer boycotts, farmer resistance, street protests and de facto moratoriums. Indeed, the public opposition to GM food has reached an all time high. That said, in the 2008/2009 financial year Monsanto posted a $US 6.4 billion profit in what is now considered a $US 26 billion profitable worldwide economy. Amidst existing worldwide public concern, agrocrop science company Bayer also plans to triple its GM seed production and take its seed profits beyond its annual 500 million euros – a figure that has it in sixth place of all companies internationally producing GM seeds and technology (Burger and Siebelt, 2009). This upsurge in biotech profits coincides with other political and international decisions to support GM food. For example, in May 2009 the Vatican approved GM crops for the poorest nations. The Pontifical Academy for Sciences concluded that GMOs were ‘praiseworthy for improving the lives of the poor’, and promising ‘improved food safety and health benefits, better food security, and enhanced environmental performance in a sustainable manner’ (Allen, 2009). After sustained pressure by the US Government (see next chapter) the reticence of the Vatican to support GM food has finally wilted. With the Catholic faith experiencing increasing followers in Africa, this papal approval is likely to re-open debates and markets where hunger and starvation are most extreme. In addition, the pro-GM government positions in the UK and the pressure applied on EU by the WTO has marginalised a growing opposition to transgenic food. As a result, debates about risk have also been demarcated to an expanding periphery in the interests of free trade. The vast amounts of scholarship published on risk during the last decade have drawn extensively on Ulrich Beck’s Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity, originally published in 1986 and translated in 1992. In forming his risk thesis, Beck analysed a range of environmental hazards including

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‘pollutants in foodstuffs’. Central to Beck’s argument was the way in which risks were systematically defined, ‘industrially produced and politically reflexive’ (p. 183). The GM debate returns to the heart of Beck’s analysis in focusing on risks that are truly global. Moreover, it identifies how ‘risks’ can be defined and manipulated by government and corporate entities for political and economic gain. Unlike many areas of the risk society thesis where governing entities amplify ‘riskiness’ and promote individual responsibility, the concept of risk is downplayed by those in power within the GM debate. In the GM debate we see that agents of power are not identifying high risk to exert control but asserting a position of low risk in an attempt to manipulate and monopolise world trade in the food industry. High risk is associated with the plight of the starving, and GM food is identified as a means to reduce the risk of death, malnutrition and hunger. Consistent with conservative and neo-liberal modes of governance and actuarial assessments of risk is the identification of ‘public opinion’ as one social category or unitary method of risk calculation. The public voice is merely one aspect to assessing overall GM risk. There is no democratisation in the process of risk assessment but one that favours political and economic interests. Moreover, it is also apparent that what counts as ‘expert knowledge’ in the GM food debate is both ambiguous and subject to corporate and governmental control. The scientific citizen has been able to exert a degree of influence, but this influence has been subverted within global rhetoric of hunger, food security, trade and agricultural development. The voice of the public has served to slow the speed of the pro-GM juggernaut and even detour its course into greener areas of biofuel but has not been able to derail it. This should not be seen as a failure of public protest but a lesson. One that demonstrates how ‘power in movement’ to quote Sidney Tarrow, is able to influence public and political discourses in ‘ferocious’ ways yet often disperse and subside. Yet like a crashing wave, public opinion provides ‘enabling power’, in the case of GM food, to social movements, to consumers, to farmers, to indigenous cultures and to impoverished nations wishing to preserve their biodiversity. It is true that the marginalisation of public opinion and the emerging governance of GM science serve to blur the boundaries of truth and risk and to regulate and neutralise voices of opposition. It could be argued that the scientific public serves a useful purpose when its voice promotes government trade priorities, less so when it doesn’t. Moreover, the emphasis and impact of the scientific citizen is arguably diluted in times of extremity – war, global terrorism, food insecurity, water shortages and so on – governments tend to refer back to their mainstream scientific and intelligence communities for advice over and above the public voice for analyses of risk. That said, the scientific citizen and the emergent scientific public form a new regime of regulatory practice that ebbs and flows yet contributes new meanings to debates about risk and rights.

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There is now an established body of scholarship that examines the ways in which new modes of governance aim to manage ‘risks’ within society (Simon, 1987; O’Malley, 1998; Rose, 2000). The identification of risk groups becomes wedded to processes of prediction and measurement (Feeley and Simon, 1992). The scientific citizen is utilised as a form of measurement but only one form. Is this truly extended or deliberative democracy? Or does public participation merely become an instrument of government to sell public policy rather than shape it? Take, for example, the New Zealand Royal Commission on Genetic Modification which identified an overwhelming public rejection of GM foods.5 It represented the first official government public consultation exercise on the topic of genetic modification and GM food and is worthy of some detail here. Public debates on globalised risks in new genetic technological areas of health and agriculture had previously focused on medical and not commercial ethics (Glasner and Rothman, 2001). In spite of overwhelming public concerns about GM foods, the Royal Commission adopted a middle ground approach to its conclusion. It argued that global trends and future consumer preferences could not be predicted with any surety and that it would be both premature to either ban GM technologies or to commit substantial resources to their rapid and unregulated expansion. It concluded that GM technologies were both risky and yet provided great potential for nutritional and price benefits to consumers. International debates and movement about GM technologies influenced the Commission, notably, the increasing consumer resistance to GM food, particularly in Europe. However, the Commission argued that such consumer opinion can easily change and become more sympathetic to GM and that New Zealand should ‘favour a strategy of preserving opportunities and proceeding selectively with appropriate care’ (Royal Commission on Genetic Modification, 2001: 331). The New Zealand Green Party and anti-GM movements in New Zealand criticised the Commission’s report for closing options and for failing to adequately address GM food safety issues (Kedgley, 2001). The then leader of the Green Party Jeanette Fitzsimons stated that the Royal Commission had ignored the wishes of New Zealanders and further stated that: while the report recognises that the technology is unpredictable and risky, the Commission then shows an incredible faith in the technology, assuming that it will eventually be safe … The Commission has fallen into the fear trap, and accepted the argument that New Zealand has to embrace this newest technology or we will be left behind economically. (Fitzsimons, 2001: 1) Environment and conservation movements in New Zealand, such as Greenpeace and ECO, argued that whilst the Royal Commission had examined

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compelling evidence against GM foods it had failed to protect New Zealanders and their environment against the risks of GM contamination (Cotter, 2001). Moreover, the recommendations of the Royal Commission were greeted with public opposition with more than 10,000 people marching in Auckland to protest against the Commission’s unwillingness to uphold a ‘GM-free New Zealand’. Following the recommendations of the Royal Commission, the then New Zealand Prime Minister, Helen Clark, announced the government’s response on 30 October 2001: [w]e cannot afford to turn our back on science which has the potential to inform our medical, biotechnology, and industry strategies, but nor can we ignore the concerns raised about aspects of genetic modification. (quoted in Walters, 2004) National newspapers reported that the Labour Government had ‘broadly adopted’ the recommendations of the Royal Commission in adopting a ‘middle-ground’, one that neither condemned genetic engineering or endorsed it but provided a ‘cautious approval’ (Samson, 2001). The government’s position generated widespread disapproval from political parties, lobby groups and indigenous peoples. This was an opposition that was further fuelled by political scandal in the weeks leading up to the national election in July 2002. However, this substantial public voice become marginalised and subdued within political priorities of trade. Nicky Hagar’s Seeds of Distrust meticulously traces with the use of leaked government documents how the government covered up the importation of GM contaminated maize seed. He reveals that in November 2000, the New Zealand Government was made aware that an imported 5.6 ton consignment of ‘GM Free’ maize seed from GM giant Novertis was contaminated. He further identifies how the government decided ‘behind closed cabinet doors’ and without the knowledge of parliament to amend the Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996 to allow a 0.5 per cent threshold on GM contaminated foods into the New Zealand food supply (the Act had previously stipulated a 0 per cent contamination level), thereby permitting the Novertis consignment to fall below the 0.5 per cent threshold and be deemed ‘GM Free’ (Hager, 2002). This unconstitutional political manoeuvre was subsequently referred to by the New Zealand press as ‘corngate’ – an issue underpinned by political power, coverup and a betrayal of public trust. As Hager stated, ‘political management bound on secrecy and public relations allowed all constitutional processes to be by passed. Had the decision been made public, they would never have got away with it’ (quoted in Rowell and Burton, 2002). The above provides a useful example in how mechanisms to fill the democracy deficit are often trumped by the political machinations of economics. Public participation is able to exert influence and pressure; it

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may bring about changes to regulation, even law and government policy. However, it can be sidelined and subverted behind closed doors with trade agreements enhanced by the sands of time. Again, this is not to say that public participation is of little value; indeed the opposite is true. The scientific citizens have become voices of resistance that are increasingly involved in social and political debates. In addition, we observe specific examples where there is an alliance of the scientific citizen and the pure scientist in issues pertaining to environmental preservation. Take for example, the Union of Concerned Scientists: Citizens and Scientists for Environmental Solutions which ‘combines independent scientific research and citizen action to develop innovative, practical solutions and to secure responsible changes in government policy, corporate practices, and consumer choices … an alliance of more than 250,000 citizens and scientists’ (UCS, 2009). Within the GM debate this reputable group has produced important and influential publications (see Gurian-Sherman, 2009, discussed in chapter two) that have been widely referenced by the UN Food Programme. The above points to the various spin-off and often immeasurable networks and impacts of the scientific citizen. Moreover, irrespective of how long they last, such voices, movements and collection actions, regardless of their cause, not only play an important role in influencing public policy and political debate but also change lives. From the public to personal exists an enabling power whereby individuals make choices that have the potential to change cultures and governing regimes.

Concluding comment The commercialisation and privatisation of world food markets within emerging models of globalisation provide useful examples of the ways in which sovereign authority over economic and ecological resources is no longer localised or territorial but is regulated and owned by offshore entities with market power. As Ruggiero (2000) points out, the expansion of globalised economies has created new domains for corporate and organised crime to flourish as national criminal justice systems lack jurisdictional authority to investigate and prosecute. Moreover, the noticeable lack of an international regulatory body for GM technology and food allows ongoing corporate and government practices of economic and ecological exploitation to carry on relatively unchecked (discussed in the next chapter). Finally, Fergusson et al. (2002) point out, globalisation and conservative modes of governance have provided the impetus for social and political protest or what is more commonly referred to as ‘globalised resistance’. As Stewart (2001: 118) argues: [t]he overwhelming characteristic of modern states, whatever their variable characteristics, has been monopoly, monopoly control of violence,

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monopoly right of taxation, monopolistic internationality towards political identity and political obligation, monopolistic arbitration of legal dispute and monopolistic claim to membership of international society. However, with the erosion of these state monopoly powers the possibility has been increased ‘that alternative sites of power and competitors for human loyalty will emerge’ (Stewart, 2001: 209). The public voice becomes an alternative site of power. The aggressive trade policies of the United States and the economic exploitation of biotech industries when combined with governmental apathy or uncertainty to GM food has both ignited and fuelled a growing anti-GM social movement. These movements expressed through GM Watch, Genewatch, Food and Democracy, Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, the Soil Association and the European Social Forum have been powerful voices of opposition to the rhetoric and science of biotech companies and pro-GM governments. The extent to which public voices have influenced government food policy is mixed, however, it is clear that such voices have been mobilised by campaign and activist movements. Such movements represent alterative forms of public policy and provide necessary and important platforms for articulating the views from the voices below in a struggle against corporate and government power.

Notes 1 Both Smith (2003) and Rees (2006) provide numerous examples of the ways in which critical scientists, activists and consumers in the US have also been subjected to ‘extreme’ tactics in what they refer to as the ‘biotech companies’ dirty tricks’. Moreover, they detail how visible images of public support for GM food through street marches, letters and petitions have been orchestrated and falsified by corporate entities working on behalf of pro-GM lobby groups. 2 This is occurring simultaneously with a record high level of consumers demanding that their foods are ethically sourced. Such consumer opinion continues to influence the food policies of large retailers (see The Co-operative Food, 2009). 3 For an overview of all EU countries and reported public attitudes to GM foods, see Friends of the Earth, 2009. On average these statistics identify that 75 per cent of Europeans are opposed to GM foods; upwards of 90 per cent request mandatory labelling of all GM products. 4 The Food Standards Agency has recently launched a new website for consumers where information about GM food is contained within the FSA’s ‘Eatwell website’ under the heading ‘GM Food – Eat well, be well – Helping you make healthier choices’. Again, the FSA’s partisan and favourable view of GM food is projected through this optimistic public dialogue that promotes ‘healthy choice’ (FSA, 2010b). 5 Elsewhere I have detailed and critiqued the processes and findings of the New Zealand Royal Commission on Genetic Modification (see Walters, 2004).

Chapter 4

Biotech, papal and trade ‘wars’ Third world hunger, exploitation and the politics of GM food

Introduction In September 2002 at the World Earth Summit in Johannesburg, hunger stricken African nations including Zambia, Ethiopia, Mozambique and Zimbabwe voiced opposition to GM food aid and rejected US Government claims that they were ‘letting people starve through misplaced concern over GM food’ (Martin, 2002). Prior to the Earth Summit the United States Government had been pursuing options through the World Trade Organisation that would require such nations to accept GM food aid. This included the drafting of an agreement for the Earth Summit that would have given the WTO the power to override the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety that currently gives developing countries the right to reject GM food (discussed in chapter four). On 13 May 2003, the Bush Government launched its case in the WTO against the European Commission seeking billions of dollars in damages for lost revenue caused by the so called ‘European Moratorium’ on US GM food. This chapter seeks to further the criminological debate by exploring a case study involving the exploitation of hunger in Zambia and the processes and outcomes of the WTO case mentioned above. Elsewhere I have noted that a social and political analysis of the complex debates involving GM food requires a ‘criminological knowledge capable of transcending disciplinary boundaries in order to critique the multifaceted dimensions of international biotechnology’ (Walters, 2004: 165). This necessitates an engagement with international trade and environmental law, environmental and trade politics, discourses on the political economy of hunger and food, debates about biotechnology, food science and agriculture, as well as an understanding of the sociology of development. This chapter also examines the ways in which third world hunger has been exploited by pro-GM countries for commercial profit. It also identifies how sovereign nations, such as Zambia, rich in untapped biodiversity, seek to protect their natural resources against the exploits of Western trade powers, such as the United States. In doing so, it highlights how eco crime,

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masquerading in the form of world trade and food aid, seeks to destroy environmental sovereignty and compromise the international programmes of sustainable security.

Coercive trade and GM food The United States Government has been repeatedly accused of influencing the WTO and using GM food to gain international trade supremacy (Nisse, 2002; Toke, 2004). Moreover, US authorities have placed undue pressure on African nations to accept surpluses of GM food from US farmers (Walters, 2006). The United States ambassador to the United Nations’ food agencies, Mr Tony Hall, has suggested, for example, that Zambia’s political leaders be convicted as criminals (see Reuters, 2002). In 2003, despite having a clear understanding of Zambia’s explicit opposition to GM food, the United States continued to distribute food aid through the UN’s World Food Programme that contained GM maize (Walters, 2006). When the Zambian Government called for an immediate withdrawal of all the contaminated food, a riot broke out among some starving people in Southern Zambia. The Zambian Minister for Agriculture, Mr Mundia Sikatana, accused the US of ‘promoting food riots in order to force Zambia to accept GM maize’ (quoted in Jonathan, 2004; Walters, 2006). By situating the decision to send genetically modified maize to Southern Africa in the context of US–European debates over agricultural biotechnology, it becomes clear that the promotion of biotechnology has nothing to do with ending hunger in the region. As Zerbe (2004: 1) has argued: … American food aid shipments to Southern Africa have little to do with the famine at all. Instead, I argue that US food aid policy following the 2002 crisis was intended to promote the adoption of biotech crops in Southern Africa, expanding the market access and control of transnational corporations and undermining local smallholder production thereby fostering greater food insecurity on the Continent. Such exploitations of the world’s hungry have previously been described as ‘famine crimes’ (see DeWaal, 1997) as powerful Western corporations manipulate market control of global food networks and undermine UN aid relief for commercial gain. Furthermore, the US Government has also been accused of dumping unwanted GM food on starving African countries and using Africa as a ‘human experiment’ (Townsend, 2002). In addition, it has been alleged that the US Government and biotech industries have used the UN Food Aid Programme as a ‘covert subsidy for US farmers’ (Vidal, 2002). The economic imperatives of US agricultural and foreign policy are further highlighted in relation to the so-called ‘US trade wars’. In addition

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to verbal pressure from international diplomats, the US Government launched a case with the World Trade Organisation in an attempt to seek a ruling that would prevent an anti-GM trade stance currently adopted by the European Commission. In May 2003 the Bush Administration began its case in the WTO against the European Commission seeking billions of dollars in damages for lost revenue, arguing that the EU violated its WTO obligations with a moratorium on GM food that constituted a ‘trade barrier’ (Schifferes, 2003). As an observation through the lens of political economy, it should be noted that the Bush Administration submitted its case the very week after the Iraq invasion. In the preceding months to Iraqi invasion, the Bush Administration was completely silent on GM food; diplomatic energy was exerted on seeking European support for the war. A case in the WTO before the Iraqi invasion may have severely jeopardised much needed European support for the Bush post 9–11 ‘war on terror’ campaign. Since the beginning of the proceedings, the US Government argued that the EU moratorium on GM food was not only harming international trade but was also preventing developing countries from importing biotechnology. The US sought an international ruling that would force countries to accept GM food and its associated biotechnology products. This raised serious concerns by governments and agricultural groups around the world that the WTO was an inappropriate place to make a judgement confined by narrow trade rules. The US Government (along with Australia and Argentina) launched a case with the World Trade Organization in an attempt to seek a ruling that prevents an anti-GM trade stance currently adopted by the European Commission. The EU Trade Commissioner Mr Pascal Lamy stated that: the EU’s regulatory system for GMO’s authorization is in line with WTO rules: it is clear, transparent and non-discriminatory. There is therefore no issue that the WTO needs to examine. The US claims that there is a so-called “moratorium” but the fact is that the EU has authorized GM varieties in the past and is currently processing applications. So what is the real US motive in bringing a case? (European Union, 2003) In essence, the US sought an international ruling through the WTO that would force countries to accept GM food and its associated biotechnology products. This raised serious concerns by governments and protest groups around the world that the WTO was an inappropriate place to make a judgement confined by narrow trade rules. Moreover, the US Government was reportedly seen as pressuring the three-person WTO panel not to involve scientific experts but instead to make its ruling in private. As a result, petitions were sent to the WTO urging it not to pass judgement in public (Bebb, 2004). The pressure on countries (notably developing countries) from powerful international bodies intensified during 2004. In May 2004, 60 organisations

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from 15 African countries forwarded an open-letter to the UN’s World Food Programme criticising that the WFP and USAID were misleading African nations by presenting them with a ‘no choice option’ to accept GM food (Ash and Mayet, 2004). Further condemnation of the UN followed with the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) releasing its report Agricultural biotechnology: meeting the needs of the poor? which was criticised for being ‘biased against the poor, against the environment and against food production in general’. It prompted a second open-letter signed by representatives from 80 countries angered by the UN’s support of biotech companies stating, ‘The report turns FAO away from food sovereignty and the real needs of the world’s farmers, and is a stab in the back to the farmers and rural poor FAO is meant to support’ (quoted in Grain, 2004). This legal and political pressure from powerful international institutions has had an impact on some anti-GM countries. For example, the European Union’s Consumer Protection Commissioner, David Byrne urged seven EU countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy and Luxembourg) to lift their bans on new GM food products arguing that Europe risks were falling behind the United States. In March 2004, the European Commission approved the trial planting of NK603 maize, a herbicide-resistant crop owned by biotech giant Monsanto (Engdahl, 2004). The European Commission has since ‘ordered’ Greece to lift its ban on 17 different GM maize varieties or face litigation. The GM maize MON 810 has been included in the EU’s seed catalogue which permits farmers to grow plants from the seed varieties without government restriction (Environment Daily, 2006). The European Commission has been accused by various organisations as ‘misleading’ and ‘lying’ to member states. For example, Greenpeace International accused the EU Commission of providing ‘false and misleading information to member states by saying that Monsanto fulfilled the current legal requirements to allow commercial growing of its genetically modified maize (MON 810)’ (Greenpeace, 2006). This claim was based on Monsanto’s failure to provide the necessary monitoring plans and environmental impact assessments (Greenpeace, 2006). Arguably the international pressure exerted by the United States and the aggressive trade practices of biotech corporations is influencing the decisions and policies of EU Commissioners. The WTO finally released its ruling in 2006. More than 2000 pages of the report were published, including an 802-page section on ‘findings’. In essence, the WTO argued that the EU had adopted a moratorium that was inconsistent with international trade law (WTO, 2006). It did not rule on the safety of GM food, nor did it decide in favour of compensation to the complaining countries. It stated that six EU member countries including Belgium, Germany, Austria, France, Italy and Luxemburg had acted illegally in banning GM food products from national trade. It did not, however, suggest that it was illegal for such countries to prohibit GM products for environmental and health reasons. For many, the WTO was the wrong place

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to hear such a case. Moreover, it was, as one might expect, heavily skewed in favour of pro-trade initiatives and incentives. As Somja Meister, trade campaigner for Friends of the Earth stated, ‘The international community must find an alternative before another case occurs … The WTO ignored international environmental laws, met in secret behind closed doors and barred any public involvement, even though we have a strong public resistance against GMOs in Europe’ (quoted in Fletcher, 2006). The criticism of the WTO’s ruling was widespread; with various allegations of scandal, concealment and secrecy (Mekay, 2006). On the other hand, proponents of biotechnology argued that the WTO rightly exercised its rights to protect national health standards whilst ruling on issues of trade (Chen and Ni, 2009). Notwithstanding the ambiguities surrounding jurisdiction and the conflicts between trade and environmental law (discussed in the next chapter), the WTO ruling has created a platform for continued trade while providing a mechanism to prevent opposition and resistance to GM food. For now it is important to explore specific forms of resistance and how pressure from the US and biotech companies has impacted on the world’s hungry.

African hunger and Zambian resistance When some of the world’s poorest and most hungry people reject GM food, others will, and should take note. As a social scientist exploring the political economy and governance of GM food, I was captivated by international press headlines highlighting the Zambian Government’s vociferous opposition to GM food aid during a period of desperate food insecurity. As a result, I travelled to Zambia, conducted 27 interviews (see appendix) and quickly realised that this Southern African landlocked country with a population of 10.5 million people had become a beacon of guidance for its neighbouring nations on the GM issue, as well as an international site of spiteful political and economic turf warfare involving the trade superpowers. The case of Zambian resistance is important to explore in detail, as it highlights the ways in which Western state and corporate power is mobilised through various contexts in violation of international law to exploit hunger in pursuit of trade and economic interests. It also identifies how Zambian state sovereignty over resources and biodiversity were challenged and usurped by pro-GM international authorities, but also how ‘power from below’ is capable of triumphing against the trade superpowers. Moreover, the following case study also emphasises the ways in which ‘risk’ has been constructed and used by biotechnology companies and the US Government to pressure impoverished nations in ways that are tantamount to culturecide (discussed later). Previously known as Northern Rhodesia and subject to South African and British rule, Zambia became a republic in 1964, and unlike many other African nations has not experienced civil war. It is rich in natural resources

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including copper, zinc, gold and gems stones, however, its external debt of $US 5 billion and an unemployment rate in excess of 50 per cent of the population makes it one of the United Nations’ Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC). Alongside disturbing economics trends, Zambia continues to tackle intense social problems. These include an HIV rate of 16.5 per cent of the entire population, a national life expectancy of 38 years and upwards of 90 per cent of its people living below the poverty line including 65 per cent having no access to safe drinking water, electricity or sanitation (World Health Organisation, 2009). That said, a 23 per cent rise in exports in 2003, a stable inflation and an increased domestic gross product in what the government refers to as the ‘longest period of sustained growth since independence’ provides reason for optimism (Magande, 2004; cf. World Bank, 2004). Along with mining, one of the best performing sectors is agriculture. For the first time in Zambia’s 40-year independence, in 2004 it began exporting surplus grain to neighbouring Malawi and Angola. In 2008/2009, Zambia produced 1.9 million metric tons of grain, vastly exceeding its necessary food security target of 1.2 million tons. The increased yields have been attributed to growth in development and infrastructure (Bupe, 2009). Agriculture is an essential part of the social and economic fabric of Zambian society. Zambia has more than 800,000 farmers (Simwanda and Mwila, 2004a) and an estimated 85 per cent are ‘small-scale or peasant farmers’ who own less than one hectare of land and produce 80 per cent of the nation’s crops (Simwanda and Mwila, 2004b). Agriculture is a central political issue where farming union representatives are frequently in the national press. For example, the President of the Zambian National Farmers Union, Jervis Binda, has recently strongly criticised and accused the government for coverups and a lack of dialogue with the agricultural community regarding food marketing strategies. Such inferences of government deceit over food policies are an issue of widespread public concern and outrage in Zambia. The current Zambian president, Mr Banda, was quick to allay public fears with comments about the future for a sustainable and secure food industry. He advised that food security was embedded in irrigation initiatives and financial investments to enhance infrastructure (Singyangwe, 2009). The point to be made here is that food security, grain, farming and government food policies are pervasive and integral to social and political life in Zambia. The Zambian Government’s rejection of GM food As mentioned above, farming is a cornerstone of Zambian society, especially cassava and maize that are staple foods in the north and south respectively. While fulfilling dietary needs it also holds substantial social and political value as one interviewee said ‘if you can’t manage maize then you cannot be a President of Zambia, it is our lifeblood’. While conducting fieldwork in Zambia, various discussions centred on grain; types, colours, smells, and

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tastes were recounted as a means of describing the ways in which grain, notably maize, has a national identity. It is more than a food and a source of trade and income; it has social and cultural capital or as one farmer said ‘it is part of who we are; it is our life blood’. The cultural significance of food is a relatively recent topic in Western academic discourses (see Ashley et al., 2004); however, in Southern Africa it has played an essential role in ceremony, worship and social structure for thousands of years. As discussed earlier, the concerns over GM food safety received international headlines when the former Zambian president referred to it as poison. The introduction of genetic technology into the food chain has posed a perceived danger to their staple food and has generated a discourse of fear and moral panic among many Zambians who were united behind their former president’s opposition to GM food. In Lusaka, as discussed earlier, the colloquial name for a prostitute (most of whom are HIV positive) is a ‘GMO’. The use of language that seeks to demonise GM food as morally repugnant, diseased and harmful must be contextualised within the social value of maize in Zambia and within contemporary discourses of risk and moral panic. Indeed, the use of the word ‘organism’ has powerful connotations. Throughout the world genetically modified foods are widely referred to in media, scientific and political discourses as ‘GM food’. In Zambia, the situation is different. Consistent with the cultural interpretations of grain as a ‘lifeblood’, the introduction of a foreign and unnatural element to the food supply is seen as contamination, a form of bodily poisoning. GM food represents a living organism, capable of reproducing and responding to stimuli – it is a living being. To ingest GM maize is to consume an unknown or alien species; to grow it is to pollute centuries of natural seed breeding. Not only is GM maize considered harmful to human health but the Zambian authorities interviewed for this research had reasons to believe that unmilled US grain donations were being strategically transported to Zambia to permit illegal growing of GM crops that would contaminate natural maize varieties in what was perceived as a strategic attempt to pollute biodiversity and create economic dependence (cf. Nottingham, 2003).1 The Zambian Government has been hailed as leading the African opposition to GM food. It rejected GM grain during its food deficit of 2002 and prompted other nations at the September 2002 World Earth Summit including Ethiopia, Mozambique and Zimbabwe to oppose US Government claims that they were ‘letting people starve through misplaced concern over GM food’ (Martin, 2002). The Zambian Government called a national debate in August 2002 on the safety of GM food. This meeting recommended a Zambian-led ‘fact finding mission’ involving leading scientists and medical experts travelling overseas with a specific remit to comment on the government’s adoption of the precautionary principle. It concluded that the safety of GM food was uncertain, that GM maize would contaminate indigenous Zambian maize varieties, that the export industry of maize and organic

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foods was jeopardised and that the ‘government should maintain the current stand of not accepting GM foods by employing the precautionary principle’ (Banda et al., 2002:38). This fieldwork resulted in the Zambian Government maintaining its cautious approach and moving towards the drafting of biosafety legislation. The Ministry of Science encapsulated the government’s position in the publication of its Biosafety Strategy. While biotechnology is often promoted by agri-business as an answer to the world’s food problems, real food security problems are caused not by food shortages, but inequity, poverty and the concentration of food production. Therefore, unless regulated, biotechnology is likely to further consolidate control of the seed industry in the hands of a few large firms. (Ministry of Science, Technology and Vocational Training, 2003: 7) It should be noted that the Zambian Government is not opposed to biotechnology per se. The National Institute for Scientific Research continues to conduct experiments using genetic technologies that aim to reduce animal disease as well as exploring medicinal benefits. A senior scientist with the Ministry of Science, Technology and Vocational Training (interviewed for this book) dismissed allegations that Zambia was anti genetic technology claiming: of course we are exploring developments in genetic science but our resources are limited. We have various laboratories and experiments conducting research into genetic possibilities … But to suggest that Zambia is opposed to genetic technology is simply not true, we are opposed to GM food and we are opposed to the pressure to accept it. As Paarlberg (2001) argues, the politics of precaution across developing countries is not simply ‘thumbs up or thumbs down on a single issue’, but a variety of ways that countries are responding to intellectual property laws, risk assessment and management, biotechnology research and regulation. The debate surrounding the refusal of GM food is, therefore, not onedimensional; indeed there are several reasons for adopting the precautionary principle. For example, the Minister of Agriculture stated: we are adopting the precautionary principle on GM food and until we have more accurate scientific facts that clearly show that it is safe, we will not introduce it to our environment … I am wanting to explore the potential of our biodiversity before we destroy what we already freely have, what God has given us for free. How can we accept GMOs when I know that such technology could destroy our biodiversity, the possibilities of which are still unknown. (Sikatana, 2004)

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A reasonable argument, however, the expansion of bio-agriculture in Southern Africa is not subservient to ecological dangers or risks to biodiversity. As the following section explores, the production and sale of GM food is driven by the economic imperatives of ‘free trade’ and an aggressive political economy that seeks new markets in fragile, vulnerable and ‘at risk’ societies.

Political and economic pressure to accept GM food In 2003, despite having a clear understanding of Zambia’s explicit opposition to GM food, the United States continued to distribute food aid through the UN’s World Food Programme that contained GM maize. When the Zambian Government called for an immediate withdrawal of all the contaminated food, a riot broke out among some starving people in Southern Zambia. The Zambian Minister for Agriculture, Mr Mundia Sikatana, accused the US of ‘promoting food riots in order to force Zambia to accept GM maize’ (quoted in Jonathan, 2004). Moreover, US authorities continued to place intolerable pressure on African nations to accept what was a surplus of GM food from US farmers. For example, the US Ambassador to the United Nations, Mr Tony Hall, suggested that Zambia’s political leaders be convicted as criminals by stating ‘people that deny food to their people, that are in fact starving people to death, should be held responsible … for the highest crimes against humanity in the highest courts in the world’ (quoted in Reuters, 2002). Other sources in the international press were claiming that ‘millions’ were dying in Zambia (see Laidlaw, 2002), and Minister Sikatana explained that this was all part of the political pressure placed on his government by US authorities: [f]ood is a weapon of mass destruction. It is used by some countries to control and pressure the poorer African nations. Western leaders have accused my President of untruths. In 2002 when we had a food deficit, they said that 4 million people were starving. This was all propaganda. No one in Zambia died from starvation. The food deficit was isolated to Southern regions where people eat maize. In the north we had a surplus of cassava, if the US Government really wanted to help Zambians why not transport our surplus cassava from the north to hungry people in the south, but no. So you must understand how lies and manipulation are used to exploit the hungry. But this year we have a surplus of maize. For the first time in Zambia’s 40 year independence we have a surplus of grain, and we are now exporting grain to Angola and Malawi, and we’ve done it without GMOs. (Sikatana, 2004)

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Other government interviewees also placed the above comments of US Ambassador Hall within its political and economic contexts arguing that it: served to endorse US food aid policies … African countries experience this sort of political pressure from the West all the time whether it be in health, education or whatever. And why? Because there are more and more business opportunities emerging in Africa in engineering and development and Western countries are all competing for the profits. (Sikitana, 2004) The US Government was also accused of dumping unwanted GM food on starving African countries and using Africa as a ‘human experiment’ (Townsend, 2002). In addition, it was alleged that the US Government and biotech industries were using the UN food aid programme as a ‘covert subsidy for US farmers’ (Vidal, 2002). This criticism further deepened the scepticism of sub-Saharan nations and stiffened their resolve to reject GM foods from the US. One Zambian scientist explained: [t]he US oversupply of GM grain creates a danger for the North American market. Too much grain drives prices down which effects local American markets. Food aid to Africa provides an option to rescue local markets while scoring international political points as a donor of food. But then again, it is never simply donated, it always comes with a debt of some kind. But it must be remembered that the US are not motivated by a sincere humanitarian desire to help people who are hungry, they are motivated by their own local economies and their own local markets. Government, NGOs and farmer groups in Zambia interviewed for this research reported that starvation was exaggerated by the West to optimise commercial opportunities. That said, there is no doubting that Southern Zambia experienced a six-month food shortage in 2002, but reports of widespread famine and death were untrue and exploited. For example, the former United States President George Bush claimed that US efforts to reduce hunger in Africa were ‘impeded’ by European nations that ‘have blocked all new bio-crops because of unfounded, unscientific fears’. As a result, President Bush argued that African countries ‘avoid investing in bio-technologies for fear that their products will be shut out of European markets’ (see BBC News, 2003). Yet, it is clear that the politicisation of hunger serves to mask the economic priorities of the US Administration. Take for example, the non-food industries of cotton and tobacco. Zambia has a very productive and thriving cotton industry. Indeed, cotton has been hailed as the ‘one unquestioned success of Zambia’s turn towards a market economy’ since the country’s liberalisation policies in 1994 (Tschirley

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et al., 2004). Like other Zambian industries that have proven commercially and internationally fruitful, such as copper, gold and gemstones, cotton has also attracted offshore corporate interests. Several interviewees reported that US and UK cotton corporations were growing and testing genetically modified cotton without the Zambian Government’s knowledge. Again, a growing and lively market economy for cotton in Zambia has attracted corporate interests with a pro-GM position for increasing yields and maximising profits. Of course, the proposed bt cotton for the Zambian market (which has been prohibited by current Zambian authorities) would have seen offshore corporate industries patent cotton plantations and increase their profit share in crop production. Interestingly, while US officials have put pressure on Zambia to accept biotechnologies with food and cotton, the opposite is true for tobacco. Philip Morris, the largest tobacco company in the US with cigarette brand varieties consuming 49.9 per cent of the US retail markets, refuses to purchase GM tobacco from international growers (Philip Morris, 2009). GM technologies in cigarette production are used solely by US-based Vector Group Limited that also produces a nicotine-free cigarette. Vector claims that it is committed to helping people quit smoking and their research demonstrates that one in three smokers using its Quest nicotine-free cigarette cease smoking within four weeks (Tobacco.org, 2004). As one Zambian interviewee from the tobacco industry stated: if GM technologies are so good, as the US keeps saying with food and cotton, why not for tobacco? It’s simple, GM tobacco is less addictive and therefore it’s not wanted, now what does that say about the US’ motivation? This contradiction serves to briefly illustrate that the propagation of GM technologies by the US Government and bio-corporations is more about exploitation for economic growth than humanitarian relief and poverty reduction. Of course the West’s plunder of Africa is a familiar and tragic story. ‘US imperialism’ continues to stir a growing African resistance or antiimperialist struggle against Western ‘neo-colonialism’ (Ismi and Schwartz, 2007). Within the Zambian context, the international pressures and ‘trade wars’ (discussed above) have clearly influenced the local WFP as well as USAID. In 2004, the US Government provided an estimated $US 66 million in financial assistance to Zambia through the USAID. Its Strategic Plan for Zambia for 2004 to 2010 focuses on five key objectives of ‘increased private sector competitiveness’, ‘improved quality of basic education for more schoolaged children’, ‘improved health status of Zambians’, ‘Government held more accountable’, ‘reduced impact of HIV/AIDS through multi-sectoral response’ (US Department of State, 2004).

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The Zambian’s Government rejection of US GM food has reportedly produced ramifications for funding. An interviewee for this research who sits on various official committees stated ‘USAID has reduced funding for projects in social and health type projects. This is a silent or unspoken penalty for rejecting GMOs’. It appears, however, that USAID remains committed to its first objective in Zambia, namely providing business opportunities for US-based companies. As one scientist stated, ‘USAID champions Western ideals whilst creating opportunities for US business … business is number one and if research starts saying that GM food is harmful then it will effect US business … so the research doesn’t get done unless it can produce positive results’. Another scientist interviewed for this research stated that his organisation received substantial funding from USAID (as many organisations in Zambia do) and that USAID ‘actively dissuaded us from doing research on GM food’. Indeed, scientific research into GM technology in Zambia has received substantial funding from biotech companies and pro-GM lobbies. As one senior government scientist interviewed for this research stated: we have Monsanto funding research people like academics and other scientific projects to promote GMOs … It’s more promotion and public and relations than what I’d call real research, but it still has a lot of important people listening to it both in Zambia and in other countries. Therefore, in addition to international political and legal pressure there is evidence of governments and corporations adopting an orchestrated campaign to suppress or prevent research in Zambia that criticises GM food, and instead, to actively promote pro-GM technologies. This exploitation of hunger and society’s threatened with food security is a violation of the 1999 United Nations Food Aid Convention to which the US is a signatory. Article 1 stipulates that ‘food aid provided is aimed particularly at the alleviation of poverty and hunger of the most vulnerable groups, and is consistent with agricultural developments in those countries’. Food shortages and hunger are not intended to be commercial opportunities, and signatories of the Food Aid Convention agree to reduce poverty and famine through aid and not advance their own agricultural industries or exploit new trade agreements. Moreover, the US Government’s insistence that Zambia accept GM food and the subsequent pressure that was exerted (discussed further below) was a clear breach of Article 1. In addition, the US Government refused to provide food grants or cash to Zambia for non-GM aid, a position that violates the ‘terms of aid’ defined in Article 9 of the Food Aid Convention.

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US Government and papal pressure In addition to political, economic and legal pressures, the US Government has been actively engaged in exerting diplomatic pressure, notably within the Vatican City. With millions of followers of the Catholic faith, an endorsement of GM food from the Holy See would create substantial business opportunities and revenue for the US Government and its biotech corporations. Moreover, it is worth tracing some of the events involving the Holy See as Jesuit priests in Zambia have been actively promoting their opposition to the aggressive trade policies of GM corporations and as a result have been subject to widespread criticism from US Government authorities. During September–December 2002, following the Zambian Government’s rejection of GM food, US authorities began meeting with senior archbishops at the Vatican. The US ambassador to the Holy See and a strong advocate of biotechnology, Mr Jim Nicholson, held several meetings with Archbishop Leonardo Sandri, Monsignor Celestino Migliore and Jesuit Superior General Peter-Hans Kolvenbach to obtain ‘a clear and unambiguous’ statement that affirmed ‘the safety of biotech foods’ that would ‘neutralise antipropaganda in Africa’ (Cardinale, 2003). Such meetings did not achieve their objective; instead the Holy See reaffirmed the right of developing countries to adopt the precautionary principle regarding the acceptance of food aid. As a result, the US intensified its pressure on the Vatican with the US Secretary of State Colin Powell receiving an audience with the Pope on 2 June 2003 (Independent Catholic News, 2003). Mr Powell is reported to have said to the Pope, ‘[l]ook at me, sir. I eat genetically modified products every day; all in all, I’m not doing too badly, am I?’ The US delegation to the Vatican clearly influenced the Holy See, and within five months a conference was organised on 10–11 November 2003, in the offices of the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace ‘to gather a great amount of information about GMOs, studying their implications in the fields of nutrition, commerce, the environment, and health care, as well as humanitarian and ethical aspects’ (Catholic World News, 2003). The conference had a clear pro-GM agenda yet its outcome failed to produce a definitive Vatican position on GM food. In early 2004 US authorities maintained diplomatic pressure on the Vatican through the release of a book written by the Ambassador of the United States to the Holy See, Mr Jim Nicholson. This book celebrates 20 years of diplomatic relation between the Holy See and the United States. In doing so, it provides a substantial discussion about GMOs. In this book Nicolson (2004: 108) makes the US case for GM food in Africa and in doing so identifies the rationale for the US pressuring the Vatican: … we believe the Holy See’s moral voice on food consumption safety and on the potential of such food to end world hunger and malnutrition

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may help diminish myths about biotech foods in underdeveloped countries. Moreover, the Holy See can discourage the spread of erroneous information, which jeopardize the lives of persons, through prominent Church personalities or groups associated with them. (cf. Magister, 2004) Furthermore, he criticised certain individuals in Zambia, notably a ‘Jesuit priest’ for spreading misinformation about GMOs, paralysing ‘the World Food Programme’s efforts in Zambia and placing millions of lives at risk’ (Nicolson, 2004: 109). These disparaging remarks were directed to Dr Peter Henriot, the Director of the Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection in Lusaka, who has been critical of biotechnology and its potential deleterious effects on developing societies. Interviewed for this research, Dr Henriot2 described how US Government officials lobbied his church superiors and government ministers in Zambia to have him removed. Henriot returned fire and criticised a further conference convened at the Vatican on 24 September 2004 entitled ‘Feeding a Hungry World: The Moral Imperative of Biotechnology’. This conference was funded and organised by the US Embassy to the Holy See and included six plenary speakers, most with affiliations to biotech companies in the US (see Turnley, 2004). Father Henriot and a senior researcher in agriculture in Lusaka, Dr Roland Lesseps, suggested that the conference was seriously flawed, concluding that the Vatican should be extremely cautious that it is not seen to be compromised through linkages with known promoters of only one position on this issue. ‘When ethical and religious issues such as food security are being discussed, there is no place either for one scientific view to be heard or only one political force to be recognised’ (Lesseps and Henriot, 2004). Others severely criticised the conference for an unquestioning belief in GM technology and for being ‘hopelessly stacked in favour of the controversial new technology’ (Hitchen, 2004). These ‘outspoken’ voices may have influenced the former Pope who intimated a rejection of GM food by stressing the rights of farmers, the need to preserve biodiversity and protect indigenous communities ‘whose vast patrimony or culture and knowledge linked to biodiversity, run the risk of disappearing because of a lack of adequate protection’ (Pope John Paul II quoted in Independent Catholic News, 2004). The death of Pope John Paul II in 2005 ushered in a new papal leadership and one which has since decided to support GM food. Years of biotech lobbying in the Vatican appear to have finally paid off. In a further Vatican conference in May 2009 on genetically modified organisms, papal scientists advised Pope Bendict XI to embrace biotechnology to solve world hunger problems. The Pope subsequently declared GM ‘a blessing’, rejecting the evidence of the International Assessment of Agriculture Knowledge written by the influential Science and Technology and Development Institute (New

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Scientist, 2009). Many observers criticised the Vatican’s conference convened by Bishop Marcello Sanchez Sorrendo, Chancellor of the Pontifical Academy of Sciences, for inviting a 40-strong pro-GM audience including scientists and employees from Monsanto (Vidal, 2009b). As word begins to spread of papal endorsement of GM foods across all nations, we wait to hear how the Catholic believing world reacts to this unprecedented and unexpected Papal u-turn of the blessings found in biotechnology and genetically modified foods.

Concluding comment The utility of GM food in providing a ‘solution to world hunger’ has become a mantra of pro-GM advocates, governments and biotech companies. However, this chapter demonstrates that creating food security is more a convenient marketing strategy to increase trade and profits in transgenic foods than support the agricultural needs of the world’s poor and hungry. Hunger has become a convenient platform for corporate exploitation. For millions, the realities of hunger are tragic; for others, starvation provides the impetus to develop new technologies and open new trade routes with the emphasis on power and profit. This point is further explored in the next chapter through an examination of the regulatory regimes governing the production and trade of GM food.

Notes 1 The British company Lonrho was identified by several Zambian Government and agricultural sources as having been involved in illegal GM crop experiments in Lusaka during 2000–2002. Attempts to substantiate these reports with official documents have been unsuccessful. 2 Father Henriot continues to serve as Director of the Jesuit Center for Theological Reflection in Lusaka. He remains a key figure in public debates about food security and advocates for the sovereignty of Zambian ecological resources. He also continues to disseminate ‘caution’ over the GMOs (Henriot, 2009).

Chapter 5

Regulatory regimes Ensuring safety or enhancing profits?

Introduction Thus far, this book has explored the origins and politics of GM food, controversies surrounding science, the role of public opinion and the political economy of GM food trade. Attention is now turned to legal and regulatory structures that govern GM technologies, production and distribution. This analysis, in the first instance, necessitates turning back the clock to examine the ways in which politics and vested interests have been integrally entwined and embedded in the debates and subsequent controls of genetics and food production in the UK. Issues pertaining to genetics and plant breeding have a long history in the UK. Non-transgenic breeding (that is, the cross pollination of plants within a single species or of two species within the same genus) has occurred among farmers and botanists for hundreds of years. It is not the intention here to rehearse those developments; instead this chapter commences by tracing some of the political and scientific developments throughout the twentieth century that shaped international debates and domestic policy around plant breeding and genetic manipulation of food production. In doing so, it seeks to understand and contextualise existing regulatory arrangements. Moreover, this chapter will critically examine the existing legal regimes (both domestic and international) that regulate the production of GM food using archival documents and those obtained under the Official Information Act.

Historical reflections1 In the introduction to this volume it was noted that the first genetically modified food was made available for public consumption in the US in 1994. Yet plant breeding and genetics has a much longer history. There are several points at which one could chart specific intellectual and political currents and explore how such movements have influenced the direction of genetic technology. In this section what follows is what Foucault (1980) referred to in his Questions of Method as ‘eventalization’, an intelligibility that seeks to

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isolate specific historical developments as ‘events’ and to analyse the various processes and pieces that create such events. This approach provides new ways of understanding what is often identified as a historical constant and to further appreciate a broader picture, in this instance, the development and regulation of genetically engineered organisms and food products. The House of Commons Select Committee on Science and Technology provides details on a website devoted to ‘A brief outline history of the legislation and health and safety aspects of GMOs’. It identifies how the UK was the first country to provide a regulatory regime over GMOs. In doing so, it conveys a UK Government commitment to safety, science and caution (Select Committee on Science and Technology, 1999). What follows provides a different story. A detailed examination of the Ashby Committee papers reveals a one-sided and pro-GM government review where GMO regulation was suggested and best positioned within the peer review of scientists using the technology, and not government legislation and regulation (discussed below). In the UK, the Agricultural Research Council Joint Sub-Committee conducted a survey of plant breeding in 1945 to enhance crop varieties and concluded inter alia ‘that the systems of control of these stations (i.e. plant breeding) is not uniform’ (Agricultural Research Council SubCommittee, 1945: 31). Indeed, the Committee stated that ‘the differences in practice in the testing of varieties put forward by different stations may be an embarrassment’ (ibid, 19). It is clear from mid-twentieth century UK Government documentation that plant breeding and genetics, particularly during and immediately after the Second World War when food shortages and rationing existed, emphasised increasing crop varieties and yields for social and financial reconstruction efforts in Britain. It was a time when advances in science were promoted and supported by government and industry for agricultural developments. Issues of safety, regulations or health, and environment concerns were considered ‘ethical issues’ that were subservient to ‘progress of knowledge’ and ‘problems of the agricultural industry’. There was an identified ‘hostility’ between farmers, agricultural researchers and corporate interests. The business community was threatened and defensive of any research assessments that hindered corporate profits. Moreover, the post war agricultural committee in the UK identified that the uncritical quest for ‘complete genetic homogeneity’ was ‘built on an expectation which has never been realized’ and one which provided ‘a decided embarrassment’ in issues regarding safety (ibid., 26). The seeds of scientific uncertainty, corporate self-interest and control, and lack of uniform regulation were already in harvest in the mid 1940s and provided the unsteady foundation upon which developments in policy, law and ethics would be built. In 1974, the United States National Academy of Sciences took an unprecedented step in declaring a voluntary international ban on all scientific

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inquiry involving genetic engineering ‘because of the risk of infecting man with bacteria containing hybrid DNA molecules whose biological properties cannot be predicted in advance’ (Nature, 1974: 175). This moratorium based on a declaration of ‘potentially hazardous’ technologies through the manipulation of DNA came about after eminent scientists assembled at the 1973 Gordon Research Conference on nucleic acids, expressed serious concern that plasmid engineering was occurring without evaluation, regulation or adequate safety standards to prevent the spread of dangerous antibiotic resistant toxins. The National Academy of Sciences, acting on behalf of the National Research Council, concluded that until ‘better evaluation’ and methods for preventing the spread of potentially hazardous recombinant DNA molecules were known, all GM technologies should cease. Moreover, due to the perceived risk of bacterial strains infecting human populations and the known fact that ‘many types of animal cell DNA’s contain sequences common to RNA tumor viruses’ (ibid., 175), the potential for increases in human cancers and other diseases was deemed possible. Finally, the Committee recommended that National Institutes of Health set up monitoring bodes and convene an international meeting in early 1975 to bring scientists from around the world to ‘review scientific progress’. The announcement of the US National Academy of Sciences may have been unexpected, but the concerns over genetically modified organisms were already known to the British Government. Documents embargoed and placed in the National Archive and not released to the public until 2005 reveal fascinating insights into the ways in which biotechnology and genetically modified organisms developed in the UK. Tracing some of these events is necessary to contextualize existing regulatory arrangements in the UK. In 1974, the British Government had a DHSS Working Party on Dangerous Pathogens. The minutes of the July meeting of this committee (only weeks before the US Academy of Sciences international embargo of experiments involving the genetic engineering of DNA) identify that Professor Kornberg of the University of Leicester had drawn attention ‘to the problem (and indeed dangers) of some experimental work involving DNA’. Following the piece in Nature which was reported in The Times, the Chairman of the UK Government’s Working Party on Dangerous Pathogens suggested that relevant government bodies contact the appropriate research councils to formulate a ‘joint letter or publication’ on possible dangers. In correspondence to Sir John Gray (then Head of the Medical Research Council) the Department of Education and Science alluded to other possible newspaper articles that could ‘stir something up’, and that the MRC should not ‘refer to the “pathogens” Working Party at this stage’, to do so would highlight the potential dangers of GMOs (Department of Education and Science, 1974a). Interestingly, the Medical Research Council, along with selected scientists

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from the Royal Society and within government decided to take the lead in setting up an advisory body that could provide ‘an authoritative statement to be made of the potential benefits or potential risks of these new techniques’ (Gray, 1974). It was the Medical Research Council that suggested the advisory committee to the Secretary of State who ‘welcomed’ the idea and presented it to his fellow ministers. The special advisory committee subsequently received ministerial approval to assess and evaluate the claims of American scientists. The remit of the Committee was: [t]o evaluate the potential benefits and hazards of techniques which allow the experimental manipulation of the genetic composition of micro-organisms and to report to the ABRC. Sir John Gray, who was invited to co-opt members to the committee, asked Lord Eric Ashby of Clare College Cambridge to head-up the Committee (subsequently known as the Ashby Committee). Lord Ashby requested that the first meeting be without witnesses and with documentation at the level of a ‘child’s guide’ to allow ‘members of the working party as ignorant as I about the recent work of genomes’ to understand the ‘the sort of questions’ that should be asked of experts and scientists (Ashby, 1974). Sir John Gray was anxious to form a fully constituted committee with hand picked scientists (even contacting Professor Wilkins whilst on holiday in France) ‘before public opinion or politics begin to get worked up’ (Gray, 1974: 1). Ashby gave Gray the green light to recruit all members of the committee. In correspondence between Mr D.G. Evans of the National Institute for Biological Standards and Control and Sir John Gray it was made clear that ‘it was right to keep the Ministry of Defence (MRE in particular) out of the picture at this stage’ (Evans, 1974). The Ministry of Defence had reached its own conclusions about the potential dangers of genetically engineered DNA through its Biological Research Advisory Board (which were reported to the Working Party on Dangerous Pathogens) and the MoD ‘fully agreed with the views of the US National Academy of Sciences’ (Ministry of Defence, 30 July 1974). Such voices of concern and criticism were not to be included in Lord Ashby’s ‘independent’ working party. In a letter from the Chief Scientist of the Ministry of Defence to the resident of the Royal Society, Dr Penlay offered to assist any British scientific efforts to explore the hazards of GM technologies stating: [t]he Microbiological Research Establishment, which is in my area of responsibility, has special and possibly unique facilities in the UK for work with dangerous substances and has assisted the DHSS in carrying out essential work with such virulent agents as the ‘Marburg’ virus, and currently Herpes B and Lassa viruses. (Ibid:1)

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A similar letter was forwarded to Sir John Gray. Yet, as mentioned above, despite having the best available laboratories at the time to conduct tests on genetically engineered organisms, Sir John Gray deliberately avoided the MoD and in particular the ‘unique facilities’ made available by the Ministry of Defence that could have been used to confirm or reject the conclusions of US scientists (i.e. the MRE). In addition, the Agricultural Research Council had raised with the Medical Research Council the possibility of bringing Professor Kornberg on-board who was known to be critical of genetic engineering and ‘strongly in favour of considerable restrictions’. Yet, in doing so, the Agricultural Research Council (ARC) reiterated its disapproval of Kornberg by stating that the Secretary to the ARC ‘would certainly remove his objections [to Professor Kornberg] if it was thought necessary’ (Agricultural Research Council, 5 August 1974). The Department of Education and Sciences’ press notice announcing the establishment of a ‘working party of high level scientists’ on the potential hazards and benefits of genetically manipulated organisms, identified the proposed membership (which included Professor Kornberg) but unsurprisingly no members of the Ministry of Defence were appointed to the committee or listed as one of the 23 experts invited to give evidence (Department of Education and Science, 1974b). The Working Party on Genetic Engineering in Micro-Organisms or the ‘Ashby Working Party’ met on four occasions: 17 and 26 September, 9 and 14 October 1974. At the first meeting, Lord Ashby alluded to ‘expressions of irritation from some distinguished scientists who felt that they should have been on the Committee’ (Working Party on Genetic Engineering in Micro-Organisms, 1974a: 1). He also rejected suggestions that representatives of industrial scientific unions should not be invited to speak with the committee. The committee heard (from Professor Kornberg who suggested at the first meeting that the Working Party make use of the MoD facilities, a suggestion not taken-up) that since 1972 it had been possible to insert a foreign DNA into a host DNA. He identified the dangers of newly constructed antibiotic resistant DNA and its possible transfer to other organisms and the reality of hazardous ‘enzyme splits’ using E. coli viruses. Based on other scientific evidence presented by committee members (including the health risks to humans who consumed plants ‘of drug resistance plasmids to man’s microflora’, and ‘ecological disasters’), the Working Party asked one of its members (Professor Berg) to prepare a statement that recommended: restraint from carrying out forms of experiments: first the construction of bacterial strains carrying combinations of drug resistance factors not now occurring, for example, penicillin resistance introduced into organisms not normally possessing it and secondly the transfer of fragments of oncogenic material into other organisms. (Ibid., 3)

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Committee members presented their respective scientific expertise. Professor Postgate (microbiologist, University of Sussex) identified numerous risks as well as the enormous ‘economic advantages’ of genetic engineering, and while his comments convey concern he concluded that the potential benefits of such techniques, both nationally and globally, were enormous and the risks were trivial or at least could be ‘contained’. The tenure of the first meeting was one that conveyed the concerns expressed in the scientific literature about the manipulation of animal genes but also the relatively unknown yet equally uncertain techniques involving plants. As the remit of the Working Party stipulated, the purpose of the committee was to establish the potentials and hazards of GE (genetically engineered) organisms. ‘Ethical’ considerations were not to be considered; and the minutes of the first meeting identify that there were attempts to preempt any neutral and evaluative assessment of ‘hazards and potentials’. Indeed, Lord Ashby asked committee members to assess the usefulness of a moratorium on GE (before hearing the testimonies of witnesses), with most members stating that it was fruitless. Clearly the proposed benefits of GE technologies were being framed within economic benefits. While certain scientists were excluded from the committee and union representatives were not to be consulted, key players from the commercial sector were to be consulted on an ‘informal’ basis, and such contact was deemed important. A draft minute of the first meeting (not subsequently appearing in the official minutes) identified that ‘witnesses from commerce should not be called but later in the meeting, it was felt that informal discussions between members of the Working Party and suitable contacts in industry should be encouraged’ (Rutter, 1974). At its second meeting, Lord Ashby’s introductory remarks to each witness indicated that the committee remit was ‘narrow’ and not interested with ‘ethical considerations or the detailed drafting of codes of practice’. He also prefaced witness testimony with the announcement that ‘a lengthy moratorium would not be satisfactory and that the situation must be resolved quickly’ (Medical Research Council, 1974a). Professor Anderson (PHS Enteric Reference Laboratory) testified that acceptable standards of practice to minimise hazards were neglected in molecular genetics. After the first three witnesses had given their testimonies, Lord Ashby asked the committee ‘whether anything so far said by the witnesses tended to cause them to change the testimonies that they had given’. In other words, the pre-determined position of the committee was to be periodically queried for its ongoing resolve. The fourth witness from the John Innes Research Institute (Professor D.A. Davies) expressed concern about ‘the possibility of the introduction of foreign DNA which, without becoming fully incorporated, could nonetheless be functional’. He also challenged the practical benefits of this technology. His critical and alarming testimony was met with ‘surprise’ by committee members, one of whom, Professor Postgate, proceeded to

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discredit the evidence of Professor Davies claiming that he’d spoken with Davies’ superior ‘who had taken the line that there was no risk associated with his work, on plants, and that the whole question was a storm in a tea cup’ (ibid, 7). This was an extraordinary move and served to identify the biased nature of this committee. The so-called superior of Professor Davies was not called as a witness, and no documents from this person were tendered to the committee as evidence. Yet, one of the most damning testimonies against GE technologies which alluded to transfer of pathogens and their instability was dismissed out-of-hand as a result of a casual out-of-session conversation between one committee member and an unnamed third party. The committee questioned every witness about the veracity and outcome of the moratorium fearing that it might ‘turn into an embargo’. The evidence of Professor M.H. Richmond (Department of Bacteriology, Bristol University) summed up the future of the moratorium by suggesting that ‘the commercial interests in this area were so substantial that they would certainly override any moratorium imposed on the scientific community’. Moreover he claimed that: he saw something of an intellectual lock-out in the moratorium, in that those people who had called for it were not only those who had a start in this field but would, presumably be those who would be given a privileged position in any programme set up to assess the position. (ibid, 8) This was to be a decisive and influential statement concluding that the moratorium brought by US scientists was not about ethics, risks and safety but about gaining an intellectual and financial advantage in the development of GE technologies. Again, there was no evidence to suggest that this was the motivation or purpose of the moratorium. While the committee was clearly pro-GE technologies, its hand-picked witnesses, generally speaking, confirmed concerns about DNA manipulation and the production of antibiotic resistant genes, about the transferability of genetically engineered DNA, the uncertainty of mutation and contamination of host and new gene, the production of super pathogens, the uses of the technology in biological weaponry, ecological disasters, the spread of new viruses, the risks to researchers and the lack of specific training to laboratory staff. The advantages were less specific and couched in terms of medical and agricultural ‘potential’ and financial benefits (Medical Research Council, 1974b and c). Predictably the final report of the Ashby Working Party was supportive of GE technologies. Indeed, much of its fourth meeting was spent discussing the framework of their report. The minutes of the final meeting, held on 14 October 1974, reveal that expert witnesses were almost an inconvenience to the main business: to debate the final report’s style and content. Prior to

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hearing all the witnesses, the committee members had decided ‘to lay emphasis on benefits, pointing out that these techniques were a stronger tool to do things that had been going on earlier and playing down the idea that something completely new was now possible’ (Medical Research Council, 1974c: 6) – a point objected to by the committee’s lone critical voice, Professor Kornberg, who emphasised that it ‘was so far not possible to applaud the achievements of the techniques’ (id). The chairman determined that the committee’s report should represent genetic engineering ‘as part of the continuing story of a branch of biology with a very good record of success’ (ibid, 7). One member (Professor Postgate) concluded that legislative regulations should ‘not be pressed’ preferring ‘codes of practice’ and ‘peer review’. He also concluded that ‘it would be best to assume that there were no hazards until experiments had proven otherwise’ (id). Yet, early in proceedings the working party made it clear that their remit did not include drafting codes of practice or ethical issues; yet they would dismiss legislative regimes of regulation in favour of scientific codes of practices that they heard in evidence were disparate, unsatisfactory and lacking oversight. This committee met on only four occasions within a month. As mentioned, its members and witnesses were hand-picked and constituted almost exclusively of individuals and organisations who were known to the Department of Education and Science and/or had expressed favourable views of genetic engineering. The Working Group concluded that, subject to rigorous safeguards, these techniques should continue to be used because of the great benefits to which they might lead. They took the view that an agreed code of practice and a central advisory service were necessary for laboratories in this field, together with appropriate training facilities, but that ‘it would be unreasonably difficult to introduce a statutory system of controls’ (Department of Education and Science, 1975: 1). The preference for ‘industry regulation’ was, therefore, in train. Indeed, during the Ashby Working Party hearings, private research corporations with pharmaceutical and military experiences handling ‘dangerous human pathogenic viruses’ had independently petitioned a member of the committee to offer their services as regulatory agents. In doing so, the senior executive from G.D. Searle and Co. Ltd. stated: I feel it may be rather more difficult for academic organizations to cope with this situation. Their organizational structure is quite different from that in industry. There is greater degree of personal independence and a much lesser degree of common objectives within the organization. Thus I feel that you might encounter both opinions resisting control and organizational difficulties obstructing such control in an academic environment. (Hale, 1974) As a result, the conclusions and recommendations of the Ashby Committee were predictable ‘that the potential benefits are likely to be great’ (Ashby,

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1974b: 26). Such benefits were presented in the realm of medical discoveries but also, and quite surprisingly, for other applications to tackle ‘world food shortages’. The anticipated gains were to be found in the production of genetically modified nitrogen fertilisers with ‘experiments already under way’. The unpredictable hazards of GE technologies were identified as ‘in the realm of conjecture’ (p. 15) and viewed as part-and-parcel of scientific developments that could be minimised through ‘containment’, ‘epidemiological monitoring’ and ‘tests on animals’. The development of foreign bacterial strains from GE culture manipulation were, contrary to evidence, deemed to present little or no risk to the ‘healthy human intestine and … incapable of transferring generic information to strains of E Coli resident in the gut’ (p. 18). In conclusion the Ashby Working Party minimised and deflected risk and gave the green light for GE experiments to continue in Britain with ‘some’ training for laboratory technicians. The call for a moratorium by eminent US scholars was referred to as a ‘pause’ called by ‘a group of research workers’, which should not stand in the way of techniques that ‘open up exciting prospects both for science and for its application to society, and the evidence we have received indicates that the potential hazards can be kept under control’ (p. 32). Lord Ashby’s Working Party on the Experimental Manipulation of Genetic Composition of Micro-Organisms was clearly pro-GE technologies. The working party was significantly influenced by the Medical Research Council that saw widespread benefits in this technology and by government and industry that perceived of substantial financial gains. The working party from its outset set about silencing dissent by hand-picking a sympathetic committee, by narrowly defining the committee’s remit to exclude potential critical or damning evidence (i.e. ethics, biological weaponry), by screening witnesses, and cherry-picking testimonies to support a report that from the beginning was constructed to dismiss the validity of a US-called moratorium and provide the go-ahead for genetic engineering of micro-organisms. Indeed, seven months after Lord Ashby published his final report, one of the working party’s expert witnesses (Dr Guy Maxwell, University of Kent) wrote to the secretary of the Ashby Committee stating that ‘the safety angle as a whole reminds me very much of the early days of killed polio vaccine. A lot of enthusiasm, accompanied by tests on a very few subjects compared to the total number that is likely to be exposed to risk’ (Meynell, 1975: 1). The committee had not provided the avenue for Dr Meynell to voice his concerns and present his research about safety, and he felt compelled to write to the secretary; yet his concerns were not taken up. His letter to Dr T. Vickers (Ashby Committee Secretary) was accompanied with an excerpt from his own extensive ten-year research on ‘Genetic Hazards and Ingested Bacteria’ that identified that genetically engineered organisms represented in ‘both animal and human data suggest that in certain circumstances even a few ingested bacteria will proliferate rapidly in the gut’. He went on to point out how laboratory workers and

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patients in contact with GE bacteria could spread illness to others, concluding that ‘there is a case for not using in these genetic experiments, at least until experience has been gained, any strains selected by current chemotherapeutic practice, whether their elective advantage comes from chromosomal or plasmid-borne genes’ (Meynell, undated: 3). The committee had alluded to the realm of conjecture surrounding risk and the limited literature on hazards, yet this emphatic study was not included and when brought to the secretary’s attention in mid-1975 was not acted on but rather embargoed in the state archive for 30 years. The events described above set the tone for the UK’s earliest form of GMO regulation in the form of an amendment to the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974. Consistent with the recommendations of the Ashby Committee, this amendment set about to ensure the safety of laboratory technicians working on GMOs. Further, in 1978 the Health and Safety (Genetic Manipulation) Regulations were passed that required notifications to be made to the Health and Safety Executive by any organisation engaged in work with GMOs. This industry and science-led approach to regulation has remained the dominant approach in Britain. Given the discussion above, it is surprising that the House of Commons Select Committee on Science and Technology has referred to the early years of GMO regulation in the UK as ‘unduly restrictive’, and further points to the ‘industry-led’ controls preferred by government. For example: [t]hrough the 1980s the techniques of genetic modification were developed into industrial processes, and it became apparent that the very precautionary approach adopted in the 1978 Regulations was unduly restrictive and disproportionate to the risks as revealed by the increased knowledge gained. The 1978 Regulations had become out of date and were replaced by the Genetic Modification Regulations 1989. Like the 1978 Regulations, they applied only to human health and safety and not to the protection of the environment (though under the auspices of HSC and ACGM there was a voluntary agreement with the industry that they would also assess environmental risks). (House of Commons Select Committee on Science and Technology, 1999) In 1989, the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution concluded that the release of genetically engineered substances had potentially concerning effects on the environment. As a result, the RCEP proposed a statutory regime that would regulate release, screen applications for licences, register companies conducting experiments with GMOs and create greater public access to information. The Health and Safety Commission which had issued guidelines in the early 1980s for the regulation of GMOs welcomed most of the RCEP’s call for tighter controls; however, its responses to the Department of Environment’s

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consultation paper on additional legislation on the intentional release of GMOs proposed by the RCEP was mindful of economic priorities and industry confidentiality. For example it stated: industry would be concerned if the timescale involved in granting approvals were to stretch beyond the 90 days enshrined in existing arrangements. (Health and Safety Commission, 1989: 6) That said, there was a recognition that ‘prevailing international political and scientific opinion requires that releases of GMOs should, at present, only proceed after a case-by-case review and approval by a national authority’ (HSC, 1989: 8). Such developments in Britain reflected international concerns and discussions and provided the beginnings of the regulatory regime in the UK. The following section examines the existing legal and regulatory regimes of GM foods both in Britain and abroad.

GM food laws and regulations Before exploring the existing regulatory framework in the UK, it is necessary to examine international legal contexts. Such a process highlights the ways in which pro-GM countries have exerted political and economic pressure to create international GM laws that are sympathetic and subservient to industry and trade. International regulations A crucial and central principle of international environmental law is the duty of states not to cause environmental harm. In both Articles 21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration and Article 2 of the 1992 Rio Declaration this obligation was reaffirmed along with the notion of responsibility and accountability for those states that cause damage or harm to the environment. As Hunter et al. (1998: 348) succinctly identify the ongoing deficiencies of obligation under international law by asking: ‘what level of harm should trigger the obligation? To what standard of care should the State be held? What activities should be considered under the jurisdiction and control, of the State? What remedies should be available to States who suffer damage?’ The answers to these questions are complex and continue to provide challenges for parties to environment treaties. However, what is agreed upon is that the answers to the above questions are to be found in the negotiating processes of international protocols that aim to achieve maximum consensus and that are subsequently reflected in individual nation-state legislation. One of the most significant recent developments in the international regulation of GMOs has emerged with the signing of the Cartagena Protocol on

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Biosafety. Like many international agreements the passing of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety was anything but smooth and straightforward. Indeed its negotiation and enactment were described by the Executive Director of the United Nations Environment Programme, Mr Klaus Topfer, as ‘mission impossible’ (Topfer, 2004). As Nijar (2002: 263) identifies, every step of the way, ‘the biotechnology industry and its governmental protagonists in the negotiating process fought to prevent the protocol from coming into existence’. Bail et al. (2002) provide a detailed insight into the often bitter debate that transpired between negotiating groups that were polarised by vested interests. For example, the self-titled ‘Miami Group’ (Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, Uruguay and the United States) represented (at times) a strong opposition to the Protocol for its potential deleterious effects on global trade. The ‘Like Minded Group’ (Ethiopia, Jamaica, Brazil, Philippines, Seychelles, Iran and China) voiced the concerns of developing countries and urged that a protocol was necessary for the protection of biodiversity from living modified organisms. The European Union comprised another key player in negotiations and supported the concerns raised by developing countries as well as emphasising the risks to the environment posed by genetically modified organisms. The fourth major contingent were the ‘Compromise Group’ (Switzerland, Norway, Japan and Mexico, later joined by Singapore and New Zealand) who adopted a middle-ground approach to the divided positions of the Miami and Like-Minded Groups. The Protocol came into force on 11 September 2003, exactly 90 days after the 50th signatory had ratified it. As of December 2009, a total of 156 countries had signed the Protocol, notably none of the above mentioned Miami Group has yet to ratify the Protocol (see Convention on Biological Diversity, 2009). The Protocol provides a mandate for the safe transfer, handling and use of ‘living modified organisms resulting from modern biotechnology that may have adverse effects on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, taking also into account risks to human health, and specifically focusing on transboundary movements’ (Article 1). Countries that plan to introduce living modified organisms into another country will be required to submit an application notifying exact details of content (Articles 7 and 8), and all products intended for food, or feed must be labelled (Article 18). The importation of all genetically modified organisms (GMOs) to nations that are party to the Protocol will require risk assessments and the express written approval of the receiving country (Articles 11, 15 and 16). No signatory to the Protocol can be forced to accept GMOs without their consent, thus preserving sovereign rights – an issue that is being contested by the United States in the WTO. Moreover illegal movement of GMOs, notably in contravention of the Protocol (Article 25), provides for liability and redress that includes financial penalties (see Articles 27 and 28). This final point was a major sticking point in the negotiation process as pro-GM groups sought to eliminate liability from the agreement. However, ‘no liability, no protocol’

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was a hardline position adopted by developing nations with the support of most other countries (Cook, 2002). In addition, the Protocol is consistent with the Convention on Biological Diversity and adopting the precautionary Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration which states ‘that where there is threat of significant reduction or loss of biological diversity, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to avoid or minimize such a threat’. As Graff (2002) points out, such precautionary principles in international environmental law are rare. Therefore the Cartagena Protocol (notably Articles 1, 10 and 11) encourage parties to incorporate precautionary measures into their national framework. In doing so, it grants a right to take precaution based on national or internal risk assessments. A lack of scientific evidence confirming ‘potential adverse effects’ cannot be asserted to force any country to accept GMOs. The Cartagena Protocol permits all parties to self-determine their acceptance or rejection of GMOs based on their own mechanisms of risk assessment. This principal creates tensions with notions of free trade and international trade law. The US-led case in the WTO against the EU’s so-called moratorium on GM food has been premised on the assumption that anti-GMO stances based on unscientific and inconclusive evidence constitute illegal trade barriers (see Falkner, 2004). The 2009 report of the compliance committee of the Cartagena Protocol of Biosafety identified that gathering national information from signatories has proven difficult. The Protocol requires signatories to meet certain ‘reporting’ requirements to ensure that the terms and conditions of the Protocol are implemented. There is still much work to be done in this regard. As the Committee concluded, ‘lack of legal and administrative regulations for biosafety of having no or little activity related to biosafety could hold back some Parties from fulfilling their reporting obligations’ (Convention of Biosafety, 2009b:4). In addition, the Compliance Committee received information from an NGO alleging that one country had violated the conditions of the Protocol. The Committee met in private to discuss the submission and debated whether or not it should even receive the report, let alone act on it. As such, the Compliance Committee’s role is more about gathering information and assisting nation-states to implement the Protocol rather than enforcing its contents. The Cartagena Protocol has been strengthened with the ratification of the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture that officially became law on 29 June 2004. This agreement has been reached in harmony with the Convention on Biological Diversity and has two distinct objectives. The first is the ‘conservation and sustainable use of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture’ and the second is the ‘fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of their use’ (Article 1). As a result, the treaty aims to address acts of bio-piracy and bio-prospecting. The commercial use of genetic resources must result in equitable sharing

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(information-exchange, access to technology, capacity building and financial payments) to the country of genetic origin (Article 13). Moreover, the treaty identifies the important role of farmers and indigenous knowledge in the preservation of genetic resources and establishes a set of ‘farmers’ rights’ that includes the ‘right to equitably participate in sharing benefits arising from the utilisation of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture’ and ‘the right to participate in making decisions, at the national level, on matters related to the conservation and sustainable use of plant genetic resources’ (Article 9). This legal framework aims to safeguard against genetic exploitation, notably the plunder of developing countries by international corporations that remains widespread (see Simwanda and Mwila, 2004). European Union legislative framework Both international and national regulation of GM food relies upon three key principles: the precautionary principle, the preventative principle and the polluter pay principle. The above principles have been acknowledged by European Community (EC) legislation and integrated into member state legal frameworks. Since the early 1990s EC law, notably in the form of the Contained Use Directive (92/219/EEC) and the Deliberative Release Directive (90/220/EEC), has provided the regulatory leadership on the production, handling and release of GMOs (Walters, 2007). In 2001, the Deliberative Release Directive was amended to include stricter controls over scientific consultations and compulsory monitoring of environmental impacts (Thornton and Beckwith, 2004). Moreover, EC law regulates the marketing of GMOs where all manufacturers and importers of GM food products must submit notifications with risk assessments to the receiving countries’ authorities and enter into a ‘consent agreement’ that stipulates the uses and prohibitions of the designated foodstuff. In addition, labelling and traceability laws have been passed by the EC that require all GM products and their derivatives to be labelled and for the origin of all stages of the product handling to be clearly traceable. That said, the GM Food and Feed Regulation (EC 1829/2003) requires food containing GMOs to be labelled; however, dairy and yoghurts produced with GM enzymes do not require labelling nor do meats and dairy products produced from animals fed on GM grain (Food Standards Agency, 2006). Individual member states of the EC are not required or expected to transpose or replicate regulations into national legal frameworks – such regulations, once they come into force, immediately constitute law within member states. On the one hand, directives are not binding but are designed to ‘promote harmonization’, a common spirit or purpose regarding specific environmental issues that should be integrated into national law. Most European countries have adopted various forms of biosafety legislation that include regulatory mechanisms for genetically modified foods.

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That said, it is clear that trade remains central to the actions of the EC and to member states. The European Court of Justice ruling in the case of Procureur du Roi v Dassonville highlights the importance of promoting trade and sets standards for trade restriction. The widely quoted Dassonville formula serves to preserve and stress that community beneficial trade is the cornerstone of the EU. This formula identifies: [a]ll rules enacted by Member States which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade are to be considered as measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions. (Case 8/74 Procureur du Roi v Dassonville [1974] ECR 837) Should EC member states wish to introduce environmental measures then such national laws must reflect the priorities of trade. Therefore, coexistence between free trade and environmentalism is a complex issue. The EU was premised on an economic foundation. Its development has been underpinned by economic imperatives that are frequently at odds with environmental protection. The challenges that face the EC are to integrate environmental concerns into a model that has continually prioritised trade and economic prosperity for five decades. Harmonising environmental legislation across culturally and economically diverse nations within an historical context that prioritises trade and economic stability is a demanding and challenging enterprise. The integration of EC environmental law currently remains insufficient and in many instances inadequate. Yet the tensions of environmental protection within trade law are not an EU specific problem but a global one where the priorities of the free market are emphasised. It is true that at an international level, trade agreements continue to insert clauses that acknowledge the need to protect the environment in what is commonly referred to as ‘greening the GATT’. While parties to environmental agreements may seek trade restrictions where the trade is deemed to harm human, animal or plant health or threatens the existence of a natural resource, ‘there is no internationally agreed set of principles to deal with the potential difficulties caused by the overlap between the GATT rules and the trade provisions of environmental provisions’ (Thornton and Beckworth, 2004: 40). Indeed, the imperatives of trade law have always usurped the contents of environmental agreements. For example the widely cited Tuna Dolphin case brought by the European Union against the United States in 1994 demonstrates this point. The United States placed a ban on all imported tuna known to be caught with nets detrimental to dolphins and other marine life. The WTO ruled that even though the method of fishing was a breach of international environmental law, the US embargo was in violation of the GATT and was, therefore, illegal. Interestingly the WTO stated that if exporting countries agreed with the US imposed trade

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sanctions then the embargo would have been lawful. Similar cases have been heard by WTO (see Shaffer, 1998 and the Shrimp Turtle case) where trade restrictions imposed by one country on another for environmental reasons have been found to be unlawful under trade law. For the EU, its GMO regulations emphasise ‘expert-led’ risk assessments for the authorisation of licenses. Holder and Lee (2007: 209) argue that existing EU GM food laws provide central guidance for member states with, as yet, unknown results. They conclude: ‘agricultural biotechnology has been an extraordinarily fraught issue for the EU, and there are as yet no guarantees as to the stability of the regulatory regime’. UK GM food law Thornton and Beckwith (2004: 422) describe Britain’s regulatory regime for GMOs ‘as the tightest in the world’. This comment has merit when compared to the United States where public opinion supporting labeling GM food, and National Academy of Science concerns for human health and environmental safety, have been sidelined in favour of a biotech industry led regulatory system based on voluntary partnership and not monitoring and enforcement (Montague, 2000). Regulations in the UK have also been subjected to numerous stinging criticisms. As the opening quotation to this book identified, industry controls the regulatory regime in Britain and biotech lobby groups have been widely reported to influence the corridors of Whitehall (Monbiot, 2000; Rees, 2006). For example, British law does not require products with GM ingredients below 0.9 per cent for approved GM varieties and 0.5 per cent for unapproved GM to be labeled. As a result, there are numerous varieties of food in UK supermarkets that will be unlabelled as derivates of GM products or considered ‘GM free’, an issue that has drawn widespread criticism (Soil Association, 2007; Smith, 2004). Academic commentators have also criticised the UK GM food regulatory regimes for focusing too much on the ‘means’ or techniques of genetic modification and not on the ‘ends’ or outcomes; that regulatory authorities and government advisory bodies are too closely aligned with the biotechnology industry; that clear guidelines do not exist stipulating distances between GM and non-GM crops; that precaution is half hearted and regulation fragmented (Hughes et al., 2002). Under the Blair years, Britain was clearly pro-GM. The UK opposed both France and Greece’s efforts to introduce an EU GM moratorium during 1999 and was actively against the labelling of food products with GM derivative (Monbiot, 2000). Former Environment Minister Michael Meacher was increasingly attacked by biotech representatives for his resistance and caution to GM crops (Colin and Elliot, 2003). Senior scientific figures with the New Labour Government have continually promoted GM food. For example, the Chief Scientific Officer in Scotland,

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Professor Anne Glover, who is a strong advocate of GM food, has been referred to as a ‘business-savvy genetic engineer’. She angered environmentalists with her reported suggestion that GM food is better for the environment and an answer to world poverty and hunger (Edwards, 2006). Within government there have been documents critical of the existing regulatory regimes for GMOs. Take for example, the 2003 cost-benefit analyses conducted by the Cabinet Office’s Strategy Unit. This report emphasised the eminence of economics in UK environmental policies, and suggested that present and future regulatory regimes would tend to adapt to a range of unexpected events brought about by international markers and innovations in science (Cabinet Office, 2003). This thoughtful report was forwarded to Defra for dissemination and rollout – yet it has barely seen the light of day and the challenges it alludes to for future agricultural and environmental impacts and regulations are virtually ignored. Instead, we have the softer and ‘do-able’ sections ‘cherry-picked’ and utilised by government for contemporary practice. In setting out its regulatory stall, Defra has been openly critical of the EU ban on GM foods and has emphasised that a ‘one size fits all’ approach is unsatisfactory. In its place Defra has proposed a regulatory approach that treats GM crops as separate and distinct issues; concluding ‘The results of the Farm-Scale Evaluations demonstrate very clearly that each crop is different, and must be considered on its own merits (Defra, 2004:13). The European Union Directives noted above have been integrated into UK law in the form of the Genetically Modified Organisms (Contained Use) (Amendment) Regulations 2002, and the Genetically Modified Organisms (Contained Use) (Amendment) Regulations 2005. There are several bodies associated with regulations of GMOs in Britain including Defra, FSA, Heath and Safety Executive, Environment Agency, Scottish Environment Protection Agency as well as local authorities. Health and safety executive The three main bodies are Defra (for the deliberate release and marketing of GMOs), FSA (GM food safety) and HSC (GMO contained use). Defra (2009d) summarises the regulation of GMOs in Britain as follows: The legislation adopts a step-by-step approach to the assessment of GMOs. This means that initial developments are carried out in containment and only released into the environment if they are assessed to be sufficiently safe. The initial releases outside containment are small, and carefully controlled and precautionary measures can be applied to prevent or minimise the spread of genetically modified DNA. The scale of the releases is increased gradually and tested at each level. The tests at each stage indicate whether the next step can be taken.

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All GMOs are first kept in a contained environment. The Health Safety Executive defines contained use as: … where control measures are used to limit contact between GMOs and humans and the environment so as to provide a high level of safety. In practice, this involves work in laboratories, animal houses, plant growth facilities (including growth rooms in buildings and suitable glasshouses) and large-scale production facilities on industrial sites. (HSE, 2009) The majority of genes that are manipulated in the UK are ‘crippled’ whilst in the laboratory to prevent their growth outside the contained environment. However, as the HSC notes ‘only a small number of activities involve GMOs that are not disabled and still capable of growth outside of the laboratory’ (HSC, 2009a). The Genetically Modified Organisms (Contained Use) Regulations 2000 requires the HSC to place on the public register all applications that have been assessed for contained use; however, ‘a limited number of activities have been removed in the interest of national security and some information may be excluded from individual notifications under the exemptions of the Environmental Information Regulations 2004’ (HSC, 2009b). The Public Register contains almost 8000 pages of data and includes details on applications for the contained used of GMOs for medicine, science, food and all other areas of research and experimentation. All applications are subjected to a risk assessment, and the HSC seeks the expertise of an independent panel of experts (Scientific Advisory Committee on Genetic Modification Contained Use) for advice on all human and environmental risk matters related to contained use of GMOs. This 15-person panel is represented by a range of eminent scientists across various fields working, in the main, at universities or hospitals. The extent to which SACGM is pro or anti GMOs is difficult to determine. It is clear that the panel members have devoted their careers or have a keen interest in the furtherance of genetic scientific research. Appointment to the panel requires all members to declare interests; however, ‘share holdings need only be declared if they exceed £25,000’ (HSE, 2009c) which may give rise to significant ‘undeclared’ interests.2 The HSE, which has regulatory jurisdiction for GMO contained use across the UK processes and monitors three types of applications. CU1 – A notification of intention to use premises for genetic medication. This requires the applicant to provide details of the facilities proposed for GMO contained use, including the ethics and safety protocols on location; CU2 – A notification of intention to conduct activities within a contained use involving GMOs;

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CU-3 Regulation 21 of the Genetically Modified Organisms (Contained Use) Regulations 2000 requires that all applicants with permission for the contained use of GMOs notify the HSE when accidents occur (HSE, 2009d). The only prosecution during the ten-year period under review was conducted on 23 July 2001. Imperial College London was ordered to pay £46,000 at Blackfriars Crown Court after pleading guilty to HSE charges of unsafe practices involving a GM virus. Dr Simon Warne, HSE specialist inspector stated: [t]his case related to a situation where one of the country’s most important medical research facilities failed to fully implement the safety measures that were agreed with HSE following the notification of its plans for a potentially hazardous genetic modification project. This was a matter which could not be taken lightly, and although it was not believed that anyone was harmed or that any GMOs were released from the laboratory, it was felt that prosecution was appropriate. It is hoped that this prosecution will be a reminder to all those involved in genetics research that lapses from the highest standards will not be tolerated. (Tsavalos, 2006)

Defra As mentioned above, Defra regulates all deliberate release and marketing of GMOs which it describes as having two clear objectives:  To protect human health and the environment; and  To ensure consumer choice. (Defra, 2009e) Decisions about safety for release rest with Defra which is advised on such matters by the Advisory Committee on Releases to the Environment (ACRE). ACRE is a statutory body that advises government on GMO risk and grants approval or ‘consents’ for the use and introduction of genetically modified organisms into the UK. More specifically, its function is to give advice ‘on the risks to human health and the environment from the release and marketing of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) … advise on the release of certain non-GM species of plants and animals that are not native to Great Britain’ (ACRE, 2008: 1). As a regulatory body it is has been widely criticised for having members closely associated with the biotech industry (including financial remunerations) and for carte blanche green lights on all applications for GM crop experimental planting (Rees, 2006: 41; Monbiot, 2000).3

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Its March 2009 annual report identifies that since 1993 (when the Deliberative Release Directive came into force), ACRE had received a total of 229 applications for release; not a single application has been denied (although it should be noted that various conditions of reporting and follow-up are usually attached to consent to release). In addition, ACRE will often request further information when it considers an applicant has submitted insufficient or inconclusive findings. Interestingly, and in a similar fashion to the DHSS Working Party discussed in the historical section of this chapter, ACRE will defer to its members for sympathetic and favourable explanations not expressed in the evidence of the applicant (see ACRE, 2008: 14). Moreover, in an interview with the former Environment Secretary, Michael Meacher, he identified how ACRE was set up in the early 1990s as a hand-picked pro-GM body that has remained a powerful voice in favour of promoting GM food: This is a regulatory body approved and supported by the Government, with only one or two dissenting views … they are people who believe in GM, who have spent their lives working in it, and it is their future and by God they’re backing it. Such views are also supported by calls for the former ACRE chairperson, Professor Alan Gray, to resign after it was revealed that a consent form issued by ACRE had nothing but a date and Professor Gray’s name – issuing what was arguably a blank check. Eminent expert Dr Stephen Kerstin from theSchoolofVeterinarySciencesatthedescribed how research undertaken in support of an application before ACRE was unacceptable; however, approval was granted: [i]t’s rubbish. There are fundamental flaws in the study which they should have spotted. Is this a clean way of operating? No. What are they trying to achieve? Are they trying to rubber-stamp it or are they trying to get to the bottom of it? (Edwards, 2002) Decisions to release GMOs into the UK environment are taken by Defra in consultation with HSE and Food Standards Agency (discussed below). The applications and consents for release granted by the Secretary of State under sections 111 and 112 of the Environment Protection Act 1990 and Genetically Modified Organisms (Deliberate Release) Regulations 2002 are published on Defra’s website (Defra, 2009f). Follow up inspections on sites granted consents are undertaken by Defra inspectors.4 In the years 2001–9, a total of 628 inspections were undertaken. Under the terms and conditions of release, Defra enforce a policy of inspecting only 50 per cent of deliberate release sites to ensure compliance of consent orders (Sherlock, 2006 and 2010).

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Data released under Freedom of Information identifies that a total of 34 ‘incidents’ were reported during 2001–9, that is, sites were observed to be in breach of their consent orders. The majority of the incidents involved GM crops still growing in areas that should have been cleared or the appearance of weeds or other plants, some contaminated by GM crops, others not; all should have been cleared from the designated release area. The actions taken by the GM Inspectorate varied from ‘no action’, to warning letters or telephone calls, to increased monitoring or to actions to clear-up or uproot sites of foreign plants. The appearance of flowering GM crops, in breach of consent orders, is notably disturbing as the issue of genetic contamination to neighbouring fields is probable. Again, the plants were ordered to be destroyed. The actions taken by the GM Inspectorate indicate a partnership model that aids consent holders to comply with the condition of their deliberate release order; it is not a punitive regulatory model. In 2008–9, the GM Inspectorate conducted 15 site visits across the UK and was satisfied that all conditions of GMO release permits were complied with. The GM Inspectorate also responded to public complaints about possible GM food being sold and consumed in the UK – what is referred to as ‘unauthorised GMO releases’. The Inspectorate confirmed that genetically modified fish, yellow red zebra danios, was being sold in the UK. It stated: … our investigations indicated that the retailer had been supplied with the fish inadvertently. Investigations higher up the supply chain yielded little concrete information and it was not possible to establish contact with the supplier in the Far East. A written warning was issued to the retailer and the importer of the fish. (GM Inspectorate, 2009: 10) In some instances Defra was unable to provide inspection reports claiming they were not available. Many sites were inspected prior to commencement of activities, which unsurprisingly resulted in no identifiable breaches of permits. In most instances sites were visited on only one occasion, and surprisingly Defra had ‘no reports of post-trial monitoring from HSE’ (Sherlock, 2010: 2). It is here that one might expect to see the consequences of any permit breaches, yet no information is held by Defra to confirm or deny the impact on the environment once trial is completed. Clearly Defra’s inspection procedures are fraught with inadequacies. Defra claims that the inspection has improved stating: In the past clinical trial application were not inspected as comprehensively as crop trial but in our current agreement with HSE we have specified that there should be one inspection prior to a trial starting and one during the trial. If a major issue is identified then additional visits might be required. (Sherlock, 2010: 2)

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Again, pre-trial inspections are unlikely to detect irregularities or wrongdoing, and the identification of a ‘major issue’, which is undefined, suggests that very few if any additional inspections are undertaken. As a result, ‘no incidents arising from field inspections have occurred since 2002/3 that have warranted referral to Defra Legal’ (Sherlock, 2010: 9, emphasis added). FSA ACRE and Defra are also influenced by the FSA which is responsible for regulating GM food safety for human consumption. As mentioned earlier, the FSA ‘is an independent Government department set up by an Act of Parliament in 2000 to protect the public’s health and consumer interests in relation to food’ (FSA, 2008a). Yet its ‘independence’ has been widely challenged. Its former chief executive was Sir John Krebs, an advocate of GM food who received national headlines when he attacked organic foods (Lean, 2002).5 All GM foods marketed in the European Union must be assessed by the European Food Standards Agency to ensure that there is no risk to human health, that consumers are not misled and that nutritional value is enhanced. When carrying out its evaluations it ‘may consult the authority responsible for food safety assessment in one of the EU Member States. In the UK this is the FSA, which seeks expert advice on GM foods from the independent Advisory Committee on Novel Foods and Processes (ACNFP) as appropriate (FSA, 2008b). No such consultations have been made with the FSA in the UK. The FSA conducts investigations into breaches of food safety legislation. For example, during the years 2000–5, the FSA conducted 412 investigations across 305 locations in the UK and determined that 920 separate contraventions of food safety laws had occurred. A total of 74 contraventions or eight per cent of all investigations resulted in prosecution. The reasons for not prosecuting included: i) insufficient evidence to take to court; ii) the closure of the premises in question or the liquidation of the company operating the plant; iii) unavailability of witnesses to attend trial; and iv) not in the public interest as the commencement of the investigation had resulted in the necessary compliance being achieved. (FSA, 2005) Again, the above reasons convey a model based on ensuring and assisting compliance rather than deterring non-compliance. Such reasons as the unavailability of witnesses, the closure of the premises and the achievement of subsequent compliance are not issues that would routinely deter criminal trials; they are examples of an organisation that either does not have the necessary

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capacity in order to pursue prosecution, or its modus operandi emphasises food safety within a model of industry tolerance and compliance partnership. The above inspections and prosecutions relate to food safety generally across the UK and are not specific to GM food. Indeed, none of the above statistics relate to GM food. When requests were made of the FSA to provide the details for all GM food law violations and the details of all GM breaches in accordance with EU directive, the FSA replied: FSA does not enforce breaches of GM food law. Local authorities are the enforcement bodies … FSA does organize and finance food surveys during the course of which breaches of legislation may be identified, but it would be for the relevant local authority to take enforcement action. (Johnson, 2005) More recently, the following questions were put to the FSA under FOI: 1.

Between 2000–2009, on how many occasions has the FSA conducted surveys/investigations to ensure that foodstuffs available to the British public are below the 1% threshold for GM foods? 2. Between 2000–2009, how many times has the FSA investigated the accuracy of labelling of GM food products in the UK? 3. How does the FSA ensure that local authorities are enforcing breaches of GM food law? 4. What role does the FSA play in the oversight of local authorities and GMO’s?

‘The FSA does not hold any information specifically in relation to the four parts of your Request’ (Lawrie, 2010). The FSA subsequently identified these as delegated responsibilities to local authorities. A responsibility that the FSA ensures is carried out by monitoring of local councils. This is quite striking. For an organisation charged with the responsibility of ensuring that foods in the UK available for human consumption are safe and healthy, this body devolves regulatory functions to local authorities. It relies on GM food assessments from the EFSA (which does not consult with its British counterpart), as well as the advice of ACNFP, which has also been widely condemned for being pro-GM. Does the FSA monitor and regulate the operations of local authorities – no. When officially asked how the FSA ensures that local authorities are enforcing breaches of GM food law, the FSA indicated that it ‘carries out audits of Local Authorities to monitor how they are enforcing food law’ (Lawrie, 2010). However, this has only occurred once in the last ten years. In 2003, the FSA invited the Local Authorities Co-ordinators of Regulatory Services (LACORS) to test 91 samples of foodstuffs for the presence of GM. ‘[Eight] contained traces of GM below the 1% threshold, three of which were labeled “GM free”’ (FSA, 2003). This

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exercise constituted the only occasion that the FSA has actively sought to check GM labeling. As mentioned above, it does not fund food surveys that may expose legislative breaches and does not exercise an enforcement role; yet it’s only investigatory exercise uncovers that almost eight per cent of a small sample of food items available to UK consumers contained GMOs (some whilst represented as ‘GM Free’). Indeed it must be questioned to what extent this organisation is championing food safety on behalf of the British public. Which agency is randomly testing food products on our supermarket shelves for GMO contents – no one is.6 Which agency is randomly assessing all food labels to ensure that the contents are GM free – no agency. How can the existing regulatory regimes in the UK ensure we are eating GM free food – it cannot. Does the existing regulatory regime ensure that only those GM foods cleared by the appropriate assessment body are consumed by the British public – no.

Concluding comment Law as a mechanism for protecting the environment falls short when free trade is jeopardised or compromised. In its place, notions of regulation and mutual agreement emerge between trading nations where environmental protection becomes a negotiated concept. In other words, the limits of trade are boundless; however, environmental protection occurs within the parameters of trade relations. When trade is restricted in the interests of protecting the environment, it is done not because the law determines so, but because trading partners agree so. Trade and economic buoyancy are viewed by nations around the world as the cornerstones of stable and productive societies. Such trade often comes with environmental consequences, and our individual actions both perpetuate the imperatives of trade and cause environmental damage. The regulation of GMOs in the UK reveals a pro-trade and pro-science story. It is a story where governments and regulatory authorities have willed and wanted GMOs to be both accepted and successful. The international concerns involving GMOs in the 1970s that resulted in the UK’s Ashby Committee demonstrate how critical voices were sidelined within a pro-GM orchestrated government working party that sought to rubber stamp GMO approval. The ‘official’ status of this committee served to cover-up, downplay or ignore concerns about GMOs, while recommending a regulatory regime with sympathetic scientific and biotechnology oversight. Within the Blair years, and beyond, the regulation of GM food has been strongly influenced by pro-biotechnology scientists within a model that emphasises industry partnership and tolerance. The combination of a powerful and unfailing ‘belief ’ in evidence-led policy, in this case biotech science, with a faith in free-trade, and ‘all things US’ have conspired to produce an enabling system of regulation that promises to see GM food flourish in the UK in years to come.

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Notes 1 The following analysis is based on research carried out in the National Archive in Kew Gardens, London over a four-week period during 2005. It includes a synthesis of 2,000 pages of documentation made publicly available after 30 years of government suppression. I attended the archive on the morning the documents were available to the public and began the process of reading through official government paperwork untouched for three decades. 2 In 2003 a feature newspaper article based on leaked government documents reported that almost three-quarters of all personnel on scientific advisory panels to ministers concerned with food safety had commercial links and interests with biotech companies and pro-GM industries (Barnett and Townsend, 2003). 3 As mentioned earlier in this chapter, GMO advisory bodies to government have been criticised and compromised for having members with close links to the biotech industry. Consider, for example, the Advisory Committee on Novel Foods and Processes (ACNFP) which advises government on the safety of GM foods for human consumption. It has been reported that much of its expertise is unpublished corporate generated documentation that is supportive of GM food (Smith, 2004). 4 In 2007 there were five inspectors appointed by the Secretary of State (Sherlock, 2007). 5 Repeated attempts to interview members of the FSA for this book were unsuccessful. Indeed, I experienced stony silences and curt rejections when requesting a meeting to discuss the FSA’s work – see appendix. 6 In February 2010, a random selection of local and port health authorities were contacted in England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. Personnel from the relevant Food Safety or Environmental Health Services offered information of the testing and labelling of GM food. It is apparent that sporadic testing took place ‘when GM food was an issue’ back in 2002 and 2003; but for now it is not a priority. Local authorities conduct a range of food inspections but are not adequately resourced to carry out or fund the expensive tests required to determine whether products are above the one per cent threshold. It would appear that tests are only pursued by local authorities when alerted to do so – such alerts are usually provided by the FSA.

Chapter 6

Green criminology Power, harm and (in)justice

Introduction Thus far, this book has integrated diverse narratives in law, political economy, environmental studies and the sociology of harm to examine GM food within ‘eco crime’. From these traditions previous chapters have examined political decision-making, economic and technological change, and quality of life within notions of food security. In doing so, the discussions of science, agriculture, monopoly capitalism, hunger, politics, public opinion and regulation have served to illustrate the complex dynamics involving the development, production, distribution and consumption of GM food. Such dynamics give rise to, nurture and perpetuate what I call ‘eco crime’ (discussed in chapter one). To briefly recap, eco crime encapsulates breaches of law, but also acts of environmental harm. In doing so, it emphasises the plight of victims, those who experience injustice, that is acts committed by states and corporations in the pursuit of trade, power and profit that deprive individuals of the social, cultural and economic benefits of their environment. This approach broadly represents the growing field of green criminology – and it is within these emerging discourses that the discussions thus far have been located.

GM food and greening criminological discourse In his April 2005 lecture on ‘Nature at the cross-road: the bifurcation of nature and its end,’ for the Spinoza Chair in Philosophy at the University of Amsterdam, Bruno Latour attempted to link the social with the natural and commenced with a metaphor. He argues (2005: 5): [i]magine the following scene: you try and build a bridge over a rather tumultuous river. Let’s say that one bank of this river is the ‘social’ and the other, inaccessible separated by a violent current, by many eddies and dangerous rapids, is the ‘natural’. Suppose now that, instead of trying to cross this river and build this bridge, you decide instead to go

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with the flow, that is to get involved in a bit of canoeing, kayaking or drafting. Then the absence of the bridge is not such a problem. What counts is your ability to equip yourself with the right paraphernalia in order to go down the river without drowning yourself. For me, green criminology is standing on the banks of the river and attempting to connect the social with the natural; I intend to take Latour’s advice and enter the waters of the river and permit the current to take me with the flow. Green criminology1 remains an underdeveloped criminological narrative, yet its various perspectives aim to provide an interdisciplinary scholarship committed to the protection and conservation of environmental resources and the prevention of illegal and harmful acts that threaten or damage the natural environment. This is not surprising, and it should be remembered that environmentalism, environmental law and environmental sociology are also relatively recent movements and disciplines that continue to gather momentum and assert influence. Indeed, within the pure sciences, ecology is also a later comer to discourse about humans and the natural world (Dobson, 1990). Two key figures in the founding of green criminology (Bierne and South, 2007: xiii) argue that at its ‘most abstract level’ it includes ‘those harms against humanity, against the environment (including space) and against non-human animals committed by both powerful organisations (e.g. governments, transnational corporations, military apparatuses) and also by ordinary people’. However, the main focus to date which has generated the greatest amount of green criminological scholarship centres on acts of the ‘powerful’ in causing widespread and long-term environmental damage, and not acts of urban vandalism, graffiti and fly tipping. This focus is consistent with the origins of green criminology. When it was first coined by Michael Lynch in 1990 it was a term designed to harness green environmentalism and green political theories to examine ‘environmental destruction as an outcome of the structure of modern capitalist production and consumption patterns’ (p. 1). In this sense, green criminology has its theoretical roots embedded within the traditions of radical criminological schools of thought such as feminism, Marxism and social constructionism that arose as an opposition to dominate positivist ideologies arguing, among other things, that crime is to be found in relations of power, oppression and selective processes of criminalisation. Numerous studies have since emerged that explore various acts of environmental crime, green crime or eco crime (Simon, 2000; Lynch and Stretesky, 2001; Block, 2001; Schmidt, 2004). These articles and many others are reprinted in an excellent volume edited by Rob White. In this collection, White identifies that existing green criminology scholarship falls within three dimensions: those that attempt to conceptualise environmental crime, those that are devoted to exploring its various types or dimensions

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and those addressing environmental policing and law enforcement (White, 2009). There is no section devoted to theory. As White (2008: 15) argues, there is no one green criminology theory but rather a series of ‘perspectives’ or narratives that draw on various philosophical, sociological, legal and scientific traditions. He asserts that three ‘theoretical tendencies’ form the basis for the eclectic theoretical inquiry to green criminology, notably ‘environmental justice’, ‘ecological justice’ and ‘species justice’ (discussed further below). Power and Injustice As we shall discuss shortly, these tendencies or perspectives share some common features, including a critical narrative that examines the harm and injustice. For many criminological scholars the starting point is to investigate behaviours that break state defined laws; for others within the more left or critical persuasion, it is to challenge existing notions of social order, criminalisation and justice. In the spirit of Paul Gilroy’s There Ain’t No Black in the Union Jack and Jeff Reiman’s The Rich Get Richer and the Poor Get Prison, this project commenced by questioning issues of injustice, powerlessness and discrimination.2 In a critique of Plato’s dikaiosune, John Rawls’ famous A Theory of Justice argues that individual virtues of justice are to be nurtured and engendered in the ‘social’, more particularly the ‘basic structure’ or the justice of institutions. Through this analysis, injustice is represented more broadly than state processes that grant and uphold individual rights; certain pervasive principles are imbued within a model that advocates social cohesion through institutional power. Notwithstanding the lengthy body of scholarship that has subsequently wrestled with, challenged and debunked Rawlsian thought, notions of injustice brought about by state, corporate and institutional bias, discrimination and aggression provide useful pathways for exploring social pain and suffering. Current and future debates about GM food must encounter and engage with discourses of injustice. Not as an ‘add-on’ to the priorities of trade and scientific progress, but a central focus in exploring future GM food horizons. Such analyses emphasis the green criminological approach presented by Piers Bierne and Nigel South. Following their first ever edited journal edition on green criminology in Theoretical Criminology in 1998, Piers Beirne and Nigel South published the first-ever edited book on green criminology. They identify that green criminology intersects diverse narratives in exploring the harms that people, state and corporations commit in the business of their everyday activities. As a result, green criminology, they argue, includes: harms, but are not limited to, exploitation, modes of discrimination and disempowerment, degradation, abuse, exclusion, pain, injury, loss and

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suffering. Straddling and intersecting these many forms of harm are key concepts for a green criminology such as gender inequalities, racism, dominionism and speciesism, classism, the north/south divide, the accountability of science, and the ethics of global capitalist expansion. (2007: iv) An ability to engage with, and straddle, the various forms identified above requires analyses of politics and power. The preceding chapters identify how various forms of ‘power’ are mobilised. Biotech companies and pro-GM food governments have exerted ‘coercive power’ or ‘power over’ farmers, food aid organisations, nations exercising the precautionary principle and consumers. The aggressive and controlling seed contracts utilised by the biotech industry; the government threats and condemnations of anti-GM stances; the use of the WTO to enforce trade laws; the monopolisation of agriculture; and the industry-led regulatory arrangements all within a context of little or no regard for environmental and cultural aspects of local economies serves to demonstrate what Bachrach and Baratz (1970: 43) referred to as the ‘mobilisation of bias’. They describe this as a set of predominant values, beliefs, rituals and institutional procedures (‘rules of the games’) that operate systematically and consistently to the benefit of certain persons and groups at the expense of others. Those who benefit are placed in a preferred position to defend and promote their vested interests. More often than not, the ‘status quo defenders’ are a minority or elite group within the population in question’. This is a form of coercion where science (often funded or sympathetic to biotechnology) has been used as a means of influence to assert authority. On the one hand, this form of power has been overt, deliberate and quite ruthless – the exploitation of US patent law and testimonies of farmers forced into bankruptcy; the aggressive law suits; the PR spin; and the intimidation of poorer nations to accepts GM food have occurred within a bold and unrepentant biotech power. As one representative of a large biotech company informed me during an interview: ‘I don’t know why people think we are some philanthropic organization that aims to save the world, yes we do a lot of good but we are a business and we are part of a very competitive industry that requires a determined and committed ambition to achieve our objectives’. These ‘objectives’ are the accumulation of profits, increased returns to investors and larger shares of the market. The ‘determined’ and ‘committed ambition’ is expressed through a belligerent, forceful and uncompromising endeavour to ensure the maintenance of corporate trade monopolies. This constitutes what Lukes (2005: 21) refers to as ‘the securing of compliance through the threat of sanction’. At another level, biotech companies exercise a form of ‘influential power’. Rather than exerting force, networks of position are used to manipulate pressure and sway specific events for desired outcomes. Monsanto’s bribing

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of political officials, corrupting science, contaminating and cajoling regulatory regimes, setting political priorities and agendas, flexing diplomatic and market muscle, and petitioning religious leaders are brought about by having the resources, and strategic position to influence and shape decisionmaking. Unlike coercive power which ultimately denies the disempowered party access to intended wants, needs and outcomes; influential power often operates in partnership with the subject or object of influence. For example, a government official receives a bribe or financial reward while Monsanto obtains agricultural contracts. Finally, the GM giants are engaged in what Parmer and Cox (2010) refer to as ‘soft power’. A form of ambassadorial power based on persuasion, charm and diplomacy. The biotech industries have used this approach effectively to curry favour with farmers, governments and foreign markets. Here the promises of increased yields, profits, health benefits, and solutions to food insecurity are presented through environmental friendly images and language. The advertising and promotion slogans of the biotech industry capture international rhetoric in environmentalism to create green images of corporate innovation. Monsanto for example uses picturesque pastures and landscape to describe their products and purpose ‘ … We help farmers grow yields sustainably so they can be successful, produce healthier foods, better animal feeds and more fiber, while also reducing agriculture’s impact on our environment’ (Monsanto, 2010). This tactic fulfils dual objectives. It provides a subtle and sophisticated rebuttal to public uncertainty and resistance. As discussed in chapter three, ‘power from below’ in the form of public opinion and consumer action has proven potent as an opposition to GM food. Consumer power carries significant weight with large retail entrepreneurs such as supermarkets. Whilst governments go to the electorate every four years, supermarkets must account for themselves on a daily basis. The European rejection of GM foods has resulted in large supermarkets adopting a cautious GM stance. The biotech industry combines its heavy-handed approach to resistance with an image that seeks to embrace all things good in an attempt to persuade public confidence. This greenwashing of biotech activities, including the funding of conservation initiatives, also acts to neutralise criticism in a way akin to Cohen’s theory of denial (Cohen, 2001). Here the biotech industry refutes or denies claims that its operations are anything but a well intended, scientifically based and progressive industry meeting world food needs whilst ensuring farmer, consumer and environmental well-being. This soft power approach is what Tombs and Whyte (2009: 156) refer to as ‘covert power’, notably in shaping non-conflict ‘compliance’ based regulatory regimes. For them, it is a power that ‘works through the more general shaping of peoples’ perception … it works most effectively where it does not seem to be present at all’. The persuasive powers of the biotech industry are rendered almost invisible through its entrepreneurial enterprises across food, energy, pharmaceuticals,

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animal feed and growth products. On the surface, these initiatives are responding to and leading on, world crises (food security; energy poverty; health; shortages in animal food grain to sustain the world’s growing meat diet). Power is almost not at play because such ventures are embraced as necessary responses to pressing global needs. The good corporate citizen is, therefore, addressing what the world’s population wants and desires in a purportedly environmentally friendly way or providing what have been called ‘world benefits’ (Mackay, 2003). The elevation from the provision of goods and services to ‘world benefits’ or ‘world saviour’ places the biotech industry in a privileged position. Suddenly it becomes something of a trump card to solve social and economic ills, thereby ensuring its status in future government debates and policies about global social justice. In this sense, pro-GM governments and biotech companies are capable of exerting what Foucault (1976) referred to as ‘biopower’. Here the subjugation of bodies and populations is not focused on coercion, cruelty or control but on regulation via ‘the protection of life’. The promulgation and promotion of GM food as a ‘saviour’ to world food shortages, as a benefit to human health provides a ‘technology of power’ through which governing bodies can effectively introduce carte blanche measures. Here, the state and proponents of biotechnology are ‘saving lives’; as a result policies and practices become justifiable within a politics and ethics of human preservation and well-being. Moreover, Jasanoff (2006: 282–83) observes, this governing of human bodies through rational notions of self-preservation now includes nature as ‘biopower extends into all life on the planet, not only the lives of humans but also the natural worlds with which humans live in close symbiosis. Sick and failing plants, no less than sick and failing people, fall within the biopolitical imagination of the neoliberal state and its corporate partners’. For Jasanoff, biotechnology is akin to a form of contemporary empire building where the state and associated interests are at their most powerful and dangerous when presented as the ‘healing state’ (p. 283). The UK Government’s attempt to engage in public dialogues through the FSA discussed in chapter three is a form of biopolitics. Voices of resistance are heard and their participation serves an important function in their own governance. The consuming public are dealt with as a homogenous group; differing social and cultural food practices become subsumed within a mode of governance premised on healing, health and the provision of all things fundamental for human existence. As a result, biotech breaches of legislation, illegal planting and selling GM food products, soft regulations and enforcement, an unwillingness to enforce mandatory labelling legislation and provide details sourcing of all food products, the bankruptcy of farmers and the exploitation of developing countries are all justifiable and inevitable of a holistic approach that purportedly prioritises ‘feeding people’ whilst creating a more robust nature upon which to sustain future generations. Moreover, biotech power is witnessed through offering choice. The ability to

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regulate and indeed dominate market capital is found through offerings that prove to heal social and global problems. Game theory For the biotech industry, it offers a game theory of choice, a strategy that provides benefits or profits irrespective of the selection.3 Coleman (1999: 3) argues: Game Theory is a branch of mathematics devoted to the logic of decisionmaking in social interactions. It is applicable to any social interaction with the following properties: (a) there are two or more decision makers; called players; (b) each player has a choice of two or more ways of acting, called strategies, such that the outcome of the interaction depends on the strategy choices of all the players; (c) the players have well-defined preferences among the possible outcomes, so that numerical payoffs reflecting these presences can be assigned to all players for all outcomes. The ability to ‘sell’ GM food to a reluctant international consumer community has required corporate innovation, strategy and prediction. Not only consumers, but politicians, farmers, religious leaders and scientists are offered ‘appealing’ solutions to an array of pressing problems. Each biotech solution whether it is increased yields, new technologies and scientific innovations, answers to world hunger and poverty, pharmaceutical innovations, new fuels, or cheap and nutritious sustenance generates profitable returns. If one solution is not chosen, another provides a viable market and a resultant fiscal victory for commercial biotechnology. In addition, vociferous and active protagonists of biotechnology are systematically silenced, neutralised and criminalised through anti-progress and anti-humanitarian corporate agendas. For example, the opponents of GM technologies are cast as ‘ecoterrorists’, a term now officially adopted by the FBI to describe protestors that destroy crops (Walters, 2009b). This representation of the biotech company as victim and the protestor as terrorist was used to good effect during the Blair years in the UK to describe the exodus of biotechnology scientists from British shores in search of ‘safer’ and more sympathetic grounds to pursue their work. During 2003, biotech scientists successfully petitioned 10 Downing Street appealing to the Prime Minster’s belief in science and trade and Britain’s status as a world leader (Charter, 2003). In addition, alternative biotechnology innovations provide lucrative markets or ‘choice’ when biotech companies continue to return record profits, even

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during recent times of desperate recession. The rejection of GM food stimulated new debates and markets in biofuels and green energy. When criticism of biofuel was couched within discourses of ‘feeding humans and not cars’ the biotech companies offered new choices through growing GM grain to feed animals for increased meat consumption. All the while medicine and pharmacology provided a stable and publicly favourable choice embedded within politically palatable policies of healthcare and reducing third world disease. The ability to provide multidimensional choice within commercial sectors that represent the pillars of capitalist societies – food, agriculture, energy, transportation and human health – supplied the basis for several predictable outcomes. The rejection of one area on the grounds of risk or ethics served to enhance the take-up of another. The ongoing ‘greening’ of business has created a new landscape of rhetoric, public relations and political and public lobbying (Thomspon, 2009) where corporations can negate criticism while adopting profitable strategies focused on environmentalism and consumer choice. Green criminology should utilise analytical approaches through, for example, game theory to examine and understand the innovations in the mobilisation of state and corporate power. Of course, critical criminological discourses have drawn on and written about state and corporate power for some time (Poulantzas, 1978; Hall et al., 1978; Carson, 1982; Carlen 1983; Scraton, 2007; Sim, 2009, to mention just a few). Issues about GM food reveal how state and corporate power is mobilised in different ways (coercive, covert, soft) for diverse purposes (trade, scientific knowledge, risk, public opinion, regulation). As Coleman et al. (2009: 7) observe, analyses of ‘state power’ have been ‘airbrushed’ in recent times as new modes of governance reformulate and reconfigure political terrains. GM food provides a useful example of how ‘the state’ (in its various contemporary formations) must be brought back when examining notions of eco crime and corporate power. Harm Green criminology and discourses in eco crime continue to wrestle with notions of harm. Much criminological scholarship has been developed on harm and its links with physical, psychological and social violence (Hillyard et al., 2004), yet notions of environmental harm have been conspicuously absent. But what is environmental harm? The answer to this important question reflects a range of ideological positions regarding the relationship between humans and nature. For liberal ecologists, technologies and lifestyles that cause environmental damage should be managed and monitored but not eradicated (diZerega, 1996). This is a human centred position that accepts environmental harm in the interests of human progress; however, such harm should be minimised. The level of acceptable damage depends on scientific expertise linked to notions of ‘sustainability’. Within the GM

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debate, environmental harm is subject to risk assessments that include policies and practices aimed at reducing or managing activities that damage or destroy natural habitats. In this sense, environmental harm is seen as inevitable and unavoidable in the pursuit of greener and more efficient technologies, and in the interests of human progress. Deep ecology on the other hand argues for a more biocentric analysis of harm that includes human and non-human specifies. In doing so, it acknowledges the interconnectedness of food webs and human lifestyles with nature. The plight of animals is emphasised as an environmental harm. Protest groups and voices of opposition to GM food have highlighted threats and dangers to nonhuman species through genetic contaminations. Moreover, the degradation of air, water and soil quality through new genetic technologies for the pursuit of trade is upheld as a form of harm. For eco-Marxists, capitalism is the main source of environmental harm (Barry, 1999). More specifically, it is the accumulation of capital, beyond fundamental material human needs that constitutes unnecessary, and thus harmful, environmental damage. John Bellamy Foster provides an intriguing overview of Marx’s work on capitalist agriculture and social ecology arguing that developing bourgeois human societies were not only exploiting but conquering nature in pursuit of wealth and production. Here is it not only the control of nature for materialism that is emphasised but the hegemony or science (2000: 21–61). In a similar fashion to liberal ecology, notions of environmental harm are not represented or constructed by the lived experiences and voices of people but in the experiments and instruments of science. Connected to notions of eco-Marxism are social ecological approaches that define environmental harm in terms of political and economic power. Harms to the environment are those associated with an incessant desire for development, driven by individuals in positions of state and corporate power. As a result, environmental harm is disproportionately experienced by the poor and powerless (see Bookchin, 2004).4 Halsey (2004: 835) argues that green criminology has failed to move beyond ‘modernist conceptions of harm and reparation’ that focus on anthropocentric concepts and practices. Halsey offers what could be called a form of ‘post-structuralist green criminology’ that seeks to deconstruct modernist notions of nature involving a reflexive environmental discourse capable of transcending the polarised, politicised and reductionist discourses within anthropocentric and biocentric ecological discourses. Therefore Halsey’s work is a crucial theoretical development (see also Halsey, 2006) in understanding harm through a lens of environmental ethics. This approach examines the relationship between humans and the natural environment. It questions the moral and ethical bases upon which contemporary laws permit the exploitation of flora and fauna for human consumption and development and examines the conditions in which co-existence and inter-species cooperation can be achieved on an equitable level. Environmental ethics is

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underpinned by various approaches, including libertarian extension, ecoholism and conservation ethics (Taylor, 1986). The first pivots on the notions of biocentricism where non-human and even inanimate objects that form the natural environment have rights. In other words, there is no hierarchy of existence with human beings at the pinnacle of nature; all ‘things in existence’ share an equal status of importance. George Bernard Shaw, the famous Irish Nobel Laureate for Literature, once wrote in his 1925 Crude Criminology, when discussing vegetarianism, ‘while we ourselves are the living graves of murdered animals, how can we expect any ideal conditions on this earth’. Beirne and South (2007) identify that to prohibit or disregard non-human creatures with equal standing within the natural environment is an act of speciesism. Linked closely to this is the notion of ‘ecological extension’ or ‘eco-holism’ where the ‘ethical worth’ of human beings is considered no more significant in the long-term existence of all other creatures and matters that combine to form the natural environment. Yet, it is ‘conservation ethics’ that drives international policy and notions of environmental harm. In a similar fashion to liberal ecology, it focuses on preserving and developing the environment for the long-term benefit of human beings. It is often the principle that guides protocols that seek to reduce greenhouse emissions or preserve international parklands, that is, that failure to care and restore the environment will have dire consequences for human beings. The notion of harm is further explored through emerging perspectives of environmental, ecological and species justice.

Environmental and ecological justice As outlined above, analyses of power are necessarily linked to understandings of justice. Environmental justice is a human-centred or anthropocentric discourse with two dimensions. First, it assesses the equity of access and use of environmental resources across social and cultural divides. Who has access to the benefits and profits of natural resources and why? What factors prevent all people from equally sharing in the environment? For example, toxic dumping, chemical spills, industrial pollution, nuclear testing, illegal fishing and wildlife poaching and contamination of drinking water has adverse side-effects that do not victimise all people equally. It is indigenous people, ethnic minorities, the poor and often women who are most affected by such eco crimes. With GM food indigenous peoples have expressed concerns over the sovereignty of their lands and the protection of their biodiversity. The indigenous voice is often overlooked or subdued in debates about environmental development and exploitation. Whether logging and destruction of natural habitats, the pollution of soils and waterways or the extinction of plant and animal life to occur in the name of ‘capitalist progress’, indigenous lifestyles are threatened and compromised in acts that

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are tantamount to culturecide or ‘environmental genocide’ (see Brook, 1998; Foreman, 1998; Doornbos et al., 2000). Ecological justice focuses on the relationship or interaction between humans and the natural environment (White, 2008). When humans develop the environment for material needs (housing, agriculture, business, consumption) this approach insists that such actions be assessed within the context of damage or harm to other living things. This position is often referred to as an ‘ecocentric’ understanding of human and nature interaction. Some may criticise this position because it lacks ‘reality’ as political action will always be a human perspective. That is, the reality of harm, existence, development, progress and so on will always be defined and responded to by humans. Yet ecological justice, similar to deep ecology, argues that an environmentally centred perspective which upholds the importance of living creatures as well as inanimate and non-living objects (such as soil, rocks, water, air) provide useful insights for guiding future economic and developmental decisions. It asserts the intrinsic value and equal status of non-humans but explores the potential for sustainability while utilising environmental resources for fundamental human needs. As discussed in chapter four, Zambian farmers, whilst mindful of long-term food security, expressed significant concern about genetic contamination on wildlife. Actor network theory Green criminology may draw on and learn through actor-network theory (ANT), developed from the work of Callon (1991) and Latour (2005) through the social studies of science and technology. Callon and Latour perceive of a network in which both human and non-human actors assume identities. The often cited semiotic example of human and non-human actants is the driving of a motor vehicle which Latour argues does not occur in a technological or cultural vacuum. In other words, the mechanics of the motor car, combined with road conditions and traffic rules and prior experience combine or link to produce a social and technological network that creates the act of driving. This network approach to green criminology takes the criminological gaze beyond acts of criminal intent to the global dimensions that contribute to environmental harm. In this way, the deforestation of the Amazon rainforest, for example, is not simply the wilful action of a government to permit timber corporations to log ancient indigenous woodlands. It is much more complex than that (cf. Cochrane and Walters, 2008; Walters, 2009). The act of deforestation in the Amazon is a global phenomenon that involves the technologies and consumers of all inputs and outputs of rainforest logging. In other words, the felling of the Amazon tree occurs because of a network of participating factors or actants – from the lumberjack who controls the saw to the North American family that uses the chipwood to spread across their front garden – all

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combine and contribute to the act of deforestation which has widespread ecological consequences. ANT facilitates understandings of species justice, which is a non-human or biocentric discourse that emphasises the importance of non-human rights. It asserts that human beings are not the only creatures with rights, nor are humans superior beings. In other words, there is no hierarchy of existence with human beings at the pinnacle of nature; all ‘living things in existence’ share an equal status of importance. Within GM food debates, farmers, corporations, consumers, politicians and scientists form a complex web of networks each producing identities within realms of ‘food security’, ‘agriculture’, ‘food aid’, ‘trade’ and ‘the environment’. It is through these complex and highly politicised networks of power and profit that definitions of harm are reconstructed, manipulated and discarded. Yet examining the processes of interplay between actor and actants are necessary for understanding the ways in which GM food production and consumption is embroiled within political, economic and cultural morays that provide different meanings and definitions to concepts of justice and harm. Such analyses acknowledge that existence or survival and indeed evolution itself, is dependent upon one species consuming another. As White (2008: 17) identifies, an analysis from this perspective aids a critique of how rights are constructed. It allows us to question the bases from which rights are created and protected. The processes and networks that give rise to protections, freedoms and rights are often underpinned by human-centred knowledges of progress, sustainability and environmental development. This approach ensures challenging processes of criminalisation whereby green criminology is not only responding to official and scientific evidence about environmental damage and species decline but is also responding to, and engaging with, the emerging social movements and public opinions of resistance. In doing so, green criminology moves away from a sole reliance on science and government, and incorporates social and cultural meanings. That is, harm defined by ordinary citizens. It questions the moral and ethical bases upon which contemporary laws permit the exploitation of nature and examines the conditions in which co-existence and inter-species cooperation can be achieved. This globalising of the criminological lens permits the involvement of movements and organisations, discussed above, outside the state to contribute to emerging notions of environmental justice.

Towards a green justice The above notions of justice provide perspectives or theoretical parameters for underpinning policy and practice. How might such perspectives be mobilised in practice? This book has examined the shortcomings of national regulations and explored European and international legal developments in the production

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and trade of GM foods. The role of the ‘scientific citizen’ has also been examined within the politics and regulation of GM foods. The growing amount of international, European and domestic environmental law, and its impact on regulation and enforcement, were examined in chapter five. Here, the possibilities and beginnings of a ‘green justice’ are explored. This is by no means a polished or finished account of what notions of green justice may mean and how they may operate. It is an opening ambit, a way of thinking about how increasing scholarship, policy and practice involving crimes against the environment can be mobilised around processes of alternative and new forms of justice. It furthers the work of Kibert (2001) who has asserted that ‘green justice’ seeks to redress the discrimination of ethnic and socially-disadvantaged minorities who experience ‘environmental racism’ and the disproportionate effects of pollution and advanced capitalism. As a concept ‘green justice’ has been used by activists and left scholars to examine environmental injustice – the plight of the poor and powerless at the hands of affluent, industrial economies (Alier, 2000). Others have used the phrase to discuss environmental law and policy and the use of court processes (Hoban and Brooks, 1996) – this dimension is also explored. Therefore, the usage of green justice resonates in discourses of protest, resistance and anticapitalism, but also within legal debates about the role of law. What is briefly discussed here is related to this book’s central concern, namely GM food, rather than focused on broader issues of eco crime. Citizen and informal justice To commence is the concept of what I call ‘citizen justice’. It is a combination of Jacobs’ exegesis of ‘consumer sovereignty’ and the power of social movements and public resistance. For Jacobs consumer power that insists on ethical sources of goods and services is able to influence the market decisions of large corporations (Jacobs, 1991). The consuming citizen, through product and company boycotts, is able to exert a bottom-up pressure capable of altering corporate practice. Naturally, such forms of citizen participation rely on reputable resources that provide accurate information. Given that newspapers often provide this resource, corporations have responded with various ‘green washing’ campaigns that seek to mobilise positive publicity of a company’s social and environmental responsibility (Pearce, 2008). However, the consuming citizen is also informed by networks of resistance which also form an important part of citizen justice. The successful ways in which public resistance to environmentally damaging activities has been mobilised to influence state and corporate practice has been widely documented (Mehta, 2005). The illegal and harmful environmental acts of corporations involving pollution, toxic waste and chemicals have often been first identified and then pursued by movements of resistance seeking environmental and social justice (Foreman, 1998; Bullard, 2005). Chapter four identified how

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public and consumer resistance, notably across Europe, resulted in a ten-year quasi-moratorium of the production and sale of GM foods. Notwithstanding recent legal rulings requiring EU countries to accept GM foods, several countries maintain an opposition amidst a sustained public voice that has rejected the technology. More recently, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the Indian Government has suspended all plans to commercialise GM crops on the grounds of safety. This position has been overwhelmingly influenced by a mobilised and well networked resistance of farmers, consumers and local communities highlighting unscrupulous and harmful biotech actions (BBC, 2010). Whether through public protest, petitioning local authorities, boycotting consumer products and services, lobbying politicians or undertaking legal proceedings, ‘people power’ not only provides the first step in detecting harmful environmental acts but also a process through which a form of community justice and social change may be mediated. Naturally, justice can be mediated through various forms and guises. Speaking on the recent global recession and bank-induced financial crises, John Braithwaite notes how ‘criminologists join the assumption that strengthening regulation, conceived in the expanded-criminal-law powers paradigm, is the priority’ (2010: 439). As he rightly notes, the expansion of state powers and the widening of criminal justice enterprises has repeatedly been observed as ineffective in addressing the complexities of criminal behaviour. Braithwaite calls for various informal justice initiatives, including ‘bottom-up and top down’ approaches and those asserting restorative justice. The previous chapter identified weaknesses in regulatory regimes surrounding GM foods, and notwithstanding the proposed strengthening of the legal apparatus, Braithwaite’s arguments deserve careful attention. Identifying how restorative processes may have prevented the collapse of Enron (2010: 445) Braithwaite outlines how early and less formal interventions that examine ethics and corporate practice may spot and ‘weed-out’ the beginnings of unlawful and more harmful acts. Within the GM food debate, a model of inspection and monitoring that asserted restorative principles may provide a useful means of identifying underlying corporate and state actions that manifest into widespread national and international action of environmental harm. That said, it still requires a model capable of moving beyond existing notions of partnership that seek to aid the production of GM technologies rather than oversee malpractice. Missing from existing discourses about GM food is a language of ‘justice’. Governments and corporations rarely see victims and offences; instead claims for justice are made through the imperatives of trade. Through trade people will be fed, economies will be stimulated, agriculture will be sustained, etc. To implement a landscape of justice, whether formal or informal, requires a governance model that acknowledges and responds to illegal and harmful acts. Unless biotech companies are involved in serious criminal acts such as corruption, regulatory

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mechanisms will exist to facilitate trade through partnership. Before moving to informal processes of justice identified by Braithwaite, issues surrounding GM food require shifts in discourses to capture currently accepted acts within notions of harm or else to permit greater transparency and independent auditing in a spirit of compliance, where compliance has meaning and where non-compliance is viewed not as an administrative oversight but as an eco crime. Moreover, the research for this book detected how correspondence from regulatory authorities in the UK adopted ‘restorative justice’ language when describing their actions. The extent to which restorative justice can be hijacked and manipulated to serve as a pro-trade initiative remains concerning. Whatever forms a green justice should take; it should integrate informal methods of justice and citizen participation with more dynamic mechanisms of regulatory and criminal justice. Existing legal structures should be utilised to deal with acts that damage or destroy the environment. That said, only Australia, New Zealand and Sweden currently have specialised ‘environment courts’, and most of their business deals with planning and resource management laws. The following section briefly explores the ways in which the regulations of GM food at an international level may be administered through innovative court processes. Transnational justice Transnational justice continues to assert a central place within criminological discourse within the globalised landscapes of contemporary organised corporate and state crime (see Reichel, 2005; Walker, 2003). Therefore, international justice and transnational legal processes are emerging through protocols and inter-state agreements that seek to regulate and prevent illicit corporate activity within the complex webs of global markets (Likosky, 2002). Jamieson and McEvoy (2005: 505) argue that criminology’s engagement with transnational justice extends to ‘violations of human rights humanitarian law, crimes against humanity and the related developments in international criminal and transitional justice’. As a result, mechanisms of transnational justice must reflect the changing nature of the modern state within various forms of governance that include non-state and corporate actors. Such innovations in transnational justice must also occur with eco crimes that breach environmental legislation. As previously mentioned, environmental offences are often seen as administrative matters rather than crimes. That said, the enforcement of international environmental protocols and treaties for both EU and non-EU countries may take place in the International Court of Justice. However, the costs and procedures governing access to the ICJ create barriers to justice. With increasing concerns about climate change, ecological degradation, ozone depletion, food and water security and sustainable development, it is imperative that a legally constituted and representative system of justice

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be established to provide leadership in issues of global environmental concern. It must also be a court accessible to NGOs and interest groups. Moreover, the growing number of international environmental treaties and agreements require consolidation within one jurisdiction to facilitate judicial decision-making but also much policy work currently undertaken in a vast amount of disparate UN committee work. Such proposals are by no means new. In 1990 at the World Conference of Environmental Law Associations delegates called for an International Environmental Court as well as resources within the UN to develop education, training, regulation and prosecution divisions to deal with conservation and ecological security. The importance of environmental law beyond ‘policy development’ was asserted and placed on the international agenda as a key principal in sustainable development and the protection of the earth’s natural resources (see Cochrane and Walters, 2008). The UN has moved to regulate the global environment with a proposed World Environment Court at the 1992 Rio Declaration. More recently the Directive of the European Union 2004/35/EC has called upon member states to consider proposals, including a world environment court, for preventing and remedying environmental damage (ICEF, 2005). The growing number of nations signing up to the increasing number of international environmental treaties represents an emerging global network of collective concern about justice and the environment. The International Court of the Environment Foundation, established in Italy in 1988, continues to promote, research and collaborate with governments, NGOs and legal practitioners to develop and implement an International Environment Court (see Pirro, 2002). Chambers and Green (2005) argue that the growing number of international agreements and institutions has occurred simultaneously with a proliferation of environmental degradation (cf. Walters, 2009a). What is needed they argue is a new and integrated system of environmental governance that seeks to mobilise and coordinate existing international resources on questions of environmental sustainability. An international environmental court is likely to enable a newly integrated framework for environmental justice. In 2002, at the World Summit on Sustainable Development, 130 senior judges from around the world identified that there were sufficient domestic and international laws to protect the environment but a growing number of ‘miscreant corporations and backsliding governments’ that were unwilling to self-regulate or enforce laws. The judges called for a unified international court of the environment to strengthen the existing legal framework of environmental governance and in doing so, to protect the world’s poor who are ‘often the hardest-hit victims of environmental crimes’ (quoted in James, 2002). Further insistence of the need for an international environment court was recommended at the Conference of the Americas for the Environment and Sustainable Development at Rio de Janeiro in September 2004. In a country continually exploited for its genetic

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diversity and richness, the Brazilian Government continues to support an international legal forum that can prosecute and sanction criminal activities that have origins and backing beyond Brazil’s jurisdiction. The UN, through its environment programme and notably the World Environment Organisation, sees the role of a new system of environmental governance as necessitating a mixture of precaution, education, responsibility and control. In other words, an international environment court cannot solely be about punishment and sanction but must also be premised on notions of dispute resolution and restorative justice. As Judge Postiglione (Director of the International Court of the Environment Foundation) argues, such a court should meet the cultural, ethical, social, economic and religious needs of peoples and their environments as well as the legal needs of global governance (Postiglione, 2004). Of course, there will be criticisms that such a court will lack the ability to enforce its orders, particularly against powerful nations such as the US that fail to sign up to international environment treaties. However, such international bodies are not solely about enforcement. They are about providing leadership for nation-states to develop their own regulatory frameworks for dealing with environmental security and social justice. Moreover, they are about harm minimisation that can be achieved through dispute resolution and notions of restorative justice. As a result, an international environment court should co-exist with a range of restorative, self-regulatory and participatory models. Establishing such mechanisms remains an ongoing challenge for parties to the Cartagena Protocol. However, it is important to recognise that the more vulnerable countries, notably developing nations, are now able to seek the security and support of over 100 countries against biotech companies and governments that seek to exploit their natural resources or violate their rights to self-determination. As mentioned, issues of compliance and redress especially against non-party countries remain an ongoing issue of concern – and perhaps a weakness of the Protocol. That said, the developing countries have been given both a voice and forum. As a result, the emergence of a ‘symbolic justice’ becomes important for national ecological sovereignty, protection and conservation. Nation-states have been given a mandate to develop their own legislative frameworks and the confidence to resist the aggressive tactics and practices of powerful corporations and governments. Moreover, an international environment court will provide a focal point for coordinating and directing the increasing amount of environmental law. Such a role is pivotal for the development of domestic legal frameworks, and for environmental protection and justice (cf. Walters, 2009b).

Concluding comment The production and sale of GM foods is a global business dominated by a monopoly of biotech industries and supported by the world’s most powerful

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governments. With such influential and affluent backing, the proselytisers of GM food and its associated technologies provide a formidable voice against campaigns of resistance and oppositions. In doing so, concepts of harm and justice become malleable and supple for political and economic gain. As a result, diverse discourses of power necessitate analytical understandings of the ways in which both the strong-arm and subtleties of persuasion are played out. Green criminological narratives must continue to engage with these networks of power and governance in order to contribute to global debates such as GM food. As I have written elsewhere, green criminology: must not be reduced to green party politics but must be a position premised on the principles of environmentalism and broader issues of environmental justice. Such an approach recognizes that environmental victiminology is as much about issues of race, class, poverty, trade and economics as it is about the environment. Moreover, a green criminology must harness discourses in both risk and rights. It must be a global criminology, one that examines notions of transnational justice within expanding global economies. This is a hire-wire act omitted from the criminological repertoire but essential within changing international economic and political landscapes where crime respects no sovereign domains and where crime control must be dynamic. (Walters, 2007: 1999) Green criminology is emerging as knowledge of resistance, one that challenges mainstream disciplinary discourses as well as government and corporate rationalities. Scraton (2001) argues that what is needed is the expansion of ‘knowledges of resistance’ that identify knowledge/power complexes within contemporary forms of governance and critique the injustice of governmental regimes that construct notions of truth for material and political gain. The promotion of new critical narratives in green criminology provides voices of resistance against state and corporate activities that harm humans, non-humans and the natural environment. This calls for a politics of engagement with diverse sources of collective concern.

Notes 1 A healthy debate exists within criminological discourses over nomenclature. Preferences over the naming of this critical narrative are debated around various ideological, political and environmental perspectives. Its origins are found in the works of Lynch (1990), and others have since utilised the title ‘Green Criminology’ to encapsulate a broad scholarship devoted to crimes and harms against humans and non-human species (South, 1998, Groombridge, 1998, Lane, 1998, Lynch and Stretesky, 2003; Beirne and South, 2007, Ruggerio and South, forthcoming). For some, ‘environmental criminology’ or eco-global criminology is preferable (see White, 2008 and 2009); for others ‘conservation criminology’ (Herbig and Joubert, 2006; Gibbs et al., 2010) and eco-critical criminology (Seis, 1993). I use

122 Eco crime and GM food green criminology here to harness all those perspectives that broadly comprise the green criminological movement. 2 Stan Cohen, Barbara Hudson and many others have, for example, long advocated this line of criminological enquiry (see Downes et al., 2007; Hudson, 2003). 3 For a general overview of game theory and the social sciences, see Morrow (1994). 4 See also debates within ecofeminism which assert women’s victimisation through male environmental exploitation (Eaton and Lorentzen, 2003).

Reflections and conclusions

The production and trade in GM food identifies how powerful monopolies of influential biotechnology advocates, motivated by politics and profit, have been able to dictate global food policy. Humanitarian food crises facing the world’s poorest and most vulnerable people have been seized upon as commercial opportunities for big business. Hunger and the fear of starvation and food security have been ruthlessly used to further uncertain technologies. This book has identified that economic and environmental exploitation, with scant regard for human and non-human existence, tell the story of GM food and its worldwide expansion. The biotech language of ‘environmentalism’, ‘feeding the world’s hungry’, ‘leading agricultural technologies’, ‘social justice’, etc. are merely sugarcoated terms for what is ‘big business’. It is also a salient example of the ways in which sovereign authority over environmental resources are increasingly influenced and controlled by transnational corporations. Notwithstanding some excellent and robust studies, the science surrounding GM food provides a kaleidoscope of ambiguity and contradiction, often tainted by censorship, corporate influence or personal bias. The more influential works on policy in the UK and the US have been pro-biotechnology studies utilised by governments to persevere with GM agendas. The politics of GM food research reveals explicable links with organisations with ‘an axe to grind’, and therefore, discourses remain understandably shrouded in scepticism and public concern. The regulation of GM technologies and foods in the UK emerges from a period of government cover-up that ensured developments in biotechnology would be self-governing, pro-science and pro-industry. Contemporary regulations reflect historical legacies that prioritised a science-industry alliance. Moreover, the various agencies involved currently in the approval, monitoring, regulation and enforcement of GM foods is disconnected, under-resourced, non-communicative and ineffective. The current regulatory regimes and advisory committees should be disbanded and replaced with a newly constructed and truly independent Food Authority with diverse representation across the scientific, agricultural, academic, policy and consuming communities.

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It is not the contention of this book that GM crops have no place in any future societies. The creation of new medicines, the production of biofuels and the absorption of heavy metals from soil and water are all proposed benefits, within contained settings, that may offer solutions to pressing human and environmental needs that do not include food (Hepang, 2005). Yet, the motives, policies and practices of corporations and governments that pursue such future proposals must also be closely examined through multiple lenses of power, politics and political economy. For example, we must ask why the biotech giants such as Monsanto have not been vying or promoting biofuels, medicines, tobacco and heavy metal soil absorption? Is it because such initiatives would require sharing the profits with oil, tobacco and pharmaceutical industries? Or because there is no money to be made in technology that absorbs chemicals such as mercury from soil and water, a perilous problem facing poor countries like Bangladesh? GM food, on the other hand, has been a priority for Monsanto. Is it because this enterprise is substantially owned by the biotech giants and because food is a profitable market monopoly? The official answers to these questions will always be glossed over with the rhetoric of business acumen; however, if GM technologies are not about power and profit, why is it that those who own and espouse it do not vociferously argue for its use in medicine, in less polluting energies, in less addictive tobaccos and in environmental clean-up campaigns in developing nations? If biotechnology is an essential agricultural development for feeding the world’s hungry, why are infrastructural programmes in developing nations bypassed or subsumed within food aid polices that pressure nations with food insecurity to accept GM foods? As discussed throughout this book, food insecurity is more an issue of poverty and development than crop shortages. Food shortages do not exist in affluent, capitalist, developed countries. As mentioned, an estimated 18 million tons a year of food is wasted in the UK. This is not only a food source capable of feeding millions of people but also a potential energy that could be converted to ‘green gas’ (Vaughan, 2009). Moreover, if GM crops were the answer to the fiscal problems of farmers, then we would not be witnessing class action law suits brought by entire agricultural communities, nor the tribulations of grain farmers who invested their livelihoods in a technology that bound them to bankruptcy. Public opposition to GM foods remains widespread on a global scale. Irrespective of political lobbying and orchestrated public relations campaigns that present transgenic foods in the most favourable of lights, consumers remain understandably sceptical and opposed to their food chain being dominated by a potentially injurious, hotly contested and untrustworthy technology. Yet public resistance has been mobilised with some success to halt and change the course of GM development. Amidst the mixed messages of science and politics, consumers, indigenous peoples and citizens have expressed their concern for conserving untapped biodiversity, for promoting

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organic farming and for safeguarding their foods and environments. The risks associated with GM food have signaled alarm and caution to a public that continues to be concerned and involved in environmental issues. And it will be the public who will form the site of future backgrounds. This book concludes that uncertain science; bitter public opposition; growing farmer concern and bankruptcy; irreversible damage to biodiversity; corporate monopolies and exploitation; disregard for social and cultural practices; devastation of small scale and local agricultural economies; imminent threats to organics; weak regulation; and widespread political and biotech mistrust do not provide the bases for advancing and progressing GM foods into the next decade. Yet, with the backing of the WTO, the US and UK Governments march on – but at what cost to future generations?

Appendix Methodological considerations

The interest for this book began several years ago when the world’s first Royal Commission on Genetic Modification was held in New Zealand during 2001. Working in Wellington at the time, it struck me why the world’s largest biotech companies had descended on New Zealand’s small capital with dozens of lawyers, scientists and PR consultants. This Royal Commission provided the window through which criminological possibilities were revealed and significantly influenced the shape that this project would take. While the Commission’s warrant was not limited to an examination of food, the overwhelming majority of public submissions and official testimonies focused on food. The entire proceedings of the Royal Commission were open to the public and included 19 meetings involving more than 3,000 people; 10,904 written submissions; 10 regional Hui (Maori gatherings); a one-day youth forum involving 100 people aged 12–25; a public opinion survey involving a national representative sample of 1,153 New Zealanders aged 15 years and older; and a further 328 interviews with Maori. In addition, the Royal Commission conducted a series of formal hearings lasting four months and involving 330 international expert witnesses. This included evidence from all the large GM companies such as Monsanto, Novartis and DuPont. Moreover, the Commission heard legal arguments and testimonies from 117 ‘interested persons’ – collectively their input revealed stories of corporate manipulation and exploitation; social and environmental harm; risks and dangers to human health; and an array of devious and illegal acts. It is important to note that the evidence of expert witnesses significantly influenced the recommendations of the Royal Commission. Irrespective of the lengths taken by the Commission to consult with youth, Maori people, interest groups and the general public, the recommendations often reflected the ambiguities and contradictions presented by the scientific experts and a subsequent reliance on ‘hard facts’ to guide decision-making. This emphasis on ‘expert evidence’ also raised questions about the production and utility of ‘knowledge’ in judicial and government decision-making. That is, what counts as ‘knowledge’ in the GM debate and why? The often polarised views about GM food were coupled with vested interests which determined political and scientific loyalties.

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It was an extensive investigation into the possibilities and problems of GM technologies, and I was able to observe the proceedings and discuss issues with participants. I have previously written about this Commission, the concerns it raised and the pressures placed on scientists to provide favourable testimonies (see Walters, 2004). In addition, the research for this book included numerous interviews, telephone calls, casual conversations and email communications with politicians, activists, farmers, civil servants, scientists and lawyers in Australia, New Zealand, Scotland, England, the US, Italy and Switzerland. These voices often represented both sides of the GM equation – from the biotech industry to organic farmers. The collective voices of those contacted, repeatedly identified, inter alia, how the marketing and trade of GM food required an understanding of power and political economy. As a result, the research decided to interrogate the politics and international trade relations of governments and corporations. In doing so, a six-week field trip was conducted in Zambia. Why Zambia? The concerns over GM food safety received international headlines when the Zambian President Mr Mwanawasa condemned it as ‘poisonous’ (Plaut, 2002). Zambia is one of six southern African nations that for most of its 40-year independence has faced food shortages. However despite this, the government continues to reject GM food in fear of potential harm to its population and biodiversity. For some American geneticists, the stance adopted by the Zambian president was ‘incomprehensible – unless one views it from an economic point of view’, claiming that the Zambian Government was protecting its future trade in Europe (see Fedoroff and Brown, 2004: 310). Controversially, Pringle (2003: 189) has argued ‘the Zambian incident also refocused attention on the developing world as a new front line in the biotech wars’. For me, it was important to ask, what could be learned from visiting one of the so-called biotech ‘war zones’ and examining how the majority world had become embroiled in the politics of global trade and GM food? A total of 19 semi-structured interviews were conducted in Zambia. The names of interviewees are not disclosed, with the exception of the Deputy Prime Minister of Zambia at the time who permitted quotation attribution. Most interviewees also granted consent to be identified; however, in a country which has invoked state law to silence and punish dissenting voices of government, I do not wish to endanger the interviees professionally or personally and have decided to keep them anonymous. In addition, while in Zambia, field visits were undertaken to organic and commercial farms outside Lusaka and discussions held with small-scale farmers, the farmer’s union and consumer groups. The interviews sought to understand the Zambian Government’s position and its political and economic ramifications. For example, why would a nation with ‘millions of people facing starvation’ reject GM food aid? What reasons could explain the international political and economic pressure placed on Zambian authorities, businesses,

128 Appendix

scientists and farmers? Were such actions in breach of newly enacted international environmental law, namely the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture? And what were the challenges facing biosafety and regulation when powerful governments and corporations willfully neglect or violate international treaties? These were just some of the issues I pursued on what was an illuminating, yet exhausting field trip. Such fieldwork has provided the basis for more than ten conference presentations around the world which, in itself, created the opportunity for wider academic consultation and input into this project. Extensive archival research was also undertaken at the Public Records office in Kew Gardens, London. Much of the historical background relating to the regulation of GMOs in the UK contained in chapter five was gathered from thousands of pages of documents held in the national archive. Individuals from leading biotech companies (including lawyers, scientists and communications personnel) were contacted; their responses, like their counterparts in the anti-GM movements, were predictable. Much of what was said was publicly available on their respective websites. As a result, it was decided not to conduct numerous interviews just for the sake of it but to explore comments raised in conversation with both pro and anti-GM food camps through published and unpublished sources. Attempts to interview policy and enforcement personnel in the UK in Defra and the FSA were rejected despite repeated attempts. Therefore, it was necessary to submit applications under the Freedom of Information Act to obtain statistics as well as answers to safety and regulatory issues pertaining to policy and practice. More than 50 official Information Act requests to the Food Standards Agency, Defra, the Health and Safety Executive and the Environment Agency were made during 2005–10. Information generated through FOI requests necessitated further investigation, notably with local authorities to examine regulatory policies and practices. Ten local authorities in England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales were randomly selected and information gathered from relevant Food Safety and Environmental Health teams. Mr Michael Meacher MP and former Minister of the Environment who was interviewed for this book also generously agreed for me to grant access to his ministerial archive. However, what should have been a simple matter of a former minister retrieving his past ministerial files turned into a protracted affair that was eventually torpedoed by Defra. Mr Meacher’s office communicated the following to me: We have had a reply from DEFRA Permanent Secretary, Helen Ghosh, which states the following: ‘The official guidance from the Cabinet Office, which I have copied below, makes it clear that it is only former Ministers personally who can have access to the relevant papers, which I am afraid therefore

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rules out your researcher looking at the papers on your behalf [see paragraph 2]. Are you able to be any more specific about the topic and the dates for the papers you are looking for? An alternative would be for you to meet the official who is now responsible for GM policy, to see if you can find a way to narrow down the files that would need to be searched. (Secretary to Michael Meacher MP, email correspondence, 18 March 2009) To think that a serving Labour MP, and former minister, within the Labour Government was obstructed and effectively denied access through onerous restrictions to his own archive is alarming to say the least. It identifies how protraction and obfuscation became part-and-parcel of New Labour’s way of avoiding transparency and public criticism (see Coleman et al., 2009). Finally, the research for this book also required a detailed understanding of legal and scientific issues which necessitated the undertaking of a PGCE in Environmental Law and Management at the University of Aberystwyth (Wales) which was completed in 2005. Moreover, involvement with events and staff at the International Court for the Environment Foundation in Rome provided invaluable insights to developments and implementation of legal mechanisms seeking to protect and develop the environment.

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Cases Alphacell v Woodward [1972] 2 AC 824. Case 8/74 Procureur du Roi v Dassonville [1974] ECR 837. Case 6/90 and 9/90 Francovich and Bonifaci v Italy [1991] ECR 1 5357. Case 102/79 Commission v Belgium [1980] ECR 1473. Diamond v Chakrabarty [1980] 447 US 303. Srimp Turtle WTO case 58 and 61. http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/ edis08_e.htm Tuna Dolphin http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_E/envir_e/edis04_e.htm

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Index

abuse of buying power 12 ACRE 41, 97–99 actor network theory 114–15 African hunger 68–75 agricorporations 43 Agricultural Biotechnology Council (UK) 25 agricultural reform 3 Agricultural Research Council 80, 83 agrobiotechnology 53–54, 65 AIDS 74 alfalfa 40 allergenicity 21, 30, 35–37 allergens 20, 23, 33 altered immunogenicity 37 Amazon rainforest 114 Animal and Plant Inspection Service (US) 20 animal testing 87 ANT see actor network theory anti-social behaviour 16 antibiotic resistance 21, 30, 33–37 antibiotic resistant marker genes 10, 33, 35–36 ANU see Australia National University APHIS see Animal and Plant Inspection Service (US) apomictic reproduction 8–9 apomixes 39 ARC see Agricultural Research Council Argentina 30, 43, 48 ARMs see antibiotic resistant marker genes Asda 12 asexual reproduction 8–9 Ashby Committee 80, 82, 85–88 asthma 36 AstraZeneca 23 Australia 37, 44–45, 55

Australia National University 37 Aventis Cropscience 23, 40 Azteca Foods 23 bacillus thuringienis 10, 47 barley 39 Bayer 10, 12–13, 20, 55, 58 Beck, Ulrich 58–60 benefits of GM food 29–43 bio-agriculture 44, 52, 71 bio-imperialism 13, 74 bio-piracy 20, 48, 91 bio-prospecting 5, 48, 91 biodiversity 18, 37–38, 41, 43, 47–49, 70–71, 77, 113 biofuels 2, 4, 7, 110, 124 biological weaponry 85, 87 biomass 40–41 biopolitics 109 biopower 109 biosafety 71, 76 biotech wars 64–78 biotechnological hegemony 23 Bivings Group 28 black market economies 38 Blair, Tony 23, 25, 49, 94, 102, 110 blindness 32 boycotts 58, 116 Brazil 36, 119–20 breaches of food safety legislation 100–101 Brown, Gordon 24–25 Bt crops 10, 41, 46–47, 73 Bush, George 66, 73 cancer 30 canola 9, 19, 40, 44, 55 Captive State 5 carbon footprints 44

160 Index carcinogenic side-effects 33 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 64, 89–92, 120, 128 cassava 69, 72 caution 52–58 Center for Food Safety (US) 19, 40 China 20, 31, 90 Chomsky, Noam 21 citizen justice 116–18 civil liberties 23 cleistogamy 39 climate change 22 co-existence 47 Codex Alimentarius Commission 54 coercive trade and GM food 65–68, 107–8 collusion 24 colonisation of nature 48 commercialisation 62 commonsense 52–58 Competition Act 1998 12 Competition Commission (UK) 12 compliance 91, 98, 100, 107–8, 118, 120 ‘Compromise Group’ 90 concepts in GM 7–22 consumer choice 12 consumer resistance 51–63; concluding comment 62–63; governance, risk, public participation 58–62; introduction 51–52; ‘scientific citizens’ 52–58 consumer sovereignty 116 ‘contained use’ 11, 95–96 containment 3, 38–39 contamination 4, 8, 15, 18–20, 29, 38–40, 43–47 controversies of GM food 23–50; concluding comment 49–50; economics, patents, farmers 43–49; introduction 23; politics of GM knowledge 23–29; untangling risks 29–43 Convention on Biological Diversity 91 copyright 47–49 ‘Corngate’ 61 corporate exploitation 18–21, 68 corporate power 12–13; see also power corruption 27 cotton 44, 73–74 cover-ups 27, 69, 102, 123 covert power 108 creation of superweeds 21 ‘credit crunch’ 1 crime mapping 16

criminological discourse 104–13 cross-pollination 38, 40, 79 Crude Criminology 113 Cry9c 23 cultural significance of food 69–70 culturecide 68, 113 cytokines 37 damming 43 Danone 32 Darwin, Charles 8 debt 1, 47–49, 69 deep ecology 17–18 definitions of GM food 8–11 deforestation 114 Defra (UK) 3, 39–40, 57, 95, 97–99 degradation of ecosystems 21, 23, 119 desalination 43 development of conceptual framework 13–18; eco crime, political economy, harm 14–18 DHSS Working Party on Dangerous Pathogens 81–87, 98 Diamond v Chakrabarty 9 diarrhoea 36 dietary control products 32 ‘dirty tricks’ 54 dominance 8 dominionism 107 drought tolerance 29, 31, 42–43 DuPont 12, 126 E. coli 34–35, 83, 87 eco-holism 113 eco-Marxism 17–18, 112 eco-terrorism 110 ecofeminism 17–18 ecological disaster 83, 85 ecological justice 113–15 economic diversity 12 economic pressure to accept GM food 27, 72–75 economics 43–49; copyright, profits, debts 47–49; higher yields 44–47 EFSA see European Food Standards Agency embargo 81, 85, 93–94 emergence of ‘scientific citizens’ 52–58 endangered species 15 energy poverty 108–9 English Nature 41 enhancement of profit 79–103 Enron 117 ensuring safety 79–103

Index environmental genocide 113–14 environmental issues with GM food 37–43; genetic contamination 38–40; water 42–43; wildlife 41–42 environmental justice 113–15; actor network theory 114–15 Environmental Protection Act 1990 10 Environmental Protection Agency (US) 18 enzyme splits 83 epsps DNA transfer 34 ethics 4, 13, 23–24, 76, 80, 84, 87 European Court of Human Rights 17 European Food Standards Agency 100–101 European Soil Forum 63 European Union legislative framework 92–94 eventalisation 79–80 exploitation 4, 29, 48, 64–78 ‘famine crimes’ 65 FAO see Food and Agriculture Organisation farm scale evaluations 39, 95 farmers 43–49 fast food 2 feeding behaviours 39 fermentation 9 fly-tipping 15, 105 Food and Agriculture Organisation 32, 54, 67 food aid 1, 64–68, 72–73, 75–76, 107, 115, 124, 127 food crime 7–8 Food and Democracy 63 Food and Drug Administration (US) 9, 20 food labelling 55–56, 92, 94, 101 food laws and GM regulation 89–102; European Union legislative framework 92–94; international regulations 89–92; UK GM food law 94–102 food poisoning 29 food shortages 1, 3–4, 31–32, 49, 73, 75, 87, 108–9, 124 Food Standards Agency (UK) 4, 34–35, 57–58, 99–102, 109 food toxicology 37 foreign genes 9–11 Foucault, Michel 21, 24, 79, 109 fraud 8, 28 freshness 7

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freshwater 42 Friends of the Earth 20, 63, 68 FSA see Food Standards Agency (UK) FSE see farm scale evaluations game theory 110–11 Gaza Strip 1 gene flow 41 gene guns 10 Gene Revolution 44 gene transfer 31–35, 38–39 Genencor 20 genetic contamination 38–40 genetic engineering 9–10, 34–36, 81–84, 95 genetic mutilation 9 genetic pollution 5, 21, 23, 37–38, 41 genetic revolution 23 Genetically Modified Language 28–29 genetically modified organisms 4, 9–10, 13, 28, 37, 52–54, 77, 81, 90 Genetically Modified Organisms (Contained Use) (Amendment) Regulations 2002 95–97 Genetically Modified Organisms (Contained Use) (Amendment) Regulations 2005 95 Genetically Modified Organisms (Contained Use) Regulations 2000 96–97 Genewatch 38, 63 genome incompatibility 39 Gilroy, Paul 106 global kitchens 7 global security 17, 23 global warming 21, 47 globalisation 1–2, 7, 21, 115 globalised resistance 62–63 glyphosate 43, 46 GM derivatives 11 GM food 8–11 GM food debate in UK 55–58 GM food law of UK 94–102; Defra 97–99; FSA 99–102; Health and Safety Executive 95–97 ‘GM Public Debate’ 35, 39–40, 44, 56–59 GM Science Review Panel (UK) 27 GM Watch 52, 63 GMOs see genetically modified organisms golden rice 32–33 governance 58–62 graffiti 15, 105

162 Index Great Depression 1 green criminology 17, 104–22; concluding comment 120–21; environmental and ecological justice 113–15; greening criminological discourse 104–13; introduction 104; key concepts of 106–7; towards green justice 115–20 green gas 124 Green Party (NZ) 60 green policies 24 Green Revolution 43–44 greenhouse gases 44, 47 greening of business 111 greening criminological discourse 104–13; game theory 110–11; harm 111–13; power and injustice 106–9 greening the GATT 93 Greenpeace International 38, 63, 67 habitat preservation 45, 62, 113 Hagar, Nicky 61 Halsey, Mark 112 harm 14–18, 104–22; and eco crime 14–18; and green criminology 111–13 harmonisation 92–93 Hawaii 43 Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996 61 hazardous waste 15 health issues with GM food 30–37; antibiotic resistance, allergenicity, toxicity 35–37; nutrition, hunger, gene transfer 31–35 Health and Safety Executive (UK) 95–97 heavy metals 124 hegemony 12, 23, 26, 111 higher yields 31, 43–47, 73; organic farming 47 historical reflections of regulation 79–89 HIV 70, 74 Holy See see Vatican Home Office (UK) 15 Hoodia gordonia cactus 32 horizontal gene transfer 30 HS see Health and Safety Executive (UK) human cloning 23 human health 5, 17–18, 23, 30, 34 hunger 31–35, 59, 64–78, 104; African 68–75; third world 64–78; see also world hunger hybridisation 42, 81

IAASTD see International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development ICBS see International Consortium on Biotechnology Research ICJ see International Court of Justice IMF 44 ‘incidents’ 98–99 Independent Science Panel 33 India 43, 55, 117 indigenous tribes 48, 126 Industrial Development Organisation 38 informal justice 116–18 injustice 104–22; and power 106–9 insect resistant crops 9–11 International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development 31 International Consortium on Biotechnology Research 53–54 International Court of the Environment Foundation 119–20, 129 International Court of Justice 118 international public opinion 54–55 international regulations on GM food 89–92 Interpol 15 intestinal microflora 34, 83 Iraq War 53, 66 irrigation 42, 69 IUU fishing 15 John Innes Centre 25, 84 Journal of Applied Ecology 38 justice 104–22 Kenya 20 key concepts of green criminology 106–7 knowledges of resistance 120 Kraft 23, 32 L-Trytophan 30 Lancet 27 land sovereignty 48 landfill 15 laws of genetic inheritance 8 liability 18–21 life expectancy 69 ‘Like Minded Group’ 90 littering 15 LLRice 601 20 logging 114

Index maize 3, 27–28, 39, 43, 46, 57, 61, 65–72 malnutrition 4, 59 marginalisation of public opinion 28, 51–52 marker genes 10, 33, 35–36 Marx, Karl 112 Massachusetts Institute of Technology 62 Meacher, Michael 1, 3, 25, 94, 98, 128 Mendel, Gregor 8 methodological considerations 126–29 ‘Miami Group’ 90 milkweed 41 mining 69 Ministry of Defence 83 misinformation 76 misrepresentation 29 mistrust 52–58 MIT see Massachusetts Institute of Technology mobilisation of bias 107 MoD see Ministry of Defence MON 810 67 Monarch butterfly 41 Monbiot, George 25, 52, 94 monopoly capitalism 12–13, 104 Monsanto 10–12, 18–19, 25–31, 36, 40, 42–49, 55, 58, 67, 75–77, 107–8, 124–26 Monsanto v Schmeiser 19 moratorium on GM food 54, 58, 64, 66–67, 81, 84–87, 91, 94, 116 Morrisons 4, 12 muscular dysfunction 35–36 Namada Dam 43 National Farmers’ Union (Canada) 48 National Health Council (US) 35 natural resources 68–69 Nature 81 nausea 36 neo-imperialism 74 New Zealand 60–61, 126–29 NK603 67 non-compliance 100, 118 non-transgenic breeding 79; see also cross-pollination North American Soil Association 45 Novartis 61, 126 nuclear testing 113 nutrition 31–35 Obama, Barack 1 obesity 1–2, 32

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Office of Fair Trading 12 oilseed rape 38–41 organic farming 40, 47, 70–71, 125–27 overview of international public opinion 54–55 ozone depletion 22, 118 P57 32 papal pressure 75–77 papal wars 64–78 Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology 56 Pasteur, Louis 9 ‘patch protection’ 29 Patent Act 1985 19 patents 43–49 ‘people power’ 117 perils of GM food 23–50 persistent resistance 29 Philip Morris 74 PHS Enteric Reference Laboratory 84 PIL see Public Interest Litigation planting the seed 1–6 Plato 106 PMSU see Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit poaching 113 political economy 14–18, 24; of truth 24 political pressure to accept GM food 72–75 political weaponry 44 politicisation of GM 7–22, 73; concluding comment 21–22; corporate exploitation, liability, prosecution 18–21; corporate power, monopoly capitalism 12–13; developing conceptual framework 13–18; GM food 8–11; introduction 7–8 politics of GM food 64–78 politics of GM knowledge 23–29 pollution 8, 15, 18, 21–23, 37–38, 41, 45, 58–59, 70, 113 Pontifical Academy for Sciences 58, 77 Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace 76 pornography 2 potatoes 9, 30, 39 poverty 1–2, 24, 32, 49, 71, 74–75, 95 Powell, Colin 76 power 104–22; and injustice 106–9 precaution 51, 71 price fixing 12 Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit 56, 95

164 Index privatisation 51, 62 Procureur du Roi v Dassonville 93 profit 47–49, 79–103 promotion of antimicrobials 35 prosecution of corporations 18–21 prospects of GM food 23–50 public criminology 6 Public Interest Litigation 19 public opinion 51–63, 104 public participation 50, 58–62 Quest nicotine-free cigarettes 74 Questions of Method 79 racism 107 rationing 80 Rawls, John 106 RCEP see Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution recession 8 reduction in biodiversity 37–38 regulatory regimes 79–103; concluding comment 102; GM food laws and regulations 89–102; historical reflections 79–89; introduction 79 Reiman, Jeremy H. 18, 106 rejection of GM food 69–71; see also Zambia resistance 33–37; antibiotic 21, 30, 33–37; to insects/disease 9–11, 31 restorative justice 118 rice 4, 13, 20, 32–33; golden rice 32–33 Rice, Condoleeza 52 The Rich Get Richer and the Poor Get Prison 18, 106 Rift Valley 20 Rio Declaration 89, 119 risk 29–43, 51–63, 68–75; governance and public participation 58–62; untangling risks 29–43 risk assessment 26 Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity 58–59 risk theory 58–60 Rockefeller Foundation 32, 36 Roundup 10, 40, 46 Roundup Ready Alfalfa 40 Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution 88–89 Royal Commission on Genetic Modification (NZ) 10, 41, 47, 60, 126 Royal Institute of International Affairs 3 Royal Society 25, 27, 81–82 Russian Academy of Sciences 34

safety 27, 29–43, 79–103, 117; ensuring 79–103; unravelling controversies 29–43 Sainsbury’s 12 scepticism 24 ‘scientific citizens’ 51–58, 61; international public opinion 54–55; UK GM food debate 55–58 scientific impropriety 23 Second World War 80 Securities and Exchange Commission (US) 19 seed police 49 Seeds of Deception 26 Seeds of Distrust 61 self-regulation 20 sewerage 15 shareholder community 29 Shaw, George Bernard 113 Shrimp Turtle case 94 silent tsunami 1 Smith, Geoffrey 26 social ecology 17–18 ‘soft power’ 108 Soil Association 40, 63 soil erosion 8, 40, 45 solutions to world hunger 1–2, 5, 25, 30–32, 43, 49, 76–77, 110 soybeans 3, 9, 11, 18–19, 34, 36–39, 43, 46, 56 speciesism 107 Starlink corn 20, 23 starvation 1, 4, 58–59, 65, 71–72 Stockholm Declaration 89 subsistence farming 32, 44 sugar beet 20, 39, 41 superweeds 21, 38, 40–41 sustainability 111, 115, 119 swine flu 1 Syngenta 12, 18, 20, 55 techniques used in GM food 8–11 terms used in GM 7–22 terrain of GM 7–22 terrorism 21, 59, 66 Tesco 12 theory of denial 108 A Theory of Justice 106 There Ain’t no Black in the Union Jack 106 third world hunger 64–78; see also hunger; world hunger tobacco 2, 9, 73–74, 124

Index towards green justice 115–20; citizen and informal justice 116–18; transnational justice 118–20 toxicity 18, 30, 33, 35–37, 113 trade wars 64–78; African hunger, Zambian resistance 68–75; coercive trade and GM foods 65–68; concluding comment 77–78; introduction 64–65; US government and papal pressure 75–77 transgenic plants 9, 20, 25, 33, 36, 40, 44–46, 52–53, 76–77 transmutation 39 transnational justice 118–20 Tuna Dolphin case 93–94 UN Food Programme 62 uncertain science 123–25 UNICRI see United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Institute Unilever 32 Union for Protection of New Variants of Plants 1991 47 United Kingdom 31, 55–58, 94–102; GM food debate 55–58; GM food law 94–102 United Nations Food Aid Convention 75–76 United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Institute 15 United States of America 30–31, 35, 47–48, 75–77; National Health Council 35; US government and papal pressure 75–77 unravelling controversies 29–43 untangling risks 29–43; environmental issues 37–43; health issues 30–37 Upper Crust 7 uptake of biotechnology 52–53 vandalism 15, 56, 105 Vatican 58, 75–77

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Vector Group Limited 74 vertical gene transfer 30 violation of agreements 14–15, 19 war on terror 66 war of words 28 wastage 7, 124 water 42–43 water shortage 42–43, 59 water tables 41 weak science 31, 49 weapons of mass destruction 21, 72; food as 72 Weed Science Society of America 40 WFP see World Food Aid Programme wheat 37, 39 WHO see World Health Organisation Wilde, Oscar 50 wildlife 15, 41–42 World Bank 43–44 World Earth Summit 64, 70 World Food Aid Programme 1, 32, 65–67, 72–76 World Health Organisation 1, 12–13, 35–37, 54 world hunger 1–2, 5, 25, 30–32, 43, 49, 76–77, 110; see also hunger; third world hunger World Trade Organisation 28, 54, 64–68, 107 World Water Forum 42 WTO see World Trade Organisation xenotransplanation 37 Zambia 7, 41, 65, 68–75, 127; beans 7; governmental rejection of GM food 69–71; political/economic pressure to accept GM food 72–75; resistance 68–75 zebra danios 99