Embodying Technesis
Embodying Technesis

Embodying
Technesis
Technology Beyond Writing
Mark Hansen
An...
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Embodying Technesis
Embodying Technesis

Embodying
Technesis
Technology Beyond Writing
Mark Hansen
Ann Arbor
THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN PRESS
Embodying Technesis Technology Beyond Writing
Mark Hansen
Ann Arbor
TIm liNIvERsrrr OF MIcmGAN PREss
Copyright © by the University of Michigan 2000
All rights reserved
Published in the United States of America by
The University of Michigan Press
Manufactured in the United States of America
O Printed on acid-free paper
2003 2002 2001 2000
4 3 2 1
No part of this publication may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form
or by any means, electronic, mechanical, or otherwise,
without the written permission of the publisher.
A CIP catalog record for this book is available from the British Library.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Hansen, Mark, 1956-
Embodying technesis : technology beyond writing / Mark Hansen.
p. cm. - (Studies in literature and science)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-472-09662-1 (alk. paper) - ISBN 0-472-06662-5 (pbk. :alk.
paper)
1. Technology-Philosophy. 2. Technology-Social aspects.
I. Title. II. Series.
Copyright © by the University of Michigan 2000 All rights reserved Published in the United States of America by The University of Michigan Press Manufactured in the United States of America @ Printed on acid-free paper
T14 .H287 2000
601-dc21
99-050879
2003
2002
2001
2000
4
3
2
1
No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, or otherwise, without the written permission of the publisher. A elP
catalog record for this book is available from the British Library.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Hansen, Mark, 1 9 5 6Embodying technesis : technology beyond writing / Mark Hansen. p. cm. - ( Studies in literature and science) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-4 72-09662-1 ( alk. paper) - ISBN 0-472-06662-5 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Technology-Philosophy. 2. Technology-Social aspects. I. Title. II. Series. T14 .H2 8 7 2000 99-050 8 79 601-dc2 1
Foreword: Clearing the Ground
N. Katherine Hayles
A decade ago, when Michael Benedikt, Sandy Stone, and others decided to
organize a series of cyberspace conferences, the idea seemed promising.
Bring together a gaggle of software engineers and a pride of critical theo-
rists, throw them together for three or four days, and see what happens. Sev-
eral months later shock waves were still reverberating through the listservs,
with the engineers complaining that the critical jargon was obscure non-
Foreword: Clearing the Ground
sense that had nothing to contribute to their real-life technologies, and the
critical theorists grumpily responding that the software engineers were
incredibly naive about language and representation. The stand-off, which
N.
Katherine Hayles
has achieved the status of legend in cyberspace circles, is symptomatic of a
larger rift between the lowland fields of the history of technology on the one
hand, and the high plains of critical theory on the other. From the point of
view of the technologist, the critical theorist knows nothing about the work-
ings of technology and demonstrates it by talking in terms so abstract that
material objects are vaporized into mere words; from the point of view of
the theorist, the technologist is so stuck on nuts and bolts that he remains
oblivious of the fact that these objects are never simply present in them-
selves, being always already enframed by cultural assumptions and medi-
ated by discursive practices.
Since then, a number of important initiatives have aimed at integrating
the technoscapes that surround us with the intimate bodily terrains through
which we understand language and culture. In Reading Minds Mark Turner
suggests that the field of literary studies should reformulate itself through
understandings based on the cognitive sciences; George Lakoff and Mark
Johnson have sought to show how language emanates from bodily experi-
ence and remains marked by it. Andy Clark has articulated an "extended
mind" model that enrolls technical objects into the human cognitive system;
Edwin Hutchins argues that change propagates across extended cognitive
systems through self-organizing swirls of activity which include human and
A decade ago, when Michael Benedikt, Sandy Stone, and others decided to organize a series of cyberspace conferences, the idea seemed promising. Bring together a gaggle of software engineers and a pride of critical theo rists, throw them together for three or four days, and see what happens. Sev eral months later shock waves were still reverberating through the listservs, with the engineers complaining that the critical j argon was obscure non sense that had nothing to contribute to their real-life technologies, and the critical theorists grumpily responding that the software engineers were incredibly naive about language and representation. The stand-off, which has achieved the status of legend in cyberspace circles, is symptomatic of a larger rift between the lowland fields of the history of technology on the one hand, and the high plains of critical theory on the other. From the point of view of the technologist, the critical theorist knows nothing about the work ings of technology and demonstrates it by talking in terms so abstract that material obj ects are vaporized into mere words; from the point of view of the theorist, the technologist is so stuck on nuts and bolts that he remains oblivious of the fact that these obj ects are never simply present in them selves, being always already enframed by cultural assumptions and medi ated by discursive practices. Since then, a number of important initiatives have aimed at integrating the technoscapes that surround us with the intimate bodily terrains through which we understand language and culture. In Reading Minds Mark Turner suggests that the field of literary studies should reformulate itself through understandings based on the cognitive sciences; George Lakoff and Mark Johnson have sought to show how language emanates from bodily experi ence and remains marked by it. Andy Clark has articulated an " extended mind" model that enrolls technical obj ects into the human cognitive system; Edwin Hutchins argues that change propagates across extended cognitive systems through self-organizing swirls of activity which include human and
vi
vi * Foreword
nonhuman actors.1 Diverse as these programs are, they share a conviction
that human cognition does not stand apart from the world of technical
objects but remains deeply immersed within it.
Cognition, in this view, does not issue from the mind alone but extends
beyond the neocortex into the lower brain, the limbic system, the central
nervous system, and the peripheral nervous system. Cognition also reaches
out into the techno-environment, dissolving the boundary between inside
and outside into fluid assemblages that incorporate technical artifacts into
the human cognitive system, not just as metaphors but as working parts of
everyday thoughts and actions. For these researchers, understanding lan-
guage and culture means first of all grasping how cognition emerges from
bodily and physical realities. Yet the very everyday-ness of these models iso-
lates them from the complex linguistic performances that are the subject and
vehicle for critical arguments espousing the self-enclosing nature of lan-
guage. Moreover, although the models assume the physically real nature of
technology, they tend to emphasize the interfaces connecting technology
and human cognition rather than technology as a thing in itself.
We are long overdue, then, for the rigorous, thorough, and far-reaching
analysis that Mark Hansen mounts in Embodying Technesis: Technology
Beyond Writing. Hansen argues that technology is much more important
for everyday life than scientific theories are, reminding us of Isaac Asimov's
comment that it would make far more difference in our lives if the automo-
bile had not been invented than if Einstein had failed to formulate the the-
ory of relativity. For Hansen, technology is the primary determinant of the
human lifeworld and has been so for thousands of years. He finds it partic-
ularly ironic, then, that contemporary critical theory has consistently
treated technology as a trope or representation rather than a physical real-
ity in the world, a move he calls technesis, or "the putting-into-discourse of
technology" (4).
Ranging widely across influential theorists of the twentieth century,
including Freud, Heidegger, Derrida, Lacan, and Foucault, Hansen exhibits
the crucial moves that reduce technology from material reality to discourse.
Paying meticulous attention to each theorist's overall project as well as to
the details of the arguments, Hansen displays an awe-inspiring erudition
and a remarkable ability to analyze complex arguments. This book is
polemical in the best sense, for Hansen's project does not pretend to be a
neutral examination of the question of technology. Rather, this is a book
with a mission and a quest. The mission is to show how pervasively techne-
sis has infected contemporary theory, and the quest is to find theoretical
•
Foreword
nonhuman actors. 1 Diverse as these programs are, they share a conviction that human cognition does not stand apart from the world of technical obj ects but remains deeply immersed within it. Cognition, in this view, does not issue from the mind alone but extends beyond the neocortex into the lower brain, the limbic system, the central nervous system, and the peripheral nervous system. Cognition also reaches out into the techno-environment, dissolving the boundary between inside and outside into fluid assemblages that incorporate technical artifacts into the human cognitive system, not j ust as metaphors but as working parts of everyday thoughts and actions. For these researchers, understanding lan guage and culture means first of all grasping how cognition emerges from bodily and physical realities. Yet the very everyday-ness of these models iso lates them from the complex linguistic performances that are the subj ect and vehicle for critical arguments espousing the self-enclosing nature of lan guage. Moreover, although the models assume the physically real nature of technology, they tend to emphasize the interfaces connecting technology and human cognition rather than technology as a thing in itself. We are long overdue, then, for the rigorous, thorough, and far-reaching analysis that Mark Hansen mounts in Embodying Technesis: Technology Beyond Writing. Hansen argues that technology is much more important for everyday life than scientific theories are, reminding us of Isaac Asimov's comment that it would make far more difference in our lives if the automo bile had not been invented than if Einstein had failed to formulate the the ory of relativity. For Hansen, technology is the primary determinant of the human lifeworld and has been so for thousands of years. He finds it partic ularly ironic, then, that contemporary critical theory has consistently treated technology as a trope or representation rather than a physical real ity in the world, a move he calls technesis, or " the putting-into-discourse of technology " ( 4 ) . Ranging widely across influential theorists o f the twentieth century, including Freud, Heidegger, Derrida, Lacan, and Foucault, Hansen exhibits the crucial moves that reduce technology from material reality to discourse. Paying meticulous attention to each theorist's overall proj ect as well as to the details of the arguments, Hansen displays an awe-inspiring erudition and a remarkable ability to analyze complex arguments. This book is polemical in the best sense, for Hansen's proj ect does not pretend to be a neutral examination of the question of technology. Rather, this is a book with a mission and a quest. The mission is to show how pervasively techne sis has infected contemporary theory, and the quest is to find theoretical
Foreword
Foreword * vii
tools he can adapt to give a robust account of technology in its irreducible
materiality that exists beyond discourse and representation.
For him the most promising avenue lies in Walter Benjamin's essays about
Baudelaire's poetics, in which Benjamin develops the idea of material inter-
ventions that deliver a "shock" to the human nervous system by operating
below the level of the neocortex. Hansen follows Benjamin in picking up on
Freud's speculation about a "dead cortical layer" that insulates the neocor-
tex from precognitive perceptions. Although Freud's neurophysiological
speculations have been discredited, there is ample contemporary evidence
from such researchers as Antonio Damasio that cognition extends through-
out the body and includes emotions, kinesthesia, proprioception, and other
sensations located in the lower brain, limbic system, and central nervous sys-
tem.2 Although such sensations can be given verbal expression, they origi-
nate as nonverbal perceptions and need not be brought into language at all.
The important point here for Hansen, as for Damasio, is that a highly sensi-
tive and interactive realm of experience exists that precedes linguistic expres-
sion and legitimately counts as cognition. Hansen argues that such experi-
ences function as nonverbal avenues through which humans experience
technology in its robust materiality. By attending to these "shocks," we can
understand technology as an important experience in our lives beyond how
it is represented in language. What Hansen is after is "a process of embodied
reception-of reception as embodiment-that culminates in a nonrepresen-
tational experience of embodied physiological sensation" (261).
This quest engenders a paradox that is not likely to escape the notice of
technologically oriented readers. We can uncover the paradox by compar-
ing the route through which Hansen comes to his quest to the path taken by
Damasio. Damasio's conclusions are based on three decades of work with
neurologically damaged patients at the University of Iowa Hospital, which
serves as the tertiary care facility for patients throughout the central Mid-
western area. When Damasio writes about emotions as the body murmur-
ing to the mind, underlying his poetic language are his experiences with
hundreds of PET scans, X-rays, CAT scans, and other diagnostic proce-
dures, as well as his examinations of literally thousands of patients.
Hansen's body of evidence, by contrast, consists not of intimate physical
knowledge of medical imaging technologies and damaged human neural
systems but rather the very theoretical writings he wishes to go beyond in
order to grasp technology as a thing in itself. His analysis is remarkable for
the absence of particular technologies used either as examples or as occa-
sions for analytical exploration. Skeptics might wonder if Hansen suffers
•
vii
tools he can adapt to give a robust account of technology in its irreducible materiality that exists beyond discourse and representation. For him the most promising avenue lies in Walter Benj amin's essays about Baudelaire's poetics, in which Benjamin develops the idea of material inter ventions that deliver a " shock" to the human nervous system by operating below the level of the neocortex. Hansen follows Benj amin in picking up on Freud's speculation about a " dead cortical layer" that insulates the neocor tex from precognitive perceptions. Although Freud's neurophysiological speculations have been discredited, there is ample contemporary evidence from such researchers as Antonio Damasio that cognition extends through out the body and includes emotions, kinesthesia, proprioception, and other sensations located in the lower brain, limbic system, and central nervous sys tem.2 Although such sensations can be given verbal expression, they origi nate as nonverbal perceptions and need not be brought into language at all. The important point here for Hansen, as for Damasio, is that a highly sensi tive and interactive realm of experience exists that precedes linguistic expres sion and legitimately counts as cognition. Hansen argues that such experi ences function as nonverbal avenues through which humans experience technology in its robust materiality. By attending to these " shocks, " we can understand technology as an important experience in our lives beyond how it is represented in language. What Hansen is after is " a process of embodied reception-of reception as embodiment-that culminates in a nonrepresen tational experience of embodied physiological sensation" (26 1 ) . This quest engenders a paradox that i s not likely to escape the notice of technologically oriented readers. We can uncover the paradox by compar ing the route through which Hansen comes to his quest to the path taken by D amasio. Damasio's conclusions are based on three decades of work with neurologically damaged patients at the University of Iowa Hospital, which serves as the tertiary care facility for patients throughout the central Mid western area. When Damasio writes about emotions as the body murmur ing to the mind, underlying his poetic language are his experiences with hundreds of PET scans, X-rays, CAT scans, and other diagnostic proce dures, as well as his examinations of literally thousands of patients . Hansen's body of evidence, by contrast, consists not of intimate physical knowledge of medical imaging technologies and damaged human neural systems but rather the very theoretical writings he wishes to go beyond in order to grasp technology as a thing in itself. His analysis is remarkable for the absence of particular technologies used either as examples or as occa sions for analytical exploration. Skeptics might wonder if Hansen suffers
viii
viii * Foreword
himself from the disease that he so brilliantly diagnoses, for he seems to shy
away from actual technologies and our experiences with them in favor of
verbal articulations, which according to his own argument are always in
danger of stripping technology of its physical reality.
I am willing to grant the paradox but not the judgment, for I think that
Hansen's project fulfills an important role that could not be accomplished in
any other way. As the schism between the software engineers and cyber-
space theorists demonstrated, no amount of talking about technology as a
thing in itself will convince the theorists that technology as such plays an
important role in human culture, for they can always revert to cultural and
linguistic interpretations that embed technology in discursive productions.
Arguing that it is these productions which give technology meaning and
significance, they will continue to pooh-pooh any thought of technology as
a thing in itself. Only a systematic analysis such as Embodying Technesis
can prevail, for it takes the argument onto the high ground of theory and
uncovers the moves by which technology is not just embedded in language
but erased by language. Through such analysis, Embodying Technesis aims
to clear the ground so that space can be opened to ask what technology
might be outside of its embeddedness in discursivity.
Having cleared the ground, Hansen then seeks to establish a physiologi-
cal basis for human interaction with technology that is not based primarily
on language. As more theorists become interested in this question of tech-
nology (which is virtually the opposite of the question of technology as Hei-
degger framed it), it may be that the answers Hansen suggests will not long
endure, for this question is now the focus of wide-ranging inquiries emerg-
ing from an interdisciplinary convergence of cognitive science, anthropol-
ogy, literary studies, computer science, and media theory. What will come
out of this convergence remains to be seen, but enough research has already
been done to make clear that much more can be said about the question
than Embodying Technesis articulates. The fact that Hansen's speculations
may soon become outdated is proof of the success of his larger argument,
however, for the resources to answer what technology is in itself can be fully
mobilized only after the question is recognized as legitimate and important.
In my view, the enduring contribution of Embodying Technesis is likely to
be its tenacious insistence that it makes sense to ask this question and its rig-
orous analysis of the theoretical moves that have kept us from asking it in
full force until now. If Embodying Technesis does nothing else (and it does
much more), the ground that it clears will establish it as one of the impor-
tant books concerning the question of technology, for it frees us to ask and
answer that question in new and embodied ways.
•
Forewo rd
himself from the disease that he so brilliantly diagnoses, for he seems to shy away from actual technologies and our experiences with them in favor of verbal articulations, which according to his own argument are always in danger of stripping technology of its physical reality. I am willing to grant the paradox but not the judgment, for I think that Hansen's proj ect fulfills an important role that could not be accomplished in any other way. As the schism between the software engineers and cyber space theorists demonstrated, no amount of talking about technology as a thing in itself will convince the theorists that technology as such plays an important role in human culture, for they can always revert to cultural and linguistic interpretations that embed technology in discursive productions . Arguing that it is these productions which give technology meaning and significance, they will continue to pooh-pooh any thought of technology as a thing in itself. Only a systematic analysis such as Embodying Technesis can prevail, for it takes the argument onto the high ground of theory and uncovers the moves by which technology is not just embedded in language but erased by language. Through such analysis, Embodying Technesis aims to clear the ground so that space can be opened to ask what technology might be outside of its embeddedness in discursivity. Having cleared the ground, Hansen then seeks to establish a physiologi cal basis for human interaction with technology that is not based primarily on language. As more theorists become interested in this question of tech nology (which is virtually the opposite of the question of technology as Hei degger framed it) , it may be that the answers Hansen suggests will not long endure, for this question is now the focus of wide-ranging inquiries emerg ing from an interdisciplinary convergence of cognitive science, anthropol ogy, literary studies, computer science, and media theory. What will come out of this convergence remains to be seen, but enough research has already been done to make clear that much more can be said about the question than Embodying Technesis articulates. The fact that Hansen's speculations may soon become outdated is proof of the success of his larger argument, however, for the resources to answer what technology is in itself can be fully mobilized only after the question is recognized as legitimate and important. In my view, the enduring contribution of Embodying Technesis is likely to be its tenacious insistence that it makes sense to ask this question and its rig orous analysis of the theoretical moves that have kept us from asking it in full force until now. If Embodying Technesis does nothing else ( and it does much more ) , the ground that it clears will establish it as one of the impor tant books concerning the question of technology, for it frees us to ask and answer that question in new and embodied ways.
Foreword
•
ix
Notes Foreword * ix
Notes
1. Mark Turner, Reading Minds: The Study of English in the Age of Cognitive
Science (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); George Lakoff and Mark
Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and the Challenge to West-
ern Thought (New York: Basic Books, 1999); Andy Clark, Being There: Putting
Brain, Body, and World Together Again (New York: Bradford Books, 1998); Edwin
Hutchins, Cognition in the Wild (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994).
2. Antonio R. Damasio, Descartes's Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human
Brain (New York: Avon Books, 1995); The Feeling of What Happens: Body and
Emotion in the Making of Consciousness (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1999).
1 . Mark Turner, Reading Minds: The Study of English in the Age of Cognitive Science (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1 9 94 ) ; George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and the Challenge to West ern Thought (New York: Basic Books, 1 9 9 9 ) ; Andy Clark, Being There: Putting Brain, Body, and World Together Again (New York: Bradford Books, 1 9 9 8 ) ; Edwin Hutchins, Cognition in the Wild ( Cambridge: MIT Press, 1 9 94). 2. Antonio R. Damasio, Descartes's Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (New York: Avon Books, 1 9 9 5 ) ; The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1 9 9 9 ) .

Acknowledgments
This book began as a dissertation in comparative literature at the University
of California, Irvine, and would never have come into being without the
generous support of many teachers, mentors, and friends. The project
evolved under the direct guidance of two fantastic teachers whose examples
have continued to motivate me to this day and whom I would like especially
to thank. Juliet Flower MacCannell has provided me with perhaps the most
important gift a teacher can give-the trust and open-mindedness that nour-
Acknowledgments
ishes and sustains confidence. For this, I am deeply grateful. J. Hillis Miller
has furnished an example of what a scholar should be-someone who con-
tinues to grow in new and exciting ways, who is not afraid to challenge his
own most deep-seated critical assumptions. I only hope that I can emulate
their fine examples in my own future growth as a scholar and teacher.
I would also like to thank three other teachers who have challenged and
supported me in the long period of revision during which this work acquired
its cross-disciplinary form. I am grateful to Richard Shusterman for his
sober-minded, pragmatic outlook on popular culture; his insights have been
instrumental for my effort to bridge the gap from theoretical speculation to
concrete analysis. I thank Thomas Pavel, from whom I have learned the
importance of maintaining a critical vigilance in the face of intellectual
seduction; his example helped me find the confidence necessary to assert the
value of bodily experience against the discursivist tide of contemporary lit-
erary studies. Finally, Kate Hayles has literally opened a new scholarly
world for me; her generous support for my project and her own example as
a sophisticated cultural critic of science and technology have reaffirmed for
me the urgency of rethinking our received linguistic and literary paradigms
in our ongoing efforts to grapple with the fundamental shifts currently
underway in our culture.
I wish to thank other teachers who have provided support and inspira-
tion at various stages along the way: Julia Lupton, Wolfgang Iser, Barbara
Spackman, Martin Schwab, Alexander Gelley, Joseph Margolis, J. N.
This book began as a dissertation in comparative literature at the University of California, Irvine, and would never have come into being without the generous support of many teachers, mentors, and friends. The proj ect evolved under the direct guidance of two fantastic teachers whose examples have continued to motivate me to this day and whom I would like especially to thank. Juliet Flower MacCannell has provided me with perhaps the most important gift a teacher can give-the trust and open-mindedness that nour ishes and sustains confidence. For this, I am deeply grateful. J. Hillis Miller has furnished an example of what a scholar should be-someone who con tinues to grow in new and exciting ways, who is not afraid to challenge his own most deep-seated critical assumptions. I only hope that I can emulate their fine examples in my own future growth as a scholar and teacher. I would also like to thank three other teachers who have challenged and supported me in the long period of revision during which this work acquired its cross-disciplinary form. I am grateful to Richard Shusterman for his sober-minded, pragmatic outlook on popular culture; his insights have been instrumental for my effort to bridge the gap from theoretical speculation to concrete analysis. I thank Thomas Pavel, from whom I have learned the importance of maintaining a critical vigilance in the face of intellectual seduction; his example helped me find the confidence necessary to assert the value of bodily experience against the discursivist tide of contemporary lit erary studies. Finally, Kate Hayles has literally opened a new scholarly world for me; her generous support for my proj ect and her own example as a sophisticated cultural critic of science and technology have reaffirmed for me the urgency of rethinking our received linguistic and literary paradigms in our ongoing efforts to grapple with the fundamental shifts currently underway in our culture. I wish to thank other teachers who have provided support and inspira tion at various stages along the way: Julia Lupton, Wolfgang Iser, Barbara Spackman, Martin Schwab , Alexander Gelley, Joseph Margolis, J. N.
xii
xii Acknowledgments
Mohanty, John Carvahlo, and Andrzej Warminski. I am deeply indebted to
friends and colleagues from Irvine, Austin, Princeton, and Santa Cruz-
especially Jacques Duvoisin, Jeffrey Belnap, Susan Morrison, Jim Kilfoyle,
Rebecca Bell-Metereau, Stephen Schwartz, Ziad Elmarsafy, Michael Ran-
dall, and Taylor Carmen. I also thank my students at Southwest Texas State
University and at Princeton University; their enthusiasm and eagerness to
learn convinced me of the value of sustained critical reflection on contem-
porary culture, at moments when I most needed convincing. Somewhere out
there are two excellent anonymous readers whose generous constructive
criticism helped me reconceive my sense of purpose and fathom the
demands of my intended interdisciplinary audience.
I am grateful to the following institutions for financial support that, in
both direct and indirect ways, helped me bring this project to fruition: the
University of California, Irvine; Temple University; the Fulbright Scholar-
ship Program; Southwest Texas State University; DAAD (Deutscher
Akademischer Austauschdienst); and the National Endowment for the
Humanities.
I want to thank Laurie Clark Klavins, Shelly Emmett, and the rest of
Team X at the University of Michigan Press for guiding the manuscript to
print, and I especially thank my editor, LeAnn Fields, for her belief in the
project and for her generosity in understanding my repeated requests for "a
little more time."
I also thank my parents, Howard and Yvonne Hansen, and my sister,
Natalie Hansen, for their direct and indirect support over the years. In ways
I am still coming to understand, their influence stands behind my persistent
engagement with subjectivity in the technological age.
Finally, I thank Mimi Lukens for her friendship and support from the
project's inception and for helping me to appreciate the value of saying what
you mean and meaning what you say.
•
Ack nowledgments
Mohanty, John Carvahlo, and Andrzej Warminski. I am deeply indebted to friends and colleagues from Irvine, Austin, Princeton, and Santa Cruz especially Jacques Duvoisin, Jeffrey Belnap, Susan Morrison, Jim Kilfoyle, Rebecca Bell-Metereau, Stephen Schwartz, Ziad Elmarsafy, Michael Ran dall, and Taylor Carmen. I also thank my students at Southwest Texas State University and at Princeton University; their enthusiasm and eagerness to learn convinced me of the value of sustained critical reflection on contem porary culture, at moments when I most needed convincing. Somewhere out there are two excellent anonymous readers whose generous constructive criticism helped me reconceive my sense of purpose and fathom the demands of my intended interdisciplinary audience. I am grateful to the following institutions for financial support that, in both direct and indirect ways, helped me bring this proj ect to fruition: the University of California, Irvine; Temple University; the Fulbright Scholar ship Program; Southwest Texas State University; DAAD (Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst) ; and the National Endowment for the Humanities. I want to thank Laurie Clark Klavins, Shelly Emmett, and the rest of Team X at the University of Michigan Press for guiding the manuscript to print, and I especially thank my editor, LeAnn Fields, for her belief in the proj ect and for her generosity in understanding my repeated requests for " a little more time . " I also thank my parents, Howard and Yvonne Hansen, and m y sister, Natalie Hansen, for their direct and indirect support over the years. In ways I am still coming to understand, their influence stands behind my persistent engagement with subj ectivity in the technological age. Finally, I thank Mimi Lukens for her friendship and support from the proj ect's inception and for helping me to appreciate the value of saying what you mean and meaning what you say.
Contents
Introduction: The Resistance to Technology
1
PART 1. Technology, Embodiment and Cultural Critique
Chapter 1. Technoculture and Embodiment
25
Chapter 2. Locating the Technological Real
53
PART 2. The Machine Reduction of Technology
Chapter 3. From Metaphor to Embodiment: Resisting Technesis 77
Chapter 4. Questioning the Machine Basis of Techne:
Heidegger on Technology
Contents
102
Chapter 5. The Mechanics of Deconstruction:
Derrida on de Man, or Poststructuralism in
an Age of Cultural Studies
122
INTERLUDE 1. Psyche and Metaphor:
Derrida's Freud
141
Introduction: The Resistance to Technology
PART 3. Tracking the Technological Real
1
Chapter 6. Technology and External Experience:
Reconsidering Freud's Project for a
Scientific Psychology
151
Chapter 7. Technology beyond Thought, or
How Real Is the Lacanian Real?
PART
1.
Technology, Embodiment and Cultural Critique
170
Chapter 1.
Technoculture and Embodiment
25
Chapter 2.
Locating the Technological Real
53
PART
2.
The Machine Reduction of Technology
Chapter 3.
From Metaphor to Embodiment: Resisting
Chapter 4.
Questioning the Machine Basis of
77
Techne:
Heidegger on Technology Chapter 5 .
Technesis
102
The Mechanics o f Deconstruction: Derrida on de Man, or Poststructuralism in an Age of Cultural Studies INTERLUDE 1.
Psyche and Metaphor: Derrida's Freud
PART
3.
Chapter 6.
141
Tracking the Technological Real Technology and External Experience: Reconsidering Freud's
Project for a
Scientific Psychology Chapter 7 .
122
15 1
Technology beyond Thought, or How Real
Is the Lacanian Real?
17 0
xiv
•
C o n tents
Chapter 8.
Ontological Revolution at What Cost? Ambivalence in Deleuze and Guattari's
xiv * Contents
Capitalism and Schizophrenia
Chapter 8. Ontological Revolution at What Cost?
Ambivalence in Deleuze and Guattari's
Capitalism and Schizophrenia
186
186
INTERLUDE 2. Breaking with the System:
Technology beyond Semiotics
INTERLUDE 2.
212
Breaking with the System: Technology beyond Semiotics
PART 4. Corporeal Mimesis
212
Chapter 9. On Some Motifs in Benjamin:
(Re)Embodying Technology as Erlebnis,
or the Postlinguistic Afterlife of Mimesis
231
Notes
265
Bibliography
307
PART
4.
Corporeal Mimesis
Index
323
Chapter 9.
On Some Motifs in Benjamin: (Re)Embodying Technology as
Erlebnis,
or the Postlinguistic Afterlife of Mimesis
231
Notes
265
Bibliography
307
Index
323
Introduction: The Resistance to Technology
Isaac Asimov once suggested that the lived experience of modern man has
been shaped far more by practical inventions than by arguably more conse-
quential paradigm shifts in scientific knowledge. Life as we know it, Asimov
implies, would be more drastically altered by the absence of the automobile
than, say, had Einstein never discovered the theory of relativity. This alto-
gether banal observation perfectly captures the ethos shared by many recent
critics in the various fields comprising contemporary science and technology
Introduction: T he Resistance to Technology
studies. Despite an almost bewildering diversity of interest, these critics
stand united against traditional philosophy of science and the sanitizing
privilege it grants the theoretical. Not only do they self-confidently assert
the primacy of the practical, but they do so to probe the messy extraphilo-
sophical "logic" of scientific and technological change-its constitutive
embeddedness within a thick cultural context. Their work collectively oper-
ates what amounts to a paradigm shift in the analysis of science and tech-
nology: for the traditional top-down "diffusion" model, they substitute a
model far more attentive to the wealth of interactions and linkages com-
prising technoscience in action, what sociologist Bruno Latour dubs the
model of "translation" (Latour 1987, 132ff.).
From a broad, anthropological perspective, what is most significant
about this paradigm shift is the central role it accords experience; regardless
of the specific disciplinary or interdisciplinary approach taken, the human
impact of scientific and technological change must be assessed according to
its concrete experiential effects, not its abstract theoretical significance.
While such an imperative introduces an empowering flexibility into the cul-
tural study of technology, it simultaneously calls on us to undertake a major
methodological revisioning: eschewing our ingrained proclivities, we must
learn to embrace language not as the ontological ground of cultural analy-
sis but rather as an admittedly central tool for such analysis. Put another
way, the displacement of language as universal medium and the correlated
recourse to experience confronts the contemporary poststructurally smart
cultural critic with what amounts to a significant theoretical quandary: for
Isaac Asimov once suggested that the lived experience of modern man has been shaped far more by practical inventions than by arguably more conse quential paradigm shifts in scientific knowledge. Life as we know it, Asimov implies, would be more drastically altered by the absence of the automobile than, say, had Einstein never discovered the theory of relativity. This alto gether banal observation perfectly captures the ethos shared by many recent critics in the various fields comprising contemporary science and technology studies. Despite an almost bewildering diversity of interest, these critics stand united against traditional philosophy of science and the sanitizing privilege it grants the theoretical. Not only do they self-confidently assert the primacy of the practical, but they do so to probe the messy extraphilo sophical " logic" of scientific and technological change-its constitutive embeddedness within a thick cultural context. Their work collectively oper ates what amounts to a paradigm shift in the analysis of science and tech nology: for the traditional top-down " diffusion " model, they substitute a model far more attentive to the wealth of interactions and linkages com prising techno science in action, what sociologist Bruno Latour dubs the model of " translation" ( Latour 1 9 8 7, 1 32ff. ) . From a broad, anthropological perspective, what is most significant about this paradigm shift is the central role it accords experience; regardless of the specific disciplinary or interdisciplinary approach taken, the human impact of scientific and technological change must be assessed according to its concrete experiential effects, not its abstract theoretical significance. While such an imperative introduces an empowering flexibility into the cul tural study of technology, it simultaneously calls on us to undertake a maj or methodological revisioning: eschewing our ingrained proclivities, we must learn to embrace language not as the ontological ground of cultural analy sis but rather as an admittedly central tool for such analysis. Put another way, the displacement of language as universal medium and the correlated recourse to experience confronts the contemporary poststructurally smart cultural critic with what amounts to a significant theoretical quandary: for
2
2 * Embodying Technesis
all our readiness to confirm Asimov's altogether commonsensical observa-
tion, the long-standing logocentrism of our (often inimical) methodologies
renders us hard-pressed to discover concrete instances through which we
can reflexively grasp technology's practical impact on our experience. While
we can confidently assert that the lifeworld would be markedly different
without modern technologies like the automobile or the computer, we are
not so readily able to specify in exactly what ways it would be so.
This theoretical quandary is, I suggest, connected to the constitutive
embeddedness of human practice within concrete and local contexts-what
Ludwig Wittgenstein so aptly termed "forms of life." According to (the
later) Wittgenstein, every human agent necessarily exists within a given
form of life (or "habitus," to use Pierre Bourdieu's more recent idiom) that
performs the central function of orienting (giving meaning to) shared lin-
guistic and, by extension, cultural practices. Any effort to clarify such forms
of life philosophically is bound to fail, since it would require what for the
later Wittgenstein is an impossibility: a descriptive language not similarly
rooted in a particular form of life. As the precursor to the so-called linguis-
tic turn in philosophy, Wittgenstein's account of language forcefully asserts
the immanence of human experience within language-more precisely,
within specific language games that comprise everyday life in a given cul-
tural context.
For Wittgenstein and the philosophical tradition beholden to his later
work, this necessity serves the philosophically significant function of pro-
hibiting the advancement of absolute, fully clarified knowledge claims. It
furnishes the theoretical basis for philosophy's recent turn away from foun-
dationalism and for its contemporary "conversational" style.1 Applied to
technology, however, this same necessity helps to explain why the rich expe-
riential impact of technology, despite its obvious practical impact, nonethe-
less remains so abstract and difficult to grasp. Like language games, tech-
nologies play a constitutive role in structuring the worlds within which they
exist. To the extent that we humans necessarily act within such prestruc-
tured worlds-worlds we in fact share with our technologies2-our prac-
tices presuppose technology in ways that foreclose all possibility for analytic
isolation and cognitive recuperation. Despite its irreducible concreteness,
technology's experiential impact must accordingly be considered to be first
and foremost indirect and holist. More fundamental than all the intentional,
explicit-dare I say cultural?-uses we make of our technologies are the
largely unmarked alterations they operate on our basic perceptual and sub-
perceptual experiential faculties. As philosophers of technology have
recently contended, technologies underlie and inform our basic "ways of
•
E m bodyi n g
Technesis
all our readiness to confirm Asimov's altogether commonsensical observa tion, the long-standing logocentrism of our (often inimical ) methodologies renders us hard-pressed to discover concrete instances through which we can reflexively grasp technology's practical impact on our experience. While we can confidently assert that the lifeworld would be markedly different without modern technologies like the automobile or the computer, we are not so readily able to specify in exactly what ways it would be so. This theoretical quandary is, I suggest, connected to the constitutive embeddedness of human practice within concrete and local contexts-what Ludwig Wittgenstein so aptly termed " forms of life. " According to (the later) Wittgenstein, every human agent necessarily exists within a given form of life (or "habitus, " to use Pierre Bourdieu's more recent idiom ) that performs the central function of orienting (giving meaning to ) shared lin guistic and, by extension, cultural practices. Any effort to clarify such forms of life philosophically is bound to fail, since it would require what for the later Wittgenstein is an impossibility: a descriptive language not similarly rooted in a particular form of life. As the precursor to the so-called linguis tic turn in philosophy, Wittgenstein's account of language forcefully asserts the immanence of human experience within language-more precisely, within specific language games that comprise everyday life in a given cul tural context. For Wittgenstein and the philosophical tradition beholden to his later work, this necessity serves the philosophically significant function of pro hibiting the advancement of absolute, fully clarified knowledge claims. It furnishes the theoretical basis for philosophy's recent turn away from foun dationalism and for its contemporary "conversational " style. 1 Applied to technology, however, this same necessity helps to explain why the rich expe riential impact of technology, despite its obvious practical impact, nonethe less remains so abstract and difficult to grasp. Like language games, tech nologies play a constitutive role in structuring the worlds within which they exist. To the extent that we humans necessarily act within such prestruc tured worlds-worlds we in fact share with our technologies2-our prac tices presuppose technology in ways that foreclose all possibility for analytic isolation and cognitive recuperation. Despite its irreducible concreteness, technology's experiential impact must accordingly be considered to be first and foremost indirect and holist. More fundamental than all the intentional, explicit-dare I say cultural ?-uses we make of our technologies are the largely unmarked alterations they operate on our basic perceptual and sub perceptual experiential faculties. As philosophers of technology have recently contended, technologies underlie and inform our basic "ways of
I ntro d u ction
Introduction * 3
seeing" the world and thus cannot be thematized as "objects" that are con-
stituted by such paradigmatic holist perspectives (Ihde 1991).
In this book, I shall expand the holist approach to technology in order to
counter the recent culturalist assimilation of technology. Without repudiat-
ing the culturalist position as such, I shall reject one of its central underlying
implications: that the cultural construction of technologies somehow
exhausts the extent of their impact on our experience. Although technocul-
tural critics are undoubtedly right to suggest, for example, that "save sheer
accident, technology has no force outside of a system of social practices"
(Stone 1996, 170), much hangs on how such claims are understood. In my
opinion, critics all too often assume that technologies must be "one hundred
percent" social, as it were-that they must be entirely a product of cultural
construction simply because they cannot exist outside social networks.
Countering such a misconception requires a more subtle understanding of
technology's social basis, one that can distinguish the concrete effects of
particular technologies from the general conditions of their efficacy. If it is
true that technologies cannot exist outside social systems, that in no way
precludes them from having effects that cannot be captured by the interpre-
tative tools germane to such systems.
To explore just one example of this enabling confusion, technocultural
critic Sandy Stone, in speaking of social context as the irreducible back-
ground for understanding technologies, collapses their significance into the
impact they have on ideology: ". . . technologies are visible and frequently
material evidence of struggles over meaning. They don't exist outside of
complex belief systems in whose social and political frames they are embed-
ded. Their apparent obduracy is an artifact, a technology of its own" (1996,
176). Technologies may in fact form important sites for carrying out such
struggles, but-as material elements that structure our experiential world(s)
holistically and beyond thematization-they are also much more than that.
Their impact on experience is at once so primitive and so pervasive that any
effort to fathom it through cultural critique will have already presupposed
what it sets out to isolate and clarify. In seeking to localize the extracultural,
extrasocial dimension of technological change, I thus mean to suggest that
technologies function much like language games on Wittgenstein's model.
Within the contemporary postmodern lifeworld, they are simply more basic
than other social phenomena: not unlike language for Wittgenstein, tech-
nologies play an essential role as part of what allows for the very existence
of the social as such.
Given the extensive role that technology's indirect and amorphous
impact has on our basic modes of perception and experience, we can easily
•
3
seeing" the world and thus cannot be thematized as " obj ects " that are con stituted by such paradigmatic holist perspectives ( Ihde 1 99 1 ) . In this book, I shall expand the holist approach to technology in order to counter the recent culturalist assimilation of technology. Without repudiat ing the culturalist position as such, I shall rej ect one of its central underlying implications: that the cultural construction of technologies somehow exhausts the extent of their impact on our experience. Although technocul tural critics are undoubtedly right to suggest, for example, that " save sheer accident, technology has no force outside of a system of social practices " ( Stone 1 996, 1 70 ) , much hangs o n how such claims are understood. I n my opinion, critics all too often assume that technologies must be " one hundred percent" social, as it were-that they must be entirely a product of cultural construction simply because they cannot exist outside social networks. Countering such a misconception requires a more subtle understanding of technology's social basis, one that can distinguish the concrete effects of particular technologies from the general conditions of their efficacy. If it is true that technologies cannot exist outside social systems, that in no way precludes them from having effects that cannot be captured by the interpre tative tools germane to such systems. To explore just one example of this enabling confusion, techno cultural critic Sandy Stone, in speaking of social context as the irreducible back ground for understanding technologies, collapses their significance into the impact they have on ideology: " . . . technologies are visible and frequently material evidence of struggles over meaning. They don't exist outside of complex belief systems in whose social and political frames they are embed ded. Their apparent obduracy is an artifact, a technology of its own " ( 1 996, 1 76 ) . Technologies may in fact form important sites for carrying out such struggles, but-as material elements that structure our experiential world(s) holistically and beyond thematization-they are also much more than that. Their impact on experience is at once so primitive and so pervasive that any effort to fathom it through cultural critique will have already presupposed what it sets out to isolate and clarify. In seeking to localize the extracultural, extrasocial dimension of technological change, I thus mean to suggest that technologies function much like language games on Wittgenstein's model . Within the contemporary postmodern lifeworld, they are simply more basic than other social phenomena: not unlike language for Wittgenstein, tech nologies play an essential role as part of what allows for the very existence of the social as such. Given the extensive role that technology's indirect and amorphous impact has on our basic modes of perception and experience, we can easily
4
4 Embodying Technesis
make sense of the common imperative guiding recent cultural investigations
of technology-the imperative to secure technology's impact within some
delimited, theorizable "space." For all of the diversity of approaches
employed by contemporary cultural critics, this imperative seems time and
again to result in an analysis of technology insofar, and only insofar, as it
impacts representation. By focusing on representation-and specifically by
substituting an analysis of technology's impact on representational thinking
for an analysis of technology itself-modern and contemporary critics aim
to overcome the difficulties involved in delimiting technology's ubiquitous
and subthematic impact. Yet if, as I shall argue, technology affects our expe-
rience first and foremost through its infrastructural role, its impact occurs
prior to and independently of our production of representations: effectively,
technologies structure our lifeworlds and influence our embodied lives at a
level, as it were, below the "threshold" of representation itself.3 As long as
cultural analysis restricts its focus to the technical modification of represen-
tation, it cannot but compromise the richness and multidimensionality of
technology's impact on our experience-what, in the following, I shall
repeatedly refer to as the robust materiality of technology.4 What is lost in
the representationalist reduction is not simply some abstract alterity of tech-
nology but the host of concrete materializations through which technologies
impact our practices (and not just our communicational practices) accord-
ing to "logics" that are strongly posthermeneutical.5
The Argument
By critically evaluating the role technology plays in twentieth-century theo-
retical discourse, I seek to prepare the ground for an expanded analysis of
technological materiality, one capable of exploring specifically those mate-
rializations through which technologies mediate the material rhythms of
embodied life. Through what amounts to a critical genealogy of contempo-
rary cultural studies of technology, I trace the latter's extensive, though
largely unrecognized, allegiance to poststructuralism and in particular to the
(philosophical and rhetorical) strategy of what I call technesis, or the
putting-into-discourse of technology. For many of the so-called master-
•
E m bodyi n g
Technesis
make sense of the common imperative guiding recent cultural investigations of technology-the imperative to secure technology's impact within some delimited, theorizable " space. " For all of the diversity of approaches employed by contemporary cultural critics, this imperative seems time and again to result in an analysis of technology insofar, and only insofar, as it impacts representation. By focusing on representation-and specifically by substituting an analysis of technology's impact on representational thinking for an analysis of technology itself-modern and contemporary critics aim to overcome the difficulties involved in delimiting technology's ubiquitous and subthematic impact. Yet if, as I shall argue, technology affects our expe rience first and foremost through its infrastructural role, its impact occurs prior to and independently of our production of representations: effectively, technologies structure our lifeworlds and influence our embodied lives at a level, as it were, below the " threshold " of representation itself.3 As long as cultural analysis restricts its focus to the technical modification of represen tation, it cannot but compromise the richness and multidimensionality of technology's impact on our experience-what, in the following, I shall repeatedly refer to as the robust materiality of technology.4 What is lost in the representationalist reduction is not simply some abstract alterity of tech nology but the host of concrete materializations through which technologies impact our practices ( and not just our communicational practices ) accord ing to " logics " that are strongly posthermeneuticaI.5
thinkers of (technological) modernity-in particular, for Freud, Heidegger,
Derrida, Lacan, Foucault, and Deleuze and Guattari-technesis forms a
common, though variously implemented, reductive strategy that allows for
a progressive assimilation of technology to thought. Technesis allows these
critics to open their respective systems to a form of material exteriority
The Argument
By critically evaluating the role technology plays in twentieth-century theo retical discourse, I seek to prepare the ground for an expanded analysis of technological materiality, one capable of exploring specifically those mate rializations through which technologies mediate the material rhythms of embodied life. Through what amounts to a critical genealogy of contempo rary cultural studies of technology, I trace the latter's extensive, though largely unrecognized, allegiance to poststructuralism and in particular to the (philosophical and rhetorical) strategy of what I call technesis, or the putting-into-discourse of technology. For many of the so-called master thinkers of ( technological ) modernity-in particular, for Freud, Heidegger, Derrida, Lacan, Foucault, and Deleuze and Guattari-technesis forms a common, though variously implemented, reductive strategy that allows for a progressive assimilation of technology to thought. Technesis allows these critics to open their respective systems to a form of material exteriority
I ntro d u ction
Introduction * 5
(technology) without imperiling or abandoning the priority accorded to
thinking by our philosophical modernity. To the extent that contemporary
technocriticism absorbs this same strategy in the process of adapting post-
structuralism for its own ends, my critique of modernist technesis will oper-
ate simultaneously as a critique of technocultural criticism in the postmod-
ern age.
In recounting the story of the twentieth century's halted efforts to
embrace technology, my primary aim will be to disabuse cultural critics of
technology (myself included) of our lingering allegiances to vestiges of the
hermeneutic mode. From the groundbreaking explorations of Heidegger
and Freud to the more localized interventions of Stephen Greenblatt and
Donna Haraway, technology has been repeatedly invoked as a means of his-
toricizing theoretical claims, of stamping them with the indelible mark of
the empirical. In the phenomenological and psychoanalytic paradigms
whose trajectories I track, the appeal to technology comprises an ever
increasing ontic turn-a localization of thought and memory, if not always
directly in the concrete, technically mediated lifeworld, then at least against
the more general background of technological modernization. So, for
example, Heidegger's conjunction of modern technology and Being in his
Nietzsche functions to delimit a specifically modern epoch; and Freud's
hydraulic model of the psyche, as Lacan has shown, situates the birth of psy-
choanalysis and the discovery of the unconscious at an irreducibly concrete
moment within the history of technology.
Yet even as this ontic turn has been amplified in the work of the post-
structuralists (Derrida, the later Lacan, Foucault, and Deleuze and Guattari)
and again with the advent of cultural studies and of specific cultural
approaches to science and technology, there is much reason to question its
adequacy as a means of capturing technology's robust materiality. Post-
structuralists and contemporary cultural critics alike tend to invoke tech-
nology not for its own sake but as an enabling means and a material support
for a more pressing account of subject constitution, whether on ontogenetic
or strictly empirical grounds. In case after case, technology is invoked as a
concrete placeholder for the alterity that has become, at least in the post-
modern academic scene, a compulsory component of any respectable
account of subjectivity. In this role, technology lends a spatiotemporal
specificity to diverse forms of alterity dear to our philosophical modernity,
including Heideggerian Being, the Freudian unconscious, Derridian dif-
ferance, and the Lacanian objet petit a. In each of these cases, the invocation
of technology remains subordinate to a more central overriding theoretical
purpose.
•
5
(technology) without imperiling or abandoning the priority accorded to thinking by our philosophical modernity. To the extent that contemporary technocriticism absorbs this same strategy in the process of adapting post structuralism for its own ends, my critique of modernist technesis will oper ate simultaneously as a critique of technocultural criticism in the postmod ern age . In recounting the story of the twentieth century's halted efforts to embrace technology, my primary aim will be to disabuse cultural critics of technology (myself included) of our lingering allegiances to vestiges of the hermeneutic mode. From the groundbreaking explorations of Heidegger and Freud to the more localized interventions of Stephen Greenblatt and D onna Haraway, technology has been repeatedly invoked as a means of his toricizing theoretical claims, of stamping them with the indelible mark of the empirical. In the phenomenological and psychoanalytic paradigms whose traj ectories I track, the appeal to technology comprises an ever increasing ontic turn-a localization of thought and memory, if not always directly in the concrete, technically mediated lifeworld, then at least against the more general background of technological modernization. So, for example, Heidegger's conj unction of modern technology and Being in his Nietzsche functions to delimit a specifically modern epoch; and Freud's hydraulic model of the psyche, as Lacan has shown, situates the birth of psy choanalysis and the discovery of the unconscious at an irreducibly concrete moment within the history of technology. Yet even as this ontic turn has been amplified in the work of the post structuralists (Derrida, the later Lacan, Foucault, and Deleuze and Guattari ) and again with the advent of cultural studies and of specific cultural approaches to science and technology, there is much reason to question its adequacy as a means of capturing technology's robust materiality. Post structuralists and contemporary cultural critics alike tend to invoke tech nology not for its own sake but as an enabling means and a material support for a more pressing account of subj ect constitution, whether on ontogenetic or strictly empirical grounds. In case after case, technology is invoked as a concrete placeholder for the alterity that has become, at least in the post modern academic scene, a compulsory component of any respectable account of subj ectivity. In this role, technology lends a spatiotemporal specificity to diverse forms of alterity dear to our philosophical modernity, including Heideggerian Being, the Freudian unconscious, Derridian di{ {hance, and the Lacanian o bjet petit a. In each of these cases, the invocation of technology remains subordinate to a more central overriding theoretical purpose.
6
6 Embodying Technesis
More recently, technology has been variously invoked by cultural critics
as one of the many material factors that structure the world of social prac-
tice. For those cultural critics who focus specifically on contemporary
technoscience or technoculture, technologies most often play the role of
material condition for new forms of subjectivity-for a subjectivity either
wholly liberated from former (logocentric) limitations or one constrained in
new and ambivalent, though always somehow enabling, ways. Viewed in
this manner, technologies generate new types of human (or posthuman)
embodiment that should lead us to question the privilege we grant thought
in determining what constitutes identity or agency. While such questioning
has been taken up by a minority of today's cultural critics (Kittler, Hayles)
and has been a central focus in such emerging fields as cognitive neuropsy-
chology and linguistics (Varela, Mark Johnson), the majority of cultural
critics remain incapable, often despite their own intentions, of overcoming
their dependence on a representationalist conception of subjectivity. As long
as it is held to be the privileged vehicle by which materiality acquires cul-
tural value, technology will remain pigeonholed into the reductive role of
mere material support for the all important-and all engulfing-process of
subject constitution.
We can observe this subjectivist assimilation of technology in at least
four important and influential recent variants of technocultural criticism.6
First, the mode of criticism found in "science studies" or "technoculture"
views scientific discourses and technologies as cultural phenomena like any
others. While it is attentive to the constraint imposed by capitalist institu-
tions, such as the military and the global economy, this approach finds
solace in the fact that scientific discourses and technologies are constructed
entities. Not only are they potentially open to alternate, noncoercive theo-
retical constructions, but they are in fact always simultaneously constructed
according to alternative popular desires.7 Indeed, scientific discourses and
technologies appear on this account not primarily as constraints (except
when they are employed by powerful elites) but as the enabling tools for
oppositional practices of identity constitution and community formation.8
Second, the mode of criticism found in "social studies of science" views
scientific facts and technological machines as processes rather than prod-
ucts. In this view, facts and machines come to exist and to have an impact
as a result of struggle within robust social networks involving various levels
of extrascientific practice from the most immediately relevant (relation to
previous research and experimentation) to the most distant (general goals of
society).9 From the perspective of a cultural analysis of technology, the most
interesting aspect of this approach is its call for a new constitution or con-
•
E m bodyi n g
Technesis
More recently, technology has been variously invoked by cultural critics as one of the many material factors that structure the world of social prac tice. For those cultural critics who focus specifically on contemporary techno science or techno culture, technologies most often play the role of material condition for new forms of subj ectivity-for a subj ectivity either wholly liberated from former (logocentric) limitations or one constrained in new and ambivalent, though always somehow enabling, ways. Viewed in this manner, technologies generate new types of human (or posthuman) embodiment that should lead us to question the privilege we grant thought in determining what constitutes identity or agency. While such questioning has been taken up by a minority of today's cultural critics ( Kittler, Hayles) and has been a central focus in such emerging fields as cognitive neuropsy chology and linguistics (Varela, Mark Johnson ) , the majority of cultural critics remain incapable, often despite their own intentions, of overcoming their dependence on a representationalist conception of subj ectivity. As long as it is held to be the privileged vehicle by which materiality acquires cul tural value, technology will remain pigeonholed into the reductive role of mere material support for the all important-and all engulfing-process of subj ect constitution. We can observe this subj ectivist assimilation of technology in at least four important and influential recent variants of technocultural criticism.6 First, the mode of criticism found in " science studies " or " technoculture " views scientific discourses and technologies as cultural phenomena like any others. While it is attentive to the constraint imposed by capitalist institu tions, such as the military and the global economy, this approach finds solace in the fact that scientific discourses and technologies are constructed entities. Not only are they potentially open to alternate, noncoercive theo retical constructions, but they are in fact always simultaneously constructed according to alternative p opular desires.7 Indeed, scientific discourses and technologies appear on this account not primarily as constraints ( except when they are employed by powerful elites) but as the enabling tools for oppositional practices of identity constitution and community formation. s Second, the mode o f criticism found i n " social studies of science " views scientific facts and technological machines as processes rather than prod ucts. In this view, facts and machines come to exist and to have an impact as a result of struggle within robust social networks involving various levels of extrascientific practice from the most immediately relevant (relation to previous research and experimentation) to the most distant (general goals of society ) . 9 From the perspective of a cultural analysis of technology, the most interesting aspect of this approach is its call for a new constitution or con-
I ntro d u ction
Introduction * 7
tract between the human and the nonhuman-a fresh conception of knowl-
edge that refuses the modern division between knowledge of people (power)
and knowledge of things (science). By denying mastery to either things or
people, this new constitution would follow the delegation of power to both
humans and nonhumans along the trajectory of networks that produce both
as material effects of a shared world (Latour 1993b).
Third, what I shall call the "virtual-reality-is-an-illusion" school counters
the exuberant claims of "visionary proponents" of cyberspace by insisting
on the "indebtedness" of virtual-reality technologies to their "logocentric
past."10 By remaining cognizant of the inherent and unbreachable limita-
tions of metaphysical discourse, the critics of this school are able to interpret
the derealizing "consensual hallucination" of cyberspace as a collective fan-
tasy "that the more technologically sophisticated our society becomes the
less it has to worry about the distribution of wealth and resources"
(Markley 1996, 4). Specifically, they insist on distinguishing the virtual tech-
nologies that materialize our consensual hallucination from the content of
that hallucination-the abstraction "cyberspace." While the latter promises
a fantasy resolution founded on denial, attention to the former suggests that
virtual reality "can never separate itself from the politics of representation
precisely because it is a projection of the conflicts of class, gender, and race
that technology both encodes and seeks to erase" (ibid.).
Fourth, a diffuse research program grouped under the rubric of the
"materialities of communication" expands the function of exteriority as it is
developed in Derrida's early work.11 Employed as a general term for the
"physical side" of language, exteriority plays an important antihermeneutic
role within what nonetheless remain so many forms of human self-refer-
ence. Exteriority, that is to say, furnishes a significant resistance to the reign
of interpretation and calls for a new model-that of "meaning constitu-
tion"-which brings into view "situations where couplings between human
bodies, psychic systems, and new communications technologies ... produce
specific subject-effects" (Gumbrecht and Pfeiffer 1994, 400).
No matter how forcefully these approaches claim to engage technology
in a robust, postrepresentational, post-theoretical fashion, all of them work
with an impoverished concept of technological materiality that, I suggest,
effectively undermines their intentions. In one way or another, all of them
equate the materiality of technology with cultural materiality-with the
material markings that technology (like all cultural productions) acquires
on entering the cultural domain. Though its advent as a means of conceptu-
alizing technology can be traced back to Aristotle (as I shall argue in chap-
ter 3), this impoverished concept of materiality owes its contemporary
•
7
tract between the human and the nonhuman-a fresh conception of knowl edge that refuses the modern division between knowledge of people (power) and knowledge of things ( science ) . By denying mastery to either things or people, this new constitution would follow the delegation of power to both humans and nonhumans along the traj ectory of networks that produce both as material effects of a shared world (Latour 1 99 3 b ) . Third, what I shall call the " virtual-reality-is-an-illusion " school counters the exuberant claims of "visionary proponents" of cyberspace by insisting on the " indebtedness" of virtual-reality technologies to their " logocentric past. "10 By remaining cognizant of the inherent and unbreachable limita tions of metaphysical discourse, the critics of this school are able to interpret the derealizing " consensual hallucination" of cyberspace as a collective fan tasy " that the more technologically sophisticated our society becomes the less it has to worry about the distribution of wealth and resources " (Markley 1 9 96, 4 ) . Specifically, they insist o n distinguishing the virtual tech nologies that materialize our consensual hallucination from the content of that hallucination-the abstraction " cyberspace. " While the latter promises a fantasy resolution founded on denial, attention to the former suggests that virtual reality "can never separate itself from the politics of representation precisely because it is a proj ection of the conflicts of class, gender, and race that technology both encodes and seeks to erase " (ibid. ) . Fourth, a diffuse research program grouped under the rubric o f the " materialities of communication" expands the function of exteriority as it is developed in Derrida's early work . l l Employed as a general term for the " physical side " of language, exteriority plays an important antihermeneutic role within what nonetheless remain so many forms of human self-refer ence. Exteriority, that is to say, furnishes a significant resistance to the reign of interpretation and calls for a new model-that of " meaning constitu tion "-which brings into view " situations where couplings between human bodies, psychic systems, and new communications technologies . . . produce specific subj ect-effects " ( Gumbrecht and Pfeiffer 1 994, 400 ) . No matter how forcefully these approaches claim to engage technology in a robust, postrepresentational, post-theoretical fashion, all of them work with an impoverished concept of technological materiality that, I suggest, effectively undermines their intentions. In one way or another, all of them equate the materiality of technology with cultural materiality-with the material markings that technology ( like all cultural productions ) acquires on entering the cultural domain. Though its advent as a means of conceptu alizing technology can be traced back to Aristotle (as I shall argue in chap ter 3 ) , this impoverished concept of materiality owes its contemporary
8
8 Embodying Technesis
currency to French poststructuralism. The various materialities invoked by
the aforementioned cultural critics-materialities encountered in cultural
and social life, in virtual hardware/software, and in the nonsignifying ele-
ments of language-all comprise examples of the quasi materiality (or rela-
tive exteriority) that Derrida's critique of logocentrism unleashes within the
domain of thought. As mere supplements or material supports for the pro-
duction of knowledge/thought/desire, none can furnish the site for a resis-
tance against the imperialism of theoretical (or linguistic) idealism.
By subjecting this impoverished concept of materiality to criticism, I shall
demonstrate that the extensive invocation of technology by twentieth-cen-
tury philosophers and theorists from Freud and Heidegger to contemporary
cultural critics remains faithful to the logocentric foundation of philosophi-
cal humanism-the privilege of thought and/or the thinking agent. Viewed
under the genealogical gaze, the phenomenological and psychoanalytic tra-
ditions on which I focus are marked by the repetition of a shared reductive
pattern. An initial move to embrace technology is in each case compromised
by a defensive gesture: at some point or other, the radical alterity of tech-
nology is sacrificed to preserve thought as the ultimate tribunal of experi-
ence. Analysis of this sacrifice in the theorists already mentioned reveals a
rigorous and inflexible logic behind the various twentieth-century invoca-
tions of technology. Though introduced as a concrete instance of alterity,
technology has in all cases already undergone a fundamental reduction: a
dogmatic stripping away of its robust materiality that I shall refer to under
the rubric of the machine reduction of technology. Rather than embracing
technologies as materially robust entities, the aforementioned critical dis-
courses constrain technology to the figure of the machine-a static and
mechanical figure that is by nature secondary and posterior to the primary
and constitutive movement of thought and to whose sway, consequently, it
can pose no threat.
Though our recent intellectual history displays an undeniable and pro-
gressively evolving interest in embracing technology, the machine reduction
appears only to have been rendered more forceful with the passage of time.
If Derrida's exemplary poststructuralist declaration concerning the "closure
of representation" served to efface traces of the enabling prior reduction of
technology, the empirical approach favored by contemporary cultural crit-
ics compounds the reduction and effectively renders representationalism
hegemonic. By assimilating the poststructuralist representationalist ontol-
ogy without subjecting it to critique (and without preserving its negative or
antihermeneutic moment), cultural studies adds a further layer of distance
between its positivist methodology and the enabling reduction that lies
•
E m bodyi n g
Technesis
currency to French poststructuralism. The various materialities invoked by the aforementioned cultural critics-materialities encountered in cultural and social life, in virtual hardware/software, and in the nonsignifying ele ments of language-all comprise examples of the quasi materiality (or rela tive exteriority) that Derrida's critique of logocentrism unleashes within the domain of thought. As mere supplements or material supports for the pro duction of knowledge/thought/desire, none can furnish the site for a resis tance against the imperialism of theoretical ( or linguistic ) idealism. By subj ecting this impoverished concept of materiality to criticism, I shall demonstrate that the extensive invocation of technology by twentieth-cen tury philosophers and theorists from Freud and Heidegger to contemporary cultural critics remains faithful to the logocentric foundation of philosophi cal humanism-the privilege of thought and/or the thinking agent. Viewed under the genealogical gaze, the phenomenological and psychoanalytic tra ditions on which I focus are marked by the repetition of a shared reductive pattern. An initial move to embrace technology is in each case compromised by a defensive gesture: at some point or other, the radical alterity of tech nology is sacrificed to preserve thought as the ultimate tribunal of experi ence. Analysis of this sacrifice in the theorists already mentioned reveals a rigorous and inflexible logic behind the various twentieth-century invoca tions of technology. Though introduced as a concrete instance of alterity, technology has in all cases already undergone a fundamental reduction: a dogmatic stripping away of its robust materiality that I shall refer to under the rubric of the machine reduction of technology. Rather than embracing technologies as materially robust entities, the aforementioned critical dis courses constrain technology to the figure of the machine-a static and mechanical figure that is by nature secondary and posterior to the primary and constitutive movement of thought and to whose sway, consequently, it can pose no threat. Though our recent intellectual history displays an undeniable and pro gressively evolving interest in embracing technology, the machine reduction appears only to have been rendered more forceful with the passage of time. If Derrida's exemplary po ststructuralist declaration concerning the "closure of representation " served to efface traces of the enabling prior reduction of technology, the empirical approach favored by contemporary cultural crit ics compounds the reduction and effectively renders representationalism hegemonic. By assimilating the poststructuralist representationalist ontol ogy without subj ecting it to critique ( and without preserving its negative or antihermeneutic moment) , cultural studies adds a further layer of distance between its positivist methodology and the enabling reduction that lies
I ntro d u ction
Introduction * 9
behind it. Far from lending theory a concrete historicity, the culmination of
the ontic turn in contemporary cultural studies thus threatens to efface
wholesale the entire history of technology's reduction-to wipe out those
traces of technology's radical exteriority that remain discernable in the
fissures that cleave the poststructuralist machine reduction of technology.
Accordingly, while the ontic turn toward technology can be cited as one, if
not the most important, factor motivating the contemporary shift from
hermeneutics and textual analysis to a more inclusive and less monological
approach to culture,12 the field of contemporary cultural studies insures in
the most effective form yet imaginable the subordination of the technical to
the social and the reduction of technology to a "relative exteriority."13 By
treating technology exclusively as the material support for ideology critique
and/or identity performance, cultural criticism simply amplifies those ten-
dencies of poststructuralist thought most inimical to a robust account of
technology. In the process, it further obscures any possibility for an engage-
ment with technology's essentially material historicity-an engagement that
would situate technology beyond the grasp of representational thought and
the forms of practice arising from it. By tracing contemporary cultural crit-
icism's extensive reduction of technological materiality to its uncritical
assimilation of poststructuralism, I intend to work through these deep, the-
oretical limitations, with the constructive aim of exploring alternative
avenues toward a cultural criticism more appropriate to our ever increas-
ingly technological, and perhaps (as some recent commentators propose)
properly posthuman, world.14
Poststructuralism in the Age of Cultural Studies
Contemporary cultural criticism of technology, I have suggested, gains
much of its critical force from an extension of certain claims advanced by
French poststructuralism. Unifying the various approaches to cultural prac-
tices and representations that comprise contemporary cultural studies is a
shared embrace of Derrida's sweeping claim (which, for the moment at
least, can stand in for poststructuralism as a whole) that we live in an era
marked by the "closure of representation." In assimilating French post-
structuralism, however, cultural criticism has largely failed to appreciate the
philosophical context and the profound (anti)hermeneutic and (anti)prag-
matic consequences of the various poststructuralist deconstructions of the
•
9
behind it. Far from lending theory a concrete historicity, the culmination of the ontic turn in contemporary cultural studies thus threatens to efface wholesale the entire history of technology's reduction-to wipe out those traces of technology's radical exteriority that remain discernable in the fissures that cleave the poststructuralist machine reduction of technology. Accordingly, while the ontic turn toward technology can be cited as one, if not the most important, factor motivating the contemporary shift from hermeneutics and textual analysis to a more inclusive and less mono logical approach to culture,12 the field of contemporary cultural studies insures in the most effective form yet imaginable the subordination of the technical to the social and the reduction of technology to a " relative exteriority. " 1 3 By treating technology exclusively as the material support for ideology critique and/or identity performance, cultural criticism simply amplifies those ten dencies of poststructuralist thought most inimical to a robust account of technology. In the process, it further obscures any possibility for an engage ment with technology's essentially material historicity-an engagement that would situate technology beyond the grasp of representational thought and the forms of practice arising from it. By tracing contemporary cultural crit icism's extensive reduction of technological materiality to its uncritical assimilation of poststructuralism, I intend to work through these deep, the oretical limitations, with the constructive aim of exploring alternative avenues toward a cultural criticism more appropriate to our ever increas ingly technological, and perhaps (as some recent commentators propose) properly posthuman, world.14
subject.
To lend substance to my call for a recontextualization of poststructural-
Poststruduralism in the Age of Cultural Studies
Contemporary cultural criticism of technology, I have suggested, gams much of its critical force from an extension of certain claims advanced by French poststructuralism. Unifying the various approaches to cultural prac tices and representations that comprise contemporary cultural studies is a shared embrace of Derrida's sweeping claim (which, for the moment at least, can stand in for poststructuralism as a whole) that we live in an era marked by the " closure of representation. " In assimilating French post structuralism, however, cultural criticism has largely failed to appreciate the philosophical context and the profound (anti )hermeneutic and ( anti )prag matic consequences of the various poststructuralist deconstructions of the subj ect. To lend substance to my call for a recontextualization of poststructural-
10
10 * Embodying Technesis
ism within the new cultural horizon, let me briefly evaluate the contribu-
tions of several cultural critics who have made an explicit effort to apply the
insights of deconstructive criticism transformationally. The work of these
critics-Terry Eagleton, Stephen Greenblatt, and Donna Haraway-exem-
plifies the most fruitful assimilation of poststructuralism in three significant
fields within cultural criticism broadly considered: British materialism, the
new historicism, and (cyborg) feminism. Consideration of their respective
merits and limitations will thus go far toward establishing both the heuris-
tic importance and the methodological limitations of contemporary cultural
studies for the development of a robust, holist account of contemporary
technology's experiential impact. While all three critics deserve praise for
their efforts to suture deconstructive analysis with material reality, they
must all be criticized for their refusal to think rigorously about the disjunc-
tion of the linguistic and the phenomenal. Though the task these critics set
for themselves is admirable and urgent, they articulate concrete suggestions
that too hastily invoke or reinvoke various aspects of the traditionally priv-
ileged cognitive subject.1s
The work of Eagleton, Greenblatt, and Haraway should be situated in
the passage from poststructuralism to postmodernism as the dominant par-
adigm of academic criticism. With the advent of the so-called postmodern
condition, the various core distinctions underwriting the poststructuralist
ethos became largely untenable. In particular, postmodernism witnessed the
collapse of the great divide between literature and popular culture-the very
divide that informed and reinvigorated the modernist assumptions from
which poststructuralism drew its strength (Huyssen 1986). Compelled by
this collapse to confront the ideological assumptions underlying poststruc-
turalism, critics who matured during this transitional period have tended to
direct their attention beyond the formal gymnastics of ecriture to the social,
economic, and technological background of cultural production. Thus, ever
expanding groups of critics representing positions as diverse as neo-Marx-
ism, new historicism, media theory, postcolonialism, queer theory, femi-
nism, and now science and technology studies have stormed the poststruc-
turalist arsenal, claiming its major theorems as tools for developing (often
overtly political) critical agendas far removed from the pristine neutrality
and high-art aura indissociably bound up with poststructuralism's textual-
ist focus. To a certain extent, this deflection of critical sensibility can be
ascribed to a phenomenon known as the Americanization of deconstruc-
tion: the "translation" of theory from a monological society into a pro-
foundly and provocatively dialogical one. Even more fundamentally, this
critical shift would appear simply to reflect the new urgency with which
•
Em bod y i n g
Technesis
ism within the new cultural horizon, let me briefly evaluate the contribu tions of several cultural critics who have made an explicit effort to apply the insights of deconstructive criticism transformationally. The work of these critics-Terry Eagleton, Stephen Greenblatt, and Donna Haraway-exem plifies the most fruitful assimilation of poststructuralism in three significant fields within cultural criticism broadly considered: British materialism, the new historicism, and (cyborg) feminism. Consideration of their respective merits and limitations will thus go far toward establishing both the heuris tic importance and the methodological limitations of contemporary cultural studies for the development of a robust, holist account of contemporary technology's experiential impact. While all three critics deserve praise for their efforts to suture deconstructive analysis with material reality, they must all be criticized for their refusal to think rigorously about the disj unc tion of the linguistic and the phenomenal . Though the task these critics set for themselves is admirable and urgent, they articulate concrete suggestions that too hastily invoke or reinvoke various aspects of the traditionally priv ileged cognitive subject. IS The work of Eagleton, Greenblatt, and Haraway should be situated in the passage from poststructuralism to postmodernism as the dominant par adigm of academic criticism. With the advent of the so-called postmodern condition, the various core distinctions underwriting the poststructuralist ethos became largely untenable. In particular, postmodernism witnessed the collapse of the great divide between literature and popular culture-the very divide that informed and reinvigorated the modernist assumptions from which poststructuralism drew its strength (Huyssen 1 9 8 6 ) . Compelled by this collapse to confront the ideological assumptions underlying poststruc turalism, critics who matured during this transitional period have tended to direct their attention beyond the formal gymnastics of ecriture to the social, economic, and technological background of cultural production. Thus, ever expanding groups of critics representing positions as diverse as neo-Marx ism, new historicism, media theory, postcolonialism, queer theory, femi nism, and now science and technology studies have stormed the poststruc turalist arsenal, claiming its major theorems as tools for developing (often overtly political) critical agendas far removed from the pristine neutrality and high-art aura indissociably bound up with poststructuralism's textual ist focus. To a certain extent, this deflection of critical sensibility can be ascribed to a phenomenon known as the Americanization of deconstruc tion: the " translation" of theory from a monological society into a pro foundly and provocatively dialogical one. Even more fundamentally, this critical shift would appear simply to reflect the new urgency with which
I n trod u cti on
Introduction * 11
agents living in the ever more confusing and paradoxically ever more inter-
connected postmodern environment seek to discover reference points for
their activity in the social and economic context of their lived experience. As
the impetus for the cultural, social, and political contextualization of post-
structuralist tenets, this urgency has introduced a healthy concern for the
relevance or pragmatic function of criticism; wrested from its abstract and
neutral analytic framework, the deconstructive account of subjectivity can
be viewed more productively as a concrete consequence of late capitalism's
impact on traditional modes of experience. Yet for all the freedom such a
shift introduces, to avoid succumbing to the thrill of such a consumerist
utopia-to avoid commodifying theory as our personal means of appropri-
ating the world-we must refrain from abandoning our critical duty to post-
structuralism. Such a duty enjoins us never to forget that the critical possi-
bilities opened by this newfound perspective can fruitfully redeploy
poststructuralist arguments only if they respect-and to some extent only if
they embrace-the poststructuralists' critical rigor.
With this proviso in mind, let us examine the three critics just mentioned
as they engineer critical negotiations with poststructuralism. Terry Eagle-
ton's evaluation of deconstruction in "Capitalism, Modernism, and Post-
modernism" furnishes a splendid example of the contextualization of
deconstruction in the material domain. For Eagleton, hardly a card-carrying
postmodernist, the deconstruction of the traditional "unified subject"
obtains its force not so much from a theoretical necessity (the literariness of
language) as from a material one: "late capitalism," he states with typical
aplomb, "has deconstructed [the unified subject] much more efficiently than
meditations on ecriture" (Eagleton 1988, 396). A similar valorization of
context underwrites Stephen Greenblatt's endorsement in "Towards a Poet-
ics of Culture" of the fluid circulation between the no longer distinct realms
of fiction and reality. Though couched as a remedy to the complementary
insufficiencies of Jameson's and Lyotard's versions of postmodernism,
Greenblatt's argument can more interestingly be viewed as a postmodern
retooling of the deconstructive motif of the "invagination" of fictive and ref-
erential discourse.16 Where deconstruction ascribes the motive force for
such invagination to a theoretical insight concerning language, Greenblatt
situates it squarely within the postmodern mutation of capitalism. Nothing
but the "power of capital" itself can explain the oscillation "between the
establishment of distinct discursive domains and the collapse of those
domains into one another" (Greenblatt 1989, 8). Donna Haraway's practi-
cal deployment of the deconstruction of binary oppositions in "A Cyborg
Manifesto" furnishes yet another example. For Haraway, "high-tech
•
11
agents living i n the ever more confusing and paradoxically ever more inter connected postmodern environment seek to discover reference points for their activity in the social and economic context of their lived experience. As the impetus for the cultural, social, and political contextualization of post structuralist tenets, this urgency has introduced a healthy concern for the relevance or pragmatic function of criticism; wrested from its abstract and neutral analytic framework, the deconstructive account of subj ectivity can be viewed more productively as a concrete consequence of late capitalism's impact on traditional modes of experience. Yet for all the freedom such a shift introduces, to avoid succumbing to the thrill of such a consumerist utopia-to avoid commodifying theory as our personal means of appropri ating the world-we must refrain from abandoning our critical duty to post structuralism. Such a duty enjoins us never to forget that the critical possi bilities opened by this newfound perspective can fruitfully redeploy poststructuralist arguments only if they respect-and to some extent only if they embrace-the poststructuralists' critical rigor. With this proviso in mind, let us examine the three critics just mentioned as they engineer critical negotiations with poststructuralism. Terry Eagle ton's evaluation of deconstruction in " Capitalism, Modernism, and Post modernism " furnishes a splendid example of the contextualization of deconstruction in the material domain. For Eagleton, hardly a card-carrying postmodernist, the deconstruction of the traditional " unified subj ect" obtains its force not so much from a theoretical necessity (the literariness of language ) as from a material one: " late capitalism, " he states with typical aplomb, " has deconstructed [the unified subj ect] much more efficiently than meditations on ecriture" ( Eagleton 1 9 8 8 , 3 9 6 ) . A similar valorization of context underwrites Stephen Greenblatt's endorsement in "Towards a Poet ics of Culture " of the fluid circulation between the no longer distinct realms of fiction and reality. Though couched as a remedy to the complementary insufficiencies of Jameson's and Lyotard's versions of postmodernism, Greenblatt's argument can more interestingly be viewed as a postmodern retooling of the deconstructive motif of the " invagination" of fictive and ref erential discourse. 1 6 Where deconstruction ascribes the motive force for such invagination to a theoretical insight concerning language, Greenblatt situates it squarely within the postmodern mutation of capitalism. Nothing but the "power of capital" itself can explain the oscillation " between the establishment of distinct discursive domains and the collapse of those domains into one another " ( Greenblatt 1 9 8 9, 8 ) . Donna Haraway's practi cal deployment of the deconstruction of binary oppositions in "A Cyborg Manifesto " furnishes yet another example. For Haraway, "high-tech
12
12 * Embodying Technesis
culture" itself conditions the deconstruction of persistent dualisms that have
"been systemic to the logics and practices of domination . . . of all consti-
tuted as others" (Haraway 1991a, 177). By undermining the distinction
between human and machine, the electronics revolution and the advent of
what Haraway calls the "integrated circuit" facilitate a practice of "liminal
transformation" that, by submitting hitherto unassailable binary opposi-
tions to radical destabilization, affords new possibilities for overcoming
oppressive constraints.
Poststructuralist arguments are central in all three of these examples; in
varying ways, deconstruction-of the subject, of the fiction-reality divide, or
of dualism itself-furnishes a theoretical principle that simultaneously
demands and facilitates a sociopolitical project. For Eagleton, late capital-
ism's deconstruction of the subject indicates the need to preserve those
aspects of modernism that might mitigate its effect. For Greenblatt, capital-
ism's dissolution of the fiction-reality divide calls for a theoretical model
capable of accounting for "the unsettling circulation of materials and dis-
courses" characteristic of aesthetic practice in its contemporary, thoroughly
worldly form (1989, 13). For Haraway, capitalism's electronic revolution
activates the feminist deconstruction of dualism in a manner far more
urgent, far more productive, and finally far more actual than that developed
by the French feminists of the 1970s.
By applying poststructuralist techniques within a larger social, economic,
and technological context, these critical projects perfectly illustrate how
contemporary cultural criticism seeks a new relevance for the claims of the-
ory. Yet they also exemplify the decidedly ambivalent attitude cultural crit-
icism takes toward poststructuralism. While they all deploy the critical
power of deconstruction (linked directly to late-capitalist material reality) as
the motive force of their respective critical programs, they simultaneously
play down or simply jettison the crucial philosophical rationale behind post-
structuralism: its fundamental critique of logocentrism. By neglecting the
profound antihermeneutic consequences ensuing from the incompatibility
of the linguistic and the phenomenal, such transformational critical projects
fail to grapple with the most unsettling, but also most provocative, conse-
quences of the worldly localization of deconstruction: the eclipse of lan-
guage as a medium capable of brokering our contemporary experience.
Since it reproaches deconstruction with anachronism, Eagleton's analysis
furnishes an apt illustration of the consequences of such an ambivalent
appropriation. To the extent that late capitalism has produced a new kind
of agent, "a dispersed, decentred network of libidinal attachments" lacking
any common ground with the unified subject of the modernist age, post-
•
Em bod y i n g
Technesis
culture " itself conditions the deconstruction of persistent dualisms that have " been systemic to the logics and practices of domination . . . of all consti tuted as others " (Haraway 1 9 9 1 a, 1 77 ) . By undermining the distinction between human and machine, the electronics revolution and the advent of what Haraway calls the " integrated circuit " facilitate a practice of " liminal transformation " that, by submitting hitherto unassailable binary opposi tions to radical destabilization, affords new possibilities for overcoming oppressive constraints . Poststructuralist arguments are central in all three of these examples; in varying ways, deconstruction-of the subj ect, of the fiction-reality divide, or of dualism itself-furnishes a theoretical principle that simultaneously demands and facilitates a sociopolitical proj ect. For Eagleton, late capital ism's deconstruction of the subj ect indicates the need to preserve those aspects of modernism that might mitigate its effect. For Greenblatt, capital ism's dissolution of the fiction-reality divide calls for a theoretical model capable of accounting for " the unsettling circulation of materials and dis courses" characteristic of aesthetic practice in its contemporary, thoroughly worldly form ( 1 9 8 9, 1 3 ) . For Haraway, capitalism's electronic revolution activates the feminist deconstruction of dualism in a manner far more urgent, far more productive, and finally far more actual than that developed by the French feminists of the 1 9 70s. By applying poststructuralist techniques within a larger social, economic, and technological context, these critical proj ects perfectly illustrate how contemporary cultural criticism seeks a new relevance for the claims of the ory. Yet they also exemplify the decidedly ambivalent attitude cultural crit icism takes toward poststructuralism. While they all deploy the critical power of deconstruction (linked directly to late-capitalist material reality) as the motive force of their respective critical programs, they simultaneously play down or simply jettison the crucial philosophical rationale behind post structuralism: its fundamental critique of logocentrism. By neglecting the profound antihermeneutic consequences ensuing from the incompatibility of the linguistic and the phenomenal, such transformational critical proj ects fail to grapple with the most unsettling, but also most provocative, conse quences of the worldly localization of deconstruction: the eclipse of lan guage as a medium capable of brokering our contemporary experience. Since it reproaches deconstruction with anachronism, Eagleton's analysis furnishes an apt illustration of the consequences of such an ambivalent appropriation. To the extent that late capitalism has produced a new kind of agent, "a dispersed, decentred network of libidinal attachments " lacking any common ground with the unified subj ect of the modernist age, post-
I n trod u cti on
Introduction * 13
structuralism is disingenuous, suggests Eagleton, in directing its critique
against the traditional humanist subject. In the context of postmodern cul-
ture, he argues, "the 'unified subject' looms up . . . as more and more of a
shibboleth or straw target, a hangover from an older liberal epoch of capi-
talism, before technology and consumerism scattered our bodies to the
wind" (1988, 396). Rarely equaled for its ferocity and bluntness, Eagleton's
judgment nonetheless expresses the rather reactionary sentiment shared by
most practitioners of what we might call "post-poststructuralist" cultural
criticism: an impatience and skepticism concerning the complicated trajec-
tories of deconstructive logic. In the very act of situating the cause inform-
ing the deconstruction of the unified subject within the postmodern mater-
ial domain, Eagleton's analysis fails to account for (if not simply to
recognize) the basic philosophical thesis underlying the textual practice of
poststructuralism: the homology it posits between textual structures and
thought.17 Insofar as they presuppose that thinking itself functions like a
text, textualist analyses posit a coequality between the structure of thought
and the structure of textuality, which they then deploy to distance thought
from the hermeneutic and/or phenomenal models that have traditionally
served to account for it.18 Transformative analyses like Eagleton's ulti-
mately fail to appreciate the irreducibility of this disjunction. Whether it is
caused by the "literariness" of language or by the material realities of the
late-capitalist lifeworld ("technology and consumerism"), the deconstruc-
tion of the subject has lasting consequences: once thought is divorced from
phenomenality, it simply loses its jurisdiction over the experiential domain.
Correlatively, language loses its force as the faculty governing our lived
experience. Despite a constructive effort to (re)ascribe the cause of the sub-
ject's deconstruction directly to the domain of social and material reality,
contemporary cultural critics ultimately undermine their transformative
programs by retaining an analytical methodology (focus on language)
and critical commitments (to traditionally humanist political agendas,
hermeneutical goals, etc.) that are themselves deconstructed in the same
process.
Insofar as they reproduce Eagleton's oversight, today's cultural critics
commit themselves to a reductive strategy. Far from extending the disjunc-
tion of thought and phenomenality into the wider arena of culture, they seek
to historicize the cause of deconstruction in order to render it a "positivity,"
a concrete and local, tangible and fully transparent-and thus temporary
and reversible-impingement on cognition and identity formation as they
have been traditionally conceived. By thus positivizing a theoretical disjunc-
tion that questions the very viability of positivized modes of experience,
•
13
structuralism is disingenuous, suggests Eagleton, in directing its critique against the traditional humanist subj ect. In the context of postmodern cul ture, he argues, "the 'unified subj ect' looms up . . . as more and more of a shibboleth or straw target, a hangover from an older liberal epoch of capi talism, before technology and consumerism scattered our bodies to the wind " ( 1 9 8 8 , 3 9 6 ) . Rarely equaled for its ferocity and bluntness, Eagleton's j udgment nonetheless expresses the rather reactionary sentiment shared by most practitioners of what we might call "post-poststructuralist " cultural criticism: an impatience and skepticism concerning the complicated traj ec tories of deconstructive logic. In the very act of situating the cause inform ing the deconstruction of the unified subj ect within the postmodern mater ial domain, Eagleton's analysis fails to account for (if not simply to recognize) the basic philosophical thesis underlying the textual practice of poststructuralism: the homology it posits between textual structures and thought . I 7 Insofar as they presuppose that thinking itself functions like a text, textualist analyses posit a coequality between the structure of thought and the structure of textuality, which they then deploy to distance thought from the hermeneutic and/or phenomenal models that have traditionally served to account for it. I 8 Transformative analyses like Eagleton's ulti mately fail to appreciate the irreducibility of this disj unction. Whether it is caused by the "literariness " of language or by the material realities of the late-capitalist lifeworld ( " technology and consumerism " ) , the deconstruc tion of the subj ect has lasting consequences : once thought is divorced from phenomenality, it simply loses its jurisdiction over the experiential domain. Correlatively, language loses its force as the faculty governing our lived experience . Despite a constructive effort to (re)ascribe the cause of the sub j ect's deconstruction directly to the domain of social and material reality, contemporary cultural critics ultimately undermine their transformative programs by retaining an analytical methodology ( focus on language ) and critical commitments (to traditionally humanist political agendas, hermeneutical goals, etc . ) that are themselves deconstructed in the same process. Insofar as they reproduce Eagleton's oversight, today's cultural critics commit themselves to a reductive strategy. Far from extending the disj unc tion of thought and phenomenality into the wider arena of culture, they seek to historicize the cause of deconstruction in order to render it a "positivity, " a concrete and local, tangible and fully transparent-and thus temporary and reversible-impingement on cognition and identity formation as they have been traditionally conceived. By thus positivizing a theoretical disj unc tion that questions the very viability of positivized modes of experience,
14
14 * Embodying Technesis
cultural critics are able to script the triumph of the cognitive subject over the
deconstructing forces immanent to the late-capitalist lifeworld. Among the
critics I have been discussing, such a triumph takes form along two lines:
through an allegedly more "sophisticated" form of criticism that can
embrace the aporia it introduces (Eagleton, Greenblatt) or through the cog-
nitive adaptation of our experiential faculties to a point where the new
social "logic" can be understood, strategically and locally deployed, or
"cognitively mapped" (Haraway, Jameson).
Rethinking Poststructuralism in the
Technological Age
•
Em bod y i n g
Technesis
cultural critics are able to script the triumph of the cognitive subj ect over the deconstructing forces immanent to the late-capitalist lifeworld. Among the critics I have been discussing, such a triumph takes form along two lines: through an allegedly more " sophisticated " form of criticism that can embrace the aporia it introduces (Eagleton, Greenblatt) or through the cog nitive adaptation of our experiential faculties to a point where the new social " logic " can be understood, strategically and locally deployed, or "cognitively mapped" (Haraway, Jameson) .
Against this common historicizing strategy, we can develop a more empow-
ering refunctionalization of deconstruction if (and only if) we focus on the
ways in which its cultural-and specifically, its technological-localization
radicalizes the disjunction of language and expression beyond the narrow
textualist frame. With the advent of postmodernism, the divide between
thought and materiality takes on new proportions, since the increasing
Rethinking Poststructuralism in the Technological Age
complexification of the material world makes materiality ever more alien
and elusive to thought. One striking example of such material complexifi-
cation-the ever increasing convergence of linguistic materiality with
machine code-has led recent critics to abandon the models of signification
developed in the print era in favor of models derived from information the-
ory (Serres 1982a; Kittler 1987; Porush 1985; Hayles 1990, 1993). Such
developments stress the critical necessity of grappling with the worldly
anchoring of theory: once it is localized in the postmodern real, the disjunc-
tion of thought and materiality can no longer be conceived as an abstract
formalist divide between thought and language. Language simply can no
longer assert its claim to be the exclusive or privileged faculty of experience
(Godzich 1994). In the information age, the disjunction between thought
and linguistic materiality becomes one local and particularly marginal case
of the broader and more forceful disjunction of thought (together with its
material support) from materiality considered robustly. No mere assimila-
tion of deconstruction to the cultural domain will suffice to address the
experiential consequences of this shift: to succeed in this latter task-and
thus to accomplish what I take to be the central task of contemporary criti-
cal theory-we will have to acknowledge the diminution of thought as the
privileged faculty of experience. Only by radicalizing deconstruction's dis-
junction of thought from experience will we be able to emancipate experi-
Against this common historicizing strategy, we can develop a more empow ering refunctionalization of deconstruction if ( and only if) we focus on the ways in which its cultural-and specifically, its technological-localization radicalizes the disj unction of language and expression beyond the narrow textualist frame. With the advent of postmodernism, the divide between thought and materiality takes on new proportions, since the increasing complexification of the material world makes materiality ever more alien and elusive to thought. One striking example of such material complexifi cation-the ever increasing convergence of linguistic materiality with machine code-has led recent critics to abandon the models of signification developed in the print era in favor of models derived from information the ory ( Serres 1 9 82a; Kittler 1 9 8 7; Porush 1 9 8 5 ; Hayles 1 990, 1 993 ) . Such developments stress the critical necessity of grappling with the worldly anchoring of theory: once it is localized in the postmodern real, the disj unc tion of thought and materiality can no longer be conceived as an abstract formalist divide between thought and language. Language simply can no longer assert its claim to be the exclusive or privileged faculty of experience ( Godzich 1 994 ) . In the information age, the disj unction between thought and linguistic materiality becomes one local and particularly marginal case of the broader and more forceful disj unction of thought (together with its material support) from materiality considered robustly. No mere assimila tion of deconstruction to the cultural domain will suffice to address the experiential consequences of this shift: to succeed in this latter task-and thus to accomplish what I take to be the central task of contemporary criti cal theory-we will have to acknowledge the diminution of thought as the privileged faculty of experience. Only by radicalizing deconstruction's dis junction of thought from experience will we be able to emancipate experi-
I n trod u cti on
Introduction * 15
ence from the supposedly unbreachable-though in truth thoroughly reduc-
tive-closure of representation; our very ability to rearticulate the "mean-
ing" of experience, once it is divorced from language, requires nothing less
than a thorough working-through of the philosophical consequences of
poststructuralism in the context of postmodern culture.
Precisely the waning of language as the privileged medium of experience
motivates much of the research of contemporary cultural critics of science
and technology. The wide-ranging interest in the technological mediation of
language and the technological embodiment of subjectivity should be under-
stood as a response to this very shift in the media that broker our experi-
ence.19 Yet even among broad-minded, fundamentally technophilic critics,
there persists a strong resistance to technology-a resistance that prevents
them from addressing this fundamental experiential shift. Following in the
footsteps of Haraway and Jameson (and, more distantly, Eagleton and
Greenblatt), recent cultural critics of science and technology have variously
and persuasively deconstructed the dualisms central to traditional techno-
scientific critique (e.g., instrumental vs. substantive theory [Feenberg
1991]), only to compromise their deconstruction because of a recalcitrant,
if not always explicit or intended, commitment to representationalism.
To illustrate this resistance to technology, let me briefly discuss an exam-
ple of the strategy previously outlined-the "positivizing" of an irreducible
theoretical disjunction-which occurs in the work of a recent cultural critic
whose position explicitly refuses to "exclude technological processes and
artifacts as ontologically antecedent to the human" (Kendrick 1996, 144).
In her insightful article, "Cyberspace and the Technological Real," cultural
critic Michelle Kendrick attempts to develop an approach to technology
that would avoid reduction on two fronts: on the one hand, within tradi-
tional dualist schemes where technology is assimilated to the inessential
body; on the other hand, in a more contemporary form of this dualism in
which (virtual-reality) technology facilitates a similar rejection, or more pre-
cisely a transcendence, of the body. According to Kendrick, what both
reductive approaches overlook is the "technological real," a "symbiotic and
contentious-hence dialogic-relationship between the human and the
machine." Attention to the technological real-to the concrete ways in
which technology intervenes in our "selves"-requires a recognition "that
subjectivity is always in the process of being reconstructed by the technolo-
gies-material and semiotic which it purports merely to manipulate"
(ibid.).
To develop the significance of the technological real, Kendrick focuses on
two concrete examples that are marshaled to illustrate the intervention of
•
15
ence from the supposedly unbreachable-though i n truth thoroughly reduc tive-closure of representation; our very ability to rearticulate the " mean ing " of experience, once it is divorced from language, requires nothing less than a thorough working-through of the philosophical consequences of poststructuralism in the context of postmodern culture. Precisely the waning of language as the privileged medium of experience motivates much of the research of contemporary cultural critics of science and technology. The wide-ranging interest in the technological mediation of language and the technological embodiment of subj ectivity should be under stood as a response to this very shift in the media that broker our experi ence . 1 9 Yet even among broad-minded, fundamentally technophilic critics, there persists a strong resistance to technology-a resistance that prevents them from addressing this fundamental experiential shift. Following in the footsteps of Haraway and Jameson ( and, more distantly, Eagleton and Greenblatt) , recent cultural critics of science and technology have variously and persuasively deconstructed the dualisms central to traditional techno scientific critique (e.g., instrumental vs. substantive theory [Feenberg 1 9 9 1 ] ) , only to compromise their deconstruction because of a recalcitrant, if not always explicit or intended, commitment to representationalism. To illustrate this resistance to technology, let me briefly discuss an exam ple of the strategy previously outlined-the " positivizing " of an irreducible theoretical disj unction-which occurs in the work of a recent cultural critic whose position explicitly refuses to " exclude technological processes and artifacts as onto logically antecedent to the human " (Kendrick 1 996, 1 44 ) . I n her insightful article, " Cyberspace and the Technological Real," cultural critic Michelle Kendrick attempts to develop an approach to technology that would avoid reduction on two fronts: on the one hand, within tradi tional dualist schemes where technology is assimilated to the inessential body; on the other hand, in a more contemporary form of this dualism in which ( virtual-reality) technology facilitates a similar rej ection, or more pre cisely a transcendence, of the body. According to Kendrick, what both reductive approaches overlook is the " technological real," a " symbiotic and contentious-hence dialogic-relationship between the human and the machine. " Attention to the technological real-to the concrete ways in which technology intervenes in our " selves"-requires a recognition " that subj ectivity is always in the process of being reconstructed by the technolo gies-material and semiotic-which it purports merely to manipulate " ( ibid . ) . To develop the significance o f the technological real, Kendrick focuses on two concrete examples that are marshaled to illustrate the intervention of
16
16 * Embodying Technesis
technology in our minds and bodies "in the localized and multivalent ways
in which real life assaults us" and not merely in "a vaguely holistic fashion"
(146). Both examples concern the relationship between cyber-personas and
actual persons, and both are marshaled to undermine the contention that
cyberspace represents some sort of utopian escape into an alternate reality.
The first example, borrowed from technocultural critic Sandy Stone (and
ultimately from Ms. journalist Leslie Van Gelder), involves a cyber-persona,
"Julie," an older disabled woman who developed intimate electronic rela-
tionships with a group of cyber-companions. When it was revealed that
"Julie" was actually a middle-aged, able-bodied male psychiatrist, the
women "she" had helped reacted with outrage, employed the rhetoric of
rape to describe their sense of violation, and in some cases even "went so far
as to repudiate the genuine gains they had made in their personal and emo-
tional lives" (Stone 1991, 83). The second example, borrowed from Village
Voice journalist Julian Dibbell, recounts a so-called rape within a computer
database named "LambdaMOO," a shared, textually described computer
space that allows interaction among multiple users. By juxtaposing two ver-
sions of the rape-a virtual-reality and a real-life version-Dibbell is able to
complicate the notion of alternate realities. On his account, the response of
the community-and in particular the virulent and vengeful outrage of the
actual user behind the cyber-victim-demonstrates that "MUDs [multiuser
domains] are not places of alternate subjectivities, of a transcending of one's
social and biological identity, but of simultaneous subjectivities" (Kendrick
1996, 158). Together, these examples aptly illustrate Kendrick's sweeping
claim that "the construction of subjectivity is a process of intervening social
and technological forces, in many ways beyond the control or agency of the
user" (159).
One might, however, read these examples along somewhat different
lines. Far from serving to establish the "instability of simultaneous subject
positions" (Kendrick 1996, 159), they could both be interpreted as attesting
to the practical priority of actual persons over cyber-personas. In both cases,
the defensive reactions on the part of the actual users demonstrate the super-
venience of feelings of violation that stem from embeddedness within the
actual world and in an actual body. By showing (contra Kendrick) the per-
durance, in practice, of an actual agent who preexists and supports the con-
stitution of any virtual identity in cyberspace, these examples attest to the
irreducibility of the "embodied mind" (to appropriate Francisco Varela's
felicitous term) as the processing center for all experience, actual and virtual
alike. At the same time as it would support and even expand Kendrick's cri-
tique of dualism, such a reading would highlight the intrinsic limitations of
•
Em bod y i n g
Technesis
technology in our minds and bodies " in the localized and multivalent ways in which real life assaults us " and not merely in "a vaguely holistic fashion " ( 1 4 6 ) . Both examples concern the relationship between cyber-personas and actual persons, and both are marshaled to undermine the contention that cyberspace represents some sort of utopian escape into an alternate reality. The first example, borrowed from technocultural critic Sandy Stone ( and ultimately from Ms. journalist Leslie Van Gelder) , involves a cyber-persona, "Julie, " an older disabled woman who developed intimate electronic rela tionships with a group of cyber-companions . When it was revealed that "Julie" was actually a middle-aged, able-bodied male psychiatrist, the women " she " had helped reacted with outrage, employed the rhetoric of rape to describe their sense of violation, and in some cases even "went so far as to repudiate the genuine gains they had made in their personal and emo tional lives" ( Stone 1 9 9 1 , 8 3 ) . The second example, borrowed from Village Voice j ournalist Julian Dibbell, recounts a so-called rape within a computer database named " LambdaMOO," a shared, textually described computer space that allows interaction among multiple users. By juxtaposing two ver sions of the rape-a virtual-reality and a real-life version-Dibbell is able to complicate the notion of alternate realities. On his account, the response of the community-and in particular the virulent and vengeful outrage of the actual user behind the cyber-victim-demonstrates that " MUD s [multiuser domains] are not places of alternate subj ectivities, of a transcending of one's social and biological identity, but of simultaneous subj ectivities " (Kendrick 1 9 96, 1 5 8 ) . Together, these examples aptly illustrate Kendrick's sweeping claim that "the construction of subj ectivity is a process of intervening social and technological forces, in many ways beyond the control or agency of the user " ( 1 59 ) . One might, however, read these examples along somewhat different lines. Far from serving to establish the " instability of simultaneous subj ect positions" (Kendrick 1 996, 1 5 9 ) , they could both be interpreted as attesting to the practical priority of actual persons over cyber-personas. In both cases, the defensive reactions on the part of the actual users demonstrate the super venience of feelings of violation that stem from embeddedness within the actual world and in an actual body. By showing (contra Kendrick) the per durance, in practice, of an actual agent who preexists and supports the con stitution of any virtual identity in cyberspace, these examples attest to the irreducibility of the " embodied mind" (to appropriate Francisco Varela's felicitous term ) as the processing center for all experience, actual and virtual alike. At the same time as it would support and even expand Kendrick's cri tique of dualism, such a reading would highlight the intrinsic limitations of
I n trod u cti on
Introduction * 17
her approach-the constraints imposed by her commitment to representa-
tionalism. By defining cyberspace as "a discursive site of ideological strug-
gles" (160) and by restricting materiality as such to the (relative) "material-
ity of subjectivity" (150), Kendrick effectively pigeonholes her own
approach to technology in a manner only marginally less reductive finally
than what she opposes. Although she posits the inextricability of embodied
identity and technology, her penchant to explore it exclusively "in the con-
struction of working fictions of subjectivity" (145) evacuates embodiment
of any content and insures the restriction of technology's impact to its effect
on representation-in this case, on the subject's capacity to represent itself
as a self. Within such a scheme, there is no room for the molecular and sub-
representational material impact of technology "outside" or "beneath" the
frame of fantasy or the closure of representation. In the end, by preventing
us from attending to the impact technology has on our bodies prior to and
independently of our discursive constitution as subjects, Kendrick's exclu-
sive attention to identity formation compromises whatever promise her
antidualist view might have for reorienting our approach to technology.
Kendrick's analysis furnishes an exemplary contemporary target for the
criticism of cultural studies I developed earlier in this introduction: it opens
a promising cultural approach to technology that falters because of a too
facile appropriation of poststructuralism, one that fails to respect its pro-
found antihermeneutic consequences. While Kendrick's postulation of the
technological real takes an important first step beyond dualism, it too read-
ily positivizes the real as a "dialogic relationship" between humans and
their technology. Through her reliance on (Bakhtinian) dialogism, Kendrick
suggests that technology's impact can be captured as a social or cultural
materiality inscribed within the "life" of signs. Indeed, by restricting tech-
nology's impact to the destabilization of narratives (or "working fictions")
of subjectivity, she renders it essentially linguistic. Nothing, I suggest, could
be more antithetical to Lacan's understanding of the real or, for that matter,
Althusser's materialist appropriation of it (to mention just two of the
inevitable sources for Kendrick's term). Viewed through a Lacanian or
Althusserian lens, the technological real would raise a different and far more
destabilizing problem than Kendrick's appropriation admits: it would force
us to ask how we could grasp technology's impact on our experience if it
intervenes, outside of the phenomenal field of subjectivity, as the material
support for the "object cause of desire" or as an impossible object of expe-
rience. Within a Lacanian or Althusserian frame of reference, in short, tech-
nology belongs to the real precisely because of its role in the constitution of
the split subject or the subject of ideology, a role that is predicated on its
•
17
her approach-the constraints imposed by her commitment to representa tionalism. By defining cyberspace as "a discursive site of ideological strug gles" ( 1 60 ) and by restricting materiality as such to the (relative ) " material ity of subj ectivity " ( 1 50 ) , Kendrick effectively pigeonholes her own approach to technology in a manner only marginally less reductive finally than what she opposes. Although she posits the inextricability of embodied identity and technology, her penchant to explore it exclusively " in the con struction of working fictions of subj ectivity " ( 1 4 5 ) evacuates embodiment of any content and insures the restriction of technology's impact to its effect on representation-in this case, on the subj ect' s capacity to represent itself as a self. Within such a scheme, there is no room for the molecular and sub representational material impact of technology " outside" or " beneath " the frame of fantasy or the closure of representation. In the end, by preventing us from attending to the impact technology has on our bodies prior to and independently of our discursive constitution as subjects, Kendrick's exclu sive attention to identity formation compromises whatever promise her antidualist view might have for reorienting our approach to technology. Kendrick's analysis furnishes an exemplary contemporary target for the criticism of cultural studies I developed earlier in this introduction: it opens a promising cultural approach to technology that falters because of a too facile appropriation of poststructuralism, one that fails to respect its pro found antihermeneutic consequences. While Kendrick's postulation of the technological real takes an important first step beyond dualism, it too read ily positivizes the real as a " dialogic relationship" between humans and their technology. Through her reliance on ( Bakhtinian ) dialogism, Kendrick suggests that technology's impact can be captured as a social or cultural materiality inscribed within the " life " of signs. Indeed, by restricting tech nology's impact to the destabilization of narratives (or " working fictions " ) of subj ectivity, she renders it essentially linguistic. Nothing, I suggest, could be more antithetical to Lacan's understanding of the real or, for that matter, Althusser's materialist appropriation of it (to mention just two of the inevitable sources for Kendrick's term ) . Viewed through a Lacanian or Althusserian lens, the technological real would raise a different and far more destabilizing problem than Kendrick's appropriation admits: it would force us to ask how we could grasp technology's impact on our experience if it intervenes, outside of the phenomenal field of subj ectivity, as the material support for the " obj ect cause of desire " or as an impossible obj ect of expe rience. Within a Lacanian or Althusserian frame of reference, in short, tech nology belongs to the real precisely because of its role in the constitution of the split subj ect or the subj ect of ideology, a role that is predicated on its
18
18 * Embodying Technesis
absolute resistance to representational capture. By positivizing this role,
Kendrick simply conjures away the robust materiality she claims to address,
substituting in its place a relative materiality that resists (without invalidat-
ing) the narrative construction of subjectivity.
The internal contradictions that plague even such a technophilic and
antidualist analysis as Kendrick's are important less as criticisms of
Kendrick than as testimony to the difficulties involved when cultural critics
attempt to analyze in a nonholist manner technology's pervasive structuring
impact on our experience. In the end, Kendrick's example makes a funda-
mental contribution precisely because it foregrounds the urgency for a fun-
damental reorientation on our part: we must reject the privilege accorded
the discursive construction of subjectivity in our efforts to describe technol-
ogy's presubjective impact on our bodily experience. Only then will we be
able to realize the implicit desideratum motivating contemporary techno-
criticism: the foregrounding of the body as the site for technology's molecu-
lar material impact.
Technocultural Studies beyond Technesis
Having now established the need for a fundamental reassessment of the
legacy of poststructuralism in contemporary technocultural criticism, let me
briefly sketch the critical genealogy I propose to develop in this study. By
reconstructing the turn toward technology in twentieth-century thought
along Heideggerian and Freudian trajectories, I shall track, on the one hand,
the progressive infiltration of technology into theoretical discourses of dif-
•
Em bod y i n g
Technesis
absolute resistance to representational capture. By pOSltlVlzmg this role, Kendrick simply conj ures away the robust materiality she claims to address, substituting in its place a relative materiality that resists (without invalidat ing) the narrative construction of subj ectivity. The internal contradictions that plague even such a technophilic and antidualist analysis as Kendrick's are important less as criticisms of Kendrick than as testimony to the difficulties involved when cultural critics attempt to analyze in a nonholist manner technology's pervasive structuring impact on our experience. In the end, Kendrick's example makes a funda mental contribution precisely because it foregrounds the urgency for a fun damental reorientation on our part: we must reject the privilege accorded the discursive construction of subj ectivity in our efforts to describe technol ogy's presubj ective impact on our bodily experience. Only then will we be able to realize the implicit desideratum motivating contemporary techno criticism: the foregrounding of the body as the site for technology's molecu lar material impact.
fering sorts and, on the other, the compensating defensive reduction of tech-
nology imposed ever more forcefully to preserve the integrity of theory in
the face of this infiltration. In my reconstruction, twentieth-century theoret-
ical discourses seek to answer the call of two incompatible demands. They
Technocultural Studies beyond
Technesis
pursue what I previously called the "ontic turn" toward the actual, a turn
that requires, among other things, an embrace of the technological media-
tion of the lifeworld; at the same time, however, they develop within the
horizon of a theoretical model inherited from the Greeks (more specifically,
from Aristotle) that appears to presuppose (but actually imposes) the sub-
ordination of materiality to thought. Considered against the background of
the "complexification" of the material domain, a process primarily cat-
alyzed in the modern period by technological development, these two con-
tradictory demands impose on theory a fatal double bind that spells the end
of its traditional jurisdiction over the real (Lyotard 1991). Technology, on
Having now established the need for a fundamental reassessment of the legacy of poststructuralism in contemporary technocultural criticism, let me briefly sketch the critical genealogy I propose to develop in this study. By reconstructing the turn toward technology in twentieth-century thought along Heideggerian and Freudian traj ectories, I shall track, on the one hand, the progressive infiltration of technology into theoretical discourses of dif fering sorts and, on the other, the compensating defensive reduction of tech nology imposed ever more forcefully to preserve the integrity of theory in the face of this infiltration. In my reconstruction, twentieth-century theoret ical discourses seek to answer the call of two incompatible demands. They pursue what I previously called the " ontic turn" toward the actual, a turn that requires, among other things, an embrace of the technological media tion of the lifeworld; at the same time, however, they develop within the horizon of a theoretical model inherited from the Greeks (more specifically, from Aristotle) that appears to presuppose ( but actually imposes) the sub ordination of materiality to thought. Considered against the background of the "complexification " of the material domain, a process primarily cat alyzed in the modern period by technological development, these two con tradictory demands impose on theory a fatal double bind that spells the end of its traditional jurisdiction over the real (Lyotard 1 9 9 1 ) . Technology, on
I n trod u cti on
Introduction * 19
this account, comprises a privileged "index" of the material stratum
(Deleuze and Guattari), the real (Lacan), or the unmediated flux (Hayles).
As actual forces immanent to the real, technologies furnish an immediate
material source of movement (active force) that does not rely on the activity
of thinking for its ontogenesis. Yet because technologies so drastically and
fundamentally impact the process of thinking, they seem to afford an ideal
site for analyzing the encounter between thought and the all-too-amorphous
real.
While this peculiar ontological duplicity of technology does much to
explain its allure as a privileged topic for twentieth-century critics, it cannot
justify an all-too-common feature of recent efforts to analyze technology as
the site for thought's encounter with the real: the wholesale assimilation of
technology's materiality into the domain of thought. Technology must not
be construed as a mere figure or metaphor; its role within thought must not
be reductively equated with its far more robust ontological status as "agent"
of material complexification. For this reason, my account of technology
draws more from a functionalist model like Deleuze and Guattari's (despite
my local criticism of it in chap. 8) than from a far more influential contem-
porary representationalist approach like Jameson's. In suggesting that tech-
nology is the "representational shorthand for something else"-for the vast
and altogether unfathomable global, multinational network that comprises
the world of late capitalism, Jameson perfectly illustrates the predicament
theory encounters when it seeks to confront technology's increasing media-
tion of the lifeworld (Jameson 1991). Like the theorists I discuss at length in
this study, Jameson attempts to open theory to materiality through the priv-
ileged index of technology; yet to preserve the priority of thought-or more
precisely because he cannot conceive of our relation to the real as anything
other than a cognitive relation (a relationship culminating in a successful
"cognitive mapping")-Jameson is compelled to construe technology not as
a direct force in the real but as a metaphor for the real itself. Like its coun-
terpart in the Romantic sublime, the ensuing moment of crisis in this process
(what Jameson calls "the technological sublime") remains graspable only
negatively, through the imagination's failure to give it form.20 Moreover,
the negative presentation of technology, like the negative presentation of the
absolutely great or small, remains a merely temporary setback, a provisional
phase on the way toward a successful cognitive adaptation. In Jameson's
allegedly materialist "cultural logic," "technology" is simply the (provi-
sional) "stand-in" for our representational incapacity.
Like Jameson, the critics on whom my critique focuses-Heidegger,
Freud, Derrida, Lacan, and Deleuze and Guattari-all turn to technology as
•
19
this account, comprises a privileged " index" of the material stratum (Deleuze and Guattari ) , the real (Lacan ) , or the unmediated flux (Hayles ) . A s actual forces immanent t o the real, technologies furnish a n immediate material source of movement ( active force ) that does not rely on the activity of thinking for its ontogenesis. Yet because technologies so drastically and fundamentally impact the process of thinking, they seem to afford an ideal site for analyzing the encounter between thought and the all-too-amorphous real. While this peculiar ontological duplicity of technology does much to explain its allure as a privileged topic for twentieth-century critics, it cannot j ustify an all-too-common feature of recent efforts to analyze technology as the site for thought's encounter with the real: the wholesale assimilation of technology's materiality into the domain of thought. Technology must not be construed as a mere figure or metaphor; its role within thought must not be reductively equated with its far more robust ontological status as " agent" of material complexification. For this reason, my account of technology draws more from a functionalist model like Deleuze and Guattari's ( despite my local criticism of it in chap. 8 ) than from a far more influential contem porary representationalist approach like Jameson's. In suggesting that tech nology is the " representational shorthand for something else "-for the vast and altogether unfathomable global, multinational network that comprises the world of late capitalism, Jameson perfectly illustrates the predicament theory encounters when it seeks to confront technology's increasing media tion of the lifeworld (Jameson 1 9 9 1 ) . Like the theorists I discuss at length in this study, Jameson attempts to open theory to materiality through the priv ileged index of technology; yet to preserve the priority of thought-or more precisely because he cannot conceive of our relation to the real as anything other than a cognitive relation (a relationship culminating in a successful " cognitive mapping " )-Jameson is compelled to construe technology not as a direct force in the real but as a metaphor for the real itself. Like its coun terpart in the Romantic sublime, the ensuing moment of crisis in this process (what Jameson calls " the technological sublime " ) remains graspable only negatively, through the imagination's failure to give it form.20 Moreover, the negative presentation of technology, like the negative presentation of the absolutely great or small, remains a merely temporary setback, a provisional phase on the way toward a successful cognitive adaptation. In Jameson's allegedly materialist "cultural logic, " " technology " is simply the (provi sional ) " stand-in " for our representational incapacity. Like Jameson, the critics on whom my critique focuses-Heidegger, Freud, Derrida, Lacan, and Deleuze and Guattari-all turn to technology as
20
20 * Embodying Technesis
a privileged site where the human encounters the material. Yet in all of these
cases, a promising start again ultimately comes to naught, since the explo-
ration of technological materiality is quickly and surreptitiously translated
into an exploration of technology's effects on thought-of the way in which
thought, in coming to rely on technological means of support or embodi-
ment, undergoes a relative exteriorization. In this process, technology is
stripped of its robust materiality in order to serve as a figure for the impact
of materiality on thinking. By variously imposing this same reduction on
technology, the master-thinkers of technological modernity demonstrate
their common allegiance to the strategy that I shall call technesis, or the
putting-into-discourse of technology. An updated form of the Husserlian
phenomenological epoche, this reduction constrains worldliness within the
form of what we might call a technema, the correlate of an act of techno-
thinking (technesis). This correlation is far more inclusive than that imposed
by the phenomenological epoche, since technesis explodes the purity of
Husserl's reduction by encompassing language, the unconscious, and other
sources of materiality that complicate the suspension of the natural stand-
point. But it nonetheless retains the noiesis-noema correlation as its basic
principle. Thus, like the classical phenomenological reduction it updates,
this reduction continues to privilege the ontogenetic role of thinking: like
noiesis, technesis reductively determines the field of exteriority as the tech-
nema that forms its correlate.
Ultimately, this general allegiance to the basic form of phenomenological
reduction is the reason that various twentieth-century theoretical discourses
explored in this study have failed to give a robust account of technological
materiality. While each master-thinker makes some important contribution
toward the assessment of technology's impact on experience, each is ulti-
mately compelled to sacrifice technological materiality in order to maintain
the integrity of thought. Each is compelled, that is, to repress technology at
the point where it threatens to exceed the particular technematic field con-
ditioning whatever serves as the motive principle of analysis in the respec-
tive critics at issue (e.g., Heidegger's horizon of thought, Derrida's closure
of representation, Freud's psychic space, Lacan's objet a, and Deleuze and
Guattari's social assemblage). In each case, the result of this residual phe-
nomenological commitment is the wholesale repression of what I shall call,
adapting Levinas's term, the "radical exteriority" of technology. Like Lev-
inas's primordial "Other" with whom we are in relation prior to all phe-
nomenality, technology possesses a fundamental alterity with respect to
thought. It simply cannot be reduced, without essential violence, to the form
of a technema.21
•
Em bod y i n g
Technesis
a privileged site where the human encounters the material. Yet in all of these cases, a promising start again ultimately comes to naught, since the explo ration of technological materiality is quickly and surreptitiously translated into an exploration of technology's effects on thought-of the way in which thought, in coming to rely on technological means of support or embodi ment, undergoes a relative exteriorization. In this process, technology is stripped of its robust materiality in order to serve as a figure for the impact of materiality on thinking. By variously imposing this same reduction on technology, the master-thinkers of technological modernity demonstrate their common allegiance to the strategy that I shall call technesis, or the putting-into-discourse of technology. An updated form of the Husserlian phenomenological epoche, this reduction constrains worldliness within the form of what we might call a technema, the correlate of an act of techno thinking (technesis ) . This correlation is far more inclusive than that imposed by the phenomenological epoche, since technesis explodes the purity of Husserl's reduction by encompassing language, the unconscious, and other sources of materiality that complicate the suspension of the natural stand point. But it nonetheless retains the noiesis-noema correlation as its basic principle. Thus, like the classical phenomenological reduction it updates, this reduction continues to privilege the ontogenetic role of thinking: like noiesis, technesis reductively determines the field of exteriority as the tech nema that forms its correlate. Ultimately, this general allegiance to the basic form of phenomenological reduction is the reason that various twentieth-century theoretical discourses explored in this study have failed to give a robust account of technological materiality. While each master-thinker makes some important contribution toward the assessment of technology's impact on experience, each is ulti mately compelled to sacrifice technological materiality in order to maintain the integrity of thought. Each is compelled, that is, to repress technology at the point where it threatens to exceed the particular technematic field con ditioning whatever serves as the motive principle of analysis in the respec tive critics at issue (e.g., Heidegger's horizon of thought, Derrida's closure of representation, Freud' s psychic space, Lacan's objet a, and Deleuze and Guattari's social assemblage ) . In each case, the result of this residual phe nomenological commitment is the wholesale repression of what I shall call, adapting Levinas's term, the " radical exteriority " of technology. Like Lev inas 's primordial " Other " with whom we are in relation prior to all phe nomenality, technology possesses a fundamental alterity with respect to thought. It simply cannot be reduced, without essential violence, to the form of a technema. 2 1
I n trod u cti on
Introduction * 21
In their quest to open theory to its constitutive material outside without
jettisoning the basic enabling principle of theoretical phenomenology, the
neo-Husserlian master-thinkers of modernity must forge a difficult compro-
mise: they must find a way of acknowledging, pace Husserl, technology's
undeniable material exteriority without abandoning the governing privilege
of thought. Faced with this dilemma, these master-thinkers adopt a defen-
sive strategy: they reduce technology to an ontological status compatible
with nouocentrism and pass this status off as natural. Bound by the privilege
they lend thought, the master-thinkers can only account for technology by
thematizing it. They must, in short, treat technology descriptively, through
the category or figure of the machine. In this study's exploration of this
descriptive thematization, I will uncover the pervasive operation of a
machine reduction of technology whose effect is to naturalize technology's
status as the relative exteriority of thought. By reducing the broad experien-
tial impact of technology to its restricted impact on thought, twentieth-cen-
tury theoretical discourses effectively function to "enframe" technology
within a linguistically or semiotically constituted field. In any such frame of
reference, technology can only attain a positive ontological status in the
form of the machine metaphor, a figure for some (mechanical) operation of
thought.
In its late twentieth-century embodiment, this machine reduction of tech-
nology takes the form of textualism-the reigning ideology of literary stud-
ies from formalism on. In this form, technesis functions covertly and, as I
shall argue, according to the operation of figural compression or reversal
governed by the rhetorical figure of metalepsis. Since the reduction is
imposed in the very same instant that technology is thematized in terms of
textuality, the resulting technema appears to be foundational. In this way, a
reductive account of technology is passed off as a robust one: the funda-
mental alterity of technology is simply effaced in a sweeping move that
asserts the primacy of its derivative, reductive form. Yet while the operation
of metalepsis makes detection of the machine reduction more difficult, by
submitting it to deconstruction in the texts of each of the critics discussed in
this study, I will uncover the presence of a prior, extensive, and dogmatic
reduction of technology to the textual figure of the machine. By liberating
technological materiality from its illegitimate, rhetorically imposed reduc-
tion, I will reposition it as the motive mechanism of an antiformalist, exter-
nally oriented neodeconstructive critical practice responsive to the
"demands" of embodied reality. As an index of the technological real itself,
the deconstruction facilitated by such a practice will testify not to the auton-
omy of language but to the profound resistance that contemporary
•
21
I n their quest t o open theory t o its constitutive material outside without j ettisoning the basic enabling principle of theoretical phenomenology, the neo-Husserlian master-thinkers of modernity must forge a difficult compro mise: they must find a way of acknowledging, pace Husserl, technology's undeniable material exteriority without abandoning the governing privilege of thought. Faced with this dilemma, these master-thinkers adopt a defen sive strategy: they reduce technology to an ontological status compatible with nouocentrism and pass this status off as natural. Bound by the privilege they lend thought, the master-thinkers can only account for technology by thematizing it. They must, in short, treat technology descriptively, through the category or figure of the machine. In this study's exploration of this descriptive thematization, I will uncover the pervasive operation of a machine reduction of technology whose effect is to naturalize technology's status as the relative exteriority of thought. By reducing the broad experien tial impact of technology to its restricted impact on thought, twentieth-cen tury theoretical discourses effectively function to " enframe " technology within a linguistically or semiotically constituted field. In any such frame of reference, technology can only attain a positive ontological status in the form of the machine metaphor, a figure for some (mechanical ) operation of thought. In its late twentieth-century embodiment, this machine reduction of tech nology takes the form of textualism-the reigning ideology of literary stud ies from formalism on. In this form, technesis functions covertly and, as I shall argue, according to the operation of figural compression or reversal governed by the rhetorical figure of metalepsis. Since the reduction is imposed in the very same instant that technology is thematized in terms of textuality, the resulting technema appears to be foundational. In this way, a reductive account of technology is passed off as a robust one: the funda mental alterity of technology is simply effaced in a sweeping move that asserts the primacy of its derivative, reductive form. Yet while the operation of metalepsis makes detection of the machine reduction more difficult, by submitting it to deconstruction in the texts of each of the critics discussed in this study, I will uncover the presence of a prior, extensive, and dogmatic reduction of technology to the textual figure of the machine. By liberating technological materiality from its illegitimate, rhetorically imposed reduc tion, I will reposition it as the motive mechanism of an antiformalist, exter nally oriented neodeconstructive critical practice responsive to the " demands " of embodied reality. As an index of the technological real itself, the deconstruction facilitated by such a practice will testify not to the auton omy of language but to the profound resistance that contemporary
22
22 * Embodying Technesis
technology mounts to the psycho-phenomenological modes of criticism that
have long functioned to contain it. By critically reconstructing the machine
reduction of technology in twentieth-century theoretical discourse, I intend
to trace this resistance to the point at which theory's defenses against tech-
nology break down-to the point, that is, where we can begin to see beyond
our ingrained (and to some extent self-inflicted) theoretical proclivities. In
the end, I suggest, it is only by grappling with this collapse that we can even
begin to address the robust impact contemporary technologies have on our
embodied lives.
•
Em bod y i n g
Technesis
technology mounts to the psycho-phenomenological modes of criticism that have long functioned to contain it. By critically reconstructing the machine reduction of technology in twentieth-century theoretical discourse, I intend to trace this resistance to the point at which theory's defenses against tech nology break down-to the point, that is, where we can begin to see beyond our ingrained ( and to some extent self-inflicted) theoretical proclivities. In the end, I suggest, it is only by grappling with this collapse that we can even begin to address the robust impact contemporary technologies have on our embodied lives.
Part 1
Technology, Embodiment,
and Cultural Critique
Part 1 Tech n o l ogy, E m bod i m ent, and Cu l tu ral Criti q u e

Chapter 1
Technoculture and Embodiment
In the famous "Book of Machines" from his 1872 utopian satire, Erewhon,
Samuel Butler conceives the man-machine relationship in a hitherto
Chapter 1
unprecedented manner. Cutting through the impasse of the well-worn vital-
ism-mechanism opposition, Butler foregrounds the more important issue of
machinery's experiential impact. His is a vision of the machined man, one
that crystallizes the profound complicity of machines in the ontology of the
Technoculture and Embodiment
human: "Man's very soul is due to the machines; it is a machine-made thing:
he thinks as he thinks, and feels as he feels, through the work that machines
have wrought upon him, and their existence is quite as much a sine qua non
for his, as his for theirs" (Butler 1968, 269). Butler goes on to compare
machines with breathing: both, he suggests, literally condition our existence
at the deepest level, thus impacting us in ways that cannot be captured in
purely cognitive, representationalist terms. His vision of the quasi-evolu-
tionary symbiosis of man and machine imposes an enabling holist frame-
work on analysis, one that forbids the analytical isolation of technology so
common in more recent theorization. Thus, even though he ends by pro-
hibiting machines from Erewhon, Butler readily entertains a thinking of the
impact of technology that does not restrict itself to its impact on thinking.
In sharply distinguishing the rich and varied experiential domain from
the narrow realm of cognition, Butler's analysis succinctly expresses the
deep divide separating the diffuse practical impact of technologies from
their narrow function as handmaidens of science. Indeed, by engaging tech-
nologies as material forces in and of themselves, Butler's analysis makes
common cause with much recent work in the anthropological, historical,
and social studies of science (science studies for short), one central aim of
which has been to demonstrate, in a concrete and local frame, how tech-
nologies both furnish the material background for scientific experimenta-
tion and, in the process, generate unintended effects that diverge from and
(potentially) compromise anticipated or desired scientific results. Because it
engages technology beyond the confines of science itself, Butler's analysis
helps us retool the methodology of this recent work to combat the narrowly
In the famous " Book of Machines " from his 1 8 72 utopian satire, Erewhon, Samuel Butler conceives the man-machine relationship in a hitherto unprecedented manner. Cutting through the impasse of the well-worn vital ism-mechanism opposition, Butler foregrounds the more important issue of machinery's experiential impact. His is a vision of the machined man, one that crystallizes the profound complicity of machines in the ontology of the human: " Man's very soul is due to the machines; it is a machine-made thing: he thinks as he thinks, and feels as he feels, through the work that machines have wrought upon him, and their existence is quite as much a sine qua non for his, as his for theirs " ( Butler 1 9 6 8 , 269 ) . Butler goes on to compare machines with breathing: both, he suggests, literally condition our existence at the deepest level, thus impacting us in ways that cannot be captured in purely cognitive, representationalist terms. His vision of the quasi-evolu tionary symbiosis of man and machine imposes an enabling holist frame work on analysis, one that forbids the analytical isolation of technology so common in more recent theorization. Thus, even though he ends by pro hibiting machines from Erewhon, Butler readily entertains a thinking of the impact of technology that does not restrict itself to its impact on thinking. In sharply distinguishing the rich and varied experiential domain from the narrow realm of cognition, Butler's analysis succinctly expresses the deep divide separating the diffuse practical impact of technologies from their narrow function as handmaidens of science . Indeed, by engaging tech nologies as material forces in and of themselves, Butler's analysis makes common cause with much recent work in the anthropological, historical, and social studies of science (science studies for short) , one central aim of which has been to demonstrate, in a concrete and local frame, how tech nologies both furnish the material background for scientific experimenta tion and, in the process, generate unintended effects that diverge from and ( potentially) compromise anticipated or desired scientific results. Because it engages technology beyond the confines of science itself, Butler's analysis helps us retool the methodology of this recent work to combat the narrowly
26
•
Em bod y i n g
Technesis
scientistic view of technology that is (as I shall demonstrate in this study) all 26 * Embodying Technesis
scientistic view of technology that is (as I shall demonstrate in this study) all
too common in the discourses of "high" theory. With its understanding of
scientific practice as an ongoing and imperfect negotiation with an unpre-
dictable, "noncompliant" material domain, the field of science studies opens
an avenue to engage technology nonreductively, in the rich context of
embodied reality. By expanding such engagement outside the narrow
domain of scientific practice, we can situate technology beyond writing and
thus begin the crucially important task of embodying technesis.
Insofar as it operates such an expansion, Butler's analysis establishes the
pattern for a responsible cultural studies of technology. To encompass the
unthematizable contingency of technology's diffuse material impact on cul-
ture, we must follow Butler in stressing its practical dimension not simply as
it effects scientific procedure but, more broadly, as it permeates the very
core of our embodied practical lives. Accordingly, we need to introduce a
subtle yet fundamental shift in the tenor of cultural studies of technology-
an exteriorization and generalization of its operative deconstruction of the
science-technology correlation. While science and technology have certainly
become (and perhaps have always been) so deeply coimplicated that no sim-
ple hierarchy can tenably divide them,1 efforts to eschew the reduction of
technology to applied science must be thought of not simply as the end point
of particular critical acts but-in the larger cultural frame-as a first step
toward a more global reconfiguration of technology studies. By insistently
foregrounding the broader, extrascientific context in which technologies dif-
fusely impact our embodied lives, such a reconfiguration institutes a
methodological double vision as its operative principle. Thereafter, we will
find it necessary to account for technologies in a double register-to view
them, at once, as concrete embodiments that both condition and are condi-
tioned by the specific scientific principles they translate and also, in a far
broader context, as material forces that expand the role of embodiment and,
in the process, alter what I shall, adapting Walter Benjamin's analysis, call
the "economy" of experience.
Bringing such a double vision to bear on the analysis of technology's
experiential impact comprises one of my major aims in this study, and it
obliges me to draw and maintain a distinction between two divergent con-
cepts of embodiment that are too often either conflated during analysis or
simply collapsed from the beginning. In its predominant definition-a
definition that is, curiously enough, shared by cultural critics of science and
technology and by the practitioners of high theory on whom my critique
focuses-embodiment demarcates the materialization in artifactual form of
some given process of inscription. Whether this process of inscription is
too common in the discourses of " high" theory. With its understanding of scientific practice as an ongoing and imperfect negotiation with an unpre dictable, " noncompliant " material domain, the field of science studies opens an avenue to engage technology nonreductively, in the rich context of embodied reality. By expanding such engagement outside the narrow domain of scientific practice, we can situate technology beyond writing and thus begin the crucially important task of embodying technesis. Insofar as it operates such an expansion, Butler's analysis establishes the pattern for a responsible cultural studies of technology. To encompass the unthematizable contingency of technology's diffuse material impact on cul ture, we must follow Butler in stressing its practical dimension not simply as it effects scientific procedure but, more broadly, as it permeates the very core of our embodied practical lives. Accordingly, we need to introduce a subtle yet fundamental shift in the tenor of cultural studies of technology an exteriorization and generalization of its operative deconstruction of the science-technology correlation. While science and technology have certainly become ( and perhaps have always been ) so deeply coimplicated that no sim ple hierarchy can tenably divide them,l efforts to eschew the reduction of technology to applied science must be thought of not simply as the end point of particular critical acts but-in the larger cultural frame-as a first step toward a more global reconfiguration of technology studies. By insistently foregrounding the broader, extrascientific context in which technologies dif fusely impact our embodied lives, such a reconfiguration institutes a methodological double vision as its operative principle. Thereafter, we will find it necessary to account for technologies in a double register-to view them, at once, as concrete embodiments that both condition and are condi tioned by the specific scientific principles they translate and also, in a far broader context, as material forces that expand the role of embodiment and, in the process, alter what I shall, adapting Walter Benj amin's analysis, call the " economy " of experience. Bringing such a double vision to bear on the analysis of technology's experiential impact comprises one of my maj or aims in this study, and it obliges me to draw and maintain a distinction between two divergent con cepts of embodiment that are too often either conflated during analysis or simply collapsed from the beginning. In its predominant definition-a definition that is, curiously enough, shared by cultural critics of science and technology and by the practitioners of high theory on whom my critique focuses-embodiment demarcates the materialization in artifactual form of some given process of inscription. Whether this process of inscription is
Tech noculture a n d E m b od i ment
Technoculture and Embodiment * 27
understood as an autonomous act of language (e.g., Derridian differance) or
a pragmatic intervention (e.g., Latour's notion of translation), such embod-
iment in a technical artifact (and even, at the limit, in a body) serves to sta-
bilize and exteriorize something that is by nature amorphous and highly ten-
uous-for example, meaning (for Derrida) or intention (for Latour). Since
this definition focuses on the constitutive role of embodiment for the analy-
sis of socially constructed institutions of knowledge, I shall call it epistemo-
logical (or artifactual) embodiment.
A second (and, within the theoretical field I explore, certainly secondary)
concept links embodiment directly to the (human) process of living through
the body. Not surprisingly, this concept emerges from critical traditions
phenomenology of the body, Deweyian pragmatism, Bergsonian meta-
physics-that have been marginalized with the advent of both high theory
and cultural constructivist criticism (not to mention Anglo-American phi-
losophy following the so-called linguistic turn). By making bodily experi-
ence primary, this concept reverses the direction of analysis imposed by the
epistemological projects previously mentioned: rather than moving from
inscription to (technical or artifactual) embodiment, it stresses the funda-
mental role of (corporeal) embodiment as the necessary background out of
which all acts of inscription emerge and take on meaning. Moreover, far
from imposing an enabling and allegedly nonreductive, if instrumental, fit
between inscription and embodiment, the corporeal concept of embodiment
insists on the irreducible excess of embodied life; it asserts the impossibility
of ever completely clarifying-bringing to discursive articulation-the
embodied background underlying human practice. Philosopher Mark John-
son concisely explains this concept: ". . . because of the limitations of our
propositional modes of representation, we have a hard time trying to
express the full meaning of our experiences . . . [W]hile we must use propo-
sitional language to describe these dimensions of our experience and under-
standing, we must not mistake our mode of description for the things
described" (Johnson 1989, 4). Clearly, for Johnson, as for certain other
recent critics (e.g., Bourdieu, Shusterman, Dreyfus, Varela, to name those
most immediately relevant to my study), the lived body is the site of this
experiential excess. Accordingly, I shall refer to it under the rubric of phe-
nomenological (or corporeal) embodiment.
Drawing this crucial distinction allows me to correlate the general criti-
cal program I develop in this study-the critique of technesis or the putting-
into-discourse of technology-with the specific priorities and the larger con-
text(s) motivating recent science studies. In essence, my program explores
the limitations of a purely epistemological (or in the case of high theory,
•
27
understood as an autonomous act of language (e.g., Derridian differance) or a pragmatic intervention (e.g., Latour's notion of translation) , such embod iment in a technical artifact ( and even, at the limit, in a body) serves to sta bilize and exteriorize something that is by nature amorphous and highly ten uous-for example, meaning (for Derrida) or intention ( for Latour ) . Since this definition focuses on the constitutive role of embodiment for the analy sis of socially constructed institutions of knowledge, I shall call it epistemo logical ( or artifactual) embodiment. A second ( and, within the theoretical field I explore, certainly secondary) concept links embodiment directly to the (human) process of living through the body. Not surprisingly, this concept emerges from critical traditions phenomenology of the body, Deweyian pragmatism, Bergsonian meta physics-that have been marginalized with the advent of both high theory and cultural constructivist criticism (not to mention Anglo-American phi losophy following the so-called linguistic turn) . By making bodily experi ence primary, this concept reverses the direction of analysis imposed by the epistemological proj ects previously mentioned: rather than moving from inscription to (technical or artifactual) embodiment, it stresses the funda mental role of (corporeal) embodiment as the necessary background out of which all acts of inscription emerge and take on meaning. Moreover, far from imposing an enabling and allegedly nonreductive, if instrumental, {it between inscription and embodiment, the corporeal concept of embodiment insists on the irreducible excess of embodied life; it asserts the impossibility of ever completely clarifying-bringing to discursive articulation-the embodied background underlying human practice. Philosopher Mark John son concisely explains this concept: " . . . because of the limitations of our propositional modes of representation, we have a hard time trying to express the full meaning of our experiences . . . . [W] hile we must use propo sitional language to describe these dimensions of our experience and under standing, we must not mistake our mode of description for the things described" (Johnson 1 9 8 9 , 4 ) . Clearly, for Johnson, as for certain other recent critics (e.g., Bourdieu, Shusterman, Dreyfus, Varela, to name those most immediately relevant to my study ) , the lived body is the site of this experiential excess. Accordingly, I shall refer to it under the rubric of phe nomenological ( or corporeal) embodiment. Drawing this crucial distinction allows me to correlate the general criti cal program I develop in this study-the critique of technesis or the putting into-discourse of technology-with the specific priorities and the larger con text ( s ) motivating recent science studies. In essence, my program explores the limitations of a purely epistemological (or in the case of high theory,
28
28 * Embodying Technesis
onto-epistemological) engagement with technology, in order, ultimately, to
expand our understanding of the rich and varied role(s) technologies play in
our embodied lives. Without denying the importance of concrete study of
the complex coimplication of science and technology, my critique exposes
the necessary partiality of all such study and calls on critics to expand their
perspective by approaching the extra-scientific, practical impact of contem-
porary technologies through the frame of phenomenological embodiment.
The affirmative component of my program should thus be seen not as an
alternative but as a necessary complement to contemporary science stud-
ies-an effort to fill out the extra-scientific and practical register of the dou-
ble methodological vision proposed earlier.
Accordingly, my project bears a markedly different relation to science
studies than to high theory, despite the root privileging of inscription com-
mon to both. Whereas high theory imposes on technology a purely abstract
discursive (or technetic) ontological frame that effectively forecloses all lim-
its to its theoretical dominion, science studies champions a cautious empiri-
cism specifically designed to obstruct the institution of such dominion. If sci-
ence studies (not to mention actual science) cannot always avoid reducing
embodied reality to fit the inscriptional models it introduces, this particular
necessity stems less from an unassailable theoretical framework-from
some metaphysical need-than from the very nature of scientific practice.
To the extent that scientific activity involves the development of models
expressly designed to simplify reality, scientists, it would seem, could hardly
refrain from acknowledging (if only implicitly) that the "nature" they
experimentally produce is not, and can never be, fully commensurate with
embodied complexity. Given this key difference, my critique of the abstract,
metaphysical model of technesis need not entail a blanket rejection of the
inscriptional model(s) introduced by science studies, and it in fact points the
way to a robust understanding of technology that would combine the con-
tribution of science studies with a broader opening to the phenomenological
dimension of technology's experiential impact. Even as it urges a flat rejec-
tion of technesis as a model for thinking about this impact, my critique thus
facilitates a broader engagement with technological materiality that would
function to supplement, not displace, the account of technology generated
by the empirical, scientific paradigm. Where science enacts a process of sim-
plification by moving from embodied complexity to inscription, the corpo-
real phenomenology I propose moves in the other direction-from whatever
narrow slice of embodied complexity is at issue in a particular scientific
operation to the robust materiality that forms the rich background for our
practical, embodied experience of reality as such. By restoring the uncon-
•
Em bod y i n g
Technesis
onto-epistemological) engagement with technology, in order, ultimately, to expand our understanding of the rich and varied role( s ) technologies play in our embodied lives. Without denying the importance of concrete study of the complex coimplication of science and technology, my critique exposes the necessary partiality of all such study and calls on critics to expand their perspective by approaching the extra-scientific, practical impact of contem porary technologies through the frame of phenomenological embodiment. The affirmative component of my program should thus be seen not as an alternative but as a necessary complement to contemporary science stud ies-an effort to fill out the extra-scientific and practical register of the dou ble methodological vision proposed earlier. Accordingly, my project bears a markedly different relation to science studies than to high theory, despite the root privileging of inscription com mon to both. Whereas high theory imposes on technology a purely abstract discursive (or technetic) ontological frame that effectively forecloses all lim its to its theoretical dominion, science studies champions a cautious empiri cism specifically designed to obstruct the institution of such dominion. If sci ence studies (not to mention actual science) cannot always avoid reducing embodied reality to fit the inscriptional models it introduces, this particular necessity stems less from an unassailable theoretical framework-from some metaphysical need-than from the very nature of scientific practice. To the extent that scientific activity involves the development of models expressly designed to simplify reality, scientists, it would seem, could hardly refrain from acknowledging (if only implicitly) that the "nature" they experimentally produce is not, and can never be, fully commensurate with embodied complexity. Given this key difference, my critique of the abstract, metaphysical model of technesis need not entail a blanket rej ection of the inscriptional model ( s ) introduced by science studies, and it in fact points the way to a robust understanding of technology that would combine the con tribution of science studies with a broader opening to the phenomenological dimension of technology's experiential impact. Even as it urges a flat rejec tion of technesis as a model for thinking about this impact, my critique thus facilitates a broader engagement with technological materiality that would function to supplement, not displace, the account of technology generated by the empirical, scientific paradigm. Where science enacts a process of sim plification by moving from embodied complexity to inscription, the corpo real phenomenology I propose moves in the other direction-from whatever narrow slice of embodied complexity is at issue in a particular scientific operation to the robust materiality that forms the rich background for our practical, embodied experience of reality as such. By restoring the un con-
Tech noculture a n d E m b od i ment
•
29
strained domain of embodied complexity as the locus where technologies Technoculture and Embodiment * 29
strained domain of embodied complexity as the locus where technologies
impact us immediately and practically, I seek, in sum, to counterbalance the
blindness imposed through the narrow epistemological perspective animat-
ing contemporary science studies.
Still, for all of the constructive promise of the phenomenological frame I
introduce, this study will focus fairly insistently-for some, perhaps too
insistently-on exposing and criticizing the role technesis plays in various
twentieth-century discourses of high theory. In what might be thought of as
a propadeutic to a future technocriticism, my principle aim here is to con-
front a particularly strong philosophical tradition of inscription with the
embodied reality it would subsume in language and to do so from the inside,
so to speak, of that very tradition. Accordingly, the argument I develop
undertakes an immanent "deconstruction" of the philosophical reduction of
technology, rather than an extrinsic appeal to other, related traditions that,
like the various fields comprising science studies, certainly do have more
direct ties to embodied reality and technological materiality. This said, my
study is nonetheless intended to comprise more than simply one stage
among others on the way toward a robust model of technology's experien-
tial impact, and it will, I hope, stand as adequate testimony to the important
contribution high theory can still make to such a model, even in the age of
its obsolescence. If, as I ultimately suggest, the rich corporeal dimension of
technology's impact on embodied experience can only be opened by a fun-
damental exhaustion of the epistemological perspective and not solely by
the kinds of local (and still epistemologically focused) interventions pursued
by science studies, the perspectival shift I urge-to a phenomenological con-
cept of embodiment-can in turn only emerge out of a definitive destruction
of inscription's claim to encompass embodied reality, a thorough critique of
technesis that would uncover anew what it sublated in the first place: the
preinscriptive or prediscursive processes comprising corporeal embodiment.
Carrying out such an immanent destruction requires us to address tech-
nesis not simply in the abstract, as the general principle of a philosophical
reduction of technology, but concretely too, via the particular configura-
tions it assumes in contemporary technoculture. Accordingly, we will have
to criticize at least two, relatively independent "models" of technesis: one
rooted securely in French poststructuralism, which we might, with some
significant irony, call "traditional," and one derived from more recent per-
mutations given to it by researchers interested in the cognitive properties of
advanced systems. In the end, our task of overcoming the onto-epistemol-
ogy of inscription will thus call on us to eschew not just the narrow repre-
sentationalist framework of analyses that view technology as a metaphor or
impact us immediately and practically, I seek, in sum, to counterbalance the blindness imposed through the narrow epistemological perspective animat ing contemporary science studies. Still, for all of the constructive promise of the phenomenological frame I introduce, this study will focus fairly insistently-for some, perhaps too insistently-on exposing and criticizing the role technesis plays in various twentieth-century discourses of high theory. In what might be thought of as a propadeutic to a future technocriticism, my principle aim here is to con front a particularly strong philosophical tradition of inscription with the embodied reality it would subsume in language and to do so from the inside, so to speak, of that very tradition. Accordingly, the argument I develop undertakes an immanent " deconstruction" of the philosophical reduction of technology, rather than an extrinsic appeal to other, related traditions that, like the various fields comprising science studies, certainly do have more direct ties to embodied reality and technological materiality. This said, my study is nonetheless intended to comprise more than simply one stage among others on the way toward a robust model of technology's experien tial impact, and it will, I hope, stand as adequate testimony to the important contribution high theory can still make to such a model, even in the age of its obsolescence. If, as I ultimately suggest, the rich corporeal dimension of technology's impact on embodied experience can only be opened by a fun damental exhaustion of the epistemological perspective and not solely by the kinds of local ( and still epistemologically focused) interventions pursued by science studies, the perspectival shift I urge-to a phenomenological con cept of embodiment-can in turn only emerge out of a definitive destruction of inscription's claim to encompass embodied reality, a thorough critique of technesis that would uncover anew what it sublated in the first place: the preinscriptive or prediscursive processes comprising corporeal embodiment. Carrying out such an immanent destruction requires us to address tech nesis not simply in the abstract, as the general principle of a philosophical reduction of technology, but concretely too, via the particular configura tions it assumes in contemporary technoculture. Accordingly, we will have to criticize at least two, relatively independent "models" of technesis: one rooted securely in French poststructuralism, which we might, with some significant irony, call " traditional, " and one derived from more recent per mutations given to it by researchers interested in the cognitive properties of advanced systems. In the end, our task of overcoming the onto-epistemol ogy of inscription will thus call on us to eschew not j ust the narrow repre sentationalist framework of analyses that view technology as a metaphor or
30
30 * Embodying Technesis
embodiment of thought but also the broader framework of postrepresenta-
tionalist, posthumanist analyses that model technology systemically. While
the former analyses impose a traditional nouocentric standpoint as the tri-
bunal for evaluating our experience of technology, the latter divorce tech-
nology (which they restrict to the quasi-epistemological function of mater-
ial support for an abstract cognitive system) from the practical domain
altogether. The result is the same in both cases: technology's impact on
embodied life is all too readily reduced to its impact on thought, with the
only meaningful difference being whether techno-thinking (technesis)
remains rooted in the human or whether, through the process of systemati-
zation, it becomes irrevocably inhuman.
The structure of my argument in this book mirrors this division in the
contemporary configuration of technesis. Following a brief sketch of the
growing disjunction between epistemological and phenomenological modes
of experiencing technology in the modern period (chaps. 1 and 2), I recon-
struct two overlapping twentieth-century genealogies of technesis-the
onto-phenomenological and the psychoanalytic-through their respective
representationalist and systemic phases (chaps. 3-8). Since both genealogies
rely on a common, deeply problematic reduction of technology, my critique
will serve as a call for a more fundamental break with representationalism
than is offered by the various contemporary forms of technocriticism,
including those that draw on informational and systems theory. From my
perspective, these latter forms can be viewed simply as the apex of the legacy
of technesis-its mature, state-of-the-art form. In their place, what I urge is
a total break with this heritage; if we are to rethink technology's experien-
tial impact from the ground up, we must reconceptualize the role of human
embodiment and lend a renewed attention to the fundamental role that
noncognitive and nondiscursive affective bodily life plays in contemporary
technoculture.
The Return of Realism
The constructive payoff of my sustained critique of technesis-the call it
advances for a new realism in the cultural study of technology-can most
effectively be contextualized against the backdrop of sociologist of science
Bruno Latour's recent critique of modernity. In a certain sense, my project
could be characterized as an effort to round out the new constitution Latour
develops by dismantling the great divide separating nature from society, the
universe of things from the human world: while Latour attends to the epis-
•
Em bod y i n g
Technesis
embodiment of thought but also the broader framework of postrepresenta tionalist, posthumanist analyses that model technology systemically. While the former analyses impose a traditional nouocentric standpoint as the tri bunal for evaluating our experience of technology, the latter divorce tech nology (which they restrict to the quasi-epistemological function of mater ial support for an abstract cognitive system ) from the practical domain altogether. The result is the same in both cases: technology's impact on embodied life is all too readily reduced to its impact on thought, with the only meaningful difference being whether techno-thinking (technesis) remains rooted in the human or whether, through the process of systemati zation, it becomes irrevocably inhuman. The structure of my argument in this book mirrors this division in the contemporary configuration of technesis. Following a brief sketch of the growing disj unction between epistemological and phenomenological modes of experiencing technology in the modern period (chaps. 1 and 2 ) , I recon struct two overlapping twentieth-century genealogies of technesis-the onto-phenomenological and the psychoanalytic-through their respective representationalist and systemic phases (chaps. 3-8 ) . Since both genealogies rely on a common, deeply problematic reduction of technology, my critique will serve as a call for a more fundamental break with representationalism than is offered by the various contemporary forms of technocriticism, including those that draw on informational and systems theory. From my perspective, these latter forms can be viewed simply as the apex of the legacy of technesis-its mature, state-of-the-art form. In their place, what I urge is a total break with this heritage; if we are to rethink technology's experien tial impact from the ground up, we must reconceptualize the role of human embodiment and lend a renewed attention to the fundamental role that noncognitive and nondiscursive affective bodily life plays in contemporary technoculture.
The Return of Realism
The constructive payoff of my sustained critique of technesis-the call it advances for a new realism in the cultural study of technology-can most effectively be contextualized against the backdrop of sociologist of science Bruno Latour's recent critique of modernity. In a certain sense, my proj ect could be characterized as an effort to round out the new constitution Latour develops by dismantling the great divide separating nature from society, the universe of things from the human world: while Latour attends to the epis-
Tech noculture a n d E m b od i ment
Technoculture and Embodiment * 31
temological dimension of this dismantling, I seek to engage the broader
experiential consequences that ensue from the (re)distribution of agency
across what Latour calls "the parliament of things" (Latour 1993b).
Following Shapin and Schaffer in Leviathan and the Air-Pump, Latour
overcomes the dual impasse of the "modern constitution" by locating a
"new position" between Nature and Culture. On this view, modernity
arises in the wake of the Boyle-Hobbes debate, when the knowledge of
things was split from power and human politics. For Latour, this polariza-
tion installs an impoverished epistemology, for it alleges that natural objects
and social subjects are either real, social, or discursive, rather than a mix of
all three at once. While, in actual fact, there are always hybrids circulating
within networks of mediation/translation, the moderns do everything possi-
ble to situate them securely as either subject or object, social agent or nat-
ural thing. Against this tendency of modernity, Latour's project urges a
more robust epistemology: instead of ossifying into mutually incompatible
and strictly demarcated domains (Nature vs. Culture), knowledge should be
constructed by pursuing both human and nonhuman agents through the
hybrid networks they trace together. Following Latour's rejection of denun-
ciation, this imperative should not be understood as critique; instead, it
results directly from a certain paradox of modernity: the fact that the more
clandestine the hybrids are, the more they are able to proliferate. Latour
does not so much reject modernity tout court, then, as champion an amal-
gam of elements from both the modern and the premodern worldviews, one
that adopts premodern categories to conceptualize the hybrids, while retain-
ing the moderns' work of purification for the purpose of conceptualizing an
external Nature distinct from subjects (Latour 1993b, 134). In this way,
Latour is able to claim the advantages of both worldviews for his new con-
stitution: following the premoderns, he can recognize hybrids as the basic
ontological units of nature-cultures; following the moderns, he can preserve
the capacity to differentiate a transcendent nature from an immanent soci-
ety, though no longer as distinct, pregiven ontological domains but as sepa-
rate objects generated through the construction of concrete networks.
With his contention that "the very notion of culture is an artifact created
by bracketing Nature off" (104), Latour can persuasively establish the irre-
ducible codependence of Nature and Culture. Regardless of whether he is
right to do so, however, his exclusive focus on epistemology compels him
to overprivilege representation and inscription as the correlated operative
principles of the inclusive democracy of humans and things he proposes.
To grant representational status to the hybrid "quasi-objects" constitutive
of the nature-culture(s) in which we live, Latour has to impose an inscrip-
•
31
temological dimension o f this dismantling, I seek t o engage the broader experiential consequences that ensue from the (re) distribution of agency across what Latour calls " the parliament of things " ( Latour 1 99 3 b ) . Following Shapin and Schaffer i n Leviathan and the Air-Pump, Latour overcomes the dual impasse of the "modern constitution" by locating a " new position " between Nature and Culture. On this view, modernity arises in the wake of the Boyle-Hobbes debate, when the knowledge of things was split from power and human politics. For Latour, this polariza tion installs an impoverished epistemology, for it alleges that natural obj ects and social subj ects are either real, social, or discursive, rather than a mix of all three at once. While, in actual fact, there are always hybrids circulating within networks of mediationltranslation, the moderns do everything possi ble to situate them securely as either subj ect or obj ect, social agent or nat ural thing. Against this tendency of modernity, Latour's proj ect urges a more robust epistemology: instead of ossifying into mutually incompatible and strictly demarcated domains (Nature vs. Culture) , knowledge should be constructed by pursuing both human and nonhuman agents through the hybrid networks they trace together. Following Latour's rej ection of denun ciation, this imperative should not be understood as critique; instead, it results directly from a certain paradox of modernity: the fact that the more clandestine the hybrids are, the more they are able to proliferate. Latour does not so much rej ect modernity tout court, then, as champion an amal gam of elements from both the modern and the premodern worldviews, one that adopts premodern categories to conceptualize the hybrids, while retain ing the moderns' work of purification for the purpose of conceptualizing an external Nature distinct from subj ects (Latour 1 9 93b, 1 3 4 ) . In this way, Latour is able to claim the advantages of both worldviews for his new con stitution: following the premoderns, he can recognize hybrids as the basic ontological units of nature-cultures; following the moderns, he can preserve the capacity to differentiate a transcendent nature from an immanent soci ety, though no longer as distinct, pregiven ontological domains but as sepa rate obj ects generated through the construction of concrete networks. With his contention that " the very notion of culture is an artifact created by bracketing Nature off" ( 1 04 ) , Latour can persuasively establish the irre ducible codependence of Nature and Culture. Regardless of whether he is right to do so, however, his exclusive focus on epistemology compels him to overprivilege representation and inscription as the correlated operative principles of the inclusive democracy of humans and things he proposes. To grant representational status to the hybrid " quasi-objects" constitutive of the nature-culture ( s ) in which we live, Latour has to impose an inscrip-
32
32 * Embodying Technesis
tional ontology as a governing framework for analysis. The convincing
account he offers both of the construction of nature in the laboratory and
of the production of technical artifacts thus comes at a significant cost, for
it requires him simply to leave out all mention of the extrascientific context
in which technologies impact our everyday, embodied experience. By
focusing on this "surplus" impact of technology that escapes any delimited
form of inscription and by situating it within the domain of corporeal
embodiment, my project aims to supplement Latour's epistemological pro-
gram precisely on this point, to furnish a practical account of the profound
transformation(s) modern and contemporary technologies have wrought
on embodied reality.
Even given its narrow epistemological focus, however, Latour's project
takes an important step beyond the discursivist position central to the high
theory I critique in this study. Like Shapin and Schaffer's study of the early
modern air pump, Latour's intervention does manage to recognize the real-
ist basis of science, at least in principle, even if it neglects it in practice and,
more importantly, refuses to extend it to technologies. Such recognition is
crucial to the status Latour (following philosopher Michel Serres) claims for
so-called quasi-objects that occupy the new, middle position between
Nature and Culture. Unlike prior determinations that alternatively view
objects as "shapeless receptacles of social categories" or "hard facts,"
Latour's quasi-objects are aggressively hybrid, simultaneously "real, collec-
tive, and discursive." Latour insists:
Quasi-objects are in between and below the two poles, at the very place
around which dualism and dialectics had turned endlessly without being able
to come to terms with them. Quasi-objects are much more social, much more
fabricated, much more collective than the "hard" parts of nature, but they
are in no way the arbitrary receptacles of a full-fledged society. On the other
hand they are much more real, nonhuman and objective than those shapeless
screens on which society-for unknown reasons-needed to be "projected."
(55)
At the same time as it deconstructs the polarization of Nature and Culture,
Latour's mobilization of the quasi-object anchors the constructions of sci-
ence squarely in the extralinguistic domain of the real. More precisely, the
•
Em bod y i n g
Technesis
tional ontology as a governing framework for analysis. The convincing account he offers both of the construction of nature in the laboratory and of the production of technical artifacts thus comes at a significant cost, for it requires him simply to leave out all mention of the extra scientific context in which technologies impact our everyday, embodied experience. By focusing on this " surplus " impact of technology that escapes any delimited form of inscription and by situating it within the domain of corporeal embodiment, my proj ect aims to supplement Latour's epistemological pro gram precisely on this point, to furnish a practical account of the profound transformation ( s ) modern and contemporary technologies have wrought on embodied reality. Even given its narrow epistemological focus, however, Latour's proj ect takes an important step beyond the discursivist position central to the high theory I critique in this study. Like Shapin and Schaffer's study of the early modern air pump, Latour's intervention does manage to recognize the real ist basis of science, at least in principle, even if it neglects it in practice and, more importantly, refuses to extend it to technologies. Such recognition is crucial to the status Latour ( following philosopher Michel Serres) claims for so-called quasi-obj ects that occupy the new, middle position between Nature and Culture. Unlike prior determinations that alternatively view obj ects as " shapeless receptacles of social categories" or " hard facts, " Latour's quasi-obj ects are aggressively hybrid, simultaneously " real, collec tive, and discursive . " Latour insists:
focal shift to the quasi-object brings the real into the sphere of the experien-
tial, making it relative not simply to the human but to the larger "parlia-
ment of things" that (for Latour) constitutes lived reality. By repudiating the
false opposition between constitution and discovery, in other words, Latour
is able to overcome the "ghettoizing" of the object performed through phi-
losophy's Copernican revolution, the relegation of the object to a transcen-
Quasi-obj ects are in between and below the two poles, at the very place around which dualism and dialectics had turned endlessly without being able to come to terms with them. Quasi-obj ects are much more social, much more fabricated, much more collective than the "hard " parts of nature, but they are in no way the arbitrary receptacles of a full-fledged society. On the other hand they are much more real, nonhuman and obj ective than those shapeless screens on which society-for unknown reasons-needed to be " proj ected. " (55)
At the same time a s i t deconstructs the polarization o f Nature and Culture, Latour's mobilization of the quasi-obj ect anchors the constructions of sci ence squarely in the extralinguistic domain of the real. More precisely, the focal shift to the quasi-obj ect brings the real into the sphere of the experien tial, making it relative not simply to the human but to the larger "parlia ment of things" that ( for Latour) constitutes lived reality. By repudiating the false opposition between constitution and discovery, in other words, Latour is able to overcome the " ghettoizing" of the obj ect performed through phi losophy's Copernican revolution, the relegation of the obj ect to a transcen-
Tech noculture a n d E m b od i ment
Technoculture and Embodiment * 33
dental status-noumenon, or thing-in-itself-that places it forever outside
the domain of experience. If Latour thereby sacrifices the radical alterity of
the material domain, he gains something significant in return: a distance on
the three strategies for "absorb[ing] . . . the Middle Kingdom" (55). Substi-
tuting a nature "extracted from the scientific laboratory and . . . trans-
formed into external reality" for "transcendent/immanent Nature" (77),
Latour secures the right, on the one hand, to invoke the "new position"
between subjects and things against the Kantian divide and, on the other, to
resist efforts by discursive and onto-hermeneutic monists simply to collapse
the divide altogether. Ultimately, his position-and the privilege he accords
science studies-stands or falls with the broad reciprocity he claims to dis-
cover between construction and discovery: according to Latour, when we
construct nature in the lab, we do not just bring the real into the sphere of
experience; we also submit our experience to its constraints. Contrasted
with critical and monist strategies, then, the great advantage of science stud-
ies stems from a willingness to embrace the enabling paradox of the quasi-
object: the fact that, in experiencing nature through experimental construc-
tion, we cannot help but open our experience to something outside the
domain of construction.
On this general point, Latour's valorization of the quasi-object makes
common cause with my critique of technesis. His move to cast science as a
sort of reality check on the power of discourse anticipates and, to a certain
extent, parallels my own effort to embed the deconstruction of the subject
in the material infrastructure of the real. Scientific discourse introduces a
pragmatic perspective that, Latour contends, hampers all attempts to privi-
lege discursive autonomy at the expense of reference.
When [science studies] applied semiotics to scientific discourse, and not only
to literatures of fiction, the autonomization of discourse appeared as an
artifice.... [R]hetoric... changed its meaning entirely when it had truth and
proof to absorb instead of conviction and seduction. When we are dealing
with science and technology it is hard to imagine for long that we are a text
that is writing itself, a discourse that is speaking all by itself, a play of
signifiers without signifieds. It is hard to reduce the entire cosmos to a grand
narrative, the physics of subatomic particles to a text, subway systems to
rhetorical devices, all social structures to discourse. (64)
With this eloge to science studies, Latour introduces a crucial methodologi-
cal principle that will increasingly come to govern not just explicit accounts
of science and technology but all forms of cultural analysis that engage the
rapidly proliferating domain of quasi-objects:2 grappling with the complex,
hybrid ontology of the "Middle Kingdom" requires, Latour suggests, a
•
33
dental status-noumenon, or thing-in-itself-that places it forever outside the domain of experience. If Latour thereby sacrifices the radical alterity of the material domain, he gains something significant in return: a distance on the three strategies for " absorb [ing] . . . the Middle Kingdom " (55 ) . Substi tuting a nature " extracted from the scientific laboratory and . . . trans formed into external reality" for " transcendentlimmanent Nature " (77), Latour secures the right, on the one hand, to invoke the " new position" between subj ects and things against the Kantian divide and, on the other, to resist efforts by discursive and onto-hermeneutic monists simply to collapse the divide altogether. Ultimately, his position-and the privilege he accords science studies-stands or falls with the broad reciprocity he claims to dis cover between construction and discovery: according to Latour, when we construct nature in the lab, we do not just bring the real into the sphere of experience; we also submit our experience to its constraints. Contrasted with critical and monist strategies, then, the great advantage of science stud ies stems from a willingness to embrace the enabling paradox of the quasi obj ect: the fact that, in experiencing nature through experimental construc tion, we cannot help but open our experience to something outside the domain of construction. On this general point, Latour's valorization of the quasi-obj ect makes common cause with my critique of technesis. His move to cast science as a sort of reality check on the power of discourse anticipates and, to a certain extent, parallels my own effort to embed the deconstruction of the subj ect in the material infrastructure of the real. Scientific discourse introduces a pragmatic perspective that, Latour contends, hampers all attempts to privi lege discursive autonomy at the expense of reference. When [science studies] applied semiotics to scientific discourse, and not only to literatures of fiction, the autonomization of discourse appeared as an artifice . . . . [R] hetoric . . . changed its meaning entirely when it had truth and proof to absorb instead of conviction and seduction. When we are dealing with science and technology it is hard to imagine for long that we are a text that is writing itself, a discourse that is speaking all by itself, a play of signifiers without signifieds. It is hard to reduce the entire cosmos to a grand narrative, the physics of subatomic particles to a text, subway systems to rhetorical devices, all social structures to discourse. ( 6 4 )
With this e/oge t o science studies, Latour introduces a crucial methodologi cal principle that will increasingly come to govern not just explicit accounts of science and technology but all forms of cultural analysis that engage the rapidly proliferating domain of quasi-obj ects :2 grappling with the complex, hybrid ontology of the " Middle Kingdom" requires, Latour suggests, a
34
34 * Embodying Technesis
double analytic framework that focuses simultaneously on the active contri-
bution of the social and discursive and on the constraints imposed by the real.
At a general level, then, the ontology Latour erects around the quasi-
object can help inform an account of technology that would embrace both
its social and discursive constitution and its anchoring in the real. Latour
helps us see that, as ontic or mundane entities, technologies (like scientific
facts experimentally produced in the laboratory) only emerge from and exist
in the divide between Nature and Culture, the domain of nature-culture,
and are consequently (like all quasi-objects) "simultaneously real, discur-
sive, and social." Yet in seamlessly assimilating technologies into his model
of inscription-as constructions essentially similar to the production of facts
in the laboratory-Latour not only runs roughshod over some crucial onto-
logical differences between scientific facts and technologies; he also imposes
an overly narrow epistemological frame-of-reference on technology. As a
consequence, technology is largely stripped of its anchoring in the real, of
the very dimension that Latour's model promised to preserve against both
Kantian and poststructuralist reduction.
To grasp the rationale for this reduction and to expose its complicity
with Latour's governing epistemological orientation, we need to go back to
the model of inscription he develops initially, with Steve Woolgar, in Labo-
ratory Life. There, Latour readily acknowledges the inevitable reduction
involved in inscription: since science functions by translating embodied
complexity into manageable formulations, it simply cannot avoid some sim-
plification or abstraction of the real (Nature) and of the embodied processes
of laboratory practice. On this early model of science as "translation,"
inscriptions explicitly draw their force as direct mediators of the real only
on the condition that the material processes giving rise to them are brack-
eted off. Latour argues:
"[I]nscription devices" transform pieces of matter into written documents.
More exactly, an inscription device is any item of apparatus or particular
configuration of such items which can transform a material substance into a
figure or diagram.... An important consequence of this notion of inscription
device is that inscriptions are regarded as having a direct relationship to "the
original substance." The final diagram or curve thus provides the focus of
discussion about properties of the substance. The intervening material activ-
ity and all aspects of what is often a prolonged and costly process are brack-
eted off in discussions about what the figure means. (Latour and Woolgar
1986, 51; emphasis added)
To attain their role as stand-ins for embodied material processes, inscrip-
tions, in short, require the actual effacement of the very embodied context
•
Em bod y i n g
Technesis
double analytic framework that focuses simultaneously on the active contri bution of the social and discursive and on the constraints imposed by the real. At a general level, then, the ontology Latour erects around the quasi obj ect can help inform an account of technology that would embrace both its social and discursive constitution and its anchoring in the real. Latour helps us see that, as ontic or mundane entities, technologies (like scientific facts experimentally produced in the laboratory) only emerge from and exist in the divide between Nature and Culture, the domain of nature-culture, and are consequently (like all quasi-objects) " simultaneously real, discur sive, and social. " Yet in seamlessly assimilating technologies into his model of inscription-as constructions essentially similar to the production of facts in the laboratory-Latour not only runs roughshod over some crucial onto logical differences between scientific facts and technologies; he also imposes an overly narrow epistemological frame-of-reference on technology. As a consequence, technology is largely stripped of its anchoring in the real, of the very dimension that Latour's model promised to preserve against both Kantian and poststructuralist reduction. To grasp the rationale for this reduction and to expose its complicity with Latour's governing epistemological orientation, we need to go back to the model of inscription he develops initially, with Steve Woolgar, in Labo ratory Life . There, Latour readily acknowledges the inevitable reduction involved in inscription: since science functions by translating embodied complexity into manageable formulations, it simply cannot avoid some sim plification or abstraction of the real (Nature ) and of the embodied processes of laboratory practice. On this early model of science as "translation, " inscriptions explicitly draw their force as direct mediators of the real only on the condition that the material processes giving rise to them are brack eted off. Latour argues: " [I]nscription devices " transform pieces of matter into written documents . More exactly, an inscription device is any item of apparatus or particular configuration of such items which can transform a material substance into a figure or diagram . . . . An important consequence of this notion of inscription device is that inscriptions are regarded as having a direct relationship to " the original substance . " The final diagram or curve thus provides the focus of discussion about properties of the substance. The intervening material activ
ity and all aspects of what is often a prolonged and costly process are brack eted off in discussions about what the figure means. ( Latour and Woolgar 1 9 8 6 , 5 1 ; emphasis added)
To attain their role as stand-ins for embodied material processes, inscrip tions, in short, require the actual effacement of the very embodied context
Tech noculture a n d E m b od i ment
Technoculture and Embodiment * 35
that makes them possible: "Without the material environment.., none of
the objects could be said to exist," and yet this environment "is required to
be easily forgotten" (ibid., 69).
Insofar as it is both recognized and tolerated by working scientists, this
inevitable reduction comprises a part of the normal activity of science, an
occupational hazard as it were, that only becomes an issue if and when the
nature produced by scientific inscription is taken as fully commensurate
with embodied complexity. Indeed, the scientist's activity is actually
directed not toward the material real but rather toward statements or
inscriptions that have been produced in the laboratory and that have taken
the place of nature: "reality is the consequence rather than the cause of
[the] construction [of facts through operations designed to effect the drop-
ping of modalities which qualify a given statement]" (ibid., 237). Yet in We
Have Never Been Modern, Latour expands this constructionist ontology to
the point of claiming that inscription need involve no meaningful loss of
embodiment at all. In this text, not only is the nature extracted from the
laboratory every bit as real as the "transcendent/immanent Nature" it
replaces (1993b, 77), but the very production of nature as quasi-object has
been accorded the all-important duty of opening nature to our knowl-
edge-of giving us "access to things themselves, not only to their phenom-
ena" (90).
While perhaps tolerable as an inevitable occupational hazard-and cor-
responding limitation-of scientific activity, such a position cannot be car-
ried over to the analysis of technology without significantly reducing the lat-
ter's practical impact. Routed through Latour's inscriptional model,
technologies can only attain significance by contributing to scientific episte-
mology; as forms of capture of the real, they constitute embodied inscrip-
tions (or embodiments of inscription) that function, like scientific facts, to
reduce the real to manageable proportions. In essence then, as we will later
see in detail, Latour's constructivist model reduces technology to the status
of supplement or materialization of inscription. Despite (re)introducing
some form of embodied reality, the "shifting-out" involved in the produc-
tion of technology-shifting out from inscription to materiality-serves
exclusively as a means of expanding the epistemologist's control; rather
than foregrounding technology's robust anchoring in the real, it functions to
solidify the power of inscription to harness the real and render it accessible
to cognition. Regardless of whether shifting-out succeeds in this task, tech-
nology is effectively stripped of its immanence within the embodied real. In
assimilating technology to science, Latour thus brackets out more than just
the material processes of translation that occur within the narrow techno-
•
35
that makes them possible: "Without the material environment . . . none of the obj ects could be said to exist, " and yet this environment " is required to be easily forgotten " (ibid., 6 9 ) . Insofar a s i t i s both recognized and tolerated b y working scientists, this inevitable reduction comprises a part of the normal activity of science, an occupational hazard as it were, that only becomes an issue if and when the nature produced by scientific inscription is taken as fully commensurate with embodied complexity. Indeed, the scientist's activity is actually directed not toward the material real but rather toward statements or inscriptions that have been produced in the laboratory and that have taken the place of nature: " reality is the consequence rather than the cause of [the] construction [of facts through operations designed to effect the drop ping of modalities which qualify a given statement] " ( ibid., 2 3 7 ) . Yet in We Have Never Been Modern, Latour expands this constructionist ontology to the point of claiming that inscription need involve no meaningful loss of embodiment at all. In this text, not only is the nature extracted from the laboratory every bit as real as the " transcendentlimmanent Nature " it replaces ( 1 99 3 b, 77) , but the very production of nature as quasi-obj ect has been accorded the all-important duty of opening nature to our knowl edge-of giving us " access to things themselves, not only to their phenom ena " ( 90 ) . While perhaps tolerable a s an inevitable occupational hazard-and cor responding limitation-of scientific activity, such a position cannot be car ried over to the analysis of technology without significantly reducing the lat ter's practical impact. Routed through Latour's inscriptional model, technologies can only attain significance by contributing to scientific episte mology; as forms of capture of the real, they constitute embodied inscrip tions (or embodiments of inscription ) that function, like scientific facts, to reduce the real to manageable proportions . In essence then, as we will later see in detail, Latour's constructivist model reduces technology to the status of supplement or materialization of inscription. Despite (re) introducing some form of embodied reality, the " shifting-out " involved in the produc tion of technology-shifting out from inscription to materiality-serves exclusively as a means of expanding the epistemologist's control; rather than foregrounding technology's robust anchoring in the real, it functions to solidify the power of inscription to harness the real and render it accessible to cognition. Regardless of whether shifting-out succeeds in this task, tech nology is effectively stripped of its immanence within the embodied real. In assimilating technology to science, Latour thus brackets out more than just the material processes of translation that occur within the narrow techno-
36
36 * Embodying Technesis
scientific context: he quite simply eschews the entire extra-scientific dimen-
sion of technology's material impact on practical life.
Accordingly, to restore technology's anchoring in the real, we need to
reintroduce the ontological differences between technology and science that
Latour finds himself compelled to efface. Following both media theorists
and engineers, we must recognize, first, that technologies exist and perform
within a far larger and more heterogeneous social field than do scientific
programs. Situated within the real world (embodied reality), technologies
are never simple materializations of thought (or scientific protocol) but are
composite and complex results of often multiple, concrete and practical
efforts to solve local problems. Moreover, insofar as they form an important
part of the material infrastructure of the lifeworld, technologies generate
unintended and emergent practical consequences that not only have a broad
social impact well beyond the domain of science but can actually alter the
very material conditions for perceptual and cognitive social life. Grasping
this excessive "share" of technology's impact will require us to study it at
once as a social construction and a material "component" of Nature, to
impose a methodological double vision that can supplement the act of con-
structing technologies as quasi-objects with some recognition of the irre-
ducible, though hardly monolithic, autonomy peculiar to technology.3
Accordingly, I urge a stronger differentiation of technology from science
than the functionalist one that the contemporary field of science studies con-
structs entirely within its inscriptionally generated frame of reference.4 By
tempering the constructivist program with a recognition of the hard materi-
ality of technology, such a differentiation can combine the undeniable social
and cultural context underlying the production of technologies with an
account of their equally irreducible status as material components of the
"unmediated flux" (Hayles 1991b). To grasp this peculiar autonomy of
technology and to understand better how it complements the culturalist
account, I suggest that we adopt what the late Jean-Francois Lyotard called
a "cosmological" perspective-a perspective that treats technology as the
privileged vehicle in the autonomous material "complexification" of the
cosmos. Such a perspective would require us to situate technology simulta-
neously within the "Middle Kingdom" where the real, the discursive, and
the social converge in the construction of quasi-objects (the domain of
nature-culture) and within the unmediated material flux (the domain of
Nature).5 Precisely this irreducible, though not incompatible, duality of
technology necessitates the methodological double vision I am calling for:
insofar as they enter into practical networks where the nonhuman interfaces
with the human, technologies are open to the culturalist analysis that has
•
Em bod y i n g
Technesis
scientific context: he quite simply eschews the entire extra-scientific dimen sion of technology's material impact on practical life. Accordingly, to restore technology's anchoring in the real, we need to reintroduce the ontological differences between technology and science that Latour finds himself compelled to efface. Following both media theorists and engineers, we must recognize, first, that technologies exist and perform within a far larger and more heterogeneous social field than do scientific programs. Situated within the real world (embodied reality) , technologies are never simple materializations of thought ( or scientific protocol) but are composite and complex results of often multiple, concrete and practical efforts to solve local problems. Moreover, insofar as they form an important part of the material infrastructure of the lifeworld, technologies generate unintended and emergent practical consequences that not only have a broad social impact well beyond the domain of science but can actually alter the very material conditions for perceptual and cognitive social life. Grasping this excessive " share " of technology's impact will require us to study it at once as a social construction and a material "component " of Nature, to impose a methodological double vision that can supplement the act of con structing technologies as quasi-obj ects with some recognition of the irre ducible, though hardly monolithic, autonomy peculiar to technology.3 Accordingly, I urge a stronger differentiation of technology from science than the functionalist one that the contemporary field of science studies con structs entirely within its inscriptionally generated frame of reference.4 By tempering the constructivist program with a recognition of the hard materi ality of technology, such a differentiation can combine the undeniable social and cultural context underlying the production of technologies with an account of their equally irreducible status as material components of the " unmediated flux" (Hayles 1 9 9 1 b ) . To grasp this peculiar autonomy of technology and to understand better how it complements the culturalist account, I suggest that we adopt what the late Jean-Francois Lyotard called a " cosmological " perspective-a perspective that treats technology as the privileged vehicle in the autonomous material "complexification " of the cosmos. Such a perspective would require us to situate technology simulta neously within the "Middle Kingdom " where the real, the discursive, and the social converge in the construction of quasi-obj ects (the domain of nature-culture) and within the unmediated material flux (the domain of Nature) . 5 Precisely this irreducible, though not incompatible, duality of technology necessitates the methodological double vision I am calling for: insofar as they enter into practical networks where the nonhuman interfaces with the human, technologies are open to the culturalist analysis that has
Tech noculture a n d E m b od i ment
Technoculture and Embodiment * 37
recently been offered for scientific (and other like) practices of inscription
that seek to bridge the gap between the natural and the social; yet to the
extent that they contribute directly though not without human mediation to
the autonomous process by which matter "self-complexifies," technologies
always exceed the grasp of culturalist analysis and inscriptional models.
What I call technesis names the reduction that ensues when we forget this
duality, when we assimilate the material dimension of technology's impact
into its social contextualization.
Lest my position here appear retrograde (since it self-consciously returns
us to the Kantian terrain diagnosed by Bruno Latour as the root evil of
modernity), let me clarify my invocation of realism (Latour 1993b). My
qualified endorsement of Kantian empirical realism aims to counter
Latour's blanket dismissal of the Copernican revolution. In sum, I think that
a heuristic commitment to Kantian realism provides a timely recipe, as it
were, for restoring the realist vector bracketed out in Latour's presentation
of the quasi-object. In my opinion, Latour's dismissal of Kant rests on an
overly narrow construal of Kant's complex conception of nature, one that
privileges the figure of nature underlying Kant's epistemology at the expense
of the radically divergent nature conditioning his aesthetics and moral phi-
losophy. Only by ignoring Kant's explorations of the noumenal in the
notions of freedom (second Critique) and teleology (third Critique) can
Latour effectively hypostatize the topic of knowledge; to make knowledge
the sole mediator of our relation with nature, Latour must simply conflate
the two vastly different domains of nature in Kant.
Given this hypostatization, it is not surprising to discover a distinct cog-
nitive bias behind Latour's characterization of Kantianism as the final
ratification of the modern constitution. If the Boyle-Hobbes debate can be
credited with introducing the basic modern divide between society and
nature, knowledge and things, Kant (so Latour contends) is responsible for
turning this divide into a metaphysical principle, for codifying it as the divi-
sion between radically separate ontological domains.
It is with Kantianism that our Constitution receives its truly canonical for-
mulation. What was a mere distinction is sharpened into a total separation,
a Copernican Revolution. Things-in-themselves become inaccessible while,
symmetrically, the transcendental subject becomes infinitely remote from the
world. The two guarantees remain clearly symmetrical, however, since
knowledge is possible only at the median point, that of phenomena, through
an application of the two pure forms, the thing-in-itself and the subject.
Hybrids are indeed accepted, but solely as mixtures of pure forms in equal
proportion. (Latour 1993b, 56)
•
37
recently been offered for scientific ( and other like) practices of inscription that seek to bridge the gap between the natural and the social; yet to the extent that they contribute directly though not without human mediation to the autonomous process by which matter " self-complexifies, " technologies always exceed the grasp of culturalist analysis and inscriptional models. What I call technesis names the reduction that ensues when we forget this duality, when we assimilate the material dimension of technology's impact into its social contextualization. Lest my position here appear retrograde ( since it self-consciously returns us to the Kantian terrain diagnosed by Bruno Latour as the root evil of modernity), let me clarify my invocation of realism (Latour 1 99 3 b ) . My qualified endorsement of Kantian empirical realism aims to counter Latour's blanket dismissal of the Copernican revolution. In sum, I think that a heuristic commitment to Kantian realism provides a timely recipe, as it were, for restoring the realist vector bracketed out in Latour's presentation of the quasi-object. In my opinion, Latour's dismissal of Kant rests on an overly narrow construal of Kant's complex conception of nature, one that privileges the figure of nature underlying Kant's epistemology at the expense of the radically divergent nature conditioning his aesthetics and moral phi losophy. Only by ignoring Kant's explorations of the noumenal in the notions of freedom (second Critique) and teleology (third Critique) can Latour effectively hypostatize the topic of knowledge; to make knowledge the sole mediator of our relation with nature, Latour must simply conflate the two vastly different domains of nature in Kant. Given this hypostatization, it is not surprising to discover a distinct cog nitive bias behind Latour's characterization of Kantianism as the final ratification of the modern constitution. If the Boyle-Hobbes debate can be credited with introducing the basic modern divide between society and nature, knowledge and things, Kant (so Latour contends) is responsible for turning this divide into a metaphysical principle, for codifying it as the divi sion between radically separate ontological domains. It is with Kantianism that our Constitution receives its truly canonical for mulation. What was a mere distinction is sharpened into a total separation, a Copernican Revolution. Things-in-themselves become inaccessible while, symmetrically, the transcendental subj ect becomes infinitely remote from the world. The two guarantees remain clearly symmetrical, however, since knowledge is possible only at the median point, that of phenomena, through an application of the two pure forms, the thing-in-itself and the subj ect. Hybrids are indeed accepted, but solely as mixtures of pure forms in equal proportion. (Latour 1 993b, 5 6 )
38
38 * Embodying Technesis
As long as our access to the real remains mediated through epistemology,
Latour's argument is irrefutable: Kant's Copernican revolution institutes an
epoche of the thing-in-itself as the condition of possibility for the produc-
tion of cognitive representations (Vorstellungen). In this sense, Latour's cri-
tique facilitates an important minirevolution of its own: it brings the world
of things back into the epistemological fold.
Matters are quite otherwise, however, once we move out of the narrow
field of knowledge production to consider our relation with Nature in the
broader terms developed by Kant in the second and third Critiques.
Whereas Kant's concern with Nature in the first Critique centers on its role
as (one essential part of) the transcendental cause of phenomenal represen-
tations of the external world and is thus limited to its contribution to the
task of constituting the objects of experience, in the Critique of Practical
Reason and especially in the Critique of Judgement, Nature cannot be
assimilated into the form of an object, since it corresponds, as supersensible
nature, to freedom and, as teleological nature, to the final unity of things.6
In a recent article, philosopher Kate Soper usefully glosses nature in just this
sense: she speaks of "the nature whose structures and processes are inde-
pendent of human activity (in the sense that they are not a humanly created
product) and whose forces and causal powers are the condition of and con-
straint upon any human practice" (Soper 1996, 31). Understood in this
way, Kantian empirical realism requires us to distinguish two natures-the
"nature" that results from a process of construction (nature as quasi-object
produced in the laboratory) and nature (or Nature) as the material stratum
underlying and conditioning all human activity (including the very con-
struction of nature as quasi-object).
Constrained Constructivism: The Return of
Kantian Dualism
Employed as a heuristic means for conceptualizing that dimension of our
relationship with the real that remains ungraspable through cognition and
representation, a qualified return to Kantian empirical realism will help us
to recognize and respect the particular autonomy of technology I have
attempted to expose. For this purpose, accordingly, a contemporary model
designed to foreground the radical exteriority of nature-a model like
N. Katherine Hayles's "constrained constructivism"-will have certain dis-
tinct advantages over Latour's inscriptional model.7
What differentiates Hayles's constrained constructivism from Latour's
•
Em bod y i n g
Technesis
As long as our access to the real remains mediated through epistemology, Latour's argument is irrefutable: Kant's Copernican revolution institutes an epoche of the thing-in-itself as the condition of possibility for the produc tion of cognitive representations ( Vorstellungen ) . In this sense, Latour's cri tique facilitates an important minirevolution of its own: it brings the world of things back into the epistemological fold. Matters are quite otherwise, however, once we move out of the narrow field of knowledge production to consider our relation with Nature in the broader terms developed by Kant in the second and third Critiques. Whereas Kant's concern with Nature in the first Critique centers on its role as ( one essential part of) the transcendental cause of phenomenal represen tations of the external world and is thus limited to its contribution to the task of constituting the objects of experience, in the Critique of Practical Reason and especially in the Critique of Iudgement, Nature cannot be assimilated into the form of an obj ect, since it corresponds, as supersensible nature, to freedom and, as teleological nature, to the final unity of things.6 In a recent article, philosopher Kate Soper usefully glosses nature in just this sense: she speaks of " the nature whose structures and processes are inde pendent of human activity (in the sense that they are not a humanly created product) and whose forces and causal powers are the condition of and con straint upon any human practice " ( Soper 1 996, 3 1 ) . Understood in this way, Kantian empirical realism requires us to distinguish two natures-the " nature" that results from a process of construction (nature as quasi-obj ect produced in the laboratory) and nature (or Nature) as the material stratum underlying and conditioning all human activity (including the very con struction of nature as quasi-object ) .
Constrained Constructivism: The Return of Kantian Dualism
Employed as a heuristic means for conceptualizing that dimension of our relationship with the real that remains ungraspable through cognition and representation, a qualified return to Kantian empirical realism will help us to recognize and respect the particular autonomy of technology I have attempted to expose. For this purpose, accordingly, a contemporary model designed to foreground the radical exteriority of nature-a model like N. Katherine Hayles's " constrained constructivism"-will have certain dis tinct advantages over Latour's inscriptional model ? What differentiates Hayles's constrained constructivism from Latour's
Tech noculture a n d E m b od i ment
Technoculture and Embodiment * 39
inscriptional paradigm is less a deep philosophical divide than a variant
emphasis: whereas Latour is most interested in explaining the complex
process of social translation that underlies all technoscientific production,
Hayles focuses on the limitations of epistemology, on the "cusp" separating
representation from the real. Latour's inscriptional model is predicated on a
denial of the external referent, such that reality becomes the creation of a
constructed system of internal reference (e.g., the adequation and superim-
posibility of reports). Hayles's constrained constructivism, by contrast, fol-
lows the relationship between representation and "unmediated flux" to the
point at which it breaks down. Beginning from the (constructivist) position
that "everything we perceive, think, or do is always already a representa-
tion, not reality as such," Hayles pressures the role of constraint and its rela-
tionship to representation. Specifically, she argues that constraints act as
limits on social constructivism and representationalism; by ruling out cer-
tain possibilities, they "enable scientific inquiry to tell us something about
reality and not only about ourselves" (Hayles 1991b, 79).8 In short, con-
straints introduce negation into representation and thus permit some mini-
mal form of escape from the confines of language.
To explain how this happens, Hayles maps the relationship between rep-
resentation and constraint onto a modified Greimasian semiotic square as
shown in figure 1.9 Such a mapping helps to reveal the fundamental inca-
pacity of our representations to coincide with reality and, in so doing, to
open a different, nonrepresentationalist or antirepresentationalist form of
contact with the real (what Hayles calls "elusive negativity").
exclusion
(inconsistent) False
(unknown)
Not-True
_
exclusion
True
overlap
Not-False (consistent)
(unoccupied)
By contrasting the positions of true and false, Hayles is able to establish
that language's capacity to touch on the world must stem from the function
of negation: while the position of the true cannot be occupied since we can-
not step outside representation to verify the congruence between it and the
unmediated flux it represents, the false is occupied in cases where a given
representation is inconsistent with specific aspects of the reality under inter-
rogation. With the shift to the more complex relation between the not-false
(consistent with the flux as it is interactively experienced) and the not-true
•
39
inscriptional paradigm is less a deep philosophical divide than a variant emphasis: whereas Latour is most interested in explaining the complex process of social translation that underlies all techno scientific production, Hayles focuses on the limitations of epistemology, on the "cusp " separating representation from the real . Latour's inscriptional model is predicated on a denial of the external referent, such that reality becomes the creation of a constructed system of internal reference (e.g., the adequation and superim posibility of reports ) . Hayles's constrained constructivism, by contrast, fol lows the relationship between representation and " unmediated flux " to the point at which it breaks down. Beginning from the (constructivist) position that " everything we perceive, think, or do is always already a representa tion, not reality as such, " Hayles pressures the role of constraint and its rela tionship to representation. Specifically, she argues that constraints act as limits on social constructivism and representationalism; by ruling out cer tain possibilities, they " enable scientific inquiry to tell us something about reality and not only about ourselves" (Hayles 1 9 9 1 b, 79 ) . 8 In short, con straints introduce negation into representation and thus permit some mini mal form of escape from the confines of language. To explain how this happens, Hayles maps the relationship between rep resentation and constraint onto a modified Greimasian semiotic square as shown in figure 1 . 9 Such a mapping helps to reveal the fundamental inca pacity of our representations to coincide with reality and, in so doing, to open a different, nonrepresentationalist or antirepresentationalist form of contact with the real (what Hayles calls " elusive negativity " ) .
(unknown because untested in relation to the flux), Hayles expands the
asymmetry in a way that reinforces the crucial role played by negation:
"Between the negated categories of not-false and not-true, two kinds of
(i nconsistent)
False
..
( u n k n own)
Not-True
...
excl usion overlap
True
(unoccu pied)
Not- False
(co nsistent)
By contrasting the positions of true and false, Hayles is able to establish that language's capacity to touch on the world must stem from the function of negation: while the position of the true cannot be occupied since we can not step outside representation to verify the congruence between it and the unmediated flux it represents, the false is occupied in cases where a given representation is inconsistent with specific aspects of the reality under inter rogation. With the shift to the more complex relation between the not-false ( consistent with the flux as it is interactively experienced ) and the not-true ( unknown because untested in relation to the flux) , Hayles expands the asymmetry in a way that reinforces the crucial role played by negation: " Between the negated categories of not-false and not-true, two kinds of
40
40 * Embodying Technesis
oppositions are in play. One is a polarity between negation and affimation
(false/true), the other between indefinite and definite (unknown/consistent).
This ambiguity folds together the ability to negate with the ability to spec-
ify. In doing so, it opens an escape hatch from the prison house of language"
(81; emphasis added). In expanding this argument, Hayles stresses the
excess negativity of the not-true; as the "negative of a negative," the not-
true yields a double-marking that renders its status indeterminate and inar-
ticulable. Ultimately, Hayles argues, this ambiguous double negativity of the
not-true permits the reintroduction of external reference in a highly con-
torted, doubly inverted form.
The relation of constraints to representation can now be articulated more
precisely . . . At the cusp [of the theater of representation], the interactions
expressed by these representations [of constraints] have no positive content.
•
Em bod y i n g
Technesis
oppositions are in play. One is a polarity between negation and affimation ( false/true) , the other between indefinite and definite (unknownlconsistent) .
This ambiguity folds together the ability to negate with the ability to spec ify. In doing so, it opens an escape hatch from the prison house of language " ( 8 1 ; emphasis added ) . In expanding this argument, Hayles stresses the excess negativity of the not-true; as the " negative of a negative, " the not true yields a double-marking that renders its status indeterminate and inar ticulable. Ultimately, Hayles argues, this ambiguous double negativity of the not-true permits the reintroduction of external reference in a highly con torted, doubly inverted form.
The inability of language to specify these interactions as such is itself
expressed by the elusive negativity that exists within the not-true position.
... At the positive ("true") end of the diagonal [connecting the true and the
not-true], the limits imply that we cannot speak the truth. At the negative
("not-true") end, they paradoxically perform the positive function of gestur-
ing toward that which cannot be spoken. Elusive negativity, precisely
because of its doubly negative position, opens onto the flux that cannot be
represented in itself. (83)
Unlike Latour's internalist semiotic, Hayles's model seeks to address pre-
cisely that dimension of the material flux that lies beyond the grasp of rep-
resentation and the inscriptional model Latour shares with most proponents
of science studies. Through its extrinsic resistance to the textualist ideology,
constrained constructivism thus preserves the dualism that Latour rejects.
Where Latour takes pains to deny the cogency of an external Nature that
would preexist, rather than be derived from, the process of construction,
Hayles strives to preserve the autonomy of the material flux (Nature), while
The relation of constraints to representation can now be articulated more precisely . . . . At the cusp [of the theater of representation] , the interactions expressed by these representations [of constraints] have no positive content. The inability of language to specify these interactions as such is itself expressed by the elusive negativity that exists within the not-true position . . . . At the positive ( " true " ) end of the diagonal [connecting the true and the not-true] , the limits imply that we cannot speak the truth. At the negative ( "not-true " ) end, they paradoxically perform the positive function of gestur ing toward that which cannot be spoken. Elusive negativity, precisely because of its doubly negative position, opens onto the flux that cannot be represented in itself. ( 8 3 )
nonetheless developing a means of accessing it through language.
Elusive negativity reveals a synergy between physical and semiotic con-
straints that brings language in touch with the world. Physical constraints, by
their consistency, allude to a reality beyond themselves that they cannot
speak; semiotic constraints, by generating excess negativity, encode this allu-
sion into language . . . Our interactions with the flux are always richer and
more ambiguous than language can represent. Elusive negativity, acknowl-
edging this gap, gestures toward this richness and so provides a place within
semiotic systems to signify the unspeakable . . . (83)
Precisely such acknowledgment of the excess of the material flux forms the
prerequisite for a nonreductive engagement with technology beyond the
narrow frame of epistemology and language.10
Unlike Latour's internalist semiotic, Hayles's model seeks t o address pre cisely that dimension of the material flux that lies beyond the grasp of rep resentation and the inscriptional model Latour shares with most proponents of science studies. Through its extrinsic resistance to the textualist ideology, constrained constructivism thus preserves the dualism that Latour rej ects. Where Latour takes pains to deny the cogency of an external Nature that would preexist, rather than be derived from, the process of construction, Hayles strives to preserve the autonomy of the material flux (Nature) , while nonetheless developing a means of accessing it through language. Elusive negativity reveals a synergy between physical and semiotic con straints that brings language in touch with the world. Physical constraints, by their consistency, allude to a reality beyond themselves that they cannot speak; semiotic constraints, by generating excess negativity, encode this allu sion into language . . . . Our interactions with the flux are always richer and more ambiguous than language can represent. Elusive negativity, acknowl edging this gap, gestures toward this richness and so provides a place within semiotic systems to signify the unspeakable . . . . ( 8 3 )
Precisely such acknowledgment o f the excess o f the material flux forms the prerequisite for a nonreductive engagement with technology beyond the narrow frame of epistemology and language. 10
Tech noculture a n d E m b od i ment . 4 1
Technoculture and Embodiment * 41
Because her aim is to locate the unspeakable excess of the real within the
space of language, however, Hayles does not actually consider what I would
see as the broadest implications of her argument: how we actually do expe-
rience the richness and ambiguity of our nonlinguistic interactions with the
flux. Still, simply by indicating the incapacity of representation to account
adequately for our interactions with the flux, she indicates the direction for
such an analysis. Indeed, her effort furnishes a strong testament to the need
for a postrepresentationalist, postconstructivist account of our practical,
embodied existence.
It is therefore not surprising to find Hayles, in another of her recent arti-
cles, engaged in an attempt to bridge the divide between a semiotic and a
phenomenological account of technology. In "The Materiality of Informat-
ics" (1992), she turns her attention explicitly to the relation between tech-
nological change and embodied experience, in what I cannot help but see as
an inchoate gesture toward a postepistemological engagement with the real.
By stressing the irreducibility of embodiment in our experience of techno-
logical change, Hayles is able to counter the persistent identification of tech-
nology with dematerialization and decorporealization that has become a
staple of postmodern cultural criticism. For Hayles and the theorists on
whom she draws (Paul Connerton, Merleau-Ponty, Bourdieu, Varela, Mark
Johnson, etc.), cognitive and representationalist constructions are them-
selves rooted in precognitive, prerepresentational embodied experience.
Accordingly, if we expand the field of her argument beyond the "theater of
representation," we can see that embodiment in fact forms a kind of practi-
cal analogue to the negatively inscribed material flux central to the con-
strained constructivism model; as a prerepresentationalist locus for experi-
ence prior to its mediation through representation, the body negotiates
between the flux (identified with the technological infrastructure of the
world) and our discursive knowledge systems. Embodiment, in short, con-
stitutes our practical means of interaction with the material flux and with
the material reality of technology beyond the theater of representation.
Latour and the Socialization of Technology
Perhaps the advantages of Hayles's approach can most easily be grasped by
way of contrast with Latour. Where Latour thematizes technology exclu-
sively as the materialization of (scientific or extrascientific) human, social
intentions, Hayles accords it a far more complex role as mediator (via its
impact on
embodiment) between
autonomous material flux itself.
the discursive domain and the
Because her aim is to locate the unspeakable excess of the real within the space of language, however, Hayles does not actually consider what I would see as the broadest implications of her argument: how we actually do expe rience the richness and ambiguity of our non linguistic interactions with the flux. Still, simply by indicating the incapacity of representation to account adequately for our interactions with the flux, she indicates the direction for such an analysis. Indeed, her effort furnishes a strong testament to the need for a postrepresentationalist, postconstructivist account of our practical, embodied existence. It is therefore not surprising to find Hayles, in another of her recent arti cles, engaged in an attempt to bridge the divide between a semiotic and a phenomenological account of technology. In "The Materiality of Informat ics " ( 1 992 ) , she turns her attention explicitly to the relation between tech nological change and embodied experience, in what I cannot help but see as an inchoate gesture toward a postepistemological engagement with the real. By stressing the irreducibility of embodiment in our experience of techno logical change, Hayles is able to counter the persistent identification of tech nology with dematerialization and decorporealization that has become a staple of postmodern cultural criticism. For Hayles and the theorists on whom she draws (Paul Connerton, Merleau-Ponty, Bourdieu, Varela, Mark Johnson, etc . ) , cognitive and representationalist constructions are them selves rooted in precognitive, prerepresentational embodied experience. Accordingly, if we expand the field of her argument beyond the "theater of representation, " we can see that embodiment in fact forms a kind of practi cal analogue to the negatively inscribed material flux central to the con strained constructivism model; as a prerepresentationalist locus for experi ence prior to its mediation through representation, the body negotiates between the flux (identified with the technological infrastructure of the world) and our discursive knowledge systems. Embodiment, in short, con stitutes our practical means of interaction with the material flux and with the material reality of technology beyond the theater of representation.
Latour and the Socialization of Technology
Perhaps the advantages of Hayles's approach can most easily be grasped by way of contrast with Latour. Where Latour thematizes technology exclu sively as the materialization of (scientific or extra scientific ) human, social intentions, Hayles accords it a far more complex role as mediator ( via its impact on embodiment) between the discursive domain and the autonomous material flux itself.
42
42 * Embodying Technesis
In We Have Never Been Modern, in Aramis, or the Love of Technology,
and in several recent essays, Latour explicitly extends the social ontology of
the quasi-object to embrace technology (Latour 1993b, 1996, 1992). As I
have already suggested, the operative principle behind this extension is an
alleged homology between science and technology: just as the successful
production of scientific facts hinges on processes of inscription and transla-
tion that accord them importance and solidity, the development of tech-
nologies centers on the materialization of textual-or as Latour puts it in
Aramis, purely fictional-technological projects. In a sense then, technolo-
gies can be understood as extensions of the translation networks underlying
science as such. Since they culminate, if successful, in the production of
material (and not simply textual) artifacts, they add one last step to the
process of translation: they "transform into an object" what otherwise
would remain "a project in the file drawers" (Latour 1996, 24).
The processes of translation that produce technological artifacts do,
however, differ in one important respect from those underlying the produc-
tion of scientific facts. Latour argues that since a technological project "does
not exist . . . at the outset" and cannot exist as long as it is in the project
phase, the analysis of technologies has a certain measure of freedom to
evade the burden of realism that weighs on science. He maintains that sci-
entific analysis must grapple with the heritage of realist epistemology, with
the constitutive notion that the sciences "seem to have discovered a world
that came into being without men and without sciences." By contrast, tech-
nologies emerge from a protected, fictional space and come into contact
with embodied reality only in their final stages. As Latour puts it, "[n]o one
is a Platonist where technology is concerned," since it would be absurd to
assert that a technology "was always already there, even before it was dis-
covered" (23). On his reckoning, this measure of freedom enjoins the tech-
nological analyst to deconstruct the divide separating signs and things, to
understand it as a nondiscrete and progressive functional differentiation.
The observer of technologies has to be very careful not to differentiate too
hastily between signs and things, between projects and objects, between
fiction and reality, between a novel about feelings and what is inscribed in the
nature of things. In fact, the engineers the observer is studying pass progres-
sively from one of these sets to another. The R-312 [a bus project in Paris]
was a text; now it's a thing. Once a carcass, it will eventually revert to the
carcass state. Aramis was a text; it came close to becoming, it nearly became,
it might have become, an object, an institution, a means of transportation in
Paris. In the archives, it turns back into a text, a technological fiction. The
capacity of a text to weigh itself down with reality, or, on the contrary, to
•
Em bod y i n g
Technesis
In We Have Never Been Modern, in Aramis, or the Love of Technology, and in several recent essays, Latour explicitly extends the social ontology of the quasi-obj ect to embrace technology ( Latour 1 99 3 b, 1 9 96, 1 992 ) . As I have already suggested, the operative principle behind this extension is an alleged homology between science and technology: just as the successful production of scientific facts hinges on processes of inscription and transla tion that accord them importance and solidity, the development of tech nologies centers on the materialization of textual-or as Latour puts it in Aramis, purely fictional-technological proj ects. In a sense then, technolo gies can be understood as extensions of the translation networks underlying science as such. Since they culminate, if successful, in the production of material ( and not simply textual ) artifacts, they add one last step to the process of translation : they "transform into an obj ect " what otherwise would remain "a proj ect in the file drawers " (Latour 1 9 96, 24 ) . The processes o f translation that produce technological artifacts do, however, differ in one important respect from those underlying the produc tion of scientific facts. Latour argues that since a technological proj ect " does not exist . . . at the outset " and cannot exist as long as it is in the proj ect phase, the analysis of technologies has a certain measure of freedom to evade the burden of realism that weighs on science. He maintains that sci entific analysis must grapple with the heritage of realist epistemology, with the constitutive notion that the sciences " seem to have discovered a world that came into being without men and without sciences . " By contrast, tech nologies emerge from a protected, fictional space and come into contact with embodied reality only in their final stages. As Latour puts it, " [n] o one is a Platonist where technology is concerned," since it would be absurd to assert that a technology " was always already there, even before it was dis covered " (23 ) . On his reckoning, this measure of freedom enjoins the tech nological analyst to deconstruct the divide separating signs and things, to understand it as a nondiscrete and progressive functional differentiation. The observer of technologies has to be very careful not to differentiate too hastily between signs and things, between proj ects and obj ects, between fiction and reality, between a novel about feelings and what is inscribed in the nature of things. In fact, the engineers the observer is studying pass progres sively from one of these sets to another. The R-3 1 2 [a bus project in Paris] was a text; now it's a thing. Once a carcass, it will eventually revert to the carcass state. Aramis was a text; it came close to becoming, it nearly became, it might have become, an obj ect, an institution, a means of transportation in Paris. In the archives, it turns back into a text, a technological fiction. The capacity of a text to weigh itself down with reality, or, on the contrary, to
Tech noculture a n d E m b od i ment
Technoculture and Embodiment * 43
lighten its load of reality, is what endows fictional technologies with a beauty
that the novel we've inherited from the nineteenth century has difficulty man-
ifesting nowadays. Only a fiction that gains or loses reality can do justice to
the engineers. . . A fiction with a "variable geometry": this is what needs to
be invented, if we are to track the variations of a technological project that
has the potential to become an object. (24-25)
•
43
lighten its load of reality, is what endows fictional technologies with a beauty that the novel we've inherited from the nineteenth century has difficulty man ifesting nowadays. Only a fiction that gains or loses reality can do j ustice to the engineers . . . A fiction with a "variable geometry " : this is what needs to be invented, if we are to track the variations of a technological proj ect that has the potential to become an obj ect. (24-2 5 )
By isolating technology in this way, however, Latour decisively narrows the
scope of his account. Bluntly put, he privileges the genesis of technology at
the expense of what I would call its "perverse performativity." His exclusive
focus on the trajectory leading from textual project to technological materi-
alization simply leaves out an entire dimension of technological materiality:
the unintended, "after-the-fact" effects technologies have once they enter
into existence. Not only does Latour thus trivialize the functional autonomy
that technologies do enjoy after they "gain reality," but he also imposes a
reductive frame on embodiment as such. While technologies would appear
to invert the path of science and to involve a recovery (not a forgetting) of
the material processes underlying them, their contact with embodied reality,
though not always predictable and expected, remains limited in scope. Inso-
far as it constitutes a challenge to be conquered, embodied reality is
restricted to material factors that bear directly on the social and scientific
intention that a particular technology would materialize. All other material
effects that a technology does or could produce-and indeed, the entire
dimension of technology's extrascientific practical impact-simply gets
bracketed out.
To observe this reduction in action, let us focus on a concrete example of
Latour's technological analysis-his account of an automated door-closer.
In exposing the impoverished "ontology" underlying his procedure, my
intention is not to harp on the limitations of Latour's model but to broaden
his focalization of embodiment in order to address the realist dimension of
technology-the potential of any technology, once instituted, to generate
effects outside the "fictional" space governing its genesis. As we will see,
Latour's exclusive concern with challenging the asymmetry structuring the
human-nonhuman relation orients his thematization of technology too nar-
rowly around functional issues directly embedded in the particular con-
structed situation (or quasi-object) at issue.
In "Where Are the Missing Masses? The Sociology of a Few Mundane
Artifacts," Latour offers a concrete analysis of a particular technological
lineage to illustrate a general methodological claim: that any technology,
insofar as it instantiates a program of action, involves a complex network
composed of both human
and nonhuman
elements. "Students of
B y isolating technology i n this way, however, Latour decisively narrows the scope of his account. Bluntly put, he privileges the genesis of technology at the expense of what I would call its "perverse performativity. " His exclusive focus on the traj ectory leading from textual proj ect to technological materi alization simply leaves out an entire dimension of technological materiality: the unintended, " after-the-fact" effects technologies have once they enter into existence. Not only does Latour thus trivialize the functional autonomy that technologies do enjoy after they " gain reality, " but he also imposes a reductive frame on embodiment as such. While technologies would appear to invert the path of science and to involve a recovery (not a forgetting ) of the material processes underlying them, their contact with embodied reality, though not always predictable and expected, remains limited in scope. Inso far as it constitutes a challenge to be conquered, embodied reality is restricted to material factors that bear directly on the social and scientific intention that a particular technology would materialize. All other material effects that a technology does or could produce-and indeed, the entire dimension of technology's extra scientific practical impact-simply gets bracketed out. To observe this reduction in action, let us focus on a concrete example of Latour's technological analysis-his account of an automated door-closer. In exposing the impoverished " ontology" underlying his procedure, my intention is not to harp on the limitations of Latour's model but to broaden his focalization of embodiment in order to address the realist dimension of technology-the potential of any technology, once instituted, to generate effects outside the " fictional " space governing its genesis. As we will see, Latour's exclusive concern with challenging the asymmetry structuring the human-nonhuman relation orients his thematization of technology too nar rowly around functional issues directly embedded in the particular con structed situation ( or quasi-object) at issue. In "Where Are the Missing Masses? The Sociology of a Few Mundane Artifacts, " Latour offers a concrete analysis of a particular technological lineage to illustrate a general methodological claim: that any technology, insofar as it instantiates a program of action, involves a complex network composed of both human and nonhuman elements. " Students of
44
44 * Embodying Technesis
technology," proclaims Latour, "are never faced with people on the one
hand and things on the other, they are faced with programs of action, sec-
tions of which are endowed to parts of humans, while other sections are
entrusted to parts of nonhumans" (Latour 1992, 254). To illustrate the
force of his claim, Latour presents an example involving a particular door
on which is posted a notice reading (in French): "The Groom Is On Strike,
For God's Sake, Keep The Door Closed." ("Groom," Latour reminds us, is
"Frenglish" for an automated door-closer or butler [227].) Since the notice
could apply equally to a doorperson and an automated door-closer, it inter-
ests Latour as an expression of the reciprocal symmetry structuring relations
between the human and the nonhuman: it captures the crossover from the
nonhuman to the human sphere that is involved in attributing an intentional
action (going on strike) to an inanimate mechanism (an automated door-
closer). And it does so, importantly, without relying on the asymmetrical
figure of anthropomorphism, a figure that would privilege the human (and
"rhetoric") as a "general equivalent," a "literal" term onto which every-
thing else would be mapped. By guarding the nonhuman from such reduc-
tion, the network constituted by this notice-a complex fusion of "labor
relations, religion, advertisement, and technique"-opens up what Latour
calls "the missing masses of our society" (227).
To trace the network underlying the posting of this statement, Latour
begins by considering the role of the door. Doors allow us to pass through
walls without having first to break holes through them. By measuring the
work a door spares us from, we can isolate the role of "displacement or
translation or delegation or shifting"-the core notion of Latour's model of
technology. As Latour explains, we thereby acquire a basic counterfactual
method, a sort of practical calculus, for assessing the function of technolo-
gies: "As a more general descriptive rule, every time you want to know what
a nonhuman does, simply imagine what other humans or other nonhumans
would have to do were this character not present" (229). In accordance with
this rule, technologies are thematized as functional equivalents of specific
tasks that would otherwise have to be delegated either to human or other
nonhuman actants.
Far from standing alone, as some kind of abstract governing principle,
this descriptive rule immediately returns us to the practical; specifically, it
inaugurates an analytic path that traces the dialectical series of translations
involved in solving the particular practical issue of how to insure that a door
closes properly at all times. On the analysis Latour offers, this series begins
with one specific problem with doors: their tendency to remain open if peo-
ple passing through them do not remember to close them. This problem can
•
Em bod y i n g
Technesis
technology, " proclaims Latour, " are never faced with people on the one hand and things on the other, they are faced with programs of action, sec tions of which are endowed to parts of humans, while other sections are entrusted to parts of nonhumans" (Latour 1 992, 254 ) . To illustrate the force of his claim, Latour presents an example involving a particular door on which is posted a notice reading (in French ) : " The Groom Is On Strike, For God's Sake, Keep The Door Closed. " ( " Groom, " Latour reminds us, is " Frenglish" for an automated door-closer or butler [227] . ) Since the notice could apply equally to a doorperson and an automated door-closer, it inter ests Latour as an expression of the reciprocal symmetry structuring relations between the human and the nonhuman: it captures the crossover from the nonhuman to the human sphere that is involved in attributing an intentional action (going on strike ) to an inanimate mechanism ( an automated door closer ) . And it does so, importantly, without relying on the asymmetrical figure of anthropomorphism, a figure that would privilege the human ( and " rhetoric " ) as a " general equivalent, " a " literal" term onto which every thing else would be mapped. By guarding the nonhuman from such reduc tion, the network constituted by this notice-a complex fusion of " labor relations, religion, advertisement, and technique "-opens up what Latour calls " the missing masses of our society" (227) . To trace the network underlying the posting of this statement, Latour begins by considering the role of the door. Doors allow us to pass through walls without having first to break holes through them. By measuring the work a door spares us from, we can isolate the role of " displacement or translation or delegation or shifting "-the core notion of Latour's model of technology. As Latour explains, we thereby acquire a basic counterfactual method, a sort of practical calculus, for assessing the function of technolo gies: " As a more general descriptive rule, every time you want to know what a nonhuman does, simply imagine what other humans or other nonhumans would have to do were this character not present" (229 ) . In accordance with this rule, technologies are thematized as functional equivalents of specific tasks that would otherwise have to be delegated either to human or other nonhuman actants. Far from standing alone, as some kind of abstract governing principle, this descriptive rule immediately returns us to the practical; specifically, it inaugurates an analytic path that traces the dialectical series of translations involved in solving the particular practical issue of how to insure that a door closes properly at all times. On the analysis Latour offers, this series begins with one specific problem with doors: their tendency to remain open if peo ple passing through them do not remember to close them. This problem can
Tech noculture a n d E m b od i ment
Technoculture and Embodiment * 45
be solved in (at least) two ways-either by disciplining all the people who
use a given door or by hiring a doorman (also a "groom" in French). While
promising for its sheer simplicity, even this latter expedient cannot guaran-
tee a solution, since the doorman may be unreliable or occupied with other
tasks. Of course, the groom may be disciplined, but only at a cost far out of
proportion with the minimal effect it would bring about. At this point,
Latour suggests, one can take recourse to the nonhuman, substituting for
the unreliable human a "delegated nonhuman character" devoted solely to
opening and closing the door. Yet even this move cannot entirely resolve the
matter, since it introduces other difficulties, such as the door's slamming too
violently (231). If this and all subsequent problems may be solved through
further intermediate steps, all such local solutions will potentially introduce
new difficulties of their own, following an apparently never-ending dialecti-
cal pattern.
While it might appear to engage embodied reality in a robust manner, the
attention Latour lends the small "realities" of context remains purely instru-
mental: far from actually foregrounding the recalcitrance of material con-
text, he invokes local factors as provisional obstacles that are important
only insofar as they stimulate further translations and thus extend particu-
lar networks or quasi-objects under construction in particular instances.
Even if he remains enough of a realist to acknowledge the impossibility of
any "perfect" technological solution, Latour finds himself compelled to
abjure the qualified autonomy he would accord embodied reality, in order
to champion a monist ontology of social actants. To deconstruct the cate-
gorical divide between the human and the nonhuman, that is, he must focus
narrowly on the paths traced by actors, both human and nonhuman, skilled
and unskilled, as they exchange properties according to the logic of transla-
tion. Such a restricted focus, Latour would seem to suggest, is required if we
are to understand the implications of the notice posted on the door; only by
bracketing embodied reality as such will we be able to articulate the hybrid
ontology that would allow us, coherently, to attribute the property of being
"on strike" to an inanimate technical object. On such a view, claiming that
the groom is "on strike" does not so much anthropomorphize an automated
door-closer as expose the process of delegation that underlies its function;
since the groom performs the very same program of action that might alter-
natively be performed by a human actor, the practical effect of its no longer
functioning is equivalent to the effect of the human actor leaving his or her
post. In either case, to say that the groom (nonhuman or human) is "on
strike" is simply to say that this program of action, of which the groom is
an essential part, is not being performed.
•
45
be solved in ( at least) two ways-either by disciplining all the people who use a given door or by hiring a doorman (also a "groom" in French ) . While promising for its sheer simplicity, even this latter expedient cannot guaran tee a solution, since the doorman may be unreliable or occupied with other tasks . Of course, the groom may be disciplined, but only at a cost far out of proportion with the minimal effect it would bring about. At this point, Latour suggests, one can take recourse to the nonhuman, substituting for the unreliable human a " delegated nonhuman character " devoted solely to opening and closing the door. Yet even this move cannot entirely resolve the matter, since it introduces other difficulties, such as the door's slamming too violently (23 1 ) . If this and all subsequent problems may be solved through further intermediate steps, all such local solutions will potentially introduce new difficulties of their own, following an apparently never-ending dialecti cal pattern. While it might appear to engage embodied reality in a robust manner, the attention Latour lends the small "realities" of context remains purely instru mental: far from actually foregrounding the recalcitrance of material con text, he invokes local factors as provisional obstacles that are important only insofar as they stimulate further translations and thus extend particu lar networks or quasi-obj ects under construction in particular instances. Even if he remains enough of a realist to acknowledge the impossibility of any " perfect" technological solution, Latour finds himself compelled to abj ure the qualified autonomy he would accord embodied reality, in order to champion a monist ontology of social actants. To deconstruct the cate gorical divide between the human and the nonhuman, that is, he must focus narrowly on the paths traced by actors, both human and nonhuman, skilled and unskilled, as they exchange properties according to the logic of transla tion. Such a restricted focus, Latour would seem to suggest, is required if we are to understand the implications of the notice posted on the door; only by bracketing embodied reality as such will we be able to articulate the hybrid ontology that would allow us, coherently, to attribute the property of being " on strike " to an inanimate technical obj ect. On such a view, claiming that the groom is " on strike " does not so much anthropomorphize an automated door-closer as expose the process of delegation that underlies its function; since the groom performs the very same program of action that might alter natively be performed by a human actor, the practical effect of its no longer functioning is equivalent to the effect of the human actor leaving his or her post. In either case, to say that the groom (nonhuman or human ) is " on strike " is simply to say that this program of action, of which the groom is an essential part, is not being performed.
46
46 * Embodying Technesis
Under the guise of advancing a radical symmetry between human and
nonhuman actants, however, Latour seems quite content to perpetuate the
long-standing subordination of technology to human and social intentional-
ity. For Latour, and for science studies more generally, it remains the case
that humans alone make machines and hence that the origin of every
machine can be traced back to some originary human function that it either
extends or replaces. Because of his exclusive focus on the genesis of tech-
nology, Latour's effort to treat technologies as quasi-objects effectively
insures a privileging of the intention of the human actor and perhaps even
of the technological analyst himself. Not only does he make no effort to hide
his belief that technologies cannot have purposes on their own, but-as the
following example will demonstrate-he seems to think that technologies
are fully accounted for when we understand how they embody or material-
ize what is ultimately a concrete human purpose, intention, or desire.
After fruitlessly imploring his young son Robinson not to sit in the mid-
dle of the rear car seat, Latour describes how he purchased and installed a
device that connects the headrests of the two front seats of his car. This
process allows Latour to materialize his intention in an artifactual form: "I
have," he concludes, "delegated the continuous injunction of my voice and
extension of my right arm . . . to a reinforced, padded, steel bar" (249).
Drawing on the analogy between technological shifting-out and similar lit-
erary procedures, Latour roots his analytic method in a literary process-
translation-that moves outward from a privileged source text.11 By appro-
priating the method of linguists with certain modifications, Latour
maintains, students of technology can combine syntagmatic and paradig-
matic dimensions to describe the "dynamic of an artifact"-how an artifact
translates what was originally a human intention or desire: "The syntag-
matic dimension becomes the AND dimension (how many elements are tied
together), and the paradigmatic dimension becomes the OR dimension
(how many translations are necessary in order to move through the AND
dimension). I could not tie Robinson to the order ["Don't sit in the middle
of the rear seat!"], but through a detour and a translation I now hold
together my will and my son" (251).
In focusing narrowly on the genesis of a given technological solution, this
account (and even this choice of example) neglects the other side of tech-
nology-what I have called its "perverse performativity." By subordinating
technology to human intentionality and by thematizing it narrowly as the
materialization of an articulated human or social program, Latour conflates
embodiment and discourse in a way that simply brackets out the far vaster
domain of embodied experience where human beings actually live through
•
Em bod y i n g
Technesis
Under the guise of advancing a radical symmetry between human and nonhuman actants, however, Latour seems quite content to perpetuate the long-standing subordination of technology to human and social intentional ity. For Latour, and for science studies more generally, it remains the case that humans alone make machines and hence that the origin of every machine can be traced back to some originary human function that it either extends or replaces. Because of his exclusive focus on the genesis of tech nology, Latour's effort to treat technologies as quasi-obj ects effectively insures a privileging of the intention of the human actor and perhaps even of the technological analyst himself. Not only does he make no effort to hide his belief that technologies cannot have purposes on their own, but-as the following example will demonstrate-he seems to think that technologies are fully accounted for when we understand how they embody or material ize what is ultimately a concrete human purpose, intention, or desire. After fruitlessly imploring his young son Robinson not to sit in the mid dle of the rear car seat, Latour describes how he purchased and installed a device that connects the headrests of the two front seats of his car. This process allows Latour to materialize his intention in an artifactual form: " I have," h e concludes, " delegated the continuous inj unction o f m y voice and extension of my right arm . . . to a reinforced, padded, steel bar " (249 ) . Drawing o n the analogy between technological shifting-out and similar lit erary procedures, Latour roots his analytic method in a literary process translation-that moves outward from a privileged source text . l 1 By appro priating the method of linguists with certain modifications, Latour maintains, students of technology can combine syntagmatic and paradig matic dimensions to describe the " dynamic of an artifact "-how an artifact translates what was originally a human intention or desire: " The syntag matic dimension becomes the AND dimension (how many elements are tied together) , and the paradigmatic dimension becomes the OR dimension (how many translations are necessary in order to move through the AND dimension) . I could not tie Robinson to the order [ " Don't sit in the middle of the rear seat! " ] , but through a detour and a translation I now hold together my will and my son " (25 1 ) . In focusing narrowly on the genesis of a given technological solution, this account (and even this choice of example) neglects the other side of tech nology-what I have called its "perverse performativity. " By subordinating technology to human intentionality and by thematizing it narrowly as the materialization of an articulated human or social program, Latour conflates embodiment and discourse in a way that simply brackets out the far vaster domain of embodied experience where human beings actually live through
Tech noculture a n d E m b od i ment
Technoculture and Embodiment * 47
the diffuse and unrepresentable impact technologies have as material forces
of the real. As Latour readily admits, all attempts to embody disciplinary
processes in concrete technologies involve the delegation of "the selective
attitudes" of engineers to nonhuman actants (233). By thus restricting tech-
nologies, Latour simply turns his back on their broader, arguably more
significant experiential impact-on the way, for example, that they funda-
mentally alter our experience of space and time or of our own bodies,
beyond the scope of all inscriptional or representational processes.12
Embodiment beyond Cultural Ritual
Hayles's account rescues embodied experience from the neglect it suffers in
•
47
the diffuse and unrepresentable impact technologies have as material forces of the real. As Latour readily admits, all attempts to embody disciplinary processes in concrete technologies involve the delegation of " the selective attitudes" of engineers to nonhuman actants (23 3 ) . By thus restricting tech nologies, Latour simply turns his back on their broader, arguably more significant experiential impact-on the way, for example, that they funda mentally alter our experience of space and time or of our own bodies, beyond the scope of all inscriptional or representational processes ,12
Latour's analysis. Because she readily acknowledges the inevitable reduction
involved when we move from the domain of embodied practice to the dis-
cursive constructions that bubble up from it, Hayles retains the separation
between discourse and embodiment that the concept of the quasi-object
tends to collapse. In so doing, she is able to introduce a crucial distinction
E mbodiment beyond Cultural Ritual
between two forms of embodiment: the bodily dimension proper to human
experience and the materialization of information in a physical medium.
Not only does she focus her analysis of technology on the former, properly
human form of embodiment, but she differentiates it from the normative
abstraction of the body in a way that exceeds the grasp of inscription. Inso-
far as it is "contextual" and "enwebbed within the specifics of place, time,
physiology and culture," embodiment defines the excess characteristic of
robust experience against the abstraction inevitably involved in construc-
tions of the body (Hayles 1992, 154-55). While embodiment, during any
given period, is in "continual interaction" with contemporaneous construc-
tions of the body, it also possesses a materiality and concreteness that dis-
tance it from those constructions and undermine their descriptive sway.
Hayles gives the example of vaginal orgasm during the early twentieth cen-
tury, noting that women's experiences interacted with the normative con-
cept in a variety of ways, only one of which was correspondence. By stress-
ing how embodied experience is always "imbricated" within culture,
Hayles's example urges a deeper understanding of the experience of culture;
specifically, it suggests that embodied culture is more basic, as a means of
experiencing material reality, than the cultural constructs that spring up
from it: ". . . because embodiment is individually articulated, there is also at
least an incipient tension between it and hegemonic cultural constructs.
Embodiment is thus inherently destabilizing with respect to the body"
Hayles's account rescues embodied experience from the neglect it suffers in Latour's analysis. Because she readily acknowledges the inevitable reduction involved when we move from the domain of embodied practice to the dis cursive constructions that bubble up from it, Hayles retains the separation between discourse and embodiment that the concept of the quasi-obj ect tends to collapse. In so doing, she is able to introduce a crucial distinction between two forms of embodiment: the bodily dimension proper to human experience and the materialization of information in a physical medium. Not only does she focus her analysis of technology on the former, properly human form of embodiment, but she differentiates it from the normative abstraction of the body in a way that exceeds the grasp of inscription. Inso far as it is " contextual " and " enwebbed within the specifics of place, time, physiology and culture, " embodiment defines the excess characteristic of robust experience against the abstraction inevitably involved in construc tions of the body (Hayles 1 992, 1 54-5 5 ) . While embodiment, during any given period, is in " continual interaction " with contemporaneous construc tions of the body, it also possesses a materiality and concreteness that dis tance it from those constructions and undermine their descriptive sway. Hayles gives the example of vaginal orgasm during the early twentieth cen tury, noting that women's experiences interacted with the normative con cept in a variety of ways, only one of which was correspondence. By stress ing how embodied experience is always " imbricated " within culture, Hayles's example urges a deeper understanding of the experience of culture; specifically, it suggests that embodied culture is more basic, as a means of experiencing material reality, than the cultural constructs that spring up from it: " . . . because embodiment is individually articulated, there is also at least an incipient tension between it and hegemonic cultural constructs. Embodiment is thus inherently destabilizing with respect to the body"
48
48 * Embodying Technesis
(155). Following the lead of Elaine Scarry, Hayles's analysis of embodied
experience thus demonstrates that "bodily practices have a physical reality
which can never be fully assimilated into discourse" (153); they generate an
excess that becomes all the more significant, I suggest, given contemporary
technology's role in the material complexification of the cosmos.
Despite her effort to foreground the individuality and physicality of
human bodily experience, however, Hayles's decision to explicate it through
(what anthropologist Paul Connerton calls) "incorporating practices" effec-
tively reimposes the subordination of embodiment to the articulated logic of
culture. Even if it involves a more subtle, prediscursive form of articulation,
the very appearance of such a subordination in the work of a theorist
devoted to resisting the reduction of embodiment testifies both to our deeply
ingrained bias toward discursivity and to the extreme poverty of the con-
ceptual vocabulary available to us in our effort to rethink technology's
experiential impact. In the final instance, the lasting consequence of
Hayles's move is thus to lend a distinct, if covert, privilege to discursivity. As
the privileged category for describing the domain of embodiment, incorpo-
rating practices assimilate our embodied experience of technological change
into the space of structured cultural ritual and, in so doing, form a kind of
relay station on the path toward inscription. By predigesting the nondiscur-
sive, as it were, they make it ready for conversion into language. Hayles
explains:
First, incorporated knowledge retains improvisational elements that make it
contextual rather than abstract, tied to the circumstances of its instantiation.
Second, it is deeply sedimented into the body and highly resistant to change.
Third, it is partly screened from conscious view because it is habitual. Fourth,
because it is contextual, resistant to change, and obscure to the cogitating
mind, it has the power to define the boundaries within which conscious
thought takes place. To these four [characteristics] I want to add a fifth.
When changes in incorporating practices take place, they are often linked
with new technologies that affect how people use their bodies and experience
space and time. Formed by technology at the same time that it creates tech-
•
Em bod y i n g
Technesis
( 1 55 ) . Following the lead of Elaine Scarry, Hayles's analysis of embodied experience thus demonstrates that " bodily practices have a physical reality which can never be fully assimilated into discourse " ( 1 53 ) ; they generate an excess that becomes all the more significant, I suggest, given contemporary technology's role in the material complexification of the cosmos. Despite her effort to foreground the individuality and physicality of human bodily experience, however, Hayles's decision to explicate it through (what anthropologist Paul Connerton calls) " incorporating practices " effec tively reimposes the subordination of embodiment to the articulated logic of culture. Even if it involves a more subtle, pre discursive form of articulation, the very appearance of such a subordination in the work of a theorist devoted to resisting the reduction of embodiment testifies both to our deeply ingrained bias toward discursivity and to the extreme poverty of the con ceptual vocabulary available to us in our effort to rethink technology's experiential impact. In the final instance, the lasting consequence of Hayles's move is thus to lend a distinct, if covert, privilege to discursivity. As the privileged category for describing the domain of embodiment, incorpo rating practices assimilate our embodied experience of technological change into the space of structured cultural ritual and, in so doing, form a kind of relay station on the path toward inscription. By predigesting the nondiscur sive, as it were, they make it ready for conversion into language. Hayles explains:
nology, embodiment mediates between technology and discourse by creating
new experiential frameworks that serve as boundary markers for the creation
of corresponding discursive systems. In the feedback loop between techno-
logical innovations and discursive practices, incorporation is a crucial link.
(162-63; emphasis added)
Notwithstanding her insightful positioning of embodiment as both the
ground for the experiential processing of technological change and the
background for the production of discursive systems, Hayles's effort to link
these two functions in a causal relationship ultimately strips embodiment
First, incorporated knowledge retains improvisational elements that make it contextual rather than abstract, tied to the circumstances of its instantiation. Second, it is deeply sedimented into the body and highly resistant to change. Third, it is partly screened from conscious view because it is habitual . Fourth, because it is contextual, resistant to change, and obscure to the cogitating mind, it has the power to define the boundaries within which conscious thought takes place. To these four [characteristics] I want to add a fifth. When changes in incorporating practices take place, they are often linked with new technologies that affect how people use their bodies and experience space and time. Formed by technology at the same time that it creates tech nology, embodiment mediates between technology and discourse by creating new experiential frameworks that serve as boundary markers for the creation of corresponding discursive systems . In the feedback loop between techno logical innovations and discursive practices, incorporation is a crucial link. ( 1 62-63 ; emphasis added)
Notwithstanding her insightful positioning of embodiment as both the ground for the experiential processing of technological change and the background for the production of discursive systems, Hayles's effort to link these two functions in a causal relationship ultimately strips embodiment
Tech noculture a n d E m b od i ment
Technoculture and Embodiment * 49
of its constitutive excess over discourse.13 In the role of mediator between
technological change and discourse, embodiment does not emerge as an
autonomous experiential mode in its own right but instead retains its sub-
ordinate function as a means toward the production of discursive sys-
tems.14 In Hayles's own wording, embodiment creates "new experiential
frameworks that serve as boundary markers for the creation of corre-
sponding discursive systems." Though she does not say so explicitly, these
discursive systems remain the privileged focus of the critic, since they ulti-
mately furnish our sole means of cognitive access to our own robust
embodied response to technological change. What connects technology to
discourse is therefore not so much a bidirectional "feedback loop" as a lin-
ear process of emergence: via practices of incorporation, robust embodi-
ment is distilled into discourse. Consequently, though she opens the robust
domain of embodiment well beyond the normative boundaries of Fou-
cault's "body," as long as she assimilates embodiment to incorporating
practices, Hayles cannot entirely evade the critique she launches against
Foucault: she, too, tends to subordinate embodiment, if not to a normative
construct of the body, then at least to the discursive systems that make it
available to knowledge.15s
To avoid the philosophically overdetermined slide (back) into our default
mode of the theoretical,16 we must accordingly resist Hayles's identification
of embodiment with incorporating practices. Insofar as it narrows the dis-
tance between bodily and discursive action, such an identification risks col-
lapsing the autonomy so central to the promise of embodiment. By follow-
ing Connerton, Hayles in effect betrays her stated commitment to
embodiment: more precisely, she validates a reductive culturalist account of
embodiment as incorporating practice, as "an action that is encoded into
bodily memory by repeated performances until it becomes habitual" (157).
On this account, incorporating and inscribing practices are largely continu-
ous with one another and share the aim of "creat[ing] cultural constructs."
Hayles explains:
Posture and the extension of limbs in the space around the body, for exam-
ple, convey to children the gendered ways in which men and women occupy
space. These nonverbal lessons are frequently reinforced verbally: "boys
don't walk like that," or "girls don't sit with their legs open." It is significant
that verbal injunctions often take a negative form.., for the positive content
is much more effectively conveyed through incorporating rather than inscrib-
ing practices. It is easy to show someone how to stand but difficult to
describe all the nuances of the desired posture in words. Incorporating prac-
tices perform the bodily content; inscribing practices correct and modulate
the performance. (157)
•
49
of its constitutive excess over discourse . 1 3 In the role of mediator between technological change and discourse, embodiment does not emerge as an autonomous experiential mode in its own right but instead retains its sub ordinate function as a means toward the production of discursive sys tems . 14 In Hayles's own wording, embodiment creates " new experiential frameworks that serve as boundary markers for the creation of corre sponding discursive systems. " Though she does not say so explicitly, these discursive systems remain the privileged focus of the critic, since they ulti mately furnish our sole means of cognitive access to our own robust embodied response to technological change. What connects technology to discourse is therefore not so much a bidirectional " feedback loop " as a lin ear process of emergence: via practices of incorporation, robust embodi ment is distilled into discourse. Consequently, though she opens the robust domain of embodiment well beyond the normative boundaries of Fou cault's " body, " as long as she assimilates embodiment to incorporating practices, Hayles cannot entirely evade the critique she launches against Foucault: she, too, tends to subordinate embodiment, if not to a normative construct of the body, then at least to the discursive systems that make it a vailable to knowledge . 1 s T o avoid the philosophically overdetermined slide ( back) into our default mode of the theoretical,16 we must accordingly resist Hayles's identification of embodiment with incorporating practices. Insofar as it narrows the dis tance between bodily and discursive action, such an identification risks col lapsing the autonomy so central to the promise of embodiment. By follow ing Connerton, Hayles in effect betrays her stated commitment to embodiment: more precisely, she validates a reductive culturalist account of embodiment as incorporating practice, as " an action that is encoded into bodily memory by repeated performances until it becomes habitual " ( 1 5 7 ) . O n this account, incorporating and inscribing practices are largely continu ous with one another and share the aim of "creat [ing] cultural constructs . " Hayles explains: Posture and the extension of limbs in the space around the body, for exam ple, convey to children the gendered ways in which men and women occupy space. These nonverbal lessons are frequently reinforced verbally: " boys don't walk like that, " or " girls don't sit with their legs open. " It is significant that verbal inj unctions often take a negative form . . . for the positive content is much more effectively conveyed through incorporating rather than inscrib ing practices . It is easy to show someone how to stand but difficult to describe all the nuances of the desired posture in words . Incorporating prac tices perform the bodily content; inscribing practices correct and modulate the performance. ( 1 5 7)
50
50 * Embodying Technesis
Applied to such cultural practices as the performance of gendered behavior
or any of the examples Connerton develops (rituals, commemorative cere-
monies, etc.), this account of the continuity of incorporating and inscribing
practices remains perfectly coherent. When, however, we extrapolate it to
explain the role of embodiment in situations involving fundamental techno-
logical change, things appear altogether different. In such cases, embodi-
ment is not the product of logically ordered nonverbal sequences of actions
and movements designed to achieve specific, if not always acknowledged,
cultural goals; rather, embodiment here involves a far more passive, undi-
rected, and indeed emergent adaptation to new, largely unanticipated, and
certainly unthematized alterations in the material flux underlying and con-
ditioning the cultural horizon of experience. As the privileged vehicle for
our experience of material technological change, embodiment functions
beyond the scope of the kind of explicit, preconstructed, cultural hermeneu-
tic that ritual furnishes; accordingly, it must not be restricted to the cultur-
ally coded content of incorporating practices.
This conclusion echoes Pierre Bourdieu's defense of embodied experience
against the unnoticed but fundamental alterations that occur when it is
translated into theoretical representation. Contending that we simply can-
not account for the "pernicious alteration" that is "constitutive of the oper-
ation of knowing," Bourdieu argues for a discrete divide between the theo-
retical and practical attitudes (Bourdieu 1990, 27). More specifically, he
insists on the autonomy of what he calls the "practical sense," its status as
a bodily hermeneutic that is not only independent from cognitive-linguistic
understanding but situated below the level of conscious awareness. By artic-
ulating this practical sense with his concept of "habitus," Bourdieu suggests
its close ties to cultural ritual and other incorporating practices; yet his insis-
tence on the absolute divide between habit and intellection makes it clear
that practical sense cannot be clarified through ritual decoding, as it can in
Connerton's (and Hayles's) account of incorporating practices. In a key pas-
sage also cited by Hayles, Bourdieu insists on the ossification and imperme-
ability of values once they are "given body."
... principles em-bodied in this way [through habit] are placed beyond the
grasp of consciousness, and hence cannot be touched by voluntary, deliber-
ate transformation, cannot even be made explicit; nothing seems more inef-
fable, more incommunicable, more inimitable, and, therefore, more precious,
than the values given body, made body by the transubstantiation achieved by
the hidden persuasion of an implicit pedagogy. . . . (1977, 94; emphasis
added)17
•
Em bod y i n g
Technesis
Applied to such cultural practices as the performance of gendered behavior or any of the examples Connerton develops (rituals, commemorative cere monies, etc . ) , this account of the continuity of incorporating and inscribing practices remains perfectly coherent. When, however, we extrapolate it to explain the role of embodiment in situations involving fundamental techno logical change, things appear altogether different. In such cases, embodi ment is not the product of logically ordered nonverbal sequences of actions and movements designed to achieve specific, if not always acknowledged, cultural goals; rather, embodiment here involves a far more passive, undi rected, and indeed emergent adaptation to new, largely unanticipated, and certainly unthematized alterations in the material flux underlying and con ditioning the cultural horizon of experience. As the privileged vehicle for our experience of material technological change, embodiment functions beyond the scope of the kind of explicit, preconstructed, cultural hermeneu tic that ritual furnishes; accordingly, it must not be restricted to the cultur ally coded content of incorporating practices. This conclusion echoes Pierre Bourdieu's defense of embodied experience against the unnoticed but fundamental alterations that occur when it is translated into theoretical representation. Contending that we simply can not account for the "pernicious alteration" that is " constitutive of the oper ation of knowing, " Bourdieu argues for a discrete divide between the theo retical and practical attitudes ( Bourdieu 1 990, 2 7 ) . More specifically, he insists on the autonomy of what he calls the " practical sense," its status as a bodily hermeneutic that is not only independent from cognitive-linguistic understanding but situated below the level of conscious awareness. By artic ulating this practical sense with his concept of " habitus, " Bourdieu suggests its close ties to cultural ritual and other incorporating practices; yet his insis tence on the absolute divide between habit and intellection makes it clear that practical sense cannot be clarified through ritual decoding, as it can in Connerton's (and Hayles' s ) account of incorporating practices. In a key pas sage also cited by Hayles, Bourdieu insists on the ossification and imperme ability of values once they are " given body. " . . . principles em-bodied in this way [through habit] are placed beyond the
grasp of consciousness, and hence cannot be touched by voluntary, deliber ate transformation, cannot even be made explicit; nothing seems more inef fable, more incommunicable, more inimitable, and, therefore, more precious, than the values given body, made body by the transubstantiation achieved by the hidden persuasion of an implicit pedagogy . . . . ( 1 9 77, 94; emphasis added)17
Tech noculture a n d E m b od i ment
Technoculture and Embodiment * 51
What distinguishes Bourdieu's account of embodied experience is the irre-
ducible autonomy he grants it; for him, bodily practice-the embodiment of
nonverbal (i.e., felt or sensed) stimuli-constitutes a form of experience dis-
tinctly separate from and inaccessible to conscious intellection. Though he
stops short of affirming categorically that embodied knowledge can never be
altered,18 Bourdieu forcefully suggests that any such alteration can only
result from a far more holist, indirect, and indeed embodied process than
that of analytic penetration into and discursive clarification of its specific
logic.
While Hayles dismisses the autonomy Bourdieu accords practical sense as
an instance of the type of exaggeration not uncommon in recent French the-
ory, I propose, on the contrary, that we take it as the methodological crux of
a nonreductive account of embodied experience. Far from seeking to narrow
Bourdieu's account of practical sense to address specific cultural tasks, we
need to generalize it into a robust experiential mode capable of accounting
for the de jure primacy of embodiment over cultural construction. Put
another way, Bourdieu's example of bodily pedagogy needs to be circum-
scribed as one specific instance of the far more encompassing process of what
he calls "practical mimesis." Defined as a process of acquisition rooted in
direct and immediate bodily adaptation to sensory conditions, practical
mimesis (or mimeticism) "implies an overall relation of identification and has
nothing in common with an imitation that would presuppose a conscious
effort to reproduce a gesture, an utterance or an object explicitly constituted
as a model" (Bourdieu 1990, 73). Not only must practical mimesis not be
confused with identification (which is based in representation), but it must
also be situated below the threshold and beyond the grasp of conscious cog-
nition. Bourdieu notes that it takes place "below the level of consciousness,
expression and the reflexive distance which [memory and knowledge] pre-
suppose." He continues: "The body believes in what it plays at: it weeps if it
mimes grief. It does not represent what it performs . . . What is 'learned by
body' is not something that one has, like knowledge that can be brandished,
but something that one is" (73; emphasis added ). What is embodied through
mimeticism can only be experienced through mimetic reproduction, never
through translation into language; this necessity, Bourdieu suggests, "is par-
ticularly clear in non-literate societies, where inherited knowledge can only
survive in the incorporated state." There, he continues, "[i]t is never
detached from the body that bears it and can be reconstituted only by means
of a kind of gymnastics designed to evoke it, a mimesis which, as Plato
observed, implies total investment and deep emotional identification" (73;
•
51
What distinguishes Bourdieu's account of embodied experience i s the irre ducible autonomy he grants it; for him, bodily practice-the embodiment of nonverbal (i.e., felt or sensed ) stimuli-constitutes a form of experience dis tinctly separate from and inaccessible to conscious intellection. Though he stops short of affirming categorically that embodied knowledge can never be altered, 1 8 Bourdieu forcefully suggests that any such alteration can only result from a far more holist, indirect, and indeed embodied process than that of analytic penetration into and discursive clarification of its specific logic. While Hayles dismisses the autonomy Bourdieu accords practical sense as an instance of the type of exaggeration not uncommon in recent French the ory, I propose, on the contrary, that we take it as the methodological crux of a nonreductive account of embodied experience . Far from seeking to narrow Bourdieu's account of practical sense to address specific cultural tasks, we need to generalize it into a robust experiential mode capable of accounting for the de jure primacy of embodiment over cultural construction. Put another way, Bourdieu's example of bodily pedagogy needs to be circum scribed as one specific instance of the far more encompassing process of what he calls "practical mimesis. " Defined as a process of acquisition rooted in direct and immediate bodily adaptation to sensory conditions, practical mimesis (or mimeticism) "implies an overall relation of identification and has nothing in common with an imitation that would presuppose a conscious effort to reproduce a gesture, an utterance or an obj ect explicitly constituted as a model " (Bourdieu 1 990, 73 ) . Not only must practical mimesis not be confused with identification (which is based in representation) , but it must also be situated below the threshold and beyond the grasp of conscious cog nition. Bourdieu notes that it takes place " below the level of consciousness, expression and the reflexive distance which [memory and knowledge] pre suppose. " He continues: "The body believes in what it plays at: it weeps if it mimes grief. It does not represent what it performs . . . . What is 'learned by body' is not something that one has, like knowledge that can be brandished, but something that one is" ( 73 ; emphasis added ) . What is embodied through mimeticism can only be experienced through mimetic reproduction, never through translation into language; this necessity, Bourdieu suggests, "is par ticularly clear in non-literate societies, where inherited knowledge can only survive in the incorporated state . " There, he continues, " [i]t is never detached from the body that bears it and can be reconstituted only by means of a kind of gymnastics designed to evoke it, a mimesis which, as Plato observed, implies total investment and deep emotional identification" (73;
52
52 * Embodying Technesis
emphasis added). In short, access to embodiment (to the extent that we have
it) simply does not (and cannot) involve translation or delegation into lan-
guage. Accordingly, any bodily hermeneutic capable of accounting for it will
require us to learn how to use our mimetic bodily "sense" as the primary
medium for living through technology's experiential impact.
Such mimetic skill will become ever more important as contemporary
technologies continue to expand our sensory contact with the material
world. Whether we are able to capitalize on this expansion by adapting our
sensory and experiential capacities to the new media ecology will hinge, I
think, on our ability to experience our own embodiment without a pro-
foundly restrictive dependence on cognition and representation. Thus, even
before we can begin to refine our "mimetic faculty,"19 we must disabuse
ourselves of the culturally ingrained logocentrism that compels us, often
despite our own critical intentions, to translate technological materiality
into discourse.
•
Em bod y i n g
Technesis
emphasis added) . In short, access to embodiment (to the extent that we have it) simply does not (and cannot) involve translation or delegation into lan guage. Accordingly, any bodily hermeneutic capable of accounting for it will require us to learn how to use our mimetic bodily " sense" as the primary medium for living through technology's experiential impact. Such mimetic skill will become ever more important as contemporary technologies continue to expand our sensory contact with the material world. Whether we are able to capitalize on this expansion by adapting our sensory and experiential capacities to the new media ecology will hinge, I think, on our ability to experience our own embodiment without a pro foundly restrictive dependence on cognition and representation. Thus, even before we can begin to refine our " mimetic faculty, " 1 9 we must disabuse ourselves of the culturally ingrained logocentrism that compels us, often despite our own critical intentions, to translate technological materiality into discourse.
Chapter 2
Locating the Technological Real
In the introduction to the recent volume Virtual Realities and Their Discon-
tents, cultural critic Robert Markley outlines a program of research
Chapter 2
designed to counter the dematerialization so often championed by commen-
tators-both popular and academic on virtual reality. For Markley, argu-
ments that cyberspace entails the "death of print culture" (logocentrism)
are, in addition to being greatly exaggerated, flatly contradicted by their
Locating the Technological Real
own dissemination through print. As an antidote to the inflated claims of
contemporary cyber-prophets, Markley stresses the necessity of drawing a
distinction between the actual technologies facilitating virtual experience
and the abstraction "cyberspace." Such a distinction would allow us to
account for the inscription of cultural forces within the domain of the vir-
tual and would thus situate cyberspace in relation to the (logocentric) meta-
physical tradition from which it stems and that it, in many ways, simply
prolongs.
. . it is [the] awareness of the historical and cultural implication of virtual
technologies in the dreamscape of Western thought that sets [the contribu-
tors to this volume] apart from those writers who characterize cyberspace as
a new, if not always brave, world . . . [We] remain sceptical of a cyberspa-
tial metaphysics that assumes, rather than questions, the revolutionary
nature of virtual worlds and electronically mediated experience. In this
respect, [our] analyses emphasize . . . that the division between cyberspace
and virtual technologies reflects and reinscribes the oppositions of
mind/body, spirit/matter, form/substance, and male/female that have struc-
tured Western metaphysics since Plato. (Markley 1996, 2)
Following this concrete culturalist program, Markley and his colleagues
are able to separate the material technological infrastructure of virtual
reality from the fantasy of a dematerialized cyberspatial existence that it
facilitates. Such a separation allows us to interrogate claims made on
behalf of the fantasy abstraction "cyberspace" and specifically to question
its content-the false promise that, as Markley puts it, "the more techno-
logically sophisticated our society becomes the less it has to worry about
In the introduction to the recent volume Virtual Realities and Their Discon tents, cultural critic Robert Markley outlines a program of research designed to counter the dematerialization so often championed by commen tators-both popular and academic-on virtual reality. For Markley, argu ments that cyberspace entails the " death of print culture " ( logocentrism) are, in addition to being greatly exaggerated, flatly contradicted by their own dissemination through print. As an antidote to the inflated claims of contemporary cyber-prophets, Markley stresses the necessity of drawing a distinction between the actual technologies facilitating virtual experience and the abstraction " cyberspace. " Such a distinction would allow us to account for the inscription of cultural forces within the domain of the vir tual and would thus situate cyberspace in relation to the (logocentric) meta physical tradition from which it stems and that it, in many ways, simply prolongs . . . . it is [the] awareness of the historical and cultural implication of virtual technologies in the dreamscape of Western thought that sets [the contribu tors to this volume] apart from those writers who characterize cyberspace as a new, if not always brave, world . . . . [We] remain sceptical of a cyberspa tial metaphysics that assumes, rather than questions, the revolutionary nature of virtual worlds and electronically mediated experience. In this respect, [our] analyses emphasize . . . that the division between cyberspace and virtual technologies reflects and reinscribes the oppositions of mind/body, spirit/matter, form/substance, and malelfemale that have struc tured Western metaphysics since Plato. (Markley 1 9 9 6 , 2 )
Following this concrete culturalist program, Markley and his colleagues are able to separate the material technological infrastructure of virtual reality from the fantasy of a dematerialized cyberspatial existence that it facilitates . Such a separation allows us to interrogate claims made on behalf of the fantasy abstraction " cyberspace " and specifically to question its content-the false promise that, as Markley puts it, " the more techno logically sophisticated our society becomes the less it has to worry about
54
54 * Embodying Technesis
the distribution of wealth and resources" (4). By reading this content in
terms of the social, economic, psychological, and political realities
attached to the technological infrastructure-what Markley simply chris-
tens as the "material" realities-we can begin to take stock of the concrete
costs and exclusions inseparable from the allegedly revolutionary new
metaphysics. What we thereby discover is the similarity of the virtual rev-
olution to every other so-called revolution; far from comprising a veritable
break with the past and, specifically, with the Western metaphysical tradi-
tion, the cyber-revolution begins to look much more like a new and
improved phase of that tradition, a phase more thoroughly adept than any
previous one at hiding its constitutive biases and exclusions.
For all its urgency, however, Markley's measured call for sobriety in the
face of runaway techno-utopianism runs a certain risk of reduction: by
focusing exclusively on cultural materiality as the site of technology's
effects, Markley's program limits the analysis of virtual reality technologies
to their specific materializations within concrete cultural contexts. Effec-
tively, Markley's enabling alignment of technology with cultural materiality
restricts technology's impact to the effects it has as an assimilated element of
culture.1 Since it cannot address the potential impact of technological mate-
riality beyond the functions technologies acquire through their inscription
within given cultural contexts, Markley's cultural constructivist program
has the (perhaps unintended) effect of stripping technology of its robust
materiality. Despite its success in exposing significant concrete political and
social inequalities that underlie the development and dissemination of vir-
tual technologies,2 the culturalist approach thus attains its force from a
reduction that involves substituting the quasi materiality introduced
through the cultural contextualization of technology for the materiality
belonging to it by dint of its role as an "agent," so to speak, in the com-
plexification of the cosmos.3 To be assimilated into the cultural construc-
tivist paradigm, technologies must accordingly be defined exclusively
through the cultural markings that are affixed to them; whatever material-
ity they possess is derived exclusively from the cultural forces mobilized in
their development and social application. For this reason, the culturalist
approach can do no more than lay bare and contest the ideological content
of technology's culturally acquired materiality;4 it remains narrowly cir-
cumscribed by the very representationalism that is responsible, according to
my thesis, for our compromised engagement with technology. Markley's
decision to bracket the anthropological consequences of technological
change and to focus exclusively on the ideologically loaded cultural strug-
gles ensuing from it reflects precisely such a limitation.
•
Em bod y i n g
Technesis
the distribution of wealth and resources" ( 4 ) . By reading this content in terms of the social, economic, psychological, and political realities attached to the technological infrastructure-what Markley simply chris tens as the " material " realities-we can begin to take stock of the concrete costs and exclusions inseparable from the allegedly revolutionary new metaphysics . What we thereby discover is the similarity of the virtual rev olution to every other so-called revolution; far from comprising a veritable break with the past and, specifically, with the Western metaphysical tradi tion, the cyber-revolution begins to look much more like a new and improved phase of that tradition, a phase more thoroughly adept than any previous one at hiding its constitutive biases and exclusions. For all its urgency, however, Markley's measured call for sobriety in the face of runaway techno-utopianism runs a certain risk of reduction: by focusing exclusively on cultural materiality as the site of technology's effects, Markley's program limits the analysis of virtual reality technologies to their specific materializations within concrete cultural contexts. Effec tively, Markley's enabling alignment of technology with cultural materiality restricts technology's impact to the effects it has as an assimilated element of culture. 1 Since it cannot address the potential impact of technological mate riality beyond the functions technologies acquire through their inscription within given cultural contexts, Markley's cultural constructivist program has the (perhaps unintended) effect of stripping technology of its robust materiality. Despite its success in exposing significant concrete political and social inequalities that underlie the development and dissemination of vir tual technologies,2 the culturalist approach thus attains its force from a reduction that involves substituting the quasi materiality introduced through the cultural contextualization of technology for the materiality belonging to it by dint of its role as an " agent, " so to speak, in the com plexification of the cosmos.3 To be assimilated into the cultural construc tivist paradigm, technologies must accordingly be defined exclusively through the cultural markings that are affixed to them; whatever material ity they possess is derived exclusively from the cultural forces mobilized in their development and social application. For this reason, the culturalist approach can do no more than lay bare and contest the ideological content of technology's culturally acquired materiality;4 it remains narrowly cir cumscribed by the very representationalism that is responsible, according to my thesis, for our compromised engagement with technology. Markley's decision to bracket the anthropological consequences of technological change and to focus exclusively on the ideologically loaded cultural strug gles ensuing from it reflects precisely such a limitation.
Locati n g the Tech n o l ogical Real
Locating the Technological Real * 55
... even if we see cyberspace as a form of complex mediation within the tra-
ditions of Western science, metaphysics, and economics, it does not tran-
scend the problems of materiality, embodiment, or capital. In this regard, to
offer a critique of cyberspace is to engage in a multivalent exploration of the
values and assumptions of a dualism which are presented as "natural" con-
ditions of human existence, of an ideology of a revolutionary change in con-
sciousness brought about by new forms of technological intervention, and of
the political problems posed by limited access to new and expensive tech-
nologies. (8-9)
As long as we follow Markley by restricting our analysis of technology to
•
55
. . . even if we see cyberspace as a form of complex mediation within the tra ditions of Western science, metaphysics, and economics, it does not tran scend the problems of materiality, embodiment, or capital . In this regard, to offer a critique of cyberspace is to engage in a multivalent exploration of the values and assumptions of a dualism which are presented as "natural" con ditions of human existence, of an ideology of a revolutionary change in con sciousness brought about by new forms of technological intervention, and of the political problems posed by limited access to new and expensive tech nologies. ( 8-9 )
the influence it brings to bear on our "values and assumptions," we con-
strain our investigation to the macroscopic social phenomena and remain
unable even to broach the topic of technology's microphysical impact-the
ways in which it impacts our embodied experience below the threshold of
representation.
Without denying the importance of a healthy skepticism regarding the
"intrinsic" revolutionary status of virtual reality, we need to grapple with
the claims of a different group of critics (including Michael Heim, Michael
Benedikt, and Marcos Novak) whose work situates virtual reality in the
domain of the anthropological. While Markley and the cultural critics for
whom he speaks furnish a much needed thick description of the cultural
context underlying cyberspace, these more speculative theorists help us
explore its less tangible, holist dimensions. Specifically, they raise the impor-
tant issue of how our increasing reliance on virtual technology has changed
and will continue to change the very sensory modes by which we perceive
and experience the world, independently of and prior to its ideological
impact (see Benedikt 1991). Instead of pitting these two approaches against
one another, it seems to me that we might best realize their (respective) con-
tributions by attempting to forge a synthesis between their emphases, which
are differently inflected but ultimately, I think, not incompatible.
In our effort to contextualize the broad anthropological changes brought
about by technology without reductively identifying them as effects of what
Markley calls cultural materiality, we must impose on ourselves a method-
ological double-distancing from (though not a dismissal of) cultural con-
structionism as it is now practiced. Insofar as technologically generated
experiential changes tend to throw our received, culturally coded modes of
experience into (at least temporary) disarray-as, for example, Frederic
Jameson has shown in his widely influential account of postmodern hyper-
space-we must be able to reach beyond the culturally coded experiential
possibilities available to us at any given time in order to circumscribe the
As long as we follow Markley by restricting our analysis of technology to the influence it brings to bear on our " values and assumptions, " we con strain our investigation to the macroscopic social phenomena and remain unable even to broach the topic of technology's microphysical impact-the ways in which it impacts our embodied experience below the threshold of representation. Without denying the importance of a healthy skepticism regarding the " intrinsic " revolutionary status of virtual reality, we need to grapple with the claims of a different group of critics (including Michael Heim, Michael Benedikt, and Marcos Novak ) whose work situates virtual reality in the domain of the anthropological . While Markley and the cultural critics for whom he speaks furnish a much needed thick description of the cultural context underlying cyberspace, these more speculative theorists help us explore its less tangible, holist dimensions . Specifically, they raise the impor tant issue of how our increasing reliance on virtual technology has changed and will continue to change the very sensory modes by which we perceive and experience the world, independently of and prior to its ideological impact ( see Benedikt 1 9 9 1 ) . Instead of pitting these two approaches against one another, it seems to me that we might best realize their (respective ) con tributions by attempting to forge a synthesis between their emphases, which are differently inflected but ultimately, I think, not incompatible. In our effort to contextualize the broad anthropological changes brought about by technology without reductively identifying them as effects of what Markley calls cultural materiality, we must impose on ourselves a method ological double-distancing from (though not a dismissal of) cultural con structionism as it is now practiced. Insofar as technologically generated experiential changes tend to throw our received, culturally coded modes of experience into ( at least temporary) disarray-as, for example, Frederic Jameson has shown in his widely influential account of postmodern hyper space-we must be able to reach beyond the culturally coded experiential possibilities available to us at any given time in order to circumscribe the
56
56 * Embodying Technesis
changes in question. Adaptation, in such cases, requires more than a simple
appeal to the cultural field underlying our lived experience; it requires, in
effect, an expansion of that field, one that exceeds the explanatory resources
of a static cultural criticism. Furthermore, to the extent that technological
shifts take place at the microphysical level, as changes in the conditions for
embodied experience, we cannot adapt to them through representation-by
thematizing them in the explicitly formulated cultural codes underlying our
collective social experience. Since they enter our experience through embod-
iment, such changes simply cannot be adequately reconstructed through a
symptomatology of our irreducible cultural marking.5
With this conclusion, we again encounter the crucial feature of techno-
logical change that I introduced in chapter 1: its qualified autonomy from
cultural practice. To the preceding account, I can now add the following
further qualification: unlike modifications of scientific theories, technnolo-
gies impact us, in some degree, by directly altering our lifeworld without
any active contribution from us and without the direct mediation of any
preexisting cultural constructions. In attempting to demarcate technological
from scientific change, my aim is precisely to preserve from reduction that
dimension of technology's impact that resists explicit cultural thematiza-
tion. Accordingly, we must accept, as an enabling element of my analysis,
what appears to be a bewildering paradox: that technology both is and is
not cultural in the restricted sense. Whereas it is always implicated within
discursive and cultural networks that have an irreducible formative impact
on it, technology also functions as a key agent in the macroevolution, or
complexification, of the material world. Whereas technologies are always
results of culturally determined processes, they are also privileged vehicles
of the natural process of material complexification.
To respect this duality, we will need to sketch a history of technology
that serves to distinguish it from, rather than assimilate it to, the history of
science. Insofar as they function as agents of material evolution, technolo-
gies impact us as material forces without being mediated through preconsti-
tuted cultural codes. Accordingly, the history of technology foregrounds the
practical impact of matter's complexification in a manner that is, admit-
tedly, culturally relative but that does not view this impact exclusively as the
creation of culture; the history of science, by contrast, focuses on the partic-
ular modes of cultural understanding developed to explain-or more
exactly, to produce-the theoretical significance of matter's complexifi-
cation. Whereas the history of science is thoroughly cultural in the sense
that it is always a construction of a spatiotemporally distinct culture, the
history of technology, likewise a specific cultural construction in this same
•
Em bod y i n g
Technesis
changes in question. Adaptation, in such cases, requires more than a simple appeal to the cultural field underlying our lived experience; it requires, in effect, an expansion of that field, one that exceeds the explanatory resources of a static cultural criticism. Furthermore, to the extent that technological shifts take place at the microphysical level, as changes in the conditions for embodied experience, we cannot adapt to them through representation-by thematizing them in the explicitly formulated cultural codes underlying our collective social experience. Since they enter our experience through embod iment, such changes simply cannot be adequately reconstructed through a symptomatology of our irreducible cultural marking.5 With this conclusion, we again encounter the crucial feature of techno logical change that I introduced in chapter 1 : its qualified autonomy from cultural practice. To the preceding account, I can now add the following further qualification: unlike modifications of scientific theories, technnolo gies impact us, in some degree, by directly altering our lifeworld without any active contribution from us and without the direct mediation of any preexisting cultural constructions. In attempting to demarcate technological from scientific change, my aim is precisely to preserve from reduction that dimension of technology's impact that resists explicit cultural thematiza tion. Accordingly, we must accept, as an enabling element of my analysis, what appears to be a bewildering paradox: that technology both is and is not cultural in the restricted sense. Whereas it is always implicated within discursive and cultural networks that have an irreducible formative impact on it, technology also functions as a key agent in the macroevolution, or complexification, of the material world. Whereas technologies are always results of culturally determined processes, they are also privileged vehicles of the natural process of material complexification . To respect this duality, we will need to sketch a history of technology that serves to distinguish it from, rather than assimilate it to, the history of science. Insofar as they function as agents of material evolution, technolo gies impact us as material forces without being mediated through preconsti tuted cultural codes. Accordingly, the history of technology foregrounds the practical impact of matter's complexification in a manner that is, admit tedly, culturally relative but that does not view this impact exclusively as the creation of culture; the history of science, by contrast, focuses on the partic ular modes of cultural understanding developed to explain-or more exactly, to produce-the theoretical significance of matter's complexifi cation. Whereas the history of science is thoroughly cultural in the sense that it is always a construction of a spatiotemporally distinct culture, the history of technology, likewise a specific cultural construction in this same
Locati n g the Tech n o l ogical Real
Locating the Technological Real * 57
•
57
sense, also involves a supplemental " exocultural" dimension: our embodied interaction with the " evolution" of matter itself.
sense, also involves a supplemental "exocultural" dimension: our embodied
interaction with the "evolution" of matter itself.
From the Cultural History of Science to
Embodied Technoculture
Two recent and important cultural histories of modern physics both single
out the passage from mechanics to thermodynamics as a particularly
significant moment. For N. Katherine Hayles, whose Chaos Bound articu-
From the Cultural H istory of Science to E mbodied Technoculture
lates science and literature together on the basis of a common cultural back-
ground, and for Phillip Mirowski, whose More Heat than Light traces mod-
ern economics to certain culturally resonant misreadings of energy
conservation, this passage marks a basic shift in the ontology of energy-
from a static, substance model to one that is stochastic and statistically based.
In Mirowski's meticulous and sober recapitulation of nineteenth-century
physics, the primary significance of this passage is its release of immanent
contradictions within the energy concept. By introducing irreversibility into
the process of heat conversion, the second law of thermodynamics threw
into turmoil the then current definition of heat as motion at the molecular
level.
It has not been fully realized that the proliferation of probabilistic concepts
in physics is the first of many manifestations of the self-contradiction of the
global energy concept . . . The energy concept was intended to embody the
rational, lawlike, determinate behavior of nature, in that it was the reification
of the independence of natural law from all temporal or spatial accident, as
well as from the accident of human observation. As the energy concept was
thrust upon a world that appeared to abound in such accidents, and as
"external" cultural considerations sometimes encouraged scientists to elevate
the accidental in nature, ideas of probability and randomness were absorbed
into physics. First the accidents were attributed to the frailty of the human
observer, but later it was allowed that accident might be intrinsic to nature
itself. (Mirowski 1992, 64)
On Mirowski's account, the paradigm shift from classical mechanics to
Two recent and important cultural histories of modern physics both single out the passage from mechanics to thermodynamics as a particularly significant moment. For N. Katherine Hayles, whose Chaos Bound articu lates science and literature together on the basis of a common cultural back ground, and for Phillip Mirowski, whose More Heat than Light traces mod ern economics to certain culturally resonant misreadings of energy conservation, this passage marks a basic shift in the ontology of energy from a static, substance model to one that is stochastic and statistically based. In Mirowski's meticulous and sober recapitulation of nineteenth-century physics, the primary significance of this passage is its release of immanent contradictions within the energy concept. By introducing irreversibility into the process of heat conversion, the second law of thermodynamics threw into turmoil the then current definition of heat as motion at the molecular level.
thermodynamics reverses the original definition of energy, thus yielding a
liberation of energy from any physical embodiment in matter: "Once the
mathematics of the field freed energy from matter, it also implied a reversal
within the original definition. Instead of a physical field being necessarily
a spatial distribution of energy that varied in time, physicists found they
could also read the mathematics in such a way that any well-behaved scalar
It has not been fully realized that the proliferation of probabilistic concepts in physics is the first of many manifestations of the self-contradiction of the global energy concept . . . . The energy concept was intended to embody the rational, lawlike, determinate behavior of nature, in that it was the reification of the independence of natural law from all temporal or spatial accident, as well as from the accident of human observation. As the energy concept was thrust upon a world that appeared to abound in such accidents, and as " external " cultural considerations sometimes encouraged scientists to elevate the accidental in nature, ideas of probability and randomness were absorbed into physics . First the accidents were attributed to the frailty of the human observer, but later it was allowed that accident might be intrinsic to nature itself. (Mirowski 1 992, 64)
On Mirowski's account, the paradigm shift from classical mechanics to thermodynamics reverses the original definition of energy, thus yielding a liberation of energy from any physical embodiment in matter: " Once the mathematics of the field freed energy from matter, it also implied a reversal within the original definition. Instead of a physical field being necessarily a spatial distribution of energy that varied in time, physicists found they could also read the mathematics in such a way that any well-behaved scalar
58
58 * Embodying Technesis
function with a vanishing time derivative could be identified with energy"
(68). In other words, the thermodynamic revolution, processed through the
history of late nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century science,
yielded a divorce between physical or embodied description and mathemat-
ical modeling.
The story Hayles tells complements Mirowski's account but stresses cul-
ture in a far more general sense as the key to understanding the reception of
the thermodynamic revolution. More than its narrowly scientific conse-
quences, what needs to be explained, in Hayles's view, is the popular basis
for the scientific paradigm shift.
The popularization of thermodynamics during the 1860s and 1870s rein-
forced the antagonistic connection between order and chaos through predic-
tions of a cosmic dissipation that would end with all heat sources everywhere
•
Em bod y i n g
Technesis
function with a vanishing time derivative could be identified with energy " ( 6 8 ) . In other words, the thermodynamic revolution, processed through the history of late nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century science, yielded a divorce between physical or embodied description and mathemat ical modeling. The story Hayles tells complements Mirowski's account but stresses cul ture in a far more general sense as the key to understanding the reception of the thermodynamic revolution. More than its narrowly scientific conse quences, what needs to be explained, in Hayles's view, is the popular basis for the scientific paradigm shift.
being exhausted, resulting in the so-called "heat death" of the universe.
Countering this pessimistic scenario was the awareness that in the short run
(that is, in the eons while life still continued on earth), the release of thermal
energy could run trains, fuel steamships, generate electricity. The power of
heat engines was of a different kind as well as a different order from the
mechanical advantage bestowed by pulleys, levers, and winches. Whereas
mechanical energy was orderly, conveyed along visible lines of force, thermal
energy was chaotic, driven by the fiery turbulence of the furnace and deriving
its power from the random motions of molecules whizzing by at unbelievable
speeds. (Hayles 1990, 21-22; emphasis added)6
For Hayles, the meaning of the thermodynamic revolution lies less in its
direct impact on scientific theorization than in its correlation with the
broader cultural context that it both supports and modifies. While eschew-
ing any direct, linear relation of influence from science to cultural produc-
tion, Hayles's account suggests that the cultural significance of thermody-
namics is to be found primarily in the various ways in which it modifies and
is modified by our representational practices. In the preceding passage, for
example, we are presented with the tension between two cultural represen-
tations that ensues following the dissolution of the mechanical worldview:
the horrific fantasy of the heat death of the universe is counterbalanced by
The popularization of thermodynamics during the 1 8 6 0s and 1 8 70s rein forced the antagonistic connection between order and chaos through predic tions of a cosmic dissipation that would end with all heat sources everywhere being exhausted, resulting in the so-called "heat death " of the universe. Countering this pessimistic scenario was the awareness that in the short run (that is, in the eons while life still continued on earth ), the release of thermal energy could run trains, fuel steamships, generate electricity. The power of heat engines was of a different kind as well as a different order from the mechanical advantage bestowed by pulleys, levers, and winches . Whereas mechanical energy was orderly, conveyed along visible lines of force, thermal energy was chaotic, driven by the fiery turbulence of the furnace and deriving its power from the random motions of molecules whizzing by at unbelievable speeds . (Hayles 1 9 9 0 , 2 1-22; emphasis added)6
the redemptive myth of progress channeled through the new technologies of
the industrial age.
Together, these two interpretations serve to isolate the particular divorce
of theory from (embodied) experience that, in my opinion, comprises the
most significant legacy of thermodynamics for the cultural theorist. From
Mirowski, we learn that science shifts from a realist or physically instanti-
ated form of description to a highly abstract, stochastic, and statistical form
For Hayles, the meaning of the thermodynamic revolution lies less in its direct impact on scientific theorization than in its correlation with the broader cultural context that it both supports and modifies. While eschew ing any direct, linear relation of influence from science to cultural produc tion, Hayles's account suggests that the cultural significance of thermody namics is to be found primarily in the various ways in which it modifies and is modified by our representational practices. In the preceding passage, for example, we are presented with the tension between two cultural represen tations that ensues following the dissolution of the mechanical worldview: the horrific fantasy of the heat death of the universe is counterbalanced by the redemptive myth of progress channeled through the new technologies of the industrial age. Together, these two interpretations serve to isolate the particular divorce of theory from ( embodied) experience that, in my opinion, comprises the most significant legacy of thermodynamics for the cultural theorist. From Mirowski, we learn that science shifts from a realist or physically instanti ated form of description to a highly abstract, stochastic, and statistical form
Locati n g the Tech n o l ogical Real
Locating the Technological Real * 59
of modeling, while Hayles informs us about the more widespread, popular
cultural and ideological significance of this shift. In both cases, we are con-
fronted with the dissolution of the harmony or continuity between our rep-
resentational capabilities and the material structure of the world. Following
its redescription in terms of thermodynamics, energy begins to exceed the
grasp of representationalist description as what Lyotard felicitously calls a
humanist "transformer," a means of cognizing materiality in accord with
human capacities that condition practical experience. If the mathematics
developed to model energy, like the conspiracy and salvation narratives that
stand in for its description, furnish "representations" of energy, these are
distinctly inhuman representations which measure energy as the function of
a mathematical abstraction. By rendering energy abstract and divorcing it
from the phenomenal domain, such representations no longer afford us a
means of experiencing energy in a way directly tied to our embodiment. The
thermodynamic revolution thus marks the eclipse of representational
thought as the privileged faculty for mapping our relation to the material
world; in its wake, theory loses the capacity to represent energy and the
physical world of forces in their immediate relevance to our lived experi-
ence.
Technological Materiality
In broad, schematic terms, the history of modern technology largely paral-
lels that of modern science, with the industrial revolution playing a role
roughly equivalent to the thermodynamic paradigm shift. Once again, the
significance of the moment of rupture (in this case, the industrial revolution
itself) centers on the resulting dissolution of our capacity to grasp the
change at issue through representationally mediated forms of experience. In
the case of technology, however, the situation is more complex, since the
•
59
of modeling, while Hayles informs us about the more widespread, popular cultural and ideological significance of this shift. In both cases, we are con fronted with the dissolution of the harmony or continuity between our rep resentational capabilities and the material structure of the world. Following its redescription in terms of thermodynamics, energy begins to exceed the grasp of representationalist description as what Lyotard felicitously calls a humanist " transformer, " a means of cognizing materiality in accord with human capacities that condition practical experience. If the mathematics developed to model energy, like the conspiracy and salvation narratives that stand in for its description, furnish " representations " of energy, these are distinctly inhuman representations which measure energy as the function of a mathematical abstraction. By rendering energy abstract and divorcing it from the phenomenal domain, such representations no longer afford us a means of experiencing energy in a way directly tied to our embodiment. The thermodynamic revolution thus marks the eclipse of representational thought as the privileged faculty for mapping our relation to the material world; in its wake, theory loses the capacity to represent energy and the physical world of forces in their immediate relevance to our lived experi ence.
ever accelerating technological changes begun during the industrial revolu-
tion impact us at the level of our prerepresentational embodiment and not
solely in ways that are narrowly theoretical and/or explicitly mediated by
cultural codes. Consequently, the eclipse of representation produced by
technology differs markedly from the similar eclipse generated by science.
Technological M ateriality
Not only is technology's experiential impact socially ubiquitous and thus
oddly invisible (since it modifies the infrastructures underlying everyday
practice), but the modifications technologies do bring about occur with
some degree of autonomy-that is, without the mediation of either scientific
theory or popular cultural fantasy. By impacting our embodied lives in ways
In broad, schematic terms, the history of modern technology largely paral lels that of modern science, with the industrial revolution playing a role roughly equivalent to the thermodynamic paradigm shift. Once again, the significance of the moment of rupture (in this case, the industrial revolution itself) centers on the resulting dissolution of our capacity to grasp the change at issue through representation ally mediated forms of experience. In the case of technology, however, the situation is more complex, since the ever accelerating technological changes begun during the industrial revolu tion impact us at the level of our prerepresentational embodiment and not solely in ways that are narrowly theoretical and/or explicitly mediated by cultural codes. Consequently, the eclipse of representation produced by technology differs markedly from the similar eclipse generated by science. Not only is technology's experiential impact socially ubiquitous and thus oddly invisible ( since it modifies the infrastructures underlying everyday practice ) , but the modifications technologies do bring about occur with some degree of autonomy-that is, without the mediation of either scientific theory or popular cultural fantasy. By impacting our embodied lives in ways
60
60 * Embodying Technesis
that remain invisible at the level of our culturally inscribed expectations,
technologies effectively force us to experience changes in our material envi-
ronment that are no longer thematizable in representationalist terms, that
can only be lived through at the level of our embodiment.
Technology thus provides a bridge between the material, physical world
described by science and the domain of lived experience. Through their
immediate practical effects, technologies broker forms of noncognitive
experiential contact with the material domain that precede and precondi-
tion representational constructions, including those based in the mathema-
tization of the real made possible by these very technologies. What this
means, in short, is that our interaction with technology opens an experien-
tial domain where what we lose in terms of representational power can, in
a certain sense, be redeemed: by forcing us to live through the unrepre-
sentable experiential impact of materiality, our interactions with technolo-
gies operate a shift in the "economy" of experience, a shift from representa-
tion to embodiment (or in Walter Benjamin's terms, from Erfahrung to
Erlebnis) as the privileged site for exploring our worldliness.
Brought to bear on the historical perspective previously sketched, this
shift in the economy of our experience calls on us to find new ways of regis-
tering the practical dimension of technology's impact. Our interactions with
technologies call for a robust experiential model capable both of deformal-
izing our understanding of technology and of (re)situating it at the level of
concrete, lived experience. We simply cannot continue to model our under-
standing of technology's modern evolution on the history of science but
must insist on the autonomy of technology in two senses. First, we must
view technology as the product of a never entirely theorizable feedback loop
involving such forces as the logic of global capital and the cosmological
imperative of material complexification-forces that are, in some sense,
extracultural, extrascientific, and extrahuman. And second, we must refrain
from reducing technology to the product of a cumulative historical process
akin to science, one that assimilates contingent developments into a neces-
sarily culturally relative narrative of our ever increasing capacity to model
the real.
Given its ties to material complexification, it is hardly coincidental that
the specific autonomy I am claiming for technology has emerged during the
industrial revolution-following the widespread distribution to automated
machines of tasks formally performed by humans. By shifting the source of
energy from humans and nature to the machine itself, industrial technology
has rendered obsolete both the traditional understanding of technology as
applied science and its correlative division into the mechanical and the
•
Em bod y i n g
Technesis
that remain invisible at the level of our culturally inscribed expectations, technologies effectively force us to experience changes in our material envi ronment that are no longer thematizable in representationalist terms, that can only be lived through at the level of our embodiment. Technology thus provides a bridge between the material, physical world described by science and the domain of lived experience . Through their immediate practical effects, technologies broker forms of noncognitive experiential contact with the material domain that precede and precondi tion representational constructions, including those based in the mathema tization of the real made possible by these very technologies. What this means, in short, is that our interaction with technology opens an experien tial domain where what we lose in terms of representational power can, in a certain sense, be redeemed: by forcing us to live through the unrepre sentable experiential impact of materiality, our interactions with technolo gies operate a shift in the " economy" of experience, a shift from representa tion to embodiment (or in Walter Benj amin's terms, from Erfahrung to Erlebnis) as the privileged site for exploring our worldliness. Brought to bear on the historical perspective previously sketched, this shift in the economy of our experience calls on us to find new ways of regis tering the practical dimension of technology's impact. Our interactions with technologies call for a robust experiential model capable both of deformal izing our understanding of technology and of (re) situating it at the level of concrete, lived experience. We simply cannot continue to model our under standing of technology's modern evolution on the history of science but must insist on the autonomy of technology in two senses. First, we must view technology as the product of a never entirely theorizable feedback loop involving such forces as the logic of global capital and the cosmological imperative of material complexification-forces that are, in some sense, extracultural, extrascientific, and extrahuman. And second, we must refrain from reducing technology to the product of a cumulative historical process akin to science, one that assimilates contingent developments into a neces sarily culturally relative narrative of our ever increasing capacity to model the real. Given its ties to material complexification, it is hardly coincidental that the specific autonomy I am claiming for technology has emerged during the industrial revolution-following the widespread distribution to automated machines of tasks formally performed by humans. By shifting the source of energy from humans and nature to the machine itself, industrial technology has rendered obsolete both the traditional understanding of technology as applied science and its correlative division into the mechanical and the
Locati n g the Tech n o l ogical Real
Locating the Technological Real * 61
dynamical. The industrial revolution has enacted a practical destabilization
of the human measure that prevailed in classical mechanics. In the sugges-
tive terminology recently employed by Lyotard, we could say that the indus-
trial revolution has instituted a "transformer"-an energy convertor-that
is no longer analogical to human experience.
Karl Marx and Michel Serres unfold the two principle elements of this
autonomization of technology. Marx's analysis of machinery establishes the
emancipation of technology from its earlier dependance on human activity.
And Serres's account, by artfully depicting the passage from the old work
model to a new model of spontaneous energy creation, illustrates how the
industrial revolution frees technology from its narrow role of mediating a
preconstituted and static nature and renders it a forceful material agent of
the real. These two contributions develop a notion of technological auton-
omy rooted in the material conditions of energy production and yet focused
on the experiential consequences of technology's eclipse of the human mea-
sure. Together, they stress the practical dimension of technology's impact,
the fact that technology forces society at large to grapple with a new mate-
rial domain. The respective contributions of Marx and Serres help qualify
the particular claim I advance for technological autonomy. Without existing
outside concrete social networks that exert constraints on its development,
technology nonetheless resists cultural and scientific contextualization to
the extent that it "obeys" a (natural or cosmological) imperative that, as
Lyotard puts it, is simply higher than the human. Technology may never be
noncultural in any meaningful sense (what, indeed, could that ever mean?!);
yet, to the extent that its impact is holist, it evades the resources of any "pos-
itive" cultural criticism.
To grasp the significance of this unprecedented autonomy, we need only
assess the theoretical limitations of a cultural historical approach to tech-
nology that fails to appreciate the central role of the industrial revolution in
the dissolution of the human as measure. In an interpretation of the steam
engine as a fruitful fusion of mechanical technology ("the artificial control
of technical processes") and dynamical technology ("the harnassing of inan-
imate sources of power to drive new mechanisms"), cultural critic J. David
Bolter relies on an outmoded, preindustrial division that simply cannot
grasp the specificity of machine technology (Bolter 1984, 29). Bolter seizes
on the traditional dual model of technology because it underwrites the cen-
tral narrative of his study-an account of the progressive development of
technology as an expression of human ingenuity. To accomplish his goal of
showing that industrial technology actualizes the modern cultural fantasy of
autonomous technology, Bolter has absolutely no reason to break with the
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61
dynamical. The industrial revolution has enacted a practical destabilization of the human measure that prevailed in classical mechanics. In the sugges tive terminology recently employed by Lyotard, we could say that the indus trial revolution has instituted a " transformer "-an energy convertor-that is no longer analogical to human experience. Karl Marx and Michel Serres unfold the two principle elements of this autonomization of technology. Marx's analysis of machinery establishes the emancipation of technology from its earlier dependance on human activity. And Serres's account, by artfully depicting the passage from the old work model to a new model of spontaneous energy creation, illustrates how the industrial revolution frees technology from its narrow role of mediating a preconstituted and static nature and renders it a forceful material agent of the real. These two contributions develop a notion of technological auton omy rooted in the material conditions of energy production and yet focused on the experiential consequences of technology's eclipse of the human mea sure. Together, they stress the practical dimension of technology's impact, the fact that technology forces society at large to grapple with a new mate rial domain. The respective contributions of Marx and Serres help qualify the particular claim I advance for technological autonomy. Without existing outside concrete social networks that exert constraints on its development, technology nonetheless resists cultural and scientific contextualization to the extent that it " obeys " a (natural or cosmological) imperative that, as Lyotard puts it, is simply higher than the human. Technology may never be noncultural in any meaningful sense (what, indeed, could that ever mean ? ! ) ; yet, to the extent that its impact is holist, it evades the resources of any " pos itive " cultural criticism. To grasp the significance of this unprecedented autonomy, we need only assess the theoretical limitations of a cultural historical approach to tech nology that fails to appreciate the central role of the industrial revolution in the dissolution of the human as measure. In an interpretation of the steam engine as a fruitful fusion of mechanical technology ( " the artificial control of technical processes " ) and dynamical technology ( "the harnassing of inan imate sources of power to drive new mechanisms " ) , cultural critic ]. David Bolter relies on an outmoded, preindustrial division that simply cannot grasp the specificity of machine technology ( Bolter 1 9 84, 2 9 ) . Bolter seizes on the traditional dual model of technology because it underwrites the cen tral narrative of his study-an account of the progressive development of technology as an expression of human ingenuity. To accomplish his goal of showing that industrial technology actualizes the modern cultural fantasy of autonomous technology, Bolter has absolutely no reason to break with the
62
62 * Embodying Technesis
explanatory models of the past; quite to the contrary, he is able to view the
steam engine as a new and improved metaphor for the persistent telos of the
Western technological imagination precisely by demonstrating how it fuses
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Em bod y i n g
Technesis
explanatory models of the past; quite to the contrary, he is able to view the steam engine as a new and improved metaphor for the persistent telos of the Western technological imagination precisely by demonstrating how it fuses the dynamical and mechanical models.
the dynamical and mechanical models.
Dynamic technology, then, was as old as or older than mechanical technol-
ogy, but it needed much longer to mature. Although accurate pendulum
clocks were being built in the seventeenth century, it was not until the end of
the eighteenth that the inanimate prime mover found its place as a defining
technology. The triumph of this technology was the steam engine. As a clock-
work mechanism capable of producing power, it combined two qualities that
had long before been expressed separately in the clock and the waterwheel.
Although heat produced by coal was as much a natural resource as the flow
of water in a river or the wind across the plains, the steam engine seemed by
its very intricacy more artificial than the windmill or waterwheel, an expres-
sion of man's ingenuity and not a mere harnessing of nature. (30; emphasis
added)
By adopting a narrowly culturalist, representationalist perspective, Bolter
misses the crucial shift in the economy of the human and the nonhuman
that, as I have suggested, comprises the central legacy of the industrial rev-
olution for the cultural critic. While the steam engine certainly is, in a myr-
iad of senses, an altogether magnificent figure for human reason-a key
Dynamic technology, then, was as old as or older than mechanical technol ogy, but it needed much longer to mature. Although accurate pendulum clocks were being built in the seventeenth century, it was not until the end of the eighteenth that the inanimate prime mover found its place as a defining technology. The triumph of this technology was the steam engine. As a clock work mechanism capable of producing power, it combined two qualities that had long before been expressed separately in the clock and the waterwheel. Although heat produced by coal was as much a natural resource as the flow of water in a river or the wind across the plains, the steam engine seemed by its very intricacy more artificial than the windmill or waterwheel, an expres sion of man's ingenuity and not a mere harnessing of nature. ( 3 0 ; emphasis added)
"expression of man's ingenuity," as Bolter puts it-it also furnishes the
basis for a new lived understanding of the energetics of the material domain
and consequently for a whole new experiential world.
Fathoming this world, Michel Serres suggests, requires a radical break
with the representationalist mechanical models of the past. Describing an
advertising sign made by George Garrard in 1784, Serres furnishes an
account of the industrial revolution directly at odds with the picture painted
by Bolter: "For the study of mechanics, work is a force in motion. What are
the origins, the sources of this force? There are four of them and only four:
horses... ; men... ; wind... ; [and] [w]ater.... [Like Garrard's tableau,
Lagrange's book] recapitulates, by its story and in its system, a perfect
world that will soon disappear, totally overthrown when fire and its power
supplant wind and water, horses and men, as source and origin of force"
(Serres 1982b, 54-55; emphasis added). While Bolter views the industrial
revolution as the culminating cultural synthesis of the two traditional cate-
gories of technology, Serres sees it as the origin point of an entirely new
form of energy and a corresponding experiential world. For Bolter, the
steam engine is perhaps the ultimate metaphor for human reason; for Serres,
by contrast, it is the catalyst for a radically new type of expression that rec-
By adopting a narrowly culturalist, representationalist perspective, Bolter misses the crucial shift in the economy of the human and the nonhuman that, as I have suggested, comprises the central legacy of the industrial rev olution for the cultural critic. While the steam engine certainly is, in a myr iad of senses, an altogether magnificent figure for human reason-a key " expression of man's ingenuity, " as Bolter puts it-it also furnishes the basis for a new lived understanding of the energetics of the material domain and consequently for a whole new experiential world. Fathoming this world, Michel Serres suggests, requires a radical break with the representationalist mechanical models of the past. Describing an advertising sign made by George Garrard in 1 784, Serres furnishes an account of the industrial revolution directly at odds with the picture painted by Bolter: " For the study of mechanics, work is a force in motion. What are the origins, the sources of this force ? There are four of them and only four: horses . . . ; men . . . ; wind . . . ; [and] [w] ater. . . . [Like Garrard's tableau, Lagrange's book] recapitulates, by its story and in its system, a perfect world that will soon disappear, totally overthrown when fire and its power supplant wind and water, horses and men, as source and origin of force" ( Serres 1 9 82b, 54-55; emphasis added ) . While Bolter views the industrial revolution as the culminating cultural synthesis of the two traditional cate gories of technology, Serres sees it as the origin point of an entirely new form of energy and a corresponding experiential world. For Bolter, the steam engine is perhaps the ultimate metaphor for human reason; for Serres, by contrast, it is the catalyst for a radically new type of expression that rec-
Locati n g the Tech n o l ogical Real
Locating the Technological Real * 63
ognizes, and indeed takes it orientation from, the alienation of human cog-
nition ensuing in the wake of the industrial revolution.
The principle behind this alienation is, of course, the shift of operational
control from human to machine that forms the basis for the capitalist mode
of production. With the development of what Marx calls the "motor mech-
anism," technology emancipates itself from the essential dependence on
human activity that characterized it from antiquity through the age of clas-
sical mechanics. In this sense, Marx's account inaugurates a specifically
modern definition of "machine"-a definition that (as I shall argue at length
in chap. 3) breaks with its long-standing rhetorical meaning and, even more
importantly, with the correlated Greek notion of techne as an art supple-
menting nature.
All fully developed machinery consists of three essentially different parts, the
motor mechanism, the transmitting mechanism, and finally the tool or work-
ing machine . . . The tool or working machine is that part of the machinery
with which the industrial revolution of the 18th century started . . . The
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63
ognizes, and indeed takes it orientation from, the alienation of human cog nition ensuing in the wake of the industrial revolution. The principle behind this alienation is, of course, the shift of operational control from human to machine that forms the basis for the capitalist mode of production. With the development of what Marx calls the " motor mech anism, " technology emancipates itself from the essential dependence on human activity that characterized it from antiquity through the age of clas sical mechanics. In this sense, Marx's account inaugurates a specifically modern definition of " machine "-a definition that (as I shall argue at length in chap. 3 ) breaks with its long-standing rhetorical meaning and, even more importantly, with the correlated Greek notion of techne as an art supple menting nature.
machine proper is therefore a mechanism that, after being set in motion, per-
forms with its tools the same operations that were formerly done by the
workman with similar tools. From the moment that the tool proper is taken
from man, and fitted into a mechanism, a machine takes the place of a mere
implement. (Marx 1906, 407-8)
With the insertion of the tool into the machine complex, human mediation
falls out of the equation. While tools are moved by human power, machines
are moved directly by natural force. "As soon as tools had been converted
from being manual implements of man into implements of a mechanical
apparatus," Marx argues, "the motive mechanism also acquired an inde-
pendent form, entirely emancipated from the restraints of human strength"
(412). Consequently, with the development of the machine mode of pro-
duction, technology takes on the modern role I have been ascribing to it: it
becomes the agent of material complexification. Bypassing the mediation
All fully developed machinery consists of three essentially different parts, the motor mechanism, the transmitting mechanism, and finally the tool or work ing machine . . . . The tool or working machine is that part of the machinery with which the industrial revolution of the 1 8th century started . . . . The machine proper is therefore a mechanism that, after being set in motion, per forms with its tools the same operations that were formerly done by the workman with similar tools . From the moment that the tool proper is taken from man, and fitted into a mechanism, a machine takes the place of a mere implement. (Marx 1 9 06, 407-8 )
formerly furnished by the human, machines tap directly into natural force
and operate, in effect, as autonomous producers of energy. In the process,
machines introduce a fundamental shift in the very conception of energy:
rather than something to be extracted from nature, stockpiled, or held in
reserve, energy becomes something that is spontaneously or automatically
created.
While Marx articulates the new ontology of the machine age, it falls to
Serres to unpack its concrete experiential consequences. In "Turner Trans-
lates Carnot," Serres employs the self-reflexively metaphoric mode typical
of his thinking to assess the fundamental disenfranchisement of the human
With the insertion of the tool into the machine complex, human mediation falls out of the equation. While tools are moved by human power, machines are moved directly by natural force. "As soon as tools had been converted from being manual implements of man into implements of a mechanical apparatus, " Marx argues, " the motive mechanism also acquired an inde pendent form, entirely emancipated from the restraints of human strength " ( 4 1 2 ) . Consequently, with the development of the machine mode of pro duction, technology takes on the modern role I have been ascribing to it: it becomes the agent of material complexification. Bypassing the mediation formerly furnished by the human, machines tap directly into natural force and operate, in effect, as autonomous producers of energy. In the process, machines introduce a fundamental shift in the very conception of energy: rather than something to be extracted from nature, stockpiled, or held in reserve, energy becomes something that is spontaneously or automatically
created. While Marx articulates the new ontology of the machine age, it falls to Serres to unpack its concrete experiential consequences. In " Turner Trans lates Carnot, " Serres employs the self-reflexively metaphoric mode typical of his thinking to assess the fundamental disenfranchisement of the human
64
64 * Embodying Technesis
in the face of a newly empowered nature. Rooted in the "stochastic meta-
morphosis by fire," the industrial revolution operates what Serres charac-
terizes as a material revolution-a transformation that alters force at its
very origin and generates what is, from the experiential perspective, a new
form of energy.
•
Em bod y i n g
Technesis
in the face of a newly empowered nature. Rooted in the " stochastic meta morphosis by fire," the industrial revolution operates what Serres charac terizes as a material revolution-a transformation that alters force at its very origin and generates what is, from the experiential perspective, a new form of energy.
What is the Industrial Revolution? A revolution operating on matter. It takes
place at the very source of dynamics, at the origins of force. One takes force
as it is or one produces it. Descartes and Newton, crowned by Lagrange,
chose the first alternative: force is there, given by the biotope, the wind, the
sea, and gravity.... With it one produces motion, work, by using tools....
The mediating function of the tools is inscribed in their form, their lines, their
geometry.... Then a sudden change is imposed on the raw elements: fire
replaces air and water in order to transform the earth. Fire will consume
[Lagrange's] Analytical Mechanics and burn down Samuel Whitbread's
warehouse. It will destroy the wooden shed, the wooden ships. Fire finishes
off the horses, strikes them down. The source, the origin, of force is in this
flash of lightning, this ignition. Its energy exceeds form; it transforms. (Serres
1982b, 56)
For Serres, in short, what distinguishes the steam engine from all previous
technologies is not so much its energy principle in itself but rather its con-
crete effects on human experience of the material world: the steam engine
transforms a natural material, coal, into a source of energy unrelated, by
any mechanical calculus, to its natural or static force. By unpacking the
figurative resonances of the industrial revolution, Serres is able to correlate
the ontological material changes analyzed by Marx with experiential
What is the Industrial Revolution ? A revolution operating on matter. It takes place at the very source of dynamics, at the origins of force. One takes force as it is or one produces it. Descartes and Newton, crowned by Lagrange, chose the first alternative: force is there, given by the biotope, the wind, the sea, and gravity . . . . With it one produces motion, work, by using tools . . . . The mediating function of the tools is inscribed in their form, their lines, their geometry . . . . Then a sudden change is imposed on the raw elements: fire replaces air and water in order to transform the earth. Fire will consume [Lagrange's] Analytical Mechanics and burn down Samuel Whitbread's warehouse. It will destroy the wooden shed, the wooden ships. Fire finishes off the horses, strikes them down. The source, the origin, of force is in this flash of lightning, this ignition. Its energy exceeds form; it transforms. (Serres 1 9 82b, 5 6 )
changes at the level of actual practice. He thereby generalizes Marx's con-
cept of alienation into a counterphenomenology of modern experience.
Focusing on the introduction of a new energy principle unbounded by the
form accorded it by nature and by the laws of mechanics that traditionally
were held to describe it, Serres shows how we lose the capacity to experience
the world in the manner privileged by modernity-via the mediation of rep-
resentation. Whereas the energy transmitted by the waterwheel or deployed
in a clockwork mechanism could be represented through the laws of
mechanics, the energy produced by the steam engine is incalculable in tradi-
tional representationalist terms. Rather than fitting into a pregiven form, it
"transforms."
Serres develops the experiential consequences of the ontological revolu-
tion carried out by modern technology precisely by exploding the represen-
tationalist frame of reference. Once we take the creation of force as the
essential characteristic of machine technology, we no longer can oppose the
For Serres, i n short, what distinguishes the steam engine from all previous technologies is not so much its energy principle in itself but rather its con crete effects on human experience of the material world: the steam engine transforms a natural material, coal, into a source of energy unrelated, by any mechanical calculus, to its natural or static force . By unpacking the figurative resonances of the industrial revolution, Serres is able to correlate the ontological material changes analyzed by Marx with experiential changes at the level of actual practice. He thereby generalizes Marx's con cept of alienation into a counterphenomenology of modern experience. Focusing on the introduction of a new energy principle unbounded by the form accorded it by nature and by the laws of mechanics that traditionally were held to describe it, Serres shows how we lose the capacity to experience the world in the manner privileged by modernity-via the mediation of rep resentation. Whereas the energy transmitted by the waterwheel or deployed in a clockwork mechanism could be represented through the laws of mechanics, the energy produced by the steam engine is incalculable in tradi tional representationalist terms. Rather than fitting into a pregiven form, it "transforms. " Serres develops the experiential consequences of the ontological revolu tion carried out by modern technology precisely by exploding the represen tationalist frame of reference. Once we take the creation of force as the essential characteristic of machine technology, we no longer can oppose the
Locati n g the Tech n o l ogical Real
Locating the Technological Real * 65
machine to an independent reality but must situate it as a process within the
real. As a result, the very ontological division underlying the machine's
value as metaphor collapses. Following the industrial revolution, the
machine cannot be employed to represent other processes to which it is
functionally similar (e.g., the body, human life, or textuality, to name only
those most central to modernity) without undergoing a radical reduction of
its robust materiality. Through the new form it acquires in the industrial
revolution, the machine is transformed from a figure produced by thought
(e.g., a concept of functional organization) into an autonomous agent of the
material complexification of the universe.
This ontological revolution calls on us to develop a postrepresentational-
ist reformulation of the question concerning technology. We must learn to
treat technical machines in the way that Deleuze and Guattari treat desiring-
machines-as machines "in more than a metaphorical sense." They suggest:
"Every machine . . . is related to a continual material flow (hyle) that it cuts
into.... [E]very machine functions as a break in the flow in relation to the
machine to which it is connected, but at the same time is also a flow itself,
or the production of a flow, in relation to the machine connected to it"
(Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 36). With the postrepresentationalist emanci-
pation of technology from its reductive metaphoric function, the machine
sheds its restricted status as an organization of force opposed to the organic
and attains its properly modern role as the privileged agent of material
change. In this role, the machine is inseparable from the "real" that it pro-
duces.
Technology and the "History" of Matter
To model this emancipation of energy, we must trace the "inhuman" his-
tory of matter as it "evolves" in excess of our capacity to give it representa-
tional form. Such a task requires us to rethink the function of technology,
since the modern machine foregrounds the primal formlessness of matter.
Serres concludes: ". . . beneath the forms of matter, stochastic disorder
reigns supreme. To smelt is to rediscover chance as fundamental. The fur-
nace is the engine for going back toward chaos. The foundry is where cre-
ation starts over at zero. History is recast beginning with primitive matter"
(1982b, 61). In the industrial boiler room, something happens that alters
our lived relationship with matter: for the first time, we encounter the tech-
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65
machine to an independent reality but must situate it as a process within the real. As a result, the very ontological division underlying the machine's value as metaphor collapses. Following the industrial revolution, the machine cannot be employed to represent other processes to which it is functionally similar (e.g., the body, human life, or textuality, to name only those most central to modernity) without undergoing a radical reduction of its robust materiality. Through the new form it acquires in the industrial revolution, the machine is transformed from a figure produced by thought (e.g., a concept of functional organization ) into an autonomous agent of the material complexification of the universe. This ontological revolution calls on us to develop a postrepresentational ist reformulation of the question concerning technology. We must learn to treat technical machines in the way that Deleuze and Guattari treat desiring machines-as machines " in more than a metaphorical sense. " They suggest: " Every machine . . . is related to a continual material flow (hyle) that it cuts into . . . . [E] very machine functions as a break in the flow in relation to the machine to which it is connected, but at the same time is also a flow itself, or the production of a flow, in relation to the machine connected to it" (Deleuze and Guattari 1 9 8 3 , 3 6 ) . With the postrepresentationalist emanci pation of technology from its reductive metaphoric function, the machine sheds its restricted status as an organization of force opposed to the organic and attains its properly modern role as the privileged agent of material change. In this role, the machine is inseparable from the " real " that it pro duces.
nologically embodied, autonomous evolution of matter as something radi-
cally alien to our "natural" human rhythm(s).
Technology and the " H istory " of M atter
To model this emancipation of energy, we must trace the " inhuman " his tory of matter as it " evolves" in excess of our capacity to give it representa tional form. Such a task requires us to rethink the function of technology, since the modern machine foregrounds the primal formlessness of matter. Serres concludes: " . . . beneath the forms of matter, stochastic disorder reigns supreme. To smelt is to rediscover chance as fundamental. The fur nace is the engine for going back toward chaos. The foundry is where cre ation starts over at zero. History is recast beginning with primitive matter " ( 1 9 8 2b, 6 1 ) . In the industrial boiler room, something happens that alters our lived relationship with matter: for the first time, we encounter the tech nologically embodied, autonomous evolution of matter as something radi cally alien to our "natural " human rhythm ( s ) .
66
66 * Embodying Technesis
While Serres's singular fusion of science and poetry forcefully expresses
the urgency for a new evaluation of modern technology, Lyotard's recent
work most decisively sketches the inhuman history of matter correlative
with it. In a series of recent essays focusing on the contemporary material-
ization of mind and apparently addressed to the cosmos itself, Lyotard pre-
sents a conception of matter from a cosmological perspective. According to
Lyotard, the evolution of matter results from a process of "cosmological
chance"-physics' analogue to the chance variation that biologists (and
increasingly researchers in the social and cognitive sciences) identify as the
motor of natural selection. To stress its complicity with the new technolo-
gies of the information age and its autonomy with respect to the human,
Lyotard dubs this cosmological perspective the "metaphysics of develop-
ment."
[The metaphysics of development] results from a process of development,
where it is not mankind which is the issue, but differentiation . . . The strik-
ing thing about this metaphysics of development is that it needs no finality.
Development is not attached to an Idea, like that of the emancipation of rea-
son and of human freedoms. It is reproduced by accelerating and extending
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Em bod y i n g
Technesis
While Serres's singular fusion of science and poetry forcefully expresses the urgency for a new evaluation of modern technology, Lyotard's recent work most decisively sketches the inhuman history of matter correlative with it. In a series of recent essays focusing on the contemporary material ization of mind and apparently addressed to the cosmos itself, Lyotard pre sents a conception of matter from a cosmological perspective. According to Lyotard, the evolution of matter results from a process of " cosmological chance "-physics' analogue to the chance variation that biologists ( and increasingly researchers in the social and cognitive sciences) identify as the motor of natural selection. To stress its complicity with the new technolo gies of the information age and its autonomy with respect to the human, Lyotard dubs this cosmological perspective the " metaphysics of develop ment. "
itself according to its internal dynamic alone. It assimilates risks, memorizes
their informational value and uses this as a new mediation necessary to its
functioning. It has no necessity itself other than a cosmological chance.
(Lyotard 1991, 6-7)
Radicalizing Herbert Marcuse's critique of technology, Lyotard effectively
inverts the humanist perspective central to its emancipatory program:
because technology is now in the service of cosmological complexification,
or negative entropy-rather than the human domination of other human
beings (and subsequently of nature)-we must fundamentally alter our
political aims with respect to it.7 Rather than doggedly persisting in our
efforts to triumph over the metaphysics of domination, we must struggle to
adapt our experiential capabilities in an effort to keep up with the techno-
logical "expressions" of cosmological chance.
[The metaphysics of development] results from a process of development, where it is not mankind which is the issue, but differentiation . . . . The strik ing thing about this metaphysics of development is that it needs no finality. Development is not attached to an Idea, like that of the emancipation of rea son and of human freedoms. It is reproduced by accelerating and extending itself according to its internal dynamic alone. It assimilates risks, memorizes their informational value and uses this as a new mediation necessary to its functioning. It has no necessity itself other than a cosmological chance. (Lyotard 1 9 9 1 , 6-7)
With this thesis, Lyotard begins to articulate a postrepresentationalist,
"exocultural" model of technological evolution. Eschewing traditional
strategies that reductively trace technology to factors internal to human cul-
ture and society, he argues that technologies, while continuing to develop in
response to specific human needs and within specific cultural contexts, both
express and contribute to a process of material complexification unrelated
in any essential way to human cultural pursuit: ". .. what is called research
and development in contemporary society and the results of which con-
stantly disturb our environment are much more the result of... a process of
Radicalizing Herbert Marcuse's critique of technology, Lyotard effectively inverts the humanist perspective central to its emancipatory program: because technology is now in the service of cosmological complexification, or negative entropy-rather than the human domination of other human beings ( and subsequently of nature)-we must fundamentally alter our political aims with respect to it? Rather than doggedly persisting in our efforts to triumph over the metaphysics of domination, we must struggle to adapt our experiential capabilities in an effort to keep up with the techno logical " expressions " of cosmological chance. With this thesis, Lyotard begins to articulate a postrepresentationalist, " exocultural" model of technological evolution. Eschewing traditional strategies that reductively trace technology to factors internal to human cul ture and society, he argues that technologies, while continuing to develop in response to specific human needs and within specific cultural contexts, both express and contribute to a process of material complexification unrelated in any essential way to human cultural pursuit: " . . . what is called research and development in contemporary society and the results of which con stantly disturb our environment are much more the result of . . . a process of
Locati n g the Tech n o l ogical Real
Locating the Technological Real * 67
'cosmolocal' complexification than the work of human genius attached to
the discovery of truth and the realization of good" (61). From Lyotard's
perspective, then, our contemporary imperative to develop technology is not
fundamentally different from the necessity we fall under as natural creatures
subject to evolutionary chance.
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67
'cosmolocal' complexification than the work of human genius attached to the discovery of truth and the realization of good" ( 6 1 ) . From Lyotard's perspective, then, our contemporary imperative to develop technology is not fundamentally different from the necessity we fall under as natural creatures subj ect to evolutionary chance.
As is clearly shown by the development of the techno-scientific system, tech-
nology and the culture associated with it are under a necessity to pursue their
rise, and this necessity must be referred to the process of complexification (or
neg-entropy) which takes place in the area of the cosmos inhabited by
humanity. The human race is, so to speak, "pulled forward" by this process
without possessing the slightest capacity for mastering it. It has to adapt to
the new conditions. (64)
With this pronouncement, we reach the far side of the famous Heideggerian
maxim that will furnish my point of orientation in part 2 of this study. By
aligning technological development with material complexification, Lyotard
effectively expunges any possibility that technology could somehow be pure
of essence. In its contemporary role as the privileged vehicle for cosmic com-
plexification, technology does not constitute a depraved epochal ontology
that functions to conceal Being. Instead, it has become internal to Being
itself.
Correlatively with this displacement, human beings lose whatever active
role remains for them on the Heideggerian view-both as an efficient cause
of the modern epochal stamping of Being and as the passive "shepherds" of
whatever new showing of Being the future will bring. For Lyotard, human
beings have become mere pawns in a vast techno-evolutionary scheme:
"... technological-scientific development is, on the surface of the earth, the
present-day form of a process of negentropy or complexification that has
been underway since the earth began its existence. I'm granting that human
beings aren't and never have been the motor of the complexification, but an
effect and carrier of this negentropy, its continuer . . . I concede that it isn't
any human desire to know or transform reality that propels this techno-sci-
ence, but a cosmic circumstance" (22). Accordingly, for all of its importance
as a contribution to the post-Heideggerian rethinking of technology,
Lyotard's program is compromised by his unmitigated enthusiasm in
embracing techno-complexification. The unwavering privilege he grants the
cosmic point of view is fundamentally disempowering, if not downright
repugnant, given the urgency of our responsibility, as contemporary cultural
critics and as world citizens, to explore the anthropology of the technologi-
cal age.8 In my opinion, moreover, Lyotard's striking nihilism is less the
reflection of any actual or possible experiential reality than a result of his
As is clearly shown by the development of the techno-scientific system, tech nology and the culture associated with it are under a necessity to pursue their rise, and this necessity must be referred to the process of complexification ( or neg-entropy) which takes place in the area of the cosmos inhabited by humanity. The human race is, so to speak, "pulled forward " by this process without possessing the slightest capacity for mastering it. It has to adapt to the new conditions . ( 6 4 )
With this pronouncement, w e reach the far side o f the famous Heideggerian maxim that will furnish my point of orientation in part 2 of this study. By aligning technological development with material complexification, Lyotard effectively expunges any possibility that technology could somehow be pure of essence . In its contemporary role as the privileged vehicle for cosmic com plexification, technology does not constitute a depraved epochal ontology that functions to conceal Being. Instead, it has become internal to Being itself. Correlatively with this displacement, human beings lose whatever active role remains for them on the Heideggerian view-both as an efficient cause of the modern epochal stamping of Being and as the passive " shepherds " of whatever new showing of Being the future will bring. For Lyotard, human beings have become mere pawns in a vast techno-evolutionary scheme : " . . . technological-scientific development is, on the surface of the earth, the present-day form of a process of negentropy or complexification that has been underway since the earth began its existence . I'm granting that human beings aren't and never have been the motor of the complexification, but an effect and carrier of this negentropy, its continuer. . . . I concede that it isn't any human desire to know or transform reality that propels this techno-sci ence, but a cosmic circumstance " ( 22 ) . Accordingly, for all of its importance as a contribution to the post-Heideggerian rethinking of technology, Lyotard's program is compromised by his unmitigated enthusiasm in embracing techno-complexification. The unwavering privilege he grants the cosmic point of view is fundamentally dis empowering, if not downright repugnant, given the urgency of our responsibility, as contemporary cultural critics and as world citizens, to explore the anthropology of the technologi cal age . 8 In my opinion, moreover, Lyotard's striking nihilism is less the reflection of any actual or possible experiential reality than a result of his
68
68 * Embodying Technesis
effort to ally his thinking rhetorically with the cosmological perspective he
claims to be explicating. (Consider, for example, the way he introduces his
conclusions, his manner of addressing-or perhaps even of speaking for-
the cosmos itself: "I'm granting that..."; "I concede that..."; etc.) By priv-
ileging the long-term, cosmological evolutionary perspective in this rhetori-
cally insistent way, Lyotard tries his best to coax us into aligning our
perspective with it.
If we hope to meet the challenges of the emerging posthuman age with-
out simply abandoning the human, however, we must struggle most zeal-
ously against just such a cosmological alliance. Only by preserving the value
of our short-term human perspective will we retain the ability to invest our
lives with significance-to intervene (to whatever extent possible) in strug-
gles over the future of technology and to engage ourselves in the affirmative
task of exploring new technologically mediated, posthuman forms of
human agency.9 However irrelevant they may be from the perspective of the
cosmos, such struggles and engagements are absolutely central to our con-
temporary cultural moment: it would hardly be an exaggeration to claim
that their outcome will dictate the terms of whatever contract we will be
able to broker with technology. Only our active intervention, as critics like
Hayles have recently argued, will allow us to fashion a future in which the
human can find ways of grappling with the displacement it undergoes in the
face of technology's inhuman evolution.
Given such an imperative, we must accord Lyotard's cosmological per-
spective a heuristic, rather than a prescriptive, role. Insofar as it forms a
strong reminder of modern technology's fundamental autonomy from the
human measure, Lyotard's perspective provides the critical leverage neces-
sary to loosen the stranglehold maintained by the constructivist idiom. Once
we begin to view his grand narrative as something like a cosmological fairy
tale-one not entirely dissimilar from Haraway's more famous and deeply
resonant cyborg myth-we will be able to enlist his support in the project of
articulating an anthropology for the contemporary technological age.
In effect, Lyotard's effort to correlate the alienation generated by con-
temporary technology with the liberation of energy from mechanical and
dynamical constructions of matter helps to make tangible the shift explored
in the cultural histories of science and technology discussed earlier. With his
crucial notion of the transformer, Lyotard successfully foregrounds the
increasing divide separating the physics of matter-energy from the human
dimension. Lyotard's transformer operates a transformation of a "material
point"; it is a way of modeling and converting energy that can either clarify
matter for us or demarcate its radical incongruity with our human percep-
•
Em bod y i n g
Technesis
effort to ally his thinking rhetorically with the cosmological perspective he claims to be explicating. ( Consider, for example, the way he introduces his conclusions, his manner of addressing-or perhaps even of speaking for the cosmos itself: "I'm granting that . . . " ; " I concede that . . . " ; etc . ) By priv ileging the long-term, cosmological evolutionary perspective in this rhetori cally insistent way, Lyotard tries his best to coax us into aligning our perspective with it. If we hope to meet the challenges of the emerging posthuman age with out simply abandoning the human, however, we must struggle most zeal ously against j ust such a cosmological alliance. Only by preserving the value of our short-term human perspective will we retain the ability to invest our lives with significance-to intervene (to whatever extent possible) in strug gles over the future of technology and to engage ourselves in the affirmative task of exploring new technologically mediated, posthuman forms of human agency.9 However irrelevant they may be from the perspective of the cosmos, such struggles and engagements are absolutely central to our con temporary cultural moment: it would hardly be an exaggeration to claim that their outcome will dictate the terms of whatever contract we will be able to broker with technology. Only our active intervention, as critics like Hayles have recently argued, will allow us to fashion a future in which the human can find ways of grappling with the displacement it undergoes in the face of technology's inhuman evolution. Given such an imperative, we must accord Lyotard's cosmological per spective a heuristic, rather than a prescriptive, role. Insofar as it forms a strong reminder of modern technology's fundamental autonomy from the human measure, Lyotard's perspective provides the critical leverage neces sary to loosen the stranglehold maintained by the constructivist idiom. Once we begin to view his grand narrative as something like a cosmological fairy tale-one not entirely dissimilar from Haraway's more famous and deeply resonant cyborg myth-we will be able to enlist his support in the proj ect of articulating an anthropology for the contemporary technological age. In effect, Lyotard's effort to correlate the alienation generated by con temporary technology with the liberation of energy from mechanical and dynamical constructions of matter helps to make tangible the shift explored in the cultural histories of science and technology discussed earlier. With his crucial notion of the transformer, Lyotard successfully foregrounds the increasing divide separating the physics of matter-energy from the human dimension. Lyotard's transformer operates a transformation of a "material point " ; it is a way of modeling and converting energy that can either clarify matter for us or demarcate its radical incongruity with our human percep-
Locati n g the Tech n o l ogical Real
Locating the Technological Real * 69
tual, experiential, and cognitive rhythms. Lyotard notes that for classical
mechanics, which models matter on the substance model, "the only relevant
transformers are the axioms of classic geometry." He notes further that by
thinking of matter through the concept of extension, Descartes submits it to
a transformation that is "analogical to human experience." He argues that
in the case of contemporary technoscience, by contrast, transformations are,
to a large extent, inhuman: "The transformation of elements, such as the
transformation of uranium 238 into neptunium,.., are not only not on our
scale, but require an idea of matter" no longer modeled on substance (37).
In our contemporary world, he continues, "matter is energy," and com-
plexification occurs through the increasingly dematerialized transforma-
tions of energy. As transformations become more diverse and more inhu-
man, explains Lyotard, the capacities of the properly human transformer,
the nervous system, become increasingly marginalized; as a consequence,
energy (matter) increasingly escapes our ken.
Contemporary science. . . shows us that energy, in all its forms, is distributed
in waves, and that, to quote Jean Perrin, "all matter is in the end a particular
and very condensed form of energy." The reality to be accorded such-and-
such a form of energy, and therefore of matter, clearly depends on the trans-
formers we have at our disposal. Even the transformer that our central ner-
vous system is, highly sophisticated in the order of living creatures, can only
•
69
tual, experiential, and cognitive rhythms. Lyotard notes that for classical mechanics, which models matter on the substance model, " the only relevant transformers are the axioms of classic geometry. " He notes further that by thinking of matter through the concept of extension, Descartes submits it to a transformation that is " analogical to human experience. " He argues that in the case of contemporary techno science, by contrast, transformations are, to a large extent, inhuman: "The transformation of elements, such as the transformation of uranium 23 8 into neptunium, . . . are not only not on our scale, but require an idea of matter " no longer modeled on substance ( 3 7 ) . I n our contemporary world, h e continues, " matter i s energy, " and com plexification occurs through the increasingly dematerialized transforma tions of energy. As transformations become more diverse and more inhu man, explains Lyotard, the capacities of the properly human transformer, the nervous system, become increasingly marginalized; as a consequence, energy (matter ) increasingly escapes our ken.
transcribe and inscribe according to its own rhythm the excitations which
come to it from the milieu in which it lives. (43; emphasis added)
In foregrounding the incompatibility between nervous systems (explicitly
modeled as inscriptional agents) and the modern complexification of the
material domain, Lyotard describes the very divorce of theoretical knowl-
edge from experience that I have attributed to the industrial and thermody-
namic revolutions. In the process, he adds an important element to the pic-
ture previously sketched-a concrete understanding of how the human use
of technology (e.g., to model mathematically those material processes that
are cognitively unmappable by the human brain) fits within a cosmological
dialectic and indeed how it forms a double-edged sword, simultaneously
aiding us in adjusting to the inhuman material evolution and spurring fur-
Contemporary science . . . shows us that energy, in all its forms, is distributed in waves, and that, to quote Jean Perrin, " all matter is in the end a particular and very condensed form of energy. " The reality to be accorded such-and such a form of energy, and therefore of matter, clearly depends on the trans formers we have at our disposal. Even the transformer that our central ner vous system is, highly sophisticated in the order of living creatures, can only transcribe and inscribe according to its own rhythm the excitations which come to it from the milieu in which it lives. (43; emphasis added)
ther material complexification. Lyotard acknowledges that while the devel-
opment of technoscience allows us to "increase our material liberty" by
memorizing "in a fashion accessible to us, vibrations naturally beyond our
ken," it also further differentiates or complexifies matter-energy itself, leav-
ing us more marginalized than ever. Accordingly, he admits, despite local
and temporary gains, technoscience's ever expanding contribution to
"negentropy" cannot but increase our alienation: "The complexification of
In foregrounding the incompatibility between nervous systems ( explicitly modeled as inscriptional agents) and the modern complexification of the material domain, Lyotard describes the very divorce of theoretical knowl edge from experience that I have attributed to the industrial and thermody namic revolutions. In the process, he adds an important element to the pic ture previously sketched-a concrete understanding of how the human use of technology (e.g., to model mathematically those material processes that are cognitively unmappable by the human brain) fits within a cosmological dialectic and indeed how it forms a double-edged sword, simultaneously aiding us in adjusting to the inhuman material evolution and spurring fur ther material complexification. Lyotard acknowledges that while the devel opment of technoscience allows us to " increase our material liberty " by memorizing " in a fashion accessible to us, vibrations naturally beyond our ken," it also further differentiates or complexifies matter-energy itself, leav ing us more marginalized than ever. Accordingly, he admits, despite local and temporary gains, technoscience's ever expanding contribution to " negentropy " cannot but increase our alienation: "The complexification of
70
•
Em bod y i n g
Technesis
the transformers, theoretical and practical, has always had as its effect the 70 * Embodying Technesis
the transformers, theoretical and practical, has always had as its effect the
destabilization of the fit between the human subject and its environment"
(44; emphasis added).
Ultimately, the cosmological endgame between the human and the tech-
nological compels Lyotard to situate our current moment in the lineage of
earlier destabilizations of the humanist perspective, as a culminating strike
against the privilege of (human) reason itself.
... this current of thinking... deal[s] a blow to what I shall call human nar-
destabilization of the fit between the human subject and its environment" (44; emphasis added ) . Ultimately, the cosmological endgame between the human and the tech nological compels Lyotard to situate our current moment in the lineage of earlier destabilizations of the humanist perspective, as a culminating strike against the privilege of (human ) reason itself.
cissism. Freud already listed three famous ones: man is not the center of the
cosmos (Copernicus), is not the first living creature (Darwin), is not the mas-
ter of meaning (Freud himself). Through contemporary techno-science, he
learns that he does not have the monopoly of mind, that is, of
complexification, but that complexification is not inscribed as a destiny in
matter but as possible, and that it takes place, at random, but intelligibly,
well before himself. He learns in particular that his own science is in its turn
a complexification of matter, in which, so to speak, energy itself comes to be
reflected, without humans necessarily getting any benefit from this. And that
thus he must not consider himself as an origin or as a result but as a trans-
former ensuring, through techno-science, arts, economic development, cul-
tures and the new memorization they involve, a supplement of complexity in
the universe. (45; translation modified, emphasis added)
Paradoxically, to grasp the heuristic value of Lyotard's perspective, we need
to understand this passage not as a hyperbolic obituary of the human but as
a fundamentally ambivalent affirmation of its resilience. The human,
Lyotard's genealogy seems to imply, perseveres through its destabilizations.
Thus, if we can only find a way of resisting his overenthusiastic call for a
direct communion with the cosmos, we can selectively draw on his analysis
to situate technology in a more encompassing and properly posthuman con-
text without at the same time being compelled to affirm its radical inhu-
. . . this current of thinking . . . deal [ s] a blow to what I shall call human nar cissism. Freud already listed three famous ones: man is not the center of the cosmos ( Copernicus ), is not the first living creature (Darwin ), is not the mas ter of meaning (Freud himself) . Through contemporary techno-science, he learns that he does not have the monopoly of mind, that is, of complexification, but that complexification is not inscribed as a destiny in matter but as possible, and that it takes place, at random, but intelligibly, well before himself. He learns in particular that his own science is in its turn a complexification of matter, in which, so to speak, energy itself comes to be reflected, without humans necessarily getting any benefit from this. And that
thus he must not consider himself as an origin or as a result but as a trans former ensuring, through techno-science, arts, economic development, cul tures and the new memorization they involve, a supplement of complexity in the universe. (45; translation modified, emphasis added)
manity.
The Practical Dimension of Technology and
Embodied Experience
Once we take up a pragmatic perspective on Lyotard's admittedly eccentric
views, we can fully appreciate his emphasis on the practical dimension of
contemporary technoscience. By demonstrating how technoscientific devel-
opments impact us extrascientifically, independently of their institutionally
mediated scientific significance, Lyotard lends strong support to the auton-
Paradoxically, to grasp the heuristic value of Lyotard's perspective, we need to understand this passage not as a hyperbolic obituary of the human but as a fundamentally ambivalent affirmation of its resilience. The human, Lyotard's genealogy seems to imply, perseveres through its destabilizations. Thus, if we can only find a way of resisting his overenthusiastic call for a direct communion with the cosmos, we can selectively draw on his analysis to situate technology in a more encompassing and properly posthuman con text without at the same time being compelled to affirm its radical inhu manity.
The Practical Dimension of Technology and Embodied Exp erience
Once we take up a pragmatic perspective on Lyotard's admittedly eccentric views, we can fully appreciate his emphasis on the practical dimension of contemporary techno science. By demonstrating how techno scientific devel opments impact us extrascientifically, independently of their institutionally mediated scientific significance, Lyotard lends strong support to the auton-
Locati n g the Tech n o l ogical Real
Locating the Technological Real * 71
omy I have been claiming for technology. On the one hand, he furnishes a
coherent account of technology's particular autonomy from the cultural.
Though always developed within cultural contexts that have a determining
influence on their form, technologies are simultaneously exocultural: they
are crucial vehicles of a nonteleological, natural or cosmological evolution-
ary process that is only secondarily or tangentially (though certainly not
inconsequentially) subject to the more local demands of our cultural
moment. On the other hand, by stressing the key role played by transform-
ers, Lyotard furnishes a concrete account of the constitutive split that
informs human existence following the industrial revolution: with our ever
increasing reliance on inhuman transformers, our very capacity to acquire a
representationally mediated understanding of material complexification
diminishes. Insofar as it depends on abstract mathematics and computer
programs far beyond the grasp of our synthetic, phenomenal cognition, our
contemporary formalized means of representing materiality could not be
further distanced from our phenomenal experience of it.
Far from living out the global embrace gleefully envisioned by Marshall
McLuhan, then, we face a situation in which the prostheses we adopt to
cognize and intervene in the technologically driven material complexifi-
cation of the universe only seem to expand our experiential alienation. Since
they deterritorialize our cognitive mapping of the real into the dematerial-
ized, disembodied domain of mathematical formalization, the prosthetic
transformers on which we increasingly rely reinforce the fundamental inca-
pacity of those transformers proper to us-the embodied mind and the ner-
vous system-to translate technologically generated alterations of the life-
world into forms that fit the human measure.
Because contemporary technology largely exceeds the grasp of our built-
in, or natural, experiential capacities, the very hope of preserving the value
of the human perspective in the face of rapid technological change hinges on
our willingness to accept and adapt ourselves to the shift it produces in the
economy of experience. Thus, far from sharing cultural studies' commit-
ment to contextualization and its reassuring conviction that, as Markley
puts it, we still live in the humanist, logocentric era, we must take on the
more fundamental task of rethinking the very notion of culture in light of
the profound shift in the locus of experience brought about by technology.
Although a full account of this shift must await my discussion of Walter
Benjamin's trenchant distinction between Erlebnis and Erfahrung (chap. 9),
a brief consideration of Lyotard's debt to Henri Bergson-and specifically
to Bergson's ontological monism-will serve to make clear the extent of our
task. By furnishing the conceptual terminology to describe the progressive
•
71
omy I have been claiming for technology. On the one hand, he furnishes a coherent account of technology's particular autonomy from the cultural. Though always developed within cultural contexts that have a determining influence on their form, technologies are simultaneously exocultural : they are crucial vehicles of a nonteleological, natural or cosmological evolution ary process that is only secondarily or tangentially ( though certainly not inconsequentially) subj ect to the more local demands of our cultural moment. On the other hand, by stressing the key role played by transform ers, Lyotard furnishes a concrete account of the constitutive split that informs human existence following the industrial revolution : with our ever increasing reliance on inhuman transformers, our very capacity to acquire a representationally mediated understanding of material complexification diminishes. Insofar as it depends on abstract mathematics and computer programs far beyond the grasp of our synthetic, phenomenal cognition, our contemporary formalized means of representing materiality could not be further distanced from our phenomenal experience of it. Far from living out the global embrace gleefully envisioned by Marshall McLuhan, then, we face a situation in which the prostheses we adopt to cognize and intervene in the technologically driven material complexifi cation of the universe only seem to expand our experiential alienation. Since they deterritorialize our cognitive mapping of the real into the dematerial ized, disembodied domain of mathematical formalization, the prosthetic transformers on which we increasingly rely reinforce the fundamental inca pacity of those transformers proper to us-the embodied mind and the ner vous system-to translate technologically generated alterations of the life world into forms that fit the human measure. Because contemporary technology largely exceeds the grasp of our built in, or natural, experiential capacities, the very hope of preserving the value of the human perspective in the face of rapid technological change hinges on our willingness to accept and adapt ourselves to the shift it produces in the economy of experience. Thus, far from sharing cultural studies' commit ment to contextualization and its reassuring conviction that, as Markley puts it, we still live in the humanist, logocentric era, we must take on the more fundamental task of rethinking the very notion of culture in light of the profound shift in the locus of experience brought about by technology. Although a full account of this shift must await my discussion of Walter Benj amin's trenchant distinction between Erlebnis and Erfahrung (chap . 9 ) , a brief consideration o f Lyotard's debt t o Henri Bergson-and specifically to Bergson's ontological monism-will serve to make clear the extent of our task. By furnishing the conceptual terminology to describe the progressive
72
72 * Embodying Technesis
shift in the mind-matter economy that has been the legacy of technological
change since the industrial revolution, Bergson helps us grapple with the
imperative we now face: his dissolution of the mind-matter distinction
serves as the strongest possible reminder that we urgently need to find ways
of expanding our access to the ever more prominent embodied dimension of
our lived experience.
Eschewing traditional dualism, Bergson situates matter and mind as the
two poles of a single continuum; mind, he claims, is distinguished from mat-
ter only by "differences of degree, which depends on the capacity to gather
and conserve." He further claims that "[m]ind is matter which remembers
its interactions, its immanence" (Lyotard 1991, 40). Mind, in other words,
is the product of an organism's (or a system's) ability to delay its reaction to
a material point (a stimulus from the material world); such delay gives it the
capacity to assemble what are in effect successive stimuli or material shocks
into a simultaneous unity of duration that yields a "conscious perception"
or "representation" (40). In the case of human perception, the difference
between matter and mind is one of rhythm. The process we follow in delay-
ing our reaction in this way comprises a kind of interface through which we
translate the preperceptual rhythm of material stimuli into units that obey
the rhythms proper to our representational consciousness. If successful, this
translation process yields an increase in our "material liberty," for by delay-
ing our instantaneous reaction to material stimuli, we are able to resist
falling under the determinism that matter would otherwise impose on us.
On Lyotard's account, this translational capacity meets its limit in the
postmodern world. With the material changes imposed by contemporary
technologies, we increasingly find ourselves unable to bridge the gap
between the rhythms of material stimuli and our proper human rhythms.
Consequently, we find ourselves faced with an ever increasing loss of mate-
rial liberty, a loss that can be temporarily forestalled only by our use of
prosthetic forms of mind, even if these forms will progressively alienate us
from our bodies until the moment when they simply replace us. What makes
this tragic story of humanity's demise seem inevitable is not some cosmo-
logical necessity, as Lyotard claims, but simply the poverty of Bergson's
recipe for material liberty. So long as we follow Bergson in predicating the
power to delay on the production of a representation, Lyotard's extreme
antihumanist picture of the future appears all but inevitable. If our power is
reductively bound to our representationalist faculties, not only will our cur-
rent form of existence as embodied creatures become ever increasingly out
of sync with material change, but our fate will indeed come to hinge, as
Lyotard rather gothically suggests it does, on developing prosthetic bodies
•
Em bod y i n g
Technesis
shift in the mind-matter economy that has been the legacy of technological change since the industrial revolution, Bergson helps us grapple with the imperative we now face: his dissolution of the mind-matter distinction serves as the strongest possible reminder that we urgently need to find ways of expanding our access to the ever more prominent embodied dimension of our lived experience. Eschewing traditional dualism, Bergson situates matter and mind as the two poles of a single continuum; mind, he claims, is distinguished from mat ter only by " differences of degree, which depends on the capacity to gather and conserve. " He further claims that " [ m l ind is matter which remembers its interactions, its immanence " (Lyotard 1 9 9 1 , 4 0 ) . Mind, in other words, is the product of an organism's (or a system's) ability to delay its reaction to a material point (a stimulus from the material world); such delay gives it the capacity to assemble what are in effect successive stimuli or material shocks into a simultaneous unity of duration that yields a " conscious perception" or " representation" (40 ) . In the case of human perception, the difference between matter and mind is one of rhythm. The process we follow in delay ing our reaction in this way comprises a kind of interface through which we translate the preperceptual rhythm of material stimuli into units that obey the rhythms proper to our representational consciousness. If successful, this translation process yields an increase in our " material liberty, " for by delay ing our instantaneous reaction to material stimuli, we are able to resist falling under the determinism that matter would otherwise impose on us. On Lyotard's account, this translational capacity meets its limit in the postmodern world. With the material changes imposed by contemporary technologies, we increasingly find ourselves unable to bridge the gap between the rhythms of material stimuli and our proper human rhythms. Consequently, we find ourselves faced with an ever increasing loss of mate rial liberty, a loss that can be temporarily forestalled only by our use of prosthetic forms of mind, even if these forms will progressively alienate us from our bodies until the moment when they simply replace us. What makes this tragic story of humanity's demise seem inevitable is not some cosmo logical necessity, as Lyotard claims, but simply the poverty of Bergson's recipe for material liberty. So long as we follow Bergson in predicating the power to delay on the production of a representation, Lyotard's extreme antihumanist picture of the future appears all but inevitable. If our power is reductively bound to our representationalist faculties, not only will our cur rent form of existence as embodied creatures become ever increasingly out of sync with material change, but our fate will indeed come to hinge, as Lyotard rather gothically suggests it does, on developing prosthetic bodies
Locati n g the Tech n o l ogical Real
Locating the Technological Real * 73
capable of housing mind and guaranteeing its survival following the heat
death of the sun.10
Fortunately, to resist such a pessimistic and fantastically hyperbolic con-
clusion, we need only eschew the deep theoretical bias that lies at the heart
of Bergson's (and Lyotard's) ontology. By decoupling human freedom from
the capacity to translate material stimuli into mental representations, we
open entirely new possibilities. Specifically, we avoid reducing the nervous
system to a static entity by granting it capabilities of adaptation that are not
narrowly cognitive. Ultimately, this will allow us to resituate our adaptation
to technological change within the broad perspective of the evolutionary
history and flexibility of the embodied human being. Consequently, we will
be able to acquire the means of explaining how we can modify ourselves to
process preperceptual material stimuli and, correlatively, how we can expe-
rience technologically generated material complexification without the
mediation of representation.11
Faced with the task of developing what amounts to a logic of embodiment,
the contemporary cultural critic occupies a position largely analogous to
that of artificial life (AL) researchers who, departing markedly from the
artificial intelligence (AI) tradition, seek to develop cognitive agents capable
of performing simple everyday practical tasks, such as walking and avoiding
stationary objects. We too must develop a bottom-up model of cognition,
•
73
capable of housing mind and guaranteeing its survival following the heat death of the sun.1 0 Fortunately, to resist such a pessimistic and fantastically hyperbolic con clusion, we need only eschew the deep theoretical bias that lies at the heart of Bergson's ( and Lyotard' s ) ontology. By decoupling human freedom from the capacity to translate material stimuli into mental representations, we open entirely new possibilities. Specifically, we avoid reducing the nervous system to a static entity by granting it capabilities of adaptation that are not narrowly cognitive. Ultimately, this will allow us to resituate our adaptation to technological change within the broad perspective of the evolutionary history and flexibility of the embodied human being. Consequently, we will be able to acquire the means of explaining how we can modify ourselves to process preperceptual material stimuli and, correlatively, how we can expe rience technologically generated material complexification without the mediation of representation. 1 1
one that does not begin by presupposing (human) consciousness as its goal
but fundamentally reconceives cognition as the operation not of disembod-
ied logical operations but of massively distributed nervous systems. On such
a model, cognitive responses to material stimuli need not take the form of
representations but can be thought of as computational adjustments occur-
ring in the peripheral nervous system. As a model for such a bottom-up,
postrepresentationalist notion of agency, AL research affords us an alterna-
tive to the radically posthuman robotics paradigm
enthusiastically
embraced by Lyotard. If we can learn from AL research efforts to evolve
"intelligence within the machine through pathways found by the 'creatures'
themselves" (Hayles 1996b, 161; emphasis added), we may come to under-
stand how our nervous systems can adapt to material changes that exceed
their inscriptional capacities and how we can stimulate our nervous systems
to "learn" in an emergent and completely practical way-one that would
forever lack a representational correlate.12 As I shall argue in chapter 9,
Walter Benjamin's notion of sensory retraining through submission to the
shock experience of the cinema engages these possibilities in extremely fruit-
ful ways. Where Lyotard's interest in technological prostheses remains
Faced with the task o f developing what amounts to a logic o f embodiment, the contemporary cultural critic occupies a position largely analogous to that of artificial life (AL) researchers who, departing markedly from the artificial intelligence (AI) tradition, seek to develop cognitive agents capable of performing simple everyday practical tasks, such as walking and avoiding stationary obj ects. We too must develop a bottom-up model of cognition, one that does not begin by presupposing (human) consciousness as its goal but fundamentally reconceives cognition as the operation not of disembod ied logical operations but of massively distributed nervous systems. On such a model, cognitive responses to material stimuli need not take the form of representations but can be thought of as computational adj ustments occur ring in the peripheral nervous system. As a model for such a bottom-up, postrepresentationalist notion of agency, AL research affords us an alterna tive to the radically posthuman robotics paradigm enthusiastically embraced by Lyotard. If we can learn from AL research efforts to evolve " intelligence within the machine through pathways found by the "creatures' themselves " (Hayles 1 996b, 1 6 1 ; emphasis added) , we may come to under stand how our nervous systems can adapt to material changes that exceed their inscriptional capacities and how we can stimulate our nervous systems to " learn " in an emergent and completely practical way-one that would forever lack a representational correlate.12 As I shall argue in chapter 9, Walter Benj amin's notion of sensory retraining through submission to the shock experience of the cinema engages these possibilities in extremely fruit ful ways. Where Lyotard' s interest in technological prostheses remains
74
74 " Embodying Technesis
purely cognitive, Benjamin gives us a recipe for how to use them mimeti-
cally, a recipe for training our senses in a manner that, following Bourdieu's
proscription, has no direct representational or theoretical payoff. In the
space of this difference, I suggest, we encounter the core challenge of the
technological posthuman: if we are to negotiate technologically mediated
material complexification without either falling back into a retrograde and
defensive humanism or taking an all-too-precipitous leap into the inhuman,
we simply cannot put off the opportunity of exploring such unorthodox
possibilities.
•
Em bod y i n g
Technesis
purely cognitive, Benj amin gives us a recipe for how to use them mimeti cally, a recipe for training our senses in a manner that, following Bourdieu's proscription, has no direct representational or theoretical payoff. In the space of this difference, I suggest, we encounter the core challenge of the technological posthuman: if we are to negotiate technologically mediated material complexification without either falling back into a retrograde and defensive humanism or taking an all-too-precipitous leap into the inhuman, we simply cannot put off the opportunity of exploring such unorthodox possibilities.
Part 2
The Machine Reduction of Technology
Part 2 T h e Mach i n e Red u cti o n of Tech n o l ogy

Chapter 3
From Metaphor to Embodiment:
Resisting Technesis
Having now exposed the microphysical dimension of technology's impact
Chapter 3
on embodied experience, I can turn to the main topic of my study: the cri-
tique of twentieth-century critical discourses for their reduction of technol-
ogy. In this chapter, I reconstruct the genealogy of this theoretical reduction
by tracing its two major twentieth-century trajectories back to their com-
mon source in Greek ontology; in chapters 4-8, I track the legacy of this
reduction through critical readings of a core set of central twentieth-century
From Metaphor to Embodiment: Resisting Technesis
critical discourses.
Read as a contribution to contemporary criticism, my genealogical
reconstruction serves to expose the extensive and often unacknowledged
reliance of cultural studies on poststructuralist theory. By itself hardly a
grounds for complaint, this reliance becomes an issue, as I suggested in my
introduction, when contemporary critical discourses positivize their theo-
retical sources, making the deconstructive moment a transitory phase in a
larger narrative or historicization of the cognitive subject's triumph over
any and all material obstacles. In the two forms it takes in contemporary
criticism (what I differentiated in chap. 1 as representationalist and systemic
analyses, respectively), this positivization engages technology as an instance
of a broader notion
of exteriority borrowed, essentially without
modification, from poststructuralism. Since this notion of exteriority-what
Derrida christens relative exteriority-is itself profoundly reductive, my cri-
tique is intended to apply with equal force to poststructuralism and to its
contemporary legatees.
In its first, more prevalent form, the positivization of the deconstructive
moment results from the simple incapacity on the part of contemporary crit-
ics to give up their deeply entrenched commitment to representationalism.
The example of cultural critic Michelle Kendrick discussed in my introduc-
tion forms a case in point. While Kendrick announces an urgency to treat
technology as somehow "beyond the control or agency of the user"
(Kendrick 1996), her assessment of its impact is restrictively filtered through
Having now exposed the microphysical dimension of technology's impact on embodied experience, I can turn to the main topic of my study: the cri tique of twentieth-century critical discourses for their reduction of technol ogy. In this chapter, I reconstruct the genealogy of this theoretical reduction by tracing its two maj or twentieth-century traj ectories back to their com mon source in Greek ontology; in chapters 4-8 , I track the legacy of this reduction through critical readings of a core set of central twentieth-century critical discourses. Read as a contribution to contemporary criticism, my genealogical reconstruction serves to expose the extensive and often unacknowledged reliance of cultural studies on poststructuralist theory. By itself hardly a grounds for complaint, this reliance becomes an issue, as I suggested in my introduction, when contemporary critical discourses positivize their theo retical sources, making the deconstructive moment a transitory phase in a larger narrative or historicization of the cognitive subject's triumph over any and all material obstacles. In the two forms it takes in contemporary criticism (what I differentiated in chap . 1 as representationalist and systemic analyses, respectively) , this positivization engages technology as an instance of a broader notion of exteriority borrowed, essentially without modification, from poststructuralism. Since this notion of exteriority-what D errida christens relative exteriority-is itself profoundly reductive, my cri tique is intended to apply with equal force to poststructuralism and to its contemporary legatees. In its first, more prevalent form, the positivization of the deconstructive moment results from the simple incapacity on the part of contemporary crit ics to give up their deeply entrenched commitment to representationalism. The example of cultural critic Michelle Kendrick discussed in my introduc tion forms a case in point. While Kendrick announces an urgency to treat technology as somehow " beyond the control or agency of the user" (Kendrick 1 99 6 ) , her assessment of its impact is restrictively filtered through
78
78 * Embodying Technesis
the effects it has on our capacity to constitute ourselves as subjects, to rep-
resent ourselves to ourselves.1 No matter how aware we might be of the
constitutive fictionality of the self, no matter how rigorously we might fol-
low Hume in privileging habit over representation, we remain dependent on
representational constructions of the self to capture the significance of our
habits and, consequently, to mediate the "technological real" for us. What-
ever exteriority is thereby broached is-and can only be-a relative exteri-
ority, a point of resistance internal to the representational space of thought.
In its second form, the positivizing of the deconstructive moment results
from a decision to privilege formal analogies between literary and techno-
scientific systems. In reading literary texts as emergent phenomena in the
sense developed by cybernetics or, alternately, as structures sharing a com-
mon organizational logic with chaos theory, critics deploy the systems per-
spective in a largely uncritical manner: they simply presuppose an underly-
ing structural homology between literary and technoscientific branches of
knowledge.2 Not only does such a position perpetuate the hypostatization
of thought that, as we have seen, hinders the investigation of technology's
robust experiential impact, but it does so by jettisoning the very dimension
of poststructuralist theory most fundamental to its cultural application-the
disjunction between interiorizing thought and its technological embodi-
ment.3
In a recent discussion of literature and complexity that can stand as an
exemplar for the systems approach, William Paulson contextualizes decon-
struction within the cybernetic theory of communication as self-organiza-
tion from noise. By adopting an information-theoretical perspective, Paul-
son is able to reinterpret rhetorical indeterminacy as the constitutive
condition of the literary itself: "The process of self-organization from noise
provides a suggestive model for the understanding of literary signification, a
model that accounts for meaning by accepting, rather than resisting, the
rhetorical dimension of language" (Paulson 1991, 41). Within such a per-
spective, one need not fear the specter of radical undecidability and the con-
stitutive instability of language, since indeterminacy itself-as noise-repre-
sents the condition of possibility for literary meaning to arise.4 In short, the
information-systems perspective reverses the trajectory of deconstruction:
rather than moving outward, as de Manian deconstruction does, from
grammar to rhetoric, deconstruction within an information-theoretical
frame moves inward, as it were, from rhetoric (noise) to grammar (infor-
mation). By furnishing the background for the "play of the signifier," more-
over, information-theory fundamentally alters the focus of rhetorical analy-
sis: instead of culminating in a purely formal incompatibility of grammar
•
Em bod y i n g
Technesis
the effects it has on our capacity to constitute ourselves as subj ects, to rep resent ourselves to ourselves.1 No matter how aware we might be of the constitutive fictionality of the self, no matter how rigorously we might fol low Hume in privileging habit over representation, we remain dependent on representational constructions of the self to capture the significance of our habits and, consequently, to mediate the " technological real " for us. What ever exteriority is thereby broached is-and can only be-a relative exteri ority, a point of resistance internal to the representational space of thought. In its second form, the positivizing of the deconstructive moment results from a decision to privilege formal analogies between literary and techno scientific systems. In reading literary texts as emergent phenomena in the sense developed by cybernetics or, alternately, as structures sharing a com mon organizational logic with chaos theory, critics deploy the systems per spective in a largely uncritical manner: they simply presuppose an underly ing structural homology between literary and techno scientific branches of knowledge.2 Not only does such a position perpetuate the hypostatization of thought that, as we have seen, hinders the investigation of technology's robust experiential impact, but it does so by jettisoning the very dimension of poststructuralist theory most fundamental to its cultural application-the disj unction between interiorizing thought and its technological embodi ment.3 In a recent discussion of literature and complexity that can stand as an exemplar for the systems approach, William Paulson contextualizes decon struction within the cybernetic theory of communication as self-organiza tion from noise. By adopting an information-theoretical perspective, Paul son is able to reinterpret rhetorical indeterminacy as the constitutive condition of the literary itself: " The process of self-organization from noise provides a suggestive model for the understanding of literary signification, a model that accounts for meaning by accepting, rather than resisting, the rhetorical dimension of language " (Paulson 1 9 9 1 , 4 1 ) . Within such a per spective, one need not fear the specter of radical undecidability and the con stitutive instability of language, since indeterminacy itself-as noise-repre sents the condition of possibility for literary meaning to arise.4 In short, the information-systems perspective reverses the traj ectory of deconstruction: rather than moving outward, as de Manian deconstruction does, from grammar to rhetoric, deconstruction within an information-theoretical frame moves inward, as it were, from rhetoric (noise) to grammar (infor mation) . By furnishing the background for the "play of the signifier, " more over, information-theory fundamentally alters the focus of rhetorical analy sis: instead of culminating in a purely formal incompatibility of grammar
Fro m Metaphor to E m b od i ment
From Metaphor to Embodiment * 79
and rhetoric, it opens language to the outside. Ultimately, then, the cyber-
netic contextualization of the grammar-rhetoric disjunction displaces de
Man's textualist nihilism entirely; far from leading to a prison house of for-
mal self-referentiality, the cybernetic interpretation is marshaled to support
a dialectical reader-response program, based on the notion of literary com-
petence, in which indeterminacy has the function of stimulating the acquisi-
tion of new interpretative codes (see ibid., 48).
Whether the invocation of a systems perspective leads to a fortification of
properly human processes of cognition or, by contrast, to the kind of radi-
cal break with the human perspective introduced through the comparison of
literature with chaos, the attempt to situate the deconstructive disjunction
within a more embracing context can succeed only by converting it into a
functional differentiation within an inclusive context-a provisional cut
between system and environment. To assert a formal homology (and not
simply a common cultural background) between literary texts and scientific
systems, contemporary cybernetic and chaos-theoretical models have to rely
on a systems-theoretical notion of observation that severely compromises
the status of materiality. By restricting materiality to a role within a given
environment, the enabling act of observation that initially differentiates sys-
tem from environment also functions to bracket out materiality in the
broader sense. Instead of being invoked as the rich and unpredictable back-
ground for all practice, including the production of observational acts them-
selves, materiality is situated outside the circuit that connects system and
environment. As a result, it receives a purely abstract determination as that
which resists translation per se.
Paulson, for example, claims that we can infer the "ultimate underlying
unity" of literature and science ("systems that only disciplinary descriptions
have cut into separate hierarchical levels") by developing "local, emergent
and risk-taking . . . process[es] of transcoding" between cultural text (liter-
ature) and sociohistorical context (science) (50).5 Since it directs (and
thereby restricts) critical attention to a model of society (and, by extension,
of reality) that is constructed around specific processes of transcoding, such
a systems-theoretical perspective brackets out the larger domain of materi-
ality. Far from helping us clarify our embodied connection with the world,
systems theory actually seeks to revolutionize the task of theoretical descrip-
tion, to reconceptualize it as a self-contained reproduction of the real: by
introducing the notion of second-order cybernetics (according to which an
observation that introduces a distinction is itself "unable to observe the dis-
tinction on which it bases its own observation" [Schwanitz 1995, 156]), sys-
tems theory shifts the focus of analysis from a first-order process of observ-
•
79
and rhetoric, it opens language to the outside. Ultimately, then, the cyber netic contextualization of the grammar-rhetoric disj unction displaces de Man's textualist nihilism entirely; far from leading to a prison house of for mal self-referentiality, the cybernetic interpretation is marshaled to support a dialectical reader-response program, based on the notion of literary com petence, in which indeterminacy has the function of stimulating the acquisi tion of new interpretative codes ( see ibid., 4 8 ) . Whether the invocation o f a systems perspective leads to a fortification of properly human processes of cognition or, by contrast, to the kind of radi cal break with the human perspective introduced through the comparison of literature with chaos, the attempt to situate the deconstructive disj unction within a more embracing context can succeed only by converting it into a functional differentiation within an inclusive context-a provisional cut between system and environment. To assert a formal homology (and not simply a common cultural background) between literary texts and scientific systems, contemporary cybernetic and chaos-theoretical models have to rely on a systems-theoretical notion of observation that severely compromises the status of materiality. By restricting materiality to a role within a given environment, the enabling act of observation that initially differentiates sys tem from environment also functions to bracket out materiality in the broader sense. Instead of being invoked as the rich and unpredictable back ground for all practice, including the production of observational acts them selves, materiality is situated outside the circuit that connects system and environment. As a result, it receives a purely abstract determination as that which resists translation per se. Paulson, for example, claims that we can infer the " ultimate underlying unity" of literature and science ( " systems that only disciplinary descriptions have cut into separate hierarchical levels " ) by developing " local, emergent and risk-taking . . . process [es] of transcoding" between cultural text (liter ature ) and sociohistorical context ( science ) ( 5 0 ) . 5 Since it directs ( and thereby restricts) critical attention to a model of society (and, by extension, of reality) that is constructed around specific processes of transcoding, such a systems-theoretical perspective brackets out the larger domain of materi ality. Far from helping us clarify our embodied connection with the world, systems theory actually seeks to revolutionize the task of theoretical descrip tion, to reconceptualize it as a self-contained reproduction of the real: by introducing the notion of second-order cybernetics ( according to which an observation that introduces a distinction is itself " unable to observe the dis tinction on which it bases its own observation " [Schwanitz 1 995, 1 5 6] ) , sys tems theory shifts the focus of analysis from a first-order process of observ-
80
80 * Embodying Technesis
ing objects to a second-order observation of observations. Rather than a
concrete engagement with technology's impact on our embodied experi-
ence, systems-theoretical models leave us with a description of the func-
tional specification of technological society (or whatever plays the role of
most inclusive context) as a progressive proliferation of second-order obser-
vations.6 While systems theory may indeed function to overcome particular
deconstructive aporia, as its proponents claim, it does so only at the cost of
radically isolating system from environment. Consequently, whatever epis-
temological force it can claim is acquired only by cutting description off
from embodied reality-by bracketing out all constraint the real might
impose on it.7
In effect, then, systems analyses of science and technology form exem-
plary instances of the positivizing of poststructuralist theory that I have
attributed to contemporary cultural studies: by thematizing exteriority
exclusively as a temporary blind spot constitutive of a particular system that
cannot be seen from the vantage point of the observation responsible for its
construction, such analyses domesticate exteriority into a mere by-product
of an evolving description of the relation of system and environment. Not
only is exteriority thus defined, in principle, as purely relative-a con-
structed point of resistance within the space of descriptive thought-but it is
also effectively neutralized, since it can in principle always be recuperated at
a higher level of complexity, as the new state of a system following a further
act of observation. Thus, to the extent that it attributes the disjunction
between interiorizing thought and its technological embodiment to an
observer rather than to the world itself, systems analysis misses the chance
to capitalize on what, in my opinion, is truly novel and affirmative about
our otherwise all-too-banal "postmodern condition"-the way technologies
have incorporated the cause of deconstruction directly into the material
infrastructure of the lifeworld itself.8
As long as technology is modeled on the category of relative exteriority,
its material autonomy remains subordinate to its function within the
domain of discursive thought; far from functioning as an agent of material
complexification, technology is deployed as a purely abstract marker of an
alterity that is constitutive of thought. The most significant consequence of
this reduction is the collapse of technology into metaphor. For the twenti-
eth-century critics on whom I focus-those most responsible for technol-
ogy's assimilation into the category of relative exteriority-this collapse of
technology into metaphor takes the form of what I have already identified
in my introduction as the machine reduction of technology. By identifying
technology with the figure of the machine, twentieth-century critical dis-
•
Em bod y i n g
Technesis
ing obj ects to a second-order observation of observations. Rather than a concrete engagement with technology's impact on our embodied experi ence, systems-theoretical models leave us with a description of the func tional specification of technological society (or whatever plays the role of most inclusive context) as a progressive proliferation of second-order obser vations. 6 While systems theory may indeed function to overcome particular deconstructive aporia, as its proponents claim, it does so only at the cost of radically isolating system from environment. Consequently, whatever epis temological force it can claim is acquired only by cutting description off from embodied reality-by bracketing out all constraint the real might impose on it'? In effect, then, systems analyses of science and technology form exem plary instances of the positivizing of poststructuralist theory that I have attributed to contemporary cultural studies: by thematizing exteriority exclusively as a temporary blind spot constitutive of a particular system that cannot be seen from the vantage point of the observation responsible for its construction, such analyses domesticate exteriority into a mere by-product of an evolving description of the relation of system and environment. Not only is exteriority thus defined, in principle, as purely relative-a con structed point of resistance within the space of descriptive thought-but it is also effectively neutralized, since it can in principle always be recuperated at a higher level of complexity, as the new state of a system following a further act of observation. Thus, to the extent that it attributes the disj unction between interiorizing thought and its technological embodiment to an observer rather than to the world itself, systems analysis misses the chance to capitalize on what, in my opinion, is truly novel and affirmative about our otherwise all-too-banal " postmodern condition "-the way technologies have incorporated the cause of deconstruction directly into the material infrastructure of the lifeworld itself. 8 As long as technology is modeled on the category of relative exteriority, its material autonomy remains subordinate to its function within the domain of discursive thought; far from functioning as an agent of material complexification, technology is deployed as a purely abstract marker of an alterity that is constitutive of thought. The most significant consequence of this reduction is the collapse of technology into metaphor. For the twenti eth-century critics on whom I focus-those most responsible for technol ogy's assimilation into the category of relative exteriority-this collapse of technology into metaphor takes the form of what I have already identified in my introduction as the machine reduction of technology. By identifying technology with the figure of the machine, twentieth-century critical dis-
Fro m Metaphor to E m b od i ment
From Metaphor to Embodiment * 81
courses effectively preserve the priority of thought over technology and, in
the process, more deeply entrench the instrumental enframing of technology
so central to our modernity.9
Due largely to the legacy of poststructuralism, our current efforts to
rethink the contemporary role of technology are overdetermined and, I sug-
gest, undermined by the prevalence of one particular form of this machine
reduction: the reduction of technology to that particular machine known as
the text. To overcome the machine reduction of technology in its current tex-
tualist form, we will thus have to return to the source of the metaphysical
assumptions underlying current conceptualizations of technology-Aristo-
tle's "decision" to subordinate the "automatic" (to automaton) to a category
of chance modeled on human intentionality and natural teleology (tuche). To
get there, however, we must first sketch the modern trajectory that links tech-
nesis to Aristotle's inaugural machine reduction of technology.
The Machine Reduction of Technology and the
Modern Trajectory of the Machine Metaphor
Understanding the machine reduction of technology in its contemporary
form requires us to reconstruct the gradual historical process through which
it acquired its textualist basis. As literary critic Wylie Sypher suggests, this
•
81
courses effectively preserve the priority of thought over technology and, in the process, more deeply entrench the instrumental enframing of technology so central to our modernity.9 Due largely to the legacy of poststructuralism, our current efforts to rethink the contemporary role of technology are overdetermined and, I sug gest, undermined by the prevalence of one particular form of this machine reduction: the reduction of technology to that particular machine known as the text. To overcome the machine reduction of technology in its current tex tualist form, we will thus have to return to the source of the metaphysical assumptions underlying current conceptualizations of technology-Aristo tle's " decision " to subordinate the " automatic" (to automaton) to a category of chance modeled on human intentionality and natural teleology (tuche) . To get there, however, we must first sketch the modern traj ectory that links tech nesis to Aristotle's inaugural machine reduction of technology.
process can be traced back to the nineteenth century, to the moment when
literature rediscovered its pre-Romantic roots and became once again an
explicitly technical enterprise focused on method rather than expression.
For Sypher, this return to method is inseparable from the development of
technology and expresses the desire on the part of literary authors to reap
the benefits of the technicist attitude; centered on the neutralization of
chance and accident, this new attitude finds its literary apogee in Stephan
The M achine Reduction of Technology and the Modern Traj ectory of the M achine Metaphor
Mallarme's effort to automatize the process of writing poetry. Un Coup de
Des, writes Sypher, is "a desperate venture in writing a pure poem by cal-
culating everything, by ruling out the surprises of Chance-the throw of the
dice, which is the aesthetic threat." He continues:
... the Poem (the Book) should be so duly controlled that the casual, the con-
tingent, the irrelevant should be eliminated. The symbolist poem was devoted
to a conquest by method, a program of artistic discipline that banished the
accidental as utterly as a laboratory experiment... The poem, manifesting its
pure Beauty, would appear in all its clarity as the supreme artifact unconta-
minated by the hazard of photography or prose, the disorder of life, the acci-
dents in actuality. (Sypher 1968, 25-26)
Understanding the machine reduction of technology in its contemporary form requires us to reconstruct the gradual historical process through which it acquired its textualist basis. As literary critic Wylie Sypher suggests, this process can be traced back to the nineteenth century, to the moment when literature rediscovered its pre-Romantic roots and became once again an explicitly technical enterprise focused on method rather than expression. For Sypher, this return to method is inseparable from the development of technology and expresses the desire on the part of literary authors to reap the benefits of the technicist attitude; centered on the neutralization of chance and accident, this new attitude finds its literary apogee in Stephan Mallarme's effort to automatize the process of writing poetry. Un Coup de Des, writes Sypher, is " a desperate venture in writing a pure poem by cal culating everything, by ruling out the surprises of Chance-the throw of the dice, which is the aesthetic threat. " He continues: . . . the Poem (the Book) should be so duly controlled that the casual, the con tingent, the irrelevant should be eliminated. The symbolist poem was devoted to a conquest by method, a program of artistic discipline that banished the accidental as utterly as a laboratory experiment . . . The poem, manifesting its pure Beauty, would appear in all its clarity as the supreme artifact unconta minated by the hazard of photography or prose, the disorder of life, the acci dents in actuality. ( Sypher 1 9 6 8 , 25-2 6 )
82
82 * Embodying Technesis
Mallarme's ideal remained the goal for later symbolist and modernist critics
and writers, who faced the undeniable failure of his project (Sypher refers to
the "inaccessibility" of his pure Poem) by shifting the emphasis of their tech-
nicism from the work to its reception, from the metaphysics of textuality to
the pragmatics of avant-garde shock tactics. The explicit identification of
text with machine emerges from this shift: Paul Valery, for example,
qualifies the poem as "a kind of machine for producing the poetic state of
mind by means of words" (cited in ibid., 27); and William Carlos Williams
is even more concise, boldly contending that "the poem" simply "is a
machine" (cited in Porush 1985, 11).
Poststructuralist theory further reinforces these same values of the text-
machine-formalism and systematicity against the messiness and open-
ness of life processes. Armed with the methodology of structural linguistics,
poststructuralists make good on Mallarme's impossible program: by divorc-
ing Language (langue) from pragmatics (parole) and concentrating solely on
deconstructing its systematic operation, poststructuralist critics produce the
separation of pure poetry from phenomenal life.10 In this way, they develop
what amounts to a restricted machinic ontology of textuality; for them, lan-
guage assumes the role of a machine that runs independently of the phe-
nomenal and rhetorical categories governing lived experience.
Paul de
Man furnishes the prototype of the poststructuralist
identification of text and machine with his claim that the "machine is like
the grammar of the text when it is isolated from its rhetoric, the merely for-
mal element without which no text can be generated" (de Man 1979, 294).
The poststructuralist text-machine, in turn, finds its philosophical exponent
in the early Derrida, who explicitly describes grammatology as a liberation
of the machine in language: "The originary and pre- or meta-phonetic writ-
ing that I am attempting to conceive here leads to nothing less than an 'over-
taking' of speech by the machine" (Derrida 1974, 79). With their general-
ized identification of text and machine, the poststructuralists realize
Mallarme's goal in the very process of bringing to a close the progressive
project-so central to twentieth-century philosophy and cultural criticism
of introducing technology into the heart of thought. By radicalizing Heideg-
ger's and Freud's invocations of technology, Derrida, de Man, and Lacan
celebrate the text, the letter, and the signifier, respectively, as the site of tech-
nology's penetration into thought. In so doing, they open an entirely new
phase not simply in the technicist history of modern literature but in the
modern cultural history of the machine metaphor itself. With their
identification of text and machine, the poststructuralists bring about a
•
Em bod y i n g
Technesis
Mallarme's ideal remained the goal for later symbolist and modernist critics and writers, who faced the undeniable failure of his proj ect ( Sypher refers to the " inaccessibility " of his pure Poem) by shifting the emphasis of their tech nicism from the work to its reception, from the metaphysics of textuality to the pragmatics of avant-garde shock tactics. The explicit identification of text with machine emerges from this shift: Paul Valery, for example, qualifies the poem as "a kind of machine for producing the poetic state of mind by means of words " (cited in ibid. , 27); and William Carlos Williams is even more concise, boldly contending that " the poem " simply "is a machine" (cited in Porush 1 9 8 5 , 1 1 ) . Poststructuralist theory further reinforces these same values of the text machine-formalism and systematicity-against the messiness and open ness of life processes. Armed with the methodology of structural linguistics, poststructuralists make good on Mallarme's impossible program : by divorc ing Language (langue) from pragmatics (parole) and concentrating solely on deconstructing its systematic operation, poststructuralist critics produce the separation of pure poetry from phenomenal life . 1 o In this way, they develop what amounts to a restricted machinic ontology of textuality; for them, lan guage assumes the role of a machine that runs independently of the phe nomenal and rhetorical categories governing lived experience. Paul de Man furnishes the prototype of the poststructuralist identification of text and machine with his claim that the " machine is like the grammar of the text when it is isolated from its rhetoric, the merely for mal element without which no text can be generated " ( de Man 1 979, 294 ) . The poststructuralist text-machine, i n turn, finds its philosophical exponent in the early Derrida, who explicitly describes grammatology as a liberation of the machine in language : "The originary and pre- or meta-phonetic writ ing that I am attempting to conceive here leads to nothing less than an 'over taking' of speech by the machine" (Derrida 1 974, 79) . With their general ized identification of text and machine, the poststructuralists realize Mallarme's goal in the very process of bringing to a close the progressive proj ect-so central to twentieth-century philosophy and cultural criticism of introducing technology into the heart of thought. By radicalizing Heideg ger's and Freud's invocations of technology, Derrida, de Man, and Lacan celebrate the text, the letter, and the signifier, respectively, as the site of tech nology's penetration into thought. In so doing, they open an entirely new phase not simply in the technicist history of modern literature but in the modern cultural history of the machine metaphor itself. With their identification of text and machine, the poststructuralists bring about a
Fro m Metaphor to E m b od i ment
From Metaphor to Embodiment * 83
significant inversion in the tenor of the machine metaphor: for the first time,
the machine is actually deployed as a metaphor for technology itself.
Prior to this inversion, the machine-despite a diverse set of concrete
deployments-clearly served the single overarching purpose of establishing
the nature of the human. Either by furnishing analogies for its mechanisms
(body and later mind) or by representing what is other than the human (the
universe or God's creation, figured as a clockwork or a feedback mecha-
nism), the machine facilitated consideration of such key philosophical top-
ics as whether human beings have free will and what distinguishes them
from animals.11 One machine in particular provided modern Continental
philosophers with a useful metaphor for conceptualizing or repudiating
what they thought was singular and irreducible about the human-what, in
different accounts, is variously termed soul, mind, free will, spirit, and so
forth. In a justly famous passage from the sixth Meditation, Descartes inau-
gurates the reign of this metaphor by comparing the body to the workings
of a clock.
... a clock constructed with wheels and weights observes all the laws of its
nature just as closely when it is badly made . . . as when it completely fulfils
the wishes of the clockmaker. In the same way, I might consider the body of
a man as a kind of machine equipped with and made up of bones, nerves,
muscles, veins, blood and skin in such a way that, even if there were no mind
in it, it would still perform all the same movements as it now does in those
cases where movement is not under the control of the will or, consequently,
of the mind [but occurs merely as a result of the disposition of the organs].
(Descartes 1988, 58)
Across the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the clock metaphor gradu-
ally evolved into the radical affirmation of a total equivalence of the human
with the machine. It reached its culmination when the eighteenth-century
French materialist Julien de la Mettrie simply extended Descartes's analogy
to include the mind itself: ". . . since all the faculties of the soul depend to
such a degree on the proper organization of the brain and the whole body,
that apparently they are but this organization itself, the soul is clearly an
enlightened machine" (La Mettrie 1912, 128). With this extension, the rad-
ical potential of the classical machine metaphor is achieved: mechanism and
organism form a single continuum; the human being simply is a kind of
machine.
•
83
significant inversion in the tenor of the machine metaphor: for the first time, the machine is actually deployed as a metaphor for technology itself. Prior to this inversion, the machine-despite a diverse set of concrete deployments-clearly served the single overarching purpose of establishing the nature of the human. Either by furnishing analogies for its mechanisms ( body and later mind) or by representing what is other than the human (the universe or God's creation, figured as a clockwork or a feedback mecha nism ) , the machine facilitated consideration of such key philosophical top ics as whether human beings have free will and what distinguishes them from animals. l 1 One machine in particular provided modern Continental philosophers with a useful metaphor for conceptualizing or repudiating what they thought was singular and irreducible about the human-what, in different accounts, is variously termed soul, mind, free will, spirit, and so forth. In a j ustly famous passage from the sixth Meditation, Descartes inau gurates the reign of this metaphor by comparing the body to the workings of a clock . . . . a clock constructed with wheels and weights observes all the laws of its nature j ust as closely when it is badly made . . . as when it completely fulfils the wishes of the clockmaker. In the same way, I might consider the body of a man as a kind of machine equipped with and made up of bones, nerves, muscles, veins, blood and skin in such a way that, even if there were no mind in it, it would still perform all the same movements as it now does in those cases where movement is not under the control of the will or, consequently, of the mind [but occurs merely as a result of the disposition of the organs] . (Descartes 1 9 8 8 , 5 8 )
Whether we explain the motive behind this trajectory in cultural-materi-
alist terms, as historian Otto Mayr does in his thick description of the
clock's role in early modern Europe, or in theoretical terms, as French
Across the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the clock metaphor gradu ally evolved into the radical affirmation of a total equivalence of the human with the machine. It reached its culmination when the eighteenth-century French materialist Julien de la Mettrie simply extended Descartes's analogy to include the mind itself: " . . . since all the faculties of the soul depend to such a degree on the proper organization of the brain and the whole body, that apparently they are but this organization itself, the soul is clearly an enlightened machine" (La Mettrie 1 9 1 2, 1 2 8 ) . With this extension, the rad ical potential of the classical machine metaphor is achieved: mechanism and organism form a single continuum; the human being simply is a kind of machine. Whether we explain the motive behind this traj ectory in cultural-materi alist terms, as historian Otto Mayr does in his thick description of the clock's role in early modern Europe, or in theoretical terms, as French
84
84 * Embodying Technesis
philosopher of science Georges Canguilhem does in his genealogy of the
machine metaphor,12 what is important is the distinct tenor that is common
to the metaphor: in its various guises, the machine is consistently employed
as a heuristic for conceptualizing what is proper to the human.13
Precisely this basic coding is inverted in the twentieth-century evolution
of the metaphor: by the time it acquires its poststructuralist form, the
machine has begun to furnish a metaphor not for the human but for tech-
nology itself. In carrying out Mallarme's program, the poststructuralists
give a radically new spin to the text-machine equation. In their hands, this
equation does not simply comprise a means for understanding and autono-
mizing Language as system (i.e., langue); it simultaneously affords a means
for fundamentally rethinking technology itself. By consummating the shift
in the tenor of the machine metaphor that has been underway since the nine-
teenth century, the poststructuralist equation of text and machine thus fun-
damentally shifts the target of its reduction: in its new textualist form, the
machine functions as a metaphor for technology, and technology's domesti-
cation within the textually generated space of relative exteriority is effec-
tively insured.
Precisely such a reduction occurs in Derrida's assimilation of cybernetics
to grammatology. On Derrida's account, technology is functionally subor-
dinated to the movement of differance, to which it owes its existence.
... [the notion of program] ... must of course be understood in the cyber-
netic sense, but cybernetics is itself intelligible only in terms of a history of the
possibilities of the trace as the unity of a double movement of protention and
retention.... It is an emergence that makes the gramme appear as such (that
is to say according to the new structure of nonpresence) and undoubtedly
makes possible the emergence of the systems of writing in the narrow sense.
.. [O]ne could speak of a "liberation of memory," of an exteriorization
always already begun but always larger than the trace which, beginning from
the elementary programs of so-called "instinctive" behavior up to the consti-
tution of electronic card-indexes and reading machines, enlarges differance
and the possibility of putting in reserve. (1974, 84)
For Derrida, technology is thus derivative in two senses. Functionally, tech-
nology is limited to the role of material support for the "possibilities of the
trace"; like writing in the restricted sense, it is merely the means by which
differance exteriorizes or expresses itself. And ontologically, technology
remains radically dependent on the quasi-vitalist movement of differance;
again like writing in the restricted sense, it is the product of the primordial
"arche-writing" that conditions its very emergence.
By rethinking the notion of the cybernetic program in terms of his textual
•
Em bod y i n g
Technesis
philosopher of science Georges Canguilhem does in his genealogy of the machine metaphor,12 what is important is the distinct tenor that is common to the metaphor: in its various guises, the machine is consistently employed as a heuristic for conceptualizing what is proper to the human.13 Precisely this basic coding is inverted in the twentieth-century evolution of the metaphor: by the time it acquires its poststructuralist form, the machine has begun to furnish a metaphor not for the human but for tech nology itself. In carrying out Mallarme's program, the poststructuralists give a radically new spin to the text-machine equation. In their hands, this equation does not simply comprise a means for understanding and autono mizing Language as system ( i . e . , langue); it simultaneously affords a means for fundamentally rethinking technology itself. By consummating the shift in the tenor of the machine metaphor that has been underway since the nine teenth century, the poststructuralist equation of text and machine thus fun damentally shifts the target of its reduction: in its new textualist form, the machine functions as a metaphor for technology, and technology's domesti cation within the textually generated space of relative exteriority is effec tively insured. Precisely such a reduction occurs in Derrida's assimilation of cybernetics to grammatology. On Derrida's account, technology is functionally subor dinated to the movement of dif{erance, to which it owes its existence . . . . [the notion of program] . . . must of course be understood in the cyber netic sense, but cybernetics is itself intelligible only in terms of a history of the possibilities of the trace as the unity of a double movement of protention and retention . . . . It is an emergence that makes the gramme appear as such (that is to say according to the new structure of nonpresence) and undoubtedly makes possible the emergence of the systems of writing in the narrow sense . . . . [O]ne could speak of a " liberation of memory, " of an exteriorization always already begun but always larger than the trace which, beginning from the elementary programs of so-called " instinctive " behavior up to the consti tution of electronic card-indexes and reading machines, enlarges differance and the possibility of putting in reserve. ( 1 9 74, 8 4 )
For Derrida, technology is thus derivative in two senses. Functionally, tech nology is limited to the role of material support for the " possibilities of the trace " ; like writing in the restricted sense, it is merely the means by which differance exteriorizes or expresses itself. And ontologically, technology remains radically dependent on the quasi-vitalist movement of differance; again like writing in the restricted sense, it is the product of the primordial " arche-writing " that conditions its very emergence. By rethinking the notion of the cybernetic program in terms of his textual
Fro m Metaphor to E m b od i ment
From Metaphor to Embodiment * 85
metaphysics, Derrida performs what amounts to a hostile takeover. Unlike
those critics (e.g., Paulson or Michel Serres) who seek to employ the cyber-
netic theory of communication as a model for thinking about the interrela-
tionship of various autonomous spheres, Derrida seizes on the notion of the
cybernetic program precisely because it allows him to restrict technology to
this doubly derivative status and consequently to support the totalizing
grasp of his ontology of differance. For Derrida, in the context of the history
of the trace, technology functions as a mere machine-"a technics in the ser-
vice of language"-while differance is the genetic or quasi-vitalist principle
that animates the technical machine: ". . . a certain sort of question about
the meaning and origin of writing precedes, or at least merges with, a cer-
tain type of question about the meaning and origin of technics. That is why
the notion of technique can never simply clarify the notion of writing" (8).
By using the machine (the cybernetic program) as a metaphor for tech-
nology's role in the differential movement of the trace, Derrida adds a meta-
physical wrinkle to the inversion of the machine metaphor we have been
tracing. According to Derrida, it is only by recognizing its foundation in dif-
ferance that cybernetics can overcome the opposition of man and machine:
"... the entire field covered by the cybernetic program will be the field of
writing. If the theory of cybernetics is by itself to oust all metaphysical con-
cepts-including the concepts of soul, of life, of value, of choice, of mem-
ory-which until recently served to separate the machine from man, it must
conserve the notion of writing, trace, gramme, or grapheme, until its own
historico-metaphysical character is also exposed" (9; emphasis added). For
Derrida, the foundedness of cybernetics in differance leads to the dissolution
of the machine metaphor in its classical form. By tracing the cybernetic pro-
gram back to arche-writing, Derrida shows that it stems from a nonorigi-
•
85
metaphysics, Derrida performs what amounts to a hostile takeover. Unlike those critics (e.g., Paulson or Michel Serres) who seek to employ the cyber netic theory of communication as a model for thinking about the interrela tionship of various autonomous spheres, Derrida seizes on the notion of the cybernetic program precisely because it allows him to restrict technology to this doubly derivative status and consequently to support the totalizing grasp of his ontology of differance. For Derrida, in the context of the history of the trace, technology functions as a mere machine-" a technics in the ser vice of language "-while differance is the genetic or quasi-vitalist principle that animates the technical machine: " . . . a certain sort of question about the meaning and origin of writing precedes, or at least merges with, a cer tain type of question about the meaning and origin of technics. That is why the notion of technique can never simply clarify the notion of writing" ( 8 ) . By using the machine (the cybernetic program) as a metaphor for tech nology's role in the differential movement of the trace, Derrida adds a meta physical wrinkle to the inversion of the machine metaphor we have been tracing. According to Derrida, it is only by recognizing its foundation in dif
ferance that cybernetics can overcome the opposition of man and machine : " . . . the entire field covered by the cybernetic program will be the field of
nary principle of origination, a principle that precedes all metaphysical
oppositions-most importantly the very opposition underlying the classical
machine metaphor: "Even before being determined as human.., or nonhu-
man, the gramme-or the grapheme-would thus name the element" (loc.
cit.).
What Derrida does not say is that this grammatological dissolution of
metaphysical opposition generates an enabling opposition of its own, since
it owes its possibility to a subordination of technology to the genetic or
quasi-vitalist principle of differance. The grammatological project works to
realize the cybernetic program only if technology is equated with the exteri-
orization of the trace in writing. As a result, the dissolution of the machine
metaphor in its classic form gives way to a new form that perpetuates, at a
different systemic level, the very reductive binary opposition (vitalism vs.
writing. If the theory of cybernetics is by itself to oust all metaphysical con cepts-including the concepts of soul, of life, of value, of choice, of mem ory-which until recently served to separate the machine from man, it must conserve the notion of writing, trace, gramme, or grapheme, until its own historico-metaphysical character is also exposed " (9; emphasis added ) . For D errida, the foundedness of cybernetics in dif(erance leads to the dissolution of the machine metaphor in its classical form. By tracing the cybernetic pro gram back to arche-writing, Derrida shows that it stems from a nonorigi nary principle of origination, a principle that precedes all metaphysical oppositions-most importantly the very opposition underlying the classical machine metaphor: " Even before being determined as human . . . or nonhu man, the gramme-or the grapheme-would thus name the element " (loc. cit. ) . What Derrida does not say i s that this grammatological dissolution of metaphysical opposition generates an enabling opposition of its own, since it owes its possibility to a subordination of technology to the genetic or quasi-vitalist principle of dif(erance. The grammatological proj ect works to realize the cybernetic program only if technology is equated with the exteri orization of the trace in writing. As a result, the dissolution of the machine metaphor in its classic form gives way to a new form that perpetuates, at a different systemic level, the very reductive binary opposition (vitalism vs.
86
86 * Embodying Technesis
mechanism) that it is supposed to have overcome. So long as it functions "in
the service of language," technology remains thoroughly mechanical and
can readily be assimilated to the figure of the machine. In the end, the reduc-
tion Derrida imposes on technology reflects the marked privilege he accords
ontology: more precisely, it stems from his decision to consider technology
exclusively as part of an ontogenetic, language-centered program and to use
the generative text-machine as a model for encompassing technology as
such. To show that this approach succeeds only to the extent that it reduc-
tively predetermines the status of technology, we must thus expose the oper-
ational principles of its functioning.
Technesis
With his ontogenetic circumscription of cybernetic technology, Derrida fur-
nishes the theoretical core of a hugely influential approach to technology. By
•
Em bod y i n g
Technesis
mechanism ) that it is supposed to have overcome. So long as it functions " in the service of language," technology remains thoroughly mechanical and can readily be assimilated to the figure of the machine. In the end, the reduc tion Derrida imposes on technology reflects the marked privilege he accords ontology: more precisely, it stems from his decision to consider technology exclusively as part of an ontogenetic, language-centered program and to use the generative text-machine as a model for encompassing technology as such. To show that this approach succeeds only to the extent that it reduc tively predetermines the status of technology, we must thus expose the oper ational principles of its functioning.
following Derrida's lead in restricting technology to the model of the text as
machine, latter-day poststructuralist and contemporary cultural critics par-
ticipate in and define the strategy for discursivizing technology that I call
technesis.
Like gynesis, the putting of woman into discourse that Alice Jardine dis-
Technesis
covers at the heart of French feminism and poststructuralism, technesis des-
ignates an equivocal, ambivalent effort on the part of modernity to embrace
otherness. Just as gynesis promotes a reduction of women in the service of
the theoretical deconstruction of the phallologocentric modernist text, tech-
nesis advances a reduction of concrete technologies in the service of a gen-
erative, deconstructive textual model. As Jardine explains, gynesis names
the process by which modernity (in particular, French poststructuralism)
comes to explore the paradoxes and self-contradictions inherent in discur-
sive practice; seeking the "reincorporation and reconceptualization of that
With his ontogenetic circumscription of cybernetic technology, Derrida fur nishes the theoretical core of a hugely influential approach to technology. By following Derrida's lead in restricting technology to the model of the text as machine, latter-day poststructuralist and contemporary cultural critics par ticipate in and define the strategy for discursivizing technology that I call
which has been the master narratives' own 'nonknowledge,' " French theory
explores a new kind of "space," a space "over which narrative has lost con-
trol." It is not at all surprising that this space has "been coded as feminine,
as woman" (Jardine 1985, 25). Like gynesis, technesis employs an abstrac-
tion-technology-as a cipher for the internal otherness that, following
poststructuralist (and now multiculturalist) orthodoxy, forms an intrinsic,
constitutive element of any text (or identity construction). In a similar way
then, gynesis and technesis both require, as their point of departure and con-
dition of possibility, the preparation of their respective object for its assim-
ilation into the text: the robust exteriority of actual, embodied women and
technesis. Like gynesis, the putting of woman into discourse that Alice Jardine dis covers at the heart of French feminism and poststructuralism, technesis des ignates an equivocal, ambivalent effort on the part of modernity to embrace otherness. Just as gynesis promotes a reduction of women in the service of the theoretical deconstruction of the phallologocentric modernist text, tech nesis advances a reduction of concrete technologies in the service of a gen erative, deconstructive textual model. As Jardine explains, gynesis names the process by which modernity (in particular, French poststructuralism) comes to explore the paradoxes and self-contradictions inherent in discur sive practice; seeking the " reincorporation and reconceptualization of that which has been the master narratives ' own 'nonknowledge,' " French theory explores a new kind of " space," a space " over which narrative has lost con trol . " It is not at all surprising that this space has " been coded as feminine, as woman" (Jardine 1 9 8 5, 25 ) . Like gynesis, technesis employs an abstrac tion-technology-as a cipher for the internal otherness that, following poststructuralist (and now multiculturalist) orthodoxy, forms an intrinsic, constitutive element of any text (or identity construction ) . In a similar way then, gynesis and technesis both require, as their point of departure and con dition of possibility, the preparation of their respective obj ect for its assim ilation into the text: the robust exteriority of actual, embodied women and
Fro m Metaphor to E m b od i ment
From Metaphor to Embodiment * 87
of concrete ontic technologies must undergo reduction so that they can
function as purely abstract placeholders for the otherness internal to lan-
guage.
By exposing the logic of reduction central to French poststructuralism,
Jardine's critique of gynesis is bold and unequivocal. While the putting of
woman into discourse might serve to broaden textuality in a way that
allows male theory to encompass that which appears to defy narrative cap-
ture, it reduces women to the abstraction "woman," before reducing both
to language. Gynesis, Jardine concludes, transforms "woman and the femi-
nine into verbs at the interior of those narratives that are today experienc-
ing a crisis in legitimation" (25). Indeed, as Jardine points out, gynesis can-
not in fact even be said to concern women in any meaningful sense: ". . . in
the writings of those theorists participating in gynesis, woman may become
intrinsic to entire conceptual systems without being 'about' women-much
less 'about' feminism" (61).
A similar point can be made about technesis. Like gynesis, it reduces
materially embodied technologies to the abstraction "technology," before
reducing both to language. There is, however, an important difference
between the two reductive strategies. Gynesis perpetuates a reductive use of
the concept "woman" for the purpose of expanding our understanding of
the nature of textuality; its primary aim is not that of providing a model for
thinking (or rethinking) about women.14 Technesis, by contrast, is
employed by critics in an effort, whether explicit or covert, to valorize the
text as a model for enframing material technology. Unlike gynesis, technesis
has as its primary function the translation of material technology in its con-
crete, worldly embodiment into a textualist analogue, the abstraction cre-
ated when technology is constrained to fit the textual figure of the machine.
This translation betrays a deep-seated resistance to technology whose force
only increases in proportion to the strength with which it is disavowed. By
taking this resistance seriously, we can appreciate the extent to which the
enabling move in the poststructuralist version of the machine metaphor-
the generalization of the text-machine into a model for thinking about tech-
nology as such-is itself motivated by a desire to preserve the integrity of the
textual ontology on which it is based. The machine metaphor of technology
functions as a defense against the threat posed by the radical material alter-
ity of technology: by safely situating technology as the "other" within
thought, as the machinery of language integral to thought's genesis, techne-
sis neutralizes a more formidable "other" that threatens the wholesale dis-
solution of the much-cherished closure of representation.
Rather than adopting Jardine's strategy of preserving what is fruitful in
•
87
of concrete ontic technologies must undergo reduction so that they can function as purely abstract placeholders for the otherness internal to lan guage. By exposing the logic of reduction central to French poststructuralism, Jardine's critique of gynesis is bold and unequivocal. While the putting of woman into discourse might serve to broaden textuality in a way that allows male theory to encompass that which appears to defy narrative cap ture, it reduces women to the abstraction "woman, " before reducing both to language. Gynesis, Jardine concludes, transforms "woman and the femi nine into verbs at the interior of those narratives that are today experienc ing a crisis in legitimation" (25 ) . Indeed, as Jardine points out, gynesis can not in fact even be said to concern women in any meaningful sense: " . . . in the writings of those theorists participating in gynesis, woman may become intrinsic to entire conceptual systems without being 'about' women-much less 'about' feminism " ( 6 1 ) . A similar point can b e made about technesis. Like gynesis, it reduces materially embodied technologies to the abstraction " technology, " before reducing both to language. There is, however, an important difference between the two reductive strategies. Gynesis perpetuates a reductive use of the concept " woman " for the purpose of expanding our understanding of the nature of textuality; its primary aim is not that of providing a model for thinking (or rethinking) about women.14 Technesis, by contrast, is employed by critics in an effort, whether explicit or covert, to valorize the text as a model for enframing material technology. Unlike gynesis, technesis has as its primary function the translation of material technology in its con crete, worldly embodiment into a textualist analogue, the abstraction cre ated when technology is constrained to fit the textual figure of the machine. This translation betrays a deep-seated resistance to technology whose force only increases in proportion to the strength with which it is disavowed. By taking this resistance seriously, we can appreciate the extent to which the enabling move in the poststructuralist version of the machine metaphor the generalization of the text-machine into a model for thinking about tech nology as such-is itself motivated by a desire to preserve the integrity of the textual ontology on which it is based. The machine metaphor of technology functions as a defense against the threat posed by the radical material alter ity of technology: by safely situating technology as the " other " within thought, as the machinery of language integral to thought's genesis, techne sis neutralizes a more formidable " other" that threatens the wholesale dis solution of the much-cherished closure of representation. Rather than adopting Jardine's strategy of preserving what is fruitful in
88
88 * Embodying Technesis
the object of her criticism, we must therefore resolutely reject technesis in
favor of the robust embrace of technology I have outlined in the two pre-
ceding chapters. In its hegemonic role as the contemporary form taken by
the machine reduction, technesis purges technology of its materiality in a
way that simply allows for no recuperative reconstruction whatsoever. The
technema resulting from poststructuralist technesis is a woefully rarified
object-for-thought. Stripped of its material basis, it cannot deliver the expe-
rience of otherness it promises, for like the noema containing the other's
consciousness in Husserl's fifth Cartesian Meditation, it turns out to be
nothing other than a projection (no matter how distorted and indetermi-
nate) of its constituting agent, the textualized "ego" (Husserl 1977). To root
out the technetic reduction, we must therefore reject the path of Husserlian
phenomenology-and its enabling commitment to the noiesis-noema corre-
lation-as an adequate mode of describing the real.s5 By reintroducing the
very technological materiality that the phenomenological epoche was
designed to bracket out, we must try, as it were, to force high theory into a
crucial act of self-de(con)struction, one that chips away at the enabling
ontological reduction of technology to text.
To judge by the endurance of technesis following the advent of cultural
studies, the hegemonic sway poststructuralist textualism exercises over
efforts to explore technology has not only persisted into the contemporary
critical epoch but expanded to form a general program for the various sorts
of technocriticism current today. Nowhere is this legacy more significant-
and less acknowledged-than in the emerging field of literature and science.
Without explicitly intending it, contemporary technocultural critics inter-
ested in bridging the divide separating science from the humanities have
embraced technesis as a generalized theoretical interface between literary
texts and technological systems. As long as it serves a purely instrumental
function in an analysis that focuses narrowly on the interpretation of literary
texts, such an embrace remains benign; as soon, however, as it is generalized
into a universal medium capable of establishing ontological isomorphism
between text and technological system, it becomes profoundly reductive.
To illustrate how tenuous the divide actually is between these two possi-
bilities, I shall concentrate for an instant on one particularly well focused
example from the emerging field of literature and science. By exposing the
tendency of such interdisciplinary work-even when it is most limited in
scope-to advance larger claims concerning the ontology of technology, I
shall foreground the unacknowledged, structural legacy linking contempo-
rary technocriticism to technesis.
In his insightful study of "cybernetic fiction," literary critic David Porush
•
Em bod y i n g
Technesis
the obj ect of her criticism, we must therefore resolutely rej ect technesis in favor of the robust embrace of technology I have outlined in the two pre ceding chapters . In its hegemonic role as the contemporary form taken by the machine reduction, technesis purges technology of its materiality in a way that simply allows for no recuperative reconstruction whatsoever. The technema resulting from poststructuralist technesis is a woefully rarified obj ect-for-thought. Stripped of its material basis, it cannot deliver the expe rience of otherness it promises, for like the noema containing the other's consciousness in Husserl 's fifth Cartesian Meditation, it turns out to be nothing other than a proj ection (no matter how distorted and indetermi nate ) of its constituting agent, the textualized "ego " (Husserl 1 9 77) . To root out the technetic reduction, we must therefore reject the path of Husserlian phenomenology-and its enabling commitment to the noiesis-noema corre lation-as an adequate mode of describing the real . 1 5 By reintroducing the very technological materiality that the phenomenological epoche was designed to bracket out, we must try, as it were, to force high theory into a crucial act of self-de(con) struction, one that chips away at the enabling ontological reduction of technology to text. To judge by the endurance of technesis following the advent of cultural studies, the hegemonic sway poststructuralist textual ism exercises over efforts to explore technology has not only persisted into the contemporary critical epoch but expanded to form a general program for the various sorts of technocriticism current today. Nowhere is this legacy more significant and less acknowledged-than in the emerging field of literature and science. Without explicitly intending it, contemporary technocultural critics inter ested in bridging the divide separating science from the humanities have embraced technesis as a generalized theoretical interface between literary texts and technological systems. As long as it serves a purely instrumental function in an analysis that focuses narrowly on the interpretation of literary texts, such an embrace remains benign; as soon, however, as it is generalized into a universal medium capable of establishing ontological isomorphism between text and technological system, it becomes profoundly reductive. To illustrate how tenuous the divide actually is between these two possi bilities, I shall concentrate for an instant on one particularly well focused example from the emerging field of literature and science . By exposing the tendency of such interdisciplinary work-even when it is most limited in scope-to advance larger claims concerning the ontology of technology, I shall foreground the unacknowledged, structural legacy linking contempo rary technocriticism to technesis. In his insightful study of " cybernetic fiction, " literary critic David Porush
Fro m Metaphor to E m b od i ment
From Metaphor to Embodiment * 89
unpacks the multivalent function of the machine figure in modern literature
and, in the process (and, I think, without explicitly intending to), institutes
an overly narrow ontological determination of technology as, essentially, a
figure for determinism. Contending that the machine constitutes "some-
thing even more powerful than a metaphor," Porush sketches a model of
machine iconicity that, despite an important and empowering break with
the insular and largely defunct formalist tradition, steadfastly refuses to
abandon the narrowly figurative basis of the machine metaphor. Not only
does the machine consistently recur in literature as an image particularly
expressive of technology's widespread impact on contemporary culture, but
it also plays a more specific structural role in the organization and con-
cretization of postmodern literary texts. Following Eco and Iser, Porush
describes the machine as an "icon," a figure that does not "serve to desig-
nate a signified object but instead designate[s] instructions for [its] produc-
tion" (1985, 15, quoting Iser); he thereby emphasizes that it is "a sort of
machine, in so far as we understand machines as the incarnation or illustra-
tion of a systematic set of rules" (loc. cit.). As a "self-referential icon," notes
Porush, the machine designates instructions for the "production of a com-
plex of ideas about mechanism"-more exactly, "for the various determin-
istic and mechanistic descriptions of experience and the world that our cul-
ture has invented" (16).
Whatever Porush's approach can tell us about technology remains
directly correlated to his elucidation of the machinic icon's role in the con-
stitution of a text-machine. Without in any way directly intending it,
Porush's model thus effectively reduces technology to the status of a deter-
ministic system, one that is-importantly-strictly homologous to the rule-
governed mechanism of a literary text.
... in th[e] case of the machine icon, there is an infinite variety of machines
used figuratively by fiction, but only one thing that they signify: determinism.
Swift's All-Knowlege machine signifies the deterministic reduction of knowl-
edge to an accumulation of random phrases. Dickens' description of Grad-
grind signifies the determinism . . . of his pedagogical method. Butler and
Forster describe society itself as a machine. Henry Adams sees the machine as
a metaphor for history's deterministic process. The structuralists use the
machine as a metaphor for the determinism of language's structures of
signification. The cyberneticists use the machine as a metaphor for the deter-
mination of human communication and mechanisms of the brain, and then
proceed to translate their metaphors into hardware. (16)
If the machine icon is indeed, as Porush insists, "even more powerful than a
metaphor," its proper field of operation still remains the domain of lan-
•
89
unpacks the multivalent function of the machine figure in modern literature and, in the process (and, I think, without explicitly intending to ) , institutes an overly narrow ontological determination of technology as, essentially, a figure for determinism. Contending that the machine constitutes " some thing even more powerful than a metaphor, " Porush sketches a model of machine iconicity that, despite an important and empowering break with the insular and largely defunct formalist tradition, steadfastly refuses to abandon the narrowly figurative basis of the machine metaphor. Not only does the machine consistently recur in literature as an image particularly expressive of technology's widespread impact on contemporary culture, but it also plays a more specific structural role in the organization and con cretization of postmodern literary texts. Following Eco and Iser, Porush describes the machine as an " icon, " a figure that does not " serve to desig nate a signified obj ect but instead designate [ s] instructions for [its] produc tion " ( 1 9 8 5 , 1 5 , quoting Iser ) ; he thereby emphasizes that it is " a sort of machine, in so far as we understand machines as the incarnation or illustra tion of a systematic set of rules" (loc. cit. ) . As a " self-referential icon," notes Po rush, the machine designates instructions for the " production of a com plex of ideas about mechanism "-more exactly, " for the various determin istic and mechanistic descriptions of experience and the world that our cul ture has invented" ( 1 6 ) . Whatever Porush's approach can tell u s about technology remains directly correlated to his elucidation of the machinic icon's role in the con stitution of a text-machine. Without in any way directly intending it, Porush's model thus effectively reduces technology to the status of a deter ministic system, one that is-importantly-strictly homologous to the rule governed mechanism of a literary text. . . . in th [ e] case of the machine icon, there is an infinite variety of machines used figuratively by fiction, but only one thing that they signify: determinism. Swift's All-Knowlege machine signifies the deterministic reduction of knowl edge to an accumulation of random phrases. Dickens' description of Grad grind signifies the determinism . . . of his pedagogical method. Butler and Forster describe society itself as a machine. Henry Adams sees the machine as a metaphor for history'S deterministic process. The structuralists use the machine as a metaphor for the determinism of language's structures of signification. The cyberneticists use the machine as a metaphor for the deter mination of human communication and mechanisms of the brain, and then proceed to translate their metaphors into hardware. ( 1 6 )
I f the machine icon i s indeed, a s Porush insists, " even more powerful than a metaphor, " its proper field of operation still remains the domain of lan-
90
90 * Embodying Technesis
guage. In contrast to metaphor in its classical determination, the machine
icon does not refer to some extratextual state of affairs; it describes the con-
stitution of the figurative and grammatical mechanism of the very text it
generates. Without explicitly making the equation, such an analysis suggests
a textualized model of technology: like poststructuralist technesis, it privi-
leges the mechanism of the text as a sort of prototype technical system.
Porush, moreover, is hardly alone among contemporary technocultural
critics in skirting the delicate line separating a benign application of the
machinic icon to a literary text from a full-blown ontological reduction of
technology. Indeed, where his model merely implies an impoverished ontol-
ogy of technology as its correlate, other explorations of the convergence of
literature and science more directly engage the machinic icon in ways that,
it seems to me, either simply take for granted the general viability of using
texts to describe technologies or else more actively seek to expand litera-
ture's descriptive function beyond the scope of a particular literary text or
figure. In my opinion, what motivates recent literary critics to appropriate
systemic models from information science and chaos theory is not just a
methodological instrumentalism but a strong quasi-ontological conviction
that literary texts actually share common structural properties with the
physical reality that these technological models were originally developed to
describe.16 Whether they explicitly intend to or not, such systemic analyses
thus invest literary texts with the responsibility of mediating the most fun-
damental material changes technology brings about. Not unlike the cyber-
punk conspiracy narratives that Frederic Jameson reads as the "representa-
tional shorthand" for the unfathomable workings of global capitalism
(Jameson 1991, 38, 321), the postmodern literary texts privileged by these
critics are called on to translate such changes into a form more readily
understandable in human experiential terms than the technical, mathemati-
cal idiom germane to science. No matter how radically contemporary and
worldly they may appear, however, the various literary translations mobi-
lized in these readings rely on and perpetuate the thoroughly reductive
notion that technology can be adequately captured in the text.17
Metalepsis
Having established technesis as the dominant strategy of poststructuralist
and contemporary analyses of technology, we can now focus more
specifically on the form of its textual inscription. Through a rhetorical
analysis of this strategy, I shall attempt to show how the machine reduction
•
Em bod y i n g
Technesis
guage. In contrast to metaphor in its classical determination, the machine icon does not refer to some extra textual state of affairs; it describes the con stitution of the figurative and grammatical mechanism of the very text it generates. Without explicitly making the equation, such an analysis suggests a textualized model of technology: like poststructuralist technesis, it privi leges the mechanism of the text as a sort of prototype technical system. Porush, moreover, is hardly alone among contemporary technocultural critics in skirting the delicate line separating a benign application of the machinic icon to a literary text from a full-blown ontological reduction of technology. Indeed, where his model merely implies an impoverished ontol ogy of technology as its correlate, other explorations of the convergence of literature and science more directly engage the machinic icon in ways that, it seems to me, either simply take for granted the general viability of using texts to describe technologies or else more actively seek to expand litera ture's descriptive function beyond the scope of a particular literary text or figure. In my opinion, what motivates recent literary critics to appropriate systemic models from information science and chaos theory is not j ust a methodological instrumentalism but a strong quasi-ontological conviction that literary texts actually share common structural properties with the physical reality that these technological models were originally developed to describe . I 6 Whether they explicitly intend to or not, such systemic analyses thus invest literary texts with the responsibility of mediating the most fun damental material changes technology brings about. Not unlike the cyber punk conspiracy narratives that Frederic Jameson reads as the " representa tional shorthand" for the unfathomable workings of global capitalism (Jameson 1 9 9 1 , 3 8 , 32 1 ) , the postmodern literary texts privileged by these critics are called on to translate such changes into a form more readily understandable in human experiential terms than the technical, mathemati cal idiom germane to science . No matter how radically contemporary and worldly they may appear, however, the various literary translations mobi lized in these readings rely on and perpetuate the thoroughly reductive notion that technology can be adequately captured in the text.I7
M etalepsis Having established technesis as the dominant strategy of poststructuralist and contemporary analyses of technology, we can now focus more specifically on the form of its textual inscription. Through a rhetorical analysis of this strategy, I shall attempt to show how the machine reduction
Fro m Metaphor to E m b od i ment
From Metaphor to Embodiment * 91
of technology permeates poststructuralist (and contemporary technocriti-
cal) theoretical texts not so much as the result of a conscious intention but
rather as a necessary axiom of the underlying discursive ideology that the
poststructuralists (and their more recent legatees) inherit from structuralist
linguistics.18 By demonstrating how the machine reduction of technology is
effectively instituted by the "logic" of textuality, I shall prepare the ground
for a markedly different, nontextualist technocriticism.
As an involuntary, structural necessity, technesis constitutes an unrecog-
nized theoretical commitment no less for the poststructuralists than for their
more recent legatees. Not unlike the process of naturalization analyzed by
Barthes (1972) in his study of myth, technesis works by proffering a discur-
sivized model of technology as a ground-zero, default model. It is therefore
a construction, but one that is not so much chosen by the critic as imposed
by the critical method or, more exactly, by the ideology of textualism.
Accordingly, the materiality of technology surfaces in texts in a manner
more symptomatic than thematic: it is textually "inscribed," if inscribed is
the right term, through metalepsis, a rhetorical figure describing the
metonymical substitution of one (figurative) word for another or several
others. Most often involving extreme compression and an ensuing obfusca-
tion of the literal sense of the statement, metalepsis also, in certain cases,
designates an inversion or conflation of cause and effect.19 Consider, for
example, the Oxford English Dictionary's citation (s.v. metalepsis) from
Blair's Rhetoric of 1812: "When the Trope is founded on the relation
between an antecedent and a consequent, or what goes before, and immedi-
ately follows, it is called a Metalepsis." What is at stake, if not just such a
causal inversion, when technology is inscribed as a textual function? As the
rhetorical operation that collapses (linguistic) text and (nonlinguistic) con-
text, metalepsis produces "materiality" within the space of language.
Accordingly, it forms the precondition for the reign of technesis.
In this role, metalepsis functions in a manner formally akin to what
Harold Bloom describes, in his work on the anxiety of influence, as the ratio
of apophrodes, the "Return of the Dead." In this final stage of confronta-
tion with the work of a precursor, the strong poet is able to incorporate the
precursor's vision as if it were his or her own. In The Anxiety of Influence,
Bloom describes apophrades as "the triumph of having so stationed the pre-
cursor, in one's own work, that particular passages in his work seem to be
not presages of one's own advent, but rather to be indebted to one's own
achievement" (Bloom 1973, 141; emphasis added). In his commentary on
Bloom, Louis Renza points out that what apophrades actually describes is
the operation of metalepsis, and he cites Bloom's reference to the Freudian
•
91
of technology permeates poststructuralist ( and contemporary technocriti cal) theoretical texts not so much as the result of a conscious intention but rather as a necessary axiom of the underlying discursive ideology that the poststructuralists (and their more recent legatees) inherit from structuralist linguistics . 1 s By demonstrating how the machine reduction of technology is effectively instituted by the " logic " of textuality, I shall prepare the ground for a markedly different, nontextualist technocriticism. As an involuntary, structural necessity, technesis constitutes an unrecog nized theoretical commitment no less for the poststructuralists than for their more recent legatees. Not unlike the process of naturalization analyzed by Barthes ( 1 972 ) in his study of myth, technesis works by proffering a discur sivized model of technology as a ground-zero, default model. It is therefore a construction, but one that is not so much chosen by the critic as imposed by the critical method or, more exactly, by the ideology of textualism. Accordingly, the materiality of technology surfaces in texts in a manner more symptomatic than thematic: it is textually " inscribed, " if inscribed is the right term, through metalepsis, a rhetorical figure describing the metonymical substitution of one (figurative) word for another or several others. Most often involving extreme compression and an ensuing obfusca tion of the literal sense of the statement, metalepsis also, in certain cases, designates an inversion or conflation of cause and effect. 1 9 Consider, for example, the Oxford English Dictionary's citation ( s.v. metalepsis) from Blair's Rhetoric of 1 8 1 2 : " When the Trope is founded on the relation between an antecedent and a consequent, or what goes before, and immedi ately follows, it is called a Metalepsis . " What is at stake, if not j ust such a causal inversion, when technology is inscribed as a textual function ? As the rhetorical operation that collapses (linguistic) text and (nonlinguistic) con text, metalepsis produces "materiality " within the space of language. Accordingly, it forms the precondition for the reign of technesis. In this role, metalepsis functions in a manner formally akin to what Harold Bloom describes, in his work on the anxiety of influence, as the ratio of apophrodes, the " Return of the Dead. " In this final stage of confronta tion with the work of a precursor, the strong poet is able to incorporate the precursor's vision as if it were his or her own. In The Anxiety of Influence, Bloom describes apophrades as " the triumph of having so stationed the pre cursor, in one's own work, that particular passages in his work seem to be not presages of one's own advent, but rather to be indebted to one's own achievement " (Bloom 1 973 , 1 4 1 ; emphasis added ) . In his commentary on Bloom, Louis Renza points out that what apophrades actually describes is the operation of metalepsis, and he cites Bloom's reference to the Freudian
92
92 * Embodying Technesis
fantasy of the primal scene by way of example; in this instance, Renza notes,
the "trope" of apophrades is able to generate "the illusion of having
fathered one's own fathers," of projecting the vision of the precursor "as if
it has not yet occurred" (Renza 1995, 191, citing Bloom 1975, 20). Accord-
ingly, in Bloom's neo-Freudian account of metalepsis, we witness an impor-
tant modification-a modernization, as it were-of its more general sense of
tropological compression;20 here the compression of time and chronology
(and, one might add, positivist literary history) is so extreme that the com-
monsense distinctions underlying our notions of causality and influence
begin to coalesce, if not to fade away entirely.
By shifting its focus from the text itself to the intertextual agon between
ephebe and precursor, Bloom's modernization of metalepsis adds to the
trope a psychological dimension that is not present in its traditional form.
For all its promise, however, Bloom's intervention does little to supplant
the traditional task of literary interpretation or to question its narrow
focus on "the relationship between two or more texts" (1975, 65). If it
retools metalepsis as a privileged trope with which to describe psychologi-
cally motivated intertextual relationships, Bloom's analysis continues to
bracket the relation of text to context. While such a reduction remains
largely benign in an interpretative model explicitly intended to describe the
logic of textual relations, it becomes significant when metalepsis functions
instead to domesticate what lies beyond the text. Technesis represses not
simply the text of a precursor poet but the extratextual domain of techno-
logical materiality as such.21 Accordingly, what "returns" is not the dead
breaking out of their purely symbolic subservience to the living but tech-
nological materiality emancipated from the tenuous and never wholly
effective rhetorical erasure under which metalepsis places it. In its post-
Bloomian form, metalepsis thus functions to disguise the threat of techno-
logical materiality by domesticating it into something that appears to be
(or-in the past perfect tense appropriate to such a virtual historical oper-
ation-to have been) produced by the text itself. Modifying Bloom's ear-
lier cited description (with italics to mark the substitutions), we might say
that metalepsis designates "the triumph of having so stationed technology,
in one's own work, that particular aspects of technology seem to be not
preconditions of one's description, but rather to be caused by one's own
production."
What is foregrounded by such a hypothetical modification is the radically
different cause motivating the "return" of the repressed in the two cases:
while the dead precursor poet can return only because of guilt and only
through the mediation of the (Bloomian) literary critic adept in discerning
•
Em bod y i n g
Technesis
fantasy of the primal scene by way of example; in this instance, Renza notes, the " trope" of apophrades is able to generate " the illusion of having fathered one's own fathers, " of proj ecting the vision of the precursor "as if it has not yet occurred" ( Renza 1 995, 1 9 1 , citing Bloom 1 975, 2 0 ) . Accord ingly, in Bloom's neo-Freudian account of metalepsis, we witness an impor tant modification-a modernization, as it were-of its more general sense of tropological compression;2o here the compression of time and chronology ( and, one might add, positivist literary history) is so extreme that the com monsense distinctions underlying our notions of causality and influence begin to coalesce, if not to fade away entirely. By shifting its focus from the text itself to the intertextual agon between ephebe and precursor, Bloom's modernization of metalepsis adds to the trope a psychological dimension that is not present in its traditional form. For all its promise, however, Bloom's intervention does little to supplant the traditional task of literary interpretation or to question its narrow focus on " the relationship between two or more texts" ( 1 975, 6 5 ) . If it retools metalepsis as a privileged trope with which to describe psychologi cally motivated intertextual relationships, Bloom ' s analysis continues to bracket the relation of text to context. While such a reduction remains largely benign in an interpretative model explicitly intended to describe the logic of textual relations, it becomes significant when metalepsis functions instead to domesticate what lies beyond the text. Technesis represses not simply the text of a precursor poet but the extratextual domain of techno logical materiality as such .21 Accordingly, what " returns" is not the dead breaking out of their purely symbolic subservience to the living but tech nological materiality emancipated from the tenuous and never wholly effective rhetorical erasure under which metalepsis places it. In its post Bloomian form, metalepsis thus functions to disguise the threat of techno logical materiality by domesticating it into something that appears to be ( or-in the past perfect tense appropriate to such a virtual historical oper ation-to have been) produced by the text itself. Modifying Bloom's ear lier cited description (with italics to mark the substitutions ) , we might say that metalepsis designates " the triumph of having so stationed technology, in one's own work, that particular aspects of technology seem to be not preconditions of one's description, but rather to be caused by one's own
production. " What is foregrounded by such a hypothetical modification is the radically different cause motivating the " return " of the repressed in the two cases: while the dead precursor poet can return only because of guilt and only through the mediation of the ( Bloomian) literary critic adept in discerning
Fro m Metaphor to E m b od i ment
From Metaphor to Embodiment * 93
its traces, technological materiality returns under its "own" volition, as it
were, independently of mediation as such. Unlike the language of a precur-
sor literary text, technology is simply not subject to being changed by revi-
sionary rhetorical misprision, which means, in effect, that the metalepsis
constitutive of technesis cannot maintain itself in the face of the real.
Beneath-or better, outside of-the space of its textualization, technology
remains what it is regardless of the modifications to which it is submitted in
the process of its textualization.22 In sharp contrast to Bloom's ratio of
apophrades, no metalepsis involving technology can ever really be success-
ful, since rhetoric by itself remains powerless to alter the actual materiality
of technology.23
In twentieth-century theoretical texts from Freud and Heidegger to
Lacan, Derrida, and Deleuze and Guattari, metalepsis functions precisely to
produce an obfuscation of this extratextual status of technology, a denial of
the irreducibility of the technological real. As long as technology is made to
derive from language, the poststructuralist and constructivist idioms can
confidently maintain their enabling conflation of technology's robust mate-
riality with the relative materiality that it possesses within the theater of rep-
resentation. Viewed exclusively as the "support" for ecriture, the petit objet
a, the assemblage, and so forth, technology does indeed appear derivative,
the product of a genetic or quasi-vitalist program of differance, subject con-
stitution, or desiring-production.
Far from being a merely recent phenomenon, moreover, as our discussion
thus far might suggest, metalepsis in fact forms nothing less than the basic
principle of the Western philosophical tradition's encounter with the real
from antiquity onward. By subordinating robust materiality to language,
metalepsis performs a foundational role in the inauguration of philosophi-
cal discourse concerning technology: as a metaphor of metaphor, it func-
tions analogously to the figure of catachresis, with the difference being that
it is based not on an inaugural act of (improper) naming but on a derivative
sleight of hand, an illegitimate and violent domestication of materiality into
the striated space of discursive reason.24
To glimpse the rhetorical reduction at stake in technesis, let us focus
briefly on the role metalepsis plays in the paradigm case of technesis in
twentieth-century theoretical discourse. As I shall show in detail in chapter
4, Martin Heidegger's mature meditation on modern technology in "The
Question concerning Technology" owes its force and its cogency to a fun-
damental metaleptic reversal. While Heidegger unequivocally asserts the
ontological secondarity of technology on the basis of the ontological differ-
ence between Being and beings, he cannot acknowledge the precondition of
•
93
its traces, technological materiality returns under its " own " volition, as it were, independently of mediation as such. Unlike the language of a precur sor literary text, technology is simply not subj ect to being changed by revi sionary rhetorical misprision, which means, in effect, that the metalepsis constitutive of technesis cannot maintain itself in the face of the real. Beneath-or better, outside of-the space of its textualization, technology remains what it is regardless of the modifications to which it is submitted in the process of its textualization.22 In sharp contrast to Bloom's ratio of apophrades, no metalepsis involving technology can ever really be success ful, since rhetoric by itself remains powerless to alter the actual materiality of technology.23 In twentieth-century theoretical texts from Freud and Heidegger to Lacan, Derrida, and Deleuze and Guattari, metalepsis functions precisely to produce an obfuscation of this extratextual status of technology, a denial of the irreducibility of the technological real. As long as technology is made to derive from language, the poststructuralist and constructivist idioms can confidently maintain their enabling conflation of technology's robust mate riality with the relative materiality that it possesses within the theater of rep resentation. Viewed exclusively as the " support" for ecriture, the petit objet a, the assemblage, and so forth, technology does indeed appear derivative, the product of a genetic or quasi-vitalist program of differance, subj ect con stitution, or desiring-production. Far from being a merely recent phenomenon, moreover, as our discussion thus far might suggest, metalepsis in fact forms nothing less than the basic principle of the Western philosophical tradition's encounter with the real from antiquity onward. By subordinating robust materiality to language, metalepsis performs a foundational role in the inauguration of philosophi cal discourse concerning technology: as a metaphor of metaphor, it func tions analogously to the figure of catachresis, with the difference being that it is based not on an inaugural act of (improper) naming but on a derivative sleight of hand, an illegitimate and violent domestication of materiality into the striated space of discursive reason.24 To glimpse the rhetorical reduction at stake in technesis, let us focus briefly on the role metalepsis plays in the paradigm case of technesis in twentieth-century theoretical discourse. As I shall show in detail in chapter 4, Martin Heidegger's mature meditation on modern technology in " The Question concerning Technology " owes its force and its cogency to a fun damental metaleptic reversal. While Heidegger unequivocally asserts the ontological secondarity of technology on the basis of the ontological differ ence between Being and beings, he cannot acknowledge the precondition of
94
94 * Embodying Technesis
such assertion-its dependence, by way of a dogmatic appeal to the onto-
logical priority of language, on an essentially violent reduction of the ontic
impact of technology. Nonetheless, Heidegger can purchase the right to
assert the (ontological) secondarity of (ontic) technology only by first deter-
mining it as something subordinate to language. This effectively means that
the ontological difference is itself constituted as the effect of a prior reduc-
tion designed to domesticate ontic technology into the frame of reference
provided by Heidegger's onto-hermeneutic understanding of Being. Despite
Heidegger's claims for its "originarity," the ontological difference actually
functions to mask a prior metalepsis; its purpose is not to account for tech-
nology's origin but to obfuscate the enabling reduction of technology by
seamlessly assimilating materiality into the onto-hermeneutic horizon of
discourse. By demystifying Heidegger's foundational metalepsis, we can see
that the derivative status he assigns technology is less the result of a rigor-
ous analysis of its actual materiality than the mere by-product of a dogmatic
philosophical commitment.
Insofar as they fetishize this prototype textualization of technology, post-
structuralist theory and much contemporary technocultural criticism,
whether knowingly or unknowingly, follow Heidegger's lead: they too con-
ceal the fact that technology has always already undergone a prior reduction.
Moreover, because the force of the textualist metaphysics depends on a rad-
ical blindness to this reduction, the text cannot furnish the site for an archae-
ology of the technological real. From the textualist standpoint, technology
just is what it appears to be: the material support for the genetic or quasi-
vitalist ontology of textuality. Metalepsis simply effaces all (textual) traces of
anything beyond the theater of representation. Thus, the always already real-
ized reduction constitutive of technesis remains invisible in a model like
Hayles's constrained constructivism, which hypostatizes the semiotic indica-
tion of the material flux within the text; unlike the "elusive negativity" fore-
grounded by Hayles, technesis functions on an all-or-nothing basis: entrance
into a (textualist) system governed by metalepsis can only be purchased at
the cost of a total blindness to its constitutive reduction.
Accordingly, our effort to counter the forceful legacy of technesis will
require us flatly to reject the covert textualism of contemporary technocul-
tural criticism. Because the metaleptically constituted text cannot point us
to its material outside, we will have to restore such an outside beyond the
form imposed by the text, as something that had to be effaced during the
process of textual constitution. Such a task will call on us to rethink the role
of rhetoric in the analysis of contemporary technoculture. Instead of con-
tinuing to employ rhetoric semiotically-to point to the extratextual tech-
•
Em bod y i n g
Technesis
such assertion-its dependence, by way of a dogmatic appeal to the onto logical priority of language, on an essentially violent reduction of the ontic impact of technology. Nonetheless, Heidegger can purchase the right to assert the (ontological) secondarity of ( ontic ) technology only by first deter mining it as something subordinate to language. This effectively means that the ontological difference is itself constituted as the effect of a prior reduc tion designed to domesticate ontic technology into the frame of reference provided by Heidegger's onto-hermeneutic understanding of Being. Despite Heidegger's claims for its " originarity, " the ontological difference actually functions to mask a prior metalepsis; its purpose is not to account for tech nology's origin but to obfuscate the enabling reduction of technology by seamlessly assimilating materiality into the onto-hermeneutic horizon of discourse. By demystifying Heidegger's foundational metalepsis, we can see that the derivative status he assigns technology is less the result of a rigor ous analysis of its actual materiality than the mere by-product of a dogmatic philosophical commitment. Insofar as they fetishize this prototype textualization of technology, post structuralist theory and much contemporary technocultural criticism, whether knowingly or unknowingly, follow Heidegger's lead: they too con ceal the fact that technology has always already undergone a prior reduction. Moreover, because the force of the textualist metaphysics depends on a rad ical blindness to this reduction, the text cannot furnish the site for an archae ology of the technological real. From the textualist standpoint, technology just is what it appears to be: the material support for the genetic or quasi vitalist ontology of textuality. Metalepsis simply effaces all (textual) traces of anything beyond the theater of representation. Thus, the always already real ized reduction constitutive of technesis remains invisible in a model like Hayles's constrained constructivism, which hypostatizes the semiotic indica tion of the material flux within the text; unlike the " elusive negativity" fore grounded by Hayles, technesis functions on an all-or-nothing basis: entrance into a (textualist) system governed by metalepsis can only be purchased at the cost of a total blindness to its constitutive reduction. Accordingly, our effort to counter the forceful legacy of technesis will require us flatly to rej ect the covert textualism of contemporary technocul tural criticism. Because the metaleptically constituted text cannot point us to its material outside, we will have to restore such an outside beyond the form imposed by the text, as something that had to be effaced during the process of textual constitution. Such a task will call on us to rethink the role of rhetoric in the analysis of contemporary technoculture. Instead of con tinuing to employ rhetoric semiotically-to point to the extratextual tech-
Fro m Metaphor to E m b od i ment
From Metaphor to Embodiment * 95
nological outside-we must open the text to a practical deconstruction ema-
nating directly from the technological real; at the same time, we will have to
(re)focus our rhetorical skills on the task of discerning traces of those con-
stitutive metalepses that enable the simulation of textual autonomy in the
face of the technological real. Refigured as an instrumental task within a
posttextualist model of embodied experience, the effort of probing these
rhetorical sites of metaleptic suture will help us reconstruct the robust mate-
riality that was sacrificed, in each specific case, to preserve the theoretical
cogency and explanatory grasp of the hegemonic textualist ontology.
Greek Ontology and the Machine Reduction
Breaking with the metaleptic strategy of contemporary theory involves
•
95
no logical outside-we must open the text to a practical deconstruction ema nating directly from the technological real; at the same time, we will have to (re)focus our rhetorical skills on the task of discerning traces of those con stitutive metalepses that enable the simulation of textual autonomy in the face of the technological real. Refigured as an instrumental task within a posttextualist model of embodied experience, the effort of probing these rhetorical sites of metaleptic suture will help us reconstruct the robust mate riality that was sacrificed, in each specific case, to preserve the theoretical cogency and explanatory grasp of the hegemonic textualist ontology.
much more than a reconceptualization of its modern ontology. Though con-
crete industrial and electronic technologies may have been historically nec-
essary to effectuate it, the automatic deconstruction of the machine reduc-
tion explodes a metaphysical determination of technology that has been
handed down to us from the Greeks. To root out this reduction, we will
G reek Ontology and the M achine Reduction
have to revisit and revise the Greek assimilation of technology under the
category of techne.
The exemplary textual site of this assimilation occurs at the point in the
Physics where Aristotle argues that art (techne) imitates nature: "he teckhne
mimeitai ten physin" (194a; Aristotle 1929, 121, 123). As Philippe Lacoue-
Labarthe has pointed out, Aristotle specifies two forms of this mimesis: "On
the one hand," says Aristotle, "techne carries to its end [accomplishes, per-
fects, epitelei] what physis is incapable of effecting [apergasasthai]; on the
other hand, it imitates" (cited in Lacoue-Labarthe 1989, 255). While the lat-
ter designates mimesis as it has traditionally been defined, the former coin-
cides with the motif of the supplement central to Derrida's early work; in
effect, the supplement Derrida describes in Of Grammatology could well be
read as a gloss on Aristotle's passage: "The supplement adds itself, it is a
surplus, a plenitude enriching another plenitude, the fullest measure of pres-
ence. It cumulates and accumulates presence. It is thus that art, techne,
image, representation, convention, etc. come as supplements to nature and
are rich with this entire cumulating function" (Derrida 1974, 144-45). In
this form, the supplement-no matter how novel an interpretation it is
given-retains a basic fidelity to Aristotelian techne.
By sketching out the ties linking technesis and techne, Lacoue-Labarthe's
interpretation of the Physics clarifies the heritage of contemporary technesis
Breaking with the metaleptic strategy of contemporary theory involves much more than a reconceptualization of its modern ontology. Though con crete industrial and electronic technologies may have been historically nec essary to effectuate it, the automatic deconstruction of the machine reduc tion explodes a metaphysical determination of technology that has been handed down to us from the Greeks. To root out this reduction, we will have to revisit and revise the Greek assimilation of technology under the category of techne. The exemplary textual site of this assimilation occurs at the point in the Physics where Aristotle argues that art (techne) imitates nature: "he teckhne mimeitai ten physin " ( 1 94a; Aristotle 1 929, 1 2 1 , 1 23 ) . As Philippe Lacoue Labarthe has pointed out, Aristotle specifies two forms of this mimesis: " On the one hand, " says Aristotle, " techne carries to its end [accomplishes, per fects, epitelei] what physis is incapable of effecting [apergasasthai] ; on the other hand, it imitates" (cited in Lacoue-Labarthe 1 9 8 9 , 255 ) . While the lat ter designates mimesis as it has traditionally been defined, the former coin cides with the motif of the supplement central to Derrida's early work; in effect, the supplement Derrida describes in Of Grammatology could well be read as a gloss on Aristotle's passage: "The supplement adds itself, it is a surplus, a plenitude enriching another plenitude, the fullest measure of pres ence. It cumulates and accumulates presence. It is thus that art, techne, image, representation, convention, etc. come as supplements to nature and are rich with this entire cumulating function" (Derrida 1 974, 1 44-45 ) . In this form, the supplement-no matter how novel an interpretation it is given-retains a basic fidelity to Aristotelian techne. By sketching out the ties linking technesis and techne, Lacoue-Labarthe's interpretation of the Physics clarifies the heritage of contemporary technesis
96
96 * Embodying Technesis
in Aristotle's determination of technology. Accordingly, the crux of Lacoue-
Labarthe's reading concerns his subtle demarcation of two different mimetic
functions that correspond to the two forms of techne introduced by Aristotle.
There are thus two forms of mimesis. First, a restricted form, which is the
reproduction, the copy, the reduplication of what is given (already worked,
effected, presented by nature) . . . Then there is a general mimesis, which
reproduces nothing given (which thus re-produces nothing at all), but which
supplements a certain deficiency in nature, its incapacity to do everything,
organize everything, make everything its work-produce everything. It is a
productive mimesis, that is, an imitation of physis as a productive force, or a
poiesis. It accomplishes, carries out, finishes natural production as such.
(Lacoue-Labarthe 1989, 255-56)
Lacoue-Labarthe's distinction suggests that Western philosophy has devel-
oped on the basis of a fundamental (and reductive) allegiance between tech-
nology and art; techne as know-how, no less than techne as art, finds its
•
Em bod y i n g
Technesis
in Aristotle's determination of technology. Accordingly, the crux of Lacoue Labarthe's reading concerns his subtle demarcation of two different mimetic functions that correspond to the two forms of techne introduced by Aristotle. There are thus two forms of mimesis. First, a restricted form, which is the reproduction, the copy, the reduplication of what is given (already worked, effected, presented by nature ) . . . . Then there is a general mimesis, which reproduces nothing given (which thus re-produces nothing at all ) , but which supplements a certain deficiency in nature, its incapacity to do everything, organize everything, make everything its work-produce everything. It is a productive mimesis, that is, an imitation of physis as a productive force, or a poiesis. It accomplishes, carries out, finishes natural production as such. (Lacoue-Labarthe 1 9 8 9 , 255-5 6 )
place securely within the (Greek) category of production-poiesis-defined
in Plato's Symposium as the bringing forth of "what passes over and goes
forward into presencing from that which is not presencing" (205b).25 From
the Greeks to today's technocultural critics, technology thus remains under
the sway of the presentational function of mimesis-what Lacoue-Labarthe
calls "onto-mimetology."
In aligning techne and mimesis in this way, Lacoue-Labarthe in effect
marshals the Derridian motif of the closure of representation to account for
technology's function in the production of truth. Ultimately, onto-mimetol-
ogy ascribes all truth claims (and truth itself in the Greek/Heideggerian
sense of aletheia) to an untheorizable discursive operation that generates the
possibility for representation itself, what Lacoue-Labarthe glosses as the
"production of a theater" (a space of representation) that enables the
(restricted) operation of mimesis.
... because [fundamental mimetology] represents the function (or even the
fact) of supplementation in general-the function, or the fact, of substitu-
tion-it is necessary to think that the theater exemplifies general mimesis.
Theatrical mimesis, in other words, provides the model for general mimesis.
Art, since it substitutes for nature, since it replaces it and carries out the poi-
etic process that constitutes its essence, always produces a theater, a repre-
sentation. That is to say, another presentation-or the presentation of some-
thing other, which was not yet there, given, or present. (Lacoue-Labarthe
1989, 257)
For my purposes, what is important about this intervention is less its pow-
erful critique of presence than its broader fidelity to the onto-theological
Lacoue-Labarthe's distinction suggests that Western philosophy has devel oped on the basis of a fundamental ( and reductive) allegiance between tech nology and art; techne as know-how, no less than techne as art, finds its place securely within the ( Greek) category of production-poiesis-defined in Plato's Symposium as the bringing forth of " what passes over and goes forward into presencing from that which is not presencing" (20Sb) .25 From the Greeks to today's technocultural critics, technology thus remains under the sway of the presentational function of mimesis-what Lacoue-Labarthe calls " onto-mimetology. " In aligning techne and mimesis in this way, Lacoue-Labarthe in effect marshals the Derridian motif of the closure of representation to account for technology's function in the production of truth. Ultimately, onto-mimetol ogy ascribes all truth claims ( and truth itself in the Greek/Heideggerian sense of aletheia) to an untheorizable discursive operation that generates the possibility for representation itself, what Lacoue-Labarthe glosses as the " production of a theater" (a space of representation) that enables the (restricted) operation of mimesis . . . . because [fundamental mimetology] represents the function (or even the fact) of supplementation in general-the function, or the fact, of substitu tion-it is necessary to think that the theater exemplifies general mimesis. Theatrical mimesis, in other words, provides the model for general mimesis . Art, since it substitutes for nature, since it replaces it and carries out the poi etic process that constitutes its essence, always produces a theater, a repre sentation. That is to say, another presentation-or the presentation of some thing other, which was not yet there, given, or present. (Lacoue-Labarthe 1 9 8 9 , 257)
For my purposes, what is important about this intervention is less its pow erful critique of presence than its broader fidelity to the onto-theological
Fro m Metaphor to E m b od i ment
From Metaphor to Embodiment * 97
horizon opened by Aristotle. The distinction Lacoue-Labarthe draws
between general and restricted mimesis remains securely within the space
cleared by the metalepsis Aristotle inaugurates with his subordination of
technology to techne. Accordingly, the reversal Lacoue-Labarthe attributes
to the moderns-the privileging of art over nature-only serves further to
efface the dependence of this very mode of thinking about technology on its
prior and enabling reduction. Once it is determined as the supplement of
physis, techne stops being an object of interpretation; investigation turns
away from the question whether techne is an adequate category for thinking
about technology and toward the role art plays in the production of nature.
In effect, then, Lacoue-Labarthe's onto-mimetology, expanding the sway of
the Derridian supplement, generalizes Aristotle's metaleptic reduction of
technology into the constitutive condition of possibility for thought itself.
Aristotle and the Automatic
To undo the assimilation of technology under the Greek category of techne,
we will need to reconstruct Aristotle's notion of the automatic (to automa-
ton). By pressuring the contradiction at the heart of Aristotle's determina-
tion of technology-the contradiction between technology as supplement
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97
horizon opened by Aristotle. The distinction Lacoue-Labarthe draws between general and restricted mimesis remains securely within the space cleared by the metalepsis Aristotle inaugurates with his subordination of technology to techne. Accordingly, the reversal Lacoue-Labarthe attributes to the moderns-the privileging of art over nature-only serves further to efface the dependence of thi s very mode of thinking about technology on its prior and enabling reduction. Once it is determined as the supplement of physis, techne stops being an object of interpretation; investigation turns away from the question whether techne is an adequate category for thinking about technology and toward the role art plays in the production of nature. In effect, then, Lacoue-Labarthe's onto-mimetology, expanding the sway of the Derridian supplement, generalizes Aristotle's metaleptic reduction of technology into the constitutive condition of possibility for thought itself.
(techne) and as the radically nonnatural (para physin)-I shall redeem the
technological real from the forcible abjection it must undergo in order for
Aristotle's causal doctrine to retain its integrity and maximize its explana-
tory grasp. Following my analysis, Aristotle will be unmasked as nothing
less than the progenitor of technesis in Western metaphysics; like Heidegger,
Aristotle and the Automatic
Derrida, and Lacoue-Labarthe after him, Aristotle finds himself compelled,
by the structural logic of his thought, to suppress the radical exteriority of
technology at the moment when it threatens the integrity of his nouocentric
(mind-centered) metaphysics.
In the example on which I shall focus, Physics 2.6, Aristotle distinguishes
two forms of chance in a manner that appears, at least initially, to recognize
the autonomy of the real. While tuche, or "luck," remains relative to human
and/or natural intentionality, to automaton (the automatic) designates a
category of causality that remains irreducible to techne, in its general and
restricted (mimetic) forms. In the final reckoning, however, when Aristotle
seeks to reconcile his investigation of chance with his famous doctrine of
causality, he betrays the initial promise of his introduction of the automatic.
By assimilating the automatic to tuche (chance modeled on human/natural
intentionality), Aristotle inaugurates a philosophical choice that has proven
To undo the assimilation of technology under the Greek category of techne, we will need to reconstruct Aristotle's notion of the automatic (to automa ton) . By pressuring the contradiction at the heart of Aristotle's determina tion of technology-the contradiction between technology as supplement ( techne) and as the radically nonnatural (para physin )-I shall redeem the technological real from the forcible abj ection it must undergo in order for Aristotle's causal doctrine to retain its integrity and maximize its explana tory grasp. Following my analysis, Aristotle will be unmasked as nothing less than the progenitor of technesis in Western metaphysics; like Heidegger, D errida, and Lacoue-Labarthe after him, Aristotle finds himself compelled, by the structural logic of his thought, to suppress the radical exteriority of technology at the moment when it threatens the integrity of his nouocentric ( mind-centered) metaphysics. In the example on which I shall focus, Physics 2.6, Aristotle distinguishes two forms of chance in a manner that appears, at least initially, to recognize the autonomy of the real. While tuche, or " luck, " remains relative to human and/or natural intentionality, to automaton (the automatic ) designates a category of causality that remains irreducible to techne, in its general and restricted (mimetic ) forms. In the final reckoning, however, when Aristotle seeks to reconcile his investigation of chance with his famous doctrine of causality, he betrays the initial promise of his introduction of the automatic. By assimilating the automatic to tuche (chance modeled on human/natural intentionality) , Aristotle inaugurates a philosophical choice that has proven
98
98 * Embodying Technesis
decisive for subsequent efforts to explore technology's experiential impact.
Since it forms nothing less than the prototype for the metaleptic reduction,
this decision will form the initial and ultimate theoretical target, as it were,
of my effort to rethink technology beyond technesis.
Aristotle's analysis of chance (tuche) reaches its crucial moment when he
asks whether luck and the automatic (tuche and automaton) can be
explained on the basis of his famous fourfold doctrine of causality or if
they-in defiance of his nouocentric ontology-require a modification of
that doctrine. Almost as soon as the question is raised, an answer is fur-
nished: "luck and the automatic," Aristotle unequivocally states, "are reck-
oned as causes" (196a, Aristotle 1987, 100) specifically, as efficient causes,
"sources from which . . . change originates" (198a; 105). Whatever chal-
lenge the analysis of chance poses to the fourfold doctrine of causality is one
that can easily be met. As a result, chance is important less as a philosophi-
cally significant object in its own right than as a test of the scope of Aristo-
tle's causal doctrine; it draws its significance from the resistance it offers
causal explanation, since it designates events that fail to fall within the nor-
mal range of causal action, events that fail to demonstrate strict necessity
and/or regularity. Chance occurrences, Aristotle tells us, are those we ordi-
narily ascribe to "luck" (meaning precisely that which lacks necessity and/or
regularity). They can be divided into two categories: those due to "luck" in
a more narrow sense (tuche) and those due to the "automatic" (automaton).
In Aristotle's usage, luck (tuche) applies to a restricted domain of events,
those effected by an agent "capable of choosing." The automatic applies in
far more cases, extending, Aristotle says, "to the animals other than man
and to. . . inanimate objects" (1976; 104).
Aristotle gives two accounts of the difference, both of which help to
reveal what is at stake in this crucial distinction and to prepare for his reduc-
tion of the automatic to luck in the narrow sense. In the first account, Aris-
totle argues that outcomes due to luck and those that are automatic are "for
something" (i.e., have a final cause) in different ways: the former are for
something in a sense that could be determined by their agent (i.e., according
to the category of thought), while the latter are for something in a sense that
cannot be so determined, that remains-in itself-indeterminate. While it
makes sense to speak of luck in respect to a human agent-who can, for
example, go to a business meeting and run into an old friend by chance-it
makes no sense to do so when the agent in question is an inanimate object.
Aristotle concludes that "luck and its outcome belong only to things which
can be lucky and in general engage in rational activity" (197b; 104, empha-
sis added).
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Em bod y i n g
Technesis
decisive for subsequent efforts to explore technology's experiential impact. Since it forms nothing less than the prototype for the metaleptic reduction, this decision will form the initial and ultimate theoretical target, as it were, of my effort to rethink technology beyond technesis. Aristotle's analysis of chance (tuche) reaches its crucial moment when he asks whether luck and the automatic ( tuche and automaton) can be explained on the basis of his famous fourfold doctrine of causality or if they-in defiance of his nouocentric ontology-require a modification of that doctrine. Almost as soon as the question is raised, an answer is fur nished: " luck and the automatic, " Aristotle unequivocally states, " are reck oned as causes" ( 1 96a, Aristotle 1 9 8 7, 1 0 0 ) specifically, as efficient causes, " sources from which . . . change originates " ( 1 9 8 a; 1 0 5 ) . Whatever chal lenge the analysis of chance poses to the fourfold doctrine of causality is one that can easily be met. As a result, chance is important less as a philosophi cally significant obj ect in its own right than as a test of the scope of Aristo tle's causal doctrine; it draws its significance from the resistance it offers causal explanation, since it designates events that fail to fall within the nor mal range of causal action, events that fail to demonstrate strict necessity and/or regularity. Chance occurrences, Aristotle tells us, are those we ordi narily ascribe to " luck " (meaning precisely that which lacks necessity and/or regularity ) . They can be divided into two categories: those due to " luck " in a more narrow sense ( tuche) and those due to the " automatic " (automaton) . In Aristotle's usage, luck (tuche) applies to a restricted domain of events, those effected by an agent "capable of choosing. " The automatic applies in far more cases, extending, Aristotle says, "to the animals other than man and to . . . inanimate objects " ( 1 976; 1 04 ) . Aristotle gives two accounts o f the difference, both o f which help to reveal what is at stake in this crucial distinction and to prepare for his reduc tion of the automatic to luck in the narrow sense. In the first account, Aris totle argues that outcomes due to luck and those that are automatic are " for something " ( i . e . , have a final cause) in different ways : the former are for something in a sense that could be determined by their agent (i.e., according to the category of thought ) , while the latter are for something in a sense that cannot be so determined, that remains-in itself-indeterminate. While it makes sense to speak of luck in respect to a human agent-who can, for example, go to a business meeting and run into an old friend by chance-it makes no sense to do so when the agent in question is an inanimate obj ect. Aristotle concludes that " luck and its outcome belong only to things which can be lucky and in general engage in rational activity" ( 1 97b; 1 04, empha sis added ) .
Fro m Metaphor to E m b od i ment
From Metaphor to Embodiment * 99
Events caused by the automatic are not likewise (i.e., intrinsically) mean-
ingful. They do not pertain directly to the intentional horizon of an agent,
and importantly (although Aristotle does not put it this way), they can only
be rendered meaningful through (metaleptic) translation. To attain mean-
ing, automatic events must be evaluated not in themselves but rather within
a specific subjective horizon belonging to some particular intentional agent.
While luck names a real force that simultaneously plays an explanatory role
within the field of thought of its agent, the automatic is a real force inde-
pendently of its relation to an intentional agent and only becomes a cause in
the proper, explanatory sense by being transposed into a second-order func-
tion of an intentional agent.
Aristotle's second account of the difference between luck and the auto-
matic concerns the relation between efficient and final cause. In cases where
luck is in operation, the final cause is internal to the nature of the object,
stemming unintentionally but nevertheless from the activity of an otherwise
intentional agent. "The source of an automatic outcome," however, "is
external" (197b; 105): it stems from outside the nature of the object pas-
sively undergoing change. The final cause corresponding to this external
efficient cause emerges only through analogy with an intentional agent, as
Aristotle's example of a stone falling illustrates: "A stone falls and hits
someone, but it does not fall for the purpose of hitting him; the fall accord-
ingly was 'in-itself-to-no-purpose'-a chance result [rather, an automatic
result, tou automatou]."26 It is simply outside the nature of the stone to hit
a man "with the purpose of hitting him." In qualifying the final cause of the
automatic as external, Aristotle establishes, among other things, that in
itself (i.e., in its relation with its efficient cause), the automatic is opaque to
thought and can be known only negatively through comparison with the
sense it takes on when it is carried over to an intentional agent. Thus, like
the first difference, this one emphasizes the mediation or translation that the
automatic must undergo to be presented in thought.
On the basis of these two differences, Aristotle stresses the external
provenance of the efficiency that defines the automatic in its proper sense.
Luck (in the narrow sense) rests at the farthest extreme from natural neces-
sity while still remaining natural (i.e., governed by the nature of the agent);
as Aristotle puts it, "[w]e are furthest from an outcome of luck with things
which come to be due to nature" (1976, 105). The efficient cause of a lucky
event, nevertheless, remains internal to the nature of the agent, either
directly or "by concurrence." The automatic, however, comes into play
when things take place "contrary to nature" (para physin).
To illustrate this difference, Aristotle compares two examples. In the case
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99
Events caused by the automatic are not likewise ( i . e . , intrinsically) mean ingful. They do not pertain directly to the intentional horizon of an agent, and importantly ( although Aristotle does not put it this way ) , they can only be rendered meaningful through (metaleptic) translation. To attain mean ing, automatic events must be evaluated not in themselves but rather within a specific subj ective horizon belonging to some particular intentional agent. While luck names a real force that simultaneously plays an explanatory role within the field of thought of its agent, the automatic is a real force inde pendently of its relation to an intentional agent and only becomes a cause in the proper, explanatory sense by being transposed into a second-order func tion of an intentional agent. Aristotle's second account of the difference between luck and the auto matic concerns the relation between efficient and final cause. In cases where luck is in operation, the final cause is internal to the nature of the obj ect, stemming unintentionally but nevertheless from the activity of an otherwise intentional agent. "The source of an automatic outcome, " however, "is external " ( 1 97b; 1 0 5 ) : it stems from outside the nature of the obj ect pas sively undergoing change. The final cause corresponding to this external efficient cause emerges only through analogy with an intentional agent, as Aristotle's example of a stone falling illustrates: "A stone falls and hits someone, but it does not fall for the purpose of hitting him; the fall accord ingly was 'in-itself-to-no-purpose'-a chance result [rather, an automatic result, tou automatou] . " 2 6 It is simply outside the nature of the stone to hit a man "with the purpose of hitting him. " In qualifying the final cause of the automatic as external, Aristotle establishes, among other things, that in itself ( i . e . , in its relation with its efficient cause), the automatic is opaque to thought and can be known only negatively through comparison with the sense it takes on when it is carried over to an intentional agent. Thus, like the first difference, this one emphasizes the mediation or translation that the automatic must undergo to be presented in thought. On the basis of these two differences, Aristotle stresses the external provenance of the efficiency that defines the automatic in its proper sense. Luck (in the narrow sense) rests at the farthest extreme from natural neces sity while still remaining natural (i.e., governed by the nature of the agent) ; as Aristotle puts it, " [w] e are furthest from a n outcome o f luck with things which come to be due to nature " ( 1 976, 1 0 5 ) . The efficient cause of a lucky event, nevertheless, remains internal to the nature of the agent, either directly or " by concurrence. " The automatic, however, comes into play when things take place "contrary to nature" (para physin ) . To illustrate this difference, Aristotle compares two examples. In the case
100
100 * Embodying Technesis
of what we might call freaks of nature, natural monstrosities produced con-
trary to nature's logic, Aristotle contends, we are still dealing with luck,
since the cause of such monstrosities remains internal to nature. Yet because
of the perversity that goes with conceiving such mishaps in intentional
terms, we tend to attribute them to "'accident[s]' [automaton] in Nature."
When it comes to categorical definitions, however, we must avoid drawing
ontological conclusions from what is merely a manner of speaking, and so
we must distinguish from this example of luck an example of the automatic
in its proper sense. The automatic itself, Aristotle argues, is para physin
(contrary to nature) in a radical sense, since it breaks entirely with the model
of natural (or internal) generation. He continues:
Automaton, on the other hand, may be used to describe the behaviour of
brute beasts and even of many inanimate things. For instance, we attribute it
to automaton if a horse escapes a danger by coming accidentally to a place of
•
Em bod y i n g
Technesis
of what we might call freaks of nature, natural monstrosities produced con trary to nature's logic, Aristotle contends, we are still dealing with luck, since the cause of such monstrosities remains internal to nature. Yet because of the perversity that goes with conceiving such mishaps in intentional terms, we tend to attribute them to " 'accident[ s] ' [automaton] in Nature. " When it comes to categorical definitions, however, we must avoid drawing ontological conclusions from what is merely a manner of speaking, and so we must distinguish from this example of luck an example of the automatic in its proper sense. The automatic itself, Aristotle argues, is para physin (contrary to nature ) in a radical sense, since it breaks entirely with the model of natural (or internal ) generation. He continues:
safety.... But this case [of a natural monstrosity] is different from that of the
horse; for the horse's escape was due to an external cause, but the causes of
Nature's miscarriage are internal to her own processes. (Aristotle 1929, 159,
161; emphasis added)
The automatic is para physin in the sense that it cannot be tied down to a
purpose immediately graspable by and attributable to an agent of thought
or to nature. Its efficiency derives from something purely contingent and
external to the subject it qualifies and thus comprises a sort of lacuna in the
explanatory matrix of Aristotle's causal doctrine.
Given what look like solid grounds for a stable and interesting categori-
cal distinction between luck and the automatic on the basis of their respec-
Automaton, on the other hand, may be used to describe the behaviour of brute beasts and even of many inanimate things . For instance, we attribute it to automaton if a horse escapes a danger by coming accidentally to a place of safety . . . . But this case [of a natural monstrosity] is different from that of the horse; for the horse's escape was due to an external cause, but the causes of Nature's miscarriage are internal to her own processes. (Aristotle 1 929, 1 5 9 , 1 6 1 ; emphasis added)
tive relations to (human) thought, the conclusion Aristotle goes on to draw
cannot but come as a surprise.
... both [the automatic and luck] are sources from which the change origi-
nates; for they are always either things which cause naturally or things which
cause from thought-of which there is an indeterminate multitude. But since
the automatic and luck are causes of things for which mind or nature might
be responsible, when something comes to be responsible for these same
things by virtue of concurrence, and since nothing which is by virtue of con-
currence is prior to that which is by itself, it is clear that no cause by virtue of
concurrence is prior to that which is by itself a cause. Hence the automatic
and luck are posterior to both mind and nature; so however much the auto-
matic may be the cause of the heavens, mind and nature are necessarily prior
The automatic is para physin in the sense that it cannot be tied down to a purpose immediately graspable by and attributable to an agent of thought or to nature. Its efficiency derives from something purely contingent and external to the subj ect it qualifies and thus comprises a sort of lacuna in the explanatory matrix of Aristotle's causal doctrine. Given what look like solid grounds for a stable and interesting categori cal distinction between luck and the automatic on the basis of their respec
causes both of many other things and of this universe [proteron noun . .
physin aitian einai]. (Aristotle 1987, 198a; emphasis added)
tive relations to (human ) thought, the conclusion Aristotle goes on to draw cannot but come as a surprise . . . . both [the automatic and luck] are sources from which the change origi nates; for they are always either things which cause naturally or things which cause from thought-of which there is an indeterminate multitude. But since the automatic and luck are causes of things for which mind or nature might be responsible, when something comes to be responsible for these same things by virtue of concurrence, and since nothing which is by virtue of con currence is prior to that which is by itself, it is clear that no cause by virtue of concurrence is prior to that which is by itself a cause. Hence the automatic and luck are posterior to both mind and nature; so however much the auto matic may be the cause of the heavens, mind and nature are necessarily prior causes both of many other things and of this universe [proteron noun . physin aitian einai] . (Aristotle 1 9 8 7, 1 9 8 a; emphasis added)
From Metap h o r to E m bo d i m e n t
From Metaphor to Embodiment * 101
By restricting efficient causes to two categories-"either things which cause
naturally or things which cause from thought"-Aristotle leaves out the
proper definition of the automatic as what is para physin, unnatural in a
radical sense. He forgets that automatic causes are "causes of things for
which mind or nature might be responsible" only following their translation
into the horizon of an intentional agent, or in other words, only after a
reduction of the radical exteriority of the automatic. Again, the example of
the stone seems to establish this difference: by itself the stone falling is
"without why"; it acquires a determinable final cause only when viewed on
the model of intentional thought, that is, as an event within an individual
mind or within that great mind Aristotle calls "nature."
Not surprisingly, given my claim for Aristotle's privileged status as the
progenitor of technesis, this assimilation of the automatic into the doctrine
of causality takes form as a metalepsis in the text of the Physics. By claim-
ing that the automatic, like luck, is an (efficient) cause by virtue of concur-
rence, Aristotle is merely drawing a conclusion on the basis of what, for
him, is simply a fundamental law of nature-the law stating that "nothing
which is by virtue of concurrence is prior to that which is by itself." In itself
or prior to its reduction, however, the automatic does not lend itself to such
a hierarchizing distinction; since the final cause of the automatic is unknow-
able, unthinkable, and unpresentable, there is no principle in the case of the
automatic on which to separate essential from concurrent. The possibility to
do so comes only following the translation of the automatic into the horizon
of thought, where something can be a cause by concurrence only if it is sub-
ordinated to an intentional agent that is a cause in itself.27 Consequently,
Aristotle's assertion of the priority of "mind and nature" over luck and the
automatic is both circular and metaleptic. His subordination of cause by
concurrence acquires validity only on the basis of a prior commitment to
nouocentrism-a categorical and dogmatic privileging of the mental over
the material. Once it is assimilated into the field of thought, to automaton
loses its radical exteriority: following Aristotle's inaugural metalepsis, the
automatic appears to be the result of a prior cause, rather than a force oper-
ating beyond the scope of thought.
•
10 1
By restricting efficient causes to two categories-" either things which cause naturally or things which cause from thought "-Aristotle leaves out the proper definition of the automatic as what is para physin, unnatural in a radical sense. He forgets that automatic causes are " causes of things for which mind or nature might be responsible " only following their translation into the horizon of an intentional agent, or in other words, only after a reduction of the radical exteriority of the automatic. Again, the example of the stone seems to establish this difference: by itself the stone falling is " without why " ; it acquires a determinable final cause only when viewed on the model of intentional thought, that is, as an event within an individual mind or within that great mind Aristotle calls " nature . " Not surprisingly, given my claim for Aristotle's privileged status as the progenitor of technesis, this assimilation of the automatic into the doctrine of causality takes form as a metalepsis in the text of the Physics. By claim ing that the automatic, like luck, is an (efficient) cause by virtue of concur rence, Aristotle is merely drawing a conclusion on the basis of what, for him, is simply a fundamental law of nature-the law stating that " nothing which is by virtue of concurrence is prior to that which is by itself. " In itself or prior to its reduction, however, the automatic does not lend itself to such a hierarchizing distinction; since the final cause of the automatic is unknow able, unthinkable, and unpresentable, there is no principle in the case of the automatic on which to separate essential from concurrent. The possibility to do so comes only following the translation of the automatic into the horizon of thought, where something can be a cause by concurrence only if it is sub ordinated to an intentional agent that is a cause in itself.27 Consequently, Aristotle's assertion of the priority of "mind and nature " over luck and the automatic is both circular and metaleptic. His subordination of cause by concurrence acquires validity only on the basis of a prior commitment to nouocentrism-a categorical and dogmatic privileging of the mental over the material. Once it is assimilated into the field of thought, to automaton loses its radical exteriority: following Aristotle's inaugural metalepsis, the automatic appears to be the result of a prior cause, rather than a force oper ating beyond the scope of thought.
Chapter 4
Questioning the Machine Basis of Techne:
Heidegger on Technology
In chapter 3, I showed that Aristotle's decision to repress the automatic
Chapter 4
played an operative role in the inauguration of the machine reduction of
technology. To trace the endurance of this reduction in the Western philo-
sophical tradition, I shall now focus on the figure responsible for reinvent-
ing the philosophical machine metaphor in a distinctly twentieth-century
form, the German philosopher Martin Heidegger.
Heidegger's influence on contemporary technocultural theory is, in a
Questioning the Machine Basis of Techne: H eidegger on Technology
word, immense. His diagnosis in essays like "The Question Concerning
Technology" and "The Age of the World Picture" has established technol-
ogy as an important object for disciplines as diverse as political science,
media studies, gender studies, and art history, not to mention philosophy
and literary criticism. Certainly, no serious contemporary study of technol-
ogy in practically any discipline would dream of forgoing a sustained
engagement with Heidegger's work, and yet, despite the enormity of this
influence, his model tends less to inspire genuine critical attention than to be
taken as an unquestioned-and unquestionable-starting point for explor-
ing technology.1 Mediated by French poststructuralism, this uncritical
(non)reception of Heidegger is, I think, largely responsible for the reign
technesis enjoys in contemporary technocultural criticism. The failure on
the part of contemporary critics to criticize Heidegger's presuppositions-
especially his ontologizing of technology-not only has had the effect of
rubber-stamping his bleak depiction of an absolute technological command
over reality but has facilitated a wholesale and still more reductive posi-
tivizing of it. Given Heidegger's sustained call for a resistance against tech-
nology, there is certainly a bitter irony to the fact that technology's restric-
tion of the real to what can be "conceived and grasped as a picture"
(Heidegger 1977c) has come to form an unquestioned methodological basis
for much recent work in cultural theory of media and technology; from Bau-
drillard's embrace of the hyperreal to the robust celebration of representa-
In chapter 3 , I showed that Aristotle's decision to repress the automatic played an operative role in the inauguration of the machine reduction of technology. To trace the endurance of this reduction in the Western philo sophical tradition, I shall now focus on the figure responsible for reinvent ing the philosophical machine metaphor in a distinctly twentieth-century form, the German philosopher Martin Heidegger. Heidegger's influence on contemporary technocultural theory is, in a word, immense. His diagnosis in essays like "The Question Concerning Technology" and "The Age of the World Picture" has established technol ogy as an important obj ect for disciplines as diverse as political science, media studies, gender studies, and art history, not to mention philosophy and literary criticism. Certainly, no serious contemporary study of technol ogy in practically any discipline would dream of forgoing a sustained engagement with Heidegger's work, and yet, despite the enormity of this influence, his model tends less to inspire genuine critical attention than to be taken as an unquestioned-and unquestionable-starting point for explor ing technology. 1 Mediated by French poststructuralism, this uncritical (non)reception of Heidegger is, I think, largely responsible for the reign technesis enj oys in contemporary technocultural criticism. The failure on the part of contemporary critics to criticize Heidegger's presuppositions especially his ontologizing of technology-not only has had the effect of rubber-stamping his bleak depiction of an absolute technological command over reality but has facilitated a wholesale and still more reductive posi tivizing of it. Given Heidegger's sustained call for a resistance against tech nology, there is certainly a bitter irony to the fact that technology's restric tion of the real to what can be "conceived and grasped as a picture " (Heidegger 1 9 77c) has come to form an unquestioned methodological basis for much recent work in cultural theory of media and technology; from Bau drillard's embrace of the hyperreal to the robust celebration of representa-
Q u esti o n i n g the Mach i n e Basis of
Questioning the Machine Basis of Techne * 103
tion common to most contemporary forms of cultural studies, Heidegger's
bleakest prospect has been more than fulfilled.
As I suggested in my introduction, this misguided positivizing of Heideg-
ger finds its theoretical basis in the refunctionalization to which French
poststructuralism has submitted his thought. As exemplified in the work of
both Derrida and Lacan, poststructuralism operates an explicit inversion of
Heidegger's position, an inversion that functions to radicalize Heidegger's
view by expanding the command of technology and tightening the strangle-
hold exercised by representational thinking. Where Heidegger maintains
that the essence of technology (techne) is uncontaminated by technology,
both Derrida and Lacan assert a constitutive complicity of logos (and hence
of all determinations of essence) with an irreducible technicity. According to
their otherwise quite divergent analyses, the contemporary reign of repre-
sentational thinking is not simply a historically specific and hence limited
phenomenon but a structural element of thought itself.
In the wake of this poststructuralist decision regarding Heidegger's
famous maxim that the essence of technology is nothing technological, the
historically determinate reduction of technological materiality that we find
in Heidegger is given a vastly stronger legitimation. Thus in Derrida, tech-
nology is equated with writing (and all of its possible externalizations),
while in Lacan, technological artifacts (exemplarily, embodiments of the
gaze and the voice) serve as the locus for the worldly enactment of desire. In
both cases, a restricted account of technology rooted in a radicalized and yet
ultimately faithful version of Heideggerian enframing takes priority over a
robust account of technology's radical material exteriority.
Breaking with French poststructuralism, I shall challenge this radicaliza-
tion of Heidegger's position, together with the positivization it has more
recently yielded, not so much by disputing its cogency as by questioning the
adequacy of its source. In particular, I shall question whether Heidegger's
account of the temptations posed by ontic technologies provides us with a
rich enough basis for grasping technology's robust impact on our experi-
ence. In the story I shall tell, whatever cogency and force Heidegger is able
to acquire for his ontologizing of technology comes from a massive and vio-
lent reduction of ontic technologies. My account will thus expose the prior-
ity of the ontological for what, I suggest, it is: a defense against the ontic
threat of the technological real. By laying bare the occulted priority of the
ontic, I shall thus urge a different path out of Heidegger than the one cho-
sen by poststructuralism, a path that takes seriously the notion of techno-
logical autonomy that he repeatedly found himself compelled to repress and
that simply cannot be grasped through any radicalization of representation,
Techne
•
103
tion common to most contemporary forms of cultural studies, Heidegger's bleakest prospect has been more than fulfilled. As I suggested in my introduction, this misguided positivi zing of Heideg ger finds its theoretical basis in the refunctionalization to which French poststructuralism has submitted his thought. As exemplified in the work of both Derrida and Lacan, poststructuralism operates an explicit inversion of Heidegger's position, an inversion that functions to radicalize Heidegger's view by expanding the command of technology and tightening the strangle hold exercised by representational thinking. Where Heidegger maintains that the essence of technology (techne) is uncontaminated by technology, both Derrida and Lacan assert a constitutive complicity of logos ( and hence of all determinations of essence ) with an irreducible technicity. According to their otherwise quite divergent analyses, the contemporary reign of repre sentational thinking is not simply a historically specific and hence limited phenomenon but a structural element of thought itself. In the wake of this poststructuralist decision regarding Heidegger's famous maxim that the essence of technology is nothing technological, the historically determinate reduction of technological materiality that we find in Heidegger is given a vastly stronger legitimation. Thus in Derrida, tech nology is equated with writing ( and all of its possible externalizations ) , while i n Lacan, technological artifacts (exemplarily, embodiments o f the gaze and the voice ) serve as the locus for the worldly enactment of desire. In both cases, a restricted account of technology rooted in a radicalized and yet ultimately faithful version of Heideggerian enframing takes priority over a robust account of technology's radical material exteriority. Breaking with French poststructuralism, I shall challenge this radicaliza tion of Heidegger's position, together with the positivization it has more recently yielded, not so much by disputing its cogency as by questioning the adequacy of its source. In particular, I shall question whether Heidegger's account of the temptations posed by ontic technologies provides us with a rich enough basis for grasping technology's robust impact on our experi ence. In the story I shall tell, whatever cogency and force Heidegger is able to acquire for his ontologizing of technology comes from a massive and vio lent reduction of ontic technologies. My account will thus expose the prior ity of the ontological for what, I suggest, it is: a defense against the ontic threat of the technological real. By laying bare the occulted priority of the ontic, I shall thus urge a different path out of Heidegger than the one cho sen by poststructuralism, a path that takes seriously the notion of techno logical autonomy that he repeatedly found himself compelled to repress and that simply cannot be grasped through any radicalization of representation,
104
104 * Embodying Technesis
no matter how extreme. On this point, my interpretation resonates with
recent interpretations of Heidegger's politics and specifically with the per-
suasive suggestion that an overriding desire to maintain faith in a philo-
sophical salvation blinded him to the everyday, "fallen" menace of technol-
ogy, which he might otherwise have seen quite clearly.2
In this chapter, I shall critically reconstruct Heidegger's account of tech-
nology to contextualize my central claim: that the key distinction Heidegger
develops in "The Question concerning Technology" between a generic and
a specifically modern form of production-between Hervorbringen (literally
"bringing-forth," Heidegger's translation for poiesis) and Herausfordern
(challenging-forth)-presupposes and obtains coherence only on the basis
of a reduction of technology first developed in his early period. Without this
reduction, undertaken most explicitly in Heidegger's account of the
machine as subordinate to the world-disclosing power of Dasein (the mode
of situated being or "being-there" constitutive of human existence) in his
lecture course from 1928, the distinction of Herausfordern from Hervor-
bringen would threaten the primacy of poiesis and, with it, the very priority
of ontology on which his analysis is based. As I see it, Heidegger's reduction
of technology thus functions to insure the domestication of modern tech-
nology within the frame of poiesis. In the process of exploring this reduc-
tion, I shall argue that Heidegger's account of technology is ultimately
determined by the analysis of language he initially develops in Being and
Time and that his reduction forms the paradigm for technesis as the privi-
leged twentieth-century form of the machine reduction of technology.
"Angst" vor der Technik?
In Being and Time, Heidegger addresses technology in two fundamental
ways, both of which serve to establish its secondarity with respect to
Dasein's ontological commitment to its ownmost Being. On the one hand,
Heidegger develops an account of technology as that which is experienced
practically in the mode of Zuhandenheit (readiness-to-hand); in accord with
his account, ontic technologies are a part of what makes up the world of
Dasein's everyday, practical concern and are experienced as components of
a total activity and not in themselves. They owe their existence to the world-
disclosing force of Dasein. On the other hand, Heidegger addresses technol-
ogy more obliquely through his analysis of Dasein's fallenness. In the host
•
Em bod y i n g
Technesis
no matter how extreme. On this point, my interpretation resonates with recent interpretations of Heidegger's politics and specifically with the per suasive suggestion that an overriding desire to maintain faith in a philo sophical salvation blinded him to the everyday, " fallen " menace of technol ogy, which he might otherwise have seen quite clearly.2 In this chapter, I shall critically reconstruct Heidegger's account of tech nology to contextualize my central claim: that the key distinction Heidegger develops in " The Question concerning Technology " between a generic and a specifically modern form of production-between Hervorbringen (literally " bringing-forth, " Heidegger's translation for poiesis) and Herausfordern (challenging-forth )-presupposes and obtains coherence only on the basis of a reduction of technology first developed in his early period. Without this reduction, undertaken most explicitly in Heidegger's account of the machine as subordinate to the world-disclosing power of Dasein (the mode of situated being or " being-there " constitutive of human existence ) in his lecture course from 1 92 8 , the distinction of Herausfordern from Hervor bringen would threaten the primacy of poiesis and, with it, the very priority of ontology on which his analysis is based. As I see it, Heidegger's reduction of technology thus functions to insure the domestication of modern tech nology within the frame of poiesis. In the process of exploring this reduc tion, I shall argue that Heidegger's account of technology is ultimately determined by the analysis of language he initially develops in Being and Time and that his reduction forms the paradigm for technesis as the privi leged twentieth-century form of the machine reduction of technology.
of examples Heidegger marshals to illustrate the three modes of fallenness
(idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity [Gerede, Neugier, Zweideutigkeit])-
" Angst" vor der Technik? In Being and Time, Heidegger addresses technology in two fundamental ways, both of which serve to establish its secondarity with respect to Dasein's ontological commitment to its ownmost Being. On the one hand, Heidegger develops an account of technology as that which is experienced practically in the mode of Zuhandenheit (readiness-to-hand); in accord with his account, ontic technologies are a part of what makes up the world of Dasein's everyday, practical concern and are experienced as components of a total activity and not in themselves. They owe their existence to the world disclosing force of Dasein. On the other hand, Heidegger addresses technol ogy more obliquely through his analysis of Dasein's fallenness. In the host of examples Heidegger marshals to illustrate the three modes of fallenness ( idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity [Gerede, Neugier, Zweideutigkeit] )-
Q u esti o n i n g the Mach i n e Basis of
Questioning the Machine Basis of Techne * 105
examples that centrally involve technologized modes of public communica-
tion-technology is prohibited from playing any positive role whatsoever.
Rather than assisting Dasein in its quest to achieve an authentic under-
standing of its source of Being, technology here comprises precisely what
must be overcome on the way toward such an understanding. In Heideg-
ger's account, it would seem, technology can only interfere with the quest
for authenticity in a manner that-like any other breakdown in Dasein's
average everyday, practical activity (Zuhandenheit)-can easily be cor-
rected simply by being thematized.
Heidegger's account does not consider the potential recalcitrance of ontic
technologies-the possibility that they might resist such thematization or
that Dasein might never be in a position to make its dependence on them
explicit. To understand why this possibility poses a threat to Heidegger's
phenomenological program, let us distinguish Being and Time's famous
account of the hammer as the prototype of the tool from those technologies
that Dasein encounters as obstacles on its quest for authenticity. Such a dis-
tinction serves to emphasize the specificity of electronic and media tech-
nologies that, as various postmodern critics have pointed out, differ from
machine and preindustrial technologies insofar as they impact us from
within; because they are implicated in our very Being-in-the-world as a cen-
tral aspect of what enables experience as such, they cannot be thematized in
the same way as earlier technologies, that is, by being made explicit via the
theoretical mode of knowing Heidegger calls Vorhandenheit.3 Accordingly,
such technologies simply cannot be accounted for on the theory of reference
Heidegger develops in Being and Time: unlike the examples of practical
objects he furnishes (e.g., the automobile's turning signal), the vast majority
of postmodern technologies cannot be constituted either as signs or as indi-
cations and thus cannot be given any objectal status by Dasein. Effectively,
this means that postmodern technologies (to the extent that they become an
issue for Dasein) must occupy a position formally analogous to the role of
death in Being and Time: in both cases, Dasein confronts the lack of an
object where an object should be. Within the terms of Heidegger's analysis,
postmodern technologies should provoke Angst, the feeling of ontological
doubt faced in experiences (such as Dasein's confrontation with its own
death) that cannot be correlated with a particular referent and that, conse-
quently, disturb Dasein sufficiently to tear it away from its everyday
involvement with the thing-world and spur it on to attain its authenticity.
It is not surprising that Heidegger furnishes no such account of technol-
ogy in Being and Time. Not only would an account of technology as
"nonobjectal" contradict his instrumental determination of technology as
Techne
•
105
examples that centrally involve technologized modes of public communica tion-technology is prohibited from playing any positive role whatsoever. Rather than assisting Dasein in its quest to achieve an authentic under standing of its source of Being, technology here comprises precisely what must be overcome on the way toward such an understanding. In Heideg ger's account, it would seem, technology can only interfere with the quest for authenticity in a manner that-like any other breakdown in Dasein's average everyday, practical activity (Zuhandenheit)-can easily be cor rected simply by being thematized. Heidegger's account does not consider the potential recalcitrance of ontic technologies-the possibility that they might resist such thematization or that Dasein might never be in a position to make its dependence on them explicit. To understand why this possibility poses a threat to Heidegger's phenomenological program, let us distinguish Being and Time's famous account of the hammer as the prototype of the tool from those technologies that Dasein encounters as obstacles on its quest for authenticity. Such a dis tinction serves to emphasize the specificity of electronic and media tech nologies that, as various postmodern critics have pointed out, differ from machine and preindustrial technologies insofar as they impact us from within; because they are implicated in our very Being-in-the-world as a cen tral aspect of what enables experience as such, they cannot be thematized in the same way as earlier technologies, that is, by being made explicit via the theoretical mode of knowing Heidegger calls Vorhandenheit. 3 Accordingly, such technologies simply cannot be accounted for on the theory of reference Heidegger develops in Being and Time: unlike the examples of practical obj ects he furnishes (e.g., the automobile's turning signal ) , the vast majority of postmodern technologies cannot be constituted either as signs or as indi cations and thus cannot be given any obj ectal status by Dasein. Effectively, this means that postmodern technologies (to the extent that they become an issue for Dasein) must occupy a position formally analogous to the role of death in Being and Time: in both cases, Dasein confronts the lack of an obj ect where an obj ect should be. Within the terms of Heidegger's analysis, postmodern technologies should provoke Angst, the feeling of ontological doubt faced in experiences (such as Dasein's confrontation with its own death) that cannot be correlated with a particular referent and that, conse quently, disturb Dasein sufficiently to tear it away from its everyday involvement with the thing-world and spur it on to attain its authenticity. It is not surprising that Heidegger furnishes no such account of technol ogy in Being and Time. Not only would an account of technology as " nonobj ectal" contradict his instrumental determination of technology as
106
106 * Embodying Technesis
ready-to-hand (zuhandene), but more importantly, it would accord a recal-
citrance to technology that Heidegger is hardly prepared to allow. Unlike
Being-toward-death, which provokes Angst from a source internal to
Dasein, nonobjectal technology introduces a source of anxiety that would
be radically external to Dasein's powers-that could, in short, potentially
obstruct Dasein from ever beginning its quest for authenticity. This threat, I
suggest, furnishes the root motivation for Heidegger's reduction of ontic
technology: to purchase coherence for his account of Dasein's conversion,
Heidegger must exclude all possibility of sustained external technical inter-
ference.
We can see this reduction at work in the analysis of how Dasein moves
from its everyday absorption in idle talk (Gerede) to a position where it is
able to hear itself authentically. Restricted by his inflexible categorical
opposition of authenticity and inauthenticity, Heidegger has no means to
recognize the possibility that Dasein might indeed depend, intrinsically and
insurmountably, on ontic technologies; not insignificantly, it is important to
point out that any such dependence will only have increased with the evolu-
tion and increasing sophistication of consumer society in the twentieth cen-
tury. In paragraph 55 of Being and Time, Heidegger depicts Dasein's strug-
gle for authenticity as an unmediated response to the call of conscience; to
respond properly, Heidegger contends, Dasein must overcome its factical or
phenomenal absorption in the idle talk of the public self (das Man). Yet,
because this absorption is rooted not in the formal structure of Dasein but
in its ontic, fallen desire, Dasein must overcome what is in effect an external
threat-an everyday, habitual (i.e, nonthematized) reliance on mundane
technologies that might in fact be quite difficult or altogether impossible to
give up.4 Before it can even begin its philosophical quest for ontological
authenticity, Dasein must thus surmount a prior ontic commitment-its
absorption in the domain of the technical.
In the face of the external, ontic origin of the threat of the technical, Hei-
degger asserts the categorical priority of the ontological over the ontic. Sim-
ply by presupposing this priority (the very priority that technology puts into
question), Heidegger is able to shift the focus of the existential analytic of
Dasein from the constraints imposed by its external absorption to its
unhampered power for internal modification. "Losing itself in the public-
ness and the idle talk of the 'they,'" Heidegger says, "Dasein fails to hear
[Uberhort] its own Self in listening to the they-self." He continues:
If Dasein is to be able to get brought back from this lostness of failing to hear
itself, and if this is to be done through itself, then it must first be able to find
•
Em bod y i n g
Technesis
ready-to-hand (zuhandene), but more importantly, it would accord a recal citrance to technology that Heidegger is hardly prepared to allow. Unlike Being-toward-death, which provokes Angst from a source internal to Dasein, nonobj ectal technology introduces a source of anxiety that would be radically external to Dasein's powers-that could, in short, potentially obstruct Dasein from ever beginning its quest for authenticity. This threat, I suggest, furnishes the root motivation for Heidegger's reduction of ontic technology: to purchase coherence for his account of Dasein's conversion, Heidegger must exclude all possibility of sustained external technical inter ference. We can see this reduction at work in the analysis of how Dasein moves from its everyday absorption in idle talk ( Gerede) to a position where it is able to hear itself authentically. Restricted by his inflexible categorical opposition of authenticity and inauthenticity, Heidegger has no means to recognize the possibility that Dasein might indeed depend, intrinsically and insurmountably, on ontic technologies; not insignificantly, it is important to point out that any such dependence will only have increased with the evolu tion and increasing sophistication of consumer society in the twentieth cen tury. In paragraph 55 of Being and Time, Heidegger depicts Dasein's strug gle for authenticity as an unmediated response to the call of conscience; to respond properly, Heidegger contends, Dasein must overcome its factical or phenomenal absorption in the idle talk of the public self ( das Man) . Yet, because this absorption is rooted not in the formal structure of Dasein but in its ontic, fallen desire, Dasein must overcome what is in effect an external threat-an everyday, habitual (i.e, nonthematized ) reliance on mundane technologies that might in fact be quite difficult or altogether impossible to give up .4 Before it can even begin its philosophical quest for ontological authenticity, Dasein must thus surmount a prior ontic commitment-its absorption in the domain of the technical. In the face of the external, ontic origin of the threat of the technical, Hei degger asserts the categorical priority of the ontological over the ontic. Sim ply by presupposing this priority (the very priority that technology puts into question ) , Heidegger is able to shift the focus of the existential analytic of Dasein from the constraints imposed by its external absorption to its unhampered power for internal modification. " Losing itself in the public ness and the idle talk of the 'they,' " Heidegger says, "Dasein fails to hear [ Oberhort] its own Self in listening to the they-self. " He continues: If Dasein is to be able to get brought back from this lostness of failing to hear itself, and if this is to be done through itself, then it must first be able to find
Q u esti o n i n g the Mach i n e Basis of
Questioning the Machine Basis of Techne * 107
itself-to find itself as something which has failed to hear itself, and which
fails to hear in that it listens away to the "they." This listening-away must get
broken off; in other words, the possibility of another kind of hearing which
will interrupt it, must be given by Dasein itself. The possibility of its thus get-
ting broken off lies in its being appealed to without mediation. Dasein fails
to hear itself, and listens away to the "they"; and this listening-away gets
broken by the call if that call, in accordance with its character as such,
arouses another kind of hearing, which, in relationship to the hearing that is
lost, has a character in every way opposite. If in this lost hearing, one has
been fascinated with the "hubbub" [vom Larm] of the manifold ambiguity
[Zweideutigkeit] which idle talk possesses in its everyday "newness" [des
alltaglich "neuen" Geredes], then the call must do its calling without any
hubbub and unambiguously, leaving no foothold for curiosity. (1962,
315-16/1986, 271; emphasis added)5
Given Heidegger's own catastrophic fall into the ontic-a fall mediated, as
Avital Ronell has shown, by his own fear and repression of the technologi-
cal-there is every reason to question the efficacy of such an exclusively the-
Techne
•
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itself-to find itself as something which has failed to hear itself, and which fails to hear in that it listens away to the " they. " This listening-away must get broken off; in other words, the possibility of another kind of hearing which will interrupt it, must be given by Dasein itself The possibility of its thus get ting broken off lies in its being appealed to without mediation. Dasein fails to hear itself, and listens away to the " they " ; and this listening-away gets broken by the call if that call, in accordance with its character as such, arouses another kind of hearing, which, in relationship to the hearing that is lost, has a character in every way opposite. If in this lost hearing, one has been fascinated with the " hubbub " [vom Uirm] of the manifold ambiguity [Zweideutigkeit] which idle talk possesses in its everyday " newness " [des alltaglich "neuen " Geredes], then the call must do its calling without any hubbub and unambiguously, leaving no foothold for curiosity. ( 1 962, 3 1 5-1 6/1 9 8 6 , 2 7 1 ; emphasis added)S
oretical solution.6 What we quickly discover in doing so is that Heidegger's
analysis of language (Rede) is absolutely powerless to insure the "breaking-
away" of Dasein from its everyday objects of desire. Though his formal-
ontological genealogy of language establishes the ontological priority of
authentic discourse (Rede) over mere speech (Sprache) and idle talk
(Gerede), ontology can provide no guarantee against the external danger
inherent in the everyday priority of these latter-the danger of a practical,
ontic co-optation of the "call of conscience" by the technological. While
Heidegger's dogmatic assertion of Dasein's power to overcome its fallenness
might effectively repress the priority of the ontic within the domain of his
theory, it can do no such thing at the level of the practical, where, I suggest,
ontic technology returns with a vengeance.
Heidegger's Ambivalence
To grasp the significance of ontic technology's return beyond its much
debated role in Heidegger's own fall into ontic politics, we must turn to the
later Heidegger's far more nuanced account of technology and specifically
to the central claim he makes in "The Question concerning Technology"
that the essence of technology "is in a lofty sense [in einem hohen Sinne]
ambiguous" (1977b, 33). The possibility of reconstructing and developing
the repressed ontic priority of technology hinges on our ability to demystify
Given Heidegger's own catastrophic fall into the ontic-a fall mediated, as Avital Ronell has shown, by his own fear and repression of the technologi cal-there is every reason to question the efficacy of such an exclusively the oretical solution.6 What we quickly discover in doing so is that Heidegger's analysis of language (Rede) is absolutely powerless to insure the " breaking away " of Dasein from its everyday obj ects of desire. Though his formal ontological genealogy of language establishes the ontological priority of authentic discourse (Rede) over mere speech (Sprache) and idle talk ( Gerede), ontology can provide no guarantee against the external danger inherent in the everyday priority of these latter-the danger of a practical, ontic co-optation of the " call of conscience " by the technological. While Heidegger's dogmatic assertion of Dasein's power to overcome its fallenness might effectively repress the priority of the ontic within the domain of his theory, it can do no such thing at the level of the practical, where, I suggest, ontic technology returns with a vengeance.
H eidegger' s Ambivalence
To grasp the significance of ontic technology'S return beyond its much debated role in Heidegger's own fall into ontic politics, we must turn to the later Heidegger's far more nuanced account of technology and specifically to the central claim he makes in "The Question concerning Technology" that the essence of technology "is in a lofty sense [in einem hohen Sinne] ambiguous " ( 1 9 77b, 3 3 ) . The possibility of reconstructing and developing the repressed ontic priority of technology hinges on our ability to demystify
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108 * Embodying Technesis
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Technesis
this claim, to recognize the fundamental limitation inherent in the very ter minology Heidegger employs to present the two poles of the ambiguity.
this claim, to recognize the fundamental limitation inherent in the very ter-
minology Heidegger employs to present the two poles of the ambiguity.
On the one hand, Enframing [das Gestell] challenges forth into the frenzied-
ness of ordering [das Rasende des Bestellens] that blocks every view into the
coming-to-pass of revealing and so radically [von Grund auf] endangers the
relation to the essence of truth [den Bezug zum Wesen der Wahrheit]. On the
other hand, Enframing comes to pass [ereignet sich] for its part in the grant-
ing that lets man endure.., that he may be the one who is needed and used
for the safekeeping of the coming to presence of truth [zur Wahrnis des
Wesens der Wahrheit]. (33/37)7
Against Heidegger's inclination to take this description as exhaustive of the
ontology of technology, we must stress its fundamental limitations. Since
On the one hand, Enframing [das Gestell] challenges forth into the frenzied ness of ordering [das Rasende des Bestellens] that blocks every view into the coming-to-pass of revealing and so radically [von Grund aufJ endangers the relation to the essence of truth [den Bezug zum Wesen der Wahrheit] . On the other hand, Enframing comes to pass [ereignet sich] for its part in the grant ing that lets man endure . . . that he may be the one who is needed and used for the safekeeping of the coming to presence of truth [zur Wahrnis des
Wesens der Wahrheit] . ( 3 3/3 7)?
both poles remain firmly within the space of an ontological hermeneutics in
which language is the site of truth, Heidegger's "lofty ambiguity," like the
ontological difference itself, presupposes a prior reduction of the ontic
domain, an act of translation in which a merely theoretical incompatibility
between two modes of thematizing technology takes the place of a real
conflict between technological materiality and thought. Since it strips tech-
nology of its exteriority and its material resistance to thought, this transla-
tion installs technesis as the enabling figure of Heidegger's account of tech-
nology.
Not surprisingly, this very same epoche of technological materiality
informs the poststructuralist reception of Heidegger and, through it, con-
temporary cultural studies of technology. By retaining the structure of Hei-
degger's account of technology, contemporary technocultural critics effec-
tively render themselves incapable of eschewing his reduction. Like
Heidegger's poststructuralist heirs, these critics are barred by their own
methodology from redeeming his prescient, if bleak, insight into technol-
ogy's radical and inhuman autonomy-the very insight whose foreclosure
comprises the enabling condition for constituting technology as "in a lofty
sense ambiguous."
Though Heidegger could never quite bring himself to face this prospect
without reduction, there are moments in his later career when he actually
comes close. In his 1966 interview with the German news magazine Der
Spiegel, for example, Heidegger contends that technology impinges directly
on the very possibility of thought itself not from within (as it does in the
figure of the supplement) but from without:8 "The modes of thinking
handed down by the metaphysical tradition, which concludes in the figure
of Nietzsche, no longer offer the possibility of reflectively experiencing
Against Heidegger's inclination to take this description as exhaustive of the ontology of technology, we must stress its fundamental limitations. Since both poles remain firmly within the space of an ontological hermeneutics in which language is the site of truth, Heidegger's " lofty ambiguity, " like the ontological difference itself, presupposes a prior reduction of the ontic domain, an act of translation in which a merely theoretical incompatibility between two modes of thematizing technology takes the place of a real conflict between technological materiality and thought. Since it strips tech nology of its exteriority and its material resistance to thought, this transla tion installs technesis as the enabling figure of Heidegger's account of tech nology. Not surprisingly, this very same epoche of technological materiality informs the post structuralist reception of Heidegger and, through it, con temporary cultural studies of technology. By retaining the structure of Hei degger's account of technology, contemporary techno cultural critics effec tively render themselves incapable of eschewing his reduction. Like Heidegger's poststructuralist heirs, these critics are barred by their own methodology from redeeming his prescient, if bleak, insight into technol ogy's radical and inhuman autonomy-the very insight whose foreclosure comprises the enabling condition for constituting technology as " in a lofty sense ambiguous . " Though Heidegger could never quite bring himself to face this prospect without reduction, there are moments in his later career when he actually comes close. In his 1 9 66 interview with the German news magazine Der Spiegel, for example, Heidegger contends that technology impinges directly on the very possibility of thought itself not from within (as it does in the figure of the supplement ) but from without: 8 "The modes of thinking handed down by the metaphysical tradition, which concludes in the figure of Nietzsche, no longer offer the possibility of reflectively experiencing
Q u esti o n i n g the Mach i n e Basis of
Techne
•
109
[denkend zu erfahren] the fundamental principle [Grundzug] of the emerg Questioning the Machine Basis of Techne * 109
[denkend zu erfahren] the fundamental principle [Grundzug] of the emerg-
ing technical age."9 Far from merely contaminating thought via its depen-
dance on language, Heidegger here suggests that technology imperils the
descriptive sway of discursive reason by producing a reality that exceeds the
onto-hermeneutical grasp of language. Unlike his poststructuralist disciples,
who fervently embrace the critical constraints imposed by the reign of rep-
resentational thought, Heidegger momentarily envisions (if only to dismiss)
the possibility of a more fundamental shift in the economy of our experi-
ence.
Because of the sustained, enabling privilege he grants language, however,
Heidegger was unable to cash in this insight. Like his disciples, he could not
see in technology anything other than a threat to the purity of language.
"Cybernetics," he contends in another late essay, "reconstructs language so
that it can function as an exchange of news [bildet die Sprache um zu einem
Austausch von Nachrichten]. The arts become stored and storing instru-
ments," (Heidegger 1977a, 376; translation modified). As a consequence,
the possibility of connecting thought with its primordial ground in the
ontology of truth is compromised: "'Theory' ['Theorie'] now means: sup-
position of the categories, which are restricted to a cybernetic function, but
denied any ontological significance [aber jeder ontologische Sinn abge-
sprochen wird]" (377). On such a view, technology's impact, which can
only be negative, stems exclusively from the way it effaces the deep onto-
logical significance of Vorhandenheit, or "presence-at-hand," the ontic cat-
egory Heidegger develops in Being and Time to describe the theoretical
being of a worldly object. What cybernetic technologies do is present the
being of language as mere words cut off from their connection with a
Bedeutungsganzheit, or "context of involvements." In this sense, what Hei-
degger says of the typewriter is all the more true of the computer: it "renders
language operational [die Sprache in Betrieb nimmt] and thus holds mastery
over [meistert] the essence of man" (Heidegger 1957, 28).10
Despite its very different tonality, this restriction of technology's impact
to its effect on language draws on and extends his early formative account
of Dasein's effort to gain knowledge of (or make explicit) its practical
engagement with technology. In Being and Time, Heidegger subordinates
Vorhandenheit to Zuhandenheit, the mode in which Dasein exists in its
average everydayness. One only becomes aware of the existence of a techni-
cal object (e.g., a hammer) when the object fails to function properly (e.g.,
when it is too heavy or breaks down). On Heidegger's account, while the
practical activity characteristic of the mode of Zuhandenheit is prior to and
ing technical age . ,, 9 Far from merely contaminating thought via its depen dance on language, Heidegger here suggests that technology imperils the descriptive sway of discursive reason by producing a reality that exceeds the onto-hermeneutical grasp of language. Unlike his post structuralist disciples, who fervently embrace the critical constraints imposed by the reign of rep resentational thought, Heidegger momentarily envisions (if only to dismiss) the possibility of a more fundamental shift in the economy of our experi ence. Because of the sustained, enabling privilege he grants language, however, Heidegger was unable to cash in this insight. Like his disciples, he could not see in technology anything other than a threat to the purity of language. " Cybernetics, " he contends in another late essay, " reconstructs language so that it can function as an exchange of news [bildet die Sprache um zu einem Austausch von Nachrichten] . The arts become stored and storing instru ments," (Heidegger 1 9 77a, 3 76; translation modified) . As a consequence, the possibility of connecting thought with its primordial ground in the ontology of truth is compromised: " 'Theory' ['Theorie'] now means: sup position of the categories, which are restricted to a cybernetic function, but denied any ontological significance [aber jeder ontologische Sinn abge sprochen wird] " ( 3 77 ) . On such a view, technology's impact, which can only be negative, stems exclusively from the way it effaces the deep onto logical significance of Vorhandenheit, or " presence-at-hand, " the ontic cat egory Heidegger develops in Being and Time to describe the theoretical being of a worldly obj ect. What cybernetic technologies do is present the being of language as mere words cut off from their connection with a Bedeutungsganzheit, or "context of involvements. " In this sense, what Hei degger says of the typewriter is all the more true of the computer: it " renders language operational [die Sprache in Betrieb nimmt] and thus holds mastery over [meistert] the essence of man" (Heidegger 1 957, 2 8 ) . 1 0 Despite its very different tonality, this restriction of technology's impact to its effect on language draws on and extends his early formative account of Dasein's effort to gain knowledge of (or make explicit) its practical engagement with technology. In Being and Time, Heidegger subordinates Vorhandenheit to Zuhandenheit, the mode in which Dasein exists in its average everydayness. One only becomes aware of the existence of a techni cal obj ect (e.g., a hammer) when the obj ect fails to function properly (e.g., when it is too heavy or breaks down ) . On Heidegger's account, while the practical activity characteristic of the mode of Zuhandenheit is prior to and
1 10
110 * Embodying Technesis
comprises a necessary background for the mode of theoretical knowing, one
can only encounter one's dependence on ontic technology-and thus only
assess the impact of technology on experience-by thematizing it in the
mode of Vorhandenheit. By instituting such a theoretical necessity, Heideg-
ger imposes a fundamental limitation on what counts as technology: only
those technologies that are or can be thematized in explicit terms can, on his
account, be understood to have a direct impact on our practical lives.
Left out of this scheme are two kinds of technologically mediated practi-
cal experiences that do not achieve the level of explicit thematization: (1)
experiences in which there is no breakdown and hence no motivating reason
to cross from the practical to the theoretical domain and (2) experiences in
which technology's impact (because it is molecular and diffuse) is in princi-
ple not recuperable through thematization. To assess these two kinds of
experiences, we must break with the cognitive focus of Heidegger's analysis
and articulate a bodily hermeneutics-a robust mode of understanding able
to encompass the unthematized, corporeal dimensions of our embodied
lives.11 Without in any way endorsing Heidegger's paranoia about technol-
ogy, we must radicalize his muted concern at the fundamental incapacity of
Western metaphysics to facilitate what Heidegger, in his monumental
Nietszche (1961), calls a "thinking experience" (denkende Erfahrung) of
modern technology. By acknowledging the eclipse of language as the domi-
nant experiential faculty, we can bring the deep ambivalence of Heidegger's
project to the fore and take stock of the cost, as it were, of his stubborn
commitment to the motif of the ontological difference: simply stated, Hei-
degger's logocentrism prevents him from capitalizing on-let alone recog-
nizing the importance of-the fundamental shift in the economy of experi-
ence toward which his late work gestures.
While Heidegger attributed the ontological difference to (his reconstruc-
tion of) pre-Socratic Greek thought, it appears, when seen in historical hind-
sight, to owe much more to an ontic, and thus (in his terms) inauthentic,
fear of technology. Accordingly, Heidegger's explicit characterization of
technology as "in a lofty sense ambiguous" should be viewed as a protective
measure designed to ward off the threat of a more fundamental
modification of our mode of being, one that would destroy the gains of his
life's work. Yet because technology's actual ontic effects are entirely unaf-
fected by the theoretical reduction, the threat of technological autonomy-
precisely the dreaded object of Heidegger's fear-remains very much alive;
in the contemporary world, this threatened autonomy takes the form of an
insistent revenge of the real operated through our profound addiction to
commodified technologies.
•
Em bod y i n g
Technesis
comprises a necessary background for the mode of theoretical knowing, one can only encounter one's dependence on ontic technology-and thus only assess the impact of technology on experience-by thematizing it in the mode of Vorhandenheit. By instituting such a theoretical necessity, Heideg ger imposes a fundamental limitation on what counts as technology: only those technologies that are or can be thematized in explicit terms can, on his account, be understood to have a direct impact on our practical lives. Left out of this scheme are two kinds of technologically mediated practi cal experiences that do not achieve the level of explicit thematization: ( 1 ) experiences in which there is no breakdown and hence no motivating reason to cross from the practical to the theoretical domain and (2) experiences in which technology's impact (because it is molecular and diffuse) is in princi ple not recuperable through thematization. To assess these two kinds of experiences, we must break with the cognitive focus of Heidegger's analysis and articulate a bodily hermeneutics-a robust mode of understanding able to encompass the unthematized, corporeal dimensions of our embodied lives . l l Without in any way endorsing Heidegger's paranoia about technol ogy, we must radicalize his muted concern at the fundamental incapacity of Western metaphysics to facilitate what Heidegger, in his monumental Nietszche ( 1 9 6 1 ) , calls a " thinking experience " ( denkende Erfahrung) of modern technology. By acknowledging the eclipse of language as the domi nant experiential faculty, we can bring the deep ambivalence of Heidegger's proj ect to the fore and take stock of the cost, as it were, of his stubborn commitment to the motif of the ontological difference: simply stated, Hei degger's logocentrism prevents him from capitalizing on-let alone recog nizing the importance of-the fundamental shift in the economy of experi ence toward which his late work gestures . While Heidegger attributed the ontological difference t o (his reconstruc tion of) pre-Socratic Greek thought, it appears, when seen in historical hind sight, to owe much more to an ontic, and thus (in his terms) inauthentic, fear of technology. Accordingly, Heidegger's explicit characterization of technology as " in a lofty sense ambiguous " should be viewed as a protective measure designed to ward off the threat of a more fundamental modification of our mode of being, one that would destroy the gains of his life's work. Yet because technology's actual ontic effects are entirely unaf fected by the theoretical reduction, the threat of technological autonomy precisely the dreaded obj ect of Heidegger's fear-remains very much alive; in the contemporary world, this threatened autonomy takes the form of an insistent revenge of the real operated through our profound addiction to commodified technologies.
Q u esti o n i n g the Mach i n e Basis of
Questioning the Machine Basis of Techne * 111
Acknowledging this material revenge allows us to deflate Heidegger's
claim for the archaic priority of ontology. Like Aristotle's reading of the
automatic, such a claim imposes a reduction of technology that both enables
the command of philosophical description over the real yet is thoroughly
reductive-and also thoroughly impotent-in light of the robust materiality
of the technological real. This effectively means, then, that the most famous
motif of Heidegger's thought might turn out to owe more to a strategic deci-
sion than to any philosophical necessity. Just as Aristotle strategically
employs a theoretical hierarchy to domesticate the excess of the automatic,
Heidegger strategically fetishizes language as the locus of Being to bracket
out the ontic priority of technology. Far from the primordial and enabling
motif he claims it to be, the ontological difference is thus itself conditioned
by something "older" than and prior to it: the dogmatic reduction of tech-
nology to the purely instrumental status of the machine.12
The Machine
Heidegger's deeply paradoxical claim concerning the devastation wrought
by technology in the twentieth century follows directly from this reduction
of technology to instrumental status.
[Technology's] threat to man does not come in the first instance from the
Techne
•
111
Acknowledging this material revenge allows u s t o deflate Heidegger's claim for the archaic priority of ontology. Like Aristotle's reading of the automatic, such a claim imposes a reduction of technology that both enables the command of philosophical description over the real yet is thoroughly reductive-and also thoroughly impotent-in light of the robust materiality of the technological real. This effectively means, then, that the most famous motif of Heidegger's thought might turn out to owe more to a strategic deci sion than to any philosophical necessity. Just as Aristotle strategically employs a theoretical hierarchy to domesticate the excess of the automatic, Heidegger strategically fetishizes language as the locus of Being to bracket out the ontic priority of technology. Far from the primordial and enabling motif he claims it to be, the ontological difference is thus itself conditioned by something " older " than and prior to it: the dogmatic reduction of tech nology to the purely instrumental status of the machine.12
potentially lethal machines and apparatus [todlich wirkenden Maschinen
und Apparaturen] of technology. The actual threat [Die eigentliche Bedro-
hung] has already affected man in his essence. The rule of the Enframing [Die
Herrschaft des Gestells] threatens man with the possibility that it could be
denied to him to enter into a more original revealing [Entbergen] and hence
The M achine
to experience the call [Zuspruch] of a more primal truth. (1977b, 28/1954,
32)
Despite its undeniable perversity, we must acknowledge that this claim
obeys a logic that is absolutely central to the humanist tradition of Western
thought. By celebrating the priority of the human over the technological, of
the essential over the derivative, Heidegger paradoxically reinforces the
Heidegger's deeply paradoxical claim concerning the devastation wrought by technology in the twentieth century follows directly from this reduction of technology to instrumental status.
humanism that he otherwise so insistently rejects: as long as technology is
defined as merely machinic-as wholly dependant on Dasein for its being-
it remains purely instrumental and (always potentially) subject to human
control.
The significance of this paradox cannot be emphasized enough, for it
demonstrates the enduring sway exercised by Heidegger's early reduction of
technology to the figure of the machine. Far from marking a break with fun-
[Technology's] threat to man does not come in the first instance from the potentially lethal machines and apparatus [todlich wirkenden Maschinen und Apparaturen] of technology. The actual threat [Die eigentliche Bedro hung] has already affected man in his essence . The rule of the Enframing [Die Herrschaft des Gestells] threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing [Entbergen] and hence to experience the call [Zuspruch] of a more primal truth. ( 1 9 77b, 2 8/1 954, 32)
Despite its undeniable perversity, we must acknowledge that this claim obeys a logic that is absolutely central to the humanist tradition of Western thought. By celebrating the priority of the human over the technological, of the essential over the derivative, Heidegger paradoxically reinforces the humanism that he otherwise so insistently rejects: as long as technology is defined as merely machinic-as wholly dependant on Dasein for its being it remains purely instrumental and ( always potentially) subj ect to human control. The significance of this paradox cannot be emphasized enough, for it demonstrates the enduring sway exercised by Heidegger's early reduction of technology to the figure of the machine. Far from marking a break with fun-
112
112 * Embodying Technesis
damental ontology, the later Heidegger's famous division of technology is in
fact thoroughly dependent on his early, seldom discussed instrumental
definition of the machine.13 In a lecture course of 1929-30, The Fundamen-
tal Principles of Phenomenology, Heidegger explicitly likens machine tech-
nologies to tools: "The machine is a tool [Zeug] and as such is 'serviceable
for' [dienlich zu] . . ." (Heidegger 1981, 315). The type of being accorded
machines-Dienlichkeit, or "serviceability"-squares perfectly with the
account of Zuhandenheit from Being and Time; like the hammer, with
which we engage first and for the most part in a practical mode, the machine
is a use object and becomes the explicit theme of theoretical discourse only
when it breaks down. In accord with this homology, we can thus conclude
that Heidegger's early determination of the machine respects the founda-
tional privilege of Dasein; like all tools, the machine requires a "manufac-
turing by men" (Erzeugnis von Menschen) and, more importantly, is depen-
dant for its very existence on the activity of a questioning Being: ". . . the
manufacture of tools," Heidegger says unequivocally, "is only possible on
the basis of what we call Weltbildung" (313).
In assimilating the machine to the tool, Heidegger effectively expands the
sway of the restriction Being and Time placed on our assessment of tech-
nology's impact; like the prototypical tool (the hammer), the machine can
only be made thematically available to us as Vorhandenheit. Through this
assimilation, Heidegger effectively pigeonholes the machine as an instru-
mentalist mode of revealing that owes its existence to the constitutive con-
cern of Dasein or the world-disclosing power of language. Moreover, the
reduction of machine to tool lies behind Heidegger's later splitting of tech-
nology into essential (linguistic) and nonessential (nonlinguistic) dimen-
sions; by generating a category for what he later comes to call the "merely
technical" (das Technische), this assimilation of machine to tool effectively
serves as the foil against which the essential status of technology as techne
can emerge (1977b).
Indeed, this assimilation itself ultimately underwrites the central motif of
Heidegger's questioning after technology: the much debated purity of
techne, the essence of technology. Heidegger models his machine reduction
of technology on the assimilation of machine to tool; like any tool, the
machine is constituted by the passage from Zuhandenheit to Vorhanden-
heit. With this restriction of technology to the figure of the machine, he ties
technology's efficacy to the world-disclosing activity of Dasein or language,
thereby purchasing, as it were, the right to domesticate the radical material
exteriority of technology. The priority Heidegger places on ontology thus
•
Em bod y i n g
Technesis
damental ontology, the later Heidegger's famous division of technology is in fact thoroughly dependent on his early, seldom discussed instrumental definition of the machine. 1 3 In a lecture course of 1 929-3 0, The Fundamen tal Principles of Phenomenology, Heidegger explicitly likens machine tech nologies to tools: "The machine is a tool [Zeug] and as such is ' serviceable for' [dienlich zu] . . . " (Heidegger 1 9 8 1 , 3 1 5 ) . The type of being accorded machines-Dienlichkeit, or " serviceability "-squares perfectly with the account of Zuhandenheit from Being and Time; like the hammer, with which we engage first and for the most part in a practical mode, the machine is a use obj ect and becomes the explicit theme of theoretical discourse only when it breaks down. In accord with this homology, we can thus conclude that Heidegger's early determination of the machine respects the founda tional privilege of Dasein; like all tools, the machine requires a " manufac turing by men " (Erzeugnis von Menschen) and, more importantly, is depen dant for its very existence on the activity of a questioning Being: " . . . the manufacture of tools, " Heidegger says unequivocally, "is only possible on the basis of what we call Weltbildung" ( 3 1 3 ) . In assimilating the machine to the tool, Heidegger effectively expands the sway of the restriction Being and Time placed on our assessment of tech nology's impact; like the prototypical tool (the hammer) , the machine can only be made thematically available to us as Vorhandenheit. Through this assimilation, Heidegger effectively pigeonholes the machine as an instru mentalist mode of revealing that owes its existence to the constitutive con cern of Dasein or the world-disclosing power of language. Moreover, the reduction of machine to tool lies behind Heidegger's later splitting of tech nology into essential (linguistic ) and nonessential (nonlinguistic) dimen sions; by generating a category for what he later comes to call the " merely technical " (das Technische), this assimilation of machine to tool effectively serves as the foil against which the essential status of technology as techne can emerge ( 1 977b ) . Indeed, this assimilation itself ultimately underwrites the central motif of Heidegger's questioning after technology: the much debated purity of techne, the essence of technology. Heidegger models his machine reduction of technology on the assimilation of machine to tool; like any tool, the machine is constituted by the passage from Zuhandenheit to Vorhanden heit. With this restriction of technology to the figure of the machine, he ties technology's efficacy to the world-disclosing activity of Dasein or language, thereby purchasing, as it were, the right to domesticate the radical material exteriority of technology. The priority Heidegger places on ontology thus
Q u esti o n i n g the Mach i n e Basis of
Questioning the Machine Basis of Techne * 113
allows him to enact a sweeping two-part, theoretical metalepsis: only after
violently reducing the ontic priority of technology is he able to establish that
language furnishes the ground for whatever relationship we have with tech-
nology; yet once he imposes this reduction, ontic technology is accorded a
status only through the thus secured ontological standpoint, effectively
insuring that it can only have the derivative status he grants it. As an instru-
mental machine, technology is made to depend for its very existence on the
"world-forming" (weltbildend) power of an agent of thought (1981). And
since thought hereby attains the status of efficient cause, Heidegger's doubly
reductive move effectively installs representation in the place of production
and description in the place of the real.
Aristotle and to automaton
The very same metaleptic strategy informs Heidegger's rereading of Aristo-
tle's doctrine of causality in "The Question concerning Technology."
Techne
•
113
allows him t o enact a sweeping two-part, theoretical metalepsis: only after violently reducing the ontic priority of technology is he able to establish that language furnishes the ground for whatever relationship we have with tech nology; yet once he imposes this reduction, ontic technology is accorded a status only through the thus secured ontological standpoint, effectively insuring that it can only have the derivative status he grants it. As an instru mental machine, technology is made to depend for its very existence on the " world-forming " (weltbildend) power of an agent of thought ( 1 9 8 1 ) . And since thought hereby attains the status of efficient cause, Heidegger's doubly reductive move effectively installs representation in the place of production and description in the place of the real.
According to Heidegger, this doctrine has dominated man's thinking about
causality since Aristotle; in its wake, the essential meaning of cause as "that
to which something else is indebted" [das, was ein anderes verschuldet] has
been covered over by a merely instrumental definition (Heidegger 1977b,
7/1954, 12). To correct this instrumentalist reduction, we must ask after the
meaning of the term cause itself, with an eye to discovering what Heidegger
Aristotle and
to automaton
calls the "unifiedly determined" causal character of the four causes, that
which allows them to "belong together" (7/12). Heidegger finds this deeper
meaning in the hermeneutic function he substitutes for Aristotle's efficient
cause.
Finally there is a fourth participant in the responsibility for the finished
sacrificial vessel's lying before us ready for use, i.e., the silversmith-but not
at all because he, in working, brings about the finished sacrificial chalice as if
it were the effect of a making; the silversmith is not a causa efficiens. The
Aristotelian doctrine neither knows the cause that is named by this term nor
uses a Greek word that would correspond to it. The silversmith considers
carefully and gathers together the three aforementioned ways of being
responsible and indebted. To consider carefully [iberlegen] is in Greek leg-
ein, logos. Legein is rooted in apophainesthai, to bring forward into appear-
ance. The silversmith is co-responsible as that from whence the sacrificial ves-
sel's bringing forth and resting-in-self take and retain their first departure.
The three previously mentioned ways of being responsible [formal, material,
The very same metaleptic strategy informs Heidegger' s rereading of Aristo tle's doctrine of causality in "The Question concerning Technology. " According to Heidegger, this doctrine has dominated man's thinking about causality since Aristotle; in its wake, the essential meaning of cause as " that to which something else is indebted" [das, was ein anderes verschuldet] has been covered over by a merely instrumental definition (Heidegger 1 9 77b, 7/1 954, 1 2 ) . To correct this instrumentalist reduction, we must ask after the meaning of the term cause itself, with an eye to discovering what Heidegger calls the " unifiedly determined " causal character of the four causes, that which allows them to " belong together " ( 7/1 2 ) . Heidegger finds this deeper meaning in the hermeneutic function he substitutes for Aristotle's efficient cause. Finally there is a fourth participant in the responsibility for the finished sacrificial vessel's lying before us ready for use, i . e . , the silversmith-but not at all because he, in working, brings about the finished sacrificial chalice as if it were the effect of a making; the silversmith is not a causa efficiens. The Aristotelian doctrine neither knows the cause that is named by this term nor uses a Greek word that would correspond to it. The silversmith considers carefully and gathers together the three aforementioned ways of being responsible and indebted. To consider carefully [iiberlegen] is in Greek leg ein, logos. Legein is rooted in apophainesthai, to bring forward into appear ance . The silversmith is co-responsible as that from whence the sacrificial ves sel's bringing forth and resting-in-self take and retain their first departure. The three previously mentioned ways of being responsible [formal, material,
114
114 * Embodying Technesis
final causes] owe thanks to the pondering of the silversmith for the "that"
•
Em bod y i n g
Technesis
final causes] owe thanks to the pondering of the silversmith for the " that " and the " how" of this coming into appearance and into play for the produc tion of the sacrificial vessel. ( 8/1 3 )
and the "how" of this coming into appearance and into play for the produc-
tion of the sacrificial vessel. (8/13)
In the context of my argument, this allegedly fundamental philosophical
intervention underwrites what is in effect a mere reversal. Because it leaves
intact the broader foundation of Aristotle's doctrine-the purely instrumen-
tal determination of (ontic) technology-Heidegger's ontologizing of
efficient causality does nothing to surmount Aristotle's restricted view of it
as a supplement to physis. In both cases, something that has causal force
outside of any secured hermeneutic space is metaleptically translated into a
mere derivative effect of a constitutive act of thought.
The parallel with Aristotle helps to contextualize what is at stake in Hei-
degger's (failed) effort to capture ontic technology within an onto-
hermeneutic frame of reference. Just as so-called automatic events refuse the
subordination Aristotle submits them to, industrial and electronic technolo-
gies exceed the space of the epoche Heidegger imposes on them. Yet since
the materiality at stake in these latter is active or productive at the level of
the real, they operate a revenge of the real that literally explodes the prior-
ity Heidegger lends ontology. This revenge takes place as a kind of
autonomous deconstruction
that puts into practice something like
Emmanuel Levinas's (still essentially theoretical) critique of fundamental
ontology for "subordinat[ing] the relation with someone who is a being (the
ethical relation) to a relation with the Being of being which, because it is
impersonal, permits the capture, the domination of being (in a theoretical
relation [une relation de savoir])" (Levinas 1971, 36). Effectuated in this
way Levinas's critique calls on us to recognize the practical or ethical imma-
nence of contemporary technology within the real. Indeed, the resulting
revenge of the real operates a mundane equivalent of what arms-race spe-
cialists call "technology creep"-"the uncontrollable surging ahead of
invention [or simply of technical mediation] past all attempts to predict it or
legislate it" (Brand 1987, 19). Such a revenge perfectly instantiates the cat-
egory of "technological drift" that political philosopher Langdon Winner
coins to describe such unintended consequences of technological innova-
tion. More precisely, the revenge of the technological real instantiates Win-
ner's twofold notion of technological drift as a designation for the "preg-
nant possibilities" accompanying new technologies in the early phases of
their dissemination as well as the particular autonomy of technology, the
"life of its own" that any given technology possesses "as it finds its way into
the complex sphere of social practice" (Winner 1977, 92-93).
In the context o f my argument, this allegedly fundamental philosophical intervention underwrites what is in effect a mere reversal. Because it leaves intact the broader foundation of Aristotle's doctrine-the purely instrumen tal determination of ( ontic) technology-Heidegger's ontologizing of efficient causality does nothing to surmount Aristotle's restricted view of it as a supplement to physis. In both cases, something that has causal force outside of any secured hermeneutic space is metaleptically translated into a mere derivative effect of a constitutive act of thought. The parallel with Aristotle helps to contextualize what is at stake in Hei degger's ( failed) effort to capture ontic technology within an onto hermeneutic frame of reference. Just as so-called automatic events refuse the subordination Aristotle submits them to, industrial and electronic technolo gies exceed the space of the epoche Heidegger imposes on them. Yet since the materiality at stake in these latter is active or productive at the level of the real, they operate a revenge of the real that literally explodes the prior ity Heidegger lends ontology. This revenge takes place as a kind of autonomous deconstruction that puts into practice something like Emmanuel Levinas 's ( still essentially theoretical ) critique of fundamental ontology for " subordinat [ing] the relation with someone who is a being (the ethical relation) to a relation with the Being of being which, because it is impersonal, permits the capture, the domination of being ( in a theoretical relation [une relation de savoir] ) " (Levinas 1 9 7 1 , 3 6 ) . Effectuated in this way Levinas's critique calls on us to recognize the practical or ethical imma nence of contemporary technology within the real. Indeed, the resulting revenge of the real operates a mundane equivalent of what arms-race spe cialists call " technology creep "-"the uncontrollable surging ahead of invention [or simply of technical mediation] past all attempts to predict it or legislate it" ( Brand 1 9 8 7, 1 9 ) . Such a revenge perfectly instantiates the cat egory of " technological drift " that political philosopher Langdon Winner coins to describe such unintended consequences of technological innova tion. More precisely, the revenge of the technological real instantiates Win ner's twofold notion of technological drift as a designation for the " preg nant possibilities" accompanying new technologies in the early phases of their dissemination as well as the particular autonomy of technology, the " life of its own " that any given technology possesses "as it finds its way into the complex sphere of social practice " (Winner 1 9 77, 92-93 ) .
Q u esti o n i n g the Mach i n e Basis of
Production and
Techne
•
115
Poiesis
Questioning the Machine Basis of Techne * 115
Production and Poiesis
In "The Question concerning Technology," we find another, more sophisti-
cated version of this same metaleptic reduction, one that foregrounds Hei-
degger's paradigmatic identification of technology (techne) with poiesis:
"Technology is a way of revealing.... Techne belongs to bringing-forth, to
poiesis; it is something poietic" (Heidegger 1977b, 13/1954, 16). By explic-
itly identifying production with the Greek notion of poiesis, Heidegger
effectively covers over the reduction of ontic technology that renders plausi-
ble his ontological approach to technology: once installed as the category
for thinking technology, poiesis limits the domain of what counts as tech-
nology to what can be constituted through onto-hermeneutics, whether an
onto-hermeneutics of Dasein (early Heidegger) or of language itself (late
Heidegger). In this sense, the identification of production with poiesis is not
fundamental, as Heidegger claims, but rather, like the more general priority
of ontology, thoroughly dependent on a prior reduction of ontic technology.
The immediate motive for Heidegger's identification of technological
production with poiesis stems, as one recent commentator suggests, from
his understanding of Greek metaphysics: "The Greek founders of meta-
physics defined the being of entities in a proto-technological way. For them,
'to be' meant 'to be produced.' Hence, according to Heidegger, the history
of metaphysics became the history of the unfolding of productionist meta-
physics" (Zimmerman 1990, xv). Insofar as he concurs with Plato in
defining poiesis as the bringing-forth of "what passes over and goes forward
into presencing from that which is not presencing" (Symposium 205b; Hei-
degger's translation [1977b, 10/1954, 13]), Heidegger contributes to the
deep hold that Greek poietic ontology exercises over Western metaphysics.
Indeed, precisely this Heideggerian appropriation of the term productionist
as a translation for poiesis informs the modern repression of productive
materiality: in its wake, production is simply narrowed to fit within the poi-
etic model. Faced with this reduction, we must insist on a fundamental dif-
ference between Greek and modern technology. Whereas poiesis could
coherently be applied to the forms of production known to the Greeks
("handcraft manufacture," "artistic and poetical bringing into appearance
and concrete imagery," and physis [1977b, 10/1954, 13]), it simply cannot
be extended to cover the category of modern production. By claiming that
"[t]he possibility of all productive manufacturing lies in revealing," Heideg-
ger violently restricts the scope of production to a model utterly incapable
of accounting for (a large share of) the impact of modern and postmodern
technology (1977b, 12/1954, 15). Moreover, Heidegger's attempt to suture
In "The Question concerning Technology, " we find another, more sophisti cated version of this same metaleptic reduction, one that foregrounds Hei degger's paradigmatic identification of technology (techne) with poiesis: " Technology is a way of revealing . . . . Techne belongs to bringing-forth, to poiesis; it is something poietic" (Heidegger 1 9 77b, 1 3/1 954, 1 6 ) . By explic itly identifying production with the Greek notion of poiesis, Heidegger effectively covers over the reduction of ontic technology that renders plausi ble his ontological approach to technology: once installed as the category for thinking technology, poiesis limits the domain of what counts as tech nology to what can be constituted through onto-hermeneutics, whether an onto-hermeneutics of Dasein (early Heidegger) or of language itself (late Heidegger) . In this sense, the identification of production with poiesis is not fundamental, as Heidegger claims, but rather, like the more general priority of ontology, thoroughly dependent on a prior reduction of ontic technology. The immediate motive for Heidegger's identification of technological production with poiesis stems, as one recent commentator suggests, from his understanding of Greek metaphysics : "The Greek founders of meta physics defined the being of entities in a proto-technological way. For them, 'to be' meant 'to be produced . ' Hence, according to Heidegger, the history of metaphysics became the history of the unfolding of productionist meta physics" (Zimmerman 1 9 90, xv) . Insofar as he concurs with Plato in defining poiesis as the bringing-forth of "what passes over and goes forward into presencing from that which is not presencing " (Symposium 205b; Hei degger's translation [1 977b, 1 0/1 954, 1 3 ] ) , Heidegger contributes to the deep hold that Greek poietic ontology exercises over Western metaphysics. Indeed, precisely this Heideggerian appropriation of the term productionist as a translation for poiesis informs the modern repression of productive materiality: in its wake, production is simply narrowed to fit within the poi etic model. Faced with this reduction, we must insist on a fundamental dif ference between Greek and modern technology. Whereas poiesis could coherently be applied to the forms of production known to the Greeks ( " handcraft manufacture, " " artistic and poetical bringing into appearance and concrete imagery, " and physis [ 1 977b, 1 0/1 954, 1 3 ] ) , it simply cannot be extended to cover the category of modern production. By claiming that " [t]he possibility of all productive manufacturing lies in revealing, " Heideg ger violently restricts the scope of production to a model utterly incapable of accounting for (a large share of) the impact of modern and postmodern technology ( 1 977b, 1 2/1954, 1 5 ) . Moreover, Heidegger's attempt to suture
116
116 * Embodying Technesis
the gap separating ancient and modern ontology by determining production
as poiesis appears to compromise his crucial claim regarding the fundamen-
tal singularity of modern technology.
As is so often the case with Heidegger, this apparent contradiction points
to a deeper unity that invokes the seemingly all-powerful figure of the onto-
logical difference: ancient and modern technologies are ontically distinct
even though they share a common (ontological) essence. Consider, for
example, the important passage where Heidegger connects the enframing
[das Gestell], his term for modern technology's hold on Being, with poiesis.
The word stellen [to set upon] in the name Ge-stell [enframing] not only
means challenging. At the same time it should preserve the suggestion of
•
Em bod y i n g
Technesis
the gap separating ancient and modern ontology by determining production as poiesis appears to compromise his crucial claim regarding the fundamen tal singularity of modern technology. As is so often the case with Heidegger, this apparent contradiction points to a deeper unity that invokes the seemingly all-powerful figure of the onto logical difference: ancient and modern technologies are ontically distinct even though they share a common (ontological) essence. Consider, for example, the important passage where Heidegger connects the enframing [das Gestell] , his term for modern technology's hold on Being, with poiesis.
another Stellen from which it stems, namely, that producing and presenting
[Her- und Dar-stellen] which, in the sense of poiesis, lets what presences
come forth into unconcealment. This producing that brings forth-e.g., the
erecting of a statue in the temple precinct-and the challenging ordering now
under consideration are indeed fundamentally different [grundverschieden],
and yet they remain related in their essence [im Wesen verwandt]. Both are
ways of revealing, of aletheia. (1977b, 21/1954, 24)
Despite an allegedly fundamental difference, challenging-forth and bring-
ing-forth-into-concealment are, Heidegger seems to be saying, at a deeper
(i.e., ontological) level, effectively the same.
What is the sense of this equivocation? How can modern technology be
simultaneously non-poietic and yet ultimately a mode of poiesis? How, fur-
thermore, can we reconcile this claim with Heidegger's earlier articulated
commitment to the view that modern technology "does not unfold into a
The word stellen [to set upon] in the name Ge-stell [enframing] not only means challenging. At the same time it should preserve the suggestion of another Stellen from which it stems, namely, that producing and presenting [Her- und Dar-stellen] which, in the sense of poiesis, lets what presences come forth into unconcealment. This producing that brings forth-e.g., the erecting of a statue in the temple precinct-and the challenging ordering now under consideration are indeed fundamentally different [grundverschieden] , and yet they remain related in their essence [ im Wesen verwandt] . Both are ways of revealing, of aletheia. ( 1 9 77b, 2 1/1954, 24)
bringing-forth in the sense of poiesis" (14/18)? Is this just carelessness on
Heidegger's part, or can we read in it the traces of a deeper, structural
conflict-of a prior commitment to a model of technology wholly incapable
of accounting for the alleged singularity of modern technology?
To address these questions, we must explore the notion of Herausfordern
(challenging-forth) that Heidegger introduces to characterize the mandate
behind modern technology, the "stockpiling" (Lagern) or placing "on call"
(zur Stelle) of energy as the "standing-reserve" (Bestand). Herausfordern
characterizes what I shall call the storage model of technology, a model
whose essential feature is the bending of natural force to unnatural (i.e.,
non-poietic) ends.
The revealing that rules in modern technology is a challenging [Heraus-
fordern], which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply
energy that can be extracted and stored as such. But does this not hold true
for the old windmill as well? No. . . . [T]he windmill does not unlock
Despite an allegedly fundamental difference, challenging-forth and bring ing-forth-into-concealment are, Heidegger seems to be saying, at a deeper (i.e., ontological ) level, effectively the same. What is the sense of this equivocation ? How can modern technology be simultaneously non-poietic and yet ultimately a mode of poiesis ? How, fur thermore, can we reconcile this claim with Heidegger's earlier articulated commitment to the view that modern technology " does not unfold into a bringing-forth in the sense of poiesis " ( 1 4/1 8 ) ? Is this just carelessness on Heidegger's part, or can we read in it the traces of a deeper, structural conflict-of a prior commitment to a model of technology wholly incapable of accounting for the alleged singularity of modern technology ? To address these questions, we must explore the notion of Herausfordern (challenging-forth ) that Heidegger introduces to characterize the mandate behind modern technology, the " stockpiling" (Lagern) or placing " on call " (zur Stelle) of energy as the " standing-reserve " (Bestand) . Herausfordern characterizes what I shall call the storage model of technology, a model whose essential feature is the bending of natural force to unnatural (i.e., non-poietic ) ends. The revealing that rules in modern technology is a challenging [Heraus fordern] , which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy that can be extracted and stored as such. But does this not hold true for the old windmill as well ? No . . . . [T]he windmill does not unlock
Q u esti o n i n g the Mach i n e Basis of
Questioning the Machine Basis of Techne * 117
[erschliesst] energy from the air currents [Energien der Luftstromung] in
order to store it [umrn sie zu speichern]. In contrast, a tract of land is chal-
lenged into the putting out of coal and ore. The earth now reveals itself as a
coal mining district, the soil as a mineral deposit. The field that the peasant
formerly cultivated and set in order [bestellte] appears differently than it did
when to set in order still meant to take care of and to maintain. The work of
the peasant does not challenge the soil of the field. In the sowing of the grain
it places the seed in the keeping of the forces of growth [Wachstumkrdiften]
and watches over its increase. But meanwhile even the cultivation of the field
has come under the grip of another kind of setting-in-order, which sets upon
[stellt] nature. It sets upon it in the sense of challenging it. Agriculture is now
the mechanized food industry. Air is now set upon to yield nitrogen, the earth
to yield ore, ore to yield uranium . . . ; uranium is set upon to yield atomic
energy... (14-15/18-19)
In the very act of instituting a fundamental distinction between the two
technological modes of storage and translation, this passage inscribes an
essential duplicity into the key notion of Heidegger's theory of technology:
Techne
•
117
[erschliesst] energy from the air currents [Energien der Luftstromung] in order to store it [um sie zu speichern] . In contrast, a tract of land is chal lenged into the putting out of coal and ore . The earth now reveals itself as a coal mining district, the soil as a mineral deposit. The field that the peasant formerly cultivated and set in order [bestellte] appears differently than it did when to set in order still meant to take care of and to maintain. The work of the peasant does not challenge the soil of the field. In the sowing of the grain it places the seed in the keeping of the forces of growth [ Wachstumkra(ten] and watches over its increase. But meanwhile even the cultivation of the field has come under the grip of another kind of setting-in-order, which sets upon [stellt] nature. It sets upon it in the sense of challenging it. Agriculture is now the mechanized food industry. Air is now set upon to yield nitrogen, the earth to yield ore, ore to yield uranium . . . ; uranium is set upon to yield atomic energy . . . ( 1 4-1 5/1 8-1 9 )
Herausfordern is made to designate both a mode of production unique to
modernity and a mode of revealing like any other. In so doing, Heidegger
perpetuates and in fact greatly expands the sway of his early subordination
of technology (as Zuhandenheit) to the world-disclosing power of Dasein:
he sacrifices his claim regarding the difference of modern technology in
order to champion an allegedly more basic ontological unity of production
as such. With this "choice," Heidegger effectively exposes the instrumental-
ist basis of his interest in technology: for him, technology is nothing more
than a stepping-stone toward a discussion of humanity's peculiar ontologi-
cal predicament in the modern age, a predicament that-Heidegger takes
great pains to stress-is in no way essentially technological.
As we might expect, however, Heidegger is able to downplay the para-
dox that ensues from the duplicity of Herausfordern. By playing his onto-
logical trump card once again, he introduces a covertly operating distinction
between two basic registers of poiesis: (1) poiesis as a description of pro-
duction-the production of presencing-as such and (2) poiesis as a nar-
rower category of production in harmony with the presencing of physis.
This key distinction allows Heidegger to maintain the ontic singularity of
modern technology without abandoning
his primordial ontological
identification of production and poiesis. Viewed against the narrow register
of poiesis, Herausfordern presents a radically new mode of production; cir-
cumscribed by the broader register of poiesis, by contrast, it shows itself to
possess a fundamental kinship with Hervorbringen, since both are, essen-
tially, modes of revealing.
I n the very act o f instituting a fundamental distinction between the two technological modes of storage and translation, this passage inscribes an essential duplicity into the key notion of Heidegger's theory of technology: Herausfordern is made to designate both a mode of production unique to modernity and a mode of revealing like any other. In so doing, Heidegger perpetuates and in fact greatly expands the sway of his early subordination of technology (as Zuhandenheit) to the world-disclosing power of Dasein: he sacrifices his claim regarding the difference of modern technology in order to champion an allegedly more basic ontological unity of production as such. With this "choice," Heidegger effectively exposes the instrumental ist basis of his interest in technology: for him, technology is nothing more than a stepping-stone toward a discussion of humanity's peculiar ontologi cal predicament in the modern age, a predicament that-Heidegger takes great pains to stress-is in no way essentially technological. As we might expect, however, Heidegger is able to downplay the para dox that ensues from the duplicity of Herausfordern. By playing his onto logical trump card once again, he introduces a covertly operating distinction between two basic registers of poiesis: ( 1 ) poiesis as a description of pro duction-the production of presencing-as such and (2) poiesis as a nar rower category of production in harmony with the presencing of physis. This key distinction allows Heidegger to maintain the ontic singularity of modern technology without abandoning his primordial ontological identification of production and poiesis. Viewed against the narrow register of poiesis, Herausfordern presents a radically new mode of production; cir cumscribed by the broader register of poiesis, by contrast, it shows itself to possess a fundamental kinship with Hervorbringen, since both are, essen tially, modes of revealing.
118
118 * Embodying Technesis
By introducing this distinction, Heidegger effectively embraces technesis
as the enabling strategy for his mature meditation on technology: whether it
accords with physis or not, technology (as an ontological modality of
physis) always essentially involves a production of presencing. Yet far from
solving the paradox underlying "The Question Concerning Technology"-
the paradox of Herausfordern's duplicity-Heidegger's recourse to the priv-
ilege of ontology effectively suspends it. By reinstalling the ontological dif-
ference, Heidegger is able to focalize his account of modern technology
exclusively on its role in the presencing constitutive of truth. From this per-
spective, not surprisingly, technology can only be given a negative determi-
nation, as a degradation of a former, more authentic relationship to Being:
Herausfordern only attains its status as a form of poiesis in the broader
sense (as a mode of revealing) by constituting a degradation of poiesis in the
narrower sense (as a mode of presentation compatible with physis). With
this move, Heidegger subtly shifts his focus: far from exploring the being of
modern technology, he concentrates exclusively on the ways in which it cov-
ers over whatever possibility we might have of developing an authentic rela-
tionship with the essence of technology qua the modern stamping of Being,
or in other words, with truth in its modern showing.14 As long as it com-
prises a mode of poiesis or the revealing of Being, modern technology, in
other words, can be distinguished solely through its negativity-the way it
obscures the meaning of Being.
Technology and Language
Heidegger's effort to enframe modern technology as an obstacle preventing
us from authentically experiencing Being sends him back to the account of
language he originally developed in Being and Time. As a degradation of
poiesis, Herausfordern plays a role formally identical to the one played by
Aussage (assertion), the inauthentic degradation of Auslegung (interpreta-
tion), within his onto-hermeneutic theory of reference. By transforming
Herausfordern into a degraded form of an authentically onto-hermeneutical
relation to Being, Heidegger restricts the scope of its effects to the horizon
of thought in a way that insures the efficacy, in principle, of his poietic
•
Em bod y i n g
Technesis
By introducing this distinction, Heidegger effectively embraces technesis as the enabling strategy for his mature meditation on technology: whether it accords with physis or not, technology (as an ontological modality of physis) always essentially involves a production of presencing. Yet far from solving the paradox underlying "The Question Concerning Technology" the paradox of Herausfordern's duplicity-Heidegger's recourse to the priv ilege of ontology effectively suspends it. By reinstalling the ontological dif ference, Heidegger is able to focalize his account of modern technology exclusively on its role in the presencing constitutive of truth. From this per spective, not surprisingly, technology can only be given a negative determi nation, as a degradation of a former, more authentic relationship to Being: Herausfordern only attains its status as a form of poiesis in the broader sense (as a mode of revealing ) by constituting a degradation of poiesis in the narrower sense (as a mode of presentation compatible with physis ) . With this move, Heidegger subtly shifts his focus : far from exploring the being of modern technology, he concentrates exclusively on the ways in which it cov ers over whatever possibility we might have of developing an authentic rela tionship with the essence of technology qua the modern stamping of Being, or in other words, with truth in its modern showing.14 As long as it com prises a mode of poiesis or the revealing of Being, modern technology, in other words, can be distinguished solely through its negativity-the way it obscures the meaning of Being.
strategies (see for example, his discussion of the "saving power" of language
[1977b, 28, 32-35/1954, 31, 35-38]) for overcoming the threat posed by
modern technology. Following this reductive transformation, whatever
strategy we take to grapple with technology involves an essential internal
modification of our (ontological) self-understanding that is unrelated to any
Technology and Language
Heidegger's effort to enframe modern technology as an obstacle preventing us from authentically experiencing Being sends him back to the account of language he originally developed in Being and Time. As a degradation of poiesis, Herausfordern plays a role formally identical to the one played by Aussage (assertion ) , the inauthentic degradation of Auslegung ( interpreta tion ) , within his onto-hermeneutic theory of reference. By transforming Herausfordern into a degraded form of an authentically onto-hermeneutical relation to Being, Heidegger restricts the scope of its effects to the horizon of thought in a way that insures the efficacy, in principle, of his poietic strategies ( see for example, his discussion of the " saving power " of language [ 1 977b, 2 8 , 32-3 5/1 954, 3 1 , 3 5-3 8 ] ) for overcoming the threat posed by modern technology. Following this reductive transformation, whatever strategy we take to grapple with technology involves an essential internal modification of our ( ontological) self-understanding that is unrelated to any
Q u esti o n i n g the Mach i n e Basis of
Questioning the Machine Basis of Techne * 119
potential change in our mundane, practical comportment toward technol-
ogy. Just as Dasein only reaches a more primordial understanding of its
Being-in-the-world by surmounting its superficial absorption in Aussage, so
too must human beings in the technological epoch see beyond their chal-
lenging-forth of nature (Herausfordern) in order to experience the revealing
of Being. By attesting to the enduring sway of a hermeneutic (or logocentric)
notion of truth, this homology foregrounds the central function that the
(correlative) machine reduction of technology continues to play following
the period of fundamental ontology.
Indeed, this homology allows us to discern the extensive debt Heidegger's
mature reflection on technology owes to fundamental ontology. The rela-
tionship of Auslegung and Aussage furnishes a model of ontological unity
for Heidegger's later assimilation of Herausfordern to Hervorbringen.s5 In
paragraph 34 of Being and Time, Heidegger explains how the two struc-
tures of the understanding are in fact rooted in a single ontological ground,
what he calls Rede (discourse), and how, furthermore, they can be viewed as
two modifications-one authentic, the other inauthentic-of this structure.
As the most fundamental articulation of Dasein's circumspective under-
standing, Rede, Heidegger contends, "underlies [liegt . . . zugrunde] both
interpretation and assertion" (1977b, 204/1954, 161).
By determining Herausfordern as, effectively, a degradation of Hervor-
bringen in the same sense that Aussage is a degradation of Auslegung, Hei-
degger is able to map out the radical difference of modern technology (it is
non-poietic in the restricted sense) without abandoning the privilege of
ontology. While Herausfordern perverts the revealing of nature by stockpil-
ing nature's resources just for the sake of stockpiling, at a deeper level it
continues to serve the poietic function of disclosing the world, if only in a
fallen mode (one that parallels Aussage) in which the truth of Being is cov-
ered over. When Heidegger goes on to distinguish poetic from technological
modes of revealing by applying the test of authenticity, we encounter a par-
ticularly striking example of this debt to fundamental ontology.
The hydroelectric plant. . . sets the Rhine to supplying its hydraulic pressure,
which then sets the turbines turning. This turning sets those machines in
motion whose thrust sets going the electric current for which the long-dis-
tance power station and its network of cables are set up to dispatch electric-
ity. In the context of the interlocking processes pertaining to the orderly dis-
position of electrical energy, even the Rhine itself appears as something at
our command. The hydroelectric plant is not built into the Rhine River as
was the old wooden bridge that joined bank with bank for hundreds of years.
What the river is now, namely, a water power supplier, derives from out of
Techne
•
119
potential change i n our mundane, practical comportment toward technol ogy. Just as Dasein only reaches a more primordial understanding of its Being-in-the-world by surmounting its superficial absorption in Aussage, so too must human beings in the technological epoch see beyond their chal lenging-forth of nature (Herausfordern) in order to experience the revealing of Being. By attesting to the enduring sway of a hermeneutic (or logocentric) notion of truth, this homology foregrounds the central function that the ( correlative ) machine red