Europe or Africa?: A Contemporary Study of the Spanish North African Enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla

Europe or Africa?

Europe or Africa? A CONTEMPORARY STUDY OF THE SPANISH NORTH AFRICAN ENCLAVES OF CEUTA AND MELILLA

PETER GOLD

LIVERPOOL UNIVERSITY PRESS

First published 2000 by LIVERPOOL UNIVERSITY PRESS 4 CAMBRIDGE STREET LIVERPOOL L69 7ZU

Copyright © 2000 Peter Gold All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior written permission of the publishers.

British Library Cataloguing-inPublication Data A British Library CIP Record is available ISBN 0–85323–985–1 cased ISBN 0–85323–995–9 paper

Typeset by Northern Phototypesetting Co. Ltd, Bolton Printed and bound in the European Union by The Alden Press Limited, Oxford

To my Mother, to the memory of my Father, and to Anne and all our children for their love and forbearance.

CONTENTS List of figures and tables

ix

Introduction

xi

1 The impact of the enclaves on Spanish–Moroccan relations

1

2 The enclaves within the Spanish state: the autonomy statutes

36

3 The evolving political landscape in the enclaves

56

4 The 1985 Immigration Law and community relations in the enclaves

91

5 The enclaves: a migration gateway to Europe

120

6 The enclaves: Europe or Africa?

151

7 Gibraltar and the enclaves

158

8 Conclusion: looking to the future

166

References

177

Index

185

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT Chapter 5, ‘The enclaves: a migration gateway to Europe’, is a revised version of an article first published in Mediterranean Politics, 4(3) (Autumn 1999).

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES Figure 3.1 Percentage vote of main parties: Ceuta, general elections 1977–2000

59

Figure 3.2 Percentage vote of main parties: Melilla, general elections 1977–2000

59

Figure 3.3 Ceuta local elections: seats won 1979–1999

60

Figure 3.4

63

Melilla local elections: seats won 1979–1999

Figure 3.5 Percentage turnout in national elections: Ceuta, Melilla and national 1977–2000

63

Figure 3.6 Percentage vote of main parties in European elections: Ceuta, Melilla and national 1987–1999

64

Table 3.1

National election results in Ceuta and Melilla for main parties 58

Table 3.2

Council/Assembly seats won in local elections in Ceuta and Melilla since 1979 61

Table 4.1

Total and Muslim populations of Ceuta and Melilla, 1875–1986

92

INTRODUCTION On the Yebala Peninsula on the coast of North Africa lies the ancient port and fortified town of Ceuta, with a population of nearly 72,000. Occupying 19.5 square kilometres, Ceuta is some 25 kilometres away from continental Europe across the Strait of Gibraltar and a mere ninety-minute ferry journey from the Spanish port of Algeciras, which can be seen from the promontory on a clear day. Some 250 kilometres to the east of Ceuta, on the Guelaia Peninsula jutting out into the Mediterranean, stands the town of Melilla with over 62,000 inhabitants. Melilla covers an area of 12.5 square kilometres and is eight hours by sea from Málaga on the Spanish Costa del Sol. Archaeological evidence indicates that the settlements were first established in the third century BC, but an Arab presence can be traced from the eighth century AD. Occupied thereafter by a succession of caliphates and emirates owing to its economic and strategic importance, by the twelfth century Ceuta (or Sebta) had become one of the main Mediterranean ports. Melilla (or Mililia) was of lesser importance but attracted interest because of nearby salt deposits. From a geographical perspective both towns are indisputably part of the continent of Africa. However, Melilla has been in Spanish hands since 1497, when it was seized by Pedro de Estopiñán, envoy of the Duke of Medina Sidonia, and is one of several fortresses or presidios1 which were established along the coast to prevent further invasions of the Spanish peninsula by the ‘Moors’ (the general term used to refer to the Arabs and Berbers from the south), who had finally been expelled five years earlier after a presence going back nearly eight centuries. Ceuta, which had been seized by Portugal in 1415, was formally transferred to Spain under the Treaty of Lisbon in 1668 following the ending of the union between Spain and Portugal in 1640. As part of Spain, with their own elected representatives in the national Parliament, these territories have well-established links with Europe, but following Spain’s entry into the European Community in

xii Europe or Africa? 1986 they became European by treaty: the majority of their citizens are Spanish and therefore now citizens of the European Union. They elect representatives to the European Parliament, and on the edge of both towns there are large hoardings proclaiming each to be a ‘Municipality of Europe’. Infrastructure projects invariably boast a sign indicating the financial involvement of Brussels – explicit manifestations of where Europe and Africa meet as distinct entities in one and the same place (or in the case of Ceuta and Melilla, two places). This situation gives rise to a number of paradoxes. The towns are located in the world’s poorest continent, and yet they are part of the largest and richest trading block in the world. They are physically in Africa, but the majority of their inhabitants are as European as the Belgians or the Germans. They may be on another continent, but Ceuta is closer to the EU than the UK is to France. The towns are a corner of Spain in a foreign land: in Melilla there are eight Catholic churches, a bullring in baroque style and wide Spanish boulevards, but also strong influences of the Islamic tradition and customs and practices which in many quarters are as much Berber as they are Andalucían. Melilla and Ceuta represent a cultural and ethnic crossroads, albeit one with little coordination as the streets bustle with young legionnaires in Spanish uniform (there are some six or seven thousand soldiers garrisoned in each town), Berber women wearing chadors, orthodox Jews (descendants of those who fled the Spanish Inquisition) perhaps on their way to one of the synagogues, or Hindu businessmen whose merchant grandfathers arrived at the beginning of the twentieth century.2 In the last decade more black African faces have also begun to appear, adding to the cultural mix. Such a unique straddling of the cultures of the Mediterranean – the towns are the only territories on mainland Africa which belong to an EU member state – has inevitably created a unique set of internal and external problems which merit an in-depth exploration. One such external problem concerns the relationship between the Spanish towns and the Kingdom of Morocco, since 1956 an independent sovereign state with a population of nearly 27 million and an area of almost 450,000 square kilometres which lies around and behind them. Known euphemistically in Spain as ‘the neighbour to the south’ and in the territories as ‘the neighbouring country’, the modern state of Morocco has laid claim to the two towns since the 1950s, principally on the grounds of wishing to restore its territorial

Introduction

xiii

integrity. Spain, which calls them plazas de soberanía (literally ‘sovereign towns’) or ‘enclaves’,3 has shown no signs of making any concessions in the direction of transferring their sovereignty to Morocco.4 Morocco also claims that the enclaves are colonies and therefore an anachronism, but the United Nations, which is keen to promote decolonization, does not include them in its list of territories waiting to be decolonized, on the grounds that Spanish settlers have been living there since long before the establishment of present-day Morocco.5 It is not the intention in this study to provide a history of Ceuta and Melilla, for that has been admirably done by others.6 The year 1985 is taken as the starting point for a detailed examination of a range of issues relating to the enclaves, although an analysis of events prior to that date is undertaken where appropriate. The justification for starting with 1985 is that it marks important internal and external events in Spain which have since had a significant effect on Ceuta and Melilla and their unique role in the Mediterranean. The most notable of these events was the signing of the agreement in 1985 that Spain would join the European Community from 1 January 1986, marking the beginning of a period of rapid economic growth. One of the effects was to attract large numbers of immigrants and turn Spain into a ‘receiving’ nation instead of either a ‘sending’ nation or a ‘transit’ nation (especially for those heading to France). Many of the immigrants were Moroccans, but there were also increasing numbers of Africans (especially from sub-Saharan Africa) migrating to Europe, a phenomenon in which the enclaves played a growing part, particularly with regard to illegal immigration. Spain’s membership of the EC also created the first tangible juxtaposition of EC and African territory, and consequently greater tension between Spain and Morocco, as the towns were now not only Spanish territory but also territory within the EC. Furthermore, it highlighted the enclaves’ position as outposts of the wealthy group of 12 (now 15) EC nations in contrast to the poverty of the developing African nations which lay to the east, west and south of them. The year 1985 also marked the introduction of a new Immigration Law in Spain, highlighting the differences between the main ethnic communities in the enclaves and creating tensions between the enclaves and Madrid. Finally, by taking 1985 as the principal point of departure this study is able to focus upon contemporary phenomena

xiv

Europe or Africa?

which have not been part of any other detailed examination of the enclaves. Chapter 1 examines the difficulties that the enclaves pose to the relationship between Spain and Morocco, whose long-standing demand for the transfer of the sovereignty of the enclaves is a constant source of friction between the two governments. The extent to which the issue is at the forefront or in the background of their relationship is in large measure determined by whether at any given time political or economic considerations are paramount in Morocco. Chapter 2 deals with the constitutional relationship between the enclaves and the rest of Spain, and describes their struggle to achieve autonomous status. This struggle and the unique solution which was achieved after years of protracted discussions have defined the relationship between Madrid and the enclaves since the transition to democracy in Spain in the late 1970s. The autonomy statutes have also impinged upon Spanish–Moroccan relations (and vice versa) and have even highlighted differences between the enclaves themselves. Chapter 3 surveys the political consequences in both national and local elections of the relationship between the Spanish community in the enclaves and the central Government in Madrid and differences between Ceuta and Melilla are again revealed. The emergence of the Muslim community as a political force in local elections is examined, as is the rise of the GIL party in both towns and the political crises that it caused; both phenomena are clear manifestations of the peculiar circumstance of the enclaves within the Spanish state. Chapter 4 explores the uneasy relationship between the residents of Spanish and Moroccan origin within the enclaves, the growing militancy of the Muslim-Berber communities (especially in Melilla) under the early leadership of the enigmatic Aomar Dudú, and the tensions between those communities in the enclaves and the Government in Madrid, particularly following the introduction of the 1985 Immigration Law. The ensuing civil disturbances reveal the Madrid Government’s failure to understand the nature of the communities in the enclaves and how to resolve their problems. Chapter 5 investigates immigration issues arising from the existence of two segments of European territory in North Africa, in the context of a European Union which has removed most of its internal borders under the Schengen Agreement and which is therefore becoming increasingly concerned about the effectiveness

Introduction

xv

of its external ones in order to keep a strict control over the entry of non-EU citizens. It also includes a wider examination of the attempt to tackle economic disparities between Europe and the countries on the southern shore of the Mediterranean in order to reduce the extent of south–north migration. Chapter 6 considers different ways in which Ceuta and Melilla, given their anomalous and unique situation, are – or are not – viewed as parts of Europe, while Chapter 7 considers the parallels and contrasts between the Spanish enclaves in North Africa and the British dependent territory of Gibraltar at the foot of the Spanish peninsula – another territory whose sovereignty is claimed by another nation state, in this case Spain itself. The Conclusion considers how the various aspects of the enclaves considered in the course of the study may be modified in the future. Notes 1 The towns were also referred to as presidios in the sense of ‘prison’, as they were also used to incarcerate criminals from the peninsula. 2 For an ethnographic study of Melilla, see Driessen, 1992. 3 The terms ‘towns’ and ‘enclaves’ are used throughout this study to refer to Ceuta and Melilla. Although technically they are ‘cities’, the term ‘town’ depicts their size more accurately. It is also true that in the strict sense of the word they are not ‘enclaves’, as they have direct access to the sea and are not therefore ‘entirely enclosed within foreign territory’ (Chambers Concise Dictionary, 1997). Moreover both Ceuta and Melilla rely to a great extent on their Moroccan hinterlands, especially for commercial activity. However, Spanish writers invariably use the term ‘enclaves’ to refer to these North African territories and it has become a conventional description of them. 4 The Moroccan claim also includes the Isla de Perejil, which lies a few kilometres west of Ceuta; the rocky peninsula Peñón de Velez de la Gomera (known to Moroccans as Badis de Nekkor), 125 kilometres east of Ceuta and in Spanish hands since 1508; the Peñón de Alhucemas (Al Hoceima), a rocky outcrop acquired by Spain in 1673 which is 155 kilometres east of Ceuta and 250 metres off the coast; and the Islas Chafarinas (Moulouya), a group of three islands four kilometres off the coast and 40 kilometres to the east of Melilla which became Spanish during the nineteenth century. 5 For details of the main arguments used by Spain and Morocco in their dispute over the enclaves, see del Pino, 1983, pp. 291–94. 6 See, for example, Carabaza and de Santos, 1992; del Pino, 1983; Dollot, 1952; Cornevin, 1972; Lazrak, 1974; García Costo, 1975; Rézette, 1976; Moha, 1992.

ONE

THE IMPACT OF THE ENCLAVES ON SPANISH–MOROCCAN RELATIONS By the middle of the nineteenth century both a French and a Spanish presence had been firmly established in North Africa. Despite the reaffirmation at the Conference of Algeciras in 1906 of the principle of the sovereignty of Morocco, the Franco-Spanish Agreement of 1912 divided Morocco into two Protectorates, with France seen as the main ‘protector’ while Spain occupied Tarfaya, Ifni, and the Río de Oro in Western Sahara (where Spain had had a presence since the Spanish–Moroccan Treaty of 1767 in order to protect the Canary Islands) and, in the north, most of the region of the Rif and Yebala. The period immediately following the establishment of the Protectorates saw the conversion of Ceuta and Melilla from presidios to towns, with population increases (largely consisting of poor immigrants from southern Spain) between 1900 and 1920 of 165 per cent and 460 per cent respectively (Carabaza and de Santos, 1992, pp. 50–51). The resistance to Spanish occupation in the Rif began in 1921 under Abd el-Krim, and Spain used the enclaves as bases from which to put down the insurgency. The Spanish Foreign Legion, led from 1925 by the young Francisco Franco, joined forces with the French under Marshall Pétain and by 1927 they had succeeded in pacifying Spanish Morocco. When the Spanish Nationalists undertook to oppose the Republicans in 1936, General Franco, who began the campaign which led to the Civil War from the North African enclaves, had the support of a large number of Moroccan volunteers and a so-called ‘Moorish Guard’ for his personal protection. Although Franco received support

2

Europe or Africa?

from the Axis powers during the Civil War, during World War II Spain declared itself a non-belligerent and remained officially neutral throughout, despite providing assistance to the Axis powers from North Africa (Carabaza and de Santos, 1992, pp. 70–71). At the same time many Moroccans fought for the liberation of France. After 1945, when Spain was left diplomatically isolated from the rest of Europe because of the nature of the Franco regime, the Spanish Caudillo cultivated good relations with the Arab nations of North Africa and the Middle East. In the early 1950s the potential of these good relations in the context of the Cold War with the Soviet Union (as well as the desire of the United States to establish safe military bases in south-west Europe) led to the start of Spain’s rehabilitation in the West. In 1953 the French Government unilaterally decided to replace the Moroccan Sultan Mohammed Ben Yusuf by a puppet regime under Mohammed Ben Arafa. Spain, however, continued to recognize the former (later to become King Mohammed V) as the legitimate ruler of Morocco, while also giving some support to Moroccan nationalists. This gave rise to ‘the strange paradox of Spain, which was seen as a dictatorship, playing the card of good relations with the nationalists of the Maghreb and advocating friendship with the Muslim world, whereas the French Republic, champion of democracy, was supporting a handful of feudal barons and unleashing a powerful period of repression’ (Moha, 1992, p. 101). Such was the strength of opposition to the removal of Sultan Mohammed Ben Yusuf that eventually France, which was preoccupied with opposition to its continuing presence in Algeria, was obliged to negotiate and agree to the independence of Morocco under King Mohammed V in 1956. Franco recognized that, without the presence of the French, Spain was in no position to ignore Moroccan requests to come to a similar agreement, and so he invited King Mohammed to Madrid where they drove through the city to an enthusiastic reception. Spain thus ensured the peaceful reunification of the Alouite Kingdom of Morocco, first under King Mohammed until his death in 1961 and then under his successor King Hassan II, who died in 1999. In this respect Spain clearly emerged from the period of the Moroccan Protectorate smelling sweeter than France, but this advantage was not to last for long. For while France relinquished all of its possessions in Morocco, Spain retained the two towns of Ceuta

The impact of the enclaves on Spanish–Moroccan relations

3

and Melilla, plus Tarfaya and Ifni on the western coast, and the large, sparsely populated area of the Western Sahara. With Moroccan nationalist tribes making incursions into these areas, Spain and France launched Operación Teide (known also as Opération Ecouvillon) to restore Spanish sovereignty throughout Western Sahara in February 1958 (Hernando de Larramendi, 1997, pp. 352–53). Although this was successful, Spanish losses had been heavy, and under the Cintra Agreement of April 1958 the region of Tarfaya was ceded to Morocco. Ifni was also relinquished in 1969 following resolutions brought by Morocco to the United Nations.

Western Sahara Western Sahara, however, was more problematic. It consists of 266,000 square kilometres on either side of the Tropic of Cancer roughly between Cabo (Cape) Juby in the north and Cabo Blanco in the south. Spain had confirmed the presence of phosphate deposits in the region in 1961 and this had made it all the more determined to retain possession. However, guerrilla movements, notably the Polisario Front, began to emerge in the early 1970s, and in a climate of political uncertainty as the regime of Francisco Franco drew to a close, together with pressure from the so-called ‘Green March’ (La Marcha Verde) organized by King Hassan II, when 350,000 Moroccans undertook a peaceful ‘invasion’ of the territory, Spain eventually decided to withdraw from Western Sahara in 1975.1 Under the terms of the Tripartite Agreement between Spain, Morocco and Mauritania (which borders the eastern and southern flanks of the territory) two thirds of the area was to be administered by Morocco and the remainder by Mauritania (which ceded its share to Morocco in 1979). The Agreement drew much criticism within Spain itself from both the left and the right of the political spectrum, and although in theory Western Sahara was no longer Spain’s problem after 1975, arguably Spain continues to have a legal responsibility for the territory. In any case Spanish support (especially since the early 1980s) for a referendum on self-determination under the auspices of the UN has meant that the issue has continued to dog relations between Madrid and Rabat.2 At the time Spain’s withdrawal gave encouragement to Moroccan nationalists who have since continued

4

Europe or Africa?

to exert pressure on the Moroccan Government to persist with its claim over the very different territories of Ceuta and Melilla in the hope that Spain might similarly decide to relinquish possession of them. However, Spain’s decision to hand over Western Sahara was taken in the singular circumstances of the power vacuum during the transition from the Franco regime, and there has been nothing to suggest that such hope is at all well founded in relation to the northern enclaves.3

Spanish–Maghreb relations4 Spain’s relations with all three of its closest African neighbours – Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia – have been shaped by fourteen centuries of history between Spanish-Christian and Maghreb-Muslim civilizations, and this background will inevitably have permeated the consciousness of those modern politicians responsible for formulating policy towards the countries of the Maghreb (Hernando de Larramendi, 1992, pp. 155–56). In the post-Franco period, these relations have been determined by a number of self-interested (and, it must be said, in some cases contradictory) objectives: assisting economic development through credit arrangements; creating a context for political and economic interdependence via such measures as friendship and cooperation treaties; promoting Spain’s own cultural interests through scholarships and its own economic interests through investment; preventing the establishment of hostile regimes via security agreements; encouraging pluralism and human rights and securing the commitment of the EU to Spain’s regional objectives (Gillespie et al. [eds], 1995, p. 165), culminating in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership declaration signed in Barcelona in 1995 (see Chapter 5). Spain has a substantial economic involvement in the Maghreb region in general and in Morocco in particular. Development aid funds to Morocco (representing over 58 per cent of Spanish aid to the Maghreb countries and 7 per cent of Spain’s total aid budget) between 1977 and 1994 totalled 75,188 million pesetas (over US$500 million [US$1 = 150 pesetas]) (Hernando de Larramendi and Núñez Villaverde, 1996, p. 103). A significant factor in Spain’s involvement has been the need for reliable sources of energy. While this has

The impact of the enclaves on Spanish–Moroccan relations

5

primarily been reflected in investment and credit arrangements with Algeria in order to obtain a cheap, secure supply of gas via a 1,430kilometre pipeline across Morocco and the Strait, as well as exploration for oil in southern Algeria, Spain has also financed the laying of an underwater cable to link the Spanish and Moroccan electricity grids (Gillespie, 2000, pp. 64, 98, 106; Hernando de Larramendi and Núñez Villaverde, 1996, pp. 30–31). With extra growth in Spain in the years immediately following entry into the EC, a bilateral agreement was entered into in 1988 when a five-year credit arrangement for over US$800 million was established, while a further agreement was signed in 1996 for a five-year period which provided credit to a total of US$1,200 million. After France, Spain has become the second largest investor in Morocco, and more than 20 per cent of Morocco’s overseas investments are made in Spain (Hernando de Larramendi and Núñez Villaverde, 1996, p. 66). Although it was not always a two-way process (López García and Núñez Villaverde, 1994, pp. 130–31) and has never been an equitable one, the economic collaboration between Spain and Morocco has grown because it is in their mutual interest. But in the sphere of diplomatic relations between the two countries there is no doubt that the territorial dispute over Ceuta and Melilla has exercised an important influence, and the issue is raised whenever Morocco finds it opportune to do so.

Spanish–Moroccan relations: King Hassan’s strategy In anticipation of the signing of the treaty marking Spain’s entry into the European Community, which required freedom of movement between member states, the border gates between Spain and Gibraltar were finally reopened on 5 February 1985 after sixteen years of closure imposed by the Spanish Government under General Franco. The event prompted King Hassan II to assert in an interview for Spanish television broadcast on 8 February that when Gibraltarian sovereignty was returned to Spain, not only Morocco but also the Soviet Union would be demanding the return of Ceuta and Melilla to Morocco on the grounds that the Soviet Union would not agree to a member of NATO having control of both sides of the Strait of Gibraltar.5 This was not the first time that the King had advanced global strategic reasons

6 Europe or Africa? for the return of the enclaves,6 but the significant events in Gibraltar provided him once again with an excuse to raise Morocco’s claim to Ceuta and Melilla. However, this prompted an angry reaction from the Senator for Melilla, Miguel Angel Roldán of the PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español), who criticized the head of Spanish TV news for broadcasting ‘statements which threatened Spain’s territorial integrity’ (El País, 10 February 1985). It also produced a call to the Spanish Government from his colleague José Torres Vega, General Secretary of the PSOE in Melilla, to come up with ‘a forceful response in the face of this new act of aggression against the unity of the State’ (El País, 10 February 1985). The Spanish Foreign Ministry played down the importance of the comments. However, the pattern of action and reaction resulting from the existence of the Spanish enclaves in North Africa was encapsulated in this episode. Although it is true that King Hassan introduced modest political reforms during his reign allowing for apparently democratic elections,7 he nevertheless continued to determine and to direct both domestic and foreign policy. Despite the existence, therefore, of a long-standing nationalist movement led by the Istiqlal party (founded in 1920 as a rallying focus for Moroccan independence from France and Spain) which frequently voiced demands for the return of Ceuta and Melilla, it was King Hassan who orchestrated Morocco’s claims to the enclaves and whose intervention attracted high-profile media attention in Spain. Often developments in Gibraltar were used in order to highlight the claim to the enclaves, while the Spanish Government tried to minimize the importance of such events in order not to disturb Spanish–Moroccan relations. The ceutís and melillenses, however, saw far more significance in this particular intervention from the Moroccan head of state, and not only called for a stronger response from the Spanish Government than the latter felt it politic to give, but even criticized the state-run TV company for not censoring the remarks entirely (sentiments echoed the following day by mainland politicians from several parties). Concern was aroused within the enclaves about Moroccan intentions when the first session of the newly formed Libyan-Moroccan Parliament, held in Casablanca on 10 July 1985, voted in favour of a resolution calling for ‘the liberation of the Moroccan territories of Ceuta and Melilla which are still under colonial rule’. The Parliament,

The impact of the enclaves on Spanish–Moroccan relations

7

which had been set up under the treaty of federation (known as the Treaty of Uxda) signed between Libya and Morocco in August 1984, consisted of sixty members of the Moroccan Chamber of Representatives and sixty members of the Libyan People’s Congress. Exactly how this resolution was to be carried out was not made clear, and the Spanish Government adopted a wait-and-see policy towards the pronouncements emanating from the Libyan-Moroccan Union.8 King Hassan renewed his involvement in the future of Ceuta and Melilla in March 1986 on two occasions: the first following the visit by King Juan Carlos to Marrakesh as the sole guest of honour to celebrate the 25th anniversary of the Moroccan monarch’s accession to the throne, and the second in an interview for a Kuwaiti newspaper which was faithfully reported as front-page news in the Moroccan press. King Hassan took the same line as that which he had adopted a year earlier, indicating that when Gibraltar was returned to Spain there would be international pressure on Spain to hand the North African enclaves to Morocco. Although this was pure conjecture, there were suggestions that the Spanish Government accepted that it might come under such pressure, and that for that reason it was not in any hurry to solve the Gibraltar question with Britain (see Chapter 7).

Hassan proposes ‘a committee of experts’ Formal contact between the Spanish and Moroccan Governments was renewed on 20 January 1987 when the Spanish Interior Minister, José Barrionuevo, visited Rabat for several days of talks. This followed months of disturbances in Melilla following the introduction of the Immigration Law and the reaction to it by the Muslim community (see Chapter 4). Two agreements were signed, one on civil protection and the other on drug-trafficking, but on the question of the enclaves Barrionuevo made it clear that ‘neither in the short nor medium term is there the slightest possibility of reaching an agreement with Morocco’ over the future of Ceuta and Melilla (El País, 22 January 1987). However, this did not prevent King Hassan from adopting a novel tactic and inviting the Minister to an audience on 23 January, during which the King gave him a verbal message to be conveyed to King Juan Carlos (a message which

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Europe or Africa?

was made public by the Moroccan news agency MAP before it had been delivered) proposing the return of the enclaves to Moroccan sovereignty through ‘a committee of experts’ (una célula de reflexión) which would be charged with finding a solution to the problem.9 The Spanish Government swiftly rejected the proposal, an action which the largest party in Morocco, the Unión Constitucional, described as a serious insult to King Hassan because the reply had not come from the Spanish monarch. It warned that Spain’s position ‘could have serious consequences for relations between the two countries’ and that such an attitude ‘would only add fuel to the fire in the current tense situation in the enclaves’ (El País, 24 January 1987) (see below, Chapter 5). What was clear from this and subsequent episodes was that King Hassan much preferred to deal directly with the Spanish monarch on matters of mutual interest such as the future of the enclaves, and it was not clear whether he fully appreciated that the Spanish Constitution required that such affairs should be the responsibility of the elected government of the day. Certainly relations between the two countries remained strained for many months after this episode. Once again the Spanish Government found that the temperature between Madrid and Rabat had been raised by the Moroccan sovereign seizing an opportunity to exploit an apparently routine visit by a Spanish minister. It was notable that such interventions by the Moroccan king regarding the two enclaves had become more frequent since tensions between the two communities in Melilla had come to the fore, and in particular since the passage of the Immigration Law in July 1985 (see Chapter 5).

González responds Such was the prominence of Ceuta and Melilla in the national consciousness at this time that the Prime Minister, Felipe González, felt obliged to make reference to the enclaves in his State of the Nation address in February 1987. Because of recent civil disturbances in Melilla he focused his remarks there rather than on both towns. He was at pains to stress the Spanishness of the enclave, and pointed out that ‘contrary to what some people believe, it has never been a colony or a protectorate’ (El País, 25 February 1987), a clear reference to the remark in the Casablanca declaration the previous

The impact of the enclaves on Spanish–Moroccan relations

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July. He announced the drawing up of an autonomy statute (although, as will be described in Chapter 2, this was not to be implemented until eight years later). This also applied to Ceuta where, he said, ‘there are no conflicts’, although as things turned out there was greater opposition in Ceuta to the autonomy proposals than in Melilla. A further reason why the Prime Minister spoke of the enclaves at this time might have been in anticipation of King Hassan’s broadcast to the Moroccan people scheduled for 3 March, the 26th anniversary of his accession to the throne, which predictably made explicit reference to Morocco’s claim to Ceuta and Melilla. He referred to the inhabitants of the enclaves as ‘our faithful subjects’ and to the enclaves themselves as ‘our two towns’ (El País, 4 March 1987). He repeated the thrust of his verbal message to King Juan Carlos sent via José Barrionuevo in January. However, some observers detected a subtle shift in the King’s approach, in that he did not explicitly link Morocco’s claim to the enclaves to the fate of Gibraltar.10

Defence cooperation Any tensions that had been created by King Hassan’s interventions earlier in the year did not prevent joint military manoeuvres being carried out over eight days at the end of April in the Moroccan province of Nador, adjoining Melilla. The manoeuvres (which had first been held in 1985) involved both naval and marine forces, and coincided with the arrival of a naval attachment to join the Spanish army and air force advisers in Rabat. This made Morocco the first North African country to have Spanish advisers representing all three branches of the armed services. Moreover Morocco was a major customer of Spanish-built naval bases and warships, including its flagship commissioned in 1983. Clearly the dispute over the Spanish enclaves had not been allowed to interfere with close cooperation over defence matters, in which the two countries had mutual interests, even though paradoxically Spain’s defence strategy was increasingly focused on the deployment of forces and equipment against possible aggression in a hypothetical conflict over North Africa (Gillespie, 2000, p. 56). However, the agreement on military collaboration announced by the Defence Minister, Narcís Serra, on a

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Europe or Africa?

visit to Rabat in February 1983 had never actually been signed, suggesting that at this stage both sides preferred to maintain their cooperative arrangements, including the maintenance of equipment and the training of personnel, on an informal basis.

The fishing agreement and a new offensive By mid-June 1987 it was clear that Morocco was preparing a new offensive to set up bilateral negotiations with Spain on the future of Ceuta and Melilla. The offensive was to coincide with the visit to Rabat by the Spanish Foreign Minister, Francisco Fernández Ordóñez, on 3 and 4 July, and aimed to use as a lever the expiry of the four-year fisheries agreement between Morocco and Spain on 31 July and its replacement by an agreement between Rabat and Brussels.11 Morocco wanted to press Spain for a formal response to the proposal made by the King in January to set up a ‘committee of experts’. In an attempt to aid that process, a letter was sent in mid-June by 55 Moroccan intellectuals to 47 of their Spanish counterparts, inviting them to attend a seminar in order to discuss the ‘nontraumatic return of Ceuta and Melilla to Moroccan sovereignty’. The letter spoke of the fact that ‘the Spanish colonial presence in the two Moroccan towns is based on archaic legal arguments, the value of which is irrelevant in the face of geographical logic and the support by the international community for the ending of the last vestiges of colonialism in the world’ (El País, 19 June 1987). It is not clear whether the letter was in any way orchestrated by the Moroccan Government or the Royal Palaces, but in view of the King’s earlier proposal it seems highly likely that it was either one or the other. However, although the talks between Fernández Ordóñez and his Moroccan counterpart Abdelatif Filali touched on the issue of the enclaves, in the event they were dominated by the imminent expiry of the fishing agreement, given that if no replacement was put in place by 1 August there was the danger (just as had happened four years earlier) that the entire Spanish fishing fleet in Andalucía and the Canaries would have to remain in port.12 By way of encouragement to Rabat, the Spanish Government agreed to open immediate discussions (which they would eventually have had to do following entry into the EC) aimed at allowing the transit of

The impact of the enclaves on Spanish–Moroccan relations

11

Moroccan goods – especially citrus fruit – through Spain (which Madrid had hitherto always refused). As for the subject of the discussions held during the customary audience between a visiting Spanish minister and King Hassan, the Spanish Foreign Minister said nothing. Once again, however, the King took it upon himself to disseminate his views on the state of play between Spain and Morocco on the question of Ceuta and Melilla via the MAP news agency, just as he had done six months earlier. On 12 July he spoke to the British press on the eve of an official visit to London, insisting that there was an agreement between Morocco and Madrid to continue talks on the enclaves. He argued that a solution to the problem of Gibraltar in Spain’s favour would hasten the return of the enclaves to Morocco, but saw the first as a European problem while the second he described as a ‘Euro-African problem’ (El País, 13 July 1987). King Hassan’s understanding of the situation between Spain and Morocco was, however, swiftly corrected by a Government spokesman on 13 July, who said that no dialogue had been established (El País, 14 July 1987), and that there had been no change in Spain’s position.

The introduction of visas Relations between Spain and Morocco took a turn for the worse in February 1988 when it was announced that under an EC directive Moroccan citizens (as well as those from the other countries of the Maghreb) would in future have to obtain a visa to enter Spain. The Moroccan opposition made much of the fact that this requirement would apply not only to entry into peninsular Spain but also into the Spanish enclaves,13 except that they were to be given the designation of a ‘frontier zone’ (régimen de frontalía) allowing Moroccans who lived in the provinces of Tetuán (which adjoins Ceuta) and Nador (which borders Melilla) and who regularly entered the enclaves to require only a passport for a maximum 24-hour stay (even that was a step up from the identity card previously required).14 In order to try to protect its relations with the countries of North Africa, Spain insisted that the visa requirement, which did not finally come into force until 1991 but which resulted in the issue of about 1.2 million visas, should apply to entry into any EC country and not

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Europe or Africa?

just Spain, but for obvious reasons of geographical proximity the vast majority of citizens from North Africa entered the EC via Spain. The displeasure in Rabat at the prospect of the introduction of visas was inevitably directed principally at Madrid, not least because it was a step in the wrong direction as far as Morocco’s claim to the enclaves was concerned.

Sweetening the pill The Spanish Government was grappling throughout this period with the dilemma of trying to respond to the demands of the enclaves for greater autonomy but without offending Morocco in the process. On the one hand the Government was anxious not to alienate the political parties in the enclaves, who were being encouraged to demand full autonomous status by the main national party of opposition, the Partido Popular (PP), while on the other hand they were aware that the granting of autonomy to the enclaves (see Chapter 2) could upset delicate relations between Madrid and Rabat. Just before the Spanish Government’s announcement of the Bill on the autonomy statutes in July 1988, therefore, it tried to sweeten the pill by agreeing on 29 June its largest ever credit package for Morocco, worth 125,000 million pesetas (US$830 million) over five years. Sixty per cent of this was in the form of infrastructure projects to be carried out in Morocco by Spanish companies, while the remainder would be available to finance the export of Spanish capital goods, particularly in those sectors of Spanish industry with a low level of activity in Morocco. Rabat saw the package as a reflection of a substantially improved attitude towards the country by Spain, as evidenced also by the fisheries accord and the agreement to allow the transit of Moroccan goods across Spain. If the truth be told, however, the apparent changes in attitude in Madrid were largely driven by the requirements of Spain’s membership of the European Community.

The issue returns to the UN Following the transfer of Western Sahara in 1975, Morocco did not put its case over the enclaves to the UN Decolonization Committee

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13

for more than a decade. This was due to Morocco’s desire to avoid a confrontation with the UN over self-determination for Western Sahara. In 1988 Morocco and the Polisario Front accepted a UN peace plan, and this allowed Morocco to break its silence at the UN on the issue of the enclaves on 7 October 1988, when the Foreign Affairs Minister, Abdelatif Filali, addressed the General Assembly in New York. He placed his remarks in the context of the importance of stability and security in the Mediterranean and good relations with the European Community: ‘It is imperative to resolve the dispute concerning the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla and other small Mediterranean islands under Spanish occupation, in order to prevent this anachronistic situation – a consequence of earlier times – from threatening the essential harmony which should prevail over the relations between the two countries situated on either side of the Strait of Gibraltar’ (El País, 8 October 1988). The Spanish representative at the UN, Francisco Villar, described the references to the enclaves as ‘inadmissible’ and ‘ill-timed’. It is not clear why Rabat chose this moment to take its case once more to the UN, other than the fact that the Spanish and Moroccan Foreign Ministers had met during the previous week in order to arrange the first visit of King Hassan II to Spain during the following year.15

King Hassan visits Spain The historic visit took place from 26 September to 1 October 1989. It was noteworthy, and seen as a conciliatory gesture, that at a dinner given in his honour by King Juan Carlos on the first evening of the visit King Hassan made no reference to the enclaves, despite the fact that his host did make a reference to Western Sahara. However, King Hassan had taken the opportunity at a press conference before his departure to reiterate the proposal which he first made in January 1987 of setting up a ‘committee of experts’ to discuss the future of Ceuta and Melilla, a proposal to which the Spanish Government had yet to make any formal response, and on which it continued to maintain a discreet silence. In broad terms the visit was an undoubted success. Agreements were signed on military cooperation, mutual protection of investments, and a feasibility study for a tunnel link between Spain and Morocco.16 It was also agreed that the

14

Europe or Africa?

Prime Ministers and other members of the two Governments would meet on an annual basis, thereby putting Spain’s relations with Morocco on a par with those with France and Portugal (although Spain was disappointed that King Hassan, as the real head of government, would not be involved in such meetings). In the event visits have not taken place with anything like the frequency originally proposed. Both sides were happy to adopt a policy whereby the closer the level of cooperation, the more difficult it would be for them to fall out over the issues which separated them. That said, those issues were no nearer to being resolved. If the Moroccan leadership was trying to play down the differences with Spain over the enclaves, it gave no signs of discouraging Moroccan political parties from doing so. When the autonomy statutes were again brought forward by the Spanish Government for discussion in April 1990, there was an immediate and hostile reaction from all shades of political opinion in Morocco. On 22 July a rally attracting about a thousand people was held in Nador by the long-standing nationalist party Istiqlal, and calls were made for the European Community, the United States and even the Pope to come to Morocco’s assistance in order to ‘liberate’ the two enclaves. This was the first of three such meetings organized by Istiqlal for the summer. A further demonstration of similar size on 4 August in Martil near Tetuán was addressed by former Foreign Minister and leader of Istiqlal, Mohamed Bucetta, who called for marches on the enclaves and referred to the need for the Moroccan people to be prepared for ‘a just struggle’ (some interpreted this as an indirect reference to a holy war or jihad) in order to reclaim them. The third meeting which drew a crowd of some 500 people was held on 20 August in Hued-Zem, some 150 kilometres south-east of Casablanca.

The Gulf War The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in August 1990 caused a good deal of anti-Western sentiment in many Muslim countries, including Morocco, but did not prevent normal diplomatic contacts between Spain and Morocco, including an official visit by Prime Minister Felipe González to Rabat in December. The fact that this took place (despite

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15

the situation in Kuwait and also despite the fact that a general strike and riots in Fez had been harshly put down a week earlier, heightening concern in Madrid over human rights in Morocco) was an indication of the importance attached by the Spanish Government to the maintenance of good relations with its neighbour to the south.17 The main subjects for discussion at the meeting were the forthcoming introduction of visas for Moroccans wishing to visit Spain, and new credits from 1993 worth 125,000 million pesetas (US$830 million). The issues of the enclaves and human rights (in Morocco, at least) were carefully avoided, although the Spanish Prime Minister did indicate his Government’s determination to ‘protect the dignity’ of the Moroccan immigrants in Spain, and ‘to satisfy their social needs and condemn any act of racism’ (El País, 21 December 1990). When the Gulf War began in February 1991 the line taken by King Hassan was to support Saddam Hussein with his heart but to be against him with his head, even to the extent of sending Moroccan troops to Saudi Arabia (Collinson, 1996, p. 53, n. 43). This allowed Morocco to have the best of both worlds and avoid suffering the opprobrium of either camp. It also meant that there was no formal hostility between Rabat and Madrid given Spain’s active support for the anti-Iraq war effort, which was based not only on the practical consideration of wishing to protect reasonably priced oil supplies but also, in view of the dispute over Ceuta and Melilla, on ethical objections to the use of force for territorial gain. That is not to say that there were not sections of the Moroccan community which took the opportunity to link the events in the Middle East with Morocco’s claims to the North African enclaves, and apart from the general sense of identification with a Muslim brother there was also some sympathy for Saddam’s desire to restore what he saw as his country’s territorial integrity.

Treaty of Friendship The Gulf conflict had more immediate repercussions between the communities in the enclaves for the duration of the war (see Chapter 4) than it did between governments. The absence of tension between Madrid and Rabat over the issue meant that there was no impediment to further steps towards a closer political relationship in the

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Europe or Africa?

summer of 1991. Thus on 6 July, in the presence of the two monarchs, a Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbourliness and Cooperation was signed between Spain and Morocco in Rabat, the first such treaty between Spain and an Arab nation.18 It covered respect for international law and for sovereignty, non-intervention in internal affairs, no use of force or the threat of force, the peaceful settlement of disputes, cooperation with regard to development, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (but as defined by each country’s national legislation), and understanding of cultures. The Treaty was not ratified by the Spanish Parliament until September 1992, and when it was debated it drew a number of criticisms from opposition parties, including the fact that it made no specific reference to the inviolability of frontiers (of significance to Ceuta and Melilla). On the same day that the Treaty was signed two government ministers from Morocco set foot in one of the enclaves for the first time when Dris Basri, Interior and Information Minister, together with Rafek Haddaui, Minister for Immigration, spent two hours in Ceuta with José Luis Corcuera, the Spanish Interior Minister. The decision to visit the town appeared to be an impromptu one, although Basri hinted that it had been planned in advance. The events gave rise to mixed reactions: some politicians in Ceuta took them as a sign of recognition by Morocco of Spanish presence in the enclaves, to which Moroccan opposition parties strongly objected. The Treaty included the renunciation of the use of force in any disputes between the two countries, which was important for the enclaves, but political parties in Ceuta also took the Treaty as a sign that Madrid was preparing for an eventual transfer of the sovereignty of the enclaves to Rabat. In reality there was little substance to either conclusion regarding recognition or transfer, but what the Treaty did signify was that both countries were determined not to allow the dispute to interfere with cooperation between them on a wide front.

Spain defends Morocco in Europe In January 1992 the European Parliament voted to postpone ratification of the fourth protocol to the EC–Morocco Cooperation Agreement, involving US$600 million in aid for 1993–96, because of concern over human rights issues in Morocco and ceasefire viola-

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17

tions in Western Sahara.19 Much to Spain’s frustration, Morocco suspended negotiations on the next four-year fishing agreement as a consequence, with the existing agreement (affecting some 700 Spanish boats, 95 per cent of the total) due to expire at the end of February. Spain spoke up in European circles on Morocco’s behalf, with the Spanish Foreign Minister calling for a relationship between Brussels and Rabat which could ultimately lead to the creation of a free trade zone for the whole of the Maghreb. Although arguably this was done out of Spanish self-interest in order to revive the talks on the fishing agreement, it certainly did no harm to Spanish–Moroccan relations, and guaranteed that for the foreseeable future contentious issues such as the enclaves would be quietly left to one side. Indeed it was noteworthy that Morocco did not refer to its claim to Ceuta and Melilla for over two years after this episode, despite problems in the summer of 1992 when for the first time illegal immigrants began to try to enter mainland Spain in large numbers both from the Moroccan coast and via the enclaves (see Chapter 5). More significantly, however, it could be argued that Spain’s advocacy on Morocco’s behalf with the EU at this time marked a new beginning in both Spanish and EU policy towards the Maghreb and other states of the Southern Mediterranean, whereby the case for a more positive policy towards the south began to be made and accepted by the north, and eventually took definitive and ambitious shape in the form of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership signed nearly four years later (see Chapter 5). In acknowledgment of the use of Spain’s good offices on its behalf, Morocco agreed to extend the existing fishing agreement for a further two months as a ‘gesture of good will’ (El País, 17 March 1992), and the new agreement was eventually signed in May 1992 with permission for 650 Spanish boats and the financial compensation for Morocco increased to Ecu 310 million (although disagreement over licence use resulted in the premature termination of the agreement in April 1995).

Morocco returns to its claim Following the Spanish general election in June 1993 relations between Madrid and Rabat were described as ‘still good, but not

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Europe or Africa?

within the high pressure range of the barometer’ (El País, 19 October 1993). This was due in part to the continuing uncertainty over the referendum in Western Sahara, the expulsion from Algeciras in July of 75 Moroccans with false documents, and the proposal by the Spanish Agriculture Ministry to freeze quotas of leading Moroccan produce in a proposed EU–Maghreb association agreement. It was in this climate in December 1993 that the second ‘high-level meeting’ (they were not referred to as ‘bilateral summits’) mooted on the occasion of King Hassan’s visit to Madrid took place between Felipe González and the Moroccan Prime Minister, Karim Lamrani, at which the credit agreements for the period 1993–96 were finalized.20 But what also contributed to the climate of the day was the fact that the Spanish Government was pushing ahead with its plans for the autonomy statutes for the enclaves during the latter half of 1993 and the first half of 1994 (see Chapter 2), prompting Morocco to reiterate its claim to them after a significant period of silence on the subject. King Hassan led the way by raising the issue on the occasion of the 33rd anniversary of his accession to the throne on 3 March 1994, the first such anniversary on which he had done so since 1987. He again talked of establishing a ‘committee of experts’ as he had first done seven years earlier, and although he gave the reassurance that a solution would have to be sought by negotiation and agreement, he also argued that Morocco’s rights to the enclaves were ‘inalienable’ and that a settlement could not be put off for too long. The reaction in Spain was that this tough line was being taken partly because of the impending autonomy statutes, but also in response to further initiatives by the nationalist party Istiqlal, and in the context of imminent activity in the UN over the promised referendum in Western Sahara. The claims in Morocco were clearly part of an orchestrated campaign, for the communist Parti du Progrès et du Socialisme (PPS) added its voice on 11 March, describing Spain’s autonomy plans for the enclaves as ‘a perfidious manoeuvre’ designed to ‘reinforce the Spanishness of the enclaves’ and ‘close the door on any peaceful agreement’ (El País, 12 March 1994), while on 12 March the pro-government National Association of Independents (ANI), which was led by a former prime minister and the King’s brother-in-law, accused the Spanish Government of ‘using the language and the tone of right-wing colonialism’ (El País, 13 March

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19

1994). The Spanish Government’s reaction was deliberately low-key, despite the pressure put upon Foreign Affairs Minister Javier Solana to react to King Hassan’s comments when he appeared before the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee on 14 March. Clearly Spanish–Moroccan relations were now much more delicate than they had been for several years. Therefore when José María Aznar, the leader of the PP and future Prime Minister, visited Rabat from 22 to 24 March together with a retinue of parliamentarians and business leaders at the invitation of the Moroccan Parliament, there was considerable interest in what he had to say on matters relating to the enclaves, since the PP line on giving them autonomous powers had been stronger than that of the Spanish Government. At a meeting of the Parliamentary Committee he once more listened to the Moroccan proposal for the establishment of a ‘committee of experts’, but he told journalists that ‘he did not consider the situation of Ceuta and Melilla to be a problem’ (El País, 24 March 1994). Nevertheless the Moroccan press saw the visit as an opportunity too good to miss to remind Spain of Moroccan claims to the ‘occupied towns’. The Moroccan offensive for the return of the enclaves continued unabated with a speech from the King on the subject read out in Tetuán on 9 April and published the following day on the front page of the official daily Le Matin du Sahara, while the Moroccan ambassador in Madrid, Ali Benbouchta, gave a briefing to journalists on 14 April in Barcelona, in which he claimed that the enclaves would return to Morocco just as Gibraltar would be given back to Spain. The new Moroccan Prime Minister, Abdelatif Filali, who also retained the Foreign Affairs portfolio, referred to the claim to the enclaves when presenting his Government’s programme to Parliament on 9 June. In the ensuing debate on the programme, the leader of Istiqlal, Mohamed Bucetta, called on the Government to set a timetable for negotiations and the return of the enclaves.

Spain hints at dialogue The Moroccan position clearly meant that when Spanish Foreign Minister Javier Solana made his regular visit to Rabat on 21 July he found it difficult to avoid discussion of the subject of the enclaves in

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Europe or Africa?

his talks with the Moroccan Prime Minister and also with King Hassan. Exactly what Solana said on the question is not clear, but the Moroccan Prime Minister claimed in an interview given on 12 August that he had got the impression that Spain’s position on the enclaves had changed, and that there was the possibility of opening a dialogue with Spain on their future at the next Spanish–Moroccan ‘high-level meeting’ to be held under the 1991 agreement. The Moroccan campaign took on a new impetus on 16 September when the Prime Minister told the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Moroccan Parliament that the Government would use all the diplomatic means at its disposal to protest at Spain’s failure to respond to its claims to the enclaves, in particular to the proposal to set up a ‘committee of experts’, and to discuss their future. Some commentators in Spain, however, saw this renewed offensive by the Moroccan Government as being for the benefit of the opposition parties, who were objecting to the steps being taken in Spain towards the implementation of the autonomy statutes for the enclaves. When the ‘high-level meeting’ finally took place in Casablanca on 31 October, it became clear that Filali’s understanding of Javier Solana’s message had not been mistaken. For when Felipe González was asked at a press conference about King Hassan’s proposal to establish a ‘committee of experts’ the Prime Minister (who hitherto had preferred to say nothing rather than to say ‘no’) replied that he had no difficulty in holding discussions about the enclaves with Morocco, provided that they were only in relation to cooperation with the Moroccan ‘hinterland’ and to overall relations with Rabat. Such a limited agenda will not have satisfied Morocco, but in itself it marked a new departure. The main Spanish opposition party certainly thought so, and two days later in Parliament the PP called upon the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary to clarify their comments. The Government insisted that there was no possibility of the question of sovereignty being discussed, and that their position on the enclaves had not changed. But the matter did not rest there. The Council of Ceuta, with the support of all parties except the PSOE, voted on 8 November to demand an explanation from the Prime Minister about his comments.

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The strategy of Filali Relations between Spain and Morocco became increasingly strained in the ensuing months as Morocco took a tough stance in the renegotiation of the fishing agreement21 and as Spain finally reached the point of granting autonomous status to the enclaves (see Chapter 2). A new Government was approved by King Hassan in early March 1995, led by Abdelatif Filali. In a policy statement to the Moroccan Parliament on 5 March the Prime Minister ensured that a reference to the enclaves and the Western Sahara problem was included. ‘The issue of our territorial integrity is the Government’s first priority’, he said, claiming that ‘it will be a source of persistent concern to consolidate the final return of our Saharan provinces to the homeland and the regaining of the two usurped towns, Ceuta and Melilla, and the neighbouring islands from the Spanish presence’ (Deutsche PresseAgentur, 5 March 1995).22 The campaign was continued by the VicePresident of the Moroccan Parliament, Abdelawahed Radi, at the 93rd conference of the Inter-Parliamentary Union in Madrid on 31 March. Recognizing the risk of offending the host nation, he said he had a duty to reiterate Morocco’s claim and its determination to recover its territory on the basis of dialogue, cooperation and the strengthening of the ties of friendship between the two countries. The opportunity to raise Morocco’s territorial claims in such an international forum was clearly too good to miss. The next major opportunity came when Abdelatif Filali spoke at the UN General Assembly in September 1995, where he reiterated Morocco’s claim to the enclaves. What was notable on this occasion, however, was the conciliatory tone compared to previous occasions. Although he did not shy away from the use of provocative vocabulary, describing the towns as ‘an integral part of Moroccan territory’ and ‘the last colonies in Africa’ (a point predictably rejected by Spain’s Ambassador to the UN), he also said that ‘Morocco’s historical ties with Spain and their mutual economic interests were such that they would enable them to overcome their differences’. He continued to use King Hassan’s proposal, first put forward nearly nine years earlier, to establish a ‘committee of experts’, and made clear that they would explore how Morocco could recover the sovereignty of the towns while Spain preserved its economic interests (El País, 30 September 1995). If this was Morocco’s explicit objective in

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Europe or Africa?

proposing such a committee it is scarcely surprising if Spain has shown only limited interest in the idea and has rather more limited objectives in mind.

González’s last visit as Prime Minister The issue of the enclaves did not figure high on the agenda when the second ‘high-level meeting’ following the 1991 Treaty (such meetings were meant to take place annually) was held in Rabat at the beginning of February 1996. Prime Minister González was accompanied by seven ministerial colleagues (even more than the number which usually formed his entourage on visits to other EU countries and an indication of the importance attached to the meeting), but after two years of strained relations between the two countries and with a general election in Spain only four weeks away it was not the most auspicious time for such a meeting. From the Moroccan perspective the main objective was to secure from Spain (as it had recently done with France) a partial cancellation of its US$1.6 billion debt (part of an overall US$18 billion foreign debt which represented 68 per cent of the country’s GDP and took 40 per cent of its budget to service) and additional loans worth US$1 billion. Spain did not agree to partial cancellation as such, but in exchange for part of the debt it would receive shares in newly privatized Moroccan industries plus an agreement on Morocco’s part to use some of the debt money to replace some of the 75,000 hectares of cannabis crops grown in the Rif region which (according to a confidential report commissioned by the EU) made Morocco the largest cannabis producer in the world (see The Observer, 16 June 1996), with an estimated 50 per cent share of the cannabis market in Europe (El País, 24 July 1999). It was scarcely surprising that this resulted in drug-trafficking as a major problem in the Spanish enclaves, as they provide an obvious route for the entry of illegal drugs into the EU, as well as a considerable amount of moneylaundering (El País, 28 February 1999).23 The February meeting had been arranged in some haste, for it was generally predicted that there would shortly be a change of government in Madrid and it was assumed in Rabat that the Partido Popular would be less likely than the PSOE to have an improvement in

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relations with Morocco high on its agenda, and would also be less likely to agree to a generous financial package. With these priorities, and with the run-up to a general election not being the best time for any government to make concessions on territorial matters, it was scarcely surprising that Morocco did not press for discussions on the issue of the enclaves at this juncture. What the meeting clearly demonstrated was that with bilateral trade in excess of US$1 billion the continuation of a mutually beneficial financial relationship was of significantly greater importance to both sides than any progress with regard to the solution of a long-standing territorial dispute.

A new stage of cooperation? Moroccan predictions, like those of most political commentators regarding the outcome of the general election in Spain in March 1996, proved to be accurate and José María Aznar duly became Prime Minister. Since he had become leader of the PP Aznar had shown himself to be less concerned than González about running the risk of upsetting Morocco over the enclaves by asserting the Spanishness of the North African towns, visiting them during the election campaign and promising to go back to them following his election as Prime Minister, a journey that González never made during his thirteen years in office. However, by making Rabat his first overseas destination following his inauguration, Aznar was either demonstrating the same recognition as his predecessor of the importance of Morocco to Spain (González had made Morocco his first overseas port of call each time he was elected), or else avoiding any offence to Morocco that might have resulted from breaking the tradition which his predecessor had established. Whatever the motive, the visit (together with the fact that a meeting of PP leaders of autonomous communities due to be held in Melilla a few days before had – perhaps coincidentally – been cancelled) was well received in Rabat, and just as in the case of the visit by Aznar’s predecessor in February, the question of the future of the enclaves was not discussed. The next occasion when there was high-level contact between Spanish and Moroccan leaders involved the two Ministers of the Interior, Jaime Mayor and Dris Basri, at the beginning of October, when the main subjects on the agenda were illegal immigration and

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Europe or Africa?

drugs. The first of these had been very much to the forefront of attention during the months prior to the meeting as there had been a number of incidents involving large numbers of immigrants, particularly from sub-Saharan Africa (see Chapter 5), and these events prompted the Ministers to set up a joint commission to study the two main problems in their talks. Such was the sense of mutual interest that the Spanish Minister was able to claim that ‘Spain and Morocco were embarking upon a new stage of cooperation’ (El País, 4 October 1996), and indeed when Ceuta and Melilla were discussed it was in the context of the strengthening of border controls. The same set of priorities pervaded the meeting between the two Foreign Ministers, Abdelatif Filali (who was also Prime Minister) and Abel Matutes, when they met in Seville in March 1997 under the auspices of the Averroes Committee, a group set up on the occasion of Felipe González’s last visit to Rabat as Prime Minister and which was designed to involve groups who would explore mutual understanding and bilateral cooperation under a range of headings. At this first meeting of the Committee the main subject on the agenda was the problem of illegal immigration (no doubt for the same reason that prompted the meeting of the Interior Ministers). At the press conference following the meeting there was certainly no indication on Matutes’ part of dissatisfaction at the measures Morocco was taking to try to control illegal immigration within the limits of what was practical,24 while Filali placed his hopes in the economic development of the southern Mediterranean which would follow from the EuroMediterranean Partnership agreement (known as the Barcelona Declaration) which had been signed in 1995 (see Chapter 5). As for Ceuta and Melilla, the Moroccan Foreign Minister expressed no interest in wishing to discuss their future, and simply suggested that a solution would be found at the appropriate time. Thus this meeting, like other recent encounters, made it clear that with important economic and development issues to the fore Morocco was content to leave the dispute over the enclaves on the back burner.

Melilla’s 500th anniversary On 17 September 1997 the commemoration of the 500th anniversary of Spanish presence in Melilla began. The Spanish authorities had origi-

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25

nally thought in terms of a lavish celebration of the event, but decided to play it down partly on account of criticism from within Melilla itself about the cost and the sense of priorities that an expensive celebration would imply, but mainly because of protests in the Moroccan press (not only from the nationalist and other opposition organs, but also from pro-Government papers) who described the celebrations as an ‘act of aggression’ against Morocco and called for protest meetings in several towns across the country. King Hassan II, however, issued a royal directive via the Interior Minister, Dris Basri, calling for any protests to be kept low-key in order not to damage relations between Rabat and Madrid (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 17 September 1997). It was suggested that one consequence of the Spanish Government’s reaction was the cancellation of a planned visit to the enclaves by King Juan Carlos, which would have been the first by a reigning Spanish monarch for seventy years, and also of a visit by the Deputy Prime Minister, Francisco Alvarez Cascos (although not surprisingly it was denied by Palace and Government spokesmen that either visit was ever planned). Government representation in Melilla for the event was no higher than the level of the Minister for Public Administration. The decision by the Moroccan Government to try to restrain any protests in Morocco against the celebrations did not, however, deter them from raising the issue of the enclaves at the General Assembly of the United Nations in New York a week later. The Moroccan Prime Minister, Abdelatif Filali, described the enclaves as ‘Moroccan towns under Spanish occupation’ and called for a solution which would follow the example of Hong Kong and Macao. He reminded the international forum that Morocco was committed to the use of dialogue to achieve a solution, indicating that Morocco’s objective was to recover the sovereignty of Ceuta and Melilla while allowing Spain to ‘preserve its interests’ (El País, 26 September 1997). This was precisely the same argument Spain used towards Britain over its claim to Gibraltar, but it was not one which the Spanish Government would have found appealing in relation to the enclaves.

Youssoufi and Aznar focus on other issues The next call for talks on the enclaves was made in April 1998 by the Moroccan Communications Minister, Larbi Messari. The reason for

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Europe or Africa?

the focus on the issue on this occasion was in part the work being done on the perimeter fences around the enclaves in an attempt to deal with the growing problem of illegal immigration (see Chapter 5), for the Minister accused Spain of giving in to what he called ‘pressure groups who stand to gain from smuggling, from moneylaundering and from the status of the two cities’ (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME/D3199/MED, 13 April 1998). The call for talks in order for Morocco to ‘complete our territorial integrity’ was also made by the new Moroccan Prime Minister, Abderrahmane Youssoufi,25 in his address to Parliament on 17 April (BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 19 April 1998), and when interviewed for a Spanish newspaper a week later, he said that Morocco ‘would like Ceuta and Melilla one day to be economic and financial centres which benefit Spain and Morocco’. Again the link with Gibraltar was made when the Prime Minister reminded Spain that ‘you say to the British [about Gibraltar] the same things that we say to you’ (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME/D3211/MED, 27 April 1998). The main reason why the issue was being raised at this time, however, was the impending visit by the Spanish Prime Minister, José María Aznar, to Morocco on 27 April for the fourth Spanish–Moroccan ‘high-level meeting’. Accompanied by seven ministerial colleagues, just like his predecessor two years earlier, Aznar’s main objective was to secure the involvement of Spanish finance in the process of privatization which Morocco was undergoing, and also to continue the process begun two years earlier of the conversion of yet more of Morocco’s debt into further Spanish investment programmes. There was some talk of the renegotiation of the fishing agreement when the existing one expired at the end of November 1999, despite the fact that previously Morocco had said that it did not intend to do so, but in fact by the time the agreement lapsed no discussions had taken place.26 Mention was made in official talks of the question of Western Sahara (Morocco challenged Spain’s neutrality on the issue since there were Spanish NGOs in the refugee camps in Tinduf), but on Ceuta and Melilla, all that Aznar would say to Moroccan journalists was: ‘We have different positions. We know what they are and we will continue talking.’ For his part Youssoufi claimed that ‘the only problems between the two countries are historical ones’; with regard to the present and the future, ‘there is total agreement’ (El País, 28

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27

April 1998). The summit was generally a success, and the same could be said of the meeting the following year when the venue on 29 April 1999 was the Moncloa Palace, although Spanish concern about the impending termination of the fishing agreement was the main point of discussion. Youssoufi raised once more the idea of a ‘committee of experts’ to discuss the future of the enclaves, but in response to a question at a press conference the Spanish Prime Minister said of the enclaves that ‘they are in good health and I hope that they will be even more so in the future’ (El País, 30 April 1999).

The death of King Hassan One significant event which had the potential for a profound impact on Spanish–Moroccan relations was the death of King Hassan II on 23 July 1999 after 38 years on the Alouite throne. The Spanish press indicated admiration for his capacity for survival through gradual political reform, his contribution to the stability of a volatile region through a constructive dialogue with both the West (including Israel) and the Arab world, and his skill in leading an Islamic state while controlling so-called ‘fundamentalism’, but it was critical of his authoritarianism, his overall human rights record, his legacy to his country of extremes of wealth and extravagance but also poverty and illiteracy, and his stubbornness over the issue of Western Sahara. Although he failed to regain Ceuta and Melilla, he still demonstrated political skill in his attempts to do so, and he also knew how to exploit his strong suit against Spain, namely the importance to the Spanish fishing fleet of Moroccan territorial waters. Morocco’s new head of state, King Mohamed VI, immediately came under pressure both from reforming groups who urged him to introduce long-awaited change and from conservatives who urged caution and the need for continuity. The Spanish Prime Minister had brief discussions with him at the funeral ceremony on 25 July (to which Spain was the only country to send both the head of state and the head of government), but their first significant encounter took place at a hastily arranged meeting on 16 August in Rabat which enabled Aznar to become the first EU head of government to be received by the new Moroccan king.

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Morocco responds to the political crisis in the enclaves Immediately prior to that meeting, however, the Moroccan Prime Minister, Abderrahmane Youssoufi, took the opportunity to restate his country’s claim to the enclaves as a consequence of the serious political crisis which both towns were experiencing at that time (see Chapter 3). He virtually accused both the PSOE and the PP of racism in Melilla, when he stated in a radio interview on 12 August that Moroccan public opinion had the impression that ‘all these struggles and manoeuvres [in Melilla] are intended to stop a melillense of Moroccan origin from being President of the recently elected Assembly’ (El País, 13 August 1999).27 He called upon both countries to consider jointly a new statute for Ceuta and Melilla, with an indirect reference to King Hassan’s ‘committee of experts’, claiming that ‘the spectacle given by certain politicians in Melilla, and now also in Ceuta, is the best proof that the present situation of the two towns cannot go on’. There was inevitable speculation as to whether this intervention by the Moroccan Prime Minister was a sign of King Mohamed’s intention to move the issue of the enclaves up the agenda, especially since commentators were accustomed to the idea during his father’s reign that no strategic moves within Morocco would have been taken without the approval of the royal palace. The response from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Youssoufi was predictable: that Spain maintains its position in defence of the existing statutes. But there must have been a good deal of annoyance in Madrid that the activities of the local politicians at that time were playing into Morocco’s hands. Spanish officials insisted that Aznar’s presence in Rabat on 16 August was a ‘courtesy visit’ and had nothing to do with the political crisis in the enclaves or Youssoufi’s comments calling for negotiations. At a press conference at Rabat airport he refused to answer any questions on the enclaves, arguing that the subject had not been broached ‘because it does not come into the framework of topics for discussion between Spain and Morocco’. The Spanish Prime Minister would have been furious, however, when he returned home to find that the Catalan nationalists (in the shape of both the ruling Convergència i Unió [CiU] and the left-wing Iniciativa per CatalunyaEls Verds) were calling for a parliamentary debate on the enclaves, in

The impact of the enclaves on Spanish–Moroccan relations

29

which they would urge the Government to establish a commission to enter into talks with Morocco. It was another visit by Aznar, this time to the enclaves as part of the pre-election campaign on 9 January 2000, which upset the Moroccan press. Libération, the mouthpiece of the Moroccan Prime Minister’s party, called the visit ‘provocative’, warned that it could have ‘serious repercussions for relations between both countries’ and called for the enclaves to be ‘decolonized’ (El Mundo, 12 January 2000). Aznar was also accused in Al Bayane of breaking the unwritten rule of ‘avoiding visits to the enclaves in order not to start a bilateral polemic’, while Le Matin described the visit as a ‘dangerous faux-pas liable to put the western part of the Mediterranean on red alert’. The following day Prime Minister Youssoufi made an official protest about the visit, and in a communiqué published by the official Government spokesman said that Aznar’s remarks about the Spanishness of the enclaves were ‘an attempt to project into the future an anachronism of times past’. El Mundo suggested that the reaction by the Moroccan authorities and the Moroccan press following Aznar’s visit was very similar to what occurred when a previous Prime Minister, Adolfo Suárez, visited the enclaves in December 1980.28 Clearly in that respect little had changed in two decades, although in other respects bilateral relations had moved on. However, when Aznar made the first visit of his second term of office to Morocco in May 2000, Youssoufi raised the issue of the enclaves at their joint press conference, describing them as ‘representing a danger for our economy and for illegal immigration’ (El Mundo, 9 May 2000), as well as criticizing the Spanish Government for failing to protect the rights of migrant workers.29 Aznar, who had just announced the setting up of a government department to look after issues relating to immigration (both legal and illegal), vigorously rejected such criticisms. More significantly, following the publication of a four-year study on the north of Morocco, the Spanish Prime Minister also announced his country’s contribution of 7,250 million pesetas (US$48.3 million) towards the economic regeneration of the region, plus a further 6,725 million pesetas (US$44.8 million) for scientific and technical cooperation over two years and the third tranche of Moroccan debt conversion into investments. Youssoufi’s intervention regarding the enclaves hardly came as a surprise, but there is no doubt that he was more interested in the measures being

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taken by Spain to protect Moroccan migrant workers, control illegal immigration and assist with his country’s underdeveloped northern region than he was with any action relating specifically to the enclaves. For his part Aznar’s offer of investment in the hinterland was the best response he could have made.30

Conclusion It cannot be said that Spanish policy towards Morocco during the first half of the twentieth century enhanced the prospects for a comfortable relationship between the two countries during the second half, and in any case Spanish policy towards Morocco since 1956 has been somewhat ambivalent. Thus the relationship even without the dispute over Ceuta and Melilla was destined to be an uneasy one. Spain is an important economic partner for Morocco, although given their different stages of economic development and different economic profiles (see Chapter 5) it is hardly a partnership of equals.31 As an important market for Spanish investment and Spanish exports (over 800 Spanish companies have interests in Morocco, and Spain is the country’s second most important economic partner), Morocco’s economic development is in Spain’s interest, but only provided that it does not become a competitor (especially in agricultural produce) and threaten trade and employment. Indeed Spain’s approach to its economic relations with Morocco has been increasingly protectionist, first under the influence of political pressure from those groups whose livelihood is most affected by Moroccan development, and subsequently (under the PP Government) as a means of influencing the restructuring of those sectors of the Moroccan economy (notably citrus fruits) which compete most strongly with Spain (Gillespie, 2000, pp. 154, 157; Jordán Galduf, 1997, pp. 54–55).32 The inequality of the partnership is also reflected in the fact that as a consequence of Spain’s successful political transition since the mid-1970s and its impressive economic growth since the mid-1980s the country is for many in Morocco’s elite a model to be emulated, whereas for others there is still a sense that Spain views Morocco as backward and inferior. However, Morocco is undoubtedly working hard to change that perception, and the hard bargaining over fishing agreements, first

The impact of the enclaves on Spanish–Moroccan relations

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with Spain and then through Brussels, has been well exploited by Morocco and largely redounded to its favour.32 The outcome of these negotiations, together with Spain’s support for closer links between Morocco and the EU, has helped to push the territorial issue of the enclaves down the political agenda. Spain also recognizes the importance of having good relations with its southern neighbours for the sake of regional (and therefore national) security, and Morocco acts as an accommodating partner within the Arab world in this regard. Spain has therefore tried to minimize the significance of the visa requirements (Chapter 1), the granting of autonomy status to the North African enclaves (Chapter 2), or the 1985 Immigration Law (Chapter 4), none of which served to enhance relations between the two countries. But at the same time it has not allowed increasing illegal immigration from North Africa (Chapter 5) to stand in the way of good bilateral cooperation. Spain has divested itself of one piece of contentious territory in the shape of Western Sahara (although the outcome still awaits a conclusion and has left Morocco with a long-standing headache), but the enclaves remain an unresolved bone of contention between the Governments in Madrid and Rabat. As this chapter has shown, the issue is rarely far from the surface, and whether or not it breaks that surface largely depends on the extent to which Morocco feels able to use it as a lever to its advantage. Notes 1 For details of the ‘Green March’, see Ruiz Miguel, 1995, pp. 99–107. It is alleged that the United States was heavily involved in the organization of the march, since it preferred the territory to be in Moroccan hands rather than those of the Polisario Front who were fighting for the independence of Western Sahara, which they call the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) and which has been officially recognized by over 70 states. Although under UN pressure Morocco agreed to a referendum in 1991, this has not yet taken place owing to disagreements between Morocco and the Front on who is eligible to vote, and UN forces (in the guise of the Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, MINURSO) continue to try to keep the peace. 2 Since the late 1980s Spain has assisted Morocco with the sale of defence equipment for use in the region, thus reducing tension between the two countries over the Western Sahara issue. However, Spain has also kept its options open on the eventual outcome of the dispute and has assisted Polisario and the Saharawis in various ways (Gillespie, 2000, pp. 44–50).

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3 Although not a territorial dispute of the same kind, the other bone of contention between Spain and Morocco since the 1960s has been fishing rights in waters off the Moroccan and Western Saharan coasts. Since the 1970s Morocco has frequently used action against Spanish boats and negotiations over fishing agreements as a bargaining lever, and Spain has often made significant concessions on the understanding that in return issues such as the dispute over the enclaves would be shelved. In relation to waters off the Western Saharan coast, comments made by some Spanish politicians in recent years have been interpreted as implying recognition of Moroccan jurisdiction over the territory. By contrast Spain has been careful not to claim rights over the waters off Ceuta and Melilla in order not to draw further attention to that territorial dispute. On fishing and Spanish–Moroccan relations, see del Pino, 1983, pp. 135–57; 185–98; 219–25; Hernando de Larramendi, 1997, pp. 390–93. 4 Although the term ‘Maghreb’ can include Libya and Mauritania, in this study it is used to refer to Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, which between them account for 90 per cent of the population of the five countries. For an explanation of the concept of the Maghreb, see Spencer, 1993, pp. 5–6. 5 King Hassan’s comments were made in an interview for a programme Informe Semanal. The remarks on Ceuta and Melilla were extracted and broadcast on two news bulletins, but removed when Informe Semanal itself was transmitted the following day. This apparent partial censorship generated a good deal of criticism (except, of course, from people in the enclaves who welcomed it). 6 King Juan Carlos’ reference to Spain’s desire to recover Gibraltar in his accession speech in November 1975 had prompted King Hassan to state in a press conference a few days later that ‘no power can permit Spain to possess both keys to the same straits’ (quoted in Rézette, 1976, p. 164; see also Hernando de Larramendi, 1997, p. 396; Carabaza and de Santos, 1992, pp. 250, 252). 7 For an analysis of democratization under King Hassan, see Korany, 1998, pp. 166–76. 8 The treaty, which was designed to strengthen bilateral cooperation and efforts to unify the ‘Arab Maghreb and the Arab nation’, was seen as a counter to the Tunisian–Algerian–Mauritanian trilateral treaty signed in 1983 (Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, Vol. XXX, p. 33246). Morocco ended its treaty with Libya in July 1986 following a meeting between King Hassan and the Prime Minister of Israel which was the first step in the adoption by Morocco of a more pro-Western foreign policy. This included an application (which was rejected for a number of reasons) to join the EC in 1987. Three years later Morocco and Libya formed a new alliance in a wider regional grouping, the Arab Maghreb Union (see Chapter 5). 9 In June the Moroccan Ministry of Information included the date of King Hassan’s proposal in a book Reino de Marruecos. Hechos y Cifras, 1987 as one of the major events in Moroccan history. This is a reflection of the position of Moroccan monarchs as descendants of the Alouite Sultans, who have ruled Morocco since the

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seventeenth century and who, it is claimed, were themselves descendants of the Prophet Mohammed (Spencer, 1993, p. 10). The King therefore exercises both religious and secular authority, making the insult inflicted by the Spanish Government’s failure to respond to his proposal all the greater in Moroccan eyes. 10 Speaking to French journalists on 11 April, King Hassan said that it was ‘an anachronistic situation which cannot be compared to that of Gibraltar’ (El País, 14 April 1987). 11 The existing agreement signed in 1983 allowed 700 Spanish boats to fish in Moroccan waters, in exchange for a total of US$550 million in compensation. Following Spain’s entry into the EC the new agreement had to be reached with Brussels, but inevitably Spanish fishermen would be affected more than those of any other member state. The delay in reaching a new fishing agreement with Brussels was mainly due to the fact that Morocco was also anxious to renegotiate its entire commercial agreement with the EC, which dated back to 1976, on the grounds that the entry of Spain and Portugal to the EC had damaged Morocco’s position. 12 A new four-year fisheries agreement eventually came into force in 1988 (see Hernando de Larramendi and Núñez Villaverde, 1996, p. 33). This gave a maximum of 800 Spanish and Portuguese licences and compensation of Ecu 282 million (European Commission, 1997). 13 The Moroccan newspaper L’Opinion took the line that ‘as these two towns are Moroccan it is unacceptable for a Moroccan who wishes to visit or to pass through them to need a visa’ (see López García, 1993a, p. 65). 14 Such a relaxation would go some way to mitigate the effects on small businesses in the enclaves, which largely depended on Moroccan trade and tourism, and which in November 1990 called for the full implementation of the directive to be delayed for a year. The directive, which brought Spain into line with other EC countries, did not apply retrospectively to the estimated 90,000 Moroccan residents in Spain (many of whom had entered illegally). These measures, which were due to come into force in 1990, but were postponed until March 1991 and deferred again because of the Gulf War until May of that year, marked the start of a process undertaken by EC countries to respond to what many of them saw as the threat of increasing economic migration from North Africa in the period prior to the implementation of the Schengen Agreement in 1995. 15 The visit was originally scheduled for November 1988, but Morocco decided to postpone it following Spanish support at the UN for an Algerian motion calling for a referendum in Western Sahara and for direct contact between the Polisario Front and Morocco (Hernando de Larramendi, 1992, p. 165). Spain’s King Juan Carlos had visited Morocco in 1979 (del Pino, 1983, pp. 174–84). 16 Feasibility studies for a fixed link (either bridge or tunnel) had been in train since 1980, and by 1987 Spain was investing an annual budget of 400 million pesetas (US$2.7 million) in the project (see El País, 7 April 1987). The project

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(subsequently agreed as a rail tunnel) was taken a stage further in February 1996 when the two sides agreed to start geological and scientific work by the end of the following year with a view to completion in 2010 – provided that the estimated US$10,000 million could be raised (see El País, 6 February 1996). Hernando de Larramendi, 1992, p. 161, suggests that Morocco has always been more enthusiastic about the idea than Spain, which has been more concerned to improve communication links with the rest of Europe. Spain may also have reservations about the immigration implications of a fixed transport link with Africa. 17 Gillespie, 2000, p. 54, suggests that, although the Spanish Government’s strategy ‘was not one of appeasing Rabat at any price in order to avoid conflict over Ceuta and Melilla’, one reason why improved relations were sought was certainly ‘to pre-empt anticipated Moroccan territorial pressures’. 18 For the full text of the Treaty, see Hernando de Larramendi and Núñez Villaverde, 1996, pp. 177–83. A similar treaty was signed with Tunisia in October 1995. 19 On the significance of the 1992 dispute between Morocco and the EU, see White, 1996, pp. 121–24. 20 Gillespie, 2000, p. 60, suggests that the ‘lack of symmetry’ between the two regimes made it difficult to institutionalize the bilateral relationship between the two countries, and because decision-making power lay in the hands of the Moroccan monarch the ‘high-level meetings’ between the two prime ministers could never be really productive. The value of such meetings was also questioned in Spanish Government circles (El País, 18 March 1992; 3 December 1993), and to reflect this the end-of-meeting press conference in 1993 was presided over by the respective Foreign Ministers in order not to diminish the standing of the Spanish Prime Minister. 21 On the negotiations leading to the 1995 fishing agreement, see Damis, 1998. The new agreement which was set to run for four years from November 1995 allowed 477 (mainly Spanish) vessels to operate off the Moroccan coast in exchange for US$650 million compensation from Brussels together with other concessions regarding Moroccan workers and fish processing. Most of the funds were to be used to improve the industry’s infrastructure (‘Africa Review World of Information’, Quest Economics Database, February 1997, p. 139). 22 The Moroccan Prime Minister also drew a parallel with his country’s claim to the enclaves and Spain’s demand for the return of Gibraltar from Britain, describing Spain’s position as ‘inconsistent’. 23 One network which was uncovered in Ceuta in July 2000 had laundered drug money in foreign currencies to the value of 23,000 million pesetas (US$153 million) in eight months (El Mundo, 6 July 2000). 24 However, as the numbers of boat crossings and inevitable drownings increased during the summer, there was criticism of Morocco in some quarters for not doing everything it could to stop such activity (see El País, 19 June 1997).

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25 Following further constitutional reform in 1996 Abderrahmane Youssoufi, the moderate leader of the opposition socialists (USFP) who were the largest party after the 1997 elections, became the first Prime Minister since the introduction of elections in 1984 not to come from the establishment party, the Constitutional Union. 26 An enhanced fisheries agreement was under negotiation at the time of the implementation of the EU–Mediterranean Association Agreement between the EU and Morocco in March 2000 which would make it ‘a matter of principles of EuroMoroccan co-operation rather than simply one concerning the use of resources’ (European Commission, 2000). Negotiations were still in hand at the end of July 2000. 27 The outcome of these elections is discussed below, Chapter 3. 28 On Suárez‘s visit, see del Pino, 1983, pp. 199–203. 29 This was a reference to racial conflicts that had broken out in the Almería region in January and February 2000 (see Chapter 5, n. 34). 30 The issue of the enclaves arose on the occasion of King Mohamed’s first state visit to Spain in September 2000, in an exchange between the Spanish Foreign Minister, Josep Piqué, and his Moroccan counterpart, Mohamed Benaissa (see El Mundo, 20 September 2000). 31 In 1996 Spanish goods accounted for about 9 per cent of Moroccan imports whereas Moroccan goods accounted for only 0.5 per cent of Spanish imports. Spain received just over 9 per cent of Moroccan exports, while Morocco received about 1 per cent of Spanish exports. The trade coverage ratio (exports as a percentage of imports) is favourable to Spain at between 150 and 170 per cent (Jordán Galduf, 1997, p. 58). On the consequences of the unequal nature of this partnership, see White, 1996, pp. 111–28. 32 The main exports from Spain to Morocco are industrial machinery, mineral fuels, iron and steel products, plastic materials, synthetic fibres, textile products, electrical machines and material, cars and tractors. The main exports in the opposite direction are fish, crustaceans and molluscs, salt, phosphates and other minerals, manures and chemical fertilizers, clothes and clothing accessories and leather goods (Jordán Galduf, 1997, p. 58). 33 López García, 1993b, pp. 56–58, suggests that since 1987 the issue of immigration has also been a bargaining tool used by Morocco.

TWO

THE ENCLAVES WITHIN THE SPANISH STATE: THE AUTONOMY STATUTES The Constitutional framework The new Constitution adopted by the Spanish Parliament in 1978 following the restoration of democracy included two articles (144 and 151) which dealt specifically with the devolution of powers by mutual consent from the centre to the newly established Autonomous Communities. Parliament had the option of continuing to view Ceuta and Melilla from a political perspective as part of Andalucía, as had been the case during the Franco regime, or as separate entities. Critically for the enclaves, the text of the Constitution included the Fifth Provisional Regulation which extended via Article 144 the option to Ceuta and Melilla to establish themselves as Autonomous Communities, subject to parliamentary approval.1 The process which would enable the enclaves ultimately to achieve autonomy would also test the extent to which successive Spanish governments were committed to enabling all of Spain’s citizens, including those in North Africa, to enjoy the same democratic rights even in the face of possibly damaging consequences as far as bilateral relations with Morocco were concerned. The new Constitution also established municipal councils for which elections were first held in 1979.2 On 28 September 1981 the Council in Ceuta took its first step towards autonomy by passing a resolution to seek autonomous status from Parliament, and the Council in Melilla followed suit two weeks later. The Draft Bill (which related to Melilla but which would also be used for Ceuta if it was successful) was drawn up in March 1982 by the Ministry for Local and Regional Government and sought to offer the enclaves the

The enclaves within the Spanish state: the autonomy statutes 37 maximum possible autonomy within their size and status as municipalities. It was the attempt to reconcile both sides of this equation and to interpret their implications in practice that was to prove so contentious and thereby cause an extensive delay of almost a decade and a half before legislation was finally put in place. Further draft proposals were produced at the end of 1984 (by the Council in Ceuta) and in early 1985 (by the Ministry) although to the dismay of the ceutís the Government had decided that the law would have to be promulgated through an ordinary law and not via an organic law (i.e. one based on the principle of the existing autonomy statutes), although this decision was reversed by the time that the proposals were published over three years later. As indicated in the previous chapter, a controversial interview with King Hassan was broadcast on Spanish television on 8 February 1985. It was perhaps more than coincidence that only four days later Prime Minister González said, following a parliamentary debate on the Government’s devolution policy, that he had already been in discussion with the Councils in Ceuta and Melilla in order to find a way to give them more autonomy, and he was able to announce that there was another Draft Bill being considered by the Ministry for Local and Regional Government. At that stage the Spanish Government was anxious to avoid the use of the term autonomía in the proposed statutes for Ceuta and Melilla, in order not to give Morocco any cause to take its case once more to the United Nations, where the term was identified with ‘self-determination’ and might imply that the two enclaves currently had a colonial status. What the Spanish Government had in mind at this stage, as confirmed by the minister responsible, Félix Pons, on 10 August 1985, was an assembly with regulatory and executive responsibilities relating to public works, agriculture, tourism, culture and internal trade, but not a parliament with legislative powers. The reasons given were to do with problems of size, population, isolation and ‘management expertise’, but the proposal was certainly not going to be acceptable to the inhabitants of the enclaves in the long term.

The importance of autonomy There were several reasons why the issue of autonomy was of importance in the mid-1980s to the inhabitants of the enclaves. Talks over

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the future of Gibraltar would soon be underway, and there was the fear that Spain would bow to pressure from Morocco to start similar negotiations over Ceuta and Melilla. The granting of autonomy would make the Spanish Government’s position quite clear and send an unequivocal message to Rabat. In Ceuta (like Melilla, a free port) there were also worries about economic prospects. Sales of duty-free goods had fallen rapidly since the 1970s and were about to fall even further with the opening of the frontier between Spain and Gibraltar. Although a good part of the Spanish community benefited from lower taxes and salary premiums by comparison with the rest of Spain and enjoyed a good standard of living, the picture for the population as a whole was rather different. In terms of GDP per inhabitant the figure for the enclaves in 1985 stood at 81.45 per cent of the national average (only three regions fell below that figure) while disposable family income was at 92.12 per cent of the national average (adjusted for price differentials), placing the enclaves in 13th place out of 18.3 Unemployment was at the national average in Melilla and above it in Ceuta, while over 80 per cent of jobs in both enclaves were already in the service sector. Much of the economy outside administration (some 40 per cent of employment was within the civil service) was dependent upon the resale of goods to countries in Africa (including neighbouring Morocco and Algeria) which could not otherwise afford the foreign exchange to buy them direct. The only scope for significant growth was the underdeveloped tourist industry, but the Government had shown no signs of being prepared to give it the financial boost it needed. Coupled with the recent decision of the Spanish Government to remain in NATO (despite its election pledge on coming to power in 1982 to support the call for withdrawal in a referendum) and plans to reduce the number of Spanish troops in North Africa from the current 8,000 as part of cuts in defence spending, plus Spain’s imminent entry into the European Community and the fact that no Government minister had visited Ceuta since 1982, there was a growing feeling of uncertainty in the enclaves about the Government’s intentions regarding their future. Clarity on the issue of autonomy, it was hoped, would allow the enclaves to take the initiative on other fronts, including economic development.

The enclaves within the Spanish state: the autonomy statutes 39

Towards the statute proposals While the Spanish Government appeared to be in concessive mood, the representatives of the Muslim community in Melilla requested that in the Statute for the Town of Melilla, Spanish, Arabic and Cherja (the language of the Rif widely spoken by Muslim residents in Melilla) should be recognized as joint official languages. This remained a constant theme in the concerns expressed by the Muslims about the statute proposals, since they felt that the language issue was a reflection of their marginalization within the enclaves. The Statute itself, which stopped short of autonomous powers, appeared not to arouse substantial opposition in Melilla at this time, perhaps because the PSOE-led Council remained loyal to the Madrid Government’s position. In Ceuta, however, the population was less inclined to accept the idea of a statute which withheld autonomous status, and during a three-week campaign culminating in a petition of 20,000 signatures and a demonstration of 15–20,000 people on 10 March 1986 they demanded full autonomy for the enclave. Shortly afterwards the mayor of Ceuta, Aurelio Puya, was in Melilla in search of support for the autonomy of both enclaves. Later that year the main opposition party, Alianza Popular (AP), with the future Prime Minister José María Aznar as spokesman, put forward a parliamentary Bill on 24 November 1986 to establish Ceuta and Melilla as autonomous communities, in accordance with provisions in the Spanish Constitution. This, they argued, would be the best way to send a signal to Morocco regarding Spain’s intentions with respect to the enclaves. Such a proposal was a politically useful move for the Alianza Popular in its endeavour to enhance its support in the enclaves, but it was also based on a sound rationale. The Government attempted to regain some lost ground via a goodwill visit to Melilla by the Culture Minister, Javier Solana, on 20 December, but he was met by Muslim demonstrators protesting at the delays in dealing with applications for Spanish citizenship in the enclaves following the introduction of a new Immigration Law (see Chapter 4). Thereafter the autonomy proposals were quietly shelved, while the Government turned its mind to other matters, in particular the promised referendum on Spain’s membership of NATO and the subsequent general election in June 1986 in which the PSOE sought and gained a second term in office.

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When it finally did return to the issue, the Spanish Government was anxious to try to establish a cross-party consensus on the change of statutes for the two enclaves in order to reinforce the case for change without causing Morocco to raise the issue at the UN. It was the latter concern, together with the tensions between the communities in the enclaves (see Chapter 4), which were delaying the resolution of the statute issue. Following a series of meetings during September 1987, by early October the PSOE and the AP in Spain confirmed that they were close to an agreement on the future statutes for the enclaves, apart from a number of points of detail, while the centre party, the Centro Democrático Social (CDS), supported the Government in principle but put forward alternative proposals which took the enclaves closer to the powers enjoyed by the Autonomous Communities. By contrast, and indicative of the fact that there was no national consensus, the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) called for the transfer of the enclaves to Morocco over a 20–25-year period, with the implementation of transitional measures (including the granting of Spanish nationality to those in the Muslim communities who wanted it) and guarantees for the protection of Spanish interests. The General Secretary, Gerardo Iglesias, argued that Spanish retention of sovereignty over the enclaves ‘did nothing for Spain’s dignity, and if they were transferred it would put Spain in a better position to argue for the return of Gibraltar and to develop a clear policy towards the Sahara’ (El País, 7 October 1987). However, he revised his position a few days later when the PCE Central Committee met on 10 October, and argued that the transfer of the enclaves should be part of a package involving the actual recovery of Gibraltar by Spain.4 There was little likelihood of any movement in this regard in the near future, but it could be argued that at least the PCE recognized that there was a problem to be resolved on an international level, and that unlike the party in power they did not see the problems in the enclaves either as a matter of public order (see Chapter 4) or as problems which could be solved by a change of statutes. The statute proposals were finally published in July 1988, some seven years after they had first been requested by the enclaves, and when they did appear it came as no surprise that they fell short of full autonomous status. But the Government had made a number of concessions under pressure both from the enclaves themselves and

The enclaves within the Spanish state: the autonomy statutes 41 also from the opposition parties. It was agreed that the legal framework would be described as ‘autonomous’, and the procedure for enacting the statutes would be through the ‘organic laws’, thereby putting the enclaves on a par with the Autonomous Communities in this respect. The statutes did not give the enclaves legislative powers, but they allowed them to propose legislation and to modify national legislation, or even block it if they could successfully argue that it would be harmful to their interests. The assemblies in each enclave would be able to elect their own president, who would also be president of the Governing Council, thus making such a postholder more akin to a mayor than to the president of an autonomous community (indeed there was some criticism that it was not really justified to describe the proposals as ‘statutes’ since they were more like a municipal charter). It was proposed that the financial arrangements would be established in the first instance for a five-year period.5

Confusion over ‘Programa 2000’ In addition to the nuts-and-bolts issues relating to the powers and administrative arrangements for the enclaves, the statute proposals also took pains to make clear that the enclaves were to continue to be seen as ‘an integral part of the Spanish nation and within its indissoluble unity’ (El País, 26 July 1988). In part this was an attempt by the Spanish Government to clarify its position, following the confusion which it had created for itself in a PSOE discussion document entitled ‘Programa 2000’ which was published earlier in July. Indeed there were some suggestions that the reason why the Government had finally decided to bite the bullet over the statutes for the enclaves after such a long delay was because it was the only certain means of making its position clear on their future following the contradictory statements in the ‘Programa 2000’ document. In one part of that document it was suggested that the current status of the enclaves ‘is difficult to sustain in the long term, and a start must be made now to prepare for the most appropriate solution’ (El País, 20 July 1988). It went on to propose as one possible solution ‘the creation, despite the difficulties, of conditions within Spain, and especially within the two enclaves, such that a future solution to the problem

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would involve the minimum possible trauma and cost’. This can only have referred to a negotiated settlement with Morocco over the enclaves, and while it might have gone down well in Rabat it would certainly not have been well received in either Ceuta or Melilla, let alone in the country at large: national opinion polls in the mid-1980s showed that while less than one quarter agreed that the enclaves should be handed to Morocco, over half supported their retention by Spain and about one quarter felt that the armed defence of the enclaves would be justified (Carabaza and de Santos, 1992, p. 294). However, this was not the only statement in the document about the future of Ceuta and Melilla. There was also a reference in the section on ‘Peace and Security’ to ‘the maintenance of the status of these two towns, offsetting diplomatic proposals which might put that status into question and providing military measures which would discourage any attempts to change it by force and which would be used to defend it should the need arise’. This second statement, which not only rejected any change to the status quo but even accepted its defence by military means, was much more in keeping with what the inhabitants of the enclaves – and of the rest of Spain, for that matter – wanted to hear, but the contradictory nature of the two comments understandably led to some confusion about the governing party’s position, and the actual statute proposals gave the Government the opportunity to put the record straight. Despite that, the AP and the CDS took full advantage of the opportunity to exploit the PSOE’s self-inflicted discomfort. The statements in the PSOE document and the draft statute proposals prompted some further discussion both in Spain and Morocco. A Moroccan minister, Ahmed Alaoui, picked up on the first of the statements in ‘Programa 2000’ to point out on 6 August in Le Matin du Sahara that for the first time the Spanish socialist and communist parties were in agreement that the ‘last vestiges of colonialism on the Mediterranean coast of Morocco should be eradicated’, and called for the opening of negotiations to find a peaceful political solution.

Slow progress Further progress on the passage of the draft statutes was tortuously slow. In January 1989, six months after the draft was published, the

The enclaves within the Spanish state: the autonomy statutes 43 CDS publicly criticized the Government for its failure to bring the proposals before Parliament, while on 20 February Manuel Fraga, the leader of the Alianza Popular (now renamed the Partido Popular), called on the Government to expedite the process. Groups representing the Muslim communities in the enclaves (Terra Omnium in Melilla and the Ceuta Muslim Association) took advantage of the delay to reject the proposals at the end of February on the grounds that they did not establish Arabic and Cherja as joint official languages in the enclaves. Still the Government delayed in moving the process forward, although some progress was made on 5 April when representatives of the Partido Popular, including the future Prime Minister José María Aznar, accepted a document from the Government with its latest proposals. In the run-up to the next general election in October 1989 other matters took priority and no further progress was made. During the election campaign, Aznar promised statutes for Ceuta and Melilla, but the Izquierda Unida (IU) was the only party to include the issue of the enclaves in its manifesto. The re-elected PSOE Government finally brought the proposals back for debate in April 1990. This time there was greater clarity about the status of the enclaves’ position and powers. The proposals, which were now called the ‘Autonomy Statute’, marked a change from earlier proposals when the word ‘autonomy’ had been studiously avoided. Its inclusion suggested that the Spanish Government was less concerned that the use of the term might provoke Rabat into raising the issue at the UN, since the Moroccan Government had already done so eighteen months earlier.6 However, what distinguished the proposals for the enclaves from the statutes for the Autonomous Communities in the rest of Spain was the fact that the enclaves would have an assembly of 25 elected councillor-representatives rather than a parliament, and a Governing Council with a president whose powers would be equivalent to those of a mayor of a municipality or the head of a province.

The question of powers It was thought that both main opposition parties, the PP and the CDS, would be supportive of the Government’s proposals, and that these would at long last find their way onto the statute book.

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However, it emerged at the end of May when the proposals went before the Senate that the CDS were still unhappy with the powers which were to be granted to the assemblies to be established in the enclaves. The CDS, supported in broad terms by the PP, were calling for nothing less than the full autonomous powers which other Autonomous Communities had obtained via Article 143 of the Spanish Constitution (the so-called ‘slow way’ or vía lenta). The PSOE accused the CDS of opportunism, and the Government minister responsible, Joaquín Almunia, stressed the importance of political consensus on the issue. In the enclaves themselves there were protests against the Government’s proposals which took the form of a two-hour general strike in Ceuta on 26 June, while two days later a further move in the Senate, this time by the PP, to push for full autonomy statutes for the enclaves was defeated amidst uproar and demonstrations in the public gallery. Following this failure the two enclaves set up pro-autonomy working groups to produce their own draft statutes. The issue received a boost when the PP and the centre-right ‘nationalist’ Unión del Pueblo Melillense (UPM) obtained a majority on the Melilla Council in the 1991 local elections. At a full council meeting on 28 June 1991, it was decided to take the process forward, and in September the Melilla PP opted for a further offensive to push for full autonomy statutes by organizing a march on Madrid. Just prior to the march taking place, the PP once more put forward a motion in Congress calling for full autonomy for the enclaves, but again this was defeated by the combined votes of the PSOE and the IU. The march (which was dubbed the ‘Blue March’ as a parallel to the ‘Green March’ when King Hassan ordered the occupation of Western Sahara in 1975) finally set off from the enclaves on 13 November. The 700 who set sail from Melilla at the Council’s expense met up with a contingent of 1,200 from Ceuta, where the independent group Progreso y Futuro de Ceuta (PFC), formed as a breakaway from the PSOE, was in power. Although there were a number of Muslims in these groups, other members of the Muslim community went to protest about racism and discrimination in the PP proposals (particularly the failure to include Arabic and Cherja as official languages), and all told some 5,000 people gathered in the Plaza de Oriente before marching to the Ministry for Local and Regional Government, where formal statements were handed in.

The enclaves within the Spanish state: the autonomy statutes 45 At the heart of the demands of the local leaders of the Partido Popular was the power to legislate for the enclaves, and it was this more than anything else which prevented the two main national parties from reaching an agreement. The enclaves’ argument was twofold: a statute with such powers would give them the same standing as other Autonomous Communities, and it would make the enclaves less vulnerable to the claims of Morocco by removing their quasi-colonial status. But the PSOE Government was willing to concede virtually all powers except for the power to legislate. For that reason, Ceuta and Melilla were once more excluded from the agreement which was finally reached on 1 February 1992 between the Government and the PP providing for the transfer of 32 additional competences to those ten Communities which had obtained their autonomy through Article 143 of the Constitution. The frustration felt in Ceuta was such that a general strike was called by the coordinating group Plataforma Autonómica for 12 May and was supported by all the principal bodies in the enclave except for the PSOE and the Muslim community. The Government’s objection to the PP proposals was that the powers they would give to the enclaves were too far-reaching. They would include competences over air space and territorial waters, the right to challenge decisions taken by the Ministry of Justice on applications for Spanish nationality and the right to authorize the acquisition of property by foreigners, all potentially contentious powers in the enclaves’ geopolitical context. The PSOE, which was looking to grant the enclaves a municipal charter with competences equivalent to those of a local council, argued that the PP proposals were unconstitutional. The socialists also objected to the restrictions on eligibility for suffrage and for election as a councillor in the enclaves, both of which were confined to Spanish citizens on the local electoral register. By March 1993, fifteen years after the establishment of the new Constitution, the Senate still found itself passing a motion calling on the political parties to restart negotiations in order to resolve the continuing impasse over the autonomy statutes for Ceuta and Melilla. Despite the long history of inaction, the PSOE, which was returned to power for a fourth term in the June 1993 general election but without an overall majority, had included a commitment in its manifesto on the statutes. At his investiture the Prime Minister

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made reference to the fact that ‘this Parliament will be the one which, after years of discussion and disagreement, makes it possible for the autonomous statutes for the towns of Ceuta and Melilla to be approved’ (Hernández Lafuente, 1995, p. 128), while on 29 September the Minister for Local and Regional Government, Jerónimo Saavedra, promised an agreement on the statutes ‘within a few months’, a statement which he repeated on 15 November and again on 14 December. It was clear that what had thus far been agreed between the Government and the PP was that in addition to the competences exercised by local councils, the enclaves would also enjoy those contained in Article 148.1 of the Constitution which refer to Autonomous Communities. However, the Government proposed an important distinction: the North African territories were to be called ‘autonomous towns’ rather than ‘Autonomous Communities’.

Cross-party agreement; reaction in the enclaves Eventually the PP stepped back from its earlier stance of calling for full autonomous status for the enclaves, and accepted the Government’s position. In the definitive proposals the two enclaves would obtain autonomous status but retain the competences of a town council under the Local Government Law. Certain financial arrangements would be similar to those of the Autonomous Communities and, as agreed by the Government six years earlier, the enclaves would be able to propose legislation to Parliament even though they would not have their own legislative powers. The formal acceptance of the proposals was scheduled for 6 July 1994, when a meeting was held in Madrid between Saavedra and representatives of both Councils. The Melilla Council, which was dominated by the PSOE and the PP, gave their backing to the proposed statutes, with their representatives arguing that the proposals did not go as far as they would have wished, but they were better than no statutes at all. However, to the Minister’s dismay, the representatives of the Council in Ceuta, in which the majority of members came from local parties under the umbrella organization Progreso y Futuro de Ceuta (PFC), reported that there the proposal had been rejected while those who supported it were branded as traitors.

The enclaves within the Spanish state: the autonomy statutes 47 The reason given by the ceutís was that they feared that without the status of an Autonomous Community they would be unprotected from Moroccan claims on their territory.7 They also argued that if they were an Autonomous Community they would have a voice in what they saw as the increasingly important European Council of the Regions, and they felt that such a voice would reinforce their position vis-à-vis Morocco. In neither case did they make clear how this would be so, and the Minister Saavedra found it difficult to fathom. His intention was to put the proposals before Parliament later in the year despite the reservations in Ceuta. As part of that process on 13 July the Council in Melilla gave its formal approval to the Government’s Bill with the PP and PSOE councillors voting in favour, the Grupo Nacionalista abstaining and the Grupo Mixto (formed by the Unión del Pueblo Melillense) voting against. The response in Ceuta was very different. Two days after the decision taken in Melilla, a meeting of the Ceuta Council committee responsible for the issue of autonomy recommended the postponement of the full Council meeting scheduled for 18 July, and called on the Council to hold a referendum on the statute proposals. When the full Council finally met on 14 September, it duly rejected the proposals. By that time the Government had moved things forward. Despite the stance taken in Ceuta, the Statute Bill for the enclaves went to the Cabinet for the first time on 5 August 1994. But although the Minister for Local and Regional Government had indicated on 6 July that the views of the ceutís would not be allowed to hold up the progress of the Bill, the Cabinet did not take a decision at its August meeting on the grounds that ‘the matter was not yet ripe’, according to the Minister for the Prime Minister’s office (El País, 6 August 1994). It was a rather strange reason for a government minister to give after nearly thirteen years of discussion and negotiation. It was also shortlived, for when the Cabinet met again on 2 September, it took the decision to send the Bill to Parliament before the end of the year. There was an angry reaction in Ceuta and a general strike was called for 6 October to protest against the proposals. The turnout was impressive: between 15,000 and 20,000 people (7,000 according to the police) took part in the demonstration, and commercial activity was brought to a standstill. At a rally in the town centre, with

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placards saying ‘For Us to be Equal, an Autonomous Community for Ceuta Now’, the mayor, Basilio Fernández, called on the Government to give the people of Ceuta the same status as those in the rest of Spain. In a statement handed to the civil governor’s office, the ceutís said that ‘we do not want the unusual title of autonomous town possibly to weaken our Spanishness in international organisations by making our town an exceptional case in relation to the rest of the State’ (El País, 7 October 1994). However, there was no sign that the Government was prepared to make any concessions on that front. The ceutís appropriately chose 6 December – Spanish Constitution Day – to follow up the general strike and rally by organizing a march of 2,500 people to Madrid via Jerez, Seville and Córdoba to protest against the Statute Bill (currently still going through Parliament) and to demand Autonomous Community status. A few days later they received support from the Izquierda Unida which was holding its fourth conference in Madrid. Both the Madrid and Navarra branches of the movement put forward resolutions calling for an end to what they called the ‘colonial status’ of the enclaves. While the Government and the other political parties could argue that the Spanish Constitution would in no way support such a contention, the IU’s case was based on the fact that Ceuta and Melilla ‘live in a colonial situation, not only for historical reasons, but also on account of the discrimination suffered by the people of Berber or Arabic origin, whose identity, culture and language are absent from the proposed autonomy statutes put forward by the PSOE and the PP’ (Hernández Lafuente, 1995, p. 128). Of course this was not an argument which the majority in Ceuta were using in their rejection of the proposed statutes, but it is certainly one which found resonance among the Muslim population in both enclaves, and one which (as indicated earlier in this chapter) they had used over the past decade ever since the Spanish Government first responded to the call for autonomy statutes for the enclaves. It was not surprising that it had been picked up by the political left as a stick with which to beat the establishment parties. When the statute proposals were debated in Congress on 27 December, therefore, an amendment on the language issue was put forward by the IU. However, it was an argument that was turned against the IU by one of the representatives of the PP, Francisco Antonio González, who recalled that in 1987 the PCE (the principal

The enclaves within the Spanish state: the autonomy statutes 49 partner in the IU coalition) had proposed the return of the enclaves to Morocco, and he suggested that some people would find disturbing the call for the languages used by the Muslim-Berber population in the enclaves to be accorded the same status as Spanish. This and other amendments were brushed aside by the combined forces of the two main parties, and it came as no surprise that finally the Autonomous Statutes for Ceuta and Melilla Bill went through the Spanish Lower House and on to the Senate, with the IU representatives the only ones to oppose the statute proposals. Despite an attempt by the IU to veto the proposals in the Senate, and with the rejection of further amendments on the language issue, the Senate Autonomies Committee passed the Bill on 15 February 1995 and the full Senate gave its approval seven days later with overwhelming support: 202 votes for, 2 against and 4 abstentions.

The autonomy map complete? The Spanish Parliament had finally taken the last step towards the establishment of autonomous statutes for all Spanish territory, as envisaged in the 1978 Constitution seventeen years earlier. The Secretary of State for Local and Regional Government, Francisco Peña, claimed that the autonomous map of Spain had now been definitively drawn (El País, 22 February 1995), and since the PSOE and the PP had agreed the proposals before their passage through Parliament, there was the guarantee that there would be no change of policy even if there were a change of government. There were those who voiced their concern that the national Parliament had gone ahead with its approval of the statutes despite the formal objections in Ceuta, but it was clear that after so many years delay and with agreement established between the two main parties, there was no mood to defer a decision any longer. The statutes as passed may not have satisfied all the aspirations of the inhabitants of the two enclaves – in particular the desire to obtain legislative powers – but nor were they likely to cause any permanent upset in Rabat, and it was clear that realpolitik required Moroccan concerns to carry greater weight in Madrid than those of the enclaves. The next and final step was for elections (scheduled for 28 May 1995) to be held under the new statutes, and for the new administrative bodies to be established.8

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Rabat reacts Reaction in Morocco was predictable. The passage of the autonomy statutes legislation in Spain coincided with the inauguration of the new Government in Rabat led by Abdelatif Filali, and as part of his first policy statement to the Moroccan Parliament on 5 March, he argued that the granting of autonomy to Ceuta and Melilla ‘constitutes a negative development which we consider to be invalid and harmful to Moroccan–Spanish relations’ (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 5 March 1995). However, with the forthcoming Euro–Mediterranean Partnership (a wide-ranging agreement between the EU and twelve southern and eastern Mediterranean states; see Chapter 5) due to be signed within a matter of months there was good reason why Morocco would have wanted to avoid making a great deal of the issue at this time. While official reaction in Morocco could have been anticipated, some unofficial reaction took a completely different and dangerous form. In early April two terrorist car bomb attacks occurred in Ceuta. The group claiming responsibility called itself the ‘21st August Organisation for the Liberation of Occupied Moroccan Territories’. The strange thing was that this group had been founded in 1973 but had disappeared after the so-called ‘Green March’ in 1975, and nothing had been heard of them since. According to messages sent to the Casablanca newspaper As Sharq el Ausat, as well as a letter which the group sent to the Spanish Embassy in Rabat on 17 April, it was the granting of the autonomy statutes that had caused them to restart their activity. There was even some speculation in Spain that the Moroccan secret service was turning a blind eye to the group’s activities in order to encourage Spain to open a dialogue with Morocco about the enclaves. In the event, however, it became clear that these bombings were nothing more than isolated acts of terrorism.

Response in the enclaves In the enclaves themselves the reaction to the granting of the statutes was predictably mixed. In Melilla, as had been the case since July 1994, the sense was that the statute as passed was the best that they could currently achieve. In Ceuta, however, the fight for full autonomous status continued, and on 28 April a petition of 20,000

The enclaves within the Spanish state: the autonomy statutes 51 signatures was presented to the Ombudsman calling on him to support their claim that the statutes were unconstitutional. However, despite support from all organizations in the enclave with the exception of the PSOE and the PP the claim was rejected. With the statutes established, and the flags of the two enclaves flying at the Senate for the first time from 26 September 1995, the next phase of the process was the installation of Joint Committees to agree the transfer of competences from the Government to the enclaves. The Committee for Ceuta which was set up in July started work in September, and although it was envisaged that some powers would be transferred before the end of the year, the whole process took almost two years. In March 1997 the enclaves took another step forward in the context of their new status when the Mayor and President of the Assembly in Melilla, Ignacio Velázquez, together with his counterpart in Ceuta, were invited for the first time to participate in the debate in the Senate on the state of the autonomous regions.9 However, it was not until September of that year, on the occasion of the 500th anniversary of Spanish possession of Melilla (see Chapter 1) that King Juan Carlos met the members of the Melilla Assembly in Madrid (and even then he only met the PP representatives, as the opposition members declined the royal invitation, arguing that the King should have visited Melilla to mark the occasion) (El País, 18 September 1997). Nevertheless, with this act the transformation of the enclaves from municipalities to autonomous towns was complete. Whether they had the political maturity to accompany their elevated status will be explored in the latter part of Chapter 3.

Conclusion As this chapter has demonstrated, the process of devolution offered by the 1978 Constitution was a very protracted one for Ceuta and Melilla. From the time that they remained as the only part of the national territory without autonomous status – and that was their position from February 1983, when the last of the 17 Autonomous Community statutes was granted – the inhabitants of the enclaves could justifiably claim some degree of discrimination vis-à-vis the rest of Spain. However, even after that long-drawn-out process was

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finally completed in 1995 the creation of the new category of ‘towns with autonomous status’ (as distinct from Autonomous Communities) still left the enclaves – Ceuta in particular – with the sense that they had not been treated equitably. The fact of the matter is that they were right, but for practical reasons10 as well as pragmatic ones in the context of relations with Morocco the Spanish Government had come to the conclusion that there was no other option. Through the compromise of a limited form of autonomy which excluded legislative powers, Madrid was able provisionally to mollify the Spaniards who lived in the enclaves without unduly upsetting Rabat. However, in the longer term the Spanish Government still left itself with two problems: how to satisfy the aspirations of the inhabitants of Ceuta and Melilla to achieve the same status for their territory as that enjoyed by the rest of the population, and how to reach an agreement on the future of the enclaves which would be acceptable to Morocco. Given the difficulties and the length of time that it took for the Spanish Government to grant the enclaves their status as autonomous towns, it is unlikely that in the foreseeable future they will acquire the same powers as other communities under the Spanish Constitution, and the enclaves can therefore continue to claim that they are discriminated against as the only Spanish citizens who are not part of an Autonomous Community. That may be true, although it would also be true to say that by comparison with other towns of comparable size elsewhere in Europe they have a good deal more autonomy than most. And yet comparison with other countries in Europe only serves to highlight the problem, because being part of Europe but not physically in Europe and therefore in a sensitive position vis-à-vis Morocco is also part of the explanation for the discrimination vis-à-vis other parts of Spain. Even if the inhabitants of Ceuta and Melilla accept all that, there is still a sense within the enclaves that they are not seen as equals either by the Spanish establishment or by other Autonomous Communities. This was tragically but aptly illustrated by an event in November 1997 when a faulty water tank above Melilla burst, sending 25,000 cubic metres of water into the town, killing nine people, injuring 41 and causing a considerable amount of property damage. The local Partido Popular, which had an absolute majority on the council and had also won all three parliamentary seats at the

The enclaves within the Spanish state: the autonomy statutes 53 1996 general election, felt as the ‘establishment’ party that on account of the tragedy the enclave was entitled to expect a visit from the leader of the PP who happened also to be the Prime Minister of the day. But not only did the Prime Minister not visit; according to the Regional Executive Committee of the PP, no-one visited the enclave on behalf of the Government or the national party organization to attend the funeral of the victims, none of the other Autonomous Communities had been in communication to express their condolences, and there had been no visit from any member of the royal family (El País, 26 November 1997). If the same tragedy had occurred in another part of Spain it is likely either that one or more of these visits or contacts would have occurred (if for no other reason than that access was more convenient), or, if not, the community concerned would not have felt the need to complain because it would not have suffered from the sense of neglect by the rest of Spain which is felt by the communities in the enclaves. The very fact that a visit to the enclaves for whatever reason by a member of the royal family would be considered too sensitive for Spanish–Moroccan relations adds to the communities’ sense of isolation. What this event illustrates is that the compromise solution to the autonomy question which was devised for the enclaves did not have the effect of making the inhabitants feel fully integrated into the Spanish nation, and the reason was because the rest of Spain did not, does not, and in some respects cannot treat them in the same way as it treats other parts of the country. It is not merely in respect of the autonomy issue that this is true – it is also evident, for example, in relation to the impact of the 1985 Immigration Law (Chapter 4) or the issue of illegal immigration (Chapter 5) – but there is no doubt that the autonomy statute provides a good deal of evidence to illustrate the point. Finally it also has to be said that while the granting of the status of autonomous towns has done little to improve the political standing of the enclaves – it can scarcely be said that since 1995 they have used their opportunities as wisely as they might have done (see Chapter 3) – the economic situation of the enclaves has also failed to improve significantly as a consequence of this administrative change which (it might have been hoped) could have provided greater confidence for investors. By 1998 the enclaves had an unemployment rate of 26.4 per cent, the third worst figure in the EU (Eurostat, quoted in

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M2 Presswire, 24 September 1998), and by 1999 a per capita income figure of 75 per cent and a standard of living of 72 per cent of the EU average (El País, 30 August 1999). Those figures could partly explain recent events in the local politics of the enclaves, which are analysed in the next chapter. Notes 1 For full details of the political process leading to the autonomy statutes for Ceuta and Melilla, see Hernández Lafuente, 1995. 2 For details of election results in the enclaves, see below, Chapter 3. 3 Fundación FIES, Cajas de Ahorros Confederadas, quoted in El País, 12 December 1993. By 1997 the per capita GDP figure in the enclaves had fallen to 76.27 per cent of the national average (only two regions were below that figure), and the disposable income figure had also fallen to 82.12 per cent of the national average (also the third lowest figure) (Anuario El País, 1999, p. 448). 4 With the addition of the resolution of the Sahara question, this position was endorsed by the 12th PCE Congress on 21 February 1988. 5 The draft proposals put forward in 1985 had also included the Spanish islands off the North African coast (see Introduction, n.1). The 1988 proposals omitted the islands and referred specifically to the municipalities of Ceuta and Melilla. As the islands have no civilian inhabitants and little economic value, they were no doubt seen as a potential bargaining tool in any future negotiations with Morocco. 6 The proposals did not arouse the Moroccan Government, but they certainly provoked hostile reaction from all of Morocco’s political parties. See El País, 26 April 1990. 7 One possible reason why the ceutís feel more vulnerable to Moroccan claims is because they are closer to Rabat and surrounded by people who take the same position as the Moroccan Government and the Royal Palace, whereas Melilla is located in the Rif, whose people are not only distanced from the Government in Rabat but in many respects are opposed to it (there is quite a strong separatist movement in the Rif). The divide within Morocco is borne out by the fact that King Hassan rarely visited the Rif, a neglect which his successor quickly tried to remedy with an eleven-day visit in October 1999. 8 The provisional situation between the passage of the legislation and the elections caused at least one awkward issue of protocol. The Council in Melilla complained to the Royal Household on 18 March 1995 about the fact that no-one from either enclave’s administration had been invited to the wedding of the King’s daughter. In response, a spokeswoman said that this was intentional, as the enclaves did not yet have an assembly president in place. 9 Ironically the invitation to Velázquez was issued just at the time when the legality of his position as Mayor-President had been challenged (see Chapter 3).

The enclaves within the Spanish state: the autonomy statutes 55 10 Population size had been given as one of the reasons for not granting the enclaves the same status as other regions. In 1997 Ceuta and Melilla accounted for 0.32 per cent of the population of Spain between them. The next smallest Autonomous Community, La Rioja, accounted for 0.67 per cent of the population (but was also one of the wealthiest on a per capita basis). At the other end of the scale, the largest of the Autonomous Communities, Andalucía, accounted for 18.32 per cent of the population (Anuario El País, 1999, p. 446).

THREE

THE EVOLVING POLITICAL LANDSCAPE IN THE ENCLAVES When two leaders of locally based parties in Ceuta and Melilla, Vicente Bonache and José González Orell, visited Gibraltar in July 1985 and had talks with the Chief Minister, Sir Joshua Hassan, and the leader of the opposition, Joe Bossano, they were struck both by the considerable degree of autonomy enjoyed by the British colony and also by the strong sense of Gibraltarian identity, the equivalent of which, they admitted, was lacking in their own territories. They found that the vast majority of Gibraltarians felt themselves to be Gibraltarian first and British second, whereas the residents of the two North African enclaves considered themselves to be Spaniards first and ceutís or melillenses second. This was no doubt a reflection of a growing preoccupation in the enclaves with maintaining Hispanic hegemony in the face of an increasingly assertive non-Spanish community (see Chapter 4), and it is possible that Gibraltarians would have felt differently if an increasing number of Spaniards had become a significant part of the population of the Rock. But it is equally possible that sixteen years of blockade by Spain (1969–85) had forged a much stronger collective identity within the population of Gibraltar than was the case in the North African enclaves.

Elections: 1977–94 This identification with Spain translated itself in political terms within the enclaves into the predominance of support for mainstream parties in national elections held in the years since the transition to democracy (for the performance of the two main parties

The evolving political landscape in the enclaves 57 in the enclaves in national elections, see Table 3.1). In the Constituent Assembly elections in 1977, the main support in both enclaves went to the UCD, the centre-right coalition created to provide an acceptable vehicle for the transition, although in Ceuta the PSOE was less than 4 per cent behind the UCD (Figure 3.1), compared to 29.2 per cent behind in Melilla (Figure 3.2). After some vigorous debate in the new national Parliament the 1978 Constitution was generous to the enclaves, granting to each of them one representative (diputado) in the Lower House and two senators for the Upper House of the national Parliament.1 In the general elections held in 1979, voting in the enclaves again followed the national trend, in the sense that the winning party nationally also won in Ceuta and Melilla, with just over 50 per cent support going to the UCD in each town (significantly higher than the national figure of 35 per cent) with an increased share of the vote over the PSOE in both towns (a majority of 16.6 per cent in Ceuta and 30.3 per cent in Melilla) (Figures 3.1 and 3.2). In the municipal elections in 1979, however, the picture was different in the two enclaves (for the number of seats won by all parties in the local elections, see Table 3.2). While in Melilla the UCD won an outright majority with 14 of the 25 seats, the largest party in Ceuta was the Agrupación Electoral Ceutí (AEC) – a coalition of a number of smaller, local parties – with 12 seats, and they controlled the council with the support of the UCD with 8 seats. In both enclaves the PSOE took 5 seats, a proportion which was below its standing at national level (Figures 3.3 and 3.4). In 1981 the UCD published its autonomy plan for the enclaves, but within a year support for the party had evaporated at national level, and the PSOE won its first term in office in the general election of 1982. As in the previous general election voting in the enclaves went with the national trend in a number of respects: a significant swing to the left, the election in both cases of PSOE representatives – or their local equivalent in Melilla, the Partido Socialista de MelillaPSOE (PSM-PSOE) – to the Congress with 45–50 per cent of the vote plus two PSOE senators for each enclave, the rise of the Alianza Popular (AP) (the centre-right coalition) and the demise of the UCD (Figures 3.1 and 3.2). In the local elections the following year the outcome was again a reflection of the national scene, with PSOE winning 12 seats in Ceuta (the AEC had also disappeared) and an

Table 3.1 National election results in Ceuta and Melilla for main parties Year

1977 1979 1982 1986 1987E 1989E 1989 1993 1994E 1996 1999E 2000

% of vote for PSOE

% of vote for Centre-Right party

Turnout (%)

Ceuta

Melilla

National

Ceuta

Melilla

National

Ceuta

Melilla

National

32.56 35.50 45.75 45.49 45.60 39.91 37.52 40.58 30.81 35.79 29.04 17.76

27.37 21.48 49.35 36.18 46.27 42.21 41.83 48.79 41.44 43.32 38.49 20.01

29.27 30.49 48.40 44.35 39.44 39.66 39.56 38.78 30.79 37.63 35.27 34.08

36.36 52.14 30.01 36.55 34.17 32.64 34.36 50.93 60.27 53.21 62.04 47.71

56.59 51.75 26.62 46.62 36.55 29.47 39.49 44.92 49.02 50.57 51.42 50.00

34.62 (1) 35.02 (1) 26.18 (2) 26.15 (2) 24.89 (2) 21.45 (3) 25.84 (3) 34.76 (3) 40.12 (3) 38.79 (3) 39.73 (3) 44.54 (3)

77.6 65.43 72.29 56.70 55.91 39.77 56.10 63.30 40.44 63.81 57.30 56.18

82.49 60.68 70.50 59.98 63.06 39.69 58.09 68.17 45.12 61.95 51.40 55.90

79.10 68.30 79.85 70.36 68.95 54.60 69.92 77.14 59.10 77.38 63.10 69.98

Source: Compiled from Anuario El País (various years) and El País (various editions); España en cifras 1999 (INE); http://www.europarl.es Key: E = European Parliament elections (1) = Unión del Centro Democrático (UCD) (2) = Alianza Popular (AP) (3) = Partido Popular (PP)

The evolving political landscape in the enclaves 59 100

90

80

70

60

PSOE CENTRE-RIGHT MAIN PARTIES TOTAL

50

40

30

20

10

0 1977

1979

1982

1986

1989

1993

1996

2000

Figure 3.1: Percentage vote of main parties: Ceuta, general elections 1977–2000 100

90

80

70

60

PSOE CENTRE-RIGHT MAIN PARTIES TOTAL

50

40

30

20

10

0 1977

1979

1982

1986

1989

1993

1996

2000

Figure 3.2: Percentage vote of main parties: Melilla, general elections 1977–2000

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outright majority in Melilla with 14 seats, while in both towns the AP were in second place (Figures 3.3 and 3.4). All parties in the election were in agreement in calling for full autonomous status for the enclaves. In the general elections held in June 1986 the two enclaves diverged in their political allegiance for the first time since the transition to democracy. Felipe González’s Government was returned to power for a second term, but in Melilla it came as no surprise that following the disturbances between the Muslim and Christian communities (see Chapter 4) there was a substantial swing against the Government party (support fell from 49 per cent to 36 per cent), and the two seats for the Senate and one for the Congress all went to candidates of the Alianza Popular on 46 per cent of the vote (up from 26 per cent in 1982) (Figure 3.2). Here the Government of Felipe González was paying the price for its support (albeit belated) for the Muslim community, although in Ceuta where there had been no such civil conflict all three elected candidates were from the PSOE on a percentage of the vote almost identical to that of 1982 (Figure 3.1). 18

16

14

12

10 PSOE CENTRE-RIGHT OTHERS

8

6

4

2

0 1979

1983

1987

1991

Figure 3.3: Ceuta local elections: seats won 1979–1999

1995

1999

Table 3.2 Council/assembly seats won in local elections in Ceuta and Melilla since 1979 Year

Town

Seats obtained PSOE

1979 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999

Ceuta

1979 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999

Melilla

UCD/ AEC AP/ PP

5 12 8 3 3 2

8 7 6 6 9 8

5 14 13 11 5 2

14 6 8 12 14 5

CDS

PDL

PNC

2 2 1

2

2

CeU PSPC UPM PFC PDSC

CM

GIL

PIM

Others

12 6 2 4

3 2 2

11 6

1 3

12 6

5 3 2 2 3

1

4 5

7

3

Source: Compiled from Hernández Lafuente, 1995 and El País (various editions) Key: PSOE Partido Socialista Obrero Español UCD/AP/PP Unión del Centro Democrático/Alianza Popular/ Partido Popular AEC Agrupación Electoral Ceutí CDS Centro Democrático Social PDL Partido Demócrata Liberal PNC Partido Nacionalista de Ceuta

CeU PSPC UPM PFC PDSC CM GIL PIM

Ceuta Unida Partido Socialista del Pueblo de Ceuta Unión del Pueblo Melillense Progreso y Futuro de Ceuta Partido Democrático y Social de Ceuta Coalición por Melilla Grupo Independiente Liberal Partido Independiente de Melilla

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Following the outcome of the 1986 elections, leading figures in the PSOE in Melilla were even more concerned that the disturbances would lead to a backlash move to the right in the municipal election of June 1987. For that reason the Organizing Secretary of the party, José María Benegas, went to the enclave at the end of May to declare that the future statute for Melilla would stress the Spanishness of the town, which he said was non-negotiable. He also indicated that the other two planks of PSOE policy for the enclave were to improve the infrastructure and to restore normality between the two communities. The main difference between the six parties presenting candidates in the 1987 municipal election – the PSOE (defending 14 seats), Alianza Popular (six), Unión del Pueblo Melillense (five), plus the Centro Democrático Social (CDS), Partido Progresista Liberal de Melilla (PPLM) and the right-wing Partido Nacionalista Español de Melilla (PNEM) – was that only the PSOE rejected the idea of autonomous community status for the enclave (in line with national Government policy), supporting instead self-government but without a legislative assembly or high court (see Chapter 2). Only the PPLM had Muslim candidates in its list, but in the event the PSOE managed to retain its overall majority with 13 seats (one fewer than four years earlier) while the Alianza Popular gained two and remained the second largest party (Figure 3.4). In Ceuta, where feelings ran higher about the autonomy statutes, the distribution of seats was more fragmented. The PSOE remained the largest party with eight seats, having lost four, and kept the post of mayor. The AP remained in equal second place with six seats (down one), together with a local party, Ceuta Unida (CeU) (Figure 3.3). Coinciding with the municipal election in June 1987 were the first Spanish elections to the European Parliament. These were not European-wide, but held to enable Spain to enjoy representation at the earliest opportunity following entry into the EC, and those elected sat for two years. The national turnout at nearly 70 per cent was a reflection of the nation’s satisfaction at becoming a member of the Community some 25 years after first seeking to join. The turnout in the enclaves, especially in Ceuta, was markedly lower than the national figure, although higher than was to be the case in any subsequent European elections (Figure 3.5). The balance of support in favour of the PSOE reflected the national picture, although the

The evolving political landscape in the enclaves 63 20

18

16

14

12 PSOE CENTRE-RIGHT OTHERS

10

8

6

4

2

0 1979

1983

1987

1991

1995

1999

Figure 3.4: Melilla local elections: seats won 1979–1999

90

80

70

% Turnout

60

50 CEUTA MELILLA NATIONAL

40

30

20

10

0 1977

1979

1982

1986

1987E

1989 1989E 1993 Year (E = European Elections)

1994E

1996

1999E

2000

Figure 3.5: Percentage turnout in general and European elections: Ceuta, Melilla and national 1977–2000

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PSOE share of the vote in the enclaves was some six percentage points higher than the national figure. The Alianza Popular share was about ten percentage points higher than the figure for the country as a whole (Figure 3.6). The European-wide elections for the European Parliament were held two years later in June 1989. Disillusionment with its powers had quickly set in, for on a low national turnout (54.6 per cent) and an even lower turnout in the enclaves (just under 40 per cent), the PSOE won 40.2 per cent of the vote and the Partido Popular (the definitive name of the main centre-right party) 21.7 per cent (compared to the figures in the enclaves of 41 per cent and 31 per cent respectively) (Figures 3.5 and 3.6). These elections served as an opportunity for the Government to see whether it would be worth taking the risk of an early general election, and clearly the result gave them sufficient encouragement to go to the country in October 1989. However, the PSOE majority was all but wiped out when they obtained 176 of the 350 seats in Congress (an overall majority of two), including the two seats in the enclaves. The result in both towns was close (a PSOE majority of 3.3 per cent in Ceuta and 2.3 per 70

60

50

40

CEUTA: PSOE CEUTA: CENTRE-RIGHT MELILLA: PSOE MELILLA: CENTRE-RIGHT NATIONAL: PSOE NATIONAL: CENTRE-RIGHT

30

20

10

0 1987

1989

1994

1999

Figure 3.6: Percentage vote of main parties in European elections: Ceuta, Melilla and national 1987–1999

The evolving political landscape in the enclaves 65 cent in Melilla) (Figures 3.1 and 3.2). However, the Partido Popular appealed for a re-run of the election in Melilla because of electoral irregularities and the Constitutional Court allowed the appeal. In the original ballot, the PSOE won in Melilla with 41.2 per cent of the votes. However, although the PSOE share of the vote fell only marginally to 38.2 per cent in the re-run on 25 March 1990, the Partido Popular candidate Jorge Hernández improved his share from 38.9 per cent to 55.9 per cent, mainly by taking anti-PSOE votes from the two other main parties, the centre CDS and the right-wing Partido Nacionalista Español de Melilla (PNEM). It would appear that between the first poll and the second the Muslim vote had stayed with the PSOE while the non-Muslim vote had swung behind the PP candidate, who had made an autonomy statute for Melilla his main commitment. As a consequence the PSOE’s overall majority in Congress had disappeared, as they now had exactly 50 per cent of the seats. Although some argued that the so-called Juan Guerra affair (concerning whether the Deputy Prime Minister, Alfonso Guerra, was involved in his brother’s dubious financial dealings) was responsible for the PSOE’s change of fortunes during the five-month interval between the original election and the re-run in the enclave, it was also possible to interpret the PP victory as an indictment of the González Government’s failure to resolve the autonomy statutes issue, and with the voters of Melilla having a second chance many voted tactically to defeat the Government candidate.2 In the process they succeeded in having a significant influence on the overall outcome of the general election. Prior to the local elections of 1991, the two main Muslim organizations in Ceuta – the Asociación Musulmana Ceutí (AMC) and the Comunidad Musulmana de Ceuta (CMC) – considered the possibility of putting forward their own candidates. This had first been tried in 1983 but failure had dissuaded them from trying again in 1987. However, there was a much greater chance of success in 1991 thanks to the greater number of people in the Muslim community who, having obtained Spanish nationality, were eligible to vote, and in December 1990 the leader of the CMC, Ahmed Subaire, announced the formation of a new party, the Iniciativa por Ceuta (although in the event they were again unsuccessful).3 If the established parties were concerned about the effect of this move on their support, they largely had themselves to blame for not

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including members of the Muslim community in their own lists of candidates. In those local elections the outcomes in the two enclaves were quite distinctive. Once again in Melilla the majority of the seats (23 of the 25) were won by the two main national parties. This time, however, the PP was the largest party with 12 – one short of an overall majority – while the PSOE took 11 (Figure 3.4). By contrast in Ceuta the two main parties held only nine seats between them (PP six, PSOE three), with the PSOE having lost five, with fewer than half the votes it received in 1987. This poor showing by the PSOE in Ceuta was certainly due in part to the fact that the former mayor, Francisco Friaz Armada, stood as an independent candidate for mayor and split the party’s vote. Power in Ceuta now resided in the hands of a coalition of Progreso y Futuro de Ceuta (PFC) with 11 seats and Ceuta Unida (CeU) with two seats (down four from 1987) (Figure 3.3). When the general election was called for 6 June 1993, the socialists in Melilla included a candidate of Muslim origin for the first time. Mimona Mohamed Haddu, standing for the Senate, failed to obtain the seat by only 300 votes, although the PSOE did succeed in winning the other Senate seat as well as the only seat for Congress. There was no doubt that the strength of the PSOE vote was due to the support from the Muslim community, for this result reversed the result of the re-run election of 1990 despite the fact that nationally the PP made significant gains in both chambers of Parliament (Figure 3.2). In Ceuta, by contrast, there was a move away from the PSOE and both Senate seats as well as the Congress seat went to the Partido Popular (Figure 3.1). Given the more farreaching autonomy stance by the PP together with the more radical position in Ceuta towards the autonomy issue and the national swing towards the PP, this success by the right was always likely. In the European Parliament elections of June 1994 the swing towards the PP continued. Nationally the PP gained 40.1 per cent of the vote while the PSOE share fell to 30.8 per cent. This compared with contrasting figures in the enclaves: in Ceuta there was even stronger support for the PP (60.2 per cent), against 30.8 per cent for the PSOE, while in Melilla the figures were 49 per cent and 41.4 per cent respectively (Figure 3.6). The strength of the support for the PP in Ceuta can be attributed to the party’s stance on the autonomy statutes (see Chapter 2), while the combined vote of over 90 per cent for the two main parties in both enclaves was higher than anywhere

The evolving political landscape in the enclaves 67 else in the country (albeit on a turnout of only 42.7 per cent). This would suggest a marked preference felt in the enclaves (among those who bothered to vote) for representation at European level by parties which are strong at national level, although this was also a trend discernible across the country (support for the two main Spanish parties in European Parliament elections had gone up from 62 per cent in 1989 to 70.9 per cent in 1994).

Elections in the autonomous towns The passing of the autonomy statutes in February 1995 had a significant effect on the outcome of the local elections held on 28 May that year. As Chapter 2 has shown, the responses to the statutes in the two enclaves were very different, and this was reflected in the vote to establish the new autonomous bodies. In Ceuta, where there had been strong objections to the statutes, the PSOE fared no better than it had done in 1991 and came away with only three seats, while the PP made three gains on their 1991 showing of six seats (Figure 3.3). However, this was less than they might have expected, especially given the national swing to the PP, if they had not backed down from their original call for full autonomy for the enclaves. The party with the most seats four years earlier, Progreso y Futuro de Ceuta (PFC), held only six seats while losing five, but its coalition partner, CeU, gained two and ended with four. Two other minor parties gained representation: the Partido Socialista del Pueblo de Ceuta (PSPC) won two seats (no change), while more significantly Mustafa Mizzian Ammar of the Muslim-backed Partido Democrático y Social de Ceuta (PDSC) became the first Muslim elected in the enclave. Initially Basilio Fernández of the PFC became the new MayorPresident, with the support of the PSOE and the CeU. However, three weeks into the administration one of the PFC representatives left the group and became an Independent, leaving Fernández leading a minority administration until July 1996, when Jesús Fortes of the PP became the new Council-Assembly leader.4 In Melilla the trends were similar. The PP won 14 seats (a gain of two), which gave it an outright majority, while dissatisfaction with the autonomy statutes resulted in the loss by the PSOE of six seats, leaving them with only five (Figure 3.4). The Unión del Pueblo

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Melillense (UPM), the centre-right ‘nationalist’ party which had previously given its support to the PP, retained two seats but no longer held a pivotal role. The main beneficiary of the losses suffered by the PSOE was the Coalición por Melilla (CM), a breakaway group of the PSOE itself but representing the interests of the Muslim community, which came away with four seats. The previous Mayor, Ignacio Velázquez, retained that post and also became the President of the new Assembly.5 However, later in his term he was deposed following a challenge to his leadership, although the process was far from straightforward. On 1 March 1997 two PP representatives alleging financial irregularities by the Velázquez administration formed a new party (the Partido Independiente por Melilla – PIM) and crossed to the opposition, causing the PP temporarily to lose its majority (one of the dissidents, Abdelmalik Tahar, later resigned and was replaced by another representative from the PP list, thus restoring the majority). An attempt was made by the other PIM representative, Enrique Palacios, to overthrow the President through a censure motion and to take over the office himself. But the process was suspended by Velázquez and referred to the Government in Madrid, which supported his action on the grounds of irregularities in the Assembly procedures (see El País, 5 and 6 March 1997). In December 1997 the Supreme Court in Andalucía ruled that Velázquez had acted improperly in suspending the censure vote and that a full meeting of the Assembly should be called in order that a vote of censure could be taken (El País, 28 December 1997). It was also alleged in December that Tahar had been bribed by Velázquez and his supporters to resign and to move to Tenerife, and proceedings were started against those involved. When the motion of censure took place on 28 February 1998, almost exactly a year after it had first been put, Palacios won on the strength of his own vote and immediately became the new President (backed by the coalition of the PIM, PSOE, CM and UPM). Two weeks later the courts were once more involved when Velázquez was denied the opportunity by his rival of presenting a counter censure motion. When, at the insistence of the courts, the censure motion was eventually put by Velázquez on 14 February 1999, Palacios survived since his opponent could only muster 12 votes. Meanwhile Palacios had brought proceedings against Ignacio Velázquez in July 1998, accusing him of using 200 million pesetas

The evolving political landscape in the enclaves 69 (US$1.3 million) of public funds for building materials for Muslim voters in the local elections in 1995. It was alleged that as a result the PP had been able to gain an outright majority and Velázquez had become Mayor and first President of the autonomous Assembly. Such goings-on scarcely did anything to enhance the reputation of politicians in the enclaves in their first term of office following the establishment of their autonomous status, although events following the 1999 local elections were to cause these activities to appear dignified by comparison (see below). However, the most significant change arising from the elections in May 1995 was the appearance for the first time of a party representing the Muslim community as a political force. Despite capturing less than one quarter of the Assembly seats, the success of the Coalición por Melilla marked a watershed in the politics of the enclaves. It was a step in the advance of the Muslim community which has been described as ‘the slow march of the tortoise’ (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 27 July 1997), having begun some ten years earlier (see Chapter 4). During the general election campaign in 1996 the leader of the Partido Popular, José María Aznar, did something which the Prime Minister for the previous 13 years, Felipe González, had never done: he went campaigning in Ceuta and Melilla. As the trend across Spain went in the PP’s favour – as the largest party they were able to form a government through legislative agreements with nationalists from the Autonomous Communities – it may be that the PP candidates in the enclaves would have won without the visit, but it can certainly have done no harm, for the PP had a clean sweep of both diputados and senators in both enclaves. Given the more radical attitude to the autonomy issue in Ceuta, it was not surprising that the PP’s winning margin there for the Congress was much greater (17 per cent) than in Melilla (7 per cent) (Figures 3.1 and 3.2). Aznar also promised to return to visit the enclaves as Prime Minister, but it took a political crisis in the enclaves and the prospect of the next general election before he finally did so.

The GIL phenomenon After the fiasco concerning the post of Assembly President which rumbled on in local politics in Melilla through 1997 and 1998, the

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Government in Madrid must have hoped for a return to something resembling normality in local government in the enclaves after the court had given its ruling. But they were to be hugely disappointed, owing to the arrival of the GIL phenomenon. Jesús Gil y Gil, a furniture mogul who gained a fortune on the back of the construction boom in the late 1980s, became Mayor of Marbella in 1991 through a direct, populist approach to issues such as street crime and prostitution, with anti-immigrant overtones. Early in 1992 he registered his new political party, the Grupo Independiente Liberal (GIL) – the name was a personality cult of the first order – with the Interior Ministry, and by September, without having indicated any intention to stand for Parliament at this stage, he was gaining 1.5 per cent support in national opinion polls (see Celaya, 1993, p. 317), such was his fame and notoriety which was boosted by his chairmanship of Atlético Madrid football club. However, he also gained a reputation for dubious building tenders and financial dealings (including the alleged channelling of municipal funds into the coffers of his football team). By November 1998 he was facing 80 legal challenges to his business activities, and in January 1999 he was briefly imprisoned pending trial for fraud and embezzlement of 450 million pesetas (US$3 million), although later released on bail (ostensibly on health grounds). That did not deter him from pursuing his political ambitions. Earlier in 1998 he founded an association aimed at turning Ceuta and Melilla into a North African Hong Kong, and opened offices of the GIL in both enclaves with the intention of presenting a full slate of candidates there (and in a number of municipalities in Andalucía) in the local elections in June 1999. The attraction for Jesús Gil of gaining power in the enclaves (and it was evident that he would be the ‘power behind the throne’ from his Marbella power-base) was that, unlike Marbella, their status as autonomous towns gave the local administration untrammelled power in certain domains, such as town planning (of great interest to a man involved in the construction industry),6 control of the free port (one of the main areas of commercial activity, for which the local Assembly President appoints the port authority), and the establishment of casinos and other gambling centres, not to mention setting the price of tobacco and petrol. The attraction for the electorate was Gil’s entrepreneurship combined with an authoritarian populism, which appealed to those

The evolving political landscape in the enclaves 71 who were disillusioned with the existing political parties and especially to those who yearned after the more autocratic days of General Franco (a man for whom Gil had a certain liking, since the former dictator had pardoned him from a five-year prison sentence for criminal negligence in the 1960s). The formula of the GIL programme for the enclaves was to promise to attack organized crime, prostitution and drug-trafficking, as well as to inject large sums of money into the local economies through major property contracts, including hotels, housing, a hospital, a university and a new airport. The formula evidently worked, for the GIL party won 12 seats in Ceuta (one short of an overall majority), the main losers being the smaller parties (the PFC, CeU and PSPC) who lost 12 of their seats between them, while the PP and the PSOE both lost one each (Figure 3.3). The Muslim PDSC won three seats (up two on 1995 and one more than the PSOE) and increased its share of the vote threefold. The GIL party also enjoyed success in Melilla, where it took seven seats, while the smaller parties all made gains: the Muslim-backed Coalición por Melilla (CM) won five (a gain of one), the Unión del Pueblo Melillense won three (up one) and the Partido Independiente de Melilla (PIM), which had been formed by the breakaway President, Enrique Palacios, won three. These gains were all at the expense of the PP (down from 14 to five) and the PSOE (down from five to two) (Figure 3.4). This left the CM (with the same number of seats as the PP but with a higher percentage of the vote) as the largest party after the GIL and entitled to seek partners to form a coalition. However, on 14 June, just one day after the elections, the whole process was stopped in its tracks when the Chief Anti-Fraud Prosecutor in Madrid issued a report against Jesús Gil, in which he called for a sentence of 34 years and a fine of over 2,000 million pesetas (US$13 million) on charges of falsification of documents, insider dealing, corruption and misappropriation of funds dating back to activities in the early 1990s.7 Later in the month there were allegations that Gil had connived with a senior judge and her family in Marbella to launder money for the Mafia, allegations which led to the dismissal of the judge seven months later. The two main national parties were determined to prevent the GIL from taking control in either enclave for a number of reasons, not the

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least of which was the fact that the GIL programme indicated that they would seek legislative powers for the autonomous towns (over which there had been such prolonged debate during the passage of the statute proposals). This would not only put the GIL in direct confrontation with the Government, but more significantly run the risk of causing further problems over the enclaves between Madrid and Rabat. Therefore in an unprecedented move the headquarters of the PSOE and the PP agreed to collaborate over a ‘stop-the-GIL’ campaign, not only in the enclaves but also in nine other municipalities in southern Spain where GIL candidates had stood.8 What the national leadership of the PSOE did not realize was the strength of anti-PP feeling among party activists in the enclaves who could not contemplate the idea of working with or supporting the PP, no matter what the motive. This not only led to countless resignations among party members but – what was far worse – crisis and chaos in the Assemblies in both Ceuta and Melilla.

‘Stop-the-GIL’ in Melilla In Melilla the members of the local PSOE were reluctant to help put Ignacio Velázquez of the PP back in power as President, so the two parties at national level agreed a compromise whereby both the PSOE and the PP representatives would vote for the leader of the UPM, Juan José Imbroda. This would have produced a coalition with a majority of three. Much to everyone’s surprise, at the investiture ceremony on 3 July the two PSOE members voted not for Imbroda but for Mustafá Aberchán, the leader of the CM, for President. This would not in itself have been that significant, were it not for the fact that Aberchán had surprisingly also received support from the seven GIL representatives, thus giving the CM leader a majority of three and providing the enclave with a Muslim leader for the first time. The GIL no doubt saw such a move as the best way of exercising some influence over the government of Melilla, having withdrawn their own candidate once they had recognized that it would be impossible for him to gain sufficient support to win. The two PSOE rebels, Román Dobaños and Malika Mohamed, had voted for the CM leader because they could not bring themselves to vote with the PP. They submitted their resignations and were

The evolving political landscape in the enclaves 73 suspended from the party. Meanwhile the PSOE in Madrid expressed the hope that Aberchán would form a coalition of all parties except the GIL. However, although he insisted that there had been no pact between the CM and the GIL, Aberchán was reluctant to exclude them from his administration, despite the fact that the two parties had little in common politically. Significantly the PP itself had declined to be involved in a pact in which Aberchán was Assembly leader. The reason given by a spokesman in Madrid was that it was important for a town in Melilla’s position, where Spanish foreign policy was involved, ‘to be governed by one of the national parties which defend the general interests of Spain’ and not by ‘small parties representing particular interests’ (El País, 6 July 1999). However, this was somewhat at odds with the compromise pact in which the PP and the PSOE representatives were to have supported the candidature for President of the leader of the UPM (which was hardly a ‘national party’). This suggests that the PP did not want to be seen to be supporting a Muslim President in Melilla for fear of upsetting its core supporters in the enclave. There was talk of a possible motion of censure being brought against the new President under a new law on local pacts passed by Parliament in March 1999 designed to avoid a repetition of the delays in Melilla involving Velázquez and Palacios, although there were reservations about doing so on the part of the national parties in case of a backlash, especially from within the Muslim community, since a successful censure motion would result in the removal of the town’s first Muslim leader. However, when the CM and the GIL went ahead and formed a minority administration including four independents on 19 July, all four opposition parties (despite their different philosophies) agreed to form a Standing Committee which would coordinate their opposition and in due course consider proposing a censure motion. Such a move was not long in coming, and on 23 July the PP in Madrid gave notice that a motion of censure would be put three days later. This upset the PSOE whose two votes would be essential to win the motion of censure but who initially were not consulted about it (the reason given was that the representatives who were to replace the two who had been expelled had not yet been sworn in, but there was no doubt also a sense of annoyance on the part of the other parties that it was PSOE people who had caused the problem in the first place).

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The saga continued when one of the two PSOE representatives who had resigned, Malika Mohamed, decided to withdraw her resignation. The President was minded to accept the withdrawal, in which case she would join the Grupo Mixto (i.e. become an Independent) and would support the CM-GIL in any censure motion (thus giving them a majority). The opposition took the issue to the Central Electoral Committee in Madrid, which gave its judgment on 10 August that the withdrawal of the resignation was invalid because Malika Mohamed had formally resigned at a meeting of the Assembly Management Committee. Significantly, the judgment handed down by the Central Electoral Committee hinged on whether Melilla was viewed as an autonomous town or a municipal council, since the Standing Orders of the Assembly state that ‘the status of local representative is lost through resignation made before the [Assembly] Management Committee’ (El País, 11 August 1999). For the purposes of this exercise, however, the President, Mustafá Aberchán, preferred to treat Melilla as a municipal council, where according to Municipal Council Standing Orders resignations have to be made before the full council. Aberchán therefore rejected the judgement, issued a statement recognizing that Malika Mohamed was now an Independent (who would support his administration), and called a full Assembly meeting for 13 August in order to formalize his acceptance of Mohamed’s withdrawal of her resignation. This action prompted the Prosecutor for the Provincial Court of Málaga to institute proceedings against Aberchán on 12 August on the grounds of a failure of public duty and unreasonable conduct. Not surprisingly Aberchán was accused by the opposition parties of downgrading the status of the town to suit his own purposes, since acceptance of the Electoral Committee judgement would have meant that the PSOE could replace both of its representatives who had resigned and so bring forward and win the motion of censure. It was the ambivalent status of the enclaves as both municipal councils and autonomous towns which had allowed the latest twist in the political crisis in Melilla to occur. It could not have happened anywhere in mainland Spain in this way. On 13 August, to the relief of almost all concerned, Aberchán decided to postpone the meeting scheduled for that day. In all probability he did so because he did not want to run the risk of further

The evolving political landscape in the enclaves 75 legal difficulties for himself, but he claimed that it was in order to await further legal judgements, of which there were several pending, including one by the central Government requiring him to observe the ruling of the Electoral Committee. It still left the PSOE with neither of its representatives (about one of whom, Javier de Pro, there was no argument) having yet taken his seat. When a full Assembly meeting was held on 17 August Javier de Pro was still unable to be sworn in because the Assembly voted against recognizing the meeting as urgent, as required by the standing orders. Realizing that the situation was getting out of hand, and in particular that he had not done himself any favours by taking on the central Government, on the following day Aberchán announced his intention to abandon his support for Malika Mohamed, allow the PSOE representatives to take their seats and to end the coalition with the GIL (thereby avoiding a censure motion). There was initially some confusion among the other parties as to whether they would include Aberchán and the other CM representatives in negotiations about the next administration, or whether they would revert back to the original plan of a coalition between the PP, the PSOE, the UPM and the PIM, excluding the Muslim party. However, the PP and the PSOE, somewhat presumptuously, rapidly decided to include the CM in order to guarantee a majority in the event of any defections to the GIL, especially as Enrique Palacios, the leader of the PIM (having defected from the PP and become President of the previous administration) indicated that he was prepared to discuss collaboration with the GIL. There were also reasons concerned with the maintenance of good community relations for keeping the Muslim-backed party on board. The two national parties were uncertain about what role to offer Aberchán, but that and all their other machinations assumed that he was prepared to resign as President, and he gave no indication at all that he was willing to do so. On 20 August the two PSOE representatives were finally sworn in at a special full Assembly meeting. Immediately beforehand, Aberchán had issued a decree removing the GIL members from their executive positions. At that stage the other parties were determined that Aberchán should resign and they all threatened him with a motion of censure on 23 August if he did not do so. However, the censure motion was not put because the PSOE had a change of heart, having decided

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that they would not vote against Aberchán (who, they argued, had kept his side of the ‘bargain’ by removing the GIL from the administration) but instead aim for a coalition of all parties excluding the GIL. The PP and the UPM suspected that the reason for the PSOE’s change of mind was that the latter was intent on a pact with the CM for the general election due the following year9 (the PSOE made the same accusation about the apparent harmony between the PP and the UPM),10 but whatever the motive, the PSOE position meant that at a full meeting of the Assembly on 27 August no censure motion was put and the CM remained in power on its own. By the beginning of September the PIM had agreed to join the CM administration (making eight seats in total) with Aberchán as President, and the PSOE (two seats) had indicated a willingness to join them but only if the PP and the UPM would participate in a general coalition of ‘democratic parties’. However, after all that had happened the PSOE was hardly in a position to act as political broker, and in any case the PP and the UPM insisted that the original agreement to support Imbroda of the UPM for President should be observed. They also implied that because he had collaborated with the GIL Aberchán had forfeited their support. The minority administration led by Aberchán, which now had the support of the two PSOE representatives, limped on to the end of October. However, on 4 November Jesús Gil called a press conference to announce that he had decided not to stand in the general election expected in March 2000, nor to present GIL candidates in that election or the Autonomous Community election for Andalucía (although a decision about the withdrawal of GIL candidates for Ceuta and Melilla would be taken at a later date). Although he announced his intention to continue as Mayor of Marbella, he gave health reasons for his decision to withdraw from the wider political scene. That announcement from Gil seems to have been sufficient to make Aberchán feel comfortable with the idea of approaching the local GIL party once more to see if they would join his minority administration with the PIM. By 22 November the GIL was back in government in Melilla, with an agreement from Aberchán that the leader of the GIL, Cris Lozano, would take over the presidency of the Assembly ‘when he asked for it’ (El Mundo, 23 November 1999). Meanwhile the GIL would enjoy the chairmanship of five committees, the vice-chairmanship of four, the first vice-presidency

The evolving political landscape in the enclaves 77 of the Administration and three directorships of municipal companies (including the TV company). On 23 November the PSOE threatened to withdraw from Aberchán‘s government unless the GIL ‘disappeared as a political party in Melilla or transformed itself into a different style of local party and broke its links with the main party’ (El Mundo, 24 November 1999). The PSOE could afford to take such a stand without being accused of preventing the establishment of a majority administration because the CM, PIM and GIL had an absolute majority without the two votes of the PSOE, and three days later they confirmed their withdrawal. It was later suggested that Jesús Gil’s announcement on 4 November was aimed at persuading the courts to be more lenient with him (El Mundo, 18 January 2000). If that was so, then Aberchán had been duped, for on 7 December Gil announced that he was intending to cancel his decision to withdraw from the general election. Before any change of mind could be confirmed, however, a Supreme Court judge announced on 22 December that trading in the shares of Atlético Madrid (Gil’s football club) had been suspended, Gil and his board had been removed from their positions and an administrator had been appointed. This was a precautionary measure by the court in the light of the fact that fraud totalling 9,000 million pesetas (US$60 million) had allegedly been committed in connection with the club. Undeterred, Jesús Gil confirmed his decision on 27 December to participate in the March 2000 elections in Madrid, with GIL candidates also standing in Granada, Málaga, Cádiz, Ceuta and Melilla. While projections based on the results of the 13 June elections would have given the GIL four seats in Congress (El Mundo, 29 December 1999), in the event the challenge came to naught, although they did obtain over a quarter of the votes cast in the enclaves. The CM-GIL-PIM coalition began to unravel in less than a year. The resignation from the PIM of Francisco Robles, who joined the Grupo Mixto (Independents) in April 2000, followed by an identical move by two GIL representatives in May, left Aberchán’s administration without a majority. The opposition parties tried to persuade Aberchán to resign so that a new administration could be formed, with the two national parties, the PP and the PSOE, eager to seize the opportunity to remove the GIL from the government of the enclave by collaborating together with the UPM and the Independents to form a majority. However, it took until July for the opposition parties

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to agree on the distribution of portfolios and to bring a censure motion against Aberchán’s administration. In his desperation to avoid such a step and to remain in power, Aberchán tried to persuade the five GIL members to abandon their party and to reform as a new local party, thereby enabling some of the opposition members to join his GIL-free administration. The GIL members opted to remain with the GIL but to resign from the government. This led Enrique Palacios, the leader of the PIM, to wonder whether the censure motion would still be put; if so, he argued, it would be seen as an ‘anti-Moor pact’ rather than as ‘anti-GIL’ (El Mundo, 7 July 2000). Aberchán himself seemed determined to ensure that the attempt to unseat him from power was seen as racist. His reaction to the presentation of the censure motion on 7 July was to call for a demonstration ‘in defence of the right to equality, irrespective of religious faith’ (El Mundo, 8 July 2000) and during a visit to Madrid he threatened legal proceedings against the opposition for racist, xenophobic and therefore unconstitutional actions. The protest on 14 July of some 2,000–5,000 people was the largest seen in Melilla since the reactions to the Immigration Law in 1986 (see Chapter 4) but it passed off peacefully. Despite attempts to delay the vote on the censure motion and with Aberchán himself in Brussels on the day, the motion was passed on 17 July and the leader of the UPM, Juan José Imbroda, became the new President of Melilla in scenes which bordered on the farcical (El Mundo, 18 July 2000). Interestingly, three of the five remaining GIL representatives supported the censure and later in the year joined the Independents. Not only was the uneasy marriage between the CM and the GIL at an end, but the GIL in Melilla itself appeared to be severely split.

‘Stop-the-GIL’ in Ceuta In contrast to Melilla, the ‘stop-the-GIL’ move in Ceuta following the 13 June 1999 elections was initially relatively straightforward, with the PSOE (two seats) prepared to combine with the eight seats of the PP (even though eleven members of the PSOE Executive Committee in the enclave resigned, including the three candidates at the top of their list) and with the Muslim-backed PDSC (three seats). This gave a majority of one to the PP candidate for President, Jesús Fortes. At the inauguration meeting on 3 July, there was a good deal of anti-

The evolving political landscape in the enclaves 79 Muslim feeling expressed by supporters of the GIL, and in subsequent weeks anti-Muslim posters began to appear on the streets. Unlike Melilla, where the Muslim CM and the GIL had decided to work together, in Ceuta there was no love lost between the GIL and the PDSC. Nevertheless, a clear outcome appeared to have been settled, which excluded the GIL from power. Whether it occurred independently or was influenced by events in Melilla is unclear, but a crisis similar to that in Melilla occurred in Ceuta on 10 August, when another PSOE representative, Susana Bermúdez, announced to the Assembly her decision to become an Independent and indicated her support for the GIL (which was one short of an outright majority) by signing a censure motion against Fortes to be debated on 23 August, which would give the post of President to the GIL leader, Antonio Sampietro. The reasons given by Bermúdez (who had been elected because of the resignation of the three PSOE candidates who had been higher on the electoral list) were that the party which had received the most support should govern, and that the coalition formed to oppose the GIL did not make sense and was unsustainable.11 There were inevitable and immediate accusations by the coalition partners that Bermúdez’s decision was not a political one and that she had been ‘bought’, and there were calls from the local PSOE that she should stand down in favour of the next candidate on the PSOE list. Bermúdez’s father Angel (a former PSOE councillor in the enclave) was alleged to have claimed that in addition to a certain amount of feuding with rivals within the Ceuta PSOE (in particular the Cerdeira family) and an attempt by the GIL to bribe her financially, what ultimately swayed Bermúdez was the offer of the chairmanship of a committee and a vice-chairmanship for her husband in a GIL administration. This was clearly more in keeping with her aspirations than the position of a vicechairman of the Assembly Management Committee that she had already been given by the existing administration. It was enough to make the PSOE headquarters ask the Anti-Fraud Prosecutor on 12 August to see whether any crime of coercion or bribery had been committed.12 Meanwhile, prior to the censure motion debate, Bermúdez disappeared. Only on her return to Ceuta was it revealed that she had been with members of the GIL in Spain and France. In her absence the PSOE urged the Government to try to speed up the judicial process in the hope of getting a postponement of the

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meeting scheduled for 23 August, for unless Bermúdez changed her mind (and no-one thought that was likely) it would be the only way to prevent the GIL from coming to power. If that were to happen, the leader of the Muslim-backed PDSC, Mustafá Mizzian, predicted a breakdown in relations between the two communities in Ceuta, especially as the GIL had promised to appoint a former army officer as Chief of Police as well as 200 more police officers who, the Muslim community feared, would mostly be used against them. The leader of the PSOE, Joaquín Almunia, appealed through the media to the still absent Bermúdez not to support the GIL. Meanwhile, Bermúdez’s father was questioned on 21 August as a witness by an assistant to the Anti-Fraud Prosecutor about any possible act of corruption in connection with his daughter’s support for the GIL. It was reported that this took place in the presence of Angel Bermúdez’s newly appointed lawyers, both of whom had been successful candidates for the GIL in the June elections. It came as no surprise that he too was expelled from the PSOE for his new-found support for the GIL. Susana Bermúdez duly returned to the enclave for the full Assembly meeting on 23 August, and as expected – despite the pleadings from a number of speakers for her to reconsider – voted for the censure motion which resulted in the GIL taking control of the Assembly, with Antonio Sampietro as President. As expected, Bermúdez was offered the chair of the Culture, Heritage and Tourism Committee, while her husband was given the vice-chairmanship of another committee. The PSOE in Madrid distanced itself from Bermúdez’s behaviour, which it described as ‘corrupt and immoral’ (El País, 24 August 1999), and although the party claimed that that was not necessarily the end of the matter, for the time being at least it had to accept that its worst fears had been realized and that through the defection of one of its members the GIL had succeeded in taking power in Ceuta.13 The worst fears of the Government had also been confirmed. After the meeting Jesús Gil, who had gone to Ceuta in order to witness the historic event,14 said cryptically that with his group in power there will ‘probably be a surprise as far as relations with Morocco are concerned’ (El País, 24 August 1999). This immediately brought a rebuke from the official Government spokesman and from the Minster for Communication, who said that ‘what we will not tolerate is agreements being made which are not within the powers of Ceuta from a constitutional perspective, such as foreign relations’ (El País,

The evolving political landscape in the enclaves 81 25 August 1999). There were also suspicions that the new-found power of the GIL in such a politically sensitive town as Ceuta might be used by the party leader as a bargaining counter in relation to the legal charges which were still outstanding against him. The new leader in Ceuta, Antonio Sampietro, also succeeded in causing anxiety in Government circles and in the Canary Islands when he suggested that he would want to agree a fishing quota for the boats in Ceuta, when clearly such agreements were between Morocco and the EU. Sampietro quickly put a gloss on his remarks, and at his investiture on 28 August, which was turned into a ceremonial act before 3,000 people with the fifteenth-century Portuguese fortifications as a backdrop, the tone of his remarks (as well as those of a letter sent by Jesús Gil) was far more conciliatory and unprovocative. It was not long before the GIL (with the support of Bermúdez) began to take full control of the running of the town. On 1 September Sampietro appointed by decree the GIL election campaign coordinator as head of the port authority (although the appointment was not confirmed until 9 October).15 At the meeting of the Assembly on 6 October, the GIL voted for their own ruling that representatives of opposition parties would no longer have a place on the Boards which ran municipal companies, giving members of the administration complete control. They also passed a motion rejecting any interference by central Government in the town’s competences with regard to town planning – a clear indication that the Government would have a fight on its hands over its proposed change in legislation (see below, n.6).

The impact of 13 June 1999 on the main political parties In retrospect the political crises in Ceuta and Melilla, which in some respects seem too extraordinary to be credible, had almost as much of an impact on the main political parties in Madrid as they did on local politics in the enclaves. The PSOE party leadership was mortified by the fact that it had been PSOE councillors who had enabled the GIL to obtain power in both Melilla and Ceuta. The PSOE Leader of the Opposition, Joaquín Almunia, launched a bitter attack on the GIL, describing it as ‘an organisation in the service of one individual’s private interests… which uses methods which are

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radically opposed to democratic practice’ and pledging to eradicate it from Spanish political life (El País, 11 August 1999).16 Such a view was not shared by all leading socialists, including ex-Prime Minister Felipe González, who argued that the GIL had to be defeated in the ballot box and not through all-party pacts to keep them out of power. This position was criticized by the PP, who said that it only served to assist the GIL. However, the PSOE made the same criticism of the PP when the Deputy Prime Minister, Rodrigo Rato, and others suggested on 13 August that the activities of the PSOE in the enclaves were part of their strategy to establish a political force (the GIL) on the extreme right in Spain in order to inflict electoral damage on the centre-right PP. It was in this respect that the consequences of the GIL successes began to take on greater significance, with the two main parties apparently powerless to do anything about them (in Melilla the outcome lay in the hands of Aberchán and in Ceuta in those of Bermúdez) and therefore reduced to attacking each other rather than tackling the causes of the support for the GIL. In the process the whole episode threatened to open up a Pandora’s box of potentially extremist political activity the like of which had not been seen in Spain for over sixty years, as well as to endanger the relationship between Spain and Morocco over the enclaves. Since 1991 the Spanish political system had learned to live with ‘Gilism’ in Marbella and elsewhere on the Costa del Sol, but in the politically sensitive areas of Ceuta and Melilla local power in the hands of the GIL was potentially far more dangerous. That was why the PP and the PSOE in Madrid were so determined to stop the GIL at almost any cost, but they singularly failed to do so and neither main party emerged with any great credit. Nor, it must be said, did a number of individuals from across the political spectrum in the enclaves themselves.

The lessons of the GIL phenomenon An attempt needs to be made to explain the GIL phenomenon. The scale of the GIL impact cannot be overestimated: coming from nowhere, they took 38 per cent of the total number of seats in both towns and reduced the PSOE to a mere 8 per cent (6 per cent after the defection of Bermúdez). It would appear that the impact was

The evolving political landscape in the enclaves 83 different in the two enclaves, for as has been indicated, the votes for GIL in Ceuta came from three smaller parties, leaving the two main national parties with 40 per cent of the seats (down only 8 per cent from 1995), whereas in Melilla the two main parties went from 76 per cent of the seats to 28 per cent. However, this is mainly a reflection of the fact that there was traditionally less support for the two main parties in Ceuta in local elections (see Figure 3.3) and therefore more smaller parties from which seats could be taken. Although in general terms the voters in the two enclaves have supported the two main national parties in local elections (especially in Melilla – see Figure 3.4), one factor which could explain the success of the GIL in Melilla is that since 1994 there have been regular political legal cases involving figures from the national parties which could have undermined the standing of those parties at local level.17 Indeed there are clear indications – supported by the outcome of the 2000 general election indicating a switch back to the main parties – that the local elections in 1999 were used by the enclave electorates partly as a means of punishing the main parties without (or so it was thought at the time) serious consequences. But it must also be the case that one of the reasons for the GIL’s success was that in 1999 the non-Muslim communities in both enclaves were ready to lend their support to a party which promised ready solutions to problems such as unemployment and housing and which also offered a right-wing agenda of ‘cleaning up the streets’ in all senses of the phrase. The GIL brought with it the credentials of tangible achievements in Marbella, although the fact that its successes there may not have been achieved by entirely proper financial means did not seem to matter. The PSOE and the PP will certainly have been prompted to give serious thought to the question of why the GIL was able to gain such rapid support in the enclaves. The answer must in part be a sense among residents that neither national party had demonstrated a sufficient understanding of the problems of the enclaves, nor sufficient commitment towards trying to tackle them. The festering issues of strained community relations (Chapter 4) and a worsening illegal immigration problem (Chapter 5), if added to those of an above average level of unemployment, poor housing and a sense of being ignored by the peninsula and besieged by ‘the neighbouring country’ (Chapter 2), all left the enclaves at the mercy of the populist policies (and dubious political manoeuvrings) of the GIL.

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It was clear that the strategists of the PP at least had learned a salutary lesson from the political shenanigans in the enclaves in the second half of 1999 when José María Aznar visited the enclaves on 9 January 2000, as part of the pre-election campaign prior to the polls scheduled for March. The local leaders of the PP in each town were delighted at the visit, but opposition politicians expressed their disappointment that he was there for campaigning purposes as leader of the PP rather than in his capacity as Prime Minister, especially since before the elections in 1996 he had promised to return as Prime Minister and had not yet done so – indeed no serving Prime Minister had made an official visit to the enclaves since Adolfo Suárez twenty years before. Aznar rejected the criticism and told his audience in Melilla: ‘I said I would come and here I am. I am the Prime Minister, and I am here, and I am the national political leader who has made the most visits to Melilla. I will come again, and I will do so as Prime Minister’ (El Mundo, 10 January 2000). With regard to the political events in the enclaves, he made his views clear: ‘We do not need third-rate leaders, nor groups who only think of the interests of the few or in making money at whatever cost’. Nor was he afraid of offending Morocco when he said that the towns ‘form part of the common project’ of the Spain of the future, and that they were ‘as Spanish as any other town’. As indicated in Chapter 1, Morocco did indeed take offence. Clearly the visit and what he had to say indicated that Aznar was concerned about the possibility of losing the two enclave seats in the Congress in what was predicted to be a close result nationally. In the event he need not have worried,18 but at the time such domestic considerations far outweighed any anxieties that the Spanish Foreign Affairs Ministry might have had about Morocco’s reaction to the visit. What was clear from the political events in the enclaves during the last six months of the twentieth century was that local politics there would never be the same.

Conclusions A number of conclusions can be drawn from this survey of elections and political support in the two enclaves. The first is that by and large in general elections both towns have followed national trends in

The evolving political landscape in the enclaves 85 swings to the left or to the right (see Table 3.1; Figures 3.1 and 3.2). It might have been expected, given their particular circumstances involving the dominant presence of ‘the neighbour to the south’ and the fact that many members of the ‘European’ community are descendants of former military personnel, that political support would be predominantly right of centre, and it is notable that the leading centre-right party has had a share of the vote above the national average in both enclaves in every national election since 1977 (see Table 3.1). Nevertheless the swing to the PSOE in 1982, when the Spanish electorate as a whole ‘risked’ a left-wing government for the first time since the restoration of democracy, was as strong in the enclaves as anywhere in the country. However, since 1986 it would appear that local factors – the civil disturbances and the participation of Muslim candidates in party lists in Melilla, and the strong views on the autonomy statutes in Ceuta – have at times influenced the outcome to the extent of producing a different result in one enclave from the other in some general elections (1986, 1993), and this has been reflected even more in the results in local elections. The enclaves are invariably considered together in a political context, but there are occasions when the two electorates act differently and need to be considered separately. Second, while local political groupings have been established and have played an important role in the local political scene (especially in Ceuta), in contrast to the situation in other parts of Spain these local parties have not figured significantly in national elections. From 1977 the two main parties or political groupings – the PSOE on the one hand, and on the other the leading centre-right party in its various guises (UCD-AP-PP) – always obtained at least 70 per cent of the votes in national elections between them.19 In 1996 this rose to an extraordinary 90 per cent, although it fell back to 65–70 per cent in 2000 (Figures 3.1 and 3.2). Overall this suggests that in general elections the vast majority of electors in the enclaves who go to the polls (including members of the Muslim community) prefer to express their identification with the national political process by supporting a party which will either form the national government or play the role of the main opposition party. In the 1989 general election, for example, the CeU (which two years earlier had emerged as the equal second largest party in the local elections in Ceuta) gained only 12 per cent of the vote, and in most other national

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elections local parties have not even put up candidates. This trend was broken to a degree in 2000 when in both enclaves the GIL gained over 25 per cent of the vote (in Melilla this was in coalition with the CM and the PIM) and pushed the PSOE into third place. Even this performance, however, will have come as a disappointment to the GIL which, following its success only nine months earlier in the local elections, had high hopes of winning parliamentary seats in the enclaves. Third, it is clear that a substantial minority of the electorate in the enclaves does not feel sufficiently engaged in the national political process to trouble to vote in general elections (Figure 3.5). In only one instance since the transition to democracy – in Melilla in 1977 – has the turnout in either of the enclaves surpassed the national average figure. In the 1996 elections, with a national turnout of 77.4 per cent and with a predicted outcome of victory for the centre-right Partido Popular, only 63.8 per cent of registered voters in Ceuta went to the polls, while in Melilla the figure was even lower at 62 per cent. These turnout figures were lower than in all 50 provinces in Spain, but in March 2000 were even worse, falling to around 56 per cent in the enclaves (the lowest or equal lowest general election turnout in either town). Thus for a substantial minority in the enclaves the geographical distance from Madrid reflects a psychological distance which manifests itself in a low level of political involvement in national affairs, a sense of neglect by national politicians, and a greater engagement with local issues and local political representation.20 Fourth, perhaps surprisingly, in elections for the European Parliament, where the people of the enclaves have a unique opportunity to mark their ‘Europeanness’ by participating in a Europeanwide event to elect representatives who act on their behalf in the body which speaks for the ordinary citizens of Europe, the turnout is even lower than the already low national figure – in the case of Ceuta in 1994 by almost 20 per cent (Figure 3.5). It is clear that despite their unique position as the only European Union territories in Africa there is in the enclaves a stronger identification with Spain than with Europe. The bulwark against Morocco is not seen to be the 15 gold stars of the flag of the EU, to which the enclaves have belonged for 15 years, but the red and yellow bands of the flag of the Spanish nation state, of which the enclaves have been a part for many centuries.

The evolving political landscape in the enclaves 87 Finally, there are several interesting outcomes to note with regard to municipal elections in the two enclaves (see Table 3.2; Figures 3.3 and 3.4). First, the two main national parties have received much more support in Melilla than in Ceuta (until 1999, when the position was reversed for the first time). In Melilla the two main parties have totally dominated the council (winning between 76 per cent and 92 per cent of the seats in every election) until the dramatic fall in support in 1999 which left them with a mere 28 per cent of the seats; by contrast in Ceuta only once (in 1983) did the PSOE and the main centre-right party dominate the council between them, with 76 per cent of the seats, while since 1991 their share of the seats between them has not been higher than 48 per cent. Once again this distinction can be attributed to the different attitudes in the two enclaves towards the autonomy issue after 1986. Second, voters in Ceuta have been much more ready to support local political groupings, but in almost all cases their support has completely evaporated after two or three elections. On three occasions (in 1979, 1991 and 1999) the voters of Ceuta have thrown their support behind completely new local political groups to the extent of making them far and away the single largest party. By contrast there has been much more stability in Melilla, where in every local election except in 1991 a single party (at least initially) has had an absolute majority, where the third party (the UPM) has won between two and five seats in every election since 1983 and where there have been no sudden shifts of support (other than from one national party to another) until the arrival of the GIL in 1999 (and even then it was on a smaller scale than in Ceuta). It remains to be seen whether support for the GIL will evaporate as suddenly as other local forces have done. Third, both enclaves have seen the emergence of successful Muslim-backed parties (PDSC, CM) over a similar timescale, with the Melilla-based party ahead of its sister party in Ceuta in terms of numbers of seats and, of course, in the emergence of a Muslim mayor in 1999. The growing presence of Muslims in local politics was something that the non-Muslim community feared from the mid1980s (see Chapter 4). Now that it has come about it remains to be seen how far this will create problems in the enclaves between the Muslim and non-Muslim communities, especially since with a higher birth rate in the Muslim community the number of Muslim

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voters is likely to continue to rise. There were already signs by mid2000 of the increase of racial factors in the local political scenario in Melilla. The CM-GIL-PIM coalition between June 1999 and July 2000 marked an attempt by political representatives of the two communities to work together,21 but as a coalition of convenience it was doomed to failure, and is unlikely to be repeated. Indeed the acrimonious end to the Aberchán administration which concluded a year of political instability in the enclave did not do any favours to the cause of cross-community political cooperation. Notes 1 The four seats which the enclaves occupied between them in the Senate gave a figure of 16,949 electors per senator, compared with an average for the rest of Spain of 142,363 (1986 figures). The enclaves were given the same number of senators as the Community of Madrid. See Hernández Lafuente, 1995, p. 22. 2 The two seats for the Senate were also re-run, and the PSOE’s original victory was also overturned in favour of the PP in the second ballot. 3 Driessen, 1992, p. 193, suggests that despite the development of emancipatory movements within the Muslim community in Melilla following the introduction of the 1985 Immigration Law (see Chapter 4), the reason why it took so long for them to organize themselves into a successful political movement was ‘a high level of illiteracy and insecurity, as well as economic weakness and highly individualistic ways of making a living’. 4 In September 1999 allegations were made that the defecting PFC representative was paid by the PP in order to give them power. This was vehemently denied (El País, 16, 17 September 1999). 5 For the sake of brevity, hereafter the terms ‘Assembly’, ‘President’ and ‘representative’ (all reflecting the status of the enclaves as autonomous towns) will be used rather than ‘Council-Assembly’, ‘Mayor-President’ and ‘councillor-representative’ (which acknowledge their dual status). 6 In all other parts of Spain town planning proposals had to be approved both by municipal councils and by the Autonomous Communities. Since that did not apply in Ceuta and Melilla, as there was no ‘second tier’ authority, the Government quickly acted to change the legislation in September 1999 so that such proposals in the enclaves would have to be approved by the Ministry for Development, with effect from January 2000. The administration in Ceuta intended to challenge the constitutionality of the Government’s move. There were also criticisms that the Government had chosen to change the law via the Amendment to the Budget Law. 7 It was announced on 22 September 1999 that the trial in the Atlético case would begin on 20 March 2000.

The evolving political landscape in the enclaves 89 8 The anti-GIL pact worked in three municipalities (including Estepona, where Jesús Gil’s son had been mayor) where the GIL was the largest party but was prevented from taking power. However, the GIL came away with the post of mayor in Marbella (where Jesús Gil was elected for the third time and at his investiture declared his intention to stand in Madrid at the next general election), Casares (near Málaga) and La Línea, the border town with Gibraltar. The new GIL mayor of La Línea, Juan Carlos Suárez, crossed into Gibraltar on 24 June, together with Gil’s son (Gil Senior was advised not to attempt to enter Gibraltar owing to the conditions of his bail). They had talks with the Chief Minister of Gibraltar, Peter Caruana, who expressed his admiration for the fact that in those places where they had been in power the GIL had ‘a certain reputation for getting things done’ (El País, 25 June 1999). Caruana’s action in talking to his visitors was designed to ‘cock a snook’ at Spain’s Foreign Office, which refused to have any direct dealings with Gibraltar, as well as to exploit opportunities for Gibraltarian firms to increase their investment in Spanish towns. 9 In fact Aberchán announced an electoral pact on 16 January 2000 between the CM, the PIM and the GIL, called the Bloque Localista de Melilla (BLM), with a member of the GIL as candidate for Congress and the other two parties standing for the Senate. 10 The PP and the UPM did indeed announce an electoral pact on 18 January 2000, with a PP candidate for Congress and Imbroda of the UPM as one of the Senate candidates. 11 Bermúdez also gave as a reason the decision taken by the ruling group to award representatives large increases in allowances. The PP group proposed to withdraw the increase immediately in order to undermine her case. 12 Proceedings were instituted on 9 September on the instructions of the Attorney General (El País, 10 September 1999). The Anti-Fraud Prosecutor was called in at Estepona on 13 August to investigate irregular extra payments made to councillors under the previous GIL administration – the fourth prosecution involving the GIL. It transpired that for some time the modus operandi of the GIL, wherever it had the chance to take power, had allegedly been to use bribery to persuade councillors to change sides or otherwise support the GIL (see El País, 15 August 1999). Later that month it was revealed that Marbella and Estepona, where the GIL had been in power between 1995 and 1999, were the two municipalities which owed the most per capita in non-paid tax to the Treasury (El País, 29 August 1999). 13 The PSOE immediately began legal proceedings against Susana Bermúdez, and in March 2000 the Anti-Fraud Prosecutor was given leave by the Attorney General to bring a prosecution for bribery against her, her husband, Antonio Sampietro and his wife. There were immediate calls for Sampietro’s resignation by the PP in Ceuta (El Mundo, 29–31 March 2000). 14 As a consequence of this visit, Gil found himself the subject of a further accusation of the misuse of public funds, since it was alleged that he took 15

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policemen from Marbella as his personal bodyguards at a cost to the people of Marbella of 1 million pesetas (US$6,600) (El País, 31 August 1999). 15 On 17 September 1999 an Assembly meeting enabled the GIL to take control of the television company. Sampietro announced that from the beginning of the following year it would become a public company financed directly from municipal funds, thus providing the GIL with a useful organ for self-promotion. 16 A charge of defamation was later made by representatives of all 13 municipalities in which GIL candidates had stood in the June elections against Almunia and against the PSOE officer responsible for Regional Policy, Ramón Jáuregui (El País, 2 September 1999). 17 The PSOE Mayor, Gonzalo Hernández, elected in 1991, was accused in 1994 of mishandling a public document; Ignacio Velázquez, President for the PP in 1995, faced four charges covering alleged failure of public duty, misappropriation of public funds and bribery; Enrique Palacios, who took over from Velázquez in 1998, was accused of coercion for not allowing a censure motion to be put against him. On 23 December 1999 the Provincial Court disqualified Velázquez from holding public office for six years and one day for the first charge of failure of public duty committed in 1992, while in November 2000 Palacios was banned from public office for seven years. 18 The Partido Popular comfortably won an overall majority in Parliament, including all seats in the enclaves. The GIL gained its support in Ceuta and Melilla almost entirely at the expense of the PSOE, which recorded its lowest ever percentage of the vote in both enclaves (see Figures 3.1 and 3.2). In Andalucía the GIL obtained only 0.4 per cent of the vote. 19 In the general elections from 1977–1982 there were both UCD and AP candidates; if the votes cast for these two parties plus the PSOE are added together the percentage voting for the main national parties in the enclaves during the early years of the post-Franco period becomes even greater. 20 The other parts of Spain where this might equally be the case – the Canary Islands and the Balearic Islands – only partially reflect the same sense of distance. Turnout in 1996 in the Baleares was 71.6 per cent but in 2000 fell to 61.9 per cent. In the Province of Las Palmas in the Canary Islands the figure was 71.2 per cent, although in the other Province of the Canarias, Santa Cruz de Tenerife, the figure in 1996 was 67 per cent, giving an average for the Canarias of 70 per cent. Both sets of islands thus have turnout figures which are better than those for the enclaves, although all are clearly below the national average. 21 In Ceuta, where political relations between the GIL and the Muslim-backed PDSC were more strained, the President of the Assembly recognized his administration’s obligations towards the Muslim community and indicated his intention to establish a Committee for Muslim Affairs (El Mundo, 16 October 1999).

FOUR

THE 1985 IMMIGRATION LAW AND COMMUNITY RELATIONS IN THE ENCLAVES By the mid-1980s there was growing concern in the enclaves on the part of the inhabitants of European origin (who called themselves españoles but were also identified by their faith as cristianos) regarding the increasing number of Moroccan residents (referred to by the cristianos as marroquíes [Moroccans] or pejoratively as moros [Moors], but described by themselves and in the press as musulmanes [Muslims]). Table 4.1 shows (on the basis of available figures) the growth of both the total population and the Muslim population in Ceuta and Melilla. Although there are some discrepancies between official and unofficial figures (Carabaza and de Santos, 1992, p. 97), the table clearly indicates the increasing proportion of Muslims resident in the enclaves, especially in the period after 1960 when the total populations began to decline from their peak (or near peak) following Moroccan independence.. What the figures do not reveal, however, are the inequalities in terms of legal status and citizenship between the cristiano and musulmán communities. In 1987 in Ceuta there were some 15,000 Muslims (22.5 per cent of the total population), of whom 2,400 (16 per cent) had a national identity document conferring Spanish nationality (López García, 1993a, p. 58). Of the remainder, 500 possessed the ‘statistical’ identity card introduced in 1958, a minimal form of documentation which did not even provide them with unemployment benefit or allow them to travel to mainland Spain or to Morocco. But they and the other 12,000 were stateless, including a large number who were born in the enclave.

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Table 4.1: Total and Muslim populations of Ceuta and Melilla, 1875–1986 Year

Ceuta Total population

1875 1877 1887 1888 1910 1930 1935 1950 1960 1970 1975 1981 1986

Melilla Muslims (% of total)

Total population

Muslims (% of total)

91 (0.9) 9,703 10,744

1,517 3,539 204 (1.9)

23,907 50,614

39,852 62,614

95 (0.2) 932 (1.5)

81,182 79,586 64,942

6,277 (7.7) 7,626 (9.5)

2,717 (5.3) 59,936 73,182 67,187 70,864 65,151

7,102 (9.7)

15,002 (23.0)

58,449 52,388

14,174 (21.8) 11,105 (19.0) 17,824 (34.0)

Source: Based on Carabaza and de Santos, 1992, pp. 50–51; 94–97. Totals include garrison and prison numbers. Percentages have been calculated in relation to the nearest year for which total figures were provided

In Melilla the figures were equally stark: of the 17,800 Muslims (32.5 per cent of the total population), 6,000 (34 per cent) had the national identity document which gave them Spanish nationality, but approximately 12,000 were stateless (López García, 1993a, p. 58). Of these 6,500 held only the ‘statistical’ identity card and the remainder, including many who were born in Melilla, had no official documentation.1 Although there was a higher proportion of Muslims in Melilla than in Ceuta,2 there were clearly fears on the part of the cristiano community about the ‘Moroccanization’ of both enclaves (some were concerned that granting citizenship to the musulmanes would result in the election of Muslim candidates to the local council – as indeed eventually happened), and there was a distinct hierarchy of citizenship which neither the authorities in the enclaves nor the Government in Madrid seemed prepared to challenge. Aomar Mohamedi Dudú, leader of the Muslim group Terra Omnium and one of the few academically well-qualified Muslim residents in Melilla,3 spoke out in the Spanish press in April and May 1985 about these

The 1985 Immigration Law and community relations in the enclaves 93 social inequalities and as a consequence was expelled from the PSOE (although the party argued that the expulsion was for his membership of a proscribed internal organization, Socialist Regeneration).4 These social factors were to play an important role in the years ahead.5

The 1985 Immigration Law On 1 July 1985, in anticipation of Spain’s future membership of the European Community, the Spanish Parliament passed a new Immigration Law, the Organic Law on the Rights and Freedoms of Foreigners in Spain (Ley Orgánica sobre Derechos y Libertades de los Extranjeros en España), known as the Ley de Extranjería, which came into effect on 22 October. Non-Spaniards (estimated at some 150,000 people throughout Spanish territory) had until 31 January 1986 to apply to regularize their status. The main focus of the new law was to increase government powers to deal with non-EU foreign nationals already in Spain rather than to improve border controls. It enabled the Government to deport a number of categories of foreigners, and by requiring them to obtain a work contract from an employer, then to seek a work permit from the Ministry for Labour and a residence permit from the Ministry of the Interior it also made it extremely difficult for them to obtain legal employment (Cornelius, 1994, p. 345). For those with temporary permits, a new permit had to be obtained on expiry of the work contract; the ordinary permit valid for one year could only be renewed once (Chozas Pedrero and Aragón Bombín, 1994, p. 56). The new law had clearly not been designed to make it easy for immigrants to settle.6

Reaction to the Law in the enclaves The legislation, which took little account of the special circumstances in the enclaves (López García, 1992a, p. 151), presented a particular problem for their Muslim populations. Under Spanish law, birth on Spanish territory only gave the right to Spanish nationality if at least one of the parents had also been born there. This was not the case with the vast majority of the Muslim community in Ceuta and Melilla. The law allowed that Spanish nationality could be applied for

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after 10 years of residence, and this could be reduced to two years for nationals of certain countries, but significantly these did not include Moroccans resident in Ceuta and Melilla.7 Article 22 of the Law established as a permanent feature the identity card which would allow residence but continue to withhold nationality. Those born in the enclaves were unwilling to apply for such a card, because they did not wish to accept classification as ‘foreigners’, but without any documentation they would be liable to deportation. If they did apply for such a card in order to regularize their situation they would then have to wait at least 10 years to apply for Spanish citizenship with no guarantee that it would be forthcoming at the end of that period. It was evident that the Spanish Government was anxious to avoid a backlash by the cristiano community in the enclaves if it were seen to be too accommodating to the Muslims. But what it had not anticipated was the reaction of the Muslim community and the farreaching consequences of that reaction. In the days following the introduction of the new Law, there were several public disturbances, particularly by those who were born in the enclaves. A meeting called for 9 November by Muslim associations in Melilla, the Asociación Musulmana and Terra Omnium, to denounce the Immigration Law was attended by five hundred people in the Muslim township of La Cañada de la Muerte,8 but thousands more were turned away by the police because the Government Representative in Melilla, Andrés Moreno Aguilar, considered the meeting to be illegal. Aomar Mohamedi Dudú, who had become the spokesman for the Muslim community, agreed to abandon the meeting and it passed off without incident, but he immediately called for Moreno’s resignation and for a government commission to visit the enclave in order to discuss the question of the Muslim population. A further meeting was called for 23 November, and although it was properly authorized Moreno called upon the Muslim population not to attend. However, several thousands did so in what was described as the largest meeting ever held in Melilla. It was later to be heralded as marking the start of the active opposition by the Muslim community in Melilla to the Immigration Law. The meeting sparked off a flurry of further activity. Preparations began for a demonstration in support of the new Immigration Law on 6 December by the Spanish community of Melilla to counter the meeting by Muslims of 23 November. Two advisers to the Spanish

The 1985 Immigration Law and community relations in the enclaves 95 Ombudsman visited Melilla towards the end of November in order to investigate the situation of the Muslim community in the enclave and to produce a report to be submitted to the Ministries of Justice and of the Interior. The report was quickly drawn up and called upon the authorities in the enclaves to speed up the processing of the applications by Muslims for Spanish nationality, and to provide others resident in the enclaves with an identity card which did not classify them as foreigners. The leaders of the Muslim community in Ceuta, Ahmed Subaire and Ahmed Hassan Mohamed, travelled to Melilla on 29 November to coordinate the protest against the Immigration Law by the two enclaves, while on the same day the Government Representative in Melilla was in Madrid to give his view of the situation to the Minister of the Interior, José Barrionuevo. As a result of these talks the Minister promised the granting of residence permits and the opportunity for Muslims to move to other parts of Spain as well as an aid package for the enclaves, especially the Muslim townships. Press reports on 1 December indicated that the Government was planning to allow members of the Muslim community in the enclaves who applied for resident status under the new law automatically to acquire Spanish nationality after 10 years. The leaders of the Muslim communities rejected this proposal and called for the granting of Spanish nationality to all those born in the enclaves. Meanwhile Dudú resigned from the PSOE-affiliated union, the UGT, and was followed by the majority of Muslims in Melilla, many of whom instead joined the Communist-affiliated Comisiones Obreras (CC.OO), which was the only organization supporting the Muslims’ opposition to the Immigration Law. The Spanish Ambassador in Rabat was summoned several times by the Moroccan Government to hear its concerns about the effect of the application of the Immigration Law on Moroccans resident in Spanish territory, and the Spanish Government gave assurances that the law would be applied ‘generously’ to those of Moroccan nationality. The demonstration in Melilla on 6 December (which was also Constitution Day) in support of the Immigration Law was seen by the Muslim community as ‘a racist counter-demonstration’ and an act of divisiveness. The main streets were bedecked with the Spanish national flag as an estimated 35–40,000 people took to the streets behind placards saying ‘For the Constitution and for Human Rights, Yes to the Immigration Law’, ‘Government Representative: The

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People Are Behind You’, or ‘Melilla, for Spaniards Without Discrimination’. With the Muslim community interpreting the demonstration as a clear indication that the politicians of Melilla no longer represented them, there was no doubt that the event marked a distinct split between the two communities in the enclave. As a response, all shops run by Muslims remained closed on the following day, resulting in the dismissal of Dudú by the Mayor of Melilla from his position as market administrator.9 The Deputy Minister of the Interior, Rafael Vera, visited the enclave on 10 December and insisted to leaders of the Muslim community that they had to comply with the Immigration Law, while Muslim leaders from both Ceuta and Melilla had talks in Madrid on 18 December with the Deputy Minister and with the Ombudsman. As a consequence, with the Ombudsman pointing out some non-constitutional aspects of the new law, the Ministers of the Interior and of Justice agreed to study further the implications of the Immigration Law for the Muslim inhabitants of the enclaves, including the exclusion of the word ‘foreign’ from any documentation. However, as 31 January 1986 – the date for the end of the residence application period – drew near and there was no sign of any postponement of the application of the new law in the enclaves, members of the Muslim community in Melilla stepped up their protests. On 20 January the community leaders called for the display of white sheets from balconies and windows and the wearing of white ribbons or armbands until the end of the month as a sign of protest against the Immigration Law. The following day nearly 40 young Muslims began a hunger strike, while on 23 January the whole community was called upon to begin a three-day fast. On the third day some 300 members of the recently formed Association of Muslim Women, dressed in white and carrying placards, demonstrated in the Plaza de España, while later there were assemblies of some 5,000 members of the Muslim communities in both enclaves.

The Muslim community forces changes As a result of these protests – or perhaps it would have happened anyway – the Government announced a one-month extension to the

The 1985 Immigration Law and community relations in the enclaves 97 deadline. However, the hunger strike continued along with other forms of protest, including a second unauthorized demonstration by the Muslim women on 28 January, which on this occasion was forcibly repressed by riot police using batons, rubber bullets and smoke canisters. Officially 18 people were injured, including four police officers. As a consequence, Dudú called on the community to embark on an indefinite general strike, including the withdrawal of children from school. The response from the community on the following day was strong, although some commercial premises opened during the afternoon in order to avoid being fined. Although police reinforcements were sent and there was a substantial police presence in the streets, the Ministry of the Interior for its part issued a statement on 29 January regretting the incident. It also announced some changes in the application of the Immigration Law to the Muslim population of Melilla: residents of Moroccan origin who held the new ‘statistical’ identity card (to be known as the Identity and Residence Card [Tarjeta de Identidad y Residencia]) would not be required to leave the enclave; they would be entitled to visit or even settle anywhere on the mainland; they would also be entitled to obtain a work permit and unemployment benefit; the issue of such a card would not be subject to the possession of a work permit and would not be withdrawn if the holder became unemployed; those who had applied to regularize their situation but whose applications had not been dealt with by 1 March would not be deported; holders of such a card who wished to do so could apply for Spanish nationality. If it had not hitherto been apparent, it was now clear that the Government in Madrid had performed a significant climbdown on the application of the Immigration Law to the Muslims in the enclaves. Either the impact on them had not been fully considered when the Law was first introduced, or the political consequences of the impact on the enclaves had not been foreseen. However, while these points both clarified and improved the situation, they clearly did not go as far as the Muslim community, especially those born in Melilla, were demanding. Dudú described the Ministry communiqué as ‘an attempt to deceive and manipulate opinion’ (El País, 31 January 1986). By 30 January both the hunger strike and the general strike had been called off, and all political parties in Melilla called for a Government inquiry into recent events. The events in Melilla were

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also used a few days later by the Moroccan nationalist party Istiqlal for further attacks on the Spanish Government. Istiqlal and other opposition parties again called upon the Moroccan Government to press Madrid for negotiations to ‘liberate’ the two enclaves. Thus far the Government in Rabat led by Karim Lamrani had taken a cautious line over the incidents in Melilla, a line which was to draw praise from the Spanish Foreign Affairs Minister, Francisco Fernández Ordóñez, but there was concern in Moroccan Government circles about the fact that it was Istiqlal, led by the former Foreign Minister Mohamed Bucetta, that was making political capital out of the events, with its campaign in relation to the enclaves producing some popular demonstrations in the streets. On 7 February Istiqlal announced that a rally to show solidarity with the Muslim community in Melilla and to call for the return of the enclaves to Morocco would be held two days later in Nador, the Moroccan city adjacent to the Spanish enclave. Whether it was that announcement or merely coincidence is not clear, but the fact is that on the same day the Spanish Director General for Domestic Policy, Rafael de Francisco, announced that members of the Muslim communities in the enclaves would now be entitled to obtain Spanish nationality on presentation of proof of ‘long-standing presence’ (arraigo). This concession formed part of a package of measures agreed at a meeting in Madrid on 10 February between Government ministers and officials and the respective leaders of the Muslim communities in Ceuta and Melilla. The measures included the establishment of a Joint Committee (consisting of representatives from the Ministries of the Interior and of Justice and from the Muslim communities in the enclaves) to define the term ‘long-standing presence’ and to carry out a census10 in order to determine the qualifications for Spanish nationality. Not everyone was satisfied with the agreement: the political parties in Melilla (except once again the PSOE) felt betrayed by the Government because (they argued) the responsibility for the processes had not been given to ‘representatives of the Spanish people’, while in Morocco Istiqlal warned the Muslim communities in the enclaves that if they became Spanish they would run the risk of having renounced Islam and thereby lose entitlement to be buried in Muslim cemeteries. There was a sense in the Muslim communities in the enclaves that they were being attacked from all

The 1985 Immigration Law and community relations in the enclaves 99 sides. However, further concessions were made by the Government in Madrid when it was announced on 21 February11 that the deadline for non-Spaniards to apply for legal status was being extended a further month to the end of March, and that the Muslims’ political party in Melilla, the Partido de los Demócratas Melillenses (PDM), was to be officially recognized.

The Law comes into effect As there were no further extensions to the introduction of the Immigration Law it duly came into effect on 1 April 1986. By the time that it did so, more than 5,000 applications for Spanish citizenship (representing over 8,000 people, including minors) had been received by the Government Office in Melilla. Sensitive to the fact that the passing of the deadline required some reassurances on the part of the Government, the Minister of the Interior, José Barrionuevo, visited Melilla and Ceuta on 2–3 April and held meetings with representatives of all sections of the community. He pledged that the regularization of the status of members of the Muslim community would be carried out with ‘the necessary generosity and caution’ (El País, 3 April 1986), in other words that no expulsions would take place in the near future. Such a position was adopted as much in order to avoid difficulties for the Government authorities as it was to protect the interests of the Muslims in the enclaves. Despite such reassurances, the Muslim population in Melilla was becoming restless at the delays in the issuing of residence and registration documents which had to accompany any request for Spanish nationality, and about a thousand people demonstrated on 9 April outside the Town Hall. The meeting was addressed by Dudú, who had been accused of making death threats to local officials and who not for the first time accused them of being ‘racist and anti-Muslim’. Union officials called for the dismissal of the Government Representative, Andrés Moreno, for having allowed the demonstration to take place. A larger demonstration of some 5,000 Muslims took place on 26 April, in which there were placards in both Arabic and Spanish proclaiming ‘No to the Statute of Slavery’ and ‘No to Racism’. The focus of the demonstration was the demand for equal rights for the Muslim community, and was once more headed by Dudú. These

100 Europe or Africa? were signs of a growing confidence among the Muslims of Melilla in the assertion of their own cultural identity. The Joint Committee of representatives of the Spanish Government and of the Muslim communities continued to meet on a monthly basis in order to ensure the progress of the registration process in the enclaves. At the meeting in Madrid on 30 April it was agreed that 2,400 Muslims in Melilla and Ceuta would receive Spanish citizenship over the ensuing two months. However, there was criticism by the Muslim participants that the only applications that had already been processed were some 1,500 that has been requested some years before and had been filed in Madrid, whereas none of the 2,940 which had been presented since the beginning of 1986 had been dealt with. By the time of the next meeting on 12 June it was alleged that the number of new applications had risen to 4,400 and only one had been processed (and rejected), although the figures were disputed by the Ministry of the Interior. Measures were agreed which were designed to improve the process, and it was only this step which caused Dudú and other representatives to continue to participate on the committee.12 There was no doubt that during June relations between the Muslim and cristiano communities were becoming even more tense. Leaflets were anonymously distributed in the enclave claiming that Melilla was part of Morocco. Other leaflets put out by the Partido de los Demócratas Melillenses (PDM) called upon the Muslim community, most of whom were not eligible to vote, to boycott parliamentary elections scheduled for 22 June and to support parallel elections to be held on the same day. The proposal was announced to form a new trade union for Melilla and break with the Comisiones Obreras (the only national organization which still had links with the Muslim community). A petition with 5,600 signatures was presented in Madrid calling for an investigation by the Judiciary Committee into discrimination against Muslims in Melilla in legal matters.

The Government Representative changes sides It therefore came as no surprise that on 19 June there were clashes in the streets between Muslim and cristiano groups, resulting in the

The 1985 Immigration Law and community relations in the enclaves 101 dismissal by the Government Representative, Andrés Moreno, of the Melilla police chief, José Luis Cerviño, for a refusal to obey orders. This prompted calls by cristianos for the dismissal of Moreno, who had declared his determination to help the Muslim community to achieve integration as equal citizens in the enclave and who, in a complete reversal from the situation eight months earlier, was now seen as their ally. On 19 June Moreno issued a statement which constituted the first official recognition of the fact that the members of the Muslim community in the enclaves deserved equal rights: ‘for decades the rights of the Muslim community have been diminished and abused; this has been an historical injustice which a democratic government and a modern, free society cannot and should not tolerate’ (El País, 20 June 1986). Dudú, whose house had come under attack in the small hours of the morning of 20 June, was given a permanent police guard. The action taken against Cerviño also caused further demonstrations both at the airport the following day when the police chief left the enclave and also in the town centre on 23 June during a strike by shopkeepers, while at the request of the Government the parallel elections called by the Muslim community were brought forward to 21 June. Dudú, representing the Partido de los Demócratas Melillenses (PDM) and the only candidate, received 100 per cent of the votes cast on a turnout of over 90 per cent.13 This was a clear demonstration of the desire by the Muslim community to participate in a formal electoral process to elect their own leaders, but also a stark illustration of the ethnic divide between the communities of the enclave. As if to underscore this divide, over the ensuing weeks there were demonstrations by right-wing groups (in particular by the group calling itself The Struggle for the Freedom of Melilla) (La Lucha por la Libertad de Melilla) against the national Government and its representative in Melilla, Andrés Moreno. In response Moreno called in police reinforcements to defend the Government position, arguing on 21 July that ‘it was shameful that a group of people did not accept the integrationist policy of the Government in relation to the Muslims of Melilla, a community which has been marginalized for many years’ (El País, 21 July 1986). Tensions remained high following the deaths in separate incidents of a Moroccan and a cristiano in suspicious circumstances in Melilla towards the end of July, and the arrest on 18 August of the Secretary-General of the

102 Europe or Africa? extreme right-wing Partido Nacionalista Español de Melilla (PNEM), Juan Díez de la Cortina, accused of planning a terrorist attack at the Government Representative’s office. Representatives of the cristiano community in Melilla had their first meeting since the general election with the Deputy Interior Minister, Rafael Vera, in Madrid on 22 August. The delegation (from which the Alianza Popular senator for Melilla, Carlos Benet, and the spokesman for the Unión de Melillenses Independientes, José Imbroda, were excluded) committed itself to ‘dialogue and harmony’ with the Muslim community, although the suggestion of the possible establishment of a single joint committee to consider the rights of the Muslim population in Melilla was given short shrift by Aomar Dudú in a statement issued after the meeting. Dudú argued that it was no more appropriate for the representative politicians of Melilla to participate in negotiations over the problems of the Muslim community than it would be for Muslims to sit on a committee to examine the privileges and rights of the cristiano community. The Government now found itself in a situation it could not win, as one or other of the communities in Melilla would accuse it of betrayal.

Dudú joins, then leaves, the Establishment On 29 August the Government reshuffled some of the holders of Government Representative posts, including Andrés Moreno, who was replaced in Melilla by Manuel Céspedes, head of security in the Prime Minister’s office and a personal friend of Felipe González.14 He was also a native of the enclave and a former member of its police force, and his appointment was welcomed by the local political parties, although the leaders of the Muslim community were soon to express reservations, in particular over the fact that he brought back to the enclave a number of police officers who had been removed because of their attitude towards the Muslims. The new Government made an even bolder move on 2 September when the appointment was announced of Aomar Dudú as adviser to the Ministry of the Interior on Muslim and other minority groups. This was the first time that a member of the Muslim community had been appointed to a Government post, and the Government hoped that such a step would give a clear indication to the Muslim commu-

The 1985 Immigration Law and community relations in the enclaves 103 nities in the North African enclaves of its commitment to the improvement of their status.15 Cynics argued that it was an astute way of neutralizing a political problem, while some of Dudú’s own supporters accused him of selling out. Dudú himself came quickly to realize that for a number of reasons his acceptance of the appointment was not a wise move. In addition Dudú’s appointment caused concerns among the Muslim community in Ceuta. Their leader, Ahmed Subaire, questioned the precise nature of Dudú’s responsibilities and by the beginning of November he was criticizing Dudú for taking on a paid political position rather than trying to solve ordinary people’s problems. For the first time the Muslims of Ceuta rather than Melilla found themselves in the vanguard of representing their communities in the enclaves. It was the ceutí Muslim leaders who withdrew from the Joint Committee on 20 October because of the lack of progress being made, and on 1 November they resolved to call upon the Government to implement a number of measures, including the replacement of the statistical identity card with an alternative document for those Muslims who were not granted Spanish nationality. Whether out of rivalry or solidarity is not clear, but on 8 November at an assembly of 2,000 people the Melilla Muslim community also decided to withdraw from the Joint Committee. Even more significantly, the assembly agreed to support Dudú’s decision to resign from his appointment at the Ministry of the Interior after only two months in the post because of what he claimed was the Government’s failure to deliver on its commitments. The assembly also resolved to establish its own local council (a proposal not supported by Dudú and subsequently modified) and to issue identity documents for members of the Muslim community. Other significant resolutions were to declare ‘the Arabic, Muslim and Maghrebi character of Melilla’, to strengthen relations with Arab people in the region, and to offer joint Moroccan and Spanish nationality to the people of Melilla. Such resolutions were well received in Rabat, although no official comment was made.16 The reaction of the cristianos of Melilla to these resolutions was predictable, with José Luis Sánchez Usero of the Alianza Popular claiming on 10 November that the Muslims ‘wanted to be Spanish out of convenience and Moroccan out of express recognition of their natural feelings’, while José Imbroda of the Unión del Pueblo

104 Europe or Africa? Melillense described Dudú as ‘an excellent manipulator who is gambling with Spain, with Morocco and with our economic interests’ (El País, 11 November 1986). Carlos Robles Piquer of the Alianza Popular party described the situation in Melilla as ‘very serious’ and urged the Government to act. Certainly it was vital for the Government to recognize the dangers that these moves by the Muslim community represented. The Government’s authority over the Muslim communities in the enclaves was contingent upon the Muslims’ desire to integrate; once they started to consider alternatives to integration and to give encouragement to nationalist forces within Morocco, the situation could become much more difficult to handle. Dudú’s resignation and the calls for alternative political structures and documentation were, however, undoubtedly more disturbing for the Madrid Government. A reflection of the frustrations felt by the Muslims over the bureaucratic delays in implementing change (only 418 applications by Muslims for Spanish nationality had been granted since the beginning of the year), they also opened the way for more radical action by the Muslims, especially since they could argue that attempts at cooperation with the Government had been tried and had failed. If such radical action were to lead to external support for the Muslim community and a higher international profile for the problems in North Africa, this would undoubtedly represent a major embarrassment for the Spanish Government. A large section of the Muslim community in Melilla had now determined a change of strategy and was calling for nothing less than the abandonment of the Immigration Law. On 11 November the executive committee representing the community agreed to call a four-day business closure (there was some confusion as to whether it was to be a general strike) starting on 15 November and covering a period of political and religious public holidays in Morocco,17 and to seek permission to hold a demonstration on 22 November. The executive declared that negotiations with the Government on the Joint Committee agenda were at an end, although by 15 November Dudú had already indicated that he would be prepared to resume participation in the Committee on the basis of a ‘basic agreement’ which would grant an identification document to the Melilla Muslims who were not protected by the Immigration Law – in other words, the non-application of the Law to the Muslim community in

The 1985 Immigration Law and community relations in the enclaves 105 the enclave. The Interior Ministry accused Dudú of being exclusively preoccupied with the issues of housing and nationality and reaffirmed the Government’s policy to integrate the Muslim and cristiano communities in the enclaves.18

Growing Muslim opposition to the Law However, a growing mistrust between Aomar Dudú and the Government Representative, Manuel Céspedes, made dialogue and negotiation between the Muslim community and central Government extremely difficult. A meeting of the Joint Committee was held on 18 November with representation from the ceutí Muslims (despite their decision of 20 October), at which the Under-Secretary at the Ministry for the Interior agreed to explore the possibility of issuing a national identity document (DNI) valid for one year while applications for nationality were processed. The Ministry also indicated that it was considering the issue of a renewable residence document valid for 10 years to those Muslims who could not or did not wish to obtain Spanish nationality. These moves were at least a sign that the Government in Madrid had begun to realize the need to make progress on the issue of Muslim rights in the enclaves, but the proposal was swiftly rejected by Dudú at the demonstration on 22 November. Manuel Céspedes had decided on strict controls at the Morocco–Melilla border on that day, and organized a heavy police presence with crowd barriers and helicopter surveillance to control the demonstration, which passed off peacefully. The large banner at the head of the demonstration read ‘No to the Immigration Law’, while the chants of the demonstrators also voiced their support for Dudú, with ‘Friend Dudú, the Muslims Are With You’. Early in December the Muslim community in Ceuta followed Melilla in requesting to hold a demonstration against the Immigration Law on the 20th, although there was a split between the followers of Abdelkáder Mohamed Alí who supported the demonstration and Ahmed Subaire who was eager to take up the Government’s proposals regarding documentation. However, the community leaders decided on the day to postpone the demonstration to a later date because the Government Representative, Ramón Berra Pereira, had not given his authorization. A similar split

106 Europe or Africa? had emerged within the Muslim community in Melilla on 16 December when the young leader of the Agrupación de la Comunidad Musulmana de Melilla, Ahmed Moh (known also as ‘Jimmy’), indicated his willingness to represent the community in negotiations within the Joint Committee. The Government Representative, Manuel Céspedes, quickly seized this opportunity to undermine the authority of Dudú, and gave Moh an assurance that he would be invited to do so. Moh also said that his group accepted the proposals regarding interim documentation which Dudú had rejected. The Government will have been delighted that the more radical elements within the Muslim communities were being neutralized by other, apparently more moderate leaders. Thus the year closed with divisions within the Muslim communities and between the Muslims and cristianos but with little comfort for the Spanish Government. On 31 December in response to an employment tribunal judgment that Aomar Dudú had been wrongfully dismissed from his post as market administrator in Melilla in December 1985 and was entitled to reinstatement, back pay and costs, the Mayor and Assembly President, Gonzalo Hernández, said he would resign if Dudú returned to his job.

Moh replaces Dudú as spokesman The Joint Committee met in Madrid on 13 January 1987 but for the first time without Aomar Dudú or any of his supporters. The Muslim community was represented by Ahmed Moh, whose organization claimed to represent 1,800 people. Following the meeting, Manuel Céspedes announced that the issue of Spanish nationality documents to Muslims in the enclaves had been speeded up significantly during the previous months of November and December, and that he was confident that the process would be completed by the end of the current year.19 Meanwhile if the proposals to issue provisional documentation went ahead, this would to all intents and purposes remove the application of the Immigration Law from the Muslims in the enclaves. While Ahmed Moh was in Madrid, Dudú was addressing a meeting in Melilla, at which Moh was described as a traitor. Dudú expressly linked the acquisition of rights for Muslims with the

The 1985 Immigration Law and community relations in the enclaves 107 ‘decolonization of both towns’ and stated that Melilla ‘is Moroccan territory’ (El País, 14 January 1987). On hearing of Dudú’s comments, Manuel Céspedes decided to report him to the Public Prosecutor to see whether he had committed any crime. While Céspedes was clearly out to destroy Dudú, the latter was not doing himself any favours by allowing himself to be branded as an extremist. His comments led several political leaders in Melilla to call for Dudú to be deprived of his Spanish citizenship, while later in the month Moh accused Dudú of appropriating 50 million pesetas (US$330,000) intended for the costs of nationality documentation.

Dudú goes into exile in Morocco; demonstrators charged with sedition Following an incident at the Moroccan frontier at Beni-Enzar on 29 January 1987 which involved dozens of demonstrators including Aomar Dudú’s brother-in-law, Abdelaziz Huariachi, who had been banned from entering Melilla for five years, Dudú himself decided to go into voluntary exile in Nador in Morocco the following day on the grounds that he feared for his personal safety in Melilla. However, from there he continued to lead and to speak for the Muslim community in the enclave. The tension escalated on the night of 31 January–1 February with an incident in the enclave between Muslims and cristianos which resulted in several Muslims suffering gunshot wounds, some 22 people being injured, 32 arrested (including for a time the religious leader Sid Driss Abdelkader), plus lootings and burnt-out vehicles. Manuel Céspedes, the Government Representative, was unable to discard his former persona and took charge of the police operation. Having appeared before the Examining Magistrate for Melilla, José María Treviño, nine of those arrested (including five with Spanish nationality) were detained in prison for sedition, an extraordinarily excessive charge redolent of another era of Spanish history and suggestive of an element of racial prejudice. Later they were transferred to Almería, while the remainder were released on bail because there was insufficient room in the prison. In protest at the arrests (which included the leaders of the Coordinating Committee of the Moroccan Community of Melilla) some 800 Muslim businesses in Melilla closed on 2 February and the majority

108 Europe or Africa? did not reopen until two weeks later. Aomar Dudú and some of his closest supporters were also accused of sedition (which carried a maximum sentence of 30 years imprisonment) and of inciting an act of subversion and a warrant was issued for their arrest.20 Sid Driss Abdelkader – one of the few Muslim leaders still at liberty – addressed a meeting of about a thousand people on 3 February outside the main mosque in Melilla, and the meeting agreed to give the Public Prosecutor three days to release those detained (a deadline which came and went), despite calls for more radical action from some of those present. The Interior Ministry in Madrid accused Aomar Dudú of being responsible for the recent incidents, while Dudú himself blamed Manuel Céspedes and the police for carrying out a reign of terror. The Moroccan press had a field day, while the Spanish Government no doubt convinced itself that these incidents proved that the problem of the enclaves was largely one of law and order (which is how it had perceived the issue all along) and one which could be addressed through integration and investment. Whether that was likely to be the most productive approach was, however, open to question. Tensions within Melilla were increased by the announcement on 6 February of the death of Mohamed Hammu, one of those wounded a week earlier (the first death reported as a consequence of conflict between the two communities), together with a statement issued by the nine people imprisoned in Almería who blamed Dudú for the unrest in the enclave. After the funeral the following day (involving the transportation of the body to the Muslim cemetery on the Moroccan side of the border), Dudú addressed the estimated crowd of 6,000 mourners, and despite his calls for unity, he accused both the religious leader Sid Driss and the lawyer representing those imprisoned in Almería, Darío Fernández, of betrayal. He also accused the Government Representative’s office of issuing the statement on behalf of the prisoners in order to blacken his name. But while those arrested were in prison and Dudú was at liberty, it was scarcely surprising if they were critical of his leadership. It was increasingly apparent that with every passing day Dudú’s standing as a spokesman for the Muslim community in Melilla was being eroded, especially by Sid Driss Abdelkader (who held a press conference on 9 February to defend himself and criticize Dudú) and the prisoners in Almería (who issued a further statement the same

The 1985 Immigration Law and community relations in the enclaves 109 day). At the same time, his standing in Morocco was advancing in leaps and bounds; at a rally in Nador on 8 February he was described by a leading member of Istiqlal, the nationalist party, as ‘a Moroccan compatriot who is in the vanguard of those fighting for the liberation of Melilla’ (El País, 9 February 1987). It was becoming patently clear that one of the major differences between the prisoners and Dudú was that the former were still intent on obtaining full rights as Spanish citizens, whereas that no longer appeared to be Dudú’s prime objective. Having started out as an advocate of equal rights for the Muslim population of Melilla, Dudú had instead become a Melilla separatist.21 Suddenly on 13 February there was another about-turn in Aomar Dudú’s behaviour during a visit to Nador by Sid Driss. Following talks between the two, which appeared to be amicable despite Dudú’s earlier accusations of betrayal, Dudú described Sid Driss as a ‘prisoner of the police chief Céspedes’ and the Almería prisoners as ‘Government hostages’ (El País, 14 February 1987). He also claimed that Sid Driss identified himself with Morocco and believed that the enclaves should be returned to that country, although there was no confirmation of this from Driss himself. A breakthrough for the Almería prisoners came on 20 February with the announcement that the remaining eight (a 17-year-old youth had been released the day before) would be released on bail the following day, although they did not return to Melilla until 23 February. At a press conference in Almería they took the opportunity to dissociate themselves from Dudú, and to assert their desire to remain Spanish and to observe the Spanish Constitution. One condition of their release was that they could not travel to Morocco without permission from a judge, a prohibition which remained in force until 30 June the following year when the judicial proceedings against them were concluded. On 3 March King Hassan of Morocco celebrated the 26th anniversary of his accession to the throne. It was reported with great interest in both Spain and Morocco that Aomar Dudú, Sid Driss and Dudú’s brother-in-law Abdelaziz Huariachi – all of whom were Spanish citizens – had pledged loyalty to King Hassan as part of the commemoration ceremony. The Moroccan press made great play of the event, while in Spain there were again calls for Dudú’s Spanish citizenship to be revoked, from the Government Representative

110 Europe or Africa? Manuel Céspedes among others. However, these were rejected by the Interior Minister Martín Palacín, no doubt for diplomatic reasons. Nevertheless Dudú’s actions further alienated him from the majority of the Muslim population in Melilla whose priorities were to gain full status as Spanish citizens, and there was a notable lack of response to his call for the closure of Muslim businesses and services to be held in the mosques of Melilla to mark the anniversary. Thereafter Dudú settled into relative obscurity in Morocco, living comfortably in Nador and with a second residence in Rabat, where in 1994 he became an adviser to the Moroccan Interior Ministry (Hernando de Larramendi, 1997, p. 395), while his star in Melilla continued to wane. It is difficult to assess precisely Dudú’s position in all this. Gillespie (2000, p. 73) suggests that ‘he was either an exceptionally astute politician, with great mastery of strategy and tactics, or – more probably – that he simply became frustrated at the slow pace of change’. An alternative view is that his appointment as adviser to the Spanish Interior Ministry quickly made him realize that he had betrayed his roots, and he reacted to that sense of betrayal by switching his support to the Moroccan cause towards the enclaves, especially after the high-level treatment he received on his visit to Rabat in October 1986. In any event he was no longer a force to be reckoned with.22 Another self-exiled former Muslim leader in Melilla, Sid Driss Abdelkader, had also lost whatever influence he had in the community. When he attempted to return to the enclave from Nador on 15 September 1988 in order to hand himself over to the Spanish authorities he was prevented from doing so by Moroccan police because he had not sought permission. This prompted a call on 20 September by the Alianza Popular representative in Congress, José Luis Sánchez Usero, for the Spanish citizenship of both Sid Driss and Dudú to be revoked.

Moderate leaders take over Following the episodes of 1987 organized activity within the Muslim community in the enclave became more muted. With Dudú permanently settled in Morocco, other more moderate leaders came to the

The 1985 Immigration Law and community relations in the enclaves 111 fore, such as 29-year-old Abdelkáder Mohamed Alí, Dudú’s former right-hand man and one of those imprisoned in Almería. In an interview published in El País on 11 July 1988 Alí rejected the proMoroccan conversion that Dudú had undergone and argued that for the vast majority of the members of his community in Melilla the main concern was to ensure equal rights for the Muslims in the enclaves, which included the granting of Spanish nationality but also extended to education, social problems, housing and employment (much of which currently involved Muslims working as cheap labour on behalf of the cristianos). Although Dudú’s organization Terra Omnium remained significant under the leadership of Abderramán Mohamed, the community had become more fragmented and other associations such as Neópolis (led by Alí) and Averroes had been established. By the time of the third anniversary of the mobilization of the Muslim community on 23 November 1988 it was clear that the approach of the current leadership was very different from that of Dudú, although a number of his remaining band of supporters did engage in a noisy protest at the commemoration of the anniversary on behalf of their exiled leader. In one sense it was not surprising that the Muslim community had become less militant. Substantial progress was being made on tackling the nationality issue – the main cause of their mobilization in the mid-1980s. By the end of 1988, 5,816 members of the Muslim community in Melilla had obtained Spanish nationality, while for Ceuta the figure was 3,667 (López García, 1993a, p. 59). In Melilla 1,126 were waiting for their applications to be dealt with, 201 had been rejected and a further 1,095 had had their applications filed until they had accrued further residential qualifications. This may not have been an impressive rate of progress over three years, but nevertheless it marked a significant improvement. It was sufficient to cause Mariano Bucetta, former Moroccan Foreign Minister and leader of Istiqlal, to accuse the Spanish Government in April 1989 of ‘trying rapidly to “Hispanicize” the two occupied towns’ (El País, 3 April 1989), and again in May, when he accused Madrid of ‘carrying out a rapid and compulsory process of “Hispanicization”. It is making people choose between forcibly accepting Spanish nationality in order to be able to continue to live and work in their own land, or else be expelled’ (El País, 19 May 1989). This was not the view, however, of representatives of the Muslim communities in the

112 Europe or Africa? enclaves who felt obliged constantly to proclaim their ‘Spanishness’, especially (as in the summer of 1990) when opposition parties in Morocco became vociferous in demanding the return of the enclaves and in so doing aroused the hostility of the ceutí and melillense ‘nationalist’ groups.23 For their pains, the Muslims of the enclaves were condemned by the Moroccan nationalists as traitors. Conversely the Melilla ‘nationalists’, in the form of the Partido Nacionalista Español de Melilla (PNEM), talked of ‘the Moorish threat’ to the enclave, especially with the return of the religious leader Sid Driss Abdelkader on 12 September 1990 after some three-and-a-half years of self-imposed exile in Morocco. The PNEM blamed the socialist leadership of the enclave and the Government Representative, Manuel Céspedes, for showing greater concern for the Muslim population than for the non-Muslims. Further signs of racial tension showed themselves at this time: in September 1990 it was reported that nearly half the medical staff at the new hospital in Melilla had asked for a transfer to the peninsula because they found themselves treating too many Moroccans, while in October two Moroccans with cholera symptoms were turned away from the Red Cross hospital in Ceuta.

The Gulf War The Gulf War in early 1991 did not provoke formal tensions between Morocco and Spain (see Chapter 1). It did, however, cause strains within the enclaves themselves, as the Muslim and non-Muslim communities rallied behind either side. Police reinforcements were sent to both Ceuta and Melilla to increase the presence at border controls and important installations. Militant Muslims expressed solidarity with Saddam Hussein, while more moderate leaders such as Abdelkáder Mohamed Alí of the Asociación Neópolis, and the Izquierda Unida, recognized that Saddam’s action was ‘in tune with the concerns and frustrations of the Islamic world’ (El País, 29 January 1991). In early February petrol bombs were thrown at the headquarters of the Muslim Asociación Averroes because it did not support a pro-Iraq demonstration. The reactions of the people of the enclaves, including the small Jewish populations, were a microcosm of the whole of the Islamic and non-Islamic worlds of southern

The 1985 Immigration Law and community relations in the enclaves 113 Europe and the Middle East. After the Gulf War, however, relations between the Muslim and Spanish communities in the enclaves reverted to normality to such an extent that the Madrid Government felt confident in implementing a nationwide amnesty between June and December 1991 to allow illegal immigrants, many of whom were from Muslim countries, to regularize their situation.24

Social inequalities remain Social inequalities between the communities continued to reflect the divisions between the communities in the enclaves. In 1994 a report showed that whereas 34 per cent of the school population between the ages of 3 and 14 in Ceuta were Muslims, a relatively small proportion continued with education beyond the primary level (EGB). Of those who did, most entered the colleges that offer technical training (FP), while less than 10 per cent of the students in the academic institutions studying for the secondary leaving certificate (BUP) and the university entrance examination (COU) were of Muslim origin. This meant that the social and economic divisions between the two communities in the enclaves were being perpetuated by the educational choices that were being made. Small wonder that two representatives of the Partido Independiente Hispano-Berebere, established in 1994, felt obliged to say: ‘The Muslim-Berber community is marginalized. In Melilla there are two worlds, the Christian and the Muslim’ (El País, 22 March 1994). They called for the horizontal integration of the two communities, which would respect their differences. They saw themselves as ‘Spanish Muslims’, but wanted the official recognition of Cherja and for education to be bilingual. As indicated in Chapter 2, this was an issue which was taken up by the Izquierda Unida in relation to the autonomy statutes, but it fell on stony ground as far as the two main political parties were concerned. Clearly there would be political dangers if the Spanish Government were seen to be making any moves which might have been interpreted as a concession to pro-Moroccan demands. The issue of marginalization did not go away. At the end of March 1996, some two years after the publication of the report, several thousand members of the Muslim community in Melilla took part in a demonstration organized by the Coalición por Melilla under the

114 Europe or Africa? banner ‘Against Marginalization and for Social Justice’. Not only did they call for the problems of the outer suburbs to be tackled, such as unemployment, illiteracy, housing and infrastructure, but revealingly they called for the completion of the documentation process which had begun ten years earlier. It was reported that by July 1997 some 1,500 members of the Muslim community were still seeking Spanish citizenship (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 27 July 1997). Clearly once the spotlight had been taken off the enclaves in this regard the authorities were in no hurry to finish dealing with this issue.

Revision to the 1985 Law By mid-1998, the inadequacies of the 1985 Immigration Law were being heavily criticized, and steps were taken to begin the process of improvement. One particular area which was causing a good deal of abuse was the requirement for immigrants to possess a work permit before they could obtain a residence permit, allowing some unscrupulous employers to impose harsh working conditions on their immigrant employees. There was a cross-party consensus that the existing legislation was in need of improvement and widespread support from the opposition parties for a CiU Bill which was put through Congress at the end of 1999. The proposed Bill did not remove the link between work permits and residence permits, but significantly it recognized the rights of immigrant workers (including illegal immigrants) to the same freedoms and status as Spanish workers. However, some leading members of the Government (including the Interior Minister, Jaime Mayor Oreja) were concerned that the Bill might be too liberal, and the Foreign Affairs Minister, Abel Matutes, warned of the risk that ‘Spain might become a target of the Mafia involved in illegal immigration’ (El País, 24 November 1999). Government amendments to the Bill incorporated during its passage through the Senate were surprisingly defeated when the Coalición Canaria failed to support them on its return to Congress on 22 December, and the Prime Minister made it clear that if he won the March 2000 general election his government would bring the legislation back to Parliament in order to push through the counter-reforming amendments (a point he reiterated during his visit to Rabat in May 2000 after the election).

The 1985 Immigration Law and community relations in the enclaves 115 The 1999 Immigration Law approved by Congress came into force on 1 February 2000. It provided much greater protection to immigrants than had been the case hitherto. By contrast to the 1985 Law, if immigrants could demonstrate two years’ uninterrupted residence25 and adequate means of support, they could obtain ‘automatic regularization’ for five years with the possibility of it becoming permanent, whatever their means of entry into the country and whether or not they had a work permit. They could obtain full access to all welfare and social services, they had the right to bring their dependents into the country, and the authorities were obliged to justify any refusal to grant a visa. Illegal entry by migrants would continue to lead to expulsion if they were caught, except if they collaborated with the police in order to assist with the arrest of those engaged in people trafficking. There is no doubt that some of the postures of the political parties during the passage of the legislation were closely related to the impending general election, but they were also a reflection of the sensitivity of the issues and the collective uncertainty within Spanish society as to how the question of immigration should be dealt with in the context of the changing patterns of demography and the need for unskilled labour (see Chapter 5). Needless to say, the Law was welcomed by all groups representing the interests of immigrants in Spain, but the return to power of the PP in March 2000 with a comfortable majority suggests that the Government’s opposition to the extent of the reform may well have had support in the country at large. In Ceuta there was concern expressed by the Police Union (the Sindicato Unificado de Policía) that the revised Law would attract large numbers of migrants into the enclave, while the Government Representative in Melilla, Enrique Beamud, reported that all parties in the local Assembly would call for changes to the Law. Those changes were duly approved by the Cabinet in July and August 2000 with a view to putting them before Parliament later in the year.

Conclusions There is no doubt that the impact of the Immigration Law of 1985 for the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla had not been thought through either prior to or during its passage through Parliament. Formulated

116 Europe or Africa? by civil servants in the Interior Ministry in Madrid largely for the purpose of indicating to Spain’s future EC partners that the Spanish Government was tightening up on the issue of immigration control, the particular effect of the law on Muslims born in the enclaves but of Moroccan parentage was harsh and unjust, and their reaction caused the Socialist Government in Madrid a good deal of embarrassment. It was a law aimed at aliens, but because of the way in which it transformed community relations in the enclaves and in a political sense served to mobilize the Muslim community there in an unprecedented way, it had unforeseen major repercussions for the Spanish citizens of the enclaves and for the country as a whole. It has to be said that the Spanish authorities at all levels emerged from the episode with very little credit for the way in which they dealt with the Muslim communities in the enclaves. However, once there had been a response to the initial impact the real issue of immigration came to the fore – namely the conversion of Spain from the second half of the 1980s from being a country of emigration (especially to Latin America and – from the 1960s – to northern Europe) to one of immigration as Spain’s economy grew in the wake of Spanish entry into the EC (see Corredera García and Diez Cano, 1992, p. 195).26 Although for historical reasons a substantial number of such immigrants (both legal and illegal) were from Latin America, a growing proportion came from North Africa and increasingly from sub-Saharan Africa. Such migrants were not new to Spain and to Europe in the 1980s and 1990s, but what changed was the fact that more of them chose to stay in Spain rather than move on to northern Europe in search of better prospects (López García, 1993c, p. 87). The illegal migrants from Africa – both North Africa and further afield – frequently entered Europe via Spain’s North African enclaves, and both the impact and the ramifications of this phenomenon will be explored in the next chapter. Notes 1 Carabaza and de Santos, 1993, p. 99, produced different percentage figures from those of López García for the various categories of documentation possessed by the Muslims. On p. 95 they demonstrate that a higher percentage of Muslims living in both enclaves in 1986 were born there compared to the percentage of the ‘official population’ (población de derecho).

The 1985 Immigration Law and community relations in the enclaves 117 2 The higher percentage of Muslims in Melilla could well be due to the fact that from the early 1970s, Moroccan workers in Ceuta were part of the Social Security regime, whereas this was not the case in Melilla until 10 years later. As a consequence employers in Melilla found it cheaper to hire workers from Morocco (even if they did not have proper documentation), and hence a greater number of Muslims entered that enclave. 3 Dudú was born in Melilla in 1950 and was one of the members of the Muslim community who had only the statistical identity card. It was only thanks to the acquisition of a Moroccan passport and a grant from the Moroccan Government that he was able to study Economics at the University of Málaga. 4 For details of this episode, see Crespo, 1985. 5 As an illustration of these social factors, in 1987 illiteracy in the Muslim quarters of Ceuta stood at 37 per cent compared to 3 per cent in the non-Muslim areas, while only 28 per cent of the active Muslim population in Ceuta (30 per cent in Melilla) were in employment (see López García, 1993a, p. 58). Carabaza and de Santos, 1992, pp. 100, 102, produce different figures. 6 For a succinct summary of the development of the 1985 Immigration Law and an analysis of it, see Corredera García and Diez Cano, 1992, pp. 204–12. 7 The groups specifically referred to in the Law were Ibero-Americans, Portuguese, Filipinos, Andorrans, Equatorial Guineans, Sephardis and Gibraltarians. 8 The name came from a battle in 1893 between the Melilla garrison and tribespeople in which the Spanish were defeated (see Driessen, 1992, p. 164). 9 The press in Morocco, spurred on by the nationalist party Istiqlal, gave substantial coverage to the new Immigration Law on 9 December and called on the Moroccan Government to step up its claims to the enclaves. 10 The gathering of data for the census did not begin until August 1986. It was undertaken in two stages: a list of people who live in the towns, followed by a socioeconomic study of the residents. 11 The joint committee set up on 10 February held its first meeting in Madrid on the same day. At the second meeting on 20 March, it was announced that the Government would spend 8,500 million pesetas (US$56 million) over five years on infrastructural improvements in Melilla and 6,500 million (US$43 million) in Ceuta. 12 A militant assembly of 2,000 Muslims which met in Melilla on 15 June called upon its representatives to break off participation in the Joint Committee if certain demands were not met by 26 June. These included the granting of 1,000 Spanish citizenships and the removal of four senior officers of the Brigada de la Policía Judicial. 13 No doubt to the satisfaction of the Muslim community, the diputado for the PP elected to the Congress in the genuine elections, José Luis Sánchez Usero, obtained fewer votes from the electorate of 35,000 than the Muslim leader Aomar Dudú obtained from his electorate of just over 10,000 in these parallel elections. The PSOE

118 Europe or Africa? suffered heavily for the civil disturbances in Melilla. (See Chapter 3 for the general election result.) 14 The new Government Representative in Ceuta was Ramón Berra Pereira, formerly adviser on labour relations at the Ministry of Education and Science. 15 Dudú threatened to withdraw his acceptance of the appointment following the swearing-in ceremony of the new Government Representatives on 3 September, because no-one from the Muslim community had been invited to attend. He agreed to proceed after a public apology from the Ministry of the Interior and from Manuel Céspedes himself. 16 There were suspicions that a visit by Aomar Dudú to Rabat in early October (during which he had had contact with the Moroccan Interior Minister, Dris Basri, and possibly even an audience with King Hassan II) had been influential in this apparent change of strategy. During the weeks following Dudú’s visit a number of statements had emerged from Morocco to remind Spain of its neighbour’s claims to the enclaves. The Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP), in an editorial in their newspaper on 6 October 1986, called on the Spanish Government to adopt a policy which would transfer Ceuta and Melilla to Moroccan sovereignty, while on 22 October the First Secretary of the same party claimed that ‘sooner or later [the enclaves] will return to Morocco’. The nationalist party Istiqlal repeated its claim to the enclaves at a meeting of its central committee on 18 October, but less predictably on 3 November the Moroccan Prime Minister, Azedin Laraki, stated in Parliament in Rabat that Ceuta and Melilla were part of Moroccan territory. These claims were no doubt linked to an official visit by the Moroccan Foreign Minister, Abdelatif Filali, to Spain on 14 and 15 October. 17 Further business closures were called for 22 and 23 December. 18 Rabat seized upon these events to highlight the problem of the enclaves. The Moroccan press made front page news of recent events, while on 14 November the Spanish Ambassador in Rabat was summoned to the Moroccan Foreign Office for a warning about the possible consequences of events in Melilla. 19 By the end of 1986 only 830 requests for Spanish nationality from Muslims in the North African enclaves had been granted out of some 5,000 applications that had been submitted. Although the process improved during 1987 and over 3,000 were accepted, Céspedes’ forecast was predictably over-optimistic and over 2,500 remained to be dealt with by the end of the year. 20 In October 1993 a magistrate in Melilla decided to extend the 1987 sedition charges to a further five Muslim residents, bringing the total to 25. It was an extraordinary decision after such a lengthy period of time had elapsed. It came as a surprise to non-Muslim and Muslim communities alike, and did nothing to enhance good race relations within the enclave. The case was finally dropped in 1997. 21 It was scarcely surprising, therefore, that in a survey carried out in midFebruary 1987 in mainland Spain 44 per cent thought that the disturbances in Melilla had been concerned with demands for independence, while only 25 per cent

The 1985 Immigration Law and community relations in the enclaves 119 understood them to be concerned with equal rights for the Muslim community (López García, 1992a, p. 151). 22 Dudú remained resident in Morocco and did not visit Melilla until January 1999, by which time the sedition charge against him had been dropped (El País, 8 February 1999). 23 A leading military figure of the day observed a process of ‘Moroccanization’ rather than ‘Hispanicization’ in the enclaves, and was persuaded that Morocco was planning a four-step invasion, starting with demographic superiority, followed by civil disturbances, a ‘Green March’-style invasion and then political and military pressure from Morocco (see Martínez Inglés, 1989, p. 190). However, the signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbourliness and Cooperation in 1991 made such a scenario highly unlikely. 24 See Solé et al., 1998, p. 340; Collinson, 1996, p. 35, n. 76; Cornelius, 1994, p. 354. 25 One of the modifications proposed by the PP Government after the 2000 elections was to increase this period from two to five years (see El Mundo, 28 August 2000). Further attempts by the Government to tighten the legislation were debated in October 2000, although amendments to over half of the proposed articles were accepted (El Mundo, 14 October 2000). 26 López García, 1993c, p. 79, shows that the number of registrations in the Moroccan consulate in Madrid rose from under 1,000 in 1985 to over 6,000 in the first half of 1991.

FIVE

THE ENCLAVES: A MIGRATION GATEWAY TO EUROPE As the only territories which provide a land border between the EU and Africa, Ceuta and Melilla act as magnets for would-be illegal migrants to continental Europe from all over the African continent. Because the towns have a unique position, this chapter focuses on an examination of the specific role of the North African enclaves in illegal immigration. However, because illegal immigration is symptomatic of the whole south–north migration process, the part played by the enclaves is placed in the wider context of the immigration issue between Africa and Europe. There are three types of illegal immigrant moving across from North Africa into the EU via Spain. First, there are those who enter legally, having obtained a fixed-term visa as a tourist or student, for example, but who once in the EU disappear thanks to a support network of compatriots which enables them to stay indefinitely or until caught by police. They usually end up working without contracts for low wages and are difficult to track down. Second, there are those who try to enter through established entry-ports but do so using false documentation – either passports, work contracts or residence permits. Their fate is often similar to the first group. Most of these two types of immigrant enter during the summer months when there is a mass migration of about one million North Africans travelling across the Strait of Gibraltar and customs and immigration officers are often overwhelmed by the sheer numbers of people in what has become known as ‘Operation Passage Across the Strait’ (Operación Paso del Estrecho). The third form of immigration from North Africa is carried out on the back of well-established Moroccan networks of tobacco and

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cannabis traffickers. These organizations are linked to European networks which, once the immigrants have reached Spain, transport them to other parts of the country and beyond.1 People-smuggling – some refer to it as ‘the new slave trade’, estimated to be worth US$7,000 million world-wide (El País, 7 August 1998) – has become an increasingly attractive proposition to these groups in recent years, especially since 1991 when the numbers started to rise,2 because the profits are high and the penalties if caught are less severe than for drugs or arms trafficking. The Moroccan networks are supported in Spain by groups of fishing-boat owners, lorry or taxi drivers and businessmen, especially in the region of the Campo de Gibraltar and around Almería. The areas in which they mainly operate in North Africa are Ceuta and Melilla, and also Tangier in Morocco itself. These wouldbe immigrants are taken across the Strait (14 kilometres at the shortest distance) to various beaches on the southern Spanish coast around Algeciras for between US$700 and US$3,500 (payment in advance), the exact price depending on the distance of the sea voyage and the type of vessel – the safer, the more expensive. Some immigrants are hidden on fishing-boats or other craft – on one occasion in 1997, 71 Moroccans en route to Italy were found on board a 35-foot vessel off Algeciras (El País, 24 November 1997). But the most common vessels used are the pateras, small wooden boats often with outboard motors which are difficult for patrol boats to catch up with or to detect. They are also the most vulnerable, usually travelling with too many people on board and therefore sitting very low in the water. In recent years Spanish police carried out raids on illegal workshops where the pateras are made. In the summer of 1999 the number of pateras caught making the crossing was considerably reduced, probably due to tighter controls. There was, however, an increase in the number of cheap, motorless inflatable dinghies which are taken out to sea by divers who, at the appearance of a patrol boat, can simply vanish into the night. For the would-be immigrants (reminiscent of the Vietnamese ‘boat-people’) it is a risky business. One estimate put the number of drownings over the six-year period 1992–98 at around 1,000 (Agence France Presse, 10 February 1998), while an immigrant support group, the Association of Immigrant Moroccan Workers in Spain (ATIME), suggests that the number of deaths is much greater, and

122 Europe or Africa? claims that the first seven months of 1998 alone produced 1,000 victims. The Spanish government did confirm 200 deaths for that period, but only those in Spanish waters; ATIME estimated that a further 800 were drowned in Moroccan waters (Inter Press Service, 11 August 1998).3 Inevitably there is also uncertainty about the number of illegal immigrants who do actually make it to Spain and beyond. Recent Spanish police estimates put the figure at about 5,000 a year, but organizations like ATIME suggest that the number is probably double that, and possibly even four times that figure (see The European, 20 July 1998; Inter Press Service, 11 August 1998). Despite the introduction of the Immigration Law in 1985, plus further attempts at the regularization of illegal immigrants in 1991 (when over 108,000 – 44 per cent of them Moroccans – were given legal status [López García et al., 1994, p. 100]) and again in 1996,4 one estimate of the total number of ‘illegals’ in Spain in the mid-1990s put the figure at around 300,000 (Baldwin-Edwards, 1997, p. 509), although more recent estimates go as high as 700,000 (The Economist, 2 January 1999). The typical illegal immigrant is a young male aged 16–30, but in increasing numbers they are minors who hope to find work and send money back to their families. Those under 16 cannot by law be employed, but in accordance with the Rights of the Child Convention nor can they be repatriated, and many end up in drug or prostitution rackets. In 1997 around 350 unaccompanied Moroccan boys were caught in Madrid alone (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 18 July 1998). In October 1998 Catalan authorities identified over 200 children of Maghreb origin living on the streets of Barcelona (El País, 4 October 1998), while in Andalucía in the first three months of 1999, 172 new migrants under the age of 18 were taken into reception centres (El País, 7 July 1999), compared to 108 in the same period the year before. This represented a 59 per cent increase, although it may reflect improved detection techniques as much as a rise in the numbers attempting to enter.5 Most of the illegal immigrants trying to enter Europe in this way were Moroccan. Of the 5,948 illegal immigrants caught in Andalucía (but not in the enclaves) in the period 1990–August 1996, 67 per cent were from Morocco, 10 per cent from Algeria, 18 per cent from the rest of Africa, and 5 per cent from other countries (see El País, 18

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August 1996). If those caught in the enclaves are included, a predictably higher percentage of those detained were from Morocco: of the 7,741 people caught by Spanish police in 1996 in Andalucía and the enclaves combined, 86 per cent were Moroccan, 10 per cent Algerian, 2 per cent from the rest of Africa and the remainder from other countries (El País, 7 April 1997). 51 per cent of these were stopped before they had left the shores of Africa in either Ceuta (where 21 per cent were caught) or Melilla (30 per cent).6 The 1996 figure represented an increase of 85 per cent compared with two years earlier (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 18 June 1997), while in 1997 the total figure rose to over 16,000 (El País, 5 July 1998). This was clearly a worsening problem.7 It is scarcely surprising that the vast majority were Moroccans, for it was relatively easy for them to enter the enclaves and from there to try to cross to mainland Europe. Some 15,000 of them from the neighbouring Moroccan provinces of Tetuán and Nador enter Ceuta and Melilla to work each day (an exception to the Schengen Agreement allows them to do so without a visa), so potential illegal immigrants can easily mingle with them, while at night it is not difficult for Moroccans to enter via the coast. There are more attempts made at crossing the Strait in the summer months, when the sea is calmer, and specific events are eagerly seized upon as special opportunities: in a 10-day period in August 1998 during a carnival in Ceuta police arrested over 600 Moroccans, many of whom were trying to hide among the disassembled fairground rides awaiting shipment to Spain.8 According to police figures there were signs that from 1999 improved patrolling in the waters between Ceuta and Algeciras, the confiscation of pateras and physical barriers around the enclaves (see below) were driving more of the people-trafficking towards the Canary Islands as a point of departure for entry into the Spanish mainland. In 1998, 109 pateras and 22 other craft were stopped around Algeciras on the route across the Strait, which resulted in 2,416 people being detained, compared with only 20 pateras, 27 other craft and 1,163 people detained in the first eight months of 1999. The numbers of drowned and missing had also fallen from 107 in 1998 to 15 up to August 1999. The trend with regard to vessels was similar in the vicinity of Ceuta, with the number of boats seized down from 198 to 74. However, the opposite trend was visible on the Canaries route,

124 Europe or Africa? where figures had risen dramatically since 1996, with 67 pateras and 399 people caught in 1998, and 25 pateras and 221 people up until July 1999 (quoted in El País, 25 August 1999). In April 2000 more than 800 illegal immigrants reached the Canaries, most of them from sub-Saharan Africa (El Mundo, 3 May 2000). However, figures for the first five months of 2000 showed that the number of would-be immigrants caught by the police attempting to enter Spain across the Strait was twice that of the whole of 1999, with between 70 and 120 drownings up to the end of April. The police mentioned the 1999 Immigration Law and the ensuing regularization process as a major factor in encouraging would-be immigrants to attempt the sea-crossing (El Mundo, 16 March 2000; 6 May 2000; 4 June 2000). Those who traffic in illegal immigrants were no doubt encouraging them to act before the new PP Government tightened the legislation (see Chapter 4).9

Immigrants from the rest of Africa Although the numbers from the rest of Africa were relatively small until the early 1990s, they have since been increasing and there is a well-established network organized from Morocco which facilitates the passage of illegal immigrants from several countries in west and central Africa via Cameroon and Senegal to Morocco or Algeria and thence to the North African ports. A few try to cross to Europe from Tangier, Oujda and Nador, while an increasing number try to do so from within Ceuta and Melilla, but most of those who reach the Spanish enclaves do not have the money to pay for a boat crossing and so they seek asylum.10 Although an agreement has existed since February 1992 between Spain and Morocco on the readmission and repatriation of migrants originating in third countries provided that it can be proven that they entered the enclaves via Morocco, the Spanish authorities frequently cannot deport them to Morocco because of the difficulty of establishing such proof (often they have no papers or have deliberately destroyed them). In such circumstances they end up in refugee camps such as Calamocarro on the outskirts of Ceuta or La Granja near Melilla. The agreement between Spain and Morocco was put to the test in July 1992 when Morocco initially refused to accept the return of 72

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Africans (the final figure rose to 84) from Liberia, Nigeria, Ghana, Somalia, Zaire and Mali. Following a protest outside the Government Representative’s office in Melilla they were expelled into a strip of no-man’s land between the enclave and Morocco. After two weeks they were taken by the Spanish authorities to Málaga and Almería ‘for humanitarian reasons’, and were processed for repatriation or political asylum. In addition, the Spanish Ombudsman was called in by the Red Cross to investigate whether the Africans had been properly expelled from the enclave. By 22 August 77 of the would-be immigrants had been accepted by Morocco, and further readmissions occurred later in 1992. Since then many other major incidents have occurred involving refugees from Western and Central Africa. From early in 1993 a number of illegal immigrants, reportedly from Somalia, Liberia and Rwanda, were being housed in a disused discotheque in Ceuta. They were denied political refugee status because the authorities did not want to give any encouragement to others, but the numbers continued to grow and by May 1995 had reached 250. Although none of the authorities wanted to take responsibility for them, the Government Office in Ceuta finally decided on 20 May that each case would be considered for a temporary residence permit and if successful they would be taken across to mainland Spain for further processing. By September only 50 had been transferred, and the remainder began to threaten demonstrations and hunger strikes. Following a visit to the enclave on 22 September by an assistant to the Ombudsman, who described the situation as ‘very delicate’ and ‘explosive’, the Ombudsman wrote to the Interior Ministry urging that some action be taken to deal with their applications to enter Spain in accordance with the Immigration Law. The situation came to a head on 11 October when 60 Kurdish refugees (some reports said they were Turks claiming to be Kurds in order to obtain political refugee status) who had arrived in Ceuta from Morocco only a few days before were transported to mainland Spain without delay. In protest the African immigrants, some of whom had been in the enclave for over two years, began to riot and there was a pitched battle between some 150 immigrants, the police, and members of the Spanish community, with one policeman shot and over 80 people injured. The following day the police with reinforcements rounded

126 Europe or Africa? up a total of 300 immigrants, and those who showed physical signs of having been involved in the affray were initially detained in a warehouse at the docks, while the remainder were kept in another warehouse for their own safety. Leading politicians, including the Ceuta President Basilio Fernández López, called for the expulsion of all of the detainees and the sealing of the border with Morocco. Over the ensuing days accusations were made against the Justice and Interior Ministries as well as the Government Representative in Ceuta, Carmen Cerdeira, for allowing the situation to develop. The immigrants not involved in the affray were taken to a disused camp on the outskirts of the town under police protection until the animosity had dissipated, while some 150 rioters were gradually dispersed to detention centres in Spain for further processing. The episode reflected on the one hand the latent racist tendencies of the Spanish community in the enclaves who felt threatened by the potentially overwhelming problem of migration from Africa to Europe, and on the other the reluctance by the Spanish authorities to take responsibility for the problem, resulting in administrative paralysis in trying to decide what to do with hundreds of virtually stateless people. The apparent tolerance by the residents of Ceuta towards their unwanted guests and the inaction on the part of the authorities (the Interior Ministry and the Government Representative’s office) had been replaced, following the protests by the frustrated African immigrants, by racist animosity and hostile counteraction.11 In June 1996 it was Melilla’s turn to deal with a large group of subSaharan Africans trying to protest their way into Europe. Some 130 illegal immigrants from a number of Central African countries, who had been housed in tents in the grounds of a disused Red Cross hospital in Melilla, staged a sit-down protest outside the offices of the Government Representative, Enrique Beamud, demanding to be transferred to the peninsula. The protest also spread to the hospital grounds, where there were outbreaks of violence. On 23 June 103 of the immigrants were detained by police and flown to a detention centre in Málaga, where over the next few days they were deported in great secrecy on military aircraft via the Canary Islands to Mali, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal and Cameroon. However, that was not the end of the matter. Representatives of the police union, the Sindicato Unificado de Policía (SUP), sent a report on

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the incident to the Ombudsman, claiming (although this version of events was later disputed) that immigration officials, acting in the name of the Interior Ministry, had given some of the immigrants water containing a sedative without informing the police officers in charge of them. When it became known that the immigrants had been deported without any court order and had been treated as criminals, there was deep concern expressed by human rights groups and refugee welfare organizations throughout Spain. The Ombudsman challenged the Interior Ministry to explain the events, and the Minister Jaime Mayor Oreja did admit to Parliament on 29 July that ‘the operation had not been a model one’ (El País, 30 July 1996) although he claimed that the government was acting in the same way as the previous administration had done (a point disputed by the PSOE). Further anomalies also came to light: there were claims that the deportees originated from between eight and fourteen countries but were only repatriated to four, with some 50 of them ending up in prison in Guinea-Bissau;12 it was alleged that of the 19 immigrants who were deported to Mali were each paid 250,000 pesetas (US$1,600) (a considerable sum in Mali and one hardly likely to act as a deterrent) at the request of the Mali authorities as a form of ‘repatriation payment’; and the Ombudsman’s report maintained that at least four of the immigrants (another report suggested 30) had asked for political asylum but were improperly deported before their cases could be examined.13 The Interior Minister maintained that the action was designed to set an example and deter other would-be immigrants from trying to enter Spain via the enclaves, and since the Government had not yet found any other way of dealing with the problem of hundreds of African refugees in the enclaves, where there were always others ready to replace those who were moved on, he felt it was justified in its conception if not in every detail of its execution. Moreover it transpired that what were the first major incidents of this kind in Spain in 1995 and 1996 had already become commonplace in France, where military aircraft were used on a regular basis to transport illegal immigrants back to their African countries of origin, and there were suspicions that the Spanish Government might have been responding to a degree of pressure from its northern neighbour to take a tougher stance on the immigrant problem, given that many of those entering through Spanish territory ended up in France.

128 Europe or Africa? The Spanish Prime Minister’s comments on the episode were that ‘there was a problem and it has been dealt with’ (El País, 30 July 1996), remarks which suggested satisfaction with the way in which it had been handled and which gave cause for concern among opposition politicians and also NGOs involved with the welfare of immigrants. But there was no evidence to suggest that either the Government (which saw the problem as one of law and order) or the public at large was much concerned by the actions taken against the Africans in ‘Operation Melilla’.14 Nevertheless, it may well be that the political fallout from the way in which this episode had been handled prompted the Government to take a more permissive line at the end of January 1997 with 400 sub-Saharan Africans and 50 Algerians who had made their way into Melilla. Under the new Programme for the Reception and Employment Training for Sub-Saharan Immigrants established in October 1996, the Ministry of the Interior gave them permission to be taken to Málaga or Almería where they were given assistance and allowed two weeks to find employment somewhere in Spain in order to legalize their situation. Migrant welfare agencies complained about the short time allowed, but this was certainly a far more humane solution than the one that had been employed the previous year. Despite such dispersals of African immigrants from the enclaves, the problems of accommodating them while they were there remained to be resolved, and as long as this was unsatisfactory there was the possibility of civil disturbances, as happened in Melilla in early June 1997. It was timely, therefore, that a few days later the Ombudsman called upon the Ministry of the Interior to show a greater sense of urgency in processing applications for asylum and greater consideration for human rights, including proper reception centres and legal assistance, for the sub-Saharan Africans in the enclaves who at that time numbered over 1,000 (more than 800 of them in a centre in Melilla designed to hold 200) (El País, 14 June 1997). There were further criticisms in August that the treatment of the immigrants in the reception centres was deficient on health grounds, with inadequate basic requirements such as drinking water, sufficient food and shelter (some slept in abandoned cars in a breaker’s yard) and access to medical attention. The Ombudsman stepped in

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once more, claiming that the situation had worsened since his advisers visited the enclaves in January, and called on the Government to take some emergency measures to deal with it, including the appointment of an ‘immigration czar’. However, one spokesman from the Government Representative’s office claimed that the immigrants were well treated, and suggested that ‘if their treatment were degrading and inhuman, fewer of them would come’ (El País, 13 August 1997). But there were signs that the Government was attempting to respond to all these criticisms when it was also announced that a new temporary reception centre would be established near the border post at Farhana in Melilla to be ready by November at an initial cost of 100 million pesetas (US$660,000). The only problem was that the planned capacity was only 300. In September 1997 there was a further announcement that funding for the Calamocarro camp on the outskirts of Ceuta (where because of the political situation in Algeria the numbers of refugees from that country had gone up from 75 to 300 between April and September out of a total of 53015) would be increased in 1998 to 400 million pesetas (US$2.66 million).16 In addition to criticism of the Spanish authorities, there was considerable frustration from within the enclaves themselves that they were receiving little support from the Moroccan side of the borders in controlling the flow of immigrants. In Melilla the local Government spokesman explicitly accused local Moroccan authorities of facilitating the entry of immigrants across the border by accepting bribes and called on Morocco to implement the 1992 agreement on the readmission of illegal immigrants from third countries, which had not been applied since 1992.17 With a spate of drownings in the Strait of Gibraltar throughout the late summer of 1997 the Ombudsman for Andalucía called on Spain and the EU to force Morocco to take action against illegal immigration, although both the Spanish Foreign and Interior Ministers argued that neither Spain nor Morocco could do anything to stop it entirely. The parliamentary representatives for Melilla (all from the PP) claimed in early December that the illegal immigrants were using a disproportionate amount of the enclave’s resources for police, the courts, welfare services and health care. It may have been coincidence but two weeks later the Interior Minister announced during a lengthy appearance before the Parliamentary Justice and Interior

130 Europe or Africa? Committee that with the support of seven NGOs a total of 1,206 subSaharan Africans were to be transferred from both enclaves (1,085 of them from Melilla) to reception centres on the mainland over a twomonth period.18 This was part of the Government’s Reception Programme and unlike the first group transferred in January 1997 this cohort were given one-year renewable residence permits. It would appear that the Government’s immigration policy was gradually evolving and becoming more humane, although there was concern that this, combined with improved reception centres on the outskirts of the enclaves, would have the effect of encouraging more Africans to make their way northwards in the hope of gaining entry into Europe.19 However, it became clear that unless further improvements were made to the reception centres, there was the danger of major disturbances taking place, such as occurred on 2 September 1999 with the burning down of the old centre of La Granja in Melilla by refugees protesting against (among other things) the conditions in which they were being detained, causing damage valued at 20 million pesetas (US$133,000).20

Fences One attempt to tackle the illegal immigration problem has been the erection of fences around Ceuta and Melilla. One of the consequences of the implementation of the Immigration Law in 1986 – and also of Spain’s accession to the European Community earlier in the year – was the need for the Spanish Government to reinforce its external borders. Until April 1986 the only places between Morocco and Melilla that had been permanently guarded were the four frontier crossing points. Thereafter an illuminated stretch of wire fence was put in place with a sentry post every few hundred metres. It was planned that the frontier crossing points would have a computer link to the police, and checks would be made on whether people were legitimately staying in the enclave overnight. However, according to unofficial police reports, by the summer of 1990 the security measures were next to useless. The CCTV cameras had either been stolen or did not function, the sensor pads did not work and the wire fences were easily penetrable. In November the Partido Popular, which claimed that there were countless unofficial ways in which

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Moroccans could enter Melilla and avoid border checks, called for a wall to be built around the town. At a time when a wall with the purpose of keeping people in rather than keeping them out had just been brought down elsewhere in Europe, it was scarcely surprising that there was little enthusiasm for a wall, but work was begun on a more effective fence in 1993 and it was strengthened in September 1996 following the large numbers of Africans who had entered the enclave during that summer. In Ceuta, following the clash with the African immigrants in October 1995, action was taken to begin the erection of a similar fence around the whole border perimeter. Construction was slow and hampered by the fact that due to inadequate security arrangements fencing material was frequently stolen. Consequently the army was brought in in 1997 to assist the police of the Guardia Civil in surveillance measures, firstly for the fence on the outskirts of Melilla and a few months later for the one at Ceuta (El País, 8 October 1997). The new fences, which were operative from the autumn of 1998, cost over 5,500 million pesetas (US$36.6 million) (two thirds of it coming from EU funds) and consisted of twin rigid metal barriers 2.1 metres high and 5 metres apart, with improved closed-circuit cameras and sensor pads. There is some evidence that the fences have begun to reduce the numbers illegally entering the enclaves, although in Ceuta the terrain has made it difficult for the fence to be fully effective. Improvements at a cost of a further 2,700 million (US$18 million) were due to be completed by the end of 2000, with the height of the fences raised to 4 metres and topped with barbed wire, thermal cameras and watch towers.21 The more effective the fences have become, the more would-be immigrants have tried to enter the enclaves by sea (El Mundo, 21 March 2000), despite the extension of the fences in Ceuta into the sea on top of artificial jetties in August 1999. Although a police report in June 2000 confirmed that on average only three sub-Saharan Africans per day were now getting into Ceuta and the figure for those entering Melilla was less than one per day (compared to around 50 per day for each enclave in 1999), it is clear that the fences will not provide the solution to the problem of illegal immigration. Rather will they serve to drive the problem elsewhere – to the Canary Islands (as indicated earlier), to ports in Morocco, to Senegal and Cape Verde (El Mundo, 22 June 2000). The head of the Spanish Interior Ministry, José Ramón Onega, claimed that

132 Europe or Africa? ‘immigration will be the big problem of the future, and it is absurd to think that it can be solved with barbed wire’ (Deutsche PresseAgentur, 18 July 1998).22 The incident in Melilla in the summer of 1998, when about 40 sub-Saharan Africans entered Melilla en masse through gaps in the fence near the Gurugú border control-post, only for most of them to be captured and returned by the same means, prompted some opposition politicians to argue that the Government should call for a thorough review of European immigration policy which would put an end to identical treatment for drug-traffickers, terrorists and immigrants (El País, 11 August 1998). The then President of Melilla, Enrique Palacios, argued that since the border with Morocco was a European border, some assistance over surveillance should be forthcoming from Brussels (El País, 12 August 1998). Having funded a large part of the cost of construction of the fences the European Commission was hardly likely to agree to contribute to their operating costs, although it was suggested at a meeting in March 1999 that the EU ‘could usefully provide technical assistance to its Mediterranean Partners, in order to prevent illegal immigration into the Union’ (European Commission, 1999a).23

The disparities Those who take the risks, enter the enclaves and manage to cross the Strait to the European continent know that if they find work, however menial, somewhere in the EU their income is likely to be 10–15 times higher than they could get in Africa, always assuming they could get any kind of employment at all in their own country. This is economic migration of the most basic kind. A comparison of Spain and Morocco, where illegal immigration into the EU from the south is at its highest level, illustrates the point. The average income in Spain in 1996, which at US$13,440 was only 80 per cent of the EU average, was nevertheless nearly 12 times that of Morocco (Jordán Galduf, 1997, p. 51). Taking the EU and Mediterranean regions as a whole, and accepting the limitations of per capita GDP as an indicator of economic strength, the ratio is about 20:1, and even adjusted on the basis of the cost of living (or so-called ‘purchasing power parity’), on average the ratio is about 4:1 (Bonazzi and Gómez y Paloma, 1997). Given that Cyprus, Israel and Malta have per capita

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GDPs within the range of EU countries, the gap between the EU and the less-developed non-EU Mediterranean countries will be substantially wider (Bontoux et al., 1998). The disparities are not just economic: as one commentator puts it, ‘the northern part of the Mediterranean is, by any criterion, much more developed than the southern part… non-European Mediterranean countries suffer from low income, insufficient growth of GNP compared with their demographic growth, high inflation and unemployment, widespread illiteracy and inadequate health services’ (Benyaklef, 1997, p. 110). The Human Development Index proposed by the United Nations in 1990 (which measures life expectancy, literacy and years of schooling as well as income) shows the four main EU Mediterranean countries (France, Spain, Italy and Greece) in 8th, 9th, 20th and 22nd place respectively in 1995, and the countries on the southern shore of the Mediterranean ranging from 73rd (Libya) to 117th (Morocco) (Benyaklef, 1997, p. 100). The trading playing-field between the two groups is far from level. Agricultural production accounts on average for about 40 per cent of the labour force in non-EU Mediterranean countries (against 6 per cent in the EU), and agro-food represents about 15 per cent of the value of their exports to the EU (in Morocco the figure is closer to 20 per cent), but they are in direct competition in fruit and vegetables with the southern EU countries whose produce is supported by the Common Agricultural Policy and whose productivity is far higher (at a ratio of about 10 to 1) (Bonazzi and Gómez y Paloma, 1997). Sir Ralph Dahrendorf made the direct link between free trade and immigration when he wrote in December 1991: ‘If we do not want the people from the poor countries in our neighbourhood, we have to take the goods which they produce at home’ (quoted in Ludlow [ed.], 1994, p. 115).

The Euro–Mediterranean Partnership The response by the EU to the disparities of wealth between the member states and non-member countries in the Mediterranean area has been the establishment of a range of cooperation agreements – the earliest dating from 1969 – designed to assist economic growth and improve trade potential. In addition there have been

134 Europe or Africa? some important bilateral agreements: Spain and Morocco, for example, agreed a package of financial and economic cooperation between 1988 and 1993, and a second agreement was signed in 1996 for a five-year period, providing credit of US$1,200 million. A Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbourliness and Cooperation between the two states was signed in 1991 and came into force in 1993 (see Chapter 1). There are also large infrastructural projects, such as the gas pipeline between Algeria and Spain across Morocco which was completed at the end of 1996, while (as has been noted in Chapter 1) investigations are under way between Spain and Morocco for a tunnel across the Strait of Gibraltar which could be of enormous benefit to both sides of the Mediterranean. In addition to economic cooperation agreements, there have been a number of attempts to establish formal groups in order to discuss regional security and political issues, including south–north migration. In the late 1980s the southern EU members (France, Italy, Spain and Portugal) held several meetings with representatives from the three main Maghreb countries in a grouping known as the Mediterranean Forum, while in October 1990 the Foreign Ministers of the same four EU states met in Venice with their counterparts from the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), which had been set up in February 1989 between the three main Maghreb countries plus Mauritania and Libya.24 The AMU-EU group was known as the ‘5+4’ (renamed the ‘5+5’ when Malta joined the second meeting in Algiers in October 1991). It was at this second meeting that a working group was set up to look into migration issues, and by September 1992 they had agreed to seek a charter with the EU on migrants in Europe (Henry, 1994, pp. 53–54). However, the political crisis in Algeria following the cancellation of elections there in 1992, the imposition of UN sanctions on Libya the same year in the wake of the Lockerbie plane disaster, and the virtual breakup of the AMU following various incidents which led to border closures between the Maghreb countries over the following two years ‘made it almost impossible for the [EU] member states to deal with the Maghreb on a regional basis after 1992’ (Collinson, 1996, p. 55). Consequently dealings between the EU and the Maghreb states reverted to the type of bilateral arrangements outlined earlier. However, what the ‘5+5’ grouping had succeeded in doing was to move the issue of migration higher up the agenda of matters for

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discussion between the EU and the North African states. They may not have made any headway with their proposed charter, and there was no sign on the part of the European members of the ‘5+5’ group that they were prepared to be less restrictive on migration issues (see Chapter 1 on the introduction of visas in 1991), but there was no doubt that the attempts of the early 1990s ensured that migration was an integral part of the next and more ambitious north–south grouping, the Euro–Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). This was an agreement (in whose sponsorship and promotion Spain was very prominent) signed in Barcelona in November 1995 between the 15 EU member states and 11 countries (plus the Palestinian Authority) in the Mediterranean region, referred to here as Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPCs). The three chapters of the agreement dealt, respectively, with political and security issues, economic and financial cooperation, and social, cultural and human affairs – the first time that cooperation between the two regions extended beyond economic matters. The objectives of the Barcelona agreement are extensive and farreaching: to establish peace, stability and prosperity through a free trade area (FTA) of 800 million people by the year 2010, although the complementary purpose is to promote regional cooperation, support sustainable development and to integrate the Mediterranean countries into the world economy in order to avoid their marginalization. For the countries of the Middle East and North Africa the Euro–Mediterranean Partnership is a guarantee of some sort that they will not be overlooked in the EU’s eagerness to open its doors to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. By early 1999 four Association Agreements had been signed with individual MPCs; the first one to be implemented was with Tunisia in March 1998, while the agreement with Morocco came into effect in March 2000.25 These agreements involve the progressive establishment of an FTA through successive tariff reductions over a period of up to 12 years from the date of entry into force of the agreement, with the free movement of capital for direct investment. However, because of the direct north–south competition in a number of fruit and vegetable products, agriculture is excluded from the FTA, with the maintenance of the tariff calendar and quota systems, but with the raising of the import quota on some products (including citrus fruit, tomatoes and potatoes). Services are also excluded, although these

136 Europe or Africa? will gradually be liberalized. It is what one commentator calls ‘an FTA minus’ (Tovias, 1997, p. 118). The new financial aid allocation package covering all MPCs over the period 1996–99 involved 4.685 billion, which was substantially more than the value of earlier bilateral agreements and represented a shift from the ratio of 5:1 in favour of the Central and Eastern European countries to a ratio of 5:3.5 (Romeo, 1998, p. 30). The package, 90 per cent of which is disbursed through bilateral arrangements known as National Indicative Programmes (NIPs),26 also made the MPCs eligible for loans from the European Investment Bank, and by the end of 1999 EIB lending had reached 4.8 billion. The Barcelona Declaration was supported in July 1996 by the approval of the MEDA I Regulation (the equivalent of the PHARE and TACIS programmes for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe), which serves as the principal legal and management instrument for Euro–Mediterranean cooperation and accounts for about 3.424 billion (75 per cent) of the total financial grant package.27 Immigration issues come under the umbrella of the third chapter of the Barcelona Declaration, on social, cultural and human affairs, and it is noteworthy that Dr Jean-Pierre Derisbourg, Adviser to the Director General responsible for north–south relations in the then DG-1B of the European Commission, gave as one of the fundamental reasons for establishing the Euro–Mediterranean Partnership ‘a desire to put a brake on immigration to Europe’ (Derisbourg, 1997, p. 9). However, it could be argued that immigration should have been included as part of the second chapter, since one of the intentions behind the economic and financial measures on which the second chapter focuses is to attempt to resolve over the medium and long term some of the economic disparities which lie behind immigration issues. Aside from the fundamental questions regarding the appropriateness of establishing a Free Trade Area among such disparate economies and whether the target date of 2010 is a realistic one – 2015 has been suggested as a more likely date (Edis, 1998, p. 104) – a number of concerns have been expressed about the possible outcomes of the economic aspects of the Barcelona agreement, and whether indeed it will achieve its economic objectives. First, there is the view that it could result in higher rural unemployment and rural depopulation in the MPCs, given the lack

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of competitiveness of agricultural production in the latter vis-à-vis the EU (Bonazzi and Gómez y Paloma, 1997), although this could improve given the current industrialization process of the agro-food sector in the MPCs (Bonazzi and Gómez y Paloma, 1998), and the negative effects on agriculture may be partially counterbalanced by improved access to the EU market in textiles (Tovias, 1997, p. 120). Second, there is a concern that the transitional period may not be long enough to allow for the necessary cultural, social and educational changes, which could result in the loss of a good deal of local production (one estimate suggests the disappearance of 30–40 per cent of Moroccan companies) and hence a rise in unemployment (Kienle, 1998, pp. 5–6, 8; Romeo, 1998, p. 32). Third, there is the fact that the initial tranche of financial assistance sounds substantial but in fact represents only about 0.4 per cent of the recipients’ combined GDP (Romeo, 1998, p. 35, n. 10) and at the insistence of the UK and Germany was about 1 billion or 20 per cent lower than the European Commission had originally proposed (Edis, 1998, p. 97). For comparison, one estimate puts the real differential of EU support at three to four times higher in Eastern Europe than the Mediterranean (King, 1998a, p. 121), while the Länder of former East Germany have received 100 times more on a per capita basis than the proposal in the EMP (Licari, 1998, p. 17).28 Fourth, there is the issue of debt repayment (which the Barcelona agreement does not address), with the Mediterranean countries having to pay currently some US$19 billion annually for debt servicing against an average payment of US$2 billion from the EU in the form of grants and loans. Finally, there is the concern that the Barcelona agreement has created only a ‘hub-and-spokes’ trading system between the EU and the MPCs, with no free-trade arrangements between the MPCs themselves (although these are envisaged in the bilateral agreements), and as long as the ‘hub-and-spokes’ system remains, this could favour investment in the ‘hub’ at the expense of the spokes (Tovias, 1997, p. 122; Romeo, 1998, p. 33; Licari, 1998, pp. 8, 10, 13). Thus there are serious doubts about the contribution that the EMP will make to economic growth in the MPCs and therefore about its ability to tackle the major disparities between the two sides of the agreement which lie at the heart of the immigration problem. The likely rate of economic growth will not match the forecast annual population growth of 2.5 per cent in the MPCs, thereby failing to

138 Europe or Africa? improve unemployment (Joffé [ed.], 1999, p. 255) and making it impossible to meet growing demand for state-provided services such as education and housing. Such circumstances are precisely those which drive people, especially young men, to become migrants and seek better social conditions elsewhere (Joffé, 1997, pp. 13, 22), particularly in an era when different cultures and lifestyles can be readily accessed through satellite television and the internet. In the absence of a policy allowing the freedom of movement of people, which is not part of the Barcelona package and is unlikely to be introduced, it will be difficult to reduce the current levels of illegal immigration in the foreseeable future. Although the following figures refer to legal immigrants, it is interesting to note that of the 4.8 million people from the 12 MPCs who were resident in the EU at the beginning of 1995, 1.6 million (34 per cent) were in France (the majority from Algeria and Morocco29), while 2.2 million (46 per cent) were in Germany (the vast majority from Turkey) (European Institute for Research on Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Cooperation, 1998). The reasons for the destinations are largely historical,30 but the figures serve to explain why France and Germany are more strongly opposed to agreed legal quotas of inward migration from the MPCs than are countries like Spain (which accounts for only 1.5 per cent of the total), especially since immigrants from the MPCs represent 45 per cent of all immigrants in France and 32 per cent of all immigrants in Germany (compared to only 16 per cent in Spain).31 Opposition to freeing up movement of people from the MPCs to the EU will inevitably serve to maintain the traffic in illegal immigrants.

More immediate measures Illegal immigration not only results in insecurity and often misery for thousands of individuals who attempt it, it also creates problems for recipient EU authorities and can cause a political and social backlash, as fears of the perceived threat to the stability of society posed by migration become intertwined (in the case of the MPC countries) with fears of the perceived threat posed by the activities of so-called Islamic fundamentalists (Romeo, 1998, p. 25).32 There are also perceived threats of a rise in street crime and drug-

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trafficking (even if these are not fully supported by crime statistics) (Cornelius, 1994, p. 366–67).33 In order to respond to these issues more short-term measures are required to tackle immigration than the long-term attempts to remove economic disparities offered by the EMP. A solution proposed by the Spanish Government, and supported by other EU member states, to try to stem the flow of illegal immigrants is to reduce the amount of EU aid that goes to those ‘sending’ countries which do not take measures to prevent illegal emigration. However, this would be partially undermined by the fact that some countries, including Spain, have a much more relaxed attitude towards economic migrants than, for example, countries like the UK. Employers in southern Spain, especially in agriculture, rely on cheap immigrant labour for their own economic survival, despite the fact that there is a high level of unemployment among Spaniards, who often ‘prefer to be unemployed rather than accept low-status, temporary employment’ (King, 1998b, p. 126). Immigrant labour has become ‘a structural component of the Southern European economy’, not just in agriculture but also hotel and catering, construction and domestic service (King, 1998b, p. 138; with reference to Spain, see also Solé et al., 1998, pp. 334–35 and Cornelius, 1994, p. 336).34 Projections of demographic changes to 2025, which indicate a growing proportion of non-productive older people in EU countries while in the MPCs the numbers in the active population continue to rise (even if in the interim there is a fall in the birth rate), suggest that there will continue to be a need for immigrant labour in Europe for the foreseeable future (Safir, 1993, pp. 91–94).35 It is perhaps this factor – the social acceptance of immigrants fulfilling the function of doing jobs that Spaniards choose not to do – as well as the relatively low numbers of immigrants (1.5 per cent of the population, compared to the EU average of 4 per cent [Cornelius, 1994, p. 333]) that has so far largely prevented the rise of right-wing parties who could have exploited immigration as an electoral issue in mainland Spain, in contrast to other (northern) European countries.36 In order for financial penalties to be effective, member states would collectively need to adopt more stringent attitudes to entry to EU territory, and in any case in this sort of relationship sanctions rarely work as effectively as incentives. A more pragmatic and realistic approach, and one successfully argued for by immigrant

140 Europe or Africa? support groups and NGOs in Spain (such as SOS Racismo, the Red Cross and CEAR, the Spanish Commission for Assistance to Refugees), is for a gradual increase in the annual quota of non-EU nationals granted work permits to enter the country. Such a quota system, which is broken down on a regional and sectoral basis, has been in place in Spain since 1993, starting with the proposal to allow 20,600 permits in that year (although because of the recession far fewer were actually issued) (Cornelius, 1994, pp. 364–66).37 More recently the annual number of permits has been about 35,000, and in September 1999 Madrid agreed with Rabat an annual quota of Moroccan workers who would receive a Spanish work permit for nine months. The Spanish Government was also proposing to do the same with other non-MPC governments in Latin America, Central Africa and Eastern Europe (Inter Press Service, 12 October 1999). By July 2000 the Government was planning to issue 100,000 permits per year to last for eight months and cover a range of harvesting periods (El Mundo, 10 July 2000). The support groups suggest that this would also be appropriate for other European governments (as used to be the case in the bilateral agreements of the 1960s and early 1970s), based on a realistic assessment of their need for cheap labour. The Spanish Government, under pressure from an accumulation of adverse publicity, recognized the need to act in this way rather than operate through a system based on the hazardous adventures of thousands of migrants, plus the periodic dispersal of refugees from overcrowded North African camps. This could have the effect of keeping the numbers of illegal immigrants in check, while giving some hope to those awaiting their turn, for the less restrictive the visa regime the less likely is it that would-be immigrants would see risking their lives at vast personal expense as their only option in order to reach the continent of Europe. Indeed, one of the criticisms of the Barcelona agreement is that although it makes reference to the role played by migration in the relationships between the partners, it fails to address the migration issues from the perspective of the needs of both sides, and is more concerned on the EU side about the responsibility of the MPCs for readmitting their illegal nationals once they have been caught (Romeo, 1998, p. 29).

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Meeting in The Hague, March 1999 The most important meeting on MPC-EU immigration to be held following the establishment of the EMP took place in The Hague on 1–2 March 1999. Described as the Euro-Med Experts Meeting on ‘Migration and Human Exchanges’, the group looked at the linkages between factors encouraging migration, actual migratory flows, policies of joint development, integration and return, and human exchanges. It is noteworthy that the report on the meeting concludes that ‘it is unlikely that in the short or medium term there will be a decrease in factors encouraging migration from the southern and south-eastern Mediterranean Basin into Europe’ (European Commission, 1999a). Hence there is recognition that the first stage of the EMP is in itself insufficient to have any impact on this issue. At the meeting both sides of the partnership were critical of each other: the EU representatives argued that ‘the countries concerned bear a responsibility to address the root causes’, while the MPCs responded: ‘At the same time, these efforts should be supported by a policy by the European Union and its Member States reducing international trade barriers and stimulating investment in the region and economic transition.’ It was clear that the view of the MPCs was that the Barcelona Declaration did not go far enough with regard to free trade and investment, and the section of the report on follow-up activities recognized the importance of more projects concerning ‘the reduction of factors encouraging migration, in particular by creating more employment opportunities in the Mediterranean region’.38 The report encouraged migration which can be classified as ‘normal expressions of our integrating societies’ (exchanges, tourism, family visits), and even recognized the need to examine further ‘the legitimate needs of the Euro-Med Partners… with regard to temporary forms of migration, for example, for study, training and work’. This last reference reinforces the existing practice of some EU countries agreeing a quota of work permits for MPC nationals, but the report left no doubt as to the attitude of the EU member states towards immigration in broad terms: ‘given the existing factors encouraging migration, and the need for a generally restrictive immigration policy by receiving countries, illegal immigration should be opposed in a spirit of cooperation’.

142 Europe or Africa? The Third Euro–Mediterranean Conference of foreign ministers held in Stuttgart in April 1999, which was designed to provide further impetus to the initiatives of the Barcelona process, made reference to the meeting in The Hague in the Council’s official report. According to the Chairman’s formal conclusions, it had ‘provided an opportunity for a frank discussion on this important and delicate issue’ (European Commission 1999c). The terms ‘frank discussion’ and ‘delicate issue’ are usually euphemisms indicating that there are substantial differences between the two sides. The fact that it took over three years from the signing of the Barcelona Declaration for a major meeting on the issue of migration to be held is an indication of the difficulty of the problem. A more encouraging note emerged from a bilateral discussion held in Brussels on ‘Relations between the EU and Morocco’ on 21 October 1999. The recently appointed EU Commissioner for External Relations, Chris Patten, suggested in his speech that ‘a deeper political dialogue on issues such as drug-trafficking, migration and corruption could bring considerable benefits’ (European Commission 1999e).

MEDA II In addition to ongoing developments of the Barcelona process, what will be of greatest significance in the short term is the financial package under MEDA II for the period 2000–2006. The immediate priorities for the majority of EU member states are the enlargement of the EU involving Cyprus and the first of the Eastern European countries, together with the institutional reforms of Agenda 2000. In addition the EU has had to commit itself to substantial financial assistance towards the reconstruction programme in the former Yugoslavia and the Western Balkans, to the tune of 5.3 billion over the period 2000–2006. Over the same period MEDA II will amount to 8.1 billion, at an average per year of 1.157 billion, slightly less than the average per year under MEDA I of 1.171 billion (European Commission, 2000b). It is therefore unlikely that the financial support for the EMP via MEDA II will be enough to make any serious impact on the north–south disparities and therefore on the problems of migration. The MPCs need substantial investment in a diversity of areas such as information and communications technology, the

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development of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises, water and energy if the Mediterranean north–south divide is to be significantly narrowed (Mas and Belzunegui, 1998; Di Pietro et al., 1998; Kayamanidou, 1998; Aguado-Monsonet, 1999), and there is no reason to suppose that private foreign direct investment (FDI) in developing countries (as an alternative to funds from the EMP) is suddenly going to be diverted from the major investment areas of East Asia and Latin America to North Africa and the Middle East (Joffé, 1997, pp. 24–26; see also Fontagné and Péridy, 1997, p. 23). A permanent settlement through the Middle East peace process could eventually bring about a substantial change in this regard at the eastern end of the Mediterranean, but there are several structural economic reasons, including poor infrastructure and the relative size of domestic markets, plus potential political instability, which will continue to undermine the ability of the MPC region as a whole to attract substantial amounts of private FDI (Collinson, 1996, p. 76).

Conclusions The EU has made an important start through the EMP in trying to address the several dimensions of the immigration issue, but there is no indication in the short term that the numbers of illegal immigrants from Africa to the EU will diminish as a consequence. Illegal immigration occurs at every weak link in the EU’s external borders, and it does so largely for economic imperatives.39 What happens in the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla regarding illegal immigration into Europe is unique because of the fact that they are the only EU territories in Africa. As long as they remain ‘Municipalities of Europe’ – and there are no indications that Spain has any intention of changing that status for any reason – then their situation will continue to act as a magnet for would-be immigrants from all over the African continent. The enclaves epitomize the challenge that faces the EU in striking a balance between, on the one hand, the fortress mentality which comes with being one of the three richest trading blocks in the world, and on the other hand the effective use of its wealth to support neighbouring economies not just to the east, but also to the south, and simultaneously to enhance regional political stability in a

144 Europe or Africa? potentially – and at times literally – volatile part of the world. The fences around the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla are an attempt to control the influx of Africans into Europe, even though they merely serve to divert a part of the flow elsewhere. But they are also a stark and literal reminder of the cultural, political and economic barriers that remain to be overcome between Europe and its Mediterranean neighbours. As long as these more intangible barriers remain, the enclaves will continue to act as a funnel for migrants to Europe from North Africa and beyond. Notes 1 One illustration of such a network was reported on 17 December 1997 when a Spanish lorry registered in Valencia and on a regular run to Italy was stopped by French customs at the Spanish–French border and was found to be concealing 33 illegal immigrants from North Africa who had entered Spain from Ceuta. During 1997 it was reported that French police had deported some 2,000 illegal immigrants trying to cross the border from Spain (El País, 17 December 1997). 2 The introduction of the general visa requirement in 1991 (see Chapter 1) was cited by one of the traffickers as the main reason for the increase in illegal immigrants from that time (El País, 16 June 1992). 3 At the end of June or early July 1998 (the incident was not reported for over a month) 38 Moroccans were drowned off Melilla in Moroccan coastal waters in what was the biggest single disaster of its kind to date. There were claims and counterclaims concerning who had responsibility for assisting the victims and why the incident had not been made public earlier (El País, 7 August 1998). 4 A further period of regularization was introduced in March 2000 following the introduction of the new Immigration Law (see El Mundo, 11 April 2000). 5 Another immigration phenomenon involving minors, sometimes with tragic consequences, is the use of hundreds of Moroccan children in the enclaves to beg or undertake menial street tasks on behalf of racketeers who collect the proceeds (see El País, 25 August 1997). There was also an incident on 18 August 1999 when a fouryear-old girl from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (formerly Zaire) was passed over the fence between Morocco and Ceuta carrying a message asking for her to be reunited with her father in Asturias. Within a month two more such events had occurred involving young children from the DRC being left at the border (El País, 21 September 1999). 6 Numbers of would-be immigrants increased substantially during July and August 1996 – with police arresting over 1,000 during a six-week period – because of the regularization offer by Spain which expired on 23 August to those resident in Spain before 1 January and who possessed a work permit. Many Africans were

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encouraged by groups exploiting them outside Spain to believe that if they entered Spain before the August deadline they would be allowed to stay permanently (The Independent, 23 August 1996). 7 It became a frequent occurrence when would-be illegal immigrants were caught or found drowned that a substantial quantity of cannabis was also found on board (see BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 3 August 1998; Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 14 September 1998). In some cases this was done in order that the immigrants could be charged with an offence which would delay their repatriation; in others it was part of the link between drug-trafficking and people-smuggling. 8 Would-be immigrants from the enclaves were learning more sophisticated techniques. A group of 28 Moroccans drifting in the Strait in a patera whose motor had failed were rescued following a mobile phone call from one of the occupants to the emergency services. They were returned to Morocco (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 10 September 1999). 9 Between 21 March and 31 July 2000 almost a quarter of a million immigrants applied to regularize their status, far in excess of the anticipated 80,000 applications. Approximately one third of the applicants were Moroccans and about one quarter were from Latin American countries (El Mundo, 24 August 2000). 10 The Congress representative for Melilla, Antonio Gutiérrez, noted that fewer sub-Saharan Africans reached Ceuta and were not as well-educated or as wellnourished as those arriving in Melilla (El País, 28 December 1997). The likely reason for their better education (some had university degrees) and state of health is that the cost of travelling as far as Melilla was in the region of 150,000 pesetas (US$1,000), well beyond the reach of the majority of poor Africans, who went to Ceuta instead. The cost of travel across Africa also explained why few had enough to pay the extra for the boat crossing. 11 It is noteworthy that an anti-racist demonstration held in Ceuta on 28 October 1995 attracted only 200 people (see El País, 29 October 1995). 12 There was a good deal of confusion in Spain about the numbers of immigrants from the Melilla incident who were sent to Guinea-Bissau and how long they remained there. Spain negotiated the dispatch of 22 of the 103 immigrants to Bissau in exchange for US$50,000, but without the Spanish authorities being informed another of the planes, which had been sent to Cameroon with 23 immigrants on board, flew on to Bissau after the Cameroonian authorities declined to accept them. The Spanish Foreign Ministry only became aware of this at the end of July, one month after the events took place (see El País, 30 July 1996). As Spain did not have a diplomatic mission in Guinea-Bissau, it was dependent on its honorary consul, a Lebanese businessman, to keep them informed of the fate of the deportees, and he incorrectly told every enquirer (including the nearest Spanish ambassador in Senegal) that they had been moved on. In fact it emerged at the end of September that they were still there: 30 were in a military prison in Bissau, 11 had disappeared, three were in hospital and one had been shot dead (see El País, 29 September 1996).

146 Europe or Africa? The hasty dispatch of the immigrants in June had clearly resulted in Spain losing track of a substantial number of them, with highly disturbing consequences. 13 The episode in Melilla prompted civic leaders in Ceuta to call for the expulsion of some 250 Central African refugees in the Calamocarro camp at that time. By the end of September the numbers in the camp had reached 500 (see El País, 28 September 1996), and the Interior Ministry took the decision to send 70 of them to Barcelona on a training programme under the auspices of the Spanish Commission for Assistance to Refugees (CEAR). This programme was a sign that Spain was at last looking to implement a policy of co-development in relation to immigrants, providing them with training which would be useful in their country of origin. 14 See El País, 29 July 1996. Although not involving the enclaves, there was another deportation incident at the end of July which further illustrated the nature of the problem facing Spanish immigration officials. Sixteen immigrants with false passports flew into Madrid from Malabo in Equatorial Guinea, were held for a week before being refused asylum, and were then bound and gagged before being put on a return flight. It was reported that because of their behaviour before take-off other passengers refused to travel with them, so they remained in detention at Madrid airport while the Spanish Government unsuccessfully tried (in accordance with international aviation law) to persuade the authorities in Equatorial Guinea to readmit them before sending them on to their country of origin (it transpired that this was Nigeria). As a result of the failure of Equatorial Guinea to accept these would-be immigrants, nationals of that country were refused visas to enter Spain until the beginning of November that year. 15 In June 1997 the rise in the number of immigrants arriving from Algeria prompted the Spanish Interior Ministry to consider the establishment of the same kind of extradition treaty with Algeria as it had signed with Morocco in 1992 (see El País, 18 June 1997). It was reported in September that 50 Algerian refugees had been taken from the enclaves to Alicante and handed to Algerian police, action which drew protests from the Pro-Human Rights Association (APDH) (Inter Press Service, 26 September 1997). By December there was a total of 395 Algerians in both Ceuta and Melilla, and left-wing parliamentarians called for negotiations for any planned extradition agreement with Algeria to be suspended (El País, 19 December 1997) on the grounds that many were likely to be genuine political refugees. 16 In December 1997 the EU agreed a grant of 124 million pesetas ($826,000) towards the cost of the reception centre in Melilla, one of 17 projects across Europe to improve reception conditions for asylum seekers and displaced persons. Also in that month the Government Representative’s Office in Ceuta announced that the camp at Calamocarro was to close (see El País, 29 December 1997; European Commission Press Release 98/86, 27 January 1998). The new centre was opened in March 2000 at a cost of 500 million pesetas (US$3.3 million). 17 Radio France Internationale reported on 20 December 1996 that for the first time since 1992 Morocco had agreed to readmit illegal immigrants from sub-

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Saharan Africa, 65 of whom had been detained in the enclaves (see BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME/D2802/MED, 23 December 1996). The meeting between the two Ministers of the Interior two months earlier (see Chapter 1) could well have been the catalyst for this important step. 18 The extent to which numbers had increased was indicated by the figure of 1,357 who had been transferred during the previous 14-month period from October 1996 (El País, 19 December 1997). The transfers explicitly excluded the Algerians, as the Spanish Government was clearly concerned that generalized sympathetic treatment towards them might act as an encouragement for large numbers of Algerians fleeing from the country’s lawlessness to attempt to enter the enclaves (El País, 29 December 1997). 19 Towards the end of 1999, Ceuta found itself receiving Central African immigrants who were entering from Spain, in order to claim that they had entered the enclave from Morocco so that they might be sent to Spain with one of the cohorts which had been granted residence permits (El Mundo, 25 November 1999). 20 Most of those in La Granja, the reception centre which was destroyed, were Algerians. Their complaints included concern that they would be returned to Algeria via Spain, and also the fact that they were receiving treatment which they claimed was inferior to that given to the Central Africans, many of whom were in a new centre, the Short Stay Immigrant Centre (CETI), which had been opened in May 1999. La Granja was due to be closed in September of that year (El País, 4 September 1999; 9 September 1999). 21 At the end of October 1999 the company responsible for erecting the new fences decided that the existing fence around Ceuta had to be removed in order for the new ones to be put in place. Although the Ceuta authorities requested additional numbers of troops, this left the town at the mercy of large numbers of would-be immigrants – 5,000 were reported to be waiting in Morocco. In the first three weeks of November, over 3,000 were caught in Ceuta, leaving the Calamocarro camp with over 2,500 refugees. The figure for the first eleven months of the year was 6,914 (El Mundo, 25 November 1999). An attempt by 200 Central African immigrants to enter en masse at the end of December was prevented only by the use of anti-riot police (El Mundo, 28 December 1999). 22 As an indication that illegal immigration is expected to continue to grow, Spain is also planning a radar ‘fence’ along the 500 kilometres of southern coast from Huelva to Almería which will detect any vessel within 10 kilometres of the coast. The cost is estimated at 20,000 million pesetas (US$130 million) and it is expected to be in operation by 2002, although not completed until the end of 2004 (El Mundo, 14 July 2000). 23 The scale of the problem is indicated by the annual report on the application of the Schengen Agreement for 1998, which showed that the greatest immigration pressure anywhere on the EU external borders occurred at Melilla, where 702,094 people were refused entry (compared with 57,601 at Ceuta). The figures for 1997

148 Europe or Africa? had been 344,424 and 55,045 respectively. By comparison, at the German border with Poland and the Czech Republic 24,050 illegal attempts at entry were recorded (El Mundo, 27 December 1999). 24 As indicated in Chapter 1, this was not Morocco’s first formal alliance with Libya. 25 This does not include the interim agreement signed with the PLO for the benefit of the Palestinian Authority, which was implemented in July 1997, nor the pre-existing Association Agreements with countries which are eligible to become EU members – Turkey, Cyprus and Malta – which are still operative. The agreements signed but not in force by March 2000 were with Israel and Jordan, while negotiations were still in progress with the remaining four MPCs (European Commission, 1999b, pp. 1–2; European Commission, 2000a). 26 The remaining ten per cent is for projects under the Regional Indicative Programme (RIP), involving two EU member states and two MPCs. The most recent figures available show that for the period 1996–98, 2.822 billion was distributed to 403 projects in total. Of these, 126 were projects in the Mashreq countries (including the Palestinian Territories) and Israel (accounting for 1.352 billion), 74 in the Maghreb countries ( 997 million) and 51 in the North Mediterranean (Cyprus, Malta and Turkey), worth 248 million. The 152 RIP projects accounted for 223 million, some eight per cent of the total distributed (European Commission, 1999d, p. 5). 27 Morocco received a total of 580 million for 1996–99 under the MEDA programme, with the final tranche of 127 million aimed particularly at developing provinces in the north of the country (European Report, 6 May 1998), including, therefore, those regions in the vicinity of the enclaves. For full details of the MEDA Regulation, see European Commission Council Regulation (EC) No 1488/96 (http://www.malta.euromed.net/MEDA/meda_regulation.html) 28 One estimate in 1995 of the minimum needs of the MPC region over the following five years was 50–100 billion (see Collinson, 1996, p. 75). 29 Hamilton, 1997, p. 555, points out that the African country with the largest population in Europe is Morocco with 1.1 million. Although the geographical proximity of Morocco to Europe is a major factor, the existence of the Spanish enclaves could help to explain why the figure for Algeria (also geographically close and with a similarly sized population to that of Morocco) is about 60 per cent of the Moroccan figure (see European Institute for Research on Mediterranean and EuroArab Cooperation, 1998). 30 For a summary history of migration from the Maghreb countries to northern Europe, see Collinson, 1996, pp. 7–38. Collinson, 1993b, p. 47, suggests that the existence of a substantial immigrant-origin population in a recipient country establishes an important immigration channel which acts as a significant ‘pull’ factor in the migration process. 31 The figure given in the study for the proportion of legal immigrants from MPCs in Greece was 12 per cent. The data for Italy was incomplete; however, data

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from King, 1998b, p. 135, for the end of 1995 suggests that the proportion from MPCs was about 17 per cent. For a detailed study of immigration from the Maghreb countries into Spain, see López García, 1993a. It should be noted that as far as illegal immigrants are concerned the picture is significantly different. 32 Gillespie, 2000, p. 167, suggests, however, that fears about Islamic ‘fundamentalism’ are scarcely a factor in attitudes towards Muslims in Spain, since radical Islamism is not strong in Morocco, the country which provides most Spanish immigrants. One reason suggested for the relative weakness of the forces of political Islam in Morocco is because as head of state and religious leader ‘the monarch has monopolized the religious terrain’ (Korany, 1998, p. 163). 33 Hernández de Larramendi, 1992, p. 155 suggests that the extent to which Spaniards perceive a ‘threat from the South’ increases substantially during periods of (regional) conflict, such as the Libyan crisis in 1986 (to which could be added the Gulf War in 1991). 34 When a racist attack occurred in an encampment in Níjar, Almería, in September 1999 the trade union UGT reported that there were 17,000 legal immigrants and 4,500 illegal workers employed in the greenhouses in the province of Almería alone (El País, 19 September 1999). A newspaper editorial defending the immigrant workers described them as responsible for ‘the economic and social development achieved in parts of Níjar in recent years’ and ‘integrated into the system of production’ (El País, 20 September 1999). 35 Demographic analysis suggests that second-generation immigrants tend to adopt the reproductive patterns of their host country rather than those of their parents’ country of origin. Hence only through ongoing immigration from countries such as those of the Maghreb will the EU continue to maintain even a low level of population replacement (El País, 21 February 1999). A UN forecast suggests that Spain will need to allow an average of 240,000 immigrants to enter each year for the next 50 years in order to sustain an adequate workforce (El Mundo, 20 February 2000). 36 Carlos Celaya, 1993, p. 312, felt able to say: ‘Racism, at least with reference to foreign ethnic minorities, does not seem to be a preoccupation of Spanish political parties…’. Cornelius, 1994, p. 360, suggests that anti-immigrant feeling has largely been absent from Spanish politics because it is too reminiscent of the Franco era, although he does quote surveys (p. 359) indicating lower levels of tolerance for Maghrebis than, for example, Latin American and Eastern European immigrants (see also Corredera García and Diez Cano, 1992, pp. 200–202; Izquierdo, 1996, pp. 166–75). However, there are some localized instances of anti-immigrant parties receiving support, as illustrated by the GIL in parts of Andalucía and the enclaves (see Chapter 3). With the increase in racial conflict (often sparked by violent crime, as in El Ejido, Almería, in January and February 2000) in areas with a high concentration of poorly housed immigrant workers, support for such parties could be expected to grow, although in the March 2000 elections the problems in Almería merely led to increased support for the PP.

150 Europe or Africa? 37 Solé et al., 1998, p. 337, quote figures for the issue of work permits to non-EU nationals in 1995 as 76,677, of which 38,322 were issued to Moroccans (this was in the run-up to the regularization period ending in August 1996). The figure for 1998 was 28,000, with the total number of non-EU nationals in Spain with work and residence permits at 176,022 (El País, 3 July 1998). By July 1999, according to Labour Ministry figures, the total number of legal non-EU nationals was 719,647 of whom 140,896 were Moroccans. Of the estimated 80,000 illegals, about half were from Morocco (see El Mundo, 14 February 2000). 38 Collinson, 1993b, pp. 55–57, argues, however, that these approaches are either misguided or too simplistic. She questions whether ‘a root-cause strategy can be sustained if it is predicated almost exclusively on an interest in stopping or preventing migration’ and that ‘a blanket approach to prevention misses the complexity of the phenomenon, and is thus unlikely to be adequately responsive to the questions and challenges raised by it’. 39 Collinson, 1996, p. 80, makes the point that ‘migration, whether it be within states or across international borders, is never a straightforward symptom of migration pressures, such as relative poverty, population growth or unemployment, but is a complex component of many forms of micro- and macro-level social, economic and political change, operating at both the “sending” and “receiving” ends of the migration process’. Nevertheless, it would be difficult to argue that one of the underlying reasons in most cases is not economic.

SIX

THE ENCLAVES: EUROPE OR AFRICA? The anomalous position of the enclaves as entities which are geographically in Africa but politically and in many other respects part of Europe has from time to time resulted in a degree of ambivalence as to whether they should be treated as part of Europe or as part of Africa. This chapter explores some aspects of this issue which are not dealt with elsewhere in this study.

The economy Since 1986 Ceuta and Melilla have been part of the European Community/Union, although not part of the customs territory. They have certain preferential arrangements with the EU as a whole, and additional preference arrangements with peninsular Spain, whereby goods originating in Ceuta or Melilla qualify for exemption from duty. They are not subject to the Common Agricultural Policy nor the EU fisheries and trade policies. Under Spanish law the territories have been designated as exempted areas for customs purposes, making them in effect tax-free zones, and there is substantial trading in tax-free goods to non-residents, with thousands of Moroccans entering the enclaves every day to buy goods for resale in nearby Moroccan towns at a premium.1 They are neither like the French Départements d’Outre Mer (the DOM), which are part of the EU and part of the customs territory, nor like the Térritoires d’Outre Mer (the TOM), which are neither part of the EU nor part of the customs territory. But they are in a similar position to Gibraltar, which is also part of the EU but not part of the customs territory. Their constitutional relationship with the EU entitles the enclaves to receive financial support for infrastructural development programmes.

152 Europe or Africa? For example, Spain obtained its first tranche of EU funds as part of the Community Support Framework under Objective 1 in November 1994. It totalled 3.33 billion over six years, and included projects for Ceuta and Melilla to cover ring roads, the improvement of port facilities, the modernization of telecommunications systems and the construction of health centres. In July 1996 the EU allocated a further 186 million over three years to support cross-border cooperation between Spain and Morocco. Some of this funding was designed to help the further development of port installations in the enclaves. In addition, as has been mentioned in Chapter 5, a substantial part of the cost of the perimeter fences and the new reception centres for would-be immigrants has been met by the EU, precisely because they not only stand at the borders between the enclaves and Morocco, but also mark the external frontiers between the EU and Africa. In March 1999 each enclave was awarded 117 million for the period 2000–2006 for regional development projects. In a number of economic respects, therefore, the enclaves are very much a part of Europe, although in other ways they are treated as exceptional. But the local economies operate largely as a function of their status – as ports and transit centres linking Europe and Africa (especially Ceuta), as garrison towns, as retailers of incoming consumer goods and as administrative entities which create a large number of service sector jobs (see Chapter 2).

Defence Ceuta and Melilla have been treated differently from the rest of Spain as far as defence matters are concerned ever since Spain internationalized its defence strategy through the agreements with the United States in 1954. The US excluded a commitment to the defence of the enclaves in those and subsequent agreements, and when Spain joined NATO in 1981 (although remaining outside its military structure until the late 1990s) the enclaves were explicitly deemed to be outside the NATO defensive area.2 The NATO allies (and the US in particular) would be unwilling to become embroiled in the defence of territory in North Africa which would inevitably run the risk of escalating into a wider Middle East conflict in which alliances would be hard to predict (even post-Gulf War).

The enclaves: Europe or Africa? 153 Hence Spain remains exclusively responsible for the military defence of the North African towns because in this respect they are clearly seen as part of Africa. As a consequence, Spanish military commanders argue that the enclaves (together with the strategically important Canary Islands) require Spain to equip itself for defence commitments outside mainland Europe and beyond the purview of NATO. The North African towns not only affect Spain’s defence and procurement strategy but also contribute to ‘a strong sense of vulnerability derived from national geography’ (Gillespie, 2000, p. 162), and oblige the Spanish armed forces to prepare contingency plans to attack Morocco in the event of aggression (even though it is highly unlikely that any Spanish government would ever allow them to be put into effect). However, at a Spanish Atlantic Association seminar in Madrid held on 15 July 1999 to commemorate the 50th anniversary of NATO, it was suggested that following NATO action in Kosovo the Alliance’s strategic philosophy had changed, and it was therefore appropriate to expand NATO’s jurisdiction to include the north-west coast of Africa (thereby covering the defence of the enclaves and the Canary Islands) (Inter Press Service, 16 July 1999). Since then there has been no official change, although an interview with Lieutenant-General Juan Narro, Chief of Joint Command South-West, suggested that he believed the NATO umbrella would cover the enclaves in a crisis (El País, 30 September 1999).3 In theory, therefore, the towns are in Africa and the exclusive responsibility of Spain in matters of defence, while in practice it is likely that if any act of aggression were perpetrated against Ceuta or Melilla they would be treated as part of Europe and defended by Spain with as much NATO support as the circumstances required.

Sport The first real test following Spain’s entry into the European Community in January 1986 of the extent to which other member states were prepared to treat Ceuta and Melilla as part of Europe came in April 1987 when the enclaves became the cause of an international dispute between Spain and West Germany. The occasion was an under-16 European Cup football match between the German and Spanish teams which had been scheduled to be played in Melilla

154 Europe or Africa? on 8 April, the first time that a Spanish national side was due to appear in the enclave. It is unclear whether the Germans were concerned that the venue might have been chosen for political reasons, or were concerned about the recent civil disturbances in the enclave, or simply felt that the travel arrangements were too complicated. Whatever the motive the German Federation maintained that Melilla was not in Europe – one German official described it as ‘Spanish Morocco’ – and sought the support of the European footballing body UEFA for a change of venue. On 31 March UEFA called upon Spain to move the game to the peninsula, arguing that ‘it was a matter of principle’ that a European match should be played on the European continent. The Spanish Football Federation contended that it was improper for UEFA to decide what was and was not the territory of a sovereign state, and pointed out that the match between Portugal and Malta had been played in Madeira. However, after much pressure and an ultimatum from UEFA Spain agreed that the match would be played in Coria del Río near Seville, but that did not prevent the Senator for Melilla, Jorge Hernández, from arguing that Melilla ‘is as Spanish and as European as Coria del Río’ (El País, 2 April 1987). Spain tried to arrange another international football match in Melilla on 18 November that year, this time between the senior national team and Hungary as part of the qualifying rounds for the 1988 Olympic Games to be held in Seoul. Hungary initially agreed to the venue and the team made appropriate travel arrangements but then expressed doubts about it and requested that the venue be changed. There were suspicions within the Spanish Football Federation that pressure had been brought to bear on Hungary by Morocco or other North African states to seek an alternative. The Hungarian team was finally persuaded to go ahead with the match in Melilla but only when the Council in the enclave had agreed to pay for a charter plane for the Hungarian visitors. The issue was less contentious than the earlier game with Germany in the sense that the match was not played under the auspices of a European football organization, and so the argument that it should take place in continental Europe did not arise. It may also have been felt both in Rabat and in Budapest that since the Spanish team had already failed to qualify for the Olympic Games and the result was immaterial (Spain won 1–0) hardly anyone would take any notice.

The enclaves: Europe or Africa? 155

EU directives Spain found itself chided by the European Commission in July 1998 over the fact that Ceuta was failing to comply with the hunting provisions of the EU Wild Birds Directive – the EU’s oldest piece of nature conservation legislation. The reprimand came in the form of a reasoned opinion, the second phase of infringement proceedings under Article 169 of the EU Treaty. Every year Ceuta authorizes the hunting of quails and turtle doves during the migration period (one of three periods identified by the directive when the birds are at their most vulnerable and, therefore, when the long-term survival of the species is under threat), and every year Spain challenges and overturns the authorization given by the enclave, by which time it is too late to prevent the hunting. This is an illustration of the disadvantage for the enclaves of being part of the EU in that they cannot make decisions on such matters for themselves, although clearly it is to the advantage of the wild birds, at least in theory, to be protected by EU directives even in North Africa. However, by deciding to ignore the EU directive Ceuta causes problems for the authorities in Madrid, who have the responsibility for setting the dates when hunting is not allowed, who attempt – mostly unsuccessfully – to ensure that the EU directive is complied with, and who as a consequence receive the reprimand from the European Commission.

EU parliamentary elections In June 1989 the enclaves participated in elections to the European Parliament, voting with the rest of Europe for the first time. The signs near the airport and the harbour of both North African towns proclaiming them to be ‘Municipalities of Europe’ took on real meaning. The election campaign produced a good display of posters in Melilla (less so in Ceuta) but visiting Spanish politicians were few and far between, and of the candidates only two came from Melilla and none from Ceuta. This was not the first time that non-Europeans had voted in European-wide elections – those living in the French Départements d’Outre-Mer have participated since 1979 – but the residents of the Spanish enclaves were the first North Africans to do so. From the perspective of democratic representation in the EU’s supranational parliament, the enclaves are clearly part of Europe.

156 Europe or Africa? The different constitutional relationship between Britain and Gibraltar and the fact that certain provisions of Britain’s accession treaty to the EC did not apply to Gibraltar meant that Gibraltar was not included in the 1976 EC Act on Direct Elections to the European Parliament. As a consequence the Gibraltarians have still not been given the right to vote in European parliamentary elections, despite several attempts on their part and on the part of some British parliamentarians to achieve that right, primarily because Britain does not wish to engage in a direct confrontation with Spain over the issue.4 Thus paradoxically there are residents of North Africa who can vote for MEPs, and have done so to date in three European-wide parliamentary elections, while there are residents on mainland Europe living in the dependent territory of a member state who cannot, despite that member state having participated in six such elections. In this sense the enclaves are treated more as part of Europe than is Gibraltar, in contradiction of their respective geographical locations. Further parallels between Gibraltar and the enclaves will be considered in the next chapter. Notes 1 Carabaza and de Santos, 1992, pp. 80–87, suggest that in 1987 some 5–6,000 Moroccans crossed into Melilla daily in order to conduct this trade; in addition to clothing and footwear, goods included foodstuffs, perfume, alcohol, tobacco, white goods, cement and petrol to the value of 13–15,000 million pesetas (US$87–100 million) per year. The authors also describe other activities involving stolen luxury cars, gold, diamonds and currency, the value of which is infinitely greater. The scale of such activity is a direct consequence of the status of the enclaves as EU territories. 2 The exclusion of the enclaves plus the conflict with the UK over Gibraltar were given as the reasons why the PSOE did not advocate integration into the military structure at the time of the 1986 referendum on Spain’s continuing membership of NATO (see Carabaza and de Santos, 1992, p. 183). 3 Some commentators have mistakenly assumed that the defence of the enclaves already falls within the ambit of NATO, e.g. Giles Tremlett, The Times, 15 August 1998: ‘[The enclaves] are also NATO’s only direct frontier with the volatile Maghreb’. 4 The confrontation would arise because in order for Gibraltarians to be able to vote in European parliamentary elections Britain would need to seek amendment to the 1976 Act and this requires the unanimous agreement of all member states (Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Fourth Report, 22 June 1999: Memorandum submitted by

The enclaves: Europe or Africa? 157 the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Paragraph 10). A ruling by the European Court of Human Rights on 18 February 1999 that Britain is in violation of the Convention by not having made provision for Gibraltarians to vote in EP elections must, in theory, be dealt with before the next Euro-elections in 2004.

SEVEN

GIBRALTAR AND THE ENCLAVES It is scarcely surprising that many parallels have been drawn between Spain’s North African enclaves on the one hand, and the British colony (redesignated in 1981 ‘British dependent territory’) of Gibraltar on the other. Just as Morocco wants to negotiate with Spain a transfer of the sovereignty of Ceuta and Melilla, Spain has been pressing (particularly since the early 1960s) for the reintegration of Gibraltar into Spanish territory. The fundamental difference is that the status of the territories held by Spain and Britain on the Mediterranean coast is different in international law: unlike Ceuta and Melilla, whose Spanishness was described in the Introduction, Gibraltar was ceded to Britain in perpetuity by the Treaty of Utrecht of 1713 following its acquisition by force in 1704 during the Spanish Wars of Succession. The Treaty gives Spain the right to first refusal if ever there should be a change of sovereignty over the Rock. On the grounds that its North African enclaves are not colonies or dependent territories but integral parts of the Spanish state with their own representatives in the national Parliament, Spain has always rejected the suggestion that if it expects Britain to negotiate the transfer of the sovereignty of Gibraltar then it should also expect to have to negotiate the transfer of Ceuta and Melilla to Morocco. But the Muslim descendants of the Sultanate of Morocco and of the Rif tribespeople of northern Morocco would argue that for many years the enclaves had as much of a colonial status as Morocco itself had until 1956, and that they have ceased to be colonies only relatively recently. And if Spain can use the arguments of geographical proximity and territorial integrity to justify its claim to Gibraltar, Morocco can call up exactly the same arguments in relation to its claim to the Spanish enclaves.

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The Falklands/Malvinas crisis At no time were parallels between the enclaves and Gibraltar drawn with more frequency than during the Falklands/Malvinas war of 1982. During that crisis Spain found itself torn between its heart and its head: on the one hand, offering moral support to Argentina as a former colony, fellow member of the Hispanic family and a country which also had a long-standing territorial dispute with Britain, and on the other hand condemning an unprovoked act of aggression by a military dictator, as befitted a nation which had recently returned to democracy and the rule of law, and had just committed itself to the collective responsibility of defending democratic regimes in Europe through membership of the North Atlantic Alliance. The longer Argentinian troops remained on the islands, the more the Spanish political right was encouraged to think that Spain could attempt a similar show of force and occupy Gibraltar, prompting others to point out that Morocco might get the same idea in relation to the North African enclaves. In an article in El País on 7 May 1982 entitled ‘¿Cómo se dice Malvinas en marroquí?’ (‘How do you say Malvinas in Moroccan?’), a socialist member of the Spanish Parliament, Luis Solana, pointed out that since thousands of Spanish troops were stationed in Ceuta and Melilla, such an invasion would undoubtedly be bloody, and that perhaps the best way to avert this would be for Spain not to invade Gibraltar. When the Spanish Foreign Affairs Committee debated the Falklands/Malvinas war on 11 and 12 May the communist leader, Santiago Carrillo, pointed out that if Morocco were to attempt to take Ceuta and Melilla by force, NATO would not support Spain. In his response the Foreign Minister, Pérez-Llorca, strongly rejected the comparison between the colonial situation of the Falklands/Malvinas and the situation in the towns of Ceuta and Melilla. He pointedly added that ‘the mention of these towns at the present time is against Spanish interests’ (El País, 13 May 1982). There is a touch of irony in the fact that the communist Carrillo was at least being consistent in seeing parallels not only between territories claimed by Spain and Argentina but also between those territories and others claimed against Spain, whereas the UCD Foreign Minister was keen to raise the issue of Gibraltar in the context of the Falklands/ Malvinas but rejected even the mention of territories claimed by Morocco, even though the reference was made in the context of Spain’s

160 Europe or Africa? desire to defend them. Indeed there was a timely reminder from Joaquín Muñoz Peirats, head of the Spanish Delegation to the Council of Europe and a UCD representative in Congress, that ‘specifically Spanish matters should not be brought into the Falklands/Malvinas conflict. Those politicians who want to take advantage of these circumstances to discuss the conditions of our entry into NATO or who look for parallels with our dispute over Gibraltar do not understand international reality or else have other intentions which I would prefer not to go into here’ (El País, 13 May 1982). Spain was clearly in a dilemma over its stance on the Falklands/Malvinas crisis, a dilemma which was explored in an editorial in El País on 18 May entitled ‘The tribulations of foreign affairs’ and inspired by the Spanish Foreign Minister’s absence from a meeting in Luxembourg of the North Atlantic Council to which he had been invited as an observer. ‘Throughout the crisis,’ stated the leader writer, our diplomacy has chosen to stay in the shade. For Spaniards, the conflict in the South Atlantic, in addition to its intrinsic complexity, has the added difficulty of our links with Latin America, our claim over Gibraltar and [pace Pérez-Llorca] the permanent threat of Moroccan irredentism over Ceuta and Melilla… our Atlantic commitment squares uncomfortably with our Latin American vocation, but is made much worse with the Gibraltar situation – which after the Falklands/Malvinas the British will doubtless not let go so easily – and with our doubts about what support we would really get from NATO if Morocco were to do in Ceuta and Melilla what Galtieri’s regime decided to do in the Falklands/Malvinas.

Of course the whole question of invasion of the enclaves by Morocco was pure conjecture, but since no-one had ever thought that Argentina would invade the Falklands/Malvinas the unthinkable could legitimately be thought. The crisis passed, Spain could get back to its pursuit of a settlement to the Gibraltar issue, and as a consequence Morocco could talk of the enclaves without fear of an overdefensive reaction by Spain. But there is no doubt that while it lasted the crisis in the South Atlantic caused a good deal of discomfort in Spain regarding the North African enclaves.

The Brussels declaration Britain and Spain eventually established a formal agreement in Brussels in 1984 (which had been delayed by the conflict in the

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South Atlantic) to discuss all differences between them over Gibraltar, including sovereignty.1 Even though little progress has been made since then on the sovereignty question, Morocco would welcome a similar arrangement with Spain, and from 1987 until his death King Hassan II frequently urged Spain to agree to his proposal of the establishment of a ‘committee of experts’ in which the question of the enclaves would be fully explored (see Chapter 1). However, Morocco must be aware that Britain agreed to discuss the future of Gibraltar through the so-called Brussels Process in the context of Spain’s impending membership of the European Community and the need to ensure free movement between member states. All the evidence suggests that although Britain agreed to discuss the issue of sovereignty, it had little intention of negotiating on it unless the people of Gibraltar democratically indicated a desire for that to happen, and thus far there is as little evidence that the inhabitants of Gibraltar would want to become part of Spain as there is of the inhabitants of the enclaves (at least those of Spanish nationality) wanting to become part of Morocco.

A growing realism? At the end of September 1989 the official visit to Spain by King Hassan II (see Chapter 1) prompted the editorial writer of El País on 1 October to draw parallels between Spain’s North African enclaves and Gibraltar. What was notable about the column was the sense of realism about the future of Ceuta and Melilla which was usually absent whenever the Spanish territories were under discussion. Although, as the writer observed, the subject had been studiously avoided during the royal visit, that did not mean that the problem had gone away. He noted that the Spanish Government’s attitude seemed to be guided by two principles: to increase the ties between Spain and Morocco on the basis of shared interests which would make unilateral action undesirable and unlikely, and secondly to gain time by putting the issue on ice. The writer approved of the first principle, and while he understood the second he considered it a risky strategy. He then brought in the parallels with Gibraltar. In neither case, he argued, is the status quo a long-term option: ‘the most likely

162 Europe or Africa? outcome is that one day Britain will have to give up Gibraltar and Spain will have to give up Ceuta and Melilla. One day: perhaps in 20 years, perhaps before.’ The writer suggested that the two issues should be seen as part of a common problem, since control of the Strait of Gibraltar has international implications, and that the three countries involved – the UK, Morocco and Spain – should set about creating the conditions which would have the least traumatic effect on the populations concerned. With 130,000 people in Ceuta and Melilla (more than four times as many as in Gibraltar), it was important for Spain to place the emphasis on ‘the rights and interests of the population’. The writer noted that King Hassan had accepted that there was a connection between the problems of Gibraltar and the enclaves, and in the context of the King’s idea of federal regionalism on the German model he concluded that shared sovereignty might be a possible solution. It is doubtful whether the Spanish Government would have accepted these arguments in public at this stage, even if it was prepared to concede them in private. But it is noteworthy that the argument that Spanish writers usually used to distinguish between the two cases – that Gibraltar was a colony, while Ceuta and Melilla were part of Spanish territory – was now conspicuously absent. The possible time-scale for a solution to be reached is a further indication of a growing realism in Spain regarding the Gibraltar issue, although with more than half of those twenty years having elapsed, there is no sign of any change on either side of the Strait. In October 1991 José María Aznar, the new leader of the Partido Popular, visited London for talks with British ministers. Among other matters they inevitably discussed the issue of Gibraltar. But while Aznar was arguing to John Major that ‘it is quite illogical for such a tiny colony to be a constant tooth-ache for 40 million Spaniards’, in a debate in the Spanish Parliament held on the same day (29 October) his party was arguing (and losing the vote) that the North African enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla should be established as Autonomous Communities like the rest of Spain on the grounds of their Spanishness (see Chapter 2). The PP accused the Socialist and Izquierda Unida (United Left) Groups, who opposed the proposal on the grounds that the timing was inappropriate, of acting more in the interests of Morocco than of Spain.

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Constitutional change The question of the self-governing status of the disputed British and Spanish territories also conjures up a parallel. Chapter 2 has described the difficulties that Spain encountered in dealing with demands for a change of status by the enclaves from municipalities to Autonomous Communities, and the compromise that was settled on by designating them as autonomous towns. One of the main reasons for the agonizing by the Spanish Government over the issue was the concern not to upset Morocco, on the grounds that Hispano–Moroccan relations have priority over Madrid–enclave relations. A close parallel exists in relation to Gibraltar, which for several years has suggested a change of relationship between the Rock and London, involving integration with Britain resulting in a status similar to that enjoyed by the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man and a consequent transfer of remaining UK responsibilities from the Foreign Office to the Home Office. The British Government has always indicated its wariness about any such change for fear of upsetting Madrid, despite the fact that no change of sovereignty would be involved and that therefore there would be no breach of the Treaty of Utrecht (Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Fourth Report, 22 June 1999: Minutes of Evidence 30 March 1999, Questions 87–90).

Conclusions It is an oddity of European history that there are three territories on either side of the western Mediterranean coast whose sovereignty has for centuries been in dispute, and all of them involve Spain (as claimant in one case and claimed against in the others). Yet given the strategic locations of these territories on either side of access to the sea which is bordered by some of the major nations of Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, it is scarcely surprising that two seafaring imperial powers have defended their claim to those possessions over the centuries at any price. Whatever Spain may say there are clearly parallels between the situation of the enclaves and of Gibraltar, although the differences are also important and undeniable. The fact is, of course, that while it might have made strategic sense for Britain and Spain to retain these overseas toe-holds at a time

164 Europe or Africa? when they were imperial powers with interests to defend beyond the Mediterranean, it is much more difficult to argue the case at the turn of the twenty-first century. There will be those who will claim that Britain’s possession of Gibraltar was vital in its defence of the Falklands/Malvinas in 1982, and those who will say that Spain’s physical presence in North Africa has been (and could be in the future) an important factor in regional stability in the western Mediterranean. Yet in the days of laser-guided long-range missiles and rapid response forces it is much more difficult to make the case for their strategic value, and it is significant both that Gibraltar has been downgraded in the recently revised command structure of NATO, and that NATO has never felt it necessary to embrace Ceuta and Melilla on the grounds that they might be strategically useful. Nevertheless no former imperial power lightly relinquishes strategic vantage points, especially if they are so close to home. That, surely, is one of the crucial differences between Gibraltar and Hong Kong for Britain, and between Cuba (or even Western Sahara) and Ceuta and Melilla for Spain. If military value is not the overriding reason for their retention, then in the cases of both Gibraltar and the enclaves the reason why there is no willingness to relinquish possession by either Britain or Spain is partly national pride, but more significantly the paramountcy of the wishes of the inhabitants. Under pressure from the imminent threat of siege by General Franco, Gibraltar demonstrated in a referendum in 1967 the overwhelming desire of the population to retain close links with Britain, and subsequent opinion polls have never shown any shift from that position, despite the wellestablished restoration of democracy in Spain. The British Government built into the Preamble to the Gibraltar Constitution of 1969 a right of veto over any decision relating to sovereignty (and in practice in relation to other matters which the inhabitants deemed not in their best interests) and until there is a change in the Constitution it is likely to render all Spanish efforts fruitless. No such poll has been taken in the enclaves, and there is no reason why the Spanish Government should wish to do so. But the granting of autonomy status to the enclaves in 1995 could be seen as the equivalent of the changes introduced in Gibraltar in 1969, and there is every evidence that the substantial majority of ceutís and melillenses are just as eager to remain part of the Spanish state as their counter-

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parts over the Strait are keen to retain close constitutional ties with Britain. However, one major difference between Gibraltar and the enclaves is that demographic changes are minimal in the former but potentially significant in the latter. Although the origins of Gibraltarians may be diverse, the modern population is quite stable. That population has set its mind collectively and firmly against becoming part of Spain, and there is no apparent reason why that should alter. By contrast, not only has there been an influx of Moroccans who settled in the enclaves during the last century, but the birth-rate of those Muslim Spaniards now living there is much higher than that of the cristiano population.2 There may therefore come a day when the Muslim population is in the majority, and while there is no incentive for them to want to become part of Morocco as long as there remains a significant differential in the standard of living between Morocco and the enclaves, if and when that differential is sufficiently narrowed that situation could change. Notes 1 For a detailed account of the problem of Gibraltar, see Gold, 1994. 2 This accounts for the fact that Ceuta and Melilla have a higher birth-rate than any of the Autonomous Communities in Spain (1.47 births per thousand population, compared with a national figure of 0.92). The enclaves are the only autonomous region to exceed 1.18 (Anuario El País 1999, p. 390).

CONCLUSION: LOOKING TO THE FUTURE Relations between Spain and Morocco This study set out to explore the unique phenomenon of the Spanish North African enclaves from a variety of different perspectives. The first of these concerned the effect of the towns on relations between Spain and Morocco. There is no doubt that in many respects Spanish–Moroccan relations would be different if Ceuta and Melilla were merely towns in northern Morocco rather than territories disputed between the two nations, but there is equally no doubt that a change in the status of the enclaves is not a pressing concern for Morocco at the start of the twenty-first century. The two countries have established a modus vivendi which is based on a recognition that as neighbours they need to get on with each other in spite of their differences, and that for all sorts of reasons – aid, trade,1 plus (for Spain) investment and the Algerian gas pipeline – each is important to the other’s economic prosperity. That said, there is no indication that Spain intends to make any concessions towards Morocco over Ceuta and Melilla, and by the same token there is no sign that Morocco intends to abandon its claim to the enclaves and other related territories (see the Introduction). The impasse is set to remain in place, and the issue will therefore continue to trouble Spanish–Moroccan relations for the foreseeable future. However, having antagonized Morocco in recent years with measures such as the 1985 Immigration Law, the introduction of visas and the granting of autonomy statutes to the enclaves, Spain is anxious not to do anything further which would alienate its neighbour to the south. On the contrary, the recent introduction of a less stringent (some would say markedly liberal) Immigration Law (Chapter 4) and the bilateral agreement on a number of fixed-term work contracts (Chapter 5) will have been well received in Rabat. By the same token, it is highly

Conclusion 167 unlikely that Morocco would undertake any aggressive action which might provoke Spain into a hostile response. Even if there were indirect provocation (such as over fishing) or regional tensions (similar to those which occurred at the time of the Gulf War), there has never been any indication that Spanish troops would be called out of their barracks (although no doubt contingency plans exist), and there is general acceptance in Spain that the enclaves, especially Melilla, would be militarily indefensible without outside assistance. As previous chapters have demonstrated, Spain has deliberately cultivated a mutual interdependence with Morocco (and more widely between Morocco and the EU) which is too important from a security as well as an economic perspective to be jeopardized through any precipitate action over the enclaves. In that sense both bilateral and regional cooperation agreements have acted as important stabilizing factors despite the dispute over Ceuta and Melilla. Moreover, the start of a new era in Morocco following the death of King Hassan is likely to result in even closer cooperation between Morocco and Spain (and more widely with the EU). The dismissal of King Hassan’s long-serving Interior Minister, Dris Basri, by King Mohamed in November 1999 can be interpreted as part of the process of reform in Morocco, as well as a step towards progress on the Western Sahara problem, since for twenty years Basri was the key figure in Moroccan policy on the issue and therefore could be seen as the main impediment to the holding of the promised referendum.2 King Mohamed has shown other signs of wanting to modernize his country following the long period of transition of his father’s reign, and if this is dependent on increasing cooperation with the countries on the northern shore of the Mediterranean then the issue of the enclaves will not be allowed to get in the way.

Autonomy statutes As described in Chapter 2, the issue of the status of the enclaves within the constitutional framework of democratic Spain was clearly not an easy one to resolve. In theory the Spanish Government had the option of leaving them as municipalities within the Autonomous Community of Andalucía, but that would clearly not have satisfied the aspirations of the inhabitants of the enclaves and they would

168 Europe or Africa? have continued to make an issue of their demand for autonomous status. As long as no decision was taken the PP was able to harry the PSOE Government with the cause of autonomous statutes for the enclaves, and if the PSOE had not eventually produced the necessary legislation this would undoubtedly have done irreparable harm to their electoral prospects in the enclaves. As it was, the PP had a clean sweep of seats in the enclaves in the 1996 general election following the enactment of the statutes, and given its core of electoral support in the North African towns it would undoubtedly have wanted to introduce the necessary legislation on coming to power if the PSOE had not already done so. The compromise solution of creating a unique category of autonomous towns was, like all compromises, destined to please noone permanently, even if temporarily it was accepted as the best that was available. Clearly there are some loose ends and anomalies resulting from the hybrid status of being both municipalities and autonomous towns – such as Aberchán’s attempt to view the ruling body as a Council rather than as an Assembly to suit his own purposes, or the town planning loophole which had to be dealt with by a change in legislation because, contrary to the situation in every other municipality in Spain, there was no check on planning proposals (Chapter 3) – and others may well emerge. The real problem has been that the shift of status from Council to Assembly required a greater degree of collective political maturity on the part of the people’s local representatives than has generally been apparent. There will no doubt be demands for further competences to be added to those already devolved – in particular the power to legislate on local affairs – and this has already been intimated by the existing Assemblies. But given the possible unreliability of parties and politicians who may find themselves exercising power in what are politically highly sensitive communities, it seems probable that for the foreseeable future the Government in Madrid, of whatever political persuasion, will want to retain the degree of control over the enclaves that the present statutes allow.

Political consequences Chapter 3 drew a number of conclusions from the national, European and local election results in the enclaves since Spain’s

Conclusion 169 return to democracy. The predominance of the main national parties in national elections is striking when compared to other peripheral parts of Spain, where strong nationalist political movements have developed which take a sizeable proportion of the votes. What may cause this to change is the Muslim population, which has begun to find a political voice within the last ten years, and with the birth-rate in the Muslim population three times greater than that of the cristiano community, at the present rate by 2020 the Muslim population in the enclaves will be in the majority. It is quite possible that within the foreseeable future a stronger Muslim movement will emerge in the enclaves, and if it does what will be interesting to observe is whether it leans towards Spain or towards Morocco or alternatively takes an independent ‘pro-Ceuta’ or ‘pro-Melilla’ stance. It will also have to decide whether to confine itself to local politics or to try to make an impact in national elections, although history suggests that initially at least it is likely to be confined to the local political scene. It would mark a major change if the representatives to either chamber of Parliament from the enclaves did not come from one or other of the main political parties, and although the steps taken in Melilla in January 2000 to form an electoral pact which excluded the main parties failed to bring this about, it could happen if repeated in the future. The other issue is whether or not the GIL will survive as a permanent feature of politics in the enclaves. The rapid rise of the GIL demonstrated the vulnerability of the electorate to a populist, opportunistic approach which took the main parties by surprise and reflected their failure to comprehend the political culture in both towns. There are already signs since June 1999 that the success of the GIL may be short-lived, but this will not be confirmed until the next local elections in 2003.

Community relations There is evidence of a good deal of misunderstanding, not to say ignorance, about the enclaves among the Spanish population at large (López García, 1992a, p. 151). However, one thing that all Spaniards are clear about is that Morocco lays claim to (and therefore in their eyes threatens) the Spanish territories of Ceuta and Melilla. This,

170 Europe or Africa? together with the fact that Moroccans constitute a growing proportion of immigrants in Spain, plus a legacy of antagonism towards a culture which was an occupying power in parts of the peninsula for nearly eight centuries and which is associated with some of the dark moments of twentieth-century Spanish history,3 does nothing to create a positive image of Muslims in the minds of the Spanish people. These factors could well explain why, in a survey carried out by the Sociological Research Centre (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas) in August 1997 about attitudes in Spain towards eleven countries and their peoples, Moroccans (the only Muslim population included in the study) inspired the least confidence and more people had a bad or very bad opinion of Morocco than of any of the other countries (El País, 29 August 1997). It would probably be true to say that the results of this survey reflect an underlying racist attitude in Spain towards North Africans, since according to the survey the people who inspire most confidence are either those with whom Spaniards can most easily identify (Italians, Portuguese and Mexicans) or whom they can admire for their economic success and industry (Germans, Japanese). In a similar exercise carried out by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, only 2 per cent of those surveyed said that they would give preference to the integration of Arabs or North Africans, compared with 10 per cent to East Europeans and 14 per cent to South Americans (El País, 15 September 1998). All this means that if the Spanish Government takes a hard line in its relations with Morocco, particularly over the retention of the enclaves or the control of illegal immigrants, this is likely to have the support of the majority of the Spanish people.4 As the present study has demonstrated, the relationship between the dominant cristiano community and the Muslim community in the enclaves has undergone a substantial change in recent years. This change has brought with it a latent racism which has surfaced as the dominated community has begun to find a voice and in particular as it has begun to threaten the long-standing political hegemony of the non-Muslims. Although the cristiano communities in the enclaves have long accepted the presence of non-Spaniards (particularly Moroccans) in their midst, it has been difficult for many to adjust to the change in their relationship, and as the numbers of black Africans appearing in the enclaves have increased, this has compounded the growing sense of both physical and cultural

Conclusion 171 invasion felt by many. The enclaves have become less tolerant places because the dominated community has begun to assert its rights and the dominant community feels threatened. The political cooperation between the Muslims and cristianos in Melilla was an encouraging sign, even though all the indications were that it was the GIL that was the driving force behind the autonomous administration there. The eventual collapse of the Aberchán government and the recriminations of a racial nature marked a significant setback in this regard.

Immigration The area in which there is regular friction between Spain and Morocco is that of illegal immigration, together with smuggling and other illegal cross-border activity. Given the economic disparities between Spain and Morocco in particular, and between the countries to the north and to the south of the Mediterranean Sea in general, such activity would inevitably occur even without the presence of the Spanish enclaves (and indeed does so, particularly via Tangier and Tetuán). But the anomaly of two small territories which are part of the European Union nestling on the edge of Morocco, with the whole of the African continent behind them, inevitably multiplies the problem tenfold. Fences may have been erected, but they are only as effective as the people and the vigilance systems that control them, as well as the commitment by the administrations on both sides to ensure that international borders are recognized as such. Morocco’s position vis-à-vis the sovereignty of the enclaves means that it has little interest in patrolling them and improving their impermeability with any degree of conviction, because that would imply recognition that they are legitimate borders. In any case, since both enclaves lie on the coast, entry by land is not the only option for those determined to risk whatever it takes to migrate to Europe. In addition, a good deal of commercial activity in the enclaves is contingent upon the ease with which duty-free goods can be dispersed across the border with Morocco and into the rest of Africa, and Spain would have the task of subsidising the economy of the enclaves if such trade were curtailed. At the same time Morocco recognizes the value of allowing a lax attitude to the entry of consumer goods which it could not otherwise afford, and overall it

172 Europe or Africa? benefits from migration through remittances sent from abroad to the tune of US$2 billion per year (The Economist, 2 January 1999).5 The issue of the control of the borders around the enclaves is clearly not straightforward. Despite efforts to narrow the economic gap between Europe and North Africa, which is the root cause of most if not all attempts at illegal migration, the measures thus far have been insufficient to make a substantial impact on the migration issue. While there is implicit in the Euro–Mediterranean Partnership an agreement that it is in the interests of the European member states, both from a security as well as from an economic standpoint, to assist their neighbours to the south to improve their standard of living and thereby to increase the likelihood of regional political stability, the measures so far taken are limited by the constraints on the political will within Europe to sacrifice a share of its own prosperity in the short term. This is compounded by the fact that there are more lucrative prospects, as well as equally important security issues, which require the European Union’s urgent attention to the east and to the north (in the shape of the former Soviet Union, especially Russia). Moreover, the increase in the numbers from sub-Saharan Africa attempting to enter the EU via the enclaves is a firm reminder that the Euro–Mediterranean Partnership offers nothing to the poorest countries of Africa,6 and that if the EMP is successful in improving the standard of living of the North African states this could well result in an increase in the numbers of Africans migrating to them from further south and turning them into ‘receiving’ as well as ‘sending’ countries.

Europe or Africa? The examples in Chapter 6 illustrated the anomaly of territories being physically situated in one continent but in political and administrative terms being part of another. In the context of Europe and Africa the enclaves are unique, but there are 26 other territories which belong to member states of the EU and which are located outside Europe.7 Only one of these territories (French Guiana) is located on a mainland continent apart from Ceuta, Melilla and Gibraltar.

Conclusion 173 While all this goes to underline the unusual position of the enclaves at the present time, the Euro–Mediterranean Partnership could eventually (perhaps even by the middle of the twenty-first century) blur the distinctions between southern Europe and northern Africa, to the extent that they would mainly come to be seen as states sharing a common interest on either side of the Mediterranean. It may be too fanciful to see the ‘European’ Union extending so far to the north, east and south that the northern African states, Russia and the Middle East are all virtually part of ‘Europe’, although a free trade area stretching from Mauritania to (and possibly including) Russia and the Ukraine is already seen as an ‘ultimate goal’ (Rhein, 1999, p. 13). Even looking solely in a southerly direction, a genuine Free Trade Area between the EU and the MPCs, with improved transport links including a rail tunnel across the Strait of Gibraltar, could radically alter the wider relationship between Europe and North Africa. In such circumstances the issue of the sovereignty of the enclaves would become highly marginal because it would make very little difference whether they were African or European. By the same token, if it would make such little difference that might increase the pressure on Spain to accept change.

The enclaves and Gibraltar Chapter 7 showed that there are both parallels and differences between the situation of Gibraltar as the only remaining colony (or ‘dependent territory’) in Europe, and the position of the enclaves as the only territories in Africa which are constitutionally part of a member of the EU. The fact that Spain is involved in both situations but on opposite sides of the disputes is the reason why any change in the status quo of either situation is less likely than might otherwise be the case. Spain may not press as hard as it could for a solution to the Gibraltar question knowing that it will in turn be pressed by Morocco over the enclaves if any change were to occur. Conversely Morocco knows that no change is likely in the enclaves until Spain has some success over Gibraltar. With the end of the Cold War the prediction made by King Hassan in 1985 that when Gibraltar was returned to Spain the Soviet Union

174 Europe or Africa? would never allow a member of NATO to control both sides of the entrance to the Mediterranean not only became obsolete but also indicated a serious miscalculation on his part about how long it might take for Britain and Spain to negotiate any change in the sovereignty of Gibraltar. Sixteen years since the signing of the Brussels Declaration in 1984 have produced very little inclination for change on the part of Britain or of the Gibraltarians themselves. If there is a lesson for Morocco from the issue of Gibraltar it is that even if Spain were to agree to negotiations on the future of the enclaves, no change would occur unless Spain wished it to happen and unless Spain denied the inhabitants of the enclaves any power of veto over any decision that might be taken. Both seem highly unlikely at the present time, but demographic change followed by political change in the enclaves could alter the situation in the future.

Ceuta or Melilla? Finally, this study has virtually throughout considered Ceuta and Melilla together. Although there have been some differences, especially in terms of political allegiances and in reactions to the autonomy statutes, the conclusions drawn have invariably referred to both enclaves. But it must not be forgotten that these are two territories situated some 250 kilometres apart, and their different locations is a factor that should not be overlooked. Ceuta finds itself literally at the crossroads between Europe and Africa, and the human and commercial traffic that proximity to Europe brings with it not only makes it more ‘European’ but virtually ensures an economic viability (especially in the area of handling goods and people in transit) which is not shared by Melilla. Melilla is much more detached geographically from the Spanish peninsula and is therefore economically as well as strategically more vulnerable. It lies in the shadow of the city and port of Nador, with three quarters of a million inhabitants, and because of both distance and vulnerability investment in Melilla from Spain is much more problematic than is the case in Ceuta. In theory at least Spain has the option to consider a separate future for the two towns. In practice they have been so inextricably linked in the Spanish consciousness for so long that their fate is likely to be identical.

Conclusion

175

What that fate will be is at present unclear. King Mohamed’s plans to revitalize the Rif through the construction of a Mediterranean highway (supported by EU funding) and an international airport (The Economist, 30 October 1999), together with the eventual implementation of the free trade area envisaged in the Barcelona Declaration and/or the completion of a tunnel between Spain and North Africa could completely change the economic prospects of Ceuta and Melilla in particular and the configuration of regional cooperation in general within the span of two or three decades. Notes 1 Morocco is Spain’s seventh most important export market in terms of value and 16th most important source of imports (excluding EU countries) (Anuario El País 1999, pp. 387–88). Spain is heavily involved in investment in a number of Moroccan industries, notably fishing, food processing, textiles and leather. It is forecast that in addition to existing sectors, increased Spanish investment in Morocco is likely in the areas of infrastructural equipment, telecommunications, mining and equipment for local communities and medical centres (see Jordán Galduf, 1997, pp. 55–59). 2 Despite the removal of Basri, the earliest date for a referendum is 2002 (El Mundo, 30 July 2000). 3 For example, the defeat of the Spanish army at Annual in 1921; the use of Moroccan troops against Asturian miners in 1934; the participation of Moroccan troops on the Nationalist side in the Civil War; the ‘Green March’ on the Western Sahara in 1975 (López García, 1993d). 4 In a more recent survey conducted by the Sociological Research Centre, 44 per cent of Spaniards believe that their fellow citizens do not trust immigrants, 15 per cent believe that they treat them with indifference and 14 per cent consider that they treat them with contempt (see El Mundo, 8 February 2000). 5 López García et al., 1994, p. 105, provided figures for remittances from Spain to Morocco in 1991 based on information collected from the International Giro Section of the Spanish postal service. These added up to over 3,000 million pesetas (US$20 million) per year from more than 72,000 Moroccan immigrants. A more recent estimate is of 1,000 million pesetas (US$6.6 million) per month from the Almería region alone, mostly destined for Morocco (El Mundo, 8 May 2000). 6 The first Euro-African Conference held in Cairo in April 2000 is perhaps a recognition by the EU member countries that it is in their interests formally to develop dialogue and cooperation with the whole of the continent of Africa rather than just the northern fringe. 7 The other territories are: (British) Cayman Islands; British Virgin Islands; Anguilla; Montserrat; Bermuda; Turks and Caicos Islands; British Antarctic

176 Europe or Africa? Territory; British Indian Ocean Territory; Falkland Islands; South Georgia; Gibraltar; Pitcairn Islands; St Helena; (Dutch) Netherlands Antilles; Curacao, Bonaire, Aruba, St Martin, St Eustatius and Saba Islands (all linked in 1954); (the French DOM) French Guiana; Réunion; St Pierre and Miquelon; Guadeloupe; Martinique; St Barts; (the French TOM) New Caledonia; French Polynesia; Wallis and Futuna Islands; French Southern and Antarctic Territories; (Danish) Greenland and Faroe Islands.

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References 183 Saaf, A. (1990): ‘Sebta et Melilla et les relations hispanomarocaines’, Annales du Centre d’Etudes Stratégiques 1989–90, 3, Faculté des Sciences Juridiques, Economiques et Sociales de l’Université Mohamed V, Rabat. Safir, N. (1993): ‘La question migratoire en Méditerranée occidentale’, in Vasconcelos (ed.). Solé, C., N. Ribas, V. Bergalli, and S. Parella (1998): ‘Irregular Employment amongst Migrants in Spanish Cities’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 24(2), pp. 333–46. Spencer, C. (1993): The Maghreb in the 1990s, Adelphi Paper 274, Brassey’s for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London. Tovias, A. (1997): ‘The Economic Impact of the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area on Mediterranean Non-Member Countries’, in Gillespie (ed.). Vasconcelos, A. (ed.) (1993) Européens et Maghrébins: Une Solidarité Obligée, Paris, Editions Kathala. White, G.W. (1996): ‘The Mexico of Europe? Morocco’s Partnership with the European Union’, in D. Vandewalle (ed.), North Africa: Development and Reform in a Changing Global Economy, St Martin’s Press, New York.

INDEX 21st August Organization for the Liberation of Occupied Moroccan Territories, 50 Abd el-Krim, 1 Aberchán, Mustafá, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 82, 89, 168 Africa, xi, xii, 21, 38, 120, 122, 124, 125, 126, 132, 140, 143, 145, 151, 152, 153, 171, 172, 173, 174 Agenda 2000, 142 Agrupación de la Comunidad Musulmana de Melilla, 106 Agrupación Electoral Ceutí (AEC), 57, 61 Alaoui, Ahmed, 42 Algeciras, xi, 1, 18, 121, 123 Algeria, 2, 4, 5, 32, 38, 122, 124, 129, 134, 138, 146, 147, 148 Algerians, 128, 146, 147 Algiers, 134 Alhucemas, Peñón de (Al Hoceima), xv Alí, Abdelkáder Mohamed, 105, 111, 112 Alianza Popular (AP), 42, 43, 57, 58, 61, 62, 85, 90, 102, 103, 104, 110 and autonomy statutes, 40 electoral support in the enclaves, 60, 62, 64 puts forward autonomy Bill, 39 Alicante, 146 Almería, 107, 108, 109, 111, 121, 125, 128 Almunia, Joaquín, 44, 80, 81, 90 Alvarez Cascos, Francisco, 25 Andalucía, 10, 36, 55, 68, 70, 76, 122, 123, 129, 149, 167 Andorrans, 117

Anguilla, 175 Annual, 175 Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), 32, 134 Argentina, 159, 160 Aruba, 176 Asociación Musulmana Ceutí, 65 Asociación Musulmana Melillense, 94 Association of Immigrant Moroccan Workers in Spain (ATIME), 121, 122 Association of Muslim Women, 96 Asturias, 144 Atlético Madrid, 70, 77, 88 autonomous communities, 23, 36, 39, 40, 41, 43, 44, 45, 46, 51, 52, 53, 55, 88, 162, 163, 165 autonomy of the enclaves, xiv, 12, 21, 31, 36, 37, 39, 52, 57, 87 demand for, 12 designated as autonomous towns, 39, 46, 48, 52, 53, 70, 74 draft proposals, 36 opposition to proposals, 9 use of the term, 37, 43 autonomy statutes, 9, 18, 20, 28, 36, 40, 41, 45, 48, 50, 53, 54, 62, 65, 66, 67, 85, 113, 166, 174 and ‘Programa 2000’, 41, 42 and recognition of languages, 39, 43, 44, 48, 49 Bill goes to Cabinet, 47 general strike called in Ceuta, 45, 47 more like a municipal charter, 41, 45 passage of Bill through Parliament, 49 powers of, 41, 45 president more like mayor, 41, 43

186 Index reaction in Morocco, 14 reaction to 1986 proposals, 39 Averroes, 24, 111, 112 Axis powers, 2 Aznar, José María, 23, 26, 29, 39, 43, 69 becomes Prime Minister, 23 meets King Mohamed VI, 27 visits enclaves, 23, 29, 69, 84 visits London, 162 visits Rabat, 19, 23, 26, 28 Balearic Islands, 90 Barcelona, 19, 122, 146 Barcelona Declaration, 4, 24, 135, 136, 137, 138, 140, 141, 142, 175 Barrionuevo, José, 7, 9, 95, 99 Basri, Dris, 16, 23, 25, 118 Beamud, Enrique, 115, 126 Ben Arafa, Sultan Mohammed, 2 Ben Yusuf, Sultan Mohammed, 2 Benaissa, Mohammed, 35 Benbouchta, Ali, 19 Benegas, José María, 62 Benet, Carlos, 102 Berlin, 142 Bermuda, 175 Bermúdez, Angel, 79, 80 Bermúdez, Susana, 79, 80, 81, 82, 89 Berra Pereira, Ramón, 105, 118 Bloque Localista de Melilla (BLM), 89 Blue March, the, 44 Bonache, Vicente, 56 Bonaire, 176 Bossano, Joe, 56 Britain, 7, 25, 34, 156, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 174 British Antarctic Territory, 175 British Indian Ocean Territory, 176 British Virgin Islands, 175 Brussels, xii, 17, 30, 33, 34, 132, 142, 160 Bucetta, Mohamed, 14, 19, 98, 111 Budapest, 154 Cádiz, 77

Cairo, 175 Calamocarro, 124, 129, 146, 147 Cameroon, 124, 126, 145 Campo de Gibraltar, 121 Canary Islands, 1, 10, 81, 90, 123, 126, 153 Carrillo, Santiago, 159 Caruana, Peter, 89 Casablanca, 6, 8, 50 Casares, Málaga, 89 Cayman Islands, 175 Central and Eastern Europe, 136 Central Electoral Committee, 74, 75 Centro Democrático Social (CDS), 40, 42, 43, 44, 61, 62, 65 autonomy proposals, 43, 44 Cerdeira family, 79 Cerdeira, Carmen, 126 Cerviño, José Luis, 101 Céspedes, Manuel, 102, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 112, 118 Ceuta Muslim Association, 43 Ceuta Unida (CeU), 61, 62, 66, 67, 71, 85 Chafarinas, Islas (Moulouya), xv Cintra Agreement, 3 Coalición Canaria, 114 Coalición por Melilla (CM), 61, 68, 69, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 79, 86, 87, 88, 89, 113 Comisiones Obreras (CC.OO), 95, 100 Committee for Muslim Affairs, 90 Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), 133, 151 Community of Madrid, 88 Comunidad Musulmana de Ceuta, 65 Convergència i Unió (CiU), 28, 114 Corcuera, José Luis, 16 Córdoba, 48 Coria del Río, Seville, 154 Cuba, 164 Curacao, 176 Cyprus, 132, 142, 148 Czech Republic, 148

Index Dahrendorf, Sir Ralph, 133 de Francisco, Rafael, 98 de la Cortina, Juan Díez, 102 de Pro, Javier, 75 Democratic Republic of Congo, 144 Derisbourg, Jean-Pierre, 136 Dobaños, Román, 72 Driss Abdelkader, Sid, 107, 108, 109, 110, 112 Dudú, Aomar Mohamedi, xiv, 92, 94, 95, 96, 97, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 117, 118 East Asia, 143 East Germany, 137 Eastern Europe, 137, 140, 142 El Ejido, 149 Equatorial Guinea, 146 Equatorial Guineans, 117 Estepona, 89 Estopinán, Pedro de, xi Euro–Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), 4, 17, 24, 50, 135, 136, 137, 139, 141, 142, 143, 172, 173 European Commission, 136, 137, 155 European Commission (DG1B), 33, 132, 141 European Community (EC), 62 Spain’s entry into, xi, xiii, 5, 33, 38, 116, 161 European Council of the Regions, 47 European Court of Human Rights, 157 European Investment Bank (EIB), 136 European Parliament, 16, 58, 156 EC Act on Direct Elections, 156 elections to, xii, 62, 64, 66, 67, 86 European Union (EU), xii, 4, 18, 31, 34, 50, 81, 86, 120, 129, 132, 133, 134, 135, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 143, 148, 151, 167, 172, 173 and Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), 134 enlargement, 142, 148 funding for the enclaves, 131, 132,

187

146, 152 labour force in agriculture, 133 Wild Birds Directive, 155 Falkland Islands, 176 Falklands/Malvinas War, 159, 164 Farhana, Melilla, 129 Faroe Islands, 176 Fernández Ordóñez, Francisco, 10, 98 Fernández, Basilio, 48, 67, 126 Fernández, Darío, 108 Fez, 15 Filali, Abdelatif, 10, 13, 19, 20, 21, 24, 25, 50, 118 Filipinos, 117 fishing agreements with Morocco, 10, 12, 17, 21, 26, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35 Fortes, Jesús, 67, 78, 79 Fraga, Manuel, 43 France, xii, xiii, 1, 2, 5, 6, 14, 22, 79, 127, 133, 134, 138 Franco, Francisco, 1, 2, 3, 5, 36, 71, 164 Franco-Spanish Agreement, 1912, 1 French Départements d’Outre-Mer (DOM), 151, 155 French Guiana, 172, 176 French Polynesia, 176 French Southern and Antarctic Territories, 176 French Térritoires d’Outre-Mer (TOM), 151 Friaz Armada, Francisco, 66 Galtieri, General, 160 Germany, 137, 138, 153, 154 Ghana, 125 Gibraltar, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, 19, 32, 38, 56, 89, 151, 156, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 164, 165, 172, 173, 176 and Brussels Declaration (1984), 161, 174 comparison with the Spanish enclaves, xv, 6, 25, 26, 33, 34, 40,

188 Index 156, 158, 159, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 173 Gibraltarians, 56, 117, 156, 161, 165, 174 Gil y Gil, Jesús, 70, 71, 76, 77, 80, 81, 89 González Orell, José, 56 González, Felipe, 8, 18, 20, 23, 24, 36, 45, 60, 65, 69, 102 views on dealing with the GIL, 82 visits Rabat, 14, 22 González, Francisco Antonio, 48 Granada, 77 Greece, 133, 148 Greenland, 176 Grupo Independiente Liberal (GIL), xiv, 61, 70, 71, 72, 76, 77, 78, 79, 81, 82, 83, 86, 87, 89, 90, 149, 169 attacked by Almunia, 81 in Ceuta, 71, 78, 79, 80, 81, 83, 90 in Melilla, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 79, 83, 88, 89, 90, 171 offices opened in enclaves, 70 programme, 71, 72 registration, 70 views of Felipe González, 82 Guadeloupe, 176 Guerra, Alfonso, 65 Guerra, Juan, 65 Guinea-Bissau, 126, 127, 145 Gulf War, 14, 15, 33, 112, 113, 149, 152, 167 Gurugú, Melilla, 132 Gutiérrez, Antonio, 145 Haddaui, Rafek, 16 Hammu, Mohamed, 108 Hassan II, King, 9, 11, 32, 109, 173 and ‘Green March’, 3, 44 and Aomar Dudú, 118 and Gulf War, 15 and remarks on Spanish TV, 5, 32, 36 ‘committee of experts’ proposal, 8, 10, 13, 18, 19, 20, 21, 27, 28, 32, 161

control of policy, 6, 14 death of, 27, 167 involvement in enclaves policy, 7, 19, 20, 25, 33, 162 preference for dealing with Spanish King, 8 rarely visited the Rif, 54 receives loyalty pledge by Spanish citizens, 109 succeeds to the throne, 2 visit to Spain, 13, 33, 161 Hassan Mohamed, Ahmed, 95 Hassan, Sir Joshua, 56 Hernández, Gonzalo, 90, 106 Hernández, Jorge, 65, 154 Hong Kong, 25, 70, 164 Huariachi, Abdelaziz, 107, 109 Hued-Zem, 14 Human Development Index, 133 Hungary, 154 Hussein, Saddam, 15, 112 Ibero-Americans, 117 Ifni, 1, 3 Iglesias, Gerardo, 40 Imbroda, Juan José, 72, 76, 78, 89, 102, 103 Immigration Law 1985, 7, 104, 106, 111, 115, 117, 125, 130 call for abandonment of, 104 changes in application to Muslim community in enclaves, 97 criticism of, 114 effect on Spanish-Moroccan relations, 31, 95, 166 introduction of, xiii, 93, 94, 99, 122 opposition to, 94, 95, 96, 105 tensions created by, xiv, 8, 53, 95 Immigration Law 1999, 115, 124, 144, 166 Iniciativa per Catalunya-Els Verds, 28 Iniciativa por Ceuta, 65 Iraq, 14 Israel, 27, 132, 148

Index Istiqlal, 6, 14, 18, 19, 98, 109, 111, 117, 118 Italy, 121, 133, 134, 144, 148 Izquierda Unida (IU), 43, 44, 48, 49, 112, 113, 162 Jáuregui, Ramón, 90 Jean-Paul II, Pope, 14 Jerez, 48 Joint Committee (to examine nationality in the enclaves), 98, 100, 103, 104, 105, 106, 117 Jordan, 148 Juan Carlos, King, 7, 13, 25, 32, 33, 51, 54 Kosovo, 142, 153 Kurdish refugees, 125 Kuwait, 14 La Cañada de la Muerte, 94 La Granja, 124, 130, 147 La Línea, 89 La Rioja, 55 Lamrani, Karim, 18, 98 Laraki, Azedin, 118 Latin America, 116, 140, 143, 160 Ley de Extranjería. See Immigration Law 1985 Liberia, 125 Libya, 7, 32, 133, 134, 148 Lockerbie, 134 Lozano, Cris, 76 Macao, 25 Madeira, 154 Maghreb, 2, 4, 11, 17, 18, 32, 122, 134, 148, 149, 156 Major, John, 162 Málaga, xi, 74, 77, 89, 117, 125, 126, 128 Mali, 125, 126, 127 Malta, 132, 134, 148, 154 Marbella, 70, 71, 76, 82, 83, 89, 90 Martín Palacín, 110

189

Martinique, 176 Mashreq, 148 Matutes, Abel, 24, 114 Mauritania, 3, 32, 134 Mayor Oreja, Jaime, 23, 114, 127 MEDA I, 136, 142, 148 MEDA II, 142 Medina Sidonia, Duke of, xi Mediterranean Forum, 134 Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPCs), 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 148, 149, 173 Messari, Larbi, 25 Middle East, 15, 113, 135, 143, 152, 163, 173 Ministry for Development, 88 Ministry for Labour, 93 Ministry for Local and Regional Government, 36, 47 Ministry of Justice, 45, 95, 96, 98, 126 Ministry of the Interior, 24, 70, 93, 95, 96, 97, 98, 100, 116, 118, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 146 and Aomar Dudú, 102, 103, 105, 108, 110 Mizzian Ammar, Mustafa, 67, 80 Moh, Ahmed, 106, 107 Mohamed Haddu, Mimona, 66 Mohamed VI, King, 27, 28, 35, 54, 167, 175 Mohamed, Abderramán, 111 Mohamed, Malika, 2, 14, 19, 66, 72, 74, 75 Mohammed V, King, 2 Montserrat, 175 Moreno Aguilar, Andrés, 94, 99, 101, 102 Muñoz Peirats, Joaquín, 160 Nador, 9, 11, 14, 98, 107, 109, 110, 123, 124, 174 Narro, Juan, 153 National Association of Independents (ANI), 18

190 Index National Indicative Programmes (NIPs), 136 NATO, 5, 38, 39, 152, 153, 156, 159, 160, 164, 174 Navarra, 48 Neópolis, 111, 112 Netherlands Antilles, 176 New Caledonia, 176 NGOs, 26, 128, 130, 140 Nigeria, 125, 146 Níjar, Almería, 149 North Africa, xi, xiv, 1, 2, 6, 9, 11, 31, 33, 36, 38, 104, 116, 120, 121, 135, 143, 144, 152, 155, 156, 163, 164, 172, 173, 175 Olympic Games, 1988, 154 Ombudsman, 51, 95, 96, 125, 127, 128, 129 Onega, José Ramón, 131 Opération Ecouvillon, 3 Operation Passage Across the Strait, 120 Oujda, 124 Palacios, Enrique, 68, 71, 73, 75, 78, 90, 132 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 148 Palestinian Authority, the, 135, 148 Parti du Progrès et du Socialisme (PPS) in Morocco, 18 Partido Comunista Español (PCE), 40, 48, 54 Partido de los Demócratas Melillenses (PDM), 99, 100 Partido Demócrata Liberal (PDL), 61 Partido Democrático y Social de Ceuta (PDSC), 61, 67, 71, 78, 79, 80, 87, 90 Partido Independiente de Melilla (PIM), 61, 68, 71, 75, 76, 77, 78, 86, 88, 89 Partido Independiente HispanoBerebere, 113

Partido Nacionalista de Ceuta (PNC), 61 Partido Nacionalista Español de Melilla (PNEM), 62, 65, 102, 112 Partido Popular, 119 Partido Popular (PP), 20, 22, 30, 43, 45, 53, 58, 61, 66, 67, 69, 72, 73, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 89, 90, 115, 149, 162, 168 accused of racism, 28, 44 and autonomy proposals, 12, 19, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 51, 66, 168 and European Parliament elections, 64, 66 in Ceuta, 66, 67, 69, 71, 78, 88, 89 in Melilla, 44, 46, 51, 52, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 71, 72, 73, 75, 76, 88, 89, 90, 117, 129, 130 meeting in Melilla cancelled, 23 Partido Progresista Liberal de Melilla (PPLM), 62 Partido Socialista de Melilla-PSOE (PSM-PSOE), 57 Partido Socialista del Pueblo de Ceuta (PSPC), 61, 67, 71 Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE), 22, 39, 44, 57, 58, 61, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 93, 98, 117, 127, 156, 168 accused of racism, 28 and autonomy proposals, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 48, 49, 51, 62 and European Parliament elections, 62, 64 in Ceuta, 20, 45, 57, 60, 62, 66 in Melilla, 6, 39, 46, 47, 62, 65, 66 Patten, Chris, 142 Peña, Francisco, 49 Perejil, Isla de, xv Pérez-Llorca, Pedro, 159, 160 Pétain, Marshall, 1 PHARE, 136 Piqué, Josep, 35

Index Pitcairn Islands, 176 Plataforma Autonómica, 45 Poland, 148 Polisario Front, 3, 13 Pons, Félix, 37 Portugal, xi, 14, 33, 134, 154 Portuguese, 117 Programme for the Reception and Employment Training for SubSaharan Immigrants, 128 Progreso y Futuro de Ceuta (PFC), 44, 46, 61, 66, 67, 71, 88 Pro-Human Rights Association (APDH), 146 Puya, Aurelio, 39

191

Radi, Abdelawahed, 21 Rato, Rodrigo, 82 Red Cross, 112, 125, 126, 140 Regional Indicative Programme (RIP), 148 Réunion, 176 Rif, 1, 22, 39, 54, 158, 175 Rights of the Child Convention, 122 Rio de Oro, 1 Robles Piquer, Carlos, 104 Robles, Francisco, 77 Roldán, Miguel Angel, 6 Russia, 172, 173 Rwanda, 125

Socialist Regeneration, 93 Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP), 118 Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP), 35 Solana, Javier, 19, 20, 39 Solana, Luis, 159 Somalia, 125 SOS Racismo, 140 South Georgia, 176 Soviet Union, 2, 5, 135, 172, 173 Spanish Civil War, 1, 175 Spanish Commission for Assistance to Refugees (CEAR), 140, 146 Spanish Constitution, 8, 36, 39, 44, 45, 46, 48, 49, 51, 52, 57, 109 Spanish Football Federation, 154 St Barts, 176 St Eustatius, 176 St Helena, 176 St Martin, 176 St Pierre and Miquelon, 176 Strait of Gibraltar, xi, 5, 13, 120, 121, 123, 129, 132, 134, 145, 162, 165, 173 Stuttgart, 142 Suárez, Adolfo, 29, 35, 84 Suárez, Juan Carlos, 89 Subaire, Ahmed, 65, 95, 103, 105 sub-Saharan Africa, xiii, 24, 116, 147, 172

Saavedra, Jerónimo, 46, 47 Saba Islands, 176 Sampietro, Antonio, 79, 80, 81, 89, 90 Sánchez Usero, José Luis, 103, 110, 117 Schengen Agreement, xiv, 33, 123, 147 Senegal, 124, 126, 145 Seoul, 154 Sephardis, 117 Serra, Narcís, 9 Seville, 48 Short Stay Immigrant Centre (CETI), 147 Sindicato Unificado de Policía (SUP), 115, 126

TACIS, 136 Tahar, Abdelmalik, 68 Tangier, 121, 124, 171 Tarfaya, 1, 3 Tenerife, 68 Terra Omnium, 43, 92, 94, 111 Tetuán, 11, 14, 123, 171 The Hague, 141, 142 Third Euro–Mediterranean Conference, 142 Tinduf, 26 Torres Vega, José, 6 Treaty of Friendship, Good

192 Index Neighbourliness and Cooperation, 16, 34, 119, 134 Treviño, José María, 107 Tripartite Agreement, 3 Tunisia, 4, 32, 34, 135 tunnel link, 13, 33, 134, 173, 175 Turkey, 138, 148 Turks and Caicos Islands, 175 UEFA, 154 UK, xii, 137, 139, 162, 163 Unión Constitucional, 8 Unión de Melillenses Independientes, 102 Unión del Centro Democrático (UCD), 57, 58, 61, 85, 90, 159 Unión del Pueblo Melillense (UPM), 44, 47, 61, 62, 67, 68, 72, 73, 75, 76, 77, 78, 87, 89, 103 Unión General de Trabajadores (UGT), 95, 149 United Nations (UN), xiii, 25, 37, 40, 43, 133 United States, 2, 14, 152 Utrecht, Treaty of, 158, 163 Uxda, Treaty of, 7

Valencia, 144 Velázquez, Ignacio, 51, 54, 68, 69, 72, 73, 90 Velez de la Gomera, Peñón, xv Venice, 134 Vera, Rafael, 96, 102 Villar, Francisco, 13 Wallis and Futuna Islands, 176 Western Sahara, 3, 4, 12, 17, 21, 26, 27, 31, 40, 54, 164 and Polisario Front, 31, 33 and the ‘Green March’, 3, 31, 44, 50, 119, 175 and the United States, 31 referendum in, 18, 33 size and location, 3 Spanish presence in, 1 Yebala, 1 Youssoufi, Abderrahmane, 26, 27, 28, 29, 35 Yugoslavia, former, 142 Zaire, 125, 144