Economic Reforms in Chile
This page intentionally left blank
Economic Reforms in Chile From Dictatorship to Democra...
49 downloads
1798 Views
2MB Size
Report
This content was uploaded by our users and we assume good faith they have the permission to share this book. If you own the copyright to this book and it is wrongfully on our website, we offer a simple DMCA procedure to remove your content from our site. Start by pressing the button below!
Report copyright / DMCA form
Economic Reforms in Chile
This page intentionally left blank
Economic Reforms in Chile From Dictatorship to Democracy Second edition
Ricardo Ffrench-Davis
© Ricardo Ffrench-Davis 2010 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6–10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2002 by The University of Michigan Press This edition published 2010 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN 978–0–230–57738–1 This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Ffrench-Davis, Ricardo. Economic reforms in Chile : from dictatorship to democracy / Ricardo Ffrench-Davis. — 2nd ed. p. cm. Summary: “This book provides an depth analysis of neo-liberal and of progressive economic reforms in Chile since the Pinochet dictatorship _”— Provided by publisher. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978–0–230–57738–1 1. Chile—Economic policy. 2. Chile—Economic conditions—1970–1973. 3. Chile—Economic conditions—1973–1988. 4. Chile—Economic conditions—1988– I. Title. HC192.F443 2010 339.983—dc22 2010023772 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Antony Rowe, Chippenham and Eastbourne
Contents List of Figures
vii
List of Tables
viii
List of Boxes
xi
Preface to the Second Edition
xii
First Part: An Account of Four Decades I
Economic development in Chile since the 1970s 1 A historical perspective on development strategies 2 The neoliberal strategy, 1973–89 3 Democracy, reforming the reforms and development, 1990–2009 Annex
1 3 5 9 24 43
Second Part: The Neoliberal Experiment in Chile, 1973–1982
51
II
Import Liberalization in 1973–82 1 The import liberalization process 2 Import composition 3 Effects of trade liberalization on manufacturing 4 Towards an evaluation 5 Concluding remarks
53 54 61 64 68 75
III
Domestic Financial Liberalization and External Debt in the 1970s: Building a Major Crisis 1 Financial liberalization and foreign indebtedness 2 Financial capital flows and indebtedness: volume, sources, and uses 3 Indebtedness and macroeconomic adjustment 4 Interest-rate differentials 5 External vulnerability and the dynamics of indebtedness 6 Some lessons from this experience
Third Part: Economic Recovery and the Heritage of the Dictatorship, 1982–1989 IV
Policy Rectifications and Recovery from the Debt Crisis, 1982–9 1 The debt crisis 2 Debt management in 1982–9 3 A more pragmatic economic policy v
77 78 83 88 97 102 104 107 109 110 117 121
vi
Contents
V
4 Strong economic recovery, weak average growth 5 Macroeconomic (im)balances by 1989
124 126
Export Development during the 1980s 1 The role of exports in national development 2 Trade policy in the 1980s: a departure from orthodoxy 3 Export performance: dynamism and diversification 4 Dynamic exports and limited economic growth
130 131 133 141 144
Fourth Part: Development Challenges for Democracy
147
VI
Export Dynamism and Economic Growth since the 1990s 1 Trade policies since 1990 2 Export performance 3 Exports and foreign investment 4 Exports and economic growth 5 Concluding remarks
149 150 156 165 167 172
VII
Inequality and Poverty since the 1970s 1 Trends in income distribution and poverty 2 The role of neoliberal reforms 3 Reforms to fight poverty and income concentration 4 Concluding remarks
174 176 193 198 206
VIII Managing Capital Inflows in the 1990s and the “Encaje” 1 Capital inflows: magnitudes and composition 2 The policy counter-cyclical response 3 The effectiveness of macro-stabilizing measures 4 Savings, investment, and growth in the 1990s 5 Some policy lessons from this experience
209 211 216 226 232 234
IX
Economic Policy after the 1999 Recession 1 The origins of the break 2 The impact of the crisis, 1998–9 3 The recessive phase, 1999–2003 4 Dynamic recovery in 2004–5 5 Deceleration from 2006 6 Two relevant issues: the structural fiscal balance and the exchange rate 7 Concluding remarks
236 238 240 243 247 249
Concluding Remarks and Challenges 1 An account of sixteen years of dictatorship versus sixteen years of democracy 2 Four general conclusions 3 Ten specific challenges
268
X
255 267
268 271 274
References
278
Index
291
List of Figures I.1
Actual and potential GDP, 1960–2009 (log scale, GDP* 1996 = 100)
15
A.1
Comparison of two estimates of the Output Gap, 1960–2008 (% of GDP*)
49
II.1
Average tariff and real exchange rate, 1973–82
59
III.1
Simple conventional framework of capital markets liberalization
79
VII.1 Chile and developed countries, per capita GDP and income distribution, 2007 (PPP US$)
176
VII.2 National unemployment rate, 1960–2009 (percentage of the labor force)
183
VII.3 Income distribution in Greater Santiago, 1960–2009 (Q5/Q1 ratio, three-year moving average)
190
VIII.1 Evolution of the real exchange rate, 1986–2009 (1986 = 100)
225
IX.1
Pension fund outflows and RER, 1993–2000 (% of total funds, 1986 = 100)
241
IX.2
Real copper price, actual and trend, 1959–2009 (2009 US$/lb)
248
IX.3
Trend GDP: annual review by Committee of Experts, 2006–9 (annual growth rate, %)
262
IX.4
Panel A: evolution of exports and imports of goods and services, 2000–9 (annual real growth rates, %). Panel B: current account balances, 2000–9 (% of current GDP)
265
X.1
Per capita GDP growth, 1973–89 versus 1990–2009 (real indexes, 1973 and 1989 = 100)
271
vii
List of Tables I.1
Comparison of key macroeconomic variables, 1959–2009
8
I.2
Evolution of GDP and its composition, 1975–81 (annual average rates of growth)
17
Macroeconomic variables during dictatorship, 1974–89 (annual averages)
22
I.3 I.4
Public and private budget balances, 1990–2007 (% of GDP at current prices)
31
I.5
Gross savings ratios, 1982–2008 (% of GDP at current prices)
39
I.6
Per capita GDP growth, 1974–2009 (annual average growth rates)
41
A.1
Potential GDP growth and output gap, 1960–2007 (annual average growth rate, % of GDP*)
45
II.1
Tariff liberalization, 1973–9 (rates on cif value)
56
II.2
Cost per dollar of imports, 1973–82
58
II.3
Main imports of consumer goods and total imports, 1970, 1980, 1981 (1977 US$ millions)
62
II.4
Shares by income brackets of consumption of imported goods: main non-traditional imports in 1978 (% of total consumption)
63
Manufacturing output: Chile and the world economy, 1974–82 (1973 = 100)
65
II.5 II.6
Balance of payments, 1973–82 (1977 US$ millions)
70
III.1
Deficit on the current account and capital flows, 1970–82
84
III.2
Total foreign debt and private financial creditors, 1974–82
85
III.3
Public and private net foreign debt, 1973–82 (US$ millions)
86
III.4
Gross annual flows of loans, by debtors, 1976–82
87
III.5
Domestic and external real interest rates in pesos, 1975–82 (annual percentage rates)
98
Foreign debt and public guarantees, 1975–89 (US$ millions and percentages of total)
111
IV.1 IV.2
Production, consumption, investment, and external shocks per capita, 1980–9 (in 1977 pesos as a share of 1981 actual GDP)
114
IV.3
Net transfers of funds abroad by creditor, 1983–9 (US$ millions)
118
viii
List of Tables ix
IV.4
Indexes of stock prices in pesos and converted to US dollars, 1980–9 (1980 = 100)
121
V.1
Average tariff and real exchange rate, 1973–89
138
V.2
Growth of export volume, 1961–89 (annual averages, %)
141
V.3
Composition of goods exports, 1970–89 (%)
142
V.4
Geographic distribution of Chilean exports, according to degree of elaboration, 1970–89
143
VI.1
Growth of export volume, 1986–2009 (annual averages, %)
156
VI.2
Average tariff, collected tariff, and real exchange rate, 1984–2009
157
Indicators of export diversification, 1990–2008 (number of markets, firms, and products)
161
Geographic distribution of Chilean exports, according to technological content, 1983–2008
163
VI.5
Export participation in total output, 1961–2009 (% of GDP)
168
VI.6
Exports and economic growth, 1961–2009 (annual average rates of growth, %)
171
VI.3 VI.4
VII.1 Wages, family allowances, and social expenditure, 1970–2009 (real indices, 1989 = 100)
181
VII.2 Distribution of household expenditure in Santiago, 1969, 1978, 1988 (%)
182
VII.3 Poverty evolution in Chile, 1987–2006 (%)
186
VII.4 Poverty dynamics in Chile, 1996–2001–2006 (% of population)
187
VII.5 Distribution of household expenditure and income in Santiago, with imputed rent for homeowners, 1988 and 1997 (%)
189
VIII.1 Composition of capital flows, 1980–2008 (2008 US$ as % of GDP)
212
VIII.2 Net capital inflows and deficit on the current account, 1980–2008 (% of GDP)
225
VIII.3 Implicit cost of reserve requirement on foreign borrowing, 1991–8 (annualized rates)
227
IX.1
Investment, savings and growth, 1974–2009 (annual growth rates, % of GDP)
237
x
List of Tables
IX.2
Gross investment and depreciation, 1995–2009 (% of GDP at constant 2003 prices)
255
IX.3
Fiscal indicators, 2001–2009
258
X.1
GDP, GDP per capita and income distribution, 1974–2009 (annual growth rates, %)
270
List of Boxes III.1
The “crawling” exchange rate: a pioneer reform in 1965–70
IV.1
Debt-swaps programs
119
92
V.1
Incentives to exports by the late 1980s
137
VI.1
Molybdenum in the national economy
160
VII.1 Wages and the poverty line, 2000 and 2005 (monthly income in UF)
177
VIII.1 Regulations on capital flows by mid-1998
221
xi
Preface to the Second Edition This book reflects my research and views on crucial developments in the Chilean economy from the 1970s up to 2009. I have organized the text chronologically, in four subperiods: the first half of the Pinochet dictatorship, the second half of that regime, and then the two decades since the return to democratically elected presidents in 1990. In my view, under a restrictive definition, the four subperiods correspond to different approaches to building a market economy, progressing from an extremely orthodox neoliberalism, in the first half of the Pinochet regime (1973–82), to some significant deviations (pragmatism with a regressive bias) in the second half (1982–9), and then two variants of meaningful trials intended to achieve growth with equity (pragmatism with a progressive bias, but inconsistencies) with diverse inputs and outputs. This book is a combination of newly prepared material and previously published papers. In this second English edition, I have deleted three chapters from the first edition, abridged several sections, and added some 50,000 words, including several new sections and two new chapters. The older historical sections are built on papers written close to the times of the events, on import liberalization (Chapter II), on the building of the debt crisis of 1982 (Chapter III), and on the rectifications with recovery in the 1980s (Chapter IV). These articles were written while I was working at the Center for Economic Research on Latin America (CIEPLAN) between 1976 and 1990, no doubt the most inspiring period of my professional life. I have edited them thoroughly, but the original tone and emphasis have been retained. Happily, I continue to feel comfortable with them today. Although the knowledge informing them has improved and deepened (I hope), there is no discontinuity of approach, and I feel that the various pieces are consistent. But the reader is to be the judge. Here and there a line of thought has been expanded by incorporating paragraphs from other essays or that are newly written. Naturally, duplications among chapters have been reduced as deemed convenient, and I have deleted what I judged to be details not relevant today. Subsequently, for the first edition, I wrote the initial draft of an essay on income distribution and poverty, and a chapter on exports. For this second edition, the two chapters were carefully revised and expanded. I prepared a new chapter on reforms and policies after the contagion of the Asian crisis, as well as a chapter on exports and growth, focused on explaining the sharp variability observed in the correlation between export dynamism and GDP performance in different subperiods. A brief conclusion compares the xii
Preface to the Second Edition
xiii
overall performance during the dictatorship with that of the four democratic governments that have followed since 1990, and poses some issues and challenges for the next decade. These chapters, and several new sections, were written while I was at the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC); the main input of another chapter was coauthored in a highly fruitful association with Manuel Agosin and with valuable input from workshops held at ECLAC. The entire typescript has been revised and updated at the Department of Economics of the University of Chile during 2008 and 2009. I have made a serious effort to harmonize statistical series and to make use of excellent research by other colleagues on data harmonization and explanations of events. They are cited through the book. I have attempted to deal with each issue and period in a way that combines pragmatism with a solid analytical base, and to consistently take into account the objectives of growth with equity, while trying to keep my distance from fashion, myths, and extremes. In this book I stress relationships – reforms, policies, and outcomes – with other Latin American nations, on issues that I discuss at length in my book Reforming Latin America’s Economies after Market Fundamentalism, prepared during my stay at ECLAC, a period which I recall gratefully. Eight years of work at the central bank are reflected in some of the emphasis throughout the book. In the preparation of successive editions, in which statistical series were updated and harmonized, figures checked, duplications eliminated, sections of other writings incorporated, and language improved, I enjoyed the excellent collaboration and efficiency of my research assistants Heriberto Tapia and Rodrigo Heresi, both at ECLAC. In the final stage of this second edition in English, I acknowledge the support of Rodrigo Heresi, David Coble, and Felipe Labrín, at the Department of Economics of the University of Chile, and of Julia Escobedo in the checking of files. Finally, I would like to express my appreciation to CIEPLAN for its valuable support for this publication. To all those mentioned, and to the many who contributed but have been unjustly omitted here, my deepest gratitude. All responsibility for the content of this book and any errors it may contain are, of course, solely mine. Ricardo Ffrench-Davis Santiago, July 2010
This page intentionally left blank
First Part An Account of Four Decades
This page intentionally left blank
I Economic development in Chile since the 1970s
One main reason for the relevance of the Chilean experience for other emerging economies, with the implementation of a free market economic model, rests in the depth of transformations and the long period since this process was started. The first intense reforms were launched in 1973, under the dictatorship of general Pinochet. Usually, it has been accepted that there is “one” successful Chilean model. The fact is that the more than one-third of a century since 1973 includes several subperiods, with different approaches, diverse external environments, and notably diverse economic and social outcomes. This diversity is of great significance, since Chile teaches about successes but also deep mistakes and failures to be avoided. The first stage of the reforms (1973–81) was characterized by the implementation of a neoliberal model in its purest ideological form. Deep trade and financial liberalizations, and the adoption of “neutral” economic policies, were accompanied by massive privatizations. In general, by 1981, success was achieved in reducing the inflation rate and eliminating the fiscal deficit, but at the expense of the external balance and a low investment ratio. The consequence was an economic and social collapse in 1982, with a GDP drop of 14%, high unemployment exceeding 30% of the labor force, and a significant increase in poverty with a worsening income distribution. The second stage (1982–9) involved moves towards more pragmatic policies to overcome the effects of the deep crisis. It involved a series of foreign debt renegotiations, several policy interventions aiming to balance the external deficit – such as tariff increases and “selective” export incentives – and the direct takeover of the collapsed financial system, followed by reprivatization when balance sheets were in order thanks to heavy public subsidies to banks and debtors. At the end of this period, the economy had recovered, while income distribution had worsened even further than in the seventies. During recovery, actual GDP grew vigorously, but after due consideration of the 1982 recession, it emerges that average growth was under 3% in both halves of the Pinochet regime. 3
4 Economic Development in Chile
By 1990, in the return to democracy, the Chilean economy faced the challenges of achieving a sustained high average GDP growth and of serving the great social debt accumulated in the years of dictatorship. Thus, a third variant of the economic model began in 1990, under democracy. We have named this stage that of the reforms to the reforms, since it started from what had been inherited; the formal slogan of the Concertación Democrática, a center-left coalition of socialists and Christian democrats, was “change with stability” to achieve growth with equity in the socioeconomic dimension of the program of the new government. There were significant reforms of the market model, strengthening the social component and correcting severe failures of economic policies. These included labor reforms (which restored several labor rights) and a tax reform (which raised public revenue in order to improve social expenditure). In addition, substantive counter-cyclical changes in fiscal, monetary, capital markets, exchange rate, and regulation policies were implemented, aiming for a stable and sustainable macroeconomic environment, functional for economic development. It was in this context in which Chile expanded its productive capacity in a sustainable manner in the nineties, growing at annual rates exceeding 7%, improving at the same time the social indicators; that is, it partly achieved the elusive combination of economic growth with equity. Nevertheless, gradually, after the mid-1990s, Chile weakened its countercyclical macroeconomic approach and became, as a consequence, vulnerable to the turbulences originating in the Asian crisis: the real exchange rate appreciated significantly and the external deficit doubled. As a consequence, the economy exhibited a stagnating actual output and a drop in the growth of potential GDP in the quinquenium 1999–2003. After a partial and hesitating recovery in 2004–8, and the arrival of the contagion of the global crisis in 2009, today it should be seeking reforms to the model that would allow the resumption of sustained growth after the weak economic performance of 1999–2008. We analyze all these situations through the text. Section 1 of this chapter presents a brief summary of outstanding features of the Chilean economy since the fifties, advancing quickly up to the period on which this book focuses, which begins with the military coup of 1973. Section 2 covers the Pinochet regime. Section 3 summarizes the four democratic governments of Presidents Patricio Aylwin, Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle, Ricardo Lagos, and Michelle Bachelet. Finally, a methodological annex digs into the long-run trends of Chile’s economic growth during the past halfcentury; we emphasize (i) the contrast between average figures recorded in dictatorship and in democracy, and (ii) the respective instabilities exhibited by the real economy (employment, investment, output) in diverse subperiods; finally, the annex presents alternative measurements of potential GDP or productive frontier.
Economic Development in Chile
5
1 A historical perspective on development strategies At the time of the Great Depression, the Chilean economy was one of the most developed of the region. The Great Depression affected the Chilean economy severely. The decline in the terms of trade and the collapse of exports were disastrous (see Muñoz, 1986). Following the worst years, however, the Chilean economy enjoyed a significant recovery, with a rate of industrial growth that mitigated the constraints imposed by the trade slump. Principally, this was the result of economic policies that responded actively to the crisis with new industrialization strategies. During the 1950s, however, the development model began to encounter new problems.1 On the one hand, indiscriminate protection given to import substitutes reduced its productivity and discouraged the development of new exports. The instability of traditional export prices was transmitted to the domestic economy through recurrent balance of payments shocks. One main warning signal about the intensity of failures in the Chilean economy was the accelerating inflation of 1952–5, when the annual rate of increase in the consumer price index (CPI) jumped from 12 to 86%. The government of President Carlos Ibáñez, which had been elected by a large majority in September 1952, with the support of independents and leftists, lost its popularity, encountered growing social unrest, and ended up adopting an orthodox stabilization program. Both the money supply and government spending were sharply curtailed, and the complex system of regulations introduced during the Depression and World War II was cut back. But soon, the recessionary effects of these initiatives led to widespread social rejection. In 1958 a rightist government was elected. Given the prevailing high inflation, President Jorge Alessandri focused on achieving price stabilization. In his view, that was a prerequisite for stimulating private investment. Stabilization was to be achieved by eliminating the “inflationary financing” of the fiscal deficit and pegging the nominal exchange rate. Consequently, a stabilization program anchored to a pegged exchange rate and import liberalization was designed, supported by abundant foreign loans to the government. This program enjoyed temporary success. Inflation was indeed substantially reduced in 1960–1, but the balance of payments deficits grew so large that international reserves were soon depleted. The investment ratio and output had risen, but the increase in exports was unable to offset the great expansion in imports, which exceeded the available external financing. As a result of a currency crisis, in 1962 the exchange rate was devalued, import restrictions were reinstalled, and inflation climbed back. In 1964 the Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei Montalva was elected President. The government strategy was based on a three-point platform: a 1 The next three presidential periods – 1952–8, 1958–64 and 1964–70 – are analyzed in detail in Ffrench-Davis (1973).
6 Economic Development in Chile
gradual, multi-anchored, non-recessionary stabilization program; an industrial modernization program that reactivated the role of the State as the generator of investment initiatives, introducing new, leading sectors (such as telecommunications and the petrochemical industry), and developing non-traditional exports; and a program of structural and social change that included a significant agrarian reform, the first steps in the nationalization of the nation’s large copper mines, and the development of community and labor-based grassroots organizations (Ahumada, 1966; Molina, 1972). In 1964, productive capacity was underutilized and real wages were depressed, which made it possible to reconcile a boost in output, wage increases, and a reduced inflation. This was facilitated by improved terms of trade in 1965–6. Increased fiscal expenditures in 1965 were funded by a significant tax reform, which raised revenue, diminished evasion, and improved tax equity. After strong growth of gross domestic product (GDP) in 1965–6, underutilized productive capacity gradually became exhausted, while investment continued at moderate levels. Real wages also rose much faster than planned, with a sharp surge in the organized sectors. This resulted in cost pressures on prices and had a negative impact on the government budget and on inflationary expectations. Strikes spread, and relations between the government and urban labor unions deteriorated. Inflation, which had been dampened in 1965–7, began to rekindle in the subsequent years. The macroeconomic outcome was a gradual rise in the underutilization of productive capacity after 1967. In fact, actual average growth was a vigorous 5.9% in the first two years and a modest 3.1% in the final four years of the Frei presidency. After reaching a high rate of use of labor and capital in 1966, the gradual underutilization of capacity had generated a significant output gap by late 1970.2 Nevertheless, no disequilibria as traumatic as those of 1955 and 1962 in the past, or 1975 and 1982 in the future, were recorded. A great disequilibrium that increased over the years took place in the sociopolitical arena. Political antagonisms prevented the formation of a broadbased coalition government. The scope of the new development strategy was extremely ambitious. Evidently, without a broad and solid coalition the chances of success were slim. Differences concerning the nature and degree of change prevented the formation of a large center-left majority in favor of progressive reforms. Only after the military coup would these two political sectors reach consensus for the accomplishment of sustained economic and
2 After a drop in 1967, a sharp improvement of the terms of trade in 1968 and 1969 was recorded (equivalent to 6% of GDP), followed by a partial negative shock of 3% in 1970. A significant share of the improved external balance was captured by the Chilean government and saved as international reserves in the central bank, in order to face future deterioration of copper prices. This was a pioneering approach to the implementation of a counter-cyclical copper stabilization fund, seeking to stabilize both fiscal expenditure and the foreign exchange market.
Economic Development in Chile
7
social reforms, winning all elections after 1988 and in charge of the four presidential regimes from 1990 to 2010, until defeat in the latter year. In brief, the Frei government implemented an ambitious program of progressive reforms. Productive capacity growth averaged only 4.3%, rather low compared with the 5.6% average recorded by Latin America. But currency crises were avoided and inflation was curbed (see Table I.1). A significant reform of the tax system was accomplished and 51% domestic control over the large copper mines was achieved, leading to the capture of a sizable share of the economic rent from that rich natural resource. The rural sector – with the implementation of structural reforms, most notably agrarian reform – and the industrial sector were modernized. Exports were diversified, with a steady increase in non-mining items, and there was a strengthening of Latin American regional integration, which was also instrumental in trade diversification. The State apparatus was modernized by providing it with better qualified human resources. A stable real exchange rate policy was put in place and sustained, assisted by a sort of pioneer copper stabilization fund, and strides were made in rationalizing the import regime and export promotion. In 1970, President Salvador Allende was elected by one-third of the national electorate. The Unidad Popular (UP) government sought far-reaching structural change, particularly with respect to property and without regard for macroeconomic equilibrium. It proceeded without a social and political majority. President Allende inherited idle installed capacity and large international reserves. This allowed an expansionary policy with rapidly rising wages and social expenditures. Economic activity responded positively, with an 8% rise in GDP and no significant inflationary pressures in 1971. However, the expansion was carried out with public revenue losses due to drops in real (public) utility tariffs, an appreciating real exchange rate, and a rapidly expanding money supply, which financed a rising fiscal deficit. The fiscal deficit climbed to 12% of GDP in 1972–3, financed principally by central bank money printing. The huge deficit was strongly influenced by repressing price controls on the goods and services sold by public enterprises (Larraín, 1991), while public and private investment became depressed. Meanwhile, structural changes, including completion of the nationalization of the large copper mines and the nationalization of the banking system and several other enterprises, were under way. In addition, many firms and farms were taken over arbitrarily by workers or political groups. Aggregate demand rose disproportionately with respect to the slowing creation of new productive capacity, while external, fiscal, and monetary balances worsened at an accelerating pace. This deterioration was intensified by the persistent worsening of the terms of trade from 1970 to 1972, and by the sharp cut-off of private and US government loans (see Bitar, 1979; Dornbusch and Edwards, 1991).
8
Table I.1 Comparison of key macroeconomic variables, 1959–2009a During the government of Allesandri Frei M. Allende Pinochet Concertación Aylwin Frei R.-T. Lagos Bachelet (1959–64) (1965–70) (1971–3) (1974–89) (1990–2009) (1990–3) (1994–9) (2000–5) (2006–8) GDP growth (%) Exports growth (%) Inflation rate (%)b Unemployment rate (%)c Real wages (1970 ⫽ 100) Investment (% of GDP) In 1977 pesos In 2003 pesos Government surplus (% of GDP) Structural surplus (% of GDP)d Income distribution (Q5/Q1)e Population growth (%)
3.7 6.2 26.6 5.2 62.2
4.0 2.3 26.3 5.9 84.2
1.2 –4.1 293.8 4.7 89.7
2.9 10.7 79.9 18 81.8
5.0 7.2 7.0 8.7 129.7
7.7 9.6 17.7 7.3 99.8
5.4 9.7 6.1 7.5 123.4
4.3 5.9 2.9 10.7 140.0
2.8 2.4 4.0 8.8 153.5
20.7 17.9 –4.7 n.a. 12.5 2.5
19.5 16.8 –2.5 n.a. 13.9 2.1
16.1 13.9 –11.5 n.a. 11.4 1.8
15.7 13.6 0.3 n.a. 18.5 1.6
25.0 21.5 1.9 0.7 15.3 1.3
20.7 17.9 2.0 0.4 13.1 1.8
25.1 21.6 1.2 0.8 16.8 1.5
24.2 20.8 0.7 0.7 15.0 1.1
30.2 26.0 4.3 0.4 14.0 1.0
Source: Central Bank, Budget Office (DIPRES) and National Bureau of Statistics (INE). a Annual growth rates of GDP and exports; average of annual rates of inflation and unemployment. bFrom December to December. cWith emergency employment correction; without correction it is 13.3% in 1974–89, 7.4% in 1994–9, 9.7% in 2000–5 and 8.1% in 2006–9. dOfficial estimates that use trend GDP as structural tax base, underestimating potential GDP.
Economic Development in Chile
9
A change of the head of the economic policy team in the middle of 1972 was accompanied by a serious attempt to correct the course taken. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the macroeconomic imbalances and the lack of governance frustrated this and several later attempts at rectification. During 1972–3, actual GDP declined by 4.1% because of sectoral imbalances and bottlenecks resulting from import restrictions, countless strikes, distortions in official relative prices, a growing black market, rising underutilization of potential GDP, and accelerating inflation (Bitar, 1979). Meanwhile, income distribution initially improved due to significant expansion of employment and nominal wages, but it deteriorated later with the climbing hyperinflation (an annualized 700% in the four months before the September 1973 coup) and the underutilization of potential GDP in 1972–3. In all, this period shows a distributive improvement but within a deteriorated economy: a less concentrated distribution of a smaller cake. Economic policy ended up hurting the government politically, providing ammunition to a tough opposition. The size of idle productive capacity at the outset as well as the State’s inability to enforce price controls (at levels sometimes as low as one-tenth of generalized “black” market prices) and to sustain balance of payment imbalances were highly overestimated. Macroeconomic imbalances were fully felt in the second year of the administration, and from there on the struggle for power absorbed most of the energies of both government and opposition. Economic disequilibria, black markets, hyperinflation, low governance and the growing inability to reach political agreements finally gave way to the dramatic institutional break-up and the prevalence of the coup supporters in September 11, 1973 (Bitar, 1979; Baño, 2003).
2 The neoliberal strategy, 1973–893 The period covered by the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet is longer than that of the three democratic governments that preceded it (Alessandri, Frei Montalva, and Allende) and the three that followed it (Aylwin, Frei RuizTagle, and Lagos). This long period can be divided into two halves.4 The 3
This section is based on an abridged and revised version of “Economic and political instability in Chile: 1950–89,” co-authored with Oscar Muñoz, published in S. Teitel (ed.), Towards a New Development Strategy for Latin America: Pathways from Hirschman’s Thoughts, Inter-American Development Bank, 1992. I am indebted to Sergio Bitar, Manuel Marfán, Patricio Meller, Oscar Muñoz, Dagmar Raczynski, Joseph Ramos, John Sheahan, and Simón Teitel for their valuable comments. 4 The economic and social dimensions are examined in CIEPLAN (1982, 1983), Foxley (1983), Ramos (1986), Edwards and Cox-Edwards (1987), Larraín (1987), Fontaine (1989), Büchi (1993), Meller (1996a), and Larraín and Vergara (2000). Texts of wider coverage, with abundant references, are Moulián (1997), Hunneus (2001), and Correa et al. (2002).
10 Economic Development in Chile
first, between 1973 and 1981, is a case of orthodoxy or neoliberalism in its purest or extreme form. The second, from 1982 until March 1990, within the same general approach, introduced numerous heterodox interventions, which gave a more pragmatic, down to earth, shade. They were stimulated by the severe crisis resulting from the deep ideological policies of the first half. This second period can be identified as pragmatism (which is positive because it tries to adapt to the real economy); nevertheless, several of the interventions had a strong regressive bias (evidently negative), favoring sectors with high incomes at the expense of medium and low income sectors. That explains the significant worsening of income distribution and poverty during the 1980s. (a) Pure neoliberalism, 1973–81 One distinctive feature of neoliberalism is its “globalism”: that is, its neglect of the implications of sectoral imbalances; of the heterogeneity in productive structures and among economic agents, and in access to voice and power of different sectors; of the social and allocative implications of market segmentations, and of the difficulty of transmitting transparently information to all sorts of economic agents so that they can contribute to fulfilling the expectations of policymakers. Ultimately, neoliberalism also underestimates the frequent presence of destabilizing adjustment processes, lags, and overshooting, and the incompleteness of markets and institutions in developing nations. These elements represent severe obstacles that prevent “neutral” and indirect global economic policies from being effective, by themselves alone, in emerging economies that are in the process of deep transformation like Chile was. In parallel with the changes in the economic field, there were structural reforms in social organizations. According to the rhetoric of the dictatorship, these were part of the project to create a competitive society of “free men.” This involved reforms in the university system, in the organization and dependence of elementary schools, in health services, professional associations, and student and labor organizations.5 The initial concerns of Pinochet’s government lay with controlling the macroeconomic disequilibria and especially the hyper-inflation inherited in 1973.6 Soon, the arguments shifted into the inefficiencies of the prevailing economic system, according to the international speech that became fashionable in the following years. Increasingly, structural changes deepened, as an extreme neoliberal group extended its power until it dominated public policymaking. 5 See Campero and Valenzuela (1981), Vergara (1981), and several articles in Revista Mensaje, especially Ruiz-Tagle (1979, 1980) and Zañartu (1980). 6 Consumer prices rose by 600% in 1973; as said, in the last four months of the UP government the annualized inflation rate reached 700%.
Economic Development in Chile
11
(i) The reforms The main reforms were abolition of price controls; across-the-board import liberalization; sharp deregulation of the domestic financial market, in terms of both access by new financial institutions and interest rate and lending policies, followed at the end of the decade by a deregulation of capital inflows; reduction of the public sector and restrictions on the activities of public enterprises; privatization of the pension system and part of the national health service; the return of expropriated businesses and lands to their former owners; privatization of many traditional public enterprises; suppression of most current labor union rights; and a tax reform, which, along with eliminating some distortions (e.g. the cumulative effects of sales taxes corrected by implementing a value added tax), sharply reduced the share of direct and progressive taxes. The traditional role of the State, as entrepreneur and promoter of investment and industrialization, was to be curtailed as quickly as possible so that those functions might be fulfilled exclusively by private agents in liberalized open markets, under the “neutral” rules of a free-market economy. Privatization was not limited to transferring businesses expropriated during the regime of President Allende. It was also extended to enterprises created during successive governments after the establishment of the public Development Corporation (CORFO) in 1939. In 1970, CORFO controlled the ownership of forty-six enterprises, a number that rose to around three hundred in 1973.7 In 1980 there were only twenty-four enterprises left in the hands of this institution, half of which were in the process of being sold. There were also a dozen public enterprises dependent on other governmental departments. Among these were the Copper Corporation (CODELCO) and the National Oil Enterprise (ENAP). The sale of enterprises was largely conducted in periods of domestic recession and extremely high domestic interest rates. Hence, few agents were able to participate as buyers. This was one of the causes of the resulting acute concentration of wealth.8 It is interesting that there was weak participation by multinational corporations, in contrast with the official expectations of a vigorous flow of foreign direct investment (FDI). However, massive loans from international commercial banks provided a substantial share of the financing required by the domestic economic groups acquiring the enterprises being privatized. In the agricultural sector, the transfer of ownership had dramatic significance. The agrarian reform that had taken place during the governments of 7 This figure does not include about 220 enterprises subject to intervention in 1973. See Vergara (1981). Bitar (1979, Chapter X) examines the social property area program, its evolution, and resulting problems. 8 It is well documented that the transfers were made at prices significantly lower than normal market values. See Dahse (1979), Foxley (1983), Marcel (1989), and Devlin and Cominetti (1994).
12 Economic Development in Chile
Presidents Frei and Allende came to an abrupt end. After 1973, around onethird of the expropriated land was returned to former owners and close to another one-third was auctioned to non-rural dwellers. Barely one-third of the area was allocated to peasants. Given the curtailment of State provision of credit and technical support to peasants and cooperatives, these were some of the principal victims of the restructuring of public expenditure. It is estimated that, as early as 1979, about half of the peasants who had been assigned land had been forced to sell or rent out their farms (see Ortega, 1987).9 At the same time, a massive expulsion of peasants from the farms on which they had been living before and during the agrarian reform took place. In 1980, another major step in the process of privatization was taken in the social security system. The pension regime, hitherto financed through a pay-as-you-go system, was replaced with individual capitalization in private social security societies (AFP) created by the new system.10 Existing pensions and those of workers who would retire within five years continued to be the responsibility of the public sector; the rest of the workers could choose between remaining in the old system or transferring to an AFP. For merely making the transfer, the worker benefited from an automatic take-home increase of 11%. One enterprise of great importance that was able to evade privatization was CODELCO, the copper public firm. It underwent powerful onslaughts from the economic team but succeeded in warding them off. Even so, it suffered budgetary restrictions and systematic constraints on its expansion imposed by the Ministry of Finance, despite the substantial profits it contributed to the Treasury. It was only permitted to make investments that maintained the production level reached in 1977. Within the contradictions produced by the privatization dogma, the government encouraged, unsuccessfully hitherto, the development of other copper deposits to be operated by foreign companies.11 With regard to trade liberalization, practically all non-tariff restrictions were removed. Tariffs were rapidly reduced from the high level predominant in 1973 (a simple mean rate of 94%) to a uniform tariff of 10% for all goods from 1979. Likewise, trade reforms included the suppression of price bands, anti-dumping devices, and public purchasing mechanisms designed 9 Two financial factors that contributed to the pressure on peasants to sell or lease their allotted land were the high cost of credit in the domestic capital market and the lack of prior relations between peasants and commercial banks. On the agriculture and peasant situation see Ortega (1987). 10 The features of the pay as you go system and a comparative analysis with other options are discussed in Uthoff (2001). The health reform is analyzed in Titelman (2001). 11 The main foreign investment in the 1970s was performed by Exxon through the acquisition of a deposit in exploitation. See Vignolo (1980) and Bande and FfrenchDavis (1989).
Economic Development in Chile
13
to attenuate the transmission of external instability into the domestic economy. In line with the objective of unilateral and across-the-board opening to international trade, Chile withdrew from the Andean Pact in 1976. Further, a quite liberal statute for FDI was launched early in 1974. Chapter II covers in detail import and other trade policies. In the financial field, a drastic reform of the domestic market was introduced in 1975. The banks that had been nationalized under the President Allende regime were privatized. Interest rates were left totally free, regulations with respect to the terms and allocation of credit were eliminated, and new financial local and foreign entities were authorized with few restrictions. Finally, in relation to the capital account, there was a gradual relaxation of restrictions on financial inflows. Chapter III analyzes financial reforms, and their effective contribution to the acute recession that started in 1982. (ii) Achievements and failures Utilization rates of installed productive capacity had recovered in the first twelve months following the military coup. Labor discipline (imposed through the repression of unions and persecution of leaders), the liberalization of prices, exchange rate devaluation, increased public works investment, and high copper prices had removed bottlenecks and favored higher use of potential GDP. Rising copper prices in 1973–4 more than offset increased spending on oil imports, with a net improvement in the terms of trade equivalent to almost 5% of GDP in 1974 compared with 1972. A novel feature for Chile was the strength of the increase in the export volume. There were four causes for this outcome: (i) a very sharp real devaluation; (ii) export capacity installed in earlier years; (iii) the removal of bottlenecks in the sector and the liberalization of imports of inputs; and (iv) a sharp reduction in domestic demand (see Ffrench-Davis, 1979). The implementation of the neoliberal strategy was disturbed by two developments that negatively affected the Chilean economy during the 1970s: (i) an extremely high domestic inflation rate, which the monetarist stabilization policy had great difficulty in controlling; and (ii) the first international oil shock, which, coupled with the sharp decline of copper prices in 1975, created a severe balance of payments crisis. Until 1976, anti-inflationary action was based solely on monetary policy. From May to August of 1973, as noted above, the annualized inflation rate had skyrocketed to 700%.12 A few days after the coup, most of the controlled prices were freed within a context of high uncertainty. The foreseeable result was a dramatic upsurge of inflation (88% in October 1973). As the 12 All the inflation figures used here refer to the consumer price index as corrected in Cortázar and Marshall (1980). The official index significantly underestimated the actual rise in prices, mainly in 1973 and in 1976–8.
14 Economic Development in Chile
fiscal situation was being brought under control, monetary policy became effectively restrictive in the course of 1974. The official line was that the new price fixers, the private entrepreneurs, had to take money supply behavior into account in order to define the price of their products. The concrete fact is that the information on money supply became widely available with a lag of some months and with various divergent indicators, and given the high inflation, prices were often adjusted more frequently than once a month. Under these circumstances, the main point of reference for each economic agent became the actual behavior of entrepreneurs as a whole, measured through changes in the official monthly CPI, the most easily available and up-to-date indicator. The consequence was that annual inflation rates exceeding 300% still persisted by the third year of implementation of the model, despite monetary restrictions, a fiscal budget already under control in 1975, and a large recessive output gap (20% in 1975–6). Additionally, the price of copper dropped sharply by the second half of 1974, while the oil shock persisted, with a net negative terms of trade effect amounting to the equivalent of 6.4% of GDP in 1975 as compared to 1972. This sharp negative shock, coupled with persistent inflation, prompted the government to introduce a tougher adjustment program in 1975, based on a restriction of aggregate demand, led by fiscal and monetary contraction and significant exchange rate devaluation. The monetary restrictions, rather than influencing principally the price level, had a greater impact on economic activity: during 1975 industrial production fell by 28%, GDP declined by 17% (see Figure I.1),13 and open unemployment (including emergency programs) peaked at 20% (see Jadresic, 1986). The predominance of sharp demand-reducing policies over a weaker set of switching policies (those affecting the composition of demand and supply) explains the significant underutilization of productive capacity or output gap. This generated high unemployment, numerous bankruptcies, and depressed capital formation. The “price,” which was in fact adjusted swiftly downward, was that of labor: by 1975 wages had lost about 40% of their purchasing power owing to the drastic repression of unions, huge unemployment, and the legal readjustment based on an underestimated CPI.14 The monetarist recipe for controlling inflation multiplied, in the domestic economy, by three the depressive effects deriving from the negative external shocks and involved a notably high cost, both socially and in terms of economic activity (see Foxley, 1983; Ramos, 1986). By mid-1976, the economic 13 Naturally, the direct impact of the deterioration in the terms of trade observed in 1975 is not included in the figure of GDP decline. GDP measures real output; the terms of trade affect the real purchasing power resulting from a given GDP. 14 As Cortázar and Marshall (1980) document, in that period there was a systematic, month after month, underestimation of the CPI; the official CPI was used as reference for wage and pension readjustments. Nonetheless, even the corrected CPI shows a gradual drop in the rate of inflation.
Economic Development in Chile
15
106 Alessandri Frei Montalva Allende
Aylwin
Pinochet
Frei R.T.
Lagos
Bachelet
104 GDP growth and output gap (annual average growth rates, % of GDP)
102
1974–89 1990–2008
100
Actual GDP (%)
2.9
Potential GDP (%)
2.5
Output Gap (%)
98
5.3 5.4 5.6 2.5
10.4
96 94 92 90 Actual GDP
Potential GDP (ICOR) 2008
2004
2006
2002
2000
1998
1996
1994
1992
1990
1988
1986
1984
1980
1982
1976
1978
1974
1972
1970
1968
1966
1962
1964
1960
88
Figure I.1 Actual and potential GDP, 1960–2009 (log scale, GDP* 1996 ⫽ 100). Source: Author’s calculations detailed in the annex of this chapter.
team recognized – implicitly – that monetary control was proving to be unable to restrain inflation on its own. Then the exchange rate anchor was incorporated into the anti-inflationary policy. Thus began a long process in which this rate was used to slow down inflation by reducing the cost of imported goods and attempting to influence inflationary expectations: analytically, it was a transition from closed to open monetarism. In June 1976 and March 1977, exchange rate revaluations were made (a reduction in the number of pesos per US dollar), and these were accompanied by a systematic mass media campaign.15 The measure had a significant effect, since inflation rapidly fell to levels below 100% annually after the first revaluation and below 60% after the second. There was a belated understanding that inflation was not being generated by an excess of demand and monetary expansion. The belated realization was, however, incomplete, since it implied an excessive conditioning of the exchange rate to the anti-inflationary policy, thereby sacrificing external equilibrium and the production of tradables. The severe crisis of 1982 would show that had been a wrong bet. The evolution of anti-inflationary policy ended in 1979 with the freezing of the exchange rate. As a consequence, a new stage of automatic macroeconomic policy was introduced when the government fully adopted the “monetary approach to the balance of payments” then in fashion in 15 After the publicized revaluations, daily mini-devaluations were applied. Exchange rate policy is analyzed, abridgedly, in Chapter II, and at length in Ffrench-Davis (1981).
16 Economic Development in Chile
several academic and orthodox financial circles. The new official version was that, with a fixed exchange rate, in an economy with free imports, domestic prices could not rise more rapidly than international inflation. This policy was supported by heavy foreign lending, which more than covered, until 1981, an expanding external deficit (see Chapter III). When the exchange rate was pegged, domestic annual inflation exceeded 30%, while international inflation neared 12%. Subsequently, a convergence between the two rates occurred, but only gradually; as a consequence, for a couple of years, domestic inflation was markedly higher than the external rate, so that the exchange rate lost purchasing power.16 Hence, the regime of free imports and an appreciated exchange rate caused a flood on the domestic market and an unsustainable disequilibrium in the current account during 1981. To face the external deficit, the official policy relied on an “automatic adjustment” in the style of the gold standard: it claimed that the real exchange rate would automatically adjust with the contraction of monetary liquidity associated with the current loss of international reserves in the central bank. This contraction was expected to have provoked a sharp drop in domestic prices and nominal wages. However, the fact that the exchange rate between 1979 and 1981 had accumulated, not by 2 or 3% but by 30% (besides the still lagged effect of import liberalization, as analyzed in Chapter II) was overlooked. The outcome was a drastic fall in sales, output and employment, and a progressive strangulation of business firms through increasing indebtedness at extremely high real interest rates (see Chapter III). Despite numerous tough restrictions on labor union activities and a real wage that remained below the average level of 1970, the authorities blamed salaries for their failure to achieve a fluent and rapid automatic adjustment.17 In mid-1982, they tried to establish a general reduction of nominal wages, but the economic team was unable to impose such a measure. Consequently, they turned to exchange rate devaluation, but with unsustainable disturbances in the productive and financial systems: between June and October of 1982, the nominal exchange rate was devalued by over 70% amidst a general crisis. The corresponding inflationary impact implied that the CPI increase
16 It is relevant that external inflation (IEP,measured in US dollars) also decreased due to the sharp appreciation of the US dollar with respect to the currencies of the other industrialized countries: in the twelve months before June 1982, the IEP reached an annualized average of –2%. 17 The lower limit for the adjustment in wages was determined by the official CPI of the preceding period. Various authors blame this rule for the costly recessive adjustment. Nonetheless, there were no international precedents of cases of massive deflation that had resulted from restriction of the money supply, which had operated fluently, at the required intensity, and without causing severe problems for debtors or economic activity.
Economic Development in Chile
17
in the following twelve months jumped to 32%, in contrast with the 4% recorded in the previous period. In brief, the exchange anchor was effective in curbing inflation, which by early 1982 stood at the international level, even below zero in some months.18 But once again the severity of the macroeconomic imbalances generated was underestimated. Efforts had been concentrated on bringing down inflation, while external equilibrium and investment in human and physical capital were overlooked. As said, since 1979, the real exchange rate had lost a third of its purchasing power, the external debt doubled, the export boom faltered in 1981–2, and the current account deficit had climbed to 21% of GDP in 1981.19 (iii) Vulnerability and spurious growth The weaknesses of the model are highlighted when the composition of GDP is disaggregated (see Table I.2). First, there was a rise in external indebtedness and in its cost. Around one-fifth of per capita GDP “growth” recorded between 1974 and 1981 corresponded to interest and profit payments
Table I.2 Evolution of GDP and its composition, 1975–81 (annual average rates of growth) Total 1975–80 (1) 1 GDP 2 GNP 3 Value added (a) Marketing of imports (b) Financial services 4 GNP excluding value added in 3
Per capita 1975–81 (2)
1975–80 (3)
1975–81 (4)
3.8 3.4
4.0 3.5
2.3 1.9
2.5 2.0
15.5 14.6 1.9
16.2 14.2 1.8
13.8 12.9 0.4
14.5 12.5 0.3
Source: Calculations based on official figures from National Accounts, 1960–81, in 1977 pesos. Revised figures by Marcel and Mellor (1986) give GDP growth of 2.6% for 1975–81, and not the official 4.0%; the main correction was in the industrial sector (here included in row 4). There are no disaggregated corrected figures from which to construct a revised table. 18 Several indicators of this episode in Chile are similar, in sign and size, to those in the currency crisis of Argentina that exploded in 2002: negative inflation preceding the crisis, a sharp GDP drop, huge unemployment, and a dramatic rise in poverty with the crisis. 19 Figures were calculated on the basis of the average exchange rate in 1976–8. With the very appreciated exchange rate of 1981, the deficit is 14.5% of GDP. Notice that GDP measured in current US dollars was US$15 billion in 1978, US$33 billion in 1981 and US$16 billion in 1985. Given the enormous volatility in these years, it is wise to “normalize” the exchange rate used, in order to make inter-temporal comparisons of GDP expressed in foreign currency.
18 Economic Development in Chile
accrued to foreigners, which meant that the rate of expansion of the national product was lower than that of GDP. Second, the value-added in (i) the marketing of imported products and (ii) financial services contributed a high share to GDP “dynamism”; these two sectors exhibited a dramatic cumulative expansion of 13% annually. The first sector expanded as a result of an unsustainably rapid growth of imports of consumer and intermediate goods. As discussed above, most of these imports were financed not by higher exports but by an increase in private foreign debt. This source of “dynamism” – value-added in the marketing of imports – was unsustainable in an economy that lacked vigorous real productive support and that was experiencing a notably high external deficit. The second source of “dynamism” was associated with the financial reform and responded principally to the spread between the rates of interest on deposits and loans and to the transfer of foreign credits in Chile. Thus, these two sources of “dynamism” rested on outlier values of imports and financial spreads, both of which were prejudicial to productive activity and investment. There can be no doubt that, owing to the distortion implied by both sectors in the Chilean economy, the overall performance contained a sizable share of spuriousness. Hence, it is very significant that the rest of per capita value-added, which in 1974 amounted to 91% of gross national product, remained virtually stationary, as can be seen in column 4 of Table I.2.20 Over and above this poor performance, GDP fell by 14% in 1982–3, while Latin American GDP diminished only 3.2% in the same period. The link with the future relates to national savings and investment.21 The supporters of the model claimed that it would achieve a substantial increase in savings, investment, and efficiency, all crucial sources of economic growth. The foregoing analysis has shown that the results were negative with respect to production. However, this could be consistent with a vigorous process of slow maturing investment. Unfortunately, in each of
20 As mentioned earlier, the production of exportables also grew at a significant pace. Therefore, a contraction in the rest of the economy – the non-exporting sectors – occurred. Within this subset, the industry, which accounted for the major share of economic activity, suffered the negative pulls of the recession in 1975, trade liberalization, and then exchange rate appreciation. See Chapter II and Marcel and Meller (1986). 21 By investment, is meant what in the national accounts is called gross capital formation or gross investment in fixed capital, or what I also call productive investment, in contrast to purely financial or speculative investment. Besides investment, there are many other connections to the future that are not considered here. These include: the impact that the model may have had on the capacity for technological absorption and adaptation; the degree of creativity of the technical and university education systems; national cultural development; the channels of participation and social capital that could serve for development strategies, based on a national consensus; and the dynamism and efficiency of the state as a development leader.
Economic Development in Chile
19
the years between 1974 and 1980, the gross fixed investment ratio was lower than that of each year in the 1960s; only 1981 recorded a ratio comparable with that decade. In 1974–81, the average investment ratio was 15.7%, in contrast with 20.2% in the sixties. In parallel, savings financed a lower share of investment; in 1970, around 90% was covered by national savings, whereas in 1978–81 scarcely one-half came from this source. The high rate of external borrowing, followed by a sudden stop in 1982, led the country into a new recessionary crisis as severe as the 1975 one. For the second time in a decade, the Chilean economy underwent a sharp recession, the deepeest in Latin America in 1982, with GDP declining 14%, followed by a widespread bank crisis and massive unemployment in 1983. Those disequilibria had been induced by excessive domestic spending on the part of the private sector, spurred by financial liberalization, huge capital inflows, and the so-called monetary approach to the balance of payments. Underlying these disequilibria there was a severe diagnosis error. The government assumed that, since it had achieved a fiscal surplus and external borrowing was being decided by private agents, a foreign exchange crisis would never occur. The explicit and strong support of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (see Robichek, 1981) reassured the government in that wrong assumption. It failed to realize that an unsustainable medium-term deficit could be generated in the private sector (Marfán, 2005). With the crisis, the producers of GDP faced massive bankruptcies. Political discontent against the iron-fisted dictatorship spread, while demonstrations of opposition proliferated even among many regime supporters. National accounts, both official and corrected (Marcel and Meller, 1986), show high “growth” between 1976 and 1981. However, in the first place, the model was not initially put in motion in 1976 but (in partial form) in 1973. Second, in 1975 there was a sharp recession, which multiplied threefold the depressive effect of external shocks, with a fall of 17% in GDP. Hence, to measure economic evolution from the low 1975 point implies measuring as “growth” what in fact was simply a recovery to the 1974 level. This gave rise to the mistaken impression that Chile was growing vigorously and would continue to do so at rates in the order of 8% per year,22 irrespective of what might happen abroad. Whereas 1976–81 gives an annual per capita GDP increase of 4.7%, the period 1974–81 averages only 1.4%. It is obvious that the greater the recession of 1975, the greater could have been the subsequent recovery. Thus, the greater the loss of production as a result of the recession (a true social and private cost) the higher appears the “growth” if the measurement begins at the lowest recessed point. This is an extremely gross technical error, but it is quite frequent. This misleading implication would emerge again in the second half of the dictatorship. 22
See, for example, the illustrative statements quoted in Foxley (1983).
20 Economic Development in Chile
(b) The introduction of pragmatism, with a regressive bias in 1982–9 The impacts of the deep crisis of 1982–3 and the subsequent recovery were the dominant features of this subperiod. Renegotiations of foreign debt with bank creditors, the IMF, the World Bank and the US government played an outstanding part. As the government’s power weakened with the 1982 recession, it was compelled to revise its strategy in several respects, including the change of the head of the economic team and the “nationalization” of the private debt. The government, which by 1981 held merely one-third of total debt, by 1987 held 86% of it. The determinant of the level of economic activity, in a very explicit way, was the availability of foreign currency; thus the amount required to service the debt and the loans from international financial institutions was crucial for the speed of recovery. With respect to the policy approach, the crisis revealed the extreme vulnerability to external shocks created by neoliberal policies and the passivity of the State. The apparent economic success of the late 1970s had been based on a shaky policy of external and domestic borrowing with minimal regulations. The economic collapse and the climate of discontent made possible the reconstitution of some social movements that had been dismantled, especially labor unions and political parties of the center and left. In the economic arena, several adjustments were made by the government over the next four years, including successive devaluations, the increase of import tariffs, band prices for the main agricultural products, subsidies to non-traditional exports, stringent regulation of the financial system, implicit nationalization of private debt and massive financial aid to the private sector (see Chapter IV). All these changed policies, previously sharply dismissed by the neoliberal approach, were signals of “pragmatism,” in order to reduce the “scarcity of foreign currency” (the binding external constraint) and to recover economic activity. This implied a substantial change in fiscal policy, which after exhibiting a strong surplus until 1981 went into deficit, averaging 3.4 % of GDP in 1983–5. However, this greater pragmatism was biased in favor of upper-income sectors, including generous subsidies, while a tough position was maintained towards labor and grassroots organizations. The consequence was a further deterioration in income distribution; indeed, the year 1987 recorded the worst income distribution since statistics have been available (see Chapter VII). A strong and sustained recovery of economic activity and domestic output began in 1986. Exports were quite vigorous, encouraged by a spectacular depreciation of the real exchange rate (130% between 1982 and 1988). In 1986–7, a gradual recovery of domestic activity proceeded in a sustainable macroeconomic framework, under a binding external restriction, but generously alleviated by loans from international financial institutions (IDB, IMF and World Bank). In the next two years, the situation changed, with the disappearance of the restriction on external financing, due to a spectacular rise in the copper price. As a consequence, the expansion of aggregate demand
Economic Development in Chile
21
and economic activity accelerated, culminating in the overheating of the economy in 1989, when actual GDP increased by 10%. The jump in aggregate demand resulted from expansion of the money supply, tax reductions, and import liberalization with some exchange rate appreciation, which made imports cheaper. The installed capacity still available by 1987 and the sizable improvement in the terms of trade (copper prices) in 1988–9 made a sharp transitory jump in economic activity feasible. The last biennium of the Pinochet regime exhibited that high growth of actual GDP, in contrast with a quite moderate rise in potential GDP. Paradoxically, then, as had happened in the late 1970s, the domestic recession of 1982–7 was useful for the “marketing” of the model. The model was able to show “growth” for several years, a circumstance that attracted extensive publicity in the national and foreign mass media. The prior sharp recession was underestimated or ignored by the media under a strong dictatorial regime. In brief, the 1980s ended with the Chilean economy recording a high rate of capacity utilization and growth of actual GDP. However, average growth in the whole 1982–9 period was low, merely 2.9% annually, while per capita GDP only in 1988 reached the level it had exhibited in 1981. Additionally, the economy did show substantial disequilibria. During 1988–9, a number of macroeconomic variables exhibited inconsistent trends over the medium term. Real aggregate demand had grown swiftly – by 22% – in the biennium, and GDP had risen by 18%. Exports grew vigorously in the two-year period, but imports rose even faster. The large gap between changes in expenditure and production was compensated by an improvement in the terms of trade equivalent to 6 and 7% of GDP in 1988 and 1989, respectively, as compared to 1986. Output, in turn, rose sharply due to the progressive exhaustion of idle capacity. However, productive capacity was expanding by a total 8% in the biennium. The contrast with the 18% increase in actual GDP led to full utilization of installed capacity and overheating of the economy. This manifested itself in accelerating inflation and a deteriorating external sector. By January 1990, inflation in twelve months reached 23%, twice the 1988 rate.23 (c) A summary of outcomes Notwithstanding that some key policies were significantly different, economic growth recorded similar annual averages in both halves of Pinochet’s government: 3 and 2.9%, respectively (see Table I.3). How can these similar results be explained? The low average of both periods was associated with the severe and abrupt crises of 1975 and 1982–3, and with the gradual recovery processes, which in both cases involved high rates of underutilization of 23
This is the inflation rate for the twelve months ending in January 1990. Between August 1989 and January 1990 the annualized rate of increase in the consumer price index (CPI) was 31%.
22 Economic Development in Chile Table I.3 Macroeconomic variables during dictatorship, 1974–89a (annual averages)
GDP growth (%) Exports growth (%) Inflation rate (%)b Total unemployment rate (%)c Official unemployment rate (%) Real wages (1970 ⫽ 100) Investment (% of GDP) In 1977 pesos In 1996 pesos Government surplus (% of GDP)
1974–81
1982–9
1974–89
3.0 13.6 138.9 16.9 13.0 75.7
2.9 7.8 20.8 19.2 13.6 88.0
2.9 10.7 79.9 18.0 13.3 81.8
15.9 15.4 1.6
15.6 15.8 –1.1
15.7 15.9 0.3
Source: Same sources as Table I.1. a
Annual growth rates for GDP and exports; average annual rates for inflation and unemployment. From December to December. cWith emergency employment correction.
b
productive capacity for several years. This persistent gap between actual and potential GDP, in turn, was the main factor discouraging capital formation (Servén and Solimano, 1993; Agosin, 1998), which was under 16% of GDP in each subperiod; that is, around four points (one-third in net investment) lower than in the 1960s. The reforms had significantly different effects on the productive structure. Trade liberalization contributed to the significant expansion of exports. However, applied simultaneously with a tough monetary stabilization policy, they induced a depression that featured a 26% drop in industrial output in 1975. Nonetheless, in parallel with numerous bankruptcies, the sector achieved a rise in productivity among the surviving companies and by 1978 manufactured exports had rosen by an average of 15% (Vergara, 1980), with greatly increased heterogeneity in the sector. It must always be recalled that what is relevant for the nation as a whole is the evolution of productivity, including all people, not only those with a job! The high rate of business bankruptcies cannot necessarily be attributed to inefficiency resulting from protection under the earlier development strategy. In fact, after 1973, the long recession, real annual interest rates at an average of 38%, and the accelerated import liberalization-cum-exchange rate revaluation can be identified as the determinant factors leading to high business mortality. Manufacturing lost a significant share of GDP. Exports, on the other hand, achieved great dynamism, particularly of non-traditional goods. In fact, between 1974 and 1980, the share of non-traditional exports (including manufactures) in total sales of goods abroad rose from 9 to 19%. These exports exhibited a falling share in 1981–5 (averaging 16%), and then renewed an upward trend to 22% in 1989. In all, in 1974–89, the volume of non-copper exports averaged an annual growth of 15%, undoubtedly a significant figure (see Chapter V).
Economic Development in Chile
23
The modernized business sector featured a surge of new economic groups and managers exhibiting vigorous innovative competitiveness. This modernization went in parallel with that of the Internal Revenue Service and of the Budget Office. Together with the export drive, they contributed to, but did not determine, the economic success achieved later in the 1990s. Furthermore, many classical conditions for development arose, among them the “correction” of some prices (especially exchange rate depreciation in the 1980s and reduced costs of imported inputs), market deregulation, and guaranteed property rights. But it was also the consequence of the substantial fall in real wages and in taxes on capital, and the elimination of many labor rights, while modernization still eluded the large majority of firms. At the end, there was notable progress for some people, with the exclusion of many. An extreme neoliberal interpretation reports vigorous growth, because only the results obtained after 1986 are considered. But, it is not justified to assess a set of reforms by counting only the years with positive results and ignoring the negative ones. That leads to severe errors in diagnosis and action, and encourages other nations to repeat the experience, which happened to a large extent among Latin American economies in the 1990s (see Ffrench-Davis, 2006, Chapter I). The concrete fact is that average GDP growth was mediocre in both subperiods. Until 1982, “price corrections” had been very contradictory. In fact, the neoliberal orthodoxy did not consider that financial liberalization could lead to high outlier interest rates or that trade liberalization could be accompanied by continuous exchange rate appreciation, as was the case between 1979 and 1982. Neither was it foreseen that the private sector would be “promoted” amidst a sharp restriction of aggregate demand, as in 1975–6 and 1982–3. In turn, the debt crisis dismantled the financial system, implying that the government allocated the equivalent of 35% of annual GDP to the rescue of some affected sectors, diverting these resources from the generation of economic and social development. This combination of events helps to explain why modernization in some sectors coexisted with a mediocre economic growth averaging 2.9% between 1974 and 1989, why the average investment ratio was notoriously below the 1960s level, and why income distribution worsened so much (see Chapter VII). As on many other occasions in Chilean history, economic policy was strongly influenced by a notable transitory improvement in the copper price.24 It is undeniable that 1988–9 would have been quite different had there been a “normal” copper market in those years. Based on that abnormally high price, the Pinochet regime could finally boast an economy with impressive export values and actual GDP growth figures in 1988–9. But evident macroeconomic imbalances had to be corrected in 1990. This explains the strong policy adjustment carried out in January 1990 – in full transition 24
In fact, as was to be expected, copper prices declined from late 1989.
24 Economic Development in Chile
from dictatorship to democracy – in order to stop an overheating of the economy led by excessive aggregate demand. The adjustment was implemented, in January 1990, by the new independent central bank, launched by Pinochet a few days before the presidential election of 1989. The bank acknowledged the severity of the disequilibria and the risk in waiting until the inauguration of the democratic government in March 1990. Income inequality was notably greater than two decades earlier, as a consequence of strong worsening in the seventies and eighties. In fact, the share of the poorest quintile in total expenditure had been reduced from 7.6% in 1969, to 5.2% in 1978 and 4.4% in 1988 (see Chapter VII, table VII.2). A determining variable of that outcome was the deterioration of the labor market, with average and minimum wages that in 1989 were below those in 1981 and 1970. The major swings in distributive worsening were associated with the 1975 and 1982 crises. In political terms, a salient development was the effective organization of social movements and political parties, which were able to compel the democratization of the system, even under the rules unilaterally imposed by the dictatorship. Following the triumph of the opposition, led by a centerleft coalition, the Concertación Democrática, in the October 1988 plebiscite and the December 1989 presidential election, a democratic president, Patricio Aylwin, took office in March 1990.
3 Democracy, reforming the reforms and development, 1990–200925 From 1990 the political arena was dominated by the administration of the Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia. The Democratic Concertación, a center-left coalition of Christian democrats and social democrats, took over power with the successive elections of Patricio Aylwin (1990–4), Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (1994–2000), Ricardo Lagos (2000–6), and Michelle Bachelet (2006–10). The first two administrations gave rise to a period of the greatest prosperity in Chilean economic history, with a sustained average 7% GDP growth rate between 1990 and 1998. It marked a clear break with the historical trend (see Table I.1). High capital formation and a generalized atmosphere of stability prevailed until 1998, when the Asian crisis hit Latin American countries. The vigorous growth was led by a 10% annual expansion of exports, a figure similar to the average recorded in the seventies and eighties (see Chapters V and VI). Nevertheless, GDP growth was radically different: 7% in the nine25 Collections of studies with diverse approaches and authors can be found in Bosworth et al. (1994), Pizarro et al. (1996), Cortázar and Vial (1998), Larraín and Vergara (2000), Ffrench-Davis and Stallings (2001), Larraín (2005), Meller (2005), Muñoz (2007), and Vega (2008).
Economic Development in Chile
25
ties and 2.9% in the two previous decades.26 Given the shared good export performance, evidently, the main factor explaining the success in the nineties was the strong expansion of the rest of GDP (non-tradables plus import substitutes), which averaged 6.5% per year in 1990–8 (see Chapter VI, Table VI.6). As in the three decades of intensive development of Korea and Taiwan (1965–95), key to success were the links between the export sector and the rest of the economy, and the persistence of a comprehensive real macroeconomic balance. The end of President Frei’s administration (1999) and the first years of President Lagos’s (2000–3) were characterized by a depressed economic environment. The sharp and sustained fall in economic activity was focused in the non-exported GDP, which represented around 70% of the whole economy. A drop in export dynamism – undoubtedly very significant – explains only 1.0 out of 4.5 points of lower growth in 1999–2003 with respect to 1990–8 (see Chapter VI). In all, GDP growth averaged 5.3% in the nineteen years between 1990 and 2008 (5% if the recession of 2009 is included). In turn, per capita GDP expanded by 4% annually in the same period, in contrast with 1.3% in 1974–89. This notable difference, which is associated with improvements in the quality of macroeconomic policies since 1990 and some efforts to “complete” factor markets, explains the substantive economic and social progress achieved. Nevertheless, the brake in 1998 is significantly associated with setbacks in the quality of macroeconomic management (see Chapter IX). (a) From the reform of the reforms to the Asian contagion, 1990–8 The new administration of Patricio Aylwin focused its efforts on achieving stronger, stabler, and more equitable GDP growth. This required stabilizing the economy after the 1988–9 overheating generated by the Pinochet regime, and, among other things, an increasing investment ratio, the implementation of macroeconomic policies achieving sustained equilibrium in financial markets and in the real economy, diminishing vulnerability to external shocks, and progress in solving the most urgent social demands by enabling larger segments of the population to benefit from the modernization of the economy. The aim was to reconcile macroeconomic and macrosocial equilibria, and implement a style of economic policy that would become legitimate within the new democratic framework. The new government had decided to avoid a radical change in existing economic policy, seeking “change-with-continuity” and thus breaking with the rehashing tradition of several previous governments. In order 26 Notice that in the three cases we “end the decades” in peak years (1981, 1989, and 1998) in order to be “fair” in the comparison. From peak to peak, actual growth reflects the creation of productive capacity better than using mechanically calendar decades.
26 Economic Development in Chile
to accomplish this goal, the government of President Aylwin had to gain the support of trade unions and incorporate their organizations into the macrosocial decision-making process. The new administration had to cope with the potential conflict between macroeconomic stability and demand for more resources to be allocated to lower income groups. On the one hand, it changed the composition of public expenditure, increasing the share of social spending in the budget, and, on the other, it rapidly presented to the parliament a tax reform to increase fiscal income. Tax reform included a reintroduction of profit taxes abolished in 1988, and an increase of 2 percentage points in value-added tax.27 Likewise, in 1990 the government proposed a reform of the labor code to Congress. It was aimed at balancing the bargaining power of employers and workers and sought to endow current labor legislation with greater legitimacy. To get this law passed, an agreement was reached between the government, labor and employer organizations, and most political parties. However, the reforms agreed (including the tax reform) were always less comprehensive than those originally proposed by the government (Cortázar, 1996; Marfán, 1998). A determining fact was the group of senators that had been appointed under the Constitution designed by Pinochet, who more than compensated for the majority achieved by candidates of the new government in the 1989 and 1993 parliamentarian elections. In 1990, a tripartite agreement was also reached between the government and the representatives of unionized workers and employers; this agreement provided for an increase of 28% in the real minimum wage between 1989 and 1993. In the early 1990s, significant progress in income distribution and poverty reduction was achieved in this constructive climate. From 1994, poverty continued to decline, although more slowly. While 45% of the population lived in poverty in 1987, by 1994 this had been reduced to 27.5%, and by 1998 to 22% (see Chapter VII). It should be pointed out that greater social effort was attained with notable fiscal responsibility. As a result of the 1990 tax reform, the expansion of economic activity and imports, a higher than expected copper price (captured by Chile thanks to the fact that the large copper mines had remained nationalized; now they were grouped under Corporación Nacional del Cobre, CODELCO), and a decline in tax evasion, the fiscal burden rose by 3% of GDP (to 18% of GDP). This allowed the government to increase public spending, in particular social expenditure, and at the same time expand
27 It can be argued that the increase in value-added taxes included in the reform would tend to impose a regressive effect as low income families consume a larger part of their income. Nevertheless, a coherent comparison also has to consider that most resources are transferred to lower income families through an increase in social spending. The net effect is evidently progressive.
Economic Development in Chile
27
non-financial public sector savings from 2% in the 1980s to nearly 5% of GDP in the 1990s (see Table I.5, below).28 Higher savings not only financed public investment but also generated an average fiscal surplus of 1.8% of GDP in 1990–7; the surplus was used to reduce the high stock of public debt accumulated during the dramatic financial crisis of 1982–3. A new political agreement in 1993 enabled the approval of several previously transitory modifications on a more permanent basis. Subsequent evidence rejected the prediction of critics of the 1990s tax reform, who claimed that it would have a negative impact on investment. After a decline of the investment ratio in 1991 – associated with the lagged effect of the 1990 adjustment – capital formation increased in 1992 and again in 1993, reaching in the next five years levels never achieved in the previous three decades (see Table I.1). This high productive investment was the main factor behind the outstanding annual GDP growth, which rose from below 3% in 1974–89 to over 7% in 1990–8. As empirical studies show robustly, private investment, given its irreversibility, is positively correlated with real macroeconomic equilibria whenever they appear to be sustainable and fulfill two key conditions. First, for real equilibrium, effective demand has to be consistent with the productive capacity being generated, and, second, key macroprices (interest and exchange rates) must be right (see Servén and Solimano, 1993; Agosin, 1998; Coeymans, 1999; Ffrench-Davis, 2006, Chapter II). This is what we call real macroeconomic balances. Given the macroeconomic disequilibria generated in 1988–9, a severe adjustment through the increase in interest rates had been carried out in order to control the expansion of aggregate demand and a new outbreak of inflation. This adjustment was considerably complicated soon after by large capital inflows, which, like other economies in the region, Chile had been receiving since the early 1990s. The gap between domestic and international interest rates had increased significantly. In the meantime, risk-rating agencies had upgraded the Chilean economy, inducing a strong inflow of shortterm “hot money” and an appreciation in the exchange rate in the second half of 1990 (with a drop from the depreciated ceiling to the appreciated floor of its 10% crawling band of the price in pesos of the US dollar). The
28 Depreciation of capital goods in public firms is included in gross private savings. Moreover, the fiscal sector generated financing to cover the deficit of the public social security system. Under the social security reform of 1981, the public sector continued paying already retired workers and financed part of the new pensions, while income was shifted to the private system. The fiscal figures do not consider the quasi-fiscal deficit of the central bank – which was initially caused by the government’s intervention to prevent a massive bankruptcy of the domestic financial system in 1983; it was enlarged, subsequently, with the operational losses in monetary sterilization in the 1990s (on this latter issue, see Chapter VIII).
28 Economic Development in Chile
central bank was forced to buy large amounts of foreign currency to defend the band’s floor. Particularly, economic authorities faced the need to differentiate between permanent appreciation pressures, resulting from Chile’s net improvement in productivity and from having surmounted the debt crisis, and transitory pressures. When the former had been identified, an attempt was made to avoid the latter in order to maintain the competitiveness of tradables. The strong external supply of both short-term and portfolio capital threatened to considerably diminish the capacity of the authorities to conduct monetary policy and to avoid excessive fluctuations in both the real exchange rate and aggregate demand. Faced with a massive capital inflow, the Chilean authorities sought to reconcile these two objectives – an interest rate suited for keeping domestic balances and an exchange rate consistent with external balances – by applying several counter-cyclical policies. Among these were active exchange rate policy and monetary sterilization; selective liberalization of capital outflows; establishing a reserve requirement (encaje) on foreign loans and liquid inflows, which increased their costs, in order to avoid what was considered an excess supply; and the extension of a tax, which had previously applied only to domestic currency loans, to include foreign currency loans. Empirical research documents that these policies were successful in reducing short-term and volatile inflows and provided space for monetary policy and avoiding destabilizing exchange rate appreciation (see Chapter VIII). But FDI – risk capital was exempted from the reserve requirement – became increasingly large. FDI was stimulated by the attractive features of the Chilean economy: rich natural resources and the almost tax free transfer of the economic rent abroad (a loophole inherited from the dictatorship that required correction),29 high quality macroeconomic policies, and the positive perception of the democratization process. Therefore, a large surplus in the capital account, with effective long-term financing, higher than the moderate deficit in the current account, was generated. The central bank responded with active purchases of foreign currency and open market monetary sterilization. The set of policies, especially those affecting short-term capital inflows, contributed to keeping the current account deficit within sustainable levels (2.3% of GDP in 1990–5) and preventing an excessive increase in more volatile external liabilities. In so doing, Chilean economic authorities contributed significantly to macroeconomic stability, to the improvement of the social indicators, to the export strategy, and to overall growth. This became evident when Chile showed nearly complete immunity during the Mexican crisis of 1994–5 (see Ffrench-Davis, 2006, Chapter IX). In 1990–5, GDP growth peaked at 7.8%. If the dynamism achieved in this period is compared with that of other episodes of high GDP growth in the 29
In 2006 it began to operate a tax that plays a similar role to a royalty.
Economic Development in Chile
29
past four decades, in contrast to previous occasions, this time a comprehensive set of positive features were fulfilled: (i) GDP growth, both actual and potential, was sustained for several rather than one or two years; (ii) growth occurred in a context of fast rising productive investment and national savings; (iii) growth occurred without significant inflationary or external account pressures; (iv) an orderly fiscal balance was maintained, and (v) no major macroeconomic disequilibria were built, thanks to several mini-adjustments, thus avoiding the common need for traumatic maxi-adjustments. After each of these years of unsustainable macroeconomics in the past four decades, an adjustment program with heavy welfare costs had to be implemented. These significant changes in the macroeconomic environment are associated, on the external front, with the instability of the terms of trade and financing. On the domestic front, they reflect the high sensitivity of aggregate demand to external shocks, especially when the economy is operating under pro-cyclical policies. The impact of the adjustment program in 1990 on other economic variables was less severe and quickly reversed. As mentioned earlier, investment ratios recovered in 1992 and reached record levels from 1993. One main merit of policies in 1990–5 rests in that they successfully resisted the temptation of achieving a faster disinflation with an increased domestic absorption of capital inflows and at the expense of exchange rate appreciation and a larger external deficit. Up to 1995 the authorities implemented an effective monitoring of the counter-cyclical regulation on capital inflows. The strength of regulations (the cost or implicit fee and the coverage of the encaje) was adjusted continuously to the strength of the external supply of funding. In the six year period 1990–5, actual and potential GDP rose at similar rates, with the economy working close to the production frontier (that is, with a minor output gap between potential and actual GDP). However, policies lost their strength after 1995, thus allowing a real appreciation of the peso and imbalances in the external accounts in 1996–7. Chile did bend, partially, to the powerful international fashion promoting the liberalization of capital accounts. That fashion was in general force, pressed by the US government, the World Bank and the IMF, the OECD, and the academic world in the most influential spheres. It had been reinforced under the belief that the management of the tequila crisis had shown that the world had learnt to control financial crisis; such overoptimism was absorbed domestically by business leaders and some public authorities. Recall that the IMF was on the road to imposing on all countries the obligation to open capital accounts. That extreme position experienced a sudden stop with the arrival of the Asian crisis in 1997. Fortunately, Chile did step back, from 1995, to a middle-of-the-road position. It did not dismantle regulations but allowed a weakening of their effects, as discussed in Chapter VIII (see also Le Fort and Lehmann, 2003) Consequently, Chile entered
30 Economic Development in Chile
“vulnerability zones” – particularly with an appreciated real exchange rate and a large external deficit – where it was caught by the Asian crisis. Additional factors, beyond the acute international fashion, can explain the policy change. First, the strength shown by the Chilean economy in the face of the Mexican crisis in 1995 created a misleading sense of invulnerability. It led policymakers to disregard the fact that immunity had been the result of a policy approach that had prevented (i) excessive exchange rate appreciation, (ii) a high current account deficit, and (iii) a significant stock of liquid external liabilities; moreover, (iv) most inflows had been directed to capital formation, thus strengthening the capacity to respond to critical situations and to absorb inflows efficiently. Second, after 1995 a change in central bank priorities could be observed, with the prevalence of an antiinflationary bias. Third, the outstanding performance of Chile transformed it into a preferred destination for foreign investors, in a context in which huge amounts of capital were being supplied to emerging economies. Despite this larger capital surge, most counter-cyclical regulations were kept unchanged instead of being strengthened. Evidently, counter-cyclical policies must be adapted to the strength of the cycle, which did not happen. Therefore, when the Asian contagion reached Chile in 1998, with a strong negative terms of trade shock, the economy had accumulated significant imbalances: the real exchange rate had appreciated by 16% between 1995 and October 1997, and the current account deficit had jumped to 4.8% of GDP in 1996–7, as compared to 2.3% in 1990–5, which worsened further with a sharp negative terms of trade shock in 1998. The fiscal policy of these two years (1996–7) deserves special consideration, since it has been an object of a misinformed debate. The fiscal policy of the nineties harmonized a significant expansion of social expenses with an increase in both public savings and investments. As said, a responsible fiscal management financed increases in expenses with the tax reform and the reduction of evasion. Real macroeconomic balances placed the economy in the productive frontier or potential GDP, with a corresponding high fiscal revenue. In the particular case of 1996–7, fiscal responsibility was kept. The actual fiscal surplus was 2.1% of GDP, even exceeding that of the previous years. Consequently, the assertion that fiscal performance was responsible for the macroeconomic imbalance of this period has no support. The external deficit was evidently located in the private sector and was financed and encouraged by the weaker regulation of the capital account (see Table I.4). It is true that fiscal expenditure registered a rise in those two years. But it must be said that it was an increase in items unanimously agreed by all political parties, related to education, health, and pensions; additionally, recall that it was financed with taxes and not with indebtedness. In the meantime, GDP and productive investment kept growing up to 1998. All evidence shows that it was necessary to act strongly on the cause of the real macroeconomic imbalance, that is, the excess of capital inflows in 1996–7.
Economic Development in Chile
31
Table I.4 Public and private budget balances, 1990–2007 (% of GDP at current prices)a Total 1990–5 1996–7 1998 1999–2003 2004–7 2008
Private sector Public sector
–2.3 –4.2 –4.9 –0.9 3.2 –1.5
–4.4 –6.4 –5.3 0.1 –2.7 –6.8
2.0 2.1 0.4 –1.0 5.8 5.3
Source: Author’s calculations based on Balance of Payments data from the central bank and DIPRES for the public sector. a
Total balance is the current account deficit or use of external saving. The public sector corresponds to central government (does not include public enterprises). The private sector is constructed by difference.
Because of that excess, the Asian crisis found the Chilean economy vulnerable, with a too cheap dollar price and a high external deficit. (b) Recessive adjustment, 1999–2003 As mentioned above, the final year of President Frei’s administration (1999) and the first four years of President Lagos’s (2000–3) were characterized by a depressed economic environment that frustrated the expectations of a spontaneous rapid recovery. The sharp and sustained fall in economic activity was focused in the non-exported GDP, which represented around 70% of the economy. A drop in the volume of exports – undoubtedly very significant – explains only 1.0 out of 4.5 points of lower growth in 1999–2003 with respect to 1990–8. Contagion from the Asian crisis arrived through two channels. On the one hand, there was a sharp deterioration of the terms of the trade (equivalent to 3% of GDP). On the other hand, a widespread reduction of capital flows towards emerging economies took place. Thus, from late 1997 there arose strong expectations of depreciation, which the central bank resisted during 1998, due to the fear of inflationary overheating and the explicit concern of allowing domestic economic groups to reduce their debt denominated in dollars. First, massive sales of foreign currency were carried out by the central bank with an artificially low market price. Then, by mid-1998, the bank drastically reduced the crawling band width, intending to give a signal of nominal exchange rate stability, in combination with a rise in the real interest rate, which reached 14.5%. In this critical context, not only was there a drop of financial inflows, but also a massive residents’ capital flight. In fact, from early 1998, there were voluminous capital outflows, principally from the private pension funds – speculating against the domestic currency, in the context of successive capital account liberalizations – totaling almost
32 Economic Development in Chile
5% of GDP in eighteen months (see Ffrench-Davis and Tapia, 2001; Zahler, 2006). It naturally had a strong contractionary impact on domestic liquidity and aggregate demand. Consequently, once again, a macroeconomic imbalance led by excessive capital inflows in 1996–7 was followed by an adjustment that was costly for both economic growth and equity. Beginning by mid-1998, aggregate demand fell sharply (with a 6% drop in 1999, while GDP decreased by 0.8%). Meanwhile, productive capacity kept rising, resting on the still high investment ratio of 1998. Consequently, with the fall in actual GDP and the increase in potential GDP, a large recessive gap between both output measures emerged. It is useful to examine in some detail the size and evolution of the output gap. It is not obsolete physical capacity. It is economically productive capacity that was in use in 1997.30 New capacity was being created at a speed of about 7% per year, which, as said, continued in 1998 and 1999, determined by the high investment ratios up to 1998. The downward adjustment in economic activity started by mid-1998, with actual GDP rising by only 3.2% in 1998 and falling 0.8% in 1999. All added, a sizable recessive gap of about 6% of potential GDP was generated in 1999 and was still persisting in 2003. That was the determinant of the sharp drop in the investment ratio in 1999–2003. As a consequence, the plateau of potential GDP growth had dropped from 7 to 4% per year, but actual growth fell even further, to 2.6%. As has been shown repeatedly, a significant gap between actual GDP and the production frontier is usually followed by a drop in productive investment. As in Mexico in 1995, Argentina in 1995 and 1999–2001, and Korea in 1998, in Chile the investment ratio diminished substantially (by 18% in 1999) and remained depressed until 2003; the output gap plus the drop in investment had a deepening impact on employment too. The presidential campaign of 1999 was marked by the target of a fast return to 6–7% growth rates. Both Concertación Democrática and the opposition based their programs on expectations that ex-post turned out to be overoptimistic. This mismatch between expectations of an imminent recovery and a depressed economy, with a stagnated aggregate demand, determined an imbalance between the resources needed to fulfill the government program and the depressed tax revenue. To face this context, the government implemented a new fiscal rule that works with the concept of fiscal structural balance (see Marcel et al., 2001; Tapia, 2003). The rule consists of sustaining a level of expenses consistent with structural fiscal income; that is, for each budget year the fiscal income is estimated as if the economy were fully using the “potential or trend GDP” and were facing the expected medium-term
30 In order to estimate that capacity, the actual GDP of 1997 was adjusted downward by an estimate of the output identified as non-sustainable in that year (see Annex).
Economic Development in Chile
33
copper price.31 Consequently, when the economy is overheated the Treasury accumulates savings; and under a recession it uses those funds (or borrow) to cover the foregone wastage of productivity and employment associated with an economic activity below potential GDP. This new public policy seems to me to show great conceptual progress in fiscal and macroeconomic management, given the volatility of international trade and financial markets. This innovative fiscal rule was accompanied by two features that are not intrinsic to the rule. One was defining as a target a structural surplus of 1%; after some time, inevitably, that goal leads to a net creditor state, a strange and undesirable situation in a developing economy.32 The other one was to define as potential GDP what had been the trend GDP of the Chilean economy, which evidently includes the intense recessions that it suffered. Obviously, trend GDP moves well below potential GDP or the productive frontier (see Annex and Chapter IX). The features of the Chilean rule implied a neutral fiscal policy with respect to the economic cycle, which involves progress with respect to the procyclical traditional norm of balancing actual fiscal budget period after period. Nevertheless, initially it did not move decidedly into a counter-cyclical rule, a shortcoming that became evident in 2001–3. Beyond the highly laudable progress achieved in facing international volatility, the evidence provided by 1999–2003 shows that there is a need for effective counter-cyclical policies to stabilize economic activity, and to become able to recover fast in recessions. As I stress throughout this book, that capacity is an essential ingredient of real macroeconomic balances. The central bank foreign exchange policy evolved from the mid-nineties, when the monetary authorities began to lose confidence in the instruments that had been so successful in the first half of that decade. In September 1999, the exchange rate was fully liberalized, leaving behind the crawling band. During 2000–1, in what was considered to be a policy consistent with the new floating regime, the majority of the remaining controls on financial flows were eliminated. One of the effects has been intense financial activity, with voluminous inflows and outflows. Associated with the recessive environment, and helping to keep it like that, in 2002–3 a net outflow of portfolio investments equivalent to 3% of GDP took place. Thus, national investors joined international markets in their pro-cyclical behavior. Notwithstanding the persistent output gap, the government continued developing social reforms. In 2001 there was a second reform enhancing 31 Two independent consulting committees, set up by the Ministry of Finance, provide each year an estimate of the trend price of copper (used to determine withdrawals and deposits to a copper stabilization fund) and inputs to estimate “trend GDP” for the next budget year. 32 By 2008 the Treasury was a heavy creditor, particularly in foreign currency. Correspondingly, in a belated decision, the surplus target was reduced to 0.5% of GDP in 2008 and to 0% in 2009.
34 Economic Development in Chile
labor rights. Also, temporary public employment programs were intensified, covering nearly 2% of jobs in 2002–3. It continued with educational reforms, all-day schooling, infrastructure improvements, and some modernization of educational programs. Public health was significantly improved with the new “AUGE” health program, which includes universal access to treatment for a progressively growing number of pathologies. The “Chile Barrio” and “Chile Solidario” programs were initiated, in order to eradicate shanty towns and to incorporate indigents into the social network supported by the State (see Galasso, 2006). In 2002, an unemployment insurance scheme was started that is financed by contributions of both private workers and employers (which go to an individual account of the worker) and government contributions (which go to a “solidarity fund”); in September 2009, after seven years in force there were 3.2 million active contributors (about 85% of AFP private employers). The high coverage in terms of number of workers affiliated has been accompanied by very modest amounts of benefits and a minimal use of the solidarity fund (see Chapter VII). In brief, this insurance was progress, but it needed great strengthening in terms of its magnitude, expeditious access, expansion of the solidarity fund, and its connection with effective labor training programs. In 2009 the parliament approved a project of the government that enhanced the extent of and access to the solidarity fund, including workers with short-term contracts, introduced counter-cyclical features in the benefits, and offered job search intermediation labor training for the unemployed. All this progress, very novel and promising, has had limited financing because of the output gap. But as significant is the regressive impact that the gap has had on the labor market. In the period between mid-1998 and 2003, the number of workers with a job (including people in special programs financed by the government) grew in total by scarcely 3.3%, while the eighteen-year-old or over population increased by around 9%. The rate of labor participation, which had been rising during the 1990s but was still low by 1998 (54%), diminished by one point, and open unemployment rose by four points (exceeding10% of the labor force). The main determinant factor of this labor market deterioration was the real macroeconomic imbalance, as we define it here: the high gap between actual and potential GDP, which implied underutilization of labor and capital, discouraging productive investment. In fact, the investment ratio (at 2003 constant prices) in 1999–2003 was three points below the average recorded in 1995–8. Chile could have implemented a vigorous domestic positive shock, taking advantage of all the strengths accumulated by the Chilean economy: large international reserves, a Treasury and a central bank with low external liabilities, outstanding fiscal discipline, among other attributes, and, a main issue, the great recessive output gap prevailing in all the period 1999–2003.
Economic Development in Chile
35
(c) Recovery led by a positive external shock in 2004–8 and the contagion in 2009 During 2003, there was a sharp rise in the international prices of commodities, which lasted until the contagion of the international crisis in 2008.33 The commodity boom implied a strong positive shock for several Latin American countries (LACs).34 In the case of Chile, the terms of trade improved by the equivalent of 10% of GDP between the recessed 1999–2003 period and 2004–5; the hike in the price of copper and other commodities exported by Chile was notably stronger than that for the imports of oil. This exogenous shock contributed to a significant jump in GDP growth, from 2.6 to 5.8% in the same subperiods. Given that potential output was rising merely about 4% annually, this implied a noticeable reduction of the output gap. Generalized improved terms of trade and volume of exports enhanced, directly, the spending capacity of the private sector, and expectations returned to broad optimism. After a usual lag, productive investment started to rise. Naturally, the outstanding merits accumulated by the Chilean economy were a factor supporting the sharp recovery. But the leading force was the positive external shock. This reveals a macroeconomic weakness, since the merits of the Chilean economy were already present in the recessive period. Thus, the conditions for a domestic reactivating shock were at hand from the moment the excessive external deficit as well as the over-appreciated exchange rate of 1998 had been corrected in 1999.35 Given a large output gap by the beginning of the positive external shock, domestic supply was able to respond with a rising GDP and low inflation pressures (within a target band of 2–4% set by the autonomous central bank). In the meantime, once again, the bank allowed the real exchange rate to appreciate by 20% between March 2003 and December 2005, contributing to anchor inflation and to further increase the purchasing power. Nevertheless, the partial recovery lost force in 2006, opening a period in which actual GDP grew below the expansion of potential GDP. In contrast with the experience of the 1990s, the Chilean economy performed below
33 Surprisingly, in 2009, amidst the intense global recession, prices relevant for the Chilean economy – such as of copper and oil – resumed comparatively high levels. A similar outcome has been recorded in stock markets: high prices in a depressed world economy could be interpreted as risky bubbles, as stressed on several occasions by the Nobel prizewinner Paul Krugman. 34 It is noteworthy that actual GDP growth also jumped in Latin America, from 1.3 to 5.4%, between those two periods. The driving force was the same one for Chile. See a discussion in Ffrench-Davis (2006, Chapters I and VII). 35 For instance, a domestic positive shock, implemented by Korea and Malaysia in 1999, was highly successful, achieving a sharp recovery in one year (see Mahani et al., 2006). In my view, that option was also available for Chile.
36 Economic Development in Chile
the average speed of Latin America, thus losing the lead that it had enjoyed in the region since the late 1980s. It is true that, by 2008 it exhibited a much better record from 1990, with an average 5.3% vis-à-vis the 3.2% of all LACs, but in the margin (2004–8) it had lost ground, with a 4.9% average, lower than the 5.3% recorded by Latin America. A mix of factors directly explains that weakening. The direct origin is located in 2006. The central bank overshot the rise of the interest rate and left the exchange rate to revalue further; moreover, the Ministry of Finance sterilized the positive impact of the copper price rise, and allowed most of the negative impact of the increasing oil price to penetrate the domestic economy. A great virtue – the copper stabilization scheme – overshot, sterilizing in excess. The moderated increase in aggregate demand was strongly biased towards imports. Again, a severe inconsistency between the current exchange rate policy and the consensus objective of fostering exports with higher value-added prevailed, while small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) faced external competition with reduced import tariffs and an appreciated exchange rate (see Chapter VI). In brief, there was a combination of excessive priority for inflation, a sliding of economic policy towards more neutral policies, and the belief that actual GDP was already too close to potential GDP.36 The fact is that in 2006 actual GDP grew somewhat less than the potential GDP, thus resulting in an enlarged instead of a diminished recessive output gap. That implied forgone employment, wages, and profits. Additionally, uncertainty was reintroduced in entrepreneurs’ minds, particularly in exporters and small entrepreneurs, and optimism was weakened. During the next two years, effective demand experienced several ups and downs, affecting economic activity; the significant effects of demand on the response of real supply (that is, actual GDP) reflected the fact that the Chilean economy was operating persistently below the production frontier. Exchange rate instability contributed to the weak performance. Actually, imports rose systematically nearly twice as fast as the volume of exports; high prices hided that persistent fact. Evidently, the exchange rate was an outlier, and quite unstable. That is, the exchange rate regime combined two bads for the contribution of exports, and more broadly for tradables in general, to development. The international scenario played a relevant role, naturally enhanced by the openness of the Chilean economy. There were positive features for Chile, such as the spectacular price of copper and other large exports, which allowed the Treasury, very responsibly, to accumulate sizable funds for eventual bad years (or awful years such as 2009); fiscal surpluses jumped further to an annual average of over 7% of GDP in 2006–8. Further, world 36 This belief was associated with the biased methodology that, working with a trend that includes recessive periods, leads to underestimating potential GDP.
Economic Development in Chile
37
trade was dynamic up to the arrival of the international financial crisis. On the contrary, international prices of food were climbing. From mid-2007 to mid-2008, the price of food in the Chilean CPI increased by 22%, which generated significant inflationary pressures, explaining about half of the nearly 10% annual inflation recorded at the peak of the commodities boom (by the third quarter of 2008; see Ramos, 2008). It was, mainly, an imported inflation. The central bank consistently expressed its bias for the inflation target, at the expense of growth. By late 2008, when Chile was already exhibiting negative monthly inflation, the monetary policy interest rate (8.25%) exceeded by over seven points that of the USA. When the contagion of the global crisis arrived in 2008, the economy moved into open recession. In 2009 it experienced a drop in GDP of 1.5%, similar to the Latin American average. Now the government adopted a decided countercyclical approach, making use of the stabilization fund, which provided broad space for counter-cyclical fiscal policy. Notwithstanding a drop in tax revenue resulting from a depressed demand, some taxes were reduced transitorily (on fuels, loans, and SMEs). In parallel, fiscal expenditure increased by 18%, which implied a 4.5% actual deficit. The strong counter-cyclical fiscal policy was the main force compensating for the negative shocks, principally that suffered by the volume of exports. In fact, the volume of Chilean exports, which had risen 7.9% in the previous two decades, dived 5.6% in 2009. Fiscal policy softened to a significant degree the multiplication to the domestic market of the shock on exports. The domestic economy only contracted by a negligle amount (see Chapter VI, Table VI.6). For the first time since the opening of the economy, starting in 1973, the recessive adjustment, in the face of external shocks, was stronger on exports than on the domestic economy. Counter-cyclicality of fiscal policy was effective and efficient in 2009. In all, as said, growth was moderate, but low compared with the potentiality of the domestic economy and the positive shocks from abroad. In 2004–8, the average 4.9% rise of GDP was determined by a 6.6% expansion of the volume of exports and 4.2% of the rest of GDP. This latter figure contrasts sharply with the 6.5% dynamic growth of non-exports in 1990–8. Systemic competitivity was failing. The failure was associated with the second variable behind the weak economic performance: a hesitant development agenda, whose shortcomings rank from unlucky shortages in the supply of energy, to a faulty exchange rate policy, and to lags and lacks in the incomplete links of capital markets with productive sectors (particularly SMEs), labor training, and incentives to innovation. There have been relevant announcements of the design of a more powerful productive development policy focused on SMEs; but, notwithstanding some concrete progress, these are still mostly only announcements. Chile made ambitious social reforms in this period; pensions and health were substantially improved, as detailed in Chapter VII. They contributed to an improvement in income distribution, which today is notably less unequal
38 Economic Development in Chile
than in the 1980s. Nonetheless, the Chilean economy is still quite regressive. This is related to the fact that the strong social agenda was not well matched by the economic agenda. Fiscal responsibility was outstanding but derailed from a development concern. Structural reforms (as well as macroeconomic management, as shown) were weak and somewhat contradictory to the introduction of equitability in market behavior. The latter required deep reforms in the capital market, moving away from the priority on the overnight markets and decidedly towards enhancing the long-term market segment; developing segments for SMEs, and for entrepreneurs without wealth or history. Further, incentives for innovation were weak and have been taking a relevant shape only recently. Labor training for untrained workers has been improving but too mildly. The sharp increase in the number of years of education has become associated with lowered quality, which demands even more effective labor training. In brief, Chile missed, to a significant degree, what we call taking the road that leads from financierism to productivism. (d) A summary of outcomes Notwithstanding the recessive gap in 1998–2003, actual GDP rose by 5.3% in 1990–2008, in contrast with the 2.9% recorded in the 1970s and 1980s. The leading force behind that outstanding performance was the vigorous investment ratio achieved in the 1990s. The average ratio (21.4% in 1990– 2008) was seven points larger than during the neoliberal experiment (13.6% in 1974–89; all in 2003 prices). Even in the recessive period of 1999–2003, capital formation was significantly higher than that in the seventies and eighties, and sustained a potential GDP growth rate of 4%. It is important to stress that though FDI exhibited a very significant boom, 82% of the generation of productive capacity in the nineties was carried out by domestic agents (see Ffrench-Davis, 2003). After the recessive adjustment from 1998, greenfield FDI also contracted, temporarily, but the major reduction focused on private national investment, demonstrating the strong sensitivity of domestic investment ratios under a persistent output gap. On the other hand, in 1990–2008 the national savings ratio averaged 22% (at current prices), the highest in recent decades (see Table I.5). The higher savings ratio was associated with the stimulating macroeconomic environment faced by firms, with rather small gaps between actual and potential GDP, leading to greater use of installed capacity, higher profit margins, and larger reinvestment of profits (Agosin, 1998).37
37 As pointed out above, the convergence between the productive frontier and effective demand is an essential ingredient for an efficient macroeconomic policy. The absence or weakness of this fundamental macroeconomic equilibrium has been characteristic of Latin American economies since the 1980s. See Ffrench-Davis (2006, Chapter II).
Economic Development in Chile
39
Table I.5 Gross savings ratios, 1982–2008 (% of GDP at current prices) Gross saving ratio External National Public sector Stabilization funds Other (1) (2) ⴝ (3) ⴙ (4) ⴙ (5) (3) (4) (5) 1982–4 1985–9 1990–5 1996–8 1999–2003 2004–8
8.4 4.9 2.5 4.7 0.9 –2.2
3.1 16.5 22.1 22.7 20.6 23.8
–1.8 3.3 4.6 4.8 2.3 5.1
– 1.6 0.8 0.0 – 0.5 3.8
4.9 11.7 16.8 17.9 18.7 14.8
Source: Author’s calculations based on National Accounts data from the central bank and DIPRES. (3) The public sector includes cash profits of public firms, principally of CODELCO (the public copper producer), collected by the Treasury, excluding stabilization funds. (4) Corresponds to the Copper Buffer Fund until 2006, and the Economic and Social Stabilization Fund and Pension Reserve Fund since then. (5) Includes net private savings plus the central bank balance, profits of public firms not transferred to the Treasury and capitalized by these firms, and depreciation reserves of all public and private firms.
The savings capacity is strongly affected by the terms of trade, which continue to be extremely unstable for Chile, as documented by the several mentions above of fluctuations of the terms of trade effect as measured by the national accounts. The main determinant of these fluctuations has been the price of copper, with a smaller influence of oil imports. For instance, in 1989 the high copper price implied additional foreign currency inflows equivalent to 3.7% of GDP into the copper buffer fund (CBF), which is one source of public and domestic savings. To the contrary, in 1999 the fund decumulated 0.8% of GDP. The change represents a net difference of 4.5 percentage points, which ought to be taken into account when analyzing the evolution of public and national gross saving figures in Table I.5; that is required in order to measure actual savings effort in each year. However, that is only part of the story. The CBF covered only the proceeds of the large public firm CODELCO. But price fluctuations of copper have an effect on the taxes paid by the private producers.38 With the replacement of the CBF with the Social and Economic Stabilization Fund in 2006, the stabilization force of the fund was enhanced by including the fluctuations of tax proceeds of private copper producers.
38 All the profits of CODELCO are transferred to the Treasury. The issue was a matter of discussion, particularly in recent years, when the fiscal budget had a huge surplus with funds provided by the profits of CODELCO, and this firm had to borrow abroad to finance its investment. In 2008 the Ministry of Finance allowed CODELCO to retain a fraction of its profits after taxes, raised to a significant US$1 billion (0.6% of GDP) for 2009.
40 Economic Development in Chile
In all, the copper stabilization fund has represented an outstanding factor of macroeconomic stabilization. In general, the authorities have operated efficiently and responsibly with it. The CBF contributed to the implementation of the structural budget, thus allowing a move from pro-cyclical to neutral fiscal policies during the recessive years. But that valuable “credibility asset” was underutilized during 1999–2003, principally, as made explicit by the authorities, because of the fear of being criticized and “punished” by financial agents if they had adopted a counter-cyclical macroeconomic policy. Exports were the driving forces behind economic growth, increasing the external links of the Chilean economy and its potential for sustainable growth. It is interesting to note that the rate of export growth was relatively similar in the past three decades, contrasting with highly volatile GDP growth. In this context, it must be underlined that GDP growth in the 1990s performed notably better than in the Pinochet regime, because the rest of GDP (non-exports) also grew dynamically, reflecting broader systemic competitiveness and the positive impact of sustainable macroeconomic equilibria. In fact, non-exports rose anually by 6.5% in 1990–8, by merely 1.7% in 1999–2003, and then recovered to 4.2% in 2004–08. The sharp swings are mostly associated with domestic macroeconomic changes. Income distribution continues to be very unequal in Chile. Nevertheless, it must be recognized, considering the diverse available data (see Chapter VII), that in 1990–8 an improvement in income distribution took place. Both the decennial Household Budget Survey and the annual employment survey of the University of Chile for Santiago show a diminishing ratio between the incomes of the richest and the poorest quintiles of population. For example, the latter survey indicates that the ratio was 13in the sixties, 15 in 1974–81, 20 in 1982–9 and 14 in 1992–5 (see Figure VII.3). The regressive impact of recessive output gaps is evidenced in subsequent years, particularly in 1999–2002. With the recovery of economic activity and strengthened social policies, distributive progress was recorded in 2004–9. Nevertheless, there is still an enormous pending debt of the economy to most Chileans. The labor situation is a main determining factor of income distribution. It is a fact that the improvement of the labor market recorded between 1990 and 1998 contributed to the distributive progress in those years, and that its worsening was a key factor explaining the partial deterioration in 1999–2002. With regard to the unemployment rate, although it was lower than one-half the average rate under the Pinochet regime, it did not recover to the level of the 1960s in a sustainable pattern. Still more, after the long recessive imbalance from mid-1998, unemployment and income inequality worsened, and labor market informality arose as one of the greater challenges to restarting the path of growth with equity. In recent years the positive features have been a significant increase in the participation of women in the labor market, with its share rising to 43%, and the gradual increase in the share of the labor force making social security contributions, which
Economic Development in Chile
41
means progress towards formality and workers having the protection that contracts likely grant. The share of members of the labor force contributing to the private system had risen from 41% in 1989 to 54% in 2008. In summary, the Concertación administration compares favorably with all regimes since the 1950s in terms of (actual, potential, and per capita) GDP growth, productive investment ratio, inflation, real wages, social expenditure, and fiscal surplus (see Table I.1). This good average performance implied that, in the years of democracy, Chile shortened its distance from the developed world, as documented in Table I.6. Nevertheless, this performance was not sustained or continuous. As is known, the first half of the period (1990–8) involved vigorous growth (three times the speed of the USA’s), with a strong convergence with the developed countries and a reduction in income inequality. In the second half (1999–2008), the distance continued to be shortened, but the per capita GDP growth trend halved, and the strong development convergence exhibited in 1990–8, for example, with the United States was weakened, as were previous improvements in income distribution. What explains this remarkable change in the development trend? A mix of factors. Here, we mention four that are, naturally, interrelated. First, doubtless, the Asian crisis constituted a significant negative external shock; however, we show that its direct influence via slowing export growth only explains a minor share of the slower GDP growth (see Chapter VI). Second, there is a structural element: dynamism in exports was strongly influenced by natural resource exploitation (as in copper and forestry) and the development of public services (as in energy and telecommunications) in mega-projects that could be hardly replicated, at the same level of rising productivity, in the 2000s (Moguillansky, 1999). Consequently, a large number of smaller projects in sectors more demanding of the still pending systemic competitiveness became necessary in this new framework. Third, the strong social agenda was not well matched by the economic agenda. Evidently, there has been a lot of progress. But a rather poor economic outcome in the second decade needs an explanation. There was missing a more comprehensive effort to complete long-term capital markets; encourage Table I.6 Per capita GDP growth, 1974–2009 (annual average growth rates) Chile 1974–81 1982–9 1990–8 1999–2008 2009
1.5 1.2 5.4 2.6 –2.5
Latin America 2.0 –0.7 1.4 2.0 –2.8
Source: Central Bank of Chile, ECLAC and the IMF.
USA 1.5 2.6 1.7 1.6 –3.3
42 Economic Development in Chile
diffusion, assimilation, and adaptation of technology; broaden labor training; and open external markets for Chilean non-traditional products (all with special emphasis on SME development). All these are essential ingredients of a renewed national agenda for growth with equity. My view is that these shortcomings had a relevant influence on the defeat of Concertación Democrática in the recent presidential (January 2010) and parliamentary elections. But political analysis is beyond the reach of this book. Fourth, there is consensus that fiscal responsibility was outstanding, but some structural progressive reforms were weak and some changes were contradictory with the introduction of equitability in the market behavior. The latter required deep reforms in the capital markets, away from priority being given to overnight markets and decidedly towards enhancing the longterm market segment; developing segments for SMEs, and for entrepreneurs without wealth or history.39 Further, incentives for innovation were weak, even though they have been taking shape recently.40 Labor training for untrained workers has been improving but too mildly. The sharp increase in the number of years of education have been associated with lowered quality, demanding even more effective labor training. There appears to be a growing shortage of more trained workers and entrepreneurs, in an economy that has doubled GDP per capita, and whose requirements for growth are now more demanding. In brief, Chile missed, to a significant degree after the promising start in the early 1990s, what we call taking the road that leads from financierism to productivism. A last, but not least, factor refers to the macroeconomic environment. As detailed in Chapter IX, policies applied in the second half of the 1990s gradually lost coherence and the ability to control the vulnerability of the Chilean economy in the face of external shocks. Consequently, when the Asian crisis exploded, a climate of instability returned to Chile once again, opening a significant gap between actual and potential GDP from mid-1998. This gap, as demonstrated throughout the text, was the main cause of the sharp drop in the investment ratio in 1999–2003 and the loss of entrepreneurship pull. It is essential to find the way back to real sustainable macroeconomic equilibria, after some confusing swings between the neoliberal and growthwith-equity approaches. Thus, along with deep microeconomic developmentfriendly reforms (pro-SMEs and pro-employment) – decidedly enhanced, 39
There have been several reforms of the capital markets, which have improved the access to financing for SMEs and microcredit. However, the market is still intensive in short-term and liquid dealings and remains quite limited for SMEs (see Consejo de Trabajo y Equidad, 2008). 40 In 2008 it was decided to focus the allocation of the proceeds of a royalty recently established on mining to a selected group of clusters. It represented an encouraging deviation from allocative neutrality (see Consejo Nacional para la Innovación, 2007).
Economic Development in Chile
43
located indeed as a priority of public policy – Chile can recover sustained high rates of growth of GDP and a progressive reduction of inequality. For both growth and equity it is necessary to reach sustainable real macroeconomic balances. Beyond low inflation and fiscal responsibility, foreign exchange and interest rates approaches functional for productive development are required, as well as an active management of aggregate demand at levels consistent with productive capacity.41 Recent performance has been deficient in this matter.
Annex Long-term trends and fluctuations in economic growth: estimating potential GDP This annex reports estimates of the evolution of potential GDP (GDP*) and the gaps registered between GDP* and actual GDP. Recall that output gaps have enormous effects on investment ratios, employment and the evolution of total productivity (TFP). The expansion of productive capacity – economic growth – is not a given immutable figure, but the result of public action and the behavior of social, political, and economic agents. Naturally, it also depends on the external environment and the ideas in fashion that influence the behavior of different agents; for example, the relative weight of short term “financieristic” visions focused on windfall gains versus “productivistic” visions focused on productive development. The evolution of the potential productive capacity depends on the components of the production function: gross capital formation, the labor force and its quality (human capital), technological change and productivity. As well, the actual rate of use of potential capacity is associated with sociopolitical and macroeconomic environments. I have argued that macroeconomic policies intended to ensure a high use of productive capacity are a key ingredient of an efficient public policy. They not only contribute to sustained economic growth, but also, especially, they fortify equity through its positive impact on SMEs and employment. In order to grow with equity – as shown throughout this book– the improvement of macroeconomic policies is a core requirement. For a better analysis of this issue, there is need to examine the evolution of GDP* (productive frontier (PF) or installed capacity). Counting with a credible estimate of GDP* contributes to understanding 41
It is fashionable to repeat that with the adoption of a floating exchange rate the national economy was immunized from external shocks. The truth is that exchange rate crises are eliminated, but at the expense of transferring great instability to the real economy, especially to the allocation of resources between tradables and nontradables, and to aggregate demand.
44 Economic Development in Chile
economic history and to guiding future macroeconomic policies: that is, monetary, fiscal, and exchange rate policies, and prudential counter-cyclical regulation of the capital account. There are many sophisticated methodologies to estimate potential output, but they usually do not control comprehensively in the estimates for the effects of strong recessions. Therefore, these estimates tend to take account of the trend or historical actual GDP average, including the sharp cycles experienced by the domestic economy, which implies a downward bias of potential GDP.42 The use of these estimates affects the quality of both historical analyses and macroeconomic policy, because it tends to reproduce past recessions in the future and hide the crucial variable: the sustainable economic frontier – of full utilization of capital and labor and efficiency in economic management – at which the battery of macroeconomic policies should be aimed. This annex presents the methodological options that were used to estimate GDP*, avoiding the problem mentioned above. With those estimations of GDP* the differences from actual GDP are reported; that is, the output or recessive gap. This gap reflects the evolution of aggregate demand, its relationship with effective demand (which is that located on output by domestic resources), and the match between the structures of demand and supply of goods and factors markets. That is an interaction between macro and microeconomics. GDP* expanded in a fairly stable fashion in the 1960s, with relatively high capacity utilization, compared to the large output gaps that prevailed in the 1970s and 1980s. In fact, capital formation and the growth of productive capacity were more unstable in these two decades (see Figure I.1 above, and Table A.1). The low investment ratio and slow expansion of the productive frontier are associated with the low average capacity utilization and real macroeconomic disequilibria of these two decades. The instability of economic activity has negative repercussions in two respects. First, underutilization of capacity tends to reduce the actual social and market profitability of capital; it diminishes the availability of investment funds and worsens the financial condition of enterprises. In addition to discouraging investment, it reduces actual productivity. On the other hand, this instability depresses productive employment, destroys part of capacity as a result of massive bankruptcies, and negatively affects the sustainable future income level. That is another link between macro and microeconomics. Massive bankruptcies caused by macroeconomic imbalances implied a destruction of capital (a lot of which would have been productive under 42
For example, the popular Hodrick–Prescott technique and estimations of production functions that do not duly control for cyclical changes in the rate of capital utilization or the labor supply usually give erratic estimates of total factor productivity.
Economic Development in Chile
45
Table A.1 Potential GDP growth and output gap, 1960–2007 (annual average growth rate, % of GDP*) Potential gap
Output gap
ICOR (1)
Production function (2)
ICOR (3)
Production function (4)
1960–71 1971–3 1974–81 1982–9 1990–8 1999–2003 2004–8
4.6 1.2 1.9 3.0 7.2 4.0 4.2
3.8 3.0 2.4 3.5 6.5 4.2 4.2
1.9 5.0 8.7 12.1 –0.5 6.5 3.7
–0.5 2.4 8.7 13.2 –0.7 6.5 3.8
1974–89 1990–2008
2.5 5.6
2.9 5.3
10.4 2.5
11.0 2.3
Source: Author’s calculations detailed in this annex. Columns (1) and (2) are annual average growth rates of potential GDP or productive frontier (PF). Columns (3) and (4) report the average output gap of different subperiods, as a percentage of potential GDP. From 2002 on, the growth of potential GDP corresponds to the estimates made by the Ministry of Finance in 2009.
normal demand and right prices). Losses resulting from sharp import liberalization and large exchange rate appreciation were very significant in the 1970s (see Chapter II). The situation improved in the 1980s, partly as a result of better aligned macroprices (the exchange and interest rates), but it was restricted by the recessive effects of the binding foreign currency scarcity, and the distortion and the uncertainty generated during the debt crisis. In the 1960s, excessive protection and administrative obstacles fostered inefficiencies, but less real macroeconomic instability helped to improve the efficiency of all productive factors and to keep more enterprises afloat. It allowed the concentration of energies on creating enterprises rather than on transferring existing assets, and provided more predictable patterns of demand and stabler relative prices (which stimulated productive investment, given its irreversibility). As a consequence, development was also more inclusive or integrated, which offered greater productive opportunities for broader sectors of society. This environment, despite numerous distorting inefficiencies, explains the better performance of productivity in the 1960s vis-à-vis the 1950s and the near match with potential productivity in the 1980s (recall that actual GDP growth was 2.9% in 1982–9 and 4.8% in 1961–71). The years of great underutilization of capacity have been associated with deliberate or involuntary recessive adjustments following expansions, with fiscal, monetary, or balance of payments disequilibria. Underutilization also intensified when stabilizing policies rested on only one policy tool (generally
46 Economic Development in Chile
the exchange rate) instead of using multiple anchors. Major gaps occurred in 1954–6, 1959, 1973, 1975–9, 1982–7, and most recently 1999–2003. In the 1990s, once most idle capacity became utilized in 1989, the productive frontier started to increase vigorously at annual rates of around 7% in response to an increase in the investment ratio by 7 points of GDP between 1982–9 and 1990–8 (see table A.1). Prevailing domestic stability throughout almost the whole decade, achieved by means of prudent counter-cyclical policies like selective regulation of short-term or volatile capital inflows, determined the framework for a virtuous cycle of higher utilization of the existing capital stock, thus generating higher investment flows, and generally a more efficient use of productive resources; naturally, this reflected in significant actual productivity growth. The Asian crisis implied a sudden stop for the virtuous circle of 1990–8, enforcing a fall of the growth rate of actual GDP to below 3% in 1999–2003. The recessive gap between actual and potential GDP re-emerged, implying a significant slowdown of investment dynamism; consequently, a sharp diminution of the growth rate of potential capacity took place, from a 7% to a 4% plateau.
Estimating potential GDP or the productive frontier GDP* is the maximum aggregate supply of goods and services that can be achieved in any period, given the imperfections prevailing in the production process and factor quality. The determinant variable for achieving that maximum is an actual demand consistent with potential supply. There is a significant asymmetry in the actual performance of the economy. Actual GDP can be placed much below the PF (or GDP*), while it cannot stay above that productive capacity in a sustained way. The PF can be surpassed only temporarily, but with the exhaustion of inventories, or growing inflationary pressures, or non-financeable external deficits, or under transitory terms of trade positive shocks. In this Annex GDP* and the output gap are estimated through two methodologies, which take into account the essential issues of our interest. The first one is quite old in the literature and applied economics; it is based on the ex-ante election and correction of peaks of use of the installed capacity, then the calculation of a relation (incremental capital-output ratio, ICOR) between the increase of output and the increase of the capital stock. The second uses an aggregate production function approach. Both methods, in this specific case, report consistent results (see Table A.1). (a) ICOR methodology, with corrected peaks This is a very simple method with limitations. However, for economies with great fluctuations of economic activity it tends to give results better fitted to reality than sophisticated conventional methods that omit the control by those fluctuations or asymmetries.
Economic Development in Chile
47
With available information, we select the peaks of use of capacity in the period studied. In this sense, there is wide consensus among economists on when peaks have been reached: in the past three decades, the Chilean economic peaks were located in 1971, 1974, 1981, 1989, and 1997. I assume that in those years potential and actual GDP were rather similar. Consequently, a first estimation of GDP* is the level of actual GDP in those years. However, for greater precision and based on complementary information, I search for the main biases in each of the annual peaks identified in getting a figure for GDP*. I have corrected for the two main sources of bias. In one the PF is underestimated by actual GDP; this happens when the peak is not achieved throughout the year (for instance, in 1974, with a recession starting in the third quarter). The other overestimates the PF, in the case of an excess of imports without sustainable external financing; the excess allows a large value-added in the marketing of imports, which implies that actual GDP overestimates GDP* (overestimates GDP* moderately in 1997; overestimates GDP* greatly in 1981, partly compensated by the underutilization in producing tradables, due to a highly appreciated exchange rate). Then the net increase in output was calculated (GDP corrected by depreciation of capital) between two peaks, and the net increase in the stock of capital (the sum of the net investment of each year lagged one year). The ratio between the two is usually called the ICOR (or reciprocal of the standard ICOR) or coefficient of gross marginal productivity of capital.43 Subsequently, this ratio and annual investment were used to estimate potential GDP between peaks.44 This estimation of GDP* is based (i) on the assumption that capital is the only (or main) exogenous factor in the production function, and (ii) on the ex-ante selection of peaks, when actual GDP is located on the production function and not “below” it. Both assumptions are reasonable as a first approach. On the one hand, in countries like Chile capital is the scarce factor and, therefore, is the binding element of the productive frontier; employment as well as the absorption of technology have a positive association with vigorous investment. On the other hand, peaks were selected by means of the revision of diverse indicators that allow a good degree of certainty on the proximity between actual GDP and GDP*. However, it is 43
The reciprocal of the ICOR was used associating increases in output with net fixed capital formation. However, apart from investment in human capital, there have been changes in the use of other factors, such as technology and natural resources (Marfán and Bosworth, 1994). In fact, the use of natural resources intensified. Numerous empirical studies examine the quantity and quality of labor and capital. 44 Estimates by Marfán (1992) for 1960–88 yield annual rates of change in GDP* similar to those obtained by the two methods used in this chapter. The similarity of results, within the time frame common to both studies, is accounted for by the choice of the peaks method and the agreement in the identification of peaks and of
48 Economic Development in Chile
relevant to ask how much estimates change when relaxing both assumptions, including labor as an independent factor in an econometric estimate of a production function. (b) A production function with labor and capital By definition, the production function represents an efficient technical relation between the output level and the factors required to produce it. Therefore, those points of underutilization of productive factors – that is, points with idle capacity and productive inefficiency – are not located on the production function. In order to deal with this relation empirically, normally the production function would be estimated using as dependent variable the actual GDP and as independent the productive factors actually used. The potential GDP would be obtained, then, when applying the parameters obtained to the factors in its “full” employment level. The problem is that, given the absence of direct data, it is difficult to get the level of capital actually used and, on the other hand, it is also difficult to establish the full employment level of labor; for that reason, the estimates available usually have significant biases using this this concept.45 An alternative approach, which I use here, makes use of valuable information by estimating the production function with a corrected sample of observations that excludes the points with evident inefficiencies (since we know that the points where actual GDP is significantly below GDP* are not on the production function). For it, first the following equation in logarithms by ordinary least squares (OLS) was estimated: ln(Yt ) ⫽ a0 ⫹ a1 ln(Kt ) ⫹ a2 ln(Lt ) ⫹ ut
(1)
where Y is actual GDP (constant prices of 1996), K is the capital stock (constant prices of 1996), L represents the labor factor (we use total hours worked corrected by education), u is a random error term.46 Then, I build a periods when the economy is placed sharply below the production frontier (that is, out of the production function). Given the huge cycles experienced by the Chilean economy, empirical studies that do not take the level of activity into account can be significantly biased in their results concerning total factor productivity. For instance, Roldós (1997) gives a change of total factor productivity (TFP) per annum of –3.8% in 1981–5 and 0.9% for 1986–90, evidently distorted by the 1982 recession. The interesting paper of Beyer and Vergara (2002) estimates –2.2 points of contribution of the TFP in 1981–85 and 2.3 points in 1986–90. Given the small output gap of 1981 and 1990, the average approximates to real structural TFP. 45 See diverse estimates for the Chilean case in Morandé and Vergara (1997), Roldós (1997), Coeymans (1999), Hofman (1999), Marcel et al. (2001), Beyer and Vergara (2002), Contreras and García (2002), and Gallego and Loayza (2002). 46 The series of capital stock and hours worked constructed by the Ministry of Finance was used.
Economic Development in Chile
49
25.0 ICOR
PF
20.0 15.0 10.0 5.0 0.0
2008
2006
2004
2000
2002
1998
1996
1994
1992
1990
1988
1986
1984
1982
1980
1978
1976
1974
1972
1970
1968
1966
1964
1962
⫺10.0
1960
⫺5.0
Figure A.1 Comparison of two estimates of the Output Gap, 1960–2008 (% of GDP*). Source: Author’s calculations detailed in this annex: columns (3) and (4) of Table A.1.
corrected sample that does not contain the observations of years with more significant inefficiencies. In order to approximate to it I excluded the observations in which the error term is negative. With that exclusion I correct for the bias of the evidently asymmetrical fluctuations of actual GDP around GDP*. But, beyond econometrics, one must check for the consistency of the resulting selection with other data. The excluded years are 1975–8, 1982–8 and 1999–2003. This selection of years when actual GDP has deviated sizably from the PF is consistent with other empirical studies like Coeymans (1999) and Marfán (1992), among others. With the remaining observations, (1) was re-estimated. Then the new parameters obtained plus the actual value of K and estimates of “full employment” L were used (in logarithms) to forecast the dependent variable through the full sample, obtaining thereby the GDP* series. Figure A.1 compares the resulting output gap in both methods. Method 1 renders a higher estimate of the output gap because it considers only years close to the frontier, while method 2 retains years clearly below the PF, such as 1979 and 2004. Beyond this evident source of divergences, the similarity is clear, in spite of the differences in the assumptions, and the fact that the production function estimates GDP* with fixed parameters; meanwhile the ICOR methodology allows for changes in productivity from peak to peak.
This page intentionally left blank
Second Part The Neoliberal Experiment in Chile, 1973–1982
This page intentionally left blank
II Import Liberalization in 1973–82*
The distinctive characteristic of trade policies implemented in 1973 was the sharp unilateral import liberalization, which was undertaken to a degree then unprecedented in modern economic history in other semi-industrialized or emerging economies. By establishing a uniform tariff of 10% for nearly all imports, and deleting non-tariff restrictions, this liberalization suppressed all selective criteria for regulating them. Trade liberalization was accompanied by a reduction in restrictions on foreign exchange dealings and on capital flows. The implementation of free trade raises four questions. First, did the policy allow for a more efficient use of available resources or did it produce significant new divergences between market and social “efficiency”? Second, what degree of dynamism characterized the process, compared to its historical behavior, and how did the intensity and timing of liberalization affect employment, investment, and consumption? Third, how much competition or economic concentration did the policy reform produce? Last, how effectively “neutral” were these “non-discriminatory” economic policies? Policies, seemingly “neutral,” were applied to different segments of the economy that coexisted in a framework marked by inequalities and sharp heterogeneity in productivity among workers and among firms; the heterogeneity of productivities is an outstanding feature of developing economies, which deters economic growth and equity. It implies that “neutral” policies may produce asymmetrical effects, evidently non-neutral, among different productive and social groups. There are also different effects on the production of exportables that experience positive pulls and the production of importables that receive negative pulls. Additionally, there are * Based on “Import liberalization: the Chilean experience, 1973–82,” in Samuel and Arturo Valenzuela (eds), Military Rule in Chile: Dictatorship and Oppositions, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1986. I appreciate the comments of Augusto Aninat, Vittorio Corbo, René Cortázar, Jaime Estévez, Alejandro Foxley, Dominique Hachette, and Pilar Vergara. 53
54
Import Liberalization
likely transfers of externalities to the rest of the domestic economy generated by the exposure to foreign competition (Tybout et al., 1991; Herzer and Nowak-Lehmann, 2004).1 It is evident that the effects of a deep process of reforms need a long time for completion. Nevertheless, given a positive time preference rate, it should be kept in mind that a real peso today will be worth more than twice as much as one earned ten years later. On the other hand, many other policy changes were implemented together with trade reform, making it difficult to distinguish between the effects of each of them. At the outset, it must be discarded the simplistic dilemma that the only alternative to the specific implementation of sharp import liberalization by the Pinochet government would have been to maintain the chaotic situation of 1973 must be discarded. Actually, in 1967–70 a very pragmatic policy (in my view) rationalizing trade policies was implemented (see FfrenchDavis, 1973). Why, for instance, could not that pragmatic approach to trade reform be adopted again? Its main features were gradual implementation, direct complementarity with export promotion, reduction of the variance and average effective protection to import substitutes, and an active crawling-peg exchange rate policy consistent with the tariff reform. Section 1 shows the path followed by the reduction of import restrictions, focusing on tariff liberalization and the evolution of the real exchange rate in order to determine to what degree this macroeconomic price played the compensatory role assumed by policymakers. Section 2 analyzes the behavior of the principal categories of imports, and examines some distributive effects. Section 3 studies the overall impact of import liberalization on manufacturing and employment, examining disaggregated information on the performance by industrial branches. Section 4 presents the main conclusions of this chapter.
1 The import liberalization process In late 1973, before the introduction of reforms, Chilean foreign trade was subject to a great deal of government interventionism:2 a simple tariff average of 94%, with sharp dispersion, countless non-tariff restrictions and multiple exchange rates. A remarkable reduction in the extremely high barriers that protected import substitutes constituted the core of the new trade policy. The rapid liberalization process, which began in 1973 and ended in 1 In this chapter, I focus on import policies. Export policies, their effects, and interrelationships between both dimensions are analyzed in Chapters V and VI. 2 Notice that this was the situation in 1973. As said, in the second half of the 1960s a reform was in progress that included the gradual rationalization of the import regime, the improvement of an export promotion scheme, and the systematic implementation of a crawling-peg exchange rate policy (see Ffrench-Davis, 1973, Chapters III and IV).
Import Liberalization
55
June 1979, induced a drastic change in market comparative advantages by modifying both the profile of effective protection and its average.3 During the period of liberalization, the target of the process underwent significant changes. What initially appeared to be a moderate reform, with maximum tariff rates of 60%, in the end became a drastic revamping of the tariff structure with a final uniform tariff of 10%. The first steps in the process consisted of suppressing the main non-tariff barriers and dropping to 220% all tariffs that were above that level. Most import prohibitions and deposits were eliminated. These import deposits, with a rate of 10,000%, which were charged on more than half of imports, represented a discretionary control on imports in 1973. The deposits were waived on the condition that importers fixed their volumes within the quotas recommended by the government. Since this mechanism was applied along with an undervalued exchange rate to several thousand products, it generated countless supply bottlenecks and speculative windfall gains for importers. The “normalization” of the foreign exchange market (see Chapter III), which took place in October 1973, and a significant increase in the price of copper during the second half of that year facilitated the rapid removal of quantitative restrictions and initial tariff reductions. In early 1974, the government announced a tariff liberalization scheme that would take place gradually over a three-year period and indicated that it would proceed pari passu with real exchange rate depreciation. The finance minister asserted that it would generate export-led growth and that workers would benefit, “as it would create more jobs in expanding sectors than the number of jobs that could disappear in some highly inefficient sectors.” It was argued that “greater growth perspectives are based in the opening to trade, in the development of export industries and in the intensification of Latin American integration.”4 The announcement gave no indication of the levels that tariffs were projected to reach. The first such indication came in May 1974, when the government declared that “in 1977, no tariff will be higher than 60%. This clearly defines the tariff policy that will be followed in the future, so that domestic industries can make whatever adjustments are necessary and prepare themselves so that they will be in good shape to meet foreign competition.”5 Despite these announcements, strategic differences emerged between proponents of a fully orthodox policy and other government officials with a more pragmatic bent. Towards late 1974, reserved government documents mentioned a range of 25–35%, within which the majority of tariff rates 3 In Ffrench-Davis (2006, Chapter IV) a comparative analysis is made with the trade reforms implemented by many LACs since the mid-1980s and in the 1990s. 4 See DIPRES (1978, pp. 35 and 61). 5 Comments of the finance minister, October 1974, reprinted in DIPRES (1978, p. 107). The minister reconfirmed this goal on April 24, 1975 (p. 172).
56
Import Liberalization
would fall.6 Later, in 1975, the government announced that the tariff range would be placed between 10 and 35% and that it would be reached during the first half of 1978, by gradual reductions. Although step-by-step the initial, more pragmatic, official policy gave way to the free trade approach, the policy as it was presented by 1975 contained two important heterodox elements. On one hand, it contemplated nonuniform tariff rates (from 10 to 35%) according to the degree of elaboration of different categories of products. On the other hand, it also contemplated maintaining the tariff preferences agreed under the Andean Pact, which meant that tariff reductions for several products stopped at the minimum common external tariff in place in 1972–6, according to the Cartagena Agreement. The gradual tariff reductions were made approximately once every six months, as can be seen in Table II.1. Nevertheless, the final reductions, scheduled for the first half of 1978, were anticipated in August 1977, when 99.6% of all tariffs reached the 10–35% range, with a 20% simple average. Table II.1 Tariff liberalization, 1973–9 (rates on cif value)
Date
12/31/73 3/1/74 3/27/74 6/05/74 1/16/75 8/13/75 2/09/76 6/7/76 12/23/76 1/8/77 5/2/77 8/29/77 3/12/77 6/78 6/79
Maximum tariff
Modal tariff
Rate (%)
% of all items
Rate (%)
% of all items
(1)
(2)
(3)
220 200 160 140 120 90 80 65 65 55 45 35 25 20 10
8.0 8.2 17.1 14.4 8.2 1.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 1.6 22.9 21.6 99.5
90 80 70 60 55 40 35 30 20 20 20 20 15 10 10
(4)
Simple average tariff (%) (5)
No. of items (6)
12.4 12.4 13.0 13.0 13.0 20.3 24.0 21.2 26.2 24.7 25.8 26.3 37.0 51.6 99.5
94.0 90.0 80.0 67.0 52.0 44.0 38.0 33.0 27.0 24.0 22.4 19.8 15.7 13.9 10.1
5,125 5,125 5,125 5,125 5,125 4,958 4,952 4,956 4,959 4,981 4,984 4,985 4,993 4,301 4,301
Source: Central Bank of Chile. Note: Dates refer to the official decrees on general changes of custom tariff rates between December 1973 and December 1977. On the latter date the government issued a decree of monthly adjustments that lasted until June 1979. 6 De la Cuadra and Hachette (1992) and Hachette (2000) detail the trade reforms of the 1970s.
Import Liberalization
57
Repeated official statements implied that the reduction of protection for import-substituting firms had finished in August 1977. Three months later, however, the finance minister announced a target tariff of a uniform 10% to be reached in mid-1979. The additional tariff liberalization was carried out in monthly steps between December 1977 and June 1979. By the later date, a uniform tariff of 10% was being charged on nearly all imports into Chile.7 Non-tariff restrictions, which were generally inefficient and generated capital gains, had been mostly eliminated; and several hundreds of tariff exemptions in favor of firms, regions, or individuals had been suppressed. But price bands softening the transmission of external instability (such as on wheat, oil seeds, and sugar) were also eliminated. Imports of capital goods, which had been generally exempt from tariffs, now became subject to the uniform tariff, although they could be paid in installments. Evidently, relative prices changed against imports of capital goods and in favor of consumer goods, as well as reducing the cost of exportables. Thus the process of discussion finished in the government with a clear predominance of the most orthodox approach. In fact, the 10% flat rate was unusually low for developing countries in the 1970s, and even in developed countries a uniform rate was exceptional. Some comparative information illustrates this. In a newly industrialized country such as South Korea, even after a decade of implementation of its successful economic reforms, tariffs still ranged between 0 and 150%, with many locally produced items enjoying nominal rates of protection between 30 and 60%.8 Korea as well as Taiwan and other Asian countries had carried out a profound trade reform led by export promotion rather than by import liberalization (see FfrenchDavis, 2006, Chapter IV). Developed countries, despite their position at the forefront of world industry, usually maintained selective (non-uniform) rates of protection, with levels notably higher than 10% for significant groups of items. Effective tariff protection in the United States, Japan, and the European Economic Community was relatively high for product categories such as textiles and clothing, processed food, and light manufactures. For instance, textiles and clothing enjoyed effective tariff protection of about 40% in these countries (Roningen and Yeats, 1976; Baldwin, 1981). After 1973, public officials stated repeatedly that the real exchange rate would depreciate as effective protection dropped (DIPRES, 1978, pp. 275 and 291). The government declarations implied a naive view of causal 7 With this ends the “first trade reform.” The “second,” which initially reintroduced diverse forms of protection, began in 1983; see Chapter V. 8 See Balassa (1977, pp. 148–51) and Frank et al. (1975). For other developing countries analyzed in a comprehensive project by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), see Bhagwati (1978). All these authors support the use of selective moderate tariffs. See also Sachs (1987).
58
Import Liberalization
relationships in the economy, among others assuming no capital flows. In practice, however, large financial inflows implied significant deviations from this supposedly univocal causal relationship. In fact, during periods in which the most sizable tariff reductions were made, the real exchange rate appreciated in tandem. Table II.2 shows, for selected dates, the evolution of the real exchange rate (col. 1), nominal rates of protection for items subject to the maximum and average tariffs (cols 3 and 4), and the total cost per dollar of imports (col. 5). Dates were selected according to the evolution of the cost of imports and the relation between the two components that are considered here: the exchange rate and nominal tariffs.9 From this information, we can distinguish four phases in the liberalization process (see Figure II.1). The tariff reductions in phase I, which lasted until April 1975, were made when exchange rates were highly depreciated. Moreover, a significant proportion of the notably high tariffs was then redundant, which meant that the initial reductions did not have substantial effects, as they represented mostly
Table II.2 Cost per dollar of imports, 1973–82 Phase
Date Real Change of Nominal tariffs (%) exchange (1) in each rate phase (%) Maximum Average (1) 10/73
(2)
59.20
I
Average Change of total (5) in each exchange phase (%) rate
(3)
(4)
(5)
220
94
114.85
120
52
150.45
45
22
73.15
10
10
75.31
10
10
51.72
67.2 4/75
98.98
7/77
59.96
6/79
68.46
6/82a
47.02
II
31.0
–39.4
III
–51.4
14.2
IV
(6)
2.9
–31.3
–31.3
Source: Calculations based on Central Bank of Chile, Boletín Mensual, several issues, Ffrench-Davis (1984), and Table II.1. Col. (1) is the nominal exchange rate deflated by the corrected CPI (see Cortázar and Marshall, 1980) and multiplied by the index of external prices (IEP; see Ffrench-Davis, 1984), in 1986 prices. Col. (5) is obtained by multiplying col. (1) by [1 ⫹ (4)/100]. aMonthly average until the day before devaluation. 9 The selected dates are somewhat arbitrary, since the real exchange rate levels are sensitive to the price indexes used to calculate them. The average tariff can also be calculated in very different ways. I present here the simple average used by different government and independent sources. It is well known that the simple average is highly sensible to the extent of disaggregation.
Import Liberalization
59
110 Phase II
Phase III
Phase IV
RER, 1986 = 100
90 Real exchange rate
100 80
80 60
70 60
40 Average tariff
50
Average tariff, %
Phase I 100
20 40 30 1973 1974 1974 1974 1975 1975 1975 1976 1976 1976 1977 1977 1977 1978 1978 1978 1979 1979 1979 1980 1980 1980 1981 1981 1981 1982 1982 1982
0
Figure II.1 Average tariff and real exchange rate, 1973–82. Source: Tables I.1 and I.2.
“water” in nominal protection. Because of this, there were no significant increases in “non-traditional” imports during this phase. During phase I, the average cost of a dollar’s worth of imports increased by 31%.10 Hence, the reform process was principally one of “rationalization” in which the large dispersion of effective protection rates was diminished without causing a substantial impact on the manufacturing of import substitutes. However, the latter industries suffered the negative effects of the strong domestic recession then in progress. Import liberalization and exchange rate depreciation did have a positive effect on exportables; given that exports previously enjoyed customs exemptions for imported components, it was the exchange rate policy that had stronger effects on increasing exports (Ffrench-Davis, 1979). The situation faced by importables changed substantially during phase II, which lasted from April 1975 until mid-1977. During this period, reductions in nominal protection were more effective than in phase I, dropping from an average of 52 to 22%, and the maximum nominal protection decreased from 120 to 45%. The exchange rate appreciated by 39%, strongly reinforcing the effects of falling tariffs. Thus, for two years, while tariff liberalization rapidly reduced the effective protection, the real exchange rate was revalued in parallel. Consequently, the thirty-point reduction in the average
10 Obviously, the nominal tariff for several items, in particular for consumer goods, dropped notably more than the average tariff. The corresponding reduction in effective protection was even sharper. Therefore, for many of these categories the real exchange rate depreciation did not compensate for the effects of tariff liberalization. Data on effective and nominal tariffs before tariff liberalization appear in Behrman (1976, pp. 137–44).
60
Import Liberalization
nominal tariff meant a 51% fall in the average cost of each dollar of imports (Table II.2, col. 6). There was little chance for the market to gradually adjust to the strong impact of this rapid liberalization, unexpected because it contradicted repeated official statements that the exchange rate would “indissolubly” compensate for the dismantling of tariffs.11 The net result of tariff reforms in phase II was a rapid increase in non-traditional imports, particularly non-food consumer goods. In phase III, which lasted until mid-1979, when the nominal price of the dollar was frozen, the exchange rate was periodically adjusted to compensate for the newer tariff reductions. Consequently, at the end of phase III the average cost of the import dollar was about the same as at its beginning. Naturally, products that were relatively more protected at the start of phase III lost their privileged position as customs duties converged towards a uniform 10%. These changes occurred in an economy growingly more sensitive to the evolution of the international economy, including a constantly rising import coefficient. The average tariff had dropped from 94 to 10% during these three phases (and non-tariff restrictions had disappeared), while the real exchange rate at the end of the process was only 16% above the price at the outset of the reform. Exports also benefited from the broadening of the range of imported inputs, then either liberalized or subject to a uniform tariff. Substitutors, on the other hand, had to compete with imports that on average were 34% cheaper than in late 1973. Finally, in phase IV the real exchange rate was revalued steadily. This appreciation was a consequence of the fixed nominal rate and a domestic inflation that, from above, converged only gradually to the international rate during the three years in which the exchange rate remained frozen. In the end, foreign currency finished 21% cheaper than at the beginning of the reform, and the average cost per dollar of imports was 55% lower (see Table II.2). In June 1982, this phase ended with an abrupt devaluation and a deep recession in process. In summary, import policy took shape with successive official announcements, with each one of them presented as the final one. Thus, the policy evolved from a moderate opening to trade, explicitly and officially declared to be consistent with the process of Andean integration, to a sharp, acrossthe-board trade liberalization. As for the assumed compensatory role of the exchange rate, the facts show that in general this macro-variable did not behave according to the assumptions of the economic model. Therefore, an economic and social outcome that differed so much from that expected by the government is not surprising. 11 In this phase, Chile left the Andean Pact. As a result, producers of importables faced less Andean competition, while exporters lost their significant inroads in that market.
Import Liberalization
61
2 Import composition The drastic changes in the structure and level of protection had a significant impact on the composition of imports. As could be foreseen, imports of consumer goods (particularly non-food), which had previously been the most restricted category, were the most favored by across-the-board liberalization. Many variables other than trade policies affected the behavior of imports. Among the most significant variables were the sharp contraction in aggregate demand in 1975–6 and the recovery in 1977–81, the low investment ratio during nearly the entire liberalization period, and the rise in oil prices. Between 1970 and 1981, total imports increased by 127% in real terms (104% excluding oil and lubricants), as shown in Table II.3.12 We must recall two factors. First, until 1980 imports of equipment and machinery, as a share of GDP, were significantly below the level of 1970 and insufficient to raise productive investment and recover the 1960s growth rates. Second, per capita GDP barely increased by 10% in 1970–81, while per capita imports other than equipment and machinery grew by 115%; that is a gross income elasticity of 11. Evidently, increased imports were not associated with an income effect, but were predominantly due to import liberalization and exogenous changes in the supply and demand of importables (e.g. oil prices and changes in income distribution). Different import categories behaved heterogeneously. The influence of liberalization can be observed mainly in non-food consumer goods, where the greatest number of “new” non-traditional imports is concentrated. Purchases of non-food consumer goods increased by 534% between 1970 and 1981. The share of machinery and equipment in total imports dropped from 21 to 11%, and their participation in GDP fell by one-tenth between 1970 and 1981, with an even more noticeably lower share in the intermediate years. This drop reflects a depressed productive investment ratio in the period. Due to a reversal of the import substitution of final products, a reduction of demand for intermediate goods took place. Consequently, net expenditure in foreign currency involved in these “new” imports was less than their gross value. Additionally, relaxed or dismantled national integration requirements for manufactures caused an increase in the share of imported components in consumer goods in which substitution survived. This occurred in the car industry, for instance. Likewise, gross industrial output figures tended to overestimate the level of domestic activity due to the falling integration of domestic inputs.13 12
Given that 1973 presents significant distortions, in Table III.3 I used figures for 1970, which was considered a relatively “normal” year. Real figures are nominal dollars deflated by the index of external inflation faced by Chile. 13 This was the main source of overestimation of GDP, in the national accounts calculated with fixed coefficient matrices. See Marcel and Meller (1986).
62
Import Liberalization
Table II.3 Main imports of consumer goods and total imports, 1970, 1980, 1981 (1977 US$ millions) 1970
1980
1981
Change 1970–81 (%)
0.2 1.3 1.1 24.8
8.2 9.0 22.8 171.9
10.5 17.5 27.5 271.6
5,150 1,246 2,400 995
Confectionery items Leather and fur manufactures Alcoholic beverages and cigarettes Carpets, clothing, knitwear and fabrics Photographic and cinematographic products Footwear, hats, and umbrellas Musical and optical instruments Toys and recreational goods Processed foods Perfumery and cosmetics Television sets Radios Cars and motorcycles
8.0
17.4
25.2
215
2.1 4.4 3.5 5.3 0.1 0.7 4.7 19.5
24.0 18.1 32.0 34.6 13.7 49.0 46.0 144.4
43.3 28.7 42.4 41.3 19.6 66.2 45.8 263.9
1,962 552 1,111 679 9,500 9,357 874 1,249
I
75.7
591.1
902.6
1,093
309.9 262.1 666.9 689.5 1,561.2 1,714.3
757 484 48
II III IV V VI
Total main non-traditional consumer imports Wheat, maize, and sugar Fuels and lubricants Other consumer and intermediate goods Transport equipment Other capital goods
Total imports
43.6 118.0 1,155.5 157.4 408.6
317.5 376.6
395.8 480.6
152 18
1,959
3,823
4,445
127
Source: Calculations based on National Customs Authority for 1970 and import applications of the Central Bank of Chile for categories II, III, V, and VI in 1980 and 1981. Current dollars were deflated by the IEP.
Table II.3 shows the groups of consumer items (food and non-food) that increased most between 1970 and 1981. The thirteen groups disaggregated in this table cover 50% of all consumer goods imports in 1981. During the eleven-year period they grew by 1,093% (i.e. twice the increase in fuels), while all other imports expanded by 62%. As can be seen, most of these non-traditional imports were items that had traditionally been considered “luxury” goods. In several cases, these new imported items were not locally produced, even though they did replace similar domestically produced items. There was, then, a significant diversification in the composition of consumption. The consumption of goods whose imports grew most significantly was concentrated among high-income groups. Naturally, this phenomenon was related to the worsening of income distribution, although this effect
Import Liberalization
63
was magnified by the fact that the distribution of consumption is more concentrated for these importables than for total consumption. Undoubtedly, the low-income sectors were able to buy new varieties of consumer products, but these purchases were bound by their limited and declining earnings. According to household budget surveys conducted in Santiago by the National Bureau of Statistics, families in the upper quintile increased their share of total consumption from 44.5 to 51% between 1969 and 1978, while families in the lowest quintile decreased their share from 7.6 to 5.2% (see Chapter VII, Table VII.2). The 1978 survey also reflects the concentration of consumption of non-traditional imports that year (see Table II.4). In eleven of the thirteen groups of importables included in Table II.4, the richer quintile consumed a higher percentage than its share in total expenditure (as said, 51% in 1978). The two groups in which this richer bracket purchased proportionally less than its average include “inferior goods” (negative income elasticity) for the higher-income levels. For example, as income rose purchases of black-and-white television sets were replaced with purchases of color televisions, and transistor radios were passed over in favor of stereo sets and tabletop radios. Table II.4 Shares by income brackets of consumption of imported goods: main non-traditional imports in 1978 (% of total consumption) Item Color television sets Automobiles Imported whisky Imported cigarettes Cassettes Tennis racquets Electric blenders, mixers, and food processors Motorcycles Watches Toys Stereo equipment, record players, and tape recorders Transistor radios Black-and-white television sets Share of each bracket in total consumption
Highest 20% of households
Middle 60% of households
Lowest 20% of households
100.0 98.6 94.0 92.0 72.8 71.8 71.8
0.0 1.4 6.0 8.0 26.8 28.2 28.2
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0
65.3 59.7 56.1 51.3
34.7 34.7 41.4 48.5
0.0 5.6 2.5 0.2
32.9 18.8
57.8 71.2
9.3 10.0
51.0
43.8
5.2
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, III Encuesta de Presupuestos Familiares, vol. 3, Santiago, May 1979. Note: Only includes those products that could be identified in the survey as “non-traditional” imports. Unless otherwise specified, includes consumption of domestic and imported goods.
64
Import Liberalization
3 Effects of trade liberalization on manufacturing Evaluating the effects of import liberalization is a complex task. First, the effects were significantly different in each phase. Second, many other important changes took place simultaneously. On the one hand, there was a drop in aggregate demand, wages, and investment, and a rise in unemployment; these factors strongly influenced the nature of the adjustment process. On the other hand, export expansion, which began before the impact of liberalization was substantial (especially in 1974), contributed to the recovery of economic activity and offered opportunities for investment in the production of exportables. In this section, first, I examine the global changes in the industrial sector. In the second part, I try to progress to a disaggregated analysis by sectoral branches. (a) Macroeconomic effects Manufacturing production was drastically affected by the economic recession of 1975. That year, industrial output dropped by 26%, while GDP fell by 17%. As could be predicted, this meant that there was room for a subsequent intensive recovery. Actually, subsequently, the manufacturing sector exhibited high rates of “growth” from 1977 to 1979. Still, this was only a partial recovery. Moreover, it lost velocity in 1980 and fell off in 1981. Evidently, the invasion of imported consumer goods in 1980–1 played a crucial role in this outcome. By 1981, eight years after the neoliberal economic policy started to be implemented, industrial value-added per capita was 18.5% lower than in 1973. Table II.5 depicts the contrast between the evolution of the manufacturing sector in Chile and in developed and developing countries. This performance resulted in a notorious drop in the share of manufacturing in GDP, from 26% in 1970 to 20% in 1981. Finally, this deterioration was also revealed in industrial employment: since 1975 it remained markedly below that in 1970.14 This was caused, partly, by the diminished importance of labor-intensive industrial activities such as textiles and garments. There was also a drop in employment in areas where output increased but where value-added per unit of gross output decreased, which naturally resulted in a reduction in labor demand. Finally, without even having
14 Several studies assert that manufacturing was not affected negatively by trade liberalization. The causes of that contradictory conclusion, in sharp contrast with evidence, are: (i) the comparison is made with 1975, after the great fall of that year or (ii) the comparison centers on the eighties, disregarding that liberalization took place in the seventies and that tariff and exchange rate protection were reintroduced (though mildly) in the eighties.
Import Liberalization
65
Table II.5 Manufacturing output: Chile and the world economy, 1974–82 (1973 ⫽ 100) Total value-added (VA) Year
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
Chile
Industrialized countries (1)
Developing countries (2)
Chile (3)
Value-added per capita (4)
Industrial employment (5)
100.1 91.8 100.1 103.7 107.9 113.3 112.3 112.8 108.5
106.3 108.1 116.7 125.3 133.6 139.7 146.8 147.0 149.6
99.1 73.0 74.9 79.9 85.0 91.0 93.3 92.1 72.8
97.5 70.6 71.4 75.1 78.8 83.1 83.9 81.5 63.4
97.5 88.8 86.1 87.1 88.8 88.2 88.8 87.3 71.0
Source: For Chile, calculations based on central bank data, Jadresic (1986), and Marcel and Meller (1986). For developing and industrialized countries, United Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, May 1983.
recovered its 1973 or 1974 levels, the sector suffered another spectacular drop of 21% in 1982. Let us return to 1974.15 The actual level of industrial production in 1974 underestimates the actual productive capacity: a sharp contraction of aggregate demand had already begun in the second half of 1974 and was negatively affecting the annual level of output.16 The effect can be partially seen by observing that between October 1973 and September 1974, that is, during the first twelve-month period of the new government, industrial output was 3.4% higher than during the 1974 calendar year. From mid-1974 until 1981, the sector operated below its productive capacity and significantly below its historical trend. The gaps between actual and trend supply were caused by a series of events. Output losses in 1975 were due primarily to the contraction of aggregate demand, led by
15 The manufacturing value-added had expanded by 5.9% per year in the sixties. Nevertheless, the assertion that the industry had been “destroyed” by 1973 is disproved by the output performance immediately after the military coup. In general, there was not “destruction,” but growth did stop in 1971–3. The latter is one of the costs of macroeconomic imbalances and lack of discipline in those years. 16 There was a large drop in real wages in 1973 and 1974; the surveys conducted in January, April, and July 1974 by INE show that the average decrease was 16% compared to the same months in 1973. The decrease strongly influenced sectors that produced goods intensively demanded by middle- and low-income consumers. An outstanding example was that of the textile and clothing sectors.
66
Import Liberalization
recessive external shocks.17 During the 1977–81 period, however, production responded principally to the changes in demand patterns induced by the across-the-board import liberalization with exchange rate appreciation, the concentration of income, and the drop in domestic investment as a result of a recessive and unstable macroeconomic environment and high outlier interest rates (Mizala, 1992; Agosin, 1998). In fact, negative pulls for imports de-substitution were significantly stronger than the positive pulls for specialization in some importables and export dynamism. It is undeniable that the specific way in which import liberalization was implemented contributed strongly to the overall poor performance of the industrial sector and of the entire Chilean economy between 1973 and 1981. The productive capacity of the sector was seriously damaged, and many firms needlessly went bankrupt; survivors, naturally, tended to be strong. Altogether, despite the evident need to reduce the average level and dispersion of effective import protection in 1973, the net balance appears to be overwhelmingly negative for manufacturing. Disaggregated data presented in the next subsection provide additional support for this assertion. (b) Effects on the structure of manufactured output The structure of industrial output changed significantly during the 1970s. To identify the impact of import liberalization more precisely, I now examine the behavior of the different production branches. The close relationship between the domestic industrial sector and foreign trade can be seen first in the global evolution of exports and imports of manufactured goods. Exports grew significantly from 1974 until they totaled 10% of the gross value of the sectoral output in 1981, while imports rose to 35%. The respective figures for 1969–70 were 3 and 17%. It is well known that in the real world the behavior of exports is not univocally tied in a unique way to import policy (see Bhagwati, 1978); in fact, export promotion can be fully consistent with a policy of selective import substitution, as the East Asian countries have demonstrated beyond any doubt. Consequently, the effects of import and export policies on domestic production can be analyzed separately. Information broken down into twenty-nine groups (ISIC, rev. 2, three digits) compares the 1969–70 average to 1978; that is, a year before the freezing of the exchange rate in 1979. The composition of consumption, 17 The contraction of aggregate demand was associated in part with a significant worsening of terms of trade beginning in the second half of 1974 (see Chapter V). The negative terms of trade shock was equivalent to 6.4% of GDP in 1975 compared to 1972. It must not be forgotten that this worsening followed a strong 5% improvement in 1973–4. In fact, during the first year in which the new economic policy was put to work, the copper price was extremely high. Nevertheless, the transitory high revenues were not saved but disbursed as they were received.
Import Liberalization
67
output, and trade changed substantially during the decade (see Vergara, 1980). First, trade was dynamic in the sense that exports increased in sixteen groups while imports rose in eighteen; both imports and exports grew in ten of these groups, implying that, at three-digit information, there was intraindustrial specialization. There were drops in both output and consumption in seventeen branches. This suggests that domestic demand decisively influenced output in this period. At this level of disaggregation, many of the groups include goods whose production processes and marketing channels are quite diverse. Notwithstanding this heterogeneity, the data allow us to advance some conclusions (Vergara, 1980; Foxley, 1983, Chapter 3). First, only two groups show output growth that is associated with exports (wood and paper); in two other groups, exports play a significant role (food and industrial chemicals), even though their role is not as dominant as in the preceding groups.18 When the data are broken down still further, it can be shown that a large share of export expansion was concentrated in only five sectors: pulp and paper, wood, molybdenum oxide, fish meal, and semimanufactured copper. After a sizable diversification in the period 1974–6, the share of these products fell in 1976 to 58% of industrial exports, but in 1978 it rose to 64% and in 1981 to 66%. For imports, diversification was greater, as shown in section 2. This diversification is also reflected in the large number of groups for which imports became significant. Three branches were strongly affected by imports: electrical machinery, transport equipment, and professional equipment. In the first two groups, the rise in domestic demand ameliorated the negative impact of imports on output, while in the third group a receding domestic demand exacerbated the negative impact. In six groups, opening to trade together with a significant reduction in domestic demand led to a decline in output (textiles, clothing, leather, oil derivatives, pottery and china, and non-electrical machinery). In four other groups (footwear, printing and publishing, non-metallic minerals, and iron and steel), the determinant variable in declining output prior to 1978 seems to have been the decrease in domestic demand. Data on the other groups are more difficult to interpret, as the results depend largely on which years are compared and the methodology used to estimate the real change of each variable. As shown, the behavior of domestic demand had a determinant effect on the level of output. This effect makes it difficult to evaluate the impact of import liberalization, while depressed domestic demand contributed to increased exports of items in excess supply in the local market. Naturally, to the extent that domestic demand recovered subsequently, the relative weight of different variables changed; thus, after 1978 the effects of import 18 The main food products exported are fish meal and frozen seafood. The most important exported chemical substance is molybdenum oxide.
68
liberalization gained importance vis-à-vis aggregate demand as an explanatory factor of the poor performance of manufacturing. It was clear that by 1978 the effects of import liberalization had not yet been fully felt. At that stage, the growth of export quantum was losing speed, while imports, particularly of consumer goods, were rising quickly. This trend was at work in 1978 and 1979, before the nominal exchange rate was fixed. Subsequently, the sharp real appreciation of the peso that followed reinforced the lagged effects of import liberalization. The negative impact of non-traditional imports increased as compared to changes in domestic demand and the positive effects of exports. Aggregate demand became more import-intensive, the quantum of non-resource-based exports ceased growing in 1980, and imports (especially of consumer durables, as shown in Table II.3) rose in 1980–1 notably faster than in the previous two years. The sector had adjusted to foreign competition in three ways. Some went into bankruptcy or closed down plants. In other cases, firms began to specialize within the industry in two ways: merging with other firms and suspending lines of production within a firm. Finally, some firms also began to import goods that they marketed in place of those they had previously produced. Marketing imported products enabled firms affected by import liberalization to capitalize on the relative advantage they had because of their sales outlets and knowledge of demand. This adjustment mechanism had several interesting effects. First, in this case producing and importing were not independent functions but were managed by the same decision unit; thus, for a while foreign competition would be operating in a more limited fashion than is assumed by orthodox theory. Second, a larger share of firms leaned towards commercial and financial activities rather than producing goods. The extent of this bias is shown by changes in the composition of GDP recorded in the national accounts (see Chapter I, Table I.2). Third, the resulting growing current account deficit, which was created by the asymmetrical response of producers in sectors hurt by new trade policies and in sectors favored by them, was financed by an unsustainable increase in foreign debt. Fourth, although some producers defended themselves by switching to marketing imports, this change negatively influenced employment; in fact, productive employment decreased per unit of sales and even per unit of output.19
4 Towards an evaluation In these concluding remarks, I look first, briefly, at the global effects of trade policy on the balance of payments. Next some points are raised about the 19 This is a microeconomic increase in productivity. However, it has negative social and economic consequences (i) when it implies a greater reduction in employment than in production, instead of a greater increase in production than in employment, and (ii) when it takes place within a framework of widespread unemployment and worsened income distribution, as was the case.
Import Liberalization
69
effects on the efficiency, dynamism, and competitiveness of the Chilean economy. (a) Balance of payments and the current account Practically all components of foreign trade expanded during the period under study, especially non-traditional imports and exports. The export quantum recorded a most dynamic behavior. After an abrupt jump and diversification in 1974–6, exports moderated their increase until 1980. Undoubtedly, exports became the dynamic productive sector of the Chilean economy. Actually, they recorded a remarkable 13.6% annual expansion in 1974–81. Exports even provided some dynamism to the highly depressed agricultural sector. But the net effect was limited since, after “enforcing discipline” in the rural sector in 1974, growth reached merely 2% between 1974 and 1981. The dynamic agricultural exports, consisting mainly of fruit and forestry products, shared the sector with traditional agriculture, which decreased spectacularly (especially in grains, sugar beet, and oil seeds). The expansion of imports was much larger than that of exports, leading to a growing trade deficit that increased markedly between 1976 and 1981. A component that deviated most from “normal” values was imports of equipment and machinery, whose share of total imports lost ten percentage points; they fell to merely 11% of imports, notwithstanding that the Chilean GDP growth was highly dependent on imported capital goods. The trade deficit was affected by the copper price,20 which recorded a level one-fifth lower than the “normal” or trend price.21 Nevertheless, foreign exchange proceeds from copper exports increased as a result of two factors. On the one hand, large investments made between 1967 and 1970, with long maturing lags, made it possible for copper output to increase by 50% immediately after “discipline” was imposed in 1973. On the other hand, the 1971 nationalization of the large mines allowed the government to capture a greater share of the economic rent derived from the rich Chilean copper deposits. These two positive effects were “permanent,” while the low price could be assumed to be “transitory.” A huge current account deficit in 1981 was covered with extraordinarily and unsustainably large capital inflows. These inflows, which were primarily directed to the private sector, not only financed the current account deficit but allowed a balance of payments surplus and the respective accumulation of international reserves (Table II.6). In the meantime, external debt was 20 A component that showed a notable change in the opposite direction was the price of molybdenum, a copper byproduct whose real price increased sixfold during the 1970s. The higher value of this export was equivalent to 46% of the increased expenditure on oil imports in the same period. See in Chapter VI, Box VI.1 for the role of molybdenum in the external accounts. 21 See an early methodological discussion on the “normal” or trend copper price in Ffrench-Davis (1973, Chapter IV).
70
Table II.6 Balance of payments, 1973–82 (1977 US$ millions)
I
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
Current account –441 1 Trade balance 32 Exports (fob) 1,968 Copper 1,577 Non-copper 391 Imports (fob) 1,936 2 Non-financial services –328 3 Financial services –165 4 Unrequited transfers 20
–256 434 2,612 1,971 641 2,179 –478 –225 13
–536 76 1,734 947 787 1,657 –313 –310 11
159 693 2,282 1,330 952 1,588 –212 –352 30
–551 34 2,185 1,161 1,024 2,151 –295 –365 75
–960 –376 2,171 1,076 1,096 2,547 –214 –432 62
–925 –276 2,984 1,469 1,515 3,260 –186 –525 62
–1,361 –527 3,250 1,467 1,782 3,777 –269 –642 78
–3,213 –1,817 2,605 1,180 1,425 4,422 –476 –994 74
–1,600 43 2,573 1,170 1,403 2,529 –385 –1,334 76
94 –163
305 –230
143 303
669 118
1,589 628
1,740 815
2,220 859
3,259 45
791 –809
II Net capital inflowsa III Balance of payments
507 65
Source: Calculations based on data from the Central Bank of Chile, Balanza de Pagos. Note: The figures were deflated by the IEP (see Ffrench-Davis, 1984). aIncludes errors and omissions.
Import Liberalization
71
climbing fast, mostly devoted to finance consumption of imports (see Chapter III). Given the evolution of the sector, the authorities held on to two valid assertions, although with a faulty interpretation of their implications. It was stated that if the exchange rate were to be liberalized by the Central Bank the rate would strongly appreciate. This evidently would have happened, confirming that foreign exchange flexibility under a capital surge tends to exacerbate imbalances (see Chapter IX and Harberger, 1985). A lesser evil had been the fixing of the exchange rate at $39, but the most efficient policy would have been to moderate capital inflows and to manage a real devaluation in order to enhance a positive restructuring of production. The other weak point was the assumption that the excess of imports would slow down spontaneously. Slowing did tend to occur but with a significant lag. Additionally, since the exchange rate continued to appreciate until 1982, it stimulated a fast-rising expenditure increasingly intensive on imports, which crowded out domestic output and savings. These effects left indelible footprints on the Chilean economy over a prolonged time span. As underlined in Chapter III, the deficit on the current account of 21% of GDP in 1981 revealed an impressive and absolutely non-sustainable disequilibrium. (b) Efficiency, dynamism, and competition The theoretical foundation of import liberalization asserted that the market, free of government interference, would allocate resources according to a sort of unmistakably identifiable “comparative advantage.” Actually, market comparative advantages depend on the level and stability of the exchange rate, on the degree of activity in domestic and world markets, on international price fluctuations, and on many other factors (such as the availability of long-term funding, infrastructure, and trained labor). Additionally, market comparative advantages tend to diverge from social comparative advantages because of the disequilibria and distortions characteristic of developing economies; particularly relevant are the presence of severe unemployment and the obstacles to acquiring dynamic competitivity. The differences between the two can be striking, and highly costly, in a country facing a radical change in several economic policies, with high capital and labor unemployment, and inconsistencies among reforms, such as import liberalization and real exchange rate appreciation. (i) The macroeconomic framework and efficiency The efficiency of any economic policy depends on the context in which it is applied. The generally recessive domestic economic situation of this period was relatively conducive to export promotion, but on the other hand it increased the transition costs of import liberalization. Consequently, that macroeconomic and reforming environment would have required a trade opening led by export promotion, as East Asia had done, instead of the
72
Import Liberalization
approach led by import liberalization, as Chile did in the 1970s and Latin America did in the 1990s (see Ffrench-Davis, 2006, Chapter IV). The expansion and diversification of exports provided an outlet for excess production that otherwise would not have had a market. In fact, the sharp contraction of domestic demand (in particular, during the period from mid1974 to 1976) left a significant share of industry with underutilized installed capacity. The prevailing depreciated exchange rate, the access to the Andean market, and the efforts of PROCHILE (the government export promotion agency) supplied a market abroad for many firms with excess capacity. Later, productive capacities were expanded, and non-traditional and traditional natural resources were exploited, enhanced by prior investment during the 1960s that developed the bases for the forestry, fruit, and fishing industries, and the accelerated liberalization of imported inputs. Dynamism was reversed in the early 1980s, when an overwhelming exchange rate appreciation induced a generalized drop of exports. In general, the expansion of non-copper exports promoted efficiency in the allocation of resources, principally through an increase in the rate of utilization of capital and labor, the exploitation of natural or acquired comparative advantages, and the generation of externalities. For imports, the situation was the opposite. In fact, if a trade liberalization process goes too far, is too rapid, or is undertaken at the wrong juncture, it will provoke premature and unnecessary plant shutdowns, the underutilization of capital and labor, and a decrease in investment. Therefore, to evaluate the effects on the Chilean economy we must distinguish between the different stages of the liberalization process and take into account the macroeconomic context in which it was implemented. In phase I, clearly redundant levels of protection were eliminated. But the first tariff reductions served to limit national producers’ capacity to set monopolistic prices. In a second stage (phases II and III), the additional tariff reductions, which lowered the maximum nominal protection from 120 to 10%, had a much greater effect. The most painful part of import liberalization was carried out rapidly, with misleading announcements, and its negative effects were reinforced by exchange rate revaluations. This policy was implemented during a time in which wages were deteriorated, domestic demand was very depressed, and open unemployment was remarkably high. First, wage repression acted as an artificial protection mechanism that, although it was obviously regressive, compensated for reduced tariffs on imports. In fact, in 1976 the ratio of indexes of wages/exchange rate was less than half that of 1970, and in 1979 it had recovered to only two-thirds (see Ffrench-Davis, 1981). Second, given the depth of recession, recovery rates for demand and production were bound to be high. Since tariff liberalization took place during recovery, a naive examination of the data may lead to the wrong conclusion that the liberalization process encouraged an output increase. As was
Import Liberalization
73
demonstrated earlier, however, the opposite occurred. The implementation of free imports contributed to maintaining the recovery of domestic production at a level notably lower than that of the recovery of aggregate demand; output and aggregate demand became increasingly import intensive. The recession itself negatively affected the efficiency of the process. The underutilization of productive capacity and the extremely high real interest rates (averaging 38% between 1975 and 1982; see Chapter III) tended to raise the average cost of output to domestic producers, making it more difficult for them to face foreign competition. Third, high unemployment created a significant gap between market and social comparative advantage. Thus, the opportunity cost of resources freed by the sectors negatively affected by reform was lower than their market price. (ii) Dynamism and efficiency Here, the discussion will be confined to two interrelated points, concerning the investment ratio and asymmetry of adjustments, and “dynamic comparative advantages.” A remarkably low level of gross domestic investment contributed to an asymmetrical adjustment: strong negative pulls and weaker positive pulls. The widespread underutilization of installed capacity discouraged domestic investment (see Solimano, 1990; Agosin, 1998; Ffrench-Davis, 2006, Chapter III); the low investment ratio was also associated with the remarkably high real interest rates. It is obvious that resource reallocation is easier in an economy with a high rate of capacity utilization and dynamic growth. The stagnation exhibited by the domestic economy during this period made it necessary for many of the hurt sectors to reduce absolute output in order for the relative adjustment to take place. Limited sectoral and regional mobility of resources and the reduced rate of investment were obstacles to the effective reallocation of freed resources: it was predominantly the expansion achieved in the export sector that compensated, but quite partially, for the resulting lack of dynamism in the economy. As stated in Ffrench-Davis (1979), a growing share of the scarce domestic investment was channeled to the export sector. Investment was mainly concentrated in activities intensive in natural resources. It was less significant in products intensive in value-added and in “acquirable” comparative advantage. A reliable hypothesis is that it became easier to identify comparative advantages exhibiting a defined base of natural resources or already acquired. The countless changes taking place in the Chilean economy – depressed domestic demand, unstable and outlier interest and exchange rates, and incomplete strategic markets – made it difficult to identify the whereabouts of potentially acquirable comparative advantages. The diffuseness of comparative advantages was, presumably, one additional factor explaining the low actual investment ratio.
74
Import Liberalization
(iii) Competition and efficiency One result the government expected from import liberalization was increased “competitiveness” in the domestic market. This would be achieved by means of the effective or virtual presence of foreign importables, which would put an upper limit on domestic prices. It is undeniable that this did happen to a significant degree. What also happened, however, was that there were important deviations from the types of relationships that were supposed to characterize a “competitive” economy. First, a significant proportion of non-traditional imports belonged to categories in which product differentiation played a decisive role. Consequently, competition among suppliers of these products was based on product differentiation to a larger degree than on pricing. The segmentation of the capital market (one example is the persistent gap between domestic and foreign interest rates) also introduced competition based on the terms of suppliers’ credit. These factors provoked effects quite distinct from those that “competition” should have generated according to orthodox theory. Second, marketing channels were not completely open to every competitor; for instance, in a number of cases the producer of import substitutes became an importer of “competitive” goods. Third, the abrupt-cum-appreciation trade opening promoted greater concentration in the ownership of domestic productive activities. This phenomenon was reinforced by the depression in aggregate demand and by the manner in which the capital market operated. These factors gave a significant advantage to economic groups that were linked to financial activities and had access to foreign credit. A crucial argument for free trade policy refers to the benefits that competition allegedly brings to consumers, with the availability of a wider variety of goods and lower prices. Within the framework of orthodox consumer theory, the opening to foreign trade is seen as positive because it allows demanders to equalize their marginal utility with the marginal cost of importing (which is assumed to be the same as the international price for a “small country”). The diversification of consumption is seen as welfare increasing, as it would increase the freedom of choice of consumers. Ceteris paribus this is perfectly true. However, it is relevant to add two comments, concerning the indirect effects on consumers in their role as producers and on equity. First, the “de-substitution” of imports during the adjustment process generated unemployment and delayed the recovery of overall economic activity. These discouraged investment, which in turn had a negative impact on the creation of new job opportunities. Therefore, low-income consumers (who suffered the highest levels of unemployment), in their roles as producers (workers), bore much higher costs than the contingent benefits derived from the diversification of the basket now available in the market to those with purchasing power. Depressed producers cannot perform as dynamic consumers.
Import Liberalization
75
Second, the diversification of consumption enabled a small, high-income sector to rapidly adopt the consumption patterns of the well-off in the richest economies. The notorious increase in inequality that took place during these years (see Chapter VII) manifested itself in a noticeable differentiation of lifestyles rather than in higher savings rates and productive investment. The collapse in national savings supports this hypothesis (it dropped to 9.6% of GDP in 1981 and to 3.4% in 1982, in current prices).
5 Concluding remarks The Chilean experience left heterodox lessons. The national economy in 1973 had excessive effective protection for numerous import categories; therefore, a significant trade liberalization was required. However, trade liberalization was excessive and ill-timed; it was not coordinated with exchange rate and capital account policies, and disregarded the challenge of completing underdeveloped factor markets. A gradual procedure should have been adopted and a deliberate search for dynamic complementation between import substitution and export promotion should have been undertaken in the East Asian style. Positive export expansion would have been essentially consistent with a more pragmatic tariff policy than the one adopted. It could have involved a greater conversion of import substitutes into exportables, and a more diversified export basket that would have been more intensive in value-added. Consequently, a drastic dismantling of tariff protection, instead of a gradual and more comprehensive reform, including all ingredients for productive development, should not have been undertaken in a macroeconomic environment such as the one predominant in the Chilean economy. Supporters of the policy being implemented argued that if the policy had not been implemented so rapidly it would have been impossible to carry it out at all. The answer to this argument is threefold. First, it would have been better not to undertake tariff reductions as drastic as those performed from 1975 (covering phases II and III) rather than attempting to impose them amidst a depression, with high unemployment and low investment. As a consequence, the corresponding de-substitution of imports, predictably, was higher than naturally necessary, and therefore was inefficient in many cases. Neither excessive protection nor extreme liberalization was the appropriate solution. It is evident that “corner” solutions were not the optimal choice. Second, foreign exchange appreciation should not have been allowed during tariff liberalization. This misstep flagrantly contradicted the government’s repeated assertions. Third, developed or complete domestic markets for long-term financing, labor training and innovation were missing. These generated a real environment that differed substantially from the theoretical framework on which the arguments in favor of free trade were built.
76
Import Liberalization
Finally, the conventional hypothesis that an unrestricted opening to imports would promote the expansion of labor-intensive tradables and result in a contraction of capital-intensive activities was contradicted by the characteristics of changes that occurred in the productive structure. This performance was directly linked to the richness and characteristics of natural resources, but also to the macroeconomic framework in which trade was liberalized, to the excessive intensity and lack of selectivity of the reform, and to the absence of a comprehensive development strategy.
III Domestic Financial Liberalization and External Debt in the 1970s: Building a Major Crisis*
The Chilean economy recorded great fluctuations in its economic activity during the period 1974–81 (see Foxley, 1983; Ramos, 1986; Edwards and Cox-Edwards, 1987). In all, GDP growth averaged 3% per year; a figure notably lower than the 5.6% recorded by Latin America in the 1970s. Note that in the year after the end of that period, 1982, the debt crisis brought a generalized recession in the region; it was particularly acute in Chile. It is extremely informative that the deepest recession in the entire region took place in a Chilean economy that had eliminated the fiscal deficit, privatized many public firms, sharply liberalized imports and the domestic capital markets, and was praised by international financial markets and institutions as a highly “successful” economy. The Chilean outcome shares causes and results with those of Mexico in the “tequila” crisis of 1995, and with the currency and debt crisis of Argentina in 1998–2002.1 The poor outcome had six relevant causes: (i) the rapid and indiscriminate import liberalization (especially of consumer goods); (ii) the exchange rate appreciation in combination with sharp reductions in effective protection; (iii) the persistence of high real interest rates on the domestic capital market; (iv) the overwhelming permissiveness resulting from the lack of regulation of financial institutions and capital flows; (v) the composition of inflows, with a minor share directly linked to productive investment, while the increase in debt was principally directed to consumer imported goods; and (vi) the difficulty of identifying comparative advantages in a macroeconomic environment with a large output gap and “wrong” macro-prices. * Partially based on “The external debt, financial liberalization, and crisis in Chile,” in M. Wionczek (ed.), Politics and Economics of External Debt Crisis: The Latin American Experience, Westview Press, Boulder and London, 1985. I gratefully acknowledge the comments of researchers at CIEPLAN, and those of Robert Devlin, Rudi Dornbusch, Jorge Marshall Silva, and Carlos Massad. I appreciate the assistance of José de Gregorio. 1 In Ffrench-Davis (2006, Chapter VII) an analysis of the crises of several LACs since the implementation of the “Washington Consensus” is made. 77
78 Building a Major Crisis
Finally, great vulnerability in the national economy was generated, which resulted in the severe crisis of 1982. In fact, in view of the passive and neutral domestic policies pursued, the authorities were left with weakened policy tools to deal with external stocks. Furthermore, growing indebtedness and the magnitude of the current account deficit obviously could not have been sustained, even had the international financial crisis not taken place. Consequently, the external sector was placed on a course that would inevitably call for a traumatic adjustment process. The seriousness of this situation was exacerbated, of course, by the fact that during the 1970s the domestic productive base had been weakened given extremely low investment ratios. In fact, the average gross investment ratio fell by almost one-fifth compared to the 1960s and the GDP growth rate diminished proportionally more. Section 1 starts with the official conceptual framework, then presents the main features of the financial liberalization process and the policies adopted. Section 2 presents the evolution of capital flows and external debt; special attention is given to bank loans and the behavior of capital flows received by private debtors. In section 3, the macroeconomic impact of external indebtedness is examined, especially the effects on liquidity and on exchange-rate policy, and the disequilibrating adjustment processes to which it gave rise. Section 4 analyzes the evolution of interest rates, stressing the persistent gap between domestic and foreign rates. In section 5, a discussion of the various sources of external vulnerability to which Chile was exposed as a result of its financial openness is made. I argue, contradicting the neoliberal approach, that the problems were concentrated in the private sector segment of the debt. I also attempt to explain why the massive financial inflows were accompanied by a drop in national savings and a decline in the average investment ratio. Finally, section 6 summarizes the lessons provided by the 1970s neoliberal experiment for capital account and financial markets management. All are quite relevant for the early twentyfirst century.
1 Financial liberalization and foreign indebtedness2 A full liberalization of the domestic financial market and a rather broad opening of the capital account were the official policy in Chile. This section presents the conceptual framework on which the financial opening was based and then examines the way in which the principles were implemented. Finally, the volume and composition of capital flows and external indebtedness are analyzed. 2 For more detailed analyses of domestic financial reforms in Chile, see Arellano (1983), Eyzaguirre (1988), Zahler (1988), and Fontaine (1989). A comparative analysis of Latin American cases in the 1970s and early 1980s is presented in Ffrench-Davis (1983a).
Building a Major Crisis
79
(a) The analytical framework of the experiment There are of course some very sophisticated neoliberal versions of how the liberalization of capital markets should work and of its effects compared to those of so-called financial repression. The essential aspects of the official version can be conveyed by means of a very simple scheme, however. The liberalization of the domestic financial market and the opening up to capital flows sought to increase overall investment and to improve the allocation of resources. It was expected that there would be an increase in the volume of investment and its efficiency, which would provide the basis for vigorous and sustained economic growth. In simple terms, the conceptual framework may be described in Figure III.1. Curves O and D represent the supply of and demand for funds in the domestic market, which are identified with savings and investment, respectively. To begin with, there prevails a situation of “financial repression” in the sense that there are restrictions regarding the organization of new banks and the operations they can carry out, and there is extensive rationing of demand. Against this background, the authorities fix an interest rate (rc ) lower than the equilibrium rate for a closed economy (re ). This determines a volume of savings, Vc, and demand is rationed at the same level (for the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that initially there are no net capital inflows). The volume of savings and investment (Vc ) is less than that in a closed market situation with a free interest rate (Ve ). At the same time, some unprofitable investments are made, since rationing means that not all of
Interest rate r D
O
O1 re rf
Of
rc
Vc
Ve
Vf
Volume V
Figure III.1 Simple conventional framework of capital markets liberalization.
80 Building a Major Crisis
the most efficient investments take place. Thus, some investments would have returns equal to rc, whereas others, with a higher yield, would remain without financing (in some of them, the return would exceed re, since total investment would be Vc ). Domestic financial liberalization would allow a rise of r to its local equilibrium, and savers would face more options for investing their funds. Given the broader variety of options, there would be a larger supply of national savings (O1, to the right of O) replacing the investment in nonproductive assets. On the other hand, the financial opening would allow capital inflows, which would complement the local funding for investment.3 A small economy, like Chile, would face a horizontal supply of external funding (Of).4 With free capital inflows, an investment volume of Vf > Ve and an equalization of the interest rate at rf would be reached. The national savings rate would rise, despite the lower interest rate, if the shift of supply were sufficiently strong, as in Figure III.1. This is a common assumption, explicit or implicit, in the neoliberal reforms of financial markets. The exchange rate policy is a determining factor in the final outcome. To reach an equalization of interest rates, there must be no expectations of variation in the real exchange rate (deflated by net inflation). Initially, this was sought through a crawling-peg policy of mini-devaluations. Subsequently, a fixed nominal rate was adopted in 1979. Official policy assumed that – in a free trade regime, such as was already at work in 1979, with a fiscal surplus and, supposedly, an exchange rate close to the “equilibrium level” – freezing the nominal exchange rate would rapidly prevent domestic inflation from exceeding external inflation. Consequently, the exchange rate would become the anchor for stabilizing the level of domestic prices. The authorities thus formally adopted the “monetary approach to the balance of payments,” with its neutral monetary policy. The official approach assumed that financial liberalization would work efficiently since capital flows were managed by private agents and mostly without official guarantees. Thus, capital inflows would take place only if the borrower expected a net return for its use that would exceed interest payments. It was said that the fast growth in the external debt that took place reflected a healthy economy (De la Cuadra, 1981, p. 1025) and private debt would not present any threat of insolvency. This problem would only arise in the case of public debt (Robichek, 1981, p. 172). 3 The relevant figure for the contribution of foreign capital to domestic capital formation refers to the net transfer of funds (NTF) – that is, the net capital inflow minus the rent of foreign capital. Domestic savings plus NTF ⫽ national savings plus net capital inflows ⫽ gross domestic investment. 4 See Harberger (1985) for the case of an upward sloping supply, associated with the “negative externality” resulting from rising liabilities of a small economy.
Building a Major Crisis
81
A naive vision of the working of private institutions prevailed. Statements by the authorities that users knew how to distinguish between good and bad financial institutions were frequent. The evident fact is that prudential supervision was extremely lax in Chile.5 In all, the discrepancies between the official approach and the real world were very marked. The economic team expected that liberalization of the domestic financial market, in association with the gradual opening of the capital account, would lead to an increase in national savings. In parallel, the quality of investment would improve in response to the suppression of former subsidies, free interest rates, and the removal of discrimination among different borrowers. The volume of national savings and capital formation was less than Vc ; that is, instead of growing, ratios decreased sharply. As documented below, the domestic interest rate stood at unexpectedly high real levels, was quite unstable, and its average was spectacularly higher than international rates; terms were extremely short, mostly of thirty-days loans, with a negligible share of mid-term lending. Fixing the nominal exchange rate in 1979 led to a significant loss of purchasing power of the dollar price and to a growing external deficit. Private external indebtedness grew notably, encouraged by the risky assumption that its real cost would remain low and that there would continue to be easy access to loans in the future. Finally, the excessive indebtedness, with the correspondingly rising service, by financing competitive imports, weakened the productive system and the payments capacity instead of strengthening them. (b) The new institutional framework In this period, three subperiods may be distinguished with regard to the implementation of financial policies. The first ran from 1973 to 1975, when there were no substantial changes in the domestic financial system; banks nationalized under the previous regime remained under state control. On the other hand, varied measures undertaken in order to encourage foreign investment and foreign loans carried negligible net inflows. The second period began in 1975 with the drastic reform of the domestic financial system and the privatization of almost all commercial banks.6 In addition to freeing the interest rate, in 1975 the government eliminated the norms relating to quantitative controls of credit in domestic currency and the selectivity of bank reserve regulations, which were largely intended to channel funds into production rather than consumption. Moreover, 5 Interestingly, something similar occurred in industrial countries with a deregulation of loans to developing countries. See Valdés-Prieto (1989) on the relaxation of norms to facilitate the recycling of oil surpluses. 6 The largest commercial bank, the Banco del Estado, founded in 1953, remained public, but its market share fell from about half of the system by the early 1970s to 14% of outstanding loans in 1981.
82 Building a Major Crisis
restrictions relating to maturity terms were removed (except for a general restriction of thirty days minimum). Next, a gradual uniformity was imposed on the different financing institutions for both the operations permitted and their relaxed regulations. The tendency towards uniform treatment also included foreign banks. Their activities had been restricted during the governments of presidents Frei and Allende. In December 1974, restrictions on their operation in Chile were lifted; in the same year, a permissive statute for foreign investment (Decree 600) was enacted. By 1982, there were nineteen foreign banks, though only covering 10% of outstanding loans. In respect of the capital account, liberalization was slower. This gradualism contrasted with the rather abrupt trade and domestic financial reforms. The gradual nature of the liberalization of controls on the size and terms of capital flows was meant to ensure control over money supply, which for several years played the principal role in anti-inflation policy. It was considered that, in view of the sizable difference between domestic and foreign interest rates, abrupt liberalization of the capital account would attract inflows in such a volume that it would endanger price stabilization. To control the size of inflows, several tools were applied: quotas on borrowing and guarantees that banks could grant were established, as well as quotas on the volume of foreign loans that could be sold monthly in the domestic foreign exchange market, and a reserve requirement on financial inflows (to inflows via article 14). Indeed, with the passage of time, the capital account was liberalized through releasing quantitative restrictions or replacing them with more flexible controls. In 1981, when the net use of foreign savings jumped to 21% of GDP,7 financial inflows (under article 14 of the law on foreign exchange operations) were subject to a minimum stay in the country of twenty-four months and the compulsory deposit of a percentage of the credit (10 or 15%, depending on the term) in the case of financial operations for less than sixty-six months. There were no special restrictions on the volume of credit that the banks could borrow abroad and lend in foreign currency in Chile, but there was still a limit on the guarantees they could grant. In all, there were heavy capital inflows, which grew rapidly between 1977 and 1981. The determining factors were the abundant international supply of funds, the low initial bank debt of Chile, the image of creditworthiness that Chile had been achieving, and the weakness of prudential regulations. The poor effectiveness of capital controls was due to numerous leakages or insufficiencies, including: (i) a climbing share of financial flows was dealt 7
Current account deficit in 1977 constant prices, with GDP converted to US dollars with the real RER of 1976–8. In current US dollars, the net use of foreign capital was 14.5% of GHDP, due to the abnormally increased value of GDP expressed in US dollars as a result of an extremely appreciated (outlier) exchange rate in 1981.
Building a Major Crisis
83
away from banks (37% in 1976–81); (ii) only loans with terms under sixtysix months were subject to the reserve requirement, in an international environment in which the standard international financial loan exceeded that term; (iii) in loans under sixty-six months, the cost of the reserve requirement represented a negligible fraction of the huge spread between the domestic interest rate and the cost of external loans (see Table III.5); (iv) short-term trade credit was free to expand vigorously, duplicating their participation in a total debt that grew rapidly towards 1981. Finally, from late 1981 onward, despite the further liberalization of capital inflows, the supply shrank drastically, as a result of both the emergence of the international financial crisis and the late recognition by bank creditors of the excessive indebtedness of Chile. When the Mexican debt crisis officially exploded in August 1982, Chile already found itself amid a deep crisis. In fact, from the second half of 1981 on, GDP had been decreasing persistently (see Marcel and Meller, 1983). During 1982, the minimum term of twenty-four months was eliminated, the compulsory deposit was set at 5% of the foreign loan, which was a rate similar to the reserve requirement for domestic bank deposits, and capital outflows were liberalized.
2 Financial capital flows and indebtedness: volume, sources, and uses Capital flows grew rapidly from 1977 onward. Even though Chile recorded a large and growing current account deficit in the following years, net capital inflows were sufficient to allow a significant accumulation of international reserves until during 1981. This capital surge took place in a context of dynamic expansion of the external sector, especially of imports of consumer goods. Inflows were overwhelmingly concentrated in lending to the private sector with no state guarantee. FDI and loans to the public sector accounted for less than one-fifth of inflows. The government expected a vigorous inflow of FDI in response to the “economic and political system” that the dictatorship offered and to the new statute for foreign investment (Decree 600, of 1974). It was hoped that FDI would arrive to exploit the “comparative advantages” previously repressed, which the model was liberating. However, the response of FDI was disappointing for the expectations of the economic team. Actual inflows were rather low and concentrated in the last part of the period (see Lahera, 1981). On the other hand, a significant share of inflows corresponded to two components not involving direct creation of productive capacity. One corresponds to risk capital contributed by transnational banking branches and the other to the acquisition of firms or of packages of equity shares. Table III.1 shows several indicators of annual capital flows, expressed in constant prices. They increased significantly in the second half of the 1970s
84 Building a Major Crisis
(col. 2). Columns 3 and 4 show that capital flows rose sharply as a share of gross domestic investment and GDP. This was partly a result of the relative stagnation of the latter two variables during the 1970s. Foreign savings (deficit on the current account) and the capital service also grew, with some ups and downs, in relation to exports (cols 5 and 6), in spite of the dynamic growth of the latter in the early years of the neoliberal experiment. The total debt service in 1982 amounted to 88% of exports of goods and services, that is, three times the average coefficient recorded in 1970–4. In short, the data show that from 1977 capital inflows captured a growing relative weight in the Chilean economy. The coefficients reflecting their incidence exhibit a debt-servicing burden substantially greater than for Latin America as a whole in the 1970s and early 1980s (Bacha and DíazAlejandro, 1983; Ffrench-Davis, 1983a).
Table III.1 Deficit on the current account and capital flows, 1970–82 Year
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
Balance on current account (1977 US$ millions) (1)
Gross inflow of loans (1977 US$ millions) (2)
External financing of investment (%) (3)
(4)
(5)
–166 –367 –690 –441 –256 –536 159 –551 –960 –925 –1,361 –3,214 –1,600
941 772 1,302 1,106 1,064 1,109 1,086 1,390 2,559 2,691 3,270 4,640 2,238
6.8 15.5 36.4 24.7 12.0 32.5 –11.4 34.1 50.9 42.2 51.2 108.1 87.2
1.4 2.8 5.4 3.6 2.1 5.0 –1.4 4.6 7.4 6.6 9.0 20.7 12.2
6.5 16.9 40.0 20.7 8.9 29.3 –6.5 22.5 38.5 27.3 36.8 103.2 53.4
External Export Debt-service financing deficit (%) coefficient to GDP (%) (%)
(6) 27.0 38.4 27.9 25.4 35.1 55.6 52.7 52.8 58.7 50.8 47.7 70.8 88.5
Source: Calculations based on Central Bank of Chile, Balanza de Pagos, Deuda Externa de Chile, and Cuentas Nacionales in 1977 pesos. Note: All nominal figures were deflated by the Index of External Prices (IEP; see Ffrench-Davis, 1984), in order to convert them into figures at 1977 prices. Column (3) measures the ratio between the deficit on the current account and gross fixed capital formation. Column (4) is the deficit on the current account as a share of GDP. Column (5) is the ratio between the deficit on current account and exports of goods and services. Column (6) entries are amortizations plus net interest payments as a share of exports of goods and services. For the conversion into US dollars of the figures for GDP and investment, which were originally in 1977 pesos, the average real exchange rate for the three-year period 1976–8 was used, expressed in 1977 pesos per US dollar of that year.
Building a Major Crisis
85
Debt activity (as reflected by the volume of gross inflows and amortization payments) increased faster than net capital flows since the terms of the loans became shorter. This was a direct consequence of the increased share of private creditors in total debt and their shorter maturity terms. The magnitude reached by capital movements is reflected by the fact that, in the two-year period 1980–1, average gross inflows were equivalent to 24% of GDP. During the period under analysis, significant changes took place with regard to the agents (creditors and debtors) participating in capital flows. Among creditors, 84% of the external debt in 1981 was with banks and financial institutions, which had accounted for only 19% by 1974 (see Table III.2); in parallel, the nominal amount of debt with official institutions declined. This “privatization of creditors” was partly the result of greater use of the supply of foreign banks, which before 1977 had been scarcely used by Chile compared to other emerging economies. From then on, however, it rapidly grew-up. By 1982, Chile’s per capita bank debt exceeded US$1,000, compared to a regional average of US$600 and only about US$500 in the case of Brazil. On the other hand, Chile’s bank debt increased by 57% per year between 1977 and 1981, compared to an average of 28% for developing countries. With regard to debtors, after 1975 the growing net inflows were received mostly by the private sector, while the government moved towards a budget surplus and amortized its external debt. This situation was in line with a deliberate policy of reducing state participation. This was facilitated by the Table III.2 Total foreign debt and private financial creditors, 1974–82 Financial institutions Year
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
Total debt (US$ millions) (1)
US$ millions (2)
Share in total (%) (3)
4,776 5,453 5,392 5,763 7,153 8,790 11,325 15,700 17,263
923 1,352 1,506 2,144 3,723 5,885 8,579 13,169 14,986
19.3 24.8 27.9 37.2 52.0 67.0 75.8 83.8 86.8
Source: Central Bank of Chile, Deuda Externa de Chile, 1982, August 1983, Tables 1, 3, and 11. Note: Total debt refers to the disbursed outstanding stock at year-end. In addition to the traditional foreign debt, it includes liabilities in national currency, liabilities with the IMF, and short-term debt contracted by sectors other than the monetary system, with the exception of direct foreign-trade operations.
86 Building a Major Crisis
change that took place in international markets: the loss of weight on the part of official financial institutions, which operated mostly with governments; and the vigorous emergence of private international capital markets, which offered access to both public and private debtors. Table III.3 shows the composition of total outstanding foreign debt of public and private borrowers. Since international reserves grew steadily until 1981, part of the debt was not absorbed in the economy. I distinguish between total “gross debt” and “net debt” (the share used to finance the deficit on the current account). This has implications for determining the sectoral origin of the macroeconomic disequilibrium that Chile experienced and the effects of external debt on domestic purchasing power. An estimate of the net impact of capital flows is shown in columns 3 and 4 of Table III.3, which present the total debt minus the international reserves of the respective sectors. As the accumulation of assets was concentrated in the public sector (central bank), from 1975 up to 1981 this was reflected in a substantial reduction in its net liabilities. In the case of the private sector, in contrast, net indebtedness grew very rapidly, multiplying by thirteen between 1974 and 1981. It should be noted that most of the private debt was contracted without state guarantee. Thus, in 1981 almost two-thirds of Chile’s total debt lacked an official guarantee (see Chapter IV, Table IV.1). That high share could have constituted a decisive bargaining factor in the renegotiations of the external debt. Table III.3 Public and private net foreign debt, 1973–82 (US$ millions) Gross debt Year
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
Net debt
Public sector (1)
Private sector (2)
Public sector (3)
Private sector (4)
3,276 3,896 4,426 4,252 4,319 4,858 5,018 4,905 5,145 5,892
786 879 1,027 1,140 1,444 2,295 3,772 6,426 10,561 11,371
3,063 3,709 4,252 3,718 3,763 3,648 2,882 1,569 1,878 3,866
716 773 931 1,016 1,339 2,147 3,053 5,986 9,761 10,586
Private sector share in net debt (%) (5) 18.9 7.2 18.0 21.5 26.2 37.0 54.9 79.2 83.9 73.2
Sources: Calculations based on IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1982; Central Bank of Chile, Boletín Mensual, and Deuda Externa de Chile. Note: Column (1) excludes state-guaranteed private debt and debt contracted by the Banco del Estado. Column (2) includes private debt, state-guaranteed debt, and debt contracted by the Banco del Estado. Columns (3) and (4) represent the gross debt minus the international reserves of the central bank and the financial system, respectively. For measuring reserves, holdings of gold were valued at a constant real price of US$42,222 per ounce of fine gold, base 1977.
Building a Major Crisis
87
With regard to the intermediaries, up to 1977 a significant share of the private sector debt had been borrowed directly abroad, because of quantitative restrictions faced by domestic banks. Two qualifications should be posed, however. On the one hand, the segment of the non-financial private sector with most access to inflows was that with the closest connections to national and foreign banking institutions. On the other hand, a substantial share of these loans had bank guarantees. From 1978 onward, the domestic financial sector gained greater importance in the direct intermediation of external private financing. Table III.4 provides details on liabilities under the main channel of financial inflows (the so-called article 14). Private borrowers captured 97% of gross inflows in 1976–81. The official figures for the real net outstanding debt showed a reduction over the five-year period 1976–80: it decreased from US$5.3 billion in 1975 to US$4.3 billion in 1980 (in 1977 dollars). Two external factors explained this decline in contrast with high annual inflows in current dollars. The main factor was the rate of international inflation, which eroded the real value of the debt stock; second, net debt also decreased in response to the rise in the value of international reserves maintained in gold. These two factors explain a drop of US$2.7 billion in real net debt during the five years (see Ffrench-Davis and Arellano, 1981). Thus, instead of having decreased by 18% in real terms, the debt would have grown by one-third and would have shown a sharp acceleration toward the end of that period in the absence of these two factors. Actually, in 1981 there was an additional increase in debt that was spectacular in both nominal and real terms. It was therefore clear Table III.4 Gross annual flows of loans, by debtors, 1976–82 Breakdown (%) Private non-financial sector Year
Total flows Public (US$ millions) sector (1) (2)
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
263 336 780 1,245 2,504 4,517 1,771
13.3 13.2 4.2 1.8 3.1 1.9 24.4
1976–81
9,645
3.1
Nonguaranteed (3)
31.0 34.7 14.5 20.6 24.7
Guaranteed (4) 86.3 80.1 57.0 56.3 32.1 25.2 30.8 37.2
26.0 21.6 17.6 4.6 6.1
Domestic financial institutions (5) 0.4 6.7 38.8 41.9 64.8 72.9 44.8 59.8
Source: Based on data from Central Bank of Chile, “Créditos Liquidados Artículo 14,” December 1980; and Boletín Mensual, No. 662, April 1983. Note: Column (1) shows the gross annual flow of disbursed loans minus compulsory deposits. The breakdown over cols (2) through (5) was estimated on the basis of that for Santiago.
88 Building a Major Crisis
that the rapid growth of external indebtedness was generating macroeconomic vulnerability as well as was being harmful to national development, as is shown later (see also Chapter II). Nevertheless, the government insisted right up to the end that “borrowing abroad was good business” because the real interest rate was very low or negative; furthermore, debtors were in the private sector, which was subject to “free market laws” so that, in the official view, there could be no doubt that borrowing was efficient. A major share of foreign loans was used to finance consumption by the private sector. In fact, about three-fourths of the net debt rise in 1977–82 was used to increase the import/GDP coefficient of the Chilean economy (see Ffrench-Davis and De Gregorio, 1987). The massive net inflows, also, encouraged the excessive exchange rate appreciation and contributed to sustain it for several years. In fact, if the supply of inflows had been weaker, the government would have been forced to moderate the tariff liberalization and/or the exchange rate appreciation. Indeed, the loans available to Chile were larger than could be absorbed productively. In contrast to other countries, which channeled external financing into investment, Chile, instead of having a “debt-led economic growth” (as in Brazil), incurred a “debt-led deficit on current account,” with a crowding-out of savings and domestic output (particularly manufactures and investment in tradables) by climbing imports of consumer goods. The growing and unsustainable external gap made a future downward adjustment unavoidable. It is interesting to highlight two contrasts, one positive and one negative, between Chile and other LACs. On the one hand, capital flight was rather minor in Chile (Arellano and Ramos, 1987), while in Argentina and Venezuela it was notably high (Frenkel, 1983); in fact, in these two countries, in parallel with inflows, substantial outflows were recorded. On the other hand, the investment ratio was low in Chile, while Brazil and Colombia exhibited significant productive capital formation as a consequence of more efficient absorption of foreign resources (see Bacha and Díaz-Alejandro, 1983; Perry and Junguito, 1983).
3 Indebtedness and macroeconomic adjustment The massive process of external indebtedness between 1977 and 1981 had significant effects in many areas of the national economy. The process profoundly affected aggregate demand and its composition, contributed to the spectacular concentration of wealth (see Chapter VII), considerably altered the functioning of the savings/investment process, and conditioned to a crucial extent the management of monetary and exchange rate policies. The initial impact of external indebtedness involved an increase in the availability of foreign exchange. This gave rise to two possibilities. One was an increase in international reserves, which is usually accompanied by a rise in the money supply; the other consisted of an expansion of the
Building a Major Crisis
89
current account deficit. In practice, up to 1981, the growing indebtedness manifested itself in both ways, since net capital inflows were larger than the capacity to absorb them, notwithstanding that the current account deficit steadily increased by considerable amounts. In 1980, net use of foreign capital was the equivalent of 9% of GDP, in contrast with an average of 5% for Latin America. The difference between inflows received and those used gave rise to the increase in international reserves registered, which in 1980 represented 68% of annual imports of goods. Additionally, in 1981, both the debt stock and the deficit on current account experienced sharp jumps, with a drop in the reserves/imports ratio. The rapid building-up of reserves until 1980 had substantial effects on monetary and foreign exchange policies. They contributed, evidently, to the recovery of economic activity, thus reducing the large recessive output gap that emerged in the crisis of 1975; however, in parallel, other macroeconomic disequilibria were being built. Furthermore, the huge capital inflows meant that a large share of the total credit available in the domestic economy had originated from foreign sources. (a) Monetary policy, inflows, and the crowding-out of domestic credit From 1975 onward, net purchases of foreign exchange by the central bank represented the main source of expansion of the money supply: in the threeyear period 1978–80, these operations represented more than 100% of the total high-powered money issued (Ffrench-Davis and Arellano, 1981, Table 13). As noted, the overwhelming share of net purchases of foreign exchange by the central bank came from the private sector. Indeed, in some years foreign exchange operations with the public sector even had a contractive effect. This situation continued until 1981, when the severe macroeconomic imbalances that had been building in the Chilean economy started to emerge openly and the loss of international reserves began. Correspondingly, the monetary effect of foreign exchange operations became markedly restrictive in 1981. As indicated in section 1, during certain periods direct restrictions on capital inflows were imposed as an instrument of monetary control. This limitation was enforced – with successive modifications in the maximum amounts of foreign exchange operations authorized – in September 1977 and was held up to April 1980. These restrictions were not sufficient to keep inflows to the private sector down to a volume consistent with the monetary expansion desired by the economic authorities. Consequently, the latter took action on the other sources of money issue and on the exchange rate. In both cases, there was a crowding-out of the domestic economy by the sectors associated with foreign financing. In fact, domestic credit to banks was restricted in the face of the increase in high-powered money. The exchange rate, for its part, was revalued (see point (b) of this section) in response to
90 Building a Major Crisis
the accumulation of reserves, and concerned with the stubbornness of inflationary pressures. As a consequence, there was a significant crowding-out of domestic producers of tradables. Quotas in the expansion of liquidity remained in force as long as the closed economy monetary approach predominated. Subsequently, with the adoption of the open economy monetary approach, the nominal exchange rate was frozen, and a “neutral” monetary policy was explicitly adopted. Thus, changes in the international reserves were to be the determining factor of liquidity of the domestic economy against the background of a balanced fiscal budget (actually, a surplus) and stable low bank reserve requirements. Interest rates fluctuated freely according to financial market forces. The monetary approach to the balance of payments survived until mid1982. During the last year in which it was in force, a contractive “automatic adjustment” did operate, with disastrous effects on employment and output (see Chapter IV). (b) Foreign exchange policy: instability and appreciation8 In October 1973, a second experience with a crawling-peg regime was adopted (the first experience in 1965–70 is briefly described in Box III.1). Both experiences involved frequent small adjustments of the nominal price of the dollar, lasted more than five years, and were established during periods of acute balance of payments difficulties and sizable inflation rates. However, they differed with respect to the political environment in which they were implemented and the role assigned to the exchange rate, the stability of the policy, and the criteria used to determine modifications of the real exchange rate (RER). In this second experience, initially, the authorities sought to return the ER to the purchasing power parity of 1970, and to compensate for significant import liberalization. But subsequently they were strongly influenced by changes in gross reserves, and the ER became more a monetary policy tool than a resource allocator. Finally, the ER was used as the main instrument regulating inflationary expectations and as anchor for tradable prices, rather than as a signal for resource allocation and determinant of sustainable current account balances. The changing role of the ER – the changes in policy priorities and in the analytical approach – meant large fluctuations in the RER.9 8
A detailed analysis of foreign exchange policies between 1965 and 1982 can be found in Ffrench-Davis (1981). 9 By RER, I mean the nominal exchange rate divided by an index of domestic prices and multiplied by one of external inflation. Since Chilean trade was diversifying and price relations and exchange rates among the country’s main trading partners had changed notoriously, we built a weighted index of external inflation faced by Chile that reflects these phenomena (see Ffrench-Davis, 1973, Appendix I; Ffrench-Davis, 1984).
Building a Major Crisis
91
In a first stage, between October 1973 and 1976, the main rate, of the then multiple rates, experienced a 38% real depreciation between the average of 1974 and January 1976. The devaluation was directly associated with a depressed copper price and a worsened current account. Real devaluation compensated approximately for the average fall in nominal restrictions on imports during those years, and both factors combined to enhance the competitiveness of exports. By early 1976, a growing balance of payments surplus (owing to the external credit boom experienced by Chile since 1976) and a rising monthly rate of inflation (to levels between 11 and 15% per month) invited a change in the trend of the RER. Thus, it began a second stage, with a substantial modification in the role of the exchange rate, associated with its impact over inflation. The main features of this second phase, which covered the period up to February 1978, were the daily frequency of mini-devaluations, according to schedules (tablas) announced monthly, and a series of abrupt exchange rate revaluations. Immediately, the real rate started to appreciate rapidly, losing 14% in five months up to June. In this same period, import liberalization became more effective because tariff reductions already faced a clearly fading redundancy. Now liberalization came together with RER appreciation, rather than the reverse as the authorities had repeatedly announced. Then an abrupt revaluation of 10% took place in June 1976, when the policy change was made official. This was a notorious change in the policy, and caught public attention not so much because of its intrinsic economic effects but because of the conditions and arguments that surrounded it. The minister argued that: (i) in 1975 the ER had increased faster than domestic prices, producing an “unrealistic” ER that was not sustainable in the long run; (ii) the new parity would be adjusted systematically because its new level was realistic; (iii) the new system would allow the exporter to work with certainty; (iv) the revaluation would reduce industrial costs and inflation from July onward, thus, he asserted, increasing real wages; (v) imports and economic activity would be fostered by revaluation; and (vi) money expansion originating in net reserve purchases by the central bank would be reduced.10 The decision to revalue can be traced to a combination of factors. First, the monthly rate of inflation had been rising, complicated by a slow recovery from the downswing in economic activity in 1975, and open unemployment was at a very high level. It appeared that a spectacular event was needed to ensure the survival of the drastic orthodox policies being enforced, since economic policy was under heavy attack from government supporters; criticism from the opposition was not allowed by the dictatorship. Second, the purely 10
Speech of the Minister of Finance, in DIPRES (1978, pp. 261–2). About 80% of the changes in high-powered money had been originating in the net purchase of reserves.
92 Building a Major Crisis
Box III.1 The “crawling” exchange rate: a pioneer reform in 1965–70* Chile was a pioneer in implementing an exchange rate (ER) policy belonging to the family of crawling peg approaches. It happened between April 1965 and July 1970, making Chile the first country to implement a policy of this nature systematically. After Chile, Colombia and Brazil implemented similar policies in 1967 and 1968, respectively (see Williamson, 1981). The policy was conducted by the central bank in coordination with the Treasury. The policy selection was influenced by several factors. First, it was believed that both the nominal peg and totally free rates – the two corner solutions that were then in fashion in the literature – had a negative impact on macroeconomic stability and on resource allocation. The purpose was to have a reasonably stable real exchange rate (RER), without large jumps, in order to provide better allocative signals and avoid speculative capital gains and sharp shocks to the domestic economy. Second, the authority intended to limit the transmission of copper price instability to the domestic economy. It was necessary to ensure that government expenditure was guided by a “normal” copper price. This was done through annual agreements between the central bank and the Treasury on the use of the tax revenue from large copper producers; by using an account in dollars in the Central Bank where the “excess” revenues were deposited and sterilized abroad. This was the “informal” birth of the Copper Buffer Fund, created two decades later. In spite of facing intense appreciation pressures, the economic authority resisted them successfully. In fact, in the period 1965–70, a persistent stability of the RER was achieved, with some real devaluation associated with a gradual program of rationalization in import restrictions. The Frei Montalva government wanted to pursue in a more efficient fashion the substitution of imports and to expand and diversify exports, with stable incentives. The main variable guiding the nominal ER adjustments was the expected rate of domestic inflation. It was the purpose of the authorities to achieve a real devaluation: first, because there was a desire to reduce the upward trend of the previous decade in foreign indebtedness; and, second, because the average level of protection for import substitutes was to be reduced gradually, thus requiring a compensatory adjustment in the ER. The real rate was devalued by about 25% during the more than five years that the policy lasted. Two episodes illustrate the quality of the exchange rate reform. In 1967, the authorities foresaw early a balance of payments imbalance, to
Building a Major Crisis
93
which they responded with a reduction in fiscal expenditure and a faster devaluation (with more frequent adjustments). This conjuncture had removed the ER from its former role as a main expectations destabilizer during critical situations. Second, because of a higher price for the main export of Chile (copper, which represented about two-thirds of total exports) and an increase in the share of the economic rent accruing to the government, the balance of payments showed sizable surpluses from 1968 onward. This also induced an increase in short-term capital inflows into a “successful” emerging economy. The inflows were fostered by the larger reserves, and relatively tight domestic credit. Obviously, strong pressures were exerted on the government in order to freeze the ER. But the economic authorities managed to retain the real devaluation achieved in 1967–8 and to enlarge it by continuing to crawl nearly pari passu with the rate of domestic inflation; thus external inflation provided a positive differential. In summary, given available policy tools, in 1965–70 public policy searched for stability in the RER rather than in reserves, (i) because of its direct allocative effect, particularly with regard to exports; (ii) because of the fear of ratchet price effects if the ER started following transitory changes in the terms of trade or capital flows; and (iii) because of the belief that the actual price of copper was above its “normal” level and would fall drastically at some time in the future, as it did by mid-1970.
*Based on R. Ffrench-Davis, “Exchange rate policies in Chile: the experience with the crawling peg”, in J. Williamson (ed.), The Crawling Peg: Past Performance and Future Prospects, Macmillan, London, 1981. monetarist approach to stabilization (à la Friedman) had been weakened by the negative experience with the dynamics of inflation in previous months (Foxley, 1983). Thus, the emphasis was placed on the anti-inflationary effect that a widely announced revaluation could exert via expectations.11 The fact is that all the weight of the government-controlled mass media was put into promoting the newly announced policy. The revaluation 11 The orthodox closed economy monetarist approach to inflation that had prevailed until mid-1976 was questioned by the emergence of an open economy monetarist approach, to which most official economists seemed to have been converted rapidly. Nonetheless, the latter approach took the lead only in 1979 when the nominal ER was pegged. It is curious that economists who in the previous period had stated that if the money supply was held constant the ER would have no effect on the price level later argued that the ER determines the price level. Trade liberalization did not justify such an extreme change of approach. Thus, we witness, once again, the role of fashion in economics at the expense of pragmatism.
94 Building a Major Crisis
actually did change expectations, reducing the monthly rate of inflation to 6% in August and September; but it stagnated at that level for two quarters. The minister of finance announced in March 1977 a new revaluation of 10%, with the set of mini-devaluations fixed at 4 and 3% per month, for March and April, respectively. This was to be followed, again, by adjustments according to the rate of inflation in the preceding month. Most of the arguments provided by the government were the same as those given for the first revaluation, though with more emphasis on the assertion that exports (except for “marginal” ones) would hardly be affected because the ER “was 20% above October 1973.”12 The rate of inflation was indeed reduced to 3 or 4% a month, but it again stagnated at the new level. The drop of inflation, led by revaluations, implied a sharp real appreciation. Most of the real devaluation recorded in 1973–5 was reverted in this period, notwithstanding the deep tariff liberalization. The phase ended in February 1978 when the monthly schedule was replaced with a daily schedule for the rest of the year. The formula used in the previous biennium, based on a nominal ER dependent on previous inflation, was replaced with a schedule, determined by the annual inflation target. The policy change considered decreasing devaluation adjustments, starting with 2.5% (roughly the official rate of inflation in the previous three months) and ending with 0.75% for December. The Minister declared that “given the excellent balance of payments situation, the opening to foreign trade and the announcement of the exchange rate for 1978, competitive imports would rapidly enter if prices of domestic products were increased excessively,” and that “the government is providing the foundations, so that 1979 will mark the start of a period of unprecedented price stability.”13 On this occasion, the content of the official announcement, and of conferences and interviews of several government representatives, gave the impression that, more than the regulation of expectations, the crucial factor was the belief that the economy was already so open that the law of one price would apply.14 Domestic inflation, measured by the official CPI, fell from 64% in 1977 to 30% in 1978 (from 84 to 37%, according to the corrected CPI). This apparent success led to the adoption of the same approach for the following year. In December 1978, a schedule of daily adjustments was announced for 1979. 12 Speech of the Minister of Finance, March 1977, in DIPRES (1978, pp. 308–9). The official figure clearly overestimated the RER. See Table II.2. Recall that the official CPI systematically underestimated actual inflation. 13 Speech of the Minister of Finance, February 1978, in DIPRES (1978, pp. 369–71). 14 This law implies that domestic and external prices of tradables, corrected by tariffs and ER, are equal. As a result, it is argued that in a small country domestic prices cannot change except through tariffs or ER changes. According to the extreme view, prices of non-tradables similarly have no autonomy because they are determined by their interrelation with tradables through goods and factors markets.
Building a Major Crisis
95
The compound annual rate of devaluation to be implemented was 14.7%, similar to the rate of inflation that had been announced informally as the rate expected for 1979. No account was taken of either external inflation (which was over 14% per annum in 1978–9) or the declining gap between effective and potential GDP. If it was to be true that the law of one price applied, exchange rate policy would clearly lead to inflation above 15%. It is possible that the economic authorities were still in transition from an expectations theory to a law of one price approach. The fact is that during the first half of 1979, instead of decreasing, inflation began to rise. In the twelve-month period ending in June, inflation reached 35%. This last phase ended abruptly in June 1979 with the freezing of the ER at a level 5.7% above the price prevailing then; the new level anticipated the schedule for the end of the year. By mid-1979, after almost six years of several policy variants and oscillations of the RER, the rate was at a level close to that established at the outset. However, during the process import restrictions had been drastically reduced: most non-tariff obstacles disappeared, and tariffs were reduced from an (unweighted) average of 94% to a flat 10%. Additionally, the nominal ER was fixed in the context of a 35% inflation trend. The ER remained pegged at 39 pesos per US dollar up to mid-1982. Annual domestic inflation decreased from 35% to close to zero, but during the transition between both dates the RER had appreciated by one-third. As a result, given the pegged nominal rate, in order to return to the June 1979 level of RER, apparently estimated as one of equilibrium by authorities (McKinnon, 1981, p. 34), a domestic inflation 30 points lower than the external one was required. That was evidently out of touch, given the severe problems that a large deflation poses for financial markets.15 An initiative to accelerate the adjustment process, through a legal reduction of nominal wages, could not be imposed by the economic team. In fact, after some months of the so-called automatic adjustment, the outcome was disastrous. Unemployment increased sharply and a rapid fall in manufacturing output occurred.16 The end of the fixed exchange rate came when an abrupt devaluation of 18% was applied in June 1982, followed by a series of successive policy changes. In short, since the mid-1970s, huge financial inflows were crucial to allow diverse exchange rate approaches other than those of efficient resource
15 The wholesale price index fell by 8% between May 1981 and May 1982, while the CPI declined by 1% between February and May 1982. On the other hand, international markets exhibited negative inflation as well: the external price index fell by 4% in the first half of 1982 as a result of a US dollar revaluation. 16 Open unemployment (excluding public emergency programs) grew from 11 to 23% of the labor force between September 1981 and June 1982. The value-added by manufacturing fell by 21% in 1982.
96 Building a Major Crisis
allocation; in the process, rising inflows over-financed a climbing deficit on current account. The use of the exchange rate to guide expectations (in 1976–9) and/or to anchor domestic prices (1979–82) did indeed result in lower inflation. Nevertheless, inflation persistently decreased more slowly than expected by the government. The exchange rate was used as a variable to repress inflation, appreciating the peso during the process. This, together with import liberalization and the recovery in economic activity recorded between 1977 and 1981, led to an unsustainable current account deficit.17 At the same time, the gradual real exchange rate appreciation reduced the cost of external indebtedness vis-à-vis domestic loans. Consequently, the flows were encouraged by the evolution of the real exchange rate, enhancing the growing current account deficit and the surplus on the capital account, in a pro-cyclical behavior. (c) Worsening of portfolios and prudential supervision External indebtedness contributed to a domestic credit boom. Total availability of funding was expanded by non-guaranteed (col. 3 in Table III.4, above) and guaranteed (col. 4) direct foreign loans, and external loans intermediated by local banks (col. 5). The rest of lending by domestic banks was based on the liquidity generated by foreign exchange operations with the corresponding accumulation of international reserves by the central bank. The credit expansion took place in an environment of lax prudential regulation and supervision.18 As said, loans to related parties grew at an accelerated pace; most of them without effective guarantees. To avoid the prevailing regulations, debtors made use of cross credits and turned to dummy firms as well as operating from offshore institutions. In the face of high domestic interest rates, banks renewed the principal and granted new loans with the objective
17 The increase in the deficit was also associated with the rise in interest rates and the deterioration of the copper price. With regard to this latter item, the smaller fiscal income from this source in 1981, compared to the average for 1960–70, was equivalent to 0.7% of the 1981 GDP. The current figures on fiscal income contributed by the large copper mining industry have been deflated by the external price index. The deterioration in the copper price was partly compensated for by the improvement in the price of molybdenum, a rise in copper output, and the capture of the economic rent of the copper deposits for Chile due to the nationalization of these activities in 1966, 1969, and 1971 (see Ffrench-Davis and Tironi, 1974). 18 The permissiveness of banking regulation and supervision, and the absence of public guarantees to deposits, rested on the assumption that self-regulation would work together with the capacity of bank depositors to distinguish between the quality of different banks; irresponsible and risky banks would be rejected by the public. Consistently with this view, the authorities repeated systematically that no private loses would be financed by the state. However, after the intervention of a bankrupt bank, in 1977, a guarantee was established on deposits in domestic currency up to the equivalent of nearly US$3,000 (Held and Jimenez, 2001).
Building a Major Crisis
97
of being paid interest commitments (or the capitalization of interest); between 1976 and 1981, the outstanding stock of bank lending rose 38% annually in real terms. Non-performing loans seemed to be low, and the banking system exhibited high real profitability on capital and reserves, on the order of 17% in 1978–80. Seemingly, for the government and diverse