Ethics & Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect

Ethics & Climate Change

THE GREENHOUSE EFFECT Edited by

Harold Coward and Thomas Hurka Faced with the prospect of global warming, the anticipated rapid rise in global air temperatures due to the release of gases into the atmosphere, we have two choices of how to respond: adaptation or avoidance. With adaptation we keep burning fossil fuels, let global temperatures rise and make whatever changes this requires: move people from environmentally damaged areas, build sea walls, etc. With avoidance we stop warming from occurring, either by reducing our use of fossil fuels or by using technology such as carbon dioxide recovery after combustion to block the warming effect. Yet each strategy has its drawbacks—adaptation may not be able to occur fast enough to accommodate the expected temperature increases, but avoidance would be prohibitively expensive. An ethically acceptable goal must involve some mixture of adaptation and avoidance. Written by a team of scientists, social scientists, humanists, legal and environmental scholars and corporate researchers, this book offers an ethical analysis of possible responses to the problem. Their analyses of the scientific and technological data and the ethical principles involved in determining whose interests should be considered point to a combination of adaptation and avoidance of greenhouse gas production. They offer assessments of personal, corporate, government and international responsibility and a series of recommendations to aid decision-makers in determining solutions and apportioning responsibility. Harold Coward is Director of the Centre for Studies in Religion and Society at the University of Victoria and a member of the Board of Directors of the Canadian Global Change Program of the Royal Society of Canada. Thomas Hurka is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Calgary. From 1989-92 he wrote a weekly ethics column for The Globe and Mail.

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Ethics & Climate Change

THE GREENHOUSE EFFECT

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Ethics & Climate Change

THE GREENHOUSE EFFECT Edited by

Harold Coward and Thomas Hurka

Essays by F. Kenneth Hare Thomas Hurka Harold Coward Harvey A. Buckmaster Peter Danielson Wayne Stewart and Peter Dickey Nigel Bankes G. Cornelis van Kooten Kerri R. Blair and William A. Ross

Published by Wilfrid Laurier University Press for The Calgary Institute for the Humanities

Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data Main entry under title: Ethics and climate change : the greenhouse effect Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-88920-233-8 1. Global warming - Decision making - Moral and ethical aspects. 2. Greenhouse effect, Atmospheric Decision making - Moral and ethical aspects. I. Coward, Harold G., 1936- . II. Hurka, Thomas, 1952- . III. Calgary Institute for the Humanities. QC981.8.G56E7 1993

179'.1

C93-094493-3

Copyright 1993 Wilfrid Laurier University Press Waterloo, Ontario, Canada N2L 3C5 Cover design by Jose Martucci, Design Communications

Printed in Canada

Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect has been produced from a manuscript supplied in camera-ready form by The Calgary Institute for the Humanities. All rights reserved. No part of this work covered by the copyrights hereon may be reproduced or used in any form or by any means—graphic, electronic or mechanical—without the prior written permission of the publisher. Any request for photocopying, recording, taping or reproducing in information storage and retrieval systems of any part of this book shall be directed in writing to the Canadian Reprography Collective, 379 Adelaide Street West, Suite Ml, Toronto, Ontario, M5V 1S5.

TABLE OF CONTENTS List of Figures and Tables

ix

Preface

xi

Introduction Harold Coward

1

1. The Challenge F. Kenneth Hare

11

2. Ethical Principles Thomas Hurka

23

3. Religious Responsibility Harold Coward

39

4. The Arctic—A Canadian Case Study Harvey A. Buckmaster

61

5. Personal Responsibility Peter Danielson

81

6. Corporate Responsibility Wayne Stewart and Peter Dickey

99

7. International Responsibility Nigel Bankes

115

8. Effective Economic Mechanisms: Efficiency and Ethical Considerations G. Cornells van Kooten

133

9. Energy Efficiency at Home and Abroad Kerri R. Blair and William A. Ross

149

Conclusion Thomas Hurka

165

About the Authors

171

Bibliography

175

Index

187

vii

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LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES Figure

1.1 Global-mean Surface Air Temperature: Annual Departures from the 1951-1980 Mean

13

3.1 The Karmic Ladder of Existence

50

4.1 Circumpolar Projection Map of the Arctic and Subarctic ...

62

4.2 Variations in the Mean Annual Global Temperature

66

4.3 The Estimated Increase in the Mean Annual North American Temperatures

68

4.4 Change in Temperature from 1959-73 to 1974-88 in Canada

69

4.5 Projected Climate Warming in Canada

70

4.6 The Ecoprovinces of Canada

72

5.1 The Two-player Greenhouse Dilemma

83

5.2 The Adaptation Dilemma

84

8.1 Determining Optimal Greenhouse Gas Emissions

135

8.2 Marginal Damages and Abatement Costs from Greenhouse Warming

136

8.3 Efficient Reduction of Greenhouse Gases

137

Table

1.1 The Main Greenhouse Gases

18

6.1 Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 1990

109

9.1 Brief Descriptions of Energy Efficiency Options for the United States

154

9.2 Global Temperature Change Due to Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 1990-2030

161

ix

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PREFACE In 1990 an interdisciplinary team assembled at The Calgary Institute for the Humanities under the leadership of Harold Coward and Thomas Hurka to begin work on an ethical analysis of possible responses to the greenhouse effect. Although the problem of global warming has generated considerable scientific study and concern over how society should respond, this gathering seemed to be the first attempt to focus on an ethical analysis of the problem. As such, it has evoked considerable interest from around the world. The interdisciplinary team included scientists, social scientists, humanists, scholars from professional areas such as law and environmental studies, and researchers from the corporate sector. The methodology adopted ensured an interdisciplinary — as opposed to just a multidisciplinary — result. Rather than each team member producing a specialized contribution and leaving it to the editors to bind the disparate chapters together within the Introduction and Conclusion, members were required to digest the data from all involved disciplines before drafting their chapters. The draft chapters then underwent a thorough critique by all team members during an intensive five-day seminar in the Rocky Mountains west of Calgary. Throughout this writing, critiquing, and rewriting, care was taken to ensure that the ethical perspective remained the unifying element of the volume. This interdisciplinary process, although demanding, did significantly broaden perception and understanding of the problem. Members acquired new technical vocabularies and gained respect for the methodologies and contributions of other disciplines. In addition, the process forged ongoing personal relationships through the teamwork required by the scholarly task as well as the camaraderie of hiking through the mountains together. The results of the research are being published in two forms. This volume contains the full academic result. A companion volume, also published by Wilfrid Laurier University Press, has been written by Lydia Dotto for public policy decision makers, corporate executives, non-governmental organizations, and the public. It summarizes the findings of the academic volume in a concise, easily readable form. The two volumes will be introduced to federal and provincial roundtables during 1993 to ensure that the results reach those responsible for framing a response to the challenge of global warming. Gerry Dyer, the Institute's administrator, did much to help bond the team together into a strong working unit. She also provided the considerable infrastructural support required for the success of the project—preparing grant applications, providing the required accounting, arranging for the two seminar sessions at Kananaskis, ensuring communication among team members, and preparing camera-ready copy for

xii Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect this volume. All team members feel indebted to Gerry for her role in making this project intellectually and personally rewarding. Thanks are also due to Terry Teskey for her careful copyediting of this volume to ensure that it reads with a common voice, and to Sandra Woolfrey of Wilfrid Laurier University Press and her able staff. Finally, the financial support received from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, Shell Canada, and the Canadian Petroleum Association made the project possible.

Harold Coward Former Director The Calgary Institute for the Humanities

INTRODUCTION Harold Coward The issue of global climate change is of both national and international significance; decisions about it must be made quickly (Hare 1988; Schneider 1989). But on what basis can decisions about individual and governmental responses be made? The special contribution of this book is its attempt to guide such decision making by providing an ethical analysis of possible responses to the challenge of global climate change. In chapter 1 Kenneth Hare reviews the scientific evidence on the greenhouse effect. He concludes that warming is in progress on a global scale and that increases in the greenhouse effect are probably the main cause. Human activity is seen to be responsible for this warming. The natural greenhouse effect is beneficial, making life on earth possible, but our tampering is setting the thermostat too high, endangering human, plant, and animal life. For example, by our use of oil and coal to fuel cars and produce electricity we are adding some three billion tons of carbon to the atmosphere each year. This is like adding new panes of glass to the greenhouse. And scientific modelling of the greenhouse effect offers a nearly unanimous verdict that the warming observed over the past decades will continue and probably get stronger. Nor is this change confined to the atmosphere; the oceans and rocks are also involved. We seem to be witnessing a human-induced upset of the entire atmosphereocean-chemical equilibrium, with major implications for life. The complexity of the challenge is that the problems raised are global. In this sense, the greenhouse effect is not unlike the ozone problem, which is also global in nature. Thus, the question of how we should act to protect the atmosphere and the ocean demands sound ethical reasoning. Following the scientific analysis of chapter 1, chapters 2-9 offer religious, economic, personal, corporate, international, and technological responses to the challenge of global warming. All of these discussions assume that our response to the greenhouse effect can involve either adaptation or avoidance. With adaptation we keep burning fossil fuels, let global temperatures rise, and make whatever changes this requires: move people from environmentally damaged areas, build sea walls, and so on. With avoidance we stop warming from occurring, either by reducing our use of fossil fuels or by using technology, such as carbon dioxide recovery after combustion or plankton cultivation in the oceans, to block the warming effect. It is unlikely that either pure strategy is ethically acceptable. According to current estimates, pure adaptation would involve a temperature rise of between 2 and 5° C in the next century, faster than any in the

2 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect last ten thousand years. This would surely be devastating for many human and non-human communities. But pure avoidance —reducing warming to zero—would be enormously expensive. An ethically acceptable goal must involve some mixture of adaptation and avoidance. To decide on this mixture we must weigh against each other the ethically relevant costs and benefits of warming on the one hand and the steps needed to avoid it on the other. This will require technical information: about the biological effects of warming in different regions, about the economic effects of different avoidance measures, about the prospects for new technologies. But it also raises ethical issues. In chapter 2 Thomas Hurka outlines a series of ethical principles ranging from the relatively uncontroversial and widely accepted to the more radical. This continuum of possible principles is proposed as a helpful way to analyze responses to the challenge of global climate change and is employed by the authors of later chapters. Hurka's approach proceeds by looking at the consequences of an act or policy: Good consequences count ethically in its favour, bad consequences against it. He begins by considering the consequences for "humans here and now," moves to a consideration of consequences for "humans at other times and places" (future generations and humans in other countries, such as in developing nations), and arrives at the most radical principle by extending concern to the environment "valued for itself." The first two principles confine ethical standing to humans and examine the impact of global climate change upon humans in ever-extending ranges of inclusiveness. This approach accords with that of the Brundtland Commission Report (World Commission on Environment and Development 1987), which conceives its goal in strictly human-centred terms. The final principle surveyed by Hurka rejects the view that human well-being is the ultimate goal and extends ethical standing to all parts of the environment. This principle breaks with traditional Western ethics, which has assumed that nature exists to serve human needs. Traditional Eastern and aboriginal ethics, by contrast, have often adopted this more radical principle, in varying degrees. However, without evoking the Eastern or aboriginal traditions, Hurka examines a range of views that value the environment for itself, from the less radical individualist environmentalism to more radical approaches that locate intrinsic value in wholes such as ecosystems, or indeed, the complete biosphere. In holistic views such as that adopted by Aldo Leopold (1970), global climate change must be examined for its consequences not just to individual organisms but to the interrelated wholes they compose. Depending on which of the above principles is adopted, the ethical analysis of consequences will incline one either towards adaptation or towards the avoidance pole of the continuum of possible responses to global warming.

Introduction 3 In addition to the above consequentialist analysis, Hurka also considers a rights-based approach. Rather than searching for the end with the best overall consequences, the rights approach makes central to ethical analysis the constraints that respect for the rights of others imposes upon policy and action. Once again, a range of rights is examined, from human rights to animal rights to ecosystemic or environmental rights. The rights approach has a further aspect: that compensation is owed when a rights-violation occurs. This consideration is relevant when asking who should bear the costs of policies intended to avoid further global climate change: the developed countries (who seem largely responsible for current environmental degradation) or the developing countries? Such rights-based ethical analysis is shown by Hurka to produce complex results — a finding confirmed in Nigel Bankes's study of international responsibility in chapter 7. As a provisional result of his study, Hurka concludes that even if only the least contentious consequentialist principles, related to present and future humans, were adopted, these would enjoin avoidance of further global warming. And even if we respect only basic human rights with the least contentious claim for compensation, avoidance rather than adaptation is advised. Chapter 3 by Harold Coward employs the above ethical principles in examining views of responsibility towards the environment found in the major world religions and the Taoist and aboriginal traditions. While studies of the major religions have had much to say on human nature, they have said little on their attitudes to nature, and especially the status of humans in relation to nature. The latter is a recent issue, which did not concern people in the past (especially in the West) and therefore did not generate much response from the leading thinkers. One looks through Augustine, Aquinas, Luther, Calvin, Maimonides, and others and finds little if anything of direct relevance. The term environment is not yet in the vocabulary, and nature is most often associated with natural law rather than the environment, let alone an atmospheric problem like global warming. This is a new challenge that theologians are just beginning to put to their sources of revelation for answers, to evoke Paul Tillich's "correlation" method of doing theology, according to which one "tries to correlate the questions implied in the situation with the answers implied in the message" (1950, 8.) Books and articles grounded in the various religions are just now starting to appear in response to the environmental questions being raised by global climate change. It is as if the theologians have been given a new set of glasses with which to reread their old texts for new answers. In some ways this development parallels the re-reading of the traditions through feminist glasses that is currently going on. Coward's chapter is one of the first attempts to gather together in one place the views of the Eastern and Western world

4 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect religions along with those of the Taoist and aboriginal traditions on human responsibility to nature. All the religions reviewed see the environment as having intrinsic value or ethical standing, with the Eastern and aboriginal traditions taking a strong position on this point. The Western religions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam are more human centred, but none gives humans complete dominion over nature. The various Western views of a transcendent creator God see humans as responsible for the stewardship of the beautiful and bountiful world God has created for their use. Thus, Western religions do teach that nature is to be respected and not abused to satisfy human needs. The Eastern and aboriginal traditions, however, adopt a more holistic view of the human relationship to the environment. The separation between humans and nature fostered in much Western religion is quite different from the unity and intimate interrelationship taught in the Eastern traditions. Eastern and aboriginal ideas are a clear corrective to the human domination of nature that, as White (1967) has made clear, various interpretations of Genesis have helped to foster. All the religions argue for as much avoidance as possible in our responses to global warming. The inclusion of a chapter on religious responsibility in relation to the environment is premised on the following considerations. First, while environmental ethics can be considered from a strictly secular perspective, the ethical reflections of the various religions form a major part of human experience and therefore should also be considered. Second, the religious perspective provides a basis for an appeal to the individual believers of the various religions. Third, since states like Iran and Pakistan see themselves as religious rather than secular, knowledge of, for example, Islam's account of human responsibility to nature may help in obtaining such states' co-operation in international efforts to deal with the greenhouse effect. The implications of global climate change for a unique region of the earth, the Arctic, are analyzed by Harvey Buckmaster in chapter 4. The stress on the Arctic ecosystem caused by global warming is predicted to be greater than in the rest of Canada. An anticipated warming of 8-10° C would result in the disappearance of the ice pack from the Arctic Ocean during the summer months, leading to more precipitation, cloudiness, and significant shoreline erosion. The tundra area will shrink to about one half its current size, while the temperate zone would experience a marked increase. Much of the current permafrost will disappear, resulting in more release of carbon dioxide and methane into the atmosphere and a further 0.5° C increase in global mean surface annual air temperature. All of these changes are seen as having a significant impact on global ocean circulation patterns, thus rendering change in the Arctic important for the whole of the earth. It is further suggested that ocean, ice,

Introduction

5

and atmosphere interactions in the Arctic will have a major impact upon weather patterns throughout the northern hemisphere. Having examined the physical changes that global climate change is predicted to bring to the Arctic, Buckmaster then applies Hurka's ethical principles to the circumstances of the Arctic peoples and wildlife. The resulting ethical analysis strongly favours policies aimed at avoidance rather than adaptation, policies in which Canada is urged to take the lead because of the special responsibility of Canadians for the Arctic. In chapter 5, "Individual Responsibility," Peter Danielson suggests that the social structure itself is a driving force in the production of global problems such as the greenhouse effect. Danielson questions our strong temptation to look to government to solve the problem of the greenhouse effect. In the case of the atmosphere, which is a "global commons," Danielson shows that an appeal to government for moral regulation would work only if we were to create a single world government. Otherwise, various governments see themselves as competing decision makers and, as is the case for individuals, will rationally choose to emit more greenhouse gases (see Danielson's discussion of the Greenhouse Dilemma.) Danielson's matrix analysis demonstrates that in a commons situation such as the global atmosphere, when individuals and governments (acting as individuals) choose independently in a competitive context, there is no assurance that a decision to avoid or restrain emissions will be reciprocated by others. Therefore, the moral and not merely selfish choice is to avoid sacrificing one's own welfare by choosing to emit more greenhouse gases. This analysis suggests that individual agents of all sorts (people, corporations, states) cannot rationally be expected to take altruistic decisions that would result in avoidance behaviour and a reduced emission of greenhouse gases. As an alternative approach, Danielson proposes "individualization" in the face of complex social problems such as the greenhouse effect. Assuming that Canadians are morally motivated to respond responsibly to the challenge of global climate change, Danielson offers the innovative suggestion of an "Atmosphere Trust." Through the market mechanism of an Atmosphere Trust, each individual would be able to determine his or her own share of the global warming problem and to undertake action, through voluntary trades in greenhouse gas abatements, so as to responsibly retire his or her share of the problem. In this way, the individual could act to bring about the goal of avoidance through a mechanism that avoids the complexities and uncertainties introduced by dependence on political and corporate solutions. Danielson's idea of an Atmosphere Trust offers a new and quite different ethical resolution. Rather than relying on government and corporate decision makers (whom Danielson shows to be unable to rationally act in an altruistic way towards the atmosphere as a global commons), it places responsibility squarely in the

6 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect hands of individual citizens and, what is more, offers market mechanisms by which they could fulfill their moral responsibility to decrease the production of greenhouse gases. Danielson's original and imaginative proposal deserves careful study. Having looked at the responsibility of individuals, the volume then, in chapter 6, turns to the question of corporate responsibility. Written by industry researcher Wayne Stewart, with assistance from Peter Dickey, this chapter challenges the commonly held notion that "the business of business is business." The traditional goal of creating wealth and jobs and thereby raising the general standard of living has today been enlarged to include service to the community and protection of the environment. Drawing from their experience within large private petroleum companies, the authors examine the responsibility of corporations to protect the atmosphere from greenhouse gas emissions. This new environmental responsibility is causing corporations to develop a new model for doing business. Whereas the old model focused on economic considerations only, sought the required government approvals, and adopted an adversarial approach to those who objected, the new model begins from the Brundtland Commission's (World Commission on Environment and Development 1987) notion of "sustainable development," which is increasingly being embraced by CEOs. Sustainable development requires corporations to ensure that in meeting the needs of the present, they do not sacrifice the interests of future generations. This concept, the authors argue, has the capacity to bring corporations, governments, environmental groups, and individuals together to deal with challenges like the greenhouse effect. The federal and provincial round tables are cited as an example of the new approach. Another is the inclusion within the decision-making process of those who on the old model would have been adversaries (e.g., environmental groups.) In this way an expanded notion of the stakeholder is developing; governments, NGOs employees, and individual citizens are all coming to be included in the corporate decision-making process. Yet another aspect of the new model is the move to assign the societal costs of environmental problems to their sources —the polluter pays principle. Corporations can no longer escape environmental responsibility by simply shedding the problems they have created. Full cost accounting as well as this restriction against shedding environmental problems are providing a strong stimulus for corporations to accept ethical responsibility in mitigating the negative consequences of global climate change. Seven specific recommendations are proposed to effect this new corporate responsibility. In chapter 7 Nigel Bankes addresses the difficult question of international responsibility. In section 1, the rules of customary international law are reviewed for their application to states in relation to the challenge of global climate change. Here Bankes suggests that, as a matter of justice,

Introduction

7

the costs of dealing with greenhouse gas emissions should be internalized and that, since the developed countries are most responsible for creating the problem, they should bear most of the costs associated with avoidance. The author goes on to argue that the atmosphere should be seen as a limited shared resource that is no longer open to all, but instead is allocated on the basis of an agreed-upon equitable criterion. Bankes concludes that states are legally obligated to form multilateral instruments to deal with the problem of global climate change—thus procedural customary law reflects Hurka's "humans everywhere" ethical stance. Section 2, the bulk of the chapter, offers a detailed evaluation and critique of the Convention on Climate Change signed at Rio de Janeiro in June 1992. After providing a thumbnail sketch of the Convention, Bankes critically examines its stand on (1) the risks of uncertainty, (2) the position of developing countries, and (3) the allocation problem (the atmosphere as a shared scarce resource). The author's analysis, and especially his detailed study of how to achieve justice in solving the allocation problem, is a major contribution to the post-Rio discussion of international responsibility. Bankes urges, as a first step, that firm commitments be established by which the costs associated with greenhouse gas emissions will be internalized. Although the Rio Convention did not achieve this goal, it did succeed in getting the developed world to accept the primacy of its responsibility for the problem of global warming. A second step has to do with the way the atmosphere is viewed internationally. To date, the atmosphere has been assumed to be an unlimited and open-access resource. Although the Rio Convention recognizes that the atmosphere is both limited and shared, it developed no principles by which the atmosphere could be shared between the developed and developing countries. This remains the most difficult and sensitive international problem in developing an effective international response to global climate change, and it is to the solution of this problem that Bankes directs his main critical discussion in evaluating the Rio Convention. Any ethical analysis of possible responses to the greenhouse effect would be woefully wanting if economic considerations were not included. It is to exactly such matters that the volume turns in chapter 8 — Cornelis van Kooten's study of effective economic mechanisms for dealing with global climate change. The chapter begins by considering the opportunity costs involved in averting global climate change. (For example, money spent on reducing greenhouse gas emissions has the opportunity cost of reduced investment in non-greenhouse-related R&D and capital, debt reduction, and lower consumption.) Such costs could prove harmful to some economies, especially those of developing countries. Van Kooten's careful and convincing economic analysis makes clear that the opportunity cost of any action or policy aimed at reducing global warming must be carefully assessed. Such costs are not always evident

8 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect and are frequently not considered. Although the authors of this volume do not accept that ethical conclusions can be based on a cost/benefit, economic value assessment of the kind economists produce, we do contend that economic values occupy a central place in consideration of responses to the challenge of global climate change. As this chapter makes clear, any move to full cost accounting must include opportunity costs in its calculation. A major dissonance between this and the previous chapter is that van Kooten proceeds on the assumption that, since states have not yet recognized property rights to the atmosphere, the atmosphere can therefore be considered an open-access resource. Van Kooten is clearly correct on this legal point; however, exactly the opposite premise is urged by Bankes — that the atmosphere must become (through the Rio Convention) a limited shared resource justly allocated among states. Van Kooten picks up Danielson's contention that so long as the atmosphere is seen to be an open-access, unlimited resource no one person, country, or corporation has an incentive to reduce emissions, because the benefits of so doing are shared by others, who then may see themselves as free to pollute more. Only when the atmosphere is truly globally owned and allocated through mechanisms such as those discussed by Bankes at the end of chapter 9 will market transactions relating to the atmosphere take place (e.g., trading in carbon permits). Only then will the world market distribute environmental resources such as the atmosphere efficiently (Wilman 1992, 90). In considering the points made by Bankes's discussion of global ownership and just-allocation mechanisms, it is essential to read van Kooten's economic analysis in parallel, and vice versa. Van Kooten then considers economic policy instruments for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Government standards (e.g., for automobile exhaust) or prohibitions (e.g., on tree cutting) are seen to be problematic in their effects and costly to police. Economic incentives, on the other hand, encourage emission reductions at least cost to society by providing incentives for innovation. Subsidies and taxes can be used in this way but are not problem free. Emission permits along with offsets and private markets are also discussed. In the last third of his chapter, van Kooten engages in a careful analysis of many of the policy issues discussed by Bankes in the previous chapter, but this time from an economic rather than a legal perspective. Van Kooten concludes by considering the economic implications of ethical responsibilities to future generations. This issue is far more complicated than one would have thought. The author's discussion reveals the many different variables involved in any attempt to make global ethical decisions with the principle of fairness to future generations in mind. One characteristic that seems common to all countries is that they have mortgaged the future in order to pay for the consumption of the present.

Introduction

9

Van Kooten's conclusion is that economic policies can help to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, but such policies carry a price tag that will make the current generation poorer. And poorer people pass on less wealth to future generations. Therefore, it may be in the interests of future generations for us to pursue a balance between adaptation and avoidance policies. The final chapter, by Kerri Blair and Bill Ross, titled "Energy Efficiency at Home and Abroad," examines ways to avoid rather than adapt to global warming through the more efficient use of energy. The authors assume that human and non-human suffering will result if global warming results in significant climate change, and that therefore all action that can be taken to avoid global warming is ethically required. The chapter proposes that if, as a first step, energy is used more efficiently in both the developed and developing countries, all three of Hurka's ethical principles will have been recognized; namely, concern for people here in Canada, everywhere on earth, future generations, and the non-human elements of the environment. The chapter relies heavily on the evidence and argument of Lovins and Lovins (1991). For current generations everywhere, it is argued, the quality of life can be improved and greenhouse gas emissions reduced by making more efficient use of energy in all its forms. This argument directly challenges some of van Kooten's findings in the previous chapter. It contends that by increasing energy efficiency, one will be able to provide the same goods and services at less cost and using less energy. Actions of this sort would be in the interests of people, would use less fossil fuel, and would produce less greenhouse gas, thus helping to avoid further global climate change. This result is to be achieved through a combination of technological advances in both energy generation and energy use, along with new approaches to customer service by the major utilities. A simple example is a projected 50 per cent reduction in lighting energy consumption in all U.S. residences by replacing incandescent lighting with compact fluorescent bulbs. Residents would save money, and the utilities would realize higher profits. Similar savings through fuel switching and new technology can also be realized in heating, cooking and cooling in both residential and commercial uses. Other very significant efficiency savings are claimed for the generation of electrical energy as well as for the performance of cars, trucks, and aircraft. All of the above energy efficiencies could be even more important in avoiding greenhouse gas when used in developing countries. If the developed countries help developing countries to leap over inefficient technologies, the ethical goal of avoidance will be achieved globally in a costefficient fashion. The failure to include full cost accounting in the pricing of energy is identified by the authors as a major obstacle to the use of energy-efficient opportunities. Similarly, if taxes, interest rates, or other policy variables

10 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect restrict the availability of energy-efficient equipment, then markets may not naturally adopt energy-efficient products. With regard to ethical responsibilities to both future generations and the non-human environment, the authors maintain that energy efficiency is one of the best strategies to follow. It is a policy which can be seen by all agents — individuals, corporations, and governments — as being both in their self-interest and as fulfilling the moral responsibility to avoid further global climate change. One final word: As this interdisciplinary research team worked on the ethical analysis of possible responses to the greenhouse effect, it became very clear that a major factor in increased greenhouse gas emissions is population growth. Thus, even if energy is used more efficiently in both developed and developing countries, the resulting reduction in greenhouse gas emissions may be completely overtaken by the added greenhouse gas emissions resulting from global population increase. The question of how to ethically respond to the threat to the atmosphere posed by population pressure was not dealt with in this volume, because it was judged to be a very difficult problem requiring its own study. Such a study is being undertaken by an international interdisciplinary team assembling under the direction of Harold Coward at the Centre for Studies in Religion and Society, University of Victoria, Victoria, BC, Canada, beginning in the summer of 1993.

Chapter 1 THE CHALLENGE F. Kenneth Hare A slow warming of the earth's surface seems to be in progress. Many people think that this warming, which will be discussed in section 2, has been caused by human actions that augment the greenhouse effect, that is, the warming influence of certain atmospheric gases. So extensive is this belief, and the fear it has created, that global climate change dominated the agenda of the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development, held in Rio de Janeiro. The Conference reached a reluctant consensus that the world must move to contain the changes. The reluctance stemmed from the costs of so acting more than doubt as to the reality of the effect. Among students of climate, however, questions are still being raised. All agree that the natural greenhouse effect keeps the planet habitable. Naturally present gases — carbon dioxide, water vapour, methane, ozone, and nitrous oxide — raise the global mean annual surface air temperature to about 15° C. They do this (and were so doing before humans appeared) by freely admitting solar radiation while resisting the return flow of heat to space. Without these gases, and the clouds that cover half the earth's surface, temperatures would be 33° C colder than they are today: the earth would be largely uninhabitable. The natural greenhouse effect —so called because the gases act in some ways like the glass in a greenhouse — is thus essential for life on earth. But there is still some disagreement about the augmented greenhouse effect arising from human economic activity—burning coal, oil, and natural gas; destroying forests; and oxidizing soil litter and humus. These processes are increasing the atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases, and human ingenuity is adding synthetics that act in the same way. No one questions that the resulting increase in the greenhouse effect should raise global temperatures still further, but most professional observers do not believe that the warming of the past century can be blamed solely on greenhouse warming. Other causes may have been at work. It will be some years — probably a few decades—before expert judgement will be unanimous. Perhaps a slim majority, this writer included, is already willing to say that the augmented greenhouse effect is the probable cause. The sceptics, however, include some of the most respected figures in the field. The thrust towards political action has outrun scientific consensus.

12 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect Most climatologists will nevertheless welcome prompt action, on slightly different grounds: • The potential consequences of the warming are enormous, for nature and for humankind; it is better to be safe than sorry. • Scientific modelling of the greenhouse effect, based on sound theory, offers a nearly unanimous verdict that the warming will continue and probably get stronger. • The effect now being demonstrated arises from a human-induced upset of the entire atmosphere-ocean-chemical equilibrium, with major implications for life. • The problem is global; it raises large questions of equity between north and south, rich and poor, and competing trading blocs. In common with many colleagues, I endorse the principle of acting in the presence of uncertainty, when the potential consequences justify such action. If the changes in progress threaten calamity, as they may do, then we must act so as to avoid the changes, adapt to them if they are unavoidable, and ensure that the burden is shared equitably. These considerations are ethical as well as prudent; self-interest and the common good will coincide, if we act wisely. Many people see global climate change as a threat; we prefer the word challenge. This volume is a justification for the more optimistic term. The challenge is obviously many sided. The research community must seek to broaden understanding of the change itself and of its potential impact on nature and society. The technical world must look for means of avoiding further warming if this is within our reach, and if not, of adaptation. Beyond all such questions lie those at the core of our study: what are the ethical implications of global warming? The problem is the result of human misjudgement; how should we act to correct our mistakes? 1. Global Temperature Records Since 1950 the world has had access to detailed weather observations from a variety of sources: a dense network of surface stations over land and of ships at sea, supplemented by balloon-borne sensors that reach thirty kilometres or more above the sea; a sparser network of rocket observations up to sixty kilometres; and increasingly sophisticated coverage of the entire earth by satellite. We are currently taking the pulse of the atmosphere more often than a patient can expect in a hospital's intensive care unit. This was far from being the case in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when observations were sparse and only a few elements were measured. We look back on an inadequately monitored past. To construct a consistent global record, several research centres have mounted efforts to make the data comparable and representative.

The Challenge 13 Leaders have been the Climate Research Unit of the University of East Anglia at Norwich, England; the Goddard Institute for Space Studies in New York; and the State Hydrological Institute in St. Petersburg, C.LS. Details of the findings are given in Boden, Sepanski, and Stoss (1991). In addition, an international review was conducted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Houghton, Jenkins, and Ephraums 1990). From these sources we have annual estimates of temperature and, to a lesser extent, precipitation (rain and snow) spanning nearly one and a half centuries. We can also gather information about the climates of the past, in growing detail, from the geological record. The estimates on which we base our conclusions are the best figures that can be calculated given the inadequacy of the original data. Their weaknesses include poor areal coverage in polar, marine, and tropical regions, especially before 1900; incomplete elimination of urban warming effects; errors of original observation; badly calibrated thermometers; and difficulty in combining marine and continental records. The ensemble nevertheless shows that a general warming has occurred since 1854, probably of a global magnitude of about 0.6° C. The change has, however, been spasmodic. Both hemispheres have been affected, in similar ways. The warming is actually less than the normal rise of temperature in one hour in mid-morning at land stations, or the fall of temperature in early evening. So far, we have experienced only a slight global change.

Fig. 1.1. Global-mean surface air temperature: annual departures from the 1951-1980 mean. The heavy line is a mathematically smoothed curve to indicate general trend. (Courtesy P. D. Jones at University of East Anglia) In more detail (see fig. 1.1), the upward trend of global temperature began just before 1910 and has since gone forward in three phases: a warming of about 0.4° C between 1910 and 1940 (average annual rise

14 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect 0.013° C/year); a standstill from 1940 until 1975; and a rise of about 0.2° C after 1975, still in progress in 1991 (average annual rise 0.014° C). These three phases affected both hemispheres, though differences appeared between land and sea areas. Strong differences occurred between years. There was also a suggestion of variability on five-year or decadal scales. Some of this may have been associated with the el Nino effect (Jones 1989), a major disturbance of climate, concentrated on the Pacific Ocean, that recurs every few years. The observed surface warming was only about half what might have been expected, considering the rate of increase of the greenhouse gases over the past century. The models used to reach this conclusion also predicted that a cooling would affect the stratosphere (the layer from about ten to fifty kilometres above the sea) (see sec. 4.) An analysis of upper air temperature measurements after 1965 (Angell 1988, 1991) showed that the entire stratosphere was undergoing such a cooling, which was most marked from 1975 to 1985, during which period the earth's surface was warming strongly. Qualitatively, this supports the view that the greenhouse effect was the underlying cause of the changes. The warming at the earth's surface has been geographically uneven. Over much of the United States, for example, it has been quite small, with some areas showing cooling (Karl, Baldwin, and Burgin 1988.) Over Greenland and northeastern Canada, surface air temperatures jumped suddenly in the 1920s and thereafter cooled, right to the present day. The summers of 1991 and 1992 were extremely cold through much of this area, including St. John's, Newfoundland, indicating that the coolness is still present in this sector. These anomalies illustrate an important general principle: that for extensive regions of the Earth, the warming of the past eighty years has deviated strongly from the global average. This fact raises major difficulties for political action: in the many countries in which future temperatures will differ strongly from the global norm, global warming will seem like a fiction to local politicians. Among the reasons for the U.S.'s reluctance to support the climate convention at Rio de Janeiro was the smallness of the effect over U.S. territories. Canada, by contrast, has been strongly affected, especially in a belt from the Yukon to northern Manitoba. 2. Precipitation Changes Rain is hard to measure, as is snow. Commonly used gauges are prone to error. Systematic measurement at sea is obviously impossible, and there is hence no reliable file of marine data, though indirect calculations have been performed. We cannot therefore say how global precipitation has varied, except in qualitative language. Only regional overland estimates can be given.

The Challenge 15 Folland, Karl, and Vinnikov (1990) offer long-term precipitation estimates for four land regions, two of which show striking trends. Over the former Soviet Union, carefully recalibrated data show a rapid increase in precipitation between 1890 and the late 1920s, followed by a slower and irregular increase to 1990. Precipitation is now 5-10 per cent higher than early in the century. Another striking record is from the African Sahel, where research has documented an intense desiccation following a phase of abundant rain in the 1950s and culminating in the fearsome droughts of the 1970s and 1980s (Hare 1983; Lamb 1985; Nicholson 1983). The subsequent recovery, beginning in 1988, has still not proved lasting. Droughts are rarely as intense or as persistent as this extraordinary series, which came during decades when rainfall over all Africa was showing extreme departures from normal. The most recent of these, affecting Somalia and much of southern Africa, has had appalling consequences in human suffering. Streamflow and lake-level records, which reflect the balance between gains (rain or snow) and evaporative losses, offer other evidence of altered climate. Here, again, no global synthesis can be offered, although there are many examples of apparent regional trends. We thus conclude that the global water balance —crucial in such questions as water supply, irrigation, navigation, waste disposal, and hydraulic power —has been too poorly monitored to allow proper assessment. There is nonetheless much evidence of regional problems, and these often pose the ethical dilemmas that this volume discusses. 3. Evidence of Direct Climatic Impact There is scattered evidence of other changes that have followed from the surface warming of recent decades. On the matter of sea level, the record is inconclusive (Warrick and Oerlemans 1990.) It is likely that global mean sea level has risen during the past century, and most estimates of the rise lie between one and two millimetres a year (i.e., ten to twenty centimetres over the past century), with little evidence of recent acceleration. The rise may have come from melting of glaciers and from thermal expansion of the average ocean water column. These estimates are very uncertain, as are predictions that the rise of sea level will accelerate. Particularly uncertain is the role of the continental ice sheets, especially that of Antarctica. The media make much of this possible source of catastrophic sea-level rise; the professionals discount it, preferring the view that gradual processes will continue. The response of forest, grassland, and arid ecosystems to the observed climatic variation remains obscure. Discussions by Melillo et al. (1990) deal primarily with the prediction of future response to predicted climatic change, and touch only lightly on visible change in present-day systems. The thrust of monitoring and research has been to clarify the

16 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect drastic effect of human intervention, which has been so large as to obscure the more subtle effects of climatic variation. Nevertheless, one must ask: have the ecosystems of today been detectably disturbed by the temperature and precipitation changes of the past century? There are some partial answers. Acid deposition, for example, has had negative impacts on lake and river ecosystems in Europe and North America (e.g., Calvert et al. 1983; Gibson et al. 1986; Schindler et al. 1981), with some indication of stress in forests. But there has been no thorough analysis of the impact of the contemporary warming, or of the Sahelian desiccation of Africa south of the Sahara (Hare 1983). In both cases, the search for direct climatic impact has been swamped by the evidence that human destructiveness is the major cause of the problems. The same is true of the tropical rainforest. We thus cannot speak with any assurance about the impact of the observed global warming of the past century. This warming has been too small to have produced large migrations of plant and animal species (with the exception of ocean fish populations). In each domain — notably the fisheries — it is difficult to disentangle climatic impact from the pervasive actions of humankind. Not until larger climatic changes have been experienced is this likely to be done. 4. Predicting Future Change The world has endured the warming of the past century with little public recognition of the consequences, which have been absorbed into the market forces that propel the world economy. In some regions, such as the African Sahel, the impact of climatic fluctuations has been obvious, but elsewhere the effects of actual (as distinct from projected} change have rarely been evaluated. The temper of the times has preferred to portray the ecological and economic stress as the work of human incompetence or ill will, as in Ethiopia and Somalia. There is nevertheless widespread fear of a harsher future. In public debate there is uncertainty because it is hard to distinguish between soundly based predictions and exaggerated claims. The very terms soundly based and exaggerated imply a process of value judgement. Science is, among other things, a system of criticism and evaluation. True, that system provides a ready means of rejecting outlandish claims, but it also allows a wide range of uncertainty within legitimate research: highly qualified specialists have produced a range of predictions concerning political visibility of the global climate change. The usual method that science applies to the study of complex physical systems is numerical modelling. Physical modelling of climate is obviously possible only on a minor scale, and so theoretically based studies of the mechanisms of climate depend on computer-based calculations. Simple calculations can be done on a personal computer, but full-scale mod-

The Challenge 17 elling requires the modern generation of supercomputers. Because of the high cost, and the rigorous training needed, such work can be done only at a few centres around the world. A tradition of international exchange, with a free flow of information and scientists, has made this a productive exercise whose results underlie the political visibility of global warming. The models used at these centres calculate the climatic impact of future greenhouse gas concentrations. Because the various gases differ greatly in concentration and in ability to absorb radiation, the analysis is usually performed for the equivalent of doubled carbon dioxide. The latter calculation is referred to as the climatic sensitivity of the model. Table 1.1 lists the main gases concerned and shows their relative contributions. Most calculations have been for the steady state, that is, the model is run until it comes into equilibrium with an instantaneously doubled greenhouse gas concentration. More refined models (e.g., Manabe et al. 1991; Washington and Meehl 1989) simulate the real process, in which the concentration increases uniformly with time (at about 1 per cent per annum). These non-equilibrium models attempt to simulate the action of the oceans, which are cold below a shallow surface layer, and which also transport large quantities of heat about the earth. The oceans act so as to slow down the predicted warming. The growing number of model predictions — of hypothetical climates rather than the real future —has created a need for critical syntheses. The most recent of these syntheses have been conducted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Bretherton, Bryan, and Woods 1990; Cubasch and Cess 1990; Gates, Rowntree, and Zeng 1990; Mitchell et al. 1990). Cubasch and Cess have tabulated the properties and outputs of twenty-two equilibrium global models published since 1980 for doubled carbon dioxide conditions. Three of these, including the much-admired Canadian Climate Centre model, have the high spatial resolution that will be needed for any kind of political response. Four models — all published in 1989 or 1990 —couple ocean and atmosphere together. Only two (Stouffer, Manabe, and Bryan 1989; Washington and Meehl 1989) introduce greenhouse warming on a gradual basis. The conclusion of the Panel was that any planned action will depend on highly generalized predictions based on the equilibrium models but significantly modified by a new generation of experiments that adequately include the ocean. On this basis, the Panel concluded, inter alia (Houghton, Jenkins, and Ephraums 1990), that • equilibrium model predictions imply, for an instantaneously doubled greenhouse gas concentration, a global surface warming in the range 1.5°-4.5° C, with the best guess at 2.5° C;

18 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect Table 1.1. The Main Greenhouse Gases, other than Water Vapour and Ozone,3 1980-1990.

Gas

% Contribution to Global Warming, 1980-1990

% Annual Increase

Carbon dioxide5

55

0.5

Chlorofluorocarbons

24

4.0

Methane

15

0.9

Nitrous oxide

6

0.3

Source: Data from Houghton 1990. a

Water vapour and clouds play a key r61e in the earth's radiative balance, but their abundance is not known to be changing. Ozone's r61e is too complex to be analyzed in these simple terms. It absorbs solar radiation, as well as the earth's own emissions. bBecause of its relatively high concentration, carbon dioxide easily dominates the warming and is likely to do so for the next century, but the other gases are much stronger absorbers of radiation per molecule, and hence play a significant role. The synthetic Chlorofluorocarbons are especially good absorbers and are still accumulating rapidly.

(Source: Data from Houghton 1990.) • the same models predict a general cooling of the stratosphere (i.e., the layer from roughly ten to fifty kilometres above sea level); • models that couple ocean and atmosphere together, and that allow for a gradual build-up of carbon dioxide equivalent (at about 1 per cent per annum), predict a warming of about 60 per cent of the equilibrium model value; • business-as-usual economic scenarios (i.e., no control over emissions), using simpler models with "best judgement" estimates, predict a warming from 1990 to 2030 of 0.7° to 1.5° C, with a best guess of 1.1° C; and

The Challenge

19

• as an overall summary, combining the probable economic and climatic outcomes, the results predict a rise by 2070 of 1.6° to 3.5° C, with a best guess of 2.4° C. Two uncertainties affect these predictions, leading to the wide ranges cited. One is the insecurity of the economic scenarios used. Just how fast will the greenhouse gas concentrations increase? How effective will proposed control measures be? The second is the continued weakness of the models. Reasons include the difficulty of an adequate treatment of cloudiness, which affects both gains and losses of heat, and the limited power of existing computers. If these warmings take place, there will be inevitable effects on global precipitation, evaporation, and streamflow. The Panel offers only equivocal suggestions in these areas. A warmer ocean implies increased evaporation and hence greater global precipitation. Equilibrium model results predict, for a doubled equivalent greenhouse gas concentration, an increase between 3 per cent and 15 per cent in mean annual precipitation and evaporation, the smallest figure coming from the Canadian Climate Centre model, which has much spatial detail. This range of uncertainty is too great to be useful as a basis for planning adaptation strategies. As regards regional differences of precipitation, little confidence can be attached to predictions. The Panel's reporters (Mitchell et al. 1990) speak of a year-round increase of precipitation in high latitudes and an increase in winter in mid-latitudes. They also discuss a probable increase in strength of the Asian summer monsoon and a warmer, drier interior for North America, with a similar change in southern Europe. But on a five-star rating of their own conclusions, they give only two stars to most of the hypothetical outcomes. They also find that deforestation, such as the clearance of the Amazonian forests, has only local effects on the inferred changes. The ocean-atmosphere experiments with a gradual buildup of greenhouse gases give results that resemble the equilibrium estimates but are uniformly smaller. The expected changes in sea level are also smaller than earlier estimates. For business-as-usual economic scenarios, Warrick and Oerlemans (1990) predict a best estimate for the year 2030 of a rise of eighteen centimetres from present levels, and for the year 2070 a rise of forty-four centimetres, in both cases with very wide ranges of uncertainty. A rise of one metre in the next century, although widely discussed, is not supported by the calculations. The effect of the projected climatic change on forests and grasslands remains obscure. Clearly the rise of temperature implies a poleward shift of the present climates, and there have been many studies that estimate how individual plant species responded to natural rises of temperature in earlier climatic changes. But the Panel's reporters make it abundantly clear (Melillo et al. 1990) that no simple response can be deduced from

20 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect such evidence. Significant stress will be felt by all ecosystems, marine and terrestrial alike, that experience rapid climatic change. A warming of as much as 0.3° C per decade—widely predicted by the models—would certainly cause such stress, even if details cannot be specified. I agree with the Panel's overall qualitative judgement, in which "may" is as frequent as "will": Rapid changes in climate will change the composition of ecosystems; some species will benefit while others will be unable to migrate or adapt fast enough and may become extinct. Enhanced levels of carbon dioxide may increase productivity and efficiency of water use of vegetation. The effect of warming on biological processes, although poorly understood, may increase the atmospheric concentrations of natural greenhouse gases (Houghton, Jenkins, and Ephraums 1990, vii).

Despite this pessimistic conclusion, there have been determined attempts in Canada to be more quantitative. An excellent review by Hengeveld (1991) suggests, for example, striking changes in natural vegetation distribution for a doubled greenhouse gas concentration, with the present Boreal Forest being invaded by temperate hardwood species and (in western Canada) by grassland — accompanied by a rise in forest productivity and, less happily, by an augmented fire hazard. Major changes in agricultural productivity (though not of extent in the farmed area) are also foreseen. The story is nowhere near its end; the research community is still hard at work trying to do better. In particular, there have been challenges to the accepted view of the roles of clouds and airborne particles in the radiation budget of the models (see Arkin 1991 for an overview). Thus, Ramanathan and Collins (1991) have proposed that high cloud veils over "supergreenhouse" areas of the tropical oceans may act as thermostats, preventing ocean temperatures from rising above 32° C, thereby limiting overall greenhouse changes. Still more recently, Charlson et al. (1992) have found that sulphate particles of human-made origin may be offsetting the greenhouse warming; their calculations indicate that these particles, coming like carbon dioxide from fossil fuel and smelting combustion, exert a cooling effect roughly comparable to calculated greenhouse warming. If so, then the observed current warming will require re-evaluation. A very recent modelling exercise by Wigley and Raper (1992) uses new and improved scenarios of future greenhouse gas concentrations, and also considers the possible effects of the sulphate cooling just described, as well as the possible consequences of ozone depletion in the lower stratosphere. The authors conclude that these processes do indeed moderate the probable greenhouse warming, but they do not significantly alter the above conclusions. For the period 1990-2100 they find a probable sea-level rise of only forty-eight centimetres. The argument is not at an end, but recently each successive exercise has reduced rather than augmented the probable warming.

The Challenge 21 5. Conclusion We are thus in a remarkable situation. A bold scientific hypothesis has led to widespread apprehension about the effect of human activities on climate, which influences or controls most other global environmental components. Human welfare is seen to be threatened by the economic and political implications of the impending change. Enough has already happened to persuade many of the world's leaders that preventive action must be taken — if such action can be identified. What has emerged from the research literature is that warming is certainly in progress on the global scale, and that increases in the greenhouse effect are possibly — I would say probably —the main cause. But there is uncertainty as to the impact on human affairs or on the natural system that supports us. So far, the change of climate has been small —indeed, smaller than most theoretical models suggest should have been the case. The surface warming of the past two decades has been accompanied by marked cooling of the stratosphere, which fact offers qualitative support for the hypothesis of greenhouse warming at the surface. A major problem arising from the slowness of these changes is that they are not visible to casual observation. The ordinary citizen sees, instead, the remarkable month-to-month and year-to-year variability of climate. Cold, damp summers like that of 1992 east of the Rockies immediately weaken public belief in the longer term warming. Taking the long view, as climatologists do, is very difficult for the voter and hence for the politician. Nevertheless, the recent trend of temperature has been upward —and we are probably responsible. Model calculations based on theory, and on the hypothesis that greenhouse warming will intensify, offer a wide range of possible outcomes for the next half-century and beyond. None is necessarily catastrophic, but even the smallest credible prediction is larger than the natural changes experienced over the past ten thousand years. If the largest estimates are accepted, ecological and economic calamity may face the world. Even the smallest estimates imply substantial stresses for vegetation and animals and will call for significant changes in the human economy. The wise course is to be prudent and to act in our common defence. My personal concern about this issue is heightened by my belief, shared by many students of global change, that the greenhouse effect is only one aspect of a larger problem, which is the chemical balance of the atmosphere-ocean system. The greenhouse gases are linked, for example, to the ozone problem, in numerous ways. For example: • The ozone layer's chemistry, in the stratosphere, depends on temperatures at those levels, which in turn reflect the greenhouse gas concentrations. • Some of the synthetic gases that attack ozone, notably the chlorofluorocarbons, are also greenhouse gases, as is ozone itself.

22 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect • Nitrous oxide, an important greenhouse gas, breaks down when it reaches the stratosphere, and thereafter attacks ozone; it is a byproduct of bacterial activity in soils at the earth's surface. Obviously, the ozone problem and greenhouse warming are interlocked issues, and both involve ecosystem processes at the earth's surface. Also implicated is acidification owing to the release of sulphur and nitrogen oxide at the earth's surface —the acid rain problem. We have learned in the past two decades that the entire complex —the chemical balance — should be seen as a whole. Governments have already acted to regulate the ozone problem and the acid deposition issue. The greenhouse effect poses larger and more complex questions, but the earlier precedents will be helpful in the search for successful action. Finally, the ethical questions raised in this volume have arisen in the other areas of concern. Acid deposition, for example, led to the design (often slow and painful) of bilateral arrangements between Canada and the U.S. The ozone problem led to the Vienna Convention, to the Montreal Protocol, and to subsequent actions to update the latter (because the actual outcome, in terms of ozone depletion, has exceeded scientific predictions). Clearly, the question of how we should act to protect the atmosphere and ocean is generic to all such controversies. The need for sound judgement and good ethical decisions has never been more evident.

Chapter 2 ETHICAL PRINCIPLES Thomas Hurka As Hare notes in the preceding chapter, the challenge of global climate change raises ethical issues. What response to this challenge, whether by an individual, corporation, or government, would be ethically right? Resolving these issues is crucial to making responsible decisions about the climate. An ethical judgement about a climate policy is not just one judgement among many, to be weighed against economic, political, and other judgements in deciding how, all things considered, to act. It is itself an all-things-considered judgement, which takes account of economic and other factors. If a climate policy is ethically right, it is simply right; if it is ethically wrong, it is wrong, period. To resolve these ethical issues we need to combine empirical facts about the threat of global climate change, of the kind summarized in Hare's chapter, with general ethical principles that say what is right and wrong in all policy areas. Combining these general principles with the specific facts about climatic change will lead to specific policy recommendations. There is dispute, however, about what the correct ethical principles are, both between cultures and within Western culture; and this can lead to conflicting judgements about policies. Even if there were no uncertainty about the facts concerning climatic change —even if there were universal agreement about the consequences of different policies —the use of different principles could lead to different ethical conclusions. The situation is not, however, entirely bleak. Some proposed ethical principles are relatively uncontroversial and widely accepted: it is hard to deny them, and few writers on ethics do. Other principles are more radical. There is, in fact, a continuum of possible principles, from ones that are well grounded and widely held to ones that are more speculative and contentious. This fact can be exploited in discussing a particular issue such as climatic change. If one can show that a climate policy is justified using only uncontentious principles, one can justify it to most people, whatever their disagreements about more radical principles. In fact, this is a useful general response to ethical disagreement: on any issue, try to establish ethical conclusions using the least contentious principles possible, to maximize the chances of agreement. I will organize this survey of ethical principles so as to allow this kind of response. For each of the two main considerations relevant to the ethical evaluation of acts or policies, I will move from less controversial prin-

24 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect ciples to ones that are more radical. The authors of the chapters to come can then situate their discussions with respect to this continuum. Some may believe that acceptable recommendations about climate policy can be justified using only widely accepted principles; others may feel that this simple response fails, and that a correct response to the challenge of global climate change requires a fundamental change in our ways of moral thinking. 1. Consequences: Humans Here and Now An important class of ethical principles consider consequences. If an act or policy has good consequences, these principles say, this counts ethically in its favour; if it has bad or, especially, disastrous consequences, this counts ethically against it. A concern for consequences is especially relevant to the choice between the broad climate policies of adaptation and avoidance. As Coward has explained (see his "Introduction" in this volume), choosing adaptation means continuing our present practices such as burning fossil fuels, letting global temperatures rise, and then making whatever further changes this requires: building sea walls, moving populations from environmentally damaged areas, and so on. Avoidance means changing our practices to prevent any warming from occurring. Mixed policies combine elements of adaptation and avoidance: they include some measures to reduce the rate of climatic change and some to adapt to the warming that does occur. The first ethical issue concerning climate policy is what mix of adaptation and avoidance is ethically preferable: to what extent should we allow global climate change to occur, and to what extent should we prevent it? In trying to resolve this issue we will surely be concerned with the two policies' consequences. First, however, we require a more precise statement of what our ethical concern for consequences involves. One issue is the form of this ethical concern. A simple principle, popular among philosophers, says that each agent has the duty always to bring about the best consequences, or the most good, possible. This maximizing principle is central, for example, to the ethical theory of utilitarianism (Smart and Williams 1973). But there are other possible principles about consequences. Egalitarian principles care not only about the total good an act produces but also about its distribution: they may prefer a smaller quantity of good that is equally distributed to a larger total of which some have a disproportionate share (Rawls 1971). What have been called satis/icing principles (from the idea of "making satisfactory") are less demanding than maximizing. They give each agent the duty only to bring about consequences that are reasonably good, either because those consequences are above an absolute threshold of satisfactoriness or

Ethical Principles 25 because they represent a reasonable proportion of the most good the agent can produce (Hurka 1990; Slote 1985). Finally, any principle about consequences can be limited by a permission allowing agents to give some more weight to their own interests than to others'. They may still have a duty to sacrifice their interests for the sake of large benefits to others, but need not accept very great losses to secure just a small increase in the aggregate good (Scheffler 1982). Whatever their exact form, these various principles are relatively easy to apply when we know with certainty what the consequences of different acts will be. As Hare emphasizes, however, this is not our situation with respect to climate policy: there is great uncertainty about, for example, both the magnitude and the rate of the threatened rise in temperature. But it does not follow that principles about consequences cannot be applied. If an act or policy involves some risk of bad consequences this is a reason to avoid it, and this reason is weightier the worse the consequences are and the higher the risk. If the consequences are extremely bad, even a small risk of producing them is a reason to avoid the act and to accept some costs in doing so. This thinking is implicit in Hare's remark that, since "the potential consequences of the warming are enormous ... it is better to be safe than sorry" (see "The Challenge," in this volume, sec. 1). If the result of allowing climatic change would be disastrous, it is prudent to avoid this result even if we are not certain that it would come about. Once the form of a principle about consequences is settled we must specify its content, or the kind of consequences it cares about. If an act's consequences are good or bad, it is because they affect beings that matter ethically, or have ethical "standing" (Sumner 1981), in ethically significant ways. These matters too need to be spelled out. A relatively uncontentious ethical principle says that we have a duty to consider the effects of our actions on other humans living in our own country at the present time. (I assume that the view that each of us should care only about his or her own interests does not count as ethical.} Since humans in our country now have ethical standing, this principle says, it counts in favour of an act if it benefits them and against the act if it harms them. But what do benefits and harms consist in? On no plausible view can they consist ultimately in effects on people's wealth or income. Money is a means to the good life, but it is only a means, and we must know what deeper values it serves. There are two main theories about this. According to welfarism, humans are benefited by whatever gives them pleasure, fulfils their desires, or contributes to something describable as their "happiness." Petfectionism, by contrast, equates the human good with knowledge, achievement, love, virtue, and other states that it values apart from any connection to happiness. What matters is not how enjoyable someone's life is but how far it develops human potentials or realizes "spiritual values." But the debate between welfarism and

26 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect perfectionism, prominent though it has been in Western ethics, seems less important for an issue such as climate policy. It seems likely that, in this policy area, the acts that turn out to benefit and harm humans will be roughly the same on welfarist, perfectionist, and indeed all plausible theories of the human good. If we confine ourselves to the uncontentious principle that we should consider the effects of our actions on humans living in our own country now, what follows for the choice between adaptation and avoidance? This principle —call it the humans-here-and-now principle —does not count some of the largest harms threatened by global climatic change: that a rise in global temperatures may damage the environment, killing individual organisms and destroying ecosystems, does not matter in itself, since only effects on humans have intrinsic ethical significance. And many of the effects on humans do not get counted either. There is a substantial time-lag between the release of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere and the resulting increase in temperature. Partly because of this, the largest effects of global climate change are projected to occur several decades into the twenty-first century, when most of the humans living today will no longer be alive. And those who will be alive —future generations —do not have ethical standing on the humans-here-and-now principle, so effects on them are also irrelevant. At the same time, this principle does count many of the harms involved in choosing avoidance. If reducing the use of fossil fuels has economic costs, these will be felt initially by humans existing today, and the losses in welfare or perfection they may suffer are ethically significant. Given its restricted concern for consequences, the humans-here-and-now principle has a tendency to favour adaptation over avoidance — since it ignores many of the former's effects while counting the latter's, it has a bias towards letting climatic change occur. It is not that this principle allows no arguments for avoidance. If humans today want the environment to be preserved or future generations to flourish, then, according to some welfarist theories, they will be harmed by future events that prevent these desires from being fulfilled. And according to some perfectionist theories, if humans today are pursuing goals whose achievement requires the flourishing of future generations—if, for example, they are trying to preserve and pass on some human tradition —there is again an indirect here-and-now reason to prevent warming. But these here-and-now arguments cannot have great weight: even if humans today have some future-oriented desires and goals, they have many more directed mainly at the present. The more serious here-and-now arguments for avoidance appeal to consequences other than ones directly concerning climate. The use of chlorofluorocarbons, for example, not only contributes to greenhouse warming but also damages the ozone layer, creating health risks for humans in the very short term. Especially since chlorofluorocarbons are

Ethical Principles 27 easily replaceable, this last fact gives us a here-and-now ethical reason to eliminate them, a policy that happens, as a side-effect, to reduce global climate change. Other avoidance measures can be justified on economic grounds. Increasing the efficiency of heating and lighting systems or the fuel efficiency of automobiles and electrical generating plants can save money while, on the side, reducing emissions of greenhouse gases. This, again, supplies a here-and-now reason for these measures. Some argue that a policy heavily weighted towards avoidance can be justified on this narrow economic ground. Thus, a study by the Union of Concerned Scientists argues that reducing carbon dioxide emissions by 70 per cent over the next forty years would save the U.S. economy $2.3 trillion (The Globe and Mail, March 12, 1992). If anything like this estimate is correct, then even the least contentious ethical principle supports radical changes in the practices that threaten to cause global climate change. But others disagree, arguing that while 10 or perhaps 20 per cent reductions in carbon dioxide emissions can be achieved at modest costs, reductions beyond this level would significantly reduce the good of humans today (Nordhaus 1990a). If the latter view is correct, the here-and-now principle still favours a policy mix weighted towards adaptation. To justify more avoidance we would need to adopt a more controversial ethical principle, such as one extending the concern for consequences, and ethical standing, to humans in future generations and/or humans in other nations. 2. Consequences: Humans at Other Times and Places A concern for humans in future generations reflects the ethical idea that the temporal location of a harm or benefit —the time when it occurs —has no bearing on its ethical significance. Goods and evils in the future will be just as real as ones today and ought to count as much in our ethical deliberations (Sidgwick 1907, 381). This idea is central to the concept of "sustainable development," which "meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (World Commission on Environment and Development 1987, 43). To care about sustainability is to care about future humans as well as about those now alive. Like the here-and-now principle, a concern for future generations can take different forms. A maximizing principle tells us to produce the greatest good possible for humans in all generations, with future interests counted equally against those in the present. Egalitarian principles tell us to aim at equality between generations. Thus, in one formulation, each generation is to leave its successors a total range of resources and opportunities that is at least as good as its own (Barry 1983). Finally, what we called satisficing principles require each generation to allow its successors

28 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect to be, not as well off as possible, nor even as well off as they, but at least reasonably well off. A parallel extension of concern to humans in other countries reflects the idea that the spatial location of a good or evil —the place where it occurs—does not matter ethically: benefits and harms far away are as real as ones close by and should figure as much in our deliberations (Singer 1972). If we maximize or satisfice with respect to the good, we should include effects on distant humans in our calculations of consequences; if we are egalitarians, we should accept a principle of equality between nations. These two extensions give rise to three further principles about consequences. A humans-here-at-all-times principle considers effects on future generations but only in our country; a humans-everywhere-now principle considers effects on humans in all countries but only now. Both are more controversial than the here-and-now principle but less controversial than a humans-everywhere-at-all-times principle, which grants ethical standing to all humans, in all countries and all generations. What is the effect of these principles on judgements about climate policy? Extending concern to future humans allows some additional arguments for adaptation. These concern the long-term economic effects (such as a less productive future economy) of costly avoidance measures today, and the losses to those humans (such as perhaps western Canadian farmers) who might benefit from higher global temperatures. But the overall effect of the extension seems likely to favour avoidance. The largest effects of global climate change on future generations will probably be negative, through rises in sea level, the destruction of traditional habitats and industries, and the loss of biodiversity. If this is so, the extension of standing to future humans pushes the ethically acceptable climate policy closer to avoidance. To here-and-now arguments about, for example, economic efficiency, it adds further arguments about the need of future generations for a healthy environment. What of extending concern to humans in other countries? This may strengthen some arguments for avoidance. To here-and-now claims about energy efficiency in our country we can add similar claims about energy efficiency in other, especially developing, countries (see Blair and Ross, "Energy Efficiency at Home and Abroad" in this volume). And future generations in these countries are likely to be among those most seriously harmed by global climatic change. They live on low-lying islands or coastal plains or depend on industries such as farming or fishing that can be destroyed by small changes in the environment, and their local economies lack the resources to pay for the expensive adaptation measures that climatic change would require. But humans-everywhere principles also magnify the ethical costs of avoidance. Humans in developing countries have a low quality of life, and

Ethical Principles 29 any ethical principle that counts their interests will recognize an ethical demand to improve that quality of life. This improvement seems likely to require further industrialization, which, even given the most efficient technologies, will probably involve increases in greenhouse gas emissions from developing countries. To forbid these countries this industrialization in order to protect future generations' interest in a healthy environment is to do those countries' citizens a serious harm, that of perpetuating an indefensibly low standard of living; but to allow their industrialization is to place very serious burdens on developed countries. If greenhouse gas emissions will increase in the developing world, the reductions required in wealthier countries to ensure an overall decline in emissions are very large indeed. Some sacrifices by developed countries do not raise serious ethical objections: when the well-being of (most of) their citizens is already so high, a small decrease is not ethically troubling. But what is contemplated in the face of increased emissions from developing countries is a large decrease, and that may be a substantial objection to wholesale avoidance. This is, for many, the central dilemma of climate policy, and indeed of environmental policy generally: how to weigh against each other the interests of developing countries in a higher quality of life, based on further industrialization, and the interests of future generations in an unravaged environment. The dilemma is especially pressing for egalitarians, who must try to balance the competing claims of equality among nations and equality among generations. And it is created by the parallel extensions of ethical concern to humans at future times and in other places. The dilemma is worsened, moreover, if we factor in future population growth. According to one estimate, the world's population will increase to 10.7 billion, twice its present size, by 2030 if the current rate of growth is maintained (Horiuchi 1992). This increase threatens to swamp even substantial measures of avoidance. Even if the per capita rate of greenhouse emissions in the world is reduced by one-third (and remember the pressure for per capita increases in developing countries), a doubling of the world's population would result in an overall increase in the quantity of gases emitted. The prospect of population growth raises extremely difficult ethical issues. A maximizing principle must be able, in ranking possible future states of the world, to weigh against each other the value (if any) of a larger human population and the value of a higher average quality of life. There is no obviously correct way of doing this. (For one proposal, see Hurka 1983.) Egalitarian and satisficing principles must likewise address this problem. But the following seems plausible: if the future human population will be larger, our duty to restrain our polluting activities now for the sake of future humans' welfare or perfection is even more stringent. If we cannot fulfil that more stringent duty, we have an ethical reason to prevent or at least limit population growth.

30 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect 3. Consequences: The Environment Valued for Itself Despite their extension beyond the here and now, the principles discussed in the last section confine ethical standing to humans. If changes in the environment matter ethically it is only indirectly, because of their effects for good or ill on human lives. This human-centred assumption is explicitly stated in the Foreword to the Brundtland Commission report, which speaks of "people, whose well-being is the ultimate goal of all environment and development policies" (World Commission on Environment and Development 1987, xiv). A more radical environmental view rejects this assumption and extends ethical standing to parts of the environment. This environment-centred view directs us to care for the natural world around us, not just as a means to better human lives, but as an end in itself. This marks a radical break with much of traditional Western ethics, which has emphasized the lordship of humans over nature. It is a reforming view, and far from universally accepted, but it too comes in less and more radical forms. The less radical environment-centred principles are modelled on our ethical concern for humans. This latter concern is individualist, treating individual humans as the bearers of ethical value and any social or global good as merely an aggregate of the goods of individuals. Individualist environmental principles extend this approach to the environment, finding intrinsic value in the lives of individual non-human organisms. How far these principles extend standing depends on what the good in general consists in. Welfarists equate the human good with, for example, pleasure and the absence of pain, and will value the same states of feeling in nonhumans. This extends concern to mammals, who may also be capable of desires and satisfactions, and to organisms as far down the developmental scale as (perhaps) arthropods. But it does not include lower beings such as mollusks, insects, and plants, who lack the capacity for feeling. Perfectionists equate the human good with states such as knowledge and achievement, which they value apart from any connection to happiness. At the deepest level, many perfectionists equate the human good with the development of properties essential to or distinctive of human nature (Hurka 1993). Their environmental ethic will therefore extend standing to all beings with a nature that can be developed to varying degrees, that is, to all living things (Attfield 1991; Taylor 1986). The rationale given for individualist environmentalism is ethical consistency. If we value a state such as freedom from pain in humans, it is arbitrary and "speciesist" not to value it also in non-humans. We do not accept the racist view that the interests of whites count more than those of blacks even though there is no ethically relevant difference between them. In the same way, it is argued, we should not accept a view that gives ethical weight to a state in humans but no weight to a qualitatively similar state in non-humans.

Ethical Principles 31 Nonetheless, individualist environmentalism is criticized as insufficiently radical to capture the real intrinsic values in the environment, which reside not in individual organisms but in wholes such as species and ecosystems. It is argued, for example, that individualism cannot account for the importance of preserving biodiversity, or a large number of biological species. Biodiversity has value for humans, and there may therefore be indirect reasons to preserve it even on a human-centred view: humans can enjoy a varied environment, and the preservation of rare species may lead to benefits in the future, such as the discovery of new medicines. But some environmentalists claim that there is value beyond this — intrinsic value — in a rich and varied natural world, and that individualism cannot account for this value. If we have a choice between saving the last members of an endangered species and a slightly greater number of members of a populous species, individualism will tell us to prefer the latter. Because it counts only the interests of individuals, it cannot recognize the special environmental value in groups (Callicott 1989; Rolston 1989). Those who urge this objection espouse a more radical, holistic environmental ethic, which takes the bearers of intrinsic value to be wholes such as ecosystems or the entire biosphere, and which grants individuals ethical significance only as contributing to valued properties of these wholes. (Holistic principles can either be added to human-centred and individualist ones or, on the most radical view of all, can supplant them entirely.) The classic statement of this holistic view is that of Aldo Leopold: "A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise" (1970, 262). Ethical standing belongs not (or not just) to individual organisms but to the interrelated wholes they compose. Adopting either environment-centred principle, the individualist or the holist, would push the ethically acceptable climate policy closer to avoidance. The new principle would not see any significant additional costs in avoidance, since the bad effects (if any) of this policy fall almost entirely on humans: it is they whose quality of life may decline as greenhouse emissions are reduced. And the principle does see additional costs in adaptation: the harms this policy causes to the environment matter not just because of their effects on humans but also in themselves, as affecting a natural world that has ethical standing in its own right. The chief worry here is the threatened rate of climatic change. There is nothing in itself environmentally objectionable about change: those who value diversity should prefer a world where, through history, forms of life succeed each other to one where species and ecosystems are eternally fixed. But the rate of warming projected for the next century given adaptation is faster than any in the last ten thousand years, and forms of life that could adapt to a slower warming may be destroyed by one this rapid. This will be bad both on an individualist environmental view—where individual

32 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect animals will suffer or find their natural life-activities impossible — and on a holist view, where complex and fragile ecosystems, such as in the Canadian Arctic, will disappear. The strength of these additional arguments for avoidance depends on a further issue: how the good of non-human entities compares with that of humans. How much human sacrifice is ethically required to preserve, for example, an Arctic ecosystem? Welfarist individualism has an answer, at least in principle, to this question: the pleasure and pain of animals has equal importance to the similar pleasure and pain of humans. Humans are capable of deeper and more complex forms of satisfaction and suffering than animals, and their interests therefore sometimes count for more. But if the physical suffering of animals counts as much as the equivalent suffering of humans, arguments based on it must surely have considerable weight. Perfectionist individualism extends standing to more beings than does welfarism, and in that way allows a stronger environment-centred argument for avoidance. At the same time, however, it is more able than welfarism to draw distinctions among these beings. It can say that the capacities fundamental to human nature are higher, more complex, and therefore more valuable than those of non-humans. The flourishing of insects, fish, and mammals has some worth, but much less than the development of the mental and especially rational capacities of humans (Attfield 1991, chap. 9). Making these rankings more precise is extremely difficult, especially since there is no pre-existing scale of value to apply. The same difficulty applies even more to the holistic view, which must compare the goods of such utterly distinct entities as complex ecosystems and individual human beings. (I assume the view is adopted in addition to human-centred principles rather than, as on the most radical view, supplanting them.) But of all the environment-centred views we can say the following: it is hard to believe that a plausible weighting scheme will not grant at least some value to non-human entities. Given this, adopting an environment-centred principle will add at least some strength to the ethical case for avoidance; and if a weighting scheme gives great value to non-human entities, adopting the principle will add greatly to the case for avoidance. 4. Consequences: Further Applications Principles about consequences are relevant not only to the broad choice between adaptation and avoidance but also to other aspects of climate policy. In fact, some writers on ethics, known as consequentialists, hold that consequences are all that is relevant to any ethical evaluation, in any area: what is right is always, for example, what produces the most good possible. For maximizing consequentialists, once we have chosen a cli-

Ethical Principles 33 mate policy, the right mechanism for implementing it is the one that is most efficient, that is, that produces the greatest benefits at the least cost. Similarly, the right division of the policy's costs is the one that makes those costs smallest. Those people (or beings) should pay for the policy who are best able to pay, or who will be harmed least by paying, whatever their or others' responsibility for the problem the policy addresses. The implications of these further consequentialist ideas depend on economic and sociological facts about the efficiency of different policy mechanisms and the impacts on people of different divisions of their costs. However, consequentialism tends to imply that avoidance in particular ought often to be implemented in developing countries with its costs borne by developed countries. The rationale for the first part of this implication is efficiency. It is often more cost-effective to bring new industrial facilities in developing countries up to the highest technological standards of efficiency than to attempt expensive retrofits of existing plants in the developed world. The most efficient policy, therefore, will often operate in developing countries. The implication about the bearing of costs rests, given a maximizing principle, on the thesis of "diminishing marginal utility": that the contribution an extra unit of wealth or income makes to a person's quality of life, in welfarist or perfectionist terms, gets smaller the more wealth or income the person has. Where an extra thousand dollars can make a large difference to the happiness or human development of a person who is starving, it may not be noticed by one who has millions. Given diminishing marginal utility, the overall consequences of a climate policy will be better if its economic costs are borne by those who are wealthiest rather than by those who are poor. And this claim is strengthened if our consequentialist principle is egalitarian or satisficing. On an egalitarian view, we have an extra reason to equalize people's levels of well-being; on a satisficing view, losses by those whose lives are above a threshold of reasonable well-being have no ethical significance. The second implication also holds for a policy of adaptation. If global temperatures rise, adaptive measures should be implemented where they need to be—where environmental damage is greatest. But it is again best if the costs of these measures are borne by those who are wealthiest and thus best able to pay. This meets the general consequentialist standard that what is right is always what produces the best outcome overall. 5. Rights: Constraints Though some writers on ethics endorse consequentialism, many reject it. They agree that an act or policy's having good consequences is one consideration in favour of it, but they deny that this is the only relevant con-

34 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect sideration. Sometimes, they argue, "the end does not justify the means"; other times the act with the best overall consequences is wrong because it violates an independent ethical rule constraining the ways we may permissibly act in pursuit of valuable goals. Often these constraining rules are formulated in terms of rights: we have a duty not only to promote good consequences but also to respect rights. What is ethically right is no longer the act with the best consequences, but the one with the best consequences and that does not violate any rights. To say that a being has rights is to say more than that it has ethical standing. If a being has ethical standing, its interests are weighed equally against the similar interests of other beings in the calculation of good and bad consequences. But the result of this calculation may be that it is best overall if the being's interests are harmed: this may most further the interests of the group as a whole. This last implication is blocked by the granting of rights. If a being has rights, it has certain interests that it is wrong to damage even if the effect of doing so is best for all beings taken together. According to an absolutist rights view, the infringement of rights can never be justified by the appeal to consequences, "though the heavens fall." According to a non-absolutist view, avoiding a major disaster can justify infringement. On any rights view, however, an act whose overall consequences are only somewhat better than the alternatives is ethically wrong if it infringes a right. It is widely accepted that humans have rights, such as the right to life. For example, if the only way to save the lives of five patients who need organ transplants is to kill an innocent person and divide his organs among them, most people would say that the killing is wrong even though, by saving five lives at the expense of one, it has overall good consequences. And the right to life surely constrains ethically acceptable climate policies. It may be that, in the face of massive population growth, killing some excess humans would have overall good consequences, but such killing is ethically ruled out. The same is true of policies that allow torture of humans or violate their rights to democratic political participation or, more controversially, to make free choices about whether or not to procreate. There would be very strict constraints on climate policies if there were strong property rights, or rights to make choices about the objects one owns. Libertarians believe in such rights and argue that government interference with citizens' property (for example, compulsory taxation to finance a welfare system) is ethically equivalent to robbery (Nozick 1974). According to this view, a coercively backed avoidance policy, involving legally enforced emissions ceilings or a carbon tax, would be ethically unacceptable. The government could exhort its citizens to restrain their greenhouse emissions, and perhaps organize a plan enabling them to do so, but could not force anyone to participate in the plan. Any avoidance measures would have to be chosen voluntarily by individuals.

Ethical Principles 35 At the same time, however, as Danielson notes (see "Personal Responsibility" in this volume, sec. 2.2), a libertarian government would abandon the subsidies to road transport and fossil fuel extraction that make current emissions higher than they would be in a completely unregulated market. Some writers extend rights such as the right to life to at least some higher animals (Regan 1983), but this is more controversial. Imagine that a herd of elk has grown too large for its habitat, so food is in short supply and a population crash is threatened. If the individual elk had the right to life, it would be wrong to cull the herd to reduce its numbers to an ecologically sustainable level. Yet many of us, including many who are deeply committed to environmental values, think culling is right. Although it harms some individual elk, it is in the interests of the herd as a whole, and that seems primary. Even more controversial is the idea that ecosystems or environmental wholes have rights. This implies that it is wrong to interfere with an ecosystem even to give it more holistic value: more life or more biodiversity. Thus, it would be wrong, according to this view, to implant life on Mars because doing so would violate Mars's "integrity" as a dead planet (McKay 1990). This is very hard to believe. If environmental wholes count in ethics —and this is itself a radical view —they do so only in the evaluation of consequences. The rights that constrain our pursuit of good ends belong only to humans or, at the very best, to humans and some higher animals. 6. Rights: Compensation Rights have a further ethical function: to require that compensation be paid to those whose rights have been infringed. Sometimes compensation is owed when a rights-infringement was ethically wrong and therefore constituted a rights-violation: if a thief steals and damages your property, he must compensate you for the damage. At other times compensation is owed even though the rights-infringement was all-things-considered acceptable. Thus, it may be ethically acceptable for the government to expropriate your property provided that it pays you adequate compensation. Cases of this second kind place an additional constraint on the pursuit of good consequences: a policy that harms some individuals may be right but only if those individuals are compensated. This imposes a constraint because the policy-plus-compensation may have less good consequences than the policy-without-compensation, as it will do, for example, if the compensation is owed to the rich and the money would do more good if given to the poor. And even if the policy-plus-compensation has the best consequences, a principle about rights strengthens the ethical grounds for compensation: those who have been harmed should be paid

36 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect not just because this is good for them or for the world, but because it is owed them as a matter of right. Claims about compensation have been prominent in recent discussions of climate policy, especially concerning the division of the costs of avoidance. For example, developing countries have argued that because the developed countries bear the main responsibility for degrading the global environment, they should carry the main burden of repairing the environment. This is in effect a claim to be paid compensation by those who caused harms to the environment. In this unrestricted form, the claim is unsustainable. Someone owes compensation for harming another only if he or she knew or should have known at the time of acting that the harm would result, and in the early years of industrialization, in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, no one could have known the effects of, for example, carbon dioxide emissions on global temperatures. More recently, however, the developed countries have known of the risks of global climate change yet have continued to emit greenhouse gases, and the same will be true in the future if there is a conscious choice of adaptation. Both recent and future emissions will involve knowledge of the harms they may cause. Is there, then, or will there be a claim to compensation for these harms? Even this claim requires further defence, since not every harm to another involves an infringement of his or her rights. If I outdo you in fair economic competition, reducing your income and lowering the value of your assets, I make you worse off but do not owe you any compensation. It must therefore be shown by ethical argument that, for example, the earth's atmosphere is not unowned but is the joint property of all humans, so that actions that increase its temperature damage something over which other humans have rights. If this can be shown, those who damage the atmosphere must compensate its other owners. This means that an ethically acceptable climate policy must include such compensation: to the extent that it harms some individuals, it must include compensation payments to those individuals. And this in turn means that the ethically acceptable policy is probably closer to pure avoidance. If the acceptable mix of adaptation and avoidance is not the one with (simply) the best consequences, but the one with the best consequences once compensation has been paid to those harmed by its adaptation component, there is pressure on the mix to slide towards avoidance. A different claim for compensation was made by the Saudi Arabian delegation on the eve of the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992: that an avoidance policy must include compensation to oil producers for the sales they lose because of reductions in fuel consumption (The Globe and Mail, June 10, 1992). The same claim might be made on behalf of the Alberta oil industry. If avoidance will mean economic losses for the producers of fossil fuels, should there be compensation for these losses?

Ethical Principles 37 There would be no claim to compensation if the losses resulted from unilateral decisions by millions of individual consumers. That would be just a market development calling for no special rectification. The question is whether the ethical situation is different when the losses result from a governmental (or intergovernmental) policy that is coercively enforced: does a political program to cut oil consumption, through emissions limits or a carbon tax, give rise to a claim to compensation when unilateral consumers' decisions do not? The same question arises for another possible claim to compensation: from inhabitants of parts of the world, perhaps including the Canadian prairies, who would benefit from increased productivity if global climate change occurred but who will not benefit if it is avoided. They too have no claim if avoidance resulted from unilateral decisions by individual consumers, but what if there is a coercively backed governmental policy? This issue aside, is a claim to compensation weaker when others fail to benefit one, or to make one better off, than when they make one worse off? There are difficult issues about when compensation is owed, but most views assume they turn only on the rights of humans. Just as it is hard to believe that non-humans have rights that can constrain an acceptable climate policy, so it is hard to believe that they have rights that call for compensation within such a policy. If a mix of adaptation and avoidance harms some animals, that may be a bad consequence and something it would be desirable to prevent. But it does not call for compensation if, counting all interests equally, the mix has the best result possible. 7. Conclusion To evaluate climate policies ethically we need to combine empirical facts about the threat of global climate change with ethical principles. Two kinds of principle are relevant. The first kind concerns the consequences of acts or policies, and explains what consequences count ethically for and against them. The second kind specifies rights, which either rule out certain means to good consequences or require compensation for those knowingly harmed by others' actions. In each category there are less and more controversial principles. (We may not always follow even the least controversial principles when we act, but intellectually they are hard to deny.) Thus, it is relatively uncontroversial that benefits and harms to humans now living in one's country are relevant to evaluating a policy, and not much more controversial to consider effects on future and distant humans. (Extending standing to parts of the environment, by contrast, and especially to environmental wholes, is more radical.) Similarly, it is relatively uncontroversial that it would be wrong for a climate policy to kill humans, but more controver-

38 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect sial that it would be wrong to interfere with people's choices about procreation or about their property. It is less controversial that there should be compensation for those harmed by climatic change that was knowingly allowed to occur, and more controversial that there should be compensation for oil producers or for those who would have benefited from higher temperatures. A full resolution of the ethical issues about global climate change would require a complete selection among these ethical principles, but even without this we can reach some provisional conclusions. Even the least controversial principles about consequences concerning present and future humans give us substantial reasons to pursue avoidance, that is, to change our present practices so the largest changes in global temperatures are prevented. In implementing this policy we must respect basic human rights, but if we accept the least controversial claim about compensation we have a further reason for avoidance. If we knowingly do what causes global climate change, we will owe compensation to those harmed by the warming; if we want to avoid paying the compensation, we must prevent the warming from occurring.

Chapter 3 RELIGIOUS RESPONSIBILITY Harold Coward Why should the question of religious responsibility to the environment be included in a book on ethics and climate change? Three reasons may be advanced. First, just as philosophy and law and economics may offer guidance based upon a long history of human thought, so also religion has been and remains a major part of human civilization; therefore its wisdom should be considered. Second, since many in today's world are believers of one or another religion, an appeal for individual environmental responsibility could use as a part of its argument, at least, an appeal to the individual's religious beliefs. Third, some states are religious rather than secular (e.g., Pakistan and Iran); therefore, knowledge of religious responsibility can help in appealing to such states for international co-operation on environmental problems such as global climate change. This chapter will review each major world religion in turn for its view of human responsibility to the environment. A concluding discussion will locate the religions in relation to the ethical considerations laid out by Hurka in chapter 2. We will begin with the Western religions of Judaism, Islam, and Christianity before moving on to the Eastern religions of Hinduism, Buddhism, and Taoism and concluding with aboriginal religion. Although the responses of these religions to issues of population and contraception are related to concern for the environment, they are questions deserving of separate treatment. 1. Judaism The spring 1992 issue of The Melton Journal contains an article suggesting that the Jews' early loss of their land in medieval Europe (they were forbidden to work the land) caused them to become the first urbanized people. No longer rooted in the land, the Jews made their civilization portable and in the process lost their sensitivity to nature (Green 1992, 4). Rather than in nature, they found God in the study of books and the writing of commentaries. The emphasis having shifted to God, the Jewish people, and the Book (Torah), nature was lost from view (p. 5). Over the centuries Jewish theologians have responded by testing out a variety of positions on the relation between the divine and the natural, from a God who is creator but nevertheless quite separate from the world (Maimonides) to the world's being seen as simply an emanation of God

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40 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect (Kabbalists.) Green, however, argues for a balance between these extremes and suggests that such a balance can be found in the Scriptures. Although the Bible has a clear appreciation of nature, it is wary of any theology that would overly glorify nature. Early Semitic religion had deified aspects of nature (Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, s.v. "nature"). Israelite religion rejects such nature worship and clearly establishes God as above and separate from nature. Yet nature is also seen as God's creation: "The earth is the Lord's and all that is in it" (Ps. 24:1). Rather than as a subject for speculation, the Bible sees nature as "a testimony to the work of the Creator" (Isa. 40:26; Amos 5:8; Job 38-41) (Encyclopedia Judaica, s.v. "nature"). As the Psalmist puts it, "The heavens are telling the glory of God; and the firmament proclaims his handiwork" (Ps. 19:1). Humans occupy the ambiguous position of both being a part of creation and exercising dominion over it. As Genesis (2:15) puts it, "The Lord God took the man and put him in the garden of Eden to till it and keep it." Humans are not only part of nature; God has given them the role of partners in creation. The tradition recognized the dangers this posed for the selfish exploitation of nature by humans: "The rabbis ...were not unaware of potential conflicts over 'ownership,' seeing the natural tendency of people to forget the greater unity that they share with creation and begin to act as lords themselves, exploiting the earth for short-term gain while sacrificing life in the process" (Shapiro 1989, 180). Consequently, blessings were required along with special offerings before humans could use the fruits of creation. Such blessings recall to mind God's ownership of creation and caution against the misuse of nature. In the Torah, God reminds humans of God's ultimate ownership of the land: "The land shall not be sold in perpetuity, for the land is mine; with me you are but aliens and tenants" (Lev. 25:23). Humans are aliens not in relation to nature, but in relation to God. The Bible views humans as part of nature —a part that has self-consciousness. The danger is that human self-consciousness sins by thinking only of itself and forgetting its humble place in God's larger scheme of creation. Selfish use of the land can lead to its infertility (Isa. 24:4-5), and safeguards are built in to protect the land. Exodus (23:10-12) requires the land to lie fallow every seventh year and Leviticus (25) every fiftieth year as well. Indeed, Leviticus seems to suggest a fifty-year cycle where all hierarchy is abolished and everything renews itself on the basis of harmony between God, humans, and all of nature. All begin again from a position of peace. Such a vision is particularly present in prophets such as Isaiah and Ezekiel. Sometimes Scripture suggests that for God the world is a failed experiment, but no matter how failed he cannot let go of it, and so hope is renewed (e.g., the flood and Ezekiel's vision of the valley of dry bones.) Humans, whose sins

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have despoiled creation, are given a fresh chance as part of a renewed creation. Apart from such scriptural visions, Judaism seems often to have been dominated by a practical, self-interested approach to nature (Segal 1989, 4). A frequently cited passage, Deuteronomy 20:10, commands Israelite armies when attacking a Canaanite town not to destroy its fruit trees "by wielding an axe against them. Although you may take food from them you must not cut them down." Segal notes the rabbis elaborated this practical rule to "the prohibition of bal task-hit which extends the ban on wastefulness to include other foodstuffs, clothing, fuel and water, or any other useful resource" (p. 4). Today's rabbis presumably would have little difficulty including pollution of the atmosphere within this ban. Segal observes, "Jewish tradition seems quite aware of our dependence on our natural environment, and has set down concrete measures for ensuring its physical continuity as well as its quality. All this was done in the consciousness that God did indeed create in his world goodly creatures and fine trees to give pleasure to humans" (p. 8). Nor is the life-sustaining quality of the environment simply an obligation for the benefit of the current generation: God expects us to turn over the land to the next generation, to our progeny, with all its resources intact. The land is not ours to dispose of, but only to make use of with reverence and responsibility" (Schorsch 1992, 3). The same principle would be applied to the atmosphere. In the face of the pressures of proliferating population, what wisdom does Judaism offer to help sustain life on this globe? Many thinkers call upon the mystical thought of the Kabbalists in responding to this question. The answer offered is that humans must learn to limit themselves—their rate of reproduction, their use of natural resources, and their production of fouling wastes. The example to emulate is the Kabbalist vision of how God created the world. If God is omnipresent, reasoned the Kabbalists, the only way God could create would be by an act of tsimtsum — of voluntary withdrawal or limitation to make room for creation. Similarly, we as humans must withdraw or limit both our reproduction and our wants so as to make room for coexistence with our environment in this and future generations. The miracle of co-habitation with other living species, the beauty of collective I-Thou relationship with beings wholly different from ourselves, requires our self-limitation. If we were everywhere, our presence would herald the end of the teeming diversity of nature. Our fragile and unique habitat needs a reprieve from human assault (Schorsch 1992,6).

Hasidism of the eighteenth century took up another aspect of Kabbalistic thought leading to a reverencing of nature in all its forms —the notion ofshekhinah. This concept suggests that sparks of God's presence can be found in everything that makes up the world — in people, in animals, in organic and inorganic matter. Nothing, it is suggested, exists

42 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect without a divine spark within, a spark that is waiting to be released from its imprisoning shell of darkness and profaneness so as to return to its divine essence. The special role of humans in this situation is to constantly turn to God, for this action releases the divine in the world, enabling it to reach its consummation in God. Thus, each person is God's co-worker, responsible for that segment of the world that he or she contacts. It is this thought that was behind Martin Buber's (1958) idea that we must enter into a living relationship (I-Thou) with all humans, animals, plants, and so on, that we encounter in life.1 If we think of our responsibility to the environment from the perspective of Judaism and in terms of the schema outlined by Hurka in chapter 2, it is evident that Jews see themselves as having duties to other humans presently living (anywhere in the world) and to future generations. Less clear is the degree to which humans have duties to animals, plants, the environment and its ecosystems. Scripture and commentaries seem to agree with the practical position that humans should respect those aspects of the environment necessary to sustain life. From this perspective nature is valued mainly because of its usefulness to humans. At the opposite extreme are the Kabbalists and Hasidic thinkers like Martin Buber whose mystical perspective endows all of creation with a divine spark that it is our duty as humans to liberate through engagement in IThou relationships. Whereas the Kabbalists would adopt a pure avoidance approach, other traditions within Judaism would likely argue for a blend of avoidance and adaptation. 2. Islam Islam's approach to nature is conditioned by the fact that Islam is life affirming and world affirming. The world was created by God as the place within which humans can function as faithful servants. The human role is to work to shape the world into the pattern that God reveals in the Qur'an. In contrast to some ascetic religious traditions, Islam does not see nature as corrupted or discontinuous with God's purpose: In itself, the world is not to be denied and combatted. On the contrary, it is innocent and good, created precisely to the end of being used and enjoyed by man. The evil is not in it, but in its abuse by man (Al Faruqi 1989,227).

Muslims are directed to use their God-given intelligence to understand themselves in relation to nature and to satisfy their basic, instinctual desires while remaining in harmony with nature. Working to make the earth more fruitful or to further highlight its beauty is judged as an act of worship and service to God. As such it must be entered into with selfless dedication. When one's actions are motivated by the correct intentions, bodily and aesthetic pleasures are viewed positively as a foretaste of the paradise to come. Therefore the Qur'an commands, "Eat, drink and enjoy yourselves, but do not abuse" (Al Faruqi 1989, 228).

Religious Responsibility 43 The Islamic approach guards against any temptation to deify nature or worship any of its elements (e.g., the sun). Indeed, Islam sees nature as joining with people in the worship of the one God, their creator. God's lordship is understood as making all of nature and all people inherently Muslim: "There is the concept of a natural, cosmic islam, in which stars and molecules, species and elements, plants and creatures, all 'worship' by their very conformity to the laws of their being" (Cragg 1977, 11). Nature not only worships God but, by its very existence, displays God's potentialities and attributes (Chittick 1983, 58). As Sayyid Ahmad Khan, an Islamic writer of the last century, saw it, the potentiality of nature is empirical evidence of the goodness of God (McDonough 1984, 35). Potentiality, as seen by Islam, is present in both nature and humanity. And this potentiality is to be realized not in some alternative afterworld or heavenly kingdom (as in some Christian theologies), but in this world. God's judgement and the paradise or hell that follows is merely a reward or punishment for how well humans have used their freedom to actualize the divine potentialities of this world in this life (and so deserve the rewards of paradise) or, conversely, have misused their freedom to abuse themselves and nature (thus meriting the punishments of hell). Nature is also seen by Islam as a revelation of God that in a sense parallels the revelation of the Qur'an. Islamic spirituality is based "not only upon the reading of the written Qur'an (al-Qur'an al-tadwlni) but also upon deciphering the text of the cosmic Qur'an (al-Qur'an altakwlnl) which is its complement" (Nasr 1987, 345). Indeed, some Sufis have talked about the events of nature as verses of "the book of nature" set before us to be read (p. 355.) Nature and the Qur'an are placed before humans as twin acts of God's self-revelation. But for Islam the relationship between the two "books" is not equal. It is only through the revelation of the Qur'an that humans can learn to "read" the revelation present in themselves and in nature. Those who abuse nature to serve their own selfish desires misunderstand themselves, nature, and the mutual relationship between humans and nature, because they have not heard and accepted the words of the Qur'an. As was the case with Judaism, it is perhaps within mystical thought that this human relationship with nature and God is most clearly seen. Nasr (1987, 346) draws our attention to the Sufi idea that nature is the manifestation of God's compassionate breath. The Sufi mystic Ibn 'Arab! defines the very substance of the cosmos as the Breath of the Compassionate (nafas al-Rahman.) Nature in its innocence manifests God's compassionate breath through its regularity and beauty. The human who surrenders to God discovers the compassionate breath within and sees its presence all around in the creatures and entities of the cosmos. Nature is thus a vehicle by which humans can be brought to see God's truth, beauty, and compassion. Both the mystic and the scientist, through their respective disciplines, are understood by Islam as capable of seeing the

44 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect divine truth inherent in nature. For Islam the goal of both mysticism and science is to unveil the divine reality within nature and to enable humans to experience the unity of themselves and nature in the Quranic revelation of God. What then is our human responsibility to nature, according to Islam? The Islamic view might be stated simply as "God possesses the cosmos, humans have it on trust!" First, although nature is seen as created by God for the benefit of humans, it is clear that it is not to be used by humans for selfish purposes. Second, nature in itself is innocent and is a manifestation of God. Thus, nature is both a source of grace to humans and, together with the Qur'an, a revelation of God's truth. Third, nature, as well as being innocent, is also fragile. Its balance can be easily upset, especially by human wickedness. Natural disasters such as floods, hurricanes, fires, and earthquakes are interpreted by some Muslims as warnings from God that people are embarked upon a fundamentally wrong course of action, and the disasters that the greenhouse effect threatens could be similarly understood. When seen as a kind of "wake-up call" from God, the greenhouse effect poses a challenging dilemma to Muslims around the world, but particularly to those Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia whose economy has come to depend upon heavy use of oil.2 For such countries, and for the world at large, Islam's view of humanity as the "custodian of nature" (Khalifa} poses critical questions. Humans, as custodians of nature, are free to satisfy their needs only with an eye to the welfare of all of creation. In terms of Hurka's criteria from chapter 2, Islam maintains that we have duties to all humans, present and future, and to all animals, plants, organic, and inorganic aspects of nature —for nature is an innocent manifestation of God over which we as humans are given the responsibility of obedient custodians (as defined and revealed in the Qur'an). Humans are seen as having God-given rights to use nature in satisfying their proper needs, but humans do not have the right to use nature in a way that would upset the divine balance present in creation. Global warming would be judged by Islam to be a sign of just such abuse, and a warning that God, through nature, may be about to strike back. Thus, humans had better quickly change their disobedient ways. Obedience to the will of God, in the view of Islam, requires avoidance rather than adaptation. 3. Christianity Christianity views both humans and nature as created by God, with nature's purpose being, at least partly, to provide for the needs of people (Ps. 105). In this, Christianity is like Judaism and Islam. Again, as in Islam and Judaism, nature by its very existence praises God and manifests his awesome powers (e.g., Ps. 148). Unlike the Islamic view of nature as innocent in itself, Christian thought sees nature as having participated in

Religious Responsibility 45 the Fall along with humans (Bonhoeffer 1955, 144). Christian commentators such as Augustine have interpreted the Fall from a state of human innocence recounted in Genesis 3 as an act of wilful disobedience. Instead of our living according to God's will, the human desire to please itself makes "itself the principle of its own existence, and following its own will makes itself the evil tree that bears evil fruit in its deeds" (Babcock 1992, 136). Christian interpretation sees the Fall as a double act: a denial of humanity's original harmony with God and an assertion of human wilfulness. Calvin calls this "pride" and "ingratitude" —"Adam, by longing for more than was allocated to him, manifested contempt for the great liberality with which God had enriched him" (1962, 2:213). A peculiarity of the Christian view is that this human fall also drags down all of nature into a corrupt state. As Calvin puts it, "Through man's fault a curse has extended above and below, over all the regions of the world" (2:214). Paul speaks of humans and nature —the whole of creation — "groaning in travail together" towards the ultimate purpose for which God created it, namely, the revealing of the sons of God in which the whole creation will share (Rom. 8:19-25). Thus, there is a strong teleological thrust in the Christian understanding of nature. In the Christian view, a special contribution of Jesus Christ was his exposure of nature as having value, not in itself, but only in relation to God's purpose. After the Fall, nature is seen as awaiting the coming of Christ as the manifestation of God's grace, through which nature and humans can be properly understood in relation to God. As Bonhoeffer puts it, "Christ Himself entered in the natural life, and it is only through the incarnation of Christ that the natural life becomes the penultimate which is directed toward the ultimate" (1955, 145). Human misuse of God-given freedom brought on the Fall (for both humans and nature); God's grace in Jesus Christ restores to us the opportunity of living a righteous life in relation to nature and God (Rom. 8:1-4). Unlike Judaism, in which the revelation of the Torah provides all the help that is required, or Islam, in which the Qur'an gives the needed revelation, Christianity sees God's incarnation in Christ as essential to the re-establishment of right relationships after the Fall. For the Christian, it is the grace of Christ that enables one to see nature not from the selfish perspective of fallen humanity, but from the perspective of God. Only when this perspective is attained do humans function in the correct relationships between humanity-nature-God that bring forth the abundance of nature described in Genesis (1:26-31). It is in this context that the "human dominion over nature" mentioned in Genesis 1:28 is correctly understood from a Christian perspective. In a widely quoted article, the historian Lynn White (1976, 1205) has pointed to the biblical notion of humans as having "dominion over the earth" as a major factor in making possible the Industrial Revolution and its attendant devastation of the environment. Christian theologians (e.g.,

46 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect Shinn 1972, 139ff.) have responded by pointing out that White's thesis oversimplifies an extremely complex historical development. Nonetheless, no one denies that there is some truth to White's analysis. Quoting Genesis 1:28, in which humans are told to "fill the earth and subdue it, and have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the air and over every living thing," White suggests that such Christian ideas led directly to a human-centred and domineering attitude towards nature. Christianity established a dualism between humankind and nature and also insisted, says White, that God wills humans to exploit nature for their proper ends (p. 1205). Consequently, concludes White, Christianity, as well as making possible the Industrial Revolution, also bears a burden of guilt for human alienation from nature and the environmental degradation, such as the greenhouse effect, that has resulted. White's solution is for us to follow Saint Francis in trying "to substitute the idea of the equality of all creatures, including man, for the idea of man's limitless rule of creation" (p. 1207). Presumably White means us to include the plants and atmosphere in "the equality of all creatures." But is White's interpretation of Genesis a fair presentation of the Christian position? To answer this, one must do more than simply go back to the text of Genesis 1:28. One must also look at how Christian thinkers have interpreted it. Augustine, for example, held that the opposition between humans and nature obtains only in the fallen state. When restored to their true spiritual state by the grace of God in Christ, humans are co-workers with God in their pure intellectual knowledge and love for the whole of creation. Spiritual humans remain superior to nature, just as God is, but act towards it as God does —in true knowledge and love (Teske 1992, 72). Presumably, then, a Christian in a state of grace would not exercise "dominion over nature" in any way destructive of nature, as for example in producing the greenhouse effect. Although this may seem a satisfying theological solution to some, it still leaves Christianity with the dubious distinction of being the only world religion that views nature in itself as being in a fallen state. In Romans 8:21 Paul "solves" the problem by declaring that "creation itself also will be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God." This will occur, says Paul, when God's love is revealed in us through the Spirit of Christ (Rom. 8:12 ff.); it is by surrender to the grace of God in Christ Jesus that humans can transcend their fallen state and act towards nature in a non-exploitative fashion. Only through such a "spiritual domination" of nature can it be saved from its unmerited corruption and the whole of creation be returned to God's original purpose (Rom. 8:18-28). Williams points out that for the prophets, nature transcended the limits of human understanding but was not simply fate or chaos:

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The prophets' most radical idea was that nature as the society of created things was itself subject to God's redemptive action. God would remake and reorder it to fulfill his divine purpose (1972,50).

Against all cyclical or fatalistic views, the prophets saw nature as manifesting God's judgement and purpose. If necessary, God could allow the present disobedient order to pass away and could begin the experiment of creation over again —as in Eziekiel's valley of dry bones or Noah's flood. In the New Testament the possibility of the earth being consumed by flames is envisaged (2 Peter 3:10). The prophets politicize the relationship of humans with nature, maintaining that "nature and man are bound together in a fateful history where the responsibility of man for his life and for his world meets the demands of a new order in which basic justice is required" (Williams 1972, 57). In line with the prophets, the New Testament teaches that one must love one's neighbour in need (e.g., act as did the Good Samaritan). Christians today realize that their neighbour's welfare is strongly affected by the way they treat the environment, including the atmosphere. In the prophetic portion of the Bible, the emphasis of Genesis on harmonious life as God's purpose for the created order is extended into the future, couched in terms of obligations to future generations. As Barbour puts it, "There is a solidarity in time, a covenant 'from generation to generation.' The idea of creation is a great unifying framework, encompassing all forms of life and all time from past to future" (1980, 311, 312). The prophets were quick to criticize human greed and sinfulness in its many forms, but they also held up a hope for the future, a harmony that would include all humankind and all nature. In the New Testament the idea of "the Kingdom of God" is seen as referring both to another world and to this world in its hoped-for state of harmony among persons and between humans and nature. For the Christian it is this goal of history that leads us to see the world differently and to behave in new ways (Barbour 1980, 313). In terms of the duties listed by Hurka in chapter 2, the Christian approach, as outlined above, entails duties to humans anywhere now and in the future. Although nature is created by God for human use, it is also seen by Christian theologians as having intrinsic value as a part of God's good and beautiful creation. Humans through their own wilful disobedience have corrupted not only themselves but nature too. Only by opening themselves to the grace of God in Christ can humans regain their original state of being spiritual beings with God and use their dominion over nature in ways that will re-establish it in the glory God intended for it. Humans are seen as having a duty to use nature in ways that respect that intrinsic value—by approaching their God-given domination of nature with love and humility. More than that, there is "the recurrent vision of a new earth, a Kingdom of justice and brotherhood as well as harmony with nature, which serves as a standard of judgement upon the present order"

48 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect (Barbour 1972,6-7). The particular duties enjoined by this Christian view of environmental responsibility may not differ from those demanded by other religions or by non-religious thinkers; what is different is the motivation behind the behaviour. A Christian is motivated by humility in response to his or her perception of God's love known in the life of Jesus Christ. In addition there is one's sense of gratitude for God's gift of life to us. The Christian response to global climate change, then, seems to lean strongly towards avoidance. 4. The Eastern Religions It is often suggested that Eastern religion, philosophy, and culture offer a less hostile and more relational or holistic conception of the relationship between humans and nature. It is true that the Eastern traditions propose an intimate interconnectedness between humans and nature. They challenge the dominant Western view of a strong qualitative difference between humans on the one hand and animals and plants on the other. The basic Eastern position, to which all Hindus, Buddhists, and Jainas ascribe, is that just as humans are beings composed of a combination of spiritual and non-spiritual elements, so also are animals. The Jainas push this position to its logical conclusion and see even plants, rocks, air, and water as endowed with a spiritual dimension. In their view, every animal, plant or element of matter is a being in a different combination of the components that make up each of us. Thus, there is no radical break between humans and the non-human realms of nature. Consequently, we should treat animals, plants, and so on with the same dignity and respect we accord other humans. Clearly, this approach has significant ethical implications: exploitation of one part of nature (plants, animals, trees) by another part of nature (humans) is unacceptable. If it is unacceptable to exploit your child, spouse, or neighbour because of their stature as "beings," then it is also unacceptable to exploit another being, who happens at that moment to be an animal (thus the Eastern practice of vegetarianism — to kill and eat an animal is to engage in cannibalism). Although this way of thinking seems strange to our Western minds, it is supported by a well-worked-out theory that follows with forceful logic once its basic assumptions are granted. These assumptions involve the notions of rebirth and the law of karma. The latter maintains that every time you perform an action or think a thought, a memory trace is laid down in the unconscious. A good action or thought leaves behind its trace, as does an evil action or thought.3 When you find yourself in a similar situation in the future, the memory trace rises up in consciousness as an impulse to perform an action or think a thought similar to the earlier one. Note that this is merely an impulse (a disposition or desire) and in itself does not force us to repeat the good or evil action or thought. We still have free choice. We may decide to go with the impulse and repeat

Religious Responsibility 49 the action (in which case a new reinforced memory trace will be laid down in the unconscious) or to negate the impulse (in which case, using the analogy of the seed, the sprouting impulse will receive neither warmth nor nourishment and will wither away, leaving no further trace in the unconscious). Thus, by the exercise of free choice at each moment in life we either nurture or uproot the memory traces in our unconscious. In theory, then, every impulse I experience in this life should be traceable back to actions or thoughts since birth. But karma theory does not assume a tabula rasa, or blank mind, at birth. Our unconscious contains memory traces not only of all actions and thoughts since birth, but also of those from the life before the current one, and the life before that, and so on, backward infinitely (as karma theory rejects any absolute beginning and assumes that life has always been going on.) Consequently, each of us is thought to have a huge store of memory traces in our unconscious, which is constantly bursting with ideas, impulses or desires to engage in this or that good or bad action or thought. These impulses can, however, be controlled by the exercise of our own free choice, and if a particular action or thought is repeated often enough it becomes a habit. The result of this theory is the ladder of existence depicted in fig. 3.1. You are a human being and hence have free choice. If you use your free choice to act on the good karmic impulses that arise within consciousness, and negate the evil impulses, then at the end of this life you will have increased the number of good karmas (memory traces) in your unconscious and reduced the number of evil karmas. This will automatically cause you to be reborn higher up the scale. If in your next and future lives you continue to act on the good and negate the evil, you will spiral up the ladder of existence until you are eventually reborn as a god. Gods are beings just like us who, according to mythology, have the honour of superintending one of the cosmic functions (for example, the sun god). But this is merely an honour that involves no free choice. Once the merit from all the good free choices made as a human is used up, you are reborn as a human being with free choice. Now let us follow out the other possibility, that in this life you use your free choice to reinforce the evil impulses and negate the good. At death you will have increased the number of evil impulses in your unconscious and reduced the number of good impulses. This will automatically cause you to be born a step lower on the ladder of existence. If the same pattern is repeated again in future lives, you will spiral downward until eventually you are reborn as an animal. Animals are beings like you and me but with a heavier composition of evil karmas. They have no free choice but simply endure the sufferings to which their animal instincts expose them. Through these sufferings the karmas built up from years of evil choices (made freely as a human being) are expiated. One is then reborn as a human with free choice and the ability to move up or down

50 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect

the ladder through karma and rebirth. In the Jaina view, plants and atoms of matter are treated as parallel to animals.

Fig. 3.1. The karmic ladder of existence.

This is indeed a "long view" on life. After countless lifetimes it might well lead one to voice the sentiment, "Stop the world, I want to get off!" or, in Eastern terms, "Is there not some way out of this beginningless and seemingly endless cycle of birth, death, and rebirth?" The Hindu religion gives one answer, or path out, the Buddhist religion another, and the Jainas a third—all quite different.4 Before looking at the Hindu and Buddhist paths of release for their views of our human responsibility towards nature, let us first make some observations regarding environmental ethics based on the karma-rebirth theory. First, there is no radical separation between humans and other forms of beings (animals, plants, atoms of matter.) Instead, a radical equality is presupposed. Second, according to karma theory, I have created the karmic impulses (good or evil) that I am now experiencing, as well as my current position on the ladder of existence, by my own freely chosen acts in previous lives. And the free choices I am making in this life will affect where I end up in my next life. I alone, therefore, am responsible for the condition in which I now find myself and for the condition I create for the future. In this regard, karmic responsibility is seen as both individual and cosmic. The way I make my choices affects not only my future lives but also the future of all other beings—which in the karma-rebirth perspective includes all of nature. 5. Hinduism

In line with the theory of karma and rebirth, Hinduism sees all of nature as interconnected and capable of progressive transformation from matter to life to consciousness and finally to divine spirit: Each stage is cyclically interlocked with the other stages. The dead stone is linked to life in the vegetable kingdom, plants are linked to consciousness in

Religious Responsibility 51 the animal kingdom, animals are linked to the intelligence of homo sapiens, and man is connected to the Life Force within the cosmos (Crawford 1989,30).

As to the character of this "Life Force," Hindu scripture is quite explicit: The essential self or the vital essence in man is the same as that in the elephant, the same as that in these three worlds, indeed the same as that in the whole universe (Brihadaranyaka Upanisad 1.3.22, as cited by Crawford 1989, 33).

Crawford interprets the above Upanisadic verse as follows: The general idea behind this text is that the individual [self] atman is one with the universal Brahman. Brahman literally means "the growing or increasing force" (brih). This Brahman force is manifest in the divinities of heaven, and in human, animal and plant life on earth. All of these entities live an apparently independent existence, but they all emanate from Brahman and are finally reabsorbed into it. (33)

This emanation of the cosmos from the Divine is given detailed description in the Bhagavad Gita, where God's body is revealed as the whole universe. Many Hindus (especially those of the Vaisnavite sect) see trees, cows, and other material beings as manifestations of God in nature and therefore as fit symbols upon which to focus in worship. Nature, as God's body, is also seen by some as a guru or guide to God and therefore a fit subject for prayerful or scientific study (Klostermaier 1989, 319-21). In Hindu law books such as the Laws of Mann (1984) one's dharma, or duties, are specified as an integral part of the cosmic order of the universe (God's body). For example, the pollution of lakes and rivers is prohibited and severe punishments for offenders are detailed (4:56). Human intervention into nature is seen as lawful only when it does not disrupt the cosmic order (rta) as specified in the rights and duties of the Laws of Manu. The overall aim of the Hindu law codes was to safeguard "the mutual co-existence of all partners in the universe: it could not be the eternal law upon which man's own nature is founded if it led to a deterioration of the living conditions by being followed" (Klostermaier 1984, 354). Nature, as God's body, was carefully protected from human exploitation. Through its scriptures and law codes, Hinduism views the cosmos "as a series of interrelated systems that are in a state of dynamic equilibrium within which man must play his part as a responsible spectator and participant" (Crawford 1989, 30). This ideal of restraint leading to renunciation has functioned in India for centuries. As a result, Indian culture has a deeply rooted "conservationist ethic." Hindu ethics does not reject technology or material possessions, but sees them as having a restrained but proper place in the cosmic order of God's body. One could perhaps look to Mahatma Gandhi as an embodiment of the Hindu ideal of restraint. He attempted to guide India between the extremes of no growth at all and growth for material values only, and along a course of selective growth guided by spiritual goals. His Hindu Vaisnavia background—with strong Jaina influence — led him to

52 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect advocate social models that balanced economic and environmental needs. In terms of the range of duties listed in chapter 2, it is clear that Hinduism views us as having duties not only to humans, of whatever time and place, but also to animals, plants, and elements of the environment, all of which are taken to be God's body and therefore to have intrinsic value. Since the atmosphere is also seen as a valuable part of God's body, pollution of it in ways that lead to global climate change is not acceptable to Hindu ethics. Avoidance rather than adaptation is clearly the counsel of Hindu teachings. This counsel presents a serious challenge to India's modern cities, such as Bombay, where carbon dioxide pollution runs rampant. In spite of its fine ecological teachings, India, like the West, has ignored these teachings in its rush to modernization; it has not followed Gandhi's ideal of restraint. 6. Buddhism Like Hinduism, Buddhism adopts the karma-rebirth theory of nature and thus sees a continuity between human and animal life. Unlike the Jainas, Buddhists do not see plants and the inorganic elements of nature as composed of beings. However, some Buddhist schools, such as Hua-yen, do see all of the cosmos as one interrelated web of existence within which there is no hierarchy. In the Hua-yen universe, "There is no center, or, perhaps, if there is one, it is everywhere. Man certainly is not the center, nor is some god" (Cook 1989, 216). This quotation identifies another distinctive feature of the Buddhist view of nature —it has no God. From the Buddhist perspective, the universe has been going on without beginning, according to its own inner laws, and without the need of a creating, sustaining, or supervising God. The Buddhist universe is one of identity and interconnectedness: what affects one part of the cosmos affects all of its parts. Therefore the acts of humans, as part of the whole, are seen as intimately affecting the environment around them, of which they are a small but crucially interconnected part. Unlike the modern Western perspective, according to which people and, for some, God stand separate from and above nature, the Buddhist perspective recognizes only one level, nature, or the cosmos, of which humanity along with everything else is simply a part. Rather than thinking of the cosmos in terms of separate entities, Buddhism conceives of reality in terms of the relationships between entities. And rather than thinking of reality as distinct parcels of matter, Buddhists view it as the dynamic interrelationships that structure the whole. The Buddha "taught that to exist in any sense at all means to exist in dependence on the other, which is infinite in number. Nothing exists truly in and of itself, but requires everything to be what it is" (Cook 1989, 220). In this regard, Buddhist thought is often said to be close to that of

Religious Responsibility

53

modern physics and notions such as Einstein's theory of relativity, in which relationship is fundamental (p. 219). Things in nature, including humans, are said to be empty (tsunya) of any essence or self-existence (svabhava.} Their existence arises from their relations of interdependence with the rest of the cosmos. The ethical implication of this viewpoint is that every single thing in the universe is important and thus deserving of respect. All human interaction with nature occurs within this context. Humans, then, are seen to exist not separate from nature, but only within their interrelationship with the whole of nature. All of this should not be taken as suggestive of determinism. Indeed, Buddhism emphasizes human free choice and our responsibility to use that freedom wisely and with compassion. It is free will that enables humans to use nature in a non-destructive way: "It is not necessary for humanity to undergo passively the hazards of Nature or aggressively dominate Nature, but rather to meaningfully harness it" (de Silva 1991, 176). Humans must live in harmony with animals, plant life, and the environment. The Buddhist teaching of the contemplation of nature (as in a Zen garden) reminds one of the Hindu notion of nature as guru and leads towards a conservation ecology. One learns that nature does not exist for humanity nor humanity for nature. Rather, nature includes humanity: the harming of another human being or the causing of any kind of degradation against nature in all its forms is tantamount to harming oneself as well as nature. In this sense ecological degradation may be conceived of as a crime against humanity. The Buddha taught that "all experienced phenomena, including human life, have dependently arisen (pratityasamutpanna)" (Kalupahana 1989, 251). The basic idea here is that everything is constantly becoming. The next moment of our existence is dependent on the previous moment, which must disintegrate to allow the next moment to arise. In this formulation the Buddha is simultaneously pointing out that everything is in constant change and that the metaphysical notion of an unchanging human self or soul existing separate from nature is an illusion. Recognition of our conditioned existence enables us to excise what to the Buddha was the single biggest obstacle to living in harmony with nature, namely, ego-selfishness — insatiable greed. Our desire for more of everything arises, said the Buddha, from the mistaken belief that each of us is a separate soul, self, or ego that has some kind of permanence. It is this illusion of a continuing self, soul, or ego that provides a foothold for the "I" that constantly desires more. Once we come to see ourselves as merely a tiny part of the dependent, arising process of the universe, there is simply no place left for the existence of a soul or ego, and therefore no basis for the arising of desire. Without desire driving us to possess ever more for our illusory selves, we are free to choose to act in harmony and compassion with the changing processes of nature of which we are a part.

54 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect By getting rid of selfish desire, the Buddha believed, we would be able to stop inflicting pain on animals and other humans. We would also protect the forests, the soil, and the water. Were the Buddha alive today, he would certainly add the atmosphere to his list. The Buddha operationalized this valuing of all forms of nature by laying down a set of rules (the Vinaya-pitaka) to be followed by all his monks and nuns. A less rigorous list was developed for laypeople. Both lists emphasize the overcoming of desire, the taking of a middle road between pleasure and asceticism, and the practice of compassion towards all of the cosmos. However, Buddhism does distinguish between the degree of compassion due humans and animals (the relevant rule being complete non-violence) and that due plants and the physical environment. The latter were not thought to have equivalent value: While the Buddha attached great importance to the planting of trees, the construction of parks, reforestation, preservation of water, etc., he does not espouse a "biotic egalitarianism," in which plants and animals are considered ethically on an equal footing with humans (de Silva 1991,181-82).

But the Buddha certainly did not condone an aggressive attitude towards the environment. Plants give us food and add an aesthetic dimension to life that can bring us closer to a realization of the whole. After all, it was when seated between the roots of a tree that the Buddha reached enlightenment. Buddhism is of particular interest in our study of the ways that the various religions regard our human responsibility to nature. Rejecting all concepts of God and any notion of scriptural revelation, Buddhism proceeds by empirical perception and rational analysis to establish duties that, in Hurka's terms (see chap. 2), extend to include humans and animals of whatever time and place. Plants and the rest of the environment are respected as a critical part of the cosmos, but valued somewhat less than humans and animals. All, however, are seen as interdependent parts of the cosmos and thus as essential to the harmony of the whole. As regards global climate change, the counsel of the Buddha would lean strongly to the avoidance side of the scale. 7. Taoism Indian thought provided the cradle for Hinduism and Buddhism. As evidenced above, Indian thought (although quite different in its basic presuppositions, such as karma and rebirth) shares with the West an approach to nature that often emphasizes laws or principles by which nature is to be ordered and understood. When we shift from the West and India to China, we encounter a radically different approach to nature. The Chinese give primacy to the concrete particular in its aesthetic context rather than to an a priori metaphysical theory. For example, whereas in Plato one proceeds by moving from the concrete particular to the ab-

Religious Responsibility 55 stract universal (i.e., the "real" forms or ideas), in Chinese Taoism there is no preassigned pattern. Rather, "the organization and order of existence emerges out of the spontaneous rearrangement of the participants" (Ames 1989,117). The Chinese adopted a "this-worldly" focus on the details of daily life as a basis for understanding nature and the cosmos. They emphasized the uniqueness of a particular person or event and at the same time stressed the interrelatedness of that particular to its cosmic context. This Chinese sensibility, suggests Ames, leads to an approach to nature characterized by "polarity" rather than the "dualism" of the West, in which humanity and nature or nature and God are seen as radically separate concepts. Polarity, by contrast, views such concepts as interrelated in such a way that each requires the other for understanding. For example, in the Taoist concepts yin and yang, "yin does not transcend yang, nor vice versa; rather, yw entails yang and yang entails yin" (Ames 1989, 119). Darkness does not transcend light, nor vice versa; rather, each entails the other. In conceptual polarity each pole can be understood only in relation to the other. In dualist thinking, by contrast, the two concepts involved are seen in opposition (e.g., male versus female), thus leading to discrete, essentialistic interpretations of the world. Thus, from the dualist perspective it is relatively easy for humans to approach nature as a separate category of existence composed of things to be used as required. The polar character of Chinese thinking and experience resists such a reification of nature and conditions one into an intimate relational perception. All of this is well represented in Taoism: nothing can be understood in isolation from its context. In fact, nothing exists by itself; all things exist only in interdependence and interpenetration. This viewpoint is captured in the Taoist concepts of te and tao. Te denotes the particular in its environment. It is both an individuating and an integrating concept. One writer offers the analogy of the stewpot: "Just as any one ingredient [te] in the stewpot must be blended with all of the others in order to express most fully its own flavor, so harmonization with other environing particulars is a necessary precondition for the fullest self-discourse of any given particular" (Ames 1989, 126). For one to fully express or individuate oneself, it is necessary to harmonize and integrate oneself with other humans, nature, and the whole cosmos. With such integration, one's particular humanness (te) will be realized. Contrary to what we might expect, Taoism does not see integration with the whole as in conflict with individual freedom and creativity. Te as one's particular nature is understood by Taoism to have an inherent drive to self-expression and self-individuation. But such dynamic manifestation of the te, when integrated into the complexity of the larger whole, is called the tao. The distinction between te and tao, therefore, is one of degree rather than kind. The te, when fully individuated and integrated, is but a particular aspect of the tao: "When te is cultivated and accumulated such

56 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect that the particular is fully expressive of the whole, the distinction between tao and te collapses" (Ames 1989, 128). The result is harmony, regularity, and rhythm, and the action involved is described by Taoists as wu-wei (translated as "non-action," meaning no self-willed action independent of the tao). It is also called tzu-jan (spontaneity or uncontrived action). Like Hindu and Buddhist texts, Taoist texts "see the dissolution of discriminating ego-self as a precondition for integrative natural action and the concomitant extension of te" (Ames 1989, 129). Taoists aim for the overcoming of one's ego and the swelling of te to embrace other humans and one's natural environment. The person of te facilitates and interprets the meaning or expression already inherent within nature. Tao refers to the ethos or natural environment within which the particular te exists. However, tao must not be thought of as the passive whole; it is fundamentally active, as is the te. Ames points out that the tao has often been misunderstood in the West as the pre-assigned laws of nature or as an unconditioned absolute existing beyond the empirical world. Instead, it should be understood "as the regularity and cadence achieved by nature ... the character or disposition of an integrated natural environment that conduces most fully to the expression of the integrity of its constituent particulars" (Ames 1989, 134-35). The particular and its environment are inseparable polarities. Rather than characterizing the tao in terms of scientific law or a priori rational order, we should think of it as the aesthetic order of nature — similar to the way we might judge a sculpture or painting in terms of the "rightness" of its creative expression (p. 135). The application of this Taoist vision of the cosmos to the issue of human responsibility to nature seems straightforward. Humans must learn to see themselves as not separate from nature, nor should they see nature as a means of achieving their own ends. Actualization of our human potential and the cultivation of nature's potential are two sides of the same coin. Therefore, in thinking of our duties in response to the greenhouse effect, we can never abstract ourselves from the whole environment within which we live and move and have our being. Rather than starting from an abstract universal ethic, we are to begin from our own particular experience, applying ourselves "to the aesthetic task of cultivating an environmental ethos in our own place and time, and recommending this project to others by our participation in their environments" (Ames 1989, 142). From the Taoist perspective, such activity is at once a fulfillment of our personal responsibility and an aesthetic enjoyment. How does all of this fit into Hurka's schema of chapter 2? It takes one immediately to the broadest range of inclusiveness — humans everywhere and at all times, animals, plants, the atmosphere, and everything in nature. The Taoist vision resists any categorization that does not simultaneously involve all of the cosmos. From this perspective, one cannot

Religious Responsibility 57 think about duties to other humans or to animals or the atmosphere without placing those considerations in the living context of which they are a part—namely, the whole dynamic cosmos, the tao. As for the question of avoidance or adaptation, Taoism would eschew this polar categorization of action and instead counsel wu-wei, or non-ego-centred behaviour, in harmony with the tao. 8. Aboriginal Religion The North American aboriginal perspective is in many ways very close to the Taoist viewpoint. In contrast to the theoretical yin-yang formulation, however, the aboriginal tradition views the cosmos as a community of "peoples." Humans, animals, plants, rocks, trees, and wind are seen as different species of peoples: Our animate-inanimate dichotomy, or our categories of animal, vegetable, and mineral, for example, have no meaning for the Indian who sees that all that exists is animate, each form in its own special way, so that even rocks have a life of their own and are believed even to be able to talk under certain conditions (Brown, 1973,193).

Put another way, all of the entities that make up nature share in the same consciousness that humans enjoy and thus are seen as different species of peoples. The consciousness that is possessed by all aspects of nature is described by aboriginals in terms of manifesting divine spirit; all things are suffused, unified, and transcended by the unseen presence of the Great Spirit. The Sioux Indian John Fire Lame Deer gives this notion metaphysical expression: You can't explain it except by going back to the "circles within circles" idea, the spirit splitting itself up into stones, trees, tiny insects even, making them all wakan by his ever-presence. And in turn all these myriad of things which make up the universe flowing back to their source, united in one Grandfather Spirit (as quoted by Callicott 1989,186).

There is of course no one aboriginal religion or culture, but the many North American aboriginal traditions share a belief in the environment as composed of different peoples manifesting the one divine spirit (as expressed by Lame Deer). This idea leads directly to a genuine respect for the welfare of all forms of nature within the environment. Central to the notion of "person," for aboriginal and non-aboriginal alike, is the idea that persons must be treated with respect and not be intentionally harmed. By seeing all aspects of the environment as different species of persons, the aboriginal traditions manifest a strong and inclusive environmental ethic. Humans together with all the component parts of nature (including the atmosphere) are seen as members of an intimately related family: "Not only does everything have spirit, in the last analysis all things are related together as members of one universal family, born of one father, the sky, the Great Spirit, and one mother, the Earth

58 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect herself (Callicott 1989, 186). Although the words are those of Lakota sage Black Elk, the concept of the Great Spirit, as symbolized by the sky, and the Earth Mother producing the family of creatures composing nature is so common as to be very nearly universal in North American Indian thinking. The ethic it generates enjoins one to treat all of nature as one would treat the members of one's own family and to recognize that there is a spiritual aspect to all natural things. Human beings are part of a larger social and physical environment, belonging to both the human community and the community of all nature (Callicott 1989, 189). The ethical responsibilities and mutual obligations due to the members of one's own family or tribe are extended to include one's "natural relatives" that make up the environment. This cosmic kinship group enables the aboriginal, even when alone in nature, to feel as comfortable and secure as one would feel in the midst of a large family: "Even without human companionship one was never alone. The world teemed with life and wisdom, there was no complete solitude" (Luther Standing Bear, as quoted by Brown 1973, 194). This aboriginal perspective does not necessitate a romantic relationship with nature. Nor did the fact that animals are another species of persons lead the aboriginals to vegetarianism, as the theory of karma-rebirth did the Hindus and Buddhists, or, when plants were considered, to the extreme of self-starvation, as it did the Jainas. Instead, the aboriginal ethic required that one approach the animal or plant needed for survival with sincere respect and kinship feeling. This ethic allows for the eating of animals and plants in order to satisfy one's daily needs but proscribes the abuse of these other species of persons for personal overindulgence or selfish materialistic gain. This same ethic extends itself to our current focus upon the atmosphere. The air is, from the aboriginal perspective, a member of our cosmic kinship group. It makes possible our survival as humans and is necessary for the well-being of other members of our cosmic family —the animals, plants, and the oceans. Pollution of the air, caused by the consuming of more than is essential for life, is unacceptable in light of our responsibilities both to other humans and to the animals, plants, and oceans that will be adversely affected both now and in the future. In summary, like Taoist thought, the aboriginal traditions would insist on extending Hurka's categorization of ethical responsibilities to humans here and everywhere, and to all aspects of nature both now and for the future. Adaptation to changes induced by global climate change would be acceptable to the extent that warming was the result of ethical human behaviour necessary for survival; but to the extent that it was the result of human behaviour motivated by the selfish desire for more food and material possessions than are necessary for survival, aboriginal religion would require avoidance. The aboriginal approach is consistent with Aldo Leopold's ecological concept of a biotic community: "All ethics so

Religious Responsibility 59 far evolved rest upon the single premise that the individual is a member of a community of interdependent parts" (Callicott 1989, 215). To this the aboriginal would add that all of these interdependent parts are but manifestations of the one Great Spirit. 9. Conclusion All the religions reviewed see nature as having varying degrees of intrinsic value, with the Eastern and aboriginal religions taking a stronger stance on this issue. The Western religions are more anthropocentric, yet none of them give humans unchecked dominion over nature in satisfying their desires. Their various visions of a transcendent creator God place upon humans the responsibility of being co-stewards of the environment God has provided for their use. Recent commentators (Callicot and Ames 1989, 281) have suggested that the above differences among religions do not seem to make much difference when we examine how humans have in fact interacted with nature. In both the East and the West the environment has been ruthlessly exploited. In the view of such commentators it is our innate aggressiveness as Homo sapiens, inherited from prehuman savanna primates, that is at the root of the problem. This might lead one to the pessimistic conclusion that what religions teach about the environment or what Hurka's ethical principles counsel does not after all matter, for we as humans are simply driven by our biological inheritance. Neither the religions reviewed nor Hurka's ethics would accept such a deterministic position. There is simply too much evidence that humans can and do change their behaviour —sometimes in radical fashion. It is in this context that the question to be asked of the religions is not, What have their followers done in the past in relation to the environment? but, What do they teach today? Two questions must be considered: (1) Do the religious ideas of a tradition encourage environmental exploitation and destruction? (2) Do the religious ideas of a tradition offer correctives to exploitation and destruction? When these questions are asked, we can then begin to draw distinctions between religions. Although all the religions reviewed here teach that nature is to be respected and not abused for human self-satisfaction, it is true that the Eastern and aboriginal traditions are more congenial to ecology and a conservationist ethic. The unity of humans and nature found in their thought is quite different from the duality of the two fostered in much Western religious thought. The active domination of nature may not have been the intent of Jewish and Christian teachings, but one can nonetheless see how Genesis is open to such interpretations in ways that the Eastern views are not. White's (1967) contribution is useful in helping us to see how biblical views about the human domination of

60 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect nature, when decontextualized, encourage us to exploit. Eastern and aboriginal ideas are a clear corrective in this regard. T.S. Eliot (1952, 286) in his poem "The Hollow Men" says: Between the idea And the reality Between the motion And the act Falls the shadow

If, as Callicott and Ames (1989) suggest, "the shadow" obstructing the actualization of our responsibilities to the environment is our innate human aggressiveness, then the worldviews of the religions reviewed in this chapter can only help. Each offers an assessment of our human condition in relation to the cosmos that to varying degrees would temper our aggressiveness towards nature. Although there are failures within all cultures and religions, there is also evidence that what we think can affect the way we act. The shadow can be flooded with light. All of the religions reviewed show, to varying degrees, an enlightened understanding of our human duties to the environment. To meet our current crisis, the ecological resources of these religions can usefully be engaged by both individual believers and religious cultures or nations. In some religions (e.g., Buddhism) ways can be found of joining religious insights with those of science and secular scholarship in the struggle to safeguard both human life and the environment. Perhaps together we can avoid the kind of shadow Eliot (p. 287) saw at the end of his poem: This is the way the world ends Not with a bang but a whimper

and instead actualize his other vision: For Thine is Life is

Notes 1 Buber was aware of the parallel notions present in Hindu, Buddhist, and Taoist thought; see Wood (1984.) 2 It is of interest that a recent government-sponsored publication of Saudi Arabia remains silent on this question; see Al-Farsy (1990.) 3 The criteria for good or evil are determined as follows: For a Hindu, good and evil actions or thoughts are defined in the revealed scripture, the Veda. In Buddhism, where there is no God or revealed scripture, good and evil are defined in terms of the intention motivating your action or thought (e.g., the intention to harm one's neighbour/dog/field produces an evil karma or memory trace). For a philosophical study of karma, see Reichenbach (1990). 4 For a review of Hindu and Buddhist thought, see my Sacred Word, Sacred Text: Scripture in World Religions (1988) and Pluralism: Challenge to World Religions (1985).

Chapter 4 THE ARCTIC-A CANADIAN CASE STUDY Harvey A. Buckmaster This chapter provides an example of the implications global climate change holds for a significant and unique region of planet Earth, as well as an ethical analysis and assessment of these implications and the consequent decisions that must be made in the near future. It is particularly appropriate that the Arctic be chosen as illustration in a Canadian study, since the Arctic and subarctic regions constitute a signficant portion of our country. Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Finland, C.I.S., and U.S. (Alaska) are northern countries because they have land masses and territorial waters that border on the Arctic Ocean or are north of the Arctic Circle (66.5N. lat.), as fig. 4.1 shows. I will summarize those features of the Arctic and subarctic regions that are relevant to a discussion of the impact of warming as predicted by the Canadian Climate Centre high-spatial-resolution, third-generation general circulation model, and were not discussed by Hare (see "The Challenge" in this volume). This discussion will focus on the complex interrelationship between the native population, the wildlife on which they subsist, the lower orders of flora and fauna, and the land- and sea-scape changes, as well as more global implications. Finally, I will attempt an ethical analysis that examines the implications of these projected changes and the rights of the indigenous peoples and other northern residents as well as those of the flora and fauna of the Arctic and subarctic regions. The special responsibility that Canada has, as one of the eight northern countries and as one of the developed countries contributing to global climate change, to provide global leadership in assessing the feasibility of various ameliorative scenarios will also be considered. 1. Climate Change in the Arctic — Environmental Factors The following is a summary of the environmental factors that are important in understanding the implications of global climate change for the Arctic. Comprehensive discussions can be found in Roots (1989), McCulloch (1990a), Houghton, Jenkins, and Ephraums (1990), and Hengeveld (1991). Planet Earth is a complex thermodynamic system that is forced to maintain both short- and long-term equilibrium whilst responding to the various characteristics of its relationship with the sun, its primary source of heat energy. I do not address factors that determine

62 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect

Fig. 4.1. Circumpolar projection map of the Arctic and subarctic. (Source: U. S. Central Intelligence Agency 1991.)

The Arctic 63 the cycle of ice ages because my primary concern is the climate of the oast ten thousand years (the Holocene epoch). 1.1 Heat Flux Patterns The tilt of the Earth's rotational axis with respect to its orbital plane means that the solar energy flux at its surface is much less at polar latitudes than at the tropics, and that no direct flux is received during a fraction of each year. Simultaneously, the heat flux from the region to space is radiated radially, as it is from every other part of the planet. Consequently, it is surprising that the annual Arctic radiation budget at the surface is in near balance, as Barry and Hare (1975) have shown, although a strong year-round cooling of the atmosphere by long-wave radiation occurs from the outer surfaces of clouds. This net loss must be compensated for by the transport of heat from lower latitudes via ocean currents and atmospheric circulation. These factors make the polar regions very dependent on heat transport from low latitudes and on the heat-trapping effect of clouds and greenhouse gases. 1.2 Snow and Ice Ten per cent of the Earth's surface has an average surface temperature below 0° C. In such regions, water on the surface of the land and ocean and in the air is in the solid state, as snow and ice. This increases the regional albedo, or energy reflectivity, and reduces the already decreased radiant energy that is absorbed by the land and ocean. It also means that most of the solar energy absorbed or radiated is involved in melting, freezing, or sublimation, so the temperature changes in these areas are small and involve large time lags. This phenomenon has important implications for hydrological, chemical, and biological processes. Low-level clouds in the Arctic consist of ice crystals rather than water droplets, which alters their ability to transmit and reflect energy of different wavelengths, to absorb and transport chemical pollutants and particulate matter, and to catalyze chemical reactions. These processes are not well understood, but it is known that their contributions can be very selective and effective. 1.3 Geography The energy distribution systems in the north and south polar regions are different: the former consists of a small central ocean surrounded by large continental land masses, whereas the latter consists of a small central continent surrounded by large oceans. Consequently, their responses to climate perturbation are different. Currents from the North Atlantic Ocean contribute most to the total Arctic heat flux, so the Arctic climate is very sensitive to small perturbations of their pattern and strength. Heat flow via the atmosphere from mid-latitudes is much more rapid, but it is

64 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect also more irregular and much smaller in magnitude. The fact that the Arctic Ocean is covered with ice has important consequences for the regional climate. The increased albedo decreases the absorption of solar energy, and the snow-ice insulating blanket restricts the heat loss from the ocean as well as the exchange of water vapour between the atmosphere and the ocean. The heat loss from 1 per cent open water leads in sea ice can be 50 per cent of the total loss. The extent of the sea ice cover varies from 5 to ISxlO6 square kilometres and has a mean thickness of three metres. There appears to be little correlation between the extent of the summer ice pack and severe climatic conditions. 1.4 Biology The biological systems that have evolved in or adapted to high-latitude regions are, of necessity, characterized by low energy and their ability to cope with dramatic seasonal energy flow and physical changes. Their survival is achieved by energy conservation forms of life and behaviour patterns: shape and structure, prolonged life cycles that are not yearly, and nomadic behaviour are important examples. These systems are highly specialized and are at a disadvantage when climatic change leaves them exposed to new predators, which may be less specialized and more adaptable. The resultant ecosystems are immature and/or simple, since the biological communities are controlled primarily by physical factors rather than competition, as is the norm at lower latitudes, and many ecological niches remain unoccupied. This accounts for the dramatic local swings observed in the populations of many Arctic species in response to apparently minor natural or human perturbations. Arctic marine ecological conditions are, on average, more resilient than those on land, but they are also subject to more violent and sudden variations than those at lower latitudes. Fluctuations in the extent of open water leads in the sea ice and shore water leads, ice cover, and snow cover on the ice have a drastic effect on the atmospheric heat and gas exchange and on the degree of light penetration into the ocean water. This causes the primary marine productivity also to fluctuate widely, both within the region and annually, which induces fluctuations in the distribution and population of higher organisms. Consequently, rate of change is the critical factor that makes low-energy marine and terrestrial ecosystems more vulnerable to rapid climate change. Nevertheless, these systems are extremely resilient: a few survivors can repopulate regions rapidly because of the low level of competitors and predators. Alexander (1990) provides a more technical discussion of Arctic marine ecosystems. One further factor is the existence of "northern oases," which are centres for the recruitment and dispersal of Arctic biosystems. Polynyas, which are large areas of open water surrounded by solid sea ice where sea birds, mammals, and fish congregate, are one example of these oases. The reason for their existence is not well understood, but they involve the

The Arctic 65 delicate interaction of desirable local physical conditions. They are known to be of short duration in time and to be very sensitive to climatic and human perturbations. The latter arise because some of these oases are natural centres for human settlement and resource exploitation. Historically, the indigenous people of the Arctic have become adapted and specialized like the ecosystems in which they live, but the increased presence of a southern, technological population for reasons of resource exploitation, strategic transport, and communications has added to the stress on these oases. Both these populations are today less dependent on the ecosystems for food but equally stressed by the impact of climate fluctuations. 2. Climatic Change in Canada The Arctic and subarctic regions may be defined as the tundra region of land and those waters known as the Arctic Ocean north of the boreal forest. Most of these regions are north of the Arctic Circle, experiencing twenty-four hours of daylight during the summer and the same amount of darkness during the winter. In Canada, the tundra region north of the treeline extends as far south as Hudson Bay and James Bay. Hare (see "The Challenge" in this volume) has summarized the data leading to the mean global surface temperature increase predicted by various general circulation models, including the Canadian Climate Centre model, in response to a twofold increase in the equivalent carbon dioxide content of the atmosphere due primarily to anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) global estimates, which are very conservative, as Hare has emphasized, are 2.5(+2.0/-1.0)° C for a 2 x CO2 atmosphere step function increase. Hare has also noted that the predicted mean global surface temperature increase is a proxy for a very complex distribution of regional temperatures that, in general, vary from negligible or small increases at tropical (<23.5° lat. N or S) latitudes to intermediate increases at mid-latitudes and much larger increases at polar latitudes. During the past ten thousand years, the temperature of this planet has exceeded the mean of the past one thousand years by up to 1.5° C during a prolonged period of over three thousand years from 7,000 to 4,000 B.P., as fig. 4.2(a) reveals. The earliest historical records in Sumeria and elsewhere date from this period. The first wave of indigenous people migrated into the Canadian Arctic near the end of this period. It has been estimated from fossil pollen cores and isotopic abundances that the lower Mackenzie basin was about 5° C warmer but also drier during these three thousand years. Bryson (1989) and others have used these pollen cores to show that Boreal Forest fires were much more prevalent, with a 125-year cycle. It is speculated that the large increase in the area

66 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect

Fig. 4.2. Variations in the mean annual global temperature during (a) the past ten thousand years and (b) the past thousand years, relative to present values. (Source: Hengeveld 1991, fig. 6.)

The Arctic 67 of the Boreal Forest that has burned during the past ten years is an indicator of global climate change. Fig. 4.2(b) provides more detail on the fluctuations over the past thousand years. The medieval warm period was followed by a five-hundred-year little Ice Age from which we emerged about a century ago. The Norse or Viking colonization of Iceland, Greenland, and Vinland (Newfoundland) occurred during the medieval warm period, but these ecological niches could not be sustained when the cooler period followed. Vikings also explored the eastern portion of the Canadian Arctic during this period, and the Dorset Inuit moved into the Arctic at this time. The onset of the little Ice Age played a role in expediting the European "discovery" of America by Christopher Columbus five hundred years ago: an energy crisis was one reason why Spain financed his voyages. Fig. 4.3(a) shows the estimated increase in the mean annual temperature in the Canadian Arctic during the Holocene maximum. This evidence confirms the results of recent 2 x CO2 general circulation model calculations that the Arctic and Antarctic regions are warmer than the remainder of the globe during warming excursions. The Canadian climate during this maximum was warmer, drier, and windier than at present. The medieval warm period saw the treeline and other natural boundaries moved slowly northward by about one hundred kilometres as shown in fig. 4.3 (b). The surface temperature in Canada during the past hundred years has followed the global trend given by Hare (see "The Challenge" in this volume, fig. 1.1). However, the annual fluctuations are accentuated, as expected from our global latitude. The warm period of the past twelve years, characterized by ten of the twelve warmest years during the past century, was preceded by a long, relatively stable period extending from 1950 to 1979. The seasonal changes in Canada between 1959-73 and 1974-88 are given in figs. 4.4(a), (b), (c), and (d). These figures reveal that most of western Canada has been warmer during both the winter and spring months and that the eastern coast has been cooler during the autumn months. The Canadian Climate Centre model has the highest spatial resolution and is more realistic because it takes account of more factors than any other model, although it is not an ocean general circulation model and cannot account for the time-dependent introduction of greenhouse gases. Figs. 4.5(a) and 4.5(b) give the projected climate warming for Canada during the summer and winter months, respectively, obtained using this model. These figures show that enhanced warming will occur at high latitudes and that most of central North America will be warmer than the global mean increase. It is also anticipated that there will be enhanced precipitation in all seasons at high latitudes and that central North America will have reduced precipitation. It is predicted, using any of the existing general circulation models, that the average rate at which the global mean temperature will rise during the next century is ~0.3

68 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect

Fig. 4.3. (a) The estimated increase in the mean annual North American temperatures during the Holocene maximum six thousand years ago relative to present values, and (b) the Arctic conditions during the medieval warm period one thousand years ago. (Source: Hengeveld 1991, figs. 10 and 11.)

The Arctic 69

Fig. 4.4. Change in temperature from 1959-73 to 1974-88 in Canada during (a) spring, (b) summer, (c) autumn, and (d) winter. (Source-. Hengeveld 1991.)

70 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect

Fig. 4.5. Projected climate warming in Canada using the Canadian Climate Centre 2 x CO2 model results from (a) June, July, and August and

(b) December, January, and February (° C). (Source: Climate Change Digest 1991, figs. 4 and 5.) Reproduced with the permission of the Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1993.

The Arctic 71 (+0.2/-0.1)0 C per decade if a "business-as-usual" fossil fuel consumption scenario is assumed. This rate of change is probably an order of magnitude greater than those occurring naturally at any previous time during the Holocene epoch. It will probably be at least a factor of three greater in the Arctic region, so the Arctic ecosystem will be stressed at rates that will produce significant changes. It is reasonable to assume that the predicted Arctic warming of ~ 810° C would cause the ice pack cover to disappear from the Arctic Ocean during the summer months but re-form in the winter. The increased atmospheric moisture would cause increased precipitation and cloudiness during the summer months in a region that is, at present, a desert. This assumption is confirmed by evidence from previous interglacial periods. However, it is difficult to estimate how quickly the permanent sea ice pack will disappear, since the accelerated warming during the summer months may be offset by increased precipitation during the winter months. The melting of the sea ice, which is floating rather than grounded, will not contribute to the level of the oceans. A rising global surface temperature will cause the oceans to expand and will increase melting of the global land ice (90 per cent of which is in Antarctica). These processes will cause the ocean level to rise, as Hare has indicated. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change estimates, which are modest-18(+11/-10) centimetres by 2030, 66(+44/-35) centimetres by 2100 —the major effect will be to cause flooding of the broad shallow deltas of the three major rivers (the Lena, Ob, and Mackenzie) that flow into the Arctic Ocean. The Mackenzie River basin, which has a delta of ~ 104 square kilometres and extends ~ 150 kilometres inland, is the only Canadian example. The shoreline will recede inland slowly as the global ocean level rises. This movement will be significant because the beaches are, typically, very shallow. The disappearance of the Arctic Ocean ice pack during the summer will probably lead to significant shoreline modification caused by wind-driven surface waves, as the Beaufort Sea is relatively shallow (less than 20 metres), and so summer storms could be intense. 3. Consequences of Climate Change for the Arctic Rizzo and Wiken (1992) have given a comprehensive assessment of the impact of a 2 x CO2 atmosphere on the Canadian ecoprovinces using the Goddard Instititute for Space Studies general circulation model. Figs. 4.6(a) and 4.6(b) give the current and projected boundaries of these ecoprovinces. The tundra province will shrink from 46.1 per cent to 28 per cent, the boreal province from 28.9 per cent to 14.9 per cent, and the temperate province will increase from 4 per cent to 24.5 per cent. The transition will, of necessity, occur over a long period of time because

72 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect

Fig. 4.6. The ecoprovinces of Canada for (a) 1 x CO2 and (b) 2 x CO2 Goddard Instititute for Space Studies general circulation model. (Source-. Rizzo and Wiken 1992, figs. 2 and 5.)

The Arctic 73 these changes also involve soil changes. The permafrost retreat will mean that large areas of frozen (cryosotic) soils will become actively involved in the soil formation processes. The transition rates may be accelerated, since there is historical evidence of an increased occurrence of fires, and burned areas will tend to be re-vegetated in compliance with the new ecoprovince. The current ecoprovinces have evolved slowly over centuries of relatively stable climate. The projected dramatic changes will probably take at least an extra century before a new equilibrium can be attained, since the ecoprovince boundaries are estimated to move at about twenty kilometres/century (Weber 1990). The disappearance of the permafrost region will have two further consequences. This region has trapped significant quantities of methane clathrates, which are solids consisting of a rigid cage of water molecules surrounding these methane molecules. These clathrates are stable in the Arctic and in the oceans at a depth of several kilometres. They also exist in ocean sediments on high-latitude ocean shelves. The release of this methane as well as carbon dioxide as the permafrost thaws will contribute significantly to the rate at which the global temperature increases; in other words, it constitutes a positive feedback mechanism. It has been estimated that its contribution to global mean surface annual air temperature could be + 0.5° C. Permafrost degradation will probably compromise the foundation of existing natural structures and have an adverse effect on slope stability. Subsidence will occur, creating lakes, swamps, and bogs. The existing carbon will be converted to methane and released to the atmosphere. It has been suggested by MacDonald (1990) that beaver ponds produce thirty times as much methane as equivalent areas of water. The decreased pressure caused by the melting of ice sheets will also destabilize the underlying clathrates. The impact of this thawing on the hydrology will be very complex, and very significant for the fishery resources of the Mackenzie basin because of the increased silt burden. An ice-free Arctic Ocean will have a major impact on the global ocean circulation system. At present, the interaction of the Labrador Current with the Gulf Stream near the Grand Banks off Newfoundland is responsible for the historic major fishery. It may be that the rapid depletion of the cod stocks is closely related to the onset of global climate change, since it is known that this fishery is very sensitive to the southern boundary of sea ice in Davis Strait. These circulation systems play a major role in determining both local and continental weather patterns. The abnormally strong el Nino southern oscillation during the 1980s that has greatly modulated North American weather is a dramatic example of this process. The Peruvian anchovy fishery, which collapsed in 1972, is an example of the interdependence of marine ecology and ocean currents resulting from the el Nino southern oscillation.

74 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect The impact of global climate change on the Arctic should be considered in the context of regional effects. Hansen and his co-workers (1991) examined the regional impact of an increasing greenhouse effect on droughts, storms, and temperature. They concluded that continuation of the current greenhouse gas growth rates will cause an increase in the frequency and severity of droughts, particularly in the subtropics and midlatitudes. However, both extremes of the hydrological cycle will be enhanced—the frequency and intensity of thunderstorms, with greater rainfall, will increase. These regional effects will be amplified by the fact that the temporal trend of the global mean surface temperature has a positive slope, which causes the year-to-year fluctuations to increase in proportion to this slope. Environments such as the Arctic will be at greater risk than other regions as the frequency of extreme weather disturbances increases. Griffiths and Young (1990, 3-4) have provided an elegant summary: The broader threats to the Arctic's environment are attributable to a combination of the pattern of air and water currents in the northern hemisphere and environmental circumstances prevailing in the Arctic itself. Air currents deliver carbon, sulphur and other pollutants, produced largely in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, to the Arctic Basin; the low level of precipitation in the Arctic ensures that these pollutants remain in the atmosphere for considerable periods of time. This gives rise to the Arctic haze, which casts a pall over large segments of the Arctic each winter and spring that rivals the annual mean level of photochemical smog over Los Angeles. Similar dynamics are at work with respect to the movement of carbon dioxide, chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), and other greenhouse gases from the mid-latitudes to the Arctic Basin. To this we may add comparable observations regarding the role of water currents as conveyor belts bringing pollutants from distant sources into the Arctic Basin. For some time, observers have noted unusually high levels of toxic substances in seals and polar bears. Such substances quickly make their way to the top of the arctic food chain, so that there is no cause for surprise in occurrences like the presence of mercury in mothers' milk in many parts of the Arctic. What all these broader threats have in common is that they originate, in considerable measure, outside the Arctic, a fact that makes it impossible to come to terms with them through international cooperation confined to the Arctic alone. Beyond this, we are now becoming acutely aware of environmental interactions between the Arctic as a distinctive region and the overall global system. Perhaps the most striking case in point involves the prospect of global climate change associated with worldwide emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases. Most efforts to model global climate change suggest that temperatures will increase in the Arctic at least twice as much as in the midlatitudes. While the driving forces giving rise to this occurrence lie outside the Arctic, the results may well include dramatic feedbacks in which events unfolding in the Arctic impact the mid-latitudes.... In part, it arises from the fact that ocean/ice/atmosphere interactions in the Arctic play a key role in determining weather patterns throughout the northern hemisphere. It follows that any tendency to ignore environmental threats to the Arctic either because they are out of sight and out of mind or because Arctic constituencies are politically weak will be shortsighted in the extreme.

The Arctic 75 4. Ethical Considerations The science of ecology was established as an intellectual discipline by Aldo Leopold over fifty years ago, although the concept was invented and named by Haeckel (Bramwell 1989) a century earlier. A number of writers, including Wordsworth in England and Thoreau and Muir in the U.S. explored the value and importance of nature, but it was Leopold (1949) who established the basis for a holistic environmental ethic in his famous essay "The Land Ethic." Hardin (1968, 1974) discussed other ethical dimensions in his two seminal essays, "The Tragedy of the Commons" and "Living in a Lifeboat." These two persons played a major role in the twentieth-century development of the holistic environmental ethic discussed by Hurka (see "Ethical Principles" in this volume). 4.1 Ethical Issues For our purposes there are four major issues concerning the impact of global climate change on the Arctic and subarctic regions that require ethical examination. These are (1) the impact on the indigenous peoples; (2) the impact on the wildlife species that are permanent residents, the migratory species that are summer breeding and nesting residents, and the flora, and so on; (3) the complex interrelationship between these regions and the remainder of the planet; and (4) the special responsibility of Canadians. The impact of global climate change on the Arctic and subarctic regions that has been outlined in this chapter will have a significant effect on the culture and lifestyle of the indigenous people, the Inuit and the Dene. The vast majority of the Inuit now live with other Canadians in twenty-five communities, of which twenty-four are harbours on the Arctic Ocean. The Dene live in the subarctic and northern portion of the Boreal Forest. They both lived as extremely skilled and resourceful subsistence hunters well adapted to a hostile and unforgiving environment until about a generation ago. The older generation want future Inuit generations to retain these skills, which are an important part of their culture. The younger generation have demonstrated that they can very successfully adapt to technological culture. This generational conflict makes it imperative that southern Canadians respect the autonomy of the Inuit and Dene and ensure that both groups are fully informed on the implications of global climate change for their ancestral homeland and culture. The indigenous peoples deserve to be afforded the same rights to determine the future of their culture as southern Canadians. The Arctic wildlife species are highly specialized because, in general, the food chains are very short, as was discussed above. Most of these species are unique to the Arctic. The mammals include the polar bear, walrus, caribou, harp seal, Arctic fox, bowhead whale, and lemming. Many species of birds travel thousands of miles to breed and nest in the

76 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect Arctic. These species are highly adapted to the Arctic environment, its predators, and its time scale. The flora and fauna of the Arctic are robust to large year-to-year fluctuations, as discussed previously, but are fragile to continued stress resulting from unidirectional climate change. The ethical issue is very straightforward: Does one species, humankind, have the right to alter, either explicitly or implicitly, the evolutionary opportunities of other species? By contrast, the ecological problems raised by the impact of global climate change on the Arctic and subarctic outlined above are not simple; their interrelationship is very complex. Yet the complexity of the Arctic regional ecological system is dwarfed by the complexity of the ecological interrelations between the various regions of the planet. These interrelationships are very imperfectly understood, even under quasiequilibrium global climatic conditions. Not surprisingly, they are even less well understood when the rate of change of global climate is as great as that predicted to follow from increased emission of greenhouse gases due to human activity. The existence of these symbiotic relationships was not known until relatively recently, and our understanding remains rudimentary. 4.2 Ethical Actions Different nations are pursuing different policies concerning global climate change; these policies can be categorized according to the various ethical principles articulated by Hurka (see "Ethical Principles" in this volume). The examples given below illustrate some of these principles. They are included to emphasize the complexity of the ethical aspects of global climate change and demonstrate the need to think globally and act locally if we are to deal with a region such as the Arctic. 1. The "humans-here-and-now" principle. This principle affords standing only to humans and does not take into account future generations. The present policy of the U.S. government accords with this principle: that government takes the view that uncertainty in the available data and the perceived negative economic consequences of initiating energy conservation policies to decrease greenhouse gas emissions justify inaction. The U.S. government's failure to sign the June 1992 Rio de Janeiro Summit agreement on greenhouse gas emissions is explicit evidence that it embraces this policy. It justifies its policy by citing the facts that the continental U.S. has not experienced any positive surface temperature trend during the past century and that some portions have experienced a negative trend. It takes no account of the rights of other human inhabitants of the planet and does not afford standing or rights to flora and fauna in either the present or the future. 2. The "humans at all times and places "principle. It is entirely feasible that Western technological humankind can pursue business-as-usual energy policies and survive. Such policies implicitly accept adaptation and

The Arctic 77 do not take account of the restricted ability to adapt of the other 80 per cent of the global human population. At least 20 per cent live at or below the subsistence level under present climate conditions. A discussion of the impact of global climate change on these people is beyond the scope of this chapter, but researchers generally believe that their survival would be at greater risk under adaptation policies. 3. Tfie "holistic environmental ethic" principle. Canadians have conflicting anecdotal evidence concerning global climate change. During the past decade western Canada has experienced persistent drought in the southern portion of the Palliser triangle, tornadoes in northern Alberta for the first time, three rain and wind storms of once-in-a-century intensity in Calgary, and warmer winters as evidenced by decreased heating bills; these four facts should help convince western Canadians that global climate change is a reality. Residents of the Maritime provinces, however, have experienced colder autumns and winters (see fig. 4) and hence may be sceptical. The federal government has espoused policies to stabilize greenhouse gas emissions at 1990 levels by the year 2000, but provincial energy ministers have declared this objective to be impossible. There exists a strong inclination to follow the lead of the U.S. and opt for adaptation policies without considering the implications global climate change holds for the planet as well as for the Arctic region, to which Canadians have a romantic attachment. The evidence for global climate change provided by Hare (see "The Challenge" in this volume) and the complex negative impact on the Arctic and subarctic regions, particularly in Canada, outlined in this chapter lead to the conclusion, based on a holistic environmental ethic, that avoidance is the only correct decision. It is correct if we consider only our responsibility to the indigenous peoples of those regions. It is their right to assess the impact of global climate change on the future survival of their culture and identity and to play a significant role in determining Canadian policy on global climate change. It is appropriate that they be afforded the same rights for self-determination as we would expect and demand. And only avoidance will allow them an opportunity to make this assessment. The strongest argument for an avoidance policy is based upon a holistic environmental ethic because that ethic reflects the high value Canadians place upon these regions. It has been demonstrated that the seemingly simple but actually highly complex ecological community that has evolved in the Arctic and subarctic region is very robust to significant annual fluctuations in the local and regional weather patterns, but that the high degree of adaptation of its biological systems makes it very fragile to both warming and cooling trends that exceed critical rates of change. The predicted rate of change during the next forty years under a business-as-usual energy scenario is much greater than this region has

78 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect experienced in the past. Adaptation is therefore not a viable scenario for the Arctic region. The small number of unique mammals that inhabit the Arctic and subarctic region deserve special consideration because they, like the indigenous peoples, are highly adapted to their unique environment. The polar bear and musk oxen populations are in a delicate balance at present; they are believed to be near their critical number for continued survival. It is reasonable to assume that global climate change will impose negative stresses on these species. For example, the polar bear uses the ice pack as part of its hunting territory. The right of these species to survive requires the development of appropriate survival policies. Only a holistic environmental ethic provides a rationale for ensuring their future survival by justifying the prompt introduction of limits on greenhouse gas emissions to in turn limit global climate change. Similar arguments apply to the survival of the many migratory species of birds that breed and nest in the Arctic. Consequently, Canada and the other seven northern countries have a special responsibility to provide leadership in developing and promoting a global avoidance climate policy. This policy is ethically right on the more general basis that the environment can be "valued for itself," as discussed by Hurka, and more restrictedly because it is consistent with a holistic environmental ethic. The current policy of the U.S. ignores that country's responsibility to recognize the rights of its Alaska inhabitants as well as their environment. The impact of global climate change on the Arctic should also be considered in the context of regional effects. As mentioned in section 3, Hansen et al. (1991) have concluded that continuation of the current greenhouse gas growth rates will cause an increase in the frequency and severity of droughts (particularly in the subtropics and mid-latitudes), storms, and temperature. Environments such as the Arctic region are most vulnerable to the ravages of such weather disturbances. 5. Summary The evidence presented has demonstrated that the Arctic is fragile because it is ill adapted to cope with the predicted rate of global climate change. Roots (1990) put the matter thus: The Arctic regions occupy a special place in consideration of the effects of climate change. Not only are they likely to show, more clearly than most other parts of the world, the onset, course and effects of climate change; but their natural and human consequences may be profound. The postulated environmental changes in the Arctic would appear to be likely to take place just at the time when the Arctic regions themselves are taking on a new importance in the national affairs of northern countries and in international affairs. The socioeconomic development of northern regions, the political and cultural devel-

The Arctic 79 opment of northern peoples and indigenous societies, and the geopolitical and commercial aspects of the Arctic regions will all be profoundly affected by the environmental consequences of climate change.

Appealing to a holistic environmental ethic, I conclude that if Canadians have a special affinity with their environment and, in particular, their Arctic and subarctic regions, then they must pursue and advocate policies that avert global climate change. If we care about the well-being of others in the most generalized sense, then we must act promptly to avoid and not adapt to global climate change. Aldo Leopold (1949) would clearly have derived this conclusion from his land ethic. It is appropriate that an Inuit has (reportedly) suggested that "all true wisdom is to be found far from the dwellings of men," since the Arctic is one of the few remaining regions on planet Earth where this isolation is possible. We should not forget that we are more adept at collecting a posteriori evidence than at making accurate ecological predictions. We cannot risk the loss of the Arctic to future humankind nor forget that it is, as Weber (1990) has suggested, the canary bird for global climate change.

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Chapter 5 PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY Peter Danielson Why is global climate change such a difficult problem? There are several reasons: scientific uncertainty and value controversy stand out. Unfortunately, they are not the whole story. Even if we were certain that we are causing detrimental climatic change and we shared values that condemned this as disastrous, we would find it difficult to do anything to avert this outcome. I will argue that global problems have a social structure that drives us to bad outcomes, that we are trapped in a tragedy of the commons. No ethics of global climate change can hope to be successful unless it comes to grips with the dismal logic of our situation, which I set out in section 1. I press this model further in section 2 by arguing that our social dilemma undermines the appeal of the political solutions many of us take for granted and also casts doubt on some favoured moral principles. In section 3 I turn from criticism to constructive proposals, arguing that individual moral responsibility is relevant to our problem.1 Finally, in section 4 I propose a new institution, the Atmosphere Trust, designed to begin the process of moralizing our atmospheric frontier. 1. The Atmospheric Commons The atmosphere is physically the edge of our planet, but it is also the edge of our social world. Our institutions do not fully regulate — that is, civilize — our use of it. We use the atmosphere wantonly, treating it as a common pooled resource —a commons —in which to sink our gaseous wastes.2 The costs of so using the atmosphere are not fully borne by the individual user. These external costs are shared by all of us. That clean air is a fragile public good has long been obvious; noxious factory smoke is the textbook example of an economic externality. And recent atmospheric science has added to the list of shared atmospheric reI thank Ron Blish and Robert Young for helpful initial suggestions; Jack Stevenson, Ted Schrecker, Bill Ross, Lydia Dotto, and Jack Powelson for written comments on earlier versions; the Research Group on Ethics and Climate Change for their stimulating collegiality; Terry Teskey for her editing; and the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada for generous support for this project. Section 1.1 contains some material from my "Morality, rationality, and politics" (in press).

82 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect sources. There is now good evidence for considering ozone shielding and greenhouse gas climate stabilization as shared resources (see Hare, "The Challenge" in this volume). I will focus on the latter. Using the atmosphere as a sink for greenhouse gases (mainly carbon dioxide and methane; see Hare's table 1) is a way to exploit a commons. The greenhouse commons is particularly pernicious for two reasons. First, the effect of these gases is global. It is easier to control more local pollutants like noise and smoke because they tend to fall under a single jurisdiction. The more widespread the pollution, the less likely that control will occur. Thus acid rain was a more difficult problem to solve, because it is international, than airport noise pollution, and global issues are still more difficult. Second, greenhouse gas emissions are economically fundamental. Fossil fuels and methane-producing agriculture are central to many activities. In both respects there is a contrast with the recent success in regulating another (partially overlapping) global atmospheric commons, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (see Bankes, "International Responsibility" in this volume). Unlike carbon dioxide and methane, chlorofluorocarbons and halons are manufactured by only a few companies in a few countries, are used for a limited number of processes, and seem to be replaceable (Benedick 1991). 1.1 The Greenhouse Dilemma Modelling the atmosphere as a commons suggests one reason why global climatic change is a hard problem: Every ton of carbon dioxide removed from the atmosphere by photosynthesis is a gain in controlling the greenhouse effect. But it is clearly in the interest of nations, businesses and individuals to cut down forests and absorb agricultural and open land into urban employment and community benefits. The oxygen gained and carbon dioxide disposed of are gone with the wind. The benefits are so widely dispersed and uncapturable that, although beneficial to humanity, they are not worth producing for any...decision-making body (letter to the New York Times, September 18,1988).

Thomas Schelling puts the point succinctly: "Any single nation that imposes on its consumers the cost of further fuel restrictions shares the benefits globally and bears the costs internally" (quoted in Schneider 1990, 282). The structure of the problem is clearest in the abstract form of a twoplayer game, the Greenhouse Dilemma, depicted in fig. 5.1.3 The matrix depicts the situation of two agents, you and I, who are interdependent, that is, whose actions jointly determine the outcome. Each of us has two alternatives: to emit less or more greenhouse gases, say, by using cheap fossil fuel. We agree that emitting more will lead to global climate change. Therefore, the more-more (bottom right) outcome is bad for

Personal Responsibility 83

Fig. 5.1. The two-player greenhouse dilemma. both of us and the less-less (top left) outcome is good for both of us. However, we disagree about the remaining two outcomes. If you alone restrain yourself I do even better (in the bottom left): global climate change is partially abated and I obtain a competitive advantage over you. Conversely, if I alone restrain myself you do even better, as I suffer a competitive disadvantage (in the top right) in a partial greenhouse climate. Which action is rational in this situation? There is wide agreement that a rational agent should choose the emit-more alternative. The argument is straightforward. Consider the outcome should you emit more: I do better also emitting more. If you emit less, again I do better emitting more. Therefore, regardless of what you do, I should emit more. We can see why this situation is called a dilemma: there are two lines of reasoning that lead to opposite recommendations for action. The line we have just canvassed shows that it is individually rational to continue to emit more. But another line of reasoning takes what we might call the moral point of view and selects what would be better for both of us, namely, emitting less. However, in a commons, where we choose independently, there is no assurance that our restraint will be reciprocated, and the global benefits of restraint are lost to each of us. In a commons, rational individual choice leads to non-optimal outcomes. 1.2 The Adaptation Dilemma You may underestimate this dilemma if you see it as a problem only for self-interested agents. Consider the position of elected leaders, obligated to the citizens of their particular states. If the matrix gets the values right, it is morally right, and not merely selfish, to avoid sacrificing one's own citizens' welfare by choosing the emit-more alternative.4 Another way to make this point is to consider the contrast between adaptation and prevention strategies as responses to global climate change. Adaptation is a local strategy that is guaranteed to be effective regardless of what others do. Prevention is a global strategy that depends on the co-operation of others. Therefore, we face a global/local choice, which we can see from fig. 5.2 has the same structure as the earlier Greenhouse Dilemma. The dilemma applies again at another level. (One

84 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect

Fig. 5.2. The adaptation dilemma. benefit of this kind of social scientific approach is that abstract structures allow us to see the depth of our problems.) 1.3 Some Pessimistic Conclusions The commons model points to the attraction of a non-optimal social equilibrium from both rational and some moral points of view. It is a powerful corrective to Utopian thinking, indicating that agents of all sorts (people, firms, states) cannot be expected naturally to reach optimal outcomes. We should expect only partial compliance with beneficial co-operative schemes. Thus, the theory of social dilemmas begins to explain why global climatic change is such a hard problem. 2. The Political "Solution" Since individual attempts to co-operate are socially unstable, we are tempted to turn to institutionalized coercion —the visible foot of the state —to address the failure of the invisible hand of co-operation.5 Indeed, the most distinctively modern political theory—Thomas Hobbes's Leviathan —justifies government as the remedy for social dilemmas, arguing that peace and order are unstable public goods readily undermined by private violence and self-defence. Governments centralize coercion, thereby removing us from this state of nature. This argument can be generalized; Hardin adopts what we might label environmental Hobbesianism when he recommends "mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon" (1977, 27).6 Although Hardin is not alone, it is a mistake to appeal so quickly to coercive political institutions, for two related reasons.7 First, it overestimates the efficacy and reliability of the state. Second, the appeal to the state underestimates what people can achieve individually, by non-coercive moral means. I will take these up in turn, the first in this section and the second in sections 3 and 4.

Personal Responsibility 85 2.1 The Return of the Commons The failure of government to solve social dilemmas is most pronounced in international situations, where governments themselves are individual decision makers. Put another way, Hobbes's solution will apply to the global commons only if we create a single world state. Otherwise, plural sovereign governments constitute a commons problem, not a solution. Second, political institutions, the proposed solution to commons problems at the first level, appear as part of the problem at a second level. The benefits and burdens distributed by the state are themselves public goods and bads that create a (new) political commons.8 The public choice school of political economy (Buchanan and Tollison 1972) reapplies the commons model to suggest that governments are unreliable agents because they are so easily captured by agents seeking advantageously to appropriate these goods. 2.2 Subsidies At present, governments, with their many subsidies for activities that contribute to global climate change, exacerbate the problem. For example, governments heavily subsidized energy in the former Soviet bloc countries, leading to the most intensive energy use per GNP in the world. Closer to home, North American governments subsidize road transport, and most governments subsidize deforestation of the land they own, a good test for the reliability of governments as resource shepherds.9 Agricultural subsidies, which contribute to deforestation, and contribute to global climate change directly as well, are deeply rooted in democratic politics.10 For example, a recent challenge to Canadian violation of the principle of one vote per citizen in favour of rural voters has been rejected by the Supreme Court. Thus, Canadian governments remain deeply inclined towards agricultural subsidies. Governments also have high inertia; subsidies tend to persist. Canadians are still paying for subsidized fossil fuel megaprojects designed to cope with perceived energy shortages of the past. This persistence is especially troublesome when combined with uncertainty. One consequence of our ignorance of global climatic change is that any policy undertaken will likely be incorrect and will therefore need to be changed. Although some writers (Schneider 1990) are sanguine about mistaken initiatives, government is handicapped when policies need to change. The anti-corrective political mechanism operates in two ways. First, subsidies create a group of benefactors, who have an interest in maintaining the policy. The government agency itself is typically not an insignificant part of the group. Second, the benefactors are united by their interest and typically also by the circumstance of subsidy provision; the regulatory agency will often actively organize its clients. Since government policy is more responsive to organized than to disorganized interests, a positive feedback process prevents corrective action.

86 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect This discussion points to a modest task appropriate to government. It would be better to end these subsidies, with their bad effects on the atmosphere, the market, and morale, than to use global climate change as an excuse to introduce new taxes and subsidies.11 But we should be realistic about even this modest task. A basic lesson of social science is that governments are neither divine nor naturally beneficent. They are powerful but amoral mechanisms that deserve little faith or even trust from prudent and moral people. 3. Moral Responses to the Problem Our conclusions so far have been pessimistic. We should not expect rational agents naturally to achieve optimal outcomes in the atmospheric commons, nor should we expect easy political solutions. Therefore, I will turn to more distinctly moral alternatives. But our efforts have not been wasted, as I will retain some of the conclusions of the first two sections as assumptions in what follows. First, I will assume a context of partial compliance, that is, that not every agent is doing what she ought ideally to do. Second, I will assume widespread political failure to match the market failure that generates the original dilemma. I therefore assume that moral agents cannot simply rely on their political institutions and leaders to solve global commons problems. 3.1 Moral Means So far, I have considered political means of solving the moral problem of global climate change. In the present section I will contrast explicitly moral means with political means. This may be confusing, so I should set out my terms more carefully. We have a moral problem when a moral — that is to say, impartial — evaluation of outcomes differs from the outcomes that we individually choose. However, not every way of achieving morally preferable outcomes is itself a moral method. For example, laws prohibiting coal-burning power plants may be morally desirable, but coercively backed prohibitions need rely little on distinctively moral motives, especially where enforcement is so easy. Similarly, a carbon tax relies on economic, not distinctly moral, methods. In contrast, personal recycling or a change in lifestyle may be largely determined by moral motivation or informal social sanctioning. I do not claim that moral methods are better than non-moral, but only that they are different, and too easily overlooked when we think of ethics as directed especially to policymakers instead of ordinary people. Once we see that political solutions are prone to fail, we should consider the moral alternative.

Personal Responsibility 87 3.2 Moral Principles Adopting scepticism about the prospects of natural co-operation and the governmental alternative need not affect our moral principles.12 But it seems reasonable to consider how various otherwise attractive moral principles work in an environmentally unstable world without trustworthy governors. This is not the place for more than rough sketches of a few alternative principles, which I have chosen to contrast with my proposed moral alternative. On either of two widely held principles, co-operative failure makes a large difference in our moral obligations. Consider first contractarianism, the central moral impulse of which is the requirement of fairness. If others co-operate and I benefit thereby, I ought also to co-operate. But if they do not —often because we find ourselves in a social dilemma —I need not. Thus for a contractarian morality, co-operative and institutional failure weaken our moral obligation to do something about global climate change.13 At the other extreme lies consequentialism, exemplified by the ethical principles set out by Hurka (see "Ethical Principles" in this volume). Consequentialism has a major advantage over the contractarian morality just sketched: it is less dependent on institutional structures that assure fair compliance. Consequentialism requires that we work to achieve the best outcomes, even when others fail to do their fair share.14 However, this requirement is disconcerting; consequentialism involves a radical expansion of moral duties, especially under realistic conditions of institutional failure. In the words of one of the principle's more interesting advocates: To live in accordance with such demands would drastically alter my life. In a sense, neither my time, nor my goods, nor my plans would be my own. On this view, the demands of morality pervade every aspect and moment of our lives—and we all fail to meet its standards. This is why I suggested that few of us believe the claim, and that none of us live in accordance with it... The claim is counter-intuitive. But it is true (Kagan 1989, 2).

A striking example of consequentialism applied to global environmental disaster is Singer (1972), who concludes that famine in Africa requires that I reduce myself to the same level of suffering as the famine victims. I do not propose that these radical consequences dispose of either contractarianism or consequentialism, but they should prompt us to consider an alternative that might be better suited to a world threatened by environmental instability and institutional failure. 3.3 Responsibility Let me introduce a third moral approach by way of two intuitions that many people seem to share about the problem of global climate change. First, there is causal responsibility. We humans caused the enhanced greenhouse effect.15 We have seen that it does not follow that we can do anything about it; we acted individually and quite unintentionally.16 As

88 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect we have seen, organizing concerted action to correct what we have done is a serious problem. However, now that we know what we are doing, we are morally responsible for the bad effects.17 Second, many people consider global climate change to be special, separable from problems like global distributive justice, poverty or the population problem. This can be explained in terms of intuitions about responsibility. Many of us do not feel morally responsible for poverty abroad, nor for other people's reproductive decisions, because we did not cause these problems.18 In contrast, consequentialism is a future-looking doctrine; it will not support this distinction, which looks to the past. If we can do something to correct either poverty or overpopulation, then according to consequentialism, we ought to, regardles of whether we (or anyone) was causally responsible for these problems. Indeed, from the consequentialist point of view, global climate change is not special; dirty water, which we did not cause, may be a more useful focus for our corrective energies than climate instability.19 Notice how focusing on responsibility tends to disentangle us. Unlike in contractarianism, we need not demand that all or most others join us in a fair institutional solution. If I am part of the problem, then I ought to do something about my share of the problem even if no one else does anything. This blocks me from doing too little about global climate change. On the other hand, unlike consequentialism, the principle of responsibility does not require that I do too much. Once I correct my share of the problem, I am free to get on with the rest of my life. 3.3.1 Is Responsibility Pathogenic? Readers familiar with Hardin's "The tragedy of the commons" may find my recommendation of responsibility ironic, as the appeal to conscience is one of Hardin's main targets: "When we use the word responsibility in the absence of substantial sanctions are we not trying to browbeat a free man in a commons into acting against his own interest?" (1977, 26). Does the responsibility approach ignore the problematic social dilemma that I stressed in section 1? I hope not. There are three points that blunt Hardin's critique of responsibility. First, his subject is the population problem, where it is reasonable to assume (following the doctrine of individual selection) that one-sided individual constraint is self-eliminating. If this is so, it is a powerful reason for avoiding appeals to responsibility. But this consideration does not apply to the restraints appropriate to taming global climate change. Responsible agents —persons or institutions —may become poorer, but this need not drive them from the earth. If I consume less, I do not necessarily eliminate myself or my like-minded progeny. Hardin's argument against responsibility applies to a particular evolutionary context, not to global commons problems generally. Second, Hardin depends on a narrow reading of interests and freedom in a commons. I

Personal Responsibility 89 agree that in terms of my ordinary interests, acting responsibly will likely be a cost. It is not rational to restrain oneself unilaterally; it is morally required by the principle of responsibility. And I am assuming that some of us are morally motivated to act responsibly. This is not to say that interest and morality may not be rejoined. One can undertake to moralize one's interests, for example, by coming to care about acting responsibly. In addition, we may be able to construct institutions that reward the responsible and sanction the irresponsible, adding secondary incentives. This brings us to the third point. Hardin and I agree on the need for institutions to support responsibility. But, as I argued in section 2,1 find his assumption that coercive institutions are the solution naive. I therefore see the need to consider other institutions. 3.3.2 Is Responsibility Unfair?

A second objection sees the responsibility approach as naive about the facts of differential economic power. Ross (1991, 24) decries "the tendency, already well advanced, of passing on to individuals the deeply moralistic sense of assuming self-responsibility for the very largest ecological problems that ought to be borne primarily by corporate executives and their stockholders." Ross is correct that moralizing involves individualizing social and environmental problems. He is also correct to criticize naive moralizing as unfair to the poor and powerless. However, this criticism is not fatal to the application of individual responsibility to global problems such as climatic change. First, individualization means seeking to discover one's proper share of large problems. Further, I propose that we distinguish individual responsibility from a reliance on simple equality. Leaving aside corporate executives, consider shareholders' responsibility. We might, for example, distribute responsibility for a firm's emissions over its owners, that is, the shareholders in the case of a publicly held firm.20 Notice the differences that this would make. First, it meets Ross's objection by finding the economically advantaged more responsible than the disadvantaged. Second, it allows us to be morally more discriminating. For example, my mother-in-law tries to avoid unnecessary emissions but derives her income in part from utility stocks. As things stand, she has no idea how much emission is attributable to her through these holdings. If she knew, she could decide whether these holdings remain worthwhile, all things (moral and economic) considered. Individualization is a general method for applying the principle of moral responsibility in the face of complex social problems. Note that I do not claim that individualization is natural. Social causation is complex and it will take appropriately designed institutional mechanisms to motivate and convey individualizing information back to individual agents. Attributing responsibility to stockholders is a particularly easy case. Let us consider a harder, more general proposal.

90 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect 4. The Atmosphere Trust 4.1 Three Problems for the Responsible Canadian We are assuming that I am morally motivated to act responsibly about global climatic change. As a Canadian, I am almost certainly part of the problem, condemned by our high-energy lifestyle and infrastructure.21 But if I am to do more than/ee/ responsible, I need to know more than this. I need to know (1) a moral target (i.e., what my share of greenhouse emissions ought to be), (2) how serious my share of the problem is (the cost of attaining the target), and (3) what I can do to approach the target. I will not address question (1). Various moral goals —ranging from zero-emissions through equal per capita share of some stabilizing target to some percentage reduction of present emission on a national basis—appear reasonable; none of these stands out as the obvious moral goal. I will simply assume that responsible agents adopt reasonable moral targets; my proposal allows people to be realistic about the cost of their target, but it does not select targets. I will focus on questions (2) and (3) in turn and argue that both suggest that we employ markets in a new way. 4.1.1 Value Information

Not all of our ignorance requires scientific work. The point is that we mostly do not care about climatic stability directly. We care indirectly, via the way instability affects what we value. This means that scientific knowledge of the likelihood and extent of change is necessary but not sufficient for our response. Hurka has already made this clear in his review of the ethical issues (see "Ethical Principles" in this volume). We need to know the value impacts of adaptation and prevention (at the policy extremes). I want to develop this point in a slightly different direction, inspired by Lovins and Lovins (1990). They point out that estimates of the cost of prevention are often skewed towards pessimism, because they calculate costs in the absence of new developments in abatement technology. As the Lovins' title puts it, we want to know about "least-cost climatic stabilization." But least-cost solutions are not discovered by science or engineering alone. They require markets for the inputs we seek to combine; here efficiency is economic, not technical. Indeed, I conjecture that one cannot know the least-cost means of removing one ton of carbon from the atmosphere, simply because there is at present no market driving an entrepreneurial search for this result. Second, I stress that this information is value information in a wide sense. Do not be misled by the term economic in the discussion above. If I am striving to attain a morally informed target of greenhouse gas abatement, I ought effectively to demand (to buy) so many tons decrease in emissions. The cost of this decrease is economic information, in spite of the fact that it would not be

Personal Responsibility 91 purchased by so-called economic agents. Moral agents need economic information effectively to pursue their goals (see van Kooten, "Effective Economic Mechanisms" in this volume). 4.1.2 Trading Obligations If we developed a market in abatement, I could find out how much it would cost to limit my emissions to some target. However, if we think that the only ways to contribute to the solution are negative, that is, by personally emitting less greenhouse gases, a responsible solution seems inaccessible to us, since large reductions would be very expensive. (The argument applies even more to Europeans and Japanese, who have eliminated more of their cheap abatement opportunities.) But this worry ignores the opportunities for trade revealed by our new market prices. Greenhouse gas abatements are likely to be cheaper elsewhere, at least for the foreseeable future. Our wealth should enable us to buy abatements where they are cheaper. So, if we can motivate a market in greenhouse gas abatement, it should be possible individually to solve our share of the problem of global climate change. 4.2 A Proposal I propose to create an institution aimed at facilitating voluntary trades in greenhouse gas abatements, which I call the Atmosphere Trust. The Trust will be a non-governmental organization that acts as a broker between those wishing to buy and those wishing to sell greenhouse gas emission reductions. For example, I may be able to reduce the emissions I cause through driving and heating my home by subsidizing the replacement of an extremely inefficient, aged Mexican taxi with a more efficient, newer one. Of course, the costs of such transactions are high; one task of the Atmosphere Trust would be to reduce them by brokering the trades. The Atmosphere Trust should be able to simplify the trade and in effect charge its members an atmosphere user's fee of $F/unit of greenhouse gas emission. F is set by the Trust on the basis of the cost of its purchases of abatements of similar units of greenhouse gases. Thus, the Trust creates a market in negative emissions, funded by its members' willingness responsibly to tax themselves. These funds drive others to put a price on their emissions and to seek least-cost abatement strategies. By generating greenhouse gas pollution prices, the system allows an individual to know enough to buy herself out of the problem of global climate change. The proposal therefore addresses the problems labelled (2) and (3) above. One advantage of the Atmosphere Trust over the governmental alternative is the private Trust's ability to direct the funds it collects to the goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, wherever this may be. In contrast, a carbon tax is a half measure. Taxes can discourage an activity, but they do little on the other side; they encourage alternatives to the taxed activity only by making them relatively less expensive. Ideally, carbon tax

92 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect funds would be earmarked for reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. However, there is no strong reason to expect that a government's carbon tax, once implemented, will be directed towards this goal, especially if the goal involves international transfers.22 However, I do not claim the advantages of the Atmosphere Trust over a carbon tax a priori. My proposal contains an empirical claim. I suggest that we test the relative effectiveness of various governmental and non-governmental schemes to support responsible action. While I shall continue to contrast the Atmosphere Trust with governmental measures in what follows, I should stress that these approaches are compatible. We should try them together in various combinations. Indeed, I am happy to report that some of my colleagues in our research team are enthusiastic about the Atmosphere Trust, but only alongside other approaches. I have described the Atmosphere Trust only abstractly, saying nothing about its organizational structure. This omission is intentional. I do not have a more concrete proposal, and I do not want to get caught up too soon in detailed questions about the tax status of contributions to the Atmosphere Trust. Functionally, the Trust buys negative emissions at $G/unit and sells them at $F, paying its administrative costs with the difference. Presumably, competing trusts would economize costs of administration as well as try out various incentive strategies and policies on distributive justice. This openness to competition —no trust can prevent others from entering this line of trade —is another advantage over government monopoly practice. (But to get the advantages of competition will trusts need to take profits, and will this undercut their moral appeal or attract rip-off artists?) Presumably, intermediating institutions would arise as well. For example, a Greener Credit Card might automatically calculate and deduct the Atmosphere Trust fee for various product categories (gasoline, natural gas, beef) determined by the category's greenhouse gas potential. 43 Objections 4.3.1A Diversion? Earlier I noted the disparity between the global nature of climate change and individual action. It may seem that my solution does not adequately address this mismatch. For example, Lipsey (1991, 28) writes: Nothing here is meant to argue for stopping those who would urge people voluntarily to limit their consumption, adopt simpler life styles, and give generous assistance to the [less developed countries]. The burden of my argument is that the redistributive alternative is quite unrealistic as the major contribution to solving these pressing problems, and to assume otherwise is to divert attention from the search for feasible solutions.

I accept Lipsey's prediction; my transfers to reduce greenhouse gas emissions won't save the world. But note three things. First, the Atmosphere Trust proposal aims not to solve the world's problems but to allow each

Personal Responsibility 93 agent responsibly to solve her own problem.23 Second, unlike large-scale state action, what I do as an individual need not divert attention from seeking other solutions. Third, many people behaving responsibly may turn out to be the solution! 4.3.2 Perverse Incentives

The Atmosphere Trust subsidizes some activities, just as governments do. It therefore runs into similar problems. For example, Chairncross (1992, 86-87) relates how subsidies successfully encouraged tree planting in Britain, but unfortunately the planting took place on moorlands (because they were cheap) and destroyed habitat for rare wildlife. Perhaps a negative Atmosphere Trust policy that subsidizes only cessation of emission rather than carbon sinking would be safest. A related problem is that abatement subsidies may encourage people to "start polluting where they would not have otherwise, in order to be paid to stop" (J. Powelson, personal communication, September 1, 1991). To prevent this, the Atmosphere Trust should fix a date in the past —1990 has been suggested — after which no new polluting activity would be eligible for aid. Notice that the Atmosphere Trust shares both of these problems with similar governmental measures.24 4.3.3 Rights and the Atmospheric Frontier

An objection to government schemes similar to the Atmosphere Trust is that they create rights to pollute. It may seem that I have an easy reply: the Trust is not a government, so it cannot create rights of any kind. But this answer is too easy. I have been at pains to suggest that insofar as the Trust behaves functionally like a government, it will suffer from similar problems. What is wrong with governments is not that they are called governments, or even that they are coercive, but that they generate characteristic social dilemmas. We should similarly expect the Trust to be vulnerable to problems such as capture by narrowly focused interest groups.25 There is a deeper, theoretical objection here as well. At least a government is in a position to create rights. How can a non-governmental agency do this? To put the point as a dilemma, either there are rights to use one's share of the atmosphere, in which case governments ought to enforce them, or there are not. In the first case the Trust's job should be done by a government, and in the second there is no job to do. My reply is that there are not (yet) rights to the atmosphere. The atmosphere is still a frontier, a morally and legally unsettled, unruly domain.26 Contrast the difference between clear cases of trespass, where I use your car without your permission, and unclear cases, where I use the atmosphere to sink carbon or source oxygen. Although it is a mistake not to recognize existing rights, it is also a mistake to try to enforce rights in a domain that is still unsettled. So, I would argue, the Trust is neither enforcing nor pre-

94 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect supposing existing rights with respect to the atmosphere. It is an experiment, trying out one way to moralize the atmospheric frontier. The Trust's approach does advance claims about rights because it involves trading to meet obligations of responsibility, and a tradeable moral entitlement is a featured aspect (the property aspect) of appeals to rights. My Atmosphere Trust proposal must also meet a more narrowly moral criticism. In particular, it may seem strange to stress individual responsibility and then recommend that individuals trade permissions to pollute. After all, one idea central to the ordinary morality of responsibility is anti-consequentialist: I should not do wrong even to induce you to refrain from doing worse. But my scheme has me paying you to shift some of my responsibility to you. Thus, my proposal seems to mix components of incompatible moral approaches. This is an important criticism; I have two lines of reply. First, I agree that there are moral intuitions blocking trade in emissions and that some of these may deserve respect. For example, although sources and sinks are physically interchangeable, they may not be morally equivalent. We have good evidence that individuals make a sharp distinction between equivalent services and money payment, for example (cf. Titmus 1970). So there are open questions about the extent to which our moral sense will tolerate the incursion of market mechanisms. One ameliorative measure would be for the (or better: an) Atmosphere Trust to cap the money-transfer component of its services. It would require each member to produce a personal reduction in emission and not simply use her wealth to transfer this reduction to others. How strong such an equity-induced restriction should be is also an open and interesting question. (Hence the suggestion that various trusts differentiate themselves along this dimension.) 4.4 Values and Behaviour I began by assuming that we could agree on the values at stake in global climatic change in order to argue that even with value agreement, the global commons presented serious moral problems. Now I would like to relax that assumption, to point out an additional attraction of the approach that provides institutional support for individual responsibility. Value disagreement is a serious problem for environmental ethics. But there is a prior problem: it is not easy to discover what our own environmental values are. Many people behave as if they valued environmental effects less than they say they do. Which constitutes their values, what they say or what they do? Some dismiss what is said as "environmental hypocrisy," but there are important theoretical reasons why action and values diverge.27 When we find ourselves in a commons, each chooses something —a traffic jam, global climatic change —that she does not prefer. Therefore, we cannot read our values off our behavior. This is a situ-

Personal Responsibility 95 ation that fosters hypocrisy, an issue that has divided some environmentalists.28 Institutions that foster individual responsibility also help to provide information about values — others' but also our own. I do not assume that the result will be environmental consensus, but one tends to be unrealistically demanding about values according to which one need not live. Individual responsibility, by allowing us realistically to test our own and others' values, helps to give environmental decisions a more trustworthy basis. 5. Conclusion I will summarize this chapter in terms of the themes of conservatism in the face of radical change. I agree that global climate change is a radical discovery; it forces us to acknowledge global interdependence. Global problems and political solutions tend "to dissipate people's faith in the efficacy of local action" (Ross 1991, 25). Perhaps this is an obsolete faith; we may have created problems that demand new global ways of thinking and acting. Perhaps, but I am a conservative in these matters. Indeed, I assume that we agree that the conservative stance towards the atmosphere is the most reasonable; the complexity of the atmosphere makes claims to understand and manage the climate dubious and thus makes conservative values reasonable. This raises the question whether our pursuit of climate stability dictates similarly conservative moral and institutional strategies. Both our moral sense and our institutional frameworks are complex, which supports conservatism. On the moral side, I remain a conservative. We should be cautious about radical extensions of state power and the extreme moral demands that follow from consequentialism applied to a global commons. We should support the independence of individual moral life and give individual responsibility a chance. However, I would argue that our economic and political institutions tend to fail on environmental problems, and therefore we should experiment with new moral institutions like the Atmosphere Trust. My practical conclusion is therefore quite radical. You and I can do something, so we ought to begin acting more responsibly. Please contact me if you would like to help with the Atmosphere Trust.29 Notes 1 It is difficult even to label this general perspective. Political economy is almost right, but limits itself to the contrast of political and economic processes, following the general social scientific bias of neglecting distinctly moral processes. I address this problem in my Artificial Morality (1992). 2 The seminal idea of the tragedy of the commons is due to Hardin (1977). Although Ostrom (1991) warns of limits on it, Hardin's model is a good place to begin mod-

96 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect elling globally available resources like the atmosphere. And although Hardin's term commons has become standard, it is somewhat misleading; as Levinson (1989, 210) points out, "The problem is partly that a sense of the commons itself has eroded over the last couple of centuries. The notion of a commons implies a relationship between the people and the resource held jointly." Thus the atmosphere is not even a commons — that is precisely the problem. Ostrom provides detailed studies of the variety of ways real commons can be managed. 3 The Greenhouse Dilemma is an instance of the mixed-motive game usually called the "Prisoner's Dilemma" for reasons that need not concern us here. 4 Derek Parfit (1984) stresses the ethical significance of these problems with his beautifully designed Prisoner's Lawyer's Dilemma and Parent's Dilemma. 5 I owe the metaphor to David Gauthier (1986), but note that I have only discussed co-operative failure without the market, so I have not really given the invisible hand much of a chance. 6 Hardin does not appeal explicitly to Hobbes (contrast Ophuls's (1973) title "Leviathan or oblivion"), and he does stress the need for majority consent to coercion. Nonetheless, he shares Hobbes's ranking of order over justice: "An alternative to the commons need not be perfectly just to be preferable" (p. 27). 7 "Most economists who nowadays write about public goods believe that the failure of people to provide themselves voluntarily with these goods constitutes at least a prima facie case for state activity, and most of them presume that the state is the only means for remedying this failure" (Taylor 1987, 2); Taylor cites Baumol (1965) as a good example of this tendency. See Schmidtz (1991) for a brilliant development of the public goods argument for the state. 8 One of the earliest replies to Hardin offered a powerful statement of the criticism. Crowe (1969/1977, 53) argues that "there are no current political solutions" to global commons problems, partly because of the unreliability of regulatory agencies. Cf. de Jasay (1989) for a particularly pessimistic account in which government action enlarges the commons conflict by making "naturally" private goods into public goods. 9 This case is developed in Danielson (1992). 10 Cf. Postel and Flavin(1991,178) for the Brazilian example. 11 Notice that moral principles that limit state action, such as those suggested by Nozick (1974), have more application than Hurka suggests in chapter 2, section 5, once we take a sceptical view of the benefits of state action, since they prohibit state activities — like subsidies — that we have seen are likely to be environmentally bad. 12 Indeed, some moral principles pride themselves on their immunity to all new knowledge. 13 The most important recent contractarian theories are Rawls (1971) and Gauthier (1986); see Elster (1989) for a good introduction to the norm of fairness. The strength of the residual duty to create fair institutions is unclear in this theory. See, for example, the change in Rawls from (1969/1986, 76), where we are "not to oppose," to (1971, 334), where we are "to assist... when this can be done with little cost to ourselves" the establishment of just institutions. 14 This should not be confused with the distinct claim that consequentialists do not suffer from problems like the tragedy of the commons, which is true only if we assume, unrealistically, that all agents are committed to consequentialism (cf. Regan 1980). 15 This follows from the definition of the enhanced —that is, human-induced — greenhouse effect.

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16 McKibben (1990, 83-84) puts this contrast dramatically: "We can no longer imagine that we are part of something larger than ourselves.... Now we make that world, affect its every operation.... This is, I suppose, the victory we have been pointing to at least since the eviction from Eden—the domination some have always dreamed of. But... the power looks nothing like what we thought it would. It is a brutish, cloddish power, not a creative one. We sit astride the world like some military dictator, some smelly Papa Doc—we are able to wreak violence ... but not to exercise power to any real end." 17 In contrast, Jamieson (1992, 149-50) charges that our "conception of responsibility... collapses when we try to apply it to global environmental problems." I agree that the number, diffusion, and temporal distance between cause and harm are problematic, and that new conceptions of responsibility are needed. However, I differ on one point: current acts of emission are no longer "innocent." True, they are not intended to harm, but present (albeit imperfect) understanding of the facts about human-induced global climate change suffices to end the era of atmospheric innocence. 18 Of course, some part of the poverty and population problems may be due to our activity, but I am clearly less responsible for these problems than for climate change. Although it is important to separate global climate change from the problem of population and distributive justice, I must not overstate the point. On the other hand, some proposed agreements on global climate change provide incentives to reduce population (cf. Grubb 1989, 37-38). On the other hand, poverty and distributive justice may enter into the solution of global climate change in another way: wealth will be needed to curtail emissions, so it may be necessary to transfer wealth to enable some to co-operate. Nonetheless, the (much) larger problem of global distributive justice remains distinct; this second type of transfer is based directly on contribution to the solution, not desert or poverty. 19 "There is something bordering on the indecent about the world's heads of state gathering to bestow many tens of billions of dollars upon a hypothetical ecological concern like greenhouse warming while not lifting a finger to assist the 3.2 million impoverished Southern children who die each year of diarrheal diseases communicated through impure water" (Easterbrook 1992,24). 20 This suggestion is inspired by Friedman's (1962, 132) proposal that "corporations should be required to attribute to individual stockholders earnings which are not paid out as dividends." In the case of public ownership, should attribution follow citizenship? (I suspect that this will be a major factor when we get around to accounting for emissions from the U.S. military). If so, we are back to the equal responsibility that Ross decries. 21 Two caveats about this characterization: we are exporters of energy-intensive products, and our forests need to be included in any overall account of carbon flows. Both caveats point to the need for rather sophisticated moral accounting. 22 Indeed, Postel and Flavin (1991) support a carbon tax replacing income taxes as a source of general revenue. Of course, this may be effective if it increases support for the tax, but once again we find ourselves in a social dilemma, as politically efficacious domestic use of the tax dominates environmentally effective international transfers. 23 This is to say that the principle of responsibility is non-consequentialist. 24 On the other hand, we should be fair in our assessment of the context between various attempted solutions to commons problems, in particular between voluntary moral and coercive political solutions. We should be no more demanding of individuals than of states and firms. For example, if states' greenhouse gas emissions are

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to be grandfathered to 1990, so too should individuals', and if states are allowed to "bubble" together (merge their accounts), so too should individuals be allowed. Of course, the Atmosphere Trust amounts to a private bubbling mechanism. Compare Uzawa (1991, 277) on not reinforcing "despotic trends" in Pacific Rim states. Schelling (1991) provides a good example of the lengths to which proposals will go in accommodating states to enable them to reach an agreement on global climate change. The World Bank's inclination to megaprojects shows that non-governmental organizations are not immune to the trap of well-organized beneficiaries versus diffuse losers. Large construction concerns lobby the World Bank as if it were a government because it finances public works like a government. Another frontier is cyberspace; compare Barlow (1990) and Danielson (1992, chap. 1) for the Hacker's Dilemma on the commons of this frontier. Compare Mittelstaedt ("All the worry over ecology fails to stem consumption," The Globe and Mail, June 4,1991), Sagoff (1988, chap. 1,2), and Rathje (1989). For example, Sagoff (1981/1986, 228) celebrates the divergence of his private behaviour and his political values; Jamieson (1992, 150) criticizes "institutionalized hypocrisy" in general and environmental activist David Brower's ostentatious consumption in particular. I can be reached at The Centre for Applied Ethics, 1866 Main Mall, E-162, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada, V6T 1Z1. E-mail address: [email protected]. Fax: (604) 822-8627.

Chapter 6 CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY Wayne Stewart and Peter Dickey It used to be so easy. The widely accepted business "truth," that the "business of business is business," created a distinct limit on corporate and managerial responsibility, and is often still used for that purpose. This truth is useful, too, as a means of reducing the complexity of the enterprise to a manageable level in the best traditions of scientific management. This tenet narrows the scope of responsibility accepted by corporations to pursuit of profit in the service of a single master — the shareholder. Increasingly, as complexity reaches chaotic proportions, corporations are compelled to accept societal realities, to expand their sphere of activity and their scope of responsibility. The distinct boundaries of the past are being destroyed by growing awareness of interdependencies. All segments of society, including corporations, are being forced to face the world in its complexity and to deal with it as a whole. The complexity faced by modern corporations is enormous. Corporate managers are faced with a multitude of demands and objectives. In addition to creating wealth and jobs and thereby improving the human standard of living, their generally accepted traditional role, corporations are increasingly expected to serve their communities and to protect the environment. Adding to the difficulty are the differences among corporations, which come in all sizes and forms. They are small and large, private and public, operating locally and internationally, serving a small market and the world. It is no longer easy being a corporation. Although there are some, some economists in particular, who still hold that the business corporation is amoral and exists for the sole purpose of maximizing the return to its shareholders, I believe that this is not only nonsense, but inconceivable. Business enterprises are made up of people and they bring to the work place their own sense of morality (van Wachem 1992).

Separation, the creation of limits and boundaries, as a strategy is no longer either adequate or viable. Concepts of the corporate role and corporate responsibility must be rethought and expanded. The potential negative consequences for the environment (see Hare, "The Challenge" in this volume, sec. 5) must be accepted and dealt with. The business of business must be more than just business in the narrow sense that this term has acquired.

100 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect In this chapter we address the responsibility of corporations to protect air quality from greenhouse gas emissions, leaving aside other corporate objectives even as we recognize that conflicts may result (particularly between wealth generation and environmental protection). We will draw on our own experience for examples, which will thus focus on large, private oil companies. We will then extend the argument to small and public corporations in a summary fashion. Our experience indicates that many corporations are sincerely struggling to understand their new responsibilities and to integrate economic, social, environmental, and ethical concerns. This is not an easy task; we hope that the suggestions offered in this chapter will help. 1. Attitudes and Approaches: Causes and Changes The sincere efforts of many corporations to find a new way of conducting their business is a result of a growing recognition that the "old model" no longer works. In that old model, corporate managers developed their plans solely on the basis of economic considerations, made whatever arrangements were necessary with government, and proceeded to implement. Those who objected were treated in an adversarial fashion. Plans were kept secret from objectors until public hearings were called, and these were often held only if the opposition was adequately strong and the opponents were adequately powerful. The result, naturally, was that economic considerations prevailed and new manufacturing facilities were built at lowest cost/ highest output with little consideration of future impact. The majority of older natural gas processing plants in Alberta were planned and constructed using this model. Fossil fuel specifications and characteristics have to date mostly been established solely through business-government dialogue. Increasingly, particularly as environmental awareness grows, and with that, the power of environmental activist groups, corporations utilizing this old model are beset with ongoing complaints and difficulties. Activists refuse to remain silent on issues that they consider important; they often hound the corporation until the problem is rectified or the offending practice changed. Employees at operating facilities developed under the old model must live in the community, facing the activist pressure regularly, often lining up against their neighbours. This is understandably an unpleasant mode of existence, particularly in small communities. In itself a corporation is a legal, impersonal entity. To grasp corporate attitudes, one must understand the attitudes of its managers and employees, for the corporation is empty without its people. Corporations therefore reflect the culture of the society in which they exist, and notions of corporate duty are merely an extension of the attitudes of individuals within the culture. North American culture contains strong strains of sec-

Corporate Responsibility 101 ular humanism and materialism. Many people live solely for immediate self-gratification; their interest is focused entirely inwardly, on themselves. Our entire system often seems set up to provide for individual gratification. A further cultural norm is the focus on the individual and his or her rights, which in the extreme leads to complete isolation. We have compartmentalized our society, constructing little boxes and drawing sharp, decisive boundaries between each, allowing little overlap and encouraging even less. We adopt different roles, attitudes, and even moral values depending on which box we happen to be occupying. Corporations are, naturally, influenced by these cultural norms. It is small wonder that the corporate focus is on the short-term bottom line. With the passage of time, even in light of sophisticated planning models (we could argue, because of these models), this myopia seems to worsen. Corporate boards, historically content with sound annual results, increasingly seem to demand good performance in the present quarter. Executives are turned over and out for failure to achieve projections for the present three-month period. The negative results of this short-term focus are exacerbated by the general level of chaos existent today. Corporate responsibility is often seen in a limited, narrow way, with the sole responsibility of corporate executives being to maximize current profit. One result of this attitude is that costs are understated in an attempt to increase profit. If there is any consideration of duty at all, that duty falls only on the shareholder of record in the present quarter and, increasingly, to the corporate executives and senior managers themselves.1 Reward systems in current corporate practice generally focus solely on the bottom line and discourage all but a very narrow notion of responsibility. The question of ethics rarely enters the picture at all. Corporate managers often get caught up in the craziness that results, and chaos builds upon itself. When the blue suit goes on, personal values are left behind. Employees limit their personal involvement with an "I just work here" attitude. As the chaos grows, people try simply to cope, to survive the next corporate down-sizing. Stress increases along with hours of work; at the same time, reflection on duty decreases, as does action to fulfil duty. As one quarter ends the next starts, and the cycle is repeated. Given this relentless pressure, it is small wonder that corporate responsibility has attracted neither attention nor enthusiasm from within the corporation. There are signs of change, some suggesting that a small measure of intervention and assistance may be sufficient to catalyze an extension of corporate responsibility and action in support of it. The Canadian Chemical Producers' Association produced one of the first Canadian moves towards environmental responsibility with their Responsible Care program (which has subsequently become a global model for chemical producers). In their detailed document on the program, they identify as a

102 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect driving force "the implicit social contract that member companies have with society in general and involved communities in particular, to behave ethically and responsibly" (1991, 12). But nowhere in the document is there any elaboration of the term ethically. At best, the authors suggest that ethics requires meeting needs and concerns; the hope seems to be that if enough people are consulted, someone will surely include ethical concerns that can be addressed. It is not obvious that the authors understood what the term ethical responsibility implied, and they have provided few hints on the implications for action. On a more personal level, and not surprisingly, some corporate executives today let their actions be guided by the potential impact on their progeny, most often their grandchildren. Doug Baldwin (1992) of Imperial Oil recently stated, "I'm not willing to force my grandson Riley to sit down to a banquet of the negative consequences of my actions today." This kind of remark points to an understanding that personal values must be aligned with actions while one is functioning in the corporate executive "box," and provides much to be optimistic about for the future. 2. The New Model 2.1 Sustainable Development There are at present several positive stimuli that point towards alignment of corporate interests and an expanded sense of responsibility. Perhaps the most promising is the concept of sustainable development arising from the report of the World Commission on Environment and Development (1987). This concept requires humanity "to ensure that it meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs." It further "requires meeting the basic needs of all and extending to all the opportunity to fulfil their aspirations for a better life" (p. 8). The Canadian federal government responded quickly to the Commission report, establishing a round table process beginning with the National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy and fostering overlapping provincial equivalents. Corporate leaders were included in the various round tables, have participated in forging new partnerships, and have become active supporters of the concept. Jack MacLeod (1992c), CEO of Shell Canada Limited since 1985 and a charter member of the National Round Table since 1988, recently stated, "I have become committed to the concept personally." The concept of sustainable development has the potential to bring corporations and environmental groups together in the search for solutions, as it contains something for both. Development is accepted as a prima facie good, but not when untrammelled; it must be sustainable.

Corporate Responsibility 103 The potential for alignment and harmony between two seemingly incompatible interests suggests huge possibilities. Sustainable development has stimulated international co-operation on many levels. One example is the international Business Council for Sustainable Development, on which Ken McCready, CEO of TransAlta Utilities, and Paul Stern, CEO of Northern Telecom, are the Canadian representatives. This group of international business leaders has "committed to sustainable development" as defined by the World Commission. The Canadian Business Council on National Issues has also accepted the concept and urged its members to adopt sustainable development principles (see MacLeod 1992a). 2.2 Lesson from Japan The success of Japanese corporations on the world market provides a second stimulus. North American companies have been very slow to identify the factors that have contributed to Japanese success, focusing ever more inward in obvious frustration at their inability to compete. It is readily apparent now that among those factors are a long-term view, a genuinely strategic approach, and employee contracts and reward systems that value long-term success. The long-term focus may well be the single most important factor, for it instills added responsibility to ensure the survival of the enterprise, and the availability of resources, into the future. 23 Consumer Attitudes Another important factor in aligning corporate interests and ethics is increasing consumer awareness of environmental issues and the desire of consumers to do something to help. The most recent Decima quarterly report (1992) indicates that lifestyles continue to change out of concern for the environment, with 83 per cent of respondents reporting some change in lifestyle, up from 58 per cent in June 1987. Canadians are beginning to accept the premise that lifestyle standards will have to conform to standards of environmental protection. Fully 91 per cent report that they have made positive changes (Decima 1992). According to the same report, over half feel that environmentally inferior products should cost more where alternatives are available, in effect carrying a "sin tax" (pp. 93-94). This general consumer thrust is emphasized by Carson and Moulden (1991, 5), who state, with supporting evidence, that "recent... surveys show that millions of people in North America now have a stated interest in the future of the planet and are willing to change their habits to prove it." Customers are sending corporations powerful messages and the corporations are hearing them, as they must in order to flourish in the marketplace.

104 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect 2.4 Stakeholders Another important influence is the expansive concept of the stakeholder; corporations are expanding their understanding of those who hold a legitimate interest in corporate activities beyond their shareholders. Stakeholders can include government, employees, customers, those living in proximity to plants and facilities (community), activist groups, and the public. (In our experience with public consultation, groups are incorporated into the process more or less in the order given here.) As the concept of the stakeholder comes to include more groups, important new ideas and perspectives are brought into corporate decision making. The franchise is extended, and the corporation often benefits through better ideas, lower costs, and firmer relationships with important stakeholders. Inclusion of environmental groups, with their attendant biases and ideas, has proven to be a great help in improving environmental practice. In the new sour gas plant at Caroline, Alberta, Shell Canada used the expanded notion of stakeholders, incorporating community groups in the planning process. The result was that many contentious issues were resolved prior to the public hearing process. Given impetus by the positive results at Caroline, the concept was expanded still further at a subsequent gas development in the Ram area (in the foothills of Alberta west of Rocky Mountain House). Environmental groups, such as the Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society and Ducks Unlimited, were brought into discussions at the interest stage, and development plans were made with extensive input. There are many who endorse expansion of the stakeholder concept. Jack MacLeod (1992b), for instance, states that "a key mandate of Round Tables is to help forge new partnerships ... [to] resolve issues and overcome barriers towards a more sustainable future" and goes on to praise these new partnerships. The International Business Council makes it very clear that "we must expand our concept of those who have a stake in our operations to include not only employees and shareholders but also suppliers, customers, neighbours, citizens' groups, and others" (Schmidheiny 1992, 8). This changed attitude is welcomed by environmental groups such as the Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society, whose members have consistently worked to strengthen relationships with corporations and help corporate executives understand environmental issues (see the discussion of the Ram gas plants above). Carson and Moulden (1991, 42) quote Bryn James, formerly of Greenpeace (generally held to be among the most radical of environmental activist groups), as saying "environmentalists have got to roll up their sleeves and get to work with industry. There's no point standing on the sidelines shrieking abuse." The co-operation and changed approach of environmental groups is critical if solutions are to be found. Morbid environmentalism, the kind that presupposes the end of the world, will only lead to inaction ("There is no point") and fulfilled prophecy.2 Indeed, even on a

Corporate Responsibility 105 narrow view of stakeholders —encompassing only the shareholder — responsibility is expanding. Shareholders are increasingly holding equity in corporations that display sound environmental practice and accept increased responsibility for protection of the natural environment. The growth and popularity of "green funds" is evidence of this change. 2.5 Life-cycle Costing Finally, as a result of consumer pressure and government regulation, environmental problems are being assigned to their source —the "polluter pays" principle. Corporations can no longer escape responsibility by shedding the problem—by selling contaminated land or shipping toxic waste to landfill sites. As one example of the impact of the polluter pays principle, consider Shell Canada, which implemented an extensive reclamation program to return the Oakville, Ontario, refinery site to a state suitable for residential and commercial development —a project that took fully eight years to complete. This principle, and its implications, is leading corporations to adopt life-cycle (or full) costing practices, which include the full and final impact of production and use in the cost of a product. (For further discussion of the concept of full costing, see van Kooten, "Effective Economic Mechanisms" in this volume.) Full cost accounting also encourages practices that reduce future costs and harms through adjustment of product attributes, location and design of production facilities, and various other means. The Canadian Petroleum Association was an early proponent of this approach, including in their Environmental Code of Practice (1988, 5) a requirement that companies "assess the potential effects of their projects and ... integrate protective measures ... to prevent or reduce impacts upon the environment." The Canadian Chemical Producers' Association (1991, 5) "codes span the complete life cycle of chemicals from original development through to use and ultimate disposal or destruction." These factors provide positive stimuli to responsible action and afford the opportunity for alignment of personal and corporate values. There are many signs in the corporate world that this alignment is beginning to take place. To support this movement, we now turn to the question of ethics: What is the corporate duty and to whom is it owed? In this analysis, we reject the notion of corporations as amoral institutions: "Corporations are not passive receptors of external direction; they use their economic power aggressively often to forestall the impact of environmental regulation" (Lydia Dotto, personal communication, September 3, 1992). They must be seen to hold responsibility from an ethical as well as an economic viewpoint.

106 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect 3. Corporate Ethical Responsibility We have identified a number of stimuli that point towards an expanded sense of responsibility for the corporation and have offered a number of examples of positive corporate responses. To address the question of ethics, however, we return to and rely on the typology provided by Hurka (see "Ethical Principles" in this volume). We start from the basic assumption that "if an act or policy has good consequences ... this counts ethically in its favour" (sec. 1). We hold that corporate ethics revolves around consequences —that a corporate act is good if it produces consequences for some individual or group of people. The issue, then, is to determine to whom the corporate duty is owed—whom the corporation should seek to benefit —and to define what counts as a good for that person or group. 3.1 A Narrow View Even under the old model (where "the business of business is business"), corporations can be seen to have ethical responsibilities. To produce profits can be held to be ethical, for that produces a good for the shareholder. On the maximizing principle, the corporation should produce the greatest profit possible. To do so today, of course, requires consideration of issues beyond economics. Success in the marketplace requires responsible environmental practice and products that are environmentally acceptable. To fulfil its ethical responsibility to the shareholder — to maximize its profits — the corporation must market products that consumers will buy. And it must also become known as an environmentally responsible company. If it is to profit from the development of new resources, a company must be seen to act responsibly — or the development will not be allowed to proceed. If employees are added to the list of those to whom a corporation owes a duty (which still maintains the narrow view), the list of goods grows. Now the corporation has a duty to create and sustain jobs, to ensure security, and to offer a pleasant living environment. Once again, the corporation must make a profit. It must also ensure that relationships in the community are good so that employees live in peace with their neighbours. This inexorably draws the corporation into discussions with community groups. Shareholders, too, are redefining their good. Long-term success has always been important, as is evidenced by the holding term of equity in large companies. And increasingly, shareholders are paying attention to and rewarding companies that act responsibly on environment issues. These duties can be concisely expressed as a duty to be frugal and efficient and to use resources wisely and sparingly. This suggests that corporate ethical responsibility extends beyond humans to include natural resources as well. If a corporation holds long-term survival as an objec-

Corporate Responsibility 107 tive, it must ensure that resources are available as raw material in the future. Following this approach, corporate profits will increase and environmental damage will be reduced by the same action. 3.2 An Expanded View As the list of relevant stakeholders expands, so does the list of goods that must be provided. If the corporation, for example, includes an environmental group as a stakeholder, it might find amongst its list of goods air quality, water quality, and protection of wild land and animal rights. An expanded list of goods, of course, complicates the issue, for conflicts inevitably arise and the corporation is faced with the problem of balancing competing interests. In addition, as van Kooten points out (see "Effective Economic Mechanisms" in this volume), many of these goods are difficult or impossible to value. Shell has resorted to the use of a values matrix that includes both quantitative and qualitative indices, but inevitably the quantitative measures are given greater credence. In the end, one ends up with a satisficing approach, where an attempt is made to produce a reasonably good outcome on each of the many dimensions important to a specific case. 3.3 Temporal Considerations The foregoing discussion considers the interests of humans living here and now. One could argue that attention to shareholder goods suggests responsibility for the future, but the discussion so far has considered only shareholders of current record. Corporations appear increasingly to accept ethical responsibility for future generations of humans. The very definition of sustainable development (see sec. 2.1) considers the interests of future generations, although it stops short of intergenerational equity. (It says we need only leave unimpaired "the ability of future generations to meet their own needs," and leaves open to current generations the difficulty, or the opportunity, to define what "their needs" will be.) That many corporations and business groups have accepted the principle of sustainable development suggests acceptance of an expanded responsibility, for future human beings. Corporate executives, too, are increasingly concerned about the future that they are creating by their actions and the legacy that will remain for their progeny (see the earlier mention of Doug Baldwin's concern, sec. 1). This also suggests acceptance of a duty to future humans. Corporations can best fulfil this duty by projecting future impacts and implementing action now to mitigate or avoid those impacts. This approach has been taken by Shell, for example, in the new lubricants plant in Brockville, Ontario. Corporations must also ensure that research required for future mitigation is begun early enough for the results to be available when needed.

108 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect 3.4 Geographic Considerations If a corporation has an ethical duty to humans living here and now, that duty is owed to the same people regardless of where the corporation operates. If that duty imposes a set of standards and operating principles here, those standards also apply in a remote location in cases where the environmental impact respects no boundaries. In order to fulfil responsibilities to Canadians, the corporation must apply Canadian standards while operating in Africa, for example, for the impact of greenhouse gases cannot be confined to Africa. Once the ethical duty is accepted, on whatever basis, it must be applied universally. (Note that this may not be so when the impact can be confined, for the list of goods specific to the operating locale may well be very different from ours.) On issues that have global impact, the ethical duty is the same no matter where the operation takes place. This principle is accepted and applied by the Canadian Chemical Producers' Association (1992,1) in its statement that "the codes apply to Canadian member company operations inside and outside Canada." 3.5 Additional Thoughts on Corporate Responsibility Corporate activity has made a significant contribution to the increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. As table 6.1 indicates, 44 per cent of the carbon dioxide produced annually by humans in Canada results from direct industrial activity, and an additional 30 per cent is due to residential use of corporate products. Corporations cannot escape responsibility by assigning blame to other parties. Corporate managers have argued that they only produce products that consumers want, and therefore the consumer is responsible. The role of advertising in influencing demand (in the case of greenhouse gases, the emphasis on speed and distance driving on the open road in oil company advertising, for example) effectively counters this argument. Corporations have also been known to argue that consumers are ultimately in control; if we want harmful products off the market, we must get consumers to stop using them. Or we might get governments to regulate use, to level the playing field. Oil companies reluctance to remove lead from gasoline illustrates how effective regulation can be. The companies pleaded that consumers wanted high-performance gasolines that required lead, when the underlying corporate reasons included higher manufacturing costs. When regulation was introduced, lead was removed quickly, and even ahead of schedule, with little or no adverse consumer reaction. It is just not possible to achieve responsible consumer consumption in the face of the advertising onslaught that occurs today. The budgets of groups attempting to encourage reduced consumption are simply overwhelmed by those of the corporations, who are intent on increasing the size of the pie. Corporate action to remove

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Table 6.1. Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 1990 By fuel

Megatons

%

Coal (direct use) Oil (direct use) Gas (direct use) Electricity (production)

15.7 201.5 122.2 95.3

4 46 28 22

Total

434.7

100

Industry Energy industry Other industry

76.5 114.5

18 26

Total Industry

191.0

44

64.4 64.4

15 15

128.8

30

Residential

67.2

15

Commercial

47.7

11

434.7

100

By sector

Transport Commercial and industrial Personal Total Transport

Total

Source: Adapted from Friends of the Earth and Canadian Climate Action Network (1990, 54). Note: The original data had combined all transport data into one category. Researchers have calculated that 50 per cent or more of transportation carbon dioxide emissions results from personal transportation.

110 Ethics and Climate Change: Greenhouse Effect This suggests to us an additional ethical responsibility, once a product is known to be harmful. The additional responsibility that accrues to those who "should have known at the time of acting that the harm would result" (Hurka, "Ethical Principles" in this volume, sec. 6) also applies to the corporation. It is no longer at issue that corporations produce greenhouse gases. It is not yet clear, however, exactly what harm will accrue to humans as a result, and corporate executives have no superior wisdom to help them understand the dilemma. Hare's conclusions (see "The Challenge" in this volume) will help corporate executives such as Jack MacLeod (1992c), who speaks for many when he says, "It is not clear to me ... whether the climate change will in fact become life-threatening. The hypotheses and evidence lend themselves to conflicting conclusions." Finally, one is left with the problem of defining the good that corporations must work to produce. A review of the issues defined by stakeholders will show that greenhouse gases do not rank high on the list. Air quality issues such as those concerning sulphur and lead emissions, water quality, protection of wild lands and animals, and even noise pollution are given higher priority. Herein, of course, lies the crux of a global issue for which a cost/benefit analysis cannot meaningfully be conducted. (See Danielson, "Personal Responsibility" in this volume for a description of the atmospheric commons.) Jack MacLeod (1992c) echoes Dr. Hare's conclusions with the words, "I do not believe that one must be in terror of global climate change to become committed to sustainable development." This is one case where the corporation must do what is right even though it is not in its short-term business interest, simply because it is the right thing to do. The potential consequences to humankind from global climate change caused by greenhouse gases are enormous. Corporations have an ethical responsibility whether one takes a narrow approach or expands upon that. Corporations must accept that responsibility and act on it, and many of them are doing just that, by embarking on a prudent series of actions highlighted by energy conservation and efficiency improvement measures. 3.6 Small Companies and Public Corporations The same line of reasoning applies to small companies. For them, however, the conflict between the objectives of wealth generation and environmental protection is often more severe, as many small companies struggle simply to survive. Arguments from ethics do not change, but a different definition of the good might lead to rather different actions. The profit motive and customer pressure will, however, require responsible environmental practice to conserve resources. Small companies are often in a good position to provide leadership, as Mohawk

Corporate Responsibility 111 Oil is doing on alternative fuels, because they are more flexible and able to adjust to changed realities more quickly. Public companies have an additional ethical responsibility that derives from their public trust. They must also, we hold, support the direction of government regulation (in turn a response to public pressure) by providing leadership and modelling desired behaviour. Once the public articulate their definition of a good, public corporations must respond by providing that good for they have an ethical responsibility to do so. 4. Corporate Responsibility in Practice We have argued that corporations have an ethical responsibility to limit the potential negative consequences of greenhouse gas emissions. We suggest the following principles as a guide in meeting that responsibility. 1. The separation of the corporation from the rest of life must be eliminated. Corporations are merely an economic instrument composed of and attending to a series of stakeholders and groups and to the individuals that compose them. Corporations have no independent identity, no reason for being except to serve their stakeholders. Corporate leaders must stop seeing the corporation as a separate entity and begin to recognize interdependencies that exist at a number of levels. These leaders must align personal and corporate values. The desire of corporate executives that their grandchildren enjoy full and good lives must be reflected in the policies and practices undertaken by the corporation. 2. Effective long-term planning must replace the current focus on shortterm profit, and the long-term approach must be implemented and supported by corporate systems. Reward systems must be reworked to direct attention to long-term success and away from only short-term gain. 3. Life-cycle (full) cost accounting practices must be adopted. The full impact of a product must be accounted for in design and costing, for the entire life of the product. This involves accurately valuing all resources, including raw materials, labour, energy, air, water, land, and the impact of emissions. The impact of ultimate disposal will also have to be valued and included. 4. Corporate associations must be further developed and must be challenged to promote collective, voluntary, responsible action. Corporations must take the lead in educating their consumers about potential environmental impact and designing their products to limit negative effects. 5. An expanded concept of stakeholders and their legitimate involvement in decision making should be accepted. Ideas from all sources should be considered and integrated into corporate decision making.

112 Ethics and Climate Change: Greenhouse Effect 6. Corporations must voluntarily apply equivalent standards regardless of where they are operating. Duty cannot be confined within national borders when the impacts of actions refuse to be so restricted. 7. Corporations must operate in an efficient manner, using minimum resources to ensure both short-term profit and long-term supply of raw material. 5. Conclusion Corporations have an ethical duty to act responsibly on environmental matters. Even from the narrow viewpoint of business as a generator of wealth for the shareholder, a duty to ensure profits now and into the future requires responsible environmental action. For a corporation that intends to survive into the future, corporate duty is owed to people who will inherit that future. Enlarging the concept of the stakeholder, the corporation must be a good place for employees, who will require the respect of their community; it must ensure adequate long-term returns for its shareholders; it must satisfy its customers; and it must attend to the issues and ideas of interest groups. All of these objectives require acceptance of responsibility. In order for there simply to be a future for these stakeholders, corporate action today must be ethical and responsible. Corporations operating in the marketplace can be a potent force for change. Evolving consumer preference, nurtured by information on product attributes and responsible use and expressed in changed purchasing habits, in combination with full cost pricing, has the potential to move society towards a combination of increased demand for sustainable products (lower resource use and reduced impact) and the practice of sustainable consumption (less single use, less energy intensive products). Corporate power, used in the right manner, can have significant influence on this movement. Change involves a number of factors, including awareness of the need for change, commitment to action, and leadership. Sustainable development and its outcomes are providing the stimuli for these factors. Corporate leaders, such as Jack MacLeod and Doug Baldwin, involved with mature multistakeholder networks, are providing leadership for the change in course. And involvement in external activities is resulting in internal change. The current scientific data suggest a warming trend of global proportions caused by greenhouse gases (see Hare, "The Challenge" in this volume). Corporations have a duty, shared with other institutions and with individuals, to take precautionary measures to limit the possible negative impacts of this trend. Jack MacLeod (1992c), speaking about his company's sustainable development policy, states that its creation "was driven by the personal motivations of members of our senior management and our collective determination to protect the legitimacy of our

Corporate Responsibility 113 corporation." In this and the actions of other responsible corporations there is much cause for optimism. Notes 1 See, for example, MacLeod (1992a). Jack MacLeod is widely regarded as progressive on the issue of corporate responsibility to the environment through sustainable development. In this paper, he speaks of obligations to "employees, customers, other stakeholders and the public," presumably lumping shareholders in the "other stakeholder" category but clearly giving primacy to employees, of which, of course, he is one. 2 I make this claim on the basis of a discussion with Steve Allen, principal of Sunnyside Public School (K-6) in Calgary, in August 1992; he suggested that many young children believe they will be dead before they reach the age of twenty—a belief that is the result of "morbid environmentalism" as preached by many environmental groups.

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Chapter 7 INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Nigel Bankes Global climate change is an established fact, but much else about this issue is rife with uncertainty.1 How then ought states to react?2 What is their international responsibility? What are the international rules within which a response can be framed? This chapter is divided into two parts. In the first part I consider the applicable rules of customary international law, and in the second part I analyze the Climate Change Convention of June 1992. My critique of the Convention and customary law is based upon two considerations. First, I suggest that, as a matter of justice, a greenhouse gas regime should ensure that the costs of such gas emissions are internalized and that the developed countries, because of their contribution to the problem, should assume most of the costs associated with adaptation and avoidance strategies. Second, I argue that we need to conceptualize the atmosphere as a limited shared resource, to which access is no longer open, but which must instead be allocated in accordance with agreed-upon, equitable criteria. 1. Customary International Law The traditional rules of customary international law, based upon state practice, offer little guidance in formulating a response to the problems posed by global climate change. Those rules were developed to deal with pollution as a local problem that rarely affected neighbouring states (see Trail Smelter Arbitration 1938, 1941). The new generation of environmental threats are of a regional or global nature and have been tackled by international law-making instruments, including treaties, conventions, and protocols, supported by "soft" norms3 in the form of resolutions of international organizations and conferences, rather than through the incrementalism of state practice. Customary international law attempts to strike a balance between two competing principles. On the one hand, there is the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources (UN General Assembly 1974),4 which endorses the claim that a state should be able to use its territory so as to pursue its own national policy, be that the construction of coal-fired power stations or the clear-cutting of forests. On the other hand, international tribunals have endorsed the neighbourhood principle that a state should not so use its territory as to cause harm to another

115

116 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect state (Corfu Channel Case 1949; Trail Smelter Arbitration 1938, 1941). Both principles are collapsed in the widely quoted principle 21 of the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment (UN General Assembly 1972). States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.5

In determining the balance in a particular case, authors believe that an activity endorsed by one state within its territory only becomes unlawful and therefore restrainable when it causes appreciable harm to another state and the source state permitted the activity with foresight of that harm (Handl 1980, 1986). At this time, science simply does not permit the conclusion that there is a causal connection between greenhouse gases and harm —either to specific countries or generally. In addition, state practice surely confirms the conclusion that the construction and operation of greenhouse-gas-emitting industrial plants is a lawful activity 6 and that there is no liability for resulting harm even if one could establish causal connection.7 Customary law therefore provides no incentive or requirement for emitting states to internalize the costs associated with greenhouse gas emissions. The emphasis on appreciable harm as the basis for action suggests that customary international law has no, or only a limited, concept of intertemporal liability. Indeed, until recently one could have asserted with confidence that international law operated on the assumption that harm, or the probability of harm, to future generations could be discounted when determining the legality of state action. However, the view that subsequent generations have a claim upon us in the formulation of present policy is increasingly reflected in international instruments (usually by way of preamble) (Weiss 1984), including international declarations dealing with climate or the atmosphere (see, e.g., Ministerial Declaration 1990, esp. paras. 28-31; Noordwiijk Declaration 1989, esp. paras. 8, 14-21; UN General Assembly 1989). This evolution preceded the report of the World Commission on Environment and Development (1987), entitled Our Common Future, but that report's articulation of the concept of sustainable development has lent considerable impetus to the principle of intergenerational equity. The leading exponent of the legal claim that we need to broaden the basis of our concern to include future generations is Edith Brown Weiss. She has proposed three basic principles (1990): (l)we have a duty to preserve the diversity and options available to subsequent generations; (2) we have a duty to maintain the quality of the planet; and (3) we should preserve the access of future generations to the legacy of past generations. However, the approach does not command universal sup-

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port8 and does not yet represent customary international law. At most, it is an emerging norm. Similar comments can be made about the extent to which customary international law takes account of the intrinsic worth of non-humans when striking the balance between permitted, lawful activities and unlawful activities that cause harm. Non-humans have certainly been the object of international law. One can point to a large body of international instruments dealing with fisheries (Johnston 1965), marine mammals (Birnie 1985), migratory birds and other species, and with habitat protection concerns.9 These instruments assume (contrary to the sovereignty principle) that the management of resources and the environment is an international rather than just a domestic matter.10 Nevertheless, further examination reveals that their principal preoccupation is with the instrumental value of other species or the environment to humans, rather than their intrinsic worth (although cf. UN General Assembly 1983, esp. the third preamble). Although international law has not, to this point, recognized the inherent value of non-humans, some commentators have argued that the "breadth of consciousness" of international law is expanding. In a recent article, D'Amato and Chopra (1991) argue that not only are whales entitled to consideration on moral grounds, but they also have a legal entitlement.11 In their view this development, which "acknowledges the creation of a new subject of international law" (p. 53), is consistent with the expanding circle of rights holders in both domestic and international law (see also Shelton 1991). Once again, it would be difficult to characterize this claim as anything other than an emerging norm and one to be confined, at this stage, to higher mammals12 rather than to a broader class of beings that might be thought to have moral standing based upon sentience or some other morally relevant criterion. At a substantive level, therefore, customary international law offers little support for the claim that states have a positive duty to take steps to limit or reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases based upon possible harm to (1) other states or the interests of other states in international areas, (2) subsequent generations, or (3) other beings. Neither is there an obligation to pay compensation in the event that harm can be established. Although there may be an ethical case to be made in each of these circumstances, customary law has not yet evolved to a requirement that these interests are entitled to independent weight. In short, the substantive rules provide for neither of the two elements of a just solution to the problem of global climate change that I identified at the outset: recognition of the atmosphere as a shared limited resource and internalization of costs, thereby placing primary responsibility on the developed world. In Hurka's terms ("Ethical Principles" in this volume), customary international law reflects a "humans-here-and-now" ethical stance.

118 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect As well as being bound by substantive rules, states also have procedural obligations to other states and, in some instances, to international organizations. Whereas serious doubts prevail about the mere existence of a substantive international law of liability for harm caused by lawful acts, there is much greater certainty about the procedural obligations that states owe to one another when they propose to undertake activities on their territory that may cause damage to another state. These obligations include duties to inform other states, to exchange information, to consult with affected states, and, in the event of disagreements, to negotiate in good faith with a view to resolving the difference. In relation to shared resources, these obligations extend to negotiations over the utilization of the resource.13 The aim of these obligations is to prevent disputes from arising and to avoid harm. More particularly, their aim is to convince source states that their actions may have adverse consequences beyond their borders that should be considered in evaluating the costs and benefits of projects. Hence, the obligations are concerned with risk rather than harm. These obligations have developed in state practice in relation to international watercourses and air pollution, but they apply in principle to activities that affect the thermal properties of the atmosphere and create a risk of harm. There are obvious practical difficulties associated with implementing and co-ordinating procedural obligations on a global basis, and indeed it is evident that this needs to be done through the mechanism of an international organization.14 Given our knowledge of the risks posed by global climate change, we may conclude that states are legally obligated to participate in good faith in the process of formulating multilateral instruments to deal with the problem. To this extent, procedural customary law reflects a "humans-everywhere" ethical stance. 2. International Conventions Given the inadequacies of customary international law, it is hardly surprising that attention has focused on the need to develop new international instruments to deal with specific environmental problems, ranging from trade in endangered species (International Plenipotentiary Conference 1973, commented on in Glennon 1990) to the export of hazardous waste (UN Environment Programme Conference 1989). That accumulated experience has proven to be useful in the development of an international convention on climate change, but two precedents stand out: the Economic Commission for Europe's (ECE) Convention and protocols on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP)15 and the Vienna Ozone Convention and accompanying Montreal Protocol.16 Both can be described as framework conventions that prescribe general objectives and principles and leave the development of specific commitments to

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protocols to be adopted by the institutional mechanisms put in place by the agreement. 2.1 The Convention on Climate Change The Convention on Climate Change (UN 1992) was opened for signature in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992 following intensive intergovernmental negotiations that began in a formal way with the first session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee in February 1991 (UN General Assembly 1990; for comment see INC Climate Change Convention 1991). Earlier efforts had suggested the need for a more broadly based law of the atmosphere,17 but attention soon focused on the issue of climate change. The Convention will enter into force after the deposit of the fiftieth instrument of ratification (art. 21), a process that can be expected to take several years.18 2.2. A Thumbnail Sketch of the Convention Space does not permit a detailed description of the Convention, but an outline of the main provisions is required for the ensuing discussion. These can be considered under five headings: objectives and principles, commitments, research and information, institutions, and further steps. 2.2.7 Objectives and Principles In addition to a lengthy preamble, the Convention contains both an objectives clause (art. 2) and a statement of principles (art. 3). The complex objective is to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere "at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system." The objective is to be achieved within a time frame that allows the natural adaptation of ecosystems, ensures continued food production, and enables "economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner." The principles recognize the need to take precautionary measures despite the absence of scientific certainty; the right to development and the promotion of an international economic system that leads to sustainable economic growth; a responsibility for future generations; the primary responsibility of developed countries for both the problem and the solution; the differentiated responsibilities of developed and developing countries in taking measures to combat the problem; and the special position of developing countries that might be especially vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. The preamble, like the principles, reflects the tension between the developed countries' concern with the environment and most G-77 countries' concern with developmental issues.19 In addition, the preamble recognizes that the greenhouse gas emissions of developing countries will need to grow, as will their "share of global emissions."20

120 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect 2.2.2 Commitments

Unlike a "pure" framework convention, the Climate Convention does prescribe commitments, but because of the adamant objections of the U.S., not in a particularly rigorous form. Developed countries took the lead in limiting anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and protecting and enhancing greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs, recognizing as a suitable goal, consistent with the objective of the Convention, "the return by the end of the present decade to earlier levels of anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol" (art. 4(2)(a)). These parties undertook to report on steps taken to achieve this goal, and which measures might be taken individually or jointly with other parties. Developed countries also undertook to provide "new and additional" financial resources21 to developing countries to allow them, first, to comply with their obligations to supply information related to the Convention, and second, to meet the agreed-upon incremental costs of adopting measures mitigating or adapting to climate change (art. 4(1)). The developed countries recognized a special commitment to assist particularly vulnerable developing countries (art. 4(3) and (8)) as well as a more general obligation to "take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the transfer of or access to, environmentally sound technologies and know-how" (art. 4(5)). These commitments of developed states are in addition to the more general "common" commitments of all parties to develop, promote, and formulate policies, plans, technologies, and so forth to deal with climate change (art. 4(1)). Performance by the developing countries is linked to the effective implementation of commitments by developed countries (art. 4(7)).22 2.2.3 Research and Information

Consistent with other framework agreements, the Convention contains significant provisions dealing with the need for further research, data collection (art. 4(l)(g)), analysis of results, and the integration of this body of information into subsequent decisions of the parties reviewing and elaborating the Convention. Significant emphasis is placed on international and intergovernmental networks (art. 5) and upon education, training, and public awareness (art. 6).23 More contentious was the requirement that parties provide the Conference of the Parties with information on implementation measures (art. 12). 2.2.4 Institutions

Experience with other multilateral or global framework conventions24 has established the central importance of institutions. The Convention on Climate Change established a secretariat (art. 8), a subsidiary body for

International Responsibility 121 scientific and technological advice (art. 9), a subsidiary body for implementation (art. 10), and a Conference of the Parties (art. 7). It was decided to entrust the mechanisms for providing financial resources to existing international entities, but subject to direction from the Conference of the Parties (art. 11). 2.2.5 Further Steps

Some had hoped that it would be possible to elaborate a protocol dealing with specific matters such as stabilization of emissions and deforestation simultaneously with the formulation of the Convention, much as had happened with the Vienna Convention and Montreal Protocol. This did not prove to be possible. In the future, the Conference of the Parties may prescribe more detailed objectives either by way of amendment (art. 15) or by the adoption of protocols (art. 17). In a number of instances, the Convention specifically requires the parties to consider the adequacy of current provisions, such as art. 4(2)(a) dealing with stabilization of greenhouse gas emissions by 2000. 3. Evaluation and Critique 3.1 The Risks of Uncertainty I began this chapter by asking, rhetorically, how states ought to react to the threat of anthropogenically induced global climate change in light of all the associated uncertainties, the risks of which, by and large, will fall on future generations of people, other beings, and states that are not themselves major contributors to the problem. My review of customary law suggested a "humans-here-and-now" approach. That is, states have no legal obligation to act to protect the interests of either subsequent generations of human beings or other species; at most there could be said to be an emerging norm recognizing the entitlement of these other persons. How does the Convention stand on these questions? I conclude that the Convention goes some way towards recognizing a broader range of interests than "humans here and now," but, somewhat inconsistently, does not prescribe commensurate behaviour. Instead, the Convention for the most part postpones action pending attainment of greater certainty. Several paragraphs of the Convention posit value in beings other than the present generation of human beings. For example, paras. 10 and 22 of the preamble specifically refer to future generations. The latter provides that the parties to the Convention are "determined to protect the climate system for present and future generations." More importantly, the preambular references are followed by the recognition, in the first principle of art. 3, that

122 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect the Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity; and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof.

The last sentence of the clause is of particular significance given the definition of "adverse effects" of climate change. That phrase means "changes in the physical environment or biota resulting from climate change which have significant deleterious effects on the composition, resilience or productivity of natural and managed ecosystems or on the operations of socio-economic systems or on human health and welfare" (italics mine). Read together, these clauses impose an obligation on parties to combat climate change, potentially solely for the purpose of avoiding significant deleterious effects on natural ecosystems.25 If these are the premises, what then of required actions? The principles continue, soundly enough, with a qualified statement in para. 3(3) of the precautionary principle, incorporating a variation of the "no-regrets" policy and economic efficiency criteria: 3. The Parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such measures, taking into account that policies and measures to deal with climate change should be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost. To achieve this, such policies and measures should take into account different socio-economic contexts, be comprehensive, cover all relevant sources, sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases and adaptation, and comprise all economic sectors. Efforts to address climate change may be carried out cooperatively by interested Parties.

Logical argumentation fails, however, as one moves to the "commitments" article, which is the nub of the Convention and contains the "hardest" set of obligations. In fact, as noted in the preceding section, there is no hard commitment to either a stabilization target or a reduction target. Instead, in tortuous language, para. 4(2)(a) recognizes merely that a return to "earlier levels" of greenhouse gas emissions by the end of the decade would contribute to a modification of trends in such emissions that would be "consistent with the objective of this Convention." Measures taken to stabilize to 1990 emission levels are to be communicated to the parties, and the language of these paragraphs is to be revisited at the first meeting of the Conference of the Parties. In short, there is an implied commitment to a stabilization target, but no enforceable duty to take steps now to protect future generations or other species. 3.2 The Position of Developing Countries The threat of global climate change and measures taken to meet the threat pose several distinct problems for developing countries, including

International Responsibility 123 compensation for harm suffered and for adaptation expenses, and access to financial support to enable them to adopt appropriate energy-efficient technologies. The preamble affirms that "the largest share of historical and current global emissions of greenhouse gases has originated in developed countries." Consequently, "on the basis of equity" (art. 3(1), principles), "the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof." Most importantly, this principle translates into differentiated commitments. The soft commitment to stabilize emissions and the obligation to provide financial assistance, as well as some of the obligations to provide information, are undertakings of the developed countries only. No cap or other limitation is imposed upon developing countries' emissions. 3.2.1 Specially Vulnerable Countries: Adaptation Expenses

Some countries are specially vulnerable to the risks associated with global climate change. These include island states, states with densely populated low-lying areas, and states with ecosystems that have less capacity to adapt to climate change.26 These states have made insignificant contributions to the problem and have few resources with which to adapt. Yet my review of customary international law suggested that they would be unable to restrain greenhouse gas emissions by other countries or obtain compensation for any damage suffered. What claim might these states have to money for adaptation measures or compensation or, more neutrally, to financial assistance or insurance under the present Convention?27 Politically, these specially vulnerable states have little bargaining power. Unlike, say, China or India, whose future greenhouse gas emissions are of tremendous concern to the developed world, these states have little to put on the bargaining table in return for financial assistance.28 Two paragraphs in the "commitments" article deal with specially vulnerable countries. First, para. 4 provides: 4. The developed country Parties and other developed Parties included in annex II shall also assist the developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in meeting costs of adaptation to those adverse effects.

Second, para. 8 states: 8. In the implementation of the commitments in this Article, the Parties shall give full consideration to what actions are necessary under the Convention, including actions related to funding, insurance and the transfer of technology, to meet the specific needs and concerns of developing country Parties arising from the adverse effects of climate change and/or the impact of the implementation of response measures.

Further, the Conference of the Parties may take actions, as appropriate, with respect to this paragraph.

124 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect At this stage, therefore, pending further elaboration by the Conference of the Parties, the legal position of specially vulnerable countries has hardly changed from that which exists under the customary law regime. The Convention recognizes that these states have a special claim, but they have no clear entitlement. There is, for example, no climate insurance fund established by the Convention. Furthermore, insofar as the Convention, which must now be regarded as the arbiter of reasonable and lawful behaviour, imposes no clear duty on states to stabilize or reduce emissions, it will make it even harder to advance a claim under customary international law for damages for any harm suffered. Consequently, the Convention makes little progress towards internalization of the costs associated with greenhouse gas emissions. 3.2.2 Other Financial Assistance Given that the problem of global climate change was of the making of the developed world, G-77 countries were understandably reluctant in these negotiations, as in the Ozone Protocol negotiations, to forgo cheap developmental and technological alternatives in the absence of adequate financial assistance. This concern has been recognized by the developed countries, which have an obvious interest in encouraging efficient energy use within the developing world. Much of the debate focused on the mechanism to be used for effecting financial assistance. The final text represents a compromise between the view of some countries, such as the U.S., that the World Bank should be used and the G-77 countries' insistence upon a separate institution.29 In the end, existing institutions are to be used, but under the supervision of the Conference of the Parties. The result will no doubt be something like the arrangement under the London amendment to the Montreal Protocol, by which an interim multilateral fund was established under the control of the parties to the Protocol but administered through the World Bank (Benedick 1991, 183; Bodansky 1992,13). Much remains to be fleshed out. For example, the Convention does not detail how costs are to be shared by the developed world; Article 4(3) merely indicates that the implementation of the financial commitment shall take into account "the importance of appropriate burden sharing among the developed country Parties." 3.3 A Shared Scarce Resource: An Allocation Problem? 3.3.1 The Convention A fundamental difficulty faced by all pollution control conventions is the allocation of the costs of attaining the convention's objectives. The provision of financial assistance and the availability of effective technologies are only part of the picture. Much more significant costs and more difficult allocation problems attend a decision to reduce or stabilize emis-

International Responsibility 125 sions. There are also fundamental questions of efficiency and justice involved. What weight should be given to the historical allocation (i.e., present patterns of usage or emissions)? What credit should be accorded to states that have already achieved reductions? What "space" should be made available for the growing emissions of developing states? The Convention contains only limited treatment of these issues. Further discussion has been postponed to future meetings of the Conference of the Parties. To this point the Convention has recognized only that the size of the resource is limited30 and that "the share of global emissions originating in developing countries"31 will need to grow. How this growth is to be accommodated, and the choice of a principled basis for allocation, remains to be determined. What models exist? I will first consider the approaches that have been adopted by other well-known pollution regimes and then turn to regimes based upon the equitable utilization model developed for international watercourses. 3.3.2 Other Approaches 3.3.2.1 Pollution regimes: Stabilization or percentage reductions and critical loads Stabilization goals or percentage reductions have been used in several international instruments, including the sulphur dioxide protocol to the ECE Convention and the Montreal Protocol. Although both approaches appear to be simple, they are subject to the following criticisms: 1. Each is arbitrary. Neither approach takes into consideration what the environment will bear by way of pollutant loadings. 2. Either approach may have an exclusionary effect. As time passes it becomes increasingly difficult for late joiners to achieve the targets set by the Convention by the prescribed date. 3. A requirement that emissions be reduced to a particular level by a certain date does not deal with an obligation to maintain emissions at that level. Furthermore, if, because of the first criticism, the percentage reduction is inadequate, renegotiation of the agreement will be required, perhaps on a continuing basis. 4. Depending upon local conditions such as prevailing wind direction, emissions will have different transboundary effects, yet all are treated as equally harmful under each of these approaches. 5. Although a flat-rate reduction appears fair, its application is both unfair and inefficient. Countries that have already achieved reductions prior to the selected base year will find it more expensive to achieve further reductions.32 For the same reason, while it has the appearance of simplicity, it will be difficult for Parties to agree on appropriate base years.

126 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect 6. Each scheme is based upon the historic usage of the resource, a usage which developed when the resource was conceived of as an open access rather than as a shared limited resource. Each scheme benefits developed states at the expense of developing states (Fauteux 1991,104). For these and other reasons the concept of "critical loads" has been suggested. The approach was adopted in the ECE nitrogen oxides protocol as a refined second step to follow the initial stabilization of emissions. Under the critical loads approach, the parties agree upon the amount of pollution that can be tolerated in a particular area before a specified receptor begins to be damaged. The approach has the advantage that abatement measures can then be focused on achieving the critical load, by linking damage to specific emissions, a process that is now scientifically possible for air pollutants in Europe (Fauteux 1991, 101). The approach is therefore more equitable and efficient than across-the-board stabilization or reduction, but has only limited application to the problem of global climate change. In the context of the Convention on Climate Change, the statement of its objective provides a starting point for determining a critical load. Further refinement might be necessary in order to identify, say, the most sensitive ecosystems (Buckmaster, "The Arctic" in this volume). Beyond that, however, there is a divergence in the two problems. For long-range air pollutants the concept of critical load performs a dual role, as both a goal to be attained and at least a partial allocation formula. If stater's emissions cause the critical load to be exceeded in state B, state A must reduce emissions accordingly. If the critical load is exceeded because of emissions by states A, C, and D, the answer to the allocation question is less obvious. Yet this is precisely the problem posed by global climate change, and therefore the critical loads concept is useful only as a way of articulating an objective. It does not help us with the allocation problem. 3.3.2.2 Other allocation schemes: Equitable utilization A different method of allocating a scarce international resource is provided by state practice in relation to international watercourses. Over the years, competing theories of water allocation have been displaced in favour of the concept of equitable utilization of the river basin or system as a whole.33 Apportionment based either on prior appropriation34 or on an absolute conception of sovereignty35 has been rejected. One of the earliest authoritative formulations of the principle of equitable utilization is found in the Helsinki Rules (1966) of the International Law Association. These have been subject to detailed review by the International Law Commission (1987, esp. art. 4, commentary) in its recent study of the Law of Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses. The rules provided that in determining a "reasonable and equitable share," consideration should be given to a non-exhaustive list in-

International Responsibility 127 eluding such factors as the contribution of water by each basin state, copulation, past and existing utilization, and compensation questions. The scheme did not accord absolute priority to existing uses, and envisaged therefore that uses and allocation might vary over time36 as other basin states developed their economic potential. No one factor was to have priority, thus ensuring that negotiations would be complex and time consuming. The equitable allocation or utilization rule has achieved its most sophisticated development in the context of international water resources. Yet the principle is applicable to other shared resources.37 Similar, but certainly not identical, principles apply to the division of fisheries resources between coastal states and historic users.38 Another relevant example can be drawn from negotiations over the allocation of the geostationary orbit (GSO.) Initially, the GSO was allocated on a prior-appropriation basis, and although this view still predominates, it is considered that allocations should, in the future, be on a more equitable basis.39 3.3.3 Future Allocation Under the Convention

For the reasons given above, stabilization and across-the-board reduction schemes do not offer, at least in the long term, a practical or a just and efficient solution to the sharing of an international resource like the atmosphere. The concept of critical loads has the advantage of focusing our attention on the need to determine a tolerable level of emissions, but provides little guidance on allocation. The model offered by the allocation of international watercourses has considerable attraction. It certainly offers a fairer basis for an allocation, and although some have suggested that it will prove to be more difficult to negotiate than across-the-board cuts, one should not underestimate the difficulties of that latter approach. The arguments have been marshalled best by Grubb, who points out that a pro rata reduction approach will meet serious opposition from several quarters (1989, 20). It will certainly face objections from developing countries for reasons already identified, but it will also be objected to by countries like Japan that have already achieved important energy consumption reductions and would therefore face significantly higher costs than countries such as the U.S.A. and the C.I.S., neither of which uses energy very efficiently (p. 20.) Considerations such as these will lead to all sorts of special pleading that "unique" factors should be taken into account and special provisions made for particular countries.40 Others have objected that an equitable allocation approach, although suited to watercourses, cannot be applied to airsheds or the atmosphere, for physical and technical reasons. The argument has some credence in the context of air pollution, but even there, progress made with the concept of critical loads suggests that the technical difficulties are not insurmountable. In the case of the atmosphere it is even harder

128 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect to see the objection, for all emissions of similar greenhouse gases are equally damaging to all, no matter where their source. The formula to be adopted for any allocation will obviously be the subject of intense negotiations. Some relevant factors have been suggested, such as existing use, land area, GNP, per capita GNP, or per capita. Just as is the case with international watercourses, it is unlikely that any one criterion will find favour. A per capita entitlement would provide the most radical basis for an allocation of the absorptive capacity of the atmosphere. This proposal is most attractive to those who would like to use the problem of global climatic change as a way of addressing global equity issues, since the result of a per capita distribution would be to enrich the poor. That apart, its intuitive attractiveness lies in the fact that it emphasizes the fundamental equality and moral worth of all human beings; we all count the same (Grubb 1989). Most would argue that a per capita allocation should occur in a way that will not provide any incentive for further population growth. At the other end of the spectrum, the most conservative approach would be to allocate the absorptive capacity of the atmosphere based upon the criterion of existing utilization. The strongest argument in favour of this approach is that it respects legitimate expectations, for it represents the allocation currently "authorized" under international law. By failing to develop specific rules, states have permitted the atmosphere to emerge as an open-access resource. Other arguments in favour emphasize the immense dislocation that would be caused by interfering with historic "entitlements." Support could also be drawn from a tradition in moral philosophy, represented by Hume, that presupposes the existence of a system of property rules and institutions, as well as an allocation, before engaging in a discussion of justice (Barry 1989, 152-75). A middle-of-the-road approach would reject either extreme and instead adopt a formula for allocation that would incorporate several criteria, including historic utilization, population, per capita GNP, size of territory, and climate. This approach would represent an obvious political compromise between the demands of the developing world for room to grow and the evident reluctance of the developed world to discard its privileges. How ought we to choose between these options? One possibility would be to select the appropriate criteria from behind a variant of Rawls's veil of ignorance to ensure a sufficient degree of impartiality. Representatives would not know from which country or generation they came but would have access to general facts about the world, including basic facts about the distribution of wealth, military and political power, and responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions. This is not the place to work through the consequences of applying this approach, but intuitively, the circumstances of impartiality ought to favour the more radical alloca-

International Responsibility 129 tion criterion. However, its strict application could perhaps be modified by concerns about the dislocation caused by departing from the criterion of historic utilization, and the acceptability and format of permit trading could flow from an application of the difference principle. One can surmise, as well, that further qualifications on a per capita allocation would follow if our concern was to provide a mutually advantageous improvement upon the status quo, rather than an allocation based purely upon impartial agreement (Barry 1989,183-89, 241, 246-49; Rawls 1971). The mechanics for implementing an equitable allocation scheme could take various forms. Certainly, the approach lends itself to schemes involving tradeable emissions permits. Under such a scheme, the parties would have to agree upon a total level of acceptable greenhouse gas or carbon emissions. Permits would then be issued for a specified percentage of the total and allocated on the basis of the agreed criteria. The permits would be saleable or leaseable.41 Trades would allow reductions in emissions to be achieved most efficiently. The Convention expressly allows the parties to meet the principles and commitments co-operatively and jointly (art. 3(3), principles, and art. 4(2)(a), commitments). 4. Conclusions My evaluation of both the Convention and customary law has taken into account two considerations. First, I have suggested that there has been little progress towards internalizing the costs associated with greenhouse gas emissions. Customary law fails to require internalization, and although the Convention recognizes the claims of specially vulnerable states and subsequent generations, that recognition has not been translated into firm commitments. On a more positive note, the Convention is evidence that the developed world accepts the primacy of its responsibility for the problem of global climate change. However, mechanisms need to be put in place to give effect to this responsibility. Second, it is evident that "allocation" of the atmosphere has occurred to date on the assumption that the atmosphere is an unlimited and open-access resource. The Convention recognizes that the resource is both limited and shared, but makes no attempt to share, or to develop principles to share, that limited resource between and amongst developed and developing countries. This continues to be the most significant challenge faced by the parties to the Convention. Notes 1 See, generally, Hare and van Kooten ("The Challenge" and "Effective Economic Mechanisms," respectively, in this volume) and (Doos 1991).

130 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect 2 I am attracted to the approach of Beitz (1979), who considers it possible to develop an ethical theory applicable to international relations based upon Rawls (1971). 3 "Soft law" takes an infinite variety of forms and, although not legally binding, has some normative weight and is intended to change and develop the law. Soft norms may become hard legal norms over time (Chinkin 1989; Palmer 1992, 269-70). The courts have played only a minor role in dealing with global or regional problems, the only such case being the rather inconclusive Nuclear Tests Case (1974). 4 The claim suffers from an internal contradiction in relation to transboundary problems, insofar as transboundary interference by one state interferes with the freedom of action of another. Nevertheless, the principle maintains its vitality, as evidenced by its repeated inclusion in the Rio Declaration (1992, principle 2) at the insistence of developing countries. 5 The principle is reproduced with only one change in principle 2 of the 1992 Rio Declaration. 6 In the Nuclear Tests Case (1974), Australia's participation in nuclear tests made it difficult for it to attack France. See especially Judge Gross, p. 281. The same view was expressed by Ignacio-Pinto J. at the time of the Request for the Indication for Interim Measures of Protection (1973,133). 7 Although the International Law Commission (ILC) has been struggling with the topic of liability for injurious consequences for acts not prohibited by international law for many years, there is little consensus on a regime of liability for harm resulting from lawful activities, other than ultrahazardous activities. The lack of consensus is further evidenced by the regularity with which states have deliberately eschewed consideration of liability questions in the negotiation of international environmental agreements. For reviews of the ILC's work on a liability regime see Brownlie (1983, 49-50), Magraw (1986), and Handl (1985). Although one commentator has suggested that the emission of ozone-depleting gases could be treated as an ultrahazardous activity (Bryck 1991, 297), it is hard to see the claim being extended to greenhouse gas emissions. 8 See, for example, D'Amato (1990). D'Amato relies heavily on Parfit (1982, 1984). Parfit's and D'Amato's critiques draw on chaos theory to suggest that we cannot owe duties to subsequent generations because if we change our behaviour those generations will be differently composed. It is better to be born even in straitened circumstances than not to be born at all. Another critique (Barry 1989) suggests that contractarian theories cannot accommodate intergenerational equity because the present generation will not gain a reciprocal advantage from its restraint. Richards (1982,274-97) suggests that the absence of reciprocity is a general problem of international relations, but it may be overcome by "a deeper idea of moral reciprocity, that is, reciprocity from behind Rawls's (1971) veil of ignorance. 9 E.g., Convention Between the United States and Great Britain for the Protection of Migrating Birds (1916); Convention on the Consen'ation of Migrating Species of Wild Animals (1979); Convention on Wetlands of International Importance (1971). 10 Framing the issue this way invites an obvious and useful comparison with the evolution of international human rights law (Glennon 1990,28-37; Kiss 1983,1069). 11 In discussing the history of the international regulation of whaling, D'Amato and Chopra identify different stages, including free resource, regulation, conservation, protection, preservation, and emerging entitlement. The authors' claim is surely damaged by the willingness of some states, such as Norway and Japan, to restart commercial whaling (The Globe and Mail, June 29,1992, A21; see also Singer 1983). 12 In relation to elephants, see Glennon (1990, 43). Glennon seems (but not without equivocation) to prefer a utilitarian view of ethical obligations to animals.

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13 See Draft Principles of Conduct in the Field of the Environment for the Guidance of States in the Conservation and Harmonious Utilization of Natural Resources Shared by Two or More States (1978). Principle 1 incorporates the concept of equitable utilization. 14 In the context of shared resources, Principle 2, ibid., encourages states to negotiate agreements in relation to the resources and to consider the establishment of institutional structures. 15 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (1979); Protocol on the Reduction of Sulphur Emissions or Their Transboundary Fluxes By at Least 30 Percent (1988); and Protocol Concerning the Control of Emissions by Nitrogen Oxides or Their Transboundary Fluxes (1989). For commentary see Fraenkel (1989). 16 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (1987); Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (1987). For commentary see Benedick (1991) and Bryck (1991). 17 See, for example, Legal and Policy Experts (1989). At that time Mostafa Tolba, the Executive Director of UNEP, was almost alone in speaking for a climate convention, which was considered to be easier to achieve politically. It does avoid the need to deal with the status of the atmosphere, which is contentious because of the longstanding recognition of the sovereign status of airspace: see Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation (1944) and Jennings (1945). 18 No party may make reservations to the Convention (art. 23). 19 The term G-77 countries is used very loosely here to refer to the general interests of developing countries. In fact, the G-77 coalition broke down in the negotiations because of the divergence of interests among specially vulnerable states, OPEC countries, and large states like India and China that primarily had developmental concerns (Bodansky 1992). 20 This provision is apparently in the Convention at the insistence of India (Canadian Delegation Report 1992). It is all that remains of earlier attempts to obtain support for a common per capita level of carbon dioxide emissions (Bodansky 1992,9). 21 On the origin of the concept of additionality in the Ozone Protocol, see Benedick (1991, 158). The provisions on a financial regime, the first to be agreed upon in an international environmental agreement, were added at the London meeting of the parties (Szell 1991,167). 22 OPEC countries procured a special clause to modify their commitments (art. 4(10)). 23 Experience with the ozone issue provides abundant support for this approach, for in that instance public input played an important role in galvanizing politicians (Benedick 1991). 24 In addition to the ECE, LRTAP, and Vienna Conventions, supra, notes 15 and 16, consider also the achievement of the Antarctic Treaty (1959) system with its meetings of the consultative parties. 25 See also art. 2, objectives. 26 Parts of countries may also be specially vulnerable, especially in the high latitudes: see Buckmaster, "The Arctic" in this volume. 27 On insurance, see Stone's (1992) thought-provoking article. The issues of compensation for harm or for adaptation expenses are distinct from the broader claim that developing countries require financial support to enable them to contribute to a solution of the global climate change problem by, for example, the adoption of energy-efficient technologies. This issue is discussed in section 3.2.2. 28 Or, to put the issue in terms favoured by moral philosophers, there is no reciprocity except in the "deep" sense (Richards 1982). On "threat advantage" generally, see Barry (1989,68-76).

132 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect 29 The World Bank has been criticized for its lack of accountability to developing countries as well as for its environmental insensitivity (George 1989; Wirth 1991). 30 The "size" of the resource is "defined" by the objective of the Convention, discussed in section 2.2.1. The definition will require further scientific elucidation, and further commitments to achieve the objective will need to be inserted into Convention text, a process that is anticipated by art. 7(2)(a) requiring the Conference of the Parties to: "(a) Periodically examine the obligations of the Parties and the institutional arrangements under the Convention, in the light of the objective of the Convention, the experience gained in its implementation and the evolution of scientific and technological knowledge;" 31 See the preamble, discussed supra in the text to note 27. 32 Some attempt was made, at the instance of the U.S., to meet this criticism in the case of nitrogen oxides; hence the ability to select a base year. 33 At its 1990 session the ILC adopted language that views the ecosystem of an international watercourse as a whole (McCaffrey 1990). 34 This principle favours the most developed states, which first put water to beneficial use, and penalizes latecomers. 35 This principle accords to each state the right to do as it wishes with the resource while in its territory. The view sees water as res nullius and favours upstream states. 36 There is an implicit rejection here of a scheme that would allow the less developed state to lease its entitlement. 37 See the Principles of Conduct for Shared Natural Resources, supra, note 13. 38 Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (1974). The Law of the Sea Convention (1982) conceives of the possibility of coastal states effectively leasing access to resources found in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ.) Within an EEZ the coastal state may harvest the entire allowable catch. Where it is unable to do so, art. 62 indicates that the goal should be "optimum utilization" and that rights may be leased out. Consideration should be given to historic fishing practices and the requirements of developing countries. 39 This debate must be located in the broader context of developing country demands for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) (Adams et al. 1984; Waite and Rowan 1986). The idea of allocating the GSO to developing countries in advance of actual need has been rejected, and along with it the possibility of these countries leasing "their" allocation. 40 Canada, for example could be expected to make a special plea based upon climate and distance between communities. 41 See comments above, in notes 38 and 39, about the "leasing" of EEZ harvesting rights and the GSO.

Chapter 8

EFFECTIVE ECONOMIC MECHANISMS: EFFICIENCY AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS G. Cornells van Kooten As Hare has indicated (see "The Challenge" in this volume), scientific evidence points to anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and other so-called greenhouse gases as the main cause of global climate change. A large number of scientists and policy makers believe the evidence is compelling enough to begin to implement a range of solutions. But solutions to greenhouse warming have an economic dimension that needs to be taken into account if policies are to have their desired effect. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the economic dimensions of climatic change. Although my focus is on economic mechanisms for slowing warming, I am at pains to point out that economic instruments considered effective in theory may not be as effective in practice. Before considering economic policies for averting anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases, I begin, in section 1, by examining economic efficiency and the meaning of an economically optimal level of emissions. This is followed in section 2 by a review of methods for controlling emissions and, in section 3, by a discussion of the global dimensions of any policy. Finally, since global climate change is concerned with intergenerational equity, in section 4 I examine the role of the discount rate in global sustainability of the atmosphere and the economic/ethical question of adaptation versus avoidance of climatic change. Conclusions ensue. 1. Greenhouse Effect and Economic Efficiency A concept frequently overlooked or ignored in the climate debate is opportunity cost. The correct approach to determining the feasibility of any policy or action to address global climate change is to calculate what the state of the world would be with business-as-usual warming versus what it would with some policy in place. The term state of the world refers to the total value of global output of goods and services, and this includes The author wishes to thank Louise Arthur, Wang Sen, Peter Danielson, Bill Ross, and other authors of this volume for helpful comments and suggestions, although remaining errors are not attributable to them.

134 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect those goods and services that are not traded in markets, such as environmental amenities (values derived from clean air, watershed protection, scenic vistas, biodiversity, recreation, etc.). A policy could consist of adaptation to global climate change or a strategy to avoid warming.1 The difference in the value of global "production" of goods and services is the benefit (or cost, if negative) of the action that is undertaken. If the benefits from action exceed the costs, then the action is worth undertaking. From an economic perspective, the approach that yields the greatest net benefits is the appropriate one to pursue.2 Market economies function because individuals are, in general, motivated to maximize their welfare (utility). They willingly enter into market transactions because these are to their mutual benefit. Prices are the barometer of the values that individuals place on the goods and services that are traded. However, there are situations in which trades are not possible because property rights are not clearly specified.3 Currently there exist no property rights to the atmosphere, which can thus be considered an open-access resource.4 Although the cumulative effect of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions may be negative, no one person or country has the incentive to reduce emissions because the benefits of so doing are shared by others; the costs to others of one person's emissions are not taken into account by that person. This phenomenon is referred to as externality. In making decisions, economic agents will emit greenhouse gases into the atmosphere as long as the private marginal benefits (MBprivate) of doing so exceed the private marginal costs (MCprivate), where benefits and costs (here and elsewhere) include amenity services not traded in markets. Since private marginal costs are less than social marginal costs (MCsocial) (because the cumulative external effect of increasing greenhouse gas emissions is not taken into account in MCprjvate), there is a divergence between the socially and privately optimal levels of emissions (fig. 8.1).5 This divergence of social and private marginal costs results in excessive emissions from a global standpoint. The important thing to notice from fig. 8.1 is that the globally optimal level of greenhouse gas emissions is not zero. (It may also be true that the optimal rate of global temperature increase is not zero.) From an economic standpoint, the least-cost solution to global climatic change is one that permits some level of emissions. Any level of emissions other than OE is inefficient: a reduction in emissions lessens benefits more than it diminishes costs, and an increase in emissions escalates benefits less than it raises costs. Consider the emissions level OX that corresponds to business-as-usual emissions. The social benefits of reducing emissions from OX to OE are given by area C+D+F, and the social costs are given by area D+F; the net gain is given by area C.6 That is, the net social benefits of emissions reduction are given by the area between the MBprivate and MCsocial curves, as long as the former lies below the latter.

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Fig. 8.1. Determining optimal greenhouse gas emissions. The policy objective is to provide incentives such that emissions are reduced from OX to OE. Note that OE will change with changes in any of the MBprivate and Medial functions. Adoption of fuel-efficient technologies will shift marginal cost down and to the right, ceteris paribus, thereby increasing OE. Likewise, as society places greater value on an atmosphere with lower concentrations of greenhouse gases, the marginal cost of emissions increases and OE will be reduced. This suggests that the instruments identified below will need to be flexible over time, adjusting to changes in the optimal level of emissions (assuming this level can be identified). Fig. 8.1 is drawn in terms of the marginal costs and benefits of activities that result in greenhouse gas emissions, with the divergence between MC^^ and MCprivate representing the costs to the atmosphere. In fig. 8.2, abatement and damages are treated directly. The horizontal axis measures greenhouse gas emissions as a proportion of the uncontrolled level of emissions. The uncontrolled level of emissions is determined from private decisions (fig. 8.1) so that, at Y in fig. 8.2, the laissez-faire abatement cost is zero. Economic theory indicates that the marginal cost of abatement function (MCA) must be concave; it rises on either side of Y. Abatement costs rise as one moves to the right or left because costs are incurred when greenhouse gas emissions are increased or diminished. If it were possible to attain a lower level of emissions at

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Fig. 8.2. Marginal damages and abatement costs from greenhouse warming. (Source: Nordhaus 1991a.) less cost, society would take advantage of this possibility and move towards the origin. The marginal damage function (MD) represents the change in damages from global temperature rise resulting from each unit of change in greenhouse gas emissions. Damages can be avoided by reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Point E denotes an optimal level of emissions compared to the current level, because any emissions level below or above E leaves society worse off; that is, either costs exceed benefits (damage reduction) or damage is greater than the cost of reducing emissions. As one moves from point Y (the uncontrolled level) towards E, the marginal cost of abatement is initially quite flat, indicating that emissions can be reduced at relatively low cost over some range; but then marginal costs rise more steeply. Estimates of the functions in figs. 8.1 and 8.2 are based on measures of costs and benefits at one point in time (see sec. 4). The purpose of these estimates is to find an optimal emissions level and, thereby, the appropriate level of taxes or quotas on emissions. More complicated models exist for determining the appropriate levels of taxes and quotas over time (Nordhaus 1990b, 1991a, 1991b), but the underlying idea is not much different from that presented above. Research has focused on the marginal costs of abatement using either an end-use approach (e.g., production of fuel-efficient automobiles, replacing incandescent light bulbs with fluorescent) or one that seeks to equate the supply and demand of energy in the global economy; these

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are referred to as the bottom-up and top-down approaches, respectively. Less research has focused on the marginal damages of climate change. This explains why the MCA function in fig. 8.2 is rather smooth whereas the MD function is drawn as a wavy line (because it is just not well known). Before one can advocate policy regarding reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, it is necessary to determine the benefits of such an action. Simply arguing that action is warranted because global climate change is inevitable is unsatisfactory from the point of view of economics. It is necessary to demonstrate that (1) global welfare (the value of output plus that of non-priced amenities) under an aggravated greenhouse effect is less than what it would be in the absence of warming; (2) the net value of this output exceeds the costs of averting anthropogenic warming (with the dollar values given in present or terminal value terms, implying that discounting occurs); (3) the net benefits of averting anthropogenic warming are greater than the net benefits of adapting to the projected warmer climate; and finally, (4) costs and benefits are determined at the margin, because reliance on average costs and benefits results in misallocation of resources.7 The economic methodology can be illustrated using data from Nordhaus (1990b, 1991a), who sought to summarize all known information about the costs and benefits of slowing anthropogenic warming and thereby determine an optimal level of global greenhouse gas emissions reduction. Using information from other studies, he estimated marginal

Fig. 8.3. Efficient reduction of greenhouse gases. (Source: Nordhaus 1990b.)

138 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect cost functions for reducing concentrations of atmospheric greenhouse gases by planting trees, cutting back on chlorofluorocarbons, and reducing emissions of carbon dioxide. These marginal costs are indicated in fig. 8.3, as is the total estimated marginal cost of reducing greenhouse emissions from the current level. Lacking information on the marginal damages, he assumed three levels of constant marginal damages —low, medium, and high. (Only medium and high levels of damage are indicated in fig. 8.3.) Targeted levels of reduction occur where the marginal cost of reduction of all greenhouse gases intersects the marginal damages; this occurs in the figure for reductions of greenhouse gases of about 17 per cent and 45 per cent for medium and high levels of damages, respectively. Nordhaus (1990b) estimates that one ton of carbon is globally valued at between $US 0.57 and $US 106.70.8 The cost of achieving a 50 per cent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions will be "almost $200 billion per year in today's economy, or around 1 percent of world output. This estimate is understated to the extent that the implementing policies are inefficient or that they are undertaken in a crash program" (Nordhaus 1991a, 63). Whalley and Wigle (1991) estimate that it will cost $250-290 billion per annum to achieve such reductions worldwide, and Manne and Richels (1990, 1991) estimate that the costs of reducing carbon dioxide emissions by 20 per cent in the U.S. would reduce that country's gross national product by 3 per cent. Blair and Ross (see "Energy Efficiency at Home and Abroad" in this volume) present the opposing view that reductions in greenhouse gas emissions from investments in new technology can confer considerable financial benefits upon the economy. The economist responds by arguing that, if benefits of reducing greenhouse gas emissions exceed costs, one would observe individuals and firms investing in the new technology. Since this is not the case, some economic costs must have been neglected. This is not to say that technological innovations are not worthwhile, and a contributory factor to emissions reductions, but only that current economic incentives are inadequate and that the rate of adoption will likely be slower than technological optimists envision. Intervention to avert global climate change is not costless; any money spent to reduce greenhouse gas emissions has an opportunity cost, namely, reduced investment in non-greenhouse-related research and development and capital, debt reduction, and lower consumption. These costs are not inconsequential and could prove harmful to some economies. Aid from developed to low-income countries could alleviate some of the burden, but income redistribution on a large scale creates additional problems for both the donor and recipient countries (Bauer 1981). Donors will attempt to minimize the amount transferred (e.g., by reducing other forms of aid), and in recipient countries aid could lead to increased economic inefficiency and dependence.

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2. Policies for Reducing Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions In this section, I examine economic policy instruments for reducing global emissions of greenhouse gases. The objective of any policy should be to achieve an economically efficient level of emissions, as denoted by distance OE in fig. 8.1 (or point E in fig. 8.2.) This can be accomplished using either command and control regulation or economic incentives. 2.1 Command and Control Regulation Command and control imposes restrictions upon individual economic agents, groups of agents (e.g., a sector of the economy), or a country. The authority might specify the actual level of emissions permitted at a particular source, require that certain standards be met within a sector (e.g., an automotive emissions standard), prohibit activities such as deforestation, or specify that certain equipment be installed at emission sources. The problems with this approach are threefold. First, there are no incentives to do better than the standard. This is important in the long term, particularly if overall emissions rise. Second, there are few incentives to achieve the standards at the lowest cost to the economy as a whole. Although each agent or sector achieves its emissions standard at lowest cost, opportunities to reduce economy-wide costs are forgone because some sectors are not encouraged to reduce emissions further and others reduce them beyond what is efficient (so that costs are higher than they should be). Thus, the marginal cost of further reductions is higher in one sector than another, whereas efficiency considerations require that they be equal across sectors and across firms within a sector. Finally, monitoring and policing such a system may be expensive and, in some countries, not feasible. 2.2 Economic Incentives Economic incentives, on the other hand, harness the power of markets to achieve emission reductions at the least possible cost to society, in both the short run and the long run, by providing incentives for innovation. Economic incentives include subsidies and taxes (or charges). They can also be employed in conjunction with quantity restrictions on the level of emissions, as in the case of tradeable emission permits. 2.2.7 Subsidies

It is possible to achieve the desired level of emissions reduction in an economically efficient manner by providing firms with subsidies per unit reduction of carbon emissions, for example. Subsidies are often politically more acceptable than taxes. A subsidy of amount mT (fig. 8.1) has the effect of shifting the MBprivate inwards by that amount, since continued emissions results in forgone subsidy. The new, private marginal benefit function intersects private marginal cost at emissions level OE

140 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect rather than OX. Although this results in the desired level of emissions in the short run, there is a problem in the long run because the authority does not know the actual marginal benefit and cost functions. Subsidies are calculated on the basis of some benchmark level of emissions. Individual economic agents are encouraged to raise this benchmark by investing more than otherwise in those sectors that receive subsidies. This could be particularly troublesome where subsidies are provided to lowincome countries. Even contemplation of subsidies could encourage some of these countries not to implement currently feasible greenhouse gas reductions, and implementation of subsidies will stimulate investment in sectors receiving subsidies.9 Finally, a practical difficulty with subsidies is that they are often tied to a specific, proven technology, which could reduce efficiency and flexibility. Is it ethical to use public funds as incentives to private firms to reduce their social costs or meet their moral obligations? If property rights to the atmosphere reside with all citizens, then economic reasoning requires governments to force firms to recognize the costs on the atmosphere of their activities, rather than subsidize those activities. 2.2.2 Taxes Assume that the abscissa in fig. 8.1 is relabelled to refer to emissions of carbon dioxide only. Then a tax on carbon dioxide emissions (carbon tax) of mT (fig. 8.1) would cause individual agents to equate the marginal benefit of their carbon dioxide emissions with their marginal private cost plus the amount of the tax. That is, the MCprivate will shift up in parallel fashion by amount mTand intersect MBprivate at the socially desired level of emissions, OE. (This is illustrated by tne dashed line in fig. 8.1 labelled MCprivate+Tax.) In effect, firms (countries) avoid the tax by reducing emissions to the point where the marginal net benefit (marginal benefit minus marginal cost) to the firm (country) of further emissions reduction is equal to the tax. The main advantage of a tax scheme is that firms with low abatement costs will reduce carbon emissions to a larger extent than firms with high abatement costs; the latter will prefer to pay the tax rather than pay the higher marginal cost to reduce emissions. Further, in the long run all economic agents have an incentive to adopt technologies (e.g., fuel-efficient ones) that reduce the costs of their emissions. This causes the MCprivate curve in fig. 8.1 to shift down and to the right, thereby providing the unexpected result that the socially optimal level of carbon dioxide emissions rises, ceteris paribus, from OE back towards OX.10 The carbon tax also generates revenue for governments, which raises several issues. First, one needs to keep in mind that the objective of the tax is to reduce carbon emissions. If the authority seeks to maximize revenue from the tax scheme, it may not wish to increase taxes to the level required to achieve adequate greenhouse gas reductions and, in particu-

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lar, it may not want to increase taxes to their required levels as costs and benefits change over time. The reason is that higher tax rates could result in lower revenues as emissions are reduced. Second, although revenue from a carbon tax can be used for policing, collection, and monitoring, it can also be used to reduce other taxes in the economy (e.g., to increase investment tax credits or cut personal and corporate tax levels). But unless other taxes are reduced, it may not be politically feasible to impose a carbon tax. If governments reduce other taxes, the overall effect might be to increase long-term economic growth ("Carbonated Growth" 1992). 2.2.3 Emission Permits A tradeable emission permit is a legal device that enables its holder to emit a specified amount of greenhouse gases in each period of time. The permits are tradeable or transferable because they can be bought and sold by economic agents. They are used in conjunction with quantity restrictions to achieve the desired level of carbon emissions, OE (fig. 8.1). Experience in the U.S. indicates that the permits are more politically acceptable when issued free to existing polluters on the basis of their current emission levels. Existing markets for emission permits (e.g., sulphur dioxide emissions from thermal power plants) have functioned less than perfectly because they have been thin (few transactions) and/or dominated by single buyers or sellers. But this is unlikely to be a problem with respect to greenhouse gas emissions because markets would not be confined to a single, small region — climatic change is a global problem. From an ethical standpoint, the permits raise the question of whether the state should give legal sanction (rights or permits) to emit greenhouse gases that have potential to damage the atmosphere. 2.2.4 Offsets and Private Markets Under a system of tradeable permits, a new emission source should have the option of purchasing either those permits or carbon offsets, that is, carbon sequestration services. The benefit of such a system is that even if a country decides to restrict emissions unilaterally (i.e., in the absence of an international greenhouse protocol), it could permit emitters to purchase new carbon sequestration services worldwide. Likewise, private individuals or groups may wish to avert global climate change by purchasing new forest reserves or plantations. This approach has been used successfully by various agencies (e.g., Ducks Unlimited to preserve wetlands and World Vision to aid development); it is discussed further by Danielson (see "Personal Responsibility" in this volume). 23 Uncertainty Uncertainty is unavoidable when it comes to economic policies and the atmosphere. Not only are the marginal costs and benefits of greenhouse

142 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect gas abatement (or the functions in fig. 8.1) unknown, but estimates of the impacts of global climate change are uncertain. This uncertainty has policy implications. Setting a quantitative emissions target (say, at OE) and issuing permits to attain that target results in the same potential savings as a system of carbon taxes (set at mT). However, with uncertainty regarding greenhouse damages and with marginal costs that rise rapidly as emissions are reduced, the regulated target could result in much higher (perhaps unacceptably higher) costs than originally envisioned (Gates and Portney 1991). Thus, taxes may be preferred. On the other hand, if the effects of anthropogenic warming are not known with certainty and there is concern about critical levels of atmospheric greenhouse gases, then direct control via an emissions target may be the preferred instrument (Baumol and Gates 1988, 198-200). Taxes may be set too low and, therefore, emissions will be too high to achieve a safe minimum standard of atmospheric conservation —that is, avoiding a critical zone for greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere (Ciriacy-Wantrup 1968). Although taxes and tradeable emission permits both provide incentives to reduce costs, taxes also provide a feedback incentive to increase emissions as MCprivate falls (see above). A quantitative target, therefore, provides the authority with greater control. 3. Policy Choice in a Global Commons The economic policy issue is further complicated when one considers that climatic change is a global problem that requires co-operation among all nations. A single country or subset of countries (e.g., OECD members) pursuing emission reductions in isolation would not be effective (Gates and Portney 1991). Solitary pursuit of reduced greenhouse gas emissions would establish a moral example, but the global climate change problem is beyond the power of a single country or subset of countries to resolve, regardless of their economic might. In this section, the predicament of global policy is considered. 3.1 International Agreement The first obstacle to overcome is that of achieving an international agreement on emissions reduction. In all probability, it will be much more difficult to achieve an agreement on carbon dioxide than it was on chlorofluorocarbons. Morrisette and Plantinga (1990) identify four positions that nations have adopted concerning carbon dioxide emissions. First, the cautious countries (principally the U.S.) argue that current information about global climate change is insufficient to warrant undertaking costly policies to avert warming. Only "no-regrets" strategies that produce benefits in addition to those of mitigating global climate change (e.g., reducing harmful automobile emissions) should be pursued.

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However, as Hare has pointed out (see "The Challenge" in this volume), air quality policies can complement avoidance of climatic change but can also be antagonistic to it. Second, a number of countries, primarily in western Europe, have adopted an activist position. These countries support the view that temperatures are rising and believe that the benefits of averting global climate change outweigh the costs. Many of the countries in this group are unlikely to meet their stated targets, having adopted their positions in anticipation of negotiations of an international accord ("Europe's Industries Play Dirty" 1992). Third, some countries are currently unable to act because their economies are not able to bear the burden of complying with any international agreement (e.g., countries of the old Soviet empire and those in eastern Europe). Finally, there are the low-income nations that are both unable and unwilling to act on an agreement regarding greenhouse gas emissions. These countries argue that the developed countries are responsible for global climate change and they should be the ones to do something about it. A global agreement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions is unlikely to be successful at preventing an aggravated greenhouse effect because it will take quite some time to reach an agreement and then to actually curtail emissions (Lave 1991). It will be difficult to convince those in the first, third, and fourth categories to commit to an agreement. It will then be necessary to put in place the required institutions, technology, and so on that will cause greenhouse gas emissions to decline. These processes will take time, and probably mean that global climate change is unavoidable. Therefore, adaptation may be necessary (see section 4). 3.2 World Carbon Taxes If the countries in only the first and second categories imposed taxes, the demand for fossil fuels in those countries would fall. This would increase the supply of fossil fuels to non-participating countries, effectively reducing prices in those countries. This in turn would encourage greater emissions by consumers in non-participating countries, who will tend to purchase cheaper but more polluting technologies, and would increase investment in sectors that emit more carbon dioxide. The net effect on global emissions is unclear. There are several additional considerations pertaining to a carbon tax, even if some form of international agreement is possible. First, is the tax to be levied at the producer or the consumer level? It is unlikely that countries will agree to producer taxes that substantially increase the revenue of the producing nations (who collect the tax), particularly after the problems caused previously by a flood of petro dollars and the political instability of the Middle East. Yet levying taxes on consumers

144 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect could force countries in the Middle East to increase oil production in order to maintain their revenues. This would cause oil prices to fall, partly offsetting the effect of carbon taxes in reducing carbon dioxide emissions. Second, there remains the problem of tax revenues and equity. As noted above, countries may use revenues to reduce taxes elsewhere in their economies or they may become enthralled with the revenue that such a tax generates. But it is the developed countries that will collect the largest percentage of world revenues, and what they do with this windfall has ethical implications. Some redistribution of tax revenues to low-income countries is preferred on ethical grounds. However, "donor" countries' transfers to low-income countries are often accompanied by political riders, as now happens with foreign aid. Further, observers argue that income transfers need to target offending sectors in the low-income countries, but this counters the purpose of the tax and might inadvertently lead to increased investment in those sectors, thereby offsetting gains in emissions reductions. It is also unlikely that redistribution of tax revenue of this magnitude will be acceptable to citizens of developed countries. Third, rent seeking by various interest groups will make it difficult to achieve the desired result of emissions reduction. In Europe, for example, there are no taxes on the use of coal, and its production is highly subsidized (by about ten billion dollars annually in Germany). Existing taxes are already equivalent to a carbon tax of seventy-seven dollars per ton. However, relative taxes are distorted, resulting in inefficiency — taxes on natural gas should be increased by 17 per cent and those on coal by a much larger amount, whereas those on gas and oil need to be reduced by 17 per cent ("Carbonated Growth" 1992). Because states are an object of rent seeking and devise contradictory policies (see Danielson, "Personal Responsibility" in this volume; van Kooten 1993), it is likely that carbon taxes will fail to meet the objective of averting climatic change. Carbon taxes are an effective economic mechanism, but they will not be allowed to function properly in practice. 3.3 Quantity Restrictions and TEPs An international agreement on greenhouse gas emissions could employ country emission targets — direct control with emission permits. The advantage of country emissions quotas is that the issue of equity is addressed up front. Tradeable emission permits are the device used to bring about the desired income transfers (Wilman 1992). Countries with insufficient permits could purchase rights to emit greenhouse gases by paying an annual rental fee to those countries with "surplus" rights. A number of problems remain. First, effective use of a system of permits requires a level of expertise and administrative capability not found in many countries. Second, no institution exists for ensuring com-

Effective Economic Mechanisms 145 pliance—there is no global policeman. Third, there remains the problem of how to allocate permits. Grubb (1989) has recommended that these be distributed according to the size of the adult population, and that they be vested in governments rather than private individuals. This creates three problems: (1) developed countries are unlikely to pay the enormous rents that would be required; (2) recipient governments could use monies in ways that lead to greater emissions of greenhouse gas (e.g., to purchase warplanes); and (3) governments lack the information about emissions needed to exploit the gains of trade available from permit trading. Manne and Richels (1991) propose allocating permits initially by economic output with a gradual shift to allocation based on population; in both instances, 1990 is used as a basis to prevent countries from artificially increasing their populations. They do not, however, suggest whether the rights should be vested in government or private individuals. The issue of equity is particularly worrisome in choosing a mechanism for allocating the burdens of greenhouse gas reductions. Allocation of emission permits raises both practical and ethical questions. One purpose of applied ethics is to determine the appropriate method for distributing quotas, assuming tradeable permits are considered morally appropriate. This issue is addressed by Hurka (see "Ethical Principles" in this volume), and questions concerning implementation are addressed by Bankes (see "International Responsibility" in this volume). However, in my view the obstacles facing a global system of tradeable permits do not bode well for the prevention of global climate change. 4. Intergenerational Transfers, Discount Rate, and Adaptation Apprehension about the environment and atmosphere often involves concern about future generations (bequest values). However, it is not the case that any positive discount rate results in exploitation of the earth's resources (and atmosphere) to the detriment of future generations. Intergenerational transfer of wealth depends on the discount rate (and vice versa), but it is also a matter of ethics. Economists have argued that one cannot solve problems of intergenerational transfers and distribution of environmental resources simply by manipulating the discount rate. For example, d'Arge, Schulze, and Brookshire (1982) demonstrate that one of the factors determining the appropriateness of any discount rate is the ethical system that one adopts. (They examine the utilitarian, total egalitarian, total elitist, and libertarian ethical systems.) It is clear that "the problem of intergenerational equity is deeper than simply adopting a discount rate rule of social choice and then searching for the 'correct' number for the discount rate. More strongly, ... searching for the 'correct social rate of discount' is searching for a will-o'-the-wisp" (Page 1988, 88).

146 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect The debate about intergenerational equity is not even about the discount rate (Norgaard 1991). Society must make an explicit decision concerning the amount of income each future generation should be permitted. Once that decision is made, the discount rate is also determined. Distributing income across generations is an ethical question, and it will be difficult to reach agreement on that point (see Hurka, "Ethical Principles" in this volume). The current generation passes wealth to future generations in the form of human capital (knowledge), human-made or physical capital (e.g., energy-efficient power plants), and natural resources (pristine wilderness, an atmosphere with low concentrations of greenhouse gases, etc.). It is inconsistent to use a low discount rate on investments that reduce greenhouse gas emissions at the same time as a high return on capital. If one is faced with a choice between investments in climate and capital investments, the efficient policy is to invest heavily in the high-return options and use the proceeds to slow climatic change in the future (Nordhaus 1990a, 205). That is, investments in human and physical capital that make an economy better able to cope with adverse impacts of climate warming may make more sense than uncertain and low-return investments to avert climatic change. This introduces two additional concerns. Given that climatic change cannot be avoided entirely, should avoidance strategies (e.g., taxes or tradeable permits) take precedence over policies that provide greater scope for adaptation in the future? The economist answers that one should allocate investment funds between avoidance and adaptation strategies until the marginal benefit from allocating another dollar on avoidance is equal to that from spending another dollar on adaptation. This requires the use of equivalent discount rates in evaluating choices. However, in a world of uncertainty, where countries have many different needs and hopes for the future, the allocation of scarce resources between prevention and adaptation is also an ethical one. How much money should be set aside for adaptation in case avoidance fails? Suppose a low-income country is better off in the long run if it adopts an adaptationist approach, even though this could well increase its greenhouse gas emissions in the short run. How is this country to be treated by the international community if that community decides upon prevention? Finally, the focus of the discussion in this chapter has been on government intervention. However, experience indicates that it would be a grave error to entrust the state with the task of maintaining or enhancing the welfare of future generations (see also Danielson, "Personal Responsibility" in this volume). One characteristic that appears to be common to all countries is that they have mortgaged the future in order to pay for present consumption. If the Canadian experience is any indication, governments have been more than willing to jeopardize the welfare of future generations in order to enhance their own chances of staying in power.

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5. Conclusions Appropriate economic policies can help to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases. However, economic reasoning indicates that regulations and incentives to slow warming may not work as well as their proponents envision. As a result, rather than focusing solely on mitigating strategies, we need to seriously consider mechanisms for adapting to and coping with global climate change. Carbon taxes and regulations to reduce greenhouse gas emissions are not costless; they will make the current generation poorer, and poorer people pass on less wealth to future generations. Even if the government transfers wealth to the future generation in the form of an atmosphere with lower carbon dioxide content, there remains the efficiency question. If current generations pay two dollars for every one dollar transferred, this is surely inefficient, and it may be in the interests of the future generation to receive wealth in the form of human and physical capital as opposed to an atmosphere with fewer greenhouse gases. Notes 1 Adaptation is an often-neglected policy response; it is discussed below. 2 Although economists measure values in monetary terms, others argue that there are alternative measures of value (see Hurka, "Ethical Principles" in this volume). The criterion in this paragraph does not require that values be measured in monetary terms, although in the following discussion I assume that they are. 3 Property rights are defined by Randall (1981,143-54). 4 The atmosphere cannot be considered a global commons because this term refers to global ownership and management for mutual welfare. Until nations decide that the atmosphere is to be collectively owned and then determine an effective means for managing it, the atmosphere will remain an open-access resource. 5 Social costs subsume private costs. It is assumed that MBSOCjaj is equivalent to ^^private' 6 In general, total benefits are calculated as an area under a marginal benefit curve, and total costs are calculated as an area under the marginal cost curve. In this case, costs are a damage that is avoided and thereby constitute a gain from reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The cost is the benefits forgone. 7 In fig. 8.1, the total private benefits at OX (given by the area under MBprivate) might exceed the total marginal social costs (given by the area under MCsocial). Then the average private benefit exceeds the average social cost, leading to the wrong conclusion that OX is preferred to OE. 8 All references employ U.S. units of measure (dollars, tons, etc.), as is done here. 9 One suggested solution to this problem is to set the benchmark at some date in the past. However, this would also result in inequities because it would imply that the better-off low-income countries—ones that may already have sought to bring greenhouse gas emissions under control (viz., reducing chlorofluorocarbons) — are given greater subsidies than poorer countries that may be more in need of them. 10 As an illustration, consider a tax on gasoline that causes someone to substitute the latest fuel-efficient model for the vehicle they are currently driving. Despite the tax, they now find they are spending less on fuel than previously and, consequently, they drive more than before.

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Chapter 9 ENERGY EFFICIENCY AT HOME AND ABROAD Kerri R. Blair and William A. Ross As Hare has noted (see "The Challenge" in this volume), global climate change is generally accepted as a significant environmental concern. Many of the future scenarios developed to predict the consequences of global climate change conclude that among its potential effects are human and non-human suffering, species extinction, and loss of biodiversity (e.g., Buckmaster, "The Arctic" in this volume; Schneider 1990). Finally, some forms of human intervention, such as will be discussed in this chapter, would avoid these harms. Given these considerations, should harm be caused by global climate change when action could have prevented the harm, basic moral rights will have been violated and moral obligations ignored. This point, we submit, is the basic ethical argument requiring that we take action to deal with global climate change. It is also the reason why this chapter deals primarily with avoidance of, and not adaptation to, global climate change. In effect, deciding how to respond to the potential threats of global climate change is an exercise in applied ethics. The extent to which action is undertaken to avoid predicted effects of climate change will largely depend on the ethical principles accepted and applied by decision makers. The best decisions concerning global climate change must be based on ethical principles ascribing moral standing or rights to those predictably affected by the decisions. The number of affected beings whose interests are considered will inevitably influence the sort of decisions taken; and, in general, the larger the circle of interests recognized by an ethical principle, the more controversy that ethical principle will stimulate and the more action it will require. The three ethical positions considered here are those outlined by Hurka (see "Ethical Principles" in this volume) attributing standing to current generations (people here and now), present and future generations (people at all times and in all places) and non-human interests. According to the first position, the best course of action is that which ensures the maximum possible benefits to presently existing human beings; it protects the interests of current generations. The second ethical position assigns equal weight to the interests of presently living and future human beings; it ascribes rights to future people and guards against actions that adversely affect their interests. The third ethical approach calls

150 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect for an expansion of ethical thinking to include the interests of non-human elements of the environment. An examination of different options for avoiding global climate change reveals that, as a first step, increasing energy efficiency in both industrialized and developing countries accords with all three ethical principles. The degree of investment in energy efficiency as a global climate change response strategy will depend in large part on whether future generations and/or non-human beings are considered morally relevant. The next section considers the consequences of adopting the first position, in which only the interests of the current generation are considered. 1. Global Climate Change Policy and the Interests of Current Generations A global climate change response strategy might be developed according to an ethical principle recognizing only the interests of presently existing human beings. Avoiding future harm caused by global climate change is only modestly in the interests of presently existing human beings, many of whom may not be living when most of the harm is expected to occur. For these individuals, the desirable policy response is one that will improve quality of life in the present. Slightly less preferable (but still justified) are actions that will not negatively affect existing quality of life. Fortunately, improved quality of life can be provided by increasing energy efficiency and making energy do more for us. One might wonder: How much energy efficiency can be economically achieved in the self-interest of currently existing human beings? Interestingly, some studies indicate that global climate change can be eliminated even within the constraints imposed by this modest ethical position. They suggest that economic self-interest alone is strong enough to lead to energy-efficiency improvements of such a magnitude that problems of global climate change will vanish. The extent to which cost-effective improvements in energy efficiency can contribute to reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and hence reduce global climate change, is a very controversial issue in the literature. Lovins and Lovins (1991), for example, conclude that "most global climate change can be abated not at roughly zero net cost... but at a negative net cost." They argue, convincingly in our view, that "advanced technologies for resource efficiency, and proven ways to implement them, can now support present or greatly expanded worldwide economic activity while stabilising global climate and saving money" Other studies (e.g., Friends of the Earth Canada 1983) have reached the same or compatible conclusions. However, there are also studies that suggest such savings are illusory and that limiting global climate change will be very

Energy Efficiency 151 expensive (e.g., van Kooten, "Effective Economic Mechanisms" in this volume). In our opinion, there are great opportunities to improve energy efficiency and so limit, and maybe even eliminate, global climate change while still saving money. However, because this conclusion is so controversial, we have chosen a more conservative approach. In this chapter we assume that financially attractive improvement in energy efficiency is not in itself adequate to eliminate global climate change. This forces us to examine a variety of ethical approaches to decision making. At some levels, consumption and quality of life are closely linked. Life cannot be said to have a great deal of quality without adequate nutrition, shelter, and mobility, all of which in some way involve consumption. Beyond the clear connection between the consumption required to fulfil basic human needs and quality of life, however, it is difficult to determine exactly what is necessary to give life quality (Porritt 1990). Certainly, many residents of the developed world consume resources at rates far beyond those necessary to fulfil basic human needs, and for them, reducing consumption may be one way of reducing environmental concerns. We do not consider such changes in this chapter. When quality of life is discussed in the aggregate, indices such as total economic activity, gross national product (GNP), and per capita GNP have often been used (though it is generally accepted that these yardsticks alone measure quality of life poorly) (Porritt 1990). It is important to realize that quality of life may be enhanced in a situation where net monetary savings are experienced. Energy conservation is too often associated with suffering—with freezing in the dark. For the purposes of this analysis, improving energy efficiency involves providing the same goods and services as are now provided, but with less cost and less energy. It is in the economic interests of presently existing human beings to take actions that will result in net savings or, at the least, will incur no net cost over the course of these people's lifetimes. Actions that lead to immediate or near-future cost savings, while satisfying the most presentoriented and anthropocentric of ethical principles, would thus constitute the least controversial global climate change response strategy available to decision makers. 1.1 Getting More Out of Energy The link between increasing energy efficiency and avoiding climate change is relatively straightforward. In general, increased energy efficiency results in less use of fossil fuels, and hence lower carbon dioxide emissions. Carbon dioxide has been responsible for over half of the temperature increase attributable to human activities (IPCC 1990.) Therefore, reducing carbon dioxide emissions by means of energy conservation

152 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect will lead to less human-induced climatic change. We argue the following: Among response strategies, increased energy efficiency — that is, energy conservation — stands out as being most likely to avoid the effects of global climate change while at the same time producing net monetary savings (NAS 1991).! Typically, energy requirement projections are based on the assumption that energy use increases proportionately with economic growth (MacKenzie 1991). However, many studies (e.g., Goldemberg 1987) conclude that a positive correlation between energy consumption and economic growth is illusory. Between 1973 and 1985, according to Goldemberg, total energy use per capita in the world's most industrialized market economies fell 6 per cent, yet per capita gross domestic product (GDP) increased 21 per cent. Over the same period, per capita energy use in the United States fell 12 per cent and per capita GDP rose 17 per cent. In Japan, per capita energy use fell 6 per cent and per capita GDP rose 46 per cent. The point is that, even using the crude measure of GDP as an indicator of quality of life, quality of life can improve as energy use declines. Other studies (e.g., Cavanaugh, Goldstein, and Watson 1989; Lovins and Lovins 1991) argue convincingly that economic growth, far from being tied to growth in energy use, is best achieved by spending money on projects that will efficiently supply the real products and services needed by consumers. These projects, they argue, use modern technologies that require much less energy than conventional alternatives. Cavanaugh, Goldstein, and Watson suggest that if there is a perceived need for increased energy supply, conservation options should be weighed against the costs of such things as new oil fields and gas wells. Following such a comparison, the option with the lowest cost should be chosen first because "energy preserved from waste is indistinguishable from energy delivered to customers by production facilities." Lovins and Lovins note: To abate global climate change promptly with finite resources, // is vital to choose the best buys first. This is because of "opportunity cost" —the impossibility of using the same money to buy two different things at the same lime.... Any other sequence of investments prolongs and enlarges climatic risk (italics in original).

Next, it is appropriate to give specific examples of the increases in energy efficiency alluded to above. Shin and Sioshansi (1990) describe supply-side efficiency improvements and repowering as options for an electric utility trying to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In the production of electricity, fuel consumption may be reduced by such means as cogeneration, waste heat recovery, and reductions in transmission and distribution losses. Co-generation, for example, can improve thermal conversion efficiency from one third to roughly two thirds by using the same energy for production of both electricity and thermal energy (Shin and Sioshansi 1990). Repowering is the conversion of an existing conven-

Energy Efficiency 153 tional gas- or oil-fired steam plant into a combined-cycle plant by integrating combustion turbines. Conversion of this kind can improve fuel efficiency by about 15-20 per cent, and results in reduced carbon dioxide emissions for the same amount of useful energy (Shin and Sioshansi 1990). On the demand side (i.e., dealing with customer demand for energy), an electric utility can reduce its electricity use and hence its carbon dioxide emissions in co-operation with its customers. Greater efficiency in lighting, heating, ventilating, and air-conditioning systems and other enduse technologies can reduce energy consumption by up to 75 per cent. Strategies such as this are often referred to as demand-side management programs (Shin and Sioshansi 1990). A fuller illustration of the potential for cost-effective improvements in energy efficiency in the United States is provided in table 9.1. Other studies indicate that the potential for improving energy efficiency cost-effectively is nearly as great in other developed countries as it is in the United States (several such studies are cited in Lovins and Lovins 1991) and that potential savings in developing countries are much greater (e.g., Goldemberg 1987). It therefore seems fair to treat the results for the United States as representative of the whole world.2 Clearly, the potential for energy savings through cost-effective improvements is considerable. Munasinghe (1987), among others, summarizes options for conservation in developing countries in transportation, buildings, industry, and electricity supply. What is again found is that energy efficiency can be greatly improved through wise investments. Examples of projects that might be funded by the World Bank, the United Nations Development Program, and similar agencies include technical assistance for energy audits, retrofitting programs, establishment of energy conservation centres, improved power system management and distribution systems, development of more efficient wood stoves, and urban traffic management projects (Pinto 1987). At the International Conference on Global Warming and Sustainable Development (1991, 6), participants suggested that developing countries need not go through the evolutionary process of previous industrialization but rather, they must "leapfrog" directly from a status of underdevelopment through to economically efficient, environmentally benign technologies.

Conference participants agreed that industrialized nations and international funding agencies have an obligation not to burden developing countries with obsolete, inefficient, polluting technologies, but rather to make appropriate technology available on favourable terms. Technology transfer and even funding by developing countries thus appears in order. Moreover, in light of the tremendous improvements in efficiency that could be achieved, such investments by

154 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect Table 9.1. Brief Descriptions of Energy Efficiency Options for the United States Residential and Commercial Energy Management Electricity efficiency measures Reflective surfaces Residential lighting

Home water heating Commercial water heating Commercial lighting

Commercial cooking Commercial cooling Refrigeration Residential appliances

Residential heating

Commercial and industrial heating Commercial ventilation Oil and gas efficiency

Reduce air conditioning use and the urban heat island effect by 25% through planting vegetation and painting roofs white at 50% of U.S. residences. Reduce lighting energy consumption by 50% in all U.S. residences through replacement of incandescent lighting (2.5 inside and 1 outside light bulb per residence) with compact fluorescents. Improve efficiency by 40-70% through efficient tanks, increased insulation, low-flow devices, and alternative water heating systems. Improve efficiency by 40-60% through residential measures mentioned above, heat pumps, and heat recovery systems. Reduce lighting energy consumption by 30-60% by replacing 100% of commercial light fixtures with compact fluorescent lighting, reflectors, occupancy sensors, and daylighting. Use additional insulation, seals, improved heating elements, reflective pans, and other measures to increase efficiency 20-30%. Use improved heat pumps, chillers, window treatments, and other measures to reduce commercial cooling energy use by 30-70%. Improve efficiency 20-40% through improved compressors, air barriers and food case enclosures, and other measures. Improve efficiency of refrigeration and dishwashers by 10-30% through implementation of new appliance standards for refrigeration, and use of no-heat drying cycles in dishwashers. Reduce energy consumption by 40-60% through improved and increased insulation, window glazing, and weather stripping along with increased use of heat pumps and solar heating. Reduce energy use by 20-30% using measures similar to that for the residential sector. Improve efficiency 30-50% through improved distribution systems, energy-efficient motors, and various other measures. Reduce residential and commercial building fossil fuel energy use by 50% through improved efficiency measures similar to those listed under electricity efficiency.

Energy Efficiency Fuel Switching

155

Improve overall efficiency by 60-70% through switching 10% of building electricity use from electric resistance heat to natural gas heating.

Industrial Energy Management Co-generation Electricity efficiency Fuel efficiency

Fuel switching New process technology

Replace existing industrial energy systems with an additional 25 000 MW of co-generation plants to produce heat and power simultaneously. Improve electricity efficiency up to 30% through use of more efficient motors, electrical drive systems, lighting, and industrial process modifications. Reduce fuel consumption up to 30% by improving energy management, waste heat recovery, boiler modifications, and other industrial process enhancements. Switch 0.6 quads3 of current coal consumption in industrial plants to natural gas or oil. Increase recycling and reduce energy consumption primarily in the primary metals, pulp and paper, chemicals, and petroleum-refining industries through new, less energy intensive process innovations.

Transportation Energy Management Vehicle efficiency Light vehicles

Heavy trucks Aircraft

Use technology to improve on-road fuel economy to 9.4 litres/100 km (7.3 /100 km in CAFEb terms) with no changes in the existing fleet; improve on-road fuel economy to 6.6 /100 km (5.0 L/100 km CAFE) with measures that require changes in the existing fleet, such as down-sizing. Use measures similar to that for light vehicles to improve heavy truck efficiency up to 7.6 /100 km (5.9 /1 00 km CAFE). Implement improved fanjet and other technologies to improve fuel efficiency by 20% to 130-40 seat-miles per gallon.

Alternative fuels Methanolfrom biomass Hydrogen from non-fossil fuels Electricity from non-fossil fuels

Transportation Demand Management

a

Replace all existing gasoline vehicles with those that use methanol produced from biomass. Replace gasoline with hydrogen created from electricity generated from non-fossil fuel sources. Use electricity from non-fossil fuel sources such as nuclear and solar energy directly in transportation vehicles. Reduce solo commuting by eliminating 25% of the employer-provided parking spaces; place a tax on the remaining spaces to reduce solo commuting by an additional 1.5%.

1 quad = 1 quadrillion Btu = 1015 Btu = 1.055 x 1018 joules. Corporate average fuel economy. (Source: National Academy of Sciences 1991, Mitigation Panel Report, chap. 11.)

b

156 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect developing countries would meet the dual objectives of yielding a high return on investment and reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the most cost-effective way. Lovins and Lovins (1991) go farther and argue that, because the best new energy-saving technologies are so much cheaper than conventional energy-using technologies, the energy efficiency improvements identified here are "essential to affordable and sustainable global development and increased equity." 1.2 Reducing Emissions and Saving Money The next question to address is the extent to which, not energy, but carbon dioxide emissions could be reduced through these measures. According to the National Academy of Sciences panel (1991), improved building energy efficiency and vehicle efficiency (without any fleet changes) are technically feasible measures in the United States for which the net costs are less than or equal to zero. It is estimated that emission reduction potentials are 900 and 300 million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent per year, respectively (NAS 1991.) Furthermore, at an estimated net benefit or at a low cost (defined by the panel as between one and nine [US] dollars per tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent reduction), industrial energy management, transportation system management, and power plant heat rate improvements could save an additional 600 million tonnes per year. Together, these five measures have the potential to reduce the 1988 U.S. carbon dioxide emission rate of 4800 million tonnes per year (Boden, Kanricuk, and Farrell 1990) by 36 per cent. Similar results have been found by Rubin et al. (1992), who concluded that "a variety of energy efficiency and other measures that are now available could reduce U.S. emissions of greenhouse gases by roughly 10 to 40% of current levels at relatively low cost, perhaps at a net cost savings." According to a study undertaken for the United States Environmental Protection Agency (Breton 1990), carbon dioxide emissions could be kept at 1988 levels through the year 2010 solely by implementing programs estimated to have net cost savings for the U.S. Of these programs, the options with the greatest net savings are conservation programs in the transportation, residential, and commercial sectors.3 Emission reduction potentials have been calculated at subnational levels as well. One analysis in Alberta concluded that, by 2005, a 7.3 per cent reduction in the 1988 carbon dioxide emission level could be achieved through implementing energy efficiency and conservation programs with an approximate payback period of 3.1 years (Alberta Energy 1990). Compared to that of other energy investments, the payback period of energy efficiency programs often appears attractive. Investors nevertheless appear to make irrational decisions in this respect. According to Cavanaugh, Goldstein, and Watson (1989), when people

Energy Efficiency 157 and organizations can be persuaded to consider energy efficiency, they demand a much higher return on their investments than energy companies earn on their energy production projects. Conservation is typically expected to recover its full costs in three or fewer years, whereas a decade or more must pass before many new oil fields, coal mines, and power plants begin to earn any income. Taking only the extremely attractive investments and passing over, and thus making it difficult for others to tap, opportunities that society would normally consider attractive is called "high grading." High grading of energy conservation is a practice that would not be permitted by regulators of conventional energy resources. For this reason, some energy utilities are attempting to reduce this severe economic distortion by providing financial incentives for customers' conservation efforts. Lovins and Lovins (1991) note that "Southern California Edison Company, for example, has given away more than a million compact fluorescent lamps, because that was cheaper than operating the company's existing power plants." Friends of the Earth Canada (1983) concluded that under conditions of strong economic growth, it would be technically feasible and cost-effective to operate the Canadian economy in 2025 with between 12 per cent and 34 per cent less secondary energy than was required in 1978. In addition, they estimated that a very significant shift to reliance on renewable energy sources (as much as 82 per cent) would be possible and economically attractive. Though that study did not calculate carbon dioxide reduction potential, it is reasonable to assume that as the result of substantially greater energy savings and a switch to renewable energy sources, carbon dioxide emission rates would fall dramatically in absolute terms. Energy efficiency can effectively save costs and reduce carbon dioxide emissions in developing countries as well. Amulya Reddy derived energy policy suggestions for the state of Karnataka, India. Of all the policy directives being considered, Reddy's suggestions for energy efficiency entail the lowest costs as well as the lowest carbon dioxide emissions. He estimates that Karnataka could meet its energy needs, avoid the currently predicted doubling of carbon dioxide emissions by 2000, and at the same time save the three thousand (US) dollars per tonne of carbon dioxide emissions that supply expansion plans the government made in the late 1980s would have cost (MacKenzie 1991). If, as some argue, abating global climatic change is cost-effective, then in dealings between developed and developing nations "the object is not to figure out how to share sacrifices for the common good, but rather how to help individuals, firms and nations behave in their economic self interest" (Lovins and Lovins 1991).

158 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect 13 Full Cost Accounting In calculating the amount of energy that should optimally be used, one must consider the full cost of energy (see, e.g., van Kooten, "Effective Economic Mechanisms" in this volume). A major economic barrier to energy efficiency is that energy use decisions are based on energy prices to the end-user that do not reflect marginal costs (see, e.g., Hamburg, 1990; Kozloff 1987; Pinto 1987; Sioshansi, 1990). If the energy price charged to consumers is less than its economic opportunity cost, or if tariffs, taxes, interest rates, or other economic policy variables restrict the availability of energy-efficient equipment, then markets may not respond rationally or quickly in adopting conservation measures (Pinto 1987). Economic barriers to conservation exist in developing as well as industrialized countries. According to Shrestha and Acharya (1991), electricity pricing in many Asian countries does not reflect the true costs of supply, nor does it account for external costs. Subsidized electricity prices have serious implications for energy conservation. They lead to higher levels of consumption and, in effect, make the prospect of customers purchasing more efficient appliances less attractive financially.4 The price of fuel to consumers is, of course, an important factor in determining the cost savings that can be realized through energy efficiency and conservation. As the price per unit of fuel to run an automobile, provide a hot shower, or produce electricity goes up, so do the monetary savings associated with using fewer units of fuel to achieve these ends. Ethical principles, reflected in values, are among the many factors that affect fuel prices. Where the health of the environment is valued, for example, polluting fuels should be priced higher than where the health of the environment is a matter of indifference. Full cost accounting can ensure that the impact of consumption on all valued entities is included when fuel prices are set. In order to understand the benefit of full cost accounting, it is useful to consider the implicit costs of not implementing certain actions. Given a primary mandate to honour the interests of presently living humans, the economic and social costs of continuing with current rates of energy use are significant. Utilizing more energy than is needed to maintain a desired standard of living consumes money that might otherwise be spent to improve that standard of living. This observation is particularly relevant in developing countries. Furthermore, the external costs of inefficient energy use cannot be overlooked. Energy efficiency and conservation, in addition to reducing emissions of greenhouse gases, are key factors in other areas of pollution abatement. The costs of not implementing energy efficiency and conservation strategies include the health and environmental impacts of harmful levels of ground-level ozone, acid deposition, and, to a lesser extent, stratospheric ozone depletion. In many re-

Energy Efficiency 159 spects, then, it is costly for current societies not to pursue energy efficiency and conservation. 2. Global Warming Policy and Intergenerational Equity The next task is to consider how the role of increasing energy efficiency changes when one adopts the ethical position that both present and future generations matter. To do so, we turn to a Swedish policy of reducing carbon dioxide emissions in order to limit the effects of global climate change on future generations. Swedish researchers calculated the costs (in money and carbon dioxide) of efficiency for a number of scenarios involving different energy supply mixes (MacKenzie 1991). The research team found that no amount of efficiency was enough to both meet the country's service needs and reduce carbon dioxide emissions to the targeted (1986) level of eleven million tonnes per year if the basic source of power was fossil fuel. The scenario that produced the least carbon dioxide was found to cost less than simply letting market forces prevail.5 Nevertheless, this scenario was not the cheapest. On the other hand, carbon emissions under the cheapest plan, though less than those under market forces, were found to be too high to meet Sweden's target. The difference in cost between the cheapest plan and the one that produced the least carbon dioxide was estimated at $102 for each tonne of carbon not released. This, according to Thomas Johansson of the research team, may be viewed as the cost to society of adopting an energy policy that minimizes carbon dioxide rather than one that minimizes costs (MacKenzie 1991). The reduction of greenhouse gases through cost-effective means may not be sufficient to avoid global climate change entirely. A strategy that seeks only to minimize near-term costs may lead to a future need for adaptation measures. If, in the interests of future generations, the costs of adaptation are seen as unfavourable, then higher emission reduction targets can now be set and more costly measures included in an overall policy strategy (as in Sweden's current policy). In the United States, Breton (1990) estimates that programs with costs under two hundred dollars per metric tonne of carbon removed would permit a 13 per cent reduction of carbon dioxide emissions relative to 1988.6 Depending on the ethical principles applied, this two hundred dollars per metric tonne could be incorporated as a greenhouse (carbon) tax. Assessing a tax intended to reduce longer term effects of global climate change may not accord with policy based on the interests of people here and now. To justify a greenhouse tax, or some comparable measure the beneficial effects of which may be experienced in the relatively distant future, we would need to give greater weight to the interests of future generations. As a preliminary step in implementing a greenhouse tax, then, policy makers may need to accept the principle of

160 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect intergenerational equity. In general, the amount of such a tax would depend on the degree to which intergenerational equity was accepted as well as the degree to which the tax was expected to affect presently living individuals. Thus, with progressively increasing weight assigned to the interests of future generations, there is a corresponding shift in importance from maximizing cost-savings in the present to providing more insurance against future harm. Where intergenerational equity is applied, energy efficiency remains one of the most effective first steps of a greenhouse avoidance strategy. In contrast to an approach that is present oriented, however, a principle of intergenerational equity would justify a greenhouse tax (or other measures) to achieve higher emission reductions than would otherwise be cost-effective. 3. Global Climate Change Policy and Non-human Interests When the circle of relevant interests (or rights or moral standing) is expanded to included non-humans, there are increasingly stronger ethical grounds for considering investment in avoidance strategies. This conclusion is based on suggestions (e.g., IPCC 1990; NAS 1991; Schneider 1990) that certain species of plants could neither adapt nor migrate in order to avoid extinction in the event of rapid climatic change. On the grounds that species extinction is undesirable and that nonhuman interests count explicitly, it is possible to justify larger investments in global climate change avoidance measures than those based solely on the interests of humans beings. Also, the degradation of ecosystems due to global climate change would likely cause death and suffering among sentient animals. If one accepts the (sentience-based) principle that the suffering and death of these animals has ethical significance, then greater investment in avoidance may be justified when evaluating the potential consequences of global climate change and response strategies. 4. An Attempt to Assess the Effectiveness of Energy Efficiency In this section, we first attempt to quantify the effect of various levels of improved energy efficiency and then point out some of the attractive features of this means of dealing with global climate change. It is helpful to try to understand the effectiveness of various levels of carbon dioxide emission reductions in mitigating global climate change using a simple model of global temperature changes and the influence of carbon dioxide emissions on them (NAS 1991, 16). The temperature change was determined for each of three levels of carbon dioxide emission: a business-as-usual scenario involving growth in emissions from 1990 levels; a scenario employing a commonly suggested emission target

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(i.e., holding emissions at 1990 levels); and a scenario in which a somewhat more rigorous though still, according to some studies, easily achievable emission rate is achieved (i.e., reducing 1990 emissions by 37 per cent). Temperature changes caused by the greenhouse gas carbon dioxide alone are presented in table 9.2. These results should not be compared with those reported in Hare (see "The Challenge" this volume) for several reasons, the most important of which is that the results in table 9.2 are for carbon dioxide alone and not for all greenhouse gases. (Carbon dioxide is responsible for approximately one half of global climatic change [NAS 1991]). In addition, these results are for the year 2030, not for a future date at which there will be a doubling of total greenhouse gases. Third, these results were taken from a source for which such interpolations were easily done, not the source that Hare used.

Table 9.2. Global Temperature Change Due to Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 1990-2030 Scenario Temperature Change (° C)a Change in last century 0.1-0.3 Business as usual 1.3 Carbon dioxide emissions at 1990 levels 0.9 Carbon dioxide emissions 37% below 1990 levels 0.6 a

Note: These temperature changes are due to the effects of carbon dioxide only. (Source'. National Academy of Sciences 1991, Mitigation Panel Report, chap. 11.)

Carbon dioxide emission targets based on either of the above energy efficiency improvement scenarios would substantially reduce temperature increases commonly associated with a business-as-usual emission rate of carbon dioxide. That is, in lieu of an increase of 1.3° C, lower increases of 0.9° C or even 0.6° C would occur. One of the most attractive features of dealing with global climate change by improving energy efficiency is the multiplicity of reasons why this approach might be selected. Individuals can choose to conserve energy both as a means of meeting with their ethical obligation to combat global climate change and as a means of increasing their personal quality of life (see Danielson "Personal Responsibility" this volume). Corporations that reduce greenhouse gas emissions can satisfy their ethical obligations at the same time as they increase efficiency and

162 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect competitiveness (see Stewart and Dickey, "Corporate Responsibility" in this volume). And nations can use efficiency improvements to meet the requirements of any global climate change treaty obligations created and to improve the quality of life of their citizens (see Bankes, "International Responsibility" in this volume). Should any of these decision makers conceive a desire to conserve resources and protect the environment, they can choose to increase energy efficiency purely to achieve that end; but if they are driven by purely economic incentives, increased efficiency contributes to that end as well. 5. Conclusion Regardless of the ethical approach accepted, increasing energy efficiency, in both industrialized and developing countries, is a crucial first step in dealing with global climate change. This is so in the first instance because energy efficiency may be such a powerful tool that mere economic self-interest will be sufficient to eliminate global climate change. Moreover, actions intended to improve energy efficiency can be undertaken by individuals, corporations, and governments with a great variety of motivations. One of the appealing aspects of increasing energy efficiency is that it can be advocated by many people for many reasons. If decision makers reject the more controversial ethical approaches, they can nonetheless devote themselves to the short-term gains of efficiency as a "no-regrets" strategy. Accepting as important the interests of future humans and of non-humans, however, will expand the benefits of improved energy efficiency by increasing energy costs, via greenhouse taxes and other measures, to reflect these interests. Notes 1 These measures result in net savings even though they involve implementation costs. Net savings means only that the total cost of these measures is less than their direct benefit. 2 A detailed determination of global energy conservation potential is beyond the scope of this chapter, but we believe that there is good evidence to support the conclusion stated here. 3 The difference between these two studies — that of NAS (1991), which identifies a 36 per cent reduction in emissions, and that of Breton (1990), which concludes that no growth in emissions through 2010 would follow —illustrates the diversity of results that follow from different assumptions as well as a different presentation of conclusions. To present the conclusions of these studies accurately, we report them as do the authors. What is important is not the detailed results, but the range of reductions identified. 4 Despite the implications of subsidies on carbon dioxide emissions, Shrestha and Acharya (1991) stress that many subsidies have been implemented on social grounds. Others argue that these subsidies, although otherwise appropriate, should

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not be provided if they require environmentally inappropriate activities, such as excessive energy use. Such distortions in developing economies could well prevent optimal investments and thus preclude the economic development needed in those countries. 5 The high level of energy efficiency under this scenario saves enough money to pay for the investment needed to switch to biomass production. Under such a plan, Sweden would gain approximately forty dollars for every tonne of carbon it did not produce that it would have produced under market forces alone (MacKenzie 1991). 6 Note that this study is extremely conservative in comparison with others cited earlier in this chapter. That is, it identifies quite a modest reduction in carbon dioxide emissions. This serves to illustrates the diversity in the results obtained from the literature.

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CONCLUSION Thomas Hurka The challenge of global climate change arises from the scientific facts that Hare summarizes in his chapter, and that all the authors in this volume accept. During the past century, the earth's temperature has risen by about 0.6° C. The presence of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere keeps the earth warmer than it would otherwise be, and human activities, especially the burning of fossil fuels, have increased the concentrations of these gases and are continuing to increase them. This suggests that human activities may well have caused the past increase in temperature, and, more importantly, that continuation of present practices may cause even greater increases in the next century, perhaps around 2.4° C by 2070. A warming of this magnitude, especially in so short a time, could seriously harm both human and non-human life. Despite agreeing on these scientific facts, the authors disagree in other areas, for example, about the ethical principles to be used in framing a response to the threat of warming. All of the authors agree that there is an ethical duty not to harm other humans, either those living now or those in future generations. But they disagree about the strength, if any, of a duty to help other humans with problems one has not created oneself; thus, they disagree about the strength of a duty to promote economic equality between developed and developing nations. There is also disagreement about the source of our duties concerning the environment. Coward and Buckmaster are sympathetic to the view that we have an ethical duty to preserve parts of the environment for their own sake, as bearers of intrinsic value; Danielson and van Kooten believe that the environment, though important ethically, is so only because it contributes to human welfare. There are also disagreements about questions of economics and policy. Blair and Ross believe that much of the reduction in greenhouse gas emissions needed to avoid global climate change can be made at little or no economic cost, through the use of energy-efficient technologies that pay for themselves in the very short term. Van Kooten is sceptical, believing that emissions reductions beyond a minimal level will involve economic sacrifices by the present generation. Bankes is optimistic about the ability of governments, especially given an international greenhouse gas convention, to bring about desirable reductions in emissions; van Kooten and Danielson worry that government actions may do more harm than good. Disagreements such as these are inevitable on an issue as complex as that of global climate change; in fact, a study would be irresponsible if it

166 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect did not acknowledge them. Nonetheless, despite their disagreements, the members of this research group were able to reach consensus, or near consensus, on a number of recommendations. The first recommendation is for a climate policy with a strong component of avoidance: 1. Because of the potentially serious consequences of global climate change, it would be prudent for industrialized countries to stabilize or reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Given the current state of scientific knowledge, we cannot be certain what exact rise in temperature will follow if we continue present industrial practices, nor what precise further effects a rise of this magnitude would have. But to wait for certain knowledge could be to wait until it is too late to respond to the threat of warming effectively, or even at all. In this as in many policy areas, decisions must be taken in uncertainty, and what weighs heavily with many members of the research team is that global climate change could, at its worst, have disastrous consequences for humans and the environment, by upsetting delicately balanced ecological mechanisms. Given the possibility of such very serious harm, it seems prudent to avoid the harm, or to be safe rather than sorry, by reducing the emissions that threaten to cause warming. A further advantage is that reducing emissions will slow the rate of climate change, making adaptation to it easier. The second recommendation concerns the responsibility to reduce emissions, which the group believes does not fall just on one kind of decision maker, but is widely shared: 2. Reductions in greenhouse gas emissions should be pursued by many decision makers: by individuals, by corporations, and by governments. Individuals can contribute to avoidance by adopting energy-efficient technologies and by reducing activities that harm others more than they benefit themselves. They can also help promote energy-efficient technologies in less developed countries, through a mechanism such as the Atmosphere Trust (see Danielson, "Personal Responsibility"). Corporations too have a responsibility to reduce emissions. Their industrial activities are often the largest sources of greenhouse gases, and those who engage in these activities, such as electrical utilities and oil and gas corporations, must make them more efficient. This is partly a matter of long-term corporate self-interest but also of ethical duties of corporations, like all decision makers, not to cause harm to others (see Stewart and Dickey, "Corporate Responsibility"). Finally, governments should act where they can do so effectively. They can ensure that their own

Conclusion 167 institutions, such as hospitals and universities, reduce their emissions: here governments can be leaders for the private sector. They must also reconsider subsidies and tax policies that, perversely, encourage emissions by reducing the economic cost of polluting activities. Finally, governments can use their legislative power to create incentives for reductions by private decision makers, perhaps as part of an international convention to reduce emissions (see Bankes, "International Responsibility"). The ethical duty to avoid global climate change derives largely from the interests of future generations, but present people's interests also matter ethically, including their economic interests. An acceptable climate policy must minimize adverse effects on these interests: 3. In controlling greenhouse gas emissions, we should choose first those measures that make economic sense in their own right. Some energy-efficient technologies are economically attractive, paying for themselves in the relatively short term. All efforts should be made to pursue such "no regrets" reductions where they are possible (see Blair and Ross, "Energy Efficiency at Home and Abroad"). Where economic costs are unavoidable, they should be minimized: 4. Avoidance measures should be implemented where they are most cost-effective, to conserve scarce resources. It may be that the same expenditure will reduce emissions more if it is used to construct a new facility in a developing country to the highest technological standard than if it is used to retrofit an existing facility in a developed country. If so, the first use should be preferred. This kind of point is especially important for governments planning incentives or regulations to reduce emissions. If market-based instruments such as a carbon tax or tradeable emissions permits are better than command and control regulations at moving resources to where they will do the most good, these market-based instruments should be preferred (see van Kooten, "Effective Economic Mechanisms"). The many members of the group who favour government action to curb emissions believe this action must be co-ordinated internationally: 5. An international convention on reducing greenhouse gas emissions should be negotiated, with attention to the special needs of developing countries. International action is needed partly because the threat of warming is international. Against a challenge of this magnitude, action by one state alone would be insufficient: a global response is needed. But interna-

168 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect tional co-operation is needed also because action by one state alone would be undermined. If that one state introduced a carbon tax or other regulations, industry might simply move to another state with laxer standards and continue polluting as before. For any one state's actions against warming to be most effective, all states must act against warming. At the same time, many members of the group believe any convention must offer aid to less developed countries in the costly task of restraining emissions while trying to industrialize their economies. There is an ethical need for this industrialization, to improve the quality of life of people in developing countries, and programs of avoidance must recognize this need by offering aid that allows it, simultaneously, to be satisfied. Alongside avoidance measures, there should also be elements of adaptation: 6. Preparations should now begin for adaptation to the lesser global climate change that will and ought ethically to occur. Just as the optimal level of greenhouse gas emissions is not zero, so the optimal increase in global temperatures is not zero: the economic costs of avoiding global climate change entirely are likely to be so enormous as to be ethically unacceptable —they would impose too much hardship for too little benefit. So if there will inevitably be some increase in global temperatures, some adaptation measures will be required, and to minimize the costs of these measures, preparations for them should begin now. Research should be undertaken on the effectiveness of different adaptation measures; if new facilities are built today, their specifications should allow for possible increases in temperature, precipitation, sea level, and so on. Small expenditures today could save large ones in the future. There should also be adaptation by legal institutions: 7. International institutions should be developed that can pay appropriate compensation to those who are foreseeably harmed by global climate change. If global temperatures are allowed to rise to some degree, some humans will suffer harm. Since this harm is now foreseeable, compensation will be owed ethically to those who suffer it; but there are at present no legal institutions to enforce compensation across national boundaries. Such institutions should be developed. Finally, 8. Measures to respond to the challenge of global climate change must be weighed against measures addressing other pressing

Conclusion 169 human problems, such as malnourishment, government debt, and illiteracy, among many others. The research group recognizes that global climate change is not the only problem facing the world: it must compete for priority against other enormously serious challenges. This is one reason why our recommendations do not include precise numerical targets. Justifying such targets would require weighing the benefits of reducing global climate change against those of relieving starvation, reducing government debt, and so on, and this in turn would require technical information about these other problems that the group did not have. The group recognizes that the ethically best climate policy is not the one with the best consequences for the climate considered on its own; it is the one with the best consequences considering all other possible uses of society's limited resources. Nonetheless, we believe that the challenge of global climate change is an important one, which requires a vigorous response. Though not the only human problem, it is surely high on a list of priorities.

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ABOUT THE AUTHORS Nigel Bankes is Associate Professor of Law at the University of Calgary, where he teaches aboriginal law, property law, natural resources law, oil and gas law, and energy law. His law degree is from Cambridge University, and he has an LL.M. from the University of British Columbia. Prior to joining the faculty in 1984, he was a research associate with the Canadian Institute of Resources Law at the University. He is currently chair of the Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, a national public interest organization. Kerri R. Blair is a recent graduate of the Master's degree program in Environmental Design at the University of Calgary. Her study of world population issues as an undergraduate at Stanford University and experience working in China helped shape her interest in issues of global resource distribution. Her Master's degree project is entitled "Ethical and Cost-Effective Policy Response to Global Warming: Energy Efficiency as a First Step." Harvey A. Buckmaster has been Professor of Physics at the University of Calgary since 1967. He has published over 160 refereed journal and conference proceeding articles, primarily in the areas of electron paramagnetic resonance and microwave complex permittivity spectroscopy as applied most recently to biology and fossil fuels. He was a founding member of the Science Advisory Committee to the Environment Conservation Authority in 1971 and served as its chair in 1977 and 1978. This involvement led him to become interested in global energy scenarios and their implications for global climate change on which he has written a number of papers and given many invited presentations. Harold Coward is Director of the Centre for Studies in Religion and Society, University of Victoria. He is also a member of the Board of Directors of the Canadian Global Change Program of the Royal Society of Canada. He is co-director of the Calgary Institute for the Humanities research project "Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect." His many books and articles include Jung and Eastern Thought', Pluralism: Challenge to World Religions; Sacred Word, Sacred Text: Scripture in World Religions; and Hindu Ethics: Purity, Abortion and Euthanasia. Peter Danielson is Associate Professor of Philosophy and Senior Research Fellow in the Centre for Applied Ethics at the University of British Columbia. He is the author of Artificial Morality. Current research projects include the ethics of environmental computer modelling and the

172 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect application of evolutionary programming methods to the foundations of ethics. Peter Dickey graduated from Queen's University in 1966 with a B.Sc. in mechanical engineering. Employed by Shell Canada Limited since then, he held many engineering positions before becoming involved with safety and environment in 1982. Since 1985, he has been Corporate Manager of Safety and Environment. For the Canadian Petroleum Association (now CAPP) he has held numerous positions, including chair of the Environmental Committee and head of the Task Force on Global Climate Change. F. Kenneth Hare is Chancellor of Trent University and chair of the Advisory Board of the Institute for International Programs of the University of Toronto, where he is also University Professor Emeritus in Geography. He is chair of the Technical Advisory Panel on Nuclear Safety for Ontario Hydro. He has held senior academic positions at McGill University, the University of London, and the University of British Columbia, and served as Provost of Trinity College, Toronto. He has written extensively in the fields of climatology, environmental affairs, and nuclear safety. Thomas Hurka is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Calgary. He is the author of Perfectionism and of numerous articles in philosophy journals. From 1989-92 he wrote a weekly ethics column for The Globe and Mail; a selection of these columns is to be published as Principles: Short Essays on Ethics. William A. Ross is Professor of Environmental Science in the Faculty of Environmental Design at the University of Calgary. There he has served as Environmental Science Program Director and as Associate Dean. In the last two decades, he has studied both environmental impact assessment and energy policy, authoring a United Nations book entitled Postproject Analysis in Environmental Impact Assessment. He has also been a member of several environmental assessment panels and recently served as chair of the Oldman River Dam environmental assessment panel. Wayne Stewart is Executive Director of the Calgary Foundation, Calgary's community foundation. He retired in 1991 after twenty-seven years with Shell Canada in management of marketing, research, human resources, and public affairs. His work with Shell involved integration of environmental concerns with business activities and development of relationships with a broad range of external stakeholders. He holds Bachelors degrees in engineering science, political science, and religious studies as well as a Master's of business administration, and has taught lead-

About the Authors 173 ership to MBA students at the University of Alberta. He is an active member of the Anglican Church and involved in other community activities. G. Cornells van Kooten is Associate Professor in the Department of Agricultural Economics and Forest Resources Management at the University of British Columbia. He received his doctorate in agricultural and resource economics from Oregon State University. Previously, he was a member of the Faculty of Agricultural Economics at the University of Saskatchewan and the Faculty of Management and Industrial Organization at the University of Groningen, the Netherlands. He is the author of more than fifty articles and reports and a forthcoming book entitled Sustainable Development and Land Resources: Economic Policies for the Common Good.

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INDEX Aboriginal religion, 39,57-59 Acharya, M., 158,163n Acid deposition, 15,22,82 Adams, J. M., 132n Adaptation dilemma defined, 83-84 illustrated (Fig. 5.2), 84 Adaptation response (to climate change) and aboriginal religion, 58 and convention on climate change, 120,123 costs of, 33,90,120,123 defined, 1,24 economic necessity of, 143,146-147, 147n and humans-here-and-now principle, 26-27,159 immediate preparations for, recommended, 168 and Islam, 44 and Judaism, 42 not viable for Arctic, 78 Advertising, 108 Africa, 15,108. See also Sahel area (Africa); Somalia Agreements, international. See Conventions, international Agricultural productivity, 19 Ahmad Khan, Sayyid, 43 Air conditioning, efficient use of, 153 Al-Farsy, F., 60n Al Faruqi, I., 42 Alberta, 100,156 Alberta Energy, 156 Alexander, V., 64 Allen, Steve, 113 Allocation of atmospheric costs and resources, 124-29 Ames, R. T., 55,59,60 Angell, J. K., 14 Animals. See Non-humans; Wildlife, Arctic Antarctic Treaty, 13In Antarctica and continental ice sheets, 15 during periods of warming, 67 geography differs from Arctic's, 63

has 90% of global land ice, 71 Arctic. See also Wildlife, Arctic during periods of warming, 67 ecosystems of, 32,64-65 effect of global warming on, 4-5 environmental factors in climate change of, 61-65 and ethical issues of climatic change in, 75-76 heat flux in, 63 and holistic environmentalism, 77 indigenous peoples of, 75 interaction with other regions, 74 maps of (Fig. 4.1), 62 and subarctic regions defined, 65 Arctic, Canadian, 32,67 Arctic Ocean countries bordering, 61 effect on global ocean system when ice-free, 73 ice cover affects regional climate, 64 ice pack disappears in summer, 71 river deltas will flood, 71 Arid lands, 15 Arkin, A, 20 Associations, corporate, 111 Atman (self), 51 Atmosphere. See also Commons, atmospheric; Stratosphere, cooling of as global commons, 5-6,81-84 as limited shared resource, 115 as open-access vs. limited-shared resource, 8 no property rights to, 134 Atmosphere-ocean-chemical equilibrium, 12,21 Atmosphere Trust introduced, 5-6 as means of individual's contribution to pollution abatement, 166 proposal for, 90-95 Attfield, R., 30,32 Augustine, Saint, 45-46 Avoidance response (to climate change) and aboriginal religion, 58

188 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect and adaptation dilemma, 83-84 and adaptation response considered economically, 146 and Buddhism, 54 and Christianity, 48 and convention on climate change, 120 most cost-effective measures of, recommended, 167 costs of, 33,90,120 defined, 1,24 and developing countries, 33,120 and environmentalism, 32 ethical reasons for, 38 and Hinduism, 52 and humans-here-and-now principle, 26-27 and increasing energy efficiency, 151-156 and Islam, 44 and Judaism, 42 justified by environmentalism principle, 160 "only correct decision" for the Arctic, 77 and policy on climate change, 166 and Taoism, 57 Babcock, W. S., 45 Bal task-hit, 102,112 Baldwin, R. G., 14 Bankes, N., 3,6-7,8, 82,145,162,165, 167 Barber, I. G., 47,48 Barlow, J. P., 98n Barry, B., 27,128,129,130n, 131n Barry, R. G., 63 Bauer, P. T., 138 Baumol, W., 96n, 142 Beaufort Sea, 71 Beitz, C, 130n Benedick, R. E., 82,124,131n Bhagavad Gita, 51 Bible, 40 Biodiversity, 31,149 Birnie.P., 117 Black Elk, 58 Blair, K. R., 9,28,138,165,167 Bodansky, D., 124,131n Boden, A., 156

Boden, T. A., 13 Bombay, 52 Bonhoeffer, D., 45 Brahman (life force), 51 Bramwell, A, 75 Breath of the Compassionate. See Nafas al-Rahman Bretherton, F. P., 17 Breton, T. R., 156,159,162n Brihadaranyaka Upanisad, 51 Brockville, Ont., 107 Brookshire, D. S., 145 Brower, David, 98n Brown, J. E., 57,58 Brownlie, I., 130n Brundtland Commission. See World Commission on Environment and Development Bryan, K., 17 Bryck, D. S., 130n, 131n Bryson, R. A., 65 Buber, Martin, 42,60n Buchanan, J., 85 Buckmaster, Harvey, 4-5,126,131n, 149,165 Buddhism and climate change, 52-54 and ethical principles, 54 and good and evil, 60n led to vegetarianism by karmarebirth theory, 58 one of Eastern religions, 39 sees spiritual elements also in animals, 48 Burgin, M. G., 14 Business conduct, models of, 100-102 Business Council for Sustainable Development, 103 Callicott, J. B., 31,57,58,59,60 Calvert, J., 16 Calvin, J., 45 Canada climate change in, 65-71 possible objections to equitable utilization of atmosphere, 132n projected warming in, (Fig. 4.5), 70 special responsibility of, to protect Arctic, 78 uneven warming in, 14

Index 189 and use of renewable energy resources, 157 Canadian Business Council on National Issues, 103 Canadian Chemical Producers Association, 101-102,105,108 Canadian Climate Centre general circulation model, 61,67 model of greenhouse gas concentrations, 17 Canadian Delegation Report of the Fifth Session (Second Part) of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee, 13 In Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society, 104 Canadian Petroleum Association, 105 Carbon dioxide cost of reduction, 138 economic effects of reduction of, in Sweden, 159 emission quantities, 1990, illustrated (Table 6.1), 109 emission rates and global warming, 1990-2030, illustrated (Table 9.2), 161 and fossil fuels, 151 reduction of emissions through improvements in energy use, 156-57 states' positions on emissions of, 142-43 Carbon offsets, 141 Carbon tax does not encourage conservation, 91-92 as economic incentive to avert climate change, 140-41 economic, not moral, response to global warming, 86 and intergenerational equity, 15960 problems with levying, 143-44 Caroline, Alberta, 104 Carson, P., 103,104 Cavanaugh, R., 152,156 Centre for Applied Ethics (University of British Columbia), 98n Centre for Studies in Religion and Society (University of Victoria), 10 Cess, R. D., 17

Chairncross, F., 93 Charlson, R. J., 20 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, 131n China, 54,123,131n Chinkin, C. M., 130n Chittick, W. C, 43 Chopra, S., 117,130n Christianity, 39,44-48,59 Ciriacy-Wantrup, S. V., 142 Clathrates, methane, 73 Climate change. See also Responses to climate change in Canada, 65-71 in the Arctic, 61-79 and interaction between Arctic and other regions, 74,76 invisible to casual observation, 21 and other world problems, 168-69 prediction of, 16-20 research and information on, 120 Climate Research Institute (University ofEastAnglia), 13 Climatic sensitivity, 17 Clouds, 20 Co-generation (of electrical power), 152 Coercion, political, 84 Collins, W., 20 Columbus, Christopher, 67 Command and control regulation (of climate change), 139 Commons, 96n Commons, atmospheric, 5-6,81-84 Commons, global, 142,147n Commons, political, 85 Commonwealth of Independent States (C. I. S.), 127 Compensation (for environmental damage), 123,168 Computer modelling. See Modelling, numerical (of environmental forces and change) Conference of the Parties, 121-25,132 Consequentialism, 32-33,87 Consumers, 103,143-44 Contractarianism, 87 Controversy, ethical, 23-24,37-38 Convention Between the United States and Great Britain for the Protection of Migrating Birds, 130n

190 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect convention on climate change. 1992. Rio de Janeiro evaluation of, 7,121-29 no party may make reservations to, 131n outline of, 119-21 and size of atmospheric resource, 132n U. S. government's failure to sign, 76 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, 118, 131n Convention on the Conservation of Migrating Species of Wild Animals, 130n Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, 130n Conventions, international, 118,14243,167-68 Cook, F. H., 52 Corfu Channel Case, 116 Corporations. See also Responsibility, corporate; names of corporations, e.g., Imperial Oil Japanese, 103 North American, 103 public, 111 small, 110 Cost, opportunity, 133-34,138,152 Cost accounting, full, 105, 111, 158-59 Countries, developed, 119,120,123 Countries, developing, 119,122-23,153 Countries specially vulnerable to damage from climate change, 12324 Coward, H., 2,10,60n, 165 Cragg,K.,43 Crawford, S. C, 51 Critical loads, 126,127 Crowe, B., 96n Cubasch, U., 17 Cultural norms, 100-102 Custodian of nature, humanity as. See Khalifa D'Amato,A.,117,130n d'Arge, R. C, 145 Danielson, P., 5-6,32,95n, 96n, 98n, 110,141,146,161,165,166

Davis Strait, 73 de Jasay, A., 96n de Silva, P., 53 Decima Quarterly, 103 Demand-side management programs, 153 Dependence (Buddhist concept), 52 Determinism (vs. free will), 53 Deuteronomy, 41 Development, sustainable. See Sustainable development Dharma, 51 Dickey, P., 6,162,166 Diminishing marginal utility, 33 Discount rate, 145-46 Doos, B. R., 129n Dotto, Lydia, 105 Draft Principles of Conduct in the Field of the Environment for the Guidance of States in the Conservation and Harmonious Utilization of Natural Resources Shared by Two or More States, 13 In 132n Dualism, 46,55,59 Ducks Unlimited, 104,141 Earth Mother (in North American aboriginal religion), 57-58 Earth Summit. See UN Conference on Environment and Development. 1992. Rio de Janeiro Easterbrook, G., 97n Economic Commission for Europe, 118,125,131n Economic growth, 152 Ecoprovinces, Canadian, 71-72 Efficiency, economic, 133-38 Egalitarian consequences, principle of, 24,27,33 Einstein, A., 53 El Nino, 14,73 Electrical transmission and distribution losses, 152 Electricity, pricing of, 158 Eliot, T. S., 60 Elster, J., 96n Emission permits, tradable, 129,141, 144-45 Employees, 106 Encyclopedia Judaica, 40

Index Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, 40

Energy consumption, 152 Energy, efficient use of, 9-10,149-69 cost effective improvements in, 15051 costs of not adopting, 158-59 effectiveness of policies and actions, 160-62 and global warming at various CC>2 emission rates, 161 investment in, 153,156-57 options for the U. S., illustrated (Table 9.1), 154-55 Energy resources, renewable. See Renewable energy resources Environment-centred principles. See Environmentalism Environmentalism, 30-32 and increase in energy efficiency, 149,160 vs. humans-only policies, 165 Environmentalism, holistic Canadians choose avoidance response based on, 77 definition of, 31 of Eastern religions, 48 Leopold and Hardin contribute to development of, 75 Environmentalism, individualist, 30 Environmentalism, morbid, 104,113n Ephraums, J. J., 13,17,61 Equity, intergenerational. See Intergenerational equity "Europe's Industries Play Dirty", 143 Evaporation, 19 Exclusive economic zone, 132n Exodus, 40 Externality, 134 Ezekiel, 40,47

Fall of man, 45 Farrell, M. P., 156 Fauteux, P., 126 Financial assistance needed by developing countries to cope with climate change, 123 provisions for, under convention on climate change, 120,124,131n Fire Lame Deer, John, 57 Fisheries, 73,127

191

Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (U. K. and Northern Ireland vs. Iceland), 132n Flavin, C., 96n, 97n Folland, C. K., 15 Fossil fuels, 82,151,159 Forests deforestation of, and convention on climate change, 121 increase in fires in, 66-67 predicted effects on, obscure, 19 response of, to climate change, 15 Fraenkel, A., 13 In Francis, Saint, 46 Friedman, M., 97n Friends of the Earth Canada, 150,157 Fuel prices, 158 G-77 countries. See Countries, developing Gandhi, Mahatma, 51,52 Gates, W. L., 17 Gauthier, D., 96n Genesis, 40,45-47,59 George, S., 132n Geostationary orbit (GSO), 127,132n Gibson, J. H., 16 Glennon, M., 118,130n Global warming. See also Temperature caused by carbon dioxide, 19902030,161 caused by greenhouse effect, 21 as challenge, not threat, 12 degree of change, 13 geographically uneven, 14 impact uncertain, 16 prediction of, 16-20 reasons for action on, 12 scientific evidence of, 11-22 Goals, corporate, 110 Goddard Institute for Space Studies, 13 models of Canadian ecoprovinces (Fig. 4.6), 72 Goldemberg, J., 152,153 Goldstein, D., 152,156 Good and evil, 60n Goods, public, 84 Grand Banks, 73 Grassland, 15,19 Great Spirit, 57,58,59 Green, A., 39

192 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect Green funds, 105 Greener credit card, 92 Greenhouse dilemma defined, 82-83 illustrated (Fig. 5.1), 83 variation of Prisoner's Dilemma, 96n Greenhouse effect adaptation response to. See Adaptation response augmented vs. natural, 11 avoidance response to. See Avoidance response on droughts, storms, and temperature, 74 limitations to, 20 prediction of, 16-20 scientific evidence of, 1 Greenhouse gases in Canadian Climate Centre model, 17 and convention on climate change, 119,120 commitments to emission limits, 122-23 concentrations, 1980-1990 (Table 1.1), 18 and corporate activity, 108 costs and benefits of emissions, 13438,147n economically optimal level of emissions, 133-38 economically optimal level of emissions illustrated (Fig. 8.1), 135 Greenhouse gases, Abatement of. See also Atmosphere Trust; Emission permits, tradeable and atmospheric commons, 82 Canadian government policies on, 77 and convention on climate change, 121 and corporate goals, 110 costs and benefits of, 134-38 costs illustrated (Fig. 8.2), 136 economically sound measures should be first chosen, 167 and Greenpeace, 104 instruments of economic policy for, 8,139-45

international agreement on, 142, 167-68 and moral targets for Canadians, 90 optimum-level costs illustrated (Fig. 8.3), 137 variety of decision-making needed on,166-67 Greenhouse tax. See Carbon tax Griffiths, F., 74 Grubb, M., 97n, 127,128,145 Gulf Stream, 73 Guru, 51 Haeckel, E. H. P. A., 75 Hamburg, R. A, 158 Handl.G., 116,130n Hansen, J., 74,78 Hardin, G., 75,84,88,95n, 96n Hare, F. K., 1,15,16,23,25,61,63,65, 77, 82, 99,110,112,129n, 133,143, 149,161,165 Hasidism, 41,42 Heating, efficient use of, 153 Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, 126-127 Hengeveld, H., 20, 61 High grading, 157 Hinduism and climate change, 50-52 and ethical principles, 52 good and evil defined in scriptures of, 6 has holistic approach to environment, 48 led to vegetarianism by karmarebirth theory, 58 one of Eastern religions, 39 Hobbes, Thomas, 84,85,96n Hobbesianism, environmental, 84 Holocene epoch, 63,67,71 "Hollow Men, The," 60 Horiuchi, S., 29 Houghton, J. T., 13,17,61 Hua-yen Buddhism, 52 Human-centred ethics, 30 Humans-at-other-times-and-places principle, 27-29 Humans-everywhere-at-all-times principle Christianity promotes, 47

Index defined, 28 implies adaptation response, 76-77 and increase in energy efficiency, 159-60 Humans-everywhere-now principle, 28, 58 and corporate responsibility, 108 and procedural obligations among states, 118 Humans-here-and-now principle, 24-27 and the Arctic, 76 and corporate responsibility, 107 current international law is based on, 117,121 and improvements in energy efficiency, 149,150-59 Humans-here-at-all-times principle, 28, 107,149 Hume, David, 128 Hurka, Thomas, 2-3,25,29, 30,39,42, 44,47, 54, 56, 58, 59, 75, 78, 87, 90, 96n, 106,100,117,145,146,147n, 149 Ibn 'Arab! (Sufi mystic), 43 Ice, 63, 71 Ice Age, little, 67 Ignorance, veil of, 128-29 Imperial Oil, 102 Incentives, economic (to avert climate change), 139-42 India. See also Karnataka, India and China have developmental concerns, 131n has deeply rooted conservationist ethic, 51 its future greenhouse gas emissions of great concern, 123 shares Western belief in laws of nature, 54 Industrial Revolution, 45-46 Industrialization, 29 Intergenerational equity, 116,145-46, 159-60 Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee. Canadian Delegation, 131n Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee. INC Climate Change Convention, 119

193

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), estimates global climate change, 65 predicts flooding of Arctic river deltas, 71 reviews temperature and precipitation of last 150 years, 13 says CC»2 accounts for half of global warming, 15 synthesizes models of climate change, 17 warns of extinctions, 160 International Conference on Global Warming and Sustainable Development, 153 International Law Association, 126 International Law Commission, 126, 130n, 132n International Plenipotentiary Conference to Conclude an International

Convention on Trade in Certain Species of Wildlife: Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species. March 6,1973. Washington, 118 Inuit, 67, 75 Iran, 39 Isaiah, 40 Islam, 39 and climate change, 42-44 and ethical principles, 44 and human responsibility to nature, 44 and the Qur'an Jainas differ from Buddhists, 52 influenced Gandhi, 51 see spirituality in all matter, 48 and self-starvation, 58 James, Bryn, 104 James Bay, 65 Jamieson, J., 97n, 98n Japan, 127,130n, 152 Jenkins, G. J., 13,17,61 Jennings, R. Y., 131n Jesus Christ, 45 Johansson, Thomas, 159 Johnston, D. M, 117

194

Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect

Jones, P. D., 14 Judaism, 59 and climate change, 39-42 and ethical principles, 42 and the Torah, 45 view of nature, 40,44 Kabbalists, 40,41,42 Kagan, S., 87 Kalupahana, D. J., 53 Kanricuk, 156 Karl, T., 15 Karl, T. R., 14 Karma-rebirth theory, 48-50,58 Karnataka, India, 157 Khalifa, 44 Khan, Sayyid Ahmad. See Ahmad Khan, Sayyid Kiss, A., 130n Klostermaier, K. K,, 51 Kooten, Cornelis van. See van Kooten, Cornelis Kozloff, K., 158 Labrador Current, 73 Ladder of existence, karmic, 49-50 illustrated (Fig. 3.1), 50 Lake levels, 15 Lamb, P., 15 Lame Deer, John. See Fire Lame Deer, John "Land Ethic, The," 75 Lave, L. B., 143 Law, international, 115-18 Law of non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 126-27 Law of the Sea Convention. See UN Law of the Sea Convention, Oct. 21, 1982. Montego Bay Laws ofManu, 51 Legal and Policy Experts, 13In Leopold, Aldo, 2,31,58-59, 75,79 Leviathan, 84 "Leviathan or Oblivion," 96n Levinson, T., 96n Leviticus, 40 Liability, intertemporal, 116 Life-cycle cost accounting. See Cost accounting, full

Lighting, efficient use of, 153 Lipsey, R., 92 "Living in a Lifeboat," 75 Long-term and short-term concerns and corporate responsibility, 101, 111 and energy conservation, 162 and Japanese success, 103 Lovins, A B., 9,90,150,152,153,156, 157 Lovins, L. H., 90,150,152,153,156, 157 MacDonald, G., 73 MacKenzie, D., 152,157,159,163n MacKenzie River, 71 MacLeod, J. M., 102,103,104,110, 112,113 Magraw, D. B., 130n Maimonides, 39 Manabe, S., 17 Manne, A. S., 138,145 Markets, private, 141 Mars, 35 Maximizing consequences, principle of and adaptation / avoidance costs, 33 and corporate profits, 106 defined, 24 and humans-at-other-times-andplaces principle, 27 McCaffrey, S., 132n McCready, Ken, 103 McCulloch, J. A. W., 61 McDonough, S., 43 McKay, C. P., 35 McKibben, W., 97n Meehl, G. A, 17 Melillo, J. M., 15,19 Ministerial Declaration of the Second World Climate Conference, Oct. 29 Nov. 7,1990, Geneva, 116 Mitchell, J. F. B., 17,19 Mixed (adaptation / avoidance) policies, 24,37 Modelling, numerical (of environmental forces and change), 16-17. See also under names of model-producing agencies, e.g., Canadian Climate Centre Mohawk Oil, 110-11

Index Montreal Protocol. See Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16,1987, Montreal Morrisette, P. M., 142 Moulden, J., 103,104 Muir, John, 75 Munasinghe, M., 153 Nafas al-Rahmdn, 43 Nasr, S. H., 43 National Academy of Sciences (NAS) says energy conservation best and cheapest response to climate change, 152,162n says CO2 emissions in U. S. can be reduced by 4800 million tonnes per year, 156 says species extinction will follow rapid climate change, 160 National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy, 102 Natural resources, 106,115 Nature, Buddhist view of, 52 Neighbourhood principle (of international law), 115-16 New International Economic Order (NIEO), 132n New Testament, 47 New York Times (letter to, Sept. 18, 1988), 82 Nicholson, S., 15 "No regrets" conservation measures, 162,167 Noah, 47 Non-human interests (ethical principle). See Environmentalism Non-humans, 117,160 Noordwiijk Declaration on Atmospheric Pollution and Climatic Change. Nov., 1989,116 Nordhaus, W. D., 27,138,146 Norgaard, R. B., 146 Norms, cultural. See Cultural norms North America, 67,100-101 Northern Telecom, 103 Norway, 130n Nozick, R., 34,96n Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France), 130n

195

Oakville, Ont., 105 Obligations, procedural (of states to other states), 118 Oases, northern, 64 Gates, W. E., 142 Oerlemans, H., 15,19 Offsets, carbon. See Carbon offsets OPEC, 131n Ophuls, W., 96n Ostrom, E., 95-96n Our Common Future, 116 Ozone depletion, 20,21-22 Page, T., 145 Pakistan, 39 Palmer, G., 130n Parfit, D., 96n, 130n Paul, Saint, 45,46 Per capita entitlement, 128 Perfectionism (ethics), 25-26,32 Permafrost, 73 Permission, 25 Persons (in North American aboriginal religion), 57-58 Peter (epistle), 47 Pinto, F., 153,158 Plantinga, A, J., 142 Plato, 54-55 Polarity (in Chinese thought), 55 "Polluter pays" principle, 6,105 Polynyas, 64 Population growth, 10,29,88 Porritt,!, 151 Portney, P. R., 142 Postel, S., 96n, 97n Potentiality, 43 Powelson, J., 93 Pratltyasamutpanna, 53 Precipitation, 14-15,19 Property rights, 34,134,147n Prophets, biblical, 46-47 Protocol Concerning the Control of Emissions by Nitrogen Oxides or their Transboundary Fluxes, 131n Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16,1987, Montreal and convention on climate change, 120,121,124 as framework convention, 13In

196 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect involves control of relatively few substances, 82 ozone problem led to signing of, 22 and stabilization goals, 125 Protocol on the Reduction of Sulphur Emissions or Their Transboundary Fluxes by at Least 30 Percent, 13In Psalms, 40,44 Quality of life, 150-52,162 Qur'Sn, 42,43 Ramanathan, V., 20 Randall, A,, 147n Raper, S. C. B., 20 Rathje, W., 98n Rawls, J., 24, 96n, 128-129,130n Reddy, Amulya, 157 Regan, D., 96n Regan, T., 33 Reichenbach, B. R., 60n Religion, aboriginal. See Aboriginal religion Religions, Eastern, 39,48-57 Religions, Western, 39-48 Rent seeking, 144 Repowering (electricity), 152-53 Request for the Indication for Interim Measures of Protection, 130n Responses to climate change. See also Adaptation response; Avoidance response consequences of, 2,24-33, 37,149 by corporations. See Responsibility, corporate economic considerations of, 7-9, 133-48,165 and efficient use of energy. See Energy, efficient use of ethical principles of, 2,23-38, 76-78, 87,90,117,149-59,165 by individuals. See Responsibility, personal moral, 86-89 by nations. See Responsibility, international political, 84-85,165 recommendations for, 166-69

of religions, 3-4,39-60. See also under names of religions rights involved in, 3,33-37 Responsibility, corporate and consequences, 106 discussed, 99-113 and environmental standards, 112 and ethical principles, 106-11 and government regulations, 108 guiding principles of, 111-12 introduced, 6 non-environmental obligations of, 113n and operating efficiency, 112 and shareholders, 106 Responsibility, international, 6-7,11532 Responsibility, moral, 87-89 Responsibility, personal, 5-6,81-95 Responsible Care program, 101-102 Richards, D. A., 130n, 131n Richels, R. G., 138,145 Rights of animals, 35 to compensation for environmental damage, 35-37 as constraints on environmental policy, 33-35 of ecosystems, 35 to life, 34 to pollute, 93,94 to property. See Property rights Rio Conference. See UN Conference on Environment and Development. 1992. Rio de Janeiro Rio Convention. See convention on climate change. 1992. Rio de Janeiro Rio Declaration. See UN Conference on Environment and Development: Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. June 14,1992. Rio de Janeiro Rizzo, B., 71 Rollston, H., 31 Roots, E. F., 61, 78 Ross, A., 89, 95 Ross, W. A., 9, 28,138,165,167 Rowan, R, 132n Rowntree, P. R., 17 rta,51

Index 197 Rubin, E. S., 156 Sagoff, M., 98n Sahel area (Africa), 15,16 Satisficing consequences, principle of and adaptation / avoidance costs, 33 defined, 24 and humans-at-other-times-andplaces, 27 practised by corporations, 107 Saudi Arabia, 36,44,60n Savings, monetary, 151-52,156-57 Sayyid Ahmad Khan. See Ahmad Khan, Sayyid Scheffler, S., 25 Schelling, T., 82,98n Schindler, D., 16 Schmidheiny, S., 104 Schmidtz, D., 96n Schneider, S. H., 1,82,85,149,160 Schorsch, I., 41 Schulze, W. D., 145 Sea level effect of rise in Arctic, 71 48-cm. rise predicted, 20 predicted changes small, 19 uncertain change in, 15 Segal, E., 41 Sepanski, R. J., 13 Sequestration services, carbon. See Carbon offsets Shapiro, R. M., 40 Shekhinah, 41 Shell Canada Limited and Brockville, Ont. lubricants plant, 107 CEO of, committed to sustainable development, 102 and reclamation of Oakville, Ont. refinery site, 105 and stakeholders, 104 Shelton,D., 117 Shin, J., 152 Shinn, R. L., 46 Short-term concerns. See Long-term and short-term concerns Shrestha, R., 158,163n Sidgwick, H., 27 Singer, P., 28,87,130n Sioshansi, R, 152,158

Slote, M., 25 Smart, J. J. C, 24 Snow, 63 Soils, frozen, 73 Somalia, 15 Southern California Edison Company, 157 Soviet Union, 15 Stabilization goals, 125,127 Stakeholders, 6,104-105, 111 Standing Bear, Luther, 58 State Hydrological Institute (St. Petersburg, C. I. S.), 13 Stern, Paul, 103 Stewart, W., 6,162,166 Stone, C, 13In Stoss, F. W., 13 Stouffer, R. J., 17 Stratosphere, cooling of, 14,21 Streamflow, 15,19 Subsidies and Atmosphere Trust, 93 as economic incentives to avert climate change, 139-40,147 promote climate change, 85-86 Sufis (Islamic sect), 43 Sulphate particles, 20 Sumner, L. W., 25 Sustainable development defined in Brundtland Commission report, 116 and convention on climate change, 119 both corporate and personal ideal, 112 as corporate goal, 110 and corporate responsibility, 102103 and humans-at-other-times-andplaces, 27 and new model of doing business, 6 Svabhava,53 Sweden, 159 Szell, P., 131n Tao, 55-56, 57 Taoism and climate change, 54-57 compared with Hinduism and Buddhism, 54,60n

198 Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect and ethical principles, 56 Taxes, 140-41,147n. See also Carbon tax Taylor, M., 96n Taylor, P. W., 30 Te, 55-56 Temperature in Arctic during medieval warm period (Fig. 4.3b), 68 change in Canada, 1959-88 (Fig. 4.4), 69 Deviations from global mean (Fig. 1.1), 13 global mean surface, 12-14,65 history of, in Canada, 67 increase in North America during Holocene (Fig. 4.3a), 68 variation in the last 10,000 years (Fig. 4.2), 66 Teske, R. J., 46 Thoreau, H. D., 75 Tillich, Paul, 3 Titmus, R., 94 Tolba, Mostafa, 131n Tollison, D., 85 Torah, 39,40 "Tragedy of the Commons," 75, 81,88 Trail Smelter Arbitration (Canada v. U.S.), 116 TransAlta Utilities, 103 tsimtsum, 41 Tundra, 65,71-73 Tzu-jan, 56

UN. General Assembly. June 5 -15, 1972. Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, 116 UN. General Assembly. Feb. 5,1974. Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, 115 UN. General Assembly. Nov. 9,1982. World Charter for Nature, 117 UN. General Assembly. Dec. 12,1990. Protection of Global Climate for Present and Future Generations of Mankind, 116,119 UN Law of the Sea Convention. Oct. 21,1982. Montego Bay, 132n Uncertainty (of economic policies), 141-42 Union of Concerned Scientists, 27 United States could reduce carbon dioxide emissions, 159 drop in per capita energy use, 152 improved energy efficiency feasible, 156 inefficient energy use in, 127 uneven warming in, 14 United States Environmental Protection Agency, 156 Utilitarianism, 24 Utility, diminishing marginal. See Diminishing marginal utility Utilization, equitable, 126-28 Utilization, existing, 128 Uzawa, U., 98n

UN Conference on Environment and Development. 1992. Rio de Janeiro, 11,36 UN Conference on Environment and Development: Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. June 14,1992. Rio de Janeiro, 130n UN Development Program, 153 UN Environment Programme Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Global Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, 118

Vaisnavism (Hindu sect), 51 Values, environmental, 94-95,147n van Kooten, Cornelis, 7-9,91,107, 129n, 151,158,165,167 van Wachem, L. C, 99 Vegetation distribution, 20 Ventilation, efficient use of, 153 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer. March 22,1985. Vienna ozone problem led to signing of, 22 prescribes general objectives and principles, 118,131n and convention on climate change, 121 Vikings, 67

Index Vinaya-pitaka, 54 Vinnikov, K. Y., 15 Waite, B., 132n Warm period, medieval, 67 Warming, global. See Global warming Warrick, R. A., 15,19 Washington, W. T., 17 Waste heat recovery, 152 Water balance, global, 15 Water resources, international, 126-27 Watson, R., 152,156 Wealth, intergenerational transfer of. See Intergenerational equity Weber, P. J., 73,79 Weiss, E.B., 116-17 Welfarism (ethics), 25-26, 32 Whales, legal entitlement of, 117 Whalley, J., 138 White, L., 4,45-46,59-60 Wigle, R., 138 Wigley, T. M. L., 20 Wiken, E., 71 Wildlife, Arctic, 75-76,78 Williams, B., 24 Williams, D. D., 46,47 Wilman, E., 144

199

Wirth, D., 132n Wood, R., 60n Woods, J. D., 17 Wordsworth, William, 75 World Bank criticized for lack of accountability, 132 example of projects to be funded by, 153 preferred (by U. S.) as agency for environmental funding, 124 subsidizes as a government does, 98n World Commission on Environment and Development sees its goals as human-centred, 2, 30 endorses sustainable development, 6,27,102,116 World Vision, 141 Wu-wei, 56, 57 Yin andyang, 55, 57 Young, O. R., 74 Zeng, Q. -C, 17

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Also published by Wilfrid Laurier University Press for The Calgary Institute for the Humanities ETHICS AND CLIMATE CHANGE The Greenhouse Effect Edited by Harold Coward and Thomas Hurka Essays by: F. Kenneth Hare, Thomas Hurka, Harold Coward, Harvey A. Buckmaster, Peter Danielson, Wayne Stewart and Peter Dickey, Nigel Bankes, G. Cornelis van Kooten, Kerri R. Blair and William A. Ross 1993 / pp. xii + 199 / ISBN 0-88920-233-8 REFLECTIONS ON CULTURAL POLICY Past, Present and Future Edited by Evan Alderson, Robin Blaser and Harold Coward Essays by: Robin Blaser, John Humphrey, Haijo Westra, Jonathan Bordo, Steven E. Cole, Hazard Adams, Gordon Fearn, Anthony Welch, Barry Cooper, Robert Kroetsch 1993 / pp. xii + 194 / ISBN 0-88920-215-X BAPTISM, PEACE AND THE STATE IN THE REFORMED AND MENNONITE TRADITIONS Edited by Ross T. Bender and Alan P. F. Sell Essays by: Alan P. F. Sell, Charles C. West, Marlin E. Miller, Max L. Stackhouse, Howard John Loewen, Iain G. Nicol, Harry Loewen, Hugo Meynell, Harry H. Hiller, Andrew D. MacRae, Tom Sinclair-Faulkner 1991 / pp. xii + 248 / ISBN 0-88920-204-4 THE EDUCATIONAL LEGACY OF ROMANTICISM Edited by John Willinsky Essays by: Aubrey Rosenberg, Ann E. Berthoff, Clarence J. Karier, Diana Korzenik, Edgar Z. Friedenberg, Johan Lyall Aitken, Richard L. Butt, John Willinsky, Anne McWhir, Max van Manen, Jane Roland Martin, Madeleine R. Grumet, Deborah A. Dooley, Kieran Egan 1990 / pp. xiv + 310 / ISBN 0-88920-996-0 SILENCE, THE WORD AND THE SACRED Edited by E. D. Blodgett and H. G. Coward Essays by: David Atkinson, Robin Blaser, E. D. Blodgett, Ronald Bond, Joseph Epes Brown, Harold Coward, Monique Dumais, David Goa, Stanley Hopper, Doug Jones, Smaro Kamboureli, Rudy Wiebe 1989 / pp. xii + 226 / ISBN 0-88920-981-2 RUPERT'S LAND A Cultural Tapestry Edited by Richard C. Davis Essays by: Richard I. Ruggles, Olive P. Dickason, John L. Allen, Clive Holland, Sylvia Van Kirk, James G. E. Smith, Robert Stacey, Irene Spry, Fred Crabb, Edward Cavell, R. Douglas Francis, Robert H. Cockburn 1988 / pp. xii + 323 / ISBN 0-88920-976-6 FRANZ KAFKA (1883-1983) His Craft and Thought Edited by Roman Struc and J. C. Yardley Essays by: Charles Bernheimer, James Rolleston, Patrick O'Neill, Egon Schwarz, Ernst Loeb, Mark Harman, Ruth Gross, W. G. Kudszus 1986 / pp. viii + 160 / ISBN 0-88920-187-0

ANCIENT COINS OF THE GRAECO-ROMAN WORLD The Nickle Numismatic Papers Edited by Waldemar Heckel and Richard Sullivan Essays by: C. M. Kraay, M. B. Wallace, Nancy Moore, Stanley M. Burstein, Frank Holt, Otto M0rkholm, Bluma Trell, Richard Sullivan, Duncan Fishwick, B. Levy, Richard Weigel, Frances Van Keuren, P. Visona, Alexander G. McKay, Robert L. Hohlfelder 1984 / pp. xii + 310 / ISBN 0-88920-130-7 DRIVING HOME A Dialogue Between Writers and Readers Edited by Barbara Belyea and Estelle Dansereau Essays by: E. D. Blodgett, Christopher Wiseman, D. G. Jones, Myrna Kostash, Richard Giguere, Aritha van Herk, Peter Stevens, Jacques Brault 1984 / pp. xiv + 98 / ISBN 0-88920-148-X DOCTORS, PATIENTS, AND SOCIETY Power and Authority in Medical Care Edited by Martin S. Staum and Donald E. Larsen Essays by: David J. Roy, John C. Moskop, Ellen Picard, Robert E. Hatfield, Harvey Mitchell, Toby Gelfand, Hazel Weidman, Anthony K. S. Lam, Carol Herbert, Josephine Flaherty, Benjamin Freedman, Lionel E. McLeod, Janice P. Dickin McGinnis, Anne Crichton, Malcolm C. Brown, Thomas McKeown, Cathy Charles 1981 / pp. xiv + 290 / ISBN 0-88920-111-0 SCIENCE, PSEUDO-SCIENCE AND SOCIETY Edited by Marsha P. Hanen, Margaret J. Osier, and Robert G. Weyant Essays by: Paul Thagard, Adolf Grunbaum, Antony Flew, Robert G. Weyant, Marsha P. Hanen, Richard S. Westfall, Trevor H. Levere, A. B. McKillop, James R. Jacob, Roger Cooler, Margaret J. Osier, Marx W. Wartofsky 1980 / pp. x + 303 / ISBN 0-88920-100-5 THE NEW LAND Studies in a Literary Theme Edited by Richard Chadbourne and Hallvard Dahlie Essays by: Richard Chadbourne, Hallvard Dahlie, Nairn Kattan, Roger Motut, Peter Stevens, Ronald Sutherland, Richard Switzer, Clara Thomas, Jack Warwick, Rudy Wiebe 1978 / pp. viii + 160 / ISBN 0-88920-065-3 RELIGION AND ETHNICITY Edited by Harold Coward and Leslie Kawamura Essays by: Harold Barclay, Harold Coward, Frank Epp, David Goa, Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, Gordon Hirabayashi, Roger Hutchinson, Leslie Kawamura, Grant Maxwell, Cyril Williams 1978 / pp. x + 181 / ISBN 0-88920-064-5